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Cornell University Library 
 
 Gefnian Chancellor and the outbreak of wa 
 
 3 1924 027 808 231 
 
 THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR AND 
 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 
 
THE HISTORY OF TWELVE DAYS. JULY 24th to 
 
 AUGUST itll, 1914. BEING AN ACOODNT OF THE NEGOTIA- 
 TIONS PRECEDING THE OUTBREAK OF WABi BASED OH IHB 
 
 OFFICIAL FUBLIOATIONS. 
 
 t * 
 
 By J. W. HEABLiAM, M.A. 
 
 Formerly F&Uow of King's College, Cambridge. 
 
 Cloth, lOt. 6d. net. Second Edition. (Third Impresfiioxi.) 
 
 " Mr. Headlam haa written an exceptionally full, clear, and able analyeie 
 of the diplomatic negotiationf during the twelve momeniious days before 
 Great Britain entered t&e vair." — The Times. 
 
 " Mr. J, TV. Headlam hae done a great fierrioe, not only to the historian of 
 the future, but to the intelligent reader of to-day, in reducing to coherent 
 order, and providing with an acute and judicious commentary, the tangled 
 medley of documents i%oording the negotiations which preceded the war." 
 —The Daily Newt. 
 
 " Nothing better on this subject has appeared. It is first-rate in it« cloarneM 
 of narrative, ite sobriety of judgment, and its scholarly arrangement." — The 
 Spectator. 
 
 " In order to arrive at a clear judgment of the individual responsdbility of 
 the various belligerents for the war now raging it is essential to trace the 
 policy of each from the beginning of the crisis down to the outbreak of 
 hostilities. This task has been performed by Mr. J. W. Headlam with com- 
 plete success, and bis book is therefore a most valuable contribution to the 
 diplomatic history of the war." — Daily Telegraph. 
 
 " This is one of the booKB for which one predicts a permanent place in the 
 literature of the war." — Saturday Review. 
 
 " tliT. Headlam haa so far produced the completeet record and the best com- 
 mentary we have met with concerning the fateful twelve days that preceded 
 the war. It ip a book which every one who can aflord it ou^t to possess."— 
 Sunday Times. 
 
 T. FISIBER UNWIN, LTD., 1, Adelphi Terrace, LONDON. 
 
THE 
 
 German Chancellor 
 
 AND THE 
 
 Outbreak of War. 
 
 By J. W. HEADLAM, M.A. 
 
 AUTHOR or THE " mSTOEY OP TWELVE DAYS,'' " THB ISSCB," ETC. 
 
 T. FISHER UNWIN, LTD. 
 LONDON: ADELPHI TESXACE. 
 

 A,3rHm 
 
 First Published in 1917- 
 
 f All jieuis mskrVbdI. 
 
PREFATORY NOTE. 
 
 Chapters I., II. and III. are reprinted with 
 very slight alterations from articles which 
 appeared in the Westminster Gazette on Sep- 
 tember nth, I2th and 13th, 1916. The sub- 
 stance of Chapters IV. and V. appeared also 
 in the same paper on December i8tli and 
 19th, 1916, and January ist and 2nd, 1917, 
 but considerable alterations and additions have 
 been made. 
 
 With the exception of the telegrams pub- 
 lished for the first time by the German Chan- 
 cellor in his speech of November, 1916, all 
 the documents referred to will be found in 
 " Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to 
 the Outbreak of the European War." For a 
 fuller treatment of those points not dealt 
 with in this book, I must refer my readers 
 to "The History of Twelve Days." 
 
 J. W. H. 
 
 January, 1917. 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027808231 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction 
 
 PAGE 
 
 • 9 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 The Difficulties of the Chancellor . . . . 31 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 The Crisis 42 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 A Challenge to the Chancellor 53 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 New Disclosures 6« 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 What Did Russia Know ? 78 
 
10 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 as those who have followed the controversy 
 will be aware, this period has assumed a very 
 special importance, for it is during these 
 hours that there took place an apparent change 
 of front on the part of the German Govern- 
 ment, and, in particular, it was then that the 
 orders by the Russian Government calling up 
 the reserves were issued. Now it is on this 
 that German writers and apologists for Ger- 
 many in this and other countries have fastened ; 
 they would make it appear that at this time 
 there was a strong and definite effort on 
 the part of Germany to procure peace, and 
 that this was prevented by the action of 
 Russia, who was secretly encouraged by 
 Great Britain. 
 
 This explanation has, during the last two 
 years, been repeated and elaborated by the 
 Chancellor himself, both in speeches and in 
 of&cial and semi-official publications of the 
 German Government. It has, moreover, been 
 assiduously spread, both in Germany and in 
 neutral countries, and in fact has been the 
 basis of a world-wide propaganda carried on 
 at the cost of the German Government. The 
 theory which the Chancellor puts forward is 
 that the sole reason which made war inevitable 
 was the issue of the mobilisation order on 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. ii 
 
 the night of July 30th— 31st ; and secondly, 
 that for this action of the Russian Govern- 
 ment Great Britain was responsible. As he 
 says : " The act which made war inevitable 
 was the Russian general mobilisation which 
 was ordered on the night of July 30th — 31st, 
 1914," and "The truth is, Russia would 
 never have decided on the fateful step if she 
 had not been encouraged to it from the Thames 
 by acts of commission and omission." As 
 he expressed it in his speech on December 2nd, 
 1914, " these two states, England and Russia 
 together, bear before God and humanity the 
 responsibility for this catastrophe which has 
 broken over Europe and over mankind " ; 
 and again, " the responsibility for this greatest 
 of all wars lies clearly before us. The external 
 responsibihty belongs to those men in Russia 
 who urged on and carried through the general 
 mobiKsation of the Russian army. The inner 
 responsibility rests with the Government of 
 Great Britain." 
 
 Both statements are completely false. It 
 was not Russian mobilisation which was the 
 real cause of war ; Russian mobilisation did 
 not make war inevitable, and it was not Great 
 Britain who was responsible for this action 
 of the Russian Government. 
 
12 THE GERMAN CHANGEI<I.OR 
 
 These statements have been propounded 
 with the object of convincing those who read 
 them that the war is the result of a plan, 
 deliberately formed, under the leadership of 
 Great Britain, with the object first of attacking 
 the German Empire with the forces of a 
 superior coalition and then of annihilating it. 
 This theory is so completely removed from 
 the truth that it is difficult to believe that 
 the German Chancellor, who in the past had 
 many opportunities of acquainting himself with 
 the true nature of British policy, himself in 
 reaHty gives credit to it. By its very unreason 
 it has largely failed in its effect in neutral 
 countries. In Germany, however, it is widely 
 held, and it is no doubt to a great extent 
 responsible for the support given by the Ger- 
 man nation to methods of warfare, which, 
 undefensible as they are, might find some 
 justification in the minds of those who have 
 been taught to beHeve that their country 
 is the object of a dishonourable and unpro- 
 voked attack. It is also no doubt one of 
 the reasons why the German nation have 
 been led to demand, as a result of a victorious 
 war, terms of peace which would in fact imply 
 the complete predominance of Germany in 
 Europe, demands which they have been taught 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 13 
 
 by the Chancellor to justify as the attainment 
 of reasonable security against the repetition 
 of a similar attack in the future. 
 
 Obvious though the falsity of this view 
 may be to us, it would be a gross error to 
 neglect it, and it is therefore necessary to 
 examine in the closest detail the argument 
 on which it is based in order to discover what 
 is the evidence for it, and what is the real 
 truth as to the alleged peaceful disposition 
 of the German Government and the actions 
 of the Russian Government. In doing this, 
 it is necessary to concentrate our attention 
 on the events in Berlin and St. Petersburg 
 on July 29th and 30th. We must follow the 
 lead and deal with the matter on the ground 
 chosen by the Germans themselves. I have 
 attempted to show that even on their own 
 field their cause entirely breaks down. 
 
 But in truth the terms of the controversy, as 
 expressed by them, are misleading. It is not 
 by concentrating attention on the events of 
 these two days that we can get to the real 
 responsibility. To get a fair view we must 
 tell the whole story. The question is wrongly 
 put when we are asked to discuss whether 
 Russia was justified in carrying out mobilisa- 
 tion on these two days. As I read the story. 
 
14 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 I should put it differently. Russia determined 
 on mobilisation, not on the 29th or 30th, but 
 on the 25th. At the Council summoned on 
 that day, the decision was made that if 
 Austria, as she threatened to do, declared 
 war upon and attacked Serbia, the Russian 
 reserves would be immediately called to the 
 Colours. The Russian Government have put 
 the matter quite fairly. The Czar, in a tele- 
 gram sent on July 30th, explained that the 
 mobiUsation then being carried out was only 
 the conclusion of measures determined upon 
 five days ago. The question then which arises 
 on the 29th and the 30th is not whether Russia 
 was right in making a fresh decision at this 
 time, but whether anything had happened 
 to induce her to alter a decision already made. 
 The onus of proof rests not on St. Petersburg 
 but on Vienna and Berlin. They knew of 
 the Russian decision ; and this decision was 
 the necessary result of their own action. Could 
 they bring forward any reasonable grounds 
 for altering it ? AH this German contro- 
 versialists ignore; they make Ught of the 
 Austrian ultimatum to Serbia ; they pass 
 over hastily the first days of the crisis, but, 
 as I read it, all that followed was the inevitable 
 result of this first fatal step, a step which 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 15 
 
 could not have been taken except as the result 
 of a carefully thought out plan. 
 
 I say that Russian mobilisation was the 
 natural and inevitable consequence of a de- 
 claration of war by Austria against Serbia. 
 The justification of this view lies outside the 
 history of the Twelve Days, and^it requires 
 a study of the whole relations between Russia 
 and Austria and the Balkans during the last 
 150 years. The situation that arose in 1914 
 was one to which there are many precedents, 
 and in aU of them we find the general idea 
 that a struggle between the two great Christian 
 Empires for control over the Slavonic peoples, 
 who had formerly been incorporated in the 
 Turkish Empire, could only be avoided by 
 the estabUshment of a general agreement be- 
 tween them. For such an agreement two 
 elements were necessary. The first was that 
 neither of these Empires should take any 
 strong forward step without a preliminary 
 discussion with its rival, by which the con- 
 ditions and the limitations of its action should 
 be defined. The second was that there should 
 be some kind of agreed partition of interests ; 
 this would naturally take the form that the 
 Western Balkans should be assigned to Austria, 
 the Eastern to Russia ; obviously the ultimate 
 
i6 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 result of such a partition would be that Aus- 
 tria should get access to the Aegean at 
 Salonika and Russia by Constantinople and 
 the Dardanelles. 
 
 Serbia would, therefore, have been regarded 
 as looking to Austria, Roumania and Bulgaria 
 as allies of Russia. From this point of view 
 any action, the result of which would have 
 tended to increase Austrian ascendancy over 
 Serbia, could have been accepted by Russia 
 only on the condition that they had previous 
 warning of what was contemplated, and that 
 they were promised some cone mission in the 
 Eastern part of the Balkans, which would 
 give them an access of power and influence 
 similar to that which Austria would gain. 
 The form which this would have taken would 
 naturally have been the promise of Austrian 
 assistance in winning the opening of the Straits 
 to Russia. We know that in 1908 this was 
 the subject of confidential discussion, and we 
 know also that the agreement which was 
 foreshadowed in these discussions was broken 
 by Austria when she proceeded to the annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without wait- 
 ing until Russia had given her consent. It 
 is from this act that the recent intensity of 
 rivalry between the two states has arisen. 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 17 
 
 But there is a further matter to be con- 
 sidered. The establishment of Austrian as- 
 cendancy over Serbia would in reality have 
 given to her the complete control, not only 
 of the Western but also of the Eastern Balkans, 
 for Roumania was united to the Central Powers 
 by a formal treaty, and in addition to this, 
 since the Treaty of Bucharest, Bulgaria had 
 taken her place on the side of Austria. More- 
 over, the influence of Germany at Constanti- 
 nople was so great that Turkey must also be 
 regarded as an ally of the Germanic Powers. 
 The only thing required, therefore, to com- 
 plete the Germanic ascendancy was the sub- 
 mission of Serbia. Had Russia remained quiet, 
 as was suggested to her, she would, in a few 
 weeks, have been confronted by the situation 
 that the whole of the Balkans from the Pruth 
 to the Adriatic had been completely won over 
 to her rival, and, in addition to this, Turkey, 
 the Government and the whole of the Empire, 
 would have taken its stand by the side of 
 Germany. If we couple this with what was 
 known as to German ambition for the ex- 
 ploitation of the Turkish Empire, we can see 
 that there would have been established be- 
 tween Russia and the Mediterranean a solid 
 block of allied or subject states, supported by 
 
i8 THE GERMAN CHANCELI^OR 
 
 the whole military power, not only of Austria 
 but of Austria and Germany, intervening be- 
 tween her and the open sea. She would 
 therefore have lost, and lost if not permanently 
 at least probably for many generations, all 
 hopes of attaining that which had been the 
 governing object of her whole policy since 
 the time of Peter the Great. Was it to be 
 expected that she should tacitly acquiesce in 
 such a solution of the Eastern question ? 
 Is it conceivable that any Russian Czar or 
 Russian Minister could have remained quiet 
 before such a situation ? 
 
 And if we analyse further, we shall find 
 that the essential cause underlying these events 
 was that Germany had come forward as a 
 party directly and immediately interested in 
 Eastern Europe. If it is the case, as has been 
 said, that the road to Constantinople was to 
 be found not so much through Vienna as 
 through Berlin, this is due to the fact that 
 Germany has now come forward as a rival 
 claimant for control over the Imperial City. 
 Russia might have acquiesced for an indefinite 
 period in the maintenance of the status 
 quo ] no one could suggest that she 
 could have looked on in passive inaction 
 while Germany seized upon that which 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 19 
 
 had so long been the object of her national 
 ambition. 
 
 If then we regard the questions at issue 
 from the point of view of imperial ambition, 
 the secular rivalry of states and the balance 
 of power, the case for Russia is overwhelming. 
 But there is a further element to be considered 
 which is of equal importance. The creation 
 of independent Slavonic principalities and 
 kingdoms had opened a prospect that the 
 Balkan question might eventually be settled 
 with sole regard to the wishes and to the 
 interests of the inhabitants. The estabUsh- 
 ment of the Balkan I^eague, had it been per- 
 manent, would have created Conditions under 
 which the independent Slavonic peoples would 
 not have been forced to assume the position 
 of clients and dependents, either of Austria 
 or of Russia. The collapse of this league at 
 once reopened the rivalry of the two Empires 
 in an acute form, but there had been added 
 a new factor, the importance of which cannot 
 be over-estimated. There had always existed 
 a very strong and genuine mutual sympathy 
 between Serbs and Russians, who were con- 
 scious of their relationship as members of the 
 Slav Race and the Orthodox Church. In recent 
 years as intercourse became more frequent, 
 
 M3 
 
20 THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR 
 
 this feeling had grown in intensity, and had 
 now become so strong that, quite apart from 
 any territorial or political aims, no Russian 
 Government could have stood by while they 
 watched the independence of the Serbian nation 
 being destroyed by one of the Germanic Em- 
 pires. The attack upon Serbia thereby became 
 an affront equally to the two great motives by 
 which the Russian Government and the Russian 
 Nation are influenced, to the motive of imperial 
 expansion and of Slavonic sympathies. 
 
 This was well known at Vienna and at 
 Berlin : they were not acting in ignorance ; 
 the ultimatum to Serbia must, therefore, be 
 taken as a direct challenge to Russia. 
 
 The question may still be asked, whether 
 some solution could not have been found by 
 amicable agreement. I do not see how any 
 such solution could have been found so long as 
 Austria was claiming ascendancy in the Western 
 Balkans at the same time that Germany, in 
 alliance with her, was aiming at the control 
 of Turkey. But however this may be, we 
 have the clear and indubitable fact that no 
 offer of such a friendly arrangement was 
 made. It is indeed true that the Austrian 
 Government offered discussions with Russia 
 as to the final settlement after the conquest 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 21 
 
 of Serbia should have been completed. But 
 with regard to these discussions two points 
 are to be noticed : first, they were on the 
 basis that they should be subsequent to the 
 conquest of Serbia, i.e., any compensation 
 offered to Russia should not be put forward 
 until Austria had gained her own ends, and 
 secondly, in proposing these discussions no 
 suggestion of any kind was made that any 
 compensation should be given to Russia. Had 
 the action of Austria been intended not to be 
 hostile to Russia, a different procedure would 
 have been taken. Russia would have been 
 sounded beforehand as she was in 1908, and 
 there would have been a clear recognition 
 that if she gave Austria a free hand in Serbia, 
 some compensation was due to her. This 
 was not done. An attempt was made to 
 rush the whole affair. Russia was to be 
 placed before a fait accompli, and negotiations 
 would then have been carried on after the 
 whole issue had in fact been decided. 
 
