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Cornell University Library 
 DC 223.4.S24 1899 
 
 Napoleon Bonaparte's first campagnwith 
 
 3 1924 024 325 361 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024325361 
 
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S 
 FIRST CAMPAIGN 
 
Napoleon Bonaparte's 
 First Campaign 
 
 Witt) Commmtd 
 
 BY 
 
 HERBERT H. SARGENT 
 
 CAPTAIN OF CAVALRY UNITED STATES ARMY, COLONEL FIFTH UNITED STATES 
 
 VOLUNTEER INFANTRY, MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL 
 
 SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AUTHOR OF **THE 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO " 
 
 THIRD EDITION 
 
 CHICAGO 
 
 A. C. McCLURG AND COMPANY 
 
 1899 
 

 A. 
 
 in^Ms- 
 
 Copyright 
 
 By Herbert H. Sargent 
 
 A.D. 1894 
 
 '^7/. 
 
 ^&^ 
 
TO 
 
 VICTOR M. GORE 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR 
 
 IN REMEMBRANCE OF THE DAYS OF 
 
 OUR BOYHOOD TOGETHER 
 
 IN ILLINOIS. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 'T^HE matter contained in this book has been 
 obtained by a study of military histories and 
 the art and science of war as set forth in the 
 writings of others. 
 
 My thanks are due to Professor A. S. Hill, of 
 Harvard College, to Professor George L. Andrews, 
 Colonel (retired) U. S. Army, and especially to 
 Jos. B. Batchelor, Jr., First Lieutenant Twenty- 
 fourth Infantry, U. S. Army, for suggestions and 
 criticisms in the composition of this book. 
 
 H. H. S. 
 
 Fort Bowie, Arizona, 
 
 September 29, 1894. 
 
" There is no genius like the genius of labor. There is 
 no re'ward like that luhich comes from energy, system, and 
 perseverance.'''' 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Pag? 
 
 Introduction iS 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 montenotte i9 
 
 Comments 27 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 LODI 38 
 
 Comments 43 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE 47 
 
 Comments 51 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Bassano and San Georgio 63 
 
 Comments 68 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Arcole 77 
 
 Comments 85 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 RiVOLI 96 
 
 Comments 107 
 
1 2 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Page 
 
 The Tagliamento 123 
 
 Comments ^44 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 General Comments 167 
 
 Index 223 
 
LIST OF MAPS 
 
 TO ILLUSTRATE 
 
 Facing Page 
 
 First Part of Campaign 28 
 
 Battle of Arcole 86 
 
 Battle of Rivoli 106 
 
 Last Part of Campaign 144 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 •' Nothing is attained in war except by calculation. Dur- 
 ing a campaign, whatever 4s not profoundly considered in all 
 its details is without result. Every enterprise should be 
 conducted according to a system ; chance alone can never 
 bring success." — Napoleon. 
 
 T^O obtain a knowledge of the science of war, 
 the military student should study the cam- 
 paigns of great commanders. " Alexander," says 
 Napoleon, " made eight campaigns ; Hannibal, 
 seventeen, one in Spain, fifteen in Italy, and one 
 in Africa; Caesar, thirteen, of which eight were 
 against the Gauls and five against the legions of 
 Pompey; Gustavus Adolphus, three; Turenne, 
 eighteen ; Prince Eugene of Savoy, thirteen ; Fred- 
 erick, eleven, in Bohemia, Silesia, and on the banks 
 of the Elbe. The history of these campaigns, 
 written with care, would be a complete treatise on 
 the art of war. From this source the principles 
 which ought to be followed, in offensive as well as 
 in defensive warfare, could at once be obtained." 
 
l6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Again he says : " Read and meditate upon the 
 wars of the greatest captains. This is the only 
 means of rightly learning the science of war." 
 
 Nearly one hundred years ago, Napoleon Bona- 
 parte's military achievements amazed the world. 
 To-day, when his campaigns and battles are studied 
 by us, their brilliancy and completeness strike us 
 with wonder. The strategy that he exhibited in 
 these campaigns, and the wonderful battle tactics 
 that he employed, strongly impress us with his 
 military greatness. His combinations, his rapid 
 marches, his concentration of masses upon the 
 vital points of his enemy, his victory upon victory, 
 his wonderful power of foreseeing the results of 
 these victories and of appropriating to himself all 
 the 'advantages to be derived from them, show not 
 merely that he was a genius in war, but that he 
 was the greatest soldier in modern times, and one 
 of the greatest masters of the military art that the 
 world has ever known. 
 
 Bonaparte's campaign in Italy in 1796-97, though 
 conducted on a less stupendous scale than many 
 other campaigns in his remarkable career, was 
 surpassed by none in brilliancy, in completeness, 
 in rapidity of movement, and in strategical com- 
 binations. Here he first gained his renown as a 
 soldier. Here, at the age of twenty-six, he took 
 the first great step in his immortal career, and. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 7 
 
 with one small army, in a single campaign, de- 
 feated six Austrian armies sent successively against 
 him. 
 
 Since Napoleon's time many changes in tactics 
 and in tactical formations have resulted from the 
 inventions of man, from the use of steam, and from 
 discoveries in electricity ; but no material changes 
 in strategy have resulted from these causes. Im- 
 proved weapons and improved methods of trans- 
 portation may, in some cases, slightly modify 
 strategical movements and strategical combinations ; 
 but the principles of strategy, the great principles 
 of war, are the same to-day as in the days of the 
 great Napoleon. To divide the forces of the enemy 
 and beat them in detail, to manoeuvre upon inte- 
 rior lines, to concentrate an overwhelming mass 
 upon the vital point of the enemy, — these are 
 principles that do not change, however rapid the 
 fire of modern guns, however quick the movements 
 of troops, or however swift the dispatch of orders. 
 "The application of strategical principles," says 
 Dufour, " is the same at all times and in all places." 
 To the military student this campaign is, therefore, 
 from a strategical point of view, a very interesting 
 study. 
 
 H. H. S. 
 Fort Bowie, Arizona, 
 
 November, 1894. 
 
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST 
 CAMPAIGN. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MONTENOTTE. 
 
 TT rHEN in March, 1796, Bonaparte took com- 
 ' ' mand of the Army of Italy, he found it in 
 a destitute condition and paralyzed for the want of 
 financial means. He found that many soldiers 
 were without food and sufficient clothing. He 
 addressed the army in these words: "Soldiers, 
 you are naked and ill fed ; I will lead you into the 
 most fruitful plains in the world. Rich provinces, 
 great cities, will be in your power. There you 
 will find honor, fame, and wealth." 
 
 The situation was as follows. In Northwestern 
 Italy, the" Alps on the west and the Apennines on 
 the south divided the opposing forces. To the 
 west and south of these mountain ranges were the 
 French ; on the opposite sides, the Austrians and 
 Sardinians. Along the Alps, two armies of about 
 twenty thousand each were holding each other in 
 
20 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 check. As these two armies neutralized each 
 other during the active operations in the vicinity 
 of the Apennines, they may for the present be 
 omitted from the description of this part of the 
 campaign. Bonaparte's army, known as the Army 
 of Italy, which was about forty thousand strong, 
 and which had only twenty-four cannon of small 
 calibre, extended from Genoa to Nice along the 
 narrow strip of land between the Apennines and 
 the sea. Upon Bonaparte's right, at Genoa, a 
 British fleet, which was hostile to the French, held 
 possession of the sea. The allied armies on the 
 north side of the Apennines and immediately 
 opposed to Bonaparte, were commanded by Beau- 
 lieu, the Austrian general, and consisted of thirty 
 thousand Austrians and twenty thousand Sardin- 
 ians, the latter under General Colli. They had two 
 hundred cannon. They were facing the passes of 
 Col di Tenda, Ormea, Savona, and Bochetta, which 
 led from their position to that of Bonaparte. 
 
 The positions in detail of Bonaparte's forces 
 were as follows. His left was at the pass of 
 Tenda, which was held by seven thousand soldiers ; 
 Serrurier's division of seven thousand held the 
 pass of Ormea; Augereau with eight thousand 
 was at Mont San Giacomo; Mass^na with eight 
 thousand was at Cadibona; and La Harpe with 
 eight thousand was at Savona, having one of 
 
MONTENOTTE. 21 
 
 his brigades at Voltri. In the pass of Savona, 
 near Montenotte, works had been constructed and 
 were occupied by the French. On the north side 
 of the Apennines these passes become valleys, 
 and are separated from each other by spurs run- 
 ning out from the main chain. Though these 
 valleys were closed by the fortifications of Coni, 
 Mondovi, and Ceva, which were held by the Sar- 
 dinians, yet the French divisions, by descending 
 from the passes of the Apennines to the north, 
 could, before arriving at the fortifications, pass 
 from one valley to another over the spurs, and 
 could in this way easily communicate with one an- 
 other ; while on the south side they could still more 
 easily communicate by the Nice-Genoa road. 
 
 The allies, who were attempting to guard all the 
 valleys by occupying them all, had their forces 
 greatly subdivided and separated. They held the 
 fortresses and fortified towns of Coni, Mondovi, 
 Ceva, Alessandria, Tortona, Voghera, Turin, and 
 Ivrea. The Sardinians extended from Coni on 
 their right to Millesimo on their left. The Aus- 
 trians occupied Sassello, Ovada, Voltaggio, Genoa, 
 and the Bochetta pass. The Sardinians were com- 
 manded by Colli; the Austrian right or allied 
 centre, by Argenteau ; the Austrian left was under 
 the immediate command of Beaulieu, the general 
 in chief of the allied armies. 
 
22 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 The line of communication of Bonaparte's army 
 was by the road from Savona to Nice, and thence 
 to its base of operations in France; that of the 
 Austrian army was by two roads, — one through 
 Alessandria and Pavia, and one through Novi and 
 Placentia, — to its base of operations upon the 
 Mincio ; that of the Sardinian army was by the 
 roads through Fossano, Cherasco, and Alba, to its 
 base of operations at Turin, 
 
 Since the Republic of Genoa, though occupied 
 by the Austrians, was considered neutral territory, 
 Bonaparte asked of the Senate of Genoa permis- 
 sion to conduct his army through Genoa, and 
 thence through the Bochetta pass. Should this 
 permission be granted, his plan was, while holding 
 with small forces the passes of the Apennines, to 
 debouch with his principal army from the Bochetta 
 pass so as to throw his forces upon the Austrians 
 with his front parallel to their communications, and 
 to take in reverse the Sardinians and their fortifica- 
 tions. Should this permission be refused, he ex- 
 pected the Senate to inform Beaulieu of their 
 refusal. In that case he expected the latter to 
 move his forces towards Genoa in anticipation of 
 an attack from that quarter. By so extending 
 his left, Beaulieu would still more scatter his 
 forces and weaken his centre, and thus give Bona- 
 parte an opportunity to throw his masses upon 
 
MONTENOTTE. 23 
 
 this isolated centre, defeat it, and separate the 
 allies. 
 
 On the other hand, Beaulieu, who had probably 
 heard of Bonaparte's request and of the extension 
 of his right wing to Voltri, was expecting an attack 
 in force by way of Genoa. He resolved to antici- 
 pate this movement. His plan was to meet it by 
 moving his left wing through Genoa to attack 
 Bonaparte in front, while his centre, commanded 
 by Argenteau, was to advance upon Savona, cut 
 off the French right wing from its communica- 
 tions, and together they were to capture this 
 wing, or envelop it and drive it into the sea. 
 By adopting this plan, he expected an additional 
 advantage; namely, that of establishing commu- 
 nication with Nelson, who was in the waters of 
 Genoa with an English squadron. 
 
 Such was the situation of the opposing forces, 
 and such were the plans of the two commanders, 
 when, on April loth, Beaulieu began active opera- 
 tions. He moved his left, about one third of his 
 entire army, through the Bochetta pass upon 
 Genoa and Voltri; and ordered his centre, con- 
 sisting of ten thousand men under Argenteau, to 
 move at the same time from Sa.ssello upon Savona, 
 Beaulieu reached Voltri the next day, and made 
 two unsuccessful attacks upon the brigade there. 
 Argenteau was also unsuccessful ; he was stopped 
 
24 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 on the nth by the works in the pass near Monte- 
 notte; for though these works were defended by 
 only twelve hundred men, and though he attacked 
 with great fury all day, he did not succeed in 
 carrying the position. 
 
 On the I ith of April, while these two small forces 
 — the brigade at Voltri and the twelve hundred men 
 in the pass — were engaged with superior num- 
 bers, Bonaparte was active in making preparations 
 to crush Argenteau. He gave orders to his divis- 
 ion commanders as follows: Mass6na was to leave 
 Cadibona, march to Cairo, then cross the ridge 
 towards Argenteau and be ready to fall on his 
 flank and rear; Augereau, to march from San 
 Giacomo to Cairo and be ready to hold back the 
 Sardinians ; La Harpe, to recall his brigade from 
 Voltri, then march with his whole division to 
 the pass near Montenotte and post it behind the 
 works there. During the day and night of the 
 nth, these movements were all successfully ac- 
 complished; and on the morning of, the 12th 
 Bonaparte directed La Harpe to attack Argenteau 
 in front, and Mass6na to attack him on the flank 
 and rear. Argenteau was defeated. His army 
 was routed, and the remnants and stragglers 
 rallied at Dego. 
 
 .By this battle, known as Montenotte, the centre 
 of the allies was broken. The first step in Bona- 
 
MONTENOTTE. 2$ 
 
 parte's plan had been accomplished. Beaulieu 
 was still south of the Apennines. He advanced 
 from Voltri, but, finding no enemy and hearing 
 the guns of Montenotte, he halted for information ; 
 and on the morning of April 13th, having learned 
 of the defeat of his centre, he faced about his 
 own columns and ordered them to concentrate 
 at Dego. 
 
 While Beaulieu was retracing his steps, Bona- 
 parte was preparing to attack the left of the Sar- 
 dinians, who were divided into two armies. One, 
 under Colli, was at Ceva; and the other, under 
 Provera, at Millesimo. Bonaparte ordered La 
 Harpe to Sassello to hold back any Austrians 
 in that direction, and ordered Serrurier to make 
 false attacks from Ormea to Ceva against Colli, 
 so as to keep him occupied and prevent his re- 
 enforcing Provera. Then, at the head of Massd- 
 na's and Augereau's divisions, he marched against 
 Provera at Millesimo, defeated him, and. on the 
 morning of the 14th captured his army. 
 
 On the same day, Bonaparte, leaving Augereau 
 in front of Colli to aid Serrurier, conducted the 
 divisions of La Harpe and Mass^na upon Dego, 
 drove back and defeated the Austrians there, and 
 also defeated, the next day, a corps of Beaulieu's 
 army that was attempting to reach Dego. Beau- 
 lieu, learning of Bonaparte's success at Dego, now 
 
26 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 attempted to concentrate his scattered troops at 
 Acqui. 
 
 Thus in four days Bonaparte had crushed the 
 centre of the allies, captured a Sardinian army 
 upon his left, and forced back the Austrians threat- 
 ening his right. Now, with his divisions perched 
 upon the spurs of the Apennines, with his whole 
 army in a central position and his right well ex- 
 tended between the wings of the allies, he was 
 preparing to move against the Sardinians, to crush 
 them if he could, or to drive them back upon Turin 
 and detach them from the alliance, so as to leave 
 himself free to meet the Austrians single-handed 
 upon the fertile plains of Northern Italy. Ac- 
 cordingly, he ordered La Harpe to San Benedetto 
 to watch Beaulieu, and either to protect the French 
 rear should the Austrians move by Cairo, or to 
 prevent the junction of Beaulieu with Colli by way 
 of Alba ; he also ordered a brigade to remain 
 at Cairo in order to protect the French communi- 
 cations with Savona. 
 
 These dispositions having been made, Bonaparte 
 with Massdna's, Augereau's, and Serrurier's divis- 
 ions attacked the Sardinians at Ceva and Mondovi, 
 and drove them towards Turin. The Austrians 
 attempted to join the Sardinians at Alba; but 
 Bonaparte united his divisions there, and thus 
 destroyed Beaulieu's last hope of a junction with 
 
MONTENOTTE. 2J 
 
 his ally. The French continued their advance on 
 Turin. The Sardinians then treated separately for 
 peace, and gave up to the French the fortresses 
 of Alessandria, Conij Tortona, and the citadel of 
 Ceva. 
 
 By these manoeuvres, Bonaparte's lines of com- 
 munication with Nice by the passes of Savona, 
 Ormea, and Tenda, and directly with France by the. 
 much shorter route of Mont Cenis, were secured. 
 
 Thus it appears that Bonaparte made his first 
 movement against the allies on April nth; and 
 that the armistice of Cherasco was signed with the 
 Sardinians on April 28th. In eighteen days he 
 had turned the Apennines, driven back the allies, 
 won six victories captured or killed more than 
 twelve thousand men, taken more than forty can- 
 non, detached the Sardinians from the Austrians, 
 compelled the former to make a separate peace, 
 and had acquired, as a base for future operations 
 against the Austrians, the three fortresses of Coni, 
 Tortona, and Alessandria, with their artillery, mag- 
 azines, and stores. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 For a proper concentration for battle, not taking 
 into account obstacles such as mountains, rivers, 
 and fortifications, the front; of an army of one 
 
28 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 hundred and fifty thousand men or less should not 
 be more than thirty miles. However, in this case 
 it is to be noticed that both armies, at the outset, 
 had much longer fronts, — that of the French ex- 
 tending from Tenda to Savona, a distance of about 
 fifty miles ; that of the allies, from Coni to Vol- 
 taggio, about seventy-five miles. But the Apen- 
 nines, which were intervening obstacles, were 
 favorable to Bonaparte, who could with small 
 forces easily hold the passes, and could quickly 
 concentrate his army at any point upon his front 
 by the road south of them. During this concen- 
 tration, his forces would be perfectly protected by 
 the mountains from the attacks of the allies. The 
 Apennines, therefore, allowed him to extend his 
 front with safety beyond thirty miles. 
 
 On the other hand, the allies were not only 
 more extended than the French, but they had their 
 principal forces at the ends of their long line. 
 Furthermore, these forces themselves were sepa- 
 rated into parts by the spurs of the Apennines, 
 which made it difficult to re-enforce any portion of 
 their front without the danger of being struck in 
 flank by Bonaparte's divisions issuing from the 
 passes of the Apennines. Upon the principle that 
 " an army in motion should always be able to con- 
 centrate for battle within a single day," it is safe to 
 say that the front of the allies should not have been 
 

 
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MONTENOTTE. 29 
 
 longer than thirty miles. But it was more than 
 twice this distance ; they had scattered their forces ; 
 they had weakened their line in proportion as they 
 had extended it, and had thus allowed their adver- 
 sary to break through and divide their army, so 
 as to force them to choose between retreating, and 
 fighting with only a part of their forces. 
 
 Why did the Austrian general so scatter his 
 forces ? Why did he make this fatal mistake ? At 
 this time, and also in after years, the Austrian gen- 
 erals, in making war, seemed to believe in a di- 
 vision of forces. They made war by detachments. 
 Their main army was invariably divided into two 
 or three armies, and these were often subdivided. 
 Under this system they expected to hold all the 
 parts of their front by occupying them all. But 
 there was another reason for the separation of 
 the Austrian and Sardinian armies. Beaulieu was 
 anxious about his lines of communication, and in 
 order to protect them he separated his forces. 
 
 This anxiety, even though it led to error, was 
 natural ; for the lines of communication of an army 
 are always of the utmost importance to its safety. 
 In every manoeuvre, combination, and battle of a 
 campaign, the commanding general should give 
 the most careful consideration to his communica- 
 tions, — to their direction, extent, and protection. 
 In order to fight, soldiers must have food and 
 
30 BONAPARTBS FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 ammunition. The loss of an army's communica- 
 tions almost always leads to immediate disaster. 
 " While the distant spectator," says Hamley, " im. 
 agines a general to be intent only on striking or 
 parrying a blow, he probably directs a hundred 
 glances, a hundred anxious thoughts, to the com- 
 munications in his rear, for one that he bestows 
 upon his adversary's front." 
 
 Now, the Sardinians at Ceva and Millesimo 
 directly covered their communications with Turin. 
 The Austrians at Ovada and Voltaggio covered 
 their communications back .through Pavia to their 
 base on the Mincio. Beaulieu, being anxious 
 about his communications, had therefore divided 
 his forces ; and as they fell back along these diver- 
 gent lines of communication, they of necessity 
 became more and more separated. That it was an 
 error to attempt, by separating these two armies* 
 to cover directly their communications, is shown 
 by the victor. Napoleon himself, in his criticism of 
 the allies' position. He says : — 
 
 "But the army under the orders of Colli, instead of 
 moving upon Millesimo, should have supported itself 
 upon Dego. It was an error to suppose that, in order to 
 cover Turin, Colli must station himself directly upon the 
 road to that city. The united armies at Dego would have 
 covered Milan, because they would have been astride of 
 the high road of Montferrat; they would have covered 
 
MONTENOTTE. 3 1 
 
 Turin, because they would have been near the road 
 to that place. United, the two forces would have been 
 superior to the French army ; separated, they were lost." 
 
 Though the disposition of the forces of the Aus- 
 trian commander-in-chief were faulty in so many- 
 particulars, it is interesting to note how very near 
 he came to being successful. Had his centre, 
 under Argenteau, sacceeded in the assaults of the 
 earthworks in Savona pass, the Army of Italy, 
 instead of the allies, might have been cut in two. 
 By means of these works, a handful of men were 
 enabled to repulse the furious assaults of many 
 times their number, and thus give to Bonaparte 
 time to make his dispositions for the destruction of 
 Argenteau. 
 
 Though these insignificant works played for a 
 few hours an important part in the campaign, 
 it is worthy of notice that the strong fortresses 
 which were held by the allies, and which were 
 on the direct line of Bonaparte's operations, did 
 not stop his advance for a moment ; even though, 
 on account of having no siege artillery and only 
 a few cannon of small calibre, he could not com- 
 pletely invest them. He pushed forward past them 
 to decide, if possible, their fate upon the open 
 battle-field. "' It is upon the open field of battle," 
 said Napoleon thirteen years afterwards, " that the 
 fate of fortresses and empires is decided." 
 
32 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 As soon as Beaulieu learned of the defeat of 
 his centre, he turned back for fear of losing his 
 own communications, and to avoid meeting single- 
 handed Bonaparte's victorious army. Upon this 
 point, Hamley comments as follows : — 
 
 " Upon the defeat of Argenteau at Montenotte, Beau- 
 lieu was compelled to pause. For though he was pre- 
 pared to attack the French in front of him, yet it was on 
 the assumption that Argenteau would co-operate by an 
 attack on their flank and rear ; and this was only possible 
 on condition that the French should be concentrating 
 towards Voltri. Therefore, when Beaulieu found that 
 they had retired from that point, he knew they must be 
 either beyond the reach of Argenteau, by retreating west- 
 ward beyond Savona, — in which case he would presently 
 be apprised of it by the advance-guard of his colleague 
 issuing from the pass, — or that they had concentrated 
 for an attack, in which case he might, if he should advance, 
 find himself single-handed in the presence of a victorious 
 enemy, as would indeed have been the case. Therefore, 
 as soon as he was certified of disaster to his colleague, 
 he hastened to recover his communications, whicli he 
 might else find to be endangered." 
 
 Thus far we have said nothing about the French 
 and Sardinian armies in the Alps, for the reason 
 that they neutralized each other, and had no 
 immediate effect upon the results. It will now be 
 noticed, that, when Bonaparte was advancing upon 
 Turin, both of the Sardinian armies were between 
 
MONTENOTTE. 33 
 
 him and Kellerman, the commander of the French 
 army in the Alps. The Sardinian general could, 
 therefore, have left a small containing force ^ be- 
 fore Kellerman and have massed against Bona- 
 parte, thus playing the same game against him 
 that he had played against Beaulieu. Upon this 
 point Hamley says : — 
 
 "It was to guard against such a contingency that 
 Bonaparte, on the 25th, from Fossano pressed the com- 
 mander of the right of Kellerman's army to issue from 
 the Alps towards him. But it is to he observed, first, 
 that, even when thus combined, the Sardinians would 
 have been inferior to Bonaparte in numbers, having been 
 only equal to his single army at the outset ; and, secondly, 
 that the distance from Mont Cenis to Turin is so short 
 that Kellerman, unless strongly opposed, might reach in 
 a single march and enclose their armies while he seized 
 their capital." 
 
 The Sardinians fought hard. Before they treated 
 for peace, they were defeated in several battles. 
 This was due in a great measure to the plan of 
 campaign which Bonaparte adopted. When he 
 threw his forces against the Sardinians, they fell 
 back after each battle upon their communications 
 with Turin, rallied their scattered troops, and 
 
 1 " Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty 
 of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the 
 enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against 
 another portion of the hostile forces." — Wagner. 
 
 3 
 
34 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 were ready in a short time to fight again,. Had 
 Bonaparte held the passes of the Apennines with 
 small forces, issued with his principal army from 
 the Bochetta pass with his front parallel to the 
 Austrian communications, and attacked success- 
 fully, he would in all probability have decided the 
 campaign in a single battle; for a defeat of the 
 Austrian army, or of both armies combined, meant 
 a loss of the Austrian communications, — in other 
 words, meant ruin to the Austrian army. Had 
 the Austrians alone been defeated, the Sardinians 
 would hardly have been able, single-handed, to 
 cope successfully with Bonaparte, and would in 
 all probability have treated for peace. Under cir- 
 cumstances very similar to this supposititious case, 
 Bonaparte, in the Marengo campaign,, debouched 
 from the St Bernard pass, threw his army from 
 the north upon these same Austrian communica- 
 tions, and in one battle decided the fate of the 
 whole Austrian army. 
 
 But there were several reasons for not adopting 
 this plan besides the one already given. First: 
 Beaulieu was expecting an attack in force from 
 Bonaparte's right, and was prepared for it. Second : 
 The allies by extending their front had weakened 
 and isolated their centre. Third: An attack by 
 the right must necessarily cause a concentration of 
 the allies, and this was the very thing that Bona- 
 
MONTENOTTE. 35 
 
 parte wished to prevent. Fourth: Besides these 
 military reasons, there was also a political one, 
 which appears in the instructions given to Bona- 
 parte by the Directory, as follows : " The Aus- 
 trians, as was shown in the last campaign, trouble 
 themselves very little about the disaster of the 
 allies, and, in moments of danger, far from seek- 
 ing effectually to protect them, immediately sepa- 
 rate from them and are concerned only to cover 
 the country which belongs to themselves." This 
 fact, taken in connection with the fact that the 
 lines of communication of the two armies back 
 to their bases of operation were divergent, was 
 another strong reason for striking at the centre 
 and separating the allies. Fifth: If Bonaparte 
 really had any serious doubts as to which was 
 the better plan of campaign, the offensive move- 
 ment in force by Beaulieu upon Genoa and Voltri 
 decided the question in favor of an attack upon 
 the centre. Beaialieu's movement was a fatal one ; 
 by it he extended still more his front, separated 
 himself more and more from Argenteau, and, by 
 his fruitless march against an alftiost imaginary 
 enemy, took from the field of action one third 
 of his entire army. When Bonaparte saw this, 
 he immediately took advantage of it, and struck 
 with the rapidity of lightning. In four days he 
 gained four victories. Before Beaulieu's return, 
 
36 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Montenotte, Millesimo, and the two battles of 
 Dego had been fought and won. 
 
 Operating upon interior lines from his central 
 position, Bonaparte could concentrate his divis- 
 ions much more rapidly than the enemy, who 
 was operating upon exterior or double lines. Dur- 
 ing these actions, with one division, sometimes 
 two, as a containing force, he held back a portion 
 of the allies, and then concentrated an overwhelm- 
 ing mass upon their remaining forces at some 
 decisive point. Though the allies outnumbered 
 him, yet he invariably brought a superior force 
 against them upon the battle-field. At Monte- 
 notte, La Harpe and Mass^na had sixteen thou- 
 sand, Argenteau only ten thousand ; at Millesimo, 
 Massdna and Augereau had nearly sixteen thou- 
 sand, Provera several thousand less ; at Dego, La 
 Harpe and Mass^na engaged about six thousand 
 Austrian soldiers, and the next day about six 
 thousand more ; at Mondovi, Bonaparte had three 
 divisions — Serrurier's, Augereau's, and Mass^na's 
 — for an attack against the remnant of the Sar- 
 dinian army, about eight thousand strong. So to 
 manoeuvre as to divide the forces of the enemy 
 and beat them in detail, so to manoeuvre as 
 always to bring an overwhelming mass upon the 
 vital point of the enemy, so to manoeuvre with 
 forty thousand soldiers against fifty thousand as to 
 
MONTENOTTE. 37 
 
 outnumber the enemy upon every battle-field, — 
 this is generalship, this is strategy; it is more, it 
 is victory. Victory is the aim of all strategy. This 
 much of the campaign, Bonaparte's first, was very 
 similar to the Waterloo campaign, his last. In the 
 first, he was opposed by the Sardinians and Aus- 
 trians ; in the last, by the English and the Prussians. 
 In each case, the armies opposed to him had diver- 
 gent lines of communication. In each case, he used 
 his own army as an entering wedge to separate the 
 allies ; and when, after defeating the Prussians, he 
 detached a containing force to hold them in check 
 while he massed his force against the English, he 
 was repeating the manoeuvre that nineteen years 
 before had made him victorious in the beginning 
 of his matchless military career. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 LQDI. 
 
 "DEFORE entering upon a detailed description of 
 ■^ this part of the campaign, it will be well to 
 describe in a few words the nature of the country 
 in which the French and Austrians during the re- 
 mainder of the year 1796 conducted their opera- 
 tions; and also to point out the sources from 
 which both sides obtained supplies for their men 
 and animals. 
 
 Northern Italy was the theatre of war.^ Between 
 the Tyrolese Alps, in the extreme northern part 
 of Italy, and the Ligurian and Adriatic Seas, the 
 country is fertile and the climate mild. The rivers 
 Sesia, Ticino, Adda, Oglio, and Chiesa run south- 
 eastward from the Alpine region of the north and 
 join the Po, which, running eastward through most 
 of its course, collects their waters into one body 
 
 I " The theatre of war comprises all the territory upon which 
 the parties may assail each other, whether it belongs to them- 
 selves, to their allies, or to weaker states who may be drawn 
 into the war through fear or interest. . . . The theatre of war 
 may thus be undefined, and must not be confounded with the 
 theatre of operations of one or the other army." — Jomini. 
 
LODZ. 39 
 
 and pours them into the Gulf of Venice. The 
 Mincio, which is the outlet of Lake Garda, flows 
 south to the fortress of Mantua, at this time held 
 by the Austrians, and then flows southeast into 
 the Po. The Adige, which is deep and unford- 
 able, flows south along the ejist side of Lake 
 Garda till opposite the south end of the lake, 
 and then southeast into the Gulf of Venice. Up- 
 on the east bank of this river, at the point where 
 the mountains end and the plains begin, is the 
 fortified town of Verona; and on the same bank, 
 thirty miles nearer the mouth, is the fortifit:^ town 
 of Legnago. The Brenta rises in the Tyrol near 
 Trent, and flows southeast, past the town of Bas- 
 sano and near the town of Padua, into the Gulf 
 of Venice. Along the line of the Alps are a 
 number of lakes. The largest of these is Garda, 
 which is thirty miles long and two to eight miles 
 wide. Its northern end extends well into the 
 mountains; its southern end, into the plains of 
 Italy. 
 
 In this well-watered and fertile country, Bona- 
 parte found supplies in abundance for his army. 
 When he took command of the Army of Italy, his 
 soldiers were suffering for the necessaries of life. 
 Upon the barren rocks of the Apennines nothing 
 would grow. The bread and wine necessary to 
 hold body and soul together came mostly from 
 
40 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 France. But as soon as his soldiers descended the 
 mountains into the fertile plains of Italy they found 
 plenty of food for themselves and plenty of forage 
 for their animals. By levying contributions upon 
 the invaded territory Bonaparte collected these 
 supplies. Thus from the very start he made war 
 support war. Money, clothing, food, forage, wine, 
 — in fact all the supplies needed for his army ex- 
 cept ammunition, which came from France, — were 
 obtained from the invaded and conquered territory. 
 With the money and supplies thus obtained, he 
 established in Italy magazines and hospitals, which, 
 with the fortresses he had already acquired, formed 
 a secondary base of operations for the further 
 prosecution of the war. 
 
 The Austrians obtained their ammunition from 
 Austria and their supplies from Italy ; but as soon 
 as they were pushed back into the Alps, they were 
 compelled to obtain the greater portion of their 
 supplies also from Austria. 
 
 The situations of the opposing forces were, 
 therefore, in many respects similar. Behind the 
 French army were the Apennines and French 
 Alps ; behind the Austrian army were the Tyrol- 
 ese and Swiss Alps. As each army advanced into 
 the valley of the Po, supplies were obtained in 
 abundance ; as each fell back into the mountains, 
 supplies were obtained with difficulty. These 
 
LODI. 4X 
 
 facts should be kept in mind by the reader that 
 he may understand thoroughly the succeeding 
 movements. 
 
 The Sardinians, having been defeated by Bona- 
 parte, had, by the armistice of Cherasco, left him 
 free to proceed against the Austrian army. Bona- 
 parte with about forty thousand soldiers was at 
 Alessandria. Beaulieu with about thirty thousand 
 was occupying Valeggio, and had in addition 
 twelve thousand at Mantua. 
 
 The French lines of communication extended 
 from Alessandria, through the passes of the Alps 
 and the Apennines, into France. The Austrian 
 lines of communication extended through Milan 
 and Pavia, around the south end of Lake Garda, 
 and thence along the high-road to Austria, which 
 penetrates the Tyrol by the valley of the Upper 
 Adige. 
 
 Bonaparte, by causing to be inserted in the ar- 
 mistice of Cherasco a stipulation that he should be 
 allowed to cross the Po at Valenza, and by moving 
 his troops towards that place, had led the Aus- 
 trian commander to expect him there. But he did 
 not intend to cross at that point. On May 6th he 
 took his cavalry, three thousand five hundred gren- 
 adiers, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, as an 
 advance-guard, and marched rapidly down the Po 
 to Placentia. In thirty-six hours he marched forty 
 
4? BONAPARTE'S, FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 ijliles. His main army follqwed him in echelon by 
 divisions. 
 
 At Placentia he forced a crossing, but, having 
 no pontoon train, hp had to build a bridge for the 
 passage of the main army, and on this account his 
 divisions were considerably delayed. He advanced 
 with what force he had, attacked the Austrians at 
 Pombio, defeated them, and drove them before 
 him. Expecting to find the Austrian main force 
 between the Ticino and the Adda, he stationed onje 
 division on the Lower Adda to protect his right, 
 and one at Pavia to protect his left, while with his 
 main force he ascended the Adda towards Milan. 
 Upon his arrival at Lodi, he found that Beaulieu, 
 having crossed the Adda with his main army, had 
 made good his escape ; but that he had left a force 
 of twelve thousand at the bridge of Lodi to defend 
 it. This force was the Austrian rear-guard. Bona'^ 
 parte formed his grenadiers, ordered an attack, and, 
 with Lannes and himself at the head of the attack-- 
 ing column, carried the bridge after a desperate 
 fight and a great loss of life on both sides. The 
 Austrians retreated behind the Mincio, and there 
 halted in a strong position, with Lake Garda on 
 their right and Mantua on their left. 
 
 Bonaparte with his victorious columns then made 
 a triumphal march into Milan, which he entered 
 just one month and three days after the battle of 
 
LODZ. 43 
 
 Montenotte. But he did not remain there long. 
 After investing the citadel of Milan, in which Beaur 
 Ueu had left a garrison of two thousand Austrians, 
 Bqnaparte hastened with his main army tq the 
 Mincio to drive the Austrians out of Italy. His 
 purpose was to attack the Austrian centre at Bor- 
 ghetto. In order tp deceive the Austrians as to 
 the real point of attack, he caused a demonstration 
 to be made against Peschiera. Then, on May 
 29th, he hurled his cavalry under Murat upon 
 Borghetto. He supported it with artillery and 
 infantry. The French were victorious. They car- 
 ried the bridge there, broke through the Austrian 
 line, drove the Austrian army into the Tyrol, and 
 separated this army from Mantua with its twelve 
 thousand combatants. Tfie first Austrian arptjl 
 was defeated. 
 
