. fsjvHMHrt.i'" li'r ' t^ QJornf U ICatu i'rljiiol ffiibtary Cornell University Library JX 5316.Z41 A critical study of the emergency iegisi 3 1924 017 495 924 LIK2 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924017495924 CRITICAL STUDY OF THE EMERGENCY LEGISLATION OF WARRING NATIONS Its Effect upon the Sovereignty and Commerce of Neutral Nations, and . Upon Private International Law LECTURES BY Professor ESTANISLiO S. ZEBALLOS Delivered July 23-26, 1916, in the Law School of the ^,.„ Univerisity of Buenos Aires Translated from the original stenographic report Printed by The Fenton Press Co. at Cleveland, Ohio November, 1916 Cornell University Law Library. THE QIFT OP b&2tp Date ._ 9181 A CRITICAL STUDY \v>:a,^ OF THE EMERGENCY LEGISLATION OF WARRING NATIONS Its Effect Upt>n *^be ^^"Sovereignty /ana Commerce of Neutral Nations, and Upon Private International Law LECTURES BY Professor ESTANISLAO S. ZEBALLOS Delivered July 23-26, 1916, in the Law School of the University of Buenos Aires Translated from , the original stenographic report Printed by The Penton Press Co. at Cleveland, Ohio November, 1916 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section I Neutrality and Impartiality n Influence of the War on Private International Law III Emergency Legislation IV Domicile and Nationality V Sequestration of Property of Citizens of Hostile Countries VI Sequestration in Germany VII Sequestration in France VIII Sequestration in England IX Maritime Property X Contracts During the War ' XI Have the Citizens of a Hostile Country any Standing in Court XII Industrial Property XIII Insurance XIV Conference of the Allies on Questions of Private Law XV Nationality and Naturalization XVI Speculation and Monopoly XVII Methods of Exercising Monopoly XVIII Regulation of Trade XIX The Mails XX Supervision of the Telegraph XXI Freights XXII The Discharge of Commercial Employees XXIII The Black-List XXIV The Black-List in South America XXV Operation of the Black-List in Argentina XXVI Results XXVII The Basis of These Results XXVIII The Legislation of Italy XXIX Prohibitive Regulation of Trade in France XXX Attitude of the French Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires XXXI The Only French Law on This Subject XXXII Interpretations of the French Jurists XXXIII Statutory Trade Prohibition in Great Britain XXXIV Occurrences in Buenos Aires XXXV The New British Orders XXXVI What Do We Mean by an Enemy of Great Britain XXXVII The British Black-List XXXVIII Measures to Protect Argentine Trade XXXIX Attitude of the National Authorities XL The American Protest XLI Legal Defenses. Argentine Legislation XLII Responsibility of the Consul XLIII The Duties of Impartiality in the United States and the Argentine Republic XLIV Duties of Hospitality in the Argentine A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE EMERGENCY LEGISLATION OF WARRING NATIONS; ITS EFFECT UPON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND COMMERCE OF NEUTRAL NATIONS, AND UPON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAV^'. LECTURES BY PROFESSOR ESTANISLAO S. ZEBALLOS, DELIVERED JULY 23-26, 1916, IN THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BUENOS AIRES. (1) NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY War imposes political duties upon non-participating nations. The body of such duties is designated as the system of "neutrality". According to the strictly public character of this institution, it is solely applicable to the relations between sovereign states. Viola- tions of neutrality affect the private rights of individuals, whether belligerent or neutral, in many incidental ways. As a general rule, the enforcement of neutrality is entrusted to special tribunals of varied jurisdiction and character and with administrative, political and judicial functions combined, which are organized by the warring states for the period of hostilities. These matters constitute a distinct branch of private international law. What should be the moral and legal attitude of the individuals of a neutral country toward those of a belligerent country? There are so many personal duties growing out of a state of political neutrality that they constitute a system of social life' as a guarantee of public peace and civil liberty, a system which may be appropriately called that of "impartiality". War is not made upon private persons, nor upon private property, nor do private persons war between themselves. An attack upon either may be a necessary military recourse of defense or of attack, but in any case such action is only exercised by the public authorities and by organized forces. The unarmed inhabitants of one country do not fight with the unarmed citizens of a hostile nation. Mr. B. J. Loder, counsellor of the High Court of Justice of The Netherlands, published in the Journal de Droit International, ^Translation, and amplification of English citations, by Norton T. Horr, B. S., Cleveland, Ohio. Paris, in 1914, an article entitled "The Influence of War Upon Private Contracts", in which he calls attention to the fact that among the prohibitions established by Article 23 of the Convention of The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, relative to the customs of land warfare, is found the following: "In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden . . . (h) to declare abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and remedies of nationals of the hostile country." (Malloy, "Treaties", etc., 1910.) This principle accordingly recognizes the validity of contracts and the authority of courts in harmony with the following words of the prominent English student of international law, Mr. Westlake: "It is necessary to conclude that a state of war must be limited to the two governments which are at war and to those of their respective subjects who, in each instance, are forced to participate in the objects of the war through military organization; but, that it does not exist between individuals as such." These rules, applicable to the relations of the inhabitants of belligerent nations, acquire a very extensive and peculiar character in their application to the relations of the inhabitants of neutral countries with citizens of the belligerent nations. Each act of the inhabitants of a neutral country, which affects the tranquility, the well being, the social economy, the rights, or the interests of a citizen of any belligerent state, is an abuse of their moral and legal obligations and is a perversion of the state of impartiality which is imposed upon the individuals of neutral countries. Impartiality does not at all signify indifference, for that is an impossibility in view of the natural fellowship of the human spirit. The inhabitants of neutral countries entertain sympathies and antipathies towards the belligerent countries and their citizens, but the manifestation of such sentiment, in the exercise of the universal right of liberty of thought and speech, must recognize those limits which are universally imposed upon human actions by social decency, culture, tolerance, and the respect which is owed to the rights of others. Any excess in such manifestations is an abuse and may degen- erate into a wrong when it results in duress or unlawful restraint upon the mind, the rights, or the material interests of other residents of the neutral country. Such excess may even acquire a character of political transgression, when it results in a general atmosphere of hostility to particular social groups, and when such hostility might be interpreted by the country to whom those groups belong as evi- dence of hostility to it, particularly if the public authorities who are entrusted with the duty of preserving the public peace make no effort to restrict such conduct. For example, the local French press interpreted the remarks recently made in this school by the illustrious ambassador of Brazil, although privately and not in any official capacity, concerning the European war, as an official expression of the sentiment of the government of Brazil in favor of the allied powers. The government of Brazil made haste to protest that the ambassador's remarks were strictly of a personal and private char- acter and that the Brazilian nation is strictly conserving its neutrality. The duties of impartiality, then, require that liberty of thought can only be followed by such liberty of expression as conforms to the susceptibility of all opinions, of all nationalities, and of all interests in those civilized countries, whose education and institutions guarantee the sanctity of private rights. II INFLUENCE OF THE WAR ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW All the teachers and the writers of international law discuss the influence of war. The Argentine school maintains