A3H- PRESENTED TO THE LIBRARY OF ^.HMlMi ^ t MyVt '/I/Sx/y - BY THt . AUTHOR I 908 K.T.X\%loi,. "'w/.r. 3 1924 071 184 281 The White House, Washington, May 18, 1908. My dear Colonel Dodge: I am greatly pleased to learn that you think of presenting your twelve volumes on the Art of War to our military posts. I have read every volume. I have enjoyed all your work, and I look forward especially to the remaining volumes on the Campaigns of i'rederick. I should like to see our young officers read all your volumes, for it would do them real good. With regards and good wishes, helieve me, Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Colonel Theodore A. Dodge, U. S. Army. The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924071184281 DATE DUE Am a 2- ^m=^ €£#-^ -l+TTf .'A: V, T)rr c mmm.^ m L/tL 8 }SSLm& GAYLORD PHINTEDIN U.S.A. ^p tf)e ibnmt ^ttt!)or. THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. With Maps. 8vo, ^3.00. RIDERS OF MANY LANDS. Profusely illustrated by Remington, and from photographs of Oriental subjects. 8vo, $3.00. A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. With Maps and Illus- trations. Students' Edition. Crown 8vo, % i .00, net. PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE: A Chat m the Saddle. Popular Edition. With woodcuts from instantaneous photographs. Crown 8vo, half roan, $1.25. GREAT CAPTAINS. With Maps, etc. 8vo, $2.00. Great Captains . ALEXANDER. A History of the Origin and Growth of the Art of War, from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, b. c. 301 ; with a de- tailed account of the Campaigns of the Great Macedonian. With 237 Charts^ Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Cuts of Armor, Uniforms, Siege Devices, and Portraits. 2 vols. 8vo, jSs.oo. HANNIBAL. A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians and Romans, down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 b. C ; with a detailed account of the Second Punic War. With 227 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Cuts 01 Armor, Weapons, and Uniforms. 2 vols. 8vo, $5.00. C-^SAR. A History of the Art of War among the Romans, down to the End of the Roman Empire ; with a detailed account of the Cam* paigns of Caius Julius Caesar. With 258 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manceuvres, Cuts of Armor, Weapons, and Engines. 2 vols. 8vo, $5.00. GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. A History of the Art of War from its revival after the Middle Ages to the end of the Spanish Succession War, with a detailed account of the Campaigns of the great Swede, and the most famous Campaigns of Turenne, Cond^, Eugene, and Marlborough. With 237 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tac- tical Manceuvres, Cuts of Uniforms, Arms, and Weapons. 2 vols. 8vo, $5.00. Also in i vol. 8vo, $5.00. NAPOLEON. A History of the Art of War, with many Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Portraits, Cuts of Uni- forms, Arms, and Weapons. VOL. I. Includes the period from the beginning of the French Revolution to the end of the Eighteenth Century, with a detailed account of the Wars of the French Revolution. VOL. II. Includes the period from the beginning of the Consulate to the end of the Friedland Campaign, with a detailed account of the Napoleonic Wars. VOL. III. and VOL. IV. in preparation. 4 vols. 8vo, each {^4.00 net. Postage extra. IN PREPARATION: Uniform in style with the above volumes. FREDERICK THE GREAT. The complete series (Alexander to Napoleon) will cover the History of the Art of War from the earliest times down to 1815. HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPAN V Boston and New York. /u'.rr//?r/fl ^'''/r'/'n (" ^ /'■■■ /i(/.'' dDfteat Captatngi ALEXANDER A HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ART OF WAR FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BATTLE OF IPSUS, B. C. 301, WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE GREAT MACEDONIAN WITHSSH CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES AND TACTICAL MANCEUVRES, CUTS OF ARMOR, UNIFORMS, SIEGE DEVICES, AND PORTRAITS THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE 'the campaign of chancellorsvillh," a birds eye view of our civil war," " patroclus and penelope, a chat in the SADDLE," "great CAPTAINS," ETC., ETC. IN TWO VOLUMES — VOLUME L 1 j^^^.^^^^^K % L-JnoP^^^^^mH^^^I BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY liijtaviiui 'ssa^ 'Sr A, ^^l^Ul, Co|)yilght, 1890, Bt THEODORE ATEATJLT DODGE. ^/2 rt^Ats reserved. THIRD IMPRESSION To THE AMERICAN SOLDIER WHO, NOT BRED TO AKMS, BUT NnRTURED BY INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED THE PROUDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORY €^eie Walumti ARE DEDICATED "Faites la guerre offensive comme Alexandre, Annibal, Cisar, Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le prince Eugene et Fridiric ; lisez, reli- lisez I'histoire de leur quatre-vingt-huit campagnes ; modilez-vous sur eux, — c'est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine et de surprendre le aicret de I' art ; voire ginie, ainsi (clairi, vousfera rejeter des max- imes (ypposies h celles de ces grands homines." — Napoleon. " La tactiqae, les (volutions, la science de I'officier de ginie, de I'officier d'artillerie peuvent s'apprendre dans les traitis ; — mais la connaissance de la grande tactique ne s'acquiert que par I'eocpirience etpar I'itude de I'histoire des campagnes de tous les grands capitaines." — Napoleon. PEEFACE. The basis of this history is the Anabasis of Alexander by Arrian of Nicomedia, who lived in the second century of our era. Arrian was surnamed in Athens the Younger Xeno- phon, because he occupied the same relation to Epictetus which Xenophon did to Socrates. This historian is by far the most reliable, plain and exact of all those who have told us of the great Macedonian. Arrian, though a Greek, was long in the service of the Roman state, having fallen into the good graces of the Emperor Hadrian, whom he accompanied to Rome, and who later appointed him prefect of Cappadocia. Under Antoninus Pius, Arrian rose to the supreme dignity of consul. He wrote several philosophical and historical treatises, among them an account of his own campaign against the Alani. Arrian was himself a distinguished soldier, and it is this which enables him to make all military situations so clear to us. Of the fifteen works which we know he wrote, the Anabasis is the most valuable. Arrian had in his hands the histories of Ptolemy, son of Lagus, one of Alexander's most distinguished officers, later king of Egypt, and of Aristobulus, a minor officer of Alex- ander's. He also used the works of Eratosthenes, Megas- thenes, Nearchus, Alexander's famous admiral, Aristus, and Asclepiades, as well as had access to all which had been writ- ten before him, a large part of which he rejected in favor of the testimony of those who served under Alexander in per- son. He quotes from the king's own letters, and from the viu PREFACE. diary of Eumenes, his secretary, which he appears to have had at hand. Next to Arrian's history comes that of Quintus Curtius, who wrote in the first century. Of ten books, the eight last are extant. This work is far behind Arrian's in credibility. Curtius is somewhat of a romancer, though he gives local color, and occasionally supplies a fact missing in Arrian. But he is neither clear nor consistent. He draws his facts largely from Clitarchus, a contemporary of Alexander. Plutarch (50 to 130 A. D.) is always interesting, and his short life of Alexander is just and helpful. Many stray facts can be gleaned in the other Lives. Diodorus Siculus, a contemporary of Caesar and Augustus, in his Historical Library, gives us many items of worth. Out of his forty books, only fifteen have survived. Diodorus is suggestive, but must be construed in the light of other works. Justinus, a Roman historian who lived in the second or third century A. D., wrote a History of Macedonia. This ranks with Diodorus in usefulness. The chapters relating to Philip and Alexander supply some gaps, and give an occa- sional glimpse into the character of these monarchs, lacking elsewhere. But one cannot rely on Justin unsupported. Strabo's Geography (first century) contains material which ekes out what we glean elsewhere, and there are in many of the old authors — Dionysius, Livy, Josephus, Frontinus, Am- mian, and others — frequent references to Alexander which can be drawn from. Vegetius' De re militari is somewhat mixed, but very valuable. Onosander's Strategos can be put to use in explaining tactical manoeuvres. Polybius, one of the most valuable of all our ancient sources of information, military and political, in his Universal History, strays off to Greece, Asia Minor, and Egypt, and PREFACE. IX we find some material in his pages. He lived in the third century. There were numberless historians of Alexander. Very few have survived. Rafael Volteran quotes CUtarchus, Poly- crates, Onesicritus, Antigenes Istrus, Aristobulus, Chares, Hecatseus Eritreus, Philip the Chalcidian, Duris the Samian, Ptolemy, Anticlides, Philo the Theban, Philip, Hisangelus, Ajitisthenes, Menechmus the Sicyonian, Nymphis of Heraclea, Potamon the Mitylensean, Sotericus Arsites, Arrian, Plu- tarch, Quintus Curtius. Plutarch quotes most of the above, and CaUisthenes, Eratosthenes, PolycUtus, Hermippus, and Sotion, beside. Most of these authors did not long survive their own era ; but they were known to those whose works have remained to us, and were by them accepted or rejected, according to the credibility of each. It may be claimed that Arrian furnishes us the main body of aU histories of Alex- ander. Other sources are, as it were, appendices. And this, because the trained military mind of Arrian enabled him to distinguish clearly between what was valuable and consistent, and what was manifestly incredible or unimportant. The early chapters, about the military art preceding Philip, come mainly from Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon. Cornelius Nepos draws a clever character, and we all know what a fund of riches Plutarch lays before us, available for all purposes, if not always exact. So much for the facts. But the ancient authors rarely give more than just the bald facts in deahng with military mat- ters. They teU us where Alexander went and what he did, with sketches of character and interesting incidents ; but they furnish no clue to the special why and wherefore which the soldier likes to know; or if a clue, quite frequently a wrong one. What to us is clear, because the art which Alex- ander created has since been expanded by the deeds of the X PREFACE. other great captains and elucidated by their commentators, was, even to Arrian, a sealed book. Arrian did not under- stand what Alexander did as Jomini would have understood it; for it needed the remarkable campaigns of a Frederick and a Napoleon to enable Jomini to compass the inner mean- ing of the art of war. This meaning we must seek in mod- ern military criticism. There is by no means a perfect sequence to the origin and growth of the art of war. Its continuity has been inter- rupted by periods of many centuries. But as all great sol- diers have acknowledged their indebtedness to their predeces- sors, though they themselves have been able to improve upon the art, so it is interesting and instructive to study what these predecessors did, and see from what small beginnings and through how many fluctuations the art has grown to its pres- ent perfect state. « There have been many lives of Alexander written in mod- ern times, some within this generation. Much of the best of military criticism has been devoted to this subject. It is hard to say anything about Alexander that some one may not already have said. But a good deal contained in these volumes in the way of comment is new, and the author does not know of a life of Alexander, which, by the use of such charts and maps as abound in the histories of our own Civil War, makes the perusal of his great conquests an easy task. The mili- tary student is willing to devote his days to research ; he should not rely on others ; the general reader has no leisure for such work. He has a right to demand that his way should be made plain. The author has tried to do just this, while not neglecting the requirements of those who wish to dwell upon the military aspect of Alexander's campaigns. There is no mystery about the methods of great captains. A hundred years ago there was ; but Jomini and his follow- PREFACE. XI ers have brushed away the cobwebs from the secret and laid it bare. The technical details relating to war are intricate and difficult, nor are they of interest to the general reader. They take many years to learn. No officer, who drops for an instant his studies, can save himself from falling behind his fellows. Especially is this true to-day. This, however, relates chiefly to the minutiae of the profession. The higher the art of the soldier goes, the simpler it is, because it be- comes part of his own individuality ; but the captain must first have mastered every detail of the profession by the hard- est of work. He must be familiar with the capacities and limitations of every arm of the service, and be able to judge accurately what ground each needs for its march, its manoeu- vres, and its fire. He must be so apt a business man as never to fail in providing for his troops, however fast he moves or however far from his base. He must be an engineer of the first class. Almost aU great generals have been able to drill a company, or serve a gun, or throw up a breastwork, or con- duct a reconnoissance better than most of their subordinates. Intimate knowledge of detail is of the essence. Ad astra per aspera. Having reached the top, the captain's work is less intricate in one sense. Nothing is more beautifully simple than the leading features of the best campaign of Napoleon. We may aU understand them. But to few, indeed, has the power ever been given to conceive and execute such a masterpiece. A bare half-dozen men in the world's history stand in the highest group of captains. The larger operations of war are in themselves plain, but they are founded on complicated detail. War on the map, or strategy, appears to us, in the event, easy enough ; but to conceive and develop, and then move an army in pursuance of, a strategic plan requires the deepest knowledge of all arts and sciences applicable to war. xii PREFACE. and such exertion, mental, moral and physical, as is known to no one but the commander of a great army in time of war. The simple rests upon the difficult. What is treated of in this book is not, as a rule, the minutiae, but the larger opera- tions, though details have sometimes to be dwelt on for their historical value. What is difficult to do may be easy to nar- rate. There is no pretense to make this a military text-book. It contains nothing but what the professional soldier already knows. A military text-book is practically useless to the gen- eral reader. Even Jomini acknowledged that he could not make his books interesting except to professionals ; and there are now enough good text-books accessible to those who wish to study the technical side of war. But it is hoped that the presentation may commend itself to those military men whose studies in their peculiar branch of the profession have led them in other directions, and who may wish to refresh their knowledge of Alexander's campaigns, even if they do not agree with all the conclusions reached. It is assumed by some excellent military critics that there are no lessons to be learned from antiquity. This was not what Frederick and Napoleon thought or said. It is cer- tainly difficult to develop a text-book of the modern sci- ence from ancient campaigns alone ; illustrations and paral- lelisms must for the most part be sought in the campaigns of the last three centuries. But it will not do to forget that Frederick's victory at Leuthen was directly due to his knowl- edge of Epaminondas' manoeuvre at Leuctra, or that the passage of the Hydaspes has been the model for the cross- ing of rivers in the face of the enemy ever since. AU gain is bred of the successes and failures of our predecessors in the art ; it is well to know what these were. While all the principles of the modern science of war are not shown in the PREFACE. xni old campaigns, because the different conditions did not call for their development, as well as because history is full of gaps, the underlying ones certainly are ; and these can be best understood by tracing them from their origin. It is be- lieved that when the series of volumes of which these are the first shall have reached our own times, the entire body of the art of war will have been well covered. These volumes can include but a small part of it. This is not a political history. If any errors in the descrip- tion of the intricate political conditions of Alexander's age have crept in, the author begs that they may be pardoned as not properly within the scope of the work. Time has been devoted to manoeuvres and battles ; politics has been treated as a side issue. Individual prowess was a large part of ancient war. In Homeric times it was especially prominent. A narrative of Alexander is apt to abound in instances of his personal cour- age rather than of his moral or intellectual force. The former seemed to appeal more strongly to the ancients. The old historians deal almost exclusively in details of this kind, and in following them, one is instinctively led into giving much prominence to acts of individual gallantry. In olden days troops had to be led, and the commander-in-chief was called on to give a daily example of his bravery. Troops are now moved. Brigades are mere blocks. While he needs courage as much as ever, the commander should avoid expos- ure to unnecessary risk. His moral and intellectual forces are more in demand than the merely physical. There are singular discrepancies between all atlases, an- cient and modern. The best of maps vary in their details to an annoying extent. The maps herein given do not aim at infallibility. They are accurate enough not to mislead. The charts are original. In many cases topography has been xiv PREFACE. created to conform to the relations of the authorities. Such is the chart of Aornus. The larger part of the Eastern con- quests of Alexander are practically inaccessible to the modern traveler, and no geographer has been able to secure more than general accuracy. The local topography is quite un- known. In such cases the chart is merely suggestive, and is inserted as it were as a part of the text. Helpfulness to the reader has been sought rather than artistic excellence. There are some slight variations between charts and maps, but none of moment. The scales of miles may not in all cases be quite exact. There is an occasional variation between chart and text. In such cases the text is to be followed. The maps and charts are usually north and south. The relative sizes of the blocks of troops are not meant to be accurate. Sometimes exaggeration is resorted to to make the meaning of a manoeuvre more plain. Accuracy is not always possible. The peculiar use of the charts is to elucidate the text. Be- tween charts and text it is hoped that the book wiU be easy to read, and the author believes that a single perusal of the battle of Arbela will make its general features as plain as those of the battle of Gettysburg. Lest any part of the book should prove dull, so that the reader may desire to exert his right to skip, short arguments at the heads of the chap- ters have been provided, specific enough to preserve the con- tinuity of the narrative. The cuts of uniforms, arms and siege-devices will be found interesting. Most of them have their origin in old architec- tural or ceramic decoration. The dress and arms of the sol- diers are largely taken from Kretchmar-Rohrbach's Trachten der Volker, whose materials are copied from the ruins and the relics of the ancient world. Among very recent writers, the author desires to acknowl- edge his indebtedness to Prince Galitzin, whose just com- PREFACE. XV pleted History of War is a well-digested and admirably classified work, drawn from all sources, ancient and modern. It has been laid under free contribution. Droysen's History of Alexander is accurate, fuU and complete, but lacks the advantage of charts and maps. It has been equally utilized. From the middle of the last century, when Folard and Guish- ard began their commentaries and discussions on the ancient historians, up till now, there has been such a mass of matter published, often of highest value and often trivial, that its mere bibliography is tiresome. But there is no existing com- mentary on the great Macedonian, known to the author to be of acknowledged value, which has not been consulted. The facts, however, have been uniformly taken from or compared with the old authorities themselves. The labors and com- mentaries of many philologists, geographers and soldiers have now moulded the ancient histories into a form easily acces- sible to him who possesses but a tithe of the knowledge and patience they have so freely placed at the service of their fellow-man. TABLE OF CONTENTS. I. In General II. Early History of War . III. Early Oriental Armies IV. Early Greek Armies and Wars . v. Cyrus and Darius, b. c. 558 to 485 VI. Armies in the Fifth Century b. c. VII. MiLTiADES. Marathon, b. c. 490 VIII. Brasidas. b. c. 424-422 ... IX. Xenophon. Agesilaus. b. c. 401-394 X. Epaminondas. b. c. 371-362 . XI. Philip and Macedon. b. c. 359-336 XII. Philip and his Army. b. c. 359-336 XIII. The Art of Fortification and Sieges XIV. Alexander and Greece, b. c. 336 XV. The Danube, b. c. 335 .. . XVI. Pelium. b. c. 335 . XVII. Thebes, b. c. 335 .... XVIII. Off for Asla. b. c. 334 . XIX. Battle of the Granicus. May, b. c. 334 XX. Sardis. Miletus. Halicaknassus. Summer and Fall, b. c. 334 XXI. To the Taurus. Winter, b. c. 334-333 XXII. Cilicia. Summer and Fall, b. c. 333 XXIII. Issus. November, b. c. 333 XXIV. Tyre. December, b. c. 333, to August, b. c. 332 XXV. Gaza and Egypt. September, b. c. 332, to Spring, B. 0. 331 1 7 14 27 44 56 84 92 101 116 125 134 171 181 188 198 209 218 234 252 269 284 295 321 343 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. FAQS PoRTKAiT OP Alexander, from bust found at Tivoli Frontispiece Persian Noble 6 Assyrian Mounted Archer ..,..,.. 13 Assyrian Warriors . 15 Babylonian Heavy Footmen .16 Babylonian Slinger ......... 16 Babylonian Chariot 16 Military Insignia . 17 Median Scythed Chariot 18 Assyrian Archer . .18 Hebrew Pikeman 19 Hebrew Pikeman .19 Hebrew Heavy Footman 19 Hebrew Archer 20 Slinger, from a Coin 20 Hebrew Irregular 21 Egyptian King in War Dress ........ 21 Egyptian Soldier in Scale Armor ....... 22 Egyptian Soldier in Linen Breast Plate ...... 22 Egyptian Soldiers 23 Persian Soldier 24 Persian Irregular 24 Persian Warrior .......... 25 Assyrian Arms Bearer . .26 Paris from ^gina Marbles 28 Ancient Greek Soldier ......... 29 Greek Soldier in Linen Cuirass 29 Siege of Troy 30 Hoplite, from a Vase 32 XX LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Hoplite, from a Vase 32 Leather Cuirass, Iron Plates ........ 32 Greek Strategos .......... 34 Greek Hoplite 35 Greek Psilos, from a Vase 36 Greek Hoplite 37 Back of Hoplite 's Helmet 37 Hoplite, from a Vase 38 Heroic Horseman, from a Vase 39 Homeric Warrior .......... 40 Battle of Ampheea 42 Conquests of Cyrus 47 Battle of Thymbra 49 Darius' Campaign against the Scythians 53 Scythian Warriors 55 Persian Body-guards 57 Persian Officer 59 Full-armed Greek Archer 63 Peltast 63 Cataphractos ........... 64 Ancient Weapons 65 Ancient Helmets 65 Ancient Swords 66 Method of holding Shield 66 Thessalian Lozenge ......... 67 Parallel Order 69 Parallel Order, Wing reinforced 69 Oblique Order, Simple Form 69 Victorious Greek . . ....... 71 Trophy 72 Use of Cloak as Shield, from a Vase ...... 73 Mantelets 74 Hand Ram 75 Demi-lune 76 Greek Army Leader 80 Hoplite 82 Cataphractos, from a Vase .... . , 82 Armor of Greek Chieftain . . , 83 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. xxi Plain of Marathon 85 Soldier of Marathon 86 Before Battle of Marathon 88 Greek Manoeuvre at Marathon 89 Xenophon 91 Pylos 93 Battle of 01p» 94 March of Brasidas 96 AmphipoUs 98 Battle of Cunaxa 103 March of Ten Thousand 105 Cardusian Defile 108 Crossing of Centrites . Ill Route of Agesilaus 113 Battle of Coronea 115 Battle of Leuctra 117 Field of Mantinsea 120 Battle of Mantinsea ■ . . . 123 Battle of Cheeronaea 128 Lochos ■ 138 Hypaspist 138 Kausia . 139 Greek Helmets 139 Coat of Scale Armor 139 Greaves ............ 140 Sandal 140 Boots 140 Sarissa Bearer . 140 Ancient Shields 141 Taxiarchia (close order) 141 Syntagma (open order) 142 Simple Phalanx 142 Pezetserns with Sarissa couched 143 Casting Javelin with a Twist 144 Greek Sandal and Spur 144 Shields in Open and Close Order and Synapism .... 146 Syntagma in Perspective 146 Syntagma in Perspective 146 xxu LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Position of Sarissas in Lochoa ....... 147 Circle in Drill 147 Concave Line in Drill ......... 147 Convex Line in Drill. ......... 147 Embolon or Wedge 148 Koilembolon or Pincers ......... 148 Formation with broken Ranks and Files ..... 149 lie of Sixty-four Horse (close order) 160 Deep Square 150 Thracian Wedge 150 Reverse Wedge 150 Rhomboid with Mixed Files 151 Square ............ 151 Square with Mixed Ranks ........ 151 Cavalry Companion ......... 152 He of Hetairai of two hundred and twenty-five men . , . 153 Light Horseman .......... 154 Greek Headstall 155 Greek Headstall 155 Rider, from Frieze of Parthenon ....... 155 Simple Phalanx .......... 156 Catapult 161 Ballista 162 Greek Camp 164 Philip of Macedon, from a Coin 170 Scaling Ladders 172 Tortoise . . 173 Fort, Tower, Mound, etc 174 Tower, Drawbridge, and Ram 176 Mantelets 178 Telenon and Mural Hook 179 Pent House and Rajn Tongs 180 March into Thessaly 185 Danube and Pelium Campaigns 190 Mount Hffimus 191 Battle at the Lyginus 193 Method of using Skins 195 Getse and Syrmus 195 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. xxiu Alexander, Dresden Museum ........ 197 Plain of Pelium 201 Pelium Manceuvre .......... 204 Tetradrachma, in the Louvre 208 March from Pelium to Thebes 211 Thebes 213 Alexander, from Bust in Louvre 217 Pella to Asia Minor 231 Head of Alexander, from Statuette found at Herculaneum . . 233 To the Granious 235 Battle of the Granicus 237 Bronze Statuette of Alexander found at Herculaneum . . . 251 Granicus to Halicarnassus 253 Miletus and Environments 257 Halicarnassus .......... 263 Siege of Halicarnassus 265 Halicarnassus to Gordium 270 Halicarnassus to Gordium 271 Combat near Sagalassus ........ 279 Tetradrachma, in Berlin Museum ....... 283 .iEgean 285 Gordium to Amanus 290 Plain of Issus 296 Issus before the Battle 305 Issus ; Alexander's Manoeuvre ....... 311 Syria and Phoenicia . . 323 Alexander's Base Line 327 Tyre 329 Alexander, from Cameo in Zanetti Museum 342 Gaza 344 Egypt 348 ALEXANDER. IN GENERAL. AlI] early history is a record of wars. Peace was too uneventful to call for record. But mere record cannot fashion a science. The art of war has been created hy the intellectual conceptions of a few great captains ; it has been re- duced to a science by the analysis of their recorded deeds. Strategy is war on the map ; tactics is battlefield manceuyring. Both depend less on rules than on the brain, courage, and activity of the captain. Strategy has been of slow growth, and was, as a science, unknown to the ancients; tactics was highly developed, as were, within given limits, logistics and engineering. No study is so fruitful to the soldier as that of the history of great captains. From their deeds alone can the true instinct of war be gleaned. These pages propose to sketch briefly the typical events and the status of armies antedating Alexander, to show what then was already known of war ; and, by a relation of Alexander's campaigns, to illustrate his influence upon the art. The earliest histories are but a record of wars. The sea- sons of peace were too uneventful to call for historians. The sharply defined events which arrest attention, because fol- lowed by political or territorial changes, have always been wars, and these have been the subject-matter of nearly all early writings. The g;reatest of poems would never have seen the light had not Hom^r been inspired by the warlike deeds of heroes ; nor would Herodotus and Thucydides have penned their invaluable pages had not the stirring events of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars impelled them to the task. Xenophon, Arrian, Caesar, are strictly military histo- rians; and the works of the other great writers of ancient 2 THE ART OF WAR. history contain only the rehearsal of wars held together by a network of political conditions influencing these struggles. It is indeed peculiarly in the fact that war is now subordi- nated to peace that our modern civilization differs from that of the ancients ; and but within a couple of generations can it be truly claimed that the arts of peace have assumed more prominence than the arts of war. So long as war remains the eventual arbitrament of all national disputes, so long must the arts of peace contribute to the art of war, and so long must this be studied, and an active interest in the deeds of the great captains be maintained. The art of war has been created by the intellectual conceptions of a few great captains. It is best studied in the story of their triumphs. The memorizing of technical rules can teach but the detail of the art. The lessons con- tained in what the masters did can be learned only by an intelligent analysis of the events themselves ; the inspiration essential to success can be caught only by assimilation of their methods. Nothing is so fruitful to the soldier as to study closely the character and intellect of these great men, and to make himself familiar with the events which they have illus- trated. Few topics have greater interest for the layman. Less than a generation since, we Americans were a nation of soldiers. In four years something like foTir millions of men had worn the blue or gray. In the autumn of their life many of these veterans may enjoy the comparison of their own campaigns with those of the men whom all unite in call- ing the masters of the art. To such my work is principally addressed. Strategy has been aptly described as the art of making war upon the map. Nor is this a mere figure of speech. Napoleon always planned and conducted his campaigns on maps of the country spread out for him by his staff, and into STRATEGY. 3 these maps he stuck colored pins to indicate where his divi- sions were to move. Having thus wrought out his plan, he issued orders accordingly. To the general the map is a chess- board, and upon this he moves his troops as players move queen and knight. Strategy is, in other words, the art by which a general so moves his army about the country in rela- tion to but beyond the proximity of the enemy, that when he finally reaches him, the enemy shall be placed in a disadvan- tageous position for battle or other manoeuvre. The move- ments of an army in the immediate presence of the enemy, or on the field of battle, belong to the domain of grand tactics. Strategy is the common law or common sense of war. As the common law has arisen from the decisions of great judges relating to the common affairs of life, so strategy has arisen from the action of the great masters of war in the events they were called on to control. The word is very prop- erly derived from strategos, the name given by the Greeks to the leader of a certain unit of service — to a general. It is not the army, nor the people, nor the territory, nor the cause which are the origin of strategic movements, though, indeed, aU these bear their due part in the calculation. It is the head and heart of the leader which always have fur- nished and always must furnish the strategic values of every campaign. From his intelleetual and moral vigor — in other words, his personal equipment — must ever come the motive power and direction. Strategy has its rules, like every science. Until within a little over a century these have been unwritten. They are in principle inflexible, in practice elastic. They are but the tools of the trade, the nomenclature of the science ; the " Barbara Celarent " of logic. The strictness or laxity of the maxims of strategy is measured by the ability of the gen- eral. The second-rate commander transcends them at his * "ACTION, ACTION, ACTION !» peril. For the great captain they vary as the conditions vary. The man who can rise superior to mere rules, and succeed, has always a spark of genius. But as these maxims are, like those of the common law, nothing but a statement of what is the highest common sense, the genius who makes exceptions to them does so because the circumstances warrant the exception, or because he feels that he can control circum- stances. The great captain will never permit mere rules to tie his hands ; but his action wiU always be in general, if not specific, accordance with them. The one thing which distin- guishes the great captains of history from the rank and file of commanders is that they have known when to disregard maxims, and that they have succeeded while disregarding them, and because of their disregard of them. But in aU cases their successes have proved the rule. The first requisite of oratory, said Demosthenes, is action ; the second, action ; the third, action. In this generation of conversational speeches the saying is less applicable to ora- tory than to strategy and tactics. It is the general who can think rapidly and move rapidly ; who can originate correct lines of manoeuvre, and unceasingly and skiUfuUy follow them, who becomes great. The few instances of Fabian tac- tics are but the complement to this rule. They prove its truth. Fabius Maximus was in one sense as active as Han- nibal. It was mainly in the avoidance of armed conflict that he differed from the great Carthaginian. How, indeed, could he f oUow each movement of his wonderful antagonist, — as he did, — unless his every faculty was in constant action ? Incessant action is not of necessity unceasing motion ; it is motion in the right direction at the right moment ; though, indeed, it is the legs of an army, as much as its stomach, which enable the brain tissue and throbbing blood of the captain to conduct a successful campaign or win a pitched battle. STRATEGY A GROWTH. 5 Strategy lias been a growth, like other sciences. Its ear- liest manifestation was in the ruthless invasion by one bar- barian tribe of the territory of another, in search of bread, metals, wives, or plunder of any kind. The greater or less skill or rapidity of such an invasion, by which the population attacked was taken unawares or at a disadvantage, meant success or failure. Thus grew offensive strategy. The in- vaded people cut the roads, blocked the defiles, defended the fords of the rivers, lay in ambush in the forests. The ability shown in these simple operations originated the strategy of defense. Often the strong, relying on their strength, showed the least ability ; the weak, conscious of their weakness, the most. From such simple beginnings has grown up the sci- ence and art of war, which to-day, among the greatest na- tions, — saving always our own happily exempt America, — embraces all arts and sciences, and makes them each and all primarily subservient to its demands. As with strategy, so tactics, logistics and engineering came to perfection by a slow growth in ancient and modern times. The tactics of organization and drill rose to a high degree among the ancients ; the tactics of the battlefield were some- times superb. Logistics were simpler, for armies were nei- ther large, nor carried such enormous supplies of material. Engineering, as exemplified at the sieges of Tyre, Rhodes, and Alesia, has rarely been equaled in the adaptation of the means at hand to the end to be accomplished. War is scarcely more perfect to-day, according to our resources in arts and mechanics, than it was twenty odd centuries ago among the Greeks, according to theirs. It is not, however, the purpose of these pages to discourse upon the art of war. It wiU be a far more pleasant task to tell the story of the great captains whose deeds have created this art, and through them, by unvarnished comment, to lay 6 PURPOSE OF THIS WORK. open to the friendly reader the rules and maxims which gov- ern or limit strategy and tactics. And before coming to the first, — and perhaps the greatest of all, — Alexander of Macedon, it is proposed to describe briefly the armies ante- dating his, to say something about his predecessors in the art, and to give a short account of a very few of their campaigns or battles, in order to show what equipment this wonderful soldier possessed when, a mere lad, he undertook, as captain- general of the smallest and yet greatest nation on earth, Greece, the expedition against the stupendous power of the Persian empire, and thus placed the weight of the world upon his youthful shoulders. This cannot readily be done in a well connected historical narrative. Many noted wars and brilliant generals must be omitted. The instances and com- manders to be quoted wiU be but typical of the rest, and will illustrate the gradual advance from unintelligent to intel- lectual warfare. A history of war must embrace all wars and battles, small and great. A history of the art of war may confine itself to narrating such typical wars and battles as best illustrate its growth. Persian Noble. II. EARLY HISTORY OF WAR. The first reliable history of war is found in the Bible ; the next comes from Homer, Herodotas, Thucydides, and Xenophon. All ancient historians are properly military historians. During the Middle Ages chronicles were kept, but no history was written, and war as an art was at a low ebb. It was the French Revolution which first developed the national sentiment and the study of war as a science. The world's wars may for our uses be conveniently divided into Ancient Wars, Middle Age Wars, Modem Wars, Recent Wars. The eras of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Frederick and Napoleon contain the names of nearly all the great captains. — Man is a fighting animal. His club was the first hand-to-hand weapon ; his slung-stone the early long-range arm. The organization of armies came about in a perfectly simple manner, just as the first stockade around a barbarian village was the origin of the stu- pendous walls of Babylon. The beginning of all military devices was in the East ; they have been perfected in the West. The character of all Oriental wars was that of huge raids, accompanied by extravagant cruelties and devas- tation. Entirely unmethodical, they contain no lessons for us to-day. The first reliable history of war may be said to have come to us from the Jews. The historical books of the Bible give us the earliest written glimpse into very ancient methods of warfare, as the Egyptian monuments give us the pictorial. This narrative was followed by the Iliad, which portrays the condition of war twelve hundred years before Christ. He- rodotus (f 418 B. C.) next appeared, and by his faithful description of the Persian wars justly earned the title of Father of History ; and following him closely came Thucy- dides (f 384 B. c), who narrated the great political and in- teresting, though in instruction meagre, military events of the Peloponnesian War. Xenophon (-j- 360 B. C.) graphically, if sometimes imaginatively, described the deeds of the elder 8 HISTORY OF WAR. Cyrus, and capped all military-historical works in his won- derful Anabasis. The same character was kept up by Po- lybius, Diodorus, Dionysius, Arrian, Plutarch, among the Greeks, and by Caesar, Sallust, Liyy, Tacitus, Nepos, among the Romans. That the works of all these and many other authors should deal mostly with war was a necessity. It was war which was, as a rule, the precursor of advancing civili- zation. From the decline of Eome throughout the Middle Ages there was no history, properly speaking. Only chronicles and partial notes were kept ; nor did history emerge from its hid- ing until the revival of learning and the arts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was then patterned, as was every- thing else, on ancient models. The invention of gunpowder gave a new direction to war and its records, though the clas- sical influence and a certain pedantry in historical work re- mained until the eighteenth century. The systems of war partook of this same pedantry, with the exception of what was done by a few great masters, and it was not until the French Revolution overturned aU preconceived notions on every subject that the art of war, as we understand it, arose and throve. The worship of the ancient models gave way to a national sentiment, and the growth of scientific war became assured and permanent, as well as the fruitful study of what the great captains had really done. Military history had been but a record. It became an inquiry into the principles governing the acts recorded. Prince Galitzin's splendid work divides the history of war into four sections : — A. Ancient War. 1°. Down to 500 B. c. 2°. From the beginning of the Persian wars, 500 B. c, down to the death of Alexander, 323 B. c. IMPORTANT PERIODS OF WAR. 9 3°. From the death of Alexander, 323 b. c, to the death of Caesar, 44 b. c. 4°. From the death of Caesar, 44 b. c, to the fall of the West Roman Empire, A. d. 476. B. Wars of the Middle Ages. 1°. From A. D. 476 t» the death of Charles the Great, A. d. 814. 2°. From A. D. 814 to the introduction of firearms, A. D. 1350. 3°. From A. D. 1350 to the Thirty Years' War, A. d. 1618. C. Modern Wars. 1°. The Thirty Years' War, a. d. 1618 to 1648. 2°. Wars from A. D. 1648 to Frederick the Great. 3°. Frederick's era to the beginning of the French Revolution, A. D. 1740 to 1792. D. Recent Wars. 1°. From the French Revolution to 1805. 2°. Napoleon's wars, A. D. 1805 to 1815. 3°. Wars since 1815. Of these s^veral periods the most important by far to the military student are those which contain the deeds of Alex- ander, Hannibal, Csesar, in ancient days, and those of Gus- tavus, Frederick and Napoleon in modern times. Few of the other great generals fall without these periods. To nar- rate the military achievements of these great masters, and incidentally a few others, and to connect them by a mere thread of the intervening events, will suffice to give all which is best in the rise and progress of the science of war. " Eead," says Napoleon, " re-read the history of their campaigns, make them your model ; this is the sole means of becoming a great captain and of guessing the secret of the art." So long as man has existed on the earth he has been a fighting animal. After settling his quarrels with the weapons of nature, he resorted to clubs and stones, that is, weapons 10 ORIGIN OF ORGANIZATION. for use hand to hand and at a distance ; and no doubt at an early day built himself huts and surrounded them with stakes, stones and earth, so as to keep away aggressive neigh- bors. Herein we have the origin of weapons and of fortifi- cation. As men joined themselves into communities, the arts of attack and defense, and their uses as applied to numbers, grew. The citizen was always a soldier. But often only a portion of the citizens required to be sent away from home to fight, and this originated standing armies, which became a well-settled institution when conquerors made themselves kings. As man invented useful arts, these were first applied to the demands of war. Bows and arrows, lances, slings, swords, breastplates and shields came into use, and horses were tamed and employed for war, first as beasts of burden, and then in chariots and for cavalry. Chariots and horses for cavalry were first adopted because they afforded the fighters a higher position from which to cast their weapons, as well as rendered their aspect more dreadful. Elephants and cam- els came into warfare for a similar reason. No doubt char- iots antedated cavalry. Troops began by fighting in masses, without settled order, and the victory was won by those who had the bravest, strongest, or most numerous array. With better weapons came greater order. The best-armed war- riors were placed together. The shngers could not do good work side by side with the pikemen, nor the charioteer or mounted man with the foot-soldier. Thus certain tactical formations arose, and as the more intelligent soldiers were put in charge of the less so, rank and command appeared. It was soon found that the light-armed, bowmen and sling- ers, could best use their weapons and most rapidly move in open, skirmishing order ; that the heavy-armed, pikemen and swordsmen, could best give decisive blows when ployed into masses. The growth of army organization came about in a ORIGIN OF STRATEGY. 11 perfectly natural sequence, and grew side by side with all other pursuits. Fortification originated in a similar manner. Tribes built their villages in inaccessible places, — on rocks or hiUs, — and surrounded them with ditches, stockades or loosely-piled walls. Such simple habitations gradually grew into fortified cities, and the walls and ditches increased in size and diffi- ciUty of approach. Inner citadels were built ; and towers crowned the walls, to enable these to be swept by missiles if reached by the besiegers. The art of sieges was of much later and more formal growth. For many generations forti- fied cities were deemed inexpugnable, and artifice or hunger were resorted to for their capture. But gradually it was found that walls could be undermined or weakened or breached, or that they could be mounted by various means, and the art of besieging cities began to take on form. As tribes grew into nations war assumed larger dimensions. As a rule, it was brute weight alone which accomplished re- sults, but sometimes the weaker party would resort to strat- agems to defend itself, — such as declining battle, and mak- ing instead thereof night or partial attacks, defending river fords or mountain passes, and falling on the enemy from ambush or from cities. Out of such small beginnings of moral opposition to physical preponderance has come into existence, by slow degrees and through many centuries, what we now know as the science of war. Except the Phoenicians and Jews, the Oriental nations of~ remote antiquity were divided into castes, of which the most noble or elevated were alone entitled to bear arms, and to this profession they were trained with scrupulous care. The military caste in some nations was wont to monopolize all offices and political control ; in others it wielded a lesser sway. 12 ORIENTAL ARMIES. The existence of such castes gave rise to what eventually became standing armies, and from the ranks of these were chosen the king's body-guard, always an important factor in Oriental government. The Phoenicians first employed mercenary troops. A paid force enabled the citizens to continue without interruption the commercial life on which their power rested. But such troops were of necessity unreliable. Egypt and Persia in later times employed mercenaries in large numbers. In addition to these methods of recruitment, drafts of en- tire districts, or partial drafts of the country, were usual. These swelled the standing armies, caste or mercenary, to a huge size, but furnished an unreliable material, which, against good troops, was in itself a source of weakness, but which often won against similarly constituted bodies. The methods of conducting war, in organization and tac- tics, were always on a low scale in the Orient. The origin of every military device is in the East; successive steps towards improvement were made in Europe by the Greeks and Romans. Despite that a certain luxurious civilization rose to a higher grade among the Orientals, the military instinct of these down-trodden races was less marked than among the freemen of the West. In one respect alone — cavalry — were the Oriental nations superior. This supe- riority was owing to the excellence of their horses and to the prevalence of horsemanship among them. In all other branches they fell distinctly below the Europeans. The chief characteristic of the operations of the ancient Orientals was that of huge raids or wars of conquest, which overran vast territories, and often led to the conflict of enor- mous armies, to the extinguishment or enslaving of nations, or to long drawn-out sieges of capitals or commercial cities. In battles, it was sought by stratagem to faU on, and, by pre- ORIENTAL CRUELTIES. 13 ponderance of force, to surround and annihilate the enemy. All such operations were accompanied by dire inhumanity to individuals and to peoples, by the shedding of blood and destruction of property beyond compute. But they have fur- nished no contribution to the art of war. Assyrian Mounted Archer. III. EAELY ORIENTAL ARMIES. Among the ancient Oriental nations, military service was generally confined to a caste. Infantry was the bulk, cavalry the flower, of the Oriental armies. Light troops came from the poorer classes and were miserahly clad, and armed with bows and slings. The heavy foot, drawn from the richer classes, was, as a rule, splendidly armed and equipped. There was plenty of courage in the Eastern armies, but small discipline and ensemble. There was no strategic mar. noeuvring; armies simply met and fought. Battle was opened by the light troops ; the chariots then charged, and were followed up by an advance of the heavy foot, while the cavalry sought to surround the flanks of the enemy. The parallel order was universal, and open plains were chosen as battlefields. The Jews had, even under Moses, a fine organization. There was a sort of landwehr of two hundred and eighty-eight thousand men, of which a twelfth was always on duty. While using other arms, the sling remained a favorite weapon. The Jews learned much of war from the Philistines. The Egyptians were excellent soldiers in early times ; but their chariots and cavalry were gradually driven out by the extension of the canal system, which prevented their manoeuvring ; and mercenaries crept into use to the detriment of the service. The Egyptian formation was generally in huge squares of one hundred files one hundred deep. The Persians had a hereditary warrior caste, and were in early history very warlike. Cyrus began his wonderful career of conquest with but thirty thousand infantry. Cavalry he accumulated afterwards. The Persians learned much from the conquered Medes in the way of technical skill. Their army contained many fine bodies of troops. Assyrians, Babylonians and Medes. — The army organ- ization of the Assyrians, Babylonians and Medes had a sim- ilar origin and much common likeness in form. Military service was the sole right of a certain caste, and among the Medes was looked on as the highest of pursuits. The stand- ing armies consisted of the king's body-guard, often very large; particular corps under command of nobles of high ORIENTAL CAVALRY. 15 degree, which helped to sustain the centralized government ; and provincial troops. .The population was divided into bodies of ten, one hundred, one thousand, ten thousand, each of which furnished its quota of men ; and the army was itself organized on a decimal basis. A vast horde of nomads, mostly horse, and excellent of its kind, was wont to accompany the regular army, either for pay or in hope of plunder. Infantry constituted the bulk, cavalry the flower, of the Assyrian Warriors. Oriental armies. For many generations after the Greek in- fantry had shown to the world its superiority over any other, the Oriental cavalry was still far ahead of that of Greece. The Grreeks were not horsemen, nor their hiUy country as well suited for horse-breeding as the level plains of Asia. It is a truism, however, that a nation of horsemen overrun, a nation of footmen conquer a country. The Greeks and Ro- mans were examples of this. The armament of the light troops consisted of bows and 16 ORIENTAL HEAVY TROOPS. slings ; they wore no defensive armor. The nobles and well- to-do, who served as heavy troops,- were superbly armed and Babylonian Heavy Foot. Babylonian Slinger. equipped. They bore a sword, battle-axe, javelins, pike and dagger, or some of these. Though few in number, the heavy- Babylonian Chariot. armed were the one nucleus of value. There was no idea of strategic manoeuvring ; armies marched out to seek each other and fought when they met. The troops were ranked for battle by order of nationalities, generally in a long and ORIENTAL BATTLES. 17 often more or less concave order, so as, if possible, to surround the enemy. The foot stood in the centre, the cavalry on the wings ; the front was covered by chariots. The formation was in massed squares, often one hundred or more deep. The archers and slingers swarmed in the front of all, and opened the battle with a shower of light missiles. They then retired through the intervals be- tween the squares of the advancing main line, or around its flanks, and continued their fire from its rear. The chariots then rushed in at a gaUop and sought to break the en- my's line, generally by massing a charge on some one point. These were followed by the heavy footmen, who, covered with their shields and pike in hand, under the inspiration of the trumpet, and led by bearers of insignia, such as birds and beasts of prey or sacred emblems, mounted on long lances like our battle- flags, sought to force their way, by weight of mass, into the breaches made by the chariots ; while the cavalry swept round the flanks and charged in on the rear of the enemy. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting then ensued. The Orientals were far from lacking courage. It was mobility and disci- pKne they wanted. That army which could overlap the en- emy or had the stronger line — unless the enemy protected its front and flanks with chariots or chosen troops — was apt to win ; and the beaten army was annihilated. Battles were generally fought on open plains. It never seemed to occur to these peoples to lean a flank on a natural obstacle, such as Military Insignia. 18 ORIENTAL CITIES. a wood or river. An unfortunate turn in a battle oould not be retrieved. The capital cities were splendidly fortified. Nineveh, Bab- Median Scythed Chariot. ylon, Ecbatana, had stone walls of extraordinary thickness and height. Those of Nineveh were still one hundred and fifty feet high in Xenophon's time. Babylon had two walls, an outer one stated by Herodotus as three hundred and thir- ty-five feet high and eighty-five feet thick, and by Ctesias at almost these dimensions, and with a correspondingly wide ditch. The citadel was a marvel of strength, so far as massiveness was concerned. The art of engineering, as applied to sieges, was not highly devel- oped. The mechanical means of the day were not as well adapted for besieging as for fortification, and the defense of a city was rendered desperate by the uni- form penalty of its surrender or capture, which was death or slavery. The Assyrians are said to have fortified their temporary camps, generally in circular form. Jews. — Among the Jews, every man over twenty years of age, with certain stated exceptions, was a warrior. The Assyrian Archer. Hetrew Pikeman. Hebrew Pikeman. JEWISH TROOPS. 19 twelve tribes each furnished a corps, which, at the time of the flight from Egypt, was, on the average, fifty thousand strong. From this corps, in times of war, the needed number of recruits was selected by lot or rote. It was a draft pure and simple. Saul first established a body-guard. In David's time (1025 ? b. c.) the number of Jews fit for war was one million three hundred thousand, and each tribe furnished twenty-four thousand men for active duty. One of these bodies served each month, under a captain who reviewed it, and was held responsible for its effectiveness. The whole body of two hundred and eighty- eight thousand men was a sort of landwehr, of which one twelfth was constantly under arms. The organization was on a decimal basis of tens, hundreds and thou- sands. Solomon largely increased the num- ber of cavalry and chariots, and perfected their organization and discipline. On the flight from Egypt the Israelites were in possession of no weapons. They partially armed themselves from those cast up by the sea after the destruction of the Egyptians. Their arms, during the later part of their wanderings, were bows, slings and darts. Until they reached the promised land, they had no forged weapons. The Philistines, or dwellers in Palestine, were better provided, and were familiar with both cavalry and chariots. At a Hebrew Heavy Footman. 20 JEWISH ORGANIZATION. Hebrew Archer. later day the Jews acquired and used short, wide, eujved swords and lances. But the sling always re- mained a favorite weapon, and in its use they were curiously expert. In the corps d'elite of the time of the Judges, which consisted of twen- ty-six thousand men who drew the sword, was a body of seven hundred left-handed slingers, who could sling stones at a hair's breadth. So early as the time of Moses, even, the driU and discipline of the Jewish army was considerable. The method of battle was similar to that of other nations. The light troops in the van opened the battle in loose order ; the heavy infantry in deep masses followed after. They fought under the inspiration of horns and battle-cries. They some- times stood in three lines, light troops, main body ten to thirty men deep, and a reserve of picked troops. Martial in- signia representing animals were usually carried in the ranks. The Jews had great num- bers to encounter. The Phil- istines came against Saul with six thousand cavalry, thirty thousand chariots, and foot like to the sands of the seashore in number. In the war against Hadadeser, son of Rehob, King of Zobah, David captured one thousand char- iots, seven hundred horsemen, and twenty thousand infantry. Slinger. Hebrew Irreg- ular. EGYPTIAN ORGANIZATION. 21 Solomon kept on foot fourteen hundred chariots and twelve thousand cavalry. He had stalls for forty thousand chariot- horses, which probably included the equipages for the royal household and the army trains. These figures, compared with the numbers of chariots at Thymbra and Arbela, seem exaggerated ; but they serve to show that the main reliance for the day was on chariots rather than on cavalry. A careful military organization no doubt existed. We read in Holy Writ that David appointed Joab captain-general over his army, with twenty-seven lieutenants under him, and that his army was divided into three corps. There was clearly an established rank and command. Under Moses, the Jews fortified their daily camp in form of a square. But per- manent fortification of cities they only learned after conquering Pales- tine. Jerusalem was strongly fortified by David, on the method then usual among the Orientals. Egyptians. — Thebes and Mem- phis appear to have had the earliest Egyptian military organization, but shortly after 1500 B. C. the first Pha- raoh welded Egypt into one body. The warrior caste was at the head of society, second only to the priestly caste. Under the Sesostridse (1600- 1200 B. C.) the army organization grew in effectiveness. The father of Sesostris, at the time of this great king's birth, selected all Egyptian King in War- Dress. 22 EGYPTIAN ARMY. the boys in Egypt born on the same day, and made of them a military school, out of which later grew Sesostris' confiden- tial body-guard. Among the number were many of his gen- erals. Sesostris first gave rewards in land to his soldiers, as feudal kings did in later centuries, and obliged these depend- ents, as a consideration for their tenure, to go to war with Egyptian Soldier, in Scale Armor. Egyptian Soldier, in Linen Breastplata him at their own cost, and always to be prepared to perform this duty. The Egyptian army was over four hundred thou- sand strong. The youths of the warrior caste were carefully trained. All records and traditions agree that the Egyptians were excellent soldiers. The chief punishment for breach of discipline was loss of honor, which, however, the warrior could, by signal acts of bravery, regain. By 1200 B. C. came the decline of the Egyptian power, and, under Psammeticus, mercenary troops from Asia Minor and Grreece gradually sup- planted the warrior caste. Infantry constituted the bulk of the forces. Chariots were EGYPTIAN TACTICS. 