 Bonaparte now marched tq the Adige, took posr 
 session of Verona and Legnago, and on June 14th 
 began the investment qf Mantua. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 When Bonaparte crossed the Po at Placentia, 
 he expected to throw his whole army upon the 
 Austrian communications, to envelop their army, 
 and compel its surrender ; but, having no pontoon 
 train, he was delayed at the crossing, and this 
 
44 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 delay gave to Beaulieu the opportunity to make his 
 escape. " If I had had a good pontoon equipage," 
 said Bonaparte, speaking of this passage of the Po, 
 " the fate of the enemy's army had been sealed." 
 And, judging from what in after years he accom- 
 plished at Marengo and Ulm, where, by manceu- 
 vres similar to this, he threw his army upon his 
 enemies' communications, we cannot avoid the 
 belief that, had it not been for the delay, he would 
 have here captured the entire Austrian army. 
 
 If he had attempted to cross, or had crossed, the 
 Po at Valenza, as he had purposely made the Aus- 
 trians believe he would do, the two armies would 
 have been facing each other with their lines of 
 communication (and, in this case, their lines of 
 retreat) perpendicular to their fronts. In this situ- 
 ation, the advantages of victory and the disad- 
 vantages of defeat would have been the same or 
 nearly so to each of the two armies. Neither 
 would have had the advantage in position, and' in 
 case of defeat either could have retreated with 
 little or no danger of losing its communications. 
 But it was to avoid this, and to give the advantage 
 to the French, that Bonaparte made his flank 
 movement. For this reason he placed his army 
 on the north side of the Po with his front parallel 
 to the Austrian communications. 
 
 In this position, the Austrians, in order to give 
 
LODI. 45 
 
 battle, must form front to a flank,i and if defeated 
 must lose their communications. On the other 
 hand, the French if defeated could fall back across 
 the Po with little or no danger of losing their 
 communications. 
 
 In the march down the Po to gain this position 
 lipon the Austrian flank, the French army had of 
 necessity to expose its own flank to the enemy. 
 The river, however, in a measure protected the 
 French from a flank attack; but Bonaparte took 
 further precautions: he marched rapidly, and re- 
 quired his divisions to march in echelon with the 
 leading division farthest from the river. By this 
 means they supported one another, and, in case 
 the leading division had been attacked in flank, 
 the rear divisions could in turn have struck the 
 Austrians in flank- 
 When Bonaparte arrived before Lodi, Beaulieu 
 had already crossed the Adda with his main army. 
 The Austrian force at Lodi was simply Beaulieu's 
 rear-guard, which he had left there to protect his re- 
 treat. For these reasons, Bonaparte's victory there 
 had but little effect upon the result of the cam- 
 paign. From a strategical point of view, therefore, 
 the battle at the bridge of Lodi was unimportant. 
 Nevertheless, it gave to Bonaparte the opportunity 
 
 • An axmy forms front to aflank-vi'\aen it operates on a front 
 parallel to the line communicating with its base. 
 
46 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 to show his soldiers that he himself was brave 
 and fearless, and it covered Lannes with glory. 
 Jomini, writing of this battle in his Life of Napo- 
 leon, puts into Bonaparte's mouth these words : 
 
 " The occasion furnished an opportunity for stamping 
 by some bold stroke the character of my individual 
 actions, and I did not let it escape. The affair might 
 be attended with the loss of a few hundred men ; but 
 even should I be defeated, it could not have the least 
 influence on the result of the campaign. . . . This was 
 merely an affair of a rear-guard, but still it was a brilliant 
 one." 
 
 On April nth, Bonaparte made his first move- 
 ment against the Sardinians and Aastrians from the 
 narrow strip of land between the Apennines and 
 the sea. On May 29th, he crushed the Austrians 
 at Borghetto, and drove them into the Tyrol. In 
 less than two months, he had compelled the 
 Sardinians to make peace, and had driven the 
 Austrians out of Italy. Could he hold Italy? 
 This was now the problem. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 
 
 A USTRIA became alarmed at Bonaparte's pro- 
 •^^^ gress. She determined to make a great 
 effort for the relief of Mantua and for the recovery 
 of Italy. The Austrian army in the Tyrol was 
 increased to sixty thousand men. Marshal Wurm- 
 ser, an old man, but a brave Soldier, who had dis- 
 tinguished himself in several Austrian campaigns, 
 received the command of this army. Besides 
 these sixty thousand there were twelve thousand 
 Austrian soldiers shut up in Mantua. 
 
 Bonaparte had altogether forty-five thousand 
 soldiers. Serrurier's division, ten thousand strong, 
 was besieging Mantua ; Augereau with eight thou- 
 sand was at Legnago ; Mass^na with fifteen thou- 
 sand was at Verona and Rivoli; Sauret with four 
 thousand was at Salo; and in the rear of these 
 divisions about eight thousand were in reserve. 
 
 From Trent, where the Austrian army was 
 assembled, three direct routes led to Bonaparte's 
 position. One route was by the road from Trent to 
 Riva, and thence along the west side of Lake Garda 
 
48 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 to Brescia. This road, which passed through a 
 mountainous country, was impassable for artillery. 
 The other two routes were by the two roads from 
 Roveredo down the Adige, — one to Rivoli by the 
 right bank of the river, and the other to Verona 
 by the left bank. These two roads were passable 
 for artillery. 
 
 Marshal Wurmser divided his forces into two 
 armies: one, twenty-five thousand strong, com- 
 manded by Quasdanovich, marched on the west 
 side of Lake Garda; the other, thirty-five thou- 
 sand strong, commanded by Wurmser himself, de- 
 scended the Adige in two columns, one on each 
 side of the river. His plan was to have these 
 two columns make simultaneous attacks upon 
 Rivoli and Verona,' and, while these attacks were 
 being made, he expected Quasdanovich to de- 
 bouch by Salo on the French line of communi- 
 cations. In this way Wurmser expected to 
 envelop and capture the whole French army. 
 
 Bonaparte, not being strong enough to take the 
 offensive, had no plan. He was waiting for de- 
 velopments. On July 30th he learned that the 
 Austrians were advancing on both sides of the 
 lake. He learned that Mass6na had been driven 
 back from Rivoli, and that Sauret had been driven 
 back from Salo. Already the Austrians were 
 debouching on his rear; in a few hours at most 
 
LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 49 
 
 they would sever his communications. His situa- 
 tion was critical and time was precious. He hastily 
 called a council of war. All his generals except 
 Augereau advised retreat; but nevertheless Bona- 
 part decided to fight, and immediately formed his 
 plan. It was to raise the siege of Mantua and to 
 concentrate at once all his available force at the 
 lower end of Lake Garda, where, from his central 
 position, he could fall with almost his entire force 
 on one and then on the other of the two Austrian 
 armies. By this means he hoped to defeat them 
 separately, and to prevent them from uniting on 
 the Mincio. 
 
 On the same day that the council of war was 
 assembled, Bonaparte gave his orders to his divis- 
 ion commanders. The next day, July 31st, was a 
 day of concentration. Mass6na fell back across 
 the Mincio. Augereau left Legnago and marched 
 to join Mass^na. At the crossings of the Mincio, 
 both division commanders left rear-guards to watch 
 the march of the enemy. On the same day Ser- 
 rurier raised the siege of Mantua, spiked his guns, 
 burned his carriages, buried his projectiles, and 
 began his march to join Mass6na and Auge- 
 reau. Meanwhile, Wurmser, having united his 
 two columns, was approaching the Mincio. On 
 the afternoon of the same day, and on the next 
 day, Bonaparte with Mass^na's and Augereau's 
 
 4 
 
so BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 divisions attacked and worsted Quasdanovich at 
 Lonato, Brescia, and Salo, without doing him a 
 great amount of damage. 
 
 On August 1st BdnapaiJte halted on the Chiesa. 
 He had succeeded in placing Massena's and 
 Augereau's divisions between Wurmser and Quas- 
 danovich. He had forced back the latter into the 
 mountains upon the west side of Lake Garda; and, 
 having advanced to the Chiesa, he found that his 
 communications with Milan were safe. In order 
 still to maintain his central position, and to be 
 ready to meet Wurmser, whom he was expecting 
 from the direction of the Mincio, he turned back 
 his columns and marched towards Lonato and 
 Castiglione. During these manoeuvres, Wurmsef 
 Crossed the Mincio and directed one of his divis- 
 ions on Lonato and one on Castiglione, but with 
 the main part of his army continued his march on 
 Mantua. Meanwhile, Quasdanovich, having seen 
 the necessity of uniting with Wurmser, was ex- 
 tending his left towards Lonato. 
 
 On August 2d Bonaparte, having received a 
 part of Serrurier's division, directed Massdna upon 
 Lonato, and Augereau Upon Castiglione. On the 
 same day, Wurmser arrived at Mantua, revictualled 
 the garrison, and then marched out in the direc- 
 tion of Castiglione to find Bonaparte. 
 
 On August 3d Mass6na fought the battle of 
 
ZONA TO AND CASTIGLTONM. 51 
 
 Lonato, and Augereau foaght the battle of Cas- 
 tiglione. After hard fighting both were victorious. 
 Quasdanovich was pursued and badly cut up. He 
 retreated on Riva, 
 
 Bonaparte, having disposed of Quasdanovich, 
 now turned ^his attention to Wurmser, who was 
 marching on Castiglione, On August 4th he 
 ordered all his available force to concentrate at 
 this place, and on August sth he fought the sec- 
 ond battle of Casiiglione. Mass6na and Augereau 
 attacked Wurmser in front, while Serrurier at- 
 tacked his left ilank. Wurmser was beaten and 
 driven across the Mincio. Bonaparte followed up 
 his victory, attacked again at Peschiera, and drove 
 the AuStrians into the Tyrol. Th^ second Austrian 
 army was defeated. The French divisions were 
 again established on the Adige, and Mantua was 
 again invested. In six days Bonaparte had cap- 
 tured, killed, or wounded nearly twenty thousand 
 Austriatis, and lost but seven thousand French. In 
 six days he had fought and won three pitched 
 battles, had almost annihilated Wurmser's army, 
 and had for the second time driven the Au&trians 
 out of Italy. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 In this part of the campaign, ^sixty Jthousand 
 Austrians were marching down upon Bonaparte, 
 
52 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 and twelve thousand in Mantua were in his rear; 
 yet with only forty-five thousand soldiers he suc- 
 ceeded in winning every battle and in utterly rout- 
 ing the Austrian forces. How did he accomplish 
 this? It was not that the Austrians lacked cour- 
 age ; for they are a brave people, and fought hard, 
 even desperately. How, then, did he win such 
 success? The answer is, that he won it by his 
 marches, by his concentrations for battle, by util- 
 izing every available French soldier, by bringing 
 upon every battle-field a stronger force than his 
 adversary, and by taking advantage of the errors 
 made by the Austrian commander. 
 
 In advancing upon the French on both sides of 
 Lake Garda, Wurmser committed a great error. 
 With Lake Garda separating his two armies, neither 
 could support the other. This error allowed Bona- 
 parte to place almost his entire force at the foot 
 of the lake, where he could bring a superior force 
 against either army. To separate the forces of his 
 enemy at the beginning of a campaign was one of 
 Bonaparte's first, endeavors. It was one of his 
 master strokes. In order to separate his enemy's 
 forces, he had, at the beginning of his career in 
 Italy, fought the battle of Montenotte. But in the 
 case before us no battle was necessary to accom- 
 plish this object. Wurmser, by separating his 
 forces, did the very thing that Bonaparte wished 
 
LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 53 
 
 him to do. It is remarkable that Wurmser should 
 have made this movement ; for he certainly knew 
 that Bonaparte's success in the Montenotte cam- 
 paign had been gained against the Austrians and 
 Sardinians by overwhelming the centre of the allied 
 armies, by separating them and keeping them sep- 
 arated till, by concentrating a superior force against 
 one and then the other, he had succeeded in 
 defeating both. 
 
 In advancing on the east side of Lake Garda in 
 two columns separated by the river Adige, Wurmser 
 committed another error. These two columns, by 
 following the two roads down the Adige, one to 
 Rivoli and the other to Verona, were, as they 
 approached these places, separated by an unforda- 
 ble river and by impassable mountains. But the 
 French, who were occupying both places, had easy 
 communication between them by the bridge over 
 the Adige at Verona. Thus it is seen how a small 
 containing force could have checked the advance 
 of one column, while a concentration was being 
 made against the other. Such a plan surely offered 
 great chances of victory to Bonaparte. Other con- 
 siderations, however, which will be discussed later, 
 led him to adopt a different plan. 
 
 In going to relieve Mantua before he had de- 
 feated the French army, Wurmser made a third 
 great error. While Bonaparte was hotly engaged 
 
54 BONAPARTB'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 with Quasdanovich, Wurmser was making a fruit- 
 less march into, Mantua. Had he crossed the 
 Mincio and connected with Quasdanovich a day or 
 so before the battles of Lonata and Caatiglione, 
 and brought upon these battle-fields, thirty tho,u- 
 sand fresh troops, as he could easily have done, 
 Bonaparte would probably have been defeated. 
 Here, Wurmser had the opportunity of rectifying 
 his errors ; but, instead of doing so, he continued 
 still to blunder on with that persistency in error 
 that seemed to follow nearly all the Austrian com- 
 manders throughout the campaign. 
 
 It is, however, very easy to criticise WurmsejB 
 after the event ; but it was not so easy for him tQ 
 see clearly at the time what to do. Being anxious 
 to relieve Mantua, he needed but the opportunity. 
 His soldiers there, were in a critical condition and 
 needed supplies. This fact undoubtedly made a 
 strong impression on his mind. To the accomplish? 
 ment of the relief of Mantua everything seemed 
 favorable;, for, when he reached Rivoli, Masr 
 s6na retreated towards Milan;: Augereau, too, 
 marched towards Milan and crossed the Mincio; 
 and even Serrurier, after raising the siege of Man- 
 tua, marched in the same direction. Knowing all 
 this, Wurmser thought the French were retreating 
 on Milan. He therefore concluded that he would 
 revictual Mantua before atarting in pursuit of Bona- 
 
1.0N4T.0 Afirp C4STIQU0NB. 55 
 
 parte. This conclusion was a very natural one; 
 still he should have known that Bonaparte would 
 not yield Italy without ai battle; he should have 
 known that the victor of Montenotte, of Dego, of 
 Mondovi, of Millesimo, and of Lodi would not 
 seek safety in retreat without at least making one 
 great effort to hold what he had conquered. 
 
 Napoleon has passed judgment upon this part 
 of the campaign as follows : — 
 
 " Wurmser's plan was defective ; his three corps were 
 separated by two large rivers (the Adige and the Mincio), 
 several mountain chains, and Lake Garda. He ought 
 either to have debouched with all his forces between Lake 
 Garda and the Adige, or to have advanced with his united 
 army by the Chiesa upon Brescia. In the execution of 
 his plan, he committed an error which cost him dear : he 
 wasted two days in marching to Mantua. He should, on 
 the contrary, have thrown two bridges over the Mincio at 
 Peschiera, hastily crossed this river, joined his right at 
 Lonato, Desenzano, and Salo, and thus, by rapidly uniting 
 his divided, forces, have repaired the defects of his plan." 
 
 While Wurmser was marching and counter- 
 marching with half of his command to no purpose, 
 Bonapajte was taking advantage of every moment 
 of time, and using every one of his available men. 
 At no time does Wurmser bring half of his force 
 upon the battle-field, while on August 3d and on 
 August Sth Bonaparte concentrates there nearly 
 
56 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 the whole of his army. By a superiority offeree 
 upon the battle-fields, he won these victories. The 
 energy that he infused into this part of the cam- 
 paign is something wonderful. On July 30th he 
 learned that the French were being driven back on 
 both sides of Lake Garda. On the same day he 
 called a council of war and then issued his orders. 
 In the next twenty-four hours he concentrated for 
 battle, drove back the Austrians from Desenzano 
 and Salo, and recovered his communications. For 
 six days he was fighting almost constantly. With 
 the rapidity of lightning he struck blow after blow. 
 Though he had but a handful of men, his grena- 
 diers seemed to be everywhere. They were always^ 
 in the right place at the right time. They marched 
 by night and fought by day. He himself was 
 everywhere, tireless and indomitable. " In a few 
 days," says Thiers, " he had killed five horses ; he 
 would not intrust any one with the execution of his 
 orders; he was determined to see everything, to 
 verify everything, to animate all by his presence." 
 
 In order to understand this Lonato-Castiglione 
 part of the campaign from a strategical point of 
 view, let us notice the positions of all the forces 
 on July 29th, the day before Bonaparte decided 
 to concentrate. 
 
 The Austrian right wing, twenty-five thousand 
 strong, was before Salo; the Austrian centre, 
 
LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 57 
 
 eighteen thousand strong, before RivoH ; the Aus- 
 trian left wing, seventeen thousand strong, before 
 Verona ; and twelve thousand were at Mantua. 
 
 The French left wing, four thousand strong, 
 commanded by Sauret, was at Salo ; their centre, 
 fifteen thousand strong, commanded by Mass6na, 
 was at Verona and Rivoli ; their right, eight thou- 
 sand strong, commanded by Augereau, was at 
 Legnago ; about eight thousand were in reserve ; 
 and Serrurier had ten thousand before Mantua, 
 
 The time had arrived when Bonaparte had either 
 to retreat or to fight. He decided to fight. He 
 could adopt any one of the following plans : he 
 could fall back with all his forces and cover Man- 
 tua ; or he could concentrate against the Austrian 
 left wing at Verona, or against the Austrian centre 
 at Rivoli, or against the Austrian right at Lonato. 
 Let us examine each one of these plans in the order 
 named, that we may see which one would probably 
 have procured him the greatest advantages. 
 
 First : Had he fallen back from his position on 
 the Adige to cover Mantua, he could not have 
 taken advantage of the errors that Wurmser had 
 made in separating his columns by impassable 
 obstacles; for as soon as the Austrian armies in 
 their advance had passed Verona, Rivoli, and 
 Lake Garda, there would have been no further 
 obstacles to prevent their uniting against Bona- 
 
58 BONAPARTE'S PIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 parte. In this case he would have had the whole 
 Austrian army in his front, and twelve thousand 
 in his rear. As ten thousand of his own soldiers 
 were necessary to bold Mantua, he would have 
 had but thirty-five thousand Frenchmen with whom 
 to oppose sixty thousand Austrians. 
 
 Second: Had he made his principal attack at 
 Verona, he would have concentrated near that 
 place and would have crossed the Adige with the 
 greater part of his forces. Undoubtedly he would 
 have been victorious against the Austrian left ; but 
 as he had only sufficient force to act offensively; 
 against one column at a time, the Austrian right 
 and centre, consisting of forty-three thousand soK 
 diers, and the garrison at Mantua, consisting of 
 twelve thousand, could meanwhile have united 
 upon his rear. Such a movement would have cut 
 off his retreat on Milan, and would have led,, in. 
 all probability, to the annihilation of his army. 
 
 Third : There are several strong reasons why 
 the concentrated attack upon the Austrians should 
 have been made at RivolL The French army 
 could have been united near there just as easily 
 as at Mantua, Verona, or Lonato. A concentrated 
 attack there would have hopelessly separated the 
 other two Austrian columns. As Verona was a 
 fortified town, a small force could have easily held 
 the place for a few days, which would have given 
 
LONATO AND CASTIGUONM, 59 
 
 sufficient time for a concentration and attack at 
 Rivoli. And, besides, as a battle-field RivoU 
 offered many advantages to Bonaparte. It was 
 here that, a few months afterwards, he fought and 
 won, with inferior forces^ a great battle, — - one of 
 the greatest tactical battles mentioned in history. 
 Let us suppose that Bonaparte, had chosen to 
 attack the Austrians at Rivoli, and had issued 
 ojcders as follows : the reserve to march on Rivoli ; 
 Augereau to leave two thousand soldiers at Leg- 
 nago and to ascend the south bank of the Adige 
 tQwards Rivoli ; Massdna to withdraw all his force 
 from Verona, except four thousand to hold the 
 town, and to march to Rivoli ; Serrurier to raise 
 the siege of Mantua, to guard the crossings of 
 the Mincio with part of his. division, and with the 
 other part to fall back on Peschiera ; Sauret to fall 
 back on Peschiera, to remaia there till relieved by 
 Serrurier, and then to join Bonaparte at Rivoli, 
 In twenty-four hours, Bonaparte could in this way 
 have concentrated twenty-nine, thousand soldiers 
 with whom, to attack the Austrian centre, eighteen 
 thousand strong. Then,, by transferring this army 
 to Verona, he could have had the same superiority 
 of numbers there. In three or four days he could 
 have disposed of both the Austrian centre and left. 
 Meanwhile, Quasdanovich would have marched to 
 Mantua, or would have attempted to force the 
 
60 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 crossings of the Mincio in Serrurier's front. In 
 either case Bonaparte would have had Sauret's, 
 Mass6na's, Augereau's, and Serrurier's divisions 
 (probably thirty-five thousand after deducting the 
 cavalry sent in pursuit of the Austrian left and 
 centre) with which to attack Quasdanovich. This 
 plan offered to Bonaparte greater advantages than 
 any of the others. In this way, and in this way 
 alone, could he fight each Austrian column sepa- 
 rately, and prevent the junction of the other two 
 columns while he was engaged with the third. 
 
 Fourth : By concentrating against the Austrian 
 right, he allowed the Austrian centre and left to 
 unite ; and, as we have seen, had Wurmser taken 
 advantage of the opportunity offered he could have 
 united his forces to those of Quasdanovich before 
 Lonato. Why then did Bonaparte choose to con- 
 centrate and attack here instead of at Rivoli, where 
 the advantages for securing victory would have 
 been so much greater? The answer is, that he 
 looked not so much to the advantages for securing 
 victory as to the results of defeat. Other things 
 being equal, he would naturally wish to attack 
 first the army that was most endangering his com- 
 munications. But the principal reason for this 
 choice of attack was his anxiety to preserve his 
 line of retreat on Milan in case he were defeated. 
 Had he attacked at Rivoli and been defeated, 
 
LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE. 6l 
 
 nothing could have saved him ; for he would then 
 have had a victorious army in his front and 
 twenty-five thousand on his rear. On the other < 
 hand, had he been defeated by Quasdanovich, 
 he could have fallen back on Milan. The results 
 of defeat were more important to him than the 
 advantages for securing victory. Notwithstanding 
 the fact that he seemed always to take great 
 chances in his military career, seemed often to 
 stake everything on the fate of a single battle, 
 seemed almost to burn his bridges behind him so 
 certain was he of success in action, yet a careful 
 analysis of his campaigns shows that no great 
 military commander has ever looked with more 
 anxiety to his lines of retreat than this great 
 master of the art of war. At Marengo, where he 
 seemed to stake his fate upon a single battle, and 
 where defeat apparently meant ruin, he had care- 
 fully arranged a line of retreat by the St. Gothard. 
 At Austerlitz, where he allowed the enemy to 
 envelop his right and cut off his retreat on Vienna, 
 and where he was so certain of success that he 
 issued a proclamation in advance explaining the 
 manoeuvre by which victory would be obtained, 
 yet even here he had provided for a retreat into 
 Bohemia in case of defeat. 
 
 The Austrians are a brave people ; they fought 
 well in this campaign, but courage availed them 
 
62 BONAPAHTE'S FIRST CAMPAION. 
 
 nothing; they had a superiority of numbers, but 
 numbers availed them nothing; they tried a new 
 ' Commander, confided in the genius of one of their 
 oldest and most trusted soldiers, but his genius 
 availed them nothing. Everywhere they were 
 defeated and routed; were for the second time 
 driven out of Italy ; were in six days hurled back 
 to the mountains from which they had issued. 
 And by whom ? By a boy of twenty-six ; by one 
 who seemed to violate all their known rules of 
 War, and yet, in spite of this, met with success in 
 every movement. Such genius must have seemed 
 strange to them. It must have seemed strange to 
 their old white-haired marshal, who had won his 
 spurs in many a hard-fought and victorious cam- 
 paign. It was strange; it seems strange to us, 
 even when we know that this boy of twenty-six 
 was one of the greatest masters of the art of war 
 that the world has ever known. It will seem 
 stranger still, when we learn Jiow he hurled back, 
 routed, and destroyed, in the next few months, 
 three more large Austrian armies. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 BASSANO AND SAN GEORGIO. 
 
 A GAIN the Austrains were re-enforced. Again 
 ■^*- they attempted to relieve Mantua and to 
 drive the French from Italy. With that fatal per- 
 sistency in error that Wurmser had exhibited in 
 the previous campaign, he divided his forces; 
 leaving Davidovich with twenty thousand men 
 separated into several detachments in the Tyrol, 
 while with the remainder of his army, twenty-six 
 thousand strong, he was prepiaring to descend 
 the valley of the Brenta. 
 
 The two roads that led from the Tyrol, one to 
 RivOli by the right bank of the Adige, and the 
 Other to Verona by its left bank, we have already 
 described. From Trent a third road led into the 
 valley of the Brenta, thence followed the river's 
 course as far as Bassano, and then, leaving the 
 river, passed through Vicenza into the valley of 
 the Adige at Verona. 
 
 On this last road WUfftiSer was advancing with 
 his army. His plan was to cross the Adige if 
 possible between Verona and Legnago, and relieve 
 
64 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Mantua ; or in case the French advanced into the 
 Tyrol, to fall upon their rear, cut off their retreat, 
 and, while Davidovich was attacking them in front, 
 to pen them up in the narrow gorges of the Adige 
 and compel their surrender. 
 
 Having received a re-enforcement of several 
 thousand, Bonaparte had altogether about forty- 
 two thousand soldiers. He thought himself strong 
 enough to make an offensive movement. His 
 plan was to penetrate the Tyrol, drive back the 
 Austrians, and effect a junction with the Army of 
 the Rhine, which was then engaged in fighting 
 another Austrian army along the upper course 
 of the Danube. He left three thousand soldiers 
 in Verona, where the fortifications would enable 
 them to hold out for at least two days against 
 greatly superior numbers. He left eight thousand 
 before Mantua. He directed Vaubois, who was at 
 Salo with his division, to march by Riva upon 
 Roveredo ; and, with Mass6na's and Augereau's 
 divisions, he himself ascended the Adige. Early 
 in September he united these three divisions, 
 numbering about thirty thousand, near Roveredo, 
 attacked Davidovich, defeated him at Roveredo 
 and at Caliano, drove him into the Tyrol, and 
 gained possession of Trent. Trent was an impor- 
 tant point, in that it opened to the French the 
 valley of the Brenta and allowed them to debouch 
 
BASSANO AND SAN GEORGIO. 65 
 
 directly upon Wurmser's rear. Until Bonaparte 
 reached this point, he was not aware of Wurmser's 
 departure down the Brenta. He therefore unex- 
 pectedly found himself in a favorable position. 
 The Austrian right wing had been overthrown, 
 the left isolated and turned, and he was on its line 
 of retreat With thirty thousand soldiers he was 
 directly between Davidovich and Wurmser, and 
 the former had already been defeated. It was a 
 splendid opportunity for a soldier of Bonaparte's 
 genius. He at once renounced his original plan of 
 uniting with the Army of the Rhine, and decided 
 to march rapidly down the Brenta, in order to 
 overtake and crush Wurmser before he should 
 reach Mantua. 
 
 Accordingly, Bonaparte left Vaubois in the Tyrol 
 to hold back Davidovich, while with Mass6na's and 
 Augereau's divisions he hurried forward to overtake 
 the Austrians. Marching fifty miles in two. days, 
 he came up with them at Bassano. At Bonaparte's 
 appearance, Wurmser knew not which way to turn. 
 He had expected to find the French in his front ; 
 he found them in his rear. He had expected to 
 destroy their communications; he found himself 
 trembling for the safety of his own. He was in a 
 critical situation. Furthermore, one of his divis- 
 ions had been directed upon Verona a day or so 
 before, and could not be recalled in time to take 
 
 S 
 
66 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 part in a battle. This gave to the French a 
 numerical superiority and greatly increased Bona- 
 parte's chances of victory. Wurmser, however, 
 could not escape; he had either to surrender or 
 fight, and like a brave man he decided to accept 
 battle. He was defeated. Quasdanovich's divis- 
 ion was nearly cut to pieces, and several thousand 
 Austrians were captured. By this battle, known 
 as Bassano, the Austrian forces were separated: 
 Quasdanovich with the remnants of his division 
 retired into the mountainous district of Friuli, 
 while Wurmser himself with the remainder of his 
 army, numbering about twelve thousand, marched 
 for Mantua by way of Legnago. At Legnago he 
 rested his troops one day, and left a garrison of 
 two thousand soldiers to hold the place. 
 
 These twelve thousand Bonaparte tried hard to 
 capture. He ordered Mass6na to cross the Adige 
 at Ronco, and Augereau to march by way of Padua 
 and Legnago. At the same time he sent orders to 
 Sahuguet, who was commanding Serrurier's di- 
 vision, to destroy all the bridges and prevent the 
 Austrians from reaching Mantua. Bonaparte's 
 measures seemed to be well taken. Wurmser's 
 delay of one day at Legnago should have been 
 fatal to him. But Mass6na, on account of having 
 no pontoon train, was delayed in crossing the 
 Adige ; and Sahuguet, who had failed to destroy 
 
BASSANO 4ND SAN GEORGIO. 6/ 
 
 all the bridges, allowed Wurmser with ten thou- 
 sand Austrians to slip through into Mantua. 
 
 Meanwhile, Mass6na and Augereau had closed 
 in on Legnago, and captured the garrison of two 
 thousand Austrians left at that place. This hav- 
 ing been accomplished, Bonaparte united his 
 three divisions and advanced to meet Wurmser, 
 who, having united his forces to the garrison at 
 Mantua, had marched out of the works to San 
 Georgio to meet Bonaparte. Bonaparte attacked 
 Wurmser, defeated him in the battle of Ssm Georgio, 
 and drove him within the walls of Mantua. 
 
 The advance movements on both sides had 
 begun simultaneously early in September. On 
 the 13th, the commander-in-chief of the Austrian 
 forces, with nearly one fourth of his army, was 
 shut up in the fortress of Mantua. In less than two 
 weeks the third Austrian army was defeated. It 
 had lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners more 
 than fifteen thousand spldjers; the French, about 
 eight thousand. At the beginning of this part of 
 the campaign, Wurmser, with his ^rmy of forty- 
 six thousand men, had hoped to drive the French 
 from Italy, and to raise the siege of Mantua. At 
 the end, his army was scattered, routed, almost 
 annihilated. Part was in the Tyrol, part in Friuli ; 
 ten thousand were shut up iji Mantua, and fifteen 
 thousand had been killed, wouijicjied, or captured. 
 
68 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 At the outset, the situation was as follows. The 
 Austrians had forty-six thousand soldiers in the 
 Tyrol and ten thousand in Mantua. Wurmser was 
 free to move with these forty-six thousand against 
 the French upon any of the roads leading from the 
 Tyrol to the Po. 
 
 The French had forty-two thousand, composed 
 of four divisions: one before Mantua, two at 
 Rivoli and Verona, and one at Salo. One of these 
 divisions it was necessary to keep before Mantua, 
 in order to maintain the siege there. Bonaparte, 
 therefore, had but three divisions with which to 
 manoeuvre and fight. And, even with these three 
 divisions, he was not free to move against the 
 Austrians in every direction; for he had to ma- 
 noeuvre in such a way as always to protect the 
 division at Mantua, and prevent it from being iso- 
 lated and overwhelmed by superior numbers. 
 
 The fact that Bonaparte was tied to Mantua, 
 while Wurmser was free to move upon any point, 
 and the additional fact that Bonaparte had but 
 thirty-four thousand soldiers with whom to engage 
 forty-six thousand, gave to Wurmser a great ad- 
 vantage. These numbers are given on the suppo- 
 sition that the forces about Mantua neutralized 
 
BASSANO AND SAN CEORGIO. 69 
 
 each other. If we take them into consideration, 
 we have forty-two thousand French opposed to 
 fifty-six thousand Austrians. In other words, a 
 ratio of 3 to 4 in favor of the latter; but in the 
 Lonato-Castiglione part of the campaign the ratio 
 had been 5 to 8 in favor of the Austrians. The 
 inequality in this part of the campaign was so 
 much less that Bonaparte felt strong enough to 
 take the offensive. He believed in the offensive. 
 To win victories, as he had thus far always done, 
 by bringing a superior force upon the battle-field, 
 the offensive is more favorable than the defensive. 
 On the offensive, a general can follow his own 
 plan; on the defensive, he must conform to that 
 of his adversary. On the offensive, the parts of 
 an army can be concentrated, and the enemy may 
 be surprised and defeated before he can unite the 
 necessary force to repel an attack; on the defen- 
 sive, the parts of an army must be kept separate, 
 in order to guard all the threatened points till the 
 enemy's point of attack is developed. The Aus- 
 trian commander also believed in the offensive, but 
 there was one great difference between Bonaparte 
 and Wurmser. Bonaparte believed in it as a 
 means to an end, as a means of uniting his scat- 
 tered army ; but Wurmser left this point entirely 
 out of the problem. Bonaparte united his forces 
 as he advanced to attack; Wurmser separated his 
 
■JO BONAPARTE'S FMST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 forces the moment he commenced an offensive 
 movement. Bonaparte, with his forces at the base 
 of a triangle, moved towards the apex and there 
 won his victory; Wurmser at the apex, moved 
 towards the base and there met defeat. Bona- 
 parte, beginning active operations with divided 
 forces, united them, and step by step gained more 
 and more momentum, till at last he overcame all 
 opposition and was victorious everywhere ; Wurm- 
 ser, beginning active operations with united forces, 
 separated them, and step by step became weaker 
 and weaker, till at last he found himself a prisoner, 
 his army defeated, scattered, and routed. Though 
 at the outset the advantages were greatly in Wurm- 
 ser's favor, yet this part of the campaign, from the 
 beginning to the end, was one continual triuhiph 
 for Bonaparte. He united his three divisions at 
 the head of Lake Garda, outnumbered Davidovich 
 and defeated him at Roveredo and at Caliano ; 
 then like a thunderbolt fell upon Wurmser's rear at 
 Bassano, outnumbered him, broke his army in two, 
 and hurled a part of it back into the mountains of 
 Friuli; then again, without a pause, he rushed 
 upon the remnant of the Austrian army, pursued 
 it, concentrated^ and outnumbered his adversary 
 for the fourth time, defeated him at San Geofg'io', 
 and drove him within the Walls of Mantua. 
 
 If we glance at the positions of the opposing 
 
BASSANO AND SAJV GEORGIO. 71 
 
 forces in this and the preceding part of the cam- 
 paign, we shall find that the French were scattered 
 before the commencement of active operations and 
 united at the close ; that the Austrians were united 
 before the commencement and scattered at the 
 close. At the end of each victorious campaign, 
 Bonaparte scattered his forces to collect his sup- 
 plies, hold his line, protect his communications, 
 and intimidate his adversary. Genius in the art of 
 war consists in knowing when to scatter your forces 
 and when to unite them. This maxim Napoleon 
 carried to a perfection never equalled. 
 
 It had been necessary for Bonaparte to station 
 Vaubois's division at Salo, in order to prevent the 
 Austrians from advancing upon the French com- 
 munications by the road on the west side of Lake 
 Garda. Though the lake intervened between 
 this division and the other two at Rivoli and 
 Verona, yet in twenty-four hours Vaubois could 
 have joined Bonaparte at Rivoli by the road 
 around the south end of the lake. Though Bona- 
 parte had but these three divisions with which to 
 manoeuvre and fight, and though at the outset 
 he was necessarily weakened by the separation of 
 Vaubois's division from the other two, nevertheless 
 he was determined to take the offensive. At the 
 earliest opportunity, he desired to unite all three 
 divisions at Roveredo. In only two ways could 
 
72 BONAPARTE S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 this be done : Vaubois could either march around 
 the south end of the lake by way of Peschiera, 
 or march around the north end by way of Riva. 
 Had the first plan been adopted, the French com- 
 munications in the vicinity of Brescia would have 
 been left unguarded. Furthermore, the distance 
 to Roveredo by this route was nearly three times 
 as far as the other. Bonaparte, therefore, ordered 
 Vaubois to march directly upon Roveredo by way 
 of Riva. Though this plan of concentration, on 
 the whole, perhaps involved less risk to Bonaparte 
 than the other, yet the chances of victory offered 
 to Wurmser at this time are worthy of notice. 
 He was in the Tyrol with forty-six thousand sol- 
 diers. Had he proceeded to the upper end of 
 Lake Garda, there detached a containing force 
 of ten thousand to hold Vaubois in check, and then 
 fallen with the remainder of his army upon Mas- 
 s6na and Augereau, the chances of victory would 
 have been greatly in his favor. He would have 
 had not only superior numbers, but also the advan- 
 tage of position. In this way, he would have sep- 
 arated Bonaparte's forces, and would have placed 
 his own army in a central position, from which he 
 could have acted advantageously against the French 
 upon either side of the lake. By such a manoeuvre 
 he would have played the same game against the 
 French that Bonaparte, in the previous part of 
 
BASSANO AND SAN GEORGIO. 73 
 
 the campaign, had played against the Austrians, 
 Here was offered to Wurmser a great opportunity: 
 the opportunity of attacking with superior numbers 
 an army which was separated into two parts by an 
 impassable obstacle. 
 
