iiipii fyxmll Uttivmitg Jitotg THE GIFT OF Xt^IlA... A...^, "^J^ibU^ .K.....VA-.Q?.l>.9y& \o.\4^\o.i Date Due *^^r— ^I9F9L i Pk - A 1984 A - g ^ HB^iSgi^e^^ -p^e=* WfT B-W^ ^^ T'M Cornell University Library HG231 .T74 The story of mone' 3 1924 032 520 250 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tlie Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032520250 "COLD THE STANDARD OR MEASURE OF VALUE-SILVER SUBSIDIARY." Heading in Report of Director 0/ Mint, Nov. i, lSg3. THE STORY OF MONEY. A Science Hand-Book of Money Questions. BY EDWARD C. TOWNE, B. A. ^ NEW YORK. G. W. Dillingham Co., Publishers. Copyright, igoo, BY EDWARD C. TOWNE. WEED-PARSONS PRINTING COMPANY, PRINTERS, BLECTROTYPEES AND BINDERS, ALBANY, N. Y. A FOREWORD. The writer of the chapters embraced in the pres- ent volume was not, in the eight years following the election of Harrison, a supporter of Harrison- McKinley Republicanism, but from the beginning of Mr. McKinley's presidency he has seen what seem to him steadily and broadly advancing grounds for the belief that in World-History no American ruler, not even Washington and Lincoln, will have a larger name or a more indelible record of honor than the sagacious, judicious, resolute administrator of national magistracy who came into power through the magnificent honest money campaign of 1896, and, under whom the New World Republic of Washington and Lincoln has slipped the anchor of early limitations to take her inevitable place as a Power second to none in the world. If in the first instance this volume shall help to make President McKinley our dependence for another four years of soundness in national finances, and of demonstration throughout the world of American quality in counsel and power in action, the chief aim of the writer will have been accomplished, yet with the hope and belief that through many years yet to come the book will direct the student to sound views of money and the voter to action at once honest and honorable. [iii] "Gold the Standard or Neasore of Yafae— Silver Subsidiary. Heading in Report of Director of Mint, Nov, 1 , 1 893. PRESIDENT ANDREW JACKSON-"Iaall ages, through- out the world, the standard of value. There is no fraud in gold ; like the honest principles of the founders of our government, it is unchangeable and will do its office well everywhere and at all times. It is the true representa- tive of the principles of justice and equality which should enter into every- thing that operates on our institutions and should be ever insisted on by the industrious classes as the actual circulating medium to bring continually to the test every species of credit currency and to suppress the spurious paper system resting on no solid basis. ' ' — December 36, i8jb. SENATOR JOHN SHERMAN— "The united states is the great gold producing country of the world. The single standard of gold is an American idea."— /a««ary, r^8. " At the Paris monetary conference, held in 1867, the delegates of twenty nations represented, agreed to recommend gold alone as the standard of value* The United States, and nearly all the commercial nations, have adopted this standard." — January 16, 1^4. SENATOR W. M. STEWART— ''There is noting so satisfactory as the real measure of value — gold." — January 13. 1874. "Gold IS the universal standard of the world." — February so, 18^4. " It is idle to talk about compromising on any other measure of value ; the world will not accept it." — June 11, 1S24, SENATOR JOHN P. JONES — "The sooner we comedown to a purely gold standard the better it will be for the country. Gold is so exact a measure of human effort that when it is exclusively used as a money it teaches the very habit of honesty." — April /, t874' HON. LYMAN J. GAGE— President McKinley's Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. Lyman J. Gage, said, after reading Dr. Towne's " Story of Money " : " An immense gain and advance over any previous book on money." " I took your manuscript with a view to glancing over it and reading here and there the more interesting portions, but I became interested and read every line." ** It is very clear and instructive, and it seems to me you have made a good distinction between the possibilities of a bi-metalUc standard and bi-metallic money." "The information you have gathered into the book as to the course of money in the various countries is very valuable, and I hope you will be able to get the book promptly into the hands of the public." " I feel an interest in the work and would be glad to recommend It and buy a limited number of copies." [iv] A POLITICAL NOTE. The situation created by the legislation of last March has been very largely taken for far more than it really is. It declared very justly the existence of the gold standard, and properly provided for the redemption, or payment in gold, of United States notes and treasury notes, amounting to about $425,000,000, but it did not simi- larly provide for making as good as gold the nearly $580,000,000 of our silver, which is over half fiat value. The moral effect of the new law was got without any new legal effect whatever. It, that is, gave no new means for carrying out the gold standard system. The House bill expressly authorized the Secretary of the Treasury " to exchange gold coin for any other money issued, or coined by the United States," whenever it should be necessary to do this. This fundamental principle of the gold standard system was rejected by the Senate, leaving the law no better than it was before in respect of the means of acting on our gold standard professions. This might involve no peril if our administration traditions should become thoroughly fixed in the direction of fidelity to the gold standard. But with Mr. Bryan made President, and a second sil- ver fanatic Secretary of the Treasury, payment, in 47-cent silver dollars, of both interest and principal of the bonded debt of the United Stales, save only the funded two per cents., could be ordered at once, and undoubtedly would be. The stand thus taken for sil- ver would offer all our gold in exchange for silver at i for 16 when it is worth i for 33. No instance in history can be brought to parallel the rascal stupidity of a scheme involving such an offer, and with progress and prosperity so immensely advanced since 1896, the crash of a Bryan experiment of " fool fury " in finance would be worse than all the costs and miseries of the civil war. If any possible advantage could b; expected from either free silver legislation and administration hereafter, or free silver clamor now, the madness of 16 to i would be less extreme than it is. But no possible advantage can be imagined, except upon a basis of hood- lum ignorance of, or rascal indifference to, truth and fact. It might as well be proposed to sell wheat, corn, cotton, and beef to foreign markets at 53 cents on the dollar below the market price, as to cut [v] VI A POLITICAL NOTE. the value of a thousand millions of gold more than one-half to cus- tomers in London and Europe. The silver interest alone could bet- ter afford twice a President's salary for the rest of Mr. Bryan's life than to give him a three months' opportunity to scuttle the whole fabric of American prosperity in (he fashion of his dictation of i6 to I to the political convention which made him for the second time a presidential candidate. And that a political convention hopeful of success upon new issues for which something can be said, should bow its neck to a needless, senseless, suicidal millstone, the damn- ing infamy of which is only matched by its disastrous folly, is the worst illustration in our history of convention chances. An anti- imperialist of the financial competence of the editor of the New York Evening Post, could have shown the Kansas City convention in half an hour that the way was more than open to them to accept the gold standard, and remove the question of standard from the list of campaign issues. The only issue they have ever needed to make is that of Bimetallism of money, and it is the world's experi- ence, and especially American experience, that this can be better had under the gold standard than in any other way. If anything were needed to discredit the senile sentimentalism of Mr. Boutwell's" anti-imperialist" cabal, it has been supplied by their accession to the support of Mr. Bryan. The scholar in Ameri- can history, if he equally understands the story of A merican money and the origins of our present constitutional position, can hardly conceive a catastrophe more appalling than that invited by the hoodlum and rascal scheme for giving the present administra- tion of our national affairs an overthrow such as the candidacy of Mr. Bryan, in the name of the money of the fathers and of the Declaration of Independence, as he views these, must imply. The outcome, in constitutional politics, of the Declaration of Independence, was a wretched, a rascal, a ridiculous failure — a government which Washington described as " half-starved, limp- ing, always moving upon crutches, and tottering at every step." The Revolution, even with Washington to conduct it, would have been a disgraceful fizzle, even as late as the Yorktown campaign, had not two French fleets, a great number of French troops, and loans of honest French money, come to the aid of the meagre force led by Washington. One of the first results of liberty and independ- ence gained by the Revolution was an armed rebellion in western Massachusetts. It was because of failure, of disaster and dishonor, under the Declaration of Independence, and the scheme of union devised by the zealots of liberty, that " we the people, in order to A POLITICAL NOTE. vii form a more perfect union, to establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," made the profoundly radical new departure which an entirely new constitution of necessity was. It was plainly recognized as the creation of imperial sway over the sovereignty of the states. John Adams said in 1786 that his great desire was " to see rising in America an empire of liberty, and a prospect of two or three hundred millions of freemen." Dickinson of Pennsylvania said, that such " an extensive and well- established empire " could be rreated " not only without the least danger to liberty, but liberty will be thereby better secured." Washington alone, out of his experience, his great clearness and breadth of intelligence, and CHAPTER IX. BIMETALLISM. 98. "What is Bimetallism?" 120 99. Sidney Sherwood on bimetallism 122 100. Shaw on bimetallism 123 loi. Error of Shaw's assumption 124. 102. Confusion of points of view 125. 103. Gold standard bimetallism 127 104. Secure ratio for silver 128 105. The true bimetallic interest 129 106. Gold cannot displace silver 130 107. Advantage enjoyed by silver 130 108. How silver lost first place 131 109. Gold standard will help silver 131 CHAPTER X. BIMETALLISM IN ENGLAND: COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF THE. DOUBLE STANDARD SYSTEM. no. Early English silver 133 111. Early English gold 133 112. Recoinage scheme, 1695-99 134 TABLE OF CONTENTS. xiii PAGE. 313. The money-mongers got the silver 135 1 14. Sir Isaac Newton on money 135 115. Engtand with no good money 136 116. Birth of the present English system 137 117. A law of tender applied to silver 137 118. Coinage of silver suspended 138 119. Recoinage of silver — 1816 139 120. Reasons for the gold standard 140 CHAPTER XL BIMETALLISM IN FRANCE — DISASTROUS WORKING OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD SYSTEM DRIVES FRANCE TO THE GOLD BASIS. 131. Early French money 140 122. French revolution money 141 123. Mr. Shaw on French bimetallism 142 124. Double standard perils 14S 125. The gold standard a necessity 146 126. The Latin Union and gold 147 127. Final adoption of the gold standard 148 J28. Historic bimetallism of money 149 CHAPTER XII. THE UNITED STATES AND BIMETALLISM — COMPLETE FAILURE OF SILVER — THE GOLD STANDARD A NECESSITY. 129. Alexander Hamilton's money scheme 150 130. Fundamental error of Hamilton 150 131. Bimetallism of money practicable 151 132. Failure of Hamilton's scheme 152 133. The law of 1834 throws out silver 153 134. Gold becomes the only money 154 135. Position of silver reduced in 1853 154 136. Silver discredited as a standard ISS 137. Silver from 1873 not a standard 156 138. Silver not demonetized in 1873 156 139. Gold the standard; not the sole money 157 140. Silver as money made secure 158 xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS, PAGE. 141. Gold standard means double money 159- 142. The Bland bill double standard scheme 159 143. The Bland bill results 16& CHAPTER XIII. GERMANY AND BIMETALLISM — THE GOLD STANDARD COMES IN WITH THE EMPIRE — A RECENT GERMAN SILVER CRAZE. 144. Early German monetary effort 161 145. The Vienna convention 162 146. Germany's gold standard system 162 147. German gold and silver... 163- 148. Recent German agitation 164 149. Inquiry on behalf of silver 165 150. Latest German silver move 165 CHAPTER XIV. INDIA AND THE GOLD STANDARD. 151. India's trial of silver 166 152. India demands gold i68- 153. India gets the gold standard 169 154. Injury done by free coinage 170 155. India's demand for silver 170 156. Futile effort to hold up silver in India 171 157. Present status of silver in India 172 CHAPTER XV. MONEY AND PRICES. 158. Entirely false assertion of disastrous fall caused by gold — No disastrous change in prices I7j 159. Cause of decline in prices 174 160. How supply and demand work 175 161. The case of cotton 175 162. Wheat prices 176 163. Wholly false claim that appreciation of gold since 1873 now injures debtors 177 164. Appreciation of gold desirable 179. TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV PAGE. 165. Gold the supreme commodity 179-- 166. Debtors not hurt by gold 180 167. Gold the supreme servant 181 168. Use of metals as money does not cause appreciation. .. 182 169. Price of silver not aflfected by use as money 183 170. Market price not made by money use 185 171. Hoodlum and xascal finance 185 172. The foundation of prosperity 186 173. Entirely false idea that gold has appreciated 186 174. The cause of hard times 188 17s. False "American Independence" 189. 176. Anti-English fanaticism 191 177. Anarchist ravings 193. 178. Falsification of facts 194 179. Mendacious complaint against gold and banks 195 180. France and silver 198 181. The world's money supply to-day 199 182. Ignorant idea that gold is doing double work 200 183. Gold did double work before 1873 2or 184. Silver has helped since 1873 2or 185. Silver help' made matters worse 202 186. Criminal conspiracy against gold 202 187. Silver sale of gold 203, CHAPTER XVI. " INTERNATIONAL BIMETALLISM." 188. Dr. F. A. Walker's last book 204 189. Gold value wrongly viewed 205 igo. Radically wrong idea of money 206 191. Absurd notion of currency contraction 207 192. Possible regulation of gold and silver values 208 193. Alleged economic force set in motion by money law. . . 208 194. Dr. Walker's fundamental error 21& 195. A wholly baseless theory 212 196. False idea of eflect of new supply of gold 213 197. Possible peril in silver 2i5 198. France forced to drop silver 218 199. Double standard did not give France double money... 220 xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE. 200. Theory of bimetallism based on supposed French ex- perience 222 .201. Bimetallism a recent novelty 223 202. Errors of Dr. Walker's argument 224 :203. Mistakes of economists used in proof 226 -204. Inadequate defense of bimetallism 227 205. Alleged advantages of bimetallism 229 3q6. a wholly delusive scheme. 231 .207. " Demonetization " tragedy. 232 208. Dr. Walker's position indefensible 234 -209. Human progress means gold 234 'Gold the Standard or Measure of Value — Silver Subsidiary." Heading in Report of Dinctor of Mini, Nov. 1, 1893. The Story of Money A SCIENCE HAND-BOOK OF MONEY QUESTIONS. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. I. BETTER KNOWLEDGE NEEDED. Mr. John Henry Norman in his interesting and valuable " Complete Guide to the World's Twenty-nine Metal Monetary Systems," says by way of a dedication : " These pages are dedicated with profound respect to the world's first man of Science who in the future produces a Science Primer of Money : such as will compel the world to accept and teach it as truth." Mr. Norman's mastery of his particular field has shown him how commonly both writers and prac- tical men undertake discussion of some aspect or aspects of the question of money without any ade- quate grasp of knowledge and thought on one of the most difficult subjects upon which either the scholar or the statesman can enter. The whole question of money is one not yet adequately studied by even its gpreatest scholars, and but dimly seen into, in respect of its wisest settlement, by the most eminent statesmen. Bimetallism of the stan- dard, for example, is as much against nature as a. calf with two heads, while bimetallism of money- is as certainly necessary and practicable, properly- planned and enacted, as gold and silver side by sider in the mines and the arts, the mints and the mar- kets of the world. But in what conference of econo- mists, or in what house or senate, or by what writer or speaker, have these two separate and opposite bimetallisms been clearly put over against each other, contrasted and understood, each in its true- significance, so as to give to science and to finance- absolute monometallism of the standard and ade- quate bimetallism of money. 2. BIMETALLISM NOT RIGHTLY EXPLAINED. Upton's excellent "Coin Catechism" speaks of " Free Coinage or Bimetallism," making the last. term mean the same as the first, and says that ' ' the fact that Bimetallism has been tried by nearly- every nation of the world and abandoned as imprac- ticable should keep the United States from any- such folly as attempting its restoration througk any scheme." * This refers, of course, to bimet- allism of the standard, and it is, for what it has in_ view, a perfectly just statement. But it has the very grave defect of appearing to assume that there can be no other bimetallism than that which it con- demns. It takes no thought of a desirable and wise, a safe and necessary, bimetallism of money. Yet this is, in fact, the only real practicable bimet- allism, for the simple reason, as our review of the-. * Pp. 28, 96. history will show, that under the double standard system, that one of the two metals which is cheap- est in the market takes the whole of the money field, and the other, simply because it is worth more as merchandise than as monej', entirely leaves the field, and there is monometallism of money, actual and practical monometallism, in spite of the nominal bimetallism. 3. SHAW'S "HISTORY OF CURRENCY." Mr. W. A. Shaw's " History of Currency, 1252- i8g4., ' ' places him in the very front rank of authori- ties on the subject of money. His work is perfectly invaluable for his story of what befell the great countries of the world under the vain attempt which they made to use both silver and gold as standard money, and how they were all driven to gold as the better metal for money, and as the sole standard ; and in order to have silver also, as a safe and secure money, were compelled to put it into a secondary, subsidiary position, as under-standard money, of limited tender, and upon fiat parity with gold. But Mr. Shaw's conceptions, thoroughly sound as they are, keep to a certain extent the old point of view, under which money and standard meant the same thing. Thus, he designates as "mono- metallic" the ideal monetary system, and yet describes it as "one in which a single metal is made the legal tender, and a second or third metal bound to it in a hard-and-fast, subordinate relationship," — an arrangement which secures bimetallism of money, under monometallism of the standard. And, again, Mr. Shaw says that the main basis of the truest modern currenoy system is these two ideas thoroughly seized and put in practice, — (i) the idea of limiting the tender of the secondary money, so that it shall remain strictly subsidiary ; and (2) the idea of issuing fractional money on a basis of real value distinctly lower than the face value. These two ideas, as thus stated, do not quite express the basis of the truest modern cur- rency. In that basis the secondary money, — our silver dollar for example, — must be, precisely the same as fractional money, on a basis of real value distinctly lower than the face value; it must be subsidiary. 