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 Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University 
 
 MORRIS LLEWELLYN COOKE, 
 
 Consulting Engineer. Philadelphia 
 
 Cornell University Library 
 B945.K66 U5 
 Universe, by Scudder KWee. with three i 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 029 066 343 
 
 This book solves all problems of why, how, what, in science, religion, 
 and philosophy. Or, it gives an intelligible and unified statement of the 
 fundamentals of all things, and applies that to everyday life. It is addressed 
 to the average educated man, but is designed to meet the requirements 
 of experts in various branches. The book is experimentally verifiable. 
 
 Some of the particular things the book does are:- 
 
 Establishes a sound logic. The logic used by the ordinary man is 
 right ; that used by Aristotle and nearly all books is wrong . 
 
 Removes the fundamental error from mathematics, and makes 
 mathematics simple ; proves Euclid's "axiom" about parallels, and intelligibly 
 solves the various problems of non-Euclidian and n -dimension space. 
 
 Revises and unifies the equations of physics. Completes conventional 
 "theories" of physics — about a dozen, — and makes a somewhat new one that 
 is easier :- vortex whirls . 
 
 Shows how gravity works. Shows what is wrong with Newton's law 
 of gravity, and why. Makes Einstein's theory actually intelligible — showing 
 that it is one sort of possible language out of an infinite number of 
 possible valid languages or logics. The book shows that everyday language 
 (Euclid's and Newton's and Christ's) is valid, and the most economical and 
 practical — and uses it. 
 
 Extracts from the INTRODUCTIONS :- 
 
 Dr. JORDAN, one of the leading scientists of the world, 
 
 says:- ". . .unique . . . daring . . . successful . . . 
 Mr. Klyce makes no attempt to solve any scientific problem 
 by pure reason, but he would have us make rational use of 
 the knowledge we possess." 
 
 Professor DEWEY, by many regarded as the leading 
 living philosopher and logician, says:- ". . .The sincerity 
 and power of the book, and the radical simplicity of its 
 unifying idea give it every claim to a hearing. ... I hope 
 what has been said may indicate the extraordinary value of 
 Mr. Klyce's work for philosophers, and, in connection with the 
 way in which he applies the formal unification outlined to the 
 mathematical, natural and social sciences, to all persons inter- 
 ested in reducing intellectual bbfuscation and confusion. . . . 
 . . .Mr. Klyce's book is remarkable, noteworthy. If experts 
 in various lines shall find his special results as fruitful, as 
 illuminating, as his general treatment of knowledge and 
 technical philosophy has been to me, the remark just made 
 will turn out to be altogether too moderate. Any remark of 
 mine about the value of the book in anticipation of this result 
 will seem intemperately extravagant." 
 
 Shows intelligibly what electricity, light, matter, energy, etc., are. 
 Gives birth, life, death of solar system. 
 
 Shows how to get energy out of atoms, etc. 
 
 That simple and easy physics is used in the last third of the book 
 to solve qualitatively the more complicated human problems — those of age, 
 growth, death, life, birth, sex, medicine, immortality, good and evil, 
 freedom of will, religious experiences and ethics in general, money, taxes, 
 business principles, value, etc. 
 
 Proves that the Constitution is right, and shows what democracy is, 
 and proves that it is right and that all other forms of government and 
 'legal' law are wrong. 
 
 Proves (verifiably, of course) the doctrines of Christ: disproves the 
 essential ones of Paul and theologians. 
 
 Mr. COOKE, a leading engineer, says:- "The world 
 today needs broad generalizations, but even more it needs 
 counsel as to their application to specific situations. This 
 book fulfils both these requirements in a very special way. 
 For this reason I am recommending it, not as a philosophical 
 treatise, but as a text book with an everyday usefulness for all 
 those who are trying to bring some measure of reasonableness 
 and order and effectiveness into our turbulent industrial 
 life. . . The book as a whole, in spite of its austere mecha- 
 nics, is not hard reading. This does not mean that there are 
 not places — in fact whole sections — which I made no effort 
 to get and others which I read superficially. But the author 
 has developed quite a knack of using words in not only a 
 precise but a commonly accepted way, so that over a greater 
 part of the journey, a lack of mathematical and scientific 
 training is not an insuperable handicap. . . Of course, if one 
 readily understood and as readily agreed with everything in 
 a book like this, it would be too simple a document to merit 
 much attention. ... I will be much surprised if to most 
 men a reading of 'Universe' will not make the struggle [of 
 life] a far simpler matter than it usually seems to be." 
 
 Set up, printed, and published by 
 
 S. KLYCE, 
 
 Winchester, Mass. 
 
 Publisher's price, to everybody:- $2 plus postage 
 
 POSTAGE, up to 150 miles from Boston, 7c; to 800, 10c; 
 
 to 600, 15c; to 1000, 20c; to 1400, 26c; to 
 
 18oo, 33c; beyond, 88c. 
 
 Bookstore price, $3 
 
K 
 
 
 Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029066343 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 BY 
 
 SCUDDER KLYCE 
 
 WITH THREE 
 
 INTRODUCTIONS 
 
 BY 
 DAVID STARR JORDAN 
 
 Chancellor Emeritus, Stanford University 
 
 JOHN DEWEY 
 
 Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University 
 
 MORRIS LLEWELLYN COOKE 
 
 Consulting Engineer, Philadelphia 
 
 Copyright, 1921, by Scudder Klyck 
 
 Copyright in Great Britain 
 
 First Edition. — 1000 copies. — Printed from 
 
 type and no plates made: plates can be made by 
 
 photographic processes later if they are needed. 
 
 Set up, printed, and published by 
 
 S. KLYCE 
 
 Winchester, Massachusetts 
 
 Publisher's Price to everybody, $2 plus postage (Wt. 3 lbs.) 
 Bookstore price, $3 (see Preface, §Fi). 
 
 1921 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 First Introduction by John Dewey. 
 
 Second Introduction by David Starr Jordan. 
 
 Third Introduction by Morris Llewellyn Cooke. 
 
 Preface. 
 
 Introductory Remarks. 
 
 chapteh 
 
 I Summary of contents and their character. 
 II Order and relationship of contents. 
 
 Part One. Formal unification ; 
 or Theory of Language. 
 
 III Nature of the general problem and its conventional 
 
 name; or, what apparent failure in unification 
 requires reconcilement. 
 
 IV Statement and proof of principles of language; or, 
 
 logic. 
 V General statement and proof of how to apply language. 
 VI Names for logic, and chief application of valid logic 
 to men. 
 VII Statement and proof of valid logic from additional 
 
 points of view. 
 VIII Mechanical model of language. 
 IX Theory of language in terms of physical science; or, 
 general unification of science. 
 
 Part Two. Concrete unification ; 
 or Physical Science. 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 X General principles, and general mechanical theories, 
 of science. 
 XI General whirl mechanics. 
 XII Astronomy. 
 
 XIII Light. 
 
 XIV Electricity. 
 
 XV Heat, chemistry, etc. ; and summary of Part Two by 
 practical applications. 
 
 Part Three. Spiritual Unification; 
 or Humanics. 
 
 XVI Biology. 
 XVII Psychology. 
 XVIII Ethics and economics. 
 XIX Sociology and economics. 
 
 Appendix A. 
 Appendix B. 
 Appendix C. 
 Index. 
 
 Abbreviations. 
 
 Periodic table of elements. 
 
 Geologic time scale. 
 
 ERRATA 
 
 The errors in this following first list are those which the reader 
 can not readily see at once are errors, and see what is correct. The 
 second error in the iist was made only in about half the copies. 
 § 42d line 8 Read stayed instead of stated. 
 
 74f line 32 Equation should be Density=MI~ 3 . 
 
 do C^QmeT. 
 
 Read Reeve's instead of Reeves's. 
 Read chapter instead of section. 
 Read or instead of of. 
 Read or instead of and. 
 Read lower instead of slower. 
 Read 1913 instead of 1903. 
 Read F instead of the second E. 
 
 Read good instead of 2nd poor. 
 I mm ii Read of instead of in. 
 
 76e line 14 
 
 89b line 21 
 
 96c line 2 
 
 98n line 34 
 1 14d line 3 
 132a line 9 
 132e line 10 
 ]36c line 14 
 Footnote 168h-iii line 37 
 do -v line 14 
 
 This second list is a list of paragraphs in which typographical 
 errors occur that the reader can readily correct for himself if he not- 
 ices them. In a number of the listed cases I caught the error myself 
 
 and corrected it before printing all the 1000. I know that 
 
 there are some more-technical errors I haven't listed; and probably 
 there are numbers of errors I haven't found. 
 
 §§43cf, 44d, 47h. 49d, 50e, 59ae, 60i, 61a, 63c, running 
 head p. 61, 72d, 74b, 76e, 78a, 80c, 81h, 83e, 84b, 85b, 
 86cdh, 90c, footnote 98d, 98g, 99ab, lOOg, 101b, 104b, 1 12a, 
 113c, 116b, 118e, 120ik, 122j, 126bg, 133e, 136c, 144hi, 
 145c (two), 146k, 147fg, 148b, 149jq, 151a, 153d (two), 
 155b, 161b, 162fj, footnote 166d, 166nr, 167j, 168dmnp, 
 170k, footnote 172c, running head p. 233, 175c, 176b, foot- 
 note 176d, 176e. 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Dewey's Introduction 
 
 THREE INTRODUCTIONS 
 
 FIRST INTRODUCTION 
 
 by 
 John Dewey 
 
 Mr. Klyce has invited me to write some prefatory words 
 for his book. In spite of my technical incompetency in 
 physical sciences and realizing the handicap that imposes 
 upon me, I have gladly consented. For although the argu- 
 ment of the book as a whole must finally stand or fall with 
 the treatment of topics where my lack of knowledge makes it 
 impossible for me to have a real judgment, the sincerity and 
 power of the book, and the radical simplicity of its unifying 
 idea give it every claim to a hearing. And judging from the 
 parts where it is possible for me to follow intelligently, I 
 have a strong presentiment the other parts do not go far 
 wrong in substance : — Mr. Klyce himself makes plenty of 
 allowance for deviations in special points. 
 
 Mr. Klyce says somewhere in effect that every reader of 
 this book will have in the end to rewrite it for himself. My 
 introductory remarks can not take any other form than re- 
 writing that portion of Part One which sets forth the funda- 
 mental logic — or method — of the book. 
 
 He says that the book unifies or qualitatively solves 
 science, philosophy, and religion. Many cultivated readers 
 will be likely to stop right here. While they tolerate or 
 laud classic philosophers for attempting such unification, they 
 associate, with painfully good reason, contemporary profes- 
 sions of such solutions with pretentious ignorance. To make 
 such a claim is the common sign of the incompetent amateur 
 in philosophy and science. My first rewriting is of this phrase. 
 
 Mr. Klyce emphasizes qualitative unification. He ex- 
 pressly points out that concrete problems of science and 
 practical life are solved only in living them intelligently. 
 For the word qualitative, we may write the word formal, and 
 contrast it with material unifications. Then we note that 
 such attempts as are in unenviable repute owe their offensive 
 arrogance to claiming material unification. Every philoso- 
 pher deals with the problem of formal unification, either 
 positively or negatively. 
 
 What is significant in this book is not, then, the claim of 
 unification but the way it is worked out. Every reader knows 
 how common are phrases that combine antithetical terms, 
 terms that taken separately oppose each other. Examples of 
 such pairs are :- rest and motion, space and time, matter and 
 energy, potential and actual, analysis and synthesis, one and 
 many, individual and society, common and proper noun, 
 cause and effect, freedom and authority, quantity and quali- 
 ty, prose and poetry, parts and whole, mind and body, flesh 
 and spirit, God and nature, purpose and mechanism, static 
 and dynamic; or upon a slightly more technical plane, dis- 
 crete and continuous, substance and properties, elements and 
 relations, existence and essence. Now the natural mind, the 
 commonsense mind in the best usage of that ambiguous 
 phrase, is not perplexed by those combinations of opposites. 
 They seem natural, complementary ; expression is incomplete 
 without both. 
 
 Philosophic reflection begins with an express noting of the 
 opposition between the terms of such pairs. It sets out to 
 reconcile them, to get a qualitative or formal unification. Or 
 it denies the possibility of any unification, and holds that all 
 knowledge since it goes on in such terms as motion and rest, 
 
 space and time, is relative." Or, the apparatus of knowing 
 gets between us and the things to be known. Or it gener- 
 alizes the pairing off into a rigid dualism of the separate, in- 
 dependent forces, substances, principles. Or, like Hegel, 
 it takes the bull by the horns and declares that all reality, 
 all truth" is a union of contradictories. 
 
 Now it is a conceivable hypothesis that commonsense is 
 innocent of these contradictions because it always uses the 
 terms with reference in a context, to mark or point out 
 features in a situation, and with no other intent than calling 
 attention to them, either as memoranda for one s self or as 
 guides for another. This supposition does not as yet explain 
 the opposed character of the terms, or why they go in pairs. 
 But it raises another interesting hypothesis. What would be 
 the effect if some one else reflecting on the agencies of point- 
 ing and marking forgot their directive use, and took them to 
 convey something otherwise than as pointers to observations? 
 May not this explain why the terms are effective in ordinary 
 usage and stumbling blocks to the philosopher? 
 
 This last paragraph is one way of rewriting another sen- 
 tence of his Introductory Remarks which will give offense to 
 some readers :- that the author s method of complete formal 
 solution has to do with a mere trick of words. Unfortu- 
 
 nately, not all readers, or writers, take words as seriously as 
 Mr. Ktyce does. He himself points out that a mere word is 
 but a passing sound or a patch of ink. What he is doing, as 
 he clearly points out in §2de, is to investigate the fact that 
 knowledge is a statement or expression, and to investigate 
 this fact by the same experimental methods that have hither- 
 to been confined to the things stated or expressed. Now 
 language as a machine of expression or statement is something 
 quite different from a mere trick of words; and in §155 Mr. 
 Klyce vividly depicts the psychology that makes him from 
 time to time resort to such depreciatory phrases. The reader 
 must balance it with the term absolute unification of science, 
 philosophy, and religion," as he is used to balancing the 
 terms rest and motion, whole and parts. 
 
 Let us return then to the hypothesis that in actual use 
 names call attention to features of a situation ; that they are 
 tools for directing perception or experimental observations. 
 The first thing to be noted is that the situation" is referred 
 to only in the (literally) most general way, as the limiting in- 
 cluding thing within which specific things are pointed out. 
 A gesture calls attention to a dog-fight. It doesn't call at- 
 tention to the town, to the world or the sun and its light or 
 to the previous history of the animals or to the position and 
 expectations of the observer. And if some special feature 
 within the dog-fight is then pointed out, a broken leg, the 
 fight itself is no longer specified. It takes care of itself. It 
 is now the situation as the entire visible scene was form- 
 erly the situation within which the fight was discriminated. 
 The situation as such in short is taken for granted. It is not 
 stated or expressed. It is implicit, not explicit. Yet it sup- 
 plies meaning to all that is stated, pointed out, named. Its 
 presence makes the difference between sanity and insanity. 
 We may say if we will that it is ignored. But the ignoring 
 is not the ignorance of denial. Ignoring means "under- 
 stood," assumed as a matter of course as the background and 
 foreground which gives intelligibility and state-ability to 
 what is explicit, expressly pointed out. Now the implicit 
 situation cannot (save arbitrarily ; that is, by some agreement 
 for a purpose) be stopped short of Everything. The setting, 
 
Dewey's Introduction 
 
 the implicit situation, shades off from the explicit, indefin- 
 itely and continuously. Everything" is understood, im- 
 plied, then as the setting, or meaning-giving force, of what 
 we explicitly say or state. 
 
 Recur now to the actual naming or pointing. It discrimi- 
 nates, distinguishes something; makes it explicit, states or 
 expresses it. That which is pointed to gives the meaning of 
 the word or directive gesture. But the lone thing pointed at 
 has no meaning. We always distinguish one thing from 
 something. All explicit names point out then a comparison- 
 contrast of at least two things. A This by itself, as Mr. 
 Klyce points out, has no meaning. It is not an expression 
 or statement, but merely another thing, a noise or figure. 
 This explicitly implies That; Here explicitly implies There; 
 Now, Then. In short, the simplest possible intelligible state- 
 ment explicitly implies a number-of-things-related-together, 
 while it implicitly implies a sum total, or an Everything 
 with which the related plurality of things is continuous. This 
 is a "trick" of language just as a watch may be called a trick 
 of steel. It is the only way a thing can be done, in one case 
 keeping time, in another case giving direction to observations 
 of existence. Size and complexity in both cases may vary 
 indefinitely ; and substitutes may be found for steel, and 
 different signs in language. But the way, the principle, re- 
 mains the same. Here is the qualitative or formal unification. 
 
 This is one way in which one basic proposition of Mr. 
 Klyce may be rewritten. This way of writing will probably 
 appeal especially to those habituated to philosophical modes 
 of writing. For it suggests that the problem of statement, 
 or language, is identical with what in philosophical writing is 
 called the epistemological problem, the problem of know- 
 ledge. Science is the expression of experiments with things. 
 It isn't the things over again, nor is it simply the experi- 
 ments. It is communication of them with their results in 
 consistent form. The simplest and most objective way then 
 to examine knowledge experimentally is to examine consistent 
 expression or statement experimentally — to see what happens 
 when we do or make it. The method as used by Mr. Klyce 
 gets rid of an enormous amount of cumbrous and largely effete 
 psychology. It cuts out an enormous mass of historical 
 reminiscence that obstructs the path of one who approaches 
 the subject in the traditional way. To philosophical readers 
 (to those who use that particular dialect) I would point out 
 the freshness and directness of Mr. Klyce's method of ap- 
 proach to the old problem of the nature of knowledge. 
 
 This remark applies to his method irrespective of the re- 
 sults he has obtained by its use. Let us now return to an 
 inspection of these results. In any intelligible statement, 
 from a gesture to a complete discourse on science, there are 
 two kinds of implications, one implicit, the other explicit. 
 The explicit implication is that of relations between ele- 
 ments ; that is, between distinguished parts. The implicit, 
 understood or taken for granted is, ultimately, as we have 
 seen nothing less than the universe or Everything." 
 
 Now (l) this implicit implication is strictly ineffable. It 
 cannot be stated. For it is required to give meaning to any 
 statement. Yet it is convenient, and for consistent expres- 
 sion of complex matters it is necessary, to have a term to re- 
 fer to it. It is necessary to have a word which reminds us 
 that whatever we explicitly state has this implicit, unstate- 
 able, ineffable implication. Hence the terms which Mr. 
 Klyce calls One words, like all, nothing, only, being, every, 
 infinity, universe, whole, never, always. These words have 
 no (definite) meaning. In philosophical terminology they are 
 transcendental, noumenal, a priori. They are religious 
 terms, like God, eternity, perfect rest or peace, complete 
 salvation. An experimental realization of their meaning is 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 had only emotionally, and the emotion may be poetic es- 
 thetic or in some cases mystic. Speaking in philosophical 
 terminology, we have here revealed the truth and the falsity ot 
 the whole brood of absolutistic, transcendental phi osopher^ 
 They have had a genuine experience of ^«, which is reqmred 
 for the meaning of any consistent statement. But they as- 
 sert that these One terms themselves have a meaning, that 
 they are terms of statement. Or if they are professional 
 mystics, the ineffable character is recognized, but the experi- 
 ence is regarded as a special, separated, not to say unique, 
 experience, instead of what is implicit, in some degree of 
 intensity, in every experience. 
 
 (2) The other side of statement is distinctions-in-relations, 
 Many words, and Relationship words. Here the ways of go- 
 ing wrong by failing to observe what we do when we state or 
 express or know' are more numerous. The most general 
 and fundamental one is to turn the ignoring of the Every- 
 thing or Universe (to take Mr. Klyce's favorite term, tho to 
 some it is too indicative of the starry heavens) which is 
 equivalent to its implicit assertion into its explicit denial. 
 This is the root of all kinds of phenomenalism, relativism, 
 agnosticism. For it amounts to asserting that the very act 
 of making known (expressing) mutilates reality, puts a veil 
 or screen between us and reality, hides things-in-themselves 
 from us, perverts it in bringing it within our grasp. This is 
 the root of all agnosticism and subjectivism — the notion that 
 the process of knowing intervenes between us and the things 
 to be known. And Mr. Klyce s examination of Statement 
 shows that this notion is due to failure to grasp all that is 
 done when we state; namely, refer to the Whole as the con- 
 text within which what is explicitly stated falls as constitut- 
 ing its meaning. 
 
 Every statement (or knowledge) fully realized in its im- 
 port or logical form links us up with the Whole, instead of 
 cutting us off from it. And this is true when the statement 
 is materially wrong — as every statement in its explicitness is 
 bound to be in some degree. For some of its implicit junc- 
 tions with the Whole may be rendered perceptible in further 
 statements. If the statement is sincerely taken, they not 
 only may but will be. Every intelligible statement contains 
 within itself, in other words, the conditions of its own recti- > 
 fication, provided we carry out the experiments it indicates. 
 I think that those who appreciate the force of these remarks 
 and who find them verified in their own experience will agree 
 that Mr. Klyce understates rather than exaggerates the emo- 
 tional relief and expansion that may come with it. 
 
 Other fallacies which arise from failure to perceive fully 
 what happens when we state or make known (to ourselves or 
 others) are materialism and mechanism — as a wholesale 'ism, 
 that is. This arises from observing that parts are discrimi- 
 nated and failing to observe that they are at the same time 
 related. The problem of relations and elements is a familiar 
 one in philosophical writings. Perhaps one need here only 
 call attention to the likeness and unlikeness of Mr. Klyce's 
 treatment with that of Mr. Bradley. The latter also points 
 out that every statement both analyzes and synthesizes, 
 selects or partializes and also unifies. But he places those 
 functions over against each other. Selection mutilates the 
 living fullness of reality. Unification adds as it were insult 
 to injury; it falsifies, for the selected parts are not as such 
 capable of union. They unite only in the whole. From this 
 property of statement (judgment, in Mr. Bradley's language) 
 he infers that everything we judge is compelled to take on 
 the form of appearance, because it involves self-contradiction 
 and this cannot be found in reality. 
 
 All this is suggestive of Mr. Klyce's insistence upon iden- 
 tity or circular perception" as the test of statement, and 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Jordan's Introduction 
 
 his pointing out of contradiction between the many and the 
 one in every statement. But where Mr. Bradley ends, Mr. 
 Klyce begins. He points out that this contradiction is itself 
 contradicted by the assertion (indication) of the implicit Every- 
 thing. The elements selected are so related in every 
 intelligible statement as to constitute the Whole; or, the 
 situation is so distinguished that it has an infinite number of 
 elements. And infinity is again a reference to the Whole. 
 This is the verbal trick" in its simplest form. The infinite 
 regress of relation and element which Mr. Bradley points out 
 in judgment is to Mr. Bradley another sign that our know- 
 ledge does not get beyond Appearance. Mr. Klyce shows 
 that this infinite regress is the method by which every state- 
 ment indicates or refers to the Whole. It negates the seem- 
 ing arbitrary selection of some parts by calling attention to 
 the fact that the Whole has an infinite number of other 
 parts: that is, is a whole. 1 
 
 Another fallacy arises from confusing relationship terms 
 with many or one terms. In this case, we get pseudo- 
 idealism, pseudo-intellectualism, abstractionism in the sense 
 which Mr. James so vividly condemned. Mr. Klyce refers 
 as an instance to the fact that many writers dress up the re- 
 lationship word truth in shining armor, and exploit emotions 
 with it. All idealism of the self-conscious, professional type 
 is of this nature; all idealism, that is to say, that opposes 
 the ideal to the actual, and throws contempt upon the actual 
 and concrete; which sets up ideals as something above and 
 too good for the common man in common experience. It is 
 the aristocratic vice par excellence. The ideal is the Whole 
 implicit (tho not implied in the ordinary logical sense of im- 
 plication) as the meaning of every intelligible experience. 
 Hegel doubtless saw this in a way, but made the typical 
 idealistic error of supposing that the task of philosophy was 
 to derive modes of statement superior in kind to those of 
 commonsense and science in which the implicit whole should 
 be rationally explicated. In fact, the philosopher has the 
 humbler task of pointing to the fact that every consistent 
 statement already refers to an ineffable whole. Realism, 
 especially modern analytic realism, on the other hand, ig- 
 nores entirely the implicit, and insists only upon logical im- 
 plications ; that is, relationships which can be made explicit. 
 As a consequence its relations become only another and 
 strange kind of things or parts. An atomism results which 
 taken strictly forbids all statement whatever — as the Greek 
 critics of a similar view long ago pointed out. 
 
 A word may be added on Mr. Klyce's elimination of the 
 bugaboo of subjectivism. Mr. Klyce gets rid of it by start- 
 ing with expression or statement as itself an objective fact 
 which can be observed like any other event. His method 
 may be said to assume or imply that expression is a function' 
 of things just as heat is. But this assumption is, as Mr. 
 Klyce points out, merely formal in both cases. The meaning 
 of the assumption that heat or a statement is there (is 
 happening) is not found in the statement about heat or ex- 
 pression but in the observation of the happening itself. A 
 finger-board on the road does not materially assume anything 
 about the town to which it points. It actually or materially 
 does nothing but point. The only assumption" is that if 
 you take the road you will find -what you will find; that 
 
 'In rewriting one part of Mr. Klyce from the standpoint of the 
 traditional problems of the theory of knowledge, I am doing him an 
 injustice not only from the standpoint of the larger public not con- 
 cerned with technical philosophy but from the standpoint of profes- 
 sional philosophers. For reference to the positive development of 
 implications of space, time, energy, units of science, and the formu- 
 lae for their relations, in which Mr. Klyce makes his formal unifica- 
 tion fruitful is omitted. 
 
 which you find is alone the real meaning of the sign-board. 
 The sign may lie; Mr. Klyce may be mistaken. But the 
 only way to find out either thing is to take the path indi- 
 cated. In the case of the book this means to observe, with 
 the guidance of its author, the thing or happening called ex- 
 pression. It takes a considerable amount of skill and a large 
 degree of vision and good will to follow the road, but that is all. 
 
 I hope what has been said may indicate the extraordinary 
 value of Mr. Klyce's work for philosophers, and, in connec- 
 tion with the way in which he applies the formal unification 
 outlined to the mathematical, natural and social sciences, to 
 all persons interested in reducing intellectual obfuscation and 
 confusion. Many thinkers have had the laudable ambition 
 of exhibiting the connection of science and philosophy with 
 commonsense. But usually they have taken commonsense to 
 mean a mixture of the operation of sound sense with a body 
 of inherited engrained traditions and sophistications. Mr. 
 Klyce has taken commonsense in its radical and simplest 
 form, the form of stating or making anything known. He 
 has himself pointed out the reason why his thought is not 
 always easy to follow. The most difficult thing in the world 
 to learn to see is the obvious, the familiar, the universally 
 taken for granted. Taken as a sketch of a certain way of 
 discovering the meaning of knowledge in general and in its 
 typical branches, Mr. Klyce's book is remarkable, note- 
 worthy. If experts in various lines shall find his special re- 
 sults as fruitful, as illuminating, as his general treatment of 
 knowledge and technical philosophy has been to me, the re- 
 mark just made will turn out to be altogether too moderate. 
 Any remark of mine about the value of the book in anticipa- 
 tion of this result will seem intemperately extravagent. 
 After the result, it will, fortunately, be quite unnecessary. 
 
 John Dewev. 
 
 SECOND INTRODUCTION 
 
 by 
 David Starr Jordan 
 
 The unique treatise for which I have been asked to write 
 a few words in introduction impresses me as a daring and 
 successful effort to aid straight thinking by the accurate use 
 of language. Its central purpose is to bring into the realm 
 of Science the philosophical conception that all that exists is 
 in a sense of one piece, — infinite variety embraced within 
 infinite unity. Thus the Universe may be looked on as a 
 majestic Federation of Energies, an infinite machine in which 
 all parts fit and cooperate. 
 
 Oneness, however, does not imply tangible sameness, 
 though some apostles of Monism have insisted that underly- 
 ing unity inevitably postulates at least some measure of ob- 
 jective identity — as of matter and force, for example, — or 
 more concretely, of all the chemical elements, one with 
 another. But to be fundamentally at one" does not neces- 
 sitate any such sameness. Matter and force must comple- 
 ment each other, in some positive sense, as the key fits the 
 lock. Indeed there are numberless intimate relations which 
 do not necessarily involve identity of origin, form and sub- 
 stance. In a harmonious universe (however we may describe 
 it) there might be (and we can know only by observing) a 
 million definitely distinct chemical elements, not interchange- 
 able and not derived from Haeckel's fancied "Protyl," or 
 any other primitive world stuff, whether matter or spirit. 
 As to this and to all other questions of fact, we shall never 
 know the answer until we find it out by looking. Moreover, 
 the conception of the unity of the Universe need not ever 
 
Jordan's Introduction 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 reduce it to a single substance, nor even to a single definite 
 purpose. Pluralism (multiplicity in unity) is as true as one- 
 ness, in the meaning given by William James s assertion :- 
 No one can question that the Universe is in some sense one, 
 but the whole point lies in what that one is. 
 
 Science is human experience tested and set in order; any 
 belief which neither demands nor permits verification lies 
 outside of Science. All propositions which can be proved by 
 deduction or even proved completely (see §S5 of the book), 
 belong to the realm of expression or Logic, not to Science, — 
 conclusions being involved in premises. Pure mathematics, 
 for instance, is the logic of number and space, and its dem- 
 onstrations, however intricate, are derived from its defini- 
 tions. Similarly, a definition of the Universe can be framed 
 in such a way as to make its unity self-evident; — in fact no 
 other definition that is self-consistent is possible: but no 
 scientific conclusion can be deduced from proof thus obtained. 
 Details of reality — matter, force and life — would be no nearer 
 demonstration than before, for these we know only from the 
 coordinated results of human dealings with them. 
 
 Knowledge, never complete, may be relatively exact or 
 inexact according to the sufficiency of our data. In no field 
 has Science yet reached completion, — and it is in the nature 
 of things impossible that it ever can. It sees some things 
 very definitely ; but the unknown lies as a trackless wilder- 
 ness on every hand. As details accumulate, generalizations 
 are possible — and even prophecy with some degree of cer- 
 tainty. In Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, relative ex- 
 actness prevails. The simpler the factors involved, the more 
 definite our mastery. Obstacles in the relatively exact 
 sciences are mainly our human limitations. The enormously 
 distant and the extremely small elude precise observations; 
 star and electron baffle alike; the bulk of the Universe is 
 beyond our definite seeing. Time is as long as space is 
 
 wide," and no one can conceive a limit to either. 
 
 The sciences concerned with life deal also with the ele- 
 ments of matter and force, but in highly varying relations. 
 In any biological problem, conditions due to the relative po- 
 sition and relation of atoms and molecules, of cells and tis- 
 sues, of organisms and environment, are visibly varied almost 
 to infinity ; data of one sort or another everywhere abound, 
 but the more we have, the more we see we need. Untested 
 problems crowd on every solution. In biology, therefore, to 
 a degree greater than in the more exact sciences we cannot 
 know what we know or what we do not know with complete- 
 ness or ultimate precision. 
 
 The only final test of a supposed fact is found in our 
 ability to prove it by trusting our lives to it, or to the method 
 by which it is gained. Simply to demonstrate that a propo- 
 sition will work — that is, muddle along after a fashion 
 — is not enough ; in all its parts it must stand a supreme 
 test, that of liveableness." Such a direct and conclusive 
 proof, however, is not available in all life's complex and im- 
 mediately pressing situations. The next resource is to test 
 the method behind the conclusion. The aggregate of know- 
 ledge, so tested, constitutes Science, which then becomes 
 the guide to conduct, though never infallible, because never 
 complete. In default of personal experimental knowledge 
 as to matters of fact or ideals of conduct we make the best 
 we can of the conclusions of others, trusting to the strength 
 of the method by which the conclusions are reached. We 
 thus have an acceptable hypothesis on which to act until the 
 returns from personal experience begin to come in. 
 
 Mr. Klyce makes no attempt to solve any scientific prob- 
 lem by pure reason, but he would have us make rational use 
 of the knowledge we possess. As to the fundamental co- 
 ordination of all which exists, known or unknown, — any 
 
 consistent use of the word Universe implicitly asserts it. 
 Man himself is able with fair success to make his way in the 
 Cosmos; obviously then he is not utterly alien. Not only 
 does his continued existence prove him not alien, but further- 
 more, by taking thought, he can make headway against the 
 forces of nature and thus in some degree shape his own ca- 
 reer. A similar line of argument is shown to apply to every 
 concrete thing of which we are cognizant. The burden of 
 disproof of Mr. Klyce's thesis lies on him who, within the 
 confines of the Universe, can conceive anything — matter, 
 spirit, life, space, or time — which lies outside it. 
 
 David Starr Jordan. 
 Stanford University, California, 
 March 20, 1920. 
 
 THIRD INTRODUCTION 
 
 by 
 
 Morris Llewellyn Cooke 
 
 The world today needs broad generalizations, but even 
 more it needs counsel as to their application to specific situa- 
 tions. This book fulfils both these requirements in a very 
 special way. For this reason I am recommending it, not as 
 a philosophical treatise, but as a text book with an everyday 
 usefulness for all those who are trying to bring some measure 
 of reasonableness and order and effectiveness into our turbu- 
 lent industrial life. 
 
 Industry is not only still in the making, but it is in its 
 infancy rather than its adolescence. Just as we begin to 
 realize that civilization is dependent on industry for its very ex- 
 istence we have come to see that this same industry is really 
 not related to Life in any vital way. It is a perilous position 
 and no one claims that the path ahead is at all clearly de- 
 fined. The perpetuity of our institutions seems to depend 
 on whether in a generation or two we can come to have a 
 better understanding of this Juggernaut we have created. 
 For it is daily more apparent that all will not be well in the 
 world until each unit of the structure of industry is sympa- 
 thetically related to every other and to industry as a whole, 
 and that industry itself must understand in some measure its 
 relation to Ultimate Reality. 
 
 Our industry has been very largely a matter of trading. 
 But the barter basis is disappearing with the advance of 
 science. More and more it is the trained engineer or the 
 man with engineering training who holds the key positions 
 in industry and commerce. But Engineering in the past 
 concerned itself very largely with things. Up to a genera- 
 tion ago engineers were for the most part either designers or 
 constructors of things, i. e.,, bridges, dams, railroads, power 
 plants, etc. Then the operation of these agencies began to 
 be included within the scope of Engineering. Only quite 
 recently has it come to be considered that in the operation 
 of most industrial enterprises the engineering method is apt to 
 be the most effective. Thus has been developed the engineer- 
 ing of men, sometimes called human engineering' in con- 
 trast with what has been the more technical engineering of 
 materials. This book, from the business man s or engineer's 
 point of view, undertakes to establish a proved and verifiable 
 scientific basis for this new branch of engineering which some 
 people prefer to call efficiency engineering. 
 
 The book as a whole, in spite of its austere mechanics, is 
 not hard reading. This does not mean that there are not 
 places — in fact whole sections — which I made no effort to 
 get and others which I read superficially. But the author 
 has developed quite a knack of using words in not only a 
 precise but a commonly accepted way, so that over a greater 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Preface §Ab 
 
 part of the journey, a lack of mathematical and scientific 
 training is not an insuperable handicap. The author advises 
 readers — especially at certain places — not to work too hard to 
 get out all the meaning. I dare say that the average reader 
 who will approach the book in this spirit will get about all 
 the author expects anyone to get on first reading and will 
 then be tempted to start all over again. 
 
 The reader should be on guard against being unduly 
 stirred by the author s mannerisms. In some of his com- 
 ments on theologians and lawyers" for instance it seems to 
 me that he lapses from his general technique of tolerant expres- 
 sion and philosophy. Of course, if one readily understood 
 and as readily agreed with everything in a book like this, it 
 would be too simple a document to merit much attention. 
 
 It is altogether impossible to epitomize the conclusions of 
 any such book. But among many pithy phrases which Mr. 
 Klyce has coined, balanced co-operation ' stands out as one 
 having special significance in the industrial field. It means 
 something more than doing unto the other fellow what you 
 would have him do to you. It seems to involve a measure 
 of action and reaction as between units and groups, which 
 will in every instance be conducive to well-being and growth 
 all around. During the War it would frequently have sug- 
 gested to organized labor the advantage of restraint in push- 
 ing wage claims, and at the present moment it should give 
 pause to those employers who tend to push their opposition 
 to labor unions beyond the checking of their obviously un- 
 toward tendencies. According to the author, democracy al- 
 lows or requires that each side to any discussion re-act to the 
 other. This is the exact opposite of the We have nothing 
 to discuss" or the Public be damned attitude. 
 
 After all, whether you are king or labor leader, business 
 man or priest, your master decision is as to whether you will 
 be — to use the language of the book — a dualist and an 
 autocrat" or whether, constantly studying the unity of all 
 modes and expression of life, you will seek through bal- 
 anced co-operation" to participate in the execution of pur- 
 poses and a Purpose not your own. 
 
 Mr. Klyce has shown a capacity for infinite pains in 
 carrying his main thesis into so many different scientific 
 realms and there seeking to establish its truth. Too fre- 
 quently we have been asked to take judgments on scientific, 
 religious and philosophical matters from men who having 
 grown up in one group inherit points of view — even prejudices 
 — which would be dissipated by a larger outlook on life. 
 
 Vernon Kellogg says that while The biologist does have 
 a certain positive knowledge of some conditions or factors 
 that do help to determine the course of human life," it is 
 also true that "the course of human life is partly determined 
 by a set of conditions which are, so far, at least, quite out- 
 side the special knowledge of the biologist. He can guess 
 and wonder about them, just as other people do, but he has 
 no right to claim that he knows about them." The same re- 
 mark obviously can profitably be made about any specialist. 
 
 Also, to any specialist is apt to come the moment — and 
 and it is one of possible, even soul-racking, disillusionment 
 — when the inadequacy of a narrow slant on life becomes 
 
 apparent. The more sincere the worker and the more funda- 
 mental his work the deeper the yearning to relate the indi- 
 vidual effort to the totality of things. The surest way to give 
 dignity to a simple act is to relate it to a purposeful life. 
 The surest way to endow our industrial system with vitality 
 is to scheme it out in harmony with all Life — to make the 
 paying of a wage and the doing of the day's task in some 
 genuine fashion God's service — to link them up with the 
 Ultimate Purpose. 
 
 Of course a great industry will only result from the 
 activities of great men. Most industrial leaders impress us 
 as being literally worn out fighting against a flood of isolated 
 facts and ideas. We need the unifying thought of this book. 
 To be effective we need above all to make our lives simple. 
 Men vary in their mental capacity, but it is undoubtedly 
 true that some men with great capacities are not the match 
 for men of ordinary abilities who see life steadily and see 
 it whole." I will be much surprised if to most men a read- 
 ing of Universe ' will not make the struggle a far simpler 
 matter than it usually seems to be. 
 
 The very familiarity which grows out of usage has af- 
 forded in the past in all too generous measure, the authority 
 which we humans require to make us happy in our work and 
 play. But in so many ways — through education, through a 
 heightened individualism, and more immediately through the 
 shake-up of the Great War — the mass of men are questioning 
 all our procedures in a way heretofore unheard of. In the 
 depths of the mines, in the vast silences where the lumber- 
 jacks toil, on the seas and in our great manufacturing plants 
 near the centers of population, men are counseling together 
 as never before, on the meaning of life and the meaning of 
 industry and the relation of one to the other. 
 
 The idea that anyone knows in the old particularistic 
 sense is gone. Have we not read only yesterday of Einstein 
 and that theory of relativity that upsets ' one of the surest 
 rocks on which our whole structure of knowledge has been 
 built? We know now as never before perhaps that, to use 
 the language of this book, There is no exact science." And 
 yet our respect for science deepens and our sense of depend- 
 ence upon it has become altogether profound. This under- 
 standing of the place of science in industry and life is no 
 longer confined to the schools. The nations begin to appre- 
 ciate the hopelessness of preserving their identity except 
 through science. The owners of our industries perhaps feebly 
 — but altogether definitely — are studying in myriad ways the 
 application of science to the production of goods. And now 
 we detect the first beginnings of the same tendency in the 
 organization through which labor expresses its purposes. 
 Herein lies one of the great hopes of the race. When our 
 workers reach the point where they can well abandon force 
 and embrace science, humanity will be in for a new experience. 
 
 But a science that is unrelated is even more fearsome than 
 an industry that is detached from life. Hence our obligation 
 to the author for a master generalization in which science is 
 made to seem but another manifestation of that Ultimate 
 Reality to which the human spirit itself is kinsman. 
 
 Morris Llewellyn Cooke. 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 §A. Subject matter. — a. This book unifies or qualita- 
 tively solves science, religion, and philosophy — basing every- 
 thing on experimental, verifiable evidence. The explicit 
 meaning of that statement is given in Chapters I and II. No 
 assumption is made (as is shown in §22). 
 
 b. The book is a condensed, preliminary rough draft of 
 that unification of knowledge. All the qualitative problems 
 set forth by the race — by "religion, science, and philosophy" 
 — are herein positively, definitely, and verifiably solved. But 
 the application of those solutions consists of quantitative 
 
§Ab Preface 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 problems ; and it is shown that no quantitative solution may 
 be accurately expressed or given (§§25, 40-1, 50, etc.); also, 
 such solutions are infinite in ' number" and may not be even 
 roughly expressed in a finite book. Hence, merely general 
 methods of the application of qualitative solutions to the 
 problems of how much? and how many? are given. And only 
 in so far as the reader is able to understand, verify, and ap- 
 ply those methods to his life has the book any value to him. 
 As each person differs from others (§§162i-j, 167m, 168p, 
 170p), the best book for one reader truistically can not be 
 the best for another. So this book can not possibly be final, 
 or the last word ; other men can continually rewrite it bet- 
 ter, wholly or in part. And most emphatically, I propose to 
 no reader any creed, or theory, or system of truth, or 
 ritual of any sort. As will be seen (Part One), all such are 
 merely passing conveniences, tricks with words — and each 
 reader may best select his own words. 
 
 c. The prime purpose of the book is to substitute posi- 
 tive knowledge for that aggressive ignorance which is named 
 agnosticism — thus eliminating agnosticism, the current pre- 
 vailing ism." The accomplishment of that purpose results 
 in raising the standard and content of living — gives life 
 more abundantly" (Chapter XVIII, on ethics). 
 
 §B. To whom addressed. — a. The book is addressed 
 to the general reader who has a fair education. Each sub- 
 ject is treated with the rigor that will, it is hoped, satisfy the 
 experts in that subject. But because the book includes all 
 branches of knowledge, probably no one of the present day 
 would be competent to read it if it were written in highly 
 technical terms, and gave the minute details of each branch. 
 I certainly should not be. So in order to satisfy all the ex- 
 perts by giving each the complete grasp of his subject which 
 truistically includes knowledge of its relations with the sub- 
 jects of other experts, it was necessary to avoid all but fairly 
 common technical terms, and to omit unnecessary details. 
 And that is equivalent to addressing the general reader. 
 
 b. That reader, as will be shown implicitly throughout 
 Parts One and Three, is quite competent to judge the validity 
 of this book. There is nothing esoteric or hard" about the 
 book in general. It is merely a description of things as they 
 are. However, it requires some work to read the book. 
 Some effort of attention will have to be made in places. 
 
 c. A competent scientist of wide and successful experi- 
 ence in writing for the general reader tells me that people 
 tend to be frightened away from a book that uses mathemati- 
 cal equations. I show that such a distrust and dislike of 
 mathematics is justified, and an evidence of the wisdom of 
 people in general: conventional mathematics contains funda- 
 mental errors (§§80, 4)3-4-). I remove those disabilities of 
 conventional mathematics, and then use a few algebraic 
 equations which even the non-mathematical reader will nearly 
 surely approve, so obviously do they economize his attention. 
 
 I may add that the publishers I tried seem to disagree 
 
 with that: the reader may judge whether they underrate him. 
 
 §C. a. There is no originality in this book in any real or 
 important sense. Possibly some combinations of ideas are 
 partly new. But I myself have definitely found nearly all, ev- 
 en of the wider combinations, previously advanced by others. 
 
 b. Consequently, the reader need not anticipate being 
 repelled by any novelty or heresy of any importance ; even 
 when at first there is some slightly distressing apparent nov- 
 elty, in the end it will turn out to be obviously an old belief. 
 E. g., it is shown that the earth is cold inside (§122i). That 
 does not happen to be the current conventional belief. But 
 it was a common view in the past; and if the reader will ex- 
 amine his views he will probably find that he has no more 
 real love for a hot inside than for a cold inside — but prefers, 
 
 as the important thing, the actual facts and the absence of 
 self-contradictory views. The perspicacious reader will soon 
 discover that I am very conservative — avoid being either 
 radical or reactionary. 
 
 c. As there is no real originality in the book it follows 
 that I am indebted to others for the ideas set forth. I grate- 
 fully acknowledge that debt; but those creditors are so 
 numerous that I can name none without injustice to many 
 whose names I do not even know. In even greater measure 
 I am indebted, not only for ideas I have used, but for what 
 is more, personal aid and inspiration, to my wife, Laura 
 Kent Klyce, and to Frederick W. Taylor, David Starr Jor- 
 dan, John Dewey, T. W. Richards, Dorothy Canfield Fisher, 
 J. J. Thomson, and Gerald Stanley Lee. 
 
 §D. a. Some personal remarks may interest the reader, 
 and will give needed information :- 
 
 b. In the early summer of 1914 I finished a book that 
 contained substantially what this one does. It was too long, 
 and contained literary defects quite too atrocious, for publi- 
 cation. It ran to about -700,000 words. Since then I have 
 written it over in whole or part continually — having much of 
 that competently criticized. That work is here condensed 
 into a volume of reasonable size — I have struggled to keep 
 it down to 250,000 words (it has expanded in two rewritings 
 and probably will be about 325,000 when I finish setting it 
 up: this page is done in the middle of that job). That al- 
 most violent compression of such an obviously extensive sub- 
 ject was necessary chiefly because a long book in this day of 
 many good books frightens away readers, and because with a 
 subject of such a nature a long book would tend to have so 
 many trees that it would hide the forest' from the view of 
 the few who might have braved its length. 
 
 c. The reader can of course understand that it would 
 have given easier reading if some of the book had been ex- 
 panded into smaller and more familiar detail. But the al- 
 most imperative need of brevity, which has just been pointed 
 out, has required the sacrifice of such ease. Quite possibly 
 no reader will be satisfied with the actual compromise that 
 has been made between such brevity and such local easy in- 
 telligibility. The most difficult thing about the actual writ- 
 ing of the book was to make that needed compromise in a 
 way that was even tolerable to the reader — to conserve both 
 his effort of attention and of memory. 
 
 §E. Typographical and similar formalities. — a. Cer- 
 tain arbitrary printing styles, which are not always used, 
 have been followed in this book. An explicit statement of 
 them here, if the reader keeps the statement casually in 
 mind, will save his attention. 
 
 b. The argument unifies knowledge. Consistently with 
 that idea, often when I have a formally plural subject, in my 
 view it is clearly unified, and I use a singular verb — some- 
 times oddly. Always in that as well as in other grammatical 
 constructions, I try to be conventional and hence inoffensive. 
 But when explicitness and clearness of expression seem* to 
 require it, I deliberately sacrifice formal grammar. 
 
 c. All names of books, articles, etc. , are put in quota- 
 tion marks. 
 
 d. All algebraic symbols are given in italics. 
 
 e. All words, used as words, are printed in italics; no 
 quotation marks are placed around them unless the custom 
 for such marks (stated in the next paragraph) also applies to 
 them. Italics are also used for emphasizing a word or words 
 whenever it seems to me to make the text the least bit easier 
 to read. It would of course always be possible, by ingenious 
 literary circumlocutions, surely to indicate the desired em- 
 phasis without that mechanical use of italics. But the keen 
 reader will appreciate the brevity secured by italics, and will 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Preface §Ff 
 
 readily perceive that I compliment him by taking it that he 
 does not need the literary flattery I could give him by letting 
 him waste energy finding the emphasis. This is not a book 
 for stupid readers, who require even literary flattery. 
 
 f. Quotations of others are marked thus:- "",etc. — in 
 the usual way. Quotations of myself are marked thus:- '; 
 and such quotation usually consists of my use of some word 
 or phrase in a temporarily unusual sense. The " " marks 
 are similarly used at times to emphasize or indicate that I 
 am using a word or phrase quite conventionally. 
 
 g. This double mark :- is used to introduce something 
 that the previous sentence or clause has definitely prepared 
 for and led up to," so that it just precedes some remarks 
 that are to be expected. The ordinary colon : is reserved 
 for its other ordinary uses. When the :- is followed by a 
 word beginning with a small letter, it introduces merely the 
 remainder of the sr.me sentence — when by a capital not other- 
 wise needed, the remainder of the paragraph, etc. 
 
 h. Economy of attention requires the conventional me- 
 chanical device of treating a single topic in a paragraph. ' 
 Sometimes in this book such a natural topic needs a lengthy 
 paragraph which of itself contains sub-topics. If the long 
 paragraph were split into paragraphs to indicate its natural 
 subdivisions, it would, mechanically, at first give the reader 
 the erroneous and confusing idea that the chief topic changed. 
 So I split it into little paragraphs by a dash . 
 
 i. Most algebraic symbols' used in this book are con- 
 ventional initial letters; but some are whole words. A list 
 
 of those symbols, etc., is given as Appendix A. The 
 
 chemical elements and periodic table are given as App. B. 
 
 j. The symbol ... will be reserved for the single mean- 
 ing:- a continuing series, or infinite regress (§36n). An 
 omission in a quotation, which often is indicated by that 
 symbol, is indicated by ***. 
 
 k. When I needed to state the source of a quotation or 
 idea, or to indicate where fuller or analogous expression or 
 proof is given in this book, I have tried to avoid that distract- 
 ing and chopping up of the reader's attention which would 
 have resulted from putting the reference in a footnote in the 
 more usual way, by putting it directly in the text in an ab- 
 breviated form, where the eye can recognize it at once for 
 just what it is, and yet inattentively slide over it unless it 
 is to be definitely used. For similar reasons I have tried to 
 get along without footnotes. Only when a needed parentheti- 
 cal statement seemed to make too violent a break if printed 
 in the text, have I put it as a footnote. 
 
 1. In preparing to set up this book myself I read several 
 books on typographical rules and practices. Then I followed 
 that practice which I thought would least intrude itself upon 
 the attention of the usual reader, and at the same time would 
 cost him the least money. When there were two ways, ap- 
 parently equally good, I have used both ways — that giving 
 variety which I trust will please the reader as much as it did 
 me, and relief from remembering arbitrary rules, and a trial 
 of different ways to see if some actual preference develops. 
 
 §F. a. The reader may be interested in remarks on the 
 form of this book and the reasons for printing it myself :- 
 
 b. I finished what may perhaps be called the present 
 version in the spring of 1919 (it has been twice rewritten 
 since), and started to look for a publisher. I quickly found 
 that publishers were, so far as I could tell, afraid to risk any- 
 thing on their judgment of the soundness of the book. So I 
 proceeded to get introductions by leading authorities in the 
 three main sorts of knowledge to vouch for its soundness. 
 
 c. While continuing trying publishers I tried a number 
 of endowed institutions and similar organizations formed for 
 the purpose of advancing knowledge in one way or another, 
 
 to see if they would help get the book published. So far as 
 I could judge from their evasive but usually verbally cordial 
 letters, they believed the book couldn't be sound — not one 
 would even look at a manuscript. There was one illuminat- 
 ing exception. I began corresponding with R. S. Woodward, 
 a scientist then president of the Carnegie Institution of 
 Washington, in December, 1919, and continued until he 
 ceased to be president over a year later. Woodward made a 
 speech to the Congress of Arts and Sciences (convened at the 
 St. Louis exposition in 1904 to try to unify knowledge — 
 spending about $137,000 in the attempt), on the first page 
 of which he said in effect that a book like this is practically 
 impossible. He steadily, with a few exceptions in which he 
 tried safely to dodge my introductions by men with reputa- 
 tions of the highest, asserted in effect that he didn t believe 
 I had a sound book; and steadily refused even to look at it. 
 He repeatedly referred me to his remarks on writers of what 
 he in effect claimed were similar books (in the Year Book, 
 1917, of his Institution, 21-7), which include these epithets:- 
 cranks, quacks, aliens, charlatans, mountebanks, arrogance, 
 audacity pushed to the extreme of mendacity [that's a nice 
 phrase]. I began to think, after reading his letters, that if 
 my book was sound it must have extraordinary value. But 
 on second thought I decided that more likely Woodward was 
 a little timid in the presence of an idea. 
 
 d. I of course went over Woodward s head to the Trus- 
 tees of his Institution twice. As soon as Merriam took on its 
 presidency the first of this year, I renewed my request to 
 him and he asked for a manuscript, and for months examined 
 it and had some of his colleagues examine it. After I found I 
 would have to wait for a decision I began to print the book 
 myself (see next par.), and asked the Institution to buy 350 
 copies for distribution to the libraries on its free list. They 
 are still deliberating on the matter. 
 
 e. I tried 18 publishers, and they were afraid to take the 
 commercial risk. It is a common practice for authors of 
 books to take the money risk. So I finally had a reliable 
 publisher give me bis lowest offer:- it was that I pay $10,000 
 for an edition of 2500 — $4 a copy, to sell for at least $6 and 
 probably more (if I had printed 2500 I could have sold them 
 for $1.50 — and more, still lower). I didn't have $10,000. 
 So I tried to borrow it on substantially a mortgage on 
 the book, from 25 successful business men, they to have the 
 additional satisfaction of helping advance knowledge. About 
 one quarter of them showed genuine interest; and I am 
 pretty sure that two or three would have advanced the money 
 if I had waited until the present low-speed panic (footnote 
 168h) is over. Those business men recognized at once that 
 I was honest and probably right (index, Sizing up men"). 
 But I decided that the book had waited long enough. 
 
 f. I spent three days reading about a dozen books on 
 printing — they were fascinatingly easy reading, — and then 
 about four more reading catalogs and looking at printing sup- 
 plies and talking to printers, and buying the cheapest second- 
 hand plant (new type), and supplies for an edition of 1000. 
 I have tried my hand a little at being a machinist, a plumb- 
 er, and six or eight other trades, as I had to handle men in 
 those — and at playing golf. And printing is the easiest — and 
 to me more entertaining and gentler exercise than golf. (Of 
 course, my effort was chiefly to print a passable book at the 
 lowest cost; e. g., there are two or three pages printed 
 poorly because I deliberately would not use time waiting for 
 the humidity to drop and hadn't learned how to counteract 
 it satisfactorily ; and there are too many typographical errors 
 left in, due to not spending an extra hour on each page.) It 
 took me a week to print the first page (p. l), although I had 
 picked up a little printing as a boy; the second took three 
 
§Ff Preface 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 days. The last half of the book was printed about eight 
 pages a week, and once nine. I could have gone faster if I 
 had not taken plenty of time to revise the book — to think it 
 over and rewrite as I set it up. That revision was the only 
 real work, except I would occasionally use my head a little 
 to overcome obstacles that printers assured me couldn t be 
 overcome. Printing one's own book is the best method of 
 revising it I have found ; it gives more time to think over 
 each word, and a very gratifying and useful sense of respon- 
 sibility — there being no assumed-omniscient editor to rely on. 
 Anybody with sense enough to write a readable book can 
 learn to do passable printing in » week (of course, printing, 
 or any other trade, can be made a fine art, and a lifetime be 
 profitably spent on it; see §166f). 
 
 g. These are the costs per copy, estimated fairly close- 
 ly :- Plant and supplies (net, after selling them at the price 
 tentatively offered), 17 cents; paper, 28c; binding (by a 
 commercial binder), 25c; ink, 1-jc; engravings for pictures 
 (they are poor, I having made the mistake of getting them 
 from a high-price firm), 5c; transportation, 2-g-c; selling ex- 
 penses, insurance, etc. (circulars, postage, free copies for 
 publicity purposes), 4c. That makes a total of 83c. Then 
 my work costs:- author's royalty at 5 per cent, 10c; pub- 
 lisher's profit, 7c; my labor, at $25 a week, $1.00 — making 
 the total of what I get, $1.17, and the total cost of the book, 
 
 $2.00. I have charged labor at about half present 
 
 printer's pay. Judged by present prices of farm products, 
 that is probably more than a printer is worth. But if a regu- 
 lar publisher had printed the book I would have had to use 
 fully half as much time on it [and five times as much nerve 
 wear and tear] as I did to do the whole work: and by that 
 criterion $25 a week is more than it sounds. And the plant 
 net cost figures out as a depreciation of 70 per cent a year. 
 A regular publisher of course would not have such an extreme 
 depreciation; so he could afford modern machinery, which is 
 supposed to be five or six times faster than the hand methods 
 I had to use. My overhead" is itemized above, and con- 
 tains every legitimate item except rent, heat, and light — 
 which would have been less than 2c if I had included it. The 
 supervision and thinking for the job is included in the dollar 
 for labor; it was less than a millionth of the work of writing 
 the book, so I am getting overpaid at that. Books of about 
 the number of words of this nowadays retail around $10. 
 
 h. As that $2 is the lowest legitimate price, I had to an- 
 noy buyers by adding postage. Few know what zone post- 
 age will amount to, and the buyer is frequently consciously 
 irritated by any price which adds postage. But there is a 
 difference of as much as 600 per cent in the zone postage for 
 this book — which makes it scarcely fair to buyers to average 
 it, as the difference amounts to 16§ per cent of the net cost. 
 
 I doubt if there is in fact any such wide divergence 
 
 as that 600 per cent in actual cost of postal transportation of 
 small packages ; if not, then the present rate is unfair, as 
 well as being a nuisance. 
 
 i. I find that some readers want to buy their book at a 
 book store. It costs me no more to sell a book to the reader 
 direct than it does to a dealer, and I find it far more inter- 
 
 esting and pleasant to deal direct. I first offered the book 
 by subscription" at $2 and postage, in that conventional 
 way announcing my intention not to sell at any less. If the 
 reader prefers to buy at a book store, I am of course pleased 
 to have him suited; but naturally he should pay the dealer 
 something for his trouble. I am told that usually the dealer 
 adds about 40 per cent of the cost of the book to him, as the 
 price of his services. So as a mere empty form I have 
 put the retail bookstore price at $3 : I have no legal control 
 over the dealer's price. At that price the dealer will per- 
 haps get about 40 per cent increase on the cost to him — and 
 incidentally he will get nearly as much for selling the book 
 as I do for labor in selling and making it. Perhaps his service 
 is worth that to the buyer: the buyer can judge that better 
 
 than I can. Of course, if the dealer were doing me 
 
 any appreciable service in selling this book I would sell it to 
 him lower than to others. But there are only 1000 copies, 
 and I do not want them sold to people who have to be urged 
 in any way to buy; and the slight publicity which dealers 
 could give the book would probably be undesirable. And 
 naturally, if the dealer thinks that what he does for the 
 buyer is worth the price, he will be as anxious to tell him the 
 cost as I am, and will be grateful to me for having largely 
 done it for him. And of course, if any dealer really wants 
 the buyer to get satisfactory value for his money, that dealer 
 will be glad to have the buyer accept my price if more satis- 
 factory. So if any dealer objects to anything in this arrange- 
 ment he thereby demonstrates that he is a profiteer, selfishly 
 trying to deceive and grab something for himself without 
 giving equal value in return — and I am glad to have gained 
 his ill will. I make these remarks because my stand in this 
 matter has already been attacked — that giving direct evidence 
 that they are needed. (For theory of middlemen, see§170o.) 
 §G. a. It is the opinion of those who are probably the 
 best judges that a book is an actual commercial success if it 
 is intrinsically interesting and so is recommended by one 
 person directly to another. I shall spend no money adver- 
 tising this book, and make but a negligible effort to give it 
 publicity. I think the book is a useful one and worth read- 
 ing — rather more so than the ordinal book. If the reader 
 concludes that it is worth reading, he would, if he is right, 
 usually be useful to his friends by recommending it to them. 
 And his doing so would be ample compensation to me; for 
 if the book is useful, thus I shall in due time get paid for 
 the several years I have spent on it (principles of payment 
 are in §168). If I have an opportunity I shall inclose one 
 or more circulars in the books I send out, for the convenience 
 of those who may want to use them. 
 
 b. I find by experience with various people that, because 
 there are so many stand-patters who consider a sound book 
 of this sort impossible, it takes unusual courage to recommend 
 it publicly. So judged by that evidence the men who wrote 
 the introductions have displayed that fundamentally essential 
 trait in the degree that is leadership (§§170r, 167b). 
 
 S. Klyce. 
 Winchester, Massachusetts, 
 September 17, 1921. 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Introductory I §3b 
 
 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
 CHAPTER I. Summary qf contents and their character. 
 
 §1. a. This book is a brief description, and rigorous 
 proof of the truth of the description, of the universe and all 
 that appertains to it, both "spiritual" and material." 
 Hence, the book is religion, science, and philosophy. If 
 those three names of the main branches" of knowledge are 
 taken in their customary senses, I am unable to determine 
 which name properly designates any given portion of the 
 book. The three are actually unified. 
 
 b. But although all three branches of knowledge are thus 
 included, one general method is rigidly and without excep- 
 tion adhered to :- all statements and conclusions are based 
 on experiment, so that the reader may also verify them by 
 his own experiments or experience. When such a method is 
 used, the product nowadays is usually called science; but in 
 that case religion" and philosophy" become identical 
 synonyms of science." Personally, I have no preference 
 in that matter of names ; simply for convenience the three 
 terms are hereafter used as applying respectively to the three 
 possible and conventional ways qf expressing the same thing 
 (§39). 
 
 c. Although everything is to be experimentally verifi- 
 able, the description is not therefore materialistic." In 
 all conventional fundamental senses this book is far more 
 definitely idealistic than are (say) the doctrines of Plato or 
 Berkeley or any orthodox theologian. The leading scientists 
 of the present day, such as Richards, Jordan, Chamberlin, 
 Patten, Hale, reach conclusions the opposite of materialistic, 
 as we shall see (IX, X). It is at the same time quite true 
 that some of the men who claim to be scientists have been 
 materialistic, and have damaged the prestige of science with 
 intelligent people. Later we shall see explicitly how such 
 men as Ostwald, Claiisius, and other Germans have been 
 materialistic, and hence wrong (see especially §147). 
 
 d. But the argument of this book, although idealistic in 
 the popular sense (§49, etc.), is not sentimental; it hasmore 
 than the conventional mathematical rigor. For conventional 
 mathematics are defective (§44), and the argument is given 
 with the rigor of a properly corrected mathematics. 
 
 §2. a. We may first view the book as a whole by not- 
 ing how it compares with conventional science." The 
 brief statement of such a viewing is that we shall find present 
 science to be quite correct essentially, except that it is in- 
 complete — as is of course acknowledged by most scientists. 
 So it is completed, in a qualitative sense. In many cases we 
 shall find that science reaches what are customarily termed 
 religious conclusions. As strict science those conclusions are 
 wrong in the sense that they are mislabeled and misapplied. 
 Thus, the so-called law of conservation of energy is quite 
 true ; but it is religion, and not science. Or, to give a more 
 directly concrete example :- Newton's law of gravity is cor- 
 rect as pure religion ; but it is wrong, both in principle and 
 qualitatively, when applied to any two ('scientific') bodies 
 such as the earth and the sun (§§74, 73d, 83f). 
 
 b. But that statement of the scientific aspect of the book 
 is perhaps too broad to be comprehended at this point. So 
 we may take a more concrete view of science, and note just 
 how it is proposed to complete science. 
 
 c. Careful mensuration is considered to be the proper 
 basis of present science. Kelvin declares that "nearly all 
 the grandest discoveries" of a legitimate, valid science have 
 been "the rewards of accurate measurement and patient, 
 
 long-continued labor in the minute sifting of numerical re- 
 sults." I substantially quote this paragraph from 
 
 Richards (Faraday lecture, 1911; ' Science," N. S., 878). 
 
 d. The last paragraph asserts in effect that experiment 
 or experience is the correct method of getting science, and 
 then states the best method of experiment:- careful obser- 
 vation or measuring. ' ' (Later I prove that the assertion is 
 true; see especially §§38-9 ; also 36-7, 57, 59, 60, 150.) 
 But the use of that method by no means exhausts what sci- 
 ence must do, and actually does do :- it is obvious that what- 
 ever is obtained by those experiments must be expressed, 
 stated, communicated, classified — and is, before it is even 
 known as science. 
 
 e. So we investigate the expression — the consistent ex- 
 pression, or classification — of experiments, basing that inves- 
 tigation itself and consequent conclusions upon experiments 
 or concrete evidence. (it is a circular^ process.) That 
 investigation permits us to complete science. We promptly 
 find that the fairly well informed average man is already in 
 possession of enough experimental" data to complete sci- 
 ence, as soon as we derive a consciously definite and con- 
 sciously consistent method of expression. Hence, it follows 
 that the reader needs no wide acquaintance with scientific" 
 or technical" details in order to judge the general truth of 
 this book. However, some scientific detail is included for 
 the use of those who need it, and to show the general reader 
 the further implications of his present knowledge. 
 
 f. We shall find that there is a mere verbal trick which 
 enables us to complete and unify all knowledge; to solve, 
 verifiably and self-evidently, all qualitative problems — all 
 problems of why, how, what, or all principles. We shall find 
 that we already constantly use that verbal trick, but merely 
 have not definitely noticed it — that it is an absurdly simple 
 trick, the use of which is ordinarily named commonsense" 
 (§49l). The application of that easy trick to the thousands 
 of details of daily life sometimes requires the consideration of 
 such a number of things that it is difficult to remember them 
 all, and we say that such application is complex. That is the 
 only actual difficulty we have in understanding" anything. 
 A child can understand" the argument" or reasoning" 
 of this book. I have tried it on children of six and they did. 
 The reader already knows the argument (§49q). 
 
 g. Now, Kelvin himself elsewhere clearly implied that 
 the expression of science is defective. We have him com- 
 plaining :- Quaternions came from Hamilton after his really 
 good work was done; and although beautifully ingenious, 
 have been an unmixed evil to those who have touched them 
 in any way, including Clerk Maxwell" ("Life of Lord Kel- 
 vin," 1138; quoted from Shaw, "Philosophy of Mathemat- 
 ics," 98). Maxwell used quaternions to express the theory 
 of electricity that is still substantially used. So it is clear 
 that there is more to science than measurement. 
 
 §3. a. The last section implies that mathematics is the 
 means of expression used by orthodox science. So we may 
 view our book from a mathematical aspect. 
 
 b. We noticed Kelvin objecting to a certain sort of 
 mathematics that is explicitly used in a large part of science. 
 Somewhat contradicting Kelvin, it would be easy to quote a 
 number of scientific writers who substantially hold that those 
 without a knowledge of the so-called higher mathematics can 
 not understand many things that are true about the universe. 
 We shall see that those writers are wrong. 
 
§3c I Introductory 
 
 c. The fact is that mathematics is simply an abbreviated 
 method of expression — a formal shorthand language (§30). 
 It is based on precisely the same method or trick that ordi- 
 nary speech uses (§30). Orthodox mathematics itself contains 
 a fundamental inconsistency or self-contradiction 
 mathematicians themselves admit that ii 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 al- 
 
 The 
 
 does. Russell 
 
 it may be re- 
 
 ("Encr. Brit.," xvii,88l) shows it and says „ - -,, s) 
 moved in a certain way; but Shaw ( Phil, of Math / 
 substantially disagrees that ^-f^^nfmathematicians, 
 Poincare, one of the most renowned of recent m ^ ^ ^ ^ 
 
 as despairing of mathematicians' ever "^^ x that 
 
 is clear that mathematical «J^^^™»* P J th« 
 orthodox mathematics serves to contuse 
 <rive it any fundamental intelligibility. 
 
 g d As orthodox mathematics are afflicted With such in- 
 consistency, I shall as a general rule not use some branches 
 of them It will be shown in general how to correct— more 
 accurately:- complete— them. But this is not a book on 
 mathematical detail, and extended revision of mathematics is 
 omitted. It will be shown how ordinary algebra, when used 
 in a consistent way, gives highly abbreviated expressions 
 which we can easily keep in mind : a short formula will sum- 
 marize the whole verbal trick. So we use that formula, 
 derived in §§33-8. 
 
 §4. a. The consistent expression of experience is con- 
 ventionally named logic. The mathematicians call substan- 
 tially the same thing logistics or symbolic logic. The trick of 
 language, or the theory of language, will therefore be given 
 that conventional name logic. 
 
 b. That name has a formidable sound. Orthodox logic is 
 formidable, as it is quite unintelligible if taken at just what 
 it says. (That means the ordinary textbook logic; there are 
 several valid treatises — §49o-q.) But valid logic is excess- 
 ively easy — precisely that:, so easy that such logic was 
 usually taken for granted and overlooked, so that we have had 
 such monstrous books as Kant s Critique of Pure Reason. 
 The fact which we shall find (§49) is that the average man 
 has been using the valid logic right along, and that it is very 
 
 simple as soon as we are conscious of what it is. We 
 
 are not going to trouble ourselves with syllogisms, and other 
 such horrors of our school days. In fact, we are going to see 
 that in the conventional senses there are no such things as 
 
 logic and reasoning. 
 
 c. We shall readily see that the well advertised mys- 
 tery that shrouds the ultimate nature of the physical [also 
 spiritual] universe" is nothing more than our previous more 
 or less unconsciousness of that trick of verbal expression 
 which we continually use. The mystery and the "Veil" — 
 all Unknowns," and especially "Unknowables" — simply 
 turn out to be the things we really know best, as soon as we 
 see just how we have been talking. Valid logic itself has the 
 characteristics of a "machine" (VIII). So the puzzling 
 
 mechanical" aspect which the universe seems sometimes to 
 take is an aspect of the verbal method used to describe it. 
 
 d. Hence, this section and the last merely assert that, 
 both from the conventional point of view of science and of 
 mathematics, by using a simple trick or method of expression 
 or language, we solve all qualitative problems. 
 
 e. I may add here that always we have to solve quanti- 
 tative problems— how much?, how marnj? , when? -for ourselves 
 as we go through life. AW can such problems be solved 
 accurately except by actually "living" them. The qualita- 
 tive solutions given in this book do not take away the need 
 of continually solving such problems of actual living, and it 
 it rigorously proved that never can such problems be other- 
 wise solved (§§25d, 40-1, 50, 107, 173; cf. §<36g). So no 
 one need fear that this book or any other is ever going to re- 
 
 # rt by solving all qu ai " 
 move from man all -f^^tofci ; but we shal! see 
 itative problems. It souna 
 
 that it is quite simple (III). actual life the idea or 
 
 § 5 . a. ^Po^of- ^^ that man knows all 
 
 result or purpose °*J absolutely destroying agnosticism 
 
 qualitative truths for eyeryday Hving) the book 
 
 Splits ignollnce with knowledge. It will be shown that 
 ignorance is the only "sin" or source of pain ($164c); and 
 "faith" and dogma, by their very definitions, acknowledge 
 some degree of ignorance, and are sins. However, it is to be 
 emphasized that the actual facts, the verifiable truth, dictate 
 that purpose of the book — not any arbitrary fancy of mine. 
 In no instance do I indulge myself in any purposes" and 
 "aims," in the vague conventional sense of inexplicable or 
 truly primary or uncaused desires — for all kinds of absolute 
 purpose or First Cause or teleology are proved to be 
 wrong (§§86d, 144h, etc.). In all cases the facts govern: I 
 personally, as the writer, merely record; and the reader ob- 
 serves and discovers for himself. I am not an authority"; 
 the universe as a whole is the real authority. I do not preach. 
 I urge nothing on the reader, and do not so much as in- 
 vite" him to do anything. I do not dictate in any way. 
 
 b. In many places hereafter we see that the point of 
 view set forth in the last paragraph agrees with things as 
 they are. Here, I may show in rough physiological terms 
 that agnosticism is damaging :- If the nerves controlling the 
 beating of a man's heart were to become ignorant' or agnos- 
 tic of just what they were doing or wanted' to do, then as a 
 truism they would be vacillating, uncertain, unreliable; and 
 if they were really agnostic or quite ignorant — and not just 
 partly or 'formally' ignorant, — they would as a truism stop 
 working, and the man would die. But even the minor vac- 
 illation would be "heart disease." Obviously, if his high- 
 er" nerves become really agnostic, they stop working, and 
 he is partly dead. He would, as a truism, die wholly if he 
 
 actually were agnostic about everyday living. We 
 
 shall see that no one is really agnostic : people are ignorant 
 only in a quantitative sense, and not in a qualitative sense 
 (§§25, 49). Also, agnosticism in practice is turning out to 
 be a favorite disguise of the dogmatist, obviously saying this 
 for him:- "See how very modest I am in admitting ignor- 
 ance. You ought therefore both to praise me for being mod- 
 est, and also unquestioningly to believe what I assert I know, 
 as that modesty proves my reliability. " I shall im- 
 plicitly show in this book that an assertion of ignorance re- 
 quires as much proof as one of knowledge ; that it therefore 
 by no means follows that such a dogmatic agnostic is either 
 modest or reliable. 
 
 c. But because the method of using language rigorously 
 has previously been somewhat unconscious, although the con- 
 clusions got from the method were consciously called com- 
 monsense," there actually are what we might call quantita- 
 tive agnosticisms — partial qualitative ignorances, sins, pains, 
 or partly dead nerves. The removal of those defects will 
 truistically give life more abundantly." The reader him- 
 self, by his own efforts in observing things as they are, gains 
 for himself that more abundant life, as explicitly described 
 in Chapter XVIII on ethics. 
 
 §6. a. It is difficult to give briefly at this point any 
 easily intelligible summary of the religious conclusions which 
 are to be established. That difficulty exists mostly because 
 of the fact that theology is customarily considered to be re- 
 ligion, whereas orthodox theology contradicts religion, so that 
 
 there is great confusion 
 Another difficulty at th 
 consider religion as being a definite, verifiable matter. 
 
 ln customary terms for this subie„*. 
 Another difficulty at this point is that it is not custorna' f 
 
 e..ui„ ^ .v to 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Introductory I §7j 
 
 b. Probably the clearest way of summarizing the relig- 
 ious conclusions that will be established is to state that the 
 average American in his everyday life or work, and as the sum 
 total of his thinking about it, has substantially achieved a 
 true religion (§166e). Or, the sum of Christ's doctrines is 
 valid. On the contrary, the reasonings" and exhortations 
 of professional theologians are usually not sound religion. 
 
 c. Perhaps the only explicit remark on religion which 
 will be of much service at this point is that the theologians, 
 in so far as they are explicit and not evasive (§48b), mostly 
 teach Paulineism and not what Christ taught. It will be 
 shown that Paulineism diametrically opposes the truth, where- 
 as the substance of what Christ probably taught is correct 
 (§§160-3, etc.). Considering them as men, 1 think theolo- 
 gians vary as do other men. Some are objectionable to me, 
 while others are personally very fine. But taking them pro- 
 fessionally — and unless otherwise noted my remarks refer to 
 them professionally, — they are substantially wrong, and lam 
 opposed to them (§§169d, 177b). 
 
 §7. a. The foregoing summary of the book from five 
 points of view may unintentionally lead the reader to believe 
 that what follows is perhaps almost exciting. But to most 
 readers it will not prove to be so. It is more likely to seem 
 at first to be rather dull and tedious. I have had some 
 years of experience in giving the proofs and expansion of 
 those summaries to various people — mostly to men with 
 highly trained minds, — and the argument seems usually to 
 depress them at first. However, occasionally it explicitly 
 collides with some pet superstition of a man, and he gets 
 quite excited. Ordinarily, though, this unification of know- 
 ledge is disappointing. It may be useful to the reader to' have 
 me point out the general causes of that possible temporary 
 disappointment :- 
 
 b. (l) Many generations have been inventing pleasing 
 yarns concerning the delights of having absolute knowledge. 
 In the absence of having such knowledge, even now men 
 often assert the existence of it in some future heaven. But 
 apart from such rosy fairy tales, for generations even the re- 
 sponsible thinkers in their speculations have rather overrated 
 the benefits that would immediately accrue from the posses- 
 sion of absolute and complete qualitative knowledge. So 
 naturally the reader will be expecting too much. If he could 
 discount those expectations about 95 per cent right now — 
 which will probably be practically impossible, — he will not 
 be disappointed. 
 
 c. (2) The next particular source of disappointment will 
 be that the reader already knows the essential conclusions 
 that are reached. As I have reiterated, I do nothing but use 
 a verbal trick consistently. The reader does nothing but 
 discover for himself that he already knows the essential truth. 
 That will probably disappoint him at first, as it is not likely 
 to be what he expected. For he may have the age-old, re- 
 curring idea that some Messiah, with mighty intellect, and 
 an. overpowering command of the disciples emotions, would 
 happen along and communicate undreamed-of, beautiful truths 
 and happiness. It will clearly appear that such can never 
 happen. The reader may resent the destruction of those ex- 
 pectations, the commonplaceness of the whole truth, and 
 probably the commonplaceness of me and my ways. 
 
 d. (s) Because the reader actually knows the substance 
 of our conclusions before he reads them, it follows that I am 
 writing the obvious for him. About the most difficult thing 
 to show is the obvious, as will appear. Peshaps it is even 
 more difficult to see the obvious consciously — to observe defin- 
 itely that we know it. "Philosophy" is the simplest subject 
 there is. The difficulty with it is that it is too simple and 
 
 obvious. Those unexpected things will perhaps exasperate 
 and further disappoint the reader at first. 
 
 e. (4) The German type of materialistic scientist has 
 taken Kelvin's phrase, minute sifting of numerical results, 
 as practically stating the sum total of any sort of valid know- 
 ledge. The German scientists of that sort so vociferously 
 praised that idea that some others confidingly acquired the 
 same delusion. If any such deluded person reads this book 
 he will be disappointed — except that it is shown that in 
 humanics (Part Three) there is probably not yet enough of 
 definite measuring. For in this book there is added what the 
 materialists omit, and what we have seen Kelvin himself sub- 
 stantially saying was needed (§2f). The book does consid- 
 erable minute sifting"; it is necessary, but it is only half 
 the truth (the whole of Part One proves that). 
 
 f. (5) Finally, the reader is liable to be disappointed 
 because I am too much lacking in skill in presenting the 
 matter to him in the way he requires. 
 
 g. I know of no way, available in any practical length of 
 time, of saving the reader from one or more of those possible 
 dissapointments, or I would use it. If he has a youthful, 
 vigorous mind — a condition not closely dependent upon cal- 
 endar age, — it is nearly certain that in a few months, as the 
 discoveries he makes gradually permeate his mind and become 
 familiar, the disappointment will fade and he will find that 
 he is extremely pleased, and really approves of things' being 
 as they are. If the reader is surprisingly vigorous in spirit 
 he may be at once pleased with the rigorous truth that the 
 book proves. Personally, I am conservative, as was stated; 
 and it took me a year or two to see the beauty of the truth. 
 
 h. But to the possible reader who is so unfortunate as 
 to be rather firmly fixed or ossified in the habit of materialis- 
 tic science, ' and who requires — perhaps more or less un- 
 consciously to himself — a long list of dry-as-dust obfuscating 
 statistics, and nothing but such facts, I can offer no pleas- 
 ing hope. Both he and his mental brother, the persistently 
 sentimental reader who prefers to believe much current theo- 
 logical and ethical dogma, will perhaps to their deaths mourn 
 or resent that their beloved formulas have here been so plaus- 
 ibly questioned, if they rashly read further. 
 
 i. However, to the general normal reader I may offer 
 another pleasant hope. It will be shown that the world or 
 universe is correctly made. I am not a reformer, nor a 
 grouchy pessimist — nor a Pollyanna glad-gamer. The facts 
 do not permit me to be, as will be shown. On a basis of 
 definite fact, I judge the present age to be the best age in 
 history to live in, even though I consider people to be still 
 very stupid. I do not think that I am as stupid as some peo- 
 ple (I shall not ever bother the reader to praise me for hav- 
 ing "modesty," as I have a negligible amount); but I find 
 that I am enough like other people to prefer to associate with 
 them — wouldn't feel at home among really intelligent peo- 
 ple. So I like the human race very much on the whole, and 
 shall not try to revise it. We are all on the way of acquir- 
 ing more truth and hence more religion or life, or whatever 
 the reader prefers to call the good we get. So the only 
 panacea is experience — or in scientific technicality :- experi- 
 ments. When we consciously get experience, we name it 
 education. 
 
 j. Although I am thus correctly optimistic about quali- 
 tative affairs (§§ll<9e, 18l), in practical life I am able to see 
 existing quantitative abnormalities, or unbalances, or undue 
 departures from the average. I shall never bore the reader 
 with any nonsense to the effect that everything in ordinary 
 life is quantitatively good and lovely; for it is a fact that we 
 (in usual language) say we dislike abnormalities in ourselves 
 (usually calling them pains), and dislike to see them in 
 
§Tj I Introductory UNIVERSE 
 
 others ; and such abnormalities sometimes do exist. From a 
 ■wider point of view those painful things are good, and are 
 needed ; but we can definitely attain that wider view only 
 by explicit recognition of that usual practical view of consid- 
 ering them painful (§177). From an immediate, direct point 
 of view it is unpleasant to contemplate an extremely skinny 
 man, and equally so to contemplate an extremely fat one; 
 both departures from the normal or balance or the immedi- 
 ately pleasing are obviously dangerous to life, or limit life. 
 The "upper ten" and the "submerged tenth" are abnormal, 
 and when we come across them I shall not deny that they 
 are. As we are getting a description of the universe, which 
 includes all things, as a detail it will have to be shown that 
 the I. W. W. and the domineering, profiteering employer 
 persistently try to depart — in opposite directions — from the 
 normal balance or the temperate life, from the democratic or 
 religious life ; and are truistically offensive. So it is with 
 the materialistic scientist and his counterpart the dogmatic 
 theologian, the militaristic Prussian and the totally nonresist- 
 ant pacifist, the dualist and the technical mystic, the autocrat 
 and the socialist, the aristocrat and the tramp, the closet 
 philosopher and the rough-neck, the pure theoretical 
 man and the blatant practical" man. In brief, we shall 
 see (XVIII, XIX) that a democrat is a balanced, temperate, 
 religious man ; and rigorous proof will be given that such a 
 man is the only sort who is happy and can possibly survive. 
 It is proved with mathematical rigor that our Constitution is 
 in agreement with that and with all natural law (XIX). So 
 the book will be pleasant from a human point of view, pro- 
 vided the reader is none of those unbalanced sorts of persons. 
 
 In order really to prove anything about humans we 
 
 have to connect the proof consistently with natural law. 
 So I connect it — or unify knowledge. 
 
 i 
 
 CHAPTER II. Order and relationship of contents. 
 
 §8. a. We have seen roughly the conclusions to be 
 reached. I shall now state the order in which they are given, 
 as that shows briefly their general relationship. 
 
 b. The portion of the book following these introductory 
 remarks is divided into three parts. Part One gives a formal 
 or general unification of knowledge, by showing the language 
 trick. Part Two gives a unification in concrete terms of 
 
 matter" — or is physical science. Part Three gives the uni- 
 fication in spiritual" or mental 'terms, and is the science 
 of human beings, or humanics. 
 
 c. Those three Parts are briefly outlined in the next 
 three sections. Here it may be emphasized that in substance 
 all three are identical. I. e.,each Part is essentially a repe- 
 tition of the other two: the same principles are merely re- 
 peated in terms of different things — the essentials of words 
 in Part One, of matter in Part Two, and of mere in Part Three 
 being identical. All the different sciences' — the expres- 
 sions of all aspects of the universe, of all modes of living, of 
 all jobs in life — are merely repetitions of the same essential 
 things. They are simply different points of view — quantita- 
 tively different expression — of the same thing, regardless of 
 how widely different their names may at first seem to be. 
 Obviously, such repetition is a truistic result of unification: 
 for unification means the ultimate identity of all things. 
 
 §9. PART ONE. — Formal Unification, a. The first 
 form of unification gives the verbal trick. The statement of 
 that trick or method may with about equal accord with con- 
 ventions be named (l) the theory of language, or (2) the 
 theory of mathematics or (3) principles of mathematics, or 
 (•i) logic. And as I shall make a concrete model of language 
 
 (VIII) which is a machine, the statement of that trick could 
 also properly be named (5) mechanics. But as Part One 
 does not explicitly discuss what are ordinarily called con- 
 crete" things, that Part could also rather conventionally be 
 named (6) philosophy. And also, because the language trick 
 is found to be identical with what in theological technicality 
 is called the Trinity, Part One might with verbal conven- 
 tionality be called (7) religion. Unification itself means 
 "consistency"; and as consistency is simply "valid classifi- 
 cation," which is conventionally "science," Part One is 
 also (8) science. 
 
 b. Thus it appears how unessential mere names are. I 
 endeavor to use names in the way that is generally customary. 
 But as soon as we begin to get a real understanding of things, 
 names begin to coalesce — sometimes with such persistence 
 that even temporary verbal distinctions become hard to hold. 
 
 c. Obviously, so far as formal completeness is concerned, 
 I might end the book with Part One. For it essentially 
 unifies knowledge. But so far as that goes, knowledge is 
 also completely formally unified in the first few paragraphs 
 of Part One (§12). We need further repetitions of the uni- 
 fication as a proof that actual unification is possible (cf. %S5), 
 and in order to get directly applicable conclusions. For 
 centuries there has existed a formal unification in the word 
 God, or in the word universe — and neither unification has 
 practically proved to be very applicable, or intelligible. 
 
 §10. PART TWO. — Concrete Unification, a. Con- 
 sequently it is proved that mind and matter are identical 
 (§§46, 150), and our unification of knowledge is explicitly 
 shown in Part Two to hold good with respect to matter. 
 
 b. The doing of that constitutes physical science. We 
 shall see that such science is very useful for our purpose be- 
 cause its terms permit us to be definite. And its concepts 
 are simple, and hence easily grasped. So it is excellent as 
 an introduction to the difficult science of humanics — difficult 
 because of the numerousness or complexity of its details, 
 which are hard to hold clearly in memory. That physical 
 science is also directly useful of itself, as it is an intelligible 
 description of the environment," which we continually use. 
 
 §11. a. PART THREE. — Spiritual Unification, a. 
 The last part is another repetion of consistent knowledge, 
 given in terms of humans. That final repetition is crucial 
 proof that matter is mind — it being the actual consideration 
 and use of matter as such in a way that obviously agrees with 
 the facts. 
 
 b. Part Three is, practically, the direct application of a 
 unified knowledge to our immediate interests. It is familiar, 
 and can be used by everybody — is used, in fact; fori merely 
 describe how people act. In Part Two we see that every 
 atom, our solar system, our galaxy — every so-called material 
 thing — is a live personality with actually as many traits or 
 "properties" as a man. But in physical science we can not 
 see those traits so well; hence in each sort of "material" 
 structure we explicitly consider only the few outstanding 
 properties. And that "simplicity," which is really meager- 
 ness, permits us to work up gradually to a consistent grasp 
 of the numerous perceptible properties of men. But at the 
 same time, much of Part Two is unfamiliar and "uninterest- 
 ing" to the general reader simply because those properties 
 of atoms have not been conventionally named like the same 
 properties in humans, and so atoms are not at once recognized 
 from the very names as being like himself. The general 
 reader will hence necessarily find Part Two to seem some- 
 what "abstract" at first. There is no need that he try to 
 remember Part Two. But at least a casual acquaintance with 
 physical science is needed for any actual understanding of 
 ourselves, as we shall see at some length. 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 One III §Hb 
 
 c. In writing Part Two I have tried to show that most 
 of it is of immediate interest to us, and to remove its verbal 
 abstraction. But it is written with all the fundamental rigor 
 I could put in it, as is the rest of the book. Nothing has 
 been prettified" or sugar-coated for a lazy mind. Through- 
 out I omit many details, the explicit statement of which 
 would serve more to complicate than it would to forward the 
 main thread of thought. Many such details I know; but I 
 am quite aware that there are enormously more of which I 
 
 am not explicitly conscious — although the argument, as is 
 proved, implicitly includes them all. But everywhere the 
 book is written up," in an attempt to equal in worth the 
 work of the best experts in each particular subject, and to 
 interest them. However, the normal reader will find that he 
 is quite my equal in most subjects and superior in some, if he 
 will only take his ability for granted, and ignore the super- 
 stition that there is something esoteric and appallingly 
 recondite about ultimate knowledge. 
 
 PART ONE 
 
 FORMAL UNIFICATION; or THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
 
 CHAPTER III. Nature qfthe general problem audits conven- 
 tional name; or, ■what apparent failure in unification 
 requires reconcilement. 
 
 §12. a. In this section we shall see in a brief, concrete 
 form the whole trick which definitely unlocks all truth. After 
 that I shall prove the need of such an unlocking, and then 
 begin in a more comprehensive and generally applicable fash- 
 ion to express and apply the trick. 
 
 b. Without stating the proof explicitly, it still will be 
 rather obvious that we may make a typical form of statement 
 or sentence, thus :- 'Two things plus [or :- and] three things 
 
 are equal to five things.' We may abbreviate it, 
 
 thus :- two and three are five. ' Or we may abbreviate it 
 still more:- 2+3=5.' The only other general form of 
 statement is what is called the truism, in which both sides are 
 explicitly identical, as:- 5=5, A is- A, A=A. Later we 
 shall see that all true or-and intelligible statements can be 
 reduced to truisms (§§35-7); we can see at once that our 
 2+3=5 is really the same in meaning as 5=5. Most of the 
 sentences we use are obviously but slightly removed from be- 
 ing explicit truisms. E. g., John is a boy means that John 
 [whom I know to be a boy] is a boy, or Boy=Boy. Or, we 
 could call boy" a class,' and finally get the truism in the 
 general form, One unit [who is named John] is one unit [in a 
 collection or class named boy"]; or, 1 = 1. But we need not 
 go into that here. It was mentioned merely to make it 
 reasonably obvious at this point that, unless we make sen- 
 tences which are explicit truisms, the general form is 2+3 
 =5. And that sentence is itself only one step from a tru- 
 ism, as noticed:- for the first member, 2+3, is obviously 5, 
 and we have, 5=5. 
 
 c. So we start with merely the general form of state- 
 ment, in an abbreviated form:- 2+3=5. In the first 
 member of that, we have two parts, 2 and 3 . I. e., the 
 first member implicitly asserts that there are two collections 
 of things, which collections are at least verbally separate. The 
 last member of it asserts that there is only one part, 5. 
 I.e., the last member implicitly asserts that there are not two 
 collections of things, but that there is one collection not ver- 
 bally separate. In short, so far as form or language is con- 
 cerned, the last member formally contradicts the first. Hence, 
 in our typical sentence, we say a thing is so ; and then 
 promptly, and as a part of the very same sentence, say it is 
 not so. 
 
 d. Well; by all conventional views of logic or reason" 
 our typical sentence is thus verbally or formally positively 
 and completely illogical and irrational, as it says one thing 
 and then at once says it is not true — as it flatly contradicts 
 itself. But by ordinary commonsense — by direct observation 
 or experience — we know that the typical sentence is correct 
 
 or true. In fact, a proverbial symbol for obvious truth is the 
 statement 2+2=4; and I should have used that, except we 
 needed to distinguish one 2 from the other 2, and it is hence 
 rhetorically less awkward to use 2+3. 
 
 e. Therefore, we simply use observation or common- 
 sense, and conclude that orthodox logic or reasoning is 
 wrong, because 2+3=5 is correct. Then we further con- 
 clude, as being the total essential of a valid logic, that in any 
 sentence — i. e., completely stated and intelligible sentence — 
 which is not a truism of the form A=A, we must have a 
 formal or verbal contradiction," in the respect that parts 
 are asserted both to be parts and also to be combined into a 
 whole which is not parts. In fact, we may readily see thatto 
 make such a contradiction is the whole purpose and use 
 of language :- to combine parts into a whole : to make names 
 of parts coalesce into a formal unit that means the whole. 
 
 That states the essential of language and the whole 
 
 verbal trick. We apply that trick, and thus unify know- 
 ledge, by adhering to the simple rule :- make sure that the 
 valid — or rational," or true" — sentence does contain such 
 a formal contradiction; if it does not, and is not a truism, 
 it is really nonsense. 
 
 §13. a. That is the sum total of the essentials of valid 
 logic, and it implicitly contains the solutions of all qualita- 
 tive problems. The last three paragraphs express all the 
 real argument of this book, and there is nothing in all of 
 knowledge any more difficult to understand than those sim- 
 ple observations. The reader knows that logic already. He 
 uses it daily, as commonsense, without even having to 
 think" about it. He is so expert at it that he would find 
 difficulty in saying how he does it, just as he would find 
 (perhaps much less) difficulty in stating precisely what mo- 
 tions he makes in putting on his clothing. Below in this 
 book I merely point out the details of that familiar logic, and 
 the reader verifies them by his own observation and discov- 
 ers that he knows all answers to questions of principle. 
 
 b. So I now begin to translate that simple argument into 
 the various aspects of it we have become accustomed to use. 
 
 §14. a. As we proceed we shall see in more and more 
 detail that the formal contradiction occurring in that simple 
 typical sentence is inherent in positively all knowledge or 
 expression. I shall state in this section some of the more 
 general aspects of the contradiction which have been recog- 
 nized, often for centuries (also cf. 5th and 6th paragraphs of 
 Dewey's Introduction). 
 
 b. For each one of perhaps a thousand points of view 
 that contradiction already has a definite conventional name. 
 The philosophers" long ago (they were the scientists of 
 those days) named the formal way of speaking of parts — e. g. 
 
§14b III One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 of our V and '3' — the Many; and the formal way of speak- 
 ing of the whole, the One. Or perhaps mostly, they called 
 the parts themselves, the Many; and the whole itself, the 
 One. Usually I shall not need to be explicit about such a 
 distinction between parts and expression of parts, etc. (cf. 836). 
 And when the philosophers had assigned those names, some 
 asserted that the Many was "real" or the "truth," and the 
 One false or "seeming" or appearance' ; and others said it 
 was not so — that it was vice versa. And that dispute was 
 and is named the problem of the One and the Many. 
 
 c. We shall see in detail that the problem is by no means 
 an academic one, without appreciable effect on actual life 
 (see Index, s. v. "One and Many"). For identically the 
 same problem is involved in the theological Trinity, and 
 disputes over that plunged peoples into wars for centuries 
 and still produce clashing, expensive sects. Whether a dem- 
 ocracy is right, or an autocracy or other sort of aristocracy, 
 is the same problem (XIX). As the problem has not before 
 been rigorously and with explicit consistency settled, it fun- 
 damentally produced the world war, which was an attempt, 
 perhaps more automatic or instinctive than conscious, to find 
 out how much aristocracy could be imposed on people. 
 
 d. We have already implicitly seen in our concrete ex- 
 ample 2+3=5, that the problem of the One (the whole) 
 and Many (parts) was not an actual problem at all, but sim- 
 ply a puzzle of form — of arbitrary use of language, of verbal 
 technique. Man invented a language; and he thereby cre- 
 ated a verbal puzzle which he fancied was a real, world- 
 shaking problem. And he finally got so befuddled that he 
 called it the riddle of the universe — or if theologically in- 
 clined, the mystery of God. The human race took words, 
 mere words, far too seriously — made idols of them. The 
 race have been highbrows :- idolaters of words, the last spec- 
 ies of a long line of idolaters of more tangible things. How- 
 ever, we shall see that the normal man actually did not get 
 so befuddled : be merely made no explicit reply to the num- 
 erous varieties of aristocratic exploiters who kept misusing 
 language according to their own mistaken ideas of self- 
 interest until they came to believe their mendacities and 
 evasions. That befuddling, highbrow bunco game is now 
 mild in comparison with the past. But it may be observed 
 still — nearly surely in this morning s paper, unless like the 
 Boston Transcript" it has an editor especially well bal- 
 lasted with fair-play commonsense. This book explicitly 
 shows how the priesthood of that last, most subtle idolatry 
 work their game. 
 
 e. The sum of the matter is that there exists no riddle 
 of the universe, no mystery — that there exists no real prob- 
 lem of any sort. The solution we shall get to that pseudo- 
 problem, which we have already seen broadly given by 
 everyday observation or commonsense in §12, is that the One 
 is true, and that the Many is also true in a formal way, even 
 though they are formally contradictory. We shall simply 
 investigate those formal contradictions, and see .how to keep 
 out of any real contradictions, and how to eliminate our vari- 
 ous verbal puzzles. 
 
 §15. a. We may go somewhat more into detail as to the 
 modern forms of the One and Many. 
 
 b. John Dewey, in the Introduction of his Essays 
 in Experimental Logic," definitely implies continually that 
 this One and Many underlies all philosophy or logic. Dewey 
 is accepted by the experts as a leading authority (see Riley, 
 American Thought" ; Ency. Brit.," xvi, 918, footnote 6). 
 I think he is one of the best of al) philosophers, logicians, 
 and psychologists — and I muy add that since he wrote the 
 Introduction for me I naturally think so more emphatically. 
 And William James, who was finally in his Radical Empiri- 
 
 cism" almost as sound as Dewey, says somewhere that he 
 has come to believe that the One and the Many finally un- 
 derlies all problems. 
 
 c. Russell, one of the leading mathematical authorities, 
 shows in a general way ("Ency. Brit.," xvii, 88l) that the 
 One and Many is at the base of mathematics, and points out 
 the contradiction — which he says he obviates. We have seen 
 (§3c) how the mathematician Shaw disagrees that Russell 
 avoids the contradiction, and states that Poincare was doubt- 
 ful of ever reconciling mathematical differences of opinion 
 over infinity {infinity is one mathematical name for the One 
 see §§30, 43). 
 
 d. Technical scientists rarely use the ' philosophical ' 
 name, "One and Many." But we may quickly find them 
 asserting the existence of the problem' in the most ortho- 
 dox of treatises. E. g., Maxwell is quoted in Watson's 
 "Physics" (p. 2):- "The difference between one event and 
 another does not depend upon the mere differences of the 
 times or places at which they occur, but only in the differ- 
 ences in the nature, configuration, or motion of the bodies 
 concerned." In that statement Maxwell is obviously trying 
 to say what really divides the whole or One of things into 
 parts or "events" of the Many (and as he didn't know, his 
 statement is, as we shall see in time, confused and unintel- 
 ligible — although it is given children to learn). And three 
 times he uses a form of the term difference, which is itself 
 a technical philosophical term — the problem of Differences — 
 that is substantially a synonym of One and Many. 
 
 e. That shows with great brevity that authorities agree 
 that the One and Many is fundamental, even though they 
 name it variously. As we proceed we shall incidentally see 
 all kinds of authorities naming the problem, and puzzling 
 over it. The general statement of the problem obviously is :- 
 we seem to see the universe in two opposite aspects, (l) split 
 into parts as the Many, and (2) connected into a whole as the 
 One, or universe : and the problem is, How reconcile that ap- 
 parent contradiction?. We are now ready to see, by 
 
 our own observation and without any of the explicit support 
 of convention and authority which I have been citing above, 
 that the problem is fundamental, even though we state it in 
 everyday scientific terms :- 
 
 f. First, we consider broadly the very bottom thing of 
 science, a "machine" (for details, see §§21, 86f, 96g). 
 When we say a machine works — and obviously it is not a 
 machine in a conventional sense if it does not work, — we con- 
 sider the machine as a unit — as a One. Equally obviously, 
 the machine is made up of parts, which are the Many. 
 Everything which we conventionally call a machine has 
 at least two perceptible parts :- e.g., a lever is the bar 
 (or lever") and the fulcrum; a screw is the thread (the 
 
 screw") and the nut; the inclined plane, as a machine, is 
 the plane and the load on it. In each case there is a Jric- 
 tional union of parts which may be separated." We may 
 make a typical sentence for, as, or describing" a ma- 
 chine:- One part phis \i. e., held on by some degree of friction 
 to] at least one more part is a machine. Or, we may abbrevi- 
 ate :- One part -\- One or more parts = The machine, or the 
 Whole. Or, The Many = The One. There, in a 
 
 scientific machine," we obviously have parts equal to a 
 connected whole — which is formally contradictory. But ob- 
 viously, both are true (so far, we see by ordinary common- 
 sense that they are true ; later it is explicitly proved to be 
 true — IV). So again we have our general solution" :- 
 The Many— The One. And we see at once that the mistake 
 some people have been making as to machines" was that 
 they emphasized the parts of the machine, and overlooked 
 the equally true fact that there was a machine only as it was 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 One III §17d 
 
 a connected, consistent, really inseparable whole — related 
 together as a structure, or organism (XI). When a baby 
 takes apart a watch it is no longer to him a watch — it is not 
 a watch except as it works together. When an infant phil- 
 osopher or scientist or theologian takes apart the universe — 
 analyzes it, not into a machine," but into machine parts, 
 — he can not put it together, and to him it no longer is the 
 universe or a whole ; to him it is a pile of mental junk, vari- 
 ously named agnosticism, dualism, etc. But, the obvious 
 fact is, he never did actually take the universe apart; in his 
 egocentric, anthropocentric way (§§40f, 73h, 100, etc.) he 
 just fancied he did. The universe kept right on working, 
 and his analyses" produced no real problem. 
 
 g. Newton s first law of motion, which asserts inertia, 
 explicitly states that no body can move unless acted upon by 
 another body (§88). If we agree to say that bodies move (we 
 could construct a valid science, wherein nothing verbally 
 moves — §97), then at once we imply that in some way the 
 universe (the One) is as a whole made up of parts (the Many) 
 which are connected in some way that permits motion (by 
 orthodox logic no such motion can occur — Index, s. v. Ze- 
 no"). And as we shall see (§88), the other two laws of 
 motion were Newton s attempt to assert that there was no 
 logical contradiction in that assertion of inertia. In short, 
 his laws were an attempt, surprisingly successful for that age, 
 to solve the One and the Many. 
 
 h. The last two paragraphs give two of the thousands of 
 ways in which science names its forms of that so-called philo- 
 sophical problem of the One and Many. I may at this point 
 merely name some other ways that will probably be seen 
 obviously to involve the problem. 
 
 i. There is now much apparent conflict between quan- 
 tum" theories, and continuous energy theories — such as 
 wave theories. Those quantum theories in effect assert that 
 fundamentally the universe is divided into parts (here, parts 
 of energy — the term energy being the more usual scientific 
 name for universe). The opposing theories assert that there 
 is no such division — that the universe in continuous (XIII). 
 
 j. That conflict of words begins far back in scientific 
 history, and comes up to the present day. Is heat small, 
 Many motions (and if so, a Many of what?) ; or is it continu- 
 ous phlogiston? Is electricity continuous energy (the One), 
 or discrete as electrons or corpuscles? Usually now it is taken 
 as discrete ; but the question has already come up whether 
 electrons are continuous inside. Is light continuous as 
 waves, or discrete corpuscles — or in modern terms, discrete 
 magnetic disturbances? Or, in more generality, are there 
 exact or eternal or absolutely separate atoms (the Many) ; or 
 no exact, really separable atoms (the One)? The so-called 
 kinetic theory gives two answers to that which contradict 
 each other (§89, etc.). And the electron theory is in the 
 same contradictory condition :- Thomson and his school hold 
 that electrons have tubes of force, which substantially 
 amounts to continuity ; and the other school have discrete 
 electrons in what is substantially the older kinetic theory. 
 
 §16. a. I think that is enough evidence of the general 
 need of an investigation of the One and Many. It is prob- 
 ably already obvious to the reader that the investigation, 
 even if it does apply only to a verbal confusion, is of funda- 
 mental importance in reaching a conscious understanding of 
 things, regardless of whether we consider those things as be- 
 longing to science, philosophy, or religion. So we begin 
 the completely explicit solution. 
 
 §17. a. "The Encyclopaedia Brittanica" (llth edition) 
 seems to me to be the most reliable generally available auth- 
 ority as to what are orthodox doctrines concerning most sub- 
 
 jects. As I am trying to use words in their customary 
 senses, so as to be easily intelligible, I shall frequently cite 
 that encyclopedia as giving such general agreements as to 
 words and facts. Hence, in developing the meaning of One 
 and Many" I shall show some of the details of the orthodox 
 difficulties by quoting the important parts of that encyclo- 
 pedia's articles on pluralism and monism :- 
 
 b. Art. "Pluralism":- "Pluralism***, a term used 
 *** in philosophy for any theory which postulates more than 
 one absolutely distinct being or principle of being [postulates 
 the Many], opposed to monism. Pluralistic systems are 
 based on the difficulty of reconciling with the monistic prin- 
 ciple the principles of variety [or Difference] and freewill. 
 The chief difficulty which besets any such view [that there 
 is an absolute Many, or pluralism] is that if the elements are 
 absolutely independent, the cosmos [universe] disappears 
 and we are left with chaos : if, on the other hand, there is 
 an interrelation ***, the elements [the Many] are not ulti- 
 mate in any intelligible sense." I. e., if the universe 
 
 is not chaos, then as a truism it is not possible to say (as a 
 concrete example), that there is any actual difference which 
 will permit us to distinguish between a man and a moon. 
 Clearly, if we take language forms as seriously as the writer 
 of that article, we are fundamentally forever barred from 
 knowing anything. 
 
 c. Art. "Monism":- "Monism, *** the philosophic 
 view of the world which holds that there is but one form of 
 reality, whether that be material or spiritual. The aim of 
 knowledge is explanation, and the dualism or pluralism which 
 acquiesces in recognizing two or more wholly disparate forms 
 of reality has in so far renounced explanation (see Dualism 
 [i. e., the Article quoted in the last paragraph]). To this 
 extent monism is justified [probably the writer means that 
 monism is justified in that it explains'] ; but it becomes 
 mischievous if it prompts us to ignore the important differ- 
 ences in facts as they present themselves to our intelligence. 
 All forms of monism from Plotinus downwards tend to ignore 
 personal individuality and volition, and merge all finite ex- 
 istence in the featureless unity of the Absolute; this, indeed, 
 is what inspires the passion of protest against monism. Turn- 
 ing to the historical forms of the theory *** [there follows a 
 short statement of philosophical technicalities not needed 
 here; and it may be added that there seems to be evidence 
 of Chinese monists centuries before Plotinus]. Those who 
 maintain that all these forms are hasty and superficial stand 
 by the conviction that the right philosophical attitude is to 
 accept provisionally the main distinctions [differences] of com- 
 monsense [but we saw, in the case of the machine, &15f, 
 that commonsense gave also a One, as well as that Many], 
 above all the distinction of personal and impersonal ; but to 
 press forward to the underlying unity so far as experience 
 and reflection justify." 
 
 d. We may note that the writer of the second article 
 speaks of a passion of protest. In short, the reason peo- 
 ple have not agreed on the One and the Many is, from one 
 point of view, because they took mere words so seriously as 
 to become violently emotional over the problem. There is 
 current an odd fiction that philosophers are unemotional (for 
 the psychology or human nature" of it, see §155); but we 
 have just seen the staid Brittanica ' tacitly agreeing that 
 it is proper for emotions to keep professional philosophers 
 from agreeing. It is sometimes fancied that scientists do not 
 thus let emotions interfere with their consideration of the act- 
 ual facts. But some in real life become violently emotional 
 the minute this problem is mentioned; e. g., one professional 
 astronomer spat out metaphysician" at me, as the vilest 
 epithet he could invent, because I incautiously used with him 
 
§17d III One UNIVERSE 
 
 the name "One and Many." Those remarks are 
 
 made to show that there is all the emotion there is, concealed 
 under the apparently harmless and abstract philosophical 
 problem of the One and Many. We are going to go cau- 
 tiously with it, so as not to set off any premature emotional 
 explosions,. (See Dewey's recognition in his 8th paragraph 
 of one of" my methods of dping that which I agree I have 
 overdone, but'which I doh't'dare modify.) . But when; we. 
 have the solution thoroughly controlled, it. is to . be. shown 
 that a real grasp of the problem is an ultimate religious ex- 
 perience, or "conversion," or "rebirth" (§§153f, 162). 
 
 §18. a. The One is therefore a conventional and useful 
 technical term meaning that the universe with all its phe- 
 nomena is inherently continuous or joined together ; or is an 
 absolutely inseparable or indivisible unit. We shall see the 
 proof that the universe is really thus ; but at the same time 
 we shall see that it is absolutely impossible to make a posi- 
 tively 'intelligible statement or expression about such a uni- 
 verse. Consequently, to anticipate — perhaps somewhat 
 unintelligibly here, — the universe will arbitrarily be talked 
 of as a pluralism — explicitly as an infinite pluralism, which 
 is a formally self-contradictory name, not before used in 
 that sense so far as I know. 
 
 b. The Many, as a conventional technical term, means 
 that the universe is made up of more than one part, each part 
 being, absolutely distinct, separable, and absolutely real in 
 itself; the Many" is the conventional name for the parts. 
 Obviously, such a collective' name is essentially self-contra- 
 dictory if it is supposed to have a real meaning, if the parts 
 are absolutely separate; for in that case they are.truistically 
 absolutely not collectible, even verbal!}". Hence, r in this book 
 we shall not have the Many" used with that absolute con- 
 ventional meaning. I shall use it as a term, admittedly form- 
 ally self-contradictory and desirably so, which asserts or 
 implies that we have arbitrarily divided the universe into 
 parts, basing the division upon certain agreements among 
 men (§100, etc.). For, to anticipate the proof again — and 
 again perhaps somewhat unintelligibly here, — when we are 
 positively intelligible in our language, we have to speak con- 
 'cretely of the Many ; : an actual language is otherwise impos- 
 sible (IV). Also, we may validly hold that the infinite Many 
 is true, or is the One (§49j. 
 
 §19. a. The only other technical philosophical word 
 which the reader need remember is dualism. Instead of 
 using the now unfashionable theological name devil, I say 
 dualist — and there are many professed dualists, although as a 
 matter of fact there can not possibly be a real dualist, as we 
 shall see. Kant, in so far as he was explicit, was a dualist; 
 the Germans took him seriously — and see what happened 
 to them. 
 
 b. By dualism I mean that nonsense which is dressed up 
 in the orthodox 'logical" form — i. e., all explicit, formal 
 orthodox reasoning" is dualistic and nonsensical. I shall 
 describe that conventional form by this quotation in substance 
 from Art. "Dualism," "Ency. Brit.":- Dualism is a term 
 that is applied to all doctrines which try to explain facts 
 by classifying them all under two coexistent and separate or 
 distinct forms or beings.' Dualism in technical philosophy 
 postulates — i.e., assumes and then undertakes to prove — 'the 
 eternal coexistence of positively separate mind and matter; 
 it is thus opposed to an idealistic monism and a materi- 
 alistic monism." [The "Encyclopaedia" says there are 
 those two sorts of monism, thus obviously making monism 
 also finally dualistic; as a fact, the German variety of mon- 
 ism" does in effect make so-called monism a dualism— §49.] 
 Similarly, there are' two forms [a dualism"] of dualism. 
 One form Is that mind and matter are absolutely heterogene- 
 
 ous [that is the form that has been substantially stated just 
 above]. The other holds that matter in its usual sense does 
 not exist, but that we have an idea of matter, and the 
 dualism then consists of the eternal absolute distinction be- 
 tween (l) the idea of matter, and (2) ideas themselves, or 
 
 "reason." The reader need not worry if he fails to 
 
 understand all that : it is unintelligible when considered ex- 
 plicitly: I have been simply quoting — translating into my 
 crude, common words. Indirectly and implicitly, that formal 
 dualisrn contains the basis of truth, so that it will vaguely 
 mean something :- for we saw that dualism at once formed a 
 dualism of dualism : that regress actually implicitly goes on 
 indefinitely and gives the truth (§§23-4). But that remark 
 is not intelligible at this point. 
 
 c. In the Article "Dualism" there are given numerous 
 historical facts about the forms of dualism. E. g., according 
 to the encyclopedia the ' Christianity" which holds that 
 there is a God and a Devil is substantially dualistic, and the 
 morality that makes Good and Evil absolutely distinct is 
 positively so. In suitable places below I shall solve those 
 puzzles without burdening the reader with the explicit his- 
 torical details. But I may mention here, in anticipation of 
 the proof in §24c, that all orthodox pluralism is in final form 
 dualistic, because orthodox logic is explicitly dualistic. In 
 short, all positive expression in past history, previous to the 
 present solution of the verbal trick, was technically a plural- 
 ism which was a dualism, and hence was technically. wrong, 
 if we hold it rigorously to a valid logical standard. As a 
 matter of fact, very few people ever dreamed of interpreting 
 previous expression thus rigorously: substantially, most past 
 expression was right, and sensible people actually definitely 
 disparaged the orthodox logic, and very great men like 
 Christ practically repudiated it (§162e). 
 
 §20. a. We see thus that orthodox philosophical terms 
 are quite self-contradictory. Orthodox scientific terms are 
 as bad, as we saw in §15, and shall see in more detail from 
 time to time. Those contradictions are obviously the attempts 
 of various men to dodge the formal contradiction that is un- 
 dodgably inherent in the One and Many. So inevitably, 
 those attempts to escape the inescapable simply, for each at- 
 tempt, put the contradiction in a new place ; and instead of 
 resulting in a solution where no solution was needed, 
 simply added one more verbal puzzle. (That is the whole 
 qualitative history of philosophy.") The attempt became 
 more puzzling when the contradiction was made movable with- 
 in a given system," so that it wasn't "there" just when 
 we thought we "had" it:- such an elusive state of affairs 
 occurs in technical philosophical mysticism (analogous words 
 are mystify and mysterious), or in Bergson's "intuition" ; or 
 in modern science, relativity is really an example, which by 
 rigorously making the contradiction move infinitely becomes 
 technically sound, as will become intelligible in §66. 
 
 b. We may here, in further detailed proof of the exist- 
 ence of such contradictions, and as a useful means of becoming 
 inoculated against taking any ' 'isms" — ' 'systems' ' — too seriously, 
 casually note some further substantial quotations from the 
 'Encyclopaedia." 
 ism, Mysticism 
 
 I use the Articles 'Realism," "ideal- 
 
 (and of course what I thus substantially 
 
 quote is, just of itself, mostly unintelligible — a deliberate 
 
 but factually correct parody on the human mind as it disports 
 
 itself in the higher learning") :- 
 
 c. Realism is a "philosophical term used in two opposite 
 senses. (l) The oldest of these is the scholastic doctrine, 
 traceable back to Socrates, that universals have a more 'real' 
 existence than things." A "universal" of a chair (say) is 
 not real chairs, but the mental "ideal" chair. In its extreme 
 form of this first meaning, realism denies the reality of 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 One III §21d 
 
 anything but universals," and is opposed to what is called 
 nominalism" and "conceptualism." [That denial is of 
 course logical nonsense ; a universal is what we later call 
 a relationship word — see §§57, 49 for the solution of that 
 orthodox nonsense.] (2) The modern application of realism 
 is to the opposite doctrine that there is a reality apart from 
 such universals. There are several forms of that sort of doc- 
 trine:- e. g., natural or naive," ideal," empirical," 
 
 transcendental, etc. 
 
 [Obviously from those quo- 
 
 tations, the two opposite varieties of realism are tacitly both 
 dualisms. But when expression is so vague and conflicting 
 as those quoted definitions, no one can say positively what 
 such expression does mean.] 
 
 d. Mysticism requires about five of the encyclopedia 
 pages, the size of these, to explicate. The article says, to 
 begin with, that mysticism is a phase of thought, or rather 
 perhaps of feeling, which from its very nature is hardly sus- 
 ceptible of exact definition" — [as a matter of fact, we have 
 no difficulty in this book in considering it under the name of 
 infinite regress, which in psychology is called by the very 
 common names emotions or feelings — see Index, Infinite 
 regress," Emotions"]. Most frequently it [mysticism] 
 appears historically *** as a reaction of the spirit against the 
 the letter. In short, orthodox historical mysticism makes 
 an inconsolable contradiction between spirit" and letter 
 — and having no letter can not actually express itself. 
 The emotions of mystics are violent"; they are said to 
 
 have' fervid God ward aspirations." [i may mention 
 
 that several notable mystics have been considered by some 
 to be on the border-line of insanity, if not over. Women 
 sufficiently hysterical to be on the verge of insanity, such as 
 St. Theresa, are often mystics in the orthodox sense.] 
 
 e. The Encyclopaedia" uses six pages to explicate 
 idealism. First, there are two rather opposed meanings :- 
 (l) The popular meaning is substantially:- abstract perfec- 
 tion" ; i. e., ideals." In that sense, idealism is a form of 
 monism. As commonly used by the average man, I do not 
 think that idealism is quite so exaggerated, but think that it 
 is merely his name for the valid logic we are to deduce ex- 
 plicitly (cf. §49, etc.). (2) The technical meaning of ideal- 
 ism is :- the doctrine that conceives knowledge or experience 
 as a process in which two factors, subject and object, stand 
 in entire independence of each other. That of course is ad- 
 mittedly dualism. It is distinguished from so-called 
 "commonsense dualism, which regards mind and matter as 
 being in more or less accidental relation with each other, 
 in that it "seeks to realize its own ideas" — [by which hysteri- 
 cal phrase I suppose is meant that it strives to relate its ideas 
 into a One, and thus stultify itself, and flop over to the op- 
 posite first meaning]. The article states substantially 
 
 that there is no contradiction between technical, dualistic 
 idealism and James's pragmatism. But as a fact that is 
 easily verifiable, James, in Essays in Radical Empiricism," 
 did explicitly flop from dualism to a monism that was really 
 valid logic (§§49p, 156). 
 
 §21. a. Viewing that maze of nearly unintelligible con- 
 ventional contradictions, the reader has probably seen for 
 himself that orthodox philosophy is rather indeterminate. It 
 was fairly obvious that the contradiction, which was shifted 
 about from point to point by the various ists" in their dif- 
 ferent "isms," is the formal one between the One and the 
 
 Many. Of course I took the easy way and made a 
 
 parody — a slight exaggeration — of that higher thought." 
 (Those past experimental efforts to get consistent thought 
 were of course needed, and have actually been my guide in 
 working out this book.) But a proper constructive summary 
 of the whole thought of the race is given by Dewey in his 
 
 Introduction. His summary is a masterpiece, and was far be- 
 yond my powers — in fact, the reader needs to know consider- 
 able about the history of thinking to be able to appreciate 
 the excellence of that summary. 
 
 b. And probably the reader has seen already, in antici- 
 pation of the explicit discussion in the next chapter, that the 
 whole aim of philosophy and religion, in the search of a con- 
 sistent way of stating truth, was to get one part related to, 
 or joined in some way with, at least one other part, in or- 
 der to have the united, or One, meaning. In fact, as was 
 indicated in considering mysticism (§20d), unless there are 
 at least two such verbally contrasted parts, there can be no 
 positively intelligible expression. So philosophy was always 
 thrown back upon a dualism; and just as inevitably, as we 
 saw under "idealism" (§20e), it then struggled from that 
 really merely verbal dualism — which however it took too 
 seriously, as being real" — back to a united or One mean- 
 ing. And obviously, dualism is nothing more than an equiva- 
 lent name for machine" (§§15f, 86f), or for analysis." 
 Scientists use machines and analyses," and most of 
 them, precisely as do philosophers, struggle to get away from 
 that dualism to a popular idealism, or an intelligible rela- 
 tivity, or a unification, or understanding"- — or really, 
 to an explicit religion. Those who are too weak to struggle 
 much tend first to be quitters" by asserting agnosticism; 
 when they are sufficiently calloused to that lack of unifica- 
 tion or understanding, they become materialistic — which 
 variety of hardened, indifferent ignorance is, in everyday 
 terms, named cynicism — the dogmatic ignorance of the quit- 
 ter that is temporarily forgivable in the young, who almost 
 invariably assume it for a while as a protection from becoming 
 too fatigued by the flood of impressions rolling in (§155). 
 
 c. It is possible to go on from this point and show that 
 philosophers, poets, and prophets have invented an idea they 
 called God to make that dualism or machine work. When 
 they asserted (as the result of short vision — cf. §47) that 
 there really was a distinct dualism, then they obviously had 
 to have something to make that apparantly totally disas- 
 sembled machine get its parts together, and work together, 
 in order that it be intelligible or do what we plainly see it 
 doing. And they used their "God" to do that. Obviously, 
 if God actually stuck the pieces together, then as a truism, 
 there was not any longer a dualism, or dismantled scientific 
 machine. And, unless the prophet himself actually created 
 that God, then clearly the God existed previously, and there 
 was not the dualism the prophet or scientist began by assert- 
 ing existed. So we see, merely as a truism, that the 
 idealist-dualists who 'seek to realize their own ideas,' and 
 the realist-dualists who make their machine work somehow, 
 both have, like the mystics, "fervid Godward aspirations" 
 — which means, in commonsense terms, a desire to see 
 things as they are (§§153f, 162, 166). 
 
 d. But we shall not spend any more time directly upon 
 such vague orthodox philosophy or theology, even in order to 
 see the interesting historical facts concerning man's intellect- 
 ual inventions of God in his (man's) own image (§170jm). 
 We shall proceed to make first-hand, rigorous investigations 
 of facts for ourselves, and not rely upon picking out consis- 
 tencies from the maze of conflicting "authoritative" doctrine 
 — although the reader may readily do that for himself, if he 
 likes. By having heard those authorities a little we have 
 found some useful conventional words; and the reader is 
 perhaps convinced that it won't do to take some of such 
 authoritative knowledge" very seriously. 
 
§22a IV One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 10 
 
 CHAPTER IV. Statement and proof of principles of lang- 
 uage; or, Logic. 
 
 §22. a. We now begin definitely to observe facts, each 
 for himself. I simply point out the things the reader may 
 look at, as a means of seeing the truth for himself. What I 
 write is a sort of guide or sign-board ; it is not the truth, but 
 merely a particular expression of the truth — certain symbols 
 that point to the truth. 
 
 b. It is an evident truism that if the reader is to use 
 solely experimental evidence, and is not to make the really 
 impossible attempt to substitute this present symbolic guid- 
 ance for the truth, then I can not permissibly make any as- 
 sumption as to a real truth or fact, from which I can start. 
 If I were to say that In the beginning God created the 
 Heaven and the Earth,' or In the beginning was the Word, 
 then I have assumed the truth or reality of everything about 
 those extensive subjects I cared to assert, regardless of 
 whether or not the reader could see and verify it for himself; 
 and the assumption is obviously used as the answer, or abso- 
 lute explanation, of any problem that is proposed. Obviously 
 there always would remain the problems :- Why is the as- 
 sumption true? and What was before the assumption that 
 made it true? and Just what does the assumption mean any- 
 way? What actually is the "beginning," and the "Word"? 
 c. Therefore, in this book positively no essential or quali- 
 tative assumption is made : everything is based directly on 
 the reader's seeing for himself. However, it is not possible, 
 in my writing this symbolic expression (or guidance as to 
 which direction the reader may look), to avoid two general 
 arbitrary, quantitative, or formal assumptions. For if I am 
 to write and have the writing actually guide, I must formally 
 assume:- (l) that both the reader and I can and will use a 
 certain sort of agreed upon symbols or language; (2) that 
 those symbols do point to something for the reader to look 
 
 at. In this section we examine those assumptions' 
 
 in more detail, it being shown that they are arbitrary and 
 not real. 
 
 d. The first assumption is simply that the reader and I 
 both speak English. Obviously, it is not essential in any 
 absolute sense that we do. It simply is :- that if we wish 
 to communicate, then we both must speak English (or any 
 other mutual language; the book can be translated into 
 other languages for other readers without greatly modifying 
 its present pointings). So obviously, that assumption is not 
 real, but is a mere temporary and mutual agreement. 
 
 e. But that arbitrary assumption contains one corollary 
 or implication that is important, and which we need to keep 
 in mind. 'To speak English' [or other language] means 
 finally that if we say A is A, then we must not undertake to 
 say that simultaneously A is not A ; for to do that obviously 
 destroys at once what we say — and we then are not speaking 
 any langauge. That implication of the assumption is still 
 obviously arbitrary; for it says that j^we agree to use cer- 
 tain words for certain things, then we must keep the agree- 
 ment until we give notice that we shall change it. It is not 
 an assumption in any real sense ; for it is an obvious and 
 commonly accepted fact that (l) many people do not speak 
 'English' [i. e., any language] (infants, e. g.), and that 
 (2) some who do speak 'English' will consciously and delib- 
 erately fail to adhere to such an agreement (are liars, in 
 short), and further that (3) a number who try to keep the 
 agreement have such poor memories or nervous systems that 
 they fail to do so. The agreement is usually referred to by 
 the phrase, having the same definitions." But we are go- 
 ing to see, as an immediate implication of the principles of 
 time and space, that two persons can not have quite the same 
 definitions (§§36, 57, 64, 158; cf. 66): and that even after 
 
 I carefully make a definition it is impossible that it be accu- 
 rate (Index, s. v. "Exact"), so that it is absolutely impos- 
 sible for me to adhere strictly to my own definitions. " 
 Our examination into the language trick in this chapter will 
 show those facts about "definitions"; we have had here a 
 summary statement of why there has always been so much 
 difficulty over "definitions" — the difficulty is a quantitative 
 matter. Therefore, I have put our arbitrary agreement as 
 to language into an explicitly quantitative form, and we 
 shall see repeatedly, in further detail, that it is not a real 
 or qualitative assumption, but merely the base of the in- 
 vented language trick. 
 
 f. (2) Our second assumption, when we talk together 
 in this book, is that I am talking about something.' In 
 short, the minute I begin to use these verbal symbols then I 
 have tacitly assumed that the universe exists. Now, clearly, 
 that assumption is substantially the same, at least in form, 
 as saying that 'God exists, and his existence explains every- 
 thing'. It requires a little keen observing to see that this 
 second assumption is also formal, and not real. We shall 
 see it in general in the remainder of this section, and more 
 explicitly in §§60, 93, 161 (also, see Dewey's treatment of 
 it in his Introduction). The assumption may be called the 
 existence assumption; the philosophers discuss it under the 
 names being" or Being" or substance or ontology. 
 In actual effect, this total book is required to show and does 
 show, that it is not a real assumption. 
 
 g. We obviously correctly write the existence assump- 
 tion thus:- If we speak English, then at that time we tacitly 
 assume that something exists, goes on, acts, or happens. 
 
 Well ; we can see as a truism that if I had made a 
 
 real assumption there, then it would follow that if I had not 
 written the book the universe would not exist ; or, I really 
 saved the reader s life by writing this book, as otherwise he 
 would not be. That conclusion is clearly absurd. So it 
 is obvious that I am merely formally assuming the existence 
 
 of the universe. What actually happens, stated in a 
 
 commonsense and ultimately rigorous way (as proved by this 
 whole book), is that I write, and in writing I describe the 
 formally-assumed universe ; and the reader looks at it — what- 
 ever it is, — and if he sees it there, for himself, then the uni- 
 verse is experimentally and verifiably demonstrated to him, 
 and my formal or arbitrary assumption for the purposes of 
 this book was merely a tentative — i. e., not generally essential 
 — way or method or trick used in guiding him to see. 
 
 h. But that commonsense way of showing that I have 
 made no real assumption does not explicitly satisfy various 
 sorts of agnostics and irrationalists (§82c). They often even 
 definitely ask :- What is this universe you take for granted 
 you are talking about? and where does it come from and who 
 made it? and how?" ; and assert that unless I answer those 
 questions intelligibly then I have made a real assumption 
 that there is such a thing as the universe when I start talking 
 about it. Again, the same commonsense way of answering 
 is, that in this book I do give verifiable answers to those 
 questions, and that further I show experimental, verifiable 
 proof that those answers are complete, and that nothing more 
 or further — in a qualitative way — could exist as an answer. 
 Hence, the book as a whole again is proof that my assump- 
 tion is formal. 
 
 i. But those commonsense answers do not content the 
 technical objectors. As we shall discover (§35cd) act- 
 ually the only final way or real way to prove anything what- 
 ever is to do it or make it or produce it ('observe' it or 
 'experience' it, all that being merely the ancient wisdom 
 
 that the proof of the pudding is the eating thereof) and 
 
 that actual way is the one we use in this book for all final or 
 
11 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IV §23d 
 
 rigorous proof. But those objectors want an explicit technical 
 statement which rigorously expresses proof that our existence 
 assumption is not real. So I give it in the next paragraph ; 
 but they will have much difficulty in understanding it at this 
 point, as the understanding requires a grasp of the whole 
 book. The actual fact, which causes the difficulty, is that 
 the objectors' questions do not ask any real question; the 
 questions are wholly meaningless, or self-contradictory. The 
 reader not interested in technical word juggling might well 
 skip the paragraph, in which I answer those word jugglers. 
 
 j. I assert the formal assumption that something exists, 
 or goes on, or acts, or happens, about which we speak when 
 we speak English. We can arbitrarily consistently use that 
 form, and rigorously and intelligibly describe and prove 
 everything, without really assuming it. Each of the readers 
 using that formal assumption will then get the same meaning 
 as to what the something existing' is or is not, regardless of 
 how he considers it for himself: i. e., he can say that 'it' is 
 everything or nothing, mind, matter, God, consciousness, 
 ideals, real, unreal, truth, lies, dreams, life, death, Nirvana, 
 heaven, hell, static, dynamic, or any one of millions of pos- 
 sible mere names; and then he will still, obviously to all the 
 other readers who will adhere to A=A, mean just the same 
 that each of them does, regardless of the fact that each may 
 actually have used a different name (or "Being"). In short, 
 I assert that this book, by using that formal assumption, will 
 get for each reader the same meaning, regardless of what he 
 says it really" is. That is the explicit assertion of what 
 I formally (and at least, necessarily tacitly) assume by 
 the very act of writing this book (every book tacitly makes 
 the same assumption — and every speaker of a sentence). 
 Now, the explicit proof of it is :- It appears as a tru- 
 ism, from the very agreement as to the primary use of the 
 'English' [any] language, that the 'existence assumption,' 
 whatever it is, is absolutely and rigorously inexpressible in 
 any positive or actual words, as no provision for such expression 
 is made by the agreement. (As a further fact, which the reader 
 may verify by personal trial, or which is made to appear im- 
 plicitly by this whole book, no such provision for that ex- 
 pression — the expression in words or English of a real 
 assumption which has any positive, actual, or intelligible 
 meaning — can possibly be made ; see the remarks on the in- 
 effable, §56.) Consequently, as a truism (which truism was 
 asserted to begin with : and the fact that there is this ob- 
 servable truism, or obvious circle of reason, is the absolute 
 verbal proof — cf. §85), in no expressible sense is that assump- 
 tion a real assumption; consequently, it must be merely a 
 formal one, or an arbitrary, temporary one. And as a part 
 of the same truism, the agnostic questions quoted in par. h 
 also fail to express any real question; or, this is a formal, 
 technical solution of the problem of Being (put in a negative 
 form : as stated above, the whole book is needed to give the 
 positive, really useful form). 
 
 k. Well; if the reader did not skip, he probably finds 
 that he does not care for those verbal gymnastics. I do not 
 care for them myself, because they are not very useful ; for 
 such formal expression of proof is generally unintelligible 
 to the very objectors and word quibblers who demand it. 
 That proof is the only such a one given in the book; I put 
 that one in because I have found that it is often demanded 
 by impatient persons who do not know just what they are 
 asking for. Such "proofs" do not convince. That one is 
 rather obviously a sample of the customary uselessness of 
 mere verbal "argument." It is really a very brilliant "argu- 
 ment." But there is no room for that sort of stuff in this 
 book. 
 
 1. It may be held that if the reader is to observe for 
 
 himself, then I am tacitly making a real assumption that he 
 is able to observe — or, more generally, that man is conscious; 
 or, "I think, therefore I am." But that assumption that 
 the reader can observe is obviously included as a part of the 
 formal assumption that the universe exists (the reader is part 
 of the universe), and hence like that existence assumption is 
 arbitrary. As a matter of actual practical fact, that formal 
 existence assumption includes any assertion which I wish to 
 call to the reader's attentions/or his personal verification. Any 
 non-dogmatic book or sentence makes the same assumption, 
 and leaves the verification to the reader or hearer. In prac- 
 tice, I simply refrain from pontifically asserting that anything 
 is so: the book lets the reader assert that any thing whatever 
 is so or not so, just as he likes to say ; and if he will then 
 stick to that verbal agreement, that A=A can not simultane- 
 ously be A is not =A , the book proves that his further con- 
 clusions., verbally consistent with that assertion, give him 
 absolute knowledge, and knowledge that essentially coin- 
 cides with all other persons' similar knowledge, regardless of 
 
 how differently they started verbally. It of course 
 
 sounds odd to start" without starting from something — 
 without assuming" something. But the total book will be 
 concrete evidence that it not only can be done and is done, 
 but that ultimately no other sort of start" is possible 
 (otherwise, how could any baby possibly start learning?). 
 Valid logic or language or expression is circular, and can not 
 have a real "start" (§58j) — any more than a circle can. 
 