23 common, even in remote antiquity, as well as cavalry. These decreased in usefulness, however, as the canal-system of Egypt grew and left small room for manoeuvring. The weapons were the usual arms, — bows, lances, slings, axes, darts and swords. The Egyptian soldiers were light and heavy, irreg- ular and regular. Some carried shields covering the entire body, and wore helmets and mail. The army had martial music, and the emblem of the sacred bull or crocodile was carried on a lance as a standard. Xenophon, in the Cyro- paedia, describes their tactics at the battle of Thymbra. They stood in large, dense masses, very deep, often in squares of one hundred files of one hundred men, and, covered by linked shields and protruded lances, were dangerous to attack. The Egyptians fortified their camps in rectangular form, and built extensive walls to protect their borders. Se- sostris erected one extending from Pelusium to Heliopo- lis. Their cities were for- tified with walls of several stories. But, as with other nations at this period, the art of sieges was little ad- vanced. Ashdod, though not strongly fortified, resisted Psammeticus twenty-nine years. Sesostris is supposed to have had six hundred thousand infantry, twenty-seven thousand chariots and twenty-four thousand horse. He i^ said to have conquered Ethiopia, then crossed from Meroe to Arabia Petrea, and thence made ex- cursions as far as India. He later sailed to Phoenicia, and overran a large part of Asia Minor. Sesostris is alleged to Egyptian Soldiers. 24 CYRUS. Persian Soldier. have conquered territory as far east as the Oxus and Indus, and to have levied contributions on the populations of these countries. But his conquests had no duration, even if what is related of him by tradition has a more than problematical basis of truth. Persians. — Under Cyrus the warrior caste was not only the uppermost, but was hereditary, and at all times thoroughly pre^ pared for war. Assuming the Cyropsedia to be exact, Cyrus undertook his great con- quests with but thirty thousand men, which later increased to seventy thousand, and still more by accessions from the conquered prov- inces. In all these provinces a kernel of Persian troops was stationed, but the local government was uniformly preserved. This proceeding testifies to the keen good sense of Cyrus, who left behind him contented peoples, under satraps closely watched by his own Persian officers. His course was later imitated by Alexander the Great, with equally satisfactory re- sults. Cyrus subdued as large a part of Asia as Alexander did after him, holding the cities as points di'appui as he went along. During his lifetime, Persian dis- cipline was excellent. After his death, contact with the luxury of the Medes destroyed much of his structure. The Cyropsedia is, however, a sort of military romance, into which Xenophon has woven his own military experience and astuteness. It is full of exaggerated hero-worship. While its main features are correct, its details Persian Irre^lar. CYRUS' ARMY. 25 are unquestionably dressed up. But it has none the less as great value as it has charm. The Persians fought mainly on foot. There were few horses in Persia proper. But Cyrus found cavalry necessary against the Asiatics, who had much which was excellent. He collected ten thousand horsemen from various sources, and at Thymbra used the body to good advantage. This was the origin of the superb Persian cavalry of later days. The foot had bows, slings, darts and small shields, to begin with, but gradually bettered these weapons as they hewed their way into Asia, and thereafter used battle-axes and swords, and wore helmet and mail. Thus, from what was at first but a species of light infantry grew up a later body of heavy foot, in addition to much that remained light. The Persian foot had been marshaled thirty deep ; Cyrus reduced it to twelve ranks. The cav- alry was divided in a similar manner, — the bulk was light horse, coming mainly from the nomad allies ; a lesser part was heaA^-armed. Cyrus also had scythed-chariots, and Xenophon describes at the battle of Thymbra the use of towers on wheels, filled with armed men, together with other curious devices, and camels car- rying archers and catapults, — questionable but interesting assertions. In the art of fortification and sieges the Persians had made little or no advance, but they learned something from the Medes and other Asiatics, and gradually acquired the use of catapults and rams. But stratagem, as at Sardis after the battle of Thymbra, had generally to be put into practice to Persian Warrior. 26 CAMBYSES' CLASSES. capture towns, unless hunger speedily reduced them. Nebu- chadnezzar besieged old Tyre thirteen years and failed to take it. Cambyses, son of Cyrus, divided the male population of his kingdom into children, youths, men, old men. Each class had twelve chiefs, chosen from among the last two classes. Every lad of ten began his career by entering the first. Here he stayed till twenty ; among the youths tiU thirty ; among the men tiU forty ; and until fifty-five he was in the last class. After this he was free from military duty. Each class had its special occupations and discipline. This distri- bution is rather curious than valuable. Assyrian Armsbeafei. IV. EAKLT GREEK ARMIES AND WARS. Evert Greek citizen was a soldier and trained as snoh. In Homeric times the great warriors fonght in chariots, the lesser ones on foot. There was no cavalry. Distinct organization is traceable as far back as the times of the Seven against Thebes ; tactics is observable in the Trojan war. The siege of Troy was a mere blockade, though its walls were very poor, for there was small knowledge of the means of siege. Religion, education, and public games com- bined to maintain the honor of the warrior's life. He was on duty from eight- een to sixty years of age, and only through arms could political preferment be reached. The phalanx was the main reliance of the Greeks ; light troops were insignificant, cavalry poor. Chariots disappeared after the Trojan war. Battles were uniformly in parallel order, and decided as a rule by one shock. The Greek armies were very nimble ; but sieges were long drawn out. Com- mand was divided, much to the loss of directness. The men were not paid. Booty replaced emoluments. Rewards were mere marks of honor, punish- ments outward marks of disgrace. Sparta was noted for the severity of its discipline and the simplicity of its habits, but lacked the broad intelligence reqtiisite to continued success in war. The infantry was perfect ; the cavalry worthless. The kings, though in command, were subject to the whims of civil officials, known as ephors. The Spartans had no idea of strategy, though they practiced ruse. Peace to the soldier was incessant labor and deprivation to prepare his body for war ; he went to war as to a feast, decked with flowers and singing hymns of joy. The Athenian citizen was equally bound and bred to arms. From eighteen to forty he must serve anywhere, from forty to sixty be prepared to fall in to resist invasion. The phalanx was the chief reliance, as in Sparta. The Athenian soldier was more fiery, less constant, than the Spar- tan. Few early wars call for any notice. The Messenian wars were noteworthy on account of the able defense made against the Spartans, and the marked skill of Euphaes and Aristomenes. Not Sparta's skill or courage, but her excess of strength, subdued the Messenians. The ancient Greeks borrowed the germs of all they knew of the art of war from the East, but with true national intel- 28 EARLY METHOD OF FIGHTING. ligence they rejected the useless and improved the valuable up to its highest utility for the conditions of their age. The early kings of Greece held both the civil and military power. Every freeman was a soldier, and was trained as such from his youth up. Bronze weapons were already famil- iar to the Greeks at the time of the Trojan war. The nobles and chiefs used thrusting pike, cast- ing lance and sword, and left mis- sile-weapons — bows and slings — to the less brave or expert. The Trojan chiefs did not disdain bows. Hehnets, breastplates and large shields were likewise made of bronze. Fighting on foot and in — chariots — the latter was the pre- Paris, from ^gina Marbles. , . j! .i . .1 rogative oi the great — were the usual methods. There was no cavalry, for the hilly charac- ter of Greece (except Thessaly and Bceotia) was un suited to its evolutions, and neither, as a rule, were the horses good nor the men of Greece used to riding. The constant em- ployment of chariots is all the more curious. From these two or four horse two-wheeled vehicles the warrior descended to fight, the driver meanwhile remaining near at hand. At best they were ciimbrous and of doubtful value, except as a moral stimulant. In the tradition of the Seven against Thebes, to assert Polynices' claims as king, there are some traces of organiza^ tion suggested. The city was besieged by posting a separate detachment opposite each of its gates, and by relying on hunger as an ally. But the Thebans made a sortie, slew the seven kings, and drove their forces away. Ten years later the sons of these kings captured Thebes, and placed Polynices' son upon the throne. Greek Soldier, in Linen Cuirass. ORGANIZATION AT TROY. 29 At the siege of Troy (1193- 1184 B. c.) we find clear evi- dences of organization. Aga- memnon evidently had the legal power to compel the reluctant Greek monarchs to join him in an expedition based on a mere personal quarrel. Achilles had twenty-five hundred men, divided into five regiments of five hun- dred men each. The Grreeks ad- vanced to battle in a phalanx or deep body, shield to shield, and in silence, so that the orders of the leaders might be heard. But in front of the lines of the armies there always took place a series of duels between the doughtiest champions, — as it were a prolonged and very important com- bat of skirmishers before the closing of the heavy lines. But coupled with an admirable idea of dis- cipline was the habit of plundering the slain, for which purpose ranks would be broken and often a decisive advan- tage lost. Prisoners were treated with awful inhu- Ancient Greek Soldier. manitv Camps were regular, and oiten fortified. The men used 30 SIEQE OF TROY. no tents, but camped in the open, building huts if long in one place. At Troy the Greek camp had a broad and deep ditch, palisades, or a wall made of the earth thrown up from the ditch, and wooden towers on the waU. Behind this the army camped in huts. Fortification had advanced but little beyond the roughest work. The art of sieges was all but unknown. The ten years' blockade of Troy amply shows the latter fact, as the constant fight- ing outside the town proves that Ht- tle reliance was placed on the value of its walls by the Trojans. The Greeks did not surround the city, but sat down on the seanjoast be- fore it and blockaded it, some hun- dred thousand strong. Troy was able to ration itself from the Mount Ida region. The Greeks ^rj\frN2^ were sadly put to it for victuals, and were com- Siege of Troy. pelled to detail half the army to the Chersonesus in order to raise breadstuffs. For nine years there was naught but insignificant small-war. After the Greeks had wasted their time in isolated attacks on the Trojan territory until both sides were weU-nigh ex- hausted, Nestor counseled concentration and the division of the army into bodies by race and families, in order to pro- duce a spirit of rivalry and due ambition. It is evident that the troops knew how to deploy, for they filed out of the gates of their camps and then formed line of battle. The army had a right, centre and left. The infantry stood in several ranks, — in front the least brave, in the rear the most brave, Tc Mr TRAINING OF THE SOLDIER. 31 on the plan suggested by Nestor. And the army was mar- shaled on occasion in several lines ; as, for instance, the chariots in first, and the foot in second line. To attack the Greek intrenchments, Hector divided the Trojans into five troops, so that success should not depend on one attack alone. Here is the crude idea of a reserve, as it were. Aristides names Palamedes, who was at Troy, as the inventor of tac- tics ; but Nestor must evidently share the honor. The one thing which interfered with the successful use of tactics was the prolonged dueling part of the fray between the heroes of both sides. Of art in their warfare there was barely a trace. It was only in the tenth year, after heavy fighting, that Troy was taken, and it was without a siege, in the sense we under- stand it. From the time of the Trojan war till the sixth century B. C. the Grrecian states made gradual advances in military organization. The warrior's was the highest duty in the state, as well as the precious privilege of the freeman. Eeligion, education and public games combined to train the youth to war. Eeligion taught that heroes became demi-gods ; edu- cation was almost entirely confined to athletic and warlike exercises, training in patience and endurance, the inculcation of respect for superiors and elders and the love of country ; public games afforded the bravest, strongest and most expert an occasion of exhibiting their skill and prowess, and of earn- ing honor and repute. Chariot and horse races and athletic games monopolized these ceremonies. The latter comprised running, leaping obstacles, wrestling, throwing the lance and discus, boxing, the pancratium or boxing and wrestling mixed, and the pentathlium or an exercise combining all the others. The prizes were as a rule mere evidences of honor, but these were held to be far beyond material reward. A noted victor had statues erected, inscriptions cut and hymns 32 THE HOPLITE. sung in his honor, and was often maintained at the public expense. The right and duty of war existed from the eighteenth to the sixtieth year, varying somewhat in different states. When Hoplite (from a vase). Hoplite (from a vase). war occurred, a draft of the requisite number was made by lot, or rote, or age. A given number of years' honorable service yielded a citizen many privileges, and opened to him every civil office. Warriors crippled in battle were cared for by the state and highly honored. About the sixth century b. C. the Greeks fought almost exclusively on foot. The hoplites or phal- angites were the heavy, the psiloi the light, infantry. The former came from the best classes, and were armed with pikes up to ten feet long, short swords and large shields, and wore both helmet and breastplate, and some- times greaves. The breastplate was often of leather, and everything being provided by each hoplite for himself made the arms and equipments as various as the tastes of the individuals. The Leather Cnirass (iron plates). TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS. 33 psiloi had no defensive armor, and carried only bows and slings. Kecruited from the poorer classes, they were of far less value in action than the hoplites, but some psiloi, like the Cretan bowmen, were celebrated for their accurate aim and the penetration of their arrows. Chariots fell into disuse after the Trojan war. They were found to be unavailable among the rugged hills and vales of Greece. But cavalry began to take their place, at just what period is uncertain. Xenophon mentions cavalry in the time of Lycurgus. It was undoubtedly employed in the Messenian war, a century later. As an arm it was not good, excepting possibly the Boeotian horse, and especially that from Thes- saly, on whose broad meadows had been bred an excellent race of stout, serviceable cobs. The tactical disposition of troops was very various, but generally in earliest times was based on a decimal system like that of the East. The light troops covered the front and flanks of the army ; and the hoplites were formed in a dense body, uniformly called a phalanx, which, however, at that time had no absolute rule of formation or numbers. Xeno- phon states that the unit of the then phalanx was a taxis (or lochos or century) of one hundred men, commanded by a captain, and ranged in four files twenty-four men deep, plus four officers, each file having four sections of six men each. Ten taxes made a chiliarchia, under a chiliarch, and four chiliarchias a phalanx. The names of the units of service were very various. Attacks were made in parallel order, but it was infrequently sought to lean the flanks and rear on obstacles which might prevent their being turned. Camps were pitched where they were secure from the nature of their location, and were rarely much fortified. The soldier carried no great burden, and the Greek armies were very nimble. The right flank was the post of honor. Marches were almost 34 MILITARY COMMAND. invariably by the right, and the flanks of the column of march were covered by the psiloi. Engineering, as applied to fortification and sieges, stiU remained singularly crude. The latter were wont to be of long duration. They scarcely amounted even to blockades. Ithome was besieged eight years ; Ira, eleven ; Crissa, nine. To the government, whatever it might be, was intrusted the care of all things pertaining to the military establish- ment ; but the right to declare war and to make treaties was reserved by the people, which expressed itself in public gath- erings. The weak feature of the Greek military organization was the lack of unity of command. The armies were as a rule commanded alter- nately, for a given period, — often but a day, — by one of several leaders, elected by the people, who jointly made a council of war, and who were apt to be under the con- trol of other non-military officials sent by the government to watch them. This system very naturally arose from the history and tendencies towards liberty of the various states, but was coupled with very difficult problems, and often resulted in disaster. The Greek served his country without pay. To receive money for a duty was in early days considered an indignity. Plunder, however, made up for this lack of remuneration. After a victory, the booty was collected ; part was vowed to the gods and placed in their temples, and the rest was divided according to rank and merit, — the leaders being usually entitled to the lion's share. Punishment for military crimes involved loss of honor, sometimes of civil rights, — the penalties most dreaded by the patriotic Greek. Rewards were embodied in an increased Greek Strategos. LAWS OF LYCURGUS. 35 share of plunder, promotion, gifts of weapons and marks of honor, and in civil advancement or public support. The Greek soldier was a cm-ious mixture of virtues and He possessed courage, discipline and self-abnegating vices. patriotism in the highest measure, but was prejudiced, su- perstitious and monstrously cruel. The Greek states were characterized by similar tendencies. The individual merely reflected the state in miniature. Sparta. — Among all the Greek states, Sparta in the ninth century B. C, and Athens in the sixth, were distinguished for the perfection of their military organization. The main ob- ject of the laws of Lycurgus (820 b. C.) was to form a mili- tary power out of a mass of free citizens, and to impress on the individual soldier those qualities of courage, endurance, obedience and skill which would make him irresistible. This they did by banishing arts and sciences, — civ- ilization almost, — and by reducing life down to its lowest limits of simplicity and self- denial. This method fiUly accomplished its aim ; soldiers have rarely, perhaps never, been animated by so single a martial spirit as the Spartans. Love of country, and willingness to sacrifice to it self and all which lends life worth, has never been more fully exemplified than in the Pass of Thermopylae. But what was gained in one sense was lost in another. A state cannot become great in its best sense by its soldierly qualities and achievements alone. The Spartan youth belonged, not to the parent, but to the state. They were educated in common, and drilled in gym- nastics and the use of arms from earliest childhood. They Greek HopUte. 36 THE SPARTAN SOLDIER. were compelled to undergo extraordinary fatigues, and tMs on slender rations ; and were taught the simpler virtues of respect for age and obedience to superiors. From twenty to sixty all men were under arms. War was to them the only art ; death in battle the highest good. As a consequence, the Spar- tan army, for centuries, was con- sidered invincible. But Sparta's success in war led her into too frequent wars, and her disregard of the arts and sciences advanced other nations beyond her in the intellectual grasp of war. Sparta was forbidden by Lycurgus to possess either fortress or fleet ; the army alone must suffice as Still more curiously, the army was prohibited from pursuing a beaten enemy. Not conquest, but defense of the fatherland was sought. Such mistaken policy eventually gave Sparta's opponents the upper hand. Heavy infantry was the main reliance of Sparta. The sol- dier wore full armor ; he held it a duty to the state to pre- serve intact his body for the state, but he did not seek safety by the method of Hudibras. He deemed it dishonor to lose, or to fight without, his shield. Not to have it with him implied that in his haste to run away he had cast it aside, so as to run the faster. He bore a heavy pike, generally a lighter lance, and a short double-edged sword. There was little light infantry, and the cavalry was mediocre. It was formed in eight ranks, and generally got beaten. There is some conflict of statement between Xenophon and Thucydides as to the organization of the Spartan troops into bodies. This is probably due to the changes in such organi- Greek Psilos (from a Tase). breastwork of the land, SPARTAN RANK AND COMMAND. 37 Back of Hop- lite's helmet. Greek Hoplite. zation from time to time. But rank and command were well settled. In a mora, or regiment of four hundred, and later of nine hundred men — Thucydides says five hundred and twelve men — were one polemarch, or colonel; four lochagoi, or majors ; eight pentekosteroi, or captains ; and sixteen enomotarchoi, or lieutenants. It had four lochoi, divided into sections of twenty-five and fifty men, each under a sort of sergeant. The word lochos, like taxis, or like our word division, is often applied to various bodies. Each mora had added to it a body of one hundred horse- men or less. The kings were the commanders-in-chief. In peace their power was limited ; it Was unlimited in war. But they were strictly accountable to the people for their use of the army. If there were two armies, each king commanded one. If but one, the people decided who should command and who remain at the head of the home government. In the field the king had a species of staff and body-guard, consisting of one or two polemarchs, several of the victors at the public games and a number of younger mounted warriors. Later the kings were accompanied by the ephors (of whom there were five), who acted as a species of council of war. These ephors were civil officials, whose duty was to watch lest the kings should exceed their legal powers. The Spartans knew nothing of strategy. Their tactics was simple. They moved out to meet the enemy, drew up in a deep, heaA^ phalanx, and decided the day by one stout blow. 38 WAR A RELAXATION. If the enemy was superior in numbers, they sometimes tried ruse. They marched to battle in cadenced step and in silence, to the sound of the flute. If they won, they might not pur- sue ; if beaten, they were generally able to withdraw slowly and in good order. A mounted vanguard accompanied the army on the march. In camp they had a police-guard under a provost-marshal, and they appear to have developed a sys- tem of pickets and patrols. They rarely fortified their camp, which was round in shape, if they could place it where its location made it reasonably secure. Peace to the Spartans was a season of unremitting labor in preparing for war. War was their sole relaxation. The only duty then was to fight. The intervals between marches and battles were filled by games and gymnastic sports. They had none of the tasks of peace ; a campaign was a holiday. All fatigue-duties were performed by helots, who accompanied the army for that purpose only, but were in later years utilized in the ranks of fighting men. They carried abundant supplies on pack-ani- mals, and the general meal, in peace a most coarse though ample mess, was in war rich and nutri- tious. The soldiers prepared for battle as for a feast, wore their best garments, and plucked flowers wherewith to adorn their persons and their arms. The Spartans never opened a campaign before the fuU moon. This was a religious custom, but occasionally, as at Marathon, far from auspicious. The gods were propitiated by tiresome but invariable ceremonials and offerings before every military movement. Hoplite (from a vase). SOLON'S CLASSES. 39 Being allowed by law no fortresses, the Spartan territory- was not only open to invasion, but the nation was ignorant of fortification. Nor did they understand how to lay siege to a strong place. Atfiens. — From the abolition of the kings down to the days of Solon (1068-594 b. c), owing to the internal dis- cords and external conflicts of Athens, the war-establishment was uncertain. Solon's laws aimed at producing a form of government which should keep the aristocratic element within bounds, and at the same time not run into pure democracy. He divided the citizens into four classes (or phylse), accord- ing to wealth, — the pentakosiomedimnoi, the hippeis, or knights, the zeugitoi, and the thetes. The first were the rich- est, the last the poorest. Every citizen was bound to service. Though Athens was a democracy, the citizens were often in a small minority. There were at one time but ninety thousand of them to forty-five thousand foreigners and three hundred and sixty thousand slaves. An- other census, taken under Demetrius, showed twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand metics, and four hundred thousand slaves. The members of the first two classes above named were obliged on requisition to keep each a horse and serve as cavalry, but were then free from infantry duty in all but excep- tional cases. The third class furnished the heavy infantry, in which each man must sup- ply himself with arms. Of the fourth class, those who could furnish the proper arms might serve in the heavy foot ; the others were the light troops. Every Athenian freeman was held to pursue a certain Heroic Horseman (from a vase). 40 THE HOPLITE'S ARMOR. Homeric Warrior. gymnastic and military training in the public schools. At eighteen years of age he took a solemn oath of fealty to the state, and entered upon his military du- ties. From twenty to forty he was bound to serve, whenever drawn, within or beyond the At- tic territory. After twenty years' service the citizen was discharged, and entered upon civil pursuits. But up to his sixtieth year he must be ready at all times to fall into the ranks to resist invasion. Towards the end of the sixth cen- tury B. c, the classes were in- creased to ten. ~- The heavy infantry was the strong arm of Athens, as of Sparta. The hoplite still bore the Homeric arms, consisting of large shield, long lance and short sword. The Homeric armor remained substantially the same among the Greeks ever after. The warrior wore a tunic. He first put on his greaves ; then his cuirass in two parts, the mitre underneath, the zone above ; then he hung his sword on the left side in the socket of a belt which went over the right shoulder ; he next assumed his shield, hung in similar manner ; then his helmet ; then his spears. The hoplite fought in closed phar lanx eight or more deep. The cavalry was weak ; the light troops (psiloi) insignificant. The army was apt to be set up in one or two lines, with the heavy foot in the centre, the light foot in the wings, and the cavalry on the flanks. But this was not invariable. The organization of the troops at this time is not accu- rately known. It appears to have been much the same as FIRST MESSENIAN WAR. 41 the Spartan, — the names merely differing. Each of the ten phylae furnished a body of one thousand or more hoplites, under command of a chiliareh, or colonel. The phylse se- lected each a commander, called strategos, who was the equiv- alent of the Spartan polemarch. Of the ten strategoi, each in turn took command of the entire army ; all together they constituted the council of war. The Athenian was equally brave, more fiery in his courage, but less constant and enduring than the Spartan, and the dis- cipline to which he was subjected was somewhat less strict, as accorded with the national character. Wars. — Immediately after the Trojan war came the inva- sions of the HeracHdse (1104 b. c), who subjugated the Pe- loponnesus. Except these, the wars of the Greeks, down to 750 B. c, were much what the quarrels of small semi-civilized tribes are wont to bring about, i. e., wars quite without sys- tem. When Sparta and Athens had grown to be substantial nations, military movements came to be more noticeable. But they were still mostly confined to small-war and sieges. The territory of Greece, cut up by natural and political divi- sions into limited domains, narrowed operations down to this species of warfare. Larger evolutions were out of the ques- tion. But small-war was conducted with much intelligence. Sieges were more properly blockades ; fortification relied upon situation rather than airt. The first Messenian War (743-724 B. C.) is worthy of note for nothing so much as the long and excellent defense against the Spartans by Euphaes, king of Messenia. His maintain- ing himself in his capital during five years of preparation for war, his holding his own against the so-called invincible Spartans in the bloody but undecided battle of Amphsea, and the defense of Ithome, mark Euphaes as a great man. At 42 BATTLE OF AMPHjEA. Ithome, in a rocky fastness, for eight years, Euphaes kept the best troops of the Spartans at bay, and in the last year beat them in the second battle of Amphsea, but at the cost of his own life. At this battle of Amphsea (730 b. c.) Euphaes showed a fine conception of battle tactics. The Spartan kings, Theo- pompus and Polydorus, met the Messenian array in parallel order. The contest was severe. The right wing of each army was defeated. It was anybody's victory. But Euphaes MJ?§JNJANS_BEFpRE_??TJif.- — , \ •, ^ yr:"::::::::::::::::::^ ^^U*'- SPARTANS BtrORt BATTLE. s?fc»'' Amphsea, 730 B. c. snatched it by a masterly stroke conceived on the Instant and in the turmoil of battle. The cavalry on his left had defeated the Spartans in their front and driven them off the field. Speedily recalling them from pursuit, — always a difficult thing to do, — Euphaes led them behind his line of battle over to the succor of his retiring right. Thus supported the right was enabled to rally, and a few bold charges by the Messenian horse decided the day. Euphaes did not profit by the victory ; he fell in his moment of triumph. Aristodemus, who succeeded him, kept up a constant small- ARISTOMENES. 43 war for five years, in which he maintained his superiority, and finally again beat the Spartans at Ithome, this time so badly that only the excellent discipline of the latter enabled them to regain Laconia with the relics of their army. But the Spartans, with abundant population and resources, could easily recover themselves, while the Messenians were totally exhausted by their gallant struggle. On the death of Aristodemus the Spartans were able to take advantage of their superior strength and reduce Messenia to a tributary condition. The second Messenian war (645-628 b. c.) was illustrated by the valor and ability of Aristomenes, under whose leader- ship the Messenians again rose to cast off the yoke of Sparta, invaded Laconia, beat their oppressors so badly as almost to recover their lost liberties and devastated large parts of the Spartan territory. After two years of disaster the Spartans were more successful, and by taking advantage of the treach- ery of their allies gained a marked advantage over the Mes- senians. Aristomenes retired to Ira, a fortress which he could victual from the near-by sea, for Sparta had no fleet. The same conditions had existed at Ithome. In Ira, for eleven years, Aristomenes held himself against the Spartans by able diversions outside the walls and stanch defense within. These long sieges exhibit as nothing else does the lack of engineer- ing facilities of the day. But finally the Spartans, again by treachery, gained entrance into the fortress. Aristomenes was allowed to withdraw, but Messenia was subdued and par- celed out by the Spartans. V. CYRUS AND DARIUS. B. C. 558-485. The great warriors preceding Cyrus are mere traditions. The first to leave lessons for us was the founder of the Persian Empire. The greatest conqueror may not he a great captain. It is what the former does which makes him great ; it is how the latter does it which gives him rank. Cyrus hegan his cam- paigns hy attacking Crcesus, and was the first to employ a strategic surprise. At Thymbra his battle tactics were novel. Croesus vastly outnumbered and outflanked him. Cyrus formed his troops in five lines, so marshaled that when Croesus' wings wheeled in on his flanks he could take these very wings in re- verse, and at the same time poured into a gap in Croesus' line and defeated him. He then turned on Babylon and captured it by diverting the water of the Eu- phrates, a, gigantic work, and following its bed under the walls into the city. Cyrus left the local or civil governments of the peoples he conquered unchanged in the hands of the old satraps, merely retaining the military control himself, a plan later followed with great success by Alexander. Cyrus conquered Asia as far as Soythia beyond the Jaxartes, the natural limit to a kingdom. After him, Darius bridged the Bosphorus and Danube, and moved with seven hundred thousand men against the Scythians of Europe. These, by exceptionally able and interesting natural strategy, forced him to retire. Prior to the age of Cyrus, in the sixth century before Christ, there is to be found nothing in the history of war which yields lessons to the soldier of to-day. Although among the nations of remote antiquity existence was a con- stant interchange of armed invasion, as famine or the lust of plunder induced one or other to prey upon the territory of its neighbor, yet in their wars we see no principle whatever governing military conduct, except the rule of numbers. Nei- ther the Egyptians, Jews, Persians, Babylonians, Assyrians, nor Indians show anything like a defined military standard of campaign or battle. The conduct of war lacked every NINUS, SEMIRAMIS, SESOSTRIS. 45 element of system. Great conquerors there no doubt were. Nimrod, the reputed builder of the tower of Babel and of Nineveh, or whoever was his prototype, was no doubt justly regarded by the Jews as the exemplification of temporal power with all its attendant evil. Though we must now admit that both he and his widow, the wonderful Semiramis, were little more than mere names for explaining the tradi- tions of successful wars and the founding of powerful cities, to which condition of nonentity modern research has finally reduced them, still both must be held to represent a line of distinguished predecessors ; and though Sesostris' great con- quests, even to Ethiopia, the Ganges and Scythia, as related by the Greek historians, may have been the work of a whole dynasty instead of an individual, there remains the skeleton of a long series of able wars. Whether these famous names of prehistoric times were those of real monarchs or not, no doubt in all ages great warriors have existed and many more been born to blush unseen. For opportunity is the coefficient of genius. But however mighty the deeds of these and other conquerors may have been, great captains in the sense of cap- tains helpful to the military student of our times cannot be found in tradition. From the legends of the conquests of Ninus, Semiramis, Sesostris, we can gather nothing which lends aid to modern war. This is so partly because victory in those ages leaned to the side, not of the heaviest battalions, but of the greatest mob ; partly because history give^ us no details of these movements, and tradition is picturesque rather than reliable. It is perhaps indisputable that the actual con- querors whose deeds have been handed down to us under these names were instinct with the same divine afflatus which in- spired the conduct of later, and to us greater, captains. No doubt they illustrated all the qualities which go to make up the pattern army-leader. But prior to the time of Cyrus we 46 WHAT MAKES A GREAT CAPTAIN. search in vain for something akin to the military science of to-day, something which has added to the art of war. The same thing can be said of most historical conquerors. The greatest of these may by no means rank as a great cap- tain. To overrun vast regions, devastate well-peopled coun- tries, reduce to servitude brave tribes, may constitute a great conqueror. But it is the method with which this is done which makes a great captain. A lesser actor in the world's drama may well be a greater captain, Alexander was a type of both the great conqueror and the great captain. He had tran- scendent genius ; he had fit opportunity to give scope to his genius. He was the greatest of conquerors, because he over- ran and subdued the largest territory and the most peoples ; he was a great captain because he did this with a method which teaches us lessons of incalculable value. It is the purpose of this work to narrate the deeds of those great captains who have peculiarly influenced the art of war, as we understand it to-day. However great men may have been as generals, how- ever valuable their life's work in the world's economy, unless they have made an essential contribution to the science of war, they find no place within the scope of this and succeed- ing volumes. Cyrus is not only a historical verity, but we know from the Greek historians what he did, and to a certain extent how he did it. All histories vary, — often to a material degree ; nor is this wonderful of the ancients, when we read the con- flicting accounts in vogue to-day relating to the wars of the last hundred — the last twenty-five — years. But from the ancient histories we can generally arrive at something like the truth. No one historian can be relied upon in all things. But by diligent comparison of the statements of all, the study of the topography of the campaigns or battlefields, and the estimate of probability as between conflicting statements, a CYRUS' STRATEGIC SURPRISE. 47 reasonably exact narrative is possible. Military critics of every age are wont to disagree in many things; but their variations are rarely fatal. The same lessons can be learned from any of them. Cyrus, of the family of the Acheminidse, was the founder of the great Persian empire (b. c. 658-529). Persia had been subject to the Medes, and was grievously oppressed. Cyrus deposed Astyages, the Median king, and united Persia and Media under his own sceptre. Alarmed for his safety, Croesus, king of Lydia, which then comprised almost all Asia Minor west of the Halys, entered the lists against Cyrus, and advanced across the Halys into Cappadocia, the most westerly of the PersiarMedian provinces, and devastated the rich lands and cities of Pteria. He had as allies the Babylonians, and the Egyptians and even Sparta had prom- ised him support. Croesus was preparing to advance still farther into Persia, when Cyrus, by a rapid march, antici- pated him, and met him on the scene of his devastations. An indecisive, wild and bloody battle was fought here, and ended only by night (b. C. 554), after which Croesus retired to his capital, Sardis, not expecting that Cyrus would under- take a winter campaign. Here he endeavored to strengthen Conquests of Cyrus. 48 FORCES AT THYMBRA. for the succeeding year Ms bonds with his allies, and procure material assistance. But Cyrus, full of the ardor which brooks not delay, and acting on that oldest and soundest of military principles, to do that which your enemy least expects, gave his adversary no breathing spell. Winter was at hand. CrcESus, antici- pating no further present activity on the part of Cyrus, had unwisely allowed his army to disperse on reaching Sardis. Taking advantage of this error, Cyrus, by forced and difficult marches, came upon him unawares at Thymbra, on the plains not far from Sardis, and utterly defeated him. This is per- haps the first instance on record of those strategic surprises with which the history of great captains is filled, and of which the campaign of Ulm is so notable an example. The capital, Sardis, was besieged fourteen days, and then taken by storm. Lydia was subjected. But, with that politic generosity which great soldiers have so often known how to employ, — unusual in those days, — Cyrus made Croesus his friend and adviser, and profited much by the latter's knowledge and influence. One of the earliest instances of excellent battle tactics has been described by Xenophon. It was at this same battle of Thymbra in which Cyrus destroyed the Lydian kingdom. Croesus is reputed to have had four hundred and twenty thousand men and three hundred chariots ; Cyrus, one hun- dred and ninety-six thousand men, three hundred chariots, and three hundred war camels. Xenophon states that Cyrus had shown great skiU in organizing and in victualing his army. The rival forces met on the plain of Thymbra, not far from Sardis. It has been suggested that Xenophon improved in his description upon the actual manoeuvres. But if the re- lation is not a true account of what Cyrus actually did, it describes what Xenophon actually knew how to do, and is equally interesting from this standpoint. BATTLE OF THYMBRA. 49 Croesus proposed to utilize his great numerical superiority, by extending his line far beyond the flanks of Cyrus, and by wheeling in upon these so as to encompass him on all sides. Croesus' army was in one long line, some say in two, with the cavalry on the flanks. The depth of the line was thirty men, except in the centre, where the Egyptian allies kept their na- tional formation of ploying each ten thousand men into a huge square block of one hundred files of one hundred men each. CRCESUS' ABMY. -2:^. // □ Dana □ □□□a w w / j|cvRu5 armv r ...-■•■*"'■"' Battle of Thymbra. The chariots were in front. Cyrus, aware of his opponent's great numerical superiority, and expecting this inclosing ma^ noeuvre, — an almost invariable one at that day, — drew up his army so as best to meet it. He reduced his files to a depth of twelve men, but arrayed his troops in five lines, so as to give the army, with the intervals between the lines, exceptional depth. In his first line were the heavy infantry- men in armor ; in the second, the acontists, or dart-throwers ; in the third, the archers, who were to shoot over the heads of the other lines ; in the fourth line the infantry d' elite ; and in the fifth, the tower-bearing wagons, — a species of movable tower filled with armed men. Behind all this was the wagon train, in a huge square, within which all the non-combatants were placed. His chariots Cyrus placed, one hundred in front, and one hundred along each flank, and at the rearward 50 VICTORY AT THYMBRA. end of the line of chariots he posted a chosen body of one thousand foot and oae thousand horse. The camel-corps — archers mounted on camels — was with the latter body on the left. Cyrus' idea in forming the line so deep was to oblige Croe- sus to make a very extensive inward wheel if he expected to inclose his flanks. Such a wheel must of necessity open gaps in the Lydian line, of which Cyrus hoped to be able to take advantage. The wagon-towers made a sort of fortified camp to which he could retire if defeated. Cyrus awaited the onset of Croesus. When the Lydian monarch came within proper distance, his centre halted, and his wings began the anticipated turning wheel. As can be weU understood, so vast a body could not make this manoeuvre without losing touch in many places. When the wheel was about completed, the chariots on the flanks of Cyrus' army charged upon the somewhat disordered wings of Croesus in front, while the reserves dashed in on their flanks. In a brief time these wings were entirely broken. Meanwhile gaps had also been made between the centre and the wings of Croesus' army, seeing which Cyrus quickly gathered his best horse and attacked the flanks and rear of Croesus' centre. This, too, was soon beaten, though the Egyptians fought so stanchly that Cyrus was compelled to make terms with them by which they entered his service. After the battle of Thymbra, Cyrus left his lieutenants to subjugate the Greek cities on the coast of the ^gean, while he himself undertook the larger task of reducing Parthia, Sog- diana, Bactria, Arachosia, and the neighboring principalities. In this expedition he overran almost as large a territory as did subsequently Alexander the Great. The Sacse gave him the greatest trouble. He then turned upon Babylon, and in a two years' siege CAPTURE OF BABYLON. 51 (b. C. 539-538) reduced that city and incorporated the Bab- ylonian with the Persian . kingdom. It was not properly a siege, scarcely a blockade. The Babylonians were very confi- dent in the strength of their huge walls and derided the be- siegers. Cyrus had no battering-rams or catapults ; nor does he appear to have understood the undermining of walls. He had to confine himself to erecting walls or mounds and towers higher than and commanding those of the city. But by this means alone he was able to accomplish nothing. Finally, by one of those audacious conceptions which cause the great cap- tain to loom up above his fellows, Cyrus, hearing from desert- ers that an annual five days' religious festival was about to take place, during which the population would abandon itself to rejoicing and pay less heed to his proceedings, made prep- aration to divert the water of the Euphrates from its bed. He had shortly before drained the Gyndes; the experience so gained led him to the present idea ; and the vast horde of Asiatics which always seeks for crumbs from the table of an army, afforded him the means of executing his plan, by widen- ing the canal which Nitocris had dug for carrying the over- flow of the river into the Chaldean Lake. He increased the vigor of the usual operations to divert the attention of the Babylonians, which he succeeded in doing; and, while the population was engaged in revelry, the water of the Euphrates was, in the course of a few hours, so far lowered as to yield a 'footing to his men under the wall and into the city. The king's son, Belshazzar, left in charge of the capital while King Na-bu-nahid took the field, was surprised in his palace and surrendered; or, according to other authorities, died sword in hand, surrounded by his ministers and attendants. Cyrus' stratagem had succeeded perfectly. Then, with both natural humanity and that supreme appreciation of policy which has always been the complement of the martial virtue of great 52 CYRUS AND THE MASSAGET^. soldiers, Cyrus at once arrested the slaughter and promised unqualified amnesty to aU who should surrender. In all his conquests Cyrus was wont to leave the civil gov- ernment in the hands of the ancient officials of each people, under his own supreme control, keeping a military hold upon the country by suitable garrisons. He was the first to show a broad conception of the best manner in which the elements of a new empire may firmly be consolidated. Later on (b. c. 538-529), Cyrus extended his conquests to the Scythians, in the territories east of the Caspian Sea. He is said to have thrown a bridge over the Jaxartes, and to have built boats surmounted by towers to aid him in driving away the barbarians from the farther bank, and thus enable him to put over his army. According to the legend, the Massagetae were as frank and loyal as they were independent and warlike. They first tried to dissuade Cyrus from his purposed invasion of their land ; but failing in their negotiations, they offered to withdraw from the river three days' journey and await Cyrus' approach ; or Cyrus might do the like and they would cross to meet him. Cyrus accepted the first proposition, crossed, marched onward three days and camped, spreading Out a vast store of provi- sions, wines and Persian luxuries. He then left a rear-guard in the camp and simulated retreat. The Massagetae attacked the camp, routed the few men left there, and fell to enjoying the unwonted good cheer. Hereupon Cyrus returned by a; speedy and secret march, fell upon them in the midst of their revelries, and utterly defeated them. The legend may have no value except as indicating the sort of stratagem on a large scale which a general then might be able to practice. It is not very different in principle from some stratagems of mod- ern times. Not long after, it is said, Cyrus fell in battle with these same Massagetae, and his army was totally annihilated. DARIUS IN SCYTHIA. 53 Darius, son of Hystaspes, the consolidator of the Persian empire (b. c. 521-485), was so great a king that his mere military talent has been overshadowed by his statecraft. Among his great deeds of war is an expedition against the European Scythians north of the Danube. He bridged the Bosphorus, or rather the Greek Mandrocles did it for him, brought his fleet up the Danube from the ^gean, and bridged SOVTHIANS Darins' fOOMILfS. aign agaixist the Scythians. the Danube as well. No doubt both these bridges were laid on boats. His army is said to have numbered seven hundred thousand men. He advanced into the steppes between the Danube and the Dniester. In meeting this gigantic invasion the barbarians showed consummate skill in their defensive scheme. Perhaps no savage nation ever exhibited sounder natural strategy. They were good horsemen and skiUful arch- ers, and were brave and warlike. They declined to meet the Persians in open battle, but in lieu thereof kept up a harass- ing system of partial attacks on the Persian flanks ; they made 54 SCYTHIAN STRATEGY. constant threats on the Persian rear and line of retreat ; they planned numberless attempts to seize the bridges on the Dan- ube; they destroyed the crops and filled up the springs. These acts were not done in an irrational manner, but with the greatest forethought. They never so entirely devastated a province as to cause the Persians to turn back, for they de- sired to lure them on to their ruin. They retired from before Darius through the territory, not of friends, but of lukewarm tribes, so that these, irritated by the burden of war, should be compelled to cast in their lot with the others. They retired in three bodies by three eccentric lines, thus preventing Da- rius, who desired to bring them to battle, from overwhelming them at one blow, and by this means led him astray. This policy utterly exhausted the vast host of the Persian king in the course of a few weeks and compelled its withdrawal. It was fortunate for Darius that the Greeks who were left to guard the bridge decided to remain faithful. Miltiades was among them, and advised its destruction so as to deal a fatal blow to the Persians. His counsel did not prevail. The coup de grace was reserved for him to give at Marathon. So hot was the pursuit of the barbarians, so constantly and effectively did they harass his rear, that Darius was obliged to resort to a ruse and make a sudden night march to with- draw from their front. The ruse was the leaving of the sick and non-combatants behind with the pack-train, while Darius marched away with aU his effective troops. The Scythians saw the campfires and heard the braying of the asses, and nat- urally supposed the Persians still in camp. This was a bar- barous but typical stratagem of the day. So soon as the Scythians discovered Darius' retreat, they set out by the shortest route for the bridges, purposing to de- stroy them, or to head off Darius in his attempt to reach them. Darius, ignorant of the way, had retired by the circuitous SIMILARITY TO 1812 CAMPAIGN. 55 route of his advance. The Scythians, having as they sup- posed induced the Greeks to destroy the bridge, for these custodians did in fact take up that part nearest the north bank as a matter of safety to themselves, were confident that they could intercept the Persians in their retreat. But hap- pily Darius was able to secure his communications with the bridge, and was fortunate indeed to get his army over to the south bank in safety. He had lost eighty thousand men in seventy days. This campaign suggests in many features the Russian campaign of Napoleon, though the latter by no means failed for lack of careful preparation. But the method of the Scythians was in its intelligence somewhat similar to that of the Russians, while Darius had failed from lack of study of his problem, and because he believed that numbers alone suf- ficed in war. He had made no preparations for victual, nor provided a means of forestalling such opposition as the Scyth- ians exhibited. But though Darius failed in this campaign, he subdued Thrace, and extended his empire to the confines of the Indus. His failure leaves him stiU with a large repu- tation as a soldier, added to a stiU greater one as a king. Scythian Warriors. VI. ARMIES IN THE FIFTH CENTURY B. C. The Persian army was divided into aetiye and garrison troops. The whole population was parceled out on a decimal basis, and from this the army was drawn. The body-guard of the king, "The Immortals," was ten thousand strong. The satraps gradually acquired more and more power, grew careless of war and lived in their harems. Mercenary troops were engaged, many from Greece. Cavalry was the most effective of the Persian arms ; the foot was numerous but unreliable. Chariots remained in use. Wide, open plains were chosen as battlefields. Tactics underwent no improvement. The Per- sians were sliding backward in war. In Greece mercenary troops also appeared, and though citizens were still held to service, substitutes were allowed. The best Greek soldiers became professionals and sold their services abroad to whom- soever paid the most. Despite which there was always a kernel left of good native troops. Such was the Theban Sacred Band. The lance of the hoplite grew in length. A new body of light troops, peltasts, was created, much bet- ter than the irregular psiloi. The cavalry grew in numbers, but was still far from good. The phalanx was improved in drill and battle-tactics. It was a body perfect for one blow on level ground, or for defense, but was easily dis- organized by rough ground, and if broken it was gone. Greek armies were small and carried little baggage. They marched far and stood hardship and rough usage with wonderful constancy. There were several orders of battle, but the parallel was still generally employed. Troops were now paid. After the Peloponnesian war discipline declined. There continued to be much reli- gious ceremonial connected with the movements of armies, and the burial of the dead was demanded by custom. The Greeks were barbarous to prisoners. There was no field fortification, but cities were well fortified. These were usu- ally taken by storm or stratagem. Rams and other siege machinery gradually came into use, with mines, mounds, towers, etc. War on land and war at sea were not so different as they are to-day. The hoplite served on the fleet as readily as on land. Ships were small and put into shore every night. The nu- merous rowers left small room for soldiers aboard. ' War ships sought to ram their opponents and then to board them. Naval tactics was simple. In Sparta, Laconians, freedmen, helots and mercenaries crept into the army. In Athens, ORGANIZATION OF DARIUS. 