SOCIAl iEMDGBMY 
 
 ^^ E^ 
 

 CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 FROM 
 
 Carl Hecker 
 
Date Due 
 
 JAN 1 3 1944 
 
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 JUN 1 ]c 
 
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 MAR 6 laetAN 
 
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 3 1924 027 891 674 
 
The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027891674 
 
GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 DURING THE WAR 
 
GERMAN SOCIAL 
 DEMOCRACY 
 DURING THE WAR 
 
 BY 
 
 EDWYN BEVAN 
 
 NEW YORK 
 E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 
 
 68i FIFTH AVENUE 
 
Published 1919 
 By E. P. BUTTON & COMPANY 
 
 All Rights Resened 
 
 Printed in the United States of America 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The aim of this book is to put together in a cwi- 
 se cutive na rrative, the princi2al_ex£iitSHftfhieh-make up 
 the history o?the (jerman Social Democrat Party from 
 the outbreak of the Great War till the elevation of 
 Count Hertling to the Imperial Chancellorship at the 
 beginning of November 19 17. Of course any account 
 of German Social Democracy written in England at 
 this period must be — to use a delightful phrase of the 
 late Professor T. K. Cheyne's — "strongly mar ked w ith 
 provisionalness. " This a ccount ~ls based"~upon the 
 printed utterances — in papers, pamphlets, and books — 
 of those who have themselves taken part in the events 
 .n arrate d : to that extent it is afi^eadypossible to have 
 first-hand data. Further, since the warjitfiiature pro- 
 duced by the opposing Social Democrat groups consists 
 largely of mutual criticism and polem ic, it is often 
 possible to check one mode of representation by 
 another. For a finally satisfactory account to be 
 given, it will no doubt be necessary, not only that 
 first-hand data should be available with regard to the 
 separate facts, but that the person who constructs out 
 of those facts a living whole should himself have 
 been inside the movement and, grasping the inner 
 forces at work, the interplay of personal influences, 
 should select and order the facts in such a way as 
 to exhibit their organic significance. That an English 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 writer in the fourth year of the war cannot do. Yet 
 the outlines are already established, and one may hope 
 that if such an account as the present one would need 
 a great deal of supplementing in the light of fuller 
 knowledge, it would not need much correction. It 
 seems of great importance that we in England should 
 gain without delay such clearness as is now possible 
 on the part played by Social Democracy during these 
 fateful years in Germany. 
 
 A great deal of the material from which the account 
 is derived is still dispersed in newspapers and periodi- 
 cals (as will be seen by the footnotes), but a few 
 books may be mentioned which have already put some 
 of the material together. For the earlier part of the 
 war we have the account written by a German Social 
 Democrat of the extreme Nationalist wing, Konrad 
 Haenisch, Die deutsche Sosicddemokratie in und nach 
 dem Weltkriege (Berlin, 19 16), and a book by Dr. 
 Richard Berger (Catholic "Centrum" Party), Frak- 
 tionsspaltung und Parteikrisis (Miinchen in Gladbach, 
 1916), referred to as "Berger" in the footnotes — 
 which, although ill-constructed and wooden, is useful 
 in so far as it puts together a certain number of docu- 
 ments. On the other side one may call special attention 
 to Eduard Bernstein's article "Der Riss in der Sozial- 
 demokratie" in Die Zukunft of April 21, 1917. One 
 may also mention La Faillite de I' Internationale, 
 by Alexandre Zevaes (Paris, 191 7), a book written 
 apparently with a strong anti-Socialist bent, and The 
 Socialist Party in the Reichstag, by P. G. La Chesnais 
 (Fisher Unwin, 191 5). I regret that I did not see, in 
 time to make use of them, Berger's second volume, 
 Die deutsche Sosialdemokratie im dritten Kriegsjahr 
 ( 1917) , or Die deutsche Sosialdemokratie wdhrend des 
 Weltkrieges, a little book, published posthumously. 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 by the able Minority writer Gustav Eckstein, who died 
 untimely in 19 16, a comparatively young man. 
 
 A word must be added on the developments which 
 have taken place since November 191 7, since, apart 
 from them, a false conclusion might be drawn from 
 the story broken off at that point. My book traces 
 the continuous growth of the anti-war Minority in 
 numbers and influence during thirty-nine months of 
 war. It is important, therefore, to realize that in the 
 subsequent months this process has been suddenly 
 reversed, and it is difficult to say for how much the 
 Minority counts to-day. The explanation seems to be 
 given in the extract with which this book concludes. 
 The Minority grew, not because the German masses 
 cared for "self-determination of nationalities" or "no 
 annexations," or any other ideal principle, but because 
 the bereavements and material discomforts of the 
 war made them want peace above everything else, 
 and the policy of the Minority leaders seemed to 
 promise them peace most speedily. Since November 
 they have been given a peace on the East, a peace of 
 ruthless conquest, a peace which the Pan-Germans 
 acclaim as their own, and the effect has been to draw 
 the masses to the side of the Government. As to 
 the conduct of the Majority leaders in face of the 
 Russian peace, a great deal of sarcasm has been ex- 
 pended upon it. And it must be admitted that they 
 present anj^hing but a heroic figure in the eyes of 
 history. It is a cruel position to have to swallow all 
 your professed principles with the world looking on, 
 to be reduced simply to shrugging the shoulders and 
 saying: "Not, of course, a peace which we approve, 
 but still a peace ; and if one nation is going to trample 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 on another, better that it should be we on the Russians 
 than the Russians on us." But probably they knew 
 that if they had tried to take a stronger line they 
 would have had no considerable body of the people 
 behind them. 
 
 May 31, 1918. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGB 
 
 PREFACE 7 . . V 
 
 I. THE TIME BEFORE THE WAR .... I 
 
 II. THE FOURTH OF AUGUST 12 
 
 III. BURGFRIEDB 23 
 
 IV. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OPPOSITION . . 30 
 V. THE MINORITY GROWS 40 
 
 VI. MINORITY MANIFESTOS 50 
 
 VII. THE VOTE OF AUGUST 191S .... 57 
 
 VIII. MINORITY PROPAGANDA AT THE END OF 1915 . 62 
 
 IX. THE REICHSTAG SESSION OP DECEMBER 1915 . 67 
 
 X. FROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1916 ... 76 
 
 XI. THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG . . 9I 
 
 XII. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MAJORITY AND 
 
 MINORITY 109 
 
 XIII. THE SEPTEMBER CONFERENCE .... 128 
 
 XIV. TOWARDS A COMPLETE SPLIT .... I36 
 XV. "the INDEPENDENT SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY 
 
 OF GERMANY" 147 
 
 XVI. STOCKHOLM 161 
 
 XVII. THE JULY CRISIS 181 
 
 XVllI. MICHAELIS PROVES A DISAPPOINTMENT . . 198 
 
 ix 
 
X CONTENTS 
 
 PAGB 
 XIX. THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER ipi? . . . .215 
 
 XX. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES . 229 
 
 XXI. THE TRADE UNION CONFERENCE AT BERNE . 235 
 
 XXII. THE wiJRZBURG CONGRESS 240 
 
 XXIII. SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY . . . .254 
 
 INDEX 277 
 
GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 DURING THE WAR 
 
German Social Democracy 
 during the War 
 
 I 
 
 THE TIME BEFORE THE WAR 
 
 It is well known that before the war German Social 
 Democracy formed a community within the country 
 
 whose relations with the State were little 
 mn^be- short of hostile. It was a commonplace 
 
 tween Social among Social Democrats that the prole- 
 the'stote7"'* tariat had no interest in the existing 
 
 State, had "nothing to lose except its 
 chains"; and it was a commonplace outside Socialist 
 circles that the Social Democrats were vaterlandslose 
 Gesellen ("a crew without a country"). It is less 
 ge nerally realized that in the months immediately 
 prec eding the war this hos tilityTiad bec'ronelinusiially 
 ii]Jtfiniili3^ There were "the atteT^^ects of~Za5ern ; 
 there had been new administrative measures restrict- 
 ing the working people's right of coalition ; in the 
 Prussian House of Representatives the Minister of 
 the Interior, von Lobell, had given a rough refusal 
 to consider any projects for electoral reform; an 
 extraordinarily bitter feeling prevailed generally in 
 the Labour world. At the conclusion of the session 
 of the Reichstag, in the early summer of 19 14, the 
 Social Democrat members were not satisfied with 
 
a GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 leaving the Chamber before Hochs were raised for the 
 Kaiser, as they usually did; the bulk of them remained 
 to dissociate themselves more provocatively still from 
 the expression of loyalty. 
 
 The party was not, however, really all of one shade. 
 There were a series of gradations of tone, from the 
 
 Ex treme Lef t, which w as uncompr o- 
 w'^ctionB ""* "using an d revolutio nary, to the Extrem e 
 
 Right, which differed little from the 
 Liberal bourg eois imperialists. One may in this scale 
 distinguish five sections: — 
 
 1. The Ej £tremists, represented in the Reichstag 
 by Karl_Liebknecht, P aul Lensc h. and Stadhagen. 
 The veteran historian of German Socialism, Franz 
 Mehring, not himself a member of the Reichstag, 
 represented this section in the sphere of letters. It 
 had also two prominent woman-figures among its 
 leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin. It 
 was for a thorough-going class-war, which was jiot 
 hamperedjjy too tender a regard for Parliamentarism 
 or thg _unity of the Party, and did not shrink from 
 resortmg to street agitation. It was against the view 
 which advocated co-operation with non-Socialist 
 parties in political work. 
 
 2. The Left C entre, whose philosopher was Karl 
 Kautsky. exponent of the pure_doctri|je-ii£-Marx, and 
 editor of the weekly Die Neue Zeit. Kautskv. Ij ke 
 Mehrin^ y. w^«^ not jn the Reichstag. Heinrich Cunow, 
 one of the editors of Vorwdrts, was another of those 
 who represented it by their writings. In the Reichs- 
 tagLHugo_Haase and Ledebour were two~orTfFprin- 
 cipal figures, irdisagreed^ith'the Extremist section 
 in attaching the greatest value to parliamentary action 
 and condemning street demonstrations; on the other 
 hand, like the Extremist section, it disagreed with the 
 
THE TIME BEFORE THE WAR 3 
 
 Revisionists in disapproving of the co-operation with 
 the non-Socialist parties. 
 
 3. The Right_Centre, led by Philipp Scheidemann 
 and Richard Fische r (manager of Vorwart7)"^(3Iiered 
 t heoretically to the traditional Party programme, but 
 was in pr acfice inclin ed to compro mise with the Re- 
 visionists. 
 
 The Left_andRight Centre together constituted 
 ntmierically the buK'oFSieTarty. 
 
 4. The Moderate Re visionists, led by Eduard Bern- 
 stein. This section was tranHy in favour of abjmaSn-"" 
 m^The class-war and co-operating with the non-Social- 
 ist Radicals in constitutional activity. "Revisionism" 
 had abandoned the idea of overthrowing capitalist so- 
 ciety by a violent revolution, and hoped rather to secure 
 the ends of Social Democracy by a series of successive 
 partial reforms. Dr. Eduard David was among the 
 principal men of this section, and^rtother was Ludwig 
 Frank, a man of exceptional ability and personal charm, 
 '^'gr^he jmperialist Socialists , who supported the de- 
 
 .Wand for a big arm yand big navy, for colonial expan- 
 simu^nd even Protection. TEiTSgction v ras not strong 
 injiuaibers, but its leading oersona lities madejhern- 
 selves felt: Kolb of BadenTPr Qiipssel, an enthusiast 
 for colonies, Edmund JEischer, and Wolfgang Heine. 
 
 The Social Democrat Party was at the outbreak 
 of the war the largest organized political Party in 
 „^ _.^ ^ Germany. Its enrolled members through- 
 
 Strengtii ana ■' _, . •» «• i 
 
 organization out the Empire on March 31, 19 14, 
 ot the Party. numbered 1,085,905, including 174,754 
 women. Over_oii£ithirdjof_tiiejotal_vote^ 
 the Reichstag electimis of 19 12 w ere given for Social 
 Djanoc ^tTmemb ers. Amongst the ^xSTembers of 
 the Reichstag, the Social Democrat Group {Fraktion) 
 numbered no. 
 
4) GERMAN SPCIAL DEMO»JRACY 
 
 The Party was organized throughout the country 
 in a large number of local centres; and each State 
 of the Empire had its own particular Social Democrat 
 organization. Once a year, according to the Consti- 
 tution, there was a Congress (Parteitag) to which all 
 the local organizations all over the Empire sent 
 delegates. The members of the Party Group in the 
 Reichstag also attended the Parteitag, ex officio. The 
 Congress elected the Directorate (Vorstand) of the 
 Party, which comprised a President, a Vice-President, 
 a Treasurer, six Secretaries and two assistants, and 
 the Committee of Control (Kontrol Commission) of 
 nine members.^ For special purposes the Vorstand was 
 assisted by the Party Committee (Ausschuss) , con- 
 sisting of representatives of the local organizations. 
 
 In July 1914 the Joint-Presidents of the Party were 
 Hugo Halase, and Fritz Ebert, and Haase was also 
 President of the Group in the Reichstag, where he sat 
 as a member for Konigsberg. 
 
 German Social Democracy was distinguished by 
 the volume and the high quality of its Party press. 
 It had a large number of local newspapers and period- 
 icals; the Hamburger Echo, the Chemnitzer Volks- 
 stimme, the Karlsruher Volksfreund, the Breslaiier 
 Volkswacht, the MUnchner Post, and the Leipsiger 
 Volksseitung were among the most influential. 
 
 The central daily organ of the Party was Vorw'drts 
 ("Forward"), published in Berlin, which also served 
 as the special organ of the Berlin branch of the Party. 
 The weekly review, Die Neue Zeit, edited by Karl 
 Kautsky, was the intellectual organ of the Party. 
 
 ' For a brief and lucid popular account of German Social 
 Democracy before the war reference may be made to Mr. 
 W. Stephen Sanders' Fabian tract "The Socialist Movement 
 in Germany" (The Fabian Society, 3 Clement's Inn, W. C. 2.). 
 
THE TIME BEFORE THE WAR 5 
 
 The Sozialistische Monatshefte came out fortnightly. 
 The former had a tendency to the Left, whereas the 
 Sozialistische Monatshefte represented the Right wing 
 of the Party — ^the section of the "Imperialist 
 Socialists" alluded to above. The economist Max 
 Schippel, who cannot really count as a Socialist at 
 all, is a frequent contributor to it. 
 
 When the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia in July 
 1914 brought the danger of war upon Europe, 
 
 nothing could have rung more bravely 
 Sociaust Press than the words with which German Social 
 condemns Democracy denounced the action of 
 
 the militarist Governments in Germany 
 and Austria: — 
 
 They want war, the unscrupulous circles who exercise a 
 determining influence on the Vienna Hofburg. They want 
 war — these weeks past that has been apparent in the wild 
 clamour of the black-and-yellow provocative Press. They want 
 war — ^the Austrian ultimatum makes it plain and declares it 
 to the whole world. . . . 
 
 This ultimatum is so sham:e1ess, in its manner as well as 
 in its demands, that any Serbian Government which backed 
 down submissively before such a Note would have to reckon 
 with the possibility of being flung out by a popular mass- 
 movement between dinner and dessert. Of course, even if 
 the Great Serb movement is a part of the South-Slav bour- 
 geois revolution and, as such, has all historical right on its 
 side, as against the mass of organized corruption constituting 
 the Habsburg Monarchy (since the break-up of States com- 
 posed of different nationalities and the creation of homo- 
 geneous national States corresponds with the line of historical 
 evolution), still. Socialism cannot find much to commend 
 in a propaganda on • the Serbian side, which whips up all 
 the bad instincts of chauvinism, and it must certainly set 
 its face against an agitation which works with bombs and 
 revolvers. So long as the Austro-Hungarian Government 
 confines itself to asking Herr Pashitch to track down the 
 accomplices in the crime of Serajevo on Serbian soil and 
 
6 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 bring them to justice, it is certainly within its rights. But as 
 the Serbian Premier has himself declared, such a request would 
 be met to the fullest extent by the Belgrade authorities. It 
 is because the war-party in Vienna do not desire a peaceful 
 solution that Berchtold's note is couched in quite another 
 tone. . . . 
 
 It was a crime of the chauvinist Press in Germany that 
 it goaded on Germany's dear ally in his warlike passions 
 to the utmost, and unquestionably Herr von Bethmann 
 HoUweg has himself promised Herr Berchtold to stand 
 behind him. But the game they are playing in Berlin is as 
 dangerous as that played in Vienna . . . {Vorwdrts, July 25, 
 1914).' 
 
 The Directorate of the German Social Democrat 
 Party issued on the same day an "Appeal," in which 
 it said: — 
 
 No drop of a German soldier's blood must be sacrificed 
 to the Austrian despots' lust for power, to imperialist com- 
 mercial interests. Comrades, we call upon you to express 
 immediately in mass-meetings the unshakable will for peace 
 of the class-conscious proletariat. . . . The ruling classes, who 
 in peace-time oppress you, despise you, exploit you, want to 
 use you as cannon-fodder. Everywhere the cry must ring 
 in the despots' ears : "We want no war ! Down with war ! 
 Long live international brotherhood!" 
 
 On the following day (July 26), after the Austrian 
 declaration of war on Serbia, Vorw'drts wrote that the 
 one comfort was that Germany was not pledged to 
 support Austria in a step which Austria had taken 
 without German concurrence. 
 
 The German proletariat must insist that this view, prevalent 
 at the moment, remains the permanent view, and that Ger- 
 many refuses emphatically, if it is asked later on, to get 
 Austria out of this mess. ... It is a question whether the 
 other Powers, and especially Russia, will remain passive 
 spectators if big Austria throttles little Serbia. . . . The 
 gigantic German armaments have caused England, France, 
 
THE TIME BEFORE THE WAR 7 
 
 and Russia to follow suit to such an extent that ... the 
 detonation of the electrical tension, which has become more 
 and more explosive from year to year, is only too much to 
 be feared. 
 
 The paper goes on to speak of the "complete 
 absence of direction in the German Government." 
 
 It is not the first time that amongst us a war-party and 
 a peace-party are engaged in struggle. . . . For the preser- 
 vation of peace and the avoidance of the most wicked and 
 fatal conflicts between the peoples, the proletariat must 
 throw into the scale ali its political maturity and all its organ- 
 izing power! The international situation is as confused as 
 ever. The Governments incline more than ever to the policy 
 which stakes all on the hazard. The Austrian Government 
 has lost all its reason and is plunging desperately into 
 the Serbian adventure. The German Government is obvi- 
 ously not unanimous, is divided and without direction. Who 
 knows what struggles are going on behind the scenes between 
 William senior and William jwmor and their respective 
 followings? . . . 
 
 On the same day on which these words appeared 
 
 in Vorwdrts, Hugo Haase, the President of the Social 
 
 Democrat Party, and Ebert were sum- 
 
 see'the^chtn- moncd to the Prussian Ministry of the 
 
 ceuor. July 26, Interior. Ebert being at the moment 
 
 1914 
 
 away from Berhn, Haase chose Adolf 
 Braun instead to accompany him. Certain other 
 prominent men of the Party who might naturally 
 have accompanied him (Scheidemann, Molkenbuhr) 
 were also out of Berlin and too far away to be tele- 
 graphed for. 'The government had learnt that the 
 Party was getting up a number of public meetings 
 to protest against war, and wished to caution the 
 leaders as to the things which might and might not 
 be said./ In the course of this interview, the officials 
 told Haase that if Russia attacked Austria-Hungary, 
 
8 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY" 
 
 Germany would stand by Austria. Haase replied 
 by referring to a speech of Eduard David's in the 
 Reichstag, in which David had stated that the Social 
 Democrat Party regarded Germany's alliance with 
 Austria as purely defensive. If Austria, he said, 
 began by declaring war on Serbia, the war for Austria 
 and Germany would not be a defensive one. The 
 official reply was simply that this view was not the one 
 taken by any Party in the Empire except tiie Social 
 Democrat.* 
 
 /Next day (July 27) Vorwdrts announces that 
 twenty-seven mass-meetings are to take place in 
 
 Berlin to show the rulers the people's 
 Gei^ny ^ resolute will for peace. / 
 •gainst the On the 28th it welcomes the British 
 
 jowiT-so proposal for mediation by Great Britain, 
 
 France, Germany, and Italy, "a fair and 
 acceptable (billig) proposal for all parties." 
 
 Our Russian comrades have given an emphatic enough decla- 
 ration of their view to the Tsardom, and they will let their 
 autocracy have it strong if it goes about to throw itself into 
 a worse military adventure than the mad enterprise in the 
 Farther East. But it is rash, for all that, so to rely upon 
 the revolutionary movement as to goad the power of Tsardom 
 and Panslavism to extremities — no inconsiderable power, after 
 all — by encouraging Austria to plunge along the road of 
 the wildest provocation. /* is not in Tsardom, at the present 
 moment, that the worst danger of war lies, but in mis- 
 guided Austria. 
 
 The twenty-seven mass-meetings took place duly in 
 Berlin on July 28, and passed a resolution beginning: 
 "Austria by its brutal ultimatum has declared war on 
 Serbia. ..." The resolution called on the German 
 
 •These facts were stated by Haase on September 22, 1916, 
 at the Reichskonferenx. 
 
THE TIME BEFORE THE WAR 9 
 
 Gove rnmen tjo keep clear of all military in teryention. 
 Similar demonstrations took place all over the German 
 Empire during the five days from July 26 to July 30 
 inclusive — in Barmen, Breslau, Brunswick, Chemnitz, 
 Danzig, Dusseldorf, Duisburg, Elberfeld-Barmen, 
 Essen, Frankfurt-on-Main, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 
 Gotha, Halle, Hamburg, Hanover, Jena, Kiel, Cologne, 
 Konigsberg, Ludwigshafen, Mannheim, Munich, 
 Niirnberg, Stettin, Stuttgart, and Cannstatt. 
 
 On July 29 Vorwdrts criticized adversely the 
 attitude of Germany towards the British proposal 
 for a conference. "To the mobilization of the 
 Powers," it declared heroically, "there is but one 
 possible answer — ^the permanent mobilization of the 
 people." 
 
 A meeting of the International Socialist Bureau 
 took place at Brussels on July 29 and 30, which was 
 attended by delegates from France, 
 i.s'.B.'to'* ' ° Holland, Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
 Brussels, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Poland, 
 
 July 29 and 30. Svvitzcrland, Denmark, and Spain. Hugo 
 Haase himself was one of the German delegates. 
 On July 29 he spoke at an "International Meeting 
 against the War" in Brussels. He said that the 
 guilt for the war rested upon Austria alone, and he 
 added : — 
 
 It seems that Austria wishes to count upon Germany, but 
 the German Socialists declare that secret treaties to not bind 
 the proletariat. The German proletariat declares that Ger - 
 many must not intervene , even if Kiissta intervenes. . . . 
 The French proletarians thmk as we do. EeF^our enemies 
 beware! It may be that the peoples, wrathful at so much 
 misery and oppression, will awake at last and establish the 
 Socialist order of society. Yesterday, at Berlin, thousands and 
 thousands of prol etarians ^ ^otested against war with cries 
 of "Long live pe'acel Down with war!" 
 
10 GERMAN S0CIAI3 DEMOCRACY 
 
 On the motion of the German delegates, the Inter- 
 national Socialist Committee decided, with the warm 
 approval of the French delegates, to summon an 
 International Socialist Congress to meet in Paris on 
 August 9. The German delegates returned to Berlin 
 on July 31. 
 
 Whilst Haase was in Brussels, C arl Legi en. the 
 G erman Trade U nion leader anr ^ Prpsidpnt nf the 
 German and IntenmtJona l Federation of Trade 
 foreign Trade Uni5ns,"had Sent telegrams to the Trade 
 ^'^'"'^- UntoiTTederations in the several coun- 
 
 tries, inviting them to declare their attitude towards 
 the crisis. A few days before ( on July 25) Legien 
 had h^d a conversation in Brussels with two F renr.h 
 Socia lists^ - Jouhaux and Dumoulin — and the Secre- 
 tary of the Belgian Commission Syndicate, in which 
 he had himself been interrogated. According to 
 the account of the interview published later on 
 by Jouhaux,^ Xegien was a sked repeatedly jwhat the 
 German Comrades intended to do in order to obv iate 
 warTangTrnuld TTntJjellaHimEd-ta-reply. To his own 
 interrogations he now received answers expressing 
 the determination to oppose war. Amongst these 
 answers was one from London, dated July 31, and 
 signed by Mr. W. A. Appleton, assuring Legirai that 
 British Trade Unionists would do their utmost to sup- 
 port the efforts being made by German Comrades for 
 the preservation of peace. 
 
 On the same day, J uly 31. the German Empire wa s 
 
 declared to be ona war- fo oting {in Kriegszustand) . 
 
 Instantly it was seen hgw—much the 
 
 Kriegszusiand, g|.Qyj ^q^^s of the German Social Demo- 
 
 July 31. , 
 
 crats were worth when it was a question 
 of action. The_ further jieetings. of p rotest whi ch 
 * La Bataille Syndkaliste, September 26, 1914 
 
THE TIME BEFORE THE WAR 11 
 
 had be en a rran^gdjgr_were simply wiped off the slate, 
 by or3eF^^oF2e-^i^SQritiesr TEF Sqciai_^emocrat 
 new^ap ers cease d to_jyrite^bj3uLJKe-addcedness of 
 Austria. vThey could only get gratification in retro- 
 sp'ect Irom the strong language they had used before 
 July 31, and from the assurance of their own right- 
 eousness ; they could only repeat over and over again 
 that, if war came, they at any rate had protested 
 against it; they at any rate bore none of the respon- 
 sibility. / Apparently, among the rank and file of the 
 party, some found it hard to accomplish the rapid 
 transition to self-effacement: on August i Vorwarts 
 insert^ an editorial admonition to all Comrades to lie 
 low /they must cherish their old convictions in their 
 breasts, but they must also take care how they give 
 utterance to these convictions in speech/ 
 /This purely negative behaviour was a somewhat 
 poor substitute for a "permanent mobilization of the 
 people" against wai?^ But German Social Democracy 
 was not allowed to remain at the negative point. By 
 August 4 it was actually voting credits in the Reichs- 
 tag for the war which, according to its solemn warn- 
 ings of July 29, was going to encounter the solid 
 opposition of the German proletariat/' 
 
II 
 
 THE FOURTH OF AUGUST 
 
 The voting of the credits asked for by the Government 
 
 did not come easy to German Social Democracy. 
 
 We have many testimonies to the 
 
 Is the Social • . . • r i . ,i i 
 
 Democrat agomes and searchmgs of heart through 
 
 Group to vote which Comradcs passed in those fateful 
 days. It was announced that the Govern- 
 ment would ask the Reichstag on August 4 to vote 
 war-credits to the amount of 5,000,000,000 marks. 
 The Social Democrat group in the Reichstag had to 
 decide what its action at this juncture should be. The 
 group, as has been stated, consisted of no members, 
 under the presidency of Hugo Haase. A meeting of 
 the Group was called for August 3 to consider the 
 momentous dilemma. 
 
 After receiving the report of what had happened at 
 the Brussels meetings, the Directorate of the German 
 Mission of Her- ^ocial Democrat Party had dispatched 
 man Mfiuer an emissary to Paris, Hermann Miiller, 
 to Pans. Qj^g q£ jj.g Q^jj members. According to 
 
 his own statement, the object of his mission was to 
 communicate to the French Socialists that the German 
 Directorate thought it impossible, in view of the 
 strained situation, for the Congress of the Interna- 
 tional Socialist Bureau to take place on August 9 in 
 Paris, as had been arranged in Brussels. He was not 
 sent, as Siidekum erroneously told the Italians some 
 
 12 
 
THE FOURTH OF AUGUST 13 
 
 months later, to represent German Social Democracy 
 at the funeral of Jaures: the murder of Jaures was 
 not known in Germany when he left. But it may be 
 believed that the real object of his mission was to 
 ascertain what the French Socialists were going to 
 do in the matter of voting war-credits and to arrange, 
 if possible, for parallel action in the two countries. 
 At the meeting of the Directorate which empowered 
 Muller to go as the emissary of German Social 
 Democracy to France, Richard Fischer had spoken 
 as follows: — 
 
 From my Socialist standpoint I cannot conceive in any 
 case our voting the credits, but if the Russians break into 
 the country, I shall find myself placed in a difficult position. 
 In that case I could not well refuse the credits. I should 
 therefore decide for simple abstention from voting (Stim- 
 menthaltung) .* 
 
 Mtiller with difficulty made his way to Paris in 
 a motor-car. The French Parliamentary Socialist 
 Group were in session at the Palais Bourbon on 
 August I, and had had no expectation of the coming 
 of the German Comrade, when he dropped upon them 
 as a bolt from the blue. He was accompanied by 
 two Belgians — Camille Huysmans, Secretary of the 
 International Socialist Bureau, and Henri de Man. 
 Huysmans acted as interpreter. The French Social- 
 ists received Muller with warm cordiality.^ Miiller 
 
 'Haase's speech at the Rekhskonferenz, September 22, 1916. 
 
 'Siidekum told the Italians he had been badly received, 
 "in an unheard-of fashion " but Muller himself corrected this 
 statement: "Alle franzosischen Genossen, mit denen ich 
 anlasslich meines kurzen Aufenhalts in Paris kurz vor 
 Kriegsanbruch zusammen war, sind mir in der gleichen herz- 
 lichen Weise entgegengekommen wie in fruheren Jahren" 
 Hyorwdrts, November 4, 1914). 
 
14. GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 told them that there were two strands of opinion 
 in the German Social Democrat Party: some were 
 for voting against the war-credits, others were for 
 abstention from voting. As to voting for the war- 
 credits — that, Miiller repeated, was out of the 
 question: "Doss man fur die Kriegskredite stimmt, 
 das halte ich fur ausgeschlossen." The French Social- 
 ists told him that if France were attacked, the alter- 
 natives for them would be different; they would feel 
 that the only two possible courses were either absten- 
 tion or voting for the war credits. It seemed, 
 therefore, that abstention was the only policy which 
 offered the hope of common action to the Socialists 
 of the two countries. He himself — so MuUer told 
 the French Comrades — was in favour of the German 
 Party voting against the war-credits; and he gave 
 them to understand that this was the view of the 
 majority of German Social Democrats; if, however, 
 the French took the line of abstention, the German 
 Party would probably decide to do the same, so as 
 to preserve conformity of action. Yet he warned the 
 French Socialists that he could only speak for what 
 had been in the mind of the German Comrades two 
 days before ; he did not know what changes had come 
 up in Germany during two days. When he took his 
 leave of the French Comrades to return to Berlin, 
 it had been made clear that no engagement had been 
 taken on either side; the Party in each country was 
 free to act as might seem best to it; only it was 
 hoped that the French and German Socialists would 
 now have a clearer understanding of each other's 
 mind. Miiller arrived back in Berlin in time to com- 
 municate what had happened in Paris to the German 
 Social Democrat Party before the fateful meeting of 
 August 3. 
 
THE FOURTH OF AUGUST 15 
 
 In a letter written by one Social Democrat member 
 to another, and subsequently made public, 
 
 How a change , , , . r j 
 
 came in the we may See the workmg of the new 
 minds of Ger- emotions UDon the old professions in the 
 
 man Socialists. , i ■ i i i . i , 
 
 hours which preceded that meeting: — 
 
 On August 3 Dittmann and I travelled from Dortmund to 
 Berlin to attend the Party meeting on that day, at which the 
 question of voting the war-credits was to be decided. . . . 
 I shall never forget the crowded incidents of those days. I 
 saw reservists join the colours and go forth singing Social 
 Democrat songs! Some Socialist reservists I knew said to me: 
 "We are going to the front with an easy mind, because we 
 know the Party will look after us if we are wounded, and 
 that the Party will take care of our families if we don't come 
 home." Just before the train started for Berlin, a group of 
 reservists at the station said to me: "Konig, you're going to 
 Berlin, to the Reichstag: think of us there: see to it that we 
 have all we need: don't be stingy in voting money." In the 
 train I told Dittmann what a deep impression all this had made 
 upon me. Dittmann confessed that things had happened to 
 him, too, which affected him in the same way. For hours, 
 as the train carried us towards Berlin, we discussed the whole 
 situation, what our attitude should be to national defence, 
 whether the Party would vote the credits. We came to the 
 final conclusion that the Party was absolutely bound to vote 
 the credits, that, if any difference of opinion came up in the 
 meeting, that was the line we should have to take. Ditt- 
 mann wound up by saying: "The Party could not act other- 
 wise. It would rouse a storm of indignation among men at 
 the front and people at home against the Social Democrat Party 
 if it did. The Socialist organization would be swept clean 
 away by popular resentment.'" 
 
 On August 3 the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann 
 
 Hollweg, received in private conference 
 
 The meeting of ^^^ leaders of the Reichstag Groups. The 
 
 Angust 3, 1911. _ . , -r^ ^ 1 
 
 Social Democrat Group was represented 
 by Haase, Scheidemann, and Molkenbuhr.' On the 
 ' Vossische Zeitung, May S, 1916. 
 'Haase's speech of September 22, 1916. 
 
16 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 same day the critical meeting of the Reichstag Social 
 Democrat Group took place. The case between 
 Austria and Serbia, concerning which the Party press 
 had been so eloquent a few days before, was hardly 
 mentioned — so Eduard Bernstein tells us, who was 
 present.^ The one fact which now eclipsed every- 
 thing else was that the Russians were on the soil of 
 the Fatherland. Tsardom, according to the tradition 
 in Social Democrat circles, was the darkest of horrors. 
 The old leaders of the Party had spoken of a war 
 with Russia as one which German Social Democrats 
 might wage with the consciousness of fighting in the 
 cause of liberty and civilization against Asiatic bar- 
 barism. And now, whatever the origin of the war, 
 German Social Democrats had to make an instant 
 decision whether they would stand by and see German 
 towns and villages overrun by (as they imagined) 
 semi-savage hordes. Also, from what was then 
 known of the diplomatic transactions leading up to 
 war, it was believed universally in Germany that 
 Russia and France had at the last moment opened 
 hostilities without necessity. Bernstein tells us that 
 he himself was under this impression at the time. 
 According to a story told later on by Wendel, a 
 member of the Reichstag Group, to the Belgian 
 Socialists, certain members of the Party had been 
 shown by a member of the German Government 
 some days before a number of secret documents, 
 which purported to prove that an understanding 
 existed between France and Belgium to allow French 
 troops to attack Germany by marching through 
 Belgium. If Wendel's story is true, the members in 
 question did not pass on their information to the 
 
 *C. Grunberg, "Die Internationale und der Weltkrieg" (Leip- 
 ?ig, 1916), No. 57, p. 70. 
 
THE FOURTH OF AUGUST 17 
 
 Group as a whole, since Liebknecht, who was present 
 at ^ meeting, told the Belgians that he had heard 
 nothing about these secret documents, nor knew, 
 indeed, anything about the German violation of 
 Belgian neutrality till the Chancellor announced it 
 the following day in the Reichstag. It is possible, 
 however, that dark communications had taken place 
 between the Government and some of the more 
 Nationalist Social Democrats, which these latter did 
 not divulge, but on the strength of which they made 
 themselves active advocates of the policy of voting 
 the credits at the meeting of the Group. 
 
 This much is certain. Under the stress of the hour, 
 the majority of the Group on August 3 were for doing 
 what had seemed to Hermann Mtiller, when he left 
 Berlin on July 31, to be ausgeschlossen (out of the 
 question), for voting the war-credits. 
 
 The duty of defending the Fatherland was recog- 
 nized on principle by all the members of the Group, 
 except four — Liebknecht, Riihle, Henke, and Herzfeld 
 — who declared the expression "defence of the 
 Fatherland" to be a "misleading phrase" {Verwir- 
 rungsphrase) } 
 
 Besides these four intransigeants, a minority, acting 
 on the advice given by Karl Kautsky, contended, even 
 with the Russians on German soil, that Social Democ- 
 racy would stultify the position it had taken up, of 
 being free from all responsibility for the war, if it 
 voted the credits. Some one suggested that the Group 
 might do as Muller had led the French Socialists 
 to believe they would do, as Bebel and the elder Lieb- 
 knecht had done in 1870, simply abstain from voting 
 at all. But it was held that the action of the Group 
 when it had consisted of two men could hardly serve 
 ' Vossische Zeitung, March 13, 1916, evening. 
 
18 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 as a precedent for the Group when it consisted of 
 no. Then, at least, it was urged, do not vote 
 the credits unconditionally. Use the juncture to 
 extort a promise from the Government that it will 
 not employ the power of Germany for making any 
 fresh annexations. But how, it was replied, could the 
 Government tie itself beforehand, in view of all the 
 unknown possibilities of a war? Yet Social Democ- 
 racy, the other side argued, must put some conditions 
 to its vote; it must not give the Government a blank 
 cheque. But supposing the Government simply re- 
 fused the conditions prescribed by the Group, what 
 then? The Social Democrats would then have put 
 themselves in a position in which they would be bound 
 to refuse the credits. At last the question was put. 
 Seventy-eight were for voting the credits uncon- 
 ditionally, fourteen were against. The President, 
 Hugo Haase, voted with the Minority. 
 
 The question now confronted the Minority of 
 fourteen whether, on the following day in the Reichs- 
 tag, they would separate themselves from the rest of 
 the Group and refuse, as an isolated little body of men, 
 to vote the credits. They decided that the right 
 course at present was to maintain the unity of the 
 Party as towards those without and subordinate their 
 public action to the will of the majority. This meant 
 that Haase, although he was against voting the 
 credits, would, as President of the Group, have to 
 read out in the Reichstag the Group's declaration that 
 it supported the Government. He made it obvious 
 that the office was a very distasteful one to him. But 
 he was under the necessity of accepting it — "like a 
 coy maiden reluctant against an embrace," a Social 
 Democrat of the Majority, Wolfgang Heine, wrote of 
 him injuriously some months later. 
 
THE FOURTH OF AUGUST 19 
 
 Amongst those who were in favour of voting the 
 credits was Eduard Bernstein. When the meeting was 
 over Haase engaged him in conversation, and they 
 continued their talk in the Tiergarten. 
 
 The two men will play a principal part in the story 
 which follows, and we may look at them more closely 
 as they hold converse on this critical summer after- 
 noon of August 1914. Both belong to the Hebrew 
 race. Haase is a lawyer, born in Prussia in 1863, 
 a smallish man with a bushy moustache. His 
 personality does not give an impression of great 
 power; it may be that he lacks the will to push for- 
 ward and assert himself, which is usually neces- 
 sary to the magnetism of a great leader. But men feel 
 in listening to him that he has a clear mind, and that 
 he is essentially an honest man. And to have held 
 fast to simple honesty, in an atmosphere of vehement 
 misrepresentation, may give some men a high place 
 in history, who lacked gifts that can properly be 
 called brilliant. Eduard Bernstein, a man of sixty- 
 four, with his long beard, has the appearance of a 
 benevolent sage. He belonged to the opposite wing 
 of the Party to Haase, being, as has been said, the 
 principal exponent in German Social Democracy of 
 the "Revisionist" policy. He was the son of an 
 engine-driver and educated in business. In the 
 time of the anti-Socialist laws he lived abroad as an 
 exile (from 1888 to 1901), and much of this time 
 was spent in London. He has a sympathetic under- 
 standing of England possessed by few Germans, 
 and he contributed before the war, to English 
 periodicals — to The Nation in latter years. There 
 is an atmosphere about him of kindly humanitarian 
 Internationalism, and even his enemies cannot 
 question his goodness of heart. He represents one 
 
20 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, 
 
 of the divisions of Breslau in the Reichstag, and is 
 well known as a writer on topics connected with 
 Socialism. 
 
 Although Bernstein belonged to the opposite wing 
 of the Party, some observations which he had let fall 
 at the meeting had given Haase the hope of bringing 
 him to the side of the Minority. "What I am more 
 afraid of than anything else in connexion with this 
 resolution," Haase said as they walked in the Tier- 
 garten, "is the after-effect it will have on the develop- 
 ment of the Party." Later events brought back the 
 words to Bernstein's mind. 
 
 August 4 came, and Haase read out the Group's 
 
 declaration in the Reichstag. It endeavoured to 
 
 reconcile the desire of the Party, to divest 
 
 "The Fourth j^.ggif Qf j^ji responsibility for the war, 
 
 of August." ... ■ r 1 -A • • 
 
 With the action of the Party, in voting 
 war-credits, by emphatically and solemnly, after the 
 precedent of Pilate, disclaiming the Party's responsi- 
 bility in words: — ^ 
 
 We are confronted by an hour big with fate. The conse- 
 quences of the Imperialist policy by which an epoch of com- 
 
 ' Later on Haase himself came to judge the action in a 
 light which assimilates it to Pilate's. In his speech at the 
 Reichsko'nferem (September 1916), he said: "In the declara- 
 tion of August 4, it is indeed stated that we do not take 
 on ourselves responsibility for the war. But that is to make 
 words compensate for actions. The action was voting the 
 credits. It is an absurdity to try to get rid of the respon- 
 sibility with words, only in order to assume it by actions." 
 ("In der Erklarung vom 4 August steht ja, dass wir die 
 Verantwortung fur den Krieg nicht iibernehmen. Das sind 
 aber Worte gegeniiber der Tat, und die Tat war die Abstim- 
 mung. Es ist ein Widersinn, die Verantwortung mit Worten 
 ablehnen zu wollen und sie schliesslich durch die Tat zu 
 iibernehmen.") 
 
THE FOURTH OF AUGUST 21 
 
 petitive armaments was brought in, and the antagonisms be- 
 tween the nations accentuated, have broken upon Europe like a 
 deluge. The responsibility for this rests upon those who main- 
 tained this policy: we disclaim it. . . . 
 
 For our people and its peaceful development, much, if not 
 everything, is at stake, in the event of the victory of Russian 
 despotism, which has stained itself with the blood of the best 
 of its own people. Our task is to ward off this danger, to safe- 
 guard the civilization {Kultur) and the independence of our 
 own country. And here we make good what we have always 
 emphatically affirmed: we do not leave the Fatherland in the 
 lurch in the hour of danger. . . . 
 
 With regard to the absence in the declaration of 
 any reference to the German violation of Belgium, 
 it must be remembered that, when the members of 
 the Reichstag assembled on August 4, nothing was 
 yet generally known about the German ultimatum to 
 Belgium, nor was it known that German troops had 
 crossed the Belgian frontier. It was the Chancellor 
 in his speech who revealed to the House the "wrong" 
 which had been committed. By then the Social 
 Democrat Group had already handed in the text of 
 its resolution to the President of the House. Perhaps 
 if there had been more time for consideration, the 
 Chancellor's staggering disclosure might have led 
 the Social Democrat Group to reconsider its resolution 
 of the day before as to voting the credits. As it 
 was, bewildered by the surge of events, they decided, 
 after deliberating for two hours on the new fact, that 
 they must carry out what had been arranged.^ 
 
 AH the Group gave their votes for the war-credits 
 — all of them, even Karl Liebknecht. No sign was 
 shown the public of the sharp division of opinion 
 
 'This detail of the two hours' deliberation was made public 
 in a speech by Grenz at the Wiirzburg Congress on Oc- 
 tober 16, 1917. 
 
22 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 which had agitated the Group the day before behind 
 closed doors. Or rather, one member, Kunert of 
 Halle, absented himself for a moment whilst the 
 voting took place. His absence was not noticed. It 
 was not till months afterward that he proclaimed the 
 fact, and stated that he had absented himself for 
 reasons of principle. 
 
 Dr. Ludwig Frank, who has been mentioned as one 
 of the finest personalities in German Social Democ- 
 racy, immediately after the meeting of the Reichstag, 
 voltinteered for active service and went to the front 
 as a private. He was killed shortly afterwards at 
 Baccarat in France, the first member of the Reichstag 
 to fall in the war. When the Reichstag re-assembled 
 in December, his empty place was marked by a laurel 
 wreath. The death of Frank gave a new consecration 
 to the national cause in the feelings of German Social 
 Democrats. 
 
Ill 
 
 BURGFRIEDE 
 
 (LATE SUMMER, 1914) 
 
 The expectation that, in the event of war breaking 
 
 out, German Social Democrats would take their stand 
 
 in opposition to their own Government, 
 
 German*SocM that they WOUld proclaim the much- 
 Democracy and talked-of general strike and otherwise 
 paralyse the militarist authorities, had 
 been entertained in different quarters abroad. So 
 strong was that anticipation that at the outbreak 
 of war, in August 1914, the report ran through the 
 foreign press that Karl Liebknecht, who, as a matter 
 of fact, . as we have seen, had given his vote on Au- 
 gust 4 for the war-credits, had raised the standard of 
 revolt and been put to death by the German Govern- 
 ment! But it was not only abroad that similar 
 expectations had been rife. In Germany itself many 
 circles had perpetually denounced the Social Democrats 
 as destitute of all patriotism, and there had been wide- 
 spread uneasiness as to what the Social Democrats 
 would really do if the emergency ever came. When, 
 therefore, on August 4 the Reichstag Social Demo- 
 crat Group declared, through Haase's mouth, that 
 German Social Democrats would not leave the country 
 in the lurch, when it voted in a body the credits asked 
 for by the Government, there was a great revulsion 
 
 23 
 
24 GERMAN SOCIAi; DEMOCRACY 
 
 of joy. The unity of the country seemed almost 
 too good to be true. The Emperor, whose language 
 about the Social Democrats had not always been 
 of an emollient kind before the war, had already on 
 August I made the announcement which has since 
 then been so often quoted in Germany: "Henceforth 
 I know no parties any more." The boycott of 
 Social Democrat local branches established by the 
 military authorities ceased; the ban upon the circu- 
 lation of Social Democrat literature in the army was 
 removed at the end of August; Prussian Ministers 
 and Chiefs of Police paid complimentary visits to 
 Social Democrat institutions. In Wtirtemberg, for 
 the first time, a Social Democrat was given the post 
 of High School teacher. Permission was given for 
 the official organ of the Party, Vorw'drts, to be 
 sold among other newspapers in the railway stations. 
 All legal proceedings already instituted against 
 Trade Unions were dropped; the Government gave a 
 promise that the reactionary electoral system in 
 Prussia should be reformed at some future date. 
 For this new attitude of the Government to Social 
 Democracy and democratic reform, the catchword 
 of N euorientierung came later on into vogue. It 
 seems first to have been used in November 1914 by 
 the Secretary of State for the Interior, Dr. Clemens 
 Delbruck. 
 
 The Social Democrats, on their side, gave the 
 Government indispensable help in dealing with the 
 internal economic difficulties created by the war. 
 The Trade Unions, and other Labour organizations, 
 which, although they did not coincide with the politi- 
 cal Social Democrat Party, had a large number of 
 members in common, and co-operated according to 
 predefined arrangements, now put their administra- 
 
BURGFRIEDE 26 
 
 tive machinery and a large part of their funds at 
 the Government's disposal for coping with distress, 
 with the claims of soldiers' dependents, with the 
 dislocation of the labour market. The moment 
 the war broke out the Trade Unions put an end 
 to all the strikes and lock-outs which were in 
 process. 
 
 Another service which German Social Democracy- 
 rendered to the German Government at this time 
 was to send missions to the Socialists of those 
 neutral countries whose attitude to Germany threat- 
 ened to become hostile. If the Socialists in these 
 countries, or a considerable number of them, were 
 won over to the German view of the war, that would 
 no doubt give Germany a hold upon each country 
 itself. In September 1914 a member of the Party 
 was sent to carry on an active campaign of propa- 
 ganda amongst the Italian Socialists. The person 
 chosen was Siidekum, a Comrade of somewhat worldly 
 stamp, well-groomed, intriguing, and not too scrupu- 
 lous. He went about addressing meetings in different 
 Italian towns. According to reports in Rome, the 
 arguments of Sudekum were reinforced by the threat 
 that, unless the Italian Comrades worked hard to 
 keep Italy neutral, the financial help sent to the 
 Italian Socialist body by German Social Democracy 
 would be withheld. In any case the reception given 
 Siidekum by the Italian Socialists was not of a 
 kind to encourage him. Siidekum went on a similar 
 mission to Roumania. In this case a German Social 
 Democrat organ is said definitely to have alleged that 
 he went as an emissary of the German Government.'^ 
 The Roumanian, Albert Prahovan, asserts that Stide- 
 
 'Oflficial Bulletin of the Stuttgart Social Democrat organiza- 
 tion, quoted by Z^vaes, "La Faillite de I'lnternationale," p. 87. 
 
26 GERMAN SOCIAi; DEMOCRACY; 
 
 kum secured the opposition of the Roumanian Social- 
 ists to a war-policy by a liberal distribution of money. 
 Whether this is true or not, the few Roumanian 
 Socialists are of a negligible quantity.^ 
 
 The envoy sent to Bulgaria was a Russian named 
 Helphand, a refugee in Germany, where before -the 
 war he had worked with the extreme Left of German 
 Social Democracy, and assumed for his public activi- 
 ties the name of "Parvus." Between the Russian 
 abortive revolution of 1905, in which Helphand took 
 part, and the outbreak of this war, he spent some 
 time in Turkey, where he had close relations with 
 the Young Turks, and made a handsome fortune 
 by speculations in corn. On the outbreak of the 
 war he threw himself with zeal into the German 
 cause. He went not only to Sofia to gain the ad- 
 herence of the Bulgarian Socialists, but also to 
 Constantinople, where he knew the ground, and here 
 came into touch with a Russian refugee Socialist, 
 whom he tried to persuade to get up a revolution 
 in the Caucasus against the Russian Government. 
 M. Gregoire Alexinsky, in a letter published in 
 L'Humanite (October 3, 1915), accused him roundly 
 of being an agent provocateur in the pay of the Ger- 
 man and Turkish Governments." The organ of the 
 Russian refugee Socialists in Paris {Nasha Slovo) 
 warned Comrades against having anything to do 
 
 ^La Roumanie en armes (Paris, IQIS). 
 
 'On August 28, 1917, Helphand published in the Bremer 
 Biirger-Zeitung a denial of this: "All the assertions that I 
 ever occupied in Turkey an official or semi-official post, that 
 I am in the service or the pay of the Turkish or Austrian or 
 German General Staff, that my political or literary activity 
 has ever in any way, direct or indirect, been dependent upon 
 any official institution or personality, are base and dirty 
 libels." 
 
BURGFRIEDE 27 
 
 with him. In the spring of 191 5 he took up his 
 residence in Copenhagen, where he Hves, it is said, 
 in sumptuous style. In the summer of the same year 
 he started a new German Social Democrat peri- 
 odical, Die Glocke ("The Bell"), of which Conrad 
 Haenisch, one of the able young men of the Party, 
 a Member of the Prussian Landtag, took over 
 the editorship, and to which many other of the 
 principal Social Democrat writers of the Imperialist 
 wing — Lensch, Jansson, Wiimig — are regular con- 
 tributors. 
 
 The envoy chosen for the Swedish Social Democrats 
 was again Sudekum ; for Holland it was Scheidemann. 
 Attempts were even made through Auer, one of the 
 leading members of the Social Democrat Party in 
 Bavaria, to induce the Socialists in the occupied 
 districts of France to give assistance to the Germans. 
 The Socialist maire of Roubaix, M. Lebas, has de- 
 scribed Auer's overtures to him, and how, when he 
 proved obdurate, he was charged with high treason 
 and thrown into a German prison.* 
 
 Later on a still more astonishing attempt was made 
 through Siidekum to seduce French prisoners from 
 their allegiance to their national Government. They 
 were allowed to slip back into France on the under- 
 standing that they would carry on a subterranean 
 propaganda amongst French Socialists for a German 
 peace. We have the account published by Sergeant 
 Rene Tison (302nd Regiment of the Line) of his 
 interview with Siidekum at Metz in January 191 5; he 
 was provided with 600 francs and a false Belgian 
 passport.^ 
 
 L'Humamte, January 20, 1916. 
 'Zevaes, pp. 145, 146. 
 
28 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 This strange co-operation between the old antago- 
 nists. Government and Social Democracy, was part 
 of the general cessation of party feuds 
 
 rf w«.'* '"''"'^ ^1^ o^^"" t^^ country— of what was called 
 the Burgfriede, the Civil Peace. The 
 whole German people during the first month or two 
 of the war was in a state of unnatural exaltation, 
 in which former habits of thought and feeling were 
 temporarily inhibited by one all-mastering emotion. 
 The victorious sweep of the German armies through 
 Belgium and France, the tremendous defeat of the 
 Russians at Tannenberg, seemed to mean that the war 
 was going to be a short and intense episode, during 
 which the various interests of the different parties and 
 classes might well remain in abeyance. All decisions 
 seemed to have been taken out of the hands of 
 politicians and social theorists into those of the 
 Destiny ruling the battle-field. It was no good to 
 think of social reconstruction in the rush of events.^ 
 
 '"At the time when the German armies were pressing for- 
 ward in the rapid march of victory through Belgium and North- 
 ern France, when Hindenburg was dealing the Russians stunning 
 blows in East Prussia, our Majority politicians felt no doubts 
 as to an overwhelming German victory. The English sea- 
 dominion shattered, Russia thrust back beyond the 'line of the 
 Narev, Mitteleuropa constituted from Tornea-Elf to Lugano, 
 from Calais to the Persian Gulf — all these things they saw as 
 already established facts. But if this was so, if history as a 
 matter of fact was taking this course, then it was mere folly 
 to be lachrymose or peevish and resist the brazen tramp of 
 history, for the sake of fine-drawn Socialist theorizings. Be- 
 cause — so Cunow proclaimed — ^the right is always on the side 
 of history, not on that of the constructor of historical theory, 
 who wants to force his own arbitrary laws upon history. 
 Moreover, the fact of the overwhelming victory offered the 
 Majority various chances which might be usefully turned to 
 account. The war would create a gigantic economic boom, 
 
BURGFRIEDE 29 
 
 which would expedite the rise of the German working-class. 
 Also, it was thought, the more 'patriotic' the working-class had 
 shown itself during the war, the fewer unpleasantnesses it had 
 caused the Government and the bourgeoisie in the carrying out 
 of their plans, the easier it would be to get round the govern- 
 ing classes after the war, the less able would they be to re- 
 fuse the social and political demands of the working-class" (H. 
 Strobel, in Die Neue Zeit for September 15, 1916, pp. O74, 675). 
 
IV 
 
 THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OPPOSITION 
 (AUTUMN 1914) 
 
 The battle of the Marne destroyed the possibility of 
 a lightning triumph for Germany. But the battle of 
 Hopes of a *^^ Marne was not at first realized in 
 
 rapid trinmph Germany as a defeat. As represented 
 '*^®" to the German people, it seemed only a 
 
 momentary check; the German armies were only 
 pausing, in the language of Professor Adolf Harnack, 
 to gather strength for a fresh advance. Then, as the 
 weeks went on, and the German armies still remained 
 stationary on the Aisne, the grim reality of a long and 
 wearing war began slowly to dawn upon the German 
 people through the rainbow mists of illusion. The 
 fourteen members of the Social Democrat Reichstag 
 Group, who had indeed on August 4 helped to vote 
 the war-credits, but had on August 3 voted against 
 voting them, began to recover breath. Now that the 
 war was begiiming to lose its halo of glory, there 
 seemed a chance for agitation. 
 
 Some of the prominent representatives of German 
 Social Democracy in the literary field were disposed 
 to regard "the policy of the Fourth of 
 KariKautsky. ^ugust" as an apostasy. Karl Kautsky 
 is an instance. Not being himself a member of 
 the Reichstag, he had taken no part in the critical 
 voting of August 3, except by the advice he had 
 
 30 
 
ITHE BEGINNINGS OF THE OPPOSITION 81 
 
 given, not to vote the credits. Born at Prague in 
 1854, of Czech blood, Kautsky is one of the most 
 proHfic vsrriters of German Social Democracy. A 
 writer of some S3mipathy with Social Democracy 
 describes Kautsky as a doctrinaire of the old school. 
 "He is the very type of the theoretical Radical, who 
 has learnt nothing and forgotten nothing since he 
 came out of the hands of his master, Karl Marx. If 
 he lives for another hundred years he will always go 
 on saying the same thing in new writings, till he is 
 at length left, the last faithful witness of a great van- 
 ished age, to carry on a lonely conversation with him- 
 self." * Yet, whatever may be said by critics, it 
 remains true that Kautsky had been the dominant mind 
 of German Social Democracy in recent years. No one 
 has expounded the principles of Socialism with such 
 authority and such extensive knowledge. It told 
 heavily against the official leaders that Karl Kautsky 
 condemned their action. In spite, however, of Kaut- 
 sky's adverse judgment on the policy adopted by the 
 Party, it seemed to him at the beginning of the war 
 (so it is affirmed in a publication from the Majority 
 side) ^ that the maintenance of Party unity was a con- 
 sideration overriding all others. If this is so, the 
 process of events at any rate led him to take up a 
 different attitude. 
 
 A still more extreme position was taken by the 
 historian of German Social Democracy, Franz Meh- 
 ring. He is now an old man of seventy- 
 The Party ^^q^ ^ scholar and recluse, with a vigor- 
 
 ous and bitter pen. Early in the war 
 he started, in collaboration with the intransigeante 
 
 ' Friedrich Naumann, in Die Hilfe (July i, IQIS)- 
 'Fiir die Einheit der Partei," published by the Party 
 Directorate. 
 
33 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY; 
 
 woman-Socialist, Rosa Luxemburg, a new periodical, 
 Die Internationale, but the Grovernment suppressed it 
 after the appearance of its first number. The second 
 number, Comrades were assured, would appear imme- 
 diately upon the conclusion of peace.^ The leaders 
 of the main body of German Social Democracy them- 
 selves became conscious that they must think out their 
 policy more clearly. In November 1914 the editors 
 of the Social Democrat newspapers met for the first 
 time since the beginning of war in conference. The 
 following principles were laid down for the guidance 
 of the Party Press: — 
 
 1. The Party Press should work against Jingoism 
 and the wilder sort of patriotism. 
 
 2. It should fight against the lust to grab more ter- 
 ritory [though, as we shall see, many Social Democrat 
 leaders were prepared to admit certain annexations as 
 desirable]. 
 
 3. In reproducing accounts of atrocities and of the 
 ill-usage of prisoners and wounded on the part of the 
 enemy, it should aim at the greatest possible measure 
 of "objectivity" — i.e. should try to avoid false reports 
 and exaggerations. 
 
 4. It should be alert and constructive in the 
 sphere of social and economic policy.* 
 
 The Central organ of the Party in the Press, the 
 Berlin Vorwdrts, tried at first to maintain a non- 
 committal attitude between the official policy of the 
 Party and the views of the Opposition. But before 
 long it became plain that those directing the editorial 
 staflf of the paper were mainly in sympathy with the 
 Opposition, and although contributions from the 
 
 ' Berger, p. 81. 
 