that private international law is independent of public international law, not- withstanding the many bonds of relationship which exist between them, as between all branches of legal science, the object of which is the good of mankind. Consequently, it is not a part of my task to examine the problems presented by the abrogation of many of the principles of public international law, some of them centuries old, or to speculate upon their possible or probable efficient re-estab- lishment in the future. Private international law considers and solves questions of private interest, divorcing them from the influence and interests of public policy so far as possible. It protects one man ctgainst another and against the state, domestic or foreign, during times of peace as well as of war. Let us now consider what has been the fate of international private law in the present universal catastrophe. Has it and the protection of its principles disappeared? It has unquestionably suffered serious consequences in the universal disaster, but fortunately to only a limited extent. While we deplore the direct and indirect disregard of the rules of public international law, those of private international law subsist and are still applied, maintaining the integrity of its principles and of its results in most cases in an atmosphere heated, it is true, by the military bonfires, but clarified by that sentiment of justice which never ceases to influence humanity, even though it be distracted by the din of battle. It is a great consolation to examine the testimonials to the high moral elevation preserved by the magistrates of belligerent nations in their protection of the rights of the' innocent ; and this glorious achievement of private international law is a portent of hope for better days for public international law. Ill EMERGENCY LEGISLATION Emergency legislation enacted by states at war interests humanity because it affects the most important achievements of mankind and principles of international law of both local and general application. It encroaches the domain of public international law as well as that of private rights, and, for that reason, its study falls well within the scope of our curriculum. Although more or less directly affected, the rules of private international la-w have not been abro- gated. They have simply been made to suffer limitations imposed by circumstances, but which do not amount to the suppression of civic liberty or of its guaranties. Even in those cases where the administration of private law has been affected by the provisions of emergency legislation, litigants have enjoyed those double guar- antees of individual freedom, a judge and an advocate, or their "day in court". True, the defense which the German now enjoys in England, and an Englishman in Germany, is not ideal as compared with that enjoyed under normal circumstances. Without in any way casting aspersions upon the German, French and British judges (I use the order of ceremonial diplomacy), parties to suits will look with distrust upon magistrates of a nationality hostile to their own ; and, under certain circumstances, the judges themselves, by a very natural psychological process, will frequently be influenced by a certain involuntary patriotic partiality. Nevertheless, it is certain that the administration of justice in these unfortunate times exhibits in every belligerent country irreproachable independence and moral elevation. We may conclude from the foregoing that the limitations imposed by emergency legislation upon private rights is moderate and exceptional; that, notwithstanding the rigid and often exagger- ated precautions of a state of war, the field of its action remains open and protected by those sentiments of justice and pity which war has strengthened in the noble spirits of every civilized commu- nity. This security of our law appears to me complete, quite different from that which may result from the application of policy to the domain of international law, the recovery of which will be subordinated to the manner in which the war ends, and to the spirit of the treaties of peace which may and should be very comprehensive and broad and not mere stepping stones to new military catastrophies. 4 IV DOMICILE AND NATIONALITY When in 1892 I was honored with a call to this University as professor of international private law, I founded that which I called the Argentine School of Private International Law, the funda- mental principles of which are expounded in my various publications, and to which I now refer, for lack of time to make any pertinent quotations of that material. At that time I asserted that the Argen- tine Constitution, which had its origin in the provisional statute of 1815, and as it was- revised in 1853, together with the civil and commercial legislation based upon it, produced a system of law which was not only a novelty in jurisprudence, but which is also a guaranty of the future development of this country, whose popula- tion is so largely the product of immigration. At that time, as well as later, in studying the two chief principles which influence private rights, nationality and domicile, I initiated my propaganda in favor of the latter system as the best means of assuring future develop- ment. This system of nationality in its final form was first adopted as a means to political ends; namely, in order to make the unity of Italy possible and to permit the reconstruction of its nationality which had been so shattered by feudalism and domestic dissension. The system of domicile had been inherited by us from the Romans. They had adopted it when they founded their world empire, which is so comparable to the modern empire of the British, and which covered the entire world known to the ancients. As they came in contact with the systems of law of conquered, subject^^ purchased, or allied peoples, the Romans, in later days so faithfully imitated by English and American statesmen, created that wonderful System of conquest which Cicero characterizes in one of his letters to Attikus, when he says: "We make the Greeks and conquered Orientals be- lieve that they are free, because we permit them to regulate their private affairs according to their own ' systems of law, and in that way they forget that they are our slaves." This political system of permitting all the existing forms of law to continue side by side within the territory of the empire, forms the foundation of the system of private law based upon that of the domicile; the individual is competent or incompetent, major or minor, married or single, divorced or not divorced, his marriage is valid or invalid, his offspring is legitimate or bastard, all according to the law of the land which the person in question has chosen of his own free will as his domicile. The system of domicile is, therefore, the highest guaranty of 5 the freedom of the individual who can select for himself the locality in which he prefers to establish a family, to acquire property, and permanently to reside, because he finds there the greatest degree of freedom, the greatest opportunity for labor, the greatest tolerance, the greatest legal protection, the climate which pleases him the best, adequate nourishment, social institutions to his liking — in short, all those moral and physical conditions which are necessary to his well- being and to enable him to contribute, on his part, to the progress and prosperity of the community which he has voluntarily joined. Out of this system of the domicile follows the right of volun- tarily relinquishing one's former nationality; that is, the right freely to emigrate and immigrate, to give up the fatherland of one's birth and to become a member of a new one. Nationality as a political bond ties the individual to his father- land. "Once a subject, always a subject," was a maxim of the feudal and British law. If we were to apply that legal doctrine, which has been somewhat weakened by the majority of European nations in their definitions o,f the law of the person, the Italians, for example, who settled in the Argentine Republic in the days of Rosas, those heroic soldiers who came to us with Garibaldi (1853), and others, of. whom some died in our midst as generals and admirals, although they had severed the actual bonds which tied them to their European fatherlands, although "they had acquired property here, purchased burial places and committed the remains of their dear ones to our earth, would have been obliged, in spite of all that, to marry, devise their property, and inherit according to the civil law of Italy, the law of a country under whose jurisdiction they no longer lived, with which they were no longer acquainted, and to which they were only bound by a moral sentiment of friendliness. Our intelligence