 In such a situation there was no possible 
 course for the Russian Government to take 
 except that which they did in fact take : to 
 state openly and frankly that they could not 
 accept Austrian proposals, that the first move- 
 ment of the Austrian armies would be met 
 
22 THE GERMAN CHANCELI.OR 
 
 by mobilisation, with the implication that if 
 the Austrians in reality proceeded to overrun 
 Serbia, Russia would interfere in arms. As 
 soon as it became evident that Austria was 
 acting with the support of Germany, and 
 that in the event of war, German support 
 would be given to Austria, it was obvious 
 that this mobihsation must be directed against 
 Germany as well as against Austria if it was 
 to have any effect. 
 
 A complete endorsement of this point of 
 view is to be found in the introduction to 
 the Austrian Red Book, in which it is clearly 
 stated that the combined action of Austria 
 and Germany was directed against Russian 
 ambitions in regard to Constantinople. This 
 is put in the forefront of the argument. 
 
 In the discussion of these matters this point 
 of view is more or less recognised by Austrian 
 controversiaHsts. To them the matter is so 
 famihar that it could not in fact be ignored. 
 In the statements of German writers, Uttle 
 or nothing is said about it, but one has a 
 feeling that they really quite tmderstand the 
 situation, and just for this reason say httie 
 about it. When I read the attempts to defend 
 Austrian and German action which have ap- 
 peared in England, I find a complete ignorance 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 23 
 
 and a complete indifference to these great 
 questions which have occupied Europe for 
 over ioo years. It is indeed impossible for 
 men who have given no previous study to 
 these great problems of power to embark 
 without adequate preparation on an analysis 
 of the events which brought about the war. 
 It has been objected by a German writer 
 that I am more Russian than the Russians. 
 I should like, therefore, to explain that I am 
 not in the least concerned to defend every 
 action of the Russian Government. I know 
 little about Russia except that the whole 
 conditions and modes of thought and action 
 are necessarily very different from those of 
 Great Britain. It would be ludicrous to 
 expect that the decisions of the Russian Council 
 of State would be entirely guided by con- 
 ceptions similar to those which prevailed in 
 the British Cabinet. They had their own 
 point of view, which is just as legitimate as, 
 however different it may be from, ours. To 
 them a great Continental war was necessarily 
 something much less strange than it was to 
 us, and much less contrary to their political 
 conceptions. Moreover, the questions of the 
 Balkans from which this war arose, involved 
 for them vital problems of power ; and from 
 
24 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.IX)R 
 
 the very beginning of the crisis, they were 
 immediately confronted by fundamental ques- 
 tions essential to their vital interests, of a 
 kind which did not arise for Great Britain 
 until France and Belgium became involved 
 in the war. But even from the German 
 statements of the case, I cannot find any 
 suggestion that Russia had intended or deter- 
 mined on war in the year 1914. I find on the 
 other hand that it has again and again been 
 stated that Russia intended war in 1916 at 
 a time when her preparations would have 
 been completed. Real evidence for this is 
 wanting ; it is a charge probably as baseless 
 as the similar charge made against Great 
 Britain ; but given that it was a just suspicion, 
 it is a reason why Germany should have forced 
 the crisis in 1914 when Germany was ready, 
 but Russia was not yet ready, and is therefore 
 real evidence against the charge that Russia 
 was directly responsible for the war. 
 
 I should not be in the least surprised or 
 disturbed to find that as the crisis developed 
 there arose a definite war party at St. Peters- 
 burg, who, when the challenge to them had 
 once been' made, were willing and even eager 
 to take it up, and were as ready to submit 
 the great questions at issue to the arbitrament 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 25 
 
 of war as were the military party in Germany. 
 However peaceful might be the disposition 
 of the Czar and of M. Sazonoff, the Russian 
 Council of State was not a committee of a 
 Peace Association. We can be sure that there 
 were among it men who would not shrink 
 from war, and that when a crisis arose would 
 even urge it on. It is one of the inevitable 
 results which arose from the action of Austria 
 that the influence of this party would be 
 increased. Nor should I be surprised to find 
 that they speculated on the help of England 
 and believed that however much she might 
 desire to do so, she would not be able to 
 maintain neutrality in the coming struggle. 
 In pubHc, as in private Hfe, threats necessarily 
 call out counter threats ; a challenge is 
 answered by a counter challenge ; the warUke 
 spirit in one nation awakens a similar spirit 
 in another. All this is well known ; it is a 
 commonplace of political psychology, and this 
 is one of the strongest condemnations of the 
 original Austrian action, for anyone could 
 have foreseen that it would inevitably call 
 up a spirit in Russia which would make any 
 accommodation extremely difficult. 
 
 I will go further and confess that I have 
 always been inclined to hold that the issue 
 
26 THE GERMAN CHANCEI<I.OR 
 
 of the final order calling in Russian reserves 
 at the particular moment when it was pub- 
 lished, was a diplomatic mistake ; I say a 
 diplomatic mistake, for it gave to the German 
 Government just the kind of pretext that they 
 wanted. Looking back on the series of events 
 with our present knowledge, we may, I think, 
 suggest that the course of action actually 
 adopted shows the inconvenience which comes 
 from divided councils. It would, perhaps, 
 have been wiser if directly the Austrian de- 
 claration of war against Serbia was issued 
 they had at once broken off all negotiations, 
 issued an ultimatum to Austria and summoned 
 the whole of the reserves to the colours. 
 I assume that the reason for not doing this 
 was a double one : first, there was a genuine 
 desire on the part of the Czar not to break 
 off the last faint chance of preserving peace, 
 and secondly, it was necessary to wait until 
 the French President had returned to Paris. 
 Had they acted in this way on Wednesday, 
 they would have had a full and complete 
 justification. What they did was to have 
 recourse to a half measure. This put them 
 into an awkward position ; as I attempt to 
 show the events of Thursday really took away 
 the last reasons which had induced the Czar 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 27 
 
 to hold back, but they did not give the same 
 open, public and obvious ground for completing 
 mobilisation that the declaration of war on 
 Serbia had done. It therefore became possible 
 for the German Government to fix on the final 
 act, to attempt to show that this was taken 
 without adequate reason and to twist round 
 the whole of the narrative, deaUng with it 
 as an isolated action and out of connection 
 with all that had preceded it. ; 
 
 The articles are largely controversial, that 
 is, they are occupied not with setting up 
 and defending an hypothesis, but in overthrow^ 
 ing that put forward by the other side. They 
 are negative, not positive. This course is 
 necessary. In order to prove conclusively any 
 contention, it is not enough to put forward 
 and defend one's own point of view ; it must 
 be shown that no other explanation of the 
 facts is tenable. The advocate in the Court 
 of Law has not only to prove his own case, 
 but to demolish that of his opponent. This 
 he does by cross-examination. This is a method 
 we would gladly adopt were it possible ; as 
 it is not, the only course available is to take 
 the best and most authoritative statements 
 
28 THE GERMAN CHANCELU)R 
 
 on the other side and subject them to the 
 most searching criticism. Even if some may 
 think that the criticism fails, it cannot but 
 serve the cause of truth. And in fact con- 
 troversy, relentless and persistent controversy, 
 is the only method of arriving at truth. 
 
 This procedure has the necessary disad- 
 vantage that the argument is involved and 
 technical, and it requires much repetition. It 
 is difficult at such a time as this to invite 
 the reader to concentrate his attention on 
 what may appear to be a mere historian's 
 point of view of the interpretation of diplo- 
 matic documents. But it must be remembered 
 that the complications and doubts through 
 which we have to make our dubious and 
 circuitous course arise not so much from the 
 nature of the matter under discussion, as from 
 the fact that much essential evidence is still 
 wanting, and also from the compUcations intro- 
 duced by the fallacies and misstatements which 
 I attempt to expose. I believe that when 
 all is known, the course of events will be on 
 the whole clear, and that the obscurity arises 
 from the fact that the chief of the protagonists 
 has not given us his complete story. And 
 secondly, I will ask the reader always to 
 keep in mind that there is at issue one of 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 29 
 
 the greatest historical facts with which the 
 world has ever had to do. The war, at any 
 rate, is there. Why did it arise ? Was it, 
 as some would beheve, a tragic error ? Was 
 it, as others would tell us, the result of a 
 scheme formed many 3'^ears ago by the British 
 Government and the outcome of a plot assidu- 
 ously nurtured during the years of peace 
 with an almost unparalleled cunning, in which 
 a deep machiavellian design was veneered over 
 and hidden even from the British nation ? 
 Or was it on the contrary, the outcome of 
 a plan formed by the German Government 
 to secure once and for all their predominance 
 and control over Europe ? 
 
 On one point there is agreement between 
 both sides. The question of the origin of 
 the war remains now, as it has always been, 
 one of supreme importance ; it stiU governs 
 the conduct of the war, and when the time 
 comes to discuss the terms of peace, it will 
 be found that the proposals made by different 
 countries are profoundly influenced by the 
 views taken as to the origin of the war. The 
 British Government have done aU in their 
 power to help to an understanding of this 
 question. At the very beginning they put 
 forward a full, complete and unvarnished 
 
30 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I,OR 
 
 record of the whole of the negotiations which 
 had taken place with aU the interested Powers, 
 with those with whom they are now in aUiance 
 as well as with the enemy countries. On 
 this record we stand. Having no more dis- 
 closures to make, they fear no disclosures 
 which may be made by other countries ; they 
 have been wilhng to submit to the judgment 
 of the world based on this simple record, 
 which requires neither explanation nor apology. 
 The German Government, while constantly 
 asserting its innocence of the designs attributed 
 to it and its peaceful intentions, has to this 
 day refrained from making any such dis- 
 closure. Till they do so, it does not seem 
 as if any further discussion on this point 
 will be profitable. When they do, then the 
 British nation will be willing, as they always 
 have been, to rely on the verdict of any 
 impartial tribunal and on the general judgment 
 of the civilised world. 
 
AJ^D TBM OUTBRBAK OF WAR. 31 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Difficui^ties of the Chancei,i,or. 
 
 Those who have occupied themselves with 
 any detailed discussions as to the negotiations 
 preceding the outbreak of the war have 
 naturally during the last months been silent. 
 
 As Baron Burian has said, it is at this 
 moment not the origin but the end of the 
 war in which the world is interested. More- 
 over, all that could be said seemed to have 
 been said. The analysis of the official publi- 
 cations had been completed. There was a 
 general feeling that we could not get any 
 further vmtil the veil was lifted which had 
 hung over the actions of the German Govern- 
 ment, the internal discussions in Germany, 
 and the negotiations between Germany and 
 Austria. For it was in Berlin and in Vienna 
 and there alone that fresh light would be 
 found. 
 
 We have always^known that^the time would 
 come when the veil would be Ufted, and it 
 
32 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 was easy to see that this would be when 
 differences came between Germany and AuS' 
 tria or when the internal dissensions of 
 Germany would force the hands of the 
 Government, and the different parties would 
 in self-defence be driven to explain more 
 fully their actions and their poHcy. 
 
 The process has already begun. The division 
 between the Chancellor and the Nationalist 
 parties is widening, and as it grows recrimina- 
 tion is arising. This recrimination extends 
 not only to the terms of peace, as, e.g., the 
 annexation question, and the conduct of the 
 war, e.g., the use of submarines, but also to 
 the origins of the war. 
 
 This extension is not accidental, but is inti- 
 mately connected with the whole political 
 situation. The Chancellor is rightly and natur- 
 ally anxious to preserve the unity of the 
 nation. This he has repeatedly laid stress 
 on. But the unity of the nation means in 
 practice the continuance of the support given 
 to the Government by the extreme I^iberals 
 and the moderate SociaUsts. Now this support 
 has throughout been given owing to the behef 
 that the war was a defensive war forced on 
 Germany by Russia. This has been clearly 
 explained in a pamphlet called " Der springende 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 33 
 
 Punkt " (" The Decisive Issue "), by " Ger- 
 manicus." As the author, who himself is a 
 member of the Sociahst minority and is 
 opposed to the war, points out, the real 
 explanation of the attitude of the majority 
 and their difference from him and his friends 
 lies in the different interpretation that they 
 give to the events leading up to the war. 
 
 " The question. Is Germany carrjdng on a 
 defensive or an aggressive war? is, then, 
 the decisive issue, which Hes at the bottom 
 of aU the differences between the left and 
 the right wing of the German (Socialist) Party. 
 The question of guilt is the starting-point." 
 
 The maintenance of German unity and the 
 position of the Chancellor therefore depends 
 above aU on his being able to maintain the 
 position that the war was forced on Germany ; 
 if he cannot, he wiU lose the support of the 
 Socialist majority. But in his anxiety to 
 free himself from the charge of being responsible 
 for the war, he has exposed himself to a very 
 damaging attack from the other side, the 
 essence of which is that he allowed his policy 
 to be governed to such an extent by his desire 
 to secure the friendship of England and Eng- 
 lish neutrality in the war, that, for this or 
 other reasons, at the critical period he inter- 
 
34 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 fered with the plans of the military party; 
 he caused the outbreak of war to be deferred 
 for three days ; by this he brought enormous 
 losses upon Germany, and though they do 
 not now say it, no doubt eventually the 
 charge wiU be brought against him that it 
 is he who is responsible for the final defeat. 
 
 The point is one of such importance for 
 our knowledge of the internal relations of 
 parties in Germany, and also for the history 
 of the negotiations, that I will quote the 
 accusation in full* : 
 
 " All Germany felt and knew that the fatal 
 hour had struck. Only Bethmann-Hollweg 
 clung to the hope that a peaceful solution 
 of the ' incident ' could be found, or at least 
 that hostilities might be confined to Austria 
 and Serbia. 
 
 " Concerning the activities of the Chancellor 
 immediately before the war, known to us 
 from published dispatches and notes, it is 
 unnecessary to speak in detail. It is plain 
 that, taken as a whole, his untiring efforts 
 
 * This passage is an extract from an anonymous pam- 
 phlet by "Junius Alter," privately circulated in Germany. 
 No copy of it seems to have reached this country, but 
 I am enabled to make this quotation from an article in 
 the Chicago Uaily News of July nth, in which long 
 extracts are printed. 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 35 
 
 up to the very last hour, regardless of military- 
 happenings, were directed to prevent at any 
 price the long unavoidable war. In vain were 
 the warnings of the General Staff. The Minister 
 of War and men of authority in the naval 
 department pointed in vain to the necessity 
 of mobiUsation. They succeeded in half-con- 
 vincing the Emperor of its absolute necessity. 
 On Thursday, July 30th, the afternoon police 
 papers and the Berlin Lokalanzeiger published 
 the fact of the mobiUsation, but the inter- 
 ference of Bethmann-HoUweg served to nulhfy 
 this decisive action. 
 
 " Having control, he still held fast to the 
 hope that with England's help he would 
 succeed in bringing about an agreement be- 
 tween Vienna and St. Petersburg. So two 
 more precious days were lost, costing us not 
 only part of Alsace, but also streams of 
 blood. Even August ist, 1914, would have 
 passed in the same manner had not the 
 mihtary authorities declared that in the event 
 of further postponement of mobihsation they 
 refused to accept the responsibility for the 
 consequences. Moreover, the French had or- 
 dered mobilisation early that afternoon, and 
 had already crossed the frontier at several 
 places, as had the Russians. 
 
36 THE GERMAN CHANCEI/I.OR 
 
 " But even after mobilisation began Beth- 
 mann-HoUweg made a last attempt to have 
 the order withdrawn. Fortunately, it was 
 then too late. Clear-headed and politically 
 far-sighted military authorities had carried 
 their point at the eleventh hour. What those 
 days of indecision on the Chancellor's part 
 really cost us can hardly be estimated. The 
 important advantage gained by the capabiHty 
 of more rapid mobilisation than our enemies 
 was lost, thanks to Bethmann-Hollweg. What- 
 ever military advantage also was lost we will 
 read later between the lines of the reports 
 of the General Staff 
 
 " If ever there was a time in a decisive 
 hour when the task of responsible military 
 leaders had been rendered nearly impossible 
 it was before the outbreak of this war, when 
 Germany faced a fight for her very existence, 
 and that is the fault of her leading statesman. 
 No condemnation can be severe enough for 
 much unnecessary blood that has been shed, 
 due to the poHcy of this poUtical sleep- 
 walker 
 
 " The absolute lack of diplomatic prepara- 
 tion came to light on August ist, 1914, by 
 the fact that no one at the Foreign Office 
 knew whether the war would be waged on 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 37 
 
 ©ne front or two. War on three fronts due 
 to the participation of England was at first 
 looked upon as an utter impossibility. Al- 
 though the French mobilisation had taken 
 place early that afternoon, it was still insisted 
 that mobilisation did not necessarily mean war. 
 The Press was given the definite instruction : 
 ' Not one word against France.' In the mean- 
 time the news was already coming in that the 
 German border in Alsace had been crossed 
 in several places by the French. What ap- 
 plied to France naturally applied to England. 
 The Press of England was given to under- 
 stand that the strictest moderation must be 
 observed."* 
 
 Some of these statements, e.g., that the 
 French and the Russians had crossed the 
 frontier before German mobilisation cannot 
 be accepted ; with that I am not on this 
 occasion concerned. 
 