 •"Junius" in Die Neue Rundschau for December 1917, 
 p. 1720. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OPPOSITION 33 
 
 Social Democrat Majority continued to appear in 
 Vorwdrts, the curious anomaly came to exist that the 
 Central organ of the Party kept up in its editorial 
 articles a persistently adverse criticism of the policy 
 of the party. 
 
 We have seen that Hugo Haase, who was President 
 both of the Reichstag Group and of the Party as a 
 whole, had voted against the policy of 
 ugo aase. ^^ Majority on August 3. His influence 
 was now thrown into the scale of the Opposition. 
 The same writer from whom a description of Kautsky 
 was quoted just now says of Haase: "There is a 
 basis of East-Prussian Radicalism in him, modified 
 by a sensitiveness to Socialist opinion in neutral 
 countries. The reproaches of these foreign Socialists 
 do not affect the mass of Social Democrats in Ger- 
 many, but the President of the Party is necessarily 
 in a somewhat different position. It rests upon him 
 mairi!^ to keep the connexion with foreign Socialism 
 in 'being. There is a suggestion of pessimism in his 
 attitude. He cannot shut his eyes to the fact that the 
 old Marxian Internationale is a thing of the past, 
 and that mankind has fallen into new groups, accord- 
 ing to the connexions between national States. 
 Besides that, all Presidents are apt to be Conservative, 
 even Social Democrat ones!" 
 
 The Opposition proceeded in the early months of 
 the war by meetings in different places. Its activities 
 began to be felt in Berlin, Gotha, Bremen, 
 ItV^^^ Leipzig, and Hamburg. When the ten 
 members whom Social Democracy sent 
 to the Prussian Landtag met to decide the policy of 
 their Group, it was discovered that they were divided, 
 five to five. Karl Liebknecht was one of the five on 
 the side of the Opposition. 
 
84 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 The world outside the ranks of Social Democracy 
 knew little of the rift of the Party till November, 
 when the Directorate of the Social 
 vrartembirg. Democrat Party in Wtirtemberg sud- 
 denly ejected the editorial body of the 
 Wurtemberg Party organ, the Schwdhische Tagwacht, 
 which, like Vorwdrts, had ranged itself with the 
 Opposition. Stuttgart, the capital of the kingdom of 
 Wtirtemberg, was one of the first centres of agitation 
 against the official policy of the Party. As early as 
 August 21, 1 9 14, at a private gathering of certain 
 local leaders, violent speeches were made against the 
 Group in the Reichstag. Those who voted credits for 
 the war were denounced as rogues and humbugs. 
 
 In September Karl Liebknecht was in Stuttgart. 
 Liebknecht's name is as well known outside Grermany 
 as that of any German Socialist. He owed, no doubt, 
 originally a good part of his prominence to the fact 
 that he was the son of Wilhelm Liebknecht. That 
 he is a man of the calibre of his father it does not 
 seem possible to maintain. But he has an energy 
 which is in part extreme nervous excitability. Bom 
 in 1 871, he is a lawyer by profession, and a speaker 
 who does not qualify his words. He is, perhaps, less 
 afraid than any German Social Democrat leader of 
 standing alone. He sat in the Reichstag as member 
 for Potsdam, and in the Prussian Landtag as member 
 for a division of Berlin. Already before the war he 
 belonged to the extreme section which repudiated on 
 principle all concern for the national cause. He is, in 
 fact, what we have since come to know as a Bolshevik. 
 
 Liebknecht now divulged to the comrades in 
 Stuttgart what hardly any one in Germany as yet 
 knew — that at the meeting of the Group on August 3 
 (fourteen members had voted against voting the credits. 
 
(THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OPPOSITION 35 
 
 At a meeting on September 2 1 in Stuttgart, one of the 
 local leaders, Westmeyer, declared that if the Party 
 had done its duty war would have been prevented: 
 "If only 500,000 workmen in Germany had started 
 a general strike the Government would have thought 
 twice about going to war." The Party, Westmeyer 
 cried, had been sold and betrayed by its chiefs. On 
 November 9 another Wiirtemberg Social Democrat, 
 Crispien, spoke vehemently against the Party leaders. 
 "It is terrible to think of the day of reckoning. 
 Think of the day when the women come, whose hus- 
 bands have fallen, when the cripples come marching 
 up and say to us, 'German Social Democracy left us 
 in the lurch at the moment of our greatest need: now 
 we are going to settle accounts with you!' That is 
 what they are afraid of, and that is why they want 
 to get all the local branches and all the local organs 
 into their hands." In the Schwdbische Tagwacht 
 Crispien and others carried on a campaign of denun- 
 ciation, and this brought about the violent action on 
 the part of the local Party Directorate.^ 
 
 There has been a tendency in certain quarters to 
 represent the Opposition as coinciding with the sections 
 of the Party described at the outset as "Left Centre" 
 and "Extremist." This, however, is only very roughly 
 true. It is true, no doubt, in the case of a good many, 
 that they were now in opposition because by their 
 principles and their habitual instincts it was almost 
 impossible for them to be anything but against the 
 Government. On the other hand, there were many 
 hitherto belonging to the Left extremity of the 
 Party who, believing either that Germany had been 
 wantonly attacked or that, at any rate, the interests 
 of the German working-class would suffer by a 
 'Berger, pp. jg, 80; Haenisch, p. 42. 
 
36 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 German defeat, now threw themselves into the 
 national quarrel. And there were many who had 
 belonged to the Right of the Party and had, on prin- 
 ciple, no objection to parliamentary compromise with 
 other Parties, but who now came to the conclu- 
 sion that Germany's case in this particular war was 
 a bad one, and ranged themselves therefore with the 
 Opposition. Most notable among the latter was 
 Eduard Bernstein. 
 
 Bernstein, as we saw, had stood with the Majority at 
 the outbreak of war. He continued for a time to fre- 
 quent the meetings which the supporters 
 
 Ednard Bern- ^f ^f^g "policy of the Fourth of AugUSt" 
 stein, Eisner, . - , . -r, ,. 
 
 Erdmann,and held at & ccrtam coftec-house m Berlm. 
 Hiiferding join g^^ before two months were gone he 
 
 the Opposition. . ° ,_ 
 
 had come to take a different view. Two 
 lines of consideration, he tells us, powerfully affected 
 him. One was the further light on the diplomatic 
 history of the days immediately preceding the war 
 which gradually penetrated to Germany, and which 
 made the view of the facts, upon which the action 
 of the Group on August 4 had been based, the view 
 put forward by the German Government, now seem 
 false. The other consideration was his observation of 
 the subtle change taking place in the inner attitude of 
 the Social Democrat Majority. At the outset they 
 had definitely disclaimed any approval of the Gov- 
 ernment's foreign policy, and had only voted the war- 
 credits under the overwhelming Russian peril; but 
 the new association in work between Social Democrats 
 and Government was obliterating all distinction in 
 outlook between the Government and themselves, was 
 bringing them all together on to a non-Socialist plat- 
 form. They had been, he felt, corrupted by the 
 applause of the world. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OPPOSITION 37 
 
 In the autumn, therefore, of 19x4 Bernstein ap- 
 proached Haase. "I am afraid," he said, "you were 
 right: our Party is indeed in the thick of a crisis, 
 compared with which all previous crises were child's 
 play. For myself, I cannot go any farther along this 
 road." He wrote in a similar sense to Kautsky and 
 Mehring, from whom he had hitherto been divided 
 by wide differences. 
 
 Another man who had belonged to the Right before 
 the war, and now joined the Opposition, was Kurt 
 Eisner. He had been specially singled out for attack 
 in the old days by Kautsky and Mehring, as one who 
 had apostatized from the pure Marxian doctrine 
 towards an ethical, aesthetic view of the world. To 
 the same category belongs August Erdmann. Rudolf 
 Hilferding, another of those who joined the Oppo- 
 sition, was, if not really a Revisionist, suspected of 
 having tendencies that way.^ 
 
 On the other hand, some belonging to the Left 
 passed after the outbreak of the war into the Nation- 
 alist camp. Prominent amongst these 
 Heinrich ^^^ Heinrich Cunow, a man who had 
 
 Cunow. ... , T-, 
 
 won a great position in the Party as 
 a distinguished savant, an authority on economics 
 and anthropology. He had been closely associated 
 in his literary and scientific work with Karl Kautsky. 
 The war was destined to divide them. Cunow has 
 given us his account of his motives in the first two 
 
 'See the article by Cunow entitled "Parteipsychologisches" 
 in Die Neue Zeit for December 28, 191 7. Where Cunow main- 
 tains that the Comrades who joined the Opposition did so on 
 no ground of principle but simply in consequence of their per- 
 sonal temperament, he leaves out of account (as it was con- 
 venient to him to do) the whole question of the facts bearing 
 on the outbreak of the war, which was for some, at any rate, 
 of the Opposition the determining consideration. 
 
88 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 months of the war, which may be taken with some 
 allowance for the fact that people's accounts of their 
 own inner experiences at a former time often owe 
 something to the transfiguring work of memory and 
 to subsequent impressions. 
 
 It was just as little true in the case of the Opposition — 
 then a little handful — that their attitude was determined by 
 revolutionary or Marxian principles. I can speak on the point 
 from personal experience, for I belonged myself to the Op- 
 position during the first two months of the war, till the 
 political situation became gradually clearer to me and I 
 realized what great interests of the working-class were at 
 stake. The attitude of the group in question was deter- 
 mined, first, by their attachment to old Party traditions, 
 especially traditions of a pacifist tendency, and secondly 
 by the expectation that the Internationale would soon 
 enforce a peace, and that then German Social Democracy, 
 if it had supported the Government, would lose its high 
 standing within the Internationale, but above all by a strong 
 feeling of antagonism to the State, which had hitherto op- 
 pressed Social Democracy, had for years applied the anti- 
 Socialist laws with extreme harshness, bitterly persecuted and 
 imprisoned many individuals, and on the very eve of war had 
 been preparing to restrict the right of coalition. Besides all 
 this, they were influenced by the belief that the whole political 
 and economic system of the world, if the war went on for 
 any length of time, would infallibly come down with a crash, 
 and that then it would be all the easier for Social Democracy 
 to arise out of the chaos as a revolutionary force the less 
 they had compromised themselves with the old system and 
 had "sanctioned" the war by voting war-credits.' 
 
 As is indicated in this passage, Cunow in the third 
 
 month of the war broke with the Opposition. Another 
 
 conspicuous transition was that of Paul 
 
 Paul LenBc . Lgnsch, a vigorous writer, of a good 
 
 Berlin family, then just over forty, who before the 
 
 ^Die Neue Zeit for December 28, 1917, p. 292. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OPPOSITION 39 
 
 war had belonged to the extreme Liebknecht wing,, 
 and had been editor of the uncompromising Leipsiger 
 Volkszeitung. At the fateful meeting of August 3, 
 which he had attended as a Member of the 
 Reichstag, he had not only been against voting the 
 war-credits, but had urged, with Liebknecht, that the 
 Party should actually vote against them. After the 
 Group had voted the credits, Lensch spoke bitterly of 
 their action. In a phrase which was much repeated, 
 he said that the Group had "put the guts of the 
 Internationale on the operating table." Yet a few 
 months after the outbreak of war he passed to the 
 opposite extreme of Jingoism and Anglophobia, 
 
THE MINORITY GROWS 
 
 (DECEMBER 1914 TO MAY 1915) 
 
 In December 19 14 the German Government asked for 
 a new credit of 5,000,000,000 marks. Once more 
 
 the Social Democrat Group met together 
 December 2 *° considcr what it would do. It was 
 1914: Lieb-' plain that many reasons might have de- 
 ^oae! '"'*' termined Social Democrats to vote money 
 
 for the war vmder the terror of Russia in 
 August, which no longer existed in December. Yet 
 the Majority were again for voting the credits. Some 
 members of the Majority wished the vote to be given 
 in the House without any such explanatory declara- 
 tion as had accompanied the vote of August 4, but 
 this proposal was defeated after a hot debate. When 
 the question of voting the credits was put, it was 
 discovered that the Minority against it had grown 
 from fourteen — ^the "baker's dozen," as they were 
 contemptuously named by the Majority — to seven- 
 teen. Haase, as President, would have, as before, 
 to read out the declaration. The Minority obtained 
 with difficulty permission for Haase to insert in the 
 declaration a cautiously guarded sentence about 
 Belgium and Luxemburg. It stated that the Social 
 Democrats "did not depart from the standpoint 
 which the Chancellor had taken on August 4 with 
 regard to Belgium and Luxemburg." This was 
 
 40 
 
THE MINORITY GROWS 41 
 
 intended to imply that the Social Democrats regarded 
 the violation of Belgium as a "wrong," in agreement 
 with the admission made by Bethmann Hollweg in 
 his speech of that day, and held that Belgium must 
 be not only restored, but "indemnified." ^ Perhaps 
 the casual hearer or reader might have been pardoned, 
 had they failed to discern that there was all this in 
 the apparently dutiful phrase. 
 
 The declaration, as drawn up, began: — 
 
 The Social Democrat Group still holds the same ground as 
 in its declaration of August 4. We opposed, up to the last 
 moment, the war which has been brought about by a clash 
 of economic interests. The frontiers of our country are still 
 menaced by hostile forces. For this reason, the German peo- 
 ple is still to-day bound to put forth its whole strength for 
 the defence of the country. Therefore, Social Democracy 
 grants the credits asked for. . . . 
 
 The declaration next acknowledged the people's debt 
 of gratitude to the fighters in the field, and re-affirmed 
 the right of every nation to integrity and independence. 
 It continued: — 
 
 We stand fast by what we said on August 4; we demand 
 that so soon as ever the aim of the war, security, has been 
 attained and our opponents are disposed for peace, the war 
 shall be concluded by a peace which makes friendship with 
 neighbouring nations possible. 
 
 The declaration then condemned the artificial working 
 up of hatred against other nations, touched upon 
 the obligations created by the social need consequent 
 on the war at home, called on the Goverimaent to 
 
 *So Haase explained the sentence in his speech at the 
 Reichskonferem. He pointed out that when Dr. David gave 
 the resolution of December 2, 1914, in his book in defence of 
 German Social Democracy, he significantly left out the sentence 
 about Belgium. 
 
42 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 trust the people, and protested against the censorship, 
 especially the censorship of the Press. 
 
 One member of the Minority, Karl Liebknecht, asked 
 the sanction of the Group for his giving an independ- 
 ent vote against the war-credits; to vote the credits 
 was, he urged, forbidden by the resolutions of the 
 Party in general assembly before the war. This re- 
 quest the Group refused. The Minority, as a whole, 
 resolved, as before, to subordinate their personal con- 
 victions to the will of the Majority. 
 
 Once more, therefore, on December 2, 1914, the 
 world saw the Social Democrat Reichstag Group vote 
 as a solid body for war-credits. There was, however, 
 now one conspicuous dissentient. In spite of the pre- 
 vious party decision, Karl Liebknecht did vote against 
 the credits. He voted alone. At the same time he 
 sent in to the President of the Reichstag in writing 
 a memorandum explaining his action: the war was an 
 Imperialist war of conquest.* This memorandum the 
 President of the Reichstag, Herr Kaempf, refused to 
 allow to be entered upon the records of the House, 
 but it was disseminated widely as a pamphlet by Lieb- 
 necht's friends in the country. 
 
 Liebknecht's action on December 2 was an obvious 
 defiance of Party discipline. Even the rest of the 
 Minority, who had waived their scruples 
 censures in the interests of the solid Party front, 
 
 Liebknecht. could not approve of it. A resolution 
 was passed almost unanimously by the Group, Ma- 
 
 'It is important to note that Liebknecht did not apparently 
 mean that the war was an Imperialist war of conquest on the 
 German side only. His position has always been that Im- 
 perialist and capitalist ambitions on both sides have brought on 
 the war — that it is six of one and half a dozen of the other. 
 His position would thus correspond with the extreme Socialist 
 pacifists in Great Britain. 
 
THE MINORITY GROWS 43 
 
 jority and Minority alike, censuring Liebknecht. The 
 bulk of the Social Democrat Press regarded him as 
 guilty of a gross breach of Party discipline. 
 
 On February 2, 1915, Frohme proposed in a private 
 meeting of the Group that Liebknecht should be 
 deprived of his privileges as a member of the Group. 
 The Group, however, passed, by 82 votes to 7, a 
 resolution to the effect that it was not competent to 
 proceed against a member beyond expressing its dis- 
 approval of his action. The question of exclusion 
 must be reserved for a Parteitag. The Trade Union- 
 ist leader, Legien, threatened on this occasion that, if 
 Liebknecht were not expelled from the Group, he and 
 others, for whom he spoke, might consider whether 
 they could continue to belong to it, but he was pre- 
 vailed upon to withdraw his motion.^ On the same 
 day, it was re-affirmed by 93 votes to 4 that the 
 Group must in all circumstances vote solid in plenary 
 sessions of the Reichstag; whatever individual differ- 
 ences there might be behind closed doors, Party unity 
 must be preserved in the eyes of the world.^ 
 
 Notwithstanding this, in February 191 5 the division 
 of opinion between the Social Democrat Majority 
 and Minority became apparent in the 
 °S"to ' Prussian House of Representatives. In 
 the Socialist this case the Majority, i.e. those who 
 pruBsu'n House stood for the samc policy as the majority 
 ofRepresen- of the Rcichstag Group, were now actu- 
 tatives. ^jjy j^ ^^^ minority, Paul Hirsch having 
 
 changed sides since the previous autumn ; in other 
 words, the opposition to "the policy of the Fourth gf 
 August," which commanded (and that still secretly) » 
 minority only of the 1 10 Social Democrat members in 
 
 'These details are given in Haase's second speech at the 
 Rwhskonferens, " Vorwarts, December 22, 1915. 
 
44 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 the Imperial Reichstag, commanded a majority of the 
 Social Democrat members (six to four) in the Prtis- 
 sian Lower House. The six consisted of Karl Lieb- 
 knecht, Strobel (one of the editors of Vorwdrts), Paul 
 Hirsch, Adolf Hoffmann (an elderly, solid working- 
 man), Paul Hoffmann, and Hofer ; the four of Conrad 
 Haeniseh, Otto Braun, Hue, and Leinert. This fact 
 enabled the views of the opposition to be put forward 
 in the declaration read out on February 9, 19 15, by 
 Paul Hirsch in the name of the Group as a whole. Karl 
 Liebknecht, in his speech on March 2, proclaimed the 
 views of the extreme section of the opposition with 
 characteristic abandon. On the other hand, Conrad 
 Haeniseh, belonging to the Four, felt at liberty in 
 his speech of March 3 to give emphatic expression 
 to the "policy of the Fourth of August," so that the 
 disagreement between the two sections of the Group 
 was manifested with sufficient publicity. 
 
 In March 191 5 the Imperial Government asked 
 
 the Reichstag to vote war-credits for the third time, 
 
 and this time not 5,000, but 10,000 
 
 ??*™'V' millions of marks were asked for. The 
 
 March 20, , ^ . t t-. 
 
 1916: Ruble problem before the Social Democrats was 
 votes with complicated by a new factor. The two 
 
 Liebknecht. ^ -^ . ,. , , , 
 
 former votes of credit had been moved, 
 not as part of the ordinary Imperial Budget, but as 
 extraordinary credits voted for the specific purpose 
 of national defence in the wir. The 10,000 million 
 vote of credit on this occasion was incorporated in 
 the Imperial Budget (Reichsetat) . Now, it had been 
 the standing practice of German Social Democrats 
 that, whilst they voted the Budgets of the several 
 Federal States, which were not for military purposes, 
 it was just the Imperial Budget which they had 
 always refused to vote. The demand of the Govern- 
 
THE MINORITY GROWS 45 
 
 ment for money in March 191 5 brought them up 
 against a new and painful breach with their past. At 
 the private meeting of the Group some one moved that, 
 instead of the 10,000 millions asked for, only 5,000 
 should be voted, as on former occasions; but this 
 appariently pointless compromise was negatived by 64 
 votes to 34. On the main question of voting the 
 Imperial Budget, the Minority against was 30. The 
 Majority was left with 69 votes. 
 
 On March 20 the Imperial Budget was moved in 
 the Reichstag. The Minority of 30 no longer con- 
 formed their public action to that of the Majority. 
 Georg Ledebour, one of the Minority members, an 
 elderly, clean-shaven man, Hanoverian by birth and 
 upbringing, with something of the appearance of an 
 American actor, cast away reticence and thrust before 
 the House the divergent views of the Minority. The 
 Majority, through the mouth of Philipp Scheidemann, 
 thought it necessary to let the House know that they 
 repudiated Ledebour's utterances. This conflict of 
 speeches manifested the division of the Party in the 
 Reichstag on March 20, just as it had been manifested 
 in the Prussian House of Representatives in the first 
 days of the month. 
 
 Scheidemann will play a prominent role in our 
 story. He was born at Cassel in 1863, and is a 
 'printer by trade. Before the outbreak of the war 
 he had come to be one of the principal figures in the 
 Social Democrat Group in the Reichstag, where he 
 sat for Solingen. In February 19 13 he had been 
 chosen to be Vice-President of the House. The gifts 
 which had enabled him to rise were less any great 
 eminence of mind or character than a considerable 
 diplomatic address. He is what would be called in 
 England "a good Parliamentary hand," and can 
 
46 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY; 
 
 manage difficult situations with dexterity. An effec- 
 tive and ready speaker, he is very conscious of his 
 audience, and undoubtedly is glad thit attention 
 should be directed upon his person. Li)ce many vain 
 people, he is also somewhat easily ^ayed by the 
 currents of opinion which he meets and led by those 
 whom he aspires to lead. 
 
 When the moment for voting came, Liebknecht, 
 as on the last occasion, gave his vote against the 
 credits. And he was now no longer 
 ceiTsures"' Solitary; one other member, Otto Riihle, 
 
 Liebknecht votcd with him. The thirty who had 
 
 "" " °' • opposed the voting of the Budget at 
 the private meeting of the Group also now separated 
 themselves publicly from the Majority. They did 
 not, indeed, vote against the Budget, but they osten- 
 tatiously left the Chamber in a body before the 
 voting took place. A vote of censure was duly passed 
 by the Group upon Liebknecht and Riihle, as it had 
 been passed upon Liebknecht in December. Then, 
 however, the censure had been almost unanimous; 
 now seventeen votes were found to acquit the two 
 insubordinate members of blame against the sixty- 
 seven which condemned. Liebknecht was disavowed 
 on April 18 by a resolution of the Committee of the 
 Union of Social Democrat Wahlvereine in his own 
 province of Brandenburg. 
 
 An attempt of the military authorities to put 
 Liebknecht under constraint about this time mis- 
 carried. He had been enrolled as an 
 ^oce"(fings Armierungssoldat — i.e. a soldier in the 
 against noncombatant equipment service — and 
 
 the military authorities contended that 
 this gave them jurisdiction over him. On the other 
 hand, the Deputy of the Imperial Chancellor in the 
 
THE MINORITY GROWS 47 
 
 Reichstag gave it as his opinion that Liebknecht 
 was immune from military arrest, in virtue of his 
 seat in the Reichstag (Article 31 of the Constitution). 
 This view was accepted by the Government, and the 
 proceedings against him had been stopped before the 
 matter came up in the Reichstag on May 14. 
 
 The division of the Party began to be reflected m 
 the Party Press, in polemics between Vorwdrts and 
 other papers in sympathy with the 
 iii°tte°pr^: Minority on the one hand and the 
 " Majority M Majority papers on the other/ The 
 inonty question "Majority or Minority?" be- 
 
 came the one mainly agitated in the local Social 
 Democrat organizations all over Germany. Some 
 localities ranged themselves predominantly with one 
 side, other localities with the other side. It was 
 recognized by both sides that the controversy could 
 not be finally settled till a General Assembly of the 
 whole Party (a Parteitag) could be held, and this 
 could not be till the great numbers of Comrades on 
 active service came home.^ We find in this con- 
 nexion that appeals are made by all parties in Germany 
 to the sentiment of men at the front. When the 
 armies come home, each party affirms, they will make 
 short work of its opponents. Letters were printed 
 in May 19 15 in the German Press from working- 
 men at the front, members of the Builders' Trade 
 Union, condemning the Minority with great bitterness, 
 and saying that the action of Liebknecht and Lede- 
 bour had caused wide-spread resentment among the 
 Comrades in field-grey.^ 
 
 •"The attack on Vorwarts goes merrily forward, hardly 
 in the interests of Party solidarity!" {Vorwdrts, May 2, 1915.) 
 
 *See the account of the meeting at Frankfurt addressed by 
 Haase {Vorwdrts, May 19, 1915)- 
 
 *Munchner Neueste Nachrichten, May 9, 1915. 
 
48 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 When the Reichstag met in May 19 15 the entrance 
 
 of Italy into the war had acted momentarily as a 
 
 check to the propaganda of the Minority 
 
 The debate , . . . '^ f ° . , , ,- " 
 
 o( May 28, 191B: by magnifymg the national danger. On 
 tie questidn of May 28 the Spokesman of the Social 
 Democrat Group in the Reichstag was 
 no longer Hugo Haase, but Ebert. Haase was still 
 officially President, but his identifying himself 
 with the Minority caused his functions to be exer- 
 cised to some extent by members of the Majority. 
 Ebert repeated the assurances given on August 4, 1914, 
 that the Social Democrats would stand fast by the 
 country. But he added that they desired a peace not 
 embittered by any fresh annexations. 
 
 The burning question of "Annexations" first came 
 up prominently before the German people in this 
 debate of May 28, 1915. Pan-German circles had 
 started agitating for vast new territorial acquisitions 
 as a war-aim. The notorious memorandum of the Six 
 Associations to the Chancellor had been presented 
 (secretly) a few days before. In* the speech which 
 the Chancellor made at this meeting of the Reichstag, 
 he had spoken ambiguously of the "guarantees" re- 
 quired, leaving it open to annexationists and anti- 
 annexationists to dispute whether "guarantees" meant 
 annexations or not. The utterance of Ebert in his 
 speech awakened the controversy on this subject into 
 life in the Reichstag. The other speaker for the 
 Social Democrats, Scheidemann, took a similar line to 
 Ebert. The speakers for the Conservatives and 
 National-Liberals contended for annexations. Lieb- 
 knecht at one point raised a storm by ejaculating 
 "Capitalist interests !" 
 
 One may notice how the emergence of this question 
 of annexations affected the position of the Majority. 
 
THE MINORITY GROWS 49 
 
 The bulk of the Majority, not all of them, were op- 
 posed to annexations. The standing reproach directed 
 against the Majority by the Minority was that by 
 their support of the Government they had obliterated 
 all distinction between themselves and the bourgeois 
 parties ; the old attitude of protest and revolt, on which 
 Social Democracy had prided itself, had been aban- 
 doned. But now the question of annexations fur- 
 nished an issue on which men like Scheidemann could 
 once more take up an attitude of protest against 
 Imperialism. It was no longer an antagonism to the 
 Government — Scheidemann maintained that Beth- 
 mann HoUweg agreed with him ; but it was an antago- 
 nism to Pan-Germans and Imperialist National- 
 Liberals, to all who desiderated any territorial con- 
 quests as a result of the war. The cry of "No annex- 
 ations!" enabled members of the Social Democrat 
 Majority still to represent themselves as fighters for 
 anti-Imperialist principles, 
 
VI 
 
 MINORITY MANIFESTOS 
 (JUNE TO AUGUST. 191S) 
 
 Signs began to multiply in the spring of 191 5 that 
 
 the old antagonism of the Government to Social 
 
 Democracy, which had seemingly dis- 
 
 The Govern- i • a . « •« •■ i 
 
 menfs heavy appeared m August 19 14, had revived 
 hand on the in reference to that part of Social 
 '"°" ■ Democracy which went with the Minority. 
 
 Various meetings were forbidden by the authorities 
 on May Day. On May 15 thirty meetings were pro- 
 hibited in the country round Dresden. On June 9 
 a lecture which Haase had arranged to give at 
 Diisseldorf on "The Past and Future of Social 
 Democracy" was forbidden. At Bremen a meeting 
 had been arranged for June 14, at which Haase was 
 to speak; the General in Command at Altona refused 
 to give the necessary permission. On June 12 the 
 police raided the printing office of the Social Democrat 
 Party at Diisseldorf; a member of the Party had his 
 house searched and was put under arrest. 
 
 Some of the more extreme wing of German Social 
 Democracy, restless to attack the Majority, but 
 „^ ^. , finding themselves muzzled in Germany 
 
 The disclosures ° . ■' 
 
 ottheBerner by the censorship, adopted the device 
 Tagwacht. q£ communicating articles to the Swiss 
 Socialist paper, the Berner Tagwacht. In the course^ 
 of these articles they published certain details as to 
 a secret debate in the Reichstag early in June on 
 
 so 
 
MINORITY MANIFESTOS 61' 
 
 cruelty in the German army. This was considered an 
 outrageous violation of confidence, and the Directorate 
 of the Party made haste to condemn the action of the 
 members in question. 
 
 Two documents circulated in June 191 5 caused 
 wide commotion. One was an "Open Letter to. the 
 The "Open Chiefs of the Party and the Reichstag 
 Letter "of Group." It was dated Jime 9, and 
 
 June 1915. .^^^g originally signed by eleven members 
 
 of the Minority in the Reichstag Group — Albrecht, 
 Henke, Herzfeld, Kunert, Ledebour, Liebknecht, 
 Riihle, Schwartz, Stadthagen, StoUe, and Vogtherr 
 — and some 100 other prominent members of the 
 Party. About 1,400 other names of lesser known 
 Comrades were appended. The Letter denounced 
 "the policy of the Fourth of August"; accused the 
 Party of pursuing a "back-stairs" policy — i.e. a 
 policy of secret understanding with the Government; 
 and called for the throwing over of the Civil Peace 
 and the resumption of class-war. The Reichstag 
 Group, it said, had abandoned all resistance to the 
 Imperialist policy of conquest. It claimed to express 
 the feelings of a large section of the people when it 
 called upon the Party authorities to act in the sense 
 indicated. Otherwise the responsibility for all that 
 might follow would rest upon those who had driven 
 the Party on to the down-grade. This Letter was 
 circulated in hundreds of copies among the rank and 
 file of the Party, and further signatures were invited. 
 
 The other document was a Manifesto signed by 
 Haase, Bernstein, and Kautsky. It ap- 
 d^stMid""" peared in the Leipziger Volkszeitung of 
 June 19, and was headed "Das Gebot der 
 Stunde" ("The Requirement of the Hour"). Its oc- 
 casion was the memorandum of the Six Associations. 
 
52 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 The three Social Democrat leaders contended that the 
 war had ceased to be a war of defence, such as had 
 been envisaged by the Reichstag Group on August 4, 
 and became an ImperiaHst war of conquest, to which 
 a Social Democracy, true to its essential principles, 
 could not give any support. The original idea and 
 first draft of this document were due to Bernstein. 
 
 These two documents at once became centres for 
 the agitation in the Social Democrat Party, and even 
 " Social De- *^^ non-Socialist Press was moved. The 
 mocracyand Government suspended the Leipziger 
 Peace." Volkszeitutig ' for a period, as a punish- 
 
 ment for printing the Manifesto. On June 22 Vor- 
 warts published a protest by ten members of the Party 
 Directorate against the action of Haase, Bernstein, 
 and Kautsky. The Social Democrat Press took 
 sides. The agitation nevertheless made the Party 
 Directorate feel it incumbent upon it to issue some 
 Manifesto of its own, which, while adhering to "the 
 policy of the Fourth of August," showed that the 
 Majority had not abandoned their desire for peace or 
 their anti-Imperialist principles. It was necessary for 
 them to go as far as they could in the direction of 
 Haase and his associates, in order to take the wind out 
 of the sails of the Minority. They did this in a 
 Manifesto published officially on the authority of the 
 Directorate in the Vorw'drts of June 26 under the 
 heading "Social Democracy and Peace." They took 
 occasion in it to protest against annexations. "The 
 people want no annexations, the people want peace." 
 For publishing this Manifesto Vorw'drts was suspended 
 by the Government for five days, on the ground that 
 it contravened the prohibition to discuss war-aims, 
 and other Social Democrat papers publishing the Mani- 
 festo were apparently likewise suspended. 
 
MINORITY MANIFESTOS 63 
 
 At the meetings of the Party Committee in Berlin 
 on June 30 and July i, at which forty-one Local 
 The Party Committees of the German Empire were 
 
 committeo represented, a vote of censure was passed 
 
 ispeaks. ^y ^ large majority on the "underground 
 
 work obviously directed from a central quarter" (a 
 glance at Haase), with the ultimate object of splitting 
 the Party. It was also declared that Haase's signa- 
 ture of Bernstein's manifesto had been an act incom- 
 patible with his obligations as President. Paul 
 Lensch, who had now completed his transition from 
 the extreme "Radical" to the Nationalist wing of 
 the Party, in an article published in the Schwdbische 
 Tagwacht (quoted in theVossische Zeitung,]\nae 28), 
 called on Haase to resign his leadership. "The Presi- 
 dent of a Party," he said, "who is doing his best to 
 thwart the policy of the Party as a whole is a mon- 
 strosity (Unding)." 
 
 A controversy in Vorw'drts between the Party 
 Directorate and the Editorial Committee of the paper 
 about this time throws some light on 
 incouusion" the charge of a "back-stairs policy." 
 with the There had been nothing dishonourable, 
 
 overnmen ^^^ Directorate contended, in what had 
 been done. It had merely brought to the notice of 
 the Government, as it was bound to do, things which 
 were causing trouble to the Party — ^the suppression 
 of newspapers, the arrest of Comrades, etc. The 
 proceedings to which the phrase pointed, the editors 
 reply, are very dififerent from that. The day will 
 come when it will be possible to speak out about them. 
 The Directorate vehemently repudiates the insinuation 
 that there had been any otiier dealings between itself 
 and the Government, other than those it had 
 specified. The editors answer that it is certainly not 
 
64 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 true that all questions relating to the war had been 
 dealt with in the light of publicity, as the Minority 
 demand. At the same date we get an alarm in 
 the non-Socialist Jingo Press that there is a secret 
 understanding between the Government and the Social 
 Democrat Majority with regard to the peace-feelers 
 being .put out in neutral countries. It is even sug- 
 gested that the Directorate's Manifesto was really 
 published in Vorwarts by the connivance of the Gov- 
 ernment, and that the suspension of the paper had 
 been a blind. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 
 of June 27 issues a declaration that the German Gov- 
 ernment has had nothing to do with international 
 peace propaganda, and given no authorization in that 
 direction either to Social Democrats or any other inter- 
 mediaries. 
 
 Meantime, both the extreme Liebknecht wing of 
 the Party and the extreme Imperialist wing, repre- 
 sented, for instance, by Kolb of Karls- 
 and Imperial- fuhc, are bcginnmg to call for a disrup- 
 ists desire a tion of the Party on the ground that that 
 ^^ ■ would be a lesser evil than continued 
 
 co-operation with the opposite wing. The inter- 
 mediate bulk of the Party, both Majority and 
 Minority, are still trying to hold the Party together 
 and pleading that a certain latitude should be conceded 
 within the Party to variety of opinion. 
 
 The division of opinion in the Party was leading 
 to bitter personal asperities. At a private meeting 
 of the Social Democrat members of the 
 Persona! Prussiah House of Representatives, now 
 
 reduced to nme, more than one of the 
 four who agreed with the "policy of the Fourth of 
 August" expressed themselves as favourable to the 
 "economic annexation" of Belgium by force. Against 
 
MINORITY MANIFESTOS 55 
 
 this Strobel, one of the editors of Vorw'drts, who be- 
 longed to the opposing five, protested. He declared 
 himself against all annexationist projects, however 
 veiled under economic forms. Some of this dispute 
 within the Group got into the public Press, in con- 
 nexion with an attack Lensch made upon Strobel. 
 "The hour of reckoning," Strobel retorted in Vorw'drts 
 (July i8), "will strike. Till then Lensch and his like 
 may exult in their rowdiness and their licence to make 
 fools of themselves." About the same time a dis- 
 closure in the Berner Tagwacht shows that strong lan- 
 guage was not used on one side only. In the lobbies 
 of the Reichstag, said the correspondent of that paper, 
 in the hearing of all the opponents of Socialism, the 
 members of the Social Democrat Majority reviled 
 Liebknecht as an "ambitious ass," a "buffoon," etc. 
 In the private meetings of the Group, we are told, 
 names which in English might be represented by 
 "ragamuffin," "lout," "clown" were hurled at Lieb- 
 knecht; Ledebour was described as a "political ape 
 (Fatske)"; Bernstein as "a political child, who can- 
 not be taken seriously." The Comrade who writes to 
 the Berner Tagwacht goes on to speak of the "abysses 
 of moral unscrupulousness and abandonment" on the 
 side of the Majority. "All the dirt which Government 
 publications have flung at the Party for the last fifty 
 years shrinks up to mere little heaps in comparison. 
 Their insinuations, their slanders, their spitting, have 
 been only too successfully copied !" 
 
 We may notice that at this time a common nick- 
 Vml rner name applied to the Majority was that of 
 
 and Umlerner. Some of the Majority them- 
 
 Quertreiber. selves professed that their ideas had 
 undergone correction through further experience, 
 that there had been a reversal in their mental attitude 
 
66 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 owning to fresh learning — a process summed up in 
 the one German word umilernen. If these members 
 of the Majority called themselves Umlerner in an 
 honourable sense, their opponents habitually used the 
 term of them with mordant irony. The name of re- 
 proach, on the other hand, fastened by the Majority 
 upon the Minority was that of Quertreiber, "people 
 driving across the course," or, in our English 
 idiom, "people who queer the pitch" of Social 
 Democracy. 
 
VII 
 
 THE VOTE OF AUGUST 1915 
 
 On August 20 the Government was again going to 
 ask for war-credits. Six days before (August 14) 
 The Reichstag *e Reichstag Group of no members 
 Group and the and the Party Committee (consisting, 
 
 Stitee^detoe ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^' °^ representatives of 
 their war- the local Organizations over the Empire) 
 
 '"°^" had a common meeting to discuss the 
 
 critical question of war-aims. Dr. Eduard E>avid 
 presented a statement of the views of the Majority. 
 David is one of the ablest men in the Party, and he 
 might have seemed designated for the first place. 
 Although he has been passed by Scheidemann, he is 
 unquestionably the man of the more solid qualities. 
 He is a Jew by race, and he entered political life 
 from academic antecedents. His poor physique has 
 no doubt handicapped him, but he is an excellent 
 speaker, and has made his mark as a man of letters. 
 Without going as far as the more extreme Imperialist 
 Socialists, David during the war has stood more to 
 the Right than Scheidemann, in the strongly National- 
 ist wing of the Party. Bernstein presented the state- 
 ment for the Minority. The resolution, passed after 
 a debate, naturally supported the Majority. These 
 resolutions were published by Vorwdrts on August 24, 
 and are as follows: 
 
 i. No cession of German territory: this applies to the 
 re-uniting of Alsace-Lorraine to France under any form 
 whatsoever. 
 
 5^ 
 
68 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCEACY 
 
 2. Security to be obtained for the commercial development 
 of Germany by — 
 
 (o) the Open Door in all colonial dependencies: 
 
 (&) the inclusion of the most-favoured-nation clause in 
 
 the treaty of peace concluded with all the belligerent 
 
 Powers : 
 (c) the abrogation, as far as possible, of tariffs: 
 (,d) the improvement of social-political institutions in 
 
 the sense desired by the International Labour 
 
 Movement : 
 (e) freedom of the seas, viz. abolition of the right of 
 
 capture at sea and the internationalization of all 
 
 straits important to world-commerce. 
 
 3. No disruption of Austria-Hungary or Turkey. 
 
 4. No annexations of non-German territory by the German 
 Empire. 
 
 5. A perpetual International Court of Arbitration. 
 
 According to a statement by Wolfgang Heine, the 
 resolution declaring against the restoration of Alsace- 
 Lorraine to France was passed by 81 to 14 votes of 
 the Reichstag Group and 31 to 7 votes of the Party 
 Committee.^ 
 
 The Committee had to face the thorny question of 
 Belgium. Dr. David proposed a resolution worded as 
 follows: 
 
 From the point of view of German interests no less than 
 from that of justice, we hold the restoration of Belgium to 
 be imperative, but neither can Germany, in the interest of 
 its own security and freedom of movement, permit Belgium 
 to become a military advanced post and political instrument 
 of England. 
 
 The qualification contained in the second half of 
 the resolution provoked the opposition of the Minority 
 members of the Group. They urged that it left 
 
 ^Berliner Tageblatt, January 11, 1916, evening. 
 
THE VOTE OF AUGUST 1915 59 
 
 a pretext for limiting Belgium's future independence, 
 which must be absolute. David therefore withdrew 
 this part of the resolution before it was put to the 
 vote. Liebknecht, however, wanted something more 
 positive. He moved that after the words "restora- 
 tion of Belgium" these further words should be 
 added: — 
 
 in unlimited internal and external independence, every kind 
 of compulsory political or economic attachment being excluded. 
 
 This amendment the Group threw out by 60 votes 
 to 42, and the Party Committee by 30 votes to 10. 
 It was plain that the German Social Democrat 
 Majority, when it asked for the "restoration of Bel- 
 gitmi," was far from meaning a genuine restoration 
 of Belgium's independence.^ 
 
 The question finally came up how the war-aims of 
 the Party Committee could be communicated to the 
 people. The Government prohibition of a public dis- 
 cussion of war-aims, then in force, made it impossible 
 to publish them straight away in the Party Press. 
 There was only one way in which the Government's 
 prohibition could be evaded, and that was by their 
 being read out as an official pronouncement of the 
 Group in the Reichstag. The privileges of the 
 House in that case would secure their being reported. 
 So averse, however, were many of the Majority at 
 that time from admitting the light of publicity upon 
 their proceedings that the proposal to read out the 
 war-aims resolution in the Reichstag was strongly 
 opposed. It was eventually only carried by Dr. 
 David's casting vote.^ 
 
 'Kautsky, Die Neue Zeit for September 14, 1917, p. 557. 
 'Haase's second speech at the Reichskonferem. 
 
60 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 The Government was again on this occasion asking 
 for 10,000 millions of marks. At the private meeting 
 of the Group, at which the action of 
 Au^?t »!' *^ ^^^^y was decided upon, the Minority 
 1918: Dr. David against voting the credits had risen to 
 spe^sforth. 36— practically a third of the Group. 
 Haase, the President, being still dis- 
 qualified by his views from speaking for the Party in 
 the Reichstag, the speaker chosen was Dr. David. His 
 speech, of strong Nationalist complexion, gave pleasure 
 to the non-Socialist parties. Vorwdrts, on the other 
 hand, as the Frankfurter Zeitung remarked (August 
 21), could not conceal its chagrin that David's utter- 
 ances should have diverged at no point from those of 
 the non-Socialist speakers. ' 
 
 At the Third Reading of the Bill, 32 (or, according 
 to another account, 29) members of the Social Demo- 
 crat Group left the Chamber before the voting. Three 
 of the 36 who had voted at the Party meeting against 
 voting the War Budget remained in the Chamber 
 and voted with the Majority. Liebknecht alone 
 voted against the Budget. Ruble, who had voted 
 with Liebknecht on March 20, published a statement 
 in the Vorwdrts of August 26 that he had intended 
 to do so also on this occasion, but the vote had 
 been taken so suddenly, while he happened to 
 be absent, that he was unable to reach the Chamber 
 in time. 
 
 Why, if some thirty members were ready to leave 
 the Chamber, were they not ready to vote outright 
 against the credits, like Liebknecht? It was in 
 obedience to an old rule of the Group, which aimed 
 at preserving within the Chamber the appearance 
 of a solid front. On February 2, 1915, the Group 
 had decided by 93 votes to 4 that it must in all cir- 
 
THE VOTE OF AUGUST 1916 61 
 
 cumstances give a united vote.^ But already in August 
 191 5 Bernstein tells us,** the feeling came up amongst 
 the thirty as they sat in a neighbouring room, whilst 
 the voting was going on, that they were playing a sorry 
 farce. Some members gave open expression to the 
 feeling. When the Government next asked for credits, 
 the feeling would have determined new action. 
 
 * Vorwarts, December 22, 1915. 
 
 *Die Zukunft for April 21, 1917, p. 72. 
 
VIII 
 
 MINORITY PROPAGANDA AT THE END 
 OF 1915 
 
 (AUGUST TO DECEMBER 1915) 
 
 Between August and December 1915 there was no 
 
 conspicuous new development in German Social 
 
 Democracy. The more or less sub- 
 
 menf/hand terranean work of the Minority, by 
 
 Btiii heavy on Hying specch and pamphlet, went for- 
 
 inony. ward. At the beginning of September 
 
 we find two prominent members of the Party at 
 
 Diisseldorf, the Branch Secretary and another man, 
 
 cited before the local Tribunal on the charge of 
 
 exciting class-hatred through the distribution of a 
 
 pamphlet, "The Chief Enemy the Enemy at Home." 
 
 Haase himself conducted the defence, but the accused 
 
 were condemned to three months' imprisonment. 
 
 On October 3 Vorwdrts announces: — 
 
 Special measures have been taken by the Government 
 against the more pacifist wing of the Party — i.e. the Lieb- 
 knecht group. A large number of Comrades (both men and 
 women) in Essen, Dusseldorf and other places within the dis- 
 trict of the 7th Army Corps have been warned by the Police, 
 upon instructions from the military General Command, that 
 during the course of the war they are prohibited from mak- 
 ing any speeches either in public or private meetings, and 
 from circulating any printed matter. A contravention of this 
 order will lead to arrest for the term of the war. These 
 measures do not apply to the Social Democrat Par^ as a 
 
 62 
 
MINORITY PROPAGANDA B3 
 
 whole, but only to the section represented by those who signed 
 the Open Letter of June 9. 
 
 In September an International Socialist Confer- 
 ence was held at Zimmerwald in Switzerland (Sep- 
 ^^g tember 5 to 8). The Socialist Parties of 
 
 Zimmerwald various neutral countries were officially 
 Conference. represented there, but no official repre- 
 sentatives came from the main Socialist organizations 
 of any belligerent country, except Italy. Two 
 eccentric pacifists found their way to Zimmerwald 
 from France ; from Germany there came ten members 
 of the Minority. But these ten split at Zimmerwald 
 into a more and a less extreme section. The less 
 extreme section was represented by Ledebour and 
 Adolf Hoffmann. They affixed their signatures to 
 the Manifesto finally passed by the Conference, calling 
 for an immediate resumption of the International 
 class-war to end the war between nations. This 
 Manifesto, after the return of the ten to Germany, 
 was widely circulated among the people. The more 
 extreme section of the Germans attached them- 
 selves to a group whose leader and prophet at 
 Zimmerwald was a Pole, called Sobelsohn, but 
 better known by his "party name" of Karl Radek. 
 Under this name he was active as an agitator and 
 writer. Two years later the world was to hear 
 more of him as associated with Trotsky in 
 Petrograd, after the Bolshevik Government had 
 seized the direction of things in Russia. For this 
 section even Ledebour and Hofifmann were luke- 
 warm and the Zimmerwald Manifesto tame.^ The 
 
 'The section in question has split away in Germany from the 
 body of Social Democracy and constituted a separate organiza- 
 tion of its own under the name of Internationale Sozialisten 
 Deutschlands. 
 
64 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 organ of the section in Germany was a paper called 
 Lichtstrahlen, edited by Julian Borchardt, to which 
 Radek was a frequent contributor. 
 
 One feature of the situation which was coming 
 into notice at this time was that the Trade Unions 
 in Germany, under the influence of such 
 Onions side leaders as Legien, President of the Gen- 
 withthe eral Committee of Trade Unions, a man 
 
 with whom appreciation of the lower ma- 
 terial goods would seem to determine policy rather 
 than any striving after ideal values, and Winnig, sec- 
 ond President of the German Builders' Union, had 
 gone strongly on the side of the Social Democrat 
 Majority against the Minority. They stood for 
 materialist RealpoUtik, not Socialist theories. 
 
 The official organ of German Trade Unionism {Kor- 
 respondensblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerk- 
 schaften Deutschlands) wrote on January 15, 1916: — 
 
 The policy of the Fourth of August, 1914, corresponds with 
 the most vital interests of the Trade Unions; it removes all 
 peril of hostile invasion ; . it gives protection against the dis- 
 integration of German territory and the destruction of 
 flourishing branches of German industry; it gives protection 
 against the doom involved in an unhappy end to the wzt, 
 which would burden us for decades to come with war-indem- 
 nities. This policy further secures to us not only our fields 
 for industry and for the production of raw materials at home, 
 but also the importation from abroad of the raw materials 
 required for our manufactures and markets in other countries 
 for the disposal of our products. It frustrates the desires 
 of our enemies for our strategic and economic overthrow, 
 and guarantees to German labour free development and a free 
 world-market. . . . The Trade Unions must in all circum- 
 stances hold fast to their policy of the Fourth of August, 
 and cannot warn urgently enough against the efiForts being 
 made to thwart this policy, which is the policy of the Group 
 to-day. 
 
MINORITY PROPAGANDA 66 
 
 According to the older theory of the Social Demo- 
 crats, as expounded by Kautsky, the Trade Unions, 
 as such, ought to keep clear of politics. It is not 
 necessary that a member of a Trade Union should 
 be a Social Democrat. The Trade Unions might 
 indeed serve as a recruiting-ground for the Social 
 Democrat Party, but it is the Party, and not the 
 Trade Unions, to which action in the political sphere 
 belongs. When, therefore, the Trade Union officials 
 began to take sides against the Minority, it became 
 a subject of complaint in Minority circles that they 
 were going beyond their sphere. 
 
 In spite of its division, the Social Democrat Party 
 still, for some purposes during these autumn months. 
 Campaign actcd as E wholc, in carrying on a cam- 
 
 •gainsthigh paign agaiust the high prices of food, 
 """"• ascribed to profiteering, and against the 
 
 Censorship. A protest inserted by Vorw'drts (Novem- 
 ber 6), signed by the Directorate and Committee of 
 the Social Democrat Party of Germany, "Against 
 the High Prices" {Gegen die Teuerung), caused the 
 paper to be subjected to stricter Government control. 
 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (November 
 13) published an answer to this appeal from the Im- 
 perial Chancellor. It assured the Social Democrats of 
 the Chancellor's sympathy with the sufferings of the 
 poor and of the Government's firm intention to put 
 down profiteering. 
 
 In November Scheidemann and three other Coiii- 
 rades of the Majority paid a visit to the 
 
 Four Comrades r . • -n i • j ij.'j 
 
 visit Belgium, frout in Belgium, and were entertained 
 wovember by Headquarters. This brought upon 
 
 them a storm of invective from the side 
 of the Minority. On November 14 we find, 
 for instance, the Social Democrats of the Weimar 
 
66 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 electoral district passing a resolution approving of 
 the Zimmerwald" Conference and censuring the four 
 Comrades who had gone to Belgium.^ We gather 
 that Scheidemann was commonly referred to in cer- 
 tain circles by such names as "the Tourist in Belgium," 
 "the Visitor to the Front," "the Cinema Hero." The 
 language of some of the secretly distributed pamphlets 
 was still more vigorous: — 
 
 Whilst the Belgian proletariat, deprived of its rights, 
 groans under a shameful dictatorship, official representatives 
 of Social Democracy arrange to go on a pleasure tour arm in 
 arm with the oppressors and tormentors through the midst 
 of that unhappy country. Whilst their own comrades at home, 
 because they will not deny and betray Socialism as they 
 have done, are persecuted and harassed, thrown into prison 
 and haled before the courts, they consent to receive invita- 
 tions from the persecutors and enemies of Labour, and to be 
 treated with wines and dainties. Is there, then, no working- 
 man in all Germany who will spit in the faces of these rogues? 
 Has nobody a dog-whip to drive these traitors to all the 
 devils? Are the proletarians so destitute of self-respect that 
 they can put up with such Judas action on the part of their 
 leaders? 
 
 * Vossische Zeitung, November 30. 
 
IX 
 
 THE REICHSTAG SESSION OF 
 DECEMBER 191 5 
 
 The December session of the Reichstag exercised 
 
 Social Democrat circles long beforehand. There 
 
 were many in the Minority who hoped 
 
 Deinandsof ^h^^. ^^^ occasion would be taken for 
 
 the Minority. 
 
 a clearer public declaration of the war- 
 aims for which they stood. Kautsky wrote to com- 
 plain that in the official declaration of the war-aims 
 of the Party, issued in August, nothing had been said 
 about disarmament. Kolb, representing the National- 
 ist extremity of the Majority, answered in his Baden 
 paper, the Volksfreund, that only a doctrinaire, shut 
 up in theories from all knowledge of the world, could 
 now renew the old demand of the Internationale for 
 disarmament after the war.^ 
 
 Both the extremes continued to press for a frank 
 schism of the Party as the only way in which the 
 issues could be cleared. Kautsky and the Leipziger 
 Volksseitung kept on asserting that the Minority must 
 at last speak out in the Reichstag. It was even 
 doubtful, they maintained, whether the Minority 
 had not actually become the majority. It was 
 certainly, they said, doubtful whether this was not 
 
 ^Kdlnische Zeitung, November 16, 1915. 
 67 
 
68 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 the case in the country as a whole, and to some extent 
 doubtful whether it was not the case in the Reichstag 
 Group. 
 
 Ten days before the meeting of the Reichstag (i.e. 
 on November 30) a proposal was moved in the Group 
 Socialists to from the side of the Minority that an 
 address inter- interpellation be addressed to the Chan- 
 p««°Group '^^'^°''' aslcing whether he was ready to 
 meeting of enter upon negotiations for peace imme- 
 
 Hovemberso, diatcly on the basis of "no annexations." 
 This proposal was defeated by 58 votes to 43.^ An 
 amendment was passed by 93 votes to 5,^ that the 
 Chancellor be asked on what conditions he was pre- 
 pared to enter upon peace negotiations. 
 
 It now became a question of choosing the two 
 Meiibers to speak on the interpellation in the House. 
 Scheidemann was proposed to speak first. According 
 to precedent, when two Members spoke in the House 
 for the Party upon one question, one belonged to 
 the Right and one to the Left wing of the Party. It 
 was therefore proposed by the Minority that, in. 
 this case too, a member of the Minority should be 
 chosen to speak after Scheidemann. This was op- 
 posed by the Majority, and in the voting which fol- 
 lowed, the speaker proposed by the Minority got only 
 47 votes as against the 75 and the 62 votes got 
 respectively by the two speakers proposed by the 
 Majority, Scheidemann and Landsberg. The Minority 
 now asked that they might be given freedom of action, 
 to express their views in the House independently 
 of the Group. This proposal was defeated by 68 
 votes to 29. A member of the Majority then pro- 
 posed that it should be made compulsory for every 
 individual member of the Party Group to support in 
 
 * Vossische Zeitung, December 2. ' Berger, p. 8. 
 
DECEMBER 1916 69 
 
 the Reichstag the policy resolved on by the majority 
 of the Group. The proposal was carried by 70 votes 
 to 27/ 
 
 Haase at this point gave the Group to understand 
 that he intended definitely to join the Minority, and 
 therefore proposed to resign his position as President 
 of the Group.^ 
 
 The public announcement that an interpellation 
 was going to be brought forward by the Social 
 Democrat Group caused some excitement both within 
 and without Social Democrat circles in the days 
 preceding the meeting of the Reichstag. The 
 Nationalist Press, of course, condemned it on the 
 ground that it would give abroad the impression 
 that Germany was weakening. Social Democrat 
 Majority circles were pleasurably expectant ; Vorwdrts 
 was pessimistic: "What do all interpellations help 
 if the Imperial Chancellor answers only with eva- 
 sions? ..." Free utterance was the one thing 
 needful. 
 
 The debate on peace-terms came on in the Reichstag 
 on December 9. The Chancellor used more vague 
 phrases; he talked about Germany's 
 Decemb«V holding territories as "gages" {Faust- 
 1916: scheide- pfdnde), about the necessity that Belgium 
 Landsberg should no longer furnish England with 
 
 speak against a "gate of invasion" (Einfattsthor) or 
 annexations. "field of approach" (Aufmarschgebtet) . 
 The speakers for the various parties emphasised their 
 view for or against annexations, as the case might 
 be. Scheidemann and Landsberg, speaking for the 
 Social Democrat Group, of course laid stress on the 
 Party's desire for peace and opposition to annexations. 
 They claimed that the terms used by the Chancellor 
 ^VorwHrts, December 5. 'Berger, p. 12. 
 
70 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 implied agreement with their view. The expressions, 
 indeed, of the Chancellor were interpreted by every 
 Party in a sense favourable to itself. Landsberg 
 argued that "gages" were things given back. Haase 
 took occasion of a debate raised on a point of order 
 to "disassociate himself with the utmost emphasis" 
 from the views expressed by Scheidemann. The ex- 
 pressions used by the Chancellor, he said, had been 
 "indefinite, general, and capable of many meanings." 
 It was well that the German people and the world 
 should learn that there were some, at any rate, in the 
 Reichstag who did not accept his explanations. "Do 
 you really desire," he cried, "that the result of all this 
 carnage should be a Europe which is nothing better 
 than a field of ruins ?" 
 
 The line taken by the two Majority speakers 
 
 gave great satisfaction to the Minority. They were 
 
 convinced that the Chancellor's expres- 
 
 The Minority sions did not really bear such a sense as 
 
 dissatisfied, , ■' 
 
 Social Democracy could approve, and the 
 attempt of the two speakers to accommodate them 
 smoothly seemed to prevent any forcible expression 
 of the principles of Social Democracy in international 
 policy. Some even of the Majority were painfully 
 impressed.^ On the morning after the Peace debate 
 more than thirty members of the Group signed a decla- 
 ration of agreement with Haase. The Social Demo- 
 crat "General Assembly" (Generalversammlung) o£ 
 Scheidemann's own constituency of Solingen passed 
 a resolution expressing dissatisfaction with his speech 
 of December 9, and calling for a "more definite 
 attitude." When, however, the Minority moved in 
 a meeting of the Group that the Group should 
 repudiate the utterances of the two speakers, the 
 
 ' Wenig erbaut, Bernstein, p. 73. 
 
DECEMBER 1915 Tl 
 
 Majority was strong enough to secure the rejection 
 of the proposal. 
 
 On December 21 the Government was going again 
 to ask for credits. On December 13 the Social Demo- 
 The question *'^^* Group met to considcr its action on 
 of the new this Hcw occasion. It was decided by 
 
 bate"tattJ 60 votes to 31 to offer no opposition to 
 Party, Decern- the first reading of the Supplementary 
 ber. 1916. Estimates, but it was left to the meeting 
 
 of the following day to determine the attitude of the 
 Group towards the Estimates on the decisive second 
 reading. 
 