 Had Wurmser even kept his army united till 
 after the concentration of the French at Roveredo, 
 he would have had forty-six thousand Austrians 
 with whom to oppose thirty thousand French. 
 The chances of victory would still have been 
 greatly in his favor. But at the very outset he 
 began to separate his forces. He repeated the 
 errors that had before caused his own defeat, and 
 also that of his predecessor. Experience taught 
 him nothing. Brave, fearless, and stubborn, he 
 continued to blunder on, neither able to see his 
 own past errors, nor able to comprehend the stra- 
 tegical combinations of his brilliant adversary. 
 
 After Bonaparte had defeated the Austrian right 
 and gained Trent, he was between the two Aus- 
 trian armies with his three divisions. To march 
 against the Austrian left with all this force would 
 have been a hazardous move; for the Austrian 
 right could then have taken Trent and cut off his 
 retreat, which would have enclosed him between 
 the two Austrian armies, where, if defeated, his 
 army would have been captured or annihilated. 
 Bonaparte, therefore, left one division in the Tyrol 
 
74 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 to hold the Austrians there in check, and to pro- 
 tect his line of retreat; and with the other two 
 divisions he marched against Wurmser. This 
 movement, too, was in One sense a hazardous one ; 
 for Bonaparte knew that he might meet superior 
 numbers. He had but twenty thousand ; Wurm- 
 ser, twenty-six thousand. To overcome this ad* 
 vantage, Bonaparte trusted to his own skill on the 
 battle-field, and to the feeling of his soldiers that 
 they had been victorious so often that they could 
 not be defeated. If, however, he should be de* 
 feated, he could fall back, unite with Vaubois, and 
 still present a formidable front. Fortunately for 
 him, when he struck the Austrians at Bassano, one 
 division of Wurmser's army had been detached 
 Against Verona ; and though it was recalled, it did 
 not return in time to participate in the battle. 
 
 It might seem that, while the French were in 
 the valley of the Brenta directly on Wurmser's 
 communications, he could have neutralized this 
 advantage by rapidly marching to RivoH, where 
 he would have been directly on Bonaparte's com- 
 munications; but Verona barred the way. This 
 place was occupied by three thousand soldiers, 
 Tfvho could easily have held out against superior 
 numbers for two or three days ; that is, until Bona- 
 parte would have been upon Wurmser's rear. But 
 even if Verona had not beefl occupied by the 
 
BASSANO AND SAN GEORGIO, 75 
 
 French, Wurmser would not, in all probability, 
 have attempted this movement upon the French 
 communications. In accordance with a maxim of 
 war which has been proved by experience, he 
 would have abandoned any intended attack upon 
 his adversary's communications, in order to fight 
 for the recovery of his own. This maxim is stated 
 by Hamley as follows: "When two armies are 
 mancEuvring against each other's communications, 
 that army whose communications are most easily 
 threatened will abandon the initiative and conform 
 to the movements of its adversary." And he adds 
 further these words : " The importance of this fact 
 [meaning the maxim just quoted] is immense ; for 
 the commander who finds himself on his enemy's 
 rear, while his own is still beyond his adversary's 
 reach, may cast aside all anxiety for his own com- 
 niiunications, and call up every detachment to the 
 decisive point, certain that the enemy will abandon 
 his own desighs in order, if possible, to retrieve 
 his position." 
 
 Wurmser's delay of one day at Legnago should 
 have been fatal to him, and it would have been 
 if Mass^na had not been delayed in crossing the 
 Adige at Ronco. Here, as at Placentia, Bonaparte's 
 want of a pontoon train saved an Austrian army. 
 
 Thus far in his military career, Bonaparte was 
 remarkably successful. Part of this success was 
 
76 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 due to his own genius, and part to his adversary's 
 errors. Moreover, circumstances which he could 
 not control seemed to favor him. Well aware 
 that the goddess of fortune smiled on his under- 
 takings, he often spoke of his " lucky star." We 
 see instances of his good fortune in the move- 
 ments just described. It was fortunate that he 
 was not attacked before he had united his divisions 
 at Roveredo; it was fortunate that he was not 
 attacked by the whole Austrian army after he had 
 united them there ; it was still more fortunate that 
 Wurmser's army was divided, and that an Aus- 
 trian division was absent from the battle of Bas- 
 sano. Thus far, fortune had favored him ; but in 
 his next struggle it was to be against him. At 
 Arcole we shall see him driven back and almost 
 overwhelmed by numbers; we shall see his sol- 
 diers discouraged, and his generals without hope ; 
 we shall see the very elements themselves united 
 for his destruction: but amidst the turmoil and 
 the strife we shall see him, by the force of his 
 genius, still unconquerable, still victorious. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 ARCOLE. 
 
 "P*OR the fourth time the Austrian government 
 -■- determined to make an effort for the posses- 
 sion of Italy. The outlook was favorable to the 
 Austrians. Two French armies along the Upper 
 Danube had met with reverses, and had been 
 driven back. Epidemic fevers among the French 
 troops about Mantua were rapidly diminishing 
 their numbers, and Bonaparte, who now greatly 
 felt the need of more soldiers, was asking in vain 
 for re-enforcements. 
 
 By the middle of October, the Austrian forces 
 outside of Mantua were increased to fifty thousand 
 men. Davidovich with twenty thousand was in 
 the Tyrol, and Quasdanovich with thirty thou- 
 sand was in Friuli. General Alvinzi, who had 
 succeeded Wurmser as commander-in-chief, was 
 with Quasdanovich. Wurmser with twenty thou- 
 sand Austrians was shut up in Mantua. 
 
 To oppose these forces, Bonaparte had barely 
 forty thousand men, situated as follows : Kilmaine 
 with eight thousand was besieging Mantua ; Mas- 
 
78 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 s^na with ten thousand was at Bassano; Auge- 
 reau with nine thousand, at Verona; and Vaubois 
 with ten thousand, on the Lavis, near Trent. The 
 French had also two or three thousand cavalry in 
 reserve. 
 
 Alvinzi and Bonaparte had each a plan of cam- 
 paign. Alvinzi's plan was that Davidovich should 
 attack Vaubois on the Lavis, while Quasdanovich 
 attacked Massdna at or near Bassano. By reason 
 of his superior numbers, Alvinzi calculated that 
 the French would be defeated ; and that Davido- 
 vich and Quasdanovich could advance, the former 
 down the Adige to Verona, and the latter along 
 the road from Bassano to Verona. From Verona, 
 with his forces united, Alvinzi purposed to 
 advance to the relief of Mantua, 
 
 Bonaparte's plan was to repeat from right to 
 left against Alvinzi the same manoeuvre that he 
 had made from left to right against Wurmser in 
 the preceding part of the campaign. In other 
 words, while Vaubois viras holding Davidovich in 
 check, Bonaparte intended to attack Alvinzi in 
 force at or near Basgaijo and defeat him if pos- 
 sible; then to ascend the Brenta and unite with 
 Vaubois for a combined attack against Davidovich. 
 
 Early in November Davidovich advanced from 
 his base of operations in the Tyrol to attack 
 Vaubois at Trent, and at the same time Alvinzi 
 
ARCOLE. 79 
 
 advanced from his base of operations in Friuli to 
 attack Mass^na at Bassano, Vaubois was driven 
 back towards Corona and Rivoli, and Mass6na 
 retreated towards Verona. By reason of these 
 manoeuvres, Alvinzi could now communicate with 
 Davidovich by the valley of the Brenta along the 
 direct road between Bassano and Trent. By 
 means of this road, he could quickly re-enforce 
 Davidovich's army by a detachment from his own. 
 He did not, however, take advantage of this 
 opportunity; but continued to act separately 
 against the French with his two armies. 
 
 Bonaparte, having directed Vaubois to prevent 
 the further advance of Davidovich, advanced with 
 Mass^na's and Augereau's divisions to meet Al' 
 vinzi on the Brenta. He attacked and obtained 
 a partial success, and intended to renew the attack 
 the next day ; but, just at this time learning that 
 Vaubois was closely pressed, he renounced his 
 plan and fell back on Verona. Meanwhile, Vau^ 
 bois, having lost a third of his force in killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners, was driven back to Co- 
 rona. Bonaparte himself hastened there, and 
 harangued Vaubois's troops for the purpose of 
 stimulating their courage. Then he hurriedly 
 returned to Verona. 
 
 Meanwhile, Alvinzi had advanced on the Bas- 
 sano-Verona road as far as Caldiero, where he had 
 
80 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 taken up a strong position. Again Bonaparte 
 with Mass6na's and Augereau's divisions advanced 
 to attack him. The attack was vigorous ; but the 
 enemy's strong position, his superior numbers, the 
 muddy roads, and a severe wind and hail storm in 
 the face of the French soldiers during the attack, 
 were disadvantages that Bonaparte could not over- 
 come. He was repulsed with loss. 
 
 He was now in a critical condition. The two 
 Austrian armies were closing in upon him ; already 
 their plan of campaign seemed about to be real- 
 ized, already their cannon could be heard at 
 Verona. It seemed almost impossible to hold 
 Mantua, and at the same time to prevent the junc- 
 tion of the two Austrian armies. If they united, 
 they could relieve Mantua in spite of anything 
 Bonaparte could do. To save his army, retreat 
 seemed almost a necessity. He had been severely 
 repulsed; his force was too weak; his generals 
 were losing hope; his men were murmuring and 
 complaining; even the elements themselves, which 
 had so often been favorable to his undertakings, 
 now seemed to be united for his destruction. 
 
 In this critical condition he wrote to his govern- 
 ment as follows : — 
 
 " All our superior officers, all our best generals, are hors 
 de combat. The Army of Italy, reduced to a handful of 
 men, is exhausted. The heroes of Millesimo, of Lodi, of 
 
ARCOLE. 8 1 
 
 Castiglione, of Bassano, have died for their country, or 
 are in the hospital. Nothing is left to the corps but their 
 reputation and their pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lamare, 
 Victor, Murat, Chariot, Depuis, Rampon, Pigeon, Menard, 
 Chabrand, are wounded. We are abandoned at the ex- 
 tremity of Italy. The brave men who are left me have 
 no prospect but inevitable death, amidst chances so contin- 
 ual and with forces so inferior. Perhaps the hour of the 
 brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massdna, is near at hand. 
 If I had received the 83d, numbering three thousand 
 five hundred men known to the army, I would have 
 answered for the result. Perhaps in a few days forty 
 thousand may not be enough." 
 
 Though he complained thus bitterly to his 
 government, he affected in the presence of his 
 soldiers the utmost assurance. He encouraged 
 them. He told them that one more effort must 
 be made. He told them that they must not, could 
 not, be beaten. " From the smiling, flow^ery biv- 
 ouacs of Italy," said he, " you cannot return to the 
 Alpine snows." 
 
 Rather than yield An inch he decided to risk 
 everything. He resolved to throw his army on 
 Alvinzi's flank and rear. This was a hazardous 
 move ; but it was the only hope left, and if success- 
 ful it would show that he could conquer with 
 numbers and even fortune against him. 
 
 Alvinzi, who was advancing on the road to 
 Verona, had this fortified city in his front. On 
 
 6 
 
82 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 his right were impassable mountains. On his 
 left was the river Adige, deep and unfordable. 
 Directly to his rear was the defile of Villa Nova, 
 which he had already passed, and which was the 
 only outlet by which he could retire. To his left 
 and rear was the river Alpon, which rises near 
 Villa Nova and flows south into the Adige. On 
 the left bank of the Alpon, about three miles from 
 its mouth, is the village of Arcole, from which 
 this battle takes its name. The ground between 
 the Adige and the Alpon was marshy. Two 
 causeways crossed the marsh: one, leaving the 
 Adige at Ronco, led to Porcil ; the other, leaving 
 Ronco, led to the bridge of Arcole. 
 
 Before proceeding to execute his plan, Bona- 
 parte ordered Kilmaine to withdraw from Mantua 
 with two thousand soldiers, to take command at 
 Verona, and to hold it to the last. Then, on 
 November the 14th, Bonaparte, with Mass6na's and 
 Augereau's divisions and the reserve of cavalry, 
 in all about twenty thousand soldiers, marched out 
 of Verona by its west gate, descended the Adige, 
 and threw a bridge across the river at Ronco 
 opposite the defile of Villa Nova. On the 15th 
 he crossed the river and began the celebrated 
 battle of Arcole. Massdna advanced upon the 
 causeway towards Porcil, and Augereau upon the 
 one towards Arcole. The attacks were vigorously 
 
ARCOLE. 83 
 
 made and vigorously repulsed. Bonaparte had 
 his eye on Villa Nova. As it was the only out- 
 let for Alvinzi's army he was anxious to gain 
 possession of it. By so doing he would enclose 
 Alvinzi's army, and might be able to destroy it. 
 But before he could gain the defile, it was neces- 
 sary to carry the bridge at Arcole. He therefore 
 redoubled his efforts ; he urged forward his troops 
 again and again, — even placed himself at their 
 head, where he nearly lost his life by being thrown 
 from the causeway into the marsh. But his efforts 
 were ineffectual; his soldiers were repulsed; the 
 Austrians held the bridge. At night he crossed 
 back with his army to the right bank of the 
 Adige. 
 
 Meanwhile, Alvinzi, who had already begun to 
 fear that his retreat might be cut off, was with- 
 drawing his army through Villa Nova. Bonaparte 
 saw this movement, he saw the hope of great 
 results slipping from his grasp. Still he was not 
 discouraged; he could still act advantageously 
 upon Alvinzi's flank. 
 
 Alvinzi re-enforced his troops at Arcole, and 
 near there, on the left bank of the Alpon, drew 
 up his main army ready for battle. On the i6th 
 Bonaparte again crossed the Adige and attacked 
 Alvinzi along the causeway leading to Arcole. He 
 was again repulsed. At night he again recrossed 
 
84 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 to the right bank of the river. Here he learned 
 that Vaubois had been driven from Rivoli, but was 
 retiring slowly and in good order. He realized 
 that he must now retreat, or at once force back 
 Alvinzi. 
 
 On the 17th he crossed the Adige for the third 
 time, and after vigorous fighting succeeded, with a 
 part of his force, in driving back the Austrians 
 who had advanced beyond Arcole. With the other 
 part, he crossed the Alpon near its mouth and 
 took Arcole in reverse. This was the critical 
 period ; the Austrians were taken by surprise, and 
 gave way. Then Bonaparte debouched upon the 
 open plain with all his force, and drove them_ back 
 towards Bassano. After having fought for three 
 days more desperately than he had ever fought 
 before, he was again victorious. 
 
 Bonaparte had expected to follow Alvinzi ; but, 
 learning that Vaubois was hard pressed, he sent 
 the French cavalry to pursue Alvinzi, and with 
 Mass6na's and Augereau's divisions hastened 
 through Verona to re-enforce Vaubois. He 
 entered the city by the east gate three days 
 after having left it by the west gate. Massdna 
 and Augereau joined Vaubois, and together they 
 drove Davidovich into the Tyrol. 
 
 Meanwhile, Alvinzi, who had found out that he 
 was pursued by cavalry only, was again advancing 
 
ARCOLE. 85 
 
 towards Verona; but learning that Davidovich 
 had been defeated, he faced about his columns 
 and retired behind the Brenta. 
 
 Alvinzi was beaten at all points. The fighting 
 on both sides had been desperate, the loss heavy. 
 In prisoners, killed, and wounded the Austrians 
 had lost about thirteen thousand; the French, 
 about the same number. 
 
 During the three days of fighting at Arcole, 
 Wurmser remained quiet at Mantua. Alvinzi did 
 not expect to arrive before the place till Novem- 
 ber 23d, and had asked Wurmser not to make a 
 sortie till then. Before that time, Kilmaine was 
 again, besieging Mantua; before that time this 
 part of the campaign was ended, and the fourth 
 Austrian army defeated. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 At the outset, the Austrians had thirty thousand 
 soldiers in Friuli, twenty thousand in the Tyrol, 
 and twenty thousand shut up in Mantua. If on our 
 map we connect by three straight lines the three 
 Austrian armies, we shall find that Bonaparte had, 
 within the triangle thus formed, all the divisions of 
 his army. Mass^na was at Bassano ; Augereau, at 
 Verona; Kilmaine, before Mantifti; and Vaubois, 
 at Trent. The French, thus centrally situated. 
 
86 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 could concentrate more rapidly than the Austrians; 
 At the outset, therefore, they had the advantage 
 of interior lines. But during the campaign this 
 advantage did not always remain with the French. 
 In fact, as we proceed, we see that, owing to pe- 
 culiarities in the topography of the country, the 
 advantage of interior lines changed several times 
 from one side to the other. 
 
 Communication between Bassano and Trent by 
 the direct road along the Brenta was of course 
 much more speedy than by the circuitous route 
 through Verona. The country enclosed by these 
 two roads is mountainous, and impassable for sol- 
 diers. As long as the French occupied Bassano 
 and Trent, there could not, therefore, be any direct 
 communication, by either of these roads, between 
 Alvinzi in Friuli and Davidovich in the Tyrol. 
 But, at the start, the French were driven from 
 Bassano and Trent, and these places were occupied 
 by the Austrians. By these simple movements 
 Alvinzi had changed strategically the relative posi- 
 tions of the opposing forces. Occupying Bassano 
 with one army and Trent with the other, he could 
 concentrate by the direct road along the Brenta 
 more quickly than could Bonaparte, who in 
 his operations was restricted to the longer road 
 through Veronal The Austrians now had the 
 advantage of interior lines. 
 
ARCOLE. 87 
 
 Here was offered to Alvinzi an opportunity 
 which, if he had boldly seized it, would undoubt- 
 edly have brought success to his arms. He should 
 have recalled ten thousand soldiers from Trent to 
 Bassano by forced marches, and should have left 
 Davidovich in the Tyrol with the remaining ten 
 thousand to act against Vaubois. Then, with his 
 own army thus increased to forty thousand, he 
 should have marched rapidly against Bonaparte. 
 To oppose these forty thousand, Bonaparte could 
 not have had more than twenty thousand soldiers. 
 By adopting such a plan, Alvinzi would have been 
 almost certain of success. With ten thousand less, 
 he came within a hair's breadth of victory. With 
 ten thousand less, he drove Bonaparte from Bas- 
 sano, almost crushed him at Caldiero, and amid the 
 marshes of Arcole repulsed him again and again. 
 
 But instead of uniting both armies when the 
 opportunity was offered, he continued to act sep- 
 arately against the French along two roads, which 
 were separated by impassable mountains. And 
 Bonaparte at Verona, where these two roads met, 
 had again the advantage of interior lines. From 
 his central position he was enabled to repeat the 
 manoeuvre that had brought him victory at Mon- 
 tenotte and Millesimo, at Lonato and Castiglione ; 
 to throw a strong force against Alvinzi, then 
 against Davidovich, and, finally, to defeat both. 
 
88 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 In his letter to his government asking for re- 
 enforcements, Bonaparte said : " If I had re- 
 ceived the 83d, numbering thirtyTfiye hundred men 
 known to the army, I would have answered for 
 the result. Perhaps in a few days forty thousand 
 may not be enough." These words show clearly 
 what Bonaparte thought. In his mind victory was 
 certain if he could receive this re-enforeement ; it 
 was doubtful, if he could not receive it. With 
 such a small addition to his force as this would 
 have been, it seems strange to us that he should 
 have been so confident of success. What disposi- 
 tion could he have made of this re-enforcement 
 that would have changed doubtful success to cerT 
 tain victory? Though this question does not 
 admit a categorical answer, there are neverthg" 
 less good reasons for believing that Bonaparte 
 would have used this re-enforcement to strengthen 
 Vaubois. 
 
 Vaubois's division, which was attempting to hold 
 Davidovich in cheek, was not strong enough to 
 perform this duty. It fought hard, it lost nearly a 
 third of its strength in killed, wounded, and pris- 
 oners; but it was compelled to fall back from 
 position to position. When Bonaparte attacked 
 Alvinzi at Bassano, he expected that Vaubois 
 would be strong enough to hold Davidovich in 
 check. But at th? very time that Bonaparte 
 
ARCOLE. 89 
 
 was succeeding against Alvinzi, Vaubois was fall- 
 ing back before Davidovich. Bonaparte, having 
 learned that Davidovich was likely to overthrow 
 Vaubois and raise the siege of Mantua, saw that a 
 complete victory over Alvinzi would under these 
 circumstances have little or no effect upon the 
 result of the campaign. He saw, too, that his own 
 communications were already endangered, and 
 therefore fell back on Verona. The direct cause 
 of his retreat was the weakness of Vaubois. Un- 
 doubtedly, then, if Bonaparte had received the 
 re-enforcement that he so urgently asked for, he 
 would have used it to strengthen Vaubois. 
 
 Let us suppose that it had been received and so 
 used. This re-enforcement, added to the ten 
 thousand that Vaubois had at Trent, would have 
 increased his force to thirteen thousand five hun- 
 dred. With this force we believe that, by acting 
 on the defensive, and by taking advantage of the 
 mountainous country, the defiles, and the passes, 
 he could have maintained himself there. Let us 
 suppose that he could have done so, and was doing 
 so, when Bonaparte made his successful attack 
 against Alvinzi at Bassano, Let us suppose that 
 Bonaparte had attacked the next day, and had 
 been again successful. Alvinzi's army would then 
 have retreated to its base of operations in Friuli. 
 Then, we can imagine Bonaparte giving these 
 
90 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 orders: "Augereau to watch Alvinzi; Mass6na 
 to join Vaubois at Trent by forced marches." 
 Massdna's division of ten thousand and Vaubois's 
 division of thirteen thousand five hundred would 
 have given Bonaparte twenty-three thousand five 
 hundred with which to attack Davidovich's army 
 of twenty thousand. Who can doubt what the 
 result would have been, when we remember that 
 Napoleon never lost a battle in which he was 
 superior to his adversary in numbers? 
 
 At Verona, after the battle of Caldiero, Bona- 
 parte might have taken any one of four courses. 
 
 First: He could have remained at Verona. 
 
 Had he shut himself up in the fortified town of 
 Verona, he could in all probability have . held out 
 as long as his provisions lasted. In this case 
 Alvinzi, who was already at the gates of Verona, 
 would undoubtedly have laid siege to the place. 
 By taking such a course Bonaparte could have 
 prolonged the conflict; but it would have been 
 only a question of time when he would be com- 
 pelled to surrender. He refused to shut himself 
 up in Verona ; and in this connection it is worthy 
 of notice that during all of his military operations 
 he never allowed himself to be besieged in any 
 place. 
 
 When the commander of an army is hard pressed, 
 and there is near at hand a strongly fortified place 
 
ARCOLE. 91 
 
 with outlying works of great strength, and provis- 
 ions and water within, the temptation is great to 
 seek security there. Second rate generals accept 
 such opportunities, but in doing so they make 
 fatal mistakes. The great masters of the art of war 
 mancEuvre for position, and become themselves 
 the besiegers ; or decide upon the open battle-field 
 the fate of their fortresses and their armies. 
 
 Second : He could have united with Vaubois to 
 attack Davidovich. 
 
 Had he united his forces with those of Vaubois, 
 he could easily have defeated Davidovich; but 
 meantime Alvinzi could have crossed the Adige 
 and relieved Mantua, or could have fallen on the 
 French communications with Milan. In either case 
 the difficulties surrounding Bonaparte would have 
 been greatly increased. 
 
 Third: He could have retreated with all his 
 forces. 
 
 To follow this course would have been to yield 
 up Mantua, to give up the greater part of Italy, 
 and to acknowledge himself beaten. 
 
 Fourth : The course he chose, namely, to attack 
 Alvinzi in flank, was the only course left in which 
 there was any hope of success. When he threw 
 his army upon Alvinzi's flank and rear, he hoped 
 to gain possession of the defile of Villa Nova 
 before Alvinzi should withdraw his army through 
 
92 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 it towards Bassano. Had Bonaparte succeeded 
 in doing this, he would have been directly on 
 Alvinzi's communications, and would have held 
 the only outlet for his army. Once in possession 
 of this outlet, he expected to annihilate or capture 
 Alvinzi's army. But, in order to gain such com- 
 plete success as here set forth, three conditions 
 must be fulfilled. First, that during the flank 
 movement Kilmaine should hold Verona. Other- 
 wise, Alvinzi could unite with Davidovich, which 
 was the very thing that Bonaparte was fighting 
 to prevent. Second, that, until Bonaparte had 
 destroyed Alvinzi, Vaubois should hold Davido- 
 vich in check. Bonaparte's anxiety on this point 
 led him, after each day's unsuccessful attack at 
 Arcole, to cross the Adige to the right bank. He 
 wished to be where he could, if necessary, march 
 to Vaubois's assistance; and he was unwilling 
 to be enclosed in the marshes about Arcole, 
 which might happen if Vaubois should be driven 
 back and Davidovich should gain possession of 
 the crossing at Ronco. Third, that Bonaparte 
 should reach Villa Nova in time to cut ofif Alvinzi's 
 retreat. 
 
 The conditions were not all fulfilled. The three 
 days' fighting at Arcole allowed Alvinzi to with- 
 draw his army through Villa Nova. In this way 
 he preserved his communications, and saved his 
 
ARCOLE. 93 
 
 army from capture or annihilation ; but he could 
 not save it from defeat; nor could he stay the 
 progress of that genius who, though having infe- 
 rior numbers, brought to his aid the mountains 
 and the marshes, the defiles and the causeways, 
 and with these as re-enforcements marched on to 
 victory. 
 
 The battle of Arcole as planned shows in a re- 
 markable way what extraordinary confidence Bona- 
 parte had in his own military abilities. While his 
 generals were ready to give up Italy, while his 
 soldiers were murmuring and complaining, he was 
 unyielding, courageous, and decided. While every- 
 thing around him seemed to portend his destruc- 
 tion, he, with an extraordinary assurance of victory, 
 was planning Alvinzi's defeat; nay, more, was plan- 
 ning the capture or annihilation of his army. 
 
 Hitherto in this campaign, Bonaparte, though 
 inferior to his adversary in numbers, had never- 
 theless succeeded in bringing superior numbers 
 upon every battle-field. At Montenotte, Millesimo, 
 the two Degos, Mondovi, the. second Castiglione, 
 Roveredo, Caliano, the first Bassano, and San 
 Georgio, he outnumbered his adversary. At Lodi, 
 though he may not have attacked with a force 
 superior to that of the Austrians, he had practi- 
 cally the whole of his army close by and ready for 
 action at a moment's notice. At Lonato and the 
 
94 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 first Castiglione, which were fought on the same 
 day, though at times the Austrians outnumbered 
 the French, yet he had superior numbers near at 
 hand with which by rapid manoeuvring he won 
 these battles. But in the part of the campaign 
 now under consideration, the odds between the 
 opposing forces were much greater than before. 
 Here, for the first time, Bonaparte was outnum- 
 bered upon every battle-field. No combination 
 was possible by which he could bring a superior, 
 or even an equal, force against Alvinzi. He asked 
 for re-enforcements, but received none. He left 
 only eight thousand soldiers before Mantua. He 
 gave to Vaubois only ten thousand with which to 
 hold back twenty thousand in the Tyrol. Even 
 then, he had only twenty thousand with which to 
 oppose the thirty thousand on the Brenta. Such 
 odds were too great. He fell back from Bassano ; 
 was driven from Caldiero. Though almost sur- 
 rounded, almost crushed by numbers, still he did 
 not despair. In the midst of surroundings so dark 
 and gloomy, he saw one chance for success. His 
 mind grasped every detail of the situation. He 
 saw how the marshes, the defiles, and the cause- 
 ways could be turned to his advantage. He with- 
 drew two thousand soldiers from Mantua, and in 
 this way strengthened his small force as much as 
 he could. Then he marched down the Adige; 
 
ARCOLE. 95 
 
 plunged into a swamp, and fought along the cause- 
 ways, where victory depended upon the bravery of 
 the heads of his columns, and where the supe- 
 riority of his adversary was almost totally annulled. 
 After three days of desperate fighting, the French 
 eagles were victorious. The battle of Arcole was 
 won. In no other battle has Bonaparte shown 
 himself a greater master of the art of war. In no 
 other battle has he fought more desperately, or 
 shown greater personal courage. In no other 
 battle, among all his splendid victories, has he 
 added greater lustre to his name. 
 
CHAPTER Vi. 
 
 RivoLr. 
 
 T70UR Austrian armies had been defeated and 
 -^ hurled back into the mountains of Friuli 
 and the Tyrol ; still, the Austrians persevered and 
 hoped for success. Mantua still held out; and 
 twenty thousand starving Austrians there hoped 
 for a victory that would open the gates and allow 
 them to march forth. 
 
 By the ist of January, 1797, Alvinzi's forces in 
 Friuli and the Tyrol were increased to forty-five 
 thousand soldiers; and he determined to make 
 another effort for the relief of Mantua and the 
 possession of Italy. His forces consisted of two 
 corps : the first, seventeen thousand strong, com- 
 manded by Provera, was in Friuli; the second, 
 twenty-eight thousand strong, commanded by Al- 
 vinzi in person, was in the Tyrol. 
 
 In the previous part of the campaign Alvinzi 
 had, from his base in Friuli, made his principal 
 attack upon the French in the vicinity of Verona ; 
 this time he purposed to try a new plan. It was 
 to advance with his main force, the second corps, 
 
RIVOLI. 97 
 
 from his base in the Tyrol down the Adige upon 
 Rivoli, while Provera with the first corps advanced 
 from his base in Friuli upon Verona and Legnago. 
 Both corps were to be entirely independent, and 
 each was to strive, by defeating the French in its 
 front, to reach Mantua. By this plan Alvinzi cal- 
 culated that, while the first corps was attacking 
 the French on the line of the Adige from Verona 
 to Legnago, the second corps would defeat Bona- 
 parte near Rivoli, cut off his communications, and 
 open the gates of Mantua. Accordingly, on the 
 lOth of January, Alvinzi began to descend the 
 Adige with twenty-eight thousand men; while 
 Provera, having divided his corps of seventeen 
 thousand men into two parts, marched upon Ver- 
 ona and Legnago. 
 
 Bonaparte had forty-four thousand soldiens. His 
 divisions occupied the following positions: Serru- 
 rier with ten thousand soldiers was besieging 
 Mantua ; Augereau with ten thousand was on the 
 Adige from Verona to Legnago ; Massdna with ten 
 thousand, at Verona ; Joubert with ten thousand, at 
 Corona and Rivoli ; and a reserve of four thousand, 
 commanded by General Rey, was at Desenzano. 
 
 Bonaparte, informed that the Austrians were 
 about to take the offensive, hastened to Verona. 
 He had at the time no definite plan of operations ; 
 but was awaiting developments in order to learn, 
 
 7 
 
98 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 if possible, at what point Alvinzi would make his 
 main attack. 
 
 On January I2th Provera, having approached 
 Verona with one division of his corps, was attacked 
 and repulsed by Mass6na's division. Nearly one 
 thousand Austrians were made prisoners. The 
 ease with which the Austrians were repulsed con- 
 vinced Bonaparte that Alvinzi was not making his 
 main attack from this direction. On the afternoon 
 of the next day, January 13th, Bonaparte learned 
 that Joubert was hard pressed and had been com- 
 pelled to fall back from Corona upon Rivoli. On 
 the same day Rey sent word from Desenzano that 
 no Austrians had been seen on the west side of 
 Lake Garda, and Augereau sent word from Leg- 
 nago that there appeared to be only a small force 
 of the enemy in that direction. These facts con- 
 vinced Bonaparte that the main Austrian attack 
 would be made down the Adige. He at once 
 made his plans accordingly. He knew the advan- 
 tages that the plateau of Rivoli possessed for a 
 battle-field, and he determined to hold it with 
 Joubert's division, and concentrate other forces 
 there as soon as possible. He sent orders to 
 Joubert to hold the plateau at all hazards. Having 
 already sent orders to Rey to march to Castel 
 Novo, he now sent him orders not to delay there, 
 but to continue his march upon Rivoli. Bonaparte 
 
RIVOLI. 99 
 
 himself, having left two thousand soldiers of Mas- 
 s6na's division to hold Verona, set out with the 
 remainder of this division for Rivoli. At midnight 
 Bonaparte's orders reached Joubert, then in full 
 retreat. He immediately retraced his steps, and 
 by daybreak of the 14th reoccupied the plateau 
 of Rivoli. 
 
 This plateau, which was to be the memorable 
 battle-field of Rivoli, is on the right bank of the 
 Adige between the river and Lake Garda. On the 
 north side of the plateau is Monte Baldo and a 
 chain of mountains and hills, part of the main 
 chain that extends eastward from Lake Garda to 
 the north of and beyond Verona. The Adige 
 cuts through these mountains just before arriving 
 opposite the plateau of Rivoli, flows past the town 
 of Rivoli, and thence past Verona and Legnago 
 towards the sea. The two main roads on which 
 Alvinzi marched lie on opposite sides of the Adige, 
 cramped by the mountains within narrow spaces. 
 Between the river and Monte Baldo several roads 
 and trails, impassable for artillery, lead over the 
 mountains, separated from the main road on the 
 right bank by the heights of San Marco. This 
 road leaves the river at Incanale, just above Rivoli, 
 ascends the series of hills that at this point rise 
 abruptly from the river's bank, and passes on over 
 the plateau of Rivoli towards Verona. 
 
100 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Owing to these facts, and in accordance with his 
 plan of battle, Alvinzi had, before passing the 
 mountains, divided his forces into six parts. By 
 his numerical superiority he had forced Joubert 
 to retire from position to position. He expected, 
 however, to find the French strongly posted at 
 Rivoli, and he intended to give battle there and 
 to defeat them. He gave orders that Vukassovich, 
 with about five thousand men, should descend the 
 Adige along the road on the left bank of the river, 
 and attack any French columns on that side ; that 
 Quasdanovich, with nine .thousand men and the 
 greater part of the artillery and cavalry, should 
 follow the road along the right bank of the river, 
 ascend the heights to the plateau of Rivoli, and 
 attack the French right; that three other columns, 
 unencumbered with artillery or wagons, should 
 pass over the mountain roads and trails and attack 
 the French front ; that a sixth column, four thousand 
 strong, commanded by Lusignan, should march 
 around the western slope of Monte Baldo and 
 attack the French left and rear. By examining 
 these several positions on the map, we see that 
 Vukassovich and Quasdanovich were separated by 
 the Adige; that the three columns forming the 
 Austrian centre were separated from Quasdano- 
 vich's column on their left by the heights of San 
 Marco, and from Lusignan's column on their 
 
RIl^OLI. lOI 
 
 right by Monte Baldo itself. By these disposi- 
 tions Alvinzi expected to surround the French, 
 and, by making simultaneous attacks upon their 
 front and both flanks, to overwhelm and crush 
 them. 
 
 On January 13th these fractions of Alvinzi's 
 army were marching towards Rivoli. They camped 
 that night within sight of the battle-field. Vukas- 
 sovich and Quasdanovich camped on the river; 
 the other columns, on the southern slope of the 
 Monte Baldo mountains. 
 