 In his answer to this attack which the 
 Chancellor made in his speech of April, 1916, 
 it is interesting to notice that he does not 
 attempt to challenge the facts. He completely 
 
 * This is clearly a mistranslation; it should probably 
 read : " The Press was given to understand that the 
 strictest moderation must be observed towards England." 
 
38 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 accepts this account of what happened. His 
 actual words are : 
 
 It is alleged that I delayed the mobilisation for three 
 days. Does not the man who hurls at me the accusation 
 that I am guilty of having by my delay shed streams 
 of blood of our people — does not this man know that 
 we were feverishly engaged during those three days in 
 bringing about an understanding between Austria-Hungary 
 and Russia, and that it was just the Kaiser who was 
 so anxious to preserve peace for his people, and was 
 constantly exchanging telegrams with the Czar during 
 these days ? And does not the man see, what must 
 be clear to the eyes of everybody, that if we had pro- 
 claimed mobilisation three days earlier we should have 
 rendered ourselves guilty of that crime of which Russia 
 was guilty by mobilising in the midst of the negotiations, 
 which were proceeding favourably, against the most 
 binding promises given to us ? 
 
 The position is a piquant one. The Chancellor 
 accuses the military party of gross indifference 
 to the ordinary injunctions of international 
 moraUty and of forcing on war when a peaceful 
 solution was still possible. The others accuse 
 him of gross incompetence, of neglect of the 
 most elementary diplomatic precautions, and 
 of thereby having brought on them untold 
 loss, and though they do not yet say so, in 
 effect of having lost the war. When thieves 
 fall out honest men come by their own, and 
 in this conflict of opinion we may hope to 
 find more of the truth than we could when 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 39 
 
 we had to do with an apparently undivided 
 Germany. And I think that an examination 
 wiVL show that both sides are justified in their 
 criticisms : that the unscrupulousness of the 
 military party is equalled by the incompetence 
 of the Chancellor, and that it is the combination 
 of the two which is bringing about the downfall 
 of Germany. 
 
 Were I a German I know not which I 
 should blame most. At least the military 
 people seem to have known what they wanted 
 and how they were going to get it ; the 
 Chancellor was neither strong enough to oppose 
 them nor consistent in abetting them. 
 
 Now, anyone who has studied carefully 
 the origins of the war wiU recognise the 
 importance of these statements. It has always 
 been recognised that there was a real difficulty 
 in disentangHng the events of the last days 
 of the crisis ; it was obvious that the solution 
 of the difficulty must be found in dissensions 
 between different parties in the highest circles 
 at Berlin. These disclosures may afford us 
 a clue. 
 
 But they are not the only help we have. 
 In his speech of August, 1915, to which suffi- 
 cient attention has not been paid, the Chan- 
 cellor for the first time gave an account of 
 
40 THE GERMAN CHANCELI.OR 
 
 the events which took place late on the 
 evening of Wednesday, July 29th. The reason 
 which led him to do this is instructive. In 
 my " History of Twelve Days " I put in a 
 prominent place the now weU-known telegram 
 which was pubhshed in the Westminster Gazette 
 of August ist, 1914 ; I drew attention to the 
 remarkable circumstances in which it had 
 been pubhshed ; I pointed out that it had 
 never been communicated to the German 
 nation, and asked whether, in these circum- 
 stances, we could treat it as authentic. These 
 doubts were echoed in the Westminster Gazette 
 and other papers in the reviews of my book, 
 and as a result the Chancellor took up the 
 challenge, and, after the lapse of a year, gave 
 a full account of the circumstances in which 
 the telegram was sent. While this, of course, 
 entirely removes any doubts as to its authen- 
 ticity, it brings out in a most striking manner 
 the way in which he deals with these matters. 
 While the Enghsh Government from the begin- 
 ning published a complete account of all 
 that they did, he doles out information 
 from time to time as it may be required 
 to suit the circumstances of the moment. 
 It is this which more than anything else 
 justices tl^e distrust with whigh Gennao 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 41 
 
 accounts of these matters are generally 
 regarded. 
 
 However, we now have a valuable addition 
 to our knowledge of German diplomatic action, 
 and I propose to inquire what light this 
 throws on the responsibiUty for the origin of 
 the war. 
 
42 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Crisis. 
 
 IvET me first recapitulate the events of the 
 three preceding days and the situation on 
 Wednesdaj^ July 29th. They will be in the 
 memory of aU. 
 
 Until Wednesday the action of the German 
 Government had been consistent and har- 
 monious. They had completely identified them- 
 selves with Austria, they claimed for Austria 
 a free hand to go to war with Serbia ; by 
 the formula the " localisation of the con- 
 flict " they had asserted that the matter 
 was one with which Europe as a whole, and 
 Russia in particular, had no concern ; they 
 had publicly announced that they intended 
 to support this proposition if necessary in 
 arms, they had warned the Russian Govern- 
 ment that if they took any military measures 
 to oppose Austria, Germany would at once 
 mobilise and go to war ; this action had been 
 accompanied by the necessary steps at home. 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 43 
 
 and, by the circular letter to the German 
 Governments sent on Tuesday, the latter had 
 been informed that war was probably imminent. 
 
 So far all is intelligible. The action is in 
 one piece ; it can only be explained on the 
 assumption of a plan which had been drawn 
 up beforehand, by which the alternative of 
 surrender or war would be placed before 
 Russia, and this was accompanied by the 
 definite determination to go to war if Russia: 
 did not surrender. As to the facts and their 
 interpretation, there is not and cannot be 
 any dispute. German writers do not, in fact, 
 contest them. What they do is to contest 
 the justice of Russia's claim to be considered 
 in the Serbian question. They deny this, 
 and in denying it they adopt and defend 
 the position of the German Government that 
 it would be justifiable to go to war rather 
 than to accept it. 
 
 Now, for all this the Chancellor was primarily 
 responsible. We have to do with a diplomatic 
 policy which falls under his control. Even 
 if he had misgivings he did not let them appear. 
 He had definitely and irrevocably adopted the 
 position that Austria was to go to war with 
 Serbia, and that if Russia interfered, Germany 
 would at once go to war with her. 
 
44 THE GERMAN CHANCEI^IyOR 
 
 On one matter alone was there any symptom 
 of hesitation. It was not certain whether 
 Germany would at once go to war if Russia 
 mobilised against Austria alone and not against 
 Germany. This, however, was of little im- 
 portance, for the German Government had 
 so acted as to make it almost inevitable that 
 any Russian mobihsation must be complete 
 and not partial. They had informed the 
 Russian Government that war would foUow 
 if any " preparatory niiUtary preparations " 
 were made. The importance of this cannot 
 be exaggerated. By it they had, in fact, 
 ensured that any Russian mobilisation would 
 be complete. Had Russia had to do with 
 Austria alone, she would, as so often in the 
 past, when it appeared necessary, have begun 
 a partial mobihsation. Knowing that Ger- 
 many was behind Austria and that any inter- 
 ference meant war with Germany, it followed 
 inevitably that if they mobilised at all they 
 must at once prepare to meet a German 
 attack. 
 
 It is absolutely inconceivable that any re- 
 sponsible statesman could have acted in this 
 way unless he was prepared for immediate 
 war. It is, indeed, quite possible that some 
 of the German Ministers and the Emperor 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 45 
 
 noped and believed that Russia would give 
 way, as she had done in igog, but if she did 
 not do so they had committed themselves 
 so far that no retreat was possible. They 
 must have been prepared for and have ac- 
 cepted the possibility that this would happen. 
 The Chancellor, the Emperor, and the whole 
 of the German Government are equally re- 
 sponsible for all that ensued. They cannot 
 free themselves from this responsibility by 
 anything that happened later. If the Chan- 
 cellor did not approve of this policy, the only 
 course for him was to resign, and this he did 
 not do. 
 
 So far, then, all is easy and obvious. On 
 Wednesday, however, we suddenly find our- 
 selves in the presence of an apparently hopeless 
 confusion and uncertainty. Up to that point 
 all had gone as could have been foreseen. 
 Austria presented her Note ; Germany de- 
 clared her solidarity with Austria ; Russia 
 publicly declared that she could not dis- 
 interest herself in Serbia ; Germany gave the 
 warning that Russian mobilisation would be 
 followed by a war ; Austria declared war 
 on Serbia ; Russia answered by officially an- 
 nouncing her impending mobilisation. The 
 attempts of England at mediation had been 
 
46 THB GERMAN CHANCEIyl^OR 
 
 sucx^essfully frustrated, the clear issue had 
 been preserved. There remained, then, nothing 
 to be done except to announce German mobili- 
 sation. This would naturally follow on Wed- 
 nesday or on Thursday morning. In this case 
 war would naturally begin the next day. 
 
 I^et us suppose that this had happened. 
 Germany alone was prepared ; the Belgian 
 army was not yet mobiKsed ; the French 
 had not yet completed their preliminary ar- 
 rangements ; practically nothing had been 
 done in England ; the Germans, in fact, 
 seemed to have the whole game in their hands. 
 I/iege could not have defended itself as it 
 did later ; the rush through Belgium would 
 have been almost unimpeded, and with good 
 fortune the Germans might have been in 
 Paris in six weeks, if not sooner. For those 
 who regarded the miUtary situation alone, it 
 was, indeed, a glorious opportunity. It was 
 an opportunity which the military leaders 
 proposed to use. Junius puts the case clearly 
 enough. A " clear-sighted military authority," 
 the Army, the General Staff, the Chief of the 
 Staff, Count von Moltke, who, as the Emperor 
 has said, did such excellent work in preparing 
 for this war, supported certainly by the Crown 
 Prince and the national parties, looked for- 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 47 
 
 ward for immediate mobilisation and instant 
 action. We can easily picture these men, 
 who had so admirably prepared for the war, 
 who had drawn up in every detail the scheme 
 on which it was to be conducted, who were 
 straining at the leash and grudging every 
 hour's delay. Complete success depended on 
 its execution before the enemy was ready. 
 They cared nothing for the poUtical situation. 
 They did not trouble themselves about the 
 possibiUty of the intervention of England, 
 for they believed that if England did inter- 
 vene, she would not be strong enough to 
 prevent the accomphshment of the scheme, 
 and they also beheved that if it was once 
 accomplished, if Germany were victorious on 
 the Continent, the whole power of England 
 would have been unable to undo what had 
 been done. 
 
 What a picture does this afEord us of the 
 danger to Europe. How futile to deny, as 
 the Germans wotild do, the presence of miU- 
 tarism. Here, in the heart of Europe, were 
 these men, having an almost insuperable army, 
 fully prepared to begin by a surprise attack 
 the war which they had long considered 
 inevitable. 
 
 This was the situation when the Council 
 
48 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 met at Potsdam that evening. When it met 
 the Chancellor was able to J communicate the 
 official notification which had just been re- 
 ceived that Russia was about to mobihse. 
 The proposal to mobihse was then made. 
 This has always been assumed ; we now know 
 it certainly from the Chancellor's statement. 
 But it was unsuccessful. The Chancellor inter- 
 vened, and intervened successfully ; the Council 
 separated without any decision having been 
 made. Why was this ? It has always been 
 assumed that the reason for this was the 
 uncertaint}' as to England's action. That this 
 was one reason is shown by the fact that as 
 soon as the Council separated, the Chancellor, 
 on his return to BerHn, sent for Sir Edward 
 Goschen, and made to him the celebrated bid 
 for British neutrahty. This was, of course, 
 in accordance with his whole pohcy, which 
 was based on securing British neutrahty in 
 the case of war. But delay caused on this 
 ground alone would thoroughly justify the 
 strongest censure on the part of the mihtary 
 authorities. If the plan was not to be carried 
 through unless British neutrahty was secured 
 beforehand, then it was clearly his duty to 
 have got it guaranteed at an earher stage. 
 What he had done was to allow Germany 
 
AND THE OUTBRKAK OF WAR. 49 
 
 to go so far that she could not retreat without 
 a fiasco far worse than that of Morocco, but he 
 had done this without having taken the most 
 elementary precautions. He had made no 
 attempt to sound the British Govermnent. 
 He had simply speculated on their weakness, 
 and then at the last moment lost his nerve. 
 If British neutrality were to be a condition 
 of war, then it was his clear duty to have 
 secured it in advance. The accusation by 
 the military authorities that the diplomatic 
 preparation had been incomplete is absolutely 
 justified. 
 
 As a matter of fact, there was another 
 reason, a reason which was disclosed for the 
 first time in the Chancellor's speech of last 
 August. On that evening, at some hour which 
 is not specified, but probably before the con- 
 clusion of the conference, he received from 
 Count Pourtales at Petrograd a telegram to 
 the following effect : 
 
 M. Sazonoff, who has just asked me to 
 go to see him, informed me that the Cabinet 
 at Vienna has answered the desire which 
 he has repeatedly expressed for the entry 
 on direct conversations with a categorical 
 refusal. No other course, therefore, was 
 open to them but to return to Sir 
 
50 THE GERMAN CHANCEI<I,OR 
 
 Edward Grey's proposal for a Quadruple 
 
 conversation. 
 This was of the highest importance ; it com- 
 pletely altered the whole diplomatic situation ; 
 and the effect of it might be disastrous. It 
 made it impossible for Germany at this 
 moment to take any irrevocable step, and 
 this alone vi^ould have been quite sufficient 
 reason for postponing mobiKsation. 
 
 In order to explain why this was, we must 
 go back. The conversations which had been 
 broken off were those suggested by Russia. 
 M. Sazonofi had proposed negotiations on 
 the basis of the Austrian Note to Serbia ; 
 the object was that Austria and Russia should 
 come to an understanding which would enable 
 Russia to advise Serbia to accept the require- 
 ments made in the original Austrian Note. 
 This was a serious business proposal ; if it 
 had been adopted and the conversations had 
 been satisfactory, the whole difficulty would 
 have been got over. The proposal had been 
 gladly welcomed by England, France, and 
 Italy ; it was because of this proposal that 
 Sir Edward Grey had suspended his sugges- 
 tions for a conference, and it was on this 
 that everyone had relied as the best means 
 of avoiding war. The German Government 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 51 
 
 had themselves referred to these conversations 
 as one of the reasons for rejecting the English 
 proposal for mediation. 
 
 Now, it appeared that these negotiations 
 had been broken off by Austria. What would 
 be the effect of this as soon as it became 
 known ? Surely it would have been to show 
 that Russian mobilisation was absolutely justi- 
 fied, and, in fact, unavoidable. She would 
 have been driven to it by two simultaneous 
 acts, the declaration of war on Serbia and 
 the rupture of negotiations, for both of which 
 Austria was responsible. Supposing, now, that 
 Germany had, as the miUtary party wished, 
 at once mobiUsed, Russia could at once have 
 published the facts, and no sophistry could 
 then have obscured the real situation. The 
 answer would have been crushing. Russia 
 would have said, " We offered to negotiate 
 with Austria ; you used our offer as a means 
 of stopping English proposals for mediation ; 
 at the ver}'- moment that you were doing this 
 your ally declared war against Serbia and 
 broke off the negotiations. What course was 
 open to us except to press on with our military 
 arrangements and begin mobilisation ? But 
 in doing this we had to take into consideration 
 that we had been officially informed that 
 
 02 
 
52 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 any action of this kind would bring about 
 war with Germany. We therefore must make 
 our mobilisation complete." 
 
 As the Chancellor himself explains, if under 
 these circumstances Germany had gone to 
 war, " We should have rendered ourselves 
 guilty of that crime of which Russia was 
 guilty, by mobiUsing in the midst of negotia- 
 tions." The case against the German Govern- 
 ment would have been so complete that not 
 even the German nation could have been 
 deceived ; they would be clearly acting as 
 the aggressors and, under these circumstances, 
 it would have been impossible to depend 
 upon the support of the Socialists. Germany 
 would have entered the war not as a united 
 but as a divided nation. At whatever cost, 
 then, immediate mobihsation must be stopped. 
 The whole plan had gone wrong. Nothing 
 could be done until the line between Vienna 
 and Petrograd had been restored. The re- 
 opening of negotiations was a necessary con- 
 dition for the declaration of war. 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 53 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 A Chai.i,enge to the Chancei,i,or. 
 