4. white's "money and banking." Another work of superlative merit, and one thor- oughly fitted to serve as a handbook for every class of readers, — Mr. Horace White's " Money and Bank- ing : Illustrated by American History," — comes short to a certain extent in its defining conceptions, either stated or assumed. The title of the first chapter, " Money a Commodity," conveys an error. Money is never a commodity ; a commodity is never money. Gold may be a commodity, or it may serve as money when properly designated to that service. The commodity, gold, not made money, may pass instead of money, quite as money would, but that does not make it money. Coined and issued gold may be both money and a commodity. If it is at all over-value coin, it will work as a commodity only, and will not work as money. The market will take it all for what it is worth to trade in. The same is true of silver. The breakdown of sil- ver as standard money has resulted very largely from the fact that it has so often, and through so long periods, had more value as metal than as money, with the result that trade in it as a com- modity wholly removed it from the field of money. As soon as the modern world began to understand how the double standard involved failure of the under-valued metal to stay in use as money, care was taken that this metal should be silver rather than gold, so that silver was deliberately let go rather than let gold go. In the new silver period, silver has been declining in value so steadily as to create the instant risk that under a ratio true to the market to-day, it would be down below that ratio to-morrow, and would thus cause a loss of gold, and leave only silver as money. It is this change in silver which has made it necessary to have either the gold standard with the silver subsidiary, or silver money only and no gold. It is quite right to bring out clearly that money, good real money, requires something which has value as a commodity, and which may be, in great part at least, or in some properly designated part, intrinsically worth what it is to pass for ; but it must be no less something meeting other conditions of money, such as common occurrence and abund- ance, and of a relatively steady and even value. And the new ideas of money contain nothing more important than the principle that while stan- dard money of gold should be of full intrinsic value, worth exactly as much, therefore, as a commodity as it is as money, any other money placed under this standard, as silver, and notably the amount of silver which adequate bimetallism of money calls for, must in no case figure as commodity at more than about nine-tenths of its face value as money, but must be to at least about one-tenth fiat, repre- sentative, payable-in-gold, value, in order that there may be no danger of its taking to itself wings of real value, by rise in the market price of the material, and flying away from the field of money to the market for commodities, — as in 1873 Ameri- can silver had done for forty years. Commodity, in fact, is never money until it is properly made money ; and we have learned that the proper mak- ing of gold into standard money leaves it of full value as commodity, while the proper making of silver into money never does this. Mr. White, as will be explained a little further on, has a good deal to say about commodities being made money, when they were in fact traded in by way of regulated barter, with the express purpose of avoiding the use of money. And as perhaps the ablest American advocate of the gold standard, and of gold as money, money equally good as commodity or as money, Mr. White leaves the whole matter too much as though the question of gold and the question of money were the same, and silver need not be taken into account. He has, perhaps, not said his last word upon the use of silver as money; and he certainly has not said too much in advocacy of the gold standard ; yet, beyond a question, it is money of both gold and silver that we need to know about to-day, and to know all that we can know, whether the history of money in all its kinds, or the judgment upon 3noney, which is to make the future, not only of money but of the vast interests depending upon it. 5. DR. FRANCIS A. WALKER ON MONEY. Mr. Norman, to whose work reference has been made above, makes this declaration : " I am under the profound conviction that the world, at present, has no science of money, and that it is a disgrace to science and common sense that there is no safe guide to what money is and how it does its work." Referring to F. A. Walker's "Money, Trade, and Industry, " Mr. Norman says, that while it was recom- mended to him by Mr. Stanley Jevons as the best book on money, he not only found it lamentably disappointing,, but felt compelled to pronounce lATalker's views the unsoundest which have been .generally accepted since Locke's time ; and this, Although the work is an accepted text-book in Eng- lish institutions of learning.* There is but too much reason for Mr. Norman's severe judgment. Walker pronounces money ' ' that which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community in final discharge of debts and full payment for commodities, being accepted equally *" The writer has recently read thirty definitions of money in that number of English and American Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries. In his opinion the unsoundest of them all is in the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1883, because it contains Professor F. A. Walker's for what may be called full value payment. 57. GOLD COMMANDS CONFIDENCE. One remarkable illustration of the opinion of the world in regard to money is the fact that the great nations of Europe, whose circumstances compel them to contemplate the possibility of having in hand a great amount of money for war purposes, are doing all that they can to lay up a great store -of gold. They know that gold is a precious metal of steady value, and that whatever theories may be in vogue, or whatever practice nations may adopt, the universal market will recognize their gold according to its intrinsic value as standard money 1^ which can be depended upon. If they were to accumulate in the same way an immense stock of silver, they would take the chance of finding the silver greatly depreciate on their hands. They might have $500,000,000 in silver, that is $500,- 000,000 worth that in gold at the time the silver was purchased, and by the time they got ready to use it it might have fallen forty or fifty per cent, in value. In 1873 silver was worth a little more than 16 to I, and a United States silver dollar was worth a little more than a gold dollar. For eighty years silver had been worth as much or more than 16 to I of gold, but in 1894 it was worth less than half that. The silver in one of our present silver dollars is worth about fifty cents. A visitor to Mexico has recently given this illustration: In paying at a restaurant for a dinner, the charge for which was one dollar in Mexican money, he handed out an American silver dollar, and got in change a Mexican dollar containing seven and one-half grains of silver more than the American, and therefore intrinsically worth more than the American. The secret of the exchange was that the American silver dollar was construed as a United States promise to pay one dollar in gold, and it therefore passed for more than twice its intrinsic value. 58. THE CHIEF PROBLEM OF METALLISM. By far the most important problem of metallism is that of two kinds of money, one standard, and the other subsidiary ; the standard money to be in the standard precious metal, gold, and the subsidi- ary money to be in the subsidiary precious metal,. 77 silver. If this relation of the two metals and of the two kinds of money is not accepted, it means a fight between silver and gold, with the absolute certainty of victory for gold and defeat for silver, carrying injury wherever dependence has been placed upon silver, and prosperity wherever the basis trusted has been gold. This is a result of the nature of things. We might like to have it different, and we may be able to show by argument, that it could be different, and ought to be; but the fact is it will not be as long as the arrangements of mankind are what they are. A single nation, having no rela- tions, whatever outside itself, could adopt a system irrespective of the rest of mankind, but nothing of the sort is possible in matters of finance. Even so immensely strong a nation as the United States is to a large extent necessitated to do what the world at large considers best. The world at large con- siders best the use of the precious metals for money on the general basis of security by intrinsic value for nominal value ; and it further considers that security, in intrinsic value, is much steadier, more certain, and more satisfactory, to be in gold value rather than in silver value. Silver, therefore, is placed by mankind in a subsidiary position, and the interests of silver require that the best be made of that position. 59. THE TRUE INTEREST OF SILVER. What is best for silver turns entirely upon the relative intrinsic value of silver. The maintenance of the subsidiary position requires two things, first, a sufficient intrinsic value in the subsidiary coin to maintain an average near approach to face value^ and, second, a sufficient face value above the intrin- sic value to give security against the latter being carried by changes in the market price above the former. A silver dollar, that is, should employ as much silver as is not likely to become worth more than its face value. The bulk of silver coinage will thus stand appreciably near in value to the value for which it passes, yet without rising above its face value, with the effect of displacing, for the time, the gold standard. It is misleading to speak of the two moneys, gold and silver, as "equal standards of value." We may say "two moneys, gold and silver, side by side," but to make them work together for the best advantage, both of the public interest and of the silver interest, it is absolutely necessary to make the gold the standard of value, and to place the silver, in the matter of the amount of intrinsic value in silver coins, in a subsidiary position. To attempt to give both metals standard or first place is to have no secure standard, and no steady place for either. Silver will stand best both as coin largely employed and as metal in the markets of the world, if we keep it in the best possible subsid- iary place, and do not allow it to rise by the changes, of the market to a standard place. The question of coinage of silver, the question, that is, of the amount of intrinsic value relatively to the nominal value to be put into silver coin, ought to be left to the coinage experts. It is a matter for the mint, not a matter for legislation. Legislation should determine the principle on which 79 the mint shall turn out silver coins as near full value as will not violate the subsidiary basis, but no more than that. The mint experts will readily determine, from experience in matters of coinage, just where the line should be drawn in silver coins- between face value and intrinsic value. 60. GOLD BIMETALLISM. If these principles are carried out we obtain a. system of gold bimetallism, that is, money metal- lism based upon both gold and silver, but with gold as the standard money and silver as the subsidiary money. Any other system for coinage of silver,. regardless of the preservation of the gold standard,, can only have the effect of depriving ourselves of the use of either gold or silver. If we coin silver with a value of metal in each coin above the face value, even if only a little above it, it means that we offer to all comers more than a dollar's worth of silver for a dollar in gold. Everybody that knows enough to trade in money will hand in the gold and take our silver, and we shall find our- selves entirely sold out of the silver and on a basis, of gold monometallism. On the other hand, if we make silver coins which are less in intrinsic value, than their face value, even if only a little less, and. make them full legal tender for their face value, we at once set in motion an effort of all who have our silver to exchange it for our gold, because by the exchange they will make something ; and the result of this will be to get all our gold and leave us with only silver. This will be silver monometal- lism at a cost represented by the difference between 8o the value of our stock of gold and the silver which we have taken in place of it. If, for example, we coin silver at i6 to i, and make sach coinage of silver dollars full legal tender, there will be a very- rapid taking away of our gold in exchange for sil- ver with a loss on every dollar, at the present price of silver, of nearly or quite half a dollar. Even if circumstances should considerably carry up the price of silver we would still be in the same -fix, that of losing our gold and getting in place of it silver of less value. If it were possible to make our silver coins of almost exactly the same face value as their intrinsic value, we would still have one or the other of the difficulties mentioned. Sil- ver fluctuates in value much more than gold does, and for most of the time the intrinsic value would be either above or below the face value, and we should have one or the other of the difficulties of which we have spoken. We should, in short, have silver monometallism or gold monometallism, as to money in circulation, just according as the one dollar or the other, silver or gold, stood relatively lowest in market value. The lowest always remains as money, while the highest is disposed of as mer- chandise. Issue of the lower as legal tender equal with the higher is the same thing exactly as sale of the higher at a profit to the money mongers equal to the difference in value of the two. If the United States, for example, with its present stock of six hundred millions in gold, should issue, and make standard and legal tender, silver at i6 to i, when the market ratio is nearer 32 to i, it would be -exactly the same as offering the six hundred mil- 8i lions for sale at half price, every full-value, or double-value gold dollar for a half-value silver dol- lar, and of course the foreign money market would take the whole of it, and make three hundred mil- lions, gold value, or six hundred millions new American silver value, by the transaction. A more thoroughly criminal financial operation it would be difficult for even the wildest intellectual hoodlum- isn\ to propose. CHAPTER VI. THE USES OF MONEY. 6l. MONEY MEASURES VALUE. The things which money will do, or the uses to which we may put it, may all be covered under four heads. In the first place, it enables us to readily estimate the comparative value of different commodities. We become familiar with the stead- ily maintained value of the precious metal, and we are able to ascertain how much of the metal repre- sents the value of any given commodity and at what values the respective commodities can be offered for exchange. Money thus serves primarily as a standard of value. It has been said that the idea of general value could not be formed without the existence of money. This, however, is an entire mistake. The comparison of commodities neces- sarily results in a general idea of comparative val- ues, and primitive culture shows the rise and preva- lence of this idea at many different stages of com- 6 82 parison of commodities, all the way up to that of comparing all others with the supreme commodity, gold. But it is true that without the existence of some such commodity as gold it would not be easy to form ideas of comparative values and to count these values as they are counted by the use of money. 62. MONEY REGULATES EXCHANGE. In the second place, money serves to facilitate exchanges or trade. It does this solely in conse- quence of and subsequent to the service rendered by money as a ready means of estimating compara- tive values. Writers of distinction have placed the facilitating of exchanges first. But this is not the order of the facts. That order begins with the use of money as a means of determining comparative values, and only after this does money serve as a medium of exchange. The use of money as a medium of exchange is so conspicuous as to natur- ally take the first place in common observation, but some reflection will show that this use arose wholly in consequence of the fact that whatever was employed to facilitate exchanges had shown itself a convenient measure of value. To exchange oxen for wheat through the medium of gold shekels, the oxen must be valued in gold shekels and the wheat also. It is by an unconscious inaccuracy that writers who thoroughly know the subject, mention promotion of exchange as the first func tion of money, and measuring of values as the second. 83 63. ARISTOTLE ON MONEY. Aristotle, the most scientific of the Greek philoso- phers, speaking of the resort of the various tribes of mankind to barter, and the part which it played in the economy of human society, went on to say : ' ' From this it came about logically that as the machinery for bringing in what was wanted, and of sending out a surplus, was inconvenient, the use of money was devised as a matter of necessity. For not all the necessaries of life are easy of carriage ; wherefore, to effect their exchanges, men contrived something to give and take among themselves, which, being valuable in itself, had the advantage of being easily passed from hand to hand for the needs of life ; such as iron or silver or something else of that kind, of which they first determined merely the size and weight, but eventually put a stamp on it in order to save the trouble of weigh- ing, and this stamp became the sign of its value. ' ' (Aristotle's Politics, I. 9.) It was not so much that men contrived an instru- ment of exchange. They found commodities the value of which everywhere and always could be estimated with comparative ease and certainty. The cowry money shells, pretty shells everywhere the same, so common as to have a steady low value, offered themselves as types of value, value-meas- urers. So of gold or silver or copper by weight. It was easy to employ them as measurers of value, because estimate of their value was relatively easy and certain. After such measurers of value became known, the practice of using them to promote exchange sprang up. 84 64. MR. HORACE WHITE ON MONEY, Mr. Horace White says, for a definition of money, ""anything that serves as a common medium of exchange and measure of value." But he also says : ' ' The simple truth is that gold is the only money of civilized nations " (p. 112); and again: "The money of the country consists of all the gold, plus all the other instruments of exchange which are redeemable in it." (P. 226.) He further says, in the opening of his chapter on "General Princi- ples : " " Roescher correctly observes that if money were nothing but a measure of value it would on that account, if on no other, possess value. This fact is often contradicted, and still oftener lost sight of. No invention or discovery since the world began has been of so great service to man- kind as that of a common measure of value. ' ' "As a matter of fact, however, all the things that have been used as money have possessed other value, and we have the best reason to believe that this other value led to their use as money in every instance without a single exception. We cannot conceive that gold would ever have been brought into use as money if it had not possessed certain qualities of beauty, portability, durability, etc., which caused it to be prized as an article of adorn- ment." (P. 24.) The accuracy of this statement of facts cannot be questioned. It brings out very clearly the founda- tion fact of money, the convenience of making certain commodities serve as value-measurers, not under a contrived plan to make them such, but because they manifested themselves as such. 85 To be perfectly accurate, therefore, Mr. White's definition should say "a common measure of value and medium of exchange. 65, MONEY AS A STANDARD OF VALUE. The third function of money is that of a standard of value applicable to the more or less indefinite future. It is one thing to say that an ounce of gold is of a certain value in trade at the present time and quite another thing to say that it shall be of the same nominal value ten, fifty, or a hundred years from now. Money in proportion as it is good for its purpose, — not to say perfect for its purpose, — ■will serve as a standard for future value, not less than as a standard for present value. And here it is of special importance to observe that the urgent necessity for good money of one standard, and that the best which is possible in the nature of things, becomes more urgent still when money is used as a means of designating future values. If we designate the value ten years hence of a hundred acres of land as ten thousand dollars it may make, and in all probability will make, a very great difference whether that is ten thousand dollars in gold or in something else that may be legal tender as dollars ten years hence. Even with the best efforts which could be made to supply sil- ver money along with gold, but without the tie to gold of a substitute coin payable in gold, all the chances are that the ten thousand dollars at the end of the ten years, if paid in silver, would not exactly and fairly pay the debt. One chance at least would be that it would more than pay the debt through 86 the value of silver at the time. But nearly all the chances are that if there were any change it would be in the other direction. 