rejects suc"h legal consequences, for they run counter to the human conception of freedom. There are in the Argentine Republic two and one-half million strangers, of whom, without doubt, eight hundred thousand have lost their original European citizenship by operation of our laws. It is a principle established by European legislation that he who abandons his native land without intention of returning, "sine animo revertendi", mani- fests a desire to break his national ties with his native country and to create for himself a legal and social standing in some other country, and if the country of his choice is advised of his intention and admits him to its citizenship, as the United States has done, then the immigrant in the exercise of his civil liberty has become an integral part of a new fatherland based upon his domicile, which, according to the doctrine of the wise Savigny, is nothing else than the right to freely choose the sovereignty, the law and the country under whose government he desires to live. The doctrine of domicile governed the world until the end of the nineteenth century. The countries which adopted that doctrine, among the chief of whom were the British Empire, the United States, Germany and the Argentine Republic, held in their hands the dominion of navigation, the major portion of the tonnage which transported merchandise from 'one continent to another; they con- trolled the clothing of the world as producers of the major portion of its cotton and wool; tliey controlled the major portion of the cereals upon which humanity subsists, and the major portion of the fuel which prepares our food, warms us, and furnishes the motive power for our industries ; in a word, they dominated three- fourths of the economical factors of civilization. Germany, in whose separate states before the imperial consolida- tion distinct systems of law existed, chiefly the traditional German law, the Roman law, and the Code Napoleon introduced at the time of his conquest, after long and difficult labor succeeded in the creation of its civil code and thereby abandoned the doctrine of domicile which had been introduced into its system by the Roman law and by that of the Kingdom of Prussia, adopting the doctrine of nation- ality which was incorporated in the Code Napoleon in 1804, and perfected in the Italian code of 1865. It would be / foolhardy to attempt a critical analysis of the work of the civil code of Germany in a South American University by professors who are themselves no more than students, a code formulated by the learned men of that country after a quarter of a century of discussion and experi- ment. Nevertheless, fulfilling my duty, and as an admirer of the Argentine constitution and its doctrines as well as a satisfied cham- pion of the correctness of our own theory of the private rights of man, I permit myself to point out the error which in my judgment Germany committed when it gave up its old legal doctrine of domicile, which had been the best guaranty for the development of its international progress and of its "Weltpolitik", and substituted for it that of nationality, which is only a means of carrying upon its list of soldiers individuals who will not serve Germany as soldiers because they have been born in other portions of the world. The present war confirms the justice of my criticism and the correctness of the Argentinian theory. German commerce is today severed from all its foreign relations and is persecuted in the entire world on the theory of the legal doctrine of nationality which is now applied against it to define and fix the ownership and character of property and transactions as either neutral or hostile. If Germany had retained the doctrine of the domicile, the emigrated Germans would have been protected by the laws of neutral countries, by their own laws and by the English doctrine of domicile, and they would have been able to defend themselves against the persecution directed against them on account of their nationality, by an appeal to the rights of their domicile, which, as I will demon- strate, is recognized by the British courts, even in those cases where they are brought into question by the application of British emergency legislation. I have dwelt upon this important question of domicile and nationality so long, because out of the distinction between these two doctrines follow many serious impairments of equal rights which we will have to consider when we take up the various legal questions which have arisen as consequences, of the war. We will then observe a remarkable development in the practice • of the law of the British Empire, whose civilization is based upon the principle of the domicile and which has always been the most pertinacious supporter of this principle, both within and without its territorial jurisdiction. Now, forced by the annoying exigencies imposed upon it by war, new points of view have developed in the British Empire, which may be divided into two leading tendencies. In public law, it abandons the system of domicile and adopts that of nationality, at least in its prize tribunals ; in the field of private law, the superior English judges commenced, fortunately, by sustaining and ended by adjudging, that it is not the nationality of the indi- vidual, but his domicile which determines his legal status and that of his property. The English seized the steamer President Mitre, because a part of the shares of stock in the Company which owned it belonged to Germans, ignoring the principle of domicile repre- sented by its Argentine flag; in private cases, however, the English judges hold that Germans domiciled in London enjoy the protection of the British law. For further considerations, directing myself particularly to the students of the law school who have the greatest interest and duty to pursue these subjects further, I refer to my published work- in which I have treated questions of domicile and of nationality with relation to the German civil code and to the codification of private international law by the Hague Convention. V SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OF CITIZENS OF HOSTILE COUNTRIES Having established these general principles of law, I may now proceed to apply them to a discussion of one of the first cases in which war emergency legislation came in conflict with private indi- vidual rights. The nations of Europe by tacit consent have fixed the fourth of August, 1914, as the day of origin of the new political and legal relations arising from the war. Judicial proceedings may 8 be separated into two groups according as they were instituted before or after that date. This division is important for the legal consequences which ensue therefrom. The first measure adopted by the vvarring -powers in respect to private rights, was the sequestra- tion of the property of citizens of the hostile countries. Please observe carefully that in the legal language of the theorist there can be no such thing as German enemies of the English nor as English enemies of the Germans, because we have established that _war is not pursued between individuals, but solely between states. We can only speak of the individuals as citizens of belligerent countries. Sequestration of property is accomplished by authority of executive decrees, or by laws. Let us examine, with the brevity required by the limited time at our disposal, the varying points of view of the laws of the different countries in that respect. I will not refer to all of the numerous belligerents, but will cite the most important only, because the others have followed -their example. The emergency laws of Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy fill volumes which contain general, local and international, economical and political laws, and those governing private rights which are to be applicable during the continuance of the war; they are laws of exception, which in some respects conserve existing principles, but which in the most part establish transitory rules which will be abandoned when peace is again established. VI SEQUESTRATION IN GERMANY The emergency laws of Germany fill three volumes which have been translated and annotated in a luminous manner by the secretary of the Argentine legation in Berlin, Mr. Eduardo Labougle, and transmitted by him, with a full report, to our government. Our government has considered it prudent to withhold this report from the public, as it seems to me, needlessly, because, as we will see later, these foreign laws have been translated and published either wholly or partially, both in France and in England. The publica- tion of the Spanish translation, the first with which I am acquainted, would be very opportune and would be a stimulant to the few members of the diplomatic corps who are seriously working in