 On December 14 the question was brought to the 
 vote. Fifty-eight Members were for voting the 
 Budget, 38 were against. Ten Members, who were 
 absent, sent in their suffrages in writing. The final 
 result was that the Minority counted 44 members of 
 the Group against 66, a proportion of exactly two to 
 three. 
 
 On December 20, the day before the Estimates came 
 on in the Reichstag, the Group had another meeting, 
 and previous decisions, ruling out separate action on 
 the part of the Minority, were confirmed. Haase 
 now intimated his definite resignation of his position 
 as President of the Reichstag Group. This left 
 his position as President of the Party as a whole 
 unchanged. Some members of the Majority published 
 in the Press an appeal, described (though it was not 
 really official) as coming "from the Bureau of the 
 Party Directorate" {"Aus dem Bureau des Partei- 
 vorstandes schreibt man uns") to Comrades all over 
 the Empire to restrain their representatives in the 
 Reichstag from separate action. There were, how- 
 ever, twenty members of the Minority — 'Bernstein, 
 Bock, Biichner, Oskar Cohn, Dittmann, Geyer, 
 
72 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Haase, Herzfeld, Horn, Henke, Kunert, Ledebour, 
 Liebknecht, Riihle, Stadthagen, StoUe, Schwartz, 
 Vogtherr, Wurm, ZubeiP — who had resolved that 
 they must give public expression to their convictions, 
 even at the cost of a breach in the Party. They had 
 determined to yote against the Budget, and had drawn 
 up a declaration, giving the ground of their action, to 
 be read out by Fritz Geyer. 
 
 December 21 came, and the split in the Social 
 
 Democrat Group was exhibited to the world. Ebert, 
 
 as the official spokesman of the Group, 
 
 Decemb'er ai. ^^^^ ^ declaration to the effect that the 
 
 1916: the ncccssities of self-defence made it incum- 
 
 todeplndentiy. ^^^^ "P°" ^^ "^^°^^ German people to 
 support the Government in carrying on 
 the war. Geyer read out the declaration of the 
 Twenty, in which the Chancellor was accused of in- 
 directly encouraging the Annexationists and the re- 
 solve of the Twenty to vote against the credits was 
 justified. When the moment of voting came, the 
 Social Democrat Group divided into three sections: the 
 Twenty voted against the credits; twenty-two other 
 members — Albrecht, Antrick, Baudert, Brandes, 
 Emmel, Erdmann, Ewald, Edmund Fischer, Fuchs, 
 Hoch, Hofrichter, Hiittmann, Hugel, Jackel, Kratzig, 
 Leutert, Feirotes, Reisshaus, Ryssel, Raute, Simon, 
 Schmidt (of Meissen) — still acted as the Minority had 
 done in March and August, viz., left the Chamber 
 before voting took place; the remainder voted for 
 the Estimates. 
 
 The action of the Twenty created an effervescence 
 
 in the Press and in the country. Immediately after 
 
 the sitting in the House the Party Group met and 
 
 passed, by 63 votes to 15, a vote of censure on the 
 
 * Berger, pp. ii, 12. 
 
DECEMBER 1916 73 
 
 Twenty, as guilty of a grave breach of discipline, 
 which destroyed the unity of Party at a critical hour. 
 A resolution was proposed by Legien, the Trade 
 Unionist leader, and David, to exclude the Twenty 
 from the Party; this, however, found only i8 votes 
 to support it, and was consequently thrown out. A 
 resolution proposed by Ebert and others to deprive 
 them of the privileges attached to membership of the 
 Group was likewise rejected. It was held sufficient 
 for the time being that the Twenty should be severely 
 censured. 
 
 The local Social Democrat organizations throughout 
 the Empire passed resolutions during the next few 
 
 weeks, condemning or approving the 
 «^oughou7 Twenty, according to the prevalent feel- 
 the Empire ing in cach centre. The Vorwdrts of 
 
 Twent?.° January i, 19 16, pointed out that the 
 
 number of Social Democrat electors rep- 
 resented by the forty- four members of the Minority 
 (1,380,590) was actually greater than the number of 
 Social Democrat electors represented by the sixty-six 
 members of the Majority (1,372,058). It did not, of 
 course, follow, as Vorwdrts admitted, that all the 
 electors whom a deputy represented would necessarily 
 endorse his action. Berlin itself was one of the places 
 where the Minority was strongest. The Central 
 Directorate of the Social Democrat Organizations for 
 Greater Berlin passed, by 41 votes to 17, a resolution 
 approving of the action of the Minority. How Berlin 
 was regarded by the Majority may be seen from the 
 following words of Kolb of Karlsruhe: — 
 
 The conditions of Berlin Social Democracy are depressing. 
 But what can one expect when demagogism holds such 
 sway as it does there? When every one who opens his mouth 
 
74 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 wide enough gets a confidential post without any trouble, 
 political life cannot but end in a swamp. And now that this 
 Berlin Party swamp has been allowed to spread so far, it will 
 not be an easy matter to get clear again/ 
 
 Dr. Berger writes (pp. 72, 73): — 
 
 The Berlin Social Democrat is a peculiar type. The stren- 
 uousness in work, the sense of duty, which we meet with in 
 the [Social Democrat] organizations of the Rhenish-West- 
 phalian industrial district, the Saar district, and Upper 
 Silesia, where great bodies of power confront each other on 
 the side of employers and workmen respectively — the Berlin 
 Comrade has never been imbued with these things like the 
 deep Westphalian, the self-reliant men of the Saar, and the 
 good-tempered Silesians. The industry of Berlin is of another 
 kind. It has not the gigantic dimensions of the Western 
 districts. The Brandenburg environment and the Berlin 
 atmosphere means a loss of colour. The immigration Of foreign 
 workmen in huge masses year by year gives emphasis to the 
 fundamental note of all human effort — ^the desire to assert 
 one's value as much as possible in one's own line. A com- 
 parison naturally suggests itself between the labouring masses 
 of Berlin and the Roman plebs in the days of the Republic. 
 One might find an interesting parallel in the political sen- 
 sationalism and the tendency to go to extremes. The Roman 
 populace at all events was ruder and more natural, if also 
 perhaps more unstable. The modern city of intelligence 
 and science, which has offered veritable hecatombs to the 
 culture craze, whilst too much neglecting the education of 
 the will, without which organizations cannot be held together, 
 makes a less favourable total impression, and to-day is pro- 
 ducing its evil fruits, although the BerUn Social Democrats 
 have more opportunity for cultivating a political judgment than 
 their Comrades in the industrial regions of the Rhine or 
 Westphalia. 
 
 On the other hand, the Social Democrats of Ham- 
 burg (where hatred of England was especially bitter) 
 
 ' Vossische Zeitung, November 25, 1915. 
 
DECEMBER 1915 76 
 
 were strong for the Majority. The local Social Demo- 
 crat paper, the Hamburger Echo, had, before the war, 
 represented the Left Wing of the Party, but since the 
 war had become Jingo and Anglophobe. At a meeting 
 of the Party in Hamburg early in 1916, a speaker who 
 spoke against the Majority was driven from the plat- 
 form. A proposal brought forward in January to 
 invite Haase to speak in Hamburg was vetoed by a 
 large majority.^ 
 
 ' Berliner Tageblaft, January 27, 1916. 
 
X 
 
 FROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1916 
 
 On January 7, 1916, the Committee of the Sociai 
 Democrat Party came together. It passed the fol- 
 lowing series of resolutions by 28 votes 
 
 The Party , "' 
 
 Committee tO 1 1 '. 
 
 condemns the 
 
 Twenty. r^j^^ p^rty Cotnmittee, convoked according to 
 
 the laws of the Party, to pass judgment on important questions 
 concerning the Party as a whole, declares, in reference to- the 
 voting of the War Credits : — 
 
 The consent of the Group to the War Credits on December 
 21, 1915, was justified. It is the consistent following out of 
 the policy initiated on August 4, 1914, the presuppositions of 
 which still hold good to-day. Our enemies show no disposi- 
 tion to peace; on the contrary, they persist in their intention 
 to ruin Germany and its Allies in an economic and military 
 sense. 
 
 The thwarting of the policy of our Group by the procedure 
 of the twenty members of the Group who opposed the war- 
 credits in spite of the resolution of the Group, and delivered 
 a separate declaration, is to be most severely condemned. 
 
 This separate action is at the same time a rude break with 
 the best traditions of the Labour Movement, and imperils the 
 unity and effectiveness of the Party in the most threatening 
 way. It is not calculated to strengthen the action under- 
 taken by the Group as a whole in the interests of peace, and 
 does not serve the interests of the working-classes in any direc- 
 tion. The result of the French Socialist Congress offers the 
 most cogent proof of this which it is possible to conceive. 
 
 Especially the attitude of Comrade Haase deserves the 
 severest disapproval. In participating in the breach of 
 discipline Haase again, and in an even worse manner than by 
 
 76 
 
PROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1916 77 
 
 his issue of "Das Gebot der Stunde," has offended against the 
 duty laid upon him by his office as President of the Party 
 organization. 
 
 The Party Committee further declares that Vorwarts has not 
 fulfilled its duty as the central organ of the Party. Instead 
 of representing the entire Party, the editorial staff of Vorwarts 
 furthers a movement tending to break up the Party. By so 
 doing, Vorwarts forfeits all right to be considered the central 
 organ of the German Party.^ 
 
 By now the presiding Committee had come to con- 
 sist of Majority members only. Not only had Haase 
 
 resigned the Presidency, but Ledebour 
 HatserLUb-^ and Hoch had resigned their member- 
 knechtex- ship. On January 12 the Reichstag 
 
 tte Group? Group dcctcd Ebert to be its President 
 
 in place of Haase. Friedrich Ebert is 
 a man from the working-class, a Heidelberg saddler, 
 of solid, healthy bodily frame, an honest, common- 
 sense bureaucrat, who, if without the showy parts of 
 Scheidemann, might be trusted to discharge the busi- 
 ness of the Party, according to his lights, conscien- 
 tiously and efficiently. To fill up the other vacancies 
 Gradnauer and Kratzig were elected: the latter had 
 been one of the Twenty-two on December 31, 19 15, 
 but he is later on found attached to the Majority and 
 not to the "Antrick-Hoch section." On the same day 
 the Group considered the case of Liebknecht. Lieb- 
 knecht had insisted on heckling the Government by a 
 series of "small interpellations" {kleine Anfragen) 
 handed in to the Bureau of the Reichstag, without 
 consulting the Group. The Group now passed the 
 following resolution: — 
 
 Whereas Comrade Liebtnecht continues to go against- the reso- 
 lutions of the Group and by doing so offends in the grossest 
 
 ' Vorwarts, January 9, 1916. 
 
78 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 way against his duties as a member of the Group, the Group 
 declares that Liebknecht has thereby forfeited the rights which 
 arise from membership of the Group. 
 
 Two days later (January 14) Riihle gave notice to 
 the Presiding Committee of the Group that he asso- 
 ciated himself with Liebknecht.^ 
 
 This resolution gave rise to a lively controversy in 
 the Social Democrat press. Vorwdrts contended that 
 it did not fall within the competence 
 as to the of the Party Committee or of the Party 
 
 holding of a Directorate to expel any member from 
 the Group: that could only be done by 
 a Congress of the whole Party (a Parteitag). The 
 question of calling a Parteitag during the war began 
 to be increasingly agitated. The Minority were 
 against it, contending that it would not be really 
 representative under war conditions. The Majority 
 were largely in favour of it. The Chemnitz Volks- 
 stimme, for instance, argued in January 19 16 that 
 the work of a Parteitag would be comparatively 
 simple; it would only have to delegate full powers 
 to the Party Directorate and the Party Committee. 
 Since, as these two bodies were constituted at present, 
 this would imply a final crushing of the Minority 
 and triumph of the ofificials of the Party, it is obvious 
 why the Majority should desire the summoning of a 
 Parteitag for such a purpose, and why the Minority 
 should fight against the proposal. We find the 
 Minority taking up the line that the antagonism 
 between Majority and Minority is essentially an an- 
 tagonism between the officials of the Party and "the 
 masses." It is only, they contend, within the official 
 
 * Vorw'drts, January 16, 1916. 
 
FROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1916 79 
 
 stratum that the Majority is really a majority, not in 
 the Party as a whole.^ 
 
 The controversy between the Majority and the 
 Minority had now come to occupy a considerable 
 space in the Press. "It is plain," said an onlooker, 
 "that the strife within the Social Democrat Party 
 has reached a point at which it can be only bend or 
 break." ^ 
 
 In January a conflict occurred between the six 
 adherents of the Minority in the Prussian House of 
 Representatives and the Landeskom- 
 conflict mission of the Social Democrat Party 
 
 The Prussian of Prussia. On this Landeskommission 
 Party Landes- the Majority commanded the allegiance 
 and the Six in oi the greater number of members. It 
 the House of passcd a resolution that the Group in 
 tives. "*" the House of Representatives should 
 follow the policy of the Majority in 
 the Reichstag. In disregard of this, Hirsch, on 
 January 17, read out a declaration in the House of 
 Representatives, embodying the distinctive views of 
 the Minority — ^the contention that the German Gov- 
 ernment had given no clear and public expression of 
 its will for peace, "No conquerers and no con- 
 quered," full independence of Belgium. The other 
 four of the Group publicly dissociated themselves from 
 this declaration. The Landeskommission passed a 
 resolution, by 21 votes to 5, regretting that its instruc- 
 tions had not been followed. The Six replied by a 
 declaration that they did not recognize any right be- 
 longing to the Landeskommission to prescribe their 
 policy; they owed allegiance only to the resolutions 
 
 ^Kolnische Volksseitung, February 7, 1916, evening. 
 * Berliner Tageblatt, January 18, 1916, evening. 
 
80 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 passed by national and international Parteitagen 
 before the war. 
 
 The Trade Unions ranged themselves officially with 
 the Majority. The "General Commission of the 
 The Trade Trade Unions of Germany" published in 
 
 Unions and the January in its Korrespondenzhlatt a cen- 
 Minority. g^j.^ q£ yQ^wdrts and an appeal to the 
 
 Party Directorate to take drastic action to restore 
 Party discipline. Naturally this excited the greatest 
 indignation in the Minority. "Such action as the Gen- 
 eral Commission of the Trade Unions desire the Party 
 Directorate to take would be a gross usurpation of 
 rights which belong exclusively to a Parteitag — a fine 
 way to restore Party discipline !" ^ 
 
 The second President of the German Builders' 
 Union, August Winnig, published during the same 
 month (January), in organs representing the Social 
 Democrat Majority, a fresh declaration of the faith 
 of the Trade Unions: — 
 
 There is one tiling which the Trade Unions can never 
 do, that is, stand by inactive, whilst the Minority works to 
 bring over members of the Trade Unions to their side. The 
 cause of the present Minority can never in any circumstances 
 be the cause of the Trade Unions. The spokesmen for the 
 Minority have always looked askance and with mistrust 
 at the Trade Unions. The Trade Unions have become 
 accustomed to that during the course of decades, and have had 
 to adjust themselves to the fact that every advance in their 
 constitution and their methods had to be made, not only 
 without the help of these groups, but often in spite of their 
 opposition. . . . 
 
 The Trade Unions will certainly leave it to the Social 
 Democratic Party as a whole to declare, at the General 
 Assembly of the Party, its judgment upon the policy hitherto 
 followed, and the outline of the policy to be followed 
 in the future, but whatever those decisions may be, they 
 
 ' Vorwdrts, January i6, 1916. 
 
FROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1916 81 
 
 cannot cause the Trade Unions to take up a fundamentally 
 different attitude. 
 
 As to the main question. What in future will be 
 the relations of the Trade Unions to the Social 
 Democratic Party? Winnig says: 
 
 "The Trade Unions have by no means the ambition to play 
 the role which spokesmen for the Minority suppose them to 
 contemplate. The victory of the Minority in the Social Demo- 
 cratic Party would probably compel the Trade Unions to prac- 
 tise complete abstinence in all Party political questions, and 
 to develop a separate organization and separate methods of their 
 own, to represent the interests of the workers in legislation and 
 administration.^ 
 
 Legien, speaking at Hamburg in February, com- 
 plained that the Minority was seeking to deprive the 
 Trade Unions of their recognized rights, that it was 
 carrying into them its schismatic propaganda. One 
 of the principal editors of Vorwdrts, he declared, had 
 said to him as early as November, 1914: "You may 
 be surprised, but we shall win our way before long 
 into the Trade Unions !" 
 
 According to the agreement of 1906 between the Social Demo- 
 cratic Party and the Trade Unions, on all questions of common 
 interest, the governing bodies of the two organizations had 
 come to an understanding. The Trade Unions could not allow 
 the right conferred upon them by this agreement to be taken 
 away, or they would have to cease to regard the Social Demo- 
 cratic Parliamentary Group as representing their interests. "The 
 existing relations between the Social Democratic Party and the 
 Trade Unions," Legien concluded, "we desire to maintain; but 
 supposing the Minority in the Social Democratic Party should 
 ever become the Majority, the policy of the Party would no 
 longer correspond with the interests of the Trade Unions, and 
 the whole question of their relations would have to be raised 
 
 ' Vossische Zeitung, February 25, 1916, morning. 
 'Ibid., February i, 1916, evening. 
 
83 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Liebknecht in January formally severed his con- 
 nexion with the Social Democrat Reichstag Group, 
 Liebknecht ^^^ ^^ f ollowcd by Otto Rtihlc These 
 and RuUe be- two Members from now onward belonged 
 
 "free-lances" (Wilde— "wild men"— 
 is the German term).^ 
 
 In Scheidemann's constituency of Solingen the 
 division of opinion was marked. A meeting at which 
 it had been arranged that Scheidemann 
 and Soung^ should addrcss his constituents in Jan- 
 uary had to be abandoned. This was 
 generally attributed to the strong Minority oppo- 
 sition, but Scheidemann published his correspondence 
 with the local secretary to prove that this explanation 
 of the meeting being abandoned was not true.^ It 
 seems clear, however, that a very strong Minority 
 opposition existed in the district, though, in this 
 case, curiously enough, it was the officials of the 
 Party who were predominantly on the side of the 
 Minority. The Majority seems to have commanded 
 the support of large sections of the rank and 
 file.« 
 
 In February the alarm spread through the Majority 
 that the Minority was secretly preparing a separate 
 organization over the Empire. Its head- 
 Minority quarters were stated to be in Duisberg. 
 preparing a The organs of the Majority called upon 
 schism ^^^ Central governing body of the 
 Party to take energetic action to squash this 
 movement.* 
 
 ' Vossische Zeitung, February s, 1916, evening. 
 ' Vorw'drts, February 6, 1916. 
 
 * Frankfurter Zeitung, February 14, 1916, evening. 
 
 * Vossische Zeitung, February 14, evening. 
 
FROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1916 83 
 
 By the help of an analysis of the composition of 
 the Minority, pubHshed in the early half of March 
 1916 by the Majority organ, the Volks- 
 rfttrMinority. ^^j'^^^^ of Chemnitz, we may obtain a 
 view of the different sections into which 
 the Left of German Social Democracy had come to 
 be divided at this time. The Volksstimme distin- 
 guished six sections : — 
 
 1. The most extreme section was that represented 
 by Liebknecht and Riihle. Alone of all the sections 
 of German Social Democracy it was opposed on 
 principle (according to the Volksstimme) to all nch 
 tional distinctions. It wished, at any rate, to make 
 Social Democracy an international organization, in 
 which no account was taken of nationality. There was 
 no obligation on the proletarian to defend his country ; 
 "defence of the Fatherland" was a "misleading 
 phrase" ; the proletarian's only country was the 
 Socialist Internationale. This section was commonly 
 known as the "Spartacus" section, from the series 
 of political letters signed "Spartacus" which had 
 emanated from it, and of which more will be said 
 presently. 
 
 2. The next section is that of the ''International 
 Socialists of Germany," already mentioned in con- 
 nexion with the Zimmerwald Conference. Its organ, 
 as was said, was the Lichtstrahlen, which Julius 
 Borchardt edited, and to which Karl Radek con- 
 tributed. (This paper was suppressed by the military 
 authorities in April 1916 for the duration of the war.) 
 It agreed with the "Spartacus" section in regarding 
 the bulk of the Minority as weaklings and cowards; 
 it also, like the first section, wished to keep up the 
 class-war without any regard for the necessities of 
 
84 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 national defence. But it would not (says the Chem- 
 nitz Volksstimme go as far as the first section in 
 repudiating national distinctions. 
 
 [The difference between the first and second section 
 is obviously a fine one. Eduard David, the Majority 
 Leader, in the Internationale Korrespondens, attacked 
 them both together as the "New Party," without 
 making any distinction between them. The masses, 
 David said, who stood behind Liebknecht and the 
 "International Socialists of Germany" were a neg- 
 ligible minority of the people, and they would become 
 a still smaller minority if they ever tried to put their 
 principles in practice. Any attempt to stab the 
 national army in the back during the conflict, by 
 "action" of any sort, would be utterly crushed by the 
 real masses of the German people. The doctrine 
 that the proletarian has no fatherland to defend 
 except the Internationale was, David said, in flagrant 
 contradiction with what had hitherto been the doctrine 
 both of German Social Democracy and of the Inter- 
 nationale.] ^ 
 
 3. The section represented by Ledebour and Adolf 
 Hoffmann — that is, the section corresponding with 
 the less extreme section of the Zimmerwalders." 
 It agreed with the first two sections in wishing the 
 Internationale to be reconstituted and the class-war 
 to be resumed, but it disagreed with them, and agreed 
 with the rest of German Social Democracy, in recog- 
 nizing the principle of national self-defence. 
 
 4. The section represented by Kautsky, editor of 
 Die Neue Zeit. [The weekly admitted signed articles 
 of Social Democrats belonging to other sections, and 
 even to the Majority, though the spirit of Kautsky 
 predominated.] This section approved of the action 
 
 ' Quoted, Berliner Tageblatf, March 16, evening. 
 
FROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1916 86 
 
 of the Twenty, and wished to revive the Internationale. 
 But it dissociated itself from the Zimmerwald Group. 
 Its programme regarded the International Bureau at 
 the Hague (formerly at Brussels) as the proper organ 
 for the revival of the Internationale. 
 
 5. The section of Eduard Bernstein. It recognized 
 the principle of national defence, and did not regard 
 it as necessarily unlawful for Socialists to vote war 
 Budgets. But it objected to German Social Democrats 
 voting money supplies for this war. German Socialists 
 ought to show their readiness to make concessions to 
 the demands of the Entente Powers. For instance, 
 Alsace-Lorraine ought to be allowed to determine its 
 own fate by a plebiscite. 
 
 6. The great bulk of the Minority. They approved, 
 theoretically, of defending the country and voting 
 war-credits, but they had determined for the present 
 to refuse to vote war-credits as a protest against plans 
 of annexation and against abuses in the internal ad- 
 ministration of the Empire. 
 
 So far the account of the Chemnitz Volkstimme. 
 But if the Minority was divided, the Majority, too, 
 Anal sis ^^^ ^^ homogcneous. According to a 
 
 of the Breslau Social Democrat paper, the 
 
 Majority. Volkswacht, of June 191 5, the Majority 
 
 fell into two main divisions: — 
 
 I. The main body, the "block of August 4," who 
 did not deny that the war had its origin in Imperial- 
 ism, and were ready to do what they could to make 
 a speedy peace possible, but held that it was a pre- 
 requisite that a similar attitude ^ should be taken 
 up in the enemy countries as well. [And till the 
 
 ^ This probably implies a readiness for peace on the basis 
 of the status quo, no Power annexing any territory of which it 
 did not stand possessed in July, 1914. 
 
86 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY; 
 
 enemy countries took up the attitude indicated, they 
 were resolved to go on voting war-credits for the 
 German Government.] 
 
 2. The section of the Social Democrat "annexa- 
 tionists" — Heine, Schippel, Kloth, etc. They did 
 not themselves admit that they were in agreement 
 with the Conservative and National-Liberal annexa- 
 tionistsy but they confessed to holding that the 
 frontiers of Germany, as they were in 1914, could not 
 be regarded as fixed for all time.^ 
 
 A little later (April 19 16) the Minority paper, the 
 Leipziger V olkszeitung , gives a more elaborate analy- 
 sis of the composition of the Majority. It enumerates 
 the following inner groups: — 
 
 1. Those who stand for wholesale assimilation to 
 the bourgeois parties, the section whose principles are 
 expounded by Kolb of Karlsruhe, whose "herald" is 
 Peus, and whose best-known representatives are Keil, 
 Feuerstein, and Heymannn in Swabia. 
 
 2. Those who during the war have taken a strong 
 Nationalist line — Cohen, Heilmann, Landsberg, David, 
 Heim, Bios, Gohre, Nogke. Haenisch, Stidekiuin 
 Quarck, Oskar Geek. 
 
 3. The specifically Imperialist Nationalist group — 
 Lensch, Cunow, Heinrich Schulz, Quessel. 
 
 4. The Trade Union leaders, also Imperialist-^- 
 LegigiJ, Bauer, Robert Schmidt, Brey, Deichmann, 
 Kappler, Korsten, Sachse, Schumann, Silberschmidt. 
 
 5. Those described as the "plain, practical" set 
 (Nur-Praktiker) , akin to the preceding group — Bohle, 
 Briihne, Binder. 
 
 6. The "Right Centre," consisting of the stalwarts 
 of the old Party, represented by Molkenbuhr, Richard 
 Fischer, Dietz, Pfannkuch, Kiihn (now dead), Grenz, 
 
 'Quoted in the Berliner Tageblatt, June 25, 1915. 
 
FROM JANUARY JO MARCH 1916 87 
 
 Ebert (the new President of the Party), Haberland, 
 Wels, Thone, Konig. 
 
 7. A group closely akin to the preceding, consisting 
 bi the clever personalities (Charakterkopfe) , Scheidg- 
 n^^yvand Schopflin. 
 
 8. The "Left Centre," forming the transition to the 
 Minority — Spiegel, Giebel, Arthur Hofmann, David- 
 sohn, Hierl, and J. Hoffmann (of Kaiser slautern). 
 
 9. A number of adherents of the Party with a 
 strongly individual standpoint, such as the economist 
 Schippel. 
 
 The extremist section of Liebknechtites carried 
 on an active propaganda by a voluminous pamphlet 
 ^jjg literature secretly distributed. These 
 
 "Spartacus" pamphlets were generally not printed 
 Letters. jj^^ typewritten. Those which attracted 
 
 most attention were the "Spartacus" letters. They 
 were circulated amongst a carefully chosen circle of 
 confidential correspondents. It is understood that 
 they were the work of more than one author, but 
 that Liebknecht himself had had a hand in their com- 
 position. Some copies of them fell into the possession 
 of the Chemnitz Volksstimme and were given pub- 
 licity. Their salient characteristic was the mocking 
 bitterness of their attack on the sections of the 
 Minority which followed Haase; the letters ridiculed 
 them as weak-kneed and timorous and half-hearted. 
 The Twenty's "breach of discipline" on December 21 
 had been a very tame affair. The Minority were a 
 heterogeneous lot, who had no real community of 
 principle. The declaration read by Geyer had care- 
 fully avoided the word "Imperialism." By its studied 
 ambiguity it came near being an endorsement of the 
 "policy of the Fourth of August." Even the Twenty 
 had joined with the Majority in censuring Liebknecht 
 
88 GERMAN SOCIAE DEMOCRACY 
 
 for ^ his series of "small interpellations" ! Each 
 carried his faggot with servile zeal to the stake at 
 which the offender against the sanctity of Parliamen- 
 tarism was to be burned. They showed thereby 
 that they too had fallen victims to parliamentary 
 feeble-mindedness (Kretinismtis) . The accusations 
 brought by "Spartacus" against the German 
 Government were no less thorough-going. The 
 German and Austrian Governments together had 
 "deliberately contrived the murder of Serajevo," 
 and had "kept back the documents bearing on the 
 subject from publicity." The German Government 
 had deceived the Reichstag at the beginning of the 
 war by maintaining silence as to the ultimatum sent 
 to Belgium. 
 
 In March a speech of Liebknecht's in the Prussian 
 House of Representatives added to the agitation. 
 T- 1,. u„ He declared in the course of it that 
 
 Liebknecht's <n i • i 
 
 utterance in both m the treuchcs and at home men 
 
 ttie House of ought to droo their weapons and turn 
 
 Representa- ", ^ ^ 
 
 tives, March agamst the common enemy. ' Liebknecht 
 **'*• had been expelled from the Social Group 
 
 in the Reichstag, but in the Prussian House of Rep- 
 resentatives he not only belonged to the Social Demo- 
 crat Group, but spoke as its chosen representative. 
 Even one of those belonging to the four within the 
 Group who supported the policy of the Majority, Con- 
 rad Haenisch, voted in the House for Liebknecht's 
 being heard. When the extreme Jingo paper, the 
 Deutsche Tageszeitung, called attention to this, 
 Haenisch wrote a letter to the paper to explain that he 
 had done so, not because he agreed with Liebknecht, 
 but because Liebknecht was, as a matter of fact, the 
 speaker elected by the Group, and he wished to main- 
 tain Party discipline "to the last limit pQssible." 
 
FROM JANUARY TO MARCH 1916 89 
 
 Vorwdrts was shocked at a Social Democrat leader 
 writing to a paper like Deutsche Tagesseitung to 
 justify himself.^ 
 
 An article contributed about this time by August 
 Winnig, who has already been mentioned as the 
 
 President of the Builders' Trade Union, 
 leader expi^ns to the Internationale Korrespondenz does 
 his change of something to explain the light in which 
 posi on. those Social Democrats who had prac- 
 
 tically passed to the Imperialist camp regarded 
 their own transition. The Party before the war, 
 Winnig said, had halted ineffectually between the 
 revolutionary and the parliamentary method. With 
 the growing material prosperity of the country the 
 interests of the German working-men had changed; 
 their interests had come to be more and more in 
 the maintenance of the present state of things, not 
 in revolution. In these circumstances their true policy 
 lay in effectual co-operation with the other parties 
 in political reform, yet they continually hindered 
 such co-operation by playing with the old revolution- 
 ary phrases and ideas. The horizon of the German 
 working-class could no longer be limited to Germany ; 
 it was now a case of the conquest of the world-market 
 through German industry} 
 
 An unfriendly observer of the agitation in Social 
 Democrat circles, the Krupp paper, the Rheinisch- 
 
 Westfdlische Zeitung, whose account of 
 
 onthe°growth things has to be to some extent dis- 
 
 ofthe counted because it was concerned to 
 
 ""*" * exhibit the dangers of Socialism, bears 
 
 witness to the growing influence of the Minority. 
 
 ' Vorw'drts, March 22, 1916. 
 
 ° Quoted in the Rheinisch-Wesffdlische Zeitung for March 18, 
 1916, 2nd edition. 
 
90 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 The great masses of Social Democrat officials, it 
 says, had been trained in the Extremist school, and 
 had grown accustomed to revolutionary agitation. 
 Since there was no party in which the influence of the 
 lower officials and of the Party Press was so great as 
 in the Social Democrat Party, the poison of "Spar- 
 tacus" and his like spread rapidly. Their phrases had 
 a familiar sound. It is in these circles of the lower 
 official grades of the organization that the fight be- 
 tween the Majority and the Minority is hottest. The 
 Minority hopes, with the aid of the Extreme Press and 
 the lower officials, to bring the working-class over to 
 its side and throw the Majority out of the saddle. The 
 paper refers to a stormy meeting at Roxdorf, at which 
 one of the Majority leaders. Hue, seems to have had 
 a bad time with the local officials, as an instance of 
 what was now happening in the Party.^ 
 
 ^ Rheinisch-WestfiiHsche Zeitmg for March 21, 1916. 
 
XI 
 
 THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG 
 
 (MARCH TO MAY 1916) 
 
 It was upon such an inflamed condition of the German 
 Social Democrat Party that the fresh demand of 
 the Government for war-credits in con- 
 Ma«"*i9i6. nection with an Emergency Budget, 
 Seventeen supervcncd in March 1916. "This 
 
 "gthisMhe*** means that, since the Budget for the 
 Emergency financial year 19 16-17 had not yet been 
 " ^° ' passed by the Reichstag, the Government 
 
 was to be empowered to carry on for the first months 
 of this year the arrangements prescribed in the money 
 votes of the preceding financial year. The presiding 
 Committee of the Social Democrat Group had pro- 
 posed that the Emergency Budget should be voted and 
 that Scheidemann, as acting President, should give a 
 short explanation to the effect that this vote was 
 intended simply to allow of the orderly carrying on of 
 business, but not to commit the Group in any way 
 beforehand as to the decision it might take with 
 regard to the Budget proper." At the private 
 meeting of the Group previous to the Reichstag 
 debate "the speakers for the Minority opposed the 
 proposal, on the ground that the Group had hitherto 
 always refused on principle to vote Imperial Emer- 
 gency Budgets just as much as Budgets proper, and 
 
 91 
 
92 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 no reason had been shown why this practice, made 
 obligatory for the Group by repeated resolutions 
 of Party Congresses, should be departed from. The 
 Majority would not accept this argument, but passed 
 the proposal of the presiding Committee, against 
 thirty-three dissentient votes." ^ The two men 
 chosen to speak (Scheidemann was one) again both 
 belonged to the Majority. No opportunity was to 
 be given to the Minority to make its views heard in 
 the House. To seventeen members of the Minority 
 this state of affairs seemed no longer tolerable.* 
 They therefore determined among themselves to 
 put up Haase in the House to speak for them 
 and explain why it was that they refused to vote 
 the credits. This plan might have been stopped 
 by the Majority, had they had knowledge of it, and 
 the Seventeen, for this reason, kept their conspiracy 
 a profound secret. When the day of the debate, 
 March 24, came, Haase, on entering the House, 
 broke to Scheidemann that he intended to speak. 
 The Majority were taken completely by surprise. 
 Scheidemann's turn to speak, as representative of the 
 Social Democrat Group, came first in the debate. He 
 explained, as had been arranged, that their voting 
 of the Emergency Budget was not to be taken as com- 
 mitting them with regard to the Budget proper. 
 Presently Haase arose to speak. He declared that 
 he regarded the Emergency Budget as an act 
 of confidence in the Government and must therefore 
 vote against it. He then proceeded to attack the 
 
 'Bernstein, Die Neue Zeit for April 7, 1916, p. I. 
 
 ' The names of the Seventeen were : Bock, Biichner, Oskar 
 Cohn, Dittmann, Geyer, Haase, Henke, Herzfeld, Horn, Kunert, 
 Ledebour, Schwartz (of Liibeck), Stadthagen, Stolle, Vogtherr, 
 Wurm, Zubeil. 
 
THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG 93 
 
 y Government's shortcomings and misdeeds, in the 
 food question, in the exercise of the Censorship, in the 
 Law regarding Associations, in the imposition of 
 taxes, and in foreign policy. He passed to the question 
 of the war and made the assertion, as favourite a one 
 with the German Minority as with British pacifists, 
 that neither of the two great opposing coalitions 
 cpuld ever force the other to its knees. "At the 
 end of the tremendous conflict there will probably 
 be neither victors nor vanquished — or rather, only 
 vinquished nations bleeding from a million wounds." 
 He then went on to declare the determination of 
 "us Socialists" to oppose the continuance of the war. 
 More and more, as Haase spoke, the House grew 
 restive. The President repeatedly called him to order. 
 At last, the whole House was in an uproar. The 
 Majority Social Democrats joined in the angry cries 
 against their old chief. Heine and Keil shouted to 
 the ranks of the Majority that Haase was speaking 
 without the sanction of the Group. When the Presi- 
 dent asked whether it was the wish of the House that 
 Haase should be further heard, four Social Democrats 
 of the Majority helped to pass the resolution which 
 silenced him.^ 
 
 The vote on the Emergency Budget was taken. 
 Besides the Seventeen who, together with Bernstein, 
 voted against the Budget, fourteen members absented 
 themselves." 
 
 It was not until after the debate had been concluded 
 that Riihle was able to inform the House, in his own 
 
 ' Bernstein, Die Neue Zeit for April 7, 1916, p. 2. 
 
 'Albrecht, Antrick, Emmel, Edmund Fischer, Hoch, Hofrich- 
 ter, Hiittmann, Jackel, Leutert, Raute, Reisshaus, Ryssel, 
 Schmidt (of Meissen), J. Simon. Ryssel in the following May 
 threw in his lot with the Seventeen. 
 
9A GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 name and the name of his friend Liebknecht, that 
 they also voted against the Emergency Budget because 
 for them the old Social Democrat maxim still held 
 good — "For this system not a man and not a 
 penny!" After the angry storm excited by Haase, 
 the declaration of the two Wilde seems to have pro- 
 voked only hilarity. 
 
 Immediately after the meeting in the Reichstag 
 a meeting of the Group was hurriedly got together. 
 The Directorate proposed a resolution to the effect 
 that Haase and the other Seventeen had "by their 
 violation of discipline and bad faith" forfeited "the 
 rights which arise out of membership in the Group." 
 This resolution was carried by 58 votes to 33.^ The 
 Directorate thereupon informed the Bureau of the 
 Reichstag that the Seventeen were no longer entitled 
 to take part in the Budget Committee (Haushalts- 
 Ausschuss), in virtue of belonging to the Social Demo- 
 crat Group. This was in effect to inflict political death, 
 for it was just at the Budget Committee meetings of 
 the Reichstag that the business of the House was really 
 done. At the plenary meetings any member not 
 attached to a Group would have practically no chance 
 of speaking. 
 
 In these circumstances Haase and the other seven- 
 teen resolved to constitute themselves a distinct 
 Group in the Reichstag, altogether independent of 
 the old Group. They disputed, indeed, the com- 
 petence of the Group to deprive them of their rights, 
 and contended, as in the case of Liebknecht, that 
 it was only the Party as a whole, represented in a 
 Parteitag, which had the authority to expel a member 
 
 ' Bernstein says, "Mit alien gegen sechstindswansig Stimmen," 
 Die Zukunft for April 21, 1917 (p. 74). This seems a slip of 
 the pen. 
 
THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG 95 
 
 from the Group. Their expulsion, however, even if 
 illegal, had to be recognized as a fact and measures 
 taken accordingly. The Seventeen constituted them- 
 selves into a new Group, called the Sozialdemo- 
 kratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (the "Social Democrat 
 Labour Fellowship"). Haase and Ledebour were its 
 two chairmen and a younger man, Wilhelm Dittmann, 
 its secretary. Dittmann is a working-man from the 
 Liibeck district, a cabinet-maker by trade, then 
 forty-one years of age. Eduard Bernstein had not 
 been one of the Seventeen, but he joined the new 
 Group after its constitution, raising their numbers 
 to eighteen. Some twenty-five members of the 
 Minority remained within the old Group; their 
 numbers since then have sunk to twenty^ 
 
 Did the split of the Social Democrat body in the 
 Reichstag into two Groups mean a split in the Party, 
 a fissure running right through the Empire? This 
 was exactly one of the questions in dispute. The 
 Majority, who naturally represented the action of 
 the Haase Group as an enormity, and drew its con- 
 sequences in the blackest colours, insisted that if it 
 did not mean an immediate split in the Party, it meant 
 the beginning of a split. It was bound to cripple the 
 power of the working-classes at the very moment when 
 they needed their whole strength to secure their future 
 (Hamburger Echo). The Minority, on the other 
 hand, maintained that the division in the Reichstag 
 did not necessarily imply a breach in the Party,, and 
 the speakers for the Labour Fellowship carefully 
 avoided in their utterances anything which might seem 
 like an attack on the old Group. 
 
 The air, of course, after March 24 was thick with 
 manifestos and resolutions. On March 27 the Party 
 Committee pronounced its condemnation of the 
 
96 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 "Social Democrat Labour Fellowship" and all 
 separatist tendencies. It issued an "Appeal to the 
 Party," pointing to "the danger of a complete 
 break-up of the Party" as imminent. The complaint 
 of the Minority, it said, that it was muzzled, had no 
 basis in fact. "Since the beginning of the war, 
 twenty-two members of the Minority and thirty 
 members of the Majority had spoken in the Reichs- 
 tag." What the Minority really wanted was to pursue 
 a policy wholly incompatible with the resolutions of 
 the Group. Party unity was, of course, a topic upon 
 which the "Appeal" expatiated with fervour and many 
 words. 
 
 The Minority published an answer to the "Appeal" 
 in Vorwdrts. True, twenty-two members of the 
 Minority had spoken in the Reichstag, but they had 
 not, for the most part, spoken on the questions at 
 issue between themselves and the Majority. That 
 is, they were given no opportunity for the expressior 
 of their distinctive views — "intolerable constraint of 
 conscience." Two days later (March 30) the "Social 
 Democrat Labour Fellowship" published their own 
 appeal to the Party and the Reichstag Group on March 
 31a new counter-appeal. The Party Press, of course, 
 on both sides, seethed with the controversy. 
 
 The Swiss Neue Ziircher Zeitung published two 
 articles, by a member of the Majority and a member 
 A M • ritv ^^ *^^ Minority respectively, which illus- 
 
 writeronthe tratc their divergent views at this crisis, 
 situation. -pjjg Majority writer argues that the 
 
 breach in the Reichstag is bound to extend to the 
 Party organizations and the working-class all over 
 the country. It will impede that co-operation of 
 Socialists with the State in the interest of the working- 
 class which the more far-sighted leaders — ^David, 
 
THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG 97 
 
 Heine, Scheidemann, etc. — ^have come to desire. 
 There is no doubt a certain amount of discontent 
 and war-weariness amongst the German working- 
 classes, due in part to the food regulations. The 
 Extremist section want to exploit this, to "gamble 
 on the momentary discontent" of the population. 
 But their attempt will be a failure. The fact that the 
 great Trade Unions support the Majority is signifi- 
 cant. Ultimately the present breach will be note- 
 worthy only as a S3miptom of the passage of German 
 Social Democracy from its old ground, its "swing to 
 the Right." ^ 
 
 The Minority writer is partly concerned to rebut 
 charges brought against the Minority. "A tyrannical 
 extremist Minority," the cry goes, "is 
 writer on the trying to force its views upon the 
 situation. Majority." No, it is the Majority who 
 
 are tyrannical in ejecting Liebknecht and Haase, 
 "The Minority," we are told again, "consists entirely 
 of Intellectuals, doctrinaires, journalists, and lawyers, 
 while the Majority really represents Labour." Not 
 true; Heine, David, Stidekum, Peus, on the side of 
 the Majority, are none of them working-men. And 
 then the writer goes on to make an interesting asser- 
 tion. The real point, he says, on which the disagree- 
 ment "between Majority and Minority turns is kept 
 by the Censorship out of the German Press. Because 
 writers are forbidden to touch on this point, the real 
 question at issue, the defence of their action put for- 
 ward by the Minority in their papers must necessarily 
 seem lame and inconclusive, and their criticism of 
 the position of the Majority must be feeble. The real 
 question at issue is that of the origins of the war. 
 The whole argument of the Majority from August 4 
 *Neue Zurcher Zeitung, March 27, 1916. 
 
98 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 onwards has been based on the supposition that 
 the Entente Powers are the aggressors and Germany 
 is fighting a war of pure self-defence — such a war 
 as is sanctioned by Social Democrat principles. The 
 Minority, on the other hand — that is, all the forty- 
 four members who refused in December 191 5 to 
 vote for war-credits — ^have become convinced by 
 a study of the diplomatic correspondence and the his- 
 tory of the period before the war that Germany and 
 Austria were the aggressors. There is the parting of 
 the ways/ 
 
 This statement deserves note, but, as will be ex- 
 plained in our concluding examination of the Party 
 controversy, it can hardly be accepted as an account 
 of the Minority position witl^put qualification. 
 
 On April 6 Haase spoke in the House as Presi- 
 dent of the new Group, on the second reading of the 
 Emergency Budget. He denounced the 
 Socialist Government very much on the same lines, 
 
 Groups oppose apparently, as on March 24. It was on 
 the^Rdchsta* ^^^^ occasion that he was so carried away 
 by the habit of Socialist meetings that, in 
 a passionate moment, he addressed the House as "Com- 
 rades" (Genossen) instead of "Gentlemen," provoking 
 unfortunate mirth. Bernstein proposed a resolu- 
 tion against a ruthless submarine war. Scheidemann 
 spoke, on behalf of the old Social Democrat Group, 
 in opposition to both Haase and Bernstein. His object 
 was to mark off the position of the Social Democrat 
 Majority both from that of the Parties of the Right 
 and from that of the Minority. As against the former, 
 he insisted that the war was not a war of conquest, 
 that Germany was not driven by any hunger for new 
 
 ' Neue Zurcher Zeitung, April 6, 1916. 
 
THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG 99 
 
 lands. Yet this did not mean that he was, like 
 Haase, against all annexations. "One must be politic- 
 ally a babe to suppose that a whole continent can be 
 wrapped in flames, that millions upon millions of men 
 can be killed — and, at the end of it all, no single 
 boundary-stone be shifted, no boundary-stone set up 
 by any old diplomat long since gone to dust." Scheide- 
 mann's qualified subscription to the idea of annexa- 
 tions was received in the House (the report tells us) 
 with "strong and continued applause." His phrase 
 about the boundary-stones was quoted over and over 
 again in the months to come. Later on, as we shall 
 see, Scheidemann modified his attitude and was 
 brought to speak as plainly as Haase did then against 
 annexations of any kind. That was the effect of the 
 protracted pressure of the leagued democratic Powers 
 upon Germany. It is important to note that the con- 
 traction of the demands of the Social Democrat Ma- 
 jority was due, not to inner principle, but to the course 
 of outside events, which made the chance of Germany's 
 getting more seem small. Scheidemann also on April 
 6, 19 16, supported the demand for a more rigorous 
 submarine war, against Bernstein. "We must use the 
 submarine weapon, too, in our defence, to save our 
 women and children from being starved to death." 
 And again we are told that the House received his 
 declaration with a storm of applause. 
 
 On April 15 the new "Social Democrat Labour 
 Fellowship" made itself prominent in the House by 
 bringing in a motion for the more rapid discharge 
 of men sick or unfit for service, which was passed by 
 142 to no. Even here, however, we are on contro- 
 versial ground, as between Majority and Minority. 
 The official organ of the Trade Unions (the Kor- 
 respondensblatt) strongly condemns the motion as 
 
100 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 being really inimical to the interests of the men con- 
 cerned. The Trade Unions had always, it says, been 
 in favour of the sick and unfit being kept in the army 
 till they had been properly cured or trained for other 
 occupation as the case might be/ 
 
 A second conference of the "Zimmerwalders" 
 was held from April 24 to April 26. This time the 
 TheEentai pl^cc of meeting was not Zimmerwald, 
 Conference but Kicntal, in the Bernese Oberland. 
 April. 1916. n ^^g presided over by the German- 
 
 Swiss Socialist, Robert Grimm, editor of the Berner 
 Tagwacht, and some forty odd individuals attended it 
 from Germany, France, Italy, Serbia, as well as three 
 other Swiss Socialists besides Robert Grimm. It is 
 hardly correct to describe these individuals as "dele- 
 gates," since they came without mandates from organ- 
 ized parties in their respective countries.^ Three French 
 deputies, belonging to the French Socialist Minority — 
 Alexandre Blanc, Raffin-Dugens and Pierre Brizon — 
 got by some stratagem or other across the frontier.' 
 The Germans attending the Conference numbered 
 seven — Adolf Hoffmann, Hermann Heissner, Dr. 
 Ernst Meyer, a Comrade from Bremen, a Comrade 
 from Frankfurt, and two women. These seven in- 
 cluded representatives both of the "Ledebour section" 
 
 ^ Korrespondenzhlatt der Generalkomission der Gewerh- 
 schaften Deutschlands, April 15, 1916. 
 
 ' "Vor allem ist die Libre Federation im Irrtum, wenn sie 
 von 'Delegierten' spricht. Weder die deutschen noch die 
 franzosischen Teilnehmer an der Kientaler Konferenz waren 
 'delegiert.' Samtlich waren sie dort nur in ihrer Rolle als 
 sozialistische Fiihrer und Vertrauensmanner" (Internationale 
 Korrespondens, June 17, 1916, p. 157). 
 
 • Raffin-Dugens obtained passports for himself and his wife 
 on the pretext that they wished to go to a sanatorium in 
 Switzerland, 
 
THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG 101 
 
 of the "Zimmerwalders" (Adolf Hoffmann) and of 
 the "International Socialists of Germany." Bernstein, 
 Haase, and Kautsky received invitations, but Bern- 
 stein sent no reply, and Haase and Kautsky both de- 
 clined on the ground that they adhered to the Inter- 
 national Socialist Bureau of The Hague. Several other 
 members of the Social Democrat Reichstag Group, 
 who tried to go to the Conference, were prevented 
 by the German Government from crossing the frontier. 
 Beside the seven representing Germany, Karl Radek 
 was present, as a representative of the Socialist Party 
 of Russian Poland. The Dutch Socialists who had 
 wished to attend, but were refused passports, asked 
 him to act also as their representative, but this was 
 ruled out, since the Conference did not recognize 
 double mandates."^ Amongst the representatives of 
 Russian Socialism was Lenin. 
 
 The Conference of pacifists was apparently anything 
 but pacific. Lenin and the Swiss seem to have intro- 
 duced a turbulent element." Between the French and 
 the Germans there were heated altercations. Adolf 
 Hoffmann repudiated obstinately the French conten- 
 tion that the blame for the war rested exclusively upon 
 the German Government. On the other hand, the 
 French were vehemently indignant when the Germans 
 invited them to initiate a revolutionary movement in 
 France "at the moment," says La Bataille, "when the 
 French proletariat was defending at Verdun the soil 
 of the Revolution with heroic energy!" In fact, so 
 high did passions run amongst these angry pacifists 
 
 ^Internationale Korrespondens, May 31, 1916, p. 126. 
 
 'Die Verhandlungen . . . waren angesichts der Haltung 
 der Schweizer und einiger Slawen, wie Lenin und Radek, nichts 
 weniger als hannonisch" {Internationale Korrespondem, May 23, 
 igi6, p. no). 
 
102 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 that Blanc and Raffin-Dugens ostentatiously shook 
 the dust of Kiental from their feet in the middle of 
 the Conference, and Brizon, who remained, more than 
 once threatened to go. 
 
 The Zimmerwald movement had been started in the 
 first instance in rivalry to the International Socialist 
 Bureau of The Hague, and the question of the rela- 
 tion of the "Zimmerwalders" to the other body was 
 the main one before the Kiental Conference. This 
 matter, too, gave rise to "passionate" (leidenschaft- 
 lich) debates. Amongst the Germans Adolf Hoff- 
 mann advocated friendly relations, even though he 
 considered that the Bureau at The Hague had in some 
 respects failed in its duty. On the other hand, the 
 "Zimmerwald" "Left" denounced the Bureau at The 
 Hague as being partial to the Entente Powers, "a tool 
 of French and Belgian patriots." They wished to 
 throw over the "Second Internationale" as dead, and 
 found a "Third Internationale." At last a compromise 
 was found in a resolution, which combined severe cen- 
 sure of the International Socialist Bureau with the 
 plan of holding another Conference when the I.S.B. 
 had its next meeting, so as to determine then what 
 line to take. 
 
 Dr. Ernst Meyer, one of the Germans present, con- 
 tributed an article to Die Neue Zeit (May 19, 191 6), 
 surveying the work of the Kiental Conference, with a 
 view to showing that the flood of talk poured out in 
 those three days had not been without profit. The 
 growth, he says, of Socialist Majorities and Minorities 
 in most countries since Zimmerwald had confronted 
 Social Democracy with new problems. There had 
 been a movement of thought, due to the experiences 
 of recent months, which allowed questions which could 
 not have been raised at Zimmerwald without breaking 
 
THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG 103 
 
 up the Conference to be debated (even if no unanimity 
 was reached) at Kiental. These questions were mainly 
 concerned with the attitude of the proletariat to peace 
 and war. 
 
 Before parting, the Conference drew up a Mani- 
 festo, the first draft of which was due to Brizon. Tft 
 was amended by the Conference to meet the views of 
 the Left, who, even so, were not particularly pleased 
 with it, and only agreed to it out of deference to 
 Brizon/ It was addressed to the proletariat of all 
 countries, and exhorted them to work for ending the 
 war. It denounced both militarism and the "demo- 
 cratic hypocrisy" that the war was being fought for 
 the liberation of small nations. It specified plainly 
 what was required of Socialist Members of Parlia- 
 ment in the matter of voting war-credits, and laid it 
 down that a prerequisite to any durable peace was the 
 triumph of Socialism. 
 
 On May-day 19 16, the second May-day of the war, 
 we gather that the Burgfriede, with which the war 
 Ma da 1916- ^^'^ Opened, had worn very thin. At 
 arrest of ' Leipzig, wherevcr Comrades assembled, 
 Liebknecht. ^^y found a stroug forcc of police 
 on the ground and secret police shadowing them 
 ever3rwhere. The police accompanied the party to 
 Oetzsch, went with them to the Gasthof-zur-Linde, sat 
 at a table, drank beer, and — ^had nothing else to do. 
 It was all an excellent commentary on the well-known 
 saying: "Henceforth I know no parties any more; I 
 know only Germans." ^ 
 
 May-day, however, gave rise to one incident of con- 
 sequence. Karl Liebknecht was arrested while in the 
 act of taking part in a demonstration in the Pots- 
 
 * Internationale Korrespondens, May 31, 1916, p. 126. 
 'Leipsiger Volksseitung, May 2, 1916. 
 
104 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 damer-PIatz in Berlin. He had been inciting his fel- 
 low-demonstrators with cries of "Down with the war!" 
 "Down with the Government !" When arrested, Lieb- 
 knecht contended that his action did not constitute 
 treason (Landesverrat) . He admitted that, having 
 been enrolled in the non-combatant forces (as an 
 Armierungssoldat) , he ought to have been in uniform. 
 According to the police, he resisted arrest, and had to 
 be dragged away by force. A pamphlet written by 
 himself, of which 1,340 copies were found in his pos- 
 session ready for distribution, called for the resump- 
 tion of the class-war and a fight against the Govern- 
 ment. The Government's lust for dominion was re- 
 sponsible for the war. The workers must not tolerate 
 the human slaughter any longer. The peoples must 
 reach hands to one another across the frontiers and 
 battlefields. 
 
 The case of Liebknecht occupied during the next 
 few weeks considerable public attention. Even before 
 May-day he had made a speech in the 
 '^^us^^t''^'''' Reichstag which caused widespread indig- 
 demand nation (April 8). He had represented 
 
 Liebkneciit's ^j^g fourth German War Loan as a colos- 
 
 release. . 
 
 sal swmdle. His speech was continually 
 broken by furious interruptions. At last one Member, 
 Hubrich (Progressive), wrenched Liebknecht's manu- 
 script out of his hand and flung it upon the floor of 
 the House. Liebknecht stepped down from the tribunal 
 to pick it up, and was immediately told by the Presi- 
 dent, amid approving clamour all over the House, that 
 since he had left the tribune, his speech must be con- 
 sidered at an end. His protests were drowned in 
 general tumult and the debate was closed. 
 
 A discussion after this had arisen in the non-Social- 
 ist Press as to whether the Reichstag ought not to 
 
THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG 105 
 
 amend its standing rules in such a way as to prevent 
 similar scandals in the future. Then came Lieb- 
 knecht's arrest. It was certain that a member of the 
 Reichstag was protected by privilege against prosecu- 
 tion by the civil authorities for the expression of po- 
 litical views, but Liebknecht was a soldier, amenable to 
 military jurisdiction, and whether he was equally pro- 
 tected against action by the military authorities was a 
 point on which conflicting opinions were maintained. 
 
 On May lo, in the Standing Orders Committee of 
 the Reichstag, the question came up before the House 
 whether the Reichstag should demand Liebknecht's 
 release and the suspension of the proceedings against 
 him during the term of the session. The non-Socialist 
 Groups were against the Reichstag taking any action 
 on his behalf, in view of his manifest treason. Haase 
 had no opportunity of stating the views of the "Social 
 Democrat Labour Fellowship" in the Committee. 
 Both the speakers for the Social Democrat Group took 
 the line of repudiating all sympathy with Liebknecht's 
 views, declaring him to be hare-brained, hysterical, 
 neurasthenic, ridden by ideas he was incapable of 
 gauging and prone to violent words, but not really 
 dangerous. They argued that it would be bad policy 
 to make such a man a martyr, and that the House 
 ought to insist upon the privileges of its members, 
 whatever Liebknecht personally might be worth, out 
 of regard for its own rights. Only the Polish delegate 
 supported the Social Democrat speakers, and the Bud- 
 get committee, by a large majority, decided to report 
 to the House adversely to any action on Liebknecht's 
 behalf. 
 
 Next day (May ii) the matter came before the full 
 House. Landsberg spoke for the Social Democrats 
 and repeated the arguments used in the Budget 
 
106 GERMAN SOCIAL" DEMOCRACY 
 
 Committee. Haase spoke for the "Social Democrat 
 Labour Fellowship" and defended Liebknecht against 
 the charge of treason. Liebknecht's aim, he said, 
 was simply that the German people should bring 
 pressure upon the German Government to end the war, 
 just as he desired pressure to be brought by the other 
 belligerent peoples upon their respective Governments. 
 The House decided by 229 votes to 1 1 1 to abandon 
 Liebknecht to his fate. From the benches of the 
 "Social Democrat Labour Fellowship" came cries of 
 "Pfui!" ("Shame!") when the result was announced. 
 Riihle, Liebknecht's former /associate, gave some ex- 
 pression of his disgust, for which the President of the 
 House called him to order. Liebknecht's trial was 
 conducted in camera to avoid popular demonstrations. 
 On June 28, 19 16, he was condemned to two years, 
 six months, and three days penal servitude and to 
 removal from the army "for attempted treason in war, 
 aggravated disobedience and contumacy to the au- 
 thority of the State." His sentence was declared to be 
 the lightest possible for his offence, because the Court 
 considered that Liebknecht had not acted from dis- 
 honourable motives but from political fanaticism. 
 His appeal against this sentence was dismissed and 
 the sentence finally confirmed by the military tribunal 
 on August 23.^ 
 
 As a specimen of the secret pamphlet literature 
 
 with which the Extremist sections were now working, 
 
 we give the following extract from one 
 
 Jampirn"'* entitled "A Policy for Curs (Hunde- 
 
 ofthe politik)," which was circulated in the 
 
 xtremists. middle of June 1916: — 
 
 David, Landsberg, and Scheidemann have surpassed all 
 
 State-attorneys, put all chiefs of the police to shame, made 
 
 'Z6vaes, p. 161. 
 