57 the list of citizens freed from personal service grew large. The people allowed small scope to the strategoi ; they were under a civil officer's control, to the great loss of ability to act. Cavalry began to improve somewhat in numbers and effectiveness. Athens looked at war more intelligently than Sparta. The latter never saw beyond its material side. Persians. — The Persian kingdom founded by Cyrus first received a regular military organization from Darius, son of Hystaspes (b. C. 521-485). This monarch divided his terri- tory into twenty satrapies, confided to each satrap only the Persian Body-Guards. civil power, while himself appointed and controlled the com- mander of the military forces. These troops were fed from the taxes collected in each satrapy. There were active and garrison troops. The former were divided into bodies of one thousand men each, and did duty on the borders and along the great highways which traversed the kingdom. They were rigidly inspected, and a grand review of them held each year. The whole kingdom was divided into military districts, with central assembling points in each. The garrison troops 58 PERSIAN LEVIES. were kept under separate control for the protection of the city fortresses, and were not obliged to assemble for the annual inspection. Their organization was quite apart from the ac- tive army, though resembling it in minor detail. Several corps, each ten thousand strong, served at court. The most noble and brave of the Persians served in a corps d" elite, which was kept always at ten thousand men, and was known as the Immortals. These held the first place of honor in the army. The second belonged to a somewhat similar corps of Medes. The satraps and great officials each had his own body-guard, which he regulated himself. The whole population, like the Jews, was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and ten thousands, and in case of war fresh corps or reinforcements could be raised quickly and effectively. These levies, when made, were apt to be com- manded by the large land-owners of the districts where raised, thus preserving the national character of the force. Sometimes, as in Darius' expedition against the Scythians, or Xerxes' against Greece, a general draft of the entire people was made, and the king determined how much each province should furnish in men, material, horses, ships and so forth. Herodotus gives an extended and interesting description of the fifty-six tribes and peoples represented under Xerxes, and reviewed by him in Thrace at the time of his invasion of Greece. The troops were not paid. During active service they were fed by simply seizing and gathering in supplies wherever found. Provinces through which a Persian army passed were eaten up as by a plague of grasshoppers. Rank and command were well settled. The chiliarchs, or colonels, who commanded one thousand men, and the myri- archs, or division-generals, who commanded ten thousand, were held in honor. The higher commands were filled by the rel- DECAY OF PERSIAN ARMY. 59 Persian Officer. atives and favorites of the king. Though the Persians be- came a luxurious people and lost much of their warlike quality, they were in early days simple, soldierly and brave. They received an excellent training for war. It was only cohesion which the Per- sian army lacked. But after the days of Xerxes I. (f 465 b. c.) they began to fall backwards. The great nobles lived in their harems and more rarely assumed command in person. Mercenary fi-oops were gradually introduced, and to the best of these the safety of the kingdom was confided. This labor- saving system grew fast when it was found easy to raise mercenaries. Asiatics and Greeks were both enlisted. The former made the bulk, the latter the kernel of the Persian armies. The Greek phalangites received pay at the rate of one daricus (a ducat) per head per month, between four and five dollars, in addition to which sum, it is probable, they received an equal amount for rations. A great source of weakness of the central military power arose when the satraps became more independent and gradu- ally got possession of the armed, as well as the civil control of their satrapies. It was not long thereafter before these sa- traps became practically independent monarchs, assuming all the power and most of the attributes which properly belonged to the sovereign, and yielding but a nominal fealty. But the Great King retained the power of assembling the army. Thus at the time of the Grseco-Persian wars, the bulk of the Persian forces was by the king's orders concentrated in Thrace, Asia Minor and Egypt. The most effective part of the Asiatic armies was cavalry. In this the Orientals have always excelled. The horse was 60 PERSIAN TACTICS. in tlie East then, as now, the constant companion of man, and cavalry was the natural arm. The best heavy cavalry was the Persian ; then followed, the Median, that of Asia Minor, the Parthian. The nomad tribes furnished an excellent light cav- alry, much like the Cossacks of to-day. The foot was more numerous but less good. The light troops, slingers, darters and archers, were abundant, but had little discipline. The Greek mercenaries furnished the stanchest of the heavy troops. There were as high as fifty thousand in the Persian service at one time. Bodies of native troops were organized in like fashion. Some of the Persians were accoutred in the most splendid manner ; wore scaled armor and carried weapons of the finest description. Chari- ots, plain and scythed, were in vogue, and camels bearing archers and darters were not uncommon. There had been no progress in tactics since the elder Cyrus. Organization and discipline in the field were wretched. On the march there was no order. The army camped near water and pasturage, and surrounded the camps with wagons, stock- ades and earthworks, — sometimes using their shields as a capping to the latter. The higher generals had tents; the commonalty slept in huts in permanent camps, or without shelter in daily camps. In battle, the Persians, relying ou their bravery, preferred to advance straight on the enemy, without resort to stratagem or tactical mancBuvres. Wide, open plains were their usual choice for battlefields, on which their numbers, and especially the cavalry and chariots, could act to the best advantage. They formed in a long line so as to lap the enemy's flanks, the cavalry on the wings, the chariots in front. The centre was the place of honor. Here the king took his stand surrounded by his body-guard. On either side were placed the chosen troops, in great squares, always thirty, often one hundred deep, with light troops stationed all about WEAKNESS OF PERSIAN ARMY. 61 them and in the intervals. The king gave the war-cry for the day, and at a signal the whole mass moved forward. The Persian army was full of gallant men ; it had for generations been a terror to the Greeks, who feared to face it ; but it was unwieldly from too vast a bulk and from lack of homogeneity and discipline, and was subject to speedy and unreasoning panics. After a defeat a Persian army was bound to lose heavily from lack of ability to raUy for defense, and would often disperse so as absolutely to vanish. Destined to act in the plain, the chariots and horsemen and the huge squares were utterly unsuited to hilly countries, and were sure to fall into disorder when subjected to unusual tests. Eegular sieges were unknown. Cities were captured by ruse, treachery, or, on rare occasions, by storm. Sieges were still apt to be very long drawn out. In campaigns against barbarians, the Persian method ac- complished good results. But their mountain tribes always gave them much trouble, and the civilized discipline of the Greeks they could by no means withstand. In declaring war, the Persian habit was to demand, through heralds, earth and water as a token of submission. Greeks. — Down to the battle of Platsea (479 b. C.) there was small change in the organizatit)n of the Greeks, From that time on, many alterations came gradually about. A number of slaves appeared in the ranks. The first instance • of a standing army was the occasion when the Greek cities, during the Persian wars, mutually agreed to keep under arms ten thousand foot, one thousand horse, and one hundred war- ships. Wars beyond the borders of Greece called for larger forces than had been necessary, and in addition to the citizen- soldier, who had so far been the glory as well as guardian of Greece, large forces of freedmen, slaves, and particularly 62 GREEKS BECOME MERCENARIES. mercenary troops, were created. In the Peloponnesian war, and during the period of her greatest splendor (465-429 B. c), Athens made use extensively of mercenary troops, and other Greek states soon followed suit. Down to the Peloponnesian war the Athenians had re- tained their civil and military virtues in full force. But this internecine struggle ruined the population, devastated Greece, and familiarized the Greeks with serving for gold. Pericles found it necessary to pay the troops. The hophtes had noth- ing left to subsist upon. They had already served for pay in Asia, on a limited scale ; but after the Peloponnesian war, the Oriental princes or satraps, Carthage, or indeed any other people or prince who needed them, had no difficulty in col- lecting large bodies of Greek mercenaries. From this paid foreign service it was but a step to the point where the Greeks were willing to serve in preference him who paid the most. The pay varied from five to twenty cents a day. The best of the Greek population embraced arms as a profession, engaged mostly abroad, and left the poorer material at home. Greek cities themselves had to hire soldiers. The better citi- zens would no longer serve. They procured substitutes, and the armies, often kept standing, were filled up with wretched stuff. But in most of the Greek cities there remained a bet- ter nucleus, a corps d^ elite, in which alone the highest citizens had a place. Though this was small, it was a leaven. Such was the Theban Sacred Band, or Band of Lovers, which was bound together by ties of affection and oaths of fidelity, and,* but three hundred strong, so often saved the day for Thebes. This gallant body was finally cut to pieces at Chaeronsea. It would not yield a foot. Every man fell where he stood, sword in hand. While the armies of Greece were thus degenerating, the schools, in which, in addition to gymnastics, were taught ORIGIN OF PELTASTS. 63 mathematics and the art of war as then understood, contin- ued to grow in excellence. There was never a lack of well- trained leaders. It was the free-born rank and file which was degenerating, or allowing hirelings to do the duty it should do itself. The bone and sinew of the Greek republics had disappeared. The hoplites continued to be the fa^ vorite troops. Only they were looked on as warriors. Their armament re- mained the same, except that their shields grew smaller, — from four to two and a half feet in height, while the pike grew longer, — from ten to as much as twenty-one feet, or, as some Full- Armed Greek Aicher. state, twenty-four feet, which was the sarissa of Macedon. The psiloi served to protect the hoplites as well as to open the battle. The best archers and slingers came from Crete, Rhodes, Acarnania, ^gina, and Aehaia. The psiloi came from a poor class as of yore, were illy armed and of little consideration. It was reserved for Iphicrates of Athens to better their discipline and condition, and prove their utility in service. After the Peloponnesian war he created a new body, armed with well-poised spears for casting, light but good ' linen armor, and a small, Peltast. round shield (pelte), from which they were called peltasts. These troops had in a de- gree the lightness of the psiloi and the steadfastness of the hoplites. This new arm proved useful, and was shortly imi- 64 RELATIVE STRENGTH OF HEAVY AND LIGHT FOOT. tated by the other Greek cities. Scarlet or crimson were the favorite colors of the warrior. The Greek cavalry was either heavy, — cataphracti, bear- ing long double-ended lances, sword and axe, smaU. shield, and fully armored, as was also the horse; or light, — acrobolisti, far- shooters, — who were merely light-armed rid- ers and like nomads in their methods. The force of cavalry had been somewhat increased by the time of the Persian invasion to about one tenth the foot. Age- silaus, in Asia Minor, Cataphractos. made it for a time one fourth the foot. But the Greek cavalry was essentially poor, though certain leaders, like Epaminondas, managed to get good work out of it. The Greeks were not a nation of horsemen. The relative numbers 'of heavy and light foot and cavalry were very various. At Marathon (Herodotus) were ten thou- sand hoplites, a few psiloi, no cavalry. At Platsea served thirty-eight thousand seven hundred heavy, seventy-one thou- sand three hundred light foot, and no cavalry. At the opening of the Peloponnesian war Athens had (Thucydides) thirteen thousand heavy, sixteen hundred light foot, and twelve hundred horse, not counting sixteen thousand hoplites to defend the city. Epaminondas had at Leuctra (Diodorus) six thousand heavy foot, fifteen hundred light foot, five hun- dred horse ; at Mantinsea thirty thousand heavy and light, and three thousand horse. DEPTH OF PHALANX. 65 The phalanx had proven so good a formation during the Persian wars that the Greeks sought to improve rather than to change it. The Pelo- ^ ponnesian war furnished the opportunity to do this, and the Greeks had by na- ture exceptional capacity as drUl-masters and or- ganizers. The unit was no longer decimal, but founded on the powers of the number two. The Ancient Weapons. depth of the phalanx was rarely less than eight or more than sixteen men, though it was on rare occasions made so light as four or so heavy as twenty-four. Epaminondas made a col- umn forty-eight men deep at Leuctra and Mantinsea, but this was not the phalanx proper. Generally the eight, twelve, or sixteen deep file was in use. Xenophon puts the average at twelve. By employing any given number of files under a Ancient Helmets. leader, any convenient unit of organization could be made, or detachment formed. The leader stood in front, and there were a number of file closers to keep order in the ranks. The 66 FORMATION OF PHALANX. larger divisions of the phalanx had their ensigns and trum- peters, and each leader had near him one or two men to con- vey or repeat his orders. The right flank of the phalanx was called the head, the left the tail, for the phalanx usually marched by the right, and on the right the commander of the phalanx had his station. Small intervals were left between the divisions to allow the light troops to pass through to front or rear. There were many tac- tical formations of the phalanx for bat- tle known to the Greeks, such as a refusal of the right or left wing and various forms of columns and wedges. Columns of attack were of later origin. Manoeuvres were made in measured step to the sound of fifes. The cadenced step was essential to preserve order in a phalanx with twelve-foot pikes. The pike was practically the only weapon used so long as the phalanx held together. The foremost ranks protended their pikes; the rear ranks leaned them forward on the shoulders of their leaders to break the flight of arrows, or held them erect. The psiloi, peltasts and horse were set up and employed in many fashions. The psiloi never came to close quarters ; the peltasts often did so. The cavalry did not improve much. But the Grreeks recognized the uselessness of too great a depth, — such as the Spartans had had, — and the horse was formed in iles of files four deep and of a conven- ient length of rank. If the iles were oc- °°^^"^ ^'^*'^- casionaUy formed deeper, only the first four ranks attacked Swords. o o o 9 o o o o o c o O O O O O C COOOO oooc oooooaooo • URACOS POSITION OF THE VARIOUS ARMS. 67 the balance remained for the moment in reserve. The inter- vals between iles were greater than those in the phalanx. Some of the Thracian and Thessa- lian and other semi-nomad horse oilarcm. was wont to form in wedge and rhomboid, or lozenge columns for a charge. The phalanx, as the nucleus, ^, occupied the centre. The light oooooooooo troops might be on the flanks, in front, in the intervals, in the rear, according as the demand was for protection to front or flanks, J. i_ ,. • •^ J.1 Thessalian Lozenge. or tor shooting missiles over the heads of the phalanx. Small bodies of psUoi often accom- panied the cavalry. They were so active as to be able to follow its evolutions. Their general duties were to cover the phalanx and patrol the camp, seize heights, tear down ob- stacles, open the battle, follow the beaten' enemy with the horse, or cover a retreat. .The peltasts in battle were gener- ally on the flanks. The horse was on one or both flanks. The acrobolisti skirmished; the cataphracti were held back for a final effort. The advantages of the phalanx lay in its cohesion and weight. It was difficult to withstand its impact when the blow was delivered from a short distance and on level ground, or under such circumstances that the formation could remain intact. To break through it by an attack was practically impossible. Only its flanks and rear were weak. But if the phalanx was on rough and uneven ground, or had to march over a distance to the assault, gaps were apt to be rent in the mass, and into these a skillful enemy could pour and destroy the body. There was but one line. The phalanx had no re- 68 ORDER OF MARCH. serve to reestablish a failing battle. Neither the rear ranks of the hoplites could perform this duty, for they were fatigued by the march and battle, and if demoralization supervened, they aU the more partook it ; nor could the psiloi, as they were not stanch enough, nor armed with hand-to-hand weap- ons. Though the peltasts might have been so employed, it never seemed to occur to the Greeks to put them to such a use. A reserve was the conception of an individual, not a principle of tactics, with them. Thus the value of the phalanx lay in the defensive, or in an oifensive blow given from a short distance and always in close order. The Greek wars, like the phalanx, generally partook of a defensive character ; or rather, from the defensive char- acter of Greek wars very naturally arose the phalangial idea. The Greek armies were usually small ; their baggage-train limited. Their marches were, as a rule, in one column, by the right of the order of battle. Thus the head of column consisted of psiloi, who also acted as flankers. Then came the cavalry and the peltasts of the right wing ; then the phalanx. Behind this was apt to be placed, the train of wagons and pack-animals, and then came the peltasts and cavalry of the left wing, then again psiloi. Hampered with little trains and small in number, the armies of the Greeks could and did often perform wonderful marches, and sometimes at once went into battle. Fifteen miles was the average march ; but the Spartans marched to Marathon, one hundred and fifty miles, in three days, and arrived ready for immediate action, but too late. The theory of marches was not as generally understood and practiced as the theory of fighting. Marches were often carelessly conducted ; but some of the Greek generals marched their armies with consummate intelligence. There were no such set rules for the route as for the battlefield. The Greek orders of battle were : 1. The parallel. In this ORDERS OF BATTLE. 69 the lines marched against each other, front to front, aiming to strike " all along the line " at the same moment. The ad- vantage of this was an equal strength at every point; its weakness that it was liable to be broken in some place by valor or numbers, or by the occurrence of ? Q gaps; or that the shorter line could be ^ outflanked by the longer. 2. The parallel, h with one or other or both wings reinforced. The wing, strengthened by a line or colmnn in its front, made direct or obliquely for the enemy, and the rest of the line, less advanced I'i y than the troops reinforcing the wing, was covered by light troops. The obiect was S Parallel . -. S Order either to crush or surround the enemy's wing, s •wing re- or drive it in upon the centre so as to take ^^^^^^ inforced. . Order. advantage of the resulting confusion. Some- times both wings were reinforced and the centre withheld in similar manner, and other methods of strengthening one or both wings were employed. The weakness of this formation was the possible sundering of wings and centre, which would then lie open to being beaten in detail. 3. The oblique. This in its simple form was a mere variation from the parallel order due to accidents of ground or tactical difficulties ; in its best form it was the invention of Epaminondas. One wing was materially strengthened, and fell first on the enemy's wing opposite, in front or flank. The other wing was refused (held back) or advanced Iff ^£J more slowly, and from the nature of things in a o a sort of echeloned order, and thus the line became Oblique Order, -f-, . . simple form, oblique. As used by Epaminondas, this was the greatest advance in battle tactics ever made at one step. The advantage of this order was that the strengthened wing 70 PAY AND RATIONS. was sure to crush the enemy's flank, and while the whole enemy's army would partake of its demoralization, the centre and other wing which had been refused would remain in good condition for a further blow or for pursuit. It is perhaps the order which has in aU ages proven the most effective. It will be described more fully in the battle of Leuctra. AU other orders were mere variations of these, and up to Epam- inondas' day the parallel was practically the only one used. There was much perfection of detail, but tactical originality was absent. Rank and command remained the same as at an earlier period. The Thebans had from four to eleven leaders, bceo- tarchs, who commanded in rotation, and aU. laid down their office with the year. As already noted, until Platsea the Greek troops served without remuneration. The Athenians first began to pay the troops. The amount varied. It aver- aged ten drachmas (two dollars) per month for a foot soldier. The cavalry received two, three, and four times as much, ac- cording to its grading. The officers were paid twice to five times as much as the men. Thucydides says the soldier received as much for rations as for pay. Pay ceased with war, but the horseman received something for forage during peace, being held to keep his mount available on call. The troops lived on the country they traversed. With small armies this was no great hardship within the national territory. Victual for several days was not infrequently car- ried in the baggage-train, or brought by sea to given points. When practicable, armies hugged the sea, to have the support of their fleet. Rations in bulk were sometimes contracted for by the state for delivery at times and places stated. At their best the Greeks stood hardship perhaps better than any men have ever done. What other has ever marched so far as Alexander's tireless soldier? What retreat can REWARBS AND PUNISHMENTS. 71 compare to that of the Ten Thousand ? Csesar's legions came closest to them. In one quality alone is the modern soldier their equal, or superior. The soldier of the last two hundred years has been called on to stand greater decimation on the battlefield, and has cheerfully stood it. But in the other qualifications of the soldier, especially the ability to march far and fast on slender rations, the Greek is incomparable. Discipline varied much at different times and with differ- ent nations, being naturally a reflection of the character of the people, or of the leaders. Down to the Peloponnesian war, discipline and the feeling of honor among the troops was markedly good in almost aU Greek states. Military faults were severely punished, grave ones by death, or, what to the Greeks was worse, open branding with dishonor. Rewards were equally pronounced. The com- monest citizen might rise to distinc- tion by a signal act of bravery. The leader who won a victory became the worshiped hero of the people. But great rewards were jealously given. Miltiades was not awarded the crown of laurel because he had not won alone. The army must have the first reward, the general the next. Booty was largely distributed to both ; and booty included prisoners of war, who were ransomed at high prices or sold into slavery. The place of victory was marked by trophies, or piles of weapons, or weapons hung on masts, and by col- umns with inscriptions reciting the event. Sometimes all Greece would join in recognizing the services of some state. Victorious Greek. 72 CEREMONIES PRECEDING BATTLE. as in the case of Athens after Marathon, or of Platsea after the battle of that name. But after the Pelo- ponnesian war, the better instincts of the Greeks appear to have been lost, and their military spirit slackened. Disorder and mu- tinies were not infrequent. Leaders were compelled to purchase the good conduct of the troops by largesses; awful punishments for base or scandalous actions grew in fre- quency. This showed a slackening in the sol- dierly bearing. Civil war not infrequently results thus. The herald was an universally known and Trophy. respected official among all the ancients. War was declared by a formal accusation of and demand for repa- ration for certain acts, by a herald. On refusal, a bloody lance and a firebrand were cast by him upon the enemy's soil as a declaration of war and a threat of revenge by fire and sword. Before war or battle many and tedious ceremonials and vows to the gods were universal. The priests and augurs divined from the sacrificial entrails. The practical application of these proceedings lay in the hold it gave the leader on the superstitious feelings of his army. If the victims were pro- nounced favorable, enthusiasm rose, the warriors took a light meal, and then, to the singing of the psean and the playing of flutes, marched to battle. A battle-cry, as the phalanx closed with the enemy, was common. At certain periods the pha- lanx marched to battle in silence, so as the more distinctly to hear the orders, and chanted the paean when near the enemy, clashing their lances upon their shields and raising the battle- cry when they closed in upon him. The Greeks were a talka- tive, almost a garrulous people; but under discipline they could be singularly quiet. As fighters they were quiet and determined. CAMPS AND FORTIFICATIONS. 73 Religion demanded the burial of those slain in battle. For this purpose a truce was usual after victory. The fear of the anger of the gods for refusal of this rite often forestalled the grasping of the fruits of victory. It was the victors who erected their trophies and buried their dead. The vanquished were compelled to sue for the rite of burial. Such a request was, of itself, an acknowledgment of defeat. The bodies or ashes of fallen warriors were sent to their homes, and were there received with solemn ceremonial and given due sepul- ture. The Greeks were utterly barbarous in many things. As a rule, among the captives, the men were slain and the women and children sold into slavery. Not infrequently these last also were killed, or even burned, in numbers at a time. Ene- mies might be annihilated, tortured or used in the most in- human or indecorous manner, without a suspicion that such an act was reprehensible. The Greeks did not usually fortify their camps, but relied on situation for defense. The troops were often sheltered in tents, made of hides and carried by the men. The Greek soldier always car- ried a large blanket-wrap for protection from the weather. This was capable — as the cloak has been in all ages — of being used on occasion for -t j: n^ ^ av.- u « x Use of Cloak as ismeld (trom a vase). defense. The field fortifications of the Greeks, or fortified lines for the protection of given places, or to protect the access from harbor to town (as of the Piraeus to Athens), were constructed of earthen walls with ditch, palisades or hurdlework, abatis, 74 SIEGE OPERATIONS. or sometimes stone. The Spartans, in 429 B. c, surrounded Platsea with a double wall of intricate construction and great strength, which will be described elsewhere. But works were rarely so elaborate. The Greek cities were generally provided with thick and high stone walls, the idea of which they borrowed from the East. On these walls, at the angles, or at arrow-shot dis- tance, stood stone towers. Along the top of the wall ran a Mantelets. road, protected outwardly by overhanging battlements, so castellated and perforated that the foot of the fortifications and the surrounding country could be reached by missiles. A wide and deep, dry or wet moat lay outside. Inside were one or more citadels in the places most capable of defense, and similarly but more stoutly fortified. In Athens such was the Acropolis ; in Thebes, the Cadmsea. The Greeks took fortified cities by ruse whenever possible. If storm was resorted to, the light troops drove the defenders from the walls with their missiles, while picked heavy troops mounted the waUs by ladders, or on the upraised and inter- locked shields of the rest (this was called a testudo or tor- toise), or broke into the gates. They blockaded cities by SIEGE DEVICES. T5 walls of contravallation around and facing the town ; some- times by additional walls of circumvallation built outside and at a suitable distance from the first and facing away from the town, to hold an army of relief in check. In regular sieges they first established camps at appropriate intervals and joined them with works ; then cleared the walls of their defenders with catapults or ballistas, built covered ways towards the wall, threw up huge sloping mounds to command it, filled the ditch, which they approached under cover of mov- able screens and sheds, and undermined the wall, or broke it down with rams. A breach made, it was stormed. But catapults and ballistas were apparently not known until the Peloponnesian war. The catapult — or cannon of the ancients — was a species of huge bow, capable of throwing pikes weighing from ten to three hundred pounds over half a mile. The ballista — or mortar — threw heavy stones, or flights of arrows, or other substances, with accurate aim to a consider- able distance. Rams were at first mere iron-pointed beams handled by men. They were later swung _^^ in heavy framework, and hung on ropes or chains. They were generally placed in covered buildings mounted on wheels, which were then slowly pushed up against the waEs by men with levers. Mines were commonly opened from a distance and dug to a point under the walls, and were there sustained by wooden piles. The chambers were filled with combustibles, and being set on fire, they baked, crumbled and dropped the earth, and thus the heavy wall above it. Hand Bam. 76 DEVICES FOR DEFENSE. Movable towers of several stories set on wheels came into use as an easier means of overriding the walls than mounds. They were built at a distance beyond range of missiles, and rolled up by men. The lower story often held the ram. The besieged used converse means of defense. They con- structed wooden shields against the besiegers' fire, threw down the ladders of the storming parties, poured hot water or boil- ing oil or pitch upon them, and roUed heavy stones from the walls. They made sorties to destroy the besiegers' works, to reestablish communications with the outside world, or to cut Lu/v, \J\lA^-\- // X\ WALL -rr i I M ir i sff Tng ?5v?^?yF'? ^\;i I n 1 1 1 1 1 L - Breach in Wall. their way out. They raised the walls, built curtains or half- moons inside a breach, countermined to destroy the enemy's mines, and set his works on fire by arrows tipped with tarred tow, or by fire-pots cast by the catapults, or by other similar means. Sieges were very laborious. The defense was apt to be desperate, for the capture of a city resulted in the slaying or selling into slavery of all the inhabitants. Terms were rarely made, or if made were often violated. Sieges were therefore long in duration, and cost enormously in men and treasure. Good faith in ancient war was not universal. A pledge was by no means sacred. Heralds alone were inviolate, and not always they. Fleets. — War at sea and war on land were much less dif- ferent in olden times than to-day. AU Greek soldiers were more or less sailors ; all generals were equally admirals. NAVAL WARFARE. 77 In the heroic days fleets were used merely for piracy. As commerce grew, piracy decreased. The best period of the Greek marine was from the Persian wars to Alexander's day. Themistoeles was the founder of the Athenian navy. Until the fall of Syracuse, Athens was preeminent at sea. The Greek fleets always played a great part in war. The irregular and rocky coast, as well as the sharp and sudden storms of Greece, necessitated the use of small craft. Ships of war were propelled by oars, using sails only as an auxiliary means. They were long and shoal, with one, two or three and more banks of oars. There was but small space except for rowers and soldiers. They could carry little vict- ual and water, and had to be accompanied by transports or else keep close to shore. They landed, as a rule, every night, and the troops disembarked and camped. During storms the ships ran great danger of shipwreck, or the fleets of disper- sion. Transports and merchantmen used sails more than oars, and were in shape very much like tubs. They were called round, as men of war were denominated long, ships. Each term was descriptive of the craft. As the best citizens preferred service as hoplites or horse- men, only the lower classes, freedmen or slaves, were left for the fleet. But in times of danger much of the infantry served aboard the vessels. The duties were simple and could be easily learned. The triremes had from one hundred and fifty rowers upwards, and carried forty to fifty and more hoplites. Sea-fights were apt to occur near shore. Fleets were mobile and could readily manoeuvre. In order of battle they kept as close together as ease of rowing would permit. The great efPort was to ram the enemy's vessels amidships, for which purpose each Greek trireme had an iron prow. Or if its rud- der could be broken, a vessel was at the mercy of the adver- sary. Boarding was the common resort, in which both war- riors and oarsmen took a hand. 78 DECAY OF SPARTAN ARMY. The methods at sea and on land were much the same. Fleets and armies were wont to sustain each other, even to the extent of using their men and artillery in common ; i. e., the fleet would come close in shore, disembark its quota and take part in the action. In sieges of cities on the seaboard, which were common, both worked together. Sparta. — Sparta's system remained substantially the same from the time of Lycurgus down to the Peloponnesian war. But rivalry with Athens and the necessity of possessing a fleet, if Sparta would arrest her competitor's preponderance in Greece, changed the habits of centuries. Money became essential to conduct war against wealthy Athens, and money brought into Sparta those things which soon drove out the ancient national simplicity. And this all the more speedily from its novelty. The armies now no longer contained citi- zens alone, though these were still the kernel ; but the Laco- •iiians, freedmen, helots and mercenary troops composed a large part of it. The free population was divided into five classes, from which the ephors called into service in war as many as were needed, according to age. Cleombrotus, at Leuctra, had in the ranks the citizens from twenty to thirty- five ; after Leuctra, those up to forty were called in. The number of freedmen who gradually crept into service was large. Agesilaus had three thousand in Asia. The helots were called in only in cases of grave danger, as before Manti- nsea. The kings stiU held the command, but came more and more under the control of the ephors. The latter held the real power, and went on occasion so far as to displace the kings from command. The troops were not yet on a paid basis, excepting the helots and mercenaries ; but the kings and their stafE or suite were victualed. Up to the close of the Peloponnesian war the Spartans were sparing of their SPARTAN HORSE. 79 rewards, and retained the severity of their punishments, such as death and loss of honor ; while some criminals were clad and treated like slaves, and had half their head and beard shaven ; and burial was refused to cowards. After the Pelo- ponnesian war, discipline declined and the state was often forced to resort to largesses to encourage the troops to those exertions they had been in the habit of yielding as of course. The citizens still formed the body of the hoplites. Each of the five classes put on foot one or more mores or regiments of five hundred to one thousand men. Each hoplite had one or more psiloi under his control and often several helots or servants. The Laconians, freedmen and sometimes the helots served as light troops. These became more and more nu- merous. At Plataea they outnumbered the citizens seven to one. The cavalry remained poor. Citizens disqualified from service in the heavy foot entered the cavalry, which was used mostly for scouts and patrols. Agesilaus somewhat increased its numbers and efficiency. One mora or ile from Scirus and vicinity, where horses were abundant, was of markedly better character, and was not infrequently used in battle, where it more than once decided the day. And there was a body of three hundred hippeis selected by the ephors, who were a cavalry corps d'Hite. The horse now rode in four ranks, a great improvement over the former eight. The Spartan foot stood in from eight to twelve ranks. The manoeuvres were performed in cadenced step to the sound of fifes, and though very simple, were excellently devised. But by neglecting the arts and sciences, the Spartans remained stationary, and did nothing toward improving the art of war in a theoretical sense. They could not look beyond courage and the details of tactics. They still employed the manoeu- vres enumerated in a former chapter. But the wedge, pincers, 80 STRATEGOI. and such other tactical movements were useful rather on the drill-ground than on the battlefield. Athens. — Athens, after Marathon, which redounded to her greatest honor, rose rapidly in power, and the tendency to- wards democracy brought about many changes. Citizens from twenty to forty were stiU subject to military duty, but were permitted to procure substitutes. The list of citizens freed from military duty grew large. Aliens, freedmen and even slaves gradually crept into the ranks, the latter mostly in the fleet. Auxiliary troops from allied or tributary nations and mercenaries increased in proportion to the citizen-soldiers. The forces of Athens were large, especially at sea ; and dur- ing the height of her power the conduct of her leading citi- zens and of the troops was uniformly patriotic and brilliant. Ten strategoi commanded the forces, — one for each tribe (phyle), — and were selected by lot or vote. At the ex- piration of a year they laid down their command, and rendered an accoimt of their doings to the people. They were often reelected. Phocion served many successive terms. Such men as Themis- tocles and Aristides were constantly re- elected. If the people were not satisfied (and the Athenians were singularly un- grateful and unreasonable) the strategos was mulcted in a fine ; failing payment of which he and his children after him were cast into and kept in prison. The proper men were often not the ones who were chosen strategoi. The ever-shifting command and the natural disagreements, between Greek Army Leader. REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 81 the leaders frequently prevented Athens from securing the results of otherwise good management. Recognizing this dif- ficulty, it was finally decreed that most of the strategoi should remain in Athens to attend to the victualing of the troops and the general business management, while one of the archons (polemarch) should accompany the army, and keep up communication between the strategoi at the rear and front, and preside at the council of war. The polemarch had also specific military duties, and commanded a wing of the army — usually the right. Sometimes, on occasions of great dan- ger, the most celebrated general or citizen was chosen com- mander-in-chief with extraordinary powers. Alcibiades was thus honored. Under the ten strategoi were ten taxiarchs, who were a sort of aide-de-camp, but with specific duties and command. The taxiarchs looked after victual, camps, the order of march, weapons, and so forth. Each strategos also had one or more heralds. Rewards and punishments were practically the same as with other states. Those who avoided military duty by false pre- texts were dressed in women's clothes, and exhibited in pub- lic ; cowards were excluded from religious ceremonials and conventions of the people. Culprits were forbidden to marry ; even their families joined in disgracing them ; and they were subjected to cuffs and insults in public, which they might not resent. The Athenians, owing to their greater luxuries, were the first in Greece whose army fell into slackness and weak dis- cipline. The Athenian army consisted of ten chiliarchias (or regiments), one for every tribe, of one thousand or more men each, commanded by a chiliarch or colonel, and under him captains and file leaders. Each hoplite had a servant or arms- bearer, who retired to the rear in action. Of cavalry there was, previous to the Persian invasions, a force of but ninety- 82 ATHENIAN CAVALRY. six men, which number later grew to one thousand or twelve hundred, about one tenth the foot, and was divided into two Hoplite. hipparchias (regiments) under two hipparchs and ten phy- larchs. The richest and best fitted citizens served in the cavalry. Rigid examinations of physical strength and finan- cial ability to support the cost of cavalry service were re- quired. But this arm none the less remained very medio- cre. The Athenians were sear men, not horsemen. To the Athenians belongs the credit of first making war something more than a mere physical science. The keen wit of Athens elevated all which it touched, and among the other arts war gained some- thing of value from her brain tissue. This gain took the form of marked improvements in tactics and in fortification and sieges; and still more of a broader intelligence in the conduct of war, and an appre- ciation of its intellectual character. Catapbractos (from a vase). MACEDON RESEMBLED GREECE. 83 A more detailed account will be found in a later chapter of the military organization of Macedon. The Greek and Macedonian systems were analogous, and much of what is said of the one applies to the other. Armor of Greek Chieftain. VII. MILTIADES.— MARATHON. B. C. 490. DuKiNG the Persian invasion of Greece, at the battle of Marathon, occurred one of the early tactical variations from the parallel order. MUtiades had but eleven thousand men ; the Persians had ten times as many. They lay on the seashore in front of their fleet. To reach and lean his flanks on two brooks running to the sea, Miltiades made his centre thin, his wings strong, and ad- vanced sharply on the enemy. With his wings he scattered the Persian airay ; as was inevitable, the deep Persian line easily broke through his weakened centre. But Miltiades had either anticipated and prepared his army for this, or else seized the occasion by a very stroke of genius. There was no symptom of demoralization. The Persian troops followed hard after the defeated centre. Miltiades caused each wing to wheel inwards, and fell upon both flanks of the Persian advance, absolutely overwhelming it, and throwing it back upon the main line in such confusion as to lead to complete victory. Not many years after his Scythian expedition Darius, son of Hystaspes, invaded Greece, and his army was defeated at Marathon. On this occasion we find one of the first and most marked illustrations in a pitched battle of what to-day we call grand tactics. From now on we shall see something akin to an advance in the art of handling troops. Battle tactics would naturally come into existence before strategy. The latter, as a science, was not yet dreamed of. Many great captains had to show the world what strategy was before its maxims could be guessed. At Marathon Miltiades acted on a sensible and definite tactical plan of battle. He was one of the ten strategoi, and his turn had come to take sole command. But the others were equally divided in opinion as to the advisability of fighting. Miltiades pleaded with the polemarch Callimachus to give the MILTIADES RESOLVES TO FIQHT. 85 casting vote in its favor. This was done, and, with the ar- doi- not uncommon to great souls, Miltiades resolved to stake the fate of Athens — which was then the fate of the civilized world — on the issue of this one battle. He was to fight on historic ground, sacred to Hercules, the scene of the exploits of Theseus, and the rout of the invader Eurystheus, near the fountain of Macaria. There can be no doubt, though his words have not been preserved to us, that this large-hearted man made use of all these, by the Greeks, religiously credited traditions in a manner to inflame every man with the valor which conquers or dies. For at this time the Greek soldier rm ■0^ Plain of Marathon. harbored a hearty dread of the Persian, and by no means understood his own strength. Miltiades had but eleven thou- sand men, of whom one thousand were Platseans. Datis and Artaphernes — the former was the real chief — had more than ten times the number. But the Greeks were more heavily armed and well disciplined, and they had the high- est of all motives to bear themselves as men; the Persians MILTIADES' PLAN. were lightly armed, and though the better classes of the army were personally brave, the bulk of the rank and file had small notion of fighting except under the influence of the lash. They were, moreover, recruited from every part of the huge Persian empire, and had none of the esprit de corps so strong among the Athenians. There was no cohesion in the Persian army ; a panic would be surely fatal. But the Greeks did not know all this. To them the outlook was desperate. The Persian hosts were drawn up in a deep body on the plain extending upward from the seashore. Their heavy baggage camp was farther up the coast. Their fleet had partly been beached in their rear. It is probable that at the moment of attack a portion of the Persian force had been reembarked for a projected attack on Athens. The Athenians were on the slope of the hills a mile or so away, having pro- tected their flanks by leaning them on natural obstacles, and by some abatis or palisades.. They had lain here nine days, awaiting the Persian initiative. Miltiades had concluded that safety lay in taking the offensive himself, and finally CaUi- machus' vote came in to decide in favor of his opinion. In the attack on the enemy, which Miltiades had determined upon, the Greeks ran the most imminent risk from the enemy's cavalry, of which they themselves had none ; for this, if skill- fully handled, might fatally turn their flanks. Miltiades saw that he must act with the greatest speed when the moment arrived, and take the Persians, if possible, unawares. He had not enough troops properly to fill a front by any means as wide as that of the Persians, and was thus compelled to alter his usual formation. He made his centre thin, — probably Soldier of Marathon. THE GREEK CHARGE. 87 four men deep, — and thus gained in length of line, while he kept his phalanx of the usual depth of eight men in both the wings. In his advance upon the Persian line he was able to rest both his flanks on two brooks which ran down towards the sea. This use of obstacles was very uncommon, if not quite un- known, at his day ; and its employment here shows that qual- ity in which the great captain always excels, — the adaptation of means to end ; the ability to utilize his resources to the very best advantage. Themistocles and Aristides commanded the centre. If the troops here were sparse, they were yet well led. The Pla^ tseans were on the extreme left. In this order, and choosing a moment when the enemy was apparently not anticipating an attack, Miltiades moved down upon the Persians. His men were aU in good training, and though the distance between the lines was the best part of a mile, Miltiades had concluded that by an advance at the double quick he would run a lesser risk, even if he brought his men into action a trifle winded, than he would by advancing slowly and giving the enemy time to bring his cavalry into action. Moreover, the phalanx would be a much shorter time under the fire of the Persian archers and slingers. This course, then, he took, and in a few moments from giving the command to move forward at a run, the Greek army, still in good alignment, struck the Persian first line, which on seeing the attack had rapidly formed, but which was, no doubt, much startled by the audacity of the manoeuvre. Miltiades had calculated rightly. He had forestalled the use of the cavalry by the Persians upon his flanks, and had the strong moral advantage of the offensive. On the wings, where the phalanx was in files eight men deep, the struggle was decisive. The enemy, after a brilliant resistance, went to 88 MILTIADES' MANOEUVRE: pieces under the Grecian spears, beyond the hope of rallying. But in the centre, which was strung out and weak, the Per- sians and Sacse, despite a brave opposition, broke through and drove the hoplites back. The Greeks fought for every inch under their splendid leadership, but the mass of the enemy had too much momentum. Slowly but surely they were I 'I S IS Before the Battle of Marathon. pushed to the rear, nor could they be steadied and a new line formed until the foot of the hill was reached whence they had started. Here a stand was made, and here too came Miltiades' opportunity. He had no doubt foreseen the prob- ability of just this turn in the battle ; or if not, he seized it with the genius of the bom captain. With true mihtary coup d'oeil he gauged the proper moment. The preconcerted or a well-known signal was given by the trumpets, and the two Greek wings, having routed the Persians opposed to them, without losing their steadiness, wheeled their serried ranks HERODOTUS' ACCOUNT. 89 right and left in upon the mass of struggling Oriental sol- diery which had driven back the centre and was following hard upon. This splendid manceuvre not only disconcerted the enemy, but put him at the mercy of the Greek phalanx. The Persian van, thus taken on either flank, was compro- mised. Only the efforts of isolated bodies were possible, and Greek Manoeuvre at Marathon. these could effectuate nothing. Demoralization spread. The victory was complete. The enemy was followed to his ships. Here the conflict was still more severe and the slaughter enormous. There feU six thousand four hundred Persians and but one hundred and ninety-two Greeks. The battle had been won by crisp tactical skill and discipline, against enor- mous odds and equal individual bravery. Herodotus devotes small space to the battle of Marathon. He states that the centre was defeated and followed up by the enemy ; that the wings won a victory ; and that then Milti- 90 SPA£TANS COME TOO LATE. ades, allowing the Persians to fly, united both wings and fought with those who had broken the centre. No other con- ceivable manoeuvre than the one narrated seems to coincide ■with and satisfy these statements and those of other authori- ties. In order to unite the wings the victorious Persian cen- tre must first be defeated. There is little doubt that what has been described is what occurred. The great disproportion in losses which we constantly meet with in ancient battles can best be vouched for by pointing to the well-known losses at such battles as Cr^cy and Agincourt, in later days. The same thing is always found in the con- flicts of disciplined with undisciplined troops, and in ancient times — and often in the Middle Ages — the defeated army suffered terribly after ranks were broken and during the pursuit. Annihilation was wont to follow a defeat. MUtiades capped his work by marching speedily back to Athens, which he divined from certain signs to be the desti- nation of the Persians. They had naturally guessed the city to be disgarnished of troops, and had at once set sail thither. He reached Athens just in time to forestall its capture. The Spartans, whose religious rules would not allow them to open a campaign before the full moon, started too late, and by three successive marches of fifty miles a day arrived at Marathon the day after the battle had been won. Grievously chagrined, they returned to Sparta. This victory shows, prior to the days of Epaminondas, the most brilliant of the variations from the parallel order of armies then uniformly in vogue. The battle exhibited a set and well-digested manoeuvre promptly and intelligently exe- cuted in the heat of action. Whether Miltiades prepared for the manoeuvre, or conceived and used it on the spur of the moment, it equally redounds to his honor. This and the succeeding battles and campaigns herein nar- NECESSARY OMISSIONS. 91 rated by no means purport to describe all the instances of military skiU. which are worthy of notice prior to Alexander's day. They are rather types which show how the art of war gradually advanced, and what its condition was when the great conqueror began his wonderful career. Many notewor- thy events have of necessity to be omitted. Xenophon. vm. • BRASIDAS. B. C. 424-422. The Peloponnesian was not a great war. It was a war of eshauation and of small operations. There were "but half a dozen battles in twenty-seven years. But it shows instances of far-seeing strategy. Such was the seizure of Pylos, whence the threat of incursions on Sparta's rear obliged her to relax her hold on the throat of Athens. The siege of Platsea is peculiarly interesting as afford- ing us the first detailed glimpse into ancient siege-methods ; and it was one of the earliest instances of a complete, though crude wall of contrayallation and cireumyallation, and of something like systematic operations. This war bred some good generals. At the battle of Olpse Demosthenes cleverly made use of an ambuscade to win an otherwise lost battle. Brasidas was the man who came nearest to showing the moral and intellectual combination of the great soldier. His speech to his troops when confronted by untold numbers of barbarians is a model. It has the true ring of the captain. His marches through Thessaly and Illyria and his defeat of Cleon at Amphipolis were admirable. He it was who first marched in a hollow square with baggage in the centre, and showed what fighting in retreat should be. In this he was the prototype of Xenophon. The siege of Syracuse, too, among its long and intricate details, furnishes us with two of the best known and wisest masims of war. In the century succeeding Marathon there can be traced a constant if not rapid growth of the military art. This is shown not so much in the rise of distinguished captains as in the ability of the lesser lights to govern themselves by the success or failure of their predecessors, and thus gradually aid in shaping warfare into a system. In the far-seeing wisdom of Themistocles preceding the battle of Salamis (b. c. 480), we recognize the broad and self-poised reasoning of which is bred the soundest strategy. In the operations of the several campaigns of the Peloponnesian war, although the Greeks then practiced almost exclusively a defensive system, there SIEGE LINES AT PLAT^A. 93 may be found an occasional lesson. But many such must be passed over unnoticed throughout all history. The Pelopon- nesian was not a great war. There were but a half-dozen bat- tles in twenty-seven years, and only one decisive one, ^gos- potami. It was a war of exhaustion. The siege of Platsea (b. c. 429-427) is interesting in that we have in its story the first detailed account of any siege of an- tiquity, and can therefrom learn the methods practiced. In Pylos, B. c. 425. this light it is more important to us than because a mere hand- ful of men held the Spartans at bay for nearly two years. Thucydides tells us that the besiegers began by surrounding the town with a line of palisades ; but that when the siege operations showed no signs of success, they resorted to a care- ful blockade and built two walls sixteen feet apart, one facing toward the town, one outward. The detail on duty held this double line ; the bulk of the forces camped outside. The space between the walls was roofed in to protect the troops 94 BATTLE OF 0LPJ3. against the fire of the enemy and the weather. Thus the two walls became one, with a double parapet. Towers surmounted the wall at intervals, and commanded both sides. Large ditches were dug on either side with drawbridges thrown across them. Previous to this we find no methodical plan of siege works. The Peloponnesian war bred some good generals. Of these probably Brasidas, the Spartan, should hold the first place as a military man, though Athens developed the great- est statesmen. Pericles' conception of the plan on which Athens should work, — a defensive war on land, an aggressive war at sea, — and the words Thucydides puts into his mouth, are full of wisdom. The foresight of Demosthenes in seizing Pylos (b. c. 425), by which he threatened so dangerous an incursion on the rear of Sparta that he at once compelled her not only to relax her hold on the throat of Athens, but sue for peace, is part and parcel of the very best of strategic abil- ity. Demosthenes also won the battle of Olpae (b. c. 425) by //■-....a » -1 V OIpjE, B. c. 425. the clever use of an ambuscade. He hid in a wooded valley a force of four hundred hoplites and light troops, beyond his own right, hoping by a surprise to demoralize the Lacedaemo- nian left, which outflanked him, in case it should gain the ad- vantage. What he anticipated occurred. Eurylochus turned BRASIDAS. 95 his right, but at the proper moment the men in ambush de- bouched from hiding and fell upon Eurylochus' rear. So effective was this diversion, that although the right of Eiiry- lochus' army won a decided success, it became compromised by the defeat of the left, and Demosthenes scored a victory. The siege of Syracuse also furnishes us numerous lessons for which there is no space, as well as two of the best maxims known to the science of war : " The most certain means of conquering is to fall unexpectedly on your enemy ; " and, " No greater damage can be inflicted on the enemy than by pressing him there where you have become certain he dreads it the most." There is space to do no more than instance a march and a battle of Brasidas, in illustration of what was best in the warfare of that century. Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, together with some revolted Thracian cities and Sparta, had joined in a treaty against Athens, which city had long held the supremacy in the north. The march of Brasidas through Thessaly to join Perdiccas in Macedonia (b. c. 424) gives proof of a man with the moral element singularly and beautifully developed. Brasidas had none of the narrowness of the Spartan. He was not only a clear-headed soldier, but he was a clean man, who accom- plished his tasks as openly and honorably as he fought his way bravely. The population of Thessaly was allied to Ath- ens and inimical to Sparta. Brasidas must march through Thessaly to reach Macedonia. At the head of his four thou- sand men he made a series of forced marches with such rapid- ity and skill that he forestalled opposition. Before the people of any one section had met and determined to oppose him, Brasidas would have already passed by their land ; and when he was once arrested on the march by armed resistance at a defile through which he must pass, he persuaded his would-be adversaries that his mission was peaceful and advantageous 96 RETREAT FROM ILLYRIA. Mareli of Brasidas, B. c. 424. to them in a manner, and with an eloquence, which illustrates one of the happiest fac- ulties of the soldier, and one most rarely possessed. In his retreat from Illyria, whither he had undertaken a campaign with the Macedonians, Brasidas showed re- markable skill. Per- diccas had deserted him, decamping sud- denly by night with his entire force, in abject terror at the compro- mised situation in which he and Brasidas found themselves, leaving Brasidas with but a handful of men to encounter a vast host of barbarians who were following up his retreat. The position was one to try men's souls ; but such was the influence of Brasidas over his men that not the remotest demoralization was shown, nor loss of discipline. His speech to them, pointing out their superiority over the barbarians, despite their small numbers, both in courage, discipline and every manly quality, and the certainty of beating them if they but stood together, is a model for every soldier. Here first we find a general telling his men that the civilized warrior need have no fear from untold numbers of barbarians, trite as the saying is to-day. On the march the hoplites were formed in a hollow square or oblong, the light-armed troops and bag- gage in the centre. This appears to have been a new device with Brasidas. A number of active and brave young sol- diers were selected and stationed in an outer rank, or where COLUMN OF RETREAT. 97 they could quickly quit their places without disorganizing the body, so as to act as flankers, sally out and faU upon the bar- barians whenever they came forward to the attack. Brasidas himself, with three hundred chosen hoplites, formed the rear- guard. So soon as the command to march was given, the barbarians would begin their attacks. But there was not the slightest breach of discipline. At each onset the column halted, the flankers came out and they and the rear-guard made short work of the lUyrians. The march was then re- sumed. After two or three attacks the barbarians found that their losses were so severe that they had best be cautious, and a little additional punishment induced them to desist entirely from direct attack. But they only shifted their ground to am- buscade. On one occasion they stole a march ahead of the Greek column toward a height at the mouth of a defile which the phalanx was obliged to pass, proposing there to fight the Greeks at a disadvantage. But Brasidas was constantly on the alert. He saw the purpose of the enemy. Taking his rear-guard quickly in hand, he put it at a double-quick, and headed straight for the height ; and though the lUyrians reached the place before him, they could not form readily enough to resist the onset of the hoplites. Brasidas drove them away, killing a number, and seized the mouth of the defile. The lUyrians, throughout the entire retreat, had been so roughly handled that they now gave over the pursuit entirely. In his ascendancy over his men, and his conduct under most trying circumstances, Brasidas may fairly be called the prototype of Xenophon. The defeat of Cleon by Brasidas at Amphipolis (b. C. 422) further illustrates the rare qualities of this soldier. After his march to Macedonia and his campaign in and retreat from lUyria, he returned to the vicinity of this city, which he had taken some time before. Amphipolis is on the river Stry- 98 AMPHIPOLIS. mon, situated on a hill, round three sides of which the river flows, necessitatiag a wall on but one, the east side. Bras- idas had his camp on Mt. Kerdyllium on the other bank of the Strymon, connected with the city by a bridge. Cleon r > V '••■'1 \ \(> > (^ ii"''' v\./' V 1..U- i'''.l.l,.(«- A Mt H PO LK ' c 1., :o«i. -%,,...>*'■' A fh /v ^ I, .V' ? 'I /!# VI"-'"'' .„.''''^'" £ ,("■'11^' Amphipolis, B. c. 422. had been sent by Athens to oppose Brasidas, and had landed at Eion on the seacoast a few miles below. Desiring to re- connoitre the town, he advanced along the road, right flank in front, to a position on the heights east of Amphipolis. He had no idea whatever that Brasidas would attack him, for he BRASIDAS SURPRISES CLEON. 