 In the last chapter I explained the difficulty 
 in which the Chancellor found himself en- 
 tangled late on the Wednesday night. He 
 had allowed the country practically to become 
 committed to war, but he had neglected to 
 secure himself diplomatically against England, 
 and the rupture of negotiations by Austria 
 placed him in a most awkward position. 
 I^ate that night information came which made 
 the situation even worse. He received from 
 Prince Lichnowsky a telegram giving an ac- 
 count of his interview with Sir Edward Grey. 
 From this it was clear that his bid for Enghsh 
 neutrality was fated to be unsuccessful, and 
 that if war ensued he must look forward to 
 meeting England as well. His whole plaii 
 had broken down. We must, I think, take 
 it that from this moment he was personally 
 genuinely anxious to find some escape. There 
 is no difficulty in believing that from this 
 
54 THE GERMAN CHANCEI<I.OR 
 
 time onwards his constant reiterations that 
 he did all he could to avoid war represented 
 at least his personal desire, even if they did 
 not represent the decisions of the Government. 
 Side by side with this, however, there was 
 the other comphcation, and it was imperative 
 that the negotiations between Russia and 
 Austria should be renewed. This might result 
 in an arrangement being come to, but at the 
 same time the recommencing of negotiations 
 was, as I have shown, a necessary preliminary 
 to the outbreak of war. 
 
 If we are to attempt to understand what 
 ^ppened, we must keep these different motives 
 in our minds, and it is they which will explain 
 his action that night. 
 
 For both reasons he wished to bring Russia 
 and Austria together again, at least in ap- 
 pearance. Fortunately for him and for Ger- 
 many this was possible owing to the extreme 
 moderation of the Russian Government. They 
 were at the moment mobiHsing only against 
 Austria. They would have been quite justi- 
 fied, as I have already shown, in mobilising 
 against Germany as well, and looking back 
 at the events now, we can see that diplo- 
 matically their moderation was a mistake. 
 Had the Russian Government only wished 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 55 
 
 for a good opportunity of going to war, they 
 could not possibly have had a better one. 
 So strong, however, were the pacific intentions 
 of the Czar that in order to leave some 
 element of hope, he limited himself to a 
 partial mobilisation only. This is of great 
 importance, because, as is well known, it is 
 the transference from partial to complete 
 mobiUsation on which the Germans fix as 
 their justification for war. 
 
 As it was, this moderation of the Czar gave 
 the German Government an opportunity for 
 extricating themselves from the awkward posi- 
 tion in which they were. To this the whole 
 efforts of the next two days were directed, 
 and, as far as the German nation was con- 
 cerned, successfully, though the success was 
 attained only by giving afterwards a grossly 
 untrue account of what happened and by 
 suppressing the greater part of the corre- 
 spondence. 
 
 We can now understand the remarkable 
 telegram (the Westminster Gazette telegram) 
 which he sent to Vienna early on Thursday 
 morning, and it will be convenient to repeat 
 it: 
 
 The report of Count Pourtales does not har- 
 monise with the account which your Excellency ha,s 
 
56 THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR 
 
 given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government. 
 
 Apparently there is a misunderstanding, which I beg 
 you to clear up. 
 
 We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with 
 Serbia, with which she is in a state of war. 
 
 The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. 
 Petersburg would be a grave mistake. 
 
 We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty as an ally. 
 We must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world 
 conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting 
 our advice. 
 
 Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold 
 with all emphasis and great seriousness. 
 
 (Signed) Bethmann-Hollweg. 
 
 Here, then, we see the double motive. 
 For the first time the strongly expressed 
 desire to avoid the world conflagration (for 
 the coming in of England would change what 
 would otherwise have been a simple European 
 war to a world M'ar), and side by side with 
 this the diplomatic device of starting again 
 the negotiations which had been broken off. 
 
 As to the resumption of these negotiations, 
 a word of explanation is necessary. 
 
 From the very beginning of the crisis the 
 German Government had advised Austria to 
 offer to discuss freely the settlement after 
 the war. The line they were advised to 
 take was — " If you stand aside for the present 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 57 
 
 and give us a free hand to go to war with 
 Serbia, we will undertake not to annex any 
 Serbian territory and not to destroy the inde- 
 pendence of Serbia, and we will discuss with ; 
 you any matters concerning Russian interests 
 which arise." We do not know whether any- 
 one really believed that this offer had any 
 chance of being accepted. It is quite possible 
 that it was used to persuade the Emperor 
 to give his consent to the whole scheme, for 
 there is nothing so absurd that the Emperor 
 does not seem to have been capable of beheving 
 it. As a matter of fact, it was an offer which 
 could not have been accepted. It would mean 
 in effect that Russia should submit herself 
 to the abandonment for all time of her 
 interest in Serbia. Serbia would definitely 
 come into the Austrian sphere of interest. 
 This obviously would be a great concession 
 by Russia, but for this concession no recom- 
 pense was offered. Had it been meant as a 
 real basis to negotiation, it would have been 
 accompanied by some indication of compensa- 
 tion to be offered to Russia. There would 
 have been a suggestion of a bargain. Nothing 
 of the kind was made. The proposal there- 
 fore necessarily appeared merely as a means 
 of keeping Russia quiet until Austria had 
 
58 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 completed the conquest of Serbia. Russia, 
 therefore, while not refusing these conversa- 
 tions, treated them as of no importance, 
 and of course could not allow them to be 
 a sufficient reason for dela3dng her own mobili- 
 sation. 
 
 The proposal had, however, another im- 
 portance. By laying stress on it, as he and 
 the Emperor did, it could be made to appear 
 that Austria was willing to negotiate, and 
 if Russia then mobilised, as of course she 
 would, they could say, as they afterwards 
 did, that this mobilisation took place while 
 negotiations were proceeding, and that this 
 was the reason why negotiations which had 
 been begun by Austria were stopped. This 
 was the side of the case which was presented 
 to Germany, and it is by laying stress on 
 this that they have persuaded the German 
 nation that Russia was guilty of a wanton 
 attack. If anyone doubts this, let him read 
 the accoimt of these events given in the Official 
 White Book issued by the German Govern- 
 ment ; in this the rupture of negotiations by 
 Austria is entirely omitted ; this alone makes 
 the whole account of the negotiations mis- 
 leading ; moreover the later conversations begun 
 by Austria are confused with the earlier con- 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 59 
 
 versations begun by Russia. No one reading 
 this document could possibly understand what 
 really happened. 
 
 We have, however, still to consider whether 
 the Chancellor was not at the same time really 
 doing all he could to avoid war. Here, how- 
 ever, our information fails us, the revelations 
 stop, night falls, and we are again left in 
 darkness. WiU he now continue his revelations 
 and tell us the secret ? It is on this that 
 his reputation wiU depend. It is on the 
 sequel that it depends whether his action 
 was a genuine attempt to preserve peace 
 or a supremely dishonest move to bring about 
 a sitiiation in which Russia was obhged to 
 mobilise so as to make it possible for Germany 
 to mobilise on her side and go to war. 
 
 I wish to put the problem as clearly and 
 concisely as possible. The whole question now 
 really turned on mobilisation. The Chancellor 
 prevented German mobihsation on Wednesday 
 night and Thursday morning on the ground 
 that Russia had only mobihsed against Austria. 
 He knew, however, that if Russia mobiUsed 
 against Germany also his hand would be 
 forced and he would no longer be able to 
 keep back the soldiers. If, therefore, he wanted 
 to preserve peace, he must do all in his power 
 
6o THE GERMAN CHANCEIvI^OR 
 
 to prevent Russia mobilising further. For 
 this purpose it was necessary to reassure her, 
 to prevent apprehension, to help the Czar 
 in his desire to keep peace. How did he use 
 the opportunities which offered for doing this ? 
 
 Obviously the first thing to do was to 
 prevent Austria hurrying on with her miUtary 
 action. If Austria continued the attack on 
 Belgrade, then Russia must at once act. The 
 first question for the Chancellor therefore is : 
 Did he bring any pressure upon Austria to 
 stop military operations ? 
 
 Again, if Austria completed her mobiKsation, 
 Russia would certainly do the same. Now 
 we know that Austria ordered the complete 
 mobiUsation of the whole army very early 
 on Friday morning. This was at once answered, 
 and unavoidably answered, by complete Russian 
 mobiUsation. The second question is : Did 
 the Chancellor use any pressure on Austria 
 not to complete her mobilisation ? 
 
 Again, during Thursday a telegram came 
 from St. Petersburg containing an ofiEer from 
 Russia to stop her miHtary preparations on 
 certain conditions. If the Chancellor really 
 wished to avoid war, this was clearly the 
 most admirable opportunity. Even supposing 
 that the conditions were not entirely accept- 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 6i 
 
 able, they might be made the basis for nego- 
 tiations ; anyhow, it would be easy to use 
 them so as to gain a little time, and every 
 hour was of importance, and in any circum- 
 stances an answer should be sent which would 
 reassure the Russian Government as to the 
 friendly intentions of Germany. How was 
 this offer from Russia dealt with ? The story 
 is an old one. It was met with an instan- 
 taneous and categorical refusal. Herr von 
 Jagow did not even take the trouble to 
 forward it to Vienna. To have done so would 
 have done no harm, even had he known that 
 Austria would reject it, but it would at least 
 have saved several hours. 
 
 The categorical refusal from Germany in- 
 evitably brought about the immediate com- 
 pletion of Russian mobilisation, and everyone 
 must have known that it would do so. Our 
 third question to the Chancellor therefore is : 
 Why did he treat this Russian proposal in 
 this manner ? 
 
62 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 New Disci^osures. 
 
 So far I wrote in last August. I hoped that 
 by putting a definite issue and challenge I 
 might elicit an answer which would enable 
 me to continue the narrative which closed 
 so abruptly. I have not been disappointed. 
 On both points with which my articles were 
 concerned we have fresh information, and 
 we can now continue the interrupted 
 story. 
 
 During the last few weeks we have received 
 from Germany further contributions to the 
 controversy, contributions which I venture 
 to think are of the highest importance, and 
 which throw most valuable light on the subjects 
 at issue. 
 
 First we have the speech of the German 
 Chancellor of the 8th November, a speech 
 which has not as yet received the attention 
 which it deserves and requires. 
 
 Secondly, there has appeared in the Novem- 
 
AND tHE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 63 
 
 ber number of the Preussische Jahrbucher an 
 elaborate answer to my articles by a writer 
 who, though he does not sign his name (he 
 uses the pseudonjon Glaukos) is obviously 
 speaking with some authority ; indeed, as I 
 hope to be able to show, the resemblance 
 between the argument put forth in his article 
 and passages in the Chancellor's speech is 
 so close that he may probably be regarded 
 as a mouthpiece of the Foreign Office. 
 
 I propose to deal with each piece of new 
 evidence separately, and I think it will appear 
 how completely they corroborate the picture 
 I ventured to draw of the action of the Chan- 
 cellor and the relations between him and the 
 mihtary party at Berlin. 
 
 To deal first with the Chancellor speaking 
 under his own name. My contention in the 
 former articles was that the evidence which 
 he had been able to produce that during the 
 last three days before the outbreak of war 
 he was trying to find a means for preserving 
 peace, might probably be accepted ; but I also 
 pointed out that if this is so, what this proves 
 is not that he had been averse from war at 
 the beginning, but only that he changed his 
 policy when he suddenly found, on the evening 
 of July 29th, that Germany would be confronted 
 
64 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 with a coalition equal, if not superior in force, 
 to her own. 
 
 The chief evidence I had for this was the 
 Westminster Gazette telegram. In this the es- 
 sential passage is : " We are indeed ready to 
 fulfil our duty. As an ally we must, however, 
 refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration 
 through Austria-Hungary not respecting our 
 advice." In interpreting this, I suggested that 
 we must lay stress on the word " world war," 
 and that we should interpret it as a warning 
 to Austria to the following effect : So long 
 as your action against Serbia only threatened 
 to bring about a war with Russia and France, 
 we were prepared to support you and to make 
 this an occasion for bringing to a final issue 
 the question between the two coaUtions. We 
 now find that we were wrong in our reading 
 of the diplomatic negotiations ; it is clear 
 that England wiU come in ; that will bring 
 about a war on a scale very different to what 
 we had anticipated, and rather than incur 
 this risk, it is better that you should accept 
 the English offers of mediation. 
 
 I felt that in this I was building on a small 
 and unstable foundation; the interpretation 
 might be regarded as arbitrary and uncertain. 
 Any doubts I had are, however, now removed. 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 65 
 
 and for this we are indebted to the German 
 Chancellor. He has published a new telegram 
 which completely confirms this interpretation : 
 " Should the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment refuse aU mediation, we are confronted 
 with a conflagration in which England would 
 go against us, and Italy and Roumania, 
 according to all indications, would not be 
 with us ; so that with Austria-Hungary 
 we should confront three great Powers. 
 Germany, as the result of England's hos^ 
 tility, would have to bear the chief brunt 
 of the fight. The political prestige of Aus- 
 tria-Hungary, the honour of her arms, and 
 her justified claims against Serbia can be 
 sufficiently safeguarded by the occupation 
 of Belgrade or other places. We therefore 
 urgently and emphatically ask the Vienna 
 Cabinet to consider the acceptance of media- 
 tion on the proposed conditions. Responsi- 
 bility for the consequences which may other- 
 wise arise must be extraordinarily severe 
 for Austria-Hungary and ourselves." 
 It is characteristic of him that when he 
 allows this further document to be extracted 
 from him after an interval of more than two 
 years, it is still published in a partial and 
 mutilated form, and without a date. As it 
 
66 THE GERMAN CHANCEIvLOR 
 
 appears in his speech, the hasty reader would 
 assume that it had been sent on July 29th ; 
 there can, however, be no doubt that it was 
 not despatched until July 30th, and it is 
 probably a portion of a telegram already pub- 
 lished by the Austrian Government (A. 51). 
 When will the German Government learn to 
 publish its documents in a complete form and 
 not give to us, as they here do, what is 
 obviously merely a portion of the original 
 dispatch ? 
 
 The positive proposals referred to in this 
 telegram will be discussed in the next chapter ; 
 for the immediate argument the importance 
 of it is this : it gives us in the clearest and most 
 indisputable form the reasons why the Chan- 
 cellor suddenly changed his pohcy, and why, 
 after obstinately refusing for three days to 
 give assistance to any of the proposals for 
 mediation or accommodation which had come 
 from England, France or Russia, he suddenly 
 changed about and began to bring the strongest 
 pressure to bear upon Austria. That there 
 had been a change no one could doubt. The 
 best proof is to be found in the circular to 
 the German Governments which he had issued 
 two days before ; in this the determination 
 is clearly expressed to support Austria-Hungary 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 67 
 
 at any cost against the intervention of Russia ; 
 on Tuesday there is no suggestion that it 
 might be possible to avoid war by agreeing 
 to mediation or arbitration. On Thursday 
 he insists that Austria must not refuse all 
 mediation. In the two days his whole atti- 
 tude had altered. What was the reason for 
 this? He tells us it himself. On Tuesday 
 he anticipated that if war ensued, Russia 
 would not have the support of Great Britain, 
 and Germany could depend upon the co- 
 operation of her allies, Italy and Roumania. 
 At that time, therefore, it was to be antici- 
 pated that, in the case of war, Germany might 
 look forward to a rapid and decisive victory. 
 So long as this was the case, he ignored all 
 proposals for mediation. But now the cir- 
 cumstances have changed, for what had hap- 
 pened during the interval ? It had been 
 brought to his knowledge, both by the public 
 attention drawn to the movements of the 
 British fleet and by the positive warning 
 given by Sir Edward Grey to the German 
 Ambassador in I^ondon, that in the event 
 of war, Germany must not depend upon 
 the neutrality of Great Britain. He had 
 also, as we now know, received information 
 from Vienna to the effect that Roumania 
 
 as 
 
68 THE CBRMAN €HANCBI/U>R 
 
 could not be depended upon to support 
 Austria. 
 
 In the Red Book on the relations between 
 Austria-Hungary and Roumania, published 
 by the Austrian Government, we have a 
 dispatch dated July 28th, in which Count 
 Czemin reports as the result of a conversation 
 with the King that (i) " In a war between 
 the Monarchy and Serbia, his Majesty guaran- 
 tees the strict neutrality of Roumania ; and 
 
 (3) in the case that Russia 
 
 were to come forward against us, the King 
 said to me that we could unfortunately scarcely 
 reckon on the military support of Roumania." 
 