THE NEW GROUP IN THE REICHSTAG lOT 
 
 the late Tessendorf of blessed memory seem an innocent orphan- 
 child by comparison. It would have been a bad look-out if 
 these rascals had had the administering of Bismarck's Law 
 against the Socialists. They would have lodged the whole 
 body of Social Democrat Members of the Reichstag and 
 editors in gaol; they would have sent our August Bebel, 
 our old Liebknecht, to the gallows. . . . He is a cur who licks 
 the boots of the rulers, the boot which has dispensed him 
 nothing but kicks for years past. He is a cur who, while 
 his mouth is stuck into the muzzle of the State of Siege, 
 goes on cheerfully wagging his tail and gazes fawning and 
 whinging into the eyes of the gentlemen of the military dicta- 
 torship. He is a cur who bays the more furiously at a man 
 who is not present, a man chained in prison, and, in so doing, 
 does obedient service to those who for the moment hold the 
 power. He is a cur who, at the word of the Government, 
 abjures, calumniates, treads in the mud the whole past of his 
 Party, everything that has been sacred to it for a generation. 
 Curs — that, then, and nothing else — is what David, Landsberg 
 & Co. are, and they will certainly, when the day of reckon- 
 ing comes, get the kick they deserve from the working-men of 
 Germany.* 
 
 It was not the Majority only which the Extremists 
 attacked. Even the main body of the Minority, who 
 followed the leading of Haase, got few good words 
 from them. 
 
 An article which a Majority Social Democrat, Hugo 
 Poetzsch, contributes to the Internationale Korres- 
 pondens on May 9 illustrates the tribulations of the 
 Minority at this time from their attacks, especially 
 from the "Spartacus" Group. This Group, Poetzsch 
 says, is gaining in Berlin hand over hand. A special 
 attempt is being made to capture the young mejti; 
 pamphlets are disseminated by office-bearers on pay- 
 day evenings. To-day it is no longer the Minority 
 Leaders — Haase, Ledebour, Hoffmann — who push the 
 
 'Berger, pp. 82, 83. 
 
108 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 faction; they are the pushed. Lebedour and HofiE- 
 mann had recently issued a pamphlet in which they 
 complained of the attempt of the Extre^mists to split 
 the Minority. In January the "Spartacus" Group had 
 held a secret confabulation in Berlin with Extremist 
 Comrades from other parts of Germany, with a view 
 to forming a "Third Internationale," without letting 
 , the Minority leaders know anything about it. These 
 latter only heard of it afterwards indirectly by way 
 of Berne. They say in their pamphlet that their 
 "self-respect" forbids their having further dealings 
 with people who have gone behind their backs in this 
 way. Of course, the Majority writers recount all this 
 in the spirit of malicious triumph. The Minority are 
 only reaping wh^t they sowed. They encouraged Lieb- 
 knecht and Borchardt, and now they are themselves 
 chastised with the same rods they used for the backs 
 of the Majority. They broke the discipline of the 
 Party, and now they find the "Spartacus" Letters 
 saying: "Having broken away from one discipline, 
 are we going to accept another crippling one? No, 
 twice no !" It is too late now for the Minority leaders 
 to try to save the situation by severing their connection 
 with the Extremists, The Party in Berlin has already 
 gone to pieces. 
 
xn 
 
 THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MAJORITY 
 AND MINORITY 
 
 (MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1916) 
 
 In the spring and summer of 1916, under the pressure 
 of the blockade, there was a certain amount of darkly 
 
 heaving unrest throughout the working- 
 Onrestand class of Germany. The schism in German 
 
 Social Democracy extended to some ex- 
 tent even to the Trade Unions. As a whole, indeed, 
 the Trade Unions stood solidly with the Majority, 
 but some Trade Unionist Leaders — Horn (Glass- 
 workers' Union), Geyer (Tobacco- workers' Union), 
 the veteran Bock (Shoemakers' Union) — joined 
 the Social Democrat Labour Fellowship. In 
 Scheidemann's constituency of Solingen, the Social 
 Democrat General Assembly passed a resolution 
 adverse to the Majority and justifying the attitude 
 of the Eighteen who had formed the new body. This 
 general unrest added strength to the Extremist section 
 of Social Democracy. In the Prussian Landtag, 
 Hofer, an associate of Liebknecht's, said: — 
 
 The property-owning classes are themselves astonished at the 
 people's patience. But the masses are beginning to stir. They 
 are saying that if the Russians had come to Berlin, it could not 
 have been worse. Now you fear lest the flames of sedition 
 and revolution be kindled. You want to prevent it. But you 
 are always too late. People know that it is a case of their 
 being starved at home and killed abroad — for the interests of a 
 small set of capitalists. 
 
 109 
 
110 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 At the end of May the leaders of the Majority thought 
 it well to guard against the infection of men at the 
 front with Minority views by bringing out a new fort- 
 nightly paper, strongly Nationalist and friendly to the 
 Government, especially for circulation among men on 
 active service — the SosialdemokraHsche Feldpost. 
 Tvrenty thousand copies of its first number were printed. 
 
 On the side of the Government, meantime, repres- 
 sive measures against Minority Social Democrats in- 
 creased. According to the declaration of Dittmann 
 in the Reichstag on M^y 24, Comrades, even when 
 themselves members of the Reichstag, were subjected 
 to every species of petty persecution. Dr. Herzfeld 
 was prevented from crossing the frontier into Switzer- 
 land, although he had a regular passport, and was 
 offensively searched. Another Social Democrat, 
 Haegy, an Alsatian, when he ventured to complain of 
 the "punitive arrest" of an editor, was told that he 
 himself would be arrested or placed under police super- 
 vision, and finally was called up to the colours and 
 sent to the Eastern front. We also heard of a certain 
 Kluss, who had been arrested for making a speech 
 against the war at a public meeting and had not been 
 brought to trial till a month later. Twenty-two Socialist 
 meetings, after they had been arranged for, were sup- 
 pressed by the police in a single Berlin constituency. 
 
 In June even the Majority Group of Social Demo- 
 crats felt obliged, by the anger in the country at the 
 food shortage and the Government's re- 
 TOtes^gS actionary policy, to vote, as of old, against 
 the Budget. the Budget (June 7). Both the Majority 
 June 7, 1916.^ ^-.^.^^p ^^^ ^j^^ "Social Democrat Labour 
 
 Fellowship" on this occasion voted together against 
 the Budget, in opposition to all the rest of the House. 
 This, however, was intended by the Majority to be 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 111 
 
 merely a demonstration of discontent with the Govern- 
 ment, not a step to hamper the prosecution of the war. 
 For when, after tiie passing of the Budget, the Gov- 
 errmient asked for an extraordinary credit of 12,000 
 miUions of marks for the war, the Groups again 
 divided. The "Social Democrat Labour Fellowship" 
 and the free lance, Rtihle, voted against the credit, the 
 twenty-two members of the Social Democrat Group 
 who had formed part of the Minority in August 19 15 
 left the Chamber before the voting took place, and the 
 rest of the Social Democrat Group voted for the credit. 
 If, however, on June 7, the two Socialist Groups 
 voted together, there was more than one occasion 
 about this time when the Social Demo- 
 Minority votes (.j-at Labour Fellowship opposed measures 
 Majority on of internal legislation which had the 
 interflai support of the old Party. 
 
 questions. \F t-,.,, ,- ,. .. 
 
 On June 3 a Bill for settling dis- 
 abled soldiers on the land, with capital supplied by the 
 State (Kapital-abfindungsgesetz) , was passed by the 
 Reichstag. The "Labour Fellowship" voted against 
 it. "We reject the Bill," Henke explained in the 
 House, "firstly because it confers large powers upon 
 the army administration, which will lead to unjustified 
 tutelage; secondly because it binds the working-man 
 to the soil and thereby restricts liberty of migration." 
 On June 5 a Bill for amending the existing law as to 
 Trade Unions {Reicksvereinsgesetz) was passed with 
 the support of the Majority. The "Labour Fellow- 
 ship," in company with the Conservative Right, voted 
 against it. They denounced it as not only inadequate 
 but as actually dangerous. The two extremes voted, 
 of course, together for opposite reasons. The measure 
 in question represented a compromise. To the Con- 
 servatives it was abhorrent because it made even a small 
 
112 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 concession to Socialist demands; to the Minority So- 
 cialists it was a sham because it did not go far enough. 
 
 On the same day the "Labour Fellowship," this time 
 together with five Conservative members, voted 
 against the law for taxing war-profits (Kriegsgewinn- 
 steuergesetz), which was taxed by the votes of the 
 other Parties, including the Majority Social Demo- 
 crats. The effect of the law, said Haase, would be to 
 prevent a real taxation of war-profits, such as was 
 demanded by the great mass of the people. 
 
 Such action on the part of the Minority has added a 
 fresh count to the tale of reproaches cast up against 
 them by the Majority. Whether the Minority were right 
 or wrong in holding that the legislation in question 
 would not work out in the long run to the advantage of 
 the working-class, could be decided only by a detailed 
 study of the German laws in reference to conditions 
 in Germany, for which few Englishmen have the neces- 
 sary knowledge. In any case, it had become possible 
 to represent the Minority as having opposed even useful 
 social legislation in their rancour against the Majority 
 — or at any rate in their unpractical doctrinarianism. 
 The fact that they had been seen voting side by side 
 with Conservatives on the last two occasions made it 
 all the easier to display their action in an ugly light. 
 
 We have in May 19 16 the first conspicuous signs 
 
 of an effort on the part of the Majority to wrest the 
 
 central Party paper, Vorw'drts, out of 
 
 Directorate the control of the Minority. Although 
 
 takes step to ^jjg representatives of the Minority were 
 
 obtain control '^. . ,..,,, , 
 
 atVorwaHs. predommant in the editorial body, the 
 shau the Majority, too, had representatives on the 
 
 Minority r. / '^ . . 
 
 withhold Staff of the paper. One of these was 
 
 .ubsoriptions? jj^g manager, Richard Fischer. Acting 
 on a resolution of the Party Directorate, Fischer wrote 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 113 
 
 to one of the editors who belonged to the Minority, 
 Dr. Meyer, dismissing him from his post. But the 
 Editorial Committee of the paper supported Dr. Meyer, 
 disputed Fischer's authority, and refused to comply with 
 his orders. The Editorial Committee was supported by 
 the Berlin Press Committee (Presskommission) — a 
 body elected by the Berlin Social Democrat organiza- 
 tions to control Vorw'drts. Berlin, as has been said, 
 was a stronghold of the Minority, and the action of 
 the Party Directorate and Fischer was represented as 
 a "fresh infringement of the Party Constitution." 
 
 Dr. Meyer's offence was that he had helped to cir- 
 culate a suggestion, now becoming rife in Minority 
 circles, that pressure should be brought to bear upon 
 the central directing body of the Party by the local 
 organizations' stopping payment of their dues. He 
 was believed to have written or inspired a pamphlet 
 called "The Lessons of March 24," which was circu- 
 lated at this time and created considerable sensation. 
 It urged vehemently this extreme policy: — 
 
 Comrades! Bestir yourselves to conquer back the Party 
 which has been made an appendage of bourgeois Imperialism 
 by a clique of traitors in high office. Do not put up with the 
 traitors' coup d'etat of March 24. State clearly that you no 
 longer recognize the David-Heine-Noske Majority as repre- 
 sentatives of Social Democracy; demand clearly that the 
 traitors shall lay down the mandate they have abused. Cease 
 to allow your party funds to be put at the disposal of this 
 Party Directorate, since they use your hard-earned pence to 
 promote a policy, to give out writings, which aim at making 
 you the patient cannon-fodder of Imperialism and serve to pro- 
 long this slaughter of nations. The local branches must resolve 
 to lock the Party chests against the Directorate of the Scheide- 
 mann-Ebert set, who make over the pence of the people to the 
 Moloch of the world-war, to a Government which means famine 
 and the State of Siege.' 
 
 'Berger, pp. 85, 86. Berger gives what professes to be a 
 reprint of the whole pamphlet in full. 
 
114 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 The bulk of the Minority, as represented by Vor- 
 w'drts, shrank from advocating an action the conse- 
 quences of which would be a complete disruption of 
 the Party. A Parteitag, invested with the authority 
 of the Party as a whole, which was finally to adjudi- 
 cate all the controversies at issue in the Party and re- 
 establish unity, would hereby becom impossible, since 
 local organizations which had failed to pay their dues 
 would have thereby excluded themselves from being 
 represented.^ 
 
 These arguments were met by Franz Mehring, 
 from the point of view of the Extremists. He 
 argued that when the day of the Parteitag arrived, 
 the local organizations might pay their arrears to the 
 Congress itself and so qualify for representation. The 
 Directorate, he said, had broken all of the rules of the 
 Party Constitution, and the only way by which the 
 local organizations could dissociate themselves from 
 complicity was by refusing contributions.^ 
 
 The action of the Directorate in regard to Vor- 
 wdrts aggravated the seething anger in the Minority. 
 The Directorate, besides its attempt to 
 Ingry" the"'' cxpcl Dr. Meyer, had now insisted that 
 caseoJTeUow- jt should havc a representative upon the 
 Beeskow. Editorial Board with the power of veto. 
 
 The man chosen for this invidious post — "censor," 
 as he was currently called in the Party — ^was Her- 
 mann Miiller, he who just before the outbreak of war 
 had gone as delegate to Paris. The feeling against 
 the Majority was displayed at the end of May by a 
 resolution passed in the constituency of Niederbarnim 
 (Greater Berlin) by 113 votes to 16. The Central 
 Directorate of Greater Berlin determined on May 26, 
 
 ' Vorwdrfs, May 29, 1916. 
 
 'Bremer BUrger-Zeitung, June 13, 1916. 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 115 
 
 with 12 dissentient votes, to bring forward a motion 
 to expel the Trade Unionist leader, Legien, from the 
 Party. Legien was reported to have expressed him- 
 self in injurious terms as to various leading persons 
 of the Minority — one he had spoken of as a "police 
 informer," of another as an "idiot," of another as a 
 "petroleum Jew." 
 
 In another constituency of Greater Berlin, Teltow- 
 Beeskow, represented in the Reichstag by Zubeil, one 
 of the "Labour Fellowship," it came to an open rup- 
 ture. The local executive was on the side of the 
 Majority, the mass of the Social Democrats in the 
 constituency on that of the Minority. At two of the 
 villages included in the constituency, Neu-KoUn 
 and Lichterfelde, the local organizations had carried 
 out the suggestion just noted and resolved to withhold 
 the contributions due from them to the Party chest. A 
 pamphlet was circulated in the constituency, denounc- 
 ing Scheidemann and the Majority. The action of 
 the Directorate with regard to Vorwdrts was described 
 as "unscrupulous," and as showing that the 
 Directorate was striving after a "dictatorship," 
 in order to "turn the mass of the party into 
 beasts of burden in the service of Capitalism and 
 Imperialism." 
 
 When the General Assembly of the constituency 
 took place on June i8, trouble arose over the question 
 whether the delegates from Lichterfelde were to be 
 admitted. The chairman and the majority of the 
 local executive were for excluding them, but they were 
 overruled by the vote of the Assembly. Upon this 
 they left the hall in a body. The Assembly, minus 
 those who had left (thirteen delegates) and one dele- 
 gate who was absent, then proceeded to declare the old 
 executive deposed and to elect a new provisional 
 
116 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 executive, who should summon a new General 
 Assembly. One of those elected to this new 
 executive was Rosa Luxemburg, who belonged, as 
 has been mentioned, to Mehring's section of Ex- 
 tremists, The comments on the episode which the 
 editors of Vorwdrts desired to publish were vetoed by 
 Muller.^ 
 
 The constituency, however, although on the side 
 of the Minority, was not prepared to go the lengths 
 of the Extremist sections. When Rosa Luxemburg 
 moved that the contributions due to the central 
 Party chest should be withheld, her proposal was 
 rejected by a large majority. The old executive 
 continued to claim to be the only legitimate one, 
 and their claim was naturally supported by the Party 
 Directorate. They still had some following in the 
 constituency; we hear of them at the end of August 
 getting up a meeting at which Dr. David spoke to 
 some I, GOO persons and to which only adherents of 
 the Majority were admitted. The local organi- 
 zations would have nothing to do with it. There 
 was thus a definite split in the Party in Teltow- 
 Beeskow.^ 
 
 Meantime, another vote of credits — this time 12,000 
 million of marks — had been passed in the Reichstag 
 (June 7) . But now such a vote no longer 
 r'newis**'*' produced any fresh disturbance in the 
 Social Democrat Party. With the divi- 
 sion into two Groups, the question had been settled for 
 each in its own way. The old Group voted for the 
 credits, as before, and the "Labour Fellowship" 
 voted against them. The speaker for each Group 
 justified its action by the arguments which had now 
 been so often repeated. 
 
 *Vorw'dris, June 24, 1916. 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 117 
 
 On June 21, Scheidemann, at a meeting composed 
 mainly of non-Socialists, in Breslau, made a statement 
 
 which produced a considerable sensation 
 speech at 1^ Germany. He stated that a year 
 
 Breslau, before, after the Six Associations had 
 
 presented their memorandum to the 
 Chancellor, he and certain other Social Democrats 
 had waited on the Chancellor and heard from 
 his own lips an assurance that he disapproved of "all 
 such schemes." Ledebour, who had come to the same 
 meeting, without the knowledge of the local Social 
 Democrat oflficials, though probably on an under- 
 standing with the Minority faction in the place, stood 
 up after Scheidemann had spoken, to point out that 
 what Scheidemann had said was no revelation; every- 
 body knew that Bethmann HoUweg did not approve 
 of the particular plans of the Six Associations; but 
 his utterances in the Reichstag proved that he was 
 not against all annexations; the difference was only 
 one of degree. The sudden emergence of Ledebour 
 to combat a Social Democrat speaker before a mixed 
 assembly was declared on the side of the Majority 
 to be scandalous; notice of his speech was generally 
 suppressed in the papers — only the extreme Minority 
 Bremer Burger- Zeitung had a summary of it — whilst 
 Scheidemann's was published all over the Empire, 
 and became the topic of the hour. The Minority 
 papers followed in their comments the same line 
 which Ledebour had taken. 
 
 The reason which had ostensibly brought Scheide- 
 „^ „ . ^ mann'to these parts was the purpose of 
 
 The Reichen- . ^ r xt 
 
 bach-Neurode supportmg the Candidature of Hermann 
 Election. Mijller for the seat of Reichenbach-Neu- 
 
 rode in the Reichstag, left vacant by the death of its 
 former member, a Social Democrat named Kiihn. 
 
118 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 The Minority opposition seems to have been becoming 
 formidable in the district, though no candidate was 
 put up against Miiller. Miiller succeeded to the seat 
 of Kiihn without an electoral contest; but seven 
 votes were given in favour of a Conservative, Krause, 
 by some sort of error, since Krause apparently was 
 not standing. The election caused a good deal of 
 talk at the time, owing to a false statement of the 
 facts circulated by the Wolff Bureau. It was repre- 
 sented that in a contest between a Social Democrat — 
 some papers said a Minority Social Democrat! — and 
 a Conservative, the Social Democrat had won a great 
 victory.* 
 
 The unrest in the German working-class was shown 
 at the end of June by demonstrations which took 
 Demonstra- placc in various places to protest against 
 tions in fayour Licbknccht's conviction. We hear of 
 of Liibknecht. gyj,j^ processions through the streets and 
 minor collisions with the police — on June 26, the 
 day when Liebknecht's trial became known — in Berlin, 
 Bremen, Stuttgart, and Brunswick. 
 
 About the same time a similar trouble to that 
 which had occurred in the Teltow-Beeskow constitu- 
 ency showed itself in the Frankfurt dis- 
 Troubiein j^j^.^ jjgj.^ ^.j^e branch of the Social 
 
 Frankfurt. 
 
 Democrat Party for the city of Frankfurt 
 itself was on the side of the Majority, whereas the 
 branches in the district around, constituting, the bulk 
 of the district organization, were on the side of the 
 Minority. The quarrel between the Frankfurt City 
 and the district came to be focused upon the question 
 of the control of the local Social Democrat organ the 
 Frankfurter Volksstimme. The Frankfurt branch re- 
 fused to pay its dues to the district organization — 
 
 ' Vossische Zeitung, June 28, 1916. 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 119 
 
 doing, that is to say, exactly what the Majority re- 
 proached the Extremist Minority sections for advoca- 
 ting. In the Directorate of the district organization it- 
 self certain members held by the Majority. At a meet- 
 ing held at the end of June, the district organization 
 declared that these members had forfeited their posi- 
 tion, and they were replaced by others. It was an- 
 nounced two days later that the resolution of the Frank- 
 furt branch to suspend the payment of its dues had 
 been rescinded at the instance of the Party Directorate. 
 A much more serious blow to the Majority was the 
 open revolt of Greater Berlin. The various local 
 branches of Greater Berlin are united in 
 Gre^erBeriin; onc Verhafid with a common (Berlin) 
 Minority in Central Directorate. This Berlin Central 
 am urg. Directorate acted as the executive organ 
 
 for the Socialist Board of all Prussia. Besides this, 
 the Berlin branches, in association with the Directo- 
 rate of the whole Party in the German Empire, con- 
 trolled Vorwdrts by a specially appointed "Press Com- 
 mittee." Part of the confusion at this moment was 
 due to the fact that Vorwdrts has a double character. 
 It is both the local Berlin Socialist organ and the Cen- 
 tral organ for the whole German Socialist Party. At 
 a time, therefore, when Berlin Social Democracy was 
 in violent antagonism to the official policy of the 
 Party, the double control of Vorwdrts naturally led 
 to an impossible situation. Early in June a meeting 
 of the delegates from all the Berlin local branches 
 was called together, in order to consider the question 
 of electing a new Berlin Central Directorate instead 
 of the old Directorate which supported the Majority. 
 In 191 5, the Social Democrat local branches had 
 determined that there should be no new elections 
 • Vorwdrts, July i, 1916. 
 
120 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 till after the war: hence the action of Greater Berlin 
 was all the more startling. The Party Directorate 
 issued a condemnation of the proceedings; the 
 Socialist Board for Prussia, in which the Majority 
 was dominant, declared that it would no longer recog- 
 nize the Berlin Central Directorate as its executive 
 organ, if the Directorate was reconstituted as the 
 local branches proposed. These declarations had no 
 effect; on June 25 a meeting of delegates from all 
 the Berlin local branches dismissed the existing 
 Directorate and chose a new Directorate of Minority, 
 or even Extremist, complexion. 
 
 Even in some of the Hamburg districts the Minority 
 began to gain ground. The local Social Democrat 
 paper, the Hamburger Echo, had, as has been stated, 
 gone strongly with the Majority. In the Hanam 
 district we hear of meetings in July, at which resolu- 
 tions were carried by large majorities, declaring the 
 line taken by the paper to be incompatible with 
 Socialism.^ 
 
 The idea of summoning a Parteitag for the Empire 
 
 now began to be put forward again from the side of 
 
 the Majority. The Minority still opposed 
 
 Parteitag be it vigorously ; it was a suggestion emana- 
 
 NoTrpKUeta *^"^' ^^^^ ^^^^' ^''""^ Imperialist Socialists 
 but a like Kolb and David, in order to crush the 
 
 confereace. Minority by a snap vote, while the men 
 were in the trenches. The defeated side would never 
 recognize the authority of a Parteitag held under 
 present conditions. Yet the Party Directorate were 
 in favour of the proposal, and at a meeting with the 
 Party Committee (a consultative body, as has been 
 said, of delegates from the different branches all over 
 the Empire) warmly backed up Timm of Munich 
 ^Bremer BUrger-Zeitung, July 8, 1916. 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 131 
 
 when he moved a resolution to this effect, and persuaded 
 the Party Committee to put the question on its agenda 
 for its meeting of July 20.'^ On the date specified the 
 meeting was held — in the Reichstag building, so as to 
 be safe, we are told, from invasion by Socialist Amazons 
 animated by the spirit of Rosa Luxemburg and Luise 
 Zietz. The Party Committee, contrary to what had 
 been predicted in the Minority Press, decided, with only 
 twelve dissentient votes, that the time was not pro- 
 pitious for the summoning of a Parteitag, but that it 
 would be well to call a Conference of delegates from 
 the local branches all over the Empire (a Reichskon- 
 ferens) in order to arrest the growing disorganization.^ 
 The controversy between Majority and Minority 
 as to the summoning of a Parteitag filled the Social 
 Democrat Press during the next weeks. 
 Embitterment Passions were running high. "The 
 
 of Party con- . . ^-i 
 
 troversies: the enmity of the different nations — German, 
 Extremist French, English, Russian — to each other," 
 
 peril. . . \, HIT-- 11 IT 
 
 says a writer in the Majority weekly, JJie 
 Glocke, "is child's play compared with the mad fury 
 which at the present time excites German Social Demo- 
 crats against German Social Democrats. If we have 
 not yet turned machine-guns on to each other, it is not 
 for want of will !" ^ There was real alarm lest the 
 Extremists, growing ever in power, might bring about 
 the General Strike which Socialists had talked of 
 
 ^Leipsiger Volkszeitung, July 14, 1916; Bremer Biirger- 
 Zeitung, July 17, 1916. 
 
 ' Vorwarts, July 23, 1916. The idea of a Reichskonferens 
 as a substitute for a Parteitag seems really to have originated 
 with the Minority. The Majority Arbeiterseitung of Dortmund 
 had attacked Haase on January 7, 1916, for putting forward 
 this idea. It was now the Party Committee who put it forward, 
 and the Minority who were shy of it. 
 
 'Die Glocke, July 15, 1916, p. 638, 
 
122 , GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 before the war. The Majority paper, the Volksstimnie 
 of Chemnitz, uttered a warning: — 
 
 People are going about the country preaching a General 
 Strike. ... Of course all this is stark madness. A General 
 Strike during the war, at the critical moment of the war, is 
 something absolutely impossible, because the German working- 
 class is mature enough to see things in their trtie connexions. 
 German working-men will not make a General Strike, to bring 
 destruction upon their comrades at the front. They will not 
 make a General Strike for the benefit of the Tsar! Even 
 if isolated, undisciplined, and hare-brained individuals let 
 themselves be persuaded to make little experiments in this 
 direction, there is no reason why one should feel nervous. The 
 preachers of the General Strike may cause misfortune, very 
 much misfortune perhaps, in a limited field, but not in the 
 war as a whole. The mass of the German working-class, 
 which has passed through the school of the Social Democrat 
 Party, and which, for that reason, does not fall a blind victim 
 to every fine-sounding catchword, has a deep understanding 
 for the vital needs of the^ German people ; it will not burden 
 itself with the bitter consciousness in history of having stabbed 
 its brethren in the back as they fought. To those few, how- 
 ever, who are not quite deaf to the seductions of discreditable 
 agents, let so much be said: Do not suffer any one to persuade 
 you that by the propaganda for a General Strike you can 
 bring about peace. . . . You can achieve nothing but your 
 own eternal unhappiness, and the unhappiness of those you 
 mislead. Do not carry things to such a pass that the nation, 
 fighting in its self-defence, has to defend itself against you I 
 Beware ! ' ■< 
 
 In the summer of 1916, after the Fronde against the 
 
 Chancellor had developed and the Na- 
 
 The official tional Comrnittce for an Honourable 
 
 peace cam- i 4 i\ r 1 • t-t- 
 
 paignotthe Peacc had been formed to wm public 
 ^^ opinion for the Government and educate 
 
 the German people with regard to "mod- 
 erate" war-aims, the prohibition against discussing 
 
 'Quoted in the Rheinisch-Wesifdlische Zeitung, July 15, 1916. _ 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 128 
 
 war-aims became obsolete. The Social Democrat Party- 
 Directorate felt it the right moment to put forth a 
 public declaration of the war-aims of German Social 
 Democracy — ^that is, of course, of the Majority. In 
 view of Minority agitation, their Manifesto, like their 
 Manifesto of June 191 5, laid stress on their readiness 
 for a peace on the status quo basis (the term is not 
 used, but this is what the document points to), and 
 their opposition to all annexations. They laid the 
 blame for the continuance of the will for war in enemy 
 countries upon the programmes of the German Chau- 
 vinists. They visited the local branches of the Party 
 throughout the Empire, to arrange for public meetings 
 in which the Social Democrat attitude in the question 
 of war-aims and peace-aims should be defined. "We 
 further request that a petition be prepared for sig- 
 nature, in which a peace shall be demanded, which 
 shall ensure friendship with our neighbours and guar- 
 antee the territorial integrity, independence, and eco- 
 nomic development of our country." The new Mani- 
 festo was issued from Berlin on August 11, 1916. It 
 was adversely criticized by Lensch, from his present 
 Imperialist standpoint as a "deplorable move in the 
 direction of the Minority," in an article in Die Glocke, 
 August 19. Lensch hoped that this feebleness on the 
 part of the Directorate might be only a passing inci- 
 dent. On the other hand, when the adherents of the 
 Majority bestirred themselves to obtain signatures for 
 the peace petition throughout the country, those of 
 the Minority stood aloof. The "peace-meetings" took 
 place during August at a number of places, some 
 of them getting exceptionally large audiences. To 
 this strictly NationaUst peace-campaign of the 
 Majority the Government did not, as a rule, oppose 
 obstacles. Only at a few places (Greiz, Elberfeld, 
 

 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 Barmen, Stettin, Bredow) meetings were prohibited; 
 because the speakers refused to submit the text of 
 their speeches to the authorities. The way t^e 
 Government discriminated between Majority aftd 
 Minority was seen in Berlin, where David's address 
 was sanctioned, but a meeting at which Haase <vas 
 to speak on "War and Peace" was forbidden.^ 
 
 That this professed readiness for peace meant peace 
 rigidly on the status quo ante basis, so far as any con- 
 cessions by Germany were concerned, is indicated by 
 an article on the Conference of neutral Socialists held 
 in the summer of 1916 at The Hague, contributed 
 to the Internationale Korrespondem (August 9) by 
 Wilhelm Jansson. Jansson complains that the deci- 
 sions of the Conference were dictated by partiality 
 for the Entente because they considered the Alsace- 
 Lorraine question as one upon which there could be 
 discussion. There was no Alsace-Lorraine question 
 for Germany. If raised at all, it could be raised only 
 as a domestic German question. 
 
 A speech which Scheidemann delivered at Dresden 
 about this time puts together in a form which may 
 _ ^ . . , be taken as typical the considerations 
 
 Scheidemann's . , , ,, r i ht • • • i 
 
 speech at governmg the bulk of the Majority with 
 
 Dresden. regard to peace: — 
 
 For two years we have been passing through a time worse 
 than any ever experienced before by a civilized nation. The 
 distress is great — ^it would be foolish to deny it, since our 
 enemies are fully aware of it and in fact are building their 
 hopes on our internal collapse. Even if the German people 
 were to break down, it would still stand in history as a great 
 people. But Germany will not, Germany cannot, collapse. 
 Germany must not collapse, since a collapse would mean 
 that we should exchange the present temporary distress for 
 lasting misery. Under the ruins of Germany the working- 
 class would lie the deepest buried. Two things we must 
 
 ^Leipziger Volkszeitung, August 29-30, 1916. 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 125 
 
 demand: Bread, and no shaking of our conviction that we 
 are waging a war of defence. Germany has been fighting till 
 now for her very existence, her independence, her possibility 
 of life. We did not go out for conquests. That is proved 
 sufficiently by the fact that Austria, under Germany's pressure, 
 was willing to give up territory of her own free will to Italy. 
 Germany, too, has put forward no plans of conquest. Beth- 
 mann HoUweg flatly declined to do so. England and France 
 are continuing the war because they hope still to be able to 
 carry out their schemes of conquest. Look at the mad peace 
 conditions of the Morning Post. We wish for a peace which 
 promises to last, without annexations. To the last second we 
 tried to prevent war. We have tried ten times to get into touch 
 with the French Socialists — ^they have always refused our ad- 
 vances, the last time only a week ago. Irresponsible talkers 
 have put it about that the munition-workers ought to strike. 
 It is incomprehensible to me that we can even think of the 
 notion of hitting our soldiers from behind in order to make 
 victory easier for the enemy. We wish for peace, but not 
 for peace at any price. Germany would become the beggar- 
 nation of the world, the German working-class would become 
 a horde of beggars. What we have in common with the Gov- 
 ernment we have also in common with the whole nation — 
 interest in the maintenance of our nation. The Socialists in 
 Belgium, England, and France have closed up with their Gov- 
 ernments — but nothing is said about that. Only if one of 
 ourselves supports his Government the cry is at once raised: 
 Voluntary Government-delegate! Extraordinarily great issues 
 hang for Germany on a good peace. We wish for equal rights 
 for all in elections. We ought to do nothing that could harm 
 our troops — that is forbidden by our duty of gratitude. We 
 are ready to conclude peace, but not a peace at any price, which 
 would condemn our workers to starvation. We are what we 
 have always been — ^fighters for Socialism, fighters for democ- 
 racy, fighters for the peace of the world. 
 
 As against this speech of Scheidemann's we may 
 set one of Haase's delivered at Jena at 
 
 TjeM ^"*°'' the end of August 1916, as giving the 
 view which was being propagated by the 
 
 Minority. Haase reaffirmed what was one of his 
 
126 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 main premises, that it was impossible in this war for 
 either side to win. Since diplomats could not find; 
 a way out of the impasse, the only hope was that 
 the peace-will of the masses, of "the international 
 proletariat," should end the war. If once a majority 
 in Germany would rally to the view of the "Social 
 Democrat Labour Fellowship," then in France and 
 England too, Haase assured his hearers, the majority 
 would become pacifist and the thing would he 
 done.^ 
 
 The question whether the Majority did or did not 
 desire annexations was made clearer by an article 
 which Conrad Haenisch published in 
 v^J^me Vorwdrts (September 5, 1916) and the 
 
 against the discussion to which it gave rise. It 
 
 Imperialist ^^^ Certain that the extreme Right 
 
 Socialists. . r , Ti til 
 
 wing of the Party was prepared to back 
 up the demand for annexations, and to this wing 
 Haenisch had come to belong. His article declared 
 frankly that he desired as extensive annexations 
 as possible on the East, and on the West security that 
 Belgium should not serve as a jumping-off ground 
 for England, though the Belgian people's life as a 
 State should be spared. He asserted that the views 
 he stated were those of all the Majority. This pro- 
 duced an answer from Stampfer {Vorwdrts, Sep- 
 tember 7), one of the more cautious Majority mem- 
 bers, repudiating Haenisch's views, and strongly in- 
 sisting on the principle of "No annexations." The 
 Party Directorate after this itself published a state- 
 ment {Vorwdrts, September 9) that its views had 
 been officially expressed in the peace-petition. This 
 was equivalent to endorsing Stampfer' s statement as 
 against that of Haenisch. 
 
 ^Frankfurter Zeitung, August 28, 1916. 
 
MAJORITY AND MINORITY 127i 
 
 In connection with the extreme Right of the Social 
 Democrat Party we may -notice apecnliarity they 
 ^j^^ were already exhibiting. On the question 
 
 imperiaust whether the main enemy was England 
 
 sociausts Qj. Russia, whilc Conservative and reac- 
 
 advocates or . ' 
 
 " Autocratic tionary Germany, generally speaking, had 
 *"°™-" answered "Liberal England," and Liberal 
 
 and Socialist Germany had answered "Autocratic 
 Russia," groups of Social Democrats now took sides 
 with the Conservatives and reactionaries. In Die 
 Glocke of September i, 1916, edited by Haenisch, Wil- 
 helm Jansson published an article advocating an 
 understanding with Russia. The Sozialistische Monat- 
 shefte, the organ of another group, made apologies 
 for despotic Russia and attacks on England a regular 
 part of its plan of campaign. The traditional Social- 
 ist horror of Russia, it said frankly, had been largely 
 based on illusion ; on this point German Social Democ- 
 racy must make a right-about turn. Curiously 
 enough, this attitude of professed friendliness to Rus- 
 sia did not seem incompatible with an insistence on the 
 unbroken belt of German power from Hamburg to 
 the Persian Gulf. (Most of the enthusiasts for 
 Berlin-to-Bagdad — Paul Rohrbach, for instance — re- 
 garded Russia, rather than England, as the enemy.) 
 Indeed, the Sozialistische Monatshefte supports the 
 Continental Idea {Euro pa rather than Mitteleuropa) 
 — the whole European Continent, including France, 
 Italy, and the Scandinavian States, bound together by 
 common interests and economic reciprocity against 
 Great Britain's empire of the seas. (Since the en- 
 trance of the United States into the war, this idea 
 of the solidarity of Europe has been accentuated ; the 
 antithesis is now Continental Europe against united 
 Anglo-Saxondom. ) 
 
XIII 
 
 THE SEPTEMBER CONFERENCE 
 
 The idea of calling a Reichskonferens, a Conference 
 of delegates from the Social Democrat local organiza- 
 tions all over, the Empire, propounded 
 S: Sice, at the meeting of the Party Committee 
 on July 20, as a pis alter instead of an 
 authoritative Parteitag, had now taken practical shape. 
 A Conference was summoned for the three days 
 September 21-23, to meet in the Reichstag building at 
 Berlin ; and during September the energies of German 
 Social Democrats were largely taken up by the con- 
 tests between Majority and Minority in the election 
 of delegates from the various local centres. A certain 
 movement of reaction in favour of the Majority 
 seems at this time to have passed over German Social 
 Democracy. Conrad Haenisch, speaking at a meeting 
 in his constituency of Oberbarnim (Berlin), although 
 a member of the Minority was there to argue against 
 him, obtained a vote of confidence, with only five 
 dissentient votes. Scheidemann, whose constituency 
 of Solingen had been far from satisfied with his policy, 
 now addressed two meetings in the place, at which 
 votes of confidence were carried by overwhelming 
 majorities. In the elections to the Conference, the 
 Majority, it was seen, would really be the majority. 
 This movement in their favour was perhaps due to 
 the Majority's swerve to the Left, towards the position 
 of the Minority, in their recent peace-campaign and 
 in the peace-petition. On the othei; hand, the 
 
 J28 
 
THE SEPTEMBER CONFERENCE 129 
 
 Minority complained that the system of voting was 
 unfair to them. Local branches with fifty members 
 and under (of which there were about lOO in the 
 Empire) combined in a "district" to send one dele- 
 gate; an electoral circle with possibly 3,000 members 
 also elected one delegate; circles with between 3,000 
 and 10,000 members, two delegates ; circles with over 
 10,000 members, three delegates. This, it was said, 
 gave undue weight to small branches as against the 
 larger local bodies. All the Social Democrat Members 
 of the Reichstag, all members of the Party Directorate, 
 the Commission of Control, and the Party Committee 
 were delegates ex officio. There had been a desire in 
 the Party Directorate, favoured by Ebert, the Chair- 
 man of the Reichstag Group, to regard only the mem- 
 bers of the old Reichstag Group as ex officio members 
 of the Conference, not members of the "Social Demo- 
 crat Labour Association." The Party Committee, 
 however, had been for including the members of both 
 Groups, and this view had prevailed. 
 
 That the Extremists had not relaxed their activities 
 may be seen by the complaints still occurring at this 
 „^ .. .^ time that the Empire had been "flooded" 
 
 Should the . ^ 
 
 Minority join in With anonymous pamphlets slanderously 
 the Conference? attacking the various leaders of the 
 Party.* At one moment there was some talk 1 of 
 the Minority boycotting the Conference altogether. 
 The more moderate, however, of the Minority 
 were on the whole glad of it, as giving them an 
 opportunity to state their views without police inter- 
 ference. They did not, indeed, entertain any hope 
 that the party could be united by it in a common 
 programme, but they thought it might be possible 
 that a greater latitude for disagreement would be 
 ^Vorwarts, September 19, 1916. 
 
130 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 permitted during the war within the Party, in virtue 
 of which the Minority might have freedom of utter- 
 ance without a disruption of the Party. Kautsky was 
 more sceptical. What was the good of the Confer- 
 ence, he asked,, if its resolutions were not to be 
 authoritative? If it was only a case of the opposition 
 being granted liberty for their propaganda within the 
 Party organization, the Directorate might concede 
 them that, were they so disposed, straight away, with- 
 out any Conference at all. If they were not disposed 
 to do so, a Conference without authority could not 
 compel them.^ 
 
 When the results of the elections were declared, 
 it was found that Berlin, of course, had gone solid 
 for the Minority. So had Bremen, Brem- 
 eiecuonsf*'" ^rhaven, Konigsberg, Essen, Diisseldorf, 
 Leipsig, the first three Saxony groups, the 
 Lower Rhine, and North Bavaria. Frankfurt sent 
 seven Minority delegates against two Majority. Ham- 
 burg, Lubeck, Hanover and Westphalia, Schleswig, 
 the Rhine province, Hessen-Nassau, Baden, Wiirtem- 
 berg, and most of Bavaria were Majority. 
 
 The total number of delegates sent to the Confer- 
 ence was 302. Adding to these the 143 ex-officio mem- 
 bers (the Party Directorate, etc.), we get a total of 
 445 persons taking part in the Conference. 
 
 On September 21 the Conference assembled in the 
 -„. o .^ Reichstag building. The first controversial 
 
 The first day: . ° , . , ° , , 
 
 Shall the Con- qucstion which Came up was whether 
 ference pass j^ should pass any rcsolutions beyond such 
 
 resolutions on ... . ... .■ 
 
 questions of as had to do merely with its own busmess 
 policy? arrangements. The Minority wished the 
 
 Conference to be limited to debate, to the exposition 
 of the different views, to the clearing of issues. They 
 * Vorw'drts, September 20, 1916. 
 
THE SEPTEMBER CONFERENCE 131 
 
 did not want questions of policy put to the vote. 
 They knew that on a vote they would be left in a 
 minority ; .'and since they did not recognize that the 
 strength of the different elements in the Conference 
 corresponded with their real relative strength in the 
 country, they did not wish to be condemned by what 
 would look like a decision of the Party, but would 
 not be such in reality. Ledebour at the beginning of 
 the proceedings put this forward on behalf of some 
 100 Minority members. He was supported by 
 Frassek, spokesman for the diminutive "International 
 Socialist" group. The decision of this question was 
 deferred till after the debate had taken place. The 
 rest of the first day was occupied by a long speech from 
 Scheidemann and a speech from Ebert. 
 
 Scheidemann went over the old ground of the 
 Majority. Germany was fighting a war of self- 
 defence. At first it had been the over- 
 speelh!""^'^ whelming Russian peril. Yet "the situa- 
 tion in August 1914 was, in point of dan- 
 ger, a mere bagatelle in comparison with the situation 
 to-day." The Minority enormously under-estimated 
 the peril, and over-estimated the effect which a refusal 
 of war-credits on the part of German Social Democ- 
 racy would have in disposing other nations to peace. 
 He defended the Majority against the charge that it 
 had become subservient to the Government. Its "con-r 
 fidential relations" with the Government meant no 
 more than that the Government now put the Social 
 Democrat Party on a level with the other Parties in 
 communicating official intelligence. The Majority 
 was quite ready to criticize the Government adversely, 
 where occasion called for it. It had done more 
 for peace than could be revealed till the war was over. 
 "We fight against all annexations — ^though that does 
 
182 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 not mean that not a single boundary-stone would h6 
 shifted, but that in all changes of frontier the wishes 
 of all concerned must be consulted." There must be 
 no change which contained the germs of fresh wars. 
 
 Ebert's speech was a statement of the way in which 
 the war had affected the statistics of the Party. 
 
 The loss of members of the organization 
 fe'port?^"™' since March 19 14 had reached the figure 
 
 of 63 per cent. The Party Press had lost 
 46 per cent, of its subscribers. Things had become 
 still blacker during the last few months with the in- 
 creased drain of men into the army. But this did 
 not account for all the loss. There had been a great 
 falling off in women-members, although the employ- 
 ment of women had been so extended during the war. 
 The management of the Party had been specially 
 reproached for not doing more in the food question. 
 And yet it had never ceased to fight the profiteers. 
 The Directorate had also dohe its best to get into 
 touch with foreign Socialists, and had declared over 
 and over again that it was for a peace without con- 
 quests. The end of Ebert's speech was a denunciation 
 of those who tried to split the Party and organize 
 strikes in munition works. This of course provoked 
 retorts from the Extremists present, and the first 
 day of the Conference had a somewhat stormy close. 
 
 On September 22 the spokesmen for the Minority 
 addressed the assembly, first Haase for the "Labour 
 
 Fellowship" ^ and then Kate Duncker for 
 The second ^^^ Extremists. Then a resolution, ex- 
 
 day , - , 
 
 pressmg the views of the Majority, was 
 proposed by Dr. David. Upon this the debate was 
 opened, in which speakers on both sides took part and 
 which was resumed on the third day. 
 
 'See footnotes on pages 8, 13, 15, 20. 
 
THE SEPTEMBER CONFERENCE 133 
 
 After the conclusion of the debate, the first question 
 to be decided was whether the Conference was to put 
 David's resolution to the vote at all. The 
 ttie^Mtaon^^' Minority were against doing so. When 
 vote and the the Conference voted on this preliminary 
 ure'^e^rn^ed. qi^estion, Haasc's motion that the Confer- 
 ence was not competent to pass resolu- 
 tions, other than merely business ones, was rejected 
 by 276 votes to 169. This vote cannot be taken 
 straightaway as an index of the relative strength of 
 the Majority and Minority in German Socialism in 
 September 1916. According to the size of the con- 
 stituencies which the delegates severally represented, 
 it was calculated in a Social Democrat paper that the 
 votes on the side of the Majority represented 524,797 
 electors, and the votes given for Haase's motion 
 516,079 electors. This method of ascertaining the 
 strength of the two elements in the Party was a rough- 
 and-ready one, since it took no account pf the different 
 minorities in the several constituencies which had been 
 against the delegate eventually elected; yet since the 
 inexactitude in this respect on one side may be taken 
 to balance that on the other, it may be believed that 
 the Minority was actually stronger at this time than 
 was shown in the voting on Haase's motion. Very 
 nearly half the Social Democrats in the country 
 (leaving out of account, of course, those at the front) 
 may have taken their stand with the Minority in the 
 autumn of 19 16. 
 
 It must be pointed out that the i6g votes represented 
 the Minority in the largest extension of that word — 
 not only the adherents of Haase (the "Labour Fellow- 
 ship") and the two Extremist sections, but also the 
 section represented by the Twenty in the Reichstag 
 who adhered to the old Group and would not vote 
 
1S4. GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 against war-credits, but who also refused to vote for 
 them and advocated a latitude of opinion in the Party 
 which would allow Haase and his adherents freedom 
 of action without any severance of fellowship. At 
 the Conference this section — called sometimes "the 
 Antrick-Hoch section" after two of its leaders — ^threw 
 in its lot with the Haase section against the rest of 
 the Majority. 
 
 The Conference having been decided, in spite of 
 the opposition, to put questions of policy to the vote, 
 The Minority '^°^^ ^^ adherents of Haase, the Antrick- 
 abstainfrom Hoch group, and the two Extremist 
 voting. groups announced that they would abstain 
 
 from voting. Hence, when David's resolution was put 
 to the vote, only five delegates voted against it. The 
 bulk of the Majority delegates, 251, voted for it. 
 Another motion was then put, approving of the action 
 of the Majority in voting war-credits and condemning 
 the action of the Minority. The 96 Members of the 
 Reichstag present did not vote on this question, which 
 concerned their own conduct; this brought down the 
 number of votes given for it to 218; three votes were 
 given against it. 
 
 A number of further resolutions were passed refer- 
 ring to the Censorship, the food-control, etc., and 
 the Conference ended with an appeal for unity from 
 Ebert. 
 
 Both Majority and Minority professed to be highly 
 gratified with the result. The Majority emphasized 
 „^ . .^ the fact that they had been proved to be 
 
 Thesignifl- . , , , . . . -Cr- ., ,i 
 
 canceofthe indeed the majonty, the Mmority the 
 
 Conference. f j^(.(. ^^^ ^^y jj^^J ht&O. prOVCd tO be SO 
 
 large a minority. On the whole, the Conference 
 seems to have improved the position of the Minority / 
 rather than that of the Majority. It seems tof 
 
THE SEPTEMBER CONFERENCE 136 
 
 have been a surprise in many quarters to discover 
 that the Minority had come to form so considerable 
 a part of the Social Democrat body. It had been 
 shown that they were not a mere clique of cranks, 
 but a force to be reckoned with. Two features gen- 
 erally were noticed in the Conference. One was that, 
 in spite of some sharp disagreements, it had gone off 
 much more quietly than some people had anticipated. 
 The other was that the Imperialist group — the group 
 of Lensch and Quessel and Heine — had lain very 
 low. They seem to have shrunk from advancing their 
 especial gospel before an assembly representing Ger- 
 man Social Democracy as a whole. This was much 
 commented on in the Minority Press and was in truth 
 significant. 
 
 A week after the conclusion of the Conference a 
 big Peace Meeting, attended by 30,000 people, was 
 „^ „ held in the East Park at Frankfurt 
 
 The PcfliCO 
 
 Meeting at (Octobcr i). The meeting passed a 
 
 FranHort. rcsolution agreeing with the standpoint of 
 
 the moderate Majority— demanding, that is, a peace 
 without annexations, on the basis of the status quo. 
 The Government were adjured to strive for this, 
 without being influenced by the voices of furious 
 Nationalists and annexationists. 
 
XIV 
 
 TOWARDS A COMPLETE SPLIT 
 
 The Conference had been a climax towards which the 
 
 activities of German Social Democrats had been 
 
 ^ directed during the later summer of 
 
 The months ^ mi , . r ^ r^ • t 
 
 after the 1910. The history of German Social 
 
 Conference. Democracy during the months following 
 the Conference is mainly the record of events leading 
 to a complete separation of Majority and Minority 
 into two distinct organizations throughout the country, 
 and the various reactions produced in the Party by 
 the successive episodes on the large political stage. 
 
 The figure of Philipp Scheidemann had come during 
 the last year into a new and singular prominence. 
 The section for which Scheidemann stood 
 d^^^thL*'" was probably the largest homogeneous 
 prominent scction in tiie Party. It occupied a 
 
 ^*^^ central position — the position which was 
 
 practically identical with that described as the Left 
 Centre in the Party as it was before the war. As 
 against the Imperialist Socialists to its right, it 
 repudiated the idea of annexations (though before 
 the Russian Revolution, Scheidemann seemed not 
 averse from the annexation of some old Russian 
 territory) and stood fast for a peace on the status quo 
 basis; as against Haase and his "Labour Fellowship" 
 it maintained that till the enemies of Germany were 
 prepared to conclude a peace on this basis, it was 
 
 136 
 
jrOWARDS A COMPLETE SPLIT 137 
 
 the duty of German Socialists to vote war-credits to 
 enable the Government to carry on the war. 
 
 The amount of the public attention directed upon 
 Scheidemann had not been due only to the fact that 
 he was the spokesman for the largest section of Ger- 
 man Social Democracy, but to the mystery surround- 
 ing his relations with the Government. Scheidemann, 
 as has been narrated, asserted in June 1916 that he 
 knew from a private interview he had had with the 
 Chancellor that the Chancellor was against the annex- 
 ations clamoured for by the Pan-Germans. He gave 
 it to be understood that in denouncing annexations 
 altogether, he, Scheidemann, was the true exponent 
 of the mind of the German Government. Those of 
 other Parties who wished both to be subservient to the 
 Government and to stick to annexations vehemently 
 denied that Scheidemann had any right to claim to 
 speak for the Government; they said that the utter- 
 ances of Bethmann HoUweg, if interpreted in their 
 natural sense, implied the purpose to annex, not 
 what Scheidemarm pretended that they meant. In this 
 the Social Democrat Minority leaders agreed — not 
 because they wished to be subservient to the Govern- 
 ment, but because, from their point of view, to show 
 that the Government was at heart annexationist was 
 to lay bare its evil will. Scheidemann, said Eduard 
 Bernstein, forced an unnatural sense upon Bethmarm's 
 utterances, in order to represent the Government as 
 innocent, and he roundly taxed Scheidemann and his 
 group with dishonesty. On the other hand, the Pan- 
 German enemies of the Chancellor, who wanted to 
 discredit the Government for not being annexationist, 
 or not being annexationist enough, were always 
 suggesting that there might after all be a secret under- 
 standing between Bethmann and Scheidemarm and 
 
138 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 th^t the Government might actually be steering for 
 a "Scheidemann peace." In this way the figure of 
 Scheidemann came to occupy a central place in the 
 political controversies of the hour in Germany. 
 
 Scheidemann's speech in the Reichstag on October 
 II stamped the attitude of the moderate Majority in 
 certain phrases which passed into currency: — 
 
 The French do not know, and this time they will probably 
 not discover, because the Censorship will not let it through, that 
 they could have the freeing of their own country, and of 
 Belgium also, from German troops without having to shed 
 another drop of blood and without losing an inch of ground. 
 
 We say that what is French shall remain French; what is 
 Belgian shall remain Belgian; what is German, German. 
 
 Before this speech of Scheidemann's an event 
 
 had taken place which caused profound feeling in 
 
 '-.. ., . ._ the Party. The anomalous position of 
 
 The Majority ■' . '^ , , . 
 
 gains control Vorwurts was rudcly termmated by its 
 of VoTwarts. being first suppressed by the Government 
 for ten days and then started again as a Majority 
 not a Minority organ. The ostensible reason for 
 which the Government suppressed the paper was that 
 it had published an article "From the Witches' 
 Cauldron of the Chancellor Fronde" on October 8, 
 attacking the industrial magnates whom it believed to 
 be behind the attack on the Chancellor. This could 
 be represented as a breach of the Civil Truce; yet 
 it was odd that such an article, which attacked the 
 enemies of the Government, should have been 
 singled out for punishment. It is probable that 
 the article "From the Witches' Cauldron" was not 
 the real reason why the Government took action, but 
 only a pretext. In the same number of Vorwdrts lii« 
 leading article implied that at the beginning of the 
 war the Kaiser had been overborne by an irresponsible 
 
TOWARDS A COMPLETE SPLIT 139 
 
 clique. It is lil^ely that this was the real ofifence, whilst 
 the Government could not well give this as its reason, 
 without making the allegation seem to have some truth 
 in it. 
 
 The military Higher Command made it a condition 
 of the paper's reappearance that there should be a 
 thorough change of staff. There must be some person 
 with plenary powers in control of the paper who 
 could give the Goverimient trustworthy guarantees 
 that the Party would not allow the paper any longer 
 to prejudice the national cause. This was in itself 
 a startling extension of the censorial functions of the 
 military. What made it more sinister was that it was 
 currently reported that the stipulation made by the 
 Higher Command had actually been suggested by the* 
 manager of Vorwdrts, Richard Fischer, who, as has \ 
 been said, was a Majority man. It seemed a case of 
 the Directorate of the Social Democrat Party of Ger-^' 
 many invoking the arm of the military to crush the 
 fraction opposed to it in the Party — a mode of asso- 
 ciation between Social Democracy and the Government 
 which was enough to make the old leaders of the Party 
 turn in their graves. 
 
 When therefore Vorw'drts re-appeared on October 
 i8, 1916, it was no longer the Vorw'drts of before. 
 Hermann Miiller, who some time before had resigned 
 his invidious position as Party "Censor," was back 
 again as the representative of the Party Directorate 
 with full powers of control. The place of Vorwdrts 
 as the principal voice of the Minority in the Press 
 was henceforth taken by the Leipziger Volksseitung. 
 An attempt was made to circulate this latter paper 
 even in Berlin. Twenty thousand copies of the 
 ftumber for October 19 were distributed in Berlin 
 amongst the Vorwdrts subscribers, but the circulation 
 
140 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 of the Leipzig paper in Berlin was then forbidden by 
 the authorities. 
 
 A Reichstag by-election in the autumn, which made 
 some stir, was that in the Oschatz-Grimma-Warzen 
 Theoschati- division of Saxony. The seat had been 
 Grimma held by a Conservative, and according to 
 
 election. ^jjg informal understanding implied in the 
 
 Civil Peace any seat in the Reichstag becoming vacant 
 during the war was to be allowed to go without a 
 contest to a representative of the same Party which 
 had held it before the war. When, however, so ex- 
 treme a man as Dr. Wildgrube, a manufacturer and 
 Pan-German and supporter of the Fronde against the 
 Chancellor, was nominated as Conservative candidate 
 for this seat, the Social Democrats determined on their 
 side to put up a candidate. And against an extreme 
 man on the Conservative side they put up a well- 
 known Minority man on theirs, Lipinski. His candida- 
 ture was supported against Dr. Wildgrube even by the 
 Majority. On the eve of the election the hopes of the 
 Social Democrats were high. Dr. Wildgrube, how- 
 ever, was elected by a small majority, thanks to the 
 rural vote, which was predominantly Conservative. 
 
 The Vorwarts affair had very much damaged the 
 credit of the Majority in the Party. Further indi- 
 . . . cations came up in the Reichstag debate 
 
 Agitation - t 1 /•/-.» 
 
 against the in the latter part of October on preventive 
 
 Majority. arrests, that the Government had used 
 
 its power to hamper the Minority campaign against 
 the Majority. The reproach that the Majority had 
 become a Government Party acquired a new sting. 
 In Berlin itself there was fresh agitation. The pro- 
 posal that contributions to the Party chest should 
 be withheld again came up and was urged by the 
 Extremists. The more moderate members of the 
 
TOWARDS A COMPLETE SPLIT 141 
 
 Minority, such as Bernstein, were against it, and even 
 the Leipziger Volksseitung declared that the step 
 would be suicidal. While therefore strongly con- 
 demning the action of the Directorate, the Berlin Com- 
 rades stopped short of bringing about a complete 
 schism by refusing their contributions. 
 
 During November, the Majority completed its con- 
 trol of Vorwdrts by getting rid of those members of 
 
 the old editorial staff who had remained 
 asl^-^dia- ^^ the office. On November 13, Daumig, 
 missal of the another editor, whose function at the 
 
 beginning of the war had been to see that 
 the rules of the Censorship were observed, was also dis- 
 missed. Two other editors, who wrote to the Direc- 
 torate saying that they shared Daumig's views, were 
 dismissed. On November 17, Richard Fischer ob- 
 tained an interim injunction, forbidding the dismissed 
 editors to enter the editorial room under pain of a fine. 
 The Auxiliary Service Bill {Hilfsdienstgesets), in- 
 troduced by the Government at the end of November, 
 _,. „. ... which compelled all male subjects of the 
 
 The Civilian „ . , "^ , , ■* 
 
 Auxuiaiy Empire between the ages of seventeen and 
 
 Service Bill, sixty, not engaged in military service, to 
 do work of some kind required by the State, was a 
 new ground of division between the two wings of the 
 Social Democrat Party. The Bill was supported, 
 though with qualifications, by the Majority, whilst 
 it was bitterly denounced by the Minority as a new 
 violation of the liberties of the people. WTien the Bill 
 was put to the vote in the Reichstag (December 2), 41 
 Social Democrat members either absented themselves 
 or sent in a formal note of their abstention. These 
 included the "Labour Fellowship" and the Antrick- 
 Hoch section. The Auxiliary Service Bill created a 
 new department under the military authorities. It 
 
143 GERMAN SOCIAE DEMOCRACY 
 
 was a feature of this moment that amongst the Social 
 Democrat Majority there was a disposition to contrast 
 the military authorities favourably with the civil. 
 The civil authorities, it was allowed, were dominated 
 by capitalist and Junker interests, they were bureau- 
 cratic and reactionary; but the military authorities, 
 simply concerned to organize and direct the national 
 strength in a war of pure self-defence, were worthy of 
 the confidence of Labour. Hence the German Trade 
 Unions, led by Legien, gave warm support to the new 
 War Department. 
 