the interest of their country. On September 4, 1914, the federal cpuncil of Germany, author- ized by the law of parliament to enact from time to time such measures as were demanded by military and political necessity, enacted the first European law of sequestration, one which affected all enterprises established in German territory, either by main home offices or by branches, which were administered or financed from a hostile country, or of which the profits, either wholly or in part, would be transferred to a hostile country; it included banks, insur- ance companies and industrial corporations established in Germany and having their central directorate either in London or in Paris, by which they are controlled or to which go their earnings. What is the character of this sequestration? Did Germany appropriate the commercial property of its enemies ? No, German law is praiseworthy in the clarity and the precision of^its termin- ology, which is adequate to obviate any future disputes. Seqvjestra- tion is a measure of vigilance and of military and political precau- tionrjlrhas for its object the prevention of any prejudice to military "Security or to the economical interests of Germany, which might arise from the conduct of enterprises directed or owned by foreign- ers. This vigilance is exercised by high functionaries of the government designated by the government and known as receivers, "VeTMialter", who are limited to the direction in a general way, without going into details, of the business of such establishments, and who are empowered to adopt such measures as will save the sequestered . enterprises from paralysis, or failure to accompHsh the objects of their existence. We do not owe this provision to any sentiments of gallantry or of humanity, but to a cornmon sense policy in favor of German ca£italists, because every foreign undertaking established in the country is in such a degree linked to its business system that its disaster would be a national disaster. Suppose for a moment that Great Britain should attack the Argentine "Bank of London and Rio" with violence. The damage which its thousands of depositors of varying sums would suffer would be very great, and these depositors are part of our own business system; they are ourselves. For that reason the Germans, with wise foresight, have protected foreign enterprises instead of showing hostility to them, and in so doing they have protected all their own closely connected interests. This law provides that in case of liquidation of a foreign enterprise, its assets shall be converted into money, which must be applied first I to the payment of German creditors, and of which the balance must , be deposited in the Imperial Bank to be claimed by those to whom ' it belongs after the end of the war. When the war ends, foreign owners of the net proceeds will appear and demand payment. The German attachment of the property does not indicate its acquisition, but only the superintendence of its management so that the orderly course of business and an adequate liquidation of assets may be secured. In case the managers or superintendents of such enter- prises do not perform their duty, or make mistakes, they are replaced by receivers appointed by the government on motion of the authori- ties. The receivers have no right to change the personnel of the 10 ^ staff of the business or to hire or discharge important employees. So far as possible, everything is conducted exactly as before the war.. The second chapter of the German law of sequestration deals with goods of foreign origin which were actually in the German custom house or in open market in German territory at the begin- ing of the war. Such goods are sequestered and sold and their proceeds applied to satisfy the demands of German creditors. The remainder is deposited in the Imperial Bank for safe- keeping and subject to claim by those entitled to it at the end of the war. The provisions of the German law in this respect are published in the Journal de Droit International, 1915, page 954. VII SEQUESTRATION IN FRANCE In France dnrfag'" the first months of the war there was no fixed regulation concerning sequestration. The question came up and was approached from time to time through a series of admini- strative and judicial experiments inspired by the circumstances. The Minister of Justice, the civil tribunals and the department of public welfare were disputing among themselves concerning the sequestration of gooda of citizens of hostile countries and the steps necessary to preserve the interests of the government, and were acting independently in that respect, which led to numerous admini- strative and legal difficulties and created much friction. For that reason the system of sequestration in France does not possess as well defined legal characteristics as in Germany. It began with an indivrdua.1 case ; namely, the sequestration in the custom house at Havre of merchandise which belonged to a German firm, and which was ordered by the civil court at Havre on August 22, 1914. On October 11, 1914, the Minister of Justice issued circular instructions to the Attorney-Generals of the provinces, in 'which it ordered them to report concerning all goods in their jurisdiction subject to sequestration. On the 13th of October the Minister of the Interior at the request of the Department of Justice issued a further circular to the prefects of the departments, in which they were ordered to afford all possible assistance to the officers of justice in the diligent sequestration of movable and immovable property of German and Austro-Hungarian citizens. A circular also solicited information from all local chambers of Commerce, syndicates and other business organizations concerning articles of property which should be sequestered. The latest circular, issued November 3rd, 1914, treats of the duties and rights of receivers of the property of German and Austro-Hungarian houses. The receivers are left free to carry on business affairs with the property during the war, in 11 such manner as best to preserve the interests of the owners. Because in France the civil courts have no attendant officers representing the public interests, the circular directed the presiding judge of each civil court to initiate the sequestration of the assets of foreign busi- ness houses. The circular says: "This measure is purely of a conservatory char- acter and the receivers are empowered to take all necessary steps to collect all accounts receivable and use the proceeds to pay the accounts payable. LegiUy you cannot go any further; but as a rule, business houses under sequestration must cease their former activities". This continuation of the conduct of their busifiiSss is compatible with sequestration, and since complete and immediate closing of their business would be of injury to French interests, proper regard for ■ 'those interests will permit the continuation of the 1 business in a provisional and limited way for the purposes indicated. German and Austro-Hungarian i' factories, the products of which are used to meet the requirements of our army, must be kept in operation in order to satisfy this public- necessity ; and businesses of that kind will be continued pursuant to an under- standing reached with the military or naval authorities on direct application or by requisition. It is also possi- ble that it will be advisable, in some cases, to operate in the interests of French employees and creditors." The airn of. the^ French regulations is, therefore, the liquidation of the sequestered businesses, whereas the German law contemplates their maintenance. ■ On thie fourth of November, finally, the Minister of Justice issued special instructions concerning the legal obligations of the receivers." This is the most important edict on this subject which was issued from Bordeau: "The presidents and other members of the court must watch over every step taken by the receivers in sequestration cases. They must not only see to it that these receivers perform their duties in a regular and faithful manner, but they must also watch to see that they conduct their work as industriously as possible. Furthermore, they must take care that the business affairs of the receivers are conducted as prudently as possible, that all unnecessary expenses and all unnec- essary formalities are avoided, the costs of which will constitute a needless expenditure. To this end the 12 receivers are required to personally perform those duties which in other cases would be performed by their subordinates, by public officers or other private employees, and unless necessary, assistance is not per- mitted, in order to keep down the expense. Every offense against this provision must be inquired into and in case of necessity severely punished. The