99 could plainly see Ms camp on the other bank of the river, as well as the city on the hill, and was advancing in loose and careless order. But Brasidas had made up his mind to attack the Athenian, whose heedless formation he had been watching to good advantage. Cleon perceived the march of Brasidas from his camp into the town, but stiU anticipated no attack. By and by a commotion was visible within the gates, and Cleon became aware that he was in danger. Still he supposed that Brasidas would do what was usual in those days, emerge from the gates, form in the regular order in front of them, and advance his phalanx to the attack. Though he was in much larger force and vastly better equipped than Brasidas, Cleon determined to retire, and faced his column about, so as to march it back left in front, but stiU was not careful to ploy his column into close order. The left wing was marching somewhat ahead, the centre and right at intervals behind. Brasidas, who had a perfectly clear idea of the advantage of doing what your enemy least expects, and had no thought of merely doing the usual thing, had been quietly waiting with a picked force of one hundred and fifty men under his own command behind the gates. He had pointed out to his men the careless formation of the enemy. He addressed to them words of glowing encouragement, and fired them to their task. Then in serried ranks, this small but determined body, not a man of whom but was worth a host, suddenly rushed from the gates, feU upon the flank of Cleon's centre, which was march- ing quietly along the road, and threw it into the utmost con- fusion. The left in the advance, instead of turning to the assistance of the centre, was so taken by surprise that it at once fled towards Eion. The right retired to a position on the hill. At the same moment another and larger body emerged from an upper gate, and advanced against the right, taking it in reverse. Cleon himself fled, but was slain in his flight. 100 CHARACTER OF PELOPONNESIAN WAR. The right resisted manfully, but uselessly. Over six hundred Athenian hoplites were slain, and the whole army utterly demoralized. The Spartans lost but seven men killed. Brasidas was fatally wounded. The contrast between the two commanders in character as well as in abihty is noteworthy. There are many things in the career of Lysander, the vic- tor of -SJgospotami, which stamp him second only to Bras- idas, but his exploits, like those of many other able men, must be omitted here. The Peloponnesian war was limited in its military scope. Political means were as much employed as warlike. To seduce an ally from the enemy or rouse sedition in his capital was as important as to win a battle. Statesmanship overrode military ability. Campaigns were usually raids, having some side-issue for object. The war was conducted more at sea than on land. Small war and sieges covered all the land operations. The Peloponnesian war was essentially a little war, though on a large scale and over a large territory and with mighty interests at stake ; and it was characterized by unusual cruelty and unnecessary devastation. It produced great men, dishonest men, and weak men, and the influence of all was marked in its conduct. Pericles, Demosthenes, Brasidas, Gylippus, Lysander, Cleon, Alcibiades, Nicias, each impressed his own character for good or for ill on some part of this long-drawn-out conflict. Had it not come to a close when it did, Greece might have gone to pieces as a factor in civilization. IX. XENOPHON. — AGESILAUS. B. C. 401-394. The soldier of greatest use to us preceding Alexander was unquestionably Xenophon. After participating in the defeat of Cyrus the Younger hy Arta- xerxes at Cunaxa, in which battle the Greek phalanx had held its own against twenty times its force, Xenophon was chosen to command the rear-guard of the phalanx in the Retreat of the Ten Thousand to the Sea ; and it is he who has shown the world what should he the tactics of retreat, — how to command a rear-guard. No chieftain ever possessed a grander moral ascendant over his men. More tactical originality has come from the Anabasis than from any dozen other hooks. For instance, Xenophon describes accurately a charge over bad ground in which, so to speak, he broke forward by the right of companies, — one of the most useful minor manoeuvres. He established a reserve in rear of the phalanx from which to feed weak parts of the line, — a superb first conception. He systematically devastated the country traversed to arrest pur- suit. The whole retreat is full of originality in the operations of every day. After the lapse of twenty-three centuries there is no better military text-book than the Anabasis. Alexander had a predecessor in the invasion of Asia. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the assistance of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, unjustly oppressed by the satrap Tissaphernes. He set saU with eight thousand men, landed at Ephesus, adjusted the difficulties of these cities, and, having, with consummate ability, conducted two successful campaigns in Phrygia and Caria, returned to Laoedemon overland, — a long, toilsome and dangerous march. On the way he won the battle of Coronsea by an admirable display of tactical ability. Ctrus the Younger, second son of Darius II., proposed to dispute the kingdom with his brother Artaxerxes. He invaded Persia (b. C. 401) with an army of Asiatics and thirteen thousand Greek auxiliaries. The latter were a fine body of men, much above the ordinary class of mercenaries, of whom Greece had furnished vast munbers for many years. 102 BATTLE OF CUNAXA. They marched from Myriandrus to Thapsaeus in twelve days, at the rate of nineteen miles a day. Their commander was Clearchus. The battle of Cunaxa, fought by Cyrus against Artaxerxes, is interesting as showing the discipline of which a Grreek phalanx was capable, when compared with the het- erogeneous troops of Persia, and as being the initiation of the Retreat of the Ten Thousand. Artaxerxes had an army said to be nine hundred thousand strong — probably an exag- geration ; while Cyrus had, including the Grreeks, nearly one hundred thousand. These two armies were marching toward each other, and came together near the river Euphrates. On learning of the approach of the enemy Cyrus drew up his army. The phalanx was on the right, leaning on the river, some distance in front of the camp. A small body of one thousand horse supported it. Cyrus, with a body-guard of six hundred horse, was in the centre. The Asiatics were on the left. Artaxerxes advanced in order of battle. His enormous force, with its left on the river, so far overlapped the line of Cyrus that its centre was beyond the latter's left flank. As the Persians marched on in silence and with meas- ured tread Cyrus rode his lines, encouraged his men, and bade Clearchus attack the centre, where Artaxerxes, with his six thousand cavalry, had stationed himself, knowing that success at that place meant certain victory. But Clearchus was loath to leave his position near the river, as this protected his unshielded side; for the shield was carried on the left arm, and a phalanx always felt more concern for its right than its left flank. He therefore practically disobeyed orders, but he promised Cyrus to hold firm. As the Persian army came within about half a mile, the phalanx advanced, striking their pikes upon their shields, and shouting their martial psean. So redoubtable did they appear that the cavalry and chariots in front of Artaxerxes' left wing BATTLE OF CUNAXA. 103 did not even await their attack, but melted away before the Greeks came within an arrow flight. The phalanx, instinct with ardor, advanced in good order upon the main body of the left wing, defeated it and pursued it some two miles. / -^ ^CAMR (§'-1-' I?: IS \ ./■• y SS^ °. "\ "I'l-T'^ Battle of Cunaza, b. c. 401. Meanwhile Artaxerxes, seeing how far he overlapped Cyrus' left, ordered his right wing to wheel round upon it and take it in reverse ; and the cavalry on the Persian left had attacked the cavalry which had supported the phalanx, had driven it back, and had made its way to the camp. Cyrus had held his body-guard in hand watching devel- 104 CONDUCT OF THE PHALANX. opments ; but when he saw the success of the phalanx, he desired to do something worthy to rival it, and projected his horse with so much elan upon the large body surrounding Artaxerxes that he dispersed it at a blow. Unfortunately his horsemen followed on in pursuit, leaving Cyrus with but a few of his intimates, or "table companions," around him. With these he charged on Artaxerxes in person, and wounded him indeed, but himself feUin the onset. The right wing of the Persians had meanwhile manceuvred round upon Cyrus' left, which, thus compromised and learning of the death of its leader, sought safety in flight. Both the Persian right wing and the cavalry set to pillaging the camp. Artaxerxes, see- ing the rout of his left wing, rallied his right wing, which had thus made a complete wheel to the rear, and led it against the phalanx. Clearchus had now completed the destruction of the Persian left wing, and had faced about to attack whatever other part of the enemy might be in his front ; and as in moving back near the river he saw the new array of the Persians, he backed up against it, and obliged Artaxerxes to file to the left to face him. The phalanx then once more advanced on the enemy, and drove them off the field and to the hill on which is situated the town of Cunaxa. From here Clearchus retired to his camp. Not tiU then did the Greeks hear of the death of Cyrus. But one phalangite was wounded, though this body of thirteen thousand men had defeated an army at least a score of times greater. This battle illustrates the superiority of the phalanx over the no doubt brave but un- disciplined soldiers of Oriental nations. But its success and meagre loss must not be taken as a measure of what was usual. The Greeks were now compelled to make their way out of the country as best they might. Clearchus and some of the RETREAT. 105 other generals having been treacherously murdered in a par- ley under safe conduct with the enemy, new ones were chosen in their stead", and to the lot of Xenophon fell the rear- guard, whUe to Cheirisophus feU the van. Nothing like this famous retreat is known in the world's history. Xenophon is the father of the system of retreat, the originator of all that appertains to the science of rear-guard fighting. He reduced its management to a perfect method. More original- ity in tactics has come from the Anabasis than from any dozen other books. Every system of war looks to this as to the. March of the Ten Thonsand, 401 B. o. fountain-head when it comes to rearward movements, as it looks to Alexander for a pattern of resistless and intelligent advance. Necessity to Xenophon was truly the mother of invention, but the centuries since have devised nothing to surpass the genius of this warrior. No general ever possessed a grander moral ascendant over his men. None ever worked for the 106 COLUMN WELL CLOSED. safety of his soldiers with greater ardor or to better effect. In this retreat a number of entirely new schemes were put into practice by 'him. The building of a bridge on goat-skins stuffed with hay or stubble and sewed up so as to be water- tight is here first mentioned, though Xenophon does not claim its invention, and we shaU. see Alexander using this device constantly. Xenophon originated the advance by breaking forward by the right of regiments or companies instead of in line, in order to overcome bad ground or to maintain a better alignment, — one of the most useful of minor manoeuvres. But it is in the method he displayed that he principally instructs us. Parts of the Retreat, of the Ten Thousand were a running fight for days. Xenophon began by organizing a small cavalry force and a body of slingers, both essential to meet the sim- ilar arms of the enemy. He was always at the proper point. The Greek order of march was apt to be careless and much strung out. Xenophon taught his men that a column of march well closed up could not only more easily force its way through the enemy, but that it was far safer in retreat be- cause occupying so much less space. His opponents had no missile-throwing engines, and could not attack from a distance. So when the pursuing forces reached his rear, he had with his dense column to waste no time in concentrating before he was strong enough to attack ; meanwhile by a slight skir- mishing resistance, or a smart onset with his rear-guard, Xen- ophon enabled the main column and baggage to gain much ground, and could then quickly rejoin it. In well-closed order he reduced to a minimum the danger of flank attack. Across plains Xenophon marched, like Brasidas, in hoUow square, with baggage and non-combatants in the centre, but in passing through the moimtains — a succession of defiles — he changed the formation to one more compact, and always XENOPHON'S NEW DEVICES. 107 kept his rear-guard posted on some convenient eminence to protect the filing by of the phalanx. Before allowing the head of his column to enter a defile, he threw forward his light troops to seize the heights commanding its mouth, and these he held until the column had filed by. On this retreat also was first shown the necessary, if cruel, means of arrest- ing a pursuing enemy by the systematic devastation of the country traversed and the destruction of its villages to deprive him of food and shelter. And Xenophon is moreover the first who established in rear of the phalanx a reserve from which he could at will feed weak parts of his line. This was a superb first conception. Something like reserves had been theretofore known ; but nothing so nearly approaching our modern idea. These things aU seem simple now, but we have been twenty-three centuries learning them, and to-day Xeno- phon's Anabasis is one of the best of military text-books. On this retreat it was first demonstrated how much the Persian empire lacked homogeneity and hence strength. What Xen- ophon actually did showed Alexander what he might, by per- sistent and intelligent activity, even with a meagre force, accomplish. It is impossible to convey an adequate idea of the fertile and ingenious schemes of Xenophon by the mere relation of one or two incidents. But even this brief narrative of ear- lier exploits will serve its end after a fashion, by exhibiting the status of military science when Alexander ascended the throne of Macedon. Very many instances of able tactical battle manoeuvres existed before his day, and one or two affairs of Xenophon 's will give a partial idea of the resources, activity, good judgment and courage of which the Anabasis is fuU. To read Alexander's campaigns in the light of the Anabasis explains many obscure details. The Greeks, about midway on the march, had just emerged, 108 XENOPHON'S GUIDES. after much danger and many wounds, from a defile in the Carducian mountains, tkrougli wMcli they had been obliged to fight their way, and through which the van under Cheiri- sophus had hurried so rapidly that it had left Xenophon al- most in the lurch with the rear-guard, when they saw, as they descended into the valley, another defile in their front, the ''"'T'l'/ '>/■)■'•' ■'"••..-....-••' ' fEIGNESAnACK. 2000MEN % Cr~~^ •. CAMr, MARCHING \i\ Q '; ^■^.^•I't.. Capture of Carducian Defile, 401 B. C. heights commanding which were held by the enemy in force. The Carducians were brave, alert and weU-armed. Their bows were nearly a man's height in length, with arrows over three feet long, To advance seemed a hopeless task; but the native guides, of whom they always had several, informed them that there was no other road across the range. Perhaps there is no greater test of a general's capacity, as there is cer- tainly none of his patience, than to procure suitable guides through an enemy's country, and to decide whether these guides are leading him aright or astray. Xenophon had, in a combat in the defile just passed, captured two Carducians, who, he was convinced, must be more familiar with this par- ticular region than his other guides. He interrogated them, THE DEFILE TURNED. 109 at first separately. The one obstinately denied the existence of any other pass. Xenophon put him to death in the pres- ence of the other. This one then confessed that there was another equally good pass, which, being little known, would probably not be held in force. By means of this pass the position of the barbarians at the main gap could be turned, and it contained but one position which might have to be forced. Towards night Xenophon dispatched two thousand volun- teers to surprise the newly-discovered pass, under conduct of this guide, whom he bound, and who saw reward or death facing him on either hand. A heavy rain then falling tended to conceal this manoeuvre from observation. In order still further to divert attention from it, Xenophon made a feigned attack in the front of the defile held by the enemy, with his main body. The Carducians received him with confidence in their ability to destroy his army. They felt certain that they had him entrapped. One of their means of defense was the rolling down the mountain slope of huge stones upon the Greeks. This they continued to do all night. Xenophon left a small party at this point, with orders to keep up active demonstrations, and retired with the bulk of his force to camp, to allow his men to rest. Meanwhile the two thousand volunteers reached the side pass, and had no great difficulty in driving from it- the small body of barbarians who held it ; and having made their way to the rear of the main pass, at daylight, under cover of the morning mist, they boldly pushed in upon the astonished Carducians. The blare of their many trumpets gave notice of their successful detour to Xenophon, as well as added to the confusion of the .enemy. The main army at once joined in the attack from the valley side, and the Carducians were driven from their stronghold. The army entered the hills through both passes, — Xeno- 110 RIVER CENTRITES. phon through the second one, which the two thousand had forced. The enemy, however, still had a considerable body of troops in the defile, where they successively occupied each commanding eminence ; and at three of these the Greeks were obliged to halt and to assault in regular form in order to force a passage. They were always careful to so attack as to leave the barbarians a means of retreat ; they were not strong enough to risk a battle a outrance. Each captured height was then occupied by a suitable force and held until the long column of troops, baggage, wounded and women (for a large number accompanied the army, as was not unusual in ancient and mediaeval warfare) could file by. In retiring from each position the Carducians were sure to harass the rear of the defenders, who, at intervals, were obliged to face about and drive them away. The enemy kept at the heels of the Greeks every mile of the way. Xenophon was the soul of every encounter, at the front as much as at the rear. On approaching the river Centrites Xenophon found that the satrap of Armenia had occupied its farther bank, while the Carducians were stiU pressing upon his rear. The road on which they were marching crossed the river at a ford, but the water was high and the bottom fuU of rolling and slip- pery stones, so that in crossing the men could not hold their shields in such a manner as to protect themselves from the showers of arrows and darts shot by the Armenians. The attempt was made, but, owing to the large force opposing them, was abandoned. Xenophon with the rear-guard was out, holding the Carducians in cheek. The situation was desperate, and the army passed the night in grave anxiety. But Xenophon, whose spirit was elastic and hopeful, had a dream — or pretended to have it — as of shackles falling from off his hands, and at daybreak bade his comrades not despair. And true enough, early in the morning, some men CROSSING THE RIVER. HI discovered another and better ford higher up the river by about half a mile. To this the army marched. But the Car- ducians, as well as the Armenians on the other bank, followed up the movement. Arrived at the upper ford, Xenophon, who always was the i ARMENlftNS ,„ .-?-'=l="=^ .vJ,'i,T,,-.-- .--'■* ,.'. j'>. UPPER fOBO. CZ) MNOPHONdlEABGUABD.,?'' ,»- ' Crossing of River Centrites, 401 B. c. most daring, discreet and therefore controlling spirit, though only equal in command with the others, arranged to have Cheirisophus pass over first. He kept himself in fighting trim, and with a sufficient body to hold the Carducians in check. In order to relieve Cheirisophus from the opposition of the Armenians on the other bank, Xenophon, with a large body, made a feint to move down again to the lower ford, as if the Greeks were about to give up the attempt to cross at the upper one. The Armenians, fearing lest they should be taken between two fires if Xenophon crossed below, as well as be cut off from the main road, set out in haste for the lower ford, leaving only such a body of troops opposite Cheirisophus as he could readily force. Thus disengaged, Cheirisophus was enabled to cross and gain a foothold on the other shore. Here he drew up his troops in phalangial order, for there was a large body of Armenians on the hiUs somewhat back from 112 DISTANCE MARCHED. the river. Seeing that Cheirisophus had secured a foothold, Xenophon speedily retraced his steps, and made preparations to, follow. The Carducians, now perceiving their opportunity, began to press in upon the Greeks very seriously and in vast num- bers. To meet this attack Xenophon sent word to Cheiriso- phiis to order his archers and slingers to return part way across the ford, and remain in the water where they could cover the crossing. Then, instructing the troops to make their way over as rapidly as possible, he put himself at the head of a few chosen hoplites and advanced out to meet and impose upon the Carducians. These, who were never able to stand the attack of the Greeks, kept at a respectful distance, but used their missiles freely. When nearly all the troops were over, Xenophon, in order to clear his front, sounded the charge, moved upon the Carducians at a run, and dispersed them in terror. Then, before they could recover themselves, he turned about, retired quickly to the river and crossed. The archers and slingers remained to see the heavy-armed well over. After this admirable fashion was conducted the entire re- treat. The army as an army was saved. But out of thirteen thousand Greeks who fought at Cunaxa, only six thousand lived to see the Euxine, and to cry, " The Sea ! The Sea ! " In fourteen months these men had marched upwards of four thousand miles in two hundred and fifteen marches, or about eighteen and a haK miles a day when afoot. The Persians had degenerated. " The empire of the great king is powerful from extent of territory and sum of popida- tion; the great distances and dispersion of forces make it feeble to whomever conducts war with promptitude." " Per- sia," said Xenophon, " belongs to the man who has the cour- age to attack it." No doubt Alexander had read and pon- dered this, remark. ALEXANDER'S PREDECESSOR. 113 Agesilaus. — Alexander the Great had a predecessor in the invasion of Asia. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, in what is called the Sparto-Persian war (b. c. 399-394), went to the assistance of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which had been unjustly oppressed by Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap, for their share in the expedition of the younger Cyrus. Circum- stances prevented Agesilaus from finishing his labors, but he showed the way, conceived the project, and no doubt Alex- ander's own more gigantic imagination benefited by what he did, as his spirit of rivalry urged him on to exceed even Cyrus in his conquests. Eoute of Agesilaus, B. c. 396-394. Agesilaus left Sparta by sea with eighty-three hundred men and six months' victual, and landed at Ephesus. Hav- ing adjusted, with commendable discretion, the troubles of the Greek cities, he apparently prepared to march into Caria, where Tissaphernes had advanced to the plains of the Msean- der to meet him. But Agesilaus had no cavalry, and did not propose to accommodate Tissaphernes with a battle on a 114 RUSE OF AGESILAUS. terrain which was particularly suited to this arm ; and in lieu of advancing to Caria he directed his march into Phry- gia. His manoeuvres here were much to the purpose, but finding that horse was indispensable in a campaign in Asia, he returned to Ephesus for winter quarters, and while here raised and equipped an excellent cavalry brigade. When spring came Tissaphernes made every effort to divine the purpose of Agesilaus. The Spartan king gave out that he should march again into Phrygia. Tissaphernes understood this to be an effort to lead him away from Caria, and re- mained on the Mseander plains, as before. But Agesilaus, having thus misled his adversary, was as good as his word, and advanced toward the Pactolus, where he met and defeated a large body of cavalry. Such methods of misleading an enemy have been most successfully practiced by all great leaders. Tissaphernes followed him to Sardis ; but so frightened were his followers at the successes of Agesilaus that they assassinated the satrap, and paid the Spartan king thirty tal- ents to march out of this satrapy into Phrygia. This he did, devastating the province, and wintering at Dascyllium. Here he made large preparations for a campaign into Persia. But Persian money excited intestine troubles in Greece, and Agesilaus was constrained to march towards home. He chose the overland route which Xerxes had followed. He was obliged to fight his way through Thessaly, and gave signs of great ability by the manner in which he handled his cavalry, to him a new arm, against the Thessalian horse, then the best in Greece. In Thessaly Agesilaus heard of the defeat of the Spartan fleet at Cindus. With consummate prudence, in order to prevent demoralization in his ranks, he announced to his army a brilliant victory. He then attacked the Thebans and their allies, and under the influence of the enthusiasm AGESILAUS AT CORONjEA. 115 QCAMP. ^ CoTODsea, a. c. 394. which prevailed he beat them at Coronsea (b. C. 394). In this battle he showed a marked capacity for tactical direction. When the lines met, Agesilans on the right of the Spartans drove in the enemy's left, while the Theban right defeated Agesilaus' left, and advanced as far as the baggage camp. Agesilaus, so soon as his hands were free, wheeled the wing under his command sharply against the Thebans, and according to Xenophon, who was with him, the most terrific combat known in Greek history then took place. The Thebans, ployed into a square, were able, though with heavy loss, to cut their way through the Spartan ranks and join their defeated comrades ; but they left the battlefield and victory to Agesilaus. The study of these and other campaigns of Agesilaus furnishes excellent matter for the military man. He is selected rather as a type of the best generals of the time than because he was prom- inent beyond aU others. Agesilaus reigned forty-one years, to the glory of Sparta. All his campaigns were noteworthy. EPAMINONDAS. B. C. 371-362. Associated witli one of the most notable tactical manoeuTres — the oblique otder of battle — is the immortal name of Epaminondas. This great soldier originated what all skillful generals have used frequently and to efEeot, and what Frederick the Great showed in its highest perfection at Lenthen. As already observed, armies up to that time had with rare exceptions attacked in parallel order and fought until one or other gave way. At Leuctra Epaminon- das had six thousand men against eleven thousand of the invincible Spartans. The Thebans were dispirited by many failures ; the Lacedsemonians in good heart. The Spartan king was on the right of his army. Epaminondas tried a daring innovation. He saw that if he could break the Spartan right, he would probably drive the enemy from the field. He therefore quadrupled the depth of his own left, making it a heavy column, led it sharply forward, and ordered his centre and right to advance more slowly, so as not seriously to engage. The effect was never doubtful. While the Spartan centre and left was held in place by the threatening attack of the Theban centre and right, as well as by the com- bat of the cavalry between the lines, their right was overpowered and crushed ; having defeated which, Epaminondas wheeled around on the flank of the Spar- tan centre and swept it and the left wing from the field. The genius of a great tactician had prevailed over numbers, prestige and confidence. At Mantinsea, nine years later, Epaminondas practiced the same manoeuvre with equal suc- cess, but himself fell in the hour of victory. This great Theban, above almost all others, has stamped his name upon the military art as one of the world's early tacti- cians. To him is due the invention of a manceuvre to the use of which many generals, and Alexander and Frederick pecul- iarly, owe a number of their victories, — the well-known ob- lique order of battle. Up to his day, as already noted, all battles had been fought in parallel order, or in some variation of the parallel. The " two fair daughters " Epaminondas left behind him were the brilliant victories of Leuctra and Man- tinsea, in both of which he put this manoeuvre into use. FIRST COLUMN OF ATTACK. 117 At Leuetra (b. c. 371) Epaminondas had a force of about six thousand men. By some it is stated as high as eight thou- sand. The Thebans «d„ot««,s were in a dispirited condition. Fortune had not smiled upon them. They lacked seLf-con- fidenee. The Spartan army was about eleven thousand strong, and in the best of heart and discipline, C D C □ D ^ S (5! (^ S IS Battle of Leuetra, c. c. 371. When the armies came into presence of each other, Cleombrotus, the Spartan king, drew up the Lacedaemo- nians in the usual phalangial shape prescribed by generations of usage and success, of twelve men in depth, and with the cavalry in front. He expected, as usual, to fight in parallel order and all along the line. Cleombrotus was not a man of force or originality. His own position, with his chief officers, was at the post of honor, the right. The Spartan idea was to swing round its wings into concave order when the battle should have been engaged, and thus inclose the Theban flanks. The fact that Cleombrotus was on the Spartan right Epami- nondas well knew, and he determined to make up for his numerical weakness by a daring innovation. We do not know whether Epaminondas had long ago thought out this manoeuvre, or whether it was the inspiration of the moment. His phalanx on the right and centre con- sisted probably of eight men in a file. But thirty-two of the files in his left wing he made forty-eight men deep, thus form- ing the first narrow, deep column of attack of which we have any knowledge. On the left of this column and in a line with it marched the Theban Sacred Band under Pelopidas. Here again was a master's conception in thus protecting the 118 AN ECHELONED LINE. weak point of a novel formation. His centre and right were instructed to advance more slowly, and were thus thrown back, refused, so as to make practically an oblique angle with the Spartan line. Like aU inventions, the first oblique order of battle fell far short of its perfect echeloned formation at Leuthen under the masterly tactical dispositions of Frederick. But the conception was there, distinct, unquestioned, and it is probable that the line had a certain echeloned character. The position implies as much. We can scarcely avoid assuming that the refused wing of Epaminondas advanced in a sort of echeloned order. It is stated that at first that entire part of the line which was refused was brought into an oblique position by a short right wheel, while the column on the left advanced straight forward. This would certainly bring the army-front into the proposed position ; but in order to continue its advance towards the enemy the refused line must then march obliquely to the front. It could not strike the enemy effectively when thus advancing, and the natural thing was to allow successive syn- tagmas or mores to move into a line parallel to the enemy before they approached too closely. This would naturally echelon the line. Epaminondas' merit lay not in the details, but in the masterly conception of the effect he could produce by an oblique order. Frederick's attack at Leuthen is cele- brated for the brilliant and precise execution of the oblique order. As with all inventions, the one originated, the other perfected, the idea. But quite apart from the details of the manoeuvres, the main fact remains that for the first time in the history of war an enemy's line was to be struck on one flank by a formation oblique to itself, and by a deep column of attack. {All the effect desired was produced. No amount of tactical nicety could have improved upon what Epaminondas did on SPARTAN LINE BROKEN. 119 this field. His small body of horse was, like the Spartan, in front, but only covering the centre and partly the right. It was less in number, but as soon as the battle opened it at once proved superior to the Spartan horse, and drove this force back in great disorder on the line of battle, in which it created no little confusion. Under cover of this wavering in the Spartan line, Epaminondas pushed forward his column towards the Spartan right, ordering the horse to keep up a hearty skirmishing along their front. The column he led in person, and we can imagine the tremendous momentum with which this compact body of fifty men deep, with their long spears and heavy shields and armor, struck the Spartan line. The fighting was desperate. The Lacedsemonians, surprised at the unusual Theban formation, instead of completing their concave manoeuvre, extended their right to receive Epaminon- das' column. This, if anything, weakened their line at the key-point. But they had not been familiar with defeat, and offered their wonted stubborn resistance. They would not yield. Epaminondas, after heroic efforts, proved too strong for even Spartans. Cleombrotus was killed, together with a num- ber of his lieutenants. The Sacred Band took the confused mass of the Spartan right in flank, and completed its destruc- tion. Meanwhile on the Spartan centre and left there had been little or no fighting. Not ordered forward, because the right could not advance, and not being attacked by the The- ban centre and right, which, thus refused, was practically in reserve, this portion of the Spartan army was at a loss what to do. Finally, when the right had been entirely annihilated, and the Theban column, elate with victory, wheeled and opened an attack upon its flank, it melted away in its uncer- tainty, and the whole Lacedemonian army sought safety in flight to its camp. Only the hoplites of the right and the 120 FORCES AT MANTINjEA. cavalry had been engaged, and yet the pride of generations of victories, the vaunted irresistibility of the Spartan phalanx, had been blown to the winds. The genius of a great tactician had prevailed over numbers, prestige and confidence. Xeno- phon's saying was here well illustrated, — " Especially in war, a surprise may turn into terror, even with the stoutest." MANTINAA ^ 5j ^aito -J .^-t^•■>^■■i■f^'^ Mantinsea, B. c. 362. At Mantinsea Epaminondas put the same brilliant manoeu- vre into practice. On this field the forces were larger, be- tween twenty thousand and thirty thousand men on each side. It is possible that Epaminondas somewhat outnumbered the ADVANCE LEFT IN FRONT. 121 Spartans and allies, but this is not certainly known. His army was at this time in most excellent condition and spir- its, though partly composed of confederates not entirely reliable. The Spartans and allies lay in the valley of Man- tinsea. This valley lies substantially north and south, is about twelve miles long and seven or eight wide in parts, but at the centre it narrows down to about a mile. Opposite this narrow place the Spartans had camped and drawn up their line. Epaminondas was at Tegea at the southern outlet. He proposed to march upon the enemy, who apparently were waiting for him. This time it is quite apparent that Epaminondas had his battle plan as crisply wrought out in his own mind as Fred- erick had his, modeled upon it, at Leuthen. He left Tegea, marching left in front, with his best troops leading and the least reliable in the rear. He marched at first straight to- wards the Spartan camp. The enemy drew up in line to meet him. When within two or three miles, he filed off to the left and skirted the foothills, marching along them as if to get in upon the Spartan right fiank. His purpose was to mislead the enemy as to his intentions. The Spartans stood in line of battle, watching his every movement. The his- tories do not state that they made a right wheel in order to face the new position of Epaminondas, but there can be little doubt that this was what they did. It was the natural thing to do. They expected an attack, and no other theory con- forms with the rest of the relation. One is of^n called on thus to fill a hiatus in the inconsistencies or omissions of the ancient authors. The Theban Sacred Band headed the march. Epaminon- das had the rest of the Thebans and Boeotians, who were behind the Sacred Band in the column and thus formed the left wing, so ranked by lochoi that by a simple file to the 122 EPAMINONDAS' RUSE. right there would be formed on the left of the line the same deep column which had given him the victory at Leuctra. The lochagos or captain remained at the head of his file, and special officers stood in the front rank, each noted for his brav- ery. The rest of the line was marching, so that a simple face to the right, or at all events a very similar manoeuvre, would bring them into the usual phalangial formation. The right flank of the allies was held by the Mantinseans and Arcadians ; the centre by the Lacedaemonians, ^Iseans and Achseans ; the left by the Athenians. Their cavalry was on both wings. Epaminondas proposed to surprise his enemy. It is alto- gether probable that the allies were not aware of just how they had been defeated at Leuctra. It has always taken much time for the average general to grasp the keen devices of the great captain. This is one reason why the success of great captains is so marked. They cannot readily be copied. At all events the allies were not cautious. Epaminondas, having got into the position he purposed to occupy, now put into practice a clever ruse. He ordered his men to ground arms, as if for camping, and took such other steps as con- vinced the enemy that no attack would be made by Epam- inondas on that day. The men in the allied army were allowed to disperse ; and though the semblance of the line of battle was preserved, many of the soldiers took off their armor, and the cavalry unbridled their horses. While this was going on Epaminondas completed his dispositions, still ostensibly going into camp. The ruse was carried out with consummate skill. Opposite the allied horse he placed on his left a body of his own horse, mixed with light infantry to give it stability. Opposite the Athenian cavalry on the other flank he also placed some squadrons. And fearing that the Athenians might fall upon the right and weak flank of his column as he advanced, he stationed a smaU. but chosen force SURPRISE OF THE ALLIES. 123 near his right upon a hill, in such a position that they could take the Athenians in rear if they attempted such a manceu- vre. His heavy column he proposed to drive through the enemy's right as at Leuctra. The rest of the army was ordered, when the signal was given, to advance more slowly, the right last of all ; in other words, in a sort of echelon. Having thus quietly completed his preparations, issued instructions and no doubt encouraged his men by the promise of speedy victory, Epaminondas gave the order quickly to % -\ % ..^^ ,^ . .^ ^' iS^ ^" %::>' •I.- ■c'fe (111(11/' \y- "51- Mantinsea, B. c. 862. take arms. The sight of this unexpected intention to give immediate battle took the allies absolutely by surprise. The battle signals were sounded, the men armed and rushed into their ranks and the line was speedily formed. But it could not have had the firm consistency of that of Epaminondas, so carefully and steadily marshaled by its wonderful leader. It must have lacked the confidence engendered of the cap- tain's cheering words to prepare the men for combat; the strong tension of expected battle. 124 VICTORY. Meanwhile the Theban column bore down upon the allies with intuned paean, serried files and hearts of oak. On its left, formed also in deeper column, charged the horse. This struck the allied cavalry first and bore it back. Immediately after, the remorseless column, headed by the Sacred Band, struck the allied right like the shaft from a catapult. The blow pierced the line, but the stern resistance of the Man- tinsean hoplite was not so quickly overcome. The column, like a ship plowing iato a head-sea, all but reeled in its onward motion. But the soul of the impetus was there. Epaminondas headed the column again, pike in hand, and fiercely led it against the still resisting foe, determined to crush his line. The struggle was sharp but decisive. The deep column of the Thebans pressed . on. The Mantinaeans, in firm opposition, fell in their tracks, but the column still made headway. The Theban centre and right advanced in due order, but found no serious resistance when it reached the allied line. The victory was won, but at a hea-vy price. In the charge headed by the brave Epaminondas, this great captain was wounded by a spear in the breast, of which, shortly after, he died. The victory was less decisive than it would have been had he lived; but it yielded peace with honor. The manner in which the cavalry was used both at Leuctra and Mantinsea to sustain his oblique order shows that Epam- inondas' conception of the value of this arm was clear, as his ability to use it was marked. XI. PHILIP AND MACEDON. B. C. 359-336. The kings of Maoedon had long been vassals of the Great King, but after the Persian wars the country began to approach Greece in its tendencies. The govermnent was not unlike a modern constitutional monarchy. Philip, Alex- ander's father, was a man second only to his son in ability. He found Macedon a small kingdom, and made it the most important and the most thriving state in Hellas. He married Olympias, princess of Epirus, and from her Alexander inherited his imagination and superstitious habit, as from his father his crisp common sense. Alexander was manly and precocious, and when eighteen com- manded the left wing of the Macedonian army at Chseronaea, — the Grecian Waterloo, — where by obstinate charges at the head of the Thessalian horse he destroyed the theretofore invincible Theban Sacred Band. Philip was in con- sequence of this victory elected autocrator of Greece, and made preparations himself to invade Asia ; but he was murdered, and Alexander took up his work, having secured the throne by vigorous and rapid assertion of his rights, and by putting out of the way all possible claimants. Alexander I. of Macedon had been a Persian vassal. But the country had regained its freedom on the final retreat of the Persians (b. C. 478), and thenceforward began to approach Greece in its tendencies rather than the East. This Alexander was called by Pindar the Philhellenic. Archelaus (f B. C. 399) was the next king of note. He did much to raise the country's prosperity by building roads, fostering com- merce, instituting public games like those of Greece, and by copying whatever a more advanced civilization could teach him. He was pronounced by his contemporaries the richest and happiest of men. After Archelaus, the Macedonian throne passed through several kings, there being considerable difficulty in determin- ing their respective rights ; might and popular suffrage being 126 PHILIP OF MACE DON. always factors in the election. Three sons of Amyntas II. (f B. c. 376) successively occupied the throne : Alexander II., Perdiccas III., and Philip II., who is commonly known as Philip of Macedon, and was father of Alexander the Great. Philip had been regent during the minority of his nephew Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III., but the dangerous wars in which Macedonia was involved with the surrounding barha^ rians called him to the throne, or at least gave him the oppor- tunity of ascending it (b. c. 359). Philip of Macedon, thus invested with the crown at the age of twenty-three, was in every sense a worthy progenitor of Alexander the Great. He had, during a three years' life as hostage in Thebes, received the best Greek education and training, and had studied the tactics of Epaminondas, as well as caught, by personal intercourse, the inspiration of this great man's genius for war. He had become thoroughly familiar with the Greek methods, and was intelligent enough to recognize both their strength and weaknesses. He was a strict disciplinarian, but more than a mere martinet. He copied from the army of Cyrus, and profited well by what had been done by Epaminondas and Ipbicrates of Athens, as well as what had been taught him by the experience of his own numberless campaigns ; and by improving on the Greek organization and armament, he introduced and perfected a disciplined and steady body of men such as the world had not yet seen. As the creator of an army organization he has perhaps never had an equal. His most prominent idea was embodied in the Macedonian phalanx. By means of his ad- mirable army, and the aid of able and equally well-trained generals, among whom Parmenio held the chief rank, he sub- jugated Illyria, Pseonia and part of Thrace, captured many towns, and made constant encroachments in the direction of Greece ; seized on the mines of Thrace, from which every ALEXANDER'S MOTHER. 127 year he took considerable money, and showed a clear concep- tion of the role of conqueror. Out of a petty country of un- certain boundaries, Philip created a kingdom extending from the Euxine to the Adriatic. He was constantly at war with Athens. Not the least of his merits is the debt literature owes to his restless pertinacity and greed of power in the Philippics of Demosthenes. Philip married Olympias, daughter of the king of the Mo- lossi. Oljrmpias was of the royal house of Epirus, which claimed descent from Achilles, while Philip traced his lineage to Hercules. Philip had met Olympias at the Samothracian mysteries. She was a woman of a high-strung nature, super- stitious, semi-barbarous in her cast of mind, and is said to have been fond of tame snakes and of magic incantations. She became later in life repulsive to Philip. The night be- fore her marriage it is related that she dreamed that the light- ning fell upon her and kindled in her a mighty fire, which broke forth and consumed everything within reach. Despite . the unintelligent nature of her character, Olympias always retained a large measure of influence over her son. Three lucky things happened to be reported to Philip, who was at the siege of Potidaea, upon the same day : that Alex- ander was born ; that Parmenio had beaten the lUyrians ; that his horses had won the chariot race at the Olympic games. As it happened, the temple of Diana of Ephesus was burned on that day also. It was of Philip's marriage with Olympias that was born Alexander, the third Macedonian king of his name (July, B. C. 356). He was precocious in physique and in intellect, and had so early advanced in manliness that, when he was but sixteen years old, and Philip had left him at PeUa, the capital, as regent while he was absent besieging Byzantium, Alexan- der not only conducted the business of the state discreetly. 128 CH^RONjEA. but put down the revolt of a tribe of the Thraeians and took one of their towns, which he reehristened Alexandria, — the first of a long series so called. Philip had gradually insinuated himself into Greek poli- ties. He got himself elected to the Amphictyonic council, and finally chief of the Amphictyons, Sparta alone dissent- ing. As captain-general of the Greeks he proposed to invade Asia, as his son did later. This claim to universal leadership was, however, demurred to by the Athenians, under the pow^ erful eloquence of Demosthenes, and by the Thebans, both of whom feared Philip's dangerous encroachments in Boeotia. War ensued. The Athenians and Thebans advanced to Chae- ronsea, in Boeotia, fifty thousand strong. Philip met them with thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. SACBfO BAND gSSSSSc PKALANX. THEBANS ATHENIANS LVSlCLES dSSSSSS sssss AUXANOtn AND THESSALIANS ssssss PHILIP AND MAC. HORSt Chseronaea, August, E. c. 338. Chares and Lysicles commanded the combined Athenian- Theban army. The former was ignorant, the latter rash. Philip had brought with him his son Alexander, then a youth of eighteen, and had intrusted him with the command of the left wing, aided by older generals, while he himself com- manded the right. For many hours the event of the battle was doubtful. ALEXANDER'S CHARGES. 129 Philip's horse was defeated early in the day by the vigorous onset of the Athenians. Lysicles rashly ventured to follow up this yet dubious advantage by a pursuit conducted in the visionary belief that victory had thereby been won. But Philip retrieved his loss by the vigorous use of the phalanx. The long spears of the Macedonians bore down everything. The battle was reestablished at this point, and the splendid energy of young Alexander, shown in his determined charges at the head of the Thessalian horse, — in which he proved already that power to use cavalry which was always one of his strongest points, — enabled the Macedonians at this mo- ment to overcome the enemy's right, where in the van of the allied array fought the Theban Sacred Band, so long the right arm of brave Epaminondas. This band of lovers, bound to- gether by oaths of fidelity and ties of personal affection, died to the last man where they stood. Phibp was enabled to break the ranks of the enemy's left, while their right took to flight before enthusiastic Alexander. Sharply advancing his centre at this juncture, Philip completed the defeat. The allies were irretrievably beaten. It was the Grecian Water- loo. The loss of the Athenians was one thousand killed ; of the Thebans an equal number. Placing the lowest estimate on the wounded of eight to one, — twelve to one would be nearer the truth, — the loss in kiUed and wounded was thirty- six per cent. Philip's loss is not given. It has been sug- gested that Philip had designed to try the oblique order by the right, but that the impetuous ardor of Alexander in throwing forward the left, which was intended to be refused, had prevented his carrying out the manoeuvre he had learned from Epaminondas. This assumption, however, rests on but a slender basis. Philip was extremely moderate after this victory to all but the Thebans. He wisely approached the rest of the Greeks 130 ALEXANDER AND PHILIP QUARREL. with an open as well as a strong hand. He had abundant common-sense, and found no difficulty in being elected Hege- mon, or autocrator of Greece. This was immediately pro- claimed at Corinth. The spirit of the victory at Chaeronaea grew by what it fed on. Philip now saw his way clear to Oriental conquests, and sent a large force to Asia, which he intended later to follow in person. His generals, Parmenio and Attains, were already on the ground, fomenting among the Grecian colonies revolt against the Great King. But his preparations were thrown away. Philip did not long enjoy the distinction of autocrator of Greece. His reign came suddenly and lamentably to an end. Philip had married several wives, having repudiated Olym- pias on the allegation of infidelity. Olympias retired to the protection of her brother, the king of Epirus. Alexander sided against Philip. He always clung with respectfid love to his mother, though recognizing her peculiar weakness. Quarrels ensued. At the marriage banquet of Cleopatra, the last wife, a toast was proposed by Attalus, Cleopatra's uncle, with the hope expressed for a speedy and legitimate issue. " Dost thou then call me a bastard ? " quoth Alexander, and hurled a goblet at him. Philip started up in rage, drew his sword and rushed at his son ; but intoxication, wrath and his Chaeronaea wounds rendered him unsteady, and he fell prone. " Here is the man who proposes to cross to Asia, and he can- not cross from one couch to another ! " was the sneering com- ment of his son. Alexander conducted his mother to Epirus and thence went to the court of lUyrium. Attalus was promoted and loaded with honors. Alexander's young friends, among them Har- palus, Nearchus, Erigyius and Laomedon, Ptolemy, son of Lagus, Philotas and others, whom we shall see later among ALEXANDER SEIZES THE THRONE. 131 his celebrated generals, had either been before or were now banished. But a reconciliation was finally brought about be- tween father and son through Demaratus of Corinth, who was bold enough to tax Philip with desiring peace in HeUas and making war in his own family. To conciliate Alexander, the brother of Olympias, Philip gave him his daughter Cleopatra, Alexander's sister, to wife. At this marriage-feast Philip was treacherously murdered (b. C. 336) by Pausanias, in re- venge, it is said, for a grievous personal injury at the hands of Attalus, which Philip had refused to redress ; but the act was no doubt secretly instigated by Olympias. Though often suggested in the modern crusade against Alexander, the crime is in no wise traceable to this prince. Of the known accomplices, the Lyncestian Alexander was the first to salute Alexander, son of Philip, as king. This promptness secured him his pardon ; for by such timely aid our Alexander was enabled to forestall the arts of the parti- sans of the young prince who had been born to Philip and Cleopatra, and to take possession of the throne. At the moment of Philip's murder, Olympias, as if in an- ticipation of the event, was near at hand. The sympathizers of Philip against Alexander naturally held him too to have been cognizant of the conspiracy. Some believed that he could not have been legitimate ; that this alone could account for his father's hate and new marriage. Others were of opin- ion that Philip's young son by Cleopatra should be king. Others again held that Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III., was the rightful heir. But while all these factions argued, Alex- ander acted. The partisans of Cleopatra's son were distant and not alert ; Amyntas was a quiet, unknown lad. Alex- ander had already stamped himself upon the pride of the nation. The people sympathized with his persecution ; the army, proud of the youthful hero, was his to a man. Facts 132 A KING FROM THE START. as well as acts were all in favor of our Alexander. His Lyn- cestian namesake, as before said, saluted Mm king, and he was readily accepted by all but the usual crowd of grumblers and malcontents ; and these speedily subsided or were sup- pressed. For there was in Macedon no rule of succession definite enough to be respected. Attains and Cleopatra and her son, as well as the murderers of Philip, were put to death. This apparent — so-called inexcusable — cruelty was a matter of necessary personal safety with Alexander. That such an act was in the regular course of proceeding in those days ex- plains, if it does not palliate it. Indeed the act was no worse than Macchiavelli advocates in " The Prince," as the duty of a ruler who wishes to secure his throne. Alexander was no worse, he was better than his times ; but there is no claim that he in any sense approached perfection, except as a sol- dier. Amyntas had perhaps a prior right to the throne, had he been in a position to assert it and to do justice to the growth and power of Macedonia ; he also was put to death, ostensibly for conspiring against Alexander. The simple facts, rather than the discussion of the right or wrong of these po- litical executions, — murders, if you will, — concern us here. Though but twenty years old, Alexander was both mature and self-poised. No sooner seated than he proved himself every inch a king. He began by reviewing the army. " Though the name has changed, the king remains," quoth he, and the power, order and aspirations of the king and country were kept intact. Philip had found Macedonia a small state ; he had raised it to be the greatest nation ,of the world, excepting only Per- sia ; and as the centre of civilized power Macedonia was the more important factor in the world's economy. Neither Philip nor Alexander were Greeks. The Mace- donian stood midway, as it were, between the despot-ridden PHILIP'S COURT. 133 Persian and the free and equal Hellene. He was a rugged peasant, owning the land he tilled, and no doubt exercising many rights of local self -government of which we do not hear. But he was Hable to military duty. It is under Philip that we find the condition of the peasantry rising to marked excel- lence, and the fact that the Macedonian army was, in its civil capacity, a sort of popular assembly, shows that the instinct of liberty was supreme. The Macedonian kingdom seems more nearly to approach a constitutional monarchy than any other of the day. All Philip's surroundings had grown step by step with his power. Their dignity may have been sometimes marred by excessive drinking, a habit which was hereditary in the land ; but no part of Greece had so superb or polite a court, such magnificent feasts and games. Except in Athens in the age of Pericles, the world had as yet exhibited nothing which of itself was so complete in intelligent and solid splendor, com- bined with perfectly managed business-methods, as Philip's court and country. Pella is said to have astonished even the Athenian envoys. Looking at his every side, Philip was one of the broadest-minded, strongest and most able monarchs who ever reigned. It is only by his own son, before whose all but superhuman successes everything shrinks into insig- nificance, that Philip is surpassed. Says Theopompus, " Take him for aU in aU, never has Europe borne such a man as the son of Amyntas." XII. PHILIP AND HIS ARMY. B. C. 359-336. AiiEXAKDEB found ready to hand the standing army, unequaled in excel- lence, which his father had created. Philip had seen what he had to encounter and had armed his hopUtes with the sarissa, a pike twenty-one feet long, so that the Grecian phalangite could not reach his line. The Macedonian phalanx was the ideal of shock tactics. Its unit was a lochos or file of sixteen men with its sergeants at the head and rear. Sixteen files made a syntagma or bat- talion of two hundred and fifty-six men under a zenagos or major. This was the fighting unit. Four of these were a, taxis under a strategos or colonel. Sixteen taxes made m simple phalanx of four thousand and ninety-six men. The grand phalanx contained four of the latter, and was carefully officered, much in the style of a modern army-corps. The hoplites were pezetaeri, the sarissa- armed, and hypaspists, a more select body, armed with one-handed pike, sword and shield. Slaves accompanied the phalanx, and carried arms and rations for the heavy troops. Half as many peltasta or light infantry were attached to each phalanx, a quarter as much horse and a quarter as much irregular foot, — psiloi. These numbers varied. A grand phalanx all told had some thirty thousand men. In parade order a man occupied six feet square ; in battle order three feet ; in close order one and a half feet. The phalanx drilled much as we do to-day. Discipline was rigid. The heavy cavalry was Macedonian, Thes- salian and Greek ; there was abundance of light cavalry drawn from barbarian allies. The cavalry unit was an ile of sixteen files of four men each. Eight iles made a hipparchy, under a hipparch, the equal of a strategos. The drill and discipline of the cavalry was perfect. One choice ile of cavalry and one choice taxis of hypaspists were each called the agema, or body-guard of the king. The Macedonian heavy horse (cavalry Companions) was a splendid body, and on it Alexander relied for his stanchest work. The Thessalians stood all but as high. In line of battle the phalanx held the centre ; the cavalry was on the wings ; the light troops in front of the line, or in rear or on the wings as dic- tated by circumstances. The right was the post of honor. Here Alexander took his station with the Companions. The army was capable of making enor- mous marches, and stood unheard-of hardships. Philip and Alexander organ- ized and used batteries of balUstas and catapults, which were, within their limits, as effective as modem artillery, and more easily moved. There is evidence that PHILIP'S SOLDIERS. 