 §23. a. In order to clear the field of traditional obstruc- 
 tions, so that the reader may look at things as they are and 
 make his own discoveries, I begin here and destroy the tra- 
 ditional logic — the logic given in the usual texts, which for 
 convenience I frequently refer to as the classic logic. That 
 logic is essentially dualistic (§24c), and I hence also refer to 
 it as dualistic or pluralistic logic. And as doctrines conven- 
 tionally written in texts are ordinarily tacitly claimed to be 
 logical," and the logic is wrong, it obviously follows that 
 insofar as such books really are logical or rational they 
 too are wrong. Some books tacitly admit being illogical" 
 — "Alice in Wonderland," etc. And some few (perhaps less 
 than a dozen) rather clearly repudiate classic logic :- Christ's 
 remarks, Dewey, Richard's theory, Jordan, etc. (§49op, 
 etc.). But by the destruction of orthodox logic we clear the 
 field, formally at least, of most printed doctrines or theories. 
 
 b. I said that I shall destroy the classic logic. To 
 speak more accurately, I shall complete that logic. But as 
 the completion contains the conclusion that the beginning of 
 the classical logic — its foundation — was not only positively 
 wrong and precisely opposite to the real truth, but that the 
 logic was also useless for any directly practical purpose any- 
 way (and actually never has been so used), then perhaps it 
 is permissible to call it destruction. However, the reader 
 ought to name that process what he judges best ; I shall 
 name it destruction or completion according to the context. 
 
 c. We may trust The Encyclopaedia Biittanica" (xvi, 
 879) to state orthodoxly the essentials of that classic logic :- 
 as being the science of the processes of inference," — in- 
 ference" being the mental operation which proceeds by 
 combining two premises so as to make a consequent con- 
 clusion. 
 
 d. The obvious, commonsense replies to two common- 
 sense questions at once destroy — merely destroy — that logic :- 
 (l) If the truth of one or more premises can be observed 
 directly, why can not the truth of the conclusion be ob- 
 served directly? Clearly, if we take a classic example of 
 
 reasoning" or logic" — such as "All men are mortal; 
 Socrates is a man; therefore, as a conclusion, Socrates is 
 
§23d IV One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 mortal — it is just as easy (actually more so) to observe that 
 Socrates is mortal as it is to observe that all men are mortal. 
 Hence, such logic" clearly does nothing which can not be 
 otherwise done. So there is obviously no need of adding a 
 useless thing like "logic" to our burdens. (That is an ulti- 
 mate or absolute view. The actual temporary usefulness of 
 orthodox logic was that it was a tentative trial which, though 
 it turned out a failure itself, was needed as showing how not 
 to do it — a bit of experience essential in practically all cases.) 
 (2) The second question is :- If the two premises are two 
 distinct or separate entities of some sort, not connected in 
 any way (as is explicitly implied by the encyclopedia), then 
 how can they be combined? and if they are already com- 
 bined, then why say that they are to be combined? Obvi- 
 ously, the orthodox definition of logic substantially asserts 
 that the premises are absolutely separate — are dualistic or 
 pluralistic. In that case the assertion by that logic that it 
 then combines the premises is self-contradictory and self- 
 destructive :- it says A is A (premises are absolutely separ- 
 ate), and that A is not A (premises are combined). On the 
 other hand, if the logic means that the premises are not sep- 
 arate, then they do not need to be combined, and there tru- 
 istieally exists no such thing as the logic which does com- 
 bine" them. In point of fact, this second question, 
 
 which promptly shows the absurdity of any such thing as 
 logic" or reason" being said to exist at all, is vaguely 
 in the minds of most thinkers nowadays ; and their answers 
 to the question are not the brutal showing of the orthodox 
 contradiction which I have just given, but an assertion of 
 agnosticism. 
 
 e. This paragraph is a slight digression:- When the 
 contradiction is thus dodged by asserting agnosticism — by 
 asserting:- I do not know" — the same contradiction merely 
 bobs up in the next step. (That is well known; but I may 
 briefly write it out in this paragraph.) If the agnostic as- 
 serts that the truth of no premise can be observed or known 
 — that we can not ultimately know whether the universe ex- 
 ists (even though its existence assumption is formally rigor- 
 ously demonstrated for him in §22j), — then as an obvious 
 truism he has no consistent right to assert the first definite 
 premise or assumption of the classic logic :- that two prem- 
 ises can be combined — or even to imply thus that a premise 
 can exist. A man who does not know can not consistently 
 make any assertion : to do so is to contradict himself essen- 
 tially — to say A=A and A is not=A. He can not even as- 
 sert that he does not know, for then he would be asserting 
 that he knew at least one thing; and it would then immedi- 
 ately become necessary, according to the classic logic, that 
 he prove from that one premise, by using another which he 
 asserts does not exist, that he has no other— knows no other 
 thing. And it is obviously impossible— i. e., essentially 
 self-contradictory — to do that. In short, the customary as- 
 sertion of agnosticism promptly destroys both itself and the 
 
 classic logic at the very first step. The agnostic by 
 
 asserting agnosticism thereby asserts that he knows one thing 
 to be true. That promptly makes him in effect agree that 
 he observes — and tacitly admits the properness of the exist- 
 ence assumption of the last section. I complete the 
 
 explicit qualitative principles of agnosticism — -or rather the 
 showing of the complete lack of any valid principles — by re- 
 ferring to its variation called irrationalism, the technical 
 synonym for cynicism, in §35. But throughout this book it 
 is shown that qualitative ignorance is impossible — the expres- 
 sion of qualitative knowledge and definite consciousness of it 
 is a different matter, which is being explicitly treated in this 
 chapter, and will be finally fully considered in §150. And 
 any absolute or exact quantitative knowledge is also impossible 
 (index, s. v. Exact"). 
 
 §24. a. The last section shows the fundamental self- 
 contradictions in the classic logic, thus merely destroying it. 
 In this section we examine that logic more explicitly, and see 
 its completion into one form of a valid logic. 
 
 b. If the two premises actually be separate, then ob- 
 viously reasoning consists in combining them. I. e., reason- 
 ing consists in creating (out of nothing — as nothing is sup- 
 plied by the classic logic for the purpose, as can be seen by 
 referring to the conventional statement of what that logic is, 
 in §23c) — reasoning consists in absolutely creating a link be- 
 tween two premises, so that the two and the link all join to- 
 gether into one — that creation "causing" the consequent 
 conclusion" or that joined-together one. I am unable to con- 
 ceive anything's being created out of nothing — even an idea 
 as being created out of nothing. The assumption of such a 
 creation is saying Nothing=Nothing, and then at the same 
 time, Nothing=Something, or A=A and A is not=A. Cer- 
 tainly I never observed any such process as creating some- 
 thing out of nothing, and no one has ever submitted any 
 verifiable evidence that he observed such. But let us verb- 
 ally and formally assume that an idea, or that connecting 
 link just mentioned, is created by reason or the classic logic; 
 and then let us see what happens, in strict agreement with 
 the orthodox method of that logic :- By the conventional 
 description of that logic we have definitely that the link did 
 not exist before it was created. Hence, it is at once a mere 
 truism that the creation of the link must also create the con- 
 clusion, and that the conclusion did not exist as fact or truth 
 before that actual creation. Therefore, by classic logic, be- 
 fore formal science was reasoned" out, the universe was 
 chaos and the sun didn't rise — which is glaring nonsense. 
 What science does is merely to call men's attention to cer- 
 tain things : they look, and a part of those things actually 
 becomes a perceptible part of their nervous systems or minds 
 (see Chapter XVII, on psychology), — or their minds or ner- 
 vous systems grow as a result of observing, and nothing is 
 
 created (§§98p, 120h, 144, 146, 166). — Therefore, we 
 
 observe that the classical logic will invariably produce a non- 
 sensical conclusion — as shown typically in that conclusion 
 about chaos. And we use that observation as one premise; 
 and following strictly the rules of classic logic, observe and 
 use as a second premise :- that the classic logic is claimed to 
 exist — or to be not self-destructive. Then from the two 
 premises — viz:- (l) the classic logic destroys its conclusions 
 (i. e., gives nonsense), and (2) the classic logic is not self- 
 destructive or does not destroy its conclusions — we deduce 
 (as a truism of our verbal agreement not to contradict our- 
 selves) that there is no such thing as the classic logic or rea- 
 soning. All that — necessarily long-winded in order 
 
 to be strictly logical" — shows nothing more than the un- 
 escapable contradiction in the One and the Many. The 
 classic logic merely shuts its eyes to it. We may readily see 
 just how it arises and how to dispose of it, by observing the 
 classic logic a bit more in detail :- 
 
 c. Obviously from the last paragraph, classical logic is 
 a dualism — there being always in its forms one thing (prem- 
 ise) separate and distinct — exactly and sharply apart — from a 
 second thing (premise). All doctrines based on that logic 
 (i. e., conventional science, philosophy, and religion) are 
 hence truistically dualisms : or, are technically finite plural- 
 isms — for the possibility is tacitly indicated by the conven- 
 tional description of classic logic that there may be more than 
 two premises ; but obviously by that description there must 
 be a finite number because that logic requires explicit state- 
 ment of its premises and only a finite number can be explic- 
 itly stated — that being a truism (or, for full discussion see 
 Index, s. v. "infinity"). And as a further truism, a finite 
 pluralism may always be reduced to a dualism ; and as a 
 
13 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IV §25c 
 
 matter of commonsense fact, the classic logic itself takes its 
 final dualisms — whatever they are in the hands of its differ- 
 ent teachers — and always unites the pairs into a One : an 
 example was given in §20e. However, classical logic does 
 not explicitly agree to that commonsense fact, but takes one 
 premise and another premise and relates them by what is 
 actually a third thing or entity — that third entity agreeing 
 definitely in character with Descartes'sand Aquinas'sand the 
 Catholics' God, and less definitely with the God of all other 
 doctrines or philosophies that use the classical logic (i. e., 
 those others are with more or less explicitness beginning to 
 break away from the use of the classic logic and agree with 
 Christ). Or, the third entity constitutes whatever it is that 
 dualistic systems (§§19, 20e) vaguely and surreptitiously 
 
 mention as relating" the opposite two principles." 
 
 We may note an incidental but somewhat important truism 
 in all that. We can see already that strictly speaking, even 
 formally or verbally there is no such thing as dualism :- for 
 that third or relating entity is alway put in in someway, and 
 that makes three things at least — and not two. Therefore, 
 all so-called dualisms are actually some sort of attempted 
 finite pluralism which is at least a trinity.' But in verbal 
 agreement with conventions I shall continue to use dual- 
 ism," merely noting here the careless way the classic phil- 
 osophers had of bandying words. 
 
 d. Obviously, the classical logic has, in its historical 
 systems," used such a third, connecting link, even if that 
 link was no more than a formal word, such as relation- 
 ship." And clearly, as a truism, if the premises are such 
 sharply distinguished, separate things, they can not be joined 
 —or related" together in some way — without some link; 
 for if the two things were directly joined together they would 
 lose their essential character of being sharply distinct. But 
 then we immediately see that this link or third entity itself, 
 by the classic logic, needs a link on each side of it to join it 
 to the first two things. That fact has frequently been ob- 
 served in the past (it is another mere truism of the logic's 
 original assertion of absolutely separate things) ; and its ob- 
 servation is definitely the cause of assertions that pluralisms 
 were truth instead of dualisms. But we saw in the last para- 
 graph that those pluralisms were formally finite ; also, they 
 were exceedingly vague as to how many things they con- 
 tained — although classic logic demands sharp, distinct things. 
 However, for the pluralists to have been explicit about how 
 many would have destroyed the classical logic. For if we 
 really observe what we are doing, and become explicit about 
 it, we see that, just as the first link needed » link on each 
 side of it to connect it, so those two links in turn need a 
 link on each side, and so on ad infinitum or in absolutely in- 
 finite regress — making thus an infinite number or never-ending 
 number of entities. " Thus by rigorously using the classical 
 logic we derive an infinite pluralism — which is sound or valid 
 (the "truth"), as we shall also see in simpler and more di- 
 rect ways. But infinite pluralism means unmeasurable 
 pluralism,' or 'unnumbered number-ism' — which phrases or 
 names are explicitly verbally self-contradictory. Clearly, 
 unnumberable or uncountable pluralism means a continuous 
 connection of things: for we kept on multiplying those links 
 in infinite regress until they necessarily became continuously 
 joined — for if we went to absolute infinity those links would 
 necessarily use up everything in the universe and the last ones 
 would become zero, which truistically means that there is a 
 continuous joining. So the classic logic's rigorous conclu- 
 sion as to what is truth contradicts its base :- that there were 
 separate and distinct things. But this time its conclusion is 
 obviously a verbal or formal self-contradiction :- unnumber- 
 able number-ism,' or 'infinite pluralism.' That conclusion 
 
 obviously means either a continuous universe, or else one ab- 
 solutely divisible into an infinite number of parts of zero 
 size — which at least are not "parts" of any distinct, finite, 
 perceptibly separable size. (That is an odd looking conclu- 
 sion, of course ; but later we shall see that it can be readily 
 handled when put into commonsense terms which merely say 
 'there is no exact science.') So when it is actually used 
 rigorously, the classic logic gets the truth by destroying its 
 base. Below we observe that in simpler, sounder ways. 
 
 §25. a. We may at once see some important facts. The 
 classic logic's premises are not absolutely separate, in the 
 ordinary sense of the words. Consequently, they are al- 
 ready together, and we can, as a truism, observe conclusions 
 in essentially the same manner that we observe premises. 
 Therefore, there is no such thing as logic or reasoning in the 
 conventional sense. In the end we shall see that reason is 
 simply what is called consciousness (XVII) ; and is, in more 
 explicit terms, mind or intellect as verbally distinguished from 
 emotions. But emotions are a part even of that sort of 
 actually-existing reason. Man is not at all a reasoning" 
 animal in the conventional sense. A number of very useful 
 implications are contained in that general fact; we shall see 
 them in detail throughout the book. 
 
 b. As the classic logic will, and does, come out right if 
 it be definitely taken as far as it will go, it is an obvious tru- 
 ism that in the past the best philosophers and prophets and 
 seers and scientists have been implicitly right. If we see 
 what they meant, even though they did not say it with rig- 
 orously explicit verbal self-consistency, then we see that 
 they were essentially right. As a matter of fact (the de- 
 tailed proof of which will appear from time to time), if we 
 take into account all the causes of anyone's saying anything, 
 we see that no one can ever make an error: man can not 
 make a real error: to know all is to forgive all. A short rig- 
 orous proof of that is :- to say that someone makes a real er- 
 ror is to say that the universe — of which he is a part, — or 
 natural law, or God, makes a mistake or is inconsistent — 
 which contradicts the tacit agreement that universe" means 
 
 oneness or consistency. But actually, in practice, 
 
 we restrict our vision and statements to just a part of the 
 universe (§28c) ; and in that restricted part of it, a man may 
 obviously get out of agreement, as a man, with his somewhat 
 immediate environment, however right he may be in a wider 
 sense. We can not actually see definitely all the universal 
 details one by one, especially in the limited time of a human 
 life; and that fact is at least tacitly agreed upon when we 
 say that someone makes a mistake, or is wrong. Conse- 
 quently, when we use that practical or quantitative, re- 
 stricted way of looking at things, and observe the actual 
 historical context of the classic logic and the explicit expres- 
 sion of the doctrines that use it, then it must be said that 
 explicitly they are wrong. 
 
 c. But that is only an intellectual or partial conclusion. 
 Implicitly they are correct, and the actual fact is that men 
 have usually correctly understood them in a general way. 
 Often hereafter I sharply assert that some conclusion is 
 wrong. But I show that it is wrong from only a par- 
 tial point of view (usually the everyday one) : my sharp 
 condemnation is only intellectual, and I ask always to be un- 
 derstood as meaning that I know that the total of the matter 
 is beautifully consistent and right. Even the classical logic 
 is right ultimately. And even the late Kaiser's paranoiac 
 exaltation of his rather trivial, short-sighted self exhibited 
 the strict consistency of natural law and his own right agree- 
 ment with it, provided we go back centuries and view the 
 accumulating Prussian aristocracy that, so far as he personally 
 was concerned or responsible in his relatively short life 
 
§25c IV One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 14 
 
 merely happened to focus in him. But obviously, in daily 
 life if we say something about the former Kaiser we can not 
 stop and go through with all that lengthy prologue. Usually 
 we simply do not think in terms of centuries and of space 
 that includes galaxies. 
 
 d. The ultimate fact, anyway, as we shall see when we 
 examine the infinite regress we saw the link go into (§§40-2), 
 is that we can not make an explicit, accurate statement. 
 
 §26. a. Having thus fundamentally destroyed all ortho- 
 dox teachings in so far as they pretend to be explicitly rational 
 expression, we can now look unprejudicedly at things as they 
 are, and as a child would. And we can discontinue the use 
 of that tiresome, scholastic classic logic. I used its own 
 weapon to destroy the classical reason"; but it is a poor, 
 overweighty, clumsy tool. 
 
 b. A child sees things joined together — sees them as be- 
 ing continuous. He does not at first understand how to 
 'take' things as being apart' or separate, so that they may 
 be readily counted one by one. The reader can substantially 
 verify that by watching a child learning to count, noting that 
 at first he fails to distinguish the things he is counting as be- 
 ing "apart" from each other. I am now beginning 
 
 to formulate explicitly the verbal trick of language — the 
 trick of saying things, — which is to replace the defective 
 classical logic. That trick is the basis 6f the discovery of 
 what is positively the whole truth. It will appear that al- 
 though some of this may look like philosophy,"'/ .it is act- 
 ually experimentally verifiable. In anticipation of the 
 detailed showing of that, I may state that I first began to 
 get at the valid language trick by carefully watching a 
 child learn to count, and trying to see what it was that made 
 it such a slow, difficult process for him. The process of 
 counting is the basic form or invention of mathematics ; and 
 mathematics is merely generalized of simplified language. 
 We adults know how to count so well — are so skilled in the 
 use of the trick of mathematics — that we have to watch a 
 clumsy learner at it to see the method. 
 
 c. If it is not convenient to watch a baby learning to 
 count, or if the reader prefers to observe actually in himself 
 that we naturally, truly, or with commonsense observe 
 things as continuous or joined together, then he may readily 
 do the latter, thus:- If he observes (say) Chinamen, at first 
 they look practically alike to him. After he gets accustomed 
 to looking at them he can distinguish them apart, and see 
 readily that they have as distinctive different" features — 
 "separate parts' — as we have. The essence of the experi- 
 ment is that the reader observe something unfamiliar to him : 
 he then sees without the prejudice of preconceived ideas, and 
 he sees better what it actually is, with the details of parts 
 merging continuously into each other. 
 
 d. And that fundamental observation which we make 
 is one way of noting the fundamental principle of science :- 
 continuity (or unification or relativity). Conservation of 
 energy" is a phrase that means that energy exists continu- 
 ously. Or, scientific continuity means that there has been 
 observed a continuous, unbroken (unseparated) sequence of 
 events — whether that is named cause and effect, or by some 
 other pet phrase. We have actually had to learn to distin- 
 guish things apart. The way that distinguishing is done 
 by us humans is with convenient arbitrariness based on the 
 velocity of the light that perceptibly affects our eyes : we do 
 not have to do it that way, for by using suitable tools we 
 could divide things differently (§§77fg, 83, 100, 136; XIII). 
 
 e. Therefore, when we look at the universe, at first it 
 
 seems joined together and not separated into parts. 
 
 Usually conventional science, as its last conclusion and its 
 formal end, gets the law of continuity. We are here going 
 
 in just the opposite direction, and beginning with that, sim- 
 ply as the first, "commonsense" observation. It is merely 
 a fresh point of view. Valid logic is circular (§58j); hence, 
 we can start backwards and use our eyes then without inter- 
 ference from remembered dictums. 
 
 f. With practice we learn to separate the universe into 
 parts, as stated in par. d, and as we shall see in concrete" 
 detail in Part Two. Here we are observing words, and not- 
 ing how they are used to refer to or "express" those parts. 
 And we have seen that when we get practiced in separating 
 the universe into parts we forget how it at first was continu- 
 ous. We simply get out of the practice or custom of seeing 
 it as joined. So obviously this whole book is essentially re- 
 calling to the reader's memory something he already knows. 
 He most likely has never put it into words of any sort ; so 
 the words that have to be devised for this book may in some 
 places look a little odd at first, especially along here where 
 we are using words to discuss an investigation of words. 
 
 g. Consequently, to our sophisticated eyes and un- 
 prompted memory the universe has rather a self-contradict- 
 ory appearance:- sometimes it seems continuous and some- 
 times it seems separated into parts (the things we are very 
 familiar with seem so emphatically distinct as to be almost 
 "sharp," "exact," discrete things). Obviously, the 'prob- 
 lem" of the One and Many arises with the first observations 
 made by a baby. He does not "express" the problem and 
 its solution — the whole thing being obvious and simple to 
 him, whose mind has not been tinkered with by Aristotle, 
 the theologians, etc. 
 
 §27. a. And that seeming double aspect of the universe 
 as being the One and as being the Many can be at once ob- 
 served to be shown or reflected both in the meaning of single 
 words, and — more explicitly — in the meaning of sentences. 
 First we consider single words :- 
 
 b. A single word standing alone is simply a symbol : 
 i. e., the word indicates or points out to us a meaning which 
 we have mutually previously agreed upon. The word, just 
 of itself, has not that meaning; it is itself obviously a visible 
 design or mark or collection of ink, etc. — or if a vocal word, 
 is a combination of condensations and rarefactions of air, etc. 
 
 c. A single word does not, just of itself, have what we 
 might term a. positive meaning. E. g., the printed word Oh 
 substantially has no meaning, because only by the tone of 
 that word when spoken can we determine any particular 
 meaning: and just the single word bay (no context) might 
 mean a color, or an arm of the sea, or a sound made by an 
 animal, or a part of a building, or the state of having to face 
 an opponent, or might have several more old-fashioned or 
 
 obsolete" meanings and local or slang meanings. There- 
 fore, a single word has a positive meaning only when we tac- 
 itly or otherwise agree that it means a complete sentence. 
 With the understanding, then, that single words are agreed 
 to imply some explicit sentence, we shall observe them. 
 
 d. We may note that there are three sorts of words, if 
 we consider them from the point of view of their meaning :- 
 (l) There are words which name parts, and hence imply 
 that the universe is separated, or is made up of parts, or is 
 the Many. (2) There are words which name combinations 
 or unifications of those parts (such as the words universe, all), 
 and which hence imply that the universe is continuous and 
 not split up, or is the One. (3) And there is a third class of 
 words which are used to assert in some way the joining or 
 that which relates the Many together, so as to form a One. 
 
 From the point of view of meaning there is another 
 
 sort of words, which are named interjections (such as Oh). 
 Those words formally have no meaning, as noted. When 
 one is used, it obviously means nothing positively and is then 
 
15 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IV §2 
 
 not a word in the usual sense ; or else it must imply in its 
 particular given usage one of the three meanings mentioned. 
 
 e. Grammarians name other sorts of words ; they dis- 
 tinguish sorts according to the structural usage of words in a 
 sentence, which usage is not directly dependent upon mean- 
 ing. There are any number of ways of sorting words :- into 
 lists depending on initial letters, which the dictionaries use; 
 into classes depending on the number of letters, or of syl- 
 lables, or by whom used, etc. Those ways, and our way 
 according to meaning, are merely convenient — i. e., arbitrary 
 and not essential. We shall see that no classification of any- 
 thing is in any way absolutely essential; i. e., we can classi- 
 fy or divide the universe or any part of it as we please, 
 depending on convenience (that statement is equivalent to 
 the one about the velocity of light in §26d, and includes the 
 
 theory of space and time, §§36, 57, etc.). In the 
 
 grammars one word is sometimes one "part of speech" and 
 sometimes another, and sometimes in a given usage is not 
 positively any certain part. Precisely similarly, we are go- 
 ing to find that when we divide words according to meaning 
 the same word may be used as any one of the three kinds 
 (§§52, 44); and sometimes in vague speech its sort is not 
 
 positively determinable. In brief, even after we 
 
 classify anything, it is, as we shall see, a general principle 
 that the classification is never exact or fixed. In no case do 
 I ever intend to mean that any classification which I make is 
 sharp, absolutely accurate, or fixed in any essential way. 
 
 Much of this paragraph is an anticipatory statement, 
 
 given here to let the reader know what to be on the lookout 
 for as we further observe words. In the next section we 
 take up the three classes in more detail. 
 
 f. Although explicitly I have been saying words,' ob- 
 viously we may include whole phrases or clauses in the same 
 classification into three sorts. E. g., if I say this sheet of 
 paper, the phrase is clearly a single name for but one thing 
 in the universe. Therefore, it is to be understood that when 
 I use word' with reference to the language trick, I mean a 
 symbol that may be a single word, a phrase, a clause, or a 
 sign such as A or L. 
 
 §28. a. The first class of words mentioned in §27d — 
 words which name parts — consists usually of nouns and pro- 
 nouns or their equivalents. Those words can name (l) just 
 one definite part of the universe, as this sheet of paper ; or 
 they can name (2) a part or class" which is usually consid- 
 ered to be made up of parts itself, as men. But this sheet 
 of paper' may also be considered as being made up of parts 
 — of atoms, e. g. So there is no real distinction as to the 
 sorts of words in this first class which consists of names of 
 
 the Many. I shall refer to words in this class as 
 
 'Many' words, or pluralistic words, or scientific words. 
 They are scientific words because when scientific is given an 
 explicit meaning it refers to the formal treatment of the uni- 
 verse as made up of arbitrary parts (§85). 
 
 b. The second class of words — those which name com- 
 binations or wholes — is also usually made up of nouns or 
 pronouns (or equivalents). They name the One, and hence 
 are conventionally known as absolute words; i.e., they 
 are considered to name all there is to name, and truistically 
 they are absolute, as there remains nothing else to name. 
 Some words that are usually absolute or One words, are:- 
 the One, universe, all, complete, a-perfect-anything, an- 
 absolute-^nything, everything, an^aceurate-anythingdmean- 
 ing realiy accurate or exact), jnfinity,_zero, nothing^ none 
 (the last three are negative in form, but are obviously abso- 
 lute). However, practically any one of the words that 
 are usually Many words may be formally used asa One word. 
 I. e., at any time we may formally and arbitrarily consider 
 
 that whatever it is we are talking about may be temporarily 
 taken as the whole universe for that conversation, or sentence. 
 Thus, in our equation 2+3=5, the '5' is for the time being 
 considered to be, and is, the absolute sum total of what we 
 are talking about, and it obviously is formally a One word. 
 In the past, that way of using what was ordinarily a part in 
 a One sense, without being clearly conscious they were do- 
 ing it, caused men to fancy that they did not know the whole 
 truth. In this book, I simply call attention to that formal 
 device whenever it is importantly used, and it becomes 
 glaringly obvious that there are no qualitative problems. 
 
 c. Whenever any explicit name is needed for a word 
 which is formally or logically used as a One word, but does 
 not in ordinary meaning refer to the whole universe, I shall 
 call that word a standard universe, or state that we are talk- 
 ing about a standard universe.' It is called a standard uni- 
 verse simply because we are using a word in a One form, as 
 being for the time a formal universe, or a final verbal model 
 or scale for that conversation, or a criterion, or a measure — 
 
 and that is precisely what a standard is. Of 
 
 course, I have not as yet shown the reader enough facts to 
 make it positively intelligible to him that it is very import- 
 ant, if we are to see and think correctly, that we notice the 
 use of One words, and especially the use of standard Ones or 
 universes. It simply is requested that the reader keep these 
 remarks casually in mind until their application is shown. 
 
 d. We see again that there is a formal contradiction be- 
 tween the One words and the Many words. That formal 
 contradiction is ingrained in language. 
 
 e. But the language itself promptly — and with a rigor- 
 ous, valid logic that we are now explicitly noticing — corrects' 
 or eliminates that formal contradiction of the first two sorts 
 of words by making and using the third form, relationship 
 words. Those words, in meaning, assert that the Many are 
 really joined together, and as such is the One. In short, 
 Many words assert a splitting ; and relationship words at 
 once assert no-splitting, and thus really cancel any formal 
 contradiction. Language itself is thus really and explicitly 
 consistent, and there is » double contradiction in it which is 
 self-cancelling. We shall see that fact more definitely when 
 we consider sentences (§§31-4, 5l). 
 
 f. There are several sorts of relationship words, and it 
 is often puzzling to decide just how much of the relationship 
 quality is possessed by a word in a given usage. As a rough 
 general rule, conjunctions, prepositions, and verbs are defin- 
 itely relationship words; they are obviously copulas," or 
 joining-together words. Intransitive verbs, such as is, assert 
 explicitly the ultimate nature of a relationship :- identity, or 
 absolute unification (see par. h below). Other relationship 
 
 words merely explicitly imply identity. There is a 
 
 sort of relationship words, which words are always making 
 puzzles for us, because the implication of relationship is so 
 remote in them. Usually they are what are called abstract 
 nouns, such as truth. It is obvious that truth" is not what 
 is usually considered a part of the world ; nor is it in its con- 
 ventional meaning the whole of it, the One. It can probably 
 be seen at once that truth is simply the name of a rela- 
 tionship:- to get the word we name all the Many we like, 
 and explicitly connect them by a relationship which really 
 and obviously exists, and then we verbally abstract" or take 
 away those concrete Many and give a name to that real re- 
 lationship which we used to connect them, and formally seem 
 to speak of it as either a One or a Many name :- truth. But 
 obviously, the actual content of meaning is still relationship. 
 
 g. Usually, such abstract or relationship nouns' have 
 considerable resemblance to One words. Love is a relation- 
 ship noun or name, and we say All is love,' or 'God is love,' 
 
16 
 
 §28g IV One 
 where 'is' verbally asserts an identity between a One word 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 words, and relationship words 
 
 and a relationship word. But clearly, in such cases we mean 
 that all the parts of the Many are joined together by a rela- 
 tionship named love, and as such is-are the One. 
 
 ' msly a joining together. « 
 -really joined or connected m 
 
 in some sense. E. g., it we say i ^^ ^ book and 
 
 W is a relationship word that jo , - /jW awer - 
 
 the table merge together wfout «* «^ ^ to detail in 
 fatmrife towMfary _6e«w«» **£■■ sc ^ ntjfical iy the case.) Con- 
 
 accurately we are unable to 
 
 ,',.,! the table 'begins'; hence, it 
 
 ^ tnTon'tL^Tctlta^uch, we have to include 
 
 'and implicitly the rest of the universe). 
 
 real relation is an identity . ~ ! ' 
 
 h. A relationship is obviously a joining together. 
 
 two things are joined together- 
 
 ' m, a u 
 if we say 'the book and th 
 word that 
 ier iviti 
 between them. 
 Part Two that such is actually, sc 
 
 a „Hv if we speak positively *.- 
 sequently, f we w _ £ > ^ ^ ^^ 'begins ; 
 
 h, we have 
 with it the table (an, ^ He rest of the u .■■••) 
 
 Jetde^sSdts not see all that for himself as yet; it is 
 something that requires * large amount of evidence, and that 
 is given only gradually as we proceed. But what is espec- 
 ially called to the reader's attention at this point is that there 
 is really — in the ultimate — no sort of relationship but that of 
 identity. And here is a formal statement of the truth of that 
 point, simply as definite truisms :- Very obviously, if two 
 relationships are named, the two can not be connected by a 
 relationship word, for there is no relationship (or mutual 
 action) between relationships. A relationship of a relation- 
 ship is nonsense: e. g. , what is the brotherhood of mother- 
 hood? 2811 Relationship, by all our implicit definitions above, 
 is an indirect assertion of continuity ; and if something is 
 continuous or the One, it obviously, as a truism, can not be 
 more One or less One. And that is exactly identical to say- 
 ing that all relationship is identical ultimately, and hence is 
 
 an assertion of identity. As we proceed, frequently 
 
 I shall point out more and more clearly and in detail, that 
 there is but one relationship — that of identitj\ 
 
 i. So, to summarize, there are One words, and Many 
 
 ^The reader is usually puzzled by such a question, and by this 
 whole subject of relationship, because he has been trained into the 
 habit of being puzzled. All his life he has heard various species of 
 intellectual grafters using relationships trickily to befuddle him (us- 
 ually the grafters have long ago befuddled themselves, so that they 
 are probably no longer conscious of being such intellectual exploit- 
 ers). Many of us have given up in despair and let the befuddlement 
 proceed, so that it is difficult now to come out of it. The fact is, as 
 we shall see under religious psychology (§§153f, 162, 166), the ob- 
 servation of a universal relationship is a profound emotional exper- 
 ience. If the reader really grasps 'God is love,' or 'The Many is 
 continuous,' or any other of thousands of general statements, he is 
 much moved. All relationships are really identical and finally uni- 
 versal. Consequently, when some conscious or unconscious deceiver 
 wants to move the reader profoundly he begins to fire relationships 
 at him— abstract words, "high-sounding" words, "rhetoric," "ora- 
 tory'' which has little more sense than 'the brotherhood of mother- 
 hood when coolly examined. Perhaps the most exaggerated form of 
 that intellectual trickery is what in the present day is known as 
 futurist literature and imagism, although the same sort of exaggera- 
 
 InTr^ ! T^. iS P erennial - If *be reader of that if soft 
 
 and flabby minded he >s much moved; if he has a normally sound 
 mind, but has not studied out the way such chicanery with wordst 
 accomplished, such forms more or less irritate him; ff he knlws the 
 tack .t amuses him-and also pains him that some'people thTld try 
 
 normally tough mindeTpeopWm 3^ • ^ But aU ° f ™ 
 edly against a too-obv' n K^J^ ? 80008 ^ stru ^« ^ritat- 
 
 thus to destroy their own and their neighbors' minds 
 normally tough minded people still half-cons 
 edly against a too-obvious befudrllpmont „* 
 
 with relationships. Cole^l "f Z™ by SUch fraud 
 
 up the subject of relationships eTpS^vT * here u W to take 
 phasis on relationship, the Ir^a ea^er teX to " "^ST ^ " 
 ternary befuddled haze, and -'-- '- - ■ '" S ° mto th 
 
 towards me. 
 
 also to feel irritated and 
 
 e cus- 
 resentful 
 
 t_t .i ~ -~-^ uiuaicu ai 
 
 bunco man's J^Z^^S^^*^** '■«"■— 
 it; and we shortly shall hLfe old ^Z^slll^ T^T t ° W ° A 
 
 Many words formally cO»' 
 p worn- w ords in turn contra- 
 
 tradict One words, /ut relation^ ^ ^ & 
 diet Many words, and ^^ cUssica , logic link ), 
 
 out a relationship wori « Therefore, ob- 
 
 identity with tn ^ ^ lof , ica \ contradiction is in- 
 
 and hence 
 
 viously, the formal o^ ■ ^^^ But there „, ln 
 
 SoVshiP words, a second-and hitherto not very explic- 
 itly mentioned— formal or verbal contradiction which elimi- 
 nates all real contradiction. 
 
 j. Before proceeding to take up with regard to sen- 
 tences that same formal cancellation of verbal contradiction 
 (beginning in §3l), we shall notice that precisely the same 
 thing is evident in theology (§29), and in mathematics (§30). 
 We may here observe, as another form of summary of this 
 section, that One words, especially standard Ones, are merely 
 what science calls classes, and attempts continually in a con- 
 scious way to make. In this book we shall see in detail just 
 what classification is : existent texts a-re vague on that sub- 
 ject (for implicit authoritative agreement with that assertion, 
 see "Ency. Brit.," xvi, 900-l). 
 
 §29. a. The race for many centuries has tacitly recog- 
 nized the facts stated in the last section, in the guise of the 
 theological Trinity. Because religion is the most important 
 aspect of life (XVIII), men naturally gave those facts a theo- 
 logical name. In my opinion the men who invented the 
 Trinity — it is a verbal form, or invention," as we shall 
 see — substantially solved all knowledge, and got the same 
 solution as this book. And as that was done centuries ago 
 (nobody knows just when), the reader will probably agree 
 that there is essentially nothing novel here. The chief dif- 
 ficulty connected with the Trinity seems to have been that 
 the priestly intellectual aristocrats promptly started confus- 
 ing it with various historical happenings affecting their spec- 
 ial privileges or graft, and the rest of the people stupidly 
 and weakly submitted. 
 
 b. At this point I merely mention the outline of the 
 Trinity:- (l) God the Father corresponds to the One. He 
 was consistently the summation of all things (apart from the 
 priestly exploiting, of course). (2) God the Son was a sort 
 of emphatic symbol for Many words. As a truism, there 
 could be no absolutely unique God the Son ; there were God 
 the Son*. But we have already noticed briefly the similar 
 difficulty that arises from standard universes (§28bc). His- 
 torically it seems that Christ was first made by people rather 
 definitely simply into a standard One — and when that fact 
 was then afterwards overlooked, the Trinity obviously be- 
 came nonsensical. Christ himself seems to have intelligibly 
 and intelligently held that he was one son of God the Son* 
 — a unit of the Many (§§160-2). (s) And then, to unify 
 the God the Sons into or as God the Father, there was the 
 named universal relationship, God the Holy Ghost. 
 
 c. We shall take up those Trinity names for the One 
 and Many form or language device as we nee^ them. If 
 any reader thinks that these merely formal aspects of our 
 way of talking can be eliminated, he will find an easily read 
 attempt to do it in Wells's "God the Invisible King." 
 Wells there tried to "abolish" the Trinity as being merely a 
 theological and useless term or name. And the observant 
 reader can readily note Wells's own reconstruction of another 
 formal Trinity, even while he was throwing away the con- 
 ventional names. The orthodox theological Trinity, in which 
 Christ is a sole, or unique God the Son, is of course self- 
 contradictory autocracy, as is already broadly apparent a »A 
 as we shall further see (§§49, i 6 0-8, etc.); is precise]'/ 
 posed to what Christ probably taught; and is the hJ T 
 the aristocratic exploitation which the priests have n JT ° f 
 
 practiced 
 
17 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IV §30f 
 
 for centuries (the same dualistic game under names other 
 than Christ s was worked by priests and kings long before 
 Christ was born). 
 
 §80. a. It has been asserted (§28bgh) that the chief 
 puzzles men have had in the use of language were due to a 
 failure to notice definitely the various kinds of words — espec- 
 ially to a failure to observe the character of a standard One, 
 and the character of a certain sort of relationship words (ab- 
 stract nouns). 
 
 b. Mathematics is an abbreviated language in which 
 markedly different symbols are {usually) used for those three 
 different sorts of words. Consequently, because all that is 
 needed for consistency in using valid logic is (as we shall see 
 more definitely, §§43-5, 58) the proper recognition, or con- 
 sciousness, of the different sorts of words, it follows that 
 mathematics is an easy, useful, safety-first language because 
 that recognition in it is automatically provided for (usually). 
 In short, mathematics is simply a language that is much 
 easier to use consistently than ordinary words, because in 
 using mathematics it is far less necessary to keep our wits 
 
 about us. Orthodox mathematics has some defects 
 
 which make it very puzzling. In fact, it is impossible to 
 understand much of it (the calculus, e. g.)as it is orthodoxly 
 explicitly written : I have cited Poincare twice as asserting 
 something which means that (index, "Poincare," "Calcu- 
 lus"). So there is full justification for the customary horror 
 of mathematics. I had it myself so strongly that I investi- 
 gated them 30b to see why I had it. 
 
 c. Mathematics was probably consciously first a science 
 of number. I. e., all Many words were, in mathematics, 
 represented simply by numbers : instead of saying two 
 boys mathematics wrote 2. Afterwards, those formal sym- 
 bols were increased by writing various other brief symbols, 
 usually letters, such as x, y, a, b, 6, etc. Obviously, it is 
 easy just to glance at mathematical language and pick out 
 such Many words. 
 
 d. But orthodox mathematics may be said to be form- 
 ally defective in that it has devised no symbols for One 
 words that are readily and positively distinguishable from 
 the Many variety of symbol. As we go along we shall see 
 that the symbors for zero and infinity (o and °°) are always 
 symbols for the One — although orthodox mathematics does 
 not definitely recognize that fact (§§43-4, 55-6). But there 
 are no other symbols in mathematics which are definitely 
 distinguishable as being One words (unless various forms of 
 integration signs be taken as indirect One words). Usually 
 mathematical One words are standard universes, as the *5' 
 in 2+3= : 5. A device is usually unconsciously or intuitively 
 employed by conventional mathematicians to distinguish such 
 One symbols :- putting the symbol all alone as one member 
 
 30b I apologize to the grammatical purists for my inability to con- 
 sider such words as mathematics, ethics, as being always singular. 
 Sometimes in my view I take them as being made up of various doc- 
 trines or branches, and hence grammatically plural. In 
 
 principle, people with minds untrained in some appreciable degree 
 need rather elaborate verbal inflections — glaringly definite grammat- 
 ical signs of just where and how words fit in a sentence, — as a means 
 (1) of forcing themselves to think definitely, and (2) of definitely 
 guiding the similarly untrained hearer's otherwise unreliable com- 
 prehension. In so far as we are mentally keen we may drop such 
 slavish formalities of inflection, and thereby gain fullness of thought 
 coupled with economy in words (the characteristic of the largely 
 uninflected English language which probably helps its continual 
 spread). There must be a balance or compromise between no inflec- 
 tion and fulsome, barbaric inflection. Without further remarks on 
 the subject I shall take it that the reader of this book js mentally 
 not barbaric and hence likes to tolerate an occasional disregard of 
 inflectional agreements which might be unpleasant to the more plod- 
 ding purist who in effect considers it unsafe to give up a single in- 
 flectional crutch. 
 
 of the equation — as that '5.' We shall consciously employ 
 that device in this book, in the few algebraic equations we 
 
 need for brevity. But it is obvious that it would be 
 
 a considerable advance in mathematics if mathematical books 
 would, in some practically effective manner, positively dis- 
 tinguish One words. It would be an advance perhaps as 
 useful as any since the invention of the calculus. We are 
 going to see that our recognition of the fact that and <*> 
 are not "numbers" or Many words is the practical rule or 
 formal guidance we need in using valid logic (§43, etc.). 
 That last sentence states the exceedingly easy and simple 
 fact which all this detailed talk about words reduces to. The 
 details are all so obvious that we know them without being 
 clearly conscious of it, and I have to write at some length to 
 make them conscious. 
 
 e. But there is in mathematics a definite sort of symbol 
 
 for relationship words:- X, +, — , -=-, =, V , J , etc. 
 (An integration sign — that long *, meaning summation — is 
 a relationship noun.) Obviously, those symbols are so dis- 
 tinctive that they are ordinarily practically automatically 
 recognized, and hence are not — without almost an effort — 
 confused with Many words or with One words. If a mighty 
 orator with no real thoughts worth mentioning, or if some 
 similar intellectual bunco man, goes into a rhapsody over 
 truth, and dresses it up in shining armor, etc., soft-minded 
 people fancy he is saying something, and are impressed. But 
 if a mathematician were to do identically the same thing, 
 and go into a rhapsody over his X's, and -=-'s, and + s, and 
 dress them up in shining armor, he would be ridiculous even 
 
 to the soft minded. ■ The mathematician has not been 
 
 wholly guiltless in the past of getting relationships confused 
 with Many or with One words : those who take a space of 
 anything but three dimensions very seriously are like that 
 orator (§§59-62) — and the relativitists, unless they are defi- 
 nite about the form of logic they are using, are practically 
 like that orator (§66). But obviously, mathematics has a 
 tremendous advantage over ordinary verbal language in that 
 it is not easy to confuse relationship words with other sorts, 
 
 usually. And there is another automatic advantage 
 
 of nearly equal importance :- All relationships, as we saw 
 in §28h, are-is ultimately and definitely a relationship of 
 identity; and in mathematics that relationship is the equali- 
 ty sign = (or some logical or formal equivalent of it— often 
 in practice given in a negative form, such as >, <C, etc.). 
 And obviously, all mathematics is an effort to use that sign 
 explicitly. All other relationship symbols are evidently a 
 step by step process leading up to that final definite assertion 
 of identity. There is thus a very definite goal towards which 
 a mathematical discussion is headed : everything explicitly 
 goes towards getting some intelligible One on one side of 
 that equality sign. That gives a tremendous advantage over 
 ordinary verbal expression; for a discussion in words, be- 
 cause we are often so vague as to what ultimate relationship 
 is, frequently omits all clear statement of what mental goal is 
 desired, and naturally never arrives at any goal in particular 
 — not even at a statement of just what good it is anyway to 
 have truth in uncomfortable shining armor. 
 
 f. But mathematics is slightly defective in this matter 
 of having distinctive relationship symbols, in that sometimes 
 it uses letter symbols for relationships, that are like its Many 
 symbols (also, figures and letters when used for indices or 
 exponents are relationship symbols). Thus, d is usually the 
 differential sign ; f, the function — and there are other simi- 
 lar relationship nouns. It is a fact that mathematicians 
 rarely do confuse a relationship letter with a Many letter 
 symbol — except in the cases of L [length, or space] and T 
 [time] ; time and space are abstract or relationship nouns, 
 
§30f IV One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 and in ordinary equational use are not Many words, but are 
 
 continually orthodoxly taken to be such (IX). The 
 
 fact that there are such formal samenesses is a rather positive 
 indication that even mathematicians did not recognize just 
 how mathematics had advantages over words. And incident- 
 ally, it may be noted that Newton, who invented one sort of 
 calculus, seemed to know almost definitely the foregoing facts 
 about mathematics and hence used a dot or dots over differ- 
 entiated Manj r symbols instead of the confusing d — an in- 
 sight which the German Leibnitz seems to have obscured 
 ("Ency. Brit.," xiv, 540-2). (if the reader has forgotten 
 calculus, or never bothered to pretend to learn it, then he 
 has missed nothing appreciable by failing to understand 
 completely that technical remark about a defect of calculus 
 — and he is reassured that there are very few such remarks, 
 needed by experts, hereafter. The remark just made is quite 
 simple and intelligible if translated out of that mathematical 
 jargon. But it isn t of sufficient importance to any but the 
 mathematicians to warrant using the reader s attention on 
 such a somewhat lengthy translation giving the full meaning.) 
 g. The disadvantage all mathematics have, compared 
 with ordinary speech, is that they are not nearly so flexible 
 in giving a definite meaning. That can at once be seen by not- 
 ing that mathematics have but a few symbols for expressing 
 relationship — probably less than a hundred, — whereas verbal 
 language has thousands of such words — so many that the 
 very profusion is a perplexity sometimes, although it always 
 serves to secure an immense brevity in putting across an ex- 
 plicit meaning (because those thousands of relationship words 
 replace verbal inflections — those inflections being language's 
 original mathematical way of automatically indicating re- 
 lationship, as shown in footnote 30b: in short, mathematics 
 is merely a primitively differentiated form of words). But, 
 mathematics nevertheless achieves greater brevity with re- 
 spect to the amount of space occupied or number of symbols 
 actually used. However, that results because of the paucity 
 of relationship symbols, and each such symbol therefore 
 means so much that we take it rather mechanically and fail 
 to get the real emotional content of a mathematical equa- 
 tion. The meaning is formally put over; but not with much 
 emotional fullness or convincingness — in short, mathematics 
 is not so flexible, as was stated at first. As we shall implic- 
 itly see in the chapter on psychology (XVII), if a statement 
 fails to arouse some perceptible emotion it is pretty nearly a 
 failure as a statement — as expression. And mathematical 
 equations — i. e., mathematical sentences — have hitherto 
 failed to arouse very much perceptible emotion even among 
 first class mathematicians — who hence are dry as dust," 
 etc. Some of them go so far wrong as to assert that such 
 absence of emotion is an advantage to mathematics. (Of 
 course, if a man is so soft minded as to get excited, and fly 
 off the handle, and run amuck like an untrained Malay, or a 
 prima donna, because he has an emotion or so, then he had 
 best avoid them; but the more of controlled or balanced emo- 
 tions the better — §§149, 159). But perhaps the 
 
 most convincing proof that equations are not so flexible as 
 ordinary language is the fact that mathematicians use words 
 to say just what their equations do mean. 
 
 h. There remains but little more to add to the descrip- 
 tion of mathematics, and that will be incidently done, 
 chiefly in §§43-4, 55. The reader has seen in this section 
 the whole of the nature of mathematics, except that possibly 
 there is not yet enough direct evidence of the fact that and 
 oo are One terms or symbols. Obviously, there is nothing 
 recondite or esoteric in valid mathematics that need frighten 
 us. They are dull and dry and hence unpleasant if their 
 nature is not understood. But ordinary verbal language is a 
 
 great deal more difficult and complicated than mathematics : 
 it is much harder to avoid incorrect and confused statement 
 in formulating ordinary verbal language, or to understand it 
 correctly and clearly when it is expressed to us. But the 
 mathematics in the textbooks — especially the so-called 
 higher mathematics — contains much confusion of One words 
 with Many words, and in that degree properly is frighten- 
 ing, just as all "sin" or ignorance is repulsive. 
 
 §31. a. We have briefly seen the general nature of the 
 valid logic by examining the equation or typical sentence, 
 2-|-3=5 (§12). We then saw some more of the details of 
 precisely the same thing by observing the meaning of words 
 themselves. In doing that with words, we actually were 
 considering each word to have a meaning that implicitly was 
 a "sentence," whereas the intended meaning of a word 
 standing alone is frequently indeterminate. We are now go- 
 ing to consider sentences explicitly, and not merely implicitly. 
 
 b. When we definitely consider sentences we are going 
 to see more precisely the same principles we have already 
 seen several times. There is only one principle:- the uni- 
 verse hangs together, or works together. But there are an 
 indefinite number of -mays of stating that principle, and we 
 are now coming to another way. In this new way we are 
 going to bring in time" and space explicitly — they be- 
 ing only implicit above. And simply because the things we 
 are going to observe are things we all know, and know so 
 well that we apply them all the time, the observations have 
 never in our history so far as I can find been put very defin- 
 itely into words. Hence, some of that description of the 
 obvious looks a bit odd at first. But I do nothing more than 
 show what logic the man in the street uses, and show 
 that it is correct, and that I use it. Everybody who has 
 ever correctly stated a valid observation has used it. 
 
 §32. a. A sentence is a collection of words which states 
 a fact, an opinion — which states a meaning. That is the con- 
 ventional meaning of sentence. Obviously, the words them- 
 selves are, as a truism of that definition, a Many which are-is 
 actually joined together into a One called a meaning. We 
 obviously have there our problem of the One and the Many, 
 and an apparent contradiction — at the very beginning of 
 speech or language. As we saw, if we have simply a list or 
 assortment of words not thus collected into a sentence, the 
 words themselves do not explicitly give any meaning or One. 
 Usually the meaning of a sentence is a standard One. 
 
 b. Some technical philosophers, ordinarily named irra- 
 tionalists, substantially refuse to agree that there is a ' 'mean- 
 ing" in any sentence or any of the universe ; sometimes they 
 merely say they do not know (are agnostic), but in effect 
 they deny that a sentence can be made. Fundamen- 
 tally, the non-technical person who asks "What's the use?", 
 with the implication that there is none, is an irrationalist or 
 cynic — as will implicitly appear from time to time, as I 
 show what's the use (see Index, "Good"). There- 
 fore the irrationalists assert :- ' 'No actual sentence can be 
 made." For us commonsense mortals it is sufficient to point 
 out that their basic assertion or "principle" is a sentence 
 even if it is negative in form ; and that therefore, truistically, 
 those irrationalists destroy themselves as such by making a 
 sentence to deny sentences. In the same commonsense way 
 the sufficient answer to the person who asks What's the use? 
 is to say that if he really believed there was no use of some 
 sort, he would kill himself or at least refrain from his efforts 
 
 to keep alive, and spare us the question. Hence 
 
 those irrationalists simply prefer to talk negatively ; and it 
 is obvious that, if we wished, we could add the symbol not to 
 every sentence in this book and the meaning of the book 
 
19 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IV §33d 
 
 would remain identical, even if formally the meaning was 
 reversed"; the symbol not would merely change its present 
 arbitrary meaning. As a historical fact, Zoroaster substan- 
 tially reversed language that way (by giving his devil the 
 name of his neighbors' God), with no change in real mean- 
 ing. There is a contemporary example of language's revers- 
 ing in meaning in the slang statement, "i should worry," 
 which I am credibly informed means I should not worry." 
 
 In general, as we shall see from time to time, it is 
 
 possible validly to reverse the way of saying or expressing 
 any theory ; the theory, in its reversed condition will con- 
 tinue to mean precisely what it did to start with (cf. Index, 
 s. v. Direction," "Ether"). The fundamental principle 
 is that language is arbitrary : we can twist it around to say 
 anything whatever verbally, and then f we keep on consist- 
 ently or non-contradictorily expanding what we verbally 
 stated, we shall end with precisely the same meaning that 
 all others get, even though they may have started with 
 a statement verbally the opposite. The general proof of 
 that is quite simple and obvious :- the things themselves 
 (the universe itself) to which the words or symbols point give 
 the meaning to the words : the mere words just of them- 
 selves have no meaning; e. g., what does the word slqkebjf 
 mean? We may say that irrationalists' of all sorts are the 
 people who take the dictionary too seriously. It is always 
 painful to take any part of the universe too seriously, as only 
 the One deserves complete attention (§163b). 
 
 c. The reader who has dipped a little into general 
 science, or into philosophy or the different orthodox theolo- 
 gies, is aware of the historical fact that practically every 
 sort of principle imaginable has been asserted and denied. 
 I do not think I could formulate even the simplest, most 
 harmless looking sentence on any appreciable subject without 
 its being possible to find somebody, at some time or other, 
 asserting in effect that he could observe that the opposite of 
 my sentence was true. Those contradictory assertions are 
 not confined to closet philosophers, and scientists. Just as 
 soon as we make any kind of statement, some average man 
 is likely to bear vehement witness that it is not so. A large 
 number of average persons assert that there is no such thing 
 as whatever it is. the dictionaries designate as evil and pain 
 and disease. Therefore, in the last paragraph, at the very 
 beginning of the description of the valid logic, I considered 
 what would be the result if we verbally agreed with the man 
 who denied that there could be any such thing as a sentence 
 — thus in effect denying, according to the ordinary usage of 
 words, the possibility of any language or logic. We immedi- 
 ately saw that we would get precisely the same essential final 
 meaning regardless of whether we started by saying a sen- 
 tence is" (sentences exist), or a sentence is not." 
 
 d. The general conclusion of that discussion in par. b 
 is that we can take any sort of statement which anyone cares 
 to make, and get the same meaning for it by expanding it 
 fully as I am getting from my present conventional way of 
 expanding things. All I am doing is to take the most con- 
 ventional way of verbally naming things. If somebody 
 wishes me to start a complete and valid description of the 
 universe with his own primary verbal assertion that the moon 
 is made of green cheese, then I am quite able to do it — and 
 get it right, intelligible, consistent. But the result on lang- 
 uage itself would be that what we now customarily name 
 "green cheese" would be green cheese of a considerably 
 different history from that which verbally constituted the 
 moon. In brief, it is a scientific fact that any substance is 
 equal to any other substance, if the other substance be given 
 a different age or time factor (including space factor, the two 
 being "history"; see §§36, 57, 59, 60, 165). That is 
 
 substantially a repetition of what was shown in par. b; the 
 importance of the principle perhaps warrants the restatement 
 in different words. So we have here, with formal rig- 
 or, once for all taken care of those who wish to say things 
 in different words from ours. (We shall note the practical 
 effects of such actual variations from time to time as we pro- 
 ceed.) There is no essential objection to their using such 
 different words. It would result merely in changing the 
 present ordinary meaning of words — would result finally in 
 changing time and space implications of words into some- 
 thing different from present ones. The only objection to 
 their making such changes is the inconvenience of them. 
 Most words have a customary, fairly definitely agreed-upon 
 meaning ; and insofar as the meanings are self-consistent it is 
 mostly a waste of time to change them — it is a trivial occu- 
 pation pursued by the trivial, of scarcely more value than 
 making an index for the dictionary. There is no essential 
 reason why an apple should not now be named balloon; it 
 merely is a historical fact, dependent upon many now imper- 
 ceptible causes, that it has not in the past been so named. 
 If an appreciable advantage could be shown to accrue from 
 naming an apple balloon, we would, as a physical truism, so 
 name it (proof in §98m). A simpleton could easily devise 
 a new language by merely assigning each word in the dic- 
 tionary to the definition of some other word — and people re- 
 sembling that simpleton often write lengthy books. 
 
 e. Whenever words are taken so seriously as to be con- 
 sidered essential, then they have become idols — a part (a 
 word) is mistaken for the whole ; a unit of the Many for the 
 One. We considered that generally in §14d. Because 
 idolatry of words, directly considered, is so trivial, it is cor- 
 respondingly hard to detect (is subtle"), and hence rather 
 prevalent still — as we shall frequently have to notice, be- 
 cause of the momentous indirect results of that idolatry. 
 
 §33. a. Hence, we have established the possibility of a 
 sentence, which consists of Many words combined into a One 
 meaning. 
 
 b. If we were to name any really isolated fact or thing 
 by the word or symbol THIS, that word — which I am going 
 to use frequently as a single algebraic symbol — would ob- 
 viously be absolutely unintelligible. The reader can observe 
 the truth of that by various trials; e. g. , if all colors were 
 the same, we could and would name no color; for when we 
 say red we mean or imply that something else is not red. 
 Consequently, we must have a put-together or collected 
 Many of words before we can talk and mean anything — for 
 just one word will not (without at least implying others) say 
 anything. Hence, the THIS (whatever it is to which we 
 refer, or which we name, by that word) must be compared 
 with something else, which I shall name THAT. (Clearly, 
 whenever we say THIS, if it means anything, we have at 
 least implied a THAT with which it is compared.) 
 
 c. That last paragraph simply gives explicitly the ob- 
 vious details of the fact that we have several Many words in 
 a typical or explicit sentence — at least two:- formally THIS 
 and THAT. That is precisely the same fact which we saw 
 relative to a machine (§§15f, 21b):- there has to be more 
 than one part to a machine. In a real machine the parts 
 actually join into each other by friction — just as was men- 
 tioned concerning the book and the table (§28h). A mach- 
 ine, with strict explicitness, is what is usually called an 
 "organism" or an "organic whole." Similarly, as we see 
 in detail as we proceed, language itself is a machine — is 
 identical with a machine, — and the words themselves insep- 
 arably merge in meaning with each other. 
 
 d. When we say THIS we mean (at least implicitly) 
 that there are a number of other things with which it may be 
 
§33d IV One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 20 
 
 compared. If we say that THIS is number one of a series or 
 assemblage of things, we imply the rest of an unending 
 series of numbers or names of things with which it may be 
 compared. And that introduces and describes the primary 
 sort of mathematical words, numbers. Number is simply the 
 most generalised naming, or the most general sort of Many 
 
 words. Consequently, when we talk intelligibly we 
 
 by some means indicate that the THIS is compared (which 
 is to say :- related) to a THA T. That means or method of 
 talking intelligibly may be by gestures, by interjections or 
 sounds such as are made by the "lower" animals, by impli- 
 cation of some sort, or by explicit words. The means must 
 truistically be explicit words when we propose to express 
 something by means of language and with rigor. 
 
 e. We have seen that the Many words in the mathe- 
 matical variety of speech have that comparison or relationship 
 (with each other — which we saw in the last paragraph was 
 needed in a sentence) expressed by means of symbols such 
 as +, X , = (§30e). We have seen that in a completely 
 expressed sentence Many words are mutually related, giving 
 a combined or One meaning that is the sentence (§32a). 
 That statement of what we have observed is simply a de- 
 tailed description of a complete sentence. And we may 
 roughly express that typical sentence in mathematical sym- 
 bols, thus:- THATXTHIS=MEANING. Obviously, that 
 
 equation" or mathematical sentence is the same in form as 
 2+3=5. I have used the X sign instead of the + sign, 
 because it happens that later on ordinary science usually uses 
 it; X is simply a sort of abbreviation for a number of + s. 
 All relationships are ultimately identical (§28h) ; hence, 
 formally or logically it makes no difference whether we use 
 a X or a + , if we consistently keep to the one started with. 
 
 f. That equation THATXTHIS=MEANING is only 
 roughly expressed. I. e., it — and its equivalent sentence in 
 ordinary words — contains numbers of implications which are 
 not yet made explicit. We are now ready to begin making 
 those implications explicit — writing them all explicitly into 
 that as yet considerably abbreviated equation. 
 
 g. It may be stated here, in anticipation (and the read- 
 er can not understand it fully at this stage), that the omitted 
 implications are in general two:- (l) the THAT obviously 
 implies a series of other things, and so does the THIS; and 
 hence — with all the explicitness we usually need, but not 
 with complete explicitness — we can write them THAT... 
 and THIS...; (2) and the complete implications of those 
 things obviously are that they are explicitly named — or meas- 
 ured, as it is called by science — by the conventional or 
 Euclidian time and space. Hence if we write only THA T. . . X 
 THIS..., thus omitting that complete explicitness, we may 
 include such explicit time and space in another, or measur- 
 ing, member of the equation ; obviously, that additional 
 member is directly a repetition in different zsords, or a truism, 
 of the first member. Hence, we have the general equation :- 
 THA T. . . X THIS. . . —A whole One [or a standard One] measured 
 by the conventional time and space— MEANIAG, or —Energy 
 (as Energy is the ' scientific" One, corresponding to our 
 "logical" or verbal One :- MEANING). That equation 
 (which is logically equivalent to 2+3=5, but more explicit) 
 is the sum total of the argument of this book. All that a 
 unification of knowledge is, is such a formal expression of a 
 complete sentence. It is obvious that we may then substitute 
 in it any terms, and have a complete statement of the mean- 
 ing of those terms; or, the solution" of any problem is 
 merely the translation of such a complete statement into the 
 terms naming the point of view (the time and space) of that 
 problem. The further details of that complete statement or 
 equation consist in noting just how we customarily use time 
 
 and space to measure or name things, or concretely to re- 
 place the THA T and THIS. We drop that gen- 
 eral anticipation now, and go back and observe step by step. 
 
 §34. a. In the equation THATXTHIS=MEANING 
 it may be easily observed that the real meaning — which is 
 whatever we have observed and understood when we compare 
 'this' and 'that' — is obviously not given by the word or sym- 
 bol MEANING: it is given explicitly or positively by the 
 THIS and THAT, and that observed meaning is simply 
 named MEANING (and that name is set down in what is ob- 
 viously a tautological or repetitional manner, for the Many 
 names of that' and this' already gave that meaning once). 
 Or, it can be directly observed that MEANING does not of 
 itself positively mean anything at all. I. e., the last mem- 
 ber of the equation, of itself has no meaning, any more than 
 Oh has, or is not explicit, or is not actual or positive language: 
 for it itself is n °t verbally separated into parts that can be 
 observably or verifiably compared — and only the naming of 
 such parts in conjunction can give a verbal expression of a 
 meaning. The fact that a One word does not of it- 
 self positively express an idea is a fact not usually noticed, 
 so thoroughly have we get into the habit of speaking nearly 
 automatically. (The One is, directly considered, absolutely 
 ineffable — %56, etc.) The One word merely names and thus 
 formally or logically but not really repeats the idea positively 
 expressed by the Many words (as joined together by the re- 
 lationship words — by X in our equation). In short, we in 
 practice say everything twice — expressing it by Many words, 
 and then tautologically echoing it by a One name. It is a 
 curious fact — when first noticed. So accustomed are we to 
 that deliberate saying of everything twice (once "scientific- 
 ally," and then again ' religiously" or "ineffably" or mys- 
 tically) that it is a bit difficult to describe it intelligibly. If 
 the reader is still puzzled, in spite of my having stated the 
 proposition in several different ways in the first of this para- 
 graph, he may note that if we use language that is largely 
 composed of One words it is called mysticism — and mysti- 
 cism is of itself unintelligible (§20d). 
 
 b. As the substance of the last paragraph may still seem 
 odd, I shall expand it in more detail :- If THIS and THAT 
 be considered positive or explicit language (and, in agreement 
 with custom we do so consider it — it being the opposite of 
 mysticism), then MEANING is not lauguage in any positive 
 sense — but simply a convenient ejaculation, which is a sort 
 of signal that we have "caught" the meaning already given. 
 (It is like the last member of many formal equations :- "=0. ' ' 
 
 Zero is a One word, and means nothing explicitly.) 
 
 As we see under ethics (§162), MEANING is the milder, 
 verbal or enunciated equivalent to the laugh which 
 when we 'more energetically' catch the vivid 
 clear — meaning of something. 
 
 agreed to be not explicitly language. A laugh, and the less 
 energetic ejaculation MEANING, may be intelligibly con- 
 ceived as a finished or whole or One nervous reaction (includ- 
 ing emotions and intellect or meaning), or summing-up echo 
 to something already expressed. Hence, it is glaringly a 
 truism, that to accuse a person of having "no sense of hum- 
 or" is substantially to accuse him of being so stupid that he 
 can not sum up meanings as wholes or as a One. It is the 
 same in principle as telling him he has not enough intelli- 
 gence to make a sentence; and naturally he does not relish 
 the criticism, although it is a fact that all of us have a limit 
 beyond which we can not readily (and hence with a laugh 
 indicating reserve strength) sum things into a One— we all 
 have a practical limit to our sense of humor (§149). States- 
 men are supposed to be grave and solemn because they are 
 handling matters weighty to the limit of human endurance 
 
 is given 
 
 i. e., very 
 
 And a laugh is commonly 
 
21 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IV §3Se 
 
 — a variety of poppycock (XIX) not indulged in by Lincoln. 
 
 c. We have seen repeatedly that our typical sentence, 
 now in the rough form That X This=Meaning, contains a con- 
 tradiction between the One and the Many which has hither- 
 to in history been considered an actual self-contradiction. 
 We see now with ultimate obviousness that the contradiction 
 is merely logical or formal :- for we have seen that the mean- 
 ing is not really given by Meaning a4c ■ — that being a mere 
 ejaculation (and itself a meaningless word — by either the 
 classic logic or the valid logic). Also, it is obvious that that 
 formal contradiction, improperly called a real one by the 
 classic logic, must inhere, or must appear, in any equation, or 
 in any conclusion or sentence, which sums into a One the 
 Many that is detailed in positive words. Truistically, {/"we 
 do not use words or symbols, that must does not apply : 
 there is no such thing as what is conventionally meant by 
 
 logical necessity. That must is simply the brief way of 
 indicating the implied truism that if we use language, we 
 use language' — of indicating that we will stick to our agree- 
 ment that if A = A, then we must not say that simultane- 
 ously A is not=A (§22). See §35 for further consideration 
 of logical necessity. 
 
 d. This section shows rigorously in perhaps the most 
 obvious way that there is no real contradiction between the 
 One and the Many. It will be shown in other ways as we 
 need them (Index, One and Many"). 
 
 §35. a. The complete meaning of valid 'proof," anQl 
 implicitly of valid logic, ' and of a rational or actual logi- 
 cal necessity" is given in this section. That meaning is 
 needed to enable us to make further steps in expressing our 
 general equation explicitly. 
 
 b. If we say or assert the formal truism A=A, then (if 
 we honestly and intelligently adhere to that if' clause) we 
 
 must' not say that at the same time A is not=A, unless we 
 agree to change from that original A=A form of speaking 
 with which we started. We can make that change in agree- 
 ment if we like, and explicity say that we now agree that 
 A=something that we shall no longer name A. 
 
 c. It appears generally from the last paragraph — and I 
 proceed to show it in further detail, — that to reduce any- 
 thing to such truisms is the only valid proof" which can be 
 expressed in language. Such a meaning of valid proof" ap- 
 plies only to verbal expression of what we observe ; and logi- 
 cal necessity" is merely the must' which we follow if we 
 wish to be verbally honest and moderately intelligent. (it 
 is a historical fact that 'logical necessity" was not in the 
 least considered a necessity, or even a requirement of good 
 breeding or moderate intelligence, by some people who con- 
 sidered themselves quite logical; e. g., the well known 
 remark about a "scrap of paper.") All the 'valid proof 
 which I can print or express here in this book is that verbal 
 
 S4e I have abandoned the printing of That and This and Mean- 
 ing in capitals. I find that all-capitals is too glaringly conspicuous 
 on the printed page; the reader does not need so much emphasis on 
 the fact that he is dealing with a symbol— that all words are sym- 
 bols. Also, all-capitals uses up too much space. I could of 
 
 course reprint the last two pages, and conceal my bad judgment or 
 taste in starting with capitals— which, although they look well and 
 are needed on the written and typewritten page, are out of place on 
 the printed page. I have little patience with amateurs who insist on 
 blundering publicly. But I am an amateur printer — or rather a 
 printer perforce. Hence, it may be well not to try to conceal it. 
 It is an excellent thing, I think, to give the reader a concrete ex- 
 ample of the fact that I am not infallible— that he must verify my 
 doings and sayings for himself. Also, my leaving the pages as 
 printed shows that my mind it still flexible enough to conform to 
 changed circumstances. Also, the undue typographical emphasis of 
 the two pages may be of advantage to readers. Also, it would cost 
 me two days of work and $2 for paper, to reprint them. 
 
 proof:- reducing or reduction to truisms. All real or abso- 
 lute proof is actual observation or experience or experiment — 
 seeing for ourselves. I can not see for the reader; hence, 
 he has to get all the actual proof for himself, and make his 
 own discoveries. If there is for him any discovery in this 
 book, he makes it — not I. Hence, logic, which is the formal 
 technique or trick of consistent expression, can not give any 
 real proof. Logic gives expressional proof only, and such 
 proof is reduction of expression to truisms. 
 
 d. It is not usually recognized that the only valid ex- 
 pression of proof is to reduce the expression to truisms. 
 Classical logic substantially says that proof is something else 
 — a step by step process from premise to premise. I. e., 
 classic logic says (in its syllogism) that something to this ef- 
 fect constitutes the process:- A— Something— Something else 
 =Something else still. That logic then considers that the last 
 step is inferred from the premises (let us assume that the 
 inferring it done in accordance with that logic's rules), and 
 that hence the last step is proved. As a matter of glar- 
 ingly obvious fact, it is not in the least proved, even in ex- 
 plicit expression; the actual proof (when that step happens 
 to be true) is obtained by the reader for himself by observing 
 whatever it is the expression vaguely implicitly points to, 
 and the classic logic does not give even an explicit expression 
 of proof, as that requires statement of truisms. (On the 
 contrary, classic logic asserts that such expression of truisms 
 is circular reasoning, and that such reasoning is invalid ; see 
 par. f.) Ignoring that parenthesis here, we see that classic 
 logic thus begs the whole question, wholly omitting actual 
 consideration of What is the expression of proof?", which 
 is the relevant question. The classic logic in all that, tacitly 
 concerns itself with a much different question:- Does the 
 universe exist? But as soon as we begin to talk we verb- 
 ally assume the existence of something about which we are 
 talking — as was seen in §22, where we saw the rigorous 
 formal proof that there was something. The actual saying of 
 all which can be said, and then the observing that it does ap- 
 ply to that something is the real proof of the issue which 
 classic logic always irrelevantly raises. By declining to be 
 thus irrelevant ourselves, we see that logical proof (i. e., ex- 
 pression of proof) is the expressing of a truism. Obviously, 
 if we show that A is a number of things, and then fail to 
 assert that those things are A, there is no explicitly com- 
 pleted expression of proof — no logical proof. It sounds 
 
 silly, doesn t it? That is because it is so excessively simple. 
 And because it was so simple, classical logic substituted an 
 irrelevant question for it (thus fundamentally contradicting 
 itself as to what it was about — see Dewey's Introduction for 
 an explicit technical and historical statement of it), and the 
 result was agnosticism, and finally the recent war. If we 
 can dodge another such war by becoming intelligent enough 
 to start with thing's that are so simple and easy as to seem 
 silly, then such things are important. 
 
 e. If the point of the too-obvious remarks in the last 
 paragraph is not yet quite clear, let us take a concrete illus- 
 tration :- Suppose that a man thought his name was Smith. 
 How would he go about validly expressing the proof of what 
 
 happened to be the fact that his name was Smith? 
 
 Thus :- He asserts to begin with :- ' If all men having 
 cognizance of me agree that I am named Smith, then Smith 
 is my name." Then he produces a number of persons, all 
 of whom say :- His name is Smith. ' ' Therefore, Q. E. D. , 
 his name is Smith. Obviously, it is all a truism :- if he is 
 named Smith, then his name is Smith: he is named Smith by 
 those who do name him, therefore he is named Smith. — ■ — 
 Now, the classic logic becomes irrelevant right at the start ; 
 it asks What is his name?, and then promptly goes off on a 
 
§35e IV One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 22 
 
 tangent trying to discover what a name is, anyway. The 
 problem of What is a name? is a different problem, which 
 requires observational proof: it involves the existence as- 
 sumption (§22), and can be "solved" only by giving a com- 
 plete unified description of the universe and having the reader 
 verify it for himself. (And similar remarks apply to the 
 analogous directly irrelevant questions of number and credi- 
 bility of the witnesses, of the judges, etc.) 
 
 f. Hence all logical proof of a verbal statement consists 
 in reducing that statement to an obvious truism. As we saw 
 with respect to our equation (§§34a, 33g), we begin with 
 actual tautology in language : I am now showing that we 
 end with such tautology. Consequently, as a truism of the 
 ordinary definition of circular reasoning, all valid logic is 
 circular reasoning (see the proof of Smith's name). That 
 looks heretical, but we may readily see that it is not really 
 so :- (We have to anticipate conclusions rigorously derived 
 later on ; for final summing up of proof that valid logic is 
 circular, see §58j.) If we "reason" from the One — i. e., 
 analyze it into the Many, — we derive the Many; and to 
 
 prove the reasoning we synthesize that Many back into 
 the One. And that is circular reasoning. Obviously, as we 
 can not get out of the universe, we have to reason around' 
 
 in it: that is a truism. Usually, we reason in standard 
 
 universes. In such cases our conclusions neglect the remain- 
 der of the real universe ; and because they do, always in such 
 cases they are quantitatively inaccurate. Classical logic ob- 
 serves that truistic fact about our customary standard uni- 
 verses ; and the practical trouble with that orthodox logic is 
 that it then promptly jumps to the erroneous whole One, or 
 qualitative, conclusion that all circular reasoning is wrong, 
 whereas the fact is merely that standard Ones are quantita- 
 tively inaccurate. But the circular reasoning in standard uni- 
 verses is qualitatively or in principle, or essentially, correct; 
 and all reasoning or consistent expression is, so far as total 
 explicitness is concerned, quantitatively inaccurate. 
 
 g. This section, which anticipates somewhat, has 
 served to introduce the following facts, the detailed proof of 
 which can be observed as we proceed :- We have explicitly 
 begun with a tautology or truism :- ThatX This=Meaning. 
 So we must end by showing that it is a truism, or is tauto- 
 logical. Hence, whenever our expression or language de- 
 parts from being an explicit truism — departs from saying 
 Meaning=Meaning, to saying That X This=Meaning, — we 
 truistically must have a formal contradiction. That 'One 
 and Many' contradiction is hence essentially inherent in any 
 positive language. Therefore, the whole of a valid logic (just 
 the logic formally considered of itself, and not considering 
 its use in expressing knowledge) is to show or make obvious 
 the existence of such a formal contradiction, in summing any 
 set of details into a whole or One conclusion. Only the ex- 
 istence of such a formal contradiction allows reduction to a 
 truism; and such reduction is the only proof in a logical 
 sense. 
 
 §36. a. When we say This and That, we have implied 
 that we move or travel from one to another in some way — even 
 if only "in thought" (for more precise statement of "mo- 
 tion," see §97). That travel' definitely brings in the ideas 
 of space and time — which are at least implied whenever a 
 Many word is used, and never when a One word is used. As 
 we shall see, space and time, in their fundamental usage are 
 relationship words. For, when we split the One into 
 the Many for verbal purposes (that Many being an inherent 
 neccessity in making a positive language — §35g), we use 
 space and time as a verbal form by which we consider it log- 
 ically done, or name its doing; then, when we want to un- 
 derstand (re-collect) what we have done, we use (express) 
 
 that space and time as a relationship ('travel,' I arbitrarily 
 called it above), to get the parts verbally together again into 
 an intelligible One. A separated Many is not intelligible — 
 chaos is its conventional name. Most scientists say that a 
 separated Many, or "action at a distance," is inconceivable. 
 
 b. In that last paragraph we have a complete summary 
 of the ultimate character and use of time and space. It prob- 
 ably is too condensed to be obviously true ; so we shall have 
 various details as they arise (§§57, 59-62, 64, 66, 97, 150, 
 161, 165, etc.; also, Index, s. v. Light, velocity of"). 
 There are a number of words that practically mean time and 
 space. But usually all the scientists and philosophers and 
 theologians agree to condense the verbal puzzles of them into 
 the two words time and space. The reader can probably see 
 from the last paragraph that those puzzles evaporate very 
 simply by noting the obvious. It took me five or six years 
 of steady work to learn to write that last paragraph : so it 
 may take the reader five or six minutes to grasp it. The 
 difficulty with the paragraph is that it is too obvious. It is 
 so obvious that Herbert Spencer wrote a system of philoso- 
 phy or science and substantially forgot to consider time and 
 space : it (or they) bobbed up however in the guise of his 
 
 Unknown — and a considerable addition to the world's 
 load of deadening agnosticism resulted. 
 
 c. We shall consider that travel between 7%/* and That. 
 If That be my pencil, and This an egg possessed by you 3oc , 
 if you want to understand (really prove) a statement about 
 the two (get its meaning), you have to go from one to the 
 other and see for yourself; ultimately, you could not take 
 my word for it, and if you had not before experienced (ob- 
 served) a pencil, you would have no idea what unit of the 
 Many that word pencil pointed out, even though you wanted 
 to take my word for it. (I might verbally 'construct' a pen- 
 cil — describe it intelligibly — in terms of other units of the 
 Many previously observed, or now readily observable, by 
 you; but the ultimate proof or understanding of my expres- 
 sion is that you see for yourself; you may be ocularly blind, 
 but you still have to use me as a more or less remote tool, 
 and use your own senses and brain for the direct "seeing.") 
 That obvious fact, that in some way you have to go from one 
 thing to the other and look at them — "experiment" with 
 them,- — explicitly introduces space and time, both being thus 
 at least implied when we speak of That and This. 
 
 d. Hence, if we become more explicit in our language, 
 we must definitely name the space (which we may abbreviate 
 to L, for "length") and time (or T), when we name This 
 and That. We go from This to That, passing over a space 
 L; therefore we shall definitely say so, thus:- (ThatX 
 This)L. (The parenthesis marks, ( ), as thus used in mathe- 
 matics are equivalent to a X— are merely a different way of 
 symbolizing a relationship.) But we require time T to pass 
 over that space: the more space we pass over the directly 
 proportionally less time we need to pass over all the inter- 
 vening space before observing and expressing the final One 
 or Meaning. So we definitely say that also, thus :- (ThatX 
 This)LjT. But when we get to That we are traveling only 
 on a geometrical line— on the line or one dimension repre- 
 sented by L or length (and completely represented by LJT). 
 To see all of That we have to travel out into the other two 
 
 *=I trust that I may be forgiven for addressing the reader di- 
 rectly in the second person in this somewhat formal book. At this 
 point the number of facts we must attend to is so large that it helps 
 considerably in achieving rhetorical clearness to use the readily dis- 
 tinguishable and readable second person pronouns. The reader mav 
 perhaps consider that the saving of his effort in reading is sufficient 
 
 warrant for the use of that rhetorical device. I noted that in 
 
 occasional places further along in the book it became rather absurdlv 
 stilted to revert to 'the reader,' and I did not do so. 
 
23 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IV §36i 
 
 dimensions (if my pencil were several miles long you could 
 not see it all from the line L; even with an ordinary pencil 
 you do not confine your vision to one geometrical line L). 
 So we put in that fact explicitly also (although we still shall 
 not have a completely explicit statement), and have (ThatX 
 
 rto)L 3 /r 3 . 
 
 e. A logical or expressed proof that there are three di- 
 mensions is required. It is given in §59. We usually say 
 that we observe directly that there are three dimensions. 
 We do not directly observe that : directly we observe that all 
 things are joined together, and from different points of view 
 we give various names to that one identical relationship, one 
 name being space (see §150 for the simultaneous inclusion of 
 a cancelling time). We can observe directly, from the last 
 two paragraphs, that in order to get a That and This from, 
 or out of, a connected universe, we tacitly put in what we 
 called space to distinguish them apart, or arbitrarily sep- 
 arate them, or make them have a Difference." Then, when 
 we came to talk explicitly about That and This we promptly 
 used that same space as a verbal link to connect them. Ob- 
 viously, we thus really used space in two directly opposite 
 ways, and thus absolutely cancelled it out, as being a mere 
 form to begin with. You may thus see in detail (see also 
 par. j), from this present point of view, the truth or consis- 
 tency of the general summary of the nature of space in par. a. 
 There are other points of view which we see from time to 
 time — altogether an infinite number of points of view, all of 
 which show that space and time is-are formal and cancels 
 out, are possible. 
 
 f. But that much explicit expression — {That X This)L 3 / T 3 
 ^Meaning — does not give us the whole explicit expression :- 
 for the This may have changed ■while we were going to the 
 That. This was (as an example) your egg; and it might 
 have hatched and the chicken might then have walked off 
 and got lost while we were going over L to That. And in 
 that case our expression (That X This) L 3 /T about the two 
 things would not be quite exact or true, because there was 
 not the explicit This egg with which we began, but now a 
 lost chicken This. You may readily observe a baby lose his 
 'egg' thus in counting (in mathematical naming or talking); 
 he then does just what we are going to do — goes back and 
 finds it, or verifies" it again, — only we are going to be 
 very explicit and formal in expressing what we see and do. 
 This learning the truth of all things — which from our point 
 of view in Part One is the verbal trick of expression, or the 
 logical or mathematical or philosophical game — is nothing 
 more than being a little child with a good memory. The 
 words I am writing here are nothing more than an aid to 
 your memory — they help you concentrate on, or collect to- 
 gether, what you already know. Being myself too sophisti- 
 cated about counting, I got that aid for my memory by 
 watching a child count — as was mentioned. 
 
 g. So we have to go back to the egg This, to see it 
 again and be sure that our expression That X This is verbally 
 or formally positively correct and accurate before we re- 
 lease" that expression for publication, and then become 
 chagrined to find that This is a lost chicken instead of the 
 asserted egg. So we go back to the This. But my pencil 
 That might have had something appreciable happen to it 
 while we were going to the egg. So we go back to That, 
 and verify it. And in the same way we obviously must do 
 that ad infinitum, or in infinite regress, if our language is to 
 be perfectly explicit or positive, or is to be accurate. (in 
 this book, when I say accurate or exact or perfect, I mean ab- 
 solutely accurate or exact or perfect — which is merely the 
 conventional meaning. When I mean fairly or roughly ac- 
 curate or exact I say definite, or something that more explic- 
 
 itly indicates an approximation.) We must make that 
 
 infinite regress if our language is to assert exactly the de- 
 tails which do exist when we speak, and which details are 
 observable by us if we proceed to see them all. We have 
 proposed, as does conventional science and mathematics, to 
 make a completely explicit statement, and it is simple honesty, 
 or intelligent adherence to our agreement to keep on saying 
 A=A, that we do make that explicit statement or else pro- 
 ceed to state just where we fall short of such exactness. 
 Therefore, we write that infinite regress directly, thus :- 
 
 (That X This) If I T™= Meaning. That equation does 
 
 not yet express explicitly the fact which we observed, that 
 
 This and That changed : the L m \T° indirectly asserts it of 
 course, but asserts directly and explicitly only the ad infinitum 
 travel. I put in that omitted explicitness in par. 1. 
 
 h. And in deriving that equation we tacitly assumed 
 that This was some part of the universe, just as when we say 
 '2' we actually mean '2 things.' Just "2," the absolutely 
 abstract "number" 2, without any implication, is utterly 
 meaningless. The most abstract way in which we can 
 conceive '2" just alone, and not have it utterly meaning- 
 less, is to consider it a relationship word implying that it 
 means, or is the verbal link, joining one thing and another 
 thing into a whole; in such a case any number is cor- 
 rectly and validly equal to any other number, as they are 
 then all simply equal to links, or relationships, and the only 
 relationship is identity (that way, in which any number is 
 equal to any other number, is explicitly proved by orthodox 
 algebra in §44; it is also one view of number" taken by 
 
 Einstein's relativity, §66). In orthodox science or in 
 
 a formal equation the This and That are often given by just 
 the ' abstract" number (as by 2"), and then the 'things' 
 that also belongs in the expression is frequently forgotten — 
 with disastrous consequences to the logic, resulting in a final 
 agnosticism (also in the orthodox mathematical nonsense 
 typically shown in §44). Consequently, we are safer if we 
 put the term things into our equation, in some form, so that 
 in the equation there will be an explicit assertion that we 
 are talking about parts — about actualities, and not about 
 mere words or symbols. The customary scientific symbol for 
 
 thing, when such a sj'mbol is explicitly asserted, is M, the 
 initial of mass — a thing, or in general a part of the universe. 
 So we may stick that M into the equation, without meaning 
 that some new number is multiplied into That and This, 
 but that they explicitly mean the Many. The M we put in is 
 to be a unit of mass — to be a standard, — which thus merely 
 names the sort of measurement, and hence will positively pro- 
 vide for the equation s being used as a standard universe if 
 we so wish. So, in an algebraic sense, the M is multiplied; 
 but so long as That and This are also explicitly retained in 
 the equation, M is unity — or, is simply thing' : one thing. 
 The fact obviously is, that when we have a completely 
 explicit equation (i. e., when the space and time are 
 really taken as infinite), That and This become the total uni- 
 verse, and in that case M is the unit which is the universe 
 (as we shall see further in par. l). 
 
 i. An additional fact about the M is that we are forced 
 to be explicit as to a unit of measurement, if we are to ob- 
 serve our agreement A=A. Orthodox science sometimes is 
 not, and gets into fearful logical confusions (cf. theory of 
 relativity, §66). For, if That and This are, as we took it, a 
 pencil and an egg, we can not intelligibly multiply them to- 
 gether. CowsXhorses is nonsense. The M explicitly as- 
 serts that a common unit of measurement is taken and ap- 
 plied (ultimately it means that the egg and pencil are joined 
 and then measured simply as occupying space, as we shall 
 see). Hence, the explicit presence of the M keeps us from 
 
§36i IV One 
 
 starting talking such nonsense as PencilXEgg, by asserting 
 that a common measure (finally it is L and T) is applied to 
 those names. Therefore, we have the more explicit equa- 
 tion :- (ThatXThis)ML cc / T a> =Meaning. 
 
 j. Also, we truistically conclude — as another aspect of 
 the arbitrariness and unreality of space and time, — from our 
 way of naming L and T, that whatever they are, or however 
 we name them, they vary directly proportionally : in fact, 
 that is what I said when they were explicitly introduced into 
 the equation (4th sentence, par. d), and the statement was 
 made to agree with obvious facts which we can verify at any 
 time by watching a baby count (for explicit statement of it 
 from the point of view of T, see §§150-l). Hence, L and 
 T, so far as either the meaning of our Many expression, or 
 of Meaning, is concerned, actually cancel each other. I. e., 
 space and time, so far as this language we are constructing is 
 concerned, is-are absolutely arbitrary. They are mere ver- 
 bal counters. We saw directly in par. e that space was un- 
 real and simply a verbal form. Obviously, in precisely the 
 same way as there used for space, we can see that time is 
 unreal — it is implicitly done in §150. And in this paragraph 
 we see further, and as a formally separate observation, that 
 when we consider time and space together, they themselves 
 
 formally cancel or contradict the reality of each other. 
 
 In short, our language machine is a very close-knit affair. 
 In whatever way we regard it, we may see at once that there 
 is always the formal contradiction (here we observe it be- 
 tween L and T), but that always the very description of the 
 language structure truistically declares the contradiction to 
 be unreal because it at once cancels. These somewhat mi- 
 nute examinations of the language machine — e. g. , the one 
 in this paragraph — need not be remembered. They are ex- 
 ceedingly tiresome if you try to remember them; I never 
 remember them, but work them out by direct observation 
 when I need them. But if there is any point of the exten- 
 sive, important conclusions we are shortly to reach which you 
 wish to see for yourself in ultimate detail, then these minute 
 details are here to refer to. 
 
 k. Perhaps some readers have formerly been puzzled by 
 the idea that time and space are 'real" in the sense of con- 
 crete or objective (although leading scientists objected to 
 the idea on the ground that L and T could not be manipu- 
 lated in a test tube as could H 2 0) ; or by the dualists' 
 messes of time and space, and by views as to transcending" 
 them, apparently in our Many personality; or by the mathe- 
 maticians' ra-fold space which they themselves blandly admit 
 is sensibly inconceivable (§62). For those readers, as a 
 general means of clearing up those puzzles, I add this para- 
 graph of direct observations as to the nature of space and 
 time. (From time to time additional concrete details, more 
 
 easily seen than this paragraph, are added.) It is 
 
 clear that we have above used space and time, or L and T, 
 simply as verbal copulas. They are a paired name (i. e., 
 LJT) for God the Holy Ghost, which we implicitly intro- 
 duce when we first consider This and That as separate (intro- 
 ducing it in order to make them separate), and then have to 
 put in a second time (cancelling the original contradiction) 
 in order to get This and That back together again into the 
 One. Hence, L/ T is simply tautological with the X. 
 Therefore, in the expression {TkatY..This)LJT, the contra- 
 dictions X'and LjT' mutually cancel — which is another 
 way of showing how close-knit is our language machine. 
 
 Perhaps the simplest way of seeing the nature of time 
 
 and space is to try for yourself to see which of the three 
 kinds of words (as in the Trinity) they correspond with when 
 used in the senses above. Of course, space is sometimes 
 used as meaning that which is a part of the universe and 
 
 UNIVERSE 24 
 
 really meaning the matter that fills it, as a cubic foot — which 
 insofar as it is a Many term obviously indicates the human 
 foot. And sometimes it is used to mean the total universe, 
 as all space; then it is obviously a One word. And time m&y 
 similarly be used as each of the three sorts of words ; but it 
 is not so usual for time to be anything but a relationship word. 
 1. If we had actually done all that traveling which was 
 or is necessary in order to get the absolutely accurate (al- 
 though not yet fully explicit) statement, (ThatX. 
 This)MU'lT'"=Meaning, we obviously would have traveled, 
 naming or counting, all over the universe. And obviously, 
 the That and This would then have finally coincided as being 
 absolutely identical with the universe, or as forming the 
 universe (see last sentence, par. h). Hence we can drop 
 the verbal counters This and That if we like (as they have 
 merged into identity ; also because it is often customary in 
 everyday language to do so ; and also because we shall still 
 have in the Man explicit name for concrete things), and we 
 have left the MU'JT", which is still the universe, or a One 
 or meaning. Or, we have M [meaning the whole universe] 
 =Meaning^=Universe , — which is obviously the truisrn The 
 One— The One. And we have noted or observed only one 
 fact in the whole process of writing an explicit and accurate 
 sentence or equation — the other observations were merely of 
 word forms or agreements : were arbitrary inventions. That 
 fact is that the This (which merged with the That and hence 
 implied it: and also implied the M and is the M if we drop 
 explicit mention of This), varied in some way while we were 
 engaged in traveling over L in T. (The concrete fact was 
 that the egg hatched, or at least changed in some way. The 
 object of cold storage is to prevent as much as possible eggs' 
 changing — and it is well known that even there they still do 
 change. Part Two shows in detail that all things always are 
 
 changing.) Also, the fact that there was change is 
 
 truistically expressed by the verbal logic or form:- that the 
 That and This changed so as absolutely to merge into each 
 
 other and hence become identical with the universe (mutu- 
 ally inclusive). But that truism has not been fully verbally 
 expressed in our equation — especially it has not been defin- 
 itely asserted that M, which explicitly names This, does thus 
 vary. Therefore, we will explicitly say what we observed, 
 thus:- M{varying ■with)!?' IT™ —Meaning, or Universe. That 
 equation is then simply our truism, The One=The One. But 
 the truism, in that explicit M form, asserts that the parts of 
 the universe move or change in some way. And that motion 
 or change is nothing more than a verbal or formal agreement 
 (so far as expression is concerned) with our formal assumption 
 that we 'go' from This to That (or, finally, so far as expres- 
 sion is concerned, motion or "energy" or "life" is nothing 
 more than that the universe is formally divided — 'changed' 
 
 into parts, or into This and That; cf. §§50, 97). — 
 
 Therefore, in expression, we have simply a more explicit tru- 
 ism. And if we take it as an observable or existing fact that 
 the parts change, then we accept motion as a fact, as change 
 is motion. But, as we shall see (especially in §97), we do 
 not need to assert that "motion" is a fact, or 'exists.'' We 
 can assert "absolute rest" or "eternally static" (some peo- 
 ple do do so); 
 So it is 
 Motion 
 
 ; and we would finally get the same meaning 
 immaterial whether we say 'rest' or 'motion.' 
 is more conventional, so I take that word 
 We now have an expression, {ThatXT h is)M{varying 
 jl —Meaning, which is completely explicit and ac- 
 -logically or verbally. (We as finite individuals can 
 not of course practically use any such expression ; we come to 
 that point in §38.) When we say 'John is a boy,' we imply 
 
 that complete equation. And we have noted possible 
 
 variations in the method of writing the first member of that 
 
 m. 
 ■with)L 
 curate- 
 
25 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IV §37e 
 
 equation, depending on the degree of explicitness we wish 
 to achieve, as follows:- That X This; {ThntXThis)LJT; 
 (TkatXThis)L co lT co ; (That X This) ML JT" ; M(varying 
 ■with)L lT x ; and M [meaning a whole One]. In the next 
 section we begin to note important conclusions and applica- 
 tions. Here, we shall obtain one more variation in the 
 method of writing it that is of considerable use. 
 
 n. We have seen that in order to write That and This 
 accurately, we are forced into an infinite regress of compar- 
 ing them more and more carefully, because they change. 
 The changing was a mere truism of introducing space and 
 time at the beginning as a means of getting This and That. 
 Above, I have explicitly expressed that regress by L x lT°°. 
 There is another more conventional way of expressing it 
 which we shall find more useful:- We may write it That... 
 XThis... ; or, we may express the same thing with a single 
 word or symbol, as That..., or M. .., or This... . The dots 
 . . . are the usual typographical sign indicating a continuing 
 series, or regress, or verbal step-by-step process, when ex- 
 plicit naming of all the members of the series is not gone 
 through with. Or, the dots ... mean simply "etc.," or 
 mean that the completion of our ad infinitum process is 
 omitted. (in English the dots typographically spread out, 
 thus :- . . . ; but for obvious reasons it is preferable to use 
 
 the compact French fashion in this book.) We may 
 
 conceive the meaning of the dots in a much simpler (i. e., 
 more familiar) way than to consider that they replace the 
 M IT :- When we say This we imply that there are other 
 Tkis's and That's. Hence, we may say that the dots ... 
 mean that in order to state This completely or accurately we 
 have to go on and name an infinit)' of This's in comparison. 
 Therefore, explicit typographical expression of any This — of any 
 part of the universe, or of any unit of the Many — is This... . 
 
 §87. a. By explicitly formally expressing any statement, 
 using general words or symbols to do it, we have derived an 
 equation or sentence which we can put into various forms, 
 depending on how explicit we wish to be. And we have 
 seen that each form reduces to an explicit truism. Thus, 
 the general explicit form was M.(imrying with)L / T =Mean- 
 ing, or Universe: we may write that, M... = Universe, and 
 obviously (as a truism of our agreement as to what symbols 
 mean) M. .. is the universe, and we have Universe^ Universe. 
 
 b. But clearly such explicit truisms are not useful in 
 ordinary speech. Also, in ordinary language we can not 
 actually express that infinite regress which is implied when- 
 ever we use a Many word. Therefore, we need (l) to get 
 those various forms into directly useful shape, and (2) then 
 to note, and express very carefully in conventional terms, 
 just what our practical typical equations or sentences mean. 
 Actually, we are going to see that all the general laws of 
 science, philosophy, and religion are definitely implied — even 
 expressed — in those type sentences. It will take the 
 whole book to show that. But it is obvious that if truth is 
 consistent or unified, then it is a truism that all of it may be 
 reduced to explicit expression by one typical sentence. 
 
 c. The form which is usually implicitly used in every- 
 day speech is That. . . X This. . . =Meaning. That equation 
 simply explicitly asserts a comparison of things — a verifica- 
 tion. And it is obvious that when we talk we compare 
 things — describe the less well known in terms of mutually 
 familiar things. Or, all language is metaphor or simile. It 
 is better to know explicitly that trick of talking. Then we 
 are less liable to depart from it, and try to talk of things as 
 being absolutely separate (which of course implies that they 
 are absolutely without comparison) ; such talk is nonsensical. 
 
 d. As immediate rough evidence of the fact that that 
 everyday equation "explains" things, or solves" problems, 
 
 or gives intelligible talk, we may in the remainder of this 
 section observe some examples of its use. (These samples 
 are here quite roughly stated : the more definite statements 
 — which would not be very intelligible at this point — are in 
 
 the last chapters.) Our Constitution makes a broad 
 
 comparison of (]) That and (2) This by the method or terms 
 of comparing or joining (l) the various state governments and 
 (2) the federal government. The (l) state governments may 
 run into as many explicit dots (State Governments. . . ) as we 
 can write, by naming governors, legislators, etc., on to the 
 individual citizens — and on to the parts of their component 
 atoms. And (2) Federal Government... may have as many 
 dots as we care to name, such as president, congressmen, 
 messenger boys, on to the details federal citizens, and on 
 to pins owned by them, etc. The Constitution broadly 
 makes the Federal Government. . . react as a verbal Many, or 
 as a part of a machine, with State Governments..., thus:- 
 State Governments... X Federal Government... =Country, or Na- 
 tion. That is a standard universe (unless we consider it in 
 
 the light of §47, which we need not, here). But we 
 
 can divide our Nation into reacting pairs in an indefinite num- 
 ber of ways by making a division in those infinite details or 
 dots from other points of view. Thus, we have People... X 
 Officials. . . (a form of equation which is recognized or indicated 
 by the first ten amendments to the Constitution — the so- 
 called bill of rights). Or, we may have Congress... XPresi- 
 dent... . In that pair, the dots in President... obviously will 
 finally include the people who elect a particular man as presi- 
 dent (which means, for one thing, in ordinary language, that 
 the people are perceptibly a part of the president as such, in 
 that they can have him impeached, etc.). But Congress... 
 also includes with more or less definiteness the same people. 
 So there is an obvious example of That. . . and This. . . becom- 
 ing identical when carried out a little in detail. The 
 
 Constitution explicitly asserts a democracy — a reacting, or 
 interacting, or formally and explicitly (as well as actually) 
 related That... XThis..., or machine. And the Constitution 
 in effect states that regardless of how the standard One or 
 Country be considered as thus arbitrarily or logically' 
 divided into parts, they are compared, or balanced, or are of 
 equal logical or formal importance, but explicitly are not of 
 equal quantitative importance or value. 
 
 e. But in an attempted aristocracy or autocracy (there can 
 not possibly be a real or actual one ; § 1 74) an attempt is made 
 to depart from the valid equation That. . . X This. . . =Meaning. 
 The people in an aristocracy are mostly called subjects or 
 vassals, meaning that they are expected to be essentially or 
 in principle subordinate, and not a complementary or re- 
 acting part of the whole. In short, with respect to the gov- 
 ernment (to the autocratic officials) the people are said to be 
 officially or logically nothing or zero, so that we have the 
 attempted equation Officials= Nation, or One. 1. e., it is in 
 verbal effect denied that there is any reacting part, or other 
 unit of the Many such as That... ; and it is also denied that 
 there can be any dots, which can, by a division from » dif- 
 ferent point of view, give reacting or comparable parts. 
 Obviously that aristocratic or dualistic point of view is arrant 
 nonsense. As soon as we see how we must talk about the 
 Many if we are to talk at all in positive or concrete terms, 
 we see that there must be reacting parts, or a machine. 
 When the autocrat says that he is the state, he asserts:- An 
 individual of the Many— The One — which is obviously equiva- 
 lent to the claim of divine right, or ex officio infallibility, 
 because in conventional terms the One is God. Such logical 
 absurdity is admired and praised by some ; by others it is 
 variously named autocracy, aristocracy, egotism, paranoia, 
 megalomania, hysteria, or excessive selfishness. All 
 
§37e IV One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 •iii 
 
 of that states a logical or qualitative proposition. I have 
 made no assertion or implication that one part of the essen- 
 tial machine is quantitatively equal to another part. As a fact, 
 no two parts can ever be quantitatively equal during a finite 
 time (§§162i, 164, 167-8). The quantitative sizes of That 
 and This become a matter for measurement, by means of L 
 and T, and we are to investigate that matter ; but clearly, 
 that difference in size does not affect the principle that there 
 must explicitly be at least two reacting parts. 
 
 f. Thus we see that essentially there are no superiors 
 or inferiors" among the parts of the One. On the other 
 hand, quantitatively, or from the arbitrary L and T point of 
 view, the parts of the One are always of different sizes. 
 That double aspect of the application of our equation — 
 (l) the essentia] or qualitative aspect is the One; (2) the 
 quantitative aspect is the Many — runs through every act of 
 our lives. Thus:- no line" organization can, as such, pos- 
 sibly work, as it is self-contradictory nonsense (§§ 174c, 175, 
 167). Aline organization is the so-called military one, 
 wherein there are asserted to be essential superiors and in- 
 feriors (so that by virtue of rank an order is correct, etc. — 
 just as the pope, in the Catholic line organization or ecclesi- 
 astic hierarchy, is nonsensically held officially infallible). 
 
 g. Those conclusions are anticipated here to show that 
 what superficially seems to be a rather trivial investigation of 
 words clears up everyday matters that confuse and puzzle 
 many. Continually we are going to be using that form 
 That. . . X This. . . =Meaning. And usually we find that 
 merely to express a point of view in that form throws such 
 an illuminating light that further explanation is rather need- 
 less. Also, as we all must be able to estimate the different 
 quantitative sizes of men (XVIII, XIX), we further need to 
 know about the measuring form of that equation — we need 
 to know very definitely about L and T, and see how those 
 apparently abstract" relationships are applied to simple 
 
 material" parts of the universe — as a means of learning to 
 apply that form to the complicated parts named men. 
 
 CHAPTER V. General statement and proof of how to apply 
 language. 
 
 §38. a. We may write our explicit statement thus:- 
 That...XThis... = {ThatXThis)ML x lT" = M(varying 
 wilk)L I 'T K = Universe, or Energy. In practice, an infinite 
 regress or the L^JT" is not positively stateable. Conse- 
 quently, in order to get rid of it explicity, we assume (this is 
 an actual assumption, in that it is not an exact fact, and will 
 always in practice make our equation inaccurate quantitatively; 
 but in §42d we get rid of the assumption formally or logic- 
 ally or qualitatively by cancelling it out — doing that by the 
 simple method of asserting the real truth :- that the equa- 
 tion is inexact) \vc assume that This does not change 
 
 enough to make any particular or important inaccuracy in the 
 truth of what we say, during the time we go to That, if we 
 do not return and re-view and re-state This. Or, we assume 
 that we can guess at what change there will be in This, and 
 hence state what the parts This and That are simultaneously, 
 without going back to This to see that change — and thereby 
 losing the exact change in That, and having to return, and 
 so on ad infinitum. We therefore, (l) drop explicit stating 
 of the dots before they become absolutely infinity (we as fin- 
 ite individuals have to discontinue naming them at some 
 time) ; and (2) we also drop the infinite L's and T's that 
 symbolically gave the impractical positive naming, and have :- 
 That... X This... = (ThatXThis)ML 3 lT a = Unvarying 
 with)L 3 \T 3 =Energy. The dots ... of That..., etc., now 
 
 mean in practice that we can not positively go on and name 
 each one to infinity. They also, in practice, explicitly mean 
 that they replace the ML 3 JT 3 in the more explicit form, 
 ( That X This)ML 3 IT 3 ; i.e., That. . . X This. . . is really an 
 abbreviation which implies always that a definite measure- 
 ment by L 3 JT 3 must be made jfwe are quite practically ex- 
 plicit. Usually in this book I do not print that full form 
 {ThatXTkis)ML 3 JT 3 . Hence, always hereafter, unless 
 definitely stated or indicated otherwise (e. g. , as in the cases 
 where I am showing what pluralism or the classic logic verb- 
 ally asserts), That and This, or any of the numerous analo- 
 gous symbols or synonyms into which they are translated, 
 are to be understood as having dots; i. e., logically every 
 Many term implies the infinite regress (the classic logic verb- 
 ally tries to deny that regress). For various reasons, on a 
 few occasions I omit printing the dots. 
 
 b. And conventional science, for reasons of convenience 
 (§§68d, 72-3), changes the L 3 /T 3 into L 2 /T 2 . We may 
 therefore drop out an LjT in the second member, remem- 
 bering that it is implied (see §72), and we have what I shall 
 call our general equation, or general sentence or statement :- 
 
 That. . . X This. . . =M(varying with)L 2 T' 2 =Energy. 
 
 c. That equation expresses, formally and in a fairly 
 conventional scientific way, all knowledge. It is as conven- 
 tional in form as it is validly possible to make it. Orthodox 
 science usually (in the older textbooks) asserts the equation 
 ML" T~"= := Energy ,®* — making totally illogical and somewhat 
 inaccurate assumptions (§72, etc.). Our general equation 
 closely resembles that orthodox one in form; and the fact 
 is that our {varying with)' is a number or "coefficient" that 
 in ordinary circumstances quantitatively is equal to approxi- 
 mately 1 (§§72-3, etc.). But in principle, the orthodox equa- 
 tion asserts that the part M is isolated (has no dots) ; that 
 there is no other body with which that explicitly named M 
 reacts, but that it just has energy of itself, whatever that 
 mystic statement may mean (of course, all commonsense 
 people, and Newton's first law in effect, hold that there is 
 energy displayed only when that named M reacts with some 
 other body or M; I am merely showing what the orthodox 
 equation really asserts, and how it is interpreted). In short, the 
 orthodox equation asserts that M=The One — which we saw 
 in §37ef is nonsense. Our '(varying with)' is ultimately 
 merely an explicit assertion that there are dots — that the 
 part is really M. . . , implying an indefinite regress of other M's 
 with which it reacts or really ultimately joins. 
 
 §39. a. We begin now to note the rather numerous 
 
 38a As we shall see, the above practical use of L 3 /I^ for L^/T 00 is 
 merely arbitrary, and not essential. When we make that practical 
 assumption, besides (A) making the statement or equation inaccu- 
 rate, we a)so (R) have selected our ordinary everyday language as 
 the language we shall speak. We did not have to select that par- 
 ticlar language. We couid (1) have selected i n /7'", and thus obv- 
 iously got any one of the indefinite number of arbitrary languages of 
 a "space" of other than 3 dimensions. Also, we could (2) have 
 taken it that L was not Euclidian or "flat" space, and got any one 
 of an indefinite number of languages — which one we got depending 
 on the quantitative degree of "curvature" of the space which we ar- 
 bitrarily selected. Or, we could (3) have assumed that L and T did 
 not vary proportionally— were not mutually steady— and got anyone 
 of an indefinite number of languages known collectively as the "rela- 
 tivity theory"— which one, depending on the particular quantitative 
 degree of disproportionate variation (of "jelly-fish" shaking of space 
 described in §66) we selected for any given case or statement. We 
 consider those different sorts of languages in VIII. 
 
 ^Usually science writes that equation 'Amv 2 = Energy, where m 
 is our M; and v is velocity, or L/T, so that «*=£2T-2; and' H is the 
 numerical result of differentiating or averaging the change of velocity 
 
 (on the erroneous assumption that there is not our 'varying with' as 
 
 we shall see). Ml? T- 2 is the so-called dimensional form of K»ti> 2 
 which drops such "abstract" numbers (§68). 
 
27 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One V §39h 
 
 conclusions that are directly observable in that general form 
 of a complete sentence. It may first be observed that the 
 reason for using the "mathematical" form is that we have 
 noticed such a considerable number of implications contained 
 in language that we see we need the formality of mathemat- 
 ics to make them explicit in a statement brief enough to be 
 easily remembered — one that is an aid to memory rather 
 than a burden. If we like, we can put that form which we 
 mostly use into ' words" :- ' That and this is something . ' But 
 even compared with that form, the "mathematical" way, 
 That, . . X This. . . =Meaning, seems to be terser, and more 
 illuminating to the eye. The equation is merely a mne- 
 monic device — all equations are, and in a sense language is. 
 
 b. I may repeat somewhat, in summary :- The three 
 members of the general equation are three different forms in 
 which identically the same thing is asserted; i. e., the three 
 are the truism A=A=A. The first member, That...X 
 This..., expresses the Many in everyday terms, asserting 
 that the Many is really the One. The second member, 
 M(varying with)L 2 T~ 2 , expresses the Many explicitly in 
 measuring or quantitative terms (explicitly in terms of time 
 and space)- — again asserting that the Many is really con- 
 nected continuously into the One. The third member, 
 Energy (or The One, or Universe, or Meaning), expresses the 
 One as a tautological echo, without being itself positive 
 language. 
 
 e. We may now see that in so far as it is consistently 
 possible to distinguish apart philosophy, science, and relig- 
 ion, the three members of the equation respectively do it. 
 The meaning or content of philosophy, science, and religion 
 is obviously identical (assuming that each has a valid mean- 
 ing, as is the case if the names are honestly applied or if we 
 stick to A=A, and if this book proves that knowledge is 
 unified). Hence (unless the book fails to unify knowledge 
 — to show that The Many=The One), no valid essential differ- 
 ence can exist between religion, science, and philosophy ; 
 they are an inseparable unit, mutually including each other, 
 just as That... ultimately merges identically into This.... 
 Hence, the difference in form (an arbitrary, L and T, or 
 quantitative difference) implied by the general equation is 
 the only valid distinction between the three. 
 
 d. The That... X This... member is substantially the 
 form in which knowledge or experience has been discussed 
 by philosophy for centuries. And the same form, which 
 speaks of observations in customary terms such as this" 
 and "that," and compares such Many terms with each 
 other, is obviously the form used by the average man, in 
 which to express everyday matters. Practically all of hu- 
 manics is expressed in that form : it is used throughout Part 
 Three. Theoretically or technically, it is philosophy"; 
 practically, it is the brief commonsense way of expressing 
 what we ordinarily see or think of. Essentially, the foregoing 
 discussion of language (which some critics would nearly 
 surely condemn by their curse-word philosophy" if they 
 are not hereby discouraged) is obviously equally science, re- 
 ligion, and philosophy — briefly, is commonsense. 
 
 e. The second member, M{varying with)L T~" , is sub- 
 stantially the scientific member, and its obviously distin- 
 guishing characteristic is that it considers the Many 
 explicitly in terms of L and T. In brief, science definitely 
 and carefully uses space and time, and gets what it calls 
 measurements — so that fundamentally and specifically science 
 is the explicit form of Many expression (summing of course 
 to a One or religion). That agrees with Kelvin and other 
 authoritative scientists (§2c). But science customarily by 
 no means confines itself to the use of that explicit form. 
 Conventionally it spreads to the other forms, just as This... 
 
 merges identically with That.... E. g., conservation of en- 
 ergy (i. e., the absoluteness of the One — or briefly, The 
 Ove T =The One) is religion — even technically mysticism, al- 
 though quite intelligible, — and not formally explicitly science. 
 And science is continually using the first member, the philo- 
 sophical form; as in Force XLength= Energy ; Quantity of 
 electricity X Voltage; Volume X Pressure, etc. Further, every 
 one of science's. "mathanical theories' is definitely a philo- 
 sophical form (§§88-90, 98, etc.). 
 
 f. On the other hand, orthodox philosophers and the 
 average man are both frequently engaged in talking of time 
 and space — in explicitly using those words to express meas- 
 ures definitely. In doing so, they are obviously technically 
 scientific. As a matter of commonsense fact (i. e., taking a 
 view of all knowledge, regardless of its forms), there can be 
 no sharp distinction between science, philosophy, and relig- 
 ion, even in the matter of technique or form (for rigorous 
 implicit proof, see §§41, 40, 50). The distinction which I 
 more or less observe in this book is to consider that science 
 treats primarily of the Many — and by implication, is explicit 
 about L and T where need be, — whereas religion is explicit 
 about the One. When I use philosophy I am inclined to 
 follow customary usages of the average man, and imply a 
 doctrine of some sort that is rather vaguely stated. I may 
 say in defense of that rather untechnical conduct that to use 
 That. . . X This. . . is more vague than to use M(varying with) 
 L~T~", and that with the exception of the few first class 
 philosophers the professional philosopher, or particularly the 
 amateur sort, is pretty vague. So the word philosophy is an 
 uncertain, tricky sort of word to use. When the scientist 
 means what is strictly technically philosophy — i. e., a 
 That...XThis... summed into a One, — he usually calls it 
 
 commonsense. ' And that is just as tricky a word : it ob- 
 viously has been saying philosophy for the scientist at the 
 very time he claimed he was abjuring philosophy. Moses 
 and the theologians, when they want to indicate what we see 
 is technical philosophy, thunder Thus sayeth the Lord" — 
 which is even more dangerous and uncertain — now so glar- 
 ingly so that the day of noisy dogmatism is rapidly passing. 
 
 g. The third and last member, Energy, is the tautological 
 One word, and is the technically religious part of the equa- 
 tion. As a matter of fact, all expressed religion — when it is 
 not mysticism and of itself unintelligible, ond hence not ex- 
 pression in a positive sense — is necessarily expressed in Many 
 terms that are then summed into the One that is technically 
 religion. So, the expression of religion is thus truistically a 
 science — or it may be technical philosophy :- a mechanical 
 theory. The science which directly expresses religion is us- 
 ually called ethics (§160). Orthodox theology is funda- 
 mentally dualism, and hence is nonsense when explicitly 
 considered, and actually in practice is neither science, nor 
 philosoph}', nor religion (as we shall see in verifiable detail). 
 Theology is practically a spoiled word — so spoiled that in 
 this book I make no perhaps hopeless effort to rehabilitate 
 it, but use it in its customary meanings to indicate a certain 
 dogmatic species of dualism, aristocracy, etc. 
 
 h. I shall use the word religion to mean that the pri- 
 mary emphasis of a certain state of consciousness or life or of 
 a certain collection of words is on the validly formal and also 
 intelligible — and hence considerably emotional — summation of the 
 Many into a One. And I shall use the term with one special 
 implication :- the summation must be a complete or whole 
 One, and not merely a standard universe. (Words for sum- 
 mations that perhaps usually refer to standard Ones, and 
 hence in such cases are not religion, are education, art, cult- 
 ure, and such ; but those words can, and often actually do, 
 indicate whole One meanings and are real religion, as shown 
 
§39h V One 
 
 in §166.) Religion itself as being even more explicitly a 
 conscious -meaning, can not be positively expressed : the One 
 words which indicate religion are not positive expression. So 
 when I say religion, I refer to the fact that the definitely 
 used Many words give a meaning of a complete One, and that 
 One is religion — remembering that it or its really grasped 
 meaning gives an appreciable emotional effect. That such 
 a meaning is the One which for centuries has been striven 
 for by orthodox religions, is obvious from the fact that all of 
 them undertake to express definitely a description of the 
 universe which might be summed into a complete God or 
 One. That expression has mostly been dualistic and hence 
 invalid theology; the orthodox religion itself, as understood 
 or inarticulately held by vast numbers of past and present 
 people, is obviously real; and the expression of the great re- 
 ligious teachers themselves (of Christ, Buddha, Confucius, 
 etc.) was usually intelligibly or practically valid, although 
 technically slightly vague at times (Christ, e. g., himself 
 repeatedly asserted that he was aware of such technical 
 vagueness in his remarks, by stating that a saying was for 
 those with understanding, or for those who could receive it). 
 
 When we come to observe the details of religion 
 
 (§§153f, 162, etc.), we shall find that the more convention- 
 ally recognized characteristic of religion is that the meaning 
 of the complete One must be sufficiently vividly perceived to 
 make it what is called emotional. 
 
 §40. a. Probably the most important conclusion asserted 
 by our general equation is that there is not, and never can 
 be, any exact science. All through the book I shall be show- 
 ing just what that means, and proof of it. A brief intelli- 
 gible statement of its meaning is that if momentarily we 
 succeeded, by one chance in infinity, in getting the exact 
 dimensions of (say) this sheet of paper, then at the next in- 
 stant those dimensions would be inaccurate. Or, stated in 
 a more technical way, there is not a single physical or 
 scientific constant," and can not be. There is no such 
 thing as a constant or eternal atom, or a constant or fixed 
 atomic weight, or conservation of a certain mass, or a fixed 
 or eternal person" or personality — short of the total universe. 
 
 b. An important, intelligible way of considering the 
 fact that there is no exact science is to state it from the 
 point of view of quantity — of how much.' To put it briefly, 
 it is not possible to express accurately the quantitative solu- 
 tion of any actual problem. That is the same as saying that 
 we can not express all the really ad infinitum dots of actual 
 rto...'sand This...'s. 
 
 c. Quantity implies that the time and space relationships 
 of a part of the universe are meant: i. e., quantity means 
 measurement. In the first place, measurement implies a 
 standard unit — of time and space. It may be readily ob- 
 served that scientists have never been actually able to desig- 
 nate any such units accurately. The length of a day — which 
 gives the standard time unit :- one second — is observed to 
 have varied in past centuries; and it varies slowly now (XII). 
 There are carefully preserved metal bars representing the 
 standard L (yard and meter) : and they have been repeat- 
 edly measured and compared, and always with some slight 
 variation. There simply does not exist any exact standard 
 unit of any sort — and it is impossible for one to exist, short 
 of the total universe (Part Two). 
 
 d. However, we are acting — as distinguished from verb- 
 ally expressing — all the time in exact quantitative measure. 
 To turn this page you must exert an exact amount of force. 
 When you turn the page you do exert that force. If you 
 had turned it a second earlier or a second later, slightly dif- 
 ferent amounts would have been needed (e. g,, the sun 
 would have been in relatively different places with reference 
 
 UNIVERSE 28 
 
 to the finite size of the leaf, so that the gravity pulls, or 
 weights, of the leaf would have been slightly changed). 
 This page is a This. . . , with an infinite regress which must be 
 stated completely in order to achieve verbal quantitative ac- 
 curacy; and it can not be so stated. No man can state ex- 
 actly how much force it needs to turn the page ; of course, 
 we can, for practical purposes, readily measure it with fair 
 accuracy. But we are trying now to speak precisely, and 
 by so doing avoid all the agnosticism and errors due to the 
 vague and indefinite speech of past ages. 
 
 e. Consequently, we can accurately solve quantitative 
 problems only by doing them — living them. We can, by 
 learning the principles of measurement (principles of L and 
 T), predict pretty accurately the measures. Thus, without 
 an almanac, I can guess to within say ten minutes when the 
 sun will rise tomorrow, and that is close enough for my pur- 
 poses. The astronomer can anticipate to within about a 
 hundredth of a second what the average of actual measures 
 would be, and the navigator to about a second or so what 
 his measures would be. 
 
 f. That may be expressed in a different way :- At first 
 men expressed astronomy geocentrically — i. e., in terms of 
 the earth as a stable or exact base, or scientific constant" 
 or standard. Then Copernicus found it more convenient — 
 i. e., much more accurate and brief, if we use our customary 
 language consistently — to express astronomy heliocentrically 
 — i. e. , with the sun as a base or constant. At present, 
 with better observing, astronomers find the sun also mov- 
 ing" — not exact — (so that it is unfitted to be a center"): 
 they tacitly more or less assume a fixed base somewhere, but 
 do not know where or why. This book shows that no such 
 center is possible; there simply is not any (so far I have 
 shown it by an investigation of mere words; but later I give 
 similar proof in terms of all other things). We advance 
 from Copernican astronomy to an astronomy without a cen- 
 ter — without an exact center. Similarly, conventional hu- 
 manics usually takes a man as » base or constant; all our 
 everyday talk is anthropocentric — man creates God in man's 
 own image. We are going to change from that standard, 
 and see that man is a sample of the universe — is the uni- 
 verse, if we speak absolutely accurately (§47). That makes 
 the whole universe the center, which is logically and really 
 the same as saying no center (cf. §§43-4). It is actually 
 making a One God the standard or base : most of us have 
 been claiming for many centuries that we are monotheistic 
 or believe in one God ; now we are actually going to be, or 
 do so. It will sound odd at first, although it is merely do- 
 ing what the race has for centuries been claiming it does — 
 and really has been doing in actual living. I have a profound 
 respect for the wisdom of what, in the long run, people do 
 — but not much for what they say about it. 
 
 g. To say that we can not solve quantitative problems 
 accurately, meaning that we can not express or in any way 
 anticipate the solution of them accurately, is obviously equiv- 
 alent to saying that never can man anticipate his life exactly 
 and thus be able to quit making an effort to live a better or 
 more successful one, or stop being interested in actually 
 working it out. It is an obvious truism that if science ever 
 did succeed in doing what some over-enthusiastic second rate 
 scientists fancy is possible— accurately predict some quanti- 
 tative measures,— then in the degree in which, those meas- 
 ures were important it would make a man's life a bore, take 
 away his incentive to live, and in the same degree kill his 
 nervous system. (Qualitative agnosticism and quantitative ex- 
 act gnosticism both kill— ultimately are death.) To 
 
 restate that about quantitative exactness in more familiar 
 terms :- Suppose that a fancied-exact science had predicted 
 
29 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One V §41c 
 
 accurately the important things that would happen to us to- 
 morrow : obviously, there would be no use living to verify 
 them, as we already absolutely experience them if the pre- 
 diction is accurate: so we would simply die, as a truism. It 
 is a fact, perhaps not obvious in detail until the chapters on 
 psychology and ethics (XVII, XVIII), that such accuracy 
 would bore us to death. However, such a quest for accuracy 
 is obviously a quest for the impossible. It is a waste of time 
 or life to go after something which in the nature of things 
 does not and can not exist (but we have to be careful that 
 there is rigorous proof of such a condition : they told me 
 that this book was impossible ; and then when it was written 
 that I couldn t find you, to read it; and again that it was 
 impossible for me to print it — not to mention printing it at 
 a reasonable price). Hence, we are, by clear seeing, finding 
 just what knowledge we are after. 
 
 h. A qualitative problem is one which asks why or how 
 or what. It asks an explanation. And an explanation con- 
 sists of stating the relationships of things until we find some 
 thing in the series with which we are familiar — fundament- 
 ally, a thing which is directly related to ourselves as a part; 
 i* a part of us (cf. Index, s. v. "Rebirth"). If an average 
 child asks us to explain a cow he is generally satisfied at 
 first if we say it gives milk — is related to milk in the capacity 
 of producer. Not having disturbed himself with the verbal 
 puzzles of the philosophers, he knows milk, and the cow is 
 explained. Later, he wants himself and milk explained." 
 We are doing that in this book by relating all of the Many 
 to each other, in a generally recognizable way. Explana- 
 tion, then, means relating things, and direct observing of 
 the related things as being so related, by the person to whom 
 the explanation explains. That is circular, valid logic. 
 
 i. Already, in various ways we have observed that the 
 Many parts of the universe are all mutually related. We 
 saw that that principle was the underlying basis of our lang- 
 uage. Consequently, all qualitative problems" are ex- 
 plained. We know them all: it is the fundamental fact or 
 principle upon which we started when we started to talk. 
 Sometimes we may not see immediately the expression of the 
 aspect of desired relationship between (say) cabbages and 
 kings. I show the general relationship between cabbages 
 and kings and everything else in §47 ; also, in detail in Part 
 Two : to get the expression of other aspects of any relation- 
 ship is mere verbal skill easily acquired — and to get fairly 
 accurate measures of those relationships is the whole business 
 of life. But the essential point is that we know absolutely 
 that there is a universal relationship. We know it from 
 merely our investigation, so far, of the typical sentence 
 That... ~KThis. . .=Meaning. The solution of all qualitative 
 problems is represented or implied by any assertion of the 
 One we may make — and we are continually asserting some 
 One. So, speaking accurately, there are no qualitative problems. 
 
 j. Consequently, as qualitative so-called problems" are 
 the essential ones — the "riddle of the universe," — we need 
 never worry over any unknowns. All the theological 
 
 Veiled Beings, unseen Gods, mysteries," faith," etc., 
 are like the exploiting patent medicine advertisements which 
 in effect fool the dupe into believing he has a disease, and 
 
 then into paying for an imaginary cure. Before we 
 
 start doing anything, we can know positively and absolutely 
 that the relationships — causes and effects" — are going to 
 hold, and that the affair is going to work itself out with 
 quantitative perfection. The joy of living is to see just how 
 closely we can anticipate and then realize those measures — 
 utilizing them towards what we call our wishes" or 'will" 
 or "purpose" (§§165-8). But we know before we start 
 that there can be no perfect anticipatory guessing. 
 
 That is a very rough anticipation of the solution of the 
 problem of Good and Evil. We are here simply getting a 
 general idea of all things, directly from observing language. 
 
 k. And we may note that the One and Many is directly 
 exhibited or implied by "qualitative" and ' quantitative." 
 Quantitative is the Many, and is not accurately or absolutely 
 expressible or "soluble," but is positively expressible with 
 as great accuracy as we have time to achieve. Qualitative is 
 the One, and is absolutely known and soluble" — in con- 
 ventional terms, is so absolutely known that it is not even a 
 "problem," — but is ineffable, and can be expressed only in- 
 directly in terms of the Many. Hence, qualitative and quan- 
 titative are mutually contradictory. But the contradiction 
 is formal, and not real; for it is obvious that there is a sort 
 
 of double contradiction which cancels. Quantitative 
 
 problems are often called problems of expediency, and their 
 reasonably accurate solutions truistically change daily with 
 the change in Many circumstances. And qualitative prob- 
 lems are problems of principle, the valid solutions of which 
 are fixed and unchangeable, and which give the general way 
 of solving the changing quantitative problems. An oppor- 
 tunist" is a man who more or less ignores problems of prin- 
 ciple — which obviously must complement and serve as the 
 base of tolerably correct expediency. A theoretical man — 
 one with a single track mind ' — is unbalanced in the op- 
 posite direction, and in actual practice is more dangerous 
 than the opportunist, because he attaches One names — holy 
 names — to his bad Many guesses. 
 
 §41. a. The phrase no exact science' is a negative 
 form of statement. It is more easily intelligible in that 
 form. At first a negative statement of anything is always 
 more intelligible. For there are an indefinite number of 
 things which something is not; and as we are familiar with 
 many of the things which it is not, we can understandingly 
 compare it negatively with those. But there is only one 
 thing which a thing directly is; hence, we have to observe 
 it closely and carefully, and more or less grow some new 
 nerve structures to provide for directly understanding it 
 (XVII). It is hard work to grow a little of new mind; oft- 
 en it is painful. Hence some people protest against going 
 from the negative form of statement (which though easy to 
 understand, is correspondingly hard to apply), to the definite 
 positive form. 
 
 b. The first member, That... X This..., obviously is an 
 explicitly implicit assestion of no exact science. The second 
 member, M(varying with)L 2 T~ 2 , is an explicitly implicit as- 
 sertion of the positive form of expression of no exact science. 
 That form is :- mass varies with velocity ; or, in everyday lang- 
 uage, a thing changes as its speed ('acts,' 'living') changes. 
 That is the fundamental law of science; i. e., it ex- 
 presses a form of truism to which any scientific statement may 
 be rather readily reduced — which is what is meant by "fun- 
 damental law." We shall from time to time — e. g., 
 throughout Part Two — see concrete evidence of its truth. 
 
 c. When we say that a body varies with its speed, we 
 definitely mean that what is usually called its weight varies. 
 The best quick, concrete proof of that perhaps is to observe 
 that if a body moves fast it perceptibly rubs off (by friction) 
 some of its substance, and hence has a continuously lesser 
 weight (that technically is a static view ; in moving through 
 ether, the dynamic or 'gravity' results, in the opposite di- 
 rection, are greater for ordinary bodies at a speed less than 
 that of light — a complicated remark about measures that 
 will require a thorough grasp of Part Two to understand — 
 and only professional scientists have any use for it ; the av- 
 erage reader will get the same thing in familiar subjects we 
 discuss). At this point it might be asked how the weight 
 
§4<lc V One 
 
 could thus change in an absolute vacuum: it will be shown 
 that there is no such thing as an absolute vacuum (§§43-4, 
 lOOi, XI, XII). Scientists are now generally agreed, as the 
 result of direct experimentation, that mass varies with veloc- 
 ity (specifically, that within certain limits electrons get per- 
 ceptibly heavier as they travel faster; Ency. Brit., 
 xxiv, 401; Millikan, "The Electron," 185, 251). We are 
 seeing here, and shall later see in more detail, what it means. 
 
 d. The conventional law of conservation of energy is 
 obviously a statement that energy passes from one part (or 
 M, or unit of the Many), to another part, without changing 
 the sum total of energy — i. e. , without being destroyed and 
 without growing. As we saw (§39e), that is a religious 
 statement; it is the truism The One = Tke One. The law 
 that mass varies with velocity is the Many statement of that 
 religious truism, and asserts in effect that the parts are en- 
 ergy (i. e., are parts of Energy, or of the whole), and hence 
 merely as a verbal truism, do change or vary when energy 
 changes or passes" from one part to another — all of which 
 will be proved in detail (XI, etc.). 
 
 §42. a. The most definite proof of no exact science,' 
 is the concrete or direct proof which we can get by direct 
 observation of the fact that every unit of the Many changes. 
 It is obviously the same proof as the carefully or scientific- 
 ally observed fact that mass varies with velocity (§41c). A 
 more extensive statement of such experimental proof of no 
 exact science — no constant' units of the Many, — in mod- 
 ern scientific terms, is this:- All phenomena are observed 
 to result in (or be) some flow of electrons from atom to atom 
 (conventional science does not know about gravity in that 
 respect, but see Index, ' Gravity"). All parts of the uni- 
 verse are exhibiting some phenomena continuously — if noth- 
 ing more than a transfer of heat. Electrons have weight. 
 Hence, all things, even atoms, change continuously — or, are 
 not constant. 
 
 b. Such observations were made bjr good observers cen- 
 turies ago. Heraclitus asserted, as fundamental, that all 
 things flow or change. He was called the Obscure." It 
 is a little puzzling at first to talk of things that explicitly are 
 changing (although obviously that is only an infinitely small 
 fraction as puzzling as talking of fixed things when it isn't 
 so); but we are going to derive some very simple and un- 
 derstandable ways of being clear and intelligible in express- 
 ing our observations of that fact. We can't change the fact. 
 And the modern scientific theory of relativity is the same 
 sort of thing that Heraclitus noticed, and the relativitists 
 have become perhaps more obscure than the Obscure"; 
 what they substantially do is to say that they will keep a 
 constant M or formally fixed things, and then, in order to 
 agree with obvious facts, will let L and T vary (§66). In 
 our everyday language, as represented by the general equa- 
 tion, L and T are really relationship words, so that thus to 
 vary them is nonsense from an everyday point of view, as we 
 can not really have a relationship of a relationship. How- 
 ever, as we shall see, the relativitists make a new sort of 
 language that in theory is valid ; but in it each person has 
 his definitely exclusive language; in it a second of time to 
 
 you is not one to me, etc. Therefore, in noting that 
 
 there is no exact science we are not discovering anything 
 new. But we are arranging to keep verbally consistent 
 about our observations, and to avoid both obscurity and un- 
 intelligibility, and also the untruthful assertion that some 
 things are exact, constant standards which do not change. 
 
 c. The expression of the proof that there is no exact 
 science has already been made by formulating our general 
 equation. To say that there is no exact science is a mere 
 truism of our way of writing that equation ; and hence, so 
 
 UNIVERSE 30 
 
 far as logic or form is concerned (§35d), we have, in agree- 
 ing to use such language, absolutely demonstrated the valid- 
 ity of the law. I need not repeat the details again. Briefly, 
 we used the formal or verbal links L and T to get the arbi- 
 trary That and This together again — after it (they) was arbi- 
 trarily split by using L and T; — and we had to go into an 
 infinite regress of such formal links (just as the classic logic 
 was forced to use an infinite regress of its presumably real 
 links). And that regress is obviously truistic with 'no exact 
 science.' Hence, logically I have absolutely proved 'no 
 exact science. 
 
 d. We therefore see further, that in the equation the 
 This... (or the That... X This...) is by verbal agreement a 
 generalized naming of M, which M is an arbitrary part of 
 the universe (so that, as being the truism which we just saw 
 in the last paragraph, the expression of any such part or en- 
 tity at once demands the infinite regress if accuracy of state- 
 ment is required). And we assumed (§3 8a) that M or This 
 stated the same This pretty well if we stopped the regress 
 with L Z T~* (or L 2 T~ 2 ) instead of going on to L^T"". 
 Therefore, our general equation is not exact. Hence, if we 
 definitely assert that it is not exact — and I do, and we are 
 to understand that it is not exact, — then we formally cancel 
 our previous assumption, and the equation is absolutely rigorous 
 in form, or logically, but quantitatively inaccurate factually. 
 
 We do not need to know anything about the degree of 
 
 inaccuracy until we actually begin to measure — begin to try 
 
 to apply the equation to particular circumstances, either in 
 "science" or in daily life. In such cases we are then forced 
 to guess, literally. We can never exactly know what degree, 
 but in every practical problem there is, must finally rely 
 upon our skill in guessing fairly closely before we act. It 
 is thus absolutely proved that nothing can ever relieve us (or 
 an atom, or a solar system, etc.) of the necessity of having 
 that personal skill" (for implications, see Index, "Teleolo- 
 gy," 'Personality"). That guessing is conventionally 
 called by the polite name judgment, or by the even more 
 dignified names purpose and teleology. The mildly offensive 
 name guess is sometimes a safer one to use, and I often use 
 it. (Quite probably I over-do the avoidance of all shams 
 and pretentious euphemisms ; I have been various sorts of 
 snob and aristocrat in my time, and am probably now a snob 
 at being no snob. For the general principles of such over- 
 doing see §155.) It is obvious that this paragraph is 
 
 a deliberate repetition of the substance of this and the last 
 two sections. Yet a distinctly different logical point was 
 stated in this paragraph — I explicitly asserted the end (or 
 joining) of the logical circle, which is what makes this para- 
 graph sound a bit too vague. You can at any rate see by 
 the concrete example furnished by the paragraph that all 
 this book is going to be a continual repetition of the solution 
 of the One and Many. But I am going to bother you with 
 these fine logical points only a very little — just enough to 
 indicate that the word-quibblers can split hairs as much as 
 they like, without being able to escape the rigorousness of 
 our argument. 
 