 " The King who, in making this declaration, 
 was more moved than I have ever seen him 
 before, assured me that if he could follow 
 his heart, his army wotdd fight unconditionally 
 on the side of the Triple AlUance. It was, 
 however, impossible for him ; during the last 
 year so much had changed that he was not 
 in a position to maintain the treaty." 
 
 That similar information had come from 
 Italy we now know from the Chancellor. 
 This defection of two of Germany's Allies 
 doubtless carried great weight at Berlin. 
 
 If this interpretation of his conduct is not 
 correct, it is easy for him to disprove it, but 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 69 
 
 there is only one way in which he can do so. 
 He must produce the communications which 
 passed from BerUn to Vienna during the first 
 portion of the crisis. He has now given us 
 two telegrams sent during Thursday, the 30th. 
 lyCt us have those telegrams which were sent 
 from the time when the Austrian Note to 
 Serbia was published, and let him show that 
 his anxiety to keep the peace was as strong 
 before the possible intervention of Great Britain 
 became known as it was afterwards. 
 
 We may sum up this part of the controversy 
 by sajdng : 
 
 I. There had at the begiiming been a com- 
 plete agreement between Berlin and Vienna. 
 It had been determined that the Note should 
 be presented to Serbia in such a form as 
 almost inevitably to drive her to war. 
 
 If, as was to be anticipated, Russia threatened 
 to intervene, Germany would use all her efforts 
 to stop Russia's intervention (a) by threats 
 of war : (b) by trying to detach France from 
 Russia. If she were successful in this, either 
 the hostile aUiance would be broken up or 
 its weakness as against the Triple AUiance 
 would be demonstrated, and in either event 
 the Triple Alliance would emerge from the 
 
70 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 diplomatic struggle with increased strength, 
 and, by the conquest of Serbia, would become 
 supreme in the Balkans. 
 
 If this diplomatic action failed and Russia 
 persisted in her intervention up to the point 
 of war, Germany would support Austria and 
 the great trial of strength between the two 
 alUances on the Continent would ensue. There 
 was little doubt that Germany and Austria 
 would come out victorious. 
 
 2. This plan was based on the hypothesis 
 that Great Britain would remain neutral and 
 that Roumania and Italy would, in accordance 
 with the terms of their alUances, give their 
 support. 
 
 On Wednesday it appeared that this assump- 
 tion was false ; it became known that England 
 would not promise neutraUty, and Italy and 
 Roumania refused their support. 
 
 On this the Chancellor, who had all through 
 given his assent against his better judgment, 
 definitely turned round and tried to bring 
 about a peaceful issue by bringing strong 
 pressure to bear upon Austria to accept pro- 
 posals for mediation. 
 
 In doing this, he encountered the determined 
 opposition of the mihtary party at Berlin, 
 and during the last days of the crisi?, there 
 
AND THE OUTBRKAK OF WAR. 71 
 
 was a great struggle between him and 
 themj 
 
 On this two further questions arise : 
 
 1. Why did this plan fail ? 
 
 This question I will discuss fully in a suc- 
 ceeding chapter. I will briefly anticipate by 
 saying this : the German theory is that it 
 failed merely because of Russian mobiUsation 
 and that Russian mobilisation was resorted 
 to purely with the object of forcing a war 
 and at the instigation of Great Britain. As 
 against this, I suggest that the real reason for 
 its failure was the false position into which 
 the Chancellor had allowed himself to be 
 entangled during the earlier days of the crisis, 
 and by the extreme clumsiness with which 
 he handled most delicate negotiations, and 
 that the reason for this clumsiness was that 
 he was not really master of the situation, 
 but was constantly hampered by the Emperor, 
 who, if he wanted peace, would not accept 
 the only conditions on which peace was 
 possible, and by the military party, who 
 were throughout driving with all energy for 
 war, even if this involved war with England. 
 
 2. We have the very compHcated question 
 why the Chancellor has been so long in pub- 
 
72 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.LOR 
 
 lishing evidence which would in truth, to 
 a large extent, free him from some portion of 
 the responsibility for the war. From the 
 beginning of the controversy he repeatedly 
 asserted that he exercised the most extreme 
 pressure upOn Austria to give way. For two 
 years the whole world, Germans and neutrals, 
 as well as English, have been saying : If this 
 is really true, why do you not pubhsh the 
 evidence by which alone the world could be 
 convinced ? We now find that his statements 
 had a substratum of truth. The evidence 
 was there. Why, then, did he not produce 
 it ? The answer to this is, I think, not difficult 
 to find. Supposing the evidence which we 
 now have had been pubUshed at the beginning 
 of the war, it would have shown that while 
 in truth the Chancellor personally had, at the 
 last moment, tried to bring about some accom- 
 modation, it would also have been evident that 
 in doing this he depended entirely upon the 
 initiative of Great Britain. Every proposal 
 which he made to Austria was merely a repeti- 
 tion of what had been suggested to him by Sir 
 Edward Grey. This, therefore, would have 
 been most valuable corroborative evidence of 
 the genuine desire and constant efforts made 
 by England to avoid war. Moreover, it would 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 73 
 
 have become apparent that he had only txgun 
 to take this point of view after he had become 
 aware that in the case of war Germany would 
 probably have to meet Great Britain as well 
 as France and Russia. It would therefore 
 have been disclosed that the original plan 
 had been given up owing to the fear created 
 by the prospect of a war with England ; it 
 would have been seen that this was the way 
 in which Sir Edward Grey had forced Germany 
 into a peaceful attitude. 
 
 To have let this be known in Germany 
 would have been most inconvenient ; it would 
 have made it impossible, as was done, to 
 work up German indignation against England ; 
 it would have completely disproved the fan- 
 tastic fabric which has been put before the 
 German people who have been taught that 
 the war, when it finally came, was the deliberate 
 and foreseen culmination of a hostile en- 
 circling of Germany, started by King Edward 
 and carried through with sinister malevolence 
 for ten years. The Chancellor could not ex- 
 culpate himself without at the same time 
 paying the highest tribute to Sir Edward 
 Grey's efforts in the cause of peace. And, 
 in fact, now that this evidence has been 
 published, it gives the lie, as I shall show 
 
74 THE GERMAN CHANCKIyI.OR 
 
 later, to the previous explanations issued by 
 the German Government. 
 
 And this is not all. The reason why the 
 Chancellor has feared to avow the action 
 which he took explains the reasons why, in 
 fact, it was bound to fail. Supposing he had 
 succeeded, in what position would the German 
 Government have found itself ? They had 
 pubhcly pledged themselves before the whole 
 of Europe to a definite course of action ; Aus- 
 tria, dependent on the promised support of 
 her ally, and having in memory the " shining 
 armour " in which once before the Emperor 
 had come to her help, had staked her whole 
 prestige and position as a great Power on 
 carrying to a successful issue her controversy 
 with Serbia, despite any threatened inter- 
 vention by Russia. Trusting to German sup- 
 port, she had ignored the Russian threats of 
 mobiHsation and had gone to war on Serbia. 
 Then, when the very crisis had come, the 
 courage and resolution of the Chancellor sud- 
 denly failed ; he turned round, withdrew the 
 support he had promised, and told Austria 
 that the dangers of the course on which she 
 had embarked with his approval were too 
 great, that Germany could not risk a war 
 against the Triple Entente, and that there- 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 75 
 
 fore the only thing to be done was to make 
 the best of a bad job and accept the mediation 
 which England had offered. This change of 
 front could not have been hidden. The whole 
 world would have known of it. They would 
 have asked why Germany suddenly became 
 peaceful, and they would have been told it 
 was the threat of Russian mobilisation and 
 the prospect of war with England under the 
 fear of which they were acting. It would 
 have been shown, and conclusively shown, 
 that when the issue was joined, the Triple 
 Entente was stronger than the Triple AlUance ; 
 the Hsts would have been prepared, the cham- 
 pions would have been there armed and ready 
 for battle, but the German champion would 
 have declined the contest. Is it conceivable 
 that the German Emperor could have accepted 
 this situation ? I^et us recoUect for a moment 
 the disappointment, the indignation, the con- 
 tempt, with which his withdrawal in 1911, 
 in the Agadir affair, had been greeted in his 
 own country. Then, in the same way, he 
 had threatened war ; England had interfered, 
 and it was EngUsh intervention which kept 
 the peace. He could withdraw about Morocco, 
 which was after all a small matter and one 
 not vital to German interests. He could not 
 
76 THE GERMAN CHANCEI/LOR 
 
 do so in a Continental affair in which was 
 involved the preponderance of the military 
 Powers in Europe. 
 
 So far then from believing that the support 
 extended to this proposal by the Chancellor 
 opened out hopes of peace, I should suggest — 
 and I wiU attempt to prove — that it failed, 
 and was destined to fail from the beginning 
 because it had not behind it the full authority 
 of the Emperor, that he refused to have 
 anything to do with it, and that it was in 
 consequence of this refusal that it broke down. 
 
 So much for the first point, the Chancellor's 
 change of attitude. My second point was 
 this, that even if he did, towards the end 
 of the crisis, genuinely desire peace, he omitted 
 to take the most obvious steps to secure his 
 object, and thereby, whether deliberately or 
 not, rendered abortive the efforts which the 
 British Foreign Office, supported by France, 
 were continuing to make. I pointed out that 
 everyone could see that unless some decisive 
 step was taken to give to the Russian Govern- 
 ment some definite assurance that Austria 
 would not press on with the attack upon 
 Serbia, Russian mobilisation must continue. 
 The only way, therefore, of keeping peace was 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 'j'j 
 
 to bring the necessary influence to bear upon 
 the Russian Government. This he clearly 
 neglected to do. He sees himself that in 
 order to prove his point, it is necessary to 
 show that Russia completed her mobilisation, 
 though she was fully aware that everything 
 was going favourably towards the establish- 
 ment of a mediation. On this, according to 
 him, and as I will show later, according to 
 his apologist in the Preussische Jahrbucher, 
 evers^thing depends. This will form the sub- 
 ject of the next chapter. 
 
78 THE GERMAN CHANCEtl^OR 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 « 
 
 What did Russia Know ? 
 
 So mucli for the Chancellor speaking in his 
 own name. Now let us turn to the answer 
 to jny articles which has been contributed 
 to the Preussische Jahrbucher by a writer 
 who calls himself Glaukos. It is an article 
 which deserves attention for many reasons. 
 I/ike all that appears in the Preussische Jahr- 
 bucher, it is written with a strong grip on 
 facts, it is devoid of the foolish rhetoric and 
 grotesque misrepresentations which disfigure 
 the work of so many German apologists. 
 In particular, it is interesting because it shows 
 a real endeavour to arrive at the truth regarding 
 Great Britain and Sir Edward Grey. In this 
 he agrees with Professor Delbriick, the editor 
 of the Preussische Jahrbucher, who, of all 
 German contemporary writers, is the most 
 worth reading, just because he is not afraid, 
 when it seems to him the interests of truth 
 require it, to challenge the opinions popular 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 79 
 
 in his own country. Of this we have an 
 interesting example in another article appear- 
 ing in the same number, in which he discusses 
 I^rd Grey's responsibihty for the war, and 
 does so on lines very similar to those adopted 
 by Glaukos. It is worth while quoting the 
 paragraph at length : — 
 
 " Is I^rd Grey speaking hjrpocritically when 
 he demands an impartial investigation into 
 the events which led to the war ? Or does 
 he really feel himself innocent ? Or is he 
 perhaps already clear as to the origin and 
 importance of Russian mobiUsation, and does 
 he wish public opinion in England also to 
 recognise this at the same time that he affirms 
 that the Entente is indissoluble ? Public 
 opinion in Germany now, as before, regards 
 England and her Foreign Minister as the real 
 instigator of the war. But more impartial 
 research is tending more and more to the 
 view that Lord Grey is honest when he says 
 that he did not desire the war, but that he 
 is none the less responsible inasmuch as he 
 did not do all that was in his power to prevent 
 it. It is completely true that before the war 
 he gave warnings at St. Petersburg and dis- 
 suaded from war, but at the same time he 
 let the Russians notice and know that if they 
 
8o THE GERMAN CHANCELIvOR 
 
 did not follow his advice, England would 
 none the less take part in the war on their 
 side. By this he gave the decision into the 
 hands of the Russians. Germany acted differ- 
 ently. She declared at Vienna that if Austria 
 did not follow German advice, they also could 
 not depend on Germany's assistance. Had 
 Grey at the right time sent a note in the same 
 sense to St. Petersburg, perhaps the war 
 would have been avoided. 
 
 " Whether Grey omitted this saving act 
 merely because he did not judge the situation 
 correctly, or because in his innermost heart 
 ' he said that he would not indeed press on 
 for war, but that if war were to break out 
 without his co-operation, it might be quite 
 agreeable to England — this posterity will per- 
 haps some day learn if very intimate utterances 
 are published, and it is also possible that it 
 will never be known. Anyhow, there is a 
 difference between driving to war and not 
 preventing a war, which we must not suppress 
 and forget. For this reason I should consider 
 a timely revision of our conceptions about 
 the leader of Foreign policy in England as 
 not out of place." 
 
 This is a very different tone to that to 
 which we have been accustomed to Usten 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 8i 
 
 from Germany. It is in particular a definite 
 repudiation of the point of view for which 
 above all the Chancellor has made himself 
 responsible ; it is a serious criticism of the 
 utterances of the German Foreign Ofl&ce. We 
 feel that we have here a writer who is seriously 
 and honestly attempting to penetrate to the 
 truth in an extraordinarily compHcated pro- 
 blem, the difficulties of which not only arise 
 from the disentanglement of facts, but also 
 require great psychological insight. I hope 
 that in my discussion of Glaukos' article, I 
 may be able to contribute something towards 
 answering the questions which he raises. 
 
 In one matter, like so many German writers, 
 Glaukos is too clever. He attributes to my 
 articles and to the other desultory discussion 
 on the origins of the war an additional purpose 
 which they did not possess. He suggests that 
 they were deHberately pubHshed during a 
 period of national depression in consequence 
 of miUtary reverses in order to counteract 
 the growing discontent of the nation and 
 the feeling which prevails in I^iberal circles : 
 " if only we had been able to avoid this war." 
 This, of course, is absurd. No one who Uvea 
 in England could have made such a blunder. 
 Of this feehng, excq)t perhaps in a very small 
 
82 THE GERMAN CHANG3SI>I.0R 
 
 and uninfluential clique, there has not been 
 a shadow of suspicion. 
 
 It is not the case, as he suggests, that the 
 Westminster Gazette had entrusted me with 
 the task of removing the impression which 
 the speeches of the Chancellor and the pam- 
 phlet of Junius Alter had created in England. 
 My articles were written entirely on my own 
 initiative, and they were sent to the West- 
 minster Gazette for the simple reason that it 
 seemed to me more suitable that they should 
 appear in the paper which was responsible 
 for the original pubUcation of the Chancellor's 
 telegram, and I hoped that they would receive 
 there more attention than they would in 
 any other organ. As to the date on which 
 they were published, this had nothing to 
 do with the poHtical situation. They had 
 been long in my mind ; ever since the Chan- 
 cellor's speech of August, 1915, I had felt 
 that some answer was required. But the 
 material for an answer was wanting. It did 
 not come until his latef speech of June, 1916, 
 and even after that I had to wait until I was 
 able to procure, if not the whole, at least 
 some portion of the pamphlet by Junius Alter, 
 which seemed to me to give the clue to what 
 really happened in Germany. It was not until 
 
AND THE OuTBRltAK: OF WAR. 83 
 
 August that the number of the Chicago Daily 
 News containing the extracts from this pam- 
 phlet came into my hands. All his discussion 
 as to the particular reasons why they appeared 
 at a particular period is a baseless fabric. 
 