 During the night, while the Austrians were sleep- 
 ing, Joubert was returning to occupy the plateau ; 
 Mass6na and Rey were hurrying forward; and 
 Bonaparte himself, having pushed ahead of Mas- 
 s6na's column, was riding rapidly towards Rivoli. 
 He arrived there after midnight ; he saw the lights 
 from the six Austrian camps ; he saw that Alvinzi 
 had separated his columns by impassable obstacles ; 
 and he saw that, if he could collect his own forces 
 and hold the plateau, he could probably prevent 
 the Austrian columns from arriving simultaneously 
 upon the battle-field, and, by so doing, could de- 
 feat them in detail. In his front were twenty-eight 
 thousand Austrians. He had only Joubert's divis- 
 ion of ten thousand; but Mass6na would soon 
 bring eight thousand more upon the battle-field, 
 and perhaps Rey might arrive with his four thou- 
 
I02 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 sand in time to take part in the struggle. At once 
 Bonaparte began to arrange the troops and artil- 
 lery for battle. Early in the morning Joubert 
 advanced. The Austrians in his front having no 
 artillery, he succeeded at first in driving them back ; 
 and, by directing a part of his artillery upon Quas- 
 danovich's column, he held it in check. But the 
 Austrians soon rallied; the fighting became des- 
 perate. An Austrian column attacked furiously 
 the French left and succeeded in turning it. Bona- 
 parte himself rearranged his shattered left, then 
 hurried to the town of Rivoli to bring up Mas- 
 s6na's division which had just arrived there. These 
 troops were hurried forward, and Mass^na hurled 
 them against the Austrian right, drove it back, and 
 succeeded in re-establishing the French left. But 
 the French right was still hotly engaged. Quas- 
 danovich, after hard fighting, had overcome the 
 resistance in his front and was urging his column 
 up the winding road to the battle-field. Already 
 his advanced troops were deploying on the plateau. 
 Lusignan, too, could be seen in the distance de- 
 ploying upon Bonaparte's rear. In fact, Bona- 
 parte was surrounded ; twenty-eight thousand Aus- 
 trians were advancing upon him. He had but 
 eighteen thousand soldiers. For a moment suc- 
 cess seemed impossible, defeat inevitable ; but his 
 clear eye took in the whole field: he saw that 
 
RIVOLL 103 
 
 none of the Austrian columns had yet united ; he 
 saw at a glance where the blow must be struck in 
 order to turn disaster into victory; and, with 
 remarkable coolness, he gathered his troops and 
 prepared to throw them, in succession, against the 
 several Austrian columns. 
 
 Joubert, in advancing against the Austrian cen- 
 tre, had passed with his right beyond the ascending 
 road over which Quasdanovich was marching to 
 reach the plateau. Bonaparte ordered Joubert to 
 face about his troops and charge Quasdanovich in 
 flank. The latter was overwhelmed ; he retreated 
 in confusion down the hill. Bonaparte then hurled 
 the troops of Massdna's and Joubert's divisions 
 against the Austrian columns in their front, routed 
 them, drove them into the mountains and captured 
 many prisoners. Meanwhile, Lusignan, knowing 
 that Bonaparte was surrounded, and believing that 
 the Austrians were already victorious, was advan- 
 cing to take part in the capture of the French 
 forces. But Bonaparte, having disposed of the 
 Austrians in his front, faced about a part of his 
 victorious troops and advanced to attack Lu- 
 signan. Meanwhile, Rey, who was just arriving 
 from Castel Novo, finding Lusignan in his front, 
 also attacked him from that side. At the very 
 time that Lusignan believed the French to be 
 surrounded, he found himself entrapped. Between 
 
104 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 the two fires he could not escape. He was com- 
 pelled to surrender his entire force as prisoners 
 of war. 
 
 On all sides the Austrians were defeated. Al- 
 vinzi's army was almost destroyed. On January 
 14th nearly eight thousand Austrians were killed, 
 captured, or wounded ; and on the next day Jou- 
 bert, who was sent in pursuit of Alvinzi's army, 
 captured nearly seven thousand more. Out of 
 twenty-eight thousand Austrians with whom Al- 
 vinzi began the battle, he had left, on the night of 
 the i6th, but thirteen thousand two hundred and 
 thirty soldiers. Thus ended the battle of Rivoli, 
 which by military men is pronounced to be one of 
 Bonaparte's greatest tactical battles. 
 
 Even this astonishing success did not satisfy 
 Bonaparte. Though he had just gained the most 
 remarkable tactical victory in his already remarka- 
 ble career, still nothing escaped him. His eye 
 took in the whole theatre of operations. He was 
 anxious about his right, anxious for Augereau, 
 anxious that Provera should not reach Mantua and 
 attack Serrurier on one side, while Wurmser, issu- 
 ing from the gates of Mantua, should attack him 
 on the other. 
 
 In fact, while these operations were taking place 
 at Rivoli, Provera with eight thousand Austrians, 
 about half of his corps, forced the centre of Auge- 
 
RIVOLI. 105 
 
 reau's line along the Adige, and crossed the river 
 a few miles above Legnago. Augereau, however, 
 fell upon the rear-guard of this force before it 
 crossed the river, cut it to pieces, and captured 
 two thousand prisoners. Provera with the remain- 
 der of his force marched rapidly towards Mantua, 
 and Augereau followed in pursuit. The battle of 
 Rivoli had scarcely ended when Bonaparte learned 
 that Provera had crossed the Adige. Leaving 
 Joubert and Rey to pursue Alvinzi, Bonaparte 
 started at once with Mass^na's division for Mantua. 
 Though this division had been marching and fight- 
 ing continuously for the last twenty-four hours, 
 still, under Bonaparte's direction, it marched all 
 night on the 14th, and the whole of the next day, 
 and on the morning of the l6th was ready for battle 
 in front of Mantua. 
 
 Provera arrived before Mantua on the iSth, and 
 the next morning began to attack Serrurier ; while 
 Wurmser, issuing from the gates of Mantua, at- 
 tacked him from that side. But Bonaparte's divis- 
 ions were near at hand ; while Serrurier was driv- 
 ing Wurmser back, Bonaparte closed in upon 
 Provera. The latter, attacked on one side by 
 Serrurier and on the other by Mass^na and Auge- 
 reau, could not escape, but was compelled to sur- 
 render his entire force. 
 
 In this battle, known as La Favorita, more than 
 
I06 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 five thousand Austrians surrendered. Nearly fif- 
 teen thousand had been killed, wounded, or cap- 
 tured at Rivoli ; nearly one thousand had been 
 captured by Massdna near Verona, and two thou- 
 sand by Augereau near Legnago. In three days 
 Bonaparte had, therefore, captured or destroyed 
 more than half of Alvinzi's army. 
 
 Meanwhile, Wurmser at Mantua was in a critical 
 condition. For days the garrison of twenty thou- 
 sand there had been living on horse flesh. Over 
 seven thousand were sick, many had already died, 
 many more were dying. Even the horses were 
 almost consumed. Wurmser could hold out no 
 longer. The victories of Rivoli and La Favorita 
 had destroyed his last hope. He had long and 
 heroically held Mantua, but was at last by force 
 of necessity compelled to yield. He signed the 
 capitulation of the fortress, and on February 2d 
 the starving garrison surrendered. Thus ended 
 this part of the campaign, in which Bonaparte with 
 only forty-four thousand soldiers killed, wounded, 
 or captured nearly forty-three thousand Aus- 
 trians. The fifth Austrian army was annihilated. 
 For the first time Mantua was in possession of the 
 French. Bonaparte was at last complete master 
 of Italy. 
 
RIVOLI. 107 
 
 COMMENTS, 
 
 " To invade a country," says Napoleon, " with a 
 double line of operations is a faulty combination." 
 Alvinzi, defeated on a double line of operations 
 at Arcole, repeated the same error in this part of 
 the campaign. His own corps, having its base in 
 the Tyrol, marched down the Adige to attack at 
 Rivoli. Provera's corps, having its base in Friuli, 
 marched from Bassano to attack Verona and 
 Legnago. Impassable mountains separated the 
 two corps, so that after the movement began 
 there could be no communication between them. 
 This was Alvinzi's greatest error. It gave to 
 Bonaparte the advantage of interior lines, and 
 allowed him to concentrate his forces in succes- 
 sion against the two Austrian corps. 
 
 Alvinzi could, at the start, have easily avoided 
 this error. In fact, there were two plans, either 
 of which would have been better than the one he 
 adopted. Had he left a small force to act on the 
 defensive against Joubert along the upper Adige, 
 and united the rest of his army at Bassano by the 
 direct road along the upper Brenta, he could then 
 have made an attack on the lower Adige which 
 would have had great chances of success. By so 
 doing he would have adopted a single line of 
 operations, and his forces would have been united 
 
I08 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 into one powerful army, which would have greatly 
 outnumbered the forces that Bonaparte could, by 
 any possibility, have brought against it. Had 
 Alvinzi left ten thousand to act against Joubert, 
 he could then have concentrated thirty-five thou- 
 sand at Bassano. As Serrurier's division was 
 absolutely necessary before Mantua, and Joubert's 
 division absolutely necessary at Rivoli, the only 
 troops that Bonaparte could have united to oppose 
 such an army coming from Bassano would have 
 been Augereau's and Massdna's divisions and Rey's 
 force of four thousand. With these forces Bona- 
 parte would have had an army of only twenty-four 
 thousand with which to hold Verona and to oppose 
 Alvinzi's army of thirty-five thousand. The odds 
 against Bonaparte would, in this case, have been 
 greater than they were at Arcole. Such a plan, 
 to say the least, offered Alvinzi great chances of 
 success. 
 
 But the other plan which Alvinzi might have 
 adopted offered also great chances of success. He 
 might have left a containing force of ten thousand 
 at Bassano to act against Augereau, and united 
 the remainder of his army for an attack down the 
 Adige upon Rivoli. Such a plan would likely 
 have been successful : for with twenty-eight thou- 
 sand the result at Rivoli for a time seemed doubt- 
 ful ; perhaps with thirty-five thousand men Alvinzi 
 
RIVOLI. 109 
 
 would have won the battle. Had he adopted this 
 plan, Bonaparte could not have concentrated a 
 greater force at Rivoli than he did actually con- 
 centrate there on January 14th; for to withdraw 
 Serrurier from Mantua would have allowed Wurra- 
 ser to escape, and to withdraw Augereau from the 
 lower Adige would have allowed Serrurier to be 
 crushed between Provera and Wurmser. Further 
 on it will be shown that Alvinzi at Rivoli with 
 twenty-eight thousand soldiers should have been 
 victorious, and would have been, had he not com- 
 mitted error upon error. There is therefore good 
 reason for believing that with thirty-five thousand 
 he would have overwhelmed and crushed Bona- 
 parte. 
 
 This plan had one great advantage over the 
 plan previously discussed. An Austrian victory 
 at Rivoli would have left Alvinzi within a short 
 march of the French communications. By march- 
 ing to the Mincio he could have intercepted the 
 remaining French forces, and by so doing could 
 have ended the campaign. This advantage, how- 
 ever, was more than counterbalanced by the dis- 
 advantages which this line of operations offered. 
 The upper Adige flows through a mountainous 
 country, which becomes more mountainous to- 
 wards Rivoli. In marching down the Adige 
 Alvinzi was compelled to follow the two roads 
 
no BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 which are separated by the river, and which are 
 confined by the mountains within a narrow valley. 
 In this mountainous country, especially near Rivoli, . 
 there was not room to manoeuvre a large army. In 
 fact, it was with the greatest difficulty that troops 
 could be deployed at all, and then only in such 
 a way that impassable obstacles necessarily inter- 
 vened between the several organizations. 
 
 On the other hand, a small force acting on the 
 defensive could, by taking advantage of the moun- 
 tains and defiles, hold in check a greatly superior 
 force. 
 
 These topographical peculiarities, therefore, 
 made this route difficult for offensive operations, 
 and excellent for defensive ones. From these 
 facts it follows that, though an Austrian victory 
 at Rivoli promised great results, yet so great 
 were the difficulties there that only under the 
 most favorable circumstances could a victory be 
 expected. 
 
 But the other route from Bassano towards the 
 lower Adige, lying in an open country where a 
 large army could be easily deployed, is excellent 
 for offensive operations and difficult for defensive 
 ones. Though a victory here would not have al- 
 lowed Alvinzi to cut Bonaparte's communications, 
 and would not therefore have led to such great 
 results as a victory at Rivoli, yet the advantages 
 
RIVOLI. Ill 
 
 here outbalanced all other considerations, and 
 should have led Alvinzi to choose this route for 
 his main attack. He did choose it in the Arcole 
 part of the campaign, and, though he committed 
 many errors, he came within a hair's breadth of 
 victory. In none of these campaigns did the 
 Austrians come so near victory as at Arcole; in 
 none did they experience such a crushing defeat 
 as at Rivoli. 
 
 In this connection it is worthy of notice, that, 
 when the commander of an invading army has 
 two lines of operations offered to him, one promis- 
 ing great results under great difficulties and the 
 other offering great promise of an early victory, 
 it is better to select the latter, because a first 
 success encourages the soldier to greater effort. 
 Nothing rouses his enthusiasm like victory. Ob- 
 stacles, which might at the beginning of a cam- 
 paign seem insurmountable, appear, after several 
 victories, insignificant to him. His hopes rise, 
 his blood quickens, he feels that he can overcome 
 all difficulties, and, in the future as in the past, 
 march on to victory. 
 
 "The defects of Alvinzi's plan," says Derrecagaix in 
 criticising this campaign, " had given to Bonaparte one of 
 his most brilliant triumphs. Again the latter had manoeu- 
 vred upon interior lines of operations, while his enemies 
 followed two exterior Imes. Nor was this their only mis- 
 
112 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 take. They made their principal attack in a mountainous 
 region abounding in strong positions favorable for defence, 
 while upon the lower Adige they would have deprived the 
 French of this advantage. 
 
 " Moreover, the march of Provera's corps could have 
 led to no profitable result. A victory for Alvinzi at Rivoli 
 would have sufficed, indeed, to save Mantua ; his defeat, 
 on the contrary, made certain the loss of Provera, without 
 the possibility of bringing any advantage in return. 
 
 "The direction which the Austrians should have fol- 
 lowed was quite plain. It was that which Prince Eugene 
 adopted against Catinat in 1701, and which Napoleon 
 himself, indeed, afterwards pointed out in referring to the 
 march of Wurmser upon the Brenta. They ought then 
 to have left only a detachment at the entrance to the 
 Tyrol, and have debouched upon the lower Adige with 
 the entire army." 
 
 In choosing a double line of operations Alvinzi 
 not only committed the errors which have been 
 pointed out, but in the execution of his plan he 
 continued to multiply mistakes. In his march 
 down the Adige, just before arriving at Rivoli he 
 separated his army into six columns. He in- 
 tended to have them arrive simultaneously upon 
 the plateau of Rivoli, where he expected to find 
 the French strongly posted. When it is remem- 
 bered that the Adige separated Vukassovich's 
 column from Quasdanovich's column, that the 
 heights of San Marco separated the latter from 
 the Austrian centre, and that Monte Baldo sepa- 
 
RIVOLl. 113 
 
 rated the centre from Lusignan's column, the 
 absurdity of these movements becomes apparent 
 to every soldier. 
 
 Under the most favorable circumstances, it is an 
 error to separate an army even into two columns 
 just before a battle ; for so many unforeseen con- 
 ditions arise, or may arise, that it is almost impossi- 
 ble for the columns to attack simultaneously, and 
 only by attacking simultaneously can success be 
 expected from such a plan. Muddy roads, high 
 water, rough country, mountains, defiles, and vari- 
 ous other obstacles may delay one column, and by 
 the time it arrives on the battle-field the other 
 column will probably have been defeated. If a 
 commanding general could always foresee all the 
 conditions which would arise, he could so arrange 
 the marches that his columns would arrive simul- 
 taneously upon the battle-field ; but this being an 
 impossibility, it has come to be a maxim in war 
 that, unless absolutely unavoidable, an army in the 
 face of an enemy should never be separated into 
 parts by impassable obstacles. This, being true of 
 two columns, applies with still greater force to 
 more than two. As the number of columns 
 separated by impassable obstacles increases, the 
 chances for simultaneous attacks decrease in a 
 very rapid ratio. 
 
 But this was not Alvinzi's only error. He 
 8 
 
114 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 ordered five thousand soldiers under Vukasso- 
 vich to march on the east side of the Adige, 
 where they were unable to take part in the bat- 
 tle. In fact, they could not by any possibility 
 reach the battle-field. They were witnesses to 
 Alvinzi's defeat, without being able to raise a help- 
 ing hand. They pointed their guns in the direc- 
 tion of the battle, and fired a few shots, which had 
 no effect whatever upon the result. They might 
 better have been in the Tyrol, where they would at 
 least have been safe from capture. 
 
 Alvinzi made another error in requiring his 
 cavalry and artillery to march with Quasdano- 
 vich's column along the river road, where they 
 were enclosed by the mountains on one side and 
 by the river on the other. In this situation, his 
 cavalry could not be deployed, nor his artillery be 
 brought into action. As a result, Alvinzi, who 
 needed cavalry badly, was for the want of it com- 
 pletely ignorant of the whereabouts of the French 
 forces, and the Austrian centre for the want of 
 artillery could make no headway against Joubert's 
 division. 
 
 Notwithstanding all these errors, had Alvinzi on 
 the night of January 13th gained possession of the 
 plateau of Rivoli, he would still have had great 
 chances of success. He could easily have done 
 this; for his columns were camped within an 
 
RIVOLI. 115 
 
 hour's march of the plateau which Joubert had 
 already abandoned. Having once gained posses- 
 sion of this plateau, Alvinzi would have been past 
 the critical point in his march; he would have 
 had room to manoeuvre his army; his columns 
 could have united; his artillery could have been 
 distributed to the different organizations, and his 
 cavalry moved to the front and flanks, where it 
 belonged. In fact, he could, by an hour's march, 
 have reached a strong position for battle, where Bo- 
 naparte with his inferior numbers would hardly have 
 dared to attack him. That Alvinzi did not seize 
 upon this position was his greatest error. It was 
 the crowning act of that series of errors which 
 together caused his defeat at Rivoli, — one of the 
 most crushing defeats ever experienced by Aus- 
 trian arms. 
 
 It is easy to point out Alvinzi's mistakes after 
 this battle ; but owitig to the unfavorable situation 
 of his army, and to the obstacles in its immediate 
 front, it is not so easy to set forth in detail the 
 exact manoeuvres which he should have made in 
 his advance down the Adige upon Rivoli. At one 
 day's march from the plateau of Rivoli, where he 
 expected to meet the French in force, his army of 
 twenty-eight thousand was confined within a nar- 
 row valley; Monte Baldo and a chain of moun- 
 tains were in his froint, and the only road leading 
 
1 1 6 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 directly to Rivoli was through a long and narrow 
 defile. The problem before him was to reach this 
 plateau and unite his forces there before the 
 French could occupy it ; or in case it was already 
 occupied, then so to manoeuvre in his advance as 
 to present a united front to the enemy. His cav- 
 alry should have been sent forward in advance of 
 his army, and should have received orders to seize 
 if possible the plateau of Rivoli. The greater part 
 of the cavalry should have marched by the trails 
 between Monte Baldo and the Adige, while a small 
 column might have marched around the western 
 slope of Monte Baldo, and a still smaller column 
 — a mere scouting party — should have marched 
 by the river road. Following these troops, Alvinzi 
 should have sent a small column of infantry down 
 the Adige, and should have pushed forward his 
 infantry and artillery along the trails and over the 
 hills between Monte Baldo and the river. Hav^ing 
 adopted such a plan, his cavalry could have seized 
 the plateau, and the infantry and artillery follow- 
 ing could have occupied it ; his front would at all 
 times have been protected by cavalry ; his right, 
 by Monte Baldo and a column of cavalry ; his left, 
 by the Adige and a column of infantry ; and, what 
 is still more important, his forces would have been 
 united during the advance. 
 
 To this plan it may be objected that the country 
 
RIVOLI. 
 
 117 
 
 between Monte Baldo and the Adige was so hilly, 
 and the trails were so few, that this route was im- 
 passable for cavalry and artillery. In a measure 
 this is true ; still, by dismounting the cavalry and 
 by hauling the guns by hand, the obstacles could 
 easily have been overcome. These obstacles, 
 which seemed impassable to Alvinzi, would not 
 have hindered Bonaparte's advance an hour. To 
 a soldier " impassable " is a relative term ; to 
 mediocrity it means much; to a genius it means 
 little. A hill is impassable to an Alvinzi ; the Alps 
 themselves are not impassable to a Napoleon. 
 
 In this discussion it is a pleasure to turn from 
 the mistakes of Alvinzi to the brilliant operations 
 of Bonaparte. 
 
 " It is an easy matter," says Captain Wagner, 
 "to criticise military operations after the event; 
 but it should be borne in mind that the conditions 
 and relative positions of the forces, always set forth 
 with clearness by a good historian, are matters of 
 doubt to the commanders while the operations are 
 in progress." 
 
 These words are particularly applicable to the 
 case now before us. When the Austrians began 
 their advance Bonaparte was completely in the 
 dark as to where their main attack would be made. 
 He did not know whether the stronger Austrian 
 column was advancing from the Tyrol upon Rivoli, 
 
Il8 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 or from Bassano upon the lower Adige. In fact, 
 he was not certain that an Austrian column was 
 not advancing on the west side of Lake Garda. It 
 was of the utmost importance that he should know 
 at the earliest possible moment where the main 
 Austrian attack would be made, in order that he 
 might concentrate his forces to meet it. Every 
 moment of uncertainty increased Alvinzi's chances 
 of success. Bonaparte realized this, and was there- 
 fore in a very anxious state of mind. Couriers 
 were riding rapidly from every part of his scattered 
 army to his headquarters. All kinds of informa- 
 tion — rumors, facts, the reports of spies and 
 deserters, the opinions of his marshals and his 
 subordinates — were laid before him. He learned 
 that no Austrians had been seen on the west side 
 of Lake Garda; that Mass6na had succeeded in 
 repulsing an Austrian attack from Bassano, and 
 that Joubert had been driven back upon Rivoli. 
 At once he concluded that the main Austrian 
 attack would be made at Rivoli. 
 
 When it is remembered that a commander nearly 
 always attempts to deceive his adversary, that the 
 information received at headquarters is often un- 
 reliable, that it is frequently made up of rumor, 
 hearsay, and facts, all junibled together, it is 
 remarkable that Bonaparte should have been so 
 uniformly correct in his deductions and conclu- 
 
RIVOLI. 119 
 
 sions. Not only at Rivoli, but at Montenotte, 
 Gastiglione, and Arcole, his unerring mind de- 
 duced from the mass of uncertain information 
 at hand the true movements of his adversary. 
 
 In the choice of the plateau of Rivoli for a 
 battle-field, Bonaparte displayed excellent judg- 
 ment. Though he was in Verona at the time, he 
 had previously passed through Rivoli, and the 
 peculiarities of the surrounding country had pho- 
 tographed themselves indelibly upon his mind. 
 He realized the importance of the position. He 
 could see in the surrounding hills, in the defile, in 
 the river, and in the plateau, the advantages which 
 they offered for tactical manoeuvres. The faculty of 
 seeing and remembering the features of a country 
 through which he passed, and of understanding 
 their value from a military point of view, was one of 
 the distinguishing peculiarities of Napoleon's mind. 
 
 At Rivoli, he realized that an hour's delay might 
 lose him the battle-field and the victory. For this 
 reason, every moment of time was utilized in rap- 
 idly concentrating his troops. Again, after the 
 battle, he saw the necessity of arriving before 
 Mantua at the earliest possible moment, in order 
 to prevent Serrurier's division from being crushed 
 between Provera artd Wurmser. Accordingly, 
 Mass6na's division, which had marched all night 
 and fought all day at Rivoli, Was required to march 
 
I20 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 all the next night and all the next day. The min- 
 utes and hours which Bonaparte gained in these 
 forced marches, decided the conflict in his favor. 
 Time with him was equivalent to re-enforcements. 
 In every military undertaking, it was an important 
 factor in his calculations. 
 
 In these forced marches, the exertion of his 
 soldiers was almost beyond their endurance ; but 
 the hope of victory and the presence of Bonaparte 
 himself at their head urged them on. Under his 
 eye they could endure almost any hardship and 
 march almost any distance. The enthusiasm 
 which he could instil into the minds of his men 
 was remarkable. He had that magnetic power 
 which filled his soldiers with enthusiasm and cour- 
 age, and which in an emergency could call forth 
 all their reserve energy. In this respect he sur- 
 passed every one of his subordinate commanders, 
 if not every master of the art of war that the world 
 has ever known. 
 
 As we have previously stated, Alvinzi's errors in 
 separating his forces at the outset gave to Bona- 
 parte the advantage of interior lines, by which he 
 could easily keep the Austrian columns separated, 
 and at the same time could combine against each 
 column in succession. In carrying out this plan 
 two of his divisions acted on the defensive, while 
 with the remainder of his army he acted offensively 
 
RIVOLI. 121 
 
 and in force against Alvinzi at Rivoli. It was one 
 of Bonaparte's maxims to take the offensive only 
 on one point at a time. But every exertion was 
 made to collect at this point every spare man. To 
 bring in the shortest possible time upon the vital 
 point — the battle-field — as great a superiority of 
 force as he possibly could, was his great endeavor. 
 He could not by any possibility bring superior 
 numbers upon the battle-field of Rivoli; but by 
 his tactical manceuvres and combinations he placed 
 his adversary at a disadvantage, and overcame his 
 great superiority in numbers. 
 
 His tactical manceuvres at Rivoli were very 
 similar to his strategical manoeuvres within the 
 theatre of operations. In both cases he brought 
 a stronger force against his adversary at the vital 
 point, while he held back with small forces the 
 enemy's isolated columns. 
 
 The strategy and tactics which Bonaparte dis- 
 played in these three days' fighting in Italy give 
 us, perhaps, a clearer insight into his system of 
 war than any other single campaign in his remark- 
 able career. His divisions were centrally situated. 
 Strategically, the Austrians almost surrounded him ; 
 twenty-eight thousand were marching from the 
 Tyrol upon Rivoli, seventeen thousand from Bas- 
 sano upon the lower Adige, and twenty thousand 
 were in his rear at Mantua. Having decided that 
 
122 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 the main Austrian army was approaching Rivoli, 
 he concentrated there his available forces, took the 
 offensive, and, though actually surrounded upon 
 the battle-field, succeeded by his superior tactics 
 in crushing Alvinzi's army ; then, before the smoke 
 of battle had died aWay, he led his weary but 
 heroic troops towards Mantua, where he con- 
 centrated once more his forces, took again the 
 ofifensive, overwhelmed and captured Provera's 
 army, drove Wurmser within the walls of Mantua, 
 and forced him to capitulate. 
 
 Such was the end of these remarkable manoeu- 
 vres, which for brilliancy and completeness reniain 
 unsurpassed by any single iiiilitary operation in 
 history. Manoeuvres such as these are the foun- 
 dation of Napoleon's military glory. Not isolated 
 and occasional were they, but repeatbd again and 
 again in this campaign, till five Austrian armies 
 were successively hurled back before his victorious 
 6agles. Such deeds call forth the admiration of 
 every military student and every soldier. They 
 should encourage us to greater exertion, and to 
 deeper study of our profession, in order that we 
 may gain a better knowledge of those great prin- 
 ciples of war which, if correctly applied, wotlld 
 to-day be as certain in their strategical results as 
 they were at MontenOtte,' Arcole, and Rivoli a 
 hundred years ago. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE TAGLIAMENTO. 
 
 "DEFORE entering upon a detailed description 
 of this part of the campaign, it is necessary 
 to point out the important topographical features 
 of the theatre of operations. 
 
 In general terms, the theatre of war embraced 
 Northern Italy and a large part of Austria. The 
 theatre of operations for both armies extended 
 north from the Adriatic to the uppdr Inn, upper 
 Salza, and upper Mur, and east from Lake Garda 
 to a few miles beyond the eastern slope of the 
 Julian Alps. 
 
 Except along the shores of the Adriatic, the 
 country which is comprised within this theatre of 
 operations is very mountainous. These moun- 
 tains belong to the great chain of the Alps; 
 Over a wide country they spread out in an irreg- 
 ular way into a great number of smaller chains 
 and spurs. Near the water-sheds formed by 
 these mountains several rivers rise; some flow 
 south into the Adriatic, others north and east into 
 the Danube. In the Tyrol these rhountains are 
 
124 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 known as the Tyrolese Alps; farther east, in 
 Northern Friuli, as the Carnic Alps; and still 
 farther east, as the Julian Alps. Between Italy 
 and Austria these three chains form a barrier 
 which is impassable for soldiers except through 
 the passes where the great highways have been 
 constructed. 
 
 Within this territory are the rivers Adige, 
 Brenta, Piave, Tagliamento, Isonzo, upper Drave, 
 and their tributaries. The Adige and the Brenta 
 we have already described. The Piave, Taglia- 
 mento, and Isonzo rise in the Carnic Alps, and 
 flow south into the Gulf of Venice. Their 
 courses, which are about thirty miles apart, are 
 nearly parallel with one another. The Drave 
 rises in the eastern part of the Tyrol, and flows 
 almost due east along the foot of the northern 
 slope of the Carnic Alps. 
 
 From Verona on the lower Adige three roads 
 lead into Austria. The first, on the left, is the 
 great highway of the Tyrol. ' This road ascends 
 the Adige, passes through Trent and Brixen, 
 crosses the divide at Brenner Pass, descends 
 upon Innspruck, and thence passes into the val- 
 ley of the Danube. The second, in the centre, 
 passes through Vicenza and Udine, crosses the 
 Carnic Alps at Pontebba, descends upon Villach 
 in the valley of the Drave, and thence passes 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 125 
 
 through Klagenfurt, Judenberg, and Leoben to- 
 wards Vienna. The third, on the right, passes 
 through Vicenza, Treviso, Goricia, and Adels- 
 berg; thence, turning towards the north, it passes 
 through Laybach and Krainberg to Klagenfurt. 
 Between the last two roads just described an 
 important cross-road passes along the narrow 
 valley of the Isonzo from Goricia through Capo- 
 retto to Tarwis. Another important cross-road 
 leaves the highway of the Tyrol at Brixen, passes 
 through Brunecken, crosses the divide near In- 
 nichen, descends on Lienz in the valley of the 
 Drave, and thence passes down the valley to 
 Villach. 
 
 Such are the general topographical peculiari- 
 ties of the country in which the French and Aus- 
 trians were, for the last time in this campaign, 
 to struggle for the mastery. 
 
 The fall of Mantua had alarmed Austria. Thus 
 far, Bonaparte had shown himself irresistible in 
 war. Neither numbers, nor obstacles, nor for- 
 tune itself, seemed to stop for a moment his 
 progress. He had crossed the Apennines and 
 passed over Italy like a cyclone. Might he not 
 cross the Alps and advance to the very gates of 
 Vienna ? Would the Alps be insurmountable to 
 the veterans of Montenotte, Arcole, and Rivoli? 
 These questions Austria was pondering. She 
 
126 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 realized her danger, and determined to re-enforce 
 her soldiers in Italy, and to send her ablest gen- 
 eral to command them. 
 
 The Archduke Charles ^ was given command of 
 these forces. He established his headquarters at 
 Innspruck, and asked that forty thousand soldiers 
 be sent to re-enforce the remnants of Alvinzi's 
 army in Italy. Bonaparte concluded from this 
 that the Archduke intended to assemble his 
 
 1 The Archduke Charles (Louis de Lorraine) of Austria, son of 
 the Emperor Leopold IL, was born at Florence, in 1771. Already 
 at the age of twenty-two he ha,d acquired a high military reputa- 
 tion under the Prince of Coburg, in the campaign of 1793. In 
 1796 he was made Field-Marshal of the German Empire, and took 
 command of the Austrian army on the Rhine. When he was sent 
 against Napoleon, in 1797, the lattpr remarked to Maesfield : 
 " Ypur cabinet has sent against me three armies without generals ; 
 now it sends a general without an army. " After the campaign of 
 1799, the Archduke was, by intrigue, removed from the army, and 
 sent into Bohemia in a kind of honorable exile. After the disas- 
 ters of Hohenlinden and Marengo, he was recalled to favor and 
 placed at the head of the War Department. In 1805 he opposed 
 Massena in Italy, but was absent from Germany at the overthrow 
 of the Austrian monarchy on the field of Austerlitz. In the 
 campaign of 1809, he commanded the Austrian army and was 
 wounded at the battle of Wagram. He was afterward made 
 Governor and Captain General of Bohemia, and retired to the 
 country. He was the ablest of all the generals that opposed 
 Napoleon. His many virtues and noble character endeared him 
 even to his enemies. Napoleon always spoke of him in terms of 
 high admiration. He ranks high as a military writer. His " Prin- 
 ciples of Strategy," illustrated by the campaigns of 1796 and 1799, 
 were published in Vienna in 1813 and i8ig,in seven volumes, with 
 valuable maps and plans. — Biographic Universelle. 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 127 
 
 forces in the Tyrol, and from that point make 
 his principal attack against the French. But the 
 Austrian government, failing to see the advan- 
 tages of this plan, ordered the Archduke to con- 
 centrate the greater part of his forces in Friuli, 
 in order to protect the seaport of Trieste and 
 preserve that section of country from invasion. 
 
 On February nth, 1797, there were under arms 
 in the Tyrol ten thousand Austrian soldiers and 
 ten thousand Tyrolese militia, and on the Piave 
 twenty-two thousand Austrian soldiers. On the 
 same date the Archduke Charles arrived on the 
 Piave. The following re-enforcements were to 
 have joined him : twenty-four thousand five hun- 
 dred soldiers from the Austrian Army of the 
 Rhine, thirteen thousand from the various Aus- 
 trian provinces, eight thousand exchanged Mantua 
 prisoners, and thirteen thousand five hundred 
 recruits. These re-enforcements, added to the 
 forces already in the Tyrol and on the Piave, 
 would, if we include the ten thousand Tyrolese 
 militia, have increased his army to more than 
 one hundred thousand soldiers. 
 
 A few words here in regard to the Archduke 
 Charles will not be out of place. During the 
 time that Bonaparte was contending against 
 Wurmser and Alvinzi in the brilliant engage- 
 ments already described, the French and Aus- 
 
128 BONAPARTES FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 trians were fighting each other in the vicinity of 
 the upper Danube and the upper Rhine. The 
 French Array of the Rhine, commanded by 
 Moreau, and the French Army of the Sambre 
 and Meuse, commanded by Jourdan, were op- 
 posed to the Austrian Army of the Rhine, which 
 was commanded by the Archduke Charles. In 
 this campaign the Archduke Charles had been 
 successful. He had defeated both French armies 
 and had driven them across the Rhine. He had 
 already shown himself to be a great soldier. He 
 was a young man, — younger even than Bona- 
 parte, — and his views upon war were largely the 
 outgrowth of his own successes. He was not 
 wedded to the past. He saw the errors to which 
 in Italy the Austrian commanders had so firmly 
 clung, and he perceived the reasons for many of 
 Bonaparte's brilliant triumphs. In short, he was 
 an able soldier, well worthy to try the fortune of 
 war against Bonaparte as an adversary. 
 
 Before the capitulation qf Wurmser at Mantua, 
 Bonaparte had conceived a plan for future opera- 
 tions against the Austrians. From the Mincio 
 as a base of operations, he purposed to march 
 against the Austrians, to defeat them, cross the 
 Alps, and invade Austria. For the accomplish- 
 ment of this undertaking, he calculated that he 
 would need a re-enforcement of thirty thousand 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 29 
 
 soldiers. With this re-enforcement and the co- 
 operation of the armies of the Rhine and the 
 Sambre and Meuse, he believed that he could 
 carry the war into the very heart of the Austrian 
 dominions. Accordingly, he wrote to the Di- 
 rectory, explained his plan, and asked for a re- 
 enforcement of thirty thousand soldiers. The 
 Directory ordered Delmas's division from the 
 Army of the Rhine, and Bernadotte's division 
 from the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, to 
 cross the Swiss Alps and join Bonaparte. These 
 two divisions, which numbered a little more than 
 twenty thousand, increased the Army of Italy to 
 seventy thousand soldiers. 
 
 Before the commencement of active operations, 
 two facts caused Bonaparte to weigh carefully his 
 chances of success. First: His army was too 
 small for a successful invasion of Austria. The 
 re-enforcements which he received were nearly 
 ten thousand less than the number for which he 
 had asked. Second : The political state of affairs 
 in Italy was unfavorable to the undertaking. 
 The revolutionary governments which he had 
 favored, the opinions which he had disseminated, 
 and the contributions which he had levied in 
 Italy, had caused much discontent in several of 
 the Italian states. Thus far during the cam- 
 paign, the discontented states had been com- 
 
 9 
 
130 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 pelled to submit to his will; but it was plain 
 that, upon the least reverse to his army, they 
 would not only be willing, but anxious, to take up 
 arms against him. The governments of Turin, 
 Genoa, Naples, Tuscany, Rome, and Venice were 
 all more or less dissatisfied; and the last two, in 
 particular, felt very bitter towards Bonaparte. 
 
 In fact, the Papal soldiers had risen against 
 the French, and had planned to attack the rear of 
 the French army. These facts being disclosed 
 to Bonaparte, he at the head of several thousand 
 troops set out, immediately after the fall of 
 Mantua, to march upon Rome in order to chas- 
 tise the Pope. In the face of the French soldiers 
 the Pope was compelled to yield, but his hatred 
 of Bonaparte and of his opinions remained no 
 less bitter than before. 
 