66. LABOR AND MONEY. The use of money as a standard of value is espe- cially important when looked at from the point of view of labor. Labor depends on future payment in some definite money. No interest is more imperative than that which labor has in the making of money of the best known substance. The payment of labor in pieces of gold always and necessarily means more than any other payment Tvhich labor can accept. There might be indeed good payment in good silver money ; that is, money made as nearly as possible of a real value in silver equal to its nominal value. But all the chances are that payment in silver would fall short, at least a little, of full and fair payment, and that absolute security for a full wage could not be had except on the basis of payment in gold or in substitute money exchangeable for gold. Of all the varieties of ignorance blinding man- kind to their true interests, there could hardly be named one more lamentable than the ignorance which should permit labor in the modern world at large to demand the adoption of a money the sole result of which to labor must be the substitution of part payment for whole payment. True as it is that half a loaf is better than no bread, it is simply insane to insist on having a half loaf instead of a whole loaf. Under all circumstances whatever the use of money means trade, and when labor is oflfered 87 in trade for wages, the labor gains or loses just in proportion as the money in which wages are paid is real money of an intrinsic value fully equal to the nominal value. No class of traders have more interest in gold, as money of the highest standard quality, than that great class some of whose mis- guided leaders are everywhere proposing general acceptance of a system of money which will regu- larly cheat them out of a part, and perhaps a large part, of their wages. 67. MONEY AND CREDIT. Under the head of "A Store of Value," Mr. Jev- ons remarks on a possible fourth function of money as follows : "It is worthy of inquiry whether money does not also serve a fourth distinct purpose — that of embodying value in a convenient form for convey- ance to distant places. ... At times a person needs to condense his property into the smallest compass, so that he may hoard it away for a time, or carry it with him on a long journey, or transmit it to a friend in a distant country." The obvious justice of this might be conceded without looking farther, but a moment's considera- tion of what use of money all organized business, and notably the business of banking, involves, and of the basis upon which properly issued paper can be made to answer as money, will show that as a store of value capable of supplying a basis of credit, whether in the form of ordinary capital or in the special form of banking capital, money has a fourth function of immence significance. 88 68. MONEY AS CAPITAL. In the case of any organized business a store of money is the foundation upon which the business, including a certain amount of credit, is built. The incalculable importance of money thus serving as capital, and thus creating credit in aid of the busi- ness, cannot be too strongly expressed. A certain prejudice widely felt against capital would undoubt- edly disappear if the necessary and beneficent uses of even the largest and most questionable aggrega- tions of money, in the notable fortunes of the multi- millionaires, were better understood. What the public good demands is not repression of capital as in any way an evil, but improved service by capital, and this can be got, in all probability, more easily rather than less easily, from the administrators of great aggregates of capital. 69. MONEY AND BANKING. The use of money to create credit, and to carry on the constant supply of organized credit in aid of all kinds of business, is one of the largest and most important facts of the present organization of human affairs. After a lucid explanation of just what banking is, and how it involves (i) money, and (2) bank credits which may be four or five times the amount of the money, Mr. Horace White says : "It is found in practice that $200,000 of loans and discounts may be easily carried on $50,000 of cash. Thus, the loans of all the national banks in the United States in October, 1894, were $2,000,000,000 and their cash, including silver certificates and 89 silver dollars, was a trifle less than $400,000,000, or only one-fifth the amount of the loans. The other four-fifths -was credit, and perfectly sound credit, too, for it had passed through one of the severest, panics in our history." * 70. VALUE OF SOUND BANKING. How much banking means may be understood if we recall how Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, began his great financial operations by insisting, against the wise and hon- est counsel of the great bankers, on taking $170,- 000,000 of gold and paying it away, instead of draw- ing checks upon the banks and letting them pay, as usual, in bank notes secured by their gold reserve^ Mr. Chase by this operation broke the back of the- bank power of the country to grant loans and dis- counts to the amount of $850,000,000. The banks could have loaned him $350,000,000 with less dan- ger than the giving up of $170,000,000 of gold, involved. If Mr. Chase had been one of the great kings of finance, and had foreseen how great the war demands would be, he would have bought gold, from abroad with bonds until he had put $250,000,- 000 of gold into banks, and enabled them to lend him a thousand millions to carry on the war. But Mr. Chase, as we shall presently see more fully, had no proper knowledge of the dictates of wise; and honest finance. * Money and Banking, p. 237. go CHAPTER VII THE MINTING AND ISSUE OF MONEY. 71. COINAGE. The work of the mint in the coining of money is that of making pieces, of gold, or silver, or other metal, according to a rule of weight and fineness, which in the case of government mints has been -enacted as law. Aristotle says that the first coins were pieces of metal with only the weight stamped upon them, and that the weight stamp became the indication of the value of the coin. Such terms as shekel, talent, drachma, pound, penny, peso, livre, and mark, designated weights at first, and so came to designate values. Payment by weight was expressed in Latin by the term stipendium, from which comes our word stipend, applied especially to the pay of a clergyman or other ecclesiastic, laecause the church so long used the Latin. Our English words expend and expense are from the X,atin expendo, which means to weigh out. 72. AMERICAN MINT LAW. The Congress of the United States passed, April 2, 1792, "An Act establishing a Mint and regulat- ing the coins of the United States." The unit adopted in this law was the dollar, ' ' of the value of the Spanish milled dollar," with a specified weight of silver.* The gold eagle was ordered to " 371.25 grains of pure silver." 91 be made "of the value of ten dollars or units." The standard was made silver on the very natural ground that silver was the money of common use. In Queen Elizabeth's time in England silver was the common measure of value because it was the money of the people ; and gold was employed in large payments in quantities counted by its current value in silver.* When the celebrated John Locke studied the subject, he advised making silver the standard, with gold coined as commercial money, to pass, not as legal tender, but at its market value in silver. In France Mirabeau took the same ground, and when, in 1834, the United States law was altered, Raguet, who represented the best knowledge of that time, saw the matter as Locke and Mirabeau had seen it, — silver, the' common money of the day, as the standard, and gold trade money, passing at its commercial value. No one yet understood how bad a standard of value silver might prove to be, from its greater liability than gold to drop from a higher market value to a lower ; nor how it might become, from its bulk and weight, a terribly inconvenient medium of exchange. 73. ORIGIN OF THE DOLLAR. The term dollar, daler or thaler, comes from the German word thai, which is the same as dale in English. The Count of Schlick set up a private mint at Joachimsthal, or Joseph's-dale, in Bohemia, in 1581, and turned out, what was rare then, coins of such uniform goodness as to become very widely * Jevons' Money and the Mechanism of Exchange, p. 17. 92 acceptable. These coins were called Schlicken- thalers, or Joachimsthalers ; then for short thalers, which gave dalers or dollars. The term Dollar is thus an historic monument of German science and honesty. It was the Spanish dollar which the Congress of the Confederation, in 1785, declared the monetary- unit of the United States. This was because, although the colonies were English, and accounts were kept in pounds, shillings, and pence, there were no English coins in circulation, and the silver coins in actual use were nearly all the Spanish or Mexican silver dollars. When gold and silver were both declared full legal tender in the United States, in 1792, the division of the dollar into hundredths, or cents, was first adopted. This gave it great value as a unit of account. The law of 1792 made dollars, dimes, and cents, the money of account of the United States, but until after the civil war old colony usage, differing in different States, kept on with the divisions of the dollar which the early use of Spanish silver had made familiar. New Eng- land had a shilling which was six to the dollar ; New York one which was eight ; and Pennsylvania one (a levy, or eleven pence) which was seven and a half, and the half of which was a fip (or five pence). The dollar with its decimal divisions is now com- pletely established. Mr. Jevons says of it : "It is firmly adopted as the money of a nation, which, as far as human wisdom can penetrate the future, is destined to be the most numerous, rich, and powerful in the world. That nation, which has arisen from the best stock of England, has 93 absorbed much of tbe best blood of other European nations, and has inherited the richest continent in the world, must have an importance in coming times of which even Americans are barely con- scious." * 74. FAILURE OF HAMILTON'S DOLLAR. The Spansh dollar f amilar to the early American colonies was brought in by the trade with the West Indies. The American dollar, made upon Hamil- ton's plan, passed in trade in the West Indies, as equal to the Spanish. But it was in fact a trifle (2 1-2 grains) lighter than a new silver Spanish dollar. For every American dollar sent to the West Indies a Spanish dollar a trifle heavier could be had, and by getting this recoined into an Ameri- can dollar, a trifle of silver would be left over for the operator. The recoinage was done by the mint free. It only paid about one cent on every dollar, but all the American coinage went to the workers of the operation, the public got the benefit of hardly any of the coins made for them, but had to get along with old and worn foreign coins, and the mint was running almost wholly for the benefit of the moneymongers. 75. PRESIDENT THOMAS JEFFERSON SUSPENDS COIN- AGE OF THE SILVER DOLLAR. President Jefferson, seeing what a failure Hamil- ton's dollar was, stopped the coinage of it, and this suspension lasted until 1836, making forty-four ^ Money and the Mechanism of Exchange, p. 172, 94 years of failure of the original American dollar.* To May ist, 1806, there had been coined only 1.433.457 of Hamilton's dollars. Jefferson's order to Robert Pattison, director of the mint, to which the name of James Madison, Department of State, was signed, was in these words : "The President directs that all the silver to be coined at the mint shall be of small denomination, so that the value of the largest pieces shall not exceed half a dollar. ' ' The fractional pieces were at that time of full value, and nearly all of them went the same way that the dollars had gone. The report of the House Committee on coinage in 1832 stated that to 1830 there had been a total coinage at the mint of $37,000,000, of which four-fifths had been taken out of the country, and not more than one-fifth had been circulated. The law legalized the circulation, in 1793, of a variety of foreign coins, which were worn and light weight, and these were the princi- pal money of the people. As Mr. Upton says: "The effort of the country to provide coin for cir- culation of any kind was a dismal failure." "jQ. HAMILTON'S GOLD A FAILURE ALSO. At the same time that Hamilton's plan failed to give silver, it failed also to give gold coin. Under the ratio of 15 to i gold coin were worth more to sell than to circulate, and however many the mint turned out, the moneymongers took all of them and the public had none. Gold began to grow * White's " Money and Banking." p. 41. 95 scarce, says Mr, White, in 1810, and had wholly disappeared in 1817. Raguet, the finance expert of the time, wrote in 1820 of "the disappearance of gold from the United States," Two years later he said that "although the coinage of gold continued to be large ($1,319,030 in 1820), not a gold coin wa& anywhere to be seen in circulation. " As Mr . Whit& says : "The facilities of the mint were simply used by merchants to certify the weight and fineness of gold for exportation. ' ' Under the law, as Hamil- tion's ideas shaped it, the mint was run, in making- silver coin and in making gold coin, for almost the sole benefit of the moneymongers. The United States had two standard moneys, silver and gold, but none, or next to none, in use. The monarchies of Europe, said Thomas H. Benton, in 1834, had the use of gold; so had the young republics of South America and even the negroes of San Do- mingo; but for twenty years the yeomanry of America had had none ; not even though their mint was making it all the time. Of the mint Benton said: ' ' It has coined, and that at a large expense to the United States, 2,262,717 pieces of gold worth $11,852,890, and where are these pieces now? Not one of them to be seen ; all sold and exported. ' ' •jy. SILVER THROWN OUT BY PRESIDENT ANDREW JACKSON. President Andrew Jackson, June 28, 1834, signed a bill the purpose of which was to put an end to conditions of coinage which had made the United States mint, to use Mr. Upton's words, "a most 96 Tidiculous and absurd institution. " The bill altered the ratio from 15 to i to 16 to i. There was no ^old in circulation and only about eight millions of fractional silver. The United States Bank had some $13,000,000 of its notes in circulation. The new bill was expected to provide gold, and at the same time get rid of the bank. The actual result was to make a complete riddance of our silver. The ratio 16 to i was borrowed from Mexico, through the proposal of Senator Thomas H. Benton, and against the advice of fiaancial experts, who put the market rate at 15 5-8. The result of this 16 to I ratio was to make the silver coin, even more than before, worth more to sell than to keep in use as money. The mint coined the standard silver dollars, but only to enable the holders of silver to have it in good shape to sell. None of it went into •circulation as money. Mr. Upton says: "Silver was taken out of circulation under the operation of the new ratio as effectually as if its further coinage Tiad been prohibited under the penalty of death, and those voting for the measure understood that such would be the result, and when it came they did not plead ignorance or refer to the act as the crime of 1834."* The reason for this was the uni- versal desire to have gold. 78. HORACE WHITE ON " THE GOLD BILL" OF 1 834. Mr. Horace White says of the bill of 1834, that it was termed the Gold Bill, and that it came from a special committee of the House, of which Mr. Camp- ■ Coin Catechism, p. 31. 97 bell P. White, of New York, was chairman. Of the passage of the bill Mr. Horace White gives this account: "The bill, as reported to the House by Mr. White, provided for a ratio of i to 15.6, but when it came up for discussion Mr. White moved an amendment making the ratio i to 16; and this amendment was adopted without a division. Then another amendment was offered making the ratio I to 15.625, and it was supported on the ground that it was the true market ratio, and that it would keep gold and silver in concurrent circulation. The adoption of the ratio of i to 16, it was contended, would drive silver out of circulation. Neverthe- less, the amendment was voted down — yeas, 52 ; nays, 127. The bill was then passed in the House by 145 to 36, and in the Senate by 35 to 7. It was perceived on both sides that the passage of the bill would make the United States a gold-standard country in practice. ' ' The desire to have gold in circulation, the hope of promoting the production of gold in the Southern states, where the output was already considerable ($868,000 in 1833), and the wish to make gold coin take the place of bank notes, found an opportunity to strike a blow at silver in the fact, that it had proved a dismal failure. The absentee, good-for- nothing-for-money, merely moneymongers and merchandise silver dollar, was left a fact in law, partly because many contracts were in existence expressly calling for payment in silver, and partly because the halves, quarters, and dimes which were the small money of the people, were fractional 7 98 parts of the silver dollar, made tinder the same law, and how to make them otherwise was not yet understood. As a matter of fact the small coins were about as hard to keep in circulation as money as the dollar, unless they were worn and so of light weight, but the effort to have them could not be given up ; and so the dollar and its parts were still coined, and the double standard was retained in law although discredited by all experience from 1792 to 1834, and although discarded in practice. 79. FIRST AMERICAN SUCCESS WITH SILVER. Although the law of 1 834 gave the United States gold money, the old difficulty, the constant. taking away of the silver, was worse than ever, because gold worth less than its face value could be used to buy not only all fresh native silver coins, but even the best of the foreign coins, leaving very few small coins for use as the necessary money of the common people. In 1852, when the American mint had been sixty years in operation, it had not at any time given the American people silver coin so made and issued as to be of service. A bill which became law February 21, 1853, borrowed from English practice a coinage plan for fractional currency of about seven per cent, less real value than the face value, to be given out at the face value, and to be legal tender for small sums up to $5. Three years later the foreign silver pieces were made redeem- able at a rate slightly above their market value, with the result of buying them all in and having only American coins in circulation. "The country- then," says Mr. Upton, "had for the first time ia 99 its history (i 776-1 856 — 80 years), its own gold and diver coins circulating side by side, ample in amount, throughout the country, neither driving the other from circulation or skulking because for- eign coins were treated better in law than they were." * 80. THE SILVER DOLLAR STILL A FAILURE. The standard silver dollar was not affected by the law of 1853. It still held its position, but this only meant that the American mint supplied the trade in silver with the American honorary silver piece. It cut no figure as money ; had never done any service as money ; was an absentee, and des- tined to remain so until 1873, when ninety years of continuous failure would bring about its dismissal from service. Mr. Upton says of ' ' the total amount and the character of money in circulation in i860: " "According to an estimate of the Secretary of the Treasury the amount was $435,000,000, of which $180,000,000 is known to have been represented by bank notes, leaving $255,000,000 of coin. This coin was admittedly made up of our gold and sub- sidiary coinage, of which the latter was probably not above $43,000,000. The estimates of aggregate specie circulation and of its division between gold and silver at that time vary somewhat, but in no case does the estimate include any silver dollars as in circulation. ' ' f * Coin Catechism. t Coin Catechism, p. 39, lOO 8l. THE LEGAL TENDER PAPER DISASTER OF 1862, The progress of the United States in the direc- tion of good money, of the right kinds, both gold and silver, and ample in amount, was arrested in 1862 by one of the most discreditable and disastrous departures from sound money principles on record in history. For the purposes of the great civil war which began in 1861, the United States, by August of that year, needed large sums of money, which could be had only by large use of the national credit. The Secretary of the Treasury was Salmon P. Chase, a man of unsurpassed character and gen- eral ability, and the representative, in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, of Ohio, a State deservedly counted as the heart of the Republic. The sole question confront- ing Mr. Chase was how to wisely and honestly use the national credit in getting large sums of money ; it might be many of them, one after another, into the indefinite future. But the high intelligence and lofty patriotism of Mr. Chase not only took no note of the plain dictates of wisdom and honesty in finance, but they pushed aside the advisers who knew those dictates thoroughly, and plunged him into precisely the abyss which the worst rascals of criminal finance would have dug for him, that of getting money on the unsecured and irregular paper of the United States, instead of on regular paper with the best possible security. The better the paper the more would it be honestly handled ; the worse the paper the more would the rascals be able to use it to their profit. Mr. Chase put the United States completely into the hands of the rascals, with a profit to them of hundreds of mil- lOI lions, every dollar of whicli might have been saved by wise and honest dealing -with the accredited experts of finance. 