 On another point, however, Glaukos is quite 
 right. Speaking of the general discussion as 
 to the responsibihty for the war, he says 
 that in England, and especially among the 
 I^iberals, unanimity on the justice of the 
 Enghsh cause is a sina qua non for the conduct 
 of the war. This is indeed the case. We 
 could not continue the struggle with our 
 full strength unless the nation, and especially 
 the members of the former I^iberal Party, 
 were united on this point. He contrasts this 
 with the conditions in Germany. There, as 
 he says : " the blows of our armies would 
 fall with the same strength upon the enemy 
 as before," even though the humour of those 
 who remain at home was disturbed by the 
 efforts of a serious opposition to criticise 
 German responsibihty. We may accept the 
 contrast ; for what it means is this : that 
 in England a free nation is fighting and her 
 strength would be paralysed if there were 
 not a universal conviction that she was fighting 
 justly. In Germany he would tell us this 
 
 lt3 
 
84 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 matters nothing ; there the great war machine 
 would continue its work unimpeded and 
 tmembarrassed whatever were the doubts which 
 existed|[as to the real reasons of the origin 
 and the purpose of the war. It is true, as 
 he says, that this is the first people's war 
 which England has waged, and that " the 
 EngHsh people is bringing sacrifices in wealth, 
 in blood and in personal freedom such as it 
 has never before dreamed of." It is true 
 that these sacrifices could not be made if 
 the view as to the cause of the war put about 
 by the German Government had many sup- 
 porters among us, but it is also true that it 
 is one of the main weapons in our armoury 
 against Germany that we know that the system 
 of Government in that country is such that 
 these considerations of justice, of honour and 
 of European liberty, however strongly they 
 might be felt among individual Germans, could 
 not affect the actions of the Government. 
 
 One other point deserves notice in order 
 that we may get some insight into the in- 
 tellectual character of the author. Naturally 
 enough, he often refers to Mr. Price's book, 
 the " Diplomatic History of the War," for 
 an EngUsh book on these matters which 
 completely endorses the German case is a 
 
AND the: outbreak of war. 85 
 
 God-seud to them. But his appreciation of 
 this work goes to a curious length. Of it 
 he says : " Mr. Price has reduced the English 
 and Russian responsibility to so simple a 
 formula that the time will come when it will 
 be included among text-books of world history." 
 I am afraid that the English standard of 
 what we require in a " text-book of world 
 history " is higher than that which is regarded 
 as satisfactory in Germany. And indeed, 
 throughout the whole controversy, nothing is 
 so remarkable as the extraordinarily low stan- 
 dard of scholarship and scientific accuracy 
 which even the most distinguished German 
 controversialists accept. The reason that in 
 England we do not attach that importance 
 to Mr. Price's book which Glaukos would 
 give to it is not that his conclusions are ad- 
 verse to us. Mr. Morel has written a much- 
 read work on Morocco which I think is pro- 
 foundly misleading and very dangerous, but I 
 should always treat it with the respect which 
 is due to a man who shows that he has made 
 a real and thorough study of the subjects 
 with which he is occupied. This we cannot 
 say of Mr. Price's book. I should recommend 
 GlaukoS to read the admirable appendix dealing 
 with it which he will find at the end of Mr. 
 
86 THE GERMAN CHANCEIylvOR 
 
 Archer's "The Thirteen Days," and he will 
 then perhaps understand that this is not the 
 kind of work which can be quoted as authori- 
 tative or used as a safe guide. The simple 
 truth is that Mr. Price undertook a very 
 ambitious task without any previous know- 
 ledge of diplomatic matters, and that almost 
 every page of his book is disfigured by the 
 grossest carelessness and inaccuracy. 
 
 Now let us turn to the matter of Glaukos' 
 article. He starts from the three questions 
 with which I concluded my former articles 
 and which form the end of Chapter III. of 
 this book. The point of them was that if 
 Herr von Bethmann Hollweg really wished to 
 avoid war, there was only one means of doing 
 sc, and that was without the shghtest delay 
 to take the necessary steps to counteract the 
 Russian apprehension and to remove the causes 
 which were inevitably driving Russia to mobi- 
 lisation. The point is an old one, but it cannot 
 be repeated too often. The Russian Govern- 
 ment from the very beginning of the crisis had 
 let it be known that they could not allow 
 Austria to make war upon and overrun Serbia 
 without intervention ; the method of inter- 
 ventioM which they proposed to adopt was 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 87 
 
 not an ultimatum and the declaration of 
 war, but mobilisation. This had been deter- 
 mined on in principle as far back as the 25th 
 July, and the mobilisation, preparations for 
 which had been immediately begun, would 
 be made effective immediately supposing that 
 Austria did in fact declare war and begin 
 mihtary operations. The situation was per- 
 fectly clear. If Austria began the attack 
 upon Serbia they could not refrain from 
 making all necessary military preparations. 
 As has been repeatedly pointed out, it was 
 quite consistently the declaration of war and 
 the bombardment of Belgrade which brought 
 about the calling out of the reserves on the 
 night of July the 29th throughout a large 
 portion of the Russian army, and it was quite 
 clear that unless Austria officially engaged 
 herself to stop this action the reserves through- 
 out the rest of the Empire would immediately 
 be called to the colours. Now, according to 
 the Russian and also the Austrian point of 
 view, this did not necessarily mean war ; there 
 would still be an opportunity for continuing 
 n^otiations between the two states. According 
 to the German point of view, however, it 
 did mean war. Therefore if the German Chan- 
 cellor wished really to avoid war it was not 
 
88 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.]X)R 
 
 sufficient for him, as it would have been for 
 the others, to propose or to accept a formula 
 for negotiation ; he must also stop Russian 
 mobiUsation, and he could only do this by- 
 removing the cause of it, that is, by persuading 
 Austria to suspend, at any rate for two or 
 three days, her military measures. 
 
 The merit of Glaukos' article is that he 
 recognises this. He sees that in order to 
 throw the blame upon Russia it is necessary 
 to prove that she mobilised, although she 
 knew that Austria was prepared to give way 
 on this essential point. As he says : " Headlam 
 here comes to the kernel of the problem. 
 We cannot get clear on the guilt for the war 
 until the facts are cleared up. Was Russia, 
 in the night of the 30th — 31st July stiU under 
 the impression of obstinate Austrian refusal 
 of all concessions ? If the answer is yes, 
 then Headlam is right and the Central Powers 
 must take upon themselves a great portion 
 of the guilt for the world war. If, however, 
 Russia had good reason during this night 
 of the 30th — 31st definitely to expect that 
 Austria would give way, then all his con- 
 siderations collapse miserably." 
 
 We come down therefore to the very definite 
 and positive question : What did Russia know 
 
AND^ THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 89 
 
 as to Gennany's and Austria's intentions ? 
 And the time limit to our enquiry must be 
 the night of the 30th — 31st July, i.e., the 
 time when the final tikase caUing in the reserves 
 was issued. No knowledge which came to the 
 Russian Government after this date is of 
 any importance for this particular purpose. 
 I am quite prepared to meet him on this 
 issue. 
 
 First of all, I have pointed out that the 
 German Government did nothing in regard 
 to the two essential points, viz., they did 
 not press Austria to suspend her operations 
 against Belgrade, and they did nothing to press 
 the Austrians not to complete their mobilisa- 
 tion. As to these points, Glaukos concedes 
 the facts. We may take them, therefore, 
 as estabhshed. During this critical day of 
 July 30th, the Chancellor, while he professed, 
 and perhaps honestly professed, to wish to 
 bring about peace, refrained from these neces- 
 sary measures for doing so. 
 
 With regard to the first point, however, 
 Glaukos confuses the issue. He points out 
 quite correctly that Russia never made the 
 cessation of hostiKties against Serbia a condito 
 sine qua for an understanding with JAustria. 
 This is perfectly true. Russiajwas prepared 
 
go THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 to go on negotiating even though war with 
 Serbia was continuing, but, and this is the 
 essential point, she was not prepared, if Austria 
 continued war, to continue the negotiations 
 and at the same time herself remain unarmed. 
 Again and again we must point out that except 
 for German intervention, the negotiations could 
 have gone on even after Russia had mobiUsed. 
 What Germany, however, did, was to insist 
 that Russia should not mobilise while accepting 
 the Austrian contention that she could go on 
 fighting and preparing. 
 
 As to the second point Glaukos contests the 
 statement that Austrian mobilisation was the 
 cause of the completion of Russian mobiUsa- 
 tion. I will not discuss this point ; I recognise 
 that we do not know the precise hour at which 
 these two actions took place. I imagine the 
 truth is that when Austria and Russia mobi- 
 lised, they did so almost precisely at the same 
 hour, and each knew that the other was pre- 
 pared to act in the same way ; neither made 
 the action of the other the ground for serious 
 protest.* That, however, which is important 
 and which he cannot and does not seriously 
 contest is that Austrian complete mobilisation 
 
 * " History of Twelve Days," p. 218. 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 91 
 
 was ordered before it was known that a similar 
 step had in fact been taken in Russia, and 
 also that no efforts were made by the German 
 Government to postpone this act. This is 
 the point on which I wish especially to lay 
 stress. Germany, notwithstanding all the 
 protestations of the Chancellor, took not a 
 single step to make smooth the way of 
 peace. 
 
 So much for the first two points. Now we 
 come to the third. 
 
 I had pointed out the extraordinary help- 
 lessness with which Herr von Jagow met 
 the Russian formula given to Count Pourtales 
 at 2 a.m. on July 30th. I asked why, even 
 if this formula could not be accepted, they 
 did not at least use the fact that a formula 
 had been offered as a basis for further nego- 
 tiations, and why they rejected it summarily 
 without even referring it to Austria. Glaukos 
 does not dispute the facts ; he covers himself 
 merely by a quotation from the American 
 book by Professor Stowell, a quotation which 
 does not in the least meet my point, for my ' 
 point was not that this formula could have 
 been accepted, but that it could be made 
 the basis for further discussion, and that 
 the prompt and almost discourteous rejection. 
 
92 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 standing, as it did, entirdy by itself, must 
 confirm the worst fears of the Russian Govern- 
 ment, Glaukos characterises the nature of 
 the refusal by calling it a German " Nein " ; 
 it will not be unfair to say that this in German 
 parlance means an emphatic and rude nega- 
 tive. This is precisely what I mean ; it was 
 not the time to use what he calls a " deutsches 
 nein," not, that is, if peace was to be preserved. 
 The same formula was sent to Sir Edward 
 Grey. He acted quite differently. He saw 
 that it would not do, but by recasting it, he 
 put it in such a form that it might still have 
 been accepted by either side, and, in fact, was 
 to a large extent accepted by both sides and 
 agreed to as the basis of discussion. It would 
 have been perfectly easy for Germany to act 
 in the same way. She did not do so, and her 
 neglect to do this was, as has been clearly 
 shown, the final cause for Russian complete 
 mobilisation, i.e., for the war.* 
 
 Glaukos, therefore, has to find some other 
 way out of the difficulty. He has to show 
 that in some other way there was conveyed 
 during this da^' to the Russian Government 
 a knowledge that Austria was ready to give 
 
 F. Archer. " The Thirtten Days," p. 13S. 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 93 
 
 way. He tries to do so, and he fails lament- 
 ably. 
 
 He turns to this revision of the Russian 
 formula which Sir Edward Grey put forward. 
 This revised formula, as will be remembered, 
 was as follows : " If the Austrian advance 
 is stopped at Belgrade, the Powers will in- 
 vestigate how Serbia could satisfy Austria 
 without impairing Serbian sovereign rights 
 or independence." Of this Glaukos says, and 
 says quite truly : " This German-English pro- 
 posal for mediation seemed predestined at 
 the last hour to bring a peaceful solution 
 of the world crisis. Russia and Austria had 
 put forward demands in which theii^ prestige 
 was especially involved. The proposal for 
 mediation satisfied these demands inasmuch 
 as it required a certain amount of concession 
 from both. Austria, which was threatened 
 in her vital existence, could not make repara- 
 tion for the murder of the successor to the 
 throne depend upon the grace of an European 
 Conference, but there was conceded a certain 
 humiUatiori of Serbia which even Sir Edward 
 Grey recognised as necessary (B. 90). The 
 Russian demand that it should not be left 
 to Austria to decide whether her demands 
 were consistent with Serbian sovereignty was 
 
94 THE GERMAN CHANCKl.tOR 
 
 4 
 conceded ; the proposal of Sir Edward Grey 
 
 to summon an international conference was 
 recognised in the acceptance of mediation 
 by the four Powers." And in another place 
 he speaks of it as an " ideal proposal." 
 
 This is a notable concession to be made 
 by an authoritative German writer, for in 
 making it he has presumably omitted to notice 
 the statement pubUshed in the North German 
 Gazette of December, 1914, which is as follows : — 
 " Interesting is the fact which we learn 
 from the Yellow Book (see No. 113) that 
 the English Government by their Ambassador 
 tried to get M. Sazonoff afterwards to alter 
 his formula and make it even less accept- 
 able for Austria-Hungary. He was to add 
 to it the condition, which he had not pre- 
 viously put forward, that Austria should 
 stop the march of her troops on Serbian 
 territory. This fact shows that the British 
 Government, which had in the meantime become 
 more Russian than the Czar, desired to make 
 a compromise impossible under any circum- 
 stances." 
 
 The view put forward in this statement 
 has since been echoed in numerous German 
 propagandist publications, and has become 
 an important part of the evidence by which 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 95 
 
 they would show that Sir Edward Grey, while 
 professing to desire peace, was secretly trying 
 to stir up war. It is an essential part of 
 that picture of Sir Edward Grey as a malign 
 and machiavellian figure against which Pro- 
 fessor Delbriick protests. Glaukos will have 
 none of this. But how characteristic is the 
 whole procedure. Glaukos teUs us that this 
 English proposal seemed predestined to bring 
 about a peaceful solution. The German semi- 
 official organ tells us that the British Govern- 
 ment, in putting forward this proposal, had 
 become more Russian than the Czar and 
 desired to make a compromise impossible 
 under any circumstances. It would be well 
 if German controversialists would at least 
 agree among themselves upon their own case. 
 That they cannot do so is the best evidence 
 of the absolute nullity of it. When it is 
 desired to show the villainy of the British 
 Government, one interpretation is given to 
 this proposal ; when the exigency of the 
 moment makes it necessary to throw the 
 blame on Russia, we have a totally incon- 
 sistent interpretation. 
 
 I«et us now accept Glaukos' view of this 
 proposal, which is, of course, the correct one. 
 It was, as he says, a real effort to bring about 
 
96 THE GERMAN CHANCELIXDR 
 
 peace ; it was a brilliantly conceived idea 
 showing profound insight which might make 
 it possible, even at the last moment, to save 
 the situation, and it was as this that it was 
 supported by the German Chancellor. Now 
 the question which he puts before us, and 
 one which is of the greatest importance, is 
 this. What did Russia know about it ? When 
 she mobilised, did she do so with full knowledge 
 of this proposal and knowing that it was on 
 the verge of acceptance ? His point is that 
 Russia knew of this proposal ; she knew also 
 that it was warmly supported by Germany 
 and by the German Emperor ; she knew 
 that it would be accepted by Austria ; she 
 knew also that, if time was allowed, in this 
 proposal would be found the means of keeping 
 peace, for it would be supported by what 
 he calls the neutraUsts in England and the 
 peace party in France, and he comes to the 
 conclusion that Russia ordered immediate com- 
 pletion of mobiUsation just because she knew 
 that peace was imminent, with the deliberate 
 intention of creating an impossible situation 
 before this proposal had had time to mature. 
 In order to support this proposition, he traces 
 in detail the historj' of this proposal, and 
 sums up his conclusions as follows : 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 97 
 
 " Now it might be objected on the side 
 of the Entente : perhaps SazonofE had just 
 as little suspicion as to the diplomatic situation 
 which had arisen in I/indon on the 30th as 
 Headlam seems to have on the 13th September, 
 1916.* 
 
 " I<et us therefore investigate it shortly. 
 What did the Russian Government know as 
 to the diplomatic situation in the night of 
 the 30th — 31st ? 
 
 " First, Grey's formula must have been 
 known to them. It had been drafted in 
 Ivondon so early that the answer to it from 
 Jagow accepting it reached I^ondon on the 
 30th. 
 
 " Benckendorff must also naturally have 
 telegraphed it at once to Sazonoff. Viviani 
 expressly assumes as ' undoubted ' that Sazonoff 
 knew of it (F. iio).t 
 
 " Further, the Russian Government knew 
 that the German Emperor threw his whole 
 
 * With regard to this I need only refer Glaukos t» 
 "The History of Twelve Days," in Chapter lo of which 
 he will find the whole matter he discusses submitted tts 
 a thorough examination. 
 
 t Sic. The reference is wrong ; it should be F. 112. 
 This telegram is dated July 31st, and there is no evidence 
 that the French telegram to St. Petersburg contained in it 
 reached the Russian Government before the morning of 
 July 31st. 
 
98 THE GERMAN CHANCEIvIyOR 
 
 weight into the acceptance of the proposal. 
 His mediation had indeed been appealed to 
 by the Czar and promised in solemn words. 
 
 " Moreover, the diplomacy of the Entente 
 already scented a changed attitude at Vienna 
 as early as the 2gth. Sazonoff also was natur- 
 ally acquainted with the important and favour- 
 able conversation which Schebeko had with 
 Berchtold on the 30th. 
 