 But the Republic of Venice gave Bonaparte 
 the greatest uneasiness. He was unable to con- 
 clude a treaty of alliance with her. She hated 
 the French. She had sufficient population to 
 maintain a large army, and was already organiz- 
 ing and arming her soldiers. Moreover, Bona- 
 parte's line of communication with France, his 
 only line of retreat, passed directly through her 
 territory. Surely, if he should be defeated be- 
 yond the Alps, Venice would declare war against 
 him. Nothing could then save him. These 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 131 
 
 facts did not dishearten him, but they caused 
 him to exercise great caution in carrying out his 
 undertaking. 
 
 Early in March, while the Alps were still 
 covered with snow, Bonaparte began his advance. 
 The disposition of the Austrian forces at this 
 time was as follows: in the Tyrol behind the 
 rivers Noss and Lavis there were ten thousand 
 Tyrolese militia/ and seventeen thousand Aus- 
 trian soldiers commanded by Generals Kerpen 
 and Laudon; at Feltre, three thousand com- 
 manded by General Lusignan ; and on the Piave, 
 twenty-two thousand commanded by the Arch- 
 duke Charles. It will be seen that the Archduke 
 had altogether in position forty-two thousand Aus- 
 trian soldiers and ten thousand Tyrolese militia. 
 Inasmuch as the latter, however, were organized 
 for the defence of their firesides, and fought only 
 on their mountains, they should not be considered 
 as forming a permanent part of the Austrian 
 army. 
 
 In her instructions to the Archduke Charles, 
 Austria had insisted that he should take posi- 
 tion on the Piave with the main portion of his 
 army, so as to cover the seaport of Trieste. This 
 position was faulty, and was difficult to defend. 
 Owing, to these instructions, he had not been 
 able to form a plan of campaign in accordance 
 
133 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 with his own views, but was compelled to carry 
 out, as best he could, the erroneous views of 
 his government. Morecwer, Austria was slow in 
 sending forward the promised re-enforcements. 
 Only a few thousand had arrived in the Tyrol; 
 most of the remainder were on their way to join 
 the Archduke ; but as they were still north of the 
 Alps, and had to march by way of Klagenfurt, 
 Villach, and Pontebba, it would still take some 
 time for them to arrive. 
 
 Upon these facts the Archduke Charles based 
 his plans. He purposed to act on the defensive. 
 His object was to delay matters as long as pos- 
 sible, so as to give time for his re-enforcements 
 to arrive. 
 
 On the other hand, Bonaparte, not being able 
 to form an alliance with Venice, determined to 
 leave Generals Victor and Kilmaine in Italy with 
 eighteen thousand soldiers in order to protect his 
 rear, and with the remaining fifty-two thousand 
 to take the offensive against the Austrians before 
 their re-enforcements should arrive. He had 
 the choice of two lines of operations. He could 
 advance either to the north through the Tyrol, 
 or to the east through Friuli. But as both of 
 these lines were occupied by the Austrians, he 
 could not confine himself to either one without 
 exposing his rear to an attack from the enemy 
 
THE TAGLIAMEJVTO. 1 33 
 
 occupying the other. He therefore decided that 
 he would send a strong force into the Tyrol to 
 hold the enemy there in check, while with the 
 main portion of his army he would advance by 
 way of Friuli to attack the Austrians on the 
 Piave. His plan was to attack the right of the 
 Archduke, throw his army back towards Laybach 
 or drive it into the sea; then, to march rapidly 
 towards the north, cross the Carnic Alps at 
 Pontebba or Tarwis into the valley of the Drave, 
 unite his divisions there, and march on Vienna. 
 
 Accordingly, he sent the divisions of Delmas 
 and Baraguay d'Hilliers to join Joubert's divis- 
 ion in the Tyrol, and on the loth of March took 
 the field in person with the divisions of Mass6na, 
 Serrurier, Guyeux, and Bernadotte. The three 
 divisions in the Tyrol numbered eighteen thou- 
 sand, and the four under Bonaparte's imme- 
 diate command thirty-four thousand. Bonaparte 
 gave the command in the Tyrol to General Jou- 
 bert, and ordered him to hold the Austrians in 
 check at all hazards; and, if possible, to drive 
 them beyond the mountains which separate 
 Brixen from Innspruck. He directed Mass^na's 
 division, ten thousand strong, to march on Feltre 
 in order to drive back Lusignan; and with the 
 remaining three divisions he advanced towards 
 the Piave. 
 
134 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Upon the arrival of Massena at Feltre, Lu- 
 signan fell back on Lpngaro, where, on March 
 13th, Massena attacked and defeated him. In 
 this engagement nearly one thousand Austrians, . 
 among whom was General Lusignan, were cap- 
 tured. Having thrown back the remainder of 
 the Austrian division upon Cadora, Massdna 
 then marched towards Spilimbergo, near which 
 place he crossed the Tagliamento on the i6th. 
 After crossing the river he marched by way of 
 Gemona upon Pontebba, so as to threaten the 
 Archduke's right wing and cut off his retreat in 
 this direction. 
 
 On the 13th of March, the same day that Mas- 
 s6na defeated Lusignan, Bonaparte crossed the 
 Piave with his three divisions. The Archduke 
 retreated towards the Tagliamento, and Bo- 
 naparte followed him by way of Valvasone, 
 where he arrived on the morning of the i6th 
 of March. Opposite this town on the left bank 
 of the Tagliamento, the Austrians were drawn up 
 for battle. The river at this point is fordable. 
 Leaving Serrurier's division in reserve at Val- 
 vasone, Bonaparte ordered the divisions of Ber- 
 nadotte and Guyeux to ford the river and attack 
 the enemy. These two divisions tried to surpass 
 each other in acts of bravery. They forded the 
 river under fire, attacked the Austrians furi- 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 135 
 
 ously, defeated and routed them, and took five 
 hundred prisoners. This battle, in which Bona- 
 parte and the Archduke Charles met for the first 
 time, is known as the Tagliamento. 
 
 Meanwhile the remnants of Lusignan's division, 
 which at this time was commanded by General 
 Ocskay, had succeeded in forcing their way across 
 the mountains to Pontebba; but Massdna, arriv- 
 ing soon afterwards in the gorges of the Alps 
 near that place, attacked and routed them, and 
 drove them back upon Tarwis. 
 
 After the battle of the Tagliamento, the Arch- 
 duke divided his forces. Falling back upon 
 Gradisca with the bulk of his command, he 
 directed Bayalitsch with his division, twenty-five 
 cannon, and a convoy containing a large part of 
 the material for the Austrian army, to march by 
 Cividale and Caporetto upon Tarwis, hoping that 
 he might anticipate Mass6na, and, by uniting with 
 Ocskay, be strong enough to hold the passes at 
 Pontebba and Tarwis. The possession of these 
 passes was very important to the Archduke 
 Charles; for the re-enforcements on their way 
 to join him had either to cross the Alps at these 
 points, or to take the circuitous route by way of 
 Krainberg, Laybach, and Adelsberg. 
 
 Upon the crossings of the Isonzo the Arch- 
 duke attempted to make a stand. The town of 
 
136 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Gradisca, which was intrenched, covered his left. 
 Against this place Bonaparte directed his prin- 
 cipal attack. He ordered Bernadotte to assault 
 the intrenchments, and ordered Serrurier to cross 
 the Isonzo below the town in order to cut off 
 the retreat of the garrison. The movement was 
 successful. The garrison of three thousand sur- 
 rendered, and the Archduke retreated across the 
 river. 
 
 Bonaparte then manoeuvred against the left 
 wing of the Archduke, so as to push him into 
 the valley of the Isonzo. The Archduke, seeing 
 the danger of falling back into the valley, re- 
 treated towards Laybach by way of Adelsberg. 
 Bonaparte sent Bernadotte in pursuit. He then 
 directed Guyeux to march by way of Cividale and 
 Caporetto in order to overtake Bayalitsch, and 
 set out himself, at the head of Serrurier' s divis- 
 ion, to ascend the Isonzo. 
 
 Meanwhile Mass^na had advanced from Pon- 
 tebba towards Tarwis, and after a brief action had 
 gained possession of the pass there. The posses- 
 sion of this pass closed the only outlet by which 
 Bayalitsch's division, ascending the narrow valley 
 of the Isonzo, could reach Villach. 
 
 The Archduke was in a critical condition; his 
 forces were greatly scattered. The greater part 
 of his own immediate command, pursued by Ber- 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 137 
 
 nadotte, was retreating upon Laybach; Ocskay 
 was in front of Massena; and Bayalitsch was 
 enclosed in the narrow valley of the Isonzo, 
 'where, with Massdna in his front and Bonaparte 
 with the divisions of Guyeux and Serrurier in his 
 rear, he could hardly hope to escape capture. 
 
 The Archduke had not yet learned that Massdna 
 held the pass of Tarwis, but he anticipated 
 that such might be the case; for he knew that 
 Ocskay was not sufficiently strong to hold it 
 unless his numbers had already been increased 
 by the re-enforcements that should, by this time, 
 have reached that vicinity. He realized, too, 
 that as the large convoy accompanying Bayalitsch 
 would cause him to march slowly, Mass6na would 
 have plenty of time to attack and drive back 
 Ocskay before the arrival of Bayalitsch. On the 
 possession of this pass now depended the safety 
 of a division of the Archduke's army, and that of 
 a large part of his cannon and material of war. 
 He therefore determined to make every effort to 
 hold the pass ; or to recapture it, if it was already 
 in Mass6na's possession. Accordingly, giving 
 orders for his troops to follow him as rapidly as 
 possible, he hurried forward by way of Laybach 
 and Krainberg to Villach, where his re-enforce- 
 ments were just beginning to arrive. 
 
 Upon his arrival at Villach he hastily collected 
 
138 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 five or six thousand fresh troops that had just 
 arrived there, united them with Ocskay's division, 
 and attacked Mass6na at Tarwis. In this engage- 
 ment the Archduke was successful; he drove 
 back Mass^na and gained possession of the pass. 
 But the latter, realizing the importance of this 
 point, collected his entire division and returned 
 to attack the Archduke. The battle was furi- 
 ously fought on both sides. It took place on 
 Mount Tarwis, above the clouds and amidst the 
 snow and ice of the Alps. Both sides realized 
 that great results depended upon the success or 
 failure of the battle. Both commanders showed 
 great personal courage, but the Archduke was 
 compelled to yield to his stubborn adversary. 
 
 Mass6na held the pass. Bayalitsch, attacked 
 in front by Mass6na and in rear by Guyeux and 
 Serrurier, was forced to surrender. His division 
 was doomed ; about four thousand Austrians were 
 captured, together with twenty-five cannon and 
 an immense amount of baggage and material of 
 war. 
 
 Bonaparte had reached the summit of the Alps. 
 The first great step in his undertaking was ac- 
 complished. He was on the point of entering 
 Austria. At the start the four divisions under 
 his immediate command had numbered thirty- 
 four thousand. By casualties they had been con- 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 139 
 
 siderably reduced, so that for this momentous 
 undertaking he had only about thirty thousand 
 soldiers. Such an army was too small. The 
 Austrian re-enforcements were rapidly arriving; 
 in fact, several thousand had already arrived. In 
 a few days he might find himself outnumbered, 
 even overwhelmed, at the very threshold of the 
 Austrian dominions. Bonaparte had foreseen all 
 this before he crossed the Alps. In fact, from 
 the very start, he had calculated that, in case 
 he succeeded in defeating the Archduke, and 
 Joubert succeeded in driving the Austrians from 
 the Tyrol, he would order Joubert to join him in 
 the valley of the Drave. 
 
 Accordingly, after the battle of the Taglia- 
 mento, when Bonaparte began to see his way 
 clear for the accomplishment of his plans, he sent 
 Joubert orders to march, by way of Brunecken, 
 Lienz, and the valley of the Drave, upon Villach, 
 at which place Bonaparte expected to unite Jou- 
 bert's divisions with the divisions of Mass^na, 
 Guyeux, Serrurier, and Bernadotte. 
 
 As the execution of this plan depended as much 
 upon the success of Joubert as upon the success 
 of Bonaparte, we will, for the present, leave the 
 latter in the midst of his victorious troops, while 
 we describe the operations of his lieutenant in 
 the Tyrol. 
 
I40 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Joubert ascended the Adige with his three 
 divisions, and, upon crossing the Lavis, found 
 that the Austrians were occupying both sides of 
 the Adige. He pushed forward, attacked them 
 on March 20th at St. Michael, and defeated them. 
 In this battle he killed and captured more than 
 three thousand five hundred of the enemy. The 
 Austrians, followed by Joubert, retreated up the 
 Adige. On March 22d he attacked them again 
 at Neumark, captured one thousand more pris- 
 oners, and forced Generals Laudon and Kerpen 
 to separate their commands. The former fell 
 back to the left on Meran; the latter, to the 
 right towards Brixen. Joubert followed Kerpen, 
 who, being re-enforced by a division from the 
 Rhine, made a stand at Klausen, where Joubert 
 defeated him and forced him still farther back 
 towards Sterzing. At Mittenwald Kerpen was 
 re-enforced by a second division from the Rhine. 
 Again he made a stand; again Joubert defeated 
 him, and drove him across the divide towards 
 Innspruck. 
 
 Joubert, having disposed of Kerpen, faced 
 about his columns and marched to Brixen. At 
 this place he learned that Bonaparte had reached 
 the valley of the Drave. Joubert could now fall 
 back and crush Laudon ; but as this would take 
 several days, and as it was already the beginning 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 41 
 
 of April, he thought it time to carry out Bona- 
 parte's instructions. He therefore set out to 
 join Bonaparte by way of Brunecken, Lienz, and 
 Villach. 
 
 The Tyrol being now evacuated by the French, 
 Kerpen set out to join the Archduke by way of 
 Innspruck, Rattenberg, the valley of the Salza, 
 and Murau; and Laudon, being joined by the 
 Tyrolese militia, descended the Adige, over- 
 threw the few French detachments in his front, 
 and advanced towards Verona in order to join 
 his forces to the Venetian insurgents. 
 
 Bonaparte had grave cause for anxiety. After 
 crossing the Alps he learned that the Venetians 
 had risen in arms against the French, and that 
 the two French armies along the Rhine had made 
 no advance into Austrian territory. This news 
 was discouraging. With his communications 
 threatened, Bonaparte could hardly hope to reach 
 Vienna unless supported by the armies along the 
 Rhine. Nevertheless, he determined to put on a 
 bold front. If he could not enter the Austrian 
 capital at the head of his victorious soldiers, he 
 might, perhaps, succeed in making a treaty of 
 peace which would redound to his own and to 
 their glory. With this end in view, on March 
 31st he wrote a letter to the Archduke Charles, 
 in which he deplored the calamities of war and 
 
143 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 suggested a treaty of peace. The Archduke 
 replied that he had no authority to make treaties. 
 He did not, however, let the matter drop there, 
 but forwarded Bonaparte's letter to the Emperor 
 at Vienna. 
 
 From the summit of the Alps Bonaparte 
 descended into the valley of the Drave. On 
 March 31st he was at Klagenfurt, at which 
 place he wrote the letter to the Archduke 
 Charles. At this time Joubert was about to 
 leave the Tyrol in order to unite his forces with 
 those of Bonaparte; and Bernadotte, who had 
 marched by way of Laybach in pursuit of the 
 Archduke's forces, was approaching Klagenfurt 
 by way of Krainberg. 
 
 On the road to Vienna, a few miles north of 
 Klagenfurt, the Archduke had assembled his 
 army. That part of it which had marched by 
 way of Laybach and Krainberg had succeeded in 
 passing Klagenfurt before the arrival of Bona- 
 parte; so that the Archduke had the greater part 
 of his forces well in hand, prepared to dispute the 
 advance of Bonaparte into Austria. 
 
 On March 31st Bonaparte set his columns in 
 motion. On the morning of April ist he attacked 
 the advance-guard of the enemy at St. Veit and 
 overthrew it. On the same day he encountered 
 the enemy in force at Neumark. Here the Arch- 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 143 
 
 duke had assembled all the remnants of his army, 
 together with four divisions just arrived from 
 the Rhine. Both sides fought furiously. The 
 Austrians were stubborn, the French impetuous. 
 Finally, after losing about one thousand in killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners the Archduke was com- 
 pelled to retreat. At Unzmark he again made a 
 stand, but, after losing about one thousand more 
 of his command, was again overthrown. He fell 
 back on the road to Vienna. Bonaparte followed 
 him, and on April 7th entered Leoben. 
 
 Meanwhile, at Vienna the Imperial Court was 
 in consternation. The Emperor himself was 
 alarmed. In less than a month Bonaparte had 
 driven the Austrians from Friuli and the Tyrol ; 
 had crossed the Alps and invaded Austria; and 
 now, at the head of his victorious army, was 
 rapidly approaching the Austrian capital. The 
 onward rush of these impetuous soldiers was 
 enough to strike terror to the strongest mind 
 and stoutest heart. 
 
 The Emperor, realizing the danger, believed the 
 time had come when he should treat for peace. 
 He had already received Bonaparte's letter, which 
 encouraged him to believe that proposals for 
 peace would be favorably received. With this 
 end in view he sent two Austrian officers to Bona- 
 parte's head-quarters at Leoben to ask for a sus- 
 
144 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 pension of arms for ten days. Bonaparte granted 
 an armistice of five days, at the end of which time 
 Generals Bellegrade and Meerfeld arrived with 
 instructions to sign preliminaries for a definitive 
 peace. On April i8th these preliminaries were 
 signed ; the campaign was ended. 
 
 During these events Victor and Kilmaine, who 
 were fighting in Italy the Venetian insurgents 
 and Laudon's forces from the Tyrol, had suc- 
 ceeded in preserving Bonaparte's communica- 
 tions. After the armistice of Leoben, Laudon 
 retired into the Tyrol, and the Venetian insur- 
 gents were speedily overthrown. Thus ended 
 Bonaparte's first campaign. In less than a 
 month, more than twenty thousand Austrians 
 had been killed, wounded, or captured. The 
 sixth Austrian army, commanded by the ablest sol- 
 dier Austria has ever produced, had been beaten in 
 every battle. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 From a strategical point of view the operations 
 which we have just described are well worthy the 
 study of every military man. The abilities of the 
 opposing conimanders, the peculiar topographical 
 features of the country in which the operations 
 were conducted, and the situations of the opposing 
 
A 
 
 nj 
 
 mil 
 
 w\ m n 
 
 
 (;/,«iiiP'Mi"«M»*,iiK//u,„a,, 
 
 H T A L T f 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 45 
 
 armies with respect to each other, give to this part 
 of the campaign an unusual interest. 
 
 At the outset the two principal parts of the 
 Austrian forces were widely separated. The sev- 
 enteen thousand in the Tyrol were more than fifty 
 miles distant from the twenty-two thousand on the 
 lower Piave, and between the two, at Feltre, was a 
 small Austrian division of three thousand. Along 
 the lower Adige, in the vicinity of Verona and 
 Legnago, Bonaparte had fifty-two thousand to 
 oppose these forces. 
 
 The line of communication with Austria for the 
 force in the Tyrol extended towards the north in 
 the direction of Innspruck; that for the force on 
 the Piave extended towards the northeast across 
 the Alps in the direction of Vienna. These, two 
 lines of communication were therefore divergenfc 
 
 Several rivers and mountain chains separated the 
 Austrians in the Tyrol from those on the Piave. 
 The only communication between them was by 
 the road along the Piave to Feltre,. thence by 
 Primolano and the upper Brenta to Trent on the 
 Adige. But as this road was in front of the Aus- 
 trian line, it could not be used by the Austrians 
 after Bonaparte began his advance. At the very 
 commencement of active operations, therefore, the 
 two principal Austrian forces became hopelessly 
 separated. Moreover, as they were forced back 
 
146 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 towards Austria along divergent lines of communi- 
 cation, they became farther and farther separated. 
 In fact, each was a separate army, having its own 
 line of operations and its own line of retreat. 
 From the nature of the country which separated 
 the army in the Tyrol from that on the Piave, and 
 from the plan of campaign which Austria adopted, 
 it is evident that she intended that these two 
 armies should act independently. 
 
 Why did Austria separate her forces into two 
 armies? Why did she station one in the Tyrol 
 and the other on the Piave ? What are the advan- 
 tages and disadvantages of such an arrangement? 
 A discussion of the situation should enlighten us 
 on these points. 
 
 To prevent Bonaparte from invading her terri- 
 tory was the problem before Austria. Neither of 
 the two Austrian armies was strong enough to 
 take the offensive. Until their numbers should be 
 greatly increased, Austria could not expect to 
 drive Bonaparte from Italy. She might stop his 
 further progress ; but she could not expect to do 
 more than this, for aided by superior numbers and 
 the possession of Mantua she had not been able 
 even to hold Italy. 
 
 By two routes only could Bonaparte invade 
 Austria. One was by the great highway of the 
 Tyrol to the valley of the upper Danube; the 
 
THE TACLIAMENTO. 1 47 
 
 other was by several roads across the Alps to 
 Klagenfurt, thence by the single road to Vienna. 
 By stationing one army in the Tyrol and another 
 on the Piave, so as to cover these two routes, 
 Austria expected to prevent the advance of Bona- 
 parte. There was also an additional reason for 
 this arrangement. The army on the Piave covered 
 the roads which lead directly to Trieste. This 
 place was the only important Austrian seaport. 
 It was a large and flourishing city, surrounded by 
 a fertile country. As a considerable part of the 
 supplies for the Austrian forces came from this 
 city, it was important that it should be protected. 
 Furthermore, an army on the Piave, if defeated, 
 could fall back first on the Tagliamento and then 
 on the Isonzo, and there find good defensive 
 positions. 
 
 Did these reasons justify Austria in such an 
 arrangement of her forces? Were the two armies 
 advantageously situated for preventing the invasion 
 of her territory? This arrangement was certainly 
 faulty; in adopting it, Austria committed many 
 errors. 
 
 First: Had the two Austrian armies been united, 
 they would have constituted a strong force ; sepa- 
 rated, they were both weak. 
 
 Second: With an Austrian army in the Tyrol 
 and another on the Piaye, Bonaparte could with a 
 
148 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 small force hold one in check, while he brought 
 an overwhelming force against the other. 
 
 Third: As soon as active operations began, 
 Bonaparte could re-enforce Joubert in the Tyrol, or 
 Joubert could re-enforce Bonaparte on the Taglia- 
 mento, by the road through Feltre and Trent, 
 while neither of the Austrian armies could re- 
 enforce the other by the strength of a single man. 
 
 Fourth: As a division of only three thousand 
 soldiers covered the direct road into Austria by 
 way of Pontebba pass, Bonaparte could, by de- 
 feating this division, easily gain possession of this 
 important point. 
 
 Fifth: It was impossible for the Austrian re- 
 enforcements, coming from the upper Danube, to 
 join the army on the Piave without making a cir- 
 cuitous march by way of Klagenfurt. Had the 
 two armies been united in the Tyrol, these re- 
 enforcements could have arrived there two weeks 
 earlier. 
 
 Sixth : Instead of allowing the Archduke Charles 
 to form his own plan of campaign, the Austrian 
 government insisted that he should carry out plans 
 which were faulty, and which he did not approve. 
 He was hampered by the instructions of his gov- 
 ernment, and committed from the start to a system 
 of errors sufficient to discourage the ablest soldier. 
 He was well worthy the confidence of his govern- 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 1 49 
 
 ment, had already proved this, and should have 
 been allowed to conduct the entire campaign in 
 his own way. 
 
 Seventh: To prevent Bonaparte from invading 
 Austria by way of Klagenfurt it was not necessary 
 to station an army directly on this route. The 
 Austrian forces united into one army in the 
 vicinity of Trent would have answered the same 
 purpose; for in that case Bonaparte could not 
 advance eastward beyond the Adige without ex- 
 posing his flank and rear. Bonaparte would never 
 have attempted to invade Austria by way of Kla- 
 genfurt while the entire Austrian army at Trent 
 remained undefeated. Such a manceuvre would 
 have carried him from, instead of towards, his 
 enemy; would have lengthened and weakened his 
 line of communications ; and would have exposed 
 his flank and rear to the enemy's attack. Such a 
 manceuvre would have been the height of folly, 
 and would in all probability have resulted in the 
 capture or annihilation of the Army of Italy. 
 
 The effect produced by stationing an army on 
 the Piave was, then, exactly contrary to what the 
 Austrian government expected. An army there 
 did not prevent invasion, but encouraged it. 
 
 For similar reasons it was not necessary, in order 
 to protect Trieste, for the army on the Piave to 
 cover the roads which lead to that city. In fact. 
 
150 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 an army of forty-two thousand in the Tyrol would 
 have protected Trieste more effectually than the 
 same army could have done had it covered the 
 roads which lead directly to that place. Perhaps 
 this paradoxical statement needs proof. It will be 
 conceded, for the reasons given above, that Bona- 
 parte would not have advanced upon Trieste while 
 an Austrian army of forty-two thousand remained 
 undefeated in the Tyrol. In either case, then, 
 whether the Austrian army were on his flank in 
 the Tyrol, or directly in his front covering Trieste, 
 it would be necessary to defeat it before advancing. 
 But the Tyrol was favorable for defence. For this 
 purpose, the rivers, mountainsj and defiles gave to 
 it great strength. Moreover, an army there would 
 directly cover its communications with Austria. If 
 defeated, it could fall back to another good posi- 
 tion, fight again, and still present a formidable 
 front. The reverse of this was true for an army 
 covering Trieste. The country was more o'pen 
 and the rivers were fordable. Moreover, as in 
 this position the communications would extend to 
 the right and rear of the Austrian army, Bonaparte 
 could, by defeating the right wing, cut off and 
 seize these communications. 
 
 In this connection it is worthy of notice that 
 when a government sends forth an army to pro- 
 tect a capital, a portion of country, a large city, 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 15 1 
 
 or an important seaport, it is not always neces- 
 sary that the army should cover the roads which 
 lead directly to the place ; in fact, it is often ad- 
 vantageous to take up a flanking position where 
 the communications of the army are protected, and 
 where it can attack the flank of the enemy if he 
 advances. But these questions should be decided 
 by the commander of the army, and not by the 
 government. The best results will invariably be 
 obtained by leaving the diagnosis of disease to 
 doctors, politics to politicians, and military mat- 
 ters to military men. 
 
 We have pointed out with considerable detail 
 the errors due to the arrangement of the Aus- 
 trian forces. Was there no advantage arising 
 from such an arrangement? As the situation of 
 the two Austrian armies compelled Bonaparte to 
 divide his forces, it might seem that this was an 
 advantage to the Austrian side; for in dividing 
 his army he must necessarily have weakened his 
 side. This is true; nevertheless, after the division 
 of his forces, he still had the advantage of interior 
 lines; so that the disadvantage to him arising 
 from a division of his forces was not so great 
 as the disadvantage to the Austrians arising from 
 the same cause. 
 
 It is evident from what has already been said that 
 the two Austrian armies should have been united 
 
152 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 in the Tyrol. The plan of campaign should have 
 been to act on the defensive till the Austrian re- 
 enforcements arrived; then to take the offensive 
 against Bonaparte, either down the Brenta towards 
 Arcole, or along the west side of Lake Garda 
 towards Brescia. Had this plan been adopted, 
 the Austrian re-enforcements could have joined the 
 Archduke two weeks earlier than they did; and 
 while awaiting their arrival, the ten thousand 
 Tyrolese militia would have materially strength- 
 ened the Austrian army. By the middle of March 
 the Archduke could have been ready to take the 
 offensive with an army of more than eighty thou- 
 sand soldiers. To oppose such an army Bonaparte 
 had but seventy thousand. The advantages would 
 have been with the Archduke; and though he 
 would probably have been defeated and driven 
 back into the Tyrol, yet even then he might 
 have saved Austria from invasion. 
 
 Starting from the vicinity of Verona and Leg- 
 nago on the Adige, Bonaparte had the choice of 
 two lines of operations. As previously stated, he 
 could operate towards the north against the Aus- 
 trians in the Tyrol, or towards the east against the 
 Archduke Charles in Friuli ; but if he confined 
 himself entirely to either line, the Austrian army 
 occupying the other could fall upon his rear. He 
 was, therefore, compelled to divide his forces. He 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 153 
 
 decided to send a strong force into the Tyrol 
 to hold the Austrians there in check, while he 
 marched in person with the main part of his 
 army against the Archduke. Three reasons led 
 him to choose the route through Friuli as his 
 principal line of operations. First : The shores of 
 the Adriatic were better suited for offensive opera- 
 tions ; a large army there could be easily manoeu- 
 vred. On the other hand, the Tyrol was better 
 suited for defensive operations ; a containing force 
 there could operate to advantage. Second : As the 
 line of communications of the Archduke's army 
 was to the right and rear of his right wing, Bona- 
 parte could, by defeating it, seize the Archduke's 
 line of retreat, and by so doing might be able 
 either to capture his army or drive it into the sea. 
 Third : This route led directly towards the Austrian 
 capital. To an invading army the possession of 
 the capital of a country is always of the utmost 
 importance; as a rule, when it is taken the war 
 ends. " A capital city," says Dufour, " is a stra- 
 tegic point of great importance, because it regu- 
 lates or greatly influences the public opinion of the 
 nation, contains abundant resources of every kind, 
 the loss of which may greatly paralyze the enemy; 
 and to the minds of a large portion of the people 
 all hope of successful defence is lost when an 
 invading army has reached the heart of the state." 
 
154 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Having noticed the reasons why Bonaparte chose 
 this route for his main Hne of operations, we will 
 now point out some of the distinguishing features 
 of this part of the campaign. For the first time 
 since taking command of the Army of Italy Bona- 
 parte was stronger numerically than his adversary. 
 Omitting for the present the eighteen thousand 
 French soldiers left in Italy to protect the French 
 rear, and also the re-enforcements on their way to 
 join the Austrian armies, there remained at the 
 beginning of active operations fifty-two thousand 
 French soldiers with whom to oppose forty-two 
 thousand Austrians and the Tyrolese militia. 
 Though the militia numbered ten thousand, only 
 a part joined the Austrians at the beginning of 
 active operations. Moreover, the value of the 
 militia as a fighting force, for reasons already 
 given, was considerably less than that of the same 
 number of Austrian soldiers. At the outset, Bona- 
 parte had, therefore, a numerical superiority of 
 several thousand. To this superiority in numbers 
 is due the absence of those brilliant combinations 
 and manoeuvres which were such distinguishing 
 features in the operations previously described. 
 It will be noticed, however, that, had Bonaparte 
 been hard pressed at this time, his forces were 
 favorably situated for concentrating overwhelming 
 numbers against either Austrian army. On March 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 155 
 
 13th, the day Mass6na attacked Lusignan, the 
 opposing forces were situated as follows: Bona- 
 parte on the Piave had twenty-four thousand 
 soldiers, and the Archduke Charles in his front 
 had twenty-two thousand; Mass6na at Longaro 
 had ten thousand to oppose Lusignan's division 
 of three thousand ; and Joubert in the Tyrol had 
 eighteen thousand to oppose seventeen thousand 
 Austrians and ten thousand militia. In this situa- 
 tion Bonaparte's army consisted of two strong 
 wings and a centre. Had Joubert been hard 
 pressed, Mass6na could have joined him. This 
 junction would have given Joubert twenty-eight 
 thousand soldiers with whom to oppose seventeen 
 thousand Austrians and ten thousand militia. Had 
 Bonaparte been hard pressed, he could have called 
 Massdna to him ; and would then have had thirty- 
 four thousand soldiers with whom to oppose twenty- 
 two thousand Austrians. In fact, though not at 
 all hard pressed, he exercised the caution of hav- 
 ing Massdna near him at the battle of the Taglia- 
 mento. It will be noticed that, on the very day of 
 this battle, Massdna crossed the Tagliamento near 
 Spilimbergo only a short distance from the battle- 
 field. Though his objective at that time was the 
 pass at Pontebba, yet he so regulated his marches 
 that, had it been necessary, he could have joined 
 Bonaparte before the battle. In the detailed orders 
 
156 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 sent on the afternoon of March 13th by Bonaparte 
 to Massena are the following paragraphs bearing 
 upon this point: — 
 
 " The enemy is retiring, and appears to have decided 
 to take position behind the Tagliamento. The general- 
 in-chief hopes to deliver a blow which shall decide the 
 fate of the campaign, and cover the Army of Italy 
 with new laurels. He is certain that Prince Charles 
 commands. . . . 
 
 " The general-in-chief orders General Massdna to set 
 out to-morrow for Belluno, and move towards the Taglia- 
 mento ; he desires him to be at Aviano to-morrow even- 
 ing, where he will receive new orders. . . . 
 
 "Although the general-in-chief presumes that the 
 forces which he has at this moment are sufficient to 
 insure victory, he may think it well to delay his attacks 
 for a day in order that the brave Masse'na division may 
 participate." 
 
 When Bonaparte began his advance against 
 the Archduke, the latter fell back towards Trieste. 
 Undoubtedly, the orders of his government caused 
 him to retreat in this direction. Had he taken 
 a position directly covering the roads to Klagen- 
 furt by way of Pontebba and Tarwis, he would 
 have been better able to prevent the invasion of 
 Austria. His right flank could not then have 
 been so easily turned ; and though he must have 
 been defeated, he could have fallen back across 
 the Alps, and could have held the passes at Pen- 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 157 
 
 tebba and Tarwis with strong detachments long 
 enough to receive the greater part of the Austrian 
 re-enforcements. Had the Archduke united in 
 this way all his available forces near ViUach, and 
 held at the same time the passes, Bonaparte would 
 have found great difificulty in forcing his way 
 across the Alps; and even had he succeeded in 
 doing this, the Archduke was still in a position to 
 defeat the heads of the French columns as they 
 debouched from the passes into the valley of the 
 Drave. 
 
 It is evident, too, that, if this plan had been 
 adopted, Bonaparte would not have attempted to 
 invade Austria by way of Laybach and Krain- 
 berg; for the moment he passed the Isonzo, the 
 Archduke could have descended from Pontebba 
 and Tarwis upon the French rear, and could have 
 cut off their communications without in the least 
 endangering his own. 
 
 After the battle of the Tagliamento, the Arch- 
 duke Charles divided his army. He sent Baya- 
 litsch's division by way of Udine and Caporetto 
 towards Tarwis, while with the remainder of his 
 army he fell back on the Isonzo so as to cover 
 Trieste. When the Archduke detached this di- 
 vision, he expected that it would gain the pass at 
 Tarwis and hold it, thus insuring the retreat of his 
 immediate command by the valley of the Isonzo. 
 
158 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 Bonaparte saw in this situation a chance to entrap 
 his adversary. He directed Mass6na to seize the 
 pass at Tarwis, and then with Serrurier's and Ber- 
 nadotte's divisions he crossed the Isonzo below 
 the Archduke, and manoeuvred to turn him into 
 the valley of the Isonzo. Had Bonaparte suc- 
 ceeded in doing this, the Archduke could not 
 have escaped. Enclosed within this narrow valley 
 by Mass^na's division in his front and by Berna- 
 dotte's, Serrurier's, and Guyeux's divisions in his 
 rear, the Archduke would have been compelled to 
 surrender his army. Fortunately for him he saw 
 the danger in time to avoid it by retreating 
 towards Laybach. 
 
 It was at this time that he hurried to Villach in 
 order to collect a force to attack the pass at Tar- 
 wis. The possession of this pass had become of 
 the greatest importance. In fact, it was the key 
 to the situation. If the pass were held by Mas- 
 s6na, Bonaparte could not only destroy Baya- 
 litsch, but he could also debouch from the pass 
 upon Villach with the divisions of Mass6na, Ser- 
 rurier, and Guyeux, drive back the Austrian re- 
 enforcements, gain possession of Klagenfurt, and 
 in this way cut off, capture, or destroy the Austrian 
 forces marching by way of Laybach and Krain- 
 berg. On the other hand, if the pass were held by 
 the Archduke, he could unite his scattered forces 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 159 
 
 in the vicinity of Tarwis or Villach, and present a 
 formidable front to Bonaparte's advance. More- 
 over, Bayalitsch would escape capture, and the 
 immense amount of supplies and material of war 
 with him would be saved to the Austrian army. 
 It is to the credit of the Archduke Charles that he 
 comprehended the situation, and hurried to Tarwis 
 to fight for the possession of this important point. 
 It is to his credit that, under such unfavorable cir- 
 cumstances, he fought so desperately and showed 
 such personal courage. Though he could not 
 save Bayalitsch, nor stop the progress of Bona- 
 parte, he had the satisfaction of knowing that 
 this battle, fought so furiously, delayed his ad- 
 versary long enough to allow the Austrian divis- 
 ions coming from Laybach to escape capture or 
 annihilation. 
 
