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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032760393 
 
THE 
 
 NAVAL WAR . ^ 1 8 1 2 
 
 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 
 
 DURING THE LAST WAR WITH 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 THEODORE ROOSEVELT 
 
 NEW YORK 
 P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 
 27 & 29 WEST 23D STREET 
 1882 
 
A.jnj 
 
 A 
 
 CORNELL 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 \ 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 COPVRIGHT BY 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 i832 
 
 Press of 
 
 G. P. Putnam's Sons 
 
 Netv York 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The history of the naval events of the War of 
 1812 has been repeatedly presented both to the 
 American and the English reader. Historical 
 writers have treated it either in connection with a 
 general account of the contest on land and sea, or 
 as forming a part of the complete record of the 
 navies of the two nations. A few monographs, 
 which confine themselves strictly to the naval occur- 
 rences, have also appeared. But none of these works 
 can be regarded as giving a satisfactorily full or 
 impartial account of the war — some of them being 
 of the " popular " and loosely-constructed order, 
 while others treat it from a purely partisan stand- 
 point. No single book can be quoted which would 
 be accepted by the modern reader as doing justice 
 to both sides, or, indeed, as telling the whole story. 
 Any one specially interested in the subject must 
 read all ; and then it will seem almost a hopeless 
 task to reconcile the many and widely contradictory 
 statements he will meet with. 
 
 There appear to be three works which, taken in 
 combination, give the best satisfaction on the subject. 
 First, in James' " Naval History of Great Britain " 
 
 iii 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 (which supplies both the material and the opinions 
 of almost every subsequent English or Canadian his- 
 torian) can be found the British view of the case. 
 It is an invaluable work, written with fulness and 
 care ; on the other hand it is also a piece of special 
 pleading by a bitter and itot over-scrupulous parti- 
 san. This, in the second place, can be partially 
 supplemented by Fenimore Cooper's " Naval His- 
 tory of the United States." The latter gives the 
 American view of the cruises and battles ; but it is 
 much less of an authority than James', both because 
 it is written without great regard for exactness, and 
 because all figures for the American side need to be 
 supplied from Lieutenant (now Admiral) George E. 
 Emmons' statistical " History of the United States 
 Navy," which is the third of the works in question. 
 But even after comparing these three authors, 
 many contradictions remain unexplained, and the 
 truth can only be reached in such cases by a careful 
 examination of the navy " Records," the London 
 " Naval Chronicle," " Niles' Register," and other 
 similar documentary publications. Almost the 
 only good criticisms on the actions are those inci- 
 dentally given in standard works on other subjects, 
 such as Lord Howard Douglass' " Naval Gunnery," 
 and Admiral Jurien de la Gravi6re's " Guerres Mari- 
 times." Much of the material in our Navy Depart- 
 ment has never been touched at all. In short, no 
 full, accurate, and unprejudiced history of the war 
 has ever been written. 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 The subject merits a closer scrutiny tlian it has 
 received. At present people are beginning to real- 
 ize that it is folly for the great English-speaking 
 Republic to rely for defence upon a navy composed 
 partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new ves- 
 sels rather more worthless than the old. It is 
 worth while to study with some care that period 
 of our history during which our navy stood at the 
 highest pitch of its fame ; and to learn any thing from 
 the past it is necessary to know, as near as may be, 
 the exact truth. Accordingly the work should be 
 written impartially, if only from the narrowest mo- 
 tives. Without abating a jot from one's devotion 
 to his country and flag, I think a history can be 
 made just enough to warrant its being received as 
 an authority equally among Americans and English- 
 men. I have endeavored to supply such a work. 
 It is impossible that errors, both of fact and opinion, 
 should not have crept into it ; and although I have 
 sought to make it in character as non-partisan as 
 possible, these errors will probably be in favor of 
 the American side. 
 
 As my only object is to give an accurate 
 narrative of events, I shall esteem it a particular 
 favor if any one will furnish me with the means of 
 rectifying such mistakes ; and if I have done injus- 
 tice to any commander, or officer of an\- grade, 
 whether American or British, I shall consider my- 
 self under great obligations to those who will set 
 me right. 
 
vi NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 I have been unable to get access to the original 
 reports of the British commanders, the logs of the 
 British ships, or their muster-rolls, and so have been 
 obliged to take them at second hand from the 
 " Gazette," or " Naval Chronicle," or some standard 
 history. The American official letters, log-books, 
 original contracts, muster-rolls, etc., however, being 
 preserved in the Archives at Washington, I have 
 been able, thanks to the courtesy of the Hon. Wm. 
 H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, to look them over. 
 The set of letters from the officers is very complete, 
 in three series, — " Captains' Letters," " Masters' 
 Commandant Letters," and "Officers' Letters," 
 there being several volumes for each year. The 
 books of contracts contain valuable information as 
 to the size and build of some of the vessels. The 
 log-books are rather exasperating, often being very 
 incomplete. Thus when I turned from Decatur's 
 extremely vague official letter describing the cap- 
 ture of the Macedonian to the log-book of the 
 Frigate United States, not a fact about the fight 
 could be gleaned. The last entry in the log on the 
 day of the fight is " strange sail discovered to be a 
 frigate under English colors," and the next entry 
 (on the following day) relates to the removal of the 
 prisoners. The log of the Enterprise is very full 
 indeed, for most of the time, but is a perfect blank 
 for the period during which she was commanded by 
 Lieutenant Burrows, and in which she fought the 
 
PREFACE. VU 
 
 Boxer. I have not been able to find the Peacock's 
 log at all, though there is a very full set of letters 
 from her commander. Probably the fire of 1837 
 destroyed a great deal of valuable material. When 
 ever it was possible I have referred to printed 
 ihatter in preference to manuscript, and my au- 
 thorities can thus, in most cases, be easily consulted. 
 In conclusion I desire to express my sincerest 
 thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of 
 the United States Navy, and Commander Adolf 
 Mensing, formerly of the German Navy, without 
 whose advice and sympathy this work would prob- 
 ably never have been written or even begun. 
 
 New York City, 1883. 
 
o 
 
Fig. 3. — Section of flush-decked corvette or sloop, carrying long guns. 
 Such was the armament of the Pike and Adains^ but most flush-decked 
 ships mounted carronades. 
 
Fig. 4. — Section of frigate-built ship, with long gun on main- 
 deck and carronade on spar-deck. Taken from the "American 
 ArtiUerist's Companion," by Louis de Toussard (Philadelphia, 
 1811). 
 
PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO. 
 
 (see also in alphabetical place in index.) 
 
 American State Papers. 
 
 Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, 1783 to 1836. 2 
 vols., octavo. London, 1837. 
 
 Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo. 
 London, 1866. 
 
 " Captains' Letters " in Archives at Washington. 
 
 Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs, edited by his daughter. 2 
 vols., octavo. London, 1873. 
 
 Coggeshall, George. History of American Privateers. New York, 
 1876. 
 
 Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New York, 
 1856. 
 
 Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman. London, i860. 
 
 Douglass, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. London, 
 i860. 
 
 Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States 
 Navy, 1853. 
 
 Farragut, Adm. D. G. , Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut. 
 Octavo. New York, 1878. 
 
 Graviere, Adm., J. de la. Guerres Maritimes. 2 vols., octavo. 
 Paris, 1881. 
 
 James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols., octavo, 
 London, 1837. 
 
 Tames, William. Naval Occurrences with the Americans. Octavo, 
 London, 1817. 
 
 Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812. Octavo. 
 New York, 1869. 
 
 Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613 to 1863. 2 vols., 
 octavo. London, 1877. 
 
 London Naval Chronicle. 
 
 Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols., octavo. London, 
 1825. 
 
 xiii 
 
xiv PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO. 
 
 " Masters-Commandant Letters " in the Archives at Washington. 
 
 Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880. 
 
 Naval Archives at Washington. 
 
 Niles. Weekly Register. 
 
 Pielat, B. La Vie et les Actions Memorables du St. Michel de 
 Ruyter. Amsterdam, 1677. 
 
 Riviere, Lieut H. La Marine Franyaise sous le Regime de Louis 
 XV. Paris, 1859. 
 
 Tatnall, Commod., Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Savannah, 1878. 
 
 Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion. Phila., 
 1811. 
 
 Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris, 1868. 
 
 Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics. 1859. 
 
 Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British Navy 3 vols., 
 octavo. London, i866. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Preface 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 Causes of the war of 1812 — Conflicting views of America and 
 Britain as regards neutral riglits — Those of the former power right — 
 Impossibility of avoiding hostilities — Declaration of war June 18, 
 i8i2 — Slight preparations made — General features of the contest — 
 Race identity of combatants — The treaty of peace nominally leaves 
 the situation unchanged — But practically settles the dispute in our 
 favor in respect to maritime rights — The British navy and its reputa- 
 tion prior to 1812 — Comparison with other European navies — British 
 and American authorities consulted in the present work . , i 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America de- 
 clared war against her — Race identity of the combatants — American 
 navy at the beginning of the war — Officers well trained — Causes 
 tending to make our seamen especially efficient — Close similarity be- 
 tween British and American sailors — Our ships manned chiefly by 
 native Americans, many of whom had formerly been impressed into 
 the British navy — Quotas of seamen contributed by the different 
 States — Navy yards — Lists of officers and men — List of vessels — 
 Tonnage — Different ways of estimating it in Britain and America — 
 Ratings — American ships properly rated — Armaments of the frig- 
 ates and corvettes — Three styles of guns used — Difference between 
 long guns and carronades — Short weight of American shot — Com- 
 parison of British frigates rating 38 and American frigates rating 
 44 guns — Compared with a 74 22 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 1812. 
 
 ON THE OCEAN. 
 
 Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the Belvi- 
 dera — Engagement between Belvidera and President — Hornet capt- 
 ures a privateer — bruise of the Essex — Captain Hull's cruise and 
 escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke — Constitution capt- 
 ures Guerriere — Marked superiority shown by the Americans — Wasp 
 captures Frolic — Disproportionate loss on British side — Both after- 
 ward captured by Poictiers — Second unsuccessful cniise of Commo- 
 dore Rodgers — United States captures Macedonian — Constitution 
 captures Java-^CraSs,t of Essex — Summary 72 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 1812. 
 NN THE LAKES. 
 
 Preliminary. — The combatants starting nearly on an equality — 
 DifiKculties of creating a naval force — Diiificulty of comparing the 
 force of the rival squadrons — Meagreness of the published accounts — 
 Unreliability of authorities, especiallyjames. — Ontario — Extraordi- 
 nary nature of the American squadrolj — Canadian squadron a kind 
 of water militia — Sackett's Harbor fe'^bly attacked by Commodore 
 Earle — Commodore Chauncy attacks the Royal George — And bom- 
 bards York. — Erie — Lieutenant Elliot captures the Detroit and Cale- 
 donia — Lieutenant Angus' unsuccessful attack on Red House bar- 
 racks — Brutal sacking of Hampton . . . . , .139 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 1813. 
 
 ON THE OCEAN. 
 Blockade of the American coast — Commodore Porter's campaign 
 with the Essex in the South Vs.zihc— Hornet chased by Bonne Citoy- 
 enne — Hornet captures Resolution— Hornet captures Peacock— Gnxv- 
 
 erous treatment shown to the conquered — Viper captures Narcissus 
 
 American privateers cut out by British boats— Third cruise of Com- 
 modore Rodgers— United States, Macedonian, and Wasp blockaded 
 in New London— Broke's challenge to Lawrence— The Chesapeake 
 captured by the Shannon— Commenis and criticisms by various 
 a.ut\writ\.es— Surveyor captured by Narcissus— ¥\xii\e: gun-boat ac- 
 
CONTENTS. xvii 
 
 tions — British attack on Craney Island repulsed — Cutting out expe- 
 ditions — The Argus captured by the Pelican — The Enterprise 
 captures the Boxer — Ocean warfare of 1813 in favor of British — 
 Summary r6o 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 1813. 
 
 ON THE LAKES. 
 
 Ontario — Comparison of the rival squadrons — Yeo's superior in 
 strength — Chauncy takes York and Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at 
 Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake — The Lady of the 
 Lake captures Lady Murray — Hamilton and Scourge founder in a 
 squall — ^Yeo's partial victory off Niagara — Indecisive action off the 
 Genesee — Chauncy's partial victory off Burlington, which gives him 
 the command of the lake — Yeo and Chauncy compared — Reasons for 
 American success. — Erie — Perry's succgss in creating a fleet — His 
 victory — " Glory " of it overestimated — Sausa-^of his success. — 
 Champlain — The Growler and Eagle captured by gun-boats — Sum- 
 mary of year's campaign ......' 221 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 1 8 14. 
 
 on the ocean. 
 
 Strictness of the blockade — Cruise of Rodgers — Chased into Mar- 
 blehead — Cruise of the Constitution — Attempt to cut-out the Alligator 
 ~~ — The Essex captured after engagement with Phabe and Cherub — 
 The Frolic captured — The Peacock captures the Epervier — Commo- 
 dore Barney's flotilla afloat — The British in the Chesapeake — Capture 
 of Washington, and burning of the public buildings — The Wasp capt- 
 ures ^& Reindeer — The Wasp sinks the Avon — Cruise and loss of the 
 Adams — The privateer General Armstrong — The ^xivaXeex Prince de 
 Neufchatel — Loss of the gun-boats on Lake Borgne — Fighting near 
 New Orleans — Summary 284 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 1814. 
 
 ON THE LAKES. 
 
 Ontario — The contest one of ship-building merely — Statistics of 
 the two squadrons — Serious sickness among the Americans — Extreme 
 
XVlll CONTENTS. 
 
 caution of the commanders, verging on timidity — Yeo takes Oswego 
 and blockades Sackett's Harbor— British gun-boats captured— Chaun- 
 cy blockades Kingston.— Erie— Captain Sinclair burns St. Joseph- 
 Makes unsuccessful expedition against Mackinaw — Daring and suc- 
 cessful cutting-out expeditions of the British— Capture of the Ohio 
 axASomers. — Champlain — Macdonough's and Downie's squadrons — 
 James' erroneous statements concerning them — Gallant engagement 
 and splendid victory of Macdonough — Macdonough one of the great- 
 est of American sea-captains 353 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 1815. 
 
 CONCLUDING OPERATIONS. 
 
 The President captured by Captain Hayes' squadron — Successful 
 cutting-out expedition of the Americans — American privateer Chas- 
 seur captures St. Lawrence — The Constitution engages the Cyane and 
 the Levant and captures both — Escapes from a British squadron — The 
 Hornet captures the Penguin and escapes from pursuit of the Corn- 
 wallis — The Peacock captures the Nautilus — Wanton attack on 
 American gun-boat after treaty of peace — Summary of events in 1815 
 — Remarks on the war — Tables of comparative loss, etc — Compared 
 with results of Anglo-French struggle 400 
 
 Appendix 454 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 Causes of the War of iSiz — Conflicting views of America and Britain as re- 
 gards neutral riglits — Those of the former power right — Impossibility of avoid- 
 ing hostilities — Declaration of war — General features of the contest — Racial 
 identity of the contestants — The treaty of peace nominally leaves the situation 
 unchanged — But practically settles the dispute in our favor in respect to mari- 
 time rights — The British navy and its reputation prior to 1812 — Comparison 
 ■with other European navies — British and American authorities consulted in the 
 present work. 
 
 THE view professed by Great Britain in 1812 
 respecting the rights of belligerents and neu- 
 trals was diametrically opposite to that held by the 
 United States. " Between England and the United 
 States of America," writes a British author, " a 
 spirit of animosity, caused chiefly by the impress- 
 ment of British seamen, or of seamen asserted to be 
 such, from on board of American merchant vessels, 
 had unhappily subsisted for a long time " prior to 
 the war. " It is, we believe," he continues, " an ac- 
 knowledged maxim of public law, as well that no 
 nation but the one he belongs to can release a sub- 
 ject from his natural allegiance, as that, provided the 
 jurisdiction of another independent state be not in- 
 fringed, every nation has a right to enforce the ser- 
 vices of her subjects wherever they may be found. 
 Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over 
 her merchant vessels upon the high seas as to ex- 
 clude a belligerent nation from the right of search- 
 ing them for contraband of war or for the property 
 
2 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 or persons of her enemies. And if, in the exercise 
 of that right, the belligerent should discover on 
 board of the neutral vessel a subject who has with- 
 drawn himself from his lawful allegiance, the neu- 
 tral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver 
 him up ; more especially if that subject is proved to 
 be a deserter from the sea or land service of the for- 
 
 '» 1 
 
 men 
 
 Great Britain's doctrine was " once a subject al- 
 ways a subject." On the other hand, the United 
 States maintained that any foreigner, after five 
 years' residence within her territory, and after having 
 complied with certain forms, became one of her citi- 
 zens as completely as if he was native born. Great 
 Britain contended that her war ships possessed the 
 right of searching all neutral vessels for the proper- 
 ty and persons of her foes. The United States, re- 
 sisting this claim, asserted that " free bottoms made 
 free goods," and that consequently her ships when 
 on the high seas should not be molested on any pre- 
 text whatever. Finally, Great Britain's system of 
 impressment,^ by which men could be forcibly seized 
 and made to serve in her navy, no matter at what 
 cost to themselves, was repugnant to every Ameri- 
 can idea. 
 
 Such wide differences in the views of the two na- 
 tions produced endless difficulties. To escape the 
 press-gang, or for other reasons, many British sea- 
 men took service under the American flag ; and if 
 they were demanded back, it is not likely that they 
 or their American shipmates had much hesitation 
 
 ' " The Naval History of Great Britain," by William James, vol. iv, 
 p. 324. (New edition by Captain Cliamier, R. N., London, '1837.) ' 
 
 ^ The best idea of which can be gained by reading Marryatt's 
 novels. 
 
INTRODUCTION. ^ 
 
 in swearing either that they were not British at all, 
 or else that they had been naturalized as Americans. 
 Equally probable is it that the American blockade- 
 runners were guilty of a great deal of fraud and 
 more or less thinly veiled perjury. But the wrongs 
 done by the Americans were insignificant compared 
 with those they received. Any innocent merchant 
 vessel was liable to seizure at any moment ; and 
 when overhauled by a British cruiser short of men 
 was sure to be stripped of most of her crew. The 
 British officers were themselves the judges as to 
 whether a seaman should be pronounced a native of 
 America or of Britain, and there was no appeal from 
 their judgment. If a captain lacked his full comple- 
 ment there was little doubt as to the view he would 
 take of any man's nationality. The wrongs inflict- 
 ed on our seafaring countrymen by their impress- 
 ment into foreign ships formed the main cause of the 
 war. 
 
 There were still other grievances which are thus 
 presented by the British Admiral Cochrane.' " Our 
 treatment of its (America's) citizens was scarcely in 
 accordance with the national privileges to which 
 the young Republic had become entitled. There 
 were no doubt many individuals among the Ameri- 
 can people who, caring little for the Federal Gov- 
 ernment, considered it more profitable to break 
 than to keep the laws of nations by aiding and sup- 
 porting our enemy (France), and it was against 
 such that the efforts of the squadron had chiefly 
 "been directed ; but the way the object was carried 
 out was scarcely less an infraction of those national 
 
 ' " Autbiography of a Seaman," by Thomas, tenth Earl of Diin- 
 donald, Admiral of the Red ; Rear-Admiral of the Fleet, London, 
 i860, vol. i, p. 24. 
 
4 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 laws which we were professedly enforcing. The prac- 
 tice of taking English (and American) seamen out 
 of American ships without regard to the safety of 
 navigating them when thus deprived of their hands 
 has been already mentioned. To this may be 
 added the detention of vessels against which noth- 
 ing contrary to international neutrality could be es- 
 tablished, whereby their cargoes became damaged ; 
 the compelling them, on suspicion only, to proceed 
 to ports other than those to which they were des- 
 tined ; and generally treating them as though they 
 were engaged in contraband trade. * * * Amer- 
 ican ships were not permitted to quit English ports 
 without giving security for the discharge of their 
 cargoes in some other British or neutral port." On 
 the same subject James' writes : " When, by the 
 maritime supremacy of England, France could no 
 longer trade for herself, America proffered her ser- 
 vices, as a neutral, to tra.de for her ; and American 
 merchants and their agents, in the gains that flowed 
 in, soon found a compensation for all the perjury 
 and fraud necessary to cheat the former out of her 
 belligerent rights. The high commercial impor- 
 tance of the United States thus obtained, coupled 
 with a similarity of language and, to a superficial 
 observer, a resemblance in person between the 
 natives of America and Great Britain, has caused 
 the former to be the chief, if not the only sufferers 
 by the exercise of the right of search. Chiefly in- 
 debted for their growth and prosperity to emigra- 
 tion from Europe, the United States hold out every 
 allurement to foreigners, particularly to British 
 seamen, whom, by a process peculiarly their own, 
 'Z. ^., iv, 325. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 they can naturalize as quickly as a dollar can ex- 
 change masters and a blank form, ready signed and 
 sworn to, can be filled up.' It is the knowledge of 
 this fact that makes British naval officers when 
 searching for deserters from their service, so harsh 
 in their scrutiny, and so 4fcptical of American 
 oaths and asseverations." 
 
 The last sentence of the foregoing from James is 
 an euphemistic way of saying that whenever a Brit- 
 ish commander short of men came across an Amer- 
 ican vessel he impressed all of her crew that he 
 wanted, whether they were citizens of the United 
 States or not. It must be remembered, however, 
 that the only reason why Great Britain did us 
 more injury than any other power was because she 
 was better able to do so. None of her acts were 
 more offensive than Napoleon's Milan decree, bj' 
 which it was declared that any neutral vessel which 
 permitted itself to be searched by a British cruiser 
 should be considered as British, and as the lawful 
 prize of any French vessel. French frigates and 
 privateers were very apt to snap up any American 
 vessel they came across, and were only withheld, at 
 all by the memory of the sharp dressing they had 
 received in the West Indies during the quasi-war of 
 1799-1800. What we undoubtedly ought to have 
 done was to have adopted the measure actually pro- 
 posed in Congress, and declared war on both France 
 and England. As it was, we chose as a foe the 
 one that had done, and could still do, us the greatest 
 injury. 
 
 The principles for which the United States con- 
 tended in 1812 are now universally accepted, and 
 
 ' This is an exaggeration. 
 
6 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 those so tenaciously maintained by Great Britain 
 find no advocates in the civilized world. That Eng- 
 land herself was afterward completely reconciled to 
 our views was amply shown by her intense indigna- 
 tion when Commodore Wilkes, in the exercise of the 
 right of search for jjie persons of the foes of his 
 country, stopped the neutral British ship Trent; 
 while the applause with which the act was greeted 
 in America proves pretty clearly another fact, that 
 we had warred for the right, not because it was the 
 right, but because it agreed with our self-interest to 
 do so. We were contending for " Free Trade and 
 Sailors' Rights " : meaning by the former expres- 
 sion, freedom to trade wherever we chose without 
 hindrance save from the power with whom we were 
 trading ; and by the latter, that a man who happened 
 to be on the sea should have the same protection 
 accorded to a man who remained on land. Nomi- 
 nally, neither of these questions was settled by, or 
 even alluded to, in the treaty of peace ; but the 
 immense increase of reputation that the navy ac- 
 quired during the war practically decided both 
 points in our favor. Our sailors had gained too 
 great a name for any one to molest them with im- 
 punity again. 
 
 Holding views on these maritime subjects so 
 radically different from each other, the two nations 
 could not but be 9bntinually dealing with causes of 
 quarrel. Not onl^ did British cruisers molest our 
 •merchant-men, but at length one of them, the 50- 
 gun ship Leopard, attacked an American frigate, 
 the Chesapeake, when the latter was so lumbered 
 up that she could not return a shot, killed or dis- 
 abled some twenty of her men and took away four 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 others, one Briton and three Americans, who were 
 claimed as deserters. For this act an apology was 
 offered, but it failed to restore harmony between the 
 two nations. Soon afterward another action was 
 fought. The American frigate President, Com- 
 modore Rodgers, attacked the British sloop Little 
 Belt, Captain Bingham, and exchanged one or two 
 broadsides with her, — the frigate escaping scot-free 
 while the sloop was nearly knocked to pieces. Mu- 
 tual recriminations followed, each side insisting that • 
 the other was the assailant. 
 
 When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council 
 forbidding our trading with France, we retaliated 
 by passing an embargo act, which prevented us 
 from trading at all. There could be but one result 
 to such a succession of incidents, and that was war. 
 Accordingly, in June, 1812, war was declared ; and 
 as a contest for the rights of seamen, it was largely 
 waged on the ocean. We also had not a little fight- 
 ing to do on land, in which, as a rule, we came out 
 second-best. Few or no preparations fer the war 
 had been made, and the result was such as might 
 have been anticipated. After dragging on through 
 three dreary and uneventful years it came to an 
 end in 181 5, by a peace which left matters in almost 
 precisely the state in which the war had found 
 them. On land and water the contest took the 
 form of a succession of petty actions, in which the 
 glory acquired by the victor seldom eclipsed the 
 disgrace incurred by the vanquished. Neither side 
 succeeded in doing what it intended. Americans 
 declared that Canada must and should be conquered, 
 but the conquering came quite as near being the 
 other way. British writers insisted that the Ameri- 
 
8 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 can navy should be swept from the seas; and, 
 during the sweeping process it increased fourfold. 
 
 When the United States declared war, Great 
 Britain was straining every nerve and muscle in a 
 death struggle with the most formidable military 
 despotism of modern times, and was obliged to en- 
 trust the defence of her Canadian colonies to a mere 
 handful of regulars, aided by the local fencibles. 
 But Congress had provided even fewer trained sol- 
 diers, and relied on militia. The latter chiefly ex- 
 ercised their fighting abilities upon one another in 
 duelling, and, as a rule, were afflicted with conscien- 
 tious scruples whenever it was necessary to cross the 
 frontier and attack the enemy. Accordingly, the 
 campaign opened with the bloodless surrender of an 
 American general to a much inferior British force, 
 and the war continued much as it had begun ; we 
 suffered disgrace after disgrace, while the losses we 
 inflicted, in turn, on Great Britain were so slight as 
 hardly to attract her attention. At last, having 
 crushed her greater foe, she turned to crush the 
 lesser, and, in her turn, suffered ignominious defeat. 
 By this time events had gradually developed a small 
 number of soldiers on our northern frontier, who, 
 commanded by Scott and Brown, were able to con- 
 tend on equal terms with the veteran troops to 
 whom they were opposed, though these formed 
 part of what was then undoubtedly the most for- 
 midable fighting infantry any European nation pos- 
 sessed. The battles at this period of the struggle 
 were remarkable for the skill and stubborn courage 
 with which they were waged, as well as for the 
 heavy loss involved ; but the number of combatants 
 was so small that in Europe they would have been 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 regarded as mere outpost skirmishes, and they 
 wholly failed to attract any attention abroad in that 
 period of colossal armies. 
 
 When Great Britain seriously turned her attention 
 to her transatlantic foe, and assembled in Canada an 
 army of 14,000 men at the head of Lake Champlain, 
 Congressional forethought enabled it to be opposed 
 by soldiers who, it is true, were as well disciplined, 
 as hardy, and as well commanded as any in the 
 world, but who were only a few hundred strong, 
 backed by more or less incompetent militia. Only 
 McDonough's skill and Sir George Prevost's inca- 
 pacity saved us from a serious disaster; the sea- 
 fight reflected high honor on our seamen, but the re- 
 treat of the British land-forces was due to their 
 commander and not to their antagonists. Mean- 
 while a large British fleet in the Chesapeake had 
 not achieved much glory by the destruction of local 
 oyster-boats and the burning of a few farmers' 
 houses, so an army was landed to strike a decisive 
 blow. At Bladensburg' the five thousand British 
 regulars, utterly worn out by heat and fatigue, by 
 their mere appearance, frightened into a panic double 
 their number of American militia well posted. But 
 the only success attained was burning the public 
 buildings of Washington, and that result was of dubi- 
 ous value. Baltimore was attacked next, and the 
 attack repulsed, after the forts and ships had shelled 
 one another with the slight results that usually at- 
 tend that spectacular and harmless species of warfare. 
 
 The close of the contest was marked by the ex- 
 traordinary battle of New Orleans. It was a per- 
 
 ' See the " Capture of Washington," by Edward D. Ingraham 
 (Philadelphia, 1849). 
 
lO NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 fectly useless shedding of blood, since peace had 
 already been declared. There is hardly another 
 contest of modern times where the defeated side 
 suffered such frightful carnage, while the victors 
 caipe off almost scatheless. It is quite in accord- 
 ance with the rest of the war that the militia, 
 hitherto worse than useless, should on this occasion 
 win against great odds in point of numbers ; and, 
 moreover, that their splendid victory should have 
 been of little consequence in its effects upon the re- 
 sult. On the whole, the contest by land, where we 
 certainly ought to have been successful, reflected 
 greater credit on our antagonists than upon us, in 
 spite of the services of Scott, Brown, and Jackson. 
 Our small force of regulars and volunteers did ex- 
 cellently ; as for the militia, New Orleans proved 
 that they could fight superbly, and the other battles 
 that they generally would not fight at all. 
 
 At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were wide- 
 ly different. Here we possessed a small but highly 
 effective force, the ships well built, manned by 
 thoroughly trained men, and commanded by able 
 and experienced ofificers. The deeds of our navy 
 form a part of history over which any American 
 can be pardoned for lingering. 
 
 Such was the origin, issue, and general character 
 of the war. It may now be well to proceed to a 
 comparison of the authorities on the subject. Al- 
 lusion has already been made to them in the pref- 
 ace, but a fuller reference seems to be necessary in 
 this connection. 
 
 At the close of the contest, the large majority of 
 historians who wrote of it were so bitterly rancorous 
 that their statements must be received with caution. 
 
INTRODUCTION. II 
 
 For the main facts, 1 have relied, wherever it was 
 practicable, upon the official letters of the com- 
 manding officers, taking each as authority for his 
 own force and loss.' For all the British victories 
 we have British official letters, which tally almost 
 exactly, as regards matters o\ fact and not of opinion, 
 with the corresponding American accounts. For 
 the first year the British also published official ac- 
 counts of their defeats, which in the cases of the 
 Guerribre, Macedonian and Frolic, I have followed 
 as closely as the accounts of the American vic- 
 tors. The last British official letter published an- 
 nouncing a defeat was that in the case of the Java, 
 and it is the only letter that I have not strictly 
 accepted. The fact that no more were published 
 thereafter is of itself unfortunate ; and from the 
 various contradictions it contains it would appear to 
 have been tampered with. The surgeon's report 
 accompanying it is certainly false. Subsequent to 
 i8i2 no letter of a defeated British commander was 
 published," and I have to depend upon the various 
 British historians, especially James, of whom more 
 anon. 
 
 The American and British historians from whom 
 we are thus at times forced to draw our material 
 regard the war from very different stand-points, and 
 their accounts generally differ. Each writer natu- 
 
 ' As where Broke states his own force at 330, his antagonists at 
 440, and the American court of inquiry makes the numbers 396 and 
 379, I have talcen them as being 330 and 379 respectively. This is 
 the only just method ; I take it for granted that each commander 
 meant to tell the truth, and of course knew his own force, while he 
 might very naturally and in perfect good faith exaggerate his antago- 
 nist'.s. 
 
 ' Except about the battles on the Lakes, where I have accordingly 
 given the sanae credit to the accounts both of the British and of the 
 AmericanB. 
 
12 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 rally so colored the affair as to have it appear favor- 
 able to his own side. Sometimes this was done 
 intentionally and sometimes not. Not unfrequently 
 errors are made against the historian's own side ; as 
 when the British author, Brenton, says that the 
 British brig Peacock mounted 32's instead of 24's, 
 while Lossing in his " Field Book of the War of 
 1812" makes the same mistake about the arma- 
 ment of the American brig Argus. Errors of 
 this description are, of course, as carefully to be 
 guarded against as any others. Mere hearsay re- 
 ports, such as "it has been said," " a prisoner on 
 board the opposing fleet has observed," " an Ameri- 
 can (or British) newspaper of such and such a 
 date has remarked," are of course to be rejected. 
 There is a curious parallelism in the errors on both 
 sides. For example, the American, Mr. Low, writ- 
 ing in 181 3, tells how the Constitution, 44, cap- 
 tured the Guerriere of 49 guns, while the British 
 Lieutenant Low, writing in 1880, tells how the 
 Pelican, 18, captured the Argus of 20 guns. Each 
 records the truth but not the whole truth, for 
 although rating 44 and 18 the victors carried respec- 
 tively 54 and 21 guns, of heavier metal than those 
 of their antagonists. Such errors are generally in- 
 tentional. Similarly, most American writers men- 
 tion the actions in which the privateers were vic- 
 torious, but do not mention those in which they 
 were defeated ; while the British, in turn, record 
 every successful ''cutting-out" expedition, but ig- 
 nore entirely those which terminated unfavorably. 
 Other errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus, 
 James in speaking of the repulse of the Endynii- 
 on's boats by the Neufchatel gives the latter 
 
INTRODUCTION. I3 
 
 a crew of 120 men; she had more than this number 
 originally, but only 40 were in her at the time of 
 the attack. So also when the captain of the Peli- 
 can writes that the officers of the Argus report 
 her loss at 40, when they really reported it at 24 
 or when Captain Dacres thought the Constitu- 
 tion had lost about 20 men instead of 14. The 
 American gun-boat captains in recounting their 
 engagements with the British frigates invariably 
 greatly overestimated the loss of the latter. So that 
 on both sides there were some intentional misstate- 
 ments orgarblings, and a much more numerous class 
 of simple blunders, arising largely from an inca- 
 pacity for seeing more than one side of the question. 
 Among the early British writers upon this war, 
 the ablest was James. He devoted one work, his 
 " Naval Occurrences," entirely to it ; and it occupies 
 the largest part of the sixth volume of his more ex- 
 tensive " History of the British Navy.'" Two other 
 British writers, Lieutenant Marshall "^ and Captain 
 Brenton,^ wrote histories of the same events, about 
 the same time ; but neither of these naval officers 
 produced half as valuable a work as did the civilian 
 James. Marshall wrote a dozen volumes, each filled 
 with several scores of dreary panegyrics, or memoirs 
 of as many different officers. There is no attempt 
 at order, hardly any thing about the ships, guns, or 
 composition of the crews ; and not even the pre- 
 tence of giving both sides, the object being to make 
 every Englishman appear in his best light. The 
 work is analogous to the numerous lives of Decatur, 
 
 ' A new edition, London, 1826. 
 
 ''"Royal Naval Biography," by John Marshall (London, 1823- 
 
 1S35). 
 
 '" Naval History of Great Britain," by Edward Pelham Brenton 
 (new edition, London, 1837). 
 
14 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 Bainbridge, Porter, etc., that appeared in the United 
 States about the same time, and is quite as untrust- 
 worthy. Brenton made a far better and very inter- 
 esting book, written on a good and well-connected 
 plan, and apparently with a sincere desire to tell 
 the truth. He accepts the British official accounts 
 as needing nothing whatever to supplement them, 
 precisely as Cooper accepts the American officials'. 
 A more serious fault is his inability to be accurate. 
 That this inaccuracy is not intentional is proved by 
 the fact that it tells as often against his own side as 
 against his opponents. He says, for example, that 
 the guns of Perry's and Barclay's squadrons " were 
 about equal in number and weight," that the Pea- 
 cock (British) was armed with 32's instead of 24's, 
 and underestimates the force of the second Wasp. 
 But the blunders are quite as bad when distributed 
 as when confined to one side ; in addition, Bren- 
 ton's disregard of all details makes him of but little 
 use. 
 
 James, as already said, is by far the most valua- 
 ble authority on the war, as regards purely British 
 affairs. He enters minutely into details, and has 
 evidently laboriously hunted up his authorities. He 
 has examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty reports, 
 various treatises, all the Gazette reports, gives very 
 well-chosen extracts, has arranged his work in chron- 
 ological order, discriminates between the officers 
 that deserve praise and those that deserve blame, 
 and in fact writes a work which ought to be con- 
 sulted by every student of naval affairs. But he is 
 unfortunately afflicted with a hatred toward the 
 Americans that amounts to a monomania. He 
 wishes to make out as strong a case as possible 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 5 
 
 against them. The animus of his work may be 
 gathered from the not over complimentary account 
 of the education of the youthful seafaring Amer. 
 ican, which can be found in vol. vi, p. 113, of his 
 "History." On page 153 he asserts that he is an 
 " impartial historian " ; and about three lines before 
 mentions that »' it may suit the Americans to invent 
 any falsehood, no matter how barefaced, to foist a 
 valiant character on themselves." On page 419 he 
 says that Captain Porter is to be believed, " so far 
 as is borne out by proof (the only safe way where 
 an American is concerned)," — which somewhat 
 sweeping denunciation of the veracity of all of 
 Captain Porter's compatriots would seem to indi- 
 cate that James was not, perhaps, in that dispas- 
 sionate frame of mind best suited for writing 
 history. That he should be biassed against indi- 
 vidual captains can be understood, but when he 
 makes rabid onslaughts upon the American people 
 as a whole, he renders it difficult for an American, 
 at any rate, to put implicit credence in him. His 
 statements are all the harder to confute when they 
 are erroneous, because they are intentionally so. It 
 is not, as with Brenton and Marshall, because he 
 really thinks a British captain cannot be beaten, ex- 
 cept by some kind of distorted special providence, 
 for no man says worse things than he does about 
 certain officers and crews. A writer of James' un- 
 doubted ability must have known perfectly well that 
 his statements were untrue in many instances, as 
 where he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter's loss, 
 or misstates the comparative force of the fleets on 
 Lake Champlain. 
 
 When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge 
 
1 6 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 wished to run away from the Java, and would 
 have done so if he had not been withheld by the 
 advice of his first lieutenant, who was a renegade 
 Englishman/ it is not of much consequence whether 
 his making the statement was due to excessive cre- 
 dulity or petty meanness, for, in either case, whether 
 the defect was in his mind or his morals, it is enough 
 to greatly impair the value of his other " facts.' 
 Again, when James (p. 165) states that Decatur ran 
 away from the Macedonian until, by some mar- 
 vellous optical delusion, he mistook her for a 32, he 
 merely detracts a good deal from the worth of his 
 own account. When the Americans adopt boarding 
 helmets, he considers it as proving conclusively 
 that they are suffering from an acute attack of cow- 
 ardice. On p. 122 he says that "had the Presi- 
 dent, when she fell in with the Belvidera, been 
 cruising alone * * * Commodore Rodgers 
 would have magnified the British frigate into a line- 
 of-battle ship, and have done his utmost to avoid 
 her," which gives an excellent idea of the weight to 
 be attached to the various other anecdotes he relates 
 of the much-abused Commodore Rodgers. 
 
 But it must always be remembered that untrust- 
 worthy as James is in any thing referring purely to 
 the Americans, he is no worse than his compeers of 
 both nationalities. The misstatements of Niles in 
 his "Weekly Register" about the British are quite as 
 flagrant, and his information about his own side 
 even more valuable." Every little American author 
 
 ' Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in Virginia, and never in 
 England in his life. 
 
 '^ In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent examples of the tra- 
 ditional American " spread. eagle " style. In one place I remember his 
 describing " The Immortal Rodgers," baulked of his natural prey, the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 7 
 
 crowed over Perry's " Nelsonic victory over a 
 greatly superior force." The Constitution was de- 
 clared to have been at a disadvantage when she 
 fought the Guerriire, and so on ad infinitum. 
 But these writers have all faded into oblivion, and 
 their writings are not even referred to, much less 
 believed. James, on the contrary, has passed 
 through edition after edition, is considered as un- 
 questionable authority in his own country, and 
 largely throughout Europe, and has furnished the 
 basis for every subsequent account by British au- 
 thors. From Alison to Lieutenant Low, almost 
 every English work, whether of a popular character 
 or not, is, in so far as it touches on the war, simply 
 a "rehash "of the works written by James. The 
 consequence is that the British and American ac- 
 counts have astonishingly little resemblance. One 
 ascribes the capture of the British frigates simply to 
 the fact tha? their opponents were " cut down line- 
 of-battle ships " ; the other gives all the glory to 
 the " undaunted heroism," etc., of the Yankee 
 sailors. 
 
 One not very creditable trait of the early Amer- 
 ican naval historians gave their rivals a great ad- 
 vantage. The object of the former was to make 
 out that the Constitution, for example, won her 
 victories against an equal foe, and an exact state- 
 ment of the forces showed the contrary ; so they 
 always avoided figures, and thus left the ground 
 
 British, as " soaring about like the bold bald eagle of his native land," 
 seeking whom he might devour. The accounts he gives of British 
 line-of-battle ships fleeing from American 44's quite match James' 
 anecdotes of the latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36's for fear 
 they might mount twenty-four-pounders. The two works taken to- 
 gether give a very good idea of the war ; separately, either is utterly 
 unreliable, especially in matters of opinion. 
 
1 8 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 clear for James' careful misstatements. Even when 
 they criticised him they never went into details, 
 confining themselves to some remark about " hurl- 
 ing " his figures in his face with " loathing." Even 
 Cooper, interesting though his work is, has gone 
 far less into figures than he should, and seems to 
 have paid little if any attention to the British 
 official statements, which of course should be re- 
 ceived as of equal weight with the American. His 
 comments on the actions are generally very fair, 
 the book never being disfigured by bitterness 
 toward the British ; but he is certainly wrong, for 
 example, in ascribing the loss of the Chesapeake 
 solely to accident, that of the Argus solely to 
 her inferiority in force, and so on. His disposition 
 to praise all the American commanders may be gen- 
 erous, but is nevertheless unjust. If Decatur's 
 surrender of the President is at least impliedly 
 praised, then Porter's defence of the Essex can 
 hardly receive its just award. There is no weight in 
 the commendation bestowed upon Hull, if commen- 
 dation, the same in kind though less in degree, is be- 
 stowed upon Rodgers. It is a great pity that 
 Cooper did not write a criticism on James, for no 
 one could have done it more thoroughly. But he 
 never mentions him, except once in speaking of 
 Barclay's fleet. In all probability this silence arose 
 from sheer contempt, and the certainty that most of 
 James' remarks were false ; but the effect was that 
 very many foreigners believe him to have shirked 
 the subject. He rarely gives any data by which 
 the statements of James can be disproved, and it is 
 for this reason that I have been obliged to criticise 
 the latter's work very fully. Many of James' re- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 19 
 
 marks, however, dei")' criticism from their random 
 nature, as when he states that American midship- 
 men were chiefly masters and mates of merchant- 
 men, and does not give a single proof to support 
 the assertion. It would be nearly as true to assert 
 that the British midshipmen were for the most part 
 ex-members of the prize-ring, and as much labor 
 would be needed to disprove it. In other instances 
 it is quite enough to let his words speak for them- 
 selves, as where he says (p. 155) that of the Amer- 
 ican sailors one third in number and one half in 
 point of effectiveness were in reality British. That 
 is, of the 450 men the Constitution had when she 
 fought the Java 150 were British, and the re- 
 maining 300 could have been as effectively re- 
 placed by 150 more British. So a very little logic 
 works out a result that James certainly did not in- 
 tend to arrive at ; namely, that 300 British led by 
 American officers could beat, with ease and com- 
 parative impunity, 400 British led by their own 
 ofificers. He also forgets that the whole consists of 
 the sum of the parts. He accounts for the victories 
 of the Americans by stating (p. 280) that they were 
 lucky enough to meet with frigates and brigs who 
 had unskilful gunners or worthless crews ; he also 
 carefully shows that the Macedonian was incom- 
 petently handled, the Peacock commanded by a 
 mere martinet, the Avon's crew unpractised at 
 the guns, the Epervier s mutinous and cowardly, 
 the Penguin s weak and unskilful, the Java's ex- 
 ceedingly poor, and more to the same effect. 
 Now the Americans took in single fight three 
 frigates and seven sloops, and when as many 
 as ten vessels are met it is exceedingly probable 
 
20 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2, 
 
 that they represent the fair average ; so that James' 
 strictures, so far as true, simply show that the 
 average British ship was very apt to possess, com- 
 paratively speaking, an incompetent captain or un- 
 skilful crew. These disadvantages were not felt 
 when opposed to navies in which they existed to 
 an even greater extent, but became very apparent 
 when brought into contact with a power whose few 
 officers knew how to play their own parts very 
 nearly to perfection, and, something equally im- 
 portant, knew how to make first-rate crews out of 
 what was already good raw material. Finally, a 
 large proportion of James' abuse of the Americans 
 sufficiently refutes itself, and perhaps Cooper's 
 method of contemptuously disregarding him was 
 the best ; but no harm can follow from devoting a 
 little space to commenting upon him. 
 
 Much the best American work is Lieutenant 
 George E. Emmons' statistical " History of the 
 United States Navy." Unfortunately it is merely a 
 mass of excellently arranged and classified statistics, 
 and while of invaluable importance to the student, 
 is not interesting to the average reader. Almost 
 all the statements I have made of the force, ton- 
 nage, and armament of the American vessels, though 
 I have whenever practicable taken them from the 
 Navy Records, etc., yet could be just as well 
 quoted from Emmons. Copies of most of the 
 American official letters which I have quoted can be 
 found in " Niles' Register," volumes i to lo, and all 
 of the British ones in the " London Naval Chronicle" 
 for the same years. It is to these two authorities 
 that I am most indebted, and nearly as much so to 
 the "American State Papers," vol.xiv. Next in order 
 
INTRODUCTION. 2T 
 
 come Emmons, Cooper, and the invaluable, albeit 
 somewhat scurrilous, James ; and a great many 
 others whose names I have quoted in their proper 
 places. In commenting upon the actions, I have, 
 whenever possible, drawn from some standard 
 work, such as Jurien de la Gravi^re's " Guerres 
 Maritimes," Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gun- 
 nery," or, better still, from the lives and memoirs of 
 Admirals Farragut, Codrington, Broke, or Durham. 
 The titles of the various works will be found given 
 in full as they are referred to.' In a few cases, 
 where extreme accuracy was necessary, or where, as 
 in the case of the President' s capture, it was de- 
 sirable that there should be no room for dispute as 
 to the facts, I have given the authority for each 
 sentence ; but in general this would be too cumber- 
 some, and so I have confined myself to referring, at 
 or near the beginning of the account of each action, 
 to the authorities from whom I have taken it. For 
 the less important facts on which every one is 
 agreed I have often given no references. 
 
 ^ To get an idea of the American seamen of that time Cooper's 
 novels, " Miles Wallingford," " Home as Fomid," and the " Pilot," 
 are far better than any history ; in the " Two Admirals" the descrip- 
 tion of the fleet manoeuvring is unrivalled. His view of Jack's life is 
 rather rose-colored however. " Tom Cringle's log " ought to be read 
 for the information it gives. Marryatt's novels will show some of the 
 darker aspects of sailor life. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America declared wal 
 against her— Race identity of the combatants— The American navy at the be 
 ginning of the war— Officers well trained— Causes tending to make our seamei 
 especially efficient— Close similarity between the British and American sailor 
 —Our ships manned chiefly by native Americans, many of whom ha( 
 formerly been impressed into the British navy — Quotas of seamen contributec 
 by the different States— Navy-yards— Lists of officers and men— List of vessel 
 — Tonnage — Different ways of estimating it in Britain and America — Rating: 
 — American ships properly rated — Armaments of the frigates and corvettes- 
 Three styles of guns used — Difference between long guns and carronades- 
 Short weight of American shot— Comparison of British frigates rating 38, anc 
 American frigates rating 44 guns — Compared with a 74. 
 
 DURING the early years of this century Eng 
 land's naval power stood at a height neve: 
 reached before or since by that of any other nation 
 On every sea her navies rode, not only triumphant 
 but with none to dispute their sway. The islanc 
 folk had long claimed the mastery of the ocean, anc 
 they had certainly succeeded in making their clain 
 completely good during the time of bloody warfart 
 that followed the breaking out of* the French Rev 
 olution. Since the year 1792 each Europear 
 nation, in turn, had learned to feel bitter dread o 
 the weight of England's hand. In the Baltic, Si: 
 Samuel Hood had .taught the Russians that the) 
 must needs keep in port when the English cruiser: 
 were in theofifing. The descendants of the Vikingi 
 had seen their whole navy destroyed at Copenhagen 
 No Dutch fleet ever put out after the day when 
 off Camperdown, Lord Duncan took possession o 
 De Winter's shattered ships. But a few year 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 23 
 
 before 1812, the greatest sea-fighter of all time had 
 died in Trafalgar Bay, and In dying had crumbled 
 to pieces the navies of France and of Spain. 
 
 From that day England's task was but to keep in 
 port such of her foes' vessels as she had not de- 
 stroyed. France alone still possessed fleets that 
 could be rendered formidable, and so, from the 
 Scheldt to Toulon, her harbors were watched and 
 her coasts harried by the blockading squadrons of 
 the English. Elsewhere the latter had no fear of 
 their power being seriously assailed ; but their vast 
 commerce and numerous colonies needed ceaseless 
 protection. Accordingly in every sea their cruisers 
 could be found, of all sizes, from the stately ship- 
 of-the-line, with her tiers of heavy cannon and her 
 many hundreds of men, down to the little cutter 
 carrying but a score of souls and a couple of light 
 guns. All these cruisers, but especially those of 
 the lesser rates, were continually brought into con- 
 tact with such of the hostile vessels as had run 
 through the blockade, or were too small to be af- 
 fected by it. French and Italian frigates were often 
 fought and captured when they were skirting their 
 own coasts, or had started off on a plundering cruise 
 through the Atlantic, or to the Indian Ocean ; and 
 though the Danes had lost their larger ships they 
 kept up a spirited warfare with brigs and gun-boats. 
 So the English marine was in constant exercise, at- 
 tended with almost invariable success. 
 
 Such was Great Britain's naval power when the 
 Congress of the United States declared war upon 
 her. While she could number her thousand sail, 
 the American navy included but half a dozen frig- 
 ates, and six or eight sloops and brigs ; and it is 
 
24 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 small matter for surprise that the British officers 
 should have regarded their new foe with contemptu- 
 ous indifference. Hitherto the American seamen 
 had never been heard of except in connection with 
 two or three engagements with French frigates, 
 and some obscure skirmishes against the Moors of 
 Tripoli ; none of which could possibly attract atten- 
 tion in the years that saw Aboukir, Copenhagen, 
 and Trafalgar. And yet these same petty wars were 
 the school which raised our marine to the highest 
 standard of excellence. A continuous course of 
 victory, won mainly by seamanship, had made the 
 English sailor overweeningly self-confident, and 
 caused him to pay but little regard to manoeuvring 
 or even to gunnery. Meanwhile the American 
 learned, by receiving hard knocks, how to give them, 
 and belonged to a service too young to feel an over- 
 confidence in itself. One side had let its training 
 relax, while the other had carried it to the highest 
 possible point. Hence our ships proved, on the 
 whole, victorious in the apparently unequal struggle, 
 and the men who had conquered the best seamen 
 of Europe were now in turn obliged to succumb. 
 Compared with the great naval battles of the pre- 
 ceding few years, our bloodiest conflicts were mere 
 skirmishes, but they were skirmishes between the 
 hitherto acknowledged kings of the ocean, and new 
 men who yet proved to be more than their equals. For 
 over a hundred years, or since the time when they 
 had contended on equal terms with the great Dutch 
 admirals, the British had shown a decided supe- 
 riority to their various foes, and during the latter 
 quarter of the time this superiority, as already said, 
 was very marked, indeed ; in consequence, the victo- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 25 
 
 ries of the new enemy attracted an amount of atten- 
 tion altogether disproportionate to their material 
 effects. And it is a curious fact that our little navy, 
 in which the art of handling and fighting the old 
 broadside, sailing frigate in single conflict was 
 brought to the highest point of perfection ever 
 reached, that this same navy should have contained 
 the first representative of the modern war steamer, 
 and also the torpedo — the two terrible engines 
 which were to drive from the ocean the very white- 
 winged craft that had first won honor for the starry 
 flag. The tactical skill of Hull or Decatur is now of 
 merely archaic interest, and has but little more 
 bearing on the manoeuvring of a modern fleet than 
 have the tactics of the Athenian gallies. But the 
 war still conveys some most practical lessons as to 
 the value of efficient ships and, above all, of effi- 
 cient men in them. Had we only possessed the 
 miserable gun-boats, our men could have done noth- 
 ing ; had we not possessed good men, the heavy 
 frigates would have availed as little. Poor ships 
 and impotent artillery had lost the Dutch almost 
 their entire navy ; fine ships and heavy cannon had 
 not saved the French and Spanish from the like fate. 
 We owed our success to putting sailors even better 
 than the Dutch on ships even finer than those built 
 by the two Latin seaboard powers. 
 
 The first point to be remembered in order to 
 write a fair account of this war is that the difference 
 in fighting skill, which certainly existed between the 
 two parties, was due mainly to training, and not to 
 the nature of the men. It seems certain that the 
 American had in the beginning somewhat the ad- 
 vantage, because his surroundings, partly physical 
 
26 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 and partly social and political, had forced him into 
 habits of greater self-reliance. Therefore, on the 
 average, he offered rather the best material to start 
 with ; but the difference was very slight, and totally 
 disappeared under good training. The combatants 
 were men of the same race, differing but little from 
 one another. On the New England coast the Eng- 
 lish blood was as pure as in any part of Britain ; 
 in New York and New Jersey it was mixed with 
 that of the Dutch settlers — and the Dutch are by 
 race nearer to the true old English of Alfred and 
 Harold than are, for example, the thoroughly angli- 
 cized Welsh of Cornwall. Otherwise, the infusion 
 of new blood into the English race on this side of 
 the Atlantic has been chiefly from three sources — 
 German, Irish, and Norse ; and these three sources 
 represent the elemental parts of the composite Eng- 
 lish stock in about the same proportions in which 
 they were originally combined, — -mainly Teutonic, 
 largely Celtic, and with a Scandinavian admixture. 
 The descendant of the German becomes as much an 
 Anglo-American as the descendant of the Strath- 
 clyde Celt has already become an Anglo-Briton. 
 Looking through names of the combatants it would 
 be difficult to find any of one navy that could not 
 be matched in the other — Hull or Lawrence, Allen, 
 Perry, or Stewart. And among all the English 
 names on both sides will be found many Scotch, 
 Irish, or Welsh— McDonough, O'Brien, or Jones. 
 Still stranger ones appear : the Huguenot Tattnall is 
 one among the American defenders of the Constella- 
 tion, and another Huguenot Tattnall is among the 
 British assailants at Lake Borgne. It must always 
 be kept in mind that the Americans and the British 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 2/ 
 
 are two substantially similar branches of the great 
 English race, which both before and after their 
 separation have assimilated, and made Englishmen 
 of many other peoples." The lessons taught by the 
 war can hardly be learned unless this identity is kept 
 in mind.^ 
 
 To understand aright the efficiency of our navy, it 
 is necessary to take a brief look at the character and 
 antecedents of the officers and men who served in it. 
 
 When war broke out the United States Navy was 
 but a few years old, yet it already had a far from 
 dishonorable history. The captains and lieutenants 
 of 1812 had been taught their duties in a very prac- 
 tical school, and the flag under which they fought 
 was endeared to them already by not a few glorious 
 traditions — though these, perhaps, like others of 
 their kind, had lost none of their glory in the telling. 
 A few of the older men had served in the war of the 
 Revolution, and all still kept fresh in mind the 
 doughty deeds of the old-time privateering war 
 craft. Men still talked of Biddle's daring cruises 
 and Barney's stubborn fights, or told of Scotch 
 Paul and the grim work they had who followed his 
 
 'The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated as " Brit- 
 ish " — English being either too narrow or too broad a terra, in one case 
 meaning tlie inhabitants of but a part of Britain, and in the otlier the 
 whole Anglo-Saxon people. 
 
 "^ It was practically a civil war, and was waged with much harsh- 
 ness and bitterness on both sides. I have already spoken of the 
 numerous grievances of the Americans ; the British, in turn, looked 
 upon our blockade-runners which entered the French ports exactly as 
 we regarded, at a later date, the British steamers that ran into Wil- 
 mington and Charleston. It is curious to see how illogical writers 
 are. The careers of the Argus and Alabama for example, were 
 strikingly similar in many ways, yet the same writer who speaks of 
 one as an "heroic little brig, " will call the other a "black pirate." 
 Of course there can be no possible comparison as to the causes for 
 which the two vessels were fighting ; but the cruises themselves were 
 very much alike, both in character and history. 
 
28 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 fortunes. Besides these memories of an older gen- 
 eration, most of the ofificers had themselves taken 
 part, when younger in years and rank, in deeds not 
 a whit less glorious. Almost every man had had a 
 share in some gallant feat, to which he, in part at 
 least, owed his present position. The captain had 
 perhaps been a midshipman under Truxton when 
 he took the Vengeance, and had been sent aboard 
 the captured French frigate with the prize-master ; 
 the lieutenant had borne a part in the various attacks 
 on Tripoli, and had led his men in the desperate 
 hand-to-hand fights in which the Yankee cutlass 
 proved an overmatch for the Turkish and Moorish 
 scimitars. Nearly every senior officer had extri- 
 cated himself by his own prowess or skill from the 
 dangers of battle or storm ; he owed his rank 
 to the fact that he had proved worthy of it. 
 Thrown upon his own resources, he had learned 
 self-reliance ; he was a first-rate practical seaman, 
 and prided himself on the way his vessel was 
 handled. Having reached his rank by hard work, 
 and knowing what real fighting meant, he was care- 
 ful to see that his men were trained in the essentials 
 of discipline, and that they knew how to handle the 
 guns in battle as well as polish them in peace. Be- 
 yond almost any of his countrymen, he wor- 
 shipped the "Gridiron Flag," and, having been 
 brought up in the Navy, regarded its honor as his 
 own. It was, perhaps, the Navy alone that thought 
 itself a match, ship against ship, for Great Britain. 
 The remainder of the nation pinned its faith to the 
 army, or rather to that weakest of weak reeds, the 
 militia. The officers of the navy, with their strong 
 esprit de corps, their jealousy of their own name and 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 29 
 
 record, and the knowledge, by actual experience, 
 that the British ships sailed no faster and were no 
 better handled than their own, had no desire 
 to shirk a conflict with any foe, and having tried 
 their bravery in actual service, they made it doubly 
 formidable by cool, wary skill. Even the younger 
 men, who had never been in action, had been so 
 well trained by the tried veterans over them that the 
 lack of experience was not sensibly felt. 
 
 The sailors comprising the crews of our ships 
 were well worthy of their leaders. There was no 
 better seaman in the world than American Jack ; he 
 had been bred to his work from infancy, and had 
 been off in a fishing dory almost as soon as he 
 could walk. When he grew older, he shipped on a 
 merchant-man or whaler, and in those warlike times, 
 when our large merchant-marine was compelled to 
 rely pretty much on itself for protection, each craft 
 had to be well handled ; all who were not were soon 
 weeded out by a process of natural selection, of 
 which the agents were French picaroons, Spanish 
 buccaneers, and Malay pirates. It was a rough 
 school, but it taught Jack to be both skilful and 
 self-reliant ; and he was all the better fitted to be- 
 come a man-of-war's man, because he knew more 
 about fire-arms than most of his kind in foreign 
 lands. At home he had used his ponderous duck- 
 ing gun with good effect on the flocks of canvas- 
 backs in the reedy flats of the Chesapeake, or 
 among the sea-coots in the rough water off the New 
 England cliffs ; and when he went on a sailing voy- 
 asre the chances were even that there would be 
 some use for the long guns before he returned, for 
 the American merchant sailor could trust to no 
 armed escort. 
 
30 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2- 
 
 The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at the 
 date of which I am writing as well as long subse- 
 quently to it was largely due to the curious condition 
 of things in Europe. For thirty years all the Euro- 
 pean nations had been in a state of continuous and 
 very complicated warfare, during the course of 
 which each nation in turn fought almost every 
 other, England being usually at loggerheads with 
 all. One effect of this was to force an enormous 
 proportion of the carrying trade of the world into 
 American bottoms. The old Massachusetts town 
 of Salem was then one of the main depots of the 
 East India trade ; the Baltimore clippers carried 
 goods into the French and German ports with small 
 regard to the blockade ; New Bedford and Sag 
 Harbor fitted out whalers for the Arctic seas as well 
 as for the South Pacific ; the rich merchants of 
 Philadelphia and New York sent their ships to all 
 parts of the world ; and every small port had some 
 craft in the coasting trade. On the New England 
 seaboard but few of the boys would reach manhood 
 without having made at least one voyage to the 
 Newfoundland Banks after codfish ; and in the 
 whaling towns of Long Island it used to be an old 
 saying that no man could marry till he struck his 
 whale. The wealthy merchants of the large cities 
 would often send their sons on a voyage or two 
 before they let them enter their counting-houses. 
 Thus it came about that a large portion of our 
 population was engaged in seafaring pursuits of a 
 nature strongly tending to develop a resolute and 
 hardy character in the men that followed them. 
 The British merchant-men sailed in huge convoys, 
 guarded by men-of-war, while, as said before, our 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 31 
 
 vessels went alone, and relied for protection on 
 themselves. If a fishing smack went to the Banks 
 it knew that it ran a chance of falling in v/ith some 
 not over-scrupulous Nova Scotian privateer. The 
 barques that sailed from Salem to the Spice Islands 
 kept their men well trained both at great guns and 
 musketry, so as to be able to beat off either Malay ' 
 proas, or Chinese junks. The New York ships, 
 loaded for the West Indies, were prepared to do 
 battle with the picaroons that swarmed in the Span- 
 ish main ; while the fast craft from Baltimore could 
 fight as well as they could run. Wherever an 
 American seaman went, he not only had to contend 
 with all the legitimate perils of the sea, but he had 
 also to regard almost every stranger as a foe. 
 Whether this foe called himself pirate or privateer 
 mattered but little. French, Spaniards, Algerihes, 
 Malays, from all alike our commerce suffered, and 
 against all, our merchants were forced to defend 
 themselves. The effect of such a state of things, 
 which made commerce so remunerative that the 
 bolder spirits could hardly keep out of it, and so 
 hazardous that only the most skilful and daring 
 could succeed in it, was to raise up as fine a set of 
 seamen as ever manned a navy. The stern school 
 in which the American was brought up, forced him 
 into habits of independent thought and action 
 which it was impossible that the more protected 
 Briton could possess. He worked more intelligently 
 and less from routine, and while perfectly obedient 
 and amenable to discipline, was yet able to judge 
 for himself in an emergency. He was more easily 
 managed than most of his kind — being shrewd, 
 quiet, and, in fact, comparatively speaking, rather 
 
32 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 moral than otherwise ; if he was a New ^nglander, 
 when he retired from a sea life he was not unapt to 
 end his days as a deacon. Altogether there could 
 not have been better material for a fighting crew 
 than cool, gritty American Jack. Moreover, there 
 was a good nucleus of veterans to begin with, who 
 were well fitted to fill the more responsible positions, 
 such as captains of guns, etc. These were men who 
 had cruised in the little Enterprise after French 
 privateers, who had been in the Constellation in 
 her two victorious fights, or who, perhaps, had fol- 
 lowed Decatur when with only eighty men he cut 
 out the Philadelphia, manned by fivefold his force 
 and surrounded by hostile batteries and war vessels, 
 — one of the boldest expeditions of the kind on 
 record. 
 
 It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connection, 
 that by a singular turn of fortune, Great Britain, 
 whose system of impressing American sailors had 
 been one of the chief causes of the war, herself be- 
 came, in consequence of that very system, in some 
 sort, a nursery for the seamen of the young Repub- 
 lican navy. The American sailor feared nothing 
 more than being impressed on a British ship— dread- 
 ing beyond measure the hard life and cruel disci- 
 pline aboard of her ; but once there, he usually did 
 well enough, and in course of time often rose to be 
 of some little consequence. For years before i8i2, 
 the number of these impressed sailors was in reality 
 greater than the entire number serving in the Amer- 
 ican navy, from which it will readily be seen that 
 they formed a good stock to draw upon. Very 
 much to their credit, they never lost their devotion 
 to the home of their birth, more than two thousand 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 33 
 
 of them being imprisoned at the beginning of the 
 war because they refused to serve against their 
 country. When Commodore Decatur captured the 
 Macedonian, that ofificer, as we learn from Mar- 
 shall's "Naval Biography" (ii, 1019), stated that 
 most of the seamen of his own frigate, the United- 
 States, had served in British war vessels, and that 
 some had been with Lord Nelson in the Victory, 
 and had even been bargemen to the great Admiral, 
 — a pretty sure proof that the American sailors did 
 not show at a disadvantage when compared with 
 others.' 
 
 Good seaman as the impressed American proved 
 to be, yet he seldom missed an opportunity to escape 
 from the British service, by desertion or otherwise. 
 In the first place, the life was very hard, and, in the 
 second, the American seaman was very patriotic. 
 He had an honest and deep affection for his own 
 flag; while, on the contrary, he felt a curiously strong 
 hatred for England, as distinguished from English- 
 men. This hatred was partly an abstract feeling, 
 cherished through a vague traditional respect for 
 Bunker Hill, and partly something very real and 
 vivid, owing to the injuries he, and others like 
 
 'With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume Decatur's 
 statement to be equivalent to saying that he had chiefly British sea- 
 men on board ; whereas, even as quoted by Marshall, Decatur merely 
 said that * ' his seamen had served on board a British man-of-war, " 
 and that some "had served under Lord Nelson." Like the Con- 
 stiiuiion, the United States had rid herself of most of the British 
 subjects on board, before sailing. Decatur's remark simply referred 
 to the number of his American seamen who had been impressed 
 on board British ships. Whenever James says that an American 
 ship had a large proportion of British sailors aboard, the explana- 
 tion is that a large number. of the crew were Americans who had been 
 impressed on British ships. It would be no more absurd to claim 
 Trafalgar as an American victory because there was a certain number 
 of Americans in Nelson's fleet, than it is to assert that the Americans 
 were victorious in 1812, because there were a few renegade British on 
 board their ships. 
 
34 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 him, had received. Whether he lived in Mary- 
 land or Massachusetts, he certainly knew men 
 whose ships had been seized by British cruisers, 
 their goods confiscated, and the vessels condemned. 
 Some of his friends had fallen victims to the odious 
 right of search, and had never been heard of after- 
 ward. He had suffered many an injury to friend, 
 fortune, or person, and some day he hoped to re- 
 pay them all ; and when the war did come, he fought 
 all the better because he knew it was in his own 
 quarrel. But, as I have said, this hatred was against 
 England, not against Englishmen. Then, as now, 
 sailors were scattered about over the world without 
 any great regard for nationality ; and the resulting 
 intermingling of natives and foreigners in every 
 mercantile marine was especially great in those of 
 Britain and America, whose people spoke the same 
 tongue and wore the same aspect. When chance 
 drifted the American into Liverpool or London, he 
 was ready enough to ship in an Indiaman or whaler, 
 caring little for the fact that he served under the 
 British flag; and the Briton, in turn, who found him- 
 self in New York or Philadelphia, willingly sailed in 
 one of the clipper-built barques, whether it floated 
 the stars and stripes or not. When Captain Porter 
 wrought such havoc among the British whalers in 
 the South Seas, he found that no inconsiderable 
 portion of their crews consisted of Americans, some 
 of whom enlisted on board his own vessel ; and 
 among the crews of the American whalers were 
 many British. In fact, though the skipper of each 
 ship might brag loudly of his nationality, yet in 
 practical life he knew well enough that there was 
 very little to choose between a Yankee and a Brit- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 35 
 
 on." Both were bold and hardy, cool and intelli- 
 gent, quick with their hands, and showing at their 
 best in an emergency. They looked alike and spoke 
 alike ; when they took the trouble to think, they 
 thought alike ; and when they got drunk, which was 
 not an infrequent occurrence, they quarrelled alike. 
 Mingled with them were a few seamen of other 
 nationalities. The Irishman, if he came from the 
 old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford, Dublin, and 
 Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much 
 like the two chief combatants ; the Celto-Turanian 
 kern of the west did not often appear on shipboard. 
 The French, Danes, and Dutch were hemmed in at 
 home ; they had enough to do on their own sea- 
 board, and could not send men into foreign fleets. 
 A few Norse, however, did come in, and excellent 
 sailors and fighters they made. With the Portu- 
 guese and Italians, of whom some were to be found 
 serving under the union-jack, and others under the 
 stars and stripes, it was different; although there were 
 
 ^ What choice there was, was in favor of tlie American. In point 
 of courage there was no difference whatever. The hssex and the 
 Lawrence^ as well as the Frolic and the Reindeer,^ were defended 
 with the same stubborn, desperate, cool bravery that marks the 
 English race on both sides of the Atlantic. But tfie American was a 
 free citizen, any one's equal, a voter with a personal interest in his 
 country's welfare, and, above all, without having perpetually ,before 
 his eyes the degrading fear of tlie press-gang. In consequence, he 
 was more tractable than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and pos- 
 sessed greater judgment. In the fight between the Wasp and 
 the Frolic, the latter's crew had apparently been well trained at the 
 gunsTlor they aimed well ; but they fired at the wrong time, and 
 never corrected the error ; while their antagonists, delivering their 
 broadsides far more slowly, by intelligently waiting until the proper 
 moment, worked frightful havoc. But though there was a certain 
 slight difference between the seamen of the two nations, it must never 
 be forgotten that it was very much less than that between the various 
 individuals of the same nation ; and when the British had been 
 trained for a few years by such commanders as Broke and Manners, 
 it was impossible to surpass them, .and it needed our best men to 
 equal them. 
 
36 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 many excellent exceptions they did not, as a rule, 
 make the best kind of seamen. They were treach- 
 erous, fond of the knife, less ready with their hands, 
 and likely to lose either their wits or their courage 
 when in a tight place. 
 
 In the American navy, unlike the British, there 
 was no impressment ; the sailor was a volunteer, 
 and he shipped in whatever craft his fancy selected. 
 Throughout the war there were no " picked crews " 
 on the American side,' excepting on the last two 
 cruises of the Constitution. In fact (as seen by 
 the letter of Captains Stewart and Bainbridge to 
 Secretary Hamilton), there was often much dififi. 
 culty in getting enough men.^ Many sailors pre- 
 ferred to serve in the innumerable privateers, and, 
 the two above-mentioned officers, in urging the ne- 
 cessity of building line-of-battle ships, state that it 
 was hard work to recruit men for vessels of an in- 
 
 ' James' statements to the contrary being in every case utterly with- 
 out foundation. He is also wrong in his assertion that the American 
 ships had no boys ; they had nearly as many in proportion as the 
 British. The Constitution had 31, the Adams 15, etc. So, when he 
 states that our midshipmen were generally masters and mates of 
 merchantmen ; they were generally from eleven to seventeen years 
 old at the beginning of the war, and, besides, had rarely or never been 
 in the merchant marine. 
 
 " Reading through the volumes of official letters about this war, 
 which are preserved in the office of the Secretary of the Navy, one of 
 the most noticeable things is the continual complaints about the diffi- 
 culty of getting men. The Adams at one time had a crew of but 
 nineteen men — " fourteen of whom are marines," adds the aggrieved 
 commander. A log-book of one of the gun-boats records the fact that 
 after much difficulty two men were enlisted — from the jail, with a 
 parenthetical memorandum to the effect that they were both very 
 drunk. British ships were much more easily manned, as they could 
 always have recourse to impressment. 
 
 The Constitution on starting out on her last cruises had an ex- 
 traordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz., 218, with but 92 
 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, making, with the officers, 
 a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain Bainbridge, Oct. 16, 1814; 
 it is letter No. 51, in the fortieth volume of "Captains' Letters," iii 
 the clerk's office of the Secretary of the Navy.) 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 37 
 
 ferior grade, so long as the enemy had ships of the 
 line. 
 
 One of the standard statements made by the 
 British historians about this war is that our ships 
 were mainly or largely manned by British sailors. 
 This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons 
 which it teaches ; and, besides that, it is not true. 
 
 In this, as in every thing else, all the modern 
 writers have merely followed James or Brenton, and 
 I shall accordingly confine myself to examining 
 their assertions. The former begins (vol. iv, p. 470) 
 by diffidently stating that there is a "similarity" 
 of language between the inhabitants of the two 
 countries — an interesting philological discovery that 
 but few will attempt to controvert. In vol. vi, p. 
 154, he mentions that a number of blanks occur in 
 the American Navy List in the column " Where 
 Born " ; and in proof of the fact that these blanks 
 are there because the men were not Americans, he 
 says that their names " are all English and Irish." ' 
 They certainly are; and so are all the other names 
 in the list. It could not well be otherwise, as the 
 United States Navy was not officered by Indians. 
 In looking over this same Navy List (of 1 8 16) it 
 will be seen that but a little over 5 per cent, of the 
 
 ' For example, James writes ; " Out of the 32 captains one only, 
 Thomas Tingey, has England marked as his birthplace. . . . 
 Three Wanks occur, and we consider it rather creditable to Captains 
 John Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and John Ord Creighton, that they 
 were ashamed to tell where they were born." I have not been able 
 to find out the latter's birth-place , but Captain Shaw was born in 
 New York, and I have seen Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to 
 as "born and bred in America." Generally, whenever I have been 
 able to fill up the vacancies in the column "Where Born," I have 
 found that it was in America. From these facts it would appear 
 that James was somewhat hasty in concluding: that the omission of 
 the birth-place proved the owner of the name to be a native of Great 
 Britain. 
 
38 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 officers were born abroad— a smaller proportion by 
 far than would exist in the population of the coun- 
 try at large— and most of these had come to Amer- 
 ica when under ten years of age. On p. 155 James 
 adds that the British sailors composed " one third 
 in number and one half in point of effectiveness" of 
 the American crews. Brenton in his "Naval His- 
 tory" writes : " It was said, and I have no reason to 
 doubt the fact, that there were 200 British seamen 
 aboard the Constitution^ These statements are 
 mere assertions, unsupported by proof, and of such 
 a loose character as to be difficult to refute. As our 
 navy was small, it may be best to take each ship in 
 turn. The only ones of which the British could 
 write authoritatively were, of course, those which 
 they captured. The first one taken was the 
 Wasp. James says many British were discovered 
 among her crew, instancing especially one sailor 
 named Jack Lang; now Jack Lang was born in the 
 town of Brunswick, New Jersey, but had been im- 
 pressed and forced to serve in the British Navy. The 
 same was doubtless true of the rest of the " many 
 British " seamen of her crew ; at any rate, as the 
 only instance James mentions (Jack Lang) was an 
 American, he can hardly be trusted for those whom 
 he does not name. 
 
 Of the 95 men composing the crew of the Nauti- 
 lus when she was captured, " 6 were detained and 
 sent to England to await examination as being sus- 
 pected of being British subjects."" Of the other 
 
 ' New edition, London, 1837, vol. ii, p. 456. 
 
 ^ Quoted from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 12, 
 1812 (in Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol xxv, No. 43), 
 enclosing a " List of American prisoners of war discharged out of 
 custody of Lieutenant William iMiller, agent at the port of Halifax." 
 in exchange for some of the British captured by Porter. This list, 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 39 
 
 small brigs, the Viper, Vixen, Rattlesnake, and 
 Syren, James does not mention the composition of 
 the crew, and I do not know that any were claimed 
 as British. Of the crew of the Argus " about 10 
 or 12 were believed to be British subjects; the 
 American officers swore the crew contained none" 
 (James, " Naval Occurrences," p. 278). From o to 
 10 per cent, can be allowed. When the Frolic 
 was captured " her crew consisted of native Ameri- 
 cans" {do. p. 340). James speaks (" History," p. 418) 
 of " a portion of the British subjects on board the 
 Essex," but without giving a word of proof or stat- 
 ing his grounds of belief. One man was claimed 
 as a deserter by the British, but he turned out to be 
 a New Yorker. There were certainly a certain num- 
 ber of British aboard, but the number probably did 
 not exceed thirty. Of the President's crew he 
 says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 448): "In the opinion 
 of several British officers there were among them 
 many British seamen " ; but Commodore Decatur, 
 Lieutenant Gallagher, and the other officers swore 
 that there were none. Of the crew of the Chesa- 
 peake, he says, "about 32" were British subjects, 
 or about 10 per cent. One or two of these were 
 afterward shot, and some 25, together with a Portu- 
 guese boatswain's mate, entered into the British 
 service. So that of the vessels captured by the 
 British, the Chesapeake had the largest number of 
 British (about 10 per cent, of her crew) on board, 
 the others ranging from that number down to none 
 at all, as in the case of the Wasp. 
 
 by the way, shows the crew of the Nautilus (counting the six men 
 detained as British) to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as 
 stated by James. Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 12 
 men of the Guerriere's crew as an offset to the 6 men belonging to the 
 Nautilus. 
 
40 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 As these eleven ships would probably represent a 
 fair average, this proportion, of from o to lo per cent., 
 should be taken as the proper one. James, however, 
 is of the opinion that those ships manned by Ameri- 
 cans were more apt to be captured than those manned 
 by the braver British ; which calls for an examination 
 of the crews of the remaining vessels. Of the 
 American sloop Peacock, James says ("Naval Oc- 
 currences," p. 348) that " several of her men were 
 recognized as British seamen " ; even if this were 
 true, " several " could not probably mean more than 
 sixteen, or 10 per cent. Of the second Wasp he 
 says, " Captain Blakely was a native of Dublin, and, 
 along with some English and Scotch, did not, it 
 may be certain, neglect to have in his crew a great 
 many Irish." Now Captain Blakely left Ireland 
 when he was but 16 months old, and the rest 
 of James' statement is avowedly mere conjecture. 
 It was asserted positively in the American news- 
 papers that the Wasp, which sailed from Ports- 
 mouth, was manned exclusively by New Englanders, 
 except a small draft of men from a Baltimore priva- 
 teer, and that there was not a foreigner in her crew. 
 Of the Hornet James states that " some of her 
 men were natives of the United Kingdom " ; but he 
 gives no authority, and the men he refers to were in 
 all probability those spoken of in the journal of one 
 of the Hornet's officers, which says that " many of 
 our men (Americans) had been impressed in the Brit- 
 ish service." As regards the gun-boats, James asserts 
 that they were commanded by "Commodore Joshua 
 Barney, a native of Ireland." This officer, how- 
 ever, was born at Baltimore on July 6, 1759. As to 
 the Constitution, Brenton, as already mentioned, 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 41 
 
 supposes the number of British sailors in her crew to 
 have been 200; James makes it less, or about 150. 
 Respecting this, the only definite statements I can 
 find in British works are the following : In the "Naval 
 Chronicle," vol. xxix, p. 452, an officer of the Java 
 states that most of the Constitution s men were Brit- 
 ish, many being from the Guerriire ; which should 
 be read in connection with James' statement (vol. vi, 
 p. 156) that but eight of the Guerriere s crew de- 
 serted, and but two shipped on board the Constitu- 
 tion. Moreover, as a matter of fact, these eight men 
 were all impressed Americans. In the " Naval Chron- 
 icle " it is also said that the Chesapeake s surgeon was 
 an Irishman, formerly of the British navy ; he was 
 born in Baltimore, and was never in the British navy 
 in his life. The third lieutenant " was supposed to 
 be an Irishman " (Brenton, ii, 456). The first lieu- 
 tenant "was a native of Great Britain, we have been 
 informed" (James, vi, 194); he was Mr. George 
 Parker, born and bred in Virginia. The remaining 
 three citations, if true, prove nothing. " One man 
 had served under Mr. Kent " of the Guerriere 
 (James, vi, p. 153). " One had been in the Achille " 
 and "one in the Eurydice" (Brenton, ii, 456). 
 These three men were most probably American sea- 
 men who had been impressed on British ships. 
 From Cooper (in " Putnam's Magazine," vol. i, p. 593) 
 as well as from several places in the Constitution s 
 log,' we learn that those of the crew who were Brit- 
 
 ' See her log-book (vol. ii, Feb. i, 1812 to Dec. 13, 1813); especially 
 on July I2th, when twelve men were discharged. In some of Hull's 
 lette.s he alludes to the desire of the British part of the crew to serve 
 on the gun-boats or in the ports ; and then writes that ' ' in accordance 
 with the instractions sent him by the Secretary of the Navy" he had 
 allowed the British-born porlion to leave the ship. The log-books 
 are in the Bureau of Navigation. 
 
42 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 ish deserters were discharged from the Constitu- 
 tion before she left port, as they were afraid to 
 serve in a war against Great Britain. That this 
 fear was justifiable may be seen by reading James, 
 vol. iv, p. 483. Of the four men taken by the 
 Leopard from the Chesapeake, as deserters, one 
 was hung and three scourged. In reality the crew 
 of the Constitution probably did not contain a 
 dozen British sailors; in her last cruises she was 
 manned almost exclusively by New Englanders. 
 The only remaining vessel is the United States, 
 respecting whose crew some remarkable statements 
 have been made. Marshall (vol. ii, p. 1019) writes 
 that Commodore Decatur " declared there was not a 
 seaman in his ship who had not served from 5 to 12 
 years in a British man-of-war," from which he con- 
 cludes that they were British themselves. It may 
 be questioned whether Decatur ever made such an 
 assertion ; or if he did, it is safe to assume again 
 that his men were long-impressed Americans.' 
 
 ' At the beginning of the war there were on record in the American 
 State Department 6,257 cases of impressed American seamen. 
 These could represent but u small part of the whole, which must 
 have amounted to 20,000 men, or more than sufficient to man our 
 entire navy five times over. According to the British Admiralty 
 Report to the House of Commons, February i, 1815, 2,548 impressed 
 American seamen, who refused to serve against their country, were 
 imprisoned in i8i2. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in the 
 House, February i8, 1813, 3,300 men claiming to be American sub- 
 jects were serving in the British navy in January, 1811, and he 
 certainly did not give any thing like the whole number. In the 
 American sei-vice the term of enlistment extended for two years, and 
 the frigate. United States, referred to, had not had her crew for any 
 very great length of time as yet. If such a crew were selected at 
 random from American sailors, among them there would be, owing to 
 the small number serving in our own navy and the enormous number 
 impressed into the British navy, probably but one of the former to 
 two of the latter. As already mentioned the American always left a 
 British man-of-war as soon as he could, by desertion or discharge ; 
 but he had no unwillingness to serve in the home navy, where the pay 
 was larger, and the discipline far more humane, not to speak of mo- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 43 
 
 Of the Carolina's crew of 70 men, five were 
 British. This fact was not found out till three 
 deserted, when an investigation was made and the 
 two other British discharged. Captain Henly, in 
 reporting these facts, made no concealment of his 
 surprise that there should be any Briti-sh at all in 
 his crew.' 
 
 From these facts and citations we may according- 
 ly conclude that the proportion of British seamen 
 serving on American ships after the war broke out, 
 varied between none, as on the Wasp and Consti- 
 tution, to ten per cent., as on the Chesapeake and 
 Essex. On the average, nine tenths of each of our 
 crews were American seamen, and about one twen- 
 tieth British, the remainder being a mixture of 
 various nationalities. 
 
 On the other hand, it is to be said that the British 
 frigate Guerriire had ten Americans among her 
 crew, who were permitted to go below during ac- 
 tion, and the Macedonian eight, who were not al- 
 lowed that privilege, three of them being killed. 
 Three of the British sloop Peacock's men were 
 Americans, who were forced to fight against the 
 Hornet , one of them was killed. Two of the Eper- 
 vier's men were Americans, who were also forced to 
 fight. When the crew of the Nautilus was ex- 
 changed, a number of other American prisoners 
 were sent with them ; among these were a number 
 of American seamen who had been serving in the 
 Shannon, Acasta, Africa, and various other vessels. 
 
 lives of patriotism. Even if the ex-British man-of-war's man kept 
 out of service for some time, he would be very apt to enlist when a 
 war broke out, which his country undertook largely to avenge his own 
 wrongs. 
 
 'See his letter in " Letters of Masters' Commandant," 1814, i, 
 No. 116. 
 
44 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 So there was also a certain proportion of Americans 
 among the British crews, although forming a smaller 
 percentage of them than the British did on board 
 the American ships. In neither case was the num- 
 ber sufficient to at all affect the result. 
 
 The crews of our ships being thus mainly native 
 Americans, it may be interesting to try to find out 
 the proportions that were furnished by the different 
 sections of the country. There is not much diffi- 
 culty about the officers. The captains, masters 
 commandant, lieutenants, marine officers, whose 
 birthplaces are given in the Navy List of 1816, — 
 240 in all, — came from the various States as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 fN. H., 5] 
 New England ^;^f^; ^ }- 42 
 (^Conn., 6 J 
 
 fN. Y., 17 
 
 Middle States <^ ^- ^■' ^^ V 78 
 j Penn., 3c f '" 
 
 [Del, 
 District of Columbia {D. C, 
 
 fMd., 4 
 Va., 4 
 N. C, 
 Southern States-/ S. C, 16 )■ 116 
 Ga., 2 
 
 La., 
 iKy., 
 
 Total of given birthplaces 
 
 240 
 
 Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and 
 proportionately, the greatest number of officers Vir- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 45 
 
 ginia, then the most populous of all the States, com- 
 ing next; four fifths of the remainder came from the 
 Northern States. 
 
 It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of 
 the sailors. Something can be inferred from the 
 number of privateers and letters of marque fitted out. 
 Here Baltimore again headed the list ; following 
 closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the New 
 England coast towns, with, alone among the South- 
 ern ports, Charleston, S. C. A more accurate idea 
 of the quotas of sailors furnished by the different 
 sections can be arrived at by comparing the total 
 amount of tonnage the countrj' possessed at the out- 
 break of the war. Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of 
 it belonged to New England, 32 per cent, to the 
 Middle States, and 1 1 per cent, to Maryland. This 
 makes it probable (but of course not certain) 
 that three fourths of the common sailors hailed 
 from the Northern States, half the remainder from 
 Maryland^ and the rest chiefly from Virginia and 
 South Carolina. 
 
 Having thus discussed somewhat at length the 
 character of our ofificers and crews, it will now be 
 necessary to present some statistical tables to give 
 a more accurate idea of the composition of the 
 navy ; the tonnage, complements, and armaments of 
 the ships, etc. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the Government pos- 
 sessed six navy yards (all but the last established 
 in 1801) as follows : ' 
 
 'Report of Naval Secretary Jones, Nov. 30, 1814. 
 
46 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 
 Place. 
 
 
 Original cost. 
 
 Minimum number 
 of men employed. 
 
 I. 
 
 Portsmouth, N. 
 
 H., 
 
 $ S.5°° 
 
 10 
 
 2. 
 
 Charleston, Mass., 
 
 39.214 
 
 20 
 
 3- 
 
 New York, 
 
 
 40,000 
 
 102 
 
 4- 
 
 Philadelphia, 
 
 
 37,000 
 
 13 
 
 S- 
 
 Washington, 
 
 
 4,000 
 
 36 
 
 6. 
 
 Gosport, 
 
 
 12,000 
 
 16 
 
 In 1^12 the following was the number of officers 
 in the navy : ' 
 
 12 captains 
 
 10 masters commandant 
 73 lieutenants 
 53 masters 
 310 midshipmen 
 42 marine officers 
 
 500 
 
 At the opening of the year, the number of sea- 
 men, ordinary seamen, and boys in service was 
 4,010, and enough more were recruited to increase it 
 to 5,230, of whom only 2,346 were destined for the 
 cruising war vessels, the remainder being detailed 
 for forts, gun-boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc' The 
 marine corps was already ample, consisting of 1,523 
 men.' 
 
 No regular navy lists were published till 1816, 
 and I have been able to get very little information 
 respecting the increase in ofificers and men during 
 
 '" List of Vessels," etc., by Geo. H. Preble, U. S. N. (1874). 
 ' Report of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 2i, 1812. 
 ' Ibid. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 47 
 
 1813 and 1 8 14; but we have full returns for 1815, 
 which may be summarized as follows :' 
 
 30 captains, 
 
 25 masters commandant, 
 141 lieutenants, 
 24 commanders, 
 510 midshipmen, 
 230 sailing-masters, 
 50 surgeons, 
 12 chaplains, 
 50 pursers, 
 10 coast pilots, 
 45 captain's clerks, 
 80 surgeon's mates, 
 530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sail- 
 makers, 
 268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc., 
 1,106 quarter gunners, etc., 
 5,000 able seamen, 
 6,849 ordinary seamen and boys. 
 
 Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines.' 
 
 Comparing this list with the figures given before, 
 it can be seen that during the course of the war our 
 navy grew enormously, increasing to between three 
 and four times its original size. 
 
 At the beginning of the year 18 12, the navy of 
 the United States on the ocean consisted of the fol- 
 lowing vessels, which either were, or could have 
 been, made available during the war.^ 
 
 ' Seybert's "Statistical Annals," p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818). 
 
 ^ Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816. 
 
 ' Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Congress, Dec. 
 24, 179S ; Letter of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812 ; " Amer- 
 ican State Papers," vol. xix, p. 149. See also The " History of the 
 Navy of the United States," by Lieut. G. E. Emmons, U. S. N. 
 (published in Washington, MDCCCLin, under the authority of the 
 Navy Department.) 
 
48 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Rate 
 (Guns). 
 
 Name. 
 
 44 United States, 
 44 Constitution, 
 44 President, 
 38 Constellation, 
 38 Congress, 
 38 Chesapeake, 
 32 Essex, 
 28 Adams, 
 t8 Hornet, 
 18 fFijj^, 
 16 Argus, 
 16 Syren, 
 14 Nautilus, 
 14 Vixen, 
 12 Enterprise, 
 1 2 Viper, 
 
 Where Built. 
 
 Philadelphia, 
 
 Boston, 
 
 New York, 
 
 Baltimore, 
 
 Portsmouth, 
 
 Norfolk, 
 
 Salem, 
 
 New York, 
 
 Baltimore, 
 
 Washington, 
 
 Boston, 
 
 Philadelphia, 
 
 Baltimore, 
 
 Baltimore, 
 
 Baltimore, 
 
 Purchased, 
 
 When 
 Built. 
 
 1797 
 1797 
 1800 
 1797 
 1799 
 1799 
 1799 
 1799 
 1805 
 1806 
 1803 
 1803 
 1803 
 1803 
 1799 
 1810 
 
 Ton- 
 nage. 
 
 1576 
 
 ■1576 
 
 1576 
 
 1265 
 
 1268 
 
 1244 
 
 860 
 
 560 
 
 480 
 
 450 
 298 
 250 
 
 185 
 185 
 165 
 148 
 
 Cost. 
 
 ^299-336 
 302,718 
 220,910 
 314,212 
 197,246 
 220,677 
 
 i39>362 
 76,622 
 
 52,603 
 40,000 
 37,428 
 
 32,521 
 18,763 
 20,872 
 16,240 
 
 There also appeared on the lists the New York, 
 36, Boston, 28, and John Adams, 28. The two 
 former were condemned hulks ; the latter was en- 
 tirely rebuilt after the war. The Hornet was origi- 
 nally a brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns ; having been 
 transformed into a ship, she was pierced for 20 
 guns, and in size was of an intermediate grade 
 between the Wasp and the heavy sloops, built 
 somewhat later, of 509 tons. Her armament con- 
 sisted of 32-pound carronades, with the exception 
 of the two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The 
 whole broadside was in nominal weight just 300 
 pounds ; in actual weight about 277 pounds. Her 
 complement of men was 140, but during the war 
 she generally left port with 150.' The Wasp had 
 
 ' In the Homei'slog of Oct. 25, 1812, while in port, it is men- 
 tioned that she had 158 men ; four men who were sick were left be- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 49 
 
 been a ship from the beginning, mounted the 
 number of guns she rated (of the same calibres as 
 the Hornet's) 2,nd carried some ten men less. She 
 was about the same length as the British i8-gun 
 brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured nearly 30 
 tons less. The Argus and Syren were similar and 
 very fine brigs, the former being the longer. Each 
 carried two more guns than she rated ; and the 
 Argus, in addition, had a couple thrust through 
 the bridle-ports. The guns were 24-pound carron- 
 ades, with two long 12's for bow-chasers. The 
 proper complement of men was 100, but each sailed 
 usually with about 125. The four smaller craft 
 were originally schooners, armed with the same 
 number of light long guns as they rated, and carry- 
 ing some 70 men apiece ; but they had been very 
 effectually ruined by being changed into brigs, with 
 crews increased to a hundred men. Each was 
 armed with 18-pound carronades, carrying two more 
 than she rated. The Enterprise, in fact, mounted 
 16 guns, having two long nines thrust through the 
 bridle-ports. These little brigs were slow, not very 
 seaworthy, and overcrowded with men and guns ; 
 they all fell into the enemy's hands without doing 
 any good whatever, with the single exception of 
 the Enterprise, which escaped capture by sheer 
 good luck, and in her only battle happened to be 
 pitted against one of the corresponding and equally 
 bad class of British gun-brigs. The Adams after sev- 
 eral changes of form finally became a flush-decked 
 corvette. The Essex had originally mounted twenty- 
 six long 12's on her main-deck, and sixteen 24- 
 
 hind before she started. (See, in the Navy Archives, the Log-book, 
 Hornet, Wasp, and Argus, July 20, 1809, to Oct, 6, 1813.) 
 
50 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 pound carronades on her spar-deck; but official 
 wisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty- 
 four 32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on the 
 main-deck, and sixteen 32-pound carronades with 
 four long 12's on the spar-deck. When Captain 
 Porter had command of her he was deeply sensible 
 of the disadvantages of an armament which put him 
 at the mercy of any ordinary antagonist who could 
 choose his distance; accordingly he petitioned sev- 
 eral times, but always without success, to have his 
 ■'ong 12's returned to him. 
 
 The American 38's were about the size of the 
 British frigates of the same rate, and armed almost 
 exactly in the same way, each having 28 long i8's 
 on the main-deck and 20 32-pound carronades on 
 the spar-deck. The proper complement was 300 
 men, but each carried from 40 to 80 more.' 
 
 Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates 
 then afloat (although the British possessed some as 
 heavy, such as the Egyptienne, 44). They were 
 beautifully modelled, with very thick scantling, ex- 
 tremely stout masts, and heavy cannon. Each car- 
 ried on her main-deck thirty long 24's, and on her 
 
 ^ The Chesapeake, by some curious mistake, was frequently rated 
 as a 44, and this drew in its train a number of attendant errors. 
 When she was captured, James says that in one of her lockers was 
 found a letter, dated in Februaiy, 1811, from Robert Smith, the 
 Secretary of War, to Captain Evans, at Boston, directing him to 
 open houses of rendezvous for manning the Chesapeake, and enu- 
 merating her crew at a total of 443. Naturally this gave British histori- 
 ans the idea that such was the ordinary complement of our 38-gun 
 frigates. But the ordering so large a crew was merely a mistake, as may 
 be seen by a letter from Captain Bainbridge to the Secretary of the 
 Navy, which is given in full in the " Captains' Letters," vol. xxv, 
 No. 19 (Navy Archives). In it he mentions the extraordinary 
 number of men ordered for the Chesapeake, saying, " There is a 
 mistake in the crew ordered for the Chesapeake, as it equals in num- 
 ber the crews of our 44-gun frigates, whereas the Chesapeake is 
 of the class of the Congress and Constellation." 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 51 
 
 spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and twenty or 
 twenty-two carronades — 42-pounders on the Presi- 
 dent and United States, 32-pounders on the Constitu- 
 tion. Each sailed with a crew of about 450 men- — 
 50 in excess of the regular complement.' 
 
 It may be as well to mention here the only other 
 class of vessels that we employed during the war. 
 This was composed of the ship-sloops built in 1813, 
 which got to sea in 18 14. They were very fine ves- 
 sels, measuring 509 tons apiece," with very thick 
 scantling and stout masts and spars. Each carried 
 twenty 32-pound carronades and two long 12's 
 with a crew nominally of 160 men, but with usu- 
 ally a few supernumeraries.^ 
 
 The British vessels encountered were similiar, but 
 generally inferior, to our own. The only 24-pounder 
 frigate we encountered was the Endymion of about 
 a fifth less force than the President. Their 38-gun 
 frigates were almost exactly like ours, but with 
 fewer men in crew as a rule. They were three 
 
 ' The President when in action with the Endymion had 450 men 
 aboard, as sworn by Decatur ; the muster-roll of the Consii/zt/ion, a 
 few days before her action with the Guerriere contains 464 names (in- 
 cluding 51 marines) ; 8 men were absent in a prize, so she had aboard 
 in the action 456. Her muster-roll just before the action with the 
 Cyane and Levant shows 461 names. 
 
 ^The dimensions were 117 feet 11 inches upon the gun-deck, 97 
 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring from one foot before the 
 forward perpendicular and along the base line to the front of the 
 rabbet of tlie port, deducting 4 of the moulded breadth of the beam, 
 which is 31 feet 6 inches ; making sogf-i tons. (See in Ivavy 
 Archives, "Contracts," vol. ii, p. 137.) 
 
 'The Peacock had 166 men, as we learn from her commander 
 Warrington's, letter of June 1st (Letter No, 140 in '■ Masters' Com- 
 mandant Letters," 18 14, vol. i). The Frolic took aboard " 10 or 
 12 men beyond her regular complement " (see letter of Joseph Bain- 
 bridge, No. 51, in same vol.). Accordingly when she was captured 
 by the Orp/teus, the commander of the latter. Captain Hugli Pigot, 
 reported the number of men aboard to be 171. The Wasp left port 
 with 173 men, with which she fought her first action ; she had a 
 much smaller number aboard in her second. 
 
52 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 times matched ag-ainst our 44-gun frigates, to which 
 they were inferior about as three is to four. Their 
 36-gun frigates were larger than the Essex, with a 
 more numerous crew, but the same number of 
 guns ; carrying on the lower deck, however, long 
 l8's instead of 32-pound carronades, — a much more 
 effective armament. The 32-gun frigates were 
 smaller, with long 12's on the main-deck. The 
 largest sloops were also frigate-built, carrying 
 twenty-two 32-pound carronades on the main-deck, 
 and twelve lighter guns on the quarter-deck and 
 forecastle, with a crew of 180. The large flush- 
 decked ship-sloops carried 21 or 23 guns, with a 
 crew of 140 men. But our vessels most often 
 came in contact with the British i8-gun brig-sloop ; 
 this was a tubby craft, heavier than any of our 
 brigs, being about the size of the Hornet. The 
 crev/ consisted of from no to 135 men; ordinarily 
 each was armed with sixteen 32-pound carronades, 
 two long 6's, and a shifting 12-pound carronade ; 
 often with a light long gun as a stern-chaser, mak- 
 ing 20 in all. The Rcimicci- and Peacock had only 
 24-pound carronades ; the Epervier had but eighteen 
 guns, all carronades.' 
 
 Among the stock accusations against our navy of 
 1812, were, and are, statements that our vessels 
 were rated at less than their real force, and in par- 
 ticular that our large frigates were " disguised line- 
 of-battle ships." As regards the ratings, most ves- 
 .sels of that time carried more guns than they rated ; 
 
 'The Epervier WK'-, taken into our service under the same name 
 and rate. Both Preble and Emmons describe her as of 477 tons. 
 Warrington, her captor, however, says : " The surveyor of the port 
 has just measured the Epervier and reports her 467 tons." (In the 
 Navy Archives, " Masters' Commandant Letters," 1814, i, No. 125.) 
 
 For a full discussion of tonnage, see Appendix, A. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 53 
 
 the disparity was less in the French than in either 
 the British or American navies. Our 38-gun frigates 
 carried 48 guns, the exact number the British 38's 
 possessed. The worst case of underrating in our 
 navy was the Essex, which rated 32, and carried 
 46 guns, so that her real was 44 per cent, in excess 
 of her nominal force; but this was not as bad as the 
 British sloop Cyanc, which was rated a 20 or 22, 
 and carried 34 guns, so that she had either 55 or 70 
 per cent, greater real than nominal force. At the 
 beginning of the war we owned two i8-gun ship- 
 sloops, one mounting 18 and the other 20 guns; 
 the i8-gun brig-sloops they captured mounted each 
 19 guns, so the average was the same. Later 
 we built sloops that rated 18 and mounted 22 guns, 
 but when one was captured it was also put down in 
 the British navy list as an i8-gun ship-sloop. Dur- 
 ing all the combats of the war there were but four 
 vessels that carried as few guns as they rated. Two 
 were British, the Epervier and Levant, and two 
 American, the Wasp and Adams. One navy was cer- 
 tainly as deceptive as another, as far as underrating 
 went. 
 
 The force of the statement that our large frigates 
 were disguised line-of-battle ships, of course depends 
 entirely upon what the words " frigate " and " line-of- 
 battle ship" mean. When on the loth of August, 
 1653, De Ruyter saved a great convo\.- by beating 
 off Sir George Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail, the largest 
 of the Dutch admiral's " 33 sail of the line " carried 
 but 30 guns and 150 men, and his. own flag-ship but 
 28 guns and 134 men.' The Dutch book from 
 
 ' " La Vie et les Actions Memorables duSr. Michel de Ruyter, a 
 Amsterdam, Chez Henry et Theodore Boom, MDCLXXVii. The work 
 is by Barthelemy Pielat, a surgeon in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally 
 
54 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 which this statement is taken speaks indifferently of 
 frigates of i8, 40, and 58 guns. Toward the end of 
 the eighteenth century the terms had crystalHzed. 
 Frigate then meant a so-called single-decked ship ; 
 it in reality possessed two decks, the main- or gun- 
 deck, and the upper one, which had no name at all, 
 until our sailors christened it spar-deck. The gun- 
 deck possessed a complete battery, and the spar- 
 deck an interrupted one, mounting guns on the 
 forecastle and quarter-deck. At that time all " two- 
 decked " or " three-decked " (in reality three- and 
 four-decked) ships were liners. But in 1812 this liad 
 changed somewhat ; as the various nations built 
 more and more powerful vessels, the lower rates of 
 the different divisions were dropped. Thus the 
 British ship Cyane, captured by the Constitution, 
 was in reality a small frigate, with a main-deck 
 battery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar- 
 deck ; a few years before she would have been 
 called a 24-gun frigate, but she then ranked merely 
 as a 22-gun sloop. Similarly the 50- and 64-gun 
 ships that had fought in the line at the Doggerbank, 
 Camperdown, and even at Aboukir, were now no 
 longer deemed fit for that purpose, and the 74 was 
 the lowest line-of-battle ship. 
 
 The Constitution, President, and States must then 
 be compared with the existing European vessels 
 that were classed as frigates. The French in 1812 
 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very good rea- 
 son that they had all fallen victims to the English 
 i8-pounder's ; but in July of that year a Danish frig- 
 ate, the Nayaden, which carried long 24's, was de- 
 stroyed by the English ship Dictator, 64. 
 
 present during many of his battles. It is written in French, but is in 
 lone more strongly anti-French than anti-English. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 55 
 
 The British frigates were of several rates. The 
 lowest rated 33, carrying in all 40 guns, 26 long 12's 
 on the main-deck and 14 24-pound carronades on the 
 spar-deck — a broadside of 324 pounds.' The 36-gun 
 frigates, like the Phoebe, carried 46 guns, 26 long 
 i8's on the gun-deck and 32-pound carronades 
 above. The 38-gun frigates, like the Macedonian, 
 carried 48 or 49 guns, long i8's below and 32-pound 
 carronades above. The 32-gun frigates, then, pre- 
 sented in broadside 13 long 12's below and 7 24- 
 pound carronades above ; the 38-gun frigates, 14 
 long i8's below and 10 32-pound carronades above; so 
 that a 44-gun frigate would naturally present 15 long 
 24's below and 12 42-pound carronades above, as the 
 United States did at first. The rate was perfectly 
 proper, for French, British, and Danes already pos- 
 sessed 24-pounder frigates ; and there was really less 
 disparity between the force and rate of a 44 that car- 
 ried 54 guns, than there was in a 38 that carried 
 49, or, like the Shannon, 52. Nor was this all. 
 Two of our three victories were won by the Con- 
 stitution, which only carried 32-pound carronades, 
 and once 54 and once 52 guns ; and as two thirds of 
 the work was thus done by this vessel, I shall now 
 compare her with the largest British frigates. ■ Her 
 broadside force consisted of 15 long 24's on the main- 
 deck, and on the spar-deck one long 24, and in one 
 case 10, in the other 1 1 32-pound carronades — a 
 broadside of 704 or 736 pounds." There was then in 
 the British navy the Acasta, 40, carrying in broad- 
 side 15 long i8's and 11 32-pound carronades; when 
 
 ' In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's or g's sub- 
 stituted for the bow-chase carronades. 
 
 " Nominally ; in reality about 7 per cent, less on account of the 
 short weight in the metal. 
 
56 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 the spar-deck batteries are equal, the addition of go 
 pounds to the main-deck broadside (which is all the 
 superiority of the Constitution over the Acasta) 
 is certainly not enough to make the distinction be- 
 tween a frigate and a disguised 74. But not consid- 
 ering the Acasta, there were in the British navy 
 three 24-pounder frigates, the Cornwallis, Inde- 
 fatigable, and Endymion. We only came in con- 
 tact with the latter in 181 5, when the Constitu- 
 tion- had but 52 guns. The Endymion then had 
 an armament of 28 long 24's, 2 long i8's, and 
 20 32-pound carronades, making a broadside of 674 
 pounds,' or including a shifting 24-pound carronade, 
 of 698 pounds — just six pounds, or i per cent., less 
 than the force of that " disguised line-of-battle 
 ship " the Constitution ! As the Endymion only 
 rated as a 40, and the Constitution as a 44, 
 it was in reality the former and not the latter 
 which was underrated. I have taken the Constitu- 
 tion, because the British had more to do with 
 her than they did with our other two 44's 
 taken together. The latter were both of heavier 
 metal than the Constitution, carrying 42-pound 
 carronades. In 1812 the United States carried 
 her full 54 guns, throwing a broadside of 846 pounds ; 
 when captured, the President carried 53, having 
 substituted a 24-pound carronade for two of her 42's, 
 and her broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or 16 per 
 cent, nominal, and, on account of the short weight 
 of her shot, 9 per cent, real excess over the Endym- 
 ion. If this difference made her a line-of-bat- 
 tle ship, then the Endymion was doubly a line-of- 
 
 ' According to James 664 pounds : he omits the chase guns for no 
 reason. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 57 
 
 battle ship compared to the Congress or Con- 
 stellation. Moreover, the American commanders 
 found their 42-pound carronades too heavy ; as I 
 have said the Constitution only mounted 32's, 
 and the United States landed 6 of her guns. 
 When, in 1813, she attempted to break the block- 
 ade, she carried but 48 guns, throwing a broadside 
 of 720 pounds — just 3 per cent, more than the 
 Endymion} If our frigates were line-of-battle 
 ships the disguise was certainly marvellously com- 
 plete, and they had a number of companions equally 
 disguised in the British ranks. 
 
 The 44's were thus trtie frigates, with one com- 
 plete battery of long guns and one interrupted one 
 of carronades. That they were better than any 
 other frigates was highly creditable to our ingenuity 
 and national skill. We cannot, perhaps, lay claim 
 to the invention and first use of the heavy frigate, 
 for 24-pounder frigates were already in the service 
 of at least three nations, and the French 36-pound 
 carronnade, in use on their spar-decks, threw a 
 heavier ball than our 42-pounder. But we had en- 
 larged and perfected the heavy frigate, and were the 
 first nation that ever used it effectively. The 
 French Forte and the Danish Nayadcn shared 
 the fate of ships carrying guns of lighter calibre ; 
 and the British 24-pounders, like the Endymion 
 had never accomplished any thing. Hitherto there 
 
 ' It was on account of this difference of 3 per cent, tfiat Captain 
 Hardy refused to allow the Endymion to meet the States 
 (James, vi, p. 470). This was during the course of some challenges 
 and counter-challenges which ended in nothing, Decatur in his turn 
 being unwilling to have the Macedonian meet the Statira, un- 
 less the latter should agree not to take on a picked crew. He was 
 perfectly right in this ; but he ought never to have sent the challenge 
 at all, as two ships but an hour or two out of port would be at a 
 frightful disadvantage in a fight. 
 
58 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 had been a strong feeling, especially in England, 
 that an i8-pound gun was as effective as a 24- in arm- 
 ing a frigate ; we made a complete revolution in this 
 respect. England had been building only 18- 
 pounder vessels when she ought to have been build- 
 ing 24-pounders. It was greatly to our credit that 
 our average frigate was superior to the average Brit- 
 ish frigate ; exactly as it was to our discredit that the 
 Essex was so ineffectively armed. Captain Por- 
 ter owed his defeat chiefly to his ineffective guns, 
 but also to having lost his topmast, to the weather 
 being unfavorable, and, still more, to the admirable 
 skill with which Hilyarused his superior armament. 
 The Java, Macedonian, and Guerriire owed 
 their defeat partly to their lighter guns, but much 
 more to the fact that their captains and seamen did 
 not display either as good seamanship or as good 
 gunnery as their foes. Inferiority in armament was 
 a factor to be taken into account in all the four 
 cases, but it was more marked in that of the 
 Essex than in the other three ; it would have 
 been fairer for Porter to say that he had been cap- 
 tured by a line-of-battle ship, than for the captain 
 of the Java to make that assertion. In this last 
 case the forces of the two ships compared almost 
 exactly as their rates. A 44 was matched against a 
 38 ; it was not surprising that she should win, but 
 it was surprising that she should win with ease and 
 impunity. The long 24's on the Constitution's 
 gun-deck no more made her a line-of-battle ship than 
 the 32-pound carronades mounted on an English 
 frigate's quarter-deck and forecastle made her a line- 
 of-battle ship when opposed to a Frenchman with 
 only 8's and 6's on his spar-deck. When, a few 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 59 
 
 years before, the English Phcebe had captured 
 the French Nereide, their broadsides were re- 
 spectively 407 and 258 pounds, a greater disparity 
 than in any of our successful fights ; yet no author 
 thought of claiming that the Phcebc was any 
 thing but a frigate. So with the Clyde, throwing 
 425 lbs., which took the Vestale, throwing but 
 246. The facts were that i8-pounder frigates had 
 captured 12-pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in 
 turn captured the i8-pounders. 
 
 Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, 
 one of her i8-pounder frigates, the San Florenzo, 
 throwing 476 lbs. in a broadside, captured the 12- 
 pounder French frigate Psyche, whose broadside 
 was only 246 lbs. The force of the former was thus 
 almost double that of the latter, yet the battle was 
 long and desperate, the English losing 48 and the 
 French 124 men. ' This conflict, then, reflected as 
 much credit on the skill and seamanship of the 
 defeated as of the victorious side; the difference in 
 loss could fairly be ascribed to the difference in 
 weight of metal. But where, as in the famous ship- 
 duels of 1812, the difference in force is only a fifth, 
 instead of a half, and yet the slaughter, instead of 
 being as five is to two, is as six to one, then the 
 victory is certainly to be ascribed as much to 
 superiority in skill as to superiority in force. But, 
 on the other hand, it should always be remembered 
 that there was a very decided superiority in force. 
 It is a very discreditable feature of many of our 
 naval histories that they utterly ignore this superi- 
 ority, seeming ashamed to confess that it existed. 
 In reality it was something to be proud of. It was 
 highly to the credit of the United States that her 
 
60 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 frigates were of better make and armament than any 
 others ; it always speaks well for a nation's energy 
 and capacity that any of her implements of warfare 
 are of superior kind. This is a perfectly legitimate 
 reason for pride. 
 
 It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that they 
 opposed breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders of the 
 Austrians ; but it would be folly to give all the 
 credit of the victory to the breech-loaders and none 
 to Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it must be 
 remembered that iy^o things contributed to our 
 victories. One was the excellent make and arma- 
 ment of our ships ; the other was the skilful sea- 
 manship, excellent discipline, and superb gunnery 
 of the men who were in them. British writers are 
 apt only to speak of the first, and Americans only 
 of the last, whereas both should be taken into con- 
 sideration. 
 
 To sum up : the American 44-gun frigate was a 
 true frigate, in build and armament, properly rated, 
 stronger than a 38-gun frigate just about in the pro- 
 portion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding in strength 
 an 18-pounder frigate as much as the latter ex- 
 ceeded one carrying 12-pounders. They were in no 
 way whatever line-of-battle ships ; but they were 
 superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what is 
 still more important, they were better manned and 
 commanded than the average frigate of any other 
 navy. Lord Codrington says (" Memoirs," i, p. 3 10) : 
 " But I well know the system of favoritism and 
 borough corruption prevails so very much that 
 many people are promoted and kept in command 
 that should be dismissed the service, and while such 
 is the case the few Americans chosen for their 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 6 1 
 
 merit may be expected to follow up their successes 
 except where they meet with our best officers on 
 even terms." ' The small size of our navy was 
 probably to a certain extent effective in keeping it 
 up to a high standard ; but this is not the only 
 explanation, as can be seen by Portugal's small and 
 poor navy. On the other hand, the champions or 
 pick of a large navy ought to be better than the 
 champions of a small one." 
 
 ^ To show that I an not quoting an authority biassed in our favor I 
 will give Sir Edward Codrington's opinion of our rural better class 
 (i, 31S). " It is curious to observe the animosity which prevails here 
 among what is called the better order of people, which I think is 
 more a misnomer here than in any other country I have ever been. 
 Their whig and toiy are democrat and federalist, and it would seem 
 for the sake of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which marks 
 the Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term) who 
 takes possession of a property adopts the opposite political creed to 
 that of his nearest neighbor." 
 
 ° In speaking of tonnage I wish I could have got better authority 
 than James for the British side of the question. He is so bitter that 
 it involuntarily gives one a distrust of his judgment. Thus, in speak- 
 ing of the Penguin s capture, he, in endeavoring to show that the 
 Hornet's loss was greater than she acknowledged, says, " several 
 of the dangerously wounded were thrown overboard because the sur- 
 geon was afraid to amputate, owing to his want of experience" 
 {" Naval Occurrences," 492). Now what could persuade a writer to 
 make such a foolish accusation ? No matter how utterly depraved and 
 brutal Captain Biddle might be, he would certainly not throw his 
 wounded over alive because he feared they might die. Again, in vol. 
 vi, p. 546, he says : " Captain Stewart had caused the Cyane to be 
 painted to resemble a 36-gun frigate. The object of this was to 
 aggrandize his exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston." 
 No matter how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no matter 
 how great the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, the Cyane 
 (which by the way went to New York and not Boston) could no more 
 be painted to look like a 36-gun frigate than a schooner could be 
 painted to look like a brig. Instances of rancor like these two occur 
 constantly in his work, and make it very difficult to separate what is 
 matter of fact from what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the 
 British official accounts when they can be reached, except in the case 
 of the jfava, which seem garbled. That such was sometimes the 
 case with British officials is testified to by both James (vol. iv, p. 17) 
 and Brenton (vol. ii, p. 454, note). From the " Memoir of Admiral 
 Broke" we leam that his public letter was wrong in a number 
 of particulars. See also any one of the numerous biographies of 
 Lord Dundonald, the hero of the little Speedy's fight. It is very 
 
62 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Again, the armaments of the American as well as 
 of the British ships were composed of three very 
 different styles of guns. The first, or long gun, was 
 enormously long and thick-barrelled in comparison 
 to its bore, and in consequence very heavy ; it pos- 
 sessed a very long range, and varied in calibre from 
 two to forty-two pounds. The ordinary calibres in 
 our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24. The second 
 style was the carronade, a short, light gun of large 
 bore ; compared to a long gun of the same weight 
 it carried a much heavier ball for a much shorter 
 distance. The chief calibres were 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 
 42, and 68-pounders, the first and the last being 
 hardly in use in our navy. The third style was the 
 columbiad, of an intermediate grade between the 
 first two. Thus it is seen that a gun of one style 
 by no means corresponds to a gun of another style 
 of the same calibre. As a rough example, a long 
 12, a columbiad 18, and a 32-pound carronade would 
 be about equivalent to one another. These guns 
 were mounted on two different types of vessel. 
 The first was flush-decked ; that is, it had a single 
 straight open deck on which all the guns were 
 mounted. This class included one heavy corvette, 
 (the Adams), the ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. 
 
 unfortunate that the British stopped publishing official accounts of 
 their defeats ; it could not well help giving rise to unpleasant sus- 
 picions. 
 
 It may be as well to imention here, again, that James' accusations 
 do not really detract from the interest attaching to the war, and its 
 value for purposes of study. If, as he says, the American com- 
 manders were cowards, and their crews renegades, it is well worth 
 while to learn the lesson that good training will make such men able 
 to beat brave officers with loyal crews. And why did the British 
 have such bad average crews as he makes out? He says, for instance, 
 that the Java's was unusually bad ; yet Brenton says (vol. ii, p. 
 461) it was like " the generality of our crews." It is worth while ex- 
 plaining the reason that such ss. crew was generally better than a 
 Feench and worse than an American one. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 63 
 
 Through the bow-chase port, on each side> each of 
 these mounted a long gun ; the rest of their guns 
 were carronades, except in the case of the Adams, 
 which had all long guns. Above these came the 
 frigates, whose gun-deck was covered above by 
 another deck ; on the fore and aft parts (forecastle 
 and quarter-deck) of this upper, open deck were 
 also mounted guns. The main-deck guns were all 
 long, except on the Essex, which had carronades; 
 on the quarter-deck were mounted carronades, and 
 on the forecastle also carronades, with two long 
 bow-chasers. 
 
 Where two ships of similar armament fought one 
 another, it is easy to get the comparative force by 
 simply comparing the weight in broadsides, each 
 side presenting very nearly the same proportion of 
 long guns to carronades. For such a broadside we 
 take half the guns mounted in the ordinary way ; 
 and all guns mounted on pivots or shifting. Thus 
 Perry's force in guns was 54 to Barclay's 63 ; yet 
 each presented 34 in broadside. Again, each of the 
 British brig-sloops mounted 19 guns, presenting 10 
 in broadside. Besides these, some ships mounted 
 bow-chasers run through the bridle-ports, or stern- 
 chasers, neither of which could be used in broad- 
 sides. Nevertheless, I include them, both because it 
 works in about an equal number of cases against 
 each navy, and because they were sometimes ter- 
 ribly effective. James excludes the Guerriire s 
 bow-chaser ; in reality he ought to have included 
 both it and its fellow, as they worked more damage 
 than all the broadside guns put together. Again, 
 he excludes the Endymion s bow-chasers, though 
 in her action they proved invaluable. Yet he in- 
 
64 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 eludes those of the Enterprise and Argus, though 
 the former's were probably not fired. So I shall 
 take the half of the fixed, plus all the movable guns 
 aboard, in comparing broadside force. 
 
 But the chief difificulty appears when guns of one 
 style are matched against those of another. If a 
 a ship armed with long 12's, meets one armed with 
 32-pound carronades, which is superior in force? At 
 long range the first, and at short range the second ; 
 and of course each captain is pretty sure to insist 
 that " circumstances " forced him to fight at a dis- 
 advantage. The result would depend largely on 
 the skill or luck of each commander in choosing 
 position. 
 
 One thing is certain ; long guns are more formid- 
 able than carronades of the same calibre. There are 
 exemplifications of this rule on both sides ; of course, 
 American writers, as a rule, only pay attention to 
 one set of cases, and British to the others. The 
 Cyane and Levant threw a heavier broadside than 
 the Constitution but were certainly less formidably 
 armed ; and the^^^^";!; threw a heavier broadside than 
 the P/icebe, yet was also less formidable. On Lake 
 Ontario the American ship General Pike threw less 
 metal at a broadside than either of her two chief 
 antagonists, but neither could be called her equal ; 
 while on Lake Champlain a parallel case is aflorded 
 by the British ship Confiance. Supposing that two 
 ships throw the same broadside weight of metal, one 
 from long guns, the other from carronades, at short 
 range they are equal ; at long, one has it all her 
 own way. Her captain thus certainly has a great 
 superiority of force, and if he does not take ad- 
 vantage of it it is owing to his adversary's skill or 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 65 
 
 his own mismanagement. As a mere approxima- 
 tion, it may be assumed, in comparing the broad- 
 sides of two vessels or squadrons, that long guns 
 count for at least twice as much as carronades of 
 the same calibre. Thus on Lake Champlain Cap- 
 tain Downie possessed an immense advantage in 
 his long guns, which Commodore Macdonough's 
 exceedingly good arrangements nullified. Some- 
 times part of the advantage may be willingly fore- 
 gone, so as to acquire some other. Had the 
 Constitution kept at long bowls with the Cyanc 
 and Levant she could have probably captured 
 one without any loss to herself, while the 
 other ' would have escaped ; she preferred to run 
 down close so as to insure the capture of both, 
 knowing that even at close quarters long guns 
 are somewhat better than short ones (not to men- 
 tion her other advantages in thick scantling, speed, 
 etc.). The British carronades often upset in ac- 
 tion ; this was either owing to their having been 
 insufficiently secured, and to this remaining undis- 
 covered because the men were not exercised at 
 the 'guns, or else it was because the unpractised 
 sailors would greatly overcharge them. Our bet- 
 ter-trained sailors on the ocean rarely committed 
 these blunders, but the less-skilled crews on the 
 lakes did so as often as their antagonists. 
 
 But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had. 
 heavier and better-fitted guns, they labored under 
 one or two disadvantages. Our foundries were gen- 
 erally not as good as those of the British, and our 
 guns, in consequence, more likely to burst ; it was 
 an accident of this nature which saved the British 
 Belvidera ; and the Getteral Pike, under Com- 
 
66 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 modore Chauncy, and the new American frigate 
 Guerriire suffered in the same way; while often 
 the muzzles of the guns would crack. A more uni- 
 versal disadvantage was in the short weight of 
 our shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the Avon 
 he officially reported that her four shot which came 
 aboard weighed just 32 pounds apiece, a pound and 
 three quarters more than his heaviest ; this would 
 make his average shot about 2^ pounds less, or 
 rather over 7 per cent. Exactly similar statements 
 were made by the officers of the Constitution in 
 her three engagements. Thus when she fought 
 the Java, she threw at a broadside, as already 
 stated, 704 pounds ; the Java mounted 28 long 
 iS's, 18 32-pound carronades, 2 long 12's, and one 
 shifting 24-pound carronade, a broadside of 573 
 pounds. Yet by the actual weighing of all the 
 different shot on both sides it was found that the 
 difference in broadside force was only about "JJ 
 pounds, or the Constitution s shot were about 7 per 
 cent, short weight. The long 24's of the United 
 States each threw a shot but 4j{ pounds heavier 
 than the long i8's of the Macedonian , here again 
 the difference was about 7 per cent. The same dif- 
 erence existed in favor of the Penguin and Epervier 
 compared with the Wasp and Hornet. Mr. Feni- 
 more Cooper' weighed a great number of .shot 
 some time after the war. The later castings, even, 
 weighed nearly 5 per cent, less than the British shot, 
 and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent. The 
 average is safe to take at 7 per cent, less, and I shall 
 throughout make this allowance for ocean cruisers. 
 The deficit was sometimes owing to windage, but 
 
 ' See "Naval History," i, p. 380. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 67 
 
 more often the shot was of full size but defective 
 in density. The effect of this can be gathered from 
 the following quotation from the work of a British 
 artillerist : " The greater the density of shot of like 
 calibres, projected with equal velocity and elevation, 
 the greater the range, accuracy, and penetration." ' 
 This defectiveness in density might be a serious in- 
 jury in a contest at a long distance, but would make 
 but little difference at close quarters (although it may 
 have been partly owing to their short weight that 
 so many of the Chesapeake's shot failed to penetrate 
 the Shannon s hull). Thus in the actions with the 
 Macedonian and Java the American frigates showed 
 excellent practice when the contest was carried on 
 within fair distance, while their first broadsides at 
 long range went very wild ; but in the case of the 
 Guerribre, the Constitution reserved her fire for close 
 quarters, and was probably not at all affected by the 
 short weight of her shot. 
 
 As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, 
 the following was the regular complement estab- 
 lished by law: " 
 
 1 captain, i purser, 
 4 lieutenants, i surgeon, 
 
 2 lieutenants of marines, 2 surgeon's mates, 
 2 sailing-masters, i clerk, 
 
 2 master's mates, i carpenter, 
 
 7 midshipmen, 2 carpenter's mates, 
 
 ^ " Heavy Ordnance," Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A., London, 1S37. 
 James supposes that the "Yankee captains" have in each case 
 hunted round till they could get particularly small American shot to 
 weigh ; and also denies that short weight is a disadvantage. The 
 last proposition carried out logically would lead to some rather as- 
 tonishing results. 
 
 ^ See State Papers, vol. xiv, 159 (Washington, 1834). 
 
68 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 1 boatswain, i cook, 
 
 2 boatswain's mates, i chaplain. 
 I yeoman of gun-room, 
 
 I gunner, 5° 
 
 Ti quarter gunners, 120 able seamen, 
 
 I coxswain, 150 ordinary seamen, 
 
 II sailmaker, 30 boys, 
 
 I cooper, 50 marines. 
 
 1 steward, 
 
 1 armorer, 4°° i" ^-H- 
 
 1 master of arms. 
 
 An i8-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 
 30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 
 20 marines — 140 in all. Sometimes ships put to sea 
 without their full complements (as in the case of 
 the fiirst Wasp),, but more often with supernu- 
 meraries aboard. The weapons for close quarters 
 were pikes, cutlasses, and a few axes ; while the ma- 
 rines and some of the toomen had muskets, and 
 occasionally rifles. 
 
 In comparing the forces of the contestants I have 
 always given the number of men in crew ; but this 
 in most cases was unnecessary. When there were 
 plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails, 
 make repairs, act as marines, etc., any additional 
 number simply served to increase the slaughter on 
 board. The Guerriere undoubtedly suffered from 
 being short-handed, but neither the Alaccdonian nor 
 Java would have been benefited by the presence of 
 a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about 
 as many men as Perry, but this did not give him an 
 equality of force. The Penguin and Frolic would 
 have been taken just as surely had the Hornet and 
 Wa'ip had a dozen men less apiece than they did. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 69 
 
 The principal case where numbers would help would 
 be in a hand-to-hand fight. Thus the Chesapeake 
 having fifty more men than the Shannon ought to 
 have been successful ; but she was not, because the 
 superiority of her crew in numbers was more than 
 counterbalanced by the superiority of the Shan- 
 non s crew in other respects. The result of the 
 battle of Lake Champlain, which was fought at 
 anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry to 
 reach, was not in the slightest degree affected by 
 the number of men on either side, as both com- 
 batants had amply enough to manage the guns and 
 perform every other service. 
 
 In all these conflicts the courage of both parties 
 is taken for granted ; it was not so much a factor in 
 gaining the victory, as one which if lacking was 
 fatal to all chances of success. In the engagements 
 between regular cruisers, not a single one was gained 
 by superiority in courage. The crews of both the 
 Argus and Epervier certainly flinched ; but had they 
 fought never so bravely they were too unskilful to 
 win. The Chesapeake s crew could hardly be said to 
 lack courage ; it was more that they were inferior 
 to their opponents in discipline as well as in skill. 
 
 There was but one conflict during the war where 
 the victory could be said to be owing to superiority 
 in pluck. This was when the Neiifchatel privateer 
 beat off the boats of the Endymion. The privateers- 
 men suffered a heavier proportional loss than their 
 assailants, and they gained the victory by sheer 
 ability to stand punishment. 
 
 For convenience in comparing them I give in 
 tabulated form the force of the three British 38's 
 taken by American 44's (allowing for short weight 
 of metal of latter). 
 
^o 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 CONSTITUTION. 
 
 30 long 24's, 
 
 2 long 24's, 
 
 22 short 32's. 
 
 Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs. 
 real, 684 lbs. 
 
 GUERRlfeRE. 
 
 30 long i8's, 
 2 long 12's, 
 
 16 short 32's, 
 I short 18. 
 
 Broadside, 556 lbs. 
 
 UNITED STATES. 
 
 30 long 24's, 
 
 2 long 24's, 
 
 22 short 42's. 
 
 Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs. 
 real, 786 lbs. 
 
 MACEDONIAN. 
 
 28 long i8's, 
 2 long 12's, 
 2 long 9's, 
 
 16 short 32's, 
 I short 18. 
 
 Broadside, 547 lbs. 
 
 CONSTITUTION. 
 
 20 long 24's, 
 
 2 long 24's, 
 
 20 short 32's. 
 
 Broadside, nominal. 704 lbs. 
 real, 654 lbs. 
 
 JAVA. 
 
 28 long i8's, 
 2 long 12's, 
 
 18 short 32's, 
 I short 24. 
 
 Broadside, 576 lbs. 
 
 The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with only 
 long i8's on the second deck, was armed as follows: 
 
 28 long 32's, 
 28 " iS's, 
 
 6 " 12's, 
 14 short 32's, 
 
 7 " i8's. 
 
 or a broadside of 1,032 lbs., 736 from long guns, 296 
 from carronades ; while the Constitution threw (in 
 reality) 684 lbs., 356 from long guns, and 328 from 
 her carronades, and the United States 102 lbs. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. /r 
 
 more from her carronades. Remembering the dif- 
 ference between long guns and carronades, and con- 
 sidering sixteen of the 74's long i8's as being 
 replaced by 42-pound carronades' (so as to get the 
 metal on the ships distributed in similar proportions 
 between the two styles of cannon), we get as the 
 74's broadside 592 lbs from long guns, and 632 from 
 carronades. The United States threw nominally 
 360 and 486, and the Constitution nominally 360 
 and 352 ; so the 74 was superior even to the former 
 nominally about as three is to two ; while the Con- 
 stitution, if " a line-of-battle ship," was disguised 
 to such a degree that she was in reality of but little 
 more than one half the force of one of the smallest 
 true liners England possessed ! 
 
 ' That this change would leave the force about as it was, can be 
 gathered from the fact that the Adams and jfohn Adams both of 
 which had been armed with 42-pound carronades (which were sent to 
 Sackett's Harbor), had them replaced by long and medium 18- 
 pounders, these being considered to be more formidable ; so that the 
 substitution of 42-pound carronades would, if any thing, reduce the 
 force of the 74. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 1812. 
 
 ON THE OCEAN. 
 
 Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccesful chase of the Belvidera — Cruise 
 of the ^iwjr— Captain Hull's cruise, and escape from the squadron of Com- 
 modore Broke — Constitution captures Guerrihre — ]Vasp captures Frolic — 
 Second unsuccessful cruise of Commodore Rodgers — United States cap- 
 tures Macedonian — Constitution captu es Java — Essex starts on a cruise — 
 Summary. 
 
 AT the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 
 18 1 2, the American navy was but partially- 
 prepared for effective service. The Wasp, 18, was 
 still at sea, on her return voyage from France ; the 
 Constellation 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river, 
 unable to receive a crew for several months to come ; 
 the Chesapeake, 38, was lying in a similar condition in 
 Boston harbor ; the Adams, 28, was at Washington, 
 being cut down and lengthened from a frigate into a 
 corvette. These three cruisers were none of them 
 fit to go to sea till after the end of the year. The 
 Essex, 32, was in New York harbor, but, having some 
 repairs to make, was not yet ready to put out. The 
 Constitution, 44, was at Annapolis, without all of 
 her stores, and engaged in shipping a new crew, the 
 time of the old one being up. The Nautilus, 14, 
 was cruising off New Jersey, and the other small 
 brigs were also off the coast. The only vessels im- 
 mediately available were those under the command 
 of Commodore Rodgers, at New York, consisting of 
 
 72 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 73 
 
 his own ship, the President, 44, and of the United 
 States, 44, Commodore Decatur, Congress, 38, Cap- 
 tain Smith, Hornet, 18, Captain Lawrence, and Argtis, 
 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It seems marvellous that any 
 nation should have permitted its ships to be so scat- 
 tered, and many of them in such an unfit condition, 
 at the beginning of hostilities. The British vessels 
 cruising off the coast were not at that time very nu- 
 merous or formidable, consisting of the Africa, 64, 
 Acasta, 40, Shannon, 38, Guerriire, 38, Belvidera, 36, 
 ^olus, 32, Southampton, 32, and Minerva, 32, with a 
 number of corvettes and sloops ; their force was, 
 however, strong enough to render it impossible for 
 Commodore Rodgers to make any attempt on the 
 coast towns of Canada or the West Indies. But 
 the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed from 
 Jamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by 
 the Thalia, 36, Capt. Vashon, and Reindeer, 18, 
 Capt. Manners. Its capture or destruction would 
 have been a serious blow, and one which there 
 seemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet would 
 have to pass along the American coast, running with 
 the Gulf Stream. Commodore Rodgers had made 
 every preparation, in expectation of war being de- 
 clared, and an hour after ofificial intelligence of it, 
 together with his instructions, had been received, his 
 squadron put to sea, on June 21st, and ran off toward 
 the south-east' to get at the Jamaica ships. Having 
 learned from an American brig that she had passed 
 the plate fleet four days before in lat. 36° N., long. 
 67" W., the Commodore made all sail in that direc- 
 tion. At 6 A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, 
 Sept. I, 1812. 
 
74 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 in the N. E., which proved to be the British frigate 
 Belvidera, 36, Capt. Richard Byron.' . The latter 
 had sighted some of Commodore Rodgers' squadron 
 some time before, and stood toward them, till at 6.30 
 she made out the three largest ships to be frigates. 
 Having been informed of the likelihood of war by 
 a New York pilot boat, the Belvidera now stood 
 away, going N. E. by E., the wind being fresh from 
 the west. The Americans made all sail in chase, the 
 President, a very fast ship off the wind, leading, and 
 the Congress coming next. At noon the President 
 bore S. W., distant 2^ miles from the Belvidera, 
 Nantucket shoals bearing 100 miles N. and 48 miles 
 E.'' The wind grew lighter, shifting more toward 
 the south-west, while the ships continued steaciily 
 in their course, going N. E. by E. As the President 
 kept gaining. Captain Byron cleared his ship for ac- 
 tion, and shifted to the stern ports two long eighteen 
 pounders on the main-deck and two thirty-two pound 
 carronades on the quarter-deck. 
 
 At 4:30' the President' s starboard forecastle bow- 
 gun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself ; 
 the corresponding main-deck gun was next dis- 
 charged, and then Commodore Rodgers fired again. 
 These three shots all struck the stern of the Bel- 
 videra, killing and wounding nine men, — one of 
 them went through the rudder coat, into the after 
 gun-room, the other two into the captain's cabin. 
 A few more such shots would have rendered the 
 Belvidera s capture certain, but when the Presi- 
 
 ' Brenton, v. 46. 
 
 ' Log of Belvidera, June 23, r8i2. 
 
 ^ Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117, the President 
 was til en 600 yards distant from the Belvidera, half a point on her 
 weather or port quarter. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 75 
 
 dent's main-deck gun was discharged for the second 
 time it burst, blowing up the forecastle deck and 
 killing and wounding 16 men, among them the Com- 
 modore himself, whose leg was broken. This saved 
 the British frigate. Such, an explosion always causes 
 a half panic, every gun being at once suspected. 
 In the midst of the confusion Captain Byron's stern- 
 chasers opened with spirit and effect, killing or 
 wounding six men more. Had the President 
 still pushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers 
 until she closed abreast, which she could probably 
 have done, the Belvidera could still have been 
 taken ; but, instead, the former now bore up and 
 fired her port broadside, cutting her antagonist's 
 rigging slightly, but doing no other damage, while 
 the Belvidera kept up a brisk and galling fire, 
 although the long bolts, breeching-hooks, and 
 breechings of the guns now broke continually, 
 wounding several of the men, including Captain 
 Byron. The President had lost ground by yaw- 
 ing, but she soon regained it, and, coming up 
 closer than before, ^ again opened from her bow- 
 chasers a well-directed fire,, which severely wounded 
 her opponent's main-top mast, cross-jack yard, and 
 one or two -other spars ;' but shortly afterward 
 she repeated her former tactics and again lost 
 ground by yawing to discharge another broadside, 
 even more ineffectual than the first. Once more 
 she came up closer than ever, and once more yawed ; 
 the single shots from her bow-chasers doing consid- 
 erable damage, but her raking broadsides none."" 
 Meanwhile the active crew of the Belvidera repaired 
 
 ' James, vi, 119. He says the President vjos, within 400 yards. 
 ' Lord Howard Douglass, " Naval Gunnery," p. 419 (third edition). 
 
•]6 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 every thing- as fast as it was damaged, while under 
 the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce, 
 and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired 
 from her stern guns.' Finding that if the President 
 ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, Cap- 
 tain Byron cut away one bower, one stream, and 
 two sheet anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and jolly 
 boat, and started 14 tons of water. The effect of 
 this was at once apparent, and she began to gain ; 
 meanwhile the damage the sails of the combatants 
 had received had enabled the Congress to close, 
 and when abreast of his consort Captain Smith 
 opened with his bow-chasers, but the shot fell short. 
 The Belvidera soon altered her course to east by 
 south, set her starboard studding-sails, and by mid- 
 night was out of danger ; and three days afterward 
 reached Halifax harbor. 
 
 Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on this en- 
 counter seem very just. He says that the Presi- 
 dent opened very well with her bow-chasers (in 
 fact the Americans seem to have aimed better and 
 to have done more execution with these guns than 
 the British with their stern-chasers) ; but that she lost 
 so much ground by yawing and delivering harmless 
 broadsides as to enable her antagonist to escape. 
 Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost 
 to no purpose, the Commodore would have run 
 alongside his opponent, and the fate of the little 
 36 would have been sealed. On the other hand it 
 must be remembered that it was only the bursting 
 of the gun on board the President, causing such 
 direful confusion and loss, and especially harmful 
 in disabling her commander, that gave the Belvi- 
 
 ' James, vi, 118. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 'jn 
 
 dera any chance of escape at all. At any rate, 
 whether the American frigate does, or does not, de- 
 serve blame. Captain Byron and his crew do most 
 emphatically deserve praise for the skill with which 
 their guns were served and repairs made, the 
 coolness with which measures to escape were 
 adopted, and the courage with which they resisted 
 so superior a force. On this occasion Captain 
 Byron showed himself as good a seaman and as 
 brave a man as he subsequently proved a humane 
 and generous enemy when engaged in the blockade 
 of the Chesapeake.' 
 
 This was not a very auspicious opening of hostil- 
 ities for America. The loss of the Belvidera was 
 not the only thing to be regretted, for the distance 
 the chase took the pursuers out of their course prob- 
 ably saved the plate fleet. When the Belvidera 
 was first made out, Commodore Rodgers was in 
 latitude 39° 26' N., and longitude 71" 10' W.; at noon 
 the same day the Thalia and her convoy were in lat- 
 itude 39° N,, longitude 62° W. Had they not 
 chased the Belvidera the Americans would probably 
 have run across the plate fleet. 
 
 The American squadron reached the western edge 
 of the Newfoundland Banks on June 29th,'' and on 
 July 1st, a little to the east of the Banks, fell in with 
 large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, 
 etc., which filled every one with great hopes of 
 overtaking the quarry. On July 9th, the Hornet 
 captured a British privateer, in latitude 45° 30' N.^ 
 
 ' Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward the British, 
 does justice to the humanity of Captains Byron and Hardy — which 
 certainly shone in comparison to some of the rather buccaneering ex- 
 ploits of Cockburn's followers in Chesapeake Bay. 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 1st., 
 
78 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 and longitude 23° W., and her master reported that 
 he had seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening; 
 but nothing further was heard or seen of them, and 
 on July 13th, being within twenty hours' sail of the 
 English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly 
 turned southward, reaching Madeira July 21st. 
 Thence he cruized toward the Azores and by the 
 Grand Banks home, there being considerable sick- 
 ness on the ships. On August 31st he reached 
 Boston after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he 
 had made but seven prizes, all merchant-men, and 
 had recaptured one American vessel. 
 
 On July 3d the Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, 
 put out of New York. As has been already ex- 
 plained she was most inefificiently armed, almost en- 
 tirely with carronades. This placed her at the mer- 
 cy of any frigate with long guns which could keep at 
 a distance of a few hundred yards ; but in spite of 
 Captain Porter's petitions and remonstrances he was 
 not allowed to change his armament. On the i ith 
 of July at 2 A. M., latitude 33° N., longitude 66° 
 W., the Essex fell in with the Minerva, 32, Cap- 
 tain Richard Hawkins, convoying seven transports, 
 each containing about 200 troops, bound from Bar- 
 badoes to Quebec. The convoy was sailingiin open 
 order, and, there being a dull moon, the Essex 
 ran in and cut out transport No. 299, with 197 sol- 
 diers aboard. Having taken out the soldieffi,' Cap- 
 tain Porter stood back to the convoy, expecting 
 Captain Hawkins to come out and fight him ; but 
 this the latter would not do, keeping the convoy in 
 close order around him. The transports were all 
 armed and still contained in the aggregate 1,200 
 soldiers. As the Essex could oxA^ fight at close 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 79 
 
 quarters these heavy odds rendered it hopeless for 
 her to try to cut out the Minerva. Her carron- 
 ades would have to be used at short range to be 
 effective, and it would of course have been folly to 
 run in right among the convoy, and expose herself 
 to the certainty of being boarded by five times as 
 many men as she possessed. The Minerva had 
 three less guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried 
 24-pound carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, 
 had fifty men less than the Essex, which had 
 about 270 men this cruise ; on the other hand, her 
 main-deck was armed with long 12's, so that it is 
 hard to say whether she did right or not in refusing 
 to fight. She was of the same force as the South- 
 ampton whose captain. Sir James Lucas Yeo, sub- 
 sequently challenged Porter, but never appointed 
 a meeting-place. In the event of a meeting, the ad- 
 vantage, in ships of such radically different armaments, 
 would have been with that captain who succeeded 
 in outmanoeuvring the other and in making the 
 fight come off at the distance best suited to him- 
 self. At long range either the Minerva or South- 
 ampton would possess an immense superiority ; but 
 if Porter could have contrived to run up within 
 a couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, 
 his superiority in weight of metal and number of 
 men would have enabled him to carry either of 
 them. Porter's crew was better trained for board- 
 ing than almost any other American commander's ; 
 and probably none of the British frigates on the 
 American station, except the Shannon and Tene- 
 dos, would have stood a chance with the Essex 
 in a hand-to-hand struggle. Among her youngest 
 midshipmen was one, by name David Glas- 
 
8o NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 gow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, who 
 afterward became the first and greatest admiral of 
 the United States. His own words on this point 
 will be read with interest. " Every day," he says," 
 " the crew were exercised at the great guns, small 
 arms, and single stick. And I may here mention 
 the fact that I have never been on a ship where the 
 crew of the old Essex was represented but that 
 I found them to be the best swordsmen on board. 
 They had been so thoroughly trained as boarders 
 that every man was prepared for such an emergency, 
 with his cutlass as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by 
 the ship's armorer out of a file, and a pistol." ' 
 
 On August 13th a sail was made out to windward, 
 which proved to be the British ship-sloop Alert 
 16, Captain T. L. O. Laugharne, carrying 20 eighteen- 
 pound carronades and 100 men.' As soon as the 
 Essex discovered the Alert she put out drags astern, 
 
 ' " Life of Farragut " (embodying his journal and letters), p. 31. 
 By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York, 1879. 
 
 '^ James says ; "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to bring 
 the Minerva to action we do not see what could have prevented the 
 Essex with her superiority of sailing, from coming alongside of her. 
 But no such thought, we are sure, entered into Captain Porter's 
 head." Wliat "prevented the Essex" was the Minerva's not 
 venturing out of the convoy. Farragut, in his journal writes : " The 
 captured British oflficers were very anxious for us to have a fight with 
 the Minerva, as they considered her a good match for the Essex, 
 and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify them with pleasure 
 if his majesty's commander was of their taste. So we stood toward 
 the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, and awaited the Min- 
 erva, but she tacked and stood in among the convoy, to the utter 
 amazement of our prisoners, who denounced the commander as a base 
 coward, and expressed their determination to report him to the Ad- 
 miralty." An incident of reported "flinching" like this is not worth 
 mentioning ; I allude to it only to show the value of James' sneers. 
 
 "James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men." In the Naval 
 Archives at Washington in the " Captains' Letters " for 1812 (vol. 
 ii. No. 182) can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the parole of the 
 officers and crew of the Alert signed by Captain Laugharne ; it 
 contains either 100 or loi names of the crew of the Alert besides 
 those of a number of other prisoners sent back in the same cartel. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 8l 
 
 and led the enemy to believe she was trying to 
 escape by sending a few men aloft to shake out 
 the reefs and make sail. Concluding the frigate to 
 be a merchant-man, the Alert bore down on her; 
 while the Americans went to quarters and cleared 
 for action, although the tompions were left in the 
 guns, and the ports kept closed.' The Alert fired 
 a gun and the Essex hove to, when the former 
 passed under her stern, and when on her lee quarter 
 poured in a broadside of grape and canister ; but the 
 sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam that her 
 shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage. 
 Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as 
 soon as his guns would bear, tompions and all. The 
 Alert now discovered her error and made off, but 
 too late, for in eight minutes the Essex was along 
 side, and the Alert fired a musket and struck, 
 three men being wounded and several feet of 
 water in the hold. She was disarmed and sent as a 
 cartel into St. Johns. It has been the fashion 
 among American writers to speak of her as if she 
 were " unworthily ' given up, but such an accusa- 
 tion is entirely groundless. The Essex was four 
 times her force, and all that could possibly be ex- 
 pected of her was to do as she did — exchange broad- 
 sides and strike, having suffered some loss and dam- 
 age. The Essex returned to New York on Septem- 
 ber 7th, having made 10 prizes, containing 423 men." 
 
 ' " Life of Farragut," p. 16. 
 
 ° Before entering New York the Essex fell in with a British force 
 which, in both Porter's and Farragut's works, is said to have been 
 composed of the Acasta and Shannon, each of fifty guns, and Ring- 
 dove, of twenty. James says it was the Shannon, accompanied by a 
 merchant vessel. It is not a point of much importance, as nothing 
 came of the meeting, and the Shannon, alone, with her immensely 
 superior armament, ought to have been a match twice over for the 
 Essex ; although, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather 
 a comical turn to Porter's account of his " extraordinary escape." 
 
82 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 The Belvidera, as has been stated, carried the news 
 of the war to Halifax. On July 5th Vice-Admiral 
 Sawyer despatched a squadron to cruise against the 
 United States, commanded by Philip Vere Broke, of 
 the Shannon, 38, having under him the Belvidera, 36, 
 Captain Richard Byron, Africa, 64, Captain John 
 Bastard, and Jiolus, 32, Captain Lord James Town- 
 send. On the 9th, while off Nantucket, they were 
 joined by the Guerriire, 38, Captain James Richard 
 Dacres. On the i6th the squadron fell in with and 
 captured the United States brig Nautilus, 14, Lieu- 
 tenant Crane, which, like all the little brigs, was 
 overloaded with guns ^nd men. She threw her lee 
 guns overboard and made use of every expedient to 
 escape, but to no purpose. At 3 P. M. of the follow- 
 ing day, when the British ships were abreast of 
 Barnegat, about four leagues off shore, a strange sail 
 was seen and immediately chased, in the south by 
 east, or windward quarter, standing to the north- 
 east. This was the United States frigate Con- 
 stitution, 44, Captain Isaac Hull.' When the war 
 broke out he was in the Chesapeake River getting a 
 new crew aboard. Having shipped over 450 men 
 (counting officers), he put out of harbor on the I2th 
 of July. His crew was entirely new, drafts of men 
 coming on board up to the last moment." On the 
 17th, at 2 P. M., Hull discovered four sail, in the 
 
 ' For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly on Cooper ; see also 
 "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240; James, vi, 133; and Mar- 
 shall's " Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii, 625. 
 
 " In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Letters," 
 1812, ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the vifay his men were arriv- 
 ing, says : " The crew are as yet unacquainted with a ship of war, 
 as many have but lately joined and have never been on an armed ship 
 before. * * * We are doing all that we can to make them ac- 
 quainted with their duty, and in a few days we shall have nothing to 
 fear from any single-decked sh-p " 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 83 
 
 northern board, heading to the westward. At 3, the 
 wind being very Hght, the Constitution made sail 
 and tacked, in \%\ fathoms. At 4, in the N. E., a 
 fifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be 
 the Giierriire. The first four ships bore N. N. 
 W., and were all on the starboard tack ; while by 6 
 o'clock the fifth bore E. N. E. At 6.15 the wind 
 shifted and blew lightly from the south, bringing the 
 American ship to windward. She then wore round 
 with her head to the eastward, set her light stud- 
 ding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7.30 beat to action, 
 intending to speak the nearest vessel, the Guer- 
 ritrc. The two frigates neared one another gradu- 
 ally and at 10 the Constitution began making sig- 
 nals, which she continued for over an hour. At 
 3.30 A. M. on the 18th the Guerritre, going gradu- 
 ally toward the Constitution on the port tack, and 
 but one half mile distant, discovered on her lee 
 beam the Belvidera and the other British vessels,. 
 and signalled to them. They did not answer the 
 signals, thinking she must know who they were — a 
 circumstance which afterward gave rise to sharp re- 
 criminations among the captains — and Dacres, con- 
 cluding them to be Commodore Rodgers' squadron, 
 tacked, and then wore round and stood away from 
 the Constitution for some time before discovering 
 his mistake. 
 
 At 5 A. M. Hull had just enough steerage way on 
 to keep his head to the east, on the starboard 
 tack ; on his lee quarter, bearing N. E. by N., were 
 'the Belvidera and Guerriire and astern the 
 Shannon, ^olus, and Africa. At 5.30 it fell 
 entirely calm, and Hull put out his boats to tow 
 the ship, always going southward. At the same 
 
84 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 time he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and 
 got the forecastle-chaser aft, cutting away the taff- 
 rail to give the two guns more freedom to work in 
 and also running out, through the cabin windows, 
 two of the long main-deck 24's. The British boats 
 were towing also. At 6 A. M. a light breeze 
 sprang up, and the Constitution set studding- 
 sails and stay-sails ; the Shannon opened at her 
 with her bow guns, but ceased whenishe found she 
 could not reach her. At 6.30, the wind having 
 died away, the Shannon began to gain, almost all 
 the boats of the squadron towing her. Having 
 sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieutenant Charles Morris 
 suggested to Hull to try kedging. All the spare 
 rope was bent on to the cables, payed out into the 
 cutters, and a kedge run out half a mile ahead and 
 let go ; then the crew clapped on and walked away 
 with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedge 
 as she came up with the end of the line. Mean- 
 while, fresh lines and another kedge were carried 
 ahead, and the frigate glided away from her pur- 
 suers. At 7.30 A. M. a little breeze sprang up, when 
 the Constitiction set her ensign and fired a shot 
 at the Shannon. It soon fell calm again and the 
 Shannon neared. At 9.10 a light air from the 
 southward struck the ship, bringing her to wind- 
 ward. As the breeze was seen coming, her sails 
 were trimmed, and as soon as she obeyed her helm 
 she was brought close up on the port tack. The 
 boats dropped in alongside ; those that belonged to 
 the davits were run up, while the others were just 
 lifted clear of the water, by purchases on the spare 
 spars, stowed outboard, where they could be used 
 again at a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on her lee 
 
NAVAL, WAR OF 1 8 12. 85 
 
 beam, the Guerriere opened fire ; but her shot fell 
 short, and the Americans paid not the slightest 
 heed to it. Soon it again fell calm, when Hull had 
 2000 gallons of water started, and again put out 
 his boats to tow. The Shannon with some of the 
 other boats of the squadron helping her, gained 
 on the Constitution but by severe exertion was 
 again left behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind 
 springing up, the Belvidera gained on the other 
 British ships, and when it fell calm she was nearer 
 to the Constitution than any of her consorts, their 
 boats being put on to her.' At 10.30, observing 
 the benefit that the Constitution had derived from 
 warping. Captain Byron did the same, bending all 
 his hawsers to one another, and working two kedge 
 anchors at the same time by paying the warp out 
 through one hawse-hole as it was run in through the 
 other opposite. Having men from the other frigates 
 aboard, and a lighter ship to work, Captain Byron, 
 at 2 P. M. was near enough to exchange bow- and 
 stern-chasers with the Constitution, out of range 
 however. Hull expected to be overtaken, and made 
 every arrangement to try in such case to disable the 
 first frigate before her consorts could close. But 
 neither the Belvidera nor the Shannon dared to tow 
 very near for fear of having their boats sunk by the 
 American's stern-chasers. 
 
 The Constitution s crew showed the most excellent 
 spirit. Ofificers and men relieved each other regu- 
 larly, the former snatching their rest any where on 
 
 ' Cooper speaks as if this was the Shannon; but from Marshall's 
 "Naval Biography" we learn that it was the Belvidera. Al other 
 times he confuses the Belvidera with the Guemhe. Captain Hull, of 
 course, could not accurately distinguish the names of his pursuers. 
 My account is drawn from a careful comparison of Marshall, Cooper, 
 and James. 
 
86 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. Gradually 
 the Constitution drew ahead, but the situation con- 
 tinued most critical. All through the afternoon the 
 British frigates kept towing and kedging, being 
 barely out of gunshot. At 3 P.M. a light breeze 
 sprung up, and blew fitfully at intervals ; every 
 puff was watched closely and taken advantage of to 
 the utmost. At 7 in the evening the wind almost 
 died out, and for four more weary hours the worn- 
 out sailors towed and kedged. At 10.45 ^ little 
 breeze struck the frigate, when the boats dropped 
 alongside and were hoisted up, excepting the first 
 cutter. Throughout the night the wind continued 
 very light, the Belvidcra forging ahead till she was 
 off the Constitution s lee beam ; and at 4 A. M. on 
 the morning of the 19th, she tacked to the east- 
 ward, the breeze being light from the south by 
 east. At 4.20 the Constitution tacked also ; and at 
 5.15 the ^olus, which had drawn ahead, passed on 
 the contrary tack. Soon afterward the wind fresh- 
 ened so that Captain Hull took in his cutter. The 
 Africa was now so far to leeward as to be almost 
 out of the race ; while the five frigates were all 
 running on the starboard tack with every stitch of 
 canvas set. At 9 A. M. an American merchant-man 
 hove in sight and bore down toward the squadron. 
 The Belvidera, by way of decoy, hoisted American 
 colors, when the Constitution hoisted the British 
 flag, and the merchant vessel hauled off. The 
 breeze continued light till noon, when Hull found 
 he had dropped the British frigates well behirfJ'; 
 the nearest was the Belvidera, exactly in his wake, 
 bearing W. N. W. 2\ miles distant. The Shannon 
 was on his lee, bearing N. by W. \ W. distant 3^ 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 8/ 
 
 miles. The other two frigates were five miles off on 
 the lee quarter. Soon afterward the breeze fresh- 
 ened, and "old Ironsides" drew slowly ahead from 
 her foes, her sails being watched and tended with 
 the most consummate skill. At 4 P. M. the breeze 
 again lightened, but even the Belvidera was now 
 four miles astern and to leeward. At 6.45 there 
 were indications of a heavy rain squall, which once 
 more permitted Hull to show that in seamanship he 
 excelled even the able captains against whom he 
 was pitted. The crew were stationed and every 
 thing kept fast till the last minute, when all was 
 clewed up just before the squall struck the ship. 
 The light canvas was furled, a second reef taken in 
 the mizzen top-sail, and the ship almost instantly 
 brought under short sail. The British vessels see- 
 ing this began to let go and haul down without 
 waiting for the wind, and were steering on different 
 tacks when the first gust struck them. But Hull as 
 soon as he got the weight of the wind sheeted 
 home, hoisted his fore and main-top gallant sails, 
 and went off on an easy bowline at the rate of li 
 knots. At 7.40 sight was again obtained of the 
 enemy, the squall having passed to leeward ; the 
 Belvidera, the nearest vessel, had altered her bear- 
 ings two points to leeward, and was a long way 
 astern. Next came the Shannon ; the Guerriire and 
 ^olus were hull down, and the Africa barely visi- 
 ble. The wind now kept light, shifting occasion- 
 ally in a very baffling manner, but the Constitution 
 gained steadily, wetting her sails from the sky-sails 
 to the courses. At 6 A. M, on the morning of the 
 20th the pursuers were almost out of sight ; and 
 at 8.15 A. M. they abandoned the chase. Hull at 
 
88 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 once stopped to investigate the character of two 
 strange vessels, but found them to be only Ameri- 
 cans ; then, at midday, he stood toward the east, 
 and went into Boston on July 26th. 
 
 In this chase Captain Isaac Hull was matched 
 against five British captains, two of whom, Broke 
 and Byron, were fully equal to any in their navy ; 
 and while the latter showed great perseverance, 
 good seamanship, and ready imitation, there can be 
 no doubt that the palm in every way belongs to 
 the cool old Yankee. Every daring expedient 
 known to the most perfect seamanship was tried, 
 and tried with success ; and no victorious fight 
 could reflect more credit on the conqueror than 
 this three days' chase did on Hull. Later, on two 
 occasions, the Constitution proved herself far su- 
 perior in gunnery to the average British frigate ; 
 this time her officers and men showed that they 
 could handle the sails as well as they could the 
 guns. Hull out-manoeuvred Broke and Byron as 
 cleverly as a month later he out-fought Dacres. 
 His successful escape and victorious fight were 
 both performed in a way that place him above any 
 single ship captain of the war. 
 
 On Aug. 2d the Constitution made sail from Bos- 
 ton' and stood to the eastward, in hopes of falling 
 in with some of the British cruisers. She was un- 
 successful, however, and met nothing. Then she 
 ran down to the Bay of Fundy, steered along the 
 coast of Nova Scotia, and thence toward New- 
 foundland, and finally took her station off Cape 
 Race in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she took 
 and burned two brigs of little value. On the 15th 
 
 ' Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 1812. ^ 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 89 
 
 she recaptured a.i American brig from the British 
 ship-sloop Avenger, though the latter escaped ; 
 Capt. Hull manned his prize and sent her in. He 
 then sailed southward, and on the night of the 18th 
 spoke a Salem privateer which gave him news of a 
 British frigate to the south ; thither he stood, and 
 at 2 P. M. on the 19th, in lat. 41" 30' N. and 55° W., 
 made out a large sail bearing E. S. E. and to leeward,' 
 which proved to be his old acquaintance, the frigate 
 Giterriere Captain Dacres. It was a cloudy day and 
 the wind was blowing fresh from the northwest. The 
 Guerriire was standing by the wind on the starboard 
 tack, under easy canvas^; she hauled up her courses, 
 took in her top-gallant sails, and at 4.30 backed her 
 main-top sail. Hull then very deliberately began 
 to shorten sail, taking in top-gallant sails, stay-sails, 
 and flying jib; sendintg down the royal yards and 
 putting another reef in the top-sails. Soon the 
 Englishman hoisted three ensigns, when the Amer- 
 ican also set his colors, one at each mast-head, and 
 one at the mizzen peak. 
 
 The Constitution now ran down with the wind 
 nearly aft. The Guerriere was on the starboard 
 tack, and at five o'clock opened with her weather- 
 guns,' the shot falling short, then wore round and 
 fired her port broadside, of which two shot struck her 
 opponent, the rest passing over and through her rig- 
 ging.* As the British frigate again wore to open with 
 
 ^£>o., Aug. 30th. 
 
 ''Letter of Capt. James R. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812. 
 
 ^ Log of Guerriere. 
 
 '■ See in the Naval Archives (Bureau of Navigation) the Constitution's 
 Log-Book (vol. ii, from Feb. I, 1812, to Dec. 13, 1813). The point 
 is of some little importance because Hull, in his letter, speaks as if 
 both the first broadsides ■'fell short, vfhereas the log distinctly says that 
 the second went over the ship, except two shot, which came home. 
 
90 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 her starboard battery, the Constitution yawed a little 
 and fired two or three of her port bow-guns. Three 
 or four times the Guerriere repeated this manoeuvre, 
 wearing and firing alternate broadsides, but with 
 little or no effect, while the Constitution yawed as 
 often to avoid being raked, and occasionally fired 
 one of her bow guns. This continued nearly an 
 hour, as the vessels were very far apart when the ac- 
 tion began, hardly any loss or damage being in- 
 flicted by either party. At 6.00 the Guerriire bore 
 up and ran off under her top-sails and jib, with the 
 wind almost astern, a little on her port quarter; 
 when the Constitution set her main-top gallant sail 
 and foresail, and at 6.05 closed within half pistol- 
 shot distance on her adversary's port beam.' Im- 
 mediately a furious cannonade opened, each ship 
 firing as the guns bore. By the time the ships were 
 fairly abreast, at 6.20, the Constitution shot away the 
 Guerriere s mizzen-mast, which fell over the star- 
 board quarter, knocking a large hole in the counter, 
 and bringing the ship round against her helm. 
 Hitherto she had suffered very greatly and the Con- 
 stitution hardly at all. The latter, finding that 
 she was ranging ahead, put her helm aport and then 
 luffed short round her enemy's bows,^ delivering a 
 heavy raking fire with the starboard guns and shoot- 
 ing away the G«rrr/^n-'j .main-yard. Then she wore 
 and again passed her adversary's bows, raking with 
 her port guns. The mizzen-mast of the Guerriere, 
 dragging in the water, had by this time pulled her 
 
 The hypothesis of the Guerriere having damaged powder was founded 
 purely on this supposed falling short of the first two broadsides. 
 
 '"Autobiography of Commodore Morris" (Annapolis, 18S0), p. 
 164. 
 
 " Log of Constitution. 
 
MAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 91 
 
 bow round till the wind came on her starboard 
 quarter ; and so near were the two ships that the 
 Englishman's bowsprit passed diagonally over the 
 Constittition's quarter-deck, and as the latter ship fell 
 off it got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and the vessels 
 then lay with the Guerrierc s starboard bow against 
 the Constitution s port, or lee quarter-gallery.' The 
 Englishman's bow guns played havoc with Captain 
 Hull's cabin, setting fire to it; but the flames were 
 soon extinguished by Lieutenant Hoffmann. On 
 both sides the boarders were called away ; the Brit- 
 ish ran forward, but Captain Dacres relinquished the 
 idea of attacking ^ when he saw the crowds of men 
 on the American's decks. Meanwhile, on the Constitu- 
 tion, the boarders and marines gathered aft, but such 
 a heavy sea was running that they could not get on 
 the Guerriere. Both sides suffered heavily from the 
 closeness of the musketry fire ; indeed, almost the 
 entire loss on the Constitution occurred at this junct- 
 ure. As Lieutenant Bush, of the marines, sprang 
 upon the taffrail to leap on the enemy's decks, a 
 British marine shot him dead ; Mr. Morris, the first 
 Lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also 
 both leaped on the taffrail, and both were at the 
 same moment wounded by the musketry fire. On 
 the Guerriire the loss was far heavier, almost all the 
 men on the forecastle being picked off. Captain 
 Dacres himself was shot in the back and severely 
 wounded by one of the American mizzen topmen, 
 while he was standing on the starboard forecastle 
 hammocks cheering on his crew';' two of the lieu- 
 
 ' Cooper, in " Putnam's Magazine," i, 475. 
 
 '■ Address of Captain Dacres to the court-martial at Halifax. 
 
 ^ James, vi, 144. 
 
92 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 tenants and the master were also shot down. The 
 ships gradually worked round till the wind was again 
 on the port quarter, when they separated, and the 
 Guerrieres foremast and main-mast at once went by 
 the board, and fell over on the starboard side, leav- 
 ing her a defenseless hulk, rolling her main-deck 
 guns into the water." At 6.30 the Constitution 
 hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a little distance to the 
 eastward, and lay to. Her braces and standing and 
 running rigging were much cut up and some of the 
 spars wounded, but a few minutes sufficed to repair 
 damages, when Captain Hull stood under his ad- 
 versary's lee, and the latter at once struck, at 7.00 
 P. M.,' just two hours after she had fired the first 
 shot. On the part of the Constitution, however, the 
 actual fighting, exclusive of six or eight guns fired 
 during the first hour, while closing, occupied less 
 than 30 minutes. 
 
 The tonnage and metal of the combatants have 
 already been referred to. The Constitution had, as 
 already said, about 456 men aboard, while of the 
 Guerriire s crew, 267 prisoners were received aboard 
 the Constitution ; deducting 10 who were Americans 
 and would not fight, and adding the 15 killed out- 
 right, we get 272 ; 28 men were absent in prizes. 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 
 Comparative 
 Broad- Comparative loss 
 
 Tons. Guns. side. Men. Loss. Force. Inflicted. 
 
 Constitution 1576 27 684 456 14 i.oo 1. 00 
 
 Guerrihe 1338 25 556 272 79 .70 .18 
 
 The loss of the Constitution included Lieutenant 
 
 ' Brenton, v, 51. 
 
 '■^ Log of the Constitution. 
 
CONSTirUTION 
 
 '4 
 
 SIS 
 
 ,1 
 
 I 
 
 / 
 
 This diagram is taken from Commodore 
 Morris' autobiography and the log of the 
 Guerri^re : the official accounts apparently 
 consider ''larboard" and "starboard" as 
 interchangeable terms. 
 
 SCO f 
 
 / DUERRIERE 
 
 s./s 'M 
 
 I 
 I 
 I 
 
 I ,-• 
 J,-' 
 
 K \ 
 
 s.os: 
 
 - ^A 
 
 S.20 -^ ) 
 
 SIS Y ■•• 
 
 E.ZS 
 
 s3a 
 
 ^.-;:# 
 
 93 
 
94 NAVAL W^R OF l8l2. 
 
 } 
 
 William S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen 
 killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, Mas- 
 ter, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine, 
 wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. 
 Almost all this loss occurred when the ships came 
 foul, and was due to the Gucrriere s musketry and 
 the two guns in her bridle-ports. 
 
 The Guerriire lost 23 killed and mortally wounded, 
 including her second lieutenant, Henry Ready, and 
 56 wounded severely and slightly, including Captain 
 Dacres himself, the first lieutenant, Bartholomew 
 Kent, Master, Robert Scott, two master's mates, 
 and one midshipman. 
 
 The third lieutenant of the Constitution, Mr. 
 George Campbell Read, was sent on board the prize, 
 and the Constitution remained by her during the 
 night ; but at daylight it was found that she was in 
 danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began re- 
 moving the prisoners, and at three o'clock in the af- 
 ternoon set the Guerriirc on fire, and in a quarter of 
 an hour she blew up. He then set sail for Boston, 
 where he arrived on August 30th. " Captain Hull 
 and his officers," writes Captain Dacres in his ofifi- 
 cial letter, " have treated us like brave and generous 
 enemies ; the greatest care has been taken that we 
 should not lose the smallest trifle." 
 
 The British laid very great stress on the rotten 
 and decayed condition of the Guerriire ; mention- 
 ing in particular that the main-mast fell solely be- 
 cause of the weight of the falling foremast. But it 
 must be remembered that until the action occurred 
 she .was considered a very fine ship. Thus, in 
 Brighton's " Memoir of Admiral Broke," it is de- 
 clared that Dacres freely expressed the opinion that 
 
NAVAL WAR OP l8l2. 95 
 
 she could take a ship in half the time the Shannon 
 could. The fall of the main-mast occurred when the 
 fight was practically over ; it had no influence what- 
 ever on the conflict. It was also asserted that her 
 powder was bad, but on no authority ; her first 
 broadside fell short, but so, under similar circum- 
 stances, did the first broadside of the United States. 
 None of these causes account for the fact that her 
 shot did not hit. Heropponent wasof such superior 
 force — nearly in the proportion of 3 to 2 — that suc- 
 cess would have been very difficult in any event, and 
 no one can doubt the gallantry and pluck with which 
 the British ship was fought ; but the execution was 
 very greatly disproportioned to the force. The gun- 
 nery of the Guerritre was very poor, and that of the 
 Constitution excellent ; during the few minutes the 
 ships were yard-arm and yard-arm, the latter was not 
 hulled once, while no less than 30 shot took effect 
 on the former's engaged side,' five sheets of copper 
 beneath the bends. The Guerritrc, moreover, was 
 out-manoeuvred; "in wearing several times and ex- 
 changing broadsides in such rapid and continual 
 changes of position, her fire was much more harm- 
 less than it would have been if she had kept more 
 steady." '' The Constitution was handled faultless- 
 ly ; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skill of 
 a veteran in the way in which he managed, first to 
 avoid being raked, and then to improve the advan- 
 tage which the precision and rapidity of his fire had 
 gained. " After making every allowance claimed by 
 the enemy, the character of this victory is not es- 
 sentially altered. Its peculiarities were a fine dis- 
 
 ' Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial. 
 ^Lord Howard Douglass, " Treatise on Naval Gunnery" (London, 
 1851), p. 454. 
 
96 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 play of seamanship in the approach, extraordinary- 
 efficiency in the attack, and great readiness in re- 
 pairing damages ; all of which denote cool and ca- 
 pable officers, with an expert and trained crew ; in a 
 word, a disciplined man-of-war." ' The disparity of 
 force, lo to 7, is not enough to account for the dis- 
 parity of execution, 10 to 2. Of course, something 
 must be allowed for the decayed state of the Eng- 
 lishman's masts, although I really do not think it 
 had any influence on the battle, for he was beaten 
 when the main-mast fell ; and it must be remem- 
 bered, on the other hand, that the American crew 
 was absolutely new, while the Guerriire was manned 
 by old hands. So that, while admitting and admir- 
 ing the gallantry, and, on the whole, the seamanship 
 of Captain Dacres and his crew, and acknowledging 
 that he fought at a great disadvantage, especially in 
 being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that 
 the combat showed a marked superiority, particular- 
 ly in gunnery, on the part of the Americans. Had 
 the ships not come foul. Captain Hull would prob- 
 ably not have lost more than three or four men ; as 
 it was, he suffered but slightly. That the Guerrikre 
 was not so weak, as she was represented to be can 
 be gathered from the fact that she mounted two 
 more main-deck guns than the rest of her class; thus 
 carrying on her main-deck 30 long i8-pounders in 
 battery, to oppose to the 30 long 24's, or rather (al- 
 lowing for the short weight of shot) long 22's, of the 
 Constitution. Characteristically enough, James, 
 though he carefully reckons in the long bow- 
 chasers in the bridle-ports of the Argus and 
 Enterprise, yet refuses to count the two long 
 'Cooper, ii, 173. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 97 
 
 eighteens mounted through the bridle-ports on the 
 Gucrriires main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these 
 two bow guns were used very effectively, when 
 the ships got foul, and caused more damage and 
 loss than all of the other main-deck guns put to- 
 gether. 
 
 Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed 
 the ten Americans on board to go below, so as not 
 to fight against their flag ; and in his address to 
 the court-martial mentions, among the reasons for 
 his defeat, " that he was very much weakened by 
 permitting the Americans on board to quit their 
 quarters." Coupling this with the assertion made 
 by James and most other British writers that the 
 Constitution was largely manned by Englishmen, we 
 reach the somewhat remarkable conclusion, that the 
 British ship was defeated because the Americans on 
 board would not fight against their country, and 
 that the American was victorious because the Brit- 
 ish on board would. However, as I have shown, 
 in reality there were probably not a score of British 
 on board the Constitution. 
 
 In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate ac- 
 tions, every one must admit that there was a 
 great superiority in force on the side of the victors, 
 and British historians have insisted that this superi- 
 ority was so great as to preclude any hopes of a 
 successful resistance. That this was not true, and 
 that the disparity between the combatants was not 
 as great as had been the case in a number of en- 
 counters in which English frigates had taken French 
 ones, can be best shown by a few accounts taken 
 from the French historian Troude, who would cer- 
 tainly not exaggerate the difference. Thus on 
 
98 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 March i, 1799, the English 38-gun i8-pounder 
 frigate Sybil, captured the French 44-gun 24-pounder 
 frigate Forte, after an action of two hours and ten 
 minutes.' In actual weight the shot thrown by one 
 of the main-deck guns of the defeated Forte was 
 over six pounds heavier than the shot thrown by 
 one of the main-deck guns of the victorious Consti- 
 tution or United States!' 
 
 There are later examples than this. But a very 
 few years before the declaration of war by the 
 United States, and in the same struggle that was 
 then still raging, there had been at least two vic- 
 tories gained by English frigates over French foes as 
 superior to themselves as the American 44's were to 
 the British ships they captured. On Aug 10, 1805, 
 the Phoenix, 36, captured the Didon, 40, after 3^^ 
 hours' fighting, the comparative broadside force 
 being :^ 
 
 PHCENIX. 
 
 DIDON. 
 
 13X18 
 
 14X18 
 
 2X 9 
 
 2X 8 
 
 6X32 
 
 7X36 
 
 21 guns, 444 lbs. 
 
 23 guns, 522 lbs. 
 
 
 (nominal; about 
 
 
 600, real). 
 
 On March 8, 1808, the San Florenzo, 36, captured 
 the Piidmontaise, 40, the force being exactly what it 
 was in the case of the Phoenix and Didon." Com- 
 
 ' "Batailles Navales de la France." O. Troiide (Paris, i868), iv, 
 171. 
 
 ^ See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot. 
 
 'Hid., iii, 425. "Ibid., iii, 499. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 99 
 
 paring the real, not the nominal weight of metal, 
 we find that the Didon and PiMmontaise were 
 proportionately of greater force compared to the 
 Plioenix and San Florenzo, than the Constitution was 
 compared to the G^ierriire or Java. The French 
 iS's threw each a shot weighing but about two 
 pounds less than that thrown by an American 24 of 
 1 8 12, while their 36-pound carronades each threw a 
 shot over 10 pounds heavier than that thrown by 
 one of the Constitution s spar-deck 32's. 
 
 That a 24-pounder can not always whip an 18- 
 pounder frigate is shown by the action of the 
 British frigate Eurotas with the French frigate 
 Clilorinde, on Feb. 25, 1814.' The first with a crew 
 of 329 men threw 625 pounds of shot at a broad- 
 side, the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463 
 pounds ; yet the result was indecisive. The French 
 lost 90 and the British 60 men. The action showed 
 that heavy metal was not of much use unless used 
 well. 
 
 To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's vic- 
 tory caused in the United States, and the intense 
 annoyance it created in England, it must be re- 
 membered that during the past twenty years the 
 Island Power had been at war with almost every 
 state in Europe, at one time or another, and in the 
 course of about two hundred single conflicts be- 
 tween ships of approximately equal force (that is, 
 where the difference was less than one half), waged 
 against French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish, Algerine, 
 Russian, Danish, and Dutch antagonists, her ships 
 had been beaten and captured in but five instances. 
 Then war broke out with America, and in eight 
 
 ' James, vi, 391. 
 
lOO NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 months five single-ship actions occurred, in every 
 one of which the British vessel was captured. 
 Even had the victories been due solely to superior 
 force this would have been no mean triumph for 
 thg United States. 
 
 On October 13, 1812, the American i8-gun ship- 
 sloop Was/), Captain Jacob Jones, with 137 men 
 aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran off south- 
 east to get into the track of the West India vessels ; 
 on the l6th a heavy gale began to blow, causing the 
 loss of the jib-boom and two men who were on it. 
 The next day the weather moderated somewhat, 
 and at 11.30 P. M., in latitude 37" N., longitude 65° 
 W., several sail were descried.' These were part of 
 a convoy of 14 merchant-men which had quitted the 
 bay of Honduras on September 12th, bound for Eng- 
 land,"" under the convoy of the British i8-gun brig- 
 sloop Frolic, of 19 guns and 1 10 men, Captain 
 Thomas Whinyates. They had been dispersed by 
 the gale of the l6th, during which the Frolic s main- 
 yard was carried away and both her top-sails torn to 
 pieces^ ; next day she spent in repairing damages, 
 and by dark six of the missing ships had joined her. 
 The day broke almost cloudless on the iSth (Sun- 
 day), showing the convoy, ahead and to leeward of 
 the American ship, still some distance off, as Captain 
 Jones had not thought it prudent to close during 
 the night, while he was ignorant of the force of his 
 antagonists. The Wasp now sent down her top-gal- 
 lant yards, close reefed her top-sails, and bore down 
 under short fighting canvas ; while the Frolic removed 
 
 ' Capt. Jones' official letter, Nov. 24, 1812. 
 
 '' James' History, vi, 158. 
 
 * Capt. Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 1812 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. lOI 
 
 her main-yard from the casks, lashed it on deck, 
 and then hauled to the wind under her boom main-sail 
 and close-reefed foretop-sail, hoisting Spanish colors 
 to decoy the stranger under her guns, and permit 
 the convoy to escape. At 1 1.32 the action began — 
 the two ships running parallel on the starboard tack, 
 not 60 yards apart, the Wasp firing her port, and the 
 Frolic her starboard, guns. The latter fired very 
 rapidly, delivering three broadsides to the Wasp's 
 two,' both crews cheering loudly as the ships wal- 
 lowed through the water. There was a very heavy 
 sea running, which caused the vessels to pitch and 
 roll heavily. The Americans fired as the engaged 
 side of their ship was going down, aiming at their 
 opponent's hulP ; while the British delivered their 
 broadsides while on the crests of the seas, the shot 
 going high. The water dashed in clouds of spray 
 over both crews, and the vessels rolled so that the 
 muzzles of the guns went under.' But in spite of 
 the rough weather, the firing was not only spirited 
 but well directed. At 11.36 the Wasp's maintop- 
 mast was shot away and fell, with its yard, across 
 the port fore and foretop-sail braces, rendering the 
 head yards unmanageable; at 11.46 the gaff and 
 mizzentop-gallant mast came down, and by 11.52 
 every brace and most of the rigging was shot away.* 
 It would now have been very difficult to brace 
 any of the yards. But meanwhile the Frolic suf- 
 fered dreadfully in her hull and lower masts, and had 
 her gaff and head braces shot away." The slaughter 
 among her crew was very great, but the survivors 
 kept at their work with the dogged courage of their 
 
 ' Cooper, 182. ^ Niles' Register, iii, p. 324. ' Do. 
 
 ' Capt. Jones' letter. " Capt. Whinyatcs' letter. 
 
I02 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 race. At first the two vessels ran side by side, but 
 the American gradually forged ahead, throwing in 
 her fire from a position in which she herself received 
 little injury ; by degrees the vessels got so close that 
 the Americans struck the Frolic s side with their ram- 
 mers in loading,' and the British brig was raked 
 with dreadful effect. The Frolic then fell aboard her 
 antagonist, her jib-boom coming in between the 
 main- and mizzen-rigging of the Wasp and passing 
 over the heads of Captain Jones and Lieutenant 
 Biddle, who were standing near the capstan. This 
 forced the Wasp up in the wind, and she again raked 
 her antagonist. Captain Jones trying to restrain his 
 men from boarding till he could put in another 
 broadside. But they could no longer be held back, 
 and Jack Lang, a New Jersey seaman, leaped on the 
 Frolic s bowsprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mounted 
 on the hammock cloth to board, but his feet got 
 entangled in the rigging, and one of the midship- 
 men seizing his coat-tails to help himself up, the 
 lieutenant tumbled back on the deck. At the next 
 swell he succeeded in getting on the bowsprit, on 
 which there were already two seamen whom he 
 passed on the forecastle. But there was no one to 
 oppose him ; not twenty Englishmen were left un- 
 hurt.' The man at the wheel was still at his post, 
 grim and undaunted, and two or three more were 
 on deck, including Captain Whinyates and Lieu- 
 tenant Wintle, both so severely wounded that they 
 could not stand without support.' There could be 
 no more resistance, and Lieutenant Biddle lowered 
 the flag at 12.15 — just 43 minutes after the begin- 
 
 ' Capl. Jones' letter. ' Capt. Whinyates' letter. 
 
 " James, vi, i6i. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 103 
 
 ning of the fight.' A minute or two afterward both 
 the Frolic s masts went by the board — the foremast 
 about fifteen feet above the deck, the other short 
 off. Of her crew, as already said, not twenty men 
 had escaped unhurt. Every officer was wounded ; 
 two of them, the first lieutenant, Charles McKay, 
 and master, John Stephens, soon died. Her total 
 loss was thus over 90°; about 30 of whom were 
 killed outright or died later. The Wasp suffered 
 very severely in her rigging and aloft generally, but 
 only two or three shots struck her hull ; five of her 
 men were killed — two in her mizzen-top and one in 
 her maintop-mast rigging — and five wounded,' 
 chiefly while aloft. 
 
 The two vessels were practically of equa/1 force. 
 The loss of the Frolic s main-yard had merely con- 
 verted her into a brigantine, and, as the roughness 
 of the saa made it necessary to fight under very 
 short canvas, her inferiority in men was fully com- 
 pensated for by her superiority in metal. She had 
 been desperately defended ; no men could have 
 fought more bravely than Captain Whinyates and 
 his crew. On the other hand, the Americans had 
 done their work with a coolness and skill that could 
 not be surpassed ; the contest had been mainly one 
 of gunnery, and had been decided by the greatly 
 superior judgment and accuracy with which they 
 fired. Both officers and crew had behaved well; 
 Captain Jones particularly mentions Lieutenant 
 Claxton, who, though too ill to be of any service, 
 
 ' Capt. Jones' letter. 
 
 = Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, and is, of course, to 
 be taken as authority ; the Bermuda account makes it 69, and James 
 only 62. 
 
 - Capt. Jones' letter. 
 
I04 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 persisted in remaining on deck throughout the en- 
 gagement. DIAGRAM.' 
 
 \ 
 
 WASP 
 
 11.32 / 
 
 .0 
 
 .-^■-- 
 
 \ 
 \ 
 
 moua 
 
 i^-'S^™ H.IS 
 
 ' It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of the manojuvres in this 
 action. James says "larboard" where Cooper says "starboard"; 
 one says the Wasp wore, the other says that she could not do so, etc. 
 
 The Wasp was armed with 2 long 12's and 16 
 32-pound carronades ; the Frolic \v\t\\ 2 long 6's, 16 
 32-pound carronades, and i shifting 12-pound car- 
 ronade. 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 
 Tons. No. Guns. Weight Metal. Crews. Loss. 
 Wasp 450 9 250 135 10 
 
 Frolic 467 10 274 no 90 
 
 Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravifere comments on 
 this action as follows ': 
 
 " The American fire showed itself to be as accu- 
 rate as it was rapid. On occasions when the rough- 
 ness of the sea would seem to render all aim exces- 
 
 '" Guerres Maritimes," ii, 287 (Septi^me Edition, Paris, 1881). 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 105 
 
 sively uncertain, the effects of their artillery were 
 not less murderous than under more advantageous 
 conditions. The corvette Wasp fought the brig 
 Frolic in an enormous sea, under very short canvas, 
 and yet, forty minutes after the beginning of the 
 action, when the two vessels came together, the 
 Americans who leaped aboard the brig found on the 
 deck, covered with dead and dying, but one brave 
 man, who had not left the wheel, and three ofificers, 
 all wounded, who threw down their swords at the 
 feet of the victors." Admiral de la Gravifere's criti- 
 cisms are especially valuable, because they are those 
 of an expert, who only refers to the war of 1 812 in 
 order to apply to the French navy the lessons which 
 it teaches, and who is perfectly unprejudiced. He 
 cares for the lesson taught, not the teacher, and is 
 quite as willing to learn from the defeat of the 
 Cliesapeake as from the victories of the Constitutioti 
 — while most American critics only pay heed to the 
 latter. 
 
 The characteristics of the action are the practical 
 equality of the contestants in point of force and 
 the enormous disparity in the damage each suffered ; 
 numerically, the Wasp was superior by 5 per cent., 
 and inflicted a ninefold greater loss. 
 
 Captain Jones was not destined to bring his prize 
 into port, for a few hours afterward the Poictiers, a 
 British 74, Captain John Poer Beresford, hove in 
 sight. Now appeared the value of the Frolic s des- 
 perate defence; if she could not prevent herself 
 from being captured, she had at least ensured her 
 own recapture, and also the capture of the foe. 
 When the Wasp shook out her sails they were 
 found to be cut into ribbons aloft, and she could 
 
I06 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 not make off with sufficient speed. As the Poictiers 
 passed the Frolic, rolling like a log in the water, she 
 threw a shot over her, and soon overtook the Wasp. 
 Both vessels were carried into Bermuda. Captain 
 Whinyates was again put in command of the Frolic. 
 Captain Jones and his men were soon exchanged ; 
 25,000 dollars prize-money was voted them by Con- 
 gress, and the Captain and Lieutenant Biddle were 
 both promoted, the former receiving the captured 
 ship Macedonian. Unluckily the blockade was too 
 close for him to succeed in getting out during the 
 remainder of the war. 
 
 On Oct. 8th Commodore Rodgers left Boston on 
 his second cruise, with the President, United States, 
 Congress, and Argus,'^ leaving the Hornet in port. 
 Four days out, the United States and Argus sepa- 
 rated, while the remaining two frigates continued 
 their cruise together. The Argus^ Captain Sinclair, 
 cruised to the eastward, making prizes of 6 valua- 
 ble merchant-men, and returned to port on January 
 3d. During the cruise she was chased for three 
 days and three nights (the latter being moonlight) 
 by a British squadron, and was obliged to cut away 
 her boats and anchors and start some of her water. 
 But she saved her guns, and was so cleverly han- 
 dled that during the chase she actually succeeding 
 in taking and manning a prize, though the enemy 
 got near enough to open fire as the vessels sepa- 
 rated. Before relating what befell the United States, 
 we shall bring Commodore Rodgers' cruise to an 
 end. 
 
 On Oct. loth the Commodore chased, but failed 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Jan. i, 1813. 
 * Letter of Capt. Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4, 1813. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 107 
 
 to overtake, the British frigate Nymphe, 38, Captain 
 Epworth. On the i8th, off the great Bank of New- 
 foundland, he captured the Jamaica packet Swal- 
 low, homeward bound, with 200,000 dollars in 
 specie aboard. On the 31st, at 9 A.M., lat. 33° N., 
 long. 32° W., his two frigates fell in with the British 
 frigate Galatea, 36, Captain Woodley Losack, con- 
 voying two South Sea ships, to windward. The 
 Galatea ran down to reconnoitre, and at 10 A. M., 
 recognizing her foes, hauled up on the starboard 
 tack to escape. The American frigates made all sail 
 in chase, and continued beating to windward, tack- 
 ing several times, for about three hours. Seeing 
 that she was being overhauled, the Galatea now 
 edged away to get on her best point of sailing ; at 
 the same moment one of her convoy, the Argo, 
 bore up to cross the hawse of her foes, but was in- 
 tercepted by the Congress,v4'\\o lay to to secure her. 
 Meanwhile the President kept after the Galatea ; 
 she set her top-mast, top-gallant m.ast and lower 
 studding-sails, and when it was dusk had gained 
 greatly upon her. But the night was very dark, 
 the President lost sight of the chase, and, toward 
 midnight, hauled to the wind to rejoin her consort. 
 The two frigates cruised to the east as far as 22° W., 
 and then ran down to 17" N. ; but during the month 
 of November they did not see a sail. They had 
 but slightly better luck on their return toward 
 home. Passing 120 miles north of Bermuda, and 
 cruising a little while toward the Virginia capes, 
 they reentered Boston on Dec. 31st, having made 
 9 prizes, most of them of little value. 
 
 When four days out, on Oct. 12th, Commodore 
 Decatur had separated from the rest of Rodgers' 
 
I08 KAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 squadron and cruised east; on the 25th, in lat. 29° 
 N., and long. 29° 30', W. while going close-hauled on 
 the port tack, with the wind fresh from the S. S. 
 E., a sail was descried on the weather beam, 
 about 12 miles distant.' This was the British 38- 
 gun frigate Macedonian, Captain John Surnam Car- 
 den. She was not, like the Guerriire, an old ship 
 captured from the French, but newly built of oak, 
 and larger than any American i8-pounder frigate; 
 she was reputed (very wrongfully) to be a " crack 
 ship." According to Lieut. David Hope, " the 
 state of discipline on board was excellent ; in no 
 British ship was more attention paid to gunnery. 
 Before this cruise the ship had been engaged almost 
 every day with the enemy ; and in time of peace 
 the crew were constantly exercised at the great 
 guns." " How they could have practised so much 
 and learned so little is certainly marvellous. 
 
 The Macedonian set her foretop-mast and top- 
 gallant studding sails and bore away in chase,^ edg- 
 ing down with the wind a little aft the starboard 
 beam. Her first lieutenant wished to continue on 
 this course and pass down ahead of the United 
 States' but Captain Garden's over-anxiety to keep the 
 weather-gage lost him this opportunity of closing.' 
 Accordingly he hauled by the wind and passed 
 way to windward of the American. As Commo- 
 dore Decatur got within range, he eased off and 
 fired a broadside, most of which fell short" ; he then 
 
 ^ Official letter of Commodore Decatur, Oct. 30, 1812. 
 ° Marshall's " Naval Biography,'' vol. iv, p. 1018. 
 = Capt. Garden to Mr. Croker, Oct. 28, 1812. 
 *James, vi, l65. 
 
 '- Sentence of Court-martial held on the San Domingo, 74, at the 
 Bermudas, May 27, 1812. " Marshall, iv, 1080. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 log 
 
 kept his luff, and, the next time he fired, his long 24's 
 told heavily, while he received very little injury 
 himself.' The fire from his main-deck (for he did 
 not use his carronades at all for the first half hour)' 
 was so very rapid that it seemed as if the ship was 
 on fire ; his broadsides were delivered with almost 
 twice the rapidity of those of the Englishman.^ 
 The latter soon found he could not play at long 
 bowls with any chance of success ; and, having al- 
 ready erred either from timidity or bad judgment, 
 Captain Garden decided to add rashness to the cat- 
 alogue of his virtues. Accordingly he bore up, and 
 came down end on toward his adversary, with the 
 wind on his port quarter. The States now (10.15) 
 laid her main-topsail aback and made heavy play 
 with her long guns, and, as her adversary came 
 nearer, with her carronades also. The British ship 
 would reply with her starboard guns, hauling up to 
 do so ; as she came down, the American would ease 
 off, run a little way and again come to, keeping up 
 a terrific fire. As the Macedonian bore down to 
 close, the chocks of all her forecastle guns (which 
 were mounted on the outside) were cut away* ; her 
 fire caused some damage to the American's rigging, 
 but hardly touched her hull, while she herself suf- 
 fered so heavily both alow and aloft that she grad- 
 ually dropped to leeward, while the American fore- 
 reached on her. Finding herself ahead and to 
 windward, the States tacked and ranged up under 
 her adversary's lee, when the latter struck her col- 
 ors at 1 1. 1 5, just an hour and a half after the be- 
 ginning of the action." 
 
 ' Cooper, ii, 178. ' Letter of Commodore Decatur, 
 
 ' Tames, vi, 169. * Letter of Captain Garden. 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Decatur. 
 
no NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 The United States had suffered surprisingly little ; 
 what damage had been done was aloft. Her 'mizzen 
 top-gallant mast was cut away, some of £he spars 
 were wounded, and the rigging a good deal cut; the 
 hull was only struck two or three times. The ships 
 were never close enough to be within fair range of 
 grape and musketry," and the wounds were mostly 
 inflicted by round shot and were thus apt to be' 
 fatal. Hence the loss of the Americans amounted 
 to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th of the ship) 
 and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and 
 only five severely and slightly wounded. 
 
 The Macedonian, on the other hand, had received 
 over a hundred shot in her hull, several between 
 wind and water ; her mizzen-mast had gone by the 
 board ; her fore- and maintop-masts had been shot 
 away by the caps, and her main-yard in the slings ; 
 almost all her rigging was cut away (only the fore- 
 sail being left); on the engaged side all of her car- 
 ronades but two, and two of her main-deck guns, were 
 dismounted. Of her crew 43 were killed and mor- 
 tally wounded, and 61 (including her first and third 
 lieutenants) severely and slightly wounded.'' Among 
 her crew were eight Americans (as shown by her 
 muster-roll) ; these asked permission to go below 
 before the battle, but it was refused by Captain 
 Garden, and three were killed during the action. 
 James says that they lucre allowed to go below, but 
 this is untrue ; for if they had, the three would not 
 have been slain. The others testified that they had 
 been forced to fight, and they afterward entered 
 the American service — the only ones of the Macedo- 
 nian's crew who did, or who were asked to. 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Decatur. " Letter of Captain Cardeii. 
 
I 
 
 s 
 
 V. 
 
 \ 
 
 ,-4a,.,f:# 
 
 / ,' 
 
 l2 ^ 
 
 / k « 
 
 ^2 
 
 ^! 
 
 "^A 
 
 ui \ 
 
112 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 The Macedonian had her full complement of 301 
 men ; the States had, by her muster-roll of October 
 20th, 428 of^cers, petty officers, seamen, and boys, 
 and 50 officers and privates of marines, a total of 
 478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his " Naval Bi- 
 ography" makes it). 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 Broadside Weight 
 
 
 Size. Guns. 
 
 Metal, Men. Loss. 
 
 United States 
 
 1576 27 
 
 786 478 12 
 
 Macedonian 
 
 1325 25 
 
 547 301 104 
 
 
 Coojparative 
 Force. 
 
 Comparative Loss 
 Inflicted. 
 
 Stales 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 Macedonian 
 
 66 
 
 II 
 
 That is, the relative force being about as three is 
 to two,' the damage done was as nine to one ! 
 
 Of course, it would have been almost impossible 
 for the Macedonian to conquer with one third less 
 force ; but the disparity was by no means sufficient 
 to account for the ninefold greater loss suffered, and 
 the ease and impunity with which the victory was 
 won. The British sailors fought with their accus- 
 tomed courage, but their gunnery was exceedingly 
 
 ' I have considered the United States as mounting her full allowance 
 of 54 guns ; but it is possible that she had no more than 49. In 
 Decatur's letter of challenge of Jan. 17, 1814 (which challenge, by 
 the way, was a most blustering affair, reflecting credit neither on De- 
 catur, nor his opponent, Captain Hope, nor on any one else, excepting 
 Captain Stackpole of H. M. S. Statird)^ she is said to have had that 
 number ; her broadside would then be 15 long 24's below, I long 24, 
 t 12-pound, and 8 42-pound carronades above. Her real broadside 
 weight of metal would thus be about 680 lbs., ai>d she would be su- 
 perior to the Macedonian in the proportion of 5 to 4. But it is possi- 
 ble that Decatur had landed some of his guns in 1813, as James asserts ; 
 and though I am not at all sure of this, I have thought it best to be 
 on the safe side in describing his force. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 113 
 
 poor; and it must be remembered that though the 
 ship was bravely fought, still the defence was by no 
 means so desparate as that made by the Essex or 
 even the Chesapeake, as witnessed by their respective 
 losses. The Macedonian, moreover, was surrendered 
 when she had suffered less damage than either the 
 Guerrikre or Java. The chief cause of her loss lay 
 in the fact that Captain Garden was a poor comman- 
 der. The gunnery of the Java, Guerriere, and Mace- 
 donian was equally bad ; but while Captain Lambert 
 proved himself to be as able as he was gallant, and 
 Captain Dacres did nearly as well. Captain Carden, 
 on the other hand, was first too timid, and then too 
 rash, and showed bad judgment at all times. By 
 continuing his original course he could have closed 
 at once ; but he lost his chance by over-anxiety to 
 keep the weather-gage, and was censured by the 
 court-martial accordingly. Then he tried to remedy 
 one error by another, and made a foolishly rash ap- 
 proach. A very able and fair-minded English 
 writer says of this action : " As a display of cour- 
 age the character of the service was nobly upheld, 
 but we would be deceiving ourselves were we to ad- 
 mit that the comparative expertness of the crews in 
 gunnery was equally satisfactory. Now, taking the 
 difference of effect as given by Captain Carden, we 
 must draw this conclusion — that the comparative 
 loss in killed and wounded (104 to 12), together with 
 the dreadful account he gives of the condition of his 
 own ship, while he admits that the enemy's vessel 
 was in comparatively good order, must have arisen 
 from inferiority in gunnery as well as in force.'" 
 On the other hand, the American crew, even ac- 
 
 ^Lord Howard Douglass, " Naval Gunnery," p. 525, 
 
114 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 cording to James, were as fine a set of men as ever 
 were seen on shipboard. Though not one fourth 
 were British by birth, yet many of them had served 
 on board British ships of war,- in some cases volun- 
 tarily, but much more often because they were im- 
 pressed. They had been trained at the guns with 
 the greatest care by Lieutenant Allen. And final- 
 ly Commodore Decatur handled his ship with ab- 
 solute faultlessness. To sum up : a brave and 
 skilful crew, ably commanded, was matched against 
 an equally brave but unskilful one, with an in- 
 competent leader ; and this accounts for the dis- 
 parity of loss being so much greater than the dis- 
 parity in force. 
 
 At the outset of this battle the position of the 
 parties was just the reverse of that in the case of the 
 Constitution and Guerriire ; the Englishman had the 
 advantage of the wind, but he used it in a very dif- 
 ferent manner from that in which Captain Hull had 
 done. The latter at once ran down to close, but 
 manoeuvred so cautiously that no damage could be 
 done him till he was within pistol shot. Captain 
 Garden did not try to close till after fatal indecision, 
 and then made the attempt so heedlessly that he was 
 cut to pieces before he got to close quarters. Com- 
 modore Decatur, also, manoeuvred more skilfully 
 than Captain Dacres, although the difference was 
 less marked between these two. The combat was 
 a plain cannonade ; the States derived no advantage 
 from the superior number of her men, for they were 
 not needed. The marines in particular had nothing 
 whatever to do, while they had been of the greatest 
 service against the Guerrikre. The advantage was 
 simply in metal, as lo is to 7. Lord Howard Doug- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 115 
 
 lass' criticisms on these actions seem to me only ap- 
 plicable in part. He says (p. 524) : " The Americans 
 would neither approach nor permit us to join in 
 close battle until they had gained some extra- 
 ordinary advantage from the superior faculties of 
 their long guns in distant cannonade, and from the 
 intrepid, uncircumspect, and often very exposed ap- 
 proach of assailants who had long been accustomed 
 to contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were 
 crippled in distant cannonade from encountering 
 rashly the serious disadvantage of making direct at- 
 tacks ; the uncircumspect gallantry of our com- 
 manders led our ships unguardedly into the snares 
 which wary caution had spread." 
 
 These criticisms are very just as regards the 
 Macedonian^ and I fully agree with them (possibly 
 reserving the right to doubt Captain Garden's gal- 
 lantry, though readily admitting his uncircumspec- 
 tion). But the case of the Guerriirc differed widely. 
 There the American ship made the attack, while the 
 British at first avoided close combat ; and, so far 
 from trying to cripple her adversary by a distant 
 cannonade, the Constitution hardly fired a dozen 
 times until within pistol shot. This last point is 
 worth mentioning, because in a work on " Heavy 
 Ordnance," by Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A. (Lon- 
 don, 1837), it is stated that the Gucrriere received 
 her injuries before the closing, mentioning especially 
 the " thirty shot below the water-line " ; whereas, by 
 the official accounts of both commanders, the reverse 
 was the case. Captain Hull, in his letter, and Lieu- 
 tenant Morris, (in his autobiography) say they only 
 fired a few guns before closing ; and Captain Dacres, 
 in his letter, and Captain Brenton, in his " History," 
 
Il6 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 say that not much injury was received by the Guer- 
 riire until about the time the mizzen-mast fell, 
 which was three or four minutes after close action 
 began. 
 
 Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the Macedonian 
 as prize-master ; he secured the fore- and main-masts 
 and rigged a jury mizzen-mast, converting the vessel 
 into a bark. Commodore Decatur discontinued his 
 cruise to convoy his prize back to America ; they 
 reached New London Dec. 4th. Had it not been 
 for the necessity of convoying the Macedonian, 
 the States would have continued her cruise, for 
 the damage she suffered was of the most trifling 
 character. 
 
 Captain Carden stated (in Marshall's " Naval 
 Biography ") that the States measured 1,670 tons, 
 was manned by 509 men, suffered so from shot 
 under water that she had to be pumped out every 
 watch, and that two eighteen-pound shot passed in 
 a horizontal line through her main-masts ; all of 
 which statements were highly creditable to the 
 vividness of his imagination. The States measured 
 but 1,576 tons (and by English measurement very 
 much' less), had 478 men aboard, had not been 
 touched by a shot under water-line, and her lower 
 masts were unwounded. James states that most 
 of her crew were British, which assertion I have 
 already discussed ; and that she had but one boy 
 aboard, and that he was seventeen years old, — 
 in which case 29 others, some of whom (as we learn 
 from the " Life of Decatur") were only twelve, must 
 have grown with truly startling rapidity during the 
 hour and a half that the combat lasted. 
 
 During the twenty years preceding 1812 there 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 17 
 
 had been almost incessant warfare on the ocean, and 
 although there had been innumerable single con- 
 flicts between French and English frigates, there 
 had been but one case in which the French frigate, 
 single-handed, was victorious. This was in the 
 year 1805 when the Milan captured the Cleopatra. 
 According to Troude, the former threw at a broad- 
 side 574 pounds (actual), the latter but 334; and the 
 former lost 35 men out of her crew of 350, the lat- 
 ter 58 out of 200. Or, the forces being as lOO to 
 58, the loss inflicted was as 100 to 60; while the 
 States' force compared to the Macedonian s being 
 as 100 to 66, the loss she inflicted was as 100 to 11. 
 
 British ships, moreover, had often conquered 
 against odds as great ; as, for instance, when the Sea 
 Horse captured the great Turkish frigate Badere- 
 Zaffer ; when the Astrea captured the French frig- 
 ate Gloire, which threw at a broadside 286 pounds of 
 shot, while she threw but 174; and when, most 
 glorious of all, Lord Dundonald, in the gallant little 
 Speedy, actually captured the Spanish xebec Gamo, 
 of over five times her own force ! Similarly, the 
 corvette Comics captured the Danish frigate Fred- 
 rickscoarn, the brig Onyx captured the Dutch sloop 
 Manly, the little cutter Thorn captured the French 
 Courier-National, and the Pasley the Spanish Virgin , 
 while there had been many instances of drawn bat- 
 tles between English 12-pound frigates and French 
 or Spanish i8-pounders. 
 
 Captain Hull having resigned the command of the 
 Constitution, she was given to Captain Bainbridge, 
 of the Constellation, who was also entrusted with the 
 command of the Essex and Hornet. The latter ship 
 was in the port of Boston with the Constitution, un- 
 
Il8 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 der the command of Captain Lawrence. The Essex 
 was in the Delaware, and accordingly orders were 
 sent to Captain Porter to rendezvous at the Island of 
 Sanjago; if that failed several other places were 
 appointed, and if, after a certain time, he did not 
 fall in with his commodore he was to act at his own 
 discretion. 
 
 On October 26th the Constitution and Hornet 
 sailed, touched at the different rendezvous, and on 
 December 13th arrived off San Salvador, where Cap- 
 tain Lawrence found the Bonne Citoyenne, 18, Cap- 
 tain Pitt Barnaby Greene. The Bonne Citoyenne 
 was armed with 18 32-pound carronades and 2 long 
 nines, and her crew of 150 men was exactly equal in 
 number to that of the Hornet ; the latter's short 
 weight in metal made her antagonist superior to 
 her in about the same proportion that she her- 
 self was subsequently superior to the Pejiguin, or, in 
 other words, the ships were practically equal. Cap- 
 tain Lawrence now challenged Captain Greene to 
 single fight, giving the usual pledges that the Con- 
 stitution should not interfere. The challenge was 
 not accepted for a variety of reasons ; among others 
 the Bonne Citoyenne was carrying home half a mil- 
 lion pounds in specie." Leaving the Hornet to 
 
 ' Bienton and James both deny that Captain Greene was blockaded 
 by the Hornet, and claim that he feared the Constitution. James 
 says (p. 275) that the occurrence was one which " the characteristic 
 cunning of Americans turned greatly to their advantage " ; and adds 
 that Lawrence only sent the challenge because "it could not be ac- 
 cepted," and so he would " suffer no personal risk." He states that 
 the reason it was sent, as well as the reason that it was refused, was 
 because the Constitution was going to remain in the offing and cap- 
 ture the British ship if she proved conqueror. It is somewhat sur- 
 prising that even James should have had the temerity to advance such 
 .irguments , according to his own account (p. 277) the Constitution 
 left for Boston on Jan. 6th, and the Hornet remained blockading the 
 Bonne Citoyenne fill the 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived. Dur- 
 ing these eighteen days there could have been no possible chance of 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 1 19 
 
 blockade her, Commodore Bainbridge ran off to the 
 southward, keeping the land in view. 
 
 At 9 A. M., Dec. 29, 1 8 12, while the Constitution 
 was running along the coast of Brazil, about thirty 
 miles off shore in latitude 13° 6' S., and longitude 
 31° W., two strange sail were made,' inshore and to 
 windward. These were H. B. M. frigate Java, 
 Captain Lambert, forty-eight days out of Spithead, 
 England, with the captured ship William in com- 
 pany. Directing the latter to make for San Salva- 
 dor, the Java bore down in chase of the Constitu- 
 tion' The wind was blowing light from the 
 N.N.E., and there was very little sea on. At 10 
 the Java made the private signals, English, Span- 
 ish, and Portuguese in succession, none being an- 
 swered ; meanwhile the Constitution was standing up 
 toward the Java on the starboard tack ; a little 
 after 1 1 she hoisted her private signal, and then, 
 being satisfied that the strange sail was an enemy, 
 she wore and stood off toward the S. E., to draw her 
 antagonist away from the land," which was plainly 
 visible. The Java hauled up, and made sail in a 
 parallel course, the Constitution bearing about three 
 points on her lee bow. The Java gained rapidly, 
 being much the swifter. 
 
 At 1.30 the Constitution luffed up, shortened her 
 
 the Constitution or any other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous to 
 suppose that any such fear kept Captain Greene from sailing out to 
 attack his foe. No doubt Captain Greene's course was perfectly jus- 
 tifiable, but it is curious that with all the assertions made by James 
 as to the cowardice of the Americans, this is the only instance through- 
 out the war in which a ship of either party declined a contest with an 
 antagonist of equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir 
 George Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate of the 
 opposing ships.) 
 
 ' Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan. 3, 1813. 
 
 ^ Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec. 31, 1812. 
 
 ^ Log of the Constitution. 
 
I20 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 canvas to top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker, 
 and ran easily off on the port tack, heading toward 
 the southeast ; she carried her commodore's pen- 
 dant at the main, national ensigns at the mizzen- 
 peak and main top-gallant mast-head, and a Jack at 
 the fore. The Java also had taken in the main-sail 
 and royals, and came down in a lasking course on 
 her adversary's weather-quarter,' hoisting her ensign 
 at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at the mizzen top- 
 gallant mast-head, and another lashed to the main- 
 rigging. At 2 P. M., the Constitution fired a shot 
 ahead of her, following it quickly by a broadside,'* 
 and the two ships began at long bowls, the English 
 firing the lee or starboard battery while the 
 Americans replied "with their port guns. The can- 
 nonade was very spirited on both sides, the ships 
 suffering about equally. The first broadside of the 
 Java was very destructive, killing and wounding 
 several of the Constitution s crew. The Java kept 
 edging down, and the action continued, with grape 
 and musketry in addition ; the swifter British ship 
 soon forereached and kept away, intending to 
 wear across her slower antagonist's bow and rake 
 her ; but the latter wore in the smoke, and the two 
 combatants ran off to the westward, the Englishman 
 still a-weather and steering freer than the Constitu- 
 tion, which had luffed to close." The action went 
 on at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes, how- 
 ever, the Java again forged ahead, out of the 
 weight of her adversary's fire, and then kept off, as 
 before, to cross her bows ; and, as before, the Con- 
 stitution avoided this by wearing, both ships again 
 
 " Lieutenant Chads' Address to the Court-martial, April 23, 1813. 
 ' Commodore Bainbridge's letter. ^ Log of the Constitution. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 121 
 
 coming round with their heads to the east, the 
 American still to leeward. The Java kept the 
 weather-gage tenaciously, forereaching a little, 
 and whenever the Constitution luffed up to close,' 
 the former tried to rake her. But her gunnery was 
 now poor, Httle damage being done by it ; most of 
 the loss the Americans suffered was early in the 
 action. By setting her foresail and main-sail the 
 Constitution got up close on the enemy's lee beam, 
 her fire being very heavy and carrying away the 
 end of the Java's bowsprit and her jib-boom." The 
 Constitution forged ahead and repeated her former 
 manoeuvre, wearing in the smoke. The Java at 
 once hove in stays, but owing to the loss of head- 
 sail fell off very slowly, and the American frigate 
 poured a heavy raking broadside into her stern, at 
 about two cables' length distance. The Java re- 
 plied with her port guns as she fell off." Both 
 vessels then bore up and ran off free, with the wind 
 on the port quarter ; the Java being abreast and to 
 windward of her antagonist, both with their heads a 
 little east of south. The ships were less than a 
 cable's length apart, and the Constitution inflicted 
 great damage while suffering very little herself. 
 The British lost many men by the musketry of the 
 American topmen, and suffered still more from the 
 round and grape, especially on the forecastle," many 
 marked instances of valor being shown on both 
 sides. The Java's masts were wounded and her 
 rigging cut to pieces, and Captain Lambert then 
 ordered her to be laid aboard the enemy, who was 
 
 ' Log of the Constiiuiion. ' Lieutenant Chads' letter. 
 
 " Lieutenant Chads' letter. 
 
 * Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in minutes of the Court-mar- 
 tial on board Yi. M. S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth, April 23, 1813. 
 
123 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 on her lee beam. The helm was put a-weather, and 
 the Java came down for the Constitution s main- 
 chains. The boarders and marines gathered in the 
 gangways and on the forecastle, the boatswain 
 having been ordered to cheer them up with his pipe 
 that they might make a clean spring.' The Ameri- 
 cans, however, raked the British with terrible effect, 
 cutting off their main top-mast above the cap, and 
 their foremast near the cat harpings." The stump 
 of the Java's bowsprit got caught in the Constitu- 
 tion s mizzen-rigging, and before it got clear the Brit- 
 ish suffered still more. 
 
 Finally the ships separated, the Java's bowsprit 
 passing over the taffrail of the Constitution ; the 
 latter at once kept away to avoid being raked. 
 The ships again got nearly abreast, but the Consti- 
 tution, in her turn, forereached ; whereupon Commo- 
 dore Bainbridge wore, passed his antagonist, luffed 
 up under his quarter, raked him with the starboard 
 guns, then wore, and recommenced the action with 
 his port broadside at about 3.10. Again the vessels 
 were abreast, and the action went on as furiously as 
 ever. The wreck of the top hamper on the Java lay 
 over her starboard side, so that every discharge of 
 her guns set her on fire,'' and in a few minutes her 
 able and gallant commander was mortally wounded 
 by a ball fired by one of the American main-top- 
 men. ' The command then devolved on the first 
 lieutenant. Chads, himself painfully wounded. The 
 slaughter had been terrible, yet the British fought 
 on with stubborn resolution, cheering lustily. But 
 success was now hopeless, for nothing could stand 
 against the cool precision of the Yankee fire. The 
 
 ' Testimony of James Humble, in do., do. " Log of Constitution. 
 " Lieut. Chads' Address. ' Surgeon J. C. Jones' Report. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 23 
 
 stump of the Java's foremast was carried away by 
 a double-headed shot, the mizzen-mast fell, the gaff 
 and spanker boom were shot away, also the main- 
 yard, and finally the ensign was cut down by a shot, 
 and all her guns absolutely silenced ; when at 4.05 
 the ConstiUition, thinking her adversary had struck,' 
 ceased firing, hauled aboard her tacks, and passed 
 across her adversary's bows to windward, with her 
 top-sails, jib, and spanker set. A few minutes after- 
 ward the Java's main-mast fell, leaving her a sheer 
 hulk. The Constitution assumed a weatherly posi- 
 tion, and spent an hour in repairing damages and 
 securing her masts ; then she wore and stood tow- 
 ard her enemy, whose flag was again flying, but 
 only for bravado, for as soon as the Constitution 
 stood across her forefoot she struck. At 5.25 she 
 was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker, 1st 
 of the Constitution, in one of the latter's only two 
 remaining boats. 
 
 The American ship had suffered comparatively 
 little. But a few round shot had struck her hull, 
 one of which carried away the wheel; one 18- 
 pounder went through the mizzen-mast ; the fore- 
 mast, main-top-mast, and a few other spars were 
 slightly wounded, and the running rigging and 
 shrouds were a good deal cut ; but in an hour she 
 was again in good fighting trim. Her loss amounted 
 to 8 seamen and i marine killed ; the 5th lieuten- 
 ant, John C. Aylwin, and 2 seamen, mortally. 
 Commodore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely, 
 and 7 seamen and 2 marines, slightly wounded ; 
 in all 12 killed and mortally wounded, and 22 
 wounded severely and slightly." 
 
 ' Log of the ConstiLution (as given in Bainbridge's letter). 
 ' Report of Surgeon Amos E. Evans. 
 
124 Naval war of 1812. 
 
 " The Java sustained unequalled injuries beyond 
 the Constitution" says the British account." These 
 have already been given in detail ; she was a riddled 
 and entirely dismasted hulk. Her loss (for discus- 
 sion of which see farther on) was 48 killed (includ- 
 ing Captain Henry Lambert, who died soon after 
 the close of the action, and five midshipmen), and 
 102 wounded, among them Lieutenant Henry Ducie 
 Chads, Lieutenant of Marines David Davies, Com- 
 mander John Marshall, Lieut. James Saunders, the 
 boatswain, James Humble, master. Batty Robinson, 
 and four midshipmen. 
 
 In this action both ships displayed equal gal- 
 lantry and seamanship. " The Java" says Com- 
 modore Bainbridge, " was exceedingly well handled 
 and bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was a 
 distinguished and gallant officer, and a most worthy 
 man, whose death I sincerely regret." The ma- 
 noeuvring on both sides was excellent ; Captain 
 Lambert used the advantage which his ship pos- 
 sessed in her superior speed most skilfully, always 
 endeavoring to run across his adversary's bows and 
 rake him when he had forereached, and it was only 
 owing to the equal skill which his antagonist dis- 
 played that he was foiled, the length of the com- 
 bat being due to the number of evolutions. The 
 great superiority of the Americans was in their 
 gunnery. The fire of the Java was both less rapid 
 and less well directed than that of her antagonist; 
 the difference of force against her was not heavy, 
 being about as ten is to nine, and was by no means 
 enough to account for the almost fivefold greater 
 loss she suffered. 
 
 ' " Naval Chronicle," xxix, 452. 
 
w .g 
 
 
 e -a 
 
 5 - a d 
 
 2 s ::^ 3 
 
 -^ 
 
 
 *ft 
 
 : I 1 .■■' 
 
 ": \ 
 
 ; \ 
 \ \ 
 
 \ \ 
 
 ■• \ 
 ! \ 
 
 ii4 
 
 I 
 1 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 ***liiaUA*'' 
 
 S 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
126 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 The foregoing is a diagram of the battle. It dif- 
 fers from both of the official accounts, as these con- 
 flict greatly both as to time and as regards some of 
 the evolutions. I generally take the mean in cases 
 of difference; for example, Commodore Bainbridge's 
 report makes the fight endure but i hour and 55 
 minutes. Lieutenant Chads' 2 hours and 25 minutes ; 
 I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc., etc. 
 
 The tonnage and weight of metal of the comba- 
 tants have already been stated ; I will give the 
 complements shortly. The following is the 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS. 
 
 ConstiHUion 
 Java 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Weight Meta.1. 
 
 No. Men. Loss, 
 
 1576 
 
 654 
 
 475 34 
 
 1340 
 
 576 
 
 426 150 
 
 
 Relative 
 Force. 
 
 Relative Loss 
 Inflicted. 
 
 1 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 
 89 
 
 23 
 
 Constitution 
 Java 
 
 In hardly another action of the war do the ac- 
 counts of the respective forces differ so widely ; the 
 official British letter makes their total of men at the 
 beginning of the action 377, of whom Commodore 
 Bainbridge officially reports that he paroled 378 ! 
 The British state their loss in killed and mortally 
 wounded at 24 ; Commodore Bainbridge reports that 
 the dead alone amounted to nearly 60 ! Usually I 
 have taken each commander's account of his own 
 force and loss, and I should do so now if it were not 
 that the British accounts differ among themselves, 
 and whenever they relate to the Americans, are flat- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 127 
 
 ly contradicted by the affidavits of the latter's offi- 
 cers. The British first handicap themselves by the 
 statement that the surgeon of the Constitution was 
 an Irishman and lately an assistant surgeon in the 
 British navy (" Naval Chronicle," xxix, 452) ; which 
 draws from Surgeon Amos E. Evans a solemn state- 
 ment in the Boston Gazette that he was born in 
 Maryland and was never in the British navy in his 
 life. Then Surgeon Jones of the Java, in his offi- 
 cial report, after giving his own killed and mortally 
 wounded at 24, says that the Americans lost in all 
 about 60, and that 4 of their amputations perished 
 under his own eyes ; whereupon Surgeon Evans 
 makes the statement (Niles Register, vi, p. 35), 
 backed up by affidavits of his brother officers, 
 that in all he had but five amputations, of whom 
 only one died, and that one, a month after Surgeon 
 Jones had left the ship. To meet the assertions of 
 Lieutenant Chads that he began action with but 
 377 men, the Constitution s officers produced the 
 Java's muster-roll, dated Nov. 17th, or five days 
 after she had sailed, which showed 446 persons, of 
 whom 20 had been put on board a prize. The 
 presence of this large number of supernumeraries on 
 board is explained by the fact that the Java was 
 carrying out Lieutenant-General Hislop, the newly- 
 appointed Governor of Bombay, and his suite, to- 
 gether with part of the crews for the Cornwallis, 74, 
 and gun-sloops Chameleon and Icarus; she also con- 
 tained stores for those two ships. 
 
 Besides conflicting with the American reports, the 
 British statements contradict one another. The 
 official published report gives but two midshipmen 
 as killed ; while one of the volumes of the " Naval 
 
128 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Chronicle " (vol. xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from 
 one of the Java's lieutenants, in which he states 
 that there were five. Finally, Commodore Bain- 
 bridge found on board the Constitution, after the 
 prisoners had left, a letter from Lieutenant H. D. 
 Cornick, dated Jan. i, 1815, and addressed to Lieu- 
 tenant Peter V. Wood, 22d Regiment, foot, in which 
 he states that 65 of their men were killed. James 
 (" Naval Occurrences ") gets around this by stat- 
 ing that it was probably a forgery ; but, aside from 
 the improbability of Commodore Bainbridge being a 
 forger, this could not be so, for nothing would have 
 been easier than for the British lieutenant to have 
 denied having written it, which he never did. On 
 the other hand, it would be very likely that in the 
 heat of the action, Commodore Bainbridge and the 
 Javds own officers should overestimate the latter's 
 loss.' 
 
 Taking all these facts into consideration, we find 
 446 men on board the Java by her own muster-list ; 
 378 of these were paroled by Commodore Bainbridge 
 at San Salvador ; 24 men were acknowledged by 
 the enemy to be killed or mortally wounded ; 20 
 were absent in a prize, leaving 24 unaccounted 
 for, who were undoubtedly slain. 
 
 The British loss was thus 48 men killed and 
 mortally wounded, and 102 wounded severely and 
 slightly. The Java was better handled and more 
 desperately defended than the 'Macedonian or even 
 
 ' For an account of the shameless corruption then existing in the 
 Naval Administration of Great Britian, see Lord Dundonald's "Auto- 
 biography of a seaman." The letters of the commanders were often 
 garbled, as is mentioned by Brenton. Among numerous cases 
 that he gives, may be mentioned the cutting out of the Chevrette, 
 where he distinctly says, " our loss was much greater than was ever 
 acknowledged." (Vol. i, p. 505, edition of 1837.) 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 29 
 
 the Guerri^re, and the odds against her were much 
 smaller; so she caused her opponent greater loss, 
 though her gunnery was no better than theirs. 
 
 Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the Java, re- 
 moved all the prisoners and baggage to the Consti- 
 tution, and reported the prize to be in a very dis- 
 abled state ; owing partly to this, but more to the 
 long distance from home and the great danger there 
 was of recapture. Commodore Bainbridge destroyed 
 her on the 31st, and then made sail for San Salva- 
 dor. " Our gallant enemy," reports Lieutenant 
 Chads, "has treated us most generously"; and 
 Lieutenant-General Hislop presented the Commo- 
 dore with a very handsome sword as a token of 
 gratitude for the kindness with which he had treated 
 the prisoners. 
 
 Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries, but 
 especially because of her decayed condition. Commo- 
 dore Bainbridge sailed from San Salvador on Jan. 
 6, 1813, reaching Boston Feb. 27th, after his four 
 months' cruise. At San Salvador he left the Hornet 
 still blockading the Bonne Citoyenne. 
 
 In order " to see ourselves as others see us," I shall 
 again quote from Admiral Jurien de la Graviere,' as 
 his opinions are certainly well worthy of attention 
 both as to these first three battles, and as to the 
 lessons they teach. " When the American Congress 
 declared war on England in 1812," he says, "it 
 seemed as if this unequal conflict would crush her 
 navy in the act of being born ; instead, it but fertil- 
 ized the germ. It is only since that epoch that the 
 United States has taken rank among maritime pow- 
 ers. Some combats of frigates, corvettes, and brigs, 
 
 ' " Guerres Maritimes," ii, 284 (Paris, 1881). 
 
130 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 insignificant without doubt as regards material re- 
 sults, sufficed to break the charm which protected 
 the standard of St. George, and taught Europe what 
 she could have already learned from some of our 
 combats, if the louder noise of our defeats had not 
 drowned the glory, that the only invincibles on the 
 sea are good seamen and good artillerists. 
 
 " The English covered the ocean with their cruis- 
 ers when this unknown navy, composed of six frig- 
 ates and a few small craft hitherto hardly numbered, 
 dared to establish its cruisers at the mouth of the 
 Channel, in the very centre of the British power. 
 But already the Constitution had captured the Guer- 
 rikre and Java, the United States had made a prize 
 of the Macedonian, the Wasp of the Frolic, and the 
 Hornet of the Peacock. The honor of the new flag 
 was established. England, humiliated, tried to at- 
 tribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size of 
 the vessels which Congress had had constructed in 
 1799, and which did the fighting in 1812. She 
 wished to refuse them the name of frigates, and 
 called them, not without some appearance of reason, 
 disguised line-of-battle ships. Since then all mari- 
 time powers have copied these gigantic models, as 
 the result of the war of 1812 obliged England her- 
 self to change her naval material ; but if they had 
 employed, instead of frigates, cut-down 74's (vais- 
 seaux ras6s), it would still be difficult to explain the 
 prodigious success of the Americans. * * * 
 
 " In an engagement which terminated in less than 
 half an hour, the English frigate Guerriire, com- 
 pletely dismasted, had fifteen men killed, sixty- 
 three wounded, and more than thirty shot below the 
 water-line. She sank twelve hours after the combat. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 13 I 
 
 The Constitution, on the contrary, had but seven 
 men killed and seven wounded, and did not lose a 
 mast. As soon as she had replaced a few cut ropes 
 and changed a few sails, she was in condition, even 
 by the testimony of the British historian, to take 
 another Guerricrc. The United States took an hour 
 and a half to capture the Macedonian, and the same 
 difference made itself felt in the damage suffered by 
 the two ships. The Macedonian had her masts shat- 
 tered, two of her main-deck and all her spar-deck 
 guns disabled ; more than a hundred shot had pene- 
 trated the hull, and over a third of the crew had 
 suffered by the hostile fire. The American frigate, 
 on the contrary, had to regret but five men killed 
 and seven wounded ; her guns had been fired 
 each sixty-six times to the Macedonian s thirty-six. 
 The combat of the Constituiio?i and the Java lasted 
 two hours, and was the most bloody of these three 
 engagements. The Java only struck when she had 
 been razed like a sheer hulk ; she had twenty-two 
 
 men killed and one hundred and two wounded. 
 * * -X- * * * 
 
 "This war should be studied with unceasing dili- 
 gence ; the pride of two peoples to whom naval 
 affairs are so generally familiar has cleared all the 
 details and laid bare all the episodes, and through 
 the sneers which the victors should have spared, 
 merely out of care for -their own glory, at every step 
 can be seen that great truth, that there is only suc- 
 cess for those who know how to prepare it. 
 
 * * * 4f- * * 
 
 " It belongs to us to judge impartially these marine 
 events, too much exalted perhaps by a national 
 vanity one is tempted to excuse. The Americans 
 
132 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 showed, in the War of 1812, a great deal of skill and 
 resolution. But if, as they have asserted, the 
 chance§^ had always been perfectly equal between 
 them and their adversaries, if they had only owed 
 their triumphs to the intrepidity of Hull, Decatur, 
 and Bainbridge, there would be for us but little in- 
 terest in recalling the struggle. We need not seek 
 lessons in courage outside of our own history. On 
 the contrary, what is to be well considered is that 
 the ships of the United States constantly fought 
 with the chances in their favor, and it is on this that 
 the American government should found its true 
 title to glory. * * * The Americans in 1812 
 had secured to themselves the advantage of a better 
 organization [than the English]." 
 
 The fight between the Co7istitution and the Java 
 illustrates best the proposition, " that there is only 
 success for those who know how to prepare it." 
 Here the odds in men and metal were only about 
 as 10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to 
 say that they might have been reversed without 
 vitally affecting the result. In the fight Lambert 
 handled his ship as skilfully as Bainbridge did his; 
 and the Java's men proved by their indomitable 
 courage that they were excellent material. The Java's 
 crew was new shipped for the voyage, and had been 
 at sea but six weeks ; in the Constitution's first fight 
 her crew had been aboard of her but five weeks. 
 So the chances should have been nearly equal, and 
 the difference in fighting capacity that was shown 
 by the enormous disparity in the loss, and still 
 more in the damage inflicted, was due to the fact 
 that the ofTficera of one ship had, and the officers of 
 the other had not, trained their raw crews. The 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 133 
 
 Constitution' s men were not " picked," but simply 
 average American sailors, as the Java's were average 
 British sailors. The essential difference was in the 
 training. 
 
 During the six weeks the Java was at sea her men 
 had fired but six broadsides, of blank cartridges ; 
 during the first five weeks the Constitution cruised, 
 her crew were incessantly practised at firing with 
 blank cartridges and also at a target.' The Java's 
 crew had only been exercised occasionally, even in 
 pointing the guns, and when the captain of a gun 
 was killed the effectiveness of the piece was tem- 
 porarily ruined, and, moreover, the men did not 
 work together. The Constitution's crew were exer- 
 cised till they worked like machines, and yet with 
 enough individuality to render it impossible to cripple 
 a gun by killing one man. The unpractised British 
 sailors fired at random ; the trained Americans took 
 aim. The British marines had not been taught any 
 thing approximating to skirmishing or sharp-shoot- 
 ing ; the Americans had. The British sailors had 
 not even been trained enough in the ordinary duties 
 of seamen ; while the Americans in five weeks had 
 been rendered almost perfect. The former were at 
 a loss what to do in an emergency at all out of their 
 own line of work ; they were helpless when the 
 wreck fell over their guns, when the Americans 
 would have cut it away in a jiffy. As we learn 
 from Commodore Morris' "Autobiography," each 
 Yankee sailor could, at-need, do a little carpentering 
 or sail-mending, and so was more self-reliant. The 
 
 ' In looking through the logs of the Constitution, Hornet, etc., we 
 continually find such entries as " beat to quarters, exercised the men 
 at the great guns," "exercised with musketry," "exercised the 
 boarders," " exercised the great guns, blank cartridges, and after- 
 ward firing at mark." 
 
134 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 crew had been -trained to act as if guided by one 
 mind, yet each man retained his own individuality. 
 The petty officers were better paid than in Great 
 Britain, and so were of a better class of men, 
 thoroughly self-respecting ; the Americans soon got 
 their subordinates in order, while the British did 
 not. To sum up : one ship's crew had been trained 
 practically and thoroughly, while the other crew was 
 not much better off than the day it sailed ; and, as 
 far as it goes, this is a good test of the efficiency of 
 the two navies. 
 
 The U. S. brig Vixen, I2, Lieutenant George U. 
 Read, had been cruising off the southern coast; on 
 Nov. 22d she fell in with the Southampton, 32, Captain 
 Sir James Lucas Yeq, and was captured after a short 
 but severe trial of speed. Both vessels were wrecked 
 soon afterward. 
 
 The Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, left the Del- 
 aware on Oct. 28th, two days after Commodore 
 Bainbridge had left Boston. She expectt i to make 
 a very long cruise and so carried with her an unus- 
 ual quantity of stores and sixty more men than or- 
 dinarily, so that her muster-roll contained 319 names. 
 Being deep in the water she reached San lago after 
 Bainbridge had left. Nothing was met with until 
 after the Essex had crossed the equator in latitude 
 30° W. on Dec. nth. On the afternoon of the next 
 day a sail was made out to windward, and chased. 
 At nine in the evening it was overtaken, and struck 
 after receiving a volley of musketry which killed one 
 man. The prize proved to be the British packet 
 Nocton, of 10 guns and 31 men, with $55,000 in 
 specie aboard. The latter was taken out, and the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 135 
 
 Nocton sent home with Lieutenant Finch and a 
 prize crew of 17 men, but was recaptured by a 
 British frigate. 
 
 The next appointed rendezvous was the Island of 
 Fernando de Noronha, where Captain Porter found 
 a letter from Commodore Bainbridge, informing 
 him that the other vessels were off Cape Frio. 
 Thither cruised Porter, but his compatriots had left. 
 On the 29th he captured an English merchant 
 vessel ; and he was still cruising when the year 
 closed. 
 
 The year 1812, on the ocean, ended as gloriously 
 as it had begun. In four victorious fights the 
 disparity in loss had been so great as to sink the 
 disparity of force into insignificance. Our suc- 
 cesses had been unaccompanied by any important 
 reverse. Nor was it alone by the victories, but by 
 the cruises, that the year was noteworthy. The 
 Yankee men-of-war sailed almost in sight of the 
 British coast and right in the tract of the merchant 
 fleets and their armed protectors. Our vessels had 
 shown themselves immensely superior to their foes. 
 
 The reason of these striking and unexpected suc- 
 cesses was that our navy in 18 12 was the exact re- 
 verse of what our navy is now, in 1882. I am not 
 alluding to the personnel, which still remains excel- 
 lent ; but, whereas we now have a large number of 
 worthless vessels, standing very low down in their 
 respective classes, we then possessed a few vessels, 
 each unsurpassed by any foreign ship of her class. 
 To bring up our navy to the condition in which it 
 stood in 1812 it would not be necessary (although in 
 reality both very wise and in the end very economi- 
 
136 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 cal) to spend any more money than at present ; only 
 instead of using it to patch up a hundred antiquat- 
 ed hulks, it should be employed in building half a 
 dozen ships on the most effective model. If in 1812 
 our ships had borne the same relation to the British 
 ships that they do now, not all the courage and 
 skill of our sailors would have won us a single suc- 
 cess. As it was, we could only cope with the lower 
 rates, and had no vessels to oppose to the great 
 " liners " ; but to-day there is hardly any foreign 
 ship, no matter how low its rate, that is not supe- 
 rior to the corresponding American ones. It is too 
 much to hope that our political shortsightedness 
 will ever enable us to have a navy that is first-class 
 in point of size ; but there certainly seems no rea- 
 son why what ships we have should not be of the 
 very best quality. The effect of a victory is two- 
 fold, moral and material. Had we been as roughly 
 handled on water as we were on land during the first 
 year of the war, such a succession of disasters 
 would have had a most demoralizing effect on the 
 nation at large. As it was, our victorious sea- 
 fights, while they did not inflict any material dam- 
 age upon the colossal sea-might of England, had 
 the most important results in the feelings they 
 produced at home and even abroad. Of course 
 they were magnified absurdly by most of our 
 writers at the time ; but they do not need to be 
 magnified, for as they are any American can look 
 back upon them with the keenest national pride. 
 For a hundred and thirty years England had had 
 no equal on the sea ; and now she suddenly 
 found one in the untried navy of an almost un- 
 known power. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 137 
 
 BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN 
 
 1812. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Guerrilre 
 
 49 
 
 1>340 
 
 
 Macedonian 
 
 49 
 
 l>325 
 
 
 Java 
 
 49 
 
 1,340 
 
 
 Frolic 
 
 19 
 
 477 
 
 Recaptured. 
 
 Alert 
 
 20 
 186 
 
 325 
 
 
 
 4,807 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 477 
 
 Deducting F. 
 
 167 
 
 4,330 
 
 AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Tonnaf 
 
 Wasp 
 
 18 
 
 450 
 
 Nautilus 
 
 14 
 
 185 
 
 Vixen 
 
 14 
 
 185 
 
 46 
 
 820 
 
 VESSELS BUILT IN l8l2. 
 
 Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage. "Where Built. Cost. 
 
 Nonsuch Schooner 14 148 Charleston $15,000 
 
 Carolina Schooner 14 230 " 8,743 
 
 Louisiana Ship 16 341 New Orleans 15,500 
 
138 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 PRIZES 
 
 MADE, 
 
 1 
 
 Ship. 
 
 No. 
 
 of Prizes. 
 
 President 
 
 
 7 
 
 United States 
 
 
 2 
 
 Constitution 
 
 
 9 
 
 Congress 
 
 
 2 
 
 Chesapeake 
 
 
 I 
 
 Essex 
 
 
 II 
 
 Wasp 
 
 
 2 
 
 Hornet 
 
 
 I 
 
 Argus 
 
 
 6 
 
 Small Craft 
 
 
 5 
 46 
 
 ' These can only be approximately given ; the records are often 
 incomplete or contradictory, especially as regards the small craft. 
 Most accounts do not give by any means the full number. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 1812. 
 
 ON THE LAKES. 
 
 Preliminary-— The combatants starting nearly on an equality — DifBculties 
 of creating a naval force — Difficulty of comparing the force of the rival squad- 
 rons — Meagreness of the published accounts — Unreliability of James — Onta- 
 rio — Extraordinary nature of the American squadron — Canadian squadron 
 forming only a kind of \vater militia — Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by 
 Commodore Earle — Commodore Chauncy bombards York — Erie — Lieutenant 
 Elliott captures the Detroit and Caledonia — Unsuccessful expedition of Lieu- 
 tenant Angus. 
 
 AT the time we are treating of^ the State of 
 Maine was so sparsely settled, and covered 
 with such a dense growth of forest, that it was 
 practically impossible for either of the contending 
 parties to advance an army through its territory. 
 A continuation of the same wooded and mountain- 
 ous district protected the northern parts of Ver- 
 mont and New Hampshire, while in New York the 
 Adirondack region was an impenetrable wilderness. 
 It thus came about that the northern boundary was 
 formed, for military purposes, by Lake Huron, Lake 
 Erie, the Niagara, Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence, 
 and, after an interval, by Lake Champlain. -The 
 road into the States by the latter ran close along 
 shore, and without a naval force the invader would 
 be wholly unable to protect his flanks, and would 
 probably have his communications cut. This lake, 
 however, was almost wholly within the United 
 States, and did not become of importance till tow- 
 
 139 
 
140 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 ard the end of the war. Upon it were two Ameri- 
 can gun-boats, regularly officered and manned, and 
 for such smooth water sufficiently effective vessels. 
 
 What was at that time the western part of the 
 northern frontier became the main theatre of mil- 
 itary operations, and as it presented largely a water 
 front, a naval force was an indispensable adjunct, 
 the command of the lakes being of the utmost im- 
 portance. As these lakes were fitted for the ma- 
 noeuvring of ships of the largest size, the operations 
 upon them were of the same nature as those on the 
 ocean, and properly belong to naval and not to mil- 
 itary history. But while on the ocean America 
 started with too few ships to enable her really to 
 do any serious harm to her antagonist, on the in- 
 land waters the two sides began very nearly on an 
 equality. The chief regular forces either belligerent 
 possessed were on Lake Ontario. Here the United 
 States had a man-of-war brig, the Oneida, of 240 
 tons, carrying 16 24-pound carronades, manned 
 by experienced seamen, and commanded by 
 Lieutenant M. T. Woolsey. Great Britain pos- 
 sessed the Royal George, 22, Prince Regent, 16, Earl 
 of Moira, 14, Gloucester, 10, Seneca, 8, and Simco, 8, 
 all under the command of a Commodore Earle ; but 
 though this force was so much the more powerful 
 it was very inefficient, not being considered as be- 
 longing to the regular navy, the bailors being undis- 
 ciplined, and the officers totally without experience, 
 never having been really trained in the British ser- 
 vice. From these causes it resulted that the strug- 
 gle on the lakes was to be a work as much of creating 
 as of using a navy. On the seaboard success came 
 to those who made best use of the ships that had 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. I4I 
 
 already been built ; on the lakes the real contest lay 
 in the building. And building an inland navy was 
 no easy task. The country around the lakes, 
 especially on the south side, was still very sparsely 
 settled, and all the American naval supplies had to 
 be brought from the seaboard cities through the 
 valley of the Mohawk. There was no canal or other 
 means of communication, except very poor roads 
 intermittently relieved by transportation on the 
 Mohawk and on Oneida Lake, when they were navi- 
 gable. Supplies were thus brought up at an enor- 
 mous cost, with tedious delays and great difficulty ; 
 and bad weather put a stop to all travel. Very 
 little indeed, beyond timber, could be procured at 
 the stations on the lakes. Still a few scattered 
 villages and small towns had grown up on the 
 shores, whose inhabitants were largely engaged in 
 the carrying trade. The vessels used for the pur- 
 pose were generally small sloops or schooners, swift 
 and fairly good sailors, but very shallow and not 
 fitted for rough weather. The frontiersmen them- 
 selves, whether Canadian or American, were bold, 
 hardy seamen, and when properly trained and led 
 made excellent man-of-war's men; but on the Amer- 
 ican side they were too few in number, and too un- 
 trained to be made use of, and the seamen had to 
 come from the coast. But the Canadian shores had 
 been settled longer, the inhabitants were more numer- 
 ous, and by means of the St. Lawrence the country 
 was easy of access to Great Britain ; so that the seat 
 of war, as regards getting naval supplies, and even 
 men, was nearer to Great Britain than to us. Our 
 enemies also possessed in addition to the squadron 
 on Lake Ontario another on Lake Erie, consisting of 
 
142 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 the Queen Charlotte, 17, Lady Prevost, 13, Hunter, 10, 
 Caledorna, 2, Little Belt, 2, and Chippeway, 2. These 
 two squadrons furnished training schools for some 
 five hundred Canadian seamen, whom a short course 
 of discipline under experienced officers sufficed to 
 lender as good men as their British friends or 
 American foes. Very few British seamen ever 
 reached Lake Erie (according to James, not over 
 fifty) ; but on Lake Ontario, and afterward on 
 Lake Champlain, they formed the bulk of the crews, 
 '' picked seamen, sent out by government expressly 
 for service on the Canada lakes." ' As the contrary 
 has sometimes been asserted it may be as well to 
 mention that Admiral Codrington states that no 
 want of seamen contributed to the British disasters 
 on the lakes, as their sea-ships at Quebec had men 
 drafted from them for that service till their crews 
 were utterly depleted." I am bound to state that 
 while I think that on the ocean our sailors showed 
 themselves superior to their opponents, especially in 
 gun practice, on the lakes the men of the rival 
 fleets were as evenly matched, in skill and courage, 
 as could well be. The difference, when there was 
 any, appeared in the officers, and, above all, in the 
 builders ; which was the more creditable to us, as in 
 the beginning we were handicapped by the fact that 
 the British already had a considerable number of 
 war vessels, while we had but one. 
 
 The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation be- 
 tween Erie and Ontario ; so there were three inde- 
 pendent centres of naval operations on the northern 
 frontier. The first was on Lake Champlain, where 
 
 ' James, vi, 353. 
 
 " Memoirs, i, 322, referring especially to battle of Lake Cham- 
 plain. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 143 
 
 only the Americans possessed any force, and, singu- 
 larly enough, this was the only place where the 
 British showed more enterprise in ship-building 
 than we did. Next came Lake Ontario, where 
 both sides made their greatest efforts, but where 
 the result was indecisive, though the balance of suc- 
 cess was slightly inclined toward us. Our naval 
 station was at Sackett's Harbor ; that of our foes at 
 Kingston. The third field of operations was Lake 
 Erie and the waters above it. Here both sides 
 showed equal daring and skill in the fighting, and 
 our advantage must be ascribed to the energy and 
 success with which we built and equipped vessels. 
 Originally we had no force at all on these waters, 
 while several vessels were opposed to us. It is a 
 matter of wonder that the British and Canadian 
 governments should have been so supine as to per- 
 mit their existing force to go badly armed, and so 
 unenterprising as to build but one additional ship, 
 when they could easily have preserved their supe- 
 riority. 
 
 It is very difficult to give a full and fair account 
 of the lake campaigns. The inland navies were 
 created especially for the war, and, after it were 
 allowed to decay, so that the records of the tonnage, 
 armament, and crews are hard to get at. Of course, 
 where everything had to be created, the services 
 could not have the regular character of those on the 
 ocean. The vessels employed were of widely differ- 
 ent kinds, and this often renders it almost impossi- 
 ble to correctly estimate the relative force of two 
 opposing squadrons. While the Americans were 
 building their lake navy, they, as make-shifts, made 
 use of some ordinary merchant schooners, which 
 
144 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 were purchased and fitted up with one or two long, 
 heavy guns each. These gun-vessels had no quar- 
 ters, and suffered under all the other disadvantages 
 which make a merchant vessel inferior to a regularly- 
 constructed man-of-war. The chief trouble was that 
 in a heavy sea they had a strong tendency to cap- 
 size, and were so unsteady that the guns could not 
 be aimed when any wind was blowing. Now, if a 
 few of these schooners, mounting long 32's, encoun- 
 tered a couple of man-of-war brigs, armed with car- 
 ronades, which side was strongest? In smooth 
 water the schooners had the advantage, and in 
 rough weather they were completely at the mercy 
 of the brigs ; so that it would be very hard to get at 
 the true worth of such a contest, as each side would 
 be tolerably sure to insist that the weather was such 
 as to give a great advantage to the other. In all 
 the battles and skirmishes on Champlain, Erie, and 
 Huron, at least there was no room left for doubt as 
 to who were the victors. But on Lake Ontario 
 there was never any decisive struggle, and whenever 
 an encounter occurred, each commodore always 
 claimed tha,t his adversary had " declined the com- 
 bat " though "much superior in strength." It is, 
 of course, almost impossible to find out which really 
 did decline the combat, for the official letters flatly 
 contradict each other ; and it is often almost as dif- 
 ficult to discover where the superiority in force lay, 
 when the fleets differed so widely in character as 
 was the case in 1813. Then Commodore Chauncy's 
 squadron consisted largely of schooners; their long, 
 heavy guns made his total foot up in a very impos- 
 ing manner, and similar gun-vessels did very good 
 work on Lake Erie ; so Commodore Yeo, and more 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. I45 
 
 especially Commodore Yeo's admirers, exalted these 
 schooners to the skies, and conveyed the impression 
 that they were most formidable craft, by means of 
 which Chauncy ought to have won great victories. 
 Yet when Yeo captured two of them he refused to 
 let them even cruise with his fleet, and they were 
 sent back to act as coast gun-boats and transports, 
 which certainly would not have been done had they 
 been fitted to render any effectual assistance. 
 Again, one night a squall came on and the two 
 largest schooners went to the bottom, which did not 
 tend to increase the confidence felt in the others. 
 So there can be no doubt that in all but very 
 smooth water the schooners could almost be counted 
 out of the fight. Then the question arises in any 
 given case, was the water smooth? And the testi- 
 mony is as conflicting as ever. 
 
 It is not too easy to reconcile the official letters of 
 the commanders, and it is still harder to get at the 
 truth from either the American or British histories. 
 Cooper is very inexact, and, moreover, paints every 
 thing couleur derose, paying no attention to the Brit- 
 ish side of the question, and distributing so much 
 praise to everybody that one is at a loss to know 
 where it really belongs. Still, he is very useful, 
 for he lived at the time of the events he narrates, 
 and could get much information about them at first 
 hand, from the actors themselves. James is almost 
 the only British authority on the subject ; but he is 
 not nearly as reliable as when dealing with the 
 ocean contests, most of this part of his work being 
 taken up with a succession of acrid soliloquies on 
 the moral defects of the American character. The 
 British records for this extraordinary service on the 
 
146 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 lakes were not at all carefully kept, and so James is 
 not hampered by the necessity of adhering more or 
 less closely to official documents, but lets his imagi- 
 nation run loose. On the ocean and seaboard his 
 account of the British force can generally be relied 
 upon ; but on the lakes his authority is questionable 
 in every thing relating either to friends or foes. 
 This is the more exasperating because it is done 
 wilfully, when, if he had chosen, he could have 
 written an invaluable history ; he must often have 
 known the truth when, as a matter of preference, he 
 chose either to suppress or alter it. Thus he ignores 
 all the small " cutting out " expeditions in which 
 the Americans were successful, and where one 
 would like to hear the British side. For example, 
 Captain Yeo captured two schooners, the Julia and 
 Growler, but Chauncy recaptured both. We have 
 the American account of this recapture in full, but 
 James does not even hint at it, and blandly puts 
 down both vessels in the total " American loss " at 
 the end of his smaller work. Worse still, when the 
 Growler again changed hands, he counts it in again, 
 in the total, as if it were an entirely different boat, 
 although he invariably rules out of the American 
 list all recaptured vessels. A more serious perver- 
 sion of facts are his statements about comparative 
 tonnage. This was at that time measured arbitra- 
 rily, the depth of hold being estimated at half the 
 breadth of beam ; and the tonnage of our lake 
 vessels was put down exactly as if they were reg- 
 ular ocean cruisers of the same dimensions in 
 length and breadth. But on these inland seas the 
 Vessels really did not draw more than half as much 
 water as on the ocean, and the depth would of 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 147 
 
 course be much less. James, in comparing the ton- 
 nage, gives that of the Americans as if they were 
 regular ocean ships, but in the case of the British 
 vessels, carefully allows for their shallowness, al- 
 though professing to treat the two classes in the 
 same way ; and thus he makes out a most striking 
 and purely imaginary difference. The best example 
 is furnished by his accounts of the fleets on Lake 
 Erie. The captured vessels were appraised by two 
 captains and the ship-builder, Mr. Henry Eckford ; 
 their tonnage being computed precisely as the ton- 
 nage of the American vessels. The appraisement 
 was recorded in the Navy Department, and was 
 first made public by Cooper, so that it could not 
 have been done for effect. Thus measured it was 
 found that the tonnage was in round numbers as 
 follows : Detroit, 490 tons ; Queen Charlotte, 400 ; 
 Lady Prevost, 230; Htmter, 180; Little Belt, 90; 
 Chippeway , 70. James makes them measure respec- 
 tively 305, 280, 120, 74, 54, and 32 tons, but care- 
 fully gives the American ships the regular sea ton- 
 nage. So also he habitually deducts about 25 per 
 cent, from the real number of men on board the 
 British ships ; as regards Lake Erie he contradicts 
 himself so much that he does not need to be ex- 
 posed from outside sources. But the most glaring 
 and least excusable misstatements are made as to 
 the battle of Lake Champlain, where he gives the 
 American as greatly exceeding the British force. He 
 reaches this conclusion by the most marvellous series 
 of garblings and misstatements. First, he says that 
 the Confiance and the Saratoga were of nearly equal 
 tonnage. The Confiance being captured was placed 
 on our naval lists, where for years she ranked as a 
 
148 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 36-gun frigate, while the Saratoga ranked among 
 the 24-gun corvettes ; and by actual measurement 
 the former was half as large again as the latter. He 
 gives the Confiance but 270 men ; one of her officers, 
 in a letter published in the London Naval Chronicle,^ 
 gives her over 300 ; more than that number of dead 
 and prisoners were taken out of her. He misstates the 
 calibre of her gunsj-arud counts out two of them be- 
 cause they were used through the bow-ports ; 
 whereas, from the method in which she made her 
 attack, these would have been peculiarly effective. 
 The guns are given accurately by Cooper, on the 
 authority of an officer who was on board the Confi- 
 ance within 15 minutes after the Linnet struck, and 
 who was in charge of her for two months. 
 
 Then James states that there were but 10 British 
 gallies, while Sir George Prevost's official account, 
 as well as all the American authorities, state the 
 number to be 12. He says that Xh.^ Finch grounded 
 opposite an American battery before the engage- 
 ment began, while in reality it was an hour after- 
 ward, and because she had been disabled by the 
 shot of the American fleet. The gallies were largely 
 manned by Canadians, and James, anxious to put 
 the blame on these rather than the British, says 
 that they acted in the most cowardly way, whereas 
 in reality they caused the Americans more trouble 
 than Downie's smaller sailing vessels did. His ac- 
 count of the armament of these vessels differs widely 
 from the official reports. He gives the Linnet and 
 Cliubb a smaller number of men than the number of 
 prisoners that were actually taken out of them, not 
 
 'Vol. xxxii, p. 272. The letter also says that hardly five of her 
 men remained unhurt. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 149 
 
 including the dead. Even misstating Downie's 
 force in guns, underestimating the number of his 
 men, and leaving out two of his gun-boats, did not 
 content James ; and to make the figures show a 
 proper disproportion, he says (vol. vi, p. 504) that 
 he shall exclude the Finch from the estimate, be- 
 cause she grounded, and half of the gun-boats, be- 
 cause he does not think they acted bravely. Even 
 were these assertions true, it would be quite as 
 logical for an American writer to put the Chesa- 
 peake's crew down as only 200,. and say he should 
 exclude the other men from the estimate because 
 they flinched ; and to exclude all the guns that 
 were disabled by shot, would be no worse than to 
 exclude the Finch. James' manipulation of the 
 figures is a really curious piece of audacity. Natu- 
 rally, subsequent British historians have followed 
 him without inquiry. James' account of this battle, 
 alone, amply justifies our rejecting his narrative 
 entirely, as far as affairs on the lakes go, whenever 
 it conflicts with any other statement, British or 
 American. Even when it does not conflict, it must 
 be followed with extreme caution, for whenever he 
 goes into figures the only thing certain about them 
 is that they are wrong. He gives no details at all 
 of most of the general actions. Of these, however, 
 we already possess excellent accounts, the best 
 being those in the " Manual of Naval Tactics," by 
 Commander J. H. Ward, U. S. N. (1859), and in 
 Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812," and 
 Cooper's " Naval History." The chief difficulty 
 occurs in connection with matters on Lake Ontario,' 
 
 ' The accounts of the two commanders on Lake Ontario are as diffi- 
 cult to reconcile as are those of the contending admirals in the battles 
 which the Dutch waged against the English and French during the 
 
150 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 where I have been obliged to have recourse to a 
 perfect patchwork of authors and even newspapers, 
 for the details, using Niles Register and James as 
 mutual correctives. The armaments and equip- 
 ments being so irregular I have not, as in other 
 cases, made any allowance for the short weight of 
 the American shot, as here the British may have 
 suffered under a similar disadvantage ; and it may 
 be as well to keep in mind that on these inland 
 waters the seamen of the two navies seem to have 
 been as evenly matched in courage and skill as was 
 possible. They were of exactly the same stock, 
 with the sole exception that among and under, but 
 entirely distinct from, the Canadian-English, fought 
 the descendants of the conquered Canadian-French ; 
 and even these had been trained by Englishmen, 
 were led by English captains, fought on ships built 
 by English gold, and with English weapons and 
 discipline. 
 
 ON LAKE ONTARIO. 
 
 There being, as already explained, three inde- 
 pendent centres of inland naval operations, the 
 events at each will be considered separately. 
 
 At the opening of the war Lieutenant Woolsey, 
 with the Oneida, was stationed at Sackett's Harbor, 
 which was protected at the entrance by a small 
 fort with a battery composed of one long 32. The 
 
 years 1672-1675. In every one of Dc Ruyler's last six battles each 
 side regularly claimed the victory, although there can be but little 
 doubt that on the whole the strategical, and probably the tactical, 
 advantage remained with De Ruyter. Every historian ought to feel 
 a sense of the most lively gratitude toward Nelson ; in his various 
 encounters he never left any possible room for dispute as to which 
 si<le had come out first best. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 151 
 
 Canadian squadron of six ships, mounting nearly 
 80 guns, was of course too strong to be med- 
 dled with. Indeed, had the Royal George, 22, the 
 largest vessel, been commanded by a regular Brit- 
 ish sea-ofificer, she would have been perfectly com- 
 petent to take both the Oneida and Sackett's Har- 
 bor ; but before the Canadian commodore, Earle, 
 made up his mind to attack, Lieut. Woolsey had 
 time to make one or two short cruises, doing some 
 damage among the merchant vessels of the enemy. 
 
 On the 19th of July Earle's ships appeared off the 
 Harbor ; the Oneida was such a dull sailor that it 
 was useless for her to try to escape, so she was 
 hauled up under a bank where she raked the en- 
 trance, and her off guns landed and mounted on 
 the shore, while Lieut. Woolsey took charge of the 
 "battery," or long 32, in the fort. The latter was 
 the only gun that was of much use, for after a des- 
 ultory cannonade of about an hour, Earle with- 
 drew, having suffered very little damage, inflicted 
 none at all, and proved himself and his subordi- 
 nates to be grossly incompetent. 
 
 Acting under orders, Lieut. Woolsey now set 
 about procuring merchant schooners to be fitted 
 and used as gun-vessels until more regular cruisers 
 could be built. A captured British schooner was 
 christened the Julia, armed with a long 32 and two 
 6's, manned with 30 men, under Lieut. Henry 
 Wells, and sent down to Ogdensburg. " On her 
 way thither she encountered and actually beat off, 
 without losing a man, the Moira, of 14, and Glouces- 
 ter, of 10 guns.'" Five other schooners were also 
 purchased ; the Hamilton, of 10 guns, being the 
 
 ' James, vi, 350. 
 
152 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 largest, while the other four, the Governor Tomp. 
 kins, Growler, Conquest, and Pert had but 1 1 pieces 
 between them. Nothing is more difficult than to 
 exactly describe the armaments of the smaller lake 
 vessels. The American schooners were mere make- 
 shifts, and their guns were frequently changed' ; as 
 soon as they coiild be dispensed with they were laid 
 up, or sold, and forgotten. 
 
 It was even worse with the British, who mani- 
 fested the most indefatigable industry in intermit- 
 tently changing the armament, rig, and name of al- 
 most every vessel, and, the records being very 
 loosely kept, it is hard to find what was the force 
 at any one time. A vessel which in one conflict 
 was armed with long i8's, in the next would have 
 replaced some of them with 68-pound carronades ; 
 or, beginning life as a ship, she would do most of 
 her work as a schooner, and be captured as a brig, 
 changing her name even oftener than any thing 
 else. 
 
 On the first of September Commodore Isaac 
 Chauncy was appointed commander of the forces 
 on the lakes (except of those on Lake Champlain), 
 and he at once bent his energies to preparing an 
 effective flotilla. A large party of ship-carpenters 
 were immediately despatched to the Harbor ; and 
 they were soon followed by about a hundred offi- 
 cers and seamen, with guns, stores, etc. The keel 
 of a ship to mount 24 32-pound carronades, and to 
 
 'They were always having accidents happen to them that necessi- 
 tated some alteration. If a boat was armed with a long 32, she 
 rolled too much, and they substituted a 24 ; if she also had an 18- 
 pound carronade, it upset down the hatchway in the middle of a 
 fight, and made way for a long 12, which burst as soon as it was 
 used, and was replaced by two medium 6's. So a regular gamut of 
 changes would be rung. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 153 
 
 be called the Madison, was laid down, and she was 
 launched on the 26th of November, just when 
 navigation had closed on account of the ice. 
 Late in the autumn, four more schooners were 
 purchased, and named the Ontario, Scourge, Fair 
 American,2ind Asp, but these were hardly used until 
 the following spring. The cruising force of the 
 Americans was composed solely of the Oneida and 
 the six schooners first mentioned. The British 
 squadron was of nearly double this strength, and 
 had it been officered and trained as it was during 
 the ensuing summer, the Americans could not have 
 stirred out of port. But as it was, it merely 
 served as a kind of water militia, the very sailors, 
 who subsequently did well, being then almost use- 
 less, and unable to oppose their well-disciplined 
 foes, though the latter were so inferior in number 
 and force. For the reason that it was thus prac- 
 tically a contest of regulars against militia, I shall 
 not give numerical comparisons of the skirmishes 
 in the autumn of 1812, and shall touch on them 
 but slightly. They teach the old lesson that, 
 whether by sea or land, a small, well-officered, and 
 well-trained force, can not, except very rarely, be 
 resisted by a greater number of mere militia; and 
 that in the end it is true economy to have the 
 regular "force prepared beforehand, without waiting 
 until we have been forced to prepare it by the 
 disasters happening to the irregulars. The Cana- 
 dian seamen behaved badly, but no worse than 
 the American land-forces did at the same time ; 
 later, under regular training, both nations re- 
 trieved their reputations. 
 
 Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's Har- 
 
154 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 bor in October, and appeared on the lake on Nov. 
 8th, in the Oneida, Lieutenant Woolsey, with the 
 six schooners Conquest, Lieutenant Elliott ; Hamil- 
 ton, Lieutenant McPherson ; Tompkins, Lieutenant 
 Brown ; Pert, Sailing-master Arundel ; Julia, Sailing- 
 master Trant ; Growler, Sailing-master Mix. The 
 Canadian vessels were engaged in conveying sup- 
 plies from the westward. Commodore Chauncy dis- 
 covered the Royal George off the False Duck Islands, 
 and chased her under the batteries of Kingston, on 
 the 9th. Kingston was too well defended to be taken 
 by such a force as Chauncy's; but the latter de- 
 cided to make a reconnoissance, to discover the en- 
 emy's means of defence and see if it was possible to 
 lay the Royal George aboard. At 3 P. M. the attack 
 was made. The Hamilton and Tompkins were ab- 
 sent chasing, and did not arrive until the fighting 
 had begun. The other four gun-boats, Conquest, 
 Julia, Pert, and Growler, led, in the order named, to 
 open the attack with their heavy guns, and prepare 
 the way for the Oneida, which followed. At the 
 third discharge the Pert's gun burst, putting her 
 nearly kors de combat, badly wounding her gallant 
 commander, Mr. Arundel (who shortly afterward fell 
 overboard and was drowned), and slightly wounding 
 -four of her crew. The other gun-boats engaged the 
 five batteries of the enemy, while the Oneida pushed 
 on without firing a shot till at 3.40 she opened on 
 the Royal George, and after 20 minutes' combat act- 
 ually succeeded in compelling her opponent, though 
 of double her force, to cut her cables, run in, and 
 tie herself to a wharf, where some of her people de- 
 serted her ; here she was under the protection of a 
 large body of troops, and the Americans could not 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 155 
 
 board her in face of the land-forces. It soon began 
 to grow dusk, and Chauncy's squadron beat out 
 through the channel, against a fresh head-wind. In 
 this spirited attack the American loss had been con- 
 fined to half a dozen men, and had fallen almost ex- 
 clusively on the Oneida. The next day foul weather 
 came on, and the squadron sailed for Sackett's Har- 
 bor. Some merchant vessels were taken, and the 
 Simco, 8, was chased, but unsuccessfully. 
 
 The weather now became cold and tempestuous, 
 but cruising continued till the middle of November. 
 The Canadian commanders, however, utterly refused 
 to fight ; the Royal George even fleeing from the 
 Oneida, when the latter was entirely alone, and 
 leaving the American commodore in undisputed 
 command of the lake. Four of the schooners 
 continued blockading Kingston till the middle of 
 November; shorly afterward navigation closed.' 
 
 LAKE ERIE. 
 
 On Lake Erie there was no American naval 
 force ; but the army had fitted out a small brig, 
 armed with six 6-pounders. This fell into the 
 hands of the British at the capture of Detroit, and 
 was named after that city, so that by the time a 
 force of American ofificers and seamen arrived at the 
 lake there was not a vessel on it for them to serve 
 in, while their foes had eight. But we only have to 
 deal with two of the latter at present. The Detroit, 
 still mounting six 6-pounders, and with a crew of 56 
 men, under the command of Lieutenant of Marines 
 
 ' These preliminary events were not very important, and the histo- 
 rians on both sides agree almost exactly, so that I have not considered 
 it necessary to quote authorities. 
 
156 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Rolette, of the Royal Navy, assisted by a boat- 
 swain and gunner, and containing also 30 American 
 prisoners, and the Caledonia, a small brig mount- 
 ing two 4-pounders on pivots, with a crew of 
 12 men, Canadian-English, under Mr. Irvine, and 
 having aboard also 10 American prisoners, and a 
 very valuable cargo of furs worth about 200^000 
 dollars, moved down the lake, and on Oct. 7th an- 
 chored under Fort Erie.' 
 
 Commander Jesse D. Elliott had been sent up to 
 Erie some time before with instructions from Com- 
 modore Chauncy to construct a naval force, partly by 
 vbuilding two brigs of 300 tons each," and partly by 
 purchasing schooners to act as gun-boats. No 
 sailors had yet arrived ; but on the very day on 
 which the two brigs moved down and anchored 
 under Fort Erie, Captain Elliott received news that 
 the first detachment of the promised searrien, 51 in 
 number, including officers, ° was but a few miles dis- 
 tant. He at once sent word to have these men 
 hurried up, but when they arrived they were found 
 to have no arms, for which application was made to 
 the military authorities. The latter not only gave 
 a sufficiency of sabres, pistols, and muskets to the 
 sailors, but also detailed enough soldiers, under 
 Captain N. Towsen and Lieutenant Isaac Roach, 
 to make the total number of men that took part in 
 the expedition 124. This force left Black Rock at 
 
 ' Letter of Captain Jesse D. Elliott to Secretary of Navy, Black 
 Rock, Oct. 5, 18 1 2. 
 
 ^ That is, of 300 tons actual capacity ; measured as if they had 
 been ordinary sea vessels they each tonned 480. Their opponent, the 
 ship Detroit, similarly tonned 305, actual measurement, or 490, com- 
 puting it in the ordinary manner. 
 
 ^ The number of men in this expedition is taken from Lossing's 
 " Field-Book of the War of i8i2," by Benson L. Lossing, New York, 
 1S69, p. 385, note, where a complete list of the names is given. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. I57 
 
 one o'clock on the morning of the 8th in two large 
 boats, one under the command of Commander 
 Elliott, assisted by Lieutenant Roach, the other 
 under Sailing-master George Watts and Captain 
 Towsen. After two hours' rowing they reached the 
 foe, and the attack was made at three o'clock. 
 Elliott laid his boat alongside the Detroit before he 
 was discovered, and captured her after a very brief 
 struggle, in which he lost but one man killed, and 
 Midshipman J. C. Cummings wounded with a bay- 
 onet in the leg. The noise of the scuffle roused the 
 hardy provincials aboard the Caledonia, and they 
 were thus enabled to make a far more effectual 
 resistance to Sailing-master Watts than the larger 
 vessel had to Captain Elliott. As Watts pulled 
 alongside he was greeted with a volley of musketry, 
 but at once boarded and carried the brig, the twelve 
 Canadians being cut down or made prisoners ; one 
 American was killed and four badly wounded. The 
 wind was too light and the current too strong to 
 enable the prizes to beat out and reach the lake, so 
 the cables were cut and they ran down stream. The 
 Caledonia was safely beached under the protection 
 of an American battery near Black Rock. The 
 Detroit, however, was obliged to anchor but four 
 hundred yards from a British battery, which, to- 
 gether with some flying artillery, opened on her. 
 Getting all his guns on the port side, EUiott kept 
 up a brisk cannonade till his ammunition gave out, 
 when he cut his cable and soon grounded on Squaw 
 Island. Here the Detroit was commanded by the 
 guns of both sides, and which ever party took pos- 
 session of her was at once driven out by the other. 
 The struggle ended in her destruction^ most of her 
 
158 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 guns being taken over to the American side. This 
 was a very daring and handsome exploit, reflecting 
 great credit on Commander ElHott, and giving the 
 Americans, in the Caledonia, the nucleus of their 
 navy on Lake Erie ; soon afterward Elliott re- 
 turned to Lake Ontario, a new detachment of sea- 
 men under Commander S. Angus having arrived. 
 
 On the 28th of November, the American general, 
 Smith, despatched two parties to make an attack on 
 some of the British batteries. One of these consisted 
 of 10 boats, under the command of Captain King of 
 the 15th infantry, with 150 soldiers, and with him 
 went Mr. Angus with 82 sailors, including officers. 
 The expedition left at one o'clock in the morning, 
 but was discovered and greeted with a warm fire 
 from a field battery placed in front of some British 
 barracks known as the Red House. Six of the 
 boats put back ; but the other four, containing 
 about a hundred men, dashed on. While the 
 soldiers were forming line and firing, the seamen 
 rushed in with their pikes and axes, drove off the 
 British, capturing their commander, Lieut. King, of 
 the Royal Army, spiked and threw into the river 
 the guns, and then took the barracks and burned 
 them, after a desperate fight. Great confusion now 
 ensued, which ended in Mr. Angus and some of the 
 seamen going off in the boats. Several had been 
 killed ; eight, among whom were Midshipmen 
 Wragg, Dudley, and Holdup, all under 20 years 
 old, remained with the troops under Captain King, 
 and having utterly routed the enemy found them- 
 selves deserted by their friends. After staying on 
 the shore a couple of hours some of them found two 
 boats and got over ; but Captain King and a few 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 59 
 
 soldiers were taken prisoners. Tiiirty of the sea- 
 men, including nine of the twelve officers, were 
 killed or wounded — among the former being Sail- 
 ing-masters Sisson and Watts, and among the latter 
 Mr. Angus, Sailing-master Carter, and Midshipmen 
 Wragg, Holdup, Graham, Brailesford, and Irvine. 
 Some twenty prisoners were secured and taken 
 over to the American shore ; the enemy's loss was 
 more severe than ours, his resistance being very 
 stubborn, and a good many cannon were destroyed, 
 but the expedition certainly ended most disas- 
 trously. The accounts of it are hard to reconcile, 
 but it is difficult to believe that Mr. Angus acted 
 correctly. 
 
 Later in the winter Captain Oliver Hazard Perry 
 arrived to take command of the forces on Lake 
 Erie. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 1813. 
 
 ON THE OCEAN. 
 
 filockade of the American coast— The Essex in the South Pacific— The 
 ffornet captures the /'^ac^'f:^'— American privateers cut out by British boats — 
 Unsuccessful Cruise of Commodore Rodgers — The Chesapeake is captured by 
 the Skatinon—¥\iW\e gun-boat actions— Defence of Craney Island— Cutting- 
 out expeditions— The A rgus is captured by the Peh'can— The Enterprise cap- 
 tures the ^ojTt??— Summary. 
 
 BY the beginning of the year 181 3 the British 
 had been thoroughly aroused by the Ameri- 
 can successes, and active measures were at once 
 taken to counteract them. The force on the Ameri- 
 can station was largely increased, and a strict block- 
 ade begun, to keep the American frigates in port. 
 The British frigates now cruised for the most part in 
 couples, and orders were issued by the Board of Ad- 
 miralty that an i8-pounder frigate was not to engage 
 an American 24-pounder. Exaggerated accounts of 
 the American 44's being circulated, a new class of 
 spar-deck frigates was constructed to meet them, 
 rating 50 and mounting 60 guns ; and some 74's 
 were cut down for the same purpose.' These new 
 ships were all much heavier than their intended 
 opponents. 
 
 As New England's loyalty to the Union was, not 
 unreasonably, doubted abroad, her coasts were at 
 first troubled but little. A British squadron was 
 
 ' Jamts, vi, p. 206. 
 
 160 
 
NAVAL WAR QF l8l2. l6l 
 
 generally kept cruising off the end of Long Island 
 Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of course 
 America had no means of raising a blockade, as each 
 squadron contained generally a 74 or a razee, vessels 
 too heavy for any in our navy to cope with. Frig- 
 ates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of New 
 Jersey, the Carolinas, and Georgia. Delaware Bay 
 no longer possessed the importance it had during 
 the Revolutionary War, and as the only war vessels 
 in it were some miserable gun-boats, the British gen- 
 erally kept but a small force on that station. Chesa- 
 peake Bay became the principal scene of their opera- 
 tions ; it was there that their main body collected, 
 and their greatest efforts were made. In it a num- 
 ber of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and cutters 
 had been collected, and early in the season Admiral 
 Sir John Warren and Rear-Admiral Cockburn arrived 
 to take command. The latter made numerous de- 
 scents on the coast, and frequently came into contact 
 with the local militia, who generally fled after a couple 
 of volleys. These expeditions did not accomplish 
 much, beyond burning the houses and driving off the 
 live-stock of the farmers along shore, and destroying a 
 few small towns — one of them, Hampton, being 
 sacked with revolting brutality.' The government 
 of the United States was, in fact, supported by the 
 people in its war policy very largely on account of 
 these excesses, which were much exaggerated by 
 American writers. It was really a species of civil 
 war, and in such a contest, at the beginning of this 
 century, it was impossible that some outrages should 
 not take place. 
 
 ' James (vi , 340) says : The conduct of the British troops on this 
 occasion was " revolting to human nature " and " disgraceful to the 
 
l62 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 The American frigate Constellation had by this 
 time got ready for sea, and, under the command of 
 Captain Stewart, she prepared to put out early in 
 January. As the number of blockaders rendered a 
 fight almost certain within a few days of her de- 
 parture, her crew were previously brought to the 
 highest state of discipline, the men being exercised 
 with especial care in handling the great guns and in 
 firing at a target.' However, she never got out ; for 
 when she reached Hampton Roads she fell in with a 
 British squadron of line-of-battle ships and frigates. 
 She kedged up toward Norfolk, and when the tide 
 rose ran in and anchored between the forts ; and a 
 few days later dropped down to cover the forts 
 which were being built at Craney Island. Here she 
 was exposed to attacks from the great British force 
 still lying in Hampton Roads, and, fearing they 
 would attempt to carry her by surprise. Captain 
 Stewart made every preparation for defence. She 
 was anchored in the middle of the narrow channel, 
 flanked by gun-boats, her lower ports closed, not a 
 rope left hanging over the sides ; the boarding net- 
 tings, boiled in half-made pitch till they were as 
 hard as wire, were triced outboard toward the yard- 
 arms, and loaded with kentledge to fall on the at- 
 tacking boats when the tricing lines were cut, while 
 the carronades were loaded to the muzzle with mus- 
 ket balls, and depressed so as to sweep the water 
 near the ship.'' Twice, a force of British, estimated 
 by their foes to number 2,ooo men, started off at 
 night to carry the Constellation by surprise ; but on 
 
 ' Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones (vSavannah, 1878), 
 p. 15- 
 
 ''■ For an admirable account of these preparations, as well as of the 
 subsequent events, see Cooper, ii, 242. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 163 
 
 each occasion they were discovered and closely 
 watched by her guard-boats, and they never ven- 
 tured to make the attack. However, she was un- 
 able to get to sea, and remained blockaded to the 
 close of the war. 
 
 At the beginning of the year several frigates and 
 smaller craft were at sea. The Chesapeake, Captain 
 Evans, had sailed from Boston on Dec. 13, 1812.' 
 She ran dpwn past Madeira, the Canaries, and Cape 
 de Verde, crossed the equator, and for six weeks 
 cruised to the south of the line between longitudes 
 16° and 25°. Thence she steered to the west, pass- 
 ing near Surinam, over the same spot on which the 
 Hornet had sunk the Peacock but a day previous. 
 Cruising northward through the West Indies, she 
 passed near the Bermudas, where she was chased by 
 a 74 and a frigate- escaping from them she got into 
 Boston on April 9th, having captured five merchant- 
 men, and chased unsuccessfully for two days a brig- 
 sloop. The term of two years for which her crew 
 were enlisted now being up, they, for the most part, 
 left, in consequence of some trouble about the prize- 
 money. Captain Evans being in ill health. Captain 
 James Lawrence was appointed to command her. 
 He reached Boston about the middle of May ^ and 
 at once set about enlisting a new crew, and tried, 
 with but partial success, to arrange matters with the 
 old sailors, who were now almost in open mutiny. 
 
 When the year 1812 had come to an end, the 
 
 'Statistical "History of the U. S. Navy," by Lieutenant G. E. 
 Emmons. 
 
 '' He was still on the Hornet at New York on May loth, as we 
 know from a letter of Biddle's, written on that date (in letters of 
 " Masters' Commandant," 1813, No. 58), and so could hardly have 
 been with the Chesapeake two weel^s before he put out ; and had to 
 get his crew together and train them during that time. 
 
164 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Essex, 32, was in the South Atlantic, and Captain 
 Porter shortly afterward ran into St. Catherines to 
 water. Being at a loss where to find his consorts, 
 he now decided to adopt the exceedingly bold 
 measure of doubling Cape Horn and striking at the 
 British whalers in the Pacific. This was practically 
 going into the enemy's waters, the Portuguese and 
 Spanish countries being entirely under the influence 
 of Britain, while there were no stations where Por- 
 ter could revictual or repair in safety. However, 
 the Essex started, doubled the Horn, and on March 
 13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. Her ad- 
 venturous cruise in the Pacific was the most striking 
 feature of the war; but as it has been most minutely 
 described by Commodore Porter himself, by his son. 
 Admiral Porter, by Admiral Farragut, and by 
 Cooper, I shall barely touch upon it. 
 
 On March 20th the Essex captured the Peruvian 
 corsair Nereyda, 16, hove her guns and small arms 
 overboard, and sent her into port. She made the 
 island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and thence 
 went to the Gallipagos, getting every thing she 
 'wanted from her prizes. Then she went toTumbez, 
 and returned to the Gallipagos ; thence to the Mar- 
 quesas, and finally back to Valparaiso- again. By 
 this year's campaign in the Pacific, Captain Porter 
 had saved all our ships in those waters, had not cost 
 the government a dollar, living purely on the 
 enemy, and had taken from him nearly 4,000 tons 
 of shipping and 400 men, completely breaking up 
 his whaling trade in the South Pacific. 
 
 The cruise was- something sui generis in modern 
 warfare, recalling to mind the cruises of the early 
 English and Dutch navigators. An America^ ship 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 165 
 
 was at a serious disadvantage in having no harbor 
 of refuge away from home ; while on almost every 
 sea there were British, French, and Spanish ports 
 into which vessels of those nations could run for 
 safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a small 
 frigate to cruise a year and a half in enemy's 
 waters, and to supply herself during that time, 
 purely from captured vessels, with every thing — 
 cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions, and medi- 
 cines, and even money to pay the officers and men ! 
 Porter's cruise was the very model of what such an 
 expedition should be, harassing the enemy most 
 effectually at no cost whatever. Had the Essex 
 been decently armed with long guns, instead of car- 
 ronades, the end might have been as successful as it 
 was glorious. The whalers were many of them 
 armed letters-of-marque, and, though of course un- 
 able to oppose the frigate, several times smart skir- 
 mishes occurred in attacking them with boats, or in 
 captured ships ; as when Lieutenant Downs and 
 20 men in the prize Georgiana after a short brush 
 captured the Hector, with 25 men, two of whom 
 were killed and six wounded ; and v/hen, under simi- 
 lar circumstances, the prize Greenwich, of 25 men, 
 captured the Seringapatam of 40. The cruise of the 
 Essex, the first American man-of-war ever in the 
 Pacific, a year and a half out and many thousand 
 miles away from home, was a good proof of Porter's 
 audacity in planning the trip and his skill and re- 
 source in carrying it out. 
 
 To return now to the Hornet. This vessel had 
 continued blockading the Bonne Citoyenne until 
 January 24th, vvhen the Montagu, 74, arrived toward 
 evening and chased her into port. As the darkness 
 
1 66 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 came on the Hornet wore, stood out to sea, passing 
 into the open without molestation from the 74, and 
 then steered toward the northeast, cruising near the 
 coast, and making a few prizes, among which was 
 a brig, the Resolution, with $23,000 in specie aboard, 
 captured on February 14th. On the 24th of Feb- • 
 ruary, while nearing the mouth of the Demerara 
 River, Captain Lawrence discovered a brig to lee- 
 ward, and chased her till he ran into quarter less 
 five, when, having no pilot, he hauled off-shore. 
 Just within the bar a man-of-war brig was lying at 
 anchor ; and while beating round Caroband Bank, in 
 order to get at her. Captain Lawrence discovered 
 another sail edging down on his weather-quarter.' 
 The brig at anchor was the Espiigle, of 18 guns, 
 32-pound carronades, Captain John Taylor"; and 
 the second brig seen was the Peacock, Captain 
 William Peake,^ which, for some unknown reason, 
 had exchanged her 32-pound carronades for 24's. 
 She had sailed from the Espitgle's anchorage the 
 same morning at 10 o'clock. At 4.20 P. M. the Pea- 
 cock hoisted her colors ; then the Hornet beat to 
 quarters and cleared for action. Captain Lawrence 
 kept close by the wind, in order to get the weather- 
 gage ; when he was certain he could weather the 
 enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the Hornet hoisted 
 her colors. The ship and the brig now stood for 
 each other, both on the wind, the Hornet being on 
 the starboard and the Peacock on the port tack, and 
 at 5.25 they exchanged broadsides, at half pistol- 
 shot distance, while going in opposite directions, 
 the Americans using their lee and the British their 
 
 ' Letter of Captam Lawrence, March 29, 1813. 
 ^ James, vi, 278. ' Do. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 67 
 
 weather battery. The guns were fired as they bore, 
 and the Peacock suffered severely, while her antago- 
 nist's hull was uninjured, though she suffered 
 slightly aloft and had her pennant cut off by the first 
 shot fired." One of the men in the mizzen-top was 
 killed by a round shot, and two more were wounded 
 in the main-top." As soon as they were clear. Cap- 
 tain Peake put his helm hard up and wore, firing his 
 starboard guns ; but the Hornet had watched him 
 closely, bore up as quickly, and coming down at 5.35, 
 ran him close aboard on the starboard quarter. Cap- 
 tain Peake fell at this moment, together with many 
 of his crew, and, unable to withstand the Hornet's 
 heavy fire, the Peacock surrendered at 5.39, just 14 
 minutes after the first shot ; and directly afterward 
 hoisted her ensign union down in the forerigging 
 as a signal of distress. Almost immediately her 
 main-mast went by the board. Both vessels then 
 anchored, and Lieutenant J. T. Shubrick, being sent 
 on board the prize, reported her sinking. Lieu- 
 tenant D. Connor was then sent in another boat to 
 try to save the vessel ; but though they threw the 
 guns overboard, plugged the shot holes, tried the 
 pumps, and even attempted bailing, the water 
 gained so rapidly that the Hornet's officers devoted 
 themselves to removing the wounded and other 
 prisoners ; and while thus occupied the short tropi- 
 cal twilight left them. Immediately afterward the 
 prize settled, suddenly and easily, in 5| fathoms 
 water, carrying with her three of the Hornet's peo- 
 ple and nine of her own, who were rummaging be- 
 
 ^ Cooper, p. 200. 
 
 '^ See entry in her log for this day (In " Log-Book of Hornet, 
 Wasp, and Argus, from July 20, 1809, to October 6, 1813,") in the 
 Bureau of Navigation, at Washington. 
 
1 68 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 low ; meanwhile four others of her crew had lowered 
 her damaged stern boat, and in the confusion got off 
 unobserved and made their way to the land. The 
 foretop still remained above water, and four of the 
 prisoners saved themselves by running up the rig- 
 ging into it. Lieutenant Connor and Midshipman 
 Cooper (who had also come on board) saved them- 
 selves, together with most of their people and the 
 remainder of the Peacock's crew, by jumping into 
 the launch, which was lying on the booms, and 
 paddling her toward the ship with pieces of boards 
 in default of oars. 
 
 The Hornet's complement at this time was ijo, 
 of whom she had 8 men absent in a prize and 7 on 
 the sick list,' leaving 135 fit for duty in the action"; 
 of these one man was killed, and two wounded, all 
 aloft. Her rigging and sails were a good deal cut, 
 a shot had gone through the foremast, and the 
 bowsprit was slightly damaged ; the only shot that 
 touched her hull merely glanced athwart her. bows, 
 indenting a plank beneath the cat-head. The Pea- 
 cock's crew had amounted to 134, but 4 were absent 
 in a prize, and but 122' fit for action; of these she 
 lost her captain, and seven men killed and mortally 
 wounded, and her master, one midshipman, and 28 
 men severely and slightly wounded, — in all 8 killed 
 and 30 wounded, or about 13 times her antagonist's 
 loss. She suffered under the disadvantage of light 
 metal, having 24's opposed to 32's ; but judging 
 from her gunnery this was not much of a loss, as 
 /^6-pounders would have inflicted nearly as great 
 
 ' Letter of Captain Lawrence. 
 '' Letter of Lieutenant D. Conner, April 26, 1813. 
 ' Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright (of the Peacock), April 17, 
 1813. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 69 
 
 damage. She was well handled and bravely fought ; 
 buc her men showed a marvellous ignorance of 
 gunnery. It appears that she had long been known 
 as "the yacht," on account of the tasteful arrange- 
 ment of her deck ; the breechings of the carronades 
 were lined with white canvas, and nothing could 
 exceed in brilliancy the polish upon the traversing 
 bars and elevating screws.' In other words, Cap- 
 tain Peake had confounded the mere incidents of 
 good discipline with the essentials.'' 
 
 The Hornet' s victory cannot be regarded in any 
 other light than as due, not to the heavier metal, 
 but to the far more accurate firing of the Ameri- 
 cans ; "had the guns of the Peacock been of the 
 largest size they could not have changed the result, 
 as the weight of shot that do not hit is of no great 
 moment." Any merchant-ship might have been as 
 well handled and bravely defended as she was ; and 
 an ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as 
 creditable a defence. 
 
 During the entire combat the Espiigle was not 
 more than 4 miles distant and was plainly visible 
 from the Hornet ; but for some reason she did not 
 come out, and her commander reported that he 
 knew nothing of the action till the next day. Cap- 
 tain Lawrence of course was not aware of this, and 
 made such exertions to bend on new sails, stow his 
 boats, and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he 
 was again prepared for action,^ and at 2 P. M. got 
 under way for the N.W. Being now overcrowded 
 with people and short of water he stood for home, 
 
 ' James, vi, 280. 
 
 'Codrington ("Memoirs,"!, 310) comments very forcibly on the 
 uselessness of a mere martinet. 
 ' Letter of Captain Lawrence. 
 
1 
 
 14 
 
 "1 
 
 5* 
 
 170 
 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 171 
 
 anchoring at Holmes' Hole in Martha's Vineyard 
 on the 19th of March. 
 
 On their arrival at New York the officers of the 
 Peacock published a card expressing in the warmest 
 terms their appreciation of the way they and 
 their men had been treated. Say they: "We 
 ceased to consider ourselves prisoners ; and every 
 thing that friendship could dictate was adopted by 
 you and the officers of the Hornet to remedy the 
 inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced 
 from the unavoidable loss of the whole of our prop- 
 erty and clothes owing to the sudden sinking of the 
 Peacock." ' This was signed by the first and second 
 lieutenants, the master, surgeon and purser. 
 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Guns, 
 
 Weight 
 Metal. 
 
 Men Loss 
 
 Hornet 
 Peacock 
 
 480 
 
 477 
 
 Relative 
 Force. 
 
 10 
 10 
 
 279 
 210 
 
 13s 3 
 122 38 
 
 Relative Loss 
 Inflicted. 
 
 Hornet 
 
 1. 00 
 
 
 
 1. 00 
 
 Peacock 
 
 •83 
 
 
 
 .08 
 
 That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 11, 
 the relative execution was about as 13 is to i. 
 
 The day after the capture Captain Lawrence re- 
 ported 277 souls aboard, including the crew of the 
 English brig Resolution which he had taken, and of 
 the American brig Hunter, prize to the Peacock. As 
 James, very ingeniously, tortures these figures into 
 meaning what they did not, it may be well to show 
 exactly what the 277 included. Of the Hornet's 
 original crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize, I 
 
 ' Quoted in full in " Niles' Register"and Lossing's " Field Book." 
 
172 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick) 
 138 ; of the Peacock's original 134, 4 were ab- 
 sent in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4 es- 
 caped, leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally 
 wounded) 112; there were also aboard 16 other 
 British prisoners, and the Hunter s crew of 1 1 men 
 — making just 277.' According to Lieutenant Con- 
 nor's letter, written in response to one from Lieu- 
 tenant Wright, there were in reality 139 in the 
 Peacock's crew when she began action ; but it is, of 
 course, best to take each commander's account of 
 the number of men on board his ship that were fit 
 for duty. 
 
 Oin Jan. 17th the Viper, 12, Lieutenant J. D. Henly 
 was captured by the British frigate Narcissus, 32, 
 Captain Lumly. 
 
 On Feb. 8th, while a British squadron, consisting 
 of the four frigates Belvidera (Captain Richard By- 
 ron), Maidstone, Junon, and Statira, were at anchor 
 in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner was observed in the 
 northeast standing down Chesapeake Bay." This 
 was the Lottery, letter-of-marque, of six 12-pounder 
 carronades and 25 men, Captain John Southcomb, 
 bound from Baltimore to Bombay. Nine boats, with 
 200 men, under the command of Lieutenant Kelly 
 Nazer were sent against her, and, a calm coming on, 
 overtook her. The schooner opened a well-directed 
 fire of round and grape, but the boats rushed for- 
 ward and boarded her, not carrying her till after a 
 
 ^ The 277 men were thus divided into ; Hornet' s crfw , 138; Peacock's 
 crew, 112 ; Resolution's crew, 16 ; Hunter's crew, 11. James quotes 
 " 270" men, which he divides as follows : Hornet 160, Peacock loi, 
 Hunter, g, — leaving out the Resolution' s crew, 1 1 of the Peacock's, 
 and 2 of thp Hunter's. 
 
 '' Jiimcs, vi, 325. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 173 
 
 most obstinate struggle, in which Captain South- 
 comb and £9 of his men, together with 13 of the as- 
 sailants, were killed or wounded. The best war ship 
 of a regular navy might be proud of the discipline 
 and courage displayed by the captain and crew of 
 the little Lottery. Captain Byron on this, as well as 
 on many another occasion, showed himself to be as 
 humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain 
 Soufhcomb, mortally wounded, was taken on board 
 BjTon's frigate, where he was treated with the great- 
 est attention and most delicate courtesy, and when 
 he died his body was sent ashore with every mark 
 of the respect due to so brave an ofificer. Captain 
 Stewart (of the Constellation) wrote Captain Byron 
 a letter of acknowledgment for his great courtesy 
 and kindness.' 
 
 On March i6th a British division of five boats and 
 105 men, commanded by Lieutenant James Polking- 
 horne, set out to attack the privateer schooner 
 Dolphin of 12 guns and 70 men, and the letters-of- 
 marque, Racer, Arab, and Lynx, each of six guns 
 and 30 men. Lieutenant Polkinghorne, after pulling 
 15 miles, found the four schooners all prepared to 
 receive him, but in spite of his great inferiority in 
 force he dashed gallantly at them. The Arab and 
 Lynx surrendered at once ; the Racer was carrisd 
 after a sharp struggle in which Lieutenant Polking- 
 horne was wounded, and her guns turned on the 
 Dolphin. Most of the latter's crew jumped over- 
 board ; a few rallied round their captain, but they 
 were at once scattered as the British seamen came 
 aboard. The assailants had 13, and the privateers- 
 
 'The correspondence between the two captains is given in full in 
 " Niles' Rejjister," which also contains fragmentary notes on the ac- 
 tion, principally as to the loss incnrredi 
 
174 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 men i6 men killed and wounded in the fight. It 
 was certainly one of the most brilliant and daring 
 cutting-out expeditions that took place during the 
 war, and the victors well deserved their success. 
 The privateersmen (according to the statement of 
 the Dolphins master, in " Niles' Register") were 
 panic-struck, and acted in any thing but a brave 
 manner. All irregular fighting-men do their work 
 by fits and starts. No regular cruisers could behave 
 better than did the privateers Lottery, Chasseur, and 
 General Armstrong ; none would behave as badly as 
 the Dolphin, Lynx, and Arab. The same thing ap- 
 pears on shore. Jackson's irregulars at New Orleans 
 did as well, or almost as well, as Scott's troops at 
 Lundy's Lane ; but Scott's troops would never have 
 suffered from such a panic as overcame the militia 
 at Bladensburg. 
 
 On April gth the %c}nooVi(tx Norwich, of 14 guns and 
 61 men, Sailing-master James Monk, captured the 
 British privateer Caledonia, of 10 guns and 41 men, 
 after a short action in which the privateer lost 7 men. 
 
 On April 30th Commodore Rodgers, in the 
 President, 44, accompanied by Captain Smith in the 
 Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise.' On May 
 2d he fell in with and chased the British sloop Cnr- 
 leiv, 18, Captain Michael Head, but the latter es- 
 caped by knocking away the wedges of her masts 
 and using other means to increase her rate of sail- 
 ing. On the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., long. 60° 
 W., the Congress parted company, and sailed off 
 toward the southeast, making four prizes, of no 
 great value, in the North Atlantic"; when about in 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813. 
 " Letter of Captain Smith, Pec. IS, 1813. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 75 
 
 long. 35° W. she steered south, passing to the south 
 of the Hne. But she never saw a man-of-war, and 
 during the latter part of her cruise not a sail of any 
 kind ; and after crusing nearly eight months returned 
 to Portsmouth Harbor on Dec. 14th, having cap- 
 tured but four merchant-men. Being unfit to cruise 
 longer, owing to her decayed condition, she was dis- 
 armed and laid up ; nor was she sent to sea again 
 during the war.' 
 
 Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the eastern 
 edge of the Grand Bank until he reached latitude 
 48°, without meeting any thing, then stood to the 
 southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. 
 Then he crowded sail to the northeast after a 
 Jamaica fleet of which he had received news, but 
 which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th, in 
 lat. 46°, long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped 
 his course toward the North Sea, still without any 
 good luck befalling him. On June 27th he put into 
 North Bergen in the Shetlands for water, and thence 
 passed the Orkneys and stretched toward the 
 North Cape, hoping to intercept the Archangel 
 fleet. On July 19th, when off the North Cape, in 
 lat. 71° 52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in with two 
 sail of the enemy, who made chase ; after four days' 
 pursuit the commodore ran his opponents out of 
 sight. According to his letter the two sail were a 
 line-of-battle ship and a frigate ; aceording to 
 James they were the 12-pounder frigate Alexandria, 
 
 ' James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the Tenedos, 
 during part of 1814 ; but was too much awed by the fate of the Chesa- 
 peake to come ovA iurmg the "long blockade" of Captain Parker. 
 Considering the fact that she was too decayed to put to sea, had no 
 guns aboard, no crew, and was, in fact, laid up, the feat of the Tene- 
 dos was not very wonderful ; a row-boat could have "blockaded" her 
 quite as well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the way James 
 alters a fact by suppressing half of it. 
 
176 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 13. 
 
 Captain Cathcart, and Spitfire, 16, Captain Ellis. 
 James quotes from the logs of the two British ships, 
 and it would seem that he is correct, as it would not 
 be possible for him to falsify the logs so utterly. 
 In case he is true, it was certainly carrying caution 
 to an excessive degree for the commodore to re- 
 treat before getting some idea of what his antago- 
 nists really were. His mistaking them for so 
 much heavier ships was a precisely similar error to 
 that made by Sir George Collier and Lord Stuart at 
 a later date about the Cyane and Levant. James 
 wishes to prove that each party perceived the force 
 of the other, and draws a contrast (p. 312) between 
 the " gallantry of one party and pusillanimity of the 
 other." This is nonsense, and, as in similar cases, 
 James overreaches himself by proving too much. 
 If he had made an i8-pounder frigate like the Con- 
 gress flee from another i8-pounder, his narrative 
 would be within the bounds of possibility and 
 would need serious examination. But the little 12- 
 pounder Alexandria, and the ship-sloop with her 18- 
 pound carrortades, would not have stood the ghost 
 of a chance in the contest. Any man who would 
 have been afraid of them would also have been 
 afraid of the Little Belt, the sloo.p Rodgers cap- 
 tured before the war. As for Captains Cathcart 
 and Ellis, had they known the force of the Presi- 
 dent, and chased her with a view of attacking her, 
 their conduct would have only been explicable on 
 the ground that they were afflicted with emotianal 
 insanity. 
 
 The President now steered southward and got 
 into the mouth of the Irish Channel ; on August 
 2d she shifted her berth and almost circled Ireland ; 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 177 
 
 then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked 
 south along the coast. On Sept. 23d, a little south 
 of Nantucket, she decoyed under her guns and cap- 
 tured the British schooner Highflyer, 6, Lieut. 
 William Hutchinson, and 45 men ; and went into 
 Newport on the 27th of the same month, having 
 made some 12 prizes. 
 
 On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the Unit- 
 ed States, which had sent ashore six carron- 
 ades, and now mounted but 48 guns, accom- 
 panied by Captain Jones in the Macedonian, 38, 
 and Captain Biddle in the Wasp, 20, left New 
 York, passing through Hell Gate, as there was a 
 large blockading force off tlie Hook. Opposite 
 Hunter's Point the main-mast of the States was 
 struck by lightning, which cut off the broad pen- 
 dant, shot down the hatchway into the doctor's 
 cabin, put out his candle, ripped up the bed, and 
 entering between the skin and ceiling of the ship 
 tore off two or three sheets of copper near the water- 
 line, and disappeared without leaving a trace ! The 
 Macedonian, which was close behind, hove all aback, 
 in expectation of seeing the States blown up. 
 
 At the end of the sound Commodore Decatur 
 anchored to watch for a chance of getting out. 
 Early on June 1st he started; but in a couple of 
 hours met the British Captain R. D. Oliver's 
 squadron, consisting of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. 
 These chased him back, and all his three ships ran 
 into New London. Here, in the mud of the 
 Thames river, the two frigates remained blockaded 
 till the close of the war ; but the little sloop slipped 
 out later, to the enemy's cost. 
 
178 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 We left the Chesapeake, 38, being fitted out at 
 Boston by Captain James Lawrence, late of the 
 Hornet. Most of her crew, as already stated, their 
 time being up, left, dissatisfied with the ship's ill 
 luck, and angry at not having received their due 
 share of prize-money. It was very hard to get 
 sailors, most of the men preferring to ship in some 
 of the numerous privateers where the discipline was 
 less strict and the chance of prize-money much 
 greater. In consequence of this an unusually large 
 number of foreigners had to be taken, including 
 about forty British and a number of Portuguese. 
 The latter were peculiarly troublesome; one of their 
 number, a boatswain's mate, finally almost brought 
 about a mutiny among the crew, which was only 
 pacified by giving the men prize-checks. A few of 
 the Constitution s old crew came aboard, and these, 
 together with some of the men who had been on 
 the Chesapeake during her former voyage, made an 
 excellent nucleus. Such men needed very little 
 training at either guns or sails ; but the new hands 
 were unpractised, and came on board so late that 
 the last draft that arrived still had their hammocks 
 and bags lying in the boats stowed over the booms 
 when the ship was captured. The officers were 
 largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant, 
 Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former 
 cruise ; the third and fourth lieutenants were not 
 regularly commissioned as such, but, were only mid- 
 shipmen acting for the first time in higher positions. 
 Captain Lawrence himself was of course new to all, 
 both officers and crew.' In other words, the Chesa- 
 
 ' On the day on which he sailed to attack the Shannon, Lawrence 
 writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows : " Lieutenant Paige 
 is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with the ship. At the urgent re- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 79 
 
 peake possessed good material, but in an exceedingly 
 unseasoned state. 
 
 Meanwhile the British frigate Shannon, 38, Cap- 
 tain Philip Bowes Vera Broke, was cruising off the 
 mouth of the harbor. To give some idea of the 
 reason why she proved herself so much more for- 
 midable than her British sister frigates it may be 
 well to quote, slightly condensing, from James : 
 
 " There was another point in which the generality 
 of British crews, as compared with any one Ameri- 
 can crew, were miserably deficient ; that is, skill in 
 the art of gunnery. While the American seamen 
 were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, 
 except in particular cases, scarcely did so once in a 
 year ; and some ships could be named on board 
 which not a shot had been fired in this way for up- 
 ward of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the 
 captain's. The instructions under which he was 
 bound to act forbade him to use, during the first 
 six months after the ship had received her arma- 
 ment, more shots per month than amounted to a 
 third in number of the upper-deck guns ; and, after 
 these six months, only half the quantity. Many 
 captains never put a shot in the guns till an enemy 
 appeared ; they employed the leisure time of the 
 men in handling the sails and in decorating the 
 ship." Captain Broke was not one of this kind. 
 " From the day on which he had joined her, the 
 14th of September, 1806, the Shannon began to feel 
 the effect of her captain's proficiency as a gunner 
 and zeal for the service. The laying of the ship's 
 
 quest cff Acting-Lieutenant Pierce I have granted him, also, permission 
 10 go on shore ; one inducement for my granting his request was his 
 being at variance with every officer in his mess." " Captains' Let- 
 ters," vol. 29, No. I, in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither 
 officers nor men had shaken together. 
 
l8o NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 ordnance so that it may be correctly fired in a 
 horizontal direction is justly deemed a most impor- 
 tant operation, as upon it depends in a great meas- 
 ure the true aim and destructive effect of the shot ; 
 this was attended to by Captain Broke in person. 
 By draughts from other ships, and the usual means 
 to which a British man-of-war is obliged to resort, 
 the Shannon got together a crew ; and in the course 
 of a year or two, by the paternal care and excellent 
 regulations of Captain Broke, the ship's company 
 became as pleasant to command as it was dangerous 
 to meet." The Shannon s guns were all carefully 
 sighted, and, moreover, " every day, for about an 
 hour and a half in the forenoon, when not prevented 
 by chase or the state of the weather, the men were 
 exercised at training the guns, and for the same 
 time in the afternoon in the use of the broadsword, 
 pike, musket, etc. Twice a week the crew fired at 
 targets, both with great guns and musketry ; and 
 Captain Broke, as an additional stimulus beyond 
 the emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco to 
 every man that put a shot through the bull's eye." 
 He would frequently have a cask thrown overboard 
 and suddenly order some one gun to be manned to 
 sink the cask. In short, the Shannon was very 
 greatly superior, thanks to her careful training, to 
 the average British frigate of her rate, while the 
 Chesapeake, owing to her having a raw and inexperi- 
 enced crew, was decidedly inferior to the average 
 American frigate of the same strength. 
 
 In force the two frigates compared pretty 
 equally," the American being the superior in just 
 about the same proportion that the Wasp was to 
 
 ' Taking each commander's account for his own force. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. l8l 
 
 the Frolic, or, at a later date, the Hornet to the 
 Penguin. The Chesapeake carried 50 guns (26 in 
 broadside), 28 long iS's on the gun-deck, and 
 on the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 18, eigh- 
 teen 32-pound carronades, and one 12-pound car- 
 ronade (which was not used in the fight however). 
 Her broadside, allowing for the short weight of 
 metal was 542 lbs.; her complement, 379 men. The 
 Shamion carried 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 
 iS's on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck four long 
 9's, one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades, and three 
 12-pound carronades (two of which were not used 
 in the fight). Her broadside was 550 lbs.; her 
 crew consisted of 330 men, 30 of whom were raw 
 hands. Early on the morning of June ist. Captain 
 Broke sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an Ameri- 
 can prisoner, a letter of challenge, which for cour- 
 teousness, manliness, and candor is the very model 
 of what such an epistle should be. Before it 
 reached Boston, however. Captain Lawrence had 
 weighed anchor, to attack the Shannon, which frig- 
 ate was in full sight in the ofifing. It has been 
 often said that he engaged against his judgment, 
 but this may be doubted. His experience with the 
 Bonne Citoyenne, Espiigle, and Peacock had not tended 
 to give him a very high idea of the navy to which 
 he was opposed, and there is no doubt that he was 
 confident of capturing the Shannon} It was most 
 
 'In his letter written just before sailing (already quoted on p. 178) 
 he says : " An English frigate is now in sight from our deck. * * * 
 I am in hopes to give a good account of her before night." My ac- 
 count of the action is mainly taken from James' "Naval History" and 
 Brighton's " Memoir of Admiral Broke " (according to which the 
 official letter of Captain Broke was tampered with); see also the 
 letter of Lieut. George Budd, June 15, 1813 ; the report of the 
 Cijun of .Inquiry, Commodore Bainbridge presiding, and the Court- 
 martial held on board frigate United States, April 15, 1814, Commo- 
 dore Decatur presiding. 
 
l82 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 unfortunate that he did not receive Broke's letter, 
 as the latter in it expressed himself willing to meet 
 Lawrence in any latitude and longitude he might 
 appoint ; and there would thus have been some 
 chance of the American crew having time enough 
 to get into shape. 
 
 At midday of June i, 1812, the Chesapeake 
 weighed anchor, stood out of Boston Harbor, and 
 at I P. M. rounded the Light-house. The Shannon 
 stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 hauled up and 
 reefed top-sails. At 4 P. M. she again bore away 
 with her foresail brailed up, and her main top-sail 
 braced flat and shivering, that the Chesapeake might 
 overtake her. An hour later, Boston Light-house 
 bearing west distant about six leagues, she again 
 hauled up, with her head to the southeast, and lay 
 to under top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker. 
 Meanwhile, as the breeze freshened the Chesapeake 
 took in her studding-sails, top-gallant sails, and roy- 
 als, got her royal yards on deck, and came down 
 very fast under top-sails and jib. At 5.30, to keep 
 under command and be able to wear if necessary, 
 the Shannon filled her main top-sail and kept a 
 close luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 
 5.25 the Chesapeake hauled up her foresail, and, 
 with three ensigns flying, steered straight for the 
 Shannon s starboard quarter. Broke was afraid that 
 Lawrence would pass under the Shannon s stern, 
 rake her, and engage her on the quarter; but 
 either overlooking or waiving this advantage, the 
 American captain luffed up within 50 yards upon 
 the Shannon s starboard quarter, and squared his 
 main-yard. On board the Shannon the captain of 
 the 14th gun, William Mindham, had been ordered 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 83 
 
 not to fire till it bore into the second main-deck 
 port forward ; at 5.50 it was fired, and then the 
 other guns in quick succession from aft forward, 
 the Chesapeake replying with her whole jaroadside. 
 At 5.53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead, 
 hauled up a little. The Chesapeake' s broadsides 
 were doing great damage, but she herself was suf- 
 fering even more than her foe ; the men in the 
 Shannon's tops could hardly see the deck of the 
 American frigate through the cloud of splinters, 
 hammocks, and other wreck that was flying across 
 it. Man after man was killed at the wheel ; the 
 fourth lieutenant, the master, and the boatswain 
 were slain ; and at 5.56, having had her jib sheet 
 and foretop-sail tie shot away, and her spanker 
 brails loosened so that the sail blew out, the Chesa- 
 peake came up into the wind somewhat, so as to ex- 
 pose her quarter to her antagonist's broadside, 
 which beat in her stern-ports and swept the men 
 from the after guns. One of the arm chests on the 
 quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade 
 thrown from the Shannon^ The Chesapeake was 
 now seen to have stern-way on and to be paying 
 slowly off ; so the Shannon put her helm a-starboard 
 
 ' This explosion may have had more effect than is commonly sup- 
 posed in the capture of the Chesapeake. Commodore Bainbridge, 
 writing from Charleston, Mass., on June 2, 1813 (see "Captains' 
 Letters," vol. xxix, No. 10), says : " Mr. Knox, the pilot on board, 
 left the Chesapeake ■at 5 P. M. * * * At 6 P.M., Mr. Knox in- 
 forms me, the fire opened, and at 12 minutes past six both ships were 
 laying alongside one another as if in the act of boarding ; at that 
 moment an explosion took place on board the Chesapeake, which 
 spread a fire on her upper deck from the foremast to the mizzen- 
 mast, as high as her tops, and enveloped both ships in smoke for sev- 
 eral minutes. After it cleared away they vi'ere seen separate, with 
 the British flag hoisted on board the Chesapeake over the American." 
 James denies that the explosion was caused by a hand-grenade, 
 though he says there were some of these aboard the Shannon. It is 
 a point of no interest. 
 
1 84 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 and shivered her mizzen top-sail, so as to keep off 
 the wind and delay the boarding. But at that 
 moment her jib stay was shot away, and, her head- 
 sails becoming becalmed, she went off very slowly. 
 In consequence, at 6 P. M. the two frigates fell 
 aboard, the Chesapeake s quarter pressing upon the 
 Shannons side just forward the starboard main- 
 chains, and the frigates were kept in this position 
 by the fluke of the Shannons anchor catching in the 
 Chesapeake' s quarter port. 
 
 The Shannon s crew had suffered severely, but not 
 the least panic or disorder existed among them. 
 Broke ran forward, and seeing his foes flinching 
 from the quarter-deck guns, he ordered the ships to 
 be lashed together, the great guns to cease firing, 
 and the boarders to be called. The boatswain, who 
 had fought in Rodney's action, set about fastening 
 the vessels together, which the grim veteran suc- 
 ceeded in doing, though his right arm was literally 
 hacked off by a blow from a cutlass. All was 
 confusion and dismay on board the Chesapeake. 
 Lieutenant Ludlow had been mortally wounded 
 and carried below ; Lawrence himself, while stand- 
 ing on the quarter-deck, fatally conspicuous by his 
 full-dress uniform and commanding stature, was 
 shot down, as the vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law 
 of the British marines. He fell dying, and was car- 
 ried below, exclaiming : " Don't give up the ship " — 
 a phrase that has since become proverbial among his 
 countrymen. The third lieutenant, Mr. U. S. Cox, 
 came on deck, but, utterly demoralized by the 
 aspect of affairs, he basely ran below without stay- 
 ing to rally the men, and was court-martialled after- 
 ward for so doing. At 6.02 Captain Broke stepped 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 85 
 
 from the Shannon's gangway rail on to the muzzle 
 of the Chesapeake s aftermost carronade, and thence 
 over the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, followed 
 by about 20 men. As they came aboard, the Ches- 
 apeake's foreign mercenaries and the raw natives of 
 the crew deserted their quarters ; the Portuguese 
 boatswain's mate removed the gratings of the berth- 
 deck, and he ran below, followed by many of the 
 crew, among them one of the midshipmen named 
 Deforest. On the quarter-deck almost the only 
 man that made any resistance was the chaplain, 
 Mr. Livermore, who advanced, firing his p?stol at 
 Broke, and in return nearly had his arm hewed off 
 by a stroke from the latter's broad Toledo blade. On 
 the upper deck the only men who behaved well were 
 the marines, but of their orignal number of 44 men, 
 14, including Lieutenant James Broom and Corporal 
 Dixon, were dead, and 20, including Sergeants Twin 
 and Harris, wounded, so that there were left but one 
 corporal and nine men, several of whom had been 
 knocked down and bruised, though reported un- 
 wounded. There was thus hardly any resistance. 
 Captain Broke stopping his men for a moment till 
 they were joined by the rest of the boarders under 
 Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. The Chesapeake s 
 mizzen-topmen began firing at the boarders, mor- 
 tally wounding a midshipman, Mr. Samwell, and 
 killing Lieutenant Watt ; but one of the Shannons 
 long nines was pointed at the top and cleared it out, 
 being assisted by the English main-topmen, under 
 Midshipman Coshnahan. At the same time the 
 men in the Chesapeake' s main-top were driven out of 
 it by the fire of the Shannon's foretopmen, under 
 Midshipman Smith. Lieutenant George Budd, who 
 
1 86 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 was on the main-deck, now for the first time learned 
 that the EngHsh had boarded, as the upper-deck 
 men came crowding down, and at once called on 
 his people to follow him; but the foreigners and 
 novices held back, and only a few of the veterans 
 followed him up. As soon as he reached the spar- 
 deck, Budd, followed by only a dozen men, attacked 
 the British as they came along the gangways, re- 
 pulsing them for a moment, and killing the British 
 purser, Aldham, and captain's clerk, Dunn ; but the 
 handful of Americans were at once cut down or 
 dispersed. Lieutenant Budd being wounded and 
 knocked down the main hatchway. " The enemy," 
 writes Captain Broke, "fought desperately, but in 
 disorder." Lieutenant Ludlow, already mortally 
 wounded, struggled up on deck, followed by two or 
 three men, but was at once disabled by a sabre cut. 
 On the forecastle a few seamen and marines turned 
 to bay. Captain Broke was still leading his men 
 with the same brilliant personal courage he had all 
 along shown. Attacking the first American, who 
 was armed with a pike, he parried a blow from it, 
 and cut down the man ; attacking another he was 
 himself cut down, and only saved by the seaman 
 Mindham, already mentioned, who slew his assail- 
 ant. One of the American marines, using his 
 clubbed musket, killed an Englishman, and so stub- 
 born was the resistance of the little group that for 
 a moment the assailants gave back, having lost sev- 
 eral killed and wounded ; but immediately afterward 
 they closed in and slew their foes to the last man. 
 The British fired a volley or two down the hatch- 
 way, in response to a couple of shots fired up ; all 
 resistance was at an end, and at 6.05, just fifteen 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 187 
 
 minutes after the first gun had been fired, and not 
 five after Captain Broke had come aboard, the colors 
 of the Chesapeake were struck. Of her crew af 379 
 men, 61 were killed or mortally wounded, including 
 her captain, her first and fourth lieutenants, the 
 lieutenant of marines, the master (White), boat- 
 swain (Adams), and three midshipmen, and 85 
 severely and slightly wounded, including both her 
 other lieutenants, five midshipmen, and the chap- 
 lain ; total, 148 ; the loss falling almost entirely upon 
 the American portion of the crew. 
 
 Of the Shannon s men, 33 were killed outright or 
 died of their wounds, including her first lieutenant, 
 purser, captain's clerk, and one midshipman, and 50 
 wounded, including the captain himself and the 
 boatswain ; total, 83. 
 
 The Chesapeake was taken into Halifax, where 
 Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow were 
 both buried with military honors. Captain Broke 
 was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieuten- 
 ants Wallis and Falkiner were both made com- 
 manders. 
 
 The British writers accuse some of the American 
 crew of treachery ; the Americans, in turn, accuse 
 the British of revolting brutality. Of course in 
 such a fight things are not managed with urbane 
 courtesy, and, moreover, writers are prejudiced. 
 Those who would like to hear one side are referred 
 to James ; if they wish to hear the other, to the 
 various letters from officers published in " Niles' 
 Register," especially vol. v, p. 142. 
 
 Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower 
 masts, especially the two mizzen-m.asts, were badly 
 wounded. The Americans at that period were fond 
 
i88 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 of using bar shot, which were of very questionable 
 benefit, being useless against a ship's hull, though 
 said to be sometimes of great help in unrigging an 
 antagonist from whom one was desirous of escaping, 
 as in the case of the President and Endymion. 
 
 5. so y 
 
 S.S3 
 
 ESS 
 
 6.00 
 
 
 ■M'"-' 
 
 * ■ 
 
 s.o.f 6.00 
 
 .5.56 
 
 S.S3 
 
 ,^^'' 
 
 CHESAPEAKE 
 
 SHANNON 
 
 s.so 
 
 
 " CHESAPEAKE " STRUCK BY 
 
 
 " SHANNON " STRUCK BY 
 
 29 
 
 25 
 2 
 
 eighteen-pound shot, 
 thirty-two-pound shot, 
 nine- pound shot, 
 
 12 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 eighteen-pound shot, 
 thirty-two-pound shot, 
 bar shot, 
 
 30b 
 
 giape. 
 
 119 
 
 grape. 
 
 362 
 
 shot. 
 
 158 
 
 shot. 
 
 It is thus seen that the Shannon received from 
 shot alone only about half the damage the Chesa- 
 peake did ; the latter was thoroughly beaten at the 
 guns, in spite of what some American authors say 
 to the contrary. And her victory was not in the 
 slightest degree to be attributed to, though it may 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 189 
 
 have been slightly hastened by, accident. Training 
 and discipline won the victory, as often before ; only 
 in this instance the training and discipline were 
 against us. 
 
 It is interesting to notice that the Chesapeake bat- 
 tered the Shannon s hull far more than either the 
 Java, Guerriire, or Macedonian did the hulls of their 
 opponents, and that she suffered less in return (not 
 in loss but in damage^ than they did. The Chesa- 
 peake was a better fighter than either the Java, 
 Guerriire, or Macedonian, and could have captured 
 any one of them. The Shannon of course did less 
 damage than any of the American 44's, probably 
 just about in the proportion of the difference in 
 force. 
 
 Almost all American writers have treated the 
 capture of the Chesapeake as if it was due simply to 
 a succession of unfortunate accidents ; for example, 
 Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism, says that 
 the incidents of the battle, excepting its short dura- 
 tion, are "altogether the results of the chances of 
 war," and that it was mainly decided by " fortuitous 
 events as unconnected with any particular merit 
 on the one side as they are with any particular de- 
 merit on the other." ' Most naval men consider it 
 a species of treason to regard the defeat as due to 
 any thing but extraordinary ill fortune. And yet no 
 disinterested reader can help acknowledging that 
 the true reason of the defeat was the very simple _ 
 one that the Shannon fought better than the Chesa- 
 
 ' The worth of such an explanation is very aptly gauged in General 
 Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClellan's Campaign of 
 1862 " (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he speaks of "those unforeseen 
 or uncontrollable agencies which are vaguely described as the ' for- 
 tune of war,' but which usually prove to be the superior ability or 
 resources of the antagonist." 
 
190 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 peake. It has often been said that up to the mo- 
 ment when the ships came together the loss and 
 damage suffered by each were about the same. This 
 is not true, and even if it was, would not affect the 
 question. The heavy loss on board the Shannon 
 did not confuse or terrify the thoroughly trained 
 men with their implicit reliance on their leaders ; 
 and the experienced officers were ready to defend 
 any point that was menaced. An equal or greater 
 amount of loss aboard the Chesapeake disheartened 
 and confused the raw crew, who simply had not had 
 the time or chance to become well disciplined. 
 Many of the old hands, of course, kept their wits 
 and their pluck, but the novices and the disaffected 
 did not. Similarly with the officers ; some, as the 
 Court of Inquiry found, had not kept to their posts, 
 and all being new to each other and the ship, could 
 not show to their best. There is no doubt that the 
 Chesapeake was beaten at the guns before she was 
 boarded. Had the ships not come together, the 
 fight would have been longer, the loss greater, and 
 more nearly equal ; but the result would have been 
 the same. Cooper says that the enemy entered 
 with great caution, and so slowly that twenty 
 resolute men could have repulsed him. It was no 
 proof of caution for Captain Broke and his few 
 followers to leap on board, unsupported, and then 
 they only waited for the main body to come up; 
 and no twenty men could have repulsed such 
 boarders as followed Broke, The fight was another 
 lesson, with the parties reversed, to the effect that 
 want of training and discipline is a bad handicap. 
 Had the Chesapeake s crew been in service as man}' 
 months as the Shannon s had been years, such a 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 191 
 
 captain as Lawrence would have had his men per- 
 fectly in hand ; they would not have been cowed 
 by their losses, nor some of the officers too de- 
 moralized to act properly, and the material advan- 
 tages which the Chesapeake possessed, although 
 not very great, would probably have been enough 
 to give her a good chance of victory. It is well 
 worth noticing that the only thoroughly disci- 
 plined set of men aboard (all, according to James 
 himself, by the way, native Americans), namely, the 
 marines, did excellently, as shown by the fact that 
 three fourths of their number were among the 
 killed and wounded. The foreigners aboard the 
 Chesapeake did not do as well as the Americans, 
 but it is nonsense to ascribe the defeat in any way 
 to them ; it was only rendered rather more disas- 
 trous by their actions. Most of the English au- 
 thors give very fair accounts of the battle, except 
 that they hardly allude to the peculiar disadvan- 
 tages under which the Chesapeake suffered when 
 she entered into it. Thus, James thinks the Java 
 was unprepared because she had only been to sea 
 six weeks ; but does not lay any weight on the fact 
 that the Chesapeake had been out only as many 
 hours. 
 
 Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that 
 written by M. de la Gravifere." " It is impossible to 
 avoid seeing in the capture of the Chesapeake a new 
 proof of the enormous power of a good organiza- 
 tion, when it has received the consecration of a few 
 years' actual service on the sea. On this occasion, 
 in effect, two captains equally renowned, the honor 
 of two navies, were opposed to each other on two 
 
 ' " Guerres Maritimes," ii, 272. 
 
192 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 ships of the same tonnage and number of guns. 
 Never had the chances seemed better balanced, but 
 Sir Philip Broke had commanded the Shannon for 
 nearly seven years, while Captain Lawrence had 
 only commanded the Chesapeake for a few days. 
 The first of these frigates had cruised for eighteen 
 months on the coast of America ; the second was 
 leaving port. One had a crew long accustomed to 
 habits of strict obedience ; the other was manned 
 by men who had just been engaged in mutiny. The 
 Americans were wrong to accuse fortune on this 
 occasion. Fortune was not fickle, she was merely 
 logical. The Shannon captured the Chesapeake on 
 the first of June, 1813, but on the 14th of Septem- 
 ber, 1806, the day when he took command of his 
 frigate. Captain Broke had begun to prepare the 
 glorious termination to this bloody affair." 
 
 Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a 
 man as Lawrence, a very Bayard of the seas, who 
 was admired as much for his dauntless bravery as he 
 was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it 
 must be confessed that he acted rashly. And after 
 he had sailed, it was, as Lord Howard Douglass has 
 pointed out, a tactical error, however chivalric, to 
 neglect the chance of luffing across the Shannon s 
 stern to rake her ; exactly as it was a tactical error 
 of his equally chivalrous antagonist to have let him 
 have such an opportunity. Hull would not have 
 committed either error, and would, for the matter of 
 that, have been an overmatch for either com- 
 mander. But it must always be remembered that 
 Lawrence's encounters with the English had not 
 been such as to give him a high opinion of them. 
 The only foe he had fought had been inferior in 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. I93 
 
 strength, it is true, but had hardly made any effec- 
 tive resistance. Another sloop, of equal, if not su- 
 perior force, had tamely submitted to blockade for 
 several days, and had absolutely refused to fight. 
 And there can be no doubt that the Chesapeake, un- 
 prepared though she was, would have been an over- 
 match for the Guerrikre, Macedonian, or Java. 
 Altogether it is hard to blame Lawrence for going 
 out, and in every other respect his actions never 
 have been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friend 
 or foe, without the warmest respect. But that is 
 no reason for insisting that he was ruined purely 
 by an adverse fate. We will do far better to recol- 
 lect that as much can be learned from reverses as 
 from victories. Instead of flattering ourselves by 
 saying the defeat was due to chance, let us try to find 
 out what the real cause was, and then take care that 
 it does not have an opportunity to act again. A 
 little less rashness would have saved Lawrence s 
 life and his frigate, while a little more audacity on 
 one occasion would have made Commodore 
 Chauncy famous for ever. And whether a lesson 
 is to be learned or not, a historian, should remem- 
 ber that his profession is not that of a panegyrist. 
 The facts of the case unquestionably are that 
 Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the 
 enemy's harbor, proved conqueror over a nominally 
 equal and in reality slightly superior force ; and 
 that this is the only single-ship action of the war in 
 which the victor was weaker in force than his op- 
 ponent. So much can be gathered by reading only 
 the American accounts. Moreover accident had 
 little or nothing to do with the gaining of the 
 victory. The explanation is perfectly easy; Law- 
 
194 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 rence and Broke were probably exactly equal in 
 almost every thing that goes to make up a first- 
 class commander, but one had trained his crew for 
 seven years, and the other was new to the ship, to 
 the officers, and to the men, and the last to each 
 other. The Chesapeake s crew must have been of 
 fine material, or they would not have fought so well 
 as they did. 
 
 So much for the American accounts. On the 
 other hand, the capture of the Chesapeake was, 
 and is, held by many British historians to " con- 
 clusively prove " a good many different things ; 
 such as, that if the odds were anything like equal, 
 a British frigate could always whip an American, 
 that in a hand-to-hand conflict such would invariably 
 be the case, etc.; and as this was the only single-ship 
 action of the war in which the victor was the in- 
 ferior in force, most British writers insist that it re- 
 flected more honor on them than all the frigate 
 actions of 1812 put together did on the Americans. 
 
 These assertions can be best appreciated by ref- 
 erence to a victory won by the French in the year 
 of the Battle of the Nile. On the 14th of December, 
 1798, after two hours' conflict, the French 24-gun 
 corvette Bayonnaise captured, by boarding, the Eng- 
 lish 32-gun frigate Ambuscade. According to James 
 the Ambuscade threw at a broadside 262 pounds of 
 shot, and was manned by 190 men, while the Bayon- 
 naise threw 150 pounds, and had on board supernu- 
 meraries and passenger soldiers enough to make in 
 all 250 men. According to the French historian 
 Rouvier' the broadside force was 246 pounds 
 
 ' " Histoire des Marins Fran9ais sous la Republique," par Charles 
 Rouvier, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Paris, i368. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 195 
 
 against 80 pounds; according to Troude ' it was 270 
 pounds against 112. M. L6on Gu^rin, in his volumi- 
 nous but exceedingly prejudiced and one-sided 
 work," makes the difference even greater. At any 
 rate the English vessel was vastly the superior in 
 force, and was captured by boarding, after a long 
 and bloody conflict in which she lost 46, and her 
 antagonist over 50, men. During all the wars waged 
 with the Republic and the Empire, no English 
 vessel captured a French one as much superior to 
 itself as the Ambuscade was to the Bayonnaise, pre- 
 cisely as in the war of 18 12 no American vessel 
 captured a British opponent as much superior to 
 itself as the Chesapeake was to the Shannon. Yet 
 no sensible man can help acknowledging, in spite of 
 these and a few other isolated instances, that at that 
 time the French were inferior to the English, and 
 the latter to the Americans. 
 
 It is amusing to compare the French histories of 
 the English with the English histories of the 
 Americans, and to notice the similarity of the argu- 
 ments they use to detract from their opponents' 
 fame. Of course I do not allude to such writers as 
 Lord Howard Douglass or Admiral de la Gravifere, 
 but to men like William James and L^on Gu^rin, 
 or even O. Troude. James is alwaj's recounting how 
 American ships ran away from British ones, and 
 Gu^rin tells as many anecdotes of British ships 
 who fled from French foes. James reproaches the 
 Americans for adopting a " Parthian " mode of war- 
 fare, instead of " bringing to in a bold and becoming 
 
 ' " Batailles Navales." 
 
 ^ " Histoire Maritime de France " (par Leon Guerin, Historien titu- 
 laire de la Marine, Membre de la Legion d' Honneur), vi, 142 (Paris, 
 1852). 
 
196 NAVAL W/.R OF l8l2. 
 
 manner " Precisely the same reproaches are used 
 by the French writers, who assert that the EngHsh 
 would not fight " fairly," but acquired an advantage 
 by manoeuvring. James lays great stress on the 
 American long guns ; so does Lieutenant Richer 
 on the British carronades. James always tells how 
 the Americans avoided the British ships, when the 
 crews of the latter demanded to be led aboard ; 
 Troude says the British always kept at long shot, 
 while the French sailors "demand^rent, k grands 
 oris, r abordage." James says the Americans " hes- 
 itated to grapple " with their foes " unless they pos- 
 sessed a twofold superiority " ; Gu^rin that the 
 English " never dared attack" except when they pos- 
 sessed " une superiority dnorme." The British sneer 
 at the " mighty dollar " ; the French at the "eternal 
 guinea." The former consider Decatur's name as 
 "sunk" to the level of Porter's or Bainbridge's; 
 the latter assert that the " presumptuous Nelson " 
 was inferior to any of the French admirals of the 
 time preceding the Republic. Says James: "The 
 Americans only fight well when they have the 
 superiority of force on their side " ; and Lieutenant 
 Richer: "Never have the English vanquished us 
 with an undoubted inferiority of force." 
 
 On June 12, 18 13, the small cutter Surveyor, of 
 6 12-pound carronades, was lying in York River, in 
 the Chesapeake, under the command of Mr. William 
 S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men." At 
 nightfall she was attacked by the boats of the 
 Narcissus frigate, containing about 50 men, under 
 the command of Lieutenant John Creerie." None 
 
 ' Letter of W. S. Travis, June 16, 1813. 
 ' James, vi, 334. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 197 
 
 of the carronades could be used ; but Mr. Travis 
 made every preparation that he could for defence. 
 The Americans waited till the British were within 
 pistol shot before they opened their fire ; the latter 
 dashed gallantly on, however, and at once carried 
 the cutter. But though brief, the struggle was 
 bloody ; 5 of the Americans were wounded, and 
 of the British 3 were killed and 7 wounded. Lieu- 
 tenant Creerie considered his opponents to have 
 shown sb much bravery that he returned Mr. Travis 
 his sword, with a letter as complimentary to him as 
 it was creditable to the writer.' 
 
 As has been already mentioned, the Americans 
 possessed a large force of gun-boats at the beginning 
 of the war. Some of these were fairly sea-worthy 
 vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop- or schooner-rigged, 
 and armed with one or two long, heavy guns, and 
 sometimes with several light carronades to repel 
 boarders." Gun-boats of this kind, together with the 
 few small cutters owned by the government, were 
 serviceable enough. They were employed all along 
 
 ' The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows : "Your gallant and 
 desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more than double 
 your number, on the night of the 12th instant, excited such admira- 
 tion on the part of your opponents as I have seldom witnessed, and 
 induced me to return you the sword you had so nobly used, in testi- 
 mony of mine. Our poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned 
 chiefly, if not solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent sur- 
 prise. In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous 
 engagement aboard the Surveyor, or the determined manner in which 
 her deck was disputed inch by inch. I am, sir," etc. 
 
 '' According to a letter from Captain Hugh G. Campbell (in the 
 Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters." 1812, vol. ii, Nos. 21 and 
 192), the crews were distributed as follows : ten men and a boy to a 
 long 32, seven men and a boy to a long 9, and five men and a boy to 
 a carronade, exclusive of petty ofhcers. Captain Campbell complains 
 of the scarcity of men, and rather naively remarks that he is glad the 
 marines have been withdrawn from the gun-boats, as this m.ay make 
 the commanders of the latter keep a brighter lookout than formerly. 
 
ig8 NAVAL WAR OF X8l2. 
 
 the shores of Georgia and the Carolinas, and in Long 
 Island Sound, in protecting the coasting trade by- 
 convoying parties of small vessels from one port to 
 another, and preventing them from being molested 
 by the boats of any of the British frigates. They 
 also acted as checks upon the latter in their descents 
 upon the towns and plantations, occasionally capt- 
 uring their boats and tenders, and forcing them to 
 be very cautious in their operations. They were 
 very useful in keeping privateers off the coast, and 
 capturing them when they came too far in. The 
 exploits of those on the southern coast will be men- 
 tioned as they occurred. Those in Long Island 
 Sound never came into collision with the foe, except 
 for a couple of slight skirmishes at very long range ; 
 but in convoying little fleets of coasters, and keeping 
 at bay the man-of-war boats sent to molest them, 
 they were invaluable ; and they also kept the Sound 
 clear of hostile privateers. 
 
 Many of the gun-boats were much smaller than 
 those just mentioned, trusting mainly to their 
 sweeps for motive power, and each relying for of- 
 fence on one long pivot gun, a 12- or i8-pounder. 
 In the Chesapeake there was a quite a large num- 
 ber of these small gallies, with a few of the larger 
 kind, and here it was thought that by acting to- 
 gether in flotillas the gun-boats might in fine 
 weather do considerable damage to the enemy's 
 fleet by destroying detached vessels, instead of con- 
 fining themselves to the more humble tasks in which 
 their brethren elsewhere were fairly successful. At 
 this period Denmark, having lost all her larger 
 ships of war, was confining herself purely to gun- 
 brigs. These were stout little crafts, with heavy 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 1 99 
 
 guns, which, acting together, and being handled with 
 spirit and skill, had on several occasions in calm 
 weather captured small British sloops, and had twice 
 so injured frigates as to make their return to Great 
 Britain necessary ; while they themselves had fre- 
 quently been the object of successful cutting-out 
 expeditions. Congress hoped that our gun-boats 
 would do as well as the Danish; but for a variety of 
 reasons they failed utterly in every serious attack 
 that they made on a man-of-war, and were worse 
 than useless for all but the various subordinate em- 
 ployments above mentioned. The main reason for 
 this failure was in the gun-boats themselves. They 
 were utterly useless except in perfectly calm 
 weather, for in any wind the heavy guns caused 
 them to careen over so as to make it difficult to 
 keep them right side up, and impossible to fire. 
 Even in smooth water they could not be fought at 
 anchor, requiring to be kept in position by means of 
 sweeps ; and they were very unstable, the recoil of 
 the guns causing them to roll so as to make it difili- 
 cult to aim with any accuracy after the first dis- 
 charge, while a single shot hitting one put it hors de 
 combat. This last event rarely happened, however, 
 for they were not often handled with any approach 
 to temerity, and, on the contrary, usually made their 
 attacks at a range that rendered it as impossible to 
 inflict as to receive harm. It does not seem as if they 
 were very well rnanaged ; but they were such ill-con- 
 ditioned craft that the best officers might be pardoned 
 for feeling uncomfortable in them. Their operations 
 throughout the war offer a painfully ludicrous com- 
 mentary on Jefferson's remarkable project of having 
 our navy composed exclusively of such craft. 
 