 " Summing up, we can say : The Russian 
 Goverrunent knew the formula, knew the 
 powerful support given to it at Vienna by 
 London and BerUn, knew the unmistakable, 
 signs of Austrian concession. 
 
 " In a word, Russia knew : the acceptance 
 of the German-English proposal for mediation 
 was imminent. 
 
 " Further, had Vienna said yes, the Russian 
 Goverrmient could foresee that the French 
 and the English Governments would be forced 
 by their peoples to insist on the consent of 
 Russia also to the peaceful solution of the 
 world crisis. If Russia gave this, then it was 
 all up with her war. Did she refuse, then 
 it was all up with the Entente. The Russian 
 Government was only too well informed as 
 to the intellectual forces which it had to 
 fear in France and England. They knew 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 99 
 
 what Jaures meant among the French people, 
 and also that the neutralists in England were 
 strong in numbers, and indeed — cleaving out 
 the Belgian question — had a majority in the 
 Iviberal Cabinet." 
 
 This is his statement as to the results of 
 his investigation, and this we must now 
 discuss. 
 
 All depended on what Russia knew. Good. 
 What did Russia know, and whence did she 
 get the information ? First let us ask what 
 she learned from Germany. Germany is, we 
 must remember, not a simple idea ; it had 
 two organs of expression, the Foreign Office 
 and the Emperor. Now, the careful reader 
 will observe that not even Glaukos himself 
 suggests that any news of the very important 
 negotiations that were in progress came to 
 Russia from the German Foreign Office. This 
 proposal had been first made to them on 
 July 2gth. It was accepted by the Chancellor 
 and forwarded to Vienna on the 30th. Did 
 he tell Russia of this ? No. On this we have 
 a complete agreement. Why did the Chan- 
 cellor omit this most important step ? Why, 
 when the Secretary of State rejected the 
 Russian formula on the afternoon or evening 
 of the 30th, did he not accompany his rejection 
 
100 THE GERMAN CHANCEIyl^OR 
 
 by an explanation that a better plan had been 
 suggested and was being pressed forward with 
 every urgency ? Time was of the highest 
 importance. Germany was in a position to 
 give the earliest intimation to Russia, for 
 what Russia would want to know was not 
 merely that the proposal had been made from 
 Ivondon, but that it had been accepted in 
 Berlin. How could she interpret the absence 
 of any corroboration from BerUn except as an 
 indication that the German Foreign Office was 
 treating it with the indifference with which 
 it had treated all the previous proposals for 
 mediation ? 
 
 This, then, is our first point. The German 
 Foreign Office did nothing, and the German 
 Foreign Office was on this matter more im- 
 portant than the British. 
 
 But the words of the Emperor would natur- 
 ally carry greater weight than those of his 
 Chancellor. Glaukos tells us that the Russian 
 Government knew that the German Emperor 
 was throwing his whole weight into the ac- 
 ceptance of the proposal. Were this true, 
 it would be a fact of the highest importance. 
 Unfortunately the statement is one which 
 is definitely and undeniably untrue. 
 
 On July 30th, the day in question, the 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. loi 
 
 German Emperor sent only one telegram ; it 
 has not the slightest reference to this proposal. 
 It contains nothing of any kind except a 
 protest against Russian mobilisation ; it is 
 an imperious demand that this mobilisation 
 should cease, and there is no suggestion that 
 if it is suspended, any concession will be made 
 by Austria. This is so important that it 
 may be well to quote the telegram as a 
 whole : 
 
 " My Ambassador has instructions to direct 
 the attention of your Government to the 
 dangers and serious consequences of a mobi- 
 lisation. I have told you the same in 
 my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has 
 mobilised only against Serbia, and only a 
 part of her army. If Russia, as seems 
 to be the case, according to your advice 
 and that of your Government, mobilises 
 against Austria-Hungary, the part of the 
 mediator with which you have entrusted 
 me in such friendly manner and which 
 I have accepted upon your express desire, 
 is threatened, if not made impossible. The 
 entire weight of decision now rests upon 
 your shoulders ; you have to bear the 
 responsibility for war or peace." 
 This telegram was sent at i a.m. on the 
 
102 THE GERMAN CHANCEIvI.OR 
 
 30th ; no further communication was made by 
 the Emperor to the Czar till midday on Friday. 
 I^et any reader honestly ask himself what 
 the effect of this must have been on the mind 
 of the Czar ; it would sm'ely be this, that 
 the whole weight of Germany is thrown into 
 the balance to prevent Russia mobilising in 
 order to leave Austria a free hand for her 
 operations. And note : there is no question 
 of mobilising against Germany ; even mobili- 
 sation against Austria is forbidden. I should 
 suggest that this telegram was one of the 
 most effective methods which could have been 
 devised if it had been wished to force Russia 
 to extend her mobiUsation so as to protect 
 herself against Germany. 
 
 It is no good talking about the Emperor's 
 mediation. What the Czar had asked for 
 was " to prevent a calamity, such as a 
 European war would be, I urge you in the 
 name of our old friendship to do all in your 
 power to restrain your Ally from going too 
 far." This had been answered on the 29th 
 by a justification of the action of Austria- 
 Hungary and by the opinion " tbat it is 
 perfectly possible for Russia to remain a 
 spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without 
 drawing Europe into the most terrible war 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 103 
 
 tliat was ever seen," and this was answered 
 again on the 30th by the telegram I have 
 just quoted. In both answers the Emperor 
 says in effect : Austria may go on with the 
 war, but you must not mobilise. This is 
 in express contradiction to Grey's proposal, 
 which was : If Austria suspends her operations 
 we will ask you to suspend your mobilisation. 
 
 Glaukos is then completely wrong, and in- 
 excusably wrong. His statement that the 
 Russian Governjnent knew that the German 
 Emperor was throwing his whole weight on 
 the side of this proposal is as flagrant a 
 perversion of the truth as it would be possible 
 to find. 
 
 We have additional evidence against the 
 statement made by Glaukos that the German 
 Emperor threw his whole weight into the 
 acceptance of this proposal. On July 30th, 
 after it must have been well known to him. 
 Prince Henry telegraphed to King George. 
 In this telegram there is no reference whatever 
 to this suggestion which had been communicated 
 to the German Government the day before, 
 and had probably already been transmitted 
 to Vienna. The only practical suggestion 
 which Prince Henry has to make is that Rus- 
 sian mobilisation should be stopped and that 
 
104 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 the King of England should " use his influence 
 on France and also on Russia that they should 
 remain neutral." Now, if at this time the 
 Emperor had in fact accepted and was sup- 
 porting Sir Edward Grey's proposals for media- 
 tion. Prince Henry would certainly have re- 
 ferred to it ; he would have said, as the King 
 did in his answer, that peace could be pre- 
 served if both sides accepted this proposal ; 
 that Germany should induce Austria to suspend 
 her military operations, and that England 
 should induce Russia to suspend her mobili- 
 sation. Of this there is not a word, 
 nay, he goes so far as to say that neutrality 
 is " perhaps the only possible way of 
 maintaining the peace of Europe." But 
 there was another possible way, the way 
 which Glaukos says was an ideal proposal. 
 Why did Prince Henry, who was, of 
 course, the mouthpiece of his brother, ignore 
 this? 
 
 It is, however, not true to say that the 
 Emperor always ignored this proposal. We 
 have got one reference to it, but how instruc- 
 tive is this ! It is in a telegram sent to the 
 King on July 31st. In this he says : " Your 
 proposals coincide with my ideas, and with 
 the communication which I have this evening 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 105 
 
 received from Vienna, and which I have 
 passed on to lyondon." He thereby, for the 
 first time, gives his approval to the English 
 suggestion. In view of the last message he 
 had received from the King, it would indeed 
 have been impossible for him to do anything 
 else, but he does not do so until he is able 
 to reject it. On July 30th, when there was 
 still time, he ignores it; on July 31st he 
 refers to it and immediately proceeds to pass 
 it over. He seizes hold of the pretext of 
 Russian mobihsation, and from this moment 
 it is that, and that alone, on which he makes 
 the issue turn. 
 
 I do not wish to leave the matter negatively ; 
 it is no good criticising what was done, one 
 must show what could have been done, and 
 what would have been done had there been 
 at Berlin a strong, united, determined purpose 
 on the part of the whole Government to avoid 
 war. The German Emperor could have tele- 
 graphed to the Czar that he much regretted 
 •Russian mobilisation, that if it continued it 
 would inevitably bring about German mobili- 
 sation and war, and that to avoid this catas- 
 trophe he was using his whole efforts to 
 persuade the Austrian Government to suspend 
 their attack upon Serbia and delay any further 
 
io6 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I/3R 
 
 mobilisation. He hoped that the Czar would 
 meet him on these lines and would himself 
 suspend further preparations, at any rate for 
 a day or two. 
 
 In addition to this, when what I may call 
 the Pourtales' formula was received in Berlin, 
 Jagow could have answered that he feared 
 that this formula would not be acceptable 
 to Austria, but that he was in close connection 
 with I/3ndon, that together they were agreeing 
 on a modification of it which he hoped would 
 be acceptable to both parties, and hoped 
 therefore that Russia would at any rate wait 
 until the Austrian answer to this revised 
 formula had been received. 
 
 From Berlin, therefore, Russia learned no- 
 thing, neither from the Chancellor nor from 
 the Emperor. Do not let it be thought that 
 this is an unimportant point ; if we are to get 
 at the ultimate reasons why Russia persisted 
 in carrjdng through the mobilisation, we may 
 say without fear of contradiction that it was 
 the absence of any kind of friendly or courteous 
 message from Berlin. Had the Chancellor or 
 the Emperor made a " pacific gestture," things 
 might have been very different, and shall we 
 not say that the silence in Berlin was rightly 
 interpreted as meaning that here was in 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 107 
 
 truth no hope, that military considerations 
 were still dominant ? 
 
 How great is the contrast when we turn to 
 England. Here we find nothing of this lethargy 
 and hesitancy. Sir Edward Grey kept the 
 Russian Government informed of what was 
 going on. On this Glaukos is right, but he 
 does not see, or he omits to point out, how 
 damaging is the comparison to his own cause. 
 On July 30th, after he had received a favour- 
 able answer from Berlin and had seen the 
 German Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey tele- 
 graphed to Sir George Buchanan, rehearsed 
 the proposal, and added to it the following : 
 " If Austria (accepts this suggestion), I hope 
 that Russia would also consent to a discussion 
 and suspension of further military prepara- 
 tions, provided that other Powers do the 
 same." (B. 103). 
 
 It has been said that England did not press 
 Russia to suspend her mobilisation. This is 
 untrue. She did so, but she did so in such 
 a form as to make it easy for Russia to agree. 
 To ask Russia to promise this while Austria 
 continued to make war and to mobilise was 
 an insult. This is what the German Emperor 
 did. Had Germany on the same day, as 
 she easily might have> sent a message to Russia 
 
io8 THE GERMAN CHANCEIyIX)R 
 
 couched in similar phraseology, then indeed 
 the contentions of Glaukos would be correct, 
 and^Russian mobihsation would have been 
 unjustified. For the fact that this news was 
 not imparted from BerUn would, of course, 
 suggest that Germany was not going to 
 support this proposition. She did not do so. 
 Why not ? No explanation has been forth- 
 coming. 
 
 A very important question arises regarding 
 this telegram. It was the first intimation 
 received in St. Petersburg from Sir Edward 
 Grey direct regarding his new proposal for 
 mediation. It is possible that a previous 
 telegram had been sent from the Russian 
 Ambassador in I^ondon, but there is no evidence 
 that this was so, and he could obviously only 
 have given a general warning that a new 
 proposal was under consideration. We, there- 
 fore, wish to know when this telegram from 
 Sir Edward Grey was received in St. Peters- 
 burg and when it was communicated by Sir 
 George Buchanan to M. Sazonoff. To this it 
 is impossible to give a definite answer, but we 
 may certainly say that it was not despatched 
 till late in the evening and it wiU probably 
 eventually be found that it did not reach St. 
 Petersburg in time for Sir George Buchanan 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 109 
 
 to communicate it to M. Sazonoflf before the 
 order for mobilisation had in fact been issued. 
 If this is the case, it brings into still stronger 
 relief the result of the silence of the German 
 Foreign Office. By waiting to allow the news 
 to be conveyed through the indirect channel 
 of Ivondon, they left St. Petersburg at this 
 critical period without information, and M. 
 SazonofE had, therefore, to act purely on 
 the news which came direct from Berlin ; 
 this, as we have seen, was as bad as 
 possible. 
 
 His third point is that Russia knew that 
 there was a spirit of concession at Vienna, 
 and he devotes much space to giving an account 
 of the conversations which took place there 
 between Count Berchtold and the Russian 
 Ambassador. It is quite true that friendly 
 conversations took place, but it is quite false 
 to suggest that these conversations were of 
 such a kind as to induce the Russian Govern- 
 ment to refrain from mobihsation. In them, 
 and this is of the greatest importance, nothing 
 was said about this new proposal of Sir 
 Edward Grey's, and, in fact, nothing could 
 be said because they took place before it 
 had been conveyed to the Austrian Govern- 
 ment. They were on a completely different 
 
no THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I,OR 
 
 basis. As I have shown,* the suggestions 
 contained in these discussions were of a different 
 kind altogether. They were occupied with 
 the final settlement, and they were conducted 
 on the basis that both Powers would imme- 
 diately complete their mobilisation. The in- 
 vasion of Serbia would continue, mobilisation 
 on both sides would continue, but at 
 the same time discussions also would continue. 
 
 The result of these discussions must, in 
 fact, have been this, that they would encourage 
 the Russian Government to mobilise because 
 they would get the impression that this would 
 not necessarily mean a final breach with 
 Austria, while it would mean that Russia 
 would be able to continue negotiations on 
 equal terms while Austria was continuing the 
 war with Serbia. 
 
 That there may be no doubt about this, 
 let me quote from the dispatch of Sir Maurice 
 de Bunsen, which was sent from Vienna on 
 July 31st : "I am informed by Count Forgach, 
 Under Secretary of State, that although Austria 
 was compelled to respond to Russian mobili- 
 sation which he deplored, the Austrian Am- 
 , bassador in I^ondon has received instructions 
 to inform you that mobilisation was not to 
 
 ♦"History of Twelve Days," page 211, etc. 
 
AND THB OUTBREAK OF WAR. iii 
 
 be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on 
 either side." (B. io8^). 
 
 Glaukos, commenting on the friendly nature 
 of these conversations, says : " We have then 
 the proof that the so-called provocative military 
 measures of Austria, her advance in Serbia, 
 the announcement of her mobilisation, were 
 not considered by Russian-English diplomacy 
 in Vienna as aggressive steps which precluded 
 a peaceful solution." 
 
 This is a perfectly correct statement ; all 
 the discussions at Vienna showed that both 
 the Austrians and the Russians were agreed 
 that notwithstanding these military measures 
 a way out might be found. But Glaukos 
 omits the essential point. These discussions 
 also show that it was recognised on both 
 sides that Austrian mihtary measures would 
 be answered by Russian mobilisation ; that 
 Russian partial mobilisation would be answered 
 by Austrian complete mobilisation, and that 
 this again would be answered by complete 
 Russian mobilisation. These measures did not 
 preclude a peaceful solution, but they also 
 rendered inevitable Russian mobilisation. It 
 is here that Germany came in and insisted 
 that there should be no Russian mobilisation, 
 and when this took place, made it an excuse 
 
112 THE GERMAN CHANCEI^IvOR 
 
 for war. The fallacy of the paragraph consists 
 in the confusion between " precluding a 
 peaceful solution " and " rendering mobilisation 
 inevitable," and it was the ^ction of the 
 German Government which insisted on de- 
 mobiUsation by one Power, but gave no help 
 in bringing about similar action by the other, 
 which converted a comparatively favourable 
 situation into one from which no escape was 
 possible. It is for this reason that we are 
 justified in saying that it was Germany, and 
 Germany alone, that made war inevitable, 
 and when I say Germany, in this case I mean, 
 not the Chancellor, but the Emperor. 
 