 Though at the start Bonaparte had in his mind 
 the plan of drawing Joubert to him by the valley 
 #f the Drave, yet this movement depended not 
 only on Bonaparte's success in Friuli, but also on 
 Joubert's success in the Tyrol. Had not Bona- 
 parte crossed the Alps, Joubert would not have 
 entered the valley of the Drave. There was, in 
 fact, but one distinct line of operations; for the 
 force in the Tyrol under Joubert was essentially 
 a containing force. Joabert's object was not to in- 
 vade Austria, but to protect the rear of the Army 
 
.l6o BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 of Italy. As Bonaparte advanced fc.rther and 
 farther into Austria, it became of the utmost im- 
 portance that Joubert should hold in check the 
 Austrians and militia in the Tyrol. For this pur- 
 pose Bonaparte had given him eighteen thousand 
 soldiers. There were at this time in the Tyrol 
 seventeen thousand Austrians and ten thousand 
 Tyrolese militia. Though the result showed that 
 Joubert was stronger than his enemy, yet at the 
 beginning of active operations there was nothing 
 to indicate that he would win such success against 
 such odds. In fact, Bonaparte himself was doubt- 
 ful whether Joubert could hold in check the forces 
 of the enemy in the Tyrol. This fact is clearly 
 shown in the following orders : — 
 
 " Headquarters, Sacile, 
 March isth, 1797. 
 
 "To General Joubert: — In order to form a junc- 
 tion of the divisions which are in the Tyrol and those in 
 Friuli, it is necessary for the latter to cross the Tagliamento, 
 seize the position at Osoppo, force the passes of Ponteb- 
 bana (Pontebba), and reach the valley of the Drave. 
 
 "The Tyrol divisions should arrive at Brixen and 
 drive the enemy beyond the high chain of mountains 
 separating Innspruck from Brixen. But events may 
 occur which the contingencies of war require should be 
 provided for in advance. 
 
 " First : The Tyrol divisions may be beaten and 
 obliged to fall back upon the Mori line, or even that of 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. l6l 
 
 Rivoli ; be forced into the intrenched camp of Castelnuovo 
 (Castel Novo), and reduced to the defence of the Mincio ; 
 or even be compelled to shelter themselves in Mantua. 
 
 " Second : The enemy may endeavor to penetrate by 
 Feltre and Primolano, in an attempt to break our com- 
 munications; this, in the present condition of things, 
 appears to me very difficult. 
 
 "Third: It may happen that, by one movement or 
 another, the divisions which are in Friuli may be out- 
 flanked on the right or left, and that a head of column 
 of the enemy may hence gain the Piave, and even the 
 Brenta, before the Friuli divisions. 
 
 " Should the first hypothesis prove correct, but only in 
 this case, you will make use of the order which I send 
 you, giving you command of the divisions located in the 
 district of Mantua, as well as in Lombardy and the whole 
 of the country comprised between the Oglio and the 
 Adige. 
 
 " In every case, you must provision and hold Peschiera, 
 Porto-Legnago, Mantua, and Pizzighettone ; place your- 
 self between Mantua and the Po, in a position to supply 
 yourself by this river and to fall upon the rear of the 
 enemy if he dare to advance into the Milanese ; inform 
 General Sahuguet that he is to concentrate all his forces 
 in the castle of Ferrara. I shall give you, moreover, as 
 the exigencies of events demand, all necessary instruc- 
 tions, not doubting that, under all circumstances, you will 
 act conformably to the spirit of the war which we are now 
 waging. 
 
 " You understand that it is essential, in case you are 
 beaten, to dispute every position, and to make use of all 
 resources of art, and of all natural features of the ground. 
 
I62 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 in order to give the Friuli divisions time to take proper 
 measures. 
 
 "You will find enclosed herewith, Citizen General, 
 detailed instructions upon the different cases which may 
 arise. 
 
 "Prepare to attack Botzen by the most convenient 
 direction, taking the snows into consideration. 
 
 " To-morrow we shall make a crossing of the Taglia- 
 mento, which it is said the enemy intends disputing. I 
 desire you to begin your movement on the 27th or 28th. 
 If the weather continues as fine as to-day, and fortune 
 favors us, I calculate upon being in the defiles of Pon- 
 tebbana (Pontebba) on the 30th ; that is, upon the road 
 leading from Udine to Klagenfurt. I shall write from 
 Udine in greater detail. 
 
 "You will find enclosed instructions for your future 
 government, should yo.u succeed in seizing a part of the 
 Tyrol. 
 
 " Bonaparte." 
 
 Says Derrecagaix: — 
 
 " In his combination, Bonaparte seemed to adopt two 
 lines of operations : one through Friuli, the other through 
 the Tyrol and the Pusterthal. But this was only in ap- 
 pearance. The line indicated to Joubert was to be fol- 
 lowed only in case of the success of the main forces. It 
 extended through a country impracticable for the enemy, 
 and was to be connected by means of Mass^na's division 
 with the operating line of the principal army. 
 
 "We should not, moreover, forget that in moving 
 toward the Noric and Julian Alps, Bonaparte had upon 
 his left a hostile corps, established in the midst of the 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 163 
 
 Tyrol, and ready to cut his communications by the valley 
 of the Adige, aided by the warlike inhabitants of this 
 country. Joubert's corps had then a special mission. 
 It was a necessary detachment, but it was only a detach- 
 ment. The line of operations was that pursued by the 
 bulk of our forces. 
 
 " In reality, the decisive movement, that of the army 
 proper, was to take place upon a single line of operations, 
 the line in FriuU." 
 
 Though Bonaparte was everywhere successful 
 in his combinations, he has nevertheless been 
 severely criticised for having adopted in this part 
 of the campaign two distinct lines of operations. 
 In his own language he has stated these criticisms 
 and his replies to them as follows : — 
 
 "Was not the march into Germany by two lines of 
 operations, those of the Tyrol and Pontebba, a violation 
 of the principle that an army should have but one line of 
 operations? Was not the union of these two corps in 
 Carinthia, so distant from the point of departure, contrary 
 to the principle of never joining columns in the face of 
 the enemy? Would it not have been preferable to have 
 left from seven thousand to eight thousand men before 
 Trent upon the defensive, and to have collected ten 
 thousand or twelve thousand more upon the Piave? 
 This plan would have avoided the necessity of carrying 
 on the war in the Tyrol, a difficult theatre ; it would not 
 have been exposed to chances unfavorable for a junction 
 of the columns ; and at the outset of the campaign all 
 the forces would have been concentrated. 
 
l64 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 " Neither of the principles above cited has been violated. 
 If only eight thousand men had been left with Joubert 
 upon the Avicio (Lavis), he would have been attacked, 
 and the corps of Davidovich (Kerpen's and Laudon's 
 forces) would have reached Verona before the French 
 army arrived at Villach. For the purpose of maintaining 
 himself upon the Avicio, Joubert required at least four- 
 teen thousand men. It seemed preferable to leave his 
 forces undiminished, thus giving him a numerical supe- 
 riority which would enable hira to defeat Davidovich, 
 shatter and demoralize him, and drive him beyond the 
 Brenner. The Tyrol is a difficult region, but it is fatal to 
 the conquered. The French troops had acquired a 
 great superiority over the Germans. 
 
 " Germany was not entered by two lines of operations, 
 since the Pusterthal is on this side of the crest of the 
 Alps, and as soon as Joubert had passed Lienz, the line of 
 operation was that of Villach and Pontebba. Junction of 
 the two corps was not made in front of the enemy, for 
 when Joubert left Brixen to move to the right upon 
 Spittal by the Pusterthal or the valley of the Drave, the 
 main army had arrived at Klagenfurt, and had patrols as 
 far as Lienz. The Archduke, then, could devise no 
 manoeuvre to prevent this junction. Joubert, up to the 
 time of the battle of the Tagliamento, remained upon 
 the defensive. After this battle he attacked, beat, and 
 destroyed the greater part of Davidovich's corps, and 
 threw it back beyond the Brenner ; all this without risk, 
 since, had he been beaten, he would simply have fallen 
 back from position to position in Italy. When he 
 learned that the army had passed the Julian Alps and the 
 Drave, he made his junction movement by way of the 
 
THE TAGLIAMENTO. 165 
 
 Pusterthal, which was also without inconvenience. This 
 operation, rapidly executed, was indeed conformable to 
 all rules ; it should have had, and indeed did have, every 
 kind of advantage." 
 
 Everywhere victory had crowned the Army of 
 Italy. Bonaparte had crossed the Alps; Joubert 
 was about to join him. With all his available 
 forces about to unite into one army, Bonaparte 
 was ready to march on the Austrian capital. His 
 generals were confident of further success; his 
 soldiers were filled with enthusiasm. In an army 
 where all had tasted victory, none dreamed of 
 defeat. Bonaparte alone saw the difficulties of 
 the undertaking. He knew that his rear was in 
 danger; he knew that his line of communication 
 was weak, and would become weaker and weaker 
 the farther he advanced towards Vienna ; he knew 
 that the armies of the Rhine and the Sambre and 
 Meuse could not co-operate with him in his bold 
 undertaking. It seemed almost folly to march into 
 the heart of the Austrian dominions, and expect 
 to conquer the Austrian monarchy at the head of 
 only fifty thousand soldiers. Moreover, as he 
 advanced, his army was constantly diminishing in 
 numbers, while the Austrian army was being con- 
 tinually re-enforced. The Hungarians were about 
 to rise and join their forces to those of the Arch- 
 duke Charles. Volunteers for the defence of the 
 
1 66 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Austrian capital were already organizing. Soon, 
 Bonaparte would find himself in the presence of 
 superior numbers ; soon, he might be crushed by 
 overwhelming odds. Against odds sufficiently 
 great, the greatest must eventually fall. 
 
 Under these circumstances, Bonaparte offered 
 peace ; he agreed to the armistice, and signed the 
 preliminaries for a treaty of peace. His caution 
 decided him in this course. His caution caused 
 him to halt "^his victorious army almost within 
 sight of the Austrian capital. His caution ena- 
 bled him to end with brilliancy one of the most 
 wonderful campaigns ever planned and fought. 
 
 Had he been as cautious in after years, he might 
 have died Emperor of the French, " in the midst of 
 the French people whom he loved so well." ^ Had 
 he been as cautious in after years, he might never 
 have fallen at Waterloo, — might never have been 
 banished to that lone rock made famous by his 
 great name. 
 
 1 " It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banlcs of the 
 Seine, in the midst of the French people whom I have loved so 
 well." — The will of Napoleon. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 GENERAL COMMENTS. 
 
 \ T the beginning of this campaign the outlook 
 is most unfavorable to Bonaparte. Taking 
 command of the Army of Italy when it is ill 
 fed and ill equipped, when it is deficient in 
 siege artillery, in pontoon equipage, and means 
 of transportation, he surmounts all these difH- 
 culties, crosses the Apennines in the face of his 
 enemies, drives the Austrians before him, and 
 defeats them again and again. Yet his ambi- 
 tion is not satisfied. More marvellous purposes 
 crowd upon his brain. He will cross the Alps. 
 He will carry the French eagles into the Aus- 
 trian dominions. Proud Austria shall tremble 
 for the security of even her hereditary posses- 
 sions. 
 
 In these marvellous successes the odds against 
 which he successfully contended will perhaps be 
 better appreciated by referring to the following 
 table, which gives the strength of the opposing 
 forces, and the losses on both sides. 
 
1 68 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Parts of Campaign 
 
 [. Forces. 
 
 Forces. 
 
 1st. Montenotte . 
 
 French, 40,000. . 
 
 . Allies, 50,000. 
 
 2d. Lodi .... 
 
 French, 40,000. . 
 
 . Austrians, 42,000. 
 
 3d. Lonato and 
 
 
 
 Castiglione 
 
 French, 45,000. , 
 
 . Austrians, 72,000. 
 
 4th. Bassano and 
 
 
 
 San Georgio 
 
 French, 42,000. . 
 
 . Austrians, 56,000. 
 
 5th. Arcole . . . 
 
 French, 40,000. . 
 
 . Austrians, 70,000. 
 
 6th. Rivoli . . . 
 
 French, 44,000. . 
 
 . Austrians, 65,000. 
 
 7th. The Taglia- 
 
 
 
 mento . . . 
 
 French, 70,000. . 
 
 , Austrians, 72,000. 
 
 Average strength to 
 
 
 
 fall of Mantua . 
 
 French, 42,000. . 
 
 . Allies, 60,000. 
 
 Average strength 
 
 
 
 during campaign . 
 
 French, 46,000. . 
 
 . Allies, 61,000. 
 
 Loss during cam- 
 
 French, 
 
 Allies, 
 
 paign 
 
 about 40,000. . 
 
 about 120,000. 
 
 These numbers include the French soldiers left 
 in Italy to protect the French rear, and the re- 
 enforcements that joined the Austrian armies 
 after the battle of the Tagliamento. The losses 
 include killed, wounded, and captured on both 
 sides, but not the Austrian soldiers who died in 
 the fortress of Mantua. 
 
 By a reference to the above table it will be 
 seen that the average strength of the French 
 forces prior to the capitulation of Mantua was 
 forty-two thousandj' while that of the opposing 
 forces was sixty thousand, — a ratio of seven to 
 ten. During this time more than one hundred 
 thousand Austrians were killed, wounded, or cap- 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 69 
 
 tured by the Army of Italy, while the French 
 lost less than thirty-five thousand. 
 
 Throughout the campaign, the average strength 
 of the French forces was forty-six thousand and 
 that of the opposing forces sixty-one thousand, — 
 a ratio of about three to four. With these num- 
 bers Bonaparte defeated one Sardinian army and 
 six Austrian armies; and killed, wounded, or 
 captured, one hundred and twenty thousand men. 
 During the entire struggle, each French soldier 
 put hors de combat, on an average, two and a 
 half Austrians; and forty-six thousand French- 
 men were more than a match for sixty-one thou- 
 sand Austrians. 
 
 By skill in strategy and tactics Bonaparte was 
 constantly successful in the face of these odds. 
 By skill in strategy he outnumbered the enemy 
 upon all the prominent battle-fields except Arcole 
 and Rivoli; and by skill in tactics he won these 
 two battles. 
 
 At times the odds against him were almost too 
 great to be overcome. In the Arcole part of the 
 campaign the inequality between the opposing 
 armies was greatest, and here he carne nearest 
 to defeat; here, after desperate fighting, forty 
 thousand Frenchmen, guided by his genius, 
 defeated seventy thousand Austrians. 
 
 It was said by Napoleon that Mass^na's 
 
170 BONAPARTES FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 presence on a battle-field was equivalent to a 
 re-enforcement of twenty thousand men. Surely, 
 when we consider Bonaparte's marvellous suc- 
 cesses in the face of such great odds, we are 
 led to reckon the value of his presence by still 
 greater numbers. 
 
 It is difficult to conceive of any standard by 
 which to measure the power of intellect. Mind 
 cannot be measured with a foot rule. Only by 
 comparison can we form a correct estimate of its 
 power. By comparing the odds and the results 
 in these operations, we can imagine Bonaparte's 
 intellect exerting itself as a physical force, more 
 powerful in the conflict than thousands of re- 
 enforcements. In imagination we can see two 
 opposing armies advancing to begin a great 
 battle. We can see the brave soldiers of Austria, 
 their glittering arms, and their old white-haired 
 commander. We can see the French divisions 
 and their eagles. We can see Massena, Lannes, 
 Augereau, Joubert, and in their midst Napoleon. 
 The battle begins. The brave meet the brave. 
 All are determined to conquer or die; all fight 
 desperately, furiously. We can see the wavering 
 lines, hear the roar of the cannon, the rattle of 
 the musketry. We can see the troops hurrying 
 hither and thither, and amidst confusion and 
 death hear the shouts of victory. In the smoke 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 171 
 
 of the battle we can now and then catch a glimpse 
 of Napoleon galloping over the battle-field. He 
 commands. He does not blanch in the face of 
 great odds. He is master of the situation. His 
 eagle eye takes in the whole field. He sees 
 where the blow must be struck to decide the 
 struggle. He gives the word. The reserves 
 move forward; they charge; the crash comes. 
 The Austrians waver and fall back; the French 
 rush on with cheers. The smoke clears away; 
 the conflict is ended; the battle is won. 
 
 Bravery did not decide this battle; for the 
 Austrians and French were equally brave. Num- 
 bers did not decide it; for the Austrians out- 
 numbered the French. It was the intellect of 
 Bonaparte which turned the scale. Was not his 
 intellect all-powerful at Rivoli, Austerlitz, and 
 Friedland.V 
 
 To conduct a campaign to a successful termi- 
 nation is a worthy task for a great intellect. It 
 is difficult to conceive of any undertaking which 
 requires greater and more diverse powers of 
 mind. Hundreds of matters must be carefully 
 considered. Not only the strategical and tactical 
 manoeuvres by which he concentrates his forces 
 and wins his victories, but his communications, 
 his means of transportation, the supplies for his 
 army, the equipment and discipline of his troops. 
 
172 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 the alDilities of his subordinate commanders, the 
 topography and resources of the country, give 
 him the greatest anxiety. He must give careful 
 attention to all these matters; for the neglect 
 of a single one may lead to disaster. He must 
 be brave, clear-headed, cool, cautious, and fear- 
 less; and be able to make a quick decision in 
 critical times. He must have an eye for facts. 
 He must weigh correctly all reports and rumors, 
 and from the doubtful information at hand sift 
 the true from the false. He must see everything 
 that is going on around him. His glance must 
 penetrate the enemy's line, his vision sweep the 
 whole theatre of operations. Says Napoleon : — 
 
 " The first quality of a commander-in-chief is the pos- 
 session of a cool head, which receives correct impressions 
 of things, which never becomes over-excited, which does 
 not permit itself to be intoxicated by good nor bewildered 
 by bad news, — a mind in which the successive or simul- 
 taneous impressions received during the course of a day 
 classify themselves, and take the only place they should 
 properly occupy ; for good sense and reason are the 
 result of comparing several sensations, weighed with 
 equal consideration. 
 
 " There are men who, by reason of their physical and 
 moral constitutions, interpret every event in the same way ; 
 whatever may be their wisdom, spirit, courage, and other 
 qualities, nature has not called them to the command of 
 armies and the direction of great military operation^. 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 173 
 
 "The commander-in-chief is the head; he is every- 
 thing for the army. It was not the Roman army which 
 conquered Gaul, but Caesar ; it was not the Carthaginian 
 army which, at the gates of Rome, made the Eternal City 
 tremble, but Hannibal \ it was not the Macedonian army 
 which marched as far as the Indus, but Alexander; it 
 was not the Prussian army which defended Prussia for 
 seven years against the three most powerful states of 
 Europe, but Frederick." 
 
 By studying the campaigns of great soldiers 
 during different periods of the world's history, it 
 is found that their successes are due, in great 
 measure, to the correct application of certain 
 unchangeable laws. These laws are the prin- 
 ciples of "strategy. They have been formulated 
 after careful study of the manoeuvres and com- 
 binations of the great masters of war. Born of 
 long and varied experience, and found immutable 
 in all ages, they are the basis for all future 
 successes. 
 
 Several of the most important of these prin- 
 ciples are given here. The first three embrace 
 almost the whole subject of strategy; and con- 
 sequently include several of those which follow 
 them. 
 
 First: Be stronger than the enemy on the 
 battle-field. 
 
 Second: Operate upon the communications of 
 the enemy without exposing your own. 
 
1/4 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 Third : Operate upon interior lines. 
 
 Fourth: Engage your masses with the frac- 
 tions of the enemy's forces. 
 
 Fifth: Divide the forces of the enemy, and 
 beat them in detail. 
 
 Sixth : Operate offensively and in force along 
 but one line at a time. 
 
 Seventh: Do not advance to attack with the 
 main parts of an army separated by impassable 
 obstacles. 
 
 Eighth: Concentrate an overwhelming mass 
 upon the vital point of the enemy. 
 
 This last principle reaches into the domain of 
 tactics, for it is applicable also on the battle-field. 
 But on the battle-field tactics and strategy blend, 
 so that it is not always possible to determine 
 exactly the dividing line between them. 
 
 Owing to improved weapons of warfare, to 
 better means of transportation, and to discoveries 
 in electricity, changes in the method of applying 
 these principles have resulted; but the prin- 
 ciples themselves are immutable. They are the 
 same to-day as in the days of Alexander, of 
 Hannibal, of Csesar, and of Napoleon. They are 
 the foundations of all great military successes. 
 They are the test of generalship. No CMnmander 
 can long violate them without bringing disaster 
 and ruin upon his army. 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 175 
 
 Mankind is apt to measure a soldier's ability 
 by his successes. As victory is the aim of all 
 strategy and tactics, it is proper that generalship 
 should be judged by the results attained. But 
 this test is not always infallible. When a com- 
 mander wins battle after battle and campaign 
 after campaign under many difficulties, his suc- 
 cesses are almost a sure proof of great general- 
 ship; not because they themselves are an infallible 
 test of his military ability, but because they can 
 be attained only by carrying out correctly the 
 principles of war. But if we consider single 
 manoeuvres, or single battles, the test of victory 
 does not necessarily apply; for the commander 
 may blunder into a victory; he may win a battle 
 by tactical skill while his strategical manoeuvres 
 have been a series of errors. He may even meet 
 defeat without having committed a single fault 
 in either tactics or strategy. How then are we 
 to determine whether a battle or a manoeuvre was 
 conducted correctly or incorrectly } What is the 
 infallible test of generalship.' The answer is. 
 The immutable principles of war. He who fol- 
 lows them as far as possible in every step that he 
 takes shows good generalship. To this it may be 
 replied that the principles sometimes conflict, 
 and that it is impossible to proceed without vio- 
 lating one of them ; or that no general has ever 
 
176 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 conducted a campaign without sometimes violat- 
 ing some principle of strategy or tactics. This 
 is true; a commander has often no alternative 
 but to take up a faulty position, or to carry out 
 a plan which violates some principle of war. 
 Taking into account these facts, the following 
 rule may be takeii as the test of generalship : 
 To carry out the immutable principles of war when 
 it is possible to do so; when they conflict, to carry 
 out those which offer the greatest advantages. 
 
 To operate always upon interior lines may be 
 impossible; but if a commander carries out this 
 principle when it is possible to do so, he is doing 
 all in this respect that any soldier can do to win 
 success. 
 
 In order to illustrate this subject by a par- 
 ticular case, let us refer to one of Bonaparte'-s 
 manoeuvres in the Bassano and San Georgio part 
 of the campaign. It will be remembered that 
 he had two divisions at Rivoli, and one at Salo 
 on the other side of Lake Garda. He had 
 decided to take the offensive; he wished to 
 advance upon Roveredo with these three divis- 
 ions. In only two ways could this be accom- 
 plished : the division at Salo could either march 
 around the north end of Lake Garda and unite at 
 Roveredo with the divisions coming from Rivoli ; 
 or it could march around the south end of the 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 77 
 
 lake, unite with the two divisions at Rivoli, and 
 march on Roveredo. Bonaparte adopted the first 
 plan, and in doing so violated the principle of 
 strategy that, in advancing to attack, the main 
 parts of an army should not be separated by 
 impassable obstacles. Had he adopted the 
 second plan, he would have violated another 
 principle. He would have exposed his commu- 
 nications to an attack in the vicinity of Brescia; 
 and the Austrians could have descended on the 
 west side of Lake Garda, and have attacked his 
 communications without exposing their own. 
 He had to choose which plan to adopt, which 
 principle to violate. He chose the first, because 
 of the two plans, both of which were faulty, the 
 first offered the fewest disadvantages. Judged 
 then by the test of generalship, the manoeuvre 
 was correct. But the commander who violates 
 a principle of war, whether by neglect or neces- 
 sity, always gives to his opponent a certain ad- 
 vantage. In other words the enemy may always 
 profit by the mistakes of his adversary, whether 
 they are unavoidable or due to poor generalship. 
 Referring again to the case just mentioned, it 
 has been pointed out in a former chapter how 
 the Austrian general could have concentrated his 
 army at the head of Lake Garda, and by this 
 means have not only outnumbered Bonaparte 
 
lyS BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 upon the battle-field, but have defeated in detail 
 the separated parts of his army. The unavoidable 
 violation of a principle of strategy by Bonaparte 
 gave to the Austrian commander great chances 
 of success. The latter, however, did not have 
 sufficient military ability to take advantage of 
 the opportunity offered, but made the mistake of 
 dividing his own forces, thus allowing Bonaparte 
 not only to unite his divisions at Roveredo, but 
 to defeat separately the two Austrian armies. 
 
 Let us illustrate this subject still further by 
 taking other examples from this campaign. 
 
 On the morning of April 12, 1796, Bonaparte 
 had La Harpe's and Massdna's divisions at Mon- 
 tenotte ready to begin the battle. These two 
 divisions, numbering sixteen thousand soldiers, 
 were opposed to the Austrian centre under 
 Argenteau, numbering ten thousand soldiers. 
 Beaulieu, the Austrian commander-in-chief, was 
 between Genoa and Voltri with seventeen thou- 
 sand Austrians. The remainder of the Army of 
 Italy was watching and holding in check the 
 twenty thousand Sardinians at Mondovi, Ceva, 
 and Millesimo. This was the situation when 
 Bonaparte fought the battle of Montenotte, and 
 broke through the centre of the allies. Before 
 the manoeuvres were executed leading up to 
 this battle, he perceived that the Austrians and 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 79 
 
 Sardinians were widely separated, and that the 
 centre was the vulnerable spot in their long line. 
 By political and strategical skill he enticed 
 Beaulieu through the Bochetta pass towards 
 Genoa andVoltri; then, before he could return 
 to aid Argenteau, Bonaparte concentrated an 
 overwhelming force at Montenotte, and crushed 
 through the Austrian centre. 
 
 In these operations Bonaparte carried out the 
 following principles of strategy. 
 
 First : He brought a stronger force upon the 
 battle-field of Montenotte than the enemy. He 
 had sixteen thousand soldiers, Argenteau but ten 
 thousand; 
 
 Second : He attacked offensively and in force 
 along only one line at a time. His remaining 
 divisions were in front of the Sardinians acting 
 defensively to prevent them from re-enforcing 
 Argenteau. No French force was left in front of 
 Beaulieu, because none was needed there. " The 
 sole use of a containing force," says Hamley, " is 
 to prevent a reunion of the enemy's parts. If it 
 is not necessary to this purpose, it will be better 
 employed at the point of attack. " As has been 
 shown in the first chapter, Beaulieu could not aid 
 Argenteau by advancing from Genoa towards 
 Montenotte; neither could he aid him in time by 
 returning through the Bochetta pass, for such a 
 
l80 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 movement would take several days. Before this 
 time elapsed, not only Montenotte, but the battles 
 of Millesimo and Dego, were fought and won. 
 
 Third : At Montenotte Bonaparte divided the 
 forces of the enemy. Afterwards he beat them 
 in detail at Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi. 
 
 Fourth: Montenotte was the vital point in 
 the long line of the allies. By concentrating an 
 overwhelming mass against Argenteau, Bonaparte 
 broke through the line, and thereafter from his 
 central position had the advantage of interior 
 lines in operating against the allies. 
 
 Every principle of strategy which Bonaparte 
 carried out Beaulieu violated. The latter had 
 under his command fifty thousand soldiers ; yet 
 he so scattered his troops that he brought upon 
 the decisive point — the battle-field of Monte- 
 notte — but one fifth of his army. What made 
 the matter still more humiliating was the fact 
 that, under his immediate command and within 
 hearing of the guns of Montenotte, were seven- 
 teen thousand brave Austrians, who were march- 
 ing and countermarching in the vicinity of Genoa 
 to no purpose, neither able to re-enforce Argen- 
 teau, nor able to hold in check any fraction of 
 the Army of Italy. 
 
 If, in the Lodi part of the campaign, Bona- 
 parte had not been delayed in crossing the Po 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. l8l 
 
 at Placentia, he would have had great chances of 
 success ; for the Austrians, having to form front 
 to a flank ^ in order to fight, would upon the least 
 reverse have lost their communications. On the 
 other hand, Bonaparte could have been driven 
 back across the Po without endangering in the 
 least his communications. His object was to 
 place his army in such a position as to enable 
 him to destroy the Austrian communications 
 without endangering his own. 
 
 In the Arcole part of the campaign, Bonaparte 
 attempted a manoeuvre very similar to this: he 
 crossed the Adige at Verona, descended the 
 river to Ronco, recrossed the Adige there, and 
 attempted to throw his army upon the flank and 
 rear of Alvinzi. In this position, as at Placentia, 
 he threatened the communications of the Aus- 
 trians without exposing his own to Alvinzi's 
 attacks. 
 
 In gaining a favorable position for attacking 
 the flank and rear of the enemy, Bonaparte had 
 to make a flank march, and consequently had 
 to expose his own flank to the enemy's attacks. 
 But in each of these cases his flank was protected 
 by an unfordable river; and because he marched 
 rapidly, he was able to effect a crossing before 
 his adversary discovered his plan. Nevertheless, 
 
 1 See foot-note on page 45. 
 
1 82 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 these flank marches were attended with consider- 
 able danger. In fact all flank marches in the 
 vicinity of an active enemy are dangerous; for a 
 commander who gains a position upon the ene- 
 my's flank must necessarily expose his own flank 
 to the enemy's attacks. Even when his flank 
 is protected by a river, as in the cases just 
 mentioned, he cannot cross it in the face of the 
 enemy without taking considerable risk. Had 
 the Austrian army been assembled in force near 
 Placentia, it could have defeated the divisions 
 of the Army of Italy in detail as they crossed 
 the Po. 
 
 That flank marches are always attended with 
 more or less danger is probably the reason why 
 Napoleon seldom made them in his campaigns. 
 As a rule, he preferred to strike at the centre of 
 the enemy rather than at his flank. By striking 
 at the centre, he could separate the enemy's 
 army into parts and then defeat them in detail. 
 By striking at the flank, he gave the enemy an 
 opportunity to concentrate. Even if he defeated 
 one flank, he might drive it back upon the other, 
 and thus have to meet both in a single engage- 
 ment. Thus at Waterloo, had Napoleon attacked 
 the right of the English, as Wellington un- 
 doubtedly expected him to do, he would prob- 
 ably have driven Wellington back upon Blucher, 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 83 
 
 and would have had to fight them united. As 
 it was, after defeating Blucher, he had to fight 
 them united ; but this was not due to any fault in 
 Napoleon's plan. It was due to the inefficiency 
 of Grouchy. 
 
 At Marengo and at Ulm Napoleon made a flank 
 march, and struck at the rear of the Austrians, 
 and at Jena he struck at the flank of the Prus- 
 sians; but these cases were exceptional. There 
 were excellent reasons for his adopting this plan 
 in each case. 
 
 In the Marengo campaign, Bonaparte crossed the 
 Alps over the Great St. Bernard pass, marched 
 to Milan, and threw his army from the north 
 upon the Austrian communications near Marengo. 
 This was undoubtedly a hazardous movement; 
 nevertheless, it offered, on the whole, more 
 decisive results and greater chances of success 
 than any other plan of operations. By adopting 
 this plan he was enabled to receive a re-enforce- 
 ment of fifteen thousand soldiers from the Army 
 of the Rhine. They marched through the St. 
 Gothard pass and joined him near Milan. 
 
 Nor was this flank march of Bonaparte, after 
 all, so hazardous as it would at first seem to be ; 
 for though his communications by the St. Ber- 
 nard were exposed to the enemy's attacks, he 
 had a line of retreat to the north by way of the 
 
1 84 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 St. Gothard, which he could have utilized had he 
 been beaten at Marengo. 
 
 In the Ulm campaign, Napoleon was opposed 
 to the Austrians and Russians. The Austrian 
 army was on the Danube in the vicinity of Ulm, 
 with its front facing France. A Russian army, 
 several marches distant, was on its way to join 
 the Austrians at Ulm. In numbers Napoleon's 
 army was greatly superior to the Austrian army. 
 By a series of remarkable marches, the divisions 
 of Napoleon's army proceeded from the English 
 Channel, and from other points in the theatre 
 of war, towards Ulm. Napoleon was anxious to 
 destroy the Austrians before their Russian allies 
 should arrive. Had he attacked the Austrian 
 army in front, it might have been driven back 
 upon the Russian army, and he would have found 
 them united in his front. He therefore decided 
 to march his army around the right of the Aus- 
 trians. By making this flank march, he suc- 
 ceeded in cutting the Austrians from their 
 communications, and at the same time inter- 
 posed his own army between them and the ad- 
 vancing Russians. In this case a flank march 
 was necessary in order to divide the allies and 
 beat them in detail. In this manoeuvre Napo- 
 leon was wonderfully successful. He captured 
 almost the entire Austrian army before the Rus- 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 185 
 
 sian army could unite with it. The danger of 
 these mancEuvres was lessened by the age and 
 character of the Austrian commander, General 
 Mack. Napoleon, however, took the greatest pre- 
 cautions. In order to screen his divisions while 
 they were making the flank march around the 
 Austrian right, he directed a cavalry corps and 
 part of an infantry corps to march directly to- 
 wards Ulm. Mack, who had learned that large 
 bodies of cavalry and infantry were in his front, 
 was expecting an attack from that direction. He 
 was greatly surprised when he learned that the 
 greater part of the French army had slipped by 
 his right and had cut off his communications 
 with Vienna. The superiority in numbers of 
 Napoleon's army over the Austrian army, and 
 the great results obtained by throwing his army 
 between the allies, certainly justified him in mak- 
 ing this flank march. 
 
 It has already been said that these flank 
 marches are always dangerous, and especially so 
 in the presence of an active adversary. During 
 the whole of Napoleon's career, none of his 
 numerous adversaries ever succeeded in defeating 
 him by such a movement. At Austerlitz the allies 
 attempted just such a movement against him; 
 and they were annihilated in the most remarkable 
 tactical battle which has ever been fought. 
 
1 86 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIG2V. 
 
 In the Austerlitz campaign, Napoleon was 
 opposed to the Russians and Austrians. He 
 had marched directly north from Vienna to Aus- 
 terlitz. His line of communications extended 
 back through Vienna. His line of battle faced 
 the east, and was parallel to, and but a short dis- 
 tance from, the road to Vienna. In order to face 
 the allies he had been obliged to form front to 
 a flank, and upon the least reverse would have 
 lost his communications with Vienna. 
 
 The allies, who had just been strongly im- 
 pressed by Napoleon's flank march around the 
 Austrian right at Ulm, conceived the plan of 
 making a similar march around Napoleon's right 
 at Austerlitz. They expected to cut the com- 
 munications of Napoleon as he had cut the com- 
 munications of Mack. This being accomplished, 
 they hoped to destroy or capture the French 
 army. Since Napoleon had won such a great 
 victory by a flank manoeuvre, why should not 
 they also win by a similar manoeuvre.' They 
 purposed to do so. They believed that, by fol- 
 lowing in the footsteps of Napoleon, they could 
 beat him at his own game. 
 
 Napoleon was quick to discover their inten- 
 tions. From the movements of the allies, he 
 saw that their object was to cut him off from 
 his communications with Vienna. In fact, they 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 187 
 
 undertook to carry out this plan within sight of 
 the French army. Napoleon saw that they were 
 making a fatal blunder by weakening their centre. 
 He did not even strengthen his right to meet 
 the attack of the enemy's left. He waited until 
 the movements of the allies had progressed suffi- 
 ciently, then he ordered his divisions forward. 
 With his own centre strongly re-enforced, he 
 threw his army forward, like a wedge, upon 
 the centre of the allies, crushed through their 
 weakened lines, and actually cut them in two. 
 They were beaten on all sides. Great numbers 
 were killed, captured, and wounded. It was a 
 splendid victory for Napoleon. It was a terrible 
 defeat for the allies. 
 
 During the battle, Napoleon showed but little 
 anxiety about losing his communications with 
 Vienna. The reason for this was that he had 
 another line of communications with France 
 through Bohemia. This line was perpendicular 
 to the front of his army at Austerlitz, and was 
 shorter than the line through Vienna. If the 
 allies had succeeded in their plan, and had even 
 beaten Napoleon at Austerlitz, he could have 
 fallen back through Bohemia without losing his 
 communications with France. 
 
 Why was the flank march of the allies so disas- 
 trous, while that of Napoleon at Ulm was so sue- 
 
1 88 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 cessful ? The principal reason was that the allies 
 attempted to do tactically what Napoleon had 
 done strategically. The allies attempted this 
 manoeuvre in the immediate vicinity of the bat- 
 tle-field. They were within sight of the French 
 army. Their movements were seen by Napo- 
 leon. The intentions of the allies were almost 
 as plain to him as if he had ordered their 
 movements. At the very time that they should 
 have kept their forces concentrated, they began 
 to separate them by directing a large force to 
 their left against Napoleon's communications. 
 