 On December 2 a meeting of Minority Social Demo- 
 crats of Berlin, where the Minority had a local 
 Bremen and majority, decided by 210 votes to 20 to 
 Brunswick stop payments to the Party chest. This 
 
 secede. meant that the Bremen Majority Com- 
 
 rades now formed a wholly distinct organization. It 
 was the quite definite secession of a responsible Social- 
 ist body from the Party. A few days later the Bruns- 
 wick Social Democrats followed suit. 
 
 About the same time the Minority ceased to have 
 a majority in the Prussian Landtag. Of their six 
 ^u ■ X.. members, Liebknecht, Strobel, Hofer, 
 
 The SIX in the ' 
 
 Prussian Adolf Hoffmann, Paul Hoffmann, and 
 
 Landtag. p^yj jjirsch, Licbknecht was in prison 
 
 and Hirsch had gone back by a second transition to 
 the Majority. 
 
 Further incidents at the beginning of December 
 tended to confirm the suspicions of a secret alliance 
 between the Majority and the Govern- 
 In oofJion"'' ment. When the Chancellor made the 
 with the "peace offer" of the German Government 
 
 Government j^ j^j^ spcech in the Rcichstag on Decem- 
 ber 12, it was noted with alarm in the Jingo Press that 
 the Social Democrat Chemnitzer Volksstimme had a 
 
TOWARDS A COMPLETE SPLIT 143 
 
 forecast of it almost too accurate to be due to happy 
 guesswork. Early in December Scheidemarai and 
 Ebert paid a visit to The Hague to meet the committee 
 of the International Socialist Bureau. In their con- 
 versations with this body they admitted that the 
 Belgian deportations were regarded with disapproval 
 by the German Social Democrats. On the other "hand, 
 they persuaded the Committee to combine with its 
 protest against the Belgian deportations protests 
 against things done by the Entente Powers — depor- 
 tations of East Prussians by the Russians, treatment 
 of German prisoners, etc. The Nieuwe Rotterdamsche 
 Courani and the Times sugggested that the two Social- 
 ist leaders had gone to The Hague on an understand- 
 ing with the German Government. Scheidemann 
 vehemently denied this in a speech at Cologne on 
 December 1 7. Yet the German Government had cer- 
 tainly given them passports; and the Jingo Press was 
 uneasy. Meanwhile, the co-operation of the military 
 authorities and the Trade Unions in the matter of 
 the Auxiliary Service Law was growing closer and 
 more cordial. 
 
 On December 12 the German Government made 
 
 its first famous "peace offer" by the mouth of the 
 
 Chancellor. It was applauded in the 
 
 The German Socialist Majority Press. In the Minority 
 
 " peace offer " ... . , 
 
 and the Social Prcss Satisfaction was expressed at the 
 Democrats. f^ct that the Central Powers had made 
 
 December 1916. 
 
 the first step towards peace, but the 
 form of the offer was regarded as unfortunate, as 
 not calculated to bring about peace. The Minority 
 especially criticized the omission in the Note to give 
 any specification of the German terms. There seems 
 evidence that in Majority circles there was genuine 
 surprise and disappointment when the Entente Powers 
 
144 GERMAN SOCIAE DEMOCRACY 
 
 refused to enter into negotiations upon the basis of 
 the German Note. They had been induced by the 
 official picture of the situation to believe that the 
 position and prospects of the Entente Powers were 
 very bad and imagined that they would welcome with 
 eagerness an offer from the winning side. Their 
 refusal seemed mere blind and malignant perversity. 
 
 The fear inspired in Conservative circles at the 
 notion of co-operation between Bethmann and 
 
 Scheidemann had not reference to peace- 
 tivesfthe*"'" ^^^^^ only, was not only because the 
 Socialists, and Conservatives clung to the grandiose Pan- 
 iefo^ German scheme for the expansion of 
 
 German power in the world which would 
 be shattered by a "Scheidemann peace," but it had 
 also reference to home politics. If the Government 
 came to lean upon the Socialists, it would have to 
 make concessions to the Socialists in the matter of 
 Constitutional reform. During the early months of 
 19 1 7 there was more talk than ever in the air about 
 the Neuorientierung, the new vpillingness of the Ger- 
 man Government to make changes in the direction of 
 democracy. Ideas of reform centered about two main 
 questions. One was the reform of the system by 
 which members are elected to the Prussian Land- 
 tag, a system which produces a House representative 
 of Junker and capitalist interests rather than of the 
 people; the other was the making effective the 
 Reichstag's control of affairs. The Reichstag is 
 elected by universal manhood suffrage; but as long 
 as the Chancellor is responsible to the Emperor, not 
 to the House, as long as the House can do nothing 
 to remove the Government from office, so long it does 
 not represent any real democratic control, on what^ 
 ever principle of election it may be composed. The 
 
TOWARDS A COMPLETE SPLIT 145 
 
 Majority Social Democrats who gave the Government 
 their support continued to intimate that they expected 
 from the Government real changes in the new direc- 
 tion. From time to time they gave evidence of im- 
 patience that the Government continued only to deal 
 out fair words, where they wanted to see deeds. 
 
 On January 7, 19 17, the Minority held a Conference 
 of its own in Berlin. Seventy-two local branches were 
 A Minority represented: there were 138 delegates 
 
 Conference, bcside 1 9 Members of the Reichstag. 
 January, 1917. g^jij jj^g g^eat bulk of the Minority who 
 
 followed Haase and the two Extremist sections took 
 part. The Extremists, however, took care to empha- 
 size that they would not be bound by any resolutions 
 the Conference might pass, and that they were united 
 with the Haase section "only for one day." 
 
 A resolution was proposed by Lipinski which enu- 
 merated the oppresive acts of the official leaders of 
 the Party, especially their seizure of the Party Press 
 in Berlin, Bremen, Duisberg, and Stuttgart, conduct 
 which "contravenes the statutes of the Party and 
 endangers the Party itself." 
 
 Those local and district organizations in which the larger 
 dumber of members hold the views of the Opposition must 
 always come into close touch with each other. Where the 
 Comrades on the side of the Opposition are in the minority, 
 they must work indefatigably within the frame of the Party 
 statutes for the dissemination of their views and draw together 
 in the way which may best enable them to fulfil the tasks 
 incumbent upon the opposition in the interests of the Party and 
 to keep themselves informed. 
 
 With regard, however, to the proposal to withhold 
 contributions from the Party chest, the resolution 
 expressed an adverse judgment. To do this would 
 not yeally alter the financial resources of the Party 
 
146 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Directorate and would mean that the Minority would 
 lose all its influence. The Parteitag that comes 
 together after thorough preparation, when constitu- 
 tional guarantees have been restored, must find the 
 Opposition at its post, if the question is to be decided 
 whether the Party shall forsake the old paths." 
 
 This resolution was passed by the 1 1 1 votes of the 
 Haase group; against it the "Spartacus" section 
 could muster 34 votes and the "International 
 Socialist" section no more than seven, 
 
XV 
 
 "THE INDEPENDENT SOCIAL 
 DEMOCRAT PARTY OF GERMANY" 
 
 The answer of the Majority leaders to the challenge of 
 the Minority was not long delayed. On January i8, 
 »...„. -x- 19 1 7. the Party Committee met to con- 
 
 The Majonty 7. , , , . 
 
 completes the sider the matter. A resolution was car- 
 cieavage. ^j^^ j^y ^g votcs to lO that the action of 
 
 the Minority in holding the Conference constituted 
 ipso facto a schism from the Party. On January 
 20 the Party Directorate issued a circular laying down 
 that all those who declared themselves in agreement 
 with the resolutions passed by the Opposition could 
 "no longer be or continue members of the Party." 
 This was followed up by a later order prescribing 
 that in those local organizations where the larger 
 number of members held the views of the Majority, 
 all members who did not expressly dissociate them- 
 selves from the resolutions of the Minority Confer- 
 ence were to be ejected from the Party; and where 
 the larger number of members held by the Minority 
 the adherents of the Party Directorate were to sepa- 
 rate themselves and form distinct organizations, which 
 the Directorate would recognize as the sole legitimate 
 branches of the Party. 
 
 It was this action on the part of the Majority lead- 
 ers which made the split in German Social Democracy 
 
 147 
 
148 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 inevitable. According to the letter of the Party 
 Statutes only a Parteitag had the authority to expel 
 a member. The Minority thus represented the action 
 of the Directorate as another illegality. The Majority 
 might say that their expulsion of members was only 
 a provisional one, a suspension of their rights, till the 
 future Parteitag rescinded or ratified the sentence. 
 The Minority replied that the appeal to the future 
 Parteitag was now illusory. In the state of things 
 created by the Directorate's order of expulsion, it 
 would be easy for the Directorate to secure an over- 
 whelming majority at the Parteitag; they could simply 
 refuse to admit the delegates chosen by organizations 
 they did not recognize. A Parteitag would thus no 
 longer avail to re-unite the severed limbs of the 
 Socialist body. 
 
 In the middle of January the Social Democrat 
 Group in the Prussian House of Representatives 
 broke into two. After a scene in the 
 Landtag Group House between Hirsch and Adolf Hoff- 
 breaksinto mann, the four Minority members sepa- 
 rated from the five Majority, and formed 
 themselves into a new group, entitled "Social Demo- 
 crat Group, Old Line {alte Richtung)." 
 
 A Reichstag by-election was to take place in March 
 in the constituency of Potsdam-Spandau-Osthavelland, 
 
 Mehring *° ^^' ^^^ ^^^^ '^^* vacant by Liebknecht's 
 
 defeated as a imprisonment. In January the Haase 
 
 the^RticLtag. Minority agreed with the Extremists to 
 
 and successful put up Franz Mehring as a candidate, 
 
 as^a^andidate -pjjg nomination of so extreme a man was 
 
 Prussian taken by the non-Socialist Parties to 
 
 Landtag. dispense them from the obligations of 
 
 the Civil Peace. They intimated, however, that 
 if the Social Democrat Majority would put up a 
 
INDEPENDENT SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 149 
 
 candidate from their ranks to oppose Mehring, they 
 would support him and not put up a non-Socialist 
 candidate for the seat. This the leaders of the 
 Majority determined to do. The candidate chosen 
 was Emil Stahl, of the Transport Workers' Union, 
 a plain working-man who had served at the front in 
 191 5. It became, therefore, a combat between two 
 Socialists. The election took place on March 14, 
 and the Majority candidate was victorious. The result 
 was indeed a surprise, since even the Majority had 
 expected the contest to be a close one. And yet 
 Mehring got only 5,010 votes to Stahl's 16,881! 
 What made the result more strange was that a few 
 days earlier Mehring won a signal victory in the 
 elections which took place to supply Liebknecht's 
 vacant place in the Prussian Landtag. 
 
 The preliminary elections for this latter constitu- 
 ency, the nth Berlin Landtag constituency, had taken 
 place on February 21. It was a case of filling up 268 
 vacancies in the Electoral College which had occurred 
 since Liebknecht had been elected to the seat in 19 13. 
 Here too the contest had been between Mehring and 
 a Majority Socialist, Louis Brunner, President of the 
 German Railway Workers' Union. All the non- 
 Socialist Parties — Conservatives, National-Liberals, 
 Centre, and Progressives — combined to support Brun- 
 ner. Yet of the 268 new members of the Electoral 
 College returned, 218 were pledged to support 
 Mehring; 28 were Progressives, and only 6 Majority 
 Socialists. In the final voting (March 20), Mehring 
 got 336 votes against the 42 given for Brunner and 
 the 44 given for the Progressive candidate. 
 
 On February 9 the Leipziger Volksseitung printed 
 a Manifesto of the "Labour Fellowship" signed by 
 Haase. Ledebour, and Vogtherr. It began with the 
 
160 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 usual enumeration of the crimes of the Majority 
 and invited all local branches which had declared 
 The "Labour ^°'* *^^ Minority and, where the local 
 FeUowBhip" organization was Majority, the Comrades 
 Z^Zr who had been deprived of their rights to 
 
 Minority take part in another Minority Conference. 
 
 Conference. j^ ^^g significant that the wording of the 
 Manifesto was such as not to apply to branches in 
 which the Majority was in the ascendency, but 
 Minority members had been allowed to retain their 
 rights, or to branches which were still neutral. It 
 seemed to show a desire on the part of the "Labour 
 Fellowship" to conserve what vestiges of Party unity 
 still remained. 
 
 On March 9 Vorw'drts printed a letter from Scheide- 
 mann defining his attitude on the question of "indem- 
 scheidemann nitics," which was bccoming a topic of 
 explains his coutroversy. In this letter Scheidemann 
 posiuon. denied that he had ever uttered the phrase 
 
 which was continually thrown up against him, as 
 proving that he was against Germany's receiving 
 compensation for its losses: "Every land must bear 
 its own burden." Yet it would be equally untrue to 
 say that he stood for a war indemnity. His position 
 was this: Supposing there were a conference between 
 the belligerents, and the representatives of Germany 
 secured a war-indemnity, he certainly would not say 
 that Germany must continue the war till a situation 
 was brought about in which it would lose its chance 
 of getting an indemnity. On the other hand, he was 
 opposed to any demands being maintained which would 
 make reconciliation difficult and prolong the war. 
 What he stood for was Germany's territorial inviola- 
 bility (i.e. a territorial status quo), its political inde- 
 pendence and freedom of economic development. 
 
INDEPENDENT SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 151 
 
 In March the quarrel between Majority and Minor- 
 ity as to Vorwdrts came into the Civil Courts. Some 
 
 members of the dismissed editorial staff 
 L'Tetac'^^^ brought an action for illegal dismissal 
 
 against the Vorwdrts Publishing Com- 
 pany, Richard Fischer and the Party Directorate. 
 The Court gave a verdict for the defendants, with 
 costs. 
 
 In March 191 7 the event occurred which affected 
 the position of Socialism all over the world, altered 
 
 the whole military balance, and thereby 
 crateal^dtti'e reacted upon the interior situation in 
 Government's Germany as in all other belligerent 
 refo™!'"* countries— the Russian revolution. In 
 
 Germany its first effect was to excite and 
 stimulate in the Social Democrat Party the old desires 
 for democratic reform; it also brought home to the 
 German Government the need for concessions. The 
 approach of the convulsion in Russia was early felt by 
 the German Government. On March 14 the Chan- 
 cellor made a speech in the Prussian Landtag, in which 
 he seemed to promise, on behalf of the Government, 
 internal democratic reform more definitely than he had 
 ever done before. A few days after this speech the 
 Russian explosion came. It was followed in Germany 
 by the Kaiser's Easter Message, promising at some 
 date in the future, not specified, direct and secret suf- 
 frage in Prussia. Those in Germany who were de- 
 manding internal reform gained a new feeling of 
 strength. Scheidemann took a more masterful tone. 
 On March 19 he was calling for immediate action on 
 the part of tiie Government. Russia had been prom- 
 ised reform after the war, but she grew tired of wait- 
 ing, with the result that we see — a veiled threat ! 
 At the same time the Majority showed a new 
 
162 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 readiness to amalgamate in a single bloc with the non- 
 Socialist Parties — even the National-Liberal — ^which 
 were in favor of internal reform, so as to bring upon 
 the Chancellor a more effective pressure than could 
 be exercised from the reactionary side. 
 
 The Minority Press treated the Government's 
 promises with ridicule. The Government's intentions 
 were not honest. It wanted to delay reform and 
 believed that the people could be put off indefinitely 
 with fair words. 
 
 The new Minority Conference, which the Manifesto 
 published in the Leipziger Volkszeitung of February 
 9 had adumbrated, took place at Gotha 
 co^ffrtnc'e of ^""ng the three days April 6-8. It was 
 April 1917: the attended by 143 delegates from various 
 S'efo^e 'alepa. P^^s of the Empire. In addition fifteen 
 rate organiza- members of the Reichstag were present, 
 Independent Karl. Kautsky, and Daumig, ex-editor of 
 Social Demo- Vorw'drts. The proceedings were presided 
 Germ^^"°' ^ver by Wilhelm Bock, the veteran 
 Socialist, who had presided at a Confer- 
 ence in Gotha forty-two years before when a united 
 German Social Democrat Party was formed by a union 
 of the following of Wilhelm Liebknecht with the fol- 
 lowing of Lasselle. The "Spartacus" section took 
 part,, as well as the "Labour Fellowship," in the present 
 Conference, and an accommodation between die two 
 sections making common action possible was arranged. 
 The other Extremist section, the "International Social- 
 ists," stood aloof. The Gotha Conference agreed to 
 the draft submitted to it of a new separate organiza- 
 tion of the Minority, which was now to be a wholly 
 distinct body from the Majority, and to bear the dis- 
 tinguishing name of "The Independent Social Demo- 
 crat Party of Germany." 
 
INDEPENDENT SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 153 
 
 The "International Socialist" section at this time 
 
 came somewhat under a cloud. Julian Borchardt, 
 
 the editor of their organ, Lichtstrahlen, 
 
 The "Inter- ^^g discovered to havc contributed a 
 
 national 
 
 Socialists" Preface to a Jingo book by a certain 
 suflerin Kaxl Erdmann, a book which violently 
 
 reputation* "^ 
 
 attacked England and defended ruthless 
 submarine warfare. It was further discovered that the 
 reason why Borchardt had contributed this Preface to 
 a book in flagrant contradiction with his professed 
 principles, was that he had been handsomely paid to do 
 so by the publisher. On April i the Socialist organi- 
 zation of Teltow-Beeskow, in which Borchardt held 
 an official position, considered the matter. Borchardt 
 admitted the truth of the charge against him ; the only 
 defence he could find was that his contributing a Pref- 
 ace to a book was no sign of his agreeing with its 
 contents. This was obviously lame, and a vote of 
 censure was passed upon Borchardt; he was also de- 
 prived of the offices which he held in the local Socialist 
 Minority organization. About the same time another 
 prominent member of an Extremist section, Rosa 
 Luxemburg, was condemned to ten days' imprison- 
 ment, because, when under preventive arrest, she had 
 had an altercation with the warden and thrown a 
 blotting-pad at him. Frau Luxemburg seems to have 
 denied throwing the blotting-pad, but pleaded guilty 
 to having thrown a piece of chocolate. The Extrem- 
 ists did not gain in dignity either by the Borchardt or 
 by the Luxemburg incident. 
 
 The spokesman of the "Spartacus" section at 
 
 the Gotha Conference had spoken dis- 
 A*^ W17 paragingly of parliamentary activity, and 
 
 urged that Socialists ought to seek to stir 
 up the masses, "turn to account the excitement which 
 
164 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 had been reigning since the Russian Revolution 
 among the working-class." A few days later it seemed 
 as if such plans had been carried into execution. April 
 was marked by the outbreak of strikes in the munition 
 factories of Berlin and Leipzig, and apparently some 
 other localities. Berlin and Leipzig were the two 
 big cities in which the minority was strongest. The 
 Majority and the Trade Unions did what they could 
 to check the strike movement before it came to a 
 head, and condemned the strikes when they had 
 broken out. At the same time they urged the Govern- 
 ment to take away the motives for striking by more 
 effective measures in the food question, and by the 
 immediate concession of internal reforms. It was 
 acknowledged that the unrest expressed in the strikes 
 was not only economic but political. 
 
 On April i8 the Party Committee met to consider 
 what was to be done in view of the formation of a 
 
 separate opposition Socialist organization. 
 Committee Ebcrt indicated the importance of wrest- 
 
 considersthe ing the women's paper. Die Gleichheit, 
 rfaLextttons ^nd Kautsky's paper, Die Neue Zeit. 
 in the East from the Opposition. Certain members 
 
 of the Committee, especially the delegate 
 from Bavaria, still pleaded for conciliation and unity. 
 The Committee ultimately passed a resolution, contain- 
 ing the following points: The war was not to be ended 
 in a way which would compromise Germany's inde- 
 pendence; internal democratic reform, but no inter- 
 ference from foreigners; greetings to the New Russia, 
 and acceptance of the basis of "no annexations and 
 no indemnities" and "free national development for 
 all peoples" ; opposition to German Jingo plans of con- 
 quest; no nation to be humiliated; a compulsory 
 International Court of Arbitration. 
 
INDEPENDENT SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 155> 
 
 One of the noteworthy features of this resolution was 
 that it implied the abandonment by Scheidemann and 
 those who followed him of the idea that annexations in 
 the East might be sanctioned. The Party was now 
 strictly committed to the status quo on both frontiers. 
 
 The definite division of the old Socialist Party into 
 two Parties after the Conference of Gotha forced upon 
 _ , , all the local branches the necessity of a 
 
 The local , . . ^ , -^ _ 
 
 btanches clear dccision for one or the other. Even 
 
 take sides. j^^ Bavaria, where there had been a for- 
 
 lorn effort to keep on a united basis, local branches now 
 began seceding to the new Independent Party. At 
 Solingen, Scheidemann's own constituency, the local 
 branch decided for the Independent Party, and passed 
 a resolution by 51 votes to 13 denying Scheidemann's 
 right to represent the constituency. All over Ger- 
 many conflicts in the local branches went on. In Ham- 
 burg, which had been a Majority stronghold, Haase 
 now addressed a meeting of 800 persons, and a local 
 branch of the Independents was established, which 
 soon counted more than 1,000 members. 
 
 The Independent Party seems to have designed 
 fresh popular demonstrations for May-day. According 
 
 to a document published in the Berner 
 May-day Tagwocht, an appeal was circulated in 
 
 factories and workshops calling on them 
 to stop work on that day. The Directorate of the old 
 Party and the General Committee of the Trade 
 Unions, on the other hand, issued a joint Manifesto, 
 exhorting the workers not to stop work. The Govern- 
 ment also seems to have taken precautionary measures. 
 In any case. May-day 1917 passed off quietly in Ger- 
 many. Only a few workers here and there came out. 
 There were some local meetings — for instance, a large 
 one at Leipzig, addressed by Geyer. 
 
156 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 It would seem that during May the Independent 
 Party was gaining upon the old Party in Germany. 
 
 In the 1 5th Constituency in the Chemnitz 
 entt g°atar°*" district, whose local organ, the Chemnitz 
 the old Party Volksstimme, was one of the staunchest 
 paper's™"'"' Majority papers, the local branch decided 
 
 by an overwhelming majority to join the 
 Independents. At Chemnitz itself a local branch of 
 the Independent Party was established. 
 
 The gains of the Independents were all the more 
 significant in that the old Party had almost the 
 entire Party Press in its hands. The case of the 
 Vorwdrts was not the only one in which the official 
 authorities of the old Party had wrested an organ from 
 the Opposition by force majeure. This had also been 
 done in the case of the Bremer Burger-Zeitung. (One 
 of its editors, Holzmeier, committed suicide in the 
 latter days of March after his dismissal, but the 
 Majority Press maintained that the argument post 
 hoc, ergo propter hoc was in this case invahd.) At 
 Brunswick the Majority possessed itself forcibly of 
 the Volksfreund (March 30), where the old editorial 
 staff was not expelled till after a free fight in the office 
 of the paper. In May the Party Directorate obtained 
 possession of Die Gleichheit, the central organ of the 
 International Socialist Women's movement. Clara 
 Zetkin, under whose editorship Die Gleichheit had 
 taken a strong line for the Minority, was expelled 
 from her office. 
 
 We seem to observe that the extreme Right sec- 
 
 tion of Imperialist Socialists had gained a 
 parties after relatively more important place in the old 
 thesput. Party, now that all the Left wing had 
 
 been eliminated, than it had had in days of unity. 
 When Lensch, in the summer of 19 16, had spoken at a 
 
INDEPENDENT SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 157 
 
 meeting in favour of a forward colonial policy, the 
 , Party Directorate had felt bound to announce publicly 
 that it accepted no responsibility for Lensch's utter- 
 '^nces. But in June 1917 Noske, a Social Democrat of 
 the Imperialist section, said in the Reichstag that it 
 "goes without saying" that Germany must have a 
 Colonial Empire, and the authorities of the Party 
 made no sign of dissent. The Independent Party 
 also could take a more uncompromising line than the 
 Haase section could do, when there was still some 
 concern for Party unity. Even now that concern 
 had not altogether disappeared from German Social 
 Democracy. In the old Party there were many, 
 represented by the Antrick-Hoch section, who, while 
 still adhering to the old Party for the sake of disci- 
 pline, sympathized to a large extent with the Inde- 
 pendents and were opposed to the voting of war- 
 credits. Scheidemann himself held a position interme- 
 diate between that of the Antrick-Hoch section and 
 the Imperialist section. His speech^ in the Reichstag 
 on May 15, when the question of war-aims was before 
 the House, created an excitement by his uttering upon 
 the electric air the word "revolution." Scheidemann 
 threatened revolution, only on the hypothesis of France 
 and Britain declaring their willingness to return to the 
 map of July 1914, and Germany refusing to do so — 
 a hypothesis remote enough from probabilities. Even | 
 so, the word caused a storm in the house, and there 
 seemed to ring in it a warning that even the Majority 
 might falter in its allegiance to the Govemment, 
 might be carried oflf its feet by those tides of 
 popular feeling set in motion by the Russian revo- 
 lution. 
 
 The movement in the country, which carried the 
 working-class ever more and more into the Inde- 
 
158 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 pendent camp continued. At the end of May 1917 the 
 old Party lost Erfurt, whose member in the Reichstag, 
 Heinrich Schulz, was the man chosen to edit Die 
 Gleichheit, after the expulsion of Clara Zetkin. A 
 meeting of the Erfurt Comrades, including thirty- four 
 delegates, representing ten local sections in the constit- 
 uency, met together to hear Schultz put the case for 
 the old Party, and a local editor the case for the Inde- 
 pendents, and then decided, with only four dissentient 
 voices, to join the Independent Socialist Party. 
 
 The old Party fought hard. They tried to arrest 
 the movement by holding meetings all over the 
 country and starting new branches. But during 
 June the Independents continued to make headway. 
 One local branch after another went over to them, or 
 else-ttew local oi-ganizations were formed under their 
 auspices side by side with the branch adhering to 
 the old Party. The local branch at Eisenbach in Thu- 
 ringia decided to join them, against the advice of its 
 leader. At the delegates' meeting which discussed the 
 question, sixteen votes were given against nine. Other 
 places mentioned, at which the local branches passed 
 over before the end of June, are Schmalkalden, Halle- 
 Saalkreis, Torgau, Delitzsch-Bitterfeld, Wetzlar-Alt- 
 kirchen, Heidingsfeld (the second largest local branch 
 in the Wurzburg constituency), Borna, Wittenberg- 
 Schweinitz and Randow-Greifenhagen (Pomerania). 
 At Magdeburg the Independent local branch, started 
 as a rival to the old Party branch with a membership 
 of 150, had swelled by the end of June to a member- 
 ship of 500. 
 
 A notable sign of the Independents' progress was 
 given in the last days of June at the General Congress 
 of the German Metal-workers' Union in Cologne. This 
 Union is the largest Trade Union in Germany and in 
 
INDEPENDENT SOCIAE DEMOCRATS 159 
 
 the world. It has over a quarter of a million paying 
 members, and the Congress was attended by ii8 
 delegates, as well as by various Trade Union officials 
 and Legien, the President of the Federation of Trade 
 Unions. A great contest between the adherents of 
 the old Party and the Independents took place at the 
 Congress. In the end the resolution condemning 
 the independent agitation amongst the Trade Unions 
 was carried, but it was carried by so narrow a majority 
 that it revealed ominously how far, even in such a 
 Trade Union as that of the Metal-workers, the agita- 
 tion had taken effect: 64 votes were given for the reso- 
 lution, but 53 were given against it. 
 
 Since the spring of liij, whilst the influence of the 
 old Socialist Party upon the working-class was grad- 
 ually contracting, its influence upon the 
 hotk between Government was extending. It was being 
 old sociaust more drawn than ever into the mechanism 
 
 Go'S^ent. °* *^^ ^^^^- ^^ *^^ reactionary and 
 Conservative elements were still predomi- 
 nant in high quarters, if the Government still had the 
 whip hand both of Press and of Reichstag, and real 
 power was not always where there was most talk, 
 nevertheless it was plain that the Government felt itself 
 increasingly obliged to make concessions to Social 
 Democracy. Of course, the Government was clever 
 enough to make, as far as possible, such concessions 
 as were greater in appearance than in reality. Of 
 course, further. Social Democracy had on its side to 
 pay to some extent for its advance as a factor in the 
 State by assimilation to the bourgeois parties. The 
 Government's admission of the Majority Socialists to 
 a greater share in the business of the State was of the 
 nature of a compromise. Each side had to sacrifice 
 something to meet the views of the other. 
 
160 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 We may see one indication of this extending influ- 
 ence of the Social Democrats in the State in the fact 
 j^g that when the Government appointed in 
 
 consfitution May a special Committee of Members of 
 Committee. ^^le Rcichstag, chosen in numerical pro- 
 portion from all the several Groups in the House, to 
 examine the question of constitutional reform and 
 draw up a body of recommendations — a Committee 
 which has not yet^ terminated its labours — Scheide- 
 mann was made its chairman. Besides Scheidemann, 
 the old Social Democrat Party has as its representa- 
 tives in the Constitution Committee David, Gradnauer, 
 Heine, J. Hoffmann, and Landsberg ; the Independents 
 are represented by Haase and Ledebour. The Govern- 
 ment, of course, are in no wise bound to accept any 
 of the resolutions of the Constitution Committee. A 
 victory of the democratic element over the Conserva- 
 tive element in the Committee might therefore remain 
 a merely academic one, without any real effect upon 
 the State, if the Government desired to disregard it 
 and was not afraid of democratic opinion in the coun- 
 try. It was significant that Lewald, who before the 
 fall of Bethmann HoUweg attended the meetings of 
 the Committee as representative of the Goverrmient — 
 he was then a high official in the Home Office — ^took 
 up a singularly unsympathetic attitude to proposals of 
 reform in the democratic direction. 
 
 'May 31, 1918. 
 
XVI 
 
 STOCKHOLM 
 
 The main issue round which the history of German 
 Social Democracy in the summer of 191 7 centres is 
 The idea of ^^^ Stockholm Conference. The idea of a 
 the Stockholm Conference of the Socialists of all coun- 
 ttfeer^'"* tries at Stockholm was an outcome of the 
 Socialist Revolution in Russia. In Germany both 
 
 Parties. ^^^ ^j^j Social Democratic Party and the 
 
 Independent Socialists regarded the idea with favour 
 — ^though for somewhat different reasons. 
 
 The Majority Social Democrats, no doubt,, hoped 
 that a Conference of Socialists at Stockholm would 
 tend to increase in enemy countries the number of 
 those who were ready to conclude a peace with the 
 Central Powers on terms which would allow Germany 
 to come out of the war without loss. The Germans 
 had been accustomed to a leading role in International 
 Socialist Congresses before the war, and the Majority 
 leaders may well have felt that, had they once repre- 
 sentatives of the enemy countries brought within the 
 scope of their direct personal influence and within the 
 sound of their living voice, such Comrades would 
 return home with their obstinacy softened and would 
 act as a softening agency upon the working-classes of 
 their respective countries. 
 
 The Independent Socialists of Germany, one 
 gathers, regarded the proposed Conference in quite 
 
 i6i 
 
162 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 another way. They did not share the confidence of the 
 Majority in the good case of the German State, nor 
 did they suppose that if the German Socialists were 
 confronted with the Socialists of the enemy lands, 
 the result would be to give the foreign Comrades a 
 less unfavourable view of the German Government 
 than they had at present. The Independents rather 
 saw in the Conference an opportunity for speaking 
 out before the Socialists of the world more freely than 
 they could do at home. They saw themselves in a 
 position to secure the condemnation by the whole 
 body of International Socialism of the new principles 
 professed by their Social Democrat antagonists. They 
 would stand before their fellow-countrymen, no longer 
 a harassed and hampered Minority, but powerful 
 accusers with the great assembly on their side. They 
 realized that it was not a case of inducing other coun- 
 tries to accept the German peace terms, as outlined by 
 the Majority, but of inducing the German people to 
 recognize the justice of some at any rate of the condi- 
 tions of peace laid down by their enemies. If the 
 views of the Majority were shovra to have the whole 
 body of non-German Socialist opinion against them, 
 the Independents hoped that such recognition would 
 be helped on in Germany, as the result of a Stockholm 
 Conference, and a peace be secured such as true 
 Social Democracy would approve. 
 
 The German Extremists would have nothing to do 
 with Stockholm at all. Franz Mehring addressed 
 the following letter to the Petrograd Soviet: — 
 
 "The projected International Conference of Socialists at 
 Stockholm is intended to promote peace. As German Social- 
 ists, we protest energetically against the admission to the 
 Stockholm Conference of the German Majority Socialists, 
 who have supported the German Government throughout this 
 
STOCKHOLM 163 
 
 war. We refuse to take part in a Conference at which the 
 Majority Socialists of Germany are present, and we call upon 
 our Russian Comrades to prevent the presence at the Stock- 
 holm Conference of any representatives of the German Ma- 
 jority Socialists. If these so-called Socialists were allowed to 
 attend the Stockholm Conference, no purpose would be served 
 except to promote the interests of the German Government. If 
 the Socialists of different countries desire to promote peace, 
 it is impossible for them to do this in co-operation with 
 the Imperial German Government. Such Socialists as have 
 supported the German Government in its war policy must be 
 excluded from the Stockholm Conference. The admission of 
 Scheidemann and Siidekum and all the other so-called Socialists 
 who have been the faithful slaves of the German Government 
 would be a severe blow to International Socialism and to the 
 genuine Socialists of Germany." 
 
 In the end, as we know, the autumn of 19 17 was 
 
 not destined to see any World Conference of Socialists 
 
 at Stockholm. Representatives of the 
 
 preUminary Socialist bodies in Germany and the 
 
 discussion in countries allied with Germany, in Russia 
 
 Stockholm. . . ^ . ,. j-j'jj 
 
 and various neutral countries, did indeed 
 visit Stockholm in the course of the summer to discuss 
 preliminaries with Branting and the Dutch-Scandina- 
 vian Committee, but the matter never got beyond pre- 
 liminaries. In August a complexity of events, which 
 need not here be discussed, resulted in the Socialist 
 World Conference being postponed to an indefinite 
 future. Yet the preliminary discussions between Ger- 
 man Social Democrats and neutral Socialists were not 
 without their effect in clearing the air. For one thing, 
 the German Social Democrats of the Majority seem 
 to have received a shock at coming into contact with 
 the opinion of the outside world. However much they 
 may have learnt of that opinion from newspapers — 
 and they were probably pretty well acquainted with 
 
164. GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 it on paper — to touch it in living individuals was 
 another thing. They had never realized before 
 what it was to stand under the reprobation of 
 the world! Another result of the preliminary dis- 
 cussions was tha,t it led to the representatives 
 both of the Majority Social Democrats and of the 
 Independent Socialists giving a fresh formulation of 
 the terms which they were prepared to stand by as 
 reasonable terms of peace. The Minority, through 
 their representatives at Stockholm and through their 
 Manifesto, were indeed enabled to speak out to some 
 extent before the world, as they had hoped, though 
 not to the same extent as they could have done in a 
 general debate ; and the world on its side was enabled 
 to know more definitely where both Majority and 
 Minority stood.' 
 
 The German Majority delegates sent to Stockholm 
 were Ebert, the President of the Party ; Scheidemann, 
 n.u « J -^ Hermann Miiller, David, Molkenbuhr, 
 
 The Majority ... 
 
 Delegates at Richard Fischer, Legien, Bauer, and Sas- 
 stockhoim. sebach. They left Berlin at the end of 
 
 May and reached Stockholm, by way of Copenhagen, 
 on June 3. On the following day they had their first 
 official conversation with the Dutch-Scandinavian 
 Committee. Scheidemann defended the action of 
 the Party on August 4, 19 14, and claimed that, so far 
 from its having accomplished nothing, the Russian 
 
 'It had been intended to hold at Stockholm, simultaneously 
 with the preliminary discussions concerning the (political) 
 World Socialist Conference, a (non-political) World Trade 
 Union Conference. Many individuals, like Legien, might be 
 delegates to both C^onferences. A certain number of Trade 
 Union representatives, however, who met in Stockholm in 
 June (none from the Entente countries) decided to postpone 
 the Trade Union Conference to September and change its 
 place of meeting to Switzerland. 
 
STOCKHOLM 165 
 
 Revolution should be put down to its credit ! ^ David 
 also spoke, repeating the stock German arguments 
 about England's commercial jealousy of Germany, 
 about the Entente being a vast "World Partition 
 Syndicate," etc., and he attempted to present the con- 
 catenation of events in the fateful twelve days of 1914 
 in such a way as to make the Entente Powers appear 
 the guilty parties and Germany innocent. As for what 
 had happened in Belgium, England, he said, was re- 
 sponsible! Yet although, according to this account, 
 the first two speeeches had adventured themselves upon 
 the perilous field of the SchMfrage (Question of 
 Guilt), Ebert in the ensuing discussion seems to have 
 deprecated its being touched upon in the public con- 
 ference. The business in hand, he said, was not to 
 apportion blame ; a General Conference should confine 
 itself strictly to the question of peace. It was not a 
 tribunal before which the Party had to clear itself. 
 
 There are indications that relations between the 
 German Majority representatives and the Dutch-Scan- 
 dinavian Committee were not altogether harmonious. 
 On June 11 and 12 further meetings took place, at 
 which the questions of Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium 
 were more particularly discussed. The Dutch-Scan- 
 dinavian Committee had drawn up a questionnaire to 
 be addressed to all the delegations. The German 
 Majority representatives now handed in the written 
 memorandum which contained their answer. 
 
 It is easy, upon the basis of the Majority answer, to 
 give a fairly clear statement of their position. They 
 
 desire, they say, a "peace by understand- 
 S^'tof*^ ing" Frieden der Verstdndigung) . This 
 
 means, in their mouths, a peace in which 
 all discussion of the responsibility for the war (the 
 ' Vorw'drts, June 9, 1917. 
 
166 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Schuldfrage) is to be waived; a sponge is simply to 
 be drawn over the account, and the Central Powers 
 are to go back to the map of July 1914.^ The Cen- 
 tral Powers are not to come out of the war with any 
 territorial gains — in this matter the Majority declare 
 themselves emphatically against the Pan-German 
 annexationists ; but neither are they to come out with 
 any territorial losses. Neither Alsace nor Lorraine is 
 to be restored to France, nor are the Polish districts 
 to be re-united to Poland, though the German 
 Majority so far recognize the principle of the "self- 
 determination of nationalities" as to demand that 
 Alsace-Lorraine should be given equality of rights as 
 a Federal State within the German Empire, and the 
 Prussian Poles be allowed the free use of their mother- 
 tongue and liberty to cultivate their national genius 
 and culture. Germany's over-sea colonies are to be 
 given back to her entire. On the side of the Entente 
 Powers, on the other hand, the Majority sympathize 
 with efforts to modify the map of 1914. They would 
 like Ireland, Egypt, and India to be detached from 
 the British Empire, Morocco from France, Poland 
 and Finland from Russia, Tripoli from Italy, Thibet 
 from China, and Korea from Japan. England is 
 also to renounce her command of the narrow places 
 upon the great lines of oceanic traffic, of the Straits 
 of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the outlet of the 
 Red Sea by Aden; the United States also, one 
 
 * "We do not seek to evade a discussion of the question of 
 guilt, but we cannot see how the aim of the Conference can 
 be furthered by such discussion. The business in hand is 
 not to dispute about what is past, but to come to an under- 
 standing about the future, especially as to the quickest way of 
 bringing about a durable peace in accordance with our prin- 
 ciples and ideals." 
 
STOCKHOLM 167 
 
 gathers, their command of the Panama Canal. "All 
 important straits and canals connecting oceans* are 
 to be put under international control." Nor is Ger- 
 many to suffer any special pecuniary loss. The 
 Majority repudiate altogether the idea that Germany 
 in particular should pay for the material damage done 
 in Belgiuin or Northern France. If any State after 
 the war needs help from outside to start its economic 
 life again, the Majority imply that Germany might pay 
 its quota by common agreement, but would do no 
 more. A peace based on such terms would, they opine, 
 satisfy the formula "a peace without annexations or 
 indemnities." 
 
 Such a peace once established, the Majority express 
 their desire for many of those things which Socialists, 
 and indeed men of liberal views generally, desire — 
 a more fully elaborated international law, an Inter- 
 national Court of Arbitration, and reduction of arma- 
 ments. They further wish such principles of inter- 
 national law to be established as would prevent a 
 Power strong at sea from using that strength in war- 
 time to the disadvantage of an antagonist like Ger- 
 many. The right of capture at sea in war-time is to 
 be abolished, contraband defined so as to exclude food- 
 stuffs and raw material for clothing (presumably wool 
 and cotton), postal intercourse between neutrals or 
 between belligerents and neutrals not to be inter- 
 fered with. There is to be no economic war against 
 Germany after this war. The treaties of peace are 
 to secure freedom of commercial intercourse and 
 restore the "Most Favoured Nation" clause. Free 
 Trade is to be regarded as the ideal, to which such 
 gradual approximation as is-possible should be made, 
 
 "'Canals connecting oceans^' would presumably not include 
 the Kiel Canal. 
 
168 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 and meantime there is to be the Open Door in the 
 colonies.^ 
 
 , The Majority affirm that they are ready to work 
 'for peace — indeed, have been working for peace since 
 the beginning of the war — it being always under- 
 wood that by this they mean a peace on terms such 
 as those here indicated. The object of the Stockholm 
 Conference, as they understand it, is to bring about 
 an agreement between themselves and the Socialists 
 of the enemy countries by which these too will bring 
 pressure upon their respective Governments to con- 
 clude peace — ^that is, be it still understood, a peace 
 on the German Social Democrat Majority's terms, 
 what they euphemistically term "a peace by under- 
 istanding." 
 
 On June lo the Leipsiger Volksseitung called atten- 
 tion to public utterances of several of the individuals 
 composing the Majority delegation. These implied, 
 it said, that the individuals in question desired the es- 
 tablishment of German naval supremacy in the world, 
 the creation of Mitteleuropa, the atmexation of exten- 
 sive territories in Asia, and the creation of a vast Ger- 
 man colonial empire in Africa, composed of territories 
 wrested from England. It was "bare-faced hypoc- 
 risy," the Minority organ protested, for such men to 
 go to Stockholm as the champions of a peace "with- 
 out annexations and without indemnities." 
 
 The Majority delegates left Stockholm on June 13. 
 On June 21 five Minority delegates arrived — Haase, 
 The Minority Bcmstein, Kautsky, Stadthagen, and 
 Delegates at Hcrzfcld. It would probably have been 
 Stockholm. awkward had there been a possibility of 
 
 the two parties meeting in Stockholm. The feeling 
 
 'Presumably "colonies" here means Crown colonies, not self- 
 governing colonies. 
 
STOCKHOLM 169 
 
 which divided the Independents from the leaders of 
 the old Party had now reached such a pitch that (as 
 Kautsky tells us) ^ it was considered a serious diflBculty 
 in the way of the Stockholm Conference that the Inde- 
 pendents shrank from the idea of their knees touch- 
 ing those of the Majority representatives at the same 
 table! Yet Stockholm attracted them. Surrounded 
 as they were in Germany by antagonism, and recog- 
 nizing a certain measure of reasonableness on the side 
 of the Entente, they caught at the idea of an inter- 
 change of thoughts, in living speech, man to man, 
 with the foreign Comrades whom the strife of nations 
 had made their enemies. "Our journey will not be 
 useless," Haase is reported to have said to a news- 
 paper interviewer before leaving Germany. "The ar- 
 rival of the Russian delegates is assured, and there 
 will be French and English Comrades passing through 
 Stockholm. They will not be allowed to confer with 
 us formally, I know; yet nobody can forbid me from 
 greeting Ramsay Macdonald, for instance, in a 
 friendly way and having a talk with him." ^ The five 
 delegates at once got to work on conferences with the 
 Dutch-Scandinavian Committee. A few days later 
 they were joined by some other Comrades — ^Wengels, 
 Hof er, Ledebour, and Oskar Cohn. 
 
 The three principal speeches before the Dutch- 
 Scandinavian Committee were made by Haase, Bern- 
 stein, and Kautsky. 
 
 Haase defended the Independents against the charge 
 of having wantonly broken through Party discipline 
 and split the German Social Democrat Party. He 
 argued that from the beginning of the war the 
 
 'D«V Neue Zeit for August 31, 1917, p. 508. 
 'The Pesti Naplo, quoted by the Dusseldorfer Generalan- 
 geiger, June 23. 
 
170 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 principles for which the Minority had stood had been 
 precisely those which the formula "a peace without 
 annexations or indemnities" was intended to embody. 
 They had done their utmost to bring the Reichstag 
 Group and the Party Directorate to adhere to these 
 principles. It was only when all their attempts proved 
 vain that they had felt obliged to break through 
 Party discipline, because the claim of Party loyalty 
 was overridden by higher loyalty to the cause of the 
 proletariat and of world peace. It was no case of a 
 misunderstanding which further explanations might 
 have cleared away. There was a profound conflict of 
 fundamental principles. The Majority professed, indeed, 
 to accept the formula "peace without annexations and 
 indemnities." But that with them was nothing but a 
 tactical accommodatiot> to a momentary convenience. 
 
 Bernstein dealt with the crucial "Question of Guilt." 
 It was idle, he said, to try to rule out this question, as 
 the Majority did. The representatives of countries 
 other than Germany demanded that it should be 
 squarely dealt with, and to rule out its discussion would 
 only seem like giving undue favour to the German 
 side. The fight for peace, for a peace programme in 
 accordance with the principles of democratic justice, 
 could not be effectually carried on, unless there was 
 a clear understanding of the character of the war and 
 of the part taken by the several Governments. Such 
 an understanding could quite well be derived from a 
 study of the diplomatic correspondence published by 
 the Governments themselves. It could only further 
 the cause of peace if at a General Conference Comrades 
 from the different belligerent countries spoke out 
 their opinions freely on these controversial questions.* 
 
 '"A truly Socialist Party cannot oppose the desire for a 
 discussion of the question of guilt. Such a discussion, if 
 
STOCKHOLM 171 
 
 Kautsky dealt more specifically with the terms of 
 peace. Both the Majority and the Minority, he said, 
 accepted the Same formula "a peace without annexa- 
 tions and' indemnities." But if one looked at the 
 guiding resolutions as to war-aims passed by the 
 Reichstag Group in August 191 5, or at the recent 
 Majority memorandum drawn up at Stockholm, one 
 saw that the same words covered a wholly different 
 meaning. The construction the Majority put upon 
 the formula was incompatible with the principles of 
 International Socialism. It was steeped in the spirit 
 of Nationalist Machtpolitik and in the militarist mode 
 of thinking, since the attitude of the Majority to the 
 several problems varied according to the military situ- 
 ation of the moment. He ended by insisting that a 
 Conference would be no good if its result were merely 
 a beautiful scheme of peace terms on paper, if it did 
 not initiate a real energetic campaign in all countries 
 for such a peace as a Social Democracy, true to its 
 principles, could approve. 
 
 During the early days of July the Minority 
 
 delegations handed their memorandum to the 
 
 Dutch-Scandinavian Committee, embody- 
 
 M^stof*^ ing their reply to the Committee's series 
 
 of questions. 
 
 The Minority memorandum agrees in general import 
 with the Majority answer, so far as regards the prin- 
 ciples of international intercourse after the war. Onlv 
 
 carried on in a Socialist spirit, cannot but have an enlfc. .■ 
 ening and helpful effect. . . . Any one who tries to pre>gj^^; 
 the examination of the question of guilt doe§ poor servjci? 
 to the Socialist work for peace; for that work can only he 
 successfully accomplished if it is based on the foundation 
 of an honest recognition of facts (Sosialistische Auslands- 
 politik, Berlin, August 15, 1917). 
 
172 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 the Minority go farther. Whereas the Majority ask 
 for reduction of armaments, the Minority ask for 
 universal disarmament; whereas the Majority speak 
 of a gradual reduction of tariffs and the "Most 
 Favoured Nation" clause, the Minority demand 
 "the fullest freedom of trade between nations." 
 
 The great point about the Minority memorandiun 
 is that, instead of going back simply to the map of 
 July 1914, they are prepared to revise that map in 
 the interests of justice and national freedom, even if 
 that involves a territorial loss to the German Empire 
 or one of its allies. They pronounce it desirable not 
 only that Serbia should be restored as an independent 
 State, but that Serbia's desires for political union with 
 the people of the same stock now under Habsburg 
 rule should be satisfied; and similarly that the Poles 
 should be reunited in one national State, both Prussia 
 and Austria relinquishing their Polish districts to be 
 joined with what was Russian Poland.^ 
 
 As to Alsace-Lorraine, the Minority expressly 
 recognize that these provinces were torn from France 
 in 1871 against the will of their inhabitants, and state 
 that there can be no durable peace there till the in- 
 habitants are allowed to decide their destiny by a 
 genuinely free plebiscite. The plebiscite, they suggest, 
 might take place with greater freedom and tranquillity 
 if the question were put to the people of the provinces 
 at a certain defined period after the end of the war. 
 Even if they decided to sever their connection with the 
 German Empire, the territorial loss would be more than 
 made up to Germany by what Germany would gain 
 economically, politically, and morally. Such a view, 
 they point out, is no departure from the authoritative 
 
 *From the "Preliminary Statement" communicated to the 
 Press by the Minority delegates, dated June 29, 1917. 
 
STOCKHOLM 178 
 
 tradition of German Social Democracy ; it accords with 
 the view expressed by Engels as late as 1892. 
 
 As to Belgium, its "complete independence, political 
 and economic, is inevitable [unabweisbar]. In fulfil- 
 ment of the solemn promise given by the German Gov- 
 ernment at the begirming of the war, compensation 
 must be given to the Belgian people for the damage 
 caused by the war, especially for the economic values 
 taken out of the country.^ Such compensation has 
 nothing to do with any kind of war-indemnity ; by the 
 latter it is to be understood a despoiling of the van- 
 quished by the conqueror, and for that reason we are 
 against war-indemnities." 
 
 The position of the Minority with regard to the 
 recovery of the German colonies is curious. The diffi- 
 culty was that the Minority had regularly maintained 
 that the possession of colonies was a drawback rather 
 than an advantage to the working-class. They also 
 disapproved apparently of even the races of savage 
 Africa being subjected to European rule without an 
 expression of their national, or tribal, will. And yet 
 they shrank from declaring that the Powers which had 
 taken away Germany's colonies might retain them. 
 '.'Whilst therefore neither considerations of right nor 
 the economic interests of the working-classes require 
 it, yet political sagacity [Klugheit] (and that only) 
 prescribes that no such transference of territory in tiie 
 colonial field should take place, in consequence of the 
 treaty of peace, as may furnish a ground for fresh 
 wars." What transference of territory would, as a 
 matter of fact, furnish a ground for fresh wars, the 
 memorandum prudently does not attempt to prejudge. 
 
 The peace terms desired by the Minority, as thus 
 stated, are seen to coincide in large part with the 
 
 'This implies that the compensation must be given by 
 Germany. 
 
174 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 programme, so far as it has been announced, of Great 
 Britain and its Allies. But the Minority differ from 
 the Allied peoples in their view of the means by which 
 the peace indicated is to be reached. The obstacle is 
 plainly the will of the Central Powers, and the view 
 of the Allied peoples is that this will cannot be over- 
 come without war. That the Minority deny. The 
 theory professed in their memorandum is that war is 
 a mistaken means, even when it is applied to bring 
 about changes in themselves desirable. In their view 
 the only force which can satisfactorily overcome the 
 will of Imperialist Governments is that of the inter- 
 national proletariat, organized on Socialist principles. 
 The Socialist body in all countries ought to demand 
 a plain answer from the several Governments to the 
 question whether they are willing to enter on peace 
 negotiations at once on the basis of the Socialist pro- 
 gramme, and if any Government declines or gives an 
 evasive answer, the Socialists in that country ought to 
 refuse to vote war-credits and hinder the Government 
 to the best of its ability in the prosecution of the war. 
 This statement, it must be admitted, does not make 
 the mind of the Minority altogether clear. It may be 
 asked what, in their view, should happen if the Govern- 
 ments on one side declared their willingness to enter 
 upon peace negotiations on the basis of the Socialist 
 programme as outlined by the Minority and the Gov- 
 ernments on the other side refused? Ought the Gov- 
 ernments which accepted the Socialist programme to 
 cease from their attempts to compel by the pressure of 
 war the other Governments to accept it? And ought 
 the Socialist bodies in the countries whose Govern- 
 ments accepted their programme still to hinder the 
 prosecution of the war? If the Minority say "Yes" 
 to this question, what is the sense of their making 
 
STOCKHOLM 17S 
 
 the opposition of the SociaUst body depend upon 
 "whether the Governments accept the Sociahst pro- 
 gramme or not? Why bring in the Socialist peace 
 programme at all in this connection? Why not say 
 simply that in all circumstances the Socialist body 
 ought to oppose war? If, on the other hand, the 
 Minority say "No," what is the sense of implying that 
 war is always an improper means of bringing about 
 changes of the map? And the case put is not merely 
 a theoretical one. It actually corresponds closely with 
 the situation to-day. The programme of the Allied 
 Powers, so far as it has been defined, does not, indeed, 
 correspond at all points with the Minority programme. 
 The French Government, for instance, appears adverse 
 to the idea of a plebiscite to determine the destiny of 
 Alsace-Lorraine; and it may be questioned whether 
 the British Government would consider, in the matter 
 of the German colonies, the "sagacity" described in 
 the Minority memorandum to be really wise. Yet the 
 cor-respondence- on the whole between the peaceTerins 
 desired by the Minority and the declared programme 
 of the Allies is remarkable ; the Minority programme is 
 much closer to the programme of the Allies than it is 
 to the views of those British pacifists who combat with 
 acrimony the notion of the subject peoples passing 
 from under Hohenzollern, Habsburg, or Ottoman rule. 
 
 The Minority deputation took their leave of Stock- 
 holm early in July and returned to Germany. 
 
 Meantime the effect upon the Majority deputation of 
 __ . . their visit to Stockholm had become mani- 
 
 Stockholm f cst m Germany. On June 24 an article 
 
 scheid^m^s ^y Scheidemann appeared in Vorwdrts 
 article. which struck a note of new urgency: — 
 
 We Social Democrats cannot be said to have a light t^sk. 
 We go abroad to hear the Fatherland cursed on all sides and 
 
176 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 consigned to the lowest depths of hell, as the stronghold of 
 the blackest reaction, whilst England, France, and America 
 are praised as the bringers of light and freedom to the whole 
 world. We hear William II described as a tyrannical war- 
 fanatic and Bethmann as his pliable and cunningly worked 
 tool. . . . Then we return home to be told: "What you 
 have done in Stockholm is a good work. You have convinced 
 yourselves that democracy is a swindle. Prussia-Germany, 
 with her three-class electoral system and strong monarchy, 
 backed by us Landrdte' and Junkers, is the finest country 
 in the world. Therefore let things remain as they are. Don't 
 worry further about political reforms." ... I think we have 
 all returned from Stockholm with the belief that we are on 
 the right track. We wished to pursue and carry to its con- 
 clusion the peace policy initiated in December. Then came what 
 we had tried so hard to avoid [i.e. the unrestricted sub- 
 marine war], repeatedly warning the Government that it must 
 end in war with America. And thereby our enemies' confi- 
 dence of victory has been increased and the war prolonged. 
 . . . What has happened cannot be undone. Yet conscience 
 obliges us to see a way to stop the massacre of nations now 
 proceeding. And that is how I came in Stockholm to 
 the following unalterable conviction: It cannot be done until 
 Germany is completely democratized. It is not our enemies, 
 it is our friends abroad — alas! too few — who keep telling us: 
 "The time has come at last when you must alter your political 
 conditions at home, when you must show the outside world 
 that the differences between you and them are not after 
 all so great or so unbridgeable. You are one of the 
 most thoroughly educated peoples in the world, and you must 
 not stick to principles of government which belong to the 
 world's childhood. Only when you achieve reform in these 
 matters will you have found the way you seek, the way 
 to universal understanding between the peoples." , . . We 
 say extensive and radical reforms are imperative at once. 
 There can be no further delay, unless our people are to 
 suffer serious political injury. We must, alas I in spite 
 of Stockholm, anticipate a fourth war winter. It is our duty 
 
 'The representatives of the Government in the provincial 
 administration. 
 
STOCKHOLM 177 
 
 to obviate it, if obviated it can be with honour. One means 
 to this end — ^not an infallible one, it is true— would be the 
 democratization of Germany. . . . Let it not be supposed 
 that the people will remain ignorant of the constitutional 
 differences between Germany and other countries. Although 
 overstated, the fact of "here autocracy, there democracsr" 
 has been clearly put forward and who can deny the effects 
 it may have? . . . We Social Democrats took up this cry 
 long before there was any thought of the war, and from the 
 first day of war we have declared that freely given reform 
 is the speediest way to peace. Only much later, when the 
 enemy observed that Germany in this matter of the Neuorien- 
 terung had come to a deadlock, when Russia achieved her 
 gigantic revolution and America entered the war, were we 
 faced with the humiliation of having our own demand im- 
 posed upon us as a war-formula. To this stroke — ^perhaps the 
 cleverest that our enemy has struck — there is but one possible 
 counter-stroke. Germany, standing as she does safe to the 
 four winds — Germany, who has not yielded to the strength 
 of any conqueror, must grant her own reforms to her 
 own people. 
 