 And now we come to the most important 
 evidence in £he whole matter. Grey's formula 
 was sent to Austria ; it was discussed there, 
 and the discussion was continuing when news 
 of Russia's mobiUsation arrived. The answer 
 was sent to Germany. What was the answer ? 
 It was not an acceptance of Grey's formula. 
 On one point it embodied a great concession ; 
 the Austrian Governnient agreed to Enghsh 
 mediation, they agreed, that is, to mediation 
 after Russia had mobilised completely, and 
 so confirm the view that mobiHsation wa« 
 not a necessary cause for war. But on the 
 point of suspending mihtary operations, there 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 113 
 
 was a complete refusal. The answer is so im- 
 portant that it must again be quoted at length : 
 " I ask your Excellency to convey our 
 warm thanks to the Secretary of State 
 for the communications made to us through 
 Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to 
 him that in spite of the change in the situation 
 which has since arisen through the mobili- 
 sation of Russia, we are quite prepared 
 to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey 
 to negotiate between us and Serbia. 
 
 " The conditions of our acceptance are, 
 nevertheless, that our military action against 
 Serbia should continue to take its course, 
 and that the British Cabinet should move 
 the Russian Government to bring to a 
 standstill the Russian mobilisation which 
 is directed against us, in which case, of course, 
 we will also at once cancel the defensive 
 military counter-measures in Galida, which are 
 occasioned by the Russian attitude. " (A. 5 1) . 
 That is to say, they are to continue the 
 attack upon Serbia, but the Russian mobili- 
 sation is to be suspended. Now, Grey's pro- 
 posal had been that the suspension of Russian 
 mobilisation should be set off against the sus- 
 pension of the attack upon Serbia. This is 
 refused. 
 
114 THE GERMAN CHANCELI.OR 
 
 Why was it refused ? This is an essential 
 point as to which we must have some answer 
 or explanation. The whole German case as 
 put by Glaukos, and as now put by the Chan- 
 cellor, is that if Russia had not mobilised, 
 peace could in fact have been secured on 
 the terms of Sir Edward Grey's proposal, 
 because Austria, under German pressure, would 
 have accepted it. In support of this solution, 
 the Chancellor had put out all his strength. 
 We may well suppose that if the decision had 
 rested with him, a proposal expressed with 
 smch urgency would have been accepted, but 
 when the Austrian answer comes, we find 
 that it is a refusal in the essential point on 
 which all depends. Can we doubt that there 
 were other influences at work ? We have 
 seen that the proposal was one with which 
 the German Emperor did not identify himself ; 
 it was certainly one which the chiefs of the 
 army at Berlin would have repudiated with 
 all their energy. We know also on the irre- 
 futable authority of the Neue Freie Presse* 
 
 * In an obituary notice of Herr von Tschirschky in 
 the Neue Freie Presse of November loth, occurs the 
 following passage : — " Herr von Tschirgchky .... was 
 appointed by the Foreign Of&ce to act as their repre- 
 sentative with the Emperor William when he was oa 
 his trarsls. Th« relatieaship wkieh cevld n«t bat ariia 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 115 
 
 that Count Tschirschky, the German Am- 
 bassador at Vienna, carried on negotiations 
 with the Emperor direct over the head of 
 the Foreign Office. If we put all these things 
 together, if we put ourselves into the Emperor's 
 position, as I have represented it above, can 
 we doubt that Count Tschirschky knew that 
 this proposal, though put forward by the 
 Chancellor, had not the weight and authority 
 of the Emperor behind it ? 
 
 We can now sum up the whole matter and 
 give a definite answer to the question what 
 Russia knew when the order for complete 
 mobihsation was given. 
 
 The information before her was as follows : 
 
 1. The German Emperor continued to insist 
 on one point only, the cessation of Russian 
 mobilisation, while at the same time he gave 
 no indication that he proposed to ask Austria, 
 on her part, to stop her military operations. 
 
 2. From the German Foreign Office she 
 got nothing but a peremptory refusal of the 
 last offer of a formula which she had made^ 
 and we know what the Russian attitude as 
 
 from this association was not changed after he was 
 removed, and Herr von Tschirschky was always enabled 
 to submit to the Emperor, outside ofl&cial correspondence, 
 svcb matters as required bis personal support." 
 
 n2 
 
ii6 THK GERMAN CHANCEIvIyOR 
 
 to this formula was : " The preparations for 
 general mobihsation wiU be proceeded with 
 if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and 
 the inevitable result wiU be a European war." 
 This proposal was rejected, not by Austria 
 but by Germany, because it was never even 
 conveyed to Austria. 
 
 3. The only other information which came 
 from Berlin was the statement put into the 
 Lokalanzeiger that German mobihsation had 
 been ordered. This was immediately con- 
 tradicted, but the fact could not be without 
 influence upon their minds. It must be inter- 
 preted as a significant symptom that mobih- 
 sation was immediately impending, and as 
 we now know, it was rightly so interpreted 
 'because we know that this statement, false 
 though it was, was dehberately pubHshed by 
 the mihtary party as a means of countering 
 the peaceful efforts of the Chancellor. 
 
 From Germany therefore all the news that 
 came was as bad as possible. 
 
 From Austria, they heard only that she 
 was continuing her mihtary operations, Bel- 
 grade was being bombarded, and strong Aus- 
 trian forces were marching against Serbia on 
 three J^ different points. Conversations with 
 Count Berchtold also showed no indication* 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 117 
 
 of any concession on these points, but they 
 did show that even if Russia mobilised, there 
 was still a chance of peace if negotiations 
 were confined to Austria and Russia, and 
 were based on a consideration of the final 
 settlement after a victory had been won over 
 Serbia. 
 
 From Austria, therefore, there was nothing 
 which seemed to make it desirable or necessary 
 to postpone mobilisation. ^^jj 
 
 From I^ondon she heard of this proposal, but 
 it is doubtful whether the information arrived 
 early in the morning of the 31st or late at 
 night on the 30th. In either case the news 
 came too late to have any effect upon her 
 action, and it was not confirmed by any news 
 from Berhn. 
 
 I maintain, then, that Russia was throughout 
 the whole of the 30th in the presence of obstinate 
 refusal by Austria of all concessions, and I 
 therefore call on Glaukos to accept the corollary 
 which he has himself indicated, and to allow 
 that the Central Powers have a large share 
 in the guilt for the outbreak of the war. 
 
 As the German Chancellor and Glaukos 
 have referred to the Austrian telegram . (A. 51), it 
 seems desirable to point out the real truth 
 
ii8 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 regarding it and its final fate, for it is a 
 complete demonstration of the fallacy of his 
 statement that Russian mobilisation inevitably 
 brought about war. 
 
 The importance of the telegram and the 
 decision which it records, is indeed great. 
 For a whole week the united efforts of Europe 
 had been directed to the one single object 
 of persuading the Austrian Government to 
 accept in some form or another the idea of 
 mediation, either between Austria and Serbia, 
 or between Austria and Russia. As is well 
 known, all these efforts had been fruitless. 
 It was the continued refusal of Austria to 
 agree to arbitration, to mediation or to separate 
 discussions with Russia which was the sole 
 cause of the trouble which had arisen and 
 which alone had driven the Russian Govern- 
 ment to have recourse to mobiUsation. Now 
 at last, as the Chancellor says, owing to his 
 own efforts, the obstinacy of the Austrian 
 Government had given way, and they had 
 officially expressed their willingness that Great 
 Britain should mediate between them and 
 Serbia. This information was conveyed to 
 the German Chancellor, and to him alone. 
 How did he deal with it ? He told no one ; 
 be kept the fact hidden in profound secrecy. 
 
AND THK OUTBREAK OF WAR. 119 
 
 No infprmation as to this was ever conveyed 
 either to the Russian or to the British Govern- 
 ment. The very fact that this telegram had 
 ever been sent was riot known tmtil it was 
 published many months later by the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government among their official 
 correspondence. This compliance of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government was an answer to a 
 proposal made by Sir Edward Grey, which had 
 been passed on by the German Chancellor. 
 The German Chancellor never had the courtesy 
 to inform the British Government that an 
 answer had been made to their offer. As a 
 perusal of the pubHshed correspondence will 
 show, throughout the whole of Friday the 31st, 
 and even during Saturday, ist August, the 
 British Ambassador was bringing the strongest 
 pressure to bear upon the German Chancellor 
 and the Secretary of State to recognise that 
 there was still room for negotiation. He 
 was met with an obstinate refusal and was 
 never told that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment had in fact given their assent to medi- 
 ation. 
 
 At this time the Czar had also informed 
 the German Emperor that, notwithstanding 
 mobilisation, he was willing to continue nego- 
 tiation ; the Austrian Government took the 
 
120 THE GERMAN CHANCEI.I.OR 
 
 same view, although they had mobilised the 
 whole of their forces and knew that the Russian 
 Government had done the same. The two 
 chief parties in the conflict were therefore 
 ready to negotiate ; the German Government 
 knew of this, and they were the only Govern- 
 ment who knew of it. They kept the know- 
 ledge to themselves ; more than that, instead 
 of using it, they sent to Russia an ultimatum 
 so worded that it was impossible, under any 
 circumstances, that it could have been accepted 
 by Russia, for it demanded from the Russian 
 Government that they should stop their mobili- 
 sation, not only against Germany, but also 
 against Austria, but did not include any 
 suggestion that the Austro-Hungarian- Govern- 
 ment should also, on their part, stop their 
 mobilisation or cease their military measures, 
 and then refused all discussions of any kind 
 till an answer had been received to this 
 ultimatum. 
 
 The German Chancellor says that it was 
 Russian mobilisation which made war inevitable. 
 This view was not taken by his ally. Ger- 
 many, who professed to be mediating, took 
 up a position more intransigent than that 
 of the principal with whom she was dealing. 
 It was thus not Russian mobilisation which 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 121 
 
 made war inevitable, but the action of the 
 German Government. 
 
 It is now evident that the mobilisation of 
 the Russian army, the mobilisation of the 
 British fleet, and the warning addressed to 
 the German Government did in fact, in com- 
 bination, for the first time make a peaceful 
 issue of the crisis possible, for they opened 
 the eyes of the German Chancellor to the 
 dangers of the poUcy on which he had em- 
 barked, and they were followed by the first 
 concession on the part of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government. Even at this stage it might 
 have been possible to preserve peace. But 
 the Chancellor, though he was in possession 
 of the compliance of his ally, though he had 
 now got the consent of Austria to the principle 
 of mediation, never passed this on to the 
 other countries. If Austria, after Russian 
 mobilisation, was willing to accept arbitration 
 or mediation, it was the obvious and imperative 
 duty of the Chancellor, with the least possible 
 delay, to communicate this decision to the 
 Russian and British Governments, and to 
 have asked for the acceptance of this. Instead 
 of doing so, there was sent to Russia an 
 ultimatum so worded that it could not be 
 accepted, and no answer was made to the 
 
122 THE GERMAN CHANCBI.I.QR. 
 
 pressing enquiries made at Berlin and in 
 l>ndon by the British Ambassador and the 
 Secretary of State. Why did he act thus ? 
 
 We may well believe that this was not 
 the desire of the Chancellor ; the only ex- 
 planation of the omission is that his advice 
 was overborne by those elements in the 
 German Government against which he defended 
 himself with such vigour in his speech of 
 August. It is not in I/ondon and St. Peters- 
 burg, but in Berlin, that are to be found those 
 who defeated the efforts in favour of peace 
 that he began at the eleventh hour. 
 
AND THD OUTBREAK OF WAR. 123 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 The treatment of these matters in the Chan- 
 cellor's speech of November last is just on 
 the same Unes as that of Glaukos. It is, 
 however, worth noting as illustrating his curious 
 faculty of inaccuracy and mis-statement. Just 
 like Glaukos, he tries to show that Russia 
 mobilised knowing that a peaceful solution 
 was imminent, because she knew of Austrian 
 compliance {Nachgiebigkeit) ; but, unlike Glau- 
 kos, who at least is able to make what appears 
 at first sight a plausible case, he exaggerates 
 the point in such a way as to make it ob- 
 viously false. Glaukos aims at showing that 
 when Russia mobilised, she was " noch unter 
 dem Eindruck starrer bsterreichischer Unnach- 
 giebigkeit " (under the impression of unbending 
 Austrian obstinacy). The Chancellor alters this 
 and states that she mobilised, although she 
 was confronted with the fact of Austrian 
 compliance [der Tatsache osterreichischer Nach- 
 giebigkeit). Now this introduction of the 
 
124 THE GERMAN CHANCEIvI.OR 
 
 word " fact " of course spoils the whole argu- 
 ment, for in the telegram (A.51) which he 
 has himself just quoted, it is clearly stated 
 that the acceptance of mediation by Austria 
 (which he calls Nachgiebigkeit) was not deter- 
 mined on until after Russian mobilisation. 
 How, then, can it be said that Russia, when 
 she mobilised, did so in the face of this fact ? 
 The same speech contains other similar 
 points which show how impossible it is to 
 attach any serious importance to what the 
 Chancellor says on these matters. For in- 
 stance, he says that " as far back as July 29th, 
 when Russia mobilised against Austria-Hungary, 
 we ourselves could have mobilised. The text 
 of our treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary 
 was known and nobody could have considered 
 our mobiUsation aggressive." It is to be re- 
 gretted that he does not even observe con- 
 sistency as between his own speeches. How 
 can this statement be reconciled with the 
 statement which he made in his speech of 
 • April, 1916 : " Does not the man see, what 
 must be clear to the eyes of everybody, that 
 if we had proclaimed mobilisation three days 
 earlier (that is, July 29th), we should have 
 rendered ourselves guilty of that crime of 
 which Russia was guilty, by mobilising in the 
 
AND THK OUTBREAK OF WAR. 125 
 
 midst of negotiations which were proceeding 
 favourably." It would be desirable that the 
 Chancellor, if he expects his speeches to be 
 taken seriously, should at least not contradict 
 himself on an essential matter of this kind. 
 
 Again, it is remarkable that the Chancellor 
 speaks of the proposal to refer the dispute 
 to the Hague Conference " as a minor matter." 
 The reason that he gives for neglecting this 
 proposal is very remarkable. He says : " The 
 resort to the Hague Conference which the 
 Czar proposed sounds at first sight very im- 
 portant, but it was proposed after the Russian 
 troops had already been put in motion against 
 us," The proposal was made on July 29th, 
 before any official decree of mobilisation had 
 been issued. The movements of troops re- 
 ferred to can therefore be nothing more than 
 minor movements among the garrison troops 
 and covering troops near the frontier, which 
 were of a kind such as were quite naturally 
 made by every Power in Europe, including 
 Germany, as soon as it became apparent that 
 a serious crisis had arisen. The contention 
 of the Chancellor therefore is apparently that 
 the movement even of a single regiment is 
 by itself sufficient reason for rejecting pro- 
 posals for arbitration. It comes to this, that 
 
126 THE GERMAN CHANCEI^I/DR 
 
 when any matter arises in which a Power 
 is at issue with Germany, they are to be 
 forbidden to take the smallest measures of 
 precaution, and that if they even strengthen 
 the frontier garrison, this is a reason for reject- 
 ing any proposals for mediation or arbitration. 
 
 These are perhaps the most important, but 
 they are not the only points in this speech 
 which require comment. In his efforts to 
 mislead the world as to the true nature of 
 the military' measures taken by the different 
 Powers he mis-states the simplest facts ; for 
 instance, he states " that France ordered her 
 own mobiUsation some hours earlier than we 
 ourselves proceeded to mobilisation." The 
 point is not of great importance, for, anyhow, 
 the French order for mobilisation came a full 
 day after the proclamation of Kriegsgefahr 
 in Germany, and after the despatch of the 
 German ultimatum to Russia. The facts, how- 
 ever, are that French mobilisation was ordered 
 at 3.40 p.m. on August ist, and that of 
 Germany at 5 p.m. on the same day. Allowing 
 for the difference of time between Paris and 
 BerHn, a little more than haU-an-hour elapsed, 
 so that in fact the two orders were practically 
 issued at the same time. But he makes 
 precisely a similar mis-statement rsgardiag 
 
AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 127 
 
 the relative time of Russian and Austrian 
 mobilisation, though he obscures it by the 
 wording of his phrases. Wishing to make it 
 appear that Austrian mobilisation was preceded 
 and caused by that of Russia, he says that 
 the Russian took place " on the night of July 
 30th — 31st," while of Austrian mobilisation 
 he says, " only after the general mobilisation 
 had taken place in Russia did Austria-Hungary, 
 on the morning of July 31st, also proceed to 
 a general mobilisation." This is not the case. 
 The Austrian mobilisation did indeed take 
 place on the morning of July 31st, but at 
 a very early hour in the morning, so early 
 that it was possibly actually before that 
 of Russia, and certainly before that of Russia 
 was known. These are perhaps small matters. 
 It is not in truth on this question of hours 
 and minutes that the responsibility for the 
 war rests, but it is not a small matter that 
 he commits himself to inaccuracies of this 
 kind. 
 
Printtd in Ortal Britain by Lett A Mahmiuott, IM,, 
 liOttdon and StiM.