 §43. a. We may now observe in more detail than in 
 §30c the nature of number, and then at once observe that our 
 equation explicitly implies the one single rule for keeping 
 expression or logic consistent and valid— an important prac- 
 tical conclusion. 
 
 b. Number is directly observable to be the name of the 
 most general way of naming the units of the Many— of nam- 
 ing the This's and That's. An ordinal number (e. g., 21st) 
 is the specific name of the last thing or entity considered in 
 a series of Many things containing as many as are named by 
 the cardinal number (2l). An ordinal number hence clearly 
 
31 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One V §43i 
 
 explicitly involves relationship: it sometimes is a relationship 
 noun. But we shall not consider those distinctions in this 
 elementary book ; we take simply the broad generality that 
 numbers are general Many names, used instead of boy, tree, 
 field; we do not go into details as to classes, etc., and the 
 standard universe number, which is 1. 
 
 c. It is obvious that if we begin to name the Many, 
 using numbers as names, then the so-called number, or 
 zero, does not name a Many, but essentially denies that 
 there are any Many entities. Consequent^, it is obvi- 
 ous that is not a number in the usual meaning of number. 
 It is formally or logically a One word. Also, the name for 
 the very last number is «> or infinity. But obviously, 
 the concept of number as a general naming does not imply 
 any such end to naming. Therefore, °° is is not a number, 
 in the usual sense of number. I?finity or °° is the collective 
 name for all numbers, and hence is a One word. Orthodox 
 mathematics asserts ("Ency. Brit.," Art. "Mathematics") 
 that and °° are numbers. They are not. 
 
 d. Or, we may see in what is formally another way, 
 that and °° are not numbers. As a lower limit, outside any 
 actual number or name for a unit of the Many, there is 0. 
 And as an upper limit, outside any actual number or name 
 for a Many, there is °° . Therefore, obviously and =° are 
 not numbers, but are limits of numbers, which logically is an 
 entirely different thing. 
 
 e. Or, we may see in another way that and °° are 
 not numbers. Obviously, <*> , in any intelligible and explicit 
 sense, means all the Many, and hence means continuous or 
 joined or unified. In that respect, it is clearly a One word. 
 And is a statement of a no-Many, and hence, logically at 
 least, is a One word; with glaring obviousness it is not a 
 positive Many word in form. In agreement with that and 
 also par. c, we might conventionally say that is a null 
 Many word. Also, does not name the One, in the usual 
 sense of name; hence, it might with perhaps equal agree- 
 ment with conventions be called a null One word. Hence, 
 when I conclude that although zero is a null Many word and 
 also a null One word, it is explicitly a One word, we need to 
 see the definite reason or truism for that:- It is said that 
 is a One word because we are taking it that Many words 
 are positive — are explicitly language. {Zero does not actually 
 say anything; it is ineffable — and for that reason a One 
 word.) Consequently, when we have a null word, it posi- 
 tively is not positive language, and hence is a One word. 
 The mathematicians ( Ency. Brit.," Mathemat- 
 ics") failed to see that distinction, and consequently called 
 a number, and introduced an error that technically vitiates 
 all of orthodox mathematics, as we shall explicitly see in 
 
 this and the next section. We may see again, in a 
 
 curious way, that this paragraph is consistent. The custom- 
 ary Occidental conception of Nirvana is that it is a universal 
 nullity, or negation. It is a One, and it is zero. We of 
 the West do not, in holding that, hold precisely the Bud- 
 dha's view ("Ency. Brit.," iv, 744). But we are practically 
 right in our idea of Nirvana, because Buddhism is a sort of 
 negative language; and if language be reversed (as it may 
 validly be, and as validly is substantially done in Buddhism), 
 then is positively the One (is Nirvana), and °° is the null 
 word for the One. And obviously that reversal — which is 
 merely formal — does not at all make a Many word, or a 
 number. Hence, the orthodox mathematical views as to 
 "null" classes (l. c.) are inconsistent. 
 
 f. Hence, we say that and °° are One words, and are 
 logically identical. That means formally identical, of course. 
 and °° are "opposite" ways of speaking of the One, and 
 although at first it may seem odd to speak of them as being 
 
 formally identical, such nevertheless they are, as we shall 
 see clearly in the mechanical model of language given in 
 §§53-8. Also, that fact is the general or ultimate principle 
 of "direction" (index, "Direction"). Further, as the One is 
 really ineffable, there obviously is not any really "opposite" 
 ways of speaking of it, and hence we may use °° and in- 
 discriminately for it. But, the Many requires definite, posi- 
 tive words ; and if we were to use and °° in connection with 
 the Many, even if they correctly meant that the Many was 
 thus summed into a whole, they would mean that the sum- 
 ming was done in opposite directions; and that gives us two 
 languages, logically identical, but in one of which up" is 
 named up, and in the other is named down. 
 
 g. Orthodox mathematics has two other concepts which 
 it is continually confusing as being identical respectively 
 with and «> :- (l) a very small number (an infinitesimal), 
 and (2) a very large number. It is glaringly obvious that a 
 very small number is not 0, and that a very large number is 
 not °° . A verj' small number and are qualitatively or 
 in principle absolutely contradictory — and similarly with 
 "large number" and °°. In this book, which as has been 
 stated is much more rigorous than conventional mathematics, 
 when I mean a large number or a small number I shall say 
 so — generally saying indefinitely large or small — except in 
 a few negligible cases where it seems best for merely rhe- 
 torical purposes to follow conventional phraseology. 
 
 h. It is already obvious that in practice the only rule 
 that we need follow in being strictly validly logical — i. e., 
 rigorously consistent in expression — is to avoid naming any 
 Many thing or °° , or by any of their numerous synonyms 
 such as no, none, nothing, separate, distinct, all, whole, ab- 
 solute, continuous, total, everything, perfect, God — and, 
 on the contrary, to name all One summations by such words. 
 Or, from another point of view :- we shall be validly logical 
 simply by being truly scientific and always speaking of the 
 Many as being measuraoZe and the One as immeasurable — 
 what the measures are numerically being not a matter of log- 
 ic, or general scientific law, but of practical life, experience, 
 
 skill and good judgment or good guessing. That is 
 
 the only rule, if it is taken for granted that no one is going 
 to perpetrate the absurdity of making a relationship word — 
 God the Holy Ghost — into a One word or into a Many word. 
 Even the mathematicians sometimes do that (as shown in the 
 next section). So perhaps we should always be more pre- 
 cise, and say that the only rule to be followed to achieve ab- 
 solute consistency or rationality in expression is to avoid 
 confusing the three sorts of words. Or, we may state that 
 complete rule in terms of our equation:- (l) have no zeros 
 or infinities in the first and second members (Many mem- 
 bers), and always include one or the other in the third or 
 One member; and (2) never confuse the relationship symbols 
 with the One or with the Many names — never confuse a 
 
 "process" with an "entity." Incidentally, the L 
 
 and T in the equation are relationship symbols. As we saw 
 in §30f, it would have been typographically more consistent 
 to have made them similar to the symbols X, =, etc. 
 When we write M. . . for M(varying wiih)I?T~' i we do become 
 thus typographically consistent. And obviously, That... 
 and This. . . , and especially That. . . X This. . . , are thus typo- 
 graphically consistent, the L and T being indicated by the 
 dots, and not explicitly named by the same sort of symbol 
 used for an entity. 
 
 i. That last paragraph completely states all the rules we 
 need in order to be always consistent. The practical, every- 
 day rule is the one about and °° . Most people (except 
 when they try to talk of something of which they are largely 
 ignorant, or when they try to be oratorical or appear 
 
§43i V One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 39 
 
 wise and important and weighty) by natural commonsense 
 avoid making the confusion of relationship words. Only 
 when they begin to dress up truth, or get off some ponder- 
 ous piffle about the glory of SCIENCE do they become such 
 
 asses. But when I put that practical rule in that 
 
 formal and rigorous zero-infinity guise it looks strange and 
 hard to apply. So we may note its use and meaning in a 
 little of familiar detail :- Suppose you are looking at what 
 is actually a chair, and see it. Then, in order to be logical, 
 you will refrain, first, from saying that it is not a chair — 
 i. e., that it is a zero chair. Further, you will refrain from 
 saying that it is a pig — i. e., that it is a zero chair, and that 
 the resulting is then multiplied by °° to make it something, 
 and that that something, produced by putting in the °°, is 
 a pig." And last, you will refrain from saying that the 
 chair is everything, or perfect, or the universe — i. e., you 
 will refrain from multiplying the actual chair by <», or call- 
 ing it °° or perfect: you can validly say that the chair itself is 
 inseparably related to the total universe, and hence in that 
 sense is or becomes the One; but that statement uses chair 
 in a One sense different from its common, Many, actual use 
 we started with, and in ordinary honesty that One sense 
 ought to be explicitly distinguished when thus used. 
 
 j. Obviously, the practical application of the logical 
 rule is simple enough when we have to deal with a chair. It 
 reduces to the rule :- say that a chair is a chair. It is only 
 when we deal with numerous things that we begin to get 
 confused, and to need the explicitly formulated rigorous 
 rule. Obviously, it is essentially no more difficult to speak of 
 numerous things than it is to speak of a chair. But the 
 numerousness confuses us because it burdens the memory, 
 and we need the guidance of an explicit rule. We see in 
 the next section how even the mathematicians get confused 
 
 because of not being conscious of that rule. But as a 
 
 matter of fact, a large part of the logical errors of the world 
 comes, not from any intellectual difficulty in being logical, but 
 from the lack of courage and honesty to face facts as they 
 are — and those are usually called emotional qualities (§155, 
 etc.). It takes a strong man to be steadily logical — not 
 necessarily a mathematician. 
 
 k. The practical rule of logic is so well known and 
 common that it has, in another form, been taught to 
 children for centuries ; every well-bred person is supposed 
 to conform to that rule. The rule is :- do not exaggerate 
 [or if you do formally exaggerate, make it obvious to your 
 hearer that the exaggeration is not really meant — and then, 
 within certain limits, it gives a more vivid understanding, 
 and is one sort of humor]. Exaggeration obviously is simply 
 the making of things too small or too large, with » tendency 
 to multiply them by or °° . One of the Ten Command- 
 ments is simply a partial statement of that everyday form of 
 the logical rule (or is that rule, expressed in ethical terms) :- 
 do not take the name of God in vain. That Commandment 
 clearly is:- do not use a One word as a Many word, or in such 
 a context as to confuse it with Many words. The common- 
 sense view of the matter is that if we have a language, it can 
 be usefully employed as a good tool, and there is no sense 
 in persistently misusing it. However, the human race have 
 indulged in so much confusion of terms — really, in so much 
 
 swearing, — that it is sometimes said that language is to 
 conceal thought. E. g. , the gay and sparkling and bril- 
 liant" conversation at (say) tea parties, with its tinklings of 
 
 wonderful,' and perfectly sweet," and perfectly in- 
 triguing, is swearing, just as much as are the casual 
 
 damn s, etc., of longshoremen. So we can reduce our 
 practical rule to the homely one :- do not swear (except on 
 the occasions you really mean it, and except as humoi — and 
 
 unless one's hearer appreciates the humor, it is not humor 
 to him; also humor always ceases to be humor when it be- 
 comes too automatic; §162). You see, there is 
 
 nothing esoteric about logic. 
 
 §44. a. We shall hereafter see numbers of instances of 
 conventional failures to be validly logical — failures to follow 
 the single rule that the three kinds of words must not be 
 confused. The worst source of such logical confusions is the 
 fact that practically every name in our language may be used 
 as each of the three sorts of words. The name God is a 
 conspicuous example. And conventional logical error con- 
 sists in formally confusing the three sorts — just as the con- 
 ventional Trinity has been confused and befogged until the 
 average man feels almost a repulsion towards the very men- 
 tion of it. As was stated, conventional mathematics does 
 not follow the principle that the three sorts must not be con- 
 fused; in fact, it sometimes asserts practically the contrary; 
 so I am going to follow strictly the conventionally stated 
 principles of mathematics, and prove mathematically" in 
 several ways the absurd result that any number is equal to 
 any other number. That will show again that and °° are 
 not numbers and that we must not confuse relationship 
 words with either One words or Many words. And it will 
 prove the correctness of our logical rule, and also show that 
 orthodox mathematics needs it. 
 
 b. Let c and d be any two different numbers, with differ- 
 
 c — d- 
 
 (A) 
 
 ence e, so that 
 
 Multiplying (A) through by c — d, we have 
 
 c 2 — 2cd+d 2 =ce — de (B) 
 
 Rearranging (B), c 2 — cd — ce=cd — d 2 — de (C) 
 
 or, c(c — d — e)=d(c — d — e) (D) 
 
 Dividing (D) through by (c — d — e) ; or multiplying (D) 
 through by l/(c — d — e), we have c=d; or, any 
 
 number equals any other different number, Q. E. D., — which 
 obviously, or truistically by our agreement A=A, is non- 
 sense. The mathematicians sometimes, without giving anv 
 reasons, say that it is a fallacy to do as I did above, and di- 
 vide (D) through by zero — by (e — d — e), which is equal to 0, 
 — or multiply it through by infinity — by l/(c — d — e), which 
 is equal to » , However, I am not able to find an assertion 
 in any of the several varieties of mathematical books I hap- 
 pen to have at hand, that such a process is a fallacy; the 
 closest to such an assertion I can find is the discussion of 
 
 indeterminate or illusory forms," such as 0X0, 0X» 
 mh-oo, etc., wherein it is merely dogmatically asserted 
 that those forms are, as such, indeterminate— thus implying 
 
 that logically or mathematically they are permissible. 
 
 On the other hand, mathematical texts all assert in effect, 
 and usually explicitly if they take up the subject, that and 
 « are numbers, and hence at least imply that it is just as 
 valid to divide or multiply (D) by or » as by (say) 5— 
 and such a process with 5 gives no absurdity. "The Ency- 
 clopaedia Brittanica" (xi, 303, referring to xiv, 545) clearly 
 implies that there are actual numbers, as values, which are 
 and oo— although usually » mean8 a large number which 
 
 tends to become" » [orthodox mathematics thus clearly 
 making the contradiction A=A and A is not=A]. In its 
 Art. Mathematics" it explicitly asserts that and w are 
 numbers; afterwards in the article (p. 88l) the writer (Rus- 
 sell) does substantially deny it, and in effect, although a 
 trifle obscurely, corrects ordinary mathematics just as we are 
 domg here. But all the explicit authoritative assertions 
 (technically, even that of Russell) are thus shown to be that 
 Oandco^ values" and «,e "numbers." And hence, as 
 there ,s no doubt that we can properly divide (D) through 
 by any number other than those so-called numbers and «o 
 and as orthodox mathematics makes no distinction in kind 
 
33 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One V 
 
 between Oand °° , and those other numbers," it truistically 
 follows that it is rigorously following orthodox principles to 
 divide through by or ». c — d — e is a null com- 
 plete One — as is asserted implicitly by (A) — and the valid 
 mathematical principle is that any sort of complete One is 
 not positive language and (according to our primary agree- 
 ment that A=A) cannot be used as positive language, or as 
 Many words ; and when that One is related in any way (as 
 by multiplication) with the Many member, that is equiva- 
 lent to denying that it is a Many, or makes it a One (as all 
 relationship is that of identity). Perhaps the briefest and 
 clearest way to say that is to say that and °° are not num- 
 bers. The absurd conclusion given above is substantially 
 the same as those which are named the paradoxes of Zeno 
 ( Ency. Brit.," "Zeno"). Only the explicit solution of 
 the One and Many — which is what the rule concerning and 
 00 substantially is — will solve those paradoxes. And with 
 that solution, the solution of those centuries-old puzzles is 
 so simple that there is no need to give it explicitly here. 
 c. A series is orthodoxly ("Ency. Brit.," xxiv, 668) 
 a set of quantities arranged in order so that each quan- 
 tity is definitely and uniquely determined by its position"; 
 and it may be infinite — i. e., the number of [those quanti- 
 ties or] terms may be *** unlimited." We shall use such 
 series, again to prove that any number is equal to any other :- 
 By algebra, l/(l+a)=l — a +a 2 — cfi + ... (A) 
 Leta=l, and we have i=l — 1 +1 — 1 +... (B) 
 By algebra, (l+a)/(l+a+a 2 )=l — a 2 +a 3 
 Let a=l, and we have ft— 1 — 1 "hi 
 
 And (l+a+a?)l(l+a+a 2 - 
 Let ffl=l, and we have 
 Similarly we may get 
 
 '— a 5 +.. 
 
 . (c) 
 
 — 1+.. 
 
 . (D) 
 
 -a 7 +... 
 
 (E) 
 
 — 1 +.. 
 
 • (F) 
 
 — 1 +.., 
 
 . (G) 
 
 h« 3 )=l— a s +a 4 - 
 
 1=1—1 +1 
 4/5=1—1 +1 
 etc., etc., etc. 
 The second member of (B), of (D), (F), etc., is a series; 
 and orthodoxly it may be written out to an absolutely unlim- 
 ited number of terms — may have all the terms there are, as 
 a truism of the orthodox definition. Consequently, as those 
 various series are, by orthodox mathematics, term for term 
 identical unlimitedly , then obviously they are identical or 
 equal, by our agreement A=A. Therefore, as the second 
 members of the equations are equal, the first members are 
 equal (by the same agreement A=A : mathematics says 
 that they are equal by the axiom that things equal to the 
 same thing are equal to each other), and we have :- 
 
 1/2=2/3=3/4=4/5=... (N) 
 
 By manipulating (N), and similar equations obtained by like 
 methods, by simple algebra, we have:- 1=2=8=..., 
 
 or, any number equals any other number. Well; I did 
 
 not explicitly, or technically by orthodox mathematics, intro- 
 duce any or °° into that proof" — certainly not in the 
 sense of "multiplying" or "dividing" by one or the other, 
 which is sometimes superficially held by orthodox mathe- 
 matics to be fallacious. But with orthodox mathematical 
 rigorousness I managed to get an absurdity. In a sense (in 
 the commonsense view taken by valid logic), there was an °o 
 in the "proof":- the series had orthodoxly absolutely un- 
 limited terms. By commonsense, the fallacy is of course that 
 if the terms are unlimited or infinite in number, then the 
 terms are not "definitely determined" as was asserted by 
 the orthodox definition which I simply took at its word. The 
 simple fact is that there is no such thing as a positively stat- 
 able infinite series (there is no exact science). The series 
 above, if they are made definite and expressed definitely, 
 always have a fractional quotient as a last term, and evaluate 
 definitely as : k ==: k, §=y, etc., which are simple identities of 
 standard universes — not of standard universes and absolutely 
 infinite universes, as is orthodoxly asserted. 
 
 d. There are an indefinite number of ways of getting 
 that absurd result by orthodox mathematics, all depending 
 on confusing the One and the Many — in effect, on taking 
 and °° to be numbers, or confusing qualitative with quanti- 
 tative. We shall now proceed to "prove" with orthodox 
 mathematical rigor the same absurdity by confusing relation- 
 ship words with the other two sorts. In this way we do not 
 use or » in any ordinary senee:- 
 
 By conventional algebra, J— iH4l/(— 3)] 3 =1 (A) 
 
 Also, by conventional algebra, 1 3 =1 (B) 
 
 As the right members are identical, then 
 
 [-4+i|/(-3)] 3 =l 3 (C) 
 Extracting cube-root of both sides of (C), we have 
 
 -i+W(s)=l (D) 
 Hence, \V{— S)=s/2; or, l/(— 3)=3; or, — 3=9 (E) 
 Adding 4 to both sides of that last, 1 = 13. 
 
 And proceeding similarly by conventional algebra, any number 
 equals any other number. 
 
 e. The trouble with those last orthodoxly valid equa- 
 tions is that I used relationship terms (the cube," and the 
 "square-root," and the ' — " in y( — 3)) substantially as 
 Many terms (doing it an odd or uncancelled number of 
 times; see next paragraph). It is obvious that there is no 
 explicit principle in orthodox mathematics which says that 
 that is wrong; but it nevertheless produces an absurdity. 
 There are other well known ways of proving our ab- 
 surd proposition by manipulating the second power" 
 (which involves a relationship), without introducing the — . 
 The same absurdity is shown in another way (using geome- 
 try) in §5 Ob; and in a general way in §66. We may note 
 briefly that the symbol j/ is a relationship term, just as defi- 
 nitely as is — And of course it is as much nonsense to say 
 and mean explicitly the square-root of a minus," as it is to 
 say the brotherhood of motherhood.' Orthodox mathemat- 
 ics itself agrees that it is meaningless to speak explicitly of 
 the square-root of a minus — calling the * quantity" ]/( — l) 
 
 imaginary. As a fact, we can not even imagine that 
 
 quantity ; it is absolutely inconceivable if taken explicitly. 
 The same thing applies to manipulations of second pow- 
 ers," third powers," and all other relationships. A rela- 
 tionship can not be used as a One word or a Many word, or 
 to duplicate another relationship. 
 
 f. But orthodox mathematics does get correct results as 
 a usual thing when it uses \/( — l) (and other "relationships 
 of a relationship'). The way in which that is done is by 
 more or less unconsciously introducing another similar con- 
 tradiction which cancels the first (and, with a little common- 
 sense, rejecting the absurdity that results when it happens 
 that that is not done — a procedure which glaringly shows 
 that conventional mathematics is not rigorous). So long as 
 there is a balance, an even number, of such contradictions in 
 an argument the result will obviously be logically consist- 
 ent : and the verbal or symbolic expression of such dupli- 
 cated relationships may be considered, not as giving or in 
 any way having any explicit meaning, but as merely a mne- 
 monic device for keeping account of the relating process. 
 In the same way poker chips have no special meaning or 
 value of themselves, but are used as mnemonic devices to 
 indicate the relationship of the players to the stakes. To 
 puzzle over |/( — l) is equivalent to puzzling over the 'why- 
 ness' of a poker chip : there is no real whyness, but merely 
 a convenient agreement. In identically the same way the 
 2 's, ~'s, etc., in our L 2 T~ 2 's, etc., do not mean two absolute 
 verbal links or relationships, or any relationships of a rela- 
 tionship, but mean simply the verbal way in which space and 
 time — the single relationship — is used in the language ma- 
 chine (see the total discussion of space and time in this book). 
 
§44f V One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 3* 
 
 But as this is not a treatise on mathematical detail, I must 
 here omit the volume or so of ways of balancing and other- 
 wise handling such self-contradictory but formal duplication 
 of relationship counters. Those mathematical details will 
 be implied in the investigation made of our general equation. 
 
 g. The tacit, actual rule of conventional mathematics is 
 that if its rules — which as we have just seen, are not com- 
 plete — obviously do not work, then throw the result away, 
 and with the same blindness try again. The savage says 
 that if the lever at hand fails him, throw it away and try 
 another. Actually, it is the only ultimate way to learn; it 
 is still an excellent method ; but it is good only in the ab- 
 sence of knowledge, for it is uneconomical of time and effort. 
 Some professional mathematicians and scientists of a medi- 
 ocre sort tend to believe that mathematics is perfect — the 
 queen of the sciences, etc., — and that if anything is ex- 
 pressed mathematically we must in submissive awe believe 
 it, or at least pretend to understand it. Well ; the reader 
 has now seen that orthodox mathematics is no more certain 
 to produce an intelligent result than is orthodox language. 
 That queen stuff is obvious nonsense — the protective 
 cloak of the egotistical dogmatist. 
 
 h. The important thing which we have seen is that we 
 get absurd results in expression whenever one sort of word 
 is asserted to be another sort. We have seen that orthodox 
 mathematics needs a more precise restatement to make it 
 self-consistent. We could at this point go ahead and trans- 
 late the above simply expressed results into the technical 
 terms used by logistics — which is mathematical logic, or 
 what might be called the science of mathematical founda- 
 tions. But I omit that; for I assume that most of us have 
 more need for ordinary language than for technical mathe- 
 matics. It takes more skill to say some given thing in 
 words than it does to express it mathematically. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. Names for logic, and chief application of 
 valid logic to men. 
 
 §45. a. We have seen a way of expressing a complete 
 or unifying sentence or equation. And we have seen some 
 important conclusions which were obvious from that complete 
 sentence — finally seeing the simple rule by which consistency 
 of expression can be achieved:- the three parts of the Trinity 
 must not be confused. That rule was, for clearness and 
 vividness, exemplified by showing the absurdities resulting 
 from its non-observance by orthodox mathematics, which is 
 presumably the most precisely rigorous sort of expression. 
 
 b. In the remainder of this Part One we consider the 
 same things from different aspects, and in addition notice 
 more or less interesting details. I shall begin this chapter 
 by giving the most important general application in everyday 
 life of our precise unification. After that we shall try to 
 find a conventional name that fits the unification. To antici- 
 pate the results of that search for a name :- We definitely 
 find by observing the meanings of various conventional 
 names, the important fact that our valid logic and concrete 
 truth is the same as the logic and truth of the average man 
 — that the race for centuries has somewhat unconsciously 
 been using valid logic and obtaining truth, naming it com- 
 monsense. 
 
 c. Then, I give in the next chapter (VII) a new 
 sort of proof of our whole argument in a way which shows 
 the indefinite flexibility and possibilities of language. Next 
 I show (in VIII) a mechanical model of language, as concrete 
 proof of the argument, and for more definite guidance in the 
 use of language. Then (in the last chapter in Part One, IX), 
 
 as an actual example of the fact that merely our investigation 
 of language will enable us to unify knowledge rigorously, I 
 apply what we have learned to elementary physical science, 
 and we see its formal completion. 
 
 §46. a. Man is chiefly interested in man, because man 
 is man and hence most directly and steadily perceptible and 
 familiar to himself; it is merely a truism. Consequently, 
 the most important application of the solution of the One and 
 Many is its application directly to man. This whole book is 
 with more or less directness engaged with that particular 
 application. But now that we have the solution, we here at 
 once apply it to man with explicit directness, in broad out- 
 lines. We see further details throughout the book. 
 
 b. It is held by the dualists that man is of two-fold 
 nature:- soul and body. The soul is now usually considered 
 to be the same as mind, or spirit, or consciousness, or the 
 "vital spark." There have been many ideas as to soul (see 
 "Ency. Brit.," Index, s. v. Soul"). So many people 
 have considered it some separate entity or thing which in 
 some way dwelled in the body, that souls" have rather 
 gone out of fashion because it was so glaringly self-contra- 
 dictory to consider the soul absolutely separate and also not 
 separate, but more or less attached to the body ; also, be- 
 cause no one ever succeeded in putting his finger on such a 
 
 soul," although many attempts were made. The modern 
 
 fashionable name for soul is personality. Soul, or any 
 
 of its several synonyms, is simply the unified or joined sum 
 of parts of an individual, considered chiefly from a mental 
 or spiritual' or nervous-system aspect — as will be proved. 
 
 c. Some dualists further hold that there is a dualism — 
 an unbridgable, unescapable, essential difference in kind or 
 quality — between the body" of man, and matter." I. e., 
 they hold that body" is alive," and matter" "dead." 
 We take that up in detail in the chapter on biology (XVI, 
 especially §144; and it may be remarked that the matter of 
 the old Clerk Maxwell style of scientist was viciously dead" 
 verbally — but erroneously ; see Index, Dynamic," "Max- 
 well"). Here, we simply note that that dualism — "vital- 
 ism" is the name of that variety, — and all others, will 
 disappear in the same way as that between mind and matter 
 is shown to disappear in par. f and following. We may an- 
 ticipate here, that all the universe is ' alive" in any real or 
 One sense (or dead," if it is preferred to talk lugubriously). 
 Whether or not a given thing is, in everyday and Many 
 language, to be considered alive or not, is a quantitative prob- 
 lem, the solution of which depends upon -what perceptible 
 degree of organization or structure or personality — what in- 
 tensity of internal and external reactions — we arbitrarily agree 
 to require of the thing that is to be called alive. 
 
 d. The orthodox way of "logically" bridging the dual- 
 isms alive-dead, and mind-matter — the way of Descartes, 
 Aquinas, the Catholic church, and most other pluralists — is 
 to use God" as an entity, a concrete or Many link, or ter- 
 tium quid to join the two. (In that sense, God validly should 
 be a formal relationship word, God the Holy Ghost — in 
 which case there is no dualism.) Other dualists do not like 
 the name God and use some synonym. Some materi- 
 alistic scientists substantially deny that there is any such 
 thing as mind, or a real relationship or organization or per- 
 sonality or soul. In effect, they deny that there is (say) 
 friction in a machine. We consider their views in detail 
 later (Index, "Materialism"); in general it has already 
 been shown that the classical logic which those materialists 
 fancy they are using asserts some sort of relationship. 
 
 e. Obviously from the last paragraph, the dualists (ex- 
 cluding that queer variety :- materialists) do get mind and 
 matter absolutely together. So essentially, all that their 
 
as 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VI §47g 
 
 talk amounts to, is that they assert that the two were abso- 
 lutely apart until they (the dualists) themselves with super- 
 Godlike power created a God to put them together. Hence, 
 a commonsense question that obviously disposes of their talk 
 is :- Why do the dualists keep on chattering about mind 
 and matter being separate if they have been so good as to 
 get them together for us? do they want us to keep on being 
 grateful to them for having remoulded the universe nearer 
 to their hearts desire, and keep on appreciating their skill 
 and miraculous power in making a God? 
 
 f. The obvious principle is that mind and matter are 
 unified or related, and hence ultimately identical. The 
 dualists by inventing their poor sort of God did not change 
 the universe, and produce the relationship which they tacitly 
 admit now exists. The shortest proof of the identity of 
 mind and matter is that we attach some meaning — regardless 
 of what it is — to the phrase mind and matter' ' : and a 
 meaning is continuity or unity. If we didn't, obviously it 
 would be nonsense to use the phrase. 
 
 g. In Part Two, where we observe matter in detail, we 
 see that it is identical in all respects with mind, life, per- 
 sonality — except in quantitative respects, which are unessen- 
 tial. The formal proof in the last paragraph is of course 
 rigorous; any dualism may be destroyed in the same way. 
 But it is destructive proof. For actual, intelligible proof of 
 
 no dualism we describe things as they are. 
 
 §47. a. If we consider a man, superficially he seems to 
 be a separated part of the universe; and it seems at first 
 that we can not actually perceive that he is inseparably 
 joined on to the remainder. But if we look closer (if need 
 be, using microscopes, etc., as tools to intensify our percep- 
 tions), we can see that the man is not sharply cut off or 
 bounded from the rest of the universe. His breath extends 
 indefinitely inward into his blood and indefinitely outward 
 into the atmosphere. His skin does not bound him ; for his 
 sweat extends indefinitely in, and vaporizes indefinitely out 
 into the atmosphere. There is obviously no definite place at 
 which his food and drink become a part of him," or cease 
 to be a part. Obviously, it is not possible to say where the 
 man begins or ends. Like our circular logic, which starts 
 from truisms and ends in them and stays always inside such 
 a verbal One, the man ultimately, or in exact language, has 
 no positive beginning or end, or sharp boundary. A man 
 himself is precisely like our valid logic. 
 
 b. We can at this point be somewhat more definite 
 about his mind and body (see XVI and XVII for remainder). 
 It is observable that if we remove part of his nervous system 
 we remove part of his mind. So obviously, in that rough 
 way it is shown that there is no essential difference between 
 mind and body. Also, it is not possible to observe any exact 
 or positive boundary between the nervous system and the 
 organs in which it "terminates" (§152). Any tool which 
 we take in our hand (say), is obviously a. perceptible extension 
 of our body or nervous system or mind ; for no sharp bound- 
 ary may be distinguished anywhere; and very evidently we 
 can — with the ordinary tool — feel or observe perceptibly 
 with the outer end (§165). 
 
 c. Except for rough statement that he is a This, the 
 man is really continuous with the universe — inseparable 
 from it. He is actually This. . . ; any unit of the Many is 
 actually This..., as we have seen in theory" and are now 
 broadly seeing "concretely." If we try to assert that the 
 man is at least bounded by the surface of the earth or by 
 the atmospheric boundary, a closer look will convince us that 
 the assertion will not hold. For obviously the air and the 
 water on the surface of the earth {and some of his vaporized 
 sweat, etc.) extend into the earth with all degrees of percept- 
 
 ible connection. And the air does not stop at any outer 
 boundary. There is an outer zone of attenuated air from 
 which parts (molecules) bounce up, and mingle with similarly 
 bouncing gas from the sun, and so on. We see that continu- 
 ation of the atmosphere in zodiacal light (§12 1). And in 
 turn, it is observable that parts of the solar system mingle 
 with other such systems, then on to other galaxies, and, so 
 on indefinitely or in infinite regress (XII). 
 
 d. Therefore, the so-called individual man is an arbi- 
 trary part; for no exact boundary can be fixed for him in any 
 way, short of the total universe. And even if we were to fix 
 a formal boundary for him as a definite ' individual, ' with 
 glaring obviousness that boundary would constantly change. 
 Every time he breathed there would be a continuous cycle of 
 change; his heart beat usually moves parts of him percept- 
 ibly in and out ; the ingestion of substances constantly pro- 
 duces changes. Obviously, even such a formal boundary 
 is not definitely or positively fixable. 
 
 e. Therefore, from every point of view the man is sim- 
 ply arbitrarily a unit of the Many. In terms of the Trinity, 
 he is, considered roughly and inexactly, a God the Son. The 
 only accurate boundary we can give him is to say that he is 
 ultimately, without any real break in continuity, the whole 
 universe, or God the Father. Explicitly, each man, when 
 accurately described, absolutely includes in himself all other 
 men and things as parts of him, and is God. That is the 
 most intelligible description of God (particularly God the 
 Father) that can be given. The description is thus far very 
 thinly intellectual — i. e., mostly formal and abstract; — this 
 whole book adds details, and under ethics (XVIII) we get 
 some small measure of its actual infinite emotional content. 
 
 f. The conventional belief of the dualists is that God 
 is something outside the universe, separate from it, and 
 absolutely apart. Obviously, as a truism, if God or anything 
 else is outside the universe and apart from it, our very asser- 
 tion of the existence of that extraneous thing implies an as- 
 sertion:- the universe and it. And that assertion, by the 
 
 and', explicitly asserts a connection so that it is actually 
 implicitly a part of the universe and included in it (or else 
 the phrase is utter nonsense and unintelligible). In short, it is 
 absolutely self-contradictory to assert that we are even aware 
 of the possibility of anything extraneous to the universe or 
 separate from it ; we can write such a form or assortment of 
 words, but the form is self-contradictory and pure nonsense 
 — or else it implies some new and novel meaning of the words 
 used. I might add a volume of the same sort of ob- 
 vious proof. But the foregoing part of this paragraph is 
 rigorous, and is sufficient for the intelligent reader, in spite 
 of the wide currency of the yarn that God is outside the 
 universe. God is the universe. 
 
 g. To take another point of view of the last paragraph :- 
 There is no something exterior to the universe with or by 
 which to describe the universe s boundaries. I. e.,the uni- 
 verse is not a This, which we can speak of positively and ex- 
 plicitly (as we can of the color red) by comparing it with a 
 That outside or even formally different or separate. The 
 universe is the complete finish of all different That's and 
 This's, and has nothing by which to fix its boundaries (except 
 that they include the sum of everything inside) : in every- 
 day language, the universe is not bounded." It is not 
 quantitative. Consequently, when we achieve complete accur- 
 acy by describing a man as ultimately the universe or God, 
 there is no way of expressing any boundaries or size, in pos- 
 itive words (see Index, "Difference surface"). We are 
 really truthful, essential,' qualitative, and accurate then; 
 but we are indefinite, and not verbally positive. The universe 
 or God or any ultimate thing is ineffable or mystical, or is 
 
§47g VI One 
 
 quantitatively absolutely indeterminate, or is really infinite. 
 h. Thus far we have seen rigorously — in formal, thin 
 intellectual expression at least — that a man is arbitrarily an 
 individual or unit of the Many, and in ultimate reality is the 
 universe or God the Father, or the One. It is now similarly 
 obvious that "man" as a class is a word which implies the 
 relationship of all individual Many men. In that sense, man 
 is God the Holy Ghost, or a relationship word. That use of 
 man is rather common; the more explicit names for the same 
 relationship, which also include an implication of a Many 
 meaning, are mankind, brotherhood qf man, and society. The 
 science of sociology emphasizes that point of view of man as 
 God the Holy Ghost. All governments and other human 
 organizations obviously take the point of view that man, 
 from one aspect, exhibits relationships — is God the Holy 
 Ghost. So the solution of the vexed problem in sociology of 
 What is sovereignty? is obviously:- sovereignty is the name 
 of that relationship (is a relationship word) ; and various 
 sorts of sovereignty are nothing more than such a rela- 
 tionship of natural continuity or ultimate identity, ob- 
 served in various perceptible quantitative degrees of extension 
 
 and intensity in various historical circumstances. 
 
 When it is said God is love," fundamentally it is meant 
 that man as God the Holy Ghost is a, linkage or unbreakable 
 organization or organism called love. The same connec- 
 tion in science' is called cause and effect"; or cohe- 
 sion; or, negatively, pressure (§86). In philosophy and 
 theology the relationship aspect is called reason, and mind, 
 and the moral sense," and spirit," and teleology. The 
 chief difficulty in orthodox doctrines is that there is such an 
 everwhelming profusion of names for that same thing. For 
 centuries theologians, scientists, philosophers — prophets — 
 have come forward with systems" or "truths" — special or 
 particular ways of unifying knowledge, — each thinking that 
 he had some bright new idea, to which he often gave a new 
 name and said it was the most "important" thing in the 
 world. All of them were talking about the same simple 
 thing:- God the Holy Ghost — or copulas in language ; or the 
 relationship of the One and the Many. And all of them ob- 
 viously were fundamentally right, even if they were a bit 
 narrow minded and over-proud of their new little names. 
 
 i. When in everyday terms we speak of a man as having 
 personality, we obviously mean that he is strongly consist- 
 ent; i. e., all of him hangs together or works together so 
 energetically that it all "adds together" instead of there 
 being appreciable mutually conflicting and hence neutraliz- 
 ing parts; and hence he is on the whole vividly perceptible. 
 He then is not futilely vacillating, or noisily contradicting 
 himself, or awkwardly "falling all over himself." Hence, 
 even in conventional meaning personality substantially is 
 perceptible relationship — a definite continuity inside a given 
 man as a standard universe. Obviously, when we consider 
 man as a complete universe, personality is still God the Holy 
 Ghost. Or in that relationship sense, and also in the sense 
 that a man is accurately and ultimately the One, God is a 
 person. That is not using person in quite a conventional 
 sense, which latter sense usually makes a person a standard 
 One (vision being too short conventionally to see a whole 
 One), and hence in practice makes God a sort of senile gray- 
 bearded Oriental or Prussian kaiser seated on a sort of un- 
 supported gold throne nowhere in particular. But obviously, 
 our conclusion that God is a person uses person in its essen- 
 tial conventional sense of continuous, or organized, or con- 
 nected ; we agree completely that a standard universe may 
 have such a personality, and note that in it the personality, 
 to our rather restricted vision, may be perceptibly much 
 more vivid than is the personality of the whole universe (al- 
 
 UNIVERSE 36 
 
 most stupendously so in the case of Christ, e. g.): but it is 
 quite evident that the facts show that the whole universe is 
 also a person. I may make the technical philosophi- 
 cal remark, that in that sense the present sort of deism tru- 
 istically is practically opposite to the customary historical 
 pantheism. That pantheism usually was substantially 
 nothing but what we now call materialism (§49b), with a 
 
 silly, cloying sugar coating. 
 
 j. It is to be kept in mind that consistently with pres- 
 ent conventional language, God is a person. I. e., the uni- 
 verse is organized, connected, organic — something more 
 than a mere "heap" of parts or Many. The universe is a 
 real machine — one held together by friction (or love, if we 
 prefer the ethical term ; or cohesion or force, to use scientific 
 terms), and is not a heap of disparate parts. The machine 
 works. It is a person (§§144, 158). An ordinary locomotive 
 has a personality quite perceptible to me : in principle it 
 ought to have slight personality, as we shall see by the whole 
 of Part Two. Many people have asserted that they can per- 
 ceive the personality of a locomotive or similar machine — as 
 witness the affectionate name tin Lizzie for a Ford car. 
 
 §48. a. We have seen that nearly any name can be used 
 for each of the three sorts of words (§§28b, 29, 80, 43-4). 
 We have seen it vividly in the case of man (§47). And we 
 saw by the absurd mathematical conclusions that the confu- 
 sion of the three produced nonsense (§44). It is therefore 
 evident that to be consistent or rational — to see things as 
 they are, — we distinguish in which of the three meanings 
 we are using some given word, so that mere names shall not 
 confuse and blind us while we are ostensibly using them to 
 avoid that :- to aid our memories. Any normal child can 
 readily judge which of the three meanings of a given name 
 is intended, or else see that in a certain case he cannot and 
 hence that the word or sentence is unintelligible to him. 
 There is no intrinsic difficulty about being logical, and see- 
 ing the truth : the difficulty is that we are in the habit of 
 confusing the words. 
 
 b. It is further evident that by considering any name 
 ultimately and accurately as designating God the Father (as 
 may be validly done), we therein have a formal religion that 
 is really correct, as it means or indicates the whole related 
 universe. Obviously, as a further truism of that, any person 
 who considers and observes that the results of his activities 
 are an inseparable part of the whole universe, and are needed 
 as that part to round out the whole, they being absolutely 
 indispensible because inseparable — any person who can thus 
 regard his activities or his life has a real, everyday, working 
 religion even if he is no more than an unskilled laborer (for 
 further details and proof, see §§166-7). Theology does not 
 necessarily express a valid religion. If you will refer to an 
 authoritative orthodox theologian's statement of what theo- 
 logians think is the Trinity ("Ency. Brit.," vi, 284-5, in 
 Art. "Christianity"), you can readily see, in the light of 
 what we have now observed about the Trinity, that no so- 
 called Christian theologian, according to that statement, has 
 yet consistently expressed any valid religion. If it is not 
 obvious from that short citation, then the remaining pages of 
 the article cited make it more obvious. ^ Many theologians 
 
 48b That article (p. 289) explicitly states in effect that the theolo- 
 gians are evasive— i. e., that they will not agree to say that A=A 
 and stick to it, nor yet will they refuse to do so (cf. §22). E. g., 
 the writer states that officially both the Protestant and the Catholic 
 churches assert certain doctrines which many scholars in the church 
 find "no difficulty" in rejecting and "remaining Christian." He 
 says that they produce a large literature "reconciling science and 
 theology by softening and compromising and adapting"; that men 
 are not "prepared to carry principles to their logical conclusions. By 
 
3T 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VI 
 
 of course have a valid religion, and have had. I have merely 
 pointed out that by their own statement their expression of 
 such religion is grossly inconsistent. Yet that theological 
 dogma, worthless when strictly interpreted, implicitly points 
 
 a fortunate power of mind they are able to believe as truths mutually 
 inconsistent propositions." The writer goes on further, actually ap- 
 proving that extraordinary refusal of theologians to abide by any 
 verbal agreement they may make. Obviously, he asserts in effect 
 that a theologian will agree that A=A, and will then at any time he 
 
 likes, and without notice, assert that Aisnot=A. That 
 
 writer is an authoritative Protestant (whose name in simple kindness 
 I omit), and perhaps the Catholics may hold that he has no right to 
 speak for them. So we shall let the Catholics exhibit fundamental 
 evasiveness for themselves:- If you will refer to the Art. "Philoso- 
 phy, "in the authoritative "Catholic Encyclopedia' ' (xii, 37-8), passed 
 by their censor, you will find that its official Catholic writer (in an 
 extremely confusing manner which may have confused even himself 
 — and which on the other hand may have been sophisticated guile to 
 prevent anybody's pinning him down, which is the acme of evasive- 
 ness) dodges definite statement of what the Catholics fundamentally 
 believe as expressed in philosophical terms, and finally makes this 
 "shifty" statement as to official authoritative imposition:- "The 
 Church has never imposed any philosophical system, though she has 
 anathematized many doctrines." [That of course is equivalent to 
 asserting that the church has negatively imposed philosophical sys- 
 tems — but let that pass.] But another writer in the same official 
 work ("Cath. Ency.," v, 170) substantially flatly contradicts that 
 first writer by stating:- "From the thirteenth century, through the 
 influence of Albertus Magnus and still more of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
 the philosophy of Aristotle, though subjected to some important 
 modifications, became the accredited philosophy of the Church"; 
 and, "The distinction between the human soul and the body it ani- 
 mates was made clearer and their separability emphasized ; but the 
 ultra -dualism of Plato was avoided." An authoritative Catholic 
 theologian, Ryan, in a more or less casual book not officially recog- 
 nized by the Church so far as I can discover, asserts as a sort of mat- 
 ter of course and as actual practice, that the Catholics are dualists 
 ("Socialism: Promise or Menace," 261-2); and he goes on to make 
 the nonsensical dualistic statement (which in actual practice Catho- 
 lics claim to hold), that "science and religion as such *** deal with 
 entirely different spheres of reality," — which remark of course im- 
 plies as a verbal truism no need of consistency between science and 
 religion. Also, J. J. Walsh, in "The Popes and Science," officially 
 censored by Catholic authorities, states (p. 327):- "At the end of 
 the nineteenth century Leo XIII. crowned the tributes which many 
 popes had conferred on Thomas [Aquinas] by selecting him as the 
 teacher to whom Catholic schools should ever turn by formulating 
 the authoritative Papal opinion — the nearer to Thomas the nearer to 
 Catholic truth." And see also Walsh's "The Thirteenth, Greatest 
 of Centuries," pp. 81, 276-81. It seems to me that those quo- 
 tations prove both sorts of theologians to be officially evasive, irre- 
 sponsible and unreliable in their assertions — or else to have minds of 
 such weakness of perception and hence unreliability as perhaps oc- 
 casionally to border on pathological insanity. The Germans repudi- 
 ated a "scrap of paper," and the rest of the world would not tolerate 
 it — it is becoming bad taste, and sometimes dangerously unhealthy, 
 for even statesmen and diplomats — a "government" — to lie in these 
 days, although Henry Adams says in effect that they feel quite free 
 to lie. We here see the theologians acting even more reprehensibly 
 than that defunct German government — for that government was at 
 least honest in giving notice that it did not propose to keep its word 
 unless convenient, and those theologians in those quotations evade 
 even that much of explicit statement of how far we can rely on them. 
 As a matter of fact, if the Catholic theologians are ever forced to 
 notice these remarks, quite probably they can "prove" by technical 
 canonical law that I prove nothing officially by such quotations — a 
 characteristic Catholic procedure (e. g., see Walsh's "The Popes and 
 Science") which if followed proves my point. There is actually a 
 history extending over centuries, of theological lies and evasions: 
 see "Pious Frauds" in Lecky's history of the "Rise of Rationalism in 
 Europe." And the Protestant theologian quoted goes so far as to 
 assert that none of mankind will live up to their principles: the 
 truth is that most theologians even have excellent principles and live 
 
 up to them quite honestly as a usual thing. So far as I can 
 
 find, all other classes of men try to be verbally honest. Even the 
 first Catholic writer quoted above makes a sort of verbal claim to 
 the intended honesty of Catholics in dealing with science. But in 
 view of those quotations, I have no choice but to state that in no case 
 in this book do I place any particular reliance upon what a theologian 
 professionally or officially says. 
 
 out the complete truth. So obviously, theology need not be 
 taken more seriously than any other science. And orthodox 
 theology is explicitly wrong when it pretends to any auth- 
 ority" (such pretension being substantially the invalid claim 
 that expression is real proof; see §35). Also, theology is, 
 in making such a claim, an aristocracy, autocracy, or kaiser- 
 ism. The Catholic church explicitly pretends to such auth- 
 ority (ibid., Art. "Christianity," 289); hence, the Catholic 
 church is absolutely wrong by its explicit words in that re- 
 spect (which is an important practical one), and is in prin- 
 ciple intolerable (§169). 
 
 c. In the old days the Trinity was a governmental 
 problem. It is now the verbal custom to consider that in 
 some countries there is no religion in government. Obvious- 
 ly, in a complete sense, we can not possibly keep religion 
 out of government : man himself is clearly the Trinity, and 
 man is society. But what is meant is that we keep theology 
 out of government (allowing free speech in the matter — as 
 theology, with its claim to authority, will not willingly 
 do) — which is quite right and practically necessary until such 
 time as theology becomes a valid science (when it itself will 
 accord such free speech ; §169f). As a matter of clearly 
 obvious historical fact, the reason this country removed the- 
 ology from politics is that theology is essentially aristocratic 
 or autocratic in its substantial claims and in its practical ten- 
 dencies — a so-called spiritual dualistic doctrine of kaiser- 
 ism that can not possibly be reconciled with democracy in 
 principle, it being the flat contradiction of democracy — as 
 we shall see proved in detail in XVII-XIX. 
 
 d. The historical fact, with an obviousness that is pain- 
 fully glaring to me, is that most churches, and especially 
 the Catholic church, have opposed any verifiable, objective 
 proof that certain of their dogmas failed to agree with things 
 as they are. Theologians have tried to force men to accept 
 their authority eveu to the irrelevant point of torturing 
 them bodily. For historical proof see the Catholic Walsh's 
 officially censored Popes and Science, where the facts 
 glare through his formal denials and explanations"; or, 
 for explicitly stated proof see White s Warfare of Science 
 with Theology" (note that White advisedly says theology), 
 
 or Buckle s history. The reason for that insistence 
 
 of theologians upon their authority is of course the same 
 as the reason for the maintenance of any kaiserism :- it was 
 a more or less selfish, personal effort to get and keep them- 
 selves in a position of power and privilege and emolu- 
 ments" (i. e., graft) — and of course their doing so did con- 
 fer some very temporary benefits on the laymen (e. g., it 
 saved them the pain and effort of doing a little thinking for 
 themselves, giving them the lazy comfort of saying that those 
 subjects are of course outside our line and we will leave them 
 to the specialists — just as some presumably intelligent people 
 have talked to me about this book); and those temporary 
 comforts were paid for later by mental and moral deteriora- 
 tion, as is all kinds of paternalism or parasitism (cf. Part 
 Three). It is much easier to claim to be right (especially 
 after one's brain is so debauched — i. e., partly killed — by 
 the evasiveness described in the footnote, that it no longer 
 rebels against such dishonesty), than it is to dig into things 
 by hard effort and find out what is right. Consequently, so 
 long as there are men so weak and stupid as to tolerate being 
 duped (and even actually to invite it, as has come to my 
 notice repeatedly in working up this book), there are going 
 to be dogmatic theologians, as well as other sorts of dogmat- 
 ists, who are mentally sufficiently depraved to dupe them. 
 The dogmatist pays for the 'privileges" and graft he gets 
 by suffering that brain destruction — a very expensive 
 payment, although he in turn is too stupid to know what is 
 
§48d VI One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 38 
 
 hurting him, and fills the air with complaints about the 
 unbelief" of the people. This book will show unescapably 
 that we pay for everything we get, and get everything we 
 pay for. In the aristocratic kaiser-theologian-dupe game 
 the payment is merely a trifle slow — and that fools boobs. 
 
 e. The extent and intensity with which we perceive the 
 ultimate unity or organic personality of the universe determ- 
 ines its mental effect upon us (including emotional effect), 
 and hence its worth (§168). The remainder of this book is 
 a series of evidences that there is such ultimate unity or con- 
 nection or love or cohesion. In that sense the book expands 
 and intensifies the reader's religion or enjoyment of life if 
 he sees and verifies that evidence for himself. 
 
 f. The argument of the book is now complete. It was 
 complete when we had examined the sentence 2+3=5 in 
 §12; but now all implications of that form have been stated 
 and shown in a broad way. Hereafter I simply repeat the 
 argument in terms of different sorts of details, as a means of 
 making it applicable and more thoroughly intelligible. Hav- 
 ing now achieved that general completeness, it may at this 
 point be of interest to see what the conventional name of 
 the argument is :- 
 
 §49. a. There may be said to be three general histori- 
 cal ways of viewing — interpreting — the Trinity ( Ency. 
 Brit.," Art. "Christianity"). 49s Each of those historical 
 interpretations consists of emphasizing one sort of our three 
 sorts of words, at the expense of the two remaining kinds. 
 Sometimes the emphasis is so violent that the other two 
 members of the Trinity are claimed to be non-existent. 
 Thus, the atheist or the materialistic scientist emphasizes 
 the Many so much that there is to him nothing else — no 
 unity, no God, but only a fortuitous concourse of atoms" 
 (an obviously self-contradictory phrase that thus implicitly 
 re-establishes the Trinity). Or, the technical mystic will 
 so violently emphasize the One (or may be it is relationship 
 or God the Holy Ghost : no one ever knows just what the 
 technical mystic is saying), that he substantially denies the 
 existence of the Many. And there are other varieties of 
 doctrines that wholly deny one or more parts of the Trinity. 
 Sometimes people become exasperated with the theological 
 dogmas, as Wells apparently did, and deny the Trinity in 
 toto — and then more or less unconsciously construct another, 
 with new names. But as we have seen the formal need in 
 language of each of the three sorts of words, it is obvious 
 that the truth is not any of those doctrines which deny one 
 or more parts, either very largely in a quantitative way, 
 or wholly — in really a qualitatively impossible way. So 
 technically, we are neither Christian Scientists nor theoso- 
 phists (two species of mystics), nor atheists, nor materialistic 
 scientists (who are almost German "monists") — not yet ag- 
 nostics, who say they know little or nothing of the matter. 
 
 b. Nor are we dualists, who undertake to make some 
 real split in the Trinity, so that any two parts are perfectly 
 equal" to each other. The parts are not real or essential 
 or djstinct, but merely arbitrary or verba], and actually 
 merge into each other even in the using of such logical 
 formal distinctions. 
 
 c. It is not profitable to examine at length the names 
 of the doctrines that in one way or another gave greater 
 
 49a The writer mentions four more technical ways as being 
 "Christian," but I shall ignore such technical dogma as being too 
 trivial for intelligent readers. E. g., the Catholic Trinity is briefly 
 this:- "In this one God there are three distinct Persons, — the 
 Father, the Son [i. e., Christ], and the Holy Ghost, who are per- 
 fectly equal to each other" (Cardinal Gibbons, "The Faith of Our 
 Fathers," Chap. I) — and I take it that the reader of this book is too 
 intelligent to desire a discussion of such balderdash, that is so glar- 
 ingly self-contradictory and meaningless if explicitly considered. 
 
 emphasis to one or two parts of the Trinity than to the re- 
 mainder. There are already hundreds of tiresome books on 
 the subject. We shall look at a few important doctrines. 
 
 d. The Buddhists seem to me to make relationship 
 words — explicitly time and its numerous substantial synonyms 
 — the most emphatic of the Trinity. I. e., they make re- 
 lationships or God the Holy Ghost "real." (For rhetorical 
 purposes I tacitly take it for granted that I am historically 
 correct in my interpretations. I am not able to make out 
 with much definiteness what the Buddha did mean, and I 
 doubt whether he knew very clearly himself — there are 
 places in this book [they are labeled] where I do not know 
 clearly what I mean; e. g., the full extension of the theory 
 of harmonic periodicity : and I know considerably more 
 about things than the Buddha did. All my historical state- 
 ments are similarly liable to error. Such statements are 
 quantitative, and I can do no more than give reasonable 
 guesses, some of which are most likely to be very inaccu- 
 rate.) To make relationships real or truth, is,truist- 
 
 ically, valid, provided that there is at least formal recognition 
 of the logical existence of the other two forms. I. e., we 
 validly can emphasize relationships very much — say they are 
 
 real" — and at the same time say that the other tw r o forms 
 logically exist, but will verbally be called not real," but 
 "arbitrary" (real and arbitrary in that usage merely take on 
 quantitative meaning). The Buddhistic way of making time 
 real (doing so in practical effect by emphasizing the long 
 temporal duration of training or education, or what they 
 call the way," to ultimate perfection — to grasp of the One) 
 obviously makes the One a form — it makes the One what we 
 
 may call a negative realit3',' or Nirvana. Buddhism 
 
 is hence obviously quite right; it does not deny the formal 
 or logical need of those three forms, and their ultimate unity. 
 But we Occidentals do not talk that reversed language (it is 
 in practice an Oriental, more 'selfish' [cf. §15 1), introspect- 
 ive language; whereas we prefer an objective or "scientific" 
 language). So Buddhism is inconvenient for us — and also 
 possesses inherent tendencies towards selfishness which are 
 inadvisable (e. g. , the conduct of the Buddha himself in 
 coolly deserting his family would get him a jail sentence in 
 some of our states), and are technically and historically 
 
 primitive. In speaking of Buddhism I refer to the 
 
 original Buddhism, which was essentially sound, and an ex- 
 traordinary advance. The Buddhistic theologians seem to 
 have perverted Buddha's teachings as ours have Christ's. 
 
 e. Those who emphasize the Meaning or One or God 
 the Father member of the Trinity are now perhaps most oft- 
 en called monists. The chief objection to that name as a 
 proper name for our valid logic is that its German users, in 
 their exaggeration of detail (of the Many, of "material"), 
 have rather spoiled it. They usually call their doctrine 
 
 scientific monism," and fail to recognize that the phrase 
 implies a dualism of "matter" and "spirit" that instantly 
 stultifies it. Some theologians in a somewhat similar way 
 try to appropriate the name monism as being more up-to-date 
 than the ancient equivalent theological term monotheism,— 
 and then make a dualism out of their "monism." Or, the 
 Germans are sometimes equally shallow in asserting what 
 they call a monism, that in effect denies relationships (so 
 that they can formally use the classical logic with it) ; such 
 
 monism again implies dualism. Before the war I 
 
 used to devote considerable space to showing that Ostwald 
 and Nietzsche, who seemed to be the Germans' actually ac- 
 cepted leading "thinkers," were exceedingly unsound 
 fundamentally, (i am aware that Nietzsche attacked Prus- 
 sians in a way which was really complimentary in their 
 view and that Germans verbally often repudiated him. I 
 
39 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VI §49h 
 
 think however that in view of the psychological principle 
 shown in §155, it is reasonably correct to say that Nietzsche 
 expressed German general views :- they being chaotic and 
 selfish. I also recognize that Nietzsche was tremendously 
 in earnest, and was actually likeable in many ways on that 
 account; and that he was a victim of his time, and hence 
 deserving of much approving pity by really intelligent per- 
 sons. As we saw in the case of the Kaiser (§25c), if we take 
 an ultimate One view of Nietzsche, he was completely con- 
 sistent and beautiful. I am however restricting my remarks 
 about Nietzsche to what he actually wrote ; and that was a 
 violently emphatic dualism and hence perceptibly insanely 
 incoherent.) But now that the war has occurred, I judge 
 that any extended proof of German unsoundness in principles, 
 due to too much emphasis on detail or the Many, is no long- 
 er needed — just those very general remarks about German 
 monism being all that is needed to call attention to the 
 facts. Those remarks show, what will probably be accepted 
 as the historical fact, that the Germans did not as a rule 
 grasp any real meaning of the One, or couldn't generalize 
 well (and hence talked loudly and sentimentally of being 
 monists because essentially they were so far from being such; 
 for the psychology of that see §155) ; although they were 
 very industrious and prolific with details of all kinds. That 
 detail work they did well, and it is of great value. From 
 the point of view of their own best interest, they did that 
 detail work too well, becoming unbalanced in it (cf. §149). 
 f. Consequently, although monism is thus a somewhat 
 spoiled word, and gives conventional misleading indications, 
 it may, if stripped of those conventional accretions, serve as 
 a poor name for what we have observed to be the truth — 
 subject to another defect to be mentioned in par. i. For it 
 is an observable fact that Occidentals have acquired the ten- 
 dency to consider the One, or a unified God, to be the re- 
 ality' or truth whenever there arises any definite question 
 as to what is real." That seems to be the result of several 
 centuries of a religion that in usual practice tended to be 
 rather monotheistic (or without a center," or formally not 
 anthropocentric) if it were explicitly pinned down to definite 
 statement (and Occidentals formulated such a religion be- 
 cause they appreciably had greater mental or general vigor 
 than the Orientals, and that in turn had many causes, 
 climate being the verbally final one — Index, 'Climate"). 
 E. g., the ignorant Catholic layman substantially has five 
 coordinate Gods (Christ, God the Father, Holy Ghost, Vir- 
 gin Mary, and a null-God, the Devil), and the Protestant 
 Trinitarian usually substantially has four Gods. (As people 
 lose in mental vigor the number of their Gods increases, that 
 being merely truistic with inability to see the relationships 
 that give unity ; hence it is another truism that the numerous 
 Catholic Gods appeal to the ignorant who can t or won t 
 think for themselves.) But if either layman is pinned down 
 to an explicit statement he will verbally assert one God, in 
 spite of the glaring fact that the assertion contradicts his 
 ritualistic practices. But in spite of those practical vagaries 
 — they are emotional or ritualistic (§167d) survivals of that 
 ancient day when men were too weak mentally to see and 
 express considerable unifications, — whenever a question of 
 formal speech or explicit logic comes up, the Occidental has 
 become accustomed to asserting a unified universe or God, 
 and as a result our whole language informally permeated (cf. 
 par. j for actual practice) by the implication that the One is 
 "real" or "true," or that monism or its theological synonym 
 monotheism is the truth. And to repeat, that mono- 
 theistic "religion" did not absolutely "cause" Occidentals 
 to progress ahead of Orientals ; the Occidental progressed 
 because he was able (for reasons we implicitly see in numer- 
 
 ous places below) to get a wider grasp of the connections of 
 the Many. He stated that grasp as monotheism, and that 
 religious expression in turn reacted as a cause that widened 
 the grasp, and so on in infinite regress. 
 
 g. There remain those people who emphasize the Many 
 part of the Trinity — substantially saying that the Many is 
 most important, or is "real." The more usual name for 
 them is pluralists, meaning finite pluralists. A name nearly 
 as common is realists. Probably most people who are said to 
 have "scientific" tendencies are what are popularly called 
 commonsense realists; i. e., without much investigation 
 they take as being "real" what the theologians call the 
 things of this world. We have seen that the Many is form- 
 ally or logically true ; hence, those names for truth may 
 serve as poor ones except that we have to be explicitly 
 infinite pluralists (a verbal self-contradiction of course — 
 needed on account of the fact that the Occidental names 
 things as stated in the last paragraph ; see also §24d). How- 
 ever, we see better names in par. i. There is one 
 
 special objection to calling the Many real, and the One ar- 
 bitrary. We are in the habit of calling the One real, and 
 to call the Many always real turns our customary language 
 topsy-turvy (and fundamentally is perhaps the most import- 
 ant, theoretically superficial but intensely practical, cause of 
 the warfare between science and theology — which is hence 
 seen to be mostly verbal and unessential; and science was 
 under an obligation to show that an advantage accrued in 
 the long run from such verbal innovation, and science neither 
 recognized nor met the obligation, although^ there is an ad- 
 vantage, as indicated in footnote 100c). -That turning of 
 language topsy-turvy can be validly done (§51, etc.); but 
 it is rather confusing. We shall see (§§91, 84, 93,etc.)how 
 Reynolds in his scientific theory correctly Called the Many- 
 real ; he got matter as being holes in the ether, the holes 
 traveling when matter moved," and other weird verbal 
 results, in an elaborately upside-down language. The Many, 
 or an infinite pluralism, is real or true; but if we steadily 
 verbally consider it so, we have to construct an upside-down 
 language in which to state it. 
 
 h. There is one variety of person (other than the ag- 
 nostic), unwarrantedly usually called a scientist, who is a 
 pseudo-species of realist or pluralist that logically departs 
 wholly from the truth. He is the materialist. He starts 
 with what he considers an exact, sharp This, and he keeps 
 on saying desperately This\ Thisz Thiss Thist Thiss 
 but holds in effect that no One is achievable. Usually he 
 does not explicitly assert that no One is ever synthesized ; 
 in practice he tends to be vociferous that there is no 
 PROOF ' that we can ever sum up his scientific" string 
 of Thisi 23466 etc into any meaning. He excitedly 
 overlooks the fact (and it is an example of the principle that 
 man can not make a real error) that his very vociferousness 
 is a violent dogmatic assertion that Tkisi 2 3 etc. = Null- 
 Meaning, which logically is precisely what he has been deny- 
 ing. However, in practice we shall take the materi- 
 alist at his word, and say that in brief, instead of making an 
 intelligent equation he makes a sort of formally disconnected 
 single member of it, Thisi 2 3 etc. . and denies that there 
 is any actual equation even while he is striving desperately 
 to run down all the This's :- This 6 7 8 etc. — and pile them 
 up as mountains of statistics — an attempt to put salt on the 
 tail of the universe, so to speak. Obviously, his acts and 
 his implicit logic contradict the folly of his outward protes- 
 tations — although he vociferates so much that it sounds noisy 
 just to talk about him. He views his mountains of statis- 
 tics, which he erroneously calls science, in despair, and em- 
 phatically denies that any complete grasp of knowledge, 
 
§49h VI One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 40 
 
 such as we are seeing in this book is in actual fact fairly easy, 
 is possible. He says this book is impossible. In charac- 
 ter, he is a pessimistic, talkative weakling. 
 
 i. The defect of the three ways of calling one or another 
 member of the Trinity the important one — reality or the 
 "truth" — is that those who undertake to do it are usually 
 opposed by other schools with doctrines giving a different 
 emphasis. Then the opponents get excited, increase their 
 emphasis, and tend to finish with each school substantially 
 asserting that its emphatic part is its only part, and that the 
 opposing schools are wholly wrong. Such fanatics are very 
 entertaining, even if distressing. History, including yes- 
 terday s newspaper, is full of their vagaries. When not 
 ameliorated in some way, their excess tends to cumulate 
 until it reaches the borderland of insanity as some form of 
 megalomania, paranoia, or Nietzscheism. E.g., materialism is 
 obviously the result of becoming so emphatic about the reali- 
 ty or practical importance' of the Many that the other two 
 parts are either wholly or practically denied. 
 
 j. The essential characteristic of those three ways of 
 considering some one of the three parts of the Trinity the 
 important one, and naming it real, is that such emphasis 
 is considered a fixed emphasis (i. e., it nominally does not 
 change, and fall on some other part) ; so we may call such 
 forms static logic. We can note that the average man (who 
 is paying slight attention to logic — and that includes even 
 professional theologians and mathematicians for the most 
 part of their lives, and perhaps for the greater part of their 
 professional writings) does not use any such static logic. 
 The average man, whenever he uses any one of those three 
 sorts of words, regards that word at the time it is used as 
 pointing to or meaning the truth or reality. It is a dynamic 
 logic:- the emphasis ( reality") is laid on that particular sort 
 of word which is at the moment being used, and then changes 
 or moves to the other kinds as they are used. And obvious- 
 ly, the emphasis is thus in principle distributed in exactly 
 proper proportions. Consequently, that sort of logic is the 
 strictly valid sort (and the same sort of principle of validity 
 is extended to the end in footnote 100c). Hence, our gen- 
 eral equation is valid in that sense; for we have not consid- 
 ered that one member or one symbol of it is any more real ' 
 or important than another. And whatever word will name 
 that sort of logic is an appropriate name. Those given 
 above are not quite appropriate, as we may now see ; they 
 are usually somewhat quantitatively inaccurate for us. 
 
 k. But the reader can now see definitely (cf. §§25, 13) 
 that our observation of things as they are, especially of lang- 
 uage as it is, has showed us that all of the historical doc- 
 trines of the truth which have had any special vitality are 
 qualitatively substantially right. All the great religions 
 have been substantially right when considered apart from 
 the theological perversions. All those valid doctrines were 
 obviously conscious" or intellectual attempts to state a 
 unity already dimly perceived by people (§170j), and the 
 inevitable result was an over-emphasis somewhere in them 
 (§155). Poor emphasis does not make a statement wrong" 
 qualitatively ; but it does make it quite liable to be misin- 
 terpreted (even by the author of it — which is why we may 
 often properly assert that we do not think that some writer 
 knew what he said or meant), as it is more or less quantita- 
 tively inaccurate. (And then science came along and at- 
 tempted, usefully and properly, to correct such doctrines 
 quantitatively by measuring. Some scientists in turn so vio- 
 lently emphasized their correction as to become materialists 
 
 — thus making a religion, but one of the null sort.) 
 
 So it is glaringly obvious that the simple solution of the 
 riddle of the universe is that the man in the street uses valid 
 
 logic, and there never was any riddle about it. There is 
 nothing strange about the fact that the average man has 
 always been qualitatively right (even if somewhat inarticu- 
 tately so) : as a rapid proof that he has been, we may note 
 the truism that if that average man had not been right the 
 
 race would have died out long ago. And cows and 
 
 birds use valid logic so far as they need it for their environ- 
 ment — which is far enough to use One ejaculations. The 
 overtalkative people — philosophers, scientists, priests, poets, 
 and other varieties of persons who, being more or less biologi- 
 cal sports and unbalanced (§159), write books — became verb- 
 ally self-conscious and hence rattled, and manufactured 
 "riddles" and "mysteries" — even for themselves — where 
 there were none. But somebody had to do it thus more or 
 less wrong, by that ultimate method of trial and error, in 
 order to develop the highly useful and sure language tool 
 we now have. 
 
 1. Consequently, as the valid logic is such a common- 
 place" affair, there are a number of common and familiar 
 names which conventionally apply to it. ' Valid is one; 
 dynamic" another. We have seen that ultimately all things 
 join together as identical; and we have seen that the em- 
 phasis on the three parts of the Trinity is identical in valid 
 logic; hence, we may call it the logic of identity. (Classic 
 logic is obviously logic of non-identity, as each premise is 
 nominally distinct and different.) And since our valid logic 
 is used by the average man it may conventionally be called 
 commonsense logic, or simply commonsense — or common logic, 
 or everyday logic, or intelligible logic. 
 
 m. And the reader, finally, may like to know when and 
 where this logic made its appearance in literature. Of 
 course, as a truism, it has implicitly been used in all intelli- 
 gible writings that came to correct conclusions which were 
 stated with fairly balanced emphasis. / have not invented 
 it. It is simply the commonsense" that people so often 
 mention. I am merely pointing it out and describing it. 
 The prehistoric men who invented language invented it, ap- 
 parently half-consciously and without formulating specifica- 
 tions. The whole universe acted on them to cause them to 
 invent it — in ways we implicitly see in Part Three. 
 
 n. The valid logic has explicitly been used by a number 
 of men in forms that were pretty definite. Christ was very 
 obviously somewhat consciously using valid logic (§162e). 
 So far as I can judge, his reported utterances in the Bible 
 have been somewhat falsified (perhaps both unintentionally 
 and intentionally) ; but they still show that Christ recog- 
 nized valid logic and was deliberately using it. That was a 
 stupendous feat in his day, and indicated his remarkable 
 balance or great character (XVIII, §167b). Any fairly in- 
 telligent and honest person ought to be able to do it now. 
 
 o. For his age, Christ was reasonably definite in his use 
 and indication of the valid logic. So far as I am aware, the 
 next man to become more definite was Buckle, in his essay, 
 "Mill on Liberty." Buckle attributed the ideas to Mill] 
 but in my opinion Mill is largely innocent of them. The 
 next person I know of is Dewey; his "Psychology," writ- 
 ten over thirty years ago, was more definite than Buckle, 
 and his later works are steadily more so. Dewey has often 
 been "accused" by classic logicians of using circular logic, 
 which was precisely what he was doing, and doing validly, 
 and with rather good technique. Dewey, as far as I can 
 judge, was the founder of the present and valid, school of 
 psychology, named behavoristic psychology. That name ob- 
 viously means dynamic — and such psychology is of course in 
 general agreement with valid dynamic logic. I use that 
 psychology in this book (XVII), rewriting it in simpler form 
 and eliminating its overstock of technical names. And it 
 
41 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VI §49t 
 
 is shown repeatedly below, that all other valid knowledge, 
 like valid psychology, is "dynamic." 
 
 p. James gave the name pragmatism to substantially 
 the same logic — but bestowed the name before he worked 
 out the technical details very well. There are technical 
 defects in the expression of pragmatism — which do not, how- 
 ever, warrant explicit consideration in this condensed book. 
 The leading American philosophers, headed by Dewey, have 
 corrected the substantial ones ; and some of those philosoph- 
 ers have repudiated the name pragmatist along with the re- 
 pudiation of James s errors, and call themselves neo-realists. 
 (So far as I can find, living philosophers outside America 
 
 are scarcely out of the amateur class.) And David 
 
 Starr Jordan independently, and before James and the neo- 
 realists did so, worked out the valid logic in "The Stability 
 of Truth. Alfred Sidgwick has, with somewhat less defi- 
 
 niteness, the same valid logic in his book, "The Use of 
 Words in Reasoning. " Stallo rather definitely implied it in 
 his Theories and Concepts of Modern Physics," which was 
 explicitly perhaps too destructive. And Karl Pearson, in 
 Grammar of Science, nearly thirty years ago explicitly 
 and emphatically made for science the distinction between 
 Many words and One words under the respective names per- 
 ceptions and conceptions, and went so far as to deduce from 
 that distinction the principle that mass varies with velocity : 
 that deduction, as Pearson showed, was simply a correct 
 interpretation of Newton's laws (§88). Pearson's book is 
 now scientifically accepted almost as commonplace ; but it 
 was novel when published, and I think was, in spite of its 
 grave defect, one of the five or six first-class books on physi- 
 cal science of the last century. It contains a bad defect 
 which has marred Pearson s later work :- it omits explicit 
 naming and consideration of relationship words, and that 
 perhaps technically comes close to making Pearson a materi- 
 alist. What seems to have been the actual difficulty is that 
 Pearson tends to be a mathematician ; and as mathematic- 
 ians write relationship words as symbols +. =, X, different 
 from ordinary words, therefore he more or less unconsciously 
 took it for granted that no ordinary words were needed for or 
 about relationships: so he omitted them. As a truistic con- 
 sequence, his book was not intelligible to non-mathematicians 
 (it is readily intelligible when the omission is supplied); 
 also, the person trained in orthodox mathematics could more 
 or less understand the book, but as he himself did not ex- 
 plicitly know the language trick with reference to the rela- 
 tionship symbols, he could not clearly express what he had 
 
 understood. This paragraph of course simply states 
 
 my judgments. There is no space to show the historical 
 evidence for such quantitative matters, and my guesses will 
 probably be disagreed with by some. And nearly surely 
 there are other historical instances of fairly definite use of 
 valid logic which have not come to my attention. There are 
 not likely to be any very substantial uses of it which I have 
 overlooked ; for such use would have been by a person of 
 such unusually strong character that he would not be the 
 sort that is overlooked. For further remarks on the charac- 
 ter of men who could use the valid logic, see §167b. 
 
 q. Probably it is safer never to use for very long any 
 particular name for the valid way of expressing the truth. 
 The way itself has an indefinite number of possible variations 
 (§68, etc.). If we adopt a fairly fixed name for valid logic, 
 some soft minded person might take it to refer to a fixed 
 
 system — and thus be a word idolater. But there is 
 
 the graver danger that the intellectual exploiters will prompt- 
 ly grab any definite name for it, and capitalize it for their 
 benefit. The exploiting capitalization of the word Christi- 
 anity" is so pernicious and generally prevalent that many 
 
 people are becoming doubtful whether they wish to be 
 named Christians. Democrat will probably be the next word 
 exploited on a large scale ; the demagogs have already been 
 watering the stock of that word generously, and as this book 
 is likely to make it definitely no longer respectable to be an 
 aristocrat, probably all the intellectual bunco men and their 
 soft minded followers will scramble even more to steal the 
 now better trademark democrat. 
 
 r. The common, untechnical, everyday name of the 
 truth set forth by valid logic — other than democracy, which 
 applies particularly to people — is idealism. Hopkins, in his 
 Dartmouth inaugural address, names the common views of 
 that truth (he expressing them implicitly in valid logic) :- 
 constructive idealism. That name gives as much descript- 
 ive information as to what is truth as any I can think of. It 
 is somewhat obviously a verbally self-contradictory name, 
 meaning an idealism or unified One or religion, definitely 
 expressed mechanically (so that it will be applied). 
 
 s. In the process of giving a large choice of names fairly 
 suitable for the valid logic, so that the very number discour- 
 ages exploitation of the name, I have tried to make clear 
 the complete meaning of the valid logic, and to attach it so 
 strongly to all the historical knowledge and well established 
 emotions possessed by the reader that that essential part will 
 be easily remembered. I of course would not have used the 
 space discussing the choice of merely a name : one line 
 
 would have sufficed for a name and nothing else. 
 
 There has further appeared implicitly the answer to What's 
 in a name? The answer is :- history — meaning mental 
 
 connections or associations, or unification, and emotions, so 
 that appropriate action readily results where there is much 
 history — ;or advertising — and hence habit attached. So 
 it obviously is an advantage to have a familiar, common 
 name, even if the exploiters do capitalize it, stealing its 
 trademark value. We have to balance — compromise — be- 
 tween having a name that automatically arouses emotion, 
 and having one that is not so very automatic as to make it 
 worth the exploiters' efforts to steal. But that answer to 
 What's in a name?' includes what the name points to; 
 the mere name is a little ink, or sound. 
 
 t. We have now seen in a little intelligible detail that 
 everyone with commonsense has previously understood 
 the essentials of this book. For I am simply writing out 
 the explicit details of what for centuries has been recognized 
 as such commonsense. We have seen that the general argu- 
 ment of the book has been rather definitely stated numbers 
 of times in the past. Hence, because such knowledge is so 
 old, it is rather obvious in theory, even without observing the 
 actual facts, that a normal five or six year old child can un- 
 derstand the book — and even more so that an intelligent adult 
 can: that the adult is quite competent to grasp all essen- 
 tials of the book. But there is another side to all 
 
 that, which other aspect shows some important conclusions :- 
 The reader may occasionally find himself struggling to grasp 
 something which is written in the book ; and so would nat- 
 urally feel resentful if it were held that a six-year-old could 
 understand what he himself finds so difficult. But those 
 difficult details are the Many, and of course probably would 
 not be grasped by the child — and are not essential. The es- 
 sential parts are the One conclusions — the seeing that ulti- 
 mately things are related, and work together. I am forced 
 to state those Many details from my point of view; and all 
 readers occupy other points of view, so that those details are 
 more or less unfamiliar to them, and hence "hard." Of 
 course the reader finds it hard at times to "grasp" things 
 from my point of view. Also, as those details are in infinite 
 regress, very shortly I find it extremely difficult for me 
 
§49t VI One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 42 
 
 myself to grasp the series far out. The better the reader is 
 as an observer and thinker (a "thinker" is an observer of the 
 relationships of his "observations"), the more emphatically 
 will he be conscious that he is not grasping all the Many de- 
 tails as / see them — is not getting the detailed significance of 
 
 what I say. But, to repeat, those details are not 
 
 essential; they are the Many and are ultimately arbitrary. 
 The reader who is a good observer will substitute his own 
 details for mine. If the circumstances were reversed, and 
 the six -year-old were the writer and I the reader, the same 
 principle would hold :- I would be forced to see (if I were a 
 reasonably good observer) that the child expressed details 
 that ran on to infinity, and that I couldn't grasp" them or 
 understand them as well as he did. Considered from that 
 aspect (of details) the child would be "mystic" to me, and 
 hence deserving of the highest wonder and awe from me. 
 Or, speaking rigorously and more definitely, I could learn 
 from the child. Yet at the same time I could readily grasp 
 the One conclusions of the child, just as the child can grasp 
 any of the essential conclusions of this book if I state them 
 in words he knows (it is possible to do that for the average 
 child). So obviously, all of that is proof of two im- 
 portant practical points:- (l) The definitely observable facts 
 about so abstract a thing as logic or words show that 
 other people are really deserving of our wonder and respect 
 for their capacities and ultimate dignity (or even "divinity") 
 and lovableness; or those facts show rigorously that we can 
 learn from anyone, but need not be essentially troubled or 
 
 lowered if somebody knows more details about a certain 
 thing than we do — for in nearly every subject that state of 
 affairs does exist. (2) Those facts further rigorously show 
 the error of the frequently encountered erudite person who 
 prides himself upon the possession of some special knowledge 
 or intricately complex knowledge of some sort of details. 
 Any knowledge" which is so complex that it can't be ex- 
 plained to a child well enough for him to get the essential 
 meaning of it, is either unfinished and in that degree unin- 
 telligible to its erudite possessor, or else is wrong in some de- 
 gree and not knowledge — simply isn't so. When such 
 knowledge is also concealed from the average person, as in 
 
 secret diplomacy," it has the same defective character, 
 and in addition the concealment is undemocratic and immoral 
 (§§167-9), and its possessors deserving of contempt and 
 scorn — instead of envy and an idle curiosity, as was the case 
 
 in the crude and aristocratic childhood of the race. 
 
 We shall from time to time see more familiar proof and ex- 
 pression of this paragraph. I have here simply given the 
 general outline from both the One point of view and the 
 Many point of view, of what the reader can "understand," 
 or has need to; and of what that implies. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. Statement and proof of valid logic from 
 additional points of view. 
 
 §50. a. In this section valid logic is briefly but rigor- 
 ously demonstrated by using the principle of incommensura- 
 bility (or commensurability). Two "quantities" or "num- 
 bers" or units of the Many, or two things, are said to be 
 commensurable when there is some third quantity of the same 
 kind (another thing), called the common measure, which is 
 exactly contained a definite or whole number of times in each. 
 Two quantities are orthodoxly said to be incommensurable 
 when they have no common measure. E. g., the diameter 
 of a circle is incommensurable with the circumference; i. e., 
 if the diameter is 1 unit long, the circumference is 3. 1415... 
 units long— meaning that no number will exactly express the 
 
 circumference. (Obviously, that orthodox definition agrees 
 with the argument of this book, and does not consider and 
 °° "numbers.") The "number" 3. 1415... or ir is said to 
 be an incommensurable number — meaning that it is not act- 
 ually a number, as it ultimately can not be positively ex- 
 pressed. 
 
 b. I shall make some digressive comment in this para- 
 graph, anticipating the conclusion we are to derive, but 
 
 anticipating it in a not very intelligible form. If the 
 
 diameter of a circle is a line having a definite length, then it 
 can be conceived, or considered to exist" (i. e. , to assert 
 that there is a diameter is not a self-contradiction A=A and 
 A is nol=A ; specifically, is not Line=Definite length or 
 Line, and Line is not=^Definite length or Line), and its repre- 
 sentation can be "drawn" as a line" on paper. There- 
 fore, if there is a diameter, then it is glaringly obvious that 
 there is not any such thing as a circle or circumference ac- 
 cording to orthodox mathematics — for the circumference is 
 not definite and hence not a line — or can t exist as anything. 
 A circle is thus conventionally inconceivable, for if we have a 
 circle it can not have a diameter, and vice versa. Similarly, 
 by orthodox mathematics it is absolutely inconceivable that 
 a square have a diagonal, an equilateral triangle an altitude, 
 etc. Orthodox mathematics itself asserts in effect that it is 
 irrational — i. e., nonsensical — to say that a circle may exist, 
 when it says v is irrational. Hence, by following the same 
 argument we demolish all orthodox geometry and related 
 mathematical doctrines. In brief, classic logic, as used in 
 
 geometry, definitely gives nonsense. The immediate 
 
 conclusion from that reductio ad absurdum (it is somewhat 
 difficult to see clearly to the conclusion here, as the reductio 
 is naturally negative in form), is that there is no exact 
 science. If we do start with the absurd assumption that a 
 line is ever in any Many sense something absolutely exact, 
 then we get into those orthodox difficulties:- briefly summed, 
 that there is no geometry possible. Or, more remotefy, we 
 see that the Many members of our equation, That...Y* 
 This..., and M(varying with)L 2 T~ 2 , necessarily assert the 
 infinite regress even in geometry. And it can also be seen 
 further that a consistent geometry is dependent upon the ex- 
 plicit solution of the One and Many, and that another way 
 of viewing the orthodox difficulty above is to note that "line" 
 (and similarly point, surface, solid, etc.) is a name containing 
 considerable relationship meaning — is often practically a re- 
 lationship noun, or is "abstract"' — which must in any valid 
 logic be distinguished from Many words. To separate out 
 such relationship terms is equivalent to rewriting geometry 
 and its allied subjects, and the several volumes of that is 
 omitted from this book at this point. Orthodox geometry is 
 substantially valid ; it is merely vague and inaccurate and 
 verbally inconsistent (cf. §§60-3). The reader need not 
 feel that I have destroyed anything substantial; but in just 
 one paragraph he has seen that he is warranted in being 
 somewhat unimpressed when a mathematician thus rhapso- 
 dizes :- Coterminous with space and coeval with time is 
 the kingdom of mathematics ; within this range her dominion 
 is supreme; otherwise than according to her order nothing 
 can exist." So-called hard-headed scientists used to listen 
 to that sort of thing soberly. Now it is more kindly to omit 
 the name of the man I just quoted, as he is still alive. 
 
 c. We may generalize the fact that the diameter is in- 
 commensurable with the circumference into this proposition :- 
 any perimeter is incommensurable with its average diameter. 
 I have not been able to find any published proof of that 
 proposition. It is obviously to me true, simply as a truism 
 involving the solution of the One and Many. If it is not 
 thus obviously true to the reader, or obviously true as being 
 
43 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VII §SOh 
 
 a perfect analogy (§94g) to the conventional special case of 
 the circle, then this whole book furnishes the proof, and the 
 further proposition which I show in this section works back- 
 wards to establish the foregoing general proposition. 
 
 d. It therefore follows as a truism, that if there were 
 any fixed or exact or constant parts of the universe, it would 
 be absolutely impossible for them to join with the other 
 parts and form a body or a universe that had a perimeter. 
 And that truism holds vice versa :- that if there is any real, 
 connected, mutually-working-together universe, then it is 
 absolutely impossible that it should be composed of exact, 
 definite, constant parts of any given finite size or sizes (for 
 such would give impossible definitely-measurable diameters). 
 
 e. That last paragraph is the verbal expression of validly 
 rigorous mathematical proof of the truth of this whole book 
 or argument, with respect to its general consistency. Or ex- 
 plicitlj'j it is rigorous proof of the consistency or formal 
 truth of our general equation, and hence a proof of the 
 erroneousness of all equatious of whatever sort which fail to 
 conform in principle with that general one. And that proof 
 is perfectly reversible; i. e., it itself works vice versa as was 
 seen ; also, if the proposition in par. c is accepted, par. d 
 proves the book; and if not now accepted, the book proves 
 the proposition. And obviously, that is a general example 
 of the principle that valid logic is circular; a formal proof 
 of that principle is this :- all expression of proof if valid is re- 
 ducible to the truism A=A, and it is immaterial which A of 
 the two A's comes first, as formally or logically they are 
 identical (§§35, 58j). Hence, if there is any rule" that 
 will not work both ways, the rule is not a rule or prin- 
 ciple that is subject to any proof, but is simply a quantitative 
 guess, subject only to temporary inexact verification by meas- 
 urement. Therefore, obviously, as a general principle, no 
 quantitative fact — no proposition which includes in itself any 
 particular time and space (as contrasted with our general L 
 and T, that are relationship words that may be applied to 
 any particular units of the Many) — is susceptible to any such 
 thing as expression of proof; it is subject only to direct obser- 
 vation, or what I called "real" proof (§35). Or, we can 
 put it at once into scientific terms :- no so-called cyclic pro- 
 cess, short of a cycle including the total universe (in which 
 L and T are not particular measures) is perfectly reversible 
 (Index, "Cycle"). Or, more specifically, no machine which 
 exists or can be made, short of the total universe, is perfectly 
 reversible. I. e., any well-designed machine will (l) per- 
 form pretty nearly the same operation or cycle after making 
 one "revolution" (such as the earth's rotating daily in nearly 
 the same time) ; and may (2) run backwards in revolutions 
 or cycles that more or less approximate the cycles in the 
 ahead direction (in some ordinary machines the approxima- 
 tion is so remote that we briefly say that they won t run 
 backwards, in the same way we say the Kaiser was wrong; 
 §25). But in no case, short of the total universe, will that 
 repetition of a "cycle" ever be an exact repetition (and ingen- 
 eral, repetition includes reversal; see Index, "Direction"). 
 Part Two proves that general principle in useful detail. 
 
 f. We could go on from that point of view and consist- 
 ently completely describe the universe. The orthodox point 
 of view of the science called heat would be the next step. 
 Or we could at once shift that principle of cycles to ethics 
 and show that a workable or moral life was ultimately or as a 
 One a perfectly balanced cycle (i. e., reversible cycle, in 
 which the "other fellow" had a fair deal or reaction) of vari- 
 ous acts', which cyclic balance is commonly named temperance. 
 In a really unified knowledge, obviously, as a truism, we 
 can start from any point of view and consistently describe 
 the universe ; I mention those two large extensions of the 
 
 present point of view as an example of that principle. The 
 practical need of having an end to this particular book ob- 
 viously precludes my ever going on to all the implied details 
 — of ever continuing explicitly to name the dots of That...yi 
 This... — or even of pointing out that possibility often. 
 
 g. In this paragraph I summarize the general proof of 
 the argument of the book, by the use of incommensurables. 
 
 It is so brief as to be hard to follow. The fact that 
 
 Many units can not be bounded by a definite or exactly com- 
 mensurate perimeter or One obviously shows that the One 
 and the Many are absolutely irreconcilable in their formal 
 contradictoriness. If Ave say that there is really and truly a 
 One, then it is, by our everyday language agreements, formally 
 or logically impossible to say that there is simultaneously a 
 real Many. And we can see at once that in general there 
 are two immediately applicable ways of reconciling that con- 
 tradiction:- (l) We can say that the Many is absolutely 
 infinite, and as such is absolutely true at the same time that 
 the One is absolutely true {but that changes our everyday 
 language agreements, as we shall see). That is what we do 
 say, in our valid logic, in the formal way of reconciling the 
 contradiction (i. e., we formally say X,T _ °°). For then 
 obviously we can, in the absolutely infinitely small units of 
 that infinite Many, which are really absolute zero, find a 
 common measure that mil serve as a complete measure for 
 the otherwise incommensurable One. Logically, that way is 
 consistent, and gives us our zero-infinity logical rule. But 
 our everyday language is constructed on a formal implication 
 that the One is real, and that the infinite Many" is not 
 'real," and hence is a verbal contradiction (cf. footnote 
 100c). By such verbal agreements, infinite really" means 
 continuous, and not a measure." (2) But we can use 
 that formal reconcilement, and at the same time use the 
 practical reconcilement of stating and showing that there is 
 no exact science — that we can not be exact or accurate about 
 the Many, — that when we do make a real or definite 
 perimeter or One, then the Many or that perimeter s diame- 
 ter actually is not exactly commensurate in an} - measure that 
 we are verbally able to set down in full. In short, we drop 
 the £T _co and use L T -2 , and say that practically there is 
 an infinite regress, which we formally merely imply by writ- 
 ing t as 8 . 1415..., or as This... . And that practical way 
 of handling the difficulty clearly agrees with the obvious fact 
 that we can and do conceive geometrical circles, and have 
 no difficulty in representing them approximately. 
 
 h. That rigorous and concise proof of the argument is 
 so brief that it is scarcely susceptible of being more than 
 superficially comprehended at first. Probably a million cor- 
 ollaries — implications — could be dug out of it with but casual 
 vision. Hence, in theory, and also according to my actual 
 experience in using it on some of the ablest thinkers, it 
 slightly dazes the reader at first. You can use it to gauge 
 your own mental capacity :- If on first reading it you get a 
 vague glimmer of what I am talking about, your mental pow- 
 er is as great as anybody s in the matter of soundness, integ- 
 rity, or keenness (although that will not perceptibly be a 
 measure of the endurance of that strength — the ability to 
 keep on using such a strong mind until you get, and not 
 merely aspire to, whatever you are after). If you want to 
 compare your mental strength with mine, you are informed 
 that I had to dig at that proposition for about two years be- 
 fore I got what might honestly be called a definite glimmer 
 — you probably have a keener mind than mine, but I have 
 
 considerable endurance. Incidentally, if anybody is 
 
 fond of brevity, and thinks that anything which is true can 
 be said very briefly, then here, in 29 words, is not only a 
 statement of this whole book, but also a rigorous proof of the 
 
§50h VII One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 a 
 
 truth of it and of a unification of all knowledge :- Any 
 perimeter is incommensurable with its average diameter. 
 Hence, if there are exact Jlnite parts it is impossible for that 
 
 Many to combine into a One; and vice versa. With 
 
 further reference to brevity, the title of the book, Universe, 
 is a condensation of the book into one word. The defect of 
 brevity is that it is not positive and intelligible. When we 
 say 'Brevity is the soul of wit," it is really meant that the 
 essential of language is given by Meaning — that brevity, in 
 the ultimate, is the One word ; and that it, like humor, 
 gives us a mild rebirth (§§162a, 84b) — that the equation is, 
 Humor... ^Brevity, or Wit, or the One. In that One sense 
 obviously brevity positively expresses nothing, but is relig- 
 ion. We must have a temperate amount of That. . . X This. . . 
 (of details) before we can expect to be understood. 
 
 §51. a. I shall now briefly summarize and prove all 
 the theory of language, using a somewhat different point of 
 view that gives some additional fine points, and also shows 
 that language itself is so flexible or changing or incapable of 
 being put into any absolutely rigid form or logic that it is 
 practically imperative that each person who is going to un- 
 derstand and use a valid logic achieve that understanding 
 and skill by experience of his own — getting in the end a valid 
 logic (a style) which although thus valid is formally a little 
 different from that used by any other person. Even the expres- 
 sion of the most rigorous mathematics can not validly be put 
 into an absolutely fixed mould or form : always judgment is 
 
 needed. Hence, we need to look at some of the fine 
 
 points of language ; and truistically the argument must be- 
 come complicated, and will for that reason require attention 
 if it is to be understood. This section is very hard reading. 
 If the reader is not an expert at mathematics, science, or 
 logic, or desirous of being one, he can perhaps most satisfac- 
 torily and usefully to himself merely scan the pages of it, 
 taking only what strikes his interest. 
 
 b. We made an agreement as to what words do, and 
 the formal agreement that we shall not say A=A and simul- 
 taneously A is not=A. We then observed, as a formal basis 
 of all language — or language mechanics, — that there are 
 three more or less distinct forms of words, which are analo- 
 gous to the three parts of the Trinity. The fundamental 
 truism concerning those three forms omits the use of one 
 form (the One), and is this:- if we are going to talk about 
 parts of the whole (as we tacitly agree to do when we use 
 language of any sort), then we must have (l) the names of 
 those parts (God the Sons), which must, as the truism, then 
 be joined into the whole [which One need not be explicitly 
 named] by (2) symbols or names which do join them togeth- 
 er (relationship words, or God the Holy Ghost). So far as 
 logical necessities of language go, we could verbally stop 
 there, with just those two forms of words — (l) and (2), — 
 and understand the unified meaning, but not say Meaning. 
 And we could consider that formally there were two reacting 
 parts (i. e., the Many words with the relationship words) — 
 a verbal dualism fundamental to all speech that is positive, 
 
 all doctrines, all machines. The reader may note 
 
 that I have shifted view point, and instead of taking a con- 
 crete view of the actual Many, with its parts reacting among 
 themselves, I am looking at language directly, and consider- 
 ing what I call the reaction on each other of its two sorts of 
 words that have been mentioned. I therefore truistically 
 consider that there is a verbal dualism (l)X(2), in place of 
 the That. . . X This. . . heretofore expressed (for explicit con- 
 sideration of that new form, see footnote h). That shift of 
 point of view of itself shows how very flexible our language 
 is, and how, if we formally omit some part, other words will 
 
 imply it (I have omitted mentioning any but one formal unit 
 of the Many:- naming only (l)). 
 
 c. So we have (2) verbally reacting with (l). But, to 
 obtain the previously mentioned convenience in jogging our 
 memories and attention (and probably as a vestige of prim- 
 eval language, in which there existed only One words, while 
 and before men were inventing the other parts of the lang- 
 uage machine), we all actually do go on to a tautological 
 process, and deliberately repeat what the primary necessity 
 in formal speech would and does do of itself; i. e., we use 
 (S) words or symbols which again assert — which now explic- 
 itly name — the whole or One which the other two forms have 
 already said or positively expressed, — these third, tautologi- 
 cal words being God the Father. It is that pure tautology 
 of (in a way) deliberately saying twice everything we have to 
 say, that has been the final "mystery" that for ages puzzled 
 the seers. We knew so well what that mystery was that we 
 exuberantly said it twice — which was most illogical by the 
 classical logic, which frowns so on exuberance that it has 
 almost killed our quite proper and correct commonsense in- 
 stinct to use two or a dozen negatives when we are sure we 
 mean no, and has produced the monstrosity, May I not?" 
 
 d. We may summarize what we have:- The form (i) 
 is parts of the verbally -split universe; the form (2) joins 
 those verbal splittings together again into the whole; the 
 form (S) tautologically names and thus repeats the whole. 
 Or, (l) used in connection with (2) is the whole or meaning, 
 and is also tautologically verbally equivalent to (S). We may 
 write that (l)X(2)=(S). 
 
 e. Obviously, (l) and (3) are logically or formally self- 
 contradictory. Also, (i) asserts a splitting, and (2) asserts 
 a rejoining, and those two ideas are in reality or meaning ab- 
 solutely self-contradictory ; or (l) and (2) produce or assert 
 nullity or zero in the sense that the things asserted by (l) 
 
 are not really split off or separated. Again it can be 
 
 noted that I am taking a different point of view, by explic- 
 itly considering as a form itself the contradiction introduced 
 by {S), and considering contradictions in both form and 
 meaning. As a matter of fact, we have started on an infinite 
 regress of logic itself (see P a r. h). It should also be definitely 
 noted that when I said the things asserted by (l) are not 
 really split off or separated,' we are using real merely as a 
 tacit verbal agreement:- for we could just as well have said 
 that the One (3) was not really connected. And it can 
 again (see §49g, etc.) be seen directly that by thus reversing 
 the agreement we produce no real changes in the conclusions 
 which we are going to derive, but merely reverse language 
 or the dictionary. 
 
 f. It is also obvious that (l) and (2) are formally totally 
 different or contradictory, being the two sorts of words which 
 are formally needed together to make an explicit or positively 
 expressed whole. Hence, when we use them together, as 
 (l)X(2), we have the fundamental lingual requirement of 
 the truism in par. b:- that we split the universe and then 
 join it. So that formal contradiction must inhere to make 
 the logic valid, as it balances and cancels the formal contra- 
 diction we started with. That finishes, from the present 
 point of view, with formal agreements (but see par. h for 
 extension of the point of view). 
 
 g. We then have the disagreements in meanings — (l) X 
 (2) being made up of parts, and (s) being really a whole. 
 But {1)X(2) is only formally made up of parts, because the 
 explicit meaning contradiction inheres only in (l), and is re- 
 moved or really contradicted by the (2). Consequently, 
 though there is a contradiction in meaning of the words we 
 use, the contradiction is destroyed as stated, and is not real 
 in language as a whole. Consequently, the whole equation 
 
*s 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VII §52e 
 
 (i)X (#)=(<?) is absolutely true, and must contain the double 
 contradiction — one of form and one of meaning. That 
 double contradiction also justifies, or formally necessitates, 
 from this point of view, the existing tautology. 
 
 h. But, language as a whole thus being without any act- 
 ual self-contradiction, it follows at once that we have now 
 really failed to use our requisite mechanical truism that was 
 started with in par. b :- that language must have reacting or 
 contradictory parts. 61h Hence, we start all over again with 
 pur equation, and consider the total single symbol '(l)X 
 (#)=(;?)' as being a standard whole that is now a Many, or 
 a new (l), which we may write ((l)) ; and then we construct 
 a new (#) and new (3), and put them together into an equa- 
 tion in order to get a positive assertion that is not ineffable. 
 In short, we now have to begin to duplicate language' or 
 logic itself, in order to get the intelligible expression or 
 equation that applies the truism. And obviously, it is an 
 infinite regress. When we do it infinitely (use up all time 
 and space — or, do what is practical, take time and space as 
 unreal), we achieve a logical and also a verbally complete lang- 
 uage, or an exact language. • I know it sounds queer, 
 
 and is hard to understand. Well; there are always some 
 men with minutely seeing minds (who as a compensating 
 characteristic usually fail to see wholes or commonsense very 
 well). They would find considerable fault with our original 
 general equation as first derived, because the equation was 
 substantially said to be finished or absolute. To say that, is 
 equivalent to our conclusion in par. g, that the form of equa- 
 tion there was absolutely true. It is true; but only when it 
 is seen that the infinite regress stated in this paragraph is 
 also implicitly contained in it, and considered formally com- 
 pleted in it. But the men who have trouble in seeing a 
 whole — usually the materialists— demand the details. So I 
 have explicated the infinite regress for them. They can now 
 follow it out in detail as far as they care to go (keep on 
 drawing in the actual smaller and smaller picture of the ad- 
 vertisement), and keep on until they are by actual experience 
 convinced that it will give an absolute whole. Obviously, 
 they can not honestly assert that it does not give a whole un- 
 til they have actually kept on infinitely on the regress, if it 
 does not sooner convince them that they have seen a whole. 
 So if they can't see, they are rigorously tied up to an experi- 
 mental occupation that will keep them occupied and quiet 
 forevermore, or allow them only obviously inconsistent talk. 
 
 §52. a. The last section, in making the flexibility of 
 language obvious, implied some definite facts which are set 
 down in this section somewhat at random. 
 
 b. We have seen more vividly that the same word may 
 be used in each of the three forms. Often, many meanings 
 that have been attached to some given word in the past may 
 be now nearly dead, but still slightly remain as implications 
 
 51h The reason I succeeded in making an intelligible or positively 
 expressed equation, instead of winding up with an equation or lang- 
 uage which, as just asserted, was without reacting parts or 'contra- 
 dictions,' and which hence was ineffable and unintelligible, is this:- 
 without saying anything definitely about it in par. b and d (where it 
 would have been confusing), I introduced into the equation the re- 
 lationship symbols X and =, which was equivalent to implicitly re- 
 dvplicating the three forms in infinite regress, or to implicit assertion 
 of this footnote. A simple description of that literally infinitely in- 
 volved statement is this:- in an advertisement which contains a 
 picture of a man holding a periodical on which pictured-periodical 
 again appears the same advertisement, it is obvious that to be 
 consistent the second picture must contain another picture of the 
 man holding the periodical on which again appears in still smaller 
 picture the same advertisement, and so on ad infinitum. That equa- 
 tion {l)X(%)=i s ) was the ori g ina l 'advertisement,' and it, so far as I 
 at first explicitly stated ought to have been (1) (2) (3)— an ineffable, 
 
 unintelligible language without contradiction, etc. See the 
 
 text for the further unwinding of that infinite involution. 
 
 — or implication-ghosts, so to speak. Words, like science, 
 can't be accurate or exact, and it is now quite obvious that 
 our formal separation of words into classes is itself just a con- 
 venient, arbitrary form which is inexact, and is subject, like 
 all Many things, to infinite regress. 
 
 c. We thus again see that we can not validly make any 
 sharp separations in the universe — not even of words into 
 classes, although words are obviously as arbitrary as any- 
 thing. And that fact will often serve as a useful 
 
 measure of the ability of men. If we observe a man insist- 
 ing on sharp distinctions" between any classes of actual 
 things, or insisting that his way of making classes (of judging 
 any Many proposition — or that in human affairs he knows 
 just how to separate the sheep and the goats) is essentially 
 right, we may at once safely decide that he is more or less 
 incompetent, and knows little of his subject. In this day, 
 that test is perhaps the most easily applied test of mental 
 competence. But of course the incompetent who is cock- 
 sure about quantitative problems will quickly discover what 
 yardstick we are using on him, and superficially avoid being 
 so obviously foolish. 
 
 d. Or we may express it, that a word used in a context 
 has fields" or implication-auras that stretch out and bind 
 the word continuously in meaning to the context, even if the 
 word does appear superficially to be printed separate. 
 Hence, words in use have the characteristic of other Many 
 things; just as there is no sharp This, but always This..., 
 so no word is sharply Word, but always Word. . . . Modern 
 physical theories have atoms with such fields" (§89, XI). 
 
 e. And we may observe that words are perhaps the 
 most highly specialized tool, or machine, or means of trans- 
 mitting force, that we have — meaning that it is possible to 
 control the extensiveness and intensity of the force, and 
 hence its results, more completely when we use the language 
 machine than when we use any other machine (e. g., than 
 when we use the skeletal levers and muscles behind a fist; 
 or apply them to shoot a gun). Words actually exert 
 force," just as explicitly and definitely as do molar bodies — 
 as do machine guns, a heaved brick, or an engine. The 
 words printed here (even if primarily considered as only so 
 much ink) consist of very energetic atoms that forcibly" 
 make very perceptible changes in your eyes and nervous 
 system. Considered more indirectly as directing your atten- 
 tion to certain things (and that is also what a 16-inch gun is 
 "for"), they act as a trigger — a slight starting or initiating 
 force — that may result in enormous force transmittal. The 
 advantage of words is that they can be devised to transmit 
 very accurately the kind and quantity of force (the modern 
 technical word of course is energy, but we may here continue 
 to use the ambiguous but more forcible popular force"), 
 which it is desired to transmit in order to effect a given pur- 
 pose. Truistically, the effectiveness of words depends, like 
 that of all other tools, upon the skill and strength and endur- 
 ance of the user (actually upon his whole personality ; cf. 
 §140e), and also upon the personality of the receiver. Every- 
 body except infants and marked defectives uses words — and 
 the infant really uses the primitive words (One ejaculations, 
 or cries), and makes up by emphasis some of what his words 
 lack in positiveness. The business man carries on much of 
 his business with words — often all of it, in a direct sense. 
 Bullets and clubs are obviously very crude tools for the ex- 
 ercise of force, as they are under very poor control and give 
 very uncertain results. The truth of that is rather well 
 recognized, as is proved by the fact that people who wish to 
 seem intelligent or even barely civilized invariably try to 
 show that the other side started the use of brute force — 
 i. e., poorly directed force. Of course, if militaristic persons 
 
§52e VII One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 46 
 
 of such inferior mentality start using brute force they 
 thereby definitely indicate that they are incapable of very 
 well understanding or using more efficient forces, and intelli- 
 gent people have to give them a sufficient dose of the 
 sort of force they do understand (§114e). A person who 
 is militaristic in "private" life — in affairs between individ- 
 uals rather than between societies and governments — is con- 
 ventionally called a blackguard or bully. Militarism is 
 merely wholesale blackguardism or bullying — and still exists 
 simply because it is a little harder to see the nature of a 
 reaction between many scattered people than it is to see the 
 nature of the same reaction between a few close together 
 "private" people, so that some persons of a low grade of 
 intelligence fail to see its blackguard character. 
 
 f. But ultimately words are a tool — a means ; — funda- 
 mentally a relationship, just as force' is ultimately a rela- 
 tionship (§88, etc.). Because they are so useful, we are 
 prone to mistake words for the actualities to which they 
 point us or join us. That is word idolatry — a mistaking of 
 formulas, systems, creeds, dogmas, books, for the One, 
 which is as silly as bowing down to and being afraid of a 
 golden calf as such — and a good deal more prevalent. 
 
 g. And finally, we may note that if we begin to state 
 our observations of words in detail, we have the collection of 
 conclusions that is called rhetoric. I give a minor example :- 
 Adjectives and adverbs are observably not very definitely 
 any one of the three kinds of words ; they are rather vaguely 
 Many words which supply some of the dots after This. . . . 
 Hence, because of that vagueness, when they are used they 
 subtract from the forcefulness or clear simplicity of what is 
 meant. Therefore, where force and rough-clarity is desired 
 adjectives and adverbs should be at a minimum. But where 
 explicitness and considerable accuracy is desirable — where 
 we have to be definite about some of the dots : display a 
 keener judgment, — adjectives and adverbs (and parenthetical 
 phrases somewhat equivalent) have to be used to some extent. 
 
 h. Rhetoric is commonly called an art, or an empirical 
 science- — meaning that no definite relationships or unity be- 
 tween the observed facts of it was easily perceptible. We 
 now see that the statement of the details of a valid logic be- 
 comes a connected, rational science that includes rhetoric. 
 Hence, the argument unifies logic and rhetoric; and the 
 facts of rhetoric serve as observations that verify the forego- 
 ing description of logic. A definitely scientific treatise on 
 
 rhetoric is omitted at this point. It is a historical 
 
 fact that centuries ago the name for general or unified know- 
 ledge was rhetoric or grammar. Apparently, men rather 
 consciously recognized then that in the mechanics of lang- 
 uage lay the solution of their puzzles. But the rhetoricians 
 failed to clarify the puzzles, started exploiting and became 
 idolaters of words, and fell into such disrepute that conven- 
 tional rhetoric" is still tainted with it, and their more hon- 
 est successors were known by a new name :- philosophers. 
 
 of our single surface ring, although I remember seeing a 
 statement that there was such a treatment. I have not gone 
 very far into the investigation of the figure— just far enough 
 to see the possibilities of unlimited application of the model, 
 which has been a geometrical curiosity for years, and is not 
 mentioned in the usual text, or "Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 
 A good popular description of single surface rings is given by 
 Hering in "Scientific American," Feb. 21, 1914. He also 
 gives a preliminary mathematical investigation of those rings 
 and some additional interesting facts in another article ( Sc. 
 Am. Supplement," Dec. 21, 1918, reprinted from "jour. 
 Franklin Inst.," Aug., Nov., 1918). 
 
 §54. a. The best way to comprehend this single surface 
 model is to make a rough one — which can be done in a min- 
 ute. It is such a surprising figure on first acquaintance that 
 only the actual model is likely to be easily intelligible. Take 
 a strip of paper (say) nearly a foot long and about an inch 
 wide. Lay flat. The strip has two surfaces (neglecting now 
 
 its thickness, and the conse- 
 quent very narrow surfaces 
 of the two side edges and 
 two end edges), which we 
 may term surface A and sur- 
 Hold one end of the strip flat, and lift the other 
 twist it — over (around 180 ), so that sur- 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. Mechanical model of language. 
 
 §53. a. In this chapter is discussed a mechanical model 
 of the forms of language. This model is a so-called single 
 surface ring, including its infinitely numerous variations from 
 what we may consider its regular form. This model is 
 capable of being directly used as the model, or mechanical 
 representation, of everything (§63i, Part Two). In this 
 chapter we confine ourselves to such few simple facts as are 
 needed to give a brief but rigorous description of the different 
 possible sorts of language and-or space {and time; cf. §150). 
 
 b. I am unable to find any full mathematical treatment 
 
 Fig. 54a. 
 
 face B 
 
 end and turn it 
 face A is up at one end and B up at the other, with the strip 
 twisted a half turn, as shown roughly in Fig. 54a. Then, 
 without further twisting the ends relatively to each other, 
 bring the two ends together to form a ring, and fasten the 
 ends together (preferably with glue; or with a pin). It is 
 then a rough single surface ring (unsymmetrical or warped 
 in some respects, as we shall see). A picture of a symmet- 
 rical ring (with appreciable thickness) is shown in Fig. 68c. 
 
 b. If you place a finger on any part of the surface, and 
 move it all around the surface, touching the surface, it will 
 then be on the surface that was originally opposed to the 
 surface you started on, although your finger never left the 
 continuous surface. I. e., if you started on surface A, after 
 your finger moves all around the ring it will be on surface B, 
 which is now a surface continuous with A, and not structur- 
 ally opposite. The reason for that is of course that the 180° 
 twist gradually turns the finger onto the "other side," and 
 the twist also permits the surfaces to be continuous when 
 fastened into a ring and the thickness neglected. 
 
 c. We may note some preliminary properties:- If with 
 a knife or scissors the ring be split in two in the direction of 
 its length (i. e., the original strip, ;/ it had been flat, as in 
 Fig. 54c, and not in a ring, would 
 
 Z Z^ 
 
 Zn 
 
 V 
 
 z' 
 
 Fig. 54c. 
 
 be cut along the dotted 
 line), then there results 
 a single ring; but this 
 new ring has a 360° 
 twist in it (a double 
 twist), and has two sur- 
 faces, and has twice the 
 length around. Then, 
 if that ring be similarly split, two rings result, interlinked or 
 beknotted with each other, and each with the same double 
 twist and length around as the double-twisted ring All 
 subsequent splittings result in adding one more interlinked 
 ring of the same length and the same double twist. But if 
 the single surface ring has an edge cut off (not 'splitting' the 
 ring so that the ends of the dotted line in Fig. 54 c would 
 come together if the strip had been in a ring), and we keep 
 on cutting around (twice) until we come to the place we 
 started from a narrower single surface ring than the original 
 is left, interlinked with a double surface ring of twice the 
 length, which is the edge that is cut off. 
 
4T 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VIII §56c 
 
 d. Let us now tentatively agree that a single surface 
 ring is a symbol of language, and hence a symbol of the uni- 
 verse. Or, we may call a symbol a model. Let us agree 
 that one surface of the original strip, say surface A, repre- 
 sents the One; and that surface B represents the Many. 
 And let us consider that the thickness of the ring is negligible 
 (for the time being), and that the ring joins together at or 
 in or as a geometrical line, instead of our having to lap 
 the ends over each other in order to glue or pin them con- 
 veniently. I. e., let one end of the original untwisted strip 
 as shown in Fig. 54c be ZI, and the other end l'Z'; then, 
 when we make the ring, Z joins to Z , and I to I , and we 
 have the single line ZI for a joint — it coinciding with Z I . 
 Finally, let us agree that the 180 twist represents relation- 
 ship. It then at once follows as truistic that neither surface 
 is, or defines," the ring, nor is the 180 twist the ring. But 
 the three togethei — Many surface, One surface, relationship 
 twist — completely define or express the ring. 
 
 e. In this paragraph I digress slightly from the direct 
 argument and show the nature of the infinite regress, and 
 also of a symbol. I said that the three parts completely 
 define or express the ring. Yet the three together are ob- 
 viously not really the ring. The ring itself is the actual 
 thing between the surface A and surface B, which thing is 
 twisted and is not the twist, and which we are taking now to 
 be of negligible thickness. We might say that the ring is 
 what or that which is between the two defined surfaces: the 
 geometrical surfaces are merely the limits of the ring, and 
 
 describe or de-fine it. In the same way, the universe is 
 what is described by our words. But if we are asked to state 
 verbally what that what' is, then all we can do is to begin 
 to divide the ring up and define it as the collection of parts 
 which are then given by surfaces which are closer and closer 
 to coinciding, and to being pure geometrical surfaces of zero 
 thickness. But sero thickness is not positive language, as 
 we agreed before; it is mysticism (also, that attempt to say 
 
 what,' may be observed to be truistically circular language 
 or logic). Hence, we can not, with positive language in our 
 finite lives, go absolutely to zero language and name all the 
 zero parts of the ring. We keep going closer and closer, in 
 infinite regress, towards that zero thickness, or really exact 
 quantitative intelligible meaning. And the symbols are those 
 Many steps, which use time and space. And obviously, 
 although all attempts to use language will clearly be of that 
 eternally formally self-contradictory nature (as a truism ; be- 
 cause the language formally and finitely is not the thing it 
 describes), the use of our concrete model gives us at once 
 the conclusion that we know what we mean, even with that 
 verbal regress which we can not actually finish. We know 
 about the ring by looking at it, observing it: we experience 
 its 'existence' (cf. §22); or really prove it (cf. §35) by see- 
 ing it. In a few words here I describe the ring — symbolize 
 it, or point to it intelligibly, and you know the ring — and I do 
 that without giving the infinite words of the regress. In- 
 stead of using an "infinite number" of words I have actually 
 used about 800 — and you not only "know" the ring in gen- 
 eral, but you have already seen a number of related things. 
 §55. a. When we take the surface B of the ring as 
 representing the Many, then we have arbitrarily agreed that 
 we shall divide it into parts, or the Many, and that each 
 part may be given a name — and must have a definite and 
 positive name when referred to. We may agree that instead 
 of naming the parts as various This s and That s, we can 
 give them the general sort of naming called numbering. 
 Suppose we divide surface B into parts by lines across it, 
 parallel to ZI (Fig. 54c). Then obviously each number may 
 be, conventionally, one of two things:- (l) it may be the 
 
 name of one of those lines ; or (2) it may be the name 
 of the part of surface B between one really geometrical or 
 zero line and the next. 
 
 b. Usually, the mathematicians and logicians seem to 
 mean that a number (and by implication, any name — but 
 they probably would not acknowledge the implication) refers 
 simply to one of those zero dividing lines — to a dividing 
 (which is actually zero; and "abstract"), and not to what is 
 considered divided). In that case it is obvious that regard- 
 less of how many actual or positive numbers we used in nam- 
 ing all the parts of the Many (of B), always there would be 
 the spaces left between those imaginary geometrical or inef- 
 fable zero lines or numbers, which spaces were the actual 
 things to be indicated. In short, by that rather conventional 
 practice, we have to name or number to a real infinity in or- 
 der to get that surface B actually verbally named ; and a real 
 infinity here obviously contradicts the nature of that conven- 
 tional numbering or Many — for real infinity means continu- 
 ous. Also, it is further obvious that this more conventional 
 way of naming or numbering the Many results in what is 
 practically an infinite regress (see §58d for the details, etc.). 
 
 c. If we take the second view — that the name or num- 
 ber refers to the space between one line and the next (e. g., 
 that 2 means the part of B between say ZiL and Z2I2), — it is 
 again obvious that there is nothing whatever which determines 
 or fixes how long {how much) that space is, or should be ; nor 
 how long the surface B (i. e., the whole of the Many) is. 
 I. e. , if the model ring is the universe, there is positively 
 nothing outside it, which serves as a standard or as a meas- 
 ure to determine the length of surface B (or its width, pro- 
 vided we divided B in other ways than by those parallel 
 lines). Consequently, it is glaringly obvious that there is 
 absolutely nothing which determines fundamentally what — 
 how much — a unit of the Many is. We take such a unit ar- 
 bitrarily, making it convenient. Also, it is equally obviously 
 a truism that there is absolutely no way of verbally stating 
 positively how much the universe is — of giving it positive 
 
 boundaries" (we see the nature of its 'boundaries" in Part 
 Two; Index, Difference surface"). For time and space 
 obviously do not apply to the whole universe or to the whole 
 model of it. Time and space are simply the arbitrary con- 
 ventions we use in dividing up the surface B:- for obviously, 
 we determined Z1I1, Z2I2. ..Z n I n ..., by saying the space or 
 length between, and tacitly took it that we required time 
 to go over the space (or to take the parts in a one by one 
 order, if we look at it that way). It therefore again follows 
 by this second point of view that we may name a part of the 
 ring anything we please (call it any measure) ; and that there 
 is an infinite regress of naming. There can be no exact 
 science for the simple reason that ultimately there is nothing 
 which serves as a fixed standard or center" by which we 
 may judge any exactness. As soon as we have this concrete 
 model before our eyes it is fairly easy to see directly that 
 those things are true. 
 
 §56. a. When we take the surface A as the One — as 
 God the Father, or monistically , — it is obvious that we con- 
 sider it undivided, or as being a whole, and thus take it into 
 our perceptions or consciousness at once — at one time. It is 
 one surface; a child can conceive or perceive that — he does, 
 in fact, and does it before he is able to divide it into the 
 Many, as we saw when observing a child count (§26). 
 
 b. This One surface as a model of the universe or One 
 is characterized chiefly by its simplicity (i. e., familiarity), 
 obviousness, and total lack of definiteness, 'positiveness,' and 
 properties. It simply is continuous, or One, or the whole. 
 
 c. Possibly the most important point of view to be taken 
 of the observable fact that the One surface as a model has 
 
§56c VIII One 
 
 absolutely no properties in any positive or definite sense, is 
 that the One is not determined or bounded in any way. 
 That is obviously a truism, and it clearly implies that time 
 and space does-do not apply to the One. There are no parts 
 of the One, considered apart (spacially "separated") from 
 the other parts, and hence comparable with them, the com- 
 parison being fundamentally a property. 
 
 §57. a. Relationship words are represented by the 180 
 twist. Obviously it is the existence of such a continuous 
 twist that maintains the ring as a continuous surface. We 
 have seen (§28h) that the chief characteristic of relationship 
 is that all relationship is that of identity. That may be 
 clearly seen from our model:- Suppose we hang the ring 
 over (say) the left forefinger held horizontally, placing the 
 left thumb on the upper surface of the ring; and then 
 pull the ring so that it slips around between the finger and 
 thumb. 'Both' surfaces finally rub on the thumb, without 
 the thumb's changing its space location: the 180 twist or 
 relationship simply travels in the down-hanging part of the 
 ring. The thumb obviously always bears identically the same 
 relationship to the total form of the ring, although it rubs 
 all of it in turn. (I. e., it does, assuming that the ring 
 represents the universe with nothing outside, which is the 
 same as assuming that the actual model ring is perfectly 
 homogeneous and flexible and acted upon by steady forces, 
 thus making it always hang in a constant loop — none of 
 which is true of the actual paper ring.) 
 
 b. It is to be emphasized that the last paragraph tacitly 
 assumed that the ring was symmetrical — which means 
 ultimately that space and time, as used to name its Many 
 aspect was unchanging (or agreed with the space" of or- 
 dinary geometry, called Euclidian). When that space and 
 time is not considered Euclidian, we have other aspects of 
 relationship (§§60-1, 66). We may observe here that sym- 
 metrical,' if applied to the One, or to the ring considered as 
 a One and without reference to the arbitrary Many naming 
 of surface B, means just the same as unsymmetrical. That 
 is obviously true, from this truism:- if the ring, as a total 
 universe or whole, hangs from the forefinger, then except for 
 its own arbitrary Many parts, there is nothing whatever by 
 which to determine or to state whether it is symmetrical 
 or not (whether its space" — which in that One aspect is not 
 "used" at all — is "straight" [i. e., Euclidian], or variously 
 "curved" or "warped" [i. e., non-Euclidian]; cf. §38); 
 hence, the twist then is always merely the whole 180 twist 
 {regardless of whether it be named 180 or not), and hence 
 is always as such absolutely identical as the same relationship 
 regardless of any sliding of the ring on the finger. We shall 
 see (beginning at §60) that those very simple considerations 
 (they are merely truisms, which are easily seen by observing 
 the model — as a mnemonic device), are fundamentally the 
 complete solutions of the modern verbal puzzles about non- 
 Euclidian space, whether parallels meet at infinity, 4-dimen- 
 sion or ra-dimension space, and the theory of relativity. So 
 this paragraph, obvious and trivial as it is just of itself, is 
 important. For some authoritative thinkers get their minds 
 into a soft foggy daze contemplating those puzzles — and all 
 the "evils" of the world result from such states of mind. 
 
 §58. a. Taking the ring as a whole, and as represent- 
 ing the three sorts of words, we see first that our three forms 
 of words actually are completely symbolized. The One and 
 the Many are formally contradictory in that the first is not 
 formally separated into parts and the second is. But the 
 ring shows that the two are really the same, and inseparably 
 continuous — that continuity being achieved by the identical 
 relationship or twist. 
 
 b. The next important thing is to note that it would be 
 
 UNIVERSE 48 
 
 impossible positively to express or symbolize » meaning (any 
 whole) unless we use some sort of arbitrary contrast (or a 
 self-contradiction — such as is given by considering B split 
 into Many parts) and subsequent identification of the con- 
 trast by a "relationship." The very nature of the matter 
 is a truism, as we have seen before in several ways, and noiv 
 have before our eyes in a concrete model. So a verbal repe- 
 tition is unnecessary. Many similar models and 
 
 many valid languages can be made, as is shown in detail in 
 this chapter. The foregoing is merely a statement of the 
 essential characteristic of all those models and languages. 
 And to repeat emphatically, the foregoing about contradic- 
 tion and subsequent identification refers to a positive lang- 
 uage. It is not essential that we use positive language: cows 
 do not, having merely a few One vocal ejaculations, and 
 cows therefore do not have our verbal puzzles. But cows 
 pay for that advantageous immunity by failing to have a very 
 useful, or "controllable," language tool. 
 
 c. And the final rather important thing we can see at 
 once from the whole model is a concrete illustration of the 
 sole logical rule that it is always self-contradictory nonsense 
 to confuse one sort of word with another sort (that confusion 
 being always equivalent to saying A=A and A is not=A). 
 We see the explicit details of that general rule, in terms of 
 our model, in the remainder of this section. A further ex- 
 tension of the rule, in details from other points of view, is 
 given in subsequent sections (§§59-66) about space and time 
 — that extension amounting to the general principles of 
 measurement or judgment that are in practice used by all 
 people in all their activity or living, regardless of whether 
 they are conscious of it or not. 
 
 d. If we make a ring of the strip in Fig. 54c we may 
 consider that ZI is the geometrical line from which we begin 
 to name or number the universe, and Z I the line limiting 
 the other end. By usual conventions, ZI is therefore 0, and 
 Z I is °° . Obviously, if we follow more or less conventional 
 mathematics and say that the line at the end of a space (or 
 part) is the number" (§55b), then ZI is not a number, but 
 is the beginning or limit of the first number, 1, of which 
 ZJi (and not ZI) would be the name or number. In brief, 
 ZI is a line not in the universe (the model universe), in the 
 same sense that Zili, etc., are in it. Consequently, even if 
 we are going to agree to name an abstraction such as a zero 
 line a number (it can be validly done ; but usually it is inad- 
 visable; doing so gets us into other puzzles mentioned in 
 par. f), it is impossible to say that ZI or is a number (or 
 that its coincident line Z I or » is a number) in the same 
 sense that Zili, Z n In, are numbers. 
 
 e. The simplest way to consider ZI is to take it posi- 
 tively that a number or name actually applies to the part that 
 is in the space between the lines. That actual part is ab- 
 stracted in the mathematicians' idea that a number names 
 just the line. The truth of the matter obviously is that if I 
 say just '2+3=5,' the sentence of itself is explicitly utterly 
 meaningless; and hence nobody can have the remotest idea 
 of whether it is true or untrue. In practice, we consider 
 that 2 and 3 and 5 imply "things." Therefore, if we act- 
 ually supply what mathematics abstracts (cf. next para- 
 graph) then each actual number must apply to a part of the 
 ring, and it is glaringly obvious that (or ZI) is not a num- 
 ber, there being no part or space on the ring to which it 
 applies. In precisely the same way, regardless of any other 
 consideration as to "numbers," Z'l' or » is also not a num- 
 ber, but the upper limit of numbers. The actual unit space 
 or part that just 'precedes' Z'l' obviously has a name that is 
 indefinitely large, but which, if we are rigorously explicit in 
 speech can not be «> or any fixed "last number." 
 
49 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VIII §59a 
 
 f. As the mathematicians actually imply the space be- 
 tween lines as being what it is the numbers name, regardless 
 of whether they say abstractly that a line — a zero part — is a 
 number, we need not use time and attention showing and 
 seeing in mathematically abstract language that °° or Z'l' is 
 also, by such language, truistically not a number. It is 
 broadly obvious that it could readily be done, by considering 
 that there is positively nothing which may be used as a 
 standard showing how many numbers there are in the uni- 
 verse, or in our model of it (also, see par. d). 
 
 g. When we explicitly consider that the strip in Fig. 
 54-c is made into a ring, then obviously ZI and Z'l' are co- 
 incident as ZI, the line-joint — butt-joint — of the ring; or 
 arid «> are coincident, and the joint may be called the zero- 
 infinity line. Clearly, therefore, it makes no difference in 
 which direction we name or number when we sum up and be- 
 gin dealing with the One; or, in an absolute sense "down" 
 and up," etc., are identical. (That matter of direction 
 repeatedly comes up hereafter; see especially §99b. The 
 essential point of it is that time and space are direction,' 
 and are arbitrary and simply disappear from the One or real 
 meaning, just as that line which is the beginning' and the 
 end of time and space or direction has really disappeared 
 
 in our model as a zero geometrical abstraction.) Also, 
 
 and °° are obviously logically identical — their lines" co- 
 incide. If we are on the Many surface of the ring, and pass 
 over that zero-infinity line, going in either direction, we are 
 then on the One surface; and vice versa. I. e., if at any 
 time in language we introduce a or an °° , or any of their 
 equivalents, we have by so doing shifted from the Many to 
 the One, or vice versa. 
 
 h. This paragraph is of slight practical importance, and 
 
 hence is condensed so much as to be hard to see. 
 
 The relationship words are obviously as a sum total reducible 
 to L and T; i. e., the 180 twist is itself actually a change 
 in direction (i. e., in space during a time). That is nothing 
 but an implication of our second member, M(varying with) 
 L 2 r -2 :- for that member says that M or the Many changes 
 as we pass over space during time. Consequently, it is ob- 
 vious that if we speak of that time or space as being a Many 
 part of the whole One (if we make a relationship word into 
 a Many word or into a One word), that change implies that 
 we have tacitly assumed the whole of the twist before we thus 
 change the form, and hence have formally passed over the 
 zero-infinity line by assumption. In short, it introduces a 
 or an =° , and if that is not provided for by the context, a 
 logical contradiction results. Hence, we may validly say 
 that we need only one rule in order to be absolutely consist- 
 ent logically :- do not introduce a or an °° without balanc- 
 ing the formal contradiction introduced (cf. §43). 
 
 i. The nature of the error of confusing relationship 
 words with others may be observed directly from our ring:- 
 Suppose that it be held, hanging down, with the One or A 
 surface up. Then the upper loop of the ring may be delib- 
 erately turned over on the finger (through 180 ) so that loc- 
 ally at the top the Many or B surface is now up. We may 
 call that process :- 'going over the edge of the ring. 
 Sometimes that additional twist put in the top loop of the act- 
 ual paper ring will simply 'run' itself out through the bottom 
 loop — traveling down through each side of the ring and 
 'mutually cancelling' itself at the bottom. But unless the 
 paper is rather elastic, that local turn-over at the top puts 
 in a twist of 180° on one side of the upper loop of the ring, 
 and a twist of 180° in the opposite sense on the other side — a 
 total additional twist for the whole ring of 360° ("arithmeti- 
 cally" it is 360°). And it is directly observable that the 
 whole effect, relative to getting onto the opposite surface 
 
 (getting from the One to the Many), is equivalent to sliding 
 the whole ring around once (as in §57a), bringing in the 
 original 180° relationship; for sliding the whole ring around 
 is 360° (or corresponds to the universe or » — or to and 
 0°). Now, going over the edge of the ring, to get from one 
 sort of words to another, is obviously equivalent to using a 
 relationship word as a Many word, or as a One word (or, to 
 put it negatively :- going over the edge ignores relationship). 
 And doing so, as we have seen, is equivalent logically to 
 introducing the whole relationship or 180 twist — or to pass- 
 ing once over the zero-infinity line. Hence, it is directly 
 obvious that all relationship is identical — is that twist. 
 
 j. It is further obvious from our ring that all valid logic 
 is circular logic — meaning specifically that it is continuous 
 logic, or expression that in the end comes back and closes 
 with itself — checks up, verifies with itself, concludes 
 with the truisms from which it formally started. We may 
 see directly from the model that the reason for all that is 
 that all valid reasoning must have a complete statement of 
 relationship, or a relationship which goes all around the ring 
 in order to go continuously from the One to the Many, or 
 vice versa. Only such a complete relationship is explicitly 
 a relationship of identity (as we saw, from a somewhat dif- 
 ferent point of view, in §57b). If we go over the edge of 
 the ring we clearly have not explicitly put in a complete rela- 
 tionship — which was in the last paragraph emphasized by 
 the concrete fact that a two-sided contradictory twist was 
 thus put into the ring. If we go over the edge, we say 
 A=A (that A is, say, a Many unit), and then simultaneously 
 (on the other surface) we say A is not=A (that A is the One) ; 
 obviously, A i? ultimately the One, but the way to get it ex- 
 pressed as the One is not to talk fast and loose that way, 
 but to follow our agreements and go through all time and 
 space, identifying it with all others of the Many — that being 
 equivalent to sliding the ring around. Get-rich-quick schemes 
 won't really work, even with mere words. 
 
 k. All that of coiirse is rather confusing at first. The 
 model helps to make it concrete, and gradually clears up the 
 confusion. The actual difficulty lies in the fact that although 
 time and space are primarily used to express relationship, 
 we often use them as the other two sorts without noticing 
 the differences. I merely show how the change from one 
 form to another must be explicitly made. We can acquire 
 such conscious skill in the use of words only gradually: for 
 familiar affairs we instinctively have that skill, but we get 
 confused in less familiar affairs — to the extent of agnosticism. 
 
 1. The model, besides serving to help us consciously 
 avoid the customary confusions of the three sorts of words, 
 gives a clear insight into the solution of What is real? or 
 What is truth? Taking it in terms of the Trinity, we see at 
 once that neither (l) the God the Father or One surface A, 
 nor (2) God the Sons or Many surface B, nor yet (3) the 
 God the Holy Ghost or relationship twist, is itself (regarded 
 separately) the ring or reality." Nor is any combination 
 of any two of those the ring or truth," or the universe. 
 Obviously, only the three together are real or true. Conse- 
 quently, the valid or dynamic logic (§49jl) which takes it 
 that each part, as it comes up, is real, simply means that one 
 part, if it is intelligible, implies the other two. Hence, the 
 dynamic or everyday logic is shown to be ultimately true. 
 