 Two days after this article appeared a meeting of 
 the Party Directorate took place in Berlin (June 26), 
 
 to receive from the delegates to Stock- 
 report before" holm an account of what they had done 
 the Party there. Schcidemann and Ebert spoke 
 
 and the Directorate approved in a formal 
 resolution. In Scheidemann's speech the bitter feeling 
 he had brought back from Stockholm again betrayed 
 itself. He declared himself, indeed, generally satisfied 
 with the way things had gone, but it was clear that 
 the adverse opinion he had encountered abroad still 
 rankled. Only, speaking as he did now among Com- 
 rades, he did not vent his impatience, as in his Vor- 
 wdrts article, against the backward obstinacy of the 
 ruling caste in Germany, but against the false brethren 
 whose utterances, transmitted to Stockholm, had done 
 
178 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY; 
 
 so much to stultify the Majority delegates' efforts to 
 persuade foreign Socialists that the conduct of the 
 German Majority during the war had been admirable. 
 He was particularly angry with two articles in the 
 Leipziger Volkszeitung, which had aimed at showing 
 that the claim of the Majority to have worked for 
 peace did not correspond with the facts.^ 
 
 The difficulty in the position of the Majority is that 
 they have, as it were, to carry on simultaneously war 
 The difficulty °^ three fronts. They have to attack 
 of the Majority the Government as undemocratic in con- 
 poswon. stitution, so far as their object is to pro- 
 
 cure internal reform, and as ambiguous on the question 
 of peace, so far as they are anxious to bring about a 
 peace on the definite basis of the status quo; at the 
 same time they have to defend the government against 
 foreigners, and also against the Minority at home. 
 Against foreigners they have to argue that the German 
 Government, in appearance reactionary, is really just 
 as democratic as the British, French, and American 
 Goverrunents — or even much more democratic — and 
 has done everything it could do to prove its genuine 
 readiness for peace, whilst the enemy only rebuffs 
 its overtures with scorn. Against the Minority also 
 they have to insist upon the Government's will for 
 peace, in order to show that it is right for Socialists 
 to support it in carrying on a defensive war, but in 
 the matter of democratic reforms, they speak to the 
 
 'An attempt was made by the Letpziger Volkszeitung to 
 circulate the two articles in question as a pamphlet entitled 
 "Truth about the Peace Policy of the Government Socialists," 
 but the pamphlet was suppressed by the military Censorship 
 at Leipzig, an instance of the way the Government continually 
 interferes in the controversy between the Majority and the In- 
 dependents in favour of the Majority. 
 
STOCKHOLM 17d 
 
 Minority as being equally with them determined to get 
 reform carried through. Since Scheidemann and his 
 friends have to carry on all these three controversies 
 — with the Government, with foreigners, with the 
 Minority — simultaneously, it is no wonder their dif- 
 ferent utterances show strange contrasts. 
 
 The same Scheidemann, for instance, who could 
 speak so stoutly in his article of June 24 as to the 
 imperative necessity of getting the institutions of 
 Germany democratized without delay is reported a 
 little while before as having said to Russian journalists 
 at Stockholm: — 
 
 It appears to me that the German people has already the 
 power to exercise a considerably greater influence over its 
 Government than is the case in the so-called democratic States. 
 ... I can only wish democracy to advance also in England, 
 France, and America, where the governing power is in the 
 possession of a small Imperialist capitalist class with interests 
 of its own, from whose hands the mass of less well-to-do peo- 
 ple has to accept its destiny. . . . Not till these countries as 
 well have been really democratized — i.e. till the masses of the 
 people have the determining voice — dare we hope to reach a 
 state of durable international peace. 
 
 Scheidemann's colleague. Dr. David, always ready 
 to take up the cudgels, even more energetically than 
 Scheidemann, on behalf of the German Government 
 against foreigners, had followed a similar line of argu- 
 ment in the article published on June 22 in the Danish 
 Socialdemocraten in reply to the French Socialist 
 Thomas: — 
 
 The governing German bureaucracy is not so helplessly 
 dominated by Imperialist-capitalist interests as the Govern- 
 ments of the so-called democracies of the West. Hard as we 
 strive in Germany (one hopes with success) to realize free 
 conditions in internal politics and to establish a real democracy. 
 
180 GERMAN SOCIAL" DEMOCRACY 
 
 just so little do we share the illusion that a real democracy 
 exists in France, England, or America. ... In reality the 
 workers, and the unpropertied masses generally, in those coun- 
 tries have not more, but less, influence over the diplomacy of 
 their respective Governments than the workers in Ger- 
 many have. 
 
 This is the voice of the German Majority Socialists 
 when they speak with the foreign enemy in their mind: 
 addressing himself to the home public, Scheidemann 
 declares that the backward institutions of Germany, 
 in contrast with those of the democratic countries, 
 constitute a discredit which no time must be lost in 
 removing.^ 
 
 'How the Majority Socialists at this time, from a desire at 
 one moment to represent the institutions of Germany as fright- 
 fully backward, and at another moment exceptionally demo- 
 cratic, swung between the two conceptions, may be seen from 
 some remarks in the Frdnkische Tagespost (June 27) : "The 
 policy of the Socialist Party at home has gained through the 
 negotiations at Stockholm. We all were too much implicated 
 in the war policy of our country. . . . Some of us, having 
 become too excited during the war, fell into the habit of paint- 
 ing the_ Constitutions, the institutions, and the conditions of 
 the countries at war with us in exceedingly dark colours, while 
 in judging the Constitutions, the institutions, and the condi- 
 tions, of our own by no means newly arisen country, we, for- 
 getting all our old criticisms, became remarkably indulgent. In 
 this respect Stockholm has helped to cure us." Dr. David, vmt- 
 ing in Vorw'drts (September 16, 1917), admitted, perhaps in 
 an unguarded moment, that "a reasonable and strictly true rep- 
 resentation of domestic conditions" was not possible at the pres- 
 ent time in public utterance. 
 
XVII 
 
 THE JULY CRISIS 
 
 In the months following the Stockholm conversations 
 we see the leaders of the Majority bring more pressure 
 Goverament '° ^^^^ upon the Government to carry out 
 pressed by the internal democratic reforms and declare 
 Majonty. itself with greater plainness ready to con- 
 
 clude peace on the status quo basis. And to this pres- 
 sure we see the Government, at one point or another, 
 giving way, but always, so far as it can, making con- 
 cessions which concede nothing substantial. It might 
 seem that democratic reform of some kind had come 
 nearer, but it had not yet passed out of the region 
 of promises and hopes. And as to peace terms, no 
 pressure had yet induced the Government to say 
 straight out, even in the single matter of Belgium, 
 "We are willing to restore Belgium its independence 
 whole and entire." Amongst other concessions the 
 Government attempted to conciliate the Majority So- 
 cialists by giving them an increased share in the busi- 
 ness of government, so that one immediate effect of the 
 Socialist pressure was to make the intimacy of the 
 Social Democrat Party and the Government closer still. 
 Scheidemann, it will be remembered, had already, 
 before he went to Stockholm, been appointed chairman 
 of the Reichstag Constitution Committee. The new 
 impulse he brought back from Stockholm made him 
 take an almost threatening tone. He summoned a 
 meeting for July 3 to discuss the question of a uni- 
 
 181 
 
182 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 versal and equal franchise in the Federal States. 
 On June 27 Vorwarts had a leading article in 
 
 which it referred to the implacable oppo- 
 ^wfenTr" sition which proposals of electoral reform 
 to work of were certain to meet with from the Con- 
 
 committee" servative elements in the Committee. And 
 
 then it gave a plain warning that if the 
 Constitution Committee failed in the matter of elec- 
 toral reform "the interest of the Socialists in the fur- 
 ther manoeuvres would be — to put it carefully — very 
 small"; in other words, they would wash their hands 
 of the whole business. 
 
 Reactionary circles in Germany were provoked by 
 Scheidemann's new tone to a defiant reply. Because 
 Stockholm had turned out a fiasco, the National-Liber- 
 ate Korrespondenz wrote (June 29), Scheidemann tried 
 to cover up the defeat by making a noise in Germany: 
 
 Herr Scheidemann cannot alter that fact by attempting to 
 play the strong man in Germany and trumpeting democratically. 
 We have never believed in the strength of his policy. But 
 to-day it has unquestionably lost strength all round. That 
 will be shown him very plainly and very painfully by the 
 decision which he announces for July 3. And if he then 
 withdraws in a huff from the "manoeuvres" of the Constitu- 
 tion Committee, there will not be many who will be angry 
 with him on that account. 
 
 Things at this time were working up in Germany to 
 
 the crisis of the first half of July. To that crisis many 
 
 factors contributed, which it is not here 
 
 j^y.^^can"' *^^ P^^*^^ *^° "^^y *° analyse. But the 
 Socialists pressure of the Social Majority upon the 
 
 Mi'^rtetB? Government to obtain (i) a definite in- 
 
 stalment or pledge of democratic reform, 
 (2) a clearer statement from the Government that it 
 was prepared to conclude peace on the status quo basis, 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 183 
 
 undoubtedly was one important factor. In July the 
 Government had to ask for more war-credits, and it 
 was understood to be the intention of the Social 
 Democrat Reichstag group to refuse to vote them if 
 their demands were not satisfied. According to one 
 account they definitely communicated a threat to this 
 effect to Bethmann Hollweg. 
 
 The "Government Socialists," as their enemies called 
 them, had a new sense of power upon the Government 
 machine. So far had things changed from the old 
 days when they had stood in sheer antagonism to the 
 State, because the State was something in which they 
 had no share, that the question whether they ought 
 to accept posts as Ministers, and on what terms, had 
 come into the field of practical politics. An article 
 discussing this question, by Stampfer, appeared in 
 Vorw'drts on July 1 1 . Stampfer regarded the idea of 
 the Social Democrats actually entering the Government 
 with shrinking. He would, he said, prefer that a Par- 
 liamentary Ministry should be formed, without the 
 Socialists, but on a programme which the Socialists 
 could support. If, however, a Parliamentary Cabinet 
 could not be formed unless the Socialists joined it, 
 they ought not in that case to shirk responsibility. 
 Only if they entered the Government it must be on 
 two conditions, that the Government regime should be 
 democratized, and that the Government should declare 
 itself plainly for a status quo peace. Unless those 
 conditions were insisted upon, the world would not 
 regard the admission of Socialists to power as a victory 
 for Socialism, but as a sign that the Socialists had 
 come completely into line with the Government. 
 
 Had Bethmann Hollweg been able to go as far in 
 satisfying the Social Democrats' demand for a clear 
 statement on the peace question as he was able to go 
 
184 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 in meeting their demand for democratic reform, he 
 might have retained their support. But on the peace 
 question he continued to hedge, and the 
 Bethmann: Social Democrats, who were not confident 
 
 Michaeiis, that evctt in the matter of democratic 
 
 Chancellor. . , . < i i i • 
 
 reform he was sincere, abandoned him. 
 It was therefore of no avail to save him that on July 
 12 a Royal Rescript^ was published, ordering that a 
 Bill to establish a system of equal voting in Prussia 
 should be introduced in the Landtag before the next 
 elections. This might have temporarily appeased 
 the Socialist and Radical cry for reform, if the Chan- 
 cellor had given satisfactory assurances on the peace 
 question. 
 
 It had been known for some days that the Centre 
 and Radical Parties in the Reichstag were going to 
 combine with the Social Democrat (Majority) Group 
 to carry a resolution in favour of a peace "without 
 annexations." On the 14th Bethmann HoUweg re- 
 signed, and Herr Georg Michaeiis was appointed by 
 the Emperor in his place. 
 
 On July 19 the bloc of Party Groups which 
 constituted a majority of the Reichstag carried their 
 »... „ • V . resolution against the Conservatives, 
 
 The Reichstag ° ' 
 
 resolution of the National-Liberals, and the Inde- 
 juiyu. pendent Socialists. Its significance lay 
 
 in the sentences: — 
 
 The Reichstag strives for a peace of understanding and the 
 permanent reconciliation of the peoples. With such a peace 
 forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic, or finan- 
 cial oppressions are inconsistent. The Reichstag also rejects all 
 
 'Not an Imperial Rescript, as it is sometimes called. William 
 II could only issue an order as to the internal Constitution 
 of Prussia in his character of King of Prussia, not as Ger- 
 man Emperor. 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 185 
 
 schemes which aim at economic barriers and hostility between 
 the peoples [Absperrung und Verfeindung] after the war. 
 
 Before the debate on the resolution began, the new 
 Chancellor made his inaugural statement of policy. 
 The House waited to hear how he would define his 
 attitude, the attitude of the Government, to the 
 "peace resolution" about to be brought forward. 
 If he accepted it whole-heartedly, that meant a breach 
 with the Conservatives with whom his past, and 
 probably his personal, sympathies associated him. 
 If he refused it, it meant that he must be prepared 
 for a refusal on the part of the Reichstag majority 
 to vote supplies. Five days before (on Saturday, 
 July 14), he, together with Hindenburg and Luden- 
 dorff, had had a private meeting with the leaders of 
 the several Party Groups in Helfiferich's garden at the 
 Home Office. He does not seem to have given any 
 very explicit assurance that he would adopt the 
 resolution, but the impression left by this conversa- 
 tion upon the representatives of the Parties supporting 
 the resolution was that he would. When he came 
 to the crucial question in his inaugural speech, he got 
 out of the dilemma as follows: — 
 
 The peace must provide the basis for a lasting reconciliation 
 of the nations. It must, as your resolution puts it, prevent 
 the further creation of hostility among the nations by economic 
 barriers. It must provide a guarantee that the armed alliance 
 of our enemies does not develop into an economic offensive 
 against us. These ends are attainable within the limits of 
 your resolution, as I construe it [wie ich ihn auffasse]. 
 
 Then as to internal reform the new Chancellor spoke 
 as follows: — 
 
 It goes without sajring that I stand upon the ground of the 
 All-highest Rescript of July 12 concerning the franchise in 
 
186 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Prussia. I consider it advantageous and necessary that closer 
 touch should be established between the great Parties and the 
 Government. I am ready — so far as this is possible without 
 impairing the federal character and the constitutional basis of 
 the Empire — to do everything possible to impart to this co- 
 operation more life and efficiency. I also consider it desirable 
 that relations of confidence between Parliament and Govern- 
 ment should be made closer by calling to leading executive posi- 
 tions men who, in addition to their personal qualification for 
 the post concerned, possess also the full confidence of the 
 great Parties in the popular representative body. All this, of 
 course, is possible only on the assumption that the other side 
 recognizes that the constitutional right of the Imperial admin- 
 istration to conduct our policy must not be narrowed. I am 
 not willing to permit the conduct of affairs to be taken out 
 of my hands. 
 
 Would the Social Democrat (Majority) Group con- 
 sider that these very qualified assurances gave them 
 as much as they required in order to vote the credits? 
 Scheidemann atmounced that they would. 
 
 Useful service can be rendered [only] by a Government 
 which adopts this resolution from conviction. Is the Govern- 
 ment represented by Herr Michaelis such a Government? 
 You have heard his statement and will already have formed 
 your own opinion. ... I take it that, on closer considera- 
 tion, the Imperial Chancellor must come to the conclusion 
 that there is no further room for any foreign policy other 
 than that which we have outlined here. ... A powerful 
 policy of peace-loving defence cannot be pursued without cheer- 
 ful recognition of democratic progress. In this respect much 
 in the Imperial Chancellor's speech sounded fairly promising, 
 but it could not satisfy me. . . . We will concede the new 
 credits in the spirit of 6ur accompanying resolution — not 
 as a vote of confidence in the Imperial Chancellor. We 
 have always conceded the credits to the country alone; we 
 concede them to the German people, of whom we know 
 that nine-tenths take their stand on the ground of our peace 
 programme. 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 187 
 
 The Independent Socialists refused to join the 
 Parties which constituted the majority bloc. They 
 moved a separate resolution: — 
 
 The Reichstag is striving for a peace without annexations 
 of any kind whatever, and without a war-indemnity, on the 
 basis of the right of peoples to self-determination. It expects 
 iespecially the restoration of Belgium and the reparation of the 
 wrong done to her. 
 
 The Reichstag demands the introduction of immediate peace 
 negotiations on the basis of this programme. It asks for 
 an international agreement for general disarmament, freedom 
 of international trade and communications, as well as un- 
 restricted freedom of movement ; also international agreement 
 for the protection of the workers from exploitation, recogni- 
 tion of the equality of rights belonging to all the inhabitants 
 of a State without regard to State-allegiance, sex, race, 
 language, or religion; protection of national minorities; 
 obligatory international arbitration for the settlement of all 
 disputes. 
 
 For the establishment of this peace and for the carrjdng 
 out of this programme, the most pressing condition is the im- 
 mediate revocation of the State of Siege. Further, the com- 
 plete democratization of the whole Constitution and govern- 
 ment of the Empire and its component States is requisite — a 
 democratization which will culminate in the creation of a 
 Socialist Republic. 
 
 Haase spoke for his party. He began by exposing 
 the inconsistency of the Majority in having threatened 
 Bethmann HoUweg heroically if he did not quit am- 
 biguities on the peace questipn and then accepting 
 tamely a no less ambiguous statement from the new 
 Chancellor. He passed on to show how little the 
 development of the crisis which had replaced Beth- 
 mann by Michaelis had been a victory for democracy. 
 The new Chancellor, he said, was the nominee of the 
 military chiefs, imposed from above, without any 
 reference to the Reichstag. Michaelis was the confi- 
 
188 GERMAN SOCIAE DEMOCRACY 
 
 dant of Hindenburg and Ludendorff and "nobody 
 will assert that these two men are opposed to plans 
 of annexations and war-indemnities!" The Chan- 
 cellor had actually told the Reichstag that his state- 
 ment as to the resolution had been made with the 
 approval of the supreme military authorities! There 
 you had real Prussian militarism. Imagine such a 
 statement being made by the man at the head of the 
 Government in any other country in the world ! The 
 Reichstag had even been left completely in the 
 dark as to what men the Government was going to 
 appoint over the several great departments of State — 
 who, for instance, was to be the new Secretary for 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Then Haase came to the promise with regard to 
 Prussian electoral reform and showed how little it 
 amounted to. The promise was only that a Bill should 
 be introduced in the Prussian Landtag. There was 
 no guarantee that the Bill would be passed. Once 
 before, in 1908, a Bill of this kind had been introduced 
 in fulfilment of a Royal promise. The Bill had been 
 thrown out and there the matter had ended. In this 
 connexion Haase took occasion to observe that the 
 Independents had not, like the Majority, made their 
 peace with Monarchy. The Independents still held 
 that a real democratization of Germany would issue 
 in a Republic. 
 
 The democratization of the Empire and the Federal 
 States would tend, more than anything else, to bring 
 about peace. But the appointment of a few parlia- 
 mentary leaders to Govertmient posts would not mean 
 any advance in that direction. 
 
 The large demands of the Pan-Germans, the policy 
 of bluff recommended by Admiral Tirpitz, the hopes 
 held out that a collapse of England was quite near, 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 189 
 
 were wholly mischievous. The Independents had 
 predicted from the beginning that ruthless submarine 
 war would bring in America. 
 
 The formation of the new Reichstag bloc was due to 
 tfie Russian Revolution and its consequences, which 
 had led some annexationists to change their views. 
 But the resolution of the bloc was open to various 
 criticisms. Its account of the origin of the war was 
 dishonest. "We do not forget," Haase said, "the 
 Austrian ultimatum to Serbia nor the Austrian prepa- 
 rations for war against Russia, nor the conferences 
 which took place in Berlin on July 5, 1914, nor the 
 activity of Tirpitz and Falkenhayn in those critical 
 days." ^ Then the resolution was not a clear and 
 honest acceptance of the Russian formula "a peace 
 without annexations and indemnities on the basis 
 of the right of peoples to self-determination." Its 
 phrases about "enforced acquisitions of territory" did 
 not exclude attempts to get hold of new territories 
 on pretended grounds of right. And it said abso- 
 lutely nothing about the self-determination of nations. 
 Nor was it clear that it ruled out indemnities. Some 
 time before Scheidemann's friends had warmly denied 
 that he had ever said, "Let each nation bear its 
 own burden," and Scheidemann himself had recently 
 indicated that he was not averse from the idea of 
 indemnities. 
 
 'This enigmatic allusion in Haase's speech to conferences on 
 July S, about which the world generally was ignorant, was the 
 occasion of the publication in the Times of certain statements 
 about a conference presided over by the Emperor, which it 
 derived from some person not named. The statements of the 
 Times' informant were officially denied in Germany and 
 Austria. Lichnowsky asserts in his memoir that Austria re- 
 ceived assurances of German support at this "decisive" con- 
 ference. See now further the disclosures of Mr. Morgenthau 
 {Times, May 30, 1918). 
 
190 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Then the resolution asked for "the freedom of the 
 seas." 
 
 What do you mean by that? The progress made by our 
 mercantile fleet before the war was splendid. Our fleet rode 
 proudly through all the seas without let or hindrance. In time 
 of peace the freedom of the seas is under no danger. How 
 do you propose to secure it in war-time? For a social order 
 which no longer generated war — the Socialist order — ^the free- 
 dom of the seas would be no problem. As long as there are 
 wars any belligerent which has the power to restrict the free- 
 dom of the seas will do so. What guarantees do you want 
 to prevent that? There is only one guarantee which has any 
 promise of success — universal disarmament and the simulta- 
 neous abolition of the right of capture. 
 
 Haase next satirized the transparent attempts made 
 from the German side to seduce Russia from its Allies 
 into a separate peace. He spoke of the Manifesto of 
 the Majority delegation in Stockholm. "That decla- 
 ration was condemned as a complete failure by the 
 Socialists of all enemy and neutral countries, with the 
 single exception of one very small neutral country." 
 In Russia all the Socialist papers had pronounced it 
 by no means calculated to bring peace. Like the Ger- 
 man Government, the Majority Socialists were quite 
 incapable of understanding the feelings of other 
 nations and went from blunder to blunder. 
 
 On the other hand, there was no ambiguity about 
 the resolution of the Independents. And here Haase 
 read out at length the Manifesto of the Minority 
 delegation at Stockholm. The military Censorship 
 had forbidden its publication in Germany; by reading 
 it out as part of his speech in the Reichstag Haase 
 secured its being reported under the protection of 
 parliamentary privilege. He commented on the fact 
 that while the Censorship suppressed the Minority 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 191 
 
 Manifesto, it gave large licence to the furious Pan- 
 German propaganda. 
 
 The Majority Socialists said they voted the credits 
 to the country, not to the Government. Why, then, 
 had they threatened Bethmann Hollweg that they 
 would not vote the credits, because they had not con- 
 fidence in his policy? It was a gross self-contradic- 
 tion at one time to make their voting of the credits 
 depend upon the attitude of the Government and at 
 another time pretend that their voting was not an 
 endorsement of the Government's policy. Supposing 
 the new Chancellor had definitely rejected the resolu- 
 tion, would they have voted the credits? If not, how 
 about "leaving the country undefended" in that 
 case?^ 
 
 "When I stated in this House eighteen months ago," Haase 
 went on, "that the war would end without victors or van- 
 quished, I was shouted down, but now we hear the same thing 
 from all sides." 
 
 There was no justification, he asserted with vehe- 
 mence, for going on with the war. The Chancellor 
 thought that Germany had done enough by holding 
 out the hand last December. There had been, the 
 Chancellor said, no response from the other side. Yes : 
 but why was there no response? Because the oifer 
 was really made for its effect at home, in order to 
 neutralize the effect of Wilson's offer of mediation, 
 which was known to be impending, and it was far too 
 
 *This argument was answered by one of the speakers in the 
 Wurzburg Congress two months later. He explained that, sup- 
 posing the old Party refused to vote war-credits to show their 
 want of confidence in a particular Chancellor, that Chancellor 
 would have to go and be replaced by a Chancellor in whom 
 the Party had confidence ; the Party would then vote the credits 
 and the country would not lose in the end. 
 
192 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 vague in its terms to afford a basis for mediation. The 
 only possible basis for peace proposals was the Rus- 
 sian formula, "a peace without annexations, without 
 indemnities, and recognising the right of peoples to 
 self-determination." 
 
 And the German people among the rest must have 
 the right to determine its own destiny. The 
 "authority-State" (Obrigkeitsstaat) had no longer any 
 raison d'etre. It was due to the demands of the 
 Socialists that the Constitution Committee had been 
 formed. Yet in the Committee all proposals in the 
 direction of real responsible parliamentary government 
 had been blocked by the representatives of the non- 
 Socialist Parties. 
 
 Haase then passed on to speak of the persecution 
 of the Independent Socialists throughout liie country 
 by the Government, of the tyraimous application of 
 the Censorship. Maximilian Harden's paper, Die 
 Zukunft, had been suppressed, because it gave ex- 
 tracts from the foreign Press and allowed people to 
 know what was happening abroad. Professor Schuck- 
 ing had been forbidden to correspond with foreign 
 savants on the problems of International Law. 
 
 As for the treatment of the members of my Party, you can 
 hardly imagine it. Hundreds of my Party friends have been 
 forbidden for the duration of the war to speak at any meet- 
 ing whatever, even a private one. So completely have they 
 been robbed of the right to influence public affairs just at 
 a time when public affairs are of such importance. . . . 
 And all this political system has engendered amongst us a 
 system of delation such as Germany has never before ex- 
 perienced, a system which recalls the worst days of Imperial 
 Rome. 
 
 The Minority were restrained from conducting news- 
 papers, or their organs were hampered by continuous 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 193 
 
 vexatious interference, whilst the Majority were 
 allowed to bring out a new paper in Leipzig as a rival 
 to the Leipsiger Volkszeitung. "Terrible Draconic 
 sentences have been passed in Konigsberg, Stettin, 
 Diisseldorf, and other places against alleged rioters, 
 who acted as they did only because they were driven 
 by hunger and despair." Haase referred to Liebknecht 
 and once more demanded his release. Hundreds of 
 people were now saying just the same things as those 
 for which Liebknecht was condemned, without being 
 committed for high treason. Liebknecht's physique 
 was being ruined in prison by his being employed as 
 a shoemaker. (A voice: "He is being starved to 
 death." Laughter.) "You find the fact of Lieb- 
 knecht's being starved something humorous!" 
 
 "The feeling of the people created by the leaden weight of 
 hunger and the State of Siege is such as to make even the 
 most frivolous and optimistic reflect. You have read of the 
 riots and strikes in Upper and Lower Silesia. Do you think 
 the masses can possibly endure such a state of things for 
 long? Impossible! And when the crash comes, you have no 
 right, at any rate, to be surprised. Every day the working- 
 classes come to understand better that if they are to achieve 
 what they have at heart, they must act. They will rise up 
 against such conditions as these." 
 
 Of the two resolutions before the House that of the 
 Independent Socialists was first put. It was rejected 
 by the combined votes of all the other Parties. 
 Only one member of the old Party, Hoch, whom we 
 have already seen as leading that section of the old 
 Party which was nearest to the Independents, voted 
 on this occasion with the Independents. The resolu- 
 tion of the majority hloc was then passed by 214 
 votes to 116. All the old Socialist Group, except 
 Hoch, voted for it, the Centre (with two abstentions) 
 
194 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 and the Progressives (witH one abstention). The n6 
 adverse votes were those of the Conservatives, the 
 National Liberals, most of the small Deutsche Frak- 
 tion, and the Independent Socialists. The Poles ab- 
 stained from voting. 
 
 The war-credits were voted. Only the Independent 
 Socialists voted against them. 
 
 The closer intimacy between the old Social Demo- 
 crat Party and the Government was exhibited in 
 symbolical form on the day following 
 ae K^ler?"* *^ voting of the new war-credits (July 
 20). Another meeting of a semi-social 
 character took place in the garden of the Ministry of 
 the Interior. The Emperor was present in order to 
 converse personally with the leaders of the different 
 parties, who were invited to meet His Majesty by Dr. 
 Helfferich. Never before had German Social Demo- 
 crats, as such, waited ceremoniously upon Royalty. 
 Now, at Helfferich's invitation, five of the party 
 leaders repaired to the function — Ebert, Scheidemann, 
 David, Molkenbuhr, and Sudekum. The conversa- 
 tions, we are told, between the Emperor and the 
 various members of the Reichstag were lively and un- 
 constrained. With the Social Democrats the Emperor 
 spoke especially about Stockholm. His effusive bon- 
 homie, his free-and-easy carriage, were noticed, also 
 the length of time which he devoted to the Social 
 Democrats. Amongst the Party throughout the 
 country the incident caused great heart-burnings. It 
 gave a new handle to the Independents, and their 
 organs took up against the old Party the cry of 
 Hofgdngerei ("dancing attendance upon the Court"). 
 Vorwdrts considered silence the most prudent policy. 
 Other Majority organs defended the action of the 
 leaders: a Party, they argued, which was out for 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 198 
 
 parliamentary government could not refuse to meet 
 the chief of the State. 
 
 At the end of July, Scheidemann delivered a speech 
 in Munich, which was a confident apology for the 
 whole course of action followed by the Majority. He 
 pointed to the Royal Rescript about Prussian electoral 
 reform and the passing of the peace resolution as 
 signal triumphs for the Party. As to the meeting with 
 the Emperor, Scheidemann claimed that his past 
 cleared him from any suspicion of sycophancy. It was 
 he who had forfeited his position as Vice-President of 
 the Reichstag in years gone by, because he would not 
 accompany the other representatives of the Reichstag 
 when they went to pay their respects to the Emperor. 
 And that was not inconsistent with his present atti- 
 tude. There was a great difference between asking 
 to be received and accepting an invitation to come. 
 Social Democrats were not boors and did not reply to 
 civil invitations like Zulu Kafirs. 
 
 Both the Pan-Germans at one extreme and the 
 Independent Socialists at the other were already at 
 Scheidemann ^^^^ ^^^^ calling attention, each for their 
 defends policy owu purposc, to the uucomfortablc quali- 
 of old Party. fications wWch had marked the new 
 Chancellor's apparent acceptance of the Majority reso- 
 lution — "as I construe it." If the Government had 
 not really accepted the resolution, that took off a good 
 deal from the old Party's victory, and both Pan- 
 Germans and Independents were, as a matter of 
 fact, denying that it was a victory at all. Scheide- 
 mann in his speech of July 26 brushed aside these 
 criticisms. Any one who had taken part in the 
 Reichstag's proceedings must recognize, he said, that 
 Michaelis understood the resolution in the same sense 
 as it was tmderstood by the parliamentary bloc. 
 
196 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 (Unfortunately, the Conservatives and Independents, 
 who had taken part in the proceedings of July 19, did 
 not recognize this, and indeed it was being shown that 
 the different constituents of the bloc did not themselves 
 all understand the resolution alike.) Scheidemann 
 admitted that Michaelis might perhaps on further re- 
 flection have regretted that he had not expressed him- 
 self rather more clearly. 
 
 The final part of Scheidemann's speech was devoted 
 to the democratization of Germany. He was now 
 talking to German Social Democrats and could there- 
 fore speak freely of the backward character of Ger- 
 man political institutions. On the burning question 
 whether Socialists should take office in the German 
 Government, Scheidemann on July 26 said that 
 they must depend on whether real parliamentary 
 government was established. He could not conceive 
 the Party allowing one of its men to take office in a 
 Government which continued to be what it was at 
 present. "Germany," he concluded, "is surrounded 
 by enemies to-day, but it is also surrounded by de- 
 mocracy. In Germany a Socialist may hardly even 
 become a night-watchman! There must be an end 
 to all this. There must be no more military pre- 
 dominance, no more Junker rule. The right of the 
 people, the will of the people, must be our highest 
 law." 
 
 A few days after this speech of Scheidemann's a 
 Socialist accepted a post in the Government. At least, 
 list among the new appointments brought 
 
 enters the sbout by the rcconstructiou of the Gov- 
 
 Govemment. ernment under Michaelis was that of 
 Herr Doktor August Miiller * to the post of Assistant 
 Under-Secretary of State for the War Food Control 
 * Not to be confused with Hermann Miiller. 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 197 
 
 Department. Dr. Muller had already been employed 
 for some time on the staff of the department. Vor- 
 wdrts (August 7) hailed the appointment as implying 
 that it was now no longer any bar to office of any 
 kind that a man should acknowledge himself a Social 
 Democrat. As a matter of fact, Dr. Miiller seems to 
 be a Socialist of a somewhat dubious complexion. If 
 he is formally a member of the Social Democrat Party, 
 he stands, at any rate, according to a phrase used at 
 the Wiirzburg Congress, so far to the Right that he 
 "can hardly be discerned with the naked eye." But 
 he calls himself a Social Democrat and contributes to 
 the Imperialist-Socialist periodical, Sozidistische 
 MonatsheftQ, 
 
XVIII 
 
 MICHAELIS PROVES A DISAPPOINTMENT 
 
 The Royal Rescript as to Prussian electoral reform, 
 the passing of the peace resolution of the parliamentary 
 The old Party ^''"^' ^^ appointment of a number of 
 claims a Members of the Reichstag to posts in the 
 
 victory. Government — did these things mean a 
 
 real advance towards responsible parliamentary gov- 
 ernment in Germany? That was the great question 
 at the end of July. If they did, then it brought to the 
 old Social Democrat Party a kudos of which it was 
 sorely in need ; it had really achieved something ! In 
 the circumstances, it is not surprising that the Majority 
 was at first disposed to magnify what had been gained, 
 to declare loudly that democracy was on the march 
 in Germany. But in Germany, outside the ranks of 
 the old Social Democrat Party, it was generally 
 acknowledged that the crisis of July had led to nothing 
 but illusory gains for the cause of democracy and 
 peace. This was affirmed by the Radicals and Pro- 
 gressives with disconsolate resignation,^ on the Right 
 
 ' "We can sum up in one word all that has hitherto been 
 carried through by the Reichstag for the internal renovation 
 of the German Empire — Nothing. ... A lick-spittle sham 
 parliamentarism does not carry us forward to a system of 
 regulated control and a new distribution of power; it only 
 plunges us deeper into conditions in which everything is 
 obscure and eversrthing depends upon personal decisions and 
 uncontrollable influence." (Theodor Wolfi in the Berliner 
 Tageblatt, July 23). 
 
 198 
 
THE JULY CRISIS 199 
 
 Wing with triumph/ by the Independents with sar- 
 castic scorn.* 
 
 So long, however, as the leaders of the old Social 
 Democrat Party could put the events of the crisis 
 before the masses of the country in the light of a 
 victory, they were able to check to some extent the 
 slide towards the Independents. By the middle of 
 July the local branches in sixty-two constituencies 
 
 *"We are bound for once to agree with the Berliner Tage- 
 blatt when it says that the appointing of two parliamen- 
 tarians to offices in the Government has nothing to do with 
 establishing parliamentary government. We hail the fact, not 
 only because we do not think highly of parliamentary govern- 
 ment, especially in a country like Germany, with its Party 
 divisions, but chiefly because the new Chancellor has in this 
 matter shown himself a man who indeed will not 'allow the 
 conduct of affairs to be taken out of his hand' " (Bacmeister 
 in Das grossere Deutschland for August i8). 
 
 ^"Not that we expected from the new Chancellor anything 
 different from what he actually offered in his speech to the 
 assembled representatives of the Empire. . . . Not that we 
 over-estimated our Scheidemann people, or expected from them 
 tenacity of principle and other such qualities that they dis- 
 carded long ago. Nevertheless such a degree- of modesty, such 
 readiness to deceive themselves and deceive others as they 
 evinced yesterday, we, in spite of all our experiences during the 
 last three years, could not have anticipated" (Leipziger Volks- 
 seitung, July 20) . 
 
 Herr H. Von Gerlach is not a Socialist, but his views largely 
 coincide with those of the Independents. In his paper. Die 
 Welt am Montag, he satirizes the old Social Democrat Party 
 for being so easily satisfied with the crumbs thrown it by the 
 Government. In the new appointments, whilst a Ministerial 
 seat was given to the Centre, a Secretaryship and an Under- 
 Secretaryship to the National Liberals, the Social Democrats, 
 the Party which at the last elections had gained one-third 
 of the German people, had been put off with one Under-Secre- 
 taryship! (Quoted in the Leipzig er Volkszeitung, Au- 
 gust 14.) 
 
200 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 had gone over to the Independents, and in nineteen 
 other constituencies vigorous Independent branches 
 had been started as rivals to the branches of the old 
 Party/ But after the crisis the number of secessions 
 distinctly diminished, in spite of all the mordant satire 
 which the Independents continued to let play upon 
 the old Party's further identification with the German 
 State. 
 
 One incident upon which the critics in Independent 
 circles fastened was the speech delivered by Legien 
 Legien'B ^^ August 4. On that day, the third anni- 
 
 anniversary versary of the crucial "Fourth of Au- 
 speech. gust," there was a patriotic gathering in 
 
 the Reichstag. Amongst others Legien spoke. As a 
 matter of fact, there does not appear to have been any- 
 thing in his speech beyond what speakers of the Social 
 Democrat Majority had said hundreds of times during 
 the course of the war — the familiar declarations that 
 the German working-class really did care for the 
 Fatherland, that Germany was fighting to secure her 
 economic future against those who wished to exclude 
 her from the world-markets, that the German working- 
 class earnestly desired peace, but that all overtures 
 from the German side had been fruitless, because 
 they were only regarded by the other side as signs 
 of Germany's impending collapse, that Germany never 
 could be defeated, that the responsibility for the con- 
 tinuance of the war rested on the other side, and so 
 on. But to the Independents it was apparently a new 
 fact that a representative of Social Democracy took 
 part in a Nationalist demonstration at all. The Leip- 
 siger Volksseitung described Legien's action as "a new 
 departure from the traditional practice of the Party" ; 
 it put it on the same footing as the meeting of the 
 *Leipeiger Volksseitung for July 30. 
 
MICHAELIS A DISAPPOINTMENT 201 
 
 Social Democrat leaders with the Emperor on July 20, 
 But Legien and his friends, it said, had apostatized in 
 heart long before the war. 
 
 There were two other causes besides the apparent 
 success of the old Party which operated against the 
 progress of the Minority. One was the 
 oMhe'"*'*** discrediting of the Revolution in Russia 
 Independents by the further course of events — ^by 
 nofsToppedr *^^ welter of visionary talk, the license 
 and anarchy, the national weakness and 
 humiliation, which followed it. All those in Germany 
 who had been carried away by far-reaching hopes at 
 the first outbreak of the Revolution, who had thought 
 they saw the salvation of Germany near at hand by 
 the effecting of a similar change of regime in that 
 country, were embarrassed when it became possible for 
 their opponents to point the finger at what had hap- 
 pened in Russia as an object-lesson. And the Majority 
 organs did not fail to seize their advantage, to drive 
 home the probable consequences to the German people, 
 if anarchy of that kind were allowed to pervade Ger- 
 man life and German army-organization. Unques- 
 tionably, events in Russia were calculated to make the 
 German people shy of anything which tended to revo- 
 lution, willing rather to bear the ills they had than fly 
 to others that they knew not of. 
 
 The other cause was the action of the German 
 Government, which continuously suppressed and ham- 
 pered the Independent propaganda whilst it gave com- 
 paratively free course to the polemics of the old Party 
 against the Independents. 
 
 Yet, in spite of all, the Independents continued to 
 gain some successes. In August, Dr. Erdmann, a 
 member of the Antrick-Hoch section in the old Party, 
 went, over to the Independents. The strength of 
 
202 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 their Group in the Reichstag was thereby increased 
 to twenty-two. 
 
 At this time it was announced that the Borchardt 
 section, the "International SociaHsts of Germany," 
 had definitely organized themselves as a distinct 
 party. 
 
 The complacency of the old Party at the result of 
 the July crisis did not last long. It was soon obvious 
 that the advocates of democracy in Ger- 
 betweenthe many could put no faith in the Govern- 
 oid Party and mcnt presided over by Michaelis. The 
 regime. The discontent Spread to the followers of 
 FreeCommis- Scheidemaun. On August 21 Vorwdrts 
 
 Bion of Seven. , , , . . 111 
 
 compared the parliamentarians who had 
 been given office in the Government to the "tame 
 elephants" which are used in Indian elephant hunting 
 to make the wild elephants captured in the palisade 
 enclosure amenable to management. 
 
 In place of the parliamentary system we have got the 
 system of parliamentary government-elephants, and with 
 their help the Reichstag, which trumpeted angrily for new 
 rights, is to be made tame and docile. What they seek to 
 represent as a modest beginning of "parliamentarization" is, 
 as a matter of fact, the exact opposite of the parliamentary 
 system. 
 
 On the following day (August 22) Michaelis, in the 
 morning session of the main Committee of the Reich- 
 stag, when challenged as to the interpretation put upon 
 his speech of July 19 by the Pan-Germans, denied 
 that he had ever accepted the peace resolution of the 
 bloc. This threw the House into a ferment, and in 
 the afternoon session the Chancellor denied his denial. 
 After this, his credit with all Parties was irreparably 
 gone. It was of no avail that on August 25 the Gov- 
 
MICHAELIS A DISAPPOINTMENT 203 
 
 emment announced another innovation which might 
 seem a sop to the Parties crying out for parliamentary 
 government. A "Free Commission," the Chancellor 
 said, was to be instituted, consisting of seven Mem- 
 bers of the Reichstag selected from different Parties — 
 from the Centre (two), the Social Democrat Group 
 (two), the Progressives (one), the National Liberals 
 (one), the Conservatives (one), and of seven Mem- 
 bers of the Federal Council (Bundesrat). This Com- 
 mission was, as an experimental measure, to discuss 
 with the Chancellor the answer to be given by the 
 German Government to the Papal Note. It was inti- 
 mated that if the experiment worked successfully with 
 regard to this particular question, the Free Commis- 
 sion might become a permanent institution. The object 
 of the Government was to bring about closer touch 
 between the Government and the Reichstag. 
 
 By this time, however, even the old Social Demo- 
 crat Party was critical of the Government's attempts 
 to give the shadow of parliamentary government with- 
 out the substance. According to the Berliner Tage- 
 blatt, indeed, the leaders of the Party in the Reichstag 
 had signified in private conference to Michaelis before- 
 hand their acceptance of the new Government pro- 
 posal, which the bourgeois Progressive paper treats 
 with ridicule. 
 
 The Reichstag has let a present be pressed into its hand, 
 which is no more than an empty nut. With this new institu- 
 tion Herr Michaelis has simply made another move on the 
 chessboard which is to enable him to checkmate flie Reichstag 
 majority and to keep his own hands free. 
 
 But if the Social Democrat leaders had accepted the 
 proposal, it was at any rate without enthusiasm. Dr. 
 David, speaking for the Party in the Reichstag after 
 
204 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY; 
 
 the Chancellor's announcement of the Free Commis- 
 sion, expressed the Party's attitude in the words: "We 
 will co-operate in the new arrangement, but it does 
 not in any way satisfy our claims." He had not been 
 prepared, he said, to learn that the Bundesrat would 
 be represented in the new Commission as well as the 
 Reichstag. The only mode of government suitable 
 for modern times was government by the people. 
 Germany was the only country in which the old system 
 still existed. The parliamentary system must come. 
 There was a better way than that proposed by the 
 Chancellor to secure the desirable closer touch between 
 the Government and the Reichstag — real parliamen- 
 tarization. 
 
 It was especially unfortunate that one point in 
 connection with the new Commission was left con- 
 fused. Were the seven members of the Reichstag on 
 the Commission to act as representatives of their 
 Parties? In his speech announcing the formation of 
 the Commission, the Chancellor said, or seemed to say. 
 No. They were there simply as individuals with po- 
 litical experience ; the Commission would be completely 
 free and independent of the Reichstag. It was not 
 to be considered representative of the Parties from 
 which the seven individuals were drawn. Dr. David 
 in his speech expressed his astonishment at this decla- 
 ration. Surely it was precisely the fact that they 
 were representatives of their Parties which was the 
 important fact, if the Commission was to promote 
 co-operation between the Government and the repre- 
 sentatives of the people? Dr. Michaelis made a 
 second speech in which he said he had been misunder- 
 stood. It would certainly be the duty of the men 
 who had a post on the Commission, as possessing the 
 confidence of their several Parties, to conduct the 
 
MICHAELIS A DISAPPOINTMENT 205 
 
 discussion in accordance with the wishes of their 
 Parties. \ The leader of the Party would be sent to the 
 Commission so that he might express the mind of 
 his Party in doubtful cases. Obviously he would have 
 to be in close touch with his Party in order that the 
 Party generally might acquiesce in what had been 
 done. ' ^ 
 
 The two statements left everybody hopelessly 
 mystified. The members of the Commission, Theodor 
 Wolff wrote satirically that evening in the Berliner 
 Tageblatt, were apparently to have their extra position 
 somewhere between heaven and earth — ^perhaps on a 
 rainbow ! 
 
 The new Commission was treated with very little 
 respect by Vorwarts the following day. The ambig- 
 uities and inconsistencies implied in it were dwelt 
 upon. All real strength, the Social Democrat organ 
 maintained, lay in the Reichstag, in the Parties repre- 
 sented there. It was only in so far as they had that 
 strength behind them that the seven delegates counted 
 for an)^hing. Apart from that, the Commission was 
 nothing at all. It was at best only a makeshift. 
 "We may without contradiction wish it a prosperous 
 activity — and a speedy end." 
 
 The Independents, of course, were contemptuous. 
 The new Commission, Ledebour said in the House, 
 was all a vain pretence (Schaumschldgerei) . Its effect 
 could only be to impair the prestige of the Reichstag. 
 It would serve as an appendix to bureaucracy. In no 
 case would his friends help to play at this political 
 hocus-pocus. 
 
 As the weeks went by, the voice of the old Party, 
 as heard in Vorwarts, evinces more and more im- 
 patience and discontent. It returns to the note of 
 gcheidemann's utterances when he first came back 
 
206 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 from Stockholm, before the problematic victory of 
 July 19. This was in part due, no doubt, to the in- 
 unrestinthe creased activity and clamour of the 
 old Party. Jingoes and Conservatives. On Septem- 
 
 wusotT ^^^ 9 ^^^ Manifesto of a new organiza- 
 
 answetto tion, the "Party of the Fatherland," was 
 
 the Pope. published, announcing a great popular 
 
 campaign in favour of the Pan-German war-aims, of 
 conquests and indemnities. The agitation was power- 
 fully backed by persons in high place, found a certain 
 support among the chiefs of the Army and Navy, and 
 was soon shown to be far from a negligible force. All 
 the circles in sympathy with the movement were, of 
 course, bitterly opposed to the peace resolution of 
 July 19, and — what was especially calculated to irri- 
 tate the Social Democrat leaders — they continuously 
 claimed Michaelis as their man, and represented his 
 apparent acceptance of the peace resolution as an 
 accommodation to a momentary expediency, which did 
 not represent the real purpose of the Government. 
 
 All this was not calculated to diminish the Social 
 Democrat Party's suspicion of the Government and 
 Chancellor. There also came the revelation in an 
 American paper of the "Willy-Nicky" correspondence 
 which Vorwdrts first precipitately (September 6) 
 declared to be a clumsy forgery. When the genuine- 
 ness of the letters was admitted by the Gerrrtan 
 Government, Vorwdrts could only lay the blame upon 
 Prince Biilow and his tortuous conduct of German 
 foreign policy. But it made Vorwdrts realize more 
 acutely the urgency of a change in the German political 
 system. It went so far as to say that it was no good 
 talking about the moral wickedness of the enemy. 
 "Hand on your heart, can you affirm that the con- 
 duct of the German State business has been absolutely 
 
MICHAELIS A DISAPPOINTMENT 207 
 
 without blame?" The evil repute of the Genman Gov- 
 ernment for untrustworthiness was so far not de- 
 served, it said, that there had been no consciousness 
 of evil on the part of the German statesmen. But the 
 system was at fault. "Germany is half-way between 
 absolutism and parliamentarism. It must either go 
 forward or backward. Who dares to suggest that it 
 should go backward?. . ." 
 
 A certain divergence of view, it may be observed, 
 begins to appear within the old Party between the 
 more Nationalist and Imperialist section and the sec- 
 tion represented by Scheidemann and Vorwdrts. The 
 reception given by Vorwdrts on September i to Presi- 
 dent Wilson's Note was extremely remarkable. Whilst 
 the German Press generally, even the other organs 
 of the old Party, rose lip in indignation at the 
 idea of a foreign statesman interfering in German 
 internal affairs, whilst the Leipsiger Volkszeitung 
 threw doubts upon the purity of a bourgeois states- 
 man's motives, Vorwdrts (September i) was almost 
 friendly. The Note, it said, showed foresight and 
 skill. True, the Note omitted to say plainly that the 
 United States would withstand any demands of the 
 Entente Powers to diminish German territory or exact 
 compensation. 
 
 Yet in one respect the Note is clear. It refuses to nego- 
 tiate with Germany so long as the present system of govern- 
 ment subsists. It demands pledges that the will of the Ger- 
 man people be behind the German Government's will to treat. 
 A certain part of the German Press is sure to assert that 
 it would be unworthy of the German people to give such 
 pledges. We think, on the contrary, that it would be un- 
 worthy of them to refuse. . . . Take the map of the world 
 and look at one country after another! Everywhere else the 
 real decision as to policy lies in the hands of those chosen 
 by the people. . . . Why should it be otherwise with us? 
 
208 GERMAN SOCIAL" DEMOCRACY 
 
 . . . The Government of a country at war with us has a 
 perfect right to demand that the people themselves shall under- 
 take responsibility for the terms on which peace is concluded. 
 It is simply obvious to Social Democracy that the Governments 
 which conclude peace must embody the will of the peoples 
 and must be upheld by their confidence. Still less will any 
 one persuade us that the German people — one of the most 
 capable and best-educated people in the world — could not sup- 
 port a form of government under which other nations have 
 grown great. . . . 
 
 It must, of course, be remembered that Vorwdrts 
 gave this comparatively favourable reception to the 
 President's Note only on the hypothesis that he, too, 
 like tHe German Social Democrats, was working for 
 a status quo peace. This was made clearer by an 
 interview which Scheidemann gave a few days later to 
 a representative of the United Press of America 
 (reported September 9). 
 
 He gathered, he said, that the peace desired by the 
 President and the peace desired by the Reichstag 
 Majority were the same. Why, then, should America 
 go on fighting? If it was only that Wilson wished 
 the peace terms to be guaranteed by a German de- 
 mocracy, Scheidemann thought that was quite reason- 
 able; he only deprecated the gratuitously insulting 
 form in which the desire was expressed. But to attain 
 the democratization of Germany further bloodshed 
 was unnecessary. The Reichstag already had the work 
 well in hand, and President Wilson might be sure that 
 the work would go forward still more expeditiously, 
 if Germany could get peace. 
 
 True, there was nothing in these utterances to show 
 that Scheidemann and his followers had weakened on 
 any of the points which distinguished them from the 
 Independents — the insistence upon Germany's reten- 
 tion of what she possessed in 1914, the readiness to 
 
MICHAELIS A DISAPPOINTMENT 209 
 
 vote supplies for the continuation of the war — yet 
 it showed that for the moment they were putting the 
 main stress upon that which they had in common 
 with the Independents — the craving for democratic 
 reform. It showed that this craving was strong 
 enough to overcome the Nationalist amour propre 
 which was wounded by Wilson's plain speaking. It 
 indicated a certain tendency in the Scheidemann 
 wing of the old Party to draw nearer to the 
 Independents. 
 
 This meant some possibility of a fissure between 
 the Scheidemann wing and the other, the Imperialist- 
 Nationalist, wing of the Party. Already, 
 ^c""^aLt on August 26, the Glocke (the organ, as 
 parliamentary y/Q have Seen, of which "Parvus" is 
 governmen. founder and Conrad Haenisch editor) 
 published an article by Ernst Heilmann, editor of the 
 Internationale Korrespondenz ^ which was an attack 
 on the whole principle of parliamentary government. 
 German Socialists, he said, all wanted the democrati- 
 zation of the bureaucratic machinery, but that did not 
 mean parliamentary government. Far from it! 
 Heilmann drew a repellent picture of the parliamentary 
 regime as seen in the Western democracies. It was 
 only the inveterate German subserviency towards 
 everj^hing foreign which made many German 
 Socialists go on worshipping England and France as 
 countries of freedom and repeating the dictum of 
 the old Liebknecht that England was "two hundred 
 
 ^He had attained some notoriety earlier in the war by 
 an article from his pen in the Chemnitzer Volkstimme, pub- 
 lished when he went to the front on active service. The 
 article had concluded "I go to Hindenburg!" He had re- 
 turned to his journalistic activities at home, after having been 
 wounded. 
 
210 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 years ?Lhead of Germany." Heilmann's ideal was an 
 administration by expert officials, not by persons popu- 
 larly elected. Reform of the Prussian franchise, yes, 
 for that would tend to the democratization of the 
 administrative machine from below upwards, but par- 
 liamentarization — ^never ! 
 
 This article was a bombshell in Social Democrat 
 circles. Even the bulk of the Right Wing of the Party 
 were startled and scandalized by it. A man as far 
 to the Right as Kolb of Karlsruhe gave emphatic 
 expression to his disapproval. Between Vorwdrts 
 and the Internationale Korrespondenz war broke out 
 on another score. Heilmann accused Vorwdrts of 
 being the only Social Democrat paper which had 
 taken sides with Wilson, after his Note. Stampfer, 
 the present political editor of Vorwdrts, called this a 
 "police denunciation." Heilmann replied that even 
 had it continued to be a Minority paper, Vorwdrts 
 would hardly have sunk so low as it had done under 
 Stampfer, with his constant enthusiasm for Kerensky 
 and Wilson. 
 
 If on the question of parliamentarization there was 
 this tendency in certain individuals on the Right of 
 the Party to break away, on the peace 
 pudns a*" peace qucstion, too, it was made manifest that 
 byunder-^ the attitude of the Right differed from 
 
 Stan ing. ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ main body. This might be 
 
 concealed by the fact that all alike were for a "peace 
 by understanding," for a status gwo peace; huf~air 
 article contributed by Lensch to the Glocke showed 
 that behind this formula''it'was possible fo^r a temper 
 as Jingo and ambitious as that of the Pan-Germans 
 to find cover. Lensch explained frankly that a stattis 
 quo peace was desirable only because it would mean 
 a complete triumph for Germany in the war, that by 
 
MICHAELIS A DISAPPOINTMENT 211 
 
 securing a status quo peace now Germany would be 
 much better able to secure later on what the Pan- 
 Germans wanted than by prolonging the war now, in 
 the hope of securing it all at once, as the Pan-Germans 
 mistakenly urged. For England, France, and Italy, 
 Lensch declared, with a staggering lack of caution, a 
 "peace by understanding" would necessarily spell the 
 beginning of their downfall. The difference between) 
 the Pan-Germans and such Socialists as Paul Lenschj' 
 was discovered to be only on the question of procedure, 
 not on that of ends. '^"^ 
 
 On September 22 the reply of the German Govern- 
 ment to the Pope's Note was published in Ger- 
 many. It was the issue of a tug of war 
 
 Government's behind the SCCnCS between the Pan- 
 answer to Germans and the supporters of the 
 "'"'■ Reichstag peace resolution. On the whole, 
 the supporters of the peace resolution had the best of 
 it; the reply intimated the German Government's 
 acceptance of that resolution and of the basis laid 
 down by the Pope. Yet the Pan-Germans had suc- 
 ceeded in getting all specific mention of Belgium kept 
 out of the reply, and since it was already plain that 
 the Reichstag resolution was construed by many of 
 its supporters in a sense which did not exclude annexa- 
 tions, the fact that the German reply accepted it 
 had somewhat questionable value. Vorwdrts greeted 
 the reply with a tempered approval in which there 
 was the usual element of self-congratulation. The 
 reply did not "satisfy all its wishes," but the Social 
 Democrats of the old Party were apparently disposed 
 to take credit for the fact that the German Govern- 
 ment, in consequence of their continued pressure, had 
 really moved a certain way towards a "peace by under- 
 standing." 
 
212 GERMAN SOCIAi: DEMOCRACY 
 
 The Leipzig er Volksseitung (September 25) essayed 
 to puncture the old Party's self-gratulation. If 
 Bethmann HoUweg, it said, had moved in the direc- 
 tion of peace, that was not due to pressure from the 
 Government Socialists. It was due to the pressure 
 of military events. The policy of the German Govern- 
 ment was to get whatever it could; only it realized 
 the possibilities more truly than the Pan-Germans, 
 and simply modified its attitude as the course of the 
 war showed that the Pan-German aims were unattain- 
 able. And now Michaelis was following the same 
 line — as he was bound to do. He, too, wanted to 
 keep his hands free and adjust his policy to events. 
 The Pan-Germans had come to dislike him, because 
 he wanted no more than it was possible to get. But 
 the German answer to the Papal Note showed that the 
 destiny of the German people was still determined by 
 Crown Councils, upon which the people exerted no 
 sort of influence. "Such are the prospects opened 
 to the German people by the attitude of the German 
 Government, which the Dependent Socialists proudly 
 register as a success for their policy. Wondrous 
 prospects !" 
 
 Franz Mehring, in an article he contributed to 
 the Leipziger Volksseitung (September 26) was, of 
 course, even more scathing. At best, he said, the old 
 Party might have claimed a victory, if the German 
 Government had given a clear, express answer to the 
 Belgian question. ^ 
 
 The restoration of Belgium is, as every child in Europe 
 knows, the first and most important preliminary condition for 
 peace. Only when this, and other demands which form the 
 actual basis of a lasting peace, are completely secured can 
 there tie any talk at all about international arbitration or 
 general disarmament. When, therefore, the German reply ex- 
 
MICHAELIS A DISAPPOINTMENT 213 
 
 patiates on the general demands of the Papal Note, but passes 
 over the restoration of Belgium with an eloquent silence, it 
 simply says in eflfect, "We are quite ready to co-operate in 
 constructing the roof, but we will have nothing to do with 
 building the walls." In other words : The militarist spirit 
 has no thought yet of abdicating-: all it does is to take on a 
 protective mask. But is not the fact that militarism is com- 
 pelled to take on a mask in itself some concession to the 
 exigencies of the time? It is; to that extent the German reply 
 does mark a certain progress. 
 
 But the progress, Mehring goes on, is at so slow a pace, 
 that at this rate European civilization may well have 
 been destroyed by the time the German Government 
 has reached the point of making real concessions. If 
 the men of the old Party are as powerful as they 
 pretended, Mehring concluded, let them have the State 
 of Siege removed and the little measure of free speech 
 which existed in Germany before August 1914 
 restored. 
 
 In the gloom of their disappointment at the Ger- 
 man Chancellor's attitude, the German Social Demo- 
 connt crats of the old Party saw, or thought 
 
 czernin's they saw, a ray of light in the speech 
 
 speech. made beyond the frontier by the Austrian 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Czemin, on Oc- 
 tober 2, at Buda-Pest. In this speech Count Czernin 
 declared that the Austro-Hungarian Government 
 desired to see Europe after the war established on a 
 new international basis of justice. This was to be 
 attained by international disarmament and the recog- 
 nition of arbitration. At the conclusion of his speech 
 Count Czernin said: — 
 
 But let no one cherish the delusion that this pacific moderate 
 programme of ours can or will hold good for ever. If our 
 (enemies compel us to continue the war, we shall be obliged 
 
814i GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY" 
 
 to revise our programme and demand compensation. ... I 
 am absolutely convinced that our position in another year will 
 be incomparably better than to-day. ... If our enemies will 
 not listen and compel us to continue this bloodshed, then we 
 reserve to ourselves the right to revise our programme and 
 reserve freedom as to our terms. 
 