82. HOW MR. CHASE BROKE THE BANKS. The amount of gold in the country was unusually large and banking operations based on it were unusually safe. The most obvious wisdom was to make the most of this, carefully guarding the gold as a reserve in the banks, and borrowing of them, not by taking their gold, but by an arrangement to draw checks upon them, which they would pay in the usual way, to some extent, perhaps, in gold, but presumably in their notes. Mr. Chase nego- tiated three loans of fifty million dollars each, at a meeting, August 9, 1861, with the representatives of the chief American banks, in New York, but he refused their advice to take the money through checks drawn upon them, and insisted, with lofty but terribly mistaken self-consciousness of high honor in finance, upon having the gold, and upon having demands paid in gold which could just as well as not have been paid in bank notes. One hundred and seventy million dollars in gold were at considerable expense carried to different parts of the country, and paid away, when it was in reality worth more than its nominal value, and as the bank reserve of the country was worth vastly more than Mr. Chase got for it. A worse blunder of opinion- ated ignorance could not have been made, at that moment, but the moment speedily came in which the opportunity for worse was presented, and meanwhile Mr. Chase had not learned to take advice I02 from those who knew the dictates of wisdom and honesty in finance. 83. SEVENTEEN YEARS OF PAPER MONEY. The effect of Mr. Chase's disregard of the advice of James Gallatin and other representative Ameri- can bankers, not to take away from the banks the coin basis of credit, was to reduce them to suspen- sion of specie payment, December 28th, 1861, — a suspension which lasted until December 31, 1878, and left upon the greatest period in American his- tory a blot of discredit and dishonor which the patriot cannot sufficiently regret. Mr. Upton's excellent ' ' Coin Catechism, ' ' after briefly sketching what was done in the old days of colonial inexperi- ence and perhaps desperate necessity, raises the question whether anything of the kind could have happened under a government organized on the basis of our Constitution ; and the facts compel this answer : "In 1862 the government of the United States authorized paper promises in the form of notes, silent as to the time of their redemption, to be equal in debt-paying power to the metallic money they represented, though at the time the promises were worth in current exchange less than one-half as much as the coin itself. ' ' ' ' The Supreme Court of the United States held that the National government by its inherent power of sovereignty had a right to change the terms of all contracts whenever the law-making power deemed such a change necessary for the wel- fare of the countrj'. " I03 But it was not a question of desperate peril to the country ; not in the least ; it was a question of wisely and honestly using the national credit to get money to carry on the war; a question of straightforward honest borrowing, at a saving, as it would have proved, of hundreds of millions, or of round-about, rascally, lawless borrowing, at a loss of hundreds of millions, not to speak of the cheating, by payment in half worthless money, of all persons under contract to give service at fixed rates. The issue of unsecured, irregular promises to pay, making them legal tender, and requiring that they should be used as money, the payment of duties on imports and of interest on the regular public debt being alone excepted, was a long way off from the easier, the cheaper, and the more hon- est, not only borrowing of money, but carrying on of the business of the nation. It was an act of financial and moral lawlessness, absolutely inex- cusable, and impossible to have occurred, had not our system put in the place of chief responsibility a man who could venture to disregard the advice of financial experts, in dependence upon his own uninstructed, and in fact lamentably incompetent judgment on q.uestions of money. 104 CHAPTER VIII. FIATISM AND CURRENCY. 84. LEGAL FIAT AND MONEY. Fiatism is a method of making current by law, making to pass, that is as money, or to pass in bar- ter instead of money, something which would not pass at all, or would not pass exactly the same, but for the law. For pure honest money in gold and silver current by weight, there is no necessity for any government fiat, but there is convenience, first in a government stamp certifying the weight and fineness of either bars or coins of gold or silver, and second in a law designating the conditions of legal tender of such bars, ingots, coins, or other pieces of precious metal. As with other matters of recognized right the administration of which is facilitated by state organization and state laws, all matters of money are given security by laws prop- erly recognizing what is right and what the public interest requires. Coinage of gold and silver done by government and with the government's stamp upon it, is the highest practical security to those who handle coins, that they are what they profess to be. Governments usually forbid coinage by private persons, not because it could not be done, but because the opportunity to cheat is such as to make it extremely difficult to provide securities against it. It is of value, therefore, even for gold and silver current by weight, to have the pieces weighed and stamped by the government, and to 105 have distinct notice by law of the manner of their currency. So far, moreover, as money consists of coins in a secondary position, like those of gold under a silver standard, or those of silver under a gold standard, and all subsidiary small coins, legal fiat is necessary to determine how such coins shall pass ; to what amount they shall be legal tender, and whether they shall be passable, up to the limit of tender, on a parity with the standard superior money. 85. LEGAL FIAT AND THE STANDARD. A supremely important governmental act is that of determining a money standard of value. For many centuries the nations of Europe had no sys- tem of proper regulation and the result was a con- fusion of varying standards enormously injurious to the public, and as enormously beneficial to the money brokers. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries most, if not all civilized countries, employed both gold and silver as money of full legal tender, the legal ratio between them being fixed by some such fiat as that of 15, 15 1-2, or 16 to I, which means that 15, 15 1-2, or 16 ounces (or pounds) of coined silver shall pass as equal to one ounce (or pound) of coined gold ; the theory being that this is the ratio of value between the two metals by weight in the metal market, or at least near enough to it to answer coinage and currency purposes. Experience, however, has always shown the impossibility of keeping the metals at parity of value with each other, and the absolute certainty that whichever of the two standard metals chanced io6 at any moment to be of a higher value than the other in the market, the money changers would take all of it out of circulation, giving in exchange coin of the cheaper metal, and making a profit for themselves by the transaction in proportion to the value of the one above the other. What may be called the see-saw of the standards has been for ages the money brokers' opportunity to regularly fleece whatever governments and people undertook the foolish experiment of trying to have two stan- dards of value. 86. THE ENGLISH LAW OF STANDARD. The first nation to comprehend the situation, and to provide a remedy by choosing of the two stan- dards that one which was manifestly the best, and which could be made the steadiest and most secure, -was England, in the adoption in 1816 of the gold standard. One of the most famous monetary studies ever made was that made by the Earl of Liverpool, whose ' ' Treatise on the Coins of the Realm ' ' first set forth the principles of a composite money system, in which gold should take the place of a standard, and silver should occupy a subordinate position, with limitations to its coinage and use suited to keep it in that position. In this com- posite system coins of gold, such as the English sovereign and half sovereign, are adopted as the standard of value and principal legal tender, and subordinate coins of silver are furnished for the purpose of sub-division and as legal tender for lim- ited amounts only. These subordinate coins are made of such weights that their value as metal I07 cannot rise above the nominal value at which they are exchangeable for gold. The essential part of the Act of Parliament of 1816, on which the English monetary system is based, was in these words: "And whereas at vari- ous times heretofore the coins of this realm of gold and silver have been equally a legal tender for payments to any amount, and great inconvenience has arisen from both those precious metals being concurrently the standard measure of value and equivalent for property ; and it is expedient that the gold coin, made according to the indentures of the mint, should henceforth be the sole standard measure of value and legal tender for payment, without any limitation of amount, and that the silver coin should be a legal tender to a limited amount only, for the facility of exchange and com- merce: Be it therefore enacted, that from and after the passing of this Act, the gold coin of this realm shall be and shall be considered and is hereby declared to be the only legal tender for payments, except as hereinafter provided, . . . and no tender of payment of money made in the silver coin of this realm of any sum exceeding the sum of forty shillings at any one time, shall be reputed a tender in law." 87. THE ENGLISH LAW OF SILVER. For securing the subordinate position of silver, in this English system of gold-bimetallism, the weight of the silver coin was reduced about six per cent. ; and with the recent considerable fall in the price of silver, this now means that an English io8 silver coin is worth hardly more than half its face value, and justice to silver as good money kept reasonably near in intrinsic value to standard money, although not itself a standard, manifestly demands considerable increase in the weight of the silver coin. This, however, is of less importance to England from the fact that the coinage of silver, which is at the discretion of the mint, is kept within narrow limits; limits, in fact, which go far to make the English practice one of gold mono- metallism of money, qualified by the use of Bank of England notes, which are paper payable in gold ; and yet the case of India, a part of the British empire, with its enormous employment of silver as money, practically makes the whole British system one of gold standard bimetallism of money. 88. FRAUD BY FIATISM. The fiatism which has had the largest place in history, and which still lingers to plague the world with its iniquitous and mischievous operations, is that by which governments have issued as money either coins or paper more or less false and fraudu- lent in character, or at least more or less doubtful and worthless, for lack of security, or even expec- tation of security, for their payment. The chief Impenitent Thieves of history in this matter have been unscrupulous kings and reckless despots, undertaking by criminal monetary schemes to rob their subjects. So constantly, however, and so largely was this method of criminal finance worked, during centuries of universal ignorance and gen- eral denial of popular rights, that something like a 109 tradition of its legitimacy was established, as in the same way a tradition of the legitimacy of lotteries was established. Hence the possibility of such an extraordinary, and we must say such disgraceful ex- hibitions of facility in criminal finance as appeared in the early American colonies, and during the American Revolution, in the issue of paper money, under circumstances not only doubtful to the last degree as to proper prospect of payment, but thor- oughly discreditable and dishonest in respect of the means taken to provide securities for payment. 89. EARLY AMERICAN FIATISM. In the early history of the American colonies fiatism was very largely and very disastrously applied, both in the regulation of barter, to make commodities pass at a price fixed by law, or at the current price, and in the issue of paper money. In Massachusetts in 1631 a fiat of the General Court ordered that corn should pass for payment of all debts at the price it was usually sold for, unless money or beaver skins were expressly stipulated. This legislative fiat continued in force and opera- tion for more than half a century. In 1635 musket balls, to the extent of twelve pence in one payment, were made passable the same as coin. In 1640 the prices at which different grains might be tendered were fixed by law ; Indian corn at four shillings per bushel, wheat at six shillings, rye and barley at five shillings, and peas at six shillings. The currency of Indian wampum money was in part left to trade estimate, depending on the fact that the Indians would take it in payment for no beaver skins and that the beaver skins were a good commodity for export. In course of time the beaver trade declined and this destroyed the value of the wampum money to the whites. A fathom of wampum, consisting of 360 white beads, passed as worth sixty cents. In the years 1641-1643 a Mas- sachusetts fiat made wampum legal tender to the amount of ten pounds. This was then reduced to forty shillings, and for taxes the wampum money was not received at all. The story of fiatism in Virginia, applied to the regulation of barter, affords a most remarkable illustration of ignorance and folly seeking the pub- lic good, yet accomplishing little but mischief and injury. The attempt especially to make tobacco pass in trade at values fixed from time to time by law, showed many varieties of failure without any example of success. The public opinion which sus- tained it was largely that of the planters and farm- ers, who thought they would be benefited by fiat values put upon their produce; but no matter what scheme was tried, failure and failure only was the invariable result. 90. A CELEBRATED INSTANCE OF EXTREME FIATISM. One of the most desperate fiatist attempts ever made was that of France when her finances were under the control of the celebrated financier and projector of commercial schemes, John Law. On the nth of March, 1720, a government fiat, designed to help the value of paper money, decreed that, after the first of May, gold should no more be used in the payment of debts, nor silver after the first of Ill August, and that no more of either metal should be coined; but the utmost efiforts of a despotic government to carry out this fiat proved of no avail whatever. Gold and silver held their own exactly the same, and the value of the paper decreased faster than before. The experience of one month com- pelled the withdrawal of the decree, and although other fiat efforts were made, and in the course of fifteen months the fiat value of gold was changed twenty-eight times and that of silver twenty-five times, no real effect upon the market value of these metals was produced, nor anything whatever accom- plished in support of the value of the paper money. 91. THE COLONIAL FIAT MONEY CRAZE. The colonial paper money story of America, Massachusetts in the lead, is one of the most dis- creditable in monetary 'listory. It reveals patriot- ism in alliance with financial crookedness of the most unblushing character. In 1690 the General Court of the Colony of Massachusetts issued ;^4o,ooo in due bills, not legal tender and not bearing inter- est. It was a dishonest forced loan. The bills were not payable at any particular time, and they were receivable only for taxes and for such com- modities as the colonial treasury might have in stock. They were issued in payment of the wages of soldiers who had served in an expedition against Canada. The soldiers lost two-fifths of their face value, from the cut rate at which they had to pass them. In 1692, when it was too late to be of any benefit to the soldiers, the bills were made legal tender in all payments, receivable for taxes at five 112 per cent, better than silver, and redeemable in sil- ver at the end of twelve months ; provisions which caused them to pass at par with silver. The doubt- ful character of even the later form of these prom - ises to pay was not seen. It did not occur to a public without experience of finance, that such promises would prove worthless if they should be issued in excess of ability of the treasury to take care of them. They were so issued with reckless disregard of consequences. The success of Massa- chusetts in making paper pass at par with silver in 1692, before experience had begun to show how the scheme would ultimately work, started throughout the colonies an epidemic of confidence in paper money. 92. ELEMENTS OF THE DELUSION. Even when the intelligent and honest saw how certainly the criminal folly of the scheme would work disaster and dishonor, they were powerless to arrest the delusion. The ignorant, the debtor class, vaguely counting partial escape from pay- ment of debt one of their rights, and the specula- tors who could profit by monetary disorder, were a majority of the voters. The intellectual and moral hoodlumism of the movement for cheap money and plenty of it, went to the extreme of carrying laws to compel owners of property offered for sale to accept paper the same as silver. 93. THE OUTCOME OF FIATIST FINANCE. Those who had been compelled to take the paper naturally supported in many cases efforts to make it pass. But with a great deal of robbery and out- "3 Tage, of cruel wrong unwittingly done and of scoundrelism rampant, the invariable result, wher- ever paper money was issued, was depreciation and loss, disaster and dishonor. The bills of the colony of Massachusetts became worth only one-eleventh of their face, and to return to specie payments Massachusetts used the rascal method of repudiat- ing nine-tenths of her outstanding promises to pay. The trouble was greatest in the four colonies which then constituted New England. Puritan patriotism ■went shamelessly wrong through the craze of the uninstructed and unprincipled for cheap money, for escaping honest payment of debts, and for making ■gain by legal manipulation instead of by honest labor. Mr. Horace White, in a full chapter on the subject, showing how Massachusetts led the way, and how the plague spread to the other colonies, does not exaggerate when he says: "No kings, however tyrannical, ever debased the money in circulation so recklessly, persistently, and outrage- ously, as the colonial assemblies. ' ' * The cele- brated freethinker, Thomas Paine, all whose pre- judices were popular and. patriotic, said, in an essay written in 1786, that "the concise history of paper money schemes ' ' would show that they originated with speculators planning some swindling opera- tion and debtors who hoped to cheat their creditors. One of the uses to which fiat paper was put was that of making loans to private persons, and espe- cially to the land-owners, who everywhere con- trolled the legislative assemblies, and carried their * Money and Banking, p. 121. 