 §59. a. We may now see, by this model, just why there 
 are three dimensions of space, and not some other number 
 of dimensions. Our final conclusion is going to be this 
 simple one :- we have devised (invented ; agreed upon — per- 
 haps mostly unconsciously in the past) for everyday use the 
 language with the fewest possible forms or dimensions that 
 
§S9a VIII One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 50 
 
 could still be positive or explicit; three-dimension space 
 contains the fewest number of dimensions out of the infinite 
 regress V° T ~ co that oould explicitly be so. In get- 
 ting that conclusion we shall see that an unlimited series of 
 other sorts of languages is possible (cf. §38a; and as indi- 
 cated before, English, French, etc., are different lang- 
 uages merely in having somewhat different vocabularies ; 
 formally or logically they are the same). This investigation 
 of the number of dimensions of space is obviously a quantita- 
 tive one. There is no absolute necessity about using three 
 dimensions: there is no absolute necessity that we use lang- 
 uage, or any space. Three dimensions are necessary 
 only if we are to talk in the easiest, shortest, or simplest 
 way. It is a fundamental law that we do act in the path of 
 least resistance (with ultimate accuracy :- in the path of no 
 resistance; §§98m, 104). Consequently, acting according 
 to that law with more or less consciousness or explicitness, 
 everybody takes it for granted that we are going to use the 
 simplest language. So the reader need not fear that I am 
 going to inflict any new dimensions of space and-or time on 
 him. I am going to show that those who try to do it, and 
 those who try to assert the reality of other kinds of space 
 [or time] (such as the "two" non-Euclidian spaces, and the 
 variable space of the relativitists), are implying different 
 languages — and are usually failing to completely formulate 
 and use those other languages, but merely indicate implicitly 
 their possibility. So of course, as a truism, their different 
 sorts of space and time are not intelligible when expressed 
 in ordinary terms of everyday language : such spaces logic- 
 ally contradict that everyday language (assert that they be- 
 long in other, different languages). In order really 
 
 to understand our language, and use it without making verb- 
 al puzzles for ourselves, we need to understand how to make 
 those other, different languages. At the same time we thus 
 protect ourselves from ever taking seriously, or being puz- 
 zled by, the introduction into our language of such contra- 
 dictions of it, when taken as belonging in our language, as 
 4-dimension space, etc., which by no means whatever ex- 
 press any idea in our language. We are not familiar with 
 those other languages, of course; so my description of them 
 will truistically be a bit novel and strange — even to the 
 mathematicians whose familiarity extends mostly to views 
 that aren t so. Unless the reader is a professional scientist, 
 philosopher, or mathematician, or intends to become one, he 
 does not need to grasp especially well the details of the rest 
 of this chapter. If he merely reads it casually he can get 
 all that interests him. 
 
 b. The model ring is, as a model, considered to be a 
 standard universe; i. e., we use it as a universe, neglecting 
 the remainder of the universe; it is, so to speak, abstracted 
 from everything else, and is, in that abstract condition, for 
 the moment, the whole universe logically. Consequently, 
 every standard universe is obviously an abstraction. When 
 we are talking, and using the valid dynamic logic, consider- 
 ing each sort of word temporarily real, that reality is an 
 abstraction — for the whole reality comes only of actually sup- 
 plying the other two forms. Hence, we see that any use of 
 language, or of any sort of symbol or model, involves a tacit 
 temporary abstraction. That is equivalent merely to the 
 quite obvious fact that we can not say everything at once. Con- 
 sequently, we shall carry the idea abstraction, with reference 
 to our model, to the end, and see what we get. After that, 
 we add everything to it, and get surprising conclusions. 
 
 c. We have been considering the ring to be of negligible 
 thickness. If it has zero thickness obviously the two 
 surfaces are coincident (as well as being continuous). If the 
 surfaces are thus absolutely coincident, it is obviously verbally 
 
 contradictory (or nonsense) to say that there are two sides. 
 But the fact is that it is nonsense to say that there is any 
 such thing as a geometrical surface ; for such a surface is 
 what is left of (say) a cube when the cube is wholly removed ; 
 obviously, nothing is left. Consequently, it is obviously sen- 
 sible (as the cancellation of two nonsenses) to say that there 
 is an upper surface A and a lower surface B of the ring when 
 
 it is an abstract geometrical surface. Please keep 
 
 those apparent trivialities slightly in mind for a moment. 
 
 d. This model ring has been tacitly taken to have some 
 breadth. The one we made was casually said to be about an 
 inch wide (§54a). It is obvious that the 180° twist (the es- 
 sential relationship that establishes ultimate continuity of 
 the two surfaces) requires that the tacitly accepted breadth 
 be warped some. Now suppose that we make the ring still 
 more abstract than the mere geometrical surface, and thus 
 take it to be a line, without that breadth. We may consider 
 that line to have the surfaces A and B, and to have the 180° 
 twist (and the line in taking that twist would obviously have 
 no warp). It clearly is formally explicit and cancelling of 
 zeros, to have that line with two surfaces, and hence be thus 
 
 twistable' : see last paragraph. 
 
 e. Therefore, we now have it, in considerable abstrac- 
 tion, that the universe may be completely represented, in a 
 positive way, by a point, of no dimensions, (l) moving in a 
 line, and (2) turning or revolving so as to form a closed ring, 
 and at the same time while describing its closed path, (3) ro- 
 tating or twisting 180°, so that its original side A joins in 
 formal continuity the originally opposite side B. In that 
 somewhat abstract model, obviously we need make no real 
 demands, or have any real necessities, as to time and space :- 
 for the length or space of the point is zero, non-existent, or 
 not real; the length or space of the closed path may Retaken 
 as zero, and the time of that revolution hence zero; and then 
 obviously as a further truism the rotation vvill require zero 
 space and time. In short, making the closed path of no length, 
 the ring has become a completely abstract, or zero, point — 
 although still formally or logically a ring, and hence repre- 
 senting formally the three parts of the Trinity. The model 
 contains no "actual quantity" of space and time ; but it does 
 contain the forms of space and time, as we see in the next 
 paragraph. It is obvious that our model, and with it the 
 formal requirements of language, is here reduced to the very 
 "lowest terms." Any further reduction in the form will 
 destroy formal language and give some incomplete language 
 described in §62c. (We have already subtracted the total 
 substance, or Many actuality— and also the One reality, in 
 our everyday usage of considering the One "infinite", 'al- 
 though in a Buddhistic sense of zero reality, and also obvi- 
 ously in strict logical technicality, One reality remains.) 
 
 f. (l) It is obvious that as the point moves in the zero line 
 path it formally does one thing (i. e., that doing or moving in 
 a line constitutes "one dimension" of "space"— really con- 
 stitutes "one dimension" or 'one formal part' of the One, 
 or of whole reality or the complete ring [see §581], or of be- 
 ing, or existence). (2) When it revolves so as to close on its 
 path and make the path continuous or the One it formally 
 does the second thing (and that revolving constitutes one 
 more ^dimension of space," giving now "two dimen- 
 sions. (3) And when it rotates or twists so as to relate those 
 hrst two contradictory forms, it does the third, and obviously 
 last, formally necessary thing (and that is one more "dimen- 
 sion, making finally "three dimensions"). Obvi- 
 ously, no fewer forms will serve. Equally clearly, if any 
 other is added we have taken at least one step on the infinite 
 regress of possible languages (§5 lh), and we then have not 
 our everyday language, but have a language that is at least 
 
51 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VIII §60c 
 
 duplicate, and hence formally different from ours. Those 
 three forms are the three dimensions of space" (for obvi- 
 ously each form was a needed sort of motion" in a hence 
 formally different aspect of space" — i. e., motion and space 
 are formally or logically synonyms). Clearly those three 
 constitute the lowest practical and still positive reduction of 
 the infinite regress MLT~°°, where Mis the "thing" or 
 that point. The whole of Part Two may be considered (al- 
 though explicitly it is nothing of the sort) to be a description 
 of a point moving in a closed path in that way (§§98m, 104). 
 g. In no case in the last two paragraphs need the formal 
 model occupy actual space," in our everyday usage of 
 space. We have actually been using the Buddhistic 'nega- 
 tive' form of zero-space : for a primitive or original state- 
 ment, such a form is easier to grasp — and for that same 
 general reason or truism, Buddhism historically preceded 
 Christianity, its equivalent in infinite" or positive' terms, 
 by five centuries, it taking the race that long to grow the 
 few needed nerve connections. So we may now consider 
 the ring (which is still our zero point) to 'depart' from that 
 condition, and acquire some room" or space for the M (now 
 also become actual") to move in. The only logical way 
 to get those zeros or abstractions into positiveness, or into 
 the other aspect of the One (the infinity aspect) is to multi- 
 ply them by infinity. We then have a solid" ring, still 
 indeterminate (i. e., °°) as to the measure of all the space, 
 but containing space and time in usual meaning — though 
 they are obviously merely the same verbal forms as before. 
 Or, the ring now has real" length and breadth (and real 
 but negligible thickness — see §63f for explicit consideration 
 of thickness), and we have the usual conventional but arbi- 
 trary space :- for obviously, in our usual convention of an 
 infinite One, we now have in our model that represents the 
 universe a "length" (etc.) that is infinite" (i. e., continu- 
 ous), and the three forms occur just as before, in, or as, 
 
 3-dimension space — a truism. That is the total 
 
 mystery" of the three dimensions of space. We are so in 
 the habit of using those briefest, simplest means of talking 
 that all parts of our language imply those three dimensions 
 or forms. So when we speak our language, it is a contra- 
 diction — utter verbal nonsense — to say that there is any 
 other number of dimensions : for such an assertion says that 
 "now another language will be talked while we still talk our 
 ordinary one." It can be noted that as soon as I explicitly 
 made the ring of no thickness (of two dimensions) in par. c, 
 I abandoned our ordinary language, and was talking nonsense 
 with reference to our language and said so (even though the 
 language I was using is the language of plane geometry, 
 and quite conventional). And when I reduced to zero di- 
 mensions I was very nonsensical. So I had to balance or 
 pair off those contradictions to our everyday language, and 
 do it explicitly to be intelligible; and that obviously consisted 
 of really stating our forms (which are the real three dimen- 
 sions"), and thus actually talking of three forms of zero 
 space — or, I reversed language into Buddhism, that being 
 
 the reverse of the truism mentioned above. Hence, 
 
 with those evident truisms, the foregoing proof of the exist- 
 ence and meaning of three dimensions is quite rigorous. 
 That proof is, I think, the hardest thing to state and under- 
 stand, in this book. That is because it is so obvious. Or- 
 dinarily, we simply say that we "see" that we have to use 
 three dimensions to talk about things definitely. And that 
 is substantially all I have said above — only I stated it in de- 
 tail from a different point of view, so that it was possible to 
 see definitely that the matter of dimensions was simply get- 
 ting the fewest parts in a language machine, just as there are 
 three parts in the "simplest" machine, the lever:- load, 
 
 power, fulcrum. Also, the foregoing argument is much 
 easier to see in §62e, where concrete examples are given of 
 languages having other than three dimensions. 
 
 §60. a. When we start to describe the universe, we 
 take it that there is something (whatever it is) to talk about 
 (§22). When we similarly 'assume' (i. e. , agree to invent) 
 our ring model, obviously we in the same way, all in a lump 
 take the three sorts of words as being definitely bound to- 
 gether. I introduced no complications, but took the barest 
 agreements :- a contradictory One and Many reconciled by 
 a single or identical' relationship or invariable twist. We 
 saw in §57b that in absolute or One meaning (taking the ring 
 as a whole, as we must do to get any final intelligible mean- 
 ing) that relationship between the One and the Many could 
 be only of one sort, regardless of whether the ring was sym- 
 metrical or asymmetrical. (That is merely a special case of 
 the principle that the One is ineffable.) We also agreed (in 
 §57) that we would consider the actual ring to be perfectly 
 symmetrical, as the means of getting our ordinary language. 
 In this section we see the formal changes in language if we 
 regard the model as being unsymmetrical in various ways. 
 There are an indefinite number of quantitative ways in which 
 it can be asymmetrical, each of which gives a different./brmaZ 
 language, although every such language means the same as 
 a whole. Those changes in form are conventionally said to 
 be different sorts of space" — curved" or non-Euclidian. 
 
 b. We considered the ring to be symmetrical because 
 that gave the simplest, average sort of language; i. e.,if we 
 take any part of the ring, or unit of the Many, such as 
 Zili— Z2I2, we may name it 2, and then — if the ring stays sym- 
 metrical, — regardless of the relative position of 2 (regardless 
 of how we slip the ring around when hanging over the finger 
 and thus changing the place of 2 — regardless of where 2 is 
 in the universe) that 2 remains formally or lingually the same ; 
 its relationships or L and T, with respect to the whole ring 
 stay steady, or are average all the time formally; or the de- 
 gree of twist and warp does not change. But if the ring is not 
 considered symmetrical that part is obviously not warped in 
 an average way (so that it does not take a proportionally av- 
 erage share of the whole 180 twist); consequently, if we 
 write for 2 its full general name M(varying with)L 2 T~ 2 , the 
 L and T of its name are always varying or varied just in mere 
 form. The reader possibly can not yet grasp that condensed 
 statement — can not see just what happens to language when 
 the form of the language, or what we have called relation- 
 ships or L and T measures of units of the Many, (l) varies 
 all the time, or (2) departs or is varied from the average in 
 Euclidian space, and hence, for a given non-Euclidian space, 
 has a "steady curvature." The relativitists make L and 
 T always vary — technically over all quantitative degrees of 
 non-Euclidian and the average Euclidian spaces (§66). And 
 as neither the relativitists nor non-Euclidians grasp the ulti- 
 mate meaning of what they do to L and T there is in exist- 
 ence considerable strange, weird, esoteric doctrine which 
 tends to have the same hypnotically benumbing effect upon 
 the brains of the authors and some of their hearers that the 
 logically precisely analogous weirdly nonsensical incantations 
 of ancient medicine men or priests had on themselves and 
 most of their hearers. Both tend to superstition — fear of 
 the fancied unknown. Such hypnotic deadening or fear in 
 some degree precludes seeing things as they are, and hence 
 prevents men from being as alive as possible. So it is of value 
 to investigate those possible variations in language, espec- 
 ially as doing so further shows possibilities which may be of 
 some use. For those languages are not wrong." 
 
 c. Some mathematicians substantially claim that there 
 is no proof' ' that our ring can ever be symmetrical in any 
 
§60c VIII One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 portion; so that if we use Many words the same words (or 
 forms) because of such lack of proof, by the theory of proba- 
 bilities constantly mean something else, and that therefore 
 if we use relationship words there is no continuous identity 
 of relationship anywhere (i. e., in any finite space and time 
 — meaning that those mathematicians assert ignorance as to 
 the sum total of relationship). Again such a general con- 
 densation is possibly not quite clear to the reader. The 
 statement is equivalent to the orthodox claim that there is 
 no "proof" of one of Euclid's "axioms" or postulates (but 
 ought to be, if it is used) :- Euclid defines parallel lines as 
 straight lines which, being in the same plane and produced 
 indefinitely in both directions, do not meet. And the postu- 
 late, in common form, is :- through a given point not on a 
 straight line, one straight line, and but one, can be drawn 
 which is parallel to the given line [i give the proof of that 
 postulate in par. i]. The mathematicians say that in the ab- 
 sence of ' proof" of that postulate, there are two general 
 sorts of possibilities :- (l) It can be assumed that every 
 straight line through the point [and in the same plane, of 
 course] will cut the other line. That gives Riemannian or 
 "elliptic" space — Riemannian "geometry" [or really a new 
 space language]. It is equivalent to saying that our bound- 
 aries Z]Ir~ Z2I2 of 2' vary in such a way as regards their 
 distance apart that the L (and T) between Z1I1 and Z2I2 at 
 some point becomes absolutely zero — or any such word or 
 possibility of such word as 2 disappears : we shall not exam- 
 ine the details of the new language that results; in general, 
 the Many word '2,' or M in M(varying with)L?T~ 2 , would 
 vary in a way not conceived in our average language. (2) Or, 
 it can be considered that two lines (including some angle 
 between themselves which can contain an infinite number of 
 other lines) can be drawn which are both ' parallel" to the 
 given line, in that they do not meet it, so that those 
 two lines form the limits of the infinite number of other 
 lines lying between them that also do not cut the 
 given line. That is Lobatchevskian or hyperbolic" space 
 and geometry. It says that in our 2' or M represented by 
 Z1I1-Z2I2, Z2I2 may be two intersecting lines which do not 
 ever cut Z1I1, so that there are really an infinite number of 
 parts or M s all of which are named 2. Well; we can make 
 a language of that sort if we like ; again I shall not go into 
 the details, but below we see the general implications as to 
 
 such new languages. The Euclidian or ordinary 
 
 geometry considers space as flat" or straight" or average 
 (i. e., there is one set of two parallel Zl's which formally 
 fix the 2 with a steady or fixed or straight" — i. e., undevi- 
 ating — space, or really form) ; the other two sorts have 
 
 curved space — i. e., are two languages where the forms 
 or ways of naming depart or deviate from the average : one 
 on either side of the average. For a somewhat technical 
 orthodox account of such spaces see Ency. Brit.," xi, 724 
 to 735 (in Art. Geometry) ; or for a good popular account, 
 see "Science History of the Universe" (New York, 1909), 
 viii, 143-52 (in the same volume is a more technical account 
 — pp. 230-36 — by Key ser, a leading mathematician). Those 
 accounts are not really intelligible unless something be 
 added to them (as we shall see). Consequently the reader 
 need not worry if he has failed to understand the condensa- 
 tions of them which I made in the first part of this paragraph. 
 We shall now begin with the fundamental orthodox assertions 
 about those curved spaces, and get at their real meaning. 
 
 d. The same Art. "Geometry" (pp. 730, 733) states 
 that there is an unreconciled controversy about space, it be- 
 ing shown substantially (on p. 730) that space is considered 
 (l) as the One, (2) as the Many (i. e., in the paragraph 
 
 Axioms' :- a space known only from experience" — as 
 
 contrasted with "a priori" or One space — is obviously a 
 Many word), and (3) as relationship. [it therefore follows 
 that orthodox geometry would tend to mix the three forms of 
 space — not meeting the fundamental logical necessity of 
 distinguishing apart the three : it does rather mix them 
 in the article I am quoting from.] Then it is shown that a 
 valid geometry [or what we have been calling a valid logic 
 or language machine] is merely one that is self-consistent, 
 regardless of what arbitrary agreements are made. And two 
 general sorts of valid geometry are distinguished:- (l) In 
 projective geometry any two straight lines in a plane inter- 
 sect, and the straight lines are closed series which return 
 into themselves, like the circumference of a circle" [i. e., a 
 "straight" line is a string or series of points that have a 
 closed path: that is Riemannian or elliptic geometry]. 
 (2) "in descriptive geometry two straight lines in a plane 
 do not necessarily intersect, and a straight line is an 
 open series without beginning or end. Ordinary Euclid- 
 ian geometry is a descriptive geometry : it becomes a pro- 
 jective geometry when the so-called 'points-at-infinity' are 
 added." [That is Lobatchevskian or hyperbolic geometry; 
 and it is more rigorous to say instead of that, that Euclidian 
 geometry is the average geometry that is the limit of (l) and 
 (2) — the geometry that lies just between the two.] 
 
 e. We now come to the illuminating facts regarding 
 those orthodox sorts of geometries — still quoting from the 
 same place :- Projective geometry is developed from two 
 undefined fundamental ideas, namely, that of a point' and 
 that of a 'straight line.' ' Descriptive geometry is devel- 
 oped from two undefined fundamental ideas, namely, of 
 points and segments. A segment is a part of a straight 
 line, the development of which into an [unlimited] straight 
 line can be provided for. 
 
 f. It is obvious from an examination of those two orthodox 
 beginnings of formal language or geometry," that those 
 geometries start by taking (l) a typical One (i. e., taking a 
 line, which is considered and more or less described as a 
 continuous idea" or whole), and (2) a typical Many (i. e., 
 a point). It is then obvious that the two are formally con- 
 tradictory ; and that they are also two abstractions that 
 imply essentially (2) zero (a point is 0), and (l) infinity (a 
 line, as an indefinite series of points, is °°). Hence, rela- 
 tionship terms obviously (as a truism) must be explicitly 
 introduced in order to reconcile that formal orthodox contra- 
 diction — which the orthodox theory does then vaguely intro- 
 duce, as space-passed-over-during-time. But then it is 
 obvious further, even to the orthodox theory, that in those 
 and » fundamental ideas" there is nothing whatever posi- 
 tive (or explicitly agreed upon) by which we may say whether 
 space (during, or and, time) is a 'steady' term — an 'identi- 
 cal' term. So very clearly, consistently with itself, that 
 space is itself forced to take upon itself in addition to its rela- 
 tionship capacity, the further capacity of an explicit or positive 
 Many word (for obviously the formal or "fundamental" 
 Many word "point" was not positively a. Many word, but 
 merely an ineffable word zero). Therefore, in such orthodox 
 geometry space (and time — time is always implied by space — 
 §150, as I shall take for granted will be understood by the 
 reader) takes a double meaning, and when used in our average 
 language in one of those meanings (the Many meaning) must 
 take on variability (for bodies or units of the Many do vary), 
 while in the other meaning (the relationship meaning) it 
 would be steady, or 'identical' as a form in language. The 
 mathematicians perhaps see that in the actual, observable 
 world space" as an M or a Many body does vary (i do not 
 venture to say positively what, in their confusion, they do 
 see). At any rate, as there is orthodoxly no agreement (nor 
 
53 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VIII §60i 
 
 really any essential necessity) to make space in its second 
 capacity as a relationship formally or verbally steady (except 
 that the sum total or One is always identical, so that steady 
 space is simpler: cf. §38a), the mathematicians let their space 
 (including both formal meanings, so far as I can judge from 
 what they say) vary, and as a result we have the two sorts 
 of non-Euclidian space (in addition to the average Euclidian 
 space lying as a limit between the two), in one of which the 
 unit of L in a sense varies in one direction from the aver- 
 age, and in the other sort in the opposite' direction. 
 
 That of course would get them into difficulties with actual 
 M s, which are cyclic, or vary about a mean in both direc- 
 tions: but the mathematicians do not go on and finish formu- 
 lating their languages, so apparently do not notice such 
 practical difficulties. Neither do I finish those new lang- 
 uages, as we have no present use for them; but I indicate 
 the general results of using them — some valuable. 
 
 g. There is obviously no logical reason why those two 
 different geometries or space" should not be used if de- 
 sired. They are self-consistent — even with space implying 
 that duplex -meaning, one of which orthodox mathematics 
 fails to express definitely, so that it has an unreconciled con- 
 troversy. But there still remains one omission in the fore- 
 going statement of those orthodox geometries (I think that 
 orthodox mathematics vaguely supplies this one just as I do 
 below; but that duplex-meaning of its space confuses its 
 statements so much that it is not safe to make any definite 
 assertion as to what it does say) :- that variation of L as yet 
 has nothing to fix its measure in any given language or geome- 
 try : i. e., L can be continually variable, as in relativity; or 
 its curvature can be definite and steady for a given language. 
 
 The only possible way to catch those varying 
 
 languages and pin any one of them down so that we can use 
 it positively whenever we wish to talk among ourselves and 
 hence know that we are using at least approximately the 
 same sort of language (are all referring to the same sort of 
 space, that hence has approximately the same measure of 
 curvature")) is to revert to our ordinary average Euclidian 
 space for a basis or standard or center or verbal potential 
 of such measure. In that Euclidian language we arbitrarily 
 say that we will take (say) ourselves (we could take anything 
 else, but usually do not) as a standard universe, or a unit of 
 measure or quantity, as a sort of average, in spite of the fact 
 that we are not all in or at the same L (which introduces 
 
 minor quantitative error or inexact science). In 
 
 short, the non-Euclidian space, strictly as such, has no pos- 
 sible means of mutually indicating a quantity. And the logi- 
 cal truisms or reasons why we must revert to Euclidian space 
 in order actually to talk together, are these :- Euclidian space, 
 in terms of those infinite possible formal spaces that are 
 quantitatively different as to degree of curvature, is the space 
 whose radius is infinity, and whose curvature is hence zero; 
 consequently, we have a formal and » to balance with 
 and cancel the point and °° line with which those spaces 
 formally orthodoxly started (par. e) : the two nonsensical 
 abstractions are cancelled into sense by two opposite non- 
 senses, and we have ordinary space which omits including 
 in itself the Many sense, and requires that some definite 
 Many or quantity standard be used, there being no longer 
 any formal possibility of using the sliding scale. Therefore, 
 it follows that although an indefinite number of languages 
 are validly possible in terms of, or as, non-Euclidian space, 
 each of those languages, in order to become positive (i. e., 
 in order to have, say, any valid right to use our average lang- 
 uage word "curved," as they all do, although the word then 
 in those languages has no such meaning as "curved" — that 
 being a truism), or in order to be anything other than a form- 
 
 ally valid mysticism absolutely incapable of explicit communi- 
 cation, must be translated into Euclidian space (cf. §66). 
 
 h. Because our standard quantities in Euclidian space 
 are arbitrary, it of course follows that in an absolute sense 
 they are not verbally communicable from one person to 
 another. That is a mere truism. But as Euclidian space is 
 the average of all possible actual or factual quantitative varia- 
 tions, by using it we theoretically achieve an average quanti- 
 tative error in understanding each other that in the long run 
 cancels into zero. Also, by using that average space, and 
 asserting what is the fact about it (that there can be no 
 quantitative accuracy — no exact science), we obviously 
 achieve absolute qualitative consistency. In short, the in- 
 telligible complete translation of what the mathematicians 
 mean by non-Euclidian space is this :- there is no exact science. 
 
 i. It therefore follows as a truism that the reason 
 Euclid's postulate about parallels can not be absolutely 
 proved" in the classical logic sense (which is irrelevant any- 
 way: cf. §85), is because it is a tacit arbitrary agreement 
 that we shall select some part of the Many as a standard 
 quantity. It is not a postulate, proposition, or real assump- 
 tion at all, but our agreement (§22) to say formally that 
 A=A, and to keep on asserting that formally A remains A or 
 A r=L A, even while recognizing that any actual A, such as a 
 metal bar, keeps on perceptibly changing: obviously only if 
 we have that fixed' form A is it intelligible to say that the 
 
 actual A changes. ■ It happens that Euclid s way of 
 
 saying that the formal quantity is agreed not to change in- 
 volves the term infinity. I. e., he in effect said:- parallels 
 are the same quantity (or part of the Many) distant from each 
 other here (at distance) and everywhere else even at infinity 
 (at «> distance); or, A=A every -where, which is the same 
 as saying in §22 that A=A every-time (§§150-l). As the 
 mathematicians rather habitually use that term °° in two 
 different senses, naturally a direct confusion arose, and it 
 was irrelevantly held that the agreement was unprovable. 
 But Euclid's postulate is however obviously validly provable 
 (i. e., can be shown to be a truism: §35) as soon as we stop 
 using the same word confusedly in two senses. It is an 
 agreement (an arbitrary verbal truistic invention), and hence 
 not absolutely provable in the sense of §35. But it is prov- 
 able in the same sense that any of geometry is:- I. e., the 
 postulate is precisely the same sort of proposition as the the- 
 orem that from a point not in a straight line a perpendicular 
 to that line can be drawn, and but one. For in that theorem 
 the perpendicular is the distance or Many quantity from the 
 point to the line. Because the perpendicular is here (at pre- 
 sumably a formally distance from us), it is held to be always 
 of the same length. But obviously, in fact, it is not at ex- 
 actly the same distance from each of us, nor at zero distance 
 from us in any given case (for we do not in any Many sense 
 coincide with a "perpendicular"); we are the differently 
 located observers of the case. Consequently, if that perpen- 
 dicular distance varies any when changing its distance from 
 absolutely here (0 distance) to any distance away (and Euclid 
 includes all such distances in his postulate by saying °° dist- 
 ance), then in no case can the proposition about the perpen- 
 diculars be considered to be proved" (or for that matter, even 
 to be true) to anyone except the person impossibly coinci- 
 dent with the perpendicular. Hence, if the theorem about 
 the perpendicular is considered by the orthodox mathematic- 
 ians to be proved, in exactly the same way Euclid's postulate 
 
 is proved. That is condensed, and hence roughly 
 
 stated from a mathematician's point of view. But it proves 
 with rigorous truisms either that Euclid s axiom ' about 
 parallels is proved, or else that all kinds of geometry (includ- 
 ing non-Euclidian) are not only unprovable, but are in the 
 
§60i VIII One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 54 
 
 same sense disproved, or proved to be erroneous. The act- 
 ual fact is that we have merely rigorously established the 
 preliminary formal agreement of language or geometry — 
 Euclid s postulate being that agreement in one form. 
 
 §61. a. That leads us specifically to what I believe is 
 generally considered to be the unsolved problem of whether 
 space (and time) is really Euclidian or not. The solution of 
 it — already implied above, of course — is that there is not 
 any such problem; it is merely an implicit self-contradiction 
 and confusion to propose such a problem. ' We may prof- 
 itably explicitly consider it, as it shows the ultimate details 
 with regard to confusing the three sorts of words. 
 
 (1) If space is a relationship word or God the Holy Ghost, as 
 we explicitly consider it to be in our general equation, then 
 obviously there is no such Many or objective" thing as 
 space, and no possibility of its having anything but merely a 
 whole identity with itself (§§57, 60a). The problem of 
 
 Euclidian space" is obviously meaningless or non-existent 
 from such a point of view: space in this first sense is solely 
 an absolute assertion of connection, or id entity — and identity 
 is identity, it being nonsense to consider in curved or flat. 
 
 (2) If space is the universe, the One, then it is Euclidian or 
 non-Euclidian just as we please. Neither mystic statement 
 has any definite meaning as such, and both are true." 
 
 (3) If space is used as an actual unit of the Manj' (as mean- 
 ing, say, that -which is named by cubic yard), then obviously 
 we can say that that space is formally a fixed quantity or 
 standard One, in which case (2) again applies. But if we 
 observe that that -which' at first was in the space changes 
 with reference to other parts of the Many, and say that it no 
 longer fills the ' space,' then we use that last term space" 
 (a) vaguely in a Many sense, and also (b) in a relationship 
 sense that is covered by (l), but which is explicitly, as a 
 standard One or measure, a Euclidian space. Or, instead 
 of saying as in (b) that such a space measure did not change, 
 we may with the mathematicians say (c) that the space 
 measure also changed with the change in that which' or 
 Many part in it. Then that assertion of change, as a verbal 
 truism, implies that we have assumed another form," or a 
 second space,' which tacitly assumed form is the relation- 
 ship word, but which second space is then, by orthodox 
 mathematics, inserted into (i. e., verbally identified as, or 
 duplicated into) the original name space. (The original space 
 would then have to change again, and be fixed as a form ; 
 and so on ad infinitum. It is, from this point of view, the 
 infinite regress of language: or more definitely, that simul- 
 taneously duplex space" is the mathematicians' unrecog- 
 nized way of asserting the infinite regress; or more concretely, 
 that duplexing of space" is the ancient infinite regress of 
 ethers; cf. §51.) In that case, where we get flung on an 
 infinite regress of spaces (which is another way of stating the 
 last section), each space that changed in some given degree 
 is a distinct language, of non-Euclidian space. And clearly, 
 to interpret that language, we simply have to revert to the 
 formal or fixed space, which obviously is the average or Eu- 
 clidian space. Or, briefly and obviously, there is no such 
 thing, or unit of the Many, as space. To say ' Euclidian 
 space" is, strictly, the same thing as saying motherhood of 
 brotherhood — logical nonsense. Hence, there exists no 
 such problem as whether space is Euclidian. Space is a 
 verbal invented agreement as to the expression of universal 
 identity, and the Euclidian agreement is the average, intelli- 
 gible one, and no other is mutually quantitatively intelligible. 
 
 b. It may now be seen why we have gone to so much 
 trouble and effort with what is superficially the rather foolish 
 business of investigating non-Euclidian space. Two import- 
 ant advantages appear at once:- (l) We have very definitely 
 
 seen just how a word is orthodoxly confused in the three 
 meanings (and how excessively confused that confusion may 
 be), and just how to dig the word out and unsnarl it. The 
 non-Euclidian space serves as the type : no other mixing 
 can go further in confusion: yet, at the same time, if we 
 have nothing better to do than juggle words, it is possible to 
 make valid expression of anything in terms of non-Euclidian 
 space (but to be quantitatitively intelligible expression it then 
 has to be translated into Euclidian). (2) And we have seen 
 how very flexible our language is. If we do not explicitly 
 pin it down to Euclidian space, any noun in it can be given 
 not only any meaning as a One (which is validly possible in 
 our everyday language — we must simply point out that we are 
 doing it) ; but can also be taken as any quantity as a Many 
 (§66) ; and can further, from one point of view, be consid- 
 ered (a) steady, or (b) in any way warped as a relationship, 
 in which case it implies an infinite regress of different formal 
 languages — all of which then have to be explicitly stated 
 in order to be intelligible (and the way to 'state' all of them 
 logically, is to state the average, or zero, or Euclidian one). 
 Consequently, it behooves us to understand our logical rule 
 about and °° , and use it, if we do not wish to find ourselves 
 adrift in non-Euclidian unintelligibility, or the dupes of the 
 men who are. 
 
 §62. a. The scientific physical theory of relativity (§66) 
 is a variation from ordinary language of the same character 
 as are the non-Euclidian varieties. That theory uses "time" 
 as if it were a fourth dimension of space (§66g). Non- 
 Euclidian geometries often do the same thing ("Ency. 
 Brit., xi, 735). In both cases the usage is merely a form, 
 and implies no actual "fourth dimension." In this section 
 we consider the actual meaning of all asserted and verbal 
 departures from three dimensions. 
 
 b. We have seen (§§58ab, 59) that our everyday lang- 
 uage was reduced to the most parsimonious terms possible in 
 an explicit language, and hence had three dimensions of 
 space. We saw that they were forms; hence, it is already 
 implicit that, as a form, there might be any number of "di- 
 mensions." But we proceed to examine the details. 
 
 The Euclidian everyday language and each of the non- 
 Euclidian possibilities may be varied into an infinite number 
 of valid languages which depart from that simplest form. 
 So far as I can determine from the vague statements of ortho- 
 dox mathematics that possibility is not definitely recognized 
 by it. But orthodox mathematics in an indefinite way be- 
 gins the construction of such different languages:- e. g., 
 various branches of mathematics treat of "space" (l) of no 
 dimensions (points) ; (2) of one dimension ; (s) of two dimen- 
 sions, etc. As we shall see, the three varieties of "space" • 
 just mentioned explicitly, actually imply the use of lang- 
 uages that are logically different from our ordinary language. 
 But it is not conventionally so considered. It is considered 
 that we can "conceive" a "space" of say two dimensions. 
 The fact is (the absolute truism is) that we can not conceive 
 any such space in any way really different from conceiving 
 a space of a million dimensions (and we can not properly 
 talk of either the 2-dimension or million-dimension space in 
 our ordmary 3-dimension language— as we shall see) The 
 usual conventional assertion is that it is impossible even to 
 imagine a physical" space [i. e., a Many unit as usually 
 named\ of a milhon dimensions. Of course it is, as that is 
 an essential contradiction of terms; in precisely the same 
 everyday sense it is equally impossible to imagine a space of 
 two d.mens.ons, or three dimensions, as we shall see 
 
 c. What we are going to see now is that there are pos- 
 sible an mdefimte number of valid languages, each of which 
 has a d.fferent formal base (or, in some cases, lack of formal 
 
55 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VIII §62g 
 
 base, or negative one — which is logically the same). The 
 language which we actually use (§58) is based on the Trini- 
 ty, and is the simplest positive language. It has three forms 
 of words, conventionally necessitating the three dimensions 
 
 of space (§59). Following is a description of the 
 
 formal base of four different languages :- (l) The most primi- 
 tive 'language' — I doubt if it may properly be called a lang- 
 uage — is one merely of ejaculatory sounds, such as a. hen 
 usually uses to her chickens. It is rigorously "mysticism," 
 and implies only the One, or meaning. Actually, it has no 
 
 words, as any of its words' may, just as a One word 
 may, be used to designate any complete meaning. That 
 language does not use space at all — has no form, — and is 
 hence of zero dimensions, (it is also obviously of infinite di- 
 mensions, as it implicitly includes all possible forms.) Con- 
 ventionally, that is not a "language." (2) A hen 
 
 can and does use another and higher" form of language. 
 When she finds food she sometimes adds to her previous 
 language a gesture of pointing' or pecking at it (and perhaps 
 a vocal sound equivalent to that gesture), indicating a point, 
 or a MO-dimension location in space (and time — always under- 
 stood). A small child is 'verbally" a little more explicit 
 in such a language. He puts his finger on or towards the 
 
 point and says This or That," or some word corres- 
 ponding formally to the mathematicians' point. 1 ' That 
 also is a language which is not positive — and conventionally 
 perhaps is not recognized as a language. That O-dimension 
 form of word is the primitive Many word, and such a word 
 is indefinite as to whether (a) it is a unit of the Many that 
 is a formal part of the One, or (b) is a mere formal recogni- 
 tion that the One may be arbitrarily divided, but is not such 
 a part. It has been seen (e. g., in §58d) that orthodox 
 mathematics is still, like the child in that language, ambigu- 
 ous as to its general Many words :- number. Hence, it is 
 obvious that when mathematics speaks of points, or tech- 
 nically of number, it probably is attempting to use this 
 no-dimension language, without recognizing that it is not a 
 positive language. This language formally and implicitly 
 asserts space or form, but explicitly asserts no space. But 
 there is no trace in it of the relationship form — note the 
 indefiniteness under (a) and (b) above. Obviously, as this 
 language uses space, and denies dimensions, it may be said 
 to have no logic, or be negative logically ; yet it is fairly 
 intelligible in practice, and is often eloquent — for it raises 
 no verbal problems and needs no formal answers. This zero- 
 form or zero-logical language may be held to include the 
 
 absolute mysticism described under (l). (s) The next 
 
 'language' is the one in which the motion of a point is form- 
 ally recognized — the continuity or relationship that is explic- 
 itly a one-dimension line formally explicitly asserting the 
 Many, but obviously not fully separating the units of the 
 Many. Hence, relationship is explicitly used, but formally 
 it is denied or omitted. This 1-dimension language is still 
 not a positive, controllable language, as it obviously still 
 
 lacks a definite logic. (4) The next language is one 
 
 of 2-dimension surfaces, in which the One is obviously ex- 
 plicitly separated formally into the Many. Relationship is 
 obviously implicitly used, but it is not explicitly named as a 
 form — it is, when it comes into explicit notice, pseudo- 
 invented as a thing, or another unit of the Many, or a tertium 
 quid, or God. This is actually the language the dualists use. 
 It is not a positive language — not our Trinity language. It 
 is, compared to our positive language that has the minimum of 
 logic or form needed for controllability, a nonsensical lang- 
 uage — practically more nonsensical than the languages of 
 the hen and the infant; for those make no pretensions. 
 Dualists are not "wrong"; this language is not "wrong," 
 
 as it is fairly intelligible, and is actually the language of 
 most of conventional mathematics. It merely is not complete 
 and it is not our everyday dynamic language. Strictly speak - 
 speaking, it is a barbaric language — half-formed ; static. 
 
 d. Obviously, just as soon as we say above in the lang- 
 uage (2) that there exists one way of asserting and denying 
 "space" (or the formal distinction between the One and the 
 Many), it immediately follows that there can be two ways of 
 doing it — and two were shown in language (3), — and then 
 on and on in a balancing of such forms, in infinite regress. 
 We saw (§59) that the first way in which the whole set of 
 contradictions is explicitly or positively handled is our Trini- 
 ty language. Hence, that Trinity language is what is ordi- 
 narily known to us as language. But obviously, the 
 other forms pointed out in the last paragraph are languages 
 — even though they differ quantitatively in the number of 
 explicit forms or logic. So those are concrete and conven- 
 tional examples showing the possibility of an infinite regress 
 of languages with different forms which are valid (although 
 not equally useful in quantitative Many affairs) so long as they 
 make no claims to be other than they are (the real objection 
 to dualism and other languages with queer numbers of forms 
 is that they make false claims for themselves). 
 
 e. The mathematicians call each such assertion-denial 
 (formal assertion of a splitting: denial of it) a dimension" 
 of space," and get thus 4-dimension, ...ra-dimension... 
 space. Obviously, what they can mean is correct; the 
 names they have adopted for it are not enlightening and us- 
 ually puzzle even themselves. For obviously, in no case 
 have they got a space that is a bit different from the one 
 the child has when he merely points and has O-dimension 
 
 space" — i. e., has no form in language, no technique, no 
 trick of talking. The actual difficulty the mathematicians 
 have is due to the fact that ordinarily we consider the forms 
 of language explicitly in terms of time (with space always im- 
 plied; cf. §150); but (as in §60i) Euclid shifted those forms 
 explicitly to space — making a geometry instead of a tacit 
 
 psychology," — and instead of talking of ever}' -time talked 
 of every-wkere. Because of the nonrecognition of the existence 
 of those two aspects of precisely the same essential principle 
 of form, the mathematicians thought they had something 
 really different in the way of language variation. 
 
 f. It therefore follows as a truism that when a man un- 
 dertakes to talk about a space of (say) four 'dimensions" as 
 being one in which (say) we could go in and out of a room 
 which was closed, then he is, in his mental confusion, at- 
 tempting to talk two different languages simultaneously :- 
 our Trinity language of the ' closed" room, and the 4-dimen- 
 sion language in which he describes the path out." The 
 result truistically is nonsense — saying A=A and simultane- 
 ously A is not = A. Competent mathematicians do not talk 
 such nonsense: at least I am unable to find any such ab- 
 surdities in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica." In one modern 
 mathematical book I find the author rather undecided as to 
 whether he shall talk such 4-dimension nonsense; but in 
 spite of the fact that he is a reputable mathematician he 
 concludes that such hypergeometry resulted when the mind 
 of man finally burst into flowers of its own" — a rather 
 vague statement for a mathematician. But in sober moments 
 competent mathematicians consider space to be the same as 
 it is in our general equation — primarily a relationship word 
 (Whitehead, in "Ency. Brit.," xi, 730). However, White- 
 head frankly admits that mathematicians are undecided about 
 it, just as his competent associate Russell admits in general 
 that they are undecided about the One and Many ("Ency. 
 Brit.," xvii, 88l), which is really the problem under space. 
 
 g. It is obvious that because we tacitly call our Trinity 
 
§62g VIII One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 56 
 
 language sense or commonsense, in order to be consistent 
 we must call any other language nonsense. And I did. But 
 to repeat, that means compared with Trinity language. 
 
 h. Obviously, in each of those infinite forms of language 
 with respect to the number of "dimensions" we may now 
 have another infinite regress in sorts of space — Euclidian and 
 non-Euclidian. That makes the total of mathematics or of 
 language to consist of explicit statement of an infinite re- 
 gress of languages of different extent of form, each of which 
 languages in turn consists of an infinite regress of languages 
 of different 'intensity' of form — which may be expressed :- 
 Extensity of forms... ^Intensity of forms..., exactly equivalent 
 to That... X This... . There consequently can be no actual 
 end to the mind's bursting into flowers. I omit those 
 flowers" here, and with rigid parsimony use everyday 
 Trinity language of Euclidian space. But we can see that 
 the mathematicians can have an extensive flower garden. 
 
 §63. a. In the last section it was not stated just how 
 we are going to represent those different kinds of spaces with 
 our ring model. In this section I shall represent them by 
 showing briefly some of the possible variations of the ring. 
 To show those variations in detail would constitute a com- 
 plete new mathematics — volumes of which are here omitted. 
 
 b. A symmetrical ring consisting of a geometrical single 
 surface is generated when a straight line, the generatrix, is 
 moved so that the same point of it lies always in the circum- 
 ference of a directrix circle and its whole remains always in 
 planes passing through the center of the circle and perpen- 
 dicular to it, while at the same time the line rotates around 
 the circumference as an axis at half the angular rate of its 
 revolution about the center. In order to represent the un- 
 limited possibilities of making non-Euclidian languages, that 
 symmetrica] ring can be varied from that symmetry indefin- 
 itely. Instead of a directrix circle we could use any closed 
 path. And the warp' (the proportionality of its rotation 
 about the directrix) may be varied locally in any degree, so 
 long as the generatrix finishes a complete revolution with an 
 algebraic sum total of 180 , or 180 plus any multiple of 
 360°. If the sum total of the twist is different from that, 
 and the generatrix is of finite length, truistically the surface 
 will not close as a single surface, with one revolution, and 
 we have no language,' as there is no summed identical re- 
 lationship. The language would be a dualism; and, any 
 of the languages described in §62c would be represented by 
 a ring in which the length of the directrix was zero, and 
 the twist unstated. If the twist were stated, then other de- 
 tails too trivial and extensive for mention here are obvious. 
 
 c. An actual paper ring made of a straight strip will 
 
 Fig. 63c. 
 
 not take that symmetrical form, because to permit its doing 
 so its edges would have to stretch and contract considerably. 
 Also, when the generatrix explicitly has a length of line 
 
 extending away from the directrix greater than the diameter 
 of the directrix the single surface will intersect itself (and a 
 ring made of a paper strip physically would not intersect, 
 but would "interfere"). That fact may be observed to be 
 true by observing Fig. 63c, and considering what would 
 happen if the ring were wider. (Fig. 63c is a perspective of 
 a symmetrical one surface ring of appreciable thickness : it 
 is shown cut square across by four arbitrary planes, so as to 
 make it easier to see its shape.) If we had a paper ring of 
 negligible thickness its width could be made as great as we 
 like, without interference, by folding the strip first diagon- 
 ally along its length, and again in other ways as may be 
 necessary to keep the ZI and Z'l' edges (Fig. 54) along the 
 meeting edges of the finally be-folded triangle. The paper 
 'strip' then, when bent around to make a 'ring,' actually 
 makes a cone. (It would require pages to express that con- 
 struction with verbal explicitiness, and then it would not be 
 easily intelligible. The reader, if interested, can readily 
 understand the construction by actually making such a ring.) 
 In whatever way the folds be made, there will be one or 
 more thicknesses of paper between some portion of the join- 
 ing' ZI and Z'l' edges, and the joint will take various odd be- 
 folded conditions. Clearly, as the meeting edges have the 
 paper (or if that is considered of negligible thickness, then 
 at least a "surface") between some portion of them, then in 
 ordinary language they do not meet. But, by multiplying or 
 duplicating means of stating relationships, an n-dimension 
 language can be devised which will describe the be-folded 
 ring' as a ring" — i. e., as if the edges met: and hence 
 as if the surface was continuous and related. 
 
 d and e. Clearly, that sort of complicated language is 
 not perceptibly needed in our ordinary life. The mathema- 
 ticians may find uses for it, and quite likely in a century or 
 so, after we get skilled in our Trinity language, the last para- 
 graph may possibly be written in a consistent 4-dimension 
 language and be easily intelligible in half its present length, 
 instead of its being practically unintelligible as it stands in 
 3-dimension language unless such a strip be actually made. 
 However, it is clear that there is not contained or involved 
 in that 4-dimension model a space ' any different in a Many 
 
 sense from 3-dimension, 2-dimension, etc. As an 
 
 interesting fact, it may be observed that the model 'ring' 
 which is now a cone contains all the relationships included in 
 conic sections, and other branches of geometry — and those 
 are thus here directly connected with the theory of logic. The 
 volumes expressing that unified geometry are here omitted. 
 
 f. Instead of making the ring of a flat strip and neglect- 
 ing its thickness, we may make a ring explicitly solid — say 
 
 Fig. 63f. 
 
 of square cross-section, as in Fig. 63f. In this case, instead 
 of a twist of 180°, we give a twist of 90° (of 360° divided 
 by the number of "surfaces" or sides the solid is considered 
 
57 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VIII §6Sb 
 
 to have). Then there is but one continuous surface, and one 
 continuous edge ; but we pass our finger four times around 
 the directrix circle in completely following that surface. If 
 we cut off a comer having a right triangular cross-section 
 with legs of the same length and equal to half the ring's 
 side, there results a ring of triangular cross-section four 
 times the original length, with three surfaces and three 
 edges, interlinked with a ring of the same sort as the origi- 
 nal, but half the cross-section. Similar corners may theo- 
 retically be cut off the ring indefinitely, there remaining 
 always a square core like the original. It is obvious that a 
 direct description of the more complicated systems of rela- 
 tionship, Many surfaces, etc., of a symmetrical ring of this 
 sort would require a Euclidian language of more than three 
 dimensions," or sets of reconciled contradictions. 
 
 g. A different language would be required for the direct 
 description of a single surface ring made of triangular cross- 
 section with twist of 120°. That is obviously so, if we con- 
 sider the complications resulting if we considered the three 
 sides extended indefinitely. Similarly, a special formal lang- 
 uage is required if it is to be directly applicable to a ring of 
 any regular polygon of n sides, with a twist of 360° /». 
 
 h. The limit of that regular re-sided polygon would be a 
 circle of an 'infinite number" of sides, giving a tore or anchor 
 ring — or a smooth doughnut. If a "corner" be cut off that, 
 it would be a line. And we would keep cutting it off, 
 around and around an "infinite number" of times until the 
 whole ring — or universe — was used up, and there was just 
 one closed line to represent it. All the mutual contradictions 
 possible (an infinite "number") would be used up and recon- 
 ciled. The resulting line would be the Many, or the One, 
 or (when considered as a twist) all of relationship. As a 
 matter of rather obvious fact, the total expression in words 
 would become infinitelj' formally self-contradictory- — as is 
 directly evident in this paragraph. Yet, because all those 
 contradictions, and this line's implied ' infinite dimensions" 
 of space" mean nothing more than continuous, we under- 
 stand the description of that tore — the meaning of this para- 
 graph — without difficulty. However, more or less concretely 
 speaking, this paragraph is language gone mad. When we 
 describe a common doughnut in this romantic way, we have 
 passed beyond the power of the best mathematicians and 
 used "-dimension space," and in that extraordinary lang- 
 uage have in reality reverted to the language of the hen 
 (§62c) — a concrete proof that infinity is logically equal to 
 zero. There is not any difficulty about comprehending a 
 doughnut. The universe is essentially as easy to understand. 
 
 i. One last point concerning this variable model of lang- 
 uage remains to be added to make its infinite variety or vari- 
 ability obvious :- I have been calling language a machine. 
 This ring also serves as a model of all mechanics, as we may 
 briefly see :- If any of the rings (theoretically the cone 
 ring' also; but we for brevity omit that) be revolved about 
 its main axis (i. e., the line through the center of the direc- 
 trix circle perpendicular to the plane of the circle: the di- 
 rectrix circle itself I name the Jiliar axis), then it acts as — is 
 — a pump, or rotating fan, or propeller, of (and in) whatever 
 medium surrounds it. (Hence, some useful machines might 
 be made of the ring; I have not investigated those possibili- 
 ties, but such an investigation may be worth while, espec- 
 ially when it is remembered that all engines are reversed 
 pumps of various sorts, so that these rings will make a new 
 
 sort of rotary engine.) Also, when the rings thus 
 
 revolve, they appear to be rotating also in cross-section around 
 their filiar axis or directrix circle; virtually or dynamically 
 they are. Conseqently, they mechanically are vortex whirls, 
 or "smoke rings." And in Part Two I use such whirls as 
 
 being usually the most simple and convenient machine by 
 which to describe the universe. A whirl is shown to be 
 equivalent to a lever, or to any other machine (§100m). The 
 universe, or any atom, or any natural machine (any arti- 
 ficial machine plus man is shown to be a natural machine; 
 §140), may by its use very conveniently and intelligibly be 
 considered to be a sort of self-inclosed pump, or engine. 
 Therefore, rigorously, language is as definitely a machine as 
 is any other, and is as explicitly subject to scientific ex- 
 periment and verification. 
 
 §64. a. Two general considerations remain to be added 
 to our description of the concrete model of language :- In 
 this section we take one:- that L and T always mutually 
 imply each other. In the next section we consider the other :- 
 the general method of splitting the ring into the Many. 
 
 b. We can observe in our model (as we have several 
 times seen: §§86-7, 60i, etc.), that every time the idea or 
 form space is introduced, it at least explicitly implies a can- 
 celling time. I. e., space and time, as mutually contradict- 
 ory words, constitute the relationship, or twist, in the model. 
 To put it another way, the total universe can be described 
 as the motion of the general ('universal') body M. We can 
 not possibly have any thing which is not fully implied by 'M 
 varying with V or L l T~ 1 ,' — or with complete explicitness, 
 by M varying with LT -00 .' We see directly from our 
 model that in all cases of explicit expression, the exponents 
 of L and T are equal and cancelling : in general are n and — n. 
 
 c. Physics, somewhat vaguely, terms those exponents 
 dimensions" (§68). But orthodox physics is not quite so 
 
 definite about the matter as we are seeing is justified by the 
 facts, and hence there exists no familiar way of stating the 
 conclusion which is now obvious (also, cf. footnote 165b, on 
 Bergson). That conclusion is, that, as L and T always imply 
 each other, then if L is curved," T also must be compen- 
 satingly curved ; and if L is steady" or average" in 
 
 ordinary average space, then T also is average. 
 
 Mathematicians and physicists are confused over the matter, 
 although they substantially agree with that conclusion. 
 Their esoteric way of agreeing is to use a form which is 
 equivalent to making T a fourth dimension of L; obviously 
 that makes T identical in form with L. They are not at all 
 certain what it means ( Ency. Brit.," xi, 735). We come 
 to the same thing in the theory of relativity (§66). 
 
 d. That last paragraph is not very clear — especially is 
 it extremely confusing to follow the orthodox usage of T as 
 a fourth dimension. The last paragraph is one just for 
 the technical objector. The simple facts we need to get out 
 of it are (l) that L and T, whenever validly used explicitly, 
 are paired ; and (2) that all conventional technical languages 
 are somewhat vague on this point (IX, §66), and conse- 
 quently get into verbal confusions that are unintelligible if 
 taken literally. E. g., Newton's law of gravity is such a 
 confusion; strictly interpreted it is totally illogical, and pre- 
 cludes gravity's having any mechanics (index, "Gravity"). 
 
 §65. a. We have let our model represent the Many 
 by having its Many surface divided crosswise (Fig. 54c). 
 That has been convenient for the points of view we have 
 taken. But if we had actually cut the ring into Many parts 
 on those lines, the ring would have come apart," and no 
 longer have been a ring" (unless we had considered it a 
 One, in which ' coming apart" has no particular meaning). 
 
 b. But we saw that the rings could have an edge or 
 corner cut off, giving a lengthened ring of more than one 
 surface (and edge), interlinked with a remaining single sur- 
 face ring like the original, but with a diminished cross-section. 
 Those split-off rings constitute units of the Many more defin- 
 itely than do the crossways' units, for a number of obvious 
 
§6Sb VIII One 
 
 reasons. In splitting off parts to get units of the Many, the 
 relationship glaringly remains (as the interlinking) ; if a 
 crossways unit of the Many had been cut out, we should 
 have to consider that because the ring was the total universe 
 then that cut-out unit of the Many could not have been re- 
 moved "elsewhere" — so it in effect would stay in place and 
 
 "preserve" the ring. It may also be observed that 
 
 the split-off unit of the Many no longer has the characteris- 
 tic of a continuous One and Many; the "logic" or language 
 
 description of such a definite, formally separated but still 
 interlinked unit essentially changes. 
 
 c. All those points have perhaps become so obvious that 
 I shall write no more than those rough suggestions. A very 
 extended discussion of them is readily apparent. 
 
 §66. a. In this section we consider the theory of relativity . 
 We do so chiefly as a means of summarizing our ideas about 
 language. For the theory of relativity is essentially a lang- 
 uage or logic different from our ordinary Euclidian language, 
 and a study of it will show how we may change from ours to 
 a different sort. That theory of relativity, which is actually 
 a new scientific logic, has been developed recently, begin- 
 ning with a short article by Albert Einstein in 1905 which 
 extended Lorentz's hypothesis of the Michelson-Morley ex- 
 periment — an experiment which showed that there was no 
 perceptible motion or drift" of the ether relative to the 
 earth, as indicated by the travel of light (see §127 for de- 
 tails), although the old dualistic theory of frictionless ether 
 held that the earth could not drag that surrounding friction- 
 less ether with it, so that there would be such drift (§127ij, 
 
 XIII). For an authoritative statement of relativity I 
 
 shall use Einstein's Relativity" (Eng. trans., New York, 
 1920), referring in citations below to pages of that book. 
 
 b. Einstein used his theory a few years ago to predict 
 the bending of the path of a ray of light in a gravity field 
 (that bending is actually » special case of a general phenom- 
 enon of light known for centuries; §127). His prediction 
 was reported verified at a meeting of the Royal Society in 
 1919 (ibid., 153-5). On that occasion J. J. Thomson, as 
 its president, is reported to have stated in effect that those 
 observations perhaps caused a revolution in science — the 
 greatest in centuries, etc. And that rather strong language 
 brought Einstein's theory into general prominence. How- 
 ever, Thomson is reported to have also stated that he could 
 not understand the theory. (Obviously it is pertinent to 
 inquire :- if he couldn t understand it, how could he guess 
 it was a revolution?) But we shall see that the theory does 
 not revolutionize science except in the sense that it expresses 
 our commonsense science in a somewhat new and in an arbi- 
 trary language, which does not at all destroy or contradictor 
 change our everyday language. Also, we shall see that 
 there is no difficulty in understanding the essentials of the 
 theory; and it is in strict principle impossible to derive, in a 
 finite time, any definite quantitative result or statement from 
 the theory. However, in practical use, guessing somewhat 
 at quantities, the theory is sound and has great value, as we 
 shall see. Einstein has done work that makes him the peer 
 of Newton. 
 
 c. The specific essential of relativity is correctly and 
 clearly stated by Einstein (ibid., 135):- "According to the 
 general theory of relativity, the geometrical properties of 
 space [and time: the rest of his book proves that space is 
 logically inseparable from time ; see par. g of this section] 
 are not independent, but they are determined by matter." 
 Hence, as he uses matter explicitly as quantity, and as he 
 shows that matter is always varying or changing quantita- 
 tively (that mass varies with velocity), therefore M, L, and 
 T are always varying — or, Einstein has no formally steady 
 
 UNIVERSK 58 
 
 language. Or, instead of having our Many member, M(vary- 
 ing with)L 2 T- 2 , in which L and T are arbitrarily and form- 
 ally or logically fixed and steady as in our everyday language, 
 and in which member there is a '(varying with),' or assertion 
 of no possibility of a quantitatively exact science (see our next 
 chapter, IX, for details), Einstein's theory of relativity would 
 have a member in which there is no '(varying with)', but an 
 exact quantitative science, although then formally L and T 
 are not constant and steady or formally exact and unvarying. 
 In other words, Einstein's theory is obviously logically pre- 
 cisely the reverse of our everyday language; in respect to 
 concrete facts, or to assertions about matter, our language and 
 his language obviously undertake to mean identically the 
 same. As a truistic result of the fact that formally 
 
 his L and T are not steady, Einstein's general relativity has 
 a space (and time) which is not Euclidian. His space and 
 time is a verbal "reference jelly-fish" — i. e., an unfixed, 
 shaky, uncertain method of talking (his translator says 
 "reference-mollusk," p. 117, etc. ; but "reference jelly- 
 fish" better expresses what was or should have been Ein- 
 stein's idea). And that relativity space has no fixed curvature 
 or definite variation from Euclidian space. (Truistically it 
 can't have; for otherwise L and T would be unvarying, al- 
 though with [Gaussian] numerical coefficients different from 
 unity; see par. e.) Consequently, it is in strict principle 
 truistically impossible to get any definite quantitative result 
 
 or statement from the theory. Einstein (p. 136) 
 
 concludes that our universe is a more or less (i. e., numeri- 
 cally unspecifiably) spherical or elliptical non-Euclidian space 
 — thus showing that in his own hands in the end the theory 
 can give no definite quantities. And incidentally, as we saw 
 (§62), that more or less bounded or shaped relativity space 
 means precisely the same thing as our ordinary language's in- 
 finite or unbounded space of the universe; for obviously there 
 is nothing but an unessential verbal difference between a uni- 
 verse which is unboundable and an infinite one. 
 
 d. Or, we can express the last paragraph, showing the 
 essential characteristic of the theory of relativity, in a more 
 intelligible and more general way :- Einstein in actual effect 
 says that he will express everything in a quantitative form — 
 will express everything in exact measures — will have all state- 
 ments in the form of exact quantitative science. (in short, 
 he in effect asserts that there will be, for his theory, no dif- 
 ference between qualitative and quantitative; he can be noted 
 asserting that in his first complete paragraph on p. 23, and 
 the second on p. 15. And in agreement with my assertion 
 that he verbally makes the two equivalent, on his p. 98 he 
 in effect consistently and properly rejects the problem of the 
 One and Many as being non-existent — or the One is directly 
 the Many — in the next to the last sentence in the first para- 
 graph.) Such expression of everything is in principle an 
 absolute quantitative unification of all knowledge. And we 
 have seen (§40, etc.) that such a quantitative unification is 
 impossible. But Einstein consistently and validly makes 
 merely a formal unification of that sort except that he does not 
 finish (strictly, a unification of that sort would have to run to 
 infinity). I. e., in actual effect, as we have already seen 
 and will see more explicitly in the next paragraph, he gets a 
 jelly-fish or variable frame of numerical translation or expres- 
 sion or "reference," so that although formally he has a 
 quantitative unification, actually he has to guess at quantities 
 just as we do in ordinary language — which is merely another 
 way of saying that he does not finish. Consequently, Ein- 
 stein has a language which is formally the opposite of ours ; 
 but as stated, it means the same as ours, and there is no real 
 conflict. We take it that our standards of measurement are 
 formally steady, but that in the nature of things we can't 
 
59 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VIII §6 
 
 accurately measure always varying matter; Einstein takes 
 it that his standards measure matter accurately, but that the 
 standards themselves always vary, and vary in an unmeasur- 
 able degree. 
 
 e. Or, we can express the general relativity theory in 
 specific mathematical terms, thus repeating the last two 
 paragraphs in another form :- Einstein does it excellently 
 (p. 115):- The following statement corresponds to the 
 fundamental idea of the general principle of relativity : 'All 
 Gaussian co-ordinate systems [of which the Euclidian "sys- 
 tem is a special, or more precisely, a limiting, case] are 
 essentially equivalent for the formulation of the general laws of 
 nature. I. e., all events or phenomena may be quantita- 
 tively expressed by exact symbols in a certain kind of always 
 practically non-Euclidian space and time. Einstein proves 
 that. Then, the mathematical formula for expressing one 
 phenomenon in terms of any other is worked out (p. 105) to 
 be:- ds 2 =gndxi 2 -{-2gi2dxidx2... -\-gudx t 2 , where ds is the 
 quantitative difference of the two phenomena, the x's are 
 really our ordinary Euclidian time and dimensions of space, 
 and the g's are numerical coefficients for the given particular 
 case, which fix for that case the variations of the time and 
 space from the Euclidian reference or limit. In brief, that 
 expression is simply in effect equivalent to our formula 
 Mkvarying with) I?T~~ 2 = The One (but is not precise as to what 
 is the One and what the Many expression; see par. h). 
 But, it immediately follows (ibid., 106), from the way that 
 Einstein derived that formula, that the magnitudes or coeffic- 
 ients g have values which vary with each event. Conse- 
 quently, in actual effect, that Gaussian or non-Euclidian 
 formula is not mutually translatable from one event to 
 another; it is only formally or unintelligibly-orthodoxly- 
 mathemathically translatable — the monstrous word fits the 
 case. Or, as before, the relativity or unification derived by 
 Einstein is merely formal — is actually qualitative, just as the 
 one we are deriving in ordinary language is. 
 
 f. It therefore is truistic with those three ways of view- 
 ing relationships (in the last three paragraphs):- (l) that 
 Einstein's general theory is right (he has worked out an ex- 
 tended formal truism, mostly in terms of the orthodox 
 mathematics of space and time) ; and (2) that his form of 
 using words is the reverse of our ordinary way (and is hence 
 rather novel and sometimes puzzling — especially to him). 
 Our ordinary language is a language which, although explic- 
 itly inexact as to quantity or measures of sizes of things, is 
 qualitatively or essentially the same language for all of us, 
 and for all time (except for the arbitrary practical fact that 
 from time to time we mutually agree to change the applica- 
 tion of certain words, or invent new ones). The backwards 
 language of the relativitists is theoretically exact as to quan- 
 tity, but essentially is, or requires, a different language for 
 each person (as each person is a different phenomenon or 
 event — is differently located : two persons can not occupy 
 the same space), and also must be varied by each person 
 from moment to moment into a new language (as we saw, 
 especially in considering the Gaussian formula in the last par- 
 agraph). A simple example of that would be :- If we use 
 the theory of relativity consistently, with reference (say) to 
 what we in our ordinary language call a boy" (all of us ad- 
 mitting that "a boy" does not mean exactly quantitatively 
 the same to each of us), then only at one instant in eternal 
 time and then for one observer only, at one zero or point 
 spot in infinite space (and actually, no observer can occupy a 
 point), would the name "ffl boy" properly apply, and hence 
 be a permissible relativity term. All other observers, and 
 this single point-observer at all other times, in order to use 
 relativity consistently, must invent and use a new name (a 
 
 different "quantity"); he could still use the exact numeri- 
 cal form "a " (the "a" meaning exactly l), but must 
 
 fill in the blank with some new word to or with which the 
 quantitatively exact a or 1 will fit — which new word would 
 itself be good only instantaneously. Obviously, rela- 
 tivitists can't practically consistently talk any such language. 
 What Einstein actually does in practice, even in his formal 
 book, is tacitly to use our ordinary Euclidian language as a 
 means of translating. E. g., in the last paragraph we saw 
 that his unifying formula was itself actually expressed in 
 Euclidian language. 
 
 g. It will be useful to notice two particular points about 
 
 Einstein's theory in this long paragraph. (l) He 
 
 states it as two theories, a special theory of relativity, and a 
 general theory (his special theory really deals with what we 
 call the One, and the general with the Many, as we see 
 shortly). In the special theory he works out the verbal 
 method for expressing phenomena in mutual terms of two 
 bodies which are moving relatively to each other in a straight 
 line, with constant motion. He uses the velocity of light as 
 a standard of comparison (i. e., a verbally constant velocity 
 in free" space), thus tacitly using Euclidian space and 
 time as the form of talk to measure that velocity (which is 
 what we call a qualitative base). But Einstein sees, as we 
 we shall see, that motion in a straight line at constant 
 velocity is a special limit, and experimentally can t happen 
 in the real universe (§§83, 88, etc.). Therefore, he had 
 to develop what he calls the general theory of relativity, 
 which will apply to actual variable motion (for all the details 
 of such motion see Part Two). But as soon as motion de- 
 parts from a straight line, the standard of measurement (the 
 speed of light) is truistically relatively curved" (the paths 
 of both bodies considered are relatively curved), and hence 
 variable in quantity — i. e., merely as a verbal truism of such 
 language agreements, and without any reference to what 
 actual light does do, light can no longer in such language, 
 verbally travel in straight lines at constant speed. Hence, 
 as can be seen, all possibility of comparative measures of two 
 mutually variably moving bodies (and all actual bodies are 
 such) has departed from Einstein's logic; or, that logic or 
 language necessarily or truistically reverts to the jelly-fish 
 system of reference for both space and time, as before seen. 
 Einstein seems to think he shows that change from special to 
 general theory by experimental facts — talking about gravity 
 field" at some length, — but as a matter of fact, his gravity 
 field is created (and 'described') by an extra-universe, incon- 
 ceivable God and is piffle, and Einstein is actually merely 
 formulating verbal agreements — and doing a good job at 
 that. The only actual experience he is using is the observa- 
 tion that, expressed in ordinary language, mass varies with 
 velocity. He is unconsciously making his forms fit that Eu- 
 clidian fact. In short, it thus appears that the relativity 
 theory essentially is logic or philosophy, and not concrete 
 or experimental science : compare it with Part Two of this 
 
 book which is directly experimental science. With 
 
 constant light velocity in one theory, and variable light 
 velocity in the other theory, it superficially looks as if he 
 were dealing loosely with facts. But he is not; in making 
 the step from the special to the general theory he is merely 
 shifting from Euclidian to non-Euclidian space, and reverses 
 language (shifts from monism or monotheism as "reality" to 
 infinite pluralism as reality"). As a matter of strict fact, 
 he could be said to have already done that with mathemati- 
 cal orthodoxy in the special theory (i. e., to have asserted 
 both theories simultaneously according to the forms of ortho- 
 dox mathematics). For in deriving the equations for talking 
 mutually of two bodies (ibid., 189-45: those are the 
 
§66g VIII One 
 
 equations Lorentz used in considering the Michelson-Morley 
 experiment ; for comment on them in actual physical terms, 
 instead of terms of logic which are being given here to ac- 
 cord with Einstein's discussion, see §127j), in equations (3) 
 and (4) — not quoted here, as they are not needed, — he mul- 
 tiplied zero by two "constants," and in effect said that the 
 two could be any numbers. That is equivalent to saying 
 that any number is equal to any other number, and accepts 
 or uses the total orthodox forms of mathematics (§44). Con- 
 seqently, by that theory his "constant" speed of light in 
 the special theory is already in general any speed — i. e., by 
 such orthodox mathematics is variable. In short, his theory 
 merely amounts to using a formal mathematics in which any 
 number can equal any other number, as we saw was the case 
 with ordinary orthodox mathematics. (Or, as we can see 
 now, his special theory is what I call the One, and his general 
 theory is the Many; his special theory is the limit, or the 
 use of Euclidian space, or a dealing with and <*> ; his 
 mathematical formula includes both the special and general, 
 just as does orthodox mathematics, by considering and °° 
 to be numbers, and not limits.) That can be validly and 
 logically done, merely by formally arbitrarily agreeing to do 
 it, provided it is not otherwise contradicted, although as 
 shown before in several other ways no definite quantitative 
 statement which is mutually intelligible can then be made — 
 there will be merely mathematical, symbolical, formal exact- 
 ness or quantitative definiteness (and because by agreement 
 no mathematical Many symbol need be definite anyway — 
 i. e., n boys are not actually a definite number, although n 
 is mathematically or symbolically definite, — therefore ob- 
 viously it is possible to put that indefinite, not mutually un- 
 derstandable theory into mathematics and make it thus 
 indefinitely understandable : that is the logical trick that can 
 be done with mathematics, and it is highly useful provided 
 the mathematician is not so soft headed as to fancy that just 
 such formal, actually unintelligible statement is the end of 
 the matter). Then Einstein, instead of saying bluntly and 
 clearly that in his theory no number is steady, says what 
 amounts to precisely the same thing:- that space (and time) 
 is variable (an uncertain, shaking jelly-fish) ; and in practice 
 he uses abstract mathematics, in which indefinite letters (such 
 as g in par. e) are used for numbers, so that he talks mathe- 
 matically about his theory without being actually troubled 
 
 by that numerical indefiniteness. (2) The second 
 
 point is that when he insists, following the mathematician 
 Minkowski, that time is a fourth dimension of his jelly- 
 fish world, ' he means merely the same commonplace thing 
 which we have been seeing:- that space and time must, in 
 any valid logic, always be used together (and we see the 
 psychology of that in §150e, etc.). Orthodox physics and 
 mathematics drop time or T whenever they think it conven- 
 ient or simpler ; and that separation gives a dualism 
 
 UNIVERSE 60 
 
 ultimate form as ours. The theory of relativity is generally a 
 revival of Heraclitus the Obscure's philosophy, as before 
 noted — and is superficially obscure because it claims to be 
 using (quantitative) terms which in practical effect it isn t 
 using. Or, as was seen, formally relativity deliberately re- 
 fuses to distinguish between quantitative and qualitative ; nat- 
 urally, as we commonly explicitly distinguish between the 
 two, it is verbally confusing to us at first to use such a run- 
 together language, where any number is openly and consist- 
 ently asserted to be any other number or to be no number at 
 
 all (i. e., to be or »). Relativity really means 
 
 unification. And Einstein's theory — or actually logic — is in 
 
 And Einstein is 
 materialism when 
 is quite plain in 
 in the same sense 
 
 in that sense the 
 
 or materialism, as we have seen, 
 merely destroying such self-contradictory 
 he says time is a fourth dimension — as 
 his book. He is not using dimension 
 that we speak of a dimension of space ; 
 word is quantitative, as we have seen. When Einstien says 
 time is a fourth "dimension" he simply means that it is a 
 . relationship word and ought not to be dropped, which is 
 quite true : and he uses a very emphatic mathematical de- 
 vice to stop the dropping of time by mathematicians. 
 
 h. It thus appears that the relativitists have worked out 
 a formal logic or philosophy in terms of scientific exact 
 quantities" or "matter." The "quantities" really evapo- 
 rate, so to speak, or turn into unstatable jelly-fish measures; 
 so the logic is actually the same in meaning and also in its 
 
 principle incomplete in that he omits showing explicitly that 
 all relativity or relationship is ultimately that of identity or 
 unity (§28h). Also, his verbalisms are so confusing that 
 many obvious conclusions and experiences are hidden from 
 him; those are given in this book, in ordinary terms, with 
 an occasional indication of how they would be expressed in 
 relativity logic. 
 
 i. The theory of relativity is important, and has at- 
 tracted much attention, because it is a unification of know- 
 ledge and is valid. Einstein makes a number of minor 
 logical errors in his book. But he drops those slight errors 
 and pulls through triumphantly with a formally valid logic — 
 valid so long as he keeps his infinite regresses and actual 
 numerical indefiniteness summed into that jelly-fish space, 
 which miraculously quivers infinitely (but merely verbally). 
 About the only theoretical objection to his work worth men- 
 tioning is that he seems to think that his non-Euclidian re- 
 marks may be real" and different in actual meaning from 
 our ordinary way of talking. But because their phraseology is 
 so novel, the relativitists are not bothered with any of the supersti- 
 tions of the old dualistic science, and hence go along unhindered 
 and discover many new principles and facts hidden by and to that 
 materialism. Hence, the very novelty and quantitative verbal 
 unintelligibility of its verbalisms which repel and puzzle, 
 are the characteristics of relativity which make it valuable 
 now to the scientist by making him forget the materialistic 
 superstitions of the old so-called science. As evidence of 
 that, already it is reported that the German materialists are 
 attacking Einstein, but doing it on other alleged grounds. 
 The reader who does not intend to become an expert scient- 
 ist need not bother with relativity : if the relativitists dis- 
 cover any new fact" that is actually a fact they can state 
 it, even for themselves, much more clearly than in relativity 
 terms, in ordinary terms intelligible to the average reader. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. Theory of language in terms of Physical 
 Science; or, general unification of "science." 
 
 §67. a. In this chapter will be shown the general unifi- 
 cation of knowledge in terms of conventional physical ' 'meas- 
 urements," or experiments. I shall state more definitely 
 what that means :- All our positive language is based upon 
 explicit, or tacitly accepted, measures — is expressed in posi- 
 tive Many terms by means of using relationships, which are 
 the "measures." Thus, we speak constantly of a foot, acre, 
 quart, pound, meter, much, little, now, yesterday. Even 
 in the so-called "spiritual" business of (say) getting a wife 
 (or husband) we tacitly use measures :- e. g. , we ordinarily 
 would not accept a spouse who was two feet or ten feet tall, 
 who weighed a ton, or who in mental measures was "unbal- 
 anced." In short, our definite thought and talk is explicitly 
 in Many terms — involving either directly or with but slight 
 indirectness L and T, or some of the numerous practical 
 synonyms of those relationship terms. We talk and think 
 
61 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One VIII §68c 
 
 in so far as we do it positively and with perceptible useful- 
 ness (cf. §§166, 168), in terms or "measures" of the first 
 two members of our equation, That... X This... and M(vary- 
 ingwith)L?T~*, and have a meaning that is the One or religion 
 tautologically named by the third member. In a general 
 way, physics (or "natural science") is the broad outline 
 statement of such terms or measures made with respect to 
 what we. call "objective" or "material" things (for more 
 specific description of physics and science, see §§85-6). Those 
 terms are the easiest to use : when we learn to use them, 
 then we are more or less competent to use "subjective" or 
 spiritual" terms in Part Three. Hence, physics is simply 
 the actual use of our logic or consistent language, in connec- 
 tion with the simplest or least complicated Many parts (those 
 that are superficially that way, to be quite accurate: all 
 
 Many parts ultimately are identical in complication). 
 
 We may have a very fine, theoretically valid language; but 
 if we do not use it, apply it considerably to ourselves and our 
 environment, it is doing us no particular good. Physics uses 
 our logic mostly on the environment" — that being easier 
 to see definitely than ourselves. The general physics of this 
 chapter is therefore a rough , broad application of what we 
 have observed in this Part One. And it is a self-conscious, 
 broadly complete application, so that we may see how it is 
 done, and thus be able to understand our language and use 
 it ourselves for facts of direct interest to us. Physics them- 
 selves are ordinarily of slight direct interest to us : just 
 pure" physical statistics bore me dreadfully. But as 
 clues that enable us to derive the complete detective story 
 of the universe, physics are quite entertaining. As we are 
 going to find out what measures' are, mostly this chapter 
 is the explicit general application of M(varying ■with)l?T~^. 
 b. Hence, all of us who use language have some practi- 
 cal need for this chapter. However, in it I am going to unify 
 all things, in general explicitness, so that there may be no 
 question as to the rigorousness and applicability of our logic, 
 even in the minds of experts. Probably no reader, not even 
 the physical expert, happens to be familiar with and directly 
 interested in all the things which I happen to have looked up 
 and to have mentioned in this chapter. Consequently, parts 
 of it will be decidedly hard reading — rather dull and dry. 
 There is no practical way of avoiding that : everything that 
 is worth having costs some effort. However, the reader can 
 merely casually scan such parts, verifying for himself only 
 the passages that interest him and seem to be of use to him, 
 and (unless he is a professional scientist) he will miss a neg- 
 ligible amount. This is much the hardest" and dullest 
 chapter in the book. 
 
 §68. a. Orthodox scientists in effect undertake to make 
 a consistent theory of language or logic, naming the result 
 the theory of dimensions. For details of it, see any fairly full 
 physics ; for the few details we need here I use Ency. 
 Brit.," Art. "Units, Dimensions of"; Watson's Physics" 
 (see Appendix A), pp. 6-9; Daniell's "Physics," pp. 15-16, 
 746, 748. That conventional theory of dimensions, or logic 
 in terms of physics, is correct in principle so far as it goes : 
 it merely is incomplete, and hence gets into confusion with 
 some details. 
 
 b. Watson's "Physics" explicitly states that a dimen- 
 sion" is a relationship, thus :- "The relation by means of 
 which we derive the magnitude of the unit of any quantity, 
 in terms of the fundamental units, is indicated by what is 
 called the dimensions of the unit in question." The funda- 
 mental units are M, L, and T. To give an example of that 
 rather vague conventional definition of dimensions :- If we 
 write [V]==[M* > I}T~ 1 ~\, it means that a unit of velocity [V] 
 is equal to an agreed-upon unit length, divided by an agreed- 
 
 upon unit time (i. e., multiplied by [7 1-1 ]), with the agreed- 
 upon unit of mass equally applicable to all ( =°) cases, or from 
 the point of view, not explicitly involved (i. e., M°= 
 M/M"=M 1_1 =l). And that equation [V]={M! s L l Ir v [ is a 
 dimensional equation. The dimensions of V are said to be 
 0, 1, and — 1 ; or more fully, so as to be completely explicit, 
 the dimensions of V are [M^L^T" 1 ]. It is formally truistic 
 therefore that if a velocity is ever mentioned by physics the 
 explicit or full expression of it must involve just those dimen- 
 sions and none other. And orthodox texts correctly gener- 
 alize that into the principle that in any physical equation 
 which is valid or consistent the dimensions of each member 
 are the same (Watson's Physics," 790; Ency. Brit.," 
 xxvii, 787). Obviously, that actually is equivalent to our 
 principle that the logical proof of anything consists of reduc- 
 ing it to truisms (§35); so fundamentally, orthodox physics 
 is obviously directly our language' or logic' 
 
 c. A paragraph of arbitrary detail is required here. Or- 
 dinarily physics (as opposed to the theory of relativity) re- 
 gards the [M], etc., as being an agreed-upon unit, fixed and 
 constant, just as are the verbal forms of this book. Then, 
 when (l) various parts of the universe are expressed in terms 
 of that unit, or when (2) a given actual part of the universe 
 varies in different circumstances, the same arbitrary unit is 
 used for measuring (i. e., naming), and a numerical coefficient 
 added, which indicates (l) those different parts, and (2) those 
 changes. When ordinary physics is explicit, it usually uses 
 a small letter for that numerical coefficient or number or 
 measure":- thus mlM] means (say) SM, or 3 grams. Pre- 
 cisely the same agreements are used in everyday language. 
 Thus, as we have seen (§§60hi, 66fg), if we say boy,' the 
 expression is equivalent to [Ml; and we say John, a boy,' 
 big boy, five year old boy, etc., in which the added words 
 or phrases are equivalent to a number, or general name or 
 measure, or numerical coefficient m — and boy' stays steady" 
 or constant, or an agreed-upon verbal unit of the Many 
 
 like the form [Ml. In this book our fundamental 
 
 principle that we shall keep the three sorts of words uncon- 
 fused is itself equivalent to saying that our fundamental 
 equation That. . . X This. . . =M(varying ■with)!? 7 1_2 = Universe 
 or Energy is a dimensional equation in which (l) the dots ... 
 and the {varying ■with)' are symbols which are precisely 
 equivalent to those numerical coefficients (as we shall see 
 throughout the chapter; — and it is to be noted that in our 
 equation we always not only express the existence of those 
 coefficients, but also indicate their variable character) ; and 
 in which (2) our M, L, and T are the dimensional units con- 
 ventionally printed with the brackets around them; and in 
 which lastly (3) the That and This (without the dots) are 
 equivalent to such conventional dimensional quantities as lV^ 
 (i. e., That and This, and all names in physics such as V, 
 are not complete and explicit expressions, but are irrational as 
 
 more fully defined in §71g). Therefore, because the 
 
 method of speech we are using is already explicitly what 
 physics calls dimensional, we do not need to distinguish such 
 equations by putting the quantities in brackets. Also, as we 
 see throughout this chapter (cf. also §§134, 136,' 138, etc.), 
 orthodox physics uses terms (such as K and U; Index, "K" 
 and " U") which are not dimensional although orthodoxly 
 more or less taken to be so, but are numerical coefficients. 
 So if we were to use such brackets in this book, it would not 
 be possible to use them in a conventional way, because of 
 that orthodox confusion, and also because of the fact that M 
 is not the same sort of formal word that L and T are, and 
 the brackets conventionally used would tend to imply that it 
 is, Obviously, the brackets used by physics indicate a vague 
 and perhaps even conscious yearning to have relationship 
 
§68c IX One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 62 
 
 terms always distinguished formally from Many names (cf. 
 §§62f, 44). Hence, I omit those brackets hereafter, and 
 will gradually clear up that double confusion that exists in 
 conventional physics, as it becomes intelligible to do so. 
 
 d. Now, from our investigation of language we have in 
 effect seen:- (l) that all complete sentences are dimensional 
 equations ; (2) that such valid sentences have the same di- 
 mensions in each member ; (3) that finally such dimensions 
 really sum to zero (or °°); (4) and hence all valid sentences 
 are ultimately truisms of the form A=A ; and (5) therefore 
 all verbal "proofs" reduce to that truistic form as being the 
 proof. That is the summary of Part One in terms of physics 
 or physical equations. In detail it obviously means this :- 
 The first member of the general equation is That. . . X This. . . , 
 which, fully expressed, is (ThatY.This)ML™ T"" —and that 
 form permits the tautological (ThatyCThis) to be dropped if 
 we like, so that we have the Many unit M, with actual "di- 
 mensions" or relationships that are °° — °°, or (and the M 
 itself, taking it directly, is all things, or from that point of 
 view has °° dimensions). The second member, M(varying 
 witti)L?T~^, is similarly one in which the actual dimensions 
 are always 2 — 2, or » — 00, etc., or zero — leaving again the 
 Many name M. The third member, Universe or Meaning or 
 Energy, obviously contains no real dimensions (or °° dimen- 
 sions from the other view), or has zero dimensions," and 
 simply implies that it may be arbitrarily divided into M's if 
 we like. So we really have the truism, in physical terms, 
 M=M—M: or, more explicitly, as one M implies others :- 
 All M's— All M's=All M's, and all M's are unified or con- 
 nected. In that equation M is not a dimension" or relation- 
 ship term (but from the other point of view it explicitly 
 implies infinite relationship; the relationship terms can not 
 properly be dropped from positive language ; the definite 
 equation obviously should be M. .. = M. . .=M. .., where ... 
 indicate the dimensions, thus become symbolically infinite). 
 
 e. Now, the orthodox theory of dimensions does not 
 precisely assert the last paragraph. But I think it is obvious 
 that the conventional theory of dimensions has been striving 
 to say just that paragraph — and very clearly means it. 
 Therefore, in brief, our investigation of language is nothing 
 more than a series of observations of commonplaces, which 
 gives us the same speech or logic" that physical science 
 uses and formally names theory of dimensions." By go- 
 ing at that theory in terms of everyday life, we saw defin- 
 itely its completion, and meaning. 
 
 f. We need to look at the physics method of speech 
 from one more aspect:- I must again anticipate the proof 
 (§§88, 83, 100, etc.), and assert that we observe different 
 things (split the universe into M's) by noting their 
 
 surfaces or bounding zones, which are at about the con- 
 ventional 'velocity of light. " (I. e., we in practice divide 
 or split a chair from the rest of the universe because various 
 outside layers of what we call the chair send light" to our 
 eyes, or quantitatively similarly affect other nerves; if we 
 
 set fire to the chair those velocities change enough to 
 modify our splittings considerably.) The completest theory 
 in orthodox physics is electricity (XIV). That theory uses 
 two names, if and U (which, with respect to electricity, 
 mean respectively the same that visibility and transparence, 
 and somewhat synonymous words, mean with respect to 
 light). K and U are used to give the measures of electrical 
 M's. Orthodoxly, they are nominally dimensions, although 
 it is frankly asserted by competent physicists that their nat- 
 ure is unknown (Watson's ' Physics," 789). But by ordi- 
 nary experiments physicists find that K and U together 
 directly assert the velocity of light. That is to say, all elec- 
 trical M's or parts of the Many are also distinguished or split 
 
 from the rest of the universe (or "measured" — distinguished 
 and observed and separated into parts and considered different, 
 and all such terms, are simply synonyms of the formal tech- 
 nical term measured) — all electrical M's are also, like a chair, 
 distinguished by what is ultimately the average velocity of 
 light in their neighborhood. And there are names or meas- 
 ures' exactly analogous to K and U in all phenomena. So it 
 perhaps is now generally obvious to the reader that K and U, 
 and the other similar terms, are identical in meaning (but 
 explicit in what we might call quantity of meaning) with our 
 '(varying with).' I. e., they are numerical coefficients which 
 merely designate which actual M it is we are naming by 
 means of the fixed standard form, M — regardless of what 
 "sort" of "phenomenon" we are talking about. They in- 
 dicate that we mean the 'boy K' or the boy John' or even 
 'the boy matter that has now grown into the man light 1 
 when we name a boy in certain circumstances — i. e., in 
 certain phenomena. 
 
 g. Well; that is the total theory or inwardness" of 
 physical science, and the explicit statement of the solution of 
 the only general unsolved problem" in orthodox science. 
 It is no problem ; to repeat, competent physicists know that 
 its non-solution is a verbal confusion, and hence is merely an 
 incompleteness. The theory of physics is hence very simple; 
 anybody not mentally defective can understand that all it is, 
 is a very carefully explicit naming of all its boys' — of all its 
 M's regardless of what clothes or even disguises" they 
 wear, of what changes in appearances (dignifiedly called 
 "transformations") they pass through. The method or way 
 of doing that naming is precisely the way we use daily in 
 talking about different boys ; the physicists call it by the 
 large name theory of dimensions, but there is no reason 
 to fear a cow even if it be referred to as a bos taurus. 
 
 h. Consequently, physics merely applies the theory of 
 language we have seen, (l) using four or five sets of 'tech- 
 nical terms" instead of the set That...yiThis... (there is a 
 set for electricity, one for heat, etc.), and (2) getting defin- 
 ite numbers, measures, or names for the general (varying 
 •with)' in the second member. We saw in the last chapter 
 that we can make models of language and thus make lang- 
 uage more intelligible to us. In the same way we can make 
 models or machines" or mechanical theories of the particu- 
 lar expressions of physics, and make physics more intelli- 
 gible. Part Two is for that : in' this chapter we take just 
 the general language of physics. 
 
 i. And we see again (cf. §67b) that this chapter will 
 not be quite familiar, and hence will be hard reading in 
 places. We now see definitely that part of that results be- 
 cause of the confusion which is in orthodox science. The 
 fact is that I personally derived the theory of language by 
 definitely starting with orthodox physical equations and 
 eliminating their inconsistencies. But by actual experience 
 I have found that that directly "scientific" way of unifying 
 science is so deadly dull, especially to professional scientists, 
 that people would rarely read it, and could not keep their 
 minds on it long enough to comprehend it when they did 
 read it. They can't see at first just what it is "good for." 
 It actually is highly useful, and some parts of it are likely to 
 be of interest to the general reader. It is useful because it 
 shows explicitly the general way of making all positive state- 
 ments (that being the base of science, engineering, etc.) — 
 and is brief enough to be grasped in a lump, especially as I 
 have so violently condensed the chapter. But there is no 
 particular reason why the reader who is not directly inter- 
 ested in the special facts to be noticed should make an effort 
 to remember them. 
 
 §69. a. In this book I shall use for the most part the 
 
63 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §71b 
 
 conventional physical symbols, as given in "Ency. Brit.," 
 xxvii, 786-45, and Watson's "Physics," 7f, 843f, 789f, 
 adding subscripts r , e, or dots ..., or coefficients to them 
 when necessary to distinguish explicitly the three parts of 
 the Trinity, and substituting English for two Greek letters 
 — there being objections to lugging in Greek if English will 
 serve. The orthodox fundamental equations are of course 
 supposed to be simply a shorthand way of stating the results 
 of different sorts of systematic measurements — of explicit 
 naming. I take it for granted that the reader is roughly 
 aware of how those experiments or measures are made. In 
 the end, of course, all measurements, all observations, consist 
 in observing space (and time) coincidences (or negatively, 
 lack of coincidences); e. g., noting that the top of one 
 boy s head will reach to the same mark as that of another 
 boy s — all that being a mere truism of what we have already 
 seen about language. But if it happens that in any case 
 where I omit statement of details the reader is not roughly 
 familiar with the orthodox experiments he can find descrip- 
 tions of them in any fairly full physics or encyclopedia. 
 
 b. And in this book, unless otherwise specified by the 
 context, we shall use the ordinary scientific units :- M is 
 the unit representing the mass or quantity (§§70-4.) of a por- 
 tion of matter which weighs a gram at a given place, under 
 given conditions (including date, or T). L is the unit of 
 space, a centimeter, which is the l/lOO part of the distance 
 under certain conditions (including date) between certain 
 marks on a metal bar — kept in Paris, I believe. T is the 
 unit of time, a second, which is the l/86,400 part of an av- 
 erage solar day of the present. The average solar day varies, 
 so we do not know exactly how long a second is, any more 
 than we know exactly the unit M and unit L. 
 
 §70. a. Conventionally, W=Mg; or weight W of a 
 a body M is equal to the mass M of the body multiplied by 
 the number g, which number names or measures the accel- 
 eration given the body by the force of gravity acting at a 
 certain place under certain conditions, as observed by experi- 
 ments. (Incidentally, under average conditions in temper- 
 ate latitudes at sea level on earth, g is approximately 
 981cm/sec 2 , or 32ft/sec 2 .) That equation is a numerical or 
 non-dimensional one. W is (conventionally : all this is 
 orthodox, as stated) the force of gravity at a given place 
 and time. Acceleration is the change in velocity during a 
 unit time, or is equal to V\T; F=LT~ l , and hence Accel- 
 eration=LT~ l j T=LT~ 2 - Hence, the dimensional form of 
 the equation for W is F{qf gravity)=MLT~ 2 - Convention- 
 ally, any unit F is equal to, or measured by, the fact that 
 it results in giving unit mass a unit acceleration ; i. e. , if we 
 push with a certain force on a ball, the ball will roll 
 faster and faster if free" to move, under average conditions. 
 Or, as the brief way of saying that :- F=MLT~ 2 . And 
 orthodoxly, energy is force-acting-through-space (the amount 
 of the results of force) ; or Energy=FXL=MLT- 2 XL= 
 ML 2 T~ 2 . Now, orthodoxly, Newton's law of gravity (usually 
 I shall refer to it simply as 'Newton's law') asserts that 
 every body M in the universe attracts every other body M 
 with a force F that varies in each case directly as the two 
 attracting masses and inversely as the square of the distance 
 L between them. If we take all three as being units, we 
 may condense Newton's law to the dimensional equation, 
 F(of gravity)=M 2 Ir 2 . 
 
 b. Therefore, we have by orthodox physics two equa- 
 tions for F when it is a certain kind of force (the force of 
 gravity) :- F{qf gravity)=MLT~ 2 , and F(qf gravity)= 
 M 2 T~ 2 . Consequently, if we stick to our fundamental 
 agreement A=A, or to the conventional axiom that things 
 equal to the same thing are equal to each other, then ortho- 
 
 doxly the two F's are equal, and we have MLT" 2 =M 2 L~ 2 - 
 From that, by algebra, 2- 2 =MZT 3 ; or (l) T^^M^L 3 ; or 
 (2) M=L 3 T~ 2 ; or (3) JL^MT 2 . Obviously, any of those 
 three formulas, explicitly interpreted, is sheer nonsense. 
 The first asserts that a time, squared, is equal to a solid 
 space divided by a body; the second, that a body is a solid 
 space divided by a time, squared; the third, that a solid 
 space is a body multiplied by a time, squared — all mutually 
 contradictory nonsense, and all violating the orthodox prin- 
 ciple that the dimensions on the two sides should be the same 
 (§68b). Orthodox science has for years recognized that such 
 a nonsensical self-contradiction existed at its very base or 
 beginning. 
 
 c. It immediately follows, that (l) the orthodox defini- 
 tion of F is wrong; or (2) the orthodox law of gravity is 
 wrong ; or (3) both are wrong. We find that both are wrong 
 (§74d). That is to say, in defining or writing both of them, 
 conventional science simply failed to note and express ex- 
 plicitly all that was actually observed. The difficulty with 
 both is that too much is left to implication — i. e., orthodox 
 science in them gives no indication as to which of the 
 three sorts of words is being used, and mixes them. Science 
 now actually knows the facts quite well; but there is so 
 much of the expression of those facts omitted in the equations 
 for F, W, and F{qf gravity) that as soon as the equations are 
 compared (to see if science keeps on sticking to A^A), ex- 
 plicit nonsense results. Hence, what we have to do now is 
 to observe just what is meant, and say it explicitly. 
 
 d. The truth of the matter is that F and W in the equa- 
 tions are not the same, and ought not to have been equated. 
 F is a general way of considering a part of the expression for 
 Energy (and only the total expression of it is intelligible and 
 verbally consistent, anyway; §71g); and W is another sort 
 of part of that expression for Energy. But there is nothing 
 in orthodox physics which explicitly asserts that about those 
 equations, or which in any way explicitly holds that what I 
 did in par. b is not permissible (I merely did with orthodox 
 physics what I did in §44 with orthodox mathematics) — ex- 
 cept of course it is recognized that such nonsense would re- 
 sult, and so conventional physics usually stops before it 
 writes those queer equations — keeps its skeletons decorously 
 in the closet. 
 
 §71. a. In the first place we can observe that physics 
 undertakes to use F or force itself simultaneously as a Many 
 word and as a relationship word — and then later on uses it 
 as a standard One. Thus in Newton's law, F=MM'/L 2 , F 
 expresses a relationship between two bodies M and M , and 
 is identical in real meaning with cohesion or love (§88), or 
 God the Holy Ghost. But in the orthodox equation FXL= 
 ML 2 T~ 2 = Energy, F is actually an M, a part of the universe, 
 or a Many word (just as in That...XThis..., That... implies 
 an M, or is a Many word ; §36l). And in the orthodox 
 equation F=MLT~~ 2 , F is substantially a One word, as it is 
 absolutely alone. (As a matter of fact [cf. par. g], all of 
 these orthodox equations are logically mystic — i. e., all 
 their symbols are more or less One words. The assignment 
 just made of orthodox F s as various sorts of words is based 
 on the point of view developed by this book.) 
 
 b. The simplest way in which we can use the conven- 
 tional F, and other symbols, and at the same time keep our 
 thought clear and definite (i. e. , avoid the classic-logic or 
 dualistic mysticism just mentioned), and thus arrive at valid 
 conclusions by following the logical rule (§§43-4), is to dis- 
 tinguish its three uses in the Trinity by three explicit modifi- 
 cations. For such three uses, I shall use two subscripts, 
 r and c, and the dots ... or a numerical coefficient (C, G, K, 
 U, H, J, etc.) that is equivalent to the dots. The subscript 
 
§Tlb IX One 
 
 T means that the symbol it is used with is a relationship 
 word — equivalent to X, -^, =, etc. The subscript e means 
 a zero (or infinity) or One word — usually a standard unit or 
 One. (The , is the initial letter of relationship; I couldn't 
 buy the type for a letter more suitable than e except at a 
 silly price, so I use e , which can be remembered by the fact 
 that it looks somewhat like a little zero.) Our symbol M 
 standing just alone (and also, formally, all the M's used in 
 orthodox science) is a standard unit or One; i. e., at a certain 
 time and place it is taken as a fixed standard, and it is then 
 logically or formally considered to remain so as a word, and 
 always to refer back to those formally absolute conditions 
 (cf. §68c). Consequently, as an M, or other symbol, stand- 
 ing alone formally (i. e., without any dots, or coefficient, or 
 subscript r ) is thus formally indicated to be such a standard, 
 there actually is no positive need to distinguish it by the 
 subscript e ; but often hereafter, as a means of typographic- 
 ally emphasizing its standard nature, I use the subscript. 
 Then, a symbol followed by the dots, or by a coefficient 
 (§72), or by its general equivalent '{varying with), is a 
 
 That. . . , a Many word ; examples :- M. . . , MC, F... . 
 
 Further, as there are different "sorts" of force (i. e., con- 
 
 ventionally, but not at all necessarily, a force is named with 
 various names to indicate "different" phenomena), etc., 
 when it is convenient and clearer thus to name them, I add 
 either the subscript s , meaning a "static phenomenon, or 
 m , meaning a "dynamic" one, and at times further add, in 
 parentheses, the name of the phenomenon. 
 
 c. Now, if we wish to name at least two M s, in order 
 that later on we may say something about them, clearly we 
 must assert that there are such two parts of the universe, 
 with a relationship F T . That is positively all that F r is — a 
 pure verbal assumption or agreement, serving as a verbal basis 
 of then making an intelligible statement. Then, if we assert 
 that the M's related by the F r do move relatively to each 
 other, there has been a That... or M. . . or F. .. (i. e., an M 
 asserted related) which is compared with the This... which 
 is-are the other M's (any motion of one M, except in the 
 case of an abstract unit or standard, which only exists as a 
 verbal form, changes it to M. ..); and that comparison, or 
 That. . . X This. . . , or standard One or Energy, is u, complete 
 meaning. So we begin to state the implications of our scien- 
 tific" equations, just as was done with Tkis's and That's in 
 §§33-7, as a means of finding out how to make any valid 
 scientific equation or statement. It is a repetition, in 
 
 scientific" terms — and so I shall condense considerably. 
 The reader already knows the principles — he will see merely 
 the rigorous, definite application of them, which of course 
 serves as final proof of those principles of language. 
 
 d. The orthodox expression FXL (which equals Energy 
 or ML 2 T~ 2 [§70a], F e being equal to M e LT~ 2 ) is obviously 
 an implication that a standard Me might move over a space Le 
 relative to the implied M e at that location — i. e., the L e is 
 the implied space between the two implied M's, and hence is 
 the "potential" (i. e., implied' or possible" motion) of 
 the two. Consequently, the conventional FXL is actually 
 FeXLe when it is explicitly written and is a pure mysticism 
 equivalent to the similarly pure mysticism ML 2 T~ 2 or its 
 explicit equivalent M e L 2 T~ 2 — i. e., it does not assert, but only 
 implies motion. But clearly, those implications of naming or 
 
 measuring, just as we saw in the discussion of That. . . X 
 This... (§36), explicitly imply the form (M... XM...)L X 'T'' X ' . 
 That form, depending on how we modify its symbolic ex- 
 pression, clearly is identical with either the first or the sec- 
 ond member of our general equation — to either That. . . X 
 This... or to Mivarying with)l?T~ 2 . As we wish to retain 
 conventional symbols (I am forced to, if\ translate them), we 
 
 UNIVERSE 6 * 
 
 may therefore write that form as F...XL... (and further as 
 (M...)L 2 T~ 2 or (MC)L 2 T- 2 ; see §72d). F... and L... are 
 actual Many words— not the standard units or M's taken as 
 the One that are used in the orthodox absolutely mystic 
 formula FeXLe or FXL. 
 
 e. As we shall see in more and more detail, any scien- 
 tific equation may have a member of that That. . . X This. . . 
 form. In that F...XL... form the F... (or the orthodox F 
 or F e ) or analogous term, is conventionally named the exten- 
 sive factor; and L... (or L or Le) or any analogous term is 
 the intensive factor. Obviously, "extensive factor" agrees 
 with the usual meaning of That:- something away from this ; 
 a completing part or factor, extending the This out. And 
 "intensive" is This — something intensely right here. 
 
 f. In this book I always print as the first in the pair 
 That. ..XTkis..., the factor which seems to be usually re- 
 garded as the extensive one. 'That' obviously by usual con- 
 vention has a meaning more "extensive" than This' — but 
 not necessarily so; it depends solely upon the point of view. 
 
 g. Also, those two factors, F. . . and L. . . and all analo- 
 gous ones, are both irrational factors. I. e., each is utterly 
 meaningless when used alone: factor itself means a part, and 
 clearly a part truistically is not a whole or meaning, but ex- 
 plicitly implies incompleteness, and lack of positiveness. 
 That simply means that any Many word implies all the other 
 parts of the Many — that it is sheer, irrational nonsense to 
 say that a Many word, which formally names a part, simul- 
 taneously is not formally a part, but is formally an absolute 
 Whole. Also, the expression FeXLe (or its more con- 
 
 ventional form FXL.) from the point of view of positiveness is 
 obviously utterly irrational — as Fe and Le are by verbal 
 agreement fixed or formal standard units or Ones that as such 
 logically or truistically contradict being related with the re- 
 sulting variableness. Only as we let FXL imply other ex- 
 pression which is variable and actual and hence positive 
 can it have any actual meaning ; otherwise it is really (as 
 well as formally — and in order to handle the One and Many 
 with valid logic it must be formally or verbally) dualism or 
 the old classic logic, and fundamentally also really nonsensi- 
 cal. E. g., some militaristic Germans tried to consider the 
 This which was their State as being alone worth considering, 
 and a being a real One — and many of the historical results 
 clearly showed the stupidity and ridiculousness of their view. 
 
 h. So it is already generally evident that the difficulty 
 with orthodox physics is that it is not sufficiently explicit. It 
 unwittingly tried to simplify too much and fell into relig- 
 ious or mystic expression. Simplification" actually con- 
 sists of translation into familiar ( common") terms; it does 
 not mean the ignoring of many things that actually exist, in 
 order to get mere superficial verbal brevity. 
 
 i. In using such pairs of factors physics obviously uses 
 precisely the same sort of Many names, in precisely the 
 the same sort of way, that ordinary language does. Hence, 
 the factors may be called naming factors ; the more explicit 
 second member of the equation is the measuring member. 
 E. g., in the orthodox physics of gases the names are pressure 
 and volume (pXv; and clearly p and v indicates names more 
 definitely that they do measures, although both are the same 
 in the end); in heat, they are entropy and temperature (EntX 
 Temp); in electricity, quantity of electricity, and potential 
 or intensity or pressure of electricity (QXP); etc. In 
 Richards's explicitly complete extension of Van der Waals's 
 gas equation or kinetic theory, orthodox physics definitely 
 requires or uses the dots, or infinite regress, after those 
 Many names or factors (§§82, 92-3). So I am agreeing with 
 orthodox physics, and not really doing anything new. 
 
 j. That covers broadly the theory of the first member of 
 
65 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §72d 
 
 our general equation, as it is used by science." We go on 
 to the broad consideration of the second or measuring mem- 
 ber, and then take up details. 
 
 §72. a. Explicitly speaking in "scientific" terms (and 
 that explicitness makes this paragraph unfamiliar and queer 
 in form), a specified amount of energy (i. e., a standard or 
 whole universe or One, Energy) is equal to the movement of a 
 specified quantity of matter (which quantity or Many part is 
 hence truistically, or formally necessarily, named relatively 
 to at least one other specified quantity) ; and that meaning of 
 energy truistically implies that the movement must verbally 
 take place' or be expressed. I. e., Energy is motion (expressed 
 of course as the measure ' of it); but further, the verbal 
 assumption of such motion (which is of course necessarily 
 made when we try to express energy) requires a verbal asser- 
 tion of motion — a formal truism which orthodox science over- 
 looks, so that its Energy or M e L 2 T~ 2 is not positive 
 
 language: it should be M e L?T~ s , as we shall see. I 
 
 have not there assumed motion." Just as in §22, it was 
 verbally taken that there existed something which we talk 
 about; if so, then the talk of relative parts is motion. 
 Clearly, if a person does not care to say, with everyday peo- 
 ple, that there is motion, then he can take an absolutely 
 static reality or Nirvana, in which nothing changes or varies, 
 but which he describes by arbitrary variation in mere form or 
 relationship of words — a really non-existent change, and 
 hence a verbal proof or truism, of absolutely no motion. 
 
 b. I shall now express in symbols that explicit Energy. 
 The specified quantity of matter is expressed in standard un- 
 its by M (or Me). The movement' is, in verbally the most 
 parsimonious way, expressed by LT~^ (i. e., not with ulti- 
 mate accuracy as » One by LT -00 ). Then, still quoting 
 from the last paragraph, the truistic naming of M relative to 
 at least one other M' requires at least one more verbal rela- 
 tionship form LT -1 . Next, in order to get the movement 
 verbally to 'take place,' and complete the most parsimonious 
 set of truisms, we must have at least one more relationship 
 form jLT -1 (all that being the "scientific" point of view of 
 §59). And letting the at least one more M (an M ) be im- 
 plied (or letting it be considered to have really joined with 
 the standard M or Me), and collecting together the three 
 LT~ v s that were used, we have:- Energy=ML z T~ z , as a 
 preliminary most frugal sort of expression of energy; — the 
 expression is really mystic unless we include as being a part 
 of it, its context that the M implies at least one more M ; 
 but our chief present interest is the L S T~ S , instead of the 
 L 2 T~ 2 in the conventional ML 2 T~~ 2 . We can see at once 
 that instead of L 3 T~ S , complete expression would have been 
 jjoj-m — jj Ut we neec | not go a g a i n m to the fact that L S T~ S 
 is a practical replacement of that infinite regress and makes 
 the equation inaccurate (§38). Further, orthodox equations 
 omit and thus imply one LT~ X both in defining Energy and 
 in making the actual measurements. I. e. , in making the 
 measurements those orthodox equations tacitly assume that 
 the observer moves at zero velocity in order to measure (i. e., 
 that he sees both M's simultaneously), or at an infinite veloc- 
 ity (i. e., asserts a space between the M's, but ignores its 
 existence or passes over it in zero time) — all of which 
 amounts to asserting Energy=ML 2 T~ 7 ', which expression 
 hence actually asserts that there is absolutely zero potential 
 (or zero L) between the two M's, so that they really could 
 not exhibit any energy. It therefore results that ME 2 T~' 1 
 is absolutely not, of itself, the positive expression of anything, 
 even if the M is considered as expressing at least two M's : 
 it is absolutely ineffable. But, it furnishes a standard One, 
 and it together with the context we are to supply is to be used 
 as a scientific expression for Energy just as it is now used. 
 
 c. We noted in the last paragraph that in measuring the 
 unified bodies Me in M e L 2 T~ 2 , we tacitly assumed that the 
 observer (in going from 'egg' to 'pencil' as in §36) took his 
 speed of measuring or observing to be either zero or infinity 
 — i. e., to be absolutely constant, and hence as not needing to be 
 expressed. If the speed is not such, then (as a verbal truism 
 shown in §361 — or as a truism of the fact in par. a that the 
 M's are "moving") every M, for each person at each 
 instant, is necessarily designated by a different name, or else 
 there is a quantitative inaccuracy (as a matter of fact, our 
 speed in that measuring or observing is, to use ordinary 
 language, the velocity of light; so the inaccuracy is slight 
 with respect to things in our everyday practical environment; 
 but it is indispensable that we notice the logic definitely if 
 we are to claim to talk consistently and carefully, and are to 
 have a valid or even a really intelligible physics). Orthodox 
 science takes cognizance of those facts in relativity (§66) ; 
 we are now going to do so without having to abandon our 
 mutual language and then have a formally private language 
 for each person. Obviously, the only possible way to make 
 our equation for Energy formally correct is to put in, or ex- 
 press explicitly, that it is quantitatively inaccurate (which 
 inaccuracy of course resulted when we dropped the explicit 
 jL" j 7 ,_ °°), and also of itself has a logical omission. 
 
 d. Now, the ordinary standard unit Me which we use is 
 a gram-mass, which is the matter" or substance or part of 
 the universe that is the 1/1000 part of a lump of platinum 
 kept in Paris (Daniell's 'Physics," 13). We distinguish it 
 — only can observe or measure it — because its outer atoms or 
 molecules have zones of ether thatmove at about the velocity 
 of light in our neighborhood (XIII) — actually a varying ve- 
 locity itself (§127). We ourselves as a molar M are more or 
 less at rest (static) compared with that high velocity — not 
 absolutely so, however. Therefore, we assume that we take 
 an average M, and that we may formally for verbal purposes 
 take it to be absolutely fixed and constant always and every- 
 where — i. e., is explicitly an Me. Then, because we observe 
 that any actual body or M. .. varies, we must add to that 
 formal M or Me the dots ..., or a numerical coefficient (a 
 
 number, such as 1 . 0002... : it can never be accurately a 
 commensurate or rational" or exact number), which we 
 shall call C (that C indicating that we are referring to "ordi- 
 nary or molar bodies, as arbitrarily distinguished from elec- 
 tricity, atoms, light, etc.). Or. MC is merely another way 
 of writing M. .. or M(varying with) (§7 lb); we use that way 
 because conventional science in a number of cases in effect 
 has such letter symbols in its equations. In writing its 
 equation Energy=ML?T~ 2 orthodox science omits explicitly 
 including any equivalent of C — thus (l) taking it quantita- 
 tively for granted that C is equal to 1 ; and (2) taking it 
 logically or qualitatively for granted that C is always steady 
 or a constant, which is absolutely wrong. As a matter of 
 fact, in most practical affairs with molar bodies, C substan- 
 tially is equal to 1 , and is approximately, but never qualita- 
 tively, a constant. But in heat, electricity, light, chemistry, 
 all molecular physics, most gas phenomena, gravity, biology, 
 psychology, etc., C is so far from being a constant, and has 
 changed so much from its quantitative value in molar phys- 
 ics, that in most of those cases orthodox science explicitly 
 gives C a name, experimentally finds it to have that changed 
 value (sometimes an enormous change), and hence usually 
 gives the C different names, and also names those cases' or 
 "phenomena" or branches" of science differently, taking 
 the C of each to be unity for that branch — thus splitting 
 
 science" into parts or formally disconnected branches, 
 whereas nothing changes between any two branches but 
 velocities, or the measures of velocities — both being arbitrary 
 
§72d IX One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 66 
 
 anyway. The real confusion in science is caused by the fact 
 that in effect in each branch the original formal or quali- 
 tative error is repeated :- that of asserting that the new C, 
 with its different value, is a constant — thus in effect asserting 
 flatly, with no experimental proof of it, that a unification of 
 science is impossible, and making a verbal impass that has 
 produced the queer relativity theory as an exaggerated re- 
 action. Therefore, from the point of view of the 
 
 measuring member M(varying with)L 2 T~ 2 , our unification of 
 science will consist of replacing the {varying with)' with the 
 symbols already mostly found by science, and showing that 
 not onl}' by our already observed verbal truisms, but also by 
 scientific experiments those symbols are all identical in 
 character and in measured quantity vary continuously so that 
 there can be nothing but an arbitrary quantitative line be- 
 tween different" phenomena. That is obviously identi- 
 cally the same in principle as unifying science with respect 
 to the first member by always explicitly adding the dots as in 
 F...XI... (§71e-i); here, M(varying ■with)L 2 T~ 2 is equiva- 
 lent to (M...)L 2 T~ 2 , and we are to be explicit about the dots. 
 
 e. We may now see very briefly some general direct ex- 
 perimental proof that every actual body varies:- (l) The 
 quickest statement of that proof is :- observe that every act- 
 ual body changes — very perceptibly so if we watch it for a 
 long enough time. (2) The general technical experimental 
 proof is that it is observed that mass varies with velocity. 
 
 (3) Particular proof is, that it can be noted that every so- 
 called physical constant unit has to be described carefully as 
 to date and place — numerous conditions given — before it is 
 considered to be even approximate ; and then it is agreed 
 that no two observers of it are likely to coincide exactly in 
 their measures. The variation is orthodoxly called personal 
 error, etc. , but no proof exists that man is subject to varia- 
 tion or errors while other bodies are miraculously im- 
 mune. That is a direct implication of the infinite regress — 
 of the symbolic need of dots in M. .., or of the C in MC. 
 
 (4) Further, modern physics, in mechanical theories (in the 
 naming member That... XThis...), substantially reduces all 
 phenomena to a passage or flow of electrons (which have 
 mass and weight) between the various bodies involved in the 
 phenomena; so truistically, the bodies or M's vary. (E. g., 
 if we were merely to look at the standard 1000-gram body 
 in Paris, it actually changes as a result, due to the passage 
 of electrons in the light phenomena that are involved [XIV]. 
 It is quite true that the change is of practically no quantita- 
 tive importance — it would probably be too small to measure 
 by any direct means now available. But it is equally true 
 that it is absolutely wrong to assert, by conventionally using 
 ML?T~ 2 , that there is no change.) We see other ex- 
 perimental proofs throughout the rest of the book. 
 
 f. Consequently, we have in physics, for the funda- 
 mental positive equation for molar bodies (subject to an 
 additional implied LT~ l ) :- 
 
 F...XL... =MCL 2 T- 2 =Energy(molar) . 
 
 §78. a. We shall at once plunge into the meaning, im- 
 plications, and expansion of that somewhat odd looking equa- 
 tion. What we are going to see now is shown in §§75-81 to 
 be nearly explicitly what conventional science asserts in elec- 
 tricity and substantially in heat. So there is essentially 
 nothing novel about our equation. 
 
 b. We have seen that each of the first two members 
 implies at least two M's. The L. .. in F. .. XL... is implic- 
 itly an assertion of a molar body, which we can consider to 
 be M . Now, we wish to assert the relationship of F. .. and 
 L. .. more explicitly than that abbreviated F...XL... does 
 it. I shall condense the statement of that relationship in 
 this paragraph; but not until all the meaning of the equation, 
 
 including the explicit mathematical values of F. .. and L... 
 (par. g), is seen, can this paragraph seem very intelligible. 
 
 We take it that u relationship (the X) exists across 
 
 a space between two molar bodies Mand M' , and we wish 
 to express that relationship with formal completeness (when 
 we do that I usually name the X more explicitly:- F r ). 
 The surfaces of the bodies are their sole property, as molar 
 bodies — a truism, as property simply ultimately means an ex- 
 pression of, or a concrete, separation into parts, as we shall see 
 more and more clearly in this chapter. I. e., a body is a 
 molar body when we consider that it has a surface zone of 
 motion — the insides of the body being static or motionless so 
 far as formal expression explicitly goes (of course, such a 
 condition is never true of any actual body, and hence such 
 formal molar equations are never accurate — and unless 
 understood to imply the present context, by the agreement 
 that C is variable infinitely, conventional molar or static equa- 
 tions are illogical). Furthermore, because of the formally 
 omitted LT~ l , the space between Mand M is also consid- 
 ered to be logically negligible, or constant, or static, or 
 traveled over in the process of naming in absolutely zero 
 time (§72b), so that that space is simply and solely the divi- 
 sion (a relationship) of the One into at least two parts. 
 (I. e. , the L. .. tends to take on the form L r , and finally 
 changes in the L e which is the L" in the orthodox FXL; 
 — the three forms of the Trinity are so intimately mixed in 
 that L" that to reform the confusion science humanly used 
 the unnecessarily violent method of revolting to relativity, 
 in which the Le, or the L in MCL 2 T~ 2 , is entirely thrown 
 away or repudiated verbally — although still tacitly used.) 
 Hence, that space Lr (actually the X in F. .. XL. ..) is form- 
 ally or logically a symbol or a surface' — what I shall call a 
 difference surface, meaning not a geometrical surface, but a 
 bounding zone. Incidentally, the "F" in the ortho- 
 dox FXL, when that FXL is implicitly taken to have a 
 meaning, like our L. . . implies other forms of the Trinity ; 
 but technically the orthodox F XL is a rigid and hence mys- 
 tic FeXLe, as we shall see further. 
 
 c. We have then a formal relationship F T from M' ex- 
 tending across a logically or formally dead or static space 
 which we may call d (distance: it is a conventional symbol, 
 equivalent to L), to another body M. I. e., the two bodies 
 are actually united, but we verbally take them to be separ- 
 ated by the formal relationship space d, and then assert the 
 relationship force F r as uniting them — that being the usual 
 formal cancellation of the verbal contradiction in the One 
 and Many. I shall call that F r across an absolutely formal 
 relationship space:- 'F r (molar)' — in agreement with the 
 
 conventions stated in the last paragraph. As we are 
 
 speaking ordinary 3-dimension language, therefore, as a tru- 
 ism (cf. §§36de, 59), as we move formally (as a relationship 
 LT~ l ) from M' to M, the cancelling relationship or force F r 
 (which here takes the place of the usual "time" — or is an 
 "objective" synonym of the "subjective" T; cf. §§150-l) 
 must also spread out into the other two dimensions ; for, the 
 relationship is inclusive of all M's, as a truism of its original 
 introduction into the discussion; or, M itself (by §59) has 
 by our parsimonious explicit language, three dimensions. 
 Putting that observation of verbal truisms into ordinary sym- 
 bols, we have:- F r (molar)=M(LT- 1 )M'ld 2 . (That LT~ l 
 indicates that those M's are actual M...'s and not M/s.) 
 
 d. That equation resembles Newton's law of gravity — 
 would be it explicitly if we hadn't taken the trouble to be 
 explicit about the LT" 1 . But it is not any law of gravity. 
 It is, so far, simply an explicit statement of a relationship 
 named F r which is true anywhere in the universe across any 
 portion of formal relating space between molar bodies — and 
 
67 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §T3h 
 
 as such is a symbolic, brief expression of simple truisms of 
 the naming or arbitrary recognition of such bodies as formal 
 parts of the One which they constitute. It is nothing more; 
 it is a verbal preparation or agreement or form for measuring, 
 or for expressing observations, and is not the actual measur- 
 ing or expression of actual measuring or experiments. Or, 
 it is what is conventionally called the mathematical limit; it 
 is the ultimate abstraction and applies to no actual phenome- 
 non (§88f, etc.). And it is important to observe that that 
 so-called inverse square law which appears in that equation 
 (the \d 2 or -^~d 2 or d~~ 2 ), and which appears so often in 
 science, is nothing more than a verbal truism based on the 
 agreement to use 3-dimension space. The inverse square 
 law is purely logical — an agreement of speech. That law ex- 
 plicitly is:- (M...)(M'...)ld 2 , As we shall see, the measured 
 or observed so-called force between any two distinguished- 
 apart actual bodies is never accurately stated by the form 
 MeMe'ld 2 ; that form (more conventionally written MM' jd 2 
 or M 2 L~ 2 ) assumes the existence of a constant relationship F r 
 which is never actually, or in a Many sense, the case, as M's 
 
 always change (§72). A good physicist could readily 
 
 finish writing the valid physical equations from just that 
 crucial logical point. But to save him work I shall develop 
 some of them; and we shall see more intelligible details of 
 those very broad conclusions as we proceed (§§77, 83, 98, 
 Index, Static and dynamic"). 
 
 e. We may write that equation:- F r =(M.. .)(M' ...)d" 2 
 or JV=(MC)(MC)/d 2 or F r =M 2 C 2 Lr 2 - That simply puts it 
 in conventional form — one which is analogous to electrical 
 equations, and is in superficial form like Newton's law. We 
 could have used any other symbol beside C, and given that 
 symbol any numerical exponent besides that 2. As a stand- 
 ard of measuring, the inverse square law or formula of course 
 becomes M 2 L~ 2 , where the C is the average 1. 
 
 f. As we saw, F. .. in F...y(.L... explicitly implies an 
 M. . . . We may arbitrarily take it that F. . . is one of those 
 Af...'sin¥ 2 C 2 L~ 2 : or, F. . . =M. . . =MC. (That does not 
 mean that F...—the MC in MCL 2 T~ 2 of §72f, any more than 
 that one of the six dots here printed in F...Y.L... is equal 
 to one of the three dots in M...I?T~~ 2 . If we wished, we 
 could interpret F... as the MC in MCL 2 T~ 2 ; it would merely 
 result in making a different distribution of names, and would 
 make MC in M 2 C 2 L~~ 2 have some other name. Also, see 
 next paragraph.) When we thus talk of F... as being an 
 actual body M. . . , we are doing precisely what conventional 
 science does in talking of JXI — except for the secondary 
 fact that science means by F" :- Fe, or an ultimately av- 
 erage or standard or abstract M. " Orthodox science says 
 that that F e is a force that resides" on or in the body, 
 which by moving through L displays the M e L 2 T~ 2 or Energy. 
 Now, if one entity "F" resides" on another named M, 
 then that residence' is simply an implication of a relation- 
 ship not explicitly expressed. Hence, without repeating all 
 the truisms as to the identity of relationships (§28h), it is a 
 truism that the F... (or the orthodox "F") is identical with 
 the M... (or with the orthodox "M" in which it "re- 
 sides"): a sufficient practical explicitly expressed proof of 
 that for this place is that "M" is tacitly taken to occupy 
 all the space it occupies, and as the "F" is held to be in the 
 same space, then by science's "axiom" (A=A agreement) 
 that two things can not occupy the same space simultane- 
 ously, the "F" must be the "M." So we are quite in 
 agreement with conventions in taking F... to be an M... — 
 
 although verbally we are more explicit. That truism 
 
 that a "force residing" is the body itself in which it resides 
 is an important one, although here condensed into a few 
 lines, as an incident to another subject. There are numer- 
 
 ous attempted absolute dualisms in conventional science be- 
 tween "F" and "ilf" because the "F" "resides": that 
 truism eliminates them all. 
 
 g. Therefore, inside the narrow special limits in which we 
 take our average or standard units M e , L, T, we have F T (mo- 
 lar) on an average (i. e., in mutual language or names) giv- 
 ing a unit acceleration to a unit mass ; or, as a mutual, 
 standard statement of unit quantities, F r (molar)=M e LT~ 2 . 
 Therefore, we have the explicit, definite, actual translation 
 of actual M. ..'s into mutual, average, standard language :- 
 M e L.T~ 2 ={M 2 C 2 )lr 2 . (Incidentally, that equation shows 
 explicitly why F... is not the MC in MCL 2 ^ 2 ; cf. §70b.) 
 Then, for the F. . . in F...Y.L... we obviously have :- F. . . or 
 F.. .(matter) or F.. .(molar matter) or F...(static)=MC = 
 y / (M 2 C 2 )=i/[(M e LT- 2 )L 2 ]^M e ^L VA T^ 1 . That is explic- 
 itly F... (which we were after), when or if we are making 
 molar measurements or experiments under standard condi- 
 tions. Hence, L...(static)=MCL 2 T- 2 IM e ^L VA T- 1 ^ 
 
 M^CL^T- 1 . And F e (static)^F...jC=M^C- l L^T- 1 . 
 
 And Ustatic) = Me^T^/M^C^L^T- 1 = M^CL^T' 1 . 
 Therefore, as a truism of course, F e y,Le=M e L?T~ 2 , which 
 is the same as the orthodox equation Fy^E=M.E 2 T~ 2 =En- 
 ergy. So it is obvious that we have not at all found any real 
 error in orthodox physics — we have merely been explicit as 
 as to what the conventional equations mean. 
 
 h. We may get » preliminary general understanding of 
 those equations by considering that orthodox science, in 
 those it asserts, is absolutely anthropocentric — takes the ob- 
 server, or the asserter of the equations, as being a standard 
 One, who then talks absolute mysticism. For the conven- 
 tional F T (in "F=MLT~ 2 ") obviously consistently refers 
 only to what the observer considers actually coincident with 
 himself at a (or °°) point in space and time, which condi- 
 tions are taken arbitrarily as a unit or standard, or as an ab- 
 solute point of reference for subsequent comparison. Then, 
 he asserts, in calm and complete disregard of all the actual 
 facts and of all verbal consistency, that that absolute One 
 moves a distance L (in FyiL) and gives Energy=Ml?T~ 2 . 
 Clearly, (l) motion is then an absolute assumption of some- 
 thing which truistically is then unexplainable and indefinable 
 (the observer as that anthropocentric One is an immovable 
 body, and it can t move, according to our usual verbal agree- 
 ments) ; (2) that distance L also becomes some change re- 
 ferring to the same absolute One, and is precisely analogous 
 to the motion; and finally (3) there is absolutely nothing 
 whatever stated as to why that absolute One should move or 
 exhibit energy ; — there is expressed or given no potential — 
 no possibility' of travel through L, whatever that travel" 
 or motion' might be — nothing to make that One move. 
 
 Those difficulties have now been shown to be purely 
 
 verbal, and we have obviated all of them but one, by 
 being verbally explicit and showing the logical truisms, 
 thus :- We do begin by anthropocentrically adopting a One 
 standard, F r —MLT~ 2 ; and we end by translating back into 
 an anthropocentric One, F e "y(Le=M e L 2 T~ . But in doing 
 all that we have included expression of all changes and have 
 thus succeeded in making our One standard average (instead 
 of uniquely and rigidly individual or anthropocentric), and 
 hence mutually intelligible, and universally applicable. The 
 defect in the explicitness (the lack of completeness in logical 
 truisms) in the equations in the last paragraph is that no po- 
 tential is expressed in them or by them. I. e., I omitted 
 explicit assertion that in order to make F e become F. . . the 
 space between M and M (par. b, and §72b) can not be 
 static or dead or verbally negligible. I. e., an ZZ 1-1 was 
 omitted — the inclusion of which would have given us the ex- 
 plicit expression for energy. As a truistic consequence of that, 
 
§T3h IX One 
 
 as we saw in the last paragraph L 
 the same value, M) i CV i T~ 1 . L s is the formal verbal agree- 
 ment that there may be a potential, which our L. .. then (as 
 a consequence of omitting that LT" 1 ) merely names without 
 asserting (just as the anthropocentric FXL=ML 2 T~ 2 fails 
 to state what it is that is going to cause — to assert mo- 
 tion). Therefore, our equations in the last paragraph merely 
 name Energy, and do not state that it is in existence — i. e., do 
 not finish stating that we did divide the One as per agree- 
 ment and then put it together again. That is quite in har- 
 mony with the commonsense, valid conclusion of orthodox 
 science about its Energy :- that energy which is actual energy 
 — which does move — is "power," or MI?T~*. Therefore it 
 is obvious that we may use a form of ML 2 jT~ 2 for Energy, 
 instead of ML 3 !? 1-3 ; but we always have to remember that 
 it names energy only, omitting an LT -1 . Perhaps it may 
 be preferable in the future to be quite explicit about Energy 
 and put in that LT -1 — it is a matter of expediency ; of what 
 is verbally convenient. But in this book I am forced to use 
 both the old verbalisms and their new and more explicit 
 forms, and neither my own brain nor the usual reader s can 
 support the strain of completely changing here. 
 
 §74. a. We can now see just what Newton's law is, and 
 how he got the logic wrong. Numerically, Newton s law is 
 written F(qf gravity)^ MM' G / d 2 , in which G is orthodoxly 
 taken to be a real constant number, determined by measur- 
 ing. Newton and those who believe Newton's law to be 
 logical (Newton himself seemed to be doubtful as to whether 
 his law" was self-consistent) assert that G is constant — is 
 everywhere and at every-time the same, regardless of the 
 relative circumstances of M and M . As an actual fact, 
 Newton guessed that G was a constant, and found that his 
 guess was fairly accurate with respect to the large bodies, 
 considerably separated, inside the solar system. Newton 
 didn t know much about the principles of gravity, and 
 he knew that he didn t, as I implied in the last sentence 
 (see Brewster's life of Newton). However, it is now known 
 that G is not accurately constant even for such measures in- 
 side the solar system (Eddington, lecture Royal Inst., re- 
 printed from Nature in Sc. Am. Supp.," July 6, 13, 
 1918; Tunzelmann, A Treatise on Electrical Theory and 
 the Problem of the Universe," 418). Also, two more or 
 less adjacent molecules of a body obviously may be consid- 
 ered two M's, and it is glaringly evident to physicists that 
 Newton's law fails to apply accurately between them — that 
 there G is not a constant, and not even near the value of the 
 orthodox G. Hence, quantitatively, Newton's law is ex- 
 perimentally known to be inaccurate. Logically, it is wholly 
 wrong, if it is supposed to apply to any actual bodies, as we 
 see in the next paragraph. 
 
 b. In speaking of gravity it is taken for granted that it 
 is some sort of force' ' W (explicitly it is W... in actuality, 
 or W e as an average unit) residing" on or in all the parts of 
 a bodj 7 — including the insides of the body. That is shown 
 to be the case by the fact that we speak of the pull of gravi- 
 ty traveling, apparently unchanged (cf. §8Sf), through bod- 
 ies and into all their parts. It therefore follows that in 
 naming the force of gravity [F(gravity) — which of course at 
 once implies F... (gravity)] we consider the whole insides of 
 the two M's in the orthodox expression MM'GJd 2 as being 
 split up in parts — i. e., Mand M are structural, or intern 
 
 UNIVERSE 68 
 
 and Le have identically M' are moving inside, Newton's law ought to be simply a 
 
 ally moving relatively, or 
 
 dynamic statement of moving bodies, of which F... (static) in 
 the last section is the static form. Therefore, as the bodies 
 which explicitly assert gravity [the bodies which have a 'resi- 
 dent' Fr(gravity)] , or have IV..., are dynamic (are really, 
 ultimately, divided into relatively moving parts in infinite re- 
 gress), we simply explicitly and consistently say so, as a 
 verbal agreement of naming — i. e., we state an if, — thus:- 
 F r (gravity or dynamic matter, or dynamic molar" matter)= 
 (M . . .)(LT~ l )(moving M...)/L 2 . I. e., as in the last section, 
 we have to name M and M' relatively to each other, with F r 
 spreading out in the other two dimensions, and we hence 
 first have M(L7^ x )MIL 2 ; but then, we said that each M 
 was itself internally split, so we have to make those M's 
 into M. ..'s; and then as there was to be relative motion (not 
 is, but merely potentially, or if: an if of mere existence' or 
 preliminary verbal form), one of those M. ,.'s is a moving 
 M.' Now, as in the special circumstances in which New- 
 ton's law MM'Gld 2 is true the M's would have to be abso- 
 lutely static, it follows that if we have dynamic M. .. s we 
 would have to write for those M's or for MG^- of Newton's 
 law the expression MG~^. And for the moving' we write 
 LT~ l . Hence, we have the equation:- F r (gravity)= 
 (MG- y ')(MG- % LT- l )(UJr l )lL 2 ^M 2 G- l T^ 2 . Therefore, 
 if as standard units F T (molar) is r =^M. e LT~ 2 , then, as a uni- 
 versal law true everywhere at every time, F T (gravity)= 
 M 2 G~ 1 T~ 2 , in which G is a variable number with relation- 
 ships to be indicated below. That is the actual quantitative 
 law of gravity, consistently expressed in everyday Trinity 
 language : it is identical with Ampere s law in electricity, 
 and can be understood better by comparing it with that law 
 (§§76-7). Newton's law is a static statement of a special 
 case, and is not logical even for that. For the mechanics of 
 gravity, which are very simple, see §§103, 134. The valid 
 law of gravity is, of course, not intelligible at all, as such 
 or of itself, for the most excellent reason that it is merely a 
 statement of an if:- if so and so is verbally agreed-upon as a 
 manner of speech, then we may measure or speak in a certain 
 way, and will later on use such preliminary measures (or 'ir- 
 rational' or of-itself-unintelligible factor; §71g) in the ex- 
 pression of such and such a One or standard One ; — but the 
 law does not in the least make that intelligible statement of 
 energy, or pretend to. And that if is easy to understand as 
 a partial statement, and is completely "explained," it 
 amounting to this :- jf we agree to name a boy John, then we 
 are prepared to say that John did so and so. 
 
 c. We hence have, precisely as in §73g (and as we see 
 again in electricity, §76d) :- F r (dynamic)=M e LT~ 2 , as unit, 
 average naming agreements. And, as a translation of actual 
 M... (dynamic or gravitational):- M e LT~ 2 = M 2 G~ 1 T~ 2 . 
 Hence, F... (dynamic or gravitational) = W '...= M G~^= 
 V[(M e LT- 2 )T 2 ]=M e ^L^. We shall use A... (chemical 
 Affinity; see par. e for description of it) as the intensive 
 factor corresponding to the extensive factor W..., so that 
 W...XA...=Energy. Then, A...=MG ii L 2 T- 2 IM e ^L^= 
 M^G^L^T- 2 . And W.= W...lGr*=M*G*L* And 
 A e =M e L 2 T- 2 IM^G^L'^=M^G-^L^T- 2 . And as a tru- 
 ism, W e XA e =M e L 2 T~ 2 , which is an equation missing in 
 orthodox science, that in strictly conventional terms would 
 be WXA=ML 2 r- 2 =Energy. Because Newton's law form- 
 ally is erroneously stated (as was shown in the last paragraph) 
 
 Hence, as the M and that equation in orthodox science uses instead of A the 
 
 74b Hence, it is at once a glaring truism that Newton's law, by 
 making G constant, in effect asserts that the M's are fixed, con- 
 stant, and unchangeable, and hence not structural. Therefore, the 
 very form of Newton's law asserts that the mechanics or the de- 
 scription of gravity is non-existent — is qualitatively or absolutely 
 
 impossible. The orthodox law of gravity is static, and gravity itself 
 is dynamic. An eternally dead or absolutely static One has no 
 "mechanics," as a mere truism— unless we shift to a different lang- 
 uage from the one Newton was talking, which is our ordinary one 
 Thus it is seen that a "mechanics" of Newton's gravity is impossible 
 
69 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §75a 
 
 orthodox static potential symbol L, and writes the equa- 
 tion Wy(L^MLrT~ 2 = z Energy — which is obviously a very 
 confused, and except in narrow conditions, wrong expression. 
 
 d. It therefore follows at once that the comparison of 
 F '.. .(ordinary molar bodies, or static), and F... (dynamic bodies) 
 or W..., instead of being the nonsense orthodoxly derived in 
 §70b, is:- F...\W..—M.: A l}^T^\Me^V i =LT- x —or, is 
 a velocity. Obviously, in order to get the expression of dy- 
 namic matter from the expression of static matter we truis- 
 tically deliberately inserted a velocity, LT~ l , in par. b. So 
 as a cancelling truism, it comes out again when we compare 
 static matter (F...) with dynamic matter (W...). The ex- 
 plicit velocity which we put in is the velocity of light — which 
 we use as a distinguishing criterion in naming. Explicitly, 
 F...jW...= MClMG~ H =CG y *=L T- 1 =average velocity of 
 light here and now (see par. f). Hence, purely by verbal 
 agreements, LT~ l is the velocity of light, just as we see it 
 is in electricity (§77), and in all the other branches" of 
 physics or knowledge (§§83, 100, 136, etc.). The fact that 
 in electricity, etc., the same verbal LT~ l is also experiment- 
 ally observed to be the velocity of light is nothing more than 
 the observational verification that in that branch the same 
 criterion was put in as a verbal form and then orthodoxly kept 
 
 unconfused. The reader is not likely to grasp that 
 
 general unifying point in its entirety until he has finished 
 the book. It is merely a rigorous expression in terms of 
 physical measurement of the fact that the total universe is 
 inseparably related. If you do not happen to be interested 
 in remembering or seeing how the technical language or 
 slang of physics expresses it, you lose nothing essential in 
 passing over this casually; for the same facts are later on 
 expressed in familiar terms of everyday life. 
 
 e. We noted in par. c that orthodoxly WX.L and FXL 
 are considered logically identical; but we saw (§73g, and in 
 par. c) that they were not so : in a rough quantitative way 
 in fairly steady molar circumstances here and now they may 
 of course be used alike. We need the special symbol A for 
 
 the "L" in "IVXL." We saw in §71 e-g that F... 
 