135 the quartermaster's and commissary departments were very skillfully organized and managed. The Greek camp was round or elliptical, and picket-duty was regularly performed. There was military music, and insignia were carried in lieu of colors. On the march, which was usually right in front, a van and rear guard and flankers were employed. Minor tactics was highly developed, but battles were wont to be decided by a single shock. One line of battle was usual, but Alexander constantly made use of reserves. Level ground was essential to the phalanx, and therefore always chosen for battle ; but Alex- ander got exceptional work out of his phalanx on any ground. Philip organ- ized a corps of pages, young men of family who lived near the king's person, and learned the profession of arms in camp. This was practically a military school, — a movable West Point. The word of the king was supreme law ; but the Macedonians had apparently the right to demand that they should be consulted with regard to many matters ; and councils of war were common. The heritage of Alexander the Great from his father, Philip of Macedon, was the same which came to Frederick the Great from his father Frederick William, to wit : an army- organized, armed, equipped and disciplined in a better fashion than any which existed at that day. It was Philip who first gave shape to the army, transform- ing what was a mere manhood duty of service, or obligatory militia system, into a standing army, which rose under him to number forty thousand men. This was the first instance in which a free people subordinated itself to a military autoc- racy whose head was the king. It was this which made Macedonia the superior of Greece, which had lost its old ■ habits of personal service, and now depended largely upon mercenary soldiers, or upon volunteer service and substitutes. Personal service, unless coupled with the discipline and methods of a standing force, makes an army of volunteers rather than of regulars. In former days the Greeks had had what came very close to the best discipline attained by a standing army. But the phalanx had gradually lost its cohe- sion. One might compare the Greek troops of the days of Philip to our own volunteers in the early stages of the Civil 136 PHILIP'S IMPROVEMENTS. War, as against troops like the Prussian infantry of our own times. Later in the war many of our American volunteers had been hardened into a perfect equivalent of the best reg- ulars. No doubt the Greek habit of relying on voluntary ser- vice made for true freedom, as our own organization rather than that of the Prussians yields the greatest good to the greatest number ; but as a military machine Macedonia with its standing forces was far ahead of the rest of Greece. When Philip was elected to the throne (b. c. 359) to suc- ceed his brother, Perdiccas III., the Macedonian infantry was composed of raw and ragged material, mostly hide-clad shep- herds, armed with wicker shields and ill-assorted weapons. It was a rabble rather than an army. The cavalry was bet- ter, in fact the best in Greece, where horse had not been much in vogue, and had been drilled to charge in compact order, and with a short thrusting pike as weapon. Still it could not be pronounced satisfactory. Philip saw that cavalry would not suffice ; he must have infantry to meet the solid ranks of the Theban, Athenian and Spartan phalanx. The foot-soldier, with whom he had by his Theban education become familiar, was the one who, under Epaminondas' skillful tactics, had broken the thereto- fore invincible array of the Lacedaemonians. Philip must build up an infantry which could break the Theban forma- tion. The Greek hoplite had been armed with a large oblong ' shield, a sword and a one-handed pike, perhaps six to eight, rarely ten feet long. In close combat he pushed his enemy as well as defended himself with his shield, which was some- times provided with a knob or spike, and used his pike or sword as occasion demanded. Philip invented the sarissa or long two-handed pike, which protruded so far beyond the front rank that the Greek hoplite could not reach his enemy so as to use his shorter weapons ; and by this device he over- THE IDEAL OF SHOCK TACTICS. 137 came the Grecian phalanx. At the battle of Chseronsea the front rank of the Theban hoplites fell to the last man. With his phalanx thus armed, Philip brought Greece to his feet, and enabled his son Alexander to reap from the start the fruit of his wonderful military genius. The army for war was raised : first, from the Macedonian people, as a kernel ; second, from tributary tribes, — Thessa- lians, Thracians, Paeonians, TribaUians, Odryssians, lUyrians and others ; third, from aUied nations, such as the Greeks ; fourth, from mercenary troops, Greeks and others. The Thessalians were really allies ; but they were under a Mace- donian chief, as were also the Greek allies. We have no details as to the formation of the Greek pha- lanx until Thucydides and Xenophon, the latter of whom first describes it with satisfactory accuracy. There was consider- able difference between the phalanx of Xenophon and that of Alexander. In fact, at all periods there were material variations in the formation, arms and drill of the phalanx, but a detailed description of the Macedonian phalanx will suffice to explain that of the other states. To Philip is due the credit of organizing the whole Mace- donian military establishment ; Alexander in no material manner changed what he inherited, but only expanded the system, so as to make room for the introduction of new ele- ments in the East, and to create cadres of sufficient size to treble the strength of the army. He was wise enough to rec- ognize that he could not better the results of his father's wonderful capacity for organization. But he used the army' in a fashion his father had never dreamed of doing. The Spartan and the Athenian phalanxes have already been described in a partial way ; they were superb of their kind ; but the Macedonian phalanx will always remain in history as the ideal of shock tactics. It was numerically 138 THE HOPLITES. * duocMACoa e URAOOS. Lochos, much larger than the Greek phalanx. Its weight can be gauged by a simple comparison. In the French tactics of 1887 about seven men, including reserves, go to every metre of front line. In the Macedonian phalanx, including light troops, twenty-eight men went to about every metre, and close together from front to rear. This depth made its impact in good order irresistible. The unit of the phalanx was a lochos or file of sixteen heavy infantry men, hoplites, whose chief, the lochagos (sergeant), was the front-rank man. The second man was one who received double pay, and the third and last men extra pay for gallantry. The last man, or file -closer, was a sort of second sergeant, called uragos. Each lochos was numbered from right to left. These hoplites were either hypaspists (shield-bearing guards) or pezetaeri (foot- companions) ; the former held the right, or post of honor, of the phalanx, though apt to be used as a separate body and placed in other parts of the line ; the latter, being the ordinary rank and file, had the left of the phalanx. The hypaspists were of a better class, served voluatarily, and the most valorous of their number were the agStna (royal footguards), always imder a noted chief. The rest were called "the other hypaspists," and were organized in bodies of five hundred men, later of one thousand, each under a chiliarch. The hy- paspists were trained for hand-to-hand fight- ing and quick evolutions, and though wearing full suits of armor were more lightly armed than the pezetseri. They car- Hypaspist. THE KING'S GUARDS. 139 ried the one-handed pike (xyston), sword and large shield. They are sometimes called argyraspids, though this name is also given to another body of peltasts. In the early armies what might be called ^^^^]^__^ the aristocracy had served as hetairai, com- ^ ^ panions, comrades-in-arms, already known in the times of Homer. They were the descendants of the few who had clustered about the original conqueror, and were more properly a class bred of wealth ac- quired by ancient service near the court than one of hereditary title ; and in Philip's army included probably many of those families which had been reigning ones in their own uplands until subjugated Xausia. Greek Helmets. by Macedonia. The pezetseri, or '■^foot companions," had originally been the infantry body-guard of the king, but had gradually been expanded into a much more extensive body and had become, under Philip, the ordinary heavy infantry. In similar fashion the word " guard " is in many countries stiU applied to ordinary infantry regi- ments. The pezetseri are said by some authorities to have worn the hereditary kausia, or broad-brimmed felt hat ; but by others the kausia is stated to have been later adopted by the king as a distinguishing Coat of Scale Armor. 140 THE SARISSA. Greaves. headgear. At all events the pezetseri wore in battle a hehnet, a cuirass or breastpiece and greaves or leggings. Little is said about foot-gear. It was probably the usual sandal or boot. They bore a sppar, the sa- rissa, which, according to Polybius, was fourteen cubits, or twenty- one feet, long (the drilling spear being two cubits longer, thus mak- ing the enormous length of twenty- four feet), a shield of such size as to cover the entire person of a kneeling soldier, fixed to hang over the shoulder so as not to monopolize the left arm, and a short, straight, cut-and-thrust sword. The shield was apt to be deco- rated; often with some bird or beast or emblem of the soldier's natal city. The sarissa was held six feet from the butt, which was loaded so as to balance, and thus protruded fifteen feet in front of the soldier. The first five ranks couched their spears, the others held them erect, or else leaned them on the shoulders of the rank before them. Only great individual strength, suppled by constant practice in the gymnasium, and steady drill could render the phalangite able to execute the mancEuvres called for. Some of the best Sarissa Bearer, military critics have doubted the accuracy of Polybius in this particular, and have sought to A feet for cubits ; but there is no good reason to doubt the Sandal. Boots. rea( THE TACTICAL UNIT. 141 fact as stated, particularly in view of the length of spear carried by other nations and of the results attained by the sarissa^armed phalanx. Grote has discussed this point at length. Four of the above- described files, or lo- choi, made a tetrarchia of sixty-four men, a platoon as it were,,with a tetrarch or lieutenant, who also stood in front of the right-hand file. Two tetrarchias made a taxiarchia, or com- pany of one hundred and twenty-eight men, under a taxiarch or captain. This body was sometimes called a taxis. The best men, it will be seen, were in front and in rear and the least reliable in the centre of this company. The rank of sergeants in the front of the com- pany was like the tempered steel edge of the axe. Two taxiarchias or companies made a syn- tagma, or xenagia, or battalion of two hundred and fifty-six men. This was a body sixteen men square, the Macedonian tactical unit ; and its chief, the xenagos, or syntagmatarch (major), had an uragos (there seems some duplication of terms in the name) or second major, whose position was in the rear ; an adjutant ; a color-bearer, who also gave certain orders by raising or lowering the ensign ; a herald, who had other besides the usual work attached to his office, and a trumpeter. These various officers provided an abundant num- ber of file-leaders and file-closers, and each had specific and well-defined duties. Four syntagmas formed a chiliarchia, or a taxis, under a chniarch, or strategos (colonel), making a fofce of one thou- TAXIARCH 4 oooooooo oooooooo oooooooo oooooooo o ooooooo oooooooo oooooooo oooooooo oooooooo o O O O O'O o o Taxiarchia (close order). 142 THE PHALANX. sand and twenty-four men, equivalent to one of our regi- ments. " Taxis," like our own word " division," is a much misused term. It is not SVNTAC MARCH 4 j.^5,^^ 4 Atrumpeter infrequently employed by HERALD* ADJUTANT* the old historians as an 4A6A4464A444A464 equivalent of " detach- ! t ! ! ! t ! t ! * * V * * t ment," of whatever size. *AA44A64 AAA were frequently all but (bAdxbcbAiiidjAiiii 444 destroyed, bixteen syn- &4644*64 .. URAC0S6 chias, constituted a simple Syntagma (open order). phalanx, which WaS thuS made up of four thousand and ninety-six hoplites ; in addition to which there were attached to it a regular complement of cavalry and light troops. It was our modern brigade, so to speak, and was under command of a phalangiarch, or briga- dier-general. There was also a double phalanx (division) 4006 MEN I I 111 I 1 I I I 111 I 1 r1 PEZETCERI. a048MEN. I 1 I I I 1 I I 1 °l I ' "i T '~T~T PEUTASTS. Simple Phalanx. of eight thousand one hundred and ninety-two men, and a " grand " or quadruple phalanx (army-corps) of sixteen thousand three hundred and eighty-four infantry. Each had its peculiar chief, the diphalangiarch and tetraphalangiarch. But these names are rarely used. The term " strategos " cov- ered a multitude of titles ; and Arrian, whose Anabasis is generally followed in this work, like the other historians, gen- THE PELTASTS. 143 erally refers to bodies by the proper name of their command- ers, — a much more convenient term. Slaves, who accompanied the phalanx in great numbers, car- ried the rations, and often arms, of the heavy cavalry and infantry, which weighed from sixty pounds upwards ; though at times these camp followers must have been vastly reduced in number by incidents of the service, as they now and then were by direct orders, in which case the hoplite was remitted to carrying his own arms and ra- tions. Behind this heavy sarissa^ armed infantry (pezetseri) there were ranked, as a rule, half the number of peltasts, in files eight deep, thus occupying the same front space. The reader shall be spared the names of the peltast subdivisions and com- manders. The organization re- sembled that of the phalanx. The peltast was a light in- fantryman, half way between the psilos and the hoplite, originated by Iphicrates of Ath- ens, bearing a small shield (pelte), short pike and sword, and wearing a broad metal belt, which protected the abdom- 144 THE HYPASPISTS. inal region. The hypaspists are sometimes classed as peltasts, but they were more properly an integral part of the phalanx. At all periods there appear to have been differences in the arming and discipline of portions of the light troops, but they remained substantially the same. The peltasts are com- monly called targeteers. The Agrianians, who were among the very best of Alexander's troops, came near to being pel- tasts, though usually classed with the light troops. That part of the hypaspists or shield - bearing guards known as the agema was essentially a corps d' elite, — the infantry body- guard of the king. The hypaspists generally were more available for some services than the pezetseri, Casting a Jayelin with a Twist, q^i^jjjgj. ^^^ handier than these and yet steadier than the bulk of the peltasts or light troops. They were good for attacking and holding heights, forcing fords, supporting cavalry and in important night-watches and attacks. They could do the duty of either grade, as called on. The hypaspists in Alexander's army were under command of Nicanor, son of Parmenio, of whom we shall see more. In front of the taxes of hoplites in a simple phalanx were one thousand and twenty-four psiloi, — slingers, archers or darters (acontists or javelin-throwers), who acted as skirmish- ers. On the wings were, under drill-regulations, two groups of heavy horsemen (cataphracti), with sword and lance, sometimes javelin and battle-axe, and a small round shield, hel- _, , „ , , , „ met, greaves and spurred boots. But Gfreek Sandal and bpur. "^ '■ Alexander varied their position accord- ing to circumstances. The numbers of cavalry and light troops were elastic. THE GRAND PHALANX. 145 The normal strength of the grand phalanx all told was : — ■ Hoplites or heavy infantry 16,384 men Peltasts and psiloi, say 8,192 men Horse, heavy and light 4,096 men 28,672 men Or with officers, etc., about 30,000 men, having all classes of troops. There were other subdivisions of the phalanx, each with its appropriate chief. But like the smaller details of tactics, the minutiae of rank and command do not here concern us. To summarize, the grand phalanx was divided and officered as follows : — Loehos or section of 16 hoplites under a lochagos or sergeant. Tetrarchia or platoon of 64 hoplites under a tetrarch or lieutenant. Taxiarohia or company of 128 hoplites under a taxiaroh or captain. Syntagma or battalion of 266 hoplites under a syntagmataroh or xenagos or major. Taxis or chiUarchia or regiment of 1,024 hoplites under a chiliarch or strategos or colonel. Simple phalanx or brigade of 4,094 hoplites under a phalaugiarch or brigadier-general. Double phalanx or division of 8,192 hoplites under a diphalangiaroh or major-general. Quadruple or grand phalanx or army corps of 16,384 hoplites under a tetraphalangiarch or lieutenant-general. With cavalry and light troops this made an army of 28,672 men under the king or commander-in-chief, or especially thereto commissioned officer, generally one of the somatophylaxes or intimates of the king. It goes without saying that this was only the organization of the phalanx. In the field both numbers and subdivisions were constantly changed by losses or for convenience of hand- ling. And it will be also noticed hereafter that when Alex- ander reached Asia, and incorporated Oriental soldiers into his army, he made changes not .always consistent, as they are narrated, with this technical organization. But Philip's army remained practically unchanged. 146 POSITION OF SARISSAS. In parade or open order each phalangite occupied a space of about six feet square, with sarissa erect. In close or battle Shields in Open Order. Close Order. Synapism. order — the usual field formation — each occupied a space of three feet square, left foot advanced, so that the interval on his left was to a certain extent covered with his shield. The first five ranks advanced their sarissas, the eleven others Syntagma in Perspective. held them erect or leaned them on the shoulders of their file- leaders, in which position they arrested many missiles. The Syntagma in Perspective. front rank sarissas thus protruded fifteen feet; the second rank, twelve feet ; the third, nine feet ; the fourth, six feet ; THE SYNASPISM. 147 feet ; the fifth, three feet beyond the front alignment. With the drill-sarissa of twenty-four feet in length, those of six ranks would protend in front of the alignment. The points were slightly depressed. In defensive order, or to attack in- trenchments, a tortoise, or synaspism, was formed. The men Position of the Sarissas of a. Loclios. stood close together, each occupying but one and a half feet square, the front rank covering their bodies with their shields, the other ranks using them to form a roof over the heads of aU. This synaspism, or tortoise, was so strong that archers and slingers could march over it to shoot their missiles, and we shall see heavy wagons rolling over the formation without harm to the soldiers. To repel an attack the hoplites kneeled on the right knee and leaned the shield against the left knee, the edge on the ground. This was a device of Chabrias, the Athenian. o ? » " ' " I ° o " ° .<>°J°<> » «• OOOooo Sooooo o o o a o o Concave Line. o oo o ; o'=o 'o oO O ° o o "ooo" O O Circle in Drill. "Oo Conyex Line. It is probable that Epaminondas had brought the drill of o o 148 DRILL FORMATIONS. the heavy infantryman to a high state of perfection ; while Iphicrates had done an equal duty by the peltasts. But this was still improved upon by Philip and Alexander. In their drill the Macedonian phalangites were taught to form a circle, small or large, for the same purpose as infantry to-day forms a square ; to advance the wings so as to make a concave line to envelop the enemy's flank; to refuse the wings so as to make a convex line *° resist front and flank foo°fo°lSoo^^f^^f°°oof°o;S«°^°°!^°° ^-ttacks at the same time; to form a wedge Embolon, or Wedge. , , , , , . , or boar s head, which had but three men in the front rank and then gradually widened to thirty-six men in the sixteenth rank, and with eight ranks of an equal number of files as a base; and to form pincers, so-called, to receive and check the wedge formation. This was the exact converse of the wedge, and was a forma- jeOOoOoee OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOODOOOOOOOOOOOO oooooooooooooooooo"" -_.._._. __ QQOOoooooDoooooooo OOOoooOoOOOOOOOOoO---- ooooooooooooooo ooooooooo ooo oooo oo'^Dooop ooooooooa ooooooo OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO oQooooo ooooooooooooooQoo ooooooo ooOQoooo ooqoooooo ooooODooooooooooooo e ooooooooooeooooooo oooooaooooooooo OO Doo ood ocoooooooac- ooo ooVooooooouooooc li o o oooo o o ooo OO 00 ooooc 0004000 ooooc 0OOOOOOOOOOC OOOOO 00 OOoO OOOOOOO ooo ooooooooo OOODOOOO ooooooo ooo Ooo O O O o o OODOOOOOOgOOO ooooooooaooo o o c Koilembolon, or Pincers. tion whose centre was withdrawn in wedge form. A column of any kind more deep than wide was also apt to be called a wedge. SPACE OCCUPIED. 149 The phalanx could wheel and half -wheel to the right and left, or wheel completely to the rear. Countermarches were made by files and by ranks. Ranks were doubled from open order by the even number man of each file stepping into the interval on the left of his file-leader. Ground was taken to the right and o " o o o left on the centre. jEiles were broken <> ° o ° o ■^ _ o o o o in two and the rear half marched into o " ° o O O o the intervals. The men broke by ° o ° ° o ° ■' o o sections to the right and left to take ° o ° o order of march. The infantry was o ° ^ o ° o also drilled in a certain manual of o o o « arms, and in facing and marching to ^ <> o ^ either flank, and to the rear, at differ- ^ ° ° ^ ent paces. There were numbers of s ° o other manoeuvres and formations. „ A lochos was forty-eight feet deep, " " o in common or battle order. When . . , - - Formation -with Broken each one occupied three feet front, ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ a taxiarchia would take up twenty- four feet, a syntagma forty-eight feet front, or say fifty feet. This would give two hundred feet to the chiliarchia or regi- ment, not counting intervals, about which the information is very contradictory. A simple phalanx of infantry, without its cavalry, and placing the psiloi and peltasts in front and rear, would thus cover a front of eight hundred feet, and a grand phalanx three thousand two hundred feet, say three fifths of a mile. Commands were given by the voice, by trumpets, and by signals of a standard, sword or spear. A raised standard meant advance; a lowered standard meant retreat; a lance held erect and still was a demand for parley. There appears to have been a code of signals by smoke, which Polybius says were not at all uncertain. 150 THE CAVALRY. Philip introduced the strictest discipline. Punishments were siimmary. In 338 B. C, two officers of high rank were cashiered for introducing a female lute-player into camp against standing orders. This exclusion of women was not common, however, in ancient armies, nor could it be continued by Alexander when in the East. Alexander employed more cavalry th^ any one up to his day, and handled it better. No one has ever surpassed his cavalry tactics. Epaminondas had but one tenth of his force mounted. Alexander had one sixth to one quarter. This he found essential in order to cope with the great and admirable force of cavalry in the Persian army. For cavalry was the choice arm of the Asiatics, and it was very skillful. The cavalry, as a rule, was composed of Macedonians and Thessalians, who were heavy horse, and Thracians and Mto- lians, who were light horse. Its unit was the lie, or company of sixty-four men, m dmmmmm sixteen files, four deep, which was the QDflOQOOflflflOOOOOO equivalent of the syntagma; eight iles OOOOOOQOQOOOOQOD ^gre a hipparchy, under a hipparch, who e o ixty- our orse j.aji]je,j wii^ a strategos ; two hipparchies (close order). o » j. jr an ephipparchy, the equivalent of the small phalanx ; two ephipparchies a wing, the equivalent of the double phalanx. When sixty-four ile or two wings were 9 aooo oooQBO oooacoooo O O O O O O O ooooooooo ooeoeoO OOOOOOOOOOO OO OOO joooooooooooo i) o o Deep Square. Thracian Wedge. Reverse Wedge. together, they formed an epitagma of four thousand and ninety-six men, which was the allowance for the grand pha- o o o o o o o o o o o o o o « 9 o e e a e THE CAVALRY. 151 lanx. But so much was not always present, nor always kept in one body. This was the technical formation ; but there were exceptions. The iles of Companion cavalry num- " bered up to two hundred and fifty o o o men each, and the chiefs held a pecul- ° ° °^°^ iar rank. The changes in the cav- » o » o o o airy made by Alexander in the East ° „ were also on a different ^ ° "* " ° " *• ° ° basis. The army here llllVollllVo • ■> ° = <■ ° » ° - " " described is Philips °,:n:::o::ol ° ° " " ° ° ° " ° ° army. This Alexander „,,.„„„<, modified without chang- ° ° ° ° ° ° ' ing substantially that Square, o o o o » in it which made it so ° ° " ° efficient. It was a disciplined army, • o and discipline cannot be described in " words ; it is only shown in deeds. Rhomboid with Mixed . . . , n . n i • pjjgg Alexander vastly improved his cav- alry over what was theretofore known. It marched in columns of fours ; it formed a solid square of eight men front to charge in small bodies ; it formed in wedge or triangular bodies, charging ^o apex or base in front as occasion de- o°o°I°I°„ manded ; it charged occasionally in o°o°o°o°o°o°o° rhomboid or lozenge form. This was ° 0° ■>° o° o° o°„°o° ^'l" oooooooQ the Thessalian column, and had the ''o*'o°o°o''o°o'' advantage of facing readily in four ^o^'o^o" o o directions. The cavalry is frequently ° , . . . Square with Mixed Ranks. spoken 01 as charging " squadron by squadron " when fighting superior forces, but the exact tacti- cal meaning of the phrase is not apparent. Perhaps it was an echeloned order. As a rule, the cavalry was on the flanks of the phalanx, to protect these weak points. 152 THE COMPANIONS. Cavalry Companion. The cavalry was of three classes. First came the heavy Macedonian horsemen, each of whom was accompanied by a mounted servant or squire, and originally by two or three slaves, though Philip, and again later Alexander, found it necessary to cut down this number to one. They were volun- teers, the best men of the nation. It was Philip who had formed this body of young nobles, and taken the greatest pride in giving them the highest mili- tary as well as the most enlightened polite education and training. They thus became fit both for command and for statesmanship and diplomatic service. They wore helmet and complete scale-armor, and carried a shield, thrusting-pike and sword. The horse had head-piece and breastplate, also of scale-armor. These were the so-called cavalry hetairai. Companions or brothers-in-arms. The first squadron consti- tuted the royal body-guard. The hetairai were constantly competing under the eye of the king for glory and reputar tion. They were his right hand. No Asiatic cavalry could THE COMPANIONS. 153 ever stand their shock, no infantry resist their onset. Alex- ander's battles were uniformly decided by them. The marches they coidd execute were well exemplified in the pursuit of Darius, when they made three thousand three hundred stades — three hundred and sixty-six miles — in eleven days, under a burning sun, and part way across a desert country without water. The cavalry Companions were under Philotas, the hipparch, son of Parmenio and brother of Nicanor, who com- manded the hypaspists. Eight of these He accompanied Alexander into Asia, severally under Clitus, Glaucias, Aris- ton, Sopohs, Heracleides, Demetrius, Meleager, and Hegelo- chus, each some two hundred or more strong. Clitus' ile was the agema of cavalry, which Alexander was wont to lead in person. There appear to have been sixteen ile in all, from sixteen districts, each varying from one hundred and fifty to two hun- dred and fifty men. The value of this body in action, like Q ODOOQOOQDOQQQOOOOOOQOQOQDOOOOOQOOQQQOQQOOQQtlQOQOOQOOOOQQ OOfiOQDOflflOOOOQQOQflQOOQOOOOOOQOQOQQQDOClQClfiOQOQQQOQOOOODQO QQQQOOOQflOOOOOOOOOOQflDDQflQOOQOOOQOQOQDOQOOQODOOOflQQDQOQO QOQQQOOOQOOOOOflOOflOOOODQOQOOflOOOQDQDOQQOQQOOOQQOOOflOOQDQ lie of Hetairai of 225 Men. the Theban Sacred Band, was, owing to its wonderful martial qualities, out of aU proportion to its limited number. From these " Companions," or from the " Pages," were, as a rule, selected aU the officers for promotion or detail or civil dignities. The Companions also constituted a sort of tribunal for the trial of certain military offenses, as well as a species of council of war. Whether this was confined to the agema, or not, is not known. But the Companions were a strong power in both army and state, as weU as unquestionably the social leaders in the society of the court. 154 THE DRAGOONS. The Thessalian horse was also heavy, and in efficiency ranked all but with the Macedonian. Some of its iles con- tained the aristocrats of Thessaly. Galas, son of Harpalus, commanded this body. Good throughout, the Ue of Pharsa- lus had the most repute. In company with the Thessahans generally fought the Grecian auxiliary cavalry under Philip, son of Menelaus, but as separate corps. Next to the Companions and Thessalians came light cavalry carrying sword and javelin. These were mostly mercenary troops. Later Alexander made a special body of sarissophori or lancers. Just wherein they differed from other pike-carry- ing horsemen, unless that the lance was longer, is not known. Third were the di- machias (two - fash- ioned fighters), hght dragoons, who could engage either on foot or mounted. They had light defensive armor and shields, swords and a lance which they could use for thrust- ing or casting. They opened the combat and pursued the bro- ken enemy. These were a sort of mounted peltast, midway between heavy and irregular cavalry. They seem to have fought much as our own cavalry did in the civil war. Some of the dimachias carried bows. The light cavalry was especially recruited among the allies. Alexander used to mix archers and sometimes targeteers, i. e., peltasts, or sometimes even shield-bearing guards with his Light Horseman. HOW THE CAVALRYMAN RODE. 155 horse. These footmen proved useful in cheeking disorder, and the archers were so active as to be able to keep up with the horse in aU their marches and evolutions. (Ireek Headstall. Greek HeadstaU. The cavalryman had no stirrups, nor were the horses shod. The manner in which the horses got through the long winter and mountain marches proves that their feet were very sound and the animals extremely hardy. The rider sat on a blan- ket held by a circingle. Some of these blankets look like a species of saddle-tree. The drill was largely adapted to give the man the strength of seat which the modern saddle with stirrups lends. Of course he could not stand in his stirrups to cut and thrust as the modern cavalryman does ; and was accordingly somewhat handicapped. But so was the enemy, and the drill made him strong and active. Despite, or perhaps by reason of, these drawbacks, the cav- Rider from Frieze of Parthenon. 156 SPACE OCCUPIED BY PHALANX. alryman had a good seat. There is nothing as perfect in equestrianism as the seat of the riders on the frieze of the Parthenon. There must have been perfect riders or this piece of art could not have been produced. Philip had kept a reserve of veterans, a sort of "Old Guard," the early pezetseri, ready to act at the decisive mo- ment. By some authorities many of the members of the agema which went over to Asia are said to have been veterans of sixty to seventy years. Alexander preferred to use his Companion cavalry as an old guard. This, composed of the sons of the first families of the land, drilled and exercised from their youth up in all the habits of war, always responded to his demand. The agema was more richly and fully armed than the rest, and each individual enjoyed the king's confidence. Alexander's cavalry does not appear to have ridden boot to boot. The men were ranked slightly apart, but nevertheless kept good alignment. Just how much space man and horse occupied in the ranks cannot be given. Usually a cavalry- man occupies ten feet by forty inches. The depth of the ile of four to a file was probably not far from the same as the lochos, say fifty feet. How much front it occupied is not cer- tain. Given six inches between horses, the ile would take INIXIXM tOl^ PSILOt l^-^J-^-J^ 1 1 511 C*VAL«> 409e HOPLIT15 1 1 511 CAVAuRV 104B PtLTASTS «...ft50FT---« * BOO FT- Simple Phalans. up some sixty feet, the hipparchy four hundred and eighty feet. With its full complement of cavalry, one hipparchy on each flank, in say two lines, the simple phalanx would cover something like a quarter of a mile, the seven thousand foot occupying less than two thirds the space ; the one thou- THE LIGHT HORSE. 157 sand horse one third. It was, however, rare that the phalanx was worked in this fashion. The light horse comprised Macedonians, Paeonians under Aristo, and Odryssians, who won great credit for efficiency with Agatho as their leader. The Macedonian lancers were under Amyntas, the Lyncestian. All these were called prodromari, — fighters in front, skirmishers. Finally, there were in Asia numerous bodies of irregular light troops, both foot and horse, slingers, archers and javelin-throwers. These were used much as the Austrians used Pandours in the Seven Years' War, or as the German UManen or the Russian Cossacks are to-day. Of the light foot the Agrianians, who were javelin-throwers from the Mount Hsemus region, under command of Attalus, were the most important and numerous ; and the Thraeian javelin-throwers, Sitalces commanding, were equally useful and steady on all occasions. These were the flankers of the army. Famous archers came from Crete. Clearchus was their commander at the outset ; but the chiefs mentioned were often subject to change on account of death or wounds. The archers thrice lost their chief in battle. There were, to resume, four classes of infantry. First, the pezetseri, or foot companions, who bore the sarissa. Second, the hypaspists, or shield-bearing guards, with sword and xys- ton, or one-handed pike. Third, the peltasts, a well-organ- ized and substantially armed light infantry. Fourth, the psiloi, or irregular lightly-armed foot, archers, slingers and darters. Of cavalry there were, first, the cavalry Companions and the Thessalians and some Greeks, all heavy armed. Sec- ond, the light-cavalry, well-armed mercenary troops. Third, lancers and dimachias, or horse-bowmen. Fourth, irregular nomads, armed in any manner. Light troops had, until Philip's day, been of little use or repute in Greece. They had been raised from the poorer 158 KATE OF PAY. population, and being illy armed and not subjected to much discipline, were never apt to be steady or reliable. It re- mained for Alexander to put them under strict discipline, use them on the service to which they were peculiarly adapted, and thus make their worth apparent. There is nothing definite known as to the rate of pay. Cy- rus paid the hoplites under Clearchus a daric, about four dol- lars, a month. Demosthenes, in the Philippics, refers to the pay of a foot soldier as being ten drachmas ( = two dollars) a month. There was an arrangement between the Athenians and the Argives to pay a drachma of ^gina a day to each horseman, and three oboli for a foot-soldier, twenty-seven and thirteen cents respectively. A man who lost a limb in war received an obol (four cents + ) a day. Sinope and Heraclea offered Xenophon's men one stater of Cyzicus a month. Seu- thes offered them the same sum, which is five dollars and fifty cents. Others offered a daric (four dollars) a month per man. Droysen makes a detailed calculation, suggesting that the monthly pay of the Macedonian horseman was three hun- dred drachmas, about sixty doUars ; of the allied horseman two hundred and fifty drachmas, about fifty dollars ; of the pezetaeri one hundred drachmas, about twenty dollars ; of the light-infantryman eighty-four drachmas, about seventeen dol- lars ; and adds a similar amount to each for rations. From olden time it was the habit among the Greeks to give the soldier a sum equal to his pay for rations. But these sums are manifestly too high. Alexander may have distributed largesses to his men to this extent or more ; but that the reg- ular compensation was anything like so much appears doubt- f iJ. The daric a month seems nearer the truth ; or perhaps Droysen's figures are intended for the annual stipend. When the entire army was drawn up in line of battle, though indeed the order was much varied in the field, accord- THE ARMY IN LINE. 159 ing as the conditions varied, the phalanx occupied the centre, the several taxes or brigades by rote from right to left, under their respective chiefs. It was a precedent that these bri- gades should change their order in line by a certain rule from day to day, or at other short periods. On the right of the phalanx were the hypaspists, the agema holding the right of their line. Again, on the right of these were the eight squad- rons of Macedonian cavalry, changing order in similar fashion from day to day. Then came the light troops, lancers, Pseo- nians, Agrianians and archers, of the right wing, to act as flankers and skirmishers and to cover the right flank as well as to open the attack. On the left of the phalanx, if not on duty to protect the camp, were apt to come the Thracian jav- elin-throwers, in the place corresponding to that of the hypas- pists of the right, farther on the Grecian contingent of horse, then the Thessalian horse, then light troops such as Agatho's Odryssian cavalry. The demarcation between the right and left wings was the junction of the third and fourth brigades of pezetseri. This order was by no means a cut-and-dried rule. Alexan- der was peculiarly happy in tactical formations, and shifted his troops according to the work to be done. In line of bat- tle the phalanx was sometimes divided into right wing, left wing and centre. Each wing was in two sections, with inter- vals through which the skirmishers who opened the combat could retire. But there appear to have, been other intervals in active service. The post of honor of the phalanx was the right. Here the general took his stand, not merely to direct, but to lead the battle as the most valiant of the com- batants. Philip, and after him Alexander, thus greatly improved the organization and discipline of the phalanx, which was based on the Greek model. For the purpose of opposing what it 160 ELAN OF THE CAVALRY. then had to oppose, it was as nearly perfect as possible. It was taught before aU things to attack, never to wait attack. The heavy foot and peltasts were drilled to fight by shocks, and the several bodies or brigades moved independently and with intervals of twenty to forty feet between small phalanxes, mutually supporting each other, and thus making up for the want of reserves. The cavalry especially attacked with ex- traordinary speed and elan, — Alexander was Frederick's model in this, — relying upon impetus just as the phalanx did on weight, and when broken was always able to rally and renew the charge again and again. The light foot and horse had no special place, but filled up the intervals between the heavy bodies and protected detachments and the exposed flanks of the phalanx by restless activity. The marches were conducted with a rare appreciation of terrain and troops, and the distances continuously covered were often enormous. The entire grand phalanx rarely fought as a body, but usually the several sections or divisions fought separately, each being called a phalanx. Occasionally one section was placed by Alexander behind another as reserve, or to deepen the column, A section or sections could be in reserve, faced to the rear, or to right or left, as at Arbela. One of Alex- ander's most prominent qualities was the ability to make quick dispositions suitable to the occasion and quite outside ordinary tactical usage. For instance, on Pelium plain in lUyria, in a narrow and mountainous region, he formed the phalanx one hundred and twenty men deep. Arrian calls this cuneus or wedge. After crossing the Danube Alexander formed square, with archers and slingers in the centre, much as Brasidas and Xenophon had done. No doubt he borrowed the idea ; but what Alexander borrowed he bettered. At Arbela he formed two flying wings with consummate skill and THE CATAPULT. 161 effect. At the Hydaspes he detached a cavalry force about Porus' right flank with equal foresight and results. The artillery of those days was much improved by Philip and later by Alexander, who was the first to construct the machines, and to mount them on wagons in such a manner as to be able to march them in company with the army as our field artillery does to-day. Up to this time these military machines had only been used in sieges. Having them at hand, Alexander made constant use of them at defiles, against field-works, in crossing rivers, and in many sudden emer- gencies. Philip and Alexander consolidated the artillery into batteries, and Philip had one hundred and fifty companies on foot and twenty-five reserve batteries in his arsenals. Catapnlt. The catapult was the invention of the Syrians, according to Pliny. It was a species of huge bow, mounted on a plat- form. The propelling force was usually a twisted cord or gut applied to the arms of the bow. The bowstring was tight- ened by a windlass and released by a spring. The catapult shot huge iron-pointed arrows or pikes weighing from ten to three hundred pounds, which had considerable penetration. It may be called the cannon of the ancients. It was capable of carrying nearly one half mile, and was accurate up to five 162 THE BALLISTA. hundred paces. Some were so arranged as to hurl a flight of leaden bullets instead of an arrow. The ballista originated with the Phoenicians. It threw stones up to fifty pounds weight and over, and was the mortar of the ancients. The missile could be cast about half a mile. The ballista consisted of a stout beam or arm of wood whose CJ' Ballista. one end bore a spoon or bowl in which was held the stone, while the other end was secured in a twisted cord or gut mounted in a timber frame. Being brought backward against the twist to a nearly horizontal position by a windlass, and the stone or other projectile placed in the spoon or bowl, the arm was suddenly released and flew upward with great power. Its motion was suddenly arrested by an upper transverse beam, or by cords fastened to the frame-work. The projectile left the spoon at this point and could be directed with consider- able accuracy. Eed-hot balls and fire-pots were also hurled by the baUista, and sometimes infected corpses were thrown into a city to spread disease. These engines were really very effective ; in some respects as much so as our modem artil- lery. In the hands of Alexander, the Macedonian engines were frequently of as great use as a battery is to-day. In transporting these machines the Macedonians carried only the THE ARMY TRAIN. 163 essential parts, for the heavy timbers could be cut and fitted in any place where trees were accessible. A horse or mule could transport the essentials of one ballista or catapult such as they were when perfected by Alexander's engineers. We know nothing about the baggage or wagon train, but it must have been much what it is to-day, except that pack- animals were more common than wagons. Horses had to have forage and soldiers rations then as now, and we do not hear that Alexander's men carried twenty days' victual, like Caesar's legionaries, on their persons. They had basket-work haversacks, and their rations consisted of salt meat, cheese, olives, onions and corn. At one time there was, according to Philip's orders, a porter for every ten phalangites, and the hetairai or cavalry Companions always had servants. Philip is said to have first taken from the infantry their baggage- wagons and cut down the horseman's servants to one, and he often marched his men with full complement of equipment, baggage and provision, even in summer heat, thirty miles a day as a mere matter of training. Headquarters must neces- sarily have had certain facilities for doing business. That there were provost-marshals we know, and there are one or two references which sound as if there was a regular field- hospital service. All this demanded transportation. The quartermaster's and commissary's as well as engineer departments we read little about. But there is evidence of their wonderful efiiciency in everything which Alexander did. The system was the creation of Philip. Pella, at Philip's accession, was a place of small pretensions. At his death it had become a great capital, whose war department must have been as carefully managed as the best of to-day. Such a military machine was an entire novelty in the then world, as wonderful in that era as to-day Prussia's perfect organiza^ tion would be if it were the only regular army and the rest 164 CAMP AND PICKET DUTY. .■V.K TE Clearcnus comd g . . . • I Cretan archers, ) ' 500 Agrianian aeontists (javelin-men), Attalos comd'g . . 1,000 2,000 Total Infantry 30,000 Add Cavalry 6,200 Total 35,200 It will be noticed that the proportions of the troops are not those set down in the organization details above given. No army in active service corresponds strictly to its technical organization. Alexander took with him what he had left after leaving Macedon secure. No artillery officers are mentioned. The engines no doubt had specially drilled men to work them, but these apparently were not recognized in the specific organization of the army. The same low estimate of artillery officers was apparent in the Middle Ages. The above named were the original commanders. But active service produced many changes. Later in the war, as will be seen by the list of officers, fourteen others are also mentioned as commanding infantry brigades. Commanders of other corps were also often replaced, and the army, largely by Oriental accretions, grew to be one hundred and forty thousand strong in India. The Macedonians, Greeks and allies were generally re- cruited in localities and kept together as much as possible, so as to breed rivalry and a proper esprit de corps. Whether BAGGAGE TRAIN. 227 the Tkracians, Agrianians, Odryssians and PaBonians were all allies, or partly mercenary, is not known. The allies enlisted " for the war," as it were ; the mercenaries for set terms. The aristocrats owed service with their fealty ; the regulars served very long terms. The Greek auxiliaries and mercena- ries were often mixed with the Macedonian troops in actual service — so many lochoi or syntagmas of one to an eq-ual number of the other. We are obliged to draw largely on guess-work for the size of the baggage-train which accompanied Alexander's army. The artillery — it is surely proper so to caU the missUe-throw- ing engines — needed horses, though nothing like the number called for by our guns ; for many of the heavier parts of the engines, the beams, etc., and of the larger missUes, were not transported, but cut on the spot. Ammunition was always readily procured. Still, rations had to be carried, and forage. Phihp had cut down the several slaves a mounted man had been allowed to one. This one was probably also mounted, and if he had to carry forage for his master's as well as his own animal, he would need a pack-horse. This alone would multiply the cavalry contingent by three. Each ten phalan- gites were, at the time of the strictest reduction, allowed one slave, and probably a pack-horse. Headquarters must have considerable transportation. On the whole, the train of the Macedonian army could not have fallen very much short of ours, especially when booty and women were allowed to be carried by the soldiers. Following are such of Alexander's officers as deserve mention, numbering sixty-eight. Changes in some commands were constant. In others one man retained office for years. It is impossible to give an exact list of generals as they stood at any one date. The old authorities vary. But the follow- ing one is as accurate as may be : — 228 ALEXANDER'S OFFICERS. 1. Parmenio, general-in-ohief, under the king, usually commanding the left wing of the army, while Alexander commanded the right. 2-9. The Somatophylaxes, specially trusted officers, always near the king, unless put in command of detachments. They acted as general officers, chiefs of staff or aides-de-camp, and were the king's mili- tary family. They were, according to Arrian, though two or three more are added by other authorities : — 2. Hepheestion, the king's bosom friend, sou of Amyntas, from PeUa. 3. Leonnatus, son of Anteas, from Fella. 4. Lysimachns, son of Agathocles, from Pella. 5. Perdiccas, son of Orontes, who also commanded a brigade of pezetaeri, from Orestis. 6. Aristonus, son of Pisseus, from Pella. 7. Ptolemy, son of Lagus (succeeded Demetrius), from jEordsea. 8. Peithon, son of Crateas, from .Slordsea. 9. Peucestas, later appointed in Carmania, B. c. 325. 10. Philotas, son of Parmenio, commanding the Companion cavalry. 11. Nicanor, son of Parmenio, commanding the hypaspists. 12. Clitus (the "black" one), son of Dropidas, commanding the cavalry 13. Glaucias, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry. 14. Aristo, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry. 15. Sopolis, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry. 16. Heraolides, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry. 17. Demetrius, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry. 18. Meleager, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry. 19. Hegeloohus, commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry. 20. CfEnus, son-in-law of Parmenio, commanding brigade of pezetteri and later agema of cavalry. 21. Amyntas, son of Andromenes, commanding brigade of pezetseri. 22. Meleager, 2d, commanding brigade of pezetseri. 23. Philip, son of Amyntas, commanding brigade of pezetaeri. 24. Craterus, commanding brigade of pezetseri. ?5. Polysperchon succeeded Ptolemy and Craterus in command of brig- ade of pezetseri. 26. Calas, son of Harpalus, commanding Thessalian heavy horse. 27. Philip, 2d, son of Menelaus, commanding Greek heavy horse. 28. PhUip, 3d, son of Machatas, commanding brigade of infantry. ALEXANDER'S OFFICERS. 229 29. Sitalces, commanding Thraeian acontists. 30. Clearchus, commanding Macedonian and Cretan archers and later Greek auxiliaries. 31. Oleander succeeded Clearchus, commanding Macedonian and Cretan archers. 32. Antiochus succeeded Cleander, commanding Macedonian and Cretan archers. 33. Ombrion succeeded Antiochus, commanding Macedonian and Cretan archers. 34. Antiochus, 2d, commanding a brigade of infantry. 35. Attains, commanding Agrianians, later an infantry brigade. 36. Admetus iu temporary command of hypaspists at Tyre. 37. Amyntas, 2d, son of Arrhabseus (the Lyncestian), commanding Mace- donian lancers. 38. Amyntas, 3d, commanding infantry brigade. 39. Aristo, commanding Feeonian light horse. 40. Agatho, Parmenio's brother, commanding Odryssian light horse. 41. Antigonus, son of Philip, a Macedonian, commanding Greek auxiliary phalangites. 42. Balacrus, son of Amyntas, vice Antigonus, commanding Greek auxil- iary phalangites. 43. Balacrus, son of Nicanor, sometimes mentioned as a Somatophylax. 44. Menandrus, son of Nicanor, commanding Greek mercenary phalan- gites. 45. Seleucus, in command of royal pages. 46. Ptolemy, 2d, son of Seleucus, commanding infantry brigade. 47. Sitalces, commanding Thracians. 48. Ptolemy, 3d, son of Philip, temporarily commanding a squadron of Companion cavalry. 49. Philotas, commanding an infantry brigade. 50. Calanus succeeded Balacrus in command of Greek auxiliaries. 61. Alcestas, commanding an infantry brigade. 52. Ptolemy, 4th, commanding an infantry brigade. 63. Gorgias, commanding an infantry brigade. 54. Aristobulus, a minor officer, who wrote a history of Alexander. 55. Clitus (the white one), commanding an infantry brigade. 66. Peithon, 2d, sou of Sosocles, an infantry officer. 57. Peithon, 3d, son of Agenor, commanding an infantry brigade. 68. Neoptolemus, commanding an infantry brigade. 230 ALEXANDER. 59. Antigenes, commanding an infantry brigade. 60. Cassander, commanding an infantry brigade. 61. Alexander, son of Aeropus, the Lyncestian, commanding Thessalian horse, vice Galas. 62. Erigyius, cranmanding Greek allied cavalry. 63. Simmias, commanding infantry brigade. 64. Artabazus, commanding Darius' Greek mercenaries, later with Alex- ander. 65. Nearchus, an infantry officer and later the distinguished admiral. 66. Eumenes, the secretary. 67. Diades, the engineer. 68. Laomedon, provost marshal. Others there were but of lesser importance. Some of the above generals are constantly mentioned in aU accounts of Alexander's campaigns. They usually retained their com- mands, as given, but wounds, death, detail on other service, promotion, and sometimes unbecoming conduct, wrought changes. At the head of these generals, and in a sense which no captain has ever since reached, stood Alexander, the king, the master, the first and in every respect the leader of his army ; its pattern, its hardest worked, most untiring, most energetic, bravest, most splendid member. What he did, and the way in which he did it, roused the emulation of his lieu- tenants to an unexampled pitch. With Alexander it was never " Go ! " but " Come ! " The hardest task he invaria^ bly selected for his own personal performance. The greatest danger he always entered first. Despite his better armor, he could show more wounds than the most reckless of his men. None could vie with him in courage, bodily strength, expert use of arms, or endurance. And in every detail of the ser- vice, from hurling the Agrianian javelin to manoeuvring the phalanx, from the sarissa-drill of the heavy pezetserus to the supreme command of the army, he stood absolutely without MARCH TO HELLESPONT. 231 a peer. In his every word and deed he was easily master ; not from his royal birth, but from his qualities of body, head and heart. Alexander's route lay between the coast and Lake Cereini- tis, via Amphipolis, and passed Abdera and Maroneia. Cross- ing the Hebrus, he continued along the coast, passed the Melas, and pushing down the peninsula, arrived at Sestos, some three hundred and fifty miles from Pella, in twenty ;^^ Pella to Asia Minor. days. This was a rapid march. It is said that the fleet ac- companied the army along the shore, and that they rendez- voused every night. This was the usual habit when army and fleet had the same destination. Parmenio was charged with conveying the cavalry and nearly all the infantry from Sestos to Abydos, for which ser- vice he had the aid of the one hundred and sixty triremes, and of many trading vessels which had already been assem- bled in the Hellespont. This transit was easily accomplished, for there was practically no opposition from the Persians of the Greek mercenaries under Memnon. Alexander himself, with a few of his troops, — the hypaspists and Companions, — is said to have sailed from Elseus, where he offered sacrifices at the tomb of Protesilaus, the first Homeric Greek who per- 232 TROY. ished on the Trojan shore, steered the vessel with his own hand, and landed on Cape Sigemn, not far from the tombs of Ajax, AchiUes, and Patroclus. Having in mid-channel again sacrificed to Poseidon and the Nereids, he was himself the first man to step, in fuU armor, upon the coast of Asia, hav- ing from the bows of his boat first cast his spear as a symbol of conquest upon the land of the Persian foe. Troy was then visited, Alexander heading the chosen troops he had brought with him, and due sacrifices were made to the gods and to the shade of Priam. Especially to Achilles did the king make sacrifice, while Hephaestion, his bosom friend, poured libations to Patroclus. From the temple of Athene, on the heights of Ilium, Alexander took certain arms, said to have been carried by the Homeric heroes, — perhaps even by AchiUes, — leaving his own panoply in their place. These historic arms were thereafter always carried near him in battle by some specially selected brave man. Here also games and feasts were held. The multiplicity of these sacri- fices was in accordance with the customs of the Greeks, and was, moreover, in unison with Alexander's somewhat super- stitious nature. The landing was marked by the erection of altars and memorials, and by the founding of a new Troy. In all such matters Alexander gives us an index to his character. We may better liken him to an Homeric Greek than to an ordinary mortal. Great in love and hate, in com- mon sense and superstition, in generosity and savage rage, he was AchiUes come to life. The -^acidae had indeed a fit rep- resentative in Alexander. But grafted on this heroic charac- ter was aU that Greek inteUigence could lend it ; and this it was which enabled him to grow into the greatest soldier whom perhaps the world has ever seen. The army was here reviewed, and, according to Diodorus, was as follows : — DIODORUS' NUMBERS. 233 Infantry. Macedonian phalanx Allied hoplites, 7,000 ; mercenaries, 5,000 Thracians and lUyrians .... Agrianiau javelin-men and archers . Cavalry. Macedonian heavy, imder Philotas . Thessalian heavy, under Galas Greek mercenary, under Erigyius Thracian and Pseonian light, under Cassander 12,000 12,000 5,000 1,000 30,000 1,500 1,500 600 900 4,500 34,500 These figures vary not materially from those already given. To these must be added some five thousand men already in Asia Minor, the remnant left by Parmenio. But the effective force was speedily reduced by the garrisons left behind in Asia Minor. Head of Alexander. (From the Equestrian Statuette found at Herculaneum.) XIX. BATTLE OF THE GRAKICUS. MAY, B. C. 334. The Persian chiefs were awaiting Alexander on the line of the Granieus. Memnon had advised them to retire and devastate the country behind them. But overweening courage and jealousy of this wise Ehodian made them reject his counsel. Advancing to the river, Alexander found the Persian cavalry drawn up on its banks to dispute his crossing, with the infantry in its rear. The order should have been reversed. Foot could better defend the fords. Of this faulty disposition the king took immediate advantage, and determined on attack. He placed his phalanx in the centre with the Companions on the right and the Thessalians on the left. Parmenio, commanding the left wing, operated independently, and sought to force a crossing below the Persian right ; while Alexander, on the Macedonian right, endeavored to break the Persian array at the main ford. The vehemence of the king's attack on the Persian left ad- vanced the Macedonian right so as to give the line the aspect of an oblique order. It was solely a cavalry battle, in which Alexander had four to one against him. The fighting was stubborn ; splendidly gallant on the Persian side, many princes, nobles, and generals being killed ; bold, pertinacious, heroic on Alexander's. Finally, after great personal risk and true Homeric daring, the king succeeded in forcing a passage opposite the Persian left. The pha- lanx began to follow. Parmenio crossed below and came in on the Persian right. Thus compromised, the Persian cavalry was dispersed. The Persian in- fantry, which had not lifte'd hand, took to flight. The Grreek mercenaries fought for existence, but vrithout avail. The victory was decisive. No army could again oppose Alexander in the open field in Asia Minor. Alexander joined his army at Axlsbe, and next day ad- vanced to Percote. The passes of Mount Ida were found to be defended, and the Persian army lay on the plains of Zeleia. Alexander headed northward along the coast. He could thus turn the Mount Ida positions as weU as seek the enemy. Orders were issued against devastation or injury to the people. Passing Lampsacus, he threw forward as scouts PERSIAN ARMY AND FLEET. 