8 114 corrupt schemes. The manifest shameless crimi- nality thus introduced into political business- throughout the colonies provoked Paine to declare that a man who proposed a law of legal tender ought to be put to death. 94. FIATIST ZEAL FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE. There is no more impressively significant lesson, for Americans of English descent to ponder, than that of the story of colonial bluster against English effort to keep American money sound and honest. The colonists were not disposed to cease to be Eng- lish ; it was to their rights as Englishmen that they appealed; and foremost among those rights they placed, and stoutly contended for, that of disastrous and dishonest issue of paper money. Nearly the whole of the earlier quarrel of the colonies against the mother country, for the space of seventy-five years, was the shameless quarrel of the colonial populace and demagogues against perfectly just and wise restraint, through the colonial governors, of unbridled license to work iniquity, not against Eng- land, but against their own people ; the cruel iniquity of putting out paper money, through the handling of which large numbers of the unscrupulous and crafty could unmercifully rob those with whom they had to deal. It was not, indeed, American; the scoun- drelism was imported from England, and much of it made a stern conscience of wild west new world Yankeeism, scorning to know either instruction or restraint; the real intelligence and conscience of the makers of new commonwealths were overborne, sometimes even dragooned by circumstances into "5 figuring conspicuously on the wrong side, or even swept away in the delusion ; but that large sense of liberty and law which was to characterize Ameri- can development of the better and the dominant type, would have kept American money honest and American finance sound. Bui it was not to be until after the Revolution ; and after the Civil War ; and after the final education of the American masses to comprehend the wickedness and the folly of fiatist cut- value fifty -three-cent dollars of cheap silver.* 95. CONTINENTAL FIATIST MONEY. The Continental Congress, in respect of financial matters, and most of all in its issuing to its own people of absolutely worthless paper money, was little better than a den of thieves — strictly honor- able thieves, orators of lofty eloquence, zealots of liberty, enthusiasts for freedom, and in some respects among the greatest men in history — yet hardly less issuers of fraudulent paper and robbers of the American people, to whom they gave that paper in payment of supplies for the army, than if they had been a band of counterfeiters. By the time Yorktown was fought they had justly earned the detestation of their subjects, as much as any robber despot could have done, and but for the colossal honesty and discretion of George Wash- * Mr. Horace White's chapter in " Money and Banking'' pp. 120- 134, on " Colonial Paper Money," goes more fully than the above summary account into the facts of colonial kicking against the pricks under the administration from England of righteousness in matters of money. ii6 ington, they would have -wrecked the cause which. they undertook to direct. Mr. Horace White relates, in his chapter on "Con- tinental Money," the story of this discreditable and disastrous fiatism, undertaking to make practically worthless paper pass as money. After noting the fact that $15,000,000 of this continental currency had been issued before independence had been declared, Mr, White says: "From this time the demon of fiat money had possession of the country and worked its will on the inhabitants. The issues ran on in an increasing volume till they amounted to two hundred and forty-two million dollars in the year 1779. In 1781 the whole mass became worthless. Mr. Pelatiah Webster, a merchant of Philadelphia and an ardent patriot, wrote while the money experiment was going on : 'We have suffered more from this than from every other cause of calamity ; it has killed more men, pervaded and corrupted the choicest interests of our country more, and done more injus- tice than even the arms and artifices of our ene- mies.' Mr. Webster, in one of his essays, said that not more than one man in ten thousand was capable of understanding the subject. . . . With the mass of the people nothing could be done. All of them, the wise and the unwise together, were hur- rying to a cataclysm. 'The fatal error,' says Web- ster, 'that the credit and currency of the continen- tal money could be kept up and supported by acts of compulsion entered so deep into the mind of Congress and all departments of administration through the states that no consideration of justice, 117 religion, or policy, or even experience of its utter inefficiency, could eradicate it. It seemed to be a kind of obstinate delirium, totally deaf to every argument drawn from justice and right, from its natural tendency and mischief, from common sense and even common safety. This ruinous principle was continued in practice for five successive years, and a,ppeared in all shapes and forms, that is, in tender acts, in limitations of prices, in awful and threatening declarations, in penal laws with dread- ful and ruinous punishments, and in every other way that could be devised, and all executed with a relentless severity, by the highest authorities then in being, namely, by Congress, by assemblies and conventions of the states, by committees of inspec- tion (whose powers in those days were nearly sov- ereign), and even by military forces ; and though men of all descriptions stood trembling before this monster of force without daring to lift a hand against it during all this period, yet its unrestrained energy ever proved ineffectual to its purposes, but in every instance increased the evils it was designed to remedy and destroyed the benefits it was intended to promote. Many thousand families of full and easy fortune were ruined by these fatal measures and lie in ruins to this day, without the least bene- fit to the country or to the great and noble cause in which we were then engaged.' " "Judge Story," says Mr. White, "referring to the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary legal tender laws, says : ' They entailed the most enorm- ous evils on the country and introduced a system of fraud, chicanery and profligacy which destroyed ii8 all private confidence and all industry and enter- prise.' " The excessive fanaticism into which zeal for lib- erty is easily betrayed had the effect then, as it still has the effect, of making men blind, not only to the dictates of sound policy but to the demands of common honesty. 96. THE CIVIL WAR " GREENBACK" FIATISM. In a further chapter on "The Greenbacks," Mr. White shows by an unanswerable statement of facts how the issue of legal tender notes, and of the treasury notes known as Greenbacks, was an altogether discreditable and disastrous resort to fiatism, when the only honest and rational method of meeting the expenses of the government, even in the greatest crisis, was that of taxation and of borrowing upon the security of bonds. The financial incompetence of Secretary Chase, of the Treasury Department, together with the personal credit which his commanding intellect and liigh character gave him, were in large part, as Mr. White shows, responsible for the wretched fashion in which, by fiatism of the most illegitimate char- acter, the nation's finances were mismanaged. Mr. E. G. Spalding, of Buffalo, a successful banker, Mr. Samuel Hooper, an eminent merchant of Boston, and Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, chairman of the committee of ways and means and leader in the lower house of Congress, assisted to give char- acter to a scheme which the great representatives of American banking interests and the chief repre- sentatives of American finance remonstrated 119 against. The plan urged by the bankers for bor- rowing honestly in the money market by the sale of bonds for what they would bring was violently objected to by Mr. Spalding as likely to knock down government stocks to seventy-five or even sixty cents on the dollar, but under the plan adopted to carry out Mr. Spalding's views, the government paper went down to forty cents on the dollar, and the creditors of the government, including the sol- diers and the laboring men, were incidentally cheated out of more than half their dues. The whole scheme, as Mr. White shows, added $870,000,000 to the cost of the war. As Mr. White unanswerably demonstrates, the large general way in which Secretary Chase commanded the confi- dence of the country and the effort which he made to carry his head high and not let the United States appear as a borrower selling bonds below par, worked most disastrously for the national finances. 97. THE COSTS OF AMERICAN FIATISM. However great our country, and however excel- lent the motives governing our statesmen, we are punished none the less severely for whatever finan- cial mistakes we make. Benjamin Franklin, the wisest man of the colonial times, and especially notable in history as a laboring man who, by self- education and genius rose to the highest distinction, both in statesmanship and in science, urgently advised against continental paper money without any security for the payment of the interest at least in "hard dollars." The patriot Congress voted that it was impracticable, but in this they were I20 grievously mistaken. The determination to pay in honest hard dollars may not go very far at the time in getting the dollars, but it goes much farther than fiat issue of paper, and it secures credit for borrowing upon terms much better than those to which we have always had to come after resort to fiatism. It may be set down as beyond doubt that the United States, taking the colonial times with our own times, have fooled away, by resort to fiat- ism with its inevitable and invariable failure, not less than $1,000,000,000. The fact that we have been a great country, and are on the wa}' to become the greatest of countries, and that the average of intelligence and character in our people is higher than anywhere else in the world, cannot in the least save us from the discredit and dishonor, the disas- ter and destruction of national interests, which are the inevitable result of any fiatism whatever, by which it is attempted to make a paper or other sub- stitute for honest hard dollars. CHAPTER IX. BIMETALLISM. 98. " WHAT IS BIMETALLISM?" A public journal of July 17, 1895, had the follow- ing under the head of "Meaning of Bimetallism." "In the agitation going on over the financial question it is time that, if possible, some authority should establish the meaning of the much-used, word, 'bimetallism.' 121 "In a volume recently published by Mr. Muhle- man, deputy assistant treasurer of the United States, entitled 'Monetary Systems of the World,' the author gives the following definition: 'By bimetallism, strictly defined, is meant the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver into coins of full debt-paying power. Not the mere use of the double standard, but the actually open mints on the terms given above. No country in the world is, therefore, bimetallic to-day, since those conditions do not exist anywhere. ' Other authori- ties just as competent as Mr. Muhleman define bimetallism as 'the concurrent circulation of gold and silver coins at a fixed ratio.' " "It is absurd to hold that 'bimetallism' and 'fre& silver-coinage' are synonymous. The report of the director of the mint gives the following as the bimetallic countries: United States, France, Bel- gium, Roumania, Netherlands, Turkey, Japan, the Straits Settlements and Cuba. When two govern- ment officials like the director of the mint and the deputy assistant treasurer disagree as to the mean- ing of a word, to such an extent, it is time for its meaning to be fixed by some competent authority. ' ' The difficulty with the whole subject grows out of the fact that no proper study of the history is made the basis of the explanations offered. Such study would show very clearly that historic bimet- allism had no theoretical ground, that it was an effort to have both gold and silver money together, and that it adopted one or another plan to secure this, as very imperfect knowledge suggested, and got upon the ground of the double standard, free 122 -coinage, and equal legal tender of both gold and silver, because the bad finance involved was not yet understood. 99. SIDNEY SHERWOOD ON BIMETALLISM. Sidney Sherwood, in the eleventh of his lectures -on ' ' The History and Theory of Money, ' ' says : "What is bimetallism? It is the policy of using both gold and silver as money, the mints being open to the free coinage of both of these metals, and both kinds of money being full legal tender. There is also this requisite, that by law there shall be a fixed ratio between the units of these two coinages. All of these elements are necessary to Teal bimetallism. Hence the situation in the Uni- ted States to-day, in which there is free coinage of one metal (gold) and not free coinage of the other, is not bimetallism, although both moneys are made full legal tender. ' ' The supreme fact of the history, an attempt to have both gold and silver money, making bimet- allism of money, is left out of view in the above -Statement. Prof. Sherwood's view of the matter rests entirely on the assumption that the bimet- allism of the past, on the old bad plan of two kinds of standard money, both gold and silver, is the only possible bimetallism. This is an assumption which has been naturally made, but without suffi- cient study of the subject, and with much more than a chance that the progress of education in economics will open an entirely different view, and permit advocacy of another kind of bimetallism. It is, however, beyond all doubt that the bimet- 123 allism of the past, gold and silver yoked together to make a double standard, could not survive the revelations of modern economic science. ICO. SHAW ON BIMETALLISM. Mr. W. A. Shaw, in his '^History of Currency — 1252 to 18^4," has the following remarks in his Preface : "The total omission of the historic, reasoned, and consecutive study of currency history — the most important domain of practical economics — from the curriculum of every university in the land, is matter for surprise and regret, and can only be attributed to the lack of an initiative and of a handbook." ' ' The verdict of history on the great problem of the nineteenth century — bimetallism — is clear, and crushing, and final ; and against the evidence of history no gainsaying of theory ought for a moment to stand." "Throughout mediaeval Europe and up to the close of the eighteenth century, the currency of Europe was practically bimetallic. ' ' ' ' The conception of a law of tender is quite mod- ern. And the evolution of the idea of such a law has gone hand in hand with the evolution of a con- ception of monetary theory on the part of the legislator. . . . From the thirteenth to the eighteenth century, both gold and silver had been actually employed in European commerce without any idea either of declaring or of restricting the tender, whether of the one or of the other. ' ' ' ' The final outcome of the application of the law 124 of tender was the development of the modern monometallic system. It was only at the close of the eighteenth century that England evolved this system and flung away the last remains of that mediaeval ignorance which had brought with it such a dov/er of mishap. France has taken almost a century of further experience before arriving at the same point of development. ' ' ' ' The modern theory of bimetallism is almost the only instance in history of a theory growing not out of practice, but out of the failure of practice ;, resting not on data verified, but on data falsified and censure-marked. No words can be too strong of condemnation for the theorizing of the bimet- allist who, by sheer imaginings, tries to justify- theoretically what has failed in five centuries of history and to expound theoretically what has proved itself incapable of solution save by cutting and casting away." ' ' Such a verdict as this of history, negative as it is, must strike many a serious mind with dismay. The following of bimetallism would not be what it is were it not for the despair of any other remedy for the situation at the moment." lOI. ERROR OF MR. SHAW'S ASSUMPTION. Mr. Shaw's account is that of one of the greatest living authorities upon the history of money, and his judgment in condemnation of bimetallism of the standard is just beyond all possibility of appeal ; but that does not make it less to be regretted that his statement proceeds upon the wholly unneces- sary assumption that bimetallism can only mean. 125 and has first of all historically meant, the old bad plan of having gold and silver, or silver and gold, not only go together as money, but each figure as standard money with equal tender, under a valua- tion of coins fixed by law. It has been natural for many persons not well studied in so large and so difficult a subject, to think it possible to make the old bad plan of a double standard work well by some method of new regulation. Every such thought can only prove useless and fatal, yet there is no need of construing this as condemnation of all bimetallism. There may be a bimetallism of money, without a bimetallism of the standard, gold and silver united in use without the old bad plan of trying to have the parity of the silver with the gold as a standard maintained. What intelligence and experience now thoroughly understand is, that a double standard is a delusion and a snare. But it does not follow that we may not have both gold and silver money, and make the most of each of our precious metals. Nor does it permit us to read the past as chiefly devoted to bimetallism of the standard. It was chiefly devoted to bimetallism of money, and adopted the double standard system as a supposed necessity of use together of both gold and silver. I02. CONFUSION OF POINTS OF VIEW. Current discussion on both sides of the dispute is commonly wrong as to the point of view, with the double result that the money bimetallists are accused of straddling, or are induced to think well of international effort to restore the double stan- 126 dard system, and the silverites are betrayed into an entirely false position, that of suicidal denial of the standard which is in the nature of things the only sound and true and honest standard. If the former could explain just how they lean to silver, and if the silverites could understand themselves as friends of silver, the dispute would disappear. The confusion turns upon a double meaning of "bimetallism." The bimetallism of money is one thing, and it is the thing upon which all would unite if the whole matter were seen in a clear light. The bimetallism of the standard is another thing, an impossible thing, as well as a pro- foundly bad thing, which the silverites them- selves should be the last to advocate, because of the injury to silver, as well as to other interests, which it will work. The definitions commonly given make the great mistake of losing sight of bimetallism of money. Thus Mr. Preston, director of the mint, says that bimetallism means "the unlimited coinage of both gold and silver into full legal tender coins." But this is bimetallism of the standard, monometallism of which does not exclude bimetallism of money. Gold monometallism of the standard, with gold and silver bimetallism of money, is the true point of view. This means gold coined at its supposed intrinsic value, and current as standard money, and silver coined in the ratio to gold most secure and most helpful to silver and to general, popular money interests, and current on a fiat parity with gold, or exchangeable for gold. 127 103. GOLD STANDARD BIMETALLISM. The bimetallism thus secured would be gold" bimetallism — gold as to the standard, and gold and silver as to the money in use. There could be a silver bimetallism, with silver as the standard and gold dealt with as secondary, precisely as we explain for silver ; and with great shortage of gold such a system might be necessar)^; but no other bimetallism is workable in practice or sound in theory than that which chooses one of the two metals as standard. "All experience has shown that you must have one standard coin, which shall be a legal tender for all others, and then you may promote your domestic convenience by having a subsidiary coinage of silver, which shall circulate in all parts of your country as legal tender for a limited amount, and be redeemable at its face value by your government." — William D. Kelley in Congress, April 9, 1872. Neither the United States alone nor all nations together could maintain bimetallism of the standard; and looking in that direction would not be thought of by either party if the distinction between bimetallism of the stan- dard and bimetallism of money had been properly- understood. Real parity of standards has been found by ages of experience impossible of maintenance, because value in the market never can be depended upon to remain where real parity requires, and the moment that one of the two metals is at a market price below the other the money-mongers use it to buy up the other for the sake of what they can make by selling the other as metal. The fine work 128 of the robber gold men is got in with every change in the value of either of two standard metals which makes one of them intrinsically worth more than the other, and the only way to make an end of the plague is that of making one of the metals the standard and giving the other a parity with it, which is just enough fiat parity to make the two work together both securely and helpfully. 