 (and implicitly TV...) is an incomplete expression — a factor, 
 irrational when used alone. W... itself (par. b) simply 
 names matter considered divided internally in parts. Sup- 
 pose we name those parts atoms (we could give them any 
 "structural" name: atoms happens to be a familiar one, and 
 later we see that atoms are the conventional small parts 
 which have an outlining zone of motion at about the -velocity 
 of light). Then it is obvious that W... simply implies a 
 verbal agreement to speak of atoms — implies that there are 
 This's, compared with which W... is That's. A W (without 
 dots) — a "weight" just in itself, asserting or implying 
 ararelated That's — really asserts chaos : has absolutely no 
 meaning. Clearly that is true: for weight means something 
 only when we consider whatever it is that has weight as be- 
 ing (so to speak) stuck to the earth, or combined with or 
 compared with the earth (or sun, etc.). And obviously, in 
 our explicit scientific language, we want a word to go with W 
 which will be an a^thing to which the M implied by the W 
 is stuck: we do not, in describing the universe, wish to ex- 
 press everything directly and immediately in terms of our 
 little earth — it would be provincial, to say the kindest thing 
 about it; sometimes the earth is too small, and other times 
 it is too large, to be a useful comparison. The usual name 
 for whatever it is that makes things thus stick together 
 especially atoms — is chemical affinity. We may give it the 
 abbreviated name A. Incidentally, that A is not the A 
 (which represents any symbol, word, thing) in our formal 
 truism A=A ; but the two are always readily distinguishable 
 by the context. So we have (as already seen in par. c) the 
 
 dynamic or gravitational equation for matter in general (as 
 distinguished from the matter that is electricity, light, etc.) :- 
 W... XA . . .=MG^L 2 T~ 2 =Energy(dynamic or gravitational). 
 f. I shall be more explicit as to the comparison of static 
 matter and dynamic matter — which comparison gave (par. d) 
 the average velocity of light in our neighborhood (which 
 velocity I shall abbreviate to V\). We had F.../W...— 
 MClMG-' A =CG 1A =LT~ l =V\. That equation- assumes that 
 we talk of the same actual M from two points of view :- the 
 static and the dynamic. So the CG^- obviously merely states 
 that one point of view is in or from a static velocity, and the 
 other point of view is to consider ourselves as observers in a 
 dynamic body with a velocity of CG Vi units (which is Vi), 
 looking at a static body. We may get that numerical ratio 
 more explicitly:- Fe/fV e = M ii C- 1 L lii T- 1 lM ii G ii V i = 
 LT~ 1 ICG' / *; hence, if the bodies on which the standard 
 units F e and W e reside are the same, then FelWe=l, and 
 LT~*=CG' A . Consequently, as our equations for matter are 
 constructed with perfect generality, they may be transformed 
 as desired, and converted into any other physical equations, 
 especially the orthodox ones of modern electrical theory (see 
 §§77, 83, 100, 136, etc.). Also, as we are taking C and G 
 as being numerical factors of an explicitly variable V\ (which 
 however is approximately the same for all of us on earth at any 
 given time), with the unit or standard M, L, and T formally 
 fixed, it is obvious that those fundamental equations at once 
 furnish a mutually intelligible base upon which to establish 
 with rigorous identity all physical naming (although no quan- 
 titative accuracy is possible, for the simple reason that V\ is 
 
 never exactly the same for two persons). We may 
 
 also note a simple fact showing that we have rigorously uni- 
 fied all possible naming:- The density" of a body obvi- 
 ously implies that it is considered as a molar or formally 
 not-internally-moving body ; its dimensional equation is 
 evidence of that:- Density=ML~ s (Daniell's Physics," 
 224). The elasticity" of a body, as given by its resistance 
 to direct compression, stretching, or shear, obviously re- 
 fers to it as made up of mutually movable parts, which in 
 general is the dynamic way in which gravity refers to a body. 
 The dimensions of such direct elasticity are, Elasticity^ 
 MLT l T- 2 (Daniell's "Physics," 263). Therefore, we have 
 Density I Elasticity— ML~ S I MLT 1 T~ 2 = 1 / V 2 . Hence, if the 
 same units are used, Density / EIasticity=l I V 2 = 1 JC 2 G = 
 l/K~ 1 LT' 1 (see §§80i, 95b; also, Tunzelmann, "Electrical 
 Theory," 32). That again obviously unifies all of science, 
 and directly connects this elementary theory to all valid 
 physics, especially the usual Maxwell theory of electricity 
 and its extensions. I. e., it is obvious if the reader is famil- 
 iar with the physics I have cited : if he is not a physicist 
 there is no special need that he verify the point, as the same 
 thing is proved in familiar ways repeatedly below. 
 
 §75. a. We now take up fundamental electricity. We 
 shall conclude that orthodox science handles it in rough gen- 
 erality quite consistently, and in precisely the way we have 
 just found was necessary to express ordinary matter. We 
 find that conventional science is, however, if we interpret it 
 explicitly, wholly wrong logically about electricity, in that 
 (precisely like Newton with his G) it considers K (which 
 actually is analogous with our variable C) and U (which act- 
 ually is analogous with our variable G) as constant. The 
 experimental facts are, that those values are fairly steady in 
 ordinary circumstances (i. e., vary almost "constantly" with 
 the thickness r or L of the various spaces" — actually the 
 substances — through which the electrical "forces" act); 
 nevertheless, measured values of them vary quite percept- 
 ibly from constancy (see Ency. Brit.," ix, 245-6, and Art. 
 
§75a IX One 
 
 Magnetism"). It could be claimed of course that those 
 perceptible variations were variations in space itself; that 
 gives the relativity theory (§66). But I am taking it for 
 granted that we propose to talk our everyday Trinity lang- 
 uage, and I am tinkering it into workable condition, after 
 
 all the abuse it has received. Also, it will be shown 
 
 that Ohm's law is empirical (§136); and that fact is shown 
 
 to be directly equivalent to the principle that there is a vari- 
 able K and U — that there is no exact science, or no constant 
 in the universe; or mass varies with velocity. 
 
 b. Briefly, the "specific inductive capacity, or di- 
 electric constant," or 'permittivity, or K of a substance is 
 the numerical ratio of the electric force which it permits 
 to pass, to the force which is passed by air taken as a 
 unit standard (or its ratio to that passed by a vacuum," 
 according to some physicists : a vacuum acts practically as 
 air does); i. e., K of air is 1. Thus, two bodies of static 
 electricity exert mutual electric force on each other across a 
 dead' or static difference surface' or space (specifically now 
 in electricity, even orthodoxly, through an actual substance 
 or "dielectric"), precisely as we saw molar force F r \molar) 
 doing in §73cd. Hence, in precisely the same way, F r (static 
 electricity)={Q s K-*-){Q. a K-K)ld % , in which QsK~ K is a unit 
 body of static electricity {Qs...), analogous in all respects to 
 a molar body, with this explicit distinction (see XIV for 
 details) :- if an actual M and an actual M be touched to- 
 gether and then separated, some of one of the bodies will 
 always stick to the other; after the separation, if the amount 
 of one which is stuck to the other is not molarly' or grossly 
 perceptible, we still call the bodies the same molar bodies M 
 and M' (which obviously is not accurate or even rational, 
 just of itself), and then proceed to correct that assertion by 
 calling the amount stuck on one :- Qs. . . , or a quantity of 
 {static) electricity. Therefore, obviously, so long as that Q 3 ... 
 does not go moving around on the body perceptibly (it always 
 does move some), and hence so long as we do not formally 
 consider it split up internally, it is formally a lump or molar' 
 body of an attenuated sort, definitely named static electricity. 
 So we treat it as static. The orthodox equation is F= 
 Qp'lKcP, in which K is supposed to be a constant of a nature 
 otherwise unknown; I have merely changed that interpreta- 
 tion to agree with the quantitative experimental facts; and in 
 order to make it logical, I am attaching the K (in place of 
 the dots in Qs...) to the "Qs," thus:- Q S K~%. (It happens 
 that K was orthodoxly put into the denominator of that frac- 
 tion ; hence, in accordance with that arbitrary and logically 
 unessential agreement, the exponent ~ y * of K is different in 
 sign from that of our G.) 
 
 c. Briefly, the permeability,' or magnetic permea- 
 bility," or coefficient of magnetic induction," etc., or U 
 (which most texts symbolize by m), is the ratio (a numerical 
 coefficient again) of the electric force or relationship in any 
 given case which is induced, or which permeates" a body 
 as gravity does, with respect to the inducing magnetic force. 
 I. e., two bodies of dynamic or magnetic electricity (which 
 we shall see, especially in XIV, is static electricity split 
 up," or with insides relatively moving with V\), are consid- 
 ered to exert electric force throughout (inside) themselves, 
 precisely as we saw gravity doing (i. e., are considered to 
 be completely related to each other, in all splittings, or in 
 infinite regress — although practically we call the velocity of 
 light average, tacitly using our eyes as a quantitative stand- 
 ard, and do not go to that infinity, but are content with the 
 resulting inaccuracy). Therefore, following precisely the 
 same truisms of expressions as were followed there (§74<b), 
 we may define a static magnet m as :- F r {magnetic) ::= 
 (mU~' A )(mU~ V2 )ld 2 . Now, just as in §74b, if we take one 
 
 UNIVERSE 70 
 
 magnet m as a unit, or 'static' beginning, or potential, and 
 consider the other moving with reference to it and also in- 
 ternally, we at once, as our ordinary language agreement, 
 have the naming equation (an if equation) :- Fr{dynamic or 
 magnetic electricity)^={m...){moving m...){L r I"' l )lr 2 , in which 
 r is an L (see next section for the mnemonic reason it is con- 
 venient to name it r). Substituting the coefficient U and 
 the LT" 1 for the dots, on precisely the same truisms or ver- 
 bal agreements as before, we have FAdynamic electricity)^ 
 (mU^imU^LT-^iLT-^l^^m^UT- 2 . In agreement with 
 conventions (see next section), we may name a magnet that 
 is actually taken to be dynamic or m.... and is not a static 
 standard unit that is really a zero m e :- Qm... ; — which stands 
 for Quantity of magnetic or dynamic electricity; or, Q m ...= 
 mU~Y*. Hence, precisely analogous to the case of molar and 
 gravitational matter (see next section for explicit details), 
 we have Q..lQU. = LT^lEr^XT^; or, LT~ 1 =Vi = 
 K~^U~^. We take if and U as being variable coefficients. 
 Hence, that last equation, precisely analogous to ordinary 
 matter in §74, unifies all of electricity. In the next section 
 we see the logical details, which (§22) consist merely of uni- 
 versally applicable truisms — a rigorous explanation dry and 
 hard to see just of itself. The 'mechanics" of electricity 
 — the easy description of how these rigorous explanations are 
 true, and what they mean in everyday terms — is in XIV. 
 
 §76. a. The orthodox fundamental electrical equations 
 which we shall need here are:- F=Qs 2 K~ l L~ 2 . F= 
 m 2 U~ l L~ 2 , where to is a unit magnet pole — really a static, or 
 
 One, or zero m c . F=mclj r 2 =mcLl I? , — that being Ampere's 
 law, which asserts that a unit current of electricity c flowing 
 in a uniform conductor of length / (or L) that is arranged as 
 a segment of the circumference of a circle of a radius r (or 
 L), will exert unit force F on the unit magnet pole m at the 
 center. 76a Qm=cT, where Qm is a quantity of magnetic 
 electricity ; or truistically is the amount of electricity that is 
 the sum of unit current c flowing for the unit time T. 
 QsXP 8 = Energy, where P s is electrostatic potential. And 
 
 76a In brief, Ampere's law is, as we shall see in more detail, the 
 description of a method of using molar or static M's as a fixed zero 
 point of reference or zero of potential or absolute "center," and on 
 that formally, or agreed-upon, or fixed base dynamic "electrical" 
 matter (which is precisely similar to gravitational matter) moves— 
 actually does move (in everyday language). Obviously, we have, in 
 Ampere's description, a. fixed base on (or by or from) which to meas- 
 ure or observe the motion. (Clearly, identically the same thing 
 happened-in static electricity, as implied in §75b:- a very little of 
 the effective surface of one molar body with formally dead insides 
 stuck to another body, and then those molar bodies served as a fixed 
 point of reference.) However, it is obvious that in considering dy- 
 namic gravitational matter it is not so simple to get that convenient 
 zero point of reference or potential; actually in considering gravita- 
 tional matter the only fixed point of reference is the total universe 
 (hence, Newton's law is a. form of static equation; he did not go on 
 to the dynamic equation that was really needed, as apparently he 
 was not able to logically get hold of a formal base on which to erect 
 it— he needed to grasp the total universe as a base, and that seems 
 to have been a bit too strenuous mentally for him and men of his 
 time, although it is a commonplace performance of men nowadays). 
 We are using the total universe here as a point of reference; form- 
 ally it is nowadays still somewhat unfamiliar, and hence somewhat 
 hard to follow here; but in human terms it is used in practice all the 
 time, and the same thing will be quite easy to follow in Parts Two 
 and Three. Hence, because electricity has an easily observed, and 
 actually quantitatively rather stable zero reference, or arbitrary 
 zero of potential (§80m), the orthodox theory of electricity is broadly 
 valid, and quite simple (the orthodox error lies in assuming that the 
 molar masses are absolutely static, although obviously they are not; 
 finally we have to refer the electric point of reference to the whole 
 universe as a standard). This general anticipation of the principles 
 of this formal or logical unification of science is all that the general 
 reader needs to comprehend ; the physicist of course needs to wade 
 ahead through the dry technical details of the explicit equations 
 that follow in the text. 
 
71 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §76d 
 
 Q m XPm=Energy, where P m is magnetic electric potential — 
 or more commonly is called electromotive force (E.M.F., or 
 
 voltage). All those orthodox equations are supposed 
 
 to be based directly upon measurements, experiments. 
 
 b. Those equations conventionally take it for granted 
 that K and U are constant, or , dimensions, like M, L, and 
 T. I shall show first that if that is so, then the equations 
 will promptly give absurd, and flatly self-contradictory re- 
 sults. (I. e., the orthodox equations mix the three sorts of 
 words: analogous nonsensical results were shown in §44.) 
 Orthodoxly, F=ML7*- 2 =(Q e 2 )K- 1 L~ 2 . . (A) 
 (I print Q s in parentheses to indicate that orthodoxly it may 
 be separated from the K.) 
 
 Then, by algebra, (Qs)=M A L 1H 'T 1 K^ . (B) 
 
 Orthodoxly, we may write the molar equation, including 
 Newton s law, exactly analogously to (A), thus:- 
 
 F=MLT- 2 =M 2 L~ 2 . (C) 
 Hence, M=M 2 L~ S T 2 ...(D) 
 
 which is nonsensical of course, but no more nonsensical than 
 the precisely analogous equation (B). Then, substituting the 
 value of M given by (D) in (B), we have 
 
 {Q t )==(M*L-*T*)Hl}*T- 1 K*)=MK* .... (E) 
 
 or, Q.ET*=M (F) 
 
 We have orthodoxly, Energy=ML 2 T~ 2 =QeXP, (G) 
 
 Substituting for Q a its value from (B), we have 
 
 Ps=ML 2 T^ 2 lM H L 1 ^T- 1 K^=M H L^'r- 1 K-' A . (H) 
 Then, in Energy=Q,XP s , we substitute P B from (H), and 
 Q a from (E) and have, 
 
 Energi/=MK' A XM^L K T- 1 K-^=M lii L ii T- 1 . . (i) 
 And that result, obtained by strictly following orthodox logic 
 and equations, is nonsensical, and is also flatly and explicitly 
 
 contradicted by (G). We hence see that an actual Q s 
 
 is Qe..., and that A' is a numerical coefficient replacing the 
 dots. In standard One conditions Q s is Q se , and K is then 1. 
 
 c. In this paragraph I shall make a verbally consistent 
 explicit fundamental statement of static electricity, analogous 
 to the fundamental molar or static matter equations in §73fg. 
 We have F r (stat. elec.)^Q a (LT^ l )Q s ' I^^Qs^^/L 2 . And, 
 as a unit standard :- F r =MeLT~ 2 = QM^L' 2 . Or, 
 Q....(stat. elec.)=V / (Q* 2 K- 1 )=Q s K-X=i/[(MeLT- 2 )L 2 ] = 
 M^L VA T- 1 . And P,. . . (static electricity)=MK-^L 2 Z^ 2 -^- 
 Me^L^T- 1 = M^K-^L^T- 1 . And Q„ = Q,. . . / K~X = 
 M^K^L^T- 1 ; and P, e = MeL 2 T' 2 lM A K % L VA T- 1 = 
 M i4 K~ H L :4 T~ 1 ; so that truistically the orthodox Q.XPs, or 
 
 explicitly Q se XP. e , =M e L 2 T~ 2 — Energy. It may be 
 
 noted that the standard potential P,, or explicitly P se , and 
 the actual potential P,..., are identical (cf. §74h); and that 
 again means that these equations are merely formal or naming 
 or if' equations that omit an LT -1 ; i. e., there being act- 
 ual]}' zero potential, they assert no actual motion or energy. 
 
 d. In this paragraph I shall make a verbally consistent 
 explicit fundamental statement of dynamic or electromag- 
 netic electricity, analogous to the fundamental dynamic or 
 gravitational matter equations in §74bc (repeating a little of 
 §75c). We have as a standard or static or One unit naming, 
 Frldyn. elec.)=(mU- H )(mU- H )ld 2 =m 2 U- 1 L' 2 ; and Fri&yn. 
 elec.) z =m e c e llr 2 ; and Qme=cT. And for actual, dynamic 
 electrical matter or m. ..'s, we have F r (dynamic electricity) = 
 (m... )(moving m... )(Lr 1 )/r 2 =(m. . . )(LT- X m. . . ){LT~ l )L~ 2 = 
 {mU A ){mU )i LT-^){LT-' i -)L- 2 =m 2 UT- 2 . Also, orthodoxly 
 we have F=mclr~ 2 ; and Qm=cT, — so that c=Q»> T -1 ; and 
 substituting, F — mQmT~ l lr~ 2 ; or explicitly, F T = 
 {m. . .){Q m . . .)LT~ l r~ 2 ; hence, as Qm is an explicitly moving 
 m... (see next paragraph), we orthodoxly also explicitly have 
 the same "experimental" equation as the equation already 
 derived purely verbally (i. e. , by experiments or observations 
 on words).- F^mlfi^imU^LT-^LT^L-^. I. e., our 
 
 verbal truisms are now in definite agreement with orthodox 
 observational" equations — taking it that by correct obser- 
 vation K and V are not quantitatively constant. Then, as 
 before, we have the general One static reference or zero 
 point, F re =MeLT- 2 . Therefore, Q m ...(dyn. elec.)=mU' A = 
 \/[{MeLT- 2 )TV\=Me lA LK. And Q me , or the orthodox Qm, = 
 Q m ...IU H =M' A U-' A LYK And the orthodox E.M.F., or 
 P me , =ML 2 T- 2 IW A U-' A LyK Q m ...XP m ...=MU-' A L 2 T' 2 . 
 And Pm...=M^U- A L 1 ^T~ 2 . And we see from those val- 
 ues that Q B ...jQ m ...=LT~ l ; or orthodoxly, QsjQm or ex- 
 plicitly Qn/Qne^LT-ilK-XU-*. ■ And the same 
 
 remarks about potential (cf. par. c) still apply — an LT~ l 
 has been omitted, so that now the difference between Pme 
 and P m . . . is that Pm. . . is multiplied by ( U~^ 2 ) 2 to give Pme ; 
 i. e. , the moving m has the purely verbal inverse square law 
 applied to it, and has not yet actually become a real differ- 
 ence in potential. Or, to put briefly what we see in more 
 detail in the next section, the purely naming inverse square 
 law (which is hence absolutely explained" as being a ver- 
 bal truism of naming an arbitrary splitting of the One) is 
 applied once in order to name the static m s; then, the same 
 purely naming inverse square truism is applied a second time 
 internally in the moving-m or Qm, in order to name the parts 
 or the dynamic changes or internal motion of Q m or one of 
 those m's previously statically or molarly' named. That 
 absolutely explains the + ^ (rather than the ~' A ) exponent of 
 the t/'sin the actual F T ={mU A ){mU A ){LT- l ) 2 L- 2 ; it is what 
 I shall call the second inclusion or use or application of the 
 inverse square law — a purely verbal way of making the es- 
 sential cancelling of L's and T's, so that we may rigidly and 
 honestly adhere to our agreement that A=A. But that 
 second inverse square obviously still does not assert that the 
 zero or unit or static or point' m actually gives or exhibits 
 any potential. In practice, we verbally insert another LT~* 
 in the equation, and get "power" (§73h). And in order to 
 have our really mystic point m become actual, and consist- 
 ently apply to parts of the universe, and not be restricted to 
 mere geometrical abstractions, we assert that U is not con- 
 stant — a truism naturally in agreement with observed facts, 
 because we started these truisms on the natural fact that 
 bodies change. That gives no exact science, and in effect 
 logically includes an infinite regress of the inverse square law 
 
 itself. That is to say, actually or observably all m's 
 
 have structures — internal motions. So when we apply the 
 inverse square naming to the One, we would in practical actu- 
 ality take some finite smaller structure as a static or molar' 
 body of reference ; but, theoretically and also practically in 
 the degree in which our perception and use of the universe 
 increases, that structure or smaller or unit static m in turn 
 must be split, in order to be more accurate and definite — and 
 so on ad infinitum. So we parsimoniously chop that theo- 
 retical ad infinitum logic (not our practical efforts to use 
 smaller and smaller structures : cf. Part Two) sharp off by 
 calling U variable — which obviously will logically take care 
 
 of all splittings. In practice, we can and do take two 
 
 points of view:- (l) we consider ourselves on a static body 
 (i. e., take ourselves in effect static), and observe (i) static 
 bodies, and (ii) moving bodies and compare them; (2) we 
 take our point of view as dynamic or as moving, and observe 
 the same two sorts of bodies. Consequently, it is obvious 
 that we need, and do use, the inverse square naming device 
 twice ; we get started on that infinite regress of points of view 
 (i. e., we ourselves in turn are partly static and partly dy- 
 namic, etc., etc.); but having thus essentially experienced 
 how we go from parts to the larger standard whole they make 
 or vice versa — from a structure of one order (as molecules) to 
 one of a different order (as a molar body) — we then chop off 
 
§76d IX One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 72 
 
 the remainder of the naming devices. It is a trifle puzzling 
 at first, when stated explicitly : in implicit practice it is so 
 simple that three-year-olds understand it so well as to use it 
 fluently. I shall give a few details in the next section of 
 just how Ampere did it in practice (see also §83). In this 
 sharp, explicit form here that is needed by experts, the prop- 
 osition is hard to see because it is stated in technical terms 
 
 not very familiar except to physicists. 
 
 — But in every- 
 simple :- If we 
 i. e.. 
 
 day, rough terms all this is exceedingly 
 want to get the energy from coal we burn the coal: 
 actual energy consists of the coal's changing its inner struct- 
 ure, and ceasing to be coal. If we ourselves work — do some- 
 thing, — we partly destroy ourselves — partly die (usually we 
 eat some food and grow back again). Hence, when we be- 
 gin to express or name energy, the body which actually gives 
 the energy ceases to be, and then of course there is not any 
 such body to name: obviously, the actuality or the reality 
 is ineffable. So, what we actually do is formally to name 
 the body as exploding or flying into pieces (so to speak), and 
 we name those pieces as flying out in 1?, while we ourselves 
 nominally or with tacit formality take the line of the third 
 dimension to the other body which receives the energy. That 
 body grows (explodes or changes itself into something else, 
 in what we might call the opposite direction; see Index, 
 Growth"), or verbally receives the energy into itself by the 
 inverse square relationship. So we end, not with the two 
 bodies we first named, but with two bodies that in strict 
 verbal truth are new, and would have to have two new names 
 unless we used that inverse square device twice, as a general 
 
 way of implicit double naming. There is no need 
 
 to try to grasp all that here, in that condensed form. All 
 that needs to be noted is that the instant we start to use 
 language it will slip out of our positive grasp unless we de- 
 vise that infinite regress of inverse square naming to hold it. 
 e. It has been observed experimentally that a moving 
 static charge or Q s and a moving magnet m both create what 
 is called a magnetic field ("Ency. Brit.," ix, 216; and Art. 
 Magnetism"); and hence both cause a current (or, truis- 
 tically with our equations, are a current, when "matter" is 
 consistently defined; i. e., Q a ..., Qm...., m..., and c... are 
 all simply different names for matter). Ampere went indi- 
 rectly about measuring a current (Watson's "Physics," 688), 
 and instead of getting the immediate complete statement of 
 those observations just mentioned (I have put them in a form 
 reversed from the usual point of view), he made an if state- 
 ment, a complex verbal naming:- F T {dyn. elec.)=mcl/r 2 . 
 He tacitly assumed as a context of that statement:- F r {dyn. 
 elec.)=m 2 U- 1 L- 2 , and c=Q ms T, and Fr=MLT~ 2 , and Q se X 
 Pse=ML 2 T~ 2 What I did in the last paragraph was to 
 combine all of Ampere's if s and tacit verbal agreements 
 into a complete single statement. I did not put that com- 
 plete statement into the equation for Energy ; that equation 
 lacked an LT^ 1 : the complete statement is in the context — 
 and, as we saw, more or less had to be in the context, be- 
 cause the Q m or other matter, if it did produce Energy, 
 died," and did not any longer exist as Q m to be talked 
 about. So in the next section we see some of the details of 
 Ampere's law — of the double use of the inverse square law 
 in mentioning any actual energy. 
 
 §77. a. The orthodox equation F T =mcl/r 2 , when it 
 talks of multiplying m and c together, actually explicitly as- 
 serts that it will multiply raules by cows — which of course is 
 pure nonsense unless a definite proof is given that the ulti- 
 mate meaning is merely that m and c are related as identities 
 ■ — that mules Xcows' merely means that both are (say) ani- 
 mals — that m and c are the same sort of matter. Actually, 
 in that equational statement of Ampere's law, m is a static 
 
 unit m e that implicitly implies an unstated inverse square 
 law, and c is dynamic zero matter c e that is nominal^' dis- 
 tributed over the line I, and is named by the asserted inverse 
 square law c\r 2 . We are to look at that in a little more 
 detail and from a point of view a little different from before, 
 but essentially what we see will be a repetition of §76de. 
 
 b. Ampere explicitly asserted his law (Watson's Phys- 
 ics," 688) in this form:- F=cXdsXsmA./r 2 , where ds is 
 the length L of the infinitesimal element of the path of the 
 current c, and a the angle made by that short part of the 
 path with the line joining its center to a point (the center of 
 a circle in the experiments) at a distance r, at which point 
 the F (relationship) is measured. Now, unless that element 
 ds is actually zero or a One (a geometrical point, or the total 
 infinite universe), as a truism that verbal inverse square law 
 does not hold, (if Ampere's experiments show" that it does 
 hold, then the experimentally nonsensical conclusions of §76b 
 obviously must also be true; and as those conclusions are 
 extremely easy to disprove experimentally and as Ampere's 
 experiments on ds are truistically practically impossible to 
 get accurate, forcing him to guess, we conclude that Am- 
 pere's experiments do not accurately prove what his law 
 nevertheless formally asserts — and as Ampere is a first class 
 man, he probably said so himself.) If ds is zero, a is inde- 
 terminate; i. e., by using a zero we promptly go into ineff- 
 able religion, where no measures are positive. But as we are 
 dealing with unit measures we may call a 90°, in which case 
 sinA=l, and drop further considerations of its numerous im- 
 plications — as it then has its average effect that is implicit in 
 F=mcljr 2 - Thus we have the explicit verbal truistic agree- 
 ments:- F»=cXo/r 2 . That is rigorously logical (a truistic 
 statement of the naming principle Ampere started with, as 
 was just indicated) ; but we positively have said nothing ex- 
 cept that we are going to say something in that way or form 
 about a c which we have not yet actually asserted or indi- 
 cated, which exerts F r on, or is related to or identified with, 
 the body 0, — the c itself thus as yet being positively or in a 
 Many sense a 0, like the other body (see next paragraph). 
 The c has not yet been asserted to move. Hence, c is abso- 
 lutely static electricity, or absolutely Q se (there is no such act- 
 ual thing; it is a verbal unit form). And if we have an 
 actual Q 8 . . . , we have already seen (and it is agreed by ortho- 
 dox science) that we must allow for its environment by K +! ^, 
 and write Fr—cK+^Xo/r 2 - (I still write it c, as we have 
 
 yet to give it a velocity.) Now, that is in direct 
 
 agreement with well known experiments on static charges, 
 Q«...'s. Thomson and Heaviside have shown ("Ency. 
 Brit.," ix, 216) that F=cVsm&lr 2 , where c is a moving static 
 charge. That equation is obviously the same as Ampere's 
 law F=cXdsXsmAJr 2 , except that as c is named a "charge" 
 the V is explicitly stated.™ So that Heaviside experiment 
 
 '""Incidentally, that Heaviside equation also omits — at least in 
 the place cited— all definite statement of evironing conditions, thus 
 implying a constant K; hence, its inclusion of a definite V is self- 
 contradictory. For it is obvious that if there were no variation in K 
 —no effect of the environment on c,— then simply as a truism, r, 
 which is logically a part of the environment (or asserts that some 
 thing is 'at the distance r,' so that we mean, by using r, that thing), 
 
 could have no effect— could not have been "related to r by F. - 
 
 As a perhaps important digression, that mere verbal truism of the 
 One and Many is the solution of the controversy as to whether "action 
 at a distance" is possible. The answer depends, as a mere truism, 
 upon what language agreements are made— "on definitions." In 
 our everyday language, as a truism action at a distance (i. e., between 
 two things absolutely separate) is not logically possible, as we have 
 just seen. But, if we talk an infinite pluralism, then no sort of ac- 
 tion but action at a distance is possible (i. e., no two parts are ever 
 absolutely in contact, or unseparated, as that would mean merging 
 or ultimate identity, contradict the agreements of infinite pluralism 
 and revert to our everyday One language; also, cf. §97). 
 
73 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §77h 
 
 agrees with our language truisms to the effect that we must 
 put an actual c (i. e., c.) in Ampere's law if we are to talk 
 positively— thus :- F T — cK +K X o/r 2 . 
 
 c. We may now explicitly assert that the c& does 
 have a velocity, as in Ampere's experiments, by simply writ- 
 ing it in:- F T ={cK^)Y. FXo/r 2 . Next, we note that the 
 implies a standard unit body at a distance r from cK^. 
 Obviously, if we are to speak a positive language of finite 
 Many terms, we now have to express explicitly an actual 
 body instead of that formal (zero). The cK^ is asserted 
 to be moving, the K^ providing for any changes the envir- 
 onment may cause in the fixed unit standard c (c e , — an Me). 
 Consequently, we truistically have to assert that c is related 
 to — identical with — a part of the universe that is also moving; 
 otherwise, we would undertake to identify cows with miles 
 as such. That part can not of course be actually condensed 
 to the geometrical point at the distance r. Also, the part 
 or body at distance r obviously must have its motion internal ; 
 for if the body at distance r moved bodily or molarly' as 
 does c in its circular path, it would move away from the 
 distance r, and we would have to devise a more complicated 
 way of expressing and observing which would somewhat hide 
 these fundamental elements of expression without dispensing 
 with them. The sort of electricity which is that kind of 
 matter in internal motion is a magnet m... (as we saw in 
 rigorous theory in the last section, and as we shall see con- 
 cretely and intelligibly in §135). Hence, we have to name 
 an actual m. .. internally, by the usual inverse square law 
 (this is the second application of that verbal law) ; we may 
 indicate or imply that, as with the cK^, by writing mll^. 
 Obviously, the environment of the internal parts of an actual 
 m... is not the environment between c... and m... which the 
 K% took care of; so we had to have another coefficient, 17 . 
 
 d. We now have formally, Fr^mU^icK^LT^lL 2 . 
 But that equation is by no means explicit. It merely names 
 two dynamic bodies (i. e., both are formally wmles') :- 
 (cK^XLT -1 ) and (mU H ); but it fails to assert explicitly 
 that there is relative motion between them— fails to be ex- 
 plicit about another LT" 1 . Also, as m... is now explicitly in 
 internal motion (and as of course in finite language both c. . . 
 and m. . . must be of finite size), an infinite regress of addi- 
 tional numerical, coefficients, each implying the same inverse 
 square truism of naming, is, for absolute explicitness and accu- 
 racy, required. But clearly we can not write that infinite 
 regress. So we chop short the logical procedure by letting 
 just K and U stand for that infinite regress and then by as- 
 serting the absolutely accurate truth :- that we can not write 
 K and U accurately — which is the same as saying that in 
 absolute truth they vary. We also note that we omitted one 
 LT~ l , and that the jf-name Fr is hence still an F, e — formal. 
 
 e. The equation Fr={mU % ){cK Yi )LT' l lL 2 ' is not directly 
 comparable with the equations in §76bc. The difference of 
 point of view used is obviously that here I have used » c e (a 
 unit point of zero charge) to start with, as that showed the 
 elementary verbal laws we needed to see. In §76 we used 
 m's; and c is obviously only one of the internal parts of an 
 m (see XIV). Consequently, our equation here is merely an 
 outline of the verbal foundation of F r =m 2 U~ l L~ 2 . The last 
 paragraph explicitly asserts and describes that primitive con- 
 dition of our present equation. I have formulated this primi- 
 tive equation because it serves to show fairly clearly a number 
 of verbal relationships that are too much concealed in the 
 more explicitly complete equations in §76. The present 
 equation is merely tentative. An indefinite number of other 
 ways of writing the equation to show those relationships are 
 possible. I am not satisfied with the way I use ; the physi- 
 cal mathematician ought to have a considerable volume of 
 
 more careful and explicit discussion of these forms and appli- 
 cation of this matter which I must condense into the present 
 section. Such a treatise would show that I am forced into 
 vaguenesses and unprecise statements in order to get brevity. 
 
 f. It is obvious that the second verbal introduction of 
 the inverse square law into our equation means that a change 
 from cows to »mles was made; one standard One (a formal 
 universe of things named cows' or c — things moving bodily 
 or molarly) was translated or changed into another standard 
 One (into a universe' named Mules' or m — things moving in- 
 ternally; i. e., which were verbally split up some more; or, 
 what is the same, were split differently with respect to the 
 total universe). In short, m and c are typical of any two 
 bodies expressed each by a. property different from the other; 
 and that equation is the explicit type of phj'sical equation that 
 permits and asserts their measurable (i. e., definite, explicit, 
 
 scientific") comparison. Clearly, the explicit method of 
 splitting things differently, or giving them different proper- 
 ties, is named motion, and is otherwise expressed by or as 
 time and space (i. e., is the L7* -1 ) — method, motion, prop- 
 erty, time, space being obviously abstractions," or what 
 we more precisely call relationships, all of which are ulti- 
 mate!}' identical. And the explicit numerical or 
 
 measured or scientific connection or unification thus 
 given to all knowledge is at once obvious from the equation, 
 thus :- The unit or standard m and c were mere monistic or 
 mystic names to be expressed inversely as the distance 1?, in 
 infinite regress. Those names then were simply the verbal 
 
 framework or logic of a possible explicit expression or as- 
 sertion about two actual bodies of different properties, thus :- 
 mcjl?^a unit force or relating-into-a-One of any value (i. e., a 
 numerically indeterminate quantity). Then, when we wished 
 to make that abstract formal unit actually a unit or 1 in 
 agreement with our average positive speech of finite parts 
 like yards and pounds, I inserted a more explicit expression 
 of the infinite regress :- U^K^XLT^ 1 . (The two parts of 
 that expression are themselves implicitly cancelling — as we 
 have seen repeatedly. I. e., it is a truism, equivalent to 
 our A=A of §22 — which is the ultimate proof and explana- 
 tion of the equation.) Hence, in average conditions, or in 
 our inaccurate mutual positive finite Trinity language, we 
 have U y *K y *LT^ l =l; or lT*ir ii =LT- 1 . 
 
 g. The theory of translation — the fact that all science 
 is unified — is thus complete, rigorous (as being merely tru- 
 isms), and ultimately final (i. e., the universe itself is the 
 standard, and no changing part such as man, or our compara- 
 tively little earth). To get, in any case, the actual meas- 
 ures of the things we thus unify, we simply go and measure. 
 
 h. I have been calling our bodies 'static' and 'dynam- 
 ic, depending respectively on whether a given one was con- 
 sidered as a whole, rigid, or molar body, or as a 
 body that explicitly was internally in motion. But a static 
 body has in general effect, and also formally, a surface zone 
 of substance at V\\ and a dynamic body consists of parts, 
 each of which has such a zone, with a tacitly static interior 
 to that part like the interior of a molar body (for explicit 
 proof see Part Two). Consequently, a static' body is not 
 perfectly static (i. e., the moving zone extends into the in- 
 sides some) ; neither is a dynamic' body perfectly dynamic 
 (for the insides of its parts are tacitly static). The fact that 
 the coefficients represent an infinite regress of variable mo- 
 tion obviously provides truistically for those actual variations 
 from perfection or formally statable exactness. Furthermore, 
 it is obvious that a part of the dynamic body has substan- 
 tially the same zone velocity {V\) as the difference zone or 
 surface of the static one ; consequently that part (with a 
 negligible static insides; cf. §98pw) can unite with the 
 
§T7h IX One 
 
 moving zone of the static body, changing the velocity of the 
 whole molar body, while the dynamic body partly passes out 
 of existence as such. Hence, our formal expression is ulti- 
 mately consistent. As an incidental point, our use of stat- 
 ic' is obviously equivalent to the conventional potential 
 energy," and 'dynamic' to "kinetic energy." Clearly, 
 therefore, "potential energy" does not assert any absolute 
 non-existence of motion ; consistently, it merely means that 
 the body is verbally static. I shall not go further here into 
 those obvious details of formal speech. 
 
 i. That formally completes the theory of electricity, 
 unifying it with respect to itself, and unifying it (according 
 to the whole of this chapter) with other branches of science. 
 In XIV we revert explicitly to electricity, using Ohm s law 
 as a concrete method of unifying the actual mechanics of 
 electricity with this general statement of the valid mathe- 
 matical or verbal theory of the expression or measurement of 
 electricity. We ought to know definitely what measurement 
 itself is before we go basing science on measurement. 
 There is no more merit in the shibboleth measurement 
 than in the Scholastic ones Essence, Substance. We 
 have seen that Newton and Ampere fancied they were meas- 
 uring; however, as a matter of fact, they mostly merely 
 matched their skill with some verbal truisms. 
 
 UNIVERSE H 
 
 indicated by the H (because fundamentally £nerg#=Qh/and 
 also =ML 2 T- 2 ); and H is said to be of unknown dimen- 
 sions so that validly .7 orthodoxly must logically be unknown 
 and unusable. Watson says that perhaps H=ML 2 T~ 2 (i- e., 
 probably is Energy itself). Lamor, an authoritative mathe- 
 matical physicist, states positively and, so far as I can de- 
 termine, without reservation ("Ency. Brit.," xxii, 806):- 
 "The temperature of a gas is measured by the mean energy 
 of translation of its molecules." Expressing that in orthodox 
 equational form, we have Temp=\mV^Y, a constant; or H= 
 Ml? 'T~ 2 = Energy. ~ — However, regardless of what H 
 
 §78. a. The orthodox summed statements (i. e., the 
 orthodox fundamental equations) of the ways of naming or 
 measuring heat consist in assertions of agnosticisms and then 
 assertions of gnosticism. E. g. , Watson's Physics says 
 in effect (p. 844) that J and H (which are our heat names or 
 quantities that are really analogous respectively to the pairs 
 of coefficients C and G, and K and U; — I use H instead of 
 the usual Greek 9, the final straw deciding the change being 
 that I couldn't buy the Greek type in Boston except by 
 having it made with a delay of a month) have unknown di- 
 mensions. But Watson then explicitly makes a guess at 
 those dimensions; also, he and other orthodox physicists, 
 even in the state of admitted or tacitly admitted ignorance 
 go right ahead and use J and H in explicit equations — the 
 very doing of which of course truistically implies definite 
 knowledge of them. 
 
 b. Consequently, it truistically follows that I am unable 
 to say positively just what the orthodox theory of heat does 
 assert — ultimately, to say what any orthodox theory asserts: 
 for all actual Many units at least tacitly involve heat condi- 
 tions. We simply have to sum it up that orthodox science 
 asserts its incompleteness. So we are seeing how to com- 
 plete it. And it is an unessential quantitative problem as 
 to just where conventional science stops. 
 
 §79. a. Joule and others found that a certain amount 
 of molar motion is equivalent to a certain amount of heat un- 
 der certain conditions ; e. g. , he found that in his latitude 
 in about average weather the energy that would lift about 
 772 pounds one foot would raise the temperature of one 
 pound of presumably pure water from 59 F. to 60 F. That 
 equivalence or transformability of heat and molar motion or 
 "energy" is called the first law of heat, or of thermodynam- 
 ics. The law is expressed (Watson's Physics," 342-5) in 
 the equation Energy=Q\J, where Qh is unit quantity of heat 
 (explicitly, in our abbreviations, it would be Qhe), and J is 
 orthodoxly the mechanical equivalent of heat and a con- 
 stant (but validly, it is a variable numerical coefficient applic- 
 able to 'molar' or 'static' bodies of heat). The thermal unit 
 Qh by orthodox definition depends upon the mass M of water 
 heated, and upon the "unit" (involving H) of temperature 
 taken; or, Qh=MH. Hence, / truistically depends upon 
 the temperature scale, whose dimensions are implied or 
 
 orthodoxly is dimensionally, orthodoxly Qh = MH. 
 
 b. From the two orthodox equations, Energy = 
 ML 2 T~~ 2 =QhJ and Q h =MH, we have directly, by ordinary 
 algebra, Energy=Q h J=MHJ=ML 2 T~ 2 . If in that we sub- 
 stitute the orthodox presumptive dimensional value of /, J= 
 ML 2 r~ 2 , we have (MJ)ML 2 T- 2 =ML 2 T- 2 — which (if explic- 
 itly interpreted) is obviously self-contradictory nonsense. 
 
 c. If we take that equation, Energy^Q^J =MHJ — 
 MI?T~ 2 , as it stands and consider that it actually means or 
 implies something (and it certainly is self-consistent in its 
 usual interpretation, so far as that interpretation concerns 
 approximate measurements or experiments — which are apart 
 from conventional scientific theorizing as to what tempera- 
 ture and entropy are, which is atrociously irrational and 
 puerile), then it obviously must assert one of two general 
 statements :- (l) The equation may assert that J and H are 
 numerical coefficients, each implying an LT~ , so that H c Je = 
 (LT" 1 ) 2 , and MHJ=ML 2 T~ 2 , — which makes the equation 
 a truism (identically as in §77), and gives us H^J^^ 
 LT~^=V. In that case J'^H^ corresponds identically with 
 CG V * and K~' /2 U"^ ; and we see at once that these heat 
 equations imply the same facts as all other valid equations, 
 but orthodoxly have merely omitted explicit statement of the 
 verbal processes of naming. (A quick proof of that, 
 which of itself rigorously proves our total argument, is this :- 
 The inverse square naming law orthodoxly is omitted twice, 
 amounting to the fourth power of any single coefficient. 
 Hence, radiant heat, which implies a dynamic heat, should 
 vary approximately — since the coefficient is variable — as the 
 fourth power of such u coefficient. And that actually is ex- 
 perimentally what is known as Stefan's law ["Ency. Brit.," 
 xiii, 155J. In the experiments that variability is very per- 
 ceptible.) (2) Or we can take the equation in an 
 orthodox interpretation :- that H and J are some sort of con- 
 stant values. In that case JH=L 2 T~~ 2 ; and as a truism, J 
 and H must be fundamentally identical with L and T — a 
 conclusion which in effect asserts that all of orthodox heat is 
 religious or mystic language, and that a positive finite or 
 scientific language is impossible ; or else it drives us to the 
 theory of relativity. As a matter of fact, this second inter- 
 pretation asserts that relativity theory. In that sense, our 
 equation is an explicit assertion of the infinite regress (to 
 speak everyday language) that applies to any Many part ; or 
 
 is an explicit assertion of no exact science. So again, 
 
 by the only other interpretations of the equation that were 
 possible, we have a rigorous general proof of the validity of 
 the unification made by this book. 
 
 d. Therefore, (l) we are forced to drop any orthodox 
 view that J and if are physical "constants" (unless we re- 
 vert to relativity), and to take it that they are variable coef- 
 ficients like K and U, etc. And (2) if the actual direct 
 measures that have been made of H and J be noted (those 
 for Stefan's law are indirectly such, e. g.), it is obvious 
 
 enough that they vary. Those two points therefore 
 
 complete the essentials of the measuring theory of heat — 
 show how to write M(varying ■witli)L 2 T~~ 2 in heat terms. The 
 
75 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §80d 
 
 H and J really belong together, as was shown in §77 to be the 
 case with K~ ii U~ ii . The reader who is interested may 
 readily see for himself the details of how MJ^ expresses 
 static ("convective") heat matter, and MH J/i expresses dy- 
 namic ( radiant") heat matter, and get the consistent di- 
 mensions of them. He will see too that orthodox equations 
 really assert that Q h /, MH, and Mare all "matter," and 
 that the inconsistency and agnosticism of orthodox equations 
 lies in their omission of statement as to just what kind of 
 matter each is — i. e. , omission of the naming inverse square. 
 Consequently, as we see in the next section, when heat theo- 
 ry or naming undertakes to translate from the measuring 
 member M(varying wtk)L 2 T~ 2 into the One member Energy, 
 or into the everyday naming member That... X This..., it 
 gets confused. The actual fact is (cf. (2) in par. c) that 
 orthodox heat is mostly engaged simply in writing what are 
 substantially truisms of the religious member :- Energy=En- 
 ergy. E. g. , Energy— Q h J immediately implies such a tru- 
 ism, in so far as it explicitly has any rational meaning; and 
 so does Qh— Miif ; and so does the vague, aspiringly tenta- 
 tive equation H=ML?T~ 2 - Aspirations are for children and 
 second class poets : adults, and especially real scientists, 
 achieve. 
 
 §80. a. It therefore is obvious that conventional heat is 
 substantially not science at all, but religion. The first law 
 of heat, Energy— QhJ, is mostly an observational statement 
 of the religious law of conservation of energy; the poets 
 back in the mist of antiquity said the same thing with more 
 extensiveness, but less intensity and direct verifiability, when 
 they said that all things unite into the One. 
 
 b. But for the past fifty years there has been an effort 
 to make heat scientific — express it in pluralistic terms, or 
 definitely in terms of L and T. The difficulty was, as we 
 shall see, that heat from our usual point of view consists of 
 unsystematic splittings of bodies — which unsystematic parts 
 were readily perceptible. In short, in heat so many varia- 
 tions were perceived that it was difficult to make short, con- 
 sistently mechanical or logical statements of them, and there 
 was a tendency to bunch them religiously. When the so- 
 called science of heat tried to make a pluralistic statement 
 of itself, it intuitively followed everyday usages at first, and 
 attempted to split heat into That. . . X This. ... If it had 
 been done fairly correctly, the resulting pair of factors would 
 obviously have been similar to the Q... XP... in electricity, 
 or F...Y.L..., etc., and the last section (which formulated 
 the measuring member for heat) would have amply covered 
 the theory for the purposes of this book. It however unfor- 
 tunately happened that a German, materialistically inclined 
 and hence with no actual grasp of the principles involved (a 
 physical science highbrow, in brief), Clausius, undertook to 
 make heat a science ("Ency. Brit.," Art. "Clausius***"). 
 And Clausius messed up heat about as thoroughly as it could 
 have been done (the mess passes from the ridiculous to the 
 sublime), and concluded with a nonsensical second and last 
 "law of thermodynamics" — which is usually put into the 
 form of a strange generality called the increase of entropy, 
 which temporarily had as blighting an effect upon science 
 as its sociological analogous nonsensical generality, aristoc- 
 racy (or the "increase" to infinity of a part of mankind) 
 temporarily had on society. We have to examine Clausius s 
 rather confusing mess here from the present point of view of 
 mere scientific naming of observed M...'s. We obtain the 
 same valid principles, in familiar and more intelligible terms, 
 in §§100, 140, 153, etc. 
 
 c. The thing which Clausius substantially did (stripping 
 it of all its confused technical verbiage which poor little 
 schoolboys are supposed to be able to understand), is this:- 
 
 He combined the two approximate, observed equations En- 
 ergy— QbJ and Qt,=MH into the equation (which is still 
 monistic), Energy=MJH. Then, instead of seeing what 
 that actually meant, he substantially said that H is a quan- 
 tity that is temperature, and Energy/ H, or MJ, is a quantity 
 that is entropy — so that EntXTemp=Energy. However, 
 he could not assert any such quantitative equations as A£7= 
 Ent, or H= Temp, as the perceptible variableness of what 
 are actually mere numerical coefficients would keep those 
 equations from being quantitatively reasonably accurate ex- 
 cept at standard zero conditions, and therefore such asser- 
 tions would lead to obvious self-contradictions when H and ./ 
 were orthodoxly taken as constant. So he named tempera- 
 ture not H, but Temp, and said Energy \Temp=Ent. But 
 the verbal forms of expression he used or assumed in thus 
 attempting to get a That and This (namely, Ent and Temp — 
 instead of an actual That. . . and This. .., or Ent. . . and 
 Temp...), may obviously be considered to be these two:- 
 (l) He misinterpreted the first law of heat, Energy=QhJ, to 
 the pure dualistic effect that the total Energy which corres- 
 ponds to the Qh is absolutely independent of the temperature 
 of the body containing the heat: i. e., J is constant, or the 
 equation Energy=Q\J is taken to be completely explicit, and 
 because it fails to mention Temp explicitly, therefore it is 
 true of any temperature. (2) He then held that the equa- 
 tion Qh=MH was also completely explicit, and that it, on 
 the other hand, asserted that when we have to consider the 
 actual conversion of that heat Qh into Energy, then the temp- 
 erature of the body containing Qh (which body is the resi- 
 dence' of Qh) is asserted by H, and hence that temperature 
 has to be taken into account. That second view is one way 
 of stating the second law of heat : the equation Qh=MH is 
 
 tacitly supposed to represent the law. Of course you 
 
 can t undestand those dualisms if you interpret them strictly. 
 I am implying that they are nonsensical, and from that point 
 of view they are more intelligible than Lamor s dualistic re- 
 mark (§79a) or the orthodox mathematics ("Ency. Brit.," 
 xviii, 658), that are openly dualistic. 
 
 d. Those two interpretations of the That and This (no 
 dots) which he got for heat under the names Ent and Temp 
 are clearly self-contradictory ; — for obviously Clausius says 
 (as the first law) that heat-quantity or weight of heat' or 
 entropy resides as a second entity on a given entity or molar 
 M and is independent of the temperature or Temp or poten- 
 tial of the body (which is a materialistic assertion of dualism) ; 
 and then he asserts (as the second law) that temperature 
 
 does have some effect. The first law of heat, in that 
 
 orthodox form, is clearly merely an incomplete attempt to 
 pass from a monistic truism Energy = Qi,J, to positive or 
 pluralistic language by making a formal agreement to divide 
 the universe into static parts or M s of heat. If properly 
 (i. e., completely) expressed, such a verbal agreement or law 
 is necessary for science, as we have repeatedly seen. But 
 Clausius's way of solving that One and the Many in its heat 
 guise is merely the customary German professor's invalid 
 dualistic, materialistic way:- he logically or formally keeps 
 on having absolutely independent universes, or That That 
 That etc., explicitly as Ent Ent Ent etc., which never 
 combine into a meaning or a real universe — although he ob- 
 viously just the minute previously had started from a real 
 One. Therefore, apparently being intuitively suspicious of 
 his first law as he stated it (as was quite natural, it being 
 nonsensical; and also because it was difficult to have such a 
 short memory and forget so extremely quickly that One or 
 Energy which he started with), he proceeded flatly to deny 
 the first law in the second, with the natural result that it 
 also is nonsensical, as we now proceed to see. 
 
§80e IX One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 76 
 
 e. The difficulty he directly had with the second law 
 resulted from the fact that he tried to use Temp or tempera- 
 ture surreptitiously (even with respect to himself) as being 
 all three forms of the Trinity, in order to compensate for 
 the shortcomings of the first law in dealing with the One and 
 Many. Perhaps chiefly he used Temp as a relationship word 
 (as Tempt, corresponding to Lr) to assert L (and T) as bind- 
 ing his Ent Ent Ent etc., into a universe; consequently, 
 as a formal truism of valid logic, we have Temp r disappear- 
 ing or becoming zero in the sense that it is not a Many part; 
 and as Ent Ent Ent etc. , is all that is left as Many parts 
 when temperature thus disappears, then Ent Ent etc., 
 
 increases" until it is the universe or infinity." But the 
 second law also says in effect that Temp is This e — a standard 
 unit or One, on which as a formally fixed base the whole 
 science of heat starts (for details, see next paragraph). And 
 still further, the second law asserts that Temp is This . . . ; 
 obviously, in all applications of heat equations to actual cir- 
 cumstances Temp is a changing This... . Therefore, Claus- 
 ius, in his confused way, took Temp as actually Temp..., and 
 asserted that all This s became zero and the universe became 
 all That s — entropy increased to infinity, — which is some 
 
 more obvious and glaring nonsense. ■ That error was 
 
 clearly due primarily to fancying that Mj's could be distinct 
 or absolutely separate, while at the same time a One Energy 
 was asserted — that A=A and A does not=A. Therefore, 
 that increase of entropy is the typical technical error of 
 all formal dualism, classic logic, or scientific materialism. 
 The materialists chase the series' of That That That etc. 
 until they become mentally desperate, and finally assert that 
 those That s are the universe because there are so many of 
 them. It is the same infantile way of talking, and narrow 
 vision, that causes a child, when he sees (say) twenty cows 
 in a field and is not able to count to twenty, to say that he 
 sees a whole world of cows." As a monistic or admittedly 
 poetical way of talking it is quite permissible and intelligible, 
 being logically the way in which a hen with more or less 
 successful results talks to her chickens. The materialists 
 should not, however, claim that that way — or as they prefer 
 to put it, the increase of entropy to infinity" — is definite, 
 or positive, or 'cold fact," or "scientific," as it glaringly is 
 not, according to usual meanings of words. An ample logi- 
 cal refutation of such dualism or materialism is that if entro- 
 py increases, then there are no facts or agreements which 
 limit the past age of the universe; hence it is logically sound, 
 especially by the classic logic, to assert that already there 
 has been infinite time, and entropy has now increased to in- 
 finity, and all temperature or temperature differences have 
 disappeared or become zero — which obviously is not so. 
 
 f. Clausius tried to make Temp a One (in the same 
 sense that orthodoxly it is guessed that H=ML 2 T~ 2 =En- 
 er gy) — that being his vague way of asserting dynamic heat, 
 instead of using the valid way of inserting the inverse square 
 law a second time. When we say a body has a temperature 
 we mean, in an explicitly measurable sense, that the whole 
 inside of the body is considered to be divided into parts in 
 some way, and that that 'motion' or division inside the body 
 causes the whole to expand or contract or otherwise (as a 
 truism) change properties" or splitting, in some percep- 
 tible measure. ( Temperature' in a man is indicated by 
 calling him energetic, active, strenuous ; entropy, by calling 
 him enduring, persevering, hard-working, reliable. Obvi- 
 ously, some of each of the two factors must be had by a man 
 even to exist — to say that his endurance or entropy increases 
 to infinity, while at the same time his activity or potential or 
 actual use of that endurance becomes zero is to say that the 
 man ceases to exist: is nonsense," if we say the man has 
 
 such possibilities.) 
 
 So when temperature is asserted 
 
 we are dealing with a 'dynamic' body, precisely like a mag- 
 net in principle. And to say that H=ML?T~ 2 , or that 
 Temp is that body is valid as a religious or mystic truism, 
 but is logically wrong if we are professing to talk scientific 
 language: for temperature then should be the second im- 
 plication of inverse square that is the way of saying that the 
 body is a particular sort of M (or, is wrong because Temp 
 and Ent are irrational factors [§71gJ: each is utterly mean- 
 ingless unless supplemented by the other, just as it would be 
 nonsense to talk of a man highly strenuous but whose strenu- 
 ous activity would not endure for an instant). However, 
 Clausius decided that because Temp was sometimes used to 
 imply a body or an entity (was what I name Temp... : when 
 we talk of strenuosity we imply a man, etc.), then (as a con- 
 clusion; and this is also one conventional way of stating the 
 second law) :- heat can not pass from a cold body to a hotter 
 one (because, by tacit orthodox truisms, the cold body rela- 
 tively to the hot one has zero of the entity Temp..., and can 
 not give what it, relatively speaking, does not have). Obvi- 
 ously, those tacit orthodox truisms are quite irrelevant (as 
 they also tacitly assume the erroneous view that Temp. . . can 
 be used intelligibly entirely independent of its completing 
 irrational factor Ent...). As a matter of actual fact, if the 
 reader will strike a match he will see that pseudo second law 
 violated ; for heat then passes from relatively cold bodies — 
 the original match tip and the air about it — to the things in 
 the neighborhood of the then ignited match. Actually, 
 what that second law will validly assert is the abstract truism 
 (which completely applies to no actual body in the universe) 
 that from a low potential a higher one can not be obtained : 
 it is logically equally true that from a high potential a lower 
 one can not be obtained, as potential with reference to actual 
 bodies is a relationship word, and is not subject to compari- 
 son. The materialists erroneously assume, as the practical 
 fact, that a dynamic body has a perfectly homogeneous po- 
 tential — that all of it has, at least approximately, a steady 
 constant motion or temperature (Maxwell's demon is a theo- 
 retical speculation to the contrary). We have seen here in 
 general that the error is due to their omission of the verbal 
 inverse square laws : we shall see repeatedly in Two and 
 Three that no body has any such constant potential, but that 
 all actual bodies in principle have internal potentials that 
 vary from to » . As an equivalent statement of that, we 
 may put the foregoing materialistic pseudo-scientific confu- 
 sion of One words and relationship words that is usually 
 called the second law of heat into familiar everyday terms :- 
 (l) a baby can not be born, as his potential or ability to 
 move about for a longer time is greater as an average than 
 the biological potential of his failing parents; (2) or, "To 
 you from failing hands the torch we throw" is, according to 
 that second law, a nonsensical expression, whereas all intel- 
 ligent people can observe directly, without all this present 
 talk, that it is not nonsensical; (s) or, those materialists as- 
 sert that growth, and birth, and radioactivity, and electron 
 formation are impossibilities, as in such cases the potential or 
 temperature increases," at least locally. We shall see just 
 how matter w made, and what growth and birth are (index, 
 Growth, Secondary whirls," etc.). Then these formal- 
 ities will become easily intelligible. These facts and this 
 argument are important to you :- all the engines which sup- 
 ply you with many needs are applications of them, and 
 require clear thinking about them; and even safe experi- 
 menting with the "strenuous life" requires such clear think- 
 ing. Also, I have just performed a major surgical operation 
 on the materialistic mind ; it may not recover ; but at least 
 it can no longer infect the rest of the world. 
 
77 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §801 
 
 g. It therefore obviously follows that the way in which 
 temperature should have been measured or defined is pre- 
 cisely the way in which electric potential was. Hence we 
 may write the combined static-dynamic heat equation :- 
 
 Ent. . . X Temp. ..=MJ *H' A L 2 T- 2 =Energy(general heat) . 
 Or, if we wish to consider that we handle heat in quantities 
 such as molar bodies, in agreement with the monistic truism 
 Energy=Q b J, thus permitting all the standard One which is 
 included by the equation to become formally the same tem- 
 perature, we have the static' heat general equation :- 
 
 EnU. . . X Temp,. . . ^MJ Y2 L 2 T~ 2 =Energy{static heat). 
 
 And the corresponding general 'dynamic' heat equation is :- 
 
 EnU. . . X Tempm. ..^MH' A L 2 T~ 2 =Energy(dynamic heat). 
 
 h. Those equations (provided we write them as unit 
 standards, Ent e ...XTemp e ...=ML 2 T~ 2 , etc.) are the valid 
 forms of the well known equations for the pressure p and 
 volume v of a gas. The orthodox form of the static equation 
 is pv=a constant, — which constant" is obviously a standard 
 One or Energy, so that logically or dimensionally (but not 
 numerically when usual conventions of measuring are used) 
 the equation is pv=Energy. That is called the isothermal 
 equation, and is represented by an equilateral hyperbola. 
 The orthodox form of the dynamic equation (the last being 
 static) is the adiabatic" equation pv /e =a constant (Dan- 
 iell's "Physics," 394f; "Ency. Brit.," xxvi, 809f). We 
 take up those gas forms of scientific equations in §§82-3. 
 
 i. We may now explicitly observe (it is something of a 
 repetition) that the fundamental difficulty in those orthodox 
 heat confusions was as to the way to use the same language 
 to go from statements about static bodies to statements about 
 dynamic bodies. The equation Energy=QhJ implies molar' 
 or static heat, and Energy=MJH implies dynamic heat. 
 The theory of the transition, which is a matter of verbal 
 form, is identically the same as already seen with respect to 
 electricity, etc. I must at this point omit the volumes of 
 details which would be needed to give a reasonably full ap- 
 plication to heat. But as an introduction to the pv form of 
 the same verbal puzzle (which we need to consider), I shall 
 restate a general solution in the remainder of this section, 
 from the useful point of view of what is called the absolute 
 zero of temperature. 
 
 j. In the equation for static heat, Energy=QhJ, tem- 
 perature (in the sense of internal division of a heat-mass, or 
 Temp T ) is not mentioned ; and the same thing applies to 
 Ent s ...X Temps... =MJ H L 2 T~ 2 — i.e., that explicit static 
 equation actually has zero potential, and hence no actual 
 Tempr is explicitly asserted to exist; it of course has the 
 symbol Temp s ..., but that symbol is identical with L. .. in 
 the general F. .. XL..., and as such means merely that in an 
 actual thermometer the thermometric or heat-containing 
 substance stands at that height L" or Temp r . In that 
 sense, the explicit static heat equation makes a statement 
 which is true at a formal absolute zero of temperature (and 
 f there were no variation in J, would be true at any tem- 
 perature — but there is a variation). That is to say, so far as 
 the statement goes, there is no motion or zero internal mo- 
 tion in the MJ* (or in the QhJ). And that formal agree- 
 ment as to how the universe is to be divided — the MJ™ ob- 
 viously implies an inverse square, — is the total meaning of 
 such phrases as "absolute zero," whether the phrase refers 
 to a potential called temperature, or to any other sort of po- 
 tential. In Many terms — in actual, everyday nature as we 
 commonly speak of it, — there is no such thing as a zero of 
 temperature, any more than there is an infinity of tempera- 
 ture : it is an absolute truism that it is impossible to have 
 either, in a Many sense. The total universe is at zero tem- 
 perature or at infinite temperature, just as we prefer to say. 
 
 But no part of the universe either is, or can be. As a curi- 
 ous fact (which again shows the consistency of these truistic 
 statements), the theory of relativity, having completely cap- 
 sized our language, asserts that there can be no velocity 
 greater than the velocity of light in our neighborhood (but 
 cf. XIII, XIV). That relativity conclusion, if expressed in 
 heat terms, asserts that at the velocity of light there is an 
 absolute infinity of temperature — an absolute maximum. So 
 if a flame gives light, some portion of the flame is, by that 
 theory, at infinite temperature. And that, truistically, is 
 valid. The complete facts are (as we shall see repeatedly in 
 Part Two) that at some place in it, every natural structure 
 or body is always growing or else breaking down ; at that 
 place, where respectively either the part's neighboring parts 
 are ceasing to be, or else the part itself is ceasing to be (as 
 or in its original' structure, of course), the temperature or 
 potential is obviously either zero or infinity, depending on 
 the point of view of naming it:- if a structure is viewed as 
 going out of existence, its temperature' is zero"; but 
 at the same (really geometrical point or zero) place and time 
 its neighboring structure is coming into existence, and its 
 temperature there is infinite. But, as the structure 
 
 does not exist when it has thus broken down, or is not com- 
 ing into existence when it does exist, clearly it is a verbal 
 self-contradiction to say that any Many part can have either 
 a zero or an infinite temperature. That is obviously merely 
 the problem, in terms of measuring or of heat or of any 
 potential, of What is a number? (see discussion of the zero- 
 infinity line of Fig. 54c, which is analogous to these limits) . 
 
 k. In a way precisely analogous, the dynamic heat equa- 
 tion formally asserts temperature — whereas previously zero 
 temperature was asserted (last paragraph). Therefore, 
 speaking precisely, \f we assert that either the static or the 
 dynamic equation is absolute or is absolutely expressed, then 
 the dynamic equation asserts an infinite temperature, for 
 the simple reason that the only way to make a zero tempera- 
 ture become some other temperature is to multiply it by in- 
 finity (and that really amounts to saying that the One named 
 zero is the One named infinity — and we actually get no defi- 
 nite potential that way). The mechanical or concrete 
 
 facts that explain that verbal One and Many difficulty which 
 orthodox science fails to get out of, are those given at the 
 end of the last paragraph. 
 
 1. That verbal One and Many contradiction which in- 
 fects all conventional discussions of potential from their very 
 start with the obviously self-contradictory idea potential 
 energy," is completely obviated by noting that neither the 
 static equation nor the dynamic equation is completely ex- 
 pressed (or valid) if considered to be absolutely separate from 
 the other (which is equivalent to the fact in §§73h, 77d 
 that there is actually zero potential in our static' and in 
 our 'dynamic' equations). Actual or Many expression of 
 finite temperatures is obviously implied in the orthodox One 
 truism, Energy^McJH; and is explicitly given in Many 
 terms in Mj' / *H l/i L?T~ 2 = z Energy{heat) :- for in such a com- 
 bination we have neither the of the static nor the °o of the 
 dynamic. The practical way of avoiding those formal zeros 
 and infinities is of course to consider that (say) MJ' A always 
 has a numerical value of / ^ which agrees with the actual re- 
 lations of MJ^ with the omitted but necessarily implied H^ 
 (and that is a mathematical proposition the fairly good state- 
 ment of which would require volumes of differential equa- 
 tions, omitted from this book; I call it the theory of 
 harmonic proportions or of harmonic periodicity, as it is the 
 principle or quantative relationship of ratios, or explicit writ- 
 ing of the definite expansion of That. .. X This. .., on which 
 the periodic table of elements is based ; see Index). Until 
 
§801 IX One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 78 
 
 we came to heat we tacitly considered that the static and the 
 dynamic equations always belonged together: that view 
 was the total unification of science in the form K~^U~™=^V\. 
 But because Clausius in heat explicitly made science in act- 
 ual effect chaos — disintegrated and disrupted it logically with 
 German thoroughness (not out of bad" motives, but merely 
 through coarseness or dullness of comprehension of principles 
 resulting from having a mind overburdened with unassimi- 
 lated details or material facts" — most of which in such 
 cases aren't "so" anyway, being too inaccurate), — by split- 
 ting H and J apart and asserting that they were absolutely 
 independent, even to the preposterous extent of increase of 
 entropy, it became needful to be explicit about their unity. 
 m. It hence follows that a zero or an infinite tempera- 
 ture (or any other potential:- chemical, surface-energy, 
 space-molar-location, etc.) simply implies the 'surface' or 
 zone between two parts into which a One is split — asserts 
 the existence of a difference surface,' across which smaller 
 parts of one body pass as it changes or moves into being 
 another, the first body diminishing or dying and the second 
 (which is the first transformed) growing or being born, with 
 
 energy" being ' evolved" as the process. The potential 
 of any actual finite body can not therefore be that formal 
 limiting potential, but is measured from that limit in either 
 direction — one direction being called growth or increase, and 
 the other dying or decrease. Death is the biological term 
 for zero temperature, and birth for infinite temperature; ob- 
 viously there can be no such entities or Many parts, nor can 
 any actual finite Many part attain such an absolute condition 
 or relationship; birth and death are, with reference to any 
 part of the universe, merely quantitative, or matters of de- 
 gree, and not absolute. We shall see the concrete details of 
 this subject from time to time (Index, "Birth," "Death," 
 
 Growth," Potential," Difference surface"). Incident- 
 ally, the same principles of potential apply to the problems 
 of good and evil, the structure of the solar system and atoms 
 and man, personal immortality, etc. I have here merely 
 stated the rigidly formal solution of those problems, in con- 
 ventional physical terms. 
 
 §81. a. We have thus seen how Clausius became con- 
 fused in trying to make science of heat. Substantially his 
 was the everyday or technically philosophical way of splitting 
 Energy or Universe into That...XThis... . The more spe- 
 cifically scientific" way would have been to write heat en- 
 ergy in terms of the measuring member, as indicated in §79. 
 
 b. Hence, it has appeared that in conventional heat the 
 everyday commonsense form or philosophical form That. . . X 
 This... is ordinarily used. As that everyday form is used to 
 a considerable extent in other branches of science, we need 
 to complete this formal unification of science by a more ex- 
 plicit consideration of that naming or philosophical member. 
 
 c. We are going to find that Richards, by completing 
 the theory started by Van der Waals, has explicitly and with 
 complete generality stated a unified science in the everj'day 
 or philosophical form That...XTkis... . And as all other 
 branches of science are already expressed in terms of Exten- 
 sive factor. . . X Intensive factor. . . , and as it is commonly under- 
 stood that Intensive factor. . . or intensity or potential is 
 included in complete orthodox statements of Energy (and 
 that it rather consciously implies L and T), it follows that 
 because orthodox science accepts Van der Waals's and Rich- 
 ards's conclusions, it in effect already accepts the unification 
 of this chapter — provided I show that those conclusions agree 
 with the chapter, as is easily done. 
 
 §82. a. The conclusion which Clausius gets, and which 
 is in agreement with the dualism of the classic logic, is that 
 in EntXTemp, Ent is an entity of some sort which is abso- 
 
 lutely separate and distinct from another entity of some 
 sort, Temp — and vice versa. And in agreement with that, 
 the orthodox 'static' form of EntXTemp=Energy is pv=En- 
 ergy. Orthodoxly, pv is equal to a constant, but the 
 constant is obviously a standard One. Explicitly, the con- 
 stant is RTemp, where R is a constant number, and Temp is, 
 like H, orthodoxly confusedly given the (dimensional) mean- 
 ing Temp=MI?T~ 2 (but I do not need to repeat our heat 
 discussion to show that RTemp is actually Energy). And 
 the customary dynamic' form of EntXTemp= Energy is 
 pv k/<!= RTemp=Energy. (The same remarks as to RTemp 
 again apply. Also, k and c are orthodoxly taken as constant 
 numbers derived from experimental measures, so that R== 
 k — c, etc. ; see Daniell's Physics," 370.) 
 
 b. Thus, in \he pXv expression, the p and v have to be 
 absolutely distinct in order to agree with Clausius's theory 
 of heat. I. e., in conventional formality, the p and v are 
 explicitly without the dots — are a dualism which older ortho- 
 dox theory holds will sharply and accurately make up at least 
 a standard universe : concretely, will accurately describe any 
 given quantity of gas. But at just that point the total equa- 
 tion of pseudo, dualistic laws falls down completely and fails 
 to agree with observed facts. For a sharp pXv agrees with 
 what is called a perfect gas — one in which truistically the 
 volume and the pressure vary with perfectly steady mutual 
 proportionality. A perfect gas of course is merely an asser- 
 tion of a real One : we saw Clausius starting with it (§80cd). 
 So here it inevitably bobs up again — and fails glaringly to 
 agree with observed facts about any parts of the universe. 
 Quite naturally it would : we have seen repeatedly that as a 
 truism there are no perfect parts (index, "Exact"). The ob- 
 served fact that there is no actual perfect gas is clearly a 
 verifiable proof of the general argument of this book. 
 
 c. In short, the orthodox, "constant" form pv is neither 
 in quantitative agreement with observed facts, nor formally 
 consistent. Or, what is truistic with that:- all factors, such 
 as FXL, WXA, EntXTemp, are mutually interrelated; 
 they are explicitly That... X This..., p... Xv..., etc., and 
 each factor (such as That..., v...) is absolutely unintelligible 
 or irrational if considered alone — and so on, for all the other 
 conclusions we have already seen : they reject materialistic, 
 perfect-gas science, and assert the fundamental law that 
 mass varies with velocity, or assert no exact science. 
 
 d. Now, Van der Waals (in remarks written by himself, 
 "Ency. Brit.," vi, 846) finds that instead of the orthodox 
 sharply separated p and v, written as pv, we must write 
 (p+alv 2 )(v—b)=RTe?np [or, =Energy], in which a and b 
 are usually taken as constant numbers, but not necessarily 
 so. If constant, then Van der Waals's equation is obviously 
 equivalent top...Xv; i. e., p... varies or is an actual Many 
 part, but v (without the dots) is "perfect" [which latter is 
 nonsense]. If a and b are not constant, then the equation is 
 rational and valid, being explicitly the form p.. . Xv... . On 
 the page cited Van der Waals states that "we are still per- 
 fectly in the dark" as to the principles on which his equation 
 is based. Substantially, the equation is a fundamental modi- 
 fication of the old kinetic theory, as we shall see (§§89, 98-4, 
 etc.), and as he himself clearly implies on the same page! 
 But he fails to be definite about it, so far as I can find. 
 
 e. But Richards, basing his conclusion on a long series 
 of unusually careful and skillful measurements of substances 
 (Faraday lecture, 1911, printed in "jour. Chem. Soc " v 
 99, and Science," Oct. 27, 1911), finds definitely that all 
 volumes v, even including explicitly atomic volumes, are 
 variable;^ and hence that it is irrational ever to speak of a 
 
 perfect d— one whose value is in any way "independent." 
 By actual, direct measurements he finds Clausius's theory or 
 
79 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 One IX §83f 
 
 the perfect-gas theory (par. a) finally untenable so far as is 
 now perceptibly measurable. Then Richards explicitly takes 
 the step at which Van der Waals hesitates, and definitely 
 asserts that the old kinetic theory, which is the "concrete" 
 or mechanical, guessed-at base of the orthodox theory of 
 heat, is untenable. And that amounts to Richards's saying 
 and to proving directly even with respect to atoms, that the 
 valid physical equation is p...X,v...=Energy. In order to 
 be completely explicit and logical, we add to that equation 
 the measuring member, MJ yi H H L 2 T~ 2 . That completely 
 and rigorously unifies physical science. 
 
 §83. a. It finally remains, to complete our chapter on 
 the explicit formal unification, to make a brief statement (in 
 this section) of that complete theory or expression in familiar 
 terms that will give us a more thorough grasp of the details 
 noted ; and then (in the next section) to indicate the possible 
 extension of the general equation. 
 
 b. We have been seeing that physical equations, or in 
 general any valid statements, were simply statements assert- 
 ing some variously named splitting of the universe into parts, 
 which splitting was a "property" (i. e., an equation asserts, 
 describes, names a property). Now, the usual name for the 
 product of that splitting is things"; I also use thing' as a 
 name for the One. Some of the scientific technical names 
 for things, beginning with "large" things, are :- Energy, 
 universe, One, galaxies (I designate the galaxy or particular 
 structure of stars in which our solar system is situated, as 
 
 ours'), star clusters, solar systems, stars, planets, moons, 
 comets, meteors, earth, Jupiter, molar bodies (such as solids, 
 liquids, gases), molecules, atoms, electrons or corpuscles, 
 and finally waves or vibrations" of different sorts. We 
 therefore need to note explicitly whether or not the same 
 method of expression, of naming, that applies to (say) atoms 
 in dynamic heat also consistently applies to galaxies. The 
 observed fact is that it does — that a galaxy is identically the 
 same sort of a structure that an atom is, differing only in the 
 unessential numerical name of the L and T measure. The 
 general truth of that is rigorously formally proved in the 
 foregoing part of this chapter. In this section I state the 
 formal proof somewhat explicitly. Parts Two and Three 
 give the proof in concrete terms. 
 
 c. As we saw, Richards's effectual conclusion that the 
 valid expression of phenomena is explicitly jp...X«. .. is 
 equivalent to asserting that we must say That... X This..., 
 whatever part That or This may be. Therefore, it follows 
 that if the universe is split into (say) just two bodies— a 
 That which we may name sun (or it could be a galaxy, an 
 atom, etc.), and a This which we may name earth (or another 
 galaxy, etc.), — then those two" bodies can not be sharp 
 and exact and constant; even just those two would be con- 
 tinually changing, and must still be written That. . . X 
 This... . Or, to make that explicit and more conventional, 
 suppose that there was-were just the sun and earth (with all 
 other bodies" wiped out, except that the sun and earth are 
 not taken to be perfectly rigid or absolutely static — and tru- 
 istically they can not be if the One is formally divided into 
 that Many, the truism being the reverse statement of the 
 first part of this paragraph). Then, orthodoxly, the earth 
 and sun are taken as being in effect a perfect gas, and it is 
 then assumed that the problem of their relative motions, the 
 problem of two bodies, is rigorously exactly soluble (for solu- 
 tion, see "Ency. Brit.," ii, 803-4). But obviously no such 
 solution is possible (see next paragraph). The problem of 
 two actual bodies is not exactly soluble, any more than is 
 the problem of three bodies. Hence, in brief, there is no 
 exact science; we can not explicitly say or use^u about any 
 two actual bodies ; always the explicit expression is p. . . X 
 
 v..., with the dots indicating an infinite regress which may 
 be formally stated but never exactly evaluated. New- 
 comb shows in the place just cited why the problem of three 
 bodies or more bodies is insoluble; it amounts to showing 
 that there is an infinite regress. A mathematical solution 
 of the problem has recently been made by Sundman. Judg- 
 ing from the descriptions of the solution I have seen, he 
 simply has a formal one, which explicitly involves infinite re- 
 gresses or series which can never be exactly evaluated ; and 
 hence, athough it is a formal solution it is not an actual one. 
 
 d. The briefest proof that the problem of two bodies is 
 not accurately soluble when actual bodies are considered is 
 that because mass varies with velocity, then the average 
 point center of gravity of the two bodies is never steady 
 relative to the geometrical parts, and hence the problem is 
 identical with the problem of an infinite number of bodies and 
 
 truistically is quantitatively insoluble. That proof is 
 
 of course identical with, and inclusive of, all the proofs of 
 the same thing (clearly it is the infinite regress) given from 
 various points of view. I shall indicate some of those proofs 
 in the next paragraph. Here it may be noted that that gen- 
 eral proof is identical with saying that every actual body in 
 the universe is asymmetrical with the universe or with any 
 other body (obviously, that is also immediately a truism from 
 
 the theory of incommensurables, §50). And that 
 
 general proof is merely a verbal way of expressing the equa- 
 tion F... XL... =MCL 2 T~ 2 — Energy. For obviously that 
 equation asserts ever-varying M s, so that no two given M s 
 would remain the same for any finite length of time; hence, 
 no two could have a verbally fixed or determinate orbit. 
 
 e. Neither one of any two actual bodies is absolutely 
 rigid (all of Part Two is implicit proof of that). Hence, 
 unless the departure from rigidity is absolutely identical in 
 each body (which is not the case, as is obvious by using uni- 
 versal circular reasoning and coucluding that there is no such 
 symmetry ; or, by so-called direct reasoning, there is only 
 one chance in infinity of identical departure from absolute 
 rigidity in each, and therefore not such a departure), then 
 the bodies would have different amounts of tide, which would 
 move the point center of gravity and make the orbits insol- 
 uble, in any numerical or verbal exactness. In the 
 
 same way, any two actual bodies are electrified in some de- 
 gree. Any relative motion of them changes the relative 
 electrification (§184); hence, the orbits truistically vary in- 
 finitely. And any phenomenon between the two 
 
 bodies will similarly give that same result of variable orbits. 
 Hence, not even the heavenly' bodies constitute a perfect 
 gas, and there is no absolutely free space, or empty" 
 space (except of course those terms may be applied to the 
 One if it suits the speaker's taste and agrees with his other 
 phraseology). Whenever free ' is applied to any part — to 
 any unit of the Many — it obviously truistically is a quantita- 
 tive term implying some degree of freedom, and not absolute, 
 as we see repeatedly in familiar terms in Two and Three. 
 
 f. A point of much interest is that in the orthodox 
 pseudo-exact solution of the gravitational orbits of two bod- 
 ies, the "velocity" of the travel of gravity-force is taken as 
 infinite. The absolute solution of why gravity has that speed 
 is simply:- gravity pull is asserted to exist before we ever 
 begin to talk about it: consequently, if we say it is there, 
 then inevitably, as a purely verbal truism, it is there; or, in 
 conventional mathematical terms, in order to be there, it has 
 an ' infinite velocity. E. g. , in our general dynamic molar 
 equation W... X A... =MG K L 2 T~ 2 = : Energy, I have asserted 
 that gravity does exist between all M's, and that is the same 
 as saying that it travels at infinite speed. But, that asser- 
 tion means precisely the same thing as was meant in §80k 
 
§83f IX One 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 80 
 
 when it was shown that the dynamic heat equation asserted 
 infinite temperature. I. e., as was shown, it is not completely 
 explicit to use just the dynamic molar or gravity equation 
 alone. The complete truth is the combination of the molar 
 static and molar dynamic thus:- Extent of internal splitting 
 into M's...X This moving pair of M's directly considered... = 
 MCG Vl L 2 T~ 2 =Energy. Then, the relative velocities of nam- 
 ing the M's (i. e., naming them internally and externally) 
 are implicitly expressed by the equation CG ii =The criterion 
 velocity of naming — which velocity is in general actually 
 roughly V\ for us, but not necessarily so. But the separate 
 velocities (i. e., the "velocity" of naming the JF...,and the 
 "velocity" of naming the A...) can be anything; i. e., they 
 are absolutely indeterminate, because to separate them is to 
 speak of bodies being absolutely static or absolutely dynamic 
 — which would be ineffable One talk. Consequently, when 
 we customarily consider that gravity merely is there, or is 
 formally G e , its corresponding e velocity is °° ; and we then 
 relatively consider that the time of our travel between the 
 static body and the dynamic body is (i. e. , the two bodies 
 have the queer standard or , name used above :- This mov- 
 ing pair of M's directly considered). As soon as we observe 
 that we are co-relating that with °° -speed gravity, the 
 
 reason" for that speed of gravity becomes obvious:- it is a 
 mere truism of the formal naming of gravity — the verbal 
 trick of the One and Many. Therefore, as a further truism 
 and rigorous and absolute explanation, if we wish to be com- 
 pletely explicit about the law of gravity, then the valid equa- 
 tion must explicitly contain a second expression of inverse 
 square, precisely as in §77 we saw was in a complete Am- 
 pere's law (cf. §§100, 128, 134). If thus completely ex- 
 plicit, we could with verbal consistency say that the velocity 
 of gravity was the same as an electric current (roughly V\ in 
 ordinary circumstances), and work out all molar mechanics 
 just as electricity is stated. But, then gravity phenomena 
 obviously become — are — what we usually call electric phe- 
 nomena. Consequently, as the summing up truism, we may 
 say that gravity travels at any speed we wish to assign, and 
 on that speed work out a complete, rigorous, unified science; 
 but in every case where we say gravity has some speed other 
 than the almost One or e infinite speed, we are using 
 gravity as being a phenomenon other than the one we con- 
 ventionally consider it; e. g. , if we give it the speed of light 
 we have what is usually called electricity, as before men- 
 tioned ; and as electricity" from a conventional view is 
 sometimes light, then gravity would also be light. Or, in 
 other words, as we saw in §73d, Newton's law assumes that 
 gravity travels at an absolute infinite speed. But that is the 
 mathematical limit, and does not apply to any actual body. 
 Such gravity just verbally is, exists as a logically pure rela- 
 tionship, or is God the Holy Ghost. Obviously, no mechan- 
 ics of such gravity is possible — for such an infinite gravity is 
 not scientific but religious in form. We see details of that 
 
 point of view of Newton s law from time to time. 
 
 And in general therefore, me can have an infinite number" 
 of sorts of phenomena," the difference between any two sorts 
 being that the speed of naming' is different; and nothing else 
 but such a quantitative distinction does differentiate phe- 
 nomena. But as we have already seen in the case where 
 
 gravity" became light, ' all those different phenomena 
 are really identical — that being a truism of course, because 
 "speed" is merely LT -1 or the ultimate identical relation- 
 ship. Therefore, in this paragraph we directly see 
 
 the complete solution of Why does gravity (or any phe- 
 nomenon) have a certain speed; and what is that speed?"; 
 but we also see the truistic result that in a unified science 
 all phenomena become identical except as we arbitrarily dis- 
 
 tinguish them. And the only arbitrary way of differentiating 
 is to assign each sort a particular speed or LT~~ . 
 
 g. We may now look at the general meaning of intro- 
 ducing the inverse square law a second time. It involves 
 some repetition ; but this subject of harmonic periodicity is 
 the summed principles of final quantitative expression of 
 knowledge, and is of sufficient complexity to make some 
 repetition perhaps acceptable. When in usual language we 
 name a standard or a whole One, we imply the possibility of 
 splitting it verbally — which implication is the infinite regress. 
 And in nearly every sort of statement, we use a standard 
 molar body Me, that to begin with is logically a One. That 
 Me is formally absolutely static — is internally not split. 
 Then, as an j/"-agreement in language, we change that Me 
 into MC, and write Energy=MCL 2 T~ 2 : but that is merely 
 the verbal form of agreeing on preliminary naming of what 
 is going to be actual energy (§§73, 77). Then in any case of 
 actual transfer or exhibition of energy, some or all of one 
 such molar body must pass from itself to another such molar 
 body and be incorporated in that second one. And truistic- 
 ally, that can not occur if the second (also the first, in point 
 of fact: cf. the nature of the infinite regress of C... at the 
 end of this paragraph) is actually internally static as just as- 
 serted. Hence, the second must, as what we might call an 
 MCe (note the e), be itself split into parts, or be made 'dy- 
 namic,' by the second use of that naming law — and we get 
 the expression MCG Vl . We have seen all that before: now 
 we come to a little clearer way of expressing it :- Obviously, 
 in every case when actual energy is exhibited, we must form- 
 ally pass (or concretely :- have matter pass) from a body 
 made up of parts (say molecules), to a molar or formal e -body 
 — and we may generally consider that as passing from one 
 sort of arbitrary physical structure (i. e., one split in a cer- 
 tain way) to another structure of a different order. (Those 
 orders may be conceived thus :- electrons combine into a 
 "higher" order, atoms; atoms into "higher" molecules; 
 molecules into molar bodies, or into biologic cells; cells into 
 persons; molar bodies into solar systems, which are atoms 
 or cells of a galaxy, etc. — as we shall see in detail.) Every 
 time we make such a step" (either up" or down ') we 
 need to introduce into the measuring member a new coefficient 
 implying one additional use of the inverse square law (ortho- 
 dox science does not clearly recognize that need ; also there 
 are no such essential steps anyway, they being merely ar- 
 bitrary quantitative conveniences which merge continuously 
 into each other, as was proved generally in the last para- 
 graph, and will be shown in intelligible detail throughout 
 Two). Every time we take such a step to a different order 
 in the naming member we ought to name a new This and That 
 (and orthodox science usually does that). Then, as there is 
 no logical limit to the number of different orders of struct- 
 ures (as just seen, they ultimately merge together continu- 
 ously ; or as a concrete example, stellar galaxies exist inside 
 atoms, differing from our galaxy only in unessential size, 
 §105), we may explicitly have the numerical coefficients in ir\fin- 
 ite regress, each order or period being obviously related to all 
 the others (hence the name 'harmonic periodicity') and all 
 therefore necessarily being formally based on whatever arbi- 
 trary unit measure we start with (which, agreeing with the 
 structure of our nervous systems, happens to be V\). I. e., 
 if we wish to write (varying with)' explicitly and also in 
 agreement with our previous symbolic way of doing it, we 
 have C... (in MC...), and not just C. And that MC...L 2 T~ 2 
 is the measuring member in complete symbolic explicitness ; but 
 as we saw in §76d, we can't practically be so infinitely ex- 
 plicit, so we chop off the logic by indicating its nature by 
 different names that use the inverse square in a "step" of an 
 
81 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two X §8flb 
 
 appreciable size. The universe runs in such rhythmic" 
 appreciable steps for reasons we shall see. The periodic 
 table of chemical elements" is an example of perceptible 
 rhythmic steps that are some of the dots in (say) C. .. — the 
 total change not being considered quantitatively enough to 
 add an inverse square naming (it may be in the future). 
 
 §84. a. Thus it is obvious that there is possible an un- 
 limited extension of the various measuring expressions of 
 science. I have above reduced those expressions to their 
 simplest forms, and omitted substantially all manipulation of 
 them — omitted mathematics." That extension of science 
 is here called harmonic periodicity — a poor name. That is 
 in distinction from the use of the naming or That. . . X This. . . 
 member, which use is called mechanics," "mechanical 
 theories,' or scientific theories," but which technically is 
 philosophy (§39d) ; and when the names in that member are 
 familiar its use is called common knowledge," or infor- 
 mation." Harmonic periodicity' is not definitely recog- 
 nized as being an existing general aspect of science: it is a 
 sort of general name that includes all of what is tacitly in- 
 cluded in measuring" and measurement." Its definite 
 expansion requires primarily a rewriting of calculus in a way 
 that agrees with the basic logical rule, and then an applica- 
 tion of such mathematics ; most of the volumes needed for 
 that is omitted from this book. 
 
 b. Recently there has been a vast amount of measuring 
 or experimenting" in science, and an inadequate proportion 
 of consistent expression of results. In so far as this book 
 consists of science, its chief purpose from such a technical 
 point of view is to supply a consistent basis for such neces- 
 sary expression of results already obtained. This chapter, 
 from that technical point of view, is mostly concerned with 
 the principles of the measuring member — -science technically 
 is chiefly that member (39f). For centuries men will have 
 to try various applications of those principles before there 
 will be excellent judgment as to which forms are most useful 
 in our practical, verbally split universe. I have shown that 
 I have given nothing essentially new in this chapter : the 
 work of Richards was shown to be a generally accepted basis 
 of those principles, his facts about p...X.v... being directly 
 translatable into the chemical measuring member, of which 
 Van der Waals recognizes the need ( Ency. Brit.," vi, 846). 
 
 c. I shall mention other excellent work that may furnish 
 useful hints for the explicit extension of science (see Index, 
 under the men's names, for further details) :- Reeve's En- 
 ergy" is highly suggestive. It is not explicit in the unifi- 
 
 cation of all science, nor in using the measuring member. 
 But it takes a point of view of treating p... X«i... which has 
 its special advantages (§92). And Reynolds, in Sub- 
 Mechanics of the Universe," and in the popular On an In- 
 version of Ideas as to the Structure of the Universe," gives 
 some curious mathematics that are applicable. Marshall, in 
 "Principles of Economics," is continually treating the varia- 
 tion of our naming factors. He uses conventional mathe- 
 matical forms for summarizing his work with such variables 
 and those mathematics will furnish some guidance for ex- 
 panding our measuring member. Marshall almost explicitly 
 uses valid logic in that work; practically he always does, so 
 far as I have observed in reading the first half. Erwin in 
 The Universe and the Atom" is particularly good in point- 
 ing out the regress of the different orders of structures (§§83, 
 94). He orthodoxly uses classical logic, introducing and 
 00 without regard for our rule ; but he uses good common- 
 sense in keeping them practically balanced. Patten has 
 unified the biologic history of man by his Evolution of the 
 Vertebrates and their Kin," and has since been using a valid 
 and strongly dynamic logic in extension of the unification to 
 some of the most difficult forms of That... X This... in The 
 Grand Strategy of Evolution. Ritter has used the naming 
 member excellently in several biological books, unifying 
 general biology in a way that would be a useful guide to 
 physicists. And Jordan has done that in numerous books in 
 all the biologic sciences. Eugene Miller in The Secret of 
 the Universe gives what is actually a good monistic account 
 of gravity, and by implication of any sort of MG e '^, etc. — 
 not of the actual MG^..., etc. Possibly Miller does not 
 recognize it for just that; but a reading of his book will help 
 the intelligent physicist to learn to distinguish between pure 
 formality (which of course is religion in our strict sense of 
 §39, asareall pure' or perfect things, even pure science"), 
 and Many science. Finally, Bjerknes in Fields of 
 
 Force" keeps pretty logical even when using vector analy- 
 sis — a species of mathematics worse than that in §44 or than 
 Einstein's in §66. I have profited much from those men, 
 and have used their ideas. 
 
 d. We are now ready to take up in Part Two the usual 
 sort of description, or mechanical theories, of the universe, 
 as given by the naming member, That. . . X This. . . . That 
 sort of description, because That. . . X This. . . is truistic with 
 M{varying withjLPT -2 , will obviously serve to repeat, in 
 more intelligible form, the argument of this chapter, and the 
 general investigation of this Part One. 
 
 PART TWO 
 
 CONCRETE UNIFICATION; or PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
 
 CHAPTER X. General principles, and general mechanical 
 theories, of science. 
 
 §85. a. The everyday way of naming things is briefly 
 symbolized by the naming member That. . . X This. .., or by 
 some of the variations of it, a number of which we have seen. 
 The use of that form of expression gives what is commonly 
 called description. I. e., we name things in a related- series 
 until the hearer gets a name which he knows, from his pre- 
 vious observation or experience. The remainder of the 
 names then become intelligible to him (fundamentally, be- 
 cause he is at least intuitively or vaguely aware that all rela- 
 tionship is identity, §28h: hence, he merely identifies, 
 finally, the name that he knows with the other names that 
 
 were related to it). The description is therefore obviously 
 also a real explanation (index, ' Explanation"). 
 
 b. Hence, if we are to describe the universe we keep 
 on naming This's and That's until the hearer grasps the iden- 
 tity of relationship of everything he ever saw or rationally 
 imagined. (For the implications of the psychological half 
 of that assertion see the chapter on psychology, XVII.) So 
 as a truism the only valid description of the universe is also 
 a unification. Such a unification — specifically, the actual 
 grasp or comprehension of the whole (index, Rebirth") — is 
 as a sum what is usually called religion. And for centuries 
 men have tacitly accepted these general statements I am 
 making here in a form which already is obviously true, or 
 
§85b X Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 will be made so in due time. That men did accept these 
 statements is historically shown by the fact that every re- 
 ligion that received much acceptance undertook to give just 
 such a description (which is now usually considered scien- 
 tific") as its base. Hence, as we are in this Part going to 
 have such an everyday description of the "material" universe 
 it is well to recognize and keep in mind that final religious 
 aspect of the description — an aspect that shows the import- 
 ance of the description. 
 
 c. The somewhat expanded descriptions of the universe 
 are, as such, nowadays termed science, it being tacitly as- 
 sumed that valid, consistent descriptions are meant. The 
 chief reason for formally detaching those descriptions from 
 religion" and giving them a new name science was that 
 the religious" authorities became egotistical with their 
 power ('power-mad,' like the former Kaiser; §173) and 
 tried to use the descriptions to exploit others (§49b). I. e., 
 such aristocratic authorities substantially claimed (l) that 
 they were better able to find out the consistent descriptions 
 than ordinary people, and hence because they were thus 
 superior" to laymen their dogmatic descriptions for that 
 "reason" must be accepted. 860 Because their descriptions 
 were always liable to be somewhat inconsistent, the relig- 
 ious" authorities, in order to hide their errors (they hide them 
 from even themselves in. the end, becoming dupes of them- 
 selves; §155), naturally lost sight of the possibility of appli- 
 cation or use of the descriptions, and claimed (2) that there 
 was some sort of magic perfection about the descriptions; 
 e. g., some people still claim that there is some sort of magic 
 or supernatural verbal infallibility about the Bible. That 
 infallibility of course tacitly is taken to shed its privileged 
 aristocratic glamor over the persons who assert its existence 
 and can manage to get such a claim accepted ; for they too 
 thus become more or less perfect Gods or mouthpieces of 
 such, and thus presumably superior to the layman who does 
 not know' so much and honestly takes on himself the re- 
 sponsibility of proving the truth of what he says, even when 
 
 he quotes an assertion from the Bible. As a direct 
 
 consequence of such ecclesiastic mental evasion those relig- 
 ious" descriptions became an end in themselves:- the "let- 
 ter," the mere phraseology, made the Bible a golden calf, 
 and finally served as a mental dope that drugged the dupe's 
 mind so that he became unseeing to much of actuality. 
 Therefore, descriptions of the universe tended continually to 
 stop being useful. For, as soon as the layman began to try 
 to apply those descriptions to his own seeing and further liv- 
 ing, he actually was making a first-hand investigation of 
 them, and he then readily found some of the mistakes of the 
 authorities — that the pope or other sort of religious autocrat 
 was not actually infallible, and that even the honest original 
 
 prophets made mistakes. The argument also applies, 
 
 with merely verbal changes, to any authority : ecclesiast- 
 ics and their power-mad brothers, the demagogs, are merely 
 the most marked types. Often there are scientists" who 
 undertake to be popes in science; but the percentage of 
 such men in science is small : I have encountered only two 
 
 ^Those "religious" authorities usually do formally claim that 
 their descriptions are those which are "divinely revealed" to various 
 men other than themselves (and they generally select men safely 
 dead, who can't question the accuracy of the authorities' quotation). 
 But as the authorities themselves judge who is thus inspired, those 
 "revealed" descriptions are in reality asserted by the authorities on 
 their own responsibility, and I shall not belittle the intelligence of the 
 general reader of this book by discussing in detail that childishly 
 transparent evasion of the theologians. When / pick out some 
 former good observer and say that a doctrine of his is right, I as- 
 sume the responsibility of proving that doctrine — a responsibility 
 that any fairly reliable and intelligent modern man always assumes 
 in such circumstances. 
 
 or three who have much reputuation and were so weak^as to 
 let it "swell" their heads. Consequently, the "spir- 
 itual" aristocrats substantially denied that those descriptions 
 were useful in the sense of being applicable to this wicked 
 world. They practically were forced into that denial in or- 
 der to protect their own aristocratic power, privileges, etc., 
 in that same "wicked" world — although of course they were 
 not so brutally clear about the reasons for that denial, or 
 even about the denial, as I have just been. 
 
 d. Incidentally, it is obvious that to apply" our de- 
 scriptions means finally to use them to foretell or prophesy 
 the future. The full meaning of that is implied in the chap- 
 ter on ethics; but it is sufficient to consider here its rough, 
 everyday meaning. When we " describe," we use the re- 
 lationship of identity, and as a truism can go on and by ob- 
 serving the relationship state things not yet directly observed 
 — i. e., describe the future." That is clearly in agree- 
 ment with the fact that L and T are not real : of course, if 
 T were absolutely real it would not be possible to predict 
 the future (see §150d for rigorous proof of that). And it 
 also obviously is a truism, that because whenever we use L 
 and T we are inaccurate, we can not ever predict the future 
 with accuracy (the degree of accuracy we can achieve is a 
 quantitative matter that is a part of the theory of measuring 
 or harmonic periodicity). But we can not tell with accuracy 
 what happened yesterday — e. g. , witnesses and history are 
 notoriously unreliable in accuracy. Formerly it was tacitly 
 recognized by theologians that such prophesying application 
 was finally required of any truth, and there were such pre- 
 dictors, or prophets." But nowadays, the dogmatic theo- 
 logians, consistently with what has been said about their 
 professional exploiting and evading tendencies, substantially 
 refuse to accept the possibility of prediction — to accept the 
 possibility of there being any more bonafide prophets." 
 They thus obviously completely stultify themselves. But 
 they do claim to predict a future world — concerning which 
 they erroneously fancy there is no direct experimental evi- 
 dence to check them up and confute them. We shall see 
 that there too they have been wrong (§§144, 152). 
 
 e. Hence, it was rather convenient to. give the new 
 name science to those same continuing-attempts at descrip- 
 tions of the universe, so that under that new and unsullied 
 name, which at first had no trademark value to the aristo- 
 crats, these two essential things could be emphatically re- 
 quired of the descriptions:- (l) that those who expressed 
 such descriptions should get them by repeatable observations, 
 for the correctness of which they were explicitly personally 
 responsible, and not get them by rather irresponsible tradi- 
 tion, rumor, and hearsay; and hence would give descriptions 
 which the hearer was able to verify by observations — tests — 
 of his own; (2) that the descriptions would hence always be 
 
 applicable and therefore useful. The name science is 
 
 now rather old, and has acquired considerable trademark 
 value for exploiters: so some weak "scientists" tend to ig- 
 nore the fact that all valid science or description must, as its 
 actual test, be applicable and useful — i. e., simply must be 
 relatable to anything, regardless of the arbitrary L and T. 
 And in the same way, unbalanced or aristocratic persons in 
 other professions tend to exaggerate "classics" (not having 
 strength of their own to produce work that will stand in- 
 spection), conveniently forgetting, in order to save their own 
 egos (which then being without restraint often swell enor- 
 mously), that if anything is true— i. e., universally self- 
 consistent or related— it is, merely as a verbal truism, always 
 applicable and useful. A thing which has no perceptible ap- 
 plication, use, or immediate human worth (to the perceiver) by 
 common consent as to the meaning of words is ugly, evil 
 
83 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two X §86f 
 
 worthless (XVIII). And all things, whether "classic" or 
 not, are ultimately, in a One sense, truistically beautiful, 
 good, and applicable (§25b). 
 
 f. This section therefore sums up:- (l) That a valid 
 description of the universe is really religion when compre- 
 hended as a whole. (2) That such a description is now com- 
 monly called science. (s) That the advantage of the name 
 science over religion in the perverted ecclesiastical sense is 
 that it serves to emphasize that, as a verbal truism, such a 
 description is (i) verifiable by anyone who wishes to make 
 the responsible effort of observing for himself; (ii) useful, 
 
 applicable, beautiful, good, etc. Therefore, as the 
 
 summed conclusion of that general survey of science, I shall 
 try to give to this Part Two, which is explicitly such descrip- 
 tions, those chief characteristics of verifiability and applica- 
 bility. Part Three, humanics, is the further direct extension 
 of this Part to humans and must have the same charactistics. 
 
 §86. a. As the purpose is to describe the universe with 
 direct verifiability, it next becomes necessary to determine 
 how to do it — the method; — to answer the question, What 
 is the best way? (if the description is universally verifiable 
 it truistically equally is applicable.) The general answer to 
 that question is obviously given by, or is, Part One. The 
 specific answer is that we need to use the most familiar form 
 of everyday speech or naming, and that that is the use of 
 the form which we write generally, That. . . X This. . . . We 
 therefore shall observe in the remainder of this chapter the 
 general ways in which that formula is customarily named and 
 used. After that I shall proceed to use it in such ways. 
 
 b. Possibly the most general naming of the meaning of 
 that formula is to say that it expresses continuity. Conven- 
 tionally, continuity is said to be the basis of science. The 
 word obviously means identical relationship, and hence is 
 in complete accord with the truisms that formula expresses 
 (IV), and especially with the general characteristics of our 
 description as stated in the last section. 
 
 c. In modern days continuity is usually said to be ex- 
 hibited and expressed by, or as, a sequence of events. 
 I. e., phenomena are held to be in a continuous, unbreakable 
 
 'chain" or series. The old name for the same thing is 
 "cause and effect" — for any observed phenomenon or ef- 
 fect" there is always a preceding unique and completely 
 efficient cause," or thing which produced or made the ef- 
 fect. The phrase "cause and effect" has become somewhat 
 unfashionable, substantially for two reasons:- (l) to say that 
 a cause produced or made an effect is formally equivalent, in 
 the parlance of classic logic, to an assertion that the cause is 
 an absolute creator, and hence to imply a dualism that as a 
 finite pluralism definitely goes back to, and implies, a " First 
 Cause"; (2) and to assert a cause as a sufficient and unique 
 producer is, by classic logic, formally to imply that the uni- 
 verse is sharply cut up into absolutely separate parts — and it 
 is also, in a way, getting 'relationship' mixed with thing or 
 Many; i. e., the word cause in this second aspect is likely 
 to mean a combination of a thing and a relationship. Clear- 
 ly, both conventional objections to cause and effect are 
 correct (IV-VIII) ; the very existence of those objections 
 obviously indicates that in practice science substantially re- 
 pudiates the classic logic. But if we write for our formula, 
 Cause... XEffect. . .=Meaning, then to interpret the two fact- 
 ors just as we interpret That . . . and This. . . clearly obviates 
 the two conventoinal objections to the phrase (and also uses 
 valid logic, and not classical). And it is at once obvious 
 that science in making those objections to cause and effect 
 substantially asserted precisely the same argument as ours 
 in formulating That. . . X This. ... So it is apparent that we 
 are in agreement with the base of orthodox science. 
 
 d. Because all such words as This and That — i. e., all 
 Many names — are actually subject to precisely the same ob- 
 jections as are "cause" and ' effect," if strictly interpreted 
 by classic logic as being without dots or infinite regresses 
 (even implied ones), it would be practically inconsistent to 
 bar just those two names {Cause. . . and Effect...) and make 
 them unfashionable. Hence, I shall use the two, in the 
 meaning indicated in the formula given. Any cause there- 
 fore implies an actual infinite regress of contributing or re- 
 lated causes, which finally sum together as a closed universe, 
 or as a circle" (in which all of the causes are really identi- 
 cal with the effects), and which summing precludes any such 
 nonsense as the classic logic First Cause." And any effect 
 similarly implies an infinite regress of effects, all of those too 
 being finally related as identities with the causes in a closed 
 universe or circle, which hence precludes any such non- 
 sense as the classic logic End," or final end, or Final 
 Purpose," or Purpose." The reader who is familiar with 
 philosophical slang will note that teleological systems thus 
 simply vanish — nor are we to get in lieu thereof any of the 
 often objected-to chance collections' or fortuitous con- 
 course" of atoms as being the universe (it has already been 
 pointed out that the universe is an organism; see §144, and 
 Index, s. v. Teleology, Personality, Organism for 
 additional proof). Further, as a part of the same truism, to 
 use everyday theological terms, there is no such thing as 
 Final Judgment, or Judgment Day. There glaringly can no 
 more be any such sharp, definite, separate coming of a 
 
 judgment of the quick and the dead, than there can be an 
 absolute splitting of the universe into unrelated parts. The 
 universe as a whole keeps, so to speak, a set of ledgers (cf. 
 §158c) which are always instantaneously balanced in full to 
 date. We see those thing more definitely later: I anticipate 
 them here merely to show that there are no separate water- 
 tight compartments in which we can keep science" and 
 religion apart — to show that religion and science do not 
 deal with entirely different spheres of reality" as the 
 Catholics claim (§48b). Just a slight clear and honest con- 
 sideration of words people use almost daily, cause and effect, 
 instantly exposes the error of such theology. 
 
 e. So science, and commonsense people, have obviously 
 used the valid formula Cause... XEffect... . In that use we 
 have made the extremely commonplace observation that one 
 phenomenon or part of the universe acts to produce another 
 or cause another. And that effect then obviously reacts on 
 the cause, or stops' all or a due amount of it. (It is obvi- 
 ously precisely the same as saying that energy is the transfer 
 of part or all of one body to another; §83g, etc.) So, as an 
 equivalent statement, we may translate Cause... XEffect... 
 into A ction...X Reaction... . (Perhaps the usual point of view 
 would make Reaction... the extensive factor, so that the 
 formula would be Reaction. . . X Action... .) That formula is 
 so obviously the same observation, and the same general way 
 of naming things intelligibly that we usually take it for 
 granted without explicit expression. Action... XReaction... 
 is verbally equivalent to F. . . XL... of the last chapter. And 
 Action... XReaction... is the naming form of expression that 
 is named mechanical theory. 
 
 f. We have seen (§§15, 2l) that a machine essentially 
 consists of at least one unit of the Many acting with at least 
 one more such unit in really inseparable connection — i. e. , 
 in ultimately identical relationship. And another word we 
 use for machine is structure. A structure consisting of usually 
 numerous perceptible parts, thus verbally inseparable, is an 
 organism or a person (and in our practical language, the parts 
 or splittings are based on V\\ see XVI, XVII). We now 
 see from the last paragraph that the general form of everyday 
 
§86f X Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 description of things consists essentially of verbally putting 
 them together as such machines" and having them work 
 — observing them work, or transfer energy, or die or be born 
 with more or less completeness. If the things verbally as- 
 serted to be consistent — to go together — fail to work or 
 react or act in a perceptible way, then obviously there is no 
 perceptible consistency or intelligibility or explanation. 
 When there is perceptible reaction, then as a truism the 
 mechanical theory" is correct expression of verifiable de- 
 scription. And further, when we start using such mechani- 
 cal theory, names are given to actual parts of the Many, and 
 as such expression, are directly verifiable. Hence, it is a 
 truism that mechanical theory is merely a solution of the 
 One and Many, in which solution we emphasize the names 
 of the parts or the arbitrary Many, as a means of providing 
 for continuous verification and positive intelligibility — two 
 actually identical things. We positively grasp the One by 
 such a method or trick. Of course, if we mistake the method 
 or letter" for the reality (fall into verbal idolatry), we have 
 materialism if we use Many words, and mysticism or totally 
 unintelligible talk or dogma if we go to the opposite by using 
 One words (§§20d, 49h, etc.). So I shall avoid such verbal 
 idolatry — shall state and prove mechanical theory, apply it 
 to different machines, and then use those machines or organ- 
 isms or persons as models of the universe. 
 
 g. We have already seen in Part One that an ' infinite 
 number" of valid languages may be formulated; it truistic- 
 ally follows that a corresponding number of valid mechanical 
 theories can be formulated. In fact, we saw that each lang- 
 uage was a machine (VIII), and this present formal repeti- 
 tion of the same idea need not be expanded. It also follows 
 that an indefinite number of machines can be validly used as 
 models, each of which represents all the various That's and 
 This s. In fact, we saw that the single surface ring was 
 (especially when in motion) a machine model which would 
 give an indefinite number of forms — and all of that furnishes 
 rigorous proof that any one of an indefinite number of me- 
 chanical models will validly represent the universe. 
 
 h. And that is the total of the principles of all know- 
 ledge or science. It implicitly includes the measuring mem- 
 ber also (§84b). Those principles are extremely simple, 
 obvious and familiar; probably most people will agree that 
 any fairly intelligent person can understand this chapter so 
 far — and we have already seen the essentials. 
 
 §87. a. The brief statement of mechanical theory is 
 correctly given in a general way in terms of 'our ordinary Trin- 
 ity language by Newton's three laws of motion, which I usu- 
 ally call Newton's law*,' or 'laws of motion.' By examin- 
 ing them briefly below, I shall show that they are rather 
 vague; are negatively expressed ; and omit too much that 
 perhaps ought to be expressed explicitly. But they are sub- 
 stantially valid ; and are in effect a correct solution of the 
 One and Many, which we just saw is essential in any valid 
 mechanical theory. 
 
 b. Nowadays numbers of non-Euclidian mechanics are 
 being promulgated (e. g. , the Einstein relativity theory, §66, 
 has come into prominence since this was first written), and 
 their announcers seem to assert that the Newtonian mechan- 
 ics are wrong. Newton's mechanics do have grave defects, 
 as we shall see. But they are shown to be probably quite 
 good enough to justify the high esteem in which Newton is 
 usually held. His law of gravity was a mere incident to the 
 formulation and use of those three laws, and he got that law 
 rather thoroughly irrational. I think myself that Newton 
 knew there was no sense in his law of gravity. But all 
 those objectors to the essential soundness of the Newtonian 
 
 mechanics could formulate different and valid mechanics in 
 any of the indefinite number of languages using non-Euclidian 
 space, or using M-dimension space. The method is indicated 
 in VIII. But it would be a tedious job, and the result would 
 have to be translated back into our language; so I omit such 
 mechanics from this book, except for the outline in §66 of 
 Einstein's, which shows that it is merely another form of the 
 
 solution of the One and Many. The reader may need 
 
 to know, the better to understand later discussion, that in 
 my opinion Newton was a thinker of the first order. He en- 
 joyed the advantage of having four or five contemporaries 
 about as good — and I think that in all-'round greatness Hal- 
 ley was much superior to Newton. About a century later 
 Ampere was about as good as Newton — Ampere had greater 
 opportunities, and possibly did not use them quite so well as 
 Newton used his. He had six or seven contemporaries about 
 as good as himself, followed a bit belatedly by Faraday, who 
 seems to me to be a little better than Newton. Then, 
 bringing us to our times, Darwin and Buckle were the first 
 of eight or ten thinkers who I think are somewhat better than 
 Newton — took better advantage of their opportunities. 
 Dewey, Jordan, and Reynolds undoubtedly to me have a 
 wider, surer grasp on things than Newton did, which grasp 
 
 they mostly had to work out for themselves. But 
 
 always there are backward-looking people who hold that the 
 Golden Age was in the past, and that all the best men are 
 dead. Roughly, there are two general facts about the men- 
 tality or intelligence of such people:- (l) they are not intel- 
 ligent enough to recognize a first class man when they see 
 him (and in general all success consists in picking a winner, 
 whether a thing, an idea, or an individual — the individual 
 being hardest to recognize, as shown in Three) ; so those 
 backward-lookers can t recognize the size of their contem- 
 poraries, but because of such poor vision have to wait two or 
 three generations until a general chorus of opinion has time 
 to start, and then automatically join in without knowing 
 particularly what they are talking about; (2) they are 
 so blind to things in general and hence especially to their 
 own limitations that they have a deep-seated conviction that 
 they, having imbibed [at least the superficialities of] the 
 knowledge given by the great thinkers of the past, have 
 reached the limit to which human knowledge can go; hence 
 they automatically deny that any of their contemporaries can 
 go further and exhibit first class ability. Well ; personally 
 I would rather deal with those safety-first, backward -looking 
 people than with the even weaker minded lion-hunter who 
 thinks he has found a Messiah in every unbalanced and often 
 unwashed eccentric or radical he sees. So picking a winner 
 has dangers on either hand ; and many people in effect 
 openly acknowledge that they are failures in some ways by 
 stating that they will let the "future" give a "verdict." 
 
 §88. a. Newton's first law is this (for the three laws I 
 use Daniell's "Physics," 5-6):- "Every body tends to per- 
 severe in its state of Rest or of Uniform Motion in a Straight 
 Line unless in so far as it is acted on by impressed Force." 
 That is conventionally tersely expressed:- matter has inertia. 
 It asserts that if there is an absolutely separate universe or 
 One (a body or One absolutely distinct from any other), 
 nothing can be imagined which would affect it. Only when 
 there are^ tacitly other bodies related to it (so that the rela- 
 tionship force" can explicitly exist) is there any change in 
 state. So it is obvious that the terse assertion of inertia is 
 simply a negative statement of the existence of the One. 
 Newton s actual expression asserts or names a One, and im- 
 plies a possibility of its later being divided; and hence the 
 total assertion is that matter (or that the One) has inertia, 
 'negative universal property' of matter; if we sa y 
 
 That 
 
85 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two X §88j 
 
 that a perfectly black closed room is not light, then 'light' 
 is obviously a 'property" of the contents of the room in pre- 
 cisely the same way that "inertia" is a "property" of mat- 
 ter (there are verbal contradictions in such statements, of 
 course; a real One — a body really "in a state of Rest" — is 
 ineffable, and to say that it has a "property" is logically to 
 split it into a Many, so that it is no longer such a One). 
 Newton expressed this law otherwise by saying that action at 
 a distance — across an absolute separation — is inconceivable. 
 
 b. Clearly, his first law is substantially equivalent to 
 what we started with in formulating language :- the verbal 
 naming of a One which we may arbitrarily divide. So it is 
 merely a preliminary statement of agreement as to language 
 mechanics, equivalent to the 'existence assumption' in §22. 
 It is equivalent in detail to:- 'all matter (the One), as such, 
 has the property" of not changing.' And that is no "prop- 
 erty" at all, but an assertion that 'all matter' is not-divided 
 — which is a verbal truism at the beginning of monotheistic 
 speech. Therefore, the first law is "proved" simply in that 
 it is a truism. In the classic logic sense the first law is not 
 provable — a fact which is recognized by leading physicists, 
 who thus again agree that classical logic is invalid. 
 
 c. That negative One form of Newton's obviously im- 
 plies the reverse, or the positive Many form :- mass varies 
 
 with velocity. And of course, that mass' implies a 
 
 portion of the universe; for only a. portion can have a positive 
 or statable velocity. Motion in a "straight line" for a finite 
 distance is not positively statable; i. e., it is infinitely improb- 
 able, or contradicts the theory of commensurability (§50) or 
 the infinite regress (IV), and no actual body in the universe 
 moves so — as we shall see in more detail from time to time. 
 And rest ' is zero motion. So it is also obvious that New- 
 ton, in postulating the One, rather explicitly showed that 
 both and «> expressed it — because we might consistently 
 call motion in a straight line infinite motion.' For we have 
 seen in the problem of two bodies (§83) that any actual body 
 is always changing direction relative to any other body. So 
 only the universe, an absolute One, could move in a straight 
 line. Then the name infinity applies to such unrelatable 
 motion — meaning simply that any name is equally applicable 
 and mystic. Any really tangential motion of a body (i. e., 
 motion which formally is not affected by a second given body 
 and truistically deviated from that straight tangent) obvi- 
 ously logically holds the first body to be a One; hence that 
 motion or its energy is absolutely indeterminate and mystic 
 — and really can not occur, except to the total universe. 
 
 d. Because, as was seen, there are an indefinite number 
 of valid forms of negative expression — of statements of what 
 a thing is not, — and only one general valid statement in a 
 given sort of language of what it is, Newton naturally fol- 
 lowed the easiest course of making his first law negative in 
 form. And as a further result, orthodox science consists 
 very largely of negative statements — expressions of what is 
 not so, rather than of definite statements of what is so. When 
 it says that inertia is a fundamental property of matter, 
 then all M's are logically multiplied by zero or no" to be- 
 gin with. Hence, the only change needed in the first law 
 is to formulate it positively instead of negatively — which we 
 have done in the general discussion of how to split the One 
 and get That. . . X This. . . . This book in general makes 
 science direct instead of negative : positive instead of agnostic. 
 
 e. Newton's second law is :- "Change of Motion [Mo- 
 tion here, as used by Newton, is equal to M(Z.7^ 1 ), which is 
 now called momentum] is proportional to the impressed 
 Force, and takes place in the direction of the Straight Line 
 in which the force acts." Hence, change of Motion would 
 be the variation of MiLT -1 ) during a T; therefore, the law 
 
 says:- F—MLT' 2 . Obviously, Newton condenses too much 
 there, and gets a confused result. By saying that a change 
 takes place in a straight line, he rather inclines to the impli- 
 cation that his ML7 1-2 is an absolute universe, and in agree- 
 ment with that to say that his F is a standard unit F e which 
 moreover is itself a sort of standard universe or One instead 
 of being even there an irrational factor; whereas, his F act- 
 ually is F r (see IX). 
 
 f. Hence, it is rather apparent that Newton in this law 
 in a too brief way tried to assert :- there truistically exists a 
 relationship between the parts into which the One could be arbi- 
 trarily split — that making the split-up-One (i. e. , the Many) 
 still the One. He rather clearly implied That...Y.This..., 
 in which formula X is the relationship, force. So this sec- 
 ond law is also purely verbal agreements of truisms — as is 
 conventionally recognized by the assertions that the law is 
 not verifiable by physical experiments" (i. e., the law, like 
 the first law, is merely expression, ' and hence is subject 
 only to formal or logical proof; §35). This second law, in 
 its orthodox or Newtonian form is rather a confused jumble 
 of assertion of (l) the One and (2) relationship — is amateur- 
 ish logic or philosophy. 
 
 g. It may be reasonably held that his first law is an as- 
 sertion of or agreement to use God the Father or One words. 
 The second law then is a statement of God the Holy Ghost, 
 or force. And we shall see that the third is explicit 
 statement of God the Sons. Although the first two laws are 
 logically confused and omit most of explicitness, perhaps the 
 only practical defect of much importance at first was that the 
 first one was negative in form. However, I think the reader 
 will readily see that Newton made a remarkably good solu- 
 tion and expression of the One and Many — and especially so, 
 compared with the great confusion of views prevalent in his 
 time ("Ency. Brit.," Art. "Motion; Laws of"). But what 
 was fine in Newton is amateurish for us now. 
 
 h. His third law is :- To every Action there is always 
 an equal and contrary Reaction; or the Mutual Actions of 
 any two bodies are always equal and oppositely directed." 
 That is obviously a definite scientific or Many statement, be- 
 cause arbitrary portions of matter are considered as joined in 
 a sequence of phenomena. It is directly equivalent to Ac- 
 tion... X Reaction... (§86e), and as such is " mechanical." 
 
 It may be held by some that Newton did not imply 
 
 the dots, but meant a sharp dualistic statement of absolutely 
 separate factors :- ActionY.Reaction. Well; it is a historical 
 problem of some antiquarian interest ; if Newton did not 
 mean to imply the dots, then he was wrong — and we should 
 not imitate such mistakes even if he did make them. But 
 we have seen in the last chapter, and see further and in con- 
 siderable detail in this one, that conventional science now is 
 almost explicit in asserting the dots. 
 
 i. This third law, being explicitly pluralistic and explic- 
 itly stating that there are at least two mutually acting bodies 
 or M s, is hence a general description of God the Sons. It 
 seems to me that the first two laws, by establishing the verb- 
 al agreements as to expressing the One and Many, now defi- 
 nitely combine with the third law and clearly imply the 
 inseparability of the three" laws, and also clearly imply 
 the dots in Action... X Reaction. . . — imply the infinite regress. 
 At any rate, the reader can see that Newton's laws, if they 
 have any consistent meaning, are the solution of the One and 
 Many in terms that are conventionally mechanical." 
 
 j. The third law, being expressed directly in terms of 
 the Many, is experimentally verifiable — meaning con- 
 cretely" provable (§35). Of course, the complete verification 
 considers the other two parts of the Trinity just as 'real" as 
 the Many is real." We saw that such was true, when we 
 
86 
 
 §88j X Two 
 
 saw in §49j-l that our everyday valid logic considers 
 part of the Trinity equally real or verifiable; so we need not 
 go into that again (but cf. §§150-l). We may simply note 
 here that the reason for speaking of the Many as being ex- 
 perimentally, or concretely, or actually verifiable or provable 
 is that we tacitly take it for granted without statement of it 
 that the relationship of continuity or ultimate identity is 
 always existing as "truth," and that the consequent summa- 
 tion of that Many all the time into a real One is also truth. 
 In short, we take all of real religion for granted (we take for 
 granted God the Father and God the Holy Ghost) as being 
 Already proved, and then have left only the arbitrary Many, 
 and need to be shown its consistency directly as being proof. 
 Obviously, as proof in fact or in deed — as ultimately conclud- 
 ing proof, — we do need such Many, or concrete, proof; but 
 as expression of proof, we need the completion of the whole 
 Trinity — and I simply give it, and do use as a part of that 
 the Many precisely as is required in everyday life, or by 
 
 "science." Obviously, the "proving" of anything 
 
 by using an absolutely disconnected, dualistic Many, and ig- 
 noring that real religion (of which our valid logic is the ex- 
 pression) is wrong; is materialism ; and given time enough 
 will inevitably wind up in an exploiting aristocracy, autoc- 
 racy, ecclesiasticism, and socialism (which are the names 
 given to the chief "practices" of such ignorance), with cor- 
 responding stupidity, idolatry, and weaknesses in the ex- 
 ploited. (I am aware that ecclesiastics — and demagogs 
 violently contend that they are "spiritual"; they are some- 
 thing like the late Kaiser with his Gott; see §155 for the 
 reasons for such contentions that flatly oppose fact.) But 
 because the Many has thus been misused by being vastly 
 overrated by those grafters (and their dupes), that is all the 
 more reason why we should use the Many, and use it prop- 
 erly, in its due place and with its due value. Conseqently, 
 although I explicitly and definitely use Many or concrete 
 proof in this Part, it is properly supplemented by the state- 
 ment of logic in Part One — by explicit expression of the re- 
 ligion the average commonsense man tacitlj' takes for granted 
 as the basis of proof. 
 
 k. This third or Many law may be easily verified. I 
 once saw a two year old child discover and state the law by his 
 own observation. His statement was substantially this :- 
 "When I push on something it pushes me right back. 
 The two M's were "i" and 'something," and obviously L 
 and T were inseparably included explicitly. Clearly, there 
 was a push out" from I"; and science usually calls that 
 point of view or 'direction' or form of considering the rela- 
 tionship:- "force." But equally, there was a push in" 
 towards I" in the opposite direction ; and science usu- 
 ally calls that form of naming the relationship:- pressure." 
 But when the relationship itself is rather emphatically in 
 mind rather than the arbitrary circumstances or direction of 
 its naming, science usually combines the names force" and 
 pressure" and calls the relationship cohesion, which ob- 
 viously means the same as the ethical name love. And 
 because there is in the universe as a One no absolute direction 
 (for, as verbal truisms, there is not another One outside, 
 with which to compare or relate and thus fix" any direc- 
 tion; §§58g, 99), there is obviously no real difference in any 
 of those relationship terms — which in general is equivalent 
 to saying that all relationship is that of identity. 
 
 1. It is also obvious that because the push and the 
 push back are equal, then the sum total of the force, 
 and hence of the energy, in the universe is zero. That ob- 
 viously gives an absolute Nirvana, in which as a whole there 
 is no energy. But we could validly take another view, and 
 say that the push and the push back was each a certain 
 
 and that as there was ulti- 
 
 UNIVEKSE 
 
 each amount of force, giving energy, *»" "-■■- •; —-- all 
 
 mately no real "direction" anyway, we ^ add *£ k t 
 
 arithmetically „ . /oW way <f spea^ng ^h- to b^ 
 
 mind that there is no real separation, o^e'sej^ ^ ^ 
 
 of speaking will run into an erroneous pantheism), 
 point of view, the sum total of the energy of the universe is 
 infinity. And that is the view we usually take It merely 
 amounts to reversing forms : zero is logically identical with 
 infinity. The total energy of the universe is merely abso- 
 lutely indeterminate or ineffable— there truistically being no 
 other universe to serve as a standard of positive measurement. 
 Hence, any force or energy or part is again directly seen to 
 be unexpressible or unfixable from an absolute point of view. 
 We merely arbitrarily assign to a part a certain intensity or 
 potential— and that fixes, logically but still unexpressibly in 
 exact terms (§50), the measures of all other parts as parts. 
 There can be no absolute center or standard — no exact science, 
 m. So it is obvious again, from the child's discovery of 
 Newton's third law, that an easily intelligible description of 
 the universe is one in which we name those "something's" 
 and "J's" in familiar ways, and state the relationship which 
 exists — usually as what we prefer to name "force." And 
 that is called a mechanical description — or mechanics. For 
 any two bodies working together is called a machine. And 
 Newton's laws state the trick of giving such a description, 
 n. So we are ready to look generally at the various con- 
 ventional machines which have been used by science to 
 describe or represent the universe. We note their character- 
 istics, and select a machine we think is easiest to handle to 
 observe or see. Then we proceed to use it. 
 
 §89. a. There are several naming or mechanical descrip- 
 tions of the universe in general use. The everyday descrip- 
 tion consists of various forms of the Trinity, as we have 
 seen. That sort of commonsense, valid description actually 
 ignores any real distinction between mind and matter, and 
 speaks of things as being joined together as the parts" of 
 various "larger" things — making no real distinction between 
 periods of time and 'periods' or extent of space (cf. §150). 
 That is precisely what this book as a whole does. However 
 I do it with explicit logical formality so as either obviously 
 to include all conventional ways of describing the universe, 
 or else to show that some of the ways have some slight spots 
 that are inconsistent. 
 
 b. "Science" is also merely that more or less formal use 
 of everyday ways of describing. Perhaps the most usual such 
 mechanical theory" is called the molecular or atomic theo- 
 ry, or the kinetic theory. (There is a technical distinction 
 between the molecular theory and the atomic theory; but as 
 it is one merely of order or relative sizes of structures [pro- 
 vided the fact is recognized that atoms are splittable] it is 
 not essential, and I shall not notice it very explicitly; §100.) 
 In the kinetic theory, matter" in general, or the One, is 
 divided into parts, related by force. The assumed ultimate 
 parts are named atoms in the older, explicit kinetic theories. 
 
 (In actual fact, not conventionally always recognized, 
 
 nearly always the kinetic or atomistic or Many' theories are 
 accompanied by and explicitly mixed with logically different 
 theories:- fluid or continuous,' or One' theories — just as 
 orthodox theology is a hodgepodge of pagan polytheism, 
 Pauline dualism, and a trifle of Christianity. Rigorously 
 consistent — although never absolutely quantitatively accurate 
 — kinetic theories are possible, in which the parts for con- 
 venience and greater accuracy are smaller than atoms or 
 electrons; examples are Reynolds's in §91, and Reeves's in 
 §92. I shall omit further explicit mention of such contra- 
 dictory fluid theories included secondarily in kinetic theories 
 until §93.) In the kinetic theory the atoms are in relative 
 
87 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two X §89f 
 
 motion — as by the truism of 'dividing' they must be (§80). 
 
 The other general conventional mechanical theory is 
 
 the electron theory. It was observed that we could perceive 
 or measure a more minute splitting of matter than that form- 
 erly described by atoms. So the atoms were said to be made 
 
 up of smaller parts, now usually called electrons. ■ 
 
 That obviously implies the logical possibility of further split- 
 ting of electrons — an infinite regress of structures and of 
 "theories." As a matter of fact, we shall see that light 
 (say) is electrons split up (XIII). That is a matter of nam- 
 ing. We may note at once the formal or logical truism that 
 all the various controversies as to whether atoms are "real" 
 or not, are rather irrelevant. Atoms are obviously Many 
 entities (or names of them), and by everyday valid logic 
 (§49j-l) are real" — that ' reality" being itself based on 
 verbal agreements. But atoms are not constant" or fixed 
 or eternal; e. g. , both by verbal truisms and by actual 
 weighings of some sorts of atoms, atomic weights are variable. 
 And of course, as being merely the remainder of the same 
 verbal truism, all properties of atoms vary just as weight 
 varies, but not in any fixed proportionality ; or, there are no 
 absolute elements, with eternally absolute, fixed proper- 
 ties ; atomic weight is merely the property of atoms formerly 
 used to distinguish different" atoms apart. Obviously, the 
 controversies as to the reality of atoms were actually contro- 
 versies concerning the verbal trick of the One and Many. 
 
 c. Therefore, conventional atomic or molecular theories 
 are as varied as conventional theories of the Trinity or sys- 
 tems" of philosophy — and for precisely the same reasons. 
 For some details showing that, and showing that Maxwell 
 substantially understood that the One and the Many was in- 
 volved, see Ency. Brit.," Art. Molecule." As a rough 
 sort of statement, it may be held that there are three general 
 sorts of conventional kinetic theories (described in this and 
 the next two paragraphs) :- (l) The oldest one, definitely 
 compiled by Democritus over two thousand years ago, was that 
 matter was absolutely divided into small parts named atoms, 
 and that each atom had the absolute character of a One or 
 universe. The God which related those atoms was usually 
 named force — but was not explicitly recognized as an identi- 
 fying relationship. That God force was obviously there, 
 but was more or less denied by Democritus s classical logic. 
 That old form of the kinetic theory is held and stated by 
 Maxwell (in a notorious address ; Glazebrook, James Clerk 
 Maxwell and Modern Physics," 82):- "They [molecules; 
 or atoms, as we would now technically say] continue this day 
 as they were created — perfect in number and measure and 
 weight; and from the ineffaceable characters impressed on 
 them we may learn that those aspirations after accuracy in 
 measurement, and justice in action, which we reckon among 
 our noblest attributes as men, are ours because they are es- 
 sential constituents of the image of Him who in the begin- 
 ning created, not only the heaven and the earth, but the 
 materials of which heaven and earth consist. The reader 
 
 who has followed the solution of the One and Many will 
 recognize that as being dualism and materialism, and also 
 the conventional theological myth. It would be difficult to 
 cram more nonsense into a passage of equal length. It is as 
 bad from an ethical standpoint (XVIII) — as is directly evi- 
 denced by its term "aspirations," which means weakly and 
 futilely merely having good intentions, instead of going and do- 
 ing it, whatever it is. But logically it is possible to construct 
 a valid theory of an absolute Many which is infinite (§§91-2). 
 
 d. (2) The next form of the kinetic theory is that 
 vaguely put into form by Van der Waals (§82). In it the 
 atoms were no longer actually sharp and fixed and eternal. 
 They had "fields of force" (possibly first formulated by 
 
 Faraday) which vaguely were variable, and which were more 
 or less formally actually unified with each other, under the 
 assertion that they produced, or were, pressure. There was 
 a rough guess that beyond a small fraction of an inch from 
 an atom (whatever that may mean) gravity attraction took 
 place; closer to the "atom" than that, vaguely there was 
 an opposite force of repulsion. Nothing was very definitely 
 said as to how atoms were pulled together in (say) a solid. 
 
 e. (3) The most modem form of the kinetic theory is 
 Richards's (§82). He correctly asserts that his theory con- 
 tradicts the logic of the two just mentioned. He has atoms 
 which are also explicitly variable in volume, so that we have 
 the explicit form p. . . X«. . . , or That. . . X This. ... It would 
 consistently follow (although so far as I know, Richards does 
 not assert it), that his atoms would or could include, as be- 
 ing parts of themselves, the vague fields of the Van der 
 Waals form. If so, then atoms would truistically or logically 
 be continuously touching each other, and not be on an aver- 
 age at relatively considerable distances apart as they move 
 about colliding; in any case they truistically could not have 
 a constant boundary or absolutely fixed skin' of some unde- 
 scribed sort, as in the other two theories. And that contin- 
 uity obviously wipes out the Maxwell sort of reality" of 
 atoms, and the One and Many again definitely bobs up for 
 
 solution. In short, the kinetic theory in its modern 
 
 form works around to a destruction of the explanatory" 
 names it started with centuries ago. As a well known fact 
 (Art. ' Molecules"), the kinetic theory is explicitly called 
 the kinetic theory of gases, because only in gases where the 
 
 fields of the atoms are relatively very weak are there any 
 even approximate measures indicating any apparent separa- 
 tion of the atoms. I. e., any rigorous kinetic theory — any 
 actual dualism such as Maxwell strives for — requires that 
 every thing in the universe be a perfect gas, and no perfect 
 gas has yet been found anywhere, or ever will be (except 
 that the One is a perfect gas, if we care to say so). Hence 
 Richards finishes the complete swing around the logical cir- 
 cle, and by using a kinetic theory denies any dualism. So 
 it is obvious that to give explicit names to the details of 
 Richards s theory, some unconventional novelties will be re- 
 quired. It happens that Reynolds and Reeve and others 
 formulate such novel theories, as we shall see. 
 
 f. The reader will note that orthodox science has thus, 
 under the single name of kinetic theories, shifted all around 
 the Trinity, just as we saw theology and philosophy doing 
 (VI), and for the same reasons. And then, about twenty 
 years ago it was observed that atoms themselves were form- 
 ally splittable — explicitly, that certain phenomena which 
 appeared definitely with our improved seeing were consist- 
 ently describable in everyday language only in terms of parts 
 of atoms. The necessary repetition of the verbal inverse 
 square law for such splittings had been made only in elec- 
 tricity (IX). So that splitting of atoms into corpuscles" 
 was expressed in terms of electricity, and the quantity of 
 electricity in or on one such part was said to be a natural 
 unit of electricity and was named an electron. The term 
 electron was afterwards usually applied also to the parts 
 themselves — which of course logically implies that electricity 
 and matter" are identical, and that an electrical force" 
 residing in or on a particle is such a material particle — 
 in short, that the only relationship is identity. However, 
 orthodox science perhaps tends to assert that electrons are 
 "constant" or fixed like Maxwell's atoms, and are all of the 
 same size: such a view would clearly be logically incorrect 
 (for details see next paragraph, and for concrete proof of the 
 
 incorrectness see §137). Consequently, as the atom 
 
 was now split, the kinetic theories had to be split. There 
 
§89f X Two 
 
 obviously were none of Maxwell's perfect, eternal atoms. So 
 all the various kinetic theories of the day were shifted to in- 
 clude parts of atoms. That was mostly done in general by 
 writing electron instead of atom. 
 
 g. The atoms by older kinetic theories were not all of 
 the same mass or weight (e. g., C weighed about 12 times 
 as much as H), although by Avogadro's law they were of 
 approximately the same volume when in a gaseous condition 
 (or at least molecules were) ; whereas electrons at first were 
 all supposed to be of the same mass, with nothing definite 
 asserted about their volume. Therefore, in order to write 
 electron for atom, so that in terms of mass Atomj x^^Electron, 
 a different x had to be used for each element, on the assump- 
 tion that an element atom had a constant weight (which it 
 had not) ; x for H was variously observed to have values 
 from 1000 to 2000, but it was orthodoxly tacitly assumed 
 that it was some constant value. However, some physi- 
 cists in effect claimed that for x to have a different but con- 
 stant value for each element made no difference in the 
 logic, and that the same kinetic dualistic logic still held. It 
 would still hold, as a truism, \f the kinetic logic had experi- 
 mentally held with reference to (say) solids ; but the kinetic 
 logic admittedly had not held there. That of course con- 
 fused the whole matter; for there was no knowledge as to 
 
 whether electrons formed a gas," or solid," etc. 
 