presi- dent is given the privilege of employing a deputy for the receipt and examination of the periodical reports which must be made to him by receivers, and the judge named for each case for that purpose must countersign the reports. "The foregoing directions are limited to the deter- . mination along general lines of the methods to be observed in handling sequestration cases." A further circular was issued on the 14th of November, 1914, by the Minister of Justice to the same authorities and provided that the receiver of sequestered property had nothing to do with it except to preserve it, and could not deal with it any further than was necessary to collect the accounts receivable and to pay the accounts payable. This circular reads in part: "Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the appoint- ment of receivers for the property of German, Austrian or Austro-Hungarian subjects is not intended nor has it been so exercised as to rob these people of their property. You are not dealing with an act of confisca- ti3n,'"and very far from depriving the 'owner of his property, either directly or indirectly, the sequestration proceeding, according to the view of the government, must be limited to the safe custody of the property, as I have repeatedly declared. The regulations from their very nature will tend to hinder German and Austro- Hungarian business houses engaged in industry, trade or agriculture in France from permitting hostile nations to~draw ariy advantage from their operations during the war or out of the industrial activity of France. Under no excuse shall the sequestration serve any _ptlier purpose. ' The directions given are limited, therefore, to the disposition of the assets of German or Austro- Hungarian business houses, through the ordinary course of trade. It is superfluous to remark that the same end may indirectly be reached through the exercise of the right of requisition which cannot be defeated because of pending sequestration proceedings. In such 13 a case the law regulating military requisitions shall be applied without prejudice to the payment of indemnity equal to the value of the advancements accomplished by such requisitions." Such is the circular which defines with the best precision the character of the remedy. Another circular of December 5, 1914, establishes the essential principles which ought to be observed in the organization and exercise of the management which the presi- dents of the civil tribunals are required to ■ exercise, with the assistance of the public prosecutors, of all property sequestered from Germans, Austrians and Hungarians. A further ministerial decree fixes the manner of remunerating the receivers. You will observe that the ministerial circulars omit any refer- ence to fundamental questions of the right of the former owner to have the proceeds of the sequestration returned to him after the end of the war. Even in view of the fact that these regulations are only of a provisional character, still their text entrusts the liqui- dation of the property in question, to agencies of the state. There arise, therefore, many questions for discussion with which the French newspapers have busied themselves, such as the following: What will be decided in France about the final right of property in such cases? At the end of the war, will the net proceeds be recognized as the property of the former owner? Will the Hquida- tion be carried out in the form provided for by the German law? Have the proprietors of sequestered property the right to the income of their property .while prisoners of war, or interned in France, or while they live in neutral countries? Th ese are questions which arise from the lack of clearness in the provisions of the French regulations on this subject, but they should all be answered in the affirmative. Notwithstanding, I know of decisions in the negative. There was the case of sequestered real estate of Germans or Austro-Hun- garians which was used by the French government for barracks for troops. The question was asked whether the customary indemnity was to be paid to the owners. On April 29, 1916, according to the report by the Le Temps, this question was put to the French gov-, ernment, and it is said to have given the following answer: "This question must be answered in the negative. No indemnity of any kind will be paid for the occupa- tion of the real estate in question. And in case the receivers of the property have already received from the government any indemnity for this property, it must be immediately repaid to the public treasury." 14 Another interesting lawsuit is that of a French woman who was married to a man without a country, a German by birth, but who had left his native land forty years before without ever return- ing, and who resides in France, where he owns property. He was interned because they considered him a German. His wife demanded that the government pay her a provision for her temporary support, and there was granted to her a temporary pension of three hundred francs per month. Her husband, Frederic Durr, protested that he was not a German because he had lost his German citizenship under the German law of 1870, which provides for that result, if a German citizen resides ten years in a foreign country without making a declaration that he intends to retain his citizenship. The man was "heimatlos", without a fatherland, and, according to the spirit of the French law, he came nearer to being a French citizen. In spite of the legal soundness of his argument, the French government refused him the thousand francs which he demanded for his support out of his own sequestered property, and declared simply that it considered him a German. — {Le Temps, October 14, 1914.) VIH SEQUESTRATION IN ENGLAND The decrees about seqtiestration which England has issued differ in their fundamental character from the German laws, but are still very much more definite than the French measure. England takes away from the German or Austrp-Hungarian the possession of his property and entrusts it to its own administrators, but it keeps ..the proceeds for final liquidation after the war. IX MARITIME PROPERTY Among the important subjects covered by the emergency laws is that of property of ships and their cargoes. As I have mentioned, the English policy imposed by it upon jts allies, has^^developed to the^omFof disavowing the ancient rule of the domicile in determin- ing the ownership of vessels. Ships, like persons, have a domicile and their domicile establishes the law applicable to them even though their ownership be German or indeterminate, as is the case when- ever ships are owned by stock companies; for certificates of stock have no nationality and they change hands daily in the stock exchanges in such a way that they may belong to an Englishman, to a German, to an Argentinian, or to a Russian all in the course of one day. IS Ships, whatever may be the ownership of the shares of stock which represent their value, are domiciled according to the rules of admiralty law, and according to the regulations imposed upon them by the country of their registry and flag. The domicile of a ship is that of its origin or of its adoption by registry, just as a foreign person, who comes into our country and acquires a domicile characterized by permanent residence, the foundation of a family, the acquisition of property, the pursuit of affairs, and his final acceptance as a citizen. But England, since the war, has held that the nationditx JlLa_ihip „and/of its_^r^p_ is that of its owner, and ^s given_jyi„the_dpctrixieL_of .domicile as fixed by we^ law of its flag, and_which_vtas„r£CQgnized-even during the present war until, October 20, 1915. From that date, England has relinquished the legal prin- c1ple oT the domicile in marine law in order to better enforce the blockade of German ports. Still, it may be that this change of doctrine is only provisional, and I am satisfied that at the end of the war England will return to the doctrine of domicile, for then her trade will return to that free and unhindered competition in the exercise of which the theory of domicile offers advantage to all nations reached by the fleets of trade. Even though maritime property in England is treated provision- ally according to the . principles of nationality, it remains in neutral lands now as formerly, subject to the principles of the law of domicile; and it was this last principle which controlled the decision in the case of the seizure of the President Mitre. That ship was given back to us because England did not dare to expose itself to the decision of an impartial court, for an impartial court would have returned us the ship and would have given us a large indemnity besides on the authority of England's own law, which has been followed persistently for centuries, that domicile controls not only the rights of the individual, but those of navigation. X CONTRACTS DURING THE WAR This is another of the main topics of private international law which has been affected by emergency measures and which presents cases of interest to the tribunals of every country. AH contracts entered into before August 4, 1914, and whith by their terms were to be executed in an enemy country, enjoy a period of grace, or moritorium, "fixed by the warring governments in order that legal obligations contracted in good faith before the outbreak of war could be performed without prejudice to the interests of either contracting party. 