200 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 The first aggressive attempt made with the gun- 
 boats was characteristically futile. On June 20th 
 15 of them, under Captain Tarbell, attacked the 
 Junon, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed in 
 Hampton Roads, with the Barossa, 36, and Laures- 
 tinus, 24, near her. The gun-boats, while still at 
 very long range, anchored, and promptly drifted 
 round so that they couldn't shoot. Then they got 
 under way, and began gradually to draw nearer to 
 the Junon. Her defence was very feeble ; after 
 some hasty and ill-directed vollies she endeavored 
 to beat out of the way. But meanwhile, a slight 
 breeze having sprung up, the Barossa, Captain Sher- 
 riff, approached near enough to take a hand in the 
 affair, and at once made it evident that she was a 
 more dangerous foe than the Junon, though a lighter 
 ship. As soon as they felt the effects of the breeze 
 the gun-boats became almost useless, and, the Baros- 
 sa's fire being animated and well aimed, they with- 
 drew. They had suffered nothing from the Junon, 
 but during the short period she was engaged, the 
 Barossa had crippled one boat and slightly damaged 
 another; one man was killed and two wounded. 
 The Barossa escaped unscathed and the Junon was 
 but slightly injured. Of the combatants, the Bar- 
 ossa was the only one that came off with credit, the 
 Junon behaving, if any thing, rather worse than the 
 gun-boats. There was no longer any doubt as to 
 the amount of reliance to be placed on the latter.' 
 
 ' Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats, they acted with 
 the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bladensburg. The Brit- 
 ish Lieutenant Graig, himself a spectator, thus writes of their deeds 
 on that occasion (" Campaign at Washington," p. 119). ' Of the sail- 
 ors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the terms which 
 their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only 
 did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision which as- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 20I 
 
 On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, one 
 64, four frigates, two sloops, and three transports 
 was anchored off Craney Island. On the north- 
 west side of this island was a battery of i8-pound- 
 ers, to take charge of which Captain Cassin, com- 
 manding the naval forces at Norfolk, sent ashore 
 one hundred sailors of the Constellation, under 
 the command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick, and 
 Saunders, and fifty marines under Lieutenant Breck- 
 enbridge.' On the morning of the 22d they were 
 attacked by a division of 15 boats, containing 700 
 men,' seamen, marines, chasseurs, and soldiers of 
 the I02d regiment, the whole under the command 
 of Captain Pechell, of the San Domingo, 74. Cap- 
 tain Hanchett led the attack in the Diadem s launch. 
 The battery's guns were not fired till the British 
 were close in, when they opened with destructive 
 effect. While still some seventy yards from the 
 guns the Diadem! s launch grounded, and the attack 
 was checked. Three of the boats were now sunk by 
 shot, but the water was so shallow that they re- 
 mained above water; and while the fighting was 
 still at its height, some of the Constellation s crew, 
 headed by Midshipman Tatnall, waded out and took 
 possession of them.' A few of their crew threw 
 away their arms and came ashore with their captors ; 
 others escaped to the remaining boats, and imme- 
 
 tonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actu- 
 ally bayoneted with fuses in their hands ; nor was it till their leader 
 was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted on all 
 sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field." Certainly such 
 men could not be accused of lack of courage. Something else is 
 needed to account for the failure of the gun-boat system. 
 
 ' Letter of Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813. 
 
 " James, vi, 337. 
 
 '"Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall," by Charles C. Jones, Jr. 
 (Savannah, 1878), p. 17. 
 
202 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 diately afterward the flotilla made off in disorder, 
 having lost 91 men. The three captured barges 
 were large, strong boats, one palled the Centipede 
 being fifty feet long, and more formidable than 
 many of the American gun-vessels. The Constella- 
 tions men deserve great credit for their defence, but 
 the British certainly did not attack with their usual 
 obstinacy. When the foremost boats were sunk, the 
 water was so shallow and the bottom so good that the 
 Americans on shore, as just stated, at once waded 
 out to them ; and if in the heat of the fight Tatnall 
 and his seamen could get out to the boats, the 700 
 British ought to have been able to get in to the bat- 
 tery, whose 150 defenders would then have stood no 
 chance.' 
 
 On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels Scorpion 
 and Asp, the latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, 
 got under way from out of the Yeocomico Creek," 
 and at 10 A. M. discovered in chase the British brig- 
 sloops Contest, Captain James Rattray, and Mohawk, 
 Captain Henry D. Byng." The Scorpion beat up 
 the Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing Asp had to re- 
 enter the creek ; the two brigs anchored off the bar 
 
 'James comments on this repulse as " a defeat as discreditable to 
 those that caused it as honorable to those that suffered in it." " Unlike 
 most other nations, the Americans in particular, the British, when en- 
 gaged in expeditions of this nature, always rest their hopes of success 
 upon valor rather than on numbers." These comments read particu- 
 larly well when it is remembered that the assail.ants outnumbered the 
 assailed in the proportion of 5 to I. It is monotonous work to have 
 to supplement a history by a running commentary on James' mistakes 
 and inventions ; but it is worth while to prove once for all the utter 
 unreliability of the author who is accepted in Great Britain as the 
 great authority about the war. Still, James is no worse than his com- 
 peers. In the American Coggeshall's "History of Privateers," the 
 misstatements are as gross and the sneers in as poor taste — the Brit- 
 ish, instead of the Americans, being the objects. 
 
 ''Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July 15, 1813. 
 
 'James, vi, 343. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 203 
 
 and hoisted out their boats, under the command of 
 Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry ; whereupon the As/> 
 cut her cable and ran up the creek some distance. 
 Here she was attacked by three boats, which Mr. 
 Sigourney and his crew of twenty men, with two light 
 guns, beat off ; but they were joined by two others, and 
 the five carried the As/>, giving no quarter. Mr. 
 Sigourney and 10 of his men were killed or wounded, 
 while the British also suffered heavily, having 4 
 killed and 7 (including Lieutenant Curry) wounded. 
 The surviving Americans reached the shore, rallied 
 under Midshipman H. McClintock (second in com- 
 mand), and when the British retired after setting the 
 Asp on fire, at once boarded her, put out the flames, 
 and got her in fighting order ; but they were not 
 again molested. 
 
 On July 29th, while the Junon, 38, Captain Sand- 
 ers, and Martin, 18, Captain Senhouse, were in Del- 
 aware Bay, the latter grounded on the outside of 
 Crow's Shoal ; the frigate anchored within support- 
 ing distance, and while in this position the two ships 
 were attacked by the American flotilla in those 
 waters, consisting of eight gun-boats, carrying each 
 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier block- 
 sloops,' commanded by Lieutenant Samuel Angus. 
 The flotilla kept at such a distance that an hour's 
 cannonading did no damage whatever to anybody ; 
 and during that time gun-boat No. 121, Sailing- 
 master Shead, drifted a mile and a half away from 
 her consorts. Seeing this the British made a dash 
 at her, in 7 boats, containing 140 men, led by Lieu- 
 tenant Philip Westphal. Mr. Shead anchored and 
 made an obstinate defence , but at the first discharge 
 
 ' Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813. 
 
204 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 the gun's pintle gave way, and the next time it was 
 fired the gun-carriage was ahnost torn to pieces. 
 He kept up a spirited fire of small arms, in reply to 
 the boat-carronades and musketry of the assailants; 
 but the latter advanced steadily and carried the 
 gunrboat by boarding, 7 of her people being 
 wounded, while 7 of the British were killed and 13 
 wounded.' The defence of No. 121 was very cred- 
 itable, but otherwise the honor of the day was cer- 
 tainly with the British ; whether because the gun- 
 boats were themselves so worthless or because they 
 were not handled boldly enough, they did no dam- 
 age, even to the grounded sloop, that would seem 
 to have been at their mercy.'' 
 
 On June i8th the American brig-sloop Argus, 
 commanded by Lieutenant William Henry Allen, 
 late first of the United States, sailed from New York 
 for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that 
 country, aboard, and reached L'Orient on July nth, 
 having made one prize on the way. On July 14th 
 she again sailed, and cruised in the chops of the 
 Channel, capturing and burning ship after ship, and 
 creating the greatest consternation among the Lon- 
 don merchants ; she then cruised along Cornwall 
 and got into St. George's Channel, where the work 
 of destruction went on. The labor was very severe 
 and harassing, the men being able to get very little 
 rest.' On the night of August 13th, a brig laden 
 
 'Letter of Mr. Shead, -A-Ug. 5, 1813. 
 
 ''The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the gun-boats had 
 worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is a letter from Mr. 
 Angus (" Masters' Commandant Letters," 1813, No. 3 ; see also No. 
 91), in which he says that the frigate's shot passed over them, while 
 theirs could not even reach the sloop. He also encloses a copy of a 
 paper, signed by the other gun-boat officers, which runs ; " We, the 
 officers of the vessels comprising the Delaware flotilla, protest against 
 the powder as being unfit for service." 
 
 ^ Court of Inquiry into loss of Argus, 1S15. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 205 
 
 with wine from Oporto was captured and burnt, and 
 unluckily many of the crew succeeded in getting at 
 some of the cargo. At 5 A. M. on the 14th a large 
 brig-of-war was discovered standing down under a 
 cloud of canvas.' This was the British brig-sloop Peli- 
 can, Captain John Fordyce Maples, which, from 
 information received at Cork three days previous, 
 had been cruising especially after the Argus, and 
 had at last found her ; St. David's Head bore east 
 five leagues (lat. 52" 15' N. and 5" 50' W.). 
 
 The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her 
 lofty masts and long spars, could easily have escaped 
 from her heavier antagonist ; but Captain Allen had 
 no such intention, and, finding he could not get the 
 weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran easily along 
 on the starboard tack, while the Pelican came down 
 on him with the wind (which was from the south) 
 nearly aft. At 6 A. M. the Argus wore and fired her 
 port guns within grape distance, the /i?/zf«w respond- 
 ing with her starboard battery, and the action be- 
 gan with great spirit on both sides.' At 6.04 a 
 round shot carried off Captain Allen's leg, in- 
 flicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on deck 
 till he fainted from loss of blood. Soon the 
 British fire carried away the main-braces, main- 
 spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the Argus ; 
 the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded 
 in the head by a grape-shot and carried below ; the 
 second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no relation of 
 the captain), continued to fight the ship with great 
 skill. The Pelican s fire continued very heavy, the 
 Argus losing her spritsail-yard and most of the 
 
 ■Letter of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 1815. 
 ' Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral Thornborough, Aug. 14, 
 1813. 
 
206 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Standing rigging on the port side of the foremast. 
 At 6.14 Captain Maples bore up to pass astern of 
 his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed into the 
 wind and threw the main-top-sail aback, getting into 
 ;i beautiful raking position ' ; had the men at the 
 guns done their duty as well as those on the quar- 
 ter-deck did theirs, the issue of the fight would have 
 been very different ; but, as it was, in spite of her 
 favorable position, the raking broadside of the Ar- 
 gus did little damage. Two or three minutes after- 
 ward the Argus lost the use of her after-sails through 
 having her preventer-main-braces and top-sail tie 
 shot away, and fell off before the wind, when the 
 Pelican at 6.18 passed her stern, raking her heavily, 
 and then ranged up on her starboard quarter. In a 
 few minutes the wheel-ropes and running-rigging of 
 every description were shot away, and the Argus be- 
 came utterly unmanageable. The Pelican continued 
 raking her with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed 
 her broadside and took a position on her starboard 
 bow, when at 6.45 the brigs fell together, and the 
 British "were in the act of boarding when the 
 Argus struck her colors,"" at 6.45 A.M. The 
 Pelican carried, besides her regular armament, two 
 long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside weight 
 of metal was thus : ' 
 
 
 I 
 
 X 
 
 6 
 
 
 I 
 
 X 
 
 6 
 
 
 I 
 
 X 
 
 12 
 
 
 8 
 
 X 
 
 32 
 
 or 280 lbs. 
 
 against the A 
 
 rgus: 
 
 
 I 
 
 X 
 
 12 
 
 
 9 
 
 X 
 
 24 
 
 ' Letter of Lieutenant Watson. 
 
 
 'Lett! 
 
 ^James, vi, 
 
 320. 
 
 
 
 ' Letter of Captain Maples. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 20/ 
 
 or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent, for light weight 
 of metal, 210 lbs. The Pelican's crew consisted of 
 but 116 men, according to the British account, 
 tliough the American reports make it much larger. 
 The Argus had started from New York with 137 
 men, but having manned and sent in several prizes, 
 her crew amounted, as near as can be ascertained, 
 to 104. Mr. Low in his " Naval History," published 
 just after the event, makes it but 99. James makes 
 it 121 ; as he placed the crew of the Enterprise at 
 125, when it was really 102 ; that of the Hornet at 
 162, instead of 135 ; of the Peacock at 185, instead 
 of 166 ; of the Nautilus at 106 instead of 95 
 etc., etc., it is safe to presume that he has over- 
 estimated it by at least 20, which brings the number 
 pretty near to the American accounts. The Pelican 
 lost but two men killed and five wounded. Captain 
 Maples had a narrow escape, a spent grape-shot 
 striking him in the chest with some force, and then 
 falling on the deck. One shot had passed through 
 the boatswain's and one through the carpenter's 
 cabin ; her sides were filled with grape-shot, and her 
 rigging and sails much injured ; her foremast, 
 main-top-mast, and royal masts were slightly 
 wounded, and two of her carronades dismounted. 
 
 The injuries of the Argus have already been de- 
 tailed ; her hull and lower masts were also tolerably 
 well cut up. Of her crew. Captain Allen, two mid- 
 shipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed or 
 mortally wounded ; her first lieutenant and 13 sea- 
 men severely and slightly wounded : total, 10 killed 
 and 14 wounded. 
 
 In reckoning the comparative force, I include the 
 Englishman's six-pound stern-chaser, which could 
 
208 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF I8l2. 
 
 not be fired in broadside with the rest of the guns, 
 because I include the Argus' i2-pound bow-chaser, 
 which also could not be fired in broadside, as it was 
 crowded into the bridle-port. James, of course, 
 carefully includes the latter, though leaving out the 
 former. 
 
 COMPARISON. 
 
 Argus 
 Pelican 
 
 Argus 
 Pelican 
 
 Weight 
 Tons. No. Guns. Metal. 
 
 298 
 467 
 
 10 
 
 II 
 
 210 
 
 280 
 
 Comparative 
 Force. 
 
 .82 
 
 1. 00 
 
 Men. 
 104 
 116 
 
 Loss. 
 24 
 
 7 
 
 Commparative 
 Loss inflicted. 
 
 .29 
 
 1,00 
 
 6.4S 
 
 6.Z5 
 
 '^.'<Sr ^~^ ^ 
 
 Uf 
 
 'h-^-M 
 
 ^RGVS 
 
 s.oo a.f 
 
 Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war 
 this is the least creditable to the Americans. The 
 odds in force, it is true, were against the Argus, 
 about in the proportion of lo to 8, but this is 
 neither enough to account for the loss inflicted be- 
 ing as 10 to 3, nor for her surrendering when she 
 had been so little ill used. It was not even as if 
 her antagonist had been an unusually fine vessel of 
 her class. The Pelican did not do as well as either 
 the Frolic previously, or the Reindeer afterward, 
 though perhaps rather better than the Avon, Pert- 
 ain, or Peacock. With a comparatively unmanage- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 209 
 
 able antagonist, in smooth water, she ought to have 
 sunk her in three quarters of an hour. But the Pel- 
 ican not having done particularly well merely 
 makes the conduct of the Americans look worse ; it 
 IS just the reverse of the Chesapeake s case, where, 
 paying the highest credit to the British, we still 
 thought the fight no discredit to us. Here we can 
 indulge no such reflection. The officers did well, 
 but the crew did not. Cooper says : " The enemy 
 was so much heavier that it maybe doubted whether 
 the Argus would have captured her antagonist un- 
 der any ordinary circumstances." This I doubt; 
 such a crew as the Wasp's or Hornet's probably 
 would have been successful. The trouble with the 
 guns of the Argus was not so much that they were 
 too small, as that they did not hit ; and this seems 
 all the more incomprehensible when it is remem- 
 bered that Captain Allen is the very man to whom 
 Commodore Decatur, in his official letter, attributed 
 the skilful gun-practice of the crew of the frigate 
 United States. Cooper says that the powder was 
 bad ; and it has also been said that the men of the 
 Argus were over-fatigued and were drunk, in which 
 case they ought not to have been brought into ac- 
 tion. Besides unskilfulness, there is another very 
 serious count against the crew. Had the Pelican 
 been some distance from the Argus, and in a posi- 
 tion where she could pour in her fire with perfect 
 impunity to herself, when the surrender took place, 
 it would have been more justifiable. But, on the 
 contrary, the vessels were touching, and the British 
 boarded just as the colors were hauled down ; it was 
 certainly very disgraceful that the Americans did 
 not rally to repel them, for they had still four fifths 
 
2IO NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 of their number absolutely untouched. They cer- 
 tainly ought to have succeeded, for boarding is a dif- 
 ficult and dangerous experiment ; and if they had 
 repulsed their antagonists they might in turn have 
 carried the Pelican. So that, in summing up the 
 merits of this action, it is fair to say that both sides 
 showed skilful seamanship and unskilful gunnery; 
 that the British fought bravely and that the Ameri- 
 cans did not. 
 
 It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, 
 where a weaker American sloop was taken by a 
 stronger British one, with two or three others, where 
 both the comparative force and the result were re- 
 versed. Comparing it, therefore, with the actions 
 between the Hornet and Peacock (British), the Wasp 
 and Avon, and the Peacock (American) and Epervier, 
 we get four actions, in one of which, the first-named, 
 the British were victorious, and in the other three 
 the Americans. 
 
 
 Comparative 
 Force. 
 
 Comparative Loss 
 Inflicted. 
 
 i Per cen 
 Loss. 
 
 Pelican (British) 
 
 I.oo 
 
 I.OO 
 
 .06 
 
 Argus (American) 
 
 .82 
 
 .29 
 
 •23 ' 
 
 Hornet (American) 
 
 I.oo 
 
 1.00 
 
 .02 
 
 Peacock (British) 
 
 •83 
 
 .07 
 
 •31 
 
 Wasp (American) 
 
 I.oo 
 
 I.oo 
 
 .02 
 
 Avon (British) 
 
 .80 
 
 .07 
 
 ■ 33 
 
 Peacock (American) 
 
 I.oo 
 
 1.00 
 
 •oii 
 
 Epervier (British) 
 
 .81 
 
 .08 
 
 .20 
 
 It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the 
 superiority of force on the side of the victor was 
 each time about the same. The Argus made a 
 much more effectual resistance than did either the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 211 
 
 Peacock, Avon, or Epervier, while the Pelican did her 
 work in poorer form than either of the victorious 
 American sloops ; and, on the other hand, the resist- 
 ance of the Argus did not by any means show as 
 much bravery as was shown in the defence of the 
 Peacock or Avon, although rather more than in the 
 case of the Epervier. 
 
 This is the only action of the war where it is al- 
 most impossible to find out the cause of the inferi- 
 ority of the beaten crew. In almost all other cases 
 we find that one crew had been carefully drilled, and 
 so proved superior to a less-trained antagonist ; but 
 it is incredible that the man, to whose exertions 
 when first lieutenant of the States Commodore De- 
 catur ascribes the skilfulness of that ship's men, 
 should have neglected to train his own crew ; and 
 this had the reputation of being composed of a fine 
 set of men. Bad powder would not account for the 
 surrender of the Argus when so little damaged. It 
 really seems as if the men must have been drunk or 
 over-fatigued, as has been so often asserted. Of 
 course drunkenness would account for the defeat, 
 although not in the least altering its humiliating 
 character. 
 
 " Et tu quoque " is not much of an argument ; 
 still it may be as well to call to mind here two en- 
 gagements in which British sloops suffered much 
 more discreditable defeats than the Argus did. 
 The figures are taken from James ; as given by the 
 French historians they make even a worse showing 
 for the British. 
 
 A short time before our war the British brig Car- 
 nation, 1 8, had been captured, by boarding, by the 
 French brig Palinure, i6, and the British brig Alac- 
 
212 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 rity, 1 8, had been captured, also by boarding, by the 
 corvette Abeille, 20. 
 
 The following was the comparative force, etc., of 
 the combatants: 
 
 
 Weight Metal. 
 
 No. Crew. 
 
 Loss 
 
 Carnation 
 
 262 
 
 117 
 
 40 
 
 Palinure 
 
 174 
 
 100 
 
 20 
 
 Alacrity 
 
 262 
 
 100 
 
 18 
 
 Abeille 
 
 260 
 
 130 
 
 19 
 
 In spite of the pride the British take in their 
 hand-to-hand prowess both of these ships were capt- 
 ured by boarding. The Carnation was captured by 
 a much smaller force, instead of by a much larger 
 one, as in the case of the Argus ; and if the Argus 
 gave up before she had suffered greatly, the Alacrity 
 surrendered when she had suffered still less. French 
 historians asserted that the capture of the two brigs 
 proved that "French valor could conquer British 
 courage " ; and a similar opinion was very com- 
 placently expressed by British historians after the 
 defeat of the Argus. All that the three combats 
 really "proved " was, that in six encounters between 
 British and American sloops the Americans were 
 defeated once ; and in a far greater number of en- 
 counters between French and British sloops the 
 British were defeated twice. No one pretends that 
 either navy was invincible ; the question is, which 
 side averaged best ? 
 
 At the opening of the war we possessed several 
 small brigs ; these had originally been fast, handy 
 little schooners, each arm'ed with 12 long sixes, and 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 213 
 
 with a crew of 60 men. As such they were effective 
 enough ; but when afterward changed into brigs, 
 each armed with a couple of extra guns, and given 
 40 additional men, they became too slow to run, 
 without becoming strong enough to fight. They 
 carried far too many guns and men for their size, 
 and not enough to give them a chance with any re- 
 spectable opponent; and they were almost all ig- 
 nominiously captured. The single exception was 
 the brig Enterprise. She managed to escape capt- 
 ure, owing chiefly to good luck, and once fought a 
 victorious engagement, thanks to the fact that the 
 British possessed a class of vessels even worse than 
 our own. She was kept near the land and finally 
 took up her station off the eastern coast, where she 
 did good service in chasing away or capturing the 
 various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick privateers, 
 which were smaller and less formidable vessels than 
 the privateers of the United States, and not cal- 
 culated for fighting. 
 
 By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and over- 
 manning herself, the Enterprise, now under the 
 command of Lieutenant William Burrows, mounted 
 14 eighteen-pound carronades and 2 long 9's, with 
 102 men. On September 5th, while standing along 
 shore near Penguin Point, a few miles to the east- 
 ward of Portland, Me., she discovered, at anchor 
 inside, a man-of-war brig ' which proved to be 
 H.M.S. Boxer, Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carron- 
 ades, eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with 
 but 66 men aboard, 12 of her crew being absent." 
 
 ' Letter from Lieutenant Edward R. McCall to Commodore Hull, 
 September 5, 1813. 
 
 ''James, "Naval Occurrences," 264. The American accounts 
 give the Boxer 104 men, on very insufficient grounds. Similarly, 
 
214 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 The Boxer at once hoisted three British ensigns and 
 bore up for the Enterprise, then standing in on the 
 starboard tack ; but when the two brigs were still 4 
 miles apart it fell calm. At midday a breeze sprang 
 up from the southwest, giving the American the 
 weather-gage, but the latter manoeuvred for some 
 time to windward to try the comparative rates of 
 sailing of the vessels. At 3 P. M. Lieutenant Bur- 
 rows hoisted three ensigns, shortened sail, and 
 edged away toward the enemy, who came gallantly 
 on. Captain Blyth had nailed his colors to the 
 mast, telling his men they should never be struck 
 while he had life in his body.' Both crews cheered 
 loudly as they neared each other, and at 3.15, the 
 two brigs being on the starboard tack not a half 
 pistol-shot apart, they opened fire, the American 
 using the port, and the English the starboard, bat- 
 tery. Both broadsides were very destructive, 
 each of the commanders falling at the very begin- 
 ning of the action. Captain Blyth was struck by 
 an eighteen-pound shot while he was standing on 
 the quarter-deck ; it passed completely through his 
 body, shattering his left arm and killing him on the 
 spot. The command, thereupon, devolved on Lieu- 
 tenant David McCreery. At almost the same time 
 his equally gallant antagonist fell. Lieutenant Bur- 
 rows, while encouraging his men, laid hold of a gun- 
 tackle fall to help the crew of a carronade run out 
 the gun ; in doing so he raised one leg against the 
 bulwark, when a canister shot struck his thigh, 
 glancing into his body and inflicting a fearful 
 
 James gives the Enterprise 123 men. Each side will be considered 
 authority for its own force and loss. 
 ' " Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, p. 462. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 215 
 
 wound/ In spite of the pain he refused to be 
 carried below, and lay on the deck, crying out that 
 the colors must never be struck. Lieutenant Ed- 
 ward McCall now took command. At 3.30 the En- 
 terprise ranged ahead, rounded to on the starboard 
 tack, and raked the Boxer with the starboard 
 guns. At 3.35 the Boxer lost her main-top-mast 
 and top-sail yard, but her crew still kept up the 
 fight bravely, with the exception of four men who 
 deserted their quarters and were afterward court- 
 martialed for cowardice.' The Enterprise now set 
 her fore-sail and took position on the enemy's star- 
 board bow, delivering raking fires ; and at 3.45 the 
 latter surrendered, when entirely unmanageable and 
 defenceless. Lieutenant Burrows would not go 
 below until he had received the sword of his adver- 
 sary, when he exclaimed, " I am satisfied, I die con- 
 tented." 
 
 '£HT£J!P/I/S£ 
 
 ^ ■"■•■ ^■ 
 
 
 i.3U 
 
 3JS ~'^^~BlUC£g 
 
 Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the 
 Boxer, which had been hulled repeatedly, had three 
 eighteen-pound shot through her foremast, her top- 
 gallant forecastle almost cut away, and several of 
 her guns dismounted. Three men were killed and 
 
 'Cooper, "Naval History," vol. li, p. 259. 
 
 ° Minutes of court-martial held aboard H.M.S. Surprise, January 
 8, 1814. 
 
2l6 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 seventeen wounded, four mortally. The Enterprise 
 had been hulled by one round and many grape ; one 
 1 8-pound ball had gone through her foremast, and 
 another through her main-mast, and she was much 
 cut up aloft. Two of her men were killed and ten 
 wounded, two of them (her commander and Mid- 
 shipman Kervin Waters) mortally. The British 
 court-martial attributed the defeat of the Boxer " to 
 a superiority in the enemy's force, principally in the 
 number of men, as well as to a greater degree of 
 skill in the direction of her fire, and to the destruc- 
 tive effects of the first broadside." But the main 
 element was the superiority in force, the difference 
 in loss being very nearly proportional to it ; both 
 sides fought with equal bravery and equal skill. 
 This fact was appreciated by the victors, for at a 
 naval dinner given in New York shortly afterward, 
 one of the toasts offered was : " The crew of the 
 Boxer ; enemies by law, but by gallantry brothers." 
 The two commanders were both buried at Portland, 
 with all the honors of war. The conduct of Lieu- 
 tenant Burrows needs no comment. He was an 
 ofificer greatly beloved and respected in the service. 
 Captain Blyth, on the other side, had not only 
 shown himself on many occasions to be a man of 
 distinguished personal courage, but was equally 
 noted for his gentleness and humanity. He had 
 been one of Captain Lawrence's pall-bearers, and 
 but a month previous to his death had received a 
 public note of thanks from an American colonel, 
 for an act of great kindness and courtesy.' 
 
 The Enterprise, under Lieut.-Com. Renshaw, noAv 
 cruised off the southern coast, where she made sev- 
 
 ' " Naval Chronicle," xxxii, 466. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 2\-J 
 
 eral captures. One of them was a heavy British 
 privateer, the Mars, of 14 long nines and 75 men, 
 which struck after receiving a broadside that killed 
 and wounded 4 of her crew. The Enterprise was 
 chased by frigates on several occasions ; being once 
 forced to throw overboard all her guns but two, and 
 escaping only by a shift in the wind. Afterward, 
 as she was unfit to cruise, she was made a guard- 
 ship at Charlestown ; for the same reason the Boxer 
 was not purchased into the service. 
 
 On October 4th some volunteers from the New- 
 port flotilla captured, by boarding, the British priva- 
 teer Dart^ after a short struggle in which two of the 
 assailants were wounded and several of the priva- 
 teersmen, including the first officer, were killed. 
 
 On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in 
 command of the President, sailed again from Provi- 
 dence, Rhode Island. On the 25th, in lat. 19° N. and 
 long. 35° W., the President, during the night, fell in 
 with two frigates, and came so close that the head- 
 most fired at her, when she made off. These were 
 thought to be British, but were in reality the two 
 French 40-gun frigates Nymphe and Meduse, one 
 month out of Brest. After this little encounter 
 Rodgers headed toward the Barbadoes, and cruised 
 to windward of them. 
 
 On the whole the ocean warfare of 18T3 was de- 
 cidedly in favor of the British, except during the 
 first few months. The Hornet's fight with the 
 Peacock was an action similar- to those that took 
 place in 1812, and the cruise of Porter was unique 
 
 ' Letter of Mr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1813. 
 
2l8 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2, 
 
 in our annals, both for the audacity with which it 
 was planned, and the success with which it was 
 executed. Even later in the year the Argus and 
 the President made bold cruises in sight of the 
 British coasts, the former working great havoc 
 among the merchant-men. But by that time the 
 tide had turned strongly in favor of our enemies. 
 From the beginning of summer the blockade was 
 kept up so strictly that it was with difficulty any of 
 our vessels broke through it ; they were either 
 chased back or captured. In the three actions that 
 occurred, the British showed themselves markedly 
 superior in two, and in the third the combatants 
 fought equally well, the result being fairly decided 
 by the fuller crew and slightly heavier metal of the 
 Enterprise. The gun-boats, to which many had 
 looked for harbor defence, proved nearly useless, 
 and were beaten off with ease whenever they made 
 an attack. 
 
 The lessons taught by all this were the usual 
 ones. Lawrence's victory in the Hornet showed 
 the superiority of a properly trained crew to one 
 that had not been properly trained ; and his defeat 
 in the Chesapeake pointed exactly the same way, 
 demonstrating in addition the folly of taking a raw 
 levy out of port, and, before they have had the 
 slightest chance of getting seasoned, pitting them 
 against skilled veterans. The victory of the Enter- 
 prise showed the wisdom of having the odds in men 
 and metal in our favor, when our antagonist was 
 otherwise our equal ; it proved, what hardly needed 
 proving, that, whenever possible, a ship should be 
 so constructed as to be superior in force to the foes 
 it would be likely to meet. As far as the capture of 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 219 
 
 the Argus showed any thing, it was the advantage 
 of heavy metai and the absolute need that a crew 
 should fight with pluck. The failure of the gun- 
 boats ought to have taught the lesson (though it 
 did not) that too great economy in providing the 
 means of defence may prove very expensive in the 
 end, and that good officers and men are powerless 
 when embarked in worthless vessels. A similar 
 point was emphasized by the strictness of the 
 blockade, and the great inconvenience it caused ; 
 namely, that we ought to have had ships powerful 
 enough to break it. 
 
 We had certainly lost ground during this year ; 
 fortunately we regained it during the next two. 
 
 BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN. 
 Name. Guns. Tonnage. 
 
 Peacock 20 477 
 
 Boxer 14 181 
 
 Highflyer 6 96 
 
 40 754 
 
 AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Chesapeake 
 
 5° 
 
 1,265 
 
 Argus 
 
 20 
 
 298 
 
 Viper 
 
 10 
 
 148 
 
 80 1,711 
 
220 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED. 
 
 Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage, Where Built. Cost. 
 
 Rattlesnake Brig 14 278 Medford, Pa. f 18,000 
 
 Alligator Schooner 4 80 
 
 Asp Sloop 3 56 2,600 
 
 PRIZES MADE. 
 
 
 Name of Ship. 
 
 No. of Prizes, 
 
 President 
 
 13 
 
 Congress 
 
 4 
 
 Chesapeake 
 
 6 
 
 Essex 
 
 14 
 
 Hornet 
 
 3 
 
 Argus 
 
 21 
 
 Small craft 
 
 18 
 
 79 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 1813. 
 
 ON THE LAKES. 
 
 Ontario — Comparison of the rival squadrons — Chauncy takes York and 
 Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command of the 
 lake — Chauncy sails — Yeo's partial victory off Niagara — Indecisive action off 
 the Genesee — Chauncy's partial victory off Burlington, which gives him the 
 command of the lake — ERiE^Perry's success in creating a fleet — Hia victory 
 — Champlain — Loss of the Groivler and Eagle — Summary. 
 
 ONTARIO. 
 
 WINTER had almost completely stopped 
 preparations on the American side. Bad 
 weather put an end to all communication with Al- 
 bany or New York, and so prevented the transit of 
 stores, implements, etc. It was worse still with the 
 men, for the cold and exposure so thinned them out 
 that the new arrivals could at first barely keep the 
 ranks filled. It was, moreover, exceedingly difficult 
 to get seamen to come from the coast to serve on 
 the lakes, where work was hard, sickness prevailed, 
 and there was no chance of prize-money. The Brit- 
 ish government had the great advantage of being 
 able to move its sailors where it pleased, while in 
 the American service, at that period, the men en- 
 listed for particular ships, and the only way to get 
 them for the lakes at all was by inducing portions 
 of crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither.' 
 
 'Cooper, ii, 357. One of James' most comical misstatements i? 
 that on the lakes the American sailors were all " picked men." On 
 
222 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 However, the work went on in spite of interruptions. 
 Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely ow- 
 ing to the energy and capacity of the head builder, 
 Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as much as any naval 
 officer in giving us an effective force on Ontario), 
 the Madison was equipped, a small despatch sloop. 
 The Lady of the Lake prepared, and a large new 
 ship, the General Pike, 28, begun, to mount 13 guns 
 in each broadside and 2 on pivots. 
 
 Meanwhile Sir George Prevost, the British com- 
 mander in Canada, had ordered two 24-gun ships to 
 be built, and they were begun ; but he committed 
 the mistake of having one laid down in Kingston 
 and the other in York, at the opposite end of 
 the lake. Earle, the Canadian commodore, having 
 proved himself so incompetent, was removed ; and 
 in the beginning of May Captain Sir James Lu- 
 cas Yeo arrived, to act as commander-in-chief of 
 the naval forces, together with four captains, eight 
 lieutenants, twenty-four midshipmen, and about 450 
 picked seamen, sent out by the home government 
 especially for service on the Canada lakes.' 
 
 The comparative force of the two fleets or squad- 
 rons it is hard to estimate. I have already spoken 
 of the difficulty in finding out what guns were 
 mounted on any given ship at a particular time, 
 and it is even more perplexing with the crews. A 
 schooner would make one cruise with but thirty 
 
 p. 367, for example, in speaking of the battle of Lake Erie lie says : 
 " Commodore Perry had picked crews to all his vessels." As a mat- 
 ter of fact Peri7 had once sent in his resignation solely on account of 
 the veiy poor quality of his crews, and had with difficulty been in- 
 duced to withdraw it. Perry's crews were of hardly average ex- 
 cellence, but then the average American sailor was a very good 
 specimen. 
 
 'James, vi, 353. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 223 
 
 hands ; on the next it would appear with fifty, a 
 number of militia having volunteered as marines. 
 Finding the militia rather a nuisance, they would 
 be sent ashore, and on her third cruise the schooner 
 would substitute half a dozen frontier seamen in 
 their place. It was the same with the larger ves- 
 sels. The Madison might at one time have her full 
 complement of 200 men ; a month's sickness would 
 ensue, and she would sail with but 150 effectives. 
 The Pikes crew of 300 men at one time would 
 shortly afterward be less by a third in consequence 
 of a draft of sailors being sent to the upper lakes. 
 So it is almost impossible to be perfectly accurate ; 
 but, making a comparison of the various authorities 
 from Lieutenant Emmons to James, the following 
 tables of the forces may be given as very nearly cor- 
 rect. In broadside force I count every pivot gun, 
 and half of those that were not on pivots. 
 
 chauncy's squadron. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rig. 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Crew. 
 
 Broadside 
 Metal ; lbs. 
 
 
 Armament. 
 
 Pike, 
 
 ship 
 
 
 875 
 
 300 
 
 360 
 
 
 28 long 24's 
 
 Madison, 
 
 *' 
 
 
 593 
 
 200 
 
 364 
 
 
 24 short 32's 
 
 Oneida, 
 
 brig 
 
 
 243 
 
 too 
 
 172 
 
 
 16 " 24's 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 schooner 
 
 112 
 
 50 
 
 80 
 
 : 
 
 I long 32 
 I " 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 '■ 6's 
 
 Scourge, 
 
 " 
 
 
 no 
 
 50 
 
 80 
 
 { 
 
 I " 32 
 8 short 12's 
 
 Conquest, 
 
 " 
 
 
 82 
 
 40 
 
 56 
 
 1 
 
 I long 32 
 I " 12 
 4 " 6's 
 
 Tompkins, 
 
 U 
 
 
 96 
 
 40 
 
 62 
 
 i 
 
 I '■ 32 
 I " 12 
 6 " 6's 
 
 Julia, 
 
 " 
 
 
 82 
 
 35 
 
 44 
 
 \ 
 
 I " 32 
 I " 12 
 
 Growler, 
 
 it 
 
 
 81 
 
 35 
 
 44 
 
 \ 
 
 I " 32 
 I " 13 
 
224 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Name. Rig. 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Crew. 
 
 Broadside 
 Metal; lbs. 
 
 
 Armament. 
 
 Ontario, schooner 53 
 
 35 
 
 44 
 
 1 
 
 I long 32 
 I " 12 
 
 Fair American, " 
 
 53 
 
 30 
 
 36 
 
 • 
 
 I " 24 
 I " 12 
 
 Pert, 
 Asp, 
 Lady of the Lake, " 
 
 50 
 57 
 89 
 
 25 
 25 
 15 
 
 24 
 24 
 
 9 
 
 
 I " 24 
 I " 24 
 I " 9 
 
 14 
 
 2,576 
 
 980 t,399 
 
 This is not materially different from James' ac- 
 count (p. 356), which gives Chauncy 1 14 guns, 1,193 
 men, and 2,12 1 tons. The Ladf of the Lake, how- 
 ever, was never intended for any thing but a despatch 
 boat, and the Scourge and Hamilton were both lost 
 before Chauncy actually came into collision with 
 Yeo. Deducting these, in order to compare the 
 two foes, Chauncy had left 11 vessels of 2,265 tons, 
 with 865 men and 92 guns throwing a broadside of 
 1,230 pounds. 
 
 YEO'S SQUADRON. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Wolfe, 
 
 Broadside 
 Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal ; lbs. 
 
 ship 637 
 
 510 
 
 Royal George, 
 
 Melville, brig 279 
 
 Moira, " 262 
 
 Sydney Smith, schooner 216 
 
 B ere s ford, " 187 
 
 6 2,091 
 
 200 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 80 
 
 70 
 770 
 
 392 
 
 360 
 210 
 
 153 
 173 
 
 87 
 
 1,374 
 
 Armament. 
 
 !i long 24 
 8 " l8's 
 4 short 68's 
 10 " 32's 
 ( 3 long i8's 
 ■j 2 short 68's 
 ( 16 " 32's 
 ( 2 long iS's 
 j 12 short 32's 
 ( 2 long 9's 
 (12 short 24's 
 
 i2 long 12's 
 10 short 32's 
 I long 24 
 I " 9 
 6 short 18 s 
 
 92 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 225 
 
 This differs but slightly from James, who gives 
 Yeo 92 guns throwing a broadside of 1,374 pounds, 
 but only 717 men. As the evidence in the court- 
 martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official ac- 
 counts (on both sides) of Macdonough's victory, 
 convict him of very much underrating the force in 
 men of the British on Erie and Champlain, it can 
 be safely assumed that he has underestimated the 
 force in men on Lake Ontario. By comparing the 
 tonnage he gives to Barclay's and Downie's squad- 
 rons with what it really was, we can correct his ac- 
 count of Yeo's tonnage. 
 
 The above figures would apparently make the two 
 squadrons about equal, Chauncy having 95 men 
 more, and throwing at a broadside 144 pounds shot 
 less than his antagonist. But the figures do not by any 
 means show all the truth. The Americans greatly 
 excelled in the number and calibre of their long 
 guns. Compared thus, they threw at one discharge 
 694 pounds of long-gun metal and 536 pounds of 
 carronade metal ; while the British only threw from 
 their long guns 180 pounds, and from their carron- 
 ades 1,194. This unequal distribution of metal was 
 very much in favor of the Americans. Nor was 
 this all. The Pike, with her 1 5 long 24's in battery, 
 was an overmatch for any one of the enemy's vessels, 
 and bore the same relation to them that the Con- 
 fiatice, at a later date, did to Macdonough's squadron. 
 She should certainly have been a match for the 
 Wolfe and Melville together, and the Madison and 
 Oneida for the Royal George and Sydney Smith. In 
 fact, the three heavy American vessels ought to 
 have been" an overmatch for the four heaviest of the 
 British squadron, although these possessed the nom- 
 
226 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 inal superiority. And in ordinary cases the eight 
 remaining American gun-vessels would certainly 
 seem to be an overmatch for the two British 
 schooners, but it is just here that the difficulty of 
 comparing the forces comes in. When the water 
 was very smooth and the wind light, the long 32's 
 and 24's of the Americans could play havoc with 
 the British schooners, at a distance which would 
 render the carronades of the latter useless. But the 
 latter were built for war, possessed quarters and 
 were good cruisers, while Chauncy's schooners were 
 merchant vessels, without quarters, crank, and so 
 loaded down with heavy metal that whenever it blew 
 at all hard they could with difficulty be kept from 
 upsetting, and ceased to be capable even of defend- 
 ing themselves. When Sir James Yeo captured two 
 of them he would not let them cruise with his other 
 vessels at all, but sent them back to act as gun- 
 boats, in which capacity they were serving when re- 
 captured ; this is a tolerable test of their value com- 
 pared to their opponents. Another disadvantage 
 that Chauncy had to contend with, was the difler- 
 ence in the speed of the various vessels. The Pike 
 and Madison were fast, weatherly ships ; but the 
 Oneida was a perfect slug, even going free, and 
 could hardly be persuaded to beat to windward at 
 all. In this respect Yeo was much better off ; his 
 six ships were regular men-of-war, with quarters, 
 all of them seaworthy, and fast enough to be able 
 to act with uniformity, and not needing to pay 
 much regard to the weather. His force could act as 
 a unit ; but Chauncy's could not. Enough wind to 
 make a good working breeze for his larger vessels 
 put all his smaller ones hors de combat ; and in 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. /227 
 
 weather that suited the latter, the former could not 
 move about at all. When speed became necessary 
 the two ships left the brig hopelessly behind, and 
 either had to do without her, or else perhaps let tl;^ 
 critical moment slip by while waiting for her to 
 come up. Some of the schooners sailed quite as 
 slowly; and finally it was found out that the only 
 way to get all the vessels into action at once was to 
 have one half the fleet tow the other half. It was 
 certainly difificult to keep the command of the lake 
 when, if it came on to blow, the commodore had to 
 put into port under penalty of seeing a quarter 
 of his fleet founder before his eyes. These conflict- 
 ing considerations render it hard to pass judgment ; 
 but on the whole it would seem as if Chauncy was" 
 the superior in force, for even if his schooners were 
 not counted, his three square-rigged vessels were at 
 least a match for the four square-rigged British ves- 
 sels, and the two British schooners would not have 
 counted very much in such a conflict. In calm 
 weather he was certainly the superior. This only 
 solves one of the points in which the official letters 
 of the two commanders differ : after every meeting 
 each one insists that he was inferior in force, that 
 the weather suited his antagonist, and that the latter 
 ran away, and got the worst of it ; all of which will 
 be considered further on. 
 
 In order to settled to.ward which side the balance of 
 success inclined, we must remember that there were 
 two things the combatants were trying to do viz. : 
 
 (i) To damage the enemy directly by capturing 
 or destroying his vessels. This was the only object 
 we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers, but on 
 the lakes it was subordinated to : — 
 
228 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 (2) Getting the control of the lake, by which in- 
 valuable assistance could be rendered to the army. 
 The most thorough way of accomplishing this, of 
 course, was by destroying the enemy's squadron ; 
 but it could also be done by building ships too pow- 
 erful for him to face, or by beating him in some en- 
 gagement which, although not destroying his fleet, 
 would force him to go into port. If one side was 
 stronger, then the weaker party by skilful manoeu- 
 vring might baffle the foe, and rest satisfied by 
 keeping the sovereignty of the lake disputed ; for, 
 as long as one squadron was not undisputed master it 
 could not be of much assistance in transporting 
 troops, attacking forts, or otherwise helping the mil- 
 itary. 
 
 In 1813 the Americans gained the first point by 
 being the first to begin operations. They were 
 building a new ship, afterward the Pike, at Sack- 
 ett's Harbor; the British were building two new 
 ships, each about two thirds the force of the Pike, 
 <ine at Toronto (then called York), one at Kingston. 
 Before these were built the two fleets were just on 
 a par ; the destruction of the Pike would give the 
 British the supremacy ; the destruction of either 
 of the British ships, provided the Pike were 
 saved, would give the Americans the supremacy. 
 Both sides had already committed faults. The 
 Americans had left Sackett's Harbor so poorly de- 
 fended and garrisoned that it invited attack, while 
 the British had fortified Kingston very strongly, but 
 had done little for York, and, moreover, ought not 
 to have divided their forces by building ships in dif- 
 ferent places. 
 
 Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 229 
 
 service on April 19th, and on the 25th he made sail 
 with the Madison, Lieutenant-Commander Elliott, 
 floating his own broad pennant, Oneida, Lieutenant 
 Woolsey, Hami/ion, 'Lieutenant McFherson, Scour ov, 
 Mr. Osgood, Tompkins, Lieutenant Brown, Con- 
 quest, Lieutenant Pettigrew, Growler, Mr. Mix, 
 Julia, Mr. Trant, Asp, Lieutenant Smith, Pert, 
 Lieutenant Adams, American, Lieutenant Chauncy, 
 Ontario, Mr. Stevens, Lady of the Lake, Mr. Hinn, 
 and Raven, transport, having on board General 
 Dearborn and 1700 troops, to attack York, which 
 was garrisoned by about 700 British regulars and 
 Canadian militia under Major-General Sheafe. The 
 new 24-gun ship was almost completed, and the 
 Gloucester lo-gun brig was in port; the guns of 
 both vessels were used in defence of the port. 
 The fleet arrived before York early on April 27th, 
 and the debarkation began at about 8 A. M. 
 The schooners beat up to the fort under a heavy 
 cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from their 
 long guns ; while the troops went ashore under 
 the command of Brigadier- General Pike. The 
 boats were blown to leeward by the strong east 
 wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but landed 
 the troops under cover of the grape thrown by the 
 vessels. The schooners now beat up to within a 
 quarter of a mile from the principal work, and 
 opened heavily upon it, while at the same time 
 General Pike and the main body of the troops on 
 shore moved forward to the assault, using their 
 bayonets only. The British regulars and Canadian 
 militia, outnumbered three to one (including the 
 American sailors) and with no very good defensive 
 works, of course had to give way, having lost heav- 
 
230 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 ily, especially from the fire of the vessels. An ex- 
 plosion immediately afterward killed or wounded 
 250 of the victors, including General Pike. The 
 Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed, includ- 
 ing midshipmen Hatfield and Thompson, and 8 
 wounded ' ; and of the army,'' 14 killed and 32 
 wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killed and 180 
 wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. The Brit- 
 ish regulars lost 1 30 killed and wounded, including 40 
 by the explosion " ; together with 50 Canadians and 
 Indians, making a total of 180, besides 290 prison- 
 ers. The 24-gun ship was burned, her guns taken 
 away, and the Gloucester sailed back to Sackett's 
 Harbor with the fleet. Many military and naval 
 stores were destroyed, and much more shipped to 
 the Harbor. The great fault that the British had 
 committed was in letting the defences of so impor- 
 tant a place remain so poor, and the force in it so 
 small. It was impossible to resist very long when 
 Pike's troops were landed, and the fleet in position. 
 On the other hand, the Americans did the work in 
 good style; the schooners were finely handled, firing 
 with great precision and completely covering the 
 troops, who, in turn, were disembarked and brought 
 into action very handsomely. 
 
 After being detained in York a week by bad 
 weather the squadron got out, and for the next 
 fortnight was employed in conveying troops and 
 stores to General Dearborn. Then it was deter- 
 mined to make an attack on Fort George, where the 
 British General Vincent was stationed with from 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1813. 
 ^ James, " Military Occurrences" (Lontloii, 1818) vol. i, p. 151. 
 ^ Lossing's " Field-Bookof the War of l8i2," p. 581. The accounts 
 vary somewhat. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 23I 
 
 1,000' to 1,800" regulars, 600 militia, and about 
 100 Indians. The American troops numbered 
 about 4,500, practically under the command of Col- 
 onel Scott. On May 26th Commodore Chauncy 
 carefully reconnoitred the place to be attacked, and 
 in the night made soundings along the coast, and 
 laid buoys so as to direct the small vessels, who 
 were to do the fighting. At 3 A. M. on the 27th the 
 signal was made to weigh, the heavy land artillery 
 being on the Madison, and the other troops on the 
 Oneida, the Lady of the Lake, and in batteaux, 
 many of which had been captured at York. The 
 Julia, Growler, and Ontario moved in and attacked 
 a battery near the light-house, opening a cross-fire 
 which silenced it. The troops were to be disem- 
 barked farther along the lake, near a battery of one 
 long 24, managed by Canadian militia. The Con- 
 quest and Tompkins swept in under fire to this bat- 
 tery, and in 10 minutes killed or drove off the ar- 
 tillerymen, who left the gun spiked, and then 
 opened on the British. " The American ships with 
 their heavy discharges of round and grape too well 
 succeeded in thinning the British ranks." ^ Mean- 
 while the troop-boats, under Captain Perry and 
 Colonel Scott dashed in, completely covered by a 
 heavy fire of grape directed point-blank at the foe 
 by the Hamilton, Scourge, and Asp. " The fire from 
 the American shipping committed dreadful havoc 
 among the British, and rendered their efforts to op- 
 pose the landing of the enemy ineffectual." ' Col- 
 onel Scott's troops, thus protected, made good their 
 landing and met the British regulars ; but the latter 
 
 'James, " Military Occurrences," i, p. 151. " Lossing, 596. 
 
 ^ James, "Military Occurrences," i, p. 151. *Zoc. at. 
 
232 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 were so terribly cut up by the tremendous dis- 
 charges of grape and canister from the schooners, 
 that in spite of their gallantry and discipline they 
 were obliged to retreat, blowing up and abandoning 
 the fort. One sailor was killed and two wounded' ; 
 seventeen soldiers were killed and forty-five 
 wounded " ; making the total American loss sixty- 
 five. Of the British regulars 52 were killed, 44 
 wounded, and 262 " wounded and missing," ' in 
 addition to about forty Canadians and Indians hors 
 de combat and nearly 500 militia captured ; so that 
 in this very brilliant affair the assailants suffered 
 hardly more than a fifth of the loss in killed and 
 wounded that the assailed did ; which must be 
 attributed to the care with which Chauncy had re- 
 connoitred the ground and prepared the attack, the 
 excellent handling of the schooners, and the exceed- 
 ingly destructive nature of their fire. The British 
 batteries were very weak, and, moreover, badly 
 served. Their regular troops fought excellently ; it 
 was impossible for them to stand against the fire of 
 the schooners, which should have been engaged by 
 the batteries on shore ; and they were too weak in 
 numbers to permit the American army to land and 
 then attack it when away from the boats. The 
 Americans were greatly superior in force, and yet 
 deserve very much credit for achieving their object 
 so quickly, with such slight loss to themselves, and 
 at such a heavy cost to the foe. The effect of the 
 victory was most important, the British evacuating 
 the whole Niagara frontier, and leaving the river in 
 complete possession of the Americans for the time 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Chauncy, May 2g, 1813. 
 '' Letter of General Dearborn, May 27, 1813. 
 ' Letter of Brig.-Gen. Vincent, May 28, 1813. 
 
NAVAL WAR QF l8l2. 233 
 
 being. This offered the opportunity for despatch- 
 ing Captain Perry up above the falls to take out 
 one captured brig (the Caledonia) and four pur- 
 chased schooners, which had been lying in the 
 river unable to get past the British batteries into 
 Lake Erie. These five vessels were now carried 
 into that lake, being tracked up against the current 
 by oxen, to become a most important addition to 
 the American force upon it. 
 
 While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at 
 the west end of the lake the Wolfe, 24, was launched 
 and equipped at Kingston, making the British force 
 on the lake superior to that of the Americans. 
 Immediately Sir George Prevost, and Sir James 
 Lucas Yeo, the commanders-in-chief of the land and 
 water forces in the Canadas, decided to strike a 
 blow at Sackett's Harbor and destroy the General 
 Pike, 28, thus securing to themselves the superiority 
 for the rest of the season. Accordingly they em- 
 barked on May 27th, in the Wolfe, Royal George, 
 Moira, Prince Regent, Simco, and Seneca, with a 
 large number of gun-boats, barges, and batteaux ; 
 and on the next day saw and attacked a brigade of 
 19 boats transporting troops to Sackett's Harbor, 
 under command of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelve 
 boats were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in them 
 captured ; but Lieutenant Aspinwall and 100 men 
 succeeded in reaching the Harbor, bringing up the 
 total number of regulars there to 500 men, General 
 Brown having been summoned to take the chief 
 command. About 400 militia also came in, but 
 were of no earthly service. There were, however, 
 200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel Mills, who 
 could be relied on. The defences were miserably in- 
 
234 NAVAL WAR OF t8i2, 
 
 adequate, consisting of a battery of one long gun, 
 and a block-house. 
 
 On the 29th Sir George Prevost and 800 regulars 
 landed, being covered by the gun-boats under Sir 
 James Lucas Yeo. The American militia fled at 
 once, but the regulars and volunteers held their 
 ground in and around the block-house. "At this 
 point the further energies of the [British] troops 
 became unavailing. The [American] block-house 
 and stockade could not be carried by assault nor re- 
 duced by field-pieces, had we been provided with 
 them ; the fire of the gun-boats proved insufficient 
 to attain that end ; light and adverse winds con- 
 tinued, and our larger vessels were still far off.'" 
 The British reembarked precipitately. The Ameri- 
 can loss amounted to 23 killed and 114 wounded; 
 that of the British to 52 killed and 211 wounded,' 
 most of the latter being taken prisoners. During 
 the fight some of the frightened Americans set fire 
 to the store-houses, the Pike and the Gloucester ; 
 the former were consumed, but the flames were ex- 
 tinguished before they did any damage to either of 
 the vessels. This attack differed especially from 
 those on Fort George and York, in that the attack- 
 ing force was relatively much weaker; still it ought 
 to have been successful. But Sir George could not 
 compare as a leader with Col. Scott or Gen. Pike ; 
 and Sir James did not handle the gun-boats by any 
 means as well as the Americans did their schooners 
 in similar attacks. The admirers of Sir James lay 
 the blame on Sir George, and vice versa ; but in 
 reality neither seems to have done particularly well. 
 
 ■ Letter of Adj. -Gen. Baynes, May 30, 1813. 
 " James, " Military Occurrences," p. 173. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 235 
 
 At any rate the affair wqs the reverse of creditable 
 to the British. 
 
 The British squadron returned to Kingston, and 
 Chauncy, having heard that they were out, came 
 down the lake and went into port about June 2d. 
 So far the Americans had had all the success, and 
 had controlled the lake ; but now Yeo's force was 
 too formidable to be encountered until the Pike was 
 built, and the supremacy passed undisputed into 
 his hands, while Chauncy lay in Sackett's Harbor. 
 Of course with the Pike soon to be built, Yeo's un- 
 contested superiority could be of but short dura- 
 tion ; but he used his time most actively. He 
 sailed from Kingston on the 3d of June, to coop- 
 erate with the British army at the head of the 
 lake, and intercept all supplies going to the Amer- 
 icans. On the 8th he discovered a small camp of the 
 latter near Forty Mile Creek, and attacked it with 
 the Beresford, Sydney Smith, and gun-boats, oblig- 
 ing the Americans to leave their camp, while their 
 equipages, provisions, stores, and batteaux fell into 
 the hands of the British, whose troops occupied the 
 post, thus assisting in the series of engagements 
 which ended in the humiliating repulse of Gener.il 
 Wilkinson's expedition into Canada. On the 13th 
 two schooners and some boats bringing supplies to 
 the- Americans were captured, and on the i6th a 
 depot of provisions at the Genesee River shared the 
 same fate. On the 19th a party of British soldiers 
 were landed by the fleet at Great Sodas, and took 
 off 600 barrels of flour. Yeo then returned to 
 Kingston, where he anchored on the 27th, having 
 done good service in assisting the land forces.' As a 
 
 ' Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June 29, 1813. 
 
236 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 small compensation, on the i8th of the same month 
 the Lady of the Lake, Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy, 
 captured off Presqu' Isle the British schooner Lady 
 Murray, containing i ensign, 15 soldiers, and 6 
 sailors, together with stores and ammunition.' 
 
 During the early part of July neither squadron 
 put out in force ; although on the first of the month 
 Commodore Yeo made an abortive attempt to sur- 
 prise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it when 
 it was discovered. Meanwhile the Americans 
 were building a new schooner, the Sylph, and the 
 formidable corvette Pike was made ready to sail by 
 July 2ist. On the same day the entire American 
 squadron, or fleet, sailed up to the head of the lake, 
 and reached Niagara on the 27th. Here Col. Scott 
 and some of his regulars were embarked, and on the 
 30th a descent was made upon York, where 1 1 trans- 
 ports were destroyed, 5 cannon, a quantity of flour, 
 and some ammunition carried off, and the barracks 
 burned. On the 3d of August the troops were dis- 
 embarked at the Niagara, and 1 1 1 officers and men 
 were sent up to join Perry on Lake Erie. As this 
 left the squadron much deranged 150 militia were 
 subsequently lent it by General Boyd, but they 
 proved of no assistance (beyond swelling the num- 
 ber of men Yeo captured in the Growler and Julia 
 from 70 individuals to 80), and were again landed. 
 
 Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from 
 Kingston on Aug. 2d, and on the 7th the two fleets 
 for the first time came in sight of one another, the 
 Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, the British 
 six miles to windward, in the W. N. W. Chauncy 's 
 
 ' Letter of Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy to Com. Chauncy, June 18, 
 1813. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 237 
 
 squadron contained one corvette, one ship sloop, one 
 brig sloop, and ten schooners, manned by about 965 
 men, and throwing at a broadside 1,390 lbs. of shot, 
 nearly 800 of which were from long guns. Yeo's in- 
 cluded two ship sloops, two brig sloops, and two 
 schooners, manned by 770 men, and throwing at a 
 broadside 1,374 lbs., but 180 being from long guns. 
 But Yeo's vessels were all built with bulwarks, while 
 ten of Chauncy's had none ; and, moreover, his vessels 
 could all sail and manoeuvre together, while, as al- 
 ready remarked, one half of the American fleet spent 
 a large part of its time towing the other half. The 
 Pike would at ordinary range be a match for the 
 Wolfe and Melville together ; yet in actual weight of 
 metal she threw less than the former ship alone. In 
 calm weather the long guns of the American 
 schooners gave them a great advantage ; in rough 
 weather they could not be used at all. Still, on the 
 whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo was advanc- 
 ing to attack a superior fleet. 
 
 All through the day of the 7th the wind blew 
 light and variable, and the two squadrons went 
 through a series of manoeuvres, nominally to bring 
 on an action. As each side flatly contradicts the 
 other it is hard to tell precisely what the manoeuvres 
 were ; each captain says the other avoided him and 
 that he made all sail in chase. At any rate it was 
 just the weather for Chauncy to engage in. 
 
 That night the wind came out squally ; and about 
 I A. M. on the morning of the 8th a heavy gust struck 
 the Hamilton and Scourge, forcing them to careen 
 over till the heavy guns broke loose, and they 
 foundered, but 16 men escaping, — which accident 
 did not open a particularly cheerful prospect to 
 
238 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 the remainder of the schooners. Chauncy's force 
 was, by this accident, reduced to a numerical 
 equality with Yeo's, having perhaps a hundred 
 more men,' and throwing 144 lbs. less shot at a 
 broadside. AH through the two succeeding days 
 the same manoeuvring went on ; the question as to 
 which avoided the fight is simply one of veracity 
 between the two commanders, and of course each 
 side, to the end of time, will believe its own leader. 
 But it is not of the least consequence, as neither 
 accomplished any thing. 
 
 On the loth the same tedious evolutions were 
 continued, but at 7 P. M. the two squadrons were 
 tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward, the 
 breeze being fresh from the S. W. Commodore 
 Chauncy formed his force in two lines on the port 
 tack, while Commodore Yeo approached from be- 
 hind and to windward, in single column, on the same 
 tack. Commodore Chauncy's weather line was 
 formed of the Julia, Growler, Pert, Asp, Ontario, 
 and American, in that order, and the lee line of the 
 Pike, Oneida, Madison, Tompkins, and Conquest. 
 Chauncy formed his weather line of the smaller ves- 
 sels, directing them, when the British should en- 
 gage, to edge away and form to leeward of the 
 second line, expecting that Sir James would follow 
 them down. At 1 1 the weather line opened fire at 
 very long range; at 11. 15 it was returned, and the 
 
 ' This estimate as to men is a mere balancing of probabilities. If 
 James underestimates the British force on Ontario as much as he has 
 on Erie and Champlain, Yeo had as many men as his opponent. 
 Chauncy, in one of his letters (preserved with the other manuscript 
 letters in the Naval Archives), says; " I enclose the muster-rolls of 
 all my ships," but I have not been able to find them, and in any 
 event the complements were continually changing completely. The 
 point is not important, as each side certainly had plenty of men on 
 this occasion. 
 
/^ 
 
 o en « iH ^ 
 
 
 
 -S S 5 S 1 
 
 g 
 
 
 sa 
 
 Sd ti -t; o o 
 
 o 
 
 
 04 
 
 « o D.ja S 
 
 a> 
 
 hown Just 
 up ; the d 
 e vessels ke 
 r positions s 
 •wUr bad t 
 
 
 3 
 
 are s 
 bore 
 rses thi 
 te thei 
 ,d Gn 
 y'slee 
 
 W (U -3 rt 5 
 
 u 
 
 .& c o .H « 
 
 a 
 
 ^ S 5 S o 
 
 3 
 
 ^ t 
 
 -1 
 
 " .5 
 
 l-S S5 
 
 13 S. 
 
 239 
 
 i 
 
 § 
 
240 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 action became general and harmless; at II.30 the; 
 weather line bore up and passed to leeward, except 
 the Julia and Growler, which tacked. The Brit- 
 ish ships kept their luff and cut off the two that 
 had tacked ; while Commodore Chauncy's lee hne 
 " edged away two points, to lead the enemy down, 
 not only to engage him to more advantage, but to 
 lead him from the Julia and Growler." ' Of course 
 the enemy did not come down, and the Julia and 
 Growler were not saved. Yeo kept on till he had 
 cut off the two schooners, fired an ineffectual broad- 
 side at the other ships, and tacked after the Growler 
 and Julia. Then, when too late, Chauncy tacked 
 also, and stood after him. The schooners, mean- 
 while, kept clawing to windward till they were 
 overtaken, and, after making a fruitless effort to run 
 the gauntlet through the enemy's squadron by put- 
 ting before the wind, were captured. Yeo's ac- 
 count is simple : " Came within gunshot of Pike and 
 Madison, when they immediately bore up, fired their 
 stern-chase guns, and made all sail for Niagara, leav- 
 ing two of their schooners astern, which we capt- 
 ured." ° The British had acted faultlessly, and the 
 honor and profit gained by the encounter rested en- 
 tirely with them. On the contrary, neither Chauncy 
 nor his subordinates showed to advantage. 
 
 Cooper says that the line of battle was " sin- 
 gularly well adapted to draw the enemy down," 
 and "admirable for its advantages and ingenuity." 
 In the first place it is an open question whether 
 the enemy needed drawing down ; on this occasion 
 he advanced boldly enough. The formation may 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy, Aug. 13, 1813. 
 ° Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, Aug. 10, 1813. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 24I 
 
 have been ingenious, but it was the reverse of ad- 
 vantageous. It would have been far better to have 
 had the strongest vessels to windward, and the 
 schooners, with their long guns, to leeward, where 
 they would not be exposed to capture by any 
 accident happening to them. Moreover, it does 
 not speak well for the discipline of the fleet, that 
 two commanders should have directl\- disobeyed 
 orders. And when the two schooners did tack, 
 and it was evident that Sir James would cut 
 them ofi, it was an extraordinary proceeding for 
 Chauncy to " edge away two points * * * 
 to lead the enemy from the Growler and Julia." 
 It is certainly a novel principle, that if part of a 
 force is surrounded the true way to rescue it is to 
 run away with the balance, in hopes that the enemy 
 will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, Sir 
 James would have been placed between two fires, 
 and it would have been impossible for him to capt- 
 ure the schooners. As it was, the British com- 
 mander had attacked a superior force in weather 
 that just suited it, and yet had captured two of its 
 vessels withour suffering any injury beyond a few 
 shot holes in the sails. The action, however, was in 
 no way decisive. All next day, the nth, the fleets 
 were in sight of one another, the British to wind- 
 ward, but neither attempted to renew the engage- 
 ment. The wind grew heavier, and .the villainous 
 little American schooners showed such strong ten- 
 dencies to upset, that two had to run into Niagara 
 Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran down 
 the lake to Sackett's Harbor, which he reached on 
 the 13th, provisioned his squadron for five weeks, 
 and that same evening proceeded up the lake again. 
 
242 KAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 The advantage in this action had been entirely 
 with the British, but it is simple nonsense to say, 
 as one British historian does, that " on Lake Onta- 
 rio, therefore, we at last secured a decisive predom- 
 inance, which we maintained until the end of the 
 war." ' This " decisive " battle left the Americans 
 just as much in command of the lake as the Brit- 
 ish ; and even this very questionable " predomi- 
 nance " lasted but six weeks, after which the Brit- 
 ish squadron was blockaded in port most of the 
 time. The action has a parallel in that fought on 
 the 22d of July, 1805, by Sir Robert Calder's fleet 
 of 15 sail of the line against the Franco-Spanish 
 fleet of 20 sail of the line, under M. Villeneuve." 
 The two fleets engaged in a fogi, and the English 
 captured two ships, when both sides drew off, and 
 remained in sight of each other the next day with- 
 out either renewing the action. " A victory there- 
 fore it was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not 
 a ' decisive ' nor a ' brilliant ' victory." ' This is ex- 
 actly the criticism that should be passed on Sir 
 James Lucas Yeo's action of the loth of August. 
 
 From the 13th of August to the loth of Septem- 
 ber both fleets were on the lake most of the time, 
 each commodore stoutly maintaining that he was 
 chasing the other ; and each expressing in his let- 
 
 ' " History of the British Navy," by Charles Duke Yonge (London, 
 1866), vol. iii, p. 24. It is apparently not a work of any authority, 
 but I quote it as showing probably the general feeling of British 
 writers about the action and its results, which can only proceed from 
 extreme partizanship and ignorance of the subject. 
 
 ' " Batailles Navales de la France," par O. Troude, iii, 352, It 
 .seems rather ridiculous to compare these lake actions, fought between 
 small flotillas, vviih ihe gigantic contests which the huge fleets of 
 Europe waged in contending for the supremacy of the ocean ; but 
 the difference is one of degree and not of kind, and they serve well 
 enough for purposes of illustration or comparison. 
 
 "James' "Naval History," iv, 14. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 243 
 
 ters his surprise and disgust that his opponent 
 should be afraid of meeting him " though so much 
 superior in force." The facts are of course diffi- 
 cult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that Yeo 
 was determined to engage in heavy, and Chauncy 
 in light, weather ; and that the party to leeward 
 generally made off. The Americans had been re-in- 
 forced by the Sylph schooner, of 300 tons and 70 
 men, carrying four long 32's on pivots, and six long 
 6's. Theoretically her armament would make her 
 formidable ; but practically her guns were so 
 crowded as to be of little use, and the next year she 
 was converted into a brig, mounting 24-pound car- 
 ronades. 
 
 On the I ith of September a partial engagement, 
 at very long range, in light weather, occurred near 
 the mouth of the Genesee River ; the Americans 
 suffered no loss whatever, while the British had one 
 midshipman and three seamen killed and seven 
 wounded, and afterward ran into Amherst Bay. 
 One of their brigs, the Melville, received a shot sa 
 far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns 
 had to be run in on one side and out on the other. 
 Chauncy describes it as a running fight of 3J hours, 
 the enemy then escaping into Amherst Bay.' James 
 (p. 38) says that " At sunset a breeze sprang up 
 from the westward, when Sir James steered for the 
 American fleet ; but the American commodore 
 avoided a close action, and thus the affair ended." 
 This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness ; 
 his account is supposed to be taken from Commo- 
 dore Yeo's letter," which says : " At sunset a breeze 
 
 ' I.etier to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 13, 1813. 
 ■■'Letter to Admiral Warren, Sept. 12, 1S13. 
 
244 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 sprang up from the westward, when I steered for 
 the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy 
 could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged 
 to meet us on equal terms. This, however, he 
 carefully avoided doing." In other words Yeo did 
 not steer for but away from Chauncy. Both sides 
 admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, 
 and it is only a question as to whether Chauncy fol- 
 lowed him or not. Of course in such light weather 
 Chauncy's long guns gave him a great advantage. 
 He had present lo vessels ; the Pike, Madison, 
 Oneida, Sylph, Tompkins, Conquest, Ontario, Pert, 
 American, and Asp, throwing 1,288 lbs. of shot, with 
 a total of 98 guns. Yeo had 92 guns, throwing at a 
 broadside 1,374 lbs. Nevertheless, Chauncy told 
 but part of the truth in writing as he did: " I was 
 much disappointed at Sir James refusing to fight 
 me, as he was so much superior in point of force, 
 both in guns and men, having upward of 20 guns 
 more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of 
 shot." His inferiority in long guns placed Yeo at 
 a great disadvantage in such a very light wind ; but 
 in his letter he makes a marvellous admission 
 of how little able he was to make good use of even 
 what he had. He says : " I found it impossible to 
 bring them to close action. We remained in this 
 mortifying situation five hours, having only six guns 
 in all the squadron that would reach the enemy 
 (not a carronade being fired)." Now according to 
 James himself (" Naval Occurrences," p. 297) he had 
 in his squadron 2 long 24's, 13 long i8's, 2 long 
 12's, and 3 long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours, at 
 very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof 
 of culpable incompetency on his part that he did 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 245 
 
 not think of doing what Elliott and Perry did in 
 similar circumstances on Lake Erie — substitute all 
 his long guns for some of the carronades on the 
 engaged side. Chauncy could place in broadside 7 
 long 32's, 18 long 24's, 4 long 12's, 8 long 6's ; so he 
 could oppose 37 long guns, throwing 752 lbs. of 
 shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing 333 lbs. of 
 shot. The odds were thus more than two to one 
 against the British in any case ; and their com- 
 mander's lack of resource made them still greater. 
 But it proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive 
 results. 
 
 The two squadrons did not come in contact again 
 till on the 28th, in York Bay. The Americans had 
 the weather-gage, the wind being fresh from the 
 east. Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake, 
 while Chauncy steered directly for his centre. 
 When the squadrons were still a league apart the 
 British formed on the port tack, with their heavy 
 vessels ahead ; the Americans got on the same tack 
 and edged down toward them, the Pike ahead, tow- 
 ing the Asp ; the Tompkins, under Lieut. Bolton 
 Finch, next ; the Madison next, being much re- 
 tarded by having a schooner in tow ; then the Sylph, 
 with another schooner in tow, the Oneida, and the 
 two other schooners. The British, fearing their 
 sternmost vessels would be cut off, at 12.10 came 
 round on the starboard tack, beginning with the 
 Wolfe, Commodore Yeo, and Royal George, Captain 
 William Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of 
 the line. They opened with their starboard guns as 
 soon as they came round. When the Pike was 
 a-beam of the Wolfe, which was past the centre of 
 the British line, the Americans bore up in succes- 
 sion for their centre. 
 
246 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 The Madison was far back, and so was the Sylph 
 neither having cast off their tows ; so the whole 
 brunt of the action fell on the Pike, Asp, and Tomp- 
 kins. The latter kept up a most gallant and spirited 
 fire till her foremast was shot away. But already 
 the Pike had shot away the Wolfe's main-top-mast 
 and main-yard, and inflicted so heavy a loss upon 
 
 i 
 
 TOMP'tCI/tS 
 
 PIKE 
 
 ROYAL CEORGE 
 
 her that Commodore Yeo, not very heroically, put 
 dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas hc 
 could on her forward spars, and she ran completely 
 past all her own vessels, who of course crowded sail 
 after her. The retreat of the commodore was most 
 ably covered by the Royal George, under Captain 
 Mulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 247 
 
 officer on the lake. He luffed up across the com- 
 modore's stern, and delivered broadsides in a man- 
 ner that won the admiration even of his foes. The 
 Madison and Sylph, having the schooners in tow, 
 could not overtake the British ships, though the 
 Sylph opened a distant fire ; the Pike kept on after 
 them, but did not cast off the Asp, and so did not 
 gain; and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished,' 
 when the enemy were running into the entirely 
 undefended port of Burlington Bay, whence escape 
 would have been impossible. The Tompkins had 
 lost her foremast, and the Pike her foretop-gallant 
 mast, with her bowsprit and main-mast wounded ; 
 and of her crew five men were killed or wounded, 
 almost all by the guns of the Royal George. These 
 were the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's 
 lire, but the Pike's starboard bow-chaser burst, 
 killing or wounding 22 men, besides blowing up the 
 top-gallant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun 
 could not be used. Among the British ships, the 
 Wolfe lost her main-top-mast, mizzen-top-mast, and 
 main-yard, and the Royal George her foretop-mast ; 
 both suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded, 
 according to the report of the British officers cap- 
 tured in the transports a few days afterward. 
 
 As already mentioned, the British authorities no 
 longer published accounts of their defeats, so Com- 
 modore Yeo's report on the action was not made 
 public. Brenton merely alludes to it as follows 
 (vol. ii, p. 503) : " The action of the 28th of Sep- 
 tember, 1813, in which Sir James Yeo in the Wolfe 
 had his main- and mizzen-top-masts shot away, and 
 was obliged to put before the wind, gave Mulcaster 
 
 ^ Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Sept. 28, 1813. 
 
248 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 an opportunity of displaying a trait of valor and 
 seamanship which elicited the admiration of friends 
 and foes, when he gallantly placed himself between 
 his disabled commodore and a superior enemy." 
 James speaks in the vaguest terms. He first says, 
 " Commodore Chauncy, having the weather-gage, 
 kept his favorite distance," which he did because 
 Commodore Yeo iied so fast that he could not be over- 
 taken ; then James mentions the injuries the Wolfe 
 received, and says that " it was these and not, as Mr. 
 Clark says, ' a manoeuvre of the commodore's ' that 
 threw the British in confusion." In other words, it 
 was the commodore's shot and not his manoeuvring 
 that threw the British into confusion — a very futile 
 distinction. Next he says that " Commodore 
 Chauncy would not venture within carronade 
 range," whereas he was within carronade range of 
 the Wolfe and Royal George, but the latter did not 
 wait for the Madison and Oneida to get within range 
 with their carronades The rest of his article is 
 taken up with exposing the absurdities of some of 
 the American writings, miscalled histories, which 
 appeared at the close of the war. His criticisms on 
 these are very just, but afford a funny instance of 
 the pot calling the kettle black. This much is clear, 
 that the British were beaten and forced to flee, 
 when but part of the American force was engaged. 
 But in good weather the American force was so 
 superior that being beaten would have been no dis- 
 grace to Yeo, had it not been for the claims ad- 
 vanced both by himself and his friends, that on the 
 whole he was victorious over Chauncy. The Wolfe 
 made any thing but an obstinate fight, leaving 
 almost all the work to the gallant Mulcaster, in the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 249 
 
 Royal George, who shares with Lieutenant Finch of 
 the Tompkins most of the glory of the day. The 
 battle, if such it may be called, completely estab- 
 lished Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo spending most of 
 the remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston. 
 So Chauncy gained a victory which established his 
 control over the lakes ; and, moreover, he gained it 
 by fighting in succession, almost single-handed, the 
 two heaviest ships of the enemy. But gaining the 
 victory was only what should have been expected 
 from a superior force. The question is, did Chauncy 
 use his force to the best advantage? And it can 
 not be said that he did. When the enemy bore up 
 it was a great mistake not to cast off the schooners 
 which were being towed. They were small craft, 
 not of much use in the fight, and they entirely pre- 
 vented the Madison from taking any part in the 
 contest, and kept the Sylph at a great distance ; and 
 by keeping the Asp in tow the Pike, which sailed 
 faster than any of Yeo's ships, was distanced by 
 them. Had she left the Asp behind and run in to 
 engage the Royal George she could have mastered, 
 or at any rate disabled, her; and had the swift 
 Madison cast off her tow she could also have taken 
 an effective part in the engagement. If the Pike 
 could put the British to flight almost single-handed, 
 how much more could she not have done when 
 assisted by the Madison and Oneida ? The cardinal 
 error, however, was made in discontinuing the 
 chase. The British were in an almost open road- 
 stead, from which they could not possibly escape. 
 Commodore Chauncy was afraid that the wind 
 would come up to blow a gale, and both fleets 
 would be thrown ashore ; and, moreover, he ex- 
 
250 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 pected to be able to keep a watch over the enemy, 
 and to attack him at a more suitable time. But he 
 utterly failed in this last ; and had the American 
 squadron cast off their tows and gone boldly in, they 
 certainly ought to have been able to destroy or 
 capture the entire British force before a gale could 
 blow up. Chauncy would have done well to keep in 
 mind the old adage, so peculiarly applicable to 
 naval affairs: " L' audace ! toujours 1' audace ! at 
 encore 1' audace ! " Whether the fault was his or 
 that of his subordinates, it is certain that while the 
 victory of the 28th of September definitely settled 
 the supremacy of the lake in favor of the Americans, 
 yet this victory was by no means so decided as 
 it should have been, taking into account his supe- 
 riority in force and advantage in position, and the 
 somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe. 
 
 Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted 
 till the evening of the 31st. There was no longer 
 any apprehension of molestation from the British, 
 so the troop transports were sent down the lake by 
 themselves, while the squadron remained to watch 
 Yeo. On Oct. 2d he was chased, but escaped by 
 his better sailing; and next day false information 
 induced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded him and 
 passed down the lake, and he accordingly made 
 sail in the direction of his supposed flight. On the 
 Sth, at 3 P. M., while near the False Ducks, seven ves- 
 sels were made out ahead, which proved to be Brit- 
 ish gun-boats, engaged in transporting troops. All 
 sails was made after them; one was burned, another 
 escaped, and five were captured, the Mary, Drum- 
 mond, Lady Gore, Confiance, and Hamilton^ — the 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Oct. 8, 1813. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 251 
 
 two latter being the rechristened Julia and Growler. 
 Each gun-vessel had from one to three guns, and 
 they had aboard in all 264 men, including seven 
 naval (three royal and four provincial) and ten mili- 
 tary ofificers. These prisoners stated that in the 
 action of the 28th the Wolfe and Royal George had 
 lost very heavily. 
 
 After this Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded 
 there by Chauncy for most of the time ; on Nov. 
 lOth he came out and was at once chased back into 
 port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for the rest of 
 the season entirely undisturbed. Accordingly, 
 Chauncy was able to convert his small schooners 
 into transports. On the 17th these transports were 
 used to convey 1,100 men of the army of General 
 Harrison from the mouth of the Genesee to 
 Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy blockaded Yeo in 
 Kingston. The duty of transporting troops and 
 stores went on till the 27th, when every thing had 
 been accomplished ; and a day or two afterward 
 navigation closed. 
 
 As between the Americans and British, the suc- 
 cess of the season was greatly in favor of the former. 
 They had uncontested control over the lake from 
 April 19th to June 3d, and from Sept. 28th to 
 Nov. 29th, in all 107 days ; while their foes only 
 held it from June 3d to July 21st, or for 48 days; 
 and from that date to Sept. 28th, for 69 days, the 
 two sides were contending for the mastery. York 
 and Fort George had been taken, while the attack 
 on Sackett's Harbor was repulsed. The Americans 
 lost but two schooners, both of which were 
 recaptured ; while the British had one 24-gun-ship 
 nearly ready for launching destroyed, and one 10- 
 
252 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 gun brig taken, and the loss inflicted upon each 
 other in transports, gun-boats, store-houses, stores, 
 etc., was greatly in favor of the former. J Chauncy's 
 fleet, moreover, was able to co-operate with the army 
 for over twice the length of time Yeo's could (107 
 days to 4^). 
 
 It is more difficult to decide between the respec- 
 tive merits of the two commanders. We had shown 
 so much more energy than the Anglo-Canadians 
 that at the beginning of the year we had overtaken 
 them in the building race, and the two fleets were 
 about equally formidable. The Madison and Oneida 
 were not quite a match for the Royal George and 
 Sydney Smith (opposing 12 32-pound and 8 24-pound 
 carronades to 2 long 18's, i long 12, i 68-pound 
 and 13 32-pound carronades); and our ten gun- 
 schooners would hardly be considered very much 
 of an overmatch for the Melville, Moira, and Beres- 
 ford. Had Sir James Yeo been as bold and ener- 
 getic as Barclay or Mulcaster he would certainly 
 not have permitted the Americans, when the forces 
 were so equal, to hold uncontested sway over the 
 lake, and by reducing Fort George, to cause disaster 
 to the British land forces. It would certainly have 
 been better to risk a battle with equal forces, than 
 to wait till each fleet received an additional ship, 
 which rendered Cliauncy's squadron the superior by 
 just about the superiority of the Pike to the Wolfe. 
 Again, Yeo did not do particularly well in the re- 
 pulse before Sackett's Harbor ; in the skirmish ofT 
 Genesee rivei\ he showed a marked lack of resource ; 
 and in the action of the 28th of September (popularly 
 called the " Burlington Races " from the celerity 
 of his retreat) he evinced an amount of caution that 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 253 
 
 
 C 
 
 verged toward timidity jin allowing the entire brunt 
 of the fighting to fall on Muicaster in the Royal 
 George, a weaker ship than the Wolfe. On the 
 other hand, he gave able co-operation to the army 
 while he possessed control of the lake ; he made a 
 most gallant and successful attack on a superior 
 force on the loth of August ; and/for six weeks sub- 
 sequently by skilful manoeuvring lie prevented this 
 same superior force'-from.ac^uiring the uncontested 
 mastery. It was nc^dis^ace to be subseqiaently 
 blockaded ; but it is very ludicrous in his admirers 
 to think that he came out first best. 
 
 Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assistance 
 to the army all the while that he had control of the 
 water ; his attacks on York and Fort George were 
 managed with consummate skill and success, and on 
 the 28th of September he practically defeated the 
 opposing force with his own ship alone. Neverthe- 
 less he can by no means be said to have done the 
 best he could with the materials he had. His 
 stronger fleet was kept two months in check by a 
 weaker British fleet. When he first encountered the 
 foe, on August loth, he ought to have inflicted' 
 such a check upon him as would at least have con- 
 fined him to port and given the Americans imme- 
 diate superiority on the lake ; instead of which he 
 suffered a mortifying, although not at all disastrous, 
 defeat, which allowed the British to contest the 
 supremacy with him for six weeks longer. On the 
 28th of September, when he only gained a rather 
 barren victory, it was nothing but excessive caution 
 that prevented him from utterly destroying his foe. 
 Had Perry on that day commanded the American 
 fleet there would have been hardly a British ship 
 
254 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 left on Ontario. Chauncy was an average com- 
 mander ; and the balance of success inclined to the 
 side of the Americans only because they showed 
 ,i^reater energy and skill in shipbuilding, the crews 
 and commanders on both sides being very nearly 
 equal. 
 
 LAKE ERIE. 
 
 Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed com- 
 mand of Erie and the upper lakes, acting under 
 Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy he at 
 once began creating a naval force which should be 
 able to contend successfully with the foe. As al- 
 ready said, the latter in the beginning had exclusive 
 control of Lake Erie ; but the Americans had cap- 
 tured the Caledonia, brig, and purchased three 
 schooners, afterward named the Somers, Tigress, and 
 Ohio, and a sloop, the Trippe. These at first were 
 blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall of Fort 
 George and retreat of the British forces. Captain 
 Perry was enabled to get them out, tracking them 
 up against the current by the most arduous labor. 
 They ran up to Presque Isle (now called Erie), where 
 two 20-gun brigs were being constructed under the 
 directions of the indefatigable cap<"ain. Three other 
 schooners, the Ariel, Scorpion, and Porcupine, were 
 also built. 
 
 The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but 
 had a bar on which there was less than seven feet of 
 water. Hitherto this had prevented the enemy from 
 getting in ; now it prevented the two brigs from 
 getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay had 
 been appointed commander of the British forces on 
 Lake Erie ; and he was having built at Amherst- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 255 
 
 burg a 20-gun ship. Meanwhile he blockaded 
 Perry's force, and as the brigs could not cross the 
 bar with their guns in, or except in smooth water, 
 they of course could not do so in his presence. He 
 kept a close blockade for some time ; but on the 2d 
 of August he disappeared. Perry at once hurried 
 forward every thing ; and on the 4th, at 2 P. M., one 
 brig, the Lawrence, was towed to that point of the 
 bar where the water was deepest. Her guns were 
 whipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig 
 got over the bar by a hastily improvised " camel." 
 
 " Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were 
 hauled along-side, and the work of lifting the brig 
 proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of massive 
 timber had been run through the forward and after 
 ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's 
 edge, the ends of the timbers were blocked up, sup- 
 ported by these floating foundations. The plugs 
 were now put in the scows, and the water was 
 pumped out of them. By this process the brig was 
 lifted quite two feet, though when she was got on 
 the bar it was found that she still drew too much 
 water. It became necessary, in consequence, to 
 cover up every thing, sink the scows anew, and 
 block up the timbers afresh, This duty occupied 
 the whole night."' 
 
 Just as the Lawrence had passed the bar, at 8 
 A. M. on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too 
 late ; Captain Barclay exchanged a few shots with 
 the schooners and then drew off. The Niagara 
 crossed without difiSculty. There were still not 
 enough men to man the vessels, but a draft arrived 
 from Ontario, and many of the frontiersmen volun- 
 
 ' Cooper, ii, 389. Perry's letter of Aug. 5 th is very brief. 
 
256 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 teered, while soldiers also were sent on board. The 
 squadron sailed on the i8th in pursuit of the enemy, 
 whose ship was now ready. After cruising about 
 some time the Ohio was sent down the lake, and 
 the other ships went into Put-in Bay. On the 9th 
 of September Captain Barclay put out from Am- 
 herstburg, being so short of provisions that he felt 
 compelled to risk an action with the superior force 
 opposed. On the loth of September his squadron 
 was discovered from the mast-head of the Lawrence 
 in the northwest. Before going into details of the 
 action we will examine the force of the two squad- 
 rons, as the accounts vary considerably. 
 
 The tonnage of the British ships, as already 
 stated, we know exactly, they having been all care- 
 fully appraised and measured by the builder Mr. 
 Henry Eckford, and two sea-captains. We also 
 know the dimensions of the American ships. The 
 Lawrence and Niagara measured 480 tons apiece. 
 The Caledonia, brig, was about the size of the 
 Hunter, or 180 tons. The Tigress, Somers, and 
 Scorpion were subsequently captured by the foe and 
 were then said to measure, respectively, 96, 94, and 
 86 tons ; in which case they were larger than simi- 
 lar boats on Lake Ontario. The ^r2>/ was about 
 the size of the Hamilton ; the Porcupine and Trippe 
 about the size of the Asp and Pert. As for the guns, 
 Captain Barclay in his letter gives a complete ac- 
 count of those on board his squadron. He has also 
 given a complete account of the American guns, 
 which is most accurate, and, if any thing, underes- 
 timates them. At least Emmons in his " History " 
 gives the Trippe a long 32, while Barclay says she 
 had only a long 24 ; and Lossing in his " Field- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 257 
 
 Book" says (but I do not know on what authority) 
 that the Caledonia had 3 long 24's, while Barclay 
 gives her 2 long 24's and one 32-pound carronade ; 
 and that the Soviets had two long 32's, while Bar- 
 clay gives her one long 32 and one 24-pound carron- 
 ade. I shall take Barclay's account, which corre- 
 sponds with that of Emmons ; the only difference 
 being that Emmons puts a 24-pounder on the 
 Scorpion and a 32 on the Trippe, while Barclay re- 
 verses this. I shall also follow Emmons in giving 
 the Scorpion a 32-pound carronade instead of a 24. 
 It is more difficult to give the strength of the re- 
 spective crews. James says the Americans had 580, 
 all " picked men." They were just as much picked 
 men as Barclay's were, and no more ; that is, the 
 ships had " scratch " crews. Lieutenant Emmons 
 gives Perry 490 men ; and Lossing says he " had 
 upon his muster-roll 490 names." In vol. xiv, p. 566, 
 of the American State Papers, is a list of the prize- 
 monies owing to each man (or to the survivors 
 of the killed), which gives a grand total of 532 
 men, including 136 on the Lawrence and 155 on the 
 Niagara, 45 of whom were volunteers — frontiers- 
 men. Deducting these we get 487 men, which is 
 pretty near Lieutenant Emmons' 490. Possibly 
 Lieutenant Emmons did not include these volun- 
 teers ; and it may be that some of the men whose 
 names were down on the prize list had been so sick 
 that they were left on shore. Thus Lieutenant 
 Yarnall testified before a Court of Inquiry in 1815, 
 that there were but 13 1 men and boys of every de- 
 scription on board the Lawrence in the action ; and 
 the Niagara was said to have had but 140. Lieu- 
 tenant Yarnall also said that " but 103 men on 
 
258 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 board the Lawrence were fit for duty" ; as Captain 
 Perry in his letter said that 31 were unfit for duty, 
 this would make a total of 134. So I shall follow 
 the prize-money list ; at any rate the difference in 
 number is so slight as to be immaterial. Of the 532 
 men whose names the list gives, 45 were volunteers, 
 or landsmen, from among the surrounding inhabi- 
 tants ; 158 were marines or soldiers (I do not know 
 which, as the list gives marines, soldiers, and pri- 
 vates, and it is impossible to tell which of the 
 two former heads include the last) ; and 329 were 
 officers, seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and super- 
 numeraries. Of the total number, there were on 
 *the day of action, according to Perry's report, 116 
 men unfit for duty, including 31 on board the Law- 
 rence, 28 on board the Niagara, and 57 on the small 
 vessels. 
 
 All the later American writers put the number 
 of men in Barclay's fleet precisely at " 502," but I 
 have not been able to find out the original au- 
 thority. James (" Naval Occurrences," p. 289) says 
 the British had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 
 85 Canadians, and 210 soldiers. But the letter of 
 Adjutant-General E. Bayne, Nov. 24, 1813, states 
 that there were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's 
 squadron, of whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, 
 and the balance (178) captured ; and James him- 
 self on a previous page (284) states that there were 
 102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels, not counting 
 the Detroit, and we know that Barclay originally 
 joined the squadron with 19 sailors from the 
 Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors 
 came up from the Dover. James gives at the end 
 of his " Naval Occurrences " some extracts from 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 259 
 
 the court-martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieut. 
 Thomas Stokes, of the Queen Cliarlotte, there testi- 
 fied that he had on board "between 120 and 130 
 men, officers and all together," of whom " 16 came 
 up from the Dover three days before." James, on 
 p. 284, says her crew already consisted of no men ; 
 adding these 16 gives us 126 (almost exactly " be- 
 tween 120 and 130"). Lieutenant Stokes also tes- 
 tified that the Detroit had more men on account of 
 being a larger and heavier vessel ; to give her 150 
 is perfectly safe, as her heavier guns and larger 
 size would at least need 24 men more than the 
 Queen Cliarlotte. James gives the Lady Prevost 
 y6, Hunter 39, Little Belt 15, and Chippcway 13 
 men, Canadians and soldiers, a total of 143 ; sup- 
 posing that the number of British sailors placed on 
 them was proportional to the amount placed on 
 board the Queen Cliarlotte, we could add 21. This 
 would make a grand total of 440 men, which must 
 certainly be near the truth. This number is cor- 
 roborated otherwise : General Bayne, as already 
 quoted, says that there were aboard 250 soldiers, of 
 whom 72 were killed or wounded. Barclay reports 
 a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must therefore have 
 been sailors or Canadians, and if the loss suffered 
 by these bore the same proportion to their whole 
 number as in the case of the soldiers, there ought 
 to have been 219 sailors and Canadians, making in 
 all 469 men. It can thus be said with certainty 
 that there were between 440 and 490 men aboard, 
 and I shall take the former number, though I have 
 no doubt that this is too small. But it is not a 
 point of very much importance, as the battle was 
 fought largely at long range, where the number of 
 
26o 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 men, provided there were plenty to handle the sails 
 and guns, did not much matter. The following 
 statement of the comparative force must therefore 
 be very nearly accurate : 
 
 perry's squadron. 
 
 Tolal 
 
 Crew Broad- 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rig. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Crew. 
 
 Lawrence, 
 
 brig 
 
 480 
 
 136 
 
 Niagara, 
 
 " 
 
 480 
 
 155 
 
 Caledonia, 
 
 •■ 
 
 I So 
 
 53' 
 
 Ariel, 
 
 schooner 
 
 112 
 
 36 
 
 Scorpion, 
 
 " 
 
 86 
 
 35 
 
 Somers , 
 
 " 
 
 94 
 
 30 
 
 Porcupine, 
 
 Tigress, 
 
 Trippe, 
 
 sloop 
 
 83 
 96 
 60 
 
 25 
 27 
 35J 
 
 fit for 
 Duty. 
 
 105 
 
 127 
 
 184 
 
 side: 
 lbs. 
 
 300 
 
 300 
 
 80 
 48 
 64 
 56 
 
 32 
 32 
 24 
 
 Armament. 
 
 2 long 12's 
 8 slioit 32's 
 
 I. 
 
 i2 long 12's 
 18 short 32's 
 ( 2 long 24's 
 ( I short 32 
 
 4 long 12's 
 i 1 " 32 
 j I short 32 
 i I long 24 
 ( I short 32 
 I long 32 
 I " 32 
 I ■' 24 
 
 9 ves.sels, 
 
 1,671 
 
 532 
 
 (416) 936 lbs. 
 
 During the action, however, the Lawrence and 
 Niagara each fought a long 12 instead of one of 
 the carronades on the engaged side, making a 
 broadside of 896 lbs., 288 lbs. being from long guns. 
 
 BARCLAY'S SQUADRON. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Detroit, 
 
 Queen Charlotte, 
 
 Rig. 
 
 ship 
 
 Tons. 
 
 490 
 
 400 
 
 Broadside; 
 Crew. lbs. 
 
 150 
 
 126 
 
 138 
 
 189 
 
 Armament. 
 
 1 long 18 
 
 2 ' ' 24's 
 6 " 12's 
 8 " 9's 
 I short 24 
 I '• 18 
 
 ( I long 12 
 ] 2 " 9's 
 ( 14 short 24's 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 261 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rig. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Crew. 
 
 Broadside; 
 lbs. 
 
 Armament. 
 
 Lady Prevost, 
 
 schooner 
 
 230 
 
 86 
 
 75 
 
 ^ I long 9 
 \ 2 "' 6's 
 ( 10 short 1 2's 
 4 long 6's 
 2 " 4's 
 
 2 " 2's 
 
 2 short 12's 
 
 Hunter^ 
 
 brig 
 
 80 
 
 45 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ChippcTvay, 
 
 schooner 
 
 70 
 
 15 
 
 9 
 
 I long 9 
 
 Little Belt, 
 
 sloop 
 
 90 
 
 18 
 
 18 
 
 ( I " 12 
 \ 2 •• 6's 
 
 6 vessels. 
 
 1,460 440 459 lbs. 
 
 These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 
 lbs., of which 195 were from long guns. 
 
 The superiority of the Americans in long-gun 
 metal was therefore nearly as three is to two, and in 
 carronade metal greater than two to one. The chief 
 fault to be found in the various American accounts 
 is that they sedulously conceal the comparative 
 weight of metal, while carefully specifying the 
 number of guns. Thus, Lossing says : " Barclay 
 had 35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed 
 greatly the advantage in action at a distance " ; 
 which he certainly did not. The tonnage of the 
 fleets is not so very important ; the above tables 
 are probably pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, 
 impossible to tell exactly the number of men in the 
 two crews. Barclay, almost certainly had more 
 than the 440 men I have given him, but in all like- 
 lihood some of them were unfit for duty, and the 
 number of his effectives was most probably some- 
 what less than Perry's. As the battle was fought 
 in such smooth water, and part of the time at long 
 range, this, as already said, does not much matter. 
 The Niagara might be considered a match for the 
 Detroit, and the Lawrence and Caledonia for the five 
 
262 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Other British vessels ; so the Americans were cer- 
 tainly very greatly superior in force. 
 
 At daylight on Sept. lOth Barclay's squadron 
 was discovered in the N. W., and Perry at once got 
 under weigh ; the wind soon shifted to the N. E., 
 giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being very 
 light. Barclay lay to in a close column, heading to 
 the S. W. in the following order : Cliippeway, Mas- 
 ter's Mate J. Campbell ; Detroit, Captain R. H. 
 Barclay ; Hunter, Lieutenant G. Bignell ; Queen 
 Charlotte, Captain R. Linnis ; Lady Frevost, Lieu- 
 tenant Edward Buchan ; and Little Belt, by whom 
 commanded is not said. Perry came down with 
 the wind on his port beam, and made the attack in 
 column ahead, obliquely. First in order came the 
 Ariel, Lieut. John H. Packet, and Scorpion, Sailing- 
 Master Stephen Champlin, both being on the weath- 
 er bow of the Lawrence, Captain O. H. Perry ; next 
 came the Caledonia, Lieut. Daniel Turner ; Niagara, 
 Captain Jesse D. Elliott; Seiners, Lieutenant A. 
 H. M. Conklin ; Porcupiiie, Acting Master George 
 Serrat ; Tigress, Sailing-Master Thomas C. Almy, 
 and Trippe, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup.' 
 
 As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the 
 American squadron approached the enemy. Perry's 
 straggling line formed an angle of about fifteen de- 
 grees with the more compact one of his foes. At 
 
 ' The accounts of the two commanders tally almost exactly. Bar- 
 clay's letter is a model of its kind for candor and generosity. Let- 
 ter of Captain R. H. Barclay to Sir James, Sept. 2, 1813 ; of Lieu- 
 tenant Inglis to Captain Barclay, Sept. loth ; of Captain Perry to 
 the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. loth and Sept. I3lh, and to General 
 Harrison, Sept. nth and Sept. 13th. I have relied mainly on Los- 
 sing's " Field-Book of the War of 1812 " (especially for the diagrams 
 furnished him by Commodore Champlin), on Commander Ward's 
 " Naval Tactics," p. 76, and on Cooper's "Naval History." Ex- 
 tracts from the court-martial on Captain Barclay are given in James' 
 " Naval Occurrences," Ixxxiii. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 263 
 
 11.45 '^he Detroit opened the action by a shot from 
 her long 24, which fell short; at 11.50 she fired a 
 second which went crashing through the Lawrence, 
 and was replied to by the Scorpion's long 32. At 
 11.55 the Lawrence,\^2Mvn^ shifted her port bow- 
 chaser, opened with both the long 12's, and at meridi- 
 an began with her carronades, but the shot from 
 the latter all fell short. At the same time the ac- 
 tion became general on both sides, though the rear- 
 most American vessels were almost beyond the 
 range of their own guns, and quite out of range of 
 the guns of their antagonists. Meanwhile the Law- 
 rence was already suffering considerably as she 
 bore down on the enemy. It was twenty min- 
 utes before she succeeded in getting within good 
 carronade range, and during that time the action 
 at the head of the line was between the long guns 
 of the Chippeway zxvd. Detroit, throwing 123 pounds, 
 and those of the Scorpion, Ariel, and Lawrence, 
 throwing 104 pounds. As the enemy's fire was 
 directed almost exclusively at the Lawrence she 
 suffered a great deal. The Caledonia, Niagara, and 
 Somers were meanwhile engaging, at long range, 
 the Hunter and Queen Charlotte, opposing from 
 their long guns 96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their 
 antagonists, while from a distance the three other 
 American gun-vessels engaged the Prevost and Lit- 
 tle Belt. By 12.20 the Lawrence had worked down 
 to close quarters, and at 12.30 the action was going 
 on with great fury between her and her antagonists, 
 within canister range. The raw and inexperienced 
 American crews committed the same fault the Brit- 
 ish so often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded 
 their carronades. In consequence, that of the Scor- 
 
264 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 pion upset down the hatchway in the middle of the 
 action, and the sides of the Detroit were dotted with 
 marks from shot that did not penetrate. One of 
 the Ariel's long 12's also burst. Barclay fought the 
 Detroit exceedingly well, her guns being most ex- 
 cellently aimed, though they actually had to be dis- 
 charged by flashing pistols at the touchholes, so de- 
 ficient was the ship's equipment. Meanwhile the 
 Caledonia came down too, but the Niagara was 
 wretchedly handled, Elliott keeping at a distance 
 which prevented the use either of his carronades or 
 of those of the Queen Charlotte, his antagonist ; the 
 latter, however, suffered greatly from the long guns 
 of the opposing schooners, and lost her gallant com- 
 mander. Captain Linnis, and first lieutenant, Mr. 
 Stokes, who were killed early in the action ; her 
 next in command. Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, 
 perceiving that he could do no good, passed the 
 Hunter and joined in the attack on the Lawrence, 
 at close quarters. The Niagara, the most efficient 
 and best-manned of the American vessels, was thus 
 almost kept out of the action by her captain's mis- 
 conduct. At the end of the line the fight went on 
 at long range between the Somers, Tigress, Porcupine, 
 and Trippe on one side, and Little Belt and Lady 
 Prcvost on the other; the Lady Prevost making a 
 very noble fight, although her 12-pound carronades 
 rendered her almost helpless against the long guns 
 of the Americans. She was greatly cut up, her 
 commander. Lieutenant Buchan, was dangerously, 
 and her acting first lieutenant, Mr. Roulette, se- 
 verely wounded, and she began falling gradually to 
 leeward. 
 
 The fighting at the head of the line was fierce and 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 265 
 
 bloody to an extraordinary degree. The Scorpion, 
 Ariel, Lawrence, and Caledonia, all of them handled 
 with the most determined courage, were opposed to 
 the Chippeway , Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, 
 which were fought to the full as bravely. At such 
 close quarters the two sides engaged on about equal 
 terms, the Americans being superior in weight of 
 metal, and inferior in number of men. But the Law- 
 rence had received such damage in working down as 
 to make the odds against Perry. On each side al- 
 most the whole fire was directed at the opposing 
 large vessel or vessels ; in consequence the Queen 
 Charlotte was almost disabled, and the Detroit was 
 also frightfully shattered, especially by the raking fire 
 of the gun-boats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Garland, 
 being mortally wounded, and Captain Barclay so se- 
 verely injured that he was oliged to quit the deck, 
 leaving his ship in the command of Lieutenant 
 George Inglis. But on board the Lawrence matters 
 had gon€ even worse, the combined fire of her adver- 
 saries having made the grimmest carnage on her 
 decks. Of the 103 men who were fit for duty when 
 she began the action, 83, or over four fifths, were 
 killed or wounded. The vessel was shallow, and the 
 ward-room, used as a cockpit, to which the wounded 
 were taken, was mostly above water, and the shot 
 came through it continually, killing and wounding 
 many men under the hands of the surgeon. 
 
 The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was 'three times 
 wounded, but kept to the deck through all ; the only 
 other lieutenant on board, Brooks, of the marines, 
 was mortally wounded. Every brace and bowline 
 was shot away, and the brig almos^ completely dis- 
 mantled ; her hull was shattered to pieces, many 
 
266 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 shot going completely through it, and the guns on 
 the engaged side were by degrees all dismounted. 
 Perry kept up the fight with splendid courage. As 
 the crew fell one by one, the commodore called 
 down through the skylight for one of the surgeon's 
 assistants ; and this call was repeated and obeyed 
 till none was left ; then he asked, " Can any of the 
 wounded pull a rope?" and three or four of them 
 crawled up on deck to lend a feeble hand in placing 
 the last guns.' Perry himself fired the last effective 
 heavy gun, assisted only by the purser and chaplain, 
 A man who did not possess his indomitable spirit 
 would have then struck. Instead, however, al- 
 though failing in the attack so far, Perry merely de- 
 termined to win by new methods, and remodelled 
 the line accordingly. Mr. Turner, in the Caledonia, 
 when ordered to close, had put his helm up, run 
 down on the opposing line, and engaged at very 
 short range, though the brig was absolutely without 
 quarters. The Niagara had thus become the next 
 in line astern of the Lawrence, and the sloop Trippe, 
 having passed the three schooners in front of her, 
 was next ahead. The Niagara now, having a 
 breeze, steered for the head of Barclay's line, pass- 
 ing over a quarter of a mile to windward of the 
 Lawrence, on her port beam. She was almost unin- 
 jured, having so far taken very little part in the 
 combat, and to her Perry shifted his flag. Leaping 
 into a row boat, with his brother and four seamen, 
 he rowed to the fresh brig, where he arrived at 2.30, 
 and at once sent Elliott astern to hurry up the three 
 schooners. The Trippe was now very near the Cale- 
 donia. The Laijurence, having but 14 sound men 
 left, struck her colors, but could not be taken pos- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 267 
 
 session of before the action re-commenced. She 
 drifted astern, the , Caledonia passing between her 
 and her foes. At 2.45, the schooners having closed 
 up, Perry, in his fresh vessel, bore up to break Bar- 
 clay's line. 
 
 The British ships had fought themselves to a 
 standstill. The Lady Prevost was crippled and 
 sagged to leeward, though ahead of the others. 
 The Detroit and Queen Charlotte were so disabled 
 that they could not effectually oppose fresh antag- 
 onists. There could thus be but little resistance to 
 Perry, as the Niagara stood down, and broke the 
 British line, firing her port guns into the Chippeway, 
 Little Belt, and Lady Prevost, and the starboard ones 
 into the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, raking 
 on both sides. Too disabled to tack, the Detroit 
 and Charlotte tried to wear, the latter running up to 
 leeward of the former ; and, both vessels having 
 every brace and almost every stay shot away, they 
 fell foul. The Niagara luffed athwart their bows, 
 within half pistol-shot, keeping up a terrific dis- 
 charge of great guns and musketry, while on the 
 other side the British vessels were raked by the 
 Caledonia and the schooners so closely that some of 
 their grape shot, passing over the foe, rattled 
 through Perry's spars. Nothing further could be 
 done, and Barclay's flag was struck at 3 P. M., after 
 three and a quarter hours' most gallant and desper- 
 ate fighting. The Chippeway and Little Belt tried to 
 escape, but were overtaken and brought to respec- 
 tively by the Trippe and Scorpion, the commander 
 of the latter, Mr. Stephen Champlin, firing the last, 
 as he had the first, shot of the battle. " Captain 
 Perry has behaved in the most humane and atten- 
 
268 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 tive manner, not only to myself and officers, but to 
 all the wounded," writes Captain Barclay. 
 
 The American squadron had suffered severely, 
 more than two thirds of the loss falling upon the 
 Lawrence, which was reduced to the condition of a 
 perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being com- 
 pletely beaten in: She had, as already stated, 22 
 men killed, including Lieutenant of Marines Brooks 
 and Midshipman Lamb ; and 6i wounded, includ- 
 ing Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting second 
 lieutenant) Forrest, Sailing-Master Taylor, Purser 
 Hambleton, and Midshipmen Swartout and Clax- 
 ton. The Niagara lost 2 killed and 25 wounded 
 (almost a fifth of her effectives), including among 
 the latter the second lieutenant, Mr. Edwards, and 
 Midshipman Cummings. The Caledonia had 3, the 
 Somers 2, and Trippe 2, men wounded. The Ariel 
 had I killed and 3 wounded ; the Scorpion 2 killed, 
 including Midshipman Lamb. The total loss was 
 123; 27 were killed and 96 wounded, of whom 3 
 died. 
 
 The British loss, falling most heavily on the De- 
 troit and Queen Charlotte, amounted to 41 killed (in- 
 cluding Capt. S. J. Garden, R. N., and Captain R. 
 A. Finnis), and 94 wounded (including Captain Bar- 
 clay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Roulette, and 
 Bignall) : in all 135. The first and second in com- 
 mand on every vessel were killed or wounded, a 
 sufficient proof of the desperate nature of the de- 
 fence. 
 
 The victory of Lake Erie was most important, 
 both in its material results and in its moral effect. 
 It gave us complete command of all the upper 
 lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 269 
 
 quarter, increased our prestige with the foe and 
 our confidence in ourselves, and ensured the con- 
 quest of upper Canada ; in all these respects its 
 
 The following diagrams will serve to explain the movements. 
 
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270 NAVAL WAR OF I Si 2. 
 
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 SCOPPWN /IRIEL ^^ -r^S ONERS 
 
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 PHeVOTT 
 
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NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 2J\ 
 
 importance has not been overrated. But the 
 " glory " acquired by it most certainly has been es- 
 timated at more than its worth. Most Americans, 
 even the well educated, if asked which was the 
 most glorious victory of the war, would point to 
 this battle. Captain Perry's name is more widely 
 known than that of any other commander. Every 
 school-boy reads about him, if of no other sea-cap- 
 tain ; yet he certainly stands on a lower grade than 
 either Hull or Macdonough, and not a bit higher 
 than a dozen others. On Lake Erie our seamen 
 displayed great courage and skill ; but so did their 
 antagonists. The simple truth is, that, where on 
 both sides the officers and men were equally brave 
 and skilful, the side which possessed the superiority 
 in force, in the proportion of three to two, could 
 not well help winning. The courage with which the 
 Lawrence was defended has hardly ever been sur- 
 passed, and may fairly be called heroic ; but equal 
 praise belongs to the men on board the Detroit, 
 who had to discharge the great guns by flashing 
 pistols at the touchholes, and yet made such a 
 terribly effective defence. Courage is only one of 
 the many elements which go to make up the char- 
 acter of a first-class commander ; something more 
 than bravery is needed before a leader can be really 
 called great. 
 