 All Count Czernin's offers, that is, tied Austria- 
 Hungary to nothing at all, except in the event of the 
 enemies' instantly accepting them — a contingency of 
 which there was little probability. 
 
 In their natural desire to hail one utterance at any 
 rate of a responsible statesman in the German alliance 
 which adopted elements from the old Socialist pro- 
 gramme, some German Social Democrats were willing 
 to overlook the sinister conclusion of Count Czernin's 
 speech (So the Munchener Post). Vorwarts was now 
 harder to satisfy and noted the conclusion with dis- 
 approval. The Independents saw little to choose be- 
 tween Czernin and Michaelis. It was a bad speech, 
 said the Leipziger Volkszeitung. Even if the speech, 
 without the conclusion, would have been good, the 
 conclusion stamped its character upon the whole. 
 
 The concluding sentences are just those upon which the Pan- 
 German papers lay stress. It would be idle to pretend that 
 they serve the cause of peace. . . . The English Press said 
 that Michaelis had banged the door against peace. Czernin 
 has bolted it. 
 
XIX 
 
 THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1917 
 
 The old Party wanted to show that it was not going 
 to remain indefinitely passive in view of the new active 
 The Social ^^^ exuberant propaganda of the Pan- 
 
 Democrat Germans. On October 6, Landsberg 
 
 interpeuation. brought forward in the Reichstag, in 
 the name of his Party, an interpellation on the Pan- 
 German propaganda carried on in the army with the 
 encouragement of persons in authority. He adduced 
 an impressive body of facts which showed the great 
 extent of the propaganda and the complicity of the 
 Higher Command. Stein, the Prussian Minister for 
 War, replied. He admitted that individual officers 
 might have been over-zealous, but he pretended that 
 Landsberg had greatly exaggerated the extent of 
 partisan propaganda. Besides, if there was some in- 
 judicious Pan-German propaganda, there were "other 
 things too" going about. And he flung forward a 
 pamphlet against the war as an instance of what he 
 meant, hoping, no doubt, to discredit the Party as a 
 whole by means of the anti-Government propaganda 
 carried on out of sight by Independents and Ex- 
 tremists. (A Socialist: "The Minister for War is 
 playing a dirty game!") The impression made upon 
 the Parties of the bloc by Stein's prevarications was 
 not favourable. Their dissatisfaction was changed 
 into positive anger by a rude speech from Helfferich, 
 now Vice-Chancellor, who followed Stein. The anger 
 
 21S 
 
216 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 of the parliamentary bloc included Michaelis in its 
 scope, because he had failed to make his appearance in 
 person. 
 
 On the morning of October 8 the debate on the 
 Socialists' interpellation would normally have been re- 
 siuned as the first thing in the order of 
 on the business. But the angry Reichstag ma- 
 
 suppiementary jority had meantime determined to show 
 their want of confidence in the Govern- 
 ment by moving, before anything else was done, that 
 the Supplementary Estimates agreed upon in Commit- 
 tee (for Helfferich's salary as Vice-Chancellor, 
 amongst other things) should be referred back to the 
 Committee for reconsideration, until it could be shown 
 that no part of them was to be used to further Pan- 
 German propaganda. They carried, with the addi- 
 tional support of the Independent Group to the Left 
 and of the National Liberals to the Right, but against 
 the votes of the Conservatives, the first motion that the 
 question of the Supplementary Estimates should be put 
 before the House before the debate on the Socialist 
 interpellation was resumed. When, however, the 
 motion that the Supplementary Estimates should be 
 referred back to the Committee was put, both the Con- 
 servatives and the Independents voted against it. Now 
 as before, though they voted in the same way, it was 
 for opposite reasons — the Conservatives because they 
 held that no further consideration was necessary in 
 order to pass the Estimates, the Independents because 
 they held that no further consideration was necessary 
 in order to refuse them. In spite of the opposition of 
 the two extremes, the majority bloc, still supported in 
 this business by the National Liberals, was, of course, 
 numerous enough to secure that the motion to refer 
 back the Estimates passed. 
 
THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1917 217 
 
 Accordingly, in the afternoon of October 8, the 
 House went again into Committee to reconsider the 
 Estimates. This time the Chancellor came to the 
 House in person and tried to remove the offence of 
 his absence on the 6th by mollifying explanations. 
 Helfferich also tried to undo the unfortunate effect of 
 his speech of two days before by a statement which 
 was a half-apology. When the question was finally 
 put, it was shown that the Chancellor and Helfferich 
 had had sufficient persuasiveness to induce the Centre 
 and the Progressives to vote the estimates together 
 with the Parties on the Right. But the Social Demo- 
 crat Group was not to be placated. It voted against 
 the Estimates alongside of the Independents. For 
 the moment the Government's action had had the 
 effect of breaking up the parliamentary hloc of July 
 and throwing the two divided Socialist Groups once 
 more together. 
 
 On the following day (October 9), the question of 
 the Estimates having been disposed of, the debate on 
 the Socialist interpellation was resumed, 
 debate!"^^ Dittmann, of the Independent Group, 
 spoke first. He brought forward further 
 evidence to prove the extent of the Pan-German prop- 
 aganda in the Army, to show that it was carried on 
 not only by subordinates, but by the high commanders, 
 and that it was connived at by the Government. Then 
 he raised another matter calculated to excite contro- 
 versial passion. He alluded to the Socialist propa- 
 ganda in the Army and Navy.^ He complained that 
 the Government, while it gave every facility to the 
 
 *It is important to notice that the question of the Socialist 
 propaganda in the Navy and the Government measures of 
 suppression was apparently first brought up in this debate by 
 a Socialist speaker. 
 
818 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Pan-German propaganda, laid its hand heavily and 
 ruthlessly upon the Socialist propaganda. 
 
 Sentences of many years' imprisonment with penal servi- 
 tude are given merely for Socialist opinions, merely because of 
 attempts to gain members for the Independent Socialists. I 
 ask the Chancellor whether it is true that nearly 200 years of 
 penal servitude have been given, yes, and sentences of death — 
 whether men have been shot because they held Socialist 
 
 The Chancellor answered this challenge in a speech 
 so indiscreet that the German telegraph agencies had 
 to be prevented from transmitting it abroad till it had 
 been carefully doctored. According to what has been 
 published, the Chancellor explained that his former 
 assurance as to his treating all Parties and ten- 
 dencies with complete impartiality, applied only to 
 such Parties as did not "pursue aims which endanger 
 the existence of the German Empire and Federal 
 States" — ^not therefore, presumably, to the Inde- 
 pendent Socialists. He also went over the same 
 ground as General Von Stein on October 6, explain- 
 ing and defending the work of "enlightermient" 
 (Aufkldrung) carried on in the Army — on simply 
 patriotic lines, the Chancellor said, not on party lines. 
 In the unpublished part of his speech he seems to have 
 said things about the trouble in the Navy which it 
 was not deemed expedient that the outside world 
 should overhear. 
 
 Then Admiral von Capelle, the Secretary of State 
 for the Imperial Navy, spoke. He declared that revo- 
 lutionary ideas had been disseminated in the Navy 
 with the object of crippling the fleet and enforcing 
 peace. He roundly accused the Independents of being 
 behind this propaganda. There was documentary 
 
THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1917 219 
 
 proof, he said, that the chief agitator had had 
 an interview with Dittmann, Haase, and Vogtherr 
 in the Reichstag building and that the three Socialist 
 leaders had given their approval to his designs, and 
 promised to supply him with seditious literature; 
 they had only advised the greatest caution. He had 
 thought it his duty to give orders that the circulation 
 of such literature should be stopped. As to subse- 
 quent events in the fleet, all he need say was that 
 a few unprincipled and disloyal persons, who had 
 committed a grave offence, had met with the fate 
 they deserved, but the current rumours were gross 
 exaggerations. 
 
 All the Socialists in the House were by now in a 
 state of extreme excitement and indignation. Even 
 the members of the old Party did not believe that 
 Haase, Dittmann, and Vogtherr had ever given their 
 countenance to mutiny. They considered that 
 Capelle's accusations were outrageous. The other 
 Parties of the parliamentary bloc held that the Gov- 
 ernment had no right to make such charges except 
 before a tribunal which could pass a judicial verdict 
 on the evidence. David spoke first and protested 
 against the Chancellor's declaration that the Independ- 
 ent Socialists were to be treated as outside the pale. 
 Exceptional laws had not been found to work out 
 happily in the past. The rest of his speech was a 
 vigorous attack upon the Fatherland Party. Then 
 the three Independent Socialists accused by Capelle 
 spoke. First Haase. It was true, he said, he had 
 an interview with the sailor in question. But it was 
 not true that the sailor had submitted any such plan 
 as Capelle had described, any plan for crippling the 
 German fleet. Soldiers and sailors were continually 
 visiting him and telling him their grievances, espe- 
 
220 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 cially complaints of illegal treatment. Like other 
 Members of the Reichstag, he usually saw such visitors 
 in the Party Room in the Reichstag building. 
 
 In the summer of this year the sailor in question came to 
 see me and complained bitterly. He spoke of the great dis- 
 content among the sailors and their utter lack of any mental 
 food, for which they made up to some extent by subscribing 
 to the Independent Socialist Press. Their plan, he said, was 
 to continue their education, and when they got ashore, to hold 
 political discussions. I th|n observed to him that there was 
 nothing unlawful in this in itself, but in the particular circum- 
 stances in which he was placed, he should exercise the great- 
 est caution. . . . He made upon me the impression of a 
 fresh young man with high thoughts, and I was profoundly 
 shaken when I heard that he had had to suffer death for hav- 
 ing followed his political ideals. 
 
 As to the Chancellor's declaration that he did not 
 extend equal treatment to the Independents, Haase 
 said he had expected it. 
 
 "From the very first day of the war I expected it, and 
 on August 4, immediately before the decisive sitting, I pre- 
 dicted that such a declaration would come. But the Chancellor 
 only shows that the water is already above the gunwales of 
 the Government ship. In such a moment, when they see no 
 issue from all the misery of the war, they fly out against the 
 men who fought the policy of the Government from the out- 
 set and prophesied that it would end in disaster. The tones of 
 the Chancellor are not new to us. We have known them since 
 the days of Puttkamer of blessed memory; and just as he — 
 and a greater than he, Bismarck — came to shipwreck with 
 their policy, so, Herr Chancellor Doktor Michaelis, it will not 
 be long before you see this policy smashed to pieces and the 
 ideas for which we fight supported by an ever-increasing multi- 
 tude, not in Germany only, but in all countries inhabited by 
 civilized man." 
 
 Vogtherr also stated that he had known the sailor 
 who had been put to death, and discussed with him 
 
THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1917 221 
 
 conditions in the Navy. Every man in the services 
 had a right to tell his grievances to a Member of the 
 Reichstag, and the Member was bound to listen. But 
 there was nothing in the literature circulated by the 
 Independents which would be evidence of a plan to 
 cripple the fleet. "Show us," he cried, "a single letter, 
 a single sentence out of any writing, which has refer- 
 ence to any such thing. Any one can get our litera- 
 ture." The Chancellor tried to injure the Independents 
 by casual insinuations. His policy must lead to bank- 
 ruptcy. Dittmann spoke in a similar sense. He had 
 given advice to a large number of soldiers and sailors 
 with grievances, but had always cautioned them 
 against allowing their discontent to run away with 
 them. The persecution was directed against all 
 Socialists indiscriminately, including those of the 
 Majority. 
 
 Capelle now tried to substantiate his charges. He 
 read out the statements of a sailor taken down at the 
 trial. This made it appear that the three Independents 
 accused had been privy to the plans of Reichnitz, the 
 sailor put to death. The evidence was not such as 
 would have had much weight in a court of law without 
 further examination. 
 
 After the speaker for the Centre had deprecated the 
 sweeping charge brought against the Independents by 
 the Chancellor and Capelle, and said that if the Gov- 
 ernment had evidence against the three Members, they 
 should be proceeded against in the proper legal way, 
 and the speaker for the Conservatives had delivered 
 a defence of the Pan-German policy, Ebert spoke 
 for the old Social Democrat Party. He protested 
 strongly against the irregular way in which the 
 Government had flung out these accusations. There 
 was nothing incriminating in the fact that soldiers 
 
282 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 and sailors had made their grievances privately known 
 to Socialist Members of the Reichstag. It was hap- 
 pening every day. The Independents had as much 
 right as any other Party to disseminate their views. 
 If the Government connived at the Pan-German 
 propaganda, it could not complain of the Independent 
 propaganda. As to the Chancellor's putting the 
 Independents outside the pale, Ebert endorsed David's 
 words that this was based on the old conception of 
 exceptional legislation, which the Social Democrats 
 emphatically condemned. If the Government really 
 meant to adopt such policy, Ebert declared war upon 
 it in the name of the Party of which he was the 
 leader. 
 
 Stresemann, the National Liberal speaker, followed, 
 arguing, like the Centre speaker, that if there was real 
 evidence against the three Members, proper legal pro- 
 ceedings should be taken, and then Friedrich Nau- 
 mann, the Progressive politician and writer, of Mittel- 
 europa fame, spoke for his Party. He, too, condemned 
 the action of the Government in trying to make 
 political capital out of alleged misconduct on the part 
 of certain individual Members of the Reichstag, when 
 the Crown Prosecutor would certainly have taken 
 action against them, had the evidence against them 
 existed. To outlaw a whole Party, as Michaelis had 
 done, was to go back to the worst practices before 
 1914. Naumann devoted the rest of his speech to 
 demonstrating the harm done to the German cause by 
 the Fatherland Party and the political activities of 
 Admiral Tirpitz. 
 
 The Chancellor then spoke again in reply to the 
 complaints against his former speech. He tried to 
 justify the punishments inflicted upon sailors found 
 with cards which pledged them to recognize the 
 
THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1917 223 
 
 principles of the Independents and to carry on a work 
 of propaganda in the Navy. He denied that he had 
 ever proposed to "outlaw" the Independent Socialist 
 Party; he had only said that it was justifiable to take 
 measures against a Party which could not have the 
 same liberty for spreading its opinions conceded to it 
 as was conceded to other Parties. 
 
 Haase stood up again to join issue with him. He 
 once more emphasized the point that if there had been 
 any ground for legal proceedings against himself and 
 his two friends the Crown Prosecutor would certainly 
 have acted. 
 
 "It was a grave injustice to the accused men that we were 
 not called as witnesses. Had we been called, these unfortunate 
 men would have been saved from death." (A Majority Socialist 
 here interjected: "Judicial murder!") "Their parents were 
 never officially informed that the death sentence had been 
 passed on their sons. The first they heard of it was from a 
 man on furlough." 
 
 The Chancellor answered that the men had been 
 condemned by an independent court and that it rested 
 with the court to decide who should be called as wit- 
 nesses. He adhered to the statement that the con- 
 fessions of the condemned implicated the three Inde- 
 pendent leaders, in so far as they received from them 
 propaganda literature for distribution. 
 
 Dittmann replied. The fact that persons received 
 propaganda literature from him, he said, even if true 
 (he did not, as a matter of fact, remember giving 
 any such literature to this particular man), did not 
 constitute any offence. It would have been nothing 
 out of the common. He remembered that the man had 
 mentioned he read Independent newspapers. Arid 
 Dittmann had warned him to bear in mind that the 
 
224 GERMAN SOCIAT DEMOCRACY 
 
 political impartiality which some official quarters 
 honestly tried to observe was not found in the Navy 
 or the Army. "By the working-classes this poor sailor 
 will be accounted a martyr. His sentence will live in 
 the annals of this war as an utterly despicable judicial 
 murder." 
 
 When the resolution of no confidence in the Govern- 
 ment was put at the close of this agitating debate, the 
 voting was the same as the day before. Tho two 
 Socialist Groups — ^the old Party Group and the Inde- 
 pendents — ^voted together for it. The non-Socialist 
 Parties of the Majority bloc, although they had shown 
 in the debate their agreement with the Socialists in 
 condemning the Government's action, were not pre- 
 pared to go as far as to vote no confidence. They 
 voted against the resolution with the Conservatives and 
 the National Liberals. 
 
 On the same day a debate on the foreign policy 
 
 of the Empire, in relation to the peace resolution of 
 
 July, was begun in the Reichstag, and on 
 
 KUhimann on ^^^ following day was concluded. This 
 
 foreign policy. o j 
 
 debate was signalized by a speech from 
 Kiihlmann, the new Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs, in which he asserted that the question of 
 Belgium no longer offered an insuperable obstacle, 
 that the question of Alsace-Lorraine alone now blocked 
 the way, and that the Germans would never — "no, 
 never!" — consent to any concession in the matter of 
 Alsace-Lorraine. Since, however, the debate did not 
 make any change in the position of either Social 
 Democrat Party, it need not be examined at length 
 here. Gradnauer, speaking for the old Party, hailed 
 Kiihlmann's speech with warm approval, as containing 
 that clear acceptance of "no aimexations" which 
 had been wanting in the confused utterances of 
 
THE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1917 226 
 
 Michaelis. Ledebour, speaking for the Independents, 
 said that the Chancellor's recent declaration had not 
 made the attitude of the Government any clearer. His 
 explanations had evacuated the peace resolution of 
 any meaning. He had said in the Budget Com- 
 mittee that he would not tie his hands as to Belgium. 
 Kiihlmann's speech, perhaps, showed that if he per- 
 sonally had the conduct of negotiations, he would not 
 make difficulties about giving up Belgium. But not 
 all those included in the parliamentary bloc had really 
 renounced annexations. Finally, Ledebour spoke of 
 the Luxburg affair, complaining that Kiihlmann had 
 treated it too airily — "the suggestion of Luxburg 
 that ships should be sunk without a trace was 
 the most infamous thing that he had ever read 
 in any State document" — and of the German con- 
 duct in the Baltic provinces, where a German 
 minority, which composed less than lo per cent, of 
 the population, had been placed in a position of 
 dominance. 
 
 In the debates of the following days, the concluding 
 days of the autumn session (October lo and ii), the 
 two Socialist Groups continued to vote together. They 
 alone voted against the amendment, proposed by a 
 Centre Member, regarding the Government subsidies 
 to be paid to shipbuilders in order that Germany's 
 losses in mercantile shipping might be repaired as 
 expeditiously as possible — an amendment carried by 
 the votes of all the other Parties. They alone voted 
 against the Supplementary Estimates on their third 
 reading, to show their unmitigated hostility to Helf- 
 f erich. They alone voted for the resolution, proposed 
 by an Independent, that all "enlightenment" of men in 
 the Army and Navy by the Government should be 
 stopped. 
 
226 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 In two of the debates the extreme irritation of the 
 old Party against the Government at this juncture was 
 made manifest. When General Groner 
 theVevention had presided over the War Department, 
 of workers' which administered the Auxiliary Service 
 mee ings. Law, the relations between the Majority 
 
 Socialists and the War Office, in the working of the 
 Auxiliary Service Law, had been remarkably friendly. 
 As we saw, there was at one time even a tendency 
 in Majority Socialist circles to exalt the mihtary 
 authorities above the civil. But General Groner 
 had been removed under the Michaelis regime at 
 the end of August, because he offended the magnates 
 of the iron industry by his protection of the workers' 
 interests; this, indeed, had been among the 
 causes which made the Michaelis regime an abomina- 
 tion to the Socialists of the old Party. On October 
 ID a Majority Socialist of the section nearest to the 
 Independents, Schmidt of Meissen, introduced the 
 interpellation, which stood in the name of Antrick, on 
 the prevention of workers' meetings and combination 
 oy the Army Command. His speech showed that, if 
 the Independent Socialists were persecuted and ham- 
 pered by the Government, the old Party as well had 
 now a good deal to complain of. The favour shown 
 to it, as against the Independents, was merely the 
 negative one of a less severe, as against a more severe, 
 repression. Even the Trade Unions were prevented 
 from canvassing for new members. Socialist speakers 
 were forbidden to discuss war-aims in public, and any 
 meeting, according to the orders issued in one military 
 district, might be broken up if it was considered to 
 be prejudicial to the unity of the German people. 
 In Posen the order to breaJc up a meeting might not 
 be challenged. In the Breslau command in Jime, 
 
THE CRISIS OP OCTOBER 1917 227 
 
 even a fly-sheet which the Trade Unions wished to cir- 
 culate discountenancing a "wild strike" was prohibited 
 by the General in Command. When the strike broke 
 out, the Unions were forbidden to address the strikers 
 directly, although it was thanks to their offices that 
 an early agreement between the strikers and the 
 Government was ultimately reached. At Cattowitz, 
 when there was a meeting of the Miners' Union, a 
 gendarme stood at the door to see that none but mem- 
 bers entered. The Polish Unions in Upper Silesia 
 were forbidden to discuss the Auxiliary Service Law 
 or their own situation, and in the same region it was 
 forbidden to read a report of the activity of the Party 
 Group in the Reichstag at a closed meeting of members 
 of the party. And so on. The promises given by the 
 Government, when the Auxiliary Service Law was in- 
 troduced, had been broken. The social insight, the 
 speaker cried, which at one time had marked the War 
 Department had disappeared. 
 
 In the debate on the Censorship the Socialist protest 
 
 was supported by the Progressive speaker, Miiller of 
 
 Meiningen. Heine, who spoke for the 
 
 The Censorship jj p^^j ^jj^j g^ Jj, ^.g^mS of hot indig- 
 debate. . ^« r . , -a 
 
 nation — hateful always to receive and 
 forward the same old complaints" — "sheer tyranny," 
 and always "these same eternal gracious declarations," 
 on the part of the Government, which no longer won 
 credit with anybody. Papers were allowed every 
 licence to rail at the Reichstag Majority, whilst public 
 utterance on the other side, in the Press or on the 
 platform, was continually gagged. Heine referred to 
 the prohibition of Maximilian Harden's Zukunft, of 
 the Munich paper Das Forum, and of a recently pub- 
 lished book by F. W. Foerster. In the course of his 
 speech, he spoke of an utterance of Hindenburg's, 
 
228 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 placarded up that very day, in which people were 
 exhorted to fight against the handful of weaklings and 
 cowards. Everybody would understand that this 
 meant the supporters of a status quo peace. Heine 
 expressed the hope that Hindenburg would keep 
 himself to the business in which he had won 
 such glory — fighting — and not meddle in politics and 
 chatter. 
 
 The coupling of the term "chatter" {schwatzen) 
 with Hindenburg's name, even though a negative 
 intervened, shocked German ears as a profanity. The 
 President of the House called the speaker to order, and 
 Heine, in consideration of these sensibilities, tendered 
 the word "talk" {sprechen) as a substitute. 
 
 At the conclusion of the debate on the Censorship, 
 the Reichstag adjourned till December 5. 
 
XX 
 
 THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE 
 TWO PARTIES 
 
 Whilst, in the Reichstag, the Social Democrat Group 
 of the old Party had been taking a high tone towards 
 the Government and had been impelled 
 by Michaelis' policy to co-operate with 
 the Independents, in the country the struggle between 
 the two Parties was going on and the statistics of the 
 old Party, published in September, were far from 
 cheerful. 
 
 These statistics had been made up at the end of 
 March 191 7, and did not, therefore, show any losses 
 the old Party had sustained since the constitution of 
 the Independent Socialist Party. Of its male members 
 some 75 per cent, had at that date been called up for 
 active service. But the number of women-members 
 also showed a disconcerting fall. It is suggested by 
 the Directorate in their report that this was partly 
 due to the wives of soldiers, who had been excused 
 their contributions, having drifted away from the 
 organization. The total number of inscribed members 
 of the Party had been in the last few years as 
 follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 Men. 
 
 Women. 
 
 Total. 
 
 On 
 
 March 
 
 31. 
 
 1914 
 
 911,151 
 
 174,754 
 
 1,085,905 
 
 On 
 
 March 
 
 31. 
 
 1915 
 
 451.235 
 
 134,663 
 
 585.898 
 
 On 
 
 March 
 
 31. 
 
 1916 
 
 320,200 
 
 112,418 
 
 432,618 
 
 On 
 
 March 
 
 31, 
 
 1917 
 
 176.453 
 229 
 
 66,608 
 
 243,061 
 
19 16. 
 
 1917. 
 
 3,906 
 
 553 
 
 76,355 
 
 6,475 
 
 2,312 
 
 480 
 
 10,531 
 
 3,088 
 
 18,788 
 
 2,524 
 
 19,522 
 
 428 
 
 12,107 
 
 4,760 
 
 230 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Or, take the figures for different constituencies on 
 March 31, 1916, and March 31, 1917: — 
 
 East Prussia 
 
 Greater Berlin 
 
 Erfurt 
 
 Hesse-Nassau 
 
 Lower Rhine 
 
 Leipzig 
 
 Great Thuringia 
 
 There was a similar fall in the numbers of juvenile 
 associates. At the outbreak of the war there had been 
 in Germany 837 Junior Committees; by April i, 19 15, 
 the number had decreased to 500, a year later to about 
 400, and by April i, 1917, to 300. The number of 
 subscribers to the juvenile Socialist paper, Arheiter 
 Jugend, had been 67,062 on April i, 1915 ; on April i, 
 1917, it was only 36,511. 
 
 The Party Press generally had been badly hit. The 
 number of Social Democrat papers had decreased from 
 91 on March 31, 1914, to 80 on March 31, 1917. The 
 number of subscribers of the daily Social Democrat 
 papers showed a much greater decrease: — 
 
 On March 31, 1914 .. .. 1,488,345 subscribers 
 
 On March 31, 191S .. .. 1,060,891 " 
 
 On March 31, igi6 .. .. 900,731 " 
 
 On March 31, 1917 .. .. 762,757 " 
 
 While no doubt the calling up of men for active 
 service accounted for a good deal of this decrease, it 
 did not account for all of it. It did not, for instance, 
 account for the signal fall in the number of women 
 and junior mernbers. Also, if the calling up of men 
 might naturally have made a great difference at the 
 beginning of the war, this cause would not explain 
 
STRUGGLE OF THE TWO PARTIES 231] 
 
 so startling a fall in the membership during the third 
 year of the war. This is confirmed if we compare the 
 figures of the Trade Unions, which were affected no 
 less than the Social Democrat Party by the calling up 
 of their members, and which did not show anything 
 like a corresponding fall. The membership of the 
 Trade Unions had, indeed, declined conspicuously 
 during the earlier part of the war, but during the recent 
 period there had been a notable upward tendency. 
 
 "At the outbreak of war the Trade Unions counted 
 2,482,046 members, including 214,017 women. The 
 total membership at first sank steadily, which was 
 hardly surprising in the case of the men, so long as 
 men were being called up for military service. At the 
 end of the fourth quarter of 1916 the numbers were 
 reduced as low as to 934,784 members, including 
 197,008 women. From that time, however, a gratify- 
 ing recovery may be traced. From the third quarter 
 of 1916 to the third quarter of 1917 the numbers rose 
 from 947,564 to 1,201,770. This is equivalent to an 
 increase of 254,206, or 26.8 per cent. The increase 
 was greatest among the women-members, in conse- 
 quence of the war-industries. Their numbers rose 
 from 185,496 to 364,391 — an increase of 118,895, ^"^ 
 64.1 per cent. In the case of men-members the increase 
 was naturally smaller — 135,311 members, equivalent 
 to 17.7 per cent. Even so, the addition of 135,311 
 members implies, in view of the fact that men were 
 being continually drawn away from war-industries, 
 a recovery of the Trade Unions. What is still more 
 gratifying is that their upward curve has been main- 
 tained. The Miners' Federation at the end of the 
 fourth quarter of 19 16 numbered 53,404 members, on 
 September 30th, 19 17, 96,089. The figures for the 
 Builders at the former date were 72,948, on Octobei; 
 
232 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 15, 1917, 82,578. In the case of the workers in 
 factories, there are at present, including those called 
 up, 5,714 more members organized in Trade Unions 
 than before the war; in the case of the employes of 
 communes and municipalities, the figure is 30,477 as 
 against 25,390; in the case of the Textile Workers, 
 roughly 70,000 as against 56,747."* 
 
 It is certain that a large part of the decrease in the 
 numbers of the old Party is due to Comrades passing 
 to the camps of Haase, of Liebknecht, or of Mehring. 
 The figures for the Party given above were made up, 
 as has been pointed out, up to March i, 1917, before 
 the Minority had organized itself as a separate Party; 
 even before that date, therefore, the Minority propa- 
 ganda had been as effective as this, in spite of Censor- 
 ship and Government suppression. The fact that 
 Gleichheit, under Clara Zetkin, championed the views 
 of Haase had been of great advantage to the Minority 
 in extending its influence amongst women. If one 
 may accept the statement of the Leipziger Volksseitung 
 (September 15, 1917), the numbers of the old Party 
 had decreased since March from 243,061 to 150,000, 
 whereas the numbers of the paying members of the 
 Independent Party now amounted to 120,000. About 
 the beginning of October the important constituency 
 of Hof in Northern Bavaria, which country had 
 hitherto been solid for the old Party, went over to the 
 Independents. In Wurtemberg about the same time, 
 Hornung, the Member for Bockingen in the Wurtem- 
 berg Landtag, left the old Party for the new, accom- 
 panied by a good part of his constituency. 
 
 At the end of September the Directorate of the old 
 Party carried out with a high hand the ejection of 
 'Hermann Miiller in Die Ncue Zeit for January ig, 191^ 
 p. 364. 
 
STRUGGLE OF THE TWO PARTIES 238 
 
 Kautsky from the editorial office of Die Neue Zdt. 
 Legally the paper belonged to the Party, and the 
 Directorate had obviously some justifi- 
 "^eue^zeit^" cation, in these circumstances, for insist- 
 ing that the paper should not be run in 
 the interests of another Party by some one who was 
 doing all he could to thwart the old Party's policy. 
 On the other hand, Kautsky's past connexion with the 
 paper, which largely owed its influence to his zeal 
 and ability, seemed to give him a moral claim to be 
 left in possession. He complained, through the col- 
 umns of the Leipsiger Volkszeitung, that he had been 
 given no notice. He was actually preparing the num- 
 ber which should appear on October 5 when the repre- 
 sentatives of the Directorate of the old Party walked 
 into the office, told him that he and Wurm, his assist- 
 ant, were dismissed, and installed Heinrich Cunow in 
 his place. On October 5 the first number of a new 
 Jahrgang of Die Neue Zeit appeared as usual, similar 
 in form and type to Die Neue Zeit of old, but in char- 
 acter a new paper. 
 
 However justified the leaders of the old Party may 
 have been in refusing to allow a paper belonging to 
 the Party to be conducted in opposition to the Party, 
 their manner of action was singularly graceless. That 
 this is not only the judgment of an outsider is shown 
 by the fact that the action caused shame even within 
 the ranks of the old Party. Carl Severing, one of the 
 contributors to the Imperialist-Socialist Sosialistische 
 Monatshefte, wrote about it in the number for October 
 10, as follows: — 
 
 The Party Directorate could certainly no longer bear the 
 responsibility for allowing the Party funds to be spent in 
 combating the Party. Whether the measures they took were the 
 right ones is another question. It would surely have beefl 
 
234 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 enough to withdraw the financial and moral support of the old 
 Party from the paper which Kautsky had converted into the 
 weekly organ of the Independent Social Democrat Party, and 
 have left Kautsky to continue editing it. Die Neue Zeit was 
 not, it must be remembered, an official organ of the Party from 
 the outset. It was originally a private concern and might have 
 become such again. Formerly it was described in its sub-title 
 as "A Review of Public and Intellectual Life." It was not till 
 igoi that it was changed into "Weekly Organ of German Social 
 Democracy" — a quite needless, and not altogether happy, change 
 of garb. Intellectual life is not something which can be put 
 under rules. And the sub-title, which was intended to act as a 
 protection to the official views of the Party, has served in these 
 last years (life's ironies!) actually as a means of discrediting 
 them. All this ought not to prevent one from recognizing 
 that, as a matter of fact, Kautsky had acquired a moral right 
 (et'n geistiges Anrecht) to remain in possession of the periodical, 
 which he had conducted for an uninterrupted space of thirty- 
 five years, and which had no doubt become a part of his spiritual 
 self. . . . The Party had all the less reason to incur the odium 
 of having perpetrated an act 6f violence in that the existence of 
 an official weekly organ was in no way a necessity for it. 
 
 The breach between the Social Democrat Party 
 and Michaelis was now complete. Ebert had declared 
 
 war on him; the Party Press was assert- 
 Michaeiis ^"^ emphatically that he had made himself 
 
 "impossible" and must go. The hos- 
 tility of the Social Democrats alone would not have 
 been enough to overthrow him, but by now his inca- 
 pacity for the office of Chancellor at such a moment, 
 his self-contradictions and maladdress, had become 
 pitifully obvious to everybody. Even the Conserva- 
 tives and Pan-Germans, who claimed, probably with 
 truth, that he was in heart on their side, could hardly 
 be satisfied with such a champion. On October 28 
 the Emperor accepted his resignation and offered the 
 Chancellorship to the Roman Catholic ex-Professor 
 Count Hertling. 
 
XXI 
 
 THE TRADE UNION CONFERENCE 
 AT BERNE 
 
 Before that event, however, two gatherings had 
 taken place, not without some importance in the 
 
 history of German Social Democracy — 
 attempts the International Trade Union Congress 
 
 to hold a at Berne and the Social Democrat 
 
 Parteitag at Wiirzburg. 
 In the Trade Union Conference, of course, Social 
 Democracy was only indirectly concerned. Yet since 
 the German Trade Union leaders were also leaders in 
 the Social Democrat Party, and the relations between 
 the "free" Trade Unions and the Party were, as has 
 been shown, very close, the Conference which was as- 
 sembled at Berne from October i to October 4 cannot 
 be passed over without notice in this survey. It was 
 the result of efforts on the part of the German Trade 
 Union leaders, which had been going on since the be- 
 ginning of the war, to bring about a meeting with the 
 Trade Union leaders of other countries, including the 
 enemy countries. As early as August 25, 1914, Legien, 
 as President of the International Federation of Trade 
 Unions, which had its central office in Berlin, had 
 asked the Trade Union Federations of neutral coun- 
 tries to take steps to maintain the international con- 
 nection, and, in consequence of this request, a subor- 
 
 235 
 
236 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 dinate office had been established in Amsterdam. Early 
 in 191 5 the Trade Union Federations of Great 
 Britain, France, and America had united in the de- 
 mand that the central office should be removed from 
 Berlin to a neutral country. This gave an opportunity 
 to the German Trade Union leaders to press for an 
 International Conference, since they maintained that, 
 while they had no objection on principle to the removal 
 of the central bureau, they could consent to it only 
 if it were done on the authority of an International 
 Conference. From that time the project of the Con- 
 ference was kept continuously alive by the efforts of 
 the Germans. Such a Conference, they said, would 
 not have to discuss any of the political questions con- 
 nected with the war or the coming peace, but only 
 the international adjustment of strictly industrial 
 questions in which the working-class everywhere had 
 a common interest, and it would have to see that these 
 matters were safeguarded in the peace-terms. After 
 the Conference had been several times fixed for a 
 particular date, and postponed, and the attempt to hold 
 it in the summer of 1917 at Stockholm in connexion 
 with the Socialist Stockholm Conference had, as we 
 have seen, also failed, the Swiss Federation of Trade 
 Unions ultimately summoned the Conference for 
 October i in Berne. 
 
 In the event no representatives came to it from 
 
 any country at war with the Central Powers. The 
 
 British, Belgian, and American Trade 
 
 The Berne Unions declined to meet the Germans — 
 
 meeting. 
 
 the British for the reason, frankly stated, 
 that Germany was still holding by military force 
 territory not belonging to her and was carrying on war 
 by atrocious methods. The French and Italian 
 Trade Unionists were refused passports by their 
 
THE CONFERENCE AT BERNE 237 
 
 respective Governments. Of the 62 delegates who 
 attended, 32 came from Germany, Austria, Hungary, 
 and Bulgaria, 11 were Swiss, and the remaining 19 
 from the Scandinavian countries and Holland.^ 
 
 Legien himself was amongst the German delegates. 
 The meeting spent a good part of its time in discussing 
 such questions as freedom of migration, right of coali- 
 tion, social insurance, fixing of hours of labour, 
 hygiene, protection against accidents, home-labour, pro- 
 tection of children, protection of female workers, legis- 
 lation with regard to seamen. In the absence, how- 
 ever, of delegates from any of the enemy Powers, it 
 was obvious that the resolutions of the Conference on 
 such matters were worth little. In regard, therefore, 
 to the purpose for which it was professedly called to- 
 gether the Congress must be considered a fiasco.'' And 
 yet the German Trade Unionist leaders declare that 
 
 ' Germany 
 Austria 
 Bohemia 
 Hungary- 
 Bulgaria 
 Switzerland 
 Sweden 
 Norway 
 Denmark 
 Holland 
 
 ..10 
 .. 5 
 .. S 
 ..10 
 ..2 
 ..II 
 .. S 
 . . 2 
 r* "j r* * 3 
 
 r* ^ > • 9 
 
 62 
 
 'Der misslungene intemationale Gewerkschaftskongress. 
 . . . Der eigentliche Zweck der Veranstaltung, gewerk- 
 schaftliche Besprechung der durch den Krieg geschaffenen 
 und audi den Krieg noch anhaltenden schwierigen Wirt- 
 schaftslage ist dadurch natiirlich, trotz der Anwesenheit von 
 52 Delegierten [not counting the Swiss?] vereitelt worden 
 [(I3»V Hilfe for November i, 1917, p. 669). 
 
238 GERMAN SOCIAL" DEMOCRACY 
 
 it was from their point of view a success.^ They felt 
 that a step had been made in the direction of recon- 
 stituting the international solidarity of Labour. As 
 in the case of Stockholm, they believed that if only 
 such international solidarity were reconstituted, they 
 would have got a purchase by which they could break 
 down the opposition in the working-classes of enemy 
 countries to a status quo peace. The fact that the 
 French and Italian Trade Unionists had been pre- 
 vented from coming by the act of their Governments, 
 and not by their own, enabled the Conference to send 
 them a telegram of fraternal greetings. 
 
 The Conference was, naturally, dominated by the 
 German, Austrian, and Hungarian delegates, who 
 formed half the assembly. It was remarked how 
 impatient the Germans were of criticism or opposition. 
 The reading of the British letter, speaking plainly 
 about the crimes of Germany, stung them into rage. 
 It was answered by a tirade from the German delegate 
 Bauer. The old charges against the English of cruelty 
 in the Boer War, were once more brought out (which, 
 whether true or not, are, at any rate, emphatically 
 contradicted in the official history issued by the 
 German Great General Staff — that by the way), and 
 of course, the crim.e of trying to "starve Germany" 
 (as the Germans in 1871 starved Paris) was given its 
 place in the indictment. But if the letter made the 
 Germans angry, they seem to have been made still 
 angrier when a Swiss Socialist, Greulich, present at 
 the Conference as a guest, presumed, in the course 
 of a discussion, to criticize adversely the attitude to 
 
 *Legien, "Die Berner Internationale Gewerkschaftskon- 
 ferenz" in Die Neue Zeit for October 19; Jansson, "Die 
 Berner Gewerkschaftskonferenz" in Die Clocke for October 
 80tb, 
 
THE CONFERENCE AT BERNE 239 
 
 the German Government which had marked the 
 German Trade Unions during the war. According 
 to the picturesque phrase of one present at the Con- 
 ference, this "left the German delegates hissing like 
 black p)rthons." 
 
 The question of shifting the central bureau of the 
 International Federation to a neutral country was 
 discussed. Legien reaffirmed in the name of the 
 Germans that they had no objection on principle to 
 the change, but since the British Trade Unions had 
 represented it as equivalent to a vote of no confidence 
 in Germany, the Germans would not consent to it till 
 such time as confidence all round was restored, and 
 that would be shown by the reconstruction of the 
 International Federation and the coming together of 
 an International Conference. 
 
 The Berne Conference had "fulfilled its purpose." ^ 
 
 *"Die Berner Konferenz hat ihren Zweck erfiillt" (Legien 
 in Die Neue Zeit), 
 
XXII 
 THE WURZBURG CONGRESS 
 
 The Parteitag of the old Social Democrat Party was 
 held at Wtirzburg from Sunday, October 14, to Satur- 
 day, October 20, 191 7. Through the elim- 
 aMem3r' ination of the Independent Party, it had 
 become possible at last to hold a Parteitag 
 which represented at any rate the old Party throughout 
 the Empire, in its own eyes the only legitimate embodi- 
 ment of German Social Democracy. To this Congress 
 there came 282 delegates from 258 constituencies. In 
 addition to the delegates, 56 Members of the Reichs- 
 tag attended, 9 members of the Directorate, and a 
 certain number of permanent officials and newspaper 
 editors. A large outside public was admitted to hear 
 the proceedings of the first day, who numbered, it 
 was calculated, some two thousand persons. 
 
 After introductory ceremonies, Ebert, the President 
 of the Party, made the opening speech. He repeated 
 the stock phrases about the people's desire for peace 
 and the obstinacy of the enemy in rebuffing peace- 
 offers. But he seized the occasion to attack the Pan- 
 German propaganda as being in part to blame for the 
 enemy's "will to victory." Then he set the key for 
 the tone of the Congress in domestic policy by repeat- 
 ing against Michaelis the declaration of war he had 
 uttered in the Reichstag and declaring that the parlia- 
 mentarization of Germany must be carried through. 
 
 240 
 
THE WURZBURG CONGRESS 241 
 
 At the close of the Sunday meeting Ebert himself 
 and Auer of Munich were elected to be chairmen for 
 the Congress, which was to set about its proper labours 
 next day. 
 
 On the Monday (October 15) Auer took the chair 
 and Ebert presented the report of the Party Directo- 
 rate. A summary of this report had been 
 re^'ortf"'*' published by Vorwdrts on September 12, 
 and we have already glanced at its statis- 
 tics for the light they throw upon the struggle between 
 the new and the old Party. Braun, the treasurer of 
 the Party, followed with a financial statement. From 
 this it appeared that the subscriptions of members had 
 fallen off by 80 per cent, during the years of the war, 
 and that the Party Press had lost subscribers to the 
 extent of 58 per cent. In the latter respect, however, 
 one improvement had been revealed in the last quar- 
 terly report, the number of subscribers to the Socialist 
 Press having risen again 1 1 per cent, from its lowest 
 figure, an increase represented by an addition of 
 70,000 subscribers. Later on, in the course of the 
 Conference, the Manager of Vorwdrts, Richard 
 Fischer, spoke pessimistically about the prospects of 
 the Party Press. He predicted grave results from the 
 Party split. Already large sections of the working- 
 class, he said — especially the munition-workers — ^took 
 in non-Socialist instead of Socialist papers. 
 
 The business of the Parteitag was to pronounce 
 
 with final authority upon the questions which had 
 
 been at issue within German Social De- 
 
 The quesHon mocracy during the years of war. There 
 
 ol reunion. • y-» j 
 
 were two great questions. One concerned 
 the relations between the two divided Socialist bodies 
 — the possibility of reunion. The other concerned 
 the relations of the Party to the Government. Had 
 
242 GERMAN SOCIAE DEM0CRACS5 
 
 the Reichstag Group done right since August 4, 1914, 
 in voting war-credits? Ought it to vote war-credits 
 in all circumstances in the future? 
 
 The first question, the possibility or impossibility of 
 reunion, was discussed during the afternoon of Mon- 
 day the 15th and the morning of Tuesday the i6th. 
 The second question, that of war-credits, was dis- 
 cussed during the afternoon of Tuesday and the fourth 
 day of the Congress, Wednesday the 17th. 
 
 The question of reunion was one of great practical 
 urgency. It was quite plain that a divided Social 
 Democracy could not bring that volume of force to 
 bear which was essential, if the ideals of Socialism 
 were to be carried through in Germany. When peace 
 came, and the immensely complicated tasks of recon- 
 struction had to be faced. Social Democracy would be 
 relatively powerless, if the split continued-^-powerless 
 just at the moment when it was of transcendent im- 
 portance that it should be strong. Even utilitarian 
 considerations, therefore — ^apart from sentiment — 
 made it imperative to find an accommodation with the 
 separated brethren — if it was possible to find an ac- 
 commodation at all. 
 
 In the old Party the variety of attitudes with regard 
 to the Independent movement was exhibited by 
 different speakers. There were those on the Right 
 who had nothing but condemnation for the Inde- 
 pendents, and those on the Left, like Htittmann and 
 Heffter, whose own attitude approximated to that 
 of the Independents and who tried to put their case 
 in a favourable light. Htittmann criticized adversely 
 the manner in which the Party leaders had turned 
 Kautsky out of the office of Die Neue Zeit. Heffter 
 taxed the leaders with having acted unfairly all 
 through towards the Minority, and he contrasted the 
 
THE JVURZBURG CONGRESS 243 
 
 passivity they showed towards the extreme Right, 
 Lensch and his like. "Nine-tenths of the Socialists at 
 the front," he averred, "believe that the split was due 
 to the intolerance of the Directorate." 
 
 Adolf Braund of Niiremberg, who has from the out- 
 set taken the foremost line in labouring for unity, for 
 conciUation, for the sinking of differences, told the 
 Congress that if the Parties failed to reunite, the 
 masses would sooner or later take the matter into their 
 own hands and insist that the breach should be 
 closed: On the other hand, Kolb of Karlsruhe and 
 Kratzig argued that where there was such real and 
 fundamental disagreement, the division must be recog- 
 nized as inevitable — a judgment which the considera- 
 tions put forward in our concluding chapter will tend 
 to confirm. The official leaders, Ebert, Braun (the 
 treasurer), Molkenbuhr, Hermann Miiller, were, as 
 might have been expected, markedly hostile to the 
 Independents. 
 
 The question of Alsace-Lorraine came up a good 
 deal, since on this question, forming as it did one of 
 the chief impediments to peace, the Independents 
 had definitely taken up a different standpoint from 
 that of the old Party. One speaker, Katzenstein of 
 Stralsund, took his stand with the Independents, and 
 advocated the plebiscite; there was no reason, he said, 
 why the people of Alsace-Lorraine should not have 
 the same right as any other people to determine their 
 own destiny. Another speaker, Vetters of Giessen, 
 wished the Party to modify its attitude in so far as 
 to admit the retrocession to France of the small 
 French-speaking frontier districts. The official leaders 
 were adamant on the question. Scheidemann repeated 
 the stereotyped affirmation that Alsace-Lorraine was 
 German territory and that the principle of the right 
 
244 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 of nations to determine their own destiny did not 
 apply to the people of those countries, because they 
 were not a nation. The integrity of the Empire 
 was the Social Democrat condition for peace. Her- 
 mann Miiller went farther and spoke sceptically of 
 the principle itself. It would, he said, justify, among 
 other things, the total dismemberment of Austria- 
 Hungary! [It is interesting to notice the admission 
 that if the nationalities under Habsburg sovereignty 
 were given their free choice, they would choose total 
 separation.] Germany could never give up Alsace- 
 Lorraine, except after utter defeat. To secure the 
 integrity of the Empire was the Social Democrat 
 war-aim. As to a plebiscite, France would never con- 
 sent to it, if the Germans who had migrated into the 
 country since 1871 were allowed to vote. On the 
 other hand, the Socialists of the old Party, Scheide- 
 mann said, demanded that Alsace-Lorraine should be 
 given complete autonomy within the frame of the 
 Empire. Similarly, other speakers protested against 
 the proposal, which had been recently mooted, of an- 
 nexing Alsace-Lorraine, in whole or in part, to 
 Bavaria. Schmidt of Miinich stated that such a meas- 
 ure was not desired by the Bavarian Socialists — or 
 indeed by the Bavarian people as a whole. 
 
 Scheidemann spoke on the Monday afternoon. 
 He dealt with the charge that the Party leaders had 
 shown partiality in tolerating the extreme Right, 
 whereas they had expelled the Minority. There was a 
 difference between the two cases. In the case of the 
 Imperialist Socialists there was only a divergence of 
 opinion; in their political action they conformed to 
 that prescribed by the Party as a whole; in the 
 case of the Independents there had been schismatic 
 action. 
 
THE WURZBURG CONGRESS 245 
 
 We have never suppressed an opinion, neither on the side 
 of the Right nor on that of the Left. We believe firmly in 
 the greatest liberty of opinion. But in action we demand 
 Party solidarity. [Stormy applause.] Lensch and Pens and 
 any one else may write whatever they please, but every one 
 must conform to the resolutions of the Party in Congress and 
 observe discipline. 
 
 Later on he showed where the reproaches of the 
 Independents rankled: — 
 
 When we are reviled as "Government Socialists," J have 
 never felt anger and resentment; I have felt only pity. What 
 a petty and despicable mode of attack! — not ineffectual, I 
 know, with the working-class. But the workers will find out 
 some day what the truth is about our "pro-Government policy." 
 If we have approached the Government, it has been only in 
 order to safeguard the interests of workers, of soldiers and 
 of their wives, and to rescue victims of the State of Siege. A 
 future time will prove how many people we have happily been 
 able to help— yes, how many we have actually saved from 
 death ["Shame!"]. Wpjigyq by <^p^^hpratp purpose, avoided 
 doing anjrthing wj^jrjrgigKT disturb tVip. unity nfthfi^ Party. We 
 wilPcontinue^o avoid doing_atjything--whiGh_may_;disturb the 
 unitynrf^the ^woHcing-class. . . . We work on practical lines 
 for peace and the vital interests of the German working- 
 class. This the German working-class will come to recog- 
 nize, and will refuse to pay any attention to those who make 
 speeches with a show of "thorough," but who have actually 
 done nothing for them. The German workers will again stand 
 united in one great body, the undivided Social Democracy of 
 Germany! 
 
 The debate on unity was terminated by the Congress 
 passing, with only seven dissentient votes, a resolution 
 proposed by Severing: — 
 
 Penetrated by the conviction that the Labour Movement can 
 be successful and effectual only if its ranks are solid and 
 united, the Congress aids and supports all efforts directed to- 
 
246 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 wards the establishment of Party unity. In a Social Demo- 
 crat Party, such unity, while the utmost tolerance is shown 
 towards all differences of opinion, presupposes the subordi- 
 nation of the minority to the decisions of the majority. Who- 
 ever does not recognize these principles denies the very sources 
 of the Party's life, which consist in the concentration of all 
 forces in a single will and a single line of action. Hence all 
 efforts to restore the unity of the Party must imply the demand 
 that the majority-principle be accepted. 
 
 The Congress sees the best way to establish Party unity 
 in the strengthening of the Social Democrat Party of Ger- 
 many. It therefore calls upon the class-conscious workers of 
 Germany to rally to it. The extension of its compact organiza- 
 tion forms the surest guarantee that the arduous political 
 struggles of the future will have an issue advantageous for the 
 working-class. 
 
 A supplementary resolution was also adopted, call- 
 ing upon the local branches and all individual members 
 to strengthen the will to unity. 
 
 The debate on the second great question before the 
 Congress, that concerning the voting of war-credits. 
 The uestion ^^^ Opened on Tuesday afternoon by 
 oj voting David. In this debate, too, the differences 
 
 war-credits. between the Right and Left within the 
 old Party appeared no less than in the debate on unity. 
 It will be remembered that the Antrick-Hoch section 
 had refused since the end of 1914 to vote war-credits, 
 although since they did not, like the Independents, 
 vote against them, but only practised abstention, they 
 remained attached to the old Party. In this debate 
 Hoch himself moved a resolution, which did not in 
 principle condemn the voting of war-credits by 
 Socialists, but made such voting conditional upon the 
 Government's having accepted unequivocally the 
 Socialist demands for "no annexations" and for demo- 
 cratic reform. This the existing German Government 
 had not done, and till it had done so, the resolution 
 
THE WiJRZBURG CONGRESS SUfi 
 
 asserted, it was the duty of the Social Democrat Group 
 in the Reichstag to refuse to vote war-credits. 
 
 A contrary resolution was moved by Lobe of Bres- 
 lau. This expressed approval of the policy which the 
 Reichstag Group had hitherto pursued in voting war- 
 credits. It stated that the German Government's reply 
 to the Pope's note afforded an adequate basis for 
 peace negotiations. But it called upon the Govern- 
 ment to show greater promptitude and decision in repu- 
 diating all ideas of annexing Belgium, in establishing 
 Alsace-Lorraine as an autonomous State within the 
 Empire, in crushing the Pan-German propaganda, 
 and in realizing the wish of the German people for 
 democratic reform. In the last regard, the resolu- 
 tion specified the immediate establishment of equal 
 suffrage in Prussia and the concession to the Reichstag 
 of a greater measure of political control. 
 
 In his speech defending his resolution. Lobe urged 
 that the Party should authorize its representatives in 
 the Reichstag to cease voting war-credits, if they ever 
 became convinced that the Government had made up 
 its mind to seek annexations or to obstruct democratic 
 reform. 
 
 To certain delegates of the Right even this con- 
 ditional threat to refuse to vote was manifestly not 
 altogether pleasing. Stolten of Hamburg contended 
 that the policy of using the vote as a means of pressure 
 upon the Government must cease the moment it 
 prejudiced the safety of the nation. "Of course," 
 said Cohen of Reuss, "we do not vote credits in all 
 circumstances. But I can hardly imagine any situa- 
 tion at present in which we could refuse them." 
 
 Hoch's resolution was eventually rejected at the end 
 of the Wednesday session by 258 votes to 25, and 
 Lobe's was carried by 262 to 14. 
 
248 GERMAN SOCIAi; DEMOCRACY 
 
 On Thursday (October i8) the Congress came to 
 the more general questions of future policy. It first 
 discussed the question of "democratiza- 
 Ho^'r"'""" tion" on the basis of a report drawn up 
 by Landsberg. Scheidemann's speech in 
 opening this discussion seems to have been the chief 
 oratorical feat of the Congress. He talked in trumpet- 
 tones of the strength in which organized German 
 Social Democracy would stand before the Government 
 after the war. Social Democracy in the new condi- 
 tions must be prepared to modify its old attitude. It 
 could no longer be a mere antagonist of the State; its 
 task would be to conquer power within the State, even- 
 tually even to assume the responsibilities of govern- 
 ment. For this purpose it must see to it that Germany 
 was changed into a really democratic parliamentary 
 State., He described the fearful conditions which the 
 war would leave behind it. Even Social Democracy 
 would not be able to bring men in a moment from 
 hell into paradise. Yet the only hope for the world 
 would be in practical, not a merely theoretical, 
 Socialism. This implied that Germany must be democ- 
 ratized, must be made internally free. 
 
 A strenuous popular will set towards freedom will be strong 
 enough to secure peace as well — strong not by armaments. 
 What is it that makes our main antagonist in this war, Eng- 
 land, so strong, and what is our worst point of weakness? 
 England has known how to win the friendship of all the 
 world, and we have lost the friendship of all the world. 
 ["Very true."] That must be otherwise. We are arming for 
 a new struggle with England, a struggle not for the Flemish 
 coast, but for the sympathy ol the peoples, for the soul of 
 the world. [Loud applause.] 
 
 The proposal was put forward by Pfliiger of Stutt- 
 gart that the official statement of the programme of the 
 
THE WtJRZBURG CONGRESS 249 
 
 Party, drawn up twenty-three years before — a docu- 
 ment which appeared to the present Majority long- 
 winded and pedantic — should be superseded by a new 
 statement in effective language which had some grip 
 in it. This proposal was accepted by the Directorate, 
 who promised to appoint a commission to draft a 
 statement on these lines. 
 
 On Friday (October 19) the financial problems of 
 the immediate future and the time after the war 
 War and Were first discussed — ^how the burdens of 
 
 after-war taxation should be distributed, so that 
 
 problems. ^j^gy g^Quld not Weigh unfairly upon 
 
 the workers. A report by Cunow was submitted to 
 the Congress. Cunow made much of the trade war 
 which he maintained England would carry on against 
 Germany in the future: he advocated the now famous 
 Mittel-Europa scheme as Germany's best defence. 
 
 "We have lost," said Lobe of Breslau, "hundreds of thou- 
 sands of capable workmen; we shall have to take into ac- 
 count that hundreds of thousands of others will have their 
 capacity for work very much reduced; we must expect a gen- 
 eral lowering of vitality owing to bad nourishment. In these 
 circumstances the supreme law of financial policy must h€ the 
 sparing of human labour-power, the essential strength of our 
 people. . . . 
 
 Our taxation proposals have been met by a howl from the 
 capitalist Press, as if they meant the ruin of Germany. We 
 must therefore insist that the proposals we have put for- 
 ward are not specifically Social Democrat. Gothein, Pro- 
 fessor Jaffe, and other bourgeois financial publicists, were 
 before us in asking for taxes on property, extended death- 
 duties, and States monopolies in large measure. How other- 
 wise can the enormous costs of the war be covered? The 
 hope of a war-indemnity grows ever more shadowy and the 
 expenses and losses of the war mount higher and higher. 
 The only way by which we can stave oil a "hunger-peace," 
 a "misery peace" is by stopping the game of the Jingoes 
 
350 GERMAN SOCIAL' DEMOCRACY 
 
 before they have quite brought Germany to destruction. A 
 speedy peace affords the only possibility of saving us from 
 burdens so heavy that the German people must break down 
 altogether under them. 
 
 Various other social problems of the future were 
 then discussed by different speakers, as to which a 
 report had been drawn up by Wissell — agriculture and 
 the production of foodstuffs, demobilization, female 
 labour, infant welfare. Lensch clamored for a far- 
 reaching colonial policy. 
 
 "Free Trade has in all probability been shattered 
 into fragments by the war. ... If Germany loses 
 her colonies, her whole freedom of development will 
 be imperilled." "What good will colonies be to us in 
 the time of transition?" asked the following speaker, 
 Jackel of Berlin. "Whether and how far we shall 
 need them later on it will be time enough to discuss 
 later on." 
 
 Before the morning session closed, Scheidemann 
 made a short speech in which he came back to the 
 urgency of "democratization." 
 
 Away with all hindrances to democratization and parlia- 
 mentary government in the Empire! The hindrance which 
 calls most immediately for removal is the Imperial Chancellor, 
 Dr. Michaelis. [Stormy applause.] 
 
 On the Thursday afternoon a number of resolutions 
 were passed on the questions already debated, and the 
 great and urgent question of the feeding of the people 
 under war-conditions was discussed. Complaints were 
 made of the Government's half -measures and delays. 
 There were the usual denunciations of profiteers. 
 Some of the speakers seem to have given a description 
 of the prevalent distress in Germany, which was not 
 
THE WURZBURG CONGRESS 251 
 
 allowed to appear in tiie abridged report of the pro- 
 ceedings published by Vorwdrts. In its leading article, 
 at any riate, the following day (October 20) Vorwdrts 
 says: — 
 
 The pictures of misery drawn by Comrade Schilling of 
 Saxony [a woman speaker] were absolutely heartrending 
 {erschiitternd) . 
 