104. SECURE RATIO FOR SILVER. The most secure ratio between gold and silver means intrinsic value in the silver coin enough less than its face value to leave no chance of rise in the market value of silver making the coin worth more as metal than as money. Its parity with gold should be fiat parity to the small extent, say seven per cent., necessary to avoid the risk of giving the money-mongers a chance to make a profit by exchanging it for gold and selling it at a profit as metal. On the other hand, the ratio most helpful to sil- ver and to general popular money interests will be that of intrinsic value in the silver coin as large as may be consistent with security of the coin as money — the security against being taken out of circulation and sold as metal by the money-mon- gers. It is really a question for mint experts exactly what part of a silver coin, under the princi- ples here explained, should be intrinsic value in silver. We may suppose it to be ninety-three per cent., or about forty per cent, more than that of our present silver dollar. This amount of silver in the coin will make the largest practicable use of 129 silver, and it will at the same time permit the amplest desirable supply of silver money, with the least dependence on fiat value in it, and thus the least peril to national credit. If our present silver money had been thirty-five or forty per cent, richer in silver than it is, the amount of silver used would have been that much larger and the money itself that much less dependent on fiatism, and thus our credit more secure, and business and prosperity not only undisturbed, but booming, full and strong against all the world. 105. THE TRUE BIMETALLIC INTEREST. The facts which have been given make plain the justice of a desire for bimetallism, and even lean- ing to silver, only it is bimetallism of money, not of the standard, and gold bimetallism, or gold the standard, and silver established as near to gold as security of its position will permit, with fiat parity to make it "as good as gold" in the money market and in the labor market. There is no opposition of interest between the money market and the labor market in the matter of the character of money, except that labor suffers the most, and money-mongers, by their craft and tricks, get the most advantage, when money is not good and credit is not secure. What labor wants as against capital is a larger share, but it wants that share good, and has more interest than the money-mon- gers have to keep it steadily good. 9 I30 Io6. GOLD CANNOT DISPLACE SILVER. There is no truth whatever in the complaint of denial under the gold standard of a place for silver in the money of mankind, and dangerous depen- dence everywhere upon gold only for money. The nations of progress, of wealth, and of commerce, in whose affairs gold as money, and as a standard, is a recognized necessity, constitute the minority only of mankind. Even their use of the gold stan- dard operates to secure the large use of silver along with gold ; and the contention is a just one that even if the gold standard were accepted every- where, and gold money brought into use, it would operate to make more rather than less secure th& large use of silver. 107. ADVANTAGE ENJOYED BY SILVER. Silver enjoys the advantage of being the familiar and the necessary money of the majority of the human race, the hundreds of millions who inhabit India and China, and other parts of the eastern and tropical regions, where nearly all transactions- require small money. Even in England monetary distress of the common people has in times past turned upon the want of silver small coins in which to make change ; and what gave silver so long and in so many nations the rank of a standard was the fact that it was so generally the necessary money of the common people. Silver had the lead on this, account, and would have kept it but for its more and more failing to give the service which it was- depended upon for. 131 I08. HOW SILVER LOST FIRST PLACE. As numbers of persons came to require large sums to be frequently handled, the bulk and weight of considerable amounts were found terribly objec- tionable ; and if the market price of silver made the coins worth more than their face, the money-mon- gers took all of them, and none were available as money. If, moreover, silver stood as standard and tenaer money, and its value fell to any extent, as in times of large development and very great pro- gress it shows a tendency to do, it would fail of one of its most important uses, that of applying at the payment of a debt the same as at its creation, and would enable all persons under promise or contract to pay to make their payments by tender of less than "value received." 109. GOLD STANDARD WILL HELP SILVER. The gold standard system not only gives gold where it is a necessity, but prevents the silver money from going out of service as money, or doing by its fall in value false work as a standard equall}' applicable to the creation and to the pay- ment of debts ; and as in all countries there is an immense need of money of the common people, part of which at least may be silver dollars, and a large part of which, for smaller change, must be silver; and as vast regions of the globe, embracing a majority of mankind, chiefly use silver as money, there is no possibility of a lessened world-use of silver as money. There is, in fact, a very great probability of the increased dependence of the 132 •whole world upon silver money. Let it be once understood that this use is to be under the gold standard, and international agreements for it will be at once practicable, the effect of which will be to carry gold bimetallism everywhere, and to largely increase the amount of silver coined and current as money ; coined at the best advantage to silver and current at the best advantage to the pub- lic. Mr. Jevons put the case fairly well when he said: "The highly-civilized and advancing nations of Western Europe and North America, including also the rising states of Australasia, and some of the better second-rate states, such as Egypt, Brazil, and Japan, will all have the gold standard. The silver standard, on the other hand, will probably long be maintained throughout the Russian empire and most parts of the vast continent of Asia ; also in some parts of Africa, and possibly in Mexico. Excluding, however, these minor and doubtful cases, Asia and Russia seem likely to uphold silver against the rest of the world adopting gold."* * Money and the Mechanism of Exchange, p. 149. India and Russia have gone to the gold standard since Jevons wrote, and China even uses that standard to measure the value, day by day, of the silver she uses. 133 CHAPTER X. BIMETALLISM IN ENGLAND : COMPLETE BREAK- DOWN OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD SYSTEM. no. EARLY ENGLISH SILVER. In England silver was the only metal coined from the time of Egbert to that of Edward III., unless, perhaps, a very few small pieces of gold. Silver was the sole legal tender and measure of value, and few coins were issued except silver pennies. These silver pennies, equal probably in purchasing power to a shilling at least, and perhaps sixteen pence, of the present English money, formed the mass of the currency. Good gold coin came from Florence under the name of florins, and from far off Byzan- tium (Constantinople), under the name of byzants. Tradesmen, moreover, put out copper coins, which the people gladly used as small money. No legiti- mate coinage of copper existed before 1664. III. EARLY ENGLISH GOLD. The use of foreign gold led to English coinage of gold. The Plantagenet kings, for example, finding that under exclusive coinage of silver the people used gold money from abroad, eventually undertook the issue of gold coins, at a fixed ratio of exchange with silver. This made the English system a double standard system, and from 1257 to 1664 England had both silver inoney and gold money, under a ratio of exchange which was fixed from time to time by royal proclamation. From 134 1664 to 1717 no proclamations were made, and the value of gold was variously reckoned in terms of the silver shilling ; making a silver standard sys- tem. But the system worked badly. Under Charles II. and James II., from 1661 to 1690, there was no end of trouble to have money in England. The good coins were exported because, the face value being lower than the real value, they were worth more to sell abroad than to circulate at home, and hardly anything was in circulation except depreci- ated, scarcely half value, silver, and iron, brass, or copper pieces plated with silver. 112. RECOINAGE SCHEME 1695-99. In 1695, November 22, under William II., an Act for remedying the ill state of the coins was passed, but with the unwise determination to adhere to the pre-existing standard, in spite of the clearly seen advance in the value of silver, which made the coins worth more as metal than as money. The arguments of the celebrated John Locke were accepted and acted on, in spite of replies to them which ought to have been seen to be absolutely decisive. A great recoinage scheme, carried out in the years 1695-99, had the result of bringing in a great quantity of gold, but the gain of gold meant the loss of silver. The movement either way, of gold into England and of silver out of England, was due to the fact that the gold coin were accepted in England at more than their real value and the silver coins at less. Even a premium of 2 1-2 pence per ounce on foreign silver coins brought to the 135 Tnint, between April 17 and December i, 1709, did no good, because it still left silver wortli more else- "where than in England. 113. THE MONEY-MONGERS GOT THE SILVER. It was remarked in Parliament * that the situa- tion had occasioned "a clandestine trade, of late years carried on by the Dutch, Hamburgers and other foreigners, in concert with the Jews and other traders here (in London), which consisted in exporting silver coins and importing gold in lieu thereof; which being coined into guineas at the Tower (the government mint at the Tower), near fifteen pence was got by every guinea, which amounted to about five per cent. ; and as these returns might be made five or six times in a year, considerable sums were got by it, to the prejudice of Great Britain, which thereby was drained of silver and overstocked with gold.f 114. SIR ISAAC NEWTON ON MONEY. The celebrated Sir Isaac Newton was master of the mint in England, and in 171 7, some months •earlier than the just mentioned speech in Parlia- ment, he had made a report showing very plainly the effect of overvaluing or undervaluing gold or silver, causing the overvalued to come in and the tindervalued to go out through the inevitable trade in money which the situation stimulated. In another report of September 21st, Newton stated. * Dec. 20, 1717. ■j; Shaw; J7ist. of Currency, p. azS. 136 tHat, since tlie beginning' of 1702 to September, 1 71 7, the gold coined at the mint had amounted to 7, 127,835 pounds sterling, while the silver within the same period had only amounted to 223,380 pounds. To meet the situation Parliament petitioned the king to have the value of the guinea reduced to 2 1 shillings, instead of 21s. 6d., and this was at once done by proclamation December 22. Even this was not a complete cure. The evil lasted for half a century, and might have lasted still longer but for the rise in the value of gold which began about 1756, and by 1773 had made gold worth what it was counted as worth. 115. ENGLAND WITH NO GOOD MONEY. The change that gave England gold did not after all keep it in circulation as money. There very soon took effect another tendency created by the situation, that of export of gold to Holland to be filed and sent back in a depreciated form. The silver was so poor, so depreciated, that depreciated gold could be made to pass with it. Mr. Shaw remarks on this phenomenon, which he says "always recurs in a currency containing two differ- ently depreciated elements : ' ' "The idea that bimetallic action replaces one good metal by another, a good undepreciated coin- age of silver for a good undepreciated coinage of gold, or vice versa, is not borne out by a single instance in history. Bimetallic action always sub- stitutes the less for the greater, the more depreci- ated for the less, or the depreciated for the perfect standard coin. . . . The result of fifty years of 137 bimetallic regime left England witli currency depreciated in both its limbs, in both silver and gold, and as deficient in the quantity current as in the weight of the individual pieces.* Il6. BIRTH OF THE PRESENT ENGLISH SYSTEM. It was at this stage of English experience that Lord Liverpool intervened with those enlightened, views which operated to create the present English system of stable finance. Under his advice, and by resolutions of the House of Commons passed May lo, 1774, all the deficient gold coins were called in and recoined, and the sound rule of good standard money was made that in future the cur- rency of the gold coin should be regulated by weight as well as by tale or count, and that the several pieces should not be legal tender if dimin- ished below a certain weight. This not only brought the gold coins to a state of comparative perfection, but kept them there. 117. A LAW OF TENDER APPLIED TO SILVER. To mend the case of silver an Act was passed in. the fourteenth year of George III. prohibiting, on pain of confiscation, the importation of light silver coin, and requiring that for payment of any sum exceeding £2^1, at any one time, silver should be legal tender by weight only at the rate of 5 s. 2d. per ounce of silver. Mr. Shaw says of this last provision of English law dating from 1774: "The importance of this latter epoch-making *IIist. of Currency, pp. 232, 233. 138 clause is vital. It is the first enactment of a law of tender in the history of English monetary legisla- tion, and it was the first step towards the shaking off the incubus of that mediaeval currency system which was even then only coming to be understood in all its fatal perniciousness. For statesmanship, the only parallel to it is that Act of Henry III. of France, which proved so short lived in its adop- tion.* It was the first step in the evolution of that system of safeguarded currency which was finally constructed in i8i6.f Il8. COINAGE OF SILVER SUSPENDED. Trouble because of silver was, however, not yet at an end, and after various attempts to deal with it, the further coinage of silver was suspended, ^ ' for the present, " by an Act of June 21,1 798. Not that silver did not remain the standard coin of the realm, and legal tender to any amount. But "the state of the coins," standard though they were, and ' ' the present low price of silver bullion, ' ' mak- ing it likely that operations in coinage for export would increase, temporary suspension of coinage was adopted. Mr. Shaw says that even after this step had been taken, "the years of the bank restric- tion [from 1797], until, that is, the new mint law of 18 16, saw the heaviest export of silver probably that England has ever experienced;" that, for *The officials of the French mint advised Henry III. in 1575 to adopt a system in which the gold ecu should be the standard, and some experiment was made in this direction, but with no proper understanding of its significance and only to be abolished by Henry IV. in 1602. f Mist of Currency, p. 236. 139 example, "during the ten years, 1801-1810, nearly ten millions sterling of silver was exported from England (over 38,176,016 oz.) while the gold exports amounted only to ;^2, 088,483, so that, of the total export, silver formed eighty -two per cent, (net amounts in both cases) ; ' ' and that ' ' the straits -of the poorer classes, due to the existing bimetallic system, ' ' were most extraordinary.* 119. RECOINAGE OF SILVER— 1816 It was because of the utter breakdown of silver, and in order to restore it to currency and service, that the measure of 18 16 for recoinage of silver, but 'with limit of legal tender and gold as the sole standard and the only unlimited tender, was enacted. If silver had been doing good service, or if any other way of making it do good service had Taeen known, the change to gold monometallism of the standard would not have been made. The "'"Whereas" for the recoinage of silver said that ""the silver coins of the realm have, by long use and other circumstances, become greatly dimin- ished in number and deteriorated in value, so as not to be sufficient for the payments required in ■dealings under the value of the current gold coins, by reason whereof a great quantity of light and counterfeit silver coin and foreign coin has been introduced into circulation within this realm, and the evils resulting therefrom can only be remedied by a new coinage of silver money." f *Hist. of Currency, pp. 241, 242. \ Quoted by Shaw; Hist, of Currency, pp. 242, 243 I40 I20. REASONS FOR THE GOLD STANDARD. And for the further enactment, making gold the sole standard and the only unlimited tender, and silver tender only up to forty shillings, the prefa- tory explanation was : ' ' Whereas at various times heretofore the coins of this realm of gold and silver have been usually as legal tender for payments to any amount, and GREAT INCONVENIENCE HA.S ARISEN FROM BOTH THESE PRECIOUS METALS BEING CONCURRENTLY THE STAND- ARD MEASURE OF VALUE AND EQUIVALENT OF PROP- ERTY, IT IS EXPEDIENT THAT THE GOLD COIN MADE ACCORDING TO THE INDENTURES OF THE MiNT SHOULD HENCEFORTH BE THE SOLE STANDARD MEAS- URE OF VALUE AND LEGAL TENDER FOR PAYMENT WITHOUT ANY LIMITATION OF AMOUNT, AND THAT THE SILVER COIN SHOULD BE A LEGAL TENDER TO A LIMITED AMOUNT ONLY, FOR THE FACILITY OF EX- CHANGE AND COMMERCE," * CHAPTER XI. BIMETALLISM IN FRANCE — DISASTROUS WORK- ING OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD SYSTEM DRIVES FRANCE TO THE GOLD BASIS. 121. EARLY FRENCH MONEY. The original French livre, now called the franc, was at first a pound weight of silver. The royal custom, diligently pursued for the profit that there ^Quoted by Shaw; Hist, of Currency, p. 243. 141 was in it, was that of changing the value in a •coin to a less value, while making it pass under the same name. The report of M. Beranger, on the French monetary system, in 1802, stated that the ratio of gold to silver had been changed twenty-six times between 1602 and 1773, and that the livre was at the time of his writing worth only the seventy- sixth part of its original weight. Recoinages always meant debasement of the coin, on the rascal principle in favor with needy kings, that intrinsic value could be left out to any extent and fiat value substituted for it. There were four recoinages under Louis XIV., and five under Louis XV. The ratio between silver and gold, adopted in 1 726, was 14 5-8 to I, and at this time that in England was 15 1-7. The two worked to make silver go from England to France, and gold go from France to England, simply because France counted silver at more than its real value, and England counted gold at more than it was worth.