 There happened to be circumstances which ren- 
 dered the bragging of our writers over the victory 
 somewhat plausible. Thus they could say with an 
 appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns to 
 our 54, and outnumbered us. In reality, as well as 
 can be ascertained from the conflicting evidence, he 
 was inferior in number; but a few men more or less 
 
272 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 mattered nothing. Both sides had men enough to 
 work the guns and handle the ships, especially as the 
 fight was in smooth water, and largely at long range. 
 The important fact was that though we had nine 
 guns less, yet, at a broadside, they threw half as 
 much metal again as those of our antagonist. With 
 such odds in our favor it would have been a disgrace 
 to have been beaten. The water was too smooth for 
 our two brigs to show at their best ; but this very 
 smoothness rendered our gun-boats more formidable 
 than any of the British vessels, and the British testi- 
 mony is unanimous, that it was to them the defeat 
 was primarily due. The American fleet came into 
 action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the 
 ships straggling badly, either owing to Perry having 
 formed his line badly, or else to his having failed to 
 train the subordinate commanders how to keep 
 their places. The Niagara was not fought well at 
 first. Captain Elliott keeping her at a distance that 
 prevented her from doing any damage to the ves- 
 sels opposed, which were battered to pieces by the 
 gun-boats without the chance of replying. It cer- 
 tainly seems as if the small vessels at the rear of the 
 line should have been closer up, and in a position to 
 render more effectual assistance ; the attack was 
 made in too loose order, and, whether it was the 
 fault of Perry or of his subordinates, it fails to 
 reflect credit on the Americans. Cooper, as usual, 
 praises all concerned ; but in this instance not with 
 very good judgment. He says the line-of-battle 
 was highly judicious, but this may be doubted. The 
 weather was peculiarly suitable for the gun-boats, 
 with their long, heavy guns ; and yet the line-of- 
 battle was so arranged as to keep them in the rear, 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 273 
 
 and let the brunt of the assault fall on the Law- 
 rence, with her short carronades. Cooper again 
 praises Perry for steering for the head of the enemy's 
 line, but he could hardly have done any thing else. 
 In this battle the firing seems to have been equally 
 skilful on both sides, the Detroit's long guns being 
 peculiarly well served ; but the British captains 
 manoeuvred better than their foes at first, and sup- 
 ported one another better, so that the disparity in 
 damage done on each side was not equal to the dis- 
 parity in force. The chief merit of the American 
 commander and his followers was indomitable cour- 
 age, and determination not to be beaten. This is no 
 slight merit ; but it may well be doubted if it would 
 have ensured victory had Barclay's force been as 
 strong as Perry's. Perry made a headlong attack ; 
 his superior force, whether through his fault or his 
 misfortune can hardly be said, being brought into 
 action in such a manner that the head of the line 
 was crushed by the inferior force opposed. Being 
 literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry 
 brought up its powerful twin-sister, and the already 
 shattered hostile squadron was crushed by sheer 
 weight. The manoeuvres which marked the close of 
 the battle, and which ensured the capture of all the 
 opposing ships, were unquestionably very fine. 
 
 The British ships were fought as resolutely as their 
 antagonists, not being surrendered till they were 
 crippled and helpless, and almost all the officers, and 
 a large proportion of the men placed hors de combat. 
 Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rate 
 seaman. It was impossible to arrange them so as 
 to be superior to his antagonist, for the latter's 
 force was of such a nature that in smooth water his 
 
2/4 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 gun-boats gave him a great advantage, while in any- 
 sea his two brigs were more than a match for the 
 whole British squadron. In short, our victory was 
 due to our heavy metal. As regards the honor of 
 the affair, in spite of the amount of boasting it has 
 given rise to, I should say it was a battle to be 
 looked upon as in an equally high degree creditable 
 to both sides. Indeed, if it were not for the fact 
 that the victory was so complete, it might be said 
 that the length of the contest and the trifling dis- 
 parity in loss reflected rather the most credit on 
 the British. Captain Perry showed indomitable 
 pluck, and readiness to adapt himself to circum- 
 stances ; but his claim to fame rests much less on 
 his actual victory than on the way in which he pre- 
 pared the fleet that was to win it. Here his energy 
 and activity deserve all praise, not only for his 
 success in collecting sailors and vessels and in 
 building the two brigs, but above all for the man- 
 ner in which he succeeded in getting them out on 
 the lake. On that occasion he certainly out-gener- 
 alled Barclay ; indeed the latter committed an error 
 that the skill and address he subsequently showed 
 could not retrieve. But it will always be a source 
 of surprise that the American public should have 
 so glorified Perry's victory over an inferior force, 
 and have paid comparatively little attention to 
 Macdonough's victory, which really was won against 
 decided odds in ships, men, and metal. 
 
 There are always men who consider it unpatriotic 
 to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flattering ; 
 but, aside from the morality of the case, we never 
 can learn how to produce a certain efTect unless we 
 know rightly what the causes were that produced a 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 275 
 
 similar effect in times past. Lake Erie teaches us 
 the advantage of having the odds on our side ; Lake 
 Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill can still 
 counteract them. It is amusing to read some of the 
 pamphlets written " in reply " to Cooper's account 
 of this battle, the writers apparently regarding him 
 as a kind of traitor for hinting that the victory was 
 not "Nelsonic," " unsurpassed," etc. The arguments 
 are stereotyped : Perry had 9 fewer guns, and also 
 fewer men than the foe. This last point is the only 
 one respecting which there is any doubt. Taking 
 sick and well together, the Americans unquestion- 
 ably had the greatest number in crew ; but a quar- 
 ter of them were sick. Even deducting these they 
 were still, in all probability, more numerous than 
 their foes. 
 
 But it is really not a point of much consequence, 
 as both sides had enough, as stated, to serve the 
 guns and handle the ships. In sea-fights, after there 
 are enough hands for those purposes additional 
 ones are not of so much advantage. I have in all 
 my accounts summed up as accurately as possible 
 the contending forces, because it is so customary 
 with British writers to follow James' minute and in- 
 accurate statements, that I thought it best to give 
 every thing exactly ; but it was really scarcely neces- 
 sary, and, indeed, it is impossible to compare forces 
 numerically. Aside from a few exceptional cases, 
 the number of men, after a certain point was 
 reached, made little difference. For example, the 
 Java would fight just as effectually with 377 men, 
 the number James gives her, as with 426, the num- 
 ber I think she really had. Again, my figures make 
 the Wasp slightly superior in force to the Frolic, as 
 
276 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 she had 25 men the most; but in reality, as the 
 battle was fought under very short sail, and decided 
 purely by gunnery, the difference in number of crew 
 was not of the least consequence. The Hornet had 
 nine men more than the Penguin, and it would be 
 absurd to say that this gave her much advantage. 
 In both the latter cases, the forces were practi- 
 cally equal, although, numerically expressed, the' 
 odds were in favor of the Americans. The exact 
 reverse is the case in the last action of the Constitu- 
 tion. Here, the Levant and Cyane had all the men 
 they required, and threw a heavier broadside than 
 their foe. Expressed in numbers, the odds against 
 them were not great, but numbers could not express 
 the fact that carronades were opposed to long guns, 
 and two small ships to one big one. Again, though 
 in the action on Lake Champlain numbers do show 
 a slight advantage both in weight of metal and num- 
 ber of men on the British side, they do not make 
 the advantage as great as it really was, for they do 
 not show that the British possessed a frigate with a 
 main-deck battery of 24-pounders, which was equal 
 to the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly as 
 the Constitution was superior to the Cyane and Le- 
 vant.'' And on the same principles I think that 
 
 ' It must always be ixmembered that these rules cut both ways. 
 British \\Titers are very eloquent about the disadvantage in which car- 
 ronades placed the Cj'<?//d' and Levant, but do not hint that the Essex 
 suffered from a precisely similar cause, in addition to her other 
 misfortunes ; either they should give the Constiiii/uui more credit or 
 the Phabe less. So the Coiifiana\ throwing 4S0 pounds of metal at 
 a broadside, \\'as really equal to both the Eagle and Saratoga, who 
 jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384 pounds, from 
 her carronades g8. Their long guns threw 168, their carronades 510. 
 Now the 32-pound carronade mounted on the spar-deck of a 38-gun 
 frigate, was certainly much le^s formidable than the long 18 on 
 the main-deck ; indeed, it probably ranked more nearly with a 
 long 12, in the ordinary chances of war (and it must be remembered 
 that Downie was the attacking party and chose his own position, so 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 277 
 
 every fair-minded man must admit the great superi- 
 ority of Perry's fleet over Barclay's, though the ad- 
 vantage was greater in carronades than in long guns. 
 But to admit this by no means precludes us from 
 taking credit for the victory. Almost all the victo- 
 ries gained by the English over the Dutch in the 
 17th century were due purely to great superiority in 
 force. The cases have a curious analogy to this lake 
 battle. Perry won with 54 guns against Barclay's 
 63 ; but the odds were largely in his favor. Blake 
 won a doubtful victory on the i8th of February, 
 1653, with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but the 
 English vessels were twice the size of the Dutch, 
 and in number of men and weight of metal 
 greatly their superior. The English were excellent 
 fighters, but no better than the Dutch, and none of 
 their admirals of that period deserve to rank with 
 De Ruyter. Again, the great victory of La Hogue 
 was won over a very much smaller French fleet, 
 after a day's hard fighting, which resulted in the capt- 
 ure of one vessel ! This victory was most exult- 
 ingly chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry 
 had fought Barclay all day and only succeeded in 
 capturing the Little Belt. Most of Lord Nelson's 
 successes were certainly won against heavy odds 
 by his great genius and the daring skill of the 
 captains who served under him ; but the battle of 
 the Baltic, as far as the fighting went, reflected as 
 much honor on the defeated Danes as on the 
 
 far as Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let him). So that 
 in comparing the forces, the carronades should not be reckoned for 
 more than half the value of the long guns, and we get, as a mere ap- 
 proximation, 384 -I- 48 ^ 432, against 168 -|- 255 = 423. At any 
 rate, British writers, as well as Americans, should remember that if 
 the Constitution was greatly superior to her two foes, then the Con- 
 Jiance was certainly equal to the Eagle and Saratoga ; and vica versa. 
 
278 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 mighty sea-chief who conquered them. Many a 
 much-vaunted victory, both on sea and land, has 
 really reflected less credit on the victors than the 
 battle of Lake Erie did on the Americans. And it 
 must always be remembered that a victory, honor- 
 ably won, if even over a weaker foe, does reflect 
 credit on the nation by whom it is gained. It was 
 creditable to us as a nation that our ships were bet- 
 ter made and better armed than the British frigates, 
 exactly as it was creditable to them that a few years 
 before their vessels had stood in the same relation 
 to the Dutch ships." It was greatly to our credit 
 that we had been enterprising enough to fit out such 
 an effective little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this 
 Perry deserves the highest praise.'' 
 
 Before leaving the subject it is worth while mak- 
 ing a few observations on the men who composed 
 the crews. James, who despised a Canadian as 
 much as he hated an American, gives as one excuse 
 for the defeat, the fact that most of Barclay's crew 
 were Canadians, whom he considers to be " sorry 
 substitutes." On each side the regular sailors, from 
 the seaboard, were not numerous enough to permit 
 the battle to be fought purely by them. Barclay 
 took a number of soldiers of the regular army, and 
 Perry a number of militia, aboard ; the former had 
 a few Indian sharp-shooters, the latter quite a num- 
 
 ' After Loi'd Duncan's victory at Camperdown, James chronicled 
 the fact that all the captured line-of-battle ships were such poor craft 
 as not to be of as much value as so many P'rench frigates. This at 
 least showed that the Dutch sailors must have done well to have made 
 such a bloody and obstinate fight as they did, with the materials they 
 had. According to his own statements the loss was about propor- 
 tional to the forces in action. It was another parallel to Perry's vic- 
 tory. 
 
 " Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant approbation, 
 to which the answer must be that a history is not a panegyric. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 279 
 
 ber of negroes. A great many men in each fleet 
 were lake sailors, frontiersmen, and these were the 
 especial objects of James' contempt ; but it may be 
 doubted if they, thoroughly accustomed to lake 
 navigation, used to contests with Indians and 
 whites, naturally forced to be good sailors, and skil- 
 ful in the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when 
 trained by good men and on their own waters, the 
 very best possible material. Certainly the battle of 
 Lake Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, was better 
 contested than that of Lake Champlain, fought 
 mainly by British. 
 
 The difference between the American and British 
 seamen on the Atlantic was small, but on the lakes 
 what little there was disappeared. A New Eng- 
 lander and an Old Englander differed little enough, 
 but they differed more than a frontiersman born 
 north of the line did from one born south of it. 
 These last two resembled one another more nearly 
 than either did the parent. There had been no 
 long-established naval school on the lakes, and the 
 British sailors that came up there were the best of 
 their kind ; so the combatants were really so evenly 
 matched in courage, skill, and all other fighting 
 qualities, as to make it impossible to award the 
 palm to either for these attributes. The dogged ob- 
 stinacy of the fighting, the skilful firing and ma- 
 noeuvring, and the daring and coolness with which 
 cutting-out expeditions were planned and executed, 
 were as marked on one side as the other. The only 
 un-English element in the contest was the presence 
 among the Canadian English of some of the de- 
 scendants of the Latin race from whom they had 
 conquered the country. Otherwise the men were 
 
280 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 equally matched, but the Americans owed their 
 success — for the balance of success was largely on 
 their side — to the fact that their officers had been 
 trained in the best and most practical, although the 
 smallest, navy of the day. The British sailors on 
 the lakes were as good as our own, but no better. 
 None of their commanders compare with Mac- 
 donough. 
 
 Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which 
 he got his fleet ready ; his victory over Barclay 
 was precisely similar to the quasi-victories of Blake 
 over the Dutch, which have given that admiral 
 such renown. Blake's success in attacking Spanish 
 and Algerian forts is his true title to fame. In 
 his engagements with the Dutch fleets (as well 
 as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit 
 is no greater and no less than Perry's. Each made 
 a headlong attack, with furious, stubborn courage, 
 and by dint of sheer weight crushed or disabled a 
 greatly inferior foe. In the fight that took place 
 on Feb. i8, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried but 34 
 guns,' and yet with it he captured the Prosperous of 
 54 ; which vessel was stronger than any in the Dutch 
 fleet. The fact that Blake's battles were gener- 
 ally so indecisive must be ascribed to the fact that 
 his opponents were, though inferior in force, supe- 
 rior in skill. No decisive defeat was inflicted on 
 the Dutch until Tromp's death. Perry's operations 
 were on a very small, and Blake's on a very large, 
 scale ; but whereas Perry left no antagonists to 
 question his claim to victory, Blake's successes were 
 
 ' "La Vieet Les Actions Memorablesde Lt.-Amiral Michel De Ruy- 
 ter" (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way, why is Tromp always 
 called Van Tiomp by English writers ? It would be quite as correct 
 for a Frenchman to speak of MacNelson. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 28 1 
 
 sufficiently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in 
 almost every instance claiming that't/iej/ had won, or 
 else that it was a draw. Of course it is absurd to put 
 Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked with a 
 fleet forty times the strength of the other's flotilla ; 
 but the way in which the work was done was very 
 similar. And it must always be remembered that 
 when Perry fought this battle he was but 27 years 
 old ; and the commanders of his other vessels were 
 younger still. 
 
 CHAMPLAIN. 
 
 The commander on this lake at this time was 
 Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who had super- 
 seded the former commander. Lieutenant Sydney 
 Smith, — whose name was a curious commentary on 
 the close inter-relationship of the two contesting 
 peoples. The American naval force now consisted 
 of two sloops, the Growler and Eagle, each mount- 
 ing 1 1 guns, and six galleys, mcnmting one gun 
 each. Lieutenant Smith was sent down with his 
 two sloops to harass the British gun-boats, which 
 were stationed round the head of Sorel River, 
 the outlet to Lake Champlain. On June 3d he 
 chased three gun-boats into the river, the wind 
 being aft, up to within sight of the fort of Isle-aux- 
 noix. A strong British land-force, under Major- 
 General Taylor, now came up both banks of the 
 narrow stream, and joined the three gun-boats in 
 attacking the sloops. The latter tried to beat up 
 the stream, but the current was so strong and the 
 wind so light that no headway could be made. 
 The gun-boats kept out of range of the sloop's 
 guns, while keeping up a hot fire from their long 
 
282 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 24's, to which no reply could be made ; but the 
 galling fire of the infantry who lined the banks was 
 responded to by showers of grape. After three 
 hours' conflict, at 12.30, a 24-pound shot from one 
 of the galleys struck the Eagle under her starboard 
 quarter, and ripped out a whole plank under water. 
 She sank at once, but it was in such shoal water 
 that she did not settle entirely, and none of the 
 men were drowned. Soon afterward the Growler 
 had her forestay and main-boom shot away, and, 
 becoming unmanageable, ran ashore and was also 
 captured. The Growler had i killed and 8 wounded, 
 the Eagle 1 1 wounded ; their united crews, includ- 
 ing 34 volunteers, amounted to 112 men. The 
 British gun-boats suffered no loss ; of the troops on 
 shore three were wounded, one dangerously, by 
 grape.' Lieutenant Smith had certainly made a 
 very plucky fight, but it was a great mistake to get 
 cooped up in a narrow channel, with wind and 
 current dead against him. It was a very creditable 
 success to the British, and showed the effectiveness 
 of well-handled gun-boats under certain circum- 
 stances. The possession of these two sloops gave 
 the command of the lake to the British. Mac- 
 donough at once set about building others, but with 
 all his energy the materials at hand were so defi- 
 cient that he could not get them finished in time. 
 On July 31st, 1,000 British troops, under Col. J. 
 Murray, convoj^ed by Captain Thomas Everard, 
 with the sloops Chubb and Finch (late Growler and 
 Eagle) and three gun-boats, landed at Plattsburg 
 and destroyed all the barracks and stores both there 
 
 ' Letter from Major General Taylor (British) to Major-General 
 Stone. June 3, 1813. Lossing says the loss of the British was "prob- 
 ably at least one hundred," — on what authority, if any, I do not know. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 283 
 
 and at Saranac. For some reason Colonel Murray 
 left so precipitately that he overlooked a picket of 
 20 of his men, who were captured ; then he made 
 descents on two or three other places, and returned ■ 
 to the head of the lake by Aug. 3d. Three days 
 afterward, on Aug. 6th, Macdonough completed his 
 three sloops, the Presidetit, Montgomery, and Preble, 
 of 7 guns each, and also six gun-boats; which force 
 enabled him to prevent any more plundering ex- 
 peditions taking place that summer, and to convoy 
 Hampton's troops when they made an abortive 
 effort to penetrate into Canada by the Sorel River 
 on Sept. 2ist. 
 
 BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Ship, 
 
 600 
 
 24 
 
 Burnt on stacks. 
 
 Gloucester, 
 
 180 
 
 10 
 
 Taken at York. 
 
 Mary, 
 
 80 
 
 3 
 
 Burnt. 
 
 Drummond, 
 
 80 
 
 3 
 
 Captured. 
 
 Lady Gore, 
 
 80 
 
 3 
 
 (£ 
 
 Schooner, 
 
 80 
 
 3 
 
 t( 
 
 Detroit, 
 
 490 
 
 19 
 
 t< 
 
 Queen Charlotte, 
 
 400 
 
 17 
 
 fct 
 
 Lady Prevost, 
 
 230 
 
 13 
 
 » 
 
 Hunter, 
 
 180 
 
 10 
 
 M 
 
 Chippeway, 
 
 70 
 
 I 
 
 « 
 
 Little Belt, 
 
 90 
 
 3 
 
 a 
 
 12 vessels, 
 
 Name. 
 Growler, 
 Eagle, 
 
 2 vessels, 
 
 2,560 109 
 
 AMERICAN LOSS.' 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 112 
 
 II 
 
 Captured. 
 
 no 
 
 II 
 
 
 ' Excluding the Growler and Julia, which were recaptured. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 I 8 I 4 . 
 
 ON THE OCEAN. 
 
 Strictness of the blockade — Cruise of Rodders— Cruise of the Consiiiution— 
 Her unsuccessful chase oi La Pique — Attack on the A lligator — The Essex capt- 
 ured—The Frolic captured — The Peacock captures the EJ>crvier—CoTamo6or& 
 Barney's flotilla— The British in the Chesapeake— The IVasJ' captures the Rein- 
 deer and sinks the A-uon — Cruise and loss of the Adams — The privateer Gen- 
 eral Armstrong — The privateer /'r/Mfi? de Neufchatel — Loss of the gun-boats 
 in Lake Borgne— Fighting near New Orleans— Summary. 
 
 DURING this year the blockade of the Amer- 
 ican coast was kept up with ever increasing 
 rigor. The British frigates hovered hke hawks off 
 every seaport that was known to harbor any fight- 
 ing craft ; they almost invariably went in couples, to 
 support one another and to lighten, as far as was 
 possible, the severity of their work. On the northern 
 coasts in particular, the intense cold of the furious 
 winter gales rendered it no easy task to keep the as- 
 signed stations; the ropes were turned into stiff and 
 brittle bars, the hulls were coated with ice, and 
 many, both of men and officers, were frost-bitten and 
 crippled. But no stress of weather could long keep 
 the stubborn and hardy British from their posts. 
 With ceaseless vigilance they traversed continually 
 the allotted cruising grounds, capturing the priva- 
 teers, harrying the coasters, and keeping the more 
 powerful ships confined to port ; " no American 
 frigate could proceed singly to sea without immi- 
 nent risk of being crushed by the superior force of 
 
 284 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 285 
 
 the numerous British squadrons."' But the sloops 
 of war, commanded by officers as skilful as they 
 were daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as 
 ever sailed salt water, could often slip out; generally 
 on some dark night, when a heavy gale was blowing, 
 they would make the attempt, under storm canvas, 
 and with almost invariable success. The harder the 
 weather, the better was their chance; once clear of the 
 coast the greatest danger ceased, though throughout 
 the cruise the most untiring vigilance was needed. 
 The new sloops that I have mentioned as being built 
 proved themselves the best possible vessels for this 
 kind of work ; they were fast enough to escape 
 from most cruisers of superior force, and were over- 
 matches for any British flush-decked ship, that is, 
 for any thing below the rank of the frigate-built 
 corvettes of the Cyanes class. The danger of re- 
 capture was too great to permit of the prizes being 
 sent in, so they were generally destroyed as soon as 
 captured ; and as the cruising grounds were chosen 
 right in the track of commerce, the damage done 
 and consternation caused were very great. 
 
 Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the 
 coast in couples or small squadrons, there were two 
 or three places that were blockaded by a heavier 
 force. One of these was New London, before 
 which cruised a squadron under the direction of Sir 
 Thomas Hardy, in the 74 gun-ship Ramillies. Most 
 of the other cruising squadrons off the coast con- 
 tained razees or two-deckers. The boats of the 
 Hague, 74, took part in the destruction of some 
 coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge in April ; 
 and those of the Superb, 74, shared in a similar expe- 
 
 ' Captain Broke's letter of challenge to Captain Lawrence. 
 
286 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 dition against Wareham in June.' The command 
 on the coast of North America was now given to 
 Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane. The main 
 British force continued to lie in the Chesapeake, 
 where about 50 sail were collected. During the 
 first part of this year these were under the com- 
 mand of Sir Robert Barrie, but in May he was re- 
 lieved by Rear-Admiral Cockburn." 
 
 The President, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the be- 
 ginning of 18 14 was still out, cruising among the 
 Barbadoes and West Indies, only making a few 
 prizes of not much value. She then turned toward 
 the American coast, striking soundings near St. 
 Augustine, and thence proceeding north along the 
 coast to Sandy Hook, which was reached on Feb. 
 1 8th. The light was passed in the night, and 
 shortly afterward several sail were made out, when 
 the President was at once cleared for action." One 
 of these strange sail was the Loire, 38 (British), Capt. 
 Thomas Brown, which ran down to close the Presi- 
 dent, unaware of her force ; but on discovering her 
 to be a 44, hauled to the wind and made off." The 
 President did not pursue, another frigate and a gun- 
 brig being in sight." This rencontre gave rise to 
 nonsensical boastings on both sides ; one American 
 writer calls the Loire the Plantagenet, 74; James, on 
 the other hand, states that the President was afraid 
 to engage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only rea- 
 son the latter declined the combat was because she 
 was short of men. The best answer to this is a 
 quotation from his own work (vol. vi, p. 402), that 
 
 ' James, vi, 474. '' James, vi, 437. 
 
 'Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Feb. 20, 18 14. 
 
 ' James, vi, 412. ' " Naval Monument," p. 235. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 287 
 
 "the admiralty had issued an order that no 18- 
 pounder frigate was voluntarily to engage one of 
 the 24-pounder frigates of America." Coupling this 
 order with the results of the combats that had 
 already taken place between frigates of these classes, 
 it can always be safely set down as sheer bravado 
 when any talk is made of an American 44 refusing 
 to give battle to a British 38 ; and it is even more 
 absurd to say that a British line-of-battle ship would 
 hesitate for a minute about engaging any frigate. 
 
 On Jan. ist, the Constitution, which had been 
 lying in Boston harbor undergoing complete repairs, 
 put out to sea under the command of Capt. Charles 
 Stewart. The British 38-gun frigate Nymphe had 
 been lying before the port, but she disappeared long 
 before the Constitution was in condition, in obedi- 
 ence to the order already mentioned. Capt. Stew- 
 art ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the 14th 
 of February captured and destroyed the British 
 14-gun schooner Pictou, with a crew of 75 men. 
 After making a few other prizes and reaching the 
 coast of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the 
 23d of the same month fell in, at the entrance to 
 the Mona passage, with the British 36-gun frigate 
 Pique (late French Pallas), Captain Maitland. The 
 Constitution at once made sail for the Pique, steering 
 free ; ' the latter at first hauled to the wind and 
 waited for her antagonist, but when the latter was 
 still 3 miles distant she made out her force and im- 
 mediately made all sail to escape ; the Constitution, 
 however, gained steadily till 8 P. M., when the night 
 and thick squally weather caused her to lose sight 
 of the chase. Captain Maitland had on board the 
 
 ' Letter of Capt. Stewart, April 8, 1814. 
 
288 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 prohibitory order issued by the admiralty,' and 
 acted correctly. His ship was altogether too light 
 for his antagonist. James, however, is not satisfied 
 with this, and wishes to prove that both ships were 
 desirous of avoiding the combat. He says that 
 Capt. Stewart came near enough to count " 13 ports 
 and a bridle on the Pique s main-deck," and " saw at 
 once that she was of a class inferior to the Guerriire 
 or Java" but " thought the Piques i8's were 24's, 
 and therefore did not make an effort to bring her 
 to action." He portrays very picturesquely the 
 grief of the Pique's crew when they find they are 
 not going to engage ; how they come aft and re- 
 quest to be taken into action ; how Captain Mait- 
 land reads them his instructions, but " fails to per- 
 suade them that there had been any necessity of 
 issuing them " ; and, finally, how the sailors, over- 
 come by woe and indignation, refuse to take their 
 supper-time grog,— which was certainly remarkable. 
 As the Constitution had twice captured British frig- 
 ates " with impunity," according to James himself, 
 is it likely that she would now shrink from an en- 
 counter with a ship which she " saw at once was of 
 an inferior class" to those already conquered? 
 Even such abject cowards as James' Americans 
 would not be guilty of so stupid an action. Of 
 course neither Capt. Stewart nor any one else sup- 
 posed for an instant that a 36-gun frigate was armed 
 with 24-pounders. 
 
 It is worth while mentioning as an instance of 
 how utterly untrustworthy James is in dealing with 
 American affairs, that he says (p. 476) the Constitu- 
 tion had now " what the Americans would call a bad 
 
 'James, vi, 477. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 289 
 
 crew," whereas, in her previous battles, all her men 
 had been " picked." Curiously enough, this is the 
 exact reverse of the truth. In no case was an 
 American ship manned with a " picked " crew, but 
 the nearest approach to such was the crew the Con- 
 stitution carried in this and the next cruise, when 
 " she probably possessed as fine a crew as ever 
 manned a frigate. They were principally New 
 England men, and it has been said of them that 
 they were almost qualified to fight the ship without 
 her officers." ' The statement that such men, com- 
 manded by one of the bravest and most skilful cap- 
 tains of our navy, would shrink from attacking a 
 greatly inferior foe, is hardly worth while denying ; 
 and, fortunately, such denial is needless, Captain 
 Stewart's account being fully corroborated in the 
 " Memoir of Admiral Durham," written by his 
 nephew, Captain Murray, London, 1846. 
 
 The Constitution arrived off the port of Marble- 
 head on April 3d, and at 7 A. M. fell in with the 
 two British 38-gun frigates Junon, Captain Upton, 
 and Tenedos, Captain Parker. " The American 
 frigate was standing to the westward with the 
 wind about north by west and bore from the two 
 British frigates about northwest by west. The Ju- 
 non and Tenedos quickly hauled up in chase, and the 
 Constitution crowded sail in the direction of Marble- 
 head. At 9.30, finding the Tenedos rather gaining 
 upon her, the Constitution started her water and 
 threw overboard a quantity of provisions and other 
 articles. At 11.30 she hoisted her colors, and the 
 two British frigates, who were now dropping slowly 
 in the chase, did the same. At 1.30 p.m. the Coti- 
 
 ' Cooper, ii, 463. 
 
ago NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 stitution anchored in the harbor of Marblehead. 
 Captain Parker was anxious to follow her into the 
 port, which had no defences ; but the Tenedos was 
 recalled by a signal from the Junon." ' Shortly af- 
 terward the Constitution again put out, and reached 
 Boston unmolested. 
 
 On Jan. 29, 1814, the small U. S. coasting 
 schooner Alligator, of 4 guns and 40 men. Sailing- 
 master R. Basset, was lying at anchor in the mouth 
 of Stone River, S. C, when a frigate and a brig 
 were perceived close inshore near the breakers- 
 Judging from their motions that they would at- 
 tempt to cut him out when it was dark, Mr. Basset 
 made his preparations accordingly." At half-past 
 seven six boats were observed approaching cautious- 
 ly under cover of the marsh, with muffled oars ; on 
 being hailed they cheered and opened with boat 
 carronades and musketry, coming on at full speed; 
 whereupon the Alligator cut her cable and made 
 sail, the wind being light from the southwest ; while 
 the crew opened such a heavy fire on the as- 
 sailants, who were then not thirty yards off, that 
 they stopped the advance and fell astern. At this 
 moment the Alligator grounded, but the enemy had 
 suffered so severely that they made no attempt to 
 renew the attack, rowing off down stream. On 
 board the Alligator two men were killed and two 
 wounded, including the pilot, who was struck down 
 by a grape-shot while standing at the helm ; and 
 her sails and rigging were much cut. The extent of 
 the enemy's loss was never known ; next day one of 
 his cutters was picked up at North Edisto, much in- 
 
 ' James, vi, 479. 
 
 '^ Letter of Sailing-master Basset, Jan, 31, 1814. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 29 1 
 
 jured and containing the bodies of an officer and a 
 seaman.' For his skill and gallantry Mr. Basset was 
 promoted to a lieutenancy, and for a time his 
 exploit put a complete stop to the cutting-out ex- 
 peditions along that part of the coast. The Alliga- 
 tor herself sank in a squall on July 1st, but was 
 afterward raised and refitted. 
 
 It is much to be regretted that it is almost im- 
 possible to get at the British account of any of 
 these expeditions which ended successfully for the 
 Americans ; all such cases are generally ignored by 
 the British historians ; so that I am obliged to rely 
 solely upon the accounts of the victors, who, with 
 the best intentions in the world, could hardly be 
 perfectly accurate. 
 
 At the close of 181 3 Captain Porter was still 
 cruising in the Pacific. 
 
 Early in January the Essex, now with 255 men 
 aboard, made the South American coast, and on the 
 1 2th of that month anchored in the harbor of Val- 
 paraiso. She had in company a prize, re-christened 
 the Essex Junior, with a crew of 60 men, and 20 
 guns, 10 long sixes and 10 eighteen-pound carron- 
 ades. Of course she could not be used in a combat 
 with regular cruisers. 
 
 On Feb. 8th, the British frigate Phcebe, 36, Cap- 
 tain James Hilyar, accompanied by the Cherub, 18, 
 Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, the former carrying 
 300 and the latter 140 men,^ made their appearance, 
 and apparently proposed to take the Essex by a 
 coup de main. They hauled into the harbor on a 
 wind, the Cherub falling to leeward ; while the Phmbe 
 
 'Letter from Commander J. H. Dent, Feb. 2i, 1814. 
 " They afterward took on board enough men from British merchant- 
 vessels to raise their complements respectively to 320 and 180. 
 
292 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 made the port quarter of the Essex, and then, put- 
 ting her helm down, luffed up on her starboaad bow, 
 but 10 or 15 feet distant. Porter's crew were all at 
 quarters, the powder-boys with slow matches ready 
 to discharge the guns, the boarders standing by, 
 cutlass in hand, to board in the smoke ; every thing 
 was cleared for action on both frigates. Captain 
 Hilyar now probably saw that there was no chance 
 of carrying the Essex by surprise, and, standing on 
 the after-gun, he inquired after Captain Porter's 
 health ; the latter returned the inquiry, but warned 
 Hilyar not to fall foul. The British captain then 
 braced back his yards, remarking that if he did fall 
 aboard it would be purely accidental. " Well," said 
 Porter, "you have no business where you are; if 
 you touch a rope-yarn of this ship I shall board in- 
 stantly." ' The Phcebe, in her then position, was 
 completely at the mercy of the American ships, and 
 Hilyar, greatly agitated, assured Porter that he 
 meant nothing hostile ; and the Phcebe backed down, 
 her yards passing over those of the Essex without 
 touching a rope, and anchored half a mile astern. 
 Shortly afterward the two captains met on shore, 
 when Hilyar thanked Porter for his behavior, and, 
 on his inquiry, assured him that after thus owing 
 his safety to the latter's forbearance, Porter need be 
 under no apprehension as to his breaking the neu- 
 trality. 
 
 The British ships now began a blockade of the 
 port. On Feb. 27th, the Phcebe being hove to close 
 off the port, and the Cherub a league to leeward, the 
 former fired a weather-gun ; the Essex interpreting 
 this as a challenge, took the crew of the Essex Jun- 
 
 ' " Life of Farragut," p. 33, 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 293 
 
 ior aboard and went out to attack the British frig- 
 ate. But the latter did not await the combat ; she 
 bore up, set her studding-sails, and ran down to the 
 Clierub. The American officers were intensely irri- 
 tated over this, and American writers have sneered 
 much at "a British 36 refusing combat with an 
 American 32." But the armaments of the two frig- 
 ates were so wholly dissimilar that it is hard to 
 make comparison. When the fight really took 
 place, the Essex was so crippled and the water so 
 smooth that the British ships fought at their own 
 distance ; and as they had long guns to oppose to 
 Porter's carronades, this really made the Cherub 
 more nearly suited to contend with the Essex than 
 the latter was to fight the PhcBbe. But when the 
 Essex in fairly heavy weather, with the crew of the 
 Essex Junior aboard, was to windward, the circum- 
 stances were very different ; she carried as many 
 men and guns as the Phcebe, and in close combat, or 
 in a hand-to-hand struggle, could probably have 
 taken her. Still, Hilyar's conduct in avoiding 
 Porter except when the Cherub was in company was 
 certainly over-cautious, and very difificult to explain 
 in a man of his tried courage. 
 
 On March 27th Porter decided to run out of the 
 harbor on the first opportunity, so as to draw away 
 his two antagonists in chase, and let the Essex 
 Junior escape. This plan had to be tried sooner 
 than was expected. The two vessels were always 
 ready, the Essex only having her proper comple- 
 ment of 255 men aboard. On the next day, the 
 28th, it came on to blow from the south, when the 
 Essex parted her port cable and dragged the star- 
 board anchor to leeward, so she got under way, and 
 
294 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 made sail ; by several trials it had been found that 
 she was faster than the Pkwbe, and that the Cherub 
 was very slow indeed, so Porter had little anxiety 
 about his own ship, only fearing for his consort. 
 The British vessels were close in with the weather- 
 most point of the bay, but Porter thought he could 
 weather them, and hauled up for that purpose. Just 
 as he was rounding the outermost point, which, if 
 accomplished, would have secured his safety, a 
 heavy squall struck the Essex, and when she was 
 nearly gunwale under, the main-top-mast went by 
 the board. She now wore and stood in for the 
 harbor, but the wind had shifted, and on account of 
 her crippled condition she could not gain it ; so she 
 bore up and anchored in a small bay, three miles 
 from Valparaiso, and half a mile from a detached 
 Chilian battery of one gun, the Essex being within 
 pistol-shot of the shore.' The Phoebe and Cherub 
 now bore down upon her, covered with ensigns, 
 union-jacks, and motto flags ; and it became evident 
 that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, as 
 soon as he saw that Porter was disabled. So the 
 Essex prepared for action, though there could be 
 no chance whatever of success. Her flags were 
 flying from every mast, and every thing was made 
 ready as far as was possible. The attack was made 
 before springs could be got on her cables. She was 
 anchored so near the shore as to preclude the possi- 
 bility of Captain Hilyar's passing ahead of her" ; so 
 his two ships came cautiously down, the Cherub 
 taking her position on the starboard bow of the 
 Essex, and the Pliabe under the latter's stern. The 
 
 ' Letter of Captain David Porter, July 3, 1814. 
 ' Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1814. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 295 
 
 attack began at 4 P. M." Some of the bow-guns of 
 the American frigate bore upon the Cherub, and, 
 as soon as she found this out, the sloop ran down 
 and stationed herself near the Phcebe. The latter 
 had opened with her broadside of long i8's, from a 
 position in which not one of Porter's guns could 
 reach her. Three times springs were got on the 
 cables of the Essex, in order to bring her round till 
 her broadside bore ; but in each instance they were 
 shot away, as soon as they were hauled taut. Three 
 long 12's were got out of the stern-ports, and with 
 these an animated fire was kept up on the two 
 ^British ships, the aim being especially to cripple 
 their rigging. A good many of Porter's crew were 
 killed during the first five minutes, before he could 
 bring any guns to bear ; but afterward he did not 
 suffer much, and at 4.20, after a quarter of an hour's 
 fight between the three long 12's of the Essex, and 
 the whole 36 broadside guns of the Phcebe and 
 Cherub, the latter were actually driven off. They 
 wore, and again began with their long guns ; but, 
 these producing no visible effect, both of the 
 British ships hauled out of the fight at 4.30. " Hav- 
 ing lost the use of main-sail, jib, and main-stay, 
 appearances looked a little inauspicious," writes 
 Captain Hilyar. But the damages were soon re- 
 paired, and his two ships stood back for the crippled 
 foe. Both stationed themselves on her port-quarter, 
 the Phcebe at anchor, with a spring, firing her broad- 
 side, while the Cherub kept under way, using her 
 long bow-chasers. Their fire was very destructive, 
 for they were out of reach of the Essex's carron- 
 
 ' Mean time. Porter says 3.54; Hilyar, a few minutes past 4. 
 The former says the first attack lasted half an hour ; the latter, but 
 10 minutes. I accordingly make it 20. 
 
296 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 ades, and not one of her long guns could be brought 
 to bear on them. Porter now cut his cable, at 
 5.20, and tried to close with his antagonists. After 
 many ineffectual efforts sail was made. The flying- 
 jib halyards were thp only serviceable ropes uncut. 
 That sail was hoisted, and the foretop-sail and fore- 
 sail let fall, though the want of sheets and tacks 
 rendered them almost useless. Still the Essex 
 drove down on her assailants, and for the first time 
 got near enough to use her carronades; for a minute 
 or two the firing was tremendous, but after the 
 first broadside the Cherub hauled out of the fight in 
 great haste, and during the remainder of the action 
 confined herself to using her bow-guns from a dis- 
 tance. Immediately afterward the Phcebe also 
 edged off, and by her superiority of sailing, her foe 
 being now almost helpless, was enabled to choose 
 her own distance, and again opened from her long 
 i8's, out of range of Porter's carronades.' The 
 carnage on board the Essex had now made her 
 decks look like shambles. One gun was manned 
 three times, fifteen men being slain at it ; its cap- 
 tain alone escaped without a wound. There were 
 but one or two instances of flinching; the wounded, 
 many of whom were killed by flying splinters while 
 under the hands of the doctors, cheered on their 
 comrades, and themselves worked at the guns like 
 fiends as long as they could stand. At one of the 
 bow-guns was stationed a young Scotchman, named 
 
 ' American writers often sneer at Hilyar for keeping away from the 
 Essex, and out of reach of her short guns ; but his conduct was 
 eminently proper in this respect. It was no part of his duty to fight 
 the Essex at the distance which best suited her ; but, on the con- 
 trary, at that which least suited her. He, of course, wished to win 
 the victory with the least possible loss to himself, and acted accord- 
 ingly. His conduct in the action itself could not be improved upon. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 297 
 
 Bissly, who had one leg shot off close by the groin. 
 Using his handkerchief as a tourniquet, he said, 
 turning to his American shipmates : " I left my 
 own country and adopted the United States, to 
 fight for her. I hope I have this day proved 
 myself worthy of the country of my adoption. I 
 am no longer of any use to you or to her, so good- 
 by ! " With these words he leaned on the sill of 
 the port, and threw himself overboard.' Among 
 the very few men who flinched was one named 
 William Roach ; Porter sent one of his midshipmen 
 to shoot him, but he was not to be found. He was 
 discovered by a man named William Call, whose 
 leg had been shot off and was hanging by the skin, 
 and who dragged the shattered stump all round the 
 bag-house, pistol in hand, trying to get a shot at 
 him. Lieut. J. G. Cowell had his leg shot off above 
 the knee, and his life might have been saved had it 
 been amputated at once ; but the surgeons already 
 had rows of wounded men waiting for them, and 
 when it was proposed to him that he should be 
 attended to out of order, he replied : " No, doctor, 
 none of that ; fair play 's a jewel. One man's life is 
 as dear as another's ; I would not cheat any poor 
 fellow out of his turn." So he stayed at his post, 
 and died from loss of blood. 
 
 Finding it hopeless to try to close, the ^j'i'^;!: stood 
 for the land. Porter intending to run her ashore and 
 burn her. But when she had drifted close to the 
 bluffs the wind suddenly shifted, took her flat aback 
 and paid her head off shore, exposing her to a raking 
 fire. At this moment Lieutenant Downes, com- 
 manding the Junior, pulled out in a boat, through 
 
 ' This and most of the other anecdotes are taken from the invalu- 
 able " Life of Farragut," pp. 37-46. 
 
298 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 all the fire, to see if he could do any thing. Three 
 of the men with him, including an old boatswain's 
 mate, named Kingsbury, had come out expressly "to 
 share the fate of their old ship " ; so they remained 
 aboard, and, in their places. Lieutenant Downes took 
 some of the wounded ashore, while the Cherub kept 
 up a tremendous fire upon him. The shift of the 
 wind gave Porter a faint hope of closing ; and once 
 more the riddled hulk of the little American frigate 
 was headed for her foes. But Hilyar put his helm up 
 to avoid close quarters ; the battle was his already, 
 and the cool old captain was too good an officer to 
 leave any thing to chance. Seeing he could not 
 close. Porter had a hawser bent on the sheet-anchor 
 and let go. This brought the ship's head round, 
 keeping her stationary ; and from such of her guns 
 as were not dismounted and had men enough left to 
 man them, a broadside was fired at the Phoebe. The 
 wind was now very light, and the Phcebe, whose main- 
 and mizzen-masts and main-yard were rather seri- 
 ously wounded, and who had suffered a great loss of 
 canvas and cordage aloft, besides receiving a num- 
 ber of shot between wind and water,' and was thus 
 a good deal crippled, began to drift slowly to leeward. 
 It was hoped that she would drift out of gun-shot, 
 but this last chance was lost by the parting of the 
 hawser, which left the Essex at the mercy of the 
 British vessels. Their fire was deliberate and de- 
 structive, and could only be occasionally replied to 
 by a shot from one of the long 12's of the Essex. 
 The ship caught fire, and the flames came bursting 
 
 ' Captain Hilyar's letter. James says the Phoibe had 7 shot be- 
 tween wind and water, and one below the water-line. Porter says she 
 had 18 i2-poiind shot below the water-line. The latter statement 
 must have been an exaggeration ; and James is probably farther 
 wrong still. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 299 
 
 up the hatchway, and a quantity of powder ex- 
 ploded below. Many of the crew were knocked 
 overboard by shot, and drowned ; others leaped 
 into the water, thinking the ship was about to blow 
 up, and tried to swim to the land. Some succeeded ; 
 among them was one man who had sixteen or eigh- 
 teen pieces of iron in his leg, scales from the muz- 
 zle of his gun. The frigate had been shattered to 
 pieces above the water-line, although from the 
 smoothness of the sea she was not harmed enough 
 below it to reduce her to a sinking condition.' The 
 carpenter reported that he alone of his crew was fit 
 for duty ; the others were dead or disabled. Lieu- 
 tenant Wilmer was knocked overboard by a splinter, 
 and drowned ; his little negro boy, " Ruff," came up 
 on deck, and, hearing of the disaster, deliberately 
 leaped into the sea and shared his master's fate. 
 Lieutenant Odenheimer was also knocked overboard, 
 but afterward regained the ship. A shot, glancing 
 upward, killed four of the men who were standing 
 by a gun, striking the last one in the head and scat- 
 tering his brains over his comrades. The only 
 commissioned officer left on duty was Lieutenant 
 Decatur McKnight. The sailing-master, Barnwell, 
 when terribly wounded, remained at his post till he 
 fainted from loss of blood. Of the 255 men aboard 
 the Essex when the battle began, 58 had been killed, 
 66 wounded, and 31 drowned ("missing"), while 24 
 had succeeded in reaching shore. But 76 men were 
 left unwounded, and many of these had been bruised 
 or otherwise injured. Porter himself was knocked 
 down by the windage of a passing shot. While the 
 young midshipman, Farragut,was on the ward-room 
 
 ' An exactly analogous case to that of the British sloop Reindeer. 
 
300 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 ladder, going below for gun-primers, the captain of 
 the gun directly opposite the hatchway was struck 
 full in the face by an 1 8-pound shot, and tumbled 
 back on him. They fell down the hatch together, 
 Farragut being stunned for some minutes. Later, 
 while standing by the man at the wheel, an old 
 quartermaster named Francis Bland, a shot coming 
 over the fore-yard took off the quartermaster's right 
 leg, carrying away at the same time one of Farra- 
 gut's coat tails. The old fellow was helped below, 
 but he died for lack of a tourniquet, before he could 
 be attended to. 
 
 Nothing remained to be done, and at 6.20 the 
 Essex surrendered and was taken possession of. The 
 Pkcebe had lost 4 men killed, including her first 
 lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 wounded ; the 
 Cherub, i killed, and 3, including Captain Tucker, 
 wounded. Total, 5 killed and 10 wounded.' The 
 difference in loss was natural, as, owing to their hav- 
 ing long guns and the choice of position, the British 
 had been able to fire ten shot to the Americans' 
 one. 
 
 The conduct of the two English captains in at- 
 tacking Porter as soon as he was disabled, in neutral 
 waters, while they had been very careful to abstain 
 from breaking the neutrality while he was in good 
 condition, does not look well; at the best it shows 
 that Hilyar had only been withheld hitherto from 
 the attack by timidity, and it looks all the worse 
 when it is remembered that Hilyar owed his ship's 
 
 ' James says that most of the loss was occasioned by the first three 
 broadsides of the Essex; this is not surprising, as in all she hardly 
 fired half a dozen, and the last were discharged when half of the guns 
 had been disabled, and there were scarcely men enough to man the 
 remainder. Most of the time her resistance was limited to firing 
 such of her six long guns as would bear. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 30I 
 
 previous escape entirely to Porter's forbearance on 
 a former occasion when the British frigate was en- 
 tirely at his mercy, and that the British captain had 
 afterward expressly said that he would not break the 
 neutrality. Still, the British in this war did not act 
 very differently from the way we ourselves did on 
 one or two occasions in the Civil War, — witness the 
 capture of the Florida. And after the battle was 
 once begun the sneers which most of our historians, 
 as well as the participators in the fight, have show- 
 ered upon the British captains for not foregoing the 
 advantages which their entire masts and better ar- 
 tillery gave them by coming to close quarters, are 
 decidedly foolish. Hilyar's conduct during the battle, 
 as well as his treatment of the prisoners afterward, 
 was perfect, and as a minor matter it may be men- 
 tioned that his official letter is singularly just and 
 fair-minded. Says Lord Howard Douglass ' : " The 
 action displayed all that can reflect honor on the 
 science and admirable conduct of Captain Hilyar 
 and his crew, which, without the assistance of the 
 Cherub, would have insured the same termination. 
 Captain Porter's sneers at the respectful distance 
 the Pkcebe kept are in fact acknowledgments of the 
 ability with which Captain Hilyar availed himself of 
 the superiority of his arms ; it was a brilliant affair." 
 While endorsing this criticism, it may be worth while 
 to compare it with some of the author's comments 
 upon the other actions, as that between Decatur and 
 the Macedonian. To make the odds here as great 
 against Carden as they were against Porter, it would 
 be necessary to suppose that the Macedonian had 
 lost her main-top-mast, had but six long i8's to op- 
 
 ' " Naval Gunnery," p. 149. 
 
302 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 pose to her antagonist's 24's, and that the latter was 
 assisted by the corvette Adams ; so that as a matter 
 of fact Porter fought at fully double or treble the 
 disadvantage Garden did, and, instead of surrender- 
 ing when he had lost a third of his crew, fought till 
 three fifths of his men were dead or wounded, and, 
 moreover, inflicted greater loss and damage on his 
 antagonists than Garden did. If, then, as Lord 
 Douglass says, the defence of the Macedonian brill- 
 iantly upheld the character of the British navy for 
 courage, how much more did that of the Essex show 
 for the American navy ; and if Hilyar's conduct was 
 " brilliant," that of Decatur was more so. 
 
 This was an action in which it is difificult to tell 
 exactly how to award praise. Captain Hilyar deserves 
 it, for the coolness and skill with which he made his 
 approaches and took his positions so as to destroy his 
 adversary with least loss to himself, and also for the 
 precision of his fire. The Cherub's behavior was 
 more remarkable for extreme caution than for any 
 thing else. As regards the mere fight, Porter cer- 
 tainly did every thing a man could do to contend 
 successfully with the overwhelming force opposed to 
 him, and the few guns that were available were 
 served with the utmost precision. As an exhibition 
 of dogged courage it has never been surpassed since 
 the time when the Dutch captain, Klsesoon, after 
 fighting two long days, blew up his disabled ship, 
 devoting himself and all his crew to death, rather 
 than surrender to the hereditary foes of his race, 
 and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim 
 " sea-beggars " of Holland ; the days when Drake 
 singed the beard of the Catholic king, and the small 
 English craft were the dread and scourge of the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 303 
 
 great floating castles of Spain. Any man reading 
 Farragut's account is forcibly reminded of some of 
 the deeds of " derring do " in that, the heroic age of 
 the Teutonic navies. Captain Hilyar in his letter 
 says : " The defence of the Essex, taking into con- 
 sideration our superiority of force and the very dis- 
 couraging circumstance of her having lost her main- 
 top-mast and being twice on fire, did honor to her 
 brave defenders, and most fully evinced the courage 
 of Captain Porter and those under his command. 
 Her colors were not struck until the loss in killed 
 and wounded was so awfully great and her shattered 
 condition so seriously bad as to render all further 
 resistance unavailing." ' He also bears very candid 
 
 ' James (p. 419) says : " The Essex, as far as is borne out by proof 
 (the only safe way where an American is concerned), had 24 men 
 killed and 45 wounded. But Capt. Porter, thinking by exaggerating 
 his loss to prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed and mortally wounded, 
 39 severely, 27 slightly," etc., etc. This would be no more worthy of 
 notice than any other of his falsifications, were it not followed by va- 
 rious British writers. Hilyar states that he has l6i prisoners, has 
 found 23 dead, that 3 wounded were taken off, between 20 and 30 
 reached the shore, and that the "remamder are either killed or 
 wounded." It is by wilfully preserving silence about this last sen- 
 tence that James makes out his case. It will be obsei-ved that Hilyar 
 enumerates l6l-l-23-f-3-f-25 (say) or 212, and says the remainder were 
 either killed or wounded ; Porter having 255 men at first, this remain- 
 der was 43, Hilyar stating that of his 161 prisoners, 42 were wounded, 
 his account thus gives the Americans ill killed and wounded. James' 
 silence 'about Hilyar's last sentence enables him to make the loss but 
 69, and his wilful omission is quite on a par with the other mean- 
 nesses and falsehoods which utterly destroy the reliability of his work. 
 By Hilyar's own letter it is thus seen that Porter's loss in killed and 
 wounded was certainly iii, perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James 
 says, 265 men, 126. There still remain spme discrepancies between 
 the official accounts , which can be compared in tabular form : 
 
 Hilyar. Porter. 
 
 Prisoners unwounded, 119 75 prisoners unwounded. 
 
 " wounded, 42 27 " .slightly wounded. 
 
 Taken away wounded, 3 39 *' severely " 
 
 Those who reached shore, 25 58 killed. 
 
 Remainder killed or wounded, 43 31 missing. 
 
 Killed, 23 25 reached shore. 
 
 »5S =55 
 
304 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 testimony to the defence of the Essex having been 
 effective enough to at one time render the result 
 doubtful, saying : " Our first attack * * * pro- 
 duced no visible effect. Our second * * * was 
 not more successful ; and having lost the use of our 
 main7sail, jib, and main-stay, appearances looked a 
 little inauspicious." Throughout the war no ship 
 was so desperately defended as the Essex, taking 
 into account the frightful odds against which she 
 fought, which always enhances the merit of a de- 
 fence. The Lawrence, which suffered even more, 
 was backed by a fleet ; the Frolic was overcome by 
 an equal foe ; and the Reindeer fought at far less of 
 a disadvantage, and suffered less. None of the frig- 
 ates, British or American, were defended with any 
 thing like the resolution she displayed. 
 
 But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether 
 Porter's course, after the accident to his top-mast oc- 
 curred, was altogether the best that could have been 
 taken. On such a question no opinion could have 
 been better than Farragut's, although of course his 
 judgment was ex post facto, as he was very young at 
 the time of the fight. 
 
 " In the first place, I consider our original and 
 greatest error was in attempting to regain the 
 
 The explanation probably is that Hilyar's " 42 wounded" do not 
 include Porter's " 27 slightly wounded," and that his " 161 prison- 
 ers" include Porter's " 25 who reached shore," and his "25 who 
 reached shore" comes under Porter's "31 missing." This would 
 make the accounts nearly tally. At any rate in Porter's book are to 
 be found the names of all his killed, wounded, and missing; and 
 their relatives received pensions from the American government, 
 which, if the returns were false, would certainly have been a most 
 elaborate piece of deception. It is far more likely that Hilyar was 
 mistaken ; or he may have counted in the Essex Junior^s crew, which 
 would entirely account for the discrepancies. In any event it must 
 be remembered that he makes the American killed and wounded iii 
 (Porter, 124), and not 69, as James says. The latter's statement is 
 wilfully false, as he had seen Hilyar's letter. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 305 
 
 anchorage ; being greatly superior in sailing powers 
 we should have borne up and run before the wind. 
 If we had come in contact with the Phoebe we should 
 have carried her by boarding ; if she avoided us, as 
 she might have done by her greater ability to ma- 
 noeuvre, then we should have taken her fire and 
 passed on, leaving both vessels behind until we had 
 replaced our top-mast, by which time they would 
 have been separated, as unless they did so it would 
 have been no chase, the Cherub being a dull sailer. 
 
 " Secondly, when it was apparent to everybody 
 that we had no chance of success under the circum- 
 stances, the ship should have been run ashore, throw- 
 ing her broadside to the beach to prevent raking, and 
 fought as long as was consistent with humanity, 
 and then set on fire. But having determined upon 
 anchoring we should have bent a spring on to the 
 ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, where it 
 was exposed, and could be shot away as fast as put 
 on." 
 
 But it must be remembered that when Porter 
 decided to anchor near shore, in neutral water, he 
 could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberate and treach- 
 erous breach of faith. I do not allude to the mere 
 disregard of neutrality. Whatever international 
 moralists may say, such disregard is a mere ques- 
 tion of expediency. If the benefits to be gained by 
 attacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are such 
 as to counterbalance the risk of incurring the 
 enmity of the neutral power, why then the attack 
 ought to be made. Had Hilyar, when he first made 
 his appearance off Valparaiso, sailed in with his two 
 ships, the men at quarters and guns out, and at 
 once attacked Porter, considering the destruction 
 
306 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 of the Essex as outweighing the insult to Chili, why 
 his behavior would have been perfectly justifiable. 
 In fact this is unquestionably what he intended to 
 do ; but he suddenly found himself in such a posi- 
 tion, that in the event of hostilities, his ship would 
 be the captured one, and he owed his escape purely 
 to Porter's over-forbearance, under great provocation. 
 Then he gave his word to Porter that he would not 
 infringe on the neutrality ; and he never dared to 
 break it, until he saw Porter was disabled and 
 almost helpless ! This may seem strong language 
 to use about a British ofificer, but it is justly strong. 
 Exactly as any outsider must consider Warrington's 
 attack on the British brig Nautilus in 1815, as a 
 piece of needless cruelty ; so any outsider must con- 
 sider Hilyar as having most treacherously broken 
 faith with Porter. 
 
 After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and 
 courteously to the prisoners ; and, as already said, 
 he fought his ship most ably, for it would have 
 been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages. 
 But previous to the battle his conduct had been 
 over-cautious. It was to be expected that the 
 Essex would make her escape as soon as practicable, 
 and so he should have used every effort to bring her 
 to action. Instead of this he always declined the 
 fight when alone ; and he owed his ultimate success 
 to the fact that the Essex instead of escaping, as she 
 could several times have done, stayed, hoping to 
 bring the Phcebe to action single-handed. It must 
 be remembered that the Essex was almost as weak 
 compared to the Phcebe, as the Cherub was com- 
 pared to the Essex. Tne latter was just about mid- 
 way between the British ships, as may be seen by 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 307 
 
 the following comparison. In the action the Essex 
 fought all six of her long 12's, and the Cherub both 
 her long 9's, instead of the corresponding broadside 
 carronades which the ships regularly used. This 
 gives the Essex a better armament than she would 
 have had fighting her guns as they were regularly 
 used ; but it can be seen how great the inequality 
 still was. It must also be kept in mind, that while 
 in the battles between the American 44's and 
 British 38's, the short weight 24-pounders of the 
 former had in reality no greater range or accuracy 
 than the full weight i8's of their opponents, in this 
 case the Phoebe s full weight iS's had a very much 
 greater range and accuracy than the short weight 
 12's of the Essex. 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 
 Phcebe, 
 
 Men. 
 320 
 
 Cherub, 180 
 
 Essex. 
 
 500 men. 
 
 255 
 
 Broadside Guns. 
 13 long i8's 
 I " 12 
 
 I " 9 
 7 short 32's 
 
 1 " iS 
 
 23 guns, 
 
 2 long 9's 
 2 short i8's 
 9 " 32's 
 
 13 guns, 
 
 36 guns, 
 
 6 long 12's 
 17 short 32's 
 
 Weight. 
 234 lbs. 
 
 12 " 
 
 9 " 
 
 224 " 
 18 " 
 
 497 lbs. 
 
 18 lbs. 
 36 " 
 288 " 
 
 342 lbs. 
 
 839 lbs., metal. 
 ( 273 long. 
 ] 566 short. 
 
 ToC 
 
 (255) 
 (242) 
 
 (l8) 
 (324) 
 
 ( 273 long. ) 
 -- - t. \ 
 
 66 lbs. (Taking 7 per cent. 
 * ( weight. 
 
 255 men, 23 guns, 
 
 570 lbs. 
 
308 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 All accounts agree as to the armament of the 
 Essex. I have taken that of the Ph(ebe and Cherub 
 from James ; but Captain Porter's ofificial letter, and 
 all the other American accounts make the Phabes 
 broadside 15 long i8's and 8 short 32's, and give the 
 Cherub, in all, 18 short 32's, 8 short 24's, and two 
 long nines. This would make their broadside 904 
 lbs., 288 long, 616 short. I would have no doubt 
 that the American accounts were right if the ques- 
 tion rested solely on James' veracity; but he proba- 
 bly took his figures from official sources. At any 
 rate, remembering the difference between long guns 
 and carronades, it appears that the Essex was 
 really nearly intermediate in force between the 
 Phoebe and the Cherub. The battle being fought, 
 with a very trifling exception, at long range, it was 
 in reality a conflict between a crippled ship throw- 
 ing a broadside of 66 lbs. of metal, and two ships 
 throwing 273 lbs., who by their ability to manoeuvre 
 could choose positions where they could act with 
 full effect, while their antagonist could not return a 
 shot. Contemporary history does not afford a 
 single instance of so determined a defence against 
 such frightful odds. 
 
 The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter 
 agree substantially in all respects ; the details of the 
 fight, as seen in the Essex, are found in the "Life of 
 Farragut." But although the British captain does 
 full justice to his foe, British historians have univer- 
 sally tried to belittle Porter's conduct. It is much 
 to be regretted that we have no British account 
 worth paying attention to of the proceedings before 
 the fight, when the Plicebe declined single combat 
 with the Essex. James, of course, states that the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 309 
 
 Phcebe did not decline it, but he gives no authority, 
 and his unsupported assertion would be valueless 
 even if uncontradicted. His account of the action 
 is grossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably garbled 
 Hilyar's report. One instance of this I have already 
 mentioned, as regards Hilyar's account of Porter's 
 loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the Essex 
 was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies 
 this, thereby impliedly accusing the British captain 
 of falsehood. There is really no need of the cor- 
 roboration of Porter's letter, but he has it most 
 fully in the " Life of Farragut," p. 37 : " The men 
 came rushing up from below, many with their 
 clothes burning, which were torn from them as 
 quickly as possible, and those for whom this could 
 not be done were told to jump overboard and quench 
 the flames. * * * One man swam to shore with 
 scarcely a square inch of his body which had not 
 been burned, and, although he was deranged for 
 some days, he ultimately recovered, and afterward 
 served with me in the West Indies." The third un- 
 founded statement in James' account is that buck- 
 ets of spirits were found in all parts of the main 
 deck of the Essex, and that most of the prisoners 
 were drunk. No authority is cited for this, and 
 there is not a shadow of truth in it. He ends by 
 stating that " few even in his own country will vent- 
 ure to speak well of Captain David Porter." After 
 these various paragraphs we are certainly justified 
 in rejecting James' account in toto. An occasional 
 mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance 
 of a good many facts does not invalidate a man's 
 testimony with regard to some others with which he 
 is acquainted ; but a wilful and systematic perver- 
 
3IO NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 sion of the truth in a number of cases throw a ver)' 
 strong doubt on a historian's remaining statements, 
 unless they are supported by unquestionable au- 
 thority. 
 
 But if British historians have generally given Por- 
 ter much less than his due, by omitting all reference 
 to the inferiority of his guns, his lost top-mast, etc., 
 it is no worse than Americans have done in similar 
 cases. The latter, for example, will make great al- 
 lowances in the case of the Essex for her having 
 carronades only, but utterly fail to allude to the Cy- 
 ane and Levant as having suffered under the same 
 disadvantages. They should remember that the 
 rules cut both ways. 
 
 The Essex\\2M\x\^ suffered chiefly above the water- 
 line, she was repaired sufficiently in Valparaiso to 
 enable her to make the voyage to England, where 
 she was added to the British navy. The Essex 
 Junior was disarmed and the American prisoners 
 embarked in her for New York, on parole. But 
 Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain Adams, Midship- 
 man Lyman, and 1 1 seamen were exchanged on the 
 spot for some of the British prisoners on board the 
 Essex Junior. McKnight and Lyman accompanied 
 the Phoebe to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on 
 a Swedish vessel, were taken out of her by the Wasp, 
 Captain Blakely, and were lost with the rest of the 
 crew of that vessel. The others reached New York 
 in safety. Of the prizes made by the Essex, some 
 were burnt or sunk by the Americans, and some re- 
 taken by the British. And so, after nearly two 
 years' uninterrupted success, the career of the Essex 
 terminated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least 
 her officers and crew could reflect that they had 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 3II 
 
 afforded an ex;amrtle of courage in adversity that it 
 would be difficult/to match elsewhere. 
 
 The first of ihe new heavy sloops of war that 
 got to sea \yas the Frolic, Master Commandant 
 Joseph Bainbridge, which put out early in Febru- 
 ary. Shortly afterward she encountered a large 
 Carthagehian privateer, which refused to surrender 
 and was sunk by a broadside, nearly a hundred of 
 her crew being drowned. Before daylight on the 
 20th of April, lat. 24°i2' N., long. 8i°25' W., she 
 fell in with the British 36-gun frigate Orpheus, Capt. 
 Pigot, and the i2-gun schooner Shelburne, Lieut. 
 Hope, both to leeward. The schooner soon weath- 
 ered the Frolic, but of course was afraid to close, and 
 the American sloop continued beating to windward, 
 in the effort to escape, for nearly 13 hours ; the water 
 was started, the anchors cut away, and finally the 
 guns thrown overboard — a measure by means of 
 which both the Hornet, the Rattlesnake, and the 
 Adams succeeded in escaping under similar circum- 
 stances, — but all was of no avail, and she was finally 
 captured. The court of inquiry honorably acquitted 
 both officers and crew. As was to be expected 
 James considers the surrender a disgraceful one, be- 
 cause the guns were thrown overboard. As I have 
 said, this was a measure which had proved success- 
 ful in several cases of a like nature ; the criticism is 
 a piece of petty meanness. Fortunately we have 
 Admiral Codrington's dictum on the surrender 
 (" Memoirs," vol. i, p. 310), which he evidently con- 
 sidered as perfectly honorable. 
 
 A sister ship to the Frolic, the Peacock, Capt. Lewis 
 Warrington, sailed from New York on March 12th, 
 
312 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 and cruised southward ; on the 28th of April, at 
 seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47' N., long. 80° 7' 
 W., several sail were made to windward.' These 
 were a small convoy of merchant-men, bound for the 
 Bermudas, under the protection of the i8-gun brig- 
 sloop Epervier, Capt. Wales, 5 days out of Havana, 
 and with $118,000 in specie on board.' 'Y\\q Eper- 
 vier when discovered was steering north by east, 
 the wind being from the eastward ; soon after- 
 ward the wind veered gradually round to the south- 
 ward, and the Epervier hauled up close on the port 
 tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the 
 Peacock came down with the wind on her starboard 
 quarter. At 10 A. M. the vessels were within gun- 
 shot, and the Peacock edged away to get in a raking 
 broadside, but the Epervier frustrated this by put- 
 ting her helm up until close on her adversary's bow, 
 when she rounded to and fired her starboard guns, 
 receiving in return the starboard broadside of the 
 Peacock at 10.20 A. M. These first broadsides took 
 effect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, 
 while the Peacock's fore-yard was totally disabled by 
 two round shot in the starboard quarter, which de- 
 prived the ship of the use of her fore-sail and fore- 
 top-sail, and compelled her to run large. However, 
 the Epervier eased away' when abaft her foe's beam, 
 and ran off alongside of her (using her port guns, 
 while the American still had the starboard battery 
 engaged) at 10.35. The Peacock's fire was now very 
 hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on 
 which it told heavily, while she did not suffer at all 
 in return. The Epervier coming up into the wind, 
 
 ' Official letter of Capt. Warrington, April 29, 1814. 
 
 ° James, vi, 424. 
 
 ° According to some accounis she at this time tacked. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 313 
 
 owing somewhat to the loss of head-sail, Capt. 
 Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but they 
 refused, saying " she 's too heavy for us,'" and then, 
 at 11.05 the colors were hauled down. 
 
 Fc/lCOCf! 
 
 I 
 
 / 
 
 JO.IO / 
 
 Except the injury to her fore-yard, the Peacock's 
 damages were confined to the loss of a few top-mast 
 and top-gallant backstays, and some shot-holes 
 through her sails. Of her crew, consisting, all told, 
 
 'James, "Naval Occurrences," p. 243. 
 
314 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 of i66 men and boys," only two were wounded, both 
 slightly. The Epervier, on the other hand, had 45 
 shot-holes in her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, 
 main-top-mast over the side, main-mast nearly in 
 two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded 
 severely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays shot 
 away; and of her crew of 128 men (according to the 
 list of prisoners given by Captain Warrington; 
 James says 118, but he is not backed up by any 
 official report) 9 were killed and mortally wounded, 
 and 14 severely and slightly wounded. Instead of 
 two long sixes for bow-chasers, and a shifting carron- 
 ade, she had two 18-pound carronades (according to 
 the American prize-lists ; " Capt. Warrington says 
 32's). Otherwise she was armed as usual. She was, 
 like the rest of her kind, very " tubby," being as 
 broad as the Peacock, though 10 feet shorter on deck. 
 Allowing, as usual, 7 per cent, for short weight of 
 the American shot, we get the 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 
 
 
 No. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Broadside Guns. 
 
 Weight Metal. 
 
 Crew. 
 
 Loss. 
 
 Peacock ' 
 
 509 
 
 11 
 
 31S 
 
 166 
 
 2 
 
 Epervier 
 
 477 
 
 9 
 
 274 
 
 128 
 
 23 
 
 That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, the 
 relative execution done was as 12 is to i, and the 
 Epervier surrendered before she had lost a fifth of 
 her crew. The case of the Epervier closely re- 
 
 ' " Niles' Register," vi, lg6, says only 160; the above is taken 
 from Warrington's letter of June ist, presei"vecl with the other manu- 
 script letters in the Naval Archives. The crew contained about 10 
 boys, was not composed of picked men, and did not number 185 — 
 vide James. 
 
 " Araerican State Papers, vol. xiv, p, 427. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 315 
 
 sembles that of the Argus. In both cases the offi- 
 cers behaved finely ; in both cases, too, the victori- 
 ous foe was heavier, in about the same proportion, 
 while neither the crew of the Argus, nor the crew 
 of the Epervier fought with the determined bravery 
 displayed by the combatants in almost every other 
 struggle of the war. But it must be added that the 
 Epervier did worse than the Argus, and the Peacock 
 (American) better than the Pelican. The gunnery of 
 the Epervier was extraordinarily poor ; " the most 
 disgraceful part of the affair was that our ship was 
 cut to pieces and the enemy hardly scratched." ' 
 James states that after the first two or three broad- 
 sides several carronades became unshipped, and 
 that the others were dismounted by the fire of the 
 Peacock ; that the men had not been exercised at 
 the guns ; and, most important of all, that the crew 
 (which contained " several foreigners," but was 
 chiefly British ; as the Argus' was chiefly American) 
 was disgracefully bad. The Peacock, on the con- 
 trary, showed skilful seamanship as well as excellent 
 gunnery. In 45 minutes after the fight was over 
 the fore-yard had been sent down and fished, the 
 fore-sail set up, and every thing in complete order 
 again;'' the prize was got in sailing order by dark, 
 though great exertions had to be made to prevent 
 her sinking. Mr. Nicholson, first of the Peacock, wd^s 
 put in charge as prize-master. The next day the 
 two vessels were abreast of Amelia Island, when two 
 frigates were discovered in the north, to leeward. 
 Capt. Warrington at once directed the prize to pro- 
 ceed to St. Mary's, while he separated and made 
 
 ' " Memoirs of Admiral Codrington," i, 322. 
 ' Letter of Capt. Warrington, April 29, 1814. 
 
3l6 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 sail on a wind to the south, intending to draw the 
 frigates after him, as he was confident that the Pea- 
 cock, a very fast vessel, could outsail them.' The 
 plan succeeded perfectly, the brig reaching Savan- 
 nah on the first of May, and the ship three days 
 afterward. The Epervier was purchased for the 
 U. S. navy, under the same name and rate. The 
 Peacock sailed again on June 4th,'' going first north- 
 ward to the Grand Banks, then to fhe Flores ; then 
 she stationed herself in the mouth of the. Irish 
 Channel, and afterward cruised off Cork, the mouth 
 of the Shannon, and the north of Ireland, capturing 
 several very valuable prizes and creating great con- 
 sternation. She then changed her station, to elude 
 the numerous vessels that had been sent after her, 
 and sailed southward, off Cape Ortegal, Cape Finis- 
 terre, and finally among the Barbadoes, reaching 
 New York, Oct. 29th. During this cruise she en- 
 countered no war vessel smaller than a frigate ; but 
 captured 14 sail of merchant-men, some containing 
 valuable cargoes, and manned by 148 men. 
 
 On April 29th, H.M.S. schooner Ballahou, 6, 
 Lieut. King, while cruising off the American coast 
 was captured by the Perry, privateer, a much 
 heavier vessel, after an action of 10 minutes' dura- 
 tion. 
 
 The general peace prevailing in Europe allowed 
 the British to turn their energies altogether to 
 America; and in no place was this increased vigor 
 so much felt as in Chesapeake Bay where a great 
 number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and 
 
 " Letter of Capl. Warrington, May 4, 1814. 
 ^ Letter of Capt Warrington, Oct. 30, 1814. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 317 
 
 transports had assembled, in preparation for the 
 assault on Washington and Baltimore. The de- 
 fence of these waters was confided to Capt. Joshua 
 Barney," with a flotilla of gun-boats. These consisted 
 of three or four sloops and schooners, but mainly of 
 barges, which were often smaller than the ship's 
 boats that were sent against them. These gun- 
 boats were manned by from 20 to 40 men each, and 
 each carried, according to its size, one or two long 
 24-, 1 8-, or i2-pounders. They were bad craft at 
 best ; and, in addition, it is difificult to believe that 
 they were handled to the fullest advantage. 
 
 On June 1st Commodore Barney, with the block 
 sloop Scorpion and 14 smaller " gun-boats," chiefly 
 row gallies, passed the mouth of the Patuxent, and 
 chased the British schooner St. Lawrence and seven 
 boats, under Captain Barrie, until they took refuge 
 with the Dragon, 74, which in turn chased Barney's 
 flotilla into the Patuxent, where she blockaded it in 
 company with the Albion, 74. They were afterward 
 joined by the Loire, 38, Narcissus, 32, and Jasseur, 
 18, and Commodore Barney moved two miles up St. 
 Leonard's Creek, while the frigates and sloop block- 
 aded its mouth. A deadlock now ensued ; the gun- 
 boats were afraid to attack the ships, and the ships' 
 boats were just as afraid of the gun-boats. On the 
 8th, 9th, and nth skirmishes occurred; on each 
 occasion the British boats came up till they caught 
 sight of Barney's flotilla, and were promptly chased 
 off by the latter, which, however, took good care 
 not to meddle with the larger vessels. Finally, 
 
 ' He was bora at Baltimore, July 6, 1759 ; James, with habitual 
 accuracy, calls him an Irishman. He makes Decatur, by the way, 
 commit the geographical solecism of being born in " Maryland, Vir- 
 ginia." 
 
3l8 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Colonel Wadsworth, of the artillery, with two 
 long i8-pounders, assisted by the marines, under 
 Captain Miller, and a few regulars, offered to co- 
 operate from the shore while Barney assailed the 
 two frigates with the flotilla. On the 26th the joint 
 attack took place most successfully ; the Loire and 
 Narcissus were driven off, although not much dam- 
 aged, and the flotilla rowed out in triumph, with a 
 loss of but 4 killed and 7 wounded. But in spite of 
 this small success, which was mainly due to Colonel 
 Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made no more at- 
 tempts with his gun-boats. The bravery and skill 
 which the flotilla men showed at Bladensburg prove 
 conclusively that their ill success on the water was 
 due to the craft they were in, and not to any failing 
 of the men. At the same period the French gufi- 
 boats were even more unsuccessful, but the Danes 
 certainly did very well with theirs. 
 ' Barney's flotilla in the Patuxent remained quiet 
 until August 22d, and then was burned when the 
 British advanced on Washington. The history of 
 this advance, as well as of the unsuccessful one on 
 Baltimore, concerns less the American than the 
 British navy, and will be but briefly alluded to here. 
 On August 20th Major-General Ross and Rear- 
 Admiral Cockburn, with about 5,000 soldiers and 
 marines, moved on Washington by land ; while a 
 squadron, composed of the Seahorse, 38, Euryalus, 
 36, bombs Devastation, yEtna, and Meteor, and rocket- 
 ship Erebus, under Captain James Alexander Gor- 
 don, moved up the Potomac to attack Fort Wash- 
 ington, near Alexandria; and Sir Peter Parker, in the 
 Metielaus, 38, was sent " to create a diversion " above 
 Baltimore. Sir Peter's " diversion " turned out 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 319 
 
 most unfortunately for him : for, having landed to 
 attack some Maryland militia, under Colonel Reade, 
 he lost his own life, while fifty of his followers were 
 placed hors de combat and the remainder chased 
 back to the ship by the victors, who had but three 
 wounded. 
 
 The American army, which was to oppose Ross 
 and Cockburn, consisted of some seven thousand 
 militia, who fled so quickly that only about 1,500 
 British had time to become engaged. The fight was 
 really between these 1,500 British regulars and 
 the American flotilla men. These consisted of 78 
 marines, under Captain Miller, and 370 sailors, some 
 of whom served under Captain Barney, who had a 
 battery of two iS's and three 12's, while the others 
 were armed with muskets and pikes, and acted with 
 the marines. Both sailors and marines did nobly, 
 inflicting most of the loss the British suffered, 
 which amounted to 256 men, and in return lost 
 over a hundred of their own men, including the two 
 captains, who were wounded and captured, with the 
 guns.' Ross took Washington and burned the pub- 
 lic buildings ; and the panic-struck Americans fool- 
 ishly burned the Columbia, 44, and Argus, 18, which 
 were nearly ready for service. 
 
 Captain Gordon's attack on Fort Washington was 
 conducted with great skill and success. Fort Wash- 
 ington was abandoned as soon as fired upon, and 
 the city of Alexandria surrendered upon most hu- 
 miliating conditions. Captain Gordon was now 
 joined by the Fairy, 18, Captain Baker, who 
 brought him orders to return from Vice-Admiral 
 Cochrane ; and the squadron began to work down 
 
 ' The optimistic Cooper thinks that tivo regular regiments would 
 have given the Americans this battle — which is open to doubt. 
 
320 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 the river, which was very difficult to navigate. 
 Commodore Rodgers, with some of the crew 
 of the two 44's, Guerriire and Java, tried to 
 bar their progress, but had not sufficient means. 
 On September ist an attempt was made to destroy 
 the Devastation by fire-ships, but it failed ; on the 
 4th the attempt was repeated by Commodore 
 Rodgers, with a party of some forty men, but they 
 were driven off and attacked by the British boats, 
 under Captain Baker, who in turn was repulsed with 
 the loss of his second lieutenant killed, and some 
 twenty-five men killed or wounded. The squadron 
 also had to pass and silence a battery of light field- 
 pieces on the 5th, where they suffered enough to 
 raise their total loss to seven killed and thirty-five 
 wounded. Gordon's inland expedition was thus 
 concluded most successfully, at a very trivial cost ; 
 it was a most venturesome feat, reflecting great 
 honor on the captains and crews engaged in it. 
 
 Baltimore was threatened actively by sea and land 
 early in September. On the 13th an indecisive 
 conflict took place between the British regulars and 
 American militia, in which the former came off with 
 the honor, and the latter with the profit. The regu- 
 lars held the field, losing 350 men, including General 
 Ross ; the militia retreated in fair order with a 
 loss of but 200. The water attack was also un- 
 successful. At 5 A.M. on the 13th the bomb 
 vessels Meteor, yEtna, Terror, Volcano, and De- 
 vastation, the rocket-ship Erebus, and the frigates 
 Severn, Euryalus, Havannah, and Hebrus opened 
 on Fort McHenry, some of the other forti- 
 fications being occasionally fired at. A furious but 
 harmless cannonade was kept up between the forts 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 32 1 
 
 and ships until 7 A. M. on the 14th, when the British 
 fleet and army retired. 
 
 I have related^ these events out of their natural 
 order because they really had very little to do with 
 our navy, and yet it is necessary to mention them 
 in order to give an idea of the course of events. The 
 British and American accounts of the various gun- 
 boat attacks differ widely; but it is very certain that 
 the gun-boats accomplished little or nothing of im- 
 portance. On the other hand, their loss amounted 
 to nothing, for many of those that were sunk were 
 afterward raised, and the total tonnage of those de- 
 stroyed would not much exceed that of the British 
 barges captured by them from time to time or de- 
 stroyed by the land batteries. 
 
 The purchased brig Rattlesnake, 16, had been cruis- 
 ing in the Atlantic with a good deal of success ; but 
 in lat. .40° N., long. 33° W., was chased by a frigate 
 from which Lieutenant Renshaw, the brig's com- 
 mander, managed to escape only by throwing over- 
 board all his guns except two long nines ; and on 
 June 22d he was captured by the Leander, 50, Cap- 
 tain Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C. B. 
 
 The third of the new sloops to get to sea was 
 the Wasp, 22, Captain Johnston Blakely, which left 
 Portsmouth on May 1st, with a very fine crew of 173 
 men, almost exclusively New Englanders ; there was 
 said not to have been a single foreign seaman on 
 board. It is, at all events, certain that during the 
 whole war no vessel was ever better manned and 
 commanded than this daring and resolute cruiser. 
 The Wasp slipped unperceived through the block- 
 ading frigates, and ran into the mouth of the Eng- 
 
322 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 lish Channel, right in the thick of the English cruis- 
 ers ; here she remained several weeks, burning and 
 scuttling many ships. Finally, on- June 28th, at 4 
 A. M., in lat. 48° 36' N., long. 11° 15' W.,' while in 
 chase of two merchant-men, a sail was made on the 
 weather-beam. This was the British brig-sloop 
 Reindeer, 18, Captain William Manners," with a crew 
 of 118, as brave men as ever sailed or fought on the 
 narrow seas. Like the Peacock (British) the Rein- 
 deer was only armed with 24-pounders, and Captain 
 Manners must have known well that he was to do 
 battle with a foe heavier than himself; but there 
 was no more gallant seaman in the whole British 
 navy, fertile as it was in men who cared but little 
 for odds of size or strength. As the day broke, the 
 Reindeer made sail for the Wasp, then lying in the 
 west-southwest. 
 
 The sky was overcast with clouds, and the smooth- 
 ness of the sea was hardly disturbed by the light 
 breeze that blew out of the northeast. Captain 
 Blakely hauled up and stood for his antagonist, as 
 the latter came slowly down with the wind nearly 
 aft, and so light was the weather that the vessels 
 kept almost on even keels. It was not till quarter 
 past one that the Wasp's drum rolled out its loud 
 challenge as it beat to quarters, and a few minutes 
 afterward the ship put about and stood for the foe, 
 thinking to weather him ; but at 1.50 the brig also 
 tacked and stood away, each of the cool and skil- 
 ful captains being bent on keeping the weather- 
 gage. At half past two the Reindeer again tacked, 
 and, taking in her stay-sails, stood for the Wasp, who 
 furled her royals ; and, seeing that she would be 
 
 ' Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. ' James, vi, 429. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 323 
 
 weathered, at 2.50, put about in her turn and ran off, 
 with the wind a Httle forward the port beam, brail- 
 ing up the mizzen, while the Reindeer hoisted her 
 flying-jib, to close, and gradually came up on the 
 Wasfs weather-quarter. At 17 minutes past three, 
 when the vessels were not sixty yards apart, tlie 
 British opened the conflict, firing the shifting 12- 
 pound carronade, loaded with round and grape. To 
 this the Americans could make no return, and it 
 was again loaded and fired, with the utmost deliber- 
 ation ; this was repeated five times, and would have 
 been a trying ordeal to a crew less perfectly disci- 
 plined than the Wasp's. At 3.26 Captain Blakely, 
 finding his enemy did not get on his beam, put his 
 helm a-lee and luffed up, firing his guns from aft 
 forward as they bore. For ten minutes the ship 
 and the brig lay abreast, not twenty yards apart, 
 while the cannonade was terribly destructive. The 
 concussion of the explosions almost deadened what 
 little way the vessels had on, and the smoke hung 
 over them like a pall. The men worked at the 
 guns with desperate energy, but the odds in weight 
 of metal (3 to 2) were too great against the Reindeer, 
 where both sides played their parts so manfully. 
 Captain Manners stood at his post, as resolute as 
 ever, though wounded again and again. A grape- 
 shot passed through both his thighs, bringing him 
 to the deck ; but, maimed and bleeding to death, 
 he sprang to his feet, cheering on the seamen. The 
 vessels were now almost touching, and putting his 
 helm aweather, he ran the Wasp aboard on her 
 port ' quarter, while the boarders gathered forward, 
 
 ' Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper says starboard ; 
 it is a point of little importance ; all accounts agree as to the rela- 
 tive positions of the craft. 
 
324 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 to try it with the steel. But the Carolina captain 
 had prepared for this with cool confidence ; the 
 marines came aft ; close under the bulwarks 
 crouched the boarders, grasping in their hands the 
 naked cutlasses, while behind them were drawn up 
 the pikemen. As the vessels came grinding together 
 the men hacked and thrust at one another through 
 the open port-holes, while the black smoke curled 
 up from between the hulls. Then through the 
 smoke appeared the grim faces of the British sea- 
 dogs, and the fighting was bloody enough ; for the 
 stubborn English stood well in the hard hand play. 
 But those who escaped the deadly fire of the top- 
 men, escaped only to be riddled through by the 
 long Yankee pikes ; so, avenged by their own 
 hands, the foremost of the assailants died, and the 
 others gave back. The attack was foiled, though 
 the Reindeer s marines kept answering well the 
 American fire. Then the English captain, already 
 mortally wounded, but with' the indomitable 
 courage that nothing but death could conquer, 
 cheering and rallying his men, himself sprang, sword 
 in hand, into the rigging, to lead them on ; and they 
 followed him with a will. At that instant a ball 
 from the Wasp' s main-top crashed through his skull, 
 and, still clenching in his right hand the sword he 
 had shown he could wear so worthily, with his face 
 to the foe, he fell back on his own deck dead, while 
 above him yet floated the flag for which he had 
 given his life. No Norse Viking, slain over shield, 
 ever died better. As the British leader fell and his 
 men recoiled, Captain Blakely passed the word to 
 board ; with wild hurrahs the boarders swarmed 
 over the hammock nettings, there was a moment's 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 325 
 
 furious struggle, the surviving British were slain or 
 driven below, and the captain's clerk, the highest 
 officer left, surrendered the brig, at 3.44, just 27 
 minutes after the Reindeer had fired the first gun, 
 and just 18 after the Wasp had responded. 
 
 328 ^ 
 REINDEER _ 3./T ttr'"""'' 
 
 WASP 0^ .-M'-'" 
 
 SJ7 
 
 Both ships had suffered severely in the short 
 struggle ; but, as with the Shannon and Chesapeake, 
 the injuries were much less severe aloft than in 
 the hulls. All the spars were in their places. The 
 Wasp's hull had received 6 round, and many grape ; 
 a 24-pound shot had passed through the foremast ; 
 and of her crew of 173, 11 were killed or mortally 
 wounded, and 15 wounded severely or slightly. 
 The Reindeer was completely cut to pieces in a line 
 with her ports ; her upper works, boats, and spare 
 spars being one entire wreck. Of her crew of 118 
 men, 33 were killed outright or died later, and 34 
 were wounded, nearly all severely. 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Broadside 
 Guns. 
 
 Weight 
 Metal. 
 
 No 
 Men. 
 
 Loss. 
 
 Wasp, 
 
 S°9 
 
 II 
 
 315 
 
 173 
 
 26 
 
 Jieindeer, 
 
 477 
 
 10 
 
 210 
 
 118 
 
 67 
 
326 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 It is thus seen that the Reindeer fought at a 
 greater disadvantage than any other of the various 
 British sloops that were captured in single action 
 during the war ; and yet she made a better fight 
 than any of them (though the Frolic, and the Frolic 
 only, was defended with the same desperate cour- 
 age) ; a pretty sure proof that heavy metal is not 
 the only factor to be considered in accounting for 
 the American victories. " It is difficult to say 
 which vessels behaved the best in this short but 
 gallant combat." ' I doubt if the war produced two 
 better single-ship commanders than Captain Blakely 
 and Captain Manners ; and an equal meed of praise 
 attaches to both crews. The British could rightly 
 say that they yielded purely to heavy odds in men 
 and metal ; and the Americans, that the difference 
 in execution was fully proportioned to the differ- 
 ence in force. It is difficult to know which to ad- 
 mire most, the wary skill with which each captain 
 manoeuvred before the fight, the perfect training 
 and discipline that their crews showed, the decision 
 and promptitude with which Captain Manners tried 
 to retrieve the day by boarding, and the desperate 
 bravery with which the attempt was made; or the 
 readiness with which Captain Blakely made his 
 preparations, and the cool courage with which the 
 assault was foiled. All people of the English stock, 
 no matter on which side of the Atlantic they live, 
 if they have any pride in the many feats of fierce 
 prowess done by the men of their blood and race, 
 should never forget this fight ; although we cannot 
 but feel grieved to find that such men — men of one 
 race and one speech ; brothers in blood, as well as 
 
 ' Cooper, ii, 287. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 327 
 
 in bravery — should ever have had to turn their 
 weapons against one another. 
 
 The day after the conflict the prize's foremast 
 went by the board, and, as she was much damaged 
 by shot, Captain Blakely burned her, put a portion 
 of his wounded prisoners on board a neutral, and 
 with the remainder proceeded to France, reaching 
 r Orient on the 8th day of July. 
 
 On July 4th Sailing-master Percival and 30 vol- 
 unteers of the New York flotilla ' concealed them- 
 selves on board a fishing-smack, and carried by sur- 
 prise the Eagle tender, which contained a 32-pound 
 howitzer and 14 men, 4 of whom were wounded. 
 
 On July I2th, while off the west coast of South 
 Africa, the American brig Syren was captured after 
 a chase of 1 1 hours by the Medway, 74, Capt. Brine. 
 The chase was to windward during the whole time, 
 and made every effort to escape, throwing overboard 
 all her boats, anchors, cables, and spare spars." Her 
 commander. Captain Parker, had died, and she was 
 in charge of Lieut. N. J. Nicholson. By a curious 
 coincidence, on the same day, July 12th, H. M 
 cutter Landrail, 4," of 20 men, Lieut, Lancaster^ 
 was captured by the American privateer Syren, a 
 schooner mounting i long heavy gun, with a crew 
 of 70 men ; the Landrail had 7, and the Syren 3 
 men wounded. 
 
 On July 14th Gun-boat No. 88, Sailing-master 
 George Clement, captured after a short skirmish the 
 tender of the Tenedos frigate, with her second lieu- 
 tenant, 2 midshipmen, and 10 seamen.* 
 
 ' Letter of Com. J. Lewis, July 6, 1814. 
 ' Letter of Capt. Brine to Vice-Admiral Tyler, July 12, 1814. 
 ^ James, vi, 436 ; his statement is wrong as regards the privaceer. 
 ^ Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, July 15, 1814. 
 
328 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 The Wasp stayed in 1' Orient till she was thor- 
 oughly refitted, and had filled, in part, the gaps in 
 her crew, from the American privateers in port. 
 On Aug. 27th, Captain Blakely sailed again, making 
 two prizes during the next three days. On Sept. 
 1st she came up to a convoy of 10 sail under the 
 protection of the Armada, 74, all bound for Gib- 
 raltar ; the swift cruiser hovered round the mer- 
 chant-men like a hawk, and though chased off again 
 and again by the line-of-battle ship, always returned 
 the instant the pursuit stopped, and finally actually 
 succeeded in cutting off and capturing one ship, 
 laden with iron and brass cannon, muskets, and 
 other military stores of great value. At half past 
 six on the evening of the same day, in lat. 47° 30' 
 N., long. 11° W., while running almost free, four sail, 
 two on the starboard bow, and two on the port, rather 
 more to leeward, were made out.' Capt. Blakely at 
 once made sail for the most weatherly of the four 
 ships in sight, though well aware that more than 
 one of them might prove to be hostile cruisers, and 
 they were all of unknown force. But the deter- 
 mined Carolinian was not one to be troubled by 
 such considerations. He probably had several men 
 less under his command than in the former action, 
 but had profited by his experience with the Rein- 
 deer in one point, having taken aboard her 12- 
 pounder boat carronade, of whose efficacy he had 
 had very practical proof. 
 
 The chase, the British brig-sloop Avon, 18, Cap- 
 tain the Honorable James Arbuthnot,^ was steering 
 almost southwest ; the wind, which was blowing 
 
 " Official letter of Capt. Blakely, Sept. 8, 1814. 
 *James, vi, 432. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 329 
 
 fresh from the southeast, being a little abaft the 
 port beam. At 7.00 the Avon began making night 
 signals with the lanterns, but the Wasp, disregarding 
 these, came steadily on ; at 8.38 the Avon fired a 
 shot from her stern-chaser,' and shortly afterward 
 another from one of her lee or starboard guns. At 
 20 minutes past 9, the Wasp was on the port or 
 weather-quarter of the Avon, and the vessels inter- 
 changed several hails ; one of the American officers 
 then came forward on the forecastle and ordered 
 the brig to heave to, which the latter declined 
 doing, and set her port foretop-mast studding sail. 
 The Wasp then, at 9.29, fired the 12-pound carron- 
 ade into her, to which the Avon responded with her 
 stern-chaser and the aftermost port guns. Capt. 
 Blakely then put his helm up, for fear his adversary 
 would try to escape, and ran to leeward of her, and 
 then ranged up alongside, having poured a broad- 
 side into her quarter. A close and furious engage- 
 ment began, at such short range that the only 
 one of the Wasp's crew who was wounded, was hit 
 by a wad ; four round shot struck her hull, killing 
 two men, and she suffered a good deal in her rig- 
 ging. The men on board did not know the name 
 of their antagonist ; but they could see through 
 the smoke and the gloom of the night, as her black 
 hull surged through the water, that she was a large 
 brig ; and aloft, against the sky, the sailors could be 
 discerned, clustering in the tops.'' In spite of the 
 darkness the Wasp's fire was directed with deadly 
 precision ; the Avon's gaff was shot away at almost 
 the first broadside, and most of her main-rigging 
 and spars followed suit. She was hulled again and 
 
 ' James, vi, 432. " Captain Blakely's letter. 
 
330 NAVAI, WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 WASP 
 
 9.23 
 
 AVON -.^. 
 
 tO.OA 
 
 again, often below water-line ; some of her carron- 
 ades were dismounted, and finally the main-mast 
 went by the board. At lo.oo, after 31 minutes of 
 combat, her fire had been completely silenced and 
 Captain Blakely hailed to know if she had struck. 
 No answer being received, and the brig firing a 
 few random shot, the action recommenced ; but at 
 10.12 the Avon was again hailed, and this time 
 answered that she had struck. While lowering 
 away a boat to take possession, another sail (H. B. M. 
 brig-sloop Castilian, 18, Captain Braimer) was seen 
 astern. The men were again called to quarters, and 
 every thing put in readiness as rapidly as possible ; 
 but at 10.36 two more sail were seen (one of which 
 was H. B. M. Tartarus, 20'). The braces being cut 
 away, the Wasp was put before the wind until new 
 ones could be wove. The Castilian pursued till she 
 came up close, when she fired her lee guns into, or 
 ' " Niles' Register," vi, 216. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 331 
 
 rather over, the weather-quarter of the Wasp, cut- 
 ting her rigging slightly. Repeated signals of dis- 
 tress having now been made by the Avon (which had 
 lost 10 men killed and 32 wounded), the Castilian 
 tacked and stood for her, and on closing found out 
 she was sinking. Hardly had her crew being taken 
 out when she went down. 
 
 Counting the Wasfs complement as full (though 
 it was probably two or three short), taking James' 
 statement of the crew of the Avon as true, including 
 the boat carronades of both vessels, and considering 
 the Avon's stern-chaser to have been a six-pounder, 
 we get the 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 
 
 Tons. 
 
 No. Guns. 
 
 Weight 
 Metal. 
 
 No. Men. 
 
 Loss. 
 
 Wasp, 
 
 509 
 
 12 
 
 327 
 
 160 
 
 3 
 
 Avon, 
 
 477 
 
 11 
 
 280 
 
 117 
 
 42 
 
 It is self-evident that in the case of this action 
 the odds, 14 to 11, are neither enough to account for 
 the loss inflicted being as 14 to i, nor for the rapidi- 
 ty with which, during a night encounter, the Avon 
 was placed in a sinking condition. " The gallantry 
 of the Avon's officers and crew cannot for a moment 
 be questioned ; but the gunnery of the latter ap- 
 pears to have been not one whit better than, to the 
 discredit of the British navy, had frequently before 
 been displayed in combats of this kind. Nor, judg- 
 ing from the specimen given by the Castilian, is it 
 likely that she would have performed any better." ' 
 On the other hand, " Capt. Blakely's conduct on this 
 
 ' James, vi, 435. 
 
332 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 occasion had all the merit shown in the previous ac- 
 tion, with the additional claim of engaging an 
 enemy under circumstances which led him to believe 
 that her consorts were in the immediate vicinity. 
 The steady, officer-like way in which the Avon was 
 destroyed, and the coolness with which he prepared 
 to engage the Castilian within ten minutes after his 
 first antagonist had struck, are the best encomiums 
 on this officer's character and spirit, as well as on 
 the school in which he had been trained." ' 
 
 The Wasp now cruised to the southward and 
 westward, taking and scuttling one or two prizes. 
 On Sept. 2ist, lat. 33° 12' N., long. 14° 56' W., she 
 captured the brig Atalanta, 8, with 19 men, which 
 proved a valuable prize, and was sent in with one 
 of the midshipmen, Mr. Geisinger, aboard, as prize- 
 master, who reached Savannah in safety on Nov. 
 4th. Meanwhile the Wasp kept on toward the 
 southeast. On Oct. gth, in lat. 18° 35' N., long. 
 30° 10' W., she spoke and boarded the Swedish brig 
 Adonis, and took out of her Lieut. McKnight and 
 Mr. Lyman, a master's mate, both late of the Essex, 
 on their way to England from Brazil. 
 
 This was the last that was ever heard of the gal- 
 lant but ill-fated Wasp. How she perished none 
 ever knew ; all that is certain is that she was never 
 seen again. She was as good a ship, as well man- 
 ned, and as ably commanded as any vessel in our 
 little navy; and it may be doubted if there was at 
 that time any foreign sloop of war of her size and 
 strength that could have stood against her in fair 
 fight. 
 
 As I have said, the Wasp was manned almost 
 
 ' Cooper, ii, 2gi, 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 333 
 
 exclusively by Americans. James says they were 
 mostly Irish ; the reason he gives for the assertion 
 being that Capt. Blakely spent the first i6 months 
 of his life in Dublin. This argument is quite on a 
 par with another piece of logic which I cannot resist 
 noticing. The point he wishes to prove is that 
 Americans are cowards. Accordingly, on p. 475 : 
 "On her capstan the Constitution now mounted a 
 piece resembling 7 musket barrels, fixed together 
 with iron bands. It was discharged by one lock, 
 and each barrel threw 25 balls. * * * What 
 could have impelled the Americans to invent such' 
 extraordinary implements of war but fear, down- 
 right fear?" Then a little further on: "The men 
 were provided with leather boarding-caps, fitted with 
 bands of iron, * * * another strong symptom 
 of fear!" Now, such a piece of writing as this is 
 simply evidence of an unsound mind ; it is not so 
 much malicious as idiotic. I only reproduce it to 
 help prove what I have all along insisted on, that 
 any of James' unsupported statements about the 
 Americans, whether respecting the tonnage of the 
 ships or the courage of the crews, are not worth the 
 paper they are written on ; on all points connected 
 purely with the British navy, or which can be 
 checked off by official documents or ships' logs, or 
 where there would be no particular object in falsify- 
 ing, James is an invaluable assistant, from the dili- 
 gence and painstaking care he shows, and the thor- 
 oughness and minuteness with which he goes into 
 details. 
 
 A fair-minded and interesting English critic,' 
 whose remarks are generally very just, seems to me 
 
 ' Lord Howard Douglass, " Treatise on Naval Gunnery," p. 416. 
 
334 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 to have erred somewhat in commenting on this last 
 sloop action. He says that the Avon was first crip- 
 pled by dismantling shot from long guns. Now, 
 the Wasp had but one long gun on the side engaged, 
 and, moreover, began the action with the shortest 
 and lightest of her carronades. Then he continues 
 tliat the Avon, like the Peacock, "was hulled so low 
 that the shot-holes could not be got at, and yielded 
 to this fatal circumstance only." It certainly cannot 
 be said when a brig has been dismasted, has had 
 a third of her crew placed hors de combat, and has 
 been rendered an unmanageable hulk, that she yields 
 only because she has received a few shot below the 
 water-line. These shot-holes undoubtedly hastened 
 the result, but both the Peacock and the Avon would 
 have surrendered even if they had remained abso- 
 lutely water-tight. 
 
 The Adams, 28, had been cut down to a sloop of 
 war at Washington, and then lengthened into a 
 flush-decked, heavy corvette, mounting on each side 
 15 medium iS's, or columbiads, and i long 12, with 
 a crew of 220 men, under the command of Capt. 
 Charles Morris, late first lieut. of the Constitution!' 
 She slipped out of the Potomac and past the block- 
 aders on Jan. 18th, and cruised eastward to the 
 African coast and along it from Cape Mount to 
 Cape Palmas, thence to the Canaries and Cape de 
 Verd. She returned very nearly along the Equator, 
 thence going toward the West Indies. The cruise 
 was unlucky, but a few small prizes, laden with palm- 
 oil and ivory, being made. In hazy weather, on 
 
 '"Autobiography of Commodore Morris," Annapolis, 1880, p. 
 172. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 335 
 
 March 25th, a large Indiaman (the Woodbridge) was 
 captured ; but while taking possession the weather 
 cleared up, and Capt. Morris found himself to lee- 
 ward of 25 sail, two of which, a two-decker and a 
 frigate, were making for him, and it took him till the 
 next day to shake them off. He entered Savannah 
 on May ist and sailed again on the 8th, standing in 
 to the Gulf Stream, between Makanilla and Florida, 
 to look out for the Jamaica fleet. He found this 
 fleet on the 24th, but the discovery failed to do him 
 much good, as the ships were under the convoy of a 
 74, two frigates, and three brigs. The Adams hov- 
 ered on their skirts for a couple of days, but noth- 
 ing could be done with them, for the merchant-men 
 sailed in the closest possible order and the six war 
 vessels exercised the greatest vigilance. So the 
 corvette passed northward to the Newfoundland 
 Banks, where she met with nothing but fogs and 
 floating ice, and then turned her prow toward Ire- 
 land. On July 4th she made out and chased two 
 sail, who escaped into the mouth of the Shannon. 
 After this the Adams, heartily tired of fogs and 
 cold, stood to the southward and made a few 
 prizes ; then, in lat. 44° N., long. 10° W., on July 
 15th, she stumbled across the i8-pounder 36-gun 
 frigate Tigris, Capt. Henderson. The frigate was 
 to leeward, and a hard chase ensued. It was only 
 /by dint of cutting away her anchors and throwing 
 overboard some of her guns that the Adams held 
 her own till sunset, when it fell calm. Capt Morris 
 and his first lieutenant, Mr. Wadsworth, had been 
 the first and second lieutenants of Old Ironsides in 
 Hull's famous cruise, and they proved that they had 
 not forgotten their early experience, for they got 
 
336 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 out the boats to tow, and employed their time so 
 well that by sunrise the frigate was two leagues 
 astern. After 18 hours' more chase the Adams 
 dropped her. But in a day or two she ran across a 
 couple more, one of which, an old bluff-bows, was 
 soon thrown out ; but the other was very fast, and 
 kept close on the corvette's heels. As before, the 
 frigate was to leeward. The Adams had been built 
 by contract ; one side was let to a sub-contractor of 
 economical instincts, and accordingly turned out 
 rather shorter than the other; the result was, the 
 ship sailed a good deal faster on one tack than on 
 the other. In this chase she finally got on her good 
 tack in the night, and so escaped.' Capt. Morris 
 now turned homeward. During his two cruises he 
 had made but 10 prizes (manned by I61 men), none 
 of very great value. His luck grew worse and 
 worse. The continual cold and damp produced 
 scurvy, and soon half of his crew were prostrated by 
 the disease ; and the weather kept on foggy as ever. 
 Off the Maine coast a brig-sloop (the Rifleman, Capt. 
 Pearce) was discovered and chased, but it escaped 
 in the thick weather. The fog grew heavier, and 
 early on the morning of Aug. 17th the Adams struck 
 land — literally struck it, too, for she grounded on 
 the Isle of Haute, and had to throw over provisions, 
 spare spars, etc., before she could be got off. Then 
 she entered the Penobscot, and sailed 27 miles up it 
 to Hampden. The Rifleman meanwhile conveyed 
 intelligence of her whereabouts to a British fleet, 
 consisting of two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, 
 three sloops, and ten troop transports, under the 
 
 ' This statement is somewhat traditional ; I have also seen it made 
 about the fohn Adams. But some old officers have told me positively 
 Ihat it occurred to the Adams on this cruise. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 337 
 
 joint command of Rear-Admiral Griffeth and Lieu- 
 tenant-General Sherbrooke.' 
 
 This expedition accordingly went into the Penob- 
 scot and anchored off Castine. Captain Morris 
 made every preparation he could to defend his ship, 
 but his means were very limited; seventy of his men 
 were dead or disabled by the scurvy ; the remainder, 
 many of them also diseased, were mustered out, to 
 the number of 130 officers and seamen (without 
 muskets) and 20 marines. He was joined, however, 
 by 30 regulars, and later by over 300 militia armed 
 with squirrel guns, ducking- and fowling-pieces, etc., 
 — in all between 500 and 550 men," only 180 of 
 whom, with 50 muskets among them, could be de- 
 pended upon. On Sept. 3d the British advanced 
 by land and water, the land-force being under the 
 direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John, and consisting 
 of 600 troops, 80 marines, and 80 seamen. ° The 
 flotilla was composed of barges, launches, and rock- 
 et-boats, under the command of Captain Barry of 
 the Dragon, 74. In all there were over 1,500 men. 
 The seamen of the Adams, from the wharf, opened 
 fire on the flotilla, which returned it with rockets and 
 carronades ; but the advance was checked. Meanwhile 
 the British land-forces attacked the militia, who 
 acted up to the traditional militia standard, and re- 
 treated with the utmost promptitude and celerity, 
 omitting the empty formality of firing. This left 
 
 'James, vi, 479, " "Autobiography of Commodore Morris." 
 
 ' James, vi. 481. Whenever militia are concerned James has not 
 much fear of official documents and lets his imagination run riot ; 
 he here' says the Americans had 1,400 men, which is as accurate as he 
 generally is in writing about this species of force. His aim being to 
 overestimate the number of the Americans in the various engage- 
 ments, he always supplies militia ad libitum, to make up any possible 
 deficiency. 
 
338 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Captain Morris surrounded by eight times his num- 
 ber, and there was nothing to do but set fire to the 
 corvette and retreat. The seamen, marines, and 
 regulars behaved well, and no attempt was made to 
 molest them. None of Captain Morris' men were 
 hit ; his loss was confined to one sailor and one ma- 
 rine who were too much weakened by scurvy to re- 
 treat with the others, who marched to Portland, 200 
 miles off. The British lost ten men killed or 
 wounded. 
 
 On Sept. 9th Gunboats No. 160 and 151, com- 
 manded by Mr. Thomas M. Pendleton, captured off 
 Sapoleo Bar, Ga., the British privateer Fortune of 
 War, armed with two heavy pivot guns, and 35 men. 
 She made a brief resistance, losing two of her men.' 
 
 On Sept. 15th the British 20-gun ship-sloops 
 Hermes and Carron, and i8-gun brig-sloops Sophie 
 and Childers, and a force of 200 men on shore," at- 
 tacked Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point, but were re- 
 pulsed without being able to do any damage what- 
 ever to the Americans. The Hermes was sunk and 
 the assailants lost about 80 men. 
 
 On the 26th of September, while the privateer- 
 schooner General Armstrong, of New York, Captain 
 Samuel C. Reid, of one long 24, eight long g's, and 
 90 men, was lying at anchor in the road of Fayal, a 
 British squadron, composed of the Plantagenet, 74, 
 Captain Robert Floyd, Rota, 38, Captain Philip 
 Somerville, and Carnation, 18, Captain George Ben- 
 tham, hove in sight.' One or more boats were 
 
 ' Letter from Commodore H. E. Campbell, St. Mary's, Sept. 12, 
 1814. 
 
 " James, vi, 527. 
 
 ' Letter of Captain S. C. Reid, Oct. 7, 1814 ; and of John B. Dab- 
 ifw, Consul at Fayal, Oct. 5, 18 14. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 335 
 
 sent in by the British, to reconnoitre the schooner, 
 as they asserted, or, according to the American ac- 
 counts, to carry her by a coup de main. At any 
 rate, after repeatedly warning them off, the priva- 
 teer fired into them, and they withdrew. Captain 
 Reid then ancliored, with springs on his cables, 
 nearer shore, to await the expected attack, which 
 was not long deferred. At 8 P. M. four boats from 
 the Plantagenet and three from the Rota, contain- 
 ing in all 180 men,' under the command of 
 Lieutenant William Matterface, first of the Rota, 
 pulled in toward the road, while the Carnation 
 accompanied them to attack the schooner if she 
 got under way. The boats pulled in under cover 
 of a small reef of rocks, where they lay for some 
 time, and about midnight made the attack. The 
 Americans opened with the pivot gun, and im- 
 mediately afterward with their long 9's, while the 
 boats replied with their carronades, and, pulling 
 spiritedly on amidst a terrific fire of musketry from 
 both sides, laid the schooner aboard on her bow 
 and starboard quarter. The struggle was savage 
 enough, the British hacking at the nettings and try- 
 ing to clamber up on deck, while the Americans 
 fired their muskets and pistols in the faces of their 
 assailants and thrust the foremost through with 
 their long pikes. The boats on the quarter were 
 driven off ; but on the forecastle all three of the 
 American lieutenants were killed or disabled, and 
 the men were giving back when Captain Reid led 
 all the after-division up and drove the British back 
 into their boats. This put an end to the assault. 
 