16 But what is the effect upon the legal rights of parties to con- tracts entered into since the 4th of August, 1914, and which were intended to be performed in foreign countries? The emergency laws of Germany, France and Great Britain (Italy occupies in respect to Germany a special position which I will discuss later), have jiniformly_ held _ such contracts void. It is prohibited to the citizens of each country to contract with the citizens of the enemy country within the respective national territory, and contracts which violate this prohibition are void and constitute misdemeanors for which penalties are provided. This is a rule of military and legal precaution well within reason. The object of war is apparently to dominate the military forces of the enemy; but modern public policy and war alike are industrial; formerly, people went to battle in the flush of courage because people were romantic. Later they fought for territorial extension, for the vanity of the reigning houses; but now they fight to the death for the commerce of the world, for the domination of our industries, for the absorption of our capital. For that reason, one of the recognized methods of hostility is to prevent the Frenchman who has affairs in Germany from removing his profits to France and to thereby strengthen its powers of resistance, just as it is legitimate that France should prevent the German with affairs in France from a similar procedure favorable to his country. However, this is not the only point of view which is presented. Not only contracts may not be consummated between nationals of belligerent countries, they may not be consummated between naTionals of belligerent countries and inhabitants of neutral coun- trieSjjf it is the intention to execute them in the forrner. That is a matter of great commercial importance which has been the object of special regulation, as we will see later. XI HAVE THE CITIZENS OF A HOSTILE COUNTRY ANY STANDING IN COURT? The validity or nullity of contracts entered into since the 4th of August, 1914, is intimately linked with the consideration of this important question. Have the citizens of a belligerent country any standing in court in the enemy country? Has a German a right of access to the French and English tribunals for his personal pro- tection ? (a) The Attitude of Germany The German Supreme Court on October 26, 1914, rendered the following decision : "The German code does not recognize the provi- sions of certain foreign codes which are prejudicial to 17 the citizens of foreign states. It recognizes the theory that war is only waged between hostile governments as such and between their respective armies, and that citizens of hostile states in the eye of the civil law occupy the same position as our own citizens in war time as in peace, and that this principle will be applied in all cases save those regulated by some contrary and express provision of the statute." (Decrees of the Civil Branch of the Supreme Court, volume 85, page 734.) This judgment acknowledges the right of a citizen of a hostile state to appear before a German court as a pai'ty during the war, whether he be plaintiff or defendant. This rule is applied without restriction to natural as well as artificial persons of hostile lands who are residents of Germany. If a subject of a hostile country is unable to appear personally in court, he has the right to be repre- sented by counsel. If such a person is the owner of a business enterprise in Germany, the person conducting such business may appear in court in the name of his principal in spite of the super- vision being exercised by the state over its affairs. In discussion of this judgment, the Swiss author, A. Curti, has published an interesting article in the Journal de Droit International, page 785, anno 1915, under the title "La condition des sujets ennemis selon la loi et la jurisprudence allemandes". He says: "It follows clearly that the subjects of a country which is at war with Germany may enforce their rights during the war in its courts. Moreover, "with a view to the protection of that right of the foreigner, the highest Prussian court has held that the trial of an action may be postponed, if the party to it who is a citizen of a hostile country is not in a position to appear personally in defense of his rights." In another judgment published in the Deutsche Juristenzeitung, on May 1, 1915 (page 526), the postponement of a proceeding was ordered on the ground that the plaintiff who was an English subject and a prisoner of war was interned in Ruheleben. Article 247 of the German code of civil procedure provides as follows : "When one of the parties to an action is serving in the army during war or is in a place where he is unable to attend the sitting of the court, whether be- cause of the orders of the authorities, or in consequence of any other unforeseen circumstance resulting from 18 the war, he may dem.and as of right a delay of the proceeding until the hindrance is removed." Mr. Curti closes his article with the following language: "It appears, therefore, that it is not open to ques- tion that French, English and Russians will be per- mitted to appear before the German courts as parties, either plaintiff or defendant, during the war; but that they cannot receive or collect any* damages awarded to them by the judgment of the court, if such payment or receipt would be made in a foreign country." In the month of November, 1915, a German Protestant pastor met in one of the streets of Berlin a university Professor who had married a French woman and who was walking with his wife and a governess of the same nationality, then in his employ. During the promenade the professor conversed with the governess in French. The Lutheran pastor considered it an insult to Germany for anyone to converse in French in the streets of Berlin during the period of this terrible war. Having reproached the professor for so doing, the latter insisted that he was entirely justified in conversing with his wife and his governess in French, that he insulted no one thereby, and was not in any way disturbing the public peace. The pastor, carried away by his patriotic sentiment, which was stronger than his tolerance, struck the professor. The police intervened. The case came before the criminal branch of the court, which discharged the pastor from the complaint made against him by the professor; but the court also discharged the professor, declaring that the speaking of French in the streets of Berlin without hostile intent was no misdemeanor, but the exercise of a right. A little later a similar case came up in Strassburg. An Alsatian Miss, who was watching the passage of a column of- French prisoners, approached them and threw toward them a note on which was written "Do you not know that the 'boches' have suffered a great defeat on the Marne?" The word boches angered the officer who was in charge of the column ; the young lady was arrested and charged with espionage and with insulting the German army. The court of Dessau decided that the defendant was not guilty of espionage or of treason, although she was an Alsatian. But as to the construction of the word boches, the court held that it was not in a position to decide whether it was an insulting word or not; and, in order to avoid committing any injustice, it preferred to refer the question to the University of Strassburg for an opinion on the origin and significance of that word. ' The University placed the inquiry in the hands of Dr. Zeligson, a professor of the Lyceum in Metz. He said the word was derived 19 from caboche, which means "thick-head", and expressed the opinion that it was commonly confused with the word alboche. He expressed the opinion that subjectively the word boche implied an insult, but that used objectively it was not insulting and that it all depended upon the circumstances under which it was used. Professor Kiessmann, of Dessau, expressed the opinion that boche is derived from the word caboche, and that the common people in France were using this word during the war in an insulting sense. Basing its judgment