 And there arose another complication in the electron theo- 
 ries, which corresponded to the (l) attractions and (2) repul- 
 sions in the later kinetic theories:- there were orthodoxly 
 two kinds ' of electricity; an electron was negative" 
 electricity, and no one was able to find a positive" electron 
 for a while, and then it was finally decided that an "electri- 
 fied atom would serve. So the logic was more confused. 
 
 h. However, J. J. Thomson rather substantially cleared 
 the puzzles of that shift from atoms to electrons by asserting 
 Faraday s tubes of force as existing, and extending from 
 negative electrons to positive electrons (and vice versa, of 
 course; circularly," or as a One). Those tubes (which 
 fundamentally were merely a convenient verbal trick) are 
 obviously equivalent to a relationship, and at the same time 
 assert that electricity is structural, or is matter in a Many or 
 mechanical sense. As the original kinetic theory is not 
 structural (i. e., only an asserted metaphysical capricious God 
 holds its eternally perfect atoms together), Thomson's form 
 of electron theory is obviously identical in principle with 
 Richards's modern or valid kinetic theory. Possibly most of 
 the leading physicists now hold Thompson's form. But some 
 do not like calling a relationship a tube or an ether string, 
 and refuse to do so. But they follow substantially the same 
 consistent logic or mechanics, leaving it largely tacit and 
 unexpressed. It would be difficult to say just how many 
 sorts of electron theories there are now — they are more num- 
 erous than philosophical idealisms, and as mutually contra- 
 dictory. Some physicists seem to hold that an electron can 
 not be further split. Others seem to hold that an electron 
 absorbs and gives off by radiation" (whatever that may be) 
 a fixed or definite quantum of energy ; that amount, or 
 very small M, would obviously, as a truism, imply a struct- 
 ural splitting of the electron, but it is not clear whether they 
 mean in infinite regress. (For further details, see Millikan, 
 "The Electron Theory," X; also XIV this book.) 
 
 i. Obviously, the formal kinetic and electron theories 
 logically consider parts of the universe to be what is usu- 
 ally meant by the name, rigid molar bodies." Thus, the 
 non-Thomson electron is formally a rigid body or M, which 
 moves as a whole; and a quantum" of energy seems to be 
 held to be a whole rigid M even smaller. And so truistically 
 there must be some absolutely free" space about those bod- 
 
 UNIVERSE 88 
 
 ies, as otherwise they would be "blocked in" solidly like 
 the bricks in a wall, and so could not be "kinetic." That 
 absolutely "free" space also serves as a formal means of sep- 
 arating or distinguishing the parts. But then, such orthodox 
 dualism having "separated" the parts absolutely, itpromptly 
 wants them together again, or related — and proceeds form- 
 ally to abolish that "free" space (except for some now dis- 
 credited theories which have an infinite ' sink" for energy, 
 and a similar infinite source, as a One at the Begin- 
 ning" and the "End" corresponding to the theologians' 
 God — which theories we need not consider explicitly). And 
 at the same time, more careful observation shows that those 
 "constant" M's are not experimentally constant or rigid," 
 but that continually a regress of smaller splittings is being 
 perceived. Clearly, science must definitely use the solution 
 
 of the One and Many to escape those contradictions. 
 
 We may further note that invariably the first class scientists 
 
 who see things as they are pretty well, show that the various 
 Many M's are really continuous or universally related- — that 
 an effect must have a cause; that no miracles occur; that 
 God is love, or that real religion or continuity is true. E. g., 
 the essential of Darwin s work, the fundamental principle 
 which caused so much disturbance, was that he proved that 
 man was not sharply and dualistically and aristocratically cut 
 off from the rest of the universe, but was directly related to 
 all the living things we know (the theologians would have it 
 that man was a specially privileged aristocrat essentially 
 superior to animals," who thus could and did get something 
 for nothing, etc.); Newton's gravity (although formally 
 crammed so with the logical dualism of his time as to be 
 technically wrong) according to the practical, actual under- 
 standing of it asserted the absolute universal relationship of 
 all things (again contradicting the dualistic theologians, who 
 insisted that the earth was a specially privileged place — that 
 nature faking being intuitively felt to justify their grabbed 
 privileges). Christ substantially asserted the real relation- 
 ship or continuity of all things — taught a valid religion 
 (XVIII). And Paul and the ecclesiastics stole the name 
 Christianity, but shifted back to dualism. Always heretofore 
 in history, the mediocre, short-sighted men who are unable 
 to see things clearly, fail to observe the connection of things, 
 assert that the Many is sharply split up (and hence miracu- 
 lous, and not subject to cause and effect), and slump back 
 into dualism. So in practice those fools fancy they can get 
 something for nothing, and start grabbing or profiteering — 
 are selfish, to use the antique term, — and resent even the 
 verbal interference of the clearer-seeing men. 
 
 j. It thus becomes obvious that there has heretofore 
 been a struggle in science over the One and Many, as to 
 whether the smallest arbitrary parts of matter (e. g., atoms) 
 were continuous with each other and hence severally variable 
 or were absolutely hard, fixed, constant, eternal. If those 
 parts were constant— if there were any constant thing in nat- 
 ure—then they were obviously truistically essentially intern- 
 ally without motion, or absolutely "dead"— as witness the 
 old idea of "dead matter," or Maxwell's. And that started 
 a dualism between mind and matter (cf. §150). And invari- 
 ably, the scientists who were instinctively recognized, even 
 by the dualists, as being the best, in order to agree with 
 what they saw and speak everyday language had to make 
 those parts of matter variable or continuous or "alive"- 
 Maxwell himself did it in electricity, in which he was guided 
 by the first class observations of Faraday and Cavendish. 
 
 k. However, unless there were natural "constants," or 
 fixed (say) atoms, then the infinite regress appeared. So the 
 second class men, rather than enter upon continual efforts to 
 achieve greater accuracy and obtain knowledge of more and 
 
89 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two X §91a 
 
 more details — finer and finer splittings, — would begin to drop 
 any continuous, variable atoms and thus dodge the need to 
 consider or measure cause and effect very far (and of 
 course they simultaneously filled the air with the talk we 
 hear so much of, about science being 'accurate" measure- 
 ments, etc. ; for the psychological reasons for that surplus of 
 such talk see §155). Obviously, all the ups'and downs of 
 science are simply exhibitions of ordinary human nature, as 
 will implicitly appear in Part Three. The problem of what 
 is really inside an atom" is largely a problem of what is 
 inside the men who talk of atoms. The dualist is the lazy, 
 mediocre (compared with present day standards), "empty" 
 man who would put knowledge up in neat little finished, 
 constant, stand-pat parcels like Maxwell's "eternal" atoms 
 that were dead or empty" inside like himself except in 
 electricity. Such dualists have the sort of brains that cause 
 business men to say that brains are cheap." The dualists 
 fail to see deeply enough into things to see that principles — - 
 the complete and consistent truisms of the One and Many — 
 are the eternal things, and that parts of the Many are merely 
 arbitrary and changing. All shallow, superficial observers 
 will continue to prefer to be dualists— to have fixed atoms. 
 In society they also want delusions as to fixed things ; so 
 they assert fixed classes and are aristocrats themselves:- i.e., 
 they consider themselves the 'best," and fixedly so by a 
 Divine Providence or a miracle, without special effort on 
 their part, whether that best" be the too-rich, or slum or 
 near-slum dwellers — there are many more aristocrats among 
 incompetent or grabbing workmen than among dwellers in 
 mansions. Always they fancy that they can get some privi- 
 lege — a sinecure, light work, a soft snap, something for 
 nothing, — beat the game in some way by refusing to see 
 cause and effect, or the universal relationship of identity (for 
 proof in details, and the showing of how dualists do pay — 
 "out of their skins" — see the last two chapters). 
 
 §90. a. The solution of the One and Many at once gives 
 us the solution of the centuries-old puzzle of how to name 
 atoms and their smaller parts. Whatever parts of the One 
 which we do name are logically, as such names, positively 
 definite as units of the Many. I. e., any Mis, as such. M, 
 positive and definite, which means verbally hard, rigid, and 
 fixed" ; it does not mean actually or really constant or that 
 the Mis itself absolutely dead or motionless inside. I. e., 
 the mere names of the parts of the Many are not the actual 
 parts. Consequently, as a completely general solution, we 
 divide the whole universe into verbal parts which are small 
 enough to permit statement of all the actual variations we can per- 
 ceive. If we divide electrons into very small parts, say parts 
 small enough to give some millions of them in each electron, 
 then for the present day they are going to be about accu- 
 rate enough to state all that we can perceive. As we learn to 
 use our senses better, aiding them with better tools, our per- 
 ceptions will become more delicate — improve, — and we 
 shall have, to use smaller parts. The same thing applies to 
 any aspect of society : given a steady climate we continually 
 need more delicate legal laws (XIX). 
 
 b. Then, those smaller parts -will formally be constant — 
 Me' s. But by the very nature of language, if we assert that 
 they are absolutely constant, then they will truistically give 
 absolutely no motion. E. g. , Maxwell's hard atoms were 
 supposed to be perfectly elastic, so that they would bounce 
 off each other perfectly to give a perfect gas; but obviously, 
 if they were perfectly elastic then there was absolutely fric- 
 tionless mutual motion of an infinite number of zero-size 
 parts of such atoms ; and hence, instead of their being fixed 
 and hard they really were ineffable Ones which equally truly 
 had absolutely no rigidity or hardness. So just as we saw in 
 
 the problem of the One and Many (IV), there is necessarily 
 always a formal contradiction at the base of science. 
 
 c. And orthodox science, as we have seen, nowadays 
 tacitly and validly uses positively that verbally smallest part 
 in two ways:- (l) Richards' atoms are compressible, so that 
 by the usual kinetic theory the parts of those atoms have 
 fields, or a variable boundary ; (2) Thomson's electrons have 
 tubes of force which also are truistically variable, and that is 
 obviously equivalent to Richards's atoms, with possibly even 
 more explictness as to the existence of internal structure. 
 
 d. Clearly those two widely accepted modern theories 
 are valid — being ways of expressing That. . . X This. . . . But 
 because conventional science does not explicitly state the 
 logic of the two, they are unfinished in that respect and con- 
 tain various minor errors. But there is one grave practical 
 objection to them :- They are exceedingly vague as to what 
 a field or a tube is: those two things are not described 
 in detail — their mechanics are not given. All the ex- 
 plicit phenomena of the universe are explicit motions of or in 
 those fields or tubes, and those motions are not described. 
 In that sense orthodox science is as spiritual" and ideal- 
 istic or half-baked as can be fancied. It is a defect that 
 those fields and tubes are far too mystic and intangible — are 
 a sort of soft fog of thought." It is quite true that ulti- 
 mately all so-called matter in the conventional dead" sense 
 does disappear as being a mistake, when things are closely 
 observed. But when orthodox science permits matter to 
 disappear as those intangible fields or tubes before they are 
 ever arbitrarily described as machines, then science itself is 
 becoming a bit too precipitate in shifting to One mysticism 
 or poetry or religion. We must shift or sum to that in the 
 end : but if we use language at all we are by agreement con- 
 strained to be definite and intelligible (i. e., positive and 
 pluralistic) on the road to mysticism, so that when we get 
 there we shall actually understand it, and not be at the 
 mercy of the various intellectual exploiters — or, if we are bio- 
 logically vigorous, will not ourselves become such exploiters. 
 
 e. So although the modern theories are correct in prin- 
 ciple, and although I shall therefore continually use them in 
 this Part, we need to get a mechanical model which is rather 
 more definite about those fields — about the formal and vari- 
 able boundary or difference surface of the positive verbal 
 parts of the Many. I shall use vortex whirls — which are 
 easy to use as soon as we experimentally note their funda- 
 mental or characteristic reaction, which seems to have pre- 
 viously been overlooked (§98). ■ But various other 
 
 men have tacitly recognized just what we have explicitly seen 
 above was needed in physical descriptions and theories," 
 and have therefore validly devised in more or less complete- 
 ness various mechanical models of the universe. We briefly 
 consider such descriptions in the rest of this chapter. 
 
 §91. a. Reynolds (in the books cited, §84c) devises a 
 mechanical theory which he claims is the only possible one. 
 He does use the only correct principle (see par. d), and in 
 that essential sense justifies his claim. But he does it in a 
 way which turns ordinary language upside down, and gives a 
 weird description. He takes, as a verbal unit of the Many, 
 very small, perfectly smooth spheres, perfectly hard, and in 
 themselves perfectly inelastic. Those spheres or grains" 
 are all piled together like a heap of marbles, to make the 
 universe. Consequently the total universe holds them to- 
 gether, as a verbal truism (there is nothing inside to push one 
 out of the universe, or outside to pull one out, as will become 
 obvious). That relationship of holding-together he verbally 
 names from the point of view of the outside," and hence 
 calls pressure. We usually name the relationship that holds 
 things together as a force which pulls them together (towards 
 
§91a X Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 90 
 
 us, as a center or standard inside), and not one which like 
 Reynolds s pushes them together. Thus, Reynolds, by not 
 imagining himself as the center of things, verbally largely 
 got rid of the evils of anthropocentricism or constants. 
 But by not being a center he got his names usually backwards, 
 or in the opposite direction from ordinary conventions. 
 
 b. It is also immediately obvious that Reynolds s grains 
 or the units of his Many, are thus verbally taken as absolute 
 and not variable. His total universe or One would be vari- 
 ble, as will be seen. Hence, Reynolds has what is explicitly 
 an infinite pluralism, and it is in general valid, and essentially 
 equivalent to our everyday principles, but with the verbal 
 
 agreements reversed. It is to be noted that his grains 
 
 are not atoms, or any other things actually observable di- 
 rectly with our eyes or tools : in his infinite pluralism those 
 observable things are still variable and his grains have to be 
 much smaller to provide for such variation. He calls his 
 spheres anything or nothing" — i. e., or °° ( Sub- 
 Mech., 88). Only such a series of truisms is consistently 
 
 possible even in an infinite pluralism (cf. §90). And 
 
 because Reynolds s are thus the reverse of our usual agree- 
 ments, he therefore gets some odd namings, which are so 
 strange and unfamiliar that the burden of them on his mem- 
 ory finally trips even himself in logic (par. d). 
 
 c. If spheres be piled together as closely as they will 
 go, they fit together as roughly shown in one plane in Fig. 
 91ci, which is called nor- 
 mal piling by Reynolds. 
 (Specifically, in normal 
 piling, each grain touches 
 12 other grains.) If the 
 grains be slipped up 
 ( dislocated") out of the 
 hollows between them- 
 selves, as in Fig. 91C2, 
 they obviously take up ad- 
 ditional space, and are said 
 to dilate,' and the piling 
 is abnormal," and the 
 
 surface ' between them is 
 a difference surface or zone 
 which Reynolds names a 
 singular surface of misfit. 
 In Fig. 91c2the unoccupied 
 space between the grains is shown as the greatest possible 
 (i. e., the grains would be tangent to the plane shown by the 
 dotted line), and the grains have maximum "dilatancy." 
 Now, obviously, if in the total universe of grains any misfit 
 oecurs (and by the theory of incommensurables, §50, there 
 must be a misfit; — so far as I can judge Reynolds does not 
 explicitly make just this point, but obviously by it his uni- 
 verse, as a mere verbal truism, must logically work"), then 
 by the truism of symmetry (which is the same as the theory 
 of incommensurables) the misfit moves through the otherwise 
 more or less stationary grains. Such misfit surfaces" are 
 the surfaces of atoms, and the motion of those surfaces 
 (involving changes in the degree of misfit) obviously will 
 cause the atoms to move as a whole and to vary and split in 
 various ways (or join in various ways), and thus produce all 
 phenomena. So it is clearly truistic that in Rey- 
 nolds s grain theory atoms are anything or nothing 
 bounded by misfits which consist of larger absolute vacuums 
 than occur elsewhere: i. e., the misfit surface" in Fig. 
 91c2 is merely more of empty space than is between the 
 grains in the close or normal piling in Fig. 91 ci. The work- 
 ing" or essential part of matter" hence is absolute vacu- 
 ums, and those vacuums are the only things" that move 
 
 Fig. 91ci. 
 
 Fig. 91c 2 . 
 
 molarly. Such a theory, although odd, is obviously 
 
 quite consistent. It is concretely illustrated by Reynolds :- 
 If you step on wet sand the water is not squeezed out from 
 under your foot, making the sand around your shoe appear 
 wetter than that underneath at the moment of removing your 
 foot. On the contrary, the surrounding sand is pulled into 
 abnormal pilirfg, and more water is needed to fill its larger 
 chinks, and that surrounding sand thus seems to dry out be- 
 cause surface water is pulled into those chinks. 
 
 d. In the grain theory the actual smallest part is the 
 (ultimate^ arbitrarily) fixed grain plus its proportional share 
 of the variable absolute vacuum or field" about it (hence, a 
 grain explicitly has both the absolute rigidity and the abso- 
 lute elasticity that are actually required by Maxwell s atoms 
 if they were consistently infinitely pluralistic; §90b). Thus, 
 the formal agreement that the rigid grains touch, throws 
 the variability off his absolute Many onto the variable One — 
 as Reynolds seems to recognize (the touching of the grains 
 obviously serves to make the variable fields definite, thus cor- 
 recting the practical weak point in kinetic theories; §90d). 
 The actual result is that although he corrected the old kinetic 
 theory, he himself, thus headed right, got confused by that 
 variable One, which is obviously verbally the reverse of our 
 ordinary verbal fixed, steady, perfect' One, and asserted 
 what seems to be the ordinary nonsensical increase of en- 
 tropy. However, he stopped there, apparently recognizing 
 that something had gone wrong, and did not mix such an 
 error with the rest of his work. 
 
 e. His brief non-mathematical statement of his theory 
 in the On an Inversion of Ideas, etc." is more easily intel- 
 ligible than my mere hints here. His statement in "Sub- 
 Mechanics is an extended mathematical analysis which I 
 can not surely follow — nor was it worth while trying very 
 hard, as technical calculus in general has to be revised to be- 
 come logical. But any good mathematical physicist ought 
 to be able now to translate it into intelligible, sure-footed 
 equations. One immense advantage of his queer theory, in 
 which matter" is substantially holes in the ether (i. e., in 
 the collection of grains) is that its user is not disturbed by 
 preconceived notions; for he would not quite recognize the 
 conclusions until he translated them into ordinary terms. 
 
 f. Reynolds found that Newton's law of gravity was 
 wrong. He corrected it, and apparently got a result equiva- 
 lent to the law as given in this book, although as just im- 
 plied, I have not translated it. He gave one correct 
 mechanical description of how gravity works. So far as I 
 find, he was the first to devise such a correct description with 
 fair definiteness. Five or six men have since independently 
 devised correct mechanics, all finally equivalent (§134). 
 
 §92. a. Reeve in "Energy" devises a working or prac- 
 tical 'smallest part' which consists of at least two bodies 
 which are in effect simply two masses or M's that are con- 
 densed to geometrical points and have a formal "field of 
 force" which (by the forms of our ordinary language) is an 
 attraction or relationship that varies as the inverse square — 
 is simply 'pure space' or an absolute vacuum. Therefore, 
 his logical or verbal smallest part is the solid, rigid absolute 
 point, pin the variable field regulated in measurements by 
 assigned mass" of its point-body; that smallest unit part 
 thus is logically equivalent to Reynolds's grain plus its field 
 (§91d), with the modification that Reeve's part* can be as- 
 signed various differing values so that his One is fixed as in 
 ordinary language (and then, to take care of the mechanics 
 of such phenomena as gravity, light, etc., Reeve would have 
 to have, what he omits:- an infinite regress of different or- 
 ders of structures in each part or structure— a remark intelli- 
 gible when this Part is grasped). Clearly, Reeve has the 
 
91 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two X §9 
 
 formal contradiction of the One and Many tacitly contained 
 completely in that mechanical model, with «> in elasticity 
 of field and in the absolutely rigid point-masses as verbal 
 agreements. As the logic was valid in that it was balanced, 
 he got generally valid conclusions so far as he went with his 
 theory, which definitely included only heat. 
 
 b. The objection to Reeve's theory, other than its in- 
 completeness, is that a part of the universe' that is substan- 
 tially a point and a pure field" is not very concrete or 
 subject to direct experiment. But Reeve's book is a formal 
 valid statement in everyday language of the kinetic theory 
 (it rejects the old one explicitly), and was written several 
 years before Richards independently by direct experiments 
 on atoms found the compressible atoms which Reeve showed 
 must exist by consistently using everyday language in de- 
 scribing other observed facts. With that comparison in mind 
 the reader can readily complete Reeve's book to any desired 
 extent. In fact, I first began explicitly and deliberately to 
 write this book in 1910 by expanding Reeve's. It took 
 me about three months to work out the mechanics of gravity 
 with that start; and I got the whole argument of this book 
 in a rough way from Reeve, being assisted by other valid 
 theories which I found from year to year later on. 
 
 §98. a. It has been seen that kinetic theories are usu- 
 ally accompanied by mutually contradictory fluid or continu- 
 ous One theories. I. e., there were observed to be what 
 science called waves of light, and afterwards electrical waves, 
 heat waves, etc. ; and when the theories had their smallest 
 part' equivalent to an atom (or even to an electron) such 
 parts failed to be small enough to serve as parts of such so- 
 called waves. Therefore, science assumed (ultimately, it was 
 a mere verbal 'existence assumption' : §22) that there is a 
 continuous fluid (conveniently named ether), actually unsplit- 
 table just as the formal One is, which served to transmit, or 
 be, "waves." That One or ether of course with rather 
 glaring obviousness contradicted the Many atoms or electrons 
 and scientists have made efforts for centuries to get some 
 consistency between that One (or ether), and the Many (or 
 electrons, atoms, quantums, etc.). Clearly, that One ether 
 when strictly considered as perfectly continuous or homogene- 
 ous is not mechanical" at all, as it is not possible to make 
 a machine out of one part. (E. g., Reynolds's and Reeve s 
 "fields" of their rigid masses is-are really logically that or- 
 dinary continuous ether.) Yet in order to describe" waves 
 the ether had to be split into at-least-formal parts. So the 
 physicists vaguely admitted that necessity of language itself 
 by saying that the ether is elastic," and more or less ig- 
 nored the fact that elasticity implies parts. And then that 
 One ether, in the logical manner of the One, also caused the 
 physicists trouble by sometimes insisting on approaching zero 
 (as when it directly gives excessively slight resistance to the 
 earth's movement), and at the same time on approaching an 
 infinitely dense solid (which is the only thing that will trans- 
 mit a light wave as orthodoxly described; XIII). 
 
 b. The last paragraph shows the general total difficulty 
 science had with "ether," and its source. Ether is nothing 
 more than a name for "substance," or matter, or what- 
 ever it is we talk about. In philosophical technicality the 
 name ether is the name Being, and the philosophical 
 science of ether, or Being, or of the question Does the uni- 
 verse 'Be' or exist?, is called ontology (§§22, 60, 142, 16l). 
 When science was naming or considering the Many matter 
 (or atoms, electrons, etc.), and ether a continuity or a One, 
 there was obviously an irreconcilable formal contradiction 
 between ether and matter, and ontology or Being or ether 
 became also a formidable "scientific" problem totally insolv- 
 able until explicit statement of lingual agreements was made 
 
 — as the problem obviously is that of just such agreements. 
 
 c. Also, conventionally ether often became substantially 
 the name for a universal relationship (such as L is used for 
 in this book). Thus, Newton in a vague sort of way recog- 
 nized that force essentially asserted a relationship between 
 the various M's, and that the only possible relationship was 
 that of continuity or absolute touching," or really identity 
 in the end. He indicated that recognition by insisting on 
 what is ultimately merely a truism (of everyday language ; 
 §77a), that action at a distance is inconceivable — or that 
 force can not travel over absolutely blank space. So ether 
 was often used merely as Being, in the pure" sense of re- 
 lationship to fill empty" space so that force could exist or 
 Be (Being in conventional philosophy is also similarly thus 
 confused between the three parts of the Trinity ; apart from 
 that verbal carelessness, Being" is no problem at all). So 
 obviously ether is a verbal or logical problem. Science has 
 talked almost as much about ether as philosophy has talked 
 about Being — and as futilely so long as the One and Many 
 was unsolved. Ether" is said to be, or belong to, 
 
 science ; but obviously that does not make it actually any 
 different from Being merely because being is called 
 philosophy, or from God ' because God is called religion. 
 
 d. The immediate solution of the actual (i. e., verbal) 
 problem of the ether is obviously therefore to say that ether 
 also will be given mechanical structure — i. e., will be verb- 
 ally split into parts, so that it will as a whole or when consid- 
 ered as a One be the universe or God or Energy and really 
 absolutely continuous; but that when we talk positively of it, 
 it will be split into parts (also, it can be used as a relation- 
 ship name, when properly so designated). Ether is there- 
 fore matter. In this Part Two I usually use both terms as 
 Many words, with the infinite regress. 
 
 e. Reynolds named all the universe or Being ether, and 
 arbitrarily split it into parts that were always touching, 
 which parts or grains were small enough to be used as verbal 
 counters that would outline, or construct, or constitute 
 a structure" or form or mechanics, for any phenomenon. 
 Those grains were finite, and did not explicitly take care of 
 the infinite regress. Therefore, that regress or ultimate for- 
 mal accuracy, and the explicit logic, was included in the 
 field of the grain (which formally was a second' ether, im- 
 plying an infinite regress of ethers or splittable Being). And 
 obviously Reeve implied substantially the same thing (§92a). 
 
 f. It is therefore definitely obvious that when scientists 
 use any sort of elastic ether, or other elastic Substance such 
 as Richards's "compressible atoms" (whatever those may be 
 verbally made of"), they are tacitly making the existence 
 assumption' of Being or substance or matter or the One, 
 and are further tacitly asserting that it is split into arbitrary 
 parts in infinite regress. For elasticity can not possibly be verb- 
 ally asserted •without truistically implying a relative motion or 
 verbal separability of internal parts. In orthodox science such 
 elasticity is usually taken as perfect" — i. e., is given values 
 of or °° as happens to be convenient to keep names from 
 obviously reversing. Such elasticity is of course pure One, 
 or mysticism. It is quite true religiously or ultimately, but 
 violates the agreements that science as such will talk a posi- 
 tive language of finite bodies which hence is directly verifiable 
 experimentally. 
 
 g. It also follows that all of science which treats of 
 any sort of wave motion in any sort of perfect medium is 
 not specifically science, but is religion. I. e., orthodox light 
 and analogous subjects are monistic, and contradictory to 
 atoms or electrons. Also, that orthodox light is invariably 
 quantitatively inaccurate (XIII) — just as Newton's law is, 
 and for precisely the same reasons. 
 
§93h X Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 92 
 
 h. As a result of such confusions in the One and Many 
 in previous science, it naturally is difficult to say just what is 
 the general character of sciences which treat of fluids of 
 light, hydromechanics, ether mechanics, etc. The descrip- 
 tions frequently use zeros and infinities, just as if they were 
 talking of the One; but they also consider a fluid as made 
 up of relatively moving finite parts. Obviously, there is no 
 explicit consistency in such ether mechanics ; they solve the 
 One and Many by tacitly using the everyday valid logic — and 
 no clearly nonsensical conclusion is written down, although 
 as we shall see, some conclusions are written that are obvious 
 nonsense in the light of explicit logic. 
 
 §94. a. We may now consider two excellent fluid theo- 
 ries of the universe. The first one, Marion Erwin s The 
 Universe and the Atom" (l916), claims to be a general 
 description of the universe. The second one, V. F. K. 
 Bjerknes's Fields of Force," with considerable parade of 
 modesty" avoids claiming to do anything in particular. 
 Bjerknes gives a fine fluid theory, universally applicable (and 
 I suspect that he is intelligent enough to know it — in con- 
 tradiction to that modesty"). In another book he gives a 
 mechanics of gravity; I have not seen that gravity descrip- 
 tion, but as it would be but a trifling and obvious step be- 
 yond "Fields of Force," I judge it is substantially valid. 
 
 b. Erwin says in effect (ibid., pp. 14, 20) that he holds 
 to both dualism and continuity, and throughout his theory he 
 formally has that logical hodgepodge (the existence of the 
 similar one in conventional science has been noticed in §93h ; 
 Bjerknes formally, but not explicitly, has the same mixture). 
 However, Erwin tacitly uses our valid logic in spite of the 
 contradictions and vaguenesses he writes down, and gets his 
 theory without much important error — working out a valid 
 mechanics of ether which gives a structure of matter and a 
 mechanics of gravity, light, and electricity. 
 
 c. Erwin starts his theory by assuming (as a verbal 
 name of Being) an ether. He then takes it (p. 16) that his 
 ether is (l) structureless" and non-elastic," and is also 
 (2) "capable of indefinite subdivision" — which is of course 
 logically self-contradictory. He actually does use ether par- 
 ticles" as his 'smallest part,' which particles (p. 6) are to be 
 considered as not solid , but actually as a sort of elastic eddy 
 or center of gyration ; such infinite and zero elasticity follows 
 because (p. 16) the parts move over each other frictionlessly. 
 
 That is obviously a logical mess when I thus merci- 
 lessly set it down in parallel columns. But it is logically 
 precisely the ether used in textbook physics : and as I said 
 before, Erwin by a powerful and intelligent use of valid ev- 
 eryday logic, or commonsense, steers a fairly safe course 
 through the confusion — that confusion being merely his sup- 
 erficial use of dualistic logic. Perhaps the only mistake of 
 consequence which he makes is that he asserts that different 
 sorts of light travel at the same speed in free space; he 
 seems to have copied that out of the textbooks without 
 investigating it much himself (see §127). 
 
 d. He then begins his intelligible, detailed description 
 of the universe by showing (p. 18) that because his ether is 
 continuous, the particles are like bricks in a wall, and cer- 
 tain given ones can move only if other particles take their 
 places — so that finally all motion in the ether is effectually 
 in closed paths ('circular,' like valid logic), or is rotation. 
 
 That is simple enough, although it usually is not ob- 
 served or stated. Reynolds of course always in direct effect 
 uses that proposition. Also, it necessitates that either there 
 be somewhere some absolute vacuum serving logically as an 
 elastic field (as in Reynolds's theory), or else that the par- 
 ticles themselves be elastic (i. e. , formally divisible in infinite 
 r egress) ; for otherwise there can not be motion (cf. Index, 
 
 "Zeno's paradoxes"). Also all of those considerations ob- 
 viously introduce the formal verbal contradiction of the One 
 and Many — and valid logic requires that they should. Also, 
 if we apply that fact that the ether "rotates" to the trick of 
 using words, it directly gives us the analogous conclusion or 
 truism that all valid logic is 'rotational or circular. 
 
 e. Therefore, Erwin builds up atoms by making the 
 ether particles rotate. They explicitly rotate in all three 
 dimensions of space, and that explicitness keeps him consistent 
 with facts usually. Each rotating particle or wheel" is 
 obviously truistically elastic. Also, a "wheel" in turn can 
 and does act as a particle itself by revolving along the cir- 
 cumference of a circle which passes always through the cen- 
 ter of that wheel at right angles (that is a formal, perfect 
 One statement, given as Erwin gives it, which contains inac- 
 curacies). And that larger wheel is a part of a higher 
 order structure — which means in the terms I have been using 
 that the large wheel is, relatively speaking, static, and the 
 lower order wheel moving along its circumference is dy- 
 namic (as, besides rotating about its own center, it explicitly 
 moves as a whole). And that large wheel can in turn also 
 revolve as a particle in a wheel of a still higher ordei — and 
 so on. In that way Erwin automatically or mechanically 
 introduces the essential verbal inverse square form. Conse- 
 quently, he can go from one phenomenon to any other me- 
 chanically, so that he tacitly does unify them in spite of his 
 dualistic logic. Or, what amounts to the same thing, he by 
 that mechanical device introduces the infinite regress into all 
 structures. He himself explicitly asserts the equivalent of 
 that infinite regress on p. 78, and often elsewhere less posi- 
 tively. Hence, his perfect circular paths are mere verbal 
 forms ; in actuality that infinite regress makes all his circles 
 or wheels vary from such perfection, or from such zero-infinity 
 talk, and he definitely has That...XThis..., and he himself 
 occasionally says so in effect. 
 
 f. The reader may thus see in general how Erwin gets 
 a valid mechanical model which in the end is formally con- 
 sistent. Although it is nominally a fluid or ether theory, it 
 actually is kinetic in that to the very ultimate the universe 
 is divided into parts. In that ultimate, or with such infinite 
 regress, fluid and kinetic are obviously identical. 
 
 g. Now, Bjerknes in his Fields of Force" does not say 
 anything very definite about atoms or ether: he asserts 
 
 analogies. An analogy is of course in customary meaning 
 a similarity of relationships among at least two sets of things 
 or circumstances. Obviously, if there is a similarity, as the 
 word analogy asserts, then there can be only one sort of simi- 
 larity, and that is flatly an ultimate identity (§28h, etc.). 
 So a valid analogy is, by valid logic, that valid logic itself. 
 Therefore, if Bjerknes's claimed "analogies" are valid (and 
 they obviously are), then he actually has unified the various 
 phenomena he describes by means of them. Also, as he 
 deals with electrical "fields" offeree, he essentially is deal- 
 ing with atoms (XIV), whether he says so or not. 948 
 
 94 »I am quite aware that it is customary for people who do not 
 wish to be held responsible for their logic to say that they state an 
 analogy. I have merely pointed out that by any valid logic an act- 
 ual analogy is valid logic. Probably the most sensible way to be re- 
 lieved of responsibility for one's logic is explicitly to disclaim such 
 responsibility— in which case it is obvious that usually the ethical 
 wisest course is to keep silent, that sort of silence having long 
 been praised as "golden." Bjerknes has the "modest" habit of 
 "registering" what perhaps he thinks is proper scientific caution by 
 verbally dodging saying anything in particular (if he were not really 
 a first class thinker, with a highly valuable theory that is sound 
 apart from that "modest," "cautious" ducking, this book would ig- 
 nore him). By using a little valid logic I have rigorously pinned 
 him down to saying something explicit, as a necessary preliminary to 
 considering his theory; to do that is always easily possible with such 
 
93 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two X §95c 
 
 h. Bjerknes uses vibrating, pulsating, or oscillating bod- 
 ies — i. ei, he uses bodies that tacitly are fluid, and which 
 change shape continuously, or are elastic. Vibration, oscil- 
 lation, and pulsation are merely names for what finally is 
 rotating motion : Bjerknes takes the whole of our par. d for 
 granted. He then proceeds by using a pulsator as a body 
 inside a fluid, and deduces the fields" in the whole, fluid, 
 as far as he can take the mathematics before they become 
 too complicated (he uses vector analysis, which is pretty com- 
 plicated to begin with, and has buried deep in it the ortho- 
 dox confusions as to the One and Many). The pulsator plus 
 its field is obviously experimentally identical with one of Rich- 
 ards's compressible atoms, or one electron and its tubes, or 
 with any elastic kinetic" part. And in proof of that fact 
 (which fact he only implies), Bjerknes shows that actual pul- 
 sators, vibrators, etc., act just as do natural" phenomena; 
 and that the mathematical statement of them is equivalent 
 to the usual mathematical statement of electricity. 
 
 i. Bjerknes explicitly has a serious difficulty (ibid. , p. 
 122). He can make his mathematics for vibrators agree 
 with experiments and correspond either to static electricity 
 or to magnetic (dynamic) electricity. But he can not mathe- 
 matically consistently pass from one to another. And he 
 obviously would get into that difficulty, because his phe- 
 nomena are all of the same order. I. e., he keeps his 
 vibrators all either static or dynamic; or, there is no ex- 
 plicit mutual motion of the vibrators as wholes which is of the 
 same order as the motions of the fields. If he had given 
 such very rapid motion to some vibrators as wholes, as we 
 saw Erwin in effect doing in par. e, the verbal inverse square 
 law would have been introduced, and he could have com- 
 pletely unified phenomena — including explicitly the infinite 
 regress in his expression of the unification. 
 
 §95. a. There are many other historical physical theo- 
 ries — descriptions of the universe in the mechanical or mutu- 
 ally named form of That. . . X This. . . . Our everyday talk is 
 in that form; e. g., we classify" or relate certain things 
 and name them paper, and use that with another factor, (say) 
 cloth; or again, we similarly assert some meaning about 
 Plants... X Animals... . But as soon as we observe a number 
 of things we see that sometimes paper conventionally is cloth, 
 
 "modest" people, but it is rather obviously objectionable in that it 
 
 wastes your time, my time, and good paper and ink. The 
 
 only sort of scientific or other caution that is actually logically or 
 rationally or morally permissible to a normal, responsible adult is a 
 statement that we are uncertain as to quantitative measures: if a 
 given measure is of great importance (for the theory of "value" see 
 §168) we should be unusually careful about using it, as it is certain 
 to be inaccurate in some degree. To be "cautious" about a principle 
 or about logic or about a theory, or about any real explanation, or 
 about any general policy or executive policy, is logically absurd; for 
 directly by the solution of the One and Many, we either know or do 
 not know what it is; if we do not know, then we can readily find 
 
 out and decide by attending to the matter. The completing 
 
 practical remark about that very simple theory is that the greater 
 part of our human personality is not intellect or "logic," but emo- 
 tions (XVII); practically, it takes much training to make the emo- 
 tions stand up firmly on two feet to any such definite principles 
 (Index, "Courage"). Generally speaking, the person who is in 
 practice very sharply, definitely decisive — is a "fine executive" — is 
 often merely a callous, thick-witted brute (e. g., Napoleon, a num- 
 ber of Germans). Only unusually developed men of the executive 
 type, such as Lincoln, F. W. Taylor, Jordan, James H. Foster, 
 Carnegie, have enough emotional strength to be definitely decisive 
 and at the same time be intellectually sensitive and poised and bal- 
 anced and right. However, the man who publishes a book is respon- 
 sible for having enough emotional training to make him first definite, 
 and then consistent, about principles; that is not too much to de- 
 mand of any man who writes a book, for obviously the writer has 
 plenty of time to think and then brace up his emotions, get his cour- 
 age to the sticking point — whereas the good executive has but little 
 time to decide, and hence has to have much greater strength. 
 
 and vice versa ; and animals and plants are seen to merge 
 indistinguishably together. Hence, we obviously need nam- 
 ing factors that will be more specific than those names which 
 are actually so vague that they fail quickly in use to stay 
 definite" and distinguishable," as we just saw. And 
 what is of more importance, we need to know also the unifi- 
 cation of (say) those Jbur factors — to know, e. g., Plants... X 
 Cloth... (the cotton fabric industry is largely summarized in 
 that formula, for instance). Therefore all the more urgently 
 do we need more specific naming factors, that will not lose 
 their definiteness and usefulness in ordinary phenomena at 
 least (e. g. , suppose we burn the cloth; then, as cloth, it is 
 gone, and we would have to skirmish around for some new 
 words before we had got fairly started on a discussion of 
 cloth). Scientific" descriptions are merely those which use 
 those more minute and hence more generally applicable fac- 
 tors, or splittings. 
 
 b. But the theories mentioned above suffice to make it 
 obvious that all theories are finally identical. Superficially, 
 the most thoroughly different conventional theories are the 
 atomistic ones and the continuous fluid ones. But we 
 have seen definitely that finally in practice they become 
 identical in meaning — and that their inventors, by using ev- 
 eryday logic, usually made them formally almost obviously 
 identical. And similarly, we have just seen, in terms of 
 That... X This..., precisely the same ultimate unification of 
 the verbal contrast of 'rigidity" and elasticity," static" 
 and dynamic," that we saw in terms of M(varying with)- 
 L 2 T- 2 in §§74g, 80i. 
 
 c. Those fluid theories may all be said to rest on what 
 is called Bernoulli's principle or theorem ( Ency.Brit.," 
 xiv, 42-3). That theorem is the law of conservation of en- 
 ergy in terms of fluids, and can be expressed and experi- 
 mentally exhibited in many forms. We may state it in this 
 form :- parts of a moving fluid which have a relatively higher 
 velocity have a relatively lower pressure; and vice versa, 
 (if the fluid is supposed to be frictionless" that statement 
 is directly positive as a sort of standard unit or One ; no fluid 
 
 Fig. 95c. 
 
 is such, and hence internal rotations of all parts, resulting 
 from friction, have actually to be considered in infinite re- 
 gress as being part of the true velocity." A vortex whirl 
 
 is the most uncomplicated of such actual fluid flows.) 
 
 Bernoulli's principle may be illustrated by the reactions of 
 water flowing through a pipe containing a contraction, as 
 shown in cross-section in Fig. 95c. Obviously, if a certain 
 volume of water flows through the pipe, filling it continually, 
 the velocity through the contraction is greater. If two small 
 vertical pressure columns be attached as shown, the water 
 will rise higher in the one attached to the part which has the 
 larger cross-sectional area, in which the velocity is slower. 
 
§95c X Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 94 
 
 A pipe with such a contraction is usually called a Venturi 
 meter. The observed differences in pressure will imply the 
 various velocities, and hence the amount of water flowing. 
 
 d. The easiest way to see the ultimately truistic nature 
 of Bernoulli's theorem — to prove it absolutely — is to express, 
 formally at least, the infinite regress in it :- If the contrac- 
 tion approaches a cross-section of zero area, the velocity 
 must continually become greater in order that all the fluid 
 may go through. If the contraction becomes zero, the ve- 
 locity must be infinite; in such case there is obviously no 
 cross-section of fluid which can exert pressure, and hence the 
 pressure is zero. And by expanding the large part of the 
 pipe to infinity, the velocity becomes zero and the pressure 
 becomes indefinite, and sums to infinity (precisely as does 
 the unlimited sum of pressure Reynolds has available to run 
 his universe). That is the monistic form of the tru- 
 ism and it is self-evident. The final pluralistic proof is to 
 make a venturi meter and observe it (§35). The mathemati- 
 cal or complete expression of it may be deduced from the 
 last paragraph ; for the conventional expression of it, see 
 "Ency. Brit.," xiv, 43, 121; or Bjerknes's mechanics, 
 which are the same as Maxwell s electrical mechanics. 
 
 e. It is obvious that Bernoulli's theorem is what we 
 might call the fluid-naming or -aspect of the One and Many. 
 It considers a "continuous" [One] substance in motion [split 
 or the Many]. Obviously, arbitrary parts are conceived as 
 having relative motion, or as being split out of that One ; and 
 that verbal contradiction is promptly verbally contradicted 
 by naming a relationship in the reverse way, in the direc- 
 tion' of pressure,' so that there is no real contradiction. 
 Or, Bernoulli's theorem is identical with our fundamental 
 scientific law that mass varies with velocity. Bernoulli s 
 form of that law, about two centuries old, is a capsized state- 
 ment, that pressure decreases with relative velocity, or pres- 
 sure (and hence density, and hence mass) varies inversely with 
 velocity. It always happens that we get a reverse point of 
 view and make language go backwards' (become a different 
 form; §104), when we talk of pressure: e. g. , grain theory. 
 And it is further obvious that all physical theories ul- 
 timately use an indefinitely splittable universe, or Being, or 
 One, or ether. And it is again obvious that all of science is 
 rigorously and explicitly unified. 
 
 f. But it is obvious that if we try to see all those ortho- 
 dox theories at once, noting their consistent description or 
 unification in detail for each phenomenon, we are likely to 
 overburden our memories and become confused. The reader 
 who happens not to be familiar with the names in physics is 
 possibly a little confused by the foregoing too numerous 
 points of view, even though they are handled generally. 
 There is no need to try to remember them; if you see only 
 in a rough way that a rigorous unification is possible, then 
 you have understood all that is essential, and there will be 
 no difficulty in grasping all that follows. For in the next 
 chapter we use a single, comprehensive machine, a whirl, 
 that can be concretely followed, and that automatically takes 
 in all those conventional points of view. The next chapter 
 is itself dry-as-dust mechanics, with perhaps an occasional 
 bright spot. But we have got to get a language laboriously 
 that way which will stand the strain of giving concrete names 
 to cloth, paper, etc., in all circumstances. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. General whirl mechanics. 
 
 §96. a. Possibly the most important source of confusion 
 or unintelligibility with respect to the various conventional 
 mechanical theories in the last chapter is that people are 
 
 prone to take them too seriously. They are merely tacit 
 verbal agreements. We are not compelled to use just those 
 agreements, nor to use those of the simpler whirl theory 
 which I am going to outline — although of course if we are to 
 be honest and fit for intercourse with the large majority of 
 our fellow men, and wish to preserve a normal and useful 
 nervous system, we have to adhere to some selected verbal 
 agreement. But some people are inclined to exaggerate one 
 point of view to infinity, and other points of view the oppo- 
 site way to zero, and thus assert that those other ways are 
 absolutely wrong. Principles or the One are absolute ; but 
 ways of splitting the One can not be. 
 
 b. And the men who invent scientific theories, just as 
 the men who invent philosophical systems, are often so seri- 
 ous about them that their fanatic insistence upon the sole 
 correctness of their way or verbal trick is liable to mislead 
 others. Consequently, there is in many people's minds a 
 vague belief that there has to be a hard and fast way of de- 
 scribing things. So it becomes desirable that if possible we 
 adopt some easily intelligible way of describing, in which 
 orthodox apparently mutually contradictory theories are all 
 combined into a single directly observable machine which 
 shows that they are not contradictory. 
 
 c. Second, although the fact was ignored in the last 
 section, conventional descriptions have a bad habit of using a 
 so-called machine that explicitly occupies only one or two 
 dimensions of space; e. g., the motion of an electron is us- 
 ually described in two dimensions (because the mathematics 
 for three dimensions are too hard, as if that would alter 
 facts). There is actually no machine in any but three dimen- 
 sions, if we are using everyday language (VIII). So a really 
 intelligible machine, in addition to possessing the reconciling 
 characteristics and obvious consistency required by the last 
 paragraph, and the familiarity and other characteristics re- 
 quired by the last chapter, must explicitly be a 3-dimension 
 one. Then we shall avoid the verbal troubles of trying to 
 talk two languages simultaneously. 
 
 d. Third, and perhaps the most important of all, we 
 want a model machine which will reproduce itself in higher 
 or lower orders — which will in effect concretely and experi- 
 mentally display the infinite regress. Bjerknes's models 
 would not do it, and he could not finish a unification (§94i). 
 Erwin s wheels, as he describes them, are not, as such, ex- 
 hibited in any actual machine; he could have rigged a series 
 of gyroscopes which would in general effect have exhibited 
 them. Kelvin some years ago suggested that the universe 
 could be represented by gyroscopes; and Erwin' s is substan- 
 tially that theory, although expressed nominally in a quite 
 
 different form. In short, in order to show concretely 
 
 the way to describe static and dynamic, or fundamentally to 
 show directly any "transfer of energy" or "change of poten- 
 tial," we need a machine which will visibly give birth to 
 smaller or "lower" order duplicates of itself; or which, in 
 collections, will give 'birth' to a single duplicate of itself of 
 a larger or higher" order. 
 
 e. The machine which will concretely meet all those re- 
 quirements fairly well is a vortex whirl. It has already been 
 stated (§63i) that when our language model is revolved it 
 gives a whirl; hence, all of the theory of language is directly 
 identified with such a machine. These vortex whirls are 
 readily made experimentally with some soap and water and 
 the experimenter's hands (§10l); and they can be observed 
 to give birth to different orders, which is something that 
 some machines do not automatically perceptibly do, in the 
 usual senses of those words ("biological" 'machines' do it 
 of course ; XVI). And a whirl obviously has three dimen- 
 sions; it would take much ingenuity to ' drop" one of those 
 
95 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §97d 
 
 dimensions and talk in a different language about whirls. 
 But the actual proof that vortex whirls have those advantages 
 when used as a mechanical model of the universe is given by 
 the using of that model below. 
 
 f. Kelvin also suggested some years ago that whirls 
 would make a good model of the universe. Descartes over 
 two centuries ago tried to use vortices as such a model — 
 which is substantially the same as trying to use whirls. But 
 Kelvin was troubled with the perfect gases and perfect atoms 
 of classic logic, and made his whirls mutually frictionless, 
 and eternal. Naturally they would not work," as there 
 is not any frictionless part of the universe, unless we agree 
 to reverse language forms. Any actual whirl, as we shall 
 see experimentally, is modified by friction — and thus in the 
 only way possible exhibits the relationship, force, verbally 
 required by any mechanics in our usual language. 
 
 g. In the rest of this chapter I give the elementary 
 mechanics or description of whirls themselves, with conven- 
 ient experimental verification. In subsequent chapters I use 
 those whirls, as being simple and intelligible models of all 
 phenomena, to describe those phenomena. The remainder 
 of this chapter, because it gives details which at first are not 
 obviously useful, will be somewhat tiresome. That can not 
 be practicably avoided. The reader needs to see the general 
 mechanics or relations of the universe summed up succinctly 
 in the model ; that is what the model is for. But he may 
 merely casually observe how the summing up is accomplished 
 and not try to remember the details, and thus get through 
 
 the chapter without painful effort. The intelligent 
 
 reader is aware that it is difficult, by using classic ideas, to 
 determine or express just what are the relationships and re- 
 actions, especially the "valuable" ones, between (say) son 
 and father, or a man and his neighbor ; or precisely what is 
 democracy, concerning which there are so many conflicting 
 opinions. Our model, by itself splitting or giving birth to 
 sons, and by combining with others like itself to form collec- 
 tions like mankind (or like the solar system — it is all the 
 same except that mankind is much more perceptibly quantita- 
 tively complicated), exhibits concretely and in the simplest 
 form the complete answers to such problems. I doubt that 
 the solutions of such problems can really be comprehended 
 without the use of such concrete models — which serve to 
 support and connect our memory, that otherwise would fail 
 and leave us in confusion (XVII). In fact, the general so- 
 lutions of those problems have already in Part One been 
 given verbally, mathematically rigorously, and in terms of L 
 and T. If you completely comprehend the solutions from 
 that form of expression of them, then you waste your time in 
 reading the remainder of the book, which in a concrete and 
 more comprehensible way repeats the solutions. 
 
 §97. a. We begin with no assumptions, but with an un- 
 derstanding of the nature of verbal agreements (§22), and a 
 willingness (and ability) to make some and stick to them. 
 Let us say that the universe (or whatever it is that we are 
 talking about : select your own name) is something continu- 
 ous, which we will arbitrarily split as much as we like, but 
 which universe in that verbally split condition is still, verbally- 
 contradictorily, related together. That is the verbal trick 
 
 or solution of the One and Many. If you do not like 
 
 those agreements, then you may with equal validity (but 
 with a considerably harder strain on your memory) take 
 Reynolds's or Reeve's opposite ones : occasionally below I 
 point out how you are progressing, if you have chosen thus 
 oppositely. Also, we have tacitly chosen everyday Trinity 
 language ; if you do not like that language, then you have 
 an infinite choice of others out of VIII. Regardless of the 
 way in which you choose to talk, it will appear that ultimately 
 
 your meaning is identical with the one expressed in the ordi- 
 nary way used here. 
 
 b. We shall name that continuous something or universe 
 ether. We do that merely because it is conventional ; if you 
 do not like the name, then call it consciousness, or spirit, or 
 mind, or relationship, or loyalty, or love, or anything else 
 you like; or turn ordinary language upside down, if you like, 
 and say that the continuous substance is non-Being, or non- 
 God, or nothingness, or hate, or non-motion, or Nirvana. It 
 would be precisely as if we agreed to call an apple a balloon, 
 and vice versa :- it merely verbally happens that a balloon 
 
 would be what we now usually call an apple. If any 
 
 reader is unable to see that this paragraph is true — that it is 
 actually merely a statement of verbal truisms, — then the only 
 way which remains that can convince him is for him actually 
 to try such substitutions, and see directly what he gets. I 
 have observed that most people idolize words so much that 
 they will not at first believe this paragraph — certainly they 
 can not very readily make their emotions content with such 
 verbal changes for a long while, although intellectually they 
 have no objection (index, Ritual"). For my own benefit 
 I have spent considerable time actually making some of the 
 various substitutions suggested : it was profitable to me. 
 Like most other people, I am quite fond of ritual and stereo- 
 typed verbal phrases and names — when they are my own.' 
 
 c. We shall now consider the ether to be verbally split 
 into parts in order that we may have a positive or Many 
 language. The parts are then really held together or re- 
 lated by a relationship which we may call anything we please. 
 Suppose we conventionally name it force: and as the parts 
 are held together' let us give it also the more explicit con- 
 ventional name cohesion. (Again, we could say the opposite :- 
 that the parts were not held together. That would be iden- 
 tical verbally with Reynolds s pressure, which is the 
 reverse-direction relationship. But obviously the final mean- 
 ing is identical.) Such split-up ether that is held 
 
 together by cohesion is obviously, as a truism, viscous — or is 
 not the mathematicians frictionless, perfect fluid. The parts 
 of our ether, as a verbal agreement, rub together with some 
 friction. That characteristic of course, in terms of ordinary 
 language, agrees completely with all the actual parts of the 
 universe that have ever been observed : nobody ever saw any 
 actually frictionless parts, so it is rather a waste of words to 
 talk about such. The fact of the matter is that Reynolds, 
 e. g. , gives his grains mass, and hence actually a resistance 
 to their motion (a substantial friction, regardless of what it 
 is called or where mechanically located'), which he nomi- 
 nally overcomes by the force of pressure. His pressure 
 is then actually a relationship; he merely has not stated ex- 
 plicitly the truisms. The truth is again obvious :- that the 
 
 force" which runs the universe is truistically merely our 
 name for the relationship of continuity. 
 
 d. Suppose we name those parts of the ether ether cells, 
 or merely cells. As it is an arbitrary procedure to assert 
 parts, obviously we can keep on dividing ad infinitum. Fin- 
 ally, an ether cell would be absolutely a geometrical point, of 
 no space and time, that formally corresponds perfectly with 
 the One from which we started — and would be Reeve's 
 theory, and substantially Reynolds s. But, we are going to 
 use positive, finite, Many or scientific language, and introduce 
 quantitative inaccuracy. So we say that the cell is of some 
 small finite size (thus definitely introducing L and T — but I 
 shall not go into that again as it would be only a repetition 
 
 of Chapter III). That cell itself is, truistically with 
 
 the last two sentences or because of the actual infinite re- 
 gress, further divisible; hence it formally has parts which can 
 move relatively to each other, or is elastic in a vague and 
 
§97d XI Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 96 
 
 unexpressed quantitative degree. Regardless of how small we 
 make the cell, there inevitably remains that vagueness as to 
 the measure of its elasticity. The real measure is and °° : 
 it is absolutely a One : — but language disappears if we use 
 that. Hence, the elasticity (or a cell's actual splitting) is 
 pluralistically or scientifically indeterminate; in other words, 
 it is absolutely impossible in any finite time to get any abso- 
 lute accuracy in any scientific or actual measurement. That 
 vagueness as regards that cell will never disappear, as it is a 
 verbal truism. 
 
 e. All other valid mechanical theories or verbal descrip- 
 tions will have the same inaccuracy or its equivalent. (If 
 we use an infinite pluralism, thus starting with fixed cells of 
 exact size, we get a variable, inaccurate One, which obvi- 
 ously amounts to the same inaccuracy.) Both Reynolds and 
 Erwin fail to state that logical point very definitely : they 
 calculate the "size" of their standard small parts, which in 
 our machine are called cells; but both of those calculations 
 finally take for granted that V\ is fixed and constant (and it 
 is not; §127), which amounts to making the One constant; 
 hence their sizes are merely relative approximations — Me s, 
 applying to our average environment, and really unfixable 
 with respect to a general environment that is a One truistic- 
 ally variable. Also, if later on we say that light is waves, 
 then one size of ether cells would fit average measures — be 
 fairly accurate. But if we say, as is equally correct, that 
 light is corpuscular as Newton had it (i. e., is not formally 
 continuous, but is verbally made of small structures"), then 
 a different sized, smaller cell would be needed for the same 
 degree of quantitative accuracy. In short, any size of 
 cell which we determined on would give a certain degree of 
 accuracy — whether close enough to be acceptable or not de- 
 pending entirely on the fineness of our perceptions, measure- 
 ments, experiments, standard units. The mathematicians 
 can readily calculate those sizes (they are the ultimate arbi- 
 trary quantitative bases of harmonic periodicity) from the 
 mathematical theory of unification in IX, and by following 
 Erwin's and Reynolds s methods if they need such guidance. 
 But we do not need such figures in this book, for we can get 
 a better concept of what an ether cell is, and its practically- 
 varying sizes, in this way :- Suppose that our stellar galaxy 
 (i. e., the nebula in which we are, of which the Milky Way 
 is the base; XII) is an atom in some world like this earth, 
 but larger. Then our solar system — which is obviously a 
 variable, elastic affair, — which would be an atom of our gal- 
 axy, would be an electron of that larger world. And then, 
 what to us is a pin head would in size serve an inhabitant of 
 that larger world as a pretty accurate ether cell. Similarly, 
 what to us could be a fairly accurate ether cell is a percep- 
 tibly variable molar body to an inhabitant of a world inside 
 one of our electrons, and he would have to split it (our cell) 
 up quite a lot, quantitatively, to get a fundamental de- 
 scription of it. And so on forever ; — that is what an infinite 
 
 regress actually means. From that can be seen the 
 
 consistency of asserting that there is no such exact thing as 
 an ether cell. It is just an arbitrary very small part — small 
 to us: we are enormously big to some things and enormously 
 little to others. 
 
 f. We may also note again that when we say we split 
 the ether into parts, then in ordinary language (because of 
 having introduced L and T) we imply simply as a verbal tru- 
 ism that there is relative "motion" of those cells. (Or, we 
 could use an inverse language such as Reynolds's, in whose 
 theory the grain plus its vacuum does not necessarily as a 
 whole move; i. e., we could assert a static universe — static 
 relative to any given part. But that would, as an obvious tru- 
 ism, and as actually seen in practice in Reynolds s theory, 
 
 produce the same final meaning as our everyday way of nam- 
 ing "motion.") And that is the last verbal agree- 
 ment needed, and the last time the reader could consistently 
 require a general change in the everyday verbalisms which I 
 have been stating as the ones I am explicitly to use. I have 
 given the reader who does not like everyday commonsense 
 language an "infinite number" of other expressions to select 
 from, and shown explicitly the translation of each into our 
 language, and demonstrated in general that all those lang- 
 uages give the same meaning as the meaning now to be ex- 
 pressed in our commonplace language. 
 
 g. If the cells were absolutely distinct, then the relative 
 motion of any two of them (say we take two tangent cells) 
 would obviously require or exhibit either or » force — i. e., 
 relationship. Reynolds's grains are thus distinct, and he 
 fundamentally had to use mathematical trigonometric fictions 
 to get any Many measures (e. g. , the tangent of is ; and 
 of 90°, °° ; with "actual" values between). That fiction is 
 the orthodox mathematical error that and <*> are numbers 
 (§44) ; I shall not use the direct mathematical avoidance of 
 that fiction here, but express the consistent avoidance or so- 
 lution directly in terms of parts of the ether. Strictly speak- 
 ing, with such absolutely separate cells (i. e., in explictly 
 infinite pluralism), the size of them (or of grains, or Reeve's 
 masses, or Erwin's particles) would have to be absolutely 
 before we could have a really positive language in which 
 there was a canceling number of formal contradictions (in 
 short, for explicit verbal consistency we must assert explicitly 
 an infinite regress). That is a repetition of pars, d and e 
 from a reverse point of view. 
 
 h. Then, when I assert that the cells are not distinct or 
 of accurately fixed size, it is obvious that it means that that 
 way of asserting the infinite regress formally requires that 
 the cell be finally divisible into relatively moving zero points. 
 Then, any motion of any point is zero-infinity, or indetermi- 
 nate, or mystic. Therefore, when we arbitrarily proceed 
 from that One to the agreed-upon Many, we truistically take 
 a time and space assemblage of those points and arbitrarily 
 assign a positively named or numbered L and T to it (i. e., 
 assign a finite size — verbally contradictory to the One) : we 
 number or name that L and T, or Energy, or force, anything 
 we please. And the inaccuracy of such ' 'measure' ' is merely 
 fundamentally a truism of the fact that there really is no such 
 
 thing as an actual measure, or that the One is ineffable. 
 
 That is of course another repetition of the solution of the One 
 and Many. It sounds odd in that "concrete" form. But 
 it is the explicit general expression of this very simple fact:- 
 If we slide a finger over this paper, there is friction. Parts of 
 the paper enter into depressions in the skin, and vice versa 
 there being transfer, or "wear," of the paper into the 
 skin, and vice versa. Ultimately, the "friction" is the re- 
 lationship of absolute continuity. If that is not so, then the 
 motion of the finger over the sheet involves absolute tangen- 
 tial motion, and zero energy is exhibited — or no phenomenon 
 occurs,— which glaringly is not so. Hence, with rigorous 
 logic (this is of course another repetition of the One and the 
 Many), the fact is that the finger and paper absolutely 
 merge; or part of the so-called paper is in the so-called skin, 
 and vice versa. Now, from that fact, which is so ob- 
 vious that we customarily take it for granted without ex- 
 pressing it, we get this very simple and intelligible relation- 
 ship for our ether cells:- the outsides of neighboring ones 
 are together, or stick together, or merge together (or nega- 
 tively expressed, simply have never absolutely split apart), 
 and exhibit friction when there is any relative motion of the 
 two. (Precisely the same thing happens with respect to the 
 parts inside a cell, ad infinitum.) That statement is the 
 
97 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §98b 
 
 formal expression of any 'motion." By explicit classic logic 
 obviously it is impossible that there be any motion; Zeno's 
 paradoxes showed that centuries ago, as we saw ("Ency. 
 Brit.," Zeno"). This paragraph is hence a detailed, con- 
 crete, consistent expression in everyday language of motion. 
 
 i. Therefore, with such moving cells, and with an inner 
 infinite regress of motion in each cell, when we inaccurately 
 speak of a finite relative motion of any two cells another 
 verbal puzzle arises. We may consider the cells each to be 
 like a toy rubber balloon, with the surface covered with 
 sticky glue. The problem is whether the relative motion of 
 two cells consists (l) of stretching the surfaces of the bal- 
 loons inwards and outwards from their original spherical 
 shapes, while their centers do not move in translation, and 
 the place of the sticking together of the two surfaces does not 
 change; or whether the relative motion consists (2) of the 
 same stretching motion, with the sticking-together places 
 slipping more or less on each other so that the motion is a 
 rotation of the cells as a whole; or whether the motion con- 
 sists (s) of a translation of the whole original centers of the 
 cells, accompanied by some degree of stretch of the surfaces 
 with (A) fixed sticking, or (B) slipping sticking, or (C) rup- 
 ture of the sticking. That problem is obviously a verbal 
 quantitative one of some complication. None of those things 
 can happen if the Many cell or part is exact ; but we need 
 not go again into the solution of the One and Many with re- 
 spect to each phase of the complication. (The same compli- 
 cation is tacitly buried for Reynolds s grains in the vacuum' 
 that surrounds each ; for Reeve s points, in the distances' 
 between them; for Richards's compressible atoms, either in 
 the fields" of kinetic theory atoms, or else in the omission 
 of saying how anything can be compressible : and it is 
 tacitly buried in other theories. Obviously, it truistically is 
 
 inevitable. So I am being d-efinite about it here.) We 
 
 merely observe, now that we know how the One and Many 
 works, that the verbal problem of such motion itself takes an 
 infinite regress; the three heads under which I with arbitrary 
 formality stated the problem indicate that regress — and 
 that it is a quantitative problem of where and how much. So 
 the problem above is itself absolutely insoluble accurately, 
 and has no essential meaning (i. e. , there is no such real 
 problem). Formally, and with rigorous logic, we instantly 
 solve it arbitrarily by saying that we shall roughly have it 
 that the cells have some of each kind of motion:- that spe- 
 cifically with reference to two originally touching cells there 
 is some surface sliding, and then rupture of surface contact; 
 some internal stretch or elasticity, largely stopping when 
 the contact ruptures and translation as a whole (revolution) 
 takes place. To illustrate that:- if we had a roomful of the 
 sticky rubber balloons, with a string tied to one near the cen- 
 ter of the room, and pulled hard enough on the string, there 
 would obviously be some perceptible degree of each sort of 
 motion in some balloon or another, and some motion in each 
 balloon. The quantitative theory of those motions is an ar- 
 bitrary matter, and has no end ; it simply is truistically im- 
 possible to work it out in complete detail. But, we can 
 readily enough get sufficiently close answers by experiment 
 or experience in a particular case and predict such answers. 
 
 j. The sum of the last paragraph amounts to saying that 
 there is absolutely no accurate decision possible as to whether 
 the motion of the universe in any given place is (l) a vibration 
 (where the cells stick together, as is substantially the case in 
 Reynolds's theory or in orthodox wave theories), or (2) a 
 translation (where the stickiness of two cells ruptures, and 
 the two move apart [finally in closed orbits], or revolve [as is 
 substantially the case in Reeve's theory or in ordinary kinetic 
 theories]). The obvious truth of the matter is that neither 
 
 sort of theory — (l) wave, or fluid, or formally "static," or 
 (2) kinetic, or formally "dynamic" — is accurate. So it is a 
 mere matter of convenience as to which one we shall use in 
 a given case (of how definite or accurate we want to be or 
 need to be in expression), the ultimate truth obviously being 
 that in a finite Man}' language, some degree of one sort of 
 
 motion implies some of the other. This fact that any 
 
 phenomenon may be expressed validly, but inaccurately, as 
 either a vibration," or as a molar movement," is rather 
 hard to see when expressed in the above general form. It is 
 easy to see when we come to use it in detail. 
 
 k. This section completes the general explicit descrip- 
 tion of an ether cell. That cell exhibits, for each of an in- 
 definite number of points of view, the inherent infinite regress 
 of any actual That or This. The reason this section seems 
 complicated is that I have condensed all of Part One into it, 
 in being explicit as to the solution of all those infinite re- 
 gresses. Possibly it will be a year or so before the reader 
 can feel comfortable and at ease in the conscious explicit 
 presence of one of those regresses. But now that we have 
 summed all those solutions into the ether cell, we shall no 
 longer be troubled by the explicit or obtrusive presence of a 
 regress. So we are ready to get the summed motions of two 
 or more cells. In short, having split the universe down to 
 the limit, we now start putting those parts together again, 
 and in so doing we describe everything. And immediately 
 on considering a number of cells in motion together we get, 
 truistically and also experimentally, a whirl, which is an 
 easily observed unit structure, that turns out to be mechani- 
 cally identical with the reactions of a cell itself, and that 
 also serves as the automatic model of everything. 
 
 §98. a. The universe is therefore inaccurately agreed to 
 be a number of cells. By the theory of commensurability 
 (§50), any certain number of constant cells would fail to 
 make a universe or anything (which statement summarizes 
 the regresses stated in detail in the last section). Therefore, 
 as a truism all cells must continually be in motion as an at- 
 tempt, to speak logically," to bridge that verbal gap or 
 incommensurability or contradiction. Also, and what is 
 equivalent, no cell of a positive size (and all are agreed to be 
 positive— to have a definite L and T) can ever possibly be in 
 a position [perfectly] symmetrical with any certain cell or 
 cells. Therefore, no two adjacent cells may ever have ex- 
 actly the same amount of motion or energy. As we have 
 agreed that the size of cells is variable (i. e., they are split- 
 table), we must therefore, in order to have any positive lang- 
 uage agree that each cell will always be verbally the same 
 body. To say that is not saying that an ether cell is always 
 the same mass. A cell is always varying in mass (cf. par. h). 
 But a cell is always the same That or This — is Thate or This e . 
 It is a fixed verbal counter or symbol. It is a positive, verb- 
 ally surviving' unit of the Many, but in every actual way is 
 varying, inaccurately measurable, and irrational alone. 
 
 b. Consequently, we must state the relative motions of 
 at least two adjacent cells in order to be rational, The 
 
 adjacent cells may first be 
 considered as joining their 
 sticky skins along a part of 
 the circumference, as shown 
 in cross-section in Fig. 98b. 
 Then, because they cohere 
 and are in different rates of 
 motion, they will (l) rotate 
 in the same direction, as is 
 shown by the arrows; and 
 (2) one cell will to some degree revolve about the center of 
 the other. (In expressing these mechanics I make the usual 
 
 Fig. 98b. 
 
§98b XI Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 98 
 
 distinction that a body rotates when it turns [approximately] 
 around its own center, as in the daily rotation of the earth; 
 and revolves when it turns around some other approximate 
 center, as the revolution of the earth about the sun.) 
 
 c. We first consider that rotation in the same direction 
 (Fig. 98b). If there is any actual reaction between the cells 
 A and B, then obviously they must rotate in the same sense, 
 so that the joining portions move oppositely, as shown. 
 That is contrary to Maxwell's vague guess at a mechanical 
 ether. But the essential point is that so far as we have yet 
 gone, those two cells (virtually 8-dimension wheels in this 
 reaction) are formally the total universe; from that point of 
 view their rotation in the same direction is readily proved 
 experimentally :- Suppose A and B were two spur or cog 
 wheels (as partly indicated in Fig. 98b), and that we sup- 
 ported them by their axles (not shown) so that the cog teeth 
 meshed (those pictured are engineering monstrosities, of 
 course). Then, the only general way in which we could 
 make the two react would be to pull A quickly down (say) 
 for some distance (and B upwards, if we liked) ; the teeth 
 would of course shortly unmesh, and the wheels would rotate 
 in the same sense, in the direction shown in Fig. 98b. If 
 instead of the sticky cells, we had cells that had very flex- 
 ible rubber cog teeth, and meshed them loosely together, we 
 would get the same reaction somewhat more clearly, the 
 
 teeth reacting, and bending out of mesh. Clearly, 
 
 if the two wheels rotate in the opposite directions with teeth 
 in mesh, no reaction of just the two wheels (i. e., of the two 
 considered as a standard or whole One) occurs, except in so 
 far as the teeth themselves have friction (which is a lower order 
 reaction). If that friction be free to exhibit itself in a reaction 
 involving perceptible motion of the whole wheels it obviously 
 will push the wheels apart — so that the two, at the point of 
 contact move in opposite directions, which obviously amounts 
 to identically the same reaction already described for rotation 
 (note the small arrows at point of contact in the figure). 
 
 d. Before we explicitly take up the revolution of (say) 
 B about the center of A, we need to consider in general the 
 motion of a collection of cells in the total universe of cells. 
 Obviously, as already seen in §94d, if a collection of cells 
 moves, its place has to be taken by another collection. 983 In 
 order to avoid infinities and zeros (to avoid lapsing into One 
 language), that replacement would obviously require some 
 short time and be accompanied by some slight stretching of 
 cells (in infinite regress as indicated in footnote). (That is 
 obviously what happens, as also shown by direct experiment; 
 e. g., if a puff of smoke be blown into the air, time is re- 
 quired for the reactions.) But obviously that motion finally 
 is in a closed path. The part that first moves takes the place 
 of some other part; and that, of another part; and so on 
 until the last part that moves takes the place of the first part 
 that moved. (Obviously, because there is some elasticity or 
 vibration, in actuality that motion involves in some degree every 
 bit of the universe; that is the infinite regress, or it is the 
 way the One and Many absolutely reconciles itself in this de- 
 scription. We simply quantitatively ignore the vibrations that 
 
 98d If the cells are elastic enough, the cells that 'move' may 
 merely "condense," and adjacent cells "dilate," so that there is no 
 change in the relative order or arrangement of cells. That, relative 
 to the cells mentioned, would be a formally absolute "vibration." 
 But obviously, the size of the "elastic" yield made it result that 
 there were merely "vibrations," and the 'motion' I am describingin 
 the text would then take place relative to 'parts of cells, instead of 
 relative to whole cells. Hence, the text which I give is always ap- 
 plicable if we take parts small enough. Compare also §97j. Neither 
 "vibration," nor the 'motion' I describe, is perfect; to avoid lapsing 
 into One language, when those cells move some "elasticity" must be 
 exhibited in order to make the motion use a finite time interval. 
 
 are extremely slight: we can't yet in any way perceive such 
 vibrations that are much beyond X-rays in smallness unless 
 the yet unmeasured reactions in telepathy, "personal mag- 
 netism," etc., are such). Hence, all motion in the 
 
 universe is finally revolution. If we speak of translation 
 (or "vibration," meaning strictly back and forth translation), 
 then that is but a partial statement of the total motion which 
 finally takes place. 
 
 e. Therefore, because the motion of A and B is neces- 
 sarily asymmetrical, one cell must necessarily finally revolve 
 about the other. For the reaction of the sticking surfaces 
 (or of the elastic cogs) accounts for or provides for only equal 
 or symmetrical motion in each wheel. It is therefore again 
 seen (and again it is directly truistic with language agree- 
 ments), that there can be no accurate solution of the motion 
 of two bodies (§83). For there is no possible way of de- 
 termining just how much asymmetrical the motion is ; that 
 is finally dependent upon relative sizes, etc., as given in 
 §97i. So it does not in the least "simplify" anything to use 
 a machine of only two cells. Hence we shall at once con- 
 sider more cells and get explicit whirl mechanics. The fore- 
 going is the rough, general logic or mechanics of whirls. 
 
 f. For the foregoing, in addition to omitting the other 
 cells that actually existed, also has been tacitly dropping a 
 dimension of space. If we consider that A and B in Fig. 
 98b are actually 3-dimension approximate spheres, then 
 the actual reaction, instead of taking place in a plane, as the 
 figure tacitly indicates, takes place in the 3-diraension space 
 in which the surfaces stick together, or the flexible cogs 
 intermesh (the cogs' on such spheres could be small radial 
 pins). And in that actual case, obviously there is nothing to 
 determine positively the direction in 3-dimension space in 
 which they rotate. In terms of technical physics they have 
 six degrees of freedom (i. e., three dimensions in two direc- 
 tions each); that substantially makes six specific vague- 
 nesses. And in our actual model (i. e., the whirl we are 
 going to use) we are going to eliminate all such vaguenesses. 
 They will still be there of course in reference to measurings, 
 or when using the measuring member. But we are not using 
 that member now, but are using That... X This... which is to 
 have concrete, direct experimental positiveness. 
 
 g. Consequently, we observe that actually A. and B are 
 surrounded by other touching cells, and that in each case of 
 two mutually reacting cells the motion is asymmetrical or 
 unbalanced. The motion or reactions for two cells was-were 
 seen to be as a whole balanced when we were considering it 
 in a 2-dimension plane, by all the 'closed' or universal mo- 
 tion there is — namely, a rotation and a complete revolution. 
 We may note that that leaves an unbalance in the third di- 
 mension; i. e., on each side of A and B in the direction per- 
 pendicular to the plane of the paper there is an unbalance. 
 That unbalance has to be totally or ultimately compensated 
 precisely as we ultimately balanced A and B in just the plane 
 of Fig. 98b. I. e., there can not be either perfect rotation 
 or perfect translatory revolution of A and B in the third di- 
 mension : there must be, for finite Many or pluralistic lang- 
 uage, an infinite regress, which gives a combination (in some 
 quantative degree) of such rotation and revolution and of 
 elastic internal "reaction" (i. e. inner rotation and revolu- 
 tion), of adjacent cells (cf. par. d and §97j). 
 
 h. And therefore, if we begin by considering that 
 there are numerous cells in the plane of the paper (Fig. 
 98b), the reaction of rotation and revolution of all the cells 
 will sum up as being of precisely the same nature as for the 
 two, keeping in mind that there is some elastic change in the 
 size of the cells. That is a verbal truism with 'mass varies 
 with velocity.' For obviously, that elastic change is a change 
 
99 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §981 
 
 in mass, and the rotation and revolution (considered apart 
 from the inner change or elasticity) is velocity. It is simi- 
 larly obviously truistic with Bernoulli's theorem. 
 
 i. Then, to complete or finally balance that reaction in 
 the plane of the paper (Fig. 98b), the sideways unbalance 
 will have to be taken up in precisely the same way by cells 
 on the sides (i. e., by cells up and down from the plane of 
 the paper). By Bernoulli's principle the greater the local 
 unbalances or the higher the pressure, the slower the veloci- 
 ties. Consequently, by that, just in the immediate vicinity of 
 the plane of the paper there forms a tube — "eddy" — of ro- 
 tating and revolving cells, with any cross-section of it that is 
 approximately parallel to the plane of the paper equivalent in 
 motion to the motion in the plane as described in the last 
 paragraph. And that now partially described balancing of 
 motion, or definite statement of equal action and reaction, in 
 three dimensions is identical with the "tubes of force" used 
 by Faraday, Maxwell, and finally with practically complet- 
 ing additions by Thomson. Also, it is substantially identical 
 with what Erwin calls "ether flow" from the center of his 
 wheels. In various formulations of physics that tube (just a 
 short portion of which I have so far described) is called fluxes, 
 stresses, strains, magnetic lines, displacements (electric and 
 otherwise), currents, distortions (of various sorts), centers of 
 gyration, etc. Consequently, the concrete reactions I am 
 stating here maybe compared with those conventional mathe- 
 matical ways. The difficulty with the conventional ways is 
 that they usually tacitly consider that tube as being exactly 
 perpendicular to the plane of the paper, and hence as extend- 
 ing indefinitely up and down (I have asserted or shown no 
 such tube: see next paragraph) ; consequently, conventional 
 ways usually get "lost" right there, in that and °° — as 
 those unending" tubes are obviously unintelligible, and 
 agree with no machine or finite thing, being really a One. 
 
 j. As we have here carefully carried along a verbal bal- 
 ance between the zero-infinity One and the arbitrary finite 
 Many, we may now at once see precisely how to complete 
 that tube and make it actually practically balance, and at 
 the same time show the explicit completion of all conventional 
 ideas of tubes of force, etc. We have already seen repeatedly 
 that the only possible way — the truistic way — of completely 
 and wholly balancing those unbalances is to make a closed 
 path. Ultimately, the only way of obtaining that closed 
 path with one tube is to consider it bent around into a ring 
 (i. e., it was only approximately perpendicular to the paper 
 in the last paragraph, in order that the cells in the plane of 
 the paper should balance), closing on itself, thus forming 
 roughly an anchor ring or tore or doughnut, or a vortex whirl 
 or whirl (§68hi) — or a somewhat fully formed and enduring 
 eddy, of which a whirlpool is one not very obvious example. 
 Actual finite parts of the universe then, in such a structure, 
 are in rough equilibrium (i. e., absolutely complete balancing 
 is obtained only by considering some elastic motion of every 
 part of the universe in infinite regress — as we have already 
 seen repeatedly; e. g., in §86). That whirl is our unit 
 structure, or symbolic machine, or This e . Verbally, its 
 formation is the expression of truisms ; for a concrete tube 
 has to end somewhere; otherwise we abandon scientific lang- 
 uage and revert to the One — -which, although quite correct if 
 acknowledged, is no longer the science we agreed to make. 
 Faraday substantially made his tubes close on themselves; 
 but Maxwell lost the idea. Thomson makes his tubes end 
 in positive" electrons; but positive electrons are nothing 
 more that standard Ones (i. e., they are mere logical verbal 
 unifications of electrons) ; hence Thomson implies that ulti- 
 mately all whirls are themselves united, which means that no 
 whirl is a perfectly closed or balanced structure. It 
 
 will be noted that I have said above that our closed whirl was 
 in rough equilibrium. This whole Part Two is required to 
 show that (i. e. , the whirl, not being in complete equilibrium, 
 changes itself in various ways into other structures, and thus 
 transfers energy, or displays all phenomena). But this much 
 of this chapter shows the general completion of the electron 
 theory. We see the details as we proceed. 
 
 k. Instead of having the tube 'close on itself' (as in the 
 last paragraph, thus forming a whirl) in order to obtain a. fair 
 dynamic equilibrium for a given collection of cells, it 
 would have been possible (as the only other verbal alterna- 
 tive) to have the cells all take up mutual motions more or 
 less immediately or directly closing on themselves (in the 
 sense that a rotation may be said to be a se^closed revolution), 
 thus forming a more or less spherical or spheroidal body or 
 collection of cells. But we note at once that if the tube' 
 were of sufficient diameter, so that when it closed on itself 
 no hole" was left in the ring, then the so-called 'ring' or 
 whirl itself would quantitatively be more or less a sphere. 
 (I. e., suppose we made a doughnut out of a tube or roll of 
 dough — instead of cutting out a hole as is more usual in hand 
 making. If we made the rolls relatively short, then when 
 we bent the two ends around to join them together, no hole 
 would be left, and the dough would squeeze into more or less 
 a sphere.) Consequently, that spherical form of dynamic 
 equilibrium is merely a special case of a whirl (a quantitative 
 case, in which case conditions are pretty steady, or potentials 
 are comparatively low). We shall see, e. g. , that the earth 
 is a whirl (XII). On the other hand, the closed tube — the 
 filament of the whirl — could have any degree of tenuity com- 
 pared with the size of the hole. If the tenuity went into 
 the limit of becoming a line closed in more or less of a circle, 
 with a hole therefore of a size infinitely ' greater than that 
 line's diameter or size, then our language would obviously 
 reverse — the One and the Many formally exchanging places, 
 giving explicitly an infinite pluralism. In the precisely anal- 
 ogous case of where the hole or radius becomes zero (if we 
 were to consider it explicitly) our language also reverses. 
 Therefore, as we shall see (XII), the spherical form of whirl 
 is a reversal of the ring form. In practice we do not let the 
 logic or language itself change, but our point of view — or 
 statement of L, — in lieu of such logical change, changes from 
 in to out, or reverses ; or, from the same point of view the 
 language goes backwards mechanically. Or, what is prac- 
 tically important, the sphere is (to use customary terms) 
 static (e. g., we say the solid," steady" earth); and the 
 whirl which is not a sphere is dynamic (e. g. , the magnetic 
 "field" of the earth ; or the winds that blow over the earth). 
 
 1. It is hence obviously a truism that when we consid- 
 ered our rather spherical ether cells as being variable, or 
 elastic, we thus considered them as being whirls also — very 
 small whirls, the definite motions qf translation of whose inner 
 parts were so short that we quantitatively neglect them. 
 In brief, our valid logic appears perfectly circular — and valid 
 because it consistently includes the universe. Therefore, as 
 some more obvious truisms, any actual body whatever in the 
 universe may be considered a whirl; or any part of any 
 body or of the whole universe is a whirl ; or the universe it- 
 self is a whirl. I shall explicitly show all that in direct, 
 concretely verifiable detail as we proceed. So in a whirl we 
 have a machine model, immediately applicable to anything. 
 In §101 I shall describe some experimental whirls which you 
 can make for yourself in a minute or so ; then you can sub- 
 stitute that visible affair as being the directly usable summa- 
 tion of these verbal truisms which constitute the mechanics of 
 a whirl — for these truisms are rather tiresome and hard to 
 remember in their verbal form. 
 
§98m XI Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 100 
 
 m. As we saw, because no cell can, by the theory of in- 
 commensurables, possibly be quantitatively accurate, there- 
 fore no finite collection can be accurate or symmetrical, or in 
 absolute equilibrium. Hence, a finite or actual whirl is never 
 in absolute equilibrium with its environment — or what 
 amounts to the same thing, the whirl is not perfectly closed, 
 does not have a definite surface, etc. In brief, the whirl, as 
 our actual structure, is not a perfect or an exact structure. 
 Therefore, if we conceive a geometrical line in the whirl 
 which always passes from one cell to another at a point 
 where the pressure in its constant change is instantaneously 
 zero or balanced, then that line obviously would be continu- 
 ous ; the point mentioned would always be the instantaneous 
 point of rupture; the line would always be changing its loca- 
 tion ; it would be the conventional path of least action (ex- 
 plicitly the path of zero action, which is the limit of least); 
 it finally at some point would leave the given whirl to join 
 similarly continuously with the rest of the universe, and 
 would reenter the given whirl at the point where it was begin- 
 ning to join another (the cell-pressure being there infinity, 
 which, as we shall implicitly see in the rest of this chapter, 
 is the same as the zero-pressure from the opposite point of 
 view), after having passed through all the points of all the 
 other cells in the universe simultaneously (as strictly by the 
 infinite regress, each point is always rupturing from one point 
 and joining another). Hence that line, which is analogous 
 to the conventional stream line, would be infinitely long, and 
 formally would outline the total structure of the universe. 
 The line would in every respect be zero and infinity, so that 
 a geometrical point (zero mass or zero "material") moving 
 in it at infinite speed would obviously truistically be the 
 universe. In brief, all materiality" absolutely disap- 
 pears from the universe whenever we give explicit and rigor- 
 ous description (and the description just given is quite ortho- 
 dox, being the ordinary principle of least action stated in an 
 obviously truistic form). We see that the so-called whirl or 
 "matter" I am talking about is a mere form, a verbal trick, 
 which outlines the absolutely inexpressible finally real uni- 
 verse, which universe or God is the line of least or absolutely 
 zero action. We land in Nirvana, here and now, by that 
 particular view point (we could shift to infinite God by em- 
 phasizing that the line reentered each cell or point at the 
 point it was joining another) ; and we did it by being per- 
 sistently and really concrete — by really sticking to Newton's 
 third law, which the materialists fancy they accept. Only 
 by being metaphysical and vague and inconsistent like con- 
 ventional theologians and materialists is it possible to be ma- 
 terialistic and "worldly." The reader need not take 
 
 this paragraph too seriously. It is ultimate truth; but as 
 we see in ethics (§§166, 162), ultimate truth is a dangerous 
 thing to dwell upon explicitly without previous training: 
 just a touch too much of it for an unprepared man, and he 
 goes insane, as, e. g., did Newton temporarily and Sweden- 
 borg rather persistently. So if you do not grasp this para- 
 graph for a month or two it is merely nature automatically 
 and properly protecting your brain from too sudden a load. 
 I abruptly described the total universe or God in sharply 
 precise physical terms. If I had at the same time definitely 
 shown that the sum was also a person, if nature had not 
 sufficiently protected you, you would have become God- 
 intoxicated," or in undue measure have had what the theo- 
 logians usually call a rebirth or salvation (cf. §158). 
 
 n. Without being so ultimate as in the last paragraph, 
 we may observe that because the whirl is not exactly in equi- 
 librium, there are truistically variations from a perfect geo- 
 metrical tore, which we may note from three important 
 points of view:- (l) The 'surface' of the ring is not a sharp 
 
 geometrical surface, but is a variable, 3-dimension ^zone 
 of high velocity and relatively low pressure, which shades 
 off" with lower velocities in both directions away from that 
 'surface' (in the direction of the perpendicular or normal on 
 both sides of the 'surface'). I. e., there is rotational and 
 revolving motion "outside" the ring or closed tube, as well 
 as inside it. The ether cells outside with that shading-off 
 velocity constitute what I shall call the field. In Fig. 98n 
 two views of a whirl are shown — in cross-section above, and 
 
 Fig. 98n. 
 
 in plan below, 
 (which tube is 
 show the field, 
 only the ring.) 
 
 The 
 
 shown 
 
 closed dotted lines about the tube 
 in cross-section at ABD and A B D ) 
 (The field is not drawn in the plan view — 
 I shall call the ring or tube the filament of 
 the whirl. The filament is shown in full lines in the figure 
 — the plan or doughnut shape being below. The approximate 
 or instantaneous center about which the cells of the filament 
 revolve is shown in the cross-section part of the figure by the 
 centers F and F of the filament, and in plan by the closed 
 line FiFi Fi . I shall call it the filiar axis. The line ap- 
 proximately perpendicular to the plane of the filiar axis, and 
 through its approximate center (shown at C C in elevation, 
 and at C2 in plan) will be called the ■whirl axis or main axis, 
 or simply axis. The field and the filament is the whirl. The 
 3-dimension surface or zone (ABD, A B'D , A1D1, AiD/) 
 between the filament and the field I shall call the difference 
 surface, or briefly surface (when I mean 'geometrical sur- 
 face in this book, I use that explicit phrase, unless the 
 context clearly implies it). There is also, in the same way, 
 an indefinite 3-dimension boundary of surface on the outside 
 of the field — 'between' the field of one whirl and the field of 
 the adjacent one. I shall call that the field difference surface, 
 or briefly the field surface. We see more such details below, 
 p. The second important view to be taken of the result 
 of the asymmetry of the filament is that the cells truistically 
 do not revolve {and rotate) in a plane that is normal to the 
 filiar axis; i. e., there is no definite, sharp, exact revolution 
 of the cross-sections ABD, etc., about F, etc., in the plane 
 of the paper as shown by the little arrows. For the 'side- 
 ways' pressure is not steady. Hence, there is truistically a 
 sideways (i. e., in the direction of the filiar axis) component 
 of motion, so that as a general sum for the whole filament 
 the filament effectually rotates about the main axis, and a cell 
 
101 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §98q 
 
 in the difference surface thus travels in a spiral (as at S, S) — 
 in a line which when projected on the filiar axis in any whirl 
 always makes with it an angle different from 0° and 90°. 
 (Possibly a more correct technical name for that path is heli- 
 cal, or screw thread. However, it is not perfectly helical 
 and not perfectly spiral, but a variable path between the two 
 as limits.) Obviously, that spiral motion, relative to any- 
 thing outside the filament (to its field, e. g.), may as extreme 
 limiting views be either (l) called a rotation of the filament 
 about the main axis, or (2) called a relatively fixed filament 
 with a spiraling surface (like a helical spring). And those 
 two points of view, when taken to the extreme One limit (to 
 0, or <*>), are analogous to the dynamic and static views in 
 par. h or in §97j. So we again avoid both verbal mysticisms 
 by asserting that the motion never becomes perfectly rota- 
 tional (for in that case no connection could be had with any- 
 thing outside the filament, which is a self-contradiction; or 
 it is Kelvin's frictionless whirl), and never becomes perfectly 
 spiral (for the same truism). We say that the motion is some 
 of each, and the cells then are consistently of finite size. 
 
 Therefore, now that we have preserved actual finite 
 
 sizes, without running off into - °° mysticism, we get an 
 important mechanical reaction — the completing or ultimate 
 reaction- — or the concrete truistic expression of what transfer 
 of energy is, of what a phenomenon is :- For obviously, with 
 cells of a finite size, whenever the angle of the spirals ap- 
 proaches close to or 90 {how close depends upon the size 
 of the cells), then at that surface locality where it happens, 
 obviously a cell or cells would truistically leave, or enter, the 
 filament, and the filament thus would partly wear out or 
 decrease, or grow. As orthodox science so often omits 
 
 that point it is desirable to consider it in detail for a few 
 paragraphs. In the next one I emphasize the point by sub- 
 stantially repeating it in a different form. 
 
 p. What we must say, as a truism of the positive plural- 
 istic language we are by agreement using (and which is also 
 definitely proved by concrete, verifiable experimental fact in 
 §§101-2), is that if the spirals S, S in Fig. 98n make an 
 angle of 0° (or 180 ) with the filiar axis F1F1 Fi (become 
 parallel to it), so that the motion is pure rotation of the fila- 
 ment about the main axis, then obviously there is no reaction, 
 or there is zero force, holding the cell in the filament. Be- 
 cause the cell is of some finite size, therefore it truistically 
 leaves the filament and joins the field before that absolute 
 or 180° could occur. Similarly, if the spirals at any spot on 
 the surface approach 90° (or 270 ) the local pull on the cells 
 outside approaches infinity, and as they are of finite size, be- 
 fore any actual 90° is reached, one or more cells are pulled 
 
 into the filament. Or, by taking the opposite point 
 
 of view, the expression of all that can be reversed, giv- 
 ing identically the same result. The simple verbal fact 
 is that such and °° functions are indeterminate, and are not 
 applicable to finite bodies and can not occur with respect to 
 them. Orthodox science frequently uses such - °° forms. 
 When it does it obviously is religion — and is wrong if it pro- 
 fesses to be science. As a matter of fact, orthodox science 
 tacitly uses valid logic or commonsense, and asserts the act- 
 ual or correct answer ; for it sees the answer also in the form 
 of experiments, similar to those I shall give. But I am being 
 explicitly consistent here — putting commonsense into words, 
 — and as an immediate consequence we have seen already 
 the total explanation of what "growth" is, and it turns out 
 to be identical with any actual "transfer" of energy, or any 
 phenomenon. A few rabidly agnostic scientists and theolog- 
 ians hold that the explanation of growth is "impossible." 
 Truistically it would be if pseudo-science kept on dualistically 
 splitting the universe into absolute parts : for such parts then 
 
 obviously can't formally get together or grow. But we now 
 see that growth, in expression is merely ultimately an inevit- 
 able truism of our primary agreement arbitrarily to split 
 things into parts. In short, religiously, or from the point of 
 view of the total universe, everything is conserved (that is 
 the explicit statement of the general religious law of the con- 
 servation of energy) ; taking the verbally opposite point of 
 view of the universe as being arbitrarily split into parts, then 
 the identical law (expressed pluralistically in formally oppo- 
 site terms) is that always each part changes — either grows or 
 decreases (which it does, depends wholly upon our point of 
 view; i. e., there is no absolute evolution or progress up or 
 down — for up and down are purely relative or Many; Index, 
 Direction"). That law of growth" is hence obviously 
 simply the law, mass varies with velocity. For obviously, 
 here we have concretely given a mass or body (given a cell) 
 a velocity, and we find the resulting structure explicitly 
 growing — and doing it truistically : we have not even made 
 any experimental whirls yet to see it happen. We shall also 
 see (§146) that the same double aspect of the growth of the 
 filament (i. e., increase" and decrease") is also funda- 
 mentally what we call sex. All of this is just as explicitly 
 biology and sociology as it is physics and chemistry. As a 
 matter of fact, as soon as we get these elementary mechanics 
 summed up into whirls, I am going to use those whirls di- 
 rectly and in some detail to state astronomy (XII), as that 
 subject exhibits perhaps better and more simply than others 
 the familiar principles of biology, ethics, chemistry, etc. 
 
 q. Another point of view or way of stating the last two 
 paragraphs is quite useful in giving an understanding of 
 things in general :- When the asymmetry of the filament is 
 considered as truistically giving a spiral surface-motion, it 
 obviously is a part of the same truism that the spiral motion 
 exists in order to balance the filament with the field outside; 
 and that therefore a complete understanding of the truism 
 requires explicit expression of the motion of the cells in the 
 field. Because that spiral exists as a means of balancing 
 sideways asymmetries, it truistically follows that the reaction 
 of the field cells is a rotation and revolution (as before, 
 neither perfect or 0° or 90°) of them sideways — on one side 
 or the other depending on whether the unbalance is due to a 
 growing filament or a decreasing one. That is precisely the 
 same sort of reaction we have already seen in pars, h and i. 
 Therefore, the cells in the field move in a spiral, the projec- 
 tions of which on the spirals of the filament cross at some 
 angle between 0° and 90°, but never at 0° or 90°. When the 
 angles between various field spirals and filament spirals get 
 rather close to those One limiting angles, then, as before and 
 depending on the size we are taking the cells to be, the geo- 
 metrical paths of a spiraling 
 cell in the field and a spir- 
 ^C r ^ aling cell in the filament 
 
 absolutely join, making a 
 rounding turn of about 90° — 
 not exactly so, nor a per- 
 fectly sharp turn, — and the 
 cell in that path leaves, or 
 joins, the filament. I. e., 
 if we look perpendicularly 
 down on the path of a cell C, then it has a path represented 
 by one of the two arrows in Fig. 98q, with a rounding turn 
 of about 90°. The elbow in the arrow is in the difference 
 surface — the locus of all such elbows is the difference surface. 
 
 That filament surface is identical in kind with the 
 
 surface of the possible spherical form of a whirl. That of 
 course directly follows from this paragraph, by noting that 
 the motion of the field difference surface, relative to the field 
 
 Fig. 98q. 
 
§98q XI Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 103 
 
 of an adjacent whirl, is mechanically identically the same as 
 the filament surface. And it further follows that if the fila- 
 ment is growing, the cell moves into it on one path (say A 
 in the figure) ; and when the filament is decreasing, the cell 
 moves on a relatively opposite or reversed path B. 
 
 r. It is obvious from the last paragraph that again we 
 have the distinction between static and dynamic. Every- 
 thing in the universe, by our verbal agreements, is moving. 
 Hence, if we are in the field say of a large whirl, moving 
 along with it, we can arbitrarily consider it static, just as a 
 fish in a muddy stream would not readily notice its steady 
 motion (the fish is of finite size; hence in principle he could 
 always detect the motion of the stream by reference to his 
 nervous system, as no finite portion of the stream can have 
 mutually steady velocities of its parts — but in practice, the 
 fish would need some delicate tools to improve his nerves). 
 Then if we undertake to refer to the filament (or to act with 
 it in any way), the surface motion of it tends to approach to- 
 wards taking a path at 90 to our static' motion. So we 
 speak of the filament as dynamic,' or as exhibiting energy, 
 and formally we must introduce the other two dimensions of 
 space (the verbal inverse square law) in order to assert that 
 motion in a plane at about 90 . That is now con- 
 cretely obvious; for in our static" environment we tacitly 
 assume equilibrium, or that we are in a center of refer- 
 ence," and hence we must for formal consistency assert the 
 two balancing L's in going into a different structure. Also, 
 it is obvious (or possibly not readily so just yet), that we 
 could recognize or perceive a filament only when it was grow- 
 ing [or decreasing] a little, relative to the filaments in the 
 biological structures of our sense organs. That criterion oc- 
 curs at V\ (XIII). All this is concretely" precisely what 
 we saw "theoretically" in §80. 
 
 s. It also appears that because there is universal asym- 
 metry, or universal growth-or-decrease (i. e., change), all 
 filaments and fields as a truism are changing. I. e., even if 
 we assert that we are in a static" environment, the actual 
 pluralistic fact is that by measurements which are accurate 
 to within the size of cells, there is measurable motion. So 
 there is no positive static environment — or in a similar sense 
 no accurate wholly dynamic one. A perfect static, or 
 "dynamic," one is monistic. Or, in the terms we are now 
 using, all That's and This's are explicitly That...'s and 
 This...'s. Also, this truism is identical with what we saw 
 in §8Sg:- that all naming coefficients are infinitely regress- 
 ive. And so on- — in repeated proof of no exact science. 
 
 t. I have been speaking above as if there were a number 
 of paths of cells in and out of filaments (and implicitly, of 
 fields of adjacent whirls). Obviously, at any given instant 
 the chance that there is more than one path at exactly the 
 same phase would be one to infinity. Consequently, and 
 also in extension of the same truism, there is one con- 
 tinuous geometrical line in which all the cells must move. 
 That is simply a definite verbal proof of par. m. Beyond the 
 fact that it shows absolute unification, I do not use it. 
 
 u. (3) We may now look at the asymmetry of any whirl 
 from the third point of view mentioned in par. n. This 
 point of view is what might be called a structural or concrete 
 summing of the second point of view (beginning in par. o) :- 
 
 v. In a fairly steady whirl there is, as a truism, but 
 slight change at the difference surface. But when there is 
 considerable asymmetry ( disturbed conditions," consider- 
 able difference in "potential," etc.), obviously as another 
 truism, there is a tendency for a number of cells to pass into 
 (or out of) the filament more or less together (never two ac- 
 curately together, or simultaneously, of course). We shall 
 say that a number of cells come out of a filament more or less 
 
 together, observing concretely and generally what happens :- 
 w. In Fig. 98wthe large rough circle represents a cross- 
 section of a fairly balanced filament. If it is much out of 
 balance dynamically, as we now shall consider it to become, 
 we shall have a number of cells bulging out into the part 
 
 \ 
 
 D 
 
 Fig. 98w. 
 
 shown dotted. By Bernoulli's principle, the part of the 
 bulge farthest out will have the greatest velocity. There- 
 fore the farthest cell will leave the filament, and others 
 around it will in turn leave until equilibrium is practically 
 restored. They all come in contact with slower cells in the 
 field, and hence curl over and around as shown by the arrows 
 just in and outside the bulge, and thus form a new, small 
 whirl, in somewhat the relative size and position shown at A 
 (the variations from that size, etc., are great, depending on 
 conditions; §§101-2). The new whirl moves off (see next 
 paragraph) to the right, and its environment being asymmet- 
 rical with respect to it (usually markedly so, for reasons that 
 appear from time to time), it turns up or down (depending 
 for the direction in which it turns upon relative values of ve- 
 locities) and thus tends to take up a revolution about the filiar 
 axis F of the large whirl (subject to taking up also the spiral 
 motion of the main field, as we shall see). The new whirl 
 is shown moving around down, through the position B. 
 
 x. A whirl as a whole will partly have a motion of trans- 
 lation (more precisely :- of variable revolution about some 
 relatively distant point), and partly of rotation about its own 
 main axis (more precisely :- of spiral or varying rotation). 
 That is obviously a truism with Bernoulli's principle. Or, 
 the spirals on the outside of the fields can be considered as effect- 
 ually a screw thread, and the whirl will screw itself through 
 its environment, which then acts as a more or less fixed nut. 
 Or, its motion is due to precisely the same principles as were 
 set forth in par. b, relative to two cells, A and B. In short, 
 a whirl moves by the same principles as a cell — another cir- 
 cular checking up of the consistency of our argument or me- 
 chanics. Also, we have before seen that a cell will go in or 
 out of a filament (and also, in or out of a field, across the 
 field surface). Here, we definitely have a whirl acting as a 
 cell acts. So we see again, as we saw in par. 1, that except 
 for unessential L and T, a whirl is identical with a cell. 
 
 y. This small whirl, to which the filament gave birth, 
 is obviously a 'dynamic' body, in that it moves off while the 
 filament as a whole is a "center" or is static. As we saw, 
 orthodox physics does not explicitly recognize any bodies as 
 giving birth to smaller ones (or vice versa) — although all 
 men, e. g., are born. Such physics usually calls those things 
 which are given off "vibrations" or "waves"; yet, as we 
 shall see, electrons (and radioactivity) are tacitly by orthodox 
 physics the birth of such small whirls. And so far as that is 
 concerned, precisely the same idea is definitely contained even 
 
103 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §99c 
 
 in the old Maxwell physics :- in such physics God gave birth 
 to the smaller things — "created" them, in Maxwell's own 
 technical speech. So I am not proposing any novelty; I am 
 here merely being a little more definite as to the immediate 
 parents, while also agreeing that as a sum total God or the 
 universe gave birth to all things — and vice versa. 
 
 §99. a. The last section gives the general total of all 
 mechanics, and is as such the concrete summary of all plur- 
 alistic statement. It is much condensed. But I find that it 
 is much more intelligible that way. Those who have the 
 need or the interest to expand it in detail will have no par- 
 ticular difficulty (except in remembering the details when 
 they become numerous) in expanding it to volumes. I have 
 myself on occasions expanded it to a volume or so. The 
 worst difficulty about those mechanics is to condense them 
 into sufficiently brief expression to be comprehended as a 
 whole readily (so that the trees will not hide the forest), 
 which at the same time permits useful detail to be visible. 
 The last section is a reduction to about 6000 words of a pict- 
 ure or description of the universe in all its infinite variety — 
 undertaking to make the completely unified beauty of the 
 universe intelligibly explicit, and at the same time to make 
 the infinite details and extent of that beauty also explicit 
 enough to be intelligible or perceptible. It is thus an effort 
 to accomplish in explicit completeness what all literature 
 undertakes to accomplish in more or less completeness. I. e, , 
 any writing or verbal communication is formally an explicit 
 (or implied — as in nonsense" books like "Alice in Wonder- 
 land") statement of the solution of the One and Many — an 
 analysis into parts, which are then synthesized into a com- 
 plete meaning (and most writers do not take the whole One, 
 but imply it by using a standard One). E. g. , the usual 
 modern love story names force love, and proceeds to make 
 one couple of people, or several couples, One, or vice versa 
 — with positive mention of such This s and That's as the 
 writer thinks will best make explicitly comprehensible to 
 the reader the One and the Many. The Bible undertakes 
 to do that with respect to the universe. But the author of 
 the love story and the compilers of the Bible failed usually to 
 be very vividly conscious of what they were about, I was 
 quite conscious of what I was trying to do. To those people 
 for whom the last section is comfortably and applicably intel- 
 ligible, it is literature ; to those for whom it its not thus 
 successful, it is not literature (success of course includes per- 
 ceptible stirring of the emotions — moving' the reader to do 
 something right, indicated by my phrase applicably intellig- 
 ible ; cf. XVII). If the last section is successful to a 
 majority of readers, then by conventional measures it is lit- 
 erature" (§l71k). Then, as it is explicitly completely exten- 
 sive, greater" literature than that section would in general 
 possess (l) more meaningfulness and forcefulness (i. e., 
 more comfortable and more applicable or emotion-stirring in- 
 telligibility) in an equal number of words (with the subject 
 remaining equally complete) ; or (2) equal meaning in fewer 
 words; or (g) both. But, as the estimate of the relative 
 measures of literature obviously thus depends upon the per- 
 ceptions of the readers, such estimates will change as the 
 readers change, and a direct comparison of literature requires 
 a preliminary comparison of the readers who estimate it, 
 
 That digression as to the measures of literature will, 
 
 by introducing an odd point of view, probably permit the 
 reader to see just what the last section really means. The 
 reader might try for himself to condense the Bible, Shakes- 
 peare, and all the novels and science he has read, to 6000 
 words intelligible to others, and see how he comes out. As 
 a matter of fact, I did not expect to be successful at it, so I 
 have added the rest of the book to it. A volume on 
 
 the theory of literary construction (i. e., on ' making" lit- 
 erature, or synthesis) and criticism (i. e., analysis) is defin- 
 itely implied by this paragraph. 
 
 b. Judged by ordinary standards, the chief omission in 
 the last section is that I have failed to indicate in which di- 
 rection any given motion took place. E. g., I said that the 
 whirl or cell would move, but usually I did not show or assert 
 in which direction it would move — whether up or down, left 
 or right, etc. Obviously, the actual direction of such motion 
 will always depend upon the relative values of the asymme- 
 tries — which is a truism. Clearly, the motion can always be 
 in either direction; i. e., this machine we have arbitrarily 
 invented is reversible, (it is not perfectly reversible, as tru- 
 istically the asymmetries or measures will always be different 
 if it runs in the opposite direction; but it is always logically 
 or qualitatively perfectly reversible, and hence the universe 
 as a whole is perfectly reversible in measure as well as form 
 — which is the same as saying that L and T do not apply to 
 the One.) As an explicit example of my omission of direc- 
 tions, when I said (§98x) a whirl would move, or screw itself 
 along, between adjacent whirls, I omitted all remarks about 
 those others whirls even having directions of motion. Ob- 
 viously, the others too would have motions, so that the whirl 
 mentioned, in its somewhat corkscrew motion in the general 
 direction of its main axis (cf. path of solar system, Fig. 107e) 
 has a direction that depends on those other motions. I pro- 
 pose usually to omit naming such environmental directions; 
 for if I did name them, I obviously somewhat obligate myself 
 to the ad infinitum task of naming the relative directions of 
 all motions in the universe. I could not, while trying to set 
 forth the principles, maintain such a grasp of details: no 
 reader would stand being bored by such detail, even if a 
 publisher would print it [and since I wrote that about 18 
 publishers have in effect assured me that readers are not in- 
 terested in even the essentials of the universe or all things; 
 but I think they overestimate the prevalence of the provin- 
 cial or New York weakness known variously as pep, punch, 
 brevity and speed in the actual sense of shallowness, that 
 is shown in get-rich-quick and living-your-own-life-and-to- 
 hell-with-others delusions]. And worst of all, there is no 
 general agreement as to how directions shall be named from 
 any given place, so that I would also be involved in a com- 
 plete revision and unification of all scientific standards (as all 
 of them finally depend upon L or direction' — T being im- 
 plied), which is rather another story. Or to put it in terms 
 of the last chapter (also, cf. §§58g, lOli, 134d, 135c, 149, 
 etc.), if I name directions, thus somewhat obligating myself 
 to state environmental quantitative relationships in infinite 
 regress, I must also explicitly locate, relative to ourselves 
 or our usual tacit standards, the arbitrary zero" potential. 
 And / can not locate such a beginning point of measures 
 except for myself alone ; it requires general agreement of 
 people (§171 k); you might agree with my zero potential, 
 but by the theory of chance you probably wouldn't, and then 
 I would be involved in an argument or controversy with 
 you as to (say) how many pounds is a, heavy" load — which 
 is not the purpose of this book. I propose to give here the 
 principles or theory of all measures or descriptions ; my 
 guesses at those actual measures are my guesses, and you 
 verify the book by using your guesses or opinions. So my 
 avoidance of entering into any extended statement of direc- 
 tion is simply my generalized avoidance of imposing my 
 opinions or standards on anyone. You really want to form 
 your own standards and need to at first — though in this gen- 
 eralized form the need is yet obscure. I shall give some ex- 
 amples in the next paragraph. 
 
 c. The conventional technical example is an electrical 
 
§99c XI Two 
 
 current. It is now generally admitted that there is » flow 
 [of what is actually matter] not as the "positive" current, 
 but in the direction which is called "negative. So the 
 
 guess made over a century ago as to the direction of elec- 
 tricity is verbally contradictory to ordinary standards of zero 
 
 'molar potential.' We may take a wider case. When 
 
 a filament gives birth to a secondary or smaller whirl, that 
 filament at the time decreases — or we would conventionally 
 usually say it degenerates or runs down or loses. But verb- 
 ally contrary to that, when people give birth to a second 
 
 generation, we commonly say the race is evoluting, or pro- 
 gressing — implying a growth or increase. The trick in the 
 naming of such directions is of course as to where we take 
 the zero" and begin to count from. In the absolute, there 
 is no such "start" or zero mark on a scale (§80). In the 
 birth of people, our start" is the race, and we ignore the 
 individuals who, as such, decrease and finally die. In the 
 birth of a secondary whirl I took the filament before the 
 birth as standard ; of course, the filament itself previous to 
 that pregnant condition had to grow before it could decrease, 
 d. So it is obvious that I may not properly state direc- 
 tions in this book in any extensive connections. If I say the 
 race is progressing, I have to state that it is my opinion or 
 quantitative observation or guess that it is moving in that 
 direction; and I have to go further, in order to show that 
 the opinion is based on consistent statement of observation, 
 and show that the climate, by being fairly steady for prob- 
 ably two or three hundred centuries, accounts for it, and 
 further state that quite possible changes in climate may at 
 times in the past have caused the opposite for a while (index, 
 Climate"). It therefore follows that anybody, by taking 
 a different point of view of the directions which I do happen 
 to state in much brevity, may show that they should be re- 
 versed, in his point of view. I agree that he is right. But 
 even more confusing than that, by the theory of chances it is 
 going to be found that some of the few directions I do state 
 (when it seems more economical of space, I name a direction, 
 or guess) are going to be found to be mutually inconsistent 
 whenever they are followed out considerably further, with 
 careful measures taken all along. Those inconsistencies are 
 quantitative errors, and are due to the fact that I do not 
 know the measures, they often not having been made by any- 
 body ; those errors are also due to the fact that I can not 
 carry very many facts in my memory at once, and hence get 
 confused sometimes with measures that are available. How- 
 ever, those inconsistent guesses which I occasionally make at 
 relative measures do not vitiate the principles or logic, as is 
 explicitly proved by the whole of Part One. They merely 
 prove that I am incompetent to give the reader any quite re- 
 liable practical (i. e., pluralistic or Many) advice or informa- 
 tion. In short, there is no exact science, and I personally 
 am unable to make science as exact as available information 
 would permit. 
 
 §100. a. We may sum up what has been 'made obvious 
 about whirls in general. The summary is a concrete or 
 tangible" restatement of the whole argument of the book, 
 b. (l) Any part of the universe may be considered 
 mechanically as being a whirl. If we take a part as a whirl, 
 then we have thereby explicitly implied a certain filament 
 difference surface, which has (truistically) a fairly definite 
 velocity; and that in turn, by the truism of continuity, es- 
 tablishes or implies every other whirl in the universe, because 
 the same relationships that hold in the first whirl must be 
 consistently identical in all the others. The relationships 
 in the first or standard whirl thus established are definite 
 (i. e., there is a difference surface velocity that is definite) 
 within the degree of accuracy that is (A) possible to our 
 
 UNIVERSE 10 * 
 
 perceptions (if we have actually-measured velocities), or 
 (B) which we care to assume formally if we do not wish act- 
 ually to measure. That degree of definiteness establishes 
 the size of the cell — which is a smaller whirl we consider a 
 vague, internally unmeasured unit. Only by regarding that 
 cell as a geometrical point could we obtain accuracy ; and in 
 that case we would require an impractical infinity of words. 
 Therefore, we take or verbally agree on the practical quan- 
 titatively vague cell (or small whirl) ; and that, from two 
 points of view, allows — and verbally necessitates as a truism 
 — all other whirls to vary widely (i. e., to exhibit all phe- 
 nomena) even though they are, as has been shown, formally 
 fixed by the first:- (l) Certain limits of variation are possible 
 to the cell to begin with; when, e. g., those variations are 
 multiplied by millions (by the inverse square law) in travel- 
 ing out to a distant whirl, there obviously can consistently 
 be considerable variability in the whirl (that is the funda- 
 mental reason for harmonic periodicity, or the periodic table 
 of elements — stated in a new way). (2) We have no practi- 
 cal means of actually verbally keeping the limits of the cell 
 measurably steady (getting rid of the infinite regress); so in 
 practice those limits themselves vary, which adds to the other 
 variations ; but formally in this book, and also implicitly in 
 practical life, we consider that variation to be zero; and be- 
 cause it is not, assert that we are always inaccurate, or that 
 there is no exact science. ■ Those two verbal reas- 
 
 ons" or truisms or explanations of why there are phenomena 
 or changes, are obviously identical. 
 
 c. We hence see further, from the last paragraph, that 
 in practice our description of the universe begins anthropo- 
 centrically. Each of us takes himself (his body and-or mind) 
 as being a whirl — a This e . That primarily fixes all molar 
 bodies. Then by observing more closely (requiring some 
 millions of years of nervous evolution"), we name parts of 
 ourselves (with temporary undue self-consciousness:- "they 
 knew that they were naked" ; Gen. 3, 7) and hence of molar 
 bodies, until we now have carried the splitting down to elec- 
 trons as being definite whirls or molar bodies of a lower" 
 order. Then, we can observe even more minutely ; but at 
 that next step in splitting we consider no longer that there 
 are definitely lower order whirls (we validly could : cf. cor- 
 puscular light in XIII), but consider the whirl "continuous" 
 cells, as has been seen in this, and the last chapter. Obvi- 
 ously in that process we use the difference surface of our 
 skin as a criterion — we adopt the effective velocities of its 
 structures as the particular one(s) by which to gauge and 
 describe the universe (e. g., the Adam and Eve myth intui- 
 tively mentioned correctly that skin standard, by "naked" ; 
 except for that, and other substantial implied truths in the 
 myth — for instance, the fact that the race for ages have been 
 tackling the job of formulating this book, particularly Part 
 One, — the story would not have survived long). So when 
 we get things split down, to vibrations, we find — because we 
 originally put it in — a continuous and obvious velocity rela- 
 tionship, V\ (IX). And then the total universe becomes 
 established for us as being whirls (or any other formal struct- 
 ure or 'splitting') on the criterion of the velocity of our light 
 Vi. Therefore, jf orthodoxly we hold that V\ is an absolute 
 constant, obviously we make the universe consist of parts ab- 
 solutely different to (for) each one of us, and each part differs 
 (to each one of us) at each instant from itself at other in- 
 stants, and we then have an absolutely anthropocentric 
 universe (which is in principle the relativity theory; §66). 
 That anthropocentric universe obviously has the difficulty of 
 requiring a separate language for each person, etc. (§66). 
 see again that such a universe is logically valid or is 
 ' ' just as Ptolemaic astronomy, which 
 
 But we 
 consistent and 
 
 true 
 
105 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §100d 
 
 is geocentric, can be expressed consistently. But that as- 
 tronomy is grossly impractical ; it would verbally give some of 
 the stars terrific velocities, and thus (e. g., in order to have 
 verbal consistency with such velocities) require complete re- 
 vision of the expression of the properties and structures of 
 atoms — in short would force us to revise our ordinary way of 
 naming things. Also, unless that anthropocentricism, geo- 
 centricism, etc., or a«#-centricism, go to the ultimate limit 
 (formally at least) of splitting things down to geometrical 
 points it will become illogical (because a man, etc., is him- 
 self variable — and (2) in the last paragraph applies). No 
 sort of orthodox centricism does that ultimate splitting in 
 practice; so all are both illogical and inaccurate, except Ein- 
 stein's in pure formality (§66). I.e., such a theory which as- 
 serts any physical constant," uses something finite (a part 
 of the Many) as an absolute center (or as an absolute stand- 
 ard of measure — which is logically the same thing), and 
 hence is illogical and inaccurate. (As we saw, theories like 
 Thomson's electrons, Reynolds's, Richards's, Reeve's, and 
 Einstein's agree with that either by explicitly implying that 
 there are no such constants, or by formalty going to the nec- 
 essary infinite splitting; Einstein's book, §66, seems to be 
 inclined to overdo the thing by doing both, which, if he so 
 intends, would be wrong, and a new variety of meaningless- 
 ness.) Therefore, this book explicitly uses that prac- 
 tical anthropocentric start, formally asserts that man varies, 
 or is approximate and not absolute, and thus logically uses 
 an absolute no-center; i. e., the universe or the One is the 
 only center or constant. 1 ° Man is so accustomed 
 
 iooc n probably is better to be more explicit on that point :- 
 Throughout this book I take the everyday general or summed-up 
 language agreement that the One is "real" (§49g); and that is 
 eqivalent to rao-center, in the sense that the One is everywhere, and 
 hence my center or standard is everywhere at once — which usually 
 
 is expressed as no center. Now, that agreement which I use 
 
 makes the logic or form of the book easier to follow. It however is 
 not essential. We can, as just shown again, use an infinite pluralism 
 as "real," and in that case the correct thing to do would be to have 
 each thing that was mentioned be temporarily the absolute center 
 and standard of the universe — to have finally an infinity of centers — 
 or, so to speak, to use anthropocentricism absolutely but with a new 
 
 or changed man every time. Further, it was seen (§49) that 
 
 valid logic is a dynamic logic that shifts the "reality" of each part 
 of the Trinity to apply to the part being used momentarily. So it 
 follows that after a time, when men have learned to use language 
 with much skill (implying great brain development), a valid descrip- 
 tion of some length will shift its "reality" from (1) no-centricism, to 
 (2) infinite-centricism or a&soZwte-anthropocentricism, to (3) an at 
 present unnamed and practically unrecognized ignoring of centers by 
 making relationships "real," or by speaking temporarily in terms of 
 "abstractions" as if they were the reality. Such a valid description 
 will shift its 'centers,' etc., as the viewpoint shifts — using (say) one 
 center for a chapter, and then changing:- Thus science would as the 
 most direct way of talking use infinite-centricism; religion, the 
 third way mentioned above; philosophy, and religion as we now ordi- 
 narily use it consistently would use the no-centricism or first way, 
 which as stated is the everyday "reality" nowadays, and hence the 
 most familiar, and so the one this book uses (cf. §39). In short, this 
 book uses what in time will be found not to be the best way: in time 
 the dynamic logic with its varying "reality" of the three Trinity 
 forms will be 'expanded' explicitly to what we might call 'dynamic- 
 thinking' with a corresponding varying reality of the three forms or 
 ways of conceiving truth (cf. §39; the idea is as old as our history 
 but has no definite explicit names:- by proper dynamic-thinking the 
 subject-matter of religion, science, and philosophy is identical, but 
 for convenience and full intelligibility of expression the three ways 
 will be used as just stated). My way in this book of emphasizing 
 the reality of monotheism or Many -continuity or Many-One is the 
 conventional, the Occidental way. It seems historically to be a re- 
 action from the gross materialism into which anthropocentricism al- 
 ways — even now — tends to fall, and also a reaction from the religious 
 abstractions of the Orient, that always tended to make people good- 
 for-nothing in practical affairs. So it seems reasonable that we first 
 get skill in our hardest way of the three, before trying the still harder 
 and ultimate way of using all three as described (in which event we 
 
 to using himself as an exact or absolute center or standard 
 (without however noticing that the use of a scientific infinite 
 pluralism makes himself formally or logically be conceived as 
 coincident with the absolute unit of the Many that he tempo- 
 rarily mentions; §66) that he often fails to see that he does, 
 and denies it. Yet it is glaring, in every bit of classic logic 
 and in all the orthodox dualisms, that man creates God in 
 man's image — that man substantially takes himself as a finite 
 entity, and by 'multiplying" himself in size by about a 
 thousand (which is about as "high" as a barbarian can think) 
 gets what is actually a formally finite God; e. g., Jehovah, 
 and the God of Aquinas, and the late Kaiser's Gott. All of 
 us Occidentals tend however (as mentioned in the footnote) 
 to think in no-centricism, or with the universe or the One 
 God as the final standard. But we are so much in the bad 
 habit of using classical or theological logic, and of failing to 
 shift to an actually absolute infinite pluralism which would 
 be correct enough (multiplying man by an absolute infinity 
 to get God is correct; the materialists are our present-day 
 barbarians who can't think so high," but stop at an exag- 
 geratedly emphasized finite anthropocentricism), that we are 
 a bit puzzled by the verbal sound of this no-centricism, or 
 definite That,..Y.This..., when I state it explicitly. That 
 puzzlement is simply the difficulty that our nervous systems 
 always have in making a previously vague and indefinite and 
 dreamy idea into something more precise and useful. If in 
 addition to making that no-centric step definitely in this 
 book, I were to go on and make the last step mentioned in 
 the footnote, that puzzlement would be possibly too much ; 
 as it is, there will be a number of persons with brains so weak 
 and soft and flabby that their nervous systems can t make 
 the no-center step, which most of us have already made in 
 practice ; I fancy some of those will be so senile that they 
 will exhibit their weakness by public protests. But I think 
 that the majority of Americans are strong enough to make 
 also the last step of the footnote within a century. When 
 that is made, the aristocratic exploiters who befuddle stupid 
 men's minds will find their field unprofitably narrow. 
 
 d. (2) Next, we have seen in general that any whirl 
 consists of ether in motion, the velocities of which ether 
 reach a maximum in the difference surface, and decrease (so 
 far as just one whirl is concerned) as the distance from that 
 surface increases. (That is Bernoulli's principle in another 
 form.) Obviously if we had in the universe a stream of ether 
 which had a greater velocity than the streams on either side 
 of it, then as a truism that stream must finally close on itself 
 
 will be protected from the grave dangers of the easier ways — in all 
 
 "soft-snaps" it is correspondingly easy to get into trouble). ■ 
 
 As an example of what is stated in this footnote (and the example is 
 the concrete thing which caused me to add the footnote), the reader 
 is referred to Jordan's Introduction. In it, when he talks of science 
 he uses infinite centricism — inclines towards using infinite pluralism 
 without however insisting that infinite pluralism is the "truth" or 
 the only way. Then he substantially shifts to a use of no-centricism 
 when he sums up (particularly in summing biology). Jordan 
 thus is using valid logic in its ultimate 'expanded' form — a trick of 
 skill in using language that probably not a half dozen men have the 
 emotional strength to achieve, or the intelligence to use consistently 
 without confusion. But to repeat, that ultimate dynamic form of 
 speech is too hard to understand for an elementary book like this 
 (as proof of that, see the remarks about British biologists in §147, 
 who, perhaps without even knowing what they were up to, have 
 failed to follow Jordan all the way in that full dynamic form of ex- 
 pression — although as shown, in bare logic they may be considered 
 correct) . Also, that final way Jordan is using is so hard to stick to 
 that I doubt whether I could have been successful at it if I had tried 
 it in this whole book. As a matter of fact, this very statement of 
 the ultimate dynamic expression is hard to make clear; what it sums 
 to is that science, religion, and philosophy are identical in subject 
 matter, and that the three sorts of 'centers' determining their forms 
 should be shifted as the point of view changes. 
 
§100d XI Two 
 
 in three dimensions : so we have as a result of that closing 
 a whirl. Then, if the velocity of the ether decreases as we 
 go from the difference surface towards the filiar axis, it fol- 
 lows that there must formally be ether on that axis at zero 
 velocity. But clearly, that can be possible only if there is a 
 part of the ether which is a geometrical point; hence, we 
 see again that there must be an infinite regress of parts in 
 the cell, and that no cell, in our Many language, itself has 
 such zero velocity — which truistically would take infinite en- 
 ergy to start it going again. Also, as we leave the difference 
 surface and travel out into the field the velocity decreases so 
 long as we decrease our perpendicular distance from the fila- 
 ment surface, down to the limit of velocity at which the ad- 
 jacent whirls are in fair equilibrium (or until we come to an 
 analogous balance near the main axis of the whirl). At that 
 zone, obviousb' another field, of another filament, would com- 
 mence (or at the main axis, the opposite part of the field of 
 the same filament, with increasing velocity), and there would 
 be a field difference surface. 
 
 e. Itistruistic that such a place of fairly balanced equi- 
 librium could occur inside either the original filament or 
 field ; consequently, there may be secondary whirls inside of 
 either filament or field — and tertiary whirls inside the fields 
 or filaments of the secondaries; and fourth order whirls, etc., 
 in infinite regress, down through the finite whirls we have 
 arbitrarily taken as cells, to ultimately point-cells. And in 
 the same way there could be no upper limit of orders of 
 whirls. If we arbitrarily took a given whirl as being the 
 ultimate upper limit, it would be a One; its field would then 
 decrease in velocity towards its field surface, and reach abso- 
 lute zero at that zone or surface, which would then be the 
 outer boundary of the universe. But evidently, as that outer 
 boundary is zero, it differs in no respect from the pseudo out- 
 side" of the universe. Outside is hence absolute zero. 
 
 f. It can further be seen, as a truism, that there can be 
 no actual upper limit of velocity, regardless of what velocity 
 we practically use as a prime or standard velocity for split- 
 ting the universe (i. e., V\ is by no means an absolute upper 
 limit of velocity, but it is the highest velocity that can occur 
 except inside our atoms, as will appear). For obviously, at 
 any place in any order whirl there may be a field surface, 
 and on account of previous asymmetries the field velocities 
 on one side of it may increase very rapidly (have a high grad- 
 ient) to any velocity; we shall see that truistically there 
 must be such high gradients. It is obvious that if that ve- 
 locity is higher than V\, then the ether structure suitable to 
 be used to express such velocity must be smaller than ordi- 
 nary atoms ; for clearly, the effective structures or atoms that 
 we select to give our ordinary light are, considered as whirls, 
 determined by filament surfaces at V\ (XIII). Evidently, if 
 in a very minute cell, considered as a whirl, the filament sur- 
 face velocity became infinite, then the formally still smaller 
 cells that composed that filament surface would become 
 points or zero, that difference surface would become an exact 
 geometrical surface, the point cells would then turn in at ex- 
 actly 90 , and infinite energy would thus be displayed at 
 each point, as a result of each such birth (and those births 
 would be infinite in number — or zero, just as you prefer, be- 
 cause clearly the whole whirl truistically reduces to a point) ; 
 or the energy would be zero, as each point cell was zero. 
 Obviously that gives the concrete" details of the infinite 
 regress (IV-VI). That is another explicit way to reduce the 
 universe verbally to an absolute pluralism: obviously such 
 pluralism is identical except in verbal form to monism. 
 
 g. It therefore truistically follows from the last para- 
 graph that there exist coincident with this universe of ours — 
 this V\ universe — an indefinite number of other universes. 
 
 UNIVERSE 106 
 
 That is an old idea; those other universes are conventionally 
 vaguely known as astral planes, heaven, hell, spirit world, 
 etc. But there is one very important practical mistake in 
 the conventional idea of them :- they are obviously truistic- 
 ally not essentially different or separate from this universe we 
 ordinarily name and explicitly talk about in our positive 
 terms, but are merely verbally quantitatively different uni- 
 verses which have standard basic structures with surface ve- 
 locities different from V\ in any degree we arbitrarily care to 
 take. I. e., we can name and describe just as many of those 
 "new" universes as we like; they all truly exist: but every 
 one of them is inseparably bound up in our ordinary one, 
 coincident with it, and if we (say) stub our toe, all those ad- 
 ditional universes are definitely included in the sensation and 
 general reaction labeled "toe stubbed." Hence, it is or- 
 dinarily a waste of time to be explicit about those others. 
 Also, as a different form of the same idea, there is 
 
 obviously an infinite regress of parts or structures of different 
 order:- secondary whirls, tertiary whirls, etc. E. g., our 
 solar system can be an ether cell in some larger man, as we 
 saw. But in the same way as just above, that makes no 
 practical difference to us. For if that larger man has (say) 
 a thought, its effect on us actually exists (perhaps it will 
 quickly to him smash up our solar sytem — and do it in a few 
 billions of our years to us), but that effect is included in our 
 ordinary That. . . X This. . . , and we usually need not go formu- 
 lating different order languages to talk about that effect. 
 
 This ad infinitum duplication of universes themselves 
 
 obviously corresponds to the ad infinitum duplication of lang- 
 uages shown in VIII. And we get the same conclusion :- 
 that the average man with his age-long commonsense has 
 adequately (even if not quite consciously to himself) collected 
 the whole affair into his everyday point of view. 
 
 h. (s) Next, it has been seen that in general there are 
 pluralistically no perfect whirls. E. g. , in par. f, when the 
 difference surface became a geometrical surface, we lapsed 
 into mysticism. So it is clear that there may be any (finite) 
 degree of indefiniteness about a whirl. Any difference of 
 velocity implies a whirl of some nature. But such a whirl 
 may not have time to form very far. Only in a space where 
 there is comparatively steady equilibrium can whirls which 
 are relatively large for that size space form. (That can be 
 seen readily by a brief consideration of those spaces and 
 times ; or the various experiments shown hereafter make it 
 directly obvious.) Several important points of view of that 
 inexactness or lack of perfection of whirls are obvious :- 
 
 i. Perhaps the most important point of view is that it 
 means that there are no "perfect" phenomena. I. e., all 
 phenomena are simply the changes in whirls ; and hence no 
 phenomenon may consistently be pluralistically sharply dis- 
 tinguished from any other (except in infinite pluralism). That 
 is identical with §83fg, and I need not repeat further. 
 
 j. But precisely the same thing concretely accounts for 
 what is conventionally called the purpose in the world. Of 
 course it is "purpose," in the real meaning of the word; I 
 am simply going to express purpose pluralistically here; us- 
 ually, it is oratorically used in a monistic, mystic way that 
 is at least not clear. When I express it consistently plural- 
 istically also, then I have absolutely explained it. Some of 
 the conventional figurative ways in which the idea of purpose 
 is validly pluralistically expressed are :- water seeks its own 
 level ; in an otherwise fairly steady environment tempera- 
 tures tend to equalize; birds of a feather flock together. 
 If at any place there are whirls of the same order in 
 which the velocities of the difference surfaces are consider- 
 ably different from each other, then as a truism there are 
 considerable asymmetries. Those asymmetries would, as a 
 
107 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §100m 
 
 further truism, keep on forming whirls of other orders un- 
 til the various velocities had become fairly equalized. So 
 over any space in the universe which is large compared with 
 the size of bodies of the most usual order in it, there is fairly 
 steady equilibrium for those bodies. That is equivalent to 
 the fact observed long ago, that "nature makes no leaps," 
 has no catastrophes, or displays fair uniformity. But from 
 our way of saying and observing that here, at once we see 
 that bodies of the same general order tend to collect to- 
 gether, thus forming with more or less definiteness a struct- 
 ure of a higher order; or, the reverse way of stating the fact 
 is the easy and more familiar and intelligible negative way :- 
 whirls of a given order that are in the majority will drive 
 away or change into their own order ("destroy") whirls 
 which are out of balance with themselves (just as men fight 
 when they get badly out of balance or in 'disagreement"). 
 Thus, certain bodies collect together as the solar system. In 
 one of those bodies, the earth, there collect secondary bodies, 
 men, who are of such a great difference in order or of poten- 
 tial from the earth that they scarcely interfere with it. In 
 men, certain physiologic cells of the same kind have col- 
 lected — into differentiated organs. In the earth, to a 
 certain extent atoms and molecules of the same kind have 
 collected together. Briefly, all of what we commonly call 
 progress, or what looks to be purpose" towards some sys- 
 tematic or unified end, actually is so; but it is also true that 
 it is, in more precise and intelligible words, an exhibition of 
 this truistic or mechanical tendency to smooth out asym- 
 metries among neighboring bodies, up to a certain quantita- 
 tive point. Now, if all bodies were sufficiently close 
 
 to each other quantitatively in what I have here been calling 
 order' or potential, the majority obviously would steadily 
 tend to wipe out the others, so that the orthodox increase of 
 entropy (§80) would be true. But when the quantitative 
 disparity in order' or potential reaches a certain ratio or 
 proportion (the theory of which I call harmonic periodicity ; 
 see Index), then whirls of one order do not much interfere 
 with or destroy those of the different order, for the reason 
 that, so to speak, they can't "get hold of each other" (that 
 refers to a comparatively brief time); e. g., it would be 
 practically impossible to handle a pin directly or at once with 
 a 100-ton crane; and as mentioned above, man and the solar 
 system do not in brief times directly interfere. (Incident- 
 ally, in agreement with that practical point, in other places 
 in the book I use the phrase order of structure, etc., to 
 mean such considerable quantitative difference.) Con- 
 sequently, there is eternally a two-fold aspect, or mechanical 
 reaction, in the universe, showing it to be truistically an ab- 
 solutely automatic (i. e., perfect) machine:- (l) bodies of 
 the same order or "sort" tend to collect, to fit together, 
 to come together (and in doing so to smooth out, destroy, 
 each other's inevitable slight variations — just as men are 
 "well bred") in a "purposive," suitable way, "appropriate 
 to some end" (as we saw in §86d); (2) on the contrary, the 
 precisely similar efforts of bodies of a slightly different order 
 from those just mentioned, to do similar things for themselves 
 tend to destroy both themselves and also the first collection 
 when the two sets are more or less neighbors, and the result 
 is that the two sets of bodies are to some degree driven apart 
 spacially, the remainder of the reaction being that the part 
 of the less energetic set which doesn't get away is destroyed 
 — i. e., changed — into whirls of considerably different order, 
 so that the resulting two sets can stay together without much 
 interference for a long time (i. e., they are separated tem- 
 porally instead of spacially— &n important mathematical point 
 quite overlooked by Clausius, but which is implied by Ein- 
 stein). Thus, a difference of potential is built up at the 
 
 same time that potential is smoothed out — and the process is 
 eternally reversible. The process is very easily seen in the 
 history of men (it applies to all natural structures) in the so- 
 called rise and fall of nations ; a very superficial knowledge 
 of these principles shows that there is no need of a nation s 
 "falling," as a very mediumly intelligent application of the 
 principles will reverse the direction at any stage — given a 
 
 fairly steady climate. Truistically, the sum total of 
 
 that oscillating effect is zero — or infinity, if we speak opti- 
 mistically." But because human beings started their lang- 
 uage anthropocentrically, anything of a different order that 
 tends to break up humans (to change their supreme This, 
 which is themselves) they call evil, thus asserting that there 
 is no purpose; and then they worry over the problem of 
 
 Good (or Purpose) and Evil which is thus started. 
 