 At Ulm, when Napoleon marched his army 
 strategically round the right of Mack, he was, 
 during the critical part of the manoeuvre, fully 
 a day's march from the right of the Austrian 
 army; and his divisions were in supporting 
 distance of each other. Had Mack marched 
 against Napoleon at this time, the latter would 
 at once have united his divisions for battle. 
 
 To conduct a strategical flank march success- 
 fully requires great skill, and to conduct a tacti- 
 cal flank march successfully requires still greater 
 skill. Both are dangerous operations when con- 
 ducted in the presence of an active enemy. By 
 a flank march on the battle-field, or in its imme- 
 diate vicinity, Frederick was often successful 
 against an adversary whose principal aim was 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 189 
 
 to take up a strong position and hold it; but 
 against a Napoleon, all the skill of the great 
 Prussian would have availed naught. 
 
 In the Jena campaign, Napoleon made a flank 
 march- against the left of the Prussian army, 
 somewhat similar to that which he made against 
 the left of the Austrians at Arcole. At the time, 
 his army was superior to the enemy in numbers. 
 A Russian army was on its way to re-enforce the 
 Prussian army. He wished to annihilate the 
 Prussians before they were re-enforced by their 
 allies. Against the Russians and Austrians com- 
 bined, he had just won the battle of Austerlitz. 
 He was flushed with victory. He decided that 
 he would take the risk of making a flank march 
 in order to gain such great results. His wisdom 
 in thus deciding was shown by his successes : in 
 one month he annihilated the military power of 
 Prussia. 
 
 Having digressed somewhat upon the subject 
 of flank marches, let us return to the subject of 
 strategical principles as illustrated by the opera- 
 tions of the Lonato and Castiglione part of the 
 campaign. It will be remembered that Wurm- 
 ser had divided his forces into two armies: 
 one, twenty-five thousand strong, commanded by 
 Quasdanovich, was marching on the west side of 
 Lake Garda towards Mantua; the other, thirty- 
 
igo BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 five thousand strong, commanded by Wurmser 
 himself, was descending the Adige in two 
 columns, one on each side of the river. In addi- 
 tion to these forces there were twelve thousand 
 Austrians shut up in the fortress of Mantua. 
 
 To oppose these seventy-two thousand Austrians 
 Bbnaparte had only forty-five thousand soldiers. 
 Mass^na with fifteen thousand was at Verona and 
 Rivoli; Augereau with eight thousand was at 
 Legnago ; Sauret with four thousand was at Salo ; 
 eight thousand were in reserve; and Serrurier 
 with ten thousand was besieging Mantua. 
 
 To meet the advancing Austrians, Bonaparte 
 made his first concentration at the foot of Lake 
 Garda, in the vicinity of Lonato. Here he con- 
 centrated all his available men. Even the di- 
 vision which had been besieging Mantua was 
 directed to this point. Why did Bonaparte se- 
 lect this point for concentration ? and why did 
 he raise the siege of Mantua.' By pointing out 
 some of the strategical principles carried out and 
 violated in these operations, we shall be able 
 to answer satisfactorily these questions. In 
 advancing to attack with the main parts of the 
 Austrian army separated by impassable obstacles, 
 Wurmser was violating a principle of strategy; 
 while his lieutenant, commanding his right wing, 
 in advancing upon the French communications 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 19 1 
 
 without exposing his own, was carrying out a 
 principle of strategy. At the outset, therefore, 
 Bonaparte had two important problems to solve : 
 he must, if possible, defeat the separated parts 
 of the Austrian army before any of them unite; 
 and must also prevent Quasdanovich from cutting 
 the French communications in' the vicinity of 
 Brescia. As has been shown in Chapter III., in 
 only one way could Bonaparte solve the first prob- 
 lem. By making his first concentrated attack 
 at Rivoli, he could have succeeded in defeating 
 separately the three parts of the Austrian army. 
 But to attack at Rivoli, instead of at Lonato, 
 would have allowed Quasdanovich to cut the 
 French communications in the vicinity of Brescia. 
 Bonaparte therefore decided to make his first 
 concentration at the foot of Lake Garda. By 
 concentrating at this point, he believed that he 
 could drive back Quasdanovich, make secure 
 his communications, and prevent the twenty-five 
 thousand Austrians on the west side of Lake 
 Garda from uniting with the thirty-five thousand 
 on the east side. 
 
 In the execution of this plan there was still 
 another important problem which he had to 
 solve. He could hardly expect to be successful 
 unless he could bring superior numbers against 
 Quasdanovich at Lonato. To do this, it would 
 
192 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 be necessary to raise the siege of Mantua, in 
 order to unite Serrurier with Massdna and 
 Augereau. To withdraw Serrurier's division 
 from Mantua would allow the twelve thousand 
 Austrians there to unite with the thirty-five 
 thousand Austrians on the east side of Lake 
 Garda, and together they would outnumber the 
 entire French army: nevertheless, this was the 
 best plan to adopt; for if Bonaparte were de- 
 feated while Serrurier was in front of Mantua, 
 the Austrians would undoubtedly capture this 
 division. To withdraw Serrurier, when the Aus- 
 trians in Mantua were nearly starved out and 
 almost ready to surrender, was a great sacrifice 
 for victory; but in this way only could Bonaparte 
 outnumber the enemy upon the battle-field; in 
 this way only could he hope to make headway 
 against such great odds. 
 
 The first principle of strategy is to be stronger 
 than the enemy on the battle-field. This prin- 
 ciple is the foundation of all military success. 
 As the commander who wins a victory is neces- 
 sarily stronger than the enemy, it might seem 
 that this maxim means simply to be victorious. 
 But it means more than this. It means that he 
 should engage his masses with the fractions of 
 the enemy; it means that he should make every 
 effort to outnumber him upon the battle-field; 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 93 
 
 and when this cannot be done, it means that he 
 should take every possible chance to strengthen 
 himself and weaken the enemy. That Bonaparte 
 outnumbered the enemy upon all the important 
 battle-fields except Arcole and Rivoli shows how 
 well he applied this maxim. But what shows it 
 still better is the fact, that, when he fought his 
 battles, he had every soldier there who could 
 be spared from other important points in the 
 theatre of operations. When he won the battles 
 of Arcole and Rivoli, he had brought there every 
 available man in his army. This is the test of 
 strategical ability. He who fights and wins a 
 battle with inferior numbers may show himself 
 to be a great tactician ; but if he has idle troops 
 in the theatre of operations at the time, he shows 
 poor generalship. Contrariwise, he who concen- 
 trates on the battle-field all his available forces, 
 and outnumbers the enemy there, may show him- 
 self to be a great strategist; but if he is then 
 beaten, he likewise shows poor generalship. 
 
 In the manoeuvres and combinations of Bona- 
 parte throughout this campaign, the freedom from 
 error strikes us with wonder. It is generally an 
 easy matter for one with a fair knowledge of the 
 science of war to discover and point out, after a 
 campaign is ended, the mistakes that were made ; 
 
 to show how such or such a plan would have 
 
 13 
 
194 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 been better than the one adopted ; or how, by a 
 different tactical formation, or a different stra- 
 tegical manoeuvre, different results might have 
 been obtained. In this campaign there is no 
 chance for such criticisms. Bonaparte made no 
 avoidable errors. From a strategical as well as 
 from a tactical point of view this campaign is 
 almost perfect. It was by following the prin- 
 ciples which he displayed here that he afterwards 
 defeated coalition after coalition formed for his 
 destruction ; and it was by committing the errors 
 which he avoided here that he brought upon him- 
 self those disasters which caused his fall. 
 
 The only criticism which can be made — and 
 that only in the minor details of the campaign — 
 is that Bonaparte did not at the outset supply 
 his army with pontoon equipage. Had he done 
 so, he would not have been delayed in crossing 
 the Po at Placentia, or the Adige at Ronco, and 
 thus have been prevented in each case from 
 capturing an Austrian army. It will be remem- 
 bered, however, that in the earlier part of the 
 campaign it was almost impossible for him to 
 provide his army with pontoons. At the outset 
 his soldiers had great difficulty to obtain even 
 bread and shoes. Until these were supplied, 
 other matters of less importance had to wait. 
 Furthermore, the crossing of the Apennines was 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 195 
 
 at this time engaging Bonaparte's thoughts; he 
 did not realize that the Army of Italy would, in 
 a few months, cross the Po, the Mincio, and the 
 Adige. In this connection it is worthy of notice 
 that in his subsequent campaigns he provided his 
 army with pontoon equipage, by means of which 
 he crossed some of the largest rivers of Europe. 
 
 On the Austrian side, all the commanders 
 except the Archduke Charles not only committed 
 many errors, but continued to repeat them again 
 and again. The Austrians were always either 
 too much extended, or separated by impassable 
 obstacles. Throughout the campaign they ad- 
 vanced to attack the French with divided forces. 
 This was their greatest error. It would seem 
 that, after one or two crushing defeats, they 
 ought to have discovered their error, and have 
 abandoned this system of war. But the victories 
 of Bonaparte taught them no lesson. They were 
 wedded to the past. In the face of defeat and 
 annihilation they clung to old military ideas. 
 Even the campaigns of Frederick the Great had 
 taught them no new military truths. Their 
 whole system of war was faulty. They believed 
 in scattering their forces. By occupying all the 
 principal roads and prominent points within their 
 theatre of operations, they expected to hold mili- 
 tary possession of the country. Their system was 
 
196 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN: 
 
 to form a chain of posts, — a cordon, — extending 
 along the line to be occupied, and by this means 
 they expected to prevent the advance of the 
 enemy. Their plan of conducting active opera- 
 tions was based upon the same faulty method. 
 They supposed that the enemy would, like them, 
 scatter his army to hold his line; and wOuld 
 advance with it divided into centre and wings, 
 or into several parts, widely separated, perhaps, 
 by intervening obstacles. Their plan was to 
 meet centre with centre, wing with wing, part 
 with part. In their view, should the enemy be 
 so foolish as to advance in force along only one 
 line, their several armies would outflank him, 
 cut off his retreat, surround him, and, by attack- 
 ing him from different directions, force him to 
 surrender. To surround the enemy was regarded 
 by them as the height of military achievement ; 
 to allow themselves to be surrounded bv him 
 seemed to them the height of military folly. 
 Such were their theories ; such was their system 
 of war. Though in this system there are some 
 truths; yet on the whole it is one of the most 
 faulty systems ever advocated by military men. 
 
 Diametrically opposite to this system of war 
 is that of Bonaparte. Instead of scattering his 
 forces he concentrated them. His plan was to 
 mass them against some vital point of the enemy, 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 97 
 
 and to attack him on one line, and in such a di- 
 rection as to place him at a disadvantage. With 
 one division, sometimes two, as a containing 
 force, he held in check a part of the enemy's 
 forces, and then concentrated superior numbers 
 against his remaining forces at some decisive 
 point. If the enemy's line was too much ex- 
 tended, he struck at the centre, and broke through 
 it; then attacked and defeated in detail the sep- 
 arate parts. If the enemy advanced to attack 
 with his army separated into parts by impassable 
 obstacles, Bonaparte manoeuvred so as to crush 
 in succession these isolated parts before they 
 could unite. In this way, by fighting a part of 
 the enemy's army at one time, he was nearly 
 always stronger than the enemy on the battle- 
 field. With him this was the important point. 
 His rapid marches, his strategical manoeuvres, 
 his combinations, were all made with this object 
 in view. He believed that success in battle 
 depended principally on numbers. "God," said 
 he, " is on the side of the heaviest battalions. " 
 It is worthy of notice that throughout his career 
 he never lost a battle in which he had a numerical 
 superiority over the enemy. 
 
 Sometimes it was impossible for him to out- 
 number the enemy on the battle-field; then, by 
 taking advantage of the topography of the coun- 
 
198 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 try, as at Arcole, or by skilful manoeuvring, as 
 at Rivoli, he was able to overcome the odds 
 against him. In these battles he showed great 
 tactical ability. It was there, with fate against 
 him and disaster near at hand, that his military 
 genius shone forth with its greatest lustre. 
 
 Bonaparte depended in great measure for his 
 successes upon the rapidity of his concentrations. 
 Had the Army of Italy been organized into one 
 complete whole, instead of into divisions of about 
 ten thousand soldiers, each, it would have been 
 unwieldy and difficult to handle. But as the di- 
 visions were independent, and were commanded 
 by able soldiers, they had great manoeuvring 
 power. By his rapid marches Bonaparte made 
 his concentrations ; by his concentrations he won 
 his battles. It was the marching as well as the 
 fighting of his soldiers that won for him so many 
 victories against such overwhelming odds. 
 
 The Austrians could not comprehend the 
 manoeuvres and combinations of Bonaparte. 
 They could not understand the reasons for his 
 triumphs and their disasters. It seemed to them 
 that he was violating every known principle of 
 war, and in spite of this was everywhere victo- 
 rious. He defeated their scattered forces in such 
 rapid succession that he seemed to be every- 
 where. In the midst of the Austrian armies he 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 1 99 
 
 would unexpectedly appear in force, crush the 
 enemy with superior numbers, and in a few 
 hours afterwards mass his divisions to strike him 
 another blow at some unexpected point. To be 
 surrounded by the enemy did not mean defeat 
 to him. At Riyoli he was surrounded on the 
 'battle-field by one army, and in the theatre of 
 operations by three armies; nevertheless, he 
 annihilated the enemy. In this part of the cam- 
 paign, with only forty-four thousand soldiers, he 
 killed, wounded, or captured forty-three thou- 
 sand Austrians. His movements were so rapid, 
 his blows so terrible and unexpected, that the 
 Austrian commanders could neither fathom his 
 designs, nor understand his combinations. To 
 them he seemed to have no system of war, and no 
 method in his undertakings. He seemed rather 
 to be the incarnation of force, moving like light- 
 ning, and hurling thunderbolts of war against hi§ 
 enemies, till they were crushed, overwhelmed, 
 annihilated. 
 
 In former chapters we have shown how Bona- 
 parte, by following these principles, gained his 
 victories ; how at Montenotte he cut in two the 
 allies, then held in check with small containing 
 forces their isolated columns, while he concen- 
 trated an overwhelming mass, first against the 
 Sardinians, and then against the Austrians; how 
 
200 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 at Lonato and Castiglione he took up a central 
 position at the foot of Lake Garda, united his 
 forces there and drove back Quasdanovich towards 
 Salo, then concentrated superior numbers against 
 Wurmser, crushed him, and pursued him towards 
 Rivoli; how at Roveredo he united his three 
 divisions, defeated Davidovich and threw him 
 back into the mountains of the Tyrol, then fell 
 upon Wurmser' s rear, cut his army in two at 
 Bassano, pursued him, and shut him up in 
 Mantua; how at Arcole, with fortune against 
 him, he threw his army in desperation upon 
 Alvinzi's flank, and after three days of terrible 
 fighting against fearful odds won the hardest 
 fought battle in this campaign ; how at Rivoli in 
 the midst of his enemies he, by tactical ability, 
 turned disaster into victory, then without a pause 
 hurried his tired troops towards La Favorita, 
 where he won another battle, and then forced 
 Mantua to capitulate ; how on the Tagliamento 
 he met and defeated his ablest adversary, forced 
 him across the Alps, united the French tlivisions 
 in the valley of the Drave, marched them towards 
 the Austrian capital, and in the very heart of 
 the Austrian dominions ended this remarkable 
 campaign. 
 
 In these operations Bonaparte left nothing to 
 chance. Fortune sometimes favored him ; it was 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 201 
 
 sometimes against him; but calculation entered 
 into all of his undertakings. He planned his 
 manoeuvres and combinations with the greatest 
 care. He studied the topography of the country. 
 Upon a map of the theatre of operations he would 
 stick pins of different colors to represent his own 
 divisions, and the enemy's forces in their sup- 
 posed positions. Then by moving these pins 
 about he would represent the movements of the 
 troops, and in this way would make his calcula- 
 tions and study out his combinations. 
 
 "Napoleon," says Jomini, "possessed in an eminent 
 degree the art of concentrating, with admirable precision, 
 upon the decisive point of the zone of operations, col- 
 umns which had begun the march from the most diver- 
 gent stations. 
 
 " Provided with a pair of compasses opened to a scale 
 of seven or eight leagues^ in a right line (which always 
 implies nine or ten leagues on account of the sinuosities 
 of the roads), leaning and sometimes lying upon the map, 
 where the positions of his army corps and the presumed 
 positions of the enemy were indicated by pins of different 
 colors. Napoleon ordered his movements with an assur- 
 ance of which we can scarcely form an idea. Passing 
 the compasses quickly over his map, he judged at a 
 glance the number of marches necessary for each corps 
 to arrive upon a fixed day at the point where he desired 
 
 1 A league is about two and one half miles ; so that the com- 
 passes, as opened, extended to about one day's march on the 
 map. 
 
202 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 to have it ; then, sticking the pins in these new positions 
 and co-ordinating the rapidity of the march that it was 
 necessary to assign each column and the probable date of 
 its departure, he dictated those instructions which would 
 be, of themselves, a title to glory.'' 
 
 Having once decided upon a plan of operations, 
 every effort was made, every energy aroused, 
 every nerve strung, to make the plan a success. 
 Rivers were forded, mountains were crossed, 
 forced marches were made, obstacles were brushed 
 aside, everything was done that could be done to 
 carry out his orders and accomplish his under- 
 takings. He planned so carefully and calculated 
 so accurately that he foresaw many of the obsta- 
 cles which would be likely to arise in his path- 
 way, and in advance provided means to surmount 
 them. He had a wonderful foresight into future 
 events. His mind seemed to comprehend the 
 entire situation; seemed to grasp all the facts, 
 and understand them in all their bearings; 
 seemed to see just how certain results were to 
 be reached, just what difficulties were to be 
 expected and overcome. At Austerlitz he issued 
 a proclamation to his soldiers, not only promis- 
 ing them victory, but even explaining to them 
 in advance the manoeuvre by which he was to 
 obtain it. On March 15, 1797, the day before 
 the battle of the Tagliamento, he wrote to 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 203 
 
 Joubert as follows: "I calculate upon being in 
 the defiles of Pontebba on the 30th." At this 
 time he had in his front the Archduke's unde- 
 feated army and the great chain of the Alps. He 
 defeated the Archduke, surmounted the Alps, 
 and on March 30th was at Pontebba with the 
 Army of Italy. 
 
 The proclamations which Bonaparte addressed 
 from time to time to his soldiers in this cam- 
 paign are, for the purpose for which they were 
 written, model productions. In these comments 
 they deserve at least some notice. We give 
 here the principal parts of two, the first of 
 which was published to the army after the defeat 
 of the Sardinians, the second after the battle of 
 Lodi. 
 
 First : " Soldiers ! in fifteen days you have gained six 
 victories, taken twenty-one colors, fifty pieces of cannon, 
 several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Pied- 
 mont ;■ you have captured fifteen thousand prisoners, and 
 killed or wounded ten thousand men. Destitute of every- 
 thing, you have supplied all; you have gained battles 
 without cannon, crossed rivers without bridges, made 
 forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy, 
 and often without bread. Republican phalanxes alone 
 are capable of actions so extraordinary. The two armies 
 which so lately attacked you with audacity are flying be- 
 fore you ; the perverse men who laughed at your distress, 
 and rejoiced at the idea of victory to your enemies, are 
 
204 BON-APARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 confounded and trembling. But, soldiers ! you have 
 done nothing since more remains to be done. Neither 
 Turin nor Milan is yours : your enemies still trample on 
 the ashes of the conquerors of the Tarquins. There are 
 said to be some among you who would prefer to return 
 to the summits of the Apennines and of the Alps. No ! 
 I cannot believe it ! The conquerors of Montenotte, 
 Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi are impatient to carry 
 the glory of the French people to distant countries." 
 
 Second : " Soldiers ! you have descended like a torrent 
 from the summit of the Apennines ; you have overthrown 
 and dispersed everything that opposed your progress. 
 Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has returned 
 to her natural sentiments of peace and friendship for 
 France. Milan is yours, and the republican flag waves 
 throughout all Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and 
 Modena owe their political existence to your generosity. 
 The army which menaced you with so much pride no 
 longer finds a barrier to protect itself against your arms. 
 The Po, the Ticino, and the Adda have not checked your 
 progress for a single day ; these boasted bulwarks of Italy 
 have been crossed as rapidly as the Apennines. Yes, 
 soldiers ! you have indeed done much ; but much' still 
 remains to be done. Shall posterity say that we knew 
 how to conquer, but not how to profit by victory? I 
 already see you run to arms. Let us march. We have 
 yet forced marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels 
 to gather, injuries to revenge. Those who have whetted 
 the daggers of civil war in France, who have basely 
 assassinated our ministers, who have burned our ships at 
 Toulon, — let them tremble ! The hour of vengeance has 
 struck." 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 20$ 
 
 These proclamations refer principally to the 
 recollections of former victories, and to the wel- 
 fare and honor of France. They are forcible 
 and eloquent. Though exaggerated in statement, 
 their burning words filled the French soldiers 
 with enthusiasm. In them may be discerned 
 some of the fire of Napoleon's genius. "Napo- 
 leon has words in him," says Carlyle, "which are 
 like Austerlitz battles." 
 
 Did Bonaparte follow in the footsteps of Alex- 
 ander, of Hannibal, and of Caesar.' or did he 
 discover new principles of strategy unknown to 
 these great masters? What was the secret of 
 his successes ? By a brief review of the methods 
 of warfare prior to his time, we shall perhaps 
 be able to answer satisfactorily these questions. 
 By this means we shall certainly gain a more 
 comprehensive view of the distinguishing pecu- 
 liarities of his system of war. 
 
 In the days of Alexander, of Hannibal, and of 
 Caesar, formations for battle were in large masses 
 several ranks deep. The weapons of warfare 
 were axes, pikes, javelins, swords, and shields. 
 The tendency was then to take up strong posi- 
 tions, adapted to the numbers engaged, and fight 
 there great battles, upon which often depended 
 great results. The skill of the commander con- 
 sisted in bringing a stronger force upon the 
 
206 BON-APARTES FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 battle-field, and in arranging his troops so as to 
 present a formidable front to the enemy. From 
 this time on the battle became a great tactical 
 encounter between the opposing commanders. 
 Each strove to detect a weak point in the adver- 
 sary's line, and, by skill in tactical manoeuvres, 
 to strike a fatal blow there that would shatter 
 his formation. Having broken the line, the 
 cavalry would pour through the gap and attack 
 the enemy in flank and rear. In these battles, 
 in which the soldiers fought hand to hand, the 
 important point for the commander was to hold 
 his ranks firm, and either be ready to receive and 
 repulse the attacks of the enemy, or to advance 
 with immense momentum against him. During 
 these battles it was dangerous to withdraw or 
 weaken any portion of the line; for a vigilant 
 adversary could detect the weakened part, break 
 through, and in detail destroy the forces of the 
 enemy. 
 
 These great tactical encounters were always 
 preceded by important strategical manoeuvres. 
 The genius of the commander was displayed not 
 only on the battle-field, but in the theatre of opera- 
 tions also. It was necessary that he should give 
 the most careful attention to his communications, 
 to the direction and rapidity of his marches, and 
 to the concentration of his troops. His object 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 20/ 
 
 was SO to manoeuvre as to gain some advantage 
 over his adversary. He might cut off the com- 
 munications of the enemy, while he preserved his 
 own; might surprise him by an attack at some 
 unexpected point; or might force him to fight 
 under such a disadvantage that defeat meant ruin 
 to his army. Strategy played an important part 
 in the campaigns of these great soldiers. The 
 marching powers of Caesar's legions were as 
 necessary to his successes as their fighting qual- 
 ities. It was the strategical knowledge possessed 
 by Hannibal, in addition to his tactical ability, 
 which enabled him to maintain for fifteen years 
 his position in Italy against the legions of Rome. 
 
 The principles of strategy have never under- 
 gone any change. The methods of applying them 
 vary from time to time; but the results obtained 
 from their correct application are the same at 
 all times. Bonaparte made no discoveries in 
 strategy; he simply applied successfully the prin- 
 ciples already known. To divide the forces of 
 the enemy and beat them in detail was correct 
 strategy in his time; it was correct strategy when 
 the great Carthaginian general crossed the Alps 
 and struck terror into the heart of Rome. 
 
 The invention of fire-arms increased greatly 
 the importance of strategical manoeuvres. Fire- 
 arms increased the defensive strength of troops, 
 
208 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 and enabled the commander with small numbers 
 to hold in check, for a time, large bodies of the 
 enemy. He was thus enabled to mass his other 
 forces upon some important point on the battle- 
 field, or in the theatre of operations, where great 
 results could be obtained by outnumbering and 
 crushing the enemy. Thus the increased strength 
 of the defensive allowed also greater latitude in 
 carrying out offensive operations. As soon as 
 positions could be held with smaller numbers, 
 and lines of battle could be weakened with less 
 risk of fatal results, manoeuvring became of 
 greater consequence. Mobility became then an 
 object in the organization of armies, and strategy 
 increased in importance. 
 
 Neither Marlborough nor Frederick the Great 
 appreciated fully the change that the invention 
 of fire-arms was to bring about in the increased 
 importance of strategical manoeuvres. Marl- 
 borough gave little attention to strategy. In 
 fact the organization of his army was such that 
 he could not manoeuvre or deploy readily. His 
 army lacked mobility. He exercised his skill in 
 selecting positions and in fortifying them. His 
 genius displayed itself more particularly upon the 
 battle-field. He was a great tactical captain. 
 When the storm of battle was at its' height, and 
 confusion and death surrounded him, he was 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 209 
 
 ciDol, clear-headed, and vigilant. In the turmoil 
 of battle, he would detect the vulnerable spot in 
 the enemy's line, and, by massing troops there, 
 would overwhelm and destroy him. " This, " says 
 Hamley, "was his special gift." 
 
 Frederick the Great was fortunate in falling 
 heir to a thoroughly drilled and disciplined army. 
 Having to make headway against superior num- 
 bers and several enemies at once, he saw that 
 success must depend in great measure upon the 
 superior manoeuvring power of his own troops. 
 But he saw only half the truth. His attention 
 was directed more particularly to outmanoeuvring 
 the enemy on the battle-field. He gave little 
 attention to strategical manoeuvres and combina- 
 tions. His strategy was often faulty. But on 
 the battle-field, or in its immediate vicinity, he 
 was a master. While the enemy was await- 
 ing an attack in some strong position, he would 
 march stealthily around him, and by striking him 
 obliquely in some unexpected direction, or by 
 attacking him upon an exposed flank, would roll 
 up his line and shatter his formation. It was 
 then that the superior fighting qualities of his 
 disciplined troops carried everything before them 
 and decided the battle in his favor. "Moving 
 round their slow inert masses," says Hamley, 
 
 "like a panther round an ox, he found the un- 
 
 14 
 
210 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 guarded part, and cast himself on it with all his 
 force. The secret of his success lay not so much 
 in judicious movements in the theatre of war as 
 in the use he made of the flexibility of his army 
 as compared with the armies of his adversaries. 
 It was by his success in the fields of battle, rather 
 than by his plans of campaign, which were often 
 faulty, that he finally emerged victorious from 
 the struggle, with a military renown unrivalled 
 in his generation." 
 
 Frederick's army was organized into one com- 
 plete whole ; it was composed of an aggregate of 
 battalions, each of which formed a fragment of 
 the main army. Though it was an almost perfect 
 machine, and had as an army great manoeuvring 
 power, yet on account of the peculiarity in its 
 organization it lacked that perfect mobility which 
 has been found to be such a necessary attribute in 
 the organization of modern armies. Had it been 
 composed of divisions or corps, each capable of 
 independent action, it would have had greater 
 mobility, and would have been better adapted 
 to the purpose of carrying out strategical manoeu- 
 vres and combinations, 
 
 It remained for Bonaparte to appreciate fully 
 the increased importance of strategical manoeu- 
 vres due to the invention of fire-arms. In the 
 province of strategy he saw a field for great 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 211 
 
 improvement. The Army of Italy was well 
 adapted for carrying out his plans. It was 
 already organized into several independent divis- 
 ions, each of which was commanded by an able 
 soldier. As these divisions marched rapidly, 
 they could, under the eye of a skilful com- 
 mander, be quickly combined into a powerful 
 army on the field of battle, or be as quickly dis- 
 persed to important points in the theatre of war. 
 This method of organization gave to the Army 
 of Italy great flexibility, without destroying in 
 the least its cohesion in action. In Bonaparte's 
 hands this army became a powerful weapon of 
 destruction. 
 
 In former chapters we have described in detail 
 the strategical manoeuvres and combinations by 
 which he won his successes. It is unnecessary 
 to repeat them here ; but it should be remembered 
 that only by the greatest skill in strategy could 
 he overcome such odds against him, outnumber 
 the enemy upon so many battle-fields, and destroy 
 in succession so many armies. He was a master 
 of both strategy and tactics. Herein lay the 
 secret of his success. It was his perfect mastery 
 of the whole system of war which made his suc- 
 cesses seem so novel to the soldiers of his day. 
 Neither the generalship of Marlborough, nor that 
 of Frederick, approaches in this respect that of 
 
212 B ON A PAR TB'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Bonaparte. It is only by going back to the cam- 
 paigns of Alexander, of Hannibal, and of Caesar, 
 that any parallel can be found with which to 
 compare his successes. In strategical ability he 
 seems to surpass even these great masters of war. 
 Among all the campaigns of the great soldiers 
 who have preceded or followed him, none will 
 compare with this campaign in the brilliancy 
 of the strategical combinations, or in the mar- 
 vellousness of the results. 
 
 No just comparison between Napoleon and the 
 great soldiers who preceded him can be made, 
 without going far deeper into the subject than 
 is our purpose in this brief account of his ear- 
 lier achievements. On this point, however, the 
 words of Professor Seeley, who cannot certainly 
 be said to overestimate Napoleon in any respect, 
 are well worthy of quotation here. He says: 
 "The series of Napoleon's successes is abso- 
 lutely the most marvellous in history. No one 
 can question that he leaves far behind him the 
 Turennes, Marlboroughs, and Fredericks; but 
 when we bring up for comparison an Alexander, 
 a Hannibal, a Caesar, a Charles, we find in the 
 single point of marvellousness Napoleon surpass- 
 ing them all." 
 
 In this campaign Bonaparte began active opera- 
 tions on the nth of April, 1796, and ended them 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 21 3 
 
 on the 7th of April, 1797. In one year he 
 crossed the Apennines and the Alps, defeated 
 one Sardinian and six Austrian armies, won fifteen 
 pitched battles, and killed, wounded, or captured 
 one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians. 
 He had never before commanded an army. He 
 was only twenty-six years of age. Though he 
 had received a military education at Brienne and 
 Paris, had distinguished himself at the siege of 
 Toulon, and had gained some notoriety in quel- 
 ling a Paris mob "by a whiff of grape-shot," 
 there was nothing in all this to indicate that he 
 possessed great military ability, and would in 
 one §hort year show himself to be the greatest 
 master of the art of war. 
 
 As the knowledge of war which he displayed 
 in this campaign was not due to his own expe- 
 rience, we are led to inquire how much of this 
 knowledge was due to the experience of others, 
 and how much was due to genius. In other 
 words, how much was acquired, and how much 
 was innate. 
 
 While in the War Office at Paris prior to tak- 
 ing command of the Army of Italy, Bonaparte 
 submitted to the military authorities a plan for 
 operating against the Austrians and Sardinians 
 in Italy. He made a special study of that coun- 
 try from a military point of view. He studied 
 
214 BOJVAPAJiTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 also the political history, the kinds of govern- 
 ment, the peculiarities of the people, their be- 
 liefs, their customs, and their laws. By means 
 of maps and statistics, he informed himself 
 accurately as to the topography and resources of 
 the country. In fact he gave the most careful 
 attention to everything which might have any 
 bearing upon military operations in Italy. The 
 campaigns of Hannibal in that country interested; 
 him greatly ; and as Bonaparte was a great ad- 
 mirer of this great soldier, he studied thoroughly 
 these campaigns. 
 
 His life from the age of ten till he took com- 
 mand of the Army of Italy was devoted to the 
 military profession. At the military schools of 
 Brienne and Paris he acquired a military edu- 
 cation. While at these schools he was fond of 
 mathematics and history. Afterwards he became 
 very fond of his profession. He took the greatest 
 interest in everything pertaining to the duties of 
 a soldier, and the greatest pains to master all 
 knowledge pertaining to the art of war. For 
 this purpose he read and studied the campaigns 
 of the great commanders. The campaigns of 
 Alexander, of Hannibal, of Caesar, and of Fred- 
 erick the Great, as well as the campaigns of 
 many other noted commanders, were familiar to 
 him. He was a thorough military student. He 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 21 5 
 
 read and re-read the histories of these great sol- 
 diers, studied their manoeuvres, their plans of 
 battle, their victories, and their defeats. Every- 
 thing that pertained to his profession interested 
 him. No details were too trivial, no facts too 
 insignificant, to be carefully weighed in his 
 mind. 
 
 To military problems of all kinds he gave thfi 
 most careful attention. In military matters he 
 would assume certain faicts to be true, then, rea- 
 soning from them, would study out the best way 
 to arrive at certain desirable results. The lay 
 of the land, the rivers, the mountains, the general 
 topography of any portion of country, at once 
 suggested to him military problems. Upon this 
 ridge or that mountain side he imagined a line 
 of battle; picked out in his own mind the strong 
 places of the line; thought out how it could 
 be most easily defended; how the rivers, moun- 
 tains, and swamps could be turned to his or to 
 his adversary's advantage; how re-enforcements 
 from distant points could be marched to join the 
 fighting forces; how much time it would take; 
 how he could beat the adversary at such a point 
 by such a manoeuvre ; or how he would manoeuvre 
 his own forces to counteract a concentration, or 
 a charge, or a flank attack from his imaginary 
 adversary. 
 
2l6 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 " Napoleon," says Trevelyan, in his Life and 
 Letters of Macaulay, " set himself problems at 
 the opera while the overture was playing. ' I 
 have ten thousand men at Strasburg; fifteen 
 thousand at Magdeburg; twenty thousand at 
 Wurtzburg. By what stages must they march so 
 as to arrive at Ratisbon on three successive 
 days?'" 
 
 " Unlike most army officers," says Ropes, in his 
 work on the First Napoleon, " Bonaparte found in 
 the profession of arms a profession worthy of his 
 utmost devotion. He read and studied the great 
 campaigns of the world. He wrote for his own 
 use commentaries and criticisms on Caesar's opera- 
 tions in Gaul and Frederick's campaigns in Saxony 
 and Silesia. Of every species of military knowl- 
 edge he was a serious and accurate student. He 
 was, moreover; as attentive to the dry details of 
 the art as he was fond of studying the higher 
 branches. No man in the army had a more sure 
 eye for ground, could estimate more certainly 
 what could and could not be effected by a battery 
 placed here or placed there, whether a column of 
 troops could or could not reach a given point by 
 such or such a time. Nay, more than this, no 
 captain of a company knew better than he whether 
 the rations furnished to the men were what they 
 should be or not. Napoleon to the end of his 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 21 7 
 
 days was a good judge of the common soldier's 
 soup and bread." 
 
 _ " Napoleon," says Colonel Dodge, " collated the 
 knowledge of war which existed in his youth, and 
 out of it wrought so perfect a system that he is 
 the one captain whom all modern soldiers strive 
 to copy." "He was," says Lord, "a military 
 prodigy equally great in tactics and strategy, — a 
 master of all the improvements which had been 
 made in the art of war, from Epaminondas to 
 Frederick II." 
 
 It is difficult to say just what effect all this 
 acquired knowledge had on the mind of Bona- 
 parte; but it seems certain to us that his 
 knowledge of the art of war was in great meas- 
 ure obtained from the experience of others. By 
 studying the campaigns of the greatest captains, 
 he laid the foundation of his own successes. 
 Perhaps much of his knowledge was due to his 
 solving those problems which his imagination 
 suggested ; perhaps much was due to his genius ; 
 but without the profound study and deep medita- 
 tion of his youth, he would not, we think, have 
 become one of the greatest masters of the art of 
 war that the world has ever known. 
 