oh these opinions, the court then decided that the young lady in question, Miss Barthel, had insulted the German troops, and it sentenced her to five months in prison, deducting from the sentence the two months of imprisonment which she had already served. (b) In France What is the legal status of contracts of citizens of hostile countries in French territory? Have they a right there to the protection of the courts ? The French criminal court of Pont-l'Eveque in the first instance, and the Court of Appeals at Caen in the second instance on appeal, decided in the year 1915 a damage suit brought by Julius Ruthem- burg, German by birth, but a naturalized Frenchman, against the publishers of Le Progres, a newspaper of the city of Dines, which had called this gentleman a boche. After a very long and tedious trial, involving many irrelevant matters in which the attitude of the judge seems to have been somewhat disturbed by his war time prejudice, judgment was rendered that that word used concerning a German, even though he be naturalized, constitutes no insult; but he sentenced the newspaper publishers to a fine of sixteen francs because it had cast aspersions upon the method by which the plaintiff had acquired his property. This judgment seems to be tempered with patriotic mercy, but there was no appeal. It is one of the cases in which the court was improperly influenced by the existence of a state of war and to which I have already referred. There were, however, much more important actions in France to which Germans were parties, and in which the high principles of justice and natural honor were conserved; for in my opinion a country which does not extend justice to the stranger, whether in peace or in war, is one of inferior civilization. But in important cases the French courts have taken a higher attitude. In the Ruthemburg case it would seem as though the judge really meant to say "don't bother the court; your quarrel is not worth while." Among the many, I will cite only one of the leading cases, one reported in the Journal of Clunet, page 669, anno 1915. Branch number 10 of the criminal court of the Department of the Seine 20 rendered a judgment on January 9, 1915, in a case brought by Gey, a German, -against the Compagnie Generate de Voitures, of Paris, for damages resulting from an injury inflicted by one of the defendant's automobiles. The defendant insisted that the plaintiff, being a hostile German, could not prosecute such an action in a French court. The court held: "1. Article three of the decree of September 27, 1914, which forbids the consummation of any contracts entered into before the beginning of the war, August 4, 1914, in favor of subjects of Germany or Austro- Hungary applies to contracts of a civil or commercial character. "2. It has, however, no application when the con- summation of such a transaction or contract does not conflict with the interests of our national defense. "3. The act in question does not interfere in any way with the authority given by a German to his attorney before the 4th of August to represent him as a party in a damage suit, which might result in a judg- ment for damages and costs against the defendant. "4. Such employment has the exclusive purpose of protecting the interests of the plaintiff and to make it possible to prosecute the action without the plaintiff's personal appearance before the court. "5. Moreover, to annul such an' employment would be a direct attack upon the right of defense. For all these reasons the court will entertain the petition filed by Brunet in the name of and as attorney for the plaintiff. Gey, but will postpone any further proceedings until the close of the war. The case is continued until the day after the close of the war, and no order is now made as to costs." The postponement was based upon the theory that the presence of Gey was necessary in order to substantiate his complaint. This judgment started a wide discussion among the lawyers and judges of France, who are not in accord in their opinions. The court of the first instance in Bayonne actually decided that the receivers of sequestered property were not personal representa- tives of the German and Austro-Hungarian owners, but were simply custodians, and for that reason they had no right to appear in court in the name of the owners either to prosecute complaints or to defend against them. — (Civil court of Bayonne, December 4, 1914, as reported in the Journal de Droit International, 1915, page 653). A judgment of the civil court of Marseilles held that a German has no right to employ an attorney in a civil suit in which' he is the 21 defendant, and that the receiver of his sequestered property may not appear in the court as his representative, even though he has already been appointed by the' court as a representative ad litem., — (Civil Court of Marseilles, January 22, 1915, as reported in the Gazette des Trihunaux, May 28, 1915.) On the other hand, the civil court in Philippeville, on April 28, 1915, decided that execution may not issue against a German for a debt owed to a Frenchman, but that it might issue against the receiver of his sequestered property and that the latter may appear for and represent him in that connection. — {Journal de Droit Inter- national, July 29, 1915.) The Superior Court of Algiers decided on June 22, 1915, that the prohibition of' article two of the decree of September 27, 1914, must be construed to -include judicial proceedings, and that a German had no right during the war to appear in that court. But at the same time this court held that the German could not be condemned in his absence; and that \\t might be represented by the receiver of his sequestered property, if the latter had been appointed by the court to serve ad litem. — {Journal de Droit International, 1915, page 516.) : . ■■ • : ; Mr. Gaston Courtois, a Parisian lawyer, writes concerning these judgments as follows : "It is ftot easy to deduce a reliable rule or to reach a general conclusion from these contradictory decisions, but the questions involved and which have been decided in so many ways, are of importance and are presented frequently in our courts. It is, therefore, interesting, to seek the solution which ought to be given. I am inclined to believe that the prohibition of appearance in court by defendants of a hostile nationality is general in France and is applicable both to the complaint and to the defense. This is the solution to which the com- bined provisions of the decree of September 27, 1914 leads. — {Journal de Droit International, 1915, pp. 510- 512.) As to the temporizing attitude of the court of Marseilles and of the Supreme Court of Algiers, the same author is of the opinion that their conclusion was a happy thought, but one not yet justified by the law; because, if it be once conceded that execution may issue against an absent German, it is necessary to extend to him all the other legal consequences of his absence. Nevertheless, it appears to me from the numerous French decisions and from the commentary quoted, that there is a tendency in France to give the German standing in its courts, a course which would be honorable for the French "nation to pursue. 22 Attorney Courtois maintains that the French law of sequestra- tion is obscure and that the functions of the receiver, in cases where he is entrusted with the custody of the property of subjects of/ hostile countries, are badly defined. He believes that its provisions must be more sharply construed and extended to permit a French- man to collect by judicial process a debt owed to him by a German. Still, Mr. Courtois is in favor of the postponement of execution until the debtor of hostile nationality has an opportunity to defend himself. Concerning this, he uses the following language, which somewhat moderates the apparently narrow point of view of his statements above quoted : "No better reason could be given for the correct- ness of the judgment of the tribunal of Philippeville than the necessity of protecting the interests of French creditors, for they should not be forced to await the end of hostilities in order to obtain a recognition of their rights and a final decree. But if we claim that the court is responsible for the correctness of its judg- ments, it follows that the court should have for its guidance in formulating its judgment all the informa- tion which it can procure. The foreign debtor, when he left France, probably took with him his books of account, his correspondence, and other documents which would enable him to prove, perhaps, that he owed nothing and that the complaint against him was unfounded. In such case, the receiver of his property would have no means of defense and could not suc- cessfully contest the claims of the alleged creditor, and the court might easily be led into an unjust decision. Any so resulting injustice based upon that cause would certainly be voluntary and intentional, and might result in exposing the receiver himself to suspicions of culpable collusion with the creditor. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that the French courts be not exposed to the charge of abetting robbery, or of accomplishing reprisals under the guise of legal form. For this reason, it appears to us necessary that the court should ascertain whether the receiver would be in a position to intelligently defend the cause, before it appoints a receiver of sequestered property as its representative ad litem; yes, it even ought to ascertain whether the complain is intrinsically a just one, so that the receiver, as a defender of the suit, need only play a passive role." — (Jourp.al de Droit International, 1915, page 520.) 23 The decisions and the theories concerning the right of foreign- ers to standing in court are, as we have seen, contradictory in France; but I am inclined to believe that the leading jurists entertain the doctrine of the criminal court of the Department of the Seine, according to which a subject of a hostile country must be protected in his private rights in the French tribunals. I base my belief in that respect upon a peculiar circumstance. The French lawyers have asked themselves, "can we, as representatives and protectors of the law; we, who are bound by an obligation to exemplify by our own conduct subservience to the law; can we permit ourselves to be influenced by those motives of patriotism which seem to forbid intercourse of any kind with the subjects of a hostile country? Is the strict observance of the letter of the law consistent with the fulfillment of our duty atid with the oath which we took to defend justice in an honorable manner?" The lawyers of France found themselves in a difficult psycho- logical position. For that reason, they had a meeting and chose attorney Millerand, ex-minister of war, to decide what attitude they should take toward the denial of any right to have dealings with the enemy. Mr. Millerand composed a very remarkable report published in the Journal de Droit International, 1916, page 12, in which he maintains that the lawyers are obliged to follow this reg- ulation enacted for the national defense, but that they must at the same time- take care that no one in France is deprived of the right of being represented by counsel in the courts, leaving to them to reconcile in some manner the legal prescriptions with the duties implied by their oath of office as lawyers. He advised the French lawyers that they could undertake the defense of subjects of hostile countries, if, before doing so, they had sought and received the permission and approval of the president of the French bar. It goes without saying that this official will always give such permission. (c) In Great Britain The most noteworthy British judgment which I can cite, one which discloses a high regard for humanity and in which the English judges demonstrate that they know how to divorce them- selves from the exaggerations of political sentiment, is that handed down by Judge Younger in London in a case against a German and which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals November 26, 1915. Schaffenius vs. Goldberg, 140 Law Times Reports 88.' ^Judge Younger's decision is reviewed and favorably commented upon at length by the editor of the Law Times who may be considered to voice the sentiment of tlie Lon- don bar in the following language : "The chief cause for satisfaction in a case of this kind is to be found in the reflection that, notwithstanding the natural prejudices which a state of war engenders, British justice continues and will always continue to be admin- istered in British courts according to the high principles of British law." (Trans.) 24 Judge Younger's decision was rendered September 23, 1915, in a case in which the validity of a contract between a German and an English Company was involved. Judge Younger based his decision upon the construction of the court that the defendant was not an enemy in a legal sense, because of his interment as a German. He says that internment does not deprive him in any way of capacity to make permissible contracts; that, because of his imprisonment, he cannot leave British territory, and must, therefore, a fortiori be considered as a resident of England and entitled to the protection of the king, even though he be treated as a prisoner of war. This learned and impartial judge bases his conclusion specifically upon earlier decisions of the British courts. He cites the case of Mary, Duchess of Sutherland, in which Judge Warrington decided that a stranger of hostile nationality may institute an action in England^ even though he does not live in the country, provided, however, that he is not engaged in business with a hostile country; as would be the case, for instance, if he resided in an allied or neutral state and were to conduct trade transactions from the place of his residence through the mediation of citizens of such hostile countries. Judge Warrington says that if a stranger of hostile nationality who lives in a neutral country may bring an action in the English courts, it must follow that one who lives in England and who is interned there may do the same. He says: "In fact, we must always remember that it is the place where he is conducting his transactions, that is, his domicile, which is of controlling importance in the decision of this question and not the ixationality of the plaintiff. In a case like this, in which the plaintiff is physically prevented from leaving England, we find no element of public or governmental interest which should militate against the full application of this principle." Judger Younger examines other analogous cases, bith in Great Britain and in the United States, among others the case of Charles vs. Morey, in order to prove that strangers living in England under the sanction of the law enjoy the protection of the king. Judge Younger closes his decision with the following words : "Prima facie all persons living in England have a right to appear before the English court; but a for- eigner, even though he be of hostile nationality, who is a resident of England, must always prove that he resides in the country either with the express or with the implied consent of the king, before he can be recognized in the English courts in times of war as a plaintiff. Even under theSe conditions, as is shown 25 by the decision of Judge Sargant in the case of Pricess of Turn & Taxis vs. Moffitt, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. (1915) page 58, the registration of the plaintiff as a subject of a hostile nation, resident in England under . the Aliens Restriction Order of 1914 is sufficient proof of such permission. It is possible that the expression 'that he is under the protection of the king' signifies something more than the consequence which follows the permission to remain in England. If these words do signify anything more, it must be something ex- pressly established by law; for instance, that a prisoner of war in England enjoys the protection of the king, as is held in the case of Sparenburgh vs. Bannatyne 1 Bos. & P. 163. * >* * I conclude, therefore, that the contract concludied ietween the plaintiff and the defendant is not in any way invalidated by the circumstance that the plaintiff is temporarily interned in England as a civil prisoner of war, and that the plaintiff is entitled to pursue his remedy in every manner." The decree just cited justifies my earlier statement. It is a consolation for humanity that our science of law has protected all the legal principles which safeguard private rights in all the courts of belligerents from the danger of falling with the collapse of the principles of public international law. Gentlemen, this strictly legal analysis of the subject matter of emergency laws will, I trust, leave in your minds a satisfying and comfortable feeling in view of the passionate and very often venial newspaper articles which stimulate international hatred' and which also serve to conceal from the view of the world all the great and beautiful examples in the province of justice afforded by the conduct of all of the belligerent nations in forcing themselves to recognize and honor not only their own law, but that of the enemy. (CONTINUATION OF LECTURE JULY 26, 1916) I would like to remark that this, so far as I know, is the first time that emergency laws enacted by reason of the war and which either suspend or limit the common law, have been the subject of study or consideration in any University. I desire, for this reason, that my treatment of the subject may be both complete and logi