 'James, vi, 509 : Both American accounts say 12 boats, with 400 
 men, and give the British loss as 250. According to my usual rule, I 
 take each side's statement of ils own force and loss 
 
340 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Two boats were sunk, most of the wounded being 
 saved as the shore was so near ; two others were 
 captured, and but three of the scattered flotilla re- 
 turned to the ships. Of the Americans, 2 were 
 killed, including the second lieutenant, Alexander 
 O. Williams, and 7 were wounded, including the 
 first and third lieutenants, Frederick A. Worth and 
 Robert Johnson. Of the British, 34 were killed and 
 86 were wounded ; among the former being the 
 Rotas first and third lieutenants, William Matter- 
 face and Charles R. Norman, and among the latter 
 her second lieutenant and first lieutenant of marines, 
 Richard Rawle and Thomas Park. The schooner's 
 long 24 had been knocked ofl its carriage by a car- 
 ronade shot, but it was replaced and the deck 
 cleared for another action. Next day the Carna- 
 tion came in to destroy the privateer, but was 
 driven off by the judicious use the latter made of 
 her " Long Tom." But affairs being now hopeless, 
 the General Armstrong wom scuttled and burned, and 
 the Americans retreated to the land. The British 
 squadron was bound for New Orleans, and on ac- 
 count of the delay and loss that it suffered, it was 
 late in arriving, so that this action may be said to 
 have helped in saving the Crescent City. Few 
 regular commanders could have done as well as 
 Captain Reid. 
 
 On October 6th, while Gun-boat No. 160 was 
 convoying some coasters from Savannah, it was car- 
 ried by a British tender and nine boats.' The gun- 
 vessel was lying at anchor about eight leagues from 
 St, Mary's, and the boats approached with muffled 
 oars early in the morning. They were not discov- 
 
 ' Letter from Commander H. C. Campbell, Oct 12, 1814. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 341 
 
 ered till nearly aboard, but the defence though 
 short was spirited, the British losing about 20 men. 
 Of the gun-boat's 30 men but 16 were fit for action; 
 those, under Sailing-master Thomas Paine, behaved 
 well. Mr. Paine, especially, fought with the great- 
 est gallantry ; his thigh was broken by a grape-shot 
 at the very beginning, but he hobbled up on his 
 other leg to resist the boarders, fighting till he was 
 thrust through by a pike and had received two 
 sabre cuts. Any one of his wounds would have 
 been enough to put an ordinary man hors de 
 combat. 
 
 On October nth, another desperate privateer 
 battle took place. The brigantine Prince-de-Neuf- 
 chatel. Captain Ordronaux, of New York, was a su- 
 perbly built vessel of 310 tons, mounting 17 guns, 
 and originally possessing a crew of 1 50 men.' She 
 had made a very successful cruise, having on board 
 goods to the amount of $300,000, but had manned 
 and sent in so many prizes that only 40 of her crew 
 were left on board, while 37 prisoners were confined 
 in the hold. One of her prizes was in company, 
 but had drifted off to such a distance that she was 
 unable to take part in the fight. At mid-day, on 
 the nth of October, while off Nantucket, the 
 British frigate Endymion, 40, Captain Henry Hope, 
 discovered the privateer and made sail in chase. '^ 
 At 8.30 P. M., a calm having come on, the frigate 
 despatched 5 boats, containing in men," under the 
 
 ' " History of American Privateers," by George Coggesliall, p. 241, 
 New York, 1876. 
 
 ' James, vi, p. 527, 
 
 ' According to Captain Ordronaux ; James does not give the num- 
 ber, but says 28 were killed, 37 wounded, and the crew of the launch 
 captured. Ten of the latter were unwounded, and 18 wounded. I 
 do not know if he included these last among his "37 wounded," 
 
342 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 command of the first lieutenant, Abel Hawkins, to 
 take the brigantine ; while the latter triced up the 
 boarding nettings, loaded the guns with grape and 
 bullets, and prepared herself in every way for the 
 coming encounter. She opened fire on the boats as 
 they drew near, but they were soon alongside, and 
 a most desperate engagement ensued. Some of the 
 British actually cut through the nettings and 
 reached the deck, but were killed by the privateers- 
 men ; and in a few minutes one boat was sunk, 
 three others drifted off, and the launch, which was 
 under the brigantine's stern, was taken possession of. 
 The slaughter had been frightful, considering the 
 number of the combatants. The victorious priva- 
 teersmen had lost 7 killed, 15 badly and 9 slightly 
 wounded, leaving but 9 untouched ! Of the. Endym- 
 ions men, James says 28, including the first lieuten- 
 ant and a midshipman, were killed, and 37, including 
 the second lieutenant and a master's mate, wounded ; 
 " besides which the launch was captured and the 
 crew made prisoners." I do not know if this means 
 37 wounded, besides the wounded in the launch, or 
 not'; of the prisoners captured 18 were wounded 
 and 10 unhurt, so the loss was either 28 killed, 55 
 wounded, and 10 unhurt prisoners ; or else 28 
 killed, 37 wounded, and 10 prisoners; but whether 
 the total was 93 or 75 does not much matter. It 
 was a most desperate conflict, and, remembering 
 how short-handed the brigantine was, it reflected 
 the highest honor on the American captain and his 
 crew. 
 
 After their repulse before Baltimore the British 
 
 ' I think James does not include tlie wounded in the launch, as he 
 says 28 wounded were sent aboard the Saturn ; this could hardly 
 have included the men who had been captured. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 343 
 
 concentrated their forces for an attack upon New 
 Orleans. Accordingly a great fleet of line-of-battle 
 ships, frigates, and smaller vessels, under Vice-Ad- 
 miral Cochrane, convoying a still larger number of 
 store-ships and transports, containing the army of 
 General Packenham, appeared off the Chandeleur 
 Islands on Dec. 8th. The American navy in these 
 parts consisted of the ship Louisiana and schooner 
 Carolina in the Mississippi river, and in the shallow 
 bayous a few gun-boats, of course without quarters, 
 low in the water, and perfectly easy of entrance. 
 There were also a few tenders and small boats. The 
 British frigates and sloops anchored off the broad, 
 shallow inlet called Lake Borgne on the 12th ; on 
 this inlet there were 5 gun-boats and 2 small ten- 
 ders, under the command of Lieut. Thomas Catesby 
 Jones. It was impossible for the British to trans- 
 port their troops across Lake Borgne, as contem- 
 plated, until this flotilla was destroyed. Accord- 
 ingly, on the night of the 12th, 42 launches, armed 
 with 24-, 1 8-, and 12-pounder carronades, and 3 un- 
 armed gigs, carrying 980 seamen and marines, un- 
 der the orders of Capt. Lockyer,' pushed off from 
 the Armide, 38, in three divisions ; the first under 
 the command of Capt. Lockyer, the second under 
 Capt. Montresor, and the third under Capt. Rob- 
 erts." Lieut. Jones was at anchor with his boats at 
 the Malheureux Islands, when he discovered, on the 
 13th, the British flotilla advancing toward Port 
 Christian. He at once despatched the Seahorse 
 of one 6-pounder and 14 men, under Sailing- 
 master William Johnston, to destroy the stores at 
 Bay St. Louis. She moored herself under the bank, 
 
 ■' James, vi, 521. 
 
 ' Letter of Capt. Lockyer to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, Dec. 18, 1814. 
 
344 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 where she was assisted by two 6-pounders. There 
 the British attacked her with seven of their smaller 
 boats, which were repulsed after sustaining for 
 nearly half an hour a very destructive fire.' How- 
 ever, Mr. Johnston had to burn his boat to prevent it 
 from being taken by a larger force. Meanwhile 
 Lieut. Jones got under way with the five gun-vessels, 
 trying to reach Les Petites Coquilles, near a small 
 fort at the mouth of a creek. But as the wind was 
 light and baffling, and the current very strong, the 
 effort was given up, and the vessels came to anchor 
 off Malheureux Island passage at i A. M. on the 
 14th." The other tender, the Alligator, Sailing- 
 master Sheppard, of one 4-pounder and 8 men, was 
 discovered next morning trying to get to her con- 
 sorts, and taken with a rush by Capt. Roberts and 
 his division. At daybreak Lieut. Jones saw the 
 British boats about nine miles to the eastward, and 
 moored his 5-gun vessel abreast in the channel, with 
 their boarding nettings triced up, and every thing 
 in readiness ; but the force of the current drifted two 
 of them, Nos. 156 and 163, a hundred yards down 
 the pass and out of line. No. 156 being the head- 
 most of all. Their exact force was as follows : No. 
 156, Lieut. Jones, 41 men and 5 guns(i long 24 and 
 4 i2-pound carronades) ; No. 163, Sailing-master 
 Geo. Ulrick, 21 men, 3 guns (i long 24 and 2 12- 
 pound carronades) ; No. 162, Lieut. Robert Speddes 
 35 men, 5 guns (i long 24 and 4 light sixes) ; No. 5, 
 Sailing-master John D. Ferris, 36 men, 5 guns (i 
 long 24, 4 12-pound carronades); No. 23, Lieut. 
 Isaac McKeever, 39 men and 5 guns (i long 32 and 
 4 light sixes). There were thus, in all, 182 men and 
 
 ' James, vi, 521. 
 
 ' Official letter of Lieut. Jones, March 12, 18 15. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 345 
 
 a broadside of 14 guns, throwing 212 pounds of 
 shot. The British forces amounted, as I have said, 
 to 980 men, and (supposing they had equal num- 
 bers of 24's, i8's, and 12's,) the flotilla threw 
 seven hundred and fifty-eight pounds of shot. The 
 odds of course were not as much against the Amer- 
 icans as these figures would make them, for they 
 were stationary, had some long, heavy guns and 
 boarding nettings ; on the other hand the fact that 
 two of their vessels had drifted out of line was a 
 very serious misfortune. At any rate, the odds 
 were great enough, considering that he had British 
 sailors to deal with, to make it any thing but a cheer- 
 ful look-out for Lieut. Jones ; but nowise daunted 
 by the almost certain prospect of defeat the Ameri- 
 can officers and seamen prepared very coolly for the 
 fight. In this connection it should be remembered 
 that simply to run the boats on shore would have 
 permitted the men to escape, if they had chosen to 
 do so. 
 
 Captain Lockyer acted as coolly as his antagonist. 
 When he had reached a point just out of gun-shot, 
 he brought the boats to a grapnel, to let the sailors 
 eat breakfast and get a little rest after the fatigue 
 of their long row. When his men were rested and 
 in good trim he formed the boats in open order, 
 and they pulled gallantly on against the strong cur- 
 rent. At 10.50 the Americans opened fire from 
 their long guns, and in about 15 minutes the can- 
 nonade became general on both sides. At 11.50' 
 Captain Lockyer's barge was laid alongside No. 156, 
 and a very obstinate struggle ensued, " in which 
 the greater part of the officers and crew of the 
 
 ' Lieut. Jones' letter. 
 
346 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 barge were killed or wounded," ' including among 
 the latter the gallant captain himself, severely, and 
 his equally gallant first lieutenant, Mr. Pratt, of the 
 Seahorse frigate, mortally. At the same time Lieut. 
 Tatnall (of the Tonnani) also laid his barge aboard 
 the gun-boat, only to have it sunk ; another shared 
 the same fate ; and the assailants were for the 
 moment repulsed. But at this time Lieut. Jones, 
 who had shown as much personal bravery during 
 the assault, as forethought in preparing for it, re- 
 ceived a dangerous and disabling wound, while 
 many of his men received the same fate ; the board- 
 ing nettings, too, had all been cut or shot away. 
 Several more barges at once assailed the boats, 
 the command of which had devolved on a young 
 midshipman, Mr. George Parker; the latter, fighting 
 as bravely as his commander, was like him severely 
 wounded, whereupon the boat was carried at 12.10. 
 Its guns were turned on No. 163, and this, the 
 smallest of the gun-boats, was soon taken ; then the 
 British dashed at No. 162 and carried it, after a 
 very gallant defence, in which Lieut. Speddes was 
 badly wounded. No. 5 had her long 24 dis- 
 mounted by the recoil, and was next carried ; finally, 
 No. 23, being left entirely alone, hauled down her 
 flag at 12.30.^ The Americans had lost 6 killed 
 and 35 wounded; the British 17 killed and "JJ (many 
 mortally) wounded. The greater part of the loss 
 on both sides occurred in boarding No. 156, and 
 also the next two gun-boats. 
 
 I have in this case, as usual, taken each com- 
 mander's account of his own force and loss. Lieut. 
 Jones states the British force to have been 1,000, 
 
 ' Captain Lockyer's letter. 
 
 ' Minutes of the Court of Inquiry, held May 15, 1851. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 347 
 
 which tallies almost exactly with their own ac- 
 count ; but believes that they lost 300 in killed 
 and wounded. Captain Lockyer, on the other 
 hand, gives the Americans 225 men and three ad- 
 ditional light guns. But on the main points the 
 two accounts agree perfectly. The victors cer- 
 tainly deserve great credit for the perseverance, 
 gallantry, and dash they displayed ; but still more 
 belongs to the vanquished for the cool skill and 
 obstinate courage with which they fought, al- 
 though with the certainty of ultimate defeat be- 
 fore them, — which is always the severest test of 
 bravery. No comment is needed to prove the ef- 
 fectiveness of their resistance. Even James says 
 that the Americans made an obstinate struggle, 
 that Lieut. Jones displayed great personal bravery, 
 and that the British loss was very severe. 
 
 On the night of Dec. 23d Gen. Jackson beat up 
 the quarters of the British encamped on the bank 
 of the Mississippi. The attack was opened by Capt. 
 Patterson in the schooner Carolina, 14; she was 
 manned by 70 men, and mounted on each side six 
 12-pound carronades and one long 12. Dropping 
 down the stream unobserved, till opposite the biv- 
 ouac of the troops and so close to the shore that 
 his first command to fire was plainly heard by the 
 foe, Patterson opened a slaughtering cannonade on 
 the flank of the British, and kept it up without 
 suffering any loss in return, as long as the attack 
 lasted. But on the 27th the British had their re- 
 venge, attacking the little schooner as she lay at 
 anchor, unable to ascend the current on account of 
 the rapid current and a strong head-wind. The as- 
 sailants had a battery of 5 guns, throwing hot shot 
 
 ^Cooper, ii, p. 320. 
 
348 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 and shell, while the only gun of the schooner's that 
 would reach was the long I2. After half an hour's 
 fighting the schooner was set on fire and blown up ; 
 the crew escaped to the shore with the loss of 7 men 
 killed and wounded. The only remaining vessel, 
 exclusive of some small, unarmed row-boats, was the 
 Louisiana, 16, carrying on each side eight long 24's. 
 She was of great assistance in the battle of the 28th, 
 throwing during the course of the cannonade over 
 800 shot, and suffering very little in return.' After- 
 ward the American seamen and marines played a 
 most gallant part in all the engagements on shore ; 
 they made very efficient artillerists. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 The following vessels were got ready for sea during this year : ' 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rig. 
 
 Where Built. 
 
 Cost. 
 
 d 
 a 
 
 m 
 
 S 
 
 
 c 
 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Wasp^ 
 
 Ship 
 
 Newburyport 
 
 $77,459.&' 
 
 t6o 
 
 22 
 
 509 
 
 Built 
 
 Frolic^ 
 
 " 
 
 Boston 
 
 72,094.82 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 Peacocky 
 
 " 
 
 New York 
 
 75,644.36 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 
 " 
 
 Ontario^ 
 
 " 
 
 Baltimore 
 
 59,343.69 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 '• 
 
 " 
 
 Erie^ 
 
 >' 
 
 " 
 
 56,174.36 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 Tom Bowline^ 
 
 Schooner 
 
 Portsmouth 
 
 13,000.00 
 
 90 
 
 12 
 
 260 
 
 Purchased 
 
 LynXy 
 
 " 
 
 Washington 
 
 
 50 
 
 6 
 
 
 Built 
 
 Epcrvier^ 
 
 Brig 
 
 England 
 
 50,000.00 
 
 130 
 
 18 
 
 477 
 
 Captured 
 
 Flambeau^ 
 
 " 
 
 Baltimore 
 
 14,000.00 
 
 90 
 
 M 
 
 300 
 
 Purchased 
 
 
 Spark, 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 17,389.00 
 
 ■' 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 fi 
 
 
 Firejly, 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 17,435.00 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 333 
 
 " 
 
 ■ 
 
 Torch, 
 
 Schooner 
 
 " 
 
 13,000.00 
 
 60 
 
 12 
 
 260 
 
 " 
 
 
 Spil/ire, 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 20,000.00 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 286 
 
 " 
 
 
 Eagle, 
 
 " 
 
 N. 0. 
 
 
 " 
 
 
 270 
 
 " 
 
 
 Prometheus^ 
 
 " 
 
 Philadelphia 
 
 20,000.00 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 290 
 
 " 
 
 
 Chippe'way,^ 
 
 Brig 
 
 R.I. 
 
 52,000.00 
 
 90 
 
 14 
 
 390 
 
 " 
 
 
 Saranac, 
 
 " 
 
 Middleton 
 
 26,000.00 
 
 " 
 
 
 360 
 
 " 
 
 
 Boxer,, 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 26,000 00 
 
 " 
 
 " 
 
 37° 
 
 " 
 
 Despatch, 
 
 Schooner 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 2 
 
 S2 
 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 349 
 
 The first 5 small vessels that are bracketed were 
 to cruise under Commodore Porter ; the next 4 
 under Commodore Perry ; but the news of peace 
 arrived before either squadron put to sea. Some of 
 the vessels under this catalogue were really almost 
 ready for sea at the end of 181 3 ; and some that I 
 have included in the catalogue of 1815 were almost 
 completely fitted at the end of 1814, — but this ar- 
 rangement is practically the best. 
 
 LIST OF VESSELS LOST TO THE BRITISH. 
 
 I. DESTROYED BY BRITISH ARMIES. 
 Tons. Guns. 
 
 Columbia, 
 
 1,508 
 
 52 
 
 Adams, 
 
 760 
 
 28 
 
 Argus, 
 
 5°9 
 
 22 
 
 Carolina, 
 
 230 
 
 14 
 
 3,007 
 
 116 
 
 Destroyed to prevent 
 them falling into hands 
 of enemy. 
 Destroyed by battery. 
 
 2. CAPTURED, ETC., BY BRITISH NAVY ON OCEAN. 
 
 Name. Tons. 
 
 Essex, 860 
 
 Frolic, 509 
 
 Rattlesnake, 258 
 Syren, 250 
 
 Guns. 
 
 46 Captured by frigate and corvette. 
 
 22 " by-frigate and schooner. 
 
 16 " by frigate. 
 
 16 " by seventy-four. 
 
 1,877 100 
 Total, 4,884 tons. 216 guns. 
 
 There were also a good many gun-boats, which 1 
 do not count, because, as already said, they were 
 
350 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 often not as large as the barges that were sunk and 
 taken in attacking them, or at Craney Island, etc. 
 
 LIST OF VESSELS TAKEN FROM BRITISH. 
 
 I. CAPTURED BY AMERICAN PRIVATEERS. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Ballahou, 
 
 86 
 
 4 
 
 Landrail, 
 
 76 
 
 4 
 
 2. CAPTURED, ETC., BY AMERICAN NAVY ON OCEAN, 
 
 Name. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 
 Epervier 
 
 477 
 
 18 
 
 captured by sloop Peacock. 
 
 Avon, 
 
 477 
 
 20 
 
 sunk " " Wasp. 
 
 Reindeer, 
 
 477 
 
 19 
 
 »t (< <( (f 
 
 Pictou, 
 
 300 
 
 14 
 
 captured by frigate. 
 
 3. SUNK IN ATTACKING FORT. 
 
 Hermes, 500 22 
 
 2,393 lOI 
 
 Taking into account the losses on the lakes, there 
 was not very much difference in the amount of dam- 
 age done to each combatant by the other ; but both 
 as regards the material results and the moral effects, 
 the balance inclined largely to the Americans. The 
 chief damage done to our navy was by the British 
 land-forces, and consisted mainly in forcing us to 
 burn an unfinished frigate and sloop. On the ocean 
 our three sloops were captured in each case by an 
 overwhelming force, against which no resistance 
 could be made, and. the same was true of the capt- 
 ured British schooner. The Essex certainly gained 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 35 I 
 
 as much honor as her opponents. There were but 
 three single ship actions, in all of which the Ameri- 
 cans were so superior in force as to give them a 
 very great advantage ; nevertheless, in two of them 
 the victory was won with such perfect impunity and 
 the difTerence in the loss and damage inflicted was 
 so verj'' great, that I doubt if the result would have 
 been affected if the odds had been reversed. In the 
 other case, that of the Reindeer, the defeated party 
 fought at a still greater disadvantage, and yet came 
 out of the conflict with full as much honor as the 
 victor. No man with a particle of generosity in his 
 nature can help feeling the most honest admiration 
 for the unflinching courage and cool skill displayed 
 by Capt. Manners and his crew. It is worthy of no- 
 tice (remembering the sneers of so many of the 
 British authors at the "wary circumspection " of the 
 Americans) that Capt. Manners, who has left a more 
 honorable name than any other British commander 
 of the war, excepting Capt. Broke, behaved with 
 the greatest caution as long as it would serve his 
 purpose, while he showed the most splendid per- 
 sonal courage afterward. It is this combination of 
 courage and skill that made him so dangerous an 
 antagonist ; it showed that the traditional British 
 bravery was not impaired by refusing to adhere to 
 the traditional British tactics of rushing into a fight 
 "bull-headed." Needless exposure to danger de- 
 notes not so much pluck as stupidity. Capt. Man- 
 ners had no intention of giving his adversary any 
 advantage he could prevent. No one can help 
 feeling regret that he was killed ; but if he was to 
 fall, what more glorious death could he meet ? It 
 must be remembered that while paying all homage 
 
352 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 to Capt. Manners, Capt Blakely did equally well. It 
 was a case where the victory between two comba- 
 tants, equal in courage and skill, was decided by su- 
 perior weight of metal and number of men. 
 
 
 PRIZES 
 
 MADE. 
 
 
 Name of ship. 
 
 President 
 
 
 
 Number of prizes. 
 
 3 
 
 Constitution 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 Adams 
 
 
 
 lo 
 
 Frolic 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Wasp 
 Peacock 
 
 
 
 15 
 15 
 
 Hornet 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 Small craft 
 
 
 
 3S 
 
 ?7 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 1 8 14. 
 
 ON THE LAKES. 
 
 Ontario — The contest one of ship-building merely — Extreme caution of the 
 commanders, verging on timidity — Yeo takes Oswego, and blockades Sackett's 
 Harbor — British gun-boats captured — Chauncy blockades Kingston — Erie — 
 Captain Sinclair's unsuccessful expedition — Daring and successful cutting-out 
 expeditions of the British — Champlain — Macdonough's victory. 
 
 ONTARIO. 
 
 THE winter was spent by both parties in pre- 
 paring more formidable fleets^ for the ensuing 
 summer. All the American schooners had proved 
 themselves so unfit for service that they were con- 
 verted into transports, except the Sylph, which was 
 brig-rigged and armed like the Oneida. Sackett's 
 Harbor possessed but slight fortifications, and the 
 Americans were kept constantly on the alert, 
 through fear lest the British should cross over. 
 Commodore Chauncy and Mr. Eckford were as un- 
 remitting in their exertions as ever. In February 
 two 22-gun brigs, the Jefferson and Jones, and one 
 large frigate of 50 guns, the Superior, were laid ; 
 afterward a deserter brought in news of the enor- 
 mous size of one of the new British frigates, and 
 the Superior was enlarged to permit her carrying 62 
 guns. The Jefferson was launched on April 7th, the 
 Jones on the loth ; and the Superior on May 2d, — 
 an attempt on the part of the British to blow her 
 up having been foiled a few days before. Another 
 
 353 
 
354 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 frigate, the Mohawk, 42, was at once begun. Neither 
 guns nor men for the first three ships had as yet 
 arrived, but they soon began to come in, as the 
 roads got better and the streams opened. Chauncy 
 and Eckford, besides building ships that were 
 Hterally laid down in the forest, and seeing that they 
 were armed with heavy guns, which, as well as all 
 their stores, had to be carried overland hundreds of 
 miles through the wilderness, were obliged to settle 
 quarrels that occurred among the men, the most 
 serious being one that arose from a sentinel's acci- 
 dentally killing a shipwright, whose companions in- 
 stantly struck work in a body. What was more 
 serious, they had to contend with such constant 
 and virulent sickness that it almost assumed the 
 proportions of a plague. During the winter it was 
 seldom that two thirds of the force were fit for duty, 
 and nearly a sixth of the whole number of men in 
 the port died before navigation opened.' 
 
 Meanwhile Yeo had been nearly as active at 
 Kingston, laying down two frigates and a huge line- 
 of-battle ship, but his shipwrights did not succeed 
 in getting the latter ready much before navigation 
 closed. The Prince Regent, 58, and Princess Char- 
 lotte, 42, were launched on April 15th. I shall an- 
 ticipate somewhat by giving tabular lists of the 
 comparative forces, after the two British frigates, 
 the two American frigates, and the two American 
 brigs had all been equipped and manned. Commo- 
 dore Yeo's original six cruisers had been all re- 
 named, some of them re-armed, and both the 
 schooners changed into brigs. The Wolfe, Royal 
 
 ' Cooper mentions that in five months the Madison buried a fifth 
 of her crew. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 355 
 
 George, Melville, Moira, Beresford, and Sydney 
 Smith, were now named respectively Montreal, 
 Niagara, Star, Charwell, Netly, and Magnet. On 
 the American side there had been but slight 
 changes, beyond the alteration of the Sylyh into a 
 brig armed like the Oneida. Of the Superior s 62 
 guns, 4 were very shortly sent on shore again. 
 
 chauncy's squadron. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rig. 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Superior, 
 
 ship, 
 
 1,580 
 
 Mohawk, 
 
 « t 
 
 1,350 
 
 Pike, 
 
 " 
 
 875 
 
 Madison, 
 
 " 
 
 593 
 
 Jones, 
 
 trig. 
 
 500 
 
 Jefferson, 
 
 (( 
 
 500 
 
 Sylph, 
 
 (C 
 
 300 
 
 Oneida, 
 
 " 
 
 243 
 
 Crew. 
 
 Broadside 
 Metal. 
 
 ;oo 1,050 lbs. 
 
 350 
 
 300 
 
 160 
 
 160 
 
 554 
 360 
 364 
 332 
 332 
 i8o 
 180 
 
 ( 30 long 32' 
 \ 2 " 24' 
 ( 26 .short 42 
 I 26 long 24' 
 X 2 •■ 18 
 ( 14 short 32 
 j 26 long 24 
 ( 2 " 24' 
 j 2 long 12 
 / 22 short 32 
 
 {2 long 12 
 20 short 32 
 ( 2 long 12 
 ( 20 short 32 
 2 long 12' 
 14 short 24' 
 ( 2 long 12 
 j 14 short 24's 
 
 3 vessels, 
 
 5,941 1,870 3,352 lbs. 228 guns. 
 
 This is considerably less than James makes it, as 
 he includes all the schooners, which were abandoned 
 as cruisers, and only used as transports or gun-boats. 
 Similarly Sir James had a large number of gun- 
 boats, which are not included in his cruising force. 
 James thus makes Chauncy's force 2,321 men, and 
 a broadside of 4,188 lbs. 
 
3S6 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rig. 
 
 Prince Regent, 
 
 ship, 
 
 Princess Charlotte 
 
 
 Montreal, 
 
 " 
 
 Niagara, 
 
 •' 
 
 Charwell, 
 
 brig, 
 
 Star, 
 
 " 
 
 Nelly, 
 
 " 
 
 Magnet, 
 
 " 
 
 YEO'S SQUADRON. 
 
 Tonnage. Crew. 
 
 1,450 
 
 1,215 
 
 637 
 
 510 
 
 279 
 
 262 
 
 216 
 
 187 
 
 485 
 
 315 
 
 80 
 
 Broadside 
 Metal. 
 
 Armament. 
 
 872 lbs, 
 
 (. 32 long 24's 
 , < 4 short 68's 
 
 
 ( 22 " 32's 
 
 604 " 
 
 26 long 24's 
 ■ 2 short 68's 
 
 
 14 " 32's 
 
 258 " 
 
 7 long 24's 
 18 " iS's 
 
 332 " 
 
 2 long 12's 
 20 short 32's 
 
 236 " 
 
 ( 2 long 12's 
 ( 14 short 32's 
 
 236 " 
 
 2 long 12's 
 14 short 32's 
 
 180 " 
 
 ( 2 long 12's 
 ( 14 short 24's 
 
 156 " 
 
 2 long 12's 
 12 short 24's 
 
 8 vessels, 
 
 4,756 1,620 2,874 lbs. 209 guns. 
 
 This tallies pretty well with James' statement, 
 which (on p. 488) is 1,517 men, and a broadside of 
 2,752 lbs. But there are very probably errors as 
 regards the armaments of the small brigs, which 
 were continually changed. At any rate the Amer- 
 ican fleet was certainly the stronger, about in the 
 proportion of six to five. The disproportion was 
 enough to justify Sir James in his determination 
 not to hazard a battle, although the odds were cer- 
 tainly not such as British commanders had been 
 previously accustomed to pay much regard to. 
 Chauncy would have acted exactly as his oppo- 
 nent did, had he been similarly placed. The odds 
 against the British commodore were too great to 
 be overcome, where the combatants were otherwise 
 on a par, although the refusal to do battle against 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 357 
 
 them would certainly preclude Yeo from advancing 
 any claims to superiority in skill or courage. The 
 Princess Charlotte and Niagara were just about 
 equal to the Mohawk and Madison, and so were the 
 Charwell 3.nd Netly to the Oneida and Sylph; but 
 both the Star and Magnet together could hardly 
 have matched either the Jones or the Jefferson, 
 while the main-deck 32's of the Stiperior gave her a 
 great advantage over the Prince Regent's 24' s, where 
 the crews were so equal ; and the Pike was certainly 
 too heavy for the Montreal. A decided superiority 
 in the effectiveness of both crews and captains 
 could alone have warranted Sir James Lucas Yeo 
 in engaging, and this superiority he certainly did 
 not possess. 
 
 This year the British architects outstripped ours 
 in the race for supremacy, and Commodore Yeo put 
 out of port with his eight vessels long before the 
 Americans were ready. His first attempt was a suc- 
 cessful attack on.Oswego. This town is situated some 
 60 miles distant from Sackett's Harbor, and is the first 
 port on the lake which the stores, sent from the sea- 
 board to Chauncy, reached. Accordingly it was a 
 place of some little importance, but was very much 
 neglected by the American authorities. It was in- 
 sufficiently garrisoned, and was defended only by 
 an entirely ruined fort of 6 guns, two of them dis- 
 mounted. Commodore Yeo sailed from Kingston 
 to attack it on the 3d of May, having on board his 
 ships a detachment of 1,080 troops. Oswego was 
 garrisoned by less than 300 men,' chiefly belonging 
 to a light artillery regiment, with a score or two of 
 
 'General order of Gen. Jacob Brown, by R. Jones, Ass. Adj. -Gen- 
 eral, May 12, 1814. 
 
358 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 militia ; they were under the command of Colonel 
 Mitchell. The recaptured schooner Growler was in 
 port, with 7 guns destined for the Harbor; she 
 was sunk by her commander, but afterward raised 
 and carried off by the foe. 
 
 On the 5th Yeo appeared off Oswego and sent in 
 Captain Collier and 13 gun-boats to draw the fort's 
 fire ; after some firing between them and the four 
 guns mounted in the fort (two long 24's, one long 
 12, and one long 6), the gun-boats retired. The 
 next day the attack was seriously made. The 
 Princess Charlotte, Montreal, and Niagara engaged 
 the batteries, while the Charwcll and Star scoured 
 the woods with grape to clear them of the 
 militia.' The debarkation of the troops was super- 
 intended by Captain O'Connor, and until it was ac- 
 complished the Montreal sustained almost the whole 
 fire of the fort, being set on fire three times, and 
 much cut up in hull, masts,and rigging." Under 
 this fire 800 British troops were landed, under 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, assisted by 200 seamen, 
 armed with long pikes, under Captain Mulcaster. 
 They moved gallantly up the hill, under a heavy 
 fire, and carried the fort by assault ; Mitchell then fell 
 back unmolested to the Falls, about 12 miles above 
 the town, where there was a large quantity of 
 stores. But he was not again attacked. The Ameri- 
 cans lost 6 men killed, including Lieutenant Blaeny, 
 38 wounded, and 25 missing, both of' these last fall- 
 ing into the enemy's hands. The British lost 22 
 soldiers, marines, and seamen (including Captain 
 Hollaway) killed, and 73 (including the gallant Cap- 
 
 ' Letter of General Gordon Drummond, May 7, 1814. 
 ^ Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, May 17, 1814. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 359 
 
 tain Mulcaster dangerously, and Captain Popham 
 slightly) wounded," the total loss being 95 — nearly a 
 third of the American force engaged. General 
 Drummond, in his official letter, reports that " the 
 fort being everywhere almost open, the whole of* 
 the garrison * * * effected their escape, except 
 about 60 men, half of them wounded." No doubt the 
 fort's being " everywhere almost open " afforded 
 excellent opportunities for retreat ; but it was not 
 much of a recommendation of it as a structure in- 
 tended for defence. 
 
 The British destroyed the four guns in the bat- 
 tery, and raised the Growler and carried her off, 
 with her valuable cargo of seven long guns. They • 
 also carried off a small quantity of ordnance stores 
 and some flour, and burned the barracks; otherwise 
 but little damage was done, and the Americans re- 
 occupied the place at once. It certainly showed 
 great lack of energy on Commodore Yeo's part that 
 he did not strike a really important blow by sending 
 an expedition up to destroy the quantity of stores 
 and ordnance collected at the Falls. But the attack 
 itself was admirably managed. The ships were well 
 placed, and kept up so heavy a fire on the fort as to 
 effectually cover the debarkation of the troops, 
 which was very cleverly accomplished ; and the sol- 
 diers and seamen behaved with great gallantry and 
 steadiness, their officers leading them, sword in hand, 
 up a long, steep hill, under a destructive fire. It 
 was similar to Chauncy's attacks on York and Fort 
 George, except that in this case the assailants suf- 
 
 ' Letter of Lieut. -Col. V. Fischer, May 17, 1814. James says 
 " 18 Icilled and 64 wounded," why, I do not know ; the official re- 
 port of Col. Fischer, as quoted, says : " Of the army, 19 killed and 62 
 wounded ; of the navy, 3 killed and n wounded." 
 
360 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 fered a tnuch severer loss compared to that inflicted 
 on the assailed. Colonel Mitchell managed the de- 
 fence with skill, doing all he could with his insuffi- 
 cient materials. 
 
 •* After returning to Kingston, Yeo sailed with his 
 squadron for Sackett's Harbor, where he appeared 
 on May 19th and began a strict blockade. This 
 was especially troublesome because most of the 
 guns and cables for the two frigates had not yet ar- 
 rived, and though the lighter pieces and stores could 
 be carried over land, the heavier ones could only go 
 by water, which route was now made dangerous by 
 the presence of the blockading squadron. The very 
 important duty of convoying these great guns was 
 entrusted to Captain Woolsey, an officer of tried 
 merit. He decided to take them by water to Stony 
 Creek, whence they might be carried by land to the 
 Harbor, which was but three miles distant; and on 
 the success of his enterprise depended Chauncy's 
 chances of regaining command of the lake. On the 
 28th of May, at sunset, Woolsey left Oswego with 
 19 boats, carrying 21 long 32's, 10 long 24's, three 42- 
 pound carronades, and 10 cables — one of the latter, 
 for the Superior, being a huge rope 22 inches in cir- 
 cumference and weighing 9,600 pounds. The boats 
 rowed all through the night, and at sunrise on the 
 29th 18 of them found themselves off the Big Sal- 
 mon River, and, as it was unsafe to travel by day- 
 light, Woolsey ran up into Big Sandy Creek, 8 
 miles from the Harbor. The other boat, contain- 
 ing two long 24'st and a cable, got out of line, ran 
 into the British squadron, and was captured. The 
 news she brought induced Sir James Yeo at once to 
 send out an expedition to capture the others. He 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 361 
 
 accordingly despatched Captains Popham and Spils- 
 bury in two gun-boats, one armed witli one 68- 
 pound and one 24-pound carronade, and the other 
 with a long 32, accompanied by three cutters and a 
 gig, mounting between them two long 12's and two 
 brass 6's, with a total of 180 men." They rowed up 
 to Sandy Creek and lay off its mouth all the night, 
 and began ascending it shortly after daylight on 
 the 30th. Their force, however, was absurdly inad- 
 equate for the accomplishment of their object. 
 Captain Woolsey had been reinforced by some 
 Oneida Indians, a company of light artillery, and 
 some militia, so that his only care was, not to re- 
 pulse, but to capture the British party entire, and 
 even this did not need any exertion. He accord- 
 ingly despatched Major Appling down the river' 
 with 120 riflemen' and some Indians to lie in am- 
 bush'. When going up the creek the British ma- 
 rines, under Lieutenant Cox, were landed on the 
 left bank, and the small-arm men, under Lieuten- 
 ant Brown, on the right bank ; while the two cap- 
 tains rowed up the stream between them, throwing 
 grape into the bushes to disperse the Indians. Major 
 Appling waited until the British were close up, 
 when his riflemen opened with so destructive a 
 volley as to completely demoralize and " stam- 
 pede " them, and their whole force was captured 
 with hardly any resistance, the Americans having 
 
 ^ James, vi, 487 ; while Cooper says 186. James says the British 
 loss was 18 killed and 50 wounded ; Major Appling says " 14 were 
 killed, z8 wounded, and 27 marines and 106 sailors captured." 
 
 ' Letter from Major D. Appling, May 30, 1814. 
 
 'Letter of Capt. M. T. Woolsey, June i, 1814. There were about 
 60 Indians ; in all, the American force amounted to 180 men. James 
 adds 30 riflemen, 140 Indians, and " a large body of militia and cav- 
 alry," — none of whom were present. 
 
362 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 only one man slightly wounded. The British loss 
 was severe, — 18 killed and 50 dangerously wounded, 
 according to Captain Popham's report, as quoted 
 by James; or "14 killed and 28 wounded," accord- 
 ing to Major Appling's letter. It was a very clever 
 and successful ambush. 
 
 On June 6th Yeo raised the blockade of the Har- 
 bor, but Chauncy's squadron was not in condition 
 to put out till six weeks later, during which time 
 nothing was done by either fleet, except that two 
 very gallant cutting-out expeditions were success- 
 fully attempted by Lieutenant Francis H. Gregory, 
 U. S. N. On June i6th he left the Harbor, accom- 
 panied by Sailing-masters Vaughan and Dixon and 
 22 seamen, in three gigs, to intercept some of the 
 enemy's provision schooners ; on the 19th he was 
 discovered by the British gun-boat Black Snake, of 
 one 18-pound carronade and 18 men, commanded 
 by Captain H. Landon. Lieutenant Gregory 
 dashed at the gun-boat and carried it without the 
 loss of a man ; he was afterward obliged to burn it, 
 but he brought the prisoners, chiefly royal marines, 
 safely into port. On the 1st of July he again 
 started out, with Messrs. Vaughan and Dixon, and 
 two gigs. The plucky little party suffered greatly 
 from hunger, but on the 5th he made a sudden de- 
 scent on Presque Isle, and burned a 14-gun schooner 
 just ready for launching ; he was off before the foe 
 could assemble, and reached the Harbor in safety 
 next day. 
 
 On July 31st Commodore Chauncy sailed with his 
 fleet ; some days previously the larger British ves- 
 sels had retired to Kingston, where a loo-gun two- 
 decker was building. Chauncy sailed up to the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 363 
 
 head of the lake, where he intercepted the small 
 brig Magnet. The Sylph was sent in to destroy her, 
 but her crew ran her ashore and burned her. The 
 Jefferson, Sylph, and Oneida were left to watch some 
 other small craft in the Niagara; the Jones was 
 kept cruising between the Harbor and Oswego, and 
 with the four larger vessels Chauncy blockaded 
 Yeo's four large vessels lying in Kingston. The 
 four American vessels were in the aggregate of 
 4,398 tons, manned by rather more than 1,350 men, 
 and presenting in broadside J'j guns, throwing 2,328 
 lbs. of shot. The four British vessels measured in 
 all about 3,812 tons, manned by 1,220 men, and pre- 
 senting in broadside 74 guns, throwing 2,066 lbs. 
 of shot. The former were thus superior by about 
 15 per cent., and Sir James Yeo very properly de- 
 clined to fight with the odds against him — although 
 it was a nicer calculation than British commanders 
 had been accustomed to enter into. 
 
 Major-General Brown had written to Commodore 
 Chauncy on July 13th : " I do not doubt my ability 
 to meet the enemy in the field and to march in any 
 direction over his country, your fleet carrying for 
 me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts 
 George and Niagara, and carry Burlington Heights 
 and York, and proceed direct to Kingston and carry 
 that place. For God's sake let me see you : Sir 
 James will not fight." To which Chauncy replied : 
 " I shall afford every assistance in my power to co- 
 operate with the army whenever it can be done 
 without losing sight of the great object for the at- 
 tainment of which this fleet has been created, — the 
 capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet. But 
 that I consider the primary object. * * * We 
 
364 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 are intended to seek and fight the enemy's fleet, and 
 I shall not be diverted from my efforts to effectuate 
 it by any sinister attempt to render us subordinate 
 to, or an appendage of, the army." That is, by any 
 " sinister attempt " to make him co-operate intelli- 
 gently in a really well-concerted scheme of invasion. 
 In further support of these noble and independent 
 sentiments, he writes to the Sectetary of the Navy 
 on August loth.' " I told (General Brown) that I 
 should not visit the head of the lake unless the en- 
 emy's fleet did so. * * * Xo deprive the enemy 
 of an apology for not meeting, me I have sent ashore 
 four guns from XS\& Superior to reduce her armament 
 in number to an equality with the Prince Regent's, 
 yielding the advantage of their 68-pounders. The 
 Mohawk mounts two guns less than the Princess 
 Charlotte, and the Montreal and Niagara are equal 
 to the Pike and Madison." He here justifies his re- 
 fusal to co-operate with General Brown by saying 
 that he was of only equal force with Sir James, and 
 that he has deprived the latter of "an apology" for 
 not meeting him. This last was not at all true. 
 The Mohawk and Madison were just about equal to 
 the Princess Charlotte and Niagara ; but the Pike 
 was half as strong again as the Montreal ; and 
 Chauncy could very well afford to "yield the advan- 
 tage of their 68-pounders," when in return Sir James 
 had to yield the advantage of Chauncy's long 32's 
 and 42-pound carronades. The Superior was a 32- 
 pounder frigate, and, even without her four extra 
 guns, was about a fouth heavier than the Prince Re- 
 gent with her 24-pounders. Sir James was not act- 
 ing more warily than Chauncy had acted during 
 
 ' See Niles, vii, 12, and other places (under " Chauncy " in index). 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 365 
 
 June and July, 1813. Then he had a fleet which 
 tonned 1,701, was manned by 680 men, and threw 
 at a broadside 1,099 lbs. of shot ; and he declined to 
 go out of port or in any way try to check the op- 
 eration of Yeo's fleet which tonned 2,091, was 
 manned by 770 men, and threw at a broadside 
 1,374 lbs. of shot. Chauncy then acted perfectly 
 proper, no doubt, but he could not afford to sneer 
 at Yeo for behaving in the same way. Whatever 
 either commander might write, in reality he well 
 knew that his officers and crews were, man for man, 
 just about on a par with those of his antagonists, 
 and so, after the first brush or two, he was exceed- 
 ingly careful to see that the odds were not against 
 him. Chauncy, in his petulant answers to Brown's 
 letter, ignored the fact that his superiority of 
 force would prevent his opponent from giv- 
 ing battle, and would, therefore, prevent any 
 thing more important than a blockade occurring. 
 His ideas of the purpose for which his command 
 had been created were erroneous and very hurtful 
 to the American cause. That purpose was not, ex- 
 cept incidentally, " the destruction of the enemy's 
 fleet " ; and, if it was, he entirely failed to accom- 
 plish it. The real purpose was to enable Canada to 
 be successfully invaded, or to assist in repelling an 
 invasion of the United States. These services 
 could only be efficiently performed by acting in 
 union with the land-forces, for his independent ac- 
 tion could evidently have little effect. The only im- 
 portant services he had performed had been in at- 
 tacking Forts George and York, where he had been 
 rendered " subordinate to, and an appendage of, the 
 army." His only chance of accomplishing any 
 
366 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 thing lay in similar acts of cooperation, and he re- 
 fused to do these. Had he acted as he ought to have 
 done, and assisted Brown to the utmost, he would 
 certainly have accomplished much more than he did, 
 and might have enabled Brown to assault Kingston, 
 when Yeo's fleet would of course have been capt- 
 ured. The insubordination, petty stickling for his 
 own dignity, and lack of appreciation of the neces- 
 sity of acting in concert that he showed, were the 
 very faults which proved most fatal to the success 
 of our various land commanders in the early part 
 of the war. Even had Chauncy's assistance availed 
 nothing, he could not have accomplished less than 
 he did. He remained off Kingston blockading 
 Yeo, being once or twice blown off by gales. He 
 sent Lieutenant Gregory, accompanied by Midship- 
 man Hart and six men, in to reconnoitre on August 
 25th ; the lieutenant ran across two barges contain- 
 ing 30 men, and was captured after the midshipman 
 had been killed and the lieutenant and four men 
 wounded. On September 21st he transported 
 General Izard and 3,000 men from Sackett's Harbor 
 to the Genesee ; and then again blockaded Kingston 
 until the two-decker was nearly completed, when 
 he promptly retired to the Harbor. 
 
 The equally cautious Yeo did not come out on 
 the lake till Oct. 15th; he did not indulge in the 
 empty and useless formality of blockading his an- 
 tagonist, but assisted the British army on the Niag- 
 ara frontier till navigation closed, about Nov. 21st. 
 A couple of days before, Midshipman McGowan 
 headed an expedition to blow up the two-decker 
 (named the St. Lawrence) with a torpedo, but was 
 discovered by two of the enemy's boats, which he 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 367 
 
 captured and brought in ; the attempt was aban- 
 doned, because the St. Lawrence was found not to 
 be lying in Kingston. 
 
 For this year the material loss again fell heavi- 
 est on the British, amounting to one 14-gun brig 
 burned by her crew, one lo-gun schooner burned 
 on the stocks, three gun-boats, three cutters, and 
 one gig captured ; while in return the Amer- 
 icans lost one schooner loaded with seven guns, 
 one boat loaded with two, and a gig captured 
 and four guns destroyed at Oswego. In men the 
 British loss was heavier still relatively to that of 
 the Americans, being in killed, wounded, and pris- 
 oners about 300 to 80. But in spite of this loss and 
 damage, which was too trivial to be of any account 
 to either side, the success of the season was with the 
 British, inasmuch as they held command over the 
 lake for more than four months, during which time 
 they could cooperate with their army ; while the 
 Americans held it for barely two months and a half. 
 In fact the conduct of the two fleets on Lake On- 
 tario during the latter part of the war was almost 
 farcical. As soon as one, by building, acquired the 
 superiority, the foe at once retired to port, where he 
 waited until he had built another vessel or two, 
 when he came out, and the other went into port in 
 turn. Under such circumstances it was hopeless 
 ever to finish the contest by a stand-up sea-fight, 
 each commander calculating the chances with mathe- 
 matical exactness. The only hope of destroying 
 the enemy's fleet was by cooperating with the land- 
 forces in a successful attack on his main post, when 
 he would be forced to be either destroyed or to 
 fight — and this cooperation Chauncy refused to give. 
 
358 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 He seems to have been an excellent organizer, but 
 he did not use (certainly not in the summer of 1813) 
 his materials by any means to the best advantage. 
 He was hardly equal to his opponent, and the latter 
 seems to have been little more than an average offi- 
 cer. Yeo blundered several times, as in the attack 
 on Sackett's Harbor, in not following up his advan- 
 tage at Oswego, in showing so little resource in the 
 action off the Genesee, etc., and he was not troubled 
 by any excess of daring; but during the period 
 when he was actually cruising against Chauncy on 
 the lake he certainly showed to better advantage 
 than the American did. With an inferior force he 
 won a partial victory over his opponent ofl Niagara, 
 and then kept him in check for six weeks ; while 
 Chauncy, with his superior force, was not only par- 
 tially defeated once, but, when he did gain a partial 
 victory, failed to take advantage of it. 
 
 In commenting upon the timid and dilatory tac- 
 tics of the two commanders on Ontario, however, it 
 must be remembered that the indecisive nature of 
 the results attained had been often paralleled by the 
 numerous similar encounters that took place on the 
 ocean during the wars of the preceding century. In 
 the War of the American Revolution, the English 
 fought some 19 fleet actions with the French, Dutch, 
 and Spaniards ; one victory was gained over the 
 French, and one over the Spaniards, while the 17 
 others were all indecisive, both sides claiming the 
 victory, and neither winning it. Of course, some of 
 them, though indecisive as regards loss and damage, 
 were strategetical victories : thus. Admiral Arbuthnot 
 beat back Admiral Barras off the Chesapeake, in 
 March of 1781 ; and near the same place in Septem- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 369 
 
 ber of the same year the French had their revenge 
 in the victory (one at least in its results) of the 
 Conte de Grasse over Sir Thomas Graves. In the 
 five desperate and bloody combats which De Suff- 
 rein waged with Sir Edward Hughes in the East 
 Indies, the laurels were very evenly divided. These 
 five conflicts were not rendered indecisive by any 
 overwariness in manoeuvring, for De Suffrein's at- 
 tacks were carried out with as much boldness as skill, 
 and his stubborn antagonist was never inclined to 
 baulk him of a fair battle ; but the two hardy fighters 
 were so evenly matched that they would pound one 
 another till each was helpless to inflict injury. Very 
 different were the three consecutive battles that took 
 place in the same waters, on the 25 th of April, 1758, 
 the 3d of August, 1758, and on the loth of Septem- 
 ber, 1759, between Pocock and d' Ach6,' where, by 
 skilful manoeuvring, the French admiral saved his 
 somewhat inferior force from capture, and the Eng- 
 lish admiral gained indecisive victories. M. Rivifere, 
 after giving a most just and impartial account of the 
 battles, sums up with the following excellent criti- 
 cism.' 
 
 " It is this battle, won by Hawke, the 20th of 
 November, 1757, and the combats of Pocock and 
 d' Ach6, from which date two distinct schools in the 
 naval affairs of the i8th century: one of these was 
 all for promptness and audacity, which were regarded 
 as the indispensable conditions for victory ; the 
 other, on the contrary, praised skilful delays and 
 able evolutions, and created success by science 
 
 ' "La Marine Franfaise sous le Regne de Louis XV," par Henri Ri- 
 viere, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Chevalier de la Legion d' Honneur. 
 (Paris et Toulon, 1859), pp. 385 and 439. 
 
 ''Ibid., p. 425. I pay more attention to the sense than to the letter 
 in my translation. 
 
370 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 united to prudence. * * * But these two schools 
 were true only according to circumstances, not ab- 
 solutely. When two fleets of equal v/orth are 
 facing one another, as in the War of the American 
 Revolution, then tactic^ should come into play, and 
 audacity would often be mere foolhardiness. If it 
 happens, on the other hand, as in the Republic, or 
 during the last years of Louis XV, that an irresolute 
 fleet, without organization, has to contend with a 
 fleet prepared in every way, then, on the part of 
 this last, audacity is wisdom and prudence would be 
 cowardice, for it would give an enemy who distrusts 
 himself time to become more hardy. The only 
 school always true is that one which, freed from all 
 routine, produces men whose genius will unite in 
 one, in knowing how to apply them appropriately, 
 the audacity which will carry off victory, and the 
 prudence which knows how to obtain it in preparing 
 for it." 
 
 These generalizations are drawn from the results 
 of mighty battles, but they apply just as well to the 
 campaigns carried on on a small scale, or even to 
 single-ship actions. Chauncy, as already said, does 
 not deserve the praise which most American his- 
 torians, and especially Cooper, have lavished on 
 him as well as on all our other officers of that 
 period. Such indiscriminate eulogy entirely de- 
 tracts from the worth of a writer's favorable criti- 
 cisms. Our average commander was, I firmly 
 believe, at that time superior to the average com- 
 mander of any other nation ; but to get at this 
 average we must include Chauncy, Rodgers, and 
 Angus, as well as Hull, Macdonough, Perry, Porter, 
 Bainbridge, Biddle, Lawrence, and Warrington. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 371 
 
 Sir James Yeo did to the full as well as his op- 
 ponent, and like him was a good organizer ; but he 
 did little enough. His campaigns must be con- 
 sidered as being conducted well or ill according as 
 he is believed to have commanded better men than 
 his opponent, or not. If, as many British writers 
 contend, his crews were an overmatch for the 
 Americans, man for man, even to a slight degree, 
 then Yeo's conduct was very cowardly ; if, on the 
 contrary, the officers and men of the two fleets were 
 on a par, then he acted properly and outgeneralled 
 his opponent. It is to be regretted that most of 
 the histories written on the subject, on either side 
 of the Atlantic, should be of the " hurrah " order of 
 literature, with no attempt whatever to get at the 
 truth, but merely to explain away, the defeats or 
 immensely exaggerate the victories suffered or 
 gained by their own side. 
 
 ERIE AND THE UPPER LAKE.S. 
 
 Hitherto the vessels on these lakes (as well as on 
 Ontario) had been under the command of Com- 
 modore Chauncy ; but they were now formed into 
 a separate department, under Captain Arthur Sin- 
 clair. The Americans had, of course, complete 
 supremacy, and no attempt was seriously made to 
 contest it with them ; but they received a couple of 
 stinging, if not very important, defeats. It is rather 
 singular that here the British, who began with a 
 large force, while there was none whatever to 
 oppose it, should have had it by degrees completely 
 annihilated ; and should have then, and not till 
 then, when apparently rendered harmless, have 
 turned round and partially revenged themselves by 
 
372 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 tv/0 cutting-out expeditions which were as boldly- 
 executed as they were skilfully planned. 
 
 Captain Sinclair sailed into Lake Huron with the 
 Niagara, Caledonia, Ariel, Scorpion, and Tigress, 
 and on July 20th burnt the fort and barracks of St. 
 Joseph, which were abandoned by their garrison. 
 On Aug. 4th he arrived off the fort of Machilimaci- 
 nac (Mackinaw), which was situated on such an 
 eminence that the guns of the vessels could not 
 reach it. Accordingly, the troops under Col. 
 Croghan were landed, covered by the fire of the 
 schooners, very successfully ; but when they tried 
 to carry the fort they were driven back with the 
 loss of 79 men. Thence Sinclair sailed to the Nat- 
 tagawassa Creek, attacked and destroyed a block- 
 house three miles up it, which mounted three light 
 guns, and also a schooner called the Nancy ; but 
 the commander of the schooner. Lieutenant 
 Worsely, with his crew, escaped up the river. Captain 
 Sinclair then departed for Lake Erie, leaving the 
 Scorpion, Lieutenant Turner, and Tigress, Sailing- 
 master Champlin, to blockade the Nattagawassa. 
 News was received by the British from a party of 
 Indians that the two American vessels were five 
 leagues apart, and it was at once resolved to at- 
 tempt their capture. On the first of September, in 
 the evening, four boats started out, one manned by 
 20 seamen, under Lieutenant Worsley, the three 
 others by 72 soldiers under Lieutenants Bulger, 
 Armstrong, and Raderhurst of the army — in all 92 
 men and two guns, a 6- and a 3-pounder. A num- 
 ber of Indians accompanied the expedition but took 
 no part in the fighting. At sunset on the 2d the 
 boats arrived at St. Mary's Strait, and spent 24 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 373 
 
 hours in finding out where the American schooners 
 were. At 6 P. M. on the 3d, the nearest vessel, the 
 Tigress, was made out, six miles off, and they pulled 
 for her. It was very dark, and they were not discov- 
 ered till they had come within fifty yards, when 
 Champlin at once fired his long 24 at them ; before 
 it could be reloaded the four boats had dashed up, 
 those of Lieutenants Worsely and Armstrong 
 placing themselves on the starboard, and those of 
 Lieutenants Bulger and Raderhurst on the port 
 side. There was a short, sharp struggle, and the 
 schooner was carried. Of her crew of 28 men, 3 
 were killed and five, including Mr. Champlin, dan- 
 gerously wounded. The assailants lost three sea- 
 men killed, Lieutenant Bulger, seven soldiers and 
 several seamen wounded.' " The defence of this 
 vessel," writes Lieut. Bulger, " did credit to her 
 officers, who were all severely wounded." Next 
 daj'^ the prisoners were sent on shore ; and on the 
 5th the Scorpion was discovered working up to join 
 her consort, entirely ignorant of what had hap- 
 pened. She anchored about 2 miles from the Ti- 
 gress ; and next morning at 6 o'clock the latter slip- 
 ped her cable and ran down under the jib and fore- 
 sail, the American ensign and pendant still flying. 
 When within 10 yards of the Scorpion, the con- 
 cealed soldiers jumped up, poured a volley into her 
 which killed 2 and wounded 2 men, and the next 
 moment carried her, her surprised crew of 30 men 
 making no resistance. The whole affair reflected 
 great credit on the enterprise and pluck of the Brit- 
 ish without being discreditable to the Americans. 
 
 'Letter of Lieutenant A. H. Bulger, Sept. 7, 1814. James says 
 only 3 killed and 8 wounded ; but Lieutenant Bulger distinctly says, 
 in addition, "and several seamen wounded." 
 
374 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 It was like Lieut. Elliott's capture of the Detroit 
 and Caledonia. 
 
 Meanwhile a still more daring cutting-out expedi- 
 tion had taken place at the foot of Lake Erie. The 
 three American schooners, Ohio, Somers, and Porcu- 
 pine, each with 30 men, under Lieut. Conkling, were 
 anchored just at the outlet of the lake, to cover the 
 ilank of the works at Fort Erie. On the night of 
 August 1 2th, Capt. Dobbs, of the Charwell, and 
 Lieut. Radcliffe, of the Netly, with 75 seamen and 
 marines from their two vessels, which were lying off 
 Fort Erie, resolved to attempt the capture of the 
 schooners. The seamen carried the captain's gig 
 upon their shoulders from Queenstown to French- 
 man's Creek, a distance of 20 miles ; thence, by the 
 aid of some militia, 5 batteaux as well as the gig 
 were carried 8 miles across the woods to Lake Erie, 
 and the party (whether with or without the militia I 
 do not know) embarked in them. Between 11 and 12 
 the boats were discovered a short distance ahead of 
 the Somers and hailed. They answered " provision 
 boats," which deceived the officer on deck, as such 
 boats had been in the habit of passing and repassing 
 continually during the night. Before he discovered 
 his mistake the boats drifted across his hawse, cut his 
 cables, and ran him aboard with a volley of mus- 
 ketry, which wounded two of his men, and before 
 the others could get on deck the schooner was capt- 
 ured. In another moment the British boats were 
 alongside the Ohio, Lieut. Conkling's vessel. Here 
 the people had hurried on deck, and there was a 
 moment's sharp struggle, in which the assailants lost 
 Lieut. Radcliffe and one seaman killed and six 
 seamen and marines wounded ; but on board the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 375 
 
 Ohio Lieut. Conkling and Sailing-master M. Cally 
 were shot down, one seaman killed, and four wound- 
 ed, and Captain Dobbs carried her, sword in hand. 
 The Porcupine was not molested, and made no 
 effort to interfere with the British in their retreat ; 
 so they drifted down the rapids with their two 
 prizes and secured them below. The boldness of 
 this enterprise will be appreciated when it is re- 
 membered that but 75 British seamen (unless there 
 were some militia along), with no artillery, attacked 
 and captured two out of three fine schooners, armed 
 each with a long 32 or 24, and an aggregate of go 
 men ; and that this had been done in waters where 
 the gig and five batteaux of the victors were the 
 only British vessels afloat. 
 
 CHAMPLAIN. 
 
 This lake, which had hitherto played but an in- 
 conspicuous part, was now to become the scene of 
 the greatest naval battle of the war. A British 
 army of 11,000 men under Sir George Prevost un- 
 dertook the invasion of New York by advancing up 
 the western bank of Lake Champlain. This ad- 
 vance was impracticable unless there was a suffi- 
 ciently strong British naval force to drive back the 
 American squadron at the same time. Accordingly, 
 the British began to construct a frigate, the Con- 
 fiance, to be added to their already existing force, 
 which consisted of a brig, two sloops, and 12 or 14 
 gun-boats. The Americans already possessed a 
 heavy corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and 10 
 gun-boats or row-galleys ; they now began to build 
 a large brig, the Eagle, which was launched about 
 the i6th of August. Nine days later, on the 25th, 
 
3/6 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 the Confiance was launched. The two squadrons 
 were equally deficient in stores, etc.; the Confiance 
 having locks to her guns, some of which could not 
 be used, while the American schooner Ticonderoga 
 had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed at 
 the touchholes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Mac- 
 donough and Downie were hurried into action be- 
 fore they had time to prepare themselves thor- 
 oughly ; but it was a disadvantage common to both, 
 and arose from the nature of the case, which called 
 for immediate action. The British army advanced 
 slowly toward Plattsburg, which was held by Gener- 
 al Macomb with less than 2,000 effective American 
 troops. Captain Thomas Macdonough, the Ameri- 
 can commodore, took the lake a day or two before 
 his antagonist, and came to anchor in Plattsburg 
 harbor. The British fleet, under Captain George 
 Downie, moved from Isle-aux-Noix on Sept. 8th, 
 and on the morning of the nth sailed into Platts- 
 burg harbor. 
 
 The American force consisted of the ship Sara- 
 toga, Captain T. Macdonough, of about 734 tons,' 
 carrying eight long 24-pounders, six 42-pound and 
 twelve 32-pound carronades ; the. hn^ Eagle, Captain 
 Robert Henly, of about 500 tons, carrying eight long 
 iS's and twelve 32-pound carronades ; schooner 
 Ticonderoga Lieut. -Com. Stephen Cassin, of about 
 
 ' In the Naval Archives (" Masters'-Commandant Letters," 1814, 
 I, No. 134) is a letter from Macdonough in which he states that the 
 Saratoga is intermediate in size between the Pike, of 875, and the 
 Madison, of 593 tons ; this would make her 734, The Eagle was 
 very nearly the size of the Lawrence or Niagara, on Lake Erie. 
 The Ticonderoga was originally a small steamer, but Commodore 
 Macdonough had her schooner-rigged, because he found that her 
 machinery got out of order on almost every trip that she took. Her 
 tonnage is only approximately known, but she was of the same size 
 as the Linnet. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 377 
 
 350 tons carrying eight long i2-pounders, four 
 long i8-pouiiders, and five 32-pound carronades; 
 sloop Preble, Lieutenant Charles Budd, of about 
 80 tons, mounting seven long 9's ; the row- 
 galleys Borer, Centipede, Nettle, Allen, Viper, and 
 Burrows, each of about 70 tons, and mounting one 
 long 24- and one short 18-pounder; and the row- 
 galleys Wilnier, Ludlow, Aylwin, and Ballard, each 
 of about 40 tons, and mounting one long 12. 
 James puts down the number of men on board the 
 squadron as 950, — merely a guess, as he gives no 
 authority. Cooper says " about 850 men, including 
 officers, and a small detachment of soldiers to act 
 as marines." Lossing (p. 866, note i) says 882 in 
 all. Vol. xiv of the " American State Papers " con- 
 tains on p. 572 the prize-money list presented by 
 the purser, George Beale, Jr. This numbers the 
 men (the dead being represented by their heirs or 
 executors) up to 915, including soldiers and seamen, 
 but many of the numbers are omitted, probably 
 owing to the fact that their owners, though belonging 
 on board, happened to be absent on shore, or in the 
 hospital ; so that the actual number of names tallies 
 very closely with that given by Lossing ; and ac- 
 cordingly I shall take that.' The total number of 
 men in the galleys (including a number of soldiers, 
 as there were not enough sailors) was 350. The 
 
 'In the Naval Archives are numerous letters from Macdonough, in 
 which he states continually that, as fast as they arrive, he substitutes 
 sailors for the soldiers with which the vessels were originally manned. 
 Men were continually being sent asliore on account of sickness. In 
 the Bureau of Navigation is the log-book of ' ' sloop-of-war Surprise, 
 Captain Robert Henly " {Su7-frise was the name the Eagle origi- 
 nally went by). It mentions from time to time that men were buried 
 and sent. ashore to the hospital (five being sent ashore on September 
 2d) ; and finally mentions that the places of the absent were partially 
 filled by a draft of 21 soldiers, to act as marines. The notes on the 
 day of battle are very brief. 
 
378 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 exact proportions in which this force was distrib- 
 uted among the gun-boats can not be told, but it 
 may be roughly said to be 41 in each large galley, 
 and 26 in each small one. The complement of the 
 Saratoga was 210, of the Eagle, 130, of the Ticonde- 
 roga, 100, and of the Preble, 30 ; but the first three 
 had also a few soldiers distributed between them. 
 The following list is probably pretty accurate as to 
 the aggregate ; but there may have been a score or 
 two fewer men on the gun-boats, or more on the 
 larger vessels. 
 
 MACDONOUGH'S FORCE. 
 
 Metal, from long 
 Name. Tons. Crew. Broadside. or short guns. 
 
 Saratoga, 734 240 414 lbs. | ^°^f;_ ^^^ 
 
 EasU, 500 X50 364 " \t^J^. 
 
 Ticonderoga, 350 112 180 " ] '°"S' 84 
 
 Preble, 80 30 36 " long, 36 
 
 Six gun-boats, 420 246 252 " { 'hon, J08 
 
 Four gun-boats, 160 104 48 " long, 48 
 
 In all, 14 vessels of 2,244 tons and 882 men, with 
 86 guns throwing at a broadside 1,194 lbs. of shot, 
 480 from long, and 714 from short guns. 
 
 The force of the British squadron in guns and 
 ships is kiiown accurately, as most of it was capt- 
 ured. The Confiance rated for years in our lists 
 as a frigate of the class of the Constellation, Congress, 
 a.x\d Macedonian ; she was thus of over 1,200 tons. 
 (Cooper says more, " nearly double the tonnage of 
 the Saratoga") She carried on her main-deck thirty 
 long 24's, fifteen in each broadside. She did not 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 379 
 
 have a complete spar-deck; on her poop, which came 
 forward to the mizzen-mast, were two 32-pound (or 
 possibly 42-pound), carronades and on her spacious 
 top-gallant forecastle were four 32- (or 42-) pound 
 carronades, and a long 24 on a pivot.' She had 
 aboard her a furnace for heating shot ; eight or ten 
 of which heated shot were found with the furnace.^ 
 This was, of course, a perfectly legitimate advantage. 
 The Linnet, Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the 
 same size as the Ticonderoga, mounting 16 long 12's. 
 The Chubb and Finch, Lieutenants James McGhie 
 and William Hicks, were formerly the American 
 sloops Growler and Eagle, of 112 and no tons re- 
 spectively. The former mounted ten 18-pound car- 
 ronades and one long 6; the latter, six 18-pound 
 carronades, four long 6's, and one short 18. There 
 were twelve gun-boats.' Five of these were large, 
 of about 70 tons each ; three mounted a long 24 
 and a 32-pound carronade each ; one mounted a 
 long 18 and a 32-pound carronade; one a long 18 
 and a short 18. Seven were smaller, of about 40 
 tons each; three of these carried each a long 18, 
 and four carried each a 32-pound carronade. There 
 is greater difificulty in finding out the number of 
 men in the British fleet. American historians are 
 unanimous in stating it at from 1,000 to 1,100; Bnt- 
 
 ^ This is her armament as given by Cooper, on the authority of the 
 officer who was in charge of her for three months, and went aboard 
 her ten minutes after the Linnet struck. 
 
 ^ James stigmatizes the statement of Commodore Macdonough 
 about the furnace as *' as gross a falsehood as ever was uttered " ; but 
 he gives no authority for tlie denial, and it appears to have been mere- 
 ly an ebullition of spleen on his part. Every American officer who 
 went aboard the Conjiance saw the furnace and the hot shot. 
 
 'Letter of General Geofge Prevost, Sept. ii, 1814. All the Amer- 
 ican accounts say 13 ; the British official account had best be taken. 
 James says only ten, but gives no authority ; he appears to have been 
 entirely ignorant of all things connected with this action. 
 
38o 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 ish historians never do any thing but copy James 
 blindly. One of the midshipmen of the Confiance, in 
 a letter (already quoted) published in the " London 
 Naval Chronicle," gives her crew as 300 ; but more 
 than this amount of dead and prisoners were taken out 
 of her. The number given her by Commander Ward 
 in his " Naval Tactics," is probably nearest right — 
 325.' The Linnet had about 125 men, and the Chubb 
 and Finch about 50 men each. According to Ad- 
 miral Paulding (given by Lossing, in his " Field 
 Book of the War of 1812," p. 868) their gun-boats 
 averaged 50 men each. This is probably true, as 
 they were manned largely by soldiers, any number 
 of whom could be spared from Sir George Prevost's 
 great army; but it maybe best to consider the large 
 ones as having 41, and the small 26 men, which 
 were the complements of the American gun-boats 
 of the same sizes. 
 
 The following, then, is the force of 
 
 DlOWNIE'S SQUADRON. 
 
 Name. 
 Conjiance, 
 
 
 Tonnage. 
 1200 
 
 Crew. 
 
 325 
 
 Broadside. 
 480 lbs. 
 
 From what guns, 
 long or short. 
 
 ( long, 384 
 ( short, 96 
 
 Linnet, 
 Chubb, 
 
 
 350 
 
 112 
 
 125 
 50 
 
 96 " 
 96 ■• 
 
 long, 96 
 ( long, 6 
 j short, go 
 
 Finch, 
 
 
 1 10 
 
 50 
 
 84 •■ 
 
 j long, 12 
 ( short, 72 
 
 Five gun-boats. 
 
 350 
 
 205 
 
 254 " 
 
 ( long, 12 
 \ short, 72 
 
 Seven gun- 
 
 Doats 
 
 , 280 
 
 182 
 
 182 " 
 
 j long, 54 
 j sholt, 128 
 
 In all 
 
 16 
 
 vessels, 
 
 of about 2,402 
 
 tons, with 937 
 
 ' James gives her but 270 men, — without staling his authority. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 38 1 
 
 men/ and a total of 92 guns, throwing at a broad- 
 side 1,192 lbs., 660 from long and 532 from short 
 pieces. 
 
 These are widely different from the figures that 
 appear in the pages of most British historians, from 
 Sir Archibald Alison down and up. Thus, in the 
 " History of the British Navy," by C. D. Yonge (al- 
 ready quoted), it is said that on Lake Champlain 
 " our (the British) force was manifestly and vastly 
 inferior, * * * their (the American) broadside 
 outweighing ours in more than the proportion of 
 three to two, while the difference in their tonnage 
 and in the number of their crews was still more in 
 their favor." None of these historians, or quasi-histo- 
 rians, have made the faintest effort to find out the 
 facts for themselves, following James' figures with 
 blind reliance, and accordingly it is only necessary 
 to discuss the latter. This reputable gentleman 
 ends his account(" Naval Occurrences," p. 424) by re- 
 marking that Macdonough wrote as he did because 
 "he knew that nothing would stamp a falsehood 
 with currency equal to a pious expression, * * * 
 his falsehoods equalling in number the lines of his 
 letter." These remarks are interesting as showing 
 the unbiassed and truthful character of the author, 
 rather than for any particular weight they will have 
 in influencing any one's judgment on Commander 
 Macdonough. James gives the engaged force of the 
 British as "8 vessels, of 1,426 tons, with 537 men, 
 and throwing 765 lbs. of shot." To reduce the 
 force down to this, he first excludes the Finch, be- 
 cause she " grounded opposite an American battery 
 before the engagement commenced," which reads espe- 
 
 ' About ; there were probably more rather than less. 
 
382 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 cially well in connection with Capt. Pring's official 
 letter: "Lieut. Hicks, of the Finch, had the morti- 
 fication to strike on a reef of rocks to the eastward 
 of Crab Island about the middle of the engagement" ' 
 What James means cannot be imagined ; no stretch 
 of language will convert " about the middle of " into 
 " before." The Finch struck on the. reef in conse- 
 quence of having been disabled and rendered help- 
 less by the fire from the Ticonderoga. Adding her 
 force to James' statement (counting her crew only 
 as he gives it), we get 9 vessels, 1,536 tons, 577 men, 
 849 lbs. of shot. Jarnes also excludes five gun- 
 boats, because they ran away almost as soon as 
 the action commenced (vol. vi, p. 501). This 
 assertion is by no means equivalent to the state- 
 ment in Captain Pring's letter " that the flotilla 
 of gun-boats had abandoned the object assigned to 
 them," and, if it was, it would not warrant his ex- 
 cluding the five gun-boats. Their flight may have 
 been disgraceful, but they formed part of the attack- 
 ing force nevertheless ; almost any general could say 
 that he had won against superior numbers if he re- 
 fused to count in any of his own men whom he sus- 
 pected of behaving badly. James gives his 10 gun- 
 boats 294 men and 13 guns (two long 24's, five long 
 i8's, six 32-pound carronades), and makes them 
 average 45 tons ; adding on the five he leaves out, 
 we get 14 vessels, of 1,761 tons, with 714 men, throw- 
 ing at a broadside 1,025 lbs. of shot (591 from long 
 guns, 434 from carronades). But Sir George Pre- 
 vost, in the letter already quoted, says there were 
 12 gun-boats, and the American accounts say more. 
 
 ' The italics are mine. The letter is given in full in the " Naval 
 Chronicle." 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 383 
 
 Supposing the two gun-boats James did not include 
 at all to be equal respectively to one of the largest 
 and one of the smallest of the gun-boats as he gives 
 them (" Naval Occurrences," p. 417) ; that is, one to 
 have had 35 men, a long 24, and a 32-pound 
 carronade, the other, 25 men and a 32-pound car- 
 ronade, we get for Downie's force 16 vessels, of 
 1,851 tons, with 774 men, throwing at a broadside 
 1,113 lbs. of shot (615 from long guns, 498 from car- 
 ronades). It must be remembered that so far I 
 have merely corrected James by means of the au- 
 thorities from which he draws his account — the 
 ofhcial letters of the British commanders. I have 
 not brought up a single American authority against 
 him, but have only made such alterations as a writer 
 could with nothing whatever but the accounts of 
 Sir George Prevost and Captain Pring before him 
 to compare with James. Thus it is seen that ac- 
 cording to James himself Downie really had 774 
 men to Macdonough's 882, and threw at a broad- 
 side 1,113 lbs. of shot to Macdonough's 1,194 lbs. 
 James says ("Naval Occurrences," pp. 410, 413): 
 " Let it be recollected, no musketry was employed 
 on either side," and " The marines were of no use, 
 as the action was fought out of the range of mus- 
 ketry" ; the 106 additional men on the part of the 
 Americans were thus not of much consequence, the 
 action being fought at anchor, and there being men 
 enough to manage the guns and perform every other 
 duty. So we need only attend to the ' broadside 
 force. Here, then, Downie could present at a 
 broadside 615 lbs. of shot from long guns to Mac- 
 donough's 480, and 498 lbs. from carronades to Mac- 
 donough's 714; or, he threw 135 lbs. of shot more 
 
384 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 from his long guns, and 216 less from his carronades. 
 This is equivalent to Downie's having seven long 
 i8's and one long 9, and Macdonough's having one 
 24-pound and six 32-pound carronades. A 32-pound 
 carronade is not equal to a long 18 ; so that even by 
 James' own showing Downie's force was slightly the 
 superior. 
 
 Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected James 
 solely by the evidence of his own side ; now I shall 
 bring in some American authorities. These do not 
 contradict the British ofificial letters, for they virt- 
 ually agree with them ; but they do go against James' 
 unsupported assertions, and, being made by naval 
 officers of irreproachable reputation, will certainly 
 outweigh them. In the first place, James asserts 
 that on the main-deck of the Confiance but 13 guns 
 were presented in broadside, two 32-pound carron- 
 ades being thrust through the bridle- and two others 
 through the stern-ports ; so he excludes two of her 
 guns from the broadside. Such guns would have been 
 of great use to her at certain stages of the combat, 
 and ought to be included in the force. But besides 
 this the American officers positively say that she 
 had a broadside of 1 5 guns. Adding these two guns, 
 and making a trifling change in the arrangement of 
 the guns in the row-galleys, we get a broadside of 
 1,192 lbs., exactly as I have given it above. There 
 is no difficulty in accounting for the difference of 
 tonnage as given by James and by the Americans, 
 for we have considered the same subject in reference 
 to the battle of Lake Erie. James calculates the 
 American tonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep 
 holds, while, as regards the British vessels, he allows 
 for the shallow holds that all the lake craft had ; 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 385 
 
 that is, he gives in one the nominal, in the other 
 the real, tonnage. This fully accounts for the dis- 
 crepancy. It only remains to account for the dif- 
 ference in the number of men. From James we can 
 get 772. In the first place, we can reason by analo- 
 gy. I have already shown that, as regards the bat- 
 tle of Lake Erie, he is convicted (by English, not 
 by American, evidence) of having underestimated 
 Barclay's force by about 25 per cent. If he did the 
 same thing here, the British force was over 1,000 
 strong, and I have no doubt that it was. But we 
 have other proofs. On p. 417 of the " Naval Oc- 
 currences " he says the complement of the four cap- 
 tured British vessels amounted to 420 men, of whom 
 54 were killed in action, leaving 366 prisoners, in- 
 eluding the wounded. But the report of pris^ 
 oners, as given by the American authorities, 
 gives 369 officers and seamen unhurt or but slightly 
 wounded, 57 wounded men paroled, and other 
 wounded whose number was unspecified. Suppos- 
 ing this number to have been 82, and adding 54 
 dead, we would get in all 550 men for the four .ships, 
 the number I have adopted in my list. This would 
 make the British wounded 129 instead of 116, as 
 James says : but neither the Americans nor the 
 British seem to have enumerated all their wounded 
 in this fight. Taking into account all these con- 
 siderations, it will be seen that the figures I have 
 given are probably approximately correct, and, at 
 any rate, indicate pretty closely the relative strength 
 of the two squadrons. The slight differences in ton- 
 nage and crews (158 tons and 55 men, in favor of 
 the British) are so trivial that they need not be 
 taken into account, and we will merely consider the 
 
386 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 broadside force. In absolute weight of metal the 
 two combatants were evenly matched — almost ex- 
 actly ; — but whereas from Downie's broadside of i , 192 
 lbs. 660 were from long and 532 from short guns, of 
 Macdonough's broadside of 1,194 lbs., but 480 were 
 from long and 714 from short pieces. The forces 
 were thus equal, except that Downie opposed 180 
 lbs. from long guns to 182 from carronades ; as if 10 
 long i8's were opposed to ten 18-pound carronades. 
 This would make the odds on their face about 10 to 
 9 against the Americans ; iti reality they were 
 greater, for the possession of the Confiance was a 
 very great advantage. The action is, as regards 
 metal, the exact reverse of those between Chauncy 
 and Yeo. Take, for example, the fight off Burling- 
 ton on Sept. 28, 1813. Yeo's broadside was 1,374 
 lbs. to Chauncy's 1,288; but whereas only 180 of 
 Yeo's was from long guns, of Chauncy's but 536 
 was from carronades. Chauncy's fleet was thus 
 much the superior. At least we must say this : if 
 Macdonough beat merely an equal force, then Yeo 
 made a most disgraceful and cowardly flight before 
 an inferior foe ; but if we contend that Macdon- 
 ough's force was inferior to that of his antagonist, 
 then we must admit that Yeo's was in like manner 
 inferior to Chauncy's. These rules work both ways. 
 The Confiance was a heavier vessel than the Pike, 
 presenting in broadside one long 24- and three 32- 
 pound carronades more than the latter. James (vol. 
 v'l P- 355) says: "The Pike alone was nearly a 
 match for Sir James Yeo's squadron," and Brenton 
 says (vol. ii, 503) : " The General Pike was more than 
 a match for the whole British squadron." Neither 
 of these writers means quite as much as he says, for 
 
NAVA], WAR OF l8r2. 387 
 
 the logical result would be that the Confiance alone 
 was a match for all of Macdonough's force. Still it 
 is safe to say that the Pike gave Chauncy a great ad- 
 vantage, and that the Confiance made Downie's fleet 
 much superior to Macdonough's. 
 
 Macdonough saw that the British would be forced 
 to make the attack in order to get the control of 
 the waters. On this long, narrow lake the winds 
 usually blow pretty nearly north or south, and the 
 set of the current is of course northward ; all the 
 vessels, being flat and shallow, could not beat to 
 windward well, so there was little chance of the 
 British making the attack when there was a souther- 
 ly wind blowing. So late in the season there was 
 danger of sudden and furious gales, which would 
 make it risky for Downie to wait outside the bay 
 till the wind suited him ; and inside the bay the 
 wind was pretty sure to be light and baffling. 
 Young Macdonough (then but 28 years of age) cal- 
 culated all these chances very coolly and decided to 
 await the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with 
 the head of his line so far to the north that it could 
 hardly be turned ; and then proceeded to make all 
 the other preparations with the same foresight. 
 Not only were his vessels provided with springs, 
 but also with anchors to be used astern in any 
 emergency. The Saratoga was further prepared for 
 a change of wind, or for the necessity of winding 
 ship, by having a kedge planted broad off on each 
 of her bows, with a hawser and preventer hawser 
 (hanging in bights under water) leading from each 
 quarter to the kedge on that side. There had not 
 been time to train the men thoroughly at the 
 guns ; and to make these produce their full effect 
 
388 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 the constant supervision of the officers had to be 
 exerted. The British were laboring under this 
 same disadvantage, but neither side felt the want 
 very much, as the smooth water, stationary position 
 of the ships, and fair range, made the fire of both 
 sides very destructive. 
 
 Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the south- 
 ward ; so that a wind which would enable the Brit- 
 ish to sail up the lake would force them to beat 
 when entering the bay. The east side of the mouth 
 of the bay is formed by Cumberland Head; the 
 entrance is about a mile and a half across, and the 
 other boundary, southwest from the Head, is an 
 extensive shoal, and a small, low island. This is 
 called Crab Island, and on it was a hospital and one 
 six-pounder gun, which was to be manned in case 
 of necessity by the strongest patients. Macdon- 
 ough had anchored in a north-and-south line a little 
 to the south of the outlet of the Saranac, and out 
 of range of the shore batteries, being two miles from 
 the western shore. The head of his line was so 
 near Cumberland Head that an attempt to turn it 
 would place the opponent under a very heavy fire, 
 while to the south the shoal prevented a flank 
 attack. The Eagle lay to the north, flanked on 
 each side by a couple of gun-boats ; then came the 
 Saratoga, with three gun-boats between her and the 
 Ticonderoga, the next in line ; then came three gun- 
 boats and the Preble. The four large vessels were 
 at anchor; the galleys being under their sweeps and 
 forming a second line about 40 yards back, some 
 of them keeping their places and some not doing 
 so. By this arrangement his line could not be 
 .doubled upon, there was not room to anchor on his 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 389 
 
 broadside out of reach of his carronades, and the 
 enemy was forced to attack him by standing in 
 bows on. 
 
 The morning of September nth opened with a 
 Hght breeze from the northeast. Downie's fleet 
 weighed anchor at dayUght, and came down the 
 lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the two 
 sloops swinging out to starboard. At half-past 
 seven,' the people in the ships could see their ad- 
 versaries' upper sails across the narrow strip of land 
 ending in Cumberland Head, before the British 
 doubled the latter. Captain Downie hove to with 
 his four large vessels when he had fairly opened the 
 Bay, and waited for his galleys to overtake him. 
 Then his four vessels filled on the starboard tack 
 and headed for the American line, going abreast, the 
 Chubb to the north, heading well to windward of the 
 Eagle, for whose bows the Linnet was headed, while 
 the Confiance was to be laid athwart the hawse of the 
 Saratoga ; the Finch was to leeward with the twelve 
 gun-boats, and was to engage the rear of the Ameri- 
 can line. 
 
 As the English squadron stood bravely in, young 
 Macdonough, who feared his foes not at all, but his 
 God a great deal, knelt for a moment, with his offi- 
 cers, on the quarter-deck ; and then ensued a few 
 minutes of perfect quiet, the men waiting with grim 
 expectancy for the opening of the fight. The Eagle 
 spoke first with her long iS's, but to no effect, 
 for the shot fell short. Then, as the Linnet passed 
 the Saratoga, she fired her broadside of long 12's, 
 
 ' The letters of the two commanders conflict a little as to time, 
 both absolutely and relatively. Pring says the action lasted two hours 
 and three quarters , the American accounts, two hours and twenty 
 niinutes. Pring says it began at 8.00 ; Macdonough says a few minutes 
 before nine, etc. I take the mean lime. 
 
390 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 but her shot also fell short, except one that struck a 
 hen-coop which happened to be aboard the Saratoga. 
 There was a game cock inside, and, instead of being 
 frightened at his sudden release, he jumped up on a 
 gun-slide, clapped his wings, and crowed lustily. 
 The men laughed and cheered ; and immediately 
 afterward Macdonough himself fired the first shot 
 from one of the long guns. The 24-pound ball 
 struck the Confiance near the hawse-hole and 
 ranged the length of her deck, killing and wound- 
 ing several men. All the American long guns now 
 opened and were replied to by the British galleys. 
 The Confiance stood steadily on without replying. 
 But she was baffled by shifting winds, and was soon 
 so cut up, having both her port bow-anchors shot 
 away, and suffering much loss, that she was obliged 
 to port her helm and come to while still nearly a 
 quarter of a mile distant from the Saratoga. Cap- 
 tain Downie came to anchor in grand style, — secur- 
 ing every thing carefully before he fired a gun, and 
 then opening with a terribly destructive broadside. 
 The Chubb diXxd Linnet stood farther in, and anchored 
 forward the Eagle's beam. Meanwhile the Finch 
 got abreast of the Ticonderoga, under her sweeps, 
 supported by the gun-boats. The main fighting 
 was thus to take place between the vans, where the 
 Eagle, Saratoga, and six or seven gun-boats were 
 engaged with the Chubb, Linnet, Confiance, and two 
 ,or three gun-boats ; while in the rear, the Ticonde- 
 roga, the Preble, and the other American galleys 
 engaged the Finch and the remaining nine or ten 
 English galleys. The battle at the foot of the line 
 was fought on the part of the Americans to prevent 
 their flank being turned, and on the part of the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 39I 
 
 British to effect that object. At first the fighting 
 was at long range, but gradually the British galleys 
 closed up, firing very well. The American galleys 
 at this end of the line were chiefly the small ones, 
 armed with one i2-pounder apiece, and they by de, 
 grees drew back before the heavy fire of their op 
 ponents. About an hour after the discharge of the 
 first gun had been fired the Finch closed up toward 
 the Ticonderoga, and was completely crippled by a 
 couple of broadsides from the latter. She drifted 
 helplessly down the line and grounded near Crab 
 Island ; some of the Convalescent patients manned 
 the six-pounder and fired a shot or two at her, 
 when she struck, nearly half of her crew being killed 
 or wounded. About the same time the British 
 gun-boats forced the Preble out of line, whereupon 
 she cut her cable and drifted inshore out of the 
 fight. Two or three of the British gun-boats had 
 already been sufificiently damaged by some of the 
 shot from the Ticonderoga! s long guns to make 
 them wary ; and the contest at this part of the line 
 narrowed down to one between the American 
 schooner and the remaining British gun-boats, who 
 combined to make a most determined attack upon 
 her. So hastily had the squadron been fitted out that 
 many of the matches for her guns were at the last 
 moment found to be defective. The captain of one 
 of the divisions was a midshipman, but sixteen years 
 old, Hiram Paulding. When he found the matches 
 to be bad he fired the guns of his section by having 
 pistols flashed at them, and continued this through 
 the whole fight. The Ticonderoga s commander, 
 Lieut. Cassin, fought his schooner most nobly. He 
 kept walking the taflrail amidst showers of mus- 
 
392 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 ketry and grape, coolly watching the movements of 
 the galleys and directing the guns to be loaded with 
 canister and bags of bullets, when the enemy tried 
 to board. The British galleys were handled with 
 determined gallantry, under the command of Lieu- 
 tenant Bell. Had they driven off the Ticonderoga 
 they would have won the day for their side, and 
 they pushed up till they were not a boat-hook's 
 length distant, to try to carry her by boarding ; but 
 every attempt was repulsed and they were forced to 
 draw off, some of them so crippled by the slaughter 
 they had suffered that they''could hardly man the 
 oars. 
 
 Meanwhile the fighting at the head of the line had 
 been even fiercer. The first broadside of the Con- 
 fiance, fired from 1 6 long 24's, double shotted, 
 coolly sighted, in smooth water, at point-blank range, 
 produced the most terrible effect on the Saratoga. 
 Her hull shivered all over with the shock, and when 
 the crash subsided nearly half of her people were 
 seen stretched on deck, for many had been knocked 
 down who were not seriously hurt. Among the 
 slain was her first lieutenant, Peter Gamble; he 
 was kneeling down to sight the bow-gun, when a 
 shot entered the port, split the quoin, and drove a 
 portion of it against his side, killing him without 
 breaking the skin. The survivors carried on the 
 fight with undiminished energy. Macdonough him- 
 self worked like a common sailor, in pointing and 
 handling a favorite gun. While bending over to 
 sight it a round shot cut in two the spanker boom, 
 which fell on his head and struck him senseless for 
 two or three minutes ; he then leaped to his feet 
 and continued as before, when a shot took off the 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 393 
 
 head of the captain of the gun and drove it in his 
 face with such a force as to knock him to the other 
 side of the deck. But after the first broadside not 
 so much injury was done ; the guns of the Confi- 
 ance had been levelled to point-blank range, and as 
 the quoins were loosened by the successive dis- 
 charges they were not properly replaced, so that 
 her broadsides kept going higher and higher and do- 
 ing less and less damage. Very shortly after the 
 beginning of the action her gallant captain was 
 slain. He was standing behind one of the long 
 guns when a shot from the Saratoga struck it and 
 threw it completely off the carriage against his right 
 groin, killing him almost instantly. His skin was 
 not broken ; a black mark, about the size of a small 
 plate, was the only visible injury. His watch was 
 found flattened, with its hands pointing to the very 
 second at which he received the fatal blow. As the 
 contest went on the fire gradually decreased in 
 weight, the guns being disabled. The inexperi- 
 ence of both crews partly caused this. The Ameri- 
 can sailors overloaded their carronades so as to very 
 much destroy the effect of their fire ; when the offi- 
 cers became disabled, the men would cram the guns 
 with shot till the last projected from the muzzle 
 Of course, this lessened the execution, and also 
 gradually crippled the guns. On board the Confi- 
 ance the confusion was even worse : after the bat- 
 tle the charges of the guns were drawn, and on the 
 side she had fought one was found with a canvas 
 bag containing two round of shot rammed home 
 and wadded without any powder ; another with two 
 cartridges and no shot ; and a third with a wad be- 
 low the cartridge. 
 
394 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 At' the extreme head of the line the advantage 
 had been with the British. The Chubb and Linnet 
 had begun a brisk engagement with the Eagle and 
 American gun-boats. In a short time the Chubb had 
 her cable, bowsprit, and main-boom shot away, 
 drifted within the American lines, and was taken 
 possession of by one of the Saratoga s midshipmen. 
 The Linnet paid no attention to the American gun- 
 boats, directing her whole fire against the Eagle, and 
 the latter was, in addition, exposed to part of the 
 fire of the Confiance. After keeping up a heavy fire 
 for a long time her springs were shot away, and she 
 came up into the wind, hanging so that she could 
 not return a shot to the well-directed broadsides of 
 the Linnet. Henly accordingly cut his cable, started 
 home his top-sails, ran down, and anchored by the 
 stern between and inshore of the Confiance and Ti- 
 conderoga, from which position he opened on the 
 Confiance. The Linnet now directed her attention 
 to the American gun-boats, which at this end of the 
 line were very well fought, but she soon drove them 
 off, and then sprung her broadside so as to rake the 
 Saratoga on her bows. 
 
 Macdonough by this time had his hands full, and 
 his fire was slackening ; he was bearing the whole 
 brunt of the action, with the frigate on his beam and 
 the brig raking him. Twice his ship had been set 
 on fire by the hot shot of the Confiance ; one by 
 one his long guns were disabled by shot, and his 
 carronades were either treated the same way or else 
 rendered useless by excessive overcharging. Fi- 
 nally but a single carronade was left in the starboard 
 batteries, and on firing it the naval-bolt broke, the 
 gun flew off the carriage and fell down the main 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 395 
 
 hatch, leaving the Commodore without a single gun 
 to oppose to the few the Confiance still presented. 
 The battle would have been lost had not Macdon- 
 ough's foresight provided the means of retrieving 
 it. The anchor suspended astern of the Saratoga 
 was let go, and the men hauled in on the hawser that 
 led to the starboard quarter, bringing the ship's stern 
 up over the kedge. The ship now rode by the 
 kedge and by a line that had been bent to a bight in 
 the stream cable, and she was raked badly by the 
 accurate fire of the Linnet. By rousing on the line 
 the ship was at length got so far round that the 
 aftermost gun of the port broadside bore on the 
 Confiance. The men had been sent forward to keep 
 as much out of harm's way as possible, and now 
 some were at once called back to man the piece, 
 which then opened with effect. The next gun was 
 treated in the same manner ; but the ship now hung 
 and would go no farther round. The hawser lead- 
 ing from the port quarter was then got forward un- 
 der the bows and passed aft to the starboard quar- 
 ter, and a minute afterward the ship's whole port 
 battery opened with fatal effect. The Confiatice 
 meanwhile had also attempted to round. Her 
 springs, like those of the Linnet, were on the star- 
 board side, and so of course could not be shot away 
 as the Eagle's were ; but, as she had nothing but 
 springs to rely on, her efforts did little beyond forc- 
 ing her forward, and she hung with her head to the 
 wind. She had lost over half of her crew,' most of 
 her guns on the engaged side were dismounted, and 
 her stout masts had been splintered till they looked 
 
 ' Midshipman Lee, in his letter already quoted, says " not five 
 men were left unhurt " ; this would of course include bruises, etc., 
 as hurts. 
 
396 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 like bundles of matches ; her sails had been torn to 
 rags, and she was forced to strike, about two hours 
 after she had fired the first broadside. Without 
 pausing a minute the Saratoga again hauled on her 
 starboard hawser till her broadside was sprung to 
 bear on the Linnet, and the ship and brig began a 
 brisk fight, which the Eagle from her position could 
 take no part in, while the Ticonderoga was just fin- 
 ishing up the British galleys. The shattered and 
 disabled state of the Linnet's masts, sails, and yards 
 precluded the most distant hope of Capt. Pring's 
 effecting his escape by cutting his cable ; but he 
 kept up a most gallant fight with his greatly su- 
 perior foe, in hopes that some of the gun-boats would 
 come and tow him off, and despatched a lieutenant 
 to the Confiance to ascertain her state. The lieu- 
 tenant returned with news of Capt. Downie's death, 
 while the British gun-boats had been driven half a 
 mile off ; and, after having maintained the fight single- 
 handed for fifteen minutes, until, from the number 
 of shot between wind and water, the water had 
 risen a foot above her lower deck, the plucky little 
 brig hauled down her colors, and the fight ended, 
 a little over two hours and a half after the first gun 
 had been fired. Not one of the larger vessels had a 
 mast that would bear canvas, and the prizes were in 
 a sinking condition. The British galleys drifted to 
 leeward, none with their colors up ; but as the 
 Saratoga's boarding-officer passed along the deck of 
 the Confiance he accidentally ran against a lock- 
 string of one of her starboard guns,' and it went off. 
 This was apparently understood as a signal by the 
 
 ' A sufficient commentary, by the way, on James' assertion that the 
 guns of the Confiance had to be fired by matches, as the gun-locks 
 did not fit ! 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 397 
 
 galleys, and they moved slowly off, pulling but a 
 very few sweeps, and not one of them hoisting an 
 ensign. 
 
 On both sides the ships had been cut up in the 
 most extraordinary manner; the Saratoga had 55 
 shot-holes in her hull, and the Confiance 105 in hers, 
 and the Eagle and Linnet had suffered in proportion. 
 The number of killed and wounded can not be ex- 
 actly stated ; it was probably about 200 on the 
 American side, and over 300 on the British." 
 
 Captain Macdonough at once returned the British 
 officers their swords. Captain Bring writes : " I 
 
 ' Macdonough returned his loss as follows : 
 
 Killed. Wounded. 
 
 Saratoga^ 28 29 
 
 Eagle, 13 20 
 
 Ticonderoga^ 6 6 
 
 Preble, 1 
 
 Boxer, 3 i 
 
 Centipede, I 
 
 Wilmer, I 
 
 A total of 52 killed and 58 wounded ; but the latter head apparently 
 only included those who had to go to the hospital. Probably about 
 90 additional were more or less slightly wounded. Captain Pring, in 
 his letter of Sept. 12th, says the Confiance had 41 Icilled and 40 
 wounded ; the Linnet, 10 killed and 14 wounded ; the Chubb, 6 
 killed and 16 wounded ; the Finch, 2 wounded : in all, 57 killed 
 and 72 wounded. But he adds " that no opportunity has offered to 
 muster * * * this is the whole as yet ascertained to be killed or 
 wounded." The Americans took out 180 dead and wounded from 
 the Confiance, 50 from the Linnet, and 40 from the Chubb and Finch ; 
 in all, 270. James (" Naval Occurrences," p. 412) says the Confiance 
 had 83 wounded. As Captain Pring wrote his letter in Plattsburg 
 Bay the day after the action, he of course could not give the loss 
 aboard the British gun-boats ; so James at once assumed that they suf- 
 fered none. As well as could be found out they had between 50 and 
 100 killed and wounded. The total British loss was between 300 and 
 400, as nearly as can be ascertained. For this action, as already shown, 
 James is of no use whatever. Compare his statements, for example, 
 with those of Midshipman Lee, in the "Naval Chronicle." The com- 
 parative loss, as a means of testing the competitive prowess of the 
 combatants, is not of much consequence in this case, as the weaker 
 party in point of force conquered. 
 
398 NAVAL WAR OF l8i2. 
 
 have much satisfaction in making you acquainted 
 with the humane treatment the wounded have re- 
 ceived from Commodore Macdonough ; they were 
 immediately removed to his own hospital on Crab 
 Island, and furnished with every requisite. His 
 generous and polite attention to myself, the ofificers, 
 and men, will ever hereafter be gratefully remem- 
 bered." The effects of the victory were immediate 
 and of the highest importance. Sir George Prevost 
 and his army at once fled in great haste and con- 
 fusion back to Canada, leaving our northern frontier 
 clear fccr the remainder of the war ; while the victory 
 had a very great effect on the negotiations for 
 peace. 
 
 In this battle the crews on both sides behaved 
 with equal bravery, and left nothing to be desired in 
 this respect ; but from their rawness they of course 
 showed far less skill than the crews of most of the 
 American and some of the British ocean cruisers, 
 such as the Constitution, United States, or Shan- 
 non, the Hornet, Wasp, or Reindeer. Lieut. Cassin 
 handled the Ticonderoga, and Captain Pring the 
 Linnet, with the utmost gallantry and skill, and, 
 after Macdonough, they divide the honors of the 
 day. But Macdonough in this battle won a higher 
 fame than any other commander of the war, British 
 or American. He had a decidedly superior force to 
 contend against, the ofificers and men of the two 
 sides being about on a par in every respect ; and it 
 was solely owing to his foresight and resource that we 
 won the victory. He forced the British to engage 
 at a disadvantage by his excellent choice of position ; 
 and he prepared beforehand for every possible con- 
 tingency. His personal prowess had already been 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 399 
 
 shown at the cost of the rovers of Tripoli, and in 
 this action he helped fight the guns as ably as the 
 best sailor. His skill, seamanship, quick eye, readi- 
 ness of resource, and indomitable pluck, are beyond 
 all praise. Down to the time of the Civil War he is 
 the greatest figure in our naval history. A thor- 
 oughly religious man, he was as generous and hu- 
 mane as he was skilful and brave ; one of the 
 greatest of our sea-captains, he has left a stainless 
 name behind him. 
 
 
 BRITISH 
 
 LOSS. 
 
 
 Name. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Guns, 
 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Brig, 
 
 lOO 
 
 10 
 
 Burnt 
 
 by Lieut. Gregory 
 
 Magnet, 
 
 187 
 
 12 
 
 ii 
 
 by her crew. 
 
 Black Snake, 
 
 3° 
 
 I 
 
 
 Captured. 
 
 Gun-boat, 
 
 S° 
 
 2 
 
 
 (( 
 
 " 
 
 50 
 
 3 
 
 
 u 
 
 Confiance, 
 
 1,200 
 
 37 
 
 
 « 
 
 Linnet, 
 
 35° 
 
 16 
 
 
 a 
 
 Chubb, 
 
 112 
 
 11 
 
 
 a 
 
 Finch, 
 
 no 
 
 i-i 
 
 
 a 
 
 9 vessels. 
 
 2,189 
 
 103 
 
 
 
 
 AMERICAN 
 
 LOSS 
 
 
 Name. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Growler, 
 
 81 
 
 7 
 
 
 Captured. 
 
 Boat, 
 
 50 
 
 2 
 
 
 ** 
 
 Tigress, 
 
 96 
 
 I 
 
 
 u 
 
 Scorpion, 
 
 86 
 
 2 
 
 
 (t 
 
 Ohio, 
 
 94 
 
 I 
 
 
 u 
 
 Somers, 
 
 98 
 
 2 
 
 
 u 
 
 6 vessels, 
 
 505 
 
 IS 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 
 
 I815. 
 
 CONCLUDING OPERATIONS. 
 
 President captured by Captain Hayes' squadron — Successful Cuttlng-out 
 expeditions of tiie Americans — Privateer brig Chasseur captures St. Lawrence 
 schooner — Constitution captures Cyane and Levant — Escapes from a British 
 squadron — Tlie Hornet captures tlie Pent^iin^ and escapes from a 74 — The Pea- 
 tock and the Nautilus — Summary — Remarks on the war — Tables of compara- 
 tive loss, etc.— Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle. 
 
 THE treaty of peace between the United States 
 and Great Britain was signed at Ghent, Dec. 
 24, 1814, and ratified at Washington, Feb. i8, 1815. 
 But during these first two months of 181 5, and until 
 the news reached the cruisers on the ocean, the 
 warfare went on with much the same characteristics 
 as before. The blockading squadrons continued 
 standing on and ofT before the ports containing 
 war-ships with the same unwearying vigilance ; but 
 the ice and cold prevented any attempts at harry- 
 ing the coast except from the few frigates scattered 
 along the shores of the Carolinas and Georgia. 
 There was no longer any formidable British fleet in 
 the Chesapeake or Delaware, while at New Orleans 
 the only available naval force of the Americans 
 consisted of a few small row-boats, with which they 
 harassed the rear of the retreating British. The 
 Constitution, Capt. Stewart, was already at sea, 
 having put out from Boston on the 17th of Decem- 
 ber, while the blockading squadron (composed of 
 
 400 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 40 1 
 
 the same three frigates she subsequently encoun- 
 tered) was temporarily absent. 
 
 The Hornet, Capt. Biddle, had left the port of 
 New London, running in heavy weather through 
 the blockading squadron, and had gone into New 
 York, where the President, Commodore Decatur, 
 and Peacock, Capt. Warrington, with the Tom Bow- 
 line brig were already assembled, intending to start 
 on a cruise for the East Indies. The blockading 
 squadron off the port consisted of the 56-gun razee 
 Majestic, Capt. Hayes, 24-pounder frigate Endyniion, 
 Capt. Hope, i8-pounder frigate Pomona, Capt. 
 Lumly, and i8-pounder frigate Tenedos, Capt. Park- 
 er." On the 14th of January a severe snow-storm 
 came on and blew the squadron off the coast. 
 Next day it moderated, and the ships stood ofl to 
 the northwest to get into the track which they sup- 
 posed the Americans would take if they attempted 
 to put out in the storm. Singularly enough, at the 
 instant of arriving at the intended point, an hour 
 before daylight on the 15th, Sandy Hook bearing 
 W. N. W. 15 leagues, a ship was made out, on the 
 Majesties weather-bow, standing S. E." This ship 
 was the unlucky President. On the evening of the 
 14th she had left her consorts at anchor, and put 
 out to sea in the gale. But by a mistake of the 
 pilots who were to place boats to beacon the pas- 
 sage the frigate struck on the bar, where she beat 
 heavily for an hour and a half,' springing her masts 
 and becoming very much hogged and twisted.' 
 Owing to the severity of her injuries the President 
 
 ' Letter of Rear-Admiral Hotham, Jan. 23, 1815. 
 
 'Letter of Capt. Hayes, Jan. 17, 1815. 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Decatur, Jan. 18, 1815. 
 
 •Report of Court-martial, Alex. Murray presiding, April 20, 1815. 
 
402 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 would have put back to port, but was prevented by 
 the westerly gale.' Accordingly Decatur steered at 
 first along Long Island, then shaped his course to 
 the S. E., and in the dark ran into the British squad- 
 ron, which, but for his unfortunate accident, he 
 would thus have escaped. At daylight, the Presi- 
 dent, which had hauled up and passed to the north- 
 ward of her opponents,'' found herself with the 
 Majestic and Endymion astern, the Pomona on the 
 port and the Tenedos on the starboard quarter.' 
 The chase now became very interesting.'' During 
 the early part of the day, while the wind was still 
 strong, the Majestic led the Endyinion and fired oc- 
 casionally at the President, but without effect.' 
 The Pomona gained faster than the others, but by 
 Capt. Hayes' orders was signalled to go in chase of 
 the Tenedos, whose character the captain could not 
 make out"; and this delayed her several hours in 
 the chase.' In the afternoon, the wind coming out 
 light and baffling, the Endymion left the Majestic 
 behind,' and, owing to the President's disabled state 
 and the amount of water she made in consequence 
 of the injuries received while on the bar, gained 
 rapidly on her," although she lightened ship and 
 did every thing else that was possible to improve 
 her sailing.'" But a shift of wind helped the Endym- 
 ion," and the latter was able at about 2.30, to be- 
 gin skirmishing with her bow-chasers, answered by 
 the stern-chasers of the President." At 5.30 the 
 
 ' Decatur's letter, Jan. i8th. ° Decatur's letter, Jan, i8th. 
 
 ^ James, vi, 529. * Letter of Capt. Hayes. 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Decatur. ' James, vi, 529. 
 
 ' Log of Pomona, published at Bermuda, Jan. 2gth, and quoted in 
 full in the " Naval Chronicle," xxxiii, 370. 
 
 ° Letter of Captain Hayes. " Letter of Decatur. 
 
 '° Letter of Decatur. " Cooper, ii, 466. " Log of Pomona. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 403 
 
 Endymion began close action,' within half point- 
 blank shot on the President" s starboard quarter,' 
 where not a gun of the latter could bear/ The 
 President continued in the same course, steering 
 east by north, the wind being northwest, expecting 
 the Endymion soon to come up abeam ; but the 
 latter warily kept her position by yawing, so as not 
 to close." So things continued for half an hour 
 during which the President suffered more than 
 during all the remainder of the combat." At 6.00 
 the President kept off, heading to the south, and 
 the two adversaries ran abreast, the Americans 
 using the starboard and the British the port bat- 
 teries." Decatur tried to close with his antagonist, 
 but whenever he hauled nearer to the latter she 
 hauled off' and being the swiftest ship could of 
 course evade him ; so he was reduced to the neces- 
 sity of trying to throw her out of the combat' by 
 dismantling her. He was completely successful in 
 this, and after two hours' fighting the Endymion s 
 sails were all cut from her yards " and she dropped 
 astern, the last shot being fired from the President.^" 
 The Endymion was now completely silent,'" and 
 Commodore Decatur did not board her merely be- 
 cause her consorts were too close astern" ; accord- 
 ingly the President hauled up again to try her 
 chances at running, having even her royal studding- 
 sails set," and exposed her stern to the broadside of 
 
 ' Letter of Capt. Hayes. ^ James, vi, 530. 
 
 ' Letter of Decatur. ■" Letter of Decatur. 
 
 ' Cooper, 470. ° Log of Pomona. 
 
 ' Report of Court-martial. ' Letter of Commodore Decatur. 
 
 ° Letter of Capt. Hayes. '° Log of Pomona. 
 
 " Log of Pomona. "" Report of Court-martial. 
 "James, vi, 538. 
 
404 
 
 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 the Endymion,' but the latter did not fire a single 
 gun.' Three hours afterward, at ii," the Pomona 
 caught up with the President, and luffing to port 
 gave her the starboard broadside ' ; the Tenedos 
 being two cables' length's distance astern, taking up 
 a raking position.'' The Pomona poured in another 
 broadside, within musket shot," when the President 
 surrendered and was taken possession of by Capt. 
 Parker of the Tenedos^ A considerable number of 
 the President's people were killed by these two last 
 broadsides." The Endymion was at this time out 
 of sight astern." She did not come up, according 
 to one account, for an hour and three quarters,'" and 
 according to another, for three hours" ; and as she 
 was a faster ship than the President, this means that 
 she was at least two hours motionless repairing 
 damages. Commodore Decatur delivered his sword 
 to Capt. Hayes of the Majestic, who returned it, 
 stating in his letter that both sides had fought 
 with great gallantry.'' The President having been 
 taken by an entire squadron,'^ the prize-money was 
 divided equally among the ships." The President s 
 crew all told consisted of 450 men," none of whom 
 were British." She had thus a hundred more men 
 
 ' Letter of Commodore Decatur. '^ Log of the Pomona. 
 