 This paragraph is the general concrete or physical solution 
 (l) of that problem of purpose, (2) of all geological segrega- 
 tion, (3) of the stability of the solar system or any other 
 natural structure, and at the same time (4) expresses the 
 reasons for all chemical reactions" (it being the underlying 
 principles of what is technically known as Gibbs's phase law), 
 and (5) gives the reasons for biologic trophisms" (XVI). 
 The paragraph also (6) directly implies the general theory or 
 reasons for the periodic table — is the concrete or That...X, 
 This... expression of harmonic periodicity. Also, it (7) di- 
 rectly implies the total theory and methods (see §§140-l) of 
 how to get available energy out of any collection of whirls 
 (or put it in; it always is put in first somehow; but truistic- 
 ally if we could use the velocity of an atom down to the zero 
 velocity on the filiar axis, there would be taken out of that atom 
 infinite energy; however, it also truistically would take infin- 
 ite time to get that much out). Necessary details of such 
 problems are shown later by direct experiment. Volumes 
 of such details are omitted. A direct extension of this para- 
 graph is given by §10 If. 
 
 k. The last point of view which we have to consider of 
 the fact that whirls are of all degrees of perfection (see par. 
 h) is that just as the multitude of resulting quantitative de- 
 tails is difficult to handle mathematically, so it is difficult to 
 see experimentally all the numerous details and describe 
 them verbally.' But it can be done experimentally and 
 verbally better (at first), as I propose to do it in this Part, 
 than it can be done mathematically (in the way indicated in 
 IX with the measuring member). E. g., the phenomenon 
 of heat is a considerably confused secondary whirl formation, 
 which occurs whenever any appreciable asymmetry of whirls 
 of the same order occurs. 
 
 1. It is therefore a direct truism that it is not possible to 
 describe any experimental whirls accurately. We can not 
 even observe them definitely in much detail, compared with 
 the infinite detail they exhibit. We shall become aware of 
 that clearly when in the next section we begin with the di- 
 rect experimental proof of the mechanics of whirls. But it 
 is better to be thus admittedly quantitatively inaccurate con- 
 cerning things as they actually are, than it is to talk in the 
 old dualism about frictionless bodies, perfect gases, or con- 
 stant anything, when no such things exist. Many great art- 
 ists in various lines have been praiseworthily notable for 
 giving a sense of mystery by their productions. That 
 sort of mystery is good, as it is the truth, being simply their 
 intelligible expression of the fact that quantitative details go 
 on infinitely so that all are not perceptibly expressed. There 
 is no proper reason why science, particularly mechanics and 
 physics, should not be more clearly truthful, and human," 
 and beautiful, and useful than the work of those artists. 
 
 m. (4) The last general thing which we saw about 
 whirls is that a whirl completely fills the requirements of all 
 
§100m XI Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 108 
 
 machines (§86f), and is a concrete model of Newton's laws. 
 (A) For first, each whirl consists of at least two react- 
 ing parts:- the filament, or This...; and the field, or 
 That. . . . We may note that the reaction between a given 
 cell in the field and a given cell in the filament is identical 
 in principle with a lever, of which intervening cells form the 
 arms (§98b), and the difference surface the fulcrum (specific- 
 ally, it is a bell-crank lever; see Fig. 98q). That fulcrum is 
 truistically not a point — which agrees with fact about an or- 
 dinary actual lever. Also, it may be observed that the ex- 
 periment made with the cog wheels (§98b) to show the 
 nature of cohesion, very directly shows that cells are in prin- 
 ciple levers. And it can be noted from §98x that whirls are 
 mechanically equivalent to inclined planes. And if we con- 
 sider the single line of motion of a cell (§98m), it is obvious 
 that a whirl may be considered a pulley (the difference sur- 
 face is the pulley wheel). All those fundamental conven- 
 tional machines are obviously merely forms of levers, as has 
 been orthodoxly recognized for years. And it is clear that a 
 whirl includes them all. (B) Further, each whirl in- 
 cludes (even if only vaguely and implicitly inside the cells) 
 the dots of the formally consistent That. . . X This. . . . There 
 may be as many explicit or concrete dots as we like, in the 
 form of secondary, tertiary, etc., whirls, on down to the 
 absolute limiting One zero point-cell. As a truism of that 
 characteristic of cells as a model, we saw that our machine 
 exhibits all the phenomena of growth and purpose, just as a 
 person" does — that the so-called machine, when it is really 
 a valid or workable machine, has those personal or human 
 characteristics. Now, the truth of the matter is that any 
 actual or experimental lever, properly and consistently con- 
 sidered (cf. §47), will promptly extend itself to include the 
 total universe as a vast inseparable system of levers, any one 
 of which formally gives birth' in either direction to infra- 
 levers and super-levers. But we are not accustomed to 
 thinking of levers that way; emotionally we are myth-ridden 
 by the classic logic perfect lever with rigid line-arms and ab- 
 solutely constant point fulcrum. Such myths are excellent 
 perhaps as preliminary verbal steps for untrained observers; 
 but certainly nobody should believe" such abstractions. 
 
 n. It is so obvious that a whirl exhibits the solution of 
 the One and Many, as do Newton's laws, that no summary 
 statement seems to be needed of how it does. So we are 
 ready to look at some whirls experimentally, and thus syn- 
 thesize all the above rather lengthy talk into a single com- 
 prehended working idea of a Many part. 
 
 §101. a. The remainder of this Part Two will be chiefly 
 devoted to observing actual whirls, as a means of understand- 
 ing and applying the foregoing concrete way of naming 
 That...'s and This... s. Probably the simplest and easiest 
 whirls to make and observe are those formed by dropping 
 soapy water off the side of one's hand into a fairly large basin 
 of water. If the reader will do that occasionally when he 
 washes his hands, then probably without much expenditure 
 of time and effort he can see directly for himself the truth of 
 all the foregoing truistic mechanics. 
 
 b. Whirls which travel slowly are the best sort for see- 
 ing the important reactions — and even then whirls often 
 split into secondary whirls so rapidly that to see them it is 
 necessary to observe attentively. So far as I have observed, 
 any ordinary variety of castile soap will make a solution with 
 water of the proper viscousness or cohesiveness to produce 
 fairly slow whirls. I have tried numbers of other ordinary 
 toilet and kitchen soaps, and all produced whirls that trav- 
 eled faster — usually reacting too fast to see much detail. If 
 the basin holds considerable water there is of course more 
 room for the whirls to react in. And it is well to have the 
 
 water fairly steady — at first, anyway. Afterwards an indefi- 
 nite variety of disturbances may be given the water, there 
 being no end to the variety of whirls and part-formed whirls 
 which may thus be visibly made. Also, if the experiment- 
 er's hands are rather dirty before making these whirls the 
 
 whirls will be more easily visible. Similar whirls can 
 
 by made with numerous visible liquid solutions, using appa- 
 ratus of varying degrees of elaborateness, starting with fount- 
 ain pen fillers and going beyond million dollar laboratories. 
 I mentioned the most easily applied way, which I chiefly 
 used for about two years in order to formulate the general 
 mechanics I have just given. 
 
 c. If the hand be held so that a thick soapy drop (with 
 no appreciable bubbles included) will fall from the flat or 
 outside edge of the hand held down (so that the drop itself 
 will not be rotating inside itself very much), for a distance of 
 three to six inches to the surface of the water, then the drop 
 enters the water with a velocity sufficiently greater than the 
 then surrounding water to form a well-defined whirl which 
 slowly moves downward, with its main axis about vertical, so 
 that from above we see the filament as a ring. A consider- 
 able part of the drop of soapy water is at first in a confused 
 looking field about the filament; but by the mechanics we 
 have seen, that field spreads or extends out until it becomes 
 rather imperceptible and we see chiefly the filament, with a 
 perceptibly indefinite surface. 
 
 d. If the whirl forms in a condition of unusually steady 
 equilibrium it will look from the side, in cross-section, like 
 the top figure in Fig. 98n ; the rotation of the filament and 
 field would be the same as shown by the arrows in that fig- 
 ure, and it would therefore travel downward in practically 
 still water. Usually, however, an experimental whirl is soon 
 noticeably asymmetrical. A bulge will begin to grow at 
 some place on the outer side of the filament (cf. Fig. 98w; 
 obviously the field inside the ring is held steady by the ring, 
 and it in turn steadies that ring or filament so that ordinarily 
 a bulge does not grow on the inner side of the ring — towards 
 the hole in the doughnut). That bulge will then break out 
 or away as a secondary whirl (Fig. 98w) — with its filament 
 appearing edge on to the experimenter from above. It will 
 comparatively rapidly travel out a little way perpendicularly 
 to the main axis and to the original surface of the filament 
 where it formed, and slowly tilt over and as a result start 
 downward. Sometimes, if the primary whirl has bounced 
 up from the bottom of the basin before a secondary is born, 
 the secondary will turn upwards. Also, if the whole primary 
 whirl has been almost symmetrical, and has traveled down 
 slowly, it develops more than one bulge on its filament; 
 then it may break up apparently wholly into two or more 
 secondaries at roughly the same time. I have seen a whirl 
 break into as high as probably fifteen to twenty secondaries; 
 such very small secondaries react so fast that it is hard to 
 observe them. Also, it is occasionally possible to observe a 
 secondary give off a secondary of its own (a tertiary), and 
 two or three times I think I have seen a fourth generation. 
 
 e. Another important phenomenon to be observed is 
 that when a secondary breaks out of a filament it retains 
 (often^ng enough to be easily seen) a distinctly visible film 
 of soapy water connection with the filament, which film is 
 like the sides of a barrel, except that it bulges in all around 
 instead of out (is roughly a hyperbolic 'surface' or zone of 
 revolution). The secondary filament or ring 'sits' on one 
 nm of that tubular surface, and the other rim merges into 
 the primary filament. Sometimes that connection will per- 
 ceptibly stretch out to comparatively great distances, becom- 
 ing attenuated to the apparent thickness of a thread. Now 
 that connection between the primary and secondary whirls 
 
109 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §101h 
 
 consists of actual water cells,' strung out in identically the 
 same sort of spiral or helical nearly right-angle turn described 
 
 and pictured in §98q. Here 
 we have a number of such 
 paths in a summed up con- 
 dition, and made of visible 
 globules or cells of soapy 
 water, so that we can see 
 the sum. The phenomenon 
 (by §981) would obviously 
 be no different if the whirls 
 were ether instead of water. 
 It is indicated in Fig. 101 e 
 that those spiral paths, making about a 90° turn, would sum 
 into such a surface. If a whirl be made of smoke in air, it 
 usually on breaking up leaves considerable of such visible 
 connecting surfaces or summed spiral paths. 
 
 f. Those paths would (as shown in §98t) finally at any 
 exact instant be unified into just one path with infinite veloci- 
 ty. But because we are using actually finite bodies, in finite 
 time, we get a visible sum of paths. Hence, we can directly 
 from those experimental whirls now observe what in the dis- 
 cussion of "pu r P°se" (glOOj) we called 'birds of a feather 
 flocking together, and give it a more intelligible name. We 
 note that with a certain lack of equilibrium a bulge grows or 
 accumulates on the filament, instead of there being a more or 
 less instantaneous correction of it by the giving off of say one 
 water cell. That is because water as water (i. e.,ua Many 
 — and not mystically or in the pure" abstraction or meta- 
 physics sometimes mistaken for science) is truistically not 
 perfectly homogeneous (has a lot of unequal, smaller, asym- 
 metrical structures .in infinite regress, even apart from the 
 soap, etc., in these experimental whirls; that lack of perfect 
 homogeneity applies in every respect; e. g., chemically 
 pure" water is not perfect" H2O, but contains variable 
 molecules); or, in general, there is no exact science. So 
 there is truistically a certain amount of accumulation of un- 
 balance; the equilibrium begins to be restored by movement 
 of the very small structures which are imperceptible to us, 
 and it takes time to show an effect in the larger ones — to 
 show the bulge. We can take it simply that water" struct- 
 ures are of finite size, and like bricks in a wall require a 
 finite accumulation of energy to dislodge them. Then, when 
 that unbalance or potential accumulates enough, the secondary 
 whirl is born. It seems to us fitting" that it should be 
 born ; for a perceptible length of time we can notice that the 
 filament, so to speak, intended or purposed to give birth to the 
 secondary. No dualistic science — nothing in the classical 
 logic — will with verbal consistency permit any such phenom- 
 enon to happen : such science says it is logically impossible, 
 and yet it does happen before our eyes. For by classic logic 
 effect must follow cause instantaneously in the sense that any 
 force at once produces motion. Well ; the actual pluralistic 
 fact is that never does any force which we say we measure' 
 instantly start its motion or produce its effect: always in 
 science — in consistent positive language, which is not formally 
 mystic or religious expression — there is a lag in time. The 
 orthodox way of assuming and asserting that a reaction is 
 prompt on action is merely a One form of speech — true as a 
 One or zero or infinity ; for the reaction does begin instan- 
 taneously on the zero parts at the end of the infinite regress. 
 Classic logic and dualism having thus omitted positive state- 
 ment of that time lag which is pluralistically usually glar- 
 ingly perceptible especially in biological phenomena, and 
 having further formally or logically denied the possibility of 
 any such thing, naturally commonsense persons observed the 
 existence of lag — naming it, in general, purpose. Then, 
 
 truistically purpose" could not conventionally be explained 
 
 as it had been "logically" denied. That time lag 
 
 implies an accumulation of energy or motion which then ob- 
 viously as a truism (and also by direct observation) goes too 
 far — overruns, so to speak, — and then bounces back some. 
 Hence, including that second and completing result (that 
 bounce is of course in infinite regress : — all this is obviously 
 merely a detailing in physical terms of the theory of incom- 
 mensurability, and the incommensurability is not finished 
 by one bounce or any finite number), we call this phenome- 
 non of an accumulation or summing of results by various 
 conventional names, depending on the way we look at it:- 
 purpose or intention, will (volition), lag (with its numerous 
 technical synonyms :- hysteresis, viscosity, elasticity in some 
 senses, latent heat, potential energy, etc.), overrunning, 
 rhythm, vibration (as of an ether cell — and our use of those 
 last two terms will thus have a more extended meaning than 
 is conventional), etc. Generally I shall use for this total 
 aspect of that summing up of effects (which is a deriving of 
 That... by beginning, so to speak, with the last dot and 
 building up the That... by going backwards), due truistically 
 to the finite size of parts, the names overrunning, rhythm, or 
 vibration. Obviously, rhythm is a universal property of the 
 Many. The orbit of the earth is a rhythm ( music of the 
 spheres" — though music implies a perceptibly sustained 
 and-or organized rhythm, which involves the definite addition 
 of the principles of harmonic periodicity to conventional 
 rhythm). All vibration is explicitly rhythmic; a pendulum 
 is rhythmic. Even free verse" is rhythmic — but percept- 
 ibly so only after a painful effort to perceive. But there is 
 no perfect rhythm — no exact cycles short of the total uni- 
 verse. So there is no perfect music short of the One. 
 
 g. It may be directly observed, and consistently ex- 
 pressed as Bernoulli s theorem, that the filament throws off a 
 secondary when it loses velocity or energy, or when the field 
 relatively gains velocity or energy, so that the field has loc- 
 ally a relative asymmetry — i. e., locally its velocity tends to 
 become greater than the maximum velocity which is or de- 
 termines the difference surface, and hence truistically that 
 surface has to change in some way. Or, it could be said that 
 the inner field (the hole' in the doughnut) got energetic 
 locally, thus pushed against the filament in some spot, and 
 forced out a secondary on its other side, precisely analogously 
 to a whirl gun (§102b). There are a number of direct ways 
 of stating the actions and reactions of that phenomenon. 
 It is then obvious that precisely the reverse can oc- 
 cur:- that the field loses considerable energy relative to a 
 place on the filament, and gives birth to a secondary into it. 
 We see that experimentally more definitely in §102d. 
 
 h. It is also obvious that it is theoretically possible for 
 such secondary whirl formation to take place in either direc- 
 tion across the field difference surface with respect to two 
 primary whirls, when there is considerable local asymmetry. 
 I have never directly seen that occur with experimentally 
 made whirls; but it is probable, e. g., that most ordinary 
 electrons (they are indirectly observed) are such field surface 
 secondaries (XIV). However, it is also clear that when two 
 whirls which have joining fields are rather free to move (as is 
 the case with the limited number of whirls which can be made 
 somewhat simultaneously in the neighborhood of each other 
 by the soapy water method), then an asymmetry of the two 
 whirls is more likely to distribute itself rather evenly over 
 the whole field surfaces (cf. history of solar system in XII), 
 so that the two whirls repel or attract each other as a whole 
 (as largely happens in electricity ; XIV) — and in especially 
 free conditions will alternately repel and attract in percept- 
 ible long-continued rhythm, the two alternately threading 
 
§101h XI Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 110 
 
 through each other (§102b). If there is perceptible only a 
 "repulsion," then truistically the two repelling whirls sepa- 
 rate spacially, but in so doing would approach towards or be 
 "attracted" by other whirls; i. e., as an obvious truism 
 there can not be "repulsion" without equal attraction' 
 elsewhere, and vice versa. 
 
 i. If two whirls are attracted together in ways which do 
 not start too much rhythmic change, the 'direction of birth 
 reverses, and the two join together into one whirl having one 
 filament and one field. This larger whirl is of a higher 
 order," which we might call the first super-whirl. It is very 
 difficult to form two soapy water whirls nearly enough simul- 
 taneously to join thus (i. e., the two drops have to hit the 
 water almost exactly at the same time at a little distance 
 apart, as otherwise there will be so much relative asymmetry 
 between the two that they will not join — just as two rather 
 different sorts of animals will not breed together). But such 
 unions are readily produced in other ways (§102ef). This 
 joining of whirls into superwhirls is a very common phenom- 
 enon, being simply the quantitative obverse of secondary 
 whirl formation ; in one side of the complete cycle the po- 
 tential "increases," and in the other side the potential cor- 
 respondingly ' decreases" — which is which depending solely 
 on point of view (§99b). E. g., the combination of ether 
 cells into a definite whirl is the most general example of 
 joining of whirls; in that case the degree of union is slight, 
 just as it is in (say) the joining of two or more atomic whirls 
 into a molecule, or in the bunching of molecules into a 
 higher sort of molecule, such as a chemical chain or 
 
 ring" is sometimes. It should be noticed that when 
 
 the degree of union is practically complete, as when two whirls 
 unite to form one whirl without substantial surviving traces 
 (asymmetries) of either, that larger whirl is conventionally 
 called a different order; but there is no essential difference. 
 By the theory of ineommensurables there can be no perfect 
 union, and hence the question of order of whirls depends 
 truistically on the quantitative degree of union (cf. §100j) — 
 
 and that is in infinite regress. And that joining of 
 
 whirls will be shown to be equivalent in principle to the join- 
 ing together of two one-cell organisms, or to ordinary fertili- 
 zation in two germ-cells (XVI). A biologic cell is a whirl 
 (just as the earth is), and is in principle equivalent to our 
 ether cell, merely varying in L and T (XII, XVI). 
 
 j. That quantitative joining together of two whirls ex- 
 perimentally, or the reverse secondary whirl formation, tru- 
 istically depends upon the size of the whirls compared with 
 the size (energy) of the asymmetry. E. g., an asymmetry 
 that would break a smoke ring into pieces too small to see 
 well would be imperceptibly taken up by the solar whirl as 
 a whole; or, reversing, an asymmetry that would affect the 
 solar system perceptibly would be so comparatively huge 
 that a smoke ring would pass through it mostly unchanged, 
 in a short time (§100j). Thus there is truistically a rhythm, 
 or harmonic proportioning of sizes (at a given time), due to (or 
 which fundamentally is) the overrunning or accumulation of 
 energy — and due fundamentally to the finite size of ether 
 cells, which in turn truistically rests on the arbitrary split- 
 ting of things by V\. Or, whirls which could form and sur- 
 vive in any given environment would occur in certain 'steps' 
 in size, with a very definite proportionality; i. e., this is the 
 L aspect of the T aspect that was called lag in par. f. That 
 is the statement of the principle of the periodic table (Appendix 
 B). There is nothing esoteric or hard to understand about 
 it. It is precisely the same principle as this :- that (say) a 
 woman can not have a continuous or fluid' stream of child- 
 ren, but has to have them in stepladder order, with all sorts 
 of variations inside certain probable limits, including possible 
 
 quintuplets (say), which however are never exactly the same. 
 The principle of harmonic proportions is the same as the gen- 
 eral statement in par. f (except that harmonic proportions 
 emphasizes L ; or figuratively asserts concrete music which 
 of course lasts for a while, or includes T) ; or it is the same 
 as the fact that "static" friction is for given substances a 
 fairly fixed proportion greater than ' dynamic friction, but 
 varies with substances; or that a given vessel may be over- 
 filled with a given fluid in certain roughly definite propor- 
 tions. In no case however can there be exactness; e. g., 
 there is perceptibly no exact weight of the Pb atom, but 
 what is called Pb are atoms which are in fair proportional 
 equilibrium with other whirls in the environment and hence 
 group themselves comparatively closely around some certain 
 average weight, but exhibit some decided variations in even 
 as general a property as weight where the past histories (en- 
 vironments) of the various Pb atoms have been somewhat 
 different. The same principle of harmonic proportion is very 
 apparent in biology; those different ' elements" there are 
 named "species," etc., and individuals of them vary percept- 
 ibly from each other, but group themselves around an av- 
 erage." ■ The definite measuring-discussion of that 
 
 harmonic proportion — i. e., the explicit expansion of the 
 scientific theory of measurement — is scarcely begun in the 
 present day, as was noticed in IX; consequently, although 
 the principle is simple, and recognized in various forms by 
 nearly everybody, the expression of it is unfamiliar and hence 
 gives an emotional feeling of puzzlement. Kelvin was right 
 in saying that measurement was important in science (§2); 
 but he did not do more than begin to say what measure- 
 ment" is — he just took it for granted that anybody with 
 commonsense knew; and I am saying here that such is the 
 case, but that that knowledge is exceedingly vague and is 
 not definitely expressed. I shall give various That... X. This... 
 discussions of the principle hereafter. But that discussion 
 also is rather novel verbally, and will lead us to things that 
 although really simple seem hard at first because the details 
 have not been very definitely observed by us. I don t know 
 the details myself — merely the beginnings of them. For in- 
 stance, it is obvious from this paragraph that theoretically in 
 a chemical compound, because the 'elements" are fairly 
 stable in their proportional sizes or energy-contents, the dif- 
 ferent element atoms would not ire a great degree join together 
 into a superwhirl (obviously, if they did a new "element" 
 would result — and under suitable conditions it is probable that 
 such ' new" elements do result; §118); but there would at 
 least be always a variable and slight degree of union into larger 
 structures or compounds (or biologic cells, organs, etc.) that 
 are harmonically or spacially-proportionally fairly in symme- 
 try. So in comparatively steady conditions we would have a 
 compound ' that is a distribution or structure of "element- 
 ary atoms" in a space lattice" in crystals, directly observed 
 with perhaps most thoroughness by the Braggs with X-rays, 
 and which is being worked on symbolically from a dynamic 
 point of view by Langmuir (cf. also Erwin's "wheels"). So 
 it becomes obvious that this general, seemingly abstract, 
 theory is the foundation for getting definitely at atomic phe- 
 nomona, structure, and measurement — implies the principles 
 of solids, liquids, and gases. Some few of the facts about 
 all that, and expansion of those principles into applicable de- 
 tails, are given below in suitable places. Most of them that 
 are known to the experts I do not know; and comparatively 
 only a few such facts are known to the experts. But it has 
 appeared that such ignorance is quantitative — not essential, 
 k. The final general sort of phenomena which whirls 
 display, and which may be directly observed in these experi- 
 mental whirls, is the general elastic reaction, or various sorts 
 
Ill 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §102b 
 
 of vibration of the whirl. Primarily it is of course easily ob- 
 served that there is no fixed or constant difference surface — 
 the filament surface is visibly variable. That is the general 
 principle of elasticity :- single cells have an infinite regress 
 of parts, and hence no surface exactness can be shown any- 
 where. All phenomena are of course truistically ultimately 
 such elasticity — it is simply another name for motion. But 
 when we consider a whole whirl as for a time remaining 
 formally a definite structure, then the whole whirl visibly 
 varies, or is elastic : the filament moves back and forth, re- 
 maining the filament' (for marked and systematic experi- 
 mental evidence of that, see §102). - — — Inaccurately and 
 briefly (it is a quantitative problem I have not worked out — 
 for general implications of the probable truth of the guess to 
 be given, see XIII), ordinary light is the wave motion from 
 vibrations or rhythmic processes in atoms ; X-rays are the 
 waves from the rhythmic processes of secondaries in atoms 
 (from 'electrons' inside atoms) ; and electricity is a collection 
 of many atoms in a large or super-whirl or -whirls, so that 
 electric waves come from the vibrations of the large fields or 
 filaments of such whirls. Now, clearly the same harmonic 
 periodicity of size would hold between the dimensions of such 
 waves, as held with respect to the orders of whirls (taking 
 order here in its full formal meaning of §100j). So in our 
 ordinary average environment there would not be any persist- 
 ent or stable and hence readily detectible waves between 
 wireless waves and light waves ; then there would be a simi- 
 lar rough gap between light waves and X-ray waves, just as 
 there is a gap (including a difference also in properties) be- 
 tween C (atomic weight roughly 12) and N (l4), or between 
 an ape and n man. There is of course truistically possible 
 (using the full meaning of order) a continuous gamut of waves, 
 from those approaching the limit of infinite length that are 
 the vibrations of the ultimate whirl which is the universe, 
 down to those approaching zero length. But in & particular 
 environment such as (say) ours, by that theory of harmonic 
 periodicity there are those three "element" waves (each sort 
 has considerable natural variation about its average ; e. g., 
 the different "colors"). By changing the environment suf- 
 ficiently and for a long enough time we could produce any 
 length of wave just as it is possible theoretically to produce 
 any sort of chemical element of any weight, or as it is pos- 
 sible to change an ape into a man or vice versa (with enough 
 knowledge we could take any given ape to pieces, and change 
 the pieces and put them together as a man : it is a quantita- 
 tive task — see XVI, — and in principle every quantitative task is 
 
 possible, given enough L and T). This paragraph is 
 
 theoretically consistent. Quantitatively there is not a suffic- 
 ient amount of direct experimental proof, as this particular 
 application of obviously true principles is somewhat novel. 
 Hence, I am perforce guessing at quantities, and quite likely 
 I am badly inaccurate in some guesses ; e.g., there nearly 
 certainly are 'organic' waves normally existent, which consti- 
 tute an 'element wave' between electric or wireless waves 
 and light. But there are no positive measures and conven- 
 tional recognition of any such waves. Possibly the smallest 
 size electric waves (I do not know how short the experi- 
 menters have now got such waves: perhaps to 0.1mm) will 
 be finally shown to be near the size of waves that cause what 
 is named telepathy, the "light" in a person's eyes, per- 
 sonal magnetism," etc. ; but it is rash to guess at such wave 
 lengths. However, even if there are no such organic waves 
 of an 'element' length of their own (and with absolute cer- 
 tainty, the brain and all sorts of organic cells will give off 
 some length of wave; §146h), they are obviously nothing 
 new. For light waves (say) truistically imply the existence 
 of all sizes of waves. Also, as light waves may be 
 
 said to be themselves actual whirls (§§124-5, 130), then any 
 sort of wave may be considered explicitly a structure, or ex- 
 plicitly matter, and so they definitely show all the phenom- 
 ena possible to any sort of matter" — including spirit or 
 "mind" (see Part Three). So theoretically there is no diffi- 
 culty whatever in obtaining thoroughly consistent, intellig- 
 ible, and so-called "concrete" explanation of all the table 
 rappings, levitations, automatic messages and writings, etc., 
 produced by "mediums" for the psychic researchers. Per- 
 sonally, I never observed any such phenomena except some 
 I could see was a fraud (I have myself experienced some very 
 inaccurate and uncontrollable telepathy, which is the direct 
 form of most such phenomena that isn't fraudulent) ; but I 
 believe that Carrington, Hyslop, and Flourney, e. g. , have 
 seen some such organic phenomena — mixed perhaps with 
 considerable fraud which they have mistakenly thought genu- 
 ine. (The difficulty with observing such phenomena is that 
 most mediums have more than a touch of hysteria, and will 
 deceive even themselves in their efforts to attract attention 
 to themselves ; hysterics frequently fool experienced physicians 
 who are on their guard against just such a thing, with re- 
 spect to commonplace doings : see Weir Mitchell's little 
 book on hysterics, which gives some of the almost unbeliev- 
 able deceptions practiced by them, and furnishes proof of 
 this sentence. So they easily deceive scientists, who are not 
 accustomed to dealing with liars; also, except after consid- 
 erable dealing with hysteria, recognizing it as such and 
 guarding against it, hysteria is temporarily very catching"). 
 However, although there are such psychic phenom- 
 ena, genuine and easily explained, that by no means proves 
 the existence of a spirit world or spirits ; it actually 
 disproves the existence of any such, as we implicitly see in 
 §§152, 144, and elsewhere (index, Personality," "im- 
 mortality"). The truth is, as is truistic wjth the theory of 
 this paragraph, that we have thus far in the existence of the 
 race perceived merely a few spacially isolated spots on the 
 unending gamut (or spectrum) of waves and-or molar ele- 
 ments" (both are the same, as just seen). Not only have 
 we failed to observe the vast majority of things that exist, 
 but we have not formulated any very explicit statement of 
 the existence of the vast majority of things. In a universal 
 sense we are as narrow or provincial as many New Yorkers 
 are in a mundane sense. Yet in spite of that limitation of 
 vision, with which we have formerly been rather content, we 
 shall never experience or observe anything with which we 
 are not already thoroughly familiar in principle — anything 
 which is not in general exhibited by a whirl. 
 
 §102. a. Practically all of those general phenomena of 
 whirls can, as has been stated, be observed directly from the 
 slow-moving soapy whirls. Such are needed for direct ob- 
 servation of many of the reactions. But well-formed whirls 
 may be experimentally made in many ways, and in this sec- 
 tion I shall mention some others which serve to verify details 
 which are perhaps not clearly visible from the soapy whirls. 
 Any relative change of velocity in a Many medium forms or 
 starts forming a whirl or whirls; if the medium is compara- 
 tively fluid and conditions are fairly steady a perceptibly 
 complete whirl will be formed. 
 
 b. Some smokers can make rather symmetrical smoke 
 whirls. Volcanoes occasionally make them, as do locomo- 
 tives. Smoke whirls may be made readily by using some 
 sort of closed box having a hole of some sort in one side and 
 one or more sides relatively flexible or elastic. (Put two or 
 more holes fairly close together in order to make two or more 
 whirls at approximately the same time.) If the box is filled 
 with a visible fluid (e. g. , smoke) and placed in a fluid medi- 
 um of about the same, or greater, density (e. g., in air) a 
 
§102b XI Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 112 
 
 sufficiently hard rap on a flexible side will force some fluid out 
 through the hole, which fluid will form a visible, rather sym- 
 metrical whirl. Such a box is usually called a whirl gun. 
 By varying the factors involved (sizes and shapes of holes, 
 location of holes, elasticity of diaphragm, rap, densities and 
 viscosities of fluids, etc.), indefinite variation in the whirls 
 may be obtained. If the hole is not round, and conditions 
 are otherwise fairly balanced, the filament vibrates markedly 
 — substantially in the plane of the filiar axis. Also, as a 
 well known experiment, if one whirl is made directly after 
 another one, the leading whirl will often expand the diame- 
 ter of its filiar axis (start what we might call a vibration as a 
 whole), and attract the following one, which will contract its 
 filiar diameter and thread through that increased hole in the 
 first, and get ahead. Then, the new leader expands, the 
 other finishes its whole vibration by contracting, etc., and 
 the threading through is repeated — and so on, until the 
 whirls wear out or hit something. That is equivalent to the 
 rhythm of pendulum action. 
 
 c. An excellent experimental discussion of whirls is 
 given by Northrup ( An Experimental Study of Vortex Mo- 
 tion in Liquids," Jour. Franklin Inst.," 1911 ; reprinted 
 "Sc. Am. Supp.," Sept. 28, Oct. 5, 12, 19, 1912). He 
 made whirls of colored water and colored kerosine. He used 
 a gun; and as the whirls moved rapidly, he photographed 
 them. I shall give such description of his whirls as is needed 
 to supplement what can readily be seen with the soapy 
 whirls. That will be but a small part of his article, and the 
 reader who desires further details and some conventional 
 analysis of vortex motion, can profitably read his article. 
 
 d. Northrup does not notice any secondary whirl forma- 
 tion. It is obvious that with his rapidly moving, very sym- 
 metrical whirls the fields would constantly be losing energy 
 rapidly in a way that theoretically would make them give off 
 secondaries into the filaments (§101g), and because of the 
 well-balanced conditions such secondaries would tend to be 
 small. Also, as the primary field in Northrup's whirls con- 
 tained more or less of a fluid in which were chemicals that 
 destroyed the coloring of the filament fluid when the two 
 were mixed, it follows that as soon as a field secondary was 
 projected into the filament a number of reactions are possible 
 which would result in a perceptibly visible uneven distribu- 
 tion of coloring in the filament ; which reaction would happen 
 is a quantitative matter not determinable from the data giv- 
 en. Northrup repeatedly noted such a result, and it appears 
 clearly in a number of his photographs as a collection of 
 darker colored little roundish objects all along the filiar axis 
 of the filament. Northrup couldn t account for them — said 
 they might be dirt. 
 
 e. Northrup (in his photograph marked View D) shows 
 two whirls made approximately at the same time and travel- 
 ing side by side. Each whirl shows a field confirming our 
 Fig. 98n ; but on account of the rapid motion of the whirls 
 there is some perceptible trailing of the fields (cf. §101e). 
 One of these whirls looks precisely like the picture of an av- 
 erage comet (we shall see that comets are whirls; §120). 
 The two whirls, by the usual Bernoulli's principle, have a 
 sideways attraction for each other — shown by their tilting 
 their main axes and approaching towards each other. 
 
 f. He pictures the same two whirls actually joining to- 
 gether to form one whirl (his View F). Later pictures given 
 of the new whirl show its vibration in three dimensions ; 
 i. e., its filament bends very considerably backwards and 
 
 forwards and in and out in rapid succession. ■ The 
 
 mechanics of those reactions can be got by applying Bernoul- 
 li's principle : or see Northrup's article. Those details are 
 not explicitly needed by the general reader. 
 
 g. Northrup shows how whirls bounce off surfaces, pro- 
 ducing marked vibrations, with the following phenomena :- 
 They are reflected from surfaces just as light is reflected. 
 They will break up diffusely (not visibly as secondaries) if 
 the collisions are too violent. They will push aside relatively 
 light obstacles. If the obstacle is relatively small and too 
 firmly fixed to be pushed out of the way, the whirl will en- 
 gulf it and travel right on around and past it without being 
 broken up as a whole: analogous reactions happen (XIV, 
 XIII) when electricity, light, electrons, etc., go through or 
 pass over atoms or any structure of different order without 
 
 being changed in whole structure. All those reactions 
 
 may be followed in detail by applying the mechanics above. 
 We see them in direct detail in various phenomena below. 
 
 h. Kerosine is less dense than water (it will float). 
 Northrup shows that a water whirl, on passing into a layer of 
 kerosine floating on the water, quickly drops the water out 
 of itself, and forms itself of kerosine. That oil whirl may 
 then be deflected back into the water, and will travel in it 
 still made of oil. That is direct proof of the law that mass 
 varies with velocity and-or Bernoulli s theorem. Even more 
 definite proof is obtainable :- For as the oil whirl wears out 
 in water, drops of oil visibly segregate in the filament, be- 
 coming visibly analogous to the ether cells I have described, 
 and travel around in the filament, outlining it, apparently 
 in direct violation of so-called centrifugal force. 
 
 §103. a. As another summary of the mechanics of this 
 chapter I shall give a rough statement of the mechanics of 
 gravity. (An ultimately precise statement of the mechanics 
 of gravity is formally given in §134j.) In Fig. 103a let 
 
 S be a collection of ether 
 whirls which is the sun, and 
 E a collection which is the 
 earth. Then, speaking 
 
 1 roughly, the relative motion 
 
 of the earth about the sun 
 
 is equivalent to a flow of 
 
 ether between them, if we 
 
 Or, the result is the same as if there 
 
 r--©-^- 
 
 1 
 
 o — 
 
 E 
 Fig. 103a. 
 
 consider them fixed 
 were a pipe, represented by the dotted lines, with the earth 
 and sun contracting the flow of ether as shown. Hence, 
 by the mechanics of this chapter there would be a lower 
 pressure of the ether fluid against E and S in the space be- 
 tween them. As the ether is indefinitely extensive, and the 
 dotted lines of the pipe are merely formal surfaces with equal 
 pressure on each side, then that less pressure between S and 
 E is equivalent to attraction. That attraction is gravity. 
 
 b. That is the total of conventional gravity. For actual 
 gravity we have to be somewhat more precise, and not stop 
 thus with E and S tacitly rigid One bodies, and with the 
 explanation concealing a considerable collection of zeros and 
 infinities. In short, I have tacitly expressed That. . . X This. 
 by SXE (without dots); to be consistent, and reasonably 
 accurate, we need to include dots. But when we do, gravity 
 is no longer separable from other phenomena (§134j). 
 
 c. That inclusion of dots is accomplished by definitely 
 considering the actual fact, that if E and S were (l) regarded 
 as simply two cells they would still in that elementary form 
 be elastic, so that the difference of pressure at the contrac- 
 tion would modify their size and hence in infinite regress 
 modify the resulting contraction and hence the "force" of 
 gravity. Or, (2) if E and S were actual collections of whirls, 
 then each would have what we shall see is a field (§114f); 
 and those two fields would react on each other, and theoreti- 
 cally be or give precisely the same modifications as in (l) in 
 
 infinite regress. And the observed facts are that E 
 
 and S do have magnetic fields, and that the pull of gravity is 
 
113 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XI §104c 
 
 not absolutely steady or static (not exactly according to the 
 inverse square law; IX). Therefore, both by direct theory 
 and direct observation, there is some gravity attraction be- 
 tween E and S and some chemical (or electrical, or 'field,' or 
 whatever it is preferred to call it) attraction or union between 
 them. And obviously, it is impossible to say that there is a 
 real distinction between the two "sorts" of attraction (ex- 
 plicitly, the attractions are in infinite regress) ; each is what 
 we call irrational if asserted alone. Hence, we rigorously 
 have W...XA... (§74), or inexplicitly, S...XE... . Or, 
 the problem of any two actual or experimental bodies is in- 
 soluble (§88). Or, there is no exact science. 
 
 §104. a. In this section I shall directly unify the fore- 
 going mechanics with conventional mathematical science, and 
 with the measuring theory in IX. That is the sum of the 
 book from a particular point of view, and so I have to con- 
 dense ; the section can become obvious in detail only to those 
 readers who follow out the thought from the hints given. 
 This aspect of the subject is so extensive that I have followed 
 the suggested steps only a little way in preparing for this 
 book, and had to write a volume or two to express that much. 
 The general reader has perhaps forgotten what he read in 
 his physics textbooks so thoroughly that he will have slight 
 interest in, or recognition of, what is here condensed to dry 
 bones. If so, a casual, careless reading will give him the 
 essentials and be less boring. 
 
 b. We have seen (§§80h, 82) that any "perfect" part 
 of the universe (such as pv=Constant) is symbolized by a 
 rectangular hyperbola. For instance, if in the actual total 
 
 Fig. 104b. 
 
 universe the sun and earth were an absolutely separable per- 
 fect gas part, then SXE (without dots ; §103b) would be 
 represented in Fig 104b by the rectangular hyperbola CBD 
 (including the third quadrant branch C 3 B s Ds) in which the 
 general point B represents S and E. Clearly therefore, in 
 order that the geometrical hyperbola may accurately repre- 
 sent bodies, the bodies must, as a truism, be reduced to geo- 
 metrical point masses, of which there would be an infinity, 
 so that the universe would be validly represented by an in- 
 finity of such hyperbolas, and infinite pluralism would form- 
 ally be considered reality. In that case it is obvious that 
 the only way to represent any phenomenon with logical 
 
 consistency would be to travel on the hyperbola representing 
 conditions at the beginning of the phenomenon to the asym- 
 ptotes (i. e., revert to monism, or mystic - °°), and shift on 
 those to the hyperbola or hyperbolas of the conditions resulting 
 (and for intermediate steps of the phenomenon an indefinite 
 number of those curves would have to be considered similarly 
 
 used). Now, if Carnot's perfect heat engine, or any 
 
 perfect gas, or Newton's gravity, or any absolute constants, 
 or any exact cycles be asserted, obviously such a geometrical 
 representation of them is consistent and valid. But, it is 
 equally obvious that such a representation is actually an ad 
 infinitum affair or regress, and in so far as it is explicit is mys- 
 tic or religious language; it formally and largely explicitly is 
 the old Maxwell science and is also identical with the meta- 
 physics of Hegel, which I understand he admitted was un- 
 intelligible to himself; it is obviously mystic language which 
 is the opposite of Many language and to the usual tacit valid 
 logic and commonsense used by science. I. e., every one of 
 the bodies B is in every explicit expression (every actual 
 curve) a perfect universe of itself. In metaphysical terms, 
 each perfect curve is Kant s thing in itself — and most 
 other older dualistic philosophers had a pet name for it. 
 Maxwell's pet name for it was molecule or atom; that infinite 
 collection of hyperbolas is equivalent to Maxwell s kinetic 
 theory (except that I am finishing it here); for clearly, the 
 actual working together of the parts of the total universe is 
 merely implied — the describer of phenomena reverted to One 
 language (went into a verbal trance, so to speak) and said 
 God worked them — moving in a mysterious way his wonders 
 to perform. It is quite true; the universe did do them: but 
 science proposes to say positively how it did. Obviously, so 
 far as positive explicit expression of phenomena is concerned, 
 that old kinetic theory — and similarly all dualism, including 
 classical logic and orthodox theology — makes no statement 
 whatever of how or why or where such a universe or God 
 works. Or what amounts to identically the same thing, it is 
 glaringly obvious that those old doctrines provided no struct- 
 ure, no real mechanism, no actual relationship (such as love), 
 no working together, no binding together which is religion — 
 provided none of that in any explicit way ; but in geometric 
 expression, left it all to the asymptotes at a 0-point at °° . 
 Well ; as is obvious, such doctrines are right ulti- 
 mately, provided we dig out their implications as was done 
 for classic logic (§24). Unquestionably that tacit taking for 
 granted of relationship is the entirely valid religion which 
 animals, etc., correctly hold; I remember that as a child I 
 took such a tacit religion for granted and wondered why peo- 
 ple invented a God when all things worked beautifully and 
 justly right before their eyes. The only valid objection that 
 can be made to those dualistic, perfectly kinetic, orthodox 
 theological doctrines is that they merely fail actually and 
 positively to use the language tool ; they stop before they 
 finish and then get into a stew because their God is as empty 
 as those asymptotes. Such doctrines obviously pretend or 
 seem to use language, whereas in actual effect they are using 
 formless interjections, like the clucks of a hen. 
 
 c. But if we use as B any actual body (a finite Many 
 part of our usual Trinity language), then the body does not 
 stay on the perfect hyperbola. If we use Van der Waals's 
 partially corrected equation, which is a cubic equation, the 
 body takes a swerve at someplace (Daniell's Physics," 376) 
 and the body apparently usually has two imaginary values 
 (see par. i). Richards's form of the equation, or our That... 
 XThis..., or the S...XE... of the last section, obviously 
 makes the hyperbola become a continuously changing line of 
 infinite length, which is the single closed line we saw repre- 
 senting the universe in §98m. Hence, any phenomenon is 
 
§104c XI Two 
 
 represented by an actual portion of that universe line. But 
 no phenomenon can be accurately described ; only by sum- 
 ming it into the One do we get accuracy, and then it is 
 formal and mystic and sums as being the asymptotes, which 
 directly represent the One. 
 
 d. Also, although I shall not go into it explicitly, this 
 hyperbola model is being given in two dimensions, with the 
 third only implied. We must add the third, and consider 
 8-dimension curves in order to be completely explicit. This 
 modification applies to this whole section. 
 
 e. If a symmetrical single surface ring of no thickness 
 and infinite width be revolved, this hyperbola will always be 
 related to the generatrix in ways suggesting mathematical 
 laws, including the inverse square law — and also the non- 
 Euclidian geometries (by having the generatrix vary from a 
 straight line) and ra-dimension space (by extending or dupli- 
 cating' the curve beyond the point where it touches the 
 asymptotes — as in orthodox projective geometry). 
 
 f. Suppose we take a formally infinite or One filament 
 (as in §100df) in which the surface is a geometrical surface 
 of zero or infinite velocity. Then suppose we change the 
 filament so that it comes just inside those One limits, its val- 
 ues becoming finite. Then the motion in its surface becomes 
 helical with pitch angle different from or 90 , but ap- 
 proximately one or the other. Then a line of no force would 
 be normal to those spirals, and approximately in the surface 
 (we may take it so, omitting considering its other dimensions). 
 The projection of any such line on any plane through the 
 main axis would be (approximately, by valid logic; exactly, 
 by classic) our hyperbola — which is a line of no resistance. 
 But that line is at right angles to the line of no resistance of 
 §98m. So we see by this geometry how the inverse square 
 law comes in. ■ This paragraph is condensed far be- 
 low the point tolerated by mathematical precision. 
 
 g. The last paragraph is another form by which par. b 
 can be proved (and understood, if you have the patience and 
 professional need to dig out the implicit truisms in the last 
 paragraph). Incidentally, use of explicit logical expression 
 in the last paragraph would make the One line of no action 
 definitely 8-dimensioned, so that the two lines' mentioned 
 would be ultimately closed on themselves and identical. 
 
 h. Also, by explicitly and with pluralistic consistency 
 shifting from that One filament to actual or finite ones, we 
 get the actual universe line of par. c again. The hyperbola 
 of par. f is obviously simply the limit or envelope of that act- 
 ual line. So from that point of view all of Carnot's theory 
 and of old kinetic and cyclic theory can be seen to be only 
 limiting statements of actuality, and not actuality at all ac- 
 cording to ordinary language. That covers the whole theory 
 of calculus, and most of physical mathematics. If it be un- 
 derstood that each such dualistic or classic equation is summed 
 perfection or absolute abstraction from our actual world, and 
 hence (l) is actually inaccurate; and (2) is formally sepa- 
 rated from all others, so that logically explicitly there can not 
 possibly be any such thing as what is actually meant by ex- 
 planation, or knowledge, or continuity — if that be under- 
 stood or implicitly accepted, then even the mathematics of 
 Maxwell is correct. And science nowadays does implicitly 
 accept those things, as shown in the next paragraph. 
 
 i. As noticed (par. c), Van der Waals's equation makes 
 a swerve (usually), giving two imaginary roots. Obviously, 
 therefore, those imaginary or logically absurd values result 
 when the actual observed curve, by everyday language leaves 
 that One hyperbolic curve and exhibits at least two of the 
 actual dots of S. .. X£... or p...X«... — and hence does con- 
 tradict the classic logic it started with. So it is further tru- 
 istic that the swerve in Van der Waals's curve is equivalent 
 
 UNIVERSE U * 
 
 to the inverse square law (cf. pars, e-g), or to the principle 
 of Ampere's law. And Van der Waals himself substantially 
 asserts that, when he says that the modification of the exact 
 pv is due to a variable extension or field of the bodies 
 which are molecules ("Ency. Brit.," vi, 846). Richards's 
 theory makes all that explicit. Therefore, vaporiza- 
 tion or melting or disassociation (etc., in infinite regress) 
 lines in pv curves (or in any curve of the general 7%«tf. ..X 
 This...) are actually the verbal inverse square law; or ex- 
 
 plicitly represent (never accurately) the 3-dimension differ- 
 ence surfaces of field and-or filament. Or, they are the 
 explicit geometrical model (or equational) representation of 
 the formation of whirls of a different order (cf. Reeve's En- 
 ergy"). Or, Van der Waals's imaginary states" merely 
 mean that the M's talked of become something else, that 
 are not of the same order or state. 
 
 j. The last thing to be definitely suggested about this 
 sort of averaged or summed or e form of model of the uni- 
 verse, is that it shows that we may reverse the direction of 
 naming of any quantity — i. e., that our location of the zero 
 potential of any phenomenon is purely arbitrary. Ordinarily 
 we fancy — without really thinking — that we name things 
 which would be represented in the first (trigonometric) quad- 
 rant as algebraically positive, and that all potentials are taken 
 so that such positive trigonometrical directions increase them 
 numerically. But it may be readily seen that even science, 
 with its more careful speech, does not thus consistently name 
 potentials:- Ordinarily, with reference to molar bodies, the 
 extensive factors F, W, Ent, and Q, and their respectively 
 corresponding intensive factors L, A, Temp, and P, are 
 named positively, as indicated in Fig. 104b. But^j is a force 
 which usually is named as acting oppositely to F; so a con- 
 ventionally positive p is in the direction of OY , and p... X 
 v... is in the second quadrant — giving the conjugate hyper- 
 bola, or a language from a different viewpoint. Also, 
 
 when conventional science shifts from molar translatory mo- 
 tion to vibrations the point of view changes from out to in (or 
 vice versa, if you prefer to look at it that way), and the 
 direction-naming shifts from the usual branch in the first 
 quadrant to the branch in the third. Hence, when Rey- 
 nolds substantially begins by considering vibrations as real or 
 positive sort of motion his whole nomenclature of molar bod- 
 ies practically reverses from custom. But his vibratory mo- 
 tions are consistent with the customary naming of vibratory 
 directions, because conventional science is capsized in its 
 
 language referring to them. Therefore, here in brief 
 
 is the general theory of potential directions. I omit the 
 several volumes needed to treat the matter adequately. 
 
 k. So this section is a summary of the mathematical as- 
 pect of the That. .. X This. .. member ; it becomes naming 
 mathematics, or "geometry." (Obviously, it is a general 
 repetition of IX, which gave the "algebraic" mathematics 
 of the measuring member.) I have merely very roughly 
 suggested its possibilities. I have not gone far enough into 
 them to be very definite about them ; but the mathematical 
 physicists will have no difficulty in seeing that even this ele- 
 mentary discussion unifies their equations. There is no fur- 
 ther mathematical discussion in this book beyond occasional 
 brief reference; this section is not actually mathematical, 
 but only^implies mathematics— as does the phrase "Good 
 morning." Such a large proportion of all orthodox mathe- 
 matics is infected with classic logic that it is a sort of neces- 
 sary evil that we have to endure, to refer to such mathematics 
 at all. The reason ordinary mathematics are so excessively 
 boresome and offensive is that they are so wrong and mean- 
 ingless (cf. §30g). Consequently, they are not a pleasant 
 topic for discussion, just as bad health is not usually a pleasing 
 
115 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §106b 
 
 subject. Hereafter, I mostly use the That. . . X This. . . di- 
 rectly — usually as the explicit machine Field... X Filament..., 
 or some duplication of it, as Those whirls or cells. . . X These. . . . 
 
 CHAPTER XII. Astronomy. 
 
 §105. a. It was shown in general in §100 (especially in 
 pars, be) that the practical way we had of using the form 
 That...\Tkis... was to split the universe into parts on the 
 criterion V\. Parts of our skin (including our eyes, which 
 are physiologically parts of the skin; "Ency. Brit.," x, 93) 
 are used as standard parts ; and that fixes all other parts 
 with quantitatively a corresponding variation of limits (be- 
 cause the skin itself is variable). That actual standard 
 makes atoms the primary order of whirls, as atoms are the 
 skin structures, with a velocity V\ of difference surface (see 
 XIII), so that other different-order structures have different, 
 but proportionally related, velocities. All "things" in the 
 universe are therefore in practice compared with that stand- 
 ard or primary'; e. g. , our nervous activity or "thought" 
 is (in this materialistic"-seeming phraseology) directly 
 such atoms (XVII). The first ' higher" or superorder of 
 bodies is molar bodies — such as the skin itself, or any arbi- 
 trary part of it, as the eyes or nervous system; or such as a 
 house, a man, the earth, the sun. Conventional science gets 
 from the atomic order to the first super- or molar order by 
 means of the kinetic theory — by making the atoms dynamic- 
 ally fly around in 8-dimension space in order to produce a 
 static molar body. And conventional science, in full agree- 
 ment with the logic of this paragraph, finds that if the whole 
 of a body has V\, its mass theoretically becomes infinite. 
 I. e., the old Maxwell kinetic science has just two actual ord- 
 ers of structure; the experimental introduction of the elec- 
 tron, which is the first infraorder, thus promptly threw that 
 theory into mysticism. 
 
 b. We have seen that such a passing from one order to 
 another order logically implied an infinity of orders. Mod- 
 ern orthodox science is in logical agreement with that. We 
 have made a verbal form or machine in which by using the 
 inverse square law we make the step from order to order. 
 (And this is an important point :- because the conventional 
 kinetic theory is logically one such step, it is clear that that 
 theory is nothing but a verbal form which definitely implies 
 that inverse square in a negative fashion in its fundamental 
 formula, ^otu 2 .) And we have also devised a concrete" 
 machine by which definitely objectively to make the step:- 
 a whirl, or any of the indefinite number of machines to which 
 it is equivalent. The old Maxwell dualistic kinetic theory is 
 not a machine at all, but a poetic adumbration of a machine. 
 
 c. Therefore, we combine molar bodies into a next 
 higher order, and get a solar system. The combination of 
 solar systems into a higher order gives a stellar galaxy. And 
 a combination of stellar galaxies gives a higher order for 
 which there is no conventional name, but which becomes 
 definitely identical with combinations of atoms into various 
 
 molar bodies. Etc. According to such naming, 
 
 molecules are molar bodies. The final truth is that those 
 "orders" are not sharply distinct from each other (§§101j, 
 40) ; so I deliberately leave out molecules as an order, to 
 emphasize that. A molecule is a transition stage from atomic 
 order to molar order — sometimes a large atom and sometimes 
 a small molar body. There is no such thing as a fixed ele- 
 ment" or absolute atom. All other orders have 'transition' 
 stages : the inverse square law never names actual bodies per- 
 fectly. And proceeding in the other direction of 
 
 orders from atoms, we get electrons, parts of electrons, etc., 
 
 on down" to cells. (Between atoms and electrons are vari- 
 ous transition stages which are directly experimentally per- 
 ceptible in radioactive phenomena.) It has been seen in 
 principle that there is no essential difference between these 
 orders — only a quantitative, or L and T one. We are now 
 ready to see, by directly observing the various orders, that 
 they are essentially identical. By doing that we get some 
 useful results. Those results are roughly anticipated in the 
 remainder of this section, so that the reader may know what 
 to be looking for. 
 
 d. By observing the various orders of whirls, and seeing 
 that they are qualitatively equal or identical, but truistically 
 never quantitatively equal, we shall get a rigorous, intellig- 
 ible proof and knowledge that men, as well as other things, 
 are qualitatively identical and equal, but never quantitatively 
 equal. I. e., it is absolutely impossible, and practically and 
 theoretically irrational, to average men or anything else into 
 fixed classes. All of classic logic, orthodox theology, social- 
 ism, all the Maxwell kinetic pseudo-science try to assert the 
 dualism that men are fixed in classes— that some are in- 
 trinsically better than others. They all try to impose 
 upon men hierarchies, autocracy, socialism, or some other sort 
 of line" or bureaucratic rule like the German in 1914 or 
 the papacy, in opposition to democracy (XIX). We shall see 
 that all those conventional dualisms are irrational by seeing 
 that in the whole universe there does not and can not exist 
 any essential or qualitative distinction in order — no fixed 
 classes — no exact science. On the other hand, quantitatively 
 no two men, no two atoms, no two of any actual things are 
 ever equal (i. e., in size, or measure, or amount, or practical 
 
 or Many needs or worth. I stated above that orthodox 
 
 theologies arranged men in classes. As the truth of that 
 may not be immediately obvious, I state it explicity :- So 
 far as I can find, all those theologies technically assert that 
 their God, or each of their Gods, is a person who is superior 
 to, or essentially better than, other persons or men. That 
 truistically gives at least two fixed (or 'line" or military or 
 bureaucratic or aristocratic) classes:- (l)men; (2) God. 
 And that is irrational. This book demonstrates that man is 
 God — that God or the universe is quantitatively different from 
 any given man as conventionally specified (i. e., 'skin- 
 bounded'), but that God is in no essentials different. 
 
 e. We can see the solar system, comets, etc., in more 
 detail than we can see atoms. A comet, e. g., as is shown, 
 is an electron of the solar-system-considered-an-atom. So 
 from several points of view we may learn more about atoms 
 by observing the solar system, etc., than by observing atoms. 
 
 f. Also, as we have a consistent mechanics, we may, by 
 investigating such ' higher' order whirls that are easy to see 
 directly, get a thorough base for human phenomena — life" 
 becomes easily comprehensible (XVI). 
 
 §106. a. Therefore, because it makes no essential dif- 
 ference what order of whirls we use as a means of acquiring 
 a full understanding of our immediate environment, we may 
 without inconsistency employ such whirls as give us direct 
 quantitative details. The so-called astronomical or celestial 
 whirls seem to do that best to begin with. Those whirls ex- 
 hibit all phenomena directly, as we shall see. But I arbi- 
 trarily reserve light, electricity, etc., for other chapters. 
 
 b. Many of the quantitative details which we observe 
 have not yet been measured very definitely. So it is obvious 
 that I shall have to make rough guesses at some we need. 
 It is inevitable that there must be quantitative inaccuracy 
 in my description ; but it is most probable that that inaccu- 
 racy exists in such a degree that some important and useful 
 phenomena are made vague. I can hope only to be logically 
 consistent. 
 
§106c XII Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 116 
 
 c. It may seem at first thought that there is no need to 
 guess at anything — that such guessing is not science. The 
 general reply to that is obviously that there can not be any 
 exact science (§40). The practical reply to it is that we are 
 forced, as a means of continuing to live at all, to guess at the 
 characters or properties — measures — of the people and 
 things about us. Every time we eat anything we in effect 
 guess at the motives and properties and attributes of the per- 
 sons who were perceptibly concerned in the production of it 
 — e. g., as to whether they wished to poison us. The incom- 
 plete physics or other sciences and theologies in textbooks 
 furnish us with no definite or consistently expressed basis or 
 criterion for making such guesses. We have been going 
 through life without any consistent conscious basis of estimat- 
 ing or judging or guessing at the majority of the important 
 decisions which we actually do make. The universe or God 
 takes care of us, by it as a whole causing us to make fairly 
 correct guesses intuitively (i. e., with very vague conscious- 
 ness — as we are a part of the universe) — which fact is more 
 or less contrary to the hoary, conceited myth that man is a 
 reasoning (i. e., conscious) animal: for only in small part is 
 he conscious in the sense that he thinks or is intelligent. We 
 see the proof of that in Part Three — and how man pays for 
 such care by the loss of possible conscious life in some de- 
 gree. At present it may be noted that we do some consist- 
 ent guessing at astronomical quantities as a means of 
 becoming conscious of a consistent basis of making everyday 
 judgments. The more conscious we are of what we are do- 
 ing the more life we are aware of having; e. g., if we are 
 asleep we are unconscious and not aware of having any life. 
 Hence, as real science can do nothing else but guess, it is 
 honest to admit it, and then proceed consciously to guess. 
 That does not mean that I am rashly abandoning observations 
 and measures; actually, I am doing much less guessing than 
 does an astronomer who doesn't know the principles. 
 
 §107. a. Astronomers seem to agree rather generally 
 that our stellar galaxy is a nebula; see Hink's "Astronomy," 
 Arrhenius s Destiny of the Stars," etc. The Encyclo- 
 
 paedia Brittanica" (xix, 832) gives eight arbitrary kinds of 
 nebulas, depending on their general appearance:- (l) irregu- 
 lar nebulas, (2) annular, (3) double, (4) planetary, (5) ellip- 
 tical, (6) spiral, (7) nebulous stars, (8) diffused nebulosities. 
 We shall see that nebulas may consistently be considered to 
 be whirls. In that case those descriptive names correctly 
 describe whirls seen from various points of view, and in vari- 
 ous stages of growth or of wearing out. E. g. , an irregular 
 nebula, of which the great nebula in Orion is a type ("Ency. 
 Brit.," Art. ' Nebula," Plate I) looks very much like a 
 newly formed whirl, with its visible field, in a rather dis- 
 turbed condition; an annular whirl looks like a filament, 
 seen normally ; a spiral nebula looks like a filament that has 
 become comparatively stationary as regards traveling in the 
 direction of its main axis, and has given off a number of sec- 
 ondary whirls which hence traveled spirally roughly in the 
 filiar plane (instead of revolving about the filiar axis as in 
 Fig. 98w). We see more such details as we proceed. 
 
 b. There is no definite agreement among astronomers as 
 to what sort of nebula our stellar galaxy is. As we shall see, 
 it probably is a rather flattened-out whirl, so that quite likely 
 it has the spiral appearance if viewed from a neighboring 
 nebula (§108b). However, our solar system is probably 
 comparatively near the center of such a spiral, even though 
 we are not (except in the direction of the Milky Way) per- 
 ceptibly surrounded by nebulosity. I. e., our galaxy is 
 probably shaped like a large double convex lens — or like a 
 grindstone, to use another conventional simile. That is ex- 
 perimentally shown chiefly by the observed distribution of 
 
 stars, the appearance of the Milky Way surrounding us as a 
 ring, and by other details mentioned later. In Fig. 107e, 
 DA and BC are cross-sections of a conventionalized or 
 smoothed-out Milky Way or filament. We are near the cen- 
 ter, at S, and around us we see that filament. It probably 
 is smashed somewhat flat by surrounding whirls or galaxy- 
 nebulas of the same order, so that it (the filament or Milky 
 Way) has but comparatively slight motion of translation 
 along the main axis PP (say as a guess 100 miles per second, 
 which is very slow for such a whirl), and hence has compara- 
 tively more motion of rotation about that axis (resulting in a 
 spiral motion in the field, not shown in the figure). Our 
 solar system S is in the inner field of the whirl, a little above 
 the filiar plane (for clearness, the figure probably much ex- 
 aggerates its actual distance above), in a dynamic equilibrium 
 with that field — which inclines the ecliptic somewhat to the 
 filiar plane (the ecliptic is the rough plane in which the earth 
 revolves about the sun and which the other planets more 
 or less stay close to; that is not quite the strictly technical 
 definition, Ency. Brit.," Ecliptic"; the inclined axis qf 
 the ecliptic is roughly NS ), and which equilibrium also in- 
 volves the revolution of the whole solar system about the 
 stellar main axis PP , as we shall see. 
 
 c. Our galaxy is equivalent to an atom in everything 
 but size (and T), and that is unessential. It is obviously 
 surrounded by other stellar galaxies. I do not know whether 
 those galactic atoms constitute a celestial gas, or liquid, 
 or solid (perhaps a solid ; see par. g). We probably can not 
 see farther than a very few layers of such surrounding atoms : 
 light itself is absorbed by those surroundings (§§131-2), so 
 that comparatively speaking we are probably in the same kind 
 of darkness that we would say existed in the center of a lump 
 of coal (although there would be light there to the parts of 
 coal atoms). Even if our galaxy were an atom of a celestial 
 gas we would have comparatively short vision of surrounding 
 atoms (XIII). 
 
 d. In technical astronomy the usual unit measure of 
 stellar distance is now a parsec, which is the distance at 
 which the orbit of the earth subtends an angle of 1 second — 
 i. e., gives a fixed" star a parallax of l". It is equal to 
 about 206,000 "astronomical units." An astronomical unit 
 is the average radius of the earth's orbit, which is about 
 93,000,000 miles. An older measure of stellar distance is 
 the light year, or the distance which light at V\ travels in a 
 year. It is equal to about \ parsec, or to about 6 trillion 
 miles. I use light years, as that is more familiar. 
 
 e. There are no agreed upon figures for the size of our 
 galaxy. Eddington ("Stellar Movements," 225) roughly 
 guesses that the distance apart of the inner surfaces of the 
 Milky Way (the diameter of the hole in the 'doughnut' ; or 
 the distance from A to B, Fig. 107e; see par. b for prelimi- 
 nary description of this figure) is about 700 light years. 
 Other men guess considerably higher and also lower. I shall 
 to some extent use Eddington's guess as a base (although it 
 probably is considerably too small), making other figures in 
 proportion. The field of the galaxy in the figure has a dif- 
 ference surface with much inaccuracy represented by the 
 outer dotted line (to save space, etc., one end of figure is cut 
 away). That field probably has a long diameter of something 
 like 20,000 light years, and a short diameter of something 
 like 2000 light years (the diameter along its main axis PP'). 
 
 f. The Milky Way filament has an ether flow as indi- 
 cated very roughly by the arrows. Hence, in so far as that 
 flow is not balanced by a rotation of the whirl around PP' 
 and a spiral reaction of the whole whirl with adjacent whirls 
 (due to the spiral flow of the field ether, which is not indi- 
 cated in the figure), there will be a motion of translation of 
 
117 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §108c 
 
 N 
 Q~~D 
 
 hence, our nebula possibly 
 
 the galaxy as a whole down, in the direction PP', as was 
 
 seen to occur in Fig. 98n (§101d). Although I do not 
 
 show that spiral flow for the galaxy field in the figure, I show 
 
 in rough perspective the general spiral translation of the solar 
 
 system S (by the dotted line on 
 
 which the various S's are) : 
 
 the motion down of the galaxy 
 
 in the direction PP would act- ___ — — 
 
 ually be a similar corkscrew _ c _^--""*" 
 
 motion among the surrounding _,-'"' 
 
 galaxies. 
 
 g. Astronomers observe 
 motions of translation of neb- 
 ulas which are apparently out- 
 side our galaxy to be as high 
 as 600 or 700 miles a second. 
 Several thousands of spiral 
 nebulas are observed around 
 us. The average motion of 
 such nebulas is observed to be 
 perhaps 250 miles per second ; 
 corkscrews down at about the same rate (but see par. a). 
 There is not much reliability about such figures as yet; for 
 nebulas are faint, and are difficult to measure even in photo- 
 graphs. But it is already obvious in part, and will become 
 more so as we note more details, that such motions are very 
 slow compared with the size of the objects. I. e., very little 
 change in our galaxy as a whole is produced by that, to us, 
 rapid motion. Such motions of translation are comparatively 
 speaking almost static conditions; i. e., the collection of 
 galaxy whirls in which ours is one atom would be, if those 
 velocities are fairly good guesses, about as fixed and steady 
 as atoms in what we call a solid. And that possibility that 
 we are in a celestial solid is further strengthened by the fact 
 that observed distances of other galaxy nebulas are roughly 
 of the same order as the size of ours; i. e., the galaxy 
 whirls about us are packed in as steady as the bricks in a 
 wall — always speaking comparatively, of course (and in spite 
 of the fact that it is conventional to hear of the enormous 
 
 waste spaces in astronomical structures). I shall keep on 
 speaking comparatively, and omit repeating the obvious and 
 unimportant and unessential quantitative fact that a short 
 astronomical distance is a long terrestrial one. We are cus- 
 tomarily expected to marvel at astronomical figures — espec- 
 ially velocities. The truth is that to anyone with a fair 
 judgment of proportion, astronomical velocities are compara- 
 tively slow. From analogous points of view it is just as diffi- 
 cult to detect the slow motion of the solar system as it is to 
 detect the slow motion that is the growth of a plant. So it 
 is to be hoped that the old-style popular writers on astrono- 
 my will stop tacitly inviting that we stand like rustics, with 
 our provincial mouths ajar in wonder, whenever they mention 
 a comparatively negligible number and tell us that it is mar- 
 velous and stupendous — for relatively it is nothing of the 
 sort. The psychological effect on themselves is obvious. 
 
 §108. a. The last section gives in rough outline the de- 
 scription of our galaxy. All other astronomical structures, 
 as well as atoms, etc., are of the same general nature at the 
 youthful stage of their lives. Experimental evidence of the 
 consistency of that description is given by the remainder of 
 this chapter. There are such a number of things in the gal- 
 axy, and the changes in it are usually so nearly imperceptible 
 to us, so slow are its movements, that the experimental ob- 
 servations and measures are rather unreliable. So we shall 
 mostly use the solar system whirl instead of the galaxy. 
 
 b. Many astronomers are inclined to consider our galaxy 
 as being a well-developed spiral nebula, with the solar system 
 
 at S, as in Fig. 108b (the figure is adapted from Arrhenius s 
 "Destiny of the Stars"; cf. p. 45ff). So far as I know, the 
 galaxy may be considerably broken up, as indicated in that 
 figure; but I am inclined to think that the Milky Way 
 
 IP 
 
 I 
 
 m- 
 
 •F' 
 
 K.y 
 
 i 
 
 .{ 
 
 Fig. 108b. 
 
 t' 
 
 Fig. 107e. 
 
 directly appears to be so well-formed as to indicate the better 
 preserved whirl of Fig. 107e. However, as that is not reli- 
 able proof, and as there are no other facts that I know of to 
 decide the point, what I shall do is to describe our nebula 
 (including details of the solar system) in a broad way — cov- 
 ering all the probabilities, which are innumerable. Then, if 
 the astronomers by further and more complete observations 
 
 of stars as they actually are, 
 find our galaxy to be of the 
 character shown in Fig. 
 108b, that will be a special 
 case of our description. My 
 personal guess at the quan- 
 titative character of our gal- 
 axy and solar system is that 
 the galaxy is a rather regu- 
 lar spiral that tends towards 
 being an annular nebula, 
 with the solar system rather 
 near the center, as shown in 
 Fig. 107e, which I shall 
 call a regular spiral or a whirl spiral. The spiral shown in 
 Fig. 108b is more like a spiral that would result if two large 
 bodies or clusters pulled each other apart by gravity, and I 
 shall call that a gravity spiral. As we shall see in the next 
 two paragraphs, there can not be essentially different sorts 
 of spirals : the difference is quantitative, and each kind is 
 partly the other kind. 
 
 c. I may here briefly anticipate some conclusions, in or- 
 der to state what are the two general kinds of nebulas into 
 which I arbitrarily divide the eight sorts in §107a. If we 
 had a nearly homogeneous fluid whirl, practically as our ex- 
 perimental whirls may be considered to be when first formed, 
 or as an ether whirl containing only cells would be, then as 
 we have seen, it would wear out or grow old by giving birth 
 to lower order whirls, and those whirls would tend to collect 
 into spherical solids" like the earth. We shall see that in 
 
 detail later. (l) During the process of wearing out, 
 
 that fluid whirl, if rather closely surrounded by whirls of the 
 same order, would be what was called a regular or whirl spi- 
 ral. Or, some large secondary of the whirl, surrounded by 
 other secondaries, would pass through the stages of such a 
 rather regular whirl or spiral. Or, finally, if two rather fluid 
 whirls combined (as in §102f), the resulting single whirl, if 
 surrounded by others of the same order, would pass through 
 the stages of a whirl spiral — as shown in one stage in Fig. 
 107e. But on the other hand, a whirl, which had 
 
§108c XII Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 118 
 
 reversed or aged or degenerated" into a spherical solid like 
 the earth (with usually one or more solid satellites like the 
 moon), might approach fairly close to another similar whirl. 
 (That would be possible because the field of that solid would 
 be comparatively weak, as we shall see. I do not think that 
 such approach is often probable, but I do not know the 
 quantitative chances: cf. the remainder of this chapter.) In 
 that case the two solid whirls (never perfectly solid' — always 
 there would be some sort of 'atmosphere' of satellites, etc.) 
 would combine by pulling each other to pieces. Some of 
 the pieces would probably stay rather solid' ; most of the 
 pieces, for reasons which we shall see, would evaporate into 
 ethei — i. e., break up into pieces as small as electrons, etc. 
 The resulting single whirl would be what I call a gravity spi- 
 ral nebula (because ordinary gravity was the major force pro- 
 ducing the result). That whirl would become, more or less 
 quickly, practically identical with a fairly aged fluid whirl. 
 At some age of each sort of whirl or nebula they can not be 
 distinguished apart. The differences occur in their youths. 
 So the differences in the nebulas are quantitative differences 
 of past history. That history determines the kind of spiral. 
 
 d. We could say that the rather fluid regular whirl is 
 chiefly dynamic, and that the rather solid sphere is chiefly 
 static, and we have the same quantitative distinction. As 
 before, it obviously is not possible to have in any pluralism a 
 perfect fluid, or a perfect solid. That is equivalent to what 
 we saw in §80 concerning no perfect static or perfect dy- 
 namic phenomena : we see here in general that there can be 
 no essentially different kinds of nebulas. And we shall see 
 that that is equivalent to saying that there can neither be 
 any gravity alone, nor chemical affinity alone; both act to- 
 gether in astronomical structures, sometimes one and some- 
 times the other temporarily having the greater effect (IX). 
 
 e. In a fluid or whirl spiral, in the stage pictured in Fig. 
 107e, chemical affinity has perhaps the greatest influence 
 with respect to the whole whirl. Inside our solar system as it 
 is now, gravity has the greater influence with reference to the 
 
 larger bodies in it, or with respect to the whole whirl. 
 
 As is now rather well known, the efficacy of gravity pull has 
 in the past been considerably exaggerated. The orthodox 
 nebular theory of Kant and Laplace ("Ency. Brit.," Art. 
 
 Nebular Theory") substantially makes gravity the whole 
 (i. e., infinite) cause — which obviously is correct as relig- 
 ion, but is pure nonsense if claimed to be expression in plu- 
 ralistic or scientific everyday language. Because 
 
 gravity pull has been conventionally so much overemphasized 
 I am here more or less forced to make a somewhat dispropor- 
 tionate amount of remarks about its completing factor, chemi- 
 cal affinity (or electric or magnetic forces, as they are more 
 usually called in this connection). The reader will note that 
 rhetorical result, needed temporarily now. 
 
 §109. a. We may briefly consider the general origin of 
 the galaxy, although it will merely be a concrete" repeti- 
 tion of the previous proofs (X, XI) that any splitting of the 
 universe into parts implies, by our Trinity language, a struct- 
 ure. If we like, we may commence with a perfectly fluid 
 ether universe — perfectly static or perfectly dynamic, — and 
 existing as anything, or nothing, just as you please. If we 
 consider it pluralistically split in any way, then by our usual 
 language we introduce time and space as methods of naming 
 the results, and the results are finally atoms, which by our 
 human criterion have difference surfaces at V\. Some par- 
 ticular order of those whirls in infinite regress would contain 
 a particular whirl which is our galaxy. Its existence implies 
 us, with our V\ criterion; and our existence with that cri- 
 terion implies that whirl. Like the chicken and the egg, 
 neither comes first," except by purely arbitrary agreement 
 
 as to what is precisely quantitatively a chicken, and what an 
 egg ; and that agreement can not be made exactly in a finite 
 number of words. So ultimately the chicken and the egg 
 are identically the same (and we and the galaxy are identi- 
 cally the same), and are the universe. LikeTopsyin Uncle 
 Tom's Cabin," the galaxy whirl 'just grew.' This paragraph 
 consistently states what grew ultimately means (§S5f). 
 
 b. Topsy was expected to state her immediate parents 
 — to talk in finite, Many terms. So we too may drop that 
 tacit infinite time of the last paragraph, and undertake to 
 state the finite origin or parentage of our galaxy whirl. I 
 am unable to find any observed data which will give that 
 parentage. Or, the whirl may not have had parentage,' 
 but may be the result of a marriage or joining of two large 
 spherical solids' (those solids,' with their satellites, are us- 
 ually called star clusters or systems) which had previously 
 been born perhaps. I. e., our galaxy whirl (l) may be a 
 secondary of some larger whirl (an electron of that larger 
 atom) ; or it (2) may be that (A) two large suns, or (B) two 
 clusters that were not so far condensed into mostly only two 
 such suns, or (C) two more fluid whirls, united to make it. 
 
 c. Both those general possibilities could produce our 
 galaxy whirl. Obviously, our machine is in principle per- 
 fectly reversible — going equally well down" or up" in 
 order of whirls. All we need to note is that whatever the 
 actual origin was, the primary whirl that gave off the new 
 secondary, or the old whirls which united to form a new one, 
 was or were partly fluid and partly solid, so that there was 
 at all times no perfect characteristic or property (no egg' 
 that was essentially and absolutely egg and nothing else), 
 and no absolute homogeneity or heterogeneity of any sort. 
 (We shall see that those same processes apply precisely to 
 
 the birth of biological organisms; §146). It may be 
 
 observed that this investigation of the origin of our galaxy is 
 perfectly general in principle. Consequently, it will apply 
 as the description of the origin of any structural part of the 
 universe:- to a chicken and an egg, atoms, electrons, etc. ; 
 it will apply to (say) chairs, provided that the man and his 
 tools and materials which produce the chairs are considered 
 as partly joined together during a given time — as they are. 
 
 d. If we tentatively accept the guess in §107b that the 
 galaxy and the solar system are both roughly whirl spirals, 
 then a fairly reasonable guess as to the age of our galaxy 
 would make it as a minimum a trillion of our years (l0 12 
 years; I use the American and French style of numeration) ; 
 the solar system would as a reasonable minimum be a number 
 of billion years old (say 50 billion), counting from its first 
 rough splitting off from the Milky Way filament. However, 
 both might be a million or more times older than that, as we 
 see later. Possibly the astronomers may readily find data 
 which will give more definite guesses at the ages. If the 
 galaxy is a gravity spiral, then I am unable to find any rea- 
 sonable basis for a guess, except that by geological observa- 
 tions the solar system must be a number of billion years old ; 
 as will implicitly appear, the galaxy must be older. 
 
 §110. a. We shall begin to get more explicit proof of 
 the last two sections by considering the birth and history of 
 the (our) solar system. Suppose we have the galaxy filament 
 (the Milky Way) somewhat as shown in section in Fig. 107e. 
 The difference surface would be continually subjected to 
 varying velocities (equivalent to pushes and pulls) from inside 
 and outside the filament— every phenomenon that happened 
 in the universe would in time be registered thus on the gal- 
 axy difference surface. Any push and any pull would form a 
 whirl in more or less completeness (§§101-2). Those whirls 
 would form in harmonic sizes (or else be quickly destroyed 
 or assimilated' by sizes which did have such proportionality) : 
 
119 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §110e 
 
 see Index, Harmonic periodicity." Consequently, the 
 difference surface would continually form whirls of various 
 sizes. The smallest made in considerable number would 
 probably be the new-born forms of our atoms; those which 
 were not in fairly good proportions would be destroyed, but 
 in such disturbed conditions atomic weights would vary 
 widely in several ways from our present weights. For rea- 
 sons and facts We shall see, those atoms of a certain atomic 
 weight or size there, would, if it were possible to transport 
 them to our laboratories without changing them, be consid- 
 erably different from our analogous atoms in every property. 
 I. e., C atoms there would not quantitatively be much like 
 C atoms here; yet the collection of mutual L and T relation- 
 ships possessed by the carbon atoms would, relative to each 
 appropriate location, be practically measurably identical (not 
 exactly identical; if exact identity be required, then the 
 names of elements ' promptly require to become an infinity 
 — as may be readily seen from the fact that any change in 
 conditions changes the spectrum of any element"; XIII). 
 
 b. The small or atomic whirls would have difference 
 surfaces of a velocity which of itself gives visibility, or nearly 
 so (proof:- we see the Milky Way ; also, the rest of this 
 book). That velocity would be of the same order as V\ (it 
 differs somewhat, as those atoms are not in an environment 
 like our neighborhood ; cf. XIII). The atoms would also in 
 most circumstances be visible by diffusing, reflecting, etc., 
 light that came from atoms in other places that had light- 
 giving difference surfaces. The Milky Way atoms might 
 locally be in sufficiently dense and extensive clouds of them- 
 selves to become dark, if their difference surfaces were not 
 at a visible velocity. But obviously, without going into the 
 lengthy details which are implied in XIII on light, we may 
 take a short cut to the conclusion, and see that the chances 
 are that usually there will be enough visible atoms about the 
 Milky Way surface (or the difference surface of any galaxy 
 in our neighborhood, or any large whirl in those whirls) to 
 make the outline of that surface visible to us. We see more 
 of the details and proof of that under zodiacal light (§12l), 
 and in §111 and XIII. What we particularly need to get 
 at now is the meaning of the " temperature" of those whirls 
 that are new-born at the galaxy difference surface. 
 
 c. Those new atoms (and other whirls) would have 
 plenty of room — they could not be rubbing each other hard, 
 but would have well-formed (newly-formed or young) fila- 
 ments, and comparatively extensive fields. If we could stick 
 an ordinary thermometer among them, its expansive sub- 
 stance would almost certainly freeze. For the temperature" 
 of the "gas" which those atoms ordinarily form is almost 
 "absolute zero" in spite of the fact that they are glowing — 
 "glowing hot." The temperature of the ether which is the 
 difference surface of the atoms is high" — for its velocity is 
 near V\ (if we could get our whole thermometer in that sur- 
 face zone of ether, it theoretically would indicate nearly an 
 "infinite" temperature: any actual thermometer in the usu- 
 al sense would explode into electrons and smaller pieces). 
 But that ether is obviously very small in amount compared 
 with the 'insulating' slower ether of the fields. Our ther- 
 mometer would come into contact with the comparatively 
 very slow difference surface of the fields, and there would be 
 nothing in the rather free environment near the galaxy differ- 
 ence surface to 'smash' that high-velocity ether close up to 
 the atoms of our ordinary thermometer and hence the tem- 
 perature" would register low. There would be some rad- 
 iant heat; but radiant heat in quantities sufficient to affect 
 the thermometer very perceptibly can come only from a col- 
 lection of considerably smashed together atoms. In 
 brief, to sum up what has been said, the entropy of those 
 
 atoms is nearly zero (by our standards) and consequently one 
 of our thermometers, which requires an average entropy of 
 our environment before it will register an average tempera- 
 ture, simply would register almost no temperature of the whole 
 gas. (As a matter of fact, for reasons later implied, the or- 
 dinary thermometer will itself most probably begin to break 
 up radioactively in such an environment. And precisely the 
 same low temperature will be registered when atoms are 
 very strongly pressed together, with high entropy, as inside 
 the earth ; it is the opposite aspect of the wide departure 
 from the average conditions we use as a standard; cf. §§122, 
 120.) If we devise some method of forcing some of that dif- 
 ference surface ether that is at a temperature" of nearly 
 infinity" close up to the atoms of the expansive substance 
 of our thermometer, those atoms will locally radioactively 
 explode, as implied above — and the exploded atoms will 
 then tend again to have a temperature, relative to the origi- 
 nal thermometer, of nearly zero. 
 
 d. We are so accustomed to judging heat anthropocen- 
 trically that it is difficult at first even to understand the last 
 paragraph, which (except for the 'old heat' inside the earth) 
 describes young heat' instead of our everyday middle-aged 
 heat.' But it can be seen at once that the paragraph is a 
 concrete summary of the theory of heat in §§78-81. As we 
 see additional details of heat below, the last paragraph will 
 become more intelligible. All we need to grasp now is the 
 general fact that temperature is an intensive factor (which 
 means roughly that if we want high" temperature, we 
 must get high-speed ether at the spot where there is to be 
 such temperature), and entropy is the extensive factor of 
 heat (which means roughly that there must be an amount of 
 ether which will both build up a properly supporting struct- 
 ure about that point and also maintain the flow to it). 
 
 e. I have described atomic whirls as being secondaries 
 of the galaxy whirl. There may be such a relationship of 
 periodic sizes that the galaxy difference surface can not give 
 off such comparatively minute whirls directly as secondaries, 
 but must in the ordinary course of quantitative events give off 
 large secondaries of (say) the order of the solar system, and 
 then have them give off atoms as tertiaries of the galaxy. Or 
 in the same way atoms may be an even lower order of whirl 
 with reference to the galaxy as a primary. If so, it is merely 
 a step by step quantitative process, which makes no essential 
 difference in the brief description we need. For rhetorical 
 simplicity I shall make the experimentally unguided guess 
 that the galaxy difference surface gives off secondaries that 
 range in size from electrons and atoms to solar system whirls: 
 that is valid in principle (§101h-j). If it is not quantitative 
 fact at a given time, then future closer observation of details 
 and investigation of mechanical size-relationships will show 
 what is so at a given time. But even then, atoms would be 
 formed near (not in or of — as stated above) the Milky Way 
 surface; and the actual phenomena and subsequent descrip- 
 tion would be quantitatively about the same as that I give, 
 
 and logically identical. The same general remarks 
 
 as to the order of whirls will apply usually to my description 
 of them. In short, I can not get enough data to make a 
 reasonably accurate guess as to how many generations there 
 are usually between galaxy and (say) electrons. It is pre- 
 cisely the same as being unable to guess how many genera- 
 tions there were between Darwin and a given one-celled 
 ancestor of his ; the actual facts are that by following differ- 
 ent lines of intermarrying ancestors there nearly surely would 
 result different numbers of generations; and also there is no 
 accepted arbitrary agreement as to what does constitute one 
 generation of one-celled organisms. But obviously, with 
 electrons and with Darwin, the essential thing is that there 
 
§110e XII Two 
 
 are generations and changes of order or species, even 
 though the numbers or measures vary with the point of view. 
 So it is obvious that in the description of all phenomena I 
 give, infinite variation of quantitative detail is possible, and 
 does occur in varying conditions : there is no exact science. 
 §111. a. Thus we have the galaxy difference surface 
 outlined by atoms. That result happens only when that sur- 
 face is in fairly stable equilibrium. If there were rapid 
 changes in the galaxy whirl as a whole, that outlining would 
 disappear. Our galaxy may move about 250 mi/sec (§107g) 
 — and that, though slow, seems to be enough to cause the 
 galaxy field difference surface to clear itself pretty much of 
 secondaries of all sorts, so that the outer field surface is not 
 appreciably outlined (cf. §112a). The same thing has hap- 
 pened to most of the solar system; i. e., its difference sur- 
 faces are nearly imperceptible, except what are now the 
 main difference surfaces of it, such as the surfaces of the sun, 
 planets, etc., as we shall see. Below we see enough details 
 to make those galaxy phenomena clear. 
 
 b. And thus the galaxy filament surface continually 
 gave off secondaries into and out of the filament (it still is 
 doing so). We may guess that about 50 billion years ago 
 there was from some cause a knock, or addition of energy, 
 given to the galaxy field, so that a whirl which was to form 
 the solar system was pushed out of the filament at C, Fig. 
 107e. That unbalanced knock, which was almost negligible 
 compared with the size or energy of the galaxy, reached its 
 fair equilibrium, or was balanced, by the birth of that sec- 
 ondary, the solar whirl, according to the mechanics given for 
 Fig. 98w and in §101e. For several reasons which we shall 
 see, the solar system virtually lived faster than the galaxy; 
 also, we can observe it better. Hence, I shall discuss its 
 general history, and thus imply the further detailed descrip- 
 tion of the galaxy whirl. 
 
 c. As a reasonable guess the solar whirl would be at 
 least several centuries a-borning, and would, as a fairly sym- 
 metrical whirl like our soapy water whirls, start traveling out 
 from C to the right (more or less in or parallel to the galaxy 
 filiar plane) into and through the outer field of the galaxy at 
 a speed of say 300 to 400 miles per second — probably more. 
 This solar whirl would contain in its field ether a lot of glow- 
 ing atoms, and also quite probably a considerable number of 
 what we may call condensations (§114) — or more explicitly, 
 planetesimal condensations. Also, it would be born into a 
 disturbed environment; its very birth was due to asymme- 
 tries or lacks of equilibrium which locally were comparatively 
 marked. Hence, the solar whirl at once began to form sec- 
 ondaries and wear out (i. e., live") much more rapidly 
 than the larger galaxy whirl had in general been doing, or 
 does now. The galaxy whirl is apparently still virtually 
 rather young, while the solar system is virtually middle-aged. 
 In the periodic table (App. B) column (He, Ne, A, etc.) 
 are virtually young atoms; column VIII (Fe, Co, Ni, etc.), 
 virtually old; and column IV (C, Si, etc.), middle-aged, 
 and fairly stable like our earth, which is typically middle- 
 aged, tending to elderly. 
 
 d. Before proceeding to follow the solar system from 
 that guessed-at beginning, we may note the possible varia- 
 tions in its birth. In the first place, observation seems to 
 indicate a thicker collection of solar systems in the center 
 galaxy field where we are now, than outside (there may be a 
 thick collection in the plane of the Milky Way outside, as at 
 M, N, Fig. 107e: as we shall see, theoretically there is a 
 tendency for such a collection to form, and astronomers with 
 recently improved methods for measuring star distances are 
 rapidly collecting data that will settle this and similar mat- 
 ters). If that apparently thicker collection in the center field 
 
 UNIVERSE 12 ° 
 
 is a fact, it then follows that the galaxy is moving rather 
 steadily and is gaining in speed, so that usually the knocks 
 are negative and the solar whirls are now mostly born into 
 the filament, where by rapid travel they remain virtually of 
 the same density and are hence retained. A whirl born into 
 the filament would encounter a spiral fluid motion of rotation 
 and hence would revolve chiefly about the filiar axis, and 
 with the galaxy filament would also revolve about the galaxy 
 main axis PP'. That secondary in the Milky Way would it- 
 self revolve and rotate about its own axes, and proceed to 
 condense into a solar system similar to our present one. 
 Those solar systems would then interact, partly by affinity and 
 partly by gravity. Those general interactions may be fol- 
 lowed through in detail by analogy with what will be said of 
 the solar system. We on earth are not yet appreciably af- 
 fected by what happens inside the galaxy filament; we prob- 
 ably shall be so affected some day, as what happens there is 
 likely to be the prelude to the Many end of this astronomical 
 speck, the earth — as will implicitly appear. 
 
 e. And there could also be an indefinite number of vari- 
 ations as to the relative locality on the filament surface where 
 the solar system was born. Birth at a different place would 
 give quantitatively a different subsequent history — consider- 
 ably different if the birth had occurred at say B, Fig. 107e, 
 instead of at C. Qualitatively, the histories would be the 
 same; all history must repeat itself qualitatively, as all prin- 
 ciples are identical ; but no history can repeat itself quanti- 
 tatively exactly (all that being obvious truisms ; Part One). 
 So the history given according to the quantitative guesses I 
 have made will implicitly contain all those unending varia- 
 tions (and those following from other possible origins of the 
 solar system mentioned or implied later), and the interested 
 reader may fairly easily work out as many of such variations 
 as he likes from the following. The most probable 
 
 place of birth of larger whirls would be on the outer side, as 
 at C and D in the cross-section. That is so because obviously 
 the field is least stable there : in all other places the field in 
 greater degree supports itself more steadily. Consequently, 
 any really large whirl would, as a mechanical truism, tend 
 to be born on the outside. As we see in the next paragraph, 
 the same mechanical principle will tend to produce spiral 
 nebulas. However, the solar system is a comparatively small 
 whirl; hence, there is no great probability that it was born 
 at C unless it was born (as it may have been; cf. §112d) 
 when the galaxy was quite young. 
 
 §112. a. The young solar whirl starts out to the right 
 from C, as seen, and encounters a fairly vigorous upward 
 ether flow in the galaxy field. Consequently (as was seen in 
 §§98w, lOle), it rather soon (say in fifty centuries after it 
 more or less appreciably finishes being born) perceptibly be- 
 gins to move downward along the dotted path as shown in 
 Fig. 107e. Now, if the field had not been relatively vigor- 
 ous (and usually with a somewhat old whirl, or with respect 
 to a large secondary instead of our rather small solar whirl, 
 it relatively is not), then there would not have been enough 
 fairly steady reaction to push (pull) the new-born whirl down 
 along that dotted path. It would have kept in the galaxy 
 filiar plane, with more or less wabbling or oscillation up and 
 down with respect to that plane, depending on the minor 
 asymmetries it encountered. Consequently, it would have 
 steadied into some sort of fairly stable equilibrium while re- 
 maining more or less in the plane, as shown by the whirls M 
 and N. Those whirls theoretically could be tilted in any 
 
 direction, depending on local conditions, etc. There 
 
 was in the difference surface from which they were born a 
 component of rotation about the main axis PP'. The second- 
 ary whirl itself would of its own internal energy continue to 
 
121 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §112d 
 
 propel itself in that revolution about PP' and for a consider- 
 able time if it were a large whirl; for it would take some 
 time for enough asymmetries to accumulate to stop its motion 
 in that direction and "head" it some other way. Also, as 
 the secondary traveled out more or less in that galaxy filiar 
 plane it would keep on 'spilling' its field (like a comet; 
 §120) until it got into some reasonably steady equilibrium 
 (cf. §11 la). And all those results, with a field not relatively 
 vigorous, would obviously produce the observed phenomena 
 and appearances of a fluid spiral nebula — the large second- 
 aries staying more or less in the filiar plane. The small 
 secondaries would proceed as we shall see in the case of the 
 solar whirl. (There would be whirls more or less on the 
 dividing line between those small' and 'large' secondaries, 
 which would produce a variety of intermediate phenomena.) 
 
 Also, the large secondary whirls which produce the 
 
 spirals would, in a considerable length of time (say some 
 hundreds of billion years), condense, and they too would 
 then fall out of that spiral (out of the orbit of revolution 
 around PP ) and shoot around the galaxy filament as a comet 
 (analogous to one of our comets; §120) on a path analogous 
 to the one to be described for the solar system. So it will 
 implicitly appear as we proceed that a spiral nebula, by whirl 
 mechanics, will gradually turn into a star cluster. The star 
 cluster, if let alone (if not too much knocked by an asym- 
 metrical environment) until entropy piled up too high, would 
 automatically break up (precisely a does a radioactive atom ; 
 §§189, 14l) into a largely fluid whirl. Or, two clusters 
 more or less colliding would produce a more or less fluid 
 whirl of the gravity type. The whole process will work in 
 either direction from any stage, and contains infinite possibili- 
 ties. And, as perhaps is already obvious, there is in that 
 process or life never any comparatively explosive or quick 
 or violent action ; relatively speaking, everything always 
 works smoothly and rhythmically and without violence — 
 which means that there is always easily visible continuity, or 
 efficient cause, or least action. If we speak very carefully, 
 anything that may be properly said to be violent or explosive 
 refers to a comparison between different orders of whirls; if 
 in such comparisons we explicitly include the inverse square, 
 verbally even then no violence or catastrophe is apparent. 
 
 b. As the solar whirl traveled (Fig. 107e), the steadily 
 changing direction of the galaxy field, as it flowed about the 
 Milky Way, would force the solar whirl to change its direc- 
 tion into a revolution about that filament (about the galaxy 
 filiar axis), as shown by the dotted path. The solar filament 
 and field, by their own rotation about the solar filiar axis, 
 Would obviously keep the whirl moving ahead; i. e., at first 
 the energy which makes the solar whirl travel as shown by 
 the dotted line comes mostly from the solar whirl itself; the 
 motion of the galaxy field at that time serves chiefly to direct 
 its path (see par. g). Those fluid reactions are the same as 
 those shown generally in §§98w, lOle, 107e. 
 
 c. Now, some unusual combination of circumstances 
 may have caused the solar whirl S to move along practically 
 in the plane of the paper through S 2 and Si, as shown in the 
 figure;— i. e., S might possibly have been given off with 
 scarcely any revolution about the main axis PP ; only in one 
 chance in infinity could there have been zero revolution (for 
 a finite time, of course understood), which means not at all. 
 But even if S did move so "simply," only by one chance in 
 infinity could it keep on in such non-revolving motion. 
 (Even if, as in par. a, a whirl wabbled back and forth in the 
 plane of the galaxy filiar axis, without perceptibly revolving 
 about that axis, it is but a temporary substantial non-revolu- 
 tion; for after a time definite revolution resulted, as shown. 
 We are seeing an analogous thing here.) Consequently, S 
 
 would sooner or later begin definitely to revolve about PP . 
 As a fact, S started out from C with a component of revolu- 
 tion about PP , derived from the spiral in the galaxy filament 
 
 surface. So as a necessary truism, (cf. §§98o, lOle, 
 
 concerning spiral motion), S revolves about the main galaxy 
 axis. In Fig. 107e the solar system's spiral path is roughly 
 shown in perspective. That path is neither a perfect or geo- 
 metrical spiral nor a similar helix, but is a combination of 
 both which is forever varying as the galaxy field varies and 
 as the internal processes of the solar system proceed, as may 
 be readily deduced by Bernoulli's principle. Also, the rota- 
 tion about PP might have been in either direction ; it depends 
 upon circumstances — perhaps usually chiefly upon birth con- 
 ditions, although analogously to man, astronomical nurture 
 may under certain conditions take a chief role. [That revo- 
 lution may be considered left-handed or counter-clockwise as 
 viewed from above, and as drawn. Possibly that agrees, as 
 it should, in relative direction with (l) the left-handed revo- 
 lution of the planets, and (2) the arbitrarily drawn fluid mo- 
 tions in the figure, and (s) the naming of the poles of the 
 earth's magnetic field, and (4) the usual direction of twist in 
 the fiber of trees, the fact that man is usually right-handed, 
 has his heart on the left side, etc. But I do not know; see 
 
 §99b.] All of that is in direct agreement with the 
 
 fact that the galaxy field has a spiral motion. Consequently, 
 and as a further reaction, the spiral in the galaxy field be- 
 gins to tilt the plane of the solar filament (which is at the 
 present day still roughly the plane of the ecliptic), so that 
 the solar main field becomes or stays more definitely a spiral, 
 and so that the whirl is tilted with respect to the direction 
 of its path as shown at Si and S — the latter being the solar 
 system's present location (exaggeratedly high; §107b). And 
 that agrees with the observed facts about the motion of the 
 solar system as a whole, now. Also, it analogously tru- 
 istically requires that the axes of our planets be tilted 
 just as they actually are. And it further truistically re- 
 quires that the magnetic poles of the earth, etc., be displaced 
 from the rotational poles somewhat; and it is observed that 
 they are so. Those magnetic poles continually vary in loca- 
 tion, which indicates that none of the fields is steady — which 
 is in agreement with no exact science. Similarly, the tilt 
 of the whole solar system would slowly change some, as it 
 encountered varying strength and spiral of the galaxy field. 
 That is a motion of the solar system which has not been di- 
 rectly recognized yet, so far as I can find. 
 
 d. There are no data known to me which will deter- 
 mine whether or not the solar system in past ages has had 
 time enough [also youthful vigor enough, and-or environ- 
 mental non-interference] to go on spiraling upwards, turning 
 over the top of the Milky Way, until it made one or more 
 complete revolutions in a spiral path about the galaxy filiar 
 axis. Fig. 107e shows just a little more than one-half of such 
 a revolution — and I have guessed that so much of travel oc- 
 curred in 50 billion years. But there may have been many 
 previous revolutions of the solar system about the galaxy fila- 
 ment, so that it may be nearly as old as the galaxy whirl — 
 in fact, it is possible that by the calendar (by our arbitrary 
 L and T verbal forms) the solar system may be older than 
 the galaxy (but improbable) :- for it may have been picked 
 up by the galaxy as a galaxy comet from another galaxy (cf. 
 §120), where it could have been born (or not) as described 
 above (the heat of the sun will indefinitely survive, depend- 
 ing on galaxy conditions, as we shall see, so that it is possible 
 that the solar system has been long wandering around as 
 more or less a particular structure, or galaxy electron, from 
 one galaxy to another). As a somewhat rash guess, based 
 intuitively on the present smoothness of the solar system, 
 
§112d XII Two 
 
 my personal opinion is that our system has not made a com- 
 plete revolution about the galaxy filiar axis, but has had a 
 path somewhat as in Fig. 107e, although directions may gen- 
 erally be reversed from actual fact in that figure. 
 
 e. I shall here complete the general description of the 
 path of the solar system, although parts of the description 
 anticipate the statement of the concrete evidence. Such 
 evidence is implicitly given below in the description of inter- 
 nal details or processes of the solar system. 
 
 f. As the solar system moves around to the central gal- 
 axy field in Fig. 107e, it obviously encounters a stronger 
 and stronger spiral reaction from that field. Consequently, 
 the path of S flattens out (the helix pitch becoming less, the 
 path then expanding spirally). It is quite likely that now S 
 is revolving around the galaxy axis PP' almost in a plane, 
 without helixing or corkscrewing up very much. It is some- 
 what probable (because S is so small) that S has, or nearly 
 has, used up its energy of self-propulsion in an upward helix, 
 so that the galaxy center field has made it spiral downward 
 for a while. Then in such a case, S would wabble or oscil- 
 late up and down with respect to the galaxy filiar plane in a 
 more or less circular orbit around PP — which is mechanically 
 identical with the possible wabbling of a large whirl in an 
 orbit on the outer side (par. a). If the galaxy remains in a 
 fairly steady environment, obviously such an oscillating orbit 
 will finally be taken up by S, regardless of how many times 
 it may have revolved around the Milky Way (unless S pre- 
 viously gets assimilated by some other structure). Also, as 
 seen in par. a, all other secondaries finally get inside the hole 
 in the galaxy doughnut and take up such an orbit. Hence, 
 it then becomes inevitable, assuming sufficiently steady en- 
 vironment for the galaxy, that the systems in the central 
 field will get crowded and will proceed to combine plan- 
 etesimally into a central sun, as we shall see in the descrip- 
 tion of the formation of our sun. It is most likely, however, 
 that before that happens (before the galaxy turns itself into a 
 system similar to our present solar system — which would re- 
 quire perhaps some decillions of our years), the galaxy will 
 
 collide" with (which usually means "side swipe") another 
 galaxy — both having become somewhat elaborate star clust- 
 ers in that process of condensing (so that their fields have 
 become comparatively weak and give less protection from 
 such collisions). So the "end" of the solar system will prob- 
 ably be its combining with some other system, in that pro- 
 cess of galaxy condensation. By the theory of chance (used 
 in our ignorance of the actual pertinent facts), our system is 
 likely to last more or less as it is now for some billions of 
 years. The human race will nearly surely be wiped out by 
 some comparatively minute changes in climate long before any 
 such combining takes place, as is implicitly shown in the re- 
 mainder of this section. 
 
 g. We proceed now to consider broadly the climatic 
 variations in the solar system and galaxy ; the minor varia- 
 tions of climate — those on earth — are discussed in §122. 
 
 As S comes around under the Milky Way (Fig. 107e), 
 
 it is obvious that what chiefly determines its path is the re- 
 action of its field with the galaxy field. I. e., S is controlled 
 mostly by affinity there, and but little by ordinary gravity. 
 It is further obvious that the energy variations or asymmetries 
 of the galaxy field ether flow which S encounters furnish the 
 general, comprehensive cause of the variations in the internal 
 growth of S. In general it is obvious that at first S uses its 
 own energy (more accurately :- potential) largely (being of 
 new-born, high potential), to screw itself along its path, in 
 the direction opposite the flow of the galaxy field. As a gen- 
 eral rule, it is obvious that such a wearing out or aging of S 
 continues until such time as S oscillates near the galaxy filiar 
 
 122 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 plane (as in the last paragraph), although there could be 
 temporary reversals of that process at any time. We ^see the 
 details of that wearing out or condensation later. We may 
 note now that in general the reactions of the fields may be 
 considered as regulating the speed of the various difference 
 surfaces inside the solar system. And those speeds or poten- 
 tials determine what we know as temperature, and the gen- 
 eral phenomena of those difference surfaces or temperatures 
 are bunched together under the name climate. Obviously, 
 any variation of interaction of solar and galaxy fields modifies 
 all climates in the solar system in proper proportions. Ordi- 
 narily of course we speak of the sun as controlling our earth 
 climate (§122); we here merely go further back and see 
 what controls the sun climate — in fact, makes the sun itself. 
 We could go still further 'back r or up and show what con- 
 trols and modifies the galaxy field (and so on in infinite re- 
 gress), and say that that controls our climate; but the 
 principle is always the same (§110cd). 
 
 h. As S starts off on its dotted path we have seen that 
 it begins to revolve about the galaxy axis PP . Now, as the 
 galaxy is not a perfect or symmetrical structure it immedi- 
 ately follows that the revolution of S around PP is eccentric. 
 I. e., S will approach closer to the Milky Way on one side 
 of PP' than it does on the opposite side. As a result of that 
 rhythm or overrunning (analogous to the eccentric orbit of 
 the earth, say) there will be a corresponding rhythmic varia- 
 tion of energy of interaction of galaxy and solar fields (analo- 
 gous to the oscillations mentioned in the last paragraph, but 
 on a generally smaller scale), and hence of the climates of 
 bodies in the solar system. One side of the rhythm would 
 be a rather warm geologic age and the other side would be a 
 cold (glacial) age. I shall here proceed to write on the 
 quantitative guess that that rhythm has produced the observed 
 glacial ages; but obviously, the oscillations with respect to 
 the galaxy filiar plane would always be present in some de- 
 gree and would be a second general cause of large climatic 
 variations, in a rhythm superimposed on the rhythm due to 
 eccentricity of orbit about PP'. Similarly, it is obvious that 
 the fairly near approach of our system to another solar system 
 (say as close as a light year) would cause an appreciable varia- 
 ation in climate. And an irregular variation in climate could 
 be caused by marked variations from smoothness of the 
 Milky Way filament as S travels past them in its orbit; per- 
 haps that is actually the most efficient cause of conventional 
 
 glacial ages." A geologic time scale of the earth, 
 
 prepared from orthodox sources by H. F. Osborn, is repro- 
 
 duced from his "Origin of Life" as Appendix C (it is put in 
 an appendix so as to be easy to find, it being a useful table). 
 According to Sollas ("Age of the Earth," 285), there are 
 observed to be at least three general glacial ages — "once at 
 the beginning of the Cambrian ; again, and more evidently, 
 during the Permian period ; and yet once again in times 
 comparatively near our own," and observations show that 
 three times there were intervening periods with climates con- 
 siderably warmer than now. According to Osborn's chart 
 the time intervals between those three general glacial ages 
 are roughly 18 million years for one, and 16 for the other. 
 
 i. If we make a guess that the diameter of the orbit of 
 the solar system around PP' is something like 100 light years 
 (that is probably too low a guess; cf. §107e), and that the 
 system moves in that orbit at an average speed of 18mi/sec 
 (that is probably too high), then we find that the length of a 
 glacial year that is due to eccentricity of orbit would be 
 about 3^ million years. That does not agree with the 18 and 
 16 millions of the last paragraph. However, there are traces 
 in recent times of six glacial advances" in North America 
 ( 'Ency. Brit.," xii, 59), and it is quite possible that each of 
 
123 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §113b 
 
 those is a mark of a glacial year or revolution about PP'. If 
 that is a good quantitative guess, then orthodox guesses at 
 geological time (those given in Osborn's table) have, with 
 too much deference to Kelvin's bad guesses as to how long 
 the sun could stay hot (he had no correct principle on which 
 to base guesses), been entirely too small (cf. "Ency. Brit.," 
 xi, 65 Iff). But we can get figures that seem discrep- 
 ant in the other direction. According to Eddington ("Stel- 
 lar Motions," 26l), Charlier finds the node of the "invari- 
 able" plane of the solar system on the plane of the Milky 
 Way to have a motion of 0.85 seconds of arc per century. 
 If we assume that such invariable" conditions actually do 
 give roughly that average motion through a revolution of S 
 about PP , then a glacial year would be about 370 million 
 years, giving the sun's orbit roughly a diameter of 10,000 
 light years, if we take the same speed in it as before. 
 
 j-k. I have included those badly discrepant guesses to 
 show how uncertain and unguided by consistent principles 
 present geological and stellar measures sometimes are. The 
 obvious facts are that the revolution of S about PP is rather 
 irregular, but as it takes several million years to complete a 
 revolution the irregularities are not yet perceptible to us ; 
 and that there are other rhythms in its orbit which probably 
 modify the glacial ages due to that revolution. Further, an 
 oscillation of S with respect to the galaxy filiar plane would 
 obviously make the orbit itself vary very considerably in size. 
 And the Milky Way is itself observably irregular. And the 
 orbit of S would have precession in the minor degree that 
 "gravity" applied. Also, it is obvious that every time the 
 solar system passed fairly close to another system, there 
 would be a variation, as mentioned. Also, it is entirely pos- 
 sible that the solar system in its orbit about PP is so distant 
 from the Milky Way that whatever eccentricity there may be 
 in the orbit makes no perceptible difference in the climate, 
 but that some of the other causes are efficient in producing 
 glacial ages. Out of those several possibilities of vari- 
 ation, and some slight knowledge of geologic speeds, I intui- 
 tively judge that the time durations given in Osborn's table 
 ought to be at least three times longer in the cenozoic, at 
 least ten times as great in the mesozoic, and twenty or more 
 times as great for the remainder, with perhaps 40 or more 
 billion years for ages before the archean. 
 
 1. The "existence" of the human race obviously de- 
 pends primarily or truistically on climate — for climate is 
 simply the general name that implies certain conditions of 
 dynamic equilibrium. If conditions are too much out of 
 equilibrium the race as we know it will of course perish (or 
 change enormously) ; if conditions are sufficiently stable a 
 man could live almost indefinitely (see §123 for that consist- 
 ent, possible "fountain of youth" or millennium). Any 
 "end" of the race implies the entry of the solar system into 
 an environment somewhat different from the present. Such 
 a change could occur by our running near another system; 
 or by running into a considerably changed part of the galaxy 
 field (or by some analogous internal change in the solar sys- 
 tem with reference to our earth and its field). However, a 
 little consideration will show that no such marked change can 
 rapidly occur — we are 'protected' by affinity or fields, and 
 are not naked with a lone gravity. We would obviously take 
 on such a change almost imperceptibly, and die off slowly 
 during several generations if it were going to become too 
 great for the present sort of race, and intelligent astronomers 
 could predict the approach of any such end for thousands of 
 years. Obviously, the solar system is supported and main- 
 tained chiefly by the galaxy field (mostly by affinity, and 
 only slightly by gravity) in a fairly steady equilibrium that 
 may last without perceptible disturbance for billions of years. 
 
 So there is no need to worry about any end of the earth. 
 As indicated, an actual end would probably be so slow as to 
 be perceptibly painless. Also, any probable change of cli- 
 mate for the next ten thousand years could be met, by an 
 intelligent people, by building suitable shelter. The rain 
 will continue for a while to descend upon the just and the 
 unjust, and the unjust will continue to flourish except for the 
 process of slow suicide by stupidity which they practice (as 
 we see implicitly in XVIII, XIX). Finally, of course the 
 solar system will combine with some other system; and the 
 race will perish some time before that begins very percept- 
 ibly to happen, provided we do not detach the earth from 
 the system and sail off to a safer environment; theoretically 
 that is easy enough to do (§123). 
 
 m. It therefore follows that if the solar system has ever 
 made a previous revolution about the Milky Way (around the 
 galaxy filiar axis), it is likely that the climatic conditions re- 
 sulting eliminated much life that may have previously 
 flourished. Hence, it should be kept in mind that there is a 
 possibility that this earth has previously been peopled by a 
 human race far more conscious (i. e., intelligent and defin- 
 itely religious) than we are. So when in this book I speak 
 of human beings, unless otherwise indicated I mean the ones 
 on this planet that are included in the present time sequence 
 of history, and I neglect some possible previous race(s) on 
 earth, and races on other planets. They are all essentially 
 the same, of course; but historical (i. e., quantitative) facts 
 that apply to us, obviously do not definitely apply to those 
 
 others. But even if S has made only the part of a 
 
 revolution about the Milky Way, as in Fig. 107e, it is most 
 probable that on a number of occasions conditions became 
 sufficiently stable to permit primitive life" to start spon- 
 taneously" (§144) and continue for possibly a million or so 
 years, and then be wiped out by some too great change. 
 That is all the more probable when it is considered that this 
 earth has never had a molten interior in the conventional 
 sense (§119, etc.); quite likely the surface has been more or 
 less molten on occasions even after it became rather large — 
 it is now so, locally, as in volcanoes (and the seas and air are 
 molten). I. e., geology' very probably began all over again, 
 so to speak, several times. We could rather positively find 
 out (by principles analogous to those shown with respect to 
 meteors, §120), and get the previous history of the earth 
 fairly well, by digging it completely up — examining all of it. 
 I judge that it is not worth while to do that. But perhaps 
 the astronomers will in a few years, by plotting the paths of 
 stars, figure out our history fairly accurately for several hun- 
 dred million years back. At any rate, it is obvious that ge- 
 ology and astronomy have barely scratched the surface of 
 history, and that geology can stop skimping its time . 
 
 §113. a. We now begin to follow through the internal 
 processes of our solar system. For some of the details of 
 those processes I shall shift to a description of precisely 
 analogous processes in Saturn, in comets, and in meteors, 
 where the evidence is clearer. Such details will apply analo- 
 gously to any whirl, depending on relative quantitative con- 
 ditions. The chief new point to be considered is that in the 
 virtually older solar system gravity is now of more importance 
 than affinity, and we have reverse whirls, or solid or spheri- 
 cal whirls, like our earth. 
 
 b. As soon as gravity does begin to be a rather effective 
 force the processes become something like those asserted by 
 the old nebular theory. That theory in effect used only a 
 force of attraction, or gravity, explicitly. So formally it tru- 
 istically would not work : for any positive language requires 
 at least two parts to a machine (Part One), and Kant's start- 
 ing nebula was just a single condensing ball, and it was then 
 
§113b XII Two 
 
 impossible, even as a truism of his own dualistic logic, for it 
 ever to become anything else. As a matter of actual fact, 
 he tacitly did use an opposing force which he called inertia 
 or centrifugal force. But he failed to be explicit about it, 
 and to show definitely that it must be handled, logically at 
 least, as this book does it. There is nothing wrong with the 
 old nebular theory if that centrifugal force be consistently 
 used. If it be, we shall promptly get an infinite regress, 
 or mass varies with velocity, or an ever-varying machine of 
 two explicit parts like our whirl and filament. For instance, 
 Bjerknes ("Fields of Force," p. 10) is explicit about the 
 same thing the nebular theory is mystic about, thus:- Any 
 body which participates in the translatory motion of a fluid 
 mass is subject to a kinetic buoyancy equal to the product of 
 the acceleration of the translatory motion multiplied by the 
 mass of the water [fluid] displaced by the body." That is 
 the same as saying that mass varies with velocity ; and it is 
 concretely exemplified by the doings of a whirl. So we can 
 say that the nebular theory is quite right as religious lang- 
 uage ; the difficulty with it is lack of pluralistic positiveness. 
 For details of nebular theory, see "Ency. Brit.," xix, 333ff. 
 c. Several men have with rather explicit validity worked 
 out the gravity condensation of the solar system, and showed 
 the detailed errors of the nebular theory. Chamberlin in 
 "The Origin of the Earth," has perhaps done it best. 
 Chamberlin is such a first class all-'round man that I think 
 his book is worth reading merely from the point of view of 
 having the pleasure of looking at such a man closely. He 
 uses an explicit machine, consisting of two or more celestial 
 [spherical whirl] bodies — which of course is theoretically 
 equivalent to Reeve's theory (§92) if it be reduced to the 
 ultimate. Chamberlin does not perform that logical reduc- 
 tion : on the contrary he tacitly takes it that the reacting 
 bodies have fields which modify the formerly-orthodox gravity 
 effect — and that is, in general form, equivalent to the whirl 
 theory. The explicit astronomy in his book is definitely 
 orthodox dualistic astronomy which he took over bodily from 
 an astronomer who merely repeated Laplace s dualistic logic. 
 But Chamberlin himself twice explicitly recognizes the effect 
 of fields under the name of electric and magnetic action 
 (ibid., 29, 148), as modifying (and strictly speaking, repudi- 
 ating) that old Laplace astromical logic — or lack of it. 
 
 d. Explicit points in which the old nebular theory fails 
 to work, and additional details of how gravity collects small 
 bodies (planetesimals, to use Chamberlin's felicitous name) 
 together into spheres such as the earth, when gravity is the 
 chief force acting (i. e., when the whirl field gets too weak 
 to hold the bodies mostly by its strength — by 'affinity'), can 
 be found in Chamberlin's book. Eugene Miller in "The 
 Origin of Our Planetary System" has expressed in an easily 
 readable form a somewhat similar, non-rigorous theory, in 
 which he deduces the solar system from two meeting spheri- 
 cal bodies, now the sun and Jupiter (without explaining the 
 origin of those two). Jeans has worked out the same general 
 idea mathematically — as have several astronomers. Miller 
 makes his spheres rhythmic or elastic or overrunning; hence, 
 his description, which may be considered as a brief but ex- 
 tended application of the well known tide theory of G. H. 
 Darwin is logically equivalent to the whirl theory. But he 
 omits explicit statement of how (mechanically or-and logically) 
 a body can be elastic. To include that, he must explicitly 
 solve the One and Many, and hence become formally identi- 
 cal with this whirl description (§10 If). 
 
 e. The reader may get from those books detailed ac- 
 counts of planetesimal action, if he wishes. So I shall con- 
 dense to bare essentials the description of the planetesimal 
 processes of the solar system. 
 
 It is also to 
 later internal 
 
 124 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 §114. a. We have taken the solar system as a general 
 case, having it a rather fluid whirl with a comparatively neg- 
 ligible amount of condensation of atoms when it breaks out 
 of the Milky Way. It is to be repeated that it might vary 
 from that in an indefinite number of ways, 
 be emphasized that endless variation of the 
 processes is possible. I claim to do nothing more than show 
 typical reactions. On account of the numerous possibilities 
 —millions of perceptible ones,— for brevity I am forced to 
 become rhetorically somewhat dogmatic. But it is requested 
 that the reader remember vividly here that all quantitative 
 assertions are just guesses and approximations, even though 
 the inaccuracy may be of the order of only a second a cen- 
 tury. A difference of that much in the period of the rotation 
 of the sun may have made the difference between there being 
 now an ultra-Neptune planet or not: the solar system is just 
 that delicately poised quantitatively, as we shall implicitly 
 see. We can't tell whether a leaf will fall this way or that 
 in a wind unless we make elaborate measurements that usu- 
 ally are impracticable in the time available. It is a quantita- 
 tive problem : the intelligible qualitative answer is that it will 
 move in some direction if not held. And the solar system is 
 a living being (for proof, see XVI) that perceptibly has far 
 more parts in intricate quantitative dynamic equilibrium than 
 any plant with its leaves — truistically ; as a plant is only a 
 small part of the solar system. 
 
 b. As the system comes out at C along the path in Fig. 
 107e it encounters a comparatively rapidly changing environ- 
 ment, and itself has a youthful high potential, as we saw. 
 Consequently, the solar filament begins to break up rapidly 
 — to give off secondary whirls. It probably in a million or 
 so years began to take on the aspect of the whole galaxy 
 whirl as shown in Fig. 107e. I. e., it probably by that time 
 had man} 7 fairly large secondaries as outer spirals (the sec- 
 ondaries would be the knots in the spiral arms of photo- 
 graphed nebulas), and had numerous small whirls that had 
 come around into its central field. The collection of whirls 
 in the central field would obviously constantly increase, as 
 we saw with reference to the galaxy ; for as soon as- a whirl 
 field wears out some, losing some of its affinity factor, that 
 secondary whirl is swept by the solar field into the central 
 solar field. The secondary would there finally begin to os- 
 cillate up and down as we saw may now be happening to the 
 solar system with respect to the galaxy field. But if the 
 secondary keeps on wearing out, then it in turn will finally 
 break up into condensations (like an old, broken-up comet; 
 §120). Or in short, in aging the density of the inner struct- 
 ures of a whirl becomes too great, affinity can no longer sup- 
 port them as a fluid whirl, and by the experiments we saw 
 and obviously as a truism of Bernoulli's principle or of the 
 
 dynamic buoyancy" of Bjerknes (§113b) they are swept 
 out, the whirl condensing then mostly by gravity. 
 
 c. Thus the fields of the secondaries in the central solar 
 field themselves become weak, and the secondaries combine, 
 in some of the ways we have seen. Those secondaries ob- 
 viously become more numerous and crowded as time passes, 
 and the crowding accelerates the uniting of them, and the 
 formation of relatively harmonious sizes of condensations 
 (§100j). And with weakened fields, gravity has a greater 
 effect between whirls, pulling them together ("electricity" 
 is markedly or quite perceptibly the quantitative opposite of 
 that; XIV). That force of gravity ultimately in practice or 
 with respect to actual measuring is by no theory or measures 
 Newton's or Laplace's mystical mathematical limit, but is 
 merely what we may express as being the field reactions of 
 touching whirls of lower orders — finally of cells (§108 • Index 
 
 Gravity"). And that is obviously merely truistic - for as 
 
125 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §11 5a 
 
 soon as the whirls show signs of disintegrating, then what we 
 call gravity steps in (the measure of the gravity factor rises 
 as and when the affinity factor falls; Fig. 104b), and makes 
 them hang together in another, 'reverse' way. Therefore, 
 the total universe is now seen, in the most definitely "concrete" 
 aspect, to vibrate or oscillate or exhibit rhythm about a condition 
 of mean equilibrium. And if we observed and expressed our- 
 selves perfectly, then obviously by the principle of least action 
 (§98m), the deviation of the ultimate parts of the universe is 
 zero — which is the physics' or concrete form of the principle 
 that man can not make an error (§25). Or, all things in 
 the universe are ultimately balanced. Consequently, the 
 ultimate ethical law, expressed in pluralistic terms, is that 
 we should be balanced or temperate — consciously so, as we 
 actually in ultimate fact are anyway, and are truistically 
 partly dead, or part men, if we don't see it, don't "be" that 
 way (XVIII). Thus we promptly revert to an inex- 
 pressible One in a very obviously truistic fashion as soon as 
 we put gravity and affinity explicitly together. The keen 
 reader can note that in all this material" description I am 
 constantly on the verge of the One and Many. To use the 
 language of Cooke in his Introduction, only the austerity of 
 the mechanics of our ether cell prevents our slumping into 
 mysticism — which, while highly valuable in its place (index, 
 Rebirth"), is truistically out of place when we are under- 
 taking to talk a mutually intelligible language. 
 
 d. It can be seen to be a reasonable quantitative guess 
 (in the absence of the mathematical establishment of a gen- 
 eral periodic table), that, inside any collection of atoms and 
 small whirls which constitutes what we call a molar body, 
 gravity and affinity are about equally effective. I. e., in an 
 ordinary molar body there is obviously about average equi- 
 librium, and hence that equilibrium is so hard to upset that 
 there existed before the discovery of unbalanced radioactive 
 substances the erroneous quantitative anthropocentric guess 
 that only a molar body was matter," and that such matter 
 was indestructible. On either side (Fig. 104b) of that equilib- 
 rium which from our anthropocentric point of view is fairly 
 stable there is a less stable condition of equilibrium :- (l) that 
 in which the fields are directly more effective, which is the 
 condition we have been viewing in the solar system so far, 
 and which, e. g., occurs in electricity; and (2) that form of 
 matter in which the fields become comparatively less effect- 
 ive (never wholly ineffective or zero), and in which the parts 
 are held together mostly by gravity, as, e. g. , the planets in 
 the solar system, and radioactive bodies as compared with more 
 stable ones {all atoms are somewhat radioactive, in that all 
 field surfaces give off some secondaries; XI). 
 
 e. Consequently, whether the worn out secondary whirls 
 be broken up and the pieces swept out of the solar central 
 field, or whether they unite (collide, mostly by side swiping) 
 the result is finally identical :- the condensations or molar 
 bodies are formed. In fact, those different ways of naming 
 the processes are merely different points of view of the same 
 process. E. g., if the whirls are broken up and swept 
 out' of the central field, obviously the condensing is merely 
 
 delayed, and takes place elsewhere, the condensations being 
 finally swept back into what we may call the central conden- 
 sation, as we shall see. I. e., the central condensations in 
 the solar system produce our sun ; some of the secondaries 
 which get into the central field (as now happens with comets; 
 §120) would be swept out, and would not at once combine 
 with the sun, but would combine with (say) Jupiter; but, if 
 there is time enough, Jupiter itself will finally condense into 
 the sun (if there is not 'time enough,' then the solar system 
 will itself condense or coalesce with another system, so in 
 effect and in principle Jupiter condenses into the sun). So, 
 
 regardless of the details, the processes of condensation con- 
 tinue — up to a point stated in the next two paragraphs. 
 
 f. However, at once the opposite effect appears (it act- 
 ually always accompanied the condensation), thus:- When 
 the fields of the whirls get relatively weak, gravity becomes 
 of greater importance and pulls the whirls closer together — 
 two filaments may unite into one; two whirls may alternately 
 thread through each other; or there may be slipping or roll- 
 ing on each other: those indefinitely numerous quantitative 
 ways of condensing give new elements, or chemical com- 
 pounds, or solids, liquids, gases, and various combinations 
 and modifications of those conventional things, ad infinitum. 
 In coming together, the whirls overrun and hence make their 
 field surfaces more energetic, and that produces in effect a 
 single field which envelops the whole condensation (or, the 
 fields may be said to coalesce into one; there being no ab- 
 solutely distinct fields anyway, the two ways of expressing it 
 are equivalent), the condensation and its unit field thus be- 
 coming in principle identical with an ether cell. That ether 
 cell is a 'reversal' of a whirl (§98); i. e., we simply take a 
 new point of view of it (mathematically, we emphasize the 
 other factor of the pair in Fig. 104b we happen to be using 
 one of, so that a numerical increase of it indicates travel in 
 the other or reverse direction on the curve); or we have 
 verbally created that new, unit field, although actually it is 
 nothing more than the summing up of the effects of two bod- 
 ies which start going together and which truistically would 
 verbally or logically keep on going or condensing until they 
 became zero or monistic unless we thus changed points of 
 view, or the trick of naming them (this being the dynamic 
 concrete form of the inverse square law or the explicit going 
 from one order to another). The definite mechanics of that 
 are given in the chapters on light and electricity. There- 
 fore, this summed up effect, or reversed field' of a condensa- 
 tion, by the overrunning of the gravity effects is truistically 
 made more energetic than the weakened fields it replaces, so 
 that for the whole condensation the affinity potential immedi- 
 ately rises and stops gravity s increase. E. g., the earth 
 does not continue condensing' (by falling into the sun), but 
 is supported by its and the sun s field so long as galaxy con- 
 ditions stay fairly steady, revolving about the sun (§184j). 
 
 g. That is a general statement of the fact that potential 
 remains fairly steady or balanced (there being only a rhyth- 
 mic variation about a mean, due directly to the fact that the 
 original criterion V\ is not fixed or exact, and can not be). 
 Or, it is a logical proof or self-consistent statement in terms 
 of gravity and affinity, that each factor is mutually depend- 
 ent and cannot become either zero or infinity with respect to 
 actual bodies ; in terms of human life, no person (in the us- 
 ual Many sense of person) can be absolutely born, or can ab- 
 solutely die. And it is a little difficult to express and to 
 understand in that general form, for the simple reason that 
 we are in the habit of talking in terms of classical logic and 
 the nebular theory, which explicitly tries to talk about only 
 gravity, etc. So we may at once put the general form in 
 terms of observed facts about the solar system. The sun and 
 the earth are obviously existing condensations. Both are ob- 
 served to have a unit field (it is called electrical or magnetic; 
 cf. §§113c, 121; XIV). Obviously, those fields must modify 
 the pull of gravity. Therefore, regardless of any relative 
 values of those fields, it follows from immediately verifiable 
 facts that our argument or description is self-consistent. As 
 implied, the whole of XIV, on electricity, gives verifiable 
 facts proving this perceptible variation of gravity and affinity 
 about a mean, with a reversal of structure (it is a quantitative 
 fact: not an essential change). 
 
 §115. a . We therefore have molar bodies — planetesimals 
 
§115a XII Two 
 
 — with weak fields being pulled together in the central solar 
 field. They keep on collecting to form the sun. There ob- 
 viously would be no conventional ' collisions" of those bod- 
 ies, for all are protected somewhat by fields. When 
 mostly gravity pulls two towards each other, obviously the 
 
 fields as a result start speeding up the spherical difference 
 surface that then forms for each ; and that truistically is an 
 increase of the surface temperatures of the two bodies (that 
 is merely the ultimate and consistent mechanics of the com- 
 mon fact that compression of a substance usually makes it 
 hotter). So it is obvious that the surfaces of the planetesi- 
 mals will be comparatively hot, but their fields, and insides, 
 will be colder. Consequently, the surface of the sun will 
 always be kept relatively hot simply as the result of the re- 
 actions of the solar whirl with the galaxy field. I. e. , so long 
 as our solar system has a certain proportional amount of en- 
 ergy (relative to the galaxy field), then that long will the 
 main bulk of the solar system (which is the sun — the rest of 
 it now amounting roughly to less than l/700 of the mass of 
 the sun) have a surface hot enough to have a general V\. 
 The sun simply is kept superficially hot by the whole gal- 
 axy (and similarly the surfaces of the planets, etc., in their 
 proper proportion). If the solar system tends to accumulate 
 an excess of either affinity or gravity, so that the sun, with 
 its certain relative size, cools or heats proportionally, then, 
 just as in the last section, the solar system itself will con- 
 dense or expand, and keep up the relative proportions and 
 truistically restore and steady temperatures — up to a certain 
 quantitatively critical point, at which the system will change 
 
 order of structure. Obviously, that is merely another 
 
 way of stating that the solar system is mostly supported in 
 its spiral path by the galaxy field. So only as the galaxy 
 field around the solar system varies considerably in energy 
 can the temperature of the sun s surface vary much. In 
 short, as the galaxy field as a whole is fairly balanced, espec- 
 ially with reference to small whirls like the solar system, all 
 the bodies in our galaxy, of a size perhaps slightly larger 
 than Jupiter as a minimum, usually have a surface tempera- 
 ture high enough to make their surface atoms visible — i. e., 
 within V\. And that is the quantitative basis on which this 
 description of the universe was started ; hence, the descrip- 
 tion so far is in general self-consistent, as we have circularly 
 
 come back to that fact. And a direct proof of this 
 
 paragraph is Adams's observation (I quote from a letter in 
 which he refers to an article in Astrophysical Journal," 45, 
 1917) that the smaller and less massive stars move more rap- 
 idly than the larger and more massive ones, the comparison 
 being made between stars having similar physical conditions. 
 And that is merely one form of the law that mass varies with 
 velocity, or the astronomical aspect of Bernoulli's principle; 
 or, as Adams puts it, the fact exhibits the principle of equi- 
 partition of energy. 
 
 b. And all that is obviously merely a particular way of 
 asserting our original observation that everything is interre- 
 lated. We have seen that the sun's heat is thus sustained 
 by the whole galaxy; so there is no fear of the sun's cooling 
 off very soon. The conventional theories of the sun s heat 
 ("Ency. Brit.," Art. Sun") obviously imply the foregoing 
 explicit description ; but they get somewhat confused by lay- 
 ing the explicit stress wholly on gravity — thus fancying that 
 the inside of the sun is hot so that the sun itself is directly a 
 
 reservoir of heat. We see additional detailed facts 
 
 confirming this section as we proceed. 
 
 §116. a. As the solar whirl S travels along its path in 
 Fig. 107e the condensation of the sun continues. Obviously, 
 the central field of the solar whirl is, dynamically, somewhat 
 cylindrical, as the virtually younger Saturn is observed to be 
 
 19fi 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 now in perceptible measure ("Ency. Brit.," Art. Saturn ). 
 
 That same modification of the figure of the sun, earth, 
 
 etc., would still apply in slight degree. The exact figure of 
 the earth or any other actual celestial body is not known, 
 and is not exactly soluble. That figure approaches geomet- 
 rical sphericity somewhat; so I roughly speak of spherical 
 whirls. For the conventional mechanics of those figures, see 
 "Ency. Brit.," Art. "Earth, Figure of." 
 
 b. Obviously, that general mechanics of condensation 
 
 agrees with the fact that observed spiral nebulas have conden- 
 sations in the center. Also, in our galaxy the condensation 
 has not proceeded so far as to form any perceptible central 
 sun or visible beginning of one ; but most likely the center 
 of our galaxy, on account of the comparatively numerous bod- 
 ies there, looks, from other galaxies, as if there were the 
 usual thick nebulous center — but possibly not; possibly our 
 galaxy it too young yet. Our mechanics obviously not only 
 consistently describe the formation of the sun, but they also 
 agree explicitly with the observed distribution of stars with 
 reference to the Milky Way :- they are thinly distributed at 
 the galactic poles (P and P', Fig. 107e), becoming more 
 thickly sprinkled towards the Milky Way, as observed from 
 our position near the center ("Ency. Brit., "Star"). Also, 
 our mechanics obviously furnish an explanation of the various 
 observed star drifts (same Art. Star"). 
 
 c. It is observed that the "surface" of the sun (which 
 is fluid) rotates faster at the sun's equator and gradually 
 goes slower as the poles are approached (the equatorial sur- 
 face rotates once in about 25 days, and the polar surface in 
 about 6 days longer). The same condition seems to have 
 been observed on Saturn, and there is considerable evidence 
 that our atmosphere acts in the same way (as we shall see, 
 the sun [etc.] has a "solid" surface like the earth, as it is 
 cold inside: but just as we do not see the floor of the ocean, 
 we do not see that solid surface, except perhaps dimly in the 
 middle of sun spots, and we do not know its rotation time). 
 In the sun, the upper layers of the ' surface" we see (i. e. , 
 hydrogen layers; Ency. Brit.," Sun"), rotate faster than 
 the lower ones, and the extreme perceptible outer layer seems 
 to retain its angular velocity as the poles are approached. 
 Obviously, all those otherwise unexplained phenomena are 
 directly consistent with our description of spherical whirls — 
 or follow directly from Bernoulli's principle applied to ether 
 cells. Also, that explanation is obviously equivalent to the 
 discussion of temperature in the last section. 
 
 §117. a. The sun when condensing as described would 
 obviously not only acquire a rotation about its axis, of the 
 nature just decribed, but the sun as a whole, by the principle 
 of asymmetry, would form somewhat away from the center 
 of the solar whirl field (i. e., the axis of the sun would not 
 correspond with the solar main axis). Hence, the sun itself 
 would revolve about the solar main axis (about NS' in Fig. 
 107e, although the center of the sun would be close to NS'), 
 and the primary result of that would be that there would be 
 an accumulated asymmetry which tended to make what was 
 left of the solar filament finally split into practically two large 
 secondary whirls (which process or stage of splitting would 
 correspond to conventional "dumbbell" nebulas). Or, we 
 can equally correctly say that the general unbalance of con- 
 ditions due to the traveling of the solar whirl asymmetrically 
 in the galaxy field (i. e., the start of the solar path in Fig. 
 107e obviously is asymmetrical with respect to the main axis 
 PP ), would tend to give such a double splitting, while at 
 the same time the same general asymmetry caused the sun 
 to form with its center of gravity off to one side of the 
 solar main axis. Both ways of stating the condition obviously 
 give the same result, being merely different points of view. 
 