235 a cavalry force consisting of one Ue of Companions and four of lancers, aU under the Lyncestian Amyntas, and sent Pane- gorus with another body of Companion cavalry to take Pri- apus, a town lying at the mouth of the Granicus, in a position to command the plains through which it flowed. The place was readUy surrendered. To the Granions. The Persian fleet was ready at hand, and commanded the -Sgean. The army lay in the plains behind the Granicus. It consisted of twenty thousand cavalry, — Persian, Bactrian, Median, Hyrcanian, Paphlagonian, — and not quite an equal number of Greek mercenaries. The figures of Diodorus, — one hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse, — are unquestionably inaccurate. But the force was ample, if em- ployed with intelligence. The Persians were under a sort of joint command of Spith- ridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, and of Arsites, viceroy of Phrygia in Hellespont, aided by many noted and brave chiefs, 236 MEMNON'S ADVICE. among whom were the Persian Omares, Mithroharzanes, hip- parch of Cappadocia, Arsames, Rheomithres, Petines, Ni- phates, Atizyes, satrap of Greater Phrygia, and others, near relatives of the Great King, and nobles of high degree. The Greek mercenaries were part of the command of Memnon. This was a very respectable force, which, well led, was capable of delaying and embarrassing, if not arresting, the Macedo- nian army. Memnon, though having only a subordinate command, vol- unteered to the Persian officers the very sensible advice to avoid a decisive battle, to retire and to lay waste the country by burning crops, farms and villages, if need be, so as to cut Alexander off from supplies. For Memnon kept his eyes open, had his own sources of information, and knew that Alexander was but scantily provisioned and had little money. He offered to lead a large land force into Macedonia, and suggested that this should be coupled with a naval expedition ; for the fleet was ready at hand. This admirable advice was rejected, the Persian generals being jealously suspicious of Memnon, not only as a Greek, but as a favorite of the king. They were conscious of their own personal bravery, and deemed courage enough to make short work of the invader. Particularly Arsites refused to allow a single house to be burned in his satrapy. It was well for Alexander that Mem- non's opinion was overidden. Having deliberated and agreed that to give immediate battle was the one thing to be done, the Persians advanced, determined to dispute the further pas- sage of Alexander on the line of the Granicus. Instructed that the Persian force was in that vicinity, and always going straight for his objective, Alexander forged ahead with his heavy-armed troops in two columns consisting of right and left wing, the Macedonian cavalry on the right, the Thessalian and Greek on the left flank, the baggage and THE TERRAIN. 237 bulk of the light troops in the rear. Hegelochus with the lancers and some five hundred light troops curtained his front. Not far from the river came galloping back couriers with the news that the Persians had occupied the other bank, and stood there in order of battle. Battle of the Granicns. The Grranicus was fordable in many places ; in others it was deep and rapid. Its farther bank was steep, and it was far from easy to cross in face of opposition. The troops would be obliged to ford the stream in column, and thus not only present a meagre front to the enemy, but also be liable 238 THE PERSIAN POSITION. to be taken in flank by the Persian cavalry. Parmenio advised to camp for the night, — the day being already far spent, — hoping that the sight of such a considerable force would constrain the enemy to retire, and fearing that a first check, which was not improbable under the existing conditions, might produce a bad effect on the morale of the army. But Alexander always believed in the moral effect bred of a bold offensive, and having reconnoitred and ascertained that the disposition of the Persians was faulty, he determined to force the passage at once. This he believed he could do, and pre- ferred the attempt even to a resort to ruse, for he would not have the Persians think that he would for an instant pause at even so considerable an obstacle, and thereby give them con- fidence in their ability to oppose Macedonians. The quality of Alexander's moral courage was always equal to his per- sonal daring. At this his first encounter, it is hard to say that daring, even to the verge of foolhardiness, was not a better policy than prudence. The Persian chiefs had employed their cavalry, which had for generations ranked as the best in existence for attack, to defend the passage of a river which the Greek mercenary in- fantry, with their long spears, could vastly better have held, while the latter, on account of native jealousy of Memnon, had been placed in the rear, where it was distinctly useless, and could only be spectator of the fray. This error Alexan- der had at once recognized. The Macedonian columns were filed right and left into line. Parmenio was placed in com- mand of the left ; Alexander himself took command of the right wing. There was no centre. In the right wing, counting from the right, were first Phi- lotas with the cavalry Companions, sustained by the archers and the Agrianian acontists. To Ptolemy, son of Philip, had that day come by rote the honor of leading the van of the ALEXANDER'S PLAN. 239 heavy horse with, as Arrian says, the ile of Socrates. Amyn- tas, with the lancers, the Pseonians, and one taxis of hypas- pists to give them stability, was thrown out in front on the right. Alexander was behind Ptolemy with the rest of the hetairai. • Nicanor, with the other shield-bearing guards, was on the left of the heavy cavalry ; then came the taxes of Per- diccas, Ccenus, and Amyntas, the infantry officer ; and finally the taxis of Philip, son of Amyntas. Alexander proposed to make a diversion on the Persian left with the light troops under Amyntas ; to have this fol- lowed up by Ptolemy with his squadron of heavy horse ; whUe himself, with seven squadrons of the hetairai, backed up by the phalanx on his left, would deal the heavy blow, advancing on the enemy with the right wing. This operation would throw this wing into an oblique line, left refused. The left wing, under Parmenio, was, if necessary, to act independ- ently. In the latter wing, counting from the left, came the Thessalian cavalry, under Galas ; then the allied Greek cav- alry, under Philip, son of Menelaus, and the Thracian cavalry, under Agatho. Then came the infantry taxes under Craterus and Meleager, which adjoined Philip. The artillery was posted on this flank to throw missiles across the river at the enemy, and thus aid Parmenio, who was to advance also in oblique order, on the Persian right. It is not stated how efficient service the engines may have rendered. In the melee beyond the river they might be equally dangerous to friend or foe. It is the novelty of their use, not their effectiveness, which is of interest in this connection, for engines had until Alexander's day been used exclusively in sieges. The Persians had four to one of Alexander's force of cav- alry. They made no use of their infantry. The battle was almost solely decided by the use of horse. The phalanx merely capped the stroke. The Persian horse was extended 240 THE BATTLE OPENS. in long phalangial order along the bank of the river. Their foot, as stated, was in its rear, on the higher ground which gradually ascended from the water-side. This was a fatal mistake. The heavy infantrymen with their thrusting pikes were peculiarly adapted to defend the crossing, whUe the cav- alry, by attacking the Macedonians after they had crossed and were somewhat in disorder, would be in their very element. The order should have been reversed ; but no doubt excess of gallantry in the Persian chiefs led them to open the first and heaviest fighting in their own persons, as leaders of their choicest cavalry. Memnon, with his sons, and Arsames were on the left with the mass of the cavalry ; the Medes and Bac- trians were on their right ; the Phrygians, Paphlagonians, Hyrcanians and Lydians were under Arsites and Spithridates in the centre ; Rheomithres was on the right. More than forty Persian chiefs of high rank and princes were prominent in the battle. The Persians, so soon as they perceived the Macedonian formation, concentrated the bulk and flower of their horse upon their left, opposite the place where they recognized Alexander, who was always conspicuous in action by his two white plumes, resplendent arms, and commanding presence. And this Macedonian wing, too, was somewhat advanced by the accidents of the ground. While Alexander was mar- shaling his array, the Persians were doing the like. When this was completed, for a brief period both armies stood facing each other in profound silence. The Persians were waiting to take the Macedonians at a disadvantage as they crossed. Alexander was assuring himself that each brigade was in place and ready for action. To do this he rode the hues, and calling on all to show themselves men, he ordered Amyntas, the cavalryman, forward with his lancers, and the Paeonians and hypaspists. Ptolemy followed upon his heels. THE OBLIQUE ORDER. 241 The psean was intoned, the trumpets blared, the war-cry, " Enyalius ! " an Homeric name for Mars, was shouted, and the attack was begun with true Macedonian Slan. In the order given the army entered the fords with the confidence bred of many victories. But they had never yet encountered such foes as the splendid Persian horse. Alexander was leaning his right on Ptolemy and his left on the phalanx. This whole wing, by the advance of the extreme right, was, as stated, thrown into a sort of oblique order, and the right still kept on edging to the right, partly on account of the way the main ford ran, and partly so as to prevent the enemy from outflanking it in that quarter. The left wing, under Parmenio, was operating lower down, so as to fall on the Persian right. The two wings were separated, — not the error then which it now would be. The phalanx of the right wing was to make its way across the ford when the horse under Alexander had opened the way by its vigor- ous onset ; the phalanx of the left to follow Parmenio. The oblique order of the right wing was thus partly in- tentional, partly owing to the greater rapidity of onset of the hetairai and light horse, and the inability of the phalanx to get over the fords as soon as they did. But it was none the less effective. Alexander's excessive ardor, and the fact that he always commanded the right, gives the appearance in all his battles of a premeditated oblique order. But, as will hereafter appear, it was sometimes accidental and due to his own tremendous energy. At the Hydaspes, no doubt, the oblique order was intended. Here it was not so. Many books on the history of war portray Alexander's battles with the troops as regularly echeloned in oblique order as Freder- ick's army at Leuthen ; but the careful comparison of the original authorities by no means sustains this view. The reg- ular order in echelon is of late creation, though Epaminon- 242 A TUSSLE OF HEROES. das certainly originated, and Alexander constantly used, a formation which had the quality and effect of the oblique order in the shape best adapted to the circumstances. It has been discussed above how far Epaminondas' formation at Leuctra or Mantinaea probably approached the echeloned. At the Granicus there could be no such regularity from the very nature of the case. The Persians began the use of weapons by hurling their javelins from the high banks in all directions towards the fords, where Ptolemy, preceded by Amyntas, was struggling through the slippery clay towards the shore. The cavalry fell to, hand to hand. The Persians advanced boldly to the water's edge to force the enemy back. They cast their spears ; the Macedonians used theirs to thrust, and could thus repeat their blows many times with the same weapon. The Macedonian cavalry was much inferior in number ; the men suffered severely from the missiles showered down from the high bank above them, where were posted the best-armed Persian horsemen, commanded and encouraged by renowned and valiant chiefs. The leading Macedonians fought with valor, but they were quickly cut down and the line was driven back. The king, leading the agema of cavalry, came to the rescue with Philotas and the remainder of the Companions, and fiercely attacked that portion of the Persian line where he saw that the flower of the horse and the leaders stood. Holding himself here by efforts worthy of his ancestor Hercides, he enabled squadron after squadron of his cav- alry to essay the crossing under protection of his stanch attack. The fight was unlike the cavalry skirmishing of that day, which was by short and repeated shocks ; it was more like an ancient tussle of heroes, man to man, horse to horse ; each one trying to force the other back by the momentum of weight, as well as by valor and sturdy blows. The Persians ALEXANDER'S WOUNDS. 243 were determined to drive the Macedonians back into the river ; the Macedonians to win a footing on the bank. Hav- ing cast all their javelins, the Orientals fell to with their curved swords. The fighting was furious. The bravest and stoutest bit the dust. The white plumes waved everywhere. " Enyalius ! " resounded above the din. Finally, under the king's magnificent gallantry, the cornel-wood spears of the Macedonians bore down the lighter weapons of the Persians, and the landing of Alexander's immediate command was effected. Alexander ran great personal risk in the combat at this point. He broke his own spear in the conflict, borrowed an- other from a Companion, and slew Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, who was rushing at him with a chosen body formed like a wedge. He received at the same time a blow with a scimitar in the hands of Rhoisakes, brother of Mithridates, which cut away part of his helmet, but he slew the prince with his spear. He was always in the thickest of the fray. Spith- ridates, from behind, rushed upon him with uplifted weapon, and but for the aid of swarthy Clitus, whose" sword severed the Persian's arm, he would not have escaped a grievous wound or death. He was the centre for aU to rally on. Nothing but Alexander's irrepressible courage could have held the Companions to their work. According to Diodorus, he received two body-wounds and one in the head. Having thus pushed his van forward, the rest of the right wing was gradually enabled to cross. The cavalry of the left had forced a passage below, where the opposition was less determined, and was getting in on the Persian right flank. The Macedonians struck at the faces of the foe with their spears, and at their horses. The light-armed troops, mixed with the cavalry, did great execution upon the Persians. The enemy broke first where the king fought in the right wing. 244 LOSSES AT THE GRANICUS. Instantly seizing this opening and pouring into the gap with the Companions, the Persian cavalry was borne back in a body ; a few more doughty blows and it was dispersed. What Asiatic infantry there was decamped at once. The twenty thousand Greek mercenaries, under Omares, alone stood firm. They fought for their reputation as Greeks as well as for their lives. Drawn up in close order, they refused to stir. They begged for quarter, but Alexander refused it. They had been inactively watching a battle they might per- haps have saved, and had no orders which could apply to this unforeseen, incredible result. They fought like Greeks. But they were surrounded by the phalanx ; the cavalry of the right closed in on their left; the Thessalians rode around their right; they were cut to pieces where they stood, two thousand alone being captured. In this last attack, Alexan- der had his horse killed under him. About one thousand Persian horsemen were slain, but a fearful percentage of the chief officers fell, for they had reck- lessly exposed their persons. Among these were the viceroy of Lydia, the governor of Cappadocia, the son, the son-in- law, and the brother-in-law of Darius, and many other princes. On the Macedonian side some twenty-five Companions of the van were killed, and sixty of the other cavalry. Many hun- dreds were wounded. Less than three thousand horse had been engaged on the right. Some thirty footmen were kiUed in the attack on the Greek phalanx. It seems as if this state- ment must be below the truth. The query naturally arises, the latter being well armed, placed where they must fight for their lives, and in the open field, how could the Macedonians slay so many thousands of them with a loss of only thirty infantry? This question is always cropping up in ancient and mediaeval warfare. The only explanation is that the beaten, broken army becomes a mere mob, — demoralized, LOSSES AND RESULTS. 245 panic-stricken, incapable of any resistance, collectively or individually. There was in ancient days no artillery with which to cover the retreat of a beaten force. In this case the Macedonians bore the twenty-one foot sarissa, the Greeks but a twelve-foot pike ; and the cavalry attacked them on both flanks. Look at battles so late as Crecy (1346) and Agin- court (1415). At the former, the English loss is stated to have been one squire, three knights, and very few soldiers ; while the French are said to have lost eleven princes, twenty- eight hundred knights and nobles, and thirty thousand sol- diers. At the latter, the English lost sixteen hundred men to twenty thousand French. The experience of nineteenth cen- tury warfare makes it aU but impossible to comprehend this ; but the numberless examples of history vouch fully for its truth. It has been claimed that Macedonian losses were understated as a matter of braggadocio. But even gross exaggeration will not alter the vast excess of losses by the vanquished, nor would the many enemies of Alexander in Greece have failed to record the truth. There are few things more curious than the comparison of losses in given battles in all ages with their military and po- litical results. At Cunaxa, in the Greek phalanx, not one man was killed, and but one man wounded. At the Granicus there were one hundred and fifteen killed ; at Issus, four hundred and fifty ; at Arbela, five hundred. These three battles de- cided the fate of Persia. At the battle of Megalopolis, how- ever, Antipater, with forty thousand men, defeated Agis, with twenty thousand, the Macedonians losing thirty-five hundred kiUed, and the Spartans fifty-three hundred. Important as the battle was, it is the fierceness of the fighting, especially on the Spartan side, which is the noteworthy fact. We are wont to imagine a greater gallantry in olden times than in our own so-called degenerate days. Courage is said 246 PERCENTAGES OF KILLED. to decline into stoicism when long-range weapons supplant hand-to-hand combat. But it is a question whether the lat- ter in the soldier is not the greater virtue. Since the days when the lines of battle had to close in order to decide the day, troops have been forced to stand, and have stood, far greater decimation. Let us go no farther back than a few brilliant examples in our own day and generation. To take small bodies : — At Balaclava, the Light Brigade, out of 673 men, lost 113 killed, or 16.8 per cent. At Mars la Tour, the 16th Infantry (Westphalian), out of 3,000 men, lost 509 killed, or 16.9 per cent. At Metz, the Garde Sohiitzen, out of 1,000 men, lost 162 killed, or 16.2 per cent. These are the heaviest percentages of killed shown by these two nations within recollection. During our Civil War, each of sixty-sis Union regiments, in some one battle, lost a higher percentage in killed than this. Of these, one lost 28 per cent, in killed ; one, 26 per cent. ; one, 24 per cent. ; four, 23 per cent. ; five, 22 per cent. ; five, 21 per cent. ; seven, 20 -per cent. Or, to take somewhat larger bodies : — At Gettysburg, the First Corps, out of 9,000 men, lost 593 killed, or 6.6 per cent. ; the Second Corps, out of 10,500 men, lost 796 killed, or 7.6 per cent. ; the Third Corps, out of 11,000 men, lost 578 killed, or 6.3 per cent. At Antietara, the Second Corps, out of 15,000 men, lost 883 killed, or 5.9 per cent. At Chickamauga, the Fourteenth Corps, out of 20,000 men, lost 664 killed, or 3.3 per cent. ; McCook's Division, out of 12,500 men, lost 423 killed, or 3.4 per cent. At Stone River, the Twenty-first Corps, out of 13,000 men, lost 650 killed, or 5 per cent. At Gettysburg, Gibbon's Brigade, out of 3,773 men, lost 344 killed, or EXCEPTIONAL LOSSES. 247 9.1 per cent. ; the Iowa Brigade, out of 1,883 men, lost 162 killed, or 8.6 per cent. At the Wilderness, the Vermont Brigade, out of 2,800 men, lost 195 killed, or 7 per cent. Or, to take some large armies of this century : — At Borodino, the French, out of 133,000 men, are reckoned to have lost 4,400 killed, or 3.3 per cent. ; the Russians, out of 132,000 men, are reckoned to have lost 4,500 killed, or 3.4 per cent. At Waterloo, the Allies, out of 72,000 men, are reckoned to have lost 3,600 killed, or 5 per cent. ; the French, out of 80,000 men, are reck- oned to have lost 4,100 killed, or 5 per cent. At Gettysburg, the Federals, out of 82,000 men, actually lost 3,063 killed, or 3.8 per cent. ; the Confederates, out of 60,000 men, actually lost 2,665 killed, or 4.4 per cent. At Gravelotte, the Germans, out of 146,000 men, actually lost 4,449 killed, or 3 per cent. The term " killed " does not include those who die of their wounds. The men, for instance, in the Federal army at Gettysburg, who were killed and died of their wounds (most of them within a week) numbered five thousand two hun- dred and ninety-one men or 6.4 per cent. But to keep the same method of figuring for aU cases, only those killed in the battle are counted, viz. : three thousand and sixty-three. The figures of kiUed at Borodino and Waterloo cannot be vouched for, but they are not far from the truth. The following deductions can be made from the above figures. The larger the force the less the percentage of killed ; principally because a smaller percentage of men can be actually got into fighting contact. In bodies exceeding sixty thousand men, the loss in killed, in a very stubbornly contested battle, may be some four per cent. ; in bodies of from ten thousand to twenty thousand men, five per cent. ; in bodies of from two thousand to five thousand men, seven and a half per cent. ; in regiments of from one thousand to two 248 GREEK VERSUS MODERN LOSSES. thousand men, seventeen per cent. ; in battalions of five hun- dred men, twenty-two per cent. This makes no account of wounds whatever, even mortal ones. These percentages apply only to very stubbornly fought battles. The average battle, even if severe, falls far short of these losses. Among the Greeks only the losses of the victors can fairly be counted. The vanquished were invariably massacred. Should we count both, the Greek losses in killed would be many times those of our battles. But, in an occasional battle of ancient days, the losses in killed, quite apart from the mas- sacre following defeat, were far higher than anything shown in modern warfare. At Megalopolis the Macedonian victors lost nine per cent, in killed, twice the loss at Waterloo, two and a half times that at Gettysburg. In the average Greek battle, the killed were usually fewer than in modern actions. Hand-weapons were less deadly than musket-balls ; and the men wore armor and carried shields, which were a reason- ably good protection against spears, arrows and stones. The wounded were numerous. In Alexander's combats they aver- age ten or twelve to one of killed, often twenty. Nowadays, about seven to one is the ratio. On the basis of killed alone, Alexander's battles were not so deadly as ours ; on the basis of killed and wounded, they were not far from the same. If we take a general casualty-list composed of the kiUed and wounded in celebrated battles, we shall find that Napoleon, in nine battles, lost, in each, about 22 per eent. Frederick, in eight battles, lost, in each, about .... 18^ per cent. The Confederates, in eleven battles, lost, in each, about . 14 per cent. The Unionists, in eleven battles, lost, in each, about . . 13 per cent. The Germans, in eight battles, lost, in each, about . . . 11^ per cent. The English, in four battles, lost, in each, about .... 10 per cent. The Austrians, in nine battles, lost, in each, about ... 10 per cent. The French, in nine battles, lost, in each, about .... 9 per cent. These figures are a good gauge to measure by. HONORS TO THE DEAD. 249 The loss tten, in killed, at the Granicus, of the three thou- sand horse headed by Alexander, was less than three per cent. Cavalry never loses as heavily as infantry ; the organization of mounted troops does not enable them to stand up to dec- imation so weU as foot. The fighting ranks high as a combat of cavalry, and victory was won against vast odds. ' If we esti- mate the wounded at ten to one, the loss was thirty-one per cent., exceptionally high for cavalry, high for any body of men. We shall recur to these statistics often. It is well to bear the percentages in mind. These first Macedonian brave to perish at the Granicus had statues by Lysippus erected in their memory ; they were buried in fuU armor and with the greatest honors, and their families were relieved from taxes and handsomely provided for. The wounded were treated with the highest consideration. Alex- ander personally visited each and listened to the story of his prowess. The Persians and Greek mercenaries were also buried, and plundering was prohibited ; but the Greek pris- oners were sent to Macedonia in chain-gangs, to till the soil, for having, contrary to the decision of the associated cities at Corinth, entered the service of the Persian king and made war on Greeks. Such Thebans as happened to be among them, the king let ofE scot-free. Three hundred panoplies were sent to Athens to be dedicated in the Acropolis with this inscription : " Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedmmonians, present these spoils of the for- eigner inhabiting Asia." Booty was freely distributed to all the soldiers to whet their appetite for more. The battle of the Granicus was courageously but unintel- ligently fought by the Persians, who relied upon courage instead of tactics, and put their infantry to no use what- ever. And yet this infantry was one of the largest and best bodies of foot the Persian army had so far had, and capa- 250 PROSPECTS. ble of doing, if led by a man like Memnon, the very best of work. Galas, son of Harpalus, wbo was familiar with this terri- tory, having been here with Parmenio during the preceding two years, was made satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. His instructions were to make no internal changes, to administer the government with the ancient officials, but subject to Alex- ander's control, and to collect taxes as usual. These now flowed into the Macedonian army-chest. This victory was well calculated to give Alexander a great repute and abundant success in Asia. His personal prowess, the exceptional slaughter of noble Persians, not unlike the fall of heroes in the Iliad, must have impressed itself with wonderful force on the Persian imagination. The moral effect of the victory at the Grranicus, and the loss of so many of the governors and chiefs of this section in that battle, so completely broke up the power of the Persian satraps, that no army thereafter was found to face Alexander in the open field in Asia Minor. The road to the heart of Persia lay open to Alexander. He could march straight on Gordimn and down towards Cilicia. The direct route lay that way. But he clearly saw that this path could not yet be trodden. The Persian fleet was in the -^gean. His advance across the Taurus moun- tains would not be safe till all the cities of the coast were in his possession, so as to neutralize the one power of Persia — her ships — in which he was not prepared to measure arms with her. And he must have control of these cities to pro- tect his own rear and flanks as he advanced. Full of Greeks and democrats, these towns, not unwilling before, stood all the more ready now, after this unexpected triumph, to yield themselves and their treasures and fortunes to the conqueror. And the possession of these towns would have yet another FINAL MEASURES. 251 effect, and one of the most to be desired. It would tend to forestall the far from improbable invasion of Macedonia by the Persians. This was a danger Alexander knew he was constantly running, and one to be delivered from which was equivalent to a second army. To fully complete his victory, the king dispatched Parmenio to reduce Dascylium on the Propontis, the residence of the satrap of Phrygia, a measure necessary properly to protect his rear while he advanced, as he now proposed to do, south- erly along the coast. Bronze Statuette of Alexander. (Found at Heroulaneum in 1751, and thought to be a copy of the statue known to have been made of him by Lysippus after the battle of the Granicua.) XX. SAKDIS, MILETUS, HALICARNASSUS. FALL, B. C. 334. Alexander now marched on Sardis, whose rocky citadel might have kept him indefinitely at bay. Luckily, the commandant concluded to surrender the place, and was handsomely rewarded by the king. Ephesus opened its gates, and many other cities sent deputations tendering submission. AU such places Alexander treated with distinguished generosity, reduced their taxes, made public improrements, and restored ancient laws and customs. Miletus elected to hold out. Alexander seized the island of Lade, commanding its harbor, and by clever management of his small fleet and land forces, neutralized the Per- sian squadron, which attempted to succor the city. Finally Miletus fell, and after an unsuccessful minor sea-fight, the Persians sailed to Samos. Alexander now disbanded his fleet, as he needed the men for land service, and had scarcely funds enough to sustain it. This was, perhaps, a mistake. From Miletus the army moved on Halicamassus, capturing many cities on the way. To this place had retired Memnon and a number of able Grreeks and Persians, determined on stanch defense. The king attempted to capture Myndus, west of the town, as a point of vantage, but failed. He then sat down on the northeast side, and began regular siege-operations. These were long and exhausting ; but flnally Macedonian persistency succeeded, and Halicamassus fell and was destroyed. Memnon and others retired to one of the citadels, and the king left a force behind to besiege this, and provided for the government of the land. Sakdis, the capital of Lydia, was the first city of impor- tance which the programme of Alexander required him to take, and he lost no time in advancing on this ancient resi- dence of CrcEsus. Judging from the modern routes, and the general topography, he marched by the east of Mount Ida ; though some authorities make him retrace his steps by way of IHum. Parmenio had easily taken possession of Dascy- lium, and shortly rejoined his chief. Sardis was noted for its citadel, which, built on an isolated, high and precipitous rock, and surrounded by a triple wall, might have bidden defiance SARDIS SURRENDERED. 253 to almost any force. If held, it might lend efficient aid to the Persian fleet ; and its treasure might again summon an army into existence. Time, at this juncture, was very pre- cious. But when the army came within a short march of Sardis, the terror produced by the recent victory became Granicns to Halicamaesns. manifest. Alexander was met by a deputation headed by Mithrines, the Persian commandant, who, proving recreant to his trust, surrendered the city, the Acropolis and the vast treasure lying therein. Alexander camped on the Hermus, a couple of miles off, and sent Amyntas, son of Andromenes, with his infantry brigade to take possession of the citadel. 254 SARDIS REWARDED. He gave to Mithrines an important place near Hs own person, to show the world how he could reward such signal service rendered to his cause. He had little fear of similar treachery to himself. He granted freedom to the city, and guaranteed its ancient privileges under the old Lydian laws, of which, for two hundred years. It had been deprived by its conquerors. He thus won its good - will, and insured its fidelity. Par- menio's brother, Asandros, was appointed viceroy ; Nicias, col- lector of customs ; and in the citadel was left a garrison of Argives under Pausanias. Both the latter were Companions — probably of the agema. Alexander also laid the corner- stone of a temple to Zeus on the Acropolis. Being the first great city to succumb to his arms, he was anxious to show his friendly animus towards all who should submit without a con- flict. Moreover Sardis was a cross-roads of great importance in Asia Minor. It could not be held too securely, and the king employed both force and favor to strengthen its fealty. From here Alexander detached the rest of the Greek aux- iliaries under Galas, the new viceroy, and Alexander, son of Aeropus, the Lyncestian, who had succeeded Galas in com- mand of the Thessalian horse, on an expedition into the Hel- lespontine region, where Memnon had for some time com- manded for Darius, to work up a friendly feeling for his cause. If expertly done, this would protect his left as he advanced south, as well as hold the great roads running in- land through Gordium towards the Taurus, which by and by he expected to use as he moved farther into Asia. Nicanor, placed in charge of the fleet (no special training was deemed essential for command at sea), was ordered to Lesbos and Miletus to impose upon the coast cities, and thus aid in their eventual capture. It was his appearance which won over Mitylene to the Macedonian cause — a gain of greatest value. The easy success at Sardis was an enviable piece of good DIANA OF THE EPHESIANS. 255 fortune for Alexander. Its citadel might possibly have kept him as long at bay as Tyre did subsequently ; and a delay now, in the moment when his victorious advance was begin- ning to make a marked impression on the susceptible Asiatic mind, would have been a grievous check to his prestige. The king showed his appreciation of these facts in his conduct towards the city. Sardis and the satrapy of Lydia, in addi- tion to many privileges, were held but to pay the same tribute to Alexander which it had been usual to pay to Darius. From Sardis, Alexander marched in four days to Ephesus, the queen of the Ionian cities. This place also opened its gates, and the king broke up the tyrannical oligarchy there regnant, and established in its stead a democratic form of government. Wherever the democratic feeling was strong, there was opposition to Persian tyranny, and Alexander was naturally received with open arms. He here ordered the trib- ute, hitherto payable to Darius, to be contributed to the tem- ple of Diana, and himself paid the highest honors at her shrine, which he commanded to be rebuilt in the most superb manner by his engineer, Denocrates. It will be remembered that this temple was burned on the day of Alexander's birth. His liberal treatment of this city, and especially of its tute- lary divinity, gave to his name immense popularity. It was here that the great painter Apelles lived, and doubt- less the picture by him of Alexander holding thunderbolts in his hand, which is known long to have been an ornament of the temple of Diana, dates from the time of this visit. At this place Alexander also received deputations from Tralles and Magnesia, and from some other Carian cities, tendering submission. Parmenio, with five thousand foot and two hun- dred horse, was sent to Caria to receive the surrenders ; and Antimachus, brother of the Somatophylax Lysimachus, with an equal force, to the JEolic and Ionic cities which were under 256 PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. Persian rule, twenty-four in number. The king's instructions were to overturn the oligarchies in every case, reestablish democratic government, restore the old laws, and remit the tribute paid to Darius, collecting but the ancient smaller con- tributions for his own uses. In every Greek city which he visited, Alexander began some public improvement in commemoration of his setting it free from the Persian yoke. Smyrna had been practically destroyed; its Greek character had been quite lost; Alex- ander began its reconstruction. At ClasomenaB he laid the foundation of a mole, and opened a canal to improve its har- bor. Moneys for these works were easily forthcoming from the superabundant taxes heretofore collected by the Persian king ; Alexander diverted a considerable portion of these to the public good. He thus made firm his hold on the territory he conquered, not only by the best measures for military oc- cupation, but by fostering political good-will in the cities. These are the beginnings of those extensive improvements which prove Alexander to have looked on his conquests as possessions to be benefited, not oppressed ; which show that greed of territory was but one incentive to his restless for- ward march. After sacrificing at the temple of Diana and conducting a procession in her honor, with his army in full parade order and gala-dress, Alexander set out for Miletus. The com- mandant, the Greek Hegistratus, had lately been anxious to surrender, and had so written to the king more than once, no doubt expecting rewards and honor like Mithrines ; but news that the Persian fleet was coming to his rescue changed his determination, and he resolved to hold the place for Darius and to defend its citadel. For Persia had not oppressed Mile- tus, but rather utilized its commercial importance as it had that of PhcEnicia, allowing it to retain its own government, and not a few exceptional privileges. IMPORTANCE OF MILETUS. 257 Miletus was of the utmost consequence to the Persians, if they proposed to hold the Mgeam, now that the season was growing late. It was built on a cape south of, and protected by, the jutting headland of Mycale, fifteen miles distant; Miletus and Environments. while twenty miles seaward lay the island of Samos. Divided into outer and inner towns, the latter surrounded with strong walls and a deep ditch ; with one large harbor on the island of Lade opposite, and three smaller ones formed by islands on the coast, it could both shelter the largest fleet and offer road- ways to vast numbers of merchantmen. More than once in the past history of Asia Minor its possession had determined victory. Alexander with small effort captured the outer city, which, practically defenseless, was quickly evacuated, and set to work to blockade the inner one with a line of circumvallation. His fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, under Meaner, was 258 NAVAL BATTLE DECLINED. fortunate enough to arrive three days before the Persian squadron, and he was enabled to seize the island of Lade, and thus insure by land and sea the complete blockade of the inner city. Alexander sent the Thracians and some four thousand mercenaries to the island to place it in a state of defense beyond danger. He had with him, after his several detachments, some twelve thousand phalangians and hypas- pists, the Agrianians and bowmen, four squadrons of Mace- donian horse and the Thracian light cavalry. Many of Alexander's generals, even cautious old Parmenio, advised Alexander to attack the Persian fleet, consisting of four hundred vessels, which had arrived and now rode at anchor near the headland of Mycale. A naval battle seemed indeed inevitable, and the morale of the Macedonians was high ; and, said Parmenio, it was well to keep up its tension by a constant offensive. But Alexander decided that a pres- ent victory at sea could bring him no advantage commensurate with the risk, while the loss of a naval battle would carry with it a dangerous fall in prestige which might encourage to revolt his enemies in Greece. He declined to make venture of his fortunes on an element where he was not only not so strong as on land, but an element so far not his own. Despite that the Greeks had always defeated the Persians on the water, his ships were not as well manned as those of the Cyprians 'and Phoenicians, and were only one hundred and sixty to four hundred. His intelligence overrode his natural antagonism. He was right, for there were reasons why he could not repose the greatest confidence in the fidelity of his Greek mariners. Parmenio looked at the matter from another standpoint. An eagle had been seen sitting on the rocks near the ships, an omen which Parmenio construed as favorable. So did Alexander. But the king maintained that the eagle being on MILETUS STORMED. 259 land signified that he would be victorious on land and not at aea. And he acted on this interpretation. It seems strange indeed to think of these two generals, men of exceptional ability, intelligence and common sense, disputing over so triv- ial a thing as this. That they should seriously argue such a matter is as curious as the apparent pliancy of the omen. And yet is it more strange than the intellect and acrimony wasted in our day on the quite as trivial question of the damnation of the heathen? The Milesians now sent a deputation to the king, and offered to make their port and city equally open to the Per- sians and Greeks if Alexander would raise the siege. But Alexander rejected their offer with scorn. He came not to Asia, said he, to take a half, but the whole. He determined to assault the walls the next day at daybreak, and dismissed the deputation with a threat so to do. The engines were at once set to work, speedily broke down the wall in several places, and Alexander led his troops to the breach at the time he had set. To prevent the Persian fleet from succoring the town, as well as to forestall the flight of the Milesian mer- cenaries to the ships, Nicanor ranged his galleys across the narrowest part of the harbor, side by side, with beaks towards the enemy. The Macedonians, pressing sharply in through the broken walls, easily drove the garrison from its defense, and slew vast numbers. Many of the Greek mercenaries attempted to escape in skiffs, and even by floating upon their hollow shields, to an island near the city. Of these the great- est number fell into the hands of the fleet, but some succeeded in reaching the island. When Alexander endeavored to cap- ture this place of refuge the next day, approaching it in his triremes with ladders lashed to the prows so as to be able to scale the rocks, this handful of men, three hundred in num- ber, made so brave a resistance that, out of simple admiration 260 PERSIAN FLEET BESIEGED. of their courage, he was fain to offer them a truce on condi- tion of their taking service under himself. He also pardoned the surviving citizens of Miletus, and granted the city its freedom. The other inhabitants were sold as slaves. The Persian fleet daily offered battle to Nicanor, which the latter as often declined. At night they returned to, and anchored near, Mount Mycale, whence they had to send to the Mseander, over ten miles distant, for water. Alexander tried a scheme to drive them from their position without bat- tle. He sent Philotas, with some horse and three brigades of infantry, to occupy their landing-place, and to patrol the shore near by to prevent them from getting their usual supply, as well as keep them from foraging, and thus, as it were, besiege their fleet. The Persians were soon forced to sail for Samos, whence, after they had re victualed, they returned. Having exhausted every effort to bring the Macedonians to battle by parading each day in line at the mouth of the har- bor, they essayed to cut out some of the Greek galleys, while the sailors were ashore gathering fuel and provisions — a daily necessity in olden times — and sent five ships into the road- stead between Lade and the mainland to surprise the fleet un- manned. By thus sailing into the harbor, they believed they might get between the army and the fleet. They came close to being successful in their effort, for the Macedonian ships were nearly all, for the moment, without their crews. Per- ceiving this, Alexander, who happened to be on hand, hastily assembled what sailors were to be found, gave chase to these five galleys with ten of his own which he quickly manned, drove them off, and captured one. The Persians, chagrined by this slight disaster, and seeing no chance of disturbing Alex- ander's hold on the place, decided to leave the vicinity of Miletus. This they soon did, sailing for Samos, and having accomplished no result whatever, despite their superior num- ALEXANDER DISBANDS HIS FLEET. 261 bers and better condition. Alexander's waiting tactics had been efficient to a degree. Alexander now saw that his fleet was no longer of distinct use to him in what he had undertaken to do, and especially so if it must keep to the defensive. It had already accomplished its greatest aim in protecting him in the initial steps. It was no match for that of the Persians in open fight, for the Phoenicians and Cyprians in the Persian service were by long odds the best sailors then known. The king felt that he could better neutralize the enemy's fleet by capturing, and thus ex- cluding them from, the principal seaports, than by provoking a naval engagement; whereas by an unfortunate defeat at sea, which he might suffer at any moment, he would lose much ground difficult to recover. The Persian fleet could in no sense compromise his land operations as it was, though it might give him trouble. His own fleet was expensive, cost- ing fifty talents a month for pay alone and an equal amount for rations, — as much indeed as the army and without mak- ing conquests, as the latter did. His treasure was small, for he could not plunder the cities he had come to befriend, and was in the habit, as we have seen, of collecting only reason- able taxes. He needed for land duty such of the men in the fleet as were available. It took nearly thirty thousand men aU told — sailors, rowers and soldiers — for the one hundred and sixty triremes. He would be able again to assemble a fleet when he could better afford one. He therefore took steps to disband the seamen and lay up the ships, excepting a few transports and the twenty ships Athens had contributed. These latter he preferred to keep in commission as a sort of hostage for their city's good behavior. Diodorus says that Alexander disbanded his fleet to show his army that they had no means of retreat, and must win or perish. But this is a shallow reason. Alexander's men could always fight without bolstering of such a nature. 262 MEMNON. The king then marched along the coast to Halicarnassus, taking, one by one — usually by surrender — the cities from Miletus down, and leaving a garrison in each. It had be- come doubly important to secure every town upon his route. Only by such a land blockade could he drive the Persian fleet from the ^gean. This conception of Alexander's, of forcing the enemy's fleet from the sea by occupying all the coast towns, was as noteworthy as the execution was excellent. It was, on an enormous scale, what he had done at Miletus on a limited one. The towns relied for subsistence upon the inte- rior ; the fleet could do them no harm except by interfering with their commerce ; and the king felt that he could best restore their trade at sea by starving out the Persian fleet. The longer its naval operations were kept up in the .^gean, the longer the trade of these towns would droop ; the sooner he drove the fleet to other waters, the better for his friends. Halicarnassus was the last great Persian stronghold on the ^gean. Here had collected a large force of Persians and Greek auxiliaries, under Memnon, who, after the defeat at the Granicus, imable to save Ephesus and Miletus, had re- tired hither, by a circuit, with some fragments of his army, accompanied by Ephialtes, an Athenian exile, and Oronto- bates. The place was very strong by nature, and Memnon, who had now been appointed governor of Lower Asia and chief admiral of Darius, — for if he could not save what remained, no one else could do so, — having sent his wife and children to the Persian court as voluntary hostages for his truth and fidelity, had added all that art could supply. The mighty walls and a newly-made ditch, exceeding wide and deep, encompassed it upon three sides. On the other, the south side, was the sea. It contained three citadels, — the Acropolis, on the heights of its north side ; the Salmakis, on the southwest corner near the sea, on the neck of the cape STRENGTH OF HALICARNASSUS. 263 which forms the western boundary of the harbor ; the royal citadel, on an island at the entrance of the harbor. The island of Arconnesus had been fortified, and garrisons put in the surrounding towns as outposts to divert Alexander's atten- tion from the city. The city had been provisioned for a long Halicamassns. siege. A number of war ships were in the harbor to hold it against the Macedonians, and to use in procuring supplies, which latter proceeding Alexander could not prevent without a fleet. Meanwhile, the sailors were mostly told off for land duty. Many noted refugees were in the city, among them the Lyncestian Neoptolemus, brother of Arrhabseus, who was 264 MYNDUS. mixed up in the murder of Philip ; Amyntas, son of Antio- chus, who fled from Alexander's anger, though it would seem that his flight was uncalled for ; Thrasybulus and others. A siege of Halicarnassus became necessary. On the day of Alexander's approach, as he was leading his men up to the gate opening towards Mylasa in the northeast, and was still about a thousand paces distant, a sortie was made by the gar- rison, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Macedonians proved too strong for the Halicarnassians, and drove them back into the city. The king then opened his operations with vigor. There was a town on the western extremity of the peniur. sula named Myndus. Alexander thought that if he could take this town, it might materially aid in the siege by fur- nishing him a convenient depot, and accordingly moved a considerable part of his forces — the hypaspists, the cav- alry Companions, the brigades of Amyntas, Perdiccas, and Meleager, and the archers and Agrianians — around Hali- carnassus by the north to that point. In addition to the above purpose, Alexander intended this movement to be a general reconnoissance to ascertain if there might not pos- sibly be a better chance of assault on the Myndus side of the city wall. Some of the Myndians had offered to surren- der the place if he would come under cover of night ; but when he reached the spot his friends had probably been over- powered, and he was received with arms. Angered with this outcome of the affair, though not having brought ladders or engines, Alexander none the less resolved on an offensive ; and in the darkness of night attacked and undermined the walls, and threw down one of the towers. But this did not effect a practicable breach, and the Halicarnassian garrison, informed early next morning of the danger in which Myndus lay, hurried reinforcements by sea to the succor of the place. HALICARNASSUS INVESTED. 265 Alexander was reluctantly compelled to give up the prospect of capturing Myndus, returned to his old location, and again sat down to besiege Halicarnassus. He elected to remain on the northeast side, not having found a more promising position. He first covered his men with pent-houses (tortoises) and filled up the ditch, which was forty-five feet wide and twenty-three deep, in convenient places so that he might advance his towers to override the Siege of Halicarnassus. wall, drive away its defenders, and bring up his battering rams to open a breach. While he was getting the towers in place, the garrison was by no means neglectful. Their en- gineers not only erected on their side a tower one himdred and fifty feet high, from which they could dominate Alex- ander's, but made a night sally to destroy the works so labo- riously constructed by the besiegers. The Macedonians were alert, the outposts were quickly reinforced, and all combined met the attack with vigor ; they repulsed the sortie with a 266 A SORTIE. loss of one hundred and seventy of the enemy killed (Neop- tolemus among them), and sixteen of Alexander's men killed and three hundred wounded. The excessive number of wounds was the result of the surprise, and of the fact that at night the men could not so well protect themselves from the missiles with their shields and the mantelets. Shortly after, an attack was brought about by two of the Macedonian phalangites who, as a matter of braggadocio and rivalry in courage, armed themselves, and went forward, sin- gle-handed, to assault the wall at the point nearest the citadel. A few of the defenders, half in sport, made a sortie upon the reckless couple, who, however, killed and wounded a number of their assailants. This led to others joining the fray from both sides and to a pretty general fight and sortie in force of the garrison. A somewhat similar case occurred in the GaUic War in the land of the Nervii, and is mentioned by Caesar. The sortie was repulsed, and had the assault been regularly planned and followed up, it might have been successful ; for the walls were not well guarded, and two towers on this side (towards Mylasa), with aU the waU between them, had fallen. A third tower had also been undermined, and was ready to fall, but the garrison sustained it by an interior wall or demi- lune. Next day Alexander brought up his engines against this new wall, and the garrison made another sortie in an attempt to destroy them. In this they were partially success- ful, for they managed to set fire to some wicker-work sheds covering the engines and to part of one tower ; but Philotas preserved the rest from injury, and Alexander, leading up his Macedonians in person, drove the enemy back with loss. Still Alexander had to ask a truce to recover his dead, — the only time he ever made this confession of defeat; for this new defense was difficult to approach, inasmuch as from the old wall the garrison could throw their darts upon the rear and flank of any party assaulting the demi-lune. SECOND SORTIE. 267 But the Hallcamassians were none the less in parlous ease. They foresaw a speedy prospect of surrender unless they could fully destroy the besiegers' works, and resolved upon another general and desperate sortie. This was made from two places at one and the same time, the breach, and what was called the triple gate. The former was under charge of Ephialtes, and was so sharp and unexpected that the young Macedonian troops, who were on guard at the demi-lune works, were at first driven in, and it was with some effort that the heavy fire from the towers, and Philip's veterans, under the personal lead of the king, reestablished the matter. Here Ephialtes was killed. The Halicarnassians were well provided with torches and combustibles of all kinds, and came near to accom- plishing their purpose. But they tried to fire the towers and engines at the place where Alexander was himself superin- tending the work, and had, as usual, some of the best troops. They were met fiercely and hustled back. The breach was narrow, and the defeated enemy could not easily make his way through the debris. His loss was heavy. The second party issued from the so-called triple gate, where one of the Ptolemies (not the son of Lagus) was posted. This sortie was also driven back ; and as the Halicarnassians in crowds were retiring over a bridge which they had thrown across the ditch, it broke under the excess of weight, and many fell in, and were there slain. Seeing the rout of their comrades, the garrison shut the gates lest the besiegers should enter pell- mell with them ; and the Macedonians cut to pieces a number who remained outside without weapons, horror-struck and incapable of defense. The city could doubtless have been taken, had not the king ordered the recall to be blown, for he hoped now for surrender, and desired to avoid delivering up the ancient city to plunder. About one thousand of the garrison were killed, and of the Macedonians some forty, in- 268 HALICARNASSUS DESTROYED. eluding one of the Ptolemies, Clearclius, chief of the archers, and many noted Macedonians. The wall of the town was now so far destroyed and weak- ened, and so many of the garrison had been killed or wounded, that Orontobates and Memnon decided to withdraw to the fortress called Salmakis, and to the royal citadel, on an island in the harbor. This they did in the second watch of the night, after setting fire to their big tower and other works, and to the houses near the walls. The fire spread rapidly. The Macedonians speedily moved in, did their best to arrest its progress, and measurably succeeded. Some booty was secured. The city could, however, not well be abandoned to Memnon, and it was essential that Alexander should continue his advance. He deemed it best to raze what was left of Halicarnassus to the ground. Alexander was unable from lack of time personally to carry on a siege of the strongholds to which Orontobates and Memnon had retired, but he left a garrison of three thousand foot and two hundred horse, under another of the Ptolemies, to reduce them and then finish the capture of the remain- ing coast cities. His siege train he sent to Tralles. The po- litical charge of Caria, as vice-regent, he left to Queen Ada, who had once ruled over the land, but had been displaced. She was a woman of strong character and noted virtues, and Alexander paid her singular honors. Her influence had weighed much in bringing the Carian cities to Alexander's side. Garrisons were left in the several cities under Mace- donian officers. Harpalus was placed in receipt of custom. With the fall of Halicarnassus, Alexander could consider the west coast of Asia Minor entirely under his control, and permanently. He had done a good summer's and autumn's work since the battle of the Granicus. XXI. TO THE TAURUS. WINTER, B. C. 334-333. Alexander now headed for the interior of Asia Minor. He divided his army into two columns. The heavy trains and the bulk of the heavy troops were sent under Parmenio towards Gordium by way of Sardis, with orders to winter there. The king retained the lighter part of the army, and marched along the coast to where the Taurus range comes down to the sea. On the way he captured or received in surrender all the important towns. At Phaselis he performed the unheard-of feat of marching his army along the tide-washed bea«h at the foot of Mount Climax, — a matter of cool calculation with the king, but by all others ascribed to the divinity of his character. From Side be turned northward, reducing many places and masking such aa he could not readily take. In the Termessian defile he was fain to resort to a ruse to ob- tain the upper-hand, which he got only then by a hard fight. At Sagalassus he had a still more bitter combat and some loss ; but victory here opened his way to the upland plateau of Asia Minor. Thence he advanced, via Selsense, to Gordium, where Parmenio's column duly reached him, and some recruits from Macedonia, Alexander's plans now pointed towards the interior of Asia Minor. The renewed freedom given to the Greek cities so far captured had placed their allegiance on a basis secure beyond a peradventure. The Macedonian garrisons, holding all the important places of the ^gean coast, rendered the ground already gone over comparatively safe against any in- cursions by the Persian fleet, while the Persian array had practically evacuated Asia Minor. Alexander now rightly es- timated that the thereby weakened means of resistance of the cities of the southern coast, and their lessened hope of aid from either the fleet or the army of their suzerain, would en- able him to make more or less easy capture of them all. And this with but a small part of his forces. But he would need recruits for the next campaign. 