 ■ Letter of Capt. Hayes. " Log of the Pomona. 
 
 ^ Decatur's letter. ° Log of Pomona. 
 
 ^James, vi, 531. 
 
 'Letter of Commodore Decatur, March 6, 1S15 ; deposition of 
 Chaplain Henry Robinson before Admiralty Court at St. Georges, 
 Bermuda, Jan. 1S15. 
 
 " Letter of Decatur, Jan. i8th. '"Log of Pomona. 
 
 '' Letter of Decatur, Mar. 6th. " Letter of Capt. Hayes. 
 
 ■' Admiral Hotham's letter, Jan. 23d. 
 "Bermuda " Royal Gazette," March 8, 1815. 
 ''' Depositions of Lieut. Gallagher and the other officers. 
 " Deposition of Commodore Decatur. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 405 
 
 than her antagonist and threw about 100 pounds 
 more shot at a broadside ; but these advantages 
 were more than counterbalanced by the injuries re- 
 ceived on the bar, and by the fact that her powder 
 was so bad that while some of the British shot went 
 through both her sides, such a thing did not once 
 happen to the Endymion^ when fairly hulled. The 
 Preside7it lost 24 killed and 55 wounded''; the 
 Endymion, 11 killed and 14 wounded.' Two days 
 afterward, on their way to the Bermudas, a violent 
 easterly gale came on, during which both ships were 
 dismasted, and the Endymion in addition had to 
 throw over all her spar-deck guns.'' 
 
 As can be seen, almost every sentence of this ac- 
 count is taken (very nearly word for word) from the 
 various ofificial reports, relying especially on the log 
 of the British frigate Pomona. I have been thus 
 careful to have every point of the narrative estab- 
 lished by unimpeachable reference : first, because 
 there have been quite a number of British histori- 
 ans who have treated the conflict as if it were a 
 victory and not a defeat for the Endymion ; and in 
 the second place, because I regret to say that I do 
 not think that the facts bear out the assertions, on 
 the part of most American authors, that Commo- 
 dore Decatur "covered himself with glory" and 
 showed the " utmost heroism." As regards the 
 first point. Captain Hope himself, in his singularly 
 short official letter, does little beyond detail his own 
 loss, and makes no claim to having vanquished his 
 opponent. Almost all the talk about its being a 
 "victory" comes from James; and in recounting 
 
 ' Bermuda " Royal Gazette," Jan. 6, 1818. ^ Decatur's letter. 
 
 ' Letter of Capt. Hope, Jan. 15, 1815. "James, vi, 534. 
 
406 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 this, as well as all the other battles, nearly every 
 subsequent British historian simply gives James' 
 statements over again, occasionally amplifying, but 
 more often altering or omitting, the vituperation. 
 The point at issue is simply this : could a frigate 
 which, according to James himself, went out of ac- 
 tion with" every sail set, take another frigate which 
 for two hours, according to the log of the Pomona, 
 lay motionless and unmanageable on the waters, 
 without a sail ? To prove that it could not, of 
 course needs some not over-scrupulous manipulation 
 of the facts. The intention with which James sets 
 about his work can be gathered from the trium- 
 phant conclusion he comes to, that Decatur's name 
 has been " sunk quite as low as that of Bainbridge 
 or Porter," which, comparing small things to great, 
 is somev/hat like saying that Napoleon's defeat by 
 Wellington and Blucher " sunk " him to the level 
 of Hannibal. For the account of the American 
 crew and loss, James relies on the statements made 
 in the Bermuda papers, of whose subsequent 
 forced retraction he takes no notice, and of course 
 largely over-estimates both. On the same authority 
 he states that the President' s fire was " silenced," 
 Commodore Decatur stating the exact reverse. The 
 point is fortunately settled by the log of the Pomona, 
 which distinctly says that the last shot was fired by 
 the President. His last resort is to state that the 
 loss of the President was fourfold (in reality three- 
 fold) that of the Endymion. Now we have seen that 
 the President lost " a considerable number " of men 
 from the fire of the Pomona. Estimating these at 
 only nineteen, we have a loss of sixty caused by the 
 Endymion, and as most of this was caused during 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 407 
 
 the first half hour, when the President. -was not firing, 
 it follows that while the two vessels were both fight- 
 ing, broadside and broadside, the loss inflicted was 
 about equal ; or, the President, aiming at her adver- 
 sary's rigging, succeeded in completely disabling her, 
 and incidentally killed 25 men, while the Endymion 
 did not hurt the President's rigging at all, and, aim- 
 ing at her hull, where, of course, the slaughter ought 
 to have been far greater than when the fire was di- 
 rected aloft, only killed about the same number of 
 men. Had there been no other vessels in chase, 
 Commodore Decatur, his adversary having been 
 thus rendered perfectly helpless, could have simply 
 taken any position he chose and compelled the lat- 
 ter to strike, without suffering any material addi- 
 tional loss himself. As in such a case he would 
 neither have endured the unanswered fire of the En- 
 dymion on his quarter for the first half hour, nor the 
 subsequent broadsides of the Pomona, the President' s 
 loss would probably have been no greater than that 
 of the Constitution in taking the Java. It is diffi- 
 cult to see how any outsider with an ounce of com- 
 mon-sense and fairmindedness can help awarding the 
 palm to Decatur, as regards the action with the En- 
 dymion. But I regret to say that I must agree with 
 James that he acted rather tamely, certainly not 
 heroically, in striking to the Pomona. There was, of 
 course, not much chance of success in doing battle 
 with two fresh frigates ; but then they only mounted 
 eighteen-pounders, and, judging from the slight re- 
 sults of the cannonading from the Endymion and the 
 two first (usually the most fatal) broadsides of the 
 Pomona, it would have been rather a long time be- 
 fore they would have caused much damage. Mean- 
 
408 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 while the President was pretty nearly as well off as 
 ever as far as fighting and sailing went. A lucky 
 shot might have disabled one of her opponents, and 
 then the other would, in all probability, have under- 
 gone the same fate as the Endytnion. At least it 
 was well worth trying, and though Decatur could 
 not be said to be disgraced, yet it is excusable 
 to wish that Porter or Perry had been in his place. 
 It is not very pleasant to criticise the actions of an 
 American whose name is better known than that of 
 almost any other single-ship captain of his time ; 
 but if a man is as much to be praised for doing fair- 
 ly, or even badly, as for doing excellently, then 
 there is no use in bestowing praise at all. 
 
 This is perhaps as good a place as any other to no- 
 tice one or two of James' most common misstate- 
 ments ; they really would not need refutation were it 
 not that they have been reechoed, as usual, by almost 
 every British historian of the war for the last 60 years. 
 In the first place, James puts the number of the 
 President's men at 475 ; she had 450. An exactly 
 parallel reduction must often be made when he 
 speaks of the force of an American ship. Then he 
 says there were many British among them, which is 
 denied under oath by the American officers ; this 
 holds good also for the other American frigates. He 
 says there were but 4 boys ; there were nearly 30 ; 
 and on p. 120 he says the youngest was 14, whereas 
 we incidentally learn from the " Life of Decatur " 
 that several were under 12. A favorite accusation 
 is that the American midshipmen were chiefly mas- 
 ters and mates of merchant-men ; but this was 
 hardly ever the case. Many of the midshipmen 
 of the war afterward became celebrated command- 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 409 
 
 ers, and most of these (a notable instance being Far- 
 ragut, the greatest admiral since Nelson) were en- 
 tirely too young in 1812 to have had vessels under 
 them, and, moreover, came largely from the so-called 
 " best families." 
 
 Again, in the first two frigate actions of 1812, the 
 proportion of killed to wounded happened to be 
 unusually large on board the American frigates ; 
 accordingly James states (p. 146) that the returns of 
 the wounded had been garbled, under-estimated, and 
 made " subservient to the views of the commanders 
 and their government." To support his position 
 that Capt. Hull, who reported 7 killed and 7 
 wounded, had not given the list of the latter in full, 
 he says that " an equal number of killed and 
 wounded, as given in the American account, hardly 
 ever occurs, except in cases of explosion " ; and yet, 
 on p. 5 19, he gives the loss of the British Hermes as 
 25 killed and 24 wounded, disregarding the incon- 
 gruity involved. On p. 169, in noticing the loss of 
 the United States, 5 killed and 7 wounded, he says 
 that " the slightly wounded, as in all other Ameri- 
 can cases, are omitted." This is untrue, and the 
 proportion on the United States, 5 to 7, is just about 
 the same as that given by James himself on the 
 Endymioti, 11 to 14, and NaiLtilus, 6 to 8. In sup- 
 porting his theory, James brings up all the instances 
 where the American wounded bore a larger propor- 
 tion to their dead than on board the British ships, 
 but passes over the actions with the Reindeer, Eper- 
 vier. Penguin, Endymion, and Boxer, where the re- 
 verse was the case. One of James' most common 
 methods of attempting to throw discredit on the 
 much vilified " Yankees " is by quoting newspaper 
 
410 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 accounts of their wounded. Thus he says (p. 562) 
 of the Hornet, that several of her men told some of 
 the Penguins sailors that she lost 10 men killed, 16 
 wounded, etc. Utterly false rumors of this kind were 
 as often indulged in by the Americans as the British. 
 After the capture of the President articles occasion- 
 ally appeared in the papers to the effect that some 
 American sailor had counted "23 dead" on board 
 the Endymion, that " more than 50 " of her men were 
 wounded, etc. Such statements were as commonly 
 made and with as little foundation by one side as by 
 the other, and it is absurd for a historian to take 
 any notice of them. James does no worse than 
 many of our own writers of the same date; but 
 while their writings have passed into oblivion, his 
 work is still often accepted as a standard. This 
 must be my apology for devoting so much time to 
 it. The severest criticism to which it can possibly 
 be subjected is to compare it with the truth. When- 
 ever dealing with purely American affairs, James' 
 history is as utterly untrustworthy as its contempo- 
 rary, " Niles' Register," is in matters purely British, 
 while both are invaluable in dealing with things re- 
 lating strictly to their own nation ; they supplement 
 each other. 
 
 On Jan. 8th General Packenham was defea'^ed and 
 killed by General Jackson at New Orleans, the 
 Louisiana and the seamen of the Carolina having 
 their full share in the glory of the day, and Captain 
 Henly being among the very few American wounded. 
 On the same day Sailing-master Johnson, with 28 
 men in two boats, cut out the British-armed trans- 
 port brig Cyprus, containing provisions and munitions 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 411 
 
 of war, and manned by ten men.' On the i8th the 
 British abandoned the enterprise and retreated to 
 their ships ; and Mr. Thomas Shields, a purser, for- 
 merly a sea-officer, set off to harass them while em- 
 barking. At sunset on the 20th he left with five 
 boats and a gig, manned in all with 50 men, and 
 having under him Sailing-master Dealy and Master's 
 Mate Boyd." At ten o'clock P.M. a large barge, con- 
 taining 14 seamen and 40 officers and men of the 
 14th Light Dragoons, was surprised and carried by 
 boarding after a slight struggle. The prisoners out- 
 numbering their captors, the latter returned to shore, 
 left them in a place of safety, and again started at 
 2 A.M. on the morning of the 21st. Numerous trans- 
 ports and barges of the enemy could be seen, ob- 
 serving very little order and apparently taking no 
 precautions against attack, which they probably did 
 not apprehend. One of the American boats capt- 
 ured a transport and five men ; another, containing 
 Mr. Shields himself ar.d eight men, carried by board- 
 ing, after a short resistance, a schooner carrying ten 
 men. The flotilla then re-united and captured in 
 succession, with no resistance, five barges containing 
 70 men. By this time the alarm had spread and 
 they were attacked by six boats, but these were re- 
 pelled with some loss. Seven of the prisoners (who 
 were now half as many again as their captors) suc- 
 ceed in escaping in the smallest prize. Mr. Shields 
 returned with the others, 78 in number. During the 
 entire expedition he had lost but three men, wounded ; 
 he had taken 132 prisoners, and destroyed eight craft 
 whose aggregate tonnage about equalled that of the 
 five gun-vessels taken on Lake Borgne. 
 
 ' Letter of Sailing-master Johnson Jan, g, 1815. 
 
 * Letter ol Thomas Shields to Com. Patterson Jan, 25. 1815. 
 
412 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 On Jan. 30, 181 5, information was received by 
 Captain Dent, commanding at North Edisto, Ga., 
 that a party of British officers and men, in four boats 
 belonging to H. M. S. Hebrus, Capt. Palmer, were 
 watering at one of the adjacent islands.' Lieut. 
 Lawrence Kearney, with three barges containing 
 about 75 men, at once proceeded outside to cut 
 them off, when the militia drove them away. The 
 frigate was at anchor out of gunshot, but as soon as 
 she perceived the barges began firing guns as sig- 
 nals. The British on shore left in such a hurry that 
 they deserted their launch, which, containing a 12- 
 pound boat carronade and six swivels, was taken by 
 the Americans. The other boats — two cutters, and 
 a large tender mounting one long nine and carrying 
 30 men- — made for the frigate ; but Lieut. Kearney 
 laid the tender aboard and captured her after a 
 sharp brush. The cutters were only saved by the 
 fire of the Hebrus, which was very well directed — 
 one of her shot taking off the head of a man close 
 by Lieut. Kearney. The frigate got under way and 
 intercepted Kearney's return, but the Lieutenant 
 then made for South Edisto, whither he carried his 
 prize in triumph. This was one of the most daring 
 exploits of the war, and was achieved at very small 
 cost. On Feb. 14th a similar feat was performed. 
 Lieutenant Kearney had manned the captured 
 launch with 25 men and the 12-pound carronade. 
 News was received of another harrying expedition 
 undertaken by the British, and Captain Dent, with 
 seven boats, put out to attack them, but was unable 
 to cross the reef. Meanwhile Kearney's barge had 
 
 ' Letter of Lawience Kearney of Jan. 30, 1815 (see in the Archives 
 at Washington, "Captains' Letters/' vol. 42, No. 100). 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 413 
 
 gotten outside, and attacked the schooner Brant, a 
 tender to H. M. S. Severn, mounting an i8-pounder, 
 and with a crew of two midshipmen, and twenty- 
 one marines and seamen. A running fight began, 
 the Brant evidently fearing that the other boats 
 might get across the reef and join in the attack; 
 suddenly she ran aground on a sand-bank, which 
 accident totally demoralized her crew. Eight of 
 them escaped in her boat, to the frigate ; the re- 
 maining fifteen, after firing a few shot, surrendered 
 and were taken possession of.' 
 
 I have had occasion from time to time to speak 
 of cutting-out expeditions, successful and otherwise, 
 undertaken by British boats against American pri- 
 vateers ; and twice a small British national cutter 
 was captured by an overwhelmingly superior Ameri- 
 can opponent of this class. We now, for the only 
 time, come across an engagement between a priva- 
 teer and a regular cruiser of approximately equal 
 force. These privateers came from many different 
 ports and varied greatly in size. Baltimore pro- 
 duced the largest number; but New York, Phila- 
 delphia, Boston, and Salem, were not far behind ; 
 and Charleston, Bristol, and Plymouth, supplied 
 some that were very famous. Many were merely small 
 pilot-boats with a crew of 20 to 40 men, intended 
 only to harry the West Indian trade. Others were 
 large, powerful craft, unequalled for speed by any 
 vessels of their size, which penetrated to the re- 
 
 ' Letter of Captain Dent, Feb. l6th (in " Captains' Letters," vol. 
 42, No. 130). Most American authors, headed by Cooper, give this 
 exploit a more vivid coloring by increasing the crew of the Brant to 
 forty men, omitting to mention that she vifas hard and fast aground, 
 ■and making no allusion to the presence of the five other American 
 boats which undoubtedly caused the Branfs flight in the first place. 
 
414 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 tnotest corners of the ocean, from Man to the 
 Spice Islands. When a privateer started she was 
 overloaded with naen, to enable her to man her 
 prizes; a successful cruise would reduce her crew to 
 a fifth of its original size. The favorite rig was 
 that of a schooner, but there were many brigs and 
 brigantines. Each was generally armed with a long 
 24 or 32 on a pivot, and a number of light guns in 
 broadside, either long 9's or short i8's or 12's. 
 Some had no pivot gun, others had nothing 
 else. The largest of them carried 17 guns (a 
 pivotal 32 and 16 long 12's in broadside) with a 
 crew of 150. Such a vessel ought to have been a 
 match, at her own distance, for a British brig-sloop, 
 but we never hear of any such engagements, and 
 there were several instances where privateers gave 
 up, without firing a shot, to a force superior, it is 
 true, but not enough so to justify the absolute 
 tameness of the surrender.' One explanation of 
 this was that they were cruising as private ventures, 
 and their object was purely to capture merchant- 
 men with as little risk as possible to themselves. 
 Another reason was that they formed a kind of sea- 
 militia, and, like their compeers on land, some could 
 fight as well as any regulars, while most would not 
 fight at all, especially if there was need of concerted 
 action between two or three. The American papers 
 of the day are full of "glorious victories" gained by 
 privateers over packets and Indiamen ; the British 
 papers are almost as full of instances where the 
 packets and Indiamen " heroically repulsed " the 
 privateers. As neither side ever chronicles a defeat, 
 
 ' As when the Epervier, some little time before her own capture, 
 took without resistance the Alfred, of Salem, mounting l6 long nines 
 and having 108 men aboard. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 415 
 
 and as the narration is apt to be decidedly figurative 
 in character, there is very Httle hope of getting at 
 the truth of such meetings ; so I have confined my- 
 self to the mention of those cases where privateers, 
 of either side, came into armed collision with regu- 
 lar cruisers. We are then sure to find some au- 
 thentic account. 
 
 The privateer brig Chasseur, of Baltimore, Cap- 
 tain Thomas Boyle, carried 16 long 12's, and had, 
 when she left port, 1 15 men aboard. She made 18 
 prizes on her last voyage, and her crew was thus 
 reduced to less than 80 men ; she was then chased 
 by the Barossa frigate, and threw overboard 10 of 
 her long 12's. Afterward eight g-pound carronades 
 were taken from a prize, to partially supply the 
 places of the lost guns ; but as she had no shot of 
 the calibre of these carronades each of the latter was 
 loaded with one 4-pound and one 6-pound ball, giving 
 her a broadside of 76 lbs. On the 26th of February, 
 two leagues from Havana, the Chasseur fell in with 
 the British schooner St. Lawrence, Lieut. H. C. Gor- 
 don, mounting twelve 12-pound carronades, and one 
 long 9; her broadside was thus 81 lbs., and she had 
 between 60 and 80 men aboard." The Chasseur mis- 
 took the St. Lawrence for a merchant-man and closed 
 with her. The mistake was discovered too late to es- 
 cape, even had such been Captain Boyle's intention, 
 
 'Letter of Captain Thomas Boyle, of March 2, 1815 (see Niles and 
 Coggeshall) ; he says the schooner had two more carronades ; I have 
 taken the number given by James (p. 539). Captain Boyle says the 
 St. Lawrence had on board 89 men and several more, including a 
 number of soldiers and marines and gentlemen of the navy, as pas- 
 sengers ; James says her crew amounted to sr "exclusive of some 
 passengers," which I suppose must mean at least nine men. So the 
 forces were pretty equal ; the Chasseur may have had 20 men more 
 or 10 men less than her antagonist, and she threw from 5 to 21 lbs, 
 kss weight of shot. 
 
4l6 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 and a brief but bloody action ensued. At 1.26 P. M., 
 the Si. Lawrence fired the first broadside, within 
 pistol shot, to which the Chasseur replied with her 
 great guns and musketry. The brig then tried to 
 close, so as to board ; but having too much way on, 
 shot ahead under the lee of the schooner, which put 
 her helm up to wear under the Chasseur's stern. 
 Boyle, however, followed his antagonist's manoeuvre, 
 and the two vessels ran along side by side, the St. 
 Lawrence drawing ahead, while the firing was very 
 heavy. Then Captain Boyle put his helm a star- 
 board and ran his foe aboard, when in the act of 
 boarding, her colors were struck at 1.41 P. M., 15 
 minutes after the first shot. Of the Chasseur s 
 crew 5 were killed and 8 wounded, including Cap- 
 tain Boyle slightly. Of the St. Lawrence' s crew 6 
 were killed and 17 (according to James 18) wounded. 
 This was a very creditable action. The St. Law- 
 rence had herself been an American privateer, called 
 the Atlas, and was of 241 tons, or just 36 less than 
 the Chasseur. The latter could thus fairly claim 
 that her victory was gained over a regular cruiser of 
 about her own force. Captain Southcombe of the 
 Lottery, Captain Reid of the General Armstrong, 
 Captain Ordronaux of the Neufchatel, and Captain 
 Boyle of the Chasseur, deserve as much credit as 
 any regularly commissioned sea-officers. But it is a 
 mistake to consider these cases as representing the 
 average; an ordinary privateer was, naturally 
 enough, no match for a British regular cruiser of 
 equal force. The privateers were of incalculable 
 benefit to us, and inflicted enormous damage on the 
 foe ; but in fighting they suffered under the same 
 disadvantages as other irregular forces ; they were 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 417 
 
 utterly unreliable. A really brilliant victory would 
 be followed by a most extraordinary defeat. 
 
 After the Constitution had escaped from Boston, 
 as I have described, she ran to the Bermudas, cruised 
 in their vicinity a short while, thence to Madeira, to 
 the Bay of Biscay, and finally off Portugal, cruising 
 for some time in sight of the Rock of Lisbon. Cap- 
 tain Stewart then ran off southwest, and on Feb. 
 20th, Madeira bearing W. S. W. 60 leagues," the 
 day being cloudy, with a light easterly breeze," at 
 I P.M. a sail was made two points on the port bow ; 
 and at 2 P.M., Captain Stewart, hauling up in chase, 
 discovered another sail. The first of these was the 
 frigate-built ship corvette Cyane, Captain Gordon 
 Thomas Falcon, and the second was the ship sloop 
 Levant, Captain the Honorable George Douglass.' 
 Both were standing close hauled on the starboard 
 tack, the sloop about 10 miles to leeward of the cor- 
 vette. At 4 P.M. the latter began making signals 
 to her consort that the strange sail was an enemy, 
 and then made all sail before the wind to join the 
 sloop. The Constitution bore up in chase, setting 
 her top-mast, top-gallant, and royal studding-sails. 
 In half an hour she carried away her main royal 
 mast, but immediately got another prepared, and at 
 5 o'clock began firing at the corvette with the two 
 port-bow guns ; as the shot fell short the firing soon 
 ceased. At 5.30 the Cyane got within hail of the 
 Levant, and the latter's gallant commander expressed 
 to Captain Gordon his intention of engaging the 
 
 ' Letter of Captain Stewart to the Secretary of the Navy, May 20, 
 1815. 
 ^ Log of Constitution, Feb. 20, 1815. 
 ^ " Naval Chronicle," xxxiii, 466. 
 
41 8 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 American frigate. The two ships accordingly hauled 
 up their courses and stood on the starboard tack; 
 but immediately afterward their respective captains 
 concluded to try to delay the action till dark, so as 
 to get the advantage of manoeuvring.' Accordingly 
 they again set all sail and hauled close to the wind 
 to endeavor to weather their opponent ; but finding 
 the latter coming down too fast for them to succeed 
 they again stripped to fighting canvas and formed 
 on the starboard tack in head and stern line, the 
 Levant about a cable's length in front of her con- 
 sort. The American now had them completely 
 under her guns and showed her ensign, to which chal- 
 lenge the British ships replied by setting their colors. 
 At 6.IO the Constitution ranged up to windward of 
 the Cyane and Levant, the former on her port quarter 
 the latter on her port bow, both being distant about 
 250 yards from her" — so close that the American 
 marines were constantly engaged almost from the be- 
 ginning of the action. The fight began at once, and 
 continued with great spirit for a quarter of an hour, 
 the vessels all firing broadsides. It was now moon- 
 light, and an immense column of smoke formed 
 under the lee of the Constitution, shrouding from 
 sight her foes ; and, as the fire of the latter had al- 
 most ceased, Captain Stewart also ordered his men 
 to stop, so as to find out the positions of the ships. 
 In about three minutes the smoke cleared, disclosing 
 
 ' " Naval Chronicle,*' xxxiii, 466. 
 
 '^ Testimony sworn to by Lieutenant W. B. Shubrick and Lieu- 
 tenant of Marines Archibald Henderson before Thomas Welsh, Jr., 
 Justice of the Peace, Suffolk St., Boston, July 20, 1815. The depo- 
 sitions were taken in consequence of a report started by some of the 
 British journals that the action began at a distance of j of a mile. 
 All the American depositions were that all three ships began firing at 
 once, when equidistant from each other about 250 yards, the marines 
 being engaged almost the whole time. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 419 
 
 to the Americans the Levant dead to leeward on the 
 port beam, and the Cyane luffing up for their port 
 quarter. Giving a broadside to the sloop, Stewart 
 braced aback his main and mizzen top-sails, with 
 top-gallant sails set, shook all forward, and backed 
 rapidly astern, under cover of the smoke, abreast 
 the corvette, forcing the latter to fill again to avoid 
 being raked. The firing was spirited for a few min- 
 utes, when the Cyane s almost died away. The 
 Levant bore up to wear round and assist her consort, 
 but the Constitution filled her top-sails, and, shooting 
 ahead, gave her two stern rakes, when she at once 
 made all sail to get out of the combat. The Cyane 
 was now discovered wearing, when the Constitution 
 herself at once wore and gave her in turn a stern 
 rake, the former luffing to and firing her port broad- 
 side into the starboard bow of the frigate. Then, 
 as the latter ranged up on her port quarter, she 
 struck, at 6.50, just forty minutes after the be- 
 ginning of the action. She was at once taken pos- 
 session of, and Lieut. Hoffman, second of the Con- 
 stitution, was put in command. Having manned 
 the prize, Captain Stewart, at 8 o'clock, filled away 
 after her consort. The latter, however, had only 
 gone out of the combat to refit. Captain Douglass 
 had no idea of retreat, and no sooner had he rove 
 new braces than he hauled up to the wind, and came 
 very gallantly back to find out his friend's condition. 
 At 8.50 he met the Constitution, and, failing to 
 weather her, the frigate and sloop passed each other 
 on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides. Finding 
 her antagonist too heavy, the Levant then crowded 
 all sail to escape, but was soon overtaken by the 
 Constitution, and at about 9.30 the latter opened 
 
420 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 with her starboard bow-chasers, and soon afterward 
 the British captain hauled down his colors. Mr. 
 Ballard, first of the Constitution, was afterward put 
 in command of the prize. By one o'clock the ships 
 were all 'in order again. 
 
 The Constitution had been hulled eleven times, 
 more often than in either of her previous actions, 
 but her loss was mainly due to the grape and mus- 
 ketry of the foe in the beginning of the fight.' The 
 British certainly fired better than usual, especially 
 considering the fact that there was much manoeu- 
 vring, and that it was a night action. The Americans 
 lost 3 men killed, 3 mortally, and 9 severely and 
 slightly, wounded. The corvette, out of her crew 
 of 180, had 12 men killed and 26 wounded, several 
 mortally; the sloop, out of 140, had 7 killed and 16 
 wounded. The Constitution had started on her 
 cruise very full-handed, with over 470 men, but 
 several being absent on a prize, she went into bat- 
 tle with about 450.' The prizes had suffered a good 
 deal in their hulls and rigging, and had received 
 some severe wounds in their masts and principal 
 spars. The Cyanc carried on her main-deck twenty- 
 two 32-pound carronades, and on her spar-deck two 
 long 12's, and ten i8-pounder carronades. The Le- 
 vant carried, all on one deck, eighteen 32-pound 
 carronades and two long 9's, together with a shifting 
 i2-pounder. Thus, their broadside weight of metal 
 was 763 pounds, with a total of 320 men, of whom 
 61 fell, against the Constitution s 704 pounds and 
 450 men, of whom 15 were lost; or, nominally, the 
 relative force was 100 to 91, and the relative loss 
 
 ' Deposition of her officers as before cited. 
 
 ''410 officers and seamen, and 41 marines, by her muster-roll of 
 Feb. igth. (The muster-rolls are preserved in the Treasury Depart- 
 ment at Washington.) 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 421 
 
 100 to 24. But the British guns were almost ex- 
 clusively carronades which, as already pointed out 
 in the case of the Essex and in the battle off Platts- 
 burg, are no match for long guns. Moreover, the 
 scantling of the smaller ships was, of course, by no 
 means as stout as that of the frigate, so tha<t the dis- 
 parity of force was much greater than the figures 
 would indicate, although not enough to account for 
 the difference in loss. Both the British ships were 
 ably handled, their fire was well directed, and the 
 Levant in especial was very gallantly fought. 
 
 As regards the Constitution, " her manoeuvring was 
 as brilliant as any recorded in naval annals," and it 
 would have been simply impossible to surpass the 
 consummate skill with which she was handled in the 
 smoke, always keeping her antagonists to leeward, 
 and, while raking both of them, not being once 
 raked herself. The firing was excellent, considering 
 the short time the ships were actually engaged, and 
 the fact that it was at night. Altogether the fight 
 reflected the greatest credit on her, and also on her 
 adversaries.' 
 
 ' There is no British official account of tlie action. James states 
 that the entire British force was only 302 men of whom 12 were 
 killed and 29 wounded. This is probably not based on any author- 
 ity. Captain Stewart received on board 301 prisoners, of whom 42 
 were wounded, several mortally. Curiously enough James also un- 
 derestimates the American loss, making it only 12. He also says 
 that many attempts were made by the Americans to induee the capt- 
 ured British to desert, while the Constitution's officers deny this un- 
 der oath, before Justice Welsh, as already quoted, and state that, on 
 the contrary, many of the prisoners offered to enlist on the frigate, 
 but were all refused permission — as " the loss of the Chesapeake had 
 taught us the danger of having renegades aboard." This denial, by 
 the way, holds good for all the similar statements made by James as 
 regards the Guerriere, Macedonian, etc. He also states that a British 
 court-martial found various counts against the Americans for harsh 
 treatment, but all of these were specifically denied by the American 
 officers, under oath, as already quoted. 
 
 I have relied chiefly on Captain Stewart's narrative ; but partly (as 
 to lime, etc.) on the British account in the " Naval Chronicle." 
 
422 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12, 
 
 ^ '^ 
 
 "chf/sLuaiiOM 
 
 6.20 
 
 S.SS % \P-^ "• 
 
 -^1 
 
 s.so 
 
 \ 
 
 t 
 
 VJ 
 
 The merits of this action can perhaps be bet- 
 ter appreciated by comparing it with a similar one 
 that took place a few years before between a British 
 sloop and corvette on the one side, and a French 
 frigate on the other, and which is given in full by 
 both James and Troude. Although these authors 
 differ somewhat in the account of it, both agree 
 that the Frenchman, the Nereidc, of 44 guns, on 
 Feb. 14, 1810, fought a long and indecisive battle 
 with the Rainbow of 26 and Avon of 18 guns, the 
 British sloops being fought separately, in succession. 
 The relative force was almost exactly as in the Con- 
 stitution s fight. Each side claimed that the other 
 fled. But this much is sure : the Constitution en- 
 gaging the Cyane and Levant together, captured 
 both ; while the Nereidc, engaging the Rainbow and 
 Avon separately, captured neither. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 423 
 
 The three ships now proceeded to the Cape de 
 Verds, and on March loth anchored in the harbor 
 of Porto Praya, Island of San Jago. Here a mer- 
 chant-brig was taken as a cartel, and a hundred of 
 the prisoners were landed to help fit her for sea. 
 The next day the weather was thick and foggy, 
 with fresh breezes.' The first and second lieuten- 
 ants, with a good part of the people, were aboard 
 the two prizes. At five minutes past twelve, while 
 Mr. Shubrick, the senior remaining lieutenant, was 
 on the quarter-deck, the canvas of a large vessel 
 suddenly loomed up through the haze, her hull be- 
 ing completely hidden by the fog-bank. Her char- 
 acter could not be made out ; but she was sailing 
 close-hauled, and evidently making for the roads. 
 Mr. Shubrick at once went down and reported the 
 stranger to Captain Stewart, when that officer 
 coolly remarked that it was probably a British 
 frigate or an Indiaman, and directed the lieutenant 
 to return on deck, call all hands, and get ready to 
 go out and attack her." At that moment the can- 
 vas of two other ships was discovered rising out of 
 the fog astern of the vessel first seen. It was now 
 evident that all three were heavy frigates.' In fact, 
 they were the Newcastle, 50, Captain Lord George 
 Stewart ; Leander, 50, Captain Sir Ralph Collier, 
 K. C. B., and Acasta, 40, Captain Robert Kerr, 
 standing into Porto Praya, close-hauled on the 
 starboard tack, the wind being light northeast by 
 north." Captain Stewart at once saw that his op- 
 ponents were far too heavy for a fair fight, and, 
 
 ' Log of Constitution, March 11, 1815. " Cooper, ii, 459. 
 
 ' Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. 
 ^ Marshall's " Naval Biography," ii, 535. 
 
424 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 knowing that the neutrality of the port would not 
 be the slightest protection to him, he at once sig- 
 nalled to the prizes to follow, cut his cable, and, in 
 less than ten minutes from the time the first frigate 
 was seen, was standing out of the roads, followed 
 by Hoffmann and Ballard. Certainly a more satis- 
 factory proof of the excellent training of both ofifi- 
 cers and men could hardly be given than the rapidity, 
 skill, and perfect order with which every thing was 
 done. Any indecision on the part of the ofificers or 
 bungling on the part of the men would have lost 
 every thing. The prisoners on shore had manned a 
 battery and delivered a furious but ill-directed fire 
 at their retreating conquerors. The frigate, sloop, 
 and corvette, stood out of the harbor in the order 
 indicated, on the port tack, passing close under the 
 east point, and a gunshot to windward of the Brit- 
 ish squadron, according to the American, or about a 
 league, according to the British, accounts. The 
 Americans made out the force of the strangers cor- 
 rectly, and their own force was equally clearly dis- 
 cerned by the Acasta , but both the Newcastle and 
 Leander mistook the Cyane and Levant for frigates, 
 a mistake similar to that once made by Com- 
 modore Rodgers. The Constittttion now crossed her 
 top-gallant yards and set the foresail, main-sail, 
 spanker, flying jib, and top-gallant sails ; and the 
 British ships, tacking, made all sail in pursuit. The 
 Newcastle was on the Constitution s lee quarter 
 and directly ahead of the Leander, while the Acasta 
 was on the weather-quarter of the Newcastle. All 
 six ships were on the port tack. The Constitution 
 cut adrift the boats towing astern, and her log 
 notes that at 12.50 she found she was sailing about 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 425 
 
 as fast as the ships on her lee quarter, but that the 
 Acasta was luffing into her wake and dropping 
 astern. The log of the Acasta says, "We had 
 gained on the sloops, but the frigate had gained on 
 us." At 1. 10 the Cyane had fallen so far astern and 
 to leeward that Captain Stewart signalled to Lieu- 
 tenant Hoffman to tack, lest he should be cut off 
 if he did not. Accordingly the lieutenant put about 
 and ran off toward the northwest, no notice being 
 taken of him by the enemy beyond an ineffectual 
 broadside from the sternmost frigate. At 2.35 he was 
 out of sight of all the ships and shaped his course 
 for America, which he reached on April loth.' At 
 1.45 the Newcastle opened on the Constitution firing 
 by divisions, but the shot all fell short, according to 
 the American statements, about 200 yards, while 
 the British accounts (as given in Marshall's " Naval 
 Biography") make the distance much greater; at any 
 rate the vessels were so near that from the Constitu- 
 tion the officers of the Newcastle could be seen stand- 
 ing on the hammock nettings. But, very strangely, 
 both the 50-gun ships apparently still mistook the 
 Levant, though a low, flush-decked sloop like the 
 Hornet, for the " President, Congress, or Macedo- 
 nian" Captain Collier believing that the Constitution 
 had sailed with two other frigates in company." By 
 three o'clock the Levant had lagged so as to be in 
 the same position from which the Cyatte had just 
 been rescued ; accordingly Captain Stewart signalled 
 to her to tack, which she did, and immediately after- 
 ward all three British ships tacked in pursuit. Be- 
 fore they did so, it must be remembered the Acasta 
 
 ' Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. 
 ' Marshall, ii, 533. 
 
426 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 had weathered on the Constitution, though left con- 
 siderably astern, while the Newcastle and Leander 
 had about kept their positions on her lee or star- 
 board quarter ; so that if any ship had been de- 
 tached after the Levant it should have been the 
 Leander, which had least chance of overtaking the 
 American frigate. The latter was by no means as 
 heavily armed as either of the two 50's, and but 
 little heavier than the Acasta ;- moreover, she was 
 shorthanded, having manned her two prizes. The 
 Acasta, at any rate, had made out the force of the 
 Levant, and, even had she been a frigate, it was cer- 
 tainly carrying prudence to an extreme to make 
 more than one ship tack after her. Had the New- 
 castle and Acasta'ke'pt on after the Constitution there 
 was a fair chance of overtaking her, for the Acasta 
 had weathered on her, and the chase could not bear 
 up for fear of being cut off by the Newcastle. At 
 any rate the pursuit should not have been given up 
 so early. Marshall says there was a mistake in the 
 signalling. The British captains certainly bungled 
 the affair ; even James says (p. 558) : " It is the most 
 blundering piece of business recorded in these six 
 volumes." As for Stewart and his men, they de- 
 serve the highest credit for the cool judgment and 
 prompt, skilful seamanship they had displayed. The 
 Constitution, having shaken off her pursuers, sailed 
 to Maranham, where she landed her prisoners. At 
 Porto Rico she learned of the peace, and forthwith 
 made sail for New York, reaching it about the mid- 
 dle of May. 
 
 As soon as he saw Captain Stewart's signal, Lieu- 
 tenant Ballard had tacked, and at once made for the 
 anchorage at Porto Prayo, which he reached, though 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 427 
 
 pursued by all his foes, and anchored within 150 
 yards of a heavy battery.' The wisdom of Captain 
 Stewart's course in not trusting to the neutrality of 
 the port, now became evident. The Acasta opened 
 upon the sloop as soon as the latter had anchored, 
 at 4.30" The Newcastle, as soon as she arrived, also 
 opened, and so did the Leander, while the British 
 prisoners on shore fired the guns of the battery. 
 Having borne this combined cannonade for 15 min- 
 utes,' the colors of the Levant were hauled down. 
 The unskilful firing of the British ships certainly 
 did not redeem the blunders previously made by 
 Sir George Collier, for the three heavy frigates dur- 
 ing 15 minutes' broadside practice in smooth water 
 against a stationary and unresisting foe, did her but 
 little damage, and did not kill a man. The chief 
 effect of the fire was to damage the houses of the 
 Portuguese town.' 
 
 After the capture of the President, the Peacock, 
 Captain Warrington, the Hornet, Captain Biddle, 
 and Tom Bowline, brig, still remained in New York 
 harbor. On the 22d of January a strong northwest- 
 erly gale began to blow, and the American vessels, 
 according to their custom, at once prepared to take 
 advantage of the heavy weather and run by the 
 blockaders. They passed the bar by daylight, under 
 storm canvas, the British frigates lying to in the 
 southeast being plainly visible. They were igno- 
 rant of the fate of the President, and proceeded tow- 
 ard Tristan d' Acunha, which was the appointed 
 
 'Letter of Lieutenant Ballard, May 2, 1S15. 
 
 ^ Newcastle's log, as given by Marshall and James. 
 
 « Ballard's letter. " James, vi, 551. 
 
428 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 rendezvous. A few days out the Hornet parted 
 company from the two others ; these last reached 
 Tristan d'Acunha about March iBth, but were driven 
 ofT again by a gale. The Hornet reached the island 
 on the 23d, and at half-past ten in the morning, the 
 wind being fresh S.S.W., when about to anchor off 
 the north point, a sail was made in the southeast, 
 steering west.' This was the British brig-sloop Pen- 
 guin, Captain James Dickenson. She was a new 
 vessel, having left port for the first time in Septem- 
 ber, 1814. While at the Cape of Good Hope she 
 had received from Vice-Admiral Tyler 12 marines 
 from the Medway, ^4, increasing her complement to 
 132; and was then despatched on special service 
 against a heavy American privateer, the Young 
 Wasp, which had been causing great havoc among 
 the homeward-bound Indiamen. 
 
 When the strange sail was first seen Captain Bid- 
 die was just letting go his top-sail sheets ; he at once 
 sheeted them home, and, the stranger being almost 
 instantly shut out by the land, made all sail to the 
 west, and again caught sight of her. Captain Dick- 
 enson now, for the first time, saw the American 
 sloop, and at once bore up for her. The position of 
 the two vessels was exactly the reverse of the Wasp 
 and Frolic, the Englishman being to windward. The 
 Hornet hove to, to let her antagonist close ; then 
 she filled her maintop-sail and continued to yaw, 
 wearing occasionally to prevent herself from being 
 raked. At forty minutes past one the Penguin, be- 
 ing within musket-shot, hauled to the wind on the 
 'Starboard tack, hoisted a St. George's ensign and 
 
 ' Letter from Captain Biddle to Commodore Decatur, Mar. 25, 
 1815. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 429 
 
 fired a gun. The Hornet luffed up on the same 
 tack, hoisting American colors, and the action began 
 with heavy broadsides. The vessels ran along thus 
 for 15 minutes, gradually coming closer together, 
 and Captain Dickenson put his helm aweather, to 
 run his adversary aboard. At this moment the 
 brave young ofificer received a mortal wound, and 
 the command devolved on the first lieutenant, Mr. 
 McDonald, who endeavored very gallantly to carry 
 out his commander's intention, and at 1.56 the Pen- 
 gjiins bowsprit came in between the Hornet's main- 
 and mizzen-rigging on the starboard side. The 
 American seamen had been called away, and were 
 at their posts to repel boarders, but as the British 
 made no attempt to come on, the cutlass men began 
 to clamber into the rigging to go aboard the brig. 
 Captain Biddle very coolly stopped them, " it being 
 evident from the beginning that our fire was greatly 
 superior both in quickness and efTect." There was 
 a heavy sea running, and as the Hornet forged ahead, 
 the Penguin s bowsprit carried away her mizzen 
 shrouds, stern davits, and spanker boom ; and the 
 brig then hung on her starboard quarter, where only 
 small arms could be used on either side. An English 
 officer now called out something which Biddle 
 understood, whether correctly or not is disputed, to 
 be the word of surrender ; accordingly he directed 
 his marines to cease firing, and jumped on the taff- 
 rail. At that minute two of the marines on the 
 Penguins forecastle, not 30 feet distant, fired at him, 
 one of the balls inflicting a rather severe wound in 
 his neck. A discharge of musketry from the Hornet 
 at once killed both the marines, and at that moment 
 the ship drew ahead. As the vessels separated the 
 
430 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Penguin's foremast went overboard, the bowsprit 
 breaking short off. The Hornet at once wore, to 
 present a fresh broadside, while the Penguin s dis- 
 abled condition prevented her following suit, and 
 having lost a third of her men killed and wounded 
 (14 of the former and 28 of the latter), her hull be- 
 ing riddled through and through, her foremast gone, 
 main-mast tottering, and most of the guns on the 
 engaged side dismounted, she struck her colors at 
 two minutes past two, twenty-two minutes after the 
 first gun was fired. Of the Hornefs 150 men, 8 
 were absent in a prize. By actual measurement she 
 was two feet longer and slightly narrower than her 
 antagonist. Her loss was almost entirely caused by 
 musketry, amounting to i marine killed, i seaman 
 mortally wounded, and Captain Biddle, Lieutenant 
 
 1. 9-0 
 ISO ,..-'^^" 
 
 ••• — "'\ii'^^ •■■''' 
 
 '^■-tt> 
 
 ^ °^ HORHET 
 
 Conner, and seven seamen wounded slightly. Not 
 a round shot struck the hull, nor was a mast or spar 
 materially injured, but the rigging and sails were a 
 good deal cut, especially about the fore and main 
 top-gallant masts. The Hornefs crew had been suf- 
 fering much from sickness, and 9 of the. men were 
 unable to be at quarters, thus reducing the vessels 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 431 
 
 to an exact equality. Counting in these men, and 
 excluding the 8 absent in a prize, we get as 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 
 
 Tonnage. 
 
 No. Guns. 
 
 Weight 
 Metal. 
 
 Crew. 
 
 Loss. 
 
 let 
 
 480 
 
 10 
 
 279 
 
 142' 
 
 H 
 
 'uin 
 
 477 
 
 10 
 
 274 
 
 132 
 
 42 
 
 Or, the force being practically equal, the Hornet in- 
 flicted fourfold the loss and tenfold the damage she 
 suffered. Hardly any action of the war reflected 
 greater credit on the United States marine than 
 this ; for the cool, skilful seamanship and excellent 
 gunnery that enabled the Americans to destroy an 
 antagonist of equal force in such an exceedingly 
 short time. The British displayed equal bravery, 
 but were certainly very much behind their antago- 
 nists in the other qualities which go to make up a 
 first-rate man-of-warsman. Even James says he 
 " cannot offer the trifling disparity of force in this 
 
 'This number of men is probably too great ; I have not personally 
 examined the Hornet's muster-roll for that period. Lieutenant Em- 
 mons in his " History," gives her 132 men ; but perhaps he did not 
 include the nine sick, which would make his statement about the 
 same as mine. In response to my inquiries, I received a veiy kind 
 letter from the Treasury Department (Fourth Auditor's office), which 
 stated that the muster-roll of the Hornet on this voyage showed " loi 
 officers and crew (marines excepted)." Adding the 20 marines would 
 make but 121 in all. I think there must be some mistake in this, 
 and so have considered the Hornet's crew as consisting originally of 
 150 men, the same as on her cruises in 1812. 
 
 The Penguin was in reality slightly larger than the Hornet^ judg- 
 ing from the comparisons made in Biddle's letter (for the original of 
 which see in the Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol 42, No. 
 112). He says that the Penguin, though two feet shorter on deck 
 than the Hornet, had a. greater length of keel, a slightly greater 
 breadth of beam, stouter sides, and higher bulwarks, with swivels on 
 the capstan and tops, and that she fought both her " long 12's" on 
 the same side. I have followed James, however, as regards this ; he 
 says her short guns were 6-pounders, and that but one was fought on 
 a side. 
 
432 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 action as an excuse for the Penguins capture. The 
 chief cause is * * " the immense disparity be- 
 tween the two vessels in * * * the effectiveness 
 of their crews." * 
 
 The Penguin was so cut up by shot that she had 
 to be destroyed. After the stores, etc., had been 
 taken out of her, she was thoroughly examined 
 (Captain Biddle, from curiosity, taking her measure- 
 ments in comparison with those of the Hornet). 
 Her destruction was hastened on account of a 
 strange sail heaving in sight ; but the latter proved 
 to be the Peacock, with the Tom Bowline in com- 
 pany. The latter was now turned to account by 
 being sent in to Rio de Janeiro as a cartel with the 
 prisoners. The Peacock and Hornet remained about 
 the island till April 13th, and then, giving up all 
 hopes of seeing the President, and rightly supposing 
 she had been captured, started out for the East 
 
 ' After the action but one official account, that of Captain Biddle, 
 was published ; none of the letters of the defeated British com- 
 manders were published after 1813. As regards this action, every 
 British writer has followed James, who begins his account thus: 
 " Had the vessel in sight to windward been rigged with three masts 
 instead of two, and had she proved to be a British cruiser, Captain 
 Biddle would have marked her down in his log as a ' frigate, and 
 have made off' with all the canvas he could possibly spread. Had 
 the ship overtaken the Hornet and been in reality a trifle superior in 
 force, Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, would have exhausted his 
 eloquence in lauding the blessings of peace before he tried a struggle 
 for the honors of war." After this preface (which should be read 
 in connection with the Hornet's unaccepted challenge to the Bonne 
 Citoyenne, a ship " ". trifle superior in force") it can be considered 
 certain that James will both extenuate and also set down a good deal 
 in malice. One instance of this has already been given in speaking 
 of the President's capture. Again, he says, "the Hornet received 
 several round shot in her hull,' which she did — a month after this 
 action, from the Cornivaitis, 74 ; James knew perfectly well that not 
 one of the Penguin's shot hit the Hornet's hull. The quotations I 
 have given are quite enough to prove that nothing he says about the 
 action is worth attending to. The funniest part of his account is 
 where he makes Captain Biddle get drunk, lose his " native cunning," 
 and corroborate his (James') statements. He does not even hint at 
 the authority for this. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 433 
 
 Indies. On the 27th of the month, in lat. 38°3o' S. 
 and long. 33° E.,' t)\& Peacock signalled a stranger in 
 the S.E., and both sloops crowded sail in chase. 
 The next morning they came down with the wind 
 aft from the northwest, the studding-sails set on 
 both sides. The new 22-gun sloops were not only 
 better war-vessels, but faster ones too, than any 
 other ships of their rate ; and the Peacock by after- 
 noon was two leagues ahead of the Hornet. At 2 
 P.M. the former was observed to manifest some hes- 
 itation about approaching the stranger, which in- 
 stead of avoiding had rather hauled up toward 
 them. All on board the Hornet thought her an 
 Indiaman, and " the men began to wonder what 
 they would do with the silks," when, a few minutes 
 before four, the Peacock signalled that it was a line- 
 of-battle ship, which reversed the parts with a ven- 
 geance. Warrington's swift ship was soon out of 
 danger, while Biddle hauled close to the wind on 
 the port tack, with the Cornwallis, 74, bearing the 
 flag of Admiral Sir George Burleton, K.C.B.,' in hot 
 pursuit, two leagues on his lee quarter. The 74 
 gained rapidly on the Hornet, although she stopped 
 to pick up a marine who had fallen overboard. 
 Finding he had to deal with a most weatherly craft, 
 as well as a swift sailer. Captain Biddle, at 9 P.M., be- 
 gan to lighten the Hornet of the mass of stores 
 taken from the Penguin. The Cornwallis gained 
 still, however, and at 2 A.M. on the 29th was ahead 
 of the Hornet's lee or starboard beam, when the 
 sloop put about and ran off toward the west. Day- 
 light showed the 74 still astern and to leeward, but 
 
 ' Letter of Captain Biddle, June loth, and extracts from her log, 
 'James, vi, 564. 
 
434 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 having gained so much as to be within gunshot, 
 and shortly afterward she opened fire, her shot 
 passing over the Hornet. The latter had recourse 
 anew to the lightening process. She had already 
 hove overboard the sheet-anchor, several heavy 
 spare spars, and a large quantity of shot and bal- 
 last ; the remaining anchors and cables, more shot, 
 six guns, and the launch now followed suit, and, 
 thus relieved, the Hornet passed temporarily out of 
 danger ; but the breeze shifted gradually round to 
 the east, and the liner came looming up till at noon 
 she was within a mile, a shorter range than that at 
 which the United States crippled and cut up the 
 Macedonian ; and had the Cornwallis fire been half 
 as well aimed as that of the States, it would have 
 been the last of the Hornet. But the 74's guns were 
 very unskilfully served, and the shot passed for the 
 most part away over the chase, but three getting 
 home. Captain Biddle and his crew had no hope 
 of ultimate escape, but no one thought of giving 
 up. All the remaining spare spars and boats, all 
 the guns but one, the shot, and in fact every thing 
 that could be got at, below or on deck, was thrown 
 overboard. This increased the way of the Hornet, 
 while the Cornwallis lost ground by hauling off to 
 give broadsides, which were as ineffectual as the fire 
 from the chase-guns had been. The Hornet now 
 had gained a little, and managed to hold her own, 
 and shortly afterward the pluck and skill of her 
 crew' were rewarded. The shift in the wind had 
 been very much against them, but now it veered 
 
 ' It is perhaps worth noting that the accounts incidentally mention 
 the fact that almost the entire crew consisted of native Americans, of 
 whom quite a number had served as impressed seamen on board British 
 war-ships. James multiplies these threefold and sets them down as 
 British. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 435 
 
 back again so as to bring them to windward ; and 
 every minute, as it blew fresher and fresher, their 
 chances increased. By dark the Cornwallis was well 
 astern, and during the night the wind kept freshen- 
 ing, blowing in squalls, which just suited the Hor- 
 net, and when day broke the liner was hull down 
 astern. Then, on the morning of the 30th, after 
 nearly 48 hours' chase, she abandoned the pursuit. 
 The Hornet was now of course no use as a cruiser, 
 and made sail for New York, which she reached on 
 June 9th. This chase requires almost the same 
 comments as the last chase of the Constitution. In 
 both cases the American captains and their crews 
 deserve the very highest praise for plucky, skilful 
 seamanship ; but exactly as Stewart's coolness and 
 promptitude might not have saved the Constitution 
 had it not been for the blunders made by his an- 
 tagonists, so the Hornet would have assuredly been 
 taken, in spite of Biddle's stubbornness and resource, 
 if the Cornwallis had not shown such unskilful gun- 
 nery, which was all the more discreditable since she 
 carried an admiral's flag. 
 
 The Peacock was thus the only one left of the 
 squadron originally prepared for the East Indies ; 
 however, she kept on, went round the Cape of Good 
 Hope, and cruised across the Indian Ocean, captur- 
 ing 4 great Indiamen, very valuable prizes, manned 
 by 291 men. Then she entered the Straits of Sunda, 
 and on the 30th of June, off the fort of Anjier fell 
 in with the East India Company's cruiser Nautilus, 
 Lieut. Boyce, a brig of 180 (American measure- 
 ment over 200) tons, with a crew of 80 men, and 
 14 guns, 4 long 9's and ten 18-pound carronades.' 
 
 ' " History of the Indian Navy," by Charles Rathbone Low (late 
 lieutenant of the Indian Navy), London, 1877, p. 285. 
 
436 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Captain Warrington did not know of the peace ; 
 one of the boats of the Nautilus, however, with her 
 purser, Mr. Bartlett, boarded him. Captain Warring- 
 ton declares the latter made no mention of the 
 peace, while Mr. Bartlett swears that he did before 
 he was sent below. As the Peacock approached, 
 Lieut. Boyce hailed to ask if she knew peace had 
 been declared. Captain Warrington, according to 
 his letter, regarded this as a ruse to enable the brig 
 to escape under the guns of the fort, and commanded 
 the lieutenant to haul down his colors, which the 
 latter refused to do, and very gallantly prepared for 
 a struggle with a foe of more than twice his strength. 
 According to Captain Warrington, one, or, by the 
 deposition of Mr. Bartlett,' two broadsides were 
 then interchanged, and the brig surrendered, having 
 lost 7 men, including her first lieutenant, killed and 
 mortally wounded, and 8 severely or slightly wound- 
 ed. Two of her guns and the sheet-anchor were 
 disabled, the bends on the starboard side complete- 
 ly shivered from aft to the forechains, the bulwarks 
 from the chess-tree aft much torn, and the rigging 
 cut to pieces." The Peacock did not suffer the slight- 
 est loss or damage. Regarding the affair purely as 
 a conflict between vessels of nations at war with 
 each other, the criticism made by Lord Howard 
 Douglass on the action between the President and 
 Little Belt applies here perfectly. " If a vessel meet 
 an enemy of even greatly superior force, it is due to 
 the honor of her flag to try the effect of a few 
 rounds ; but unless in this gallant attempt she leave 
 marks of her skill upon the larger body, while she, 
 
 ' As quoted by Low. 
 
 "^ Letter of Lieut. Boyce to Company's Marine Board, as quoted by 
 Low. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 43; 
 
 the smaller body, is hit at every discharge, she does 
 but salute her enemy's triumph and discredit her own 
 gunnery." ' There could not have been a more sat- 
 isfactory exhibition of skill than that given by Cap 
 tain Warrington ; but I regret to say that it is diffi. 
 cult to believe he acted with proper humanity. It 
 seems impossible that Mr. Bartlett did not mention 
 that peace had been signed ; and when the opposing 
 force was so much less than his own it would have 
 been safe at least to defer the order " haul down 
 your flag "for a short time, while he could have kept 
 the brig within half pistol-shot, until he could have 
 inquired into the truth of the report. Throughout 
 this work I have wherever possible avoided all ref- 
 erences to the various accusations and recrimina- 
 tions of some of the captains about " unfairness," 
 " cruelty," etc., as in most cases it is impossible to 
 get at the truth, the accounts flatly contradicting 
 one another. In this case, however, there certainly 
 seems some ground for the rather fervent denunci- 
 ations of Captain Warrington indulged in by Lieut. 
 Low. But it is well to remember that a very similar 
 affair, with the parties reversed, had taken place but 
 a few months before on the coast of America. This 
 was on Feb. 22d, after the boats of the Erebus^ 20, 
 and Prmtrose, 18, under Captains Bartholomew and 
 Phillot, had been beaten off with a loss of 30 men 
 (including both captains wounded), in an expedition 
 up St. Mary's River, Ga. The two captains and 
 their vessels then joined Admiral Cockburn at Cum- 
 berland Island, and on the 25th of February were 
 informed ofificially of the existence of peace. Three 
 weeks afterward the American gunboat. No. 168, 
 
 ' " Naval Gunnery," p. 3. 
 
438 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Mr. Hurlburt, sailed from Tybee Bar, Ga., bearing- 
 despatches for the British admiral." On the same 
 day in the afternoon she fell in with the Erebus, Cap- 
 tain Bartholomew. Peace having been declared, and 
 having been known to exist for over three weeks, 
 no effort was made to avoid the British vessel; but 
 when the gunboat neared the latter she was suddenly 
 hailed and told to heave to. Mr. Hurlburt answered 
 that he had dispatches for Admiral Cockburn, to 
 which Captain Bartholomew responded, with many 
 oaths, that he did not care, he would sink her if she 
 did not send a boat aboard. When Mr. Hurlburt 
 attempted to answer some muskets were discharged 
 at him, and he was told to strike. He refused, and 
 the Erebus immediately opened fire from her great 
 guns ; the gunboat had gotten so far round that her 
 pivot-gun would not bear properly, but it was dis- 
 charged across the bows of "Csx^ Erebus, ■3S\A then Mr. 
 Hurlburt struck his colors. Although he had lain 
 right under the foe's broadside, he had suffered no 
 loss or damage except a few ropes cut, and some 
 shot-holes in the sails. Afterward Captain Barthol- 
 omew apologized, and let the gunboat proceed. 
 
 This attack was quite as wanton and unprovoked 
 as Warrington's, and Bartholomew's foe was rela- 
 tively to himself even less powerful ; moreover, 
 while the Peacock's crew showed great skill in hand- 
 ling their guns, the crew of the Erebus most emphati- 
 cally did not. The intent in both cases was equally 
 bad, only the British captain lacked the ability to 
 carry his out. 
 
 ' Letter from Com. Campbell to Sec. of Navy, Mar. 29, 1815, in- 
 cludinij one from Sailing-masler John H. Hurlburt of Mar. 18, 1815, 
 preserved in the Naval Archives, in vol. 43, No. 125, of " Captains' 
 Letters." See also " Niles' Register," viii, 104, 118, etc. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 439 
 
 The concluding operations of the war call for 
 much the same comments as those of the preceding 
 years. The balance of praise certainly inclines 
 toward the Americans. Captain John Hayes' 
 squadron showed great hardihood, perseverance and 
 judgment, which were rewarded by the capture 
 of the President ; and Decatur's surrender seems de- 
 cidedly tame. But as regards the action between the 
 President and Endyniion (taking into account the 
 fact that the former fought almost under the guns 
 of an overwhelming force, and was therefore obliged 
 to expose herself far more than she otherwise would 
 have), it showed nearly as great superiority on the 
 side of the Americans as the frigate actions of 1812 
 did — in fact, probably quite as much as in the case 
 of the Java. Similarly, while the Cyane and Levant 
 did well, the Constitution did better ; and Sir George 
 Collier's ships certainly did not distinguish them- 
 selves when in chase of Old Ironsides. So with the 
 Hornet in her two encounters ; no one can question 
 the pluck with which the Penguin was fought, but 
 her gunnery was as bad as that of the Cornwallis 
 subsequently proved. And though the skirmish 
 between the Peacock and Nautilus is not one to 
 which an American cares to look back, yet, regard- 
 ing it purely from a fighting stand-point, there is no 
 question which crew was the best trained and most 
 skilful. 
 
 LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rate. 
 
 Where Built. 
 
 Cost. 
 
 Washington 
 
 74 
 
 Portsmouth 
 
 |23S, 861.00 
 
 Independence 
 
 74 
 
 Boston 
 
 421,810.41 
 
440 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rate. 
 
 Where Built. 
 
 Cost. 
 
 Franklin 
 
 74 
 
 Philadelphia 
 
 438,149.40 
 
 Guerrilre 
 
 44 
 
 u 
 
 306,158.56 
 
 jTava 
 
 44 
 
 Baltimore 
 
 232,767.38 
 
 Fulton 
 
 3° 
 
 New York 
 
 320,000.00 
 
 Torpedo 
 
 
 i( 
 
 
 These ships first put to sea in this year. For the 
 first time in her history the United States possessed 
 line-of-battle ships ; and for the first time in all his- 
 tory, the steam frigate appeared on the navy list of 
 a nation. The Fulton, with her clumsy central 
 wheel, concealed from shot by the double hull, with 
 such thick scantling that none but heavy guns could 
 harm her, and relying for offensive weapons not on 
 a broadside of thirty guns of small calibre, but on 
 two pivotal loo-pounder columbiads, or, perhaps, if 
 necessary, on blows from her hog snout, — the Fulton 
 was the true prototype of the modern steam iron- 
 clad, with its few heavy guns and ram. Almost as 
 significant is the presence of the Torpedo. I have 
 not chronicled the several efforts made by the 
 Americans to destroy British vessels with torpedoes ; 
 some very nearly succeeded, and although they 
 failed it must not be supposed that they did no 
 good. On the contrary, they made the British in 
 many cases very cautious about venturing into good 
 anchorage (especially in Long Island Sound and the 
 Chesapeake), and by the mere terror of their name 
 prevented more than one harrying expedition. The 
 Fulton was not got into condition to be fought until 
 just as the war ended ; had it continued a few 
 months, it is more than probable that the deeds of 
 the Merrimac and the havoc wrought by the Con- 
 federate torpedoes would have been forestalled by 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 441 
 
 nearly half a century. As it was, neither of these 
 engines of war attracted much attention. For ten 
 or fifteen years the Fulton was the only war-vessel 
 of her kind in existence, and then her name disap- 
 pears from our lists. The torpedoes had been tried 
 in the Revolutionary War, but their failure pre- 
 vented much notice from being taken of them, and, 
 besides, at that time there was a strong feeling that 
 it was dishonorable to blow a ship up with a pow- 
 der-can concealed under the water, though highly 
 laudable to burn her by means of a fire-raft floating 
 on the water — a nice distinction in naval ethics that 
 has since disappeared.' 
 
 AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. 
 
 By Ocean Cruisers. 
 Name. Guns, Tonnage. Retaarks. 
 
 President 52 1,576 captured by squadron. 
 
 52 guns. 1,576 tons. 
 
 BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. 
 
 a. — By Privateers. 
 Name. GuDS. Tonnage. Remarks. 
 
 Chasseur 12 240 hy privateer St. Zawrenee. 
 
 b. — By Ocean Cruisers. 
 
 Cyane 34 659 by Cotistiiution. 
 
 Levant 20 500 retaken. 
 
 Penguin 19 477 by Hornet. 
 
 85 guns, 1,876 tons. 
 
 20 500 (subtracting Levant^. 
 
 65 guns, 1,376 tons. 
 ' James fairly foams at the mouth at the mere mention of torpedoes. 
 
442 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 In summing up the results of the struggle on the 
 ocean it is to be noticed that very little was attempt- 
 ed, and nothing done, by the American Navy that 
 could materially affect the result of the war. Com- 
 modore Rodgers' expedition after the Jamaica Plate 
 fleet failed; both the efforts to get a small squadron 
 into the East Indian waters also miscarried; and 
 otherwise the whole history of the struggle on the 
 ocean is, as regards the Americans, only the record 
 of individual cruises and fights. The material re- 
 sults were not very great, at least in their effect on 
 Great Britain, whose enormous navy did not feel in 
 the slightest degree the loss of a few frigates and 
 sloops. But morally the result was of inestimable 
 benefit to the United States. The victories kept 
 up the spirits of the people, cast down by the de- 
 feats on land ; practically decided in favor of the 
 Americans the chief question in dispute — Great Brit- 
 ain's right of search and impressment — and gave 
 the navy, and thereby the country, a world-wide 
 reputation. I doubt if ever before a nation gained 
 so much honor by a few single-ship duels. For 
 there can be no question which side came out of the 
 war with the greatest credit. The damage inflicted 
 by each on the other was not very unequal in 
 amount, but the balance was certainly in favor of 
 the United States, as can be seen by the following 
 tables, for the details of which reference can be 
 made to the various years : 
 
 AMERICAN LOSS. BRITISH LOSS. 
 
 Caused:— Tonnage. Guns. Tonnage. » Guns. 
 
 By Ocean Cruisers 5,984 278 8.451 351 
 
 'The tonnage can only be given approximately, as that of the ves- 
 sels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although we know 
 about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one another. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 443 
 
 AMERICAN LOSS. BRITISH LOSS. 
 
 Caused :— Tonnage. Guns. Tonnage. Guns. 
 
 On the Lakes 727 37 4,159 212 
 
 By the Army 3.007 116 500 
 
 By Privateers 402 
 
 22 
 20 
 
 Total, 9.718 431. 13.512 605 
 
 In addition we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 
 
 24 guns, and, in the aggregate, of 387 tons, and also 
 
 25 gun-boats, with 71 guns, and, in the aggregate of 
 nearly 2,000 tons. This would swell our loss to 
 12,105 tons, and 526 guns' ; but the loss of the rev- 
 
 ' This differs greatly from the figures given by James in his " Naval 
 Occurrences" (App. ccxv). He makes the American loss 14,844 tons, 
 and 660 guns. His list includes, for example, the " Growler a.r\ A 
 Hamilton, upset in carrying sail to avoid Sir James' fleet " ; it Vi'ould 
 be quite as reasonable to put down the loss of the Royal George to the 
 credit of the French. Then he mentions the Julia and Growler, 
 which were recaptured ; the Asp, which was also recaptured ; the 
 " New York, 46, destroyed at Washington," which was «»/ destroyed 
 or harmed in any way, and which, moreover, was a condemned hulk ; 
 the " Boston, ^^2 (in reality 32), destroyed at Washington," which 
 had been a condemned hulk for ten years, and had no guns or any- 
 thing else in her, and was as much a loss to our navy as the fishing 
 up and burning of an old wreck would have been ; and 8 gun-boats 
 whose destruction was either mythical, or else which were not na- 
 tional vessels. By deducting all these we reduce James' total by 120 
 guns, and 2,600 ions ; and a few more alterations (such as excluding 
 the swivels in the Presidents tops, which he counts, etc.), brings his 
 number down to that given above — and also affords a good idea of the 
 value to be attached to his figures and tables. The British loss he 
 gives at but 530 guns and 10,273 tons. He omits the 24-gun ship 
 burnt by Chauncy at York, although including the frigate and cor- 
 vette burnt by Ross at Washington ; if the former is excluded the 
 two latter should be, which would make the balance still more in 
 favor of the Americans. He omits the guns of the Gloucester, he- 
 cause they had been taken out of her and placed in battery on the 
 shore, but he includes those of the Adatns, which had been served in 
 precisely the same way. He omits all reference to the British 14-gun 
 schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3 and 4-gun sloops and schooners 
 captured there, although including the corresponding American 
 vessels. The reason that he so much underestimates the tonnage, 
 especially on the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed. His tables of 
 the relative loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that 
 of the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the British ; 
 but I have not tabulated this on account of the impossibility of get- 
 ting fair estimates of the killed and wounded in the cutting-out ex- 
 
444 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 enue-cutters and gun-boats can fairly be considered 
 to be counterbalanced by the capture or destruction 
 of the various British Royal Packets (all armed with 
 from 2 to lo guns), tenders, barges, etc., which would 
 be in the aggregate of at least as great tonnage and 
 gun force, and with more numerous crews. 
 
 But the comparative material loss gives no idea 
 of the comparative honor gained. The British navy, 
 numbering at the outset a thousand cruisers, had 
 accomplished less than the American, which num- 
 bered but a dozen. Moreover, most of the loss suf- 
 fered by the former was in single fight, while this 
 had been but twice the case with the Americans, 
 who had generally been overwhelmed by numbers. 
 The President and Essex were both captured by 
 more than double their force simply because they 
 were disabled before the fight began, otherwise they 
 would certainly have escaped. With the exceptions 
 of the Chesapeake and Argus (both of which were 
 taken fairly, because their antagonists, though of 
 only equal force, were better fighters), the remain- 
 ing loss of the Americans was due to the small 
 cruisers stumbling from time to time across the path 
 of some one of the innumerable British heavy ves- 
 sels. Had Congressional forethought been sufifi- 
 
 peditions, and the difficulty of enumerating the prisoners taken in 
 descents, etc. Roughly, about 2,700 Americans and 3,800 British 
 were captured ; the comparative loss in killed and wounded stood 
 much more in our favor. 
 
 I have excluded from the British loss the brips Detroit and Cale- 
 donia, and schooner Nancy (aggregating 10 guns and about 500 tons), 
 destroyed on the upper lakes, because I hardly know whether they 
 could be considered national vessels ; the schooner Highflyer, of 8 
 guns, 40 men, and 2og tons, taken by Rodgers, because she seems to 
 have been merely a tender ; and the Dominica, 15, of 77 men, and 270 " 
 tons, because her captor, the privateer Decatur, though nominally an 
 American, was really a French vessel. Of course both tables are 
 only approximately exact ; but at any rate the balance of damage and 
 loss was over 4 to 3 in our favor. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 445 
 
 ciently great to have allowed a few line-of-battle 
 ships to have been in readiness some time previous 
 to the war, results of weight might have been ac- 
 complished. But the only activity ever exhibited 
 by Congress in materially increasing the navy pre- 
 vious to the war, had been in partially carrying out 
 President Jefferson's ideas of having an enormous 
 force of very worthless gun-boats — a scheme whose 
 wisdom was about on a par with some of that states- 
 man's political and military theories. 
 
 Of the twelve ' single-ship actions, two (those of 
 the Argus and Chesapeake) undoubtedly redounded 
 most to the credit of the British, in two (that of the 
 Wasp with the Reindeer, and that of the Enterprise 
 with the Boxer), the honors were nearly even, and 
 in the other eight the superiority of the Americans 
 was very manifest. In three actions (those with the 
 Penguin, Frolic, and Shannon) the combatants were 
 about equal in strength, the Americans having 
 slightly the advantage ; in all the others but two, 
 the victors combined superiority of force with superi- 
 ority of skill. In but two cases, those of the Argus 
 and Epervier, could any lack of courage be imputed 
 to the vanquished. The second year alone showed 
 to the advantage of the British ; the various en- 
 counters otherwise were as creditable to the Amer- 
 icans at the end as at the beginning of the war. 
 This is worth attending to, because many authors 
 speak as if the successes of the Americans were con- 
 
 ' Not counting the last action of the Constitution, the President's 
 action, or the capture of the Essex, on account of the difficulty of 
 fairly estimating the amount of credit due to each side. In both the 
 first actions, however, the American ships seem to have been rather 
 more ably fought than their antagonists, and, taking into account 
 the overwhelming disadvantages under which ihe iTw^^r labored, her 
 defence displayed more desperate bravery than did that of any other 
 ship during the war. 
 
446 NAVAL WAR OF 1 8 12. 
 
 fined to the first year. It is true that no frigate 
 was taken after the first year, but this was partly 
 because the strictness of the blockade kept the 
 American frigates more in port, while the sloops 
 put out to sea at pleasure, and partly because after 
 that year the British i8-pounder frigates either 
 cruised in couples, or, when single, invariably re- 
 fused, by order of the Board of Admiralty, an en- 
 counter with a 24-pounder ; and though much of the 
 American success was unquestionably to be attrib- 
 uted to more men and heavier guns, yet much of it 
 was not. The war itself gives us two instances in 
 which defeat was owing solely, it may be said, to 
 inferiority of force, courage and skill being equal. 
 The Wasp was far heavier than the Reindeer, and, 
 there being nothing to choose between them in any 
 thing else, the damage done was about proportionate 
 to this difference. It follows, as a matter of course, 
 that the very much greater disproportion in loss in 
 the cases of the Avon, Epervier, etc., where the dis- 
 proportion in force was much less (they mounting 
 32's instead of 24's, and the victors being all of the 
 same class), is only to be explained by the inferiority 
 in skill on the part of the vanquished. These re- 
 marks apply just as much to the Argus. The Rein- 
 deer, with her 24's, would have been almost exactly 
 on a par with her, and yet would have taken her 
 with even greater ease than the Peacock did with 
 her 32's. In other words, the only effect of our 
 superiority in metal, men, and tonnage was to in- 
 crease somewhat the disparity in loss. Had the 
 Congress and Constellation, instead of the United 
 States and Constitution, encountered the Macedonian 
 and Java, the difference in execution would have 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 447 
 
 been less than it was, but the result would have 
 been unchanged, and would have been precisely such 
 as ensued when the Wasp met the Frolic, or the 
 Hornet the Penguin. On the other hand, had the 
 Shannon met the Constitution there would have been 
 a repetition of the fight between the Wasp and Rein- 
 deer ; for it is but fair to remember that great as is 
 the honor that Broke deserves, it is no more than 
 that due to Manners. 
 
 The Republic of the United States owed a great 
 deal to the excellent make and armament of its 
 ships, but it owed still more to the men who were 
 in them. The massive timbers and heavy guns of 
 Old Ironsides would have availed but little had it 
 not been for her able commanders and crews. Of 
 all the excellent single-ship captains, British or 
 American, produced by the war, the palm should be 
 awarded to Hull.' The deed of no other man (ex- 
 cepting Macdonough) equalled his escape from 
 Broke's five ships, or surpassed his half-hour's con- 
 flict with the Guerribre. After him, almost all the 
 American captains deserve high praise — Decatur, 
 Jones, Blakely, Biddle, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Bur- 
 rows, Allen, Warrington, Stewart, Porter. It is no 
 small glory to a country to have had such men up- 
 holding the honor of its flag. On a par with the 
 best of them are Broke, Manners, and also Byron 
 and Blythe. It must be but a poor-spirited Ameri- 
 can whose veins do not tingle with pride when he 
 reads of the cruises and fights of the sea-captains, 
 and their grim prowess, which kept the old Yankee 
 flag floating over the waters of the Atlantic for 
 
 ' See " Naval Tactics," by Commander J. H. Ward, and " Life of 
 Commodore Tatnall," by Charles C. Jones, Jr. 
 
448 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 three years, in the teeth of the mightiest naval 
 power the world has ever seen ; but it is equally 
 impossible not to admire Broke's chivalric challenge 
 and successful fight, or the heroic death of the cap- 
 tain of the Reindeer. 
 
 Nor can the war ever be fairly understood by any 
 one who does not bear in mind that the combatants 
 were men of the same stock, who far more nearly 
 resembled each other than either resembled any 
 Other nation. I honestly believe that the American 
 sailor offered rather better material for a man-of- 
 warsman than the British, because the freer institu- 
 tions of his country (as compared with the Britain 
 of the drunken Prince Regent and his dotard father 
 — a very different land from the present free Eng- 
 land) and the peculiar exigencies of his life tended 
 to make him more intelligent and self-reliant ; but 
 the difference, when there was any, was very small, 
 and disappeared entirely when his opponents had 
 been drilled for any length of time by men like 
 Broke or Manners. The advantage consisted in the 
 fact that our average commander was equal to the 
 best, and higher than the average, of the opposing 
 captains ; and this held good throughout the various 
 grades of the officers. The American officers knew 
 they had redoubtable foes to contend with, and 
 made every preparation accordingly. Owing their 
 rank to their own exertions, trained by practical ex- 
 perience and with large liberty of action, they made 
 every effort to have their crews in the most perfect 
 state of skill and discipline. In Commodore Tat- 
 nall's biography (p. 15) it is mentioned that the 
 blockaded Constellation had her men well trained at 
 the guns and at target practice, though still lying in 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 449 
 
 the river, so as to be at once able to meet a foe 
 when she put out to sea. The British captain, often 
 owing his command to his social standing or to 
 favoritism, hampered by red tape,' and accustomed 
 by 20 years' almost uninterrupted success to regard 
 the British arms as invincible, was apt to laugh at 
 all manoeuvring,^ and scorned to prepare too care- 
 fully for a fight, trusting to the old British " pluck 
 and luck " to carry him through. So, gradually he 
 forgot how to manoeuvre or to prepare. The Java 
 had been at sea six weeks before she was captured, 
 yet during that time the entire exercise of her crew 
 at the guns had been confined to the discharge of 
 six broadsides of blank cartridges (James, vi, 184); 
 the Constitution^ like the Java, had shipped an en- 
 tirely new and raw crew previous to her first cruise, 
 and was at sea but five weeks before she met the 
 Guerriere, and yet her men had been trained to per- 
 fection. This is a sufficient comment on the com- 
 parative merits of Captain Hull and Captain Lam- 
 bert. The American prepared himself in every 
 possible way ; the Briton tried to cope with courage 
 alone against courage united to skill. His bad 
 gunnery had not been felt in contending with Euro- 
 pean foes'* as unskilful as himself. Says Lord How- 
 ard Douglass (p. 3) : " We entered with too much 
 confidence into a war with a marine much more ex- 
 pert than any of our European enemies * * * 
 
 'For instance, James mentions that they were forbidden to use 
 more than so many shot in practice, and that Capt. Broke utterly dis- 
 regarded this command. 
 
 " Lord Howard Douglass, " Naval Gunnery,'' states this in various 
 places. — " Accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring." 
 
 'Lord Howard Douglass; he seems to think that in 1812 the 
 British had fallen off absolutely, though not relatively to their Euro- 
 pean foes. 
 
450 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 there was inferiority of gunnery as well as of force," 
 etc. Admiral Codrington, commenting on the 
 Eperviers loss, says, as before quoted, that, owing 
 to his being chosen purely for merit, the American 
 captain was an overmatch for the British, unless 
 " he encountered our best officers on equal terms." 
 The best criticism on the war is that given by 
 Capitaine Jurien de la Gravi^re." After speaking of 
 of the heavier metal and greater number of men of 
 the American ships, he continues : " And yet only 
 an enormous superiority in the precision and rapidi- 
 tj'^ of their fire can explain the difference in the 
 losses sustained by the combatants. * * * Nor 
 was the skill of their gunners the only cause to 
 which the Americans owed their success. Their 
 ships were faster ; the crews, composed of chosen 
 men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision ; 
 their captains had that practical knowledge which 
 is only to be acquired by long experience of the sea ; 
 and it is not to be wondered at that the Constitution, 
 when chased during three days by a squadron of 
 five English frigates, succeeded in escaping, by sur- 
 passing them in manoeuvring, and by availing her- 
 self of, every ingenious resource and skilful expedi- 
 ent that maritime science could suggest. * * * 
 To a marine exalted by success, but rendered neg- 
 ligent by the very habit of victory, the Congress 
 only opposed the best of vessels and most for- 
 midable of armaments. * * *'"" 
 
 ' " Guerres Maritimes," li, p. 269, 272, 274 (Paris, 1847). 
 
 ' The praise should be given to the individual captains and not to 
 Congress, however ; and none of the American ships had picked 
 crevi's. During the war the Shannon had the only crew which could 
 with any fairness be termed "picked," for her men had been to- 
 gether seven years, and all of her "boys" must have been well- 
 grown young men, much older than the boys on her antagonist. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 451 
 
 It is interesting to compare the results of this in- 
 ter-Anglian warfare, waged between the Insular and 
 the Continental English, with the results of the con- 
 test that the former v/ere at the same time carrying 
 on with their Gallo-Roman neighbors across the 
 channel. For this purpose I shall rely on Troude's 
 " Batailles Navales," which would certainly not give 
 the English more than their due. His account of 
 the comparative force in each case can be supple- 
 mented by the corresponding one given in James. 
 Under drawn battles I include all such as were inde- 
 cisive, in so far that neither combatant was captured ; 
 in almost every case each captain claimed that the 
 other ran away. 
 
 During the years 1812 to 1815 inclusive, there 
 were eight actions between French and English 
 ships of approximately equal force. In three of 
 these the English were victorious. 
 
 In 1812 the Victorious, 74, captured the Rivoli, 74- 
 
 
 COMPARATIVE FORCE. 
 
 
 
 Broadsides, Metal, lbs. 
 
 
 
 Troude. 
 
 James. 
 
 Victorious 
 
 1,014 
 
 1,060 
 
 Rivoli 
 
 1,010 
 
 1,085 
 
 In 1 8 14 the Tagus captured the Ceres and the 
 Hebrus captured the Etoile. 
 
 Broadsides, Metal, lbs. 
 
 Troude. James. 
 
 Tagus 444 467 
 
 Ceres 428 463 
 
 Hebrus 467 467 
 
 j^toile 428 463 
 
452 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 The Ceres, when she surrendered, had but one 
 man wounded, although she had suffered a good 
 deal aloft. The fight between the 74's was murder- 
 ous to an almost unexampled degree, 125 English 
 and 400 French falling. The Hebrus lo.st 40 and 
 the Etoile 120 men. 
 
 Five actions were " drawn." 
 
 In 18 12 the Swallow fought the Renard and Gar- 
 land. The former threw 262, the latter 290 lbs. of 
 shot at a broadside. 
 
 In 1815 the Pilot, throwing 262 lbs., fought a draw 
 with the Egerie throwing 260. 
 
 In 1814 two frigates of the force of the Tagus 
 fought a draw with two frigates of the force of 
 the Ceres ; and the Eurotas, with 24-pounders failed 
 to capture the Chlorinde, which had only i8-pound- 
 ers. 
 
 In 1815 the Amelia fought a draw with the 
 Ardthuse, the ships throwing respectively 549 and 
 463 lbs., according to the English, or 572 and 410 
 lbs., according to the French accounts. In spite of 
 being superior in force the English ship lost 141 
 men, and the French but 105. This was a bloodier 
 fight than even that of the Chesapeake with the 
 Shannon ; but the gunnery was, nevertheless, much 
 worse than that shown by the two combatants in 
 the famous duel off Boston harbor, one battle last- 
 ing four hours and the other 15 minutes. 
 
 There were a number of other engagements where 
 the British were successful but where it is difficult 
 to compare the forces. Twice a 74 captured or de- 
 stroyed two frigates, and a razee performed a similar 
 feat. An i8-gun brig, the Weasel, fought two 16- 
 gun brigs till one of them blew up. 
 
NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 45 
 
 The loss of the two navies at each other's hand: 
 during the four years was: — 
 
 English Ships. French Ships. 
 
 I i6-gun brig 3 line-of-battle ships 
 
 I i2-gun brig n frigates 
 
 I lo-gun cutter 2 26-gun fltites 
 
 2 i6-gun brigs 
 I lo-gun brig 
 many gun-boats, etc. 
 
 Or one navy lost three vessels, mounting 38 guns 
 and the other 19 vessels, mounting 830 guns. 
 
 During the same time the English lost to thi 
 Danes one 14-gun brig, and destroyed in returi 
 a frigate of 46 guns, a 6-gun schooner, a 4-gun cutter 
 two galliots and several gun-brigs. 
 
 In the above lists it is to be noticed how manj 
 of the engagements were indecisive, owing chiefly tc 
 the poor gunnery of the combatants. The fact tha 
 both the Eurotas and the Amelia, though mon 
 powerfully armed and manned than the Hebrus, ye 
 failed to capture the sister ships of the frigate taker 
 by the latter, shows that heavy metal and a numer 
 ous crew are not the only elements necessary foi 
 success; indeed the Eurotas and Amelia were a; 
 superior in force to their antagonists as the Constitu 
 tion was to the Java. 
 
 But the chief point to be noticed is the over 
 whelming difference in the damage the two navies 
 caused each other. This difference was, roughly 
 as five to one against the Danes, and as fifty to one 
 against the French ; while it was as four to three in 
 favor of the American. These figures give some 
 idea of the effectiveness of the various navies. At 
 
454 NAVAL WAR OF l8l2. 
 
 any rate they show that we had found out what the 
 European nations had for many years in vain striven 
 to discover — a way to do more damage than we re- 
 ceived in a naval contest with England. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 TONNAGE OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN MEN-OF-WAR 
 IN 1812-15. 
 
 According to Act of Congress (quoted in "Niles' 
 Register," iv, 64), the way of measuring double-decked 
 or war-vessels was as follows : 
 
 " Measure from fore-part of main stem to after-part of 
 stern port, above the upper deck ; take the breadth 
 thereof at broadest part above the main wales, one half of 
 which breadth shall be accounted the depth. Deduct 
 from the length three fifths of such breadth, multiply the 
 remainder by the breadth and the product by the depth ; 
 divide by 95 ; the quotient is tonnage." 
 
 (/. e., If length = x, and breadth = y ; 
 
 Tonnage = (x — f y) X y X j y.) 
 
 95 
 Niles states that the British mode, as taken from Steele's ' 
 " Shipmaster's Assistant," was this : Drop plumb-line 
 over stem of ship and measure distance between such 
 line and the after part of the stern port at the load water- 
 mark ; then measure from top of said plumb-line in 
 parallel direction with the water to perpendicular point 
 immediately over the load water-mark of the fore part of 
 main stem ; subtract from such admeasurement the 
 above distance ; the remainder is ship's extreme length, 
 from which deduct 3 inches for every foot of the load- 
 draught of water for the rake abaft, and also three fifths 
 of the ship's breadth for the rake forward ; remainder is 
 length of keel for tonnage. Breadth shall be taken from 
 outside to outside of the plank in broadest part of the 
 
 455 
 
56 APPENDIX. 
 
 lip either above or below the main wales, exclusive 
 f all manner of sheathing or doubling. Depth is to 
 e considered as one half the length. Tonnage will 
 len be the length into the depth into breadth, divided by 
 
 4- 
 
 Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbitrary man- 
 er, with no regard to actual capacity or displacement ; 
 nd, moreover, what is of more importance, the British 
 lethod differed from the American so much that a ship 
 leasured in the latter way would be nominally about 15 
 er cent, larger than if measured by British rules. This 
 i the exact reverse of the statement made by the British 
 aval historian, James. His mistake is pardonable, 
 3r great confusion existed on the subject at that time, 
 ven the officers not knowing the tonnage of their own 
 lips. When the President was captured, her officers 
 tated that she measured about 1,400 tons ; in reality she 
 jnned 1,576, American measure. Still more singular 
 'as the testimony of the officers of the Argus, who 
 lought her to be of about 350 tons, while she was 
 f 298, by American, or 244, by British measure- 
 lent. These errors were the more excusable as 
 ley occurred also in higher quarters. The earliest 
 otice we have about the three 44-gun frigates of the 
 Constitution' s class, is in the letter of Secretary of the 
 Javy, Benjamin Stoddart, on Dec. 24, 1798," where they 
 re expressly said to be of 1,576 tons; and this tonnage 
 i given them in every navy list that mentions it for 40 
 ears afterward ; yet Secretary Paul Hamilton in one of 
 is letters incidentally alludes to them as of 1,444 tons. 
 .,ater, I think about the year 1838, the method of measur- 
 ng was changed, and their tonnage was put down as 
 ,607. James takes the American tonnage from Secre- 
 ary Hamilton's letter as 1,444, 3-nd states (vol. vi, p. 5), 
 hat this is equivalent to 1,533 tons, English. But in 
 
 ' " American State Papers," xiv, 57. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 457 
 
 reality, by American measurement, the tonnage was 
 1,576 ; so that even according to James' own figures the 
 British way of measurement made the frigate 43 tons 
 smaller than the American way did ; actually the difference 
 was nearer 290 tons. James' statements as to the size of our 
 various ships would seem to have been largely mere guess- 
 work, as he sometimes makes them smaller and sometimes 
 larger than they were according to the official navy lists. 
 Thus, the Constitution, President, and United States, each 
 of 1,576, he puts down as of 1,533 ! ^'''e Wasp, of 450, as 
 of 434 ; the Hornet, of 480, as of 460 ; and tlie Chesapeake, 
 of 1,244, as of 1,135 tons. On the other hand the Enter- 
 prise, of 165 tons, he states to be of 245 ; the Argus of 
 298, he considers to be of 316, and the Peacock, Frolic, 
 etc., of 509 each, as of 539. He thus certainly adopts 
 different standards of measurement, not only for the 
 American as distinguished from the British vessels, but 
 even among the various American vessels themselves. 
 And there are other difficulties to be encountered ; not 
 only were there different ways of casting tonnage from 
 given measurements, but also there were different ways 
 of getting what purported to be the same measurement. 
 A ship, that, according to the British method of measure- 
 ment was of a certain length, would, according to the 
 American method, be about 5 per cent, longer ; and so if 
 two vessels were the same size, the American would have 
 the greatest nominal tonnage. For example, James in 
 his " Naval Occurrences " (p. 467) gives the length of the 
 Cyane's main deck as 118 feet 2 inches. This same 
 Cyane was carefully surveyed and measured, under orders 
 from the United States navy department, by Lieut. B. F. 
 Hoffman, and in his published report ' he gives, among 
 the other dimensions : "Length of spar-deck, 124 feet 9 
 inches," and "length of gurf-deck 123 feet 3 inches." 
 With such a difference in the way of taking measure- 
 ' " American State Papers," xiv, p. 417. 
 
458 APPENDIX. 
 
 ments, as well as of computing tonnage from the measure- 
 ments when taken, it is not surprising that according to 
 the American method the Cyane should have ranked as 
 of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James takes no 
 account of any of these differences I hardly know how to 
 treat his statements of comparative tonnage. Thus he 
 makes the Hornet 460 tons, and the Peacock and Penguin, 
 which she at different times captured, about 388 each. 
 As it happens both Captain Lawrence and Captain 
 Biddle, who commanded the Hornet in her two success- 
 ful actions, had their prizes measured. The Peacock 
 sank so rapidly that Lawrence could not get very accu- 
 rate measurements of her ; he states her to be four feet 
 shorter and half a foot broader than the Hornet. The 
 British naval historian, Brenton (vol, v, p. 1 11), also states 
 that they were of about the same tonnage. But we have 
 more satisfactory evidence from Captain Biddle. He 
 stayed by his prize nearly two days, and had her thor- 
 oughly examined in every way ; and his testimony is, of 
 course, final. He reports that the Penguin was by 
 actual measurement two feet shorter, and somewhat 
 broader than the Hornet, and with thicker scantling. 
 She tonned 477, compared to the Hornet's 480 — a differ- 
 ence of about one half of one per cent. This testimony is 
 corroborated by that of the naval inspectors who examined 
 the Epervier after she was captured by the Peacock. 
 Those two vessels were respectively of 477 and 509 tons, 
 and as such they ranked on the navy lists. The Ameri- 
 can Peacock and her sister ships were very much longer 
 than the brig sloops of the Epervier s class, but were no 
 broader, the latter being very tubby. All the English 
 sloops were broader in proportion than the American 
 ones were ; thus the Levant, which was to have mounted 
 the same number of guns as the Peacock, had much more 
 beam, and was of greater tonnage, although of rather less 
 length. The Macedonian, when captured, ranked on our 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 459 
 
 lists as of 1,325 tons,' the United States as of 1,576 ; and 
 they thus continued until, as I have said before, the 
 method of measurement was changed, when the former 
 ranked as of 1,341, and the latter as of 1,607 tons. 
 James, however, makes them respectively 1,081, and 
 1)533- Now to get the comparative force he ought to 
 have adopted the first set of measurements given, or else 
 have made them 1,081 and 1,286. Out of the twelve 
 single-ship actions of the war, four were fought with 38- 
 gun frigates like the Macedonian, and seven with i8-gun 
 brig sloops of the Epervier's class ; and as the Macedonian 
 and Epervier were both regularly rated in our navy, we 
 get a very exact idea of our antagonists in those eleven 
 cases. The twelfth was the fight between the Enterprise 
 and the Boxer, in which the latter was captured ; the 
 Enterprise was apparently a little smaller than her foe- 
 but had two jnore guns, which she carried in her bridle 
 ports. 
 
 As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get it com- 
 paratively, and not absolutely, I have given it throughout 
 for both sides as estimated by the American method of 
 that day. The tonnage of the vessels on the lakes has 
 been already noticed. 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 PREVIOUS HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Very few students of naval history will deny that in 
 
 1812 the average American ship was superior to the 
 
 average British ship of the same strength ; and that the 
 
 latter was in turn superior to the average French ship. 
 
 The explanati on given by the victor is in each case the 
 
 ' See the work of Lieutenant Emmons, who had access to all the 
 official records. 
 
-o 
 
 460 APPENDIX. 
 
 same ; the American writer ascribes the success of his 
 nation to " the aptitude of the American character for 
 the sea," and the Briton similarly writes that " the 
 English are inherently better suited for the sea than the 
 French." Race characteristics may have had some little 
 effect between the last pair of combatants (although 
 only a little), and it is possible that they somewhat 
 affected the outcome of the Anglo-American struggle, 
 but they did not form the main cause. This can best be 
 proved by examining the combats of two preceding 
 periods, in which the English, French, and Americans 
 were at war with one another. 
 
 During the years 1798-1800, the United States carried 
 on a desultory conflict with France, then at war with 
 England. Our navy was just built, and was rated in the 
 most extraordinary manner ; the Chesapeake^ carrying 
 i8-pounders, was called a 44 ; and the jConstellation, 
 which carried 24's, a 36, while the Washington, rating 
 24, was really much heavier than the Boston, rating 28. 
 On Feb. 9, 1799, after an hour's conflict, the Constellation 
 captured the French frigate Insurgente ; the Americans 
 lost 3, the French 70 men, killed and wounded. The 
 ^^Constitution carried but 38 guns; 28 long 24's, on the 
 main-deck, and 10 long 12's on the qurter-deck, with a 
 crew of 309 men. According to Troude (iii, 169), 
 r Insurgente carried 26 long 12's, 10 long 6's, and 4 
 36-pound carronades ; the Americans report her number 
 of men as nearly four hundred. Thus in actual ' (not 
 
 ■ French shot was really very much heavier than the nominally 
 corresponding English shot, as the following table, taken from Cap- 
 tain T. L. Simmon's work on " Heavy Ordnance" (London, 1837, p. 
 62) will show ; 
 
 Nominal French Weight Actual Weight of Same Shot in 
 
 of Shot. English Pounds. 
 
 36 lbs. 43 lbs. 4 oz. 
 
 24 " 28 " 8f " 
 
 18 " 21 " 4I " 
 
 12 " 14 " 7 .. 
 
APPENDIX. 46] 
 
 nominal) weight of shot the Constellation was superior b) 
 about 80 pounds, and was inferior in crew by from 50 tc 
 100 men. This would make the vessels apparentl) 
 nearly equal in force ; but of course the long 24's of the 
 Constellation made it impossible that I'lnsurgente, armec 
 only with long 12's, should contend with her. As 
 already said, a superiority in number of men makes verj 
 little difference, provided each vessel has ample tc 
 handle the guns, repair damages, work the sails, etc 
 Troude goes more into details than any other French 
 historian ; but I think his details are generally wrong 
 In this case he gives the Constellation 12's, instead of the 
 24's she really carried ; and also supplies her with ic 
 32-pound carronades — of which species of ordnance 
 there was then not one piece in our navy. The first 
 carronades we ever had were those carried by the same 
 frigate on her next voyage. She had completely changed 
 her armament, having 28 long i8's on the main-deck, ter 
 24-pound carronades on the quarter-deck ; and, I believe 
 6 long 12's on the forecastle, with a crew of 310 men 
 Thus armed, she encountered and fought a drawn battle 
 with la Vengeance. Troude (vol. iii, pp. 201, and 216] 
 describes the armament of the latter as 26 long i8's, 
 10 long 8's, and 4 36-pound carronades. On board o< 
 her was an American prisoner, James Howe, who swore 
 she had 52 guns, and 400 men (see Cooper, i, 306), 
 The French and American accounts thus radically disa- 
 gree. The point is settled definitely by the report of the 
 British captain Milne, who, in the Seine frigate captured 
 la Vengeance in the same year, and then reported hei 
 armament as being 28 long iS's, 16 long 12's, and 8 
 36-pound carronades, with 326 men. As the American 
 and British accounts, written entirely independently of 
 one another, tally almost exactly, it is evident that 
 Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders very 
 much over the Constellation' s armament. 
 
462 APPENDIX. 
 
 Thus in this action the American frigate fought a draw 
 with an antagonist, nearly as much superior to herself as 
 an American 44 was to a British 38. In November, 1800, 
 tlie " 28-gun frigate," Boston, of 530 tons, 200 men, 
 carrying 24 long 9's on the main-deck, and on the 
 spar-deck 8 long 6's (or possibly 12-pound carronades), 
 captured, after two hours action, the French corvette 
 Berceau, of 24 guns, long 8's ; the Boston was about the 
 same size as her foe, with the same number of men, and 
 superior in metal about as ten to nine. She lost 15, and 
 the Berceau 40 men. Troude (iii, p. 219) gives the 
 Berceau 30 guns, 22 long 8's, and 8 12-pound carronades. 
 If this is true she was in reality of equal force with the 
 Boston. But I question if Troude really knew anything 
 about the combatants ; he gives the Boston (of the same 
 size and build as the Cyane) 48 guns — a number impos- 
 sible for her to carry. He continually makes the 
 grossest errors ; in this same (the third) volume, for 
 example, he arms a British 50-gun-ship with 72 cannon, 
 giving her a broadside fifty per cent, heavier than it 
 should be (p. 141) ; and, still worse, states the ordinary 
 complement of a British 32-gun frigate to be 384 men, 
 instead of about 220 (p. 417). He is by no means as 
 trustworthy as James, though less rancorous. 
 
 The United States schooner Experiment, of 12 guns, 
 long 6's, and 70 men, captured the French man-of-war 
 three-masted-schooner La Diane, of 14 guns (either 4- or 
 6-pounders), with a crew of 60 men, and 30 passengers ; 
 and the Enterprise, the sister vessel of the Experiment, 
 captured numerous strong privateers. One of them, a 
 much heavier vessel than her captor, made a most ob- 
 stinate fight. She was the Flambeau brig of fourteen 
 8-pounders and 100 men, of whom half were killed or 
 wounded. The Enterprise had 3 killed and 7 wounded. 
 
 Comparing these different actions, it is evident that the 
 Americans were superior to the French in fighting capac- 
 
APPENDIX. 463 
 
 ity during the years 1799 and 1800. During the same 
 two years there had been numerous single contests be- 
 tween vessels of Britain and France, ending almost 
 invariably in favor of the former, which I mention first 
 in each couple. The 12-pounder frigate Dcedalus cap- 
 tured the ];2-pounder frigate Prudente, of equal force. 
 The British i8-pounder frigate ^^///« captured the frigate 
 Forte, armed with 52 guns, 30 of them long 24's on the 
 main-deck ; she was formidably armed and as heavy as 
 the Constitution. The Sybille lost 22 and the Forte 145 
 men killed and wounded. The i8-pounder frigate Clyde, 
 with the loss of 5 men, captured the 12-pounder frigate 
 Vestak, which lost 32. The cutter Courser, of twelve 
 4-pounders and 40 men, captured the privateer Guerriire, 
 of fourteen 4-pounders and 44 men. The cutter Viper, 
 of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men, captured the priva- 
 teer Suret, of fourteen 4-pounders and 57 men. The 
 i6-gun ship-sloop Peterel, with 89 men, engaged the Cerf, 
 14, Lejoille, 6, and Ligurienne, 16, with in all 240 men, and 
 captured the Ligurienne. The 30-gun corvette Dart cap- 
 tured by surprise the 38-gun frigate Desir^e. The Gypsey, 
 of ten 4-pounders and 82 men, captured the Quidproqiio, 
 of 8 guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and 98 men. The schooner 
 Milbrook of sixteen i8-pounder carronades and 47 men, 
 fought a draw with the privateer Bellone, of 24 long 8's 
 and six 36-pound carronades. Finally, six months after 
 the Vengeance had escaped from the Constellation (or 
 beaten her off, as the French say) she was captured by 
 the British frigate Seine, which threw a broadside about 
 30 pounds more than the American did in her action, and 
 had some 29 men less aboard. So that her commander. 
 Captain Milne, with the same force as Commodore Trux- 
 ton, of the Constellation, accomplished what the latter 
 failed to do. 
 
 Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty clear that, 
 while the Americans were then undoubtedly much supe- 
 
464 APPENDIX. 
 
 rior to the French, they were still, at least slightly, 
 inferior to the British. 
 
 From 1777 to 1782 the state of things was very differ- 
 ent. The single combats were too numerous for me to 
 mention them here ; and besides it would be impossible 
 to get at the truth without going to a great deal of 
 trouble— the accounts given by Cooper, Sohomberg, and 
 Troude differing so widely that they can often hardly be 
 recognized as treating of the same events. But it is cer- 
 tain that the British were very much superior to the 
 Americans. Some of the American ships behaved most 
 disgracefully, deserting their consorts and fleeing from 
 much smaller foes. Generally the American ship was 
 captured when opposed by an equal force — although 
 there were some brilliant exceptions to this. With the 
 French things were more equal ; their frigates were sunk 
 or captured time and again, but nearly as often they 
 sunk or captured their antagonists. Some of the most 
 gallant fights on record are recounted of French frigates 
 of this period ; in 1781 the Minerve, 32, resisted the 
 Courageous, 74, till she had lost 73 men and had actually 
 inflicted a loss of 17 men on her gigantic antagonist, and 
 the previous year the Bellepoule, 32, had performed a 
 similar feat with the Nonsuch, 64, while the Capricieuse 
 32, had fought for five hours before surrendering to the 
 Prudente and Licorne, each of force equal to herself. She 
 lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 upon her two antago- 
 nists. Such instances make us feel rather ashamed when 
 we compare them with the fight in which the British ship 
 Glasgow, 20, beat off an American squadron of 5 ships, 
 including two of equal force to herself, or with the time 
 when the Ariadne, 20, and Ceres, 14, attacked and cap- 
 tured without resistance the Alfred, 20, the latter ship 
 being deserted in the most outrageously cowardly man- 
 ner by her consort the Raleigh, 32. At that period the 
 average American ship was certainly by no means equal 
 
APPENDIX. 465 
 
 to the average French ship of the same force, and the lat- 
 ter in turn was a little, but only a little, inferior to the 
 average British ship of equal strength. 
 
 Thus in 17S2 the British stood first in nautical prow- 
 ess, separated but by a very narrow interval from the 
 French, while the Americans made a bad third. In 1789 
 the British still stood first, while the Americans had 
 made a great stride forward, coming close on their heels, 
 and the French had fallen far behind into the third place. 
 In 18 1 2 the relative positions of the British and French 
 were unchanged, but the Americans had taken anothei 
 very decided step in advance, and stood nearly as fai 
 ahead of the British as the latter were ahead of the 
 French. 
 
 The explanation of these changes is not difficult. In 
 1782 the American war vessels were in reality privateers; 
 the crews were unpracticed, the officers untrained, and 
 they had none of the traditions and discipline of a regu- 
 lar service. At the same time the French marine was a1 
 7ts highest point ; it was commanded by officers of ability 
 and experience, promoted largely for merit, and with 
 crews thoroughly trained, especially in gunnery, by a long 
 course of service on the sea. In courage, and in skill 
 in the management of guns, musketry, etc., they were the 
 full equals of their English antagonists ; their slight 
 average inferiority in seamanship may, it is possible, be 
 fairly put down to the difiEerence in race. (It seems cer- 
 tain that, when serving in a neutral vessel, for example, 
 the Englishmen aboard are apt to make better sailor; 
 than the Frenchmen.) In 1799 the revolution had de- 
 prived the French of all their best officers, had let the 
 character of the marine run down, and the discipline oi 
 the service become utterly disorganized ; this exposed 
 them to frightful reverses, and these in turn prevented 
 the character of the service from recovering its formei 
 tone. Meanwhile the Americans had established for the 
 
466 APPENDIX. 
 
 first time a regular navy, and, as there was excellent ma- 
 terial to work with, it at once came up close to the En- 
 glish ; constant and arduous service, fine discipline, 
 promotion for merit, and the most unflagging attention to 
 practical seamanship and gunnery had in 1812 raised it 
 far above even the high English standard. During all 
 these three periods the English marine, it must be re- 
 membered, did not fall off, but at least kept its position ; 
 the French, on the contrary, did fall of, while the Ameri- 
 can navy advanced by great strides to the first place. 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 After my work was in press I for the first time came 
 across Prof. J. Russell Soley's " Naval Campaign of 
 1812," in the " Proceedings of the United States Naval 
 Institute," for October 20, 1881. It is apparently the 
 precursor of a more extended history. Had I known 
 that such a writer as Professor Soley was engaged on a 
 work of this kind I certainly should not have attempted 
 it myself. 
 
 In several points our accounts differ. In the action 
 with the Guerriire his diagram differs from mine chiefly 
 iri his making the Constitution steer in a more direct line, 
 while I have represented her as shifting her course several 
 times in order to avoid being raked, bringing the wind 
 first on her port and then on her starboard-quarter. My 
 account of the number of the crew of the Guerriire is 
 taken from the Constitution s muster-book (in the Treas- 
 ury Department at Washington), which contains the 
 names of all the British prisoners received aboard the 
 Constitution after the fight. The various writers used 
 " larboard " and " starboard " with such perfect indiffer- 
 ence, in speaking of the closing and the loss of the 
 Guerriire' s mizzen-mast, that I hardly knew which account 
 
APPENDIX. 467 
 
 to adopt ; it finally seemed to me that the only way tC 
 reconcile the conflicting statements was by making the 
 mast act as a rudder, first to keep the ship off the wind 
 until it was dead aft and then to bring her up into it. If 
 this was the case, it deadened her speed, and prevented 
 Dacres from keeping his ship yardarm and yardarm with 
 the foe, though he tried to steady his course with the 
 helm ; but, in this view, it rather delayed Hull's raking 
 than helped him. If Professor Soley's account is right, ] 
 hardly know what to make of the statement in one of the 
 American accounts that the Constitution " luffed across 
 the enemy's bow," and of Cooper's statement (in Put- 
 nam's Magazine) that the Guerriire's Ijowsprit pressec 
 against the Constitution's " lee or port quarter." 
 
 In the action of the Wasp with the Frolic, I have 
 adopted James' statement of the latter's force ; Professoi 
 Soley follows Captain Jones' letter, which gives the brij 
 three additional guns and 18 pounds more metal ir 
 broadside. My reason for following James was that hii 
 account of the Frolic's force agrees with the regulai 
 armament of her class. Captain Jones gives her two car 
 ronades on the topgallant forecastle, which must certainl) 
 be a mistake ; he makes her chase-guns long r2's, but al 
 the other British brigs carried 6's ; he also gives her an- 
 other gun in broadside, which he calls a 12-pounder, anc 
 Lieutenant Biddle (in a letter to his father) a 32-pounc 
 carronade. His last gun should perhaps be counted in 
 I excluded it because the two American officials differec 
 in their account of it, because I did not know through 
 what port it could be fought, and because James assertec 
 that it was dismounted and lashed to the forecastle. The 
 Wasp left port with 138 men ; subtracting the pilot anc 
 two men who were drowned, makes 135 the number or 
 board during the action. As the battle was fought, ] 
 doubt if the loss of the brig's main-yard had much effeci 
 on the result ; had it been her object to keep on the wind 
 
468 APPENDIX. 
 
 or had the loss of her after-sails enabled her antagonist to 
 cross her stern (as in the case of the Argus and Pelican), 
 the accident could fairly be said to have had a decided 
 effect upon the contest. But as a short time after the 
 fight began the vessels were running nearly free, and as 
 the Wasp herself was greatly injured aloft at the time, and 
 made no effort to cross her foes stern, it is difficult to see 
 that it made much difference. The brig's head-sails were 
 all right, and, as she was not close-hauled, the cause of 
 her not being kept more under command was probably 
 purely due to the slaughter on her decks. 
 
 Professor Soley represents the combat of the States and 
 Macedoniafi as a plain yardarm and yardarm action after 
 the first forty minutes. I have followed the English 
 authorities and make it a running fight throughout. If 
 Professor Soley is right, the enormous disparity in loss 
 was due mainly to the infinitely greater accuracy of the 
 American fire ; according to my diagram the chief cause 
 was the incompetency of the Macedonian' s commander. 
 In one event the difference was mainly in the gunnery of 
 the crews, in the other, it was mainly in the tactical skill 
 of the captains. The question is merely as to how soon 
 Cardan, in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was 
 enabled to close with Decatur. I have represented the 
 closin g as taking place later than Professor Soley has done ; 
 very possibly I am wrong. Could my work now be re- 
 written I think I should adopt his diagram of the action 
 of the Macedonian. 
 