* 122. FRENCH REVOLUTION MONEY. Calonne, the finance minister of Louis XVL , un- dertook in 1785 a recoinage based on sound money principles. He put the ratio at 15 1-2, not on the ground that it was the exact market ratio, but in the belief that a rise to this was at hand. The monetary system of Republican France was built on a law of the year XL, 28th March, 1803, which, instituting no new principle, or theory, or system in French currency, but carrying on the old loose * Horace White : Monty and Banking, p. 6i. 142 and shifting plan of a double standard, made silver the basis, and issued gold money of a value based on the ratio of 15 1-2, —although the minister of finance, Gaudin, admitted that for a long time the commercial ratio had been under 15. The neces- sary result of thus overvaluing silver and under- valuing gold was that the gold went where it was worth more and France was filled with silver, the bulk and weight of which were a terror to all who had to handle money to any amount. It was not until the new and enormous production of gold in California, Australia, and Russia, about 185 1, that France was delivered from the silver incubus, and had gold as well as silver money. There is no truth whatever in the statement sometimes made, that France, under the 1803 ratio of 15 1-2, kept the ratio steady and both gold and silver in circulation. 123. MR. SHAW ON FRENCH BIMETALLISM. Mr. Shaw remarks very plainly and justly on the error into which English writers, seeing a fixed and steady state of things in England, due to gold monometallism of the standard, have given the credit for this to French bimetallism, when in fact France had no experience of it. Mr. Shaw says : "At no point of time during the present century has the actual market ratio, dependent on the com- mercial value of silver, corresponded with the French ratio of 15 1-2, and at no point of time has France been free from the disastrous influence of that want of correspondence between the legal and the commercial ratio. The opposite notion, which prevails and finds expression in the ephemeral 143 "bimetallic literature of to-day, is simply due to ignorance. It is in no polemic spirit, but simply in the interest of science that this particular misap- plication of history to the squaring of a theory is to be branded. The plainest facts of history are thereby absolutely misrepresented. At no point of a graphic representation do the market and the legal ratios coincide. After three years of fluctua- tions, 1803-06, now above and now below, the market ratio sinks persistently below the legal for seven years, 1807-13. For the succeeding five or six years, 1813-19, the market ratio was as con- sistently above the legal. From 1819 up to 1850 its course was undeviatingly below 15 1-2 ; then for 1851-67, the period of the great gold outputs of Australia and America, as undeviatingly above. And from 1867 up to our own days, the course of the commercial ratio has been again unbrokenly below the 15 1-2 ratio, and with an ever increasing enormity of divergence." "The influence of this divergence, of the com- mercial from the legal ratio, upon France's store of the precious metals, has been exactly similar in effect and force with that of similar trains of event and circumstance in the monetary history of France during the four preceding centuries. From 1830' to 1850, while the market ratio remained continu- ally below the legal 15 1-2, there was a profit on the import of silver, and a persistent and heavy import took place. In 1830 the (balance of the) silver imported amounted to a matter of six mil lions sterling; in 1831 to seven and one-quartei millions; in 1834 to four millions; in 1837 to over 144 £ve and one-half millions; in 1838 to nearly five millions; in 1841 to nearly five millions; in 1843 to over four millions ; in 1 848 to over eight and one- half millions ; and in 1 849 to nearly ten millions. There was not a single year that was not accom- panied by this import, and over the whole twenty- two years the total of importations reached the enormous figure of, approximately, ninety-two millions sterling. And it must be clearly under- -stood that this sum represents not the gross but the net importation or balance of imports over exports, and that the money passed into the cur- rency of the country, taking its place as such and displacing gold. ' ' "With the year 1852 the decisive change in the ratio sets in with the new gold influx. The market ratio rises above the 15 1-2 of the French law, and the profit on the importation and coining of silver vanishes. Its place is taken by a corresponding profit on the importation and coinage of gold. Tlie fourteen years during which the market ratio remained above the legal 15 1-2 witnessed the importation into France of a total net (or balance) of gold to the amount of one hundred and thirty- five millions sterling, and a total net or balance of exportation of silver of sixty-six and two-thirds millions sterling. ' ' "With 1865 the final, and, so far as the nine- teenth century is concerned, the fatal chaise of the commercial ratio sets in. It sinks persistently and increasingly below the legal 15 1-2, in face and spite of the united mintiujgs of the Latin Union, and at once the premium on the importation and 145 coinage of gold changes into one on silver. From 1865 to 187s, one year before the abandonment of the coinage of the 5 -franc piece and the consequent relinquishment by France of the bimetallic system, Iter net imports of silver amounted to fifty-six millions sterling." * 124. DOUBLE STANDARD PERILS. The final outcome of French experience was compulsory acceptance of the gold standard. The formation of the Latin Union in 1865, and the establishment of a convention which came into force August 17, 1869, for Belgium, France, Switz- erland, and Italy, was for the purpose, not of spreading and securing bimetallism of the standard, but of obtaining securities against the perils of such bimetallism of the standard. The French monetary commission of 1867 told a part of the story of French experience in the following : "It is well known by all that this ratio (of 1 803 — 15 1-2) by the simple reason of its being fixed could not remain correct. There was quickly a premium on gold, and silver remained almost alone in circulation until near 1850. The discovery of the mines of California and Australia suddenly changed this situation by throwing into the Euro- pean market a considerable quantity of gold. By the side of this force, which tended to create a divergence from the legal ratio by lowering gold, there was another which occasioned a rise of silver. Under the influence of various circumstances, too *Shaw: Hist of Currency, pp. 172-182, 10 146 long to enumerate, the needs of tlie extreme East had grown in unusual proportions, and as silver is alone in favor there, it was exported in enormous masses. There was a premium on silver to the extent of eight per mille, and it disappeared almost completely from circulation, yielding place to gold. Preoccupied by the situation, the government charged a commission to study the measures to be taken. Its labors are summed up in the report of M. de Bosredon (1857)." * 125. THE GOLD STANDARD A NECESSITY. The report of M. de Bosredon examined the sys- tem tending to preserve silver money intact by lowering the value of gold money, and conversely the system tending to the adoption of the gold standard by reducing the silver money to the state of billon or subsidiary money, but came to no decision. Continuance of trouble, and the example of Switzerland, which had in i860 reduced the value of its smaller coins, led to the appointment of another commission in 1861, which advised doing what Switzerland had done. ' ' It did this, ' ' to recur to the language used by the commission of 1867, "in complete knowledge of the cause, fully recog- nizing that in so doing the monetary unit of silver, characteristic of- our system, would be thereby broken, at any rate for its circulating form; for while the franc no longer existed in law, the 5 -franc was disappearing in fact, so that the change was ^Quoted by Shaw: Hist, of Currency, p. 188. 147 EQUIVALENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOLD STANDARD." * 126. THE LATIN UNION AND GOLD. The advice thus given was acted on in part only, hy a law of 1864, affecting only the fifty centime and the twenty centime coins. But the next year resort was had to the formation of the Latin Union, in order to arrange some safeguard against the perils of the tottering monetary system of France. The commission of 1867 remarked on the inten- tional aspect of the Latin Union : ' ' This conven- tion places in the front rank gold money, and reduces the piece of silver of two francs and less to the r61e of token money. It therefore definitely determines the ascendency of the gold francs, and solves practical difficulties arising from the double standard." f Mr. Shaw justly declares in regard to the Latin Union, that it was formed in order to arrange a remedy for the evils of bimetallism of the standard, as these were felt in Belgium, France, Italy, and Switzerland, and that the idea that it was formed for the maintenance of this bimetallism could not have arisen but for the complete revolution in the conditions of production of the precious metals which brought a fall in the value of silver from 1 87 1. The heavy fall which made itself felt in 1873 set in motion action of one or another of the par- • Quoted by Shaw: Hist, of Currency, p. 189. t Quoted by Shaw: Hist, of Currency, p, 190. 148 ties to the Latin Union tending to the final over- throw of bimetallism of the standard, and adoption of- the gold standard. 127. FINAL ADOPTION OF THE GOLD STANDARD. In 1876, when the fall of silver became more dis- astrously pronounced, the French government sur- rendered to the inevitable, a monetary system on the same gold basis which England had adopted sixty years earlier. The minting of 5 -franc silver pieces was suspended entirely, by a bill which M. Leon Say submitted to the Senate, March 21, 1876, and other legislation followed, the grounds of which were stated in these words : "The events which have happened for some time past in the relations of the precious metals have brought to a head the monetary question amongst us, although from 181 5 Great Britain has laid down principles which have attracted round her an ever- increasing circle of nations. ' ' "The theory of the double standard, on which our monetary law of the year XL reposes, has been called in question ever since its origin." "It is, to our conception, less a theory than the result of the primitive inability of the legislators to combine together the two precious metals other- wise than by way of an unlimited concurrence — metals, both of which are destined to enter into the monetary system, but which recent legislators have learned to co-ordinate by leaving the unlim- ited function to gold alone and reducing silver to the r61e of divisional money. From 1857 the French government has studied the question, and 149 it may be stated that since that date the principle of the gold standard has won increasing favor through our several administrations." * 128. HISTORIC BIMETALLISM OF MONEY. The interpretation here of historic bimetallism of the standard, as not the result of thought or knowledge justifying a theory, but as an effort, when thought and knowledge were not yet in pos- session of the field, is thoroughly just. Both gold and silver money were wanted, and both were made standard money, and often enough silver made the unit of value, simply because no better plan was yet known. The better plan has become known; experience, wherever it is known, proves it to be the only sound plan ; gold monometallism of the standard; gold and silver bimetallism of money; the two made to work in harmony as money by giving gold alone the place of standard and by adjusting silver to it on an under- standard and limited legal tender basis. '■Quoted by Shaw: Hist, of Currency, pp, 196, 197. ISO CHAPTER XII. THE UNITED STATES AND BIMETALLISM — COMPLETE FAILURE OF SILVER — THE GOLD STANDARD A NECESSITY. 129. ALEXANDER HAMILTON'S MONEY SCHEME. Alexander Hamilton figures conspicuously in the early monetary history of the United States, but he was far from being a prophet of sound finance. Mr. Shaw says : "Hamilton's scheme, as contained in his most remarkable paper, was for a silver unit or dollar of 371 1-4 grains of pure silver and a ratio of 15, and instead of the allowance of two per cent, for waste and coinage, the principle was adopted of free coin- age — of delivering at the mint the same weight of pure metal coined as should be brought to it in bullion or foreign coin." * 130. FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OF HAMILTON. Hamilton expressed himself as ' ' strongly inclined to the opinion that a preference ought to be given to neither of the metals for the monetary unit . , . because this cannot be done effectually without destroying the office and character of one of them as money and reducing it to the situation of mere merchandise. ' ' If Hamilton in saying this had in view bimet- allism of the standard, he spoke from the imperfect * History of Currency, p. 251, 151 knowledge of the time. The whole history of modern experience with money shows nothing more plainly than the effect of the double-standard system to reduce one of the two metals from the position of money to that of merchandise. That is the largest and the most significant fact in the his- tory of gold and silver, that if both are made stan- dard money, one of them will go as money and the other as merchandise, because one of them, com- pared with the other, will be worth more to sell than to circulate. If the United States were to enact the legal tender parity of its present i6 to i silver dollars with its standard gold, it would be in effect the same as offering the gold for sale at some- thing less than 50 cents on the dollar. Even if it were a 99-cent silver dollar, the effect would be to sell the gold for 99 cents on the dollar. Hamil- ton, therefore, spoke most unadvisedly when he suggested that we ought to have a double standard in order to keep both of them going as money. 131. BIMETALLISM OF MONEY PRACTICABLE. What Hamilton said may indeed mean that, while silver held the field he more than suspected that a silver unit was a mistake, and that gold ought to have at least equal place with it, even if not made the standard to the exclusion of a silver standard. But whatever lay behind in Hamilton's mind, he made a capital mistake in assuming that there could not be at one and the same time monometallism of the standard, and especially of the better standard, and bimetallism of money. With gold as the standard, and silver coined of, say, ninety 152 per cent, intrinsic value, and issued as by law exchangeable for gold, or upon fiat parity with, gold, there could be any amount of silver money that the public would take and use ; not indeed standard money the same as gold, but, with ninety per cent, of intrinsic value and ten per cent, of fiat, value, as true money and as good money as any other. And the supreme lesson of monetary experience is that the only way to maintain silver in use as money, good money and ample in quan- tity, is that of linking it with a gold standard as under-money, or on an under-standard basis, that of intrinsic value to about ninety per cent, and fiat value about ten per cent. ; the object being to guard against rise in the price of the metal changing it from money into merchandise. 132. FAILURE OF HAMILTON'S SCHEME. Hamilton's scheme was adopted April 2, 1792^ and of its working Mr. Shaw says : ' ' For a period the system established in 1 792 went on, although the ratio established was prejudicial to gold. But, twenty years after, the natural result arrived in America as in England, and the circula- tion of gold was completely extinguished in the United States by the unseen withdrawal of the metal.* Hamilton's scheme had made the standard silver dollar too cheap in comparison with gold. It, therefore, paid the money-mongers to get all the gold by giving the cheaper silver dollars for it. The *Shaw: Hist, of Currency, p. 253. 153 United States sold to them all her gold, at a loss to- the seller, and to the buyer a corresponding profit. The system, trying to make both silver and gold money, actually made the gold merchandise. 133. THE LAW OF 1834 THROWS OUT SILVER. The state of things created by Hamilton's mis- takes, and the causes of which were not understood, lasted until the law of July 31, 1834, made a change by enacting a new ratio, i to 16 instead of i to 15. Benton, in his "Thirty Years' View," says that at that time "15 5-8 was the ratio of nearly all who seemed best calculated from their pursuits to under- stand the subject; " that "the thick array of speak- ers was on that side, and the eighteen banks of the city of New York, with Mr. Gallatin at their head, favored that proportion;" that "the difficulty of adjusting this value, so that neither metal should expel the other had been the stumbling block for a great many years, and now seemed to be as formidable as ever; " that "there seemed to be no way of getting to a concord of opinion either from the light of science, the voice of history, or the result of calculations;" and that he, "taking his stand upon the single fact that equality and actu- ality of circulation had existed for above three hundred years in the Spanish dominions of Mexica and South America, where the proportion was 16 to I," presented this with such effect that "all the real friends of the gold currency soon rallied to it. . . . and eventually the bill was passed (in the House) by a large majority, 145 to 35 ; " while "in the Senate it had an easy passage ; Calhoun and IS4 Webster supported it, Mr. Clay opposed it ; and on the final vote there were but seven negatives. ' ' Mr. Benton went on to state "the good effects of the bill;" how "a currency (gold) banished from the country for thirty years overspread the land and gave joy and confidence to all the pursuits of industry.* 134. GOLD BECOMES THE ONLY MONEY. This was the beginning of a gold basis in the United States. It was intended to bring gold back, and the gold came — came to stay. It was not intended to displace silver, but that was the effect, a result of the fact that the silver dollar was not cheap enough, was worth more as metal, as mer- chandise in the metal market, than as money, and thus gave the money-mongers a chance to make a profit by taking it all in exchange for gold. 135. POSITION OF SILVER REDUCED IN I8S3. Mr. Shaw says in regard to Benton's glowing -account of the coming of gold : "The ratio was too high, and the silver dollars could not be maintained. They were unduly exported, especially between the years 1848 and 1851. And in order to retain within the country a sufficient amount of small coin the amount of silver in the small coins, from the half-dollar downwards, was reduced by an Act of February 24, 1853. It was at the same time provided that they should be 'Shaw: Hist, of Currency, pp. 257-259, 155 coined only on government account, and they were made legal tender only up to the sum of five dol- lars. The direction of this step will be seen at a glance — it was in the direction of the gold valua- tion. It was so conceived and explicitly stated by Dunham, who piloted the bill through the House. 'We have had,' he said, 'but a single standard for the last three or four years. That has been and no w is gold. We propose to let it remain so, and to adapt silver to it, to regulate it (silver) by it (gold).' Legally, the old silver dollar was left untouched, and the gold and silver valuation was not expressly abolished. No reference whatever was made to the silver dollars in the Act, for the simple reason that for years nothing had been seen of them. They did not and could not circulate. There was plenty of gold, and the absence of silver, with the change in standard therein practically implied, was either unnoticed, or regarded, if at all, only with indifference. ' ' 136. SILVER DISCREDITED AS A STANDARD, Both Mr. Shaw here, and Mr. Dunham, whom he quotes, miss the mark of perfectly accurate history. It was not true that the standard had become gold only, and that nobody noticed the change, or at least nobody cared. What was true was that gold alone wa? the money of the country, and that this most naturally suggested that the standard ought to be gold alone. Silver was an absentee. It had entirely quitted the field of money to figure as merchandise in the metal market. Nobody desired it to quit serving as money, but every dollar got 156 two cents for changing from serving as money ta figuring as merchandise, and away they went with one accord scorning to remain as money. And that in spite of the fact that they were standard money, if only they would stay as money. 137. SILVER FROM 1 873 NOT A STANDARD. Mr. Shaw goes on to say of the developments following the failure of silver to keep its place as money in the United States : "The final step in the simplification and unifica- tion of this system was commenced in 1870, when a bill was prepared for a revised coinage law with a pure gold standard, silver being demonetized as a legal tender money. The bill did not become law until April 12, 1873. And no opposition was expressed in either the House or the Senate to the abolition of the double standard. The silver dol- lars previously coined (of which, however, but few were in existence) maintained their quality as legal tender ; but the coining of new dollars, whether on government or private account, was forbidden. This Act was, therefore, simply the complement of the preceding legislation of 1853." 