 The conditions for great strategical combi- 
 nations are to-day superior to the conditions a 
 hundred years ago. As fire-arms increased the 
 
2i8 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 importance of strategical manoeuvres in the past, 
 so likewise repeating arms, railways, and tele- 
 graph lines have increased still more the impor- 
 tance of strategical manoeuvres in our day. The 
 principles remain the same, but the facilities for 
 applying them have greatly increased. In the 
 dispatch of orders electricity has annihilated 
 time; steam has revolutionized the movements 
 of troops; and inventions have given to armies 
 much greater fighting power. Better weapons of 
 warfare always increase the fighting power of an 
 army; they increase its defensive strength, and 
 allow small bodies to hold in check for a time 
 large bodies of the enemy. In this way they 
 increase the manoeuvring power and offensive; 
 strength of an army, and give to strategy a still 
 greater value. 
 
 Another Napoleon will probably never arise ; yet 
 imagination can picture a soldier who, holding in 
 his grasp the telegraph and railways, shall plan 
 and execute as . great strategical combinations in- 
 the campaigns of the future as Napoleon planned 
 and executed a hundred years ago. 
 
 There are many lessons to be learned from this- 
 campaign ; but perhaps the most important of all 
 is that only by the deepest study can any man, 
 however talented he may be, gain a knowledge 
 of the science of war. He who would become 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 219 
 
 a master in the military art must study deeply 
 and think clearly. He must not only keep 
 abreast of the military knowledge of his own 
 day, but must study carefully the campaigns of 
 the great commanders. 
 
 " I desire to say now," says General R. W. 
 Johnson, "that the young officer who reads the 
 most, thinks the most, and obeys orders most 
 promptly, is the one who comes to the front when 
 necessity calls for men. I mean men of iron 
 mould and dauntless purpose,, who grasp not after 
 baubles, who bow not at the venal shrine of a false 
 and prostituted public opinion, — men whose soula 
 are not intoxicated by shallow draughts from the 
 beaker of success, and who do not shrivel in the 
 first heat of disappointment, — men whose spirits 
 rise as adversities thicken, acquire fresh courage 
 and sterner resolve with each succeeding failure,, 
 confront new perils and difficulties, new foes and 
 trials, with unquailing front, — men who gather 
 to their hearts more of the light and essence of 
 heaven as the world glowers and glooms around 
 them. How many of the young men in the army 
 or in civil life are destined to make their marks in 
 this world, or to leave behind them the record of 
 useful lives with no shame to remember, no wish 
 to forget? Think of this,,, young man, and let 
 your aim be high. There may be mountains in 
 
220 BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN. 
 
 your pathway, but you will discover that with 
 no more certainty do the recurrent waves wear 
 away by ceaseless buffetings and gradual en- 
 croachments the granite of their rocky shores 
 than do persistent effort and unswerving perse- 
 verance, when sustained by calmness, probity, 
 and intelligence, wear away the rough places in 
 life. There is no genius like the genius of labor. 
 There is no reward like that which comes from 
 energy, system, and perseverance." 
 
 When Bonaparte took command of the Army 
 of Italy he seemed a mere boy. At first the 
 soldiers had misgivings as to whether he could 
 lead them successfully. But when the Army of 
 Italy descended from the Apennines into the 
 fertile valley of the Po, the soldiers began to 
 understand Bonaparte. They began then to have 
 faith in him. They could see in the features of 
 the boy the genius of the soldier; and as vic- 
 tory followed victory their admiration for him 
 increased. When he showed himself brave and 
 fearless at the bridges of Lodi and Arcole, their 
 admiration knew no bounds. Ever after these 
 events he was the idol of his soldiers. His 
 presence filled them with enthusiasm. He re- 
 tained throughout his career the extraordinary 
 hold that he gained ov&r them in this campaign. 
 In triumph or in adversity, on the field of Aus- 
 
GENERAL COMMENTS. 221 
 
 terlitz, or amid the snows of Russia, his soldiers 
 never wavered in loyalty to him. Twenty-five 
 years after this campaign as he lay upon his 
 death-bed, his mind went back to the Army of 
 Italy. "Take this watch," said he to Count 
 Bertrand at St. Helena, "it struck two in the 
 morning when I ordered Joubert to attack' at 
 Rivoli." As death approached, his mind re- 
 verted to the days of his earlier triumphs, to the 
 days of his glory, to the days when the lustre of 
 his arms was undimmed and his star was in the 
 ascendant. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Adige, river, description of, 39. 
 
 Alessandria, fortified town, held by 
 the allies, 21. 
 
 Alexander the Great, campaigns of, | 
 referred to by Napoleon, 15, 173; 
 compared with those of Napoleon, ! 
 212. 
 
 Allies, their situation before the bat- 
 tle of Montenotte, 21 ; are defeated, 
 27; how defeated, 36; their num- 
 bers in Montenotte part of cam- 
 paign, 168. 
 
 Alpon, river, description of, 82. 
 
 Alps, Tyrolese, 38; Swiss, 40; 
 French, 40; Julian, 124; Carnic, 
 124; passage of, at Tarwis, 138; 
 passage of, over the Great St. 
 Bernard, 183. 
 
 Alvinzi, General, commander-in- 
 chief of Austrian forces, 77; his 
 plan of campaign, 78 ; at battle of 
 Bassano, 79 ; advances on Verona, 
 81; withdraws through defile of 
 Villa Nova, 83 ; at battle of Arcole, 
 85; adopts another plan, 96; di- 
 vides his forces, 100; expects to 
 surround the French at Rivoli, 
 loi; at battle of Rivoli, 104; his 
 errors, 107, 111-115. 
 
 Apennines, divide the French from 
 the allies, 19; passes of, 20, 21. 
 
 Archduke Charles, takes command 
 of Austrians, 126; sketch of, 126- 
 128 ; ordered to concentrate in Fri- 
 uli, 127 ; arrives on the Piave, 127 ; 
 his forces, 131 ; instructed by his 
 government, 131; his plans, 132; 
 at battle of the Tagliamento, 134, 
 
 135 ; falls back on Gradisca, 135 ; 
 crosses the Isonzo, 136; retreats 
 upon Laybach, 136; in a critical 
 condition, 136; defeated at Mount 
 Tarwis, 138 ; replies to Bonaparte's 
 letter, 142; assembles his army on 
 the road to Vienna, 142 ; makes a 
 stand at Unzmark, 143; required 
 to carry out faulty plans, 148; in 
 front of Bonaparte, 155 ; probable 
 result of uniting his forces near 
 Villach,i57; divides his army, 157; 
 hurries to Villach, 158 ; fights des- 
 perately at Mount Tarwis, 159. 
 
 Arcole, campaign of, 77 et seq.; bat- 
 tle of, 83, 84, 95 ; bridge of, 83, 220 ; 
 French and Austrians in campaign 
 of, 168 ; Bonaparte has every avail- 
 able man at, 193. 
 
 Argenteau, General, commands cen- 
 tre of the aUies at Montenotte, 23 ; 
 routed, 24; Hamley's remarks con- 
 cerning, at Montenotte, 32; his 
 forces at Montenotte, 36, 178; is 
 overwhelmed at Montenotte, 179. 
 
 Armies, Austrian, defeated, first, 43 ; 
 second, 51; third, 67; fourth, 85; 
 fifth, 106; sixth, 144. 
 
 Army of Italy, Bonaparte takes com- 
 mand of, 19, 167; addressed by 
 Bonaparte, 19; average strength 
 and losses of, 168; organization 
 of, 198, 211. 
 
 Army of the Rhine, Bonaparte pur- 
 poses to unite with, but renounces 
 the plan, 64, 65; Bonaparte re- 
 ceives re-enforcements from, 129, 
 183. 
 
224 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Army of the Sambre and Meuse, 
 Bonaparte receives reinforcements 
 from, 129. 
 
 Augereau, General, commands a 
 French division in campaign, 20; 
 holds in checic the Sardinians, 24 ; 
 advises Bonaparte to fight, 49; 
 fights battle of Castiglione, 51; at 
 second battle of Castiglione, 51 ; 
 at Areola, 82 ; joins Vaubois, 84 ; 
 attempts to hold Provera in check, 
 104, 105. 
 
 Austerlitz, battle of, proclamation of 
 Napoleon at, 61, 202; Napoleon's 
 intellect at, 171; description of, 
 186, 187. 
 
 Austria, ammunition obtained from, 
 40; Bonaparte's progress alarms 
 her, 47, 125 ; instructions from, to 
 the Archduke Charles, 131, 148; 
 reasons for separating her forces, 
 147. 
 
 Austrians, their supplies, where ob- 
 tained, 40; were united at com- 
 mencement of operations and 
 scattered at close, 71 ; their losses 
 during the campaign, 168; their 
 system of war, 195, ig6. 
 
 Baraguay d'Hilliers, General, 
 his division sent to join Joubert's 
 in the Tyrol, 133. 
 
 Base of operations, 22, 27, 128; sec- 
 ondary, 40. 
 
 Bassano, battle of, 65, 66; second 
 battle of, 79, 88, 8g; heroes of, 81. 
 
 Bassano and San Georgio campaign, 
 63 et seq. ; forces in, 168 ; discus- 
 sion of, 176, 177. 
 
 Battle tactics. Napoleon's, 16. 
 
 Bayalitsch, General, retreats upon 
 Tarwis, 135 ; forced to surrender, 
 138. 
 
 Beaulieu, General, general in chief 
 of allies, 21 j expects an attack by 
 way of Genoa, 23; his plan, 23; 
 begins operations, 23 ; attempts to 
 concentrate at Dego, 25 ; his fatal 
 movement, 35 ; makes his escape, 
 42 ; his inefficiency, 180. 
 
 Bellegrade, General, carries instruc- 
 tions from the Emperor to Bona- 
 parte, 144. 
 
 Bernadotte, General, his division 
 joins Bonaparte, 129; his attack 
 at battle of the Tagliamento, 134, 
 135; pursues the Austrians to- 
 wards Laybach, 136; approaches 
 Klagenfurt, 142. 
 
 Bertrand, Count, present during the 
 last days of Napoleon, 221. 
 
 Blucher, Marshal, at Waterloo, 182, 
 183. 
 
 Bochetta, pass of, Bonaparte asks 
 permission to conduct his army 
 through, 22; Beaulieu moves his 
 army through, 23 ; by issuing from, 
 Bonaparte could have decided cam- 
 paign in one battle, 34. 
 
 Bohemia, Bonaparte provides for a 
 retreat into, 61, 187; Archduke 
 Charles sent into, 126. 
 
 Bonaparte, General, his campaign in 
 Italy in 1796-97, 16; takes com- 
 mand of Army of Italy, 19; his 
 forces, 20 ; asks permission to con- 
 duct his army through Genoa and 
 the Bochetta pass, 22 ; at Monte- 
 notte, 24 ; at Millesimo, 25 ; at 
 Dego, 25 ; attacks Sardinians at 
 Ceva and Mondovi, 26 ; unites 
 his divisions at Alba, 26; deceives 
 Austrian commander, 41; at Lodi, 
 42 ; at Milan, 42 ; at Borghetto, 
 43 ; his need of pontoomequipage 
 at Placentia, 44 ; his forces in Lo- 
 nato and Castiglione campaign, 
 47 ; attacks Austrians at Lonato, 
 Brescia, and Salo, 50 ; halts on the 
 Chiesa, 50 ; at Lonato and Cas- 
 tiglione, 50 ; is fighting constantly, 
 56 ; has either to retreat or fight, 
 57; his plan in Bassano and San 
 Georgio campaign, 64 ; at Rove- 
 redo, 64 J at Bassano, 65 ; at San 
 Georgio, 67 ; believes in the offen- 
 sive, 69 ; causes of his remarkable 
 success, 75, 76; asks for re-en- 
 
 j. forcements, 77 ; his forces and his 
 plan in Arcole campaign, 77, 78; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 225 
 
 attacks Alvinzi on the Brenta, 79; 
 harangues Vaubois's troops, 79; 
 attacks Alvinzi at Caldiero, 80; 
 writes bitterly to his government, 
 So, 81; descends the Adige, 82; 
 fights battle of Arcole, 83, 84 ; has 
 four courses open to him, 90, gi, 
 92 ; his confidence in himself, 93 ; 
 is outnumbered for the first time 
 upon every battle-field, 94; his 
 forces in Rivoli campaign, 97; 
 sets out for Rivoli, 99 ; fights 
 the battle of RivoU, 102 ; is sur- 
 rounded, 102 ; starts for Mantua, 
 105 ; is master of Italy, 106 ; is 
 doubtful as to vfhere the Austrians 
 will attack, 117 ; correct in his 
 conclusions, ri8 ; his judgment in 
 the choice of a battle-field, 119; 
 his strategy and tactics at RivoH, 
 121 ; is irresistible in war, 125 ; 
 advances against the Archduke 
 Charles, 131 ; his plan, 132, 133 ; 
 selects General Joubert to com- 
 mand in the Tyrol, 133; crosses 
 the Piave, 134; at the battle of the 
 Tagliamento, 134, 135 ; at Gra- 
 disca, 135, 136; crosses the Alps 
 at Tarwis, 138 ; in valley of the 
 Drave, 140; writes to Archduke 
 Charles, 141 ; at St. Veit and 
 Neumark, 142; enters Leoben, 
 143; grants an armistice, 144; di- 
 vides his forces, 152; reasons for 
 his plan, 153; his caution at the 
 Tagliamento, 155; his orders to 
 Mass6na, 156 ; his orders to Jou- 
 bert, 160-162; seems to have 
 adopted two lines of operations, 
 162; his reply to criticisms on 
 these operations, 163 ; sees the 
 difficulties of marching on Vienna, 
 165 ; his caution, 166 j he might 
 have died Emperor of France, 
 166; his skill in strategy and 
 tactics, 169 ; violates a principle of 
 strategy, 177; carries out the prin- 
 ciples of strategy, 179; crosses the 
 Alps over the Great St. Bernard 
 pass, 183; his freedom from er- 
 
 ror, 193 ; his system of vrar, 196 ; 
 his rapid concentrations, 198 ; his 
 calculation, 201, 202 ; his procla- 
 mations, 203, 204 ; makes no dis- 
 coveries in strategy, 207 ; his 
 mastery of strategy and tactics, 
 211; his early career, 213, 214; 
 his study of Italy, 213 ; his atten- 
 tion to military matters, 215 ; 
 writes commentaries upon Caesar's 
 and Frederick's operations, 216 ; 
 his knowledge of war, how ob- 
 tained, 217; is a mere boy when 
 he takes command of the Army of 
 Italy, 220 ; his reference upon his 
 death-bed to his earlier triumphs, 
 221. 
 
 Borghetto, battle of, 43, 46. 
 
 Brenta, river, description of, 39. 
 
 Brenner pass, great highway of Ty- 
 rol crosses the divide at, 124. 
 
 Brienne, military school of, attended 
 by Bonaparte, 214. 
 
 C/ESAE, his campaigns, 15, 212, 214 ; 
 compared with Napoleon, 212. 
 
 Calculation in war, necessity for, 15 ; 
 in Bonaparte's operations, 201. 
 
 Caldiero, battle of, 79, 80. 
 
 Caliano, battle of, 64, 70. 
 
 Capital of a country, its possession 
 important, 153. 
 
 Carlyle, Thomas, on the power of 
 Napoleon's words, 205. 
 
 Castiglione, battle of, 51,87, 94, 119; 
 second battle of, 51, 93 ; heroes 
 of, 81. 
 
 Ceva, fortification of, 21, 178. 
 
 Charles XII., compared with Na- 
 poleon, 212. 
 
 Cherasco, armistice of, 27, 41, 
 
 Chiesa, river, description of, 38. 
 
 Col di Tenda, pass of, 20. 
 
 Colli, General, commands the Sar- 
 dinians, 21. 
 
 Commander-in-Chief, Wurmser as, 
 47 ; Alvinzi as, 77 ; Archduke 
 Charles as, 126. 
 
 Comments on the campaign at 
 Montenotte, 27 et seq, ; at Lodi, 
 
 IS 
 
226 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 43 et seq.; at Lonato and Cas- 
 tiglione, 51 «< seq.; at Bassano 
 and San Georgio, 68 et seq.; at 
 Arcole, 85 et seq, ; at Rivoli, 107 
 et seq. ; at the Tagliamento, 144 
 et seq. ; general, 167 et seq. 
 
 Coni, fortification of, 21. 
 
 Containing force, definition of, 33. 
 
 Davidovich, General, commands 
 an Austrian army in the Tyrol, 63 ; 
 defeated at Roveredo and Caliano, 
 64 ; commands a second Austrian 
 army in the Tyrol, 77; attacks 
 Vaubois at Trent, 78 ; driven into 
 the Tyrol, 84. 
 
 Dego, battles of, 25. 
 
 Delmas, General, liis division joins 
 Bonaparte, 129; sent to join Jou- 
 bert in the Tyrol, 133. 
 
 Derrecagaix, Colonel, on the defects 
 of Alvinzi's plan, in, 112 ; on the 
 Tagliamento campaign, 162, 163, 
 
 Directory, instructs Bonaparte, 35 ; 
 orders divisions of Delmas and 
 Bemadotte to re-enforce Army of 
 Italy, 129. 
 
 Dodge, Colonel, on Napoleon'6 sys- 
 tem of war, 217. 
 
 Drave, river, description of, 124. 
 
 Dufour, Genera], on the application 
 of strategical principles, 17 ; on the 
 strategical importance of a capital 
 city, 153. 
 
 Earth-works at Montenotte, im- 
 portance of, 31. 
 
 Emperor of Austria alarmed at 
 Bonaparte's progress, 143 ; sends 
 two oflScers to Bonaparte's head- 
 quarters, 143, 
 
 Empires, fate of, how decided, 31. 
 
 English at Waterloo, 37, 182. 
 
 Eugene of Savoy, Prince, his cam- 
 paigns, 15 ; his campaign against 
 Cattnat in 1701, 112. 
 
 Fire-arms, invention of, increased 
 the importance of strategical ma- 
 noeuvres, 207, 217. 
 
 Fombio, battle of, 42. 
 
 Forces, Austrian and French, the 
 strength and losses of, in this 
 campaign, 168. 
 
 Fortresses, fate of, how decided, 31. 
 
 Frederick the Great, his campaigns, 
 15, 214; his strategy often faulty, 
 209 ; his military* renown unri- 
 valled in his generation, 210 ; or- 
 ganization of his army, 210 ; his 
 generalship, 211. 
 
 French, their supplies, where ob- 
 tained, 40; are scattered before 
 the commencement of operations, 
 united at close, 71 ; their strength 
 and losses during the campaign, 
 168. 
 
 Friedland, battle of, 171. 
 
 Friuli, Quasdanovich retires into, 66 ; 
 Bonaparte hurls Austrians into, 
 70 ; the Archdulce ordered to con- 
 centrate in, 127; the Austrians 
 driven from, 143 ; the route through 
 selected by Bonaparte as his prin- 
 cipal Une of operations, 153, 
 
 Front to a flank, definition of, 45. 
 
 Garda, Lake, description of, 39, 
 General in Chief, Beaulieu as, 21 ; 
 
 Bonaparte as, advises Mass€na of 
 
 his intentions, 156. 
 Genoa, city of, 20 ; Republic of, 22 j 
 
 Senate of, 22 ; government of, 130. 
 Goddess of fortune is favorable to 
 
 Bonaparte, 76. 
 Grouchy, Marshal, his inefficiency, 
 
 ,83. 
 Gustavus Adolphus, his campaigns, 
 
 '5- 
 Guyeux, General, commands a 
 French division in the Taglia- 
 mento campaign, 133. 
 
 Hamley, Lieutenant-General, on the 
 communications of an army, 30 ; 
 on battle of Montenotte, 32, 33; 
 on the result of two armies manoeu- 
 vring against each other's com- 
 munications, 75 ; on the use of 
 a containing force, 179; on Marl- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 227 
 
 borough, 209; on Frederick the 
 Great, 209, 210. 
 
 Hannibal, his campaigns, 15, 214; 
 was the cause of his army's suc- 
 cess, 173; principles of strategy, 
 the same now as in his time, 174 ; 
 kind of formations in his time, 
 205 ; his strategical and tactical 
 knowledge, 207; compared with 
 Napoleon, 212 ; his campaigns 
 studied by Bonaparte, 214. 
 
 Hungarians, are about to join the 
 Archduke Charles, 165. 
 
 IsoNZO, river, description of, 124. 
 
 Italy, campaigns of Hannibal in, 
 15, 212 ; Northern, description of, 
 38, 39; supplies obtained from, 
 39; Austrians driven out of, 46, 62, 
 67 ; Austrians attempt to recover, 
 47, 63, 77, 96 ; Bonaparte's gen- 
 erals ready to give up, 93 ; Bona- 
 parte is master of, io5; like a 
 cyclone he passes over, 125 ; the 
 political state of affairs in, 129; 
 Bonaparte makes a study of, 213. 
 
 Jena, battle of, 183 ; campaign of, 
 189. 
 
 Johnson, General R. W., on the 
 genius of labor, Z19. 
 
 Jomini, General, his definition of 
 theatre of war, ■^%\ on the character 
 of Bonaparte's individual actions, 
 46 ; on Napoleon's power of con- 
 centrating his forces, 201. 
 
 Joubert, General, is wounded, 8t; 
 at battle of Rivoli, 98 et seq. ; is 
 given command in the Tyrol, 133; 
 receives orders from Bonaparte, 
 133, 160, 161,162; attacks Aus- 
 trians at St. Michael and Neu- 
 mark, 140 ; sets out to join Bona- 
 parte, 141 ; his force is a containing 
 force, 159; his operations discussed 
 by Bonaparte, 163, 164; referred 
 to by Bonaparte at St. Helena, 
 221. 
 
 Jourdan, General, commands Army 
 of Sambre and Meuse, 128. 
 
 Kellerman, General, commands 
 French army in the Alps, 33. 
 
 Kerpen, General, commands Aus- 
 trian force in the Tyrol, 13I ; 
 defeated, 140; marches to join 
 Archduke Charles, 141. 
 
 Kilmaine, General, besieges Mantua, 
 77 ; sent to take command at Ve- 
 rona, 82 ; returns to besiege Man- 
 tua, 85 ; left in Italy to protect 
 French rear, 132; fights Venetian 
 insurgents, 144. 
 
 La Favorita, battle of, 105, 106. 
 
 La Harpe, General, at Savona with 
 his division, 20; marches from 
 Voltri to Montenotte, 24 ; attacks 
 Argenteau, 24. 
 
 Lannes, at the bridge of Lodi, 42 j 
 covered with glory, 46 ; wounded, 
 81. 
 
 Laudon, General, commands Aus- 
 trian force in the Tyrol, 131 ; de- 
 feated, 140 ; descends the Adige, 
 141 ; retires into the Tyrol, 144. 
 
 Legnago, fortified town of, 39. 
 
 Leoben, armistice of, 144. 
 
 Lodi, campaign of, 38 ei seq., 180; 
 battle of, 42, 93 ; bridge of, 42, 
 220 ; heroes of, 80. 
 
 Lonato, battle of, 50, 87, 93, 94, 200. 
 
 Lonato and Castiglione, campaign 
 of, 47 et seq. ; battles of, 54. 
 
 Lord, on the tactics and strategy of 
 Napoleon, 217. 
 
 Lusignan, General, forms the right 
 of Austrian army at Rivoli, 100 ; 
 envelops Bonaparte's rear, 102; 
 finds himself entrapped, 103 ; at 
 Feltre, 131 ; is captured, 134. 
 
 Macaulay, quotation from Life of, 
 regarding Napoleon, 216. 
 
 Mack, General, commands Austrians 
 in Ulm campaign, 185 ; surprised 
 at Napoleon's flank march, 185. 
 
 Mantua, fortress of, 39 ; invested, 
 43 ; Austria's efl'orts for the re- 
 lief of, 47 ; siege of, is raised, 49 ; 
 Wurmser arrives at, 50; again 
 
228 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 invested, 51 ; Wurmser driven into, 
 b"] ; number of soldiers shut up in, 
 77 ; Kilmaine withdraws 2,000 sol- 
 diers from, 82 ; Wurmser remains 
 quiet at, 85 ; the capitulation of, 
 106, 122 ; Austria not able to hold 
 Italy though in possession of, 146 ; | 
 vfhy Bonaparte raised the siege of, 
 I go. 
 
 Marengo, campaign of, 34, 44, 183 ; 
 battle of, 61. 
 
 Marlborough, Duke of, gave little 
 attention to strategy, 208 ; his gen- 
 eralship, 211. 
 
 Mass^na, General, at Verona and 
 Rivoli, 47 ; crosses the Mincio, 
 49 ; at Lonato, 50 ; at second Cas- 
 tiglione, 5 1 ; is delayed in crossing 
 the Adige at Ronco, 66, 75; at 
 Bassano, 78, 79, 85 ; the intrepid, 
 81 ; at battle of Areola, 82 ; joins 
 Vaubois, 84 ; at Verona, 97 ; 
 marches to Rivoli, 99; at battle 
 of Rivoli, loi, 102, 103; hurries 
 to Mantua, 105, iig, 120; attacks 
 Provera, 105; defeats Lusignan, 
 134 ; defeats Ocskay, 135; marches 
 on Tarwis, 136 ; meets the Arch- 
 duke, 138 ; his presence on a 
 battle-field equivalent to twenty 
 thousand soldiers, 169, 170. 
 
 Meerfeld, General, carries instruc- 
 tions from the Emperor to Bona- 
 parte, 144. 
 
 Milan, Bonaparte's triumphal march 
 into, 42 ; citadel of, 43 ; Bona- 
 parte's communications with, 50 ; 
 Bonaparte desires to preserve his 
 line of retreat on, 60. 
 
 Militia, Tyrolese, 127 ; fight only on 
 their own mountains, 131 ; de- 
 scend the Adige, 141 ; their value 
 as a re-enforcement to the Austrian 
 army, 154. 
 
 Millesimo, battle of, 25, 36, 93, 180, 
 204 ; victor of, 55 ; heroes of, 80. 
 
 Mincio, river, the base of operations 
 of Austrian army, 22 ; description 
 of, 39 ; Austrians retreat behind, 
 42 ; Wurmser should have thrown 
 
 bridges across, 55 ; Serrurier could 
 have guarded the crossings of, 59 ; 
 by marching to, Alvinzi could 
 have intercepted the French, 109 ; 
 Bonaparte's base of operations, 
 128. 
 
 Mondovi, fortification of, 21 ; victor 
 of, 55 ; battle of, 26, 93, t8o, 204. 
 
 Monte Baldo, 99, loi, 112, 115, 117. 
 
 Montenotte, campaign of, 19 et seq.^ 
 53: battle of, 24, 52, 93, 178, 179, 
 180 ; numbers engaged at battle 
 of, 36; victor of, 55. 
 
 Mont Cenis, 27, 33. 
 
 Moreau, General, commands the 
 French Army of the Rhine, izS. 
 
 Murat, General, commands the cav- 
 alry at battle of Borghetto, 43 ; 
 is wounded, 81. 
 
 Napoleon I., on calculation and 
 system in war, 15 ; is a genius in 
 war, lb ; is the greatest soldier in 
 modern times, 16; his criticism 
 of the allies, 30; his criticism of 
 Wurmser's plan, 55; knew when 
 to scatter and when to unite his 
 forces, 71 ; never lost a battle in 
 which he was superior to the en- 
 emy in numbers, go ; on a double 
 line of operations, 107; the Alps 
 not impassable to him, T17; his 
 manoeuvres are the foundation of 
 his military glory, 122; his opinion 
 of the Archduke Charles, •a26; his 
 opinion of Mass^na, 169, 170; on 
 the qualities of a commander-in- 
 chief, 172, 173 ; the principles of 
 strategy in his time, T73, 1 74 ; why 
 he seldom made flank movements, 
 182; at Ulm, 183, 184, t88.; at 
 Marengo, 183; at Jena, 183, 189 ; 
 compared with Frederick, 189, 
 211 ; dictated instructions which 
 would be of themselves a title to 
 glory, 202 ; his words like Auster- 
 litz battles, 205 ; the marvellous- 
 ness of his achievements, 212 ; 
 collated the knowledge of war, 
 and out of it wrought a perfect 
 
INDEX. 
 
 229 
 
 system, 21^ ; is a military prodigy, 
 217 ; his equal will likely never 
 again arise, 21S. 
 Nelson, commands an English squad- 
 ron in the waters of Genoa, 23. 
 
 OcsKAY, General, succeeds to the 
 command of Lusignan's division, 
 135 J his forces routed by Mass^na, 
 
 135- 
 Oglio, river, description of, 38. 
 Ormea, pass of, 20. 
 
 Paris, military school of, attended 
 by Bonaparte, 214. 
 
 Peschiera, town of, Bonaparte makes 
 a demonstration against, 43 ; at- 
 tacks Austrians at, 51 ; Wurmser 
 should have crossed the Mincio at, 
 55; Vaubois could march byway 
 of, to join Bonaparte, 72, 
 
 Piave, river, description of, 124 ; 
 Archduke arrives on, 127 ; Bona- 
 parte crosses, 134 ; an army sta- 
 tioned on, covers the roads to 
 Trieste, 147, 149; if defeated on, 
 the Austrians could fall back on 
 the Tagliamento, 147. 
 
 Placentia, passage of the Po at, 42, 
 
 43. 75. 181, 194- 
 
 Pope Pius VI. compelled to yield, 
 130 ; his hatred of Bonaparte, 130. 
 
 Provera, General, commands Sar- 
 dinians at Millesimo, 25; strength 
 of his forces at Millesimo, 36 ; 
 commands Austrian army in Fri- 
 uli, 96 ; approaches Verona, 98 ; 
 marches upon Mantua, 105; de- 
 feated at La Favorita, 105 ; his 
 march could have led to no prof- 
 itable result, 112. 
 
 Prussians, at Waterloo, 37; at 
 Jena, 183, 189. 
 
 QuASDANOViCH, General, com- 
 mands the right of Wurmser's 
 army, 48 ; is worsted, 50 ; badly cut 
 up, 51 ; engaged with Bonaparte, 
 53, 54 ; supposititious case in 
 regard to, 59 ; retreats into Friuli, 
 
 66 ; in Friuli, 77 ; at battle of 
 Rivoli, 100 ; overwhelmed, 103 ; 
 driven towards Salo, 200. 
 
 Rey, General, at Desenzano, 97 ; 
 receives orders from Bonaparte, 
 98 ; hurries towards Rivoli, loi ; 
 attacks Lusignan, 103 ; pursues 
 Alvinzi, 105. 
 
 Rivoli, reasons why an attack should 
 have been made at, 58, 191 ; as a 
 battle-field, 59, iig; campaign of, 
 96 ei seq. ; plateau of, description 
 of, 99 ; battle of, 102 ; a tactical 
 battle, 104; loss at, 106; com- 
 ments on battle of, 107 et seq. ; 
 an Austrian victory at, promised 
 great results, no; tactical ma- 
 noeuvres at, 121 f numbers engaged 
 in campaign of, 168 ; Bonaparte's 
 intellect at, 171 ; Bonaparte has 
 every available man at, 193 ; 
 Bonaparte surrounded at, 199 ; 
 Napoleon at St. Helena refers to 
 battle of, 221, 
 
 Rome, government of, felt bitter to- 
 wards Bonaparte, 130; Hannibal, 
 made her tremble, 173; the legions 
 of, 207. 
 
 Ronco, French forces delayed at, 75, 
 194; Bonaparte crosses the Adige 
 at, 82, 181. 
 
 Ropes, John C, on Bonaparte's de- 
 votion to the military profession, 
 216. 
 
 Roveredo, battle of, 64, 70, 93, 200. 
 
 Sahuguet, General, receives orders 
 to prevent the Austrians from 
 reaching Mantua, 66. 
 
 San Georgio, battle of, 67, 70, 93. 
 
 San Marco, heights of, 99, 100, 112. 
 
 Sardinians, position of, 20 ; treat for 
 peace, 27; fight hard, 33 ; defeated 
 by Bonaparte, 41 ; first movement 
 against, when made, 46; Bona- 
 parte concentrates against, 199. 
 
 Sauret, General, commands 4,000 
 French at Salo, 47, 57; driven 
 back, 48. 
 
230 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Savona, pass of, 20. 
 
 Science of war, knowledge of, how 
 obtained, 15. 
 
 Seeley, Professor, on Napoleon's 
 successes, 212. 
 
 Sernirier, General, at the pass of 
 Ormea, 20; makes false attacks 
 against Colli, 25 ; at Mondovi, 36 ; 
 besieges Mantua, 47, 97, 192; 
 raises the siege of Mantua, 49, 54 ; 
 attacks Wurmser's left flank, 5 1 ; 
 at the battle of the Tagliaroento, 
 134; crosses the Isonzo, 136; at- 
 tacks Bayalitsch in rear, 138. 
 
 St. Bernard, pass of, 34, 183. 
 
 St. Gothard, pass of, 61, 183. 
 
 Strategist, test of a, 193. 
 
 Strategy, in Napoleon's campaigns, 
 i6i principles of, 17, 173, 174; 
 aim of, 37, 175; on the battle- 
 field, 174; in the days of Alexan- 
 der, of Hannibal, of Caesar, and 
 of Napoleon, 174; has increased 
 in importance, 208, 217, 21S. 
 
 Tactician, test of a, 193. 
 
 Tactics, changes in, 1 7 ; on the battle- 
 field, 1 74 ; aim of, 175. 
 
 Tagliamento, river, description of, 
 124; battle of the, 134, 135; cam- 
 paign of, 123 et seq, 
 
 Tarwis, pass of, held by Mass^na, 
 136, 137; battle of, 138. 
 
 Theatre of war, definition of, 38. 
 
 Thiers, on Bonaparte's activity at 
 Lonato and Castiglione, 56. 
 
 Ticino, river, description of, 38. 
 
 Toulon, Bonaparte distinguishes 
 himself at, 213. 
 
 Trent, taken by Bonaparte, 64, 73 ; 
 was an important point, 64. 
 
 Trevelyan, on Napoleon, 216. 
 
 Trieste, seaport of, 127, 131 ; im- 
 portant that it be protected, 147. 
 
 Turenne, campaigns of, 15. 
 
 Turin, fortified city of, 21, 33; gov- 
 ernment of, 130. 
 
 Tyrol, Austrians driven into, 43, 46, 
 64 ; Austrian forces in, 68, 72, 77, 
 86 ; Bonaparte leaves a division in, 
 
 73, 74; great highway of, 124; 
 joubert gains possession of, 140; 
 an Austrian army hi, would have 
 protected Trieste, 150; Bonaparte 
 decides to send a strong force 
 into, 153. 
 
 Ulm, battle of, 183; campaign of, 
 184. 
 
 Valenza, Bonaparte deceives the 
 Austrian commander at, 41, 44. 
 
 Vaubois, General, commands Bona- 
 parte's left in Bassano and San 
 Georgio campaign, 64 f at Salo, 
 71; holds Davidovich in check 
 in the Tyrol, 65; commands 
 Bonaparte's left in Arcole cam- 
 paign, 78 ; forced towards Corona 
 and Rivoli, 79 ; not able to hold 
 Davidovich in check, 88. 
 
 Venice, Gulf of, 39, 124; govern- 
 ment of, felt bitter towards Bona- 
 parte, 130. 
 
 Verona, fortified town of, 39 ; taken 
 by Bonaparte, 43 ; Bonaparte falls 
 back on, 79, 89 ; Kilmaine takes 
 command at, 82 ; Bonaparte has 
 the advantage of interior lines at, 
 87 ; probable results had Bona- 
 parte allowed himself to be be- 
 sieged at, go. 
 
 Victor, General, wounded, 81; left 
 in Italy to protect French rear, 
 132 ; preserves Bonapartje's com- 
 munications, 144. 
 
 Voltri, Beaulieu attacks a French 
 brigade at, 23. 
 
 Vukassovich, General, commands 
 the left of Alvinzi's army at Riv- 
 oli, 100 ; could not reach battle- 
 field, 114. 
 
 Wagner, Captain, his definition of 
 a containing force, 33 ; on the 
 criticisms of miUtary operations 
 after the event, 117. 
 
 Warfare, offensive and defensive, 
 principles of, how obtained, 15. 
 
 Waterloo, campaign of, 37 ; battl^ of, 
 166, 182. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 231 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, expects Na- 
 poleon to attack his right at Water- 
 loo, 182. 
 
 Wurmser, Marsha], commands the 
 Austrians, 47; divides his forces, 
 48; his plan, 48 ; arrives at Mantua, 
 50 ; his errors, 50-55 ; again divides 
 his forces, 63, 69, 70 ; his plan, 
 
 63, 64 ; in a critical condition, 65, 
 106 ; fights battle of Bassano, 66 ; 
 driven within the walls of Man- 
 tua, 67; the chances of victory 
 offered him, 72 ; repeats former 
 errors, 73; his delay at Legnago, 
 75 ; signs the capitulation of Man- 
 tua, 106. 
 
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