270 THE ARMY DIVIDES. It was approaclimg winter. A considerable number of the men in tbe Macedonian army had been newly married before starting from home. The king furloughed these men and sent them back to their homes to stay with their wives till spring, under charge of Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, Coenus, Parmenio's son-in-law, and Meleager, who were also married men. This act added greatly to the good-wiU of his soldiers, and on their return the furloughed men brought with them many comrades. He likewise detailed Oleander to the Pelo- ponnesus to recruit. Alexander then diArided his effectives into two columns. Parmenio with part of the Macedonian and all the Thessalian heavy horse, the Greek auxil- iaries, the siege material and the wagon train, was headed for Sardis, which was to be an interme- diary base as it were, en route to Phrygia. He was to winter here, and, as spring opened, march to Gordium, which was to be the rendezvous of all the forces. Alexan- der had cut out for himself a winter campaign. He never intrusted the dangerous or important work to the hands of others. With the second column, consisting of the rest of the troops, — some Companions, the hypaspists, phalanx, Agria- nians, archers and Thracian prodromoi (dragoons) — in light marching order, he proposed, despite the inclement season and rugged country, to move by way of Lycia and Pamphylia, S'jO'i Halicaniassus to Gordium. A WINTER CAMPAIGN. 271 capture and garrison the coast cities, and thus finish the work of neutralizing the Persian fleet. For without a port on the mainland it must soon leave the ^gean. Thence his route would lie across the mountains through Pisidia into Phrygia, due north to Gordium. The columns separated. Parmenio, whose task was easy, carried out hia programme with discretion, and in due time PHRYGIA Halicarnassns to Gordinm. turned up at Gordium with the troops in excellent discipline and heart. We shall find him there by and by. Alexander started along the coast. Having taken Hyparna, where the Greek mercenaries surrendered the citadel on promise of safe conduct, Alexander invaded Lycia, and captured Telmessus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara, and some thirty other towns. This was the more easy, as Lycia had retained under the Persian king a sort of semi-independence. Of all the cities, Marmara alone defended itself desperately. But naught availed it. When the engines had effected such a breach that all chances 272 LYCIA. were cut off, these brave people organized themselves into a forlorn hope, fired their city and household treasures, and actually made their way by stealth through the Macedonian camp, and escaped to the mountains. With whatsoever pride and admiration we watch our hero's progress, it gives us pleasure to see an occasional act of signal bravery like this one meet with a less bitter than the usual fate. Though the mid-winter season was very unfavorable, Alex- ander pursued his advance — probably up the Xanthus, and marched into Milyas on the headwaters of this river. To him here came embassies from Phaselis and nearly all the coast towns, offering, in token of surrender and greeting, golden crowns and presents, for the news of his liberal treat- ment of those who did not oppose him had preceded him, and acted as an open sesame. These embassies Alexander re- ceived with honor, and bade each accept the regent he should send to represent him. As a rule, in all the important towns which the king cap- tured, or which submitted to his arms, a few Macedonians were left behind as the nucleus of a garrison, 'generally wounded or disabled or invalided men who had earned a right to easier duties than those in the field, but who were stiU able to leaven the lump by their skiU and fidelity. If the town was important or the population hostile, a larger garrison was left ; but even a few Macedonians, under a good chief, in possession of the citadel of a town, could hold their own with the aid of the mercenaries, with whom they increased their force up to a figure sufficiently high. From Milyas Alexander proceeded to Phaselis, perhaps the most important of those cities which had surrendered to him. It lay at the foot of Mount Climax, and possessed three fine harbors and an ample roadway. It was powerful and wealthy. From Phaselis there ran over the mountain ranges the prin- A TRAITOR. 273 cipal road Into the interior, leading direct to Perge. On this road a Pisidian tribe had biiilt a fortress, from which they made frequent descents on Phaselian territory to gather booty. Alexander at once came to the rescue of his new subjects, and lent them armed assistance in reducing this den of robbers, for it was little more. Moreover as he must use the road himself, it was essential that it should be opened. In Phaselis the king spent the rest of the winter. He was weU pleased with his prosperous campaign, and indulged in feasts and games. His enjoyment of such occasions was keen. No man ever worked harder when at work ; his pe- riods of relaxation, comparatively rare, sometimes partook of the same exuberance of strength. It is related that on one occasion here he headed a procession through the streets after a feast, and decorated with wreaths the statue of the poet Theodectes, who had once been at Philip's court, and left a savory reputation. Nearchus of Amphipolis, a Cretan, whose affiliations made him acceptable to the population, was made satrap of Lycia. It was here that occurred the unfortunate treason of the Lyncestian Alexander. This man, we remember, had been implicated in the murder of Philip, but had been pardoned for being the first to salute Alexander as king, and had been rewarded with honors and brilliant commands. When, how- ever, Amyntas had fled from Macedonia to Darius, this Alex- ander, fearing lest his pardon should not be lasting, had made overtures through Amyntas to the Persian king. He was not of those who believed in Alexander's star, Darius, under another pretext, dispatched a messenger to convey his an- swer, which was to the effect that if this Alexander would kiU the king, he himself should be king of Macedon, and should receive one thousand talents of gold ($1,250,000) as a present. The messenger was captured by Parmenio, and 274 THE PAMPHYLIAN LADDERS. compelled to reveal the plot. The Lyncestian Alexander, was at the time commander of the Thessalian horse, a position second to none in the army, and was also one of the Compan- ions. To this body the king confided the facts. The Com- panions had long mistrusted the man, and feared that the king's confidence was misplaced. The traitor, who was with Parmenio at Sardis, was deprived of his rank and ordered under guard. The Companions would have sentenced him to death ; but the king stiU strove to spare him despite his treachery ; he never forgot a benefit. This Alexander was eventually executed three years later on the occasion of the conspiracy of Philotas. When the weather became more auspicious, Alexander moved from Phaselis, sending a part of his light troops over the mountain road, which he had caused to be repaired by the Thracians after he had driven the robber tribe from its all but inaccessible fastnesses, to Perge. This was stragetically the most important town of this part of the country, because the key to the passage of the mountains on the north. The king himself, with the cavalry Companions and phalanx, marched along the seashore. This march was a very risky one to make. A narrow beach, shut in between Mount Climax, which rose in bold outlines to the height of seven thousand feet, and the sea, was generally covered by water a number of feet deep, or by marshes, for a distance of many miles. Only at those very rare intervals, when the north wind, blowing with unusual violence, beat back the tides, could the beach be used at all, and this but for a few hours at a time. The idea of marching an army along this beach was almost as bold as the conception of Hannibal's march through the Arnus swamps, though not undertaken with the crisp strategic purpose of the latter. StiU, if it could be done, Alexander might surprise the position of Perge, whose inhab- ALEXANDER'S LUCK. 275 itants would not expect him from this direction, and the moral effect of such a march would not be inconsiderable. It happened with Alexander's usual good fortune that about the time when to make this march would be desirable, the ele- ments conspired in his favor, and the periodical north wind blew with exceptional fury. That luck attended him cannot be gainsaid, but Alexander deserves none the less credit for seizing the proper moment to enable him to secure a prosper- ous passage of this treacherous route. In places the troops waded to the middle, but the transit was safely accomplished. His success gave stiU further voice to the superstitious notion that Alexander was imder the direct favor of the gods. The whole expedition was no doubt well calculated by Alexander in all its details, and what generally was a most hazardous feat may have been at that time a safe one. Not a man was lost, but his soldiers, gazing back on their perilous passage for miles through the waves of the sea at the foot of a per- pendicular rock, shuddered indeed, but all the more gained confidence in their king, and gloried in his skill and courage, as they did in his youth and beauty. WhUe the wonderful good luck which always followed this great conqueror was a marked factor in his success, it must not be forgotten that at his headquarters the king always had the very best scientific and professional talent ; that he was indefatigable in studying up the questions which bore upon every step he took ; and that what often appears to be crass luck was the result of close calcidation. Moreover, Alexander never gave Fortune a chance to desert him ; whenever she stood ready to help him, he always helped himself. The Peripatetic, KaUisthenes, who accompanied the king's headquarters, and first wrote a history of his campaigns, related the march with his usual unction, and claimed that the sea was fain to bow to the power of this godlike youth. But Alexander simply wrote home 276 ALEXANDER'S STUBBORNNESS. that " lie had made a path along the Pamphylian Ladders, and had marched over it." Perge, which was the key to the mountain passes, north and west, surrendered ; whether on account of this march or not, does not appear. The town of Aspendus was willing to do the like, but demurred at admitting a garrison ; and Alex- ander agreed to accept, in lieu thereof, a tribute from this city of fifty talents — pay for his army — and certain horses which it had been in the habit of rearing annually for Darius. Thence he marched to Side, and here he put the usual garri- son. The city was the last place of importance on the hither side of the Taurus, and was situated near the point where the range comes to an abrupt end on the seashore. Alexander could now turn safely northward, and subdue the interior provinces ; for he had under his control practi- cally the entire coast line of Asia Minor. There were but a few isolated and not important points left behind in a state of blockade. He was preparing to besiege SyUium, a place about five miles from the sea between Aspendus and Side, when news reached him from Aspendus that the promised tribute had been denied. SyUium was an exceptionally strong place, and was held by Greek mercenaries in Persian pay, — men of a different stamp to the ordinary Asiatic soldier ; so that Alexander deemed it wise to turn from this fortress for the moment, and march back upon Aspendus. The king was fond of hard tasks for their own sake. He was obstinate to a degree in his resolution ; but he had a strong enough grasp of his general problem not to allow this natural antag- onism to lead him astray. There was method in his stub- bornness. There can scarcely be pointed out an occasion when it misled him. And on this occasion he concluded that he would not waste time in besieging SyUium, but made ar- rangements to observe it instead. ALEXANDER'S DIRECTNESS. 277 Aspendus was built mainly upon a very high rock, at the foot of which ran the Eurymedon ; but a part of the inhab- itants lived in a village which nestled at its foot, and was pro- tected by a wall. This the citizens deserted on the approach of the Macedonian army, and the empty houses afforded Alexander an opportunity to quarter his army to good advan- tage. The place was of extraordinary strength, and might well have held out an indefinite time, for aU Alexander's siege material was with the column under Parmenio ; but the garrison, doubtless influenced by the current rumors of Alex- ander's divine powers, — which superstition Alexander was by no means loath to foster, for its political value as well as, be it frankly confessed, the gratification it yielded to his per- sonal vanity, — agreed to surrender on terms harder than the former ones, namely, double tribute and hostages ; and the king, having no desire to devote his time to minor exploits with the world open to his arms, settled the matter in this form, and made haste to march on Phrygia by way of Perge. Alexander had no intention of halting long on his way to subdue the mountain tribes of the Taurus. He had alto- gether too much work cut out ahead. It sufficed if, in pass- ing through, he personally taught them a salutary lesson. He could then leave the eventual settlement of the country to whatever lieutenant he might commission to represent him. Alexander invariably kept the main object in view, and did not allow unessential matters to call his attention from the more important ones. His hope now was speedUy to measure swords with the Grreat King. The only road to Phrygia lay west of Perge, skirting the foot of the mountain and then running through the defiles of Termessus, where the mountains had been torn asunder into a gap with sides so precipitous that a handful of doughty men could readily obstruct the passage of a host. The road 278 A RUSE. was hewn in the rock along one side of the steep wall, and was commanded by yet higher rocks on both sides of the gorge, and within arrow-shot. Beyond the defile lay a strongly fortified town. On reaching the defile, Alexander found that the rocks on both sides commanding the road had been occupied by a considerable body of mountaineers. He at once made preparations to go into camp, rightly arguing that this act would lead the barbarians to suppose that he would not attack the defile that night. The ruse had its nat- ural effect. It was the same Epaminondas had practiced at Mantinsea. The bulk of the enemy retired to the city which lay beyond, leaving but a slender guard on duty in the gorge, which in its turn became somewhat careless of its work. The king, watching his opportunity with his wonted restless eye, no sooner ascertained this fact than he took his archers, jav- elin throwers and hypaspists, marched with the utmost cau- tion to that part of the defile which the enemy had chosen for defense, and fell with great audacity upon this guard. Sur- prised and imable to withstand the heavier missiles of the Macedonians, the enemy was driven headlong from his foot- hold. This opened the pass. The king at once moved up his array and went actually into camp near the city gates. Here he received an embassy from Selge, a town whose in- habitants were at enmity with the Termessians, and were accordingly glad to assist the Greeks. Alexander made a treaty with Selge, to which that city remained steadily faith- ful. But as Termessus promised to give trouble and waste much time in its capture, he blockaded and passed it by, as he had SyUium and several other places, and, no doubt leav- ing a suitable detachment to hold the defile, marched on to Sagalassus. This was a city whose inhabitants were called the. most war- like of all the Pisidians, themselves a race of marked courage A SHARP FIGHT. 279 and determination. Sagalassus lay at the foot of the highest terrace of the mountains, and beyond it opened the uplands of Phrygia. The king found this people drawn up on the rocks on the south front of their city, which rocks formed, as it were, a natural rampart. And here, too, a considerable force of Termessians had joined them to oppose the Macedonian advance. Alexander could make no use of his cavalry on this rugged ground, but he prepared at once to assault the position with his foot. He drew up these troops with the shield-bearing guards under his own command on the right, and the phalangites on the left, each brigade placed accord- ing to the day's roster, the whole under Lyncestian Amyntas, son of Arrhaboeus, and so marshaled as that each commander of rank should have an occasion to display his personal valor. The archers and Agrianians covered the right, the Thracian acontists, under Sitalces, the left. The light troops in front n ' . AHCHCnS. acrians. U THRACIANS, I ' I I ' ' PHALANX. HVPASPISTS. Combat near Sag^alaasns. of the right advanced boldly up the heights, followed closely by the line, and feU upon the Pisidians with a fierceness which deserved to encompass a victory, But both wings were sud- denly taken in fiank by an ambuscade, easily prepared on such a field. The archers being light-armed, and having lost their leader, gave way in disorder ; but the always gallant Agria- nians, better armed, held their ground with great tenacity, and enabled the phalangites to come to their rescue, headed 280 PISIDIA REDUCED. by Alexander in person. Undismayed at the formidable array of the phalanx, the mountaineers showed wonderful devotion, rushing in crowds upon the line of sarissas, in front of which they fell by hundreds in a vain effort to break it down. But they found the Macedonians as immovable as their ot^ti native rocks, and confessing the hopelessness of their task, but hoping to try conclusions agaia, dispersed all over the surrounding country in places where the Macedo- nians, heavily armed and ignorant of the ground, did not deem it wise to attempt to foUow. About five hundred of the barbarians had been slain. This dispersion, however, worked them no good. It was at once taken advantage of by the king, who advanced on and stormed the town, captur- ing it without difficulty in its half-deserted condition. There had fallen in this combat about twenty Macedonians, includ- ing Oleander, the general of the archers, — the second chief of this gallant body killed in action. At this point Alexander made a halt, and undertook a number of expeditions against the rest of the strongholds of Pisidia. By taking some by storm, and by granting terms to others, he managed in no great time, and without any single case of noteworthy opposition, to reduce the entire country to his control, so far as it was essential to protect himself in his onward march. The road to the upland plains beyond this range was open to him, without leaving danger in his rear. The king now marched into Phrygia, leaving Lake Asca- nia on his left, and reached Celsenae in five marches. This city lay in the mountains at the headwaters of the Mseander, and ha,d been constructed by Xerxes, after his defeat by th,e Greeks, as a bulwark against their expected advance. It was built on an inaccessible rock and could have made an inter- minable defense ; but the garrison, consisting of one thousand Carians and one hundred Greek mercenaries, headed by the GORDIUM. 281 viceroy of Phrygia, after listening to Alexander's proposals, agreed to surrender in a given period — Curtius says in sixty days — if not succored by that time. Alexander accepted these terms, knowing that his own advance on Gordium would cut off any reinforcements which they might be ex- pecting ; left fifteen hundred men under Antigonus, son of Philip, to see that the treaty was duly carried out; placed Balacrus, son of Amyntas, in command of the Grreek allies, a position which Antigonus had hitherto held, and after a rest of ten days marched to Gordium, the ancient capital of the Phrygian kings. Parmenio shortly arrived, and the married men who had been on furlough likewise joined at this point, bringing thirty-six hundred and fifty recruits with them, namely, three thousand phalangites, three hundred Macedo- nian and two hundred Thessalian heavy horse, and one hun- dred and fifty ^Eleans. To Gordium also, Athens sent an embassy praying for the release of the Athenian prisoners captured at the Granicus and sent to Macedonia in chain-gangs. Alexander saw fit to deny the request, with intent to show that he was able to hold Greece in subjection ; but he promised to consider the matter when the present expedition should be happily accomplished. He was now again on the high road from the Hellespont through Cappadocia and Cilicia to the heart of the Persian kingdom, which he might have taken after the Granicus vic- tory. His extensive circuit along the coast had been wisely and advisedly made. It had rendered safe his base in Asia Minor, which less than this could not have done. The king had finished his first year's campaign, the last part of it during the winter season, among the mountains. There are few things which show the wonderful capacity of Alexander to face, and his men to endure, hardship so weU as the fact that the difficulties of a winter or a mountain cam- 282 WHAT HAD BEEN GAINED. paign are never dwelt upon by the ancient historians. Neither is credit given for overcoming the unusual labors of such campaigning, nor are these deemed an excuse for delay or failure. In a certain sense Alexander's success had not been so splendid as to overawe the Greek opposition at home. It must not be supposed that tongues wagged any less noisily two thousand years ago than they do to-day. To be sure he had captured all the coast cities of Asia Minor as the result of his victory at the Granicus, but there were many who alleged that Memnon, whose ability was well recognized, had only permitted this apparent gain so that he himself might more securely occupy the islands of the ^gean in force, and make ready to cut Alexander off from his base by invading Macedon. Then indeed, said Alexander's opponents, he would soon show the Macedonians how slender had been their hold on all this territory. And it was openly prophesied in Athens that Alexander woidd not dare advance further in- land. Nor were these arguments without a substratum of reason. Memnon was capable, and the one man who was so, of giving Alexander a vast amount of trouble ; and no one as yet appreciated the full extent of Alexander's resources and ability. This was natural enough. But Alexander's political nous was no less strong than his military sense. As we have seen, he gave back their freedom and old laws to all the Greek cities he had captured or which had surrendered to him. This meant not that he had merely stepped into the shoes of the Persian king; not that these cities had but exchanged one tyrant for another ; they had made so substantial a gain — and they recognized the fact — that Alexander could rely almost certainly on their remaining faithful to the end to him who had dealt thus generously by them. And it will be noticed that the king had already DARIUS' OUTLOOK. 283 begun to put in practice his uniform rule of treating with marked generosity places or parties which helped his cause, with exemplary severity those who resisted or rebelled. Nor did aU this tend merely to give him the aid he needed for his invasion of the Persian monarchy ; it added abundant strength to his home politics. For every city in Asia which accepted Alexander accepted also the fact that Macedonia was Greece. This reinforced him by just so much. Meanwhile the Persian king was no whit abashed. He looked upon the defeat of his generals by the Greeks as a mere accident, due to bad management, which could be readily repaired by proper means. Asia Minor was at one of the dis- tant ends of his dominions, and he did not comprehend what Alexander's progress meant. He did, however, see by how much Memnon's advice had been the best, and had, accord- ingly, placed him in supreme command of the theatre of operations, in the expectation of speedily retrieving the dis- asters which had followed Alexander's initial success. Tetradrachina in Berlin Museum. (Alexander idealized as Hercules.) XXII. CILICIA. SUMMEK AND FALL, B. C. 333. Meiotok, who had just been placed in sole command of the ^g'ean hj Darius, and was preparing to inyade Macedonia, now died. This relieved Alexander from grave danger, for Memnon had no worthy successor. Darius determined to collect an army and march to meet Alexander. The latter, after his late successes, was better able to sustain a fleet, and took measures to replace the one he had disbanded. At Gordium Alexander cut the Gordian knot, — or at least managed to impress upon all the idea that he had fulfilled the omen connected therewith, and would be lord of Asia, Master of all Asia Minor west of the Taurus, he marched towards the Cilician Gates. This defile Darius' satrap had failed to fortify. Alexander captured it, descended into Cilicia, and took Tarsus by a coup de main. Sending Farmenio forward to secure the Syrian Gates, he himself reduced Rugged Cilicia in a week's campaign, and overran the rest of the country. He here learned that the citadels of Halicamassus and all the other important Carian cities had been taken by his lieutenants. Memnon, who was now in sole and unlimited command of the -^gean, having the design of carrying the war into Mace- don, of instigating revolt against Alexander among his en- emies in Greece, and of cutting him and his army off from Europe, managed to get possession of the island of Chios by the treachery of ApoUonides, and reestablished the oligarchy. Thence he sailed to Lesbos, landed, and took its four large towns, all, in fact, but the city of Mitylene. This city resisted his efforts for some time with the aid of its Macedonian gar- rison. But Memnon went systematically to work. He cut the city off from the land by double walls, and blockaded its port with his fleet. This soon reduced it to great straits. But no doubt very luckily for Alexander (for he was his one distinctly able opponent) Memnon shortly after died of a fever, leaving MEMNON DIES. 285 the temporary command to his nephew Pharnabazus. Mem- non's plan had been to sail for the Hellespont, so soon as he had a suitable base in the ^Egean, cut Alexander's communi- cations at this point, and thence invade Macedonia. He was the one man in the service of Darius whose conception of the methods by which to meet Alexander's invasion had all along been clear, intelligent and practicable. His successor was, however, by no means equal to the task thus inherited. .RNASSUS Mitylene, hard pressed, was finally obliged to surrender its allegiance to Alexander, which it did on the promise by Phar- nabazus and by Autophradates, who was serving with him, of certain favorable conditions ; but no sooner did the Persians obtain possession of the city than they violated aU the agree- ments, and exacted heavy tribute from the citizens. They obtained possession of Tenedos in much the same manner. Memnon's vigor seemed to survive him for some months. The activity thus displayed by the Persian fleet, if put in practice a year sooner, might have seriously interfered with 286 DARIUS' PLANS. Alexander's landing in Asia. But Memnon was not at that time fuUy trusted, and was unable to make his influence or his intelligence ayail. The death of Memnon was on a par with the uniform cur- rent of good fortune, which always seemed to set in Alex- ander's favor. It robbed Darius of the one man who could probably have made head against the Macedonians, who would have known how to utilize the vast resources of the Persian empire to advantage, and who would have restrained Darius from committing the irreparable errors of which he was guilty. With but a tithe of the forces Darius raised, he would, no doubt, have increased Alexander's task tenfold. His death disabled the management at sea so as to make it more probable that Alexander could again utilize a fleet. He felt able to cope with Memnon's successors, if he had not been with this admirable soldier himself. After Memnon's death, Darius held a council of war to determine what action it were best to take to oppose the rash but dangerous invader of his dominions. Rejecting the advice of the Greeks about him, he placed his confidence, naturally enough, in the courage and intelligence of his Per- sian courtiers and generals, and determined to take the field himself, with a levy en masse of the kingdom. He sent to the -Sgean to confirm Pharnabazus in his command, but at the same time withdrew from him aU the Greek mercenaries ser- ving in the fleet, purposing to use them in the army to be put on foot. This latter act handicapped the Persian admirals, and effectually put a stop to any chance of invading Mace- don. But Datames, meanwhile, had taken Tenedos. The Macedonian treasury was now in better condition to afford the expense of a fleet. This, happily, it was not difficult to create. Alexander sent Hegelochus to the Hellespontine region to seize all merchantmen coming home from the Euxine ALEXANDER'S NEW FLEET. 287 sea, and convert them into war-ships. Antipater raised ves- sels from Euboea and the Peloponnesus. Athens, angered at the seizure of some of her wheat-carrying craft, declined to furnish her contingent, but armed one hundred vessels, and entered into correspondence with the Persian king. Hege- lochus, on hearing of this, deemed it wise to release the Athenian ships which he had seized ; hut he had on hand, without counting these, a goodly number suitable for the purpose. It was as well that Alexander had decided to organize an- other fleet as it had perhaps been necessary to disband the first one. Not only was the ability of the Persian fleet to ac- complish results still an open question, but some of the Greek cities were by no means beyond taking active side with Darius when it could be safely done. The fleet became useful from the very start. The first exploit of Proteas, whom Antipater put in command, was the capture of eight out of ten triremes which Datames, the Persian admiral, had at Siphnus, one of the Cyclades ; and the appearance of a new squadron had a marked effect in forestalling an outbreak of hostility from Athens, if not a general Greek revolt. It is natural to question Alexander's wisdom in disbanding his first fleet. It was perhaps an error. If Memnon had lived, it might have proved a fatal one. Alexander had ap- parently, by his want of ships, placed his rear in grave danger. The Persian fleet, unopposed, was sure, sooner or later, to make a descent on Macedon. But, on the other hand, it was not a direct threat to Alexander's standing in Asia Minor. His presence there was the rather dangerous to the Persian fleet, by closing all the coast harbors against its vessels, which, with the scant naval equipment of that age, must land daily for water and provisions. And though it would seem that a fleet was a matter almost of necessity, Alexander may have 288 THE GORDIAN KNOT. calculated tliat Antipater could hold head against auy revolt- ing Greek force which might grow dangerous to Macedonia (as indeed he proved his ability to do at Megalopolis), and meet a Persian invasion as well ; he no doubt looked to the future for success enough on land to outweigh any losses in the ^gean ; his operations imperatively called for many of the crews which manned the fleet for shore duty, let alone the fact that he had not funds enough to pay the men ; and it was not difficult, as the coming year showed, again to make him- self strong at sea, when the demand should become more urgent. If it was a mistake, it had happily not proven a disastrous one. To Gordium, then, the various columns of the Macedonians converged, and here the army was reunited. The column which had made the winter campaign with Alexander from the south ; the column from Sardis, under Parmenio, with the artillery and train and heavy cavalry ; the newly married men, reporting on expiration of furlough, aijd bringing their con- tingent of recruits from Macedonia, all met and shook hands over the brilliant success of the first campaign; all looked forward to vastly greater victories and richer booty, as they penetrated deeper into the territory of the wealthy Persian king. Their implicit belief in their leader made success an article of faith. The recruits were a welcome arrival ; their number all but compensated for the losses incurred, and the details on garrison duty in the various cities captured. It was here in Gordium, in February or March, 333 B. c, that Alexander imposed upon the credulity of the Phrygians by cutting or otherwise unloosing the famous knot of King Midas, the performance of which feat was by the oracle said to betoken that the successful man should be king of Asia. However the feat was accomplished, there is no doubt that Alexander did succeed in making the populace believe that TOWARDS CILICIA. 289 he had fulfilled the requirements of the omen, and that he would be the conqueror of the East. It makes, perhaps, small odds how Alexander managed to impose upon the cred- ulous by his actual deeds of wonder, or by his plausible way of putting things. It is none the less true that his support largely came from a popular belief that he was more than human. From Gordium, Alexander marched along the southerly slope of the boundary range to Ancyra, where he received the submission of the Paphlagonians, but granted their re- quest that no Macedonian army should be quartered upon their coxmtry. But he probably placed them under the super- vision of Galas, satrap of Phrygia. Hence marching into Cappadocia, he crossed the Halys and subdued the entire region west of this river, which had been the boundary be- tween Persia and Lydia before the days of Cyrus, and that portion beyond the Halys as far as the Iris ; and appointed Sabietas viceroy. Here, too, he returned to the Greek cities their ancient laws and customs ; but not desiring to withdraw too much time from his greater task of seeking Darius and coming to a decisive encounter with him, he left the demo- cratic party in each city with power sufficient to control the oligarchical faction, without attempting entirely to extirpate the latter party. Alexander was now master of all Asia Minor west of the Taurus, and could choose to remain on the defensive or cross the range in offense. The latter course was the one which was always the more consistent with his character. He, there- fore, took up his march toward the chief pass in the Taurus mountains, known as the Gates of Cilicia, Pylse Cilicise (the modern Golek Boghaz), a defile thirty-six hundred feet above the sea, and well-nigh inexpugnable if held by a determined party. When Cyrus the Younger had passed this defile, he 290 THE CILICIAN GATES. had expected to be unable to force it, and had made prepara- tions to turn it by transporting a force of troops by sea to the rear of the pass. Xenophon characterized the defile as beyond |>'Sj \ '- \ aA-'\-'\ I /MACEDONIANS * H-z^ei-c-sftpsorve Issus before the Battle. Alexander's whereabouts, had made ready for an advance. He had hoped to seize the Syrian Gates, but found that Alex- ander had anticipated him. He had then taken up a position behind the river Pinarus, and, on hearing of Alexander's prox- imity, threw out thirty thousand horse and twenty thousand light foot across the stream to make a curtain behind which he could form unobserved ; ordering them, on being recalled. 306 DARIUS' ARMY. to retire right and left around the flanks. He was well in- trenched. The Pinarus formed his ditch ; its northern bank, which was high, his wall. He had in his army some thirty thousand heavy armed Greek mercenaries under Thymondas, son of Mentor. These he placed opposite the Macedonian phalanx, which he could see from his position as it deployed into line, and on both sides of this he placed double their number of Cardaces (foreign mercenaries known by this name) who were also heavy armed and trained to combat hand to hand. There is some conflict of authorities as to the numbers and positions of the Greeks and Cardaces. But the conflict is not material. This part of the Persian force was in the cen- tre and more than ample. The Greeks and Cardaces appear to have formed the first line. If ninety thousand strong, and in a phalanx sixteen deep, they would occupy a breadth of over three miles. Cal- isthenes states the then breadth of the valley at the Pinarus as fourteen stadia. To crowd into this breadth (one and two thirds miles), the Greeks and Cardaces would have to be twenty-five deep. These questions are interesting, but by no means material to that consideration of the subject on which this work is intended to dwell. They may have been in two or more lines. Some twenty thousand men, perhaps the Cardaces in part, were on the extreme left, near the mountains, on the left bank of the Pinarus. They were intended as a threat to Alexander's right. For, owing to the configuration of the ground, which had once been a bay in the seacoast, part of this latter force would extend beyond the rear of Alexander's right flank, so soon as he advanced. This was a clever for- mation, and deserved success. The rest of Darius' men were drawn up in rear of this front line, by nations, in columns so ordered that they might. MACEDONIANS IN GOOD HEART. 307 it was thought, be successively brought into action, but really in equally unserviceable and dangerous masses. The whole, including probably camp-followers, was said to be six hun- dred thousand strong. The effective fighting force may have been two hundred thousand men, but it was decidedly weak- ened by the admixture of unreliable material. The very size of the army was its infirmity. Being assured that they were in pursuit of a flying enemy, their courage was by no means raised at the sight of the Macedonian army ready for attack. Having completed his formation, Darius now withdrew his curtain of cavalry and light foot, which fell back right and left. But finding that it could do no service near the hills, he ordered the bulk of the horse over to his right, opposite Par- menio, where on the seashore sand was the only place it could find room to manoeuvre. A few he ordered to the left. He relied on the hills to protect the latter flank, and proposed to make his main attack with the cavalry of the right, which was under Nabarzanes, and which he intended should break through the Macedonian left ^y mere weight, and take the line in reverse. Darius took up his own station in the usual place, the centre, in rear of the Greek mercenaries. The whole army extended from the mountains to the sea. The Macedonians were in the highest spirits and full of confidence in their own valor. The king's words had roused their enthusiasm, and so soon as they came within sight of the enemy they grew eager for the fray. One can scarcely imagine a situation which, according to our notions, was worse compromised than that of Alexander at Issus. It might have proven so in his case. And we can only marvel at the cool daring and extraordinary ability which enabled him to keep his troops in heart and rescue a brilliant victory from such desperate danger. When Alexander perceived that Darius' cavalry was filing 308 ALEXANDER'S ARMY. over to his right opposite Parmenio, he saw that Ms lieutenant was apt to be oyermatched, for only the Peloponnesian and Greek horse was stationed on this wing. He therefore dis- patched his own Thessalian cavalry, quietly but speedily, by the rear of the phalanx, so as not to be seen, over to his left. Of the horse which he retained on the right, the Companions were in line ; the lancers under Protomachus, and the Paeo- nians under Aristo, were in front of them ; and of the in- fantry, the archers under Antiochus, and the Agrianians under Attalus, were also on their right front. He threw back a crotchet of light foot and horse on the right to oppose the body which was posted so as to take this flank in reverse ; but he saw the danger of this force so long as it remained in situ, and before the battle attacked it with a body of light troops, and though it had the advantage of being on higher ground, drove it away to the top of the hiU, and occupied a position in its front by two ile of Companion cavalry, some three hundred men. The troops in the crotchet he was then able to use to strengthen the right wing phalanx, which was weak in places. The right of the phalanx, when the forma^ tion was completed, proved still to be rather thin, and he filled it by two squadrons of Companion cavalry, named from the districts from which they came, the Anthemusian and Lugsean. In the left wing the Cretan archers and Thra- cians, under Sitalces, were in front of the infantry line ; the cavalry in their front, towards the left. The Greek merce- naries were in reserve. It will be noticed that Alexander fully appreciated the value of a reserve, as only Xenophon before him had done. He recognized that the one weak point of the phalangial order was, as a rule, its lack of reserves, and was wont to correct the defect by dispositions of his troops, unusual in those days. The formation was completed with masterly skill and in ALEXANDER'S PLAN. 309 perfect quiet, and each change was made after full reconnoi- tring of the enemy's position, which happily could be readily seen. There was no flurry, no apprehension. Everything was orderly and precise to the last degree. Some thirty thousand men stood in line. The Pinarus, looking from Alexander's right towards the Persian left, made a northerly sweep such as to throw back- ward Darius' flank ; and by advancing the archers and Agri- anians, and some Grreek mercenaries, now that the Cardaces had been driven away, Alexander so thrust forward his right that it enveloped and extended beyond the left of the Persian first line. He had contrived just such a threat to Darius' left as Darius had sought to make to his right. The position was a very good one for an inferior force. The flanks were protected, the ground well covered, and mere numbers ceased to be of the value they would possess in an open plain. Alexander now gave his men some rest, think- ing that Darius might advance on him, and hoping to attack him as he crossed the river. But the Persians kept their ground, except that the cavalry of the Persian right began to cross the Pinarus to attack the Macedonian left. Alexan- der saw that Darius made a mistake to hold his centre, where he himself was, on the defensive behind the Pinarus, while advancing his right in offense across it, because if this centre was disabled, no efforts or success of the right could rectify it or retrieve a disaster which might happen to headquarters. Particularly, Oriental troops would be demoralized by a de- feat of that part of the line which was held by the king in person. Alexander's problem then was how to break this centre, and he guessed that it could best be done by destroy- ing the Persian left, and taking the centre in reverse. This he felt confident he could do if only Parmenio would hold the Macedonian left until he could make some headway. 310 THE BATTLE OPENS. Darius awaited the attack of the Greeks, confiding in his numbers, and intending, as above said, that his cavalry should, by defeating Alexander's, break the latter's left wing, and take the whole army in reverse. Thus the strong right flank of each army was opposed to the other's weaker left. Alex- ander's sending the Thessalian cavalry to his left had to a degree remedied this evil in the Macedonian army, for the Thessalians were wonderful fighters ; but Darius had not cor- rected the corresponding weakness of his own left. His fly- ing wing of Cardaces had disgracefully failed him. The defensive attitude of the Persian king gave Alexan- der's troops the impression that Darius was lacking in cour- age, and this still more heightened their own. There was a general shout to be led to the attack, and Alexander gave the order to advance. The tone in which troops cheer is indica- tive of what breeds victory or defeat. Here it was unmistak- ably for victory. As the line slowly and with the steadiness of parade moved forward, Alexander rode in front of the line, calling on the men to do their duty, saluting each brigade of the phalanx by its name, individually addressing each chieftain, and rousing aU to heroic tension. He was received with loud huzzas, and his noble presence and confident bear- ing acted as a stimulant on every soldier in the ranks. The river had to be crossed, but this difficulty only raised the spirits of the men who had fought their way across the Granicus. The north bank of the Pinarus was in most parts steep ; where it was low, Darius had caused a stockade to be erected. The water was everywhere fordable. The battle was about to open. The enthusiasm of the Macedonians rose to boiling point. In order to keep the line intact and free from wavering, the phalangites advanced slowly to the sound of music, as they were wont to do on pa- rade, with measured tread and soldierly bearing, until, reach- A SHARP ATTACK. 311 ing the zone of darts, at a preconcerted signal, and headed by Alexander and the agema, they took the double-quick, and dashed into the river with the shout which their enemies had always heard with dread, and which the hills sent rever- berating back to the sea. This rapid attack both astonished the Persians and saved themselves from being long under the cAv comPANioNSr GK f^etc'i Issus (Alexander's mancenvre). fire of missiles. Where Alexander fought in person, near the right, so soon as the troops came to close work, the Persians gave way in disorder, being, as we have shown, taken some- what in reverse by the position which the bend in the river enabled him to give the line. It will be seen that this bend in the river again resulted in the formation of what many have termed Alexander's favor- 312 DARIUS' LEFT BROKEN. ite method, — an oblique order of battle, the left refused. It was again accidental, but none the less effective. It enabled him to force the attack on the Persian left centre, which he saw was the weak point of Darius' line. The impact of the Companions and hypaspists was tremen- dous. There was but a brief resistance. No soldiers under Darius' standard could stand up under the blow. The Per- sian line reeled and weakened. The Macedonians pressed steadily on. So soon as Alexander had driven back that part of the Persian left wing which he had struck, he found him- self on the left flank of the Greek mercenaries in the Persian centre, on whom Darius peculiarly relied, and who had so far held the Macedonian phalanx in check. Where Alexander led, fortune always followed. He had won a foothold of first importance. Success here made it certain that success by Darius' right could not be fatal ; for Alexander cut Darius from his line of retreat by turning his left or strategic flank. The discovery that the enemy has a strategic flank, that is, a flank the turning of which will cut him off from his line of retreat, has often been ascribed to Napoleon, and it is no doubt true that no captain ever made use of this weak point on so grand a scale or so efficiently as the great Corsican. But here it is plain that Alexander saw the advantage of an attack on this flank ; we shall see him make use of the idea again ; and that Hannibal very clearly understood the matter is shown by the march through the Arnus marshes. It was the commentators of Napoleon's campaigns who explained to the world the value of that captain's methods. Napoleon himself repeatedly acknowledges his indebtedness to his predecessors in the art. But he carried what they taught him to its high- est degree of perfection. In the centre the Macedonian phalanx had not been so speedy or so successful as it had on the right where Alexan- PHALANX IN DANGER. 313 der's irresistible spirit led the way, and the line was somewhat disordered and less advanced. The banks had been higher where they crossed ; they were more heavUy armed, and the king's impetuosity had carried him and his immediate sur- roundings ahead of the line. Darius' Greek mercenaries had attacked the phalanx with dangerous ardor. Not only had the Macedonian centre lost its alignment, but there had been opened a gap in the phalanx towards the right wing, owing to Alexander's forward rush which the brigades on the right of the phalanx were trying their best to follow up. The Greeks and Macedonians were rivals in courage, and this gap boded evil. Ancient hatred made the combat aU the more bloody. The fray covered both banks of the river and the main ford itself. Both fought desperately; the Greek mercenaries to reestablish the battle and earn the praise of the Great- King and their promised reward ; the Macedonians not to be behind their own king in conduct, nor lose the name of invincible for the phalanx. To yield their ground meant destruction to the Macedonian army. The lines came to close quarters, where darts were useless and swords were the only weapon. Here fell Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, and one hundred and twenty Macedonians of no mean rank. Despite utmost gallantry, the phalanx was in grave danger. But as usual Alexander came to the rescue. His wing had by this time driven the Persian left weU away from its posi- tion near the river. For the moment he was hand free. Heading the hypaspists and the right brigades, while the Companions followed up the initial success, and thus sus- tained his right, he wheeled about and took the Greek merce- naries in flank, tearing open their formation with a terrific blow, and immediately relieved the pressure on the failing brigades. The danger was averted. Renewing the struggle under better auspices, the phalanx at once regained its ground and alignment, and thenceforward held its own. 314 THESSALIAN GALLANTRY. On the left the Persian cavalry had crossed the river, and attacked the Thessalian horse with fury. A fierce combat ensued in which the enemy began by winning a marked advan- tage. Indeed, Parmenio was getting so decidedly the worst of the fight at this part of the line that, but for the effect of Alexander's wonderful impetuosity on the right, serious results might have followed. Yet this was traceable rather to the Persian numbers and splendid conduct, than to any fault of Parmenio's, who had carried out his orders with zeal and discretion. The multitude of the Persian cavalry kept it in one mass, so heavy and irresistible that it threatened to sweep the field like an avalanche. Only by constantly re- peated isolated attacks at different points, and by their perfect discipline, could the Thessalians with all their gallantry hold their ground. But though vastly outnumbered and all but crushed, they would not yield, but clung desperately to their ground, rallying and returning again and again to the charge. The Companions themselves could not have done more noble work. Thus they kept up their blows as best they might. Darius, as was the rule with Persian kings, occupied in the centre the position of greatest prominence. In a gorgeous chariot drawn by four horses abreast, and surrounded by his military family, including aU the grandees of the court, under command of his brother Oxathres, he must have been the centre of all attraction. It was not long after the phalanx had been reestablished before Alexander had hewn his path clear through the Persian masses, and had headed for the very kernel of the Persian centre. It was straight for this royal group that the king at once began to carve his way. Here it was, as at Cunaxa, that the battle was to be lost or won ; and Alexander, with his usual directness, made straight for the centre point of opposition. Darius was defended by his crowd of nobles ; Alexander led his Companions. The Great "THE KING FLEES!" 315 King was soon surrounded by wounds and slaughter. His horses became unmanageable ; only by a charge, under his brother Oxathres, could he be extricated from a position where he must quickly have fallen a victim. For Darius had ceased to be a hero ; and it was the godlike fury of Hercules and AchiUes which swept like a whirlwind about him. When Darius saw that the left of his army had been broken, that Alexander was getting between the Amanic Gates and his army, and that he himself was in danger of capture or death, he lost all sense of self-control, and summa- rily took to flight in a fresh and lighter chariot which had been brought up for him. But a chariot could not convey him far. The ground was rough, and the mass of fugitives quickly became enormous. Darius had had in readiness, as if contemplating flight, a high-bred mare whose foal had been left behind on the road through the Amanic Gates. He soon left his chariot, mounted this mare and galloped from the field. The flight of the king was followed by the immediate dissolution of all discipline in the Persian ranks at the left and centre, where his movements were within the ken of all. The reserve troops in the rear, who might have now come forward, at once melted away and followed in the footsteps of Darius. The Pseonians, archers, Agrianians, mercenaries, and the two ile of cavalry pushed in on the extreme Macedo- nian right, and cut down aU who could not escape with speed. The victorious cavalry on the Persian right became aware of the rout of the left, and soon heard the cry, "The king flees ! " They also lost courage and began to waver ; then, seeing that no efforts could now avail, they turned and fled. They were pursued by the Thessalians, who not only slew great numbers of them, but so hampered their movements that they trampled each other down in flight. Alexander cotdd not begin his pursuit until he was sure of 316 LOSSES IN THE BATTLE. his centre and left ; nor was he able to pursue to any great distance, owing to the approaching darkness. This facilitated Darius' escape, but Alexander captured the Great King's chariot, in which were his Median mantle, bow and shield. Darius did not halt till he placed the Euphrates, which he crossed at Thapsacus, between himseK and Alexander. He was here able to assemble but four thousand Greek mercena^ ries out of all his vast host. Of the infantry, such as were not cut to pieces took refuge in the foot-hills ; the cavalry fol- lowed the coast until they could cross to the upper Amanic pass. A body of eight thousand Greeks, under Amyntas, is said to have cut its way out to the south along the beach, and to have reached Phoenicia, where, seizing Lesbian vessels and burning such as they did not need, they sailed to Cyprus, and thence to Egypt. Accompanying Amyntas were Thymodes, son of Mentor, Aristodemus of Phares, Bianor of Acama- nia, and other refugees. Arsames, Rheomithres, and Atizyes, who escaped at the Granicus, fell here. Vast numbers of the Persians were slain. The sum of killed is stated at one hundred thousand, includ- ing ten thousand of the cavalry. In the pursuit, Ptolemy, son of Lagus, asserts that the men who followed him filled up a deep ravine with dead bodies in order to bridge and cross it. The loss in Persian generals was heavy. They had, as usual, exposed themselves most bravely. The Macedonian loss was four hundred and fifty killed, — three hundred foot, and one himdred and fifty horse, or one and a half per cent, of the number engaged. Curtius gives one hundred and eighty- two, Justin two hundred and eighty, as the number killed. The wounded are given at various figures. The average of ten to one of killed is probably not far from correct. Taking the killed and wounded at five thousand men, the loss, not counting " missing," was not far from seventeen per cent., COMPARATIVE LOSSES. 317 which is much higher than the average of modern battles. The killed and wounded alone rarely overrun ten per cent. The number of men who died of their wounds in Alex- ander's army we have no clew to enable us to guess. It was no doubt large, for though wounds were not so severe in the days of javelins, stones and arrows as they are to-day, yet medical attendance was inefficient. That there were very many permanently disabled, we know, and the total number who disappeared from the roUs of the army was so great, that we must conclude that the battle mortality was by no means measured in the figures given of those kiUed. Prisoners were never lost by the victorious army. Hence the item of " missing " in the tabulated losses of modern battles, — and it is a very big one, — must be eliminated before we can institute a comparison between these and an- cient battles as regards casualties. The Persian treasure on the field was barely three thou- sand talents ($3,600,000), but vast stores of gold were got in Damascus, whence they were being conveyed away, when, through the treachery of the Syrian satrap, they were stopped by Parmenio, whom Alexander ordered up the Orontes valley after the battle to collect the booty Darius had sent to that place. It was then stored in Damascus. Next day Alexander, though himself disabled by a sword- cut in his thigh, went among the Macedonian wounded, com- mended and rewarded with money all who had distinguished themselves, and saw to the burial of the dead with military honors, the army marching to the funeral as to battle. The family of Darius had been left behind in the Persian camp. They were treated with great respect and dignity. If, as is sometimes alleged, Alexander was not really gener- ous, he assuredly curbed his passions to policy in a manner unusual in men so yoimg. It is pleasanter to believe what 318 DARIUS' FAMILY. Plutarch, Arrian, and others tell us of his real magnanimity. We cannot equitably debit his account with all the ill which can be discovered in his character, unless we credit it with what was noble. It is related that when Alexander returned from the chase of Darius, and was supping with his Compan- ions in the Great King's pavilion in the Persian camp, he heard in the adjoining tent the sobs of women. Inquiring the cause, he was informed that the queen-mother, Sisygam- bis, and the queen, Statira, were lamenting the death of their son and husband. He at once sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius still lived, and that they themselves had nothing to fear. He was as good as his word, for not only did he take no advantage of the acknowledged right of the conqueror of those days, but forbade the beauty and accomplishments of Statira to be mentioned in his presence. For Statira passed for the most lovely woman of her times. The royal ladies were surrounded by their accustomed Eastern state, and were treated as queens, and in no respect as captives. Perhaps Alexander was the only Greek of his time who would have done this ; and his forbearance does as great honor to his heart as the keeping of his royal captives on this scale re- dounds to his knowledge of state craft. For all his contem- poraries praised him ; it became the more easy to handle Darius, and the Persians acquired as high a regard for his character as they already had for his skill. When, the next day, the king and Hephsestion paid a visit to the queens, Sisygambis fell at the feet of the latter, thinking him the monarch, for Alexander was in no wise more richly habited, and Hephsestion was the taller of the two. And when she discovered her error, and in fear for the result fell at the feet of the conqueror, Alexander at once raised her from the ground, and assured her that it was no mistake, for Hephses- tion was also an Alexander. Then, taking up the little son of Darius, he fondled him. THE PERSIAN ARMY DISAPPEARS. 