 On Saturday morning (October 20), with Ebert in 
 the chair, some resolutions on points connected with 
 the working of the Party machinery were passed, and 
 Ebert then, after a final speech, in which he summed 
 up the position of the Party, declared the Wiirzburg 
 Congress closed. 
 
 One change in the government of the Party which 
 had been made at the Congress was that Scheidemann 
 was elevated officially to a position alongside of Ebert. 
 The two were henceforth to be joint-Presidents of the 
 Party. 
 
 The Wiirzburg Parteitag seems to have left the situ- 
 ation in Germany very much as it was before. It 
 gave, no doubt, a feeling of exhilaration 
 The result of ^^ ^jjg adherents of the old Party to meet 
 
 the Congress. . , , , . i 
 
 all together m a great assembly which 
 confirmed the official policy with something very near 
 unanimity. Since the Social Democrats who dis- 
 agreed with the policy of the old Party had practically 
 all left it by this time, the unanimity of those still 
 adhering to it was a foregone conclusion. The Con- 
 gress can hardly be said to have brought out fresh 
 arguments or assertions which were not already thread- 
 bare. It did nothing to bring the hope of reunion any 
 nearer. 
 
 A few weeks after the conclusion of the Wurzburg 
 Parteitag, the Committee of the Independents (Haase, 
 
262 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 Dittmann, Ledebour, Luise Zietz, and three others) 
 promulgated their view of the matter in a Manifesto, 
 counter-mani- ^his Said that the Independents had 
 festo of the always been fully alive to the importance 
 Independents. ^f ^^^ Labour Movement preserving 
 
 unity, and it was the leaders of the old Party who 
 were to blame for the schism. They had deserted 
 the principles of Socialism by ( i ) voting war-credits, 
 (2) agreeing to co-operation with non-Socialist 
 Parties, and (3) suppressing the opposition of the 
 Minority. The Wiirzburg Parteitag had not only 
 endorsed the policy of the old Party generally, but 
 had sanctioned their violent seizure of Press organs, 
 beginning with the case of Vorwdrts and ending with 
 that of the Neue Zeit. The old Party had, in fact, 
 ceased to be Socialist at all in anything but outward 
 profession. The only true Socialist party was the 
 Independent party, and if the Socialist movement was 
 ever again to be united, it could only be under the 
 Independent banner. 
 
 On November 2 it was announced that Count Hert- 
 
 ling had been appointed Chancellor of the German 
 
 Empire in the place of Michaelis. At 
 
 Hertiing. ^j^g |.jjjjg ^^ which this was written ^ it is 
 
 Chancellor. . 
 
 too soon to say whether his relations 
 with the Social Democrat Party will be smoother 
 than those of his ill-starred predecessor. His ante- 
 cedents and previous political bent hardly mark him 
 out as a Chancellor whom Socialists are likely to find 
 congenial. When his name was first put forward in 
 connection with the oflfice, the Social Democrat Press 
 did not regard it with favour. On the other hand, 
 the circumstances of his accession to the office have 
 shown a concession to the demand for parliamentarism 
 'November 1917. 
 
THE WURZBURG CONGRESS 253 
 
 unprecedented in the history of the German Empire. 
 Count Hertling did not take office till after negotia- 
 tions with all the Parties in the Reichstag, in which 
 he gave assurances satisfactory to the majority. 
 Although his previous utterances had made it appear 
 that his own views differed widely from the pro- 
 gramme adumbrated in the resolution of July 19, he 
 had to give assurances, which were understood by the 
 Parties composing the parliamentary bloc — including 
 the old Socialist Party — to pledge him to accept that 
 programme. Whether these Parties have again been 
 imposed upon, whether Hertling will make any clearer 
 statements on the subject of Belgium and annexations 
 generally than Bethmann Hollweg or Michaelis, re- 
 mains to be seen. In any case, never before has the 
 accession of a Chancellor to office depended upon his 
 obtaining a promise of support from the majority in 
 the Reichstag. Besides this, the strong feeling aroused 
 in the Reichstag against Helfferich caused him also to 
 be relieved of his office of Vice-Chancellor on Novem- 
 ber 9, and he has been replaced by a veteran Radical 
 parliamentarian, Herr von Payer, the leader of the 
 united Progressive Parties in the Reichstag. All this 
 does not constitute parliamentary government: it is 
 only a step in that direction; future events may quite 
 possibly make it nugatory, for the Conservatives are 
 far from having given up the game. Yet a step in 
 the direction of "parliamentarization" has been taken, 
 and some of the credit for it can hardly be denied to 
 the Social Democrats. 
 
XXIII 
 
 SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 
 
 We have followed the leading events in the history of 
 German SociaHsm from the outbreak of the Great War 
 till the elevation of Count Hertling to the Chancellor- 
 ship. In conclusion, we may survey the logic of the 
 position maintained by each of the two main bodies 
 into which German Socialism is at present divided. 
 
 With the Government, the old Social Democrat 
 body — ^the Majority — has since the beginning of the 
 war, apart from the brief spasm of hostility under the 
 Michaelis regime, been on terms of intimacy and co- 
 operation, which are something new in the history of 
 German Socialism. It is this which has procured them 
 from the Independent Socialists the opprobrious names 
 of "Government Socialists" or "Dependent Socialists." 
 It is undeniable that such subordination to the Gov- 
 ernment as has been exhibited by Social Democrats 
 of the old Party during the war is quite contrary 
 to the tradition of the Party before the war. How 
 do these Socialists justify their change? There are 
 two alternative lines of justification. One line is to 
 say: — 
 
 The practice and principles of the Party before the 
 war were wrong. In clinging to the letter of the 
 Marxian doctrine we did not allow for the change of 
 circumstances. The German working-class had grown 
 
 254 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 258 
 
 in power and prosperity, and this prosperity was 
 bound up with the prosperity of the German State. 
 It is no longer true in Germany that "the prole- 
 tariat had nothing to lose but its chains." The time 
 was come for us to assert ourselves as a Party in 
 the State, accepting responsibilities in the State, and 
 gaining our ends in the usual parliamentary way, by 
 political tactics and compromises with other Parties. 
 It was our interest not to overthrow the existing State, 
 but to push our way more and more into its offices, 
 and so gradually d i rect it to our own ends. As a 
 matter of fact, the practice ot the Pai Ly, even before 
 the war, had largely been directed on these lines, but 
 we still in our theories and verbal declarations kept 
 up the old out-of-date intransigent attitude. There 
 wa s a growing divergence betwe en theory and practice. 
 Those who say that in AugusFTQi^rwe-bfoke-^th 
 our past and changed our course are right. But if 
 the old course had come to be mistaken, there is 
 nothing to be ashamed of in that. We have learnt by 
 experience. 
 
 Those who take this line are the Umlerner in the 
 full sense. They are largely, of course, identical with 
 the Right wing of the Party, those who, before the 
 war, were called Revisionists or Reformists. Kolb of 
 Karlsruhe is one of their leading spokesmen. 
 The other line of argument is to say: — 
 Our principles and practice before the war were 
 right. And there was no change of our principles in 
 August 1914. If our practice changed, that was 
 because the war created a wholly new situation. "We 
 made good what we had always said." It had always 
 been part of Socialist doctrine that if the country was 
 involved in a non-aggressive war, a war of self-^ a^-^ 
 f^nce, it would be the duty of Social Democrats to do 
 
256 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 all they could to help the State. There are authorita- 
 tive utterances of the old leaders of our Party — Wil- 
 helm Liebknecht, Bebel — to this effect. And this war 
 is for Germany a war of self-defence. Therefore, we 
 are perfectly true to our old professed principles in 
 voting the money to the Government without which 
 it could not carry on the war, and helping in every 
 way we can to make the inner organization of the 
 people under war-conditions efficient. 
 
 Everything, it will be seen, for this argument turns 
 upon a question of fact. Is the war really a war of 
 self-defence or a war of a'gg rc^iou i' ~=^ 
 
 - ^ten jow^^weturn to tffe attitude of the Inde- 
 pendents, we find, just in the same way, that there 
 are two lines of justification for refusal to vote credits 
 and general antagonism to the German Government. 
 One runs : — 
 
 We recognize fully the duty of every citizen to help 
 the State, by fighting or by voting money, if the 
 country has to engage in a war of self-defence. But 
 this war is not for Germany a war of self-defence. 
 If some share of the blame attaches to all the belli- 
 gerents, in so far as they all are capitalist States and 
 uphold a form of society which naturally leads to 
 international conflicts, still much the greatest share 
 of blame falls upon Germany and Austria. This is 
 shown by a study of the events leading up to the war 
 — ^both those of years farther back, such as the pro- 
 vocative increase of the German fleet, and those of the 
 fatal twelve days in 19 14, the Austrian ultimatum to 
 Serbia, Germany's refusal of a conference, the out- 
 rageous invasion of Belgium. It is true that the doc- 
 trine of our old leaders was that in a defensive war 
 the Socialist would help the State, but it was no less 
 a recognized doctrine of Socialism that if any country 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 257 
 
 entered upon an aggressive war, the Socialists of that 
 country should oppose the Government by all means 
 in their power and call upon the proletariat to paralyse 
 the Government's arm by strikes and passive or active 
 resistance. Germany in this war is an aggressor; 
 therefore we who oppose the German Government 
 alone are faithful to the principles of International 
 Socialism. 
 
 Again here everything turns upon the question of 
 fact, Is the war really a war of self-defence or a war 
 of aggression? 
 
 The other line of argument runs thus: — 
 Since all Governments at present are capitalist 
 Governments, and war is the inevitable outcome of 
 the capitalist order of society, no Socialist can con- 
 sistently take upon himself any share in furthering 
 a war-policy, even if the war be a defensive one. A 
 Socialist will indeed, in such a case, fight as a soldier 
 and do his duty in repelling the foreign enemy, but 
 he will never vote money to the Government. The 
 soldier is not responsible for the orders given him by 
 the State authorities ; but the citizen who votes money, 
 or co-operates politically with the Government, talces 
 upon him his share of responsibility for the Govern- 
 ment action. The social ills of mankind can never 
 be cured except by the establishment of the Socialist 
 order, involving a solidarity of the working-class in 
 all countries. To labour for the establishment of 
 this order is the supreme duty. It is a duty which 
 overrides the duty of a man to his particular nation. 
 For a man to take any part in furthering a war -policy, 
 forthCsake of his particular nation, must hinder the 
 coming of the international Socialist order, and there- 
 fore it is to set the lower claim above the higher. If, 
 in consequence of the abstention of Socialists, their 
 
258 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 particular country is defeated by a foreign aggressor, 
 that is a lesser evil than anything which hinders the 
 coming of Socialism. 
 
 We may tabulate the four views in syllogistic 
 form: 
 
 A. B. 
 
 Socialists ought always to sup- Socialists ought to support 
 port their State in a war : their States in a defensive 
 
 war, but oppose it in an 
 aggressive war: 
 This is a war: This is for Germany a defen- 
 
 sive war: 
 Therefore German Socialists Therefore German Socialists 
 ought now to support the ought now to support the 
 German State. German State. 
 
 G. D. 
 
 Socialists ought to support Socialists ought always (till 
 
 their State in a defensive war, the coming of the Socialist 
 
 but oppose it in an aggressive order) to oppose their State 
 
 war: in a war: 
 
 This is for Germany an aggres- This is a war: 
 sive war: 
 
 Therefore German Socialists Therefore German Socialists 
 ought now to oppose the Ger- ought now to oppose the Ger- 
 man State. man State. . 
 
 It will be seen that A and B disagree in their prin-1 
 ciple but agree in their conclusion; B and C agree in 
 their principle but disagree as to the question of fact ; 
 C and D disagree in their principle but agree in their \ 
 conclusion; A and D disagree in their principle, but 
 agree in their minor premise, in so far as for both the 
 question whether the war is defensive or aggressive 
 is eliminated as irrelevant. 
 
 It is this complication of the issues which brings a 
 good deal of confusion into the controversy between 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 259 
 
 the two German Socialist Parties. It is of course the 
 conclusion of each line of thought which indicates the 
 course to be taken by practice, and it is by agreement 
 or disagreement in practice that politicians are grouped 
 in Parties. Any number of men who are willing to 
 support each other by co-operating on the same 
 practical programme may form one Party, even if 
 they have arrived at the same programme by 
 different paths. The people, therefore, whose views 
 are represented by A and B form one Party, the 
 Majority Social Democrat Party, as against the 
 Independent Social Democrat Party, which combines 
 C and D. 
 
 But it must not be thought that the several positions 
 are really marked off as sharply in psychological fact 
 as we have marked them off for the purposes of logical 
 explanation. It is inevitable that since Group A and 
 Group B are mingled together in a single organization 
 and are, day after day, working together at the same 
 tasks, the theoretical differences between them become 
 blurred. The men of each group in different degrees 
 absorb the ideas of the other; in many minds, which 
 have no great capacity for clear logical thinking, 
 the two lines of thought run together so confusedly 
 that it would be impossible to classify them either A 
 or B. The same is true of C and D. The effect of 
 practical union and co-operation is thus to draw B 
 towards A and to draw C towards D. On the other 
 hand, there are tendencies working the other way, 
 impelling B towards C. B and C have, we saw, a 
 common theoretical basis. And the same pressure of 
 circumstances which induces large numbers of the 
 members of the Majority actually to go over to the 
 Independents, is always acting upon those individuals 
 in the old Party who are nearer to the Independents, 
 
260 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 even while they remain in the old Party. All this 
 makes a kind of intellectual fog in which misappre- 
 hension is easy and sophistry has its chance. 
 
 It would appear that so far as the Independent 
 Party i-s guided by a conscious theory, it adheres 
 rather to position C than to position D. The bulk 
 of the Party recognizes the duty of the Socialist to 
 support the State in a war of self-defence. Most of 
 those in Germany who assert on principle that in no 
 war ought Socialists to vote credits belong, not to the 
 Independent Party, but to one of the more extreme 
 sections which follow Borchardt or Karl Liebknecht. 
 Yet, although the question of fact thus becomes the 
 real dividing question between the Independent 
 leaders and the most central section of the old Party, 
 it is not actually given in controversy the same prom- 
 inence as the question of principle. That is to say, 
 in most of the written controversy conducted by the 
 Independents against the old Party, they talk as if 
 all the old Party adhered to position A, and in 
 most of the controversy conducted by the old Party 
 against the Independents, they talk as if all the 
 Independents adhered to position D. This is what 
 was meant by the writer of the letter in Die 
 Neue Zurcher Zeitung (see pp. 97, 98), when he says 
 that the controversy on both sides largely strikes 
 wide, because the real question at issue is kept out 
 of sight. 
 
 The chief reason why this crucial question is so 
 little discussed is apparently to be found in the con- 
 straint exercised upon the two Parties from outside, 
 in the rigorous Government censorship and suppres- 
 sion. The question whether the war is for Germany 
 an aggressive or a defensive one involves two inquiries. 
 One is historical, an inquiry into the whole body of 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 261 
 
 facts connected with Germany's policy before the war 
 — including the crowded diplomatic and military 
 events of the Twelve Days — a matter which cannot 
 be adequately treated without the precise and dispas- 
 sionate study and valuation of a large number of 
 documents; the other is political, an inquiry into the 
 actual policy which Germany has in view, the war- 
 aims for which she is fighting, the terms on which 
 she would be prepared to conclude peace. Whatever 
 be the origin of the war, if Germany is shown to be 
 fighting for terms which are incompatible with the 
 Socialist conception of international justice, then the 
 war could not be, for a consistent Socialist, a defensive 
 war in the moral sense. Now,_bQtb- tlicsc que stions — 
 that o f the ori g in nf t^r* wn'* Tind thnt "f w ar-^''"T' 
 — are questions on which the German Governme nt 
 jealoifefy—restficts disc ussionZ Till the summer of 
 igt^-the-puWitrtHscussionof war-aims was altogether 
 forbidden in Germany ; since then it has been per- 
 mitted in a one-sided way; the Pan-Germans seem^ 
 to be allowed .every liberty for their propaganda^ 
 whilst the official gag prevents the Independents f ror 
 publicly advocating such terms as they outlined 
 Stockholm. On the origin of the war a number 
 of would-be historical studies have been published in 
 Germany, the conclusion of which is wholly favourable 
 to Germany. Yet apparently only one of them — that 
 of Ludwig Bergstrasser — can make any claim to deal 
 critically with the evidence. When one considers 
 the reputation which Germany once had for thorough- 
 ness and impartiality in research, one may well be 
 astonished at the thinness and one-sidedness of what 
 purport to be expositions of the events leading up to 
 the war put forth by professional historians such as 
 Oncken, Schiemann, Helmolt, and Haller — to say 
 
262 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 nothing of scrappy polemical pamphlets by Helfferich 
 or the Social Democrat David. There seems to be no 
 treatment of the evidence in Germany which can be 
 put, for closeness of study and judicial temper, beside 
 Mr. J. W. Headlam's "History of Twelve Days" and 
 his articles examining the data (such as the Suchomli- 
 nofi "revelations"), which have subsequently appeared. 
 When Germans are led by their studies to results 
 unfavourable to the German Government, and wish 
 to publish their conclusions, they have to do so out- 
 side Germany, as in the case of Hermann Fernau and 
 the anonymous author of "J'Accuse." It is true, of 
 course, that in any belligerent country, whilst the 
 war lasts, restrictions are put by the Government 
 upon the publication in print of opinions adverse 
 to the cause for which the nation is fighting. Prob- 
 ably as large latitude had till recently been given in 
 Great Britain as anywhere. Yet, even with the re- 
 strictions existing in Germany, one would think that 
 something more substantial, something with a little 
 more appearance of impartiality, might have been pro- 
 duced by the German historians, if Germany had had 
 a case which was even plausible. 
 
 In any case, the result of these restrictions has been 
 that, while for many of the Independent leaders, the 
 crucial question has been the "Question of Guilt" 
 (Schuldfrage) , because it is the answer to this ques- 
 tion which for them proves that Germany's war is an 
 aggressive one, this is just the question as to which 
 they are not allowed to give a free and full exposition 
 of the facts as they see them. Many false statements 
 made on the other side have to go unchallenged. In 
 default of being allowed to argue the question of fact, 
 the Independents are driven to shift the controversy 
 on to the ground of principle, and argue, either as if 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 263 
 
 all their opponents of the old Party held position A, 
 and were for supporting the national Government,' even 
 in an unrighteous war ("My country, right or 
 wrong") or as if they themselves held position D, 
 and condemned co-operation with the Government 
 even in a righteous war. 
 
 To some extent they are justified in attacking the 
 old Party on the question of principle. There are 
 many, as we have seen, in the old Party who frankly 
 repudiate the traditional principles of Social Democ- 
 racy, who co-operate with the Government, not because 
 Germany is engaged in a war of self-defence, or not 
 for that reason only, but because they believe that the 
 time has come for the Social Democrats to work, like 
 other Parties, by arrangements with the Government. 
 So far, the Independents may truly claim that it is 
 they who are faithful to the Party tradition. Here 
 the Umlerner closes with them and argues for a 
 flexible and intelligent adaptation to changing circum- 
 stances as against a rigid mechanical adherence to tra- 
 dition, a riding of abstract principles to death (Prinsi- 
 pienreiterei) , a doe trinaire blindness . This is one of 
 the stock themes in the arguments against the Inde- 
 pendents. The trouble is that it really applies only 
 to those among the Independents who hold position D. 
 If, under the stress of war, many of the old Party 
 have repudiated the traditional revolutionary policy 
 in favour of a policy of co-operation in the State, there 
 are also, we must remember, among the Independents 
 those who before the war desired to move in the direc- 
 tion of co-operation — Bernstein, for instance. It is 
 not a question of principle, but of fact, which sepa- 
 rates position C from position B. 
 
 Those on the Right of the old Party are, we may 
 repeat, divided from the Independents in principle. 
 
264 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 An utterance of Wolfgang Heine's ^ is quoted in the 
 Bremer Burger-Zeitung for May i, 1916: — 
 
 Even if the present German Government bore the sole guilt 
 for the war; even if — as our enemies allege — it had let slip 
 the dogs of war with the purpose of subjugating Europe, even 
 so we could not act in a manner different from that in which 
 we have done. 
 
 If this is not subscribing to the principle "My country, 
 right or wrong," what is ? And other utterances of 
 Heine and those like him imply the same standpoint. 
 Nor is this attitude on the part of the German Socialist 
 Right a new thing in this war. Heine has recently 
 reprinted utterances of his own at the Stuttgart Inter- 
 national Socialist Congress of 1907, to prove that he 
 put forward such views as far back as that, and he 
 claims that his statements met with no protest any- 
 where in the Social Democrat Party: — 
 
 The fight against military arrogance, etc. ... is one of 
 the tasks of national civilization. The consciousness of this 
 does not discharge us from the duty of defending German 
 civilization, if it is menaced by outside enemies. And it is 
 true that in such an event it is hardly possible to enter upon 
 nice distinctions between aggressive and defensive wars. 
 That question may be pretty hard to decide and is certain 
 in any case to be a debatable one. But there will never be 
 any difficulty in making out clearly whether Germany is in 
 danger. . . . If it is ever a case of the German nation being 
 imperilled, we [Socialists] cannot take the line of refusing to 
 repel this peril because we have not provoked it. . . . We 
 must not let the German people and German civilization 
 suffer for it, because the ruling classes of Germany have 
 brought them into danger. We, too, should have to take up 
 arms, not in order to secure the power of the Government 
 
 'Heine is a successful lawyer, who joined the Socialist body 
 only when well on in life. He has been during the war one 
 of the principal spokesmen of the Right wing. 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 265 
 
 and the ruling classes, but on behalf of our people and its 
 best possessions; that would be the real gain of the conflict, 
 even if once more, as usual, the rulers knew how to gather 
 in for themselves the immediate profits of the military re- 
 pulse of the enemy. This is the only possible policy. In peace- 
 time, yes, it is our task to work for peace. . . . But if, in 
 spite of our efforts, war comes, then the people, with its 
 frontiers, its possessions, its security, and its freedom menaced, 
 could not tolerate our embarking on elaborate consideratiops 
 and arguing backwards and forwards as to who bore the guilt 
 for the war.' 
 
 The material welfare of the German working-class 
 is spoken of as the consideration overriding every 
 other for the German Socialist in the event of war. 
 It is quite obvious that when once the German State 
 is involved in a war, whether a just war or an unjust 
 one, defeat must spell material loss of some kind, the 
 burden of which will fall in greater or less measure 
 upon the German working-class. One cannot get 
 away from the law written broadly over history — 
 Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi. When a German 
 Socialist argues: "Defeat would mean such and such 
 privations, which would be felt in every German 
 working-class home," the fact, if true at all, is true 
 quite apart from the moral character of the war. If 
 he goes on to infer "Therefore I am bound to do all 
 I can to help the German State to victory," that is, 
 in effect, to treat the moral character of the war as 
 irrelevant for practical policy.^ You cannot accept 
 
 'Quoted by Heine in the Silddeutsche MonaUckefte, March 
 1915, and reprinted in Heine's collected war articles, Zur 
 Deutschlands Erneuerung (1916), p. 34. 
 
 'Cunow notes as a feature of the present phase of working- 
 class opinion in Germany an aversion from all theory: — 
 
 "Anybody who to-day talks about theoretical questions with 
 intelligent working-men, even with such as were formerly 
 
266 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 both principles as valid for a Socialist: "Act in such 
 a way that the working-class of your own nation may 
 suffer least loss," and "Act according to the character 
 of the war, according as it is just or unjust"; for 
 the two principles conflict. If you accept the first, 
 you definitely put the national point of view above 
 the moral. A German Socialist who accepts the 
 first has no ground for censuring the Socialists of 
 enemy countries if they too do all they can to help 
 their respective nations to victory. And sometimes a 
 German Majority Socialist is logical enough to admit 
 this:— 
 
 Vorwdrts says that we, the Social Democrats of the Majority, 
 have no right to reproach French Socialists for supporting their 
 Government. We don't reproach them on that score; on the 
 contrary, we respect their patriotism, and it is just we of the 
 Majority, who have supported our country in its hour of 
 need, who are qualified to understand the standpoint of the 
 French Socialists and to deal with them — ^not those who, like 
 the Minority, have left their German Fatherland in the lurch 
 in the hour of its increasing danger (Wolfgang Heine in the 
 Internationale Korrespondenz, quoted in the Frankfurter 
 Zeitung, February 3, 1916, and edition). 
 
 This, if you accept the national consideration as 
 the decisive one, is quite consistent: Every Socialist 
 is right in supporting his country in a war: therefore 
 
 keenly interested in discussions of this kind, only too often 
 gets the answer, 'Hardly one of the things which our theo- 
 retical authorities prophesied to us as the certain consequences 
 of a world-war has come true; almost everything has turned 
 out quite different. But what is the good of a theory if it 
 cannot foresee, and only proves to you twenty or thirty years 
 after the event that everything happened as it was bound 
 to happen? Better leave all theory aside and just go in 
 for practical work.'" {Die Neue Zeit for December 28, 1918, 
 p. 294). 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 267 
 
 we German Socialists are right in voting money to the 
 German Government, and the French Socialists are 
 right in voting money to the French Government. 
 When, however, German SociaHsts who take this view 
 argue that the Independents are inconsistent because 
 they censure German SociaHsts for voting war-credits 
 and excuse the action ot French Socialists for doing 
 the same thing, this is false. For the Independents 
 do not accept the national consideration as the pre- 
 dominant one. They make everything turn upon the 
 moral character of the war. Therefore the German 
 Socialists, in voting war-credits, and the French Social- 
 ists in voting war-credits are not doing the same thing. 
 The German Socialists are voting money to carry on 
 an aggressive war, and the French Socialists are voting 
 money to carry on a mainly defensive war. There is, 
 therefore, no inconsistency at all, from the Independent 
 standpoint, in censuring the German Socialists and 
 relatively justifying the French Socialists. 
 
 One must say a "mainly" defensive war, because 
 the Independents would not admit, probably, that the 
 war for the French was purely defensive. The Inde- 
 pendents, as we have seen, in the question of Alsace- 
 Lorraine, stand for the plebiscite solution ; and though 
 this has apparently now been accepted by a large part 
 of the French Socialists, the French Government still 
 repudiates it. The purpose of the French Government 
 is apparently to conquer back Alsace-Lorraine, without 
 a plebiscite; this would, from the point of view of the 
 German Independents, import an aggressive element 
 into the French warfare. On the other hand, in pro- 
 portion as the German action in the inception of the 
 war was aggressive, to that extent the French action 
 is regarded by the German Independents as defensive. 
 
 Or again, if the Independents choose the second 
 
268 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 of the two principles stated above — "Act according 
 to the character of the war, according as it is just 
 or unjust" — they must be prepared to forego the first 
 of the two principles, "Act in such a way that the 
 working-class of your own nation may suffer least 
 loss." That is to say, the Independents must be 
 prepared to say: "We are advocating a policy by which 
 we know that the working-class of our own country 
 will suffer losses, which it would not suffer if the 
 alternative policy were successfully carried through." 
 This is a hard saying, and I do not know that the 
 Independents quite face it. It gives the Majority 
 the chance of an effective thrust in argument. They 
 have only to depict the consequences of a German 
 defeat — the poverty and social misery which would 
 follow it — and press the question upon the Inde- 
 pendents: "Are you prepared to advocate a policy 
 which leads to this rather than a policy which makes 
 the victory of the German State the dominant consid- 
 eration?" It would require almost superhuman moral 
 courage on the part of the Independents to answer 
 by a plain "Yes." They try to escape the dilemma 
 by arguing that, as a matter of fact, the policy of 
 the Majority would not lead to victory; victory 
 in this war is impossible for either side. If they 
 once admitted that victory was possible for Germany, 
 they would be fast-held to the necessity of making 
 a choice between the dreadful alternatives of helping 
 to victory a cause which they believed to be unjust 
 or of advocating the policy which they believed 
 to entail the heavier loss for the German people. 
 One understands, therefore, why they fervently 
 repeat on every occasion that victory is impossible, 
 that in this war "there can be neither victors nor 
 vanquished." 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 269 
 
 By pressing this question, the Majority thus force 
 the Minority from the ground of principle to the 
 ground of fact — whether victory is possible for Ger- 
 many. This is not a question which can be answered 
 by applying any Socialist principles, but only by an 
 estimate of the actual military situation and the re- 
 sources on either side. And as to those matters, the 
 Majority may say with some appearance of reason 
 that Hindenburg and Capelle are better judges than 
 Haase or Bernstein. 
 
 So far the Majority may seem to score in argument. 
 From a standpoint outside Germany, no doubt the 
 Majority seem wrong and the Minority right on the 
 question whether a German victory is possible (most of 
 us in England believe that a decisive defeat of Ger- 
 many is not only possible but probable, if we persist), 
 but we must bear in mind that the situation cannot but 
 look different to those for whom the German General 
 Staff is the supreme authority on military facts. If 
 one occupying an outside standpoint may here throw 
 in a criticism of the German domestic controversy, I 
 should ask whether the Majority can show that a 
 German victory (if they discard indemnities) could 
 now diminish, to any appreciable extent, the poverty 
 and social misery they forecast in the event of a Ger- 
 man defeat. The economic welfare of Germany in the 
 time after the war will not depend on whether they 
 retain or lose Alsace-Lorraine and Prussian Poland, 
 but on whether they can build up again their trade 
 with the rest of the world. And an issue of the war 
 which left Germany in possession of Alsace-Lorraine 
 and Prussian Poland might quite conceivably make it 
 harder for Germany to restore her foreign trade than 
 an issue which was a clear German defeat. But of 
 that this is not the place to speak further. 
 
270 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 There is also another way in which the Minority 
 Socialists since the beginning of the war have tried to 
 get out of the dilemma. They plead that by voting 
 against war-credits they are not impeding the national 
 defence, because, as a matter of fact, their vote, as 
 that of a Minority in the Reichstag, will have no 
 practical effect. It will serve as a protest which 
 relieves them of responsibility, but will not cause a 
 single soldier less to be equipped and moved to the 
 frontier. One must allow that this argument is 
 sophistical. It is easy for the advocates of the Ma- 
 jority to triumph over it. In the cruel dilemma in 
 which the Minority are placed, between their love of 
 their country and their love of international justice, 
 every excuse must be made for them. And yet, one 
 must regret that they should ever adopt a line of 
 defence which can only injure their case by its palpable 
 weakness. 
 
 We have noticed the consistency of certain utter- 
 ances of Heine, which imply that the national con- 
 sideration ought to be the determining one with a 
 Socialist and which justify the French Socialists for 
 supporting their Government. But, although logically, 
 if the supremacy of the national consideration were 
 once established, this by itself would give a perfectly 
 adequate justification to the action of the German 
 Majority — as in position A — no German Socialist 
 would actually feel happy "and comfortable if he had 
 his stand upon the national consideration alone. To 
 give him the feeling of moral security, he has to 
 buttress the national consideration by borrowing the 
 minor premise of position B. He has to assert that, 
 although, even if the war were an unjust one, it would 
 still be his duty to help his Fatherland to victory, 
 yet, as a matter of fact, the war is a defensive one for 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 271 
 
 Germany. In the same article of Heine's in which the 
 passage justifying the French SociaHsts quoted above 
 is to be found he writes a Uttle lower down: "The 
 German Social Democrats know that they are waging 
 a war of defence, while the French, by aiming at the 
 recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, are actually waging a war 
 of conquest." For this reason, it would probably be 
 difficult to find position A represented in its purity 
 among German Majority Socialists. Those whose atti- 
 tude seems, when analysed to its psychological basis, 
 to be A — like Heine's — ^habitually oscillate in argu- 
 ment between A and B. 
 
 It appears, then, that the old Party and the Inde- 
 pendents are divided by a real difference of belief — 
 either on a matter of principle or on a matter of fact 
 — which issues in different modes of action. If such 
 be the case, it is hopeless to think that Party unity 
 could have been maintained, or could be restored, with- 
 out a radical conversion of either one side or the other. 
 The reproaches which the Majority direct against the 
 Independents for disrupting the Party and the re- 
 proaches which the Independents direct against the 
 authorities of the old Party for insisting upon con- 
 formity of action within the Party, seem both equally 
 unreasonable. 
 
 It is the favourite argument on the Majority side 
 that while complete liberty of opinion is allowed in 
 the Party, all Comrades are bound in their action to 
 follow the decisions of the constituted authorities — 
 of the Directorate or of the Majority of the Reichstag 
 Group, as the case may be. Without such loyal sub- 
 ordination of individual opinion to discipline, they say, 
 the Party could not continue; and they demonstrate 
 this fairly obvious point circumstantially. But it is 
 equally obvious that the subordination of individual 
 
272 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 opinion can only be justly demanded when the dis- 
 agreement does not concern a fundamental matter. 
 Where a major disagreement is in question, for the 
 individual to act contrary to his opinion may well be 
 disloyalty to a higher cause than that of Party unity. 
 In the case, therefore, of a major disagreement, there 
 is nothing for it but that the dissentients should 
 separate. And the disagreement of the Majority and 
 Minority as to the war was disagreement on the fore- 
 most issue of the day. "That is all very well," cer- 
 tain members of the Majority are disposed to say. 
 "We admit that in the circumstances the Majority 
 and Minority could not act together. But the Minority 
 might have withdrawn noiselessly ; they need not have 
 tried to split the Party by propagating their own 
 views." But this, again, is not reasonable. From the 
 standpoint of the Minority, they are bound to propa- 
 gate their views. If what they believe is true, it 
 is they, and not the old Party, who are faithful 
 to the cause of SociaHsm; loyalty to that cause and 
 regard for the greatest good of men lays an obligation 
 upon them to propagate their views. The Majority 
 may reasonably try to demonstrate to them that 
 their views are wrong, but they cannot reasonably sug- 
 gest to them that they should hold their views and be 
 silent. 
 
 It seems equally unreasonable on the side of the 
 Minority to make it a grievance that the Party authori- 
 ties did not tolerate their remaining in the Party and 
 taking divergent action. Their contention that the 
 competence to expel them or determine their action 
 was vested only in a Parteitag, not in the Directorate 
 of the Party or in the Reichstag Group, may have 
 been quite correct according to the letter of the Party 
 Constitution, but was impossibly doctrinaire in the 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 273 
 
 circumstances. The constitution was not framed for 
 the emergency of a war, and it would be wholly un- 
 reasonable to expect the Party leaders at such a crisis 
 to tolerate action within the Party, which thwarted 
 the policy of the Party, because the Constitution, as it 
 stood, did not happen to give them the requisite 
 powers. From their standpoint they were plainly 
 bound to assume to themselves the powers necessary 
 to hold the Party together and wait for the future 
 Parteitag to justify them retrospectively. If what they 
 believed was true, they could not have acted with 
 greater forbearance without failing in their duty to 
 the Party and to the Fatherland. 
 
 If the case is as we have stated, a division of the 
 Party was absolutely inevitable if each side acted ac- 
 cording to its beliefs. We may blame, if we will, one 
 side or the other for having the beliefs that they do 
 have, or we may question whether they sincerely 
 believe the things they profess to believe, but if we 
 regard their beliefs as honest beliefs, it is difficult to 
 see where either side was to blame in the series of 
 actions which led to the Party split. And while the 
 beliefs on either side remain what they are, it is difficult 
 to see how the maximum of goodwill on both sides 
 could restore unity. 
 
 It seems evident that, when all is said and done, 
 the old Party has moments of discomfort, as they go 
 on time after time voting credits for the German war. 
 They still want to feel that they, as Social Democrats, 
 faithful to their principles, are essentially the party 
 of peace. In this respect it is not pleasant for them 
 to be outdone by the Independents, who refuse to vote 
 credits. The speakers and writers of the Majority, 
 therefore, lose no opportunity to protest with passion- 
 ate re-iteration that they desire peace, that Germany, 
 
274 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
 
 as represented by the Reichstag, desires peace, that it 
 is the enemy who repels with contumely every offer 
 of peace. This sounds edifying; it is, of course, in 
 reality absolutely empty of significance. That is to 
 say, it is either not true or it is a truism. If it meant 
 that the Majority Socialists were ready to accept peace 
 at any price and the enemy persisted nevertheless in 
 fighting, because he loved war in itself, it would not 
 be true. If it means that the Majority Socialists are 
 ready to make peace on the terms they think fair, but 
 the enemy is not willing to make peace on those terms, 
 it is no doubt true enough, but it is hardly worth say- 
 ing. It is true of all the belligerents, without distinc- 
 tion, that they desire peace on the terms they think 
 fair, even the Pan-Germans, or the extreme Jingoes 
 on the side of the Entente — unless there are people 
 inhuman enough to prefer that the carnage should go 
 on because it brings them individual profit — desire 
 peace on the terms they think fair. The desire for 
 peace in itself is something which may be taken for 
 granted in any man with the least vestige of feeling 
 or intelligence. It is all a question of the terms. If 
 the statesmen on our side have refused to enter into 
 conversation as to the terms at this stage, that is be- 
 cause the Germans have made it perfectly clear from 
 their side that they are not willing to consider the 
 terms which we think fair, and conversations, while 
 this is so, would be worse than a waste of time. 
 
 If the Majority German Socialists expressed what 
 they really mean, they would probably say: "The terms 
 we desire are fair ones, but the terms the enemy desires 
 are not." That would be a proposition of some import, 
 but it would also be so highly controversial a one 
 that it would not serve so well to tranquillize the 
 Socialist conscience as a continual asseveration of the 
 
SURVEY OF THE CONTROVERSY 275 
 
 undoubted fact that they desire peace. The German 
 Majority Socialists, as we have seen, consider that a 
 return to the status quo of July 19 14 would constitute 
 a peace on fair terms. One at any rate of them, 
 Paul Lensch, has incidentally explained (see pp. 210, 
 211) that this would mean a complete triumph for 
 Germany and would spell for England, France, and 
 Italy the beginning of ruin. We do not consider these 
 terms fair ones. . . . 
 
 In examining the arguments used by Majority and 
 Minority in their controversy, we must not forget that 
 the adherence of men to one Party or the other is 
 largely determined by other causes than logic. It is 
 likely enough that, as a Majority writer says, the great 
 mass of those who, during the past year, have passed 
 from the Majority to the Independents, have cared 
 little about the principles for which the Independent 
 leaders contend with such zeal. 
 
 The war, which by the first calculations was to last at 
 most five or six months, dragged on and on. The trench- 
 warfare set in. One State after another was sucked into the 
 vortex. Hence the sacrifices in killed, in wounded, in maimed, 
 mounted up; so did the sufferings which the war soon im- 
 posed upon every family, upon some families in crushing 
 volume; so did the privations in the country itself, in conse- 
 quence of the deficiency of foodstuffs, which made itself more 
 and more painfully felt, aggravated by the faulty State- 
 organization. Under this combined assault of bodily and 
 mental anguish, which gnawed ever farther in consequence of 
 the abiding anxiety as to the life of friends and relations 
 out in the field and as to the daily bread, the original Socialist 
 feeling of great masses of people could not hold out per- 
 manently. The former relation between the leaders and the 
 masses was reversed. That section among the leaders who 
 had gone off antecedently on a line of their own now gained 
 a considerable number of new adherents; at the same time, 
 the new adherent? more and more got the cpnduqt of things 
 
276 GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY; 
 
 into their hands and traced a particular course for the actions 
 of the Opposition. What had originally been nothing more 
 than a doctrinaire revolt, now acquired the character of a mass- 
 movement driven forward by instinct rather than by any clear 
 understanding. Thereby the import of the opposition move- 
 ment became different; the leaders in the meantime had long 
 left their first track, in order to reduce their opposition to 
 a sort of system which aimed at more than the stopping of 
 the war, at the stopping of war altogether, whilst what the 
 mass of the people craved was just peace as soon as possible — 
 that, no more and no less, a cessation of the anguish which the 
 war had brought upon them. . . . 
 
 It is not true that the masses are torn asunder by profound 
 disagreements in principle, by different fundamental concep- 
 tions. . . . The masses, for the most part, have no knowledge 
 of theoretical disagreements, and for that reason feel no inter- 
 est in all the Party controversy as such. . . . The Party con- 
 troversy is carried on almost entirely by the leaders. . . . 
 What the masses want is peace; they want peace immediately, 
 and since they largely believe that they can get it only by 
 fighting against their own Government, and this fight does not 
 seem to them to be carried on energetically enough by the 
 Old Social Democrat Party, they either desert the Party alto- 
 gether, grumbling and dissatisfied, or they range themselves 
 with those who, it seems to them, are carrying on this fight 
 more relentlessly and who make them the biggest promises — 
 the Independent Party. What brings adherents to the Inde- 
 pendents is the general embitterment.* 
 
 This is the testimony of a member of the Majority, 
 but one may believe that it is not far from the truth. 
 
 ' Karl Wendemuth in Die Neue Zeit for November 9, 1917. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Albrecht, ji, 72, 93 n. 
 Alexinsky, Grfigoiie, quoted, 26 
 Alsace-Lorraine, 57, 58, 85, 124, 
 
 16s, 166, 172, 17s, 224, 243, 
 
 244, 247, 267, 269, 271 
 America, United States, 127, 166, 
 
 177-80, iSg, 208, 236 
 Antrick, 72, 93 n., 226 
 "Antrick-Hoch Section," the, 134, 
 
 IS7, 201, 246 
 Appleton, W. A., 10 
 Auer, 27, 241 
 Austria-Hungary, s-9> ", S8, 98, 
 
 I2S, 172, 189 n., 213, 237, 238, 
 
 244 
 Auxiliary Service Law, 141-3, 226, 
 
 227 
 
 Bacmeister, quoted, 199 n. 
 Baudert, 72 
 Bauer, 86, 164, 238 
 Bebel, August, 17, 107, 256 
 Belgium, 16, 17, 21, 28, 40, 41, 
 
 S4, S8, S9. 6s, 66, 79, 88, 125, 
 
 143, 16s, 167, 173, 211-13, 224, 
 
 225, 236, 247, 253 
 Berchtold, Count, 6 
 Berger, Richard, quoted, 32 n., 35 
 
 n., 68 n., 69 n., 72 n., 74, 113 n. 
 Bergstrasser, Ludwig, 261 
 Berlin, 4, 73, 74, 114, 1x5, 118-20, 
 
 139-41, I4S. 149, IS4- 
 Berner Tagwacht, the, 50, $$, 100, 
 
 Bemstem, Eduard, 3, 16, 19, 20, 
 36, 37. S1-3, 55, 57, 61, 71, 8s, 
 93, q8, ioi, 137, 141, 168, 170, 
 263 
 
 Bethmann Hollweg, 6, 15, 17, 21, 
 40, 41, 48, 6s, 69, 70, 117, 122, 
 I2S, 137, 138, 140, 142-4, 151, 
 152, 160, 183, 184, 187, 191, 212 
 
 Binder, 86 
 
 Blanc, Alexandre, 100, loi 
 
 Bios, 86 
 
 Bock, Wilhehn, 71, 92 n., 109, 152 
 
 Bohle, 86 
 
 Borchardt, Julian, 64, 83, loS, 1S3 
 
 Brandes, 72 
 
 Branting, 163 
 Braun, Adolf, 7, 243 
 Braun, Otto, 44, 241, 243 
 Bremen, 50, 118, 142, is6; Bremer 
 
 Bilrger-Zeiiung, the, 117 
 Breslauer Volkswackt, the, 4, 85, 
 
 86 
 Brey, 86 
 Britain, 8, 74, 12s, 127, 166, 178- 
 
 80, 188, 209, 211, 238; British 
 
 trade unions, 10, 236, 238 
 Brizon, Pierre, 100, 102, 103 
 Brtihne, 86 
 Brunner, Louis, 149 
 Bnmswick, 118, 142, 156 
 Biichner, 71, 92 n. 
 Bulow, Prince von, 206 
 
 Capelle, Admiral von, 218-20, 269 
 Censorship, the, 62, 93, 134, 138, 
 
 141, 190, 192, 227, 228 
 Chemniizer Volksstimme, the, 4, 
 
 78, 83-5, 87, 122, 142, is6 
 Cohen, 86, 247 
 Cohn, Oskar, 71, 92 n., 169 
 Colonies, 3, 58, iS7, 166, i73, 25° 
 Constitution Committee, the, 160, 
 
 181, 182, 192 
 Crispien, 35 
 Crown Prince, the ("WiUiam 
 
 Junior"), 11 
 Cunow, Heinrich, 2, 28 n., 37, 38, 
 
 86, 233, 249, 26s n. 
 Czemin, Count, 213, 214 
 
 Daumig, 141, 152 
 
 David, Eduard, 3, 8, 41 n., 57-60, 
 73, 84, 86, 96, 97, 106, 107, 113, 
 116, 120, 124, 132-4, 160, 165, 
 179, 180 n., 194, 203, 204, 219, 
 246, 262 
 
 Davidsohn, 87 
 
 Deichmann, 86 
 
 Delbruck, Dr. Clemens, 24 
 
 Dietz, 86 
 
 Dittmann, Wilhelm, is, 71, 92 n., 
 95, 110, 217, 219, 221, 223, 224, 
 252 
 
 Duisberg, 82, 145 
 
 277 
 
278 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Dumoulin, lo 
 Duncker, Kate, 132 
 
 Ebert, Fritz, 4, 7, 48, 72, 73. 77. 87, 
 "3. 131. 132. 134, 143. IS4. 164, 
 16-5. 177. 194, 221. 222, 234, 240, 
 241, 243, 251 
 
 Eisner, Kurt, 37 
 
 Emmel, 72, 93 n. 
 
 Emperor, the, see Kaiser. 
 
 England, see Britain. 
 
 Erdmann, August, 37, 72, 201 
 
 Erdmann, Karl, 153 
 
 Ewald, 72 
 
 Falkenhayn, 189 
 
 Fernau, Hermann, 262 
 
 Feuerstein, 86 
 
 Fischer, Edmund, 3, 72, 93 n. 
 
 Fischer, Richard, 3, 13, 86, 112, 
 "3, 139, iSi. 164, 241 
 
 Foerster, F. W., 228 
 
 France, 8, 16, 27, 28, 138, 166, 
 167. 175. 178-80, 209, 211, 236, 
 267; French Socialists, 12-14, 
 27, 76, 100-3, 125, 266, 267 
 
 Frank, Ludwig, 3, 22 
 
 Frankfurt, 9, 47 n., 118, 119, 130, 
 13s; Frankfurter Volkistimme, 
 118 
 
 Frassek, 131 
 
 Frohme, 43 
 
 Fuchs, 72 
 
 Geek, Oskar, 86 
 
 Gerlach, H. von, 199 n. 
 
 Geyer, Fritz, 71, 72, 87, 92 n., 109, 
 
 Giebel, 87 
 
 Gleichheit, Die, iS4. iS6, 158, 232 
 
 Glocke, Die, 27, 121, 123, 127, 209. 
 
 210 
 Gohre, 86 
 
 Gotha, Conference at, 152, 153 
 Gradnauer, 77, 160, 224 
 Grenz, 21 n., 86 
 Greulich, 238 
 Grimm, Robert, 100 
 Groner, General, 226 
 
 Haase, Hugo, 2, 4, 7-9, 12, 15, 
 18-20, 33, 37, 40, 41 n., 47 n„ 
 48, so-3, 60, 62, 69-72, 7s, 77, 
 92-s, 98, 99. 101, los, 107, 108, 
 
 112, 121 n., 124, I2S, 126, 133, 
 
 134, 136, 14s. 146. 149. T-55, 
 
 160, 168-70, 187-93, 219, 220, 
 
 223, 251 
 Haberland, 87 
 Haegy, ijo 
 Haenisch, Conrad, 27, 44, 86, 88, 
 
 126-8 
 Haller, 261 
 
 Hamburg, 74, 75, 130, iSS; Barn- 
 burger Echo, 4, 75, 95, 120 
 Harden, Maximilian, 227 
 Hamack, Adolf, 30 
 Headlam, J. W., 262 
 Heffter, 242 
 
 Heilmann, Ernst, 86, 209, 210 
 Heim, 86 
 Heine, Wolfgang, 3, 18, 58, 86, 
 
 93, 96, 97. "3, 13s. 160, 227, 
 
 228, 264, 266, 270, 271 
 Heissner, 100 
 Helfferich, 185, 194, 215-17, 253, 
 
 262 
 Helmolt, 261 
 Helphand, see Parvus 
 Henke, 17, 51, 72, 92 n., iii 
 Hertling, Count, 234, 252, 253 
 Herzfeld, 17, 51, 72, 92 n., no, 
 
 168 
 Heymann, 86 
 Hierl, 87 
 
 Hilferding, Rudolf, 37 
 Hindenburg, 185, 188, 209 n., 228 
 Hirsch, Paul, 43, 44, 79, 142, 
 
 148 
 Hoch, 72, 77, 93 n., 193, 246, 247; 
 
 see also Antrick-Hoch Section 
 Hofer, 44, 109, 142, 169 
 Hofiman, Adolf, 44, 63, 84, 100-2, 
 
 108, 142, 148 
 Hoffman, J. (of Kaiserslautem), 
 
 87, 160 
 Hoffmann, Paul, 44, 142 
 Hofrichter, 72, 93 n. 
 Hollweg, see Bethmann HoUweg 
 Holzmeier, 156 
 Horn, 72, 92 n., 109 
 Hornung, 232 
 Hubrich, 104 
 Hu€, 44, 90 
 Hugel, 72 
 
 Hiittman, 72, 93 n., 242 
 Huysmans, Camille, 13 
 
INDEX 
 
 279 
 
 International Socialist Bureau, the, 
 9, lo, 13, 8s, loi, 102, 143 
 
 "International Socialists of Ger- 
 many," the, 63 n., 83, 84, loi, 
 114, 131, 133, 146, 152, IS3, 202 
 
 Internationale, Die (periodical), 32 
 
 Internationale Korrespondenz, 209, 
 210 
 
 Internationale, the, 33, 38, 39, 67, 
 83-5, 102, 108 
 
 Italy, 13 n., 25, 48, 100, 12s, 166, 
 211, 236, 238 
 
 "J'Accuse," author of, 262 
 jackel, 72, 93 n., 250 
 Ja£E6, JProfessor, 249 
 Jansson, 27, 124, 127 
 Jaur^s, 13 
 Jouhauz, 10 
 
 Kaempf,/42 
 
 Kaiser, the, 2, 7, 24, 176, 184, 194 
 
 Kappler, 86 
 
 Katzenstein, 243 
 
 Kautsky, Karl, 2, 4, 17, 30, 31. 37, 
 SI, 52, 6s, 67, 84, loi, 130, 152, 
 1S4. 168, 171, 233, 234, 242 
 
 Keil, 86, 93 
 
 Eerensky, 210 
 
 Kiental, Conference at, 100-3 
 
 Kloth, 86 
 
 Eluss, no 
 
 Kolb, 3, 54, 67, 73, 86, 120, 210, 
 
 243. 25s 
 KSnig, 15, 87 
 Korsten, 86 
 Kratzig, 72, 77, 243 
 Krause, 118 
 Kiihlmann, 224, 225 
 Kuhn, 86, 117 
 Kunert, 22, 51, 72, 92 n. 
 
 Landsberg, 68-70, 86, 105-7, 215, 
 
 248 
 Lassalle, 152 
 
 Lebas, maire of Roubaiz, 27 
 Ledebour, Georg, 2, 45, 47, 51, 55, 
 
 63, 72, 77, 84, 92 n.i 9S. 107. 
 
 108, 117, 131, 160, 169, 205, 
 
 225, 252 
 Legien, Carl, 10, 43, 64, 73, 81, 
 
 86, IIS, 142, 159, 164, 200, 201, 
 
 23s, 237 
 Leinert, 44 
 
 Leipzig, 154; Leipziger Volkszei- 
 tung, the, 4, 39, SI, 52, 67, 86, 
 87, 139, 141, 149, 168, 178, 193, 
 200, 207, 212, 214, 232, 233 
 
 Lenin, loi 
 
 Lensch, Paul, 2, 27, 38, 53, 55, 86, 
 123, 13s, 156, IS7, 210, 211, 
 243, 24s, 250, 275 
 
 Leutert, 72, 93 n. 
 
 Lewald, 160 
 
 Liebknecht, Karl, 2, 17, 21, 23, 33, 
 34, 39, 42-4, 46, 48, SI, S4, 55, 
 59, 60, 72, 77, 82-4, 87, 88, 94, 
 103-6, 108, 118, 142, 148, 149, 
 193, 260 
 
 Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 17, 34, 107, 
 152, 209, 256 
 
 Lipinski, 140, 14s 
 
 Lobe, 247, 249 
 
 Lobell, von, i 
 
 Ludendorff, see Hindenburg 
 
 Luxburg, 225 
 
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 2, 52, 83, 116, 
 153 
 
 Macdonald, Ramsay, 169 
 
 Man, Henri de, 13 
 
 Mehring, Franz, 2, 31, 37, 83, 114, 
 148, 149, 162, 212, 213, 260 
 
 Meyer, Dr. Ernst, 100, 102, 113 
 
 Michaelis, Dr. Georg, 184-8, 195, 
 196, 199 n., 202-6, 212, 213, 
 216-23, 225, 234, 240, 250, 252 
 
 Molkenbuhr, 7, 15, 86, 164, 194, 
 
 243 
 Mliller, August, 196, 197 
 Miiller, Hermann, 12-14, 114, 116- 
 
 18, 139, 164, 243, 244 
 Muller (of Meiningen), 227 
 
 Naumann ,Friedrich, 222; quoted 
 
 3^' 33. ^. 
 Neue Zett, Die, 4, 84, i54, 233, 
 
 234, 252 
 Niederbamim, 114 
 Noske, 86, 113, iS7 
 
 Oncken, 261 
 Oschatz-Grimma elestion, 140 
 
 Parvus, 26 
 Payer, von, 253 
 Peirotes, 72 
 Pens, 86, 97, 245 
 Pfannkrch, 86 
 
280 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Pfluger, 248 
 
 Poetzsch, 107 
 
 Pope, Note of the, 211 
 
 Potsdam election, 148 
 
 Prahavan, quoted, 26 
 
 Prussian Landtag, i, 33, 43, 44, 
 
 54, 79, 88, 142, 144, 148, 149, 
 
 184-6, 188 
 Puttkamer, 220 
 
 Quarck, 86 
 Quessel, 3, 86, 135 
 
 Radek, Karl, 63, 64, 83, 101 
 
 Raffin-Dugens, 100, loi 
 
 Raute, 72, 93 n. 
 
 Reichenbadi-Neurode election, the 
 117, 118 
 
 Reichnitz, 219-21 
 
 Reisshaus, 72, 93 n. 
 
 Riihle, Otto, 17, 46, 51, 60, 72, 
 78,82,83,93,106,111 
 
 Russia, 6-9, 16, a6, 28, 109, 127, 
 136, 143, 151, 157, 162, 163, 169, 
 172, 177, 179, 189, 201 
 
 Ryssel, 72, 93 n. 
 
 Sachse, 86 
 
 Sanders, W. Stephen, 4 n. 
 
 Sassebach, 164 
 
 Scheidemann, Philipp, 3, 7, 15, 27, 
 45, 46, 48, 57, 65, 66, 68-70, 77, 
 82, 87, 91, 92, 97-9, io6, 109, 
 113, 115, 117, 124, 125, 128, 
 131, 136-8, 143, 144, 150, 151, 
 ■^SS, IS7. 160, 163, 164, 175-7, 
 179-82, 186, 189, 194-6, 207, 
 208, 243, 244, 248, 251 
 
 Schiemann, 261 
 
 Schippel, Max, 5, 86, 87 
 
 Schmidt (of Meissen), 72, 93n., 226 
 
 Schmidt (of Munich), 244 
 
 Schmidt (Robert), 86 
 
 Schopflin, 87 
 
 Schiicking, 192 
 
 Schulz, Heinrich, 86, 158 
 
 Schumann, 86 
 
 SchwSbische TagwacM, the, 34, 35 
 
 Schwartz, 5t, 72, 92 n. 
 
 Severing, Carl, 233, 234, 24s 
 
 Simon, J., 72, 93 n. 
 
 Sobelsohn, see Radek 
 
 Solingen, 45, 70, 82, 128, 155 
 
 Soziddemokratische Fddpost, the, 
 no 
 
 Sozialistische Monatshefte, the, 5, 
 
 127, 197, 233, 234 
 "Spartacus" Letters, the, 87; the 
 
 ' Spartacus" section, 83, 107, 
 
 108, 146, 152, 153 
 Spiegel, 87 
 
 Stadthagen, 2, 51, 72, 92 n., 168 
 Stahl, Emil, 149 
 Stampfer, 126, 183, 210 
 Stein, Prussian Minister for War, 
 
 21S 
 
 Stolle, 51, 72, 92 n. 
 
 Stolten, 247 
 
 Stresemann, 222 
 
 Strobel, 29 n., 44, 55, 142 
 
 Stuttgart, 9, 34, 35, 145 
 
 Sudekum, 12, 13 n., 25-7, 86, 97, 
 163, 164 
 
 Tessendorf, 107 
 
 Thomas, Albert, 179 
 
 Thone, 87 
 
 Timm, 120 
 
 Tirpitz, Admiral, 188, 189, 222 
 
 Tison, R6n€, 27 
 
 Trade unions, 10, 24, 25, 47, 64, 
 65, 80, 81, 97, 100, 99, 109, III, 
 142, 143, 154, 155, 158, 164 n., 
 226, 227, 231, 232, 235-9. 
 
 Turkey, 26, 58 
 
 Vetters, 243 
 
 Vogtherr, 51, 72, 92 n., 149, 219, 
 221 
 
 Vorwarts, 4, 24, 32, 33, 47, 52-4, 
 60, 65, 69, 73, 77, 78, 80, 81, 89, 
 96, 112-16, 119, 126, 138-41, 
 iSi, I7S, 182, 183, 197, 202, 
 205, 206, 210, 211, 214, 252 
 
 Wendel, 16 
 
 Wendemuth, quoted, 275, 276 
 
 Wengels, 169 
 
 Wels, 87 
 
 Westmeyer, 35 
 
 Wildgrubbe, 140 
 
 Wilson, President, 191, 207-10 
 
 Wiimig, August, 27, 64, 80, 89 
 
 Wissell, 250 
 
 Wolff, Theodor, 198 n., 205 
 
 Wurm, 72, 92 n., 233 
 
 Zetkin, Clara, 2, 156, 158, 232 
 Zietz, Luise, 121, 252 
 Zimmeiwald, Conference at, 63 
 Zubeil, 72, 92 n., 115