138. SILVER NOT " DEMONETIZED " IN 1 873. The expression "demonetized as a legal tender money " is not only misleading, but it is inaccurate. To be accurate it should read " unlimited le^&l ten- der," and to recite the exact fact the expression "demonetized" should not be used at all. Silver remained money just as really as if its standard IS7 character had not been taken away. Mr. Horace White states the exact facts of money when he says: "The money of the country consists of all the gold, plus all the other instruments of ex- <:hange which are redeemable in it. ' ' 139- GOLD THE STANDARD: NOT THE SOLE MONEY. The law of 1873 made the gold dollar the unit of value or dollar of account. As Mr. Samuel Hooper, whom Mr. White quotes from the Congressional Globe, said in Congress, April 9, 1872: "The committee, after careful consideration, concluded that twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of standard gold constituting the gold dollar should be declared the money unit or metallic representa- tive of the dollar of account." To the same effect Mr. W. L. Stoughton said : ' ' Gold is practically the standard of value among all civilized nations, and the time has come in this country when the gold dollar should be distinctly declared to be the coin representative of the money unit." Mr. C. N. Potter said : "This bill provides for the making of changes in the legal tender coin of the country, and for sub- stituting as legal tender (without limit), coin of only one metal instead as heretofore of two. I think myself this would be a wise provision, and that legal tender coins, except subsidiary, should be of gold alone. ' ' * * Money and Banking, pp. 214, 215. 158 I40. SILVER AS MONEY MADE SECURE. And further, in regard to silver, Mr. Hooper said : "Section sixteen re-enacts the provisions of existing laws defining the silver coins and their ■weights respectively, except in relation to the sil- ver dollar, which is reduced in weight from 412 1-2 to 384 grains, thus making it a subsidiary coin in harmony with the silver coins of less denomination, to secure its concurrent circulation with them. The silver dollar of 412 1-2 grains, by reason of its bullion or intrinsic value being greater than its nominal value, long since ceased to be a coin of circulation, and was melted by manufacturers of silverware. ' ' And Mr. Wm. D. Kelley said : ' ' I wish to ask the gentleman who has just spoken if he knows of any government in the world which makes its subsidiary coinage of full value. The silver coin of England is ten per cent, below the value of gold coin. And, acting under the advice of the experts of this country (the United States), and of England and France, Japan has made her silver coinage, within the last year, twelve per cent, below the value of gold coin, and for this reason: It is impossible to retain the double stan- dard. The values of gold and silver continually fluctuate. You cannot determine this year what will be the relative values of gold and silver next year. Hence all experience has shown that you must have one standard coin, which shall be a legal tender for all others, and then you may promote your domestic convenience by having a subsidiary coinage of silver, which shall circulate in all parts 159 of your country as legal tender for a limited amount, and be redeemable at its face value by- your government. ' ' * 141. GOLD STANDARD MEANS DOUBLE MONEY, The evidence here is very clear that silver was not demonetized. It was, on the contrary, changed in its relation to gold, destandardized, for the sole purpose of making it stay and work as money, in- stead of failing to so work. To have silver as well as gold as money, and to have as ample a supply of silver money as could be used, was the purpose of taking silver out of the position of a standard, and giving it a subsidiary position. The old false idea made nothing money unless it were standard money. The new idea makes two kinds of money, standard of gold, and subsidiary of silver upon a basis of fiat parity with gold. And it does this as the only means of having both gold and silver money working together, instead of one working as money and the other taken away as merchandise, 142. THE BLAND BILL DOUBLE STANDARD SCHEME. It was within a very short time after the changes, made in 1873 that fresh interest in silver was stim- ulated by the new mines of that metal in Nevada,, and by the expectation of the resumption of specie payments. This led to efforts to get silver made again a standard along with gold. A commission appointed August 14, 1875, recommended the estab- lishment of the double standard. Bland, one of * Money and Banking, pp. 214-216. i6o the commission, offered a bill, for re-establishing' the double standard at the ratio of i6 to i (15.988 to i) with free coinage of silver. The majority of the Congress elected in 1876 represented the patri- otic enthusiasm, and opinionated half-knowledge or absolute ignorance of money questions and money history, of the mass of the people. They favored the Bland bill, but could not carry it against the Senate and the President. The House passed the bill, to restore the double standard and coin silver on the same terms as gold, and at the ratio of 16 to I. In the Senate Mr. Allison carried an amendment which dropped free coinage but provided that the government should bu)' every month not less than $2,000,600 worth and not more than $4,000,000 worth of silver and coin it into "16 to I " silver dollars, which should be full legal ten- der money. Although even this the President T/-etoed, it was passed over his veto,* and under its operation the whole number of dollars coined was 378,166,793, of which about 57,000,000 were put in circulation, and the remainder were made the basis of silver certificates which, although not legal ten- der, were receivable for all public dues, and were thus readily current. 143. THE BLAND BILL RESULTS. Mr. Shaw says of the (Allison) Bland bill, which had the Bland restoration of the double standard left out, and was thus Bland only in name : "The Bland bill deceived the hope of both par- * Feb. 28, 1878. i6i ties, as such a compromise might be expected to •do. It remained in force, notwithstanding, till August, 1890, and during the twelve years, 1 878-1 890, the United States coined a matter of 370 million silver dollars, employing therein a third of the total contemporary production. Almost yearly, up to 1 887, the repeal of the silver purchase clauses of the Bland bill and the suspension of the silver coinage was recommended to Congress by Presi- dential message, and in the reports of the Secretary ■of the Treasury." * CHAPTER XIII. GERMANY AND BIMETALLISM — THE GOLD STANDARD COMES IN WITH THE EMPIRE — A RECENT GERMAN SILVER CRAZE. 144. EARLY GERMAN MONETARY EFFORT. Germany, says Mr. Shaw, had not less than nine distinct and independent coinage systems in exist- ence, when at last the events of 1871 came to give her unity in her coinage, along with unity in her political life.f An unsuccessful attempt to secure mint unifica- tion throughout Germany had been made in 1738, and this attempt had been renewed in the General Mint Convention of the States of the Zollverein, which was agreed upon in full assembly of dele- gates at Dresden July 30th, 1838, and ratified there January 7, 1839. * Hist, of Currency, p. 263. \'^Hist. of Currency," p. rgS. II 1 62 145. THE VIENNA CONVENTION. The agreement of 1838-39 had continued in force nominally until the later and still more famous convention of Vienna in 1857, which undertook to bring into one system the three competing systems then existing in Germany, those of Austria, Prus- sia, and South Germany or Bavaria, and to secure a properly regulated gold coinage. In regard to the latter Mr. Shaw points out how exactly the two cases of Germany in 1857 and of the Latin Union countries in 1865, were brought about by the working of bimetallism of the stand- ard, after the gold price of silver had risen above 60 7-8 pence per standard ounce. The profit on minting gold in France at 15 1-2, sent the money- mongers into Germany to exchange silver for it, until gold had nearly disappeared and its place was filled with silver. The action of the Vienna Convention looked to the gradual adoption of gold coinage, but the effect of the agreements reached was quite in the other direction, that of establishing the maintenance of a pure silver currency. The experiment of a trade gold coin failed completely. The premium on the minting of gold in France drew all the gold there,, and left Germany little but silver, 146. GERMANY'S GOLD STANDARD SYSTEM. From the date of the Vienna Convention, prog- ress was sought on the basis of a silver standard, •with gold as trade money, and even after the moment came, with the erection of the Empire^ i63 ■when everything favored complete reform, it was only at the last stage of the preparation of a bill to establish a monetary system that the gold standard ■was settled upon. The Act to establish the system passed Dec. 4th, 1871, and a second Act of July 9th, 1873, declared the law of tender. Mr. Shaw says: "The unit of the system is the mark, which is the y^.-g- part of a pound of gold of 500 grammes at 9-10 fine, and is coined into pieces of 20 and 10 marks. The gold crown is a lo-mark piece, is 9-10 fine, and struck at a tale of 139 1-2 pieces to the German pound; charge for coinage, 3 marks per pound of fine gold." "The pound of fine silver is struck into loa marks, 9-10 fine. The total amount of silver coin not to exceed 10 marks per head of population. No individual need accept more than 20 marks of imperial silver coin in payments. They are accepted in any amount by the Empire and by the Federal States." "All other German coins are no longer legal ten- der, and have been withdrawn, with the single exception of the thaler pieces. Whatever pieces of this kind still exist are legal tender to any amount, like the imperial gold coins, each being equal to 3 marks." * 147. GERMAN GOLD AND SILVER "The total silver withdrawn from circulation up to the close of 1880 was 1,080,486,138 marks. Of *"Mist. of Currency," pp. 215, 216. 164 this amount 382,684,841 marks were delivered to the mint for coinage into the new imperial silver coins. The remaining 696,797,069 marks were melted into silver and produced 7,474,644 pounds of fine silver. Of this quantity 7,102,862 pounds were sold up to Maj', 1879." * The account of the gold minting of the recon- structed German Empire, from 1872 to December, 1878, makes a complete total, in Mr. Shaw's report, of 1,205,786 lbs. weight = ;^84, 103, 584.1 148. RECENT GERMAN AGITATION. There has sprung up recently j^ in Germany a movement of profound discontent of the landown- ers and land- cultivators, the uninstructed and headstrong zealots of which are trying to work the discredited delusion of the double standard. An injury, not to say a wrong, had been done to Ger- man agriculture and German land by a treaty of commerce with Russia admitting Russian cereals at a low rate of duty. The weight of the discon- tent, and the hold which a delusive bimetallism, of the standard had upon the chiefs of the discon- tent, made it a necessity of policy for the govern- ment to go somewhat into the matter, and for the sound money Liberals to lend themselves to the hopeless quest of relief for low prices in bimet, allism of the standard. *Shaw: "Hist, of Currency " p. 219. fid. p. 2i8. \ Refers to 1896. 165 149' INQUIRY ON BEHALF OF SILVER. In the spring of 1894 a commission of sixteen members was appointed by the Imperial govern- ment to consider whether means could be found for raising the price of silver and making it more stable. Twenty-one sessions of this commission accomplished nothing more than to show, as its president said in closing its proceedings, how diffi- cult it is to find something which would evidently be desirable if it were attainable. The proposition of an international conference to promote the free coinage of both metals on an agreed ratio (pre- sumably 15 1-2 and regardless of England) was favored by the six decided bimetallists on the com- mission, but entirely opposed by the two moderate bimetallists and the seven gold standard members (an eighth being absent). The proposal of the two moderate bimetallists of a plan looking to a larger use of silver by augmenting the weight of the sil- ver coins in actual use, was rejected by all the other members. The plan was to be carried out under a convention with other governments, and especially that of Great Britain, with an engagement of the latter to reopen the Indian mints. This was a suggestion in the direction of bimetallism of money, which may reasonably attempt to do as much for silver as respect for the place of silver below the gold standard will permit. 150. LATEST GERMAN SILVER MOVE. At a later date, after the close of Caprivi's min- istry, and the gain which the land-owning interest made by the change, a motion asking the Imperial i66 government to take the initiative for assembling a new international monetary conference, received the support of both the Conservative parties and of the Catholic party, and of nearly all the National Liberals; the latter yielding, against their judg- ment, to the pressure on them from a portion of their constituents, and in the hope that a confer- ence, inevitably stopping short of resurrection of bimetallism of the standard, might yet find some remedy for the existing discontent, or at least some cure for the silver craze of the German peasants.* CHAPTER XIV. INDIA AND THE GOLD STANDARD. 151. INDIA'S TRIAL OF SILVER. British India emerged from the difficulties of the double standard in 1835, when the silver standard was adopted. But the growth of commercial inter- ests gave rise to objection to silver on account of its bulk and weight. "As early as 1859," says Mr. Horace White, " the commercial classes of the country began to urge the government to adopt the gold standard, with silver as subsidiary currency. "In 1864 the Bombay Association addressed a memorial to the government on the subject, saying that 'a silver currency might have been suitable to the country when its commerce was limited and * Mr. Horace White gives a very lucid account of these recent German movements, in an appendix to his " Money and Banking," pp. 447-452- i67 payments in the main extremely small, but was very inconvenient when wealth was largely diffused throughout the country and the operations of com- merce had become so enormous. The transport of this bulky and cumbersome currency entailed heavy and useless expense on the country and was a seri- ous impediment to trade. ' ' ' The Bombay chamber of commerce took similar action, saying that 'the importation of gold into India had steadily increased for many years, though it was not legal tender; that the natives themselves had devised a rude remedy for the deficiency of the existing silver currency by using gold bars stamped by the Bombay banks as a circulating medium; and that the exclusion of gold from the currency of India could not be justified or be considerd other than barbarous, irrational and unnatural. ' " * This effort of India itself, more than thirty years since, to secure the gold standard, with silver sub- sidiary, caused the government of India to suggest that a system of bimetallism be adopted. The British government refused on the ground of the impracticability of a double standard. By 1878 the government of India wished to close the mints against the free coinage of silver until the demand should operate to cause a rise of the standard coin in value. Silver had fallen from about 6od. an ounce to Sod. , and the suggestion to close the mints for a time was proved by the event to have been a ■wise one. But British hesitation in London refused. In 1886, silver having fallen to 426.. per ounce. ' Money and Banking" pp. 6g, 70. i68 the India government again suggested decisive measures and again met British refusal. March 23, 1892, with silver down to sgd., the India govern- ment called the attention of the home government in London to the special request of the Bengal chamber of commerce that something be done, but still British hesitation prevailed. 152. INDIA DEMANDS GOLD. June 21, 1892, the India government sent to Lon- don suggestions for adopting the gold standard with large use of legal tender silver, which had been, matured by Sir David Barbour, the India Financial- Secretary and a thorough bimetallist. This emi- nent India official, although a bimetallist, declared that, unless the Brussels Conference satisfactorily- arranged for international bimetallism, the gold standard would be a necessity in the fast advancing wreck of Indian finances due to the rapid decline- and the worse uncertainties of silver. At a later date Sir David again pointed out how- very bad the silver situation in India was, how con- fidence in silver was utterly destroyed, and how certainly failure of the United States to continue its monthly silver purchases would tend to hastert the worst possible breakdown of silver dependence- in India. The British government met this des- perate silver situation of India by entrusting a committee of eminent experts, of which Lord Chan- cellor Herschell was chairman, with the task of determining what should be done; and May 31, 1893, this committee reported on the chief facts of money and commerce in India, and recommended 169 that the request of the government of India for permission to close the mints against silver should be granted, except as rupees might be coined on government account. 153. INDIA GETS THE GOLD STANDARD. The British government in London gave its con- sent at last, after fifteen years of refusal, to the demand of India for stopping the coinage of silver, and June 26, 1893, the India government announced this in India. It was supposed that rupees in silver might appreciate in value, and to control this the government announced that it would supply them at the rate of is. 46.. per rupee, and would receive gold at that rate in payment of taxes. This did not mean that if silver kept on falling the government would hold up the silver rupee to IS. 4d. gold value. And silver did keep on falling, first from 38 3-4d. early in June, to 30 i-2d. after the closing of the mints, and later to 27 i-2d. Although the British government held back from selling in London the bills payable in rupees in India for less than is. 4d. per rupee, they finally had to sell at 15 3-4d., and from that down to 13d. ; and even 13d., with silver at 27 1-2, meant 2d. more than the value of the silver in the rupee. The rupee, that is, will pass in India for that much more than its real silver value. India thus came to the gold standard, not through the eagerness of London to fasten it upon her, but in spite of protracted British hesitation, and through the sense, which commerce in India had created, of the necessity of gold for large use in place of silver, 170 ■and as a standard far less uncertain than silver, to which silver could be related with some possibility of holding fairly steady its currency value. 154. INJURY DONE BY FREE COINAGE. A recent statement of undoubted authority on the silver situation in India shows conclusively that the suspension of free coinage of silver had no other purpose than that of increasing the useful- ness of silver as money in that country. The rep- resentation commonly made by advocates of free coinage that the Indian mints were closed to silver in order to give an advantage to gold and compel India to pay in the dearer gold instead of in the cheaper silver, has never been true, and could not be true. India has all along paid in gold, that is, in silver rupees counted at whatever they would bring in gold in London. And India's trouble has been that the silver rupees kept falling in value in the London market, as the direct and inevitable result of the steadily falling value of silver and of the supply of rupees exceeding the demand to such an extent as to make it difficult to hold up the value of the coins above that of the silver in them. 155. INDIA'S DEMAND FOR SILVER. India was for many years as large a taker of sil- ver as the United States could be expected to be tinder free coinage. India is a continent in breadth and in bulk of population, and it is insatiable in its readiness to take silver. The net imports of silver into India in the twenty- three years from 1870-71 171 to 1892-93 were 165,226,000 tens of rupees, an average of 7,184,000 tens of rupees — about $35,-