319 The entire army of Darius (except the small force of Greek mercenaries which joined him at the Euphrates, and that which escaped to Egypt) disappeared at Issus — how we can- not say. Parts held together and made for inner Persia ; parts for the Cilician mountains. Many, grouped in smaller or larger bodies, wandered for a while, and then deserted to their homes. Squads or companies of the army reappeared at intervals in Asia Minor, — Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Luca^ nia, — to be overcome by the Macedonian viceroys. Antig- onus in Phrygia and Galas in smaller Phrygia dispersed many such, but no serious opposition to Alexander could be organized for two years to come. The approach of winter saved Darius from sharp pursuit. The battlefield of Issus is said to have been much changed by the deposits of the .streams which crossed the ancient plains. A large part of the coast is now a continuous marsh. The Syrian Gates have been blocked up by land slides, and disuse. The road across the range is now by the Amanic Gates alone. The other is a mere path. Thus was exploded, even in Persia, the reliance on simple numbers. So trite a maxim is it to-day that numbers without skill cannot avail, that it is perhaps difficult to place ourselves in the position of the peoples who at this time knew nothing but numbers. Napoleon's saying that God is on the side of the heaviest battalions, and his calculation on the equality of thousands, implies that these battalions and thousands are drilled and disciplined substantially on the same methods, and, saving only the genius of the commander, are substan- tially similar bodies. Mere hordes of men are not covered by his dictum or his theory. Darius had boasted that he would trample Alexander under foot by the weight of his magnificent army ; and but for his personal weakness here, and later at Arbela, perchance he might have done so. The 320 TWO KINGS CONTRASTED. misconduct of the Great King is another instance of the good fortune of Alexander. The Persians, as a rule (espe- cially the grandees and generals), were brave and faithful ; but the mass was easily to be demoralized. Nor did Darius by nature lack heart; but when he saw that the Greeks, whose meagre numbers he had been led to despise and under- rate, really dared oppose him, he lost his head. In contrast to this, Alexander's splendid conduct stands out in highest relief. The keen eye which grasped the situation, and dis- covered the weak point in his adversary's position, and the courage which faced vast odds with such calm skill, are alike admirable. And as no doubt it was just these qualities put into action which produced the effect from which Darius weakened, in so far was Alexander the arbiter of his own for- tune on this field. Perhaps Issus was the most far-reaching of all Alexander's victories. In consequence of the event the name of Alex- ander became the synonym of god. The usual games, feasts and sacrifices were held, and the town of Alexandria at the Syrian Passes was built as memorial of the victory. Three huge altars at the Pinarus were erected as a monument to the slain. Alexander appointed Balacrus, son of Nicanor, one of the royal body-guards, viceroy of Cilicia. This was the most important military territory which he had as yet taken, and must be in the best of hands. He put Menes in Balacrus' place among the body-guards. Polysperschon succeeded to the command of Ptolemy, son of Seleucus. Menon, son of Cerdimmas, was made satrap over northern Syria, as far as Parmenio had taken it, and left with a force of Greek allied cavalry to hold the land. XXIV. TYRE. NOVEMBER, B. C. 333, TO AUGUST, B. C. 332. Issus did aa much to weaken the Persian fleet by fostering^ desertion in the Phoenician and Cyprian contingents as to exalt Alexander's name. The king now moved down into Phoenicia, proposing to reduce the coast line before Ten- turing inland. All the towns received him with open gates until he came to Tyre, queen city of the coast. Here he was denied admittance, and resorted to a siege. He began a mole from the mainland to the island on which new Tyre was built, using the forests of Lebanon and the old city of Tyre for material. This mole was two hundred feet wide and half a mile long. On it were built towers and sheds to protect the workmen. The Tyrians showed wonderful skill in their efforts to break up the work and once set the towers on fire with a fire- ship, consuming the labor of months. Alexander went to Sidon and there got together a fleet larger than the Tynans', returning with which he was able to coop them up in their two harbors. He now built his mole wider and stronger and reached the city walls. But he was eventually forced to operate a breach on the seaward side, where the walls were not so strong. After a sea-fight, in which he was victorious, Alexander made a breach in the wall, stormed the city, captured and sacked it, hung two thousand men and sold thirty thou- sand into slavery. The city was practically destroyed. Darius now approached Alexander with an offer of ten thousand talents, all the territory west of the Euphrates, and his daughter in marriage ; but Alexander declined the offer, claiming a right to the whole of Asia. After the battle of Issus the Persian admirals made an effort to save what might yet perchance be snatched from the burning. Pharnabazus sailed with twelve triremes and fif- teen hundred mercenaries to Chios, fearing its defection. But the cause had suffered disastrous blows in the death of Memnon, and the defeat at Issus. There soon appeared threatening signs of falling off among the Phoenician and Cyprian allies which stiU more materially weakened the Per- sian cause at sea. For when Alexander headed towards Phce- 322 RESULTS OF ISSUS. nicia, instead of the Euphrates as he had been expected to do, the kings of the coast cities serving with the Persian admiral at once caught alarm for their domains and markedly weak- ened in their allegiance. Memnon's strong influence was no longer felt. The Persian admirals, having garrisoned Chios and sent ships to Cos and Halicarnassus, themselves made for Syphnus. Hither came Agis, king of Lacedsemon, still restlessly oppos- ing Alexander, and endeavored to persuade them to send a force to the Peloponnesus which the Spartans might join in active opposition to the galling Macedonian supremacy. Agis had great schemes in his head and urged them warmly. But the news of the defeat of the Persians at Issus which now came in effectually arrested such a movement. Pharnabazus returned to Chios, lest the place should revolt from Persian rule, as seemed not unlikely. Agis secured from the Persians only thirty talents in money and ten triremes. With these he dispatched his brother Agesilaus on a cruise to foment discord in Crete and neighboring islands of the JEgean, and himself joined Autophradates, who had finally sailed to Halicarnas- sus. By his victory at Issus, Alexander had not properly forced the entrance to Persia, for the Euphrates still lay before him, but rather that to Phoenicia. To reduce the cities of this seacoast country would neutralize all opposition as far as Egypt. It was part of his general plan to make sure of the coast before moving inland. Whether this plan was already matured before the king left Pella, or whether the full grasp of his problem grew with its growing size as he ad- vanced farther towards the heart of Asia, cannot be said. It is doubtful whether Alexander knew enough of the geog- raphy of the regions he invaded to construct a completed plan at the outset. But none the less was the strategy of his entire PHCENICIA. 323 movement so fully perfected that it bore the stamp of dis- tinct homogeneity as it was gradually developed. He had, as above said, already sent Parmenio with the Thessalian horse up the Orontes valley to overcome Syria, as weU as take possession of the treasures and camp-belongings which had been sent to Damascus by Darius, from Sochi, before he crossed the range to Issus. He himself, having suitably arranged for the conduct of the affairs of CUicia, marched towards Phoenicia. This country had not been so utterly tyrant-ridden as the other parts of the sea- coast controlled by the Great King. The skiU of its mar- iners and the dependence of Persia upon the cities of Phoenicia for its fleet, as well as for an outlet for commerce, made the Per- sian authorities favor these marts beyond all others. They occupied a position not unlike the free cities of Germany. They had not that insular position which is essential to perfect inde- pendence, but they were shut in between the range „ . , _. . . '^ byna and Fhoemcia. of Mount Libanus and the sea, and the cities were many of them built on coast islands, or in such a way as to be inaccessible from land or sea alike. 324 PH(ENICIAN FLEETS. Each city controlled a greater or less extent of territory in- land. The enormous trade and the clever handicrafts of these cities did not fall away as they did in other towns which be- came weakened by Oriental rule, but were cultivated by Per- sia to the utmost. The ships of these Phoenician cities were on duty with the Persian fleet, the squadron of each generally under command of its king. But the battle of Issus, as above stated, mate- rially altered their footing. The home governments saw the necessity of going over to Alexander. Had these cities worked in unison they could have cut out for Alexander a very serious task. But each one harbored some petty spite against one or more of the others, and their mutual jealous- ies, added to Alexander's clever manipulations, forestalled such action. The possession of Phoenicia was a condition precedent to Alexander's success. If Darius could retain his control or influence over, or even the merely formal co"6p- eration of these Phoenician towns, he could always be sure of a fleet. If these towns deserted their allegiance, the power of his right arm would be transferred to his opponent. Moving towards Phoenicia, Alexander was first met by Strato, son of Gerostratus, king of the territory of Aradus. The latter was serving with Autophradates ; but Strato vol- unteered the surrender of Marathus, his great and prosperous capital city, and of the island of Aradus, near by, of Sigon, of Mariamme, and all the other territory subject to himself and his father. This was a first and marked gain for Alex- ander, as will be seen. In token of his submission, Strato had come with kingly gifts, and, in accordance with custom, he placed a golden crown on Alexander's head. At Marathus, where he tarried a few days, Alexander received a letter and embassy from Darius, entreating that his mother, wife and children be restored to him, and propos- DARIUS OFFERS TERMS. 325 ing friendship and alliance. Alexander's victory lie ascribed in the message to the favor of some one of the gods. He recalled the ancient amity of Persia and Macedon, and, him- self, a king, begged of a king the return of his family. To this letter Alexander replied. He sent his missive by an equal embassy. His letter recited the injuries of Persia to Greece ; the beginning of hostilities by Darius ; the instiga- tion of his father's murder by the Persian court ; it asserted his right as conqueror to the whole of Asia ; it demanded that Darius should address him as his lord, and not as an equal ; and threatened to follow him up wherever he should go till he had accomplished his mission by destroying the Persian sovereignty. As a touch in Alexander's portrait, his very words are of interest : " I am lord of Asia. Come to me, and thou shalt receive aU that thou canst ask. But if thou deniest my right as thy lord, stand and fight for thy kingdom. I wiU seek thee wherever thou art." The letter was addressed, perhaps, as much to the Greek world as to the Persian king. Here, too, at Marathus, Alexander caused to be sent to him from Damascus certain Greeks who were at Darius' court as ambassadors from Sparta, Thebes and Athens. These men he treated with exceptional generosity, in view of their posi- tion. He released the Thebans, and but temporarily confined the Spartan. The son of Iphicrates of Athens, the general and originator of the light troops known as peltasts, who .was one of them, he appointed to a position of honor near his own person. Alexander next advanced on, and occupied Byblus by terms of capitulation. King Enylus was with his squadron in the Persian fleet. This, says Arrian, was called the oldest city in the world, and possessed a considerable territory. Sidon opened her gates, from hatred of the Persians engendered of 326 TYRE REFUSES TO SUBMIT. ancient wrongs and from bitter jealousy of Tyre. Tyre, queen city of the coast, also sent ambassadors, headed by the son of King Azemilcus, who himself was also with Autophra- dates, tendering submission, provided, however, Alexander would not enter the city. Alexander replied that he desired to come and sacrifice to the Tyrian Hercules. To this the Tyrians made objection, because at Ephesus Alexander had marshaled his whole army at the gates of the temple of Diana ; and such an entry meant absolute surrrender of all their liberties. For Alexander, once in possession, might not be willing to vacate. They had not so admitted Persia, and would not Alexander. They were open to be persuaded to transfer their allegiance and fleet to Alexander's service, but not their life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. They no doubt wished to keep their city free to join whichever king might eventually prove the victor. They knew their impor- tance both to Darius and to Alexander, and did not propose to yield it up in exchange for mere uncertainties. If Darius won — as still seemed far from unlikely — they would profit by being the only Phoenician city which had retained its loyalty. If Darius should be again beaten, they could still offer a stanch resistance, and perhaps make their own terms. Their argument was natural and sensible. But they did not know Alexander. The city therefore refused the Macedonian overtures. The citizens shut their gates, and their king re- turned home to defend the city. Alexander had matured a sensible sequence in his plan of campaign : first, an expedition to Egypt, to complete the con- quest of all the maritime cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, so as to neutralize the Persian power at sea ; and second, an advance on Babylon, which he could undertake if Macedon and faithful Greece were, by the possession of the seacoast, put beyond the danger of harm from Sparta and her Persian ALEXANDER'S GENERAL PLAN. * 327 allies. But he could accomplish neither of these things till he held Tyre, for he could not safely advance on Egypt or on Babylon, with Tyre, the chief of the naval stations of Phoeni- cia — all but of the world — in his rear. He therefore called the usual, perhaps legally required council of Companions, strategoi, ilarchs, taxiarchs, and officers of the allies, and put the case to them. Tyre, they agreed, must be taken ; but how ? The thing seemed impossible. But, said Alexander, /WACEDON General Map showing Alexander's Base-line. what must be done is never impossible to you and me. Relying on the fertility of resource of the king, it was determined to isolate the city, and then operate against it. This decision, when matters eventuated in so long a siege, was one which would have been working directly into Persian hands, if but such a spirit as Memnon's were still in control. But Darius had no master-mind to oppose the ability of Alexander. Time, usually of the essence in war, did not now run against him. Many critics have inquired why Alexander, immediately 328 '' THE PRIZE OF ISSUS. after the battle of Issus, did not sharply foUow Darius, and penetrate to Babylon and Susa, seek to control the Persian kingdom from its centre, and prevent Darius from accumulat- ing another army. A similar criticism has been passed on Gustavus for not advancing on Vienna after crossing the Lech. But the truth was that Alexander had vastly more grave fears for his rear and for Macedon than dread of any force in his front. The Persian fleet still commanded the ^gean, though it was fast being neutralized; King Agis' brother had got control of Crete ; the Greek states, though quieted for the nonce by the late victory, were easily capable of again breaking out into revolt ; and until the entire coast from the Hellespont to the Nile was in his hands, it would be but a thrust in the dark to venture his all on an expedition into the interior. If his objective was the conquest of the whole then known world, his base of operations must be the entire coast-line of the then known sea. The prize won at Issus was not his objective, but his base. This coast-line was the least he needed as a base for so gigantic an undertaking as he had planned, and that his schemes of conquest were broad and sensible, is by nothing so well shown as by his pa^ tient waiting and working here on the coast before he vent- ured beyond the Euphrates. On reaching Tyre, Alexander found the old city on the mainland vacated. The citizens had retired to the so-caUed new city. This was situated on an island two miles long, less wide, and separated from the coast by a passage half a mile wide, some eighteen feet deep near the town, shallow and swampy near the shore. It was surrounded by very lofty walls. It had two harbors, one the harbor of Sidon on the north, and one the harbor of Egypt on the south, both partly facing the mainland. The old town, vastly less strong, had stood a siege of thirteen years by Nebuchadnezzar. It was TYRE. 329 well provided -with arms, and had a brave population, — a garrison stated by some at thirty thousand men, though this figure may refer to arms-bearing inhabitants, — all manner of machines suitable to resist a siege, and a number of war-ships, which were brought back by King A^emilcus just before the Tyre. investment was completed. It was provisioned for a long period. Alexander hoped to get the assistance of the Phoeni- cian fleet. The Tyrians still trusted that their old associates might join them, rather than help Alexander crush an ancient ally. As the king had for the moment no vessels, and was reduced to attacking the city from the shore, he made up his mind to build a mole across the channel from the mainland. The 330 THE MOLE. mole was designed to be two hundred feet wide, and was built by driving piles into the bottom, and filling in with stones, earth and wood. Work was begun at once. Laborers were pro.eured from every part of the neighboring country. The piles were cedars brought from Mount Libanus, and these were easily driven into the swampy soil ; the stones came from the old town on the coast, abandoned by its citizens, and now demolished and used against them. The rushes from the swampy land made excellent binding. To prevent the edges of the mole from washing away by the attrition of the waves, whole trees, leaves and aU, were cast into the sea to stiU the water which the southwest wind usually kept in heavy motion. A city and a forest were exhausted to build this wonderful mole. Alexander oversaw every part of the work, and constantly encouraged the Macedonians and other workmen who labored at it day and night, with cheering words and substantial pres- ents. The work progressed rapidly ; but as they approached the deeper water near the city and within reach of missiles, it not only became difficult, but hazardous. The Tyrians mounted engines on the walls, and employed all manner of expedients to break up the work. They attacked the work- men on the mole with vessels of war at all times and places. They sent expert divers to undermine it. Their devices were beyond telling clever and unexpected. Diodorus details many of them, for which we have no space. They were bound to show their old skill to these impertinent Macedonian upstarts. Alexander was soon forced to build two towers on the end of the mole to keep the Tyrians at a distance. These he manned with soldiers and engines, and covered the front with skins to keep them from being set on fire by missiles from the walls. He made movable breastworks of wicker-work and skins, and erected palisades and mantelets for the workmen so as to THE TYRIAN FIRE-SHIP. 331 protect them from such assaults. Under cover of these the work made worthy progress. The Tyrians saw that they must destroy these towers. From an old horse-transport provided with two masts and a wide deck, with room to carry a bulky burden, they con- structed a fire-ship and loaded it with a quantity of bitumen, dry twigs, and other inflammable material. From the yard- arms or booms, which stood out like antennae, they huug caul- drons fiUed with sulphur, naphtha, chemical oils and similar substances. They towed this fire-ship between two triremes, one blustering day when the wind set well inland, towards the end of the mole, and leaving the men who were put aboard to kindle the fires to swim back to the city as best they might, retired to a safe distance for hurling missiles to keep off the Macedonians from quenching the flames. The head- way it acquired carried the fire-ship towards the mole in a few minutes. The poop was ballasted so as to throw the bows out of water and allow it to run up on the mole where it could be anchored firmly in place. The towers, breast- works and engines of war caught fire ; the yard-arm cauldrons emptied their inflammables ; the wind lent its aid ; despit^ manful fighting of the flames, aU were destroyed. For the northwest wind was very fresh and the missiles from the sol- diers on the Tyrian vessels and from the garrison on the town walls, made it aU but impossible for the Macedonians to work at extinguishing the flames, which were blown directly in their faces. Boats from the city also brought out many Tyrians who, landing on the wind side of the conflagration, aided in pulling down the breastworks and burning up the engines of war. Not only were the towers lost, but the end of the mole was cracked and weakened so as later to be washed away by the waves. The work of months and multitudes had been destroyed in a short hour. 332 A NEW FLEET. But this disaster by no means discouraged Alexander. He was by nature incapable of taking a backward step. Curtius and Diodorus suggest that he now contemplated a treaty with Tyre. But it nowhere appears that he took any steps in that direction; nor was such an act consonant with his moods. He at once set to work to construct a wider mole on which he could build more than two towers, and to replace the burned military engines. The new mole is said to have been headed more end on to the prevailing wash of the sea. The old one had taken the heavy water at the side and been weakened accordingly. He had plenty of able engineers and good machinists. Diades and Chairias from the school of Poly- cides were at their head. It was early spring. Alexander was convinced that he could not accomplish much so long as the Tyrians held the sea. He went to Sidon to collect triremes, leaving Perdiccas and Craterus in command, and taking with him the hypas- pists and Agrianians. His mission was soon accomplished. Gerostratus, king of Aradus, and Enylus, king of Byblus, who, as we have seen, had been serving with Autophradates and the Persian fleet, so soon as they ascertained that their cities had surrendered to Alexander, had deemed it wise to desert the Persian navy and now placed all their vessels at the ser- vice of Alexander. These, with the Sidonian contingent of triremes, made up eighty ships. Rhodes concluded to send its ship of state and nine others. Vessels from other places also joined the new fleet, induced thereto by the victory at Issus, and stiU later Cyprus sent one hundred and twenty ships under Pnytagoras. Among the ships were many with four or five rows of oars. This was a crowning triumph of Alexander's persuasive arts, and the conqueror was glad to overlook in present zeal past opposition wherever it had ex- isted. A TEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. 333 While this naval force was being put into condition for battle, and the engines were being built, Alexander, with a few iles of cavalry, the hypaspists, Agrianians and archers, conducted a ten days' campaign against the mountain tribes of Anti-Libanus, who were in control of the roads which led from the Orontes Valley to the coast, as weU as of the vaUey itself, and gave much trouble. This campaign he made as thorough as the one in Rugged CUicia, storming a number of mountain fastnesses, and sweeping like a whirlwind through the uplands. We have no information as to the details of this expedition, and can only judge by other similar feats of this untiring monarch how thoroughly he did his work, and by a knowledge of the difficulties of the region how huge was the task to be accomplished in so brief a space. The mere marching to and from his objective was apparently enough to do within the time. Plutarch mentions, on the authority of Chares, many acts of personal valor by the king during this expedition. But heroism was Alexander's daily habit. We cease to notice it. On his return to Sidon he found there a reinforcement of four thousand Grreek mercenaries under Oleander, and the fleet well on the road towards completion. When his fleet was ready, Alexander embarked on the ves- sels as many of his shield-bearing guards as he deemed to suffice for boarding and for close conflict, and by the first fair wind — for, though the vessels depended mostly on oars, they did not wiUingly encounter head-seas — sailed in order of battle towards Tyre, intending without delay to come to pitched battle with the enemy. He himself, with the Cy- prians and Phcenicians, was on the right. Craterus and Pnytagoras commanded the left wing. As this imposing array approached the city, Alexander stayed the advance to rectify the line, much as he had slowed up the impetuous for- ward march of the phalanx at Issus. When the slower ves- 334 THE SIEGE MACHINERY. sels had come up, the king again gave the order to advance. The Tyrians, who had previously resolved to fight, and were noted for their prowess, especially at sea, were so astonished at the number of vessels — thrice their own force — which Alexander had collected, so disheartened that their allies had deserted them, and so taken aback by Alexander's audacity in offering battle, which he did with unquestioned confidence, that they declined to come out into the open, but contented themselves with blockading the mouth of the north or Sido- nian harbor by a row of as many triremes as could be put in, which they disposed bows on for fear of capture. Seeing this, Alexander did not seek to force the entrance. The Phoenicians, however, by some skillful mancBuvring, managed to cut out three triremes which had ventured beyond the har- bor, and destroyed them. The sailors swam to shore. Alex- ander moored his fleet along the coast on both sides of his mole, where there was shelter from the winds. Andromachus and the Cyprians moored opposite the Sidonian harbor, and the Phcenicians opposite the Egyptian harbor. Alexander's headquarters were established on the latter side. The reduc- tion of Tyre was now only a question of time. A vast number of missile-throwing and other machines had now been collected from Cyprus and Phoenicia, or built on the ground. AU that the science of the day afforded and much in new invention was put to use. Of these engines, some were mounted on the mole and others on flat-boats or merchantmen, and on the slowest-sailing triremes. Towers were built on some of these vessels, provided with bridges to be thrown over to the walls. Earns were mounted on others. These floating engines were moored opposite the city. They were now brought into play, but were speedily and skiUf ully opposed by the Tyrians, who erected towers on the walls op- posite the mole and opposite the ships. This prevented the DREDGING. 335 bridges from being dropped upon them, and enabled them to discharge missiles from their own excellent artillery. They shot fire-tipped arrows against the vessels which approached and cast fire-pots from their balHstas. The walls of Tyre were one hundred and fifty feet high and correspondingly broad, and were built with the utmost skill and care of square hewn stone, laid in gypsum in a fashion of which the secret seems to have been lost. It was almost impossible for en- gines to be got near enough to work at undermining these walls, not only on account of the missiles from the walls, but because the water at their base was filled with loose stones, purposely cast in there to impede such approach. These stones Alexander now proceeded to fish up and remove, a work requiring no little skiU and patience. The vessels which were moored and set at this work were soon interfered with by triremes which the enemy clad in mail, and from which, with long-handled, sickle-shaped knives, they cut the stone dredges adrift. This manoeuvre Alexander met by mailing vessels in the same manner and placing them in front of the dredges, to prevent the cables of the latter from being cut. Then the Tyrians resorted to divers — this was the mart for sponges, and divers were many and expert — who cut the cables under water. Alexander nullified this scheme by using chains. The stones were then laboriously seized with slip- knots, taken out by cranes, carried away and thrown into deep water. In this manner, one part of the wall previously selected was gradually made accessible to the engineers for undermining. The Tyrians had naturally hoped for aid from Carthage, which was its most flourishing colony, and whither they had sent their families out of harm's way when Alexander's mole had become a threatening matter ; and they were no doubt grievously disappointed at the unfilial conduct of this eldest 836 A NAVAL BATTLE. daughter ; for Carthage volunteered no assistance whatsoever. To be sure she was at war herself, but, as she did later in the days of Hannibal, Carthage pursued a thoroughly selfish policy. The Tyrian fleet was divided into two sections, one in each harbor. The Macedonian fleet rode near the mouth of the harbors, and prevented aU egress, so that they could not join forces for attack. Together they were too weak to expect to do much ; singly they were impotent. But the harassed Tyrians felt called on to undertake some sharp offense, and determined to attack the Cyprian ships moored on the north side of Alexander's mole. Under cover of sails spread as for drying across the mouth of the harbor, and thus unknown to Alexander, they placed expert rowers and their bravest soldiers on board thirteen ships of war, — three quinquiremes, three quadriremes and seven triremes; and, towards the middle of the day, when Alexander's sailors were scattered in quest of victuals, and Alexander was in his tent on the farther or Egyptian side of the mole, where headquarters had been located, the Tyrians rowed out of the harbor. At first they moved with as little commotion as possible ; but when well under way, they raised their battle-cry, and sharply made for the Cyprian fleet. So sudden was the attack that at first they had things their own way, and drove on shore, sank or damaged a number of these allied vessels. Some of Alexander's outposts had, however, conveyed to him speeedy information of the attack, or, as others relate, he had happened to leave his tent earlier than usual this day. He at once manned as many of the vessels on the south side of the mole as he could get together, posted some of the half-manned ones at the mouth of the southern harbor, to prevent the exit of more Tyrian ships while he was absent, and with the rest — all the quinquiremes and five tri- THE END APPROACHING. 337 remes — started for the scene of action. The mole had now so nearly reached the city walls that he was compelled to make the entire circuit of the island in order to reach the place opposite the Sidonian harbor, where the Tyrian ships were committing such dangerous havoc. His direction woidd, however, enable him to take them in the rear. Seeing the danger of their vessels from Alexander's manoeuvre, — and his men rowed fast, as fast as an average steamer of to-day, — the Tyrians signaled from the walls to their vessels to return ; but before these, deafened with the noise of battle and excited with unwonted success, understood the meaning of these signals and essayed to escape, Alexander was upon them. The Tyrian vessels at once made off, but the king damaged many beyond use and captured two, one with five and one with four rows of oars. The mariners mostly escaped by swimming. Alexander had shown himself to be an admiral. This victory was the beginning of the end. The loss of the sea was to the Tyrians much like the loss of the glacis of a fort. Alexander blockaded the harbors so as to confine the Tyrian fleet within them, and was thus at liberty to try his engines upon the walls. Alexander had accomplished a goodly part of his labors. He had advanced his mole to a point from which he could attack the walls ; he had secured a safe anchorage for his ves- sels ; he had cleared the channel so as to enable his engine- bearing ships to reach the walls ; he had driven the Tyrian fleet into its harbors, and held it there. Nothing remained to be done but to break down and carry by assault the city walls. But just this was the gravest task of aU. The des- peration of the Tyrians grew with the danger. Despite all his trouble, Alexander found that he was unable to make any impression on the wall next to the mole, it being 338 AN ASSAULT REPULSED. too solid for any engines he had constructed. Nor could the floating engines make any impression upon the side nearest Sidon. Still, though he was much disappointed, all this did not discourage the king. After long efforts and trials on every part of it, the floating engines finally succeeded in greatly weakening the wall on the side toward Egypt and seaward, where the Tyrians, expecting no attack, had con- structed a masonry less solid, and in breaking down a por- tion. The besieged had shown themselves to be easily masters in their inventiveness and mechanical skill; and Alexander's engineers had needed all their ingenuity to match them. The impatience of the army had been growing, and confidence be- gan to weaken in the possibility of capturing this extraor- dinary fortress. But the opening of a breach kindled fresh courage in the hearts of aU, Into this breach Alexander now threw a bridge and a storming party, but the Tyrians, with showers of missiles, fire-pots and other devices, drove this partial assaidt back, and repaired the breach by a half -moon. Alexander waited for a better chance. It is asserted that he was again tempted to observe the place, and proceed upon his way. But there is no act of his to support this theory, and it is scarcely compatible with Alexander's characteristic per- sistency. Three days after this failure, the sea being calm, Alexander made preparations for a new attack in force. It was the end of July. He assembled his battering engines at the most as- sailable place, which was on the southwest front, and ordered some of his vessels carrying catapults and other missile-throw- ing engines as weU as slingers and archers to skirmish around the island on aU sides, in order to make the garrison uncertain as to where the stoutest attack was to come, and stationed others near the breach so as to overawe the enemy by the TYRE SUCCUMBS. 339 violence of the assault and the multitude of missiles. Upon stDl other vessels he placed his best troops, the shield-bearing guards under Admetus, and the phalangial brigade of Ccenus. He proposed to lead the assault in person. He sent parts of his iieet to the mouths of both harbors to endeavor to force an entrance, by breaking the chains which barred them. AU the rest were put to use to assist in the final struggle. After some hours' effort, he succeeded in opening a still wider breach, the battering vessels were withdrawn, and the two which had been fitted with bridges were brought up; the bridges were thrown, and the shield-bearing guards, under the personal eye of Alexander, mounted to the assault. The affair was sustained in the most courageous manner by the Tyrians ; but when the Macedonians had once got a footing upon the wall, they pushed back the enemy with their accus- tomed gallantry. Admetus was the first to fall, pierced by a spear. Alexander with Coenus and the phalangians followed up this success, and having taken several towers and the wall between them, advanced fighting along the battlements to- wards the royal citadel. For this was an easier means of approach than to descend to the level of the city streets. The citadel was taken. Meanwhile, the fleet at both harbors — the Phoenicians at the Egyptian, and the Cyprians at the Sidonian — had f oimd its way in, and, making short work of the Tyrian vessels, cap- tured the north and south fronts of the city, erected ladders and soon forced an entrance. Being thus taken between two fires, the stronger force of Tyrians opposite Alexander de- serted the walls and rallied near the temple of Agenor. But Alexander, who, after the death of Admetus, had headed the shield-bearing guards, emerged from the citadel and soon broke down all opposition ; and the enemy being attacked from aU sides by Coenus and by the men of the fleet, a fear- 340 THE LOSSES. f ul slaughter ensued. For the Macedonians were enraged at the obstinacy of the city's defense and the cruelties practiced on Macedonian prisoners captured by the Tyrians, who had tortured and put them to death on the walls in full sight of the army, and thrown the bodies into the sea, thus depriving them of the rights of burial. They had even cast Alexan- der's heralds into the sea from the top of the walls. Over eight thousand men were slain. Two thousand Tyrians, say Curtius and Diodorus, were hung or nailed to gibbets on the seashore. Of the population, Alexander pardoned all who had fled into the temple of Hercules, among whom were the king and many prominent officials ; but sold into slavery the rest of the Tyrians and mercenary troops, some thirty thou- sand men. The women, children and old men had mostly been previously sent to Carthage, their, as it proved, ungrate- ful colony. In the assault, but twenty of the shield-bearing guards were kUled. During the siege, four hundred Macedo- nians had lost their lives. No doubt between three and four thousand had been wounded, — a somewhat higher rate of loss than that of Grant at Vicksburg. Grote deems this number much too small. A part of the population is said to have escaped by connivance with the Phoenicians on the fleet, and to have later returned to Tyre. Curtius says fifteen thou- sand were thus saved. The cruel fate of Tyre was but the usual outcome of the sieges of antiquity. Inexcusable, if you like, but readily matched by the similar horror at Magdeburg in the Thirty Years' War. If, after sixteen centuries of Christianity, thirty thousand men, women and children, out of a population of thirty-six thousand, could be butchered in the name of reli- gion, the less criticism passed on the so-called cruelties of Alexander the better. Masses have no soul. The armies of olden times demanded such holocausts. Even such a king as DARIUS' OVERTURES. 341 Alexander, had he so desired to do, could scarcely have pru- dently stood in their way. To deny his men their rights in this particular would have forfeited much of his influence. And Alexander, no doubt, was at times as revengeful as the basest of his phalangians. Alexander now offered the proposed sacrifice to Hercules with military honors, his army parading at the very gates of the temple, and dedicated the particular engine which had opened the breach, to the god, as a thank-offering. The fleet was drawn up in battle order, and passed in review ; and the Tyrian ship, sacred to Hercules, which had been captured, was likewise dedicated, and a suitable inscription placed upon it. Games and gymnastic sports were celebrated within the precincts of the temple. Thus fell Tyre, after a siege of seven months, and no doubt its extraordinary resistance and awful doom made as deep an impression upon the world as had the battle of Issus. The pride of centuries had been humbled by the persistent cour- age, ability and military skiU of Alexander. The place was retained as a naval station, but Tyre was entirely destroyed, though Strabo says that it again became a flourishing city. The building of the mole altered the flow- ing tides in such a manner that the ancient harbors have been filled up with deposits of mud, and the island has be- come a peninsula, nature's monument to the almost super- human labors of this greatest of captains. While besieging Tyre, Alexander received from Darius a second letter, tendering him ten thousand talents for the re- lease of his mother, wife and children, and offering him his daughter Statira in marriage and all the territory west of the Euphrates. Alexander submitted this letter to the Compan- ions, and Parmenio is said to have advised its acceptance. "If I were Alpxander, I would accept." "If I were Par- 342 JERUSALEM. menio, so would I ; but being Alexander, I wiU not," — are the words said to have been exchanged. Alexander replied to Darius that the whole of Persia was his, and that he would marry his daughter, if he so wished, without his consent ; as for the money, he was in no need of it. Thus rebuffed, Da- rius prepared for a further contest. It is related by Josephus that Alexander now (some put the event after the capture of Gaza) marched towards Jeru- salem, which had refused him supplies, feeling bound to honor its oath of allegiance to Darius. But at the gates he was met by a procession of citizens headed by the high priests. These he treated with the highest respect ; and hav- ing been shown in the prophecy of Daniel that he was the Greek foretold as the one who should overcome the Persian king, he not only abstained from injuring the city, but granted it every seventh year immunity from taxation. If this be not strictly true in aU its details, it is nevertheless certain that Alexander would not have left in his rear so prominent a city as Jerusalem unvisited and unsubdued. No doubt the relation is substantially exact. Sanballat, satrap of Sa- maria, cast in his lot with Alexander. Acco made no resist- ance. Alexander. (From Cameo in Zanetti Museum.) XXV. GAZA AND EGYPT. SEPTEMBER, B. C. 332, TO SPRING, B. C. 331. Prom Tyre Alexander marched to Gaza on the way to Egypt. This town, the outpost piotectuig the road to Egypt, under Batis, made stern resistance to the conqueror. It was captured only after a two months' siege, and by the erection of mounds and works of remarkable extent. The garrison was exter- minated, and Batis treated with unnecessary cruelty. From here Alexander went to i^ypt, which he found no difficulty in reducing. He laid out Alex- andria, and visited the temple of Jupiter Ammon. He might have kept on to Carthage, but learning of Darius' new army, he turned back. The ^Egean fleet had completed its work, and Alexander had possession of the whole Med- iterranean and its coast. He could advance into the interior with safety. It was early September. All Syria except Gaza had sub- mitted to Alexander. But Gaza must be reduced. This city was situated near the edge of the desert on higher ground than the level of the plain and on an artificial eminence sixty feet high, and was by far the most formidable place in south- ern Syria, a bulwark, as it were, which dominated the road from Damascus to Egypt, from the Red Sea to Tyre, and had been the fortress from which the restless population of that country had been controlled by Persia. It had been intrusted by Darius to one of his most faithful servants, and victualed for a long siege by the Eunuch Batis, its commander, who, with a eye single to his master's interest and honor, believed that he could hold the fort with his Persian garrison and Arab contingent, and thereby keep the Egyptians in subjec- tion until Darius could again gather a new army, and come in his might to chase this overbearing adventurer from the sacred soil of Asia. Batis knew that Alexander had captured Tyre y 344 GAZA BESIEGED. with his fleet. Vessels could not approach his fortress. Gaza was some two miles inland, — Strabo says but seven stades ; the coast was marshy and bad for landing ; the fleet here was useless. Batis was satisfied that he was safe. Alexander, on his arrival, camped near the weakest-looking part of the wall on the south side, and ordered suitable en- gines to be built for its reduction. The engineers were of opinion that no towers could be erected from which the walls Gaza. could be successfully reached and battered down, owing to the height of the ground on which they were built above the level of the plain. But Alexander would consider no difficulty whatever. After Tyre, was there any city which could resist him? He began the construction of a mound around the city, beginning on the south side where the walls seemed least stout ; and here, too, the mound was largest. In an almost incredibly short time this mound had — probably only in places — risen to a height such that the engines could be set at work upon the walls. It is not improbable that there were several of these mounds. A HUGE MOUND. 345 When the battering was about to begin, and Alexander was, according to custom, sacrificing to the gods, a bird of prey flew above him, and let fall a pebble which smote Alex- ander on the head. But the bird then alighted on one of the machines, and was caught in some of its ropes. The sooth- sayer Aristander, from this event, prophesied that Alexander should indeed capture the town, but must in the assault have a care of himself. Alexander, therefore, kept somewhat more than usual in shelter, taking up post near the batteries instead of near the walls. But one day, when a sortie was made by the garrison, the works erected with so much toil were near to being fired, and the Macedonians from their lower position were in danger of being driven from the towers and engines, Alexander, seeing the imminent danger of defeat and unable longer to contain himself, seized his arms, and heading his shield-bearing guards, came quickly to the rescue. The sortie was repulsed, though the Macedonians had lost some ground ; but Alexander was wounded by a shaft from a catapult which pierced through the shield and corselet, and entered the shoulder. The wound was a serious one, and came close to being worse. According to Curtius, the king received two wounds in this siege. The engines from Tyre which had been sent for now arrived by way of Majormas, a neighboring small harbor, and the mound was completed all around the city, though possibly the expression " all around " may mean concentric with the wall. Part of it — Arrian leads one to infer that all of it — was twelve hundred feet wide, and two hundred and fifty feet high (that is, near the wall) ; and as the sand from this plain could not be used, materials were brought from a distance. If such figures as these were not abundantly vouched for, they would be incredible ; but we know from Ethiopia and Egypt, and Nineveh and Babylon, what gigantic works can be erected by 346 A FOURTH ASSAULT. the forced labor of the entire population of a district. The fact that to build such a mound all around the city would be a vast expenditure of unnecessary labor (for the mound was of use only for the towers and rams, and these were erected but at one or two of the most available spots, and the rest of the waU of contravallation need be but comparatively small), leads us to construe the passage as above, whatever the dictionary meaning of the words. If opposite but a small part of the wall, the performance is sufficiently magnificent. From this mound the Macedonian engines could easily op- erate. A large part of the city wall was speedily undermined or battered down, and much more made full of breaches. But though Alexander thus commanded the walls, and could drive the defenders from the parapet and embrasures, the defense was very stubborn, the garrison forcing back three assaults, though these were made with true Macedonian elan, and the garrison lost heavily. The fourth was delivered in greater force, and from several sides, after enlarging the breaches and making use of all the ladders and tools which their previous ill suc- cess had shown to be necessary. There was the greatest emulation as to who should first scale the wall. Neoptolemus, one of the Companions, was the man who outstripped all the rest. Being closely followed by other leaders, on whose heels pressed the balance of the troops, the wall was surmounted, and a chosen body made for each gate. These were soon opened, and the Macedonians passed into the city. The most bloody contest raged through its entire extent. The brave Gazeans fell to a man sword in hand, where each had been posted. The women and children were sold into slavery. It is said that ten thousand men were slain at Gaza, and that Alexander took barbarous revenge on Batis, the commander, dragging him around the walls lashed to the back of his chariot — as his ancestor Achilles had done to Hector. Un- TOWARDS EGYPT. 347 usual vengeance, and one which, however much in accordance with the spirit of the age, we can wish untrue of Alexander. The siege had lasted two months. Enormous stores of spices were captured here at Gaza, which was the chief market for such goods. Alexander is said to have sent Leonidas, his ancient tutor, five hundred talents' weight of frankincense and one hundred of myrrh, in memory of a reproof once given him. When as a boy he was, at a sacrifice, throwing incense by the handful into the fire, Leonidas had said to him that imtil he had conquered the land of spices he must be more sparing. Alexander now accompanied his gift with the hope that Leonidas would no longer be a churl to the gods. The study of numismatics furnishes us with many of our historical facts. The coinage of Asia Minor and Syria shows us that, while Alexander restored to the territories west of the Taurus their liberties, the cities being left on the same footing as those of Greece, those east and south of the Tau- rus were treated as possessions of his own. The coins of the latter countries bear the impress of Alexander as king ; those of the former are not so issued. Syria and Phoenicia were accordingly left under a strong government, and Alexander headed for the country of the Nile. It was early December, just a year after the battle of Issus, when Alexander started on his Egyptian expedition. In seven days he reached Pelusium, whither he had ordered his fleet under command of Hephaestion, so that it might meet him on his arrival. Though recently conquered, Egypt had no bond whatsoever with its Persian masters, nor was there any desire for an armed conflict with the Macedonians. The Egyptians were a peaceful folk. The occupation of a new conqueror seemed quite immaterial to population and rulers alike. The Persian Satrap Mazaces, in lieu of receiving as 348 THE NILE. friends the Greek mercenaries who had fled from Issus under the renegade Amyntas, and thus being able to use them for the defense of the country, as they had anticipated he would do, had attacked and dispersed the force, and massacred most of them. This left him no means of offering resistance, and being moreover at odds with the population, Alexander gained easy admittance to aU the cities of Egypt, besides enriching himself with some eight hundred talents in money. He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the east branch of the river to Memphis, and marched on the east side of the CANOPOb Egypt. Nile to Heliopolis through the desert, taking possession by voluntary surrender of aU the towns upon the way. He then advanced towards Memphis, crossed the Nile at this point and sacrificed to Apis, the Sacred Bull, with Greek feasts and gymnastic contests. Alexander was always careful to treat the religion of the countries he conquered with respect instead of contumely and outrage, and on this occasion desired to see what could be done to merge the feelings of his old and new subjects by mixing the Macedonian religious customs with those of Egypt. From Memphis he sent his army down the Nile to the coast, the agema of cavalry, hypaspists, Agrianians and arch- ers on vessels down the west branch, and turning towards MGEAN SUCCESSES. 349 the west he arrived at Canopus. He sailed round Lake Mareotis, and foreseeing that a city might become very pros- perous at this location as an entrepSt of trade, he chose the site of Alexandria and founded this famous mart. His first selection was the Pharos as the site of the city, but its extent being too small, he drew the outline of the city on the main- land. The harbor is one of the best, and Alexander's calcula- tions as to the future value of this, his first Alexandria since crossing the Hellespont, were not disappointed. In making the plans, there being nothing on hand wherewith to mark the lines proposed for walls, Alexander resorted to the use of the soldier's barley, which he scattered along the ground. Nu- merous birds were thus attracted to the spot, and the future great prosperity of the place was prophesied from this sign by Aristander and other soothsayers present. At this point Alexander was joined by Hegelochus, his admiral in the .^gean, who reported that Tenedos had re- volted from the Persian yoke forced on them against their wiU and had come over to him ; that Chios had taken a sim- ilar step ; that the fleet had captured Mitylene, and brought over other cities of Lesbos ; and that Amphoterus, his vice-ad- miral, had captured Cos. He brought with him a number of the chief men of these places who were opposed to Alexander, as prisoners. These men the king sent back to their several cities to be judged by those, now holding power under him- self, who were cognizant of the facts and better able to con- vict or acquit. By these victories, added to the closing against the fleet of their usual harbors, the Persian power at sea had been paralyzed, and Alexander had gained possession of the whole Mediterranean coast. Alexander was now seized with a desire to visit the temple of Jupiter Ammon in the Libyan desert. Perseus and Her- cules, his ancestors, were said to have consulted this oracle, 350 JUPITER AMMON. and Alexander not only wished to tread in the footsteps of these heroes, but desired to learn certainty concerning his own origin and future, or, as Arrian says, " that he might be able to say he had learned it." Both Plutarch and Arrian agree that Alexander claimed descent from Jupiter only in order to impose on the credulity of the populations he conquered. He did so, according to Curtius, "because he either believed Jupiter to be his father, or had a mind the world should think so, not being satisfied with his mor- tal grandeur." While admitting the truth of many of the allegations against this monarch, it must be allowed that foUy was not one of his characteristics. His intelligence ranged far beyond that of most of the wisest men of his day. And he was much more capable of pretending a belief in his own divine origin for political effect, or because it administered to his personal vanity, than of really harboring it. Accompanied by a considerable body of horse and foot, Alexander advanced along the seacoast to Parsetonium, nearly two hundred mUes from Alexandria, thence soiith an equal distance to the oasis where the temple lay. Aristobidus states that on this occasion rain fell in this always arid region as a sign that the gods were propitious, and that the march of the army was led by two, Curtius says great flocks of, ravens (Ptolemy, son of Lagus, says two snakes, uttering a voice), which moved on before them the entire distance. The voyage' was certainly prosperous. The oasis was five miles long by three wide. It was well inhabited and tilled, and full of olives and palms. Dew fell there, and the fertility of the spot was in wonderful contrast to the ocean of sand which surrounded it. Justin says Alex- ander gave the priests instructions as to what answers should be given to his queries, and particularly ordered them to salute him as son of Jupiter. "Now, whoever would judge ALEXANDER'S SUPERSTITION. 351 sagely of the sincerity and credit of the oracle, might easily have perceived by its answers that it was all imposture," says Curtius. Having, at all events, consulted the oracle to his satisfaction, though his queries and their answers are not divulged by history, Alexander returned by the same route to Alexandria, and thence to Memphis, as narrated by Aris- tobulus ; or straight across the desert to Memphis, according to Ptolemy. Possibly, a part returned by the former, and Alexander, with the hardier part of his force, by the latter route. Had Alexander not heard of Darius' new levies, he might have moved farther along the coast towards Carthage. But this important news beckoned him in the other direction. Carthage was isolated and entirely innocuous. Alexander remitted it to the future. At Memphis many embassies from Greece came to the king, each with its own request. Always expert in his pol- icy, Alexander was able to send all these embassies back with a feeling of satisfaction. He also received a small reinforce- ment from Antipater. This consisted of four hundred Greek mercenaries under Menidas, five hundred Thracian cavalry under Asclepiodorus, and several thousand phalangites. In providing for the future government of Egypt, Alexan- der returned, as was his habit with all conquered peoples, to its ancient and beloved customs. The king had a fine sense of how to mix civil and military rule among peoples used to a central government. He kept the civil entirely distinct from the military control. The former was invested with no power except that of levying taxes and carrying forward the old and well considered laws and customs then prevailing, which Alexander was wise enough not to upset; the latter was removed from the temptations of finance, from the dan- ger of handling moneys. Native ministers were continued in office, but carefully watched ; only the head of the state was 352 MANAGEMENT OF EGYPT. changed ; thus the people had no chance of organizing resist- ance. The citadel of every town was put in charge of a trusted band of his own Macedonians. In addition to this a general commanded outside, with a sufficient Macedonian force to act as a leaven for the native levies he was directed to make, and command and drUl in the Macedonian manner. Alexander was generally readily accepted as king, because the people knew of the change only by a general lightening of their burdens, and a less oppressive method in the collection of taxes. In this instance Alexander appointed an Egyptian, Doloas- pis, governor of Egypt ; but placed the military command in Macedonian hands. He left two Companions, Pantaleon in Memphis and Polemo in Pelusium, in command of garrisons. Some Greek auxiliaries, which he also left in Egypt, he in- trusted to Lycidas. Peucestas and Balacrus were commis- sioned generals in command of the Egyptian army, which, including the above garrisons and auxiliaries, consisted of four thousand men ; Polemo was also admiral of the navy of thirty triremes. Charge of Lybia he gave to ApoUonius ; of part of Arabia to Cleomenes. Calanus succeeded Balacrus in command of the Greek auxiliaries who kept on with the army. Ombrion succeeded Antiochus, who had died, in command of the archers. Leonnatus became one of the somatophylaxes. Alexander, says Arrian, was induced to leave the country under many governors on account of its distance from his probable future campaigning grounds, and because he deemed it unsafe to intrust a country so large and fuU of resources to the command of any one person. The lists of viceroys, governors and commanders left in the vari- ous countries often vary in the different authors. Changes in command account for this. It is not important to us. DATE DUE _jjwr>*" p»«.'-- *WM -«72E ^TffltlTT^ *|lffP^*K!B» nm 23 ■]5§4^ yiay."" GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S,A»