 But in the action with the jpava it seems to me that 
 he is mistaken. He has here followed the British ac- 
 counts ; but they are contradicted by the American 
 authorities, and besides have a very improbable look. 
 When the Constitution came round for the second time, 
 on the port tack, James declares the J^ava passed directly 
 across her stern, almost touching, but that the British 
 crew, overcome by astonishment or awe, did not fire a 
 
APPENDIX. 46c 
 
 shot ; and that shortly afterward the manoeuvre was re^ 
 peated. When this incident is said to have occurret 
 the Java's crew had been hard at work figliting ihe gum 
 for half an hour, and they continued for an hour and £ 
 half afterward ; it is impossible to believe that they woulc 
 have foreborne to fire more than one gun when in such i 
 superb position for inflicting damage. Even had thf 
 men been struck with temporary lunacy the officers alom 
 would have fired some of the guns. Moreover, if th< 
 courses of the vessels were such as indicated on Professoi 
 Soley's diagram the Java would herself have been pre- 
 viously exposed to a terrible raking fire, which was not the 
 case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, per se, a decided- 
 ly apocryphal look ; and besides they are flatly contra- 
 dicted by the American accounts which state distinctl) 
 that the J^ava remained to windward in every portion ol 
 the fight. On this same tack Professor Soley represent: 
 the Java as forereaching on the Constitution ; I have re- 
 versed this. At this time the Java had been much cul 
 up in her rigging and aloft generally, while the Constitu- 
 tion had set much additional sail, and in consequence the 
 latter forged ahead and wore in the smoke unperceived. 
 When the ships came foul Professor Soley has drawn the 
 Constitution in a position in which she would receive a 
 most destructive stern rake from her antagonist's whole 
 broadside. The positions could not have been as there 
 represented. The Java's bowsprit came foul in the Con- 
 stitution'?, mizzen rigging and as the latter forged ahead 
 she pulled the former gradually round till when they sep- 
 arated the ships were in a head and stern line. Commo- 
 dore Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at once " kept 
 away to avoid being raked," while the loss of the head- 
 sails aboard the Java would cause the latter to come up 
 in the wind, and the two ships would again be running 
 parallel, with the American to leeward. I have already 
 discussed fully the reasons for rejecting in this instance 
 
470 APPENDIX. 
 
 the British report of their own force and loss. This was 
 :the last defeat that the British officially reported ; the 
 admiralty were smarting with the sting of successive dis- 
 asters and anxious at all costs to put the best possible 
 face on affairs (as witness Mr. Croker's response to Lord 
 Dundonald's speech in the House). There is every 
 reason for believing that in this case the reports were 
 garbled exactly as at a later date the official correspond- 
 ence preceding the terrible disasters at Cabel was tampered 
 with before being put before the public (see McCarthy's 
 " History of our own times.") 
 
 It is difficult to draw a diagram of the action between 
 the Hortiet and Peacock, although it was so short, the ac- 
 counts contradicting one another as to which ship was to 
 windward and which on the " larboard tack ; " and I do 
 not know if I have correctly represented the position of 
 the combatants at the close of the engagement. Lieu- 
 tenant Conner reported the number of men aboard the 
 Hornet fit for duty as 135 ; Lawrence says she had 8 
 absent in a prize and 7 too sick to be at quarters. This 
 would make an original complement of 150, and tallies 
 exactly with the number of men left on the Hornet after 
 the action was over, as mentioned by Lawrence in his 
 account of the total number of souls aboard. The log- 
 book of the Hornet just before starting on her cruise, 
 states her entire complement as 158 ; but 4 of these were 
 sick and left behind. There is still a discrepancy of 4 
 men, but during the course of the cruise nothing would 
 be more likely than that four men should be gotten rid of> 
 either by sickness, desertion, or dismissal. At any rate 
 the discrepancy is very trivial. In her last cruise, as I 
 have elsewhere said, I have probably overestimated the 
 number of the Hornet's crew ; this seems especially 
 likely when it is remembered that toward the close of the 
 war our vessels left port with fewer supernumeraries 
 aboard than earlier in the contest. If such is the case, 
 
APPENDIX. 471 
 
 the Hornet and Penguin were of almost exactly equal 
 force. 
 
 My own comments upon the causes of our success, 
 upon the various historians of the war, etc., are so simi- 
 lar to those of Professor Soley, that I almost feel as if I 
 had been guilty of plagiarism ; yet I never saw his writ- 
 ings till half an hour ago. But in commenting on the 
 actions of 181 2, I think the Professor has laid too much 
 stress on the difference in " dash " between the combat- 
 ants. The Wasp bore down with perfect confidence to 
 engage an equal foe ; and the Hornet could not tell till 
 the Peacock opened fire that' the latter was inferior in 
 force, and moreover fought in sight of another hostile 
 vessel. In the action with the Guerriere it was Hull and 
 not Dacres who acted boldly, the Englishman delaying 
 the combat and trying to keep it at long range for some 
 time. In this fight it must be remembered that neither 
 foe knew the exact force of the other until the close 
 work began ; then, it is true, Dacres fought most bravely. 
 So with the Macedonian ; James particularly says that 
 she did not know the force of her foe, and was confident 
 of victory. The Java, however, must have known that 
 she was to engage a superior force. In neither of the 
 first two frigate actions did the Americans have a chance 
 to display any courage in the actual fighting, the victory 
 was won with such ease. But in each case they entered 
 as bravely, although by no means as rashly or foolishly, 
 into the fight as their antagonists did. It must always be 
 remembered that until this time it was by no means 
 proved that 24-pounders were better guns than i8's to 
 put on frigates ; exactly as at a little later date it was 
 vigorously contended that 42-pounders were no more 
 effective guns for two-deckers than 32-pounders were. 
 Till 1812 there had been no experience to justify the 
 theory that the 24-pounder was the better gun. So that 
 in the first five actions it cannot be said that the British 
 
4/2 APPENDIX. 
 
 showed any especial courage in beginning the fight ; it 
 was more properly to be called ignorance. After the 
 fight was once begun they certainly acted very bravely, 
 and, in particular, the desperate nature of the Frolic's 
 defence has never been surpassed. 
 
 But admitting this is a very different thing from ad- 
 mitting that the British fought more bravely than 
 their foes ; the combatants were about on a par in this 
 respect. The Americans, it seems to me, were always to 
 the full as ready to engage as their antagonists were ; on 
 each side there were few .over-cautious men, such as 
 Commodore Rodgers and Sir George Collier, the oppos- 
 ing captains on Lake Ontario, the commander of the 
 Bonne Citoye/tne, and perhaps Commodore Decatur, but 
 as a rule either side jumped at the chance of a fight. 
 The difference in tactics was one of skill and common 
 sense, not one of timidity. The United States did not 
 " avoid close action " from over-caution, but simply to 
 take advantage of her opponent's rashness. Hull's ap- 
 proach was as bold as it was skilful ; had the opponent to 
 leeward been the Endymion, instead of the Guerridre, her 
 24-pounders would not have saved her from the fate that 
 overtook the latter. Throughout the war I think that the 
 Americans were as bold in beginning action, and as stub- 
 born in continuing it, as were their foes — although no 
 more so. Neither side can claim any superiority on the 
 average, though each can in individual cases, as regards 
 courage. Foolhardiness does not imply bravery. A 
 prize-fighter who refused to use his guard would be 
 looked upon as exceptionally brainless, not as exception- 
 ally brave ; yet such a case is almost exactly parallel to 
 that of the captain of the Macedonian. 
 
 APPENDIX D. 
 In the " Historical Register of the United States ' 
 
APPENDIX. 473 
 
 (Edited by T. H. Palmer, Philadelphia, 1814), vol. i p. 105 
 (State Papers), is a letter from Lieut. L. H. Babbitt to 
 Master-commandant Wm. U. Crane, both of the Nautilus, 
 dated Sept. 13, 1812, in which he says that of the six men 
 imprisoned by the British on suspicion of being of English 
 birth, four were native-born Americans, and two natur- 
 alized citizens. He also gives a list of six men who 
 deserted, and entered on the Shannon, of whom two 
 were American born — the birthplaces of the four others 
 not being given. Adding these last, we still have but six 
 men as the number of British aboard the Nautilus. It is 
 thus seen that the crack frigate Shannon had American 
 deserters aboard here — although these probably formed 
 a merely trifling faction of her crew, as did the British 
 deserters aboard the crack frigate Constitution. 
 
 On p. 108, is a letter of Dec. 17, 1812, from Geo. S. 
 Wise, purser of the Wasp, stating that twelve of that 
 ship's crew had been detained " under the pretence of 
 their being British subjects " ; so that nine per cent, of 
 her crew may have been British — or the proportion may 
 have been very much smaller. 
 
 On p. 117, is a letter of Jan. 14, 1813, from Com- 
 modore J. Rodgers, in which he states that he encloses 
 the muster-rolls of H. B. M. ships. Moselle and Sappho, 
 taken out of the captured packet Swallow ; and that these 
 muster-rolls show that in August, 1812, one eighth of the 
 crews of the Moselle and Sappho, was composed of 
 Americans. 
 
 These various letters thus support strongly the conclu- 
 sions reached on a former page as to the proportion of 
 British deserters on American vessels. 
 
 In " A Biographical Memoir of the late Commodore 
 Joshua Barney, from Autographical Notes and Journals " 
 (Edited by Mary Barney, Boston, 1832), on pages 263, 
 and 315, are descriptions of the flotilla destroyed in the 
 Patuxent. It consisted of one gun-boat, carrying a long 
 
474 APPENDIX. 
 
 24 ; one cutter, carrying a long 18, a columbiad 18, and 
 four 9-pound carronades, and thirteen row barges, each 
 carrying a long 18 or 12 in the bow, with a 32-pound or 
 18-pound carronade in the stern. On p. 256, Barney's 
 force in St. Leonard's creek, is described as consisting of 
 one sloop, two gun-boats, and thirteen barges, with in all 
 somewhat over 500 men ; and it is claimed that the 
 flotilla drove away the blockading frigates, entirely un- 
 aided ; the infantry force on shore rendering no assist- 
 ance. The work is of some value, as showing that James 
 had more than doubled the size, and almost doubled the 
 strength, of Barney's various gun-boats. 
 
 It may be mentioned that on p. 108, Commodore 
 Barney describes the Dutch-American frigate South 
 Carolina, wliich carried a crew of 550 men, and was 
 armed with 28 long 42's on the maindeck, and 12 long 
 12's on the spardeck. She was far heavier than any of 
 our 44-gun frigates of 1812, and an overmatch for 
 anything under the rank of a 74. This gives further 
 emphasis to what I have already stated — that the dis- 
 tinguishing feature of the war of 1812, is not the intro- 
 duction of the heavy frigate, for heavy frigates had been 
 in use among various nations for thirty years previously, 
 but the fact that for the first time the heavy frigate was 
 used to the best possible advantage. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 . 212 
 
 24. 54 
 
 43. 55-6, 77. 81, 423-7 
 
 . 369 
 
 41 
 
 Abeille , 
 
 Aboukir 
 
 A casta . 
 
 d'Ache . 
 
 Achille .... 
 
 Accurate filing of the Ameri- 
 cans .... 
 
 Adams, 53, 62, 71-2, 302, 311, 
 334, 443 ; illuslr.itionof sec- 
 tion, X : cruise, 334 ; chased 
 by Tigris, 335-6 ; curious 
 sailing qualities resulting 
 from being built by contract, 
 336 ; grounds on -isle of 
 Haute, 336 ; attacked by 
 British in Penobscot, 337 ; 
 burned by Capt. ilorris 
 
 Adams, Chaplain . 
 
 Adams, Lieui. 
 
 Adirondack region 
 
 Ado7iis .... 
 
 ALolus . 
 
 Aiina . 
 
 Africa . 
 
 A lacriiy 
 
 Albion . 
 
 Alert, 80-1, 
 Essex 
 
 Alexandria, 
 
 renders to British 
 
 Alfred ... 
 
 Alison, Sir A. 
 
 Allen .... 
 
 Allen, Lieut. U. H. . 205, 
 
 Allen, Lieut. W. H,, onUnited 
 States, 114 ; commander ut 
 Argus, ao5, 207, 2og, 447 ; 
 mortally wounded 
 
 Alligator, 220, 2go, 346 ; fu- 
 tile attempt to cut her out, 
 290; sunk in a squall. 
 
 Almy, Sailing-master, T. C. 
 
 Alwyn, Master 
 
 169 
 
 . 73. 
 . 43. 73. i 
 
 lyi ; captured by 
 175-6, 318 ; sur- 
 
 
 338 
 
 
 310 
 
 
 229 
 
 
 139 
 
 
 332 
 
 83. 
 
 86-7 
 
 318 
 
 320 
 
 2-3, 
 
 86-7 
 
 
 212 
 
 
 317 
 
 319 
 414 
 
 381 
 
 377 
 206 
 
 205 
 
 291 
 
 262 
 
 91 
 
 Ambziscade , . . 194, 
 
 Amelia Island 
 
 Americans accused of treach- 
 ery . . . . 
 
 "American Artillerist's Com- 
 panion," . . . . 
 
 American gun-boats employed 
 in proleciing coasting tiatle, 
 198-9; futile attack oil IJrit- 
 ish vessels, 200 ; lesson 
 taught by their failure. 
 
 American loss in all 
 
 American navy, confidence in 
 itself, 29; esp-> it de corps of 
 its officers, 29 ; life-long 
 training of sailors, 29 ; great 
 effectiveness and reasons for 
 it, 30 ; no impressment, 35 ; 
 vessels not ' ' largely manned 
 by British sailors,"' 37-44 ; 
 proportion of officeis fur- 
 nished by different States and 
 sections, 44.; tonnage, 45 ; 
 navy yards, 46 ; statislii-s of 
 officers and seamen, 46-7 ; 
 list of vessels, tonnage and 
 description, 4S-51 ; com- 
 pared with British navy, 51 ; 
 charges of underrating, 52- 
 56 ; unquestionable superi- 
 ority in force, 59 ; effective- 
 ness due to small size, 61 ; 
 crew of a 44, 67 ; of an iS- 
 gun ship, 68 ; tabulated com- 
 parison of three Biitish and 
 three American vessels, 69 ; 
 superior discipline of Ameri- 
 cans, 133; officersbctterpaid 
 and of a better cla.-^s, 134 ; 
 American navy gave more 
 damage than it received, 434: 
 at outset of vv'ar numbered 
 but a dozen vessels 
 
 195 
 315 
 
 187 
 
 2ig 
 442 
 
 446 
 
 475 
 
476 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 American officers, reasons for 
 their superiority . . 448-9 
 
 American privateers cut out 
 by British squadron . 172-4 
 
 American revolution, fleet ac- 
 tions of British with Euro- 
 peans mostly indecisive . 368 
 
 American sailors compared 
 with British, 35 ; of better 
 material for man-of-war's 
 crew than British, 448 ; 
 American sailors on Guer- 
 riire . . . . -97 
 
 American sharp-shooters. . 133 
 
 "American State Papers,'' 20, 
 
 47, 257, 314,349. 377 
 American vessels built and 
 captured or destroyed in 
 1812, 137; prizes made, 
 138 ; in 1813, 210-20; in 
 1814, 348-9; in 1815, 439- 
 41 ; total summary, 442-3 ; 
 make-shifts in use of mer- 
 chant schooners . . 143 
 American whalers . . .34 
 American writings miscalled 
 
 histories .... 248 
 Amherst Bay .... 244 
 Amherstburg. . . 255-6 
 
 Anglo-French naval war, 451 ; 
 
 comparative force and loss 45 1-3 
 Angus, Lieut. S., 203, 370, 
 leads disastrous expedition 
 against Red House bar- 
 racks. . . . 158-9 
 
 Anjier 435 
 
 Appling, Major . . 361-2 
 
 Arab .... 173-4 
 
 Arbuthnot, Capt. J. . . 32S 
 
 Arbuthnot, Admiral, victory 
 
 over Barras ofl Chesapeake . 368 
 Argo . . . .107 
 
 Argus, 12, 39, 64, 69, 73, 96, 
 106, 136, 166, 204-12, 218- 
 20, 315, 319, 349, 444-5 ; 
 makes six prizes, 106 ; en- 
 gagement with Pelican, 205 ; 
 is captured by her, 206 ; 
 not an action creditable to 
 Americans, 208 ; compara- 
 tive force and loss, 207-8 ; 
 diagram of action, 208 ; 
 charges against her crew, 
 
 155 
 
 203 
 
 233 
 117 
 
 332 
 
 416 
 
 60 
 
 209 ; powder alleged to be 
 bad, 209 ; comparison with 
 previous combats, 210 ; in- 
 feriority of beaten crew un- 
 accountable . ' . .211 
 
 Ariel, 254, 256, 260, 262-5, 
 
 268-70, 372 
 
 Armada .... 328 
 
 Armide . .... 343 
 
 Armstrong, I.ieut. . . 372-3 
 
 Arundel. Sailing-master, 154 ; 
 wounded and di owned 
 
 Asp, 153, 202. 220, 224, 229, 
 231, 238, 244.7, 249, 256, 
 443 ; cut out by boats from 
 Mohawk and Contest . 
 
 Aspinwall, Lieut 
 
 Astrcea . 
 
 A talanta 
 
 Atlas . 
 
 Austrians 
 
 Authorities consulted and re- 
 ferred to, 1 1 (see list in de- 
 tail). 
 
 " Autobiography of a Sea- 
 man" ..... 
 
 Avon, 66, 208, 210, 211, 32S- 
 
 31, 334, 350, 421, 446 ; 
 
 chased by Wasp, 328 ; cap- 
 tured after short and furious 
 engagement, 329 ; sinks 
 Aylnier, Lieut. J. C. . 
 Ay twin ..... 
 Ayscough, Sir G. . 
 Azores ..... 
 Bainbridge, Commodore, 36, 
 50, 119, 120, 122-4, 126, 
 128, 129, 132, 134-5, 181, 
 183, ig6, 370, 406, 
 Bainbridge, Master J. . 
 Baker, Capt. . . 319, 320 
 Ballahoti . . . 316, 350 
 
 Ballard, Lieut. . 420, 424, 426-7 
 Ballard. . . . 377 
 
 Baltic, battle of . . . 277 
 Baltimore, 172, 317, 342, 413, 
 414 ; unsuccessfully attack- 
 ed by British 9, 318 
 Barbadoes . .217,286-7,316 
 
 331 
 123 
 
 377 
 
 53 
 
 175 
 
 •147 
 311 
 
 Barclay, Capt. R. 
 225, 252, 261, 
 277, 280, 376 
 
 H., 63, 68, 
 
 273. 274, 
 
 commander 
 
 of British forces on Lake 
 
INDEX. 
 
 477 
 
 Erie, 254-6 ; description of 
 his squadron and crews, 
 256-g ; engagement with 
 Perry, 262, 264; severely 
 "wounded .... 265 
 Barnegat . . . .82 
 
 Barney, Commodore J., 40, 
 317, 319 ; erroneously called 
 an Irishman, 317; attacks 
 Alhion and Dragon with 
 flotilla, 318 ; memoir . . 473 
 Bainwell, Sailing-master . 299 
 Barossa . . . 200, 415 
 
 liarras. Admiral . . . 36S 
 
 Barrie, Sir R., relieved by 
 Rear-Admiral Cochrane . 286 
 
 Barry, Capt 337 
 
 Bartholomew, Capt., 437-8 ; 
 wanton attack on American 
 gun-boat .... 43S 
 Bartlett, Purser . 436-7 
 
 Bassett, Sailing-master, 290 : 
 
 promoted to lieutenancy . 2gi 
 Bastard, Capt. J. . . .82 
 
 " Batailles Navales de la 
 
 France," see Graviere . 98 
 Bayonnaise . . . 194-5 
 
 Baylies, Adj. -Gen. E. 234, 258-9 
 Beale, G., Jr. . . . 377 
 
 Bell, Lieut 392 
 
 Belvidcra, 65, 73-7, 82, 83, 
 85-7, 172. Engagement with 
 President . ■ 74-6 
 
 Bentham, Capt. G. . . 338 
 
 Beresford . 224-5, 235, 252, 255 
 Beresford, Capt. J. P. . 105 
 
 Bermudas . . 107, 163, 417 
 Bermuda ' ' Royal Gazette " 404-5 
 Biddle, Capt., I02, 106, 177, 
 370, 401, 427-8, 430, 432, 
 
 434, 447 
 Bignell, Lieut. G. . 262, 268 
 
 Big Salmon River . . . 360 
 Big Sandy Creek . . 360-1 
 Bingham, Capt. . . 7 
 
 Black Rock . . . i57 
 
 Black Snake . . .362, 399 
 
 Bladensburg . 9, 174, 319 
 
 Blaeny, Lieut. . . -358 
 
 Blake's victory over Dutch, 
 
 277, 280 
 Blakely, Capt. J. 40. 66. 31°: 
 
 321, 323-4, 326-31, 352 447 
 
 Bland, Quartermaster F. , 300 
 Blockade of American coast, 
 
 strictness .... 284 
 Blucher .... 406 
 
 Blyth, Capt. S., 213, 447 ; 
 killed, 214 ; great personal 
 courage and humanity . 2l5 
 
 Boarding nettings boiled in 
 
 pitch .... 162 
 
 Boasting on both sides . . 286 
 Bombay . . . .172 
 
 Bonne Ciioyenne . 118, 129, 
 
 165, i8i, 432 
 Borgne, Lake . . 343, 411 
 
 Boston .... 49, 446 
 Boston . 88, 134, 129, 163, 
 
 290, 400, 413, 417 
 Boston " Gazette " . . 127 
 
 Boston Harbor . . . 417 
 Boston Lighthouse . .182 
 
 Bowyer, Fort . . . 338 
 
 Boxer, vii, 213-7, 219, 349, 
 377, 397i 4°7 ; engagement 
 with Enterprise, 213-5 I is 
 captured .... 215 
 Braileford, Midship. . . 159 
 Brainer, Capt. . . . 331 
 Brant ..... 413 
 Breckenbridge, Lieut. , . 2oi 
 Brenton's "Naval History," 
 13. 14. 37-8, 40, 41, r.2, 74, 
 92, 115, 118, 128, 247, 
 386-7 ; its inaccuracy . 14 
 
 Brest . ■ . . . .217 
 Brine, Capt. . . . 327 
 
 Bristol .... 413 
 
 British accused of brutality 187 
 British Admiralty report . 42 
 
 British loss, summary, 443 ; 
 balance of loss against the 
 British . . 444 
 
 British navy, its great prestige 
 at opening of war, 99 ; num- 
 bered a thousand vessels 446 
 British officers hampered by 
 
 red tape . 449 
 
 British vessels captured or de- 
 stroyed in 1812, 137 ; in 
 1813, 2ig ; in 1814, 345 ; in 
 1S15, 441 ; total loss, 442 ; 
 vessels on great lakes, in- 
 experience of crews . 14° 
 British whalers in Pacific . 164 
 
478 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Broke, Capt. P. V., afterward 
 Admiral, 35, 61, 82, 88, g4, 
 179-87, 192-4, 285, 351, 
 447-8 ; memoir of, 61 ; his 
 chivalric challenge to Law- 
 rence, 181 ; gallant con- 
 duct in engagement against 
 Chesapeake . ■ ■ 182-8 
 Brooks, Lieut., mortally 
 
 wounded . . 265-268 
 
 Broom, Lieut. J., killed . 185 
 
 Brown, Capt. T. . . .236 
 
 Brown, Gen. J. 233, 357, 363, 
 
 365-6 
 Brown, Lieut. . 154, 229, 361 
 
 Brutality of British troops . i6r 
 Buchan, Lieut. E., 262 ; dan- 
 
 gerously wounded 
 
 . 264, 
 
 268 
 
 Budd, 
 
 Lieut. G. 
 
 i8l, I 
 
 85-6 
 
 Budd, 
 
 Lieut. C. . 
 
 
 377 
 
 Bulgei 
 
 , Lieut. 
 
 372-3 
 
 Bulloch, Capt. J. D. . 
 
 
 vii 
 
 Bunker Hill . 
 
 
 33 
 
 Bureau of Navigation 
 
 
 41 
 
 Burleton, Admiral, Sir 
 
 G. ] 
 
 433 
 
 Burlin 
 
 ;ton Heights 
 
 
 363 
 
 "Burl 
 
 ngton Races " 
 
 . 
 
 253 
 
 Burrows 
 
 
 377 
 
 Burrows, Lieut. W., Com. of 
 
 
 the 
 
 Enterprise, vi. 
 
 213-4. 
 
 
 443 
 
 mortally wounded. 
 
 
 215 
 
 ; his gallant conduct 
 
 
 and 
 
 great popularity 
 
 215-6 
 
 Bush, 
 
 Lieut. 
 
 
 91 
 
 Byng. 
 
 Capt. H. D. 
 
 
 202 
 
 Byron 
 
 Capt. R. 74-7, 
 
 82, 88, 
 
 
 
 
 173, 
 
 447 
 
 Calder 
 
 , Sir R. 
 
 
 242 
 
 Caledonia, 142, 156-8, 233, 
 
 
 254. 
 
 256-7, 260-7C 
 
 , 372, 
 
 
 374, 444 ; and four schoon- 
 ers brought into Lake Erie. 233 
 Caledonia, British privateer, 
 
 captured by Norimch 174 
 
 Call, William . . 297 
 
 Callao ..... 164 
 Campaign on the lakes, a fair 
 
 account difficult . 143 
 
 Campbell, Commod. H. C. 
 
 ig7. 338. 340. 438 
 
 Campbell, Master's Mate |, 262 
 Camperdown, victory of Lord 
 Duncan . 22, 278 
 
 " Canada must be conquered " 7 
 Canadians, alleged cowardice 148 
 Canadian colonies feebly de- 
 
 fended . . .8 
 
 Canary Islands . 163, 334 
 
 " Captains' Letters," vi, 82, 
 
 179. 183, 197, 412-3. +31, 438 
 Garden, Capt. J. S,, loS-io, 
 1 13-6, 301-2; a poor com- 
 mander . . . .113 
 Carnation . . 2 1 1-2, 338-9 
 
 Caroband Bank . . .166 
 Carolina . 43, 137. 343. 347. 4io 
 Carolinas . . 161, 400 
 
 Carron . . . 338 
 
 Carronade, figure of, . ix 
 
 Cassin, Lieut. -Com., 20I, 376, 
 
 392, 398 
 Castilian . . . -331 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord . . 42 
 
 Castine .... 337 
 
 Cathcart, Capt. . . .176 
 Catnall, Commod., life by C. 
 
 C. Jones . . . .162 
 
 Centipede . . 202, 377, 397 
 
 Chads, Lieut. H. C, 120-2, 
 
 124, 126-7, 129 
 Chameleon . . . .127 
 
 Champlain, Lake, 139, 142, 
 144, 147, 152 ; battle of, 
 147,275-6, 279, 281, 375, 3S1.442 
 Champlin, Sailing-master, 262, 
 
 267, 372-3 
 Chandeleur Islands . . 343 
 Charlestown . . 1S3, 217, 413 
 Char-ccell . . . 355-8. 374 
 
 Chasseur, 415, 416, 441 ; 
 American privateer, chased 
 by Barossa, 415 ; mistakes 
 St. Lawrence for merchant- 
 man and engages her 416 
 Chaiincy, Commod. I., 66, ',44, 
 152, 156, 193, 230-2, 235, 
 237-8, 240-1, 353-6, 443 ; 
 commander of forces on 
 Ontario, 152 ; at Sackett's 
 Harbor, 154 ; attacks j?oj'n/ 
 George, 154 ; takes York, 
 230, and Fort George, 231; 
 in action with Yen does not 
 compare favorably, 240-1 ; 
 advantage from long guns, 
 244 ; his account of action 
 
INDEX. 
 
 479 
 
 neav Genesee River, 244 ; 
 engagement in York Bay, 
 -45-50 ; partial victory off 
 Burlington, 248 ; crilicized 
 as a commander, 253-4 I 
 blockades Kingston, 363 ; 
 refuses to co-operate with 
 Gen. Brown, 364, 367 ; does 
 not make best use of his 
 materials, 36S ; not deserv- 
 ing of praise given him 370 
 Chauncy's s(juadron on Onta- 
 rio compared with Yeo's . 225-7 
 Chauncy, Lieut. . . 229, 236 
 C/levretie .... 128 
 Chlorinde . , . .99 
 Claxton, Lieut. . . . 103 
 Claxton, Midshipman . . 268 
 Chemb . 291-6, 298, 300, 305-8 
 Chesapeake Bay . 161, 171,316 
 Chesapeake River, 82, 286, 
 
 368, 400, 440 
 Chesapeake , 39, 41-2, 67, 6g, 
 72, 105, 113, 138, 149, 163, 
 178, 180-5, 187-go, 191-6, 
 2og, 218-20, 421, 444-5 ; re- 
 fitted out at Boston, in- 
 experienced crew and new 
 officers, 178 ; armament, 
 181 ; engagement with 
 Shannon^ 182-8 ; captured 
 by her, 187 ; diagram of ac- 
 tion . . 188 
 Childers .... 338 
 Chippe-daay, 142, 147, 259, 260, 
 262-3, 265, 267, 269, 270, 
 
 283, 349 
 Chili ..... 306 
 Chubb, 148, 282, 379-80, 389- 
 
 90, 394, 397, 399 
 Civil War . . 399 
 
 Clement, Sailing-master G. 327 
 Cleopatra . . .117 
 
 Cylde . . . • 59 
 
 Cockbum, Adm., 161, 437 ; 
 
 attack on Washington . 318 
 
 Cochrane, Adm., 3, 286, 319, 343 
 Codrington, Adm., " Me- 
 moirs," 60, 142, 169, 311, 
 315, 450 ; comments on use- 
 lessness of mere martinets . 169 
 Coggeshall, G., " History of 
 American Privateers," 202, 
 
 341. 415 ; gross misstate- 
 ments and sneers 202 
 Collier, Capt. Sir G. R., 119, 
 
 176, 321.423, 425.427, 439; 
 
 nis blunders. . . 427 
 
 Columbia . . , 319, 349 
 
 Comparative force and loss 
 
 during the war . 451-3 
 
 Cojnus .... H7 
 
 Confiance, 64, 147-8, 250, 276, 
 
 375-6, 378, 380, 384, 387, 
 
 389-90, 392-7, 399 
 Congress, measure proposed 
 
 against France and England 5 
 Congi-ess, 57, 73-4, 76, 106-7, 
 
 138, 174, lit, 220, 378, 425,446 
 Congressional forethought, 
 
 lack of . . . 445 
 
 Conklin, Lieut. . 374-5 
 
 Conkling, Lieut. A. . . 262 
 Connor, Lieut. 167-8, J72, 430 
 
 Conquest, 152, 154, 223, 229, 
 
 231, 238, 244 
 Constellation, 36, 32, 157, 72; 
 
 117, 162, 173, 201-2, 378, 
 
 446, 448 ; crew of, unsuc- 
 cessful attempt to capture 
 her . . . . 162 
 
 Constitution, ]2, 33, 38, 40-3, 
 54-8, 64-7, 70-2, 82-92, 95- 
 6, 98, 105, I14-5, 117-g, 
 120-33, 138, 178, 276, 287- 
 90, 334. 352, 398, 400, 
 407, 417-26, 435, 439, 
 
 447, 449-50, skirmish with 
 and escape from British 
 squadron, 82-8 ; captures 
 and burns two brigs, 88 ; 
 recaptures American brig, 
 89 ; engagement with and 
 capture of Guertihc, 89-92; 
 comparative force and loss, 
 92 ; diagram of action, 92 ; 
 her gunnery excellent, fault- 
 lessly handled, 95 ; crew 
 new men, g6 ; engagement 
 with yava, 119-123 ; cap- 
 tures Java, 123 ; slight 
 damage received, list of 
 killed and wounded, 123 ; 
 comparative force and loss, 
 126 ; diagram of action, 
 125 ; cruising, 287 ; cap- 
 
48o 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 tures Pictou, 287 ; mis- 
 statements in regard to 
 crew, 2S8 9 ; chased by two 
 Britihli frigates, 289 ; en- 
 gagement with Cyane and 
 Levant, 418-22 ; captures 
 botli, 419-20 ; comparative 
 force and loss, 420-1 ; brill- 
 iant manoeuvring of C, di- 
 agram of action and com- 
 ments on it, 422 ; chased 
 by British squadron, 424 ; 
 successful escape . . 425-7 
 Contest .... 202 
 
 Cooper, J. F., "Naval His- 
 tory of the United States," 
 41, 66, 74, 83, 85, gi, 96, 
 loi, 109, 145-9, 162, 164, 
 166, 189, 190, 20g, 221, 
 Z40, 255, 262, 273, 275, 
 323, 326, 332, 349, 354, 
 370, 377-8, 402-3, 413, 423; 
 less of an authority than 
 James, iv ; disposition to 
 praise every thing Ameri- 
 can, 18 ; his injudicious 
 praise .... 272 
 
 Cooper's " Miles Walling- 
 ford," " Home as Found," 
 "Pilot," " Two Admirals," 21 
 Cooper, Midshipman . 168 
 
 Copenhagen . . .24 
 
 Cornick, Lieut. H. D. . . 128 
 
 Cornwall .... 204 
 Comziiallis . 56, 127, 432-5, 439 
 Corvette, section of . . x 
 
 Courier National . . .117 
 
 Cowell, Lieut. J. C, heroism 
 
 when wounded . . . 297 
 
 Coshnahan, Midshipman . 185 
 Courage alone does not make 
 
 a great commander . . 271 
 Cox, Lieut. W. S., 361 ; his 
 
 cowardice . . . 1S4 
 
 Crab Island . . 382, 391, 39S 
 
 Craney Island . . 162, 20i 
 Crane, Lieut. . . .82 
 
 Crawford, U, S. Minister to 
 
 France .... 204 
 Creerie, Lieut. J. . . 196-7 
 
 Creighton, Capt. . . .37 
 Croghan, Capt. . . . 372 
 Clow's shoal . . . 203 
 
 Crowninshield, Sec. B. W. . 47 
 Cumberland Head . 38, 388-9 
 Cumberland Island . . 437 
 
 Cummings, Midshipman J. 
 
 C 157, 268 
 
 Curlew . . . .174 
 
 Curry, Lieut. R. C. . . 203 
 Cutting-out expedition against 
 privateers, 413 ; daring and 
 successful one by British . 373 
 Cyane, 53, 6l, 64-5. 176, 276, 
 285, 310, 417-20, 422, 424- 
 5, 439, 441 ; engagement 
 with Constitution, 418-22 ; 
 surrenders . . . 449 
 
 Cyprus .... 410 
 
 Dabney, Consul J. B. . . 338 
 Dacres, Capt. J. R., 82, 88-9, 
 94-5. 97. H3-5 ! wounded in 
 engagement with Constitu- 
 tion . . . . gl 
 Danes defeated in battle of 
 
 Baltic .... 277 
 
 Danish gun-boat . . 198-9 
 
 Dart captured by Newport 
 
 flotilla .... 217 
 Davies, Lieut. D. . . 124 
 
 Dealy, Sailing-master . . 411 
 Dearborn, Gen. . 229-30, 232 
 
 Decatur . , . . 444 
 
 Decatur, Commodore, 25, 32- 
 3, 39. 42. 57, 73. 107-10, 
 112, 114, 132, 177, i8r, 
 209, 211, 311, 317, 408, 
 428, 447 ; his letter describ- 
 ing capture of Macedonian, 
 vi ; chased in the President 
 by British fleet, 401-3 ; sur- 
 renders, 404 ; did not 
 "cover himself with glory," 
 405-6 ; but acted rather 
 tamely . . . 407-8, 439 
 Delaware . . . 118, 400 
 Delaware Bay . . 161, 203 
 Demerara River . . . 166 
 Dent, Capt. J. H. . 291, 412-3 
 Detroit, 155-7, 258-65, 267, 
 
 269-71, 273, 283, 374, 444 
 Detroit, capture of . . 155 
 De Ruyter . 53, 150, 277, i28o 
 De Suffrein's five combats 
 
 with Sir Edward Hughes . 369 
 Devastation . . 318, 320 
 
INDEX. 
 
 481 
 
 De Winter . , . .22 
 Diadem .... 20I 
 
 Dictator . . . .64 
 Dickenson, Capt. J. . . 428-9 
 DidoH .... 98-9 
 
 Discipline displayed on Amer- 
 ican privateer Lottery, 173 ; 
 neglect of essentials for 
 mere incidents, in British 
 navy ..... l6g 
 Dixon, Corporal . . . 185 
 Dobbs, Capt. . . . 374 
 
 Dolphin .... 173-4 
 Dominiea .... 444 
 Douglass, Lord H., "Naval 
 Gunnery," iv, 75-6, 95, 113- 
 5, 192, 195, 301, 436-7, 
 449 ; comments on action 
 between Essex and Phcebe . 301 
 Douglass, Capt. G. . 417, 419 
 Dover . . . 258-9 
 
 Downie, Capt. G., 65, 148-9, 
 225, 381. 383-4.386-7, 389; 
 his force on Champlain, 
 378-81 ; action with Mac- 
 donough, 389-90 ; killed . 396 
 Downes, Lieut. . . 165, 297 
 Dragon . . . 317, 337 
 
 Drake singeing the beard of 
 
 the Catholic king . . 302 
 Drumvwnd . . . 250, 2S3 
 
 Drummond, Gen. G. . . 358-9 
 Drunkenness on the Argus, 2IO-I 
 Dudley, Midshipman . . 158 
 Duncan, Lord, 22 ; victory at 
 
 Camperdown . . 278 
 
 Dundonald, Lord, "Autobi- 
 ography of a Seaman" . 61, 128 
 Durham, Adm., memoir of 289 
 
 Dutch 35 
 
 Eagle,1^t-•], 281-3, 349. 375-6. 
 378, 388-go, 394-7 ; sent by 
 gun-boats and captured . 282 
 Earlof Moira, 140, 151, 224, 
 
 233, 232 
 Earle, Commod., 140; feeble 
 attack on Sackett's Harbor, 
 151 ; shows gross incompe- 
 tence .... 151 
 East Indies . 369, 401, 435 
 Eckford, Henry, 147, 222, 
 
 256, 353-4, 386-7 
 Egyptian . . 5° 
 
 Elliott, Capt. J. D.,154, 156.8, 
 229, 245, 262, 265, 272, 374 ; 
 captures Detroit and Cale- 
 donia .... 157 
 Ellis, Capt. .... 176 
 Emmons, Lieut. G. E., statis- 
 tical " History of U. S. 
 Navy," iv, 47, 52, 163, 223, 
 256-7, 348, 431; best Ameri- 
 can work on the subject . 20 
 Endymion, 12. 51, 56-7, 63-4, 
 69, 96, 213-7, 341-2, 401-10, 
 439 ; attack on Prince de 
 Neufchatel repulsed after 
 desperate struggle . . 342 
 English Channel . . . 322 
 English vessels twice the size 
 
 of Dutch .... 277 
 English victories over Dutch 
 
 due to superiority in force . 277 
 Epervier, 43, 52-3, 66, 69, 
 210-1, 312-6, 349-50, 409, 
 414, 445-6, 450 ; captured 
 by Peacock, comparative 
 force and loss, 314 ; gunnery 
 of British, poor, 315; Eper- 
 vier purchased for U. S. 
 Navy .... 316 
 
 Enterprise, vi, 32, engagement 
 with Boxer, 213-5 ; captures 
 her, 215; severity of action, 
 2i5 ; superior force of Ameri- 
 cans, 216 ; unfit to cruise 
 and made a guard-ship . 217 
 Epworth, Capt. . . . 107 
 Erebus . . 318, 320, 437-8| 
 
 Erie 34gl 
 
 Erie, Fort . . 156, 374! 
 
 Erie, Lake, 139, 141-4, 147, 
 158-g, 245-254, 372 ; no 
 American force there in 
 l8l2 . ... 155 
 
 Erie, Lake, battle of (1813), 
 271 ; teaches advantage of 
 having the odds, 275 ; vic- 
 tory honorably won, 278 ; 
 fought mainly by Canadians 279 
 Espiegle . . 166, 169, 181 
 
 Essex, 35, 39, 43, 52-3, 58, 
 63-4, 72, 78-81, 113, 117-8, 
 134, 138, 164, 165, 226, 
 276, 291-7, 299, 300, 303-4, 
 306-10, 332, 350, 351, 421, 
 
482 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 444-5 ; cuts out transport 
 from Minerva, 78 ; cruising 
 79-81 ; engagement with 
 Alert, 81 ; captures Nocton, 
 134 ; captures English mer- 
 chant vessel, 135 ; struck by 
 squall and disabled, 294 ; at- 
 tacked by/'^of^fand Cherub, 
 295 ; terrible loss and dam- 
 age, 300 ; surrenders, 300 ;, 
 comments and criticism on 
 the action, 301-10 ; repaired 
 at Valparaiso and sent to 
 England .... 310 
 Essex Junior . 291-3, 297, 310 
 Eurotas . . . .99 
 
 Euryalus . . 318, 320 
 
 Eurydice . . . .41 
 Evans, Capt. . . 50, 163 
 Evans, Surgeon, O. E. 123, 127 
 Everard, Capt. T. . 282 
 
 Fair American, 152, 224, 229, 
 
 238, 244 
 Fairy ..... 319 
 Falkiner, Lieut. . . 185 
 
 P'alse Duck Islands, 154, 244, 250 
 Farragut, D. G. (Admiral), 
 80, 164, 292, 297, 290-300 ; 
 in his memoirs comments on 
 Phoebe -Essex fight, 304-5, 
 308-9; greatest admiral since 
 Nelson . . . 409 
 
 Fayal 338 
 
 Fernando de Noronha, island 135 
 Ferris, Sailing-master . . 344 
 Finch, Lieut. B., 135, 245, 249 
 Finch, 148, 149, 282, 379-82, 
 
 389-91, 397, 399 
 Firefly . . . .349 
 
 Fischer, Lieut. Col. V. . 358-9 
 Flambeau .... 349 
 Florida . . 301 
 
 Florida . . . 335 
 
 Floyd, Capt. R. . . . 338 
 Forrest, Midshipman . . 268 
 
 Forte . , . . 57, 98 
 
 Fortune of War . . 338 
 
 Forty Mile Creek . 235 
 
 Franklin . 440 
 
 Frederickscoam , . . n? 
 
 " Free Trade and Sailors' 
 
 Rights" .... 6 
 French-English naval war 451 
 
 French histories of English 
 compared with English his- 
 tories of Americans . . 195 
 Frenchman's Creek . . 374 
 Frigate, definition and descrip- 
 tion of . . . -54 
 Frigate-built ships, section of xi. 
 Frio Cape .... 135 
 Frolic, II, 35, 39, 51, 68, 
 101-6, 130, 137, 181, 275, 
 304, 311, 326, 349, 350, 352, 
 428, 445, 447 ; engagement 
 with Wasp, captured by her 
 after great slaughter, 103 ; 
 comparative force and loss, 
 103 ; diagram of action . 104 
 Fulton . . . 440-1 
 
 Fundy, Bay . . .88 
 
 Funk, Lieut. J. M. . . no 
 Galatea .... 107 
 
 Gallagher, Lieut. . 39. 404 
 Gallapagos .... 164 
 Gamble, Lieut. P. . . 392 
 
 Gamo ..... 117 
 Garden, Capt. S. J. . . 268 
 Garland, Lieutenant, mortally 
 
 wounded .... 265 
 Geisinger, Midshipman . 332 
 
 General Armstrong, 33B-40, at- 
 tacked by British boats, 339; 
 attacked by Carnation, scut- 
 tled and burned by her own 
 crew . . 340, 416 
 
 General Pike, 64, 65, 222-3, 
 226, 228, 234-8, 240, 244-7, 
 249, 252, 355, 357, 364, 
 
 376 386 
 
 Genesee River, 235, 251, 252, 
 366, 368 ; engagement near 
 mouth .... 243 
 George, Fort, 251-4, 363, 365; 
 attacked and captured by 
 Chauncy's squadron, 230-1, 234 
 Georgia . . . 161, 401 
 
 Georgiana . 165 
 
 Gibraltar . . .328 
 
 Gladiator . . . 121 
 
 Gloria . . .117 
 
 Gloucester, 140, 151, 229-30, 
 
 234, 283, 443 
 Good Hope, Cape . 428, 435 
 Gordon, Capt., 417 ; skilful 
 attack on Fort Washington 319 
 
INDEX. 
 
 483 
 
 Governor Tompkins, 152, 154, 
 223, 22g, 231, 232, 244, 
 
 246-7, 249 
 Graham, Midshipman . 159 
 
 Graig, Lieut. . . . 200 
 
 Gravi^re, Adm. J. de la, 
 " Guerres Maritimes," iv, 
 104-5, 191, 450 ; comments 
 on first three engagements, 
 129-132 ; the best criticism 
 on the naval war . . 450 
 
 Graves, Sir T. . . . 369 
 Grasse, Conte de, victory over 
 
 Sir T. Graves . . 369 
 Great Britain, views held in 
 regard to neutral rights, r, 5, 
 6 ; find now no advocates, 
 5 ; offers apology for attack 
 on Chesapeake, issues Or- 
 ders in Council, 7; engaged 
 in European conflict during 
 early part of this war, S ; 
 assembles army of 14,000 
 men, 9 ; greatness of naval 
 power, 21-23 ! upward of 
 a thousand vessels at open- 
 ing of war . . . 446 
 Great Sodas .... 235 
 Greene, Capt. P. B. . 118 
 Greenwich .... 165 
 Gregory, Lieut. F. H. . 362 
 " Gridiron Flag " 28 
 Griffith, Adm. . 337 
 Growler, 146, 152, 154, 229, 
 231, 236, 238, 240, 251, 
 281-3, 358-9, 379> 399. 443 ; 
 captured by gun-boats 282 
 Guerriere, II, 12, 39, 41, 43, 
 58, 63, 67, 68, 73, 82, 83, 
 85, 89-92, 95-97, 99, 108, 
 113, 116, 129-31, 137, 189, 
 193, 288, 319, 421, 440, 
 449 ; engagement with and 
 capture by Constitution, 89- 
 92 ; blown up by Ameri- 
 cans, 94 ; falsely alleged to 
 have been rotten, 94 ; hand- 
 ling of her compared with 
 that of Constitution, 94 ; 
 outmanoeuvred by Constitu- 
 tion 95 
 
 Guerin, " Histoire Maritime 
 de France " . . i95 
 
 Gunnery, skill of British fal- 
 len off, 149 ; accuracy of 
 Americans . . . 169 
 
 Halifax . . .82, 187 
 
 Hambleton, Purser . . 268 
 Hamilton, Secretary P. 36, 46 
 Hamilton, 151, 154, 223, 229, 
 
 231, 237, 250, 256, 443 
 Hampden . . . 336 
 
 Plampton sacked by British 
 
 with revolting brutality . 161 
 Hampton Roads . . 162, 200 
 Hanchett, Capt. . . 201 
 
 Hardy, Capt. . . 57 
 
 Hardy, Sir T. . . . 285 
 
 Harris, Sergeant . . 185 
 
 Harrison, General . . 262 
 
 Hatfield, Midshipman . . 230 
 Haute, Isle of . . 330 
 
 Havana . . .415 
 
 Havannah . . . 320 
 
 Hawkins, Capt. R. . 78 
 
 Hawkins, Lieut. A. . 341 
 
 Hayes, Capt. J. 401-4, 439 
 
 Hebrus . . . 320, 412 
 
 Head, Capt. J. . . 174 
 
 Hector . . . 165 
 
 Hell-gate . . .117 
 
 Henderson, Capt. . 338 
 
 Henderson, Lieut. . 418 
 
 Henly, Capt. R. 376-7. 394 
 
 Hermes 338, 350, 409 
 
 Hicks, Lieut. . . . 382 
 Highflyer . IIT, 219, 444 
 
 Hilyar, Capt. J., 291-2, 294-5, 
 300-1 ; conduct in action 
 with Essex, 296, 29S ; letter 
 concerning defence of Es- 
 sex, 303-4 ; breach of faith, 
 305 ; courteous treatment of 
 prisoners 3o6> 308-g 
 
 Hinn, Lieut . . 229 
 
 Hislop, Lieut. G. . 127, 129 
 
 "Historical Register of the 
 
 United States" 473 
 
 Hoffman, Lieut., 91, 419, 
 
 424-5 
 Ho^ue . 285 
 
 Holdup, Lieut. T. 158-9, 262 
 
 HoUaway, Capt. 358 
 
 Holmes' Hole . . 171 
 
 Hope, Lieut. D. . . 108, 311 
 Hope, Capt. II., 341, 4°'. 405 
 
484 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Hornet, 40, 52, 61, 66, 68, 73, 
 77, 106, 117-8, I2g, 133, 
 138, 163, 165-72, 178, 181, 
 207, 2og-io, 217-18, 220, 
 276, 311, 352, 398, 401, 
 
 410, 425, 424-35, 439-447 ; 
 
 captures a privateer, 77 ; 
 cliased by Bonne Citoyenne, 
 
 165 ; captures Resolution, 
 
 166 ; engagement with Pea- 
 cock, ib6 ; captures her, 
 
 167 : comparative loss, 168 ; 
 diagram of action, 170: 
 comparative force, 171 ; 
 generous treatment to offi- 
 cers and crew of Peacock, 
 171; captures Penguin, 429; 
 diagram of action, 430 ; 
 comparative force and loss, 
 431 ; a creditable action for 
 Americans, 431; chased by 
 Cornwallis, but escapes . 435 
 
 Horn, Cape . . . 164 
 
 Hotham, Adm. 401, 404 
 
 Hughes, Sir E . . . 369 
 Hull, Capt. J., 25, 82-8, 92, 
 94, 114, 132, 192, 213, 271, 
 327, 370, 409 ; his letter, 
 41 ; ■ foremost ship-captain 
 of the war, 88-9, 92 ; exul- 
 tation caused by victory 
 over Giterri^re, 99 ; his 
 famous cruise, 335 ; de- 
 serves pnlm as best single- 
 ship captain . 447-9 
 Humble, James . 122, 124 
 Hunt, Hon. W. M. . . vi 
 Hunter, 142, 147, 171-2, 256, 
 
 259, 260, 262-5, '^^1-10, 283 
 Hunter's Point . 177 
 
 Hurlburt, Sailing-master 438 
 
 Huron, Lake . 139, 144, 372 
 
 Hutchinson, Lieut. W. . 177 
 
 Icarus .... 127 
 
 Impressment of American sea- 
 men, 1-4, 33 ; cases on rec- 
 
 ord 
 Indefatigable 
 Independence 
 Indian Ocean 
 
 . 42 
 . . 56 
 
 • 439 
 
 • 435 
 
 Inglis, Lieut. G. 
 Ingraham, E. D., 
 of Washington " 
 
 . 265 
 " Capture 
 
 • 9 
 
 Ingram, Lieut. W. . . 300 
 
 Ireland . . . 176, 335 
 
 Irish Channel . . .176 
 Irvine, Lieut. . 156, 159, 264 
 
 Isle Aux Noix . . . 376 
 Italians . . -35 
 
 Izard, Gen. , . , 366 
 
 Jackson, Gen., 347, 410; at 
 
 New Orleans . . . 174 
 Jamaica . . . -73 
 
 Jamaica fleet . . 335, 442 
 
 James, W., "Naval History 
 of Great Britain " and 
 " Naval Occurrences,'' iii, 
 iv, 2, 4, 5, 36-42, 56, 61, 
 63, 67, 74-6, 80-1, 85, 96-7, 
 99-100, 108-9, 114, 118, 124, 
 128, r42, 145-50, 160-1, 
 j66, 169, 171-2, 175-6, 183, 
 187, 191, 194-6, 202, 206-7, 
 208, 211, 213, 221-5, 230-1, 
 234, 238, 242-4, 257-8, 262, 
 275. 278-9, 286, 288, 290, 
 298, 300. 303, 308, 312-15, 
 317, 322, 327, 329, 331, 
 337-9, 341-3, 35'5-6, 359, 
 
 361, 377. 379-86. 396-7. 
 402-7, 409, 415, 421, 426-7, 
 431-4, 441, 449, 451 ; his 
 history a piece of special 
 pleading, iv ; most valua- 
 ble authority on British 
 affairs, hatred toward Ameri- 
 cans, 14 ; misstatements, 
 15-6 ; basis for all other 
 English histories of the war, 
 17 ; unreliability, 146, 202 ; 
 grossly inaccurate, inexcusa- 
 ble garbling of reports, 
 309 ; wilful perversion of 
 truth, 310 ; endeavor to 
 prove American seamen 
 cowards, 333 ; wherein his 
 chief value for reference lies, 
 333 ; misstatements re- 
 echoed by all British his- 
 torians, 408 ; utterly un- 
 trustworthy, except for 
 things purely British . 410 
 
 yasseur . . . .317 
 
 yava, 41, 58, 61-2, 66-8, 99, 
 113, 119-33, 137, 189, igl, 
 193, 275, 288, 319, 439-40. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 485 
 
 447, 449 ; engagement with 
 Constitution^ 119-123 : cap- 
 tured by her, 123 ; after re- 
 ceiving severe injuries, 124 ; 
 list of killed and wounded, 124-6 
 Jefferson . 353-355, 357, 363 
 Jefferson, Pres. T., project of 
 having navy composed of 
 small gnn-boats . 199, 445 
 
 John, Lieut. -Col. . . 337 
 
 John Adams, 48, 71 , curious 
 tradition about her sailing 
 qualities .... 336 
 Johnson, Lieut. R. . . 340 
 
 Johnston, Sailing-master, 
 
 343-4. 410 
 Jones, Lieut. T. C. . 343-5, 347 
 Jones, Capt. J., 100-3, 105-6, 
 
 177, 447 
 Jones, Surgeon J. C. . 122, 127 
 Jones . 353, 355, 357, 363 
 
 Julia, 146, 151, 154, 229, 231, 
 
 236, 238, 240. 251, 283, 443 
 Junon . 172, 200, 203, 289 
 Kearney, Lieut. L. . . 412 
 Klaeson, Capt., blowing up 
 
 his ship . . . 302 
 
 Kerr, Capt. R. . 423 
 
 King, Capt. . . 158 
 
 King, Lieut. . 158, 316 
 
 Kingston, 143, 154-5, 222, 
 228, 233, 235-6, 251, 353, 
 357> 360, 362, 366-7 ; block- 
 aded by Chauncy . 155, 363 
 Knox, Pilot . . 183 
 
 Lady Gore . . 250, 283 
 
 Lady of Lake, •i.iiX, iii^, 231, 
 
 236 ; captures Lady Murray 236 
 Lady Prevost, 142,147,259-60, 
 
 262-4, 267, 270-280 
 Lady Afw ray . . . 236 
 
 Lamb, Midshipman, killed 268 
 Lambert, Capt., 119-20, 449; 
 mortally wounded in action 
 with Constitution . .124 
 
 Landrail, 350 ; captured by 
 
 Syren, privateer . 327 
 
 Langhorne, Capt. T. L. O. 80 
 Lanj;, Jack . . 38, 102 
 
 " L'audace,'' etc. . . 250 
 
 Laurentinus . 200 
 
 Law, Lieut. . 184 
 
 Lawrence, 255-8, 260-6, 269- 
 
 73. 304 ; reduced to a wreck 
 on Lake Erie, 268 ; heroic 
 courage shown in the de- 
 fence .... 271 
 Lawrence, Capt., 73, ir8, 
 163, 166. 168, 169, 17], 178, 
 181, 182, 191, 216, 218, 2B5, 
 447 ; fatally wounded, 184-7; 
 a "Bayard of the Seas," 
 
 192, 194 
 Leaiider, 321, 423-4, 427 ; cap- 
 tures Rattlesnake . 321 
 Lee, Midshipman . 395, 397 
 Leopard, 42 ; attack on Chesa- 
 peake .... 6 
 Les Petites Coquilles . . 344 
 Levant, 53, 64-5, 176, 276, 
 310, 417-22, 424-6, 439,441; 
 engagement with Constitu- 
 tion, 418-22 ; surrenders . 420 
 Linnet, 148, 376, 379, 380, 
 
 389, 390, 394-8 
 Linnis, Capt. R., 262 ; killed 264 
 Little Belt, 142, 147, 176, 
 256, 260, 262-4, 267, 269, 
 
 270, 277, 283, 436 
 Livermore, Chaplain . . 185 
 Lockyer, Capt. . 343, 345-7 
 Loire . . . 386, 317, 318 
 
 London "Naval Chronicle," 
 
 20, 380, 382, 397, 417-8, 422 
 Long gun, figure of ix 
 
 Long Island Sound . 161, 440 
 Long Island . . . 402 
 
 Losack, Capt. W. . . 107 
 
 Losses in this war compared 
 with Anglo-French naval 
 struggle, 453, and Anglo- 
 Danish, 453; balance of loss 
 against Great Britain . 453 
 
 Lossing, ' ' Field- Book of War 
 of i8i2," 12, 149. 156, 171, 
 230, 231, 256-7, 282, 371, 381 
 Lottery, American privateer, 
 416 ; captured after stub- 
 born resistance, by British 
 squadron . 172-3 
 
 Louis XV . . . .373 
 
 Louisiana . 137, 343, 348, 410 
 Low, C. R., " History of In- 
 dian Navy " . . 207, 435-7 
 Ludlow, Lieut. A., 178, 184, 
 186-7 ; mortally wounded 8r 
 
486 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Lndlow . . . 377, 401 
 
 Liunley, Capt. . . 72, 401 
 Luiidy's Lane . . . 174 
 
 "Lyman, Midship, . . . 310 
 
 Lyman, Master's Mate . . 332 
 Lynhaven Bay . . . 172 
 Lynx . . . \'l'2.-li,, 349 
 
 Macdonough, Capt. T., 9, 
 65, 225, 370; force on Lake 
 Champlain, 376-9, 381-4, 
 3S6 ; victor against de- 
 cided odds, 274, 277, 281 ; 
 assumes command of Cham- 
 plain, 281 ; builds three 
 new vessels, 282-3 ; prepa- 
 ration for engagement, 387 ; 
 prays before the battle, 387 ; 
 description of the action, 
 389-98 ; Macdonough's gal- 
 lant and energetic conduct, 
 392-4 ; his victory, 398 ; 
 courtesy and humanity to 
 prisoners and wounded, 398; 
 his character, — one of the 
 greatest of our sea-captains 399 
 Macomb, Gen., at Platts- 
 
 burgh . . . .376 
 
 Macedonian, vi, ir, 33, 43, 
 55. 57. 58, 66-8, T06, 108, 
 no, 112-5, 116, 128, 130-1, 
 137, 177, 189, 193, 301, 378, 
 421, 425, 434, 446 ; en- 
 gagement with and cap- 
 ture by United States, 108- 
 9 : severely damaged and 
 with great loss of crew, no; 
 Americans in her crew . no 
 Machilimacinac . . 372 
 
 Madeira . . . 163, 417 
 
 Madison, 153, 223-6, 231, 238, 
 240, 244-9, 252, 354-5, 357, 
 
 364. 376 
 Magnet . . 355-7, 363, 397 
 Maidstone . . . .172 
 Maitland, Capt. . 287 
 
 Majestic . . 401-2, 404 
 
 Makanilla . . . 335 
 
 Malheureux Islands, 289-90, 383-4 
 Man, Isle of . . 414 
 
 Manly 114 
 
 Manners, Capt. W., 35, 73, 
 351, 352 ; heroic conduct 
 in action with Wasp, 323 ; 
 
 mortally wounded leading 
 the attack, 324 ; praise due 
 him .... 447 
 
 Maples, Capt. J. F. . 205-7 
 Maranham .... 426 
 Marquesas .... 164 
 Marryatt's novels . . .21 
 Mars ..... 217 
 Marshall's " Royal Naval 
 Biography," 13, 33, 42, 82, 
 
 85, 108, 112, 423, 425-7 
 Marshall, Capt. . . 124 
 
 Martha's Vineyard . , 171 
 
 Martin . . 203 
 
 Mary .... 250, 283 
 "Masters'-Com. Letters," vi, 
 
 163, 204, 374 
 
 • 340 
 
 213, 215 
 
 202-3 
 
 . 214 
 
 429 
 
 366 
 
 Matterface, Lieut. W, 
 McCall, Lieut. E. R. 
 McClintock, Midship. 
 McCreery, Lieut. D. 
 McDonald, Lieut. 
 McGowan, Midship. 
 McHenry, Fort, attacked un- 
 successfully by bomb vessels 320 
 McKeever, Lieut. J. D. . 345 
 
 McKnight, Lieut. 299, 310, 332 
 McPherson, Lieut, 
 Medusa 
 
 154, 
 
 Medway 
 
 Melville, 224-5, 237, 243 
 
 Menelaus 
 
 Mensing, Com. A. 
 
 Merrimac 
 
 Meteor .... 
 
 Milan . . ... 
 
 Militia of U. S., as a rule, use- 
 less in this war, but gain 
 splendid victory at New 
 Orleans, 10 ; not able to 
 withstand much 
 well-trained force 
 
 Miller, Capt. 
 
 Miller, Lieut. 
 
 Mills, Col. 
 
 Mindham, W. 
 
 Alinei-va 
 
 Mississippi 
 
 Mitchell, Col. 
 
 Mix, Sailing-master 
 
 Mobile Point 
 
 Mohawk, 141, 202, 
 
 229 
 
 . 217 
 
 327, 428 
 
 252,355 
 
 • 31.8 
 . vii 
 
 • 440 
 318, 320 
 
 117 
 
 smaller 
 
 
 153 
 
 ' 318; 
 
 319 
 
 
 38 
 
 
 233 
 
 . 182] 
 
 186 
 
 • 73, 
 
 78-Q 
 
 
 347 
 
 ' 358' 
 
 368 
 
 • 154, 
 
 229 
 
 
 338 
 
 354-5. 
 
 
 357. 
 
 364 
 
INDEX. 
 
 48: 
 
 Moira 
 
 Mona Passage 
 Monk, Sailing-master J 
 Montagu . . .118 
 Montgomery 
 
 Montreal . 355, 356-8, 
 
 Montresor, Capt. . 
 Morris, Capt. Cliarles (Com- 
 modore), "Autobiography," 
 
 90. 133, 334-8 
 
 Morris, Lieut. C. . 84, 91, 115 
 
 Mount, Cape 
 
 Mulcaster, Capt. W. H 
 245-8, 252-3, 358-9 ; best 
 British officer on Ontario 
 
 Murray, Capt. J. . 282-3, 
 
 Nancy . , . 374^ 
 
 Nantucket . . 82, 177, 
 
 Napoleon's defeat by Well- 
 ington 
 
 Narcissus, 172, ig6, 317-8 ; 
 captures Viper . 
 
 Nattagawassa Creek 
 
 Nautilus, 38-g, 43, 72, 82, 
 137. 207, 306, 409, 435-6, 
 439 ; captured by British 
 squadron . 
 
 Nayaden 
 
 Naval archives 
 
 " Naval Chronicle," iv, vi, 41, 
 124, 127, 128, 148, 
 
 Naval monument 
 
 Naval War of 1812, no satis- 
 factory history of it, iii, iv ; 
 subject deserving attention, 
 V ; authorities referred to, 
 vi ; causes of the war, i ; 
 impossibility of avoiding it, 
 6 ; declaration of war June 
 18, 1812, 7 ; slight prepara- 
 tions made, 7 ; opens badly 
 for United States, 8 ; battles 
 mere skirmishes, 8 ; battle 
 at Bladensburg, burning of 
 public buildings at Wasliing- 
 ton, attack on Baltimore, 
 battle of New Orleans, 9 ; 
 authorities referred to, II ; 
 overwhelming naval suprem- 
 acy of Great Britain, 22 ; 
 practical lessons conveyed 
 by the war, 25 ; race iden- 
 tity of combatants, 26 ; prac- 
 
 355 
 287 
 
 174 
 165 
 
 283 
 368 
 343 
 
 334 
 
 247 
 289 
 4>(4 
 341 
 
 406 
 
 172 
 372 
 
 82 
 
 54-7 
 
 377 
 
 214 
 286 
 
 tically a civil war, 27 ; 
 American navy at beginning 
 of war, 27 ; officers well 
 trained, 28 ; efficiency of 
 seamen and its causes, 29 ; 
 similarity between British 
 and American seamen, 31 ; 
 American vessels manned 
 chiefly by native Americans, 
 many of whom had formerly 
 been impressed into British 
 navy, 32-43 ; quotas of sea- 
 men contributed by thediffer- 
 ent States, 44 ; navy yards, 
 
 46 ; lists of officers and men, 
 
 47 ; tonnage and ratings, 
 American ships properly 
 rated, 49-60 ; armaments, 
 three styles of guns used, 62 ; 
 difference described, 63-65 ; 
 short weight of American 
 shot, 66 ; comparison of 
 British and American frig- 
 ates, 67-71 ; Belvidera pur- 
 sued by Commodore Rod- 
 gers, 74 ; engagement be- 
 tween Belvidera and Pres- 
 ident, 75 ; Hornet captures 
 a privateer, 77 ; cruise of 
 Essex, 78-80 ; Co7isiitution 
 captures Guerrih-e, 92 ; 
 marked superiority shown 
 by Americans, 96 ; Wasp 
 captures Frolic after hot 
 action, 103 ; disproportion- 
 ate loss on British side, ro5 ; 
 both vessels captured by 
 Poictiers, 106 ; United 
 States captures Macedonian, 
 109 ; slight American, and 
 great British, loss, no ; 
 comments by Lord Douglass 
 on the action, 113-15 ; Con- 
 stitution captures Java, 
 123 ; slight injuries received 
 by Constitiition, 123 ; severe 
 loss on Java, 124 ; diagram 
 of action, 125 ; comparative 
 force and loss. 126 ; com- 
 ments by various authorities, 
 127-129 ; comments by 
 Adm. de la Graviere on first 
 three battles of war, 129- 
 
488 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 132 ; comments by the au- 
 thor, 132-3 ; Vixen captured 
 by Southampton, and both 
 wrecked, 134 ; Essex cap- 
 tures Nocton, afterward re- 
 captured, 135 ; summary of 
 the year's fighting, 135-8 ; 
 vessels captured or de- 
 stroyed, and vessels built, 
 137 ; prizes made, 138 ; 
 war on the lakes, 139 ; com- 
 batants on nearly equal foot- 
 ing, 140 ; difficulty of com- 
 paring the rival squadrons, 
 144 ; unreliability of au- 
 thorities, especially James, 
 146 ; Earle's feeble attack 
 on Sackett's Harbor, 151 ; 
 pursuit and attack on Royal 
 George hy Chauncy, 154-5; 
 Elliott captures Detroit and 
 Caledonia, 157 ; attack on 
 Red House barracks by 
 Lieut. Angus, 158 ; disas- 
 trous result, 159 ; brutal 
 sacking of Hampton, 161 ; 
 on the ocean, 160 ; block- 
 ade of American coastv 161; 
 Commodore Porter's cam- 
 paign with Essex in South 
 Pacific, 164 ; Hornet chss,e& 
 by Bonne Citoyenne, 165 ; 
 Hornet captures Resolution, 
 166 ; Hornet captures Pea- 
 cock, 167 ; diagram of ac- 
 tion, 170; comparative force 
 and loss, 171 ; generous 
 treatment shown by victors, 
 171 ; captures Narcissus, 
 Viper 172 ; Lottery, Dol- 
 phin, Racer, Arab, and 
 Lynx, American privateers 
 cut out by British boats, 172- 
 174 ; Norwich captures 
 British privateer Caledonia, 
 174 ; third cruise of Com- 
 mod. Rodgers, 174-7; Unit- 
 ed States, Macedonia, and 
 Wasp blockaded in New 
 London, 177; Broke's chal- 
 lenge to Lawrence, 181; en- 
 gagement between Shannon 
 and Chesapeake, 182-8 ; 
 
 Chesapeake captured after 
 desperate fight, 187 ; com- 
 ments and criticism by 
 Cooper, 189-190 ; by de la 
 Gravi^re, 192 ; by author^ 
 l89-96;by British historians, 
 194 ; Surveyor captured by 
 Narcissus, 196-7 ; futile 
 gun-boat actions, 200; Brit- 
 ish attack on Craney Island, 
 
 201 ; repulsed with loss, 
 
 202 ; Asp cut out by boats 
 from Mohawk and Contest, 
 
 203 ; American gun-boat 
 cut out by boats from yimon 
 and Martin, 204 ; engage- 
 ment between Ajgus and 
 Pelican, 205-6 ; capture of 
 Argus, 206 ; comparative 
 force and loss, and diagram 
 of action, 207-8; not a cred- 
 itable action for Americans, 
 208 ; comments and com- 
 parison with similar fights, 
 208-12; Enterprise captures 
 JBoxer after very severe en- 
 gagement, 215 ; British pri- 
 vateer Dart captured by 
 Newport flotilla, 217; ocean 
 warfare of 1813 in favor of 
 British, 217 ; summary of 
 year, 217-220; vessels sunk, 
 taken, built and purchased, 
 prizes made, 218-20 ; on 
 the lakes, 1813, Chauncy's 
 squadron compared with 
 Yeo's, 223-227 ; Yeo's su- 
 perior, 227; C'hauncy takes 
 York, 229 ; takes Fort 
 George, inftictingheavy loss, 
 231-2 ; British evacuate Ni- 
 agara frontier, 232 ; British 
 attack on Sackett's Harbor 
 is repulsed with great loss, 
 234 ; Lady of Lake captures 
 Lady Murray, 236 ; Hamil- 
 ton and Scourge founder in 
 a squall, 237 ; evolution of 
 the two squadrons, 238 ; di- 
 agram showing position of 
 vessels, 239 ; British gain 
 advantage in action ensuuig, 
 240 ; but the result not de- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 481 
 
 cisive, 241 ; nor the victory 
 brilliant, 242 ; Americans 
 i-einforced by Sylph, 243 ; 
 engagement near Genesee 
 River, 243 ; in York Bay, 
 245-7 ; diagram of action, 
 246; comments and criticism 
 by Brenton, James, and the 
 author, 247-50 ; American 
 force superior, 240; reported 
 heavy loss on the Wolfe 
 and Royal George, 251; Yeo 
 blockaded in Kingston, 251; 
 summary of the season on 
 Ontario, 251-4 ; success 
 in favor of Americans, 
 251 ; Yeo and Chauncy 
 compared, 252 ; reason for 
 American success, 254 ; 
 campaign on Lake Erie, 
 255 ; description of the 
 squadrons, 256-262 ; en- 
 gagement with heavy loss on 
 both sides, 262-8 ; Ameri- 
 can victory and its import- 
 ance, 268-9; "glory "of it 
 overestimated, 271 ; dia- 
 gram of action, 269-70 ; 
 great valor displayed on 
 both sides, 271 ; injudicious 
 praise in Cooper's "Naval 
 History," 272-3 ; comments 
 and criticism, 272-81 ; vic- 
 tory due to heavy metal, 
 274 ; and superior equip- 
 ment in general, 278 ; for 
 which credit is due to Per- 
 ry, 278 ; men forming the 
 crews, 278 ; campaign on 
 Champlain, 281 ; Growler 
 and Eagle captured by gun- 
 boat attack, 282 ; total loss 
 on lakes during 1813, 283 ; 
 on the ocean, 1814, 284; 
 destruction of coasters and 
 fishing-boats at Pettipauge, 
 
 285 ; cruise of Rodgers, 
 
 286 ; chased into Marble- 
 head, 290 ; attempt at cut- 
 ting out the Alligator de- 
 feated, 290 ; British man- 
 ceuvres to capture Essex, 
 298 ; fight between Pha:be 
 
 and Cherub and the Essex, 
 298-300 ; Essex captured 
 after great loss, 300 ; com- 
 ments and criticisms on the 
 action, 301-10 ; discrepan- 
 cies m official accounts of 
 loss on Essex, 3J3 ; com- 
 parative force on the three 
 vessels, 307 ; action be- 
 tween Peacock and Epervier, 
 312-13 ; Epervier captured, 
 313 ; diagram of action, 
 313 ; comparative force and 
 loss, 314 ; comments, 315 ; 
 Commod. Barney's flotilla 
 attacks Dragon and Albion, 
 318 ; attack of British on 
 Washington by land and 
 sea, 318 ; capture of Wash- 
 ington by Gen. Ross, and 
 burning of public buildings, 
 319 ; Baltimore threatened, 
 320 ; unsuccessful attack 
 on Fort McHenry and re- 
 tirement of British fleet 
 and army, 320 ; Wasp 
 captures Reindeer after 
 severe engagement, 322-5 ; 
 diagram of action, 325; com- 
 ments, 326 ; the odds 
 against Reindeer, 320 ; gal- 
 lantry of both captains, 326 ; 
 £2^/^ tender captured, 327 ; 
 Syren taken by Medway, 
 Landrail taken by privateer 
 Syren, '^2'] ; Wasp chases 
 Avon, 328 ; captures her 
 after brief and furious en- 
 gagement, 330 ; Avons,ink%, 
 331; diagram of action 330 ; 
 comparative force and loss, 
 comments, 331-2 ; cruise of 
 the Adams, 334 ; chased by 
 Tigris ann escapes, 335-6 ; 
 curious sailing qualities re- 
 sulting from being built by 
 contract, 336 ; attacked on 
 Penobscot, 337 ; burned by 
 Capt. Morris, 338 ; priva- 
 teer Gen. Armstrong at- 
 tacked in F ayal roads, 339 ; 
 crew compelled to scuttle 
 and burn her, 340 ; boats 
 
490 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 from Endymion attack pri- 
 vateer Prince de Neufclm- 
 tel, 341 ; repulsed after 
 desperate struggle, 342 ; 
 American gun-boats on 
 Lake Borgne taken, 346 ; 
 serious loss of British, 347 ; 
 fighting near New Orleans, 
 348 ; summary of year's 
 fighting, vessels built, lost, 
 and captured, 348-g ; gen- 
 eral comments, 351 ; prizes 
 made, 352 ; on the lakes, 
 1814, Ontario, American 
 schooners converted into 
 transports, 352 ; New ves- 
 sels launched by Americans, 
 353 ; by British, 354 ; sta- 
 tistics, of the two squad- 
 rons, 355-6 ; serious sick- 
 ness among the Ameri- 
 cans, 354 ; Yeo takes Os- 
 wego, 358 ; and blockades 
 Sackett's Harbor, 360 ; 
 raises blockade, 362 ; 
 Chauncy blockades King- 
 ston, 363 ; refuses to co-op- 
 erate with General Brown, 
 364-7 ; cautiousness of com- 
 manders of both squadrons, 
 365-71; Capt. Sinclair, com- 
 mander of American forces 
 on upper lakes, burns St. 
 Joseph, 372 ; makes unsuc- 
 cessful expedition against 
 Mackinaw, leaves for Lake 
 Erie, 372 ; daring cutting- 
 out expedition of British 
 on Huron and Erie, 373-4 ; 
 capture of Ohio and Soiners, 
 375 ; Champlain, descrip- 
 tion of Macdonough's and 
 Downie's squadrons, 376- 
 8i ; James' erroneous state- 
 ments in regard to them, 
 381-7; description of action, 
 389-98 ; gallant and ener- 
 getic conduct of Macdon- 
 ough, 392 ; inexperience of 
 the crews, loading cannon 
 without powder, 393 ; Mac- 
 donough's victory, 398 ; 
 extraordinary damage to 
 
 vessels on both sides, 397 ; 
 comments on the action, 
 398 ; Macdonough one 
 of the greatest of Ameri- 
 can sea captains, 398 ; 
 his character, 399 ; on 
 the ocean, 1815, 400; 
 President chased by Capt. 
 Hayes' squadron, 401 ; dis- 
 mantles Endymion, 403, but 
 is raked by Tenedos and 
 Pomona, and surrenders, 
 404 ; account of this action 
 taken mainly from official 
 reports, 405 ; discussion of 
 various misstatements in re- 
 gard to it, 405-10 ; brilliant 
 cutting-out expeditions by 
 Americans, 411-13 ; Ameri- 
 can privateer Chasseur en- 
 gages and captures St Law- 
 rence, 415-6 ; ability of 
 several privateer captains, 
 
 416 ; cruise of Constitution, 
 
 417 ; engagement with Cy~ 
 ane and Levant, 418-22 ; 
 captures both, 419-20 ; 
 comparative force and loss, 
 420-1 ; brilliant manoeuv- 
 ring of Constituiion,6!\^^?iVix 
 of action, comments, 422 ; 
 Constitution chased by three 
 frigates, 424 ; successful 
 escape, 425-7 ; Hornet cap- 
 tures Penguin, 429-30 ; dia- 
 gram of action, 430 ; com- 
 parative force, greater effec- 
 tiveness of Americans, 431 ; 
 Hornet escapes from pursuit 
 of Cornwallis, 435 ; Peacock 
 captures East Indiaman, 
 Nautilus, 436 ; Capt. War- 
 rington acts without proper 
 precautions, 437 ; wanton 
 attack on American gun- 
 boat, by Capt, Bartholow, 
 after declaration of peace, 
 438 ; summary of events in 
 1815, 439 ; Americans de- 
 serve balance of praise, 439 ; 
 list of ships built and de- 
 stroyed, 439-41 ; feeling 
 about use of torpedoes, 441 ; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 491 
 
 material result of naval part 
 of war slight, moral benefit 
 to the Americans great, 
 442 ; total loss on both sides 
 compared, 443 ; comments 
 and criticisms on various 
 actions of the war in gen- 
 eral, 444-50 ; best criticism 
 that of de la Graviere in 
 "Guerres Maritimes," 450 ; 
 compared with results of 
 Anglo-French struggle, 452- 
 453 ; tonnage of vessels in 
 l8r2, how estimated, 455- 
 459 ; twelve single-ship 
 actions in war, 459 ; causes 
 of American success, 460 ; 
 previous history of Amer- 
 ican navy, 459-65 ; Soley's 
 " Naval Compaign of 
 1812" .... 469 
 
 Navigation bureau . . 167 
 
 Navy of Great Britain com- 
 pared with that of U. S. . 51 
 Navy of U. S., reputation 
 gained in the war, 6 ; in- 
 creased fourfold in numbers 
 during war, 8 ; previous his- 
 tory, 459; American superior 
 to French in l8oo, 462-3, 
 but slightly inferior to Brit- 
 ish, 464, but in 1777-82 
 much inferior, 464 ; reasons, 
 464 ; Troude's blunders . 464 
 Navy list of 1816 . 38 
 
 Neale, Lieut. . . .201 
 
 Nelson, Lord, 33, 150 ; " pre- 
 sumptuous," 196 ; success 
 against heavy odds . .277 
 Nereide . ■ • 59i 4^1 
 
 Nereyda . . ■ 164 
 
 Netly . . 353> 356-7. 377 
 Nettle ... 377 
 
 Neufchaiel . . 12, 69, 416 
 Neutral rights, views held by 
 United States and Great 
 Britain . i, 5. 6 
 
 Newcastle . . . 423-7 
 New England furnished 44 
 % of tonnage U. S. Navy, 
 45 ; loyalty doubted 160 
 
 Newfoundland, 77, 88, 139, 
 
 177. 335 
 
 New Jersey .... 161 
 New London, 116, 117, 401 ; 
 
 blockaded by Hardy . 285 
 
 New Orleans, 174, 340, 343, 
 348, 400, 410 : banle of, g ; 
 a useless shedding of blood 10 
 New York, 48, 139, 177, 316, 
 
 401, 413, 426, 427, 440 
 Niagara, 255-64, 266-8, 270, 
 
 272, 355-8, 364, 372, 376 
 Niagara Bay . . . 241 
 
 Niagara Falls . . . X42 
 
 Niagara, Fort . 236, 240, 363 
 Niagara River . . 363 
 
 Niagara frontier evacuated by 
 
 British .... 232 
 Nicholson, Lieut. N. J. 315, 327 
 Nicholson, Joseph, letter . 217 
 Nile, battle of . . 194 
 
 Niles' " Weekly Register," 
 iv, 20, lOi, 127, 150, 171, 
 173, 174, 187, 314, 330, 364, 
 415, 438; misstatements and 
 buncombe, 16; utterly un- 
 trustworthy, excepting for 
 matters purely American ; 
 supplements James . . 410 
 Nocton . . . 134-5 
 
 Nonsuch . . .137 
 
 Norse . . . .35 
 
 North Bergen . . .175 
 
 North Edisco . 290, 412 
 
 North Cape . . .175 
 
 Norwich captures privateer 
 
 Caledonia . . .174 
 
 Nova Scotia . . .88 
 
 Nova Scotia privateers . . 213 
 
 Nymph . . 107, 217, 2S7 
 
 O'Connor, Capt. . . .358 
 
 Odenheimer, Lieut., knocked 
 
 overboard . . • 299 
 
 " Officers' Letters," . . vi 
 
 Ogdensburg . . .151 
 
 Ohio 254-6, 374, 399 
 
 Old adage, " L'audace," etc. 250 
 "Old Ironsides" (Constitu- 
 tion) . 87, 335, 439, 447 
 Oliver, Capt. R. D. . . 177 
 Oneida Lake . . I4t 
 Oneida Indians . . 361 
 Oneida, 150-I, 153-5, 223, 
 225-6, 229, 231, 238, 244-5, 
 248-9, 252, 353, 355, 357. 363 
 
492 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Ontario, 153, 224, 22g, 23:, 
 
 238, 244, 349 
 Ontario Lake, 139-44, 149-50, 
 
 242, 255-6, 368, 443 
 Onyz . . . .117 
 
 Oporto .... 205 
 
 Orclronaux, Capt. . 341, 416 
 
 l.'C>iient . . 204, 327, 328 
 
 Orders in Council of Great 
 
 Britain .... 7 
 Orpheus . . . 51, 311 
 
 Oitegal, Cape . . . 316 
 Osgood, Lieut. . . 229 
 
 Oswego, 357, 360, 363, 368 ; 
 
 taken by Yeo . . 358 
 
 Paclcenham, Gen., 343 ; killed 
 
 at New Orleans . . 4T0 
 
 Packet, Lieut, J. H. . . 262 
 Paige, Lieut. . . . 178 
 
 Paine, Sailing-master T., 
 
 great gallantry shown . 341 
 
 Palinure . . . .211 
 
 I'almas, Cape . . . 334 
 
 Palmer, Capt. . . . 412 
 
 Pamphlets in reply to Cooper's 
 account of battle of Lake 
 Erie .... 275 
 
 Park, Lieut. T. . . . 340 
 
 Parker, Capt. G., 41, 123, 
 
 129, 289-go, 327, 401, 404 
 Parker, Midshipman G. . 346 
 
 Parker, Sir P., 318 ; killed, 319 
 " Parthian " mode of warfare 195 
 Pasley . , . .117 
 
 Patterson, Capt. . . 37, 347 
 Paluxent River . . 317-8 
 
 Paulding, Adm. . . . 380 
 Paulding, Midshipman . 391 
 
 Peacock, vii, 12, 40, 43, 51-2, 
 130, 163, 166-72, 207-8, 
 2I0-II, '217, 219, 311-16, 
 322, 334, 349, 352, 401, 
 427, 432-3, 436, 439, 446 ; 
 engagement with Hornet, 
 166 ; surrenders to her and 
 sinks, 167 ; generous treat- 
 ment of crew by officers of 
 Hornet, 171 ; captures 
 Epervier, 313 ; diagram of 
 action, 313 ; comparative 
 force and loss, 314; com- 
 Tuents on the action, 315 ; 
 skilful seamanship and ex- 
 
 cellent gunnery shown by 
 the Americans, 315 ; cap- 
 tures East Indiaman Nau- 
 tilus without loss or rlam- 
 
 age 436 
 
 Peake, Capt. W. , 166-7 ; '^'^g- 
 lect of essentials for mere 
 incidents of disdipline . log 
 
 Pearce, Capt. . . . 336 
 Pechell, Capt. . . . 201 
 Pelican, 12, 205-11, 315 ; en- 
 gagement with Argus, 205 ; 
 captures her, 206 ; com- 
 parative loss and force, 
 207-8 ; diagram of action 208 
 Pendleton, Lieut. T. M. . 338 
 Penguin, 61, 66, 68, 118, 
 181, 208, 276, 409-10, 428- 
 33. 439, 441. 445.447 I cap- 
 tured by Hornet, 429 ; dia- 
 gram of action, 430 ; de- 
 stroyed . . . 432 
 Penguin Point . . . 213 
 Penobscot River . . . 336 
 Percival, Sailing-master, cap- 
 tures Eagle, tender . . 327 
 Perry, Com. O. H., 63, 68, 
 159, 222, 231, 233, 236, 
 245, 253-4, 370, 408 ; com- 
 manding American forces 
 on Lake Erie, 254-4 ; ''e- 
 scription of squadron, 256 ; 
 and crews, 267, 258-61 ; 
 engagement with Barclay, 
 262 ; his indomitable spirit, 
 266-7 I his humanity to the 
 wounded enemy, 268 ; great 
 reputation gained by his 
 victory, 271-2 ; praised by 
 Cooper, 273-4, 277 ; de- 
 serves great credit for effec- 
 tiveness of his squadron, 
 278-80 ; his methods similar 
 to Blake . 281 
 Perry . . . 316 
 Pert, 152, 154, 224, 22g, 238, 
 
 244, 256 
 Pettigrew, Lieut. . . . 229 
 Pettipauge, destruction of 
 
 fishing-boats . , . 285 
 
 Philadelphia . . .32 
 
 Phillot, Capt. . . . 437 
 Phanix . . . gS-g 
 
INDEX. 
 
 493 
 
 Phabe, 55, 59, 64, 276, 2gl-6, 
 
 298, 300-,i 305-10 
 Philadelphia . . . 413 
 
 Pictoii . . . 286-350 
 
 Picdiitontaise . . 9S-9 
 
 Pierce, Lieut. . .179 
 
 Pigot, Capt. . .311 
 
 Pike X 
 
 Pike, Gen., 229 ; killed by 
 
 explosion . . 230, 234 
 
 Pique .... 287-8 
 Phmtagenet . 286, 338-9 
 
 Phittsburgh . . 282, 376, 421 
 
 Plattsburgh Bay . 387-8, 397 
 Plymouth .... 413 
 Pocock .... 369 
 
 Poictiers . . . 105-6 
 
 Polkinghorne, Lieut. J., cuts 
 out four American priva- 
 teers, 173 ; a brilliant ex- 
 pedition . , . 174 
 Pomona . . 401-7 
 Popham, Capt. . 359, 361, 362 
 Porcupine, 254, 256, 260, 262, 
 
 264, 269-70, 374-5 
 Port Christian . . . 343 
 
 Porter, Adm., 15, 34, 50, 58, 
 78, 118, 134-5, 164. 291-8, 
 299, 301-7, 308-9, 370, 406, 
 408, 447 ; thorough training 
 of his crew on the £ssex, 
 80 ; cruise in South Pacific, 
 breaking up whaling fleet, 
 164-5, ig6. 217 ; knocked 
 down by shot . . . 299 
 Portland . . . 213, 338 
 
 Porto Praya . . 423, 426 
 
 Porto Rico .... 426 
 Portsmouth . . 121, 175, 321 
 
 Portugal, 417 ; her small 
 
 navy - . . . .61 
 
 Portuguese customs under 
 
 British influence . 35, 164 
 
 " Pot calling kettle black " . 248 
 Potomac . . .318, 343 
 
 Pratt, Lieut. . . 346 
 
 Preble, G. H. . . 46, 52 
 Preble, 283, 377-8, 388, 390-1, 397 
 Presqu' Isle . 236, 254, 362 
 
 President, 39, 54, 56, 73-4, 
 106-7, 138. 174, 176. 218, 
 220, 283, 286, 352, 401-8, 
 410, 425, 427, 432, 436, 
 
 439. 441, 44.V5 ; attack on 
 Little Belt, 7 ; engagement 
 with Belvidera, 74-76 ; 
 chased by British fleet, 401 ; 
 attacked by Endymion but 
 dismantles her, 403 ; at- 
 tacked by Tenedos and 
 Pomona and surrenders , 404 
 Prevost, Sir G., 9, 148, 222, 
 233, 375, 379, 380. 382-3 ; 
 attacks Sackett's Harbor 
 with Yeo and is repulsed, 
 234 ; returns in confusion 
 to Canada . . . 398 
 
 Ptimrose . . .437 
 
 Princess Charlotte 354, 356-8, 364 
 Prince de Neufchatel, 341, 
 attacked by boats of Endy- 
 ?nion, 341 ; repulses them 
 after despeiate struggle 342 
 
 Prince Regent, drunken . 448 
 
 Prince Pegent, 140, 233, 354-7, 364 
 Pring, Capt., 3S2-3, 389, 396, 398 
 Privateer, American, descrip- 
 tion of . . 413-415 
 Prize-money ($25,000) voted 
 by Congress to crew of 
 Wasp, 106 ; prizes made 
 by American vessels in 
 1812 . . . .138 
 Prometheus . . . 349 
 Prosperous . . . .280 
 Prussian ... 60 
 Psycho ... 59 
 Put-in Bay .... 256 
 Queen Charlotte, 142, 147, 
 
 259-60, 263-5, 267-70, 283 
 Queenstown . 374 
 
 Race, Cape . . .88 
 
 Racer ... 173 
 
 Race characteristics not main 
 
 cause of American success 460 
 Radcliffe, Lieut. . 34, 372-3 
 
 Rainbow ■ . . .421 
 
 Ramillies . . . 285 
 
 Rattlesnake, 39, 220, 311, 
 321, 350 ; captured by Le- 
 ander . . .321 
 
 Rawle, Lieut. R. . 340 
 
 Read, Lieut. G. O. . 134 
 
 Reade, Col 319 
 
 Red House barracks attacked 
 by Lieut. Angus. . 158 
 
494 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Reid, Capt. S. C. . 338-40, 416 
 Reindeer, 35, 52, 73, 171, 208, 
 299, 304, 322-6, 350-1, 398, 
 409, 445-8 ; captured by 
 Hornet, 166 , engagement 
 with Wasp, 322-5 ; seventy 
 of action, 324 ; diagram and 
 comparative force and loss, 
 325 ; the odds against the 
 Reindeer .... 326 
 Renshaw, Lieut.-Com. . 216, 321 
 Resolution .... 166 
 Richer, Lieut. , . .96 
 Rijiefjian .... 336 
 Rio de Janeiro . . . a.'il 
 Riviere, Lieut. H., '* La Ma- 
 rine Fran9aise," . 369-70 
 Roacli, William . . . 297 
 Roach, Lieut. J. . . 156-7 
 Robert, Capt. . . 343-4 
 Robinson, Batty , . . 124 
 Robinson, Chaplain H. . 404 
 Rock of Lisbon . . .417 
 Rodgers, Commodore, 7, 38, 
 72 ; 78, 83, 119, 286, 323, 
 370, 442, 444 ; chase of Bel- 
 videra, 73; fires first gun, 74; 
 leaves Boston, 106 ; chases 
 Nyinphe, 107 ; captures Ja- 
 maica packet Swallow, 107 ; 
 pursues in vain Galatea . 107 
 Ross, Gen., attack on Wash- 
 ington, 318 : captures the 
 city and burns the public 
 buildings, 318 ; unsuccess- 
 ful attack on Baltimore, 320 
 is killed .... 320 
 Rota . . . 338-40 
 Rowlette, Lieut, . 156, 264, 268 
 Rouvier, Lieut., " Histoire des 
 
 Marins Fran9ais " . . 194 
 Royal George, 140, 151, 154, 
 224-5, 233, 245-g, 251-3, 
 355 ; attacked by Chauncy's 
 squadron . . . .154 
 
 " Ruff " . . . 299 
 
 Hackett's Harbor, 71, 143, 
 150-1, 153, 155, 228, 230, 
 233, 241, 251-2, 363, 366, 
 368 ; inadequate defences, 
 233 ; attack by Prevost re- 
 pulsed with great loss to 
 him, 234-6 ; slight fortifica- 
 
 tions, 353, 357 ; blockaded 
 by Yen, 360; blockade raised 362 
 St. Augustine . . . 286 
 
 St. Catharines . . . 164 
 St. David's Head . . . 205 
 St. George .... 130 
 St. George's Channel . . 204 
 St. Georges, Bermuda, Ad- 
 miralty Court . . . 404 
 St. Joseph's fort and barracks 
 
 burned .... 372 
 St. Lawrence Gulf . . 88 
 
 St. Lawrence River . . 139 
 St. Lawrence, 317, 366-7, 376, 
 
 415-16 
 St. Leonard Creek 
 St. Louis Bay 
 
 St. Mary's 
 
 St. Mary's River 
 
 St. Mary's Strait 
 
 San Domingo 
 
 San Florenzo . 
 
 San Gallao . 
 
 San Jago 
 
 San Salvador, 118 
 
 Salem . 
 
 Samuell, Midshipman 
 
 Sanders, Capt. 
 
 Sandy Hook . 
 
 Sapolio Bar . 
 
 Saianac. 
 
 Saranac River 
 
 Saratoga, 147, 
 
 ■ 317 
 
 ■ 344 
 315, 338, 340 
 
 • 437 
 
 ■ 372 
 . 16S, 201 
 
 • 59. 96. 99 
 
 . 164 
 
 ti8, 134, 423 
 
 119, 128, 129 
 
 • 413 
 . 185 
 200-3 
 
 161, 286, 401 
 
 276, 
 J- 
 
 338 
 349 
 
 38S 
 
 ■ 283, 
 
 376, 378, 
 
 387-90, 392-7 
 
 . 124, 201 
 
 316, 335. 
 
 Saunders, Lieut 
 
 Savannah 
 
 Sawyer, Admiral 
 
 Scott, Col. . . 231, 234, 
 
 Scott at Lundy's Lane 
 
 Scorpion. 202, 254, 256-7, 260 
 262-5, 267-70, 317, 372-3, 
 
 Scourge . 153, 223, 229, 231, 
 
 Sea Horse . 117, 318, 343, 346 
 
 Seamen on the lakes, their 
 characteristics 
 
 Second year of war to advan- 
 tage of British . 
 
 Senhouse, Capt. 
 
 Seneca .... 140, 
 
 Seringapatam 
 
 Serrat, Sailing-master G. 
 
 Severn . . . .320, 
 
 Seybert'b, "Statistical Annals" 
 
 340 
 
 82 
 
 236 
 
 174 
 
 399 
 
 237 
 
 279 
 
 448 
 203 
 233 
 165 
 262 
 
 413 
 
 47 
 
INDEX. 
 
 495 
 
 • 335 
 
 • 37 
 . 229 
 203-4 
 
 344 
 
 ■ 3" 
 
 • 337 
 
 ■ 4" 
 167, 201 
 418, 423 
 
 202-3 
 140, 233 
 
 Shannon, 43, 55, 67, 69, 73, 
 79. 8l-7, 95, 178-85, 187-90, 
 192-3, 195, 398, 445, 447, 
 450, 452 ; careful training 
 of her crew described by 
 James, 179-80 ; her arma- 
 ment, 181; engagement with 
 Chesapeake,i?,2-i%?i; captures 
 her, 1S7; diagram of action. I88 
 
 Shannon River 
 
 Shaw, Capt. . 
 
 Sheafe, Gen. . 
 
 Shead Sailing-master 
 
 Shepard, Sailing-master, 
 
 Shelbitme 
 
 Sherbrook, Gen. . 
 
 Shields, Purser T. 
 
 Shubrick, Lieut. J. T. 
 
 Shubrick, Lieut. W. B 
 
 Sigourney, Lieut. . 
 
 Simco 
 
 Simmons, Capt., " Heavy Ord 
 nance" . . . 67, 115 
 
 Sinclair, Capt. Arthur, 73, 
 100 ; commander of Ameri- 
 can forces on upper lakes, 
 371-2 ; burns St. Joseph, 
 372 ; unsuccessful attack on 
 Mackinaw, leaves for Lake 
 Erie . . 372 
 
 Single-ship actions in the war, 
 twelve in all . . 459 
 
 Smith, Midshipman . 185 
 
 Smitn, Lieut. S., in command 
 of American forces on 
 Champlain, 229, 281; makes 
 plucky fight when attacked . 281 
 
 Smith, Capt. , 174 
 
 Smith, Robert . . .50 
 
 Soley, Prof. J. R., " Naval 
 Campaign of 1812," 466 ; 
 compared with other au- 
 thorities . . . 467-72 
 
 Somers, 254, 256-7, 262-4, 268- 
 
 70, 374, 399 
 
 Somerville, Capt. P. . . 338 
 
 Sophie . . . 338 
 
 Sorel River . . 281, 283 
 
 Southampton, 73, 79, 134 
 captures Vixen 
 
 South Africa 
 
 Southcourt, Capt. J., 172-3, 416 
 
 Spain, " Floating Castles, " . 303 
 
 134 
 322 
 
 Spanish countries under the 
 
 British influence . 164 
 
 Spark ..... 34g 
 Spedder, Lieut. R. . . 344 
 
 Speedy . . 61, 117, 121 
 
 Spitfire . . . .176 
 
 Spithead . . . ,119 
 Spice Islands . . . 414 
 
 Spilshury, Capt. . . . 361 
 
 Squaw Island . .157 
 
 Stackpole . . .112 
 
 Statira . . 57, 112, 172 
 
 Stewart, Capt. C, 36, 61, 162, 
 173, 287-9,417-19,421,423, 
 
 425, 427 
 Stevens, Sailing-master 229 
 
 Stony Creek . , . 360 
 
 Stone River . . 290 
 
 Stoddart Sec, Benj. . 47 
 
 ■Stokes, Lieut. T., 259 ; killed 
 
 264, 268 
 Stuart, Lord . . . 176 
 
 Sunda Straits . . . 435 
 
 Superb . . , 285 
 
 Superior, 353, 355, 357, 360, 364 
 Surprise . . 215, 377 
 
 Surveyor . 196-7 
 
 Sybil . ... 98 
 
 Sydney Smith, 224-6, 235, 252, 355 
 Sylph, 230, 243-47, 249, 353, 
 
 355, 357, 363 
 Syren, 39, 327, 350 ; captured 
 
 by the Medway 
 Swallow .... 107 
 
 Swartout, Midshipman . 268 
 Tarbell, Capt. . . 200 
 
 Tartarus . . . - 331 
 
 Tatnall, Lieut., 201-2, 346; 
 
 life by C. C. Jones, jr. 447-8 
 Taylor, Capt. J. . . 166 
 
 Taylor, Gen. . 281-2 
 
 Taylor, Master . . 268 
 
 Tenedos, 79, 289, 327, 401-2, 404 
 Terror . . 320 
 
 Teutonic navies, heroic age of, 303 
 Thalia . 77 
 
 Thorn , . 167 
 
 Thompson, Midshipman 230 
 
 Thomborough, Adm. . 205 
 
 Ticonderoga, 376, 378-9, 382, 
 
 388, 390-2, 397-8 
 Tigris, 254, 256, 260, 262, 
 
 264, 269, 270, 336, 372-3, 399 
 
496 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Tom Bowline, 349, 401, 427, 432 
 " Tom Cringle's Log " . 21 
 
 Tonnage of vessels in 1812, 
 how estimated, 455-9 ; gen- 
 eral uncertainly and differ- 
 ence between British and 
 American methods . 456-8 
 Tonnant .... 346 
 Torch . . . .349 
 
 Torpedo .... 446 
 
 Toussard, Louis de . . xi 
 Townseiid, Capt. Lord James, 82 
 Towsen, Capt. N. . 156, 157 
 Trafalgar . . 23-4, 33 
 
 Trant, Sailing-master , 154, 229 
 Travis, W. S. . . 196 
 
 Treaty of peace signed Dec. 
 24, 1814, ratified Feb. 15, 
 1815 .... 399 
 
 Trippe, 254, 256-7, 260, 262, 
 
 264, 266-70 
 Tristan d'Acunha . . 427-8 
 Tromp . . . 277, 280 
 Troude, O., " Batailles Na- 
 vales,"g7-8, I17, 195-6,242, 
 
 422, 450 
 Truxton . . . .28 
 
 Tucker, Capt. T. T. . 291, 300 
 Turner, Lieut. D. 226, 266, 372 
 
 Tumbez 
 
 
 164 
 
 Tybee Bar . 
 
 
 438 
 
 Tyler, Adm. . 
 
 327 
 
 428 
 
 Twin, Sergeant 
 
 
 185 
 
 Ulrich, Sailing-master 
 
 344> 
 
 346 
 
 United States, vi, 33, 42, 54-7, 
 66, 70-1, 73, 95, 98, 106, 
 108-10, 112, 114, 130-1, 138, 
 177, 181, 204, 209, 211, 3981 
 409, 434, 446 ; engagement 
 with Macedonian, 108-9; the 
 latter strikes in \\ hours, 
 109 ; American loss slight, 
 no; comparative force and 
 loss, 112; struck by light- 
 ning 
 
 United States, high commer- 
 cial importance, 4 ; greatest 
 injury received from Great 
 Britain, 5 ; principle con- 
 tended for now universally 
 accepted, 5; passes embargo 
 act in retaliation for the 
 Orders in Council, 7 ; de- 
 
 177 
 
 clares war June, t8l2, 7 ; 
 badly worsted at first, 8 ; 
 weakness of American navy, 
 23 ; policy of government 
 supported .... 161 
 Upton, Capt. . . .289 
 
 Valparaiso, 164, 291, 294, 305, 310 
 Vashon, Capt. . . .73 
 Vaughan, Sailing-master . 362 
 de Verde, Cape, 163, 334, 423 
 
 Vengeance . . . .28 
 Vermont .... 139 
 Vessels mentioned (see also in 
 proper alphabetical place); Abeille, 
 Acasta, Achille, Adams, Adonis, 
 Aiolus, ^tna, Af>ica, Alacrity, 
 Albion, Alert, Alexandria, Alfred, 
 Allen, Alligator, Arab, Argo, Ar- 
 gus, Ariel, Armada, Armidc, Asp, 
 Astreea, Atalanta, Atlas, Avon, 
 Aylwin, Ballalwu, Ballard, Ba- 
 rossa, Belvidera, Beresford, Black 
 Snake, Boston, Boxer, Bonne 
 Citoyenne, Bmnt, Burrows, Cale- 
 donia, Carnation, Carolina, Car- 
 ron, Castilian, Centipede, Cha- 
 meleon, Ckarwell, Chasseur, CJierub, 
 Chesapeake, Chippetoay, Childers, 
 Chubb, Cleopatra, Clyde, Columbia, 
 Comus, Conjiance, Congress, Con- 
 quest, Constellation, Constitution, 
 Contest, Cornwallis , Curlew, Cy- 
 ane, Cyprus, Dart, Decatur, De- 
 troit, Devastation, Diadem, Dicta- 
 tor, Dolphin, Dominica, Dover, 
 Dragon, Drummond, Eagle, Karl 
 of Moira, Egyptian, Endymion, 
 Epervier, Erebus, Ene, Espiegle, 
 Essex, Essez Junior, Eurotas, 
 Euryalus, Eurydice, Fair Ameri- 
 can, Fairy, Finch, Firefly, Flam- 
 beau, Florida, Fortune of War, 
 Franklin, Frolic, Fulton, Galatea, 
 General Armstrong, General Pike, 
 Gladiator, Gloucester, Governor 
 Tompkins, Growler, Guerriere, 
 Hamilton, Bavannah, Hebrus, 
 Hermes, Highflyer, Hague, Hor- 
 net, Hunter, Icarus, Indefatiga- 
 ble, Independence, fasseur, Java, 
 Jefferson, John Adams, Jones, 
 Julia, Jution, Lady Gore, Lady 
 Murray, Lady of Lake, Lady Pre* 
 
INDEX. 
 
 497 
 
 vast. Landrail, Laurentinus, Law- 
 rence, Leander, Leopard, Levant, 
 Linnet, Little Belt, Loire, Lottery, 
 Louisiana, Ludlow, Lynx, Mace- 
 donian, Madison, Magnet, Maid- 
 stone, Majestic, Mars, Martin, 
 Mary, Medway, Medusa, Melville, 
 Menelaus, Merrimac, Meteor, 
 Minerva, Mohawk, Moira, Mon- 
 tagu, Montgomery, Montreal, 
 Nancy, Narcissus, Nautilus, 
 Nereide, Netly, Nettle, Netifcha- 
 tel, Nezvcastle, New York, Niag- 
 ara, Noct'on, Nonsuch, Norwich, 
 Nymphe, Ohio, Oneida, Ontario, 
 Onyx, Orpheus, Palinure, Pasley, 
 Peacock, Pelican, Penguin, Perry, 
 Pert, Philadelphia, Phcebe, Phce- 
 nix, Pictoic, Pique, Plantagenet, 
 Poictiers, Pomona, Porcupine, 
 Preble, President, Pjimrose, Prin- 
 cess Charlotte, Ptince de Neufcha- 
 tt.1, Pjince Regent, Prometheus, 
 Prosperous, Psyche, Queen Char- 
 lotte, Racer, Rainbow, Rainilles, 
 Rattlesnake , Reindeer, Resolution, 
 Rijleman, Rota, Royal George, St. 
 Lawrence, San Domingo, San 
 Florenzo, Saranac, Saratoga, Scor- 
 pion, Scourge, Sea-Horse, Seneca, 
 Seringapatam, Severn, Shannon, 
 Shelburne, Simco, Somers, Sophie, 
 Southampton, Spark, Speedy, Spit- 
 fire, Star, Statera, Superb, Superi- 
 or, Surprise, Surveyor, Swallow, 
 Sybil, Sydney Smith, Sylph, Syreti, 
 Tartarus, Tenedos, Terror, Thalia, 
 Thorn, Ticondetoga, Tigjis, Tom 
 Bowline, Tonnant, Torpedo, Torch, 
 Ttippe, United States, Viper, 
 Vixen, Volcano, Washington, 
 Wasp, Wtlliajns, Wilmer, Wolfe, 
 Woodbridge, Young Wasp. 
 Vestale . . . -59 
 
 Victory . . . -33 
 
 Villeneuve, M. . . . 242 
 
 Vincent, Gen. . . 230, 232 
 
 Viper, 39, 177, 219, 377 ; cap- 
 tured by Narcissus 
 Virgin . . . . • ^7 
 
 Vixen, 39, 134, I37 ) captures 
 
 Southampton . . ■ 134 
 
 Volcano . . . • 320 
 
 Wadsworth, Col. . .318 
 
 Wadsworth, Lieut. . . 335 
 Wales, Capt. . . .313 
 
 War of 1812: Ward's "Manual 
 of Naval Tactics," 149, 262, 380, 
 
 447 
 Wareham . . . .286 
 Warren, Adm. Sir J. . 161, 243 
 Warrington, Capt. L., 311-6, 
 370, 401, 427, 436. 437, 447; 
 his attack on the Nautilus, 
 needless cruelty, 306 ; acted 
 without proper humanity . 437 
 Washington, burning of pub- 
 lic buildings, 9, 319 ; British 
 advance on . . 3l8-g 
 
 Washington, Fort, 318; attacked 
 
 by Gordon., and abandoned 319 
 Washington .... 439 
 Wasp, 14, 35, 38-40, 43, 53, 
 66, 68, 73, 100-6, 137-8, 
 166, 177, 180, 2og-io, 275, 
 310, 321-5, 328-34, 349, 
 352, 398, 428, 445-7 ; en- 
 gagement with Frolic, loi ; 
 captures her after fight of 
 43 minutes, 103 ; compara- 
 tive force and loss, 103 ; 
 diagram of action, 104 ; 
 enormous disparity in dam- 
 age suffered by each vessel, 
 105 ; fine crew and daring 
 commander, 321 ; burns and 
 scuttles many ships in En- 
 glish Channel, 322 ; en- 
 gagement with and capture 
 of Reindeer, 322-25 ; de- 
 structive cannonade, 323 ; 
 diagram of action and com- 
 parative force and loss, 325 ; 
 chases and captures Avon, 
 after furious engagement, 
 329 ; yi7/i7« sinks, 331 ; cap- 
 tures Atalania, 332 ; shortly 
 after never heard of again, 
 332 ; comments on vessel, 
 crew, and their actions 333-4 
 Waters, Midship. K. . . 216 
 
 Watson, Lieut. . . 205-6 
 
 Watts, Lieut. . . 185 
 
 Watts, Sailing-master . 157 
 
 Webb's "Peninsula; McClel- 
 lan's Campaign of 1862 " . 189 
 
498 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Wells, Lieut. H. . . . 151 
 Wellington .... 406 
 Welsh, T., Jr. . . .418 
 
 Weslphal, Lieut. P. . . 203 
 West Indies . . . 163, 286 
 Whaling trade of British in 
 South Pacific broken up by 
 Porter . . . 164 
 
 Whinyates, Capt. T. 100-3, 106 
 Williams, Lieut. A. O. . . 340 
 
 William . . .119 
 
 Wilmer . . . .377 
 Wilmer, Lieut., knocked over- 
 board and drowned . . 299 
 Wilkinson, Gen., expedition 
 
 into Canada . . . 235 
 
 Winlle, Lieut. . . . 102 
 
 Wolfe, 224-5, 233, 237, 245-8, 
 
 251-3. 354 
 Woolsey, Lieut., 140, 150, 
 
 154, 229, 360, 361 
 Wood, Lieut. P. W. . . 124 
 Woodbridge . . -335 
 
 Worsley, Lieut. . . 372, 373 
 Worth, Lieut. F. A. . . 340 
 Wragg, Midship. . . 158-9 
 
 Wright, Lieut. F. W. 168, 172 
 Yarnall, Lieut., 257 ; badly 
 
 wounded . . . 265, 268 
 Yeo, Commod, Sir J. L., com- 
 mander of British squadron 
 on Lake Ontario, 79, 134, 
 
 144, 145, 237-8, 363, 365 ; 
 aftacks Sackett's Harbor 
 with Prevost, and is re- 
 pulsed, 222, 226, 233-5, 
 237-8 ; superiority of his 
 vessels, 226 ; action with 
 Chauncy, 240 ; captures 
 two schooners, 240-1 ; his 
 victory neither decisive nor 
 brilliant, 242-3 ; gets the 
 worst of action near Gen- 
 esee River, 204-9 I ^^^ force 
 not used to best advantage, 
 245-9 I blockaded in King- 
 ston, 251-2; criticised and 
 compared with Chauncy, 
 252 ; his squadron in 1814, 
 356-7 ; takes Oswego, 358- 
 9, and blockades Sackett's 
 Harbor, 360 ; raises block- 
 ade, 362 ; declines to fight 
 against odds, 362-4 ; cau- 
 tiousness amounting to timi- 
 dity, 366 ; as good as his 
 opponent . . 371, 386 
 
 Yeocomico Creek . . . 202 
 
 Yonge, C. D., " History of the 
 British Navy," not good 
 
 Y<irk (now Toronto), 222, 228, 
 229, 231, 234, 245, 251, 253, 444 
 authority . 242, 281 
 
 Young Wasp . . .487 
 
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