127 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §117f 
 
 And it can be observed in experimental soapy water whirls 
 that the inevitable asymmetry even in a basin of water that 
 is apparently still has a tendency to accumulate and produce 
 such dumbbell or two-part splitting. 
 
 b. Parenthetically it may be noted that the infant sun 
 would revolve in an elliptical orbit about the solar main axis. 
 Also, the very young sun would itself at first be composed of 
 many small condensations revolving more or less about each 
 other in orbits controlled largely by gravity ; the sun in that 
 condition is a miniature star cluster. But that star cluster 
 would be comparatively small, and hence would condense 
 rapidly (say in a few million years) and form a structure with 
 chondrules as in meteorites (§120). And the ellipticity 
 of the orbit of the sun and also the ellipticity of the orbits of 
 its parts before it was quite condensed into a more or less in- 
 fant sun, would cause the condensations to sweep out consid- 
 erable space; also, the oscillations of those orbits up and 
 down near the solar filiar plane (roughly the ecliptic) would 
 sweep out a further space; and all those reactions would ac- 
 celerate the formation of the sun. For the details of that 
 roughly described planetesimal condensation see Chamber- 
 lin's "Origin of the Earth." The essential point of the 
 process is that the reactions tend towards the same result. 
 
 c. To take up again the probable dumbbell splitting, 
 we can see that at about the time the sun begins to be a 
 more or less dense cluster the solar whirl has a strong ten- 
 dency to become a spiral nebula with two rather definite 
 arms. Of course there could have been a number of smaller 
 arms (secondaries and their debris, tertiaries, etc.) previously 
 formed ; also, instead of two arms, the whirl could have 
 completely split into a number of secondaries, forming as 
 many arms. Spiral nebulas of those varying characteristics 
 
 are actually observed in the skies. And when the 
 
 solar filament is thus nearly all dissipated as secondaries, ob- 
 viously the filament is also comparatively much weakened so 
 that the secondary fields are weak, and the gravity factor be- 
 comes locally more effective. That gravity factor then ac- 
 celerates the condensing into spherical whirls, which whirls 
 relatively have an effective strong difference surface (e. g. , 
 the hot or high potential surface of the sun), and those re- 
 versed whirls thus bring the affinity of the whole solar system 
 up again, balancing the system with the galaxy whirl 
 (§114c). Thus we again see the rhythm of structure about 
 the One line of no resistance. 
 
 d. With that increase of gravity action there would be 
 rapidly formed in the central field of each secondary a nucleus 
 similar to the infant sun. Those condensations would form 
 more or less in the solar filiar plane (which is roughly the 
 same plane still :- the ecliptic ; for that data, and for author- 
 ity for other facts I use about the planets, etc., see Ency. 
 Brit.," Arts. "Sun," "Planet," "Planets, Minor," "Jupi- 
 ter," etc. ; for brevity I omit frequent citation of authority). 
 However, a good many of those condensations, especially 
 while they were in the rather sparse cluster stage, would ob- 
 viously have their general outer field get comparatively so 
 weak that the remains of the solar whirl field would sweep 
 them out of the ecliptic, around the filiar axis, into the cen- 
 tral solar field and likely into the sun (cf. §112a). In the 
 past it is very probable that large planets (at least infant 
 planets) have been thus swept into the sun; in the future 
 when we get into the proper galaxy environment for it, other 
 outer planets will be thus swept into the sun; comets now 
 are obviously minor condensations which have had such a 
 
 history (§120). It is most likely that novas or new 
 
 stars which suddenly blaze up in a few days much brighter 
 than they were before (and then more or less slowly grow 
 dim) are stars which have thus been hit by one of their outer 
 
 planets. The general disturbance caused by the reaction of 
 the fields as the planet is falling could account for the minor 
 preliminary increase of brightness sometimes observed in 
 novas. One conventional explanation of new stars is that 
 they are caused by ordinary stars' running into dark nebulas. 
 The objection to that is that the various fields would prevent 
 such a collision, and that the fields would in any partial col- 
 lision be so strong that only very gradual results could occur. 
 If Neptune swung around into the sun it obviously would 
 make the sun blaze up quite a bit, and probably would burn 
 up most of us humans ; but it would not smash the sun ap- 
 preciably, but would be superficially spectacular, like novas. 
 It is therefore obvious that it is possible that the former popu- 
 lar fear of comets was a racial memory from the former days 
 when some comets did do a lot of local damage. Neptune 
 would make a rather large and dangerous comet. But no 
 one need get frightened, as intelligent astronomers could 
 predict such occurrences hundreds of years ahead. 
 
 e. If the solar whirl started out as a fluid whirl, it is 
 likely that the larger secondary whirl of that possible dumb- 
 bell splitting was the beginning of what is now Jupiter, our 
 giant planet. It is possible, of course, that the sun and 
 Jupiter were two solar systems which approached each other 
 and pulled each other into a gravity spiral nebula, as is tac- 
 itly asserted possible by Chamberlin and others. It is im- 
 probable, however. Certainly it is practically impossible 
 that there were two lone stars, Sun and Jupiter, in the same 
 neighborhood in the galaxy field ; and the combination of 
 the more probable Sun cluster and Jupiter cluster except by 
 extremely improbable chances would have produced a more 
 complicated solar system than ours is observed to be. It is 
 likely that the astronomers already have enough data to de- 
 termine at once the probable actual history as regards that 
 possibility. The actual fact is, of course, that the solar sys- 
 tem was never (except by one chance in infinity) a whirl so 
 perfectly fluid as to contain no structures higher in order than 
 ether cells: always it would start with some condensations.' 
 Analogously, neither could it be a whirl or nebula produced 
 by just two sharp and distinct bodies or condensations. Al- 
 ways there would be fields (affinity) to those bodies, and 
 more or less of a cluster condition which would produce some- 
 thing of a fluid whirl. Chamberlin in effect asserts that; so 
 there is logical identity between Chamberlin s planetesimal 
 processes, and these whirl mechanics in which for rhetorical 
 needs I am deliberately emphasizing affinity. 
 
 f. The solar system now, so far as has been observed, 
 consists of the sun with four planets (respectively Mercury, 
 Venus, Earth, Mars), then a gap in which there have been 
 seen over a thousand small planets or asteroids (those asteroids 
 often depart considerably from the ecliptic), then the four 
 outer planets (respectively Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and 
 Neptune), with various moons, comets, meteor trains, and 
 gases. It is likely that the asteroids form most of what is 
 left of the original solar filament (compare with the "dirt" 
 in Northrup's filaments; §102d); there probably still re- 
 mains a slight fluid motion of ether as a filament there, but 
 its spiral has probably become nearly wholly a revolution 
 about the main solar axis; some such motion might be de- 
 tected by close observation of the orbits of asteroids. 
 
 When the solar whirl became a rather well defined spiral it is 
 obvious that most likely a number of comparatively small 
 secondaries traveled around the solar filament into the cen- 
 tral solar field. The sun by that time would have been at 
 least a considerably condensed cluster, so that there would 
 have been considerable space around the sun in which there 
 was room for those whirls to survive, and to condense to- 
 gether in a proportionate way, thus sweeping out all that 
 
§117f XII Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 128 
 
 space pretty cleanly. That would produce the four inner 
 planets ; it might have produced forty except that the quan- 
 tities happened to be so related by the principles of harmonic 
 periodicity (or here, by the principles of Bode's law; cf. 
 next paragraph, §128, etc.) that there were four. Probably 
 the other and smaller part of the original dumbbell splitting 
 (if there was such a splitting) was Saturn. It would be pro- 
 tected by Jupiter; i. e., Jupiter would sweep out its space 
 pretty cleanly, and would more or less break up the original 
 solar field, so that Saturn lived in a fairly steady and weak- 
 ened solar field, and hence lived very slowly and is now virt- 
 ually quite young — compared with the earth ; middle aged 
 compared with the galaxy whirl. The two known planets 
 now remaining still further out, Uranus and Neptune, are 
 obviously condensations made up of other whirls left in the 
 outer space. There may be a number of outer planets yet 
 undiscovered; it is a quantitative problem not exactly soluble. 
 There are surely some small condensations out there. 
 
 g. Now, all of those planets (including the asteroids as 
 the averaged equivalent of one planet) may obviously truis- 
 tically be considered to have field surfaces substantially equal 
 in potential — in energeticness. In short, the reason Newton 
 got his form of illogical law is that the planet field surfaces 
 are rather weak and about equal. It therefore theoretically 
 follows directly that, as their orbits are approximately in the 
 plane of the ecliptic (roughly, are 2 -dimensioned), then the 
 proper harmonic periods for the space distribution of the 
 planets would be with radii of orbits related approximately 
 by the ratio 2 — which by the theory of areas of circles (Area= 
 471-r 2 ), dynamically balances the structure and verbally bal- 
 ances the inverse square law. If we take the number 0.15 
 and form a geometrical series by multiplying it by 2, we 
 have 0.15, 0.3, 0.6, etc. If we arbitrarily add 0.4 to each 
 number, we have 0.55, 0.7, 1.0, 1.6, 2.8, 5.2, 10.0, 19.6, 
 38.8. The radii of the planets' orbits (the earth's being 
 taken as 1.0; and roughly averaging the planetoids') are re- 
 spectively:- 0.39, 0.7, 1.0, 1.5, (2.8), 5.2, 9.5, 19.2, 30.1. 
 Obviously those radii are approximately equal to the modi- 
 fied geometrical series. That coincidence or empirical 
 
 rule is known as Bode's law ("Ency. Brit.," 'Bode"). 
 Obviously, if Newton's law were accurate and logical we 
 would not have those discrepancies, and would not have had 
 to use the 0.4 (the use of which corresponds to the actual 
 fact that the bodies are of finite size, and not zero or geomet- 
 rical points as in Newton's law). But because there are 
 fields, and bodies of finite size, the harmonic space distribu- 
 tion of the planets (including their satellites) requires first a 
 general modification of the series in more or less equal degree 
 for each member — that being accomplished by the 0.4. 
 Then, there are two considerable discrepancies :- in the dist- 
 ance of Mercury, and the distance of Neptune. The spheri- 
 cal field of the sun is comparatively strong; hence the field 
 of Mercury would be considerably modified, compared with 
 most fields in the solar system, and would have its gravity 
 pull considerably modified ; and that principle properly ex- 
 hibits itself in the discrepancy noted. (it is also definitely 
 known from astronomical observations that Mercury percept- 
 ibly departs from Newton's law.) Neptune is exposed to the 
 solar whirl field and hence like Mercury is pulled in closer by 
 gravity and thus speeded up, bringing its field to equilibrium. 
 
 In short, Bode s law is a series of numbers which 
 
 roughly exhibits relative values of W...y(.A... in the solar 
 system. If Newton s law were correct, Bode's law would 
 be a series using 2 as a precise ratio : a perfect gas, where 
 all space sizes are formally or °°, is such a monism. Bode s 
 law, logically interpreted, is equivalent to Moseley s law, if 
 Moseley's law is made to agree with the general law that 
 
 there is no exact science, so that , 
 
 ;idered ultimately exact, any more than Bode s 
 
 therefore Moseley's ratios 
 any n 
 or unites the total solar 
 
 was thus forming the 
 
 are not consi 
 
 are exact (§128). That identifies 
 
 system concretely with one wave or corpuscle oi flight, as is 
 
 made implicitly obvious in the chapter on light (X1I1) 
 
 §118. a. While the solar whirl 
 sun, with planets revolving about it, each planet as a smaller 
 or lower order whirl would obviously by the logic of identity 
 and the mechanics of whirls be following precisely the same 
 process, and we may observe in a rough way the various 
 stages in the history of the solar system by observing the 
 planets as they now are. Except for being of smaller size, 
 and hence generally less energetic, Saturn is obviously now 
 in the stage the solar system was, shortly after the sun had 
 somewhat condensed from the central cluster of planetesi- 
 mals — say 20 to 30 billion years ago. We may briefly ob- 
 serve some of the numerous details that are seen in Saturn. 
 
 b. Saturn has rings that are slightly tilted from the plane 
 of its orbit (just as the ring of planets about the sun theoret- 
 ically is tilted from the plane of the sun's orbit about PP'). 
 Conventional theories are not definite as to the composition 
 and mechanics of those rings ("Ency. Brit.," "Saturn"). 
 It is mathematically established that Newtonian gravity 
 alone would not support a fluid ring, and it is therefore ortbo- 
 doxly assumed that gravity solely acts upon small bodies, 
 keeping them in revolution and forming Saturn's rings. The 
 obvious defects in that assumption are:- (l) only by one 
 chance in infinity would the thin rings then be formed, or be 
 capable of remaining in the same plane if once formed (i. e. , 
 the sole-gravity idea — or rather absence of idea — gives no 
 fields to support or control the rings in that plane: the ordi- 
 nary sole-gravity hypothesis of the general ring or plane of 
 planets suffers from the same defect) : (2) the rings are in 
 some places practically opaque; they are clearly visible; and 
 they cast a shadow on the body of Saturn; and those condi- 
 tions obviously could not exist with rings of scattered par- 
 ticles (and have them sum only to the actual small weight of 
 the ring), unless the particles were rather close together 
 and mostly of small size, and hence were, by the electron 
 theory, in effect a fluid (and that contradicts the original 
 orthodox premise) : (3) the whole ring has dark bands (or is 
 split into concentric ' ring*") which apparently vary, and in 
 effect the whole ring has six outer concentric rings that are 
 six moons (there are four more known moons farther out, 
 not quite in the ring plane); and the orthodox sole-gravity 
 theory is helpless in stating why such conditions happened, 
 or even why they persist, having started. 
 
 c. Clearly, if we consider the ring to be the vestiges of 
 the filament of the Saturn whirl every one of those outstand- 
 ing characteristics of Saturn is directly consistently estab- 
 lished as a mechanical truism, similar to the explanation of 
 the solar system, and the conditions of the ring are direct 
 evidences of the truth of the whirl theory. 
 
 d. The ninth satellite or moon of Saturn has a retrograde 
 motion. The pure-gravity or nebular theory can not account 
 consistently for that retrograde revolution (which also applies 
 to the two outer moons of Jupiter and to the moon of Nep- 
 tune ; — incidentally, I am not certain as to numbers of vari- 
 ous sets of moons, for new ones have been recently found and 
 I am depending on casual memory for these comparatively 
 trivial facts). Obviously, the whirl theory would require, as 
 being quantitatively most probable, that most of the inner 
 condensations should revolve about the center of their whirl 
 in the same sense as the revolution component of the spiral 
 in the original filament. But outer secondary whirls obviously 
 could easily get capsized, being exposed to the environment, 
 and would then revolve in a retrograde" direction- in fact 
 
129 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §119a 
 
 such capsizing obviously establishes more stable equilibrium 
 in the weak outer field (Chamberlin's planetesimal theory, in 
 using defective astronomy, omits showing definitely any simi- 
 lar strengthening of equilibrium that amounts to a check on 
 the gravity process; and the theory thus more or less fails to 
 locate positively the probable place for retrograde motion), 
 e. I shall be more explicit as to the "dark" bands, and 
 the orbits of the six inner moons that are in the ring plane, 
 and are hence in effect equivalent to six more bright rings — 
 or, are equivalent to more or less definite electrons in an 
 atom:- The combination of the two forces W...Y.A... 
 would obviously, by our theory of harmonic periodicity, sort 
 out or sift out condensations of the same spherical field sur- 
 face intensity, arranging those of the same intensity at a 
 properly or harmoniously proportioned radial distance from 
 Saturn, thus arranging those of the same intensity in a ring 
 concentric with the rings in which were those of other inten- 
 sities — the least effective intensity being outward, and hence 
 truistically becoming distinct moons, in which and in the for- 
 mation of which obviously gravity is stronger than affinity 
 (than field surface). When the field surfaces of the conden- 
 sations become still weaker, they are obviously then not able 
 to hold the moons in the plane ; and the stronger gravity dis- 
 turbances among themselves and other bodies throw them 
 somewhat out of the plane (enough out to strengthen their 
 field surfaces, and establish harmonic equilibrium with other 
 planets, etc.). So obviously, if we were observing the six 
 inner moons from afar and had retinal persistence enough so 
 that they remained perceptible streaks of light all around 
 their orbits, they would appear as such streaks or rings located 
 in harmonious proportions or as a spectrum (XIII) ; and the 
 irregular outer moons (irregular in the sense that for them 
 there is not a nearly complete balance of W and A relative 
 to just the Saturn structure) would be bright bands of per- 
 ceptible width — that might be bright enough over a wide 
 enough radial distance to be a continuous" spectrum. In 
 short, the Saturn rings, by exhibiting directly the varying 
 proportions or effects of W and A exhibit what we might call 
 a molar spectrum ; also, they show a sifting out or concrete 
 periodic table.' Obviously, therefore, the dark rings would 
 be due to the fact that at certain places in the varying bal- 
 ancing of W and A, conditions lacking equilibrium arose, 
 and the 'atoms' were pulled to one side or the other of the 
 circle in the whole ring which would have been their lo- 
 cation had they been stable there (being thus changed or 
 'condensed' into the more stable-sized bodies away from that 
 circle): so in the neighborhood of the circle there would be 
 few if any surviving condensations of the particular size that 
 would balance there, and hence too few reflectors or givers of 
 light; and therefore "darkness." That is identically what 
 happens, with direct reference to harmonic proportions or 
 'periods' of comparative equilibrium, in the formation of the 
 periodic table. Obviously, there could exist a band in the 
 ring in which over a comparatively considerable radial dist- 
 ance there is such a proportionality of W and A that there 
 is practically continuous equilibrium, and hence no percept- 
 ible trace of dark rings or gaps, but a thicker collection of 
 condensations: and a precisely analogous condition occurs in 
 the chemical periodic table, with respect to the so-called 
 "break" containing the rare earths, which break corresponds 
 to one of the brighter, wider bands in Saturn's ring (App. A, 
 atoms 57 to 72), and in the solar system as the rather con- 
 tinuous band of asteroids. It it not a "break," but the ab- 
 sence of a break — the actual breaks (where we may say that 
 the rhythms of various — several — properties get out of step) 
 or dark rings occur between the ordinary "elements. And 
 a secondary and hence more pronounced rhythm of such lack 
 
 of breaks is evidenced by the groups in column VIII of the 
 
 periodic table. There is in the table a considerable 
 
 'dark band' between H and He. It is obvious that in that 
 space other elementary" atoms could exist temporarily, but 
 not very stably ; and Thomson (in experiments on canal rays) 
 made some of those atoms that existed for perhaps a short 
 
 time. This paragraph could profitably to physicists 
 
 be expanded to a volume. I haven't gone far into the sub- 
 ject — which is why the paragraph is vague and ambiguous. 
 §119. a. Further, depending mostly upon the ener- 
 getic condition of the main solar field, it is obvious that ad- 
 ditional outer moons of Saturn might be held in the plane of 
 the ring. If the solar field were energetic, and the Saturn 
 filament were young enough to take up some of that energy 
 or were conditioned so as to balance with it, then the Saturn 
 field would hold additional moons in its ring, and the ring 
 would be wider. And in the same circumstances, the small- 
 condensations part of the ring would extend farther out, be- 
 fore those condensations would collect into moons of weaker 
 affinity. So as a truism, in such circumstances Saturn would 
 be heavier," or would have a higher atomic weight.' 
 Therefore, if on earth we subject atoms to considerably heav- 
 ier pressure for a long time (other conditions being fairly 
 steady — as would reasonably be the case deep inside the 
 earth), then that would be equivalent to giving them a wider 
 ring and increasing their atomic weights. It therefore fol- 
 lows that inside the earth there are most probably (in prin- 
 ciple absolutely are, if the quantitative conditions are right) 
 atoms of higher atomic weights than any we have yet ob- 
 served — just as there seem to be, by the same principle ap- 
 plied to opposite quantitative conditions, elements in nebulas 
 (where the pressure is light: where there is plenty of room) 
 that are lighter than any we have got hold of on earth. So 
 if any of the heavier internal atoms got extruded by volcanoes 
 (§122), they would begin to have their outer moons' grow 
 more loose and unstable. And under proper quantitative 
 conditions (especially is time enough needed for the results to 
 accumulate) some of those outer moons would break loose 
 from the atom, and we would have the phenomena of radio- 
 activity — identical in principle with ordinary secondary whirl 
 formation described in XI, but quantitatively probably in- 
 volving considerable heavy condensations as just described. 
 In the solar system comets represent radioactivity with respect 
 to the internal parts of the system; i. e. , comets nowadays are a 
 very mild degree of internal radioactivity which would cor- 
 respond to internal electron formation with respect to atoms 
 — a breaking up so mild in degree as usually not to be called 
 "radioactivity." To get conventional radioactivity as ex- 
 hibited externally by ordinary atoms, we would have to have 
 the solar system as a whole react perceptibly with other sys- 
 tems, and it happens that at present there seems to be no 
 such perceptible reaction, in which pieces break out of our 
 solar field and go as a comet to other systems — as a rather 
 large secondary. But obviously, the principles are consist- 
 ent and simple, as shown. Clearly, there could be a long 
 series (really in infinite regress) of periodic rhythms' of new 
 and heavier atoms under long-continued heavier pressures. 
 Obviously, in steady conditions of pressure the atoms would 
 not perceptibly change any more than the solar system as a 
 whole is doing. Therefore, inside (say) the earth where the 
 conditions are fairly steady there would be no perceptible 
 breaking up of the atoms (no radioactivity"), and hence no 
 appreciable heating from that cause : there may be a com- 
 parative trifle of heating effect from radioactivity in the sur- 
 face layers of the earth. So from that point of view also, 
 the insides of the planets, etc., must be cold (see also §122i) ; 
 only their surfaces have sufficient disturbances of equilibrium 
 
§119a XII Two 
 
 to produce much heat. There would be breaks in the 
 rhythm of those heavier elements, similar to those in our 
 periodic table. And the atomic weights would keep on go- 
 ing "up," or the periodic table keep on extending itself, to 
 some variable limit in a given planet. The principle denning 
 that limit is truistically this :- if a whirl happens to be en- 
 ergetic enough to form an atom of a weight beyond the har- 
 monious limit, it will be unstable and break up. 
 
 b. Similarly in the other direction, towards the H end 
 of the periodic table, there is a lower limit of atoms for our 
 average conditions. At that limit there is a gap in our mo- 
 lar spectrum' which is equivalent to the change in order of 
 whirls from atoms to electrons. But that gap itself in differ- 
 ent quantitative conditions is subject to variation (cf. the dis- 
 cussion of spectrum in XIII). So obviously, this is merely a 
 repetition of the infinite regress of harmonic periodicity given 
 at length in a general way in §101. The way to get a defin- 
 ite and applicable numerical and rigorous statement of the 
 theory is to determine the structures of atoms in ways to be 
 shown, then tabulate the rhythms of their properties as 
 Richards does in his Faraday lecture, and combine the two. 
 
 c. Furthermore, it is directly obvious that although the 
 harmony or rhythm of proportion of all whirls or atoms 
 (based on V\ — or on an}' other given criterion) would remain 
 steady, so that relatively to its environment C always has the 
 same properties roughly, yet an atom of C in one environ- 
 ment by no means necessarily contains (and by only one 
 chance in infinity could contain) the same quantity of ether 
 cells, as a C atom in another environment. For it is obvious 
 that all of the condensations in the Saturn rings which are of 
 a fairly stable size and which as a sum form a ring of certain 
 radius, and which condensations we may say are analogous 
 to C atoms, would have to contain a different amount of 
 "substance" (really, of a fixed verbal or logical space and 
 time; cf. Part One) in order to occupy the same relative ring 
 (of relative properties) in a system other than the Saturn sys- 
 tem. Yet in both systems those condensations at similar 
 relative locations would be C. For obviously, if the two then 
 differently weighing C's (referred to a fixed standard quantity 
 of ether cells) were not both the same consistently named 
 C, then we would get a practically identical spectrum (with 
 reference to its most perceptible portion) from different" 
 elements. In brief, W is only one factor, and irrational 
 alone, and there can be no constant atomic weights. Or in 
 familiar language, circumstances alter cases — that quantita- 
 tive truism implying that the relations or principles stay 
 
 steady. Therefore, because of different past history 
 
 two atoms may apparently be built the same with respect to 
 easily perceptible properties of a certain sort (such as roughly 
 having the same spectrum ; or roughly having apparently 
 the same chemical ' reactions), and still have perceptible 
 differences in weight. As a matter of truisms, of course 
 those different past histories have made the two atoms some- 
 what different in every characteristic or property. (And as it 
 is truistic that no two things can occupy the same space sim- 
 ultaneously, therefore each thing in the universe has had a 
 history, and hence has properties, different from every other 
 thing.) It merely happens that in the general theory of 
 harmonic proportions the weight of the two varied appreci- 
 ably more than some other properties : theoretically, there 
 is no reason why the reverse should not occur (that the 
 weight of two atoms should be practically the same while the 
 two differed appreciably in other properties) ; and allotropic 
 forms are actual examples. 
 
 d. And obviously, any interaction of the Saturn whirl 
 with any other whirl (planet) will make the orbits of the 
 moons (and everything else in the whirl) get smaller or 
 
 UNIVERSE 130 
 
 larger. Any sort of atoms are therefore directly compress- 
 ible, in complete agreement with Richards's theory (§82). 
 
 e. It would be easy to go on for volumes giving the 
 general principles of atomic structures, as they are directly 
 evidenced by the structure of Saturn. Those volumes are 
 omitted for several reasons:- (l) The reader who is inter- 
 ested can work them out readily, and will find it more profit- 
 able and enjoyable to do it for himself. (2) The volumes 
 are actually rather useless until they are expressed in ob- 
 served measures with some fair numerical precision. And 
 that is an enormous work I have scarcely touched, and of 
 which I am mostly in ignorance. Quite probably I have con- 
 sequently made silly quantitative errors in the foregoing, 
 and it is better to stop before I make those errors worse. 
 
 f. It is possible, by further using Saturn as evidence, or 
 by using other facts about the solar system, to go on and 
 show in considerable rough detail why the sun and various 
 planets should have their actually observed densities, masses, 
 tilts of axes, speeds of axial rotation, virtual ages, etc. Ob- 
 viously, all those properties are completely related by W. .. X 
 A..., and we can readily get rough verbal statements of the 
 relationships out to a considerable number of dots, even in 
 the absence of the more precise mathematical expression. 
 (The chief reason we can so readily get consistent expression 
 of those relationships here is because we are working in the 
 actual three dimensions; that verbally compels a statement 
 of real structure.) But probably most readers would find 
 such a necessarily lengthy statement of technical astronomical 
 detail both confusing (for this first general view of the uni- 
 verse), and also tiresome. It is not actually needed by the 
 intelligent reader, as it is merely a detailed application of 
 principles already seen in general working. So I shall end 
 this astronomical chapter by giving some odds and ends of 
 details that are illuminating, and also perhaps interesting. 
 
 §120. a. We briefly consider comets (for authority for 
 observed facts used, see 'Ency. Brit.," Art. Comet"). 
 
 b. We have seen that any whirl would have some con- 
 densations. There would be numerous condensations in the 
 older spiral nebulas such as the solar system, or even in the 
 considerably younger Saturn. In the virtually very old spir- 
 al nebulas such as the earth-moon system, those condensa- 
 tions, especially the larger ones, seem to be rather cleanly 
 swept out by the planetesimal process. However, even in 
 the case of the earth-moon there is considerable evidence of 
 the existence still of lighter condensed whirls (§121c). For 
 verbal simplicity and brevity let us explicitly consider only 
 the condensations which are scattered in the outer parts of 
 the solar whirl field. The nearest star to us so far as known 
 is nearly four light years distant (if I remember correctly : it 
 was discovered two or three years ago). So it is probable 
 that the field difference surface of the solar whirl is, in the 
 plane of the planets, at least one light year distant from the 
 sun — about- 60,000 times the distance of the earth from the 
 sun or 2000 that of Neptune from the sun. Hence, com- 
 paratively there would be considerable room for condensa- 
 tions beyond Neptune. Possibly there are some fair sized 
 planets out there — probably retrograde. But at any rate 
 there would be some small whirls there that are more or less 
 aged into clusters. Also, in that weak outer solar field there 
 would be a tendency for the gravity of the scattered clusters 
 to become relatively strong enough to pull them into larger 
 clusters ; and the process of forming those clusters would 
 create a sufficiently strong field (increase its A) so that there 
 would be a stronger reaction of cluster field and solar field, 
 and the cluster would get swept out of the ecliptic, around 
 through the solar field into the central field where the sun is. 
 Also, precisely the same thing would obviously tend to occur 
 
131 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §120h 
 
 as the result of any disturbance of the solar field if the whirl 
 ran into a somewhat different environment — if our whirl came 
 close to another system, say. Those are merely additional 
 details showing again how outer fields are cleaned out. 
 
 c. Those clusters (or virtually old secondaries, or what- 
 ever else we name the possible variations) as they sweep 
 around into the central solar field are comets. There is no 
 very complete orthodox explanation of comets and their phe- 
 nomena ; but as we shall see, this whirl description completes 
 the orthodox explanations with obvious consistency, and 
 shows in even more detail that the whirl theory is universally 
 consistent. Of course, those comets could be born from 
 practically any part of the solar system ; or a planetary whirl 
 could give birth to a comet into the solar whirl field ; but 
 only briefly in pars, gh shall we consider those variations. 
 
 d. Those clusters would have such a comparatively weak 
 field that the sun's gravity pull would act rather strongly on 
 them to pull them towards the sun when they got started in 
 their swings around. That increased speed would truistically 
 give more intense reactions of solar field and comet field, and 
 the comet field would therefore do two general things to the 
 comet cluster:- (l) the cluster would form into a rather defi- 
 nite whirl which comparatively very rapidly started condens- 
 ing into a central nucleus (central sun') ; (2) the comet field 
 rubbing energetically on the little fields inside would make 
 them heat up the surfaces of the condensations. And both 
 of those mechanical results give subsequent phenomena pre- 
 cisely as are observed in comets. In general those phenom- 
 ena are these:- (l) As the comet gets near the sun the 
 nucleus could be either a cluster or an actual condensation 
 into an infant sun (or of course any intermediate stage). Ob- 
 servations of comets have not definitely determined whether 
 the nucleus is an opaque condensation, or a cluster that we 
 can see through pretty well ; clearly, our theory would 
 give both possibilities, and that will make plain all the ques- 
 tions as to the mass and densities of comets, and of their ob- 
 served breaking up. (2) And the spherical surfaces could 
 heat to incandescence without much affecting the parts inside 
 of those fairly thin glowing surfaces (for direct proof, see 
 par. k). (3) Those surfaces could vaporize into more or less 
 fluid atoms or molecules, and all the visible phenomena of 
 comets would follow, as is readily obvious, but as will be 
 stated in slight detail below. 
 
 e. As the comet came nearer the sun and its speed in- 
 creased its spherical surfaces would gradually get hotter, and 
 would finally vaporize some. (That vaporization is obviously 
 itself a giving off of secondary whirls : a less degree of the 
 same phenomenon gives sun-spots, volcanoes, storms, etc. ; 
 §122.) That vapor or collection of atomic secondaries would 
 fill the field of the comet with visible whirls, and so we see 
 the whirl field in photographs of comets. Also, the rapid 
 speed of the comet causes numerous births of secondaries 
 from the outer field surface of the comet, so that the atoms 
 get 'outside,' into the solar field. Then partly due to the 
 pressure of light, and partly due to the fact that those field 
 difference surface secondaries have reactions of their own 
 which cause them to screw themselves rapidly through the 
 solar field in a direction away from the sun, the tail would 
 form. Obviously, the lighting-up of the comet and the for- 
 mation of the tail would take place gradually as the sun is 
 approached, and die away as the comet recedes (and both 
 are clearly functions of the comet's mass, speed, etc. , or, 
 in general, of the comet's balance of W and A). 
 
 f. Also, certain sizes of those tail secondaries would ob- 
 viously not be in the necessary harmony of proportion to sur- 
 vive. So there would be a preponderance of certain elements 
 in the tail. Also, there would be a 3-dimension balancing of 
 
 elements in the tail, (l) in the direction of the axis of the tail; 
 and (2) because of the swinging of the tail, markedly in the 
 two dimensions at right angles or radially from that axis. In 
 Saturn the balancing of the condensations in the ring was 
 practically perceptible in two dimensions :- radially from Sat- 
 urn in the plane of the ring, forming concentric rings. Be- 
 cause Saturn moves in an orbit tilted with respect to its rings 
 there would theoretically actually be a component of balanc- 
 ing across the thickness of those rings. Such has not been 
 noticed : there is a remote possibility that it might be per- 
 ceptible if looked for. Consequently, we have the 
 
 elements' of the tail being periodically separated or sifted 
 out in 3-dimension fans" and knobs" and kinks, etc. 
 And such phenomena are actually observed. A comet s tail 
 is therefore obviously a 3-dimension molar' or chemical 
 spectrum; or, the tail gives an automatic analysis of the 
 whirls which can survive. So the description of comets tails 
 requires volumes, omitted at this point and practically un- 
 known to me. As a matter of rather obvious fact, the greater 
 part of the volumes I mention omitting is unknown to me. 
 
 g. Obviously, if the field of Saturn were in some way 
 rudely disturbed in the proper direction, the field would give 
 birth to a secondary that would be, with nearly certain prob- 
 ability, a small comet. Also, it would partake of the com- 
 ponents of motion of the Saturn whirl. Hence, usually it 
 would not be in harmony, either in size or orbit, with comets 
 formed in the outer solar field. So except in rare cases a 
 Saturn comet would not survive long, but would most prob- 
 ably be swallowed up by Saturn on the passing of the dis- 
 turbance. That shows that the tendency in the solar system, 
 so far as its internal processes are concerned (and if not in- 
 terfered with' by outside systems), is to keep on in the one 
 direction of condensing ; for a large whirl in it can reverse 
 (as Saturn was there seen to do hypothetically), but does not 
 do so except temporarily. Hence, most of the comets prob- 
 ably come from beyond Neptune; possibly some are born in 
 the vestiges of the solar filament, and a. few small weak ones 
 may come from the Saturn or the Jupiter whirl. 
 
 h. A comet may be born at the solar field difference 
 surface, either into the solar system or out of it — am' asym- 
 metry there obviously forming a comet or secondary (§98w). 
 But when comets are born into the solar system, in precisely 
 the same way as seen in the last paragraph (by the theory of 
 periodicity) only comets of some certain sizes could survive 
 very long — others being quickly assimilated. (And as an 
 obvious incidental fact, the formation of comets of any ap- 
 preciable size would mostly take place into the equatorial 
 parts of the solar whirl field, because the flat polar parts of 
 the field are more stable.) As those field surface comets are 
 obviously directly analogous to electrons, it becomes obvious 
 why electrons (i. e. , electrons in an explicitly conventional 
 sense:- those given off by ' atoms") are roughly of a certain 
 proportional size, and why any disturbance of atoms produces 
 electrons. We see at once, again in complete agreement 
 with the last paragraph, that a comet born into the solar sys- 
 tem would have practically no chance of traveling very far 
 into the solar system in its original form. It would be mak- 
 ing a considerable disturbance of equilibrium along its path, 
 and unless the solar system had received a severe jolt (which 
 seems to be improbable in its present rather isolated loca- 
 tion), the comet nearly surely would not be large enough to 
 get far without being assimilated. And that agrees with the 
 observed fact that no comet yet measured seems to have 
 come from outside the solar system; it also agrees with num- 
 erous facts about electrons. The comet from outside quite 
 likely stirs up the solar system more or less to start a comet 
 in the regular way ; and that is equivalent to saying that the 
 
§120h XII Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 132 
 
 comet from outside does swing around the sun, but that it 
 has changed its quantitative character and thereafter is a 
 solar system comet — has been 'assimilated' in that way. And 
 quite possibly such a comet, in being assimilated, starts a 
 series of reactions which will in turn cause the solar system 
 to give out a comet — so that an observer outside might think 
 he saw a comet pass through the solar system, whereas the 
 electron or comet that came out was composed of quite dif- 
 ferent materials, and was variously different otherwise. We 
 may observe that the way our own physiological cells assimi- 
 late" food, or eat," is quite analogous to this comet or 
 electron formation. The cell and its molecules will turn the 
 food into its own substance," just as comets are finally to 
 some extent assimilated by the sun; and part of the food 
 will necessarily (it is necessary or truistic because ultimately 
 there is no symmetry or commensurability in any part) start 
 some series of reactions that will cause a comet' to be given 
 off by (say) some molecule, which rejected part is not 
 wanted" or a poison (XVI). It is obviously all a matter of 
 quantitative variations in sizes, etc. ; the principles are the 
 same : for when we consider that process of assimilation 
 with respect to a biologic cell, molecules of various sorts are 
 taken in, instead of electrons, and then molecules of different 
 sorts from those taken in are observed to be rejected — show- 
 ing in another way that the electron absorbed by an atom is 
 different from the one given out. 
 
 i. So it is obvious that perhaps most of the comets 
 would come swinging in to the sun on orbits considerably 
 elongated ; in fact, in practice it is difficult to distinguish 
 some from parabolas. And because of the obvious theoreti- 
 cal interference of fields, and to the gravity pulls of planets, 
 numbers of comets are likely to be slowed into short orbits — 
 and such is the orbserved fact (incidentally there is a per- 
 ceptible harmonic periodicity to the sizes of comets' orbits). 
 The comet with the shortest orbit yet observed is Encke's, 
 with a period of about 3.29 years. And that comet percept- 
 ibly fails to obey Newton's law. We have now seen why. 
 Another fact of the same general sort about comets, which 
 shows directly that we must consider fields as well as ordi- 
 nary gravity is the observation that the long axes of their or- 
 bits tend to trail out in the wake of the solar system as it 
 moves in its own orbit about PP ; only the reactions of fields 
 — of A — could produce that phenomena. 
 
 j. Comets are of a comparative size that is unstable. 
 Obviously by our theory, and by direct observation, they 
 break" up, and the sun and planets begin to sweep up plan- 
 etesimally the pieces which have thus been transported from 
 the outer parts of the solar system, and from outside the sys- 
 tem. The pieces are called meteors or meteorites (I shall 
 not make the usual minor distinction; see Ency. Brit.," 
 Meteor," Meteorites," for definitions and for details of 
 the observed facts I use). The earth sweeps up many mete- 
 ors, and we can observe them in flight as shooting stars and 
 fireballs, and examine the occasional ones which survive until 
 they reach the earth and are found. It has been estimated 
 by astronomers that 400 million meteors telescopically visible 
 fall on the earth each 24 hours. 
 
 k. Some of those meteors fall as fireballs, which, accord- 
 ing to the vague observations available, seem to be clusters 
 of condensations (minature systems) that definitely form 
 whirls in our atmosphere — seem to be definitely comets in 
 our atmosphere. The meteors which reach the earth show 
 only two definite molar structural formations:- (l) there is 
 evidence of their surfaces having been heated ; and (2) often 
 these are chondrules or spherules (roundish grains varying in 
 size from microscopic to that of a walnut) imbedded in a rock 
 matrix. The obvious explanation of those chondrules is that 
 
 they are planetesimal condensations with hot surfaces and 
 hence rounded forms that rain down upon a hot-surface nu- 
 cleus in a comet, and are imbedded there — sometimes the 
 nucleus afterwards being broken up by some large unbalance. 
 A reference to the Art. "Meteorite" will show that no other 
 explanation is probable. So we have here direct experi- 
 mental evidence of the whirl theory or some equivalent one, 
 and of the fact that heavenly bodies are relatively cold in- 
 side. A comet exhibiting chondrules would probably be of 
 average size, whatever that may be; for obviously, larger 
 ones would melt the rain of planetesimals more or less homo- 
 geneously into the remainder of the nuclear substance, and 
 small ones would not be hot enough to imbed chondrules. 
 
 §121. a. It has been repeatedly seen that there can be 
 no perfectly fluid whirls, or on the other hand perfect spheri- 
 cal condensations which would exhibit Newton s monistic 
 gravity. Always by consistent mechanics there must be dif- 
 ference surfaces giving off an infinite regress of secondaries — 
 or any actual body must be in some intermediate stage of 
 being a nebula of which the zero-infinity limits are (l) a unit 
 fluid perfect whirl with no secondaries, and (2) a unit perfect 
 solid sphere with no interacting body. That sentence sum- 
 marizes this chapter in concrete terms of the One and Many. 
 
 b. It therefore follows that the sun, earth, moon, Jupi- 
 ter, comets, etc., would each severally, and all as a sum, 
 have in some degree an accompanying nebulosity. Comets 
 have that nebulosity in marked degree — being often accom- 
 panied by its extension into a tail. Also, in full agreement 
 with our verbal truisms of description, the sun, and earth, 
 and probably the moon, have nebulosity which is visually 
 perceptible to us. And we shall see implicitly in electricity 
 (XIV) that any body has electrical fields, which are always 
 experimentally perceptible if its relative motion is sufficiently 
 great; and those fields are equivalent to nebulosity. The 
 nebulosity of the other planets is too far off and tenuous to 
 have been noticed yet, except for that of the young Saturn. 
 
 c. That nebulosity which surrounds the sun is faintly 
 visible to us as the zodiacal light. The similar nebulosity of 
 the earth is named the Gegenschein (for description and more 
 detailed observations, see "Ency. Brit.," '"Zodiacal Light"). 
 The nebulosity of the moon has not with positive certainty 
 been observed, and it has not been named; obviously its 
 visibility would be interferred with by those other two nebu- 
 losities. Such nebulosities would probably be somewhat 
 self-luminous (agreeing with Angstrom's observations in the 
 article cited : — and in spite of the fact that they are in space 
 usually held to be at nearly absolute zero) ; also, they would 
 be luminous by diffused and reflected light (as our atmos- 
 phere is— they being obviously composed largely of thin 
 gases that are known to exist in the "free" space about us). 
 The nebulosities have probably been observed to vary in po- 
 sition, and perhaps to exhibit some traces of tails : they seem 
 to have a variable tilt, and seem to react mutually. All such 
 observations obviously agree with whirl mechanics. 
 
 §122. a. It has been seen (§1 12g-l) that the reaction of 
 the solar whirl field and galaxy field gives our general clim- 
 ate. We shall now see that the whirl theory consistently 
 gives minor climatic variations by the same principles— see- 
 ing it by considering the reactions of the sun's spherical field 
 
 with the earth s spherical or magnetic field. Also 
 
 it follows implicitly, but of course in far less quantitative de- 
 gree that the reactions of the moon's field on ours modify 
 our climate. The empirical farmer who plants by the moon's 
 phases is not wholly superstitious, although it is likely that 
 his rules of thumb are now excessively inaccurate, and are 
 merely racial memories persisting from the ancient days 
 when the earth and moon were in a younger whirl, and their 
 
133 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §122h 
 
 mutual field reactions were much stronger. Even the old 
 astrology is not completely stupid ; for millions of years ago 
 when (say) Jupiter swept near the earth spiral, it probably 
 knocked off an earth satellite which plunged into the earth in 
 a way somewhat disconcerting to live things in those days. 
 Astrology was perhaps perceptibly justified in some measure. 
 Of course the intellectual grafters exaggerated it and ritual- 
 ized it until it became silly ; they will do the same for this 
 book unless men take the trouble to observe for themselves. 
 Those grafters were not deep-dyed villains; they merely de- 
 sired to give their clients their money's worth, and hence 
 "improved their yarns to give them sufficient violence — 
 pep and punch and heart interest — to jolt even the weak 
 brains of their stupid dupes, and thus give them a sensation 
 to vary the monotony that is another name for an inactive 
 mind. Also, the dupes wouldn't rely on themselves, but 
 relied too much on experts" — with the usual result that 
 both they and the experts (named astrologers then) came to 
 grief. All too specialized specialists are dangerous. 
 
 b. The chief cause of those minor disturbances of the 
 sun's spherical field, and hence of the earth's field and hence 
 climate, is obviously the eccentric revolution of various bodies 
 around the sun. Possibly the most intense of those variations 
 are the passages through perihelion of comets, or the remains 
 of comets; obviously those comets then stir up the suns 
 spherical field sharply. 
 
 c. When one of those sharp knocks on the sun s field 
 occurs, obviously there would shortly be secondary whirl for- 
 mation at the sun s difference surface, which surface is con- 
 ventionally divided into chromosphere (at the bottom), 
 photosphere, corona, and zodiacal light ( Ency. Brit.," Art. 
 
 Sun"). Similar knocks on the earth s field would also pro- 
 duce secondary whirls here; those whirls are directly per- 
 ceptible to us as cyclones and anti-cyclones in the atmosphere 
 (which is part of the difference surface of the earth). A cy- 
 clone is a whirl in which the central field travels up (is a 
 
 Fig. 122c. 
 
 whirl born into the earth's field), and which therefore is not 
 much interferred with by the "solid" earth, and so produces 
 or is comparatively rapid motion of the air, and is a hur- 
 ricane," "storm," etc. Fig. 122c is a diagram in perspect- 
 ive of the wind circulation of a cyclone, and it vividly 
 outlines the filament difference surface of a whirl, even defi- 
 nitely as to the spiral motion. I did not manufacture that 
 picture and emphasize the whirl characteristics to prove my 
 point: the picture is reproduced from Knight s Seaman- 
 ship." An anti-cyclone is a whirl traveling in the opposite 
 direction (out of the earth field) ; hence, the solid earth in- 
 terferes with the air motion of it, and the wind slows down, 
 and we have "pleasant" weather. All our "wind" is a re- 
 sult of whirl formation. 
 
 d. Those two kinds of whirls are observable in or on the 
 sun, in greater degree because the sun's 'surface' is thicker 
 and relatively more fluid and extensive. It may be possible 
 that a sun spot is formed directly by an anti-cyclone ; it is a 
 quantitative problem, and I guess that such is not the case 
 
 (chiefly because an anti-cyclone on the sun would spread out 
 widely, like one here, and a sun spot is rather sharply local). 
 A cyclone on the sun would obviously consistently produce 
 the observed high flare-ups of the corona, and the promi- 
 nences of the denser photosphere. A very small cyclone 
 here, over such fluid (e. g. , water) will produce a water- 
 spout, or on land will lift dust, leaves, etc., high into the air 
 as a o>Air/wind" ; any cyclone lifts up the surface of the 
 earth some, but not very perceptibly with the solid earth : 
 the barometer becomes "low," showing that comparatively 
 there is some suction on the earth. The waterspout, on a 
 certain harmonic proportional wearing-out of the whirl, 
 slumps back into the water — one nearly slumped on me once. 
 Similarly, anywhere on the sun a localized, considerable act- 
 ual lift of material will take place as the result of a cyclone. 
 (That material seems to streak out in the high-speed winds 
 in the upper atmosphere of Jupiter, and make bands around 
 that planet.) That material will then slump back into the 
 sun, and by the usual principle of overrunning it will make 
 quite a hole or sun spot in the photosphere. So a sun spot is 
 most likely the dying out of a cyclone on the sun. Obviously 
 the cyclone gave the material a rotation (that can actually 
 be seen in an ordinary waterspout; also see Fig. 122c), and 
 naturally the sides of the sun spot hole will have the compo- 
 nents of that rotation. Also, the dropping of the prominence 
 into the surface is equivalent to dropping soapy water into a 
 basin; and a whirl will result, with other sorts of rotary mo- 
 tion. So for all those reasons, the spot will endure for a 
 time — perhaps as long as a month or two. Also, the spots, 
 like the more violent of the storms on earth, will tend to be 
 near the sun s equator, as it is there that both more field 
 energy and more chances of getting a knock exist. The 
 whirls from the knocks would obviously travel away from the 
 equator as they move down, by compounding their motion 
 with the sun s rotation. 
 
 e. Every one of those whirl results is definitely in agree- 
 ment with the observed facts about sun spots ( Ency. Brit.," 
 "Sun"). Further, observations by Hale, and mechanical 
 guesses and observations by Julius, show that there are such 
 rotary motions. Turner gave a theory of sun spots to the 
 Royal Astronomical Society ( Sc. Am.," April 4, 1914), 
 which shows that known comet orbits agree with the periods 
 of sun spots; the most marked one is about 11 years, but 
 there are other superimposed periods [ad infinitum, according 
 to valid logic]. It is also observed that electrical apparatus 
 on earth shows variations ("electrical storms"), indicating 
 such variations of electrical fields, occurring for a few days 
 in advance of visible formation of sun spots. Further, a con- 
 siderable body of observations now exists, and scientists are 
 beginning to agree, that our minor climate in general varies 
 coincidently with variations in the sun's surface (of course 
 after "seasonal" changes). It therefore is obvious that all 
 this evidence verifies our mechanical theory. 
 
 f. Obviously, we have come to the beginning of writing 
 a consistent science of climate — of general, and daily or sea- 
 sonal, meteorology. That would require volumes — omitted. 
 
 g. And a general consideration of the foregoing astro- 
 nomical descriptions, combined with a more specific detailing 
 of the variations of the earth's spherical field (including the 
 history of the earth whirl), would constitute the base of ge- 
 ology. Chamberlin gives that well in Origin of the Earth," 
 although not explicitly about the earth field. I shall make 
 brief remarks on geology, indicating that expansion :- 
 
 h. Obviously, ultimately any asymmetry of equilibrium 
 of the earth's surface would be referred to the earth's field, 
 and so on to our galaxy whirl, and so on. Most likely, due 
 to past stirring-ups of the solar whirl by its approaching other 
 
§122h XII Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 13+ 
 
 whirls, the earth's surface has several times been hot enough 
 to be rather fluid. The earth's field would then perhaps have 
 considerable effect in distributing the fluid matter (in prin- 
 ciple, precisely as the matter in a comet's tail or Saturn's 
 ring is sorted); in short, ultimately there is no "chance" 
 about it: the earth itself is a chemical spectrum, probably 
 several times repeated, or superimposed — of which the con- 
 ventional geological strata would constitute one "layer" or 
 order. And that gives a rigorous qualitative beginning for 
 the geology of the shaping of the juvenile earth, which is of 
 course in agreement with Chamberlin s balancing of various 
 factors with gravity, in his chapter on the subject. I merely 
 bunch all his various other factors into affinity — or into the 
 concrete field, which primarily displays that affinity. 
 
 i. There would then, as a truism of such surface asym- 
 metries, be regions of less pressure in the earth's surface 
 zone, so that the condensed, aged atoms there would move 
 around more, and thus in some measure break up, and thus 
 give off small, rapidly moving parts ( comets' or electrons, 
 or other larger parts in radioactivity) which sum as heat. In 
 the deep interior of the earth there would not be a high 
 enough degree of variation in stress to permit that breaking- 
 up to occur; that such breaking-up actually does occur when 
 pressure is removed is observed directly as small surface ex- 
 plosions in new walls of mines. And that heat would, under 
 proper quantitative conditions, as a truism, accumulate, melt 
 the more easily melted substances, and by keeping on in- 
 creasing if pressure is decreased at a sufficient rate, eat its 
 way upward, and out at the surface, as a volcano. So a vol- 
 cano thus always tends to make a more stable equilibrium — 
 to smooth out past asymmetries, — which is substantially how 
 Chamberlin puts his more detailed description of volcanoes. 
 Therefore, from both points of view it follows that the inter- 
 ior of the earth can not be hot; for if it were, asymmetries 
 or differences of potential would automatically increase as we 
 approach the center of the earth, so that at the center the 
 potential, having nothing ever to start it the other way, would 
 truistically become infinite, and the earth would blow up — 
 and it obviously does not. Or, if that general proof that the 
 interior is cold is not readily intelligible, then a concrete 
 proof is that it is an obvious truism of the whole theory of the 
 shaping of the young earth (either as given here, or in the 
 form given by most modem geologists), that a crust can not 
 form on a liquid core which is asymmetrical or out of stable 
 equilibrium (which would have been the case with the earth) 
 unless the crust be nearly instantaneously formed with suf- 
 ficient thickness to hold the liquid core (which is a silly hy- 
 pothesis). Or in brief, as the little boy puts it, if the earth 
 ■were hot melted stuff inside it would largely leak out through 
 the holes. Of course, if we dig a large hole in the earth, it 
 follows from the foregoing that it becomes a volcano — the 
 walls would keep getting hotter as we went deeper. Obvi- 
 ously, if we went deep enough, with a hole big enough not 
 to be self-plugging, we would automatically get a flow of 
 melted earth.' If we could keep that hole from plugging 
 itself for a while, the flow of liquifying interior would soon 
 leave unsupported places that would more or less break up 
 the earth by earthquakes, and thus (probably before changes 
 in center of gravity, etc., became effective) would indirectly 
 plug the hole and stop the unbalance (the earth will "heal" 
 a wound just as a human does — only on a larger scale). But 
 none of that proves that the earth is hot inside; it merely 
 proves that the earth is so constructed that we can make an 
 artificial volcano — by the simple process of digging a large 
 enough hole. The sides of the hole is a modification of the 
 difference surface (an extension of it) ; and the principle is 
 that that surface is comparatively hot, and obviously the con- 
 
 siderable unbalance of the hole would make it locally hotter. 
 
 j It therefore follows that any prolonged asymmetries 
 or knockings-about to which the earth field are subjected 
 would produce, as an accumulated result, an age of volca- 
 noes. Any such series of asymmetries, given enough room 
 (and there usually is ample space in the galaxy), would inev- 
 itably be balanced by reverse ones, and there would be a 
 severe glacial age before or after the volcanoes. And such 
 rhythms are geologically inferred to have occurred. So the 
 general basis of geology confirms the whirl theory, even if I 
 do have to be a trifle unconventional and conclude that the 
 earth is cold inside. It has been my actual experience that 
 the same sort of people who were shocked by Columbus's 
 heretical belief that the earth was round are greatly offended 
 by the proof that the earth is cold inside. So in order 
 to help those mentally rather run down people over 
 their emotional disturbance, I have devoted an otherwise 
 
 disproportionate amount of space to the point. The 
 
 keen reader will also observe that I ostentatiously and em- 
 phatically give such people an unconventional point of neglig- 
 ible direct practical importance to be horrified over. That 
 serves as a counter-irritant, permitting the painless introduc- 
 tion of an important point or two. 
 
 §123. a. As a general summary of this chapter we may 
 consider, in terms of astronomy, the millennium, heaven, 
 Nirvana, or Utopias in general. Obviously, because our as- 
 tronomical terms are universal, and are also consistent me- 
 chanics, we shall be able logically to consider the 'heaven of 
 heavens,' or a sum of all Utopias (i. e., get an inclusive theo- 
 ry of heaven); and at the same time get it in an engineering 
 form capable of actual achievement, provided people want 
 
 such a heaven enough to achieve it. The way to get 
 
 it is to make the earth into a flying machine and move it to 
 wherever we calculate we need it in order to achieve such 
 equilibrium as we consider to be heaven — for, as we shall see, 
 all Utopias are nothing more than quantitative perfection (at 
 least as an aspired-to limit) and hence eternity of balance be- 
 tween two or more bodies, which themselves therefore be- 
 come eternal as such finite bodies. In brief, the con- 
 ventional heavens and Utopias are quantitative: to be 
 blunt about it, they are grossly materialistic in the ordinary 
 dyslogistic sense — and in their aspired-to infinite limits are of 
 course not achievable. But we can approach as near as we 
 like to any Utopia or heaven by properly moving the earth 
 out of its orbit. People who in general are more or less un- 
 balanced, or intemperate, or radical or exaggerated in one 
 way or another, are truistically pained by the condition (see 
 XVIII) ; so they verbally invent a heaven where they think 
 the balance is better. For the human reasons for that, see 
 §155. Or, there is another sort of person who is 
 
 callous or insensitive nervously, who fails to get enough 
 stimuli from the environment that are violent enough to jar 
 him into much consciousness. So he complains bitterly of 
 too much monotony, and invents (or usually accepts from 
 others) a verbal heaven that is violent or "peppy," and that 
 would be painful to the radicals; the Great White Way and 
 Greenwich Village in New York is somewhat such a heaven. 
 If the radicals could get their sort of heaven it would be 
 painfully monotonous to the callous people— would bore them 
 worse than this world does. But obviously, the callous sort 
 of heaven is the same essential sort of heaven as the radical 
 one, being simply expressed negatively or in the opposite 
 quantitative direction, so that the same principles apply. As 
 a well known fact, the practical achievement of some of one 
 heaven satiates, and causes the sufferer to strive for the other; 
 e. g., the denizens of the New York heaven "long" for the 
 simple life." I n general, orthodox heavens are 
 
135 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XII §123d 
 
 merely materialistic, quantitative, selfish daydreams. But 
 we now start to examine them a little in detail, as they give 
 considerable useful information. 
 
 b. We have seen (§1 14c, etc.) that any given geometrical 
 point in us or near us, or anywhere, is itself in eternal perfect 
 balance with the rest of the universe — moves in the path of no 
 resistance, as being or exhibiting either zero energy or infin- 
 ite energy. Consequently, eliminating merely formal time 
 and space we obviously have a perfect heaven, in all respects, 
 right now, and right here, eternally and everywhere. Fur- 
 ther, if we take any pluralistic (or time and space) part of 
 our world, we have seen by astronomy that it is actually in 
 perfect balance {so Jar as we can perceive) with reference even 
 to a fairly small environment. E. g. , we and all our things 
 are so perfectly in balance with just a few galaxy whirls that 
 we can not perceive even with senses aided by our best tools 
 more than a few of them — the remainder balancing into in- 
 finity or nothingness, whichever way you want to say it. So 
 with reference to any time-and-space thing — with reference 
 to our persona], arbitrarily limited selves, say — there clearly 
 is, inside a quite restricted environment, a perceptibly perfect 
 balance (and then many people object to that heaven by 
 wanting to make a stir" in the world; and having made 
 one, they find that such unbalance is not what they want). 
 It therefore follows that actually we are in a heaven or per- 
 fect balance so far as we can perceive, if we take a wide view. 
 
 c. However, men look around them and by taking a 
 narrower view (by excluding or ignoring some of the things 
 which they actually see) they observe that in that narrower 
 world there are unbalances. E. g. , they see the lightning 
 kill an apparently innocent baby ; or they see apparently 
 unbalanced distribution of food, so that some people not di- 
 rectly responsible for that distribution starve. So men start 
 making quantitative computations intended to remove those 
 more narrow unbalances, and the conclusion is called heaven. 
 E. g. , the old Hebrews apparently judged that pain" was 
 bad, and all unbalances of day and night and climate were 
 bad (they having no electric lights and furnaces to remedy 
 such), and that there was not enough of brilliancy in their 
 surroundings (that judgment included the objection of the 
 callous to monotony): so they devised the grossly material- 
 istic heaven of Rev. 21, which sounds like a longshoreman s 
 idea of "elegance," and which is substantially the orthodox 
 ignorant "Christian's" heaven still, except that the usual 
 Utopia of the ignorant person contains the additional proviso 
 that there be no "work." The majority of the polygamous 
 Arabs apparently failed to have their sexual appetites satis- 
 fied, there not being enough women to go around; so they 
 figured out a heaven with an abundance of such satisfaction 
 — overlooking the needs and desires of women in it. Clearly 
 all Utopias propose to achieve some more or less narrow bal- 
 ance, and they ignore the perceptible unbalances that will be 
 produced elsewhere as an inevitable result. E. g., all con- 
 ventional heavens I know of propose to reject some people ; 
 obviously, the concoctors of those heavens thus tacitly admit 
 the existence of an unbalance in them, and so stultify them- 
 selves. All the people who propose to reform or remould 
 the world nearer to their heart's desire, propose usually in 
 actuality to change a narrow unbalance which annoys them 
 and they truistically produce perceptible unbalances else- 
 where (although they usually overlook that fact or deny it). 
 That is what is wrong with the reformer and radical: he in 
 effect denies that he causes unbalances elsewhere, and is 
 hence rather foolish, as he does (and sometimes for the good 
 of the majority). Of course, everything we do is locally an 
 unbalance. We take up the solution of all that in ethics 
 (XVIII). We simply note now, from the typical evidence 
 
 given, that Utopias are quantitative. Our conventional 
 theological heavens are obviously grossly dualistic and aristo- 
 cratic, with their more or less benevolent potentate, or perma- 
 nent chief boss, who is reputed to require as much deference 
 or kowtowing as that desired by any small man in official 
 position or by a hysteric. A kaiser and Jehovah are obvi- 
 ously alike in essentials. 
 
 d. Therefore, as all Utopias and heavens are merely 
 more perceptible balances within certain limits at the expense 
 of increased unbalances elsewhere, then the obvious goal of 
 intelligent Utopias is to get the unbalances located as much 
 as possible so as to be imperceptible to all men. Clearly, 
 the way to get a balance having the widest limit would be to 
 get the whole earth into some place where there was the 
 least variation in reactions received by its fields. Therefore, 
 if we create an artificial field (like an artificial house over the 
 whole earth), which will promptly react with most modifica- 
 tions from foreign fields, we can make the climate fairly 
 equable (probably we would have to take secondary steps to 
 prevent other undue unbalances). By moving the earth out 
 of the solar system, we could progressively achieve a more 
 and more perceptible balance:- its rotation could be sub- 
 stantially stopped, thus stopping most changes in light and . 
 radiation ; its revolution about the galaxy axis could be so 
 smoothed out as to be imperceptible (or we could move it 
 out of the galaxy if we wanted less motion); and we could 
 progressively level off its surface, etc. By proceeding in 
 that way all perceptible change would be gradually elimi- 
 nated. All processes could be equalized until the passage of 
 time became practically imperceptible, there being nothing 
 happening in particular by which to mark time — not even 
 perceptible monotony. Hence, in that soothing, somnolent 
 environment men would practically quit dying (or being born 
 — for birth is a perceptible unbalance) ; death would be 
 abolished to the degree in which closeness of balance was ob- 
 tained (XVI). Also, all work and other perceptible activity 
 would be similarly eliminated. Further, our brains would 
 stop acting in the same degree, and we would have practi- 
 cally no pains, no troubles, nor any perceptible consciousness 
 of any kind. In short, concretely and literally we would be 
 bored quite stiff," and for all practical purposes be dead. 
 
 ■ In fact, the consistent expression of the condition is 
 
 that we would be so completely bored that we could not even 
 die in the usual manner, but would imperceptibly enter upon 
 the equivalent of it without perceptibly physiologically dying 
 — a state of affairs worse, nominally at least, than the mythi- 
 cal fate of the Wandering Jew. Fact of course is always 
 stranger than fiction. The human race is far too stupid to 
 invent any quantitative complication that is nearly so surpris- 
 ing as those actually about us. Obviously, therefore, 
 
 the very perfection of that heaven is its condemnation, from 
 the point of view of our personal tastes. We simply do not 
 want any such millennium. The lion would lie down with 
 the lamb all right — and stay that way. In fact, the able 
 engineers who, it is tacitly assumed, would get the earth 
 started off towards that Nirvana condition would also auto- 
 matically lie down and stop work (unless they had built 
 themselves a private dwelling in which they could have some 
 manufactured unbalances) — and in the first case the earth 
 would automatically return into some condition sufficiently 
 asymmetrical to jar the sleepers into life. Incident- 
 ally, it is obvious that in such a heaven, where there is no 
 perceptible unbalance, there would be a practical and per- 
 ceptible constancy of all physical quantities, and also a prac- 
 tical exactness of all science. In conventional language, 
 bodies or things in it would be practically dead, and practi- 
 cally ' really material. 
 
§123e XII Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 136 
 
 e. Obviously, no one but a mental defective or some 
 man hopelessly worn out by this real everyday heaven we 
 have now, would want that consistent astronomical Utopia or 
 summed-up orthodox heaven. If any man truly does want 
 it, he can easily get its substantial equivalent by buying a 
 few cents worth of rat poison and eating it. For obviously, 
 we have such a perceptible heaven when we are dead (i. e., 
 we have no more personal consciousness — a condition equal 
 to that heaven; for proof, cf. Index, "immortality"). And 
 any scientist who thinks he really needs physical constants 
 and an exact science can readily get them, so far as his per- 
 ception is concerned, by the same judicious use of rat pois- 
 on ; the only other direct way he can get them is by moving 
 the earth (or a part of it, including himself) to such a condi- 
 tion — and even then it is likely that perceptible exactness 
 would be limited to quite a narrow locality on earth (perfect 
 exactness of course already now exists, and would then, with 
 
 reference to any zero point). It is a well known fact 
 
 that many people who claim or fancy that they believe that 
 the promised theological heavens exist after death, and who 
 go about asserting in effect that heaven is their home, they 
 being timid orphaned strangers in this present wicked world, 
 still refrain from proving their sincerity with rat poison. In 
 short, the people who claim to believe orthodox Utopias, in 
 practice fail to act as if they did (for their psychology, see 
 §155). They of course contrive some excusing argument" 
 about the wrongness of suicide — thereby unescapably imply- 
 ing that the God who inhabits their heaven keeps them away 
 from it, and hence is either a dog in the manger or else pos- 
 sesses that vicious, perhaps lowest Hun characteristic of teas- 
 ing, tormenting, tantalizing. The obvious solution of the 
 problem of suicide (as implied by the investigation later of 
 immortality) is that it is a quantitative problem, and is right 
 action when the suicide thinks more good than harm is pro- 
 duced by his death (i. e., it is right from his point of view; 
 others often agree with him, in which case the action is right 
 so far as it is possible to judge; §17 Ik). 
 
 f. Having shown that the orthodox heaven is as stupid 
 as the already unfashionable orthodox hell, we may now ex- 
 amine the mechanical details of making a flying machine of 
 the earth. It is not likely that we shall ever want to fly 
 away to a consistent heaven; but it is possible that at some 
 time we may want to use the process to modify the climate 
 a trifle. If we get too crowded on earth, we may possibly 
 want to add the moon to the earth in the way of a real estate 
 addition. It would be an exceedingly hazardous business, 
 but it could perhaps be handled : the moon would bump 
 rather hard when it coalesced, but we would have acquired 
 quite an increase of potential, etc., if any of us survived such 
 a get-rich-quick scheme. Also, it is well for us to know our 
 widest quantitative capabilities (anything is possible quantita- 
 tively) : then we shall have an explicit means of refuting the 
 weak-sisters who insist on whining about impossibilities, 
 when what they really mean is that they feel comparatively 
 feeble — and want us to be like them. 
 
 g. We shall see in §§140-1 the principles of how to get 
 enough power to work the machines we are going to use to 
 make the earth fly — fly differently from the present. We 
 can apply that power, by using large electrical machines, to 
 modify the earth s field — such modification being obviously 
 the same in principle as creating a field in a motor (XIV). 
 Truistically, that will move the earth relative to the sun ; 
 the earth field difference surface is obviously the fulcrum 
 Archimedes was looking for. By making the difference sur- 
 face relatively stronger we make gravity relatively weaker, 
 and we have in some humanly controlled degree harnessed 
 the solar whirl field to the earth, and can work ourselves out 
 
 of the present orbit. Very slowly at first would we move 
 from that orbit; compared with any power we now develop 
 on earth, the power to move us appreciably would be enorm- 
 ous. But as we moved out, gravity would have less and less 
 effect, and we could proceed faster. Theoretically, it is ex- 
 ceedingly simple thus to harness up the total galaxy. Prac- 
 tically, the quantitative difficulties are large. 
 
 h. This chapter shows explicitly how the earth and each 
 atom and electron in it is definitely and completely bound to 
 the total galaxy environment. If we actually know the 
 structure of such environment, then obviously we can, by 
 guiding parts directly in our reach, control the earth. So a 
 summary of this chapter, showing briefly its consistency, is a 
 statement of how to move the earth. Unless such a statement 
 can be given as a part of an explanation of the structure of 
 matter, then obviously that explanation is either not intelli- 
 gible, or is not complete and consistent (or both). So this 
 section is proof of the consistency of the chapter. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. Light. 
 
 §124. a. It is obvious that I have been describing phe- 
 nomena as being ultimately the giving off of secondary whirls 
 — as being the result of asymmetries which accumulated at 
 difference surfaces in sufficient quantitative degree, compared 
 with the ether cell size, to cause a number of ether cells to 
 unite in some way to form a new whirl, or at least percept- 
 ibly start forming a new whirl. It is equally obvious that 
 because the ether cells are taken to be of some finite size, 
 then there may be asymmetries of insufficient quantitive de- 
 gree to form such secondary whirls: but nevertheless there 
 still would not be a zero phenomenon (as the cells are finite, 
 as just stated), but as a verbal truism there must be some 
 phenomenon — and so on ad infinitum, as we arbitrarily take 
 ether cells to be smaller and smaller (or larger and larger, to 
 go the other way: — e. g., we have in §128 the description of 
 the spectrum of the solar-system-considered-as-an-atom, in 
 which atom the earth would tacitly be just a few ether 
 
 cells). Such a comparatively nearly zero phenomenon 
 
 is named light (that use of light is a relationship word). 
 Obviously, just as we have what were called orders of whirls 
 in harmonic periodicity of mutually fairly stable sizes, so we 
 would have orders of light (there light is definitely a Many 
 word, or light is just plain "matter," if we take it as cor- 
 puscular, as we shall see we may ; but if we, also properly, 
 take light as waves, then that use of light is the orthodox 
 combination of a Many word and a relationship word — a 
 double use which ordinarily is "ambiguous," but which we 
 can use clearly as we know the logic of it; cf. §134a). Three 
 orders of such a phenomenon are conventionally named, as 
 noticed before:- electric waves, ordinary light, X-rays. 
 Ordinary light is given off by ordinary atoms, electric waves 
 by collections of atoms, and X-rays by structural parts 
 of atoms. We saw that there were no sharp boundaries 
 between those "orders" or species of light. There can of 
 course be as many sub-orders of those orders as we care to 
 distinguish— or super-orders. It is probable that physicists 
 now lump together quite a number of rather distinguishable 
 sorts of light as "X-rays," as we shall see. 
 
 b. A logical or truistic proof of the general existence of 
 all that variety of lights, and probably a more intelligible 
 description of just what light is, may readily be obtained by 
 considering different sorts of difference surfaces and all of the 
 phenomena (in addition to secondary whirl formation) which 
 take place all the time at or in them. We are going to see 
 that in conventional language light is usually considered to 
 
137 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XIII §124h 
 
 be waves, or definitely a continuous fluid phenomenon. And 
 that is verbally the reverse of our secondary whirl descrip- 
 tions — for obviously, in all of the latter we had some degree 
 of definite internal structures ; now, in wave light, we have 
 none, that being truistic with continuous fluid. So we must 
 at once redefine our various orders of difference surfaces, to 
 agree with that new way of talking. And that is simply and 
 obviously done by saying that the ether cells of a given whirl 
 are large enough to be considered elastic and not to have 
 definitely named internal parts ; i.e., we merely take elastic 
 parts of the various orders of whirls large enough to permit 
 us to leave unmentioned {but never absolutely ignored) previ- 
 ously considered internal structures. Obviously, that is only 
 a verbal change ; for we saw that an ether cell was merely a 
 whirl considered to be continuous (§§97-8). Hence, we now 
 have to notice all phenomena occurring when we do consider 
 whirls continuous. Heretofore we have tacitly ignored all 
 those of a size so small as not to form secondaries. But 
 clearly, a secondary can be any size; so explicit whirls, or 
 Newton s corpuscular light, can be used to explain all phe- 
 nomena, including light. Similarly, by increasing sufficiently 
 the arbitrary size of cells,' ordinary wave light can be used 
 to explain all phenomena, the earth (say) becoming then a 
 vibratory wave (see §128). Light and (say) astronomy are 
 thus obviously identical ; the two conventional subjects are 
 merely two verbally different ways of stating observed facts. 
 Because we are familiar with the wave-light way for many 
 phenomena it is easier to understand them when that way is 
 used. So I describe light largely that way, especially as it 
 furnishes a check on the way used for other phenomena. 
 
 c. We therefore at once note that by our new or explicit 
 fluid definition of 'cells,' any difference surface (regardless of 
 its practical size) will be considered to be a layer of cells, 
 which layer rubs the adjoining layer of cells in (l) outwardly 
 the touching field and (2) inwardly its own structure. That 
 adjacent layer (in either direction) is in actual or virtual mo- 
 tion at some spiral angle between the monistic limits and 
 
 90° to the surface layer (§98o, etc.). Hence, as we 
 
 shall implicitly see, light waves (not necessarily ocularly vis- 
 ible ones) are generated everywhere always. But again basing 
 ourselves on the measure V\ we consider usually only the 
 generation of them at difference surfaces we have already es- 
 tablished by that criterion. That amply covers the phe- 
 nomena (includes positively all of them) : for all the light 
 generated (say) inside a filament thus determined is summed 
 up in its surface cells, as we shall see. 
 
 d and e. It clearly follows that as those cells rub across 
 each other, cohering or sticking to each other, then by the 
 mechanical principles of elasticity already established, they 
 will mutually distort each other, overrunning the equilibrium 
 and then letting go of each other, so to speak. The cells 
 will therefore vibrate or oscillate, truistically stirring up 
 their neighbors progressively into similar vibrations (Huy- 
 gen's principle ; §126) — the result of all that being light. 
 Obviously, any asymmetry will result in continuously chang- 
 ing or modifying those vibrations all over the difference sur- 
 face of any whirl; consequently, there is always continuous 
 light phenomena (perhaps not visible), because by our arbi- 
 trary agreement as to cells, such motion of parts, to infinite 
 smallness or in infinite regress, is truistic. Obviously, there- 
 fore, conventional light phenomena all explicitly imply the 
 infinite regress ; here, we are merely having it explicit. In 
 definitely pluralistic language, such as the talk of secondaries 
 in astronomy, only an asymmetry of a certain size compared 
 with the size of the ether cells could produce a secondary; 
 hence secondaries form only occasionally and at particular 
 places on the difference surfaces. Here, we see that light is 
 
 not thus localized, but is continuous (not necessarily visibly). 
 
 f. It is possible in many ways to get a tangible concrete 
 model of the mechanics broadly described in the last para- 
 graph. Northrup's whirls (§102) show a hazy vibratory sur- 
 face. Often smoke rings, or smoke sheets in still air, will 
 exhibit a more or less definite surface vibration. Practically 
 all of Bjerknes's experiments (§94) are definitely vibratory, 
 and can be shown to be analogous to any light phenomena. 
 Possibly the quickest way to see the mechanics of the last 
 paragraph is to take an ordinary round bristle brush and flick 
 the ends of the bristles. The ends will vibrate, often per- 
 ceptibly for a while, analogously to a small place on one of 
 our arbitrary cells, and by the same principles (although in a 
 different degree, as the quantitative relations of the anchor- 
 ing of the bristles are in considerably different proportion 
 from those of the anchoring' of the parts of the cell: — if it 
 be required to have a quantitatively proportional model, then 
 a tore can be made having a surface' of mounted gyroscopes ; 
 Erwin's model is substantially that; §94). The same sort 
 of vibration can be seen when the wind blows over a field of 
 high grass, wheat, etc. By revolving and sliding the bristle 
 brush mentioned under the finger the ends of the bristles 
 will temporarily perform oscillations analogus to cells. By 
 properly moving the brush in and out of water visible experi- 
 mental evidence of at least the general principles of any of 
 the mechanics of light is obtainable; however, it is usually 
 easier to prove those mechanics by reducing them to truisms 
 equivalent to Bernoulli s principle. 
 
 g. The mutual reactions of those vibrations give all the 
 unending light phenomena. Because of those unending pos- 
 sibilities of reaction, of the ad infinitum orders of light, and 
 of the ad infinitum asymmetries which cause light, there can 
 be no complete description of light. For that reason, and 
 also because light is substantially a repetition of astronomy, 
 and because we have already seen the general mathematical 
 identity of light with other branches of physics, I shall con- 
 dense this chapter to a brief outline of the subject — just 
 enough to give a general understanding of it, and indicate 
 the foundations. The only substantial variation I make from 
 the orthodox descriptions is that I have light 3-dimensioned, 
 and so describe it. Orthodox descriptions in actual effect of 
 course do have light in three dimensions; but the orthodox 
 mathematics are mostly of the 2-dimension, transverse-wave 
 sort that lead to difficulties, and are of course totally mean- 
 ingless when explicitly interpreted, because no such thing as 
 a pure" transverse wave ever existed or ever can — it being 
 merely a non-existent verbal abstraction of a mathematical 
 character. Quite naturally that sort of mathematics used in 
 the texts (which conceals the problem of the One and Many) 
 orthodoxly winds up in the well known self-contradiction in 
 light, which may be expressed in one way :- that Fizeau's 
 experiments and-or astronomical aberration requires a still 
 ether, and the Michelson-Morley experiment requires an 
 ether dragged some at least by the earth (see Wood, Physi- 
 cal Optics," 1st ed., XXII). An ether cell is 3-dimensioned, 
 and by considering it as producing light we keep in 3 dimen- 
 sions and readily see the cause of the orthodox difficulty with 
 those experiments (§127). 
 
 h. Incidentally, because light may equally well be rep- 
 resented by whirls instead of waves, it follows that light 
 is whirls from that point of view. And that of course is 
 equivalent to saying that light is matter (cf. par. a) — or is 
 ether. And that again is equivalent to the conclusion in the 
 last paragraph that light is 3-dimensioned. We shall see 
 how ordinary atoms grow, or decrease, according as light is 
 added to them or given off. Of course that growth is minute 
 — perhaps with no weight perceptible by present balances. 
 
§124i XIII Two 
 
 138 
 
 i. This section is a general summary of light. If the 
 reader is not particularly interested in physics or mechanics 
 he may skip this chapter and the next on electricity, or read 
 them casually and inattentively, without losing anything es- 
 sential. Easily perceptible experimental details are so 
 numerous in light and electricity that I can on any line of ob- 
 servation quickly so overburden my memory with them as to 
 become almost hopelessly confused as to what are the next 
 consistent details. If the reader finds that he has the same 
 difficulty he need not feel alarmed : those details are merely 
 some of the infinite dots of our formula which have become 
 perceptible, and as they are infinite, everyone must neces- 
 sarily fail to follow them at some stage. Because I must 
 condense violently in this and the next chapter in order to 
 include explicit unifications which will be required by the 
 physicists and which must be known by the experts in any 
 branch of knowledge, it results that the two chapters are 
 hard to follow — especially if the reader has more or less for- 
 gotten his physics. He already has all the essential ideas of 
 the "material" universe which he needs in order to follow 
 the last summarizing chapter of this Part (XV), and the de- 
 scription of man in Part Three. Some of this chapter on light 
 describes mechanical reactions so complicated (i. e., numer- 
 ous in one "phenomenon") that I find it easier to think them 
 through "originally" with "pictures" of them in my head 
 than I do to follow my own condensed written description of 
 them. There is no need for the general reader to worry 
 himself with any such stuff"; but any good physicist must. 
 
 §125. a. At a given cell on a filament surface we may 
 conveniently name the three directions thus (and we need to 
 remember these names, as they are frequently used in light 
 and electricity):- (l) the direction roughly perpendicular to 
 thefiliar axis (or when the filament cross-section is not some- 
 what circular, then the direction roughly perpendicular to 
 the surface at the locality being considered) is radial or nor- 
 mal; (2) the direction roughly parallel to the filiar axis is the 
 filiar direction ; (3) the direction roughly at right angles to 
 those two, or (what is the same thing) the direction roughly 
 parallel to the cross-section circumference at that cell, is the 
 circumferential direction. The same names are obviously 
 analogously applicable to similar directions at any difference 
 surface (at a field surface, e. g.). The last two directions, 
 filiar and circumferential, together will be called transverse 
 directions. Obviously, any cell in the difference surface is 
 asymmetrically supported or held by the surrounding cells ; 
 that is a truism of any pluralistic language (or the principle 
 of rhythm or incommensurability), as we have seen in the tru- 
 istic proof that whirls themselves exist (XI). Or explicitly, 
 under average conditions it is obvious that the cell is held 
 more or less steady in the transverse directions and hence 
 has a comparatively more free component of motion in the 
 
 normal direction. Or, if the reader does not approve 
 
 that assertion involving such quantitative directions, then the 
 principles of pluralistic language or asymmetry require that 
 (in agreement also with all observed facts) there be different 
 energy of motion in the three directions, and he can assign 
 that difference in any combination of directions he likes. If 
 he changes from my (conventional) directions, he will need 
 to change the wording of the description, but will obtain the 
 same general result (cf. §99). 
 
 b. Therefore, the given cell in the difference surface 
 will by cohesion elasticly react with the field cell [or cells] 
 touching it, and because of the opposite spirals and asym- 
 metrical support produce in that field cell a minor elongation 
 having unequal components in the filiar direction and the 
 circumferential direction. But most of the elongation will 
 take place in the comparatively unsupported radial direction, 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 and will be similarly propagated by that cell to the next 
 cells, and soon (Huygen's principle; §124d). ihe 
 
 whole reaction is a ray of light. Obviously, in the first two 
 directions— the directions transverse to the ray the ether cells 
 are structurally supported so that the resistance to deforma- 
 tion is comparatively enormous, whereas the cells in the nor- 
 mal direction, or direction of propagation or travel of the ray, 
 are structurally held only by the comparatively weak field 
 difference surface, etc., so that the resistance to deformation 
 is slight, and the light wave would 'form itself' or travel" 
 in that direction very rapidly. Further, it is obvious that 
 always the ray would be encountering — would be composed 
 of— cells which were in varying structural relations, and 
 hence the three components would always be varying; or, in 
 short, never on a path composed of as few as three ether 
 
 cells could the ray travel either straight or at a constant speed. 
 Equally obviously, the various components, being produced 
 by friction and hence subject to friction would -wear out 
 (i. e., become diffused among many cells) in a length of time 
 depending on the character of the motions (or structural re- 
 lations) of the cells they become composed of, and would in- 
 evitably in time become visually imperceptible. (The whole 
 of those variations is the general statement of the bending ' 
 of light rays, of which Einstein's predicted instance is merely 
 a special case; §66. Obviously, I have described them in 
 
 terms emphasizing affinity.) As an example of that 
 
 wearing out of light, if the ray hit some C atoms in the form 
 of soot the ray would rapidly become imperceptible; if it 
 traveled through the comparatively tenuous, but structurally 
 analogous, galaxies, it would travel far enough to permit us 
 to see a few layers of galaxy whirls. That theory agrees 
 with what we do see. Reynolds calculates that a light wave 
 is reduced to ^ its primary energy after traveling 56 million 
 years. So it is a reasonable guess that ordinary light would 
 remain rather definitely visible for a travel of a million years 
 through galaxy structures such as ours, and that might make 
 as many as 50 layers of galaxies visible to us. 
 
 c. The last paragraph is the mechanical summary of 
 light. It is obvious that it is in effect directly equivalent to 
 the orthodox theory of light, but is logically rather different. 
 I. e., the orthodox theory substantially says that light is the 
 vibration of a geometrical point in the transverse directions — 
 a point of ether perhaps, having no mass, but thus vibrating 
 against enormous (effectually infinite) resistance of a solid, 
 elastic ether; — and that comparatively the longitudinal or 
 normal resistance to travel is so small that there is none, so 
 that the wave theoretically orthodoxly travels on forever, al- 
 though the orthodox theory does not call that longitudinal 
 component a component of the wave. Further, in that ortho- 
 dox theory, it is obvious that if that point thus vibrates, it 
 can propagate itself only by acting on the next point ; but 
 evidently, if it moves up to the next point it must occupy 
 identically the same space as that point; or, if vice versa it 
 makes the next point move by moving away from it, then 
 there is left an absolute vacuum, not even filled with ether, 
 and there is no way of getting the asserted reaction across it. 
 It is therefore obvious that the orthodox theory of light is 
 continually confused by its unsolved One and Many ; and by 
 its efforts to talk in or of absolutely separate dimensions 
 (i. e., to say that a wave is absolutely only transverse vibra- 
 tions or, even worse, an orthodox plane polarized wave is 
 only 1-dimensioned), destroys itself and its classic logic con- 
 tinually, and gets numerous purely religious conclusions that 
 
 we notice from time to time. Now, all that I have 
 
 done is to sum all those orthodox verbal difficulties, get the 
 logical method which obviates them, and then consistently 
 describe a cell (§§97-8) which will vibrate without again 
 
139 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XIII §126d 
 
 introducing the verbal conflicts. That cell obviously gives 
 the 8-dimensioned components properly and self-consistently 
 combined, and we always have 8-dimensioned light and none 
 of the orthodox confusion. But obviously, I do not substan- 
 tially change any of the orthodox theory. I merely use a 
 consistent verbal trick and make that theory intelligible, in 
 the sense that it is no longer continually self-contradictory. 
 
 d. However, it appears at once that because we do act- 
 ually use a finite body as the basis of light (and thus always 
 omit explicit expression of a part of the infinite regress of 
 dots), we are not actually talking an absolutely continuous 
 language (which the orthodox theory pretends to do), or 
 using an absolutely continuous theory. Of course not; it is 
 not possible to do so in a finite time. So we have adopted a 
 practical method of using a so-called continuous theory: i. e., 
 we take a continuously moving (i. e., elastic) body of a cer- 
 tain size, and verbally ignore the inner structural details of 
 it (the orthodox theory actually ignores the inner structure of 
 the whole ether). So it then clearly follows (and it can be 
 seen to follow from par. b) that we shall be forced to reject 
 from such a positive, pluralistic science or theory all the re- 
 ligious or mystic expressions. I. e. , in dealing with any 
 finitely perceptible light, there is no such thing as (l) a con- 
 stant speed of light anywhere, or (2) a simple or compound 
 harmonic wave motion in a geometrical sense, or (g) normal 
 dispersion, or (4) plane polarization, or (5) any other "per- 
 fect phenomenon. All actual or experimental light phe- 
 nomena are the inseparably connected 8-dimension vibrations 
 of par. b, and in no case can any of the three components 
 become zero or infinity — although any or all may at times 
 become imperceptible. 
 
 e. Our elongation or vibration of cells is formally or 
 logically contradictory to secondary whirl formation, of 
 course. It is deliberately so; for in order to agree with con- 
 ventional talk, we have agreed to change our form of talk, 
 and instead of saying secondary whirl formation' (which pro- 
 duces at least one definite structure or dot in addition to the 
 original structure), we say elongation' (which continuously 
 retains the original structure, which now however becomes 
 explicitly variable in itself, or implies dots in infinite regress). 
 
 Obviously, a long continued or repeated process of 
 
 secondary whirl formation produces an elongated spiral nebula 
 (i. e., one stretched out or elongated in the transverse" 
 directions, and correspondingly flattened in the direction of 
 its travel — in the direction PP', Fig. 107e); then, a longer 
 continuation of the same processes turns that spiral nebula 
 into a cluster in which those long transverse directions short- 
 en, and the other dimension increases. Hence, the sum of 
 the processes of secondary whirl formation maybe expressed, 
 in a contrary form of language, as a vibration ; for the sum 
 actually is vibrations:- i. e. , the nebula stretches out sideways 
 and then shrinks in that filiar plane and stretches out in the 
 third dimension. We thus violate every explicit rule of the 
 classic logic, but actually keep consistent by using our solu- 
 tion of the One and Many. The orthodox assertion of a 
 vibration also violates the classical logic — and then makes 
 matters worse by denying that it has done so (cf. description 
 
 of 3rd quadrant curve, Fig. 104b). So to sum up, 
 
 when we have whirls small enough (an unessential matter of 
 space) we see them go through all the nebular stages with 
 corresponding smallness of time, and call the observation 
 "light." Therefore, to a larger being, to whom our galaxy 
 is an ether cell, the history of our galaxy in the last chapter, 
 from its arbitrarily assigned beginning to its present stage, is 
 the history of one-fourth wave length of light from it. 
 
 f. The remainder of light consists of stating the relative 
 proportions of those three components of light in collections 
 
 of cells or bodies under varying conditions. Obviously, if we 
 made a statement of such proportions for all the bodies in the 
 universe, then we would have described the universe as light. 
 §126. a. The general principle of asymmetry of cells 
 may be put in modified terms of Huygen's principle (§§124d, 
 125b), as one way of expressing Bernoulli's principle:- that 
 any cell has asymmetry of motion in the three directions of 
 elongation (by the theory of commensurability, §50), and so 
 truistically becomes the center of elongation of the surround- 
 in g cells. We are going to apply that principle to cells : 
 doing so will actually be equivalent to the application of 
 larger asymmetries to secondary formation, which was 
 done as the whole of the last chapter. 
 
 b. We may for convenience adopt a more explicit sym- 
 bolism for light velocities. We write V\ for the average 
 velocity of light in our neighborhood (about 187,000 miles 
 per second, or 8X 10 10 cm/sec). The lowest speed visible 
 light is red, and we may write its veloicity Vxb,; the highest 
 speed, violet, or V\\, etc. We may write a speed anywhere 
 between red and violet as Firv, etc. 
 
 c. I have been saying that an ordinary visible atom 
 would have a filament difference surface (or some important 
 difference surface or surface) at the approximate speed of 
 light. As will appear, a more explicit and precise statement 
 would have been that the difference surface had a speed such 
 that it produced the radial elongation which had an effective 
 speed of light. It is convenient to continue to say briefly that 
 surfaces of visible atoms in our neighborhood have a velocity 
 V\ ; I do not know what the varying three component cell 
 speeds are in various circumstances, as it is a mathematical 
 problem I have not tried — a part of the general theory of 
 harmonic periodicity. See Reynolds's and Erwin's book for 
 useful hints as to the methods of working it. 
 
 d. Since the vibration of a cell on that atomic difference 
 surface consists of the nebular processes or stages of a galaxy 
 whirl (§125e), it is apparent at once that the component 
 elongations in the three general directions are never a simple 
 harmonic motion in any one of them, as is substantially held 
 by orthodox light (see Wood's ' Optics," 5-8, for a short 
 statement of the orthodox theory, and of the nature of sim- 
 ple harmonic motion: briefly, it is oscillatory motion (l) in a 
 straight line (2) with perfect rhythm — two perfections that 
 are absolutely impossible in any actual phenomenon). We 
 can see that the speed of elongation considered separately 
 (resolved) in each of the three directions rather rapidly 
 reaches a fairly steady value which it maintains until the re- 
 versal of nebular form (until the spiral begins breaking into 
 a cluster, usually by rubbing cohesion or collision with 
 another whirl — which completes half a wave) ; then, the speed 
 of elongation becomes again comparatively rapid ('reversing' 
 or changing algebraic sign or direction), and takes up a 
 rather steady value of the other sign. In short, the speeds 
 of vibration never are represented by the orthodox perfect 
 sine curve, or any finite compounding of such curves; always 
 actual light, as seen by the direct analogy of that cell to our 
 galaxy, is represented by an infinitely compounded sine curve 
 which, as just seen, would ordinarily be a rather flat-topped 
 sinuous wave. The one ray which comes of this cell we are 
 discussing has not so far as I know ever been perceptibly ob- 
 served to be of more than one longitudinal or normal speed 
 during a time sufficient for the passage of one wave length — 
 i. e. , to be of more than one color. That fact (that one 
 wave of the ray appears to be of one color, whereas obviously 
 theoretically it is not) of course tends to show that it is rep- 
 resented by a somewhat flat-topped curve. But, as just im- 
 plied, it is clear that every actual ray of light contains in 
 itself the complete gamut in infinite regress of different light 
 
§126d XIII Two UNIVERSE 
 
 light of varying intensity in different L and T parts of the 
 ray, with limits of longitudinal speed ("color") from to°°, 
 and limits of transverse speed ("intensity," which depends 
 upon amplitude:- the length of such transverse elongation) 
 also from to °° . So a single ray — a single cell — has or is 
 or gives all possible light phenomena. But our perception of 
 light simply sums light from numbers of cells into an average 
 condition ; and in experiments our perceptions are hence too 
 coarse to perceive that complete phenomenon just described. 
 But it is obvious that, although as usual the poets first ob- 
 served and stated that general truth (the truth expressed 
 here in the form that everything is exhibited by anything, 
 even by an ether cell ; the poets expressed it by saying that 
 the see-er could construct a universe from a grain of sand, or 
 by the remark about the flower in the crannied wall, etc.), 
 still they were crude, vague, and coarse (except rhetorically), 
 about it, and only a careful scientific investigation and rigor- 
 ously precise statement gets at all the truth in its full One 
 
 beauty. No doubt a first class poet would improve 
 
 the weird rhetoric of this fearfully condensed paragraph , and 
 
 the whirl stream 
 
 140 
 lines as the 
 
 rather perpendicularly across tne w ts w j]i vary rather 
 
 wave travels, then the transverse comP ° n ttention to them but 
 regularly, and we need not pay much a changes in di- 
 
 substantially describe light by describing u ^ ^ ^ ^ 
 rection of the normal component, the pa So the last 
 
 chief exception to that is polarization; 3 13 ' . transve rse 
 paragraph is almost all we need to note a ortho- 
 
 components. In the equation Intensity is of cours( \ n 
 doxly steady ; it needs the dots that were explicitly w 
 But our chief emphasis is on This...— on L..., the ever va y 
 
 ing path of the ray. Now, curiously, but in ^c° ra 
 
 with the psychological principles of verbal balancing (§155J, 
 orthodox theory asserts that light is only the transverse com- 
 ponents, and that the path of the ray is not light at all. 
 But the theory then, in order to describe light, does practi- 
 cally what I propose to do here:- describes the path which 
 it says is not light. We have, by the foregoing, de- 
 cided that it is more convenient to decribe light by having 
 
 move the reader's emotions more. 
 
 e. It truistically being hopeless to try to talk accurately 
 of those three components of elongation of a cell (as one cell 
 exhibits the infinite regress, and for accuracy would require 
 an infinity of words), we shall at once proceed by mentioning 
 only the characteristic or more effective parts of the compo- 
 nents and implying the rest. A given cell on vibrating with 
 three components would obviously tend to set all the cells 
 around it vibrating in turn in the same way, following the 
 general principles of harmonic motion (modified by the fact 
 that such motion can not be perfect). 
 
 f. The amplitudes of the elongations in the transverse 
 directions are held in check by the structure, as seen. Or, 
 what is the same, when those components travel out (by the 
 law of action and reaction) in all directions from the first cell 
 as a center, the structure makes the ether substantially a 
 solid, so that as the ultimate limit, the amplitude of vibration 
 of a single given cell has decreased as the square of the dist- 
 ance from the central cell— that being the same as saying 
 that the total transverse elongation of all the spherical shell 
 of cells remains the same (that assumes the medium to be 
 practically homogeneous). Or, the intensity of light, as a 
 One limit decreases as the square of the distance from the 
 source, assuming that it travels in dynamically homogeneous 
 cells, and that the cells have negligible size — both of which 
 conditions are never actually met with. It is usually ortho- 
 doxly stated that the amplitude of a wave decreases directly 
 as the distance increases ; but that amounts in practice to 
 what I have just said above, because I am not talking of the 
 orthodox abstract (really mystic) waves which actually never 
 exist, but am talking of changes in particular cells, which 
 changes are various units of Energy. Then, as a sum of this 
 paragraph, we have our equation That... X This... = Energy 
 turned into the form Intensity... Y^L...=Energy, where the 
 structural unit is a cell, and Intensity is elongation in two di- 
 rections, or really Z.XL, so that the equation amounts to 
 Unit M{L... XL. .. X.L...)=Energy. And as those L's imply 
 T, the light equation is obviously truistic with the various 
 forms of the measuring member, and with Energy (IX). 
 
 g. In the last paragraph it is obvious that in order that 
 there may be such » solid structure, so that truistically the 
 transverse components as they travel out may vary inversely 
 rather accurately as the distance, we must consider the origi- 
 nal normal direction as continually changing so as to keep 
 normal to the whirl flows as those flows vary in direction. Or 
 to put it perhaps more intelligibly, if we tilt the transverse 
 directions as may be necessary to keep them always cutting 
 
 the radial direction continually shift so as to be actually the 
 main axis of the light-whirl (i. e., the whirl that would be 
 corpuscular light), which we have seen points in the varying 
 direction in which the whirl moves except for the spiral 
 modification (cf. the path of S, Fig. 107e). It then follows 
 that the radial component of motion of the ray travels by vi- 
 bration in the ever-varying direction at ever-varying speed. 
 We begin the examination of the details of that. 
 
 h. An identically equivalent* way of reaching the above 
 conclusions as to the path of a ray is to consider that as the 
 three components travel out from the central generating 
 cell, they dynamically combine with analogous components 
 in other cells by the third law of m-H, n. That way is the 
 orthodox way : but it involves a painful amount of direct 
 contacts with the verbal difficulties of the One and Many— 
 as may be readily seen from the textbooks. 
 
 i. As constituting the typical light phenomenon, we 
 may consider the radial component to have arrived at the 
 next outward difference surface beyond the one at which we 
 may arbitrarily take it to have started, and note the results. 
 
 If we are considering a simple fluid whirl, ignoring 
 
 possible condensations, the cells in that next surface will 
 have a slower speed of elongation, and also will have their 
 axes of radial elongation at some finite angle to the arriving 
 elongation. The result will in general be that the ray will 
 travel through, but will then travel at a slower speed and in 
 
 a different direction. I have expressed that as if the 
 
 ray suddenly changed. But obviously that change took 
 place gradually throughout the ray's path, and the difference 
 surface is merely a zone in which gradually (i. e., not instan- 
 taneously, and not in zero space) a different gradual change, 
 due to the next field which the ray is then entering, can be 
 considered to begin. So for brevity we may speak of the 
 difference surface as the place where the summed change oc- 
 curs — as otherwise we would attempt to express an infinite 
 regress ; and as there another sort of summation starts. 
 
 j. That general phenomenon is inclusive of all specially 
 named light phenomena except polarizations. In those last, 
 it is further perceptible and expressed that at the difference 
 surface (as the end of the summing) the transverse compo- 
 nents are also in some degree rotated (also, they are changed 
 in energy or amplitude, producing rotary dispersion). We 
 consider transverse changes in §130; that dispersion in §129. 
 
 k. Obviously, it is not possible (except by the impos- 
 sible one chance in infinity) for any ray at such a difference 
 surface to have any component entirely destroyed (or made 
 infinite), or revolved exactly 90 or 180° (or some integral 
 multiple) thus exactly changing places with another arbitrary 
 component. It therefore follows directly that any difference 
 
141 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XIII §127e 
 
 surface roughly bounds' a process which has gradually taken 
 place and is there consummated,' which process involves in 
 some degree all the phenomena of light. (That is merely 
 the truistic reverse form of our general statements in Part 
 One that the convenient practical method we use for split- 
 ting the universe into parts is to do it at the places — surfaces 
 — where our light phenomena start"; we are now seeing 
 
 that in a direct and experimental way.) That is true 
 
 even though we neglect all but the average values for the 
 components that started out to travel through the structure 
 to the next surface. So when below any given light phe- 
 nomenon is named, that implies that all others are happening 
 with it. There is nothing strange about that (it applies to 
 any sort of phenomena we can name) :- an ether cell is a 
 stellar galaxy, and obviously every possible kind of phenom- 
 enon is happening in the galaxy, and hence when the galaxy 
 is thus summed up as light, and stated in terms of light, tru- 
 istically all those kinds of phenomena are included. 
 
 1. Also, even though we start from one cell which is 
 giving practically one color light, adjacent cells will unite in 
 forming with that cell a sum giving slightly varying compo- 
 nents in the ray — in any given cell in the outer difference 
 surface. Hence, that cell in the surface will exhibit a con- 
 tinuous spectrum — perhaps perceptibly so, as we shall see. 
 
 §127. a. The last section gives a broadly detailed me- 
 chanics of light in conventional terms, making no more vari- 
 ation from those terms than logical consistency imperatively 
 requires. However, even if they are conventional, they are 
 hard to understand. So I now give an equivalent unconven- 
 tional expression of the same thing, which although rough, 
 is intelligible. 
 
 b. Let us consider two adjacent solar systems in the 
 galaxy. They would then be in fair equilibrium with each 
 other, and would have a fairly balanced solar field difference 
 surface between them (more explicitly, a field surface for 
 each, with a little of the galaxy field between them, the sum 
 
 Fig. 127b. 
 
 of the three amounting practically to saying that there is a 
 common, somewhat balanced single surface between). Let 
 Fig. 127b roughly represent those conditions. S and S are 
 parts of two whirls or solar systems in cross-section. A is a 
 cell on the filament surface of S, and B a cell on the filament 
 surface of S'. As S and S' are taken to be approximately in 
 balance, it follows that the spiral motion in their differeace 
 surfaces (FC and GD) are 'reversed' or 'opposite,' and about 
 equal, as is roughly indicated by the two arrows. So for ar- 
 bitrary clearness we may draw them as in the figure, with 
 some of the galaxy field between — although as a matter of 
 fact that part between the surfaces is merely an additional 
 thickness of the field difference surface that is common to the 
 two whirls. (That surface has some thickness; hence it is de- 
 sirable to show in the figure an appreciable thickness, and 
 the method used is equivalent to doing so.) Now, as light 
 travels out from A towards a point C on the field difference 
 
 surface of S it constantly encounters a weaker field, compared 
 with its radial component: hence, by Bernoulli's principle, 
 Huygen's principle, Newton's third law, etc. (all are equiva- 
 lent), the ray travels in the curve AC'C, which continually 
 increases its angle with pipi (the perpendicular or normal to 
 FC at C) — thus arriving at the surface FC headed in such a 
 direction that its transverse components are in about the same 
 plane as the similar components of the cell at C; that thus 
 makes it at least nominally the same ray of light that started 
 (i. e., it is its dynamic result). The ray would pass through 
 the thickness CD which was arbitrary, in the therefore tru- 
 istically necessary arbitrary straight line CD to D — that line 
 CD being tangent to AC C at C (i. e., it is simply a continua- 
 tion of AC C — a geometrical verbal counter; see par. d). 
 Then, at D, the conditions being reversed, the ray would 
 travel in the curve DD B (the dynamical reverse of AC'C) to 
 B on the filament surface of S , the beginning of its curve 
 being tangent at D to CD. That is the identical summed re- 
 sult of the path of a ray by orthodox light, when it passes 
 from one medium to another (assuming that "all" of the ray 
 passes the boundary, as of course is not the case; i. e., the 
 cell at C is 8-dimensioned, and obviously some of the energy 
 or components of the ray is absorbed, some reflected, etc. — 
 including all of light phenomena). As a sum, to agree with 
 orthodox summations into monism, we have the fields on an 
 average dynamically denser than their field difference surface. 
 Then we could, by such summations, take it that A was a 
 point inside the dense, practically homogeneous prism PQR, 
 which prism is as shown tangent at C to the surface FC; and 
 B is inside the similar prism PQR tangent at D to GD. As 
 the fields were dynamically (roughly) equal, the prisms (as- 
 sumed of equal refractive power) would have their sides PQ 
 and P Q parallel, so that the summed ray would be the 
 broken line ACDB, made up of the three straight parts 
 shown. As indicated by the figure, that ray is the orthodox 
 ray (see Wood's "Optics," chapter on refraction). 
 
 c. I shall not go into the geometry of the amount of 
 that refraction — deviation — of the ray. It is simple : all 
 that needs to be noted in going into this thoroughly is that 
 when I put a space between FC and GD it was thus tacitly 
 assumed that the two fields were made denser dynamically 
 than that symbolic space, so that AC C leaves A dynamically 
 bent from its average direction — and so on, similar!} 7 . The 
 general reader needs simply to observe that all rays traveling 
 in the universe, in any way, are continually being curved, and 
 that we seem to see things as if they were in the direction of 
 the tangent to that curve where it enters the eye. Ortho- 
 dox theory of light roughly asserts that light travels in brok- 
 en straight lines ; but even that theory admits, in order to 
 agree with observed facts and actually in contradiction to it- 
 self, that no reflection (e. g.) does take place exactly at a 
 geometrical surface: — that admission is obviously identical 
 with the general principle of no straight lines which I have 
 just asserted, and which is proved by this whole book. 
 
 d. Hence, at A, B appears to be in the direction AC' 
 (or accurately, in the direction of the tangent to AC C at A), 
 and the angle of that deviation from its true direction in the 
 straight line AC is in astronomy called its aberration. But 
 this sort of aberration (as shown by this figure) is not defin- 
 itely recognized conventionally, as we shall see. (The true 
 direction of B from A is AC : for if I had not arbitrarily put 
 in that separating space, C and D would of course coincide, 
 and ACDB would then be a straight line; but the space had 
 to be put in to show the theory well, as we shall further see.) 
 
 e. It follows that everything in the universe appears 
 slightly displaced to us — i. e., it follows, except in the one 
 chance in infinity that our finite eyes are in exact dynamic 
 
§127e XIII Two 
 
 balance with the observed body. But that displacement is 
 essential if we are to see it visually clearly, and not with 
 more or less colored spectrums for boundaries. For obvi- 
 ously, all colors actually travel from A to B or from B to A. 
 Hence, instead of there being one path AC C, as shown, 
 each of the infinite number of colors, because it has a speed 
 of its own, would travel to the field surface in a path of its 
 own, and there (as a truism of such paths) spread out into a 
 spectrum : then, the equivalent to the reversed prism {prac- 
 tically precisely reversed, as the whirls were taken to be in 
 fair equilibrium) would recombine that spectrum, so that it 
 reaches B practically all together, and it therefore seems that 
 all colors travel at about the same speed, in free space. 
 Obviously they do not, anywhere; but are always dispersed 
 fan-like into a spectrum and then, because all objects are us- 
 ually fairly in balance, are ordinarily perceptibly brought 
 together again at the object to which they travel. Each col- 
 or thus travels at a different speed all the time, but has trav- 
 eled over a path that is proportionally longer as its speed is 
 greater, so that the colors arrive practically together ordi- 
 narily. Numbers of men have elaborately observed that col- 
 ors ordinarily arrive practically together, regardless of their 
 origin in free" space; hence, some have irrelevantly con- 
 cluded that the colors must travel together at the same speed, 
 as it seems not to have occurred to them to consider whether 
 all colors traveled over the same path. They tacitly took it 
 for granted that all light travels in straight lines, whereas the 
 absolute principle is that none ever does, finitely speaking. 
 
 f. S and S can not be in exact equilibrium, because as a 
 truism of their existence, in the language we are speaking 
 they are in mutual motion. Therefore, it is impossible for 
 all the colors of B to arrive exactly simultaneously at A. Or 
 to state it otherwise, there is some degree of asymmetry at C 
 or D, and hence the spectrum which is spread upon the field 
 surface at that place can not be perfectly united at A. It is 
 obvious that ordinarily, in conditions of fairly steady balance, 
 there would not be much variation of color at A from its con- 
 dition at B; and as the colors kept on coming continually 
 from B, any slight retardation of one color would merely re- 
 sult in giving an apparent different color to B from what it 
 would have been if the balance had been more exact (i. e., 
 the actual spectrum of B at A is so slightly spread that we 
 do not notice it as a spectrum, but merely as a slight change 
 in color; see below). But obviously, if we now consider B 
 to be a rather large astronomical body and hence giving off 
 light made up of a mixture of very perceptibly different col- 
 ors ; and if it were in close orbital motion with a companion 
 which would eclipse it, then we could see the colors start to 
 come. And B's orbital motion would also obviously cause 
 quite considerable local asymmetry of B compared with the 
 steady whirl S, and hence would tend to give perhaps a per- 
 ceptible separation of the colors if we were at A observing B 
 come into view after an eclipse. The whole tendency would 
 be for us to perceive some of the colors catching up, or be- 
 coming stronger after a time. Such phenomena have been 
 actually observed :- Tikhoff and Nordmann independently 
 observed a mutual variation in the speeds of different colors 
 in so-called free space from such a source in that way. That 
 is obviously crucial proof of the consistency of the foregoing. 
 
 g. It at once follows that all that is a description of the 
 principles of a complete sort of aberration, and that it is not 
 possible to measure complete aberration (it is an infinite re- 
 gress : that is another point of view of no exact science, and 
 I shall not explicitly expand it into truisms). The actual 
 aberration which we do note is only a part of the total aber- 
 ration described above. What is conventionally known as 
 aberration is the angular displacement of a heavenly body 
 
 UNIVERSE 142 
 
 from the line of vision in which it appears to be, and is due, 
 if we interpret conventional descriptions explicitly, only to 
 the earth's spherical field. Aberration in the complete sense 
 in which we shall use it is due to all structural variations. 
 Such general aberration as a matter of obvious fact is practi- 
 cally negligible for us for all fairly balanced things in our en- 
 vironment here (where the unbalances are great — e. g., as 
 between lenses and air — the phenomena are given different 
 special names) ; but aberration for celestial bodies is percept- 
 ible. The earth's spherical field is in fairly good balance 
 with all other fields (but not in exact balance), and so gives 
 an aberration of any star, as in Fig. 127b, at any given time. 
 Then about six months later we are on the opposite side of 
 our orbit about the sun, in reverse balance, and hence the 
 aberration of the star is practically reversed (or the star ap- 
 pears to be twice the angle of the spherical field aberration 
 from its former position — neglecting the modification of its 
 aberration due to the ether structure in the distance across 
 the orbit of the earth when that distance more or less iner- 
 venes ; that neglected part includes much of the aberration 
 in the infinite regress of it, as is implied in the next para- 
 graph; e. g., the "bending" of light near the sun predicted 
 by Einstein's relativity theory is a special part of aberration 
 due to the sun's spherical field — when thus put in terms of 
 affinity; see §125b and the next paragraph). In 
 
 brief, the transverse motion of the earth relative to the star, 
 by Bernoulli's principle, makes its spherical field the equiva- 
 lent of a prism. The radial motion of the earth relative to 
 the star is provided for by Doppler's principle ("Ency. 
 Brit.," ii, 818). It is obvious that we could take aberration 
 and Doppler's principle as two factors giving the One or En- 
 ergy, and completely express — explain — the universe with 
 them. All that is omitted here. Obviously, this descrip- 
 tion of aberration is merely the description of light from the 
 point of view of its being received at a body ; that is simply 
 the reverse or vice versa of its description in the last two 
 sections from the point of view of its formation at a body or 
 ether cell. Also, it can be seen that by following ordinary 
 language we get bent light by ordinary principles as to 
 structures in ordinary steady space. 
 
 h. Clearly then, what is usually named aberration is 
 simply the refraction of a celestial body's light that is due to 
 or accomplished by the earth spherical field. The complete 
 aberration of a given body in another galaxy would have that 
 refraction by our spherical field as the first [or last] part of 
 itself. The next part of that body's aberration is due to our 
 solar whirl field — and could be measured by us if we ob- 
 served the body's direction from opposite sides of the solar 
 system's orbit about the galaxy axis, taking into account 
 other changes. Also, there would be another part of its com- 
 plete aberration if we had to view it through the sun's spher- 
 ical field : obviously the light from the body could not come 
 through that field perfectly symmetrically, and hence there 
 would necessarily be some degree of deviation of that light 
 due to that field (that being another statement of Einstein's 
 bending"). And in the same way there is a part of the 
 total aberration added by every difference surface encount- 
 ered (more precisely :- by every field and filament passed 
 through). It is obvious of course that if we look at such a 
 body one part of that total aberration is usually in a sense op- 
 posite to the next, so that the path of the light from it is 
 actually a sort of wavy, corkscrew line (we saw that a whirl 
 corkscrews itself along; we now consistently see that light, 
 regardless of whether described as waves or whirls, does the 
 same); and the aberration due to our spherical field is practi- 
 cally all there remains of the body's aberration over that al- 
 gebraic nearly zero — but possibly the aberration caused by 
 
143 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XIII §128a 
 
 the sun s orbit about the galaxy axis does not perceptibly 
 cancel out. Of course, the One absolute sum total of the 
 complete aberration of every body is obviously (or arith- 
 metically, °°), so that qualitatively aberration, as a rigorous 
 truism, does not keep us in ignorance of anything but unes- 
 sential temporary quantities. Clearly, however, it theoreti- 
 cally would require infinite time to measure the complete 
 aberration of any star accurately. 
 
 i. It thus obviously follows that the consistent way of 
 describing aberration is to have the ether around the earth 
 form a structure that accompanies the earth. It could be 
 verbally described with valid logic in the opposite way ; but 
 that would give all the enormous verbal difficulty that would 
 accompany Ptolemaic astronomy (§100c; has given the rela- 
 tivity theory as one such method). Hence, as we have been 
 seeing, in ordinary language the ether accompanies the earth. 
 
 j. In effect the Michelson-Morley experiments compared 
 the velocity of light under practically identical conditions, 
 except that (l) in one case light moved in the direction of 
 the motion of the earth from a point A to a point B and back 
 (those points being places on a large stone disk), both A and B 
 being considered as moving with the earth, and (2) in the 
 other case the light moved across that earth-motion in that 
 same path. If the ether does not move with the earth (or 
 the apparatus), then it can be shown by simple geometry 
 that it would take more time for the light to make the trip 
 across the earth's motion; if the ether moved with the appa- 
 ratus it would make no difference how the line from A to B 
 is oriented (assuming, as is practically the fact, that the earth 
 field structure is practically homogeneous in that small por- 
 tion of it). The experiment showed that it made no percept- 
 ible difference — that within certain measured limits the ether 
 was dragged by the earth. See Wood's Optics" (XXII) 
 for the details and for other details of orthodox light men- 
 tioned in this paragraph. We have just seen that a 
 
 consistent description of aberration agrees (if we use ordinary 
 language) with that. As stated in §124g, it is orthodoxly 
 considered that aberration requires a still ether; it is ortho- 
 doxly held that all experimental evidence except this 
 Michelson-Morley experiment requires a still ether — one not 
 dragged by atoms (which orthodox view about atoms shows 
 clearly that orthodox light makes a dualism between matter 
 and ether^that the fundamental difficulty it has is that it 
 makes no explicit solution of the One and the Many). It is 
 now obvious that what orthodox theory requires is an explic- 
 itly expressed difference surface: for we saw in pars, b-d 
 that the so-called still or free ether which was required was 
 merely a formal counter of actual — not zero — space between 
 prisms (which prisms the orthodox theory assumed with logi- 
 cal inconsistency to be perfectly homogeneous or isotropic). 
 (Obviously, those two orthodox absurdities — absurdities from 
 a finite point of view: religiously or mystically they are all 
 right — do cancel each other, and give a theory that is logic- 
 ally consistent, but is so only in one zero point.) In 
 
 implicit proof and agreement with all that, Lorentz under- 
 takes to show that the Michelson-Morley experiment can be 
 explained by asserting that there is a still ether (as is 
 orthodoxly supposed to be required by all other light experi- 
 mental results), and that the stone disc which fixes or gives 
 the length AB is shortened somewhat by passing through 
 that still ether, so that the actual path of the light is 
 shorter— that then being [superficially] verbally consistent 
 with observations. That dire.ct assertion is obviously 
 equivalent to saying that matter which measures space varies 
 as such a standard, so that space varies: and those ideas of 
 
 Lorentz's are the base of Einstein's work on relativity. 
 
 Well; obviously, if the stone is shortened by rubbing against 
 
 the ether, then the reaction asserts that parts of the stone 
 move some, and that of course requires that the ether must 
 also move; for it would obviously be an absolute miracle, 
 using our language, (a flat self-contradiction) if the atoms and 
 ether thus reacted without causing the ether to move — to re- 
 act, to be dragged, (if the language be changed to the rela- 
 tivity theory, then in that new language Newton s third law 
 is not so — for if space thus changes in order to avoid that re- 
 action asserted by that law, then that third law does not hold 
 
 in the new language.) Hence, to shorten the path 
 
 (even by the relativity theory itself) is identically the same 
 as saying that the ether moves. And obviously, by our 
 method of putting the ether into a structure we show the 
 character of the narrow or more or less nominal problem of 
 whether the ether 'moves"; for it is then at once evident 
 that the structural relations consistently describe all light 
 experiments, and it is entirely immaterial (from the point of 
 view of the total truth) whether we use the verbal form 
 ether moves, 'or the formula ether does not move." The 
 everyday custom of speech is that the ether moves. The 
 orthodox theory means precisely the same thing, but puts it 
 mystically — not scientifically, or finitely. 
 
 k. U. A. Boyden a number of years ago entrusted 
 $1000, now known as the Boyden premium, to the Franklin 
 Institute, to be awarded to any resident of North America 
 who shall determine by experiment whether all rays of light, 
 and other physical rays, are or are not transmitted with the 
 same velocity. ' In 1907 part of the accumulation was 
 awarded to a man who was believed to have shown that cer- 
 tain different colored light rays were transmitted at the same 
 velocity in free space, because he showed that they ar- 
 rived here practically together after starting out practically 
 together. We have seen (par. e) that that solution is wrong 
 in that it is quantitatively inaccurate and qualitatively totally 
 irrelevant. So far as I know the premium is still offered, so 
 apparently the problem is still unsolved, apart from this 
 book. Here we have the complete solution (cf. §§124-6). 
 
 1. The solution of those recognized outstanding prob- 
 lems of light is comparatively incidental. The important 
 application of this roughly stated section (the section is so 
 condensed that precision, and some intelligibility, had to be 
 sacrificed) consists of showing how the spectrum is formed. 
 Knowing that, then we can readily find the details of struct- 
 ures of different sorts of atoms, and be in a position to find 
 out qualitatively (and quantitatively, in so far as actual meas- 
 ures have been made) why certain atoms have certain prop- 
 erties, and how to use those properties — in short, we have a 
 rational basis for all engineering problems, chiefly in terms 
 of chemistry." So we start investigating that spectrum ; 
 it will have to be done briefly, and hence roughly. 
 
 §128. a. We shall go at the formation of the spectrum 
 backwards, so to speak. I. e., we start with the different 
 vibrating structures and see how they add together their ef- 
 fects as a final spectrum, expressing the mechanics in terms 
 of light. So that we may have no difficulty in forming a 
 clear conception of a spectrum — no difficulty in verifying the 
 mechanics by observation, — I shall show how our galaxy as 
 one atom will form a spectrum for a larger being, for whom 
 the cells in the surface of our galaxy filament have a velocity 
 of radial component that gives him visible light. To him, 
 therefore, our galaxy would not be large enough to be per- 
 ceptible if it is alone ; so in order to avoid verbal complica- 
 tions let us assume that it is in a collection of similar 
 'atoms,' so that the same sort of light will come from each, 
 and add together by Huygen's principle to form an ordinary 
 so-called flat wave-front. That simply means that if we 
 take it that light is corpuscular, then two of those whirl 
 
§128a XIII Two 
 
 corpuscles can not occupy the same space simultaneously — a 
 truism. In terms of the origin of vibrations it is the same 
 principle shown in §126:- that the radial component changes 
 direction. Or it means substantially the same as the ortho- 
 dox theory which shows that each newly vibrating cell 
 becomes the center of light vibrations, and that by interfer- 
 ence" light is propagated rectilinearly," and hence in 
 "wave-fronts." That orthodox theory is well known (Wood, 
 Optics," II), and I omit further details of it. I shall call 
 the results of Huygen's principle the composition of light, 
 composition of components, or results of interference. 
 
 b. Then, omitting all other details of structural insides 
 of our galaxy, it is obvious that its filament will tend to form 
 in the galaxy field surface a continuous light spectrum — i. e., 
 the infinite number of colors will tend to spread out as a con- 
 tinuous spectrum on that field surface, as we shall see in 
 more detail. But obviously, we must consider interference 
 of light from various parts of the filament surface. If the 
 filament were perfectly symmetrical and the field surface 
 perfectly symmetrical, obviously there would be total inter- 
 ference, and we would get no light: or, we could equally 
 well say that each ray would then be totally reinforced, so 
 that there would be infinite light — both being One state- 
 ments. So it follows that in our galaxy, which is not sym- 
 metrical (and remembering that we are ignoring all structures 
 but the filament and field), at any place on the field surface 
 there will be, as a result of what has been described as aber- 
 ration or what is usually called refraction, a continuous spec- 
 trum, some bands or portions of which are 'brighter' than 
 other parts (that spectrum' is not what we see and conven- 
 ventionally name a spectrum; the latter is the reflection of 
 the spectrum' of light waves from a screen, body, surface of 
 our ordinary atoms ; as we are interested here in the dynam- 
 ics of the light wave we may use spectrum, etc., to name the 
 condition of the waves). The darker parts of that spectrum 
 at the field surface are due to interference of rays from other 
 parts of the filament surface which have been "passed" 
 through that part of the filament surface which is forming 
 the bright bands (or vice versa, depending on relative con- 
 ditions). The field surface is obviously fully 'over- 
 laid,' everywhere and in every direction, with those complete 
 spectrums ; the place on the field surface at which we would 
 say a particular spectrum is located would depend upon the 
 relative location of the viewing point (analogous to the loca- 
 tion of a rainbow; this is a rainbow I am describing except 
 there are self-luminous' and refracting continuous ether 
 cells instead of drops of water). Hence, as each of us (or 
 each of those greater beings) has his own point of view in 
 seeing or describing that spectrum, each of us would have 
 his particular spectrum on that surface, specially oriented, and 
 differing somewhat from all others' spectrums. Our descrip- 
 tion has here merely run into the infinite regress ; we shall 
 get out of it with but negligible difficulty shortly. 
 
 c. We therefore see that a complete or continuous spec- 
 trum, having more or less perceptible darker bands, is the 
 spectrum of the newest, youngest, or most fluid whirl — a 
 whirl which has negligible secondaries and condensations. 
 It is called a band spectrum, and is orthodoxly considered as 
 being made of bright bands separated by dark bands; obvi- 
 ously, there must be some light in the "dark" bands, or 
 else we have a zero-infinity error. It is further obvious that 
 every finite band in the spectrum, however narrow it may be, 
 is itself a complete spectrum of the same sort overlaid on 
 the wider spectrum, coming from a structure of different 
 order. Or, we may briefly call it a different order spectrum. 
 Obviously, such different order spectrums, truistically with 
 different order whirls, will extend in infinite regress. 
 
 144 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 d. It therefore follows, that because the cell from which 
 any given band (regardless of how nearly zero in width, or 
 how nearly infinite in width, the band is) comes, is taken to 
 be of finite size (when we are using scientific language), then 
 there must always be a certain fixed ratio between the sizes 
 of those bands, or between their spacial separation (which is 
 the same in principle), depending upon the finite size of cell 
 which we originally take as a criterion (we ordinarily take a 
 cell with vibration at V\ as standard). Therefore, the pro- 
 portional periodicity of structure is seen to inhere in the peri- 
 odicity of spectrum bands (or spectrum lines : a comparatively 
 narrow perceptible spectrum band is customarily called a 
 line). That ratio would obviously be somewhat approxi- 
 mately proportional to the inverse square, on the same prin- 
 ciple as Bode's law (§117). And that ratio is observed to 
 exist, the assertion of it being known as Balmer s formula :- 
 Wave lengtk=h[R 2 l{R 2 — 4,)]XlCT 8 cm, where for observed H 
 lines, h is a number, 8645, and R is given successive values 
 3, 4, 5, 6... . That formula rationally asserts that the ratio 
 of wave length to the other two dimensions of space (to I?, 
 or radius-squared) is rather accurately, but admittedly ap- 
 
 proximately, proportional to the numerical ratio l/E? — to 
 the inverse square, — but that because of the finite size of the 
 structures jR 2 has to be reduced a little, just as was done in 
 Bode's law, and for the same reasons as were seen there, or 
 just as Newcomb and others have empirically tried to correct 
 Newton's law by making the inverse 2 a little greater number 
 ("Ency. Brit.," xii, 384). (Also, Balmer's formula is sup- 
 plemented by Biot's law; §130f. In principle the two are 
 the same.) Of course, a completely rational Bal- 
 mer's formula and a completely rational Bode s law would 
 state just how much that little' is, and the general mathe- 
 matical theory of its variations — in short, would be the ex- 
 plicit theory of harmonic periodicity, the theory of the 
 numerical coefficients in IX. Erwin, in discussing Balmer's 
 formula, gives some first steps in the statement of that fully 
 complete mathematical measuring theory of science. 
 
 e. And Moseley's law (Millikan, "The Electron," 194, 
 201, 213, etc.) is in principle the same as Balmer's formula. 
 Moseley observed that "arranged in the order of increasing 
 frequency of their characteristic X-ray spectra, all the known 
 elements which have been examined constitute a simple 
 arithmetical series each number of which is [approximately] 
 obtained by adding always the same quantity" — i. e., by 
 adding the same spacial distance on the similar spectrums. 
 Now, X-rays are roughly a different order of vibrations from 
 ordinary light, and hence a complete X-ray spectrum more 
 or less adds itself directly on to and beyond the violet end 
 of the ordinary visible light spectrum, with lines representing 
 the higher order, very rapid structures in the atom. It is 
 difficult to refract those high-frequency waves into percept- 
 ible spectra; so in the spectrums of X-rays it follows that 
 only the principal higher order internal structures manage to 
 give lines energetic enough to remain perceptible and con- 
 stitute those simple experimental spectrums. In ordinary 
 light spectrums numerous atomic secondaries give complicated 
 visible spectrums. And because our atoms are energetically 
 harmonically periodic, it follows that their higher order 
 structures are periodic. Hence, as the method of getting 
 X-ray spectra automatically analyzes the atoms for us by 
 showing only the chief energetic higher order structure, it 
 truistically follows that such periodicity would appear as 
 Moseley's series. That is merely a repetition in concrete 
 
 terms of the last paragraph ; see also par. k. If it 
 
 be desired to put Moseley's law in the form of the inverse 
 square law, we have h\lv=E?\E£, where the l's are wave 
 lengths, and the E's are respective nuclear charges of atoms 
 
145 
 
 (Millikan, "Electron," 20l). As a matter of fact, Moseley's 
 law is no more exact than Balmer's formula or Bode's law 
 (being of the same nature, as just seen). Moseley's law runs 
 somewhat out of step in the middle of the periodic table, in 
 complete agreement with the fact that there the rare earths 
 get out of step. Also, and obviously consistently, the atomic 
 weights of elements (App. B) do not always agree with 
 Moseley's order, which is given by what is called the "atom- 
 ic number" (e. g. , elements 52 and 53). For the Moseley 
 number seems to depend upon the size of the chief or "char- 
 acteristic" higher order structure in the atom, and truistically 
 some variation in another property (say density) of the whole 
 atom is likely to be enough occasionally to throw the atomic 
 weight out of order, precisely as every other simple property 
 of atoms gets out of step with any other given property. 
 That necessarily follows as a truism of the meaning of property: 
 for property means a particular way of considering an atom 
 divided into parts, and so if an}' two properties maintained a 
 regular step (stayed in step) they would be essentially iden- 
 tical and not too properties. 
 
 f. The last two paragraphs are brief statements of the 
 ultimate nature of structure and property in terms of light, 
 compared with all other terms. Because they comprise such 
 numerous details they are hard to understand. 
 
 g. In order that the spectrums at our galaxy field may 
 become perceptible, visible, to the larger man we have as- 
 sumed, they unite with others of adjacent galaxies, and build 
 up by interference more intense spectrums, that travel on 
 until they come to, and form spectrums at, the larger differ- 
 ence surface that in turn incloses these galaxy-atoms (making 
 those atoms into a solid, liquid, or gas to that man, which 
 is self-luminous). Now, if he looks directly at that larger 
 difference surface, his eyes, being another solid in what we 
 will consider to be a fairly steady environment analogous to 
 our own, are in fair dynamic balance with that collection of 
 galaxy-atoms; consequently, those spectra spread out at that 
 difference surface have their colors recombined at his eye and 
 he sees the spectrums as a bright body of a certain color just 
 as we see an ordinary self-luminous body. His particular 
 space location will determine what spectrum on that surface 
 is combined at his eye; hence, the color he sees is never ex- 
 actly the same as the color seen by any other observer, if we 
 use ordinary language. Therefore, obviously we can assert 
 and agree that we arbitrarily (i. e., for convenience — see that 
 important point made by Dewey in his Introduction) propose 
 to have verbally an exact science and also a verbally steady 
 space and time, and manage rigorously to achieve that by- 
 being exact in naming all colors (everything would have a 
 differently named color for each observer, and for the same 
 observer at each different instant of time). And as the prop- 
 erties of bodies are not in step, such an exact science would 
 formally determine the exact relative names or measures for 
 all other properties in infinite regress of variability. That 
 would be a relativity theory (of color, I suppose you would 
 call it), essentially identical with Einstein's (as well as being 
 essentially the same in meaning as our ordinary language), 
 but in which space and time would formally be our ordinary 
 steady Euclidian variety. But all color would be curved 
 (i. e., would vary in measure continually, and after an infini- 
 ty of varying would naturally or truistically return to the 
 same value, or "close on itself" like Einstein's curved space), 
 and would have time as a "fourth dimension" i. e., must 
 always be dated, as it varies with time, as a verbal truism. 
 And obviously, any property may similarly be made the base 
 of a relativity theory — and as we may truistically designate 
 an infinity of properties, there are an infinity of another sort 
 of relativity theories to choose from if our ordinary language 
 
 UNIVERSE Two XIII §128j 
 
 is not liked. If that observer introduces any appreci- 
 able asymmetry between his eye and the difference surface, 
 the spectra will truistically be appreciably spread out, and 
 from his space location he sees some particular, now visible 
 spectrum. Obviously that spectrum which he sees is differ- 
 ently dispersed both in relative and in total degree from its 
 dispersion on the difference surface (because by only one 
 chance in infinity could the prism be exactly the effectual 
 dynamic reverse of the various structures the light had been 
 corkscrewing through up to the time it spread on the large 
 difference surface). So it truistically follows in the same way 
 that the actual spectrums we see contain in them the com- 
 plete traces of the dynamic conditions of all the materials 
 that make them — of every structure through which the light 
 has passed (cf. §158c). And the other general rule which 
 we have seen is that all asymmetries in any part of 
 the path of a ray are represented in the final ray by varia- 
 tions in the composition of its components, and will be indi- 
 cated in some degree by lines or bands in its spectrum. 
 
 h. We shall now see the results produced in the spec- 
 trum by condensations in the galaxy whirl. Let us take our 
 solar system as being a secondary whirl, and the earth a ter- 
 tiary. Also, suppose that the observer is stationed some- 
 where near the north galactic pole. One of the cells that 
 we have been considering to be on the galaxy difference sur- 
 face and to be the vibratory, arbitrary beginning of one ray, 
 is by our definitions a lower order whirl of the galaxy whirl, 
 just as the solar whirl is a lower order whirl. The only dif- 
 ference in the resulting light phenomena of those cells and of 
 the solar whirl is that we have considered the cell phenomena 
 as being practically continuous (ignoring inner structures) : — 
 that is consistent in principle; quantitatively, there is prob- 
 ably such a great difference in the order of solar whirl and of 
 cell that the light from one would be practically totally im- 
 perceptible by any means that makes the light' from the 
 other perceptible; the reader should bear in mind that I am 
 making such vast quantitative discrepancies in this discussion 
 of light — deliberately, as a temporarily useful counterbalance 
 
 to the narrowness of the texts. Now that we consider 
 
 the solar whirl explicitly we shall see some detail of its inner 
 structural results in the complete spectrum made by the solar 
 whirl — which is a band or line in the galaxy spectrum. 
 
 i. A complete revolution of the solar whirl or system 
 about the galaxy main axis is obviously one vibration of the 
 galaxy lower order structure which the solar system consti- 
 tutes. Clearly that vibration is a small asymmetry compared 
 with the total galaxy; but it is always at a given time an 
 asymmetry. And obviously, that continual asymmetry, 
 fairly steady in all its temporary values, will steadily refract 
 or aberrate the ray which goes from the solar whirl to the 
 final spectrum. In each revolution the asymmetry obviously 
 reverses direction, and hence the aberration would swing 
 back and forth across a mean value and make a narrow line 
 or band in the spectrum (that vibration' lasts probably some 
 millions of our years, and would not persist in our retinas 
 as a "band": but I am using the time and space scale of 
 the larger man). 
 
 j. Inside the solar system there are bodies which will 
 again repeat that process (and bodies inside those bod- 
 ies, in infinite regress). The sun has a small revolution 
 about the solar whirl main axis. And in the same way as 
 before, that revolution of the sun will make a still narrower 
 band on the narrow band that is the spectrum of the system 
 itself (I am not at all sure of the correctness of that quanti- 
 tative assertion ; it sounds neat, but it is a problem in perio- 
 dicity I haven't worked). But the earth would obviously be 
 vibrating asymmetrically in the solar whirl field in a way that 
 
§128j XIII Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 146 
 
 is dynamically different from the asymmetry that is the sun s 
 revolution. So the earth also would give a line, less intense, 
 and separated from the sun line; i. e., no two internal bod- 
 ies or structures can ever give two coincident lines. That is 
 equivalent to the truism that no two bodies can simultane- 
 ously occupy the same space. So we have proved generally 
 that every structure in the universe is represented by a line 
 in every spectrum. Of course, quantitatively most of those 
 lines in a given spectrum are very close to zero in every re- 
 spect, and hence are imperceptible; and the fact that there 
 is directly observed to be no fixed, sharp, constant line in 
 any spectrum, especially when the conditions of the body pro- 
 ducing the spectrum are considerably changed, is hence now 
 direct crucial proof that there is no exact science — that mass 
 varies with velocity — of the general argument of this book, 
 k. Whether or not the solar system makes a line inside 
 the limits of that large observer's visible spectrum obviously 
 depends upon quantitative periodic relationships. As a rath- 
 er rash guess I should say that the solar system moved rela- 
 tively to his own general large size so fast that it would be 
 an X-ray band, above his direct visual perception, and that 
 the larger and longer-enduring structures of the galaxy fur- 
 nished lines in his visible spectrum. It is obvious however 
 that the solar system is in a certain periodic harmony with 
 those visible lines, and that the same system of ad infinitum 
 relationships must exist in any whirl. So summing to the 
 One, it is truistic that each arbitrarily particular line corres- 
 ponding to each structure is itself a spectrum which has a set 
 of relationships infinite in number" (i. e., continuous), and 
 hence identical with the spectrum that is each other line. 
 There is then the final applicable truism that the spectrums 
 of all things or structures are ultimately identical, but that 
 the perceptibly visible part of its spectrum is for each thing 
 different in some degree from that of every other thing, and 
 that the intensities of the bands similarly vary. It therefore 
 follows concretely that if a series of lines occurs perceptibly 
 in one part of the spectrum of any given sort of whirl, then 
 the same series can be found in the spectrum of any other 
 sort of whirl if that other sort is stimulated in a way suffic- 
 ient to make the differently located series intense enough to 
 be perceptible. And that is merely a general statement of 
 the principles underlying Moseley s observations and law 
 (par. e) — or the fact that there are no absolute atoms." 
 
 1. This section has therefore summed, as being identical 
 in meaning with the last section — a proof of its consistency. 
 We have seen a very rough statement of how a spectrum is 
 formed, and of what that spectrum indicates about structure. 
 The reader has perhaps noted already that there are details 
 and modifications without end, which we could start on. So 
 far I have not been very explicit about any of the ordinarily 
 named phenomena of light except refraction (aberration) and 
 the consequent dispersion. But the reader may now see for 
 himself that it would take hundreds of pages to be fairly ex- 
 plicit about the things already mentioned. I dislike leaving 
 the descriptions in the above rough and glaringly unfinished 
 state; but the general reader has no special need for further 
 mechanical details, and the professional expert can get them 
 from the given method better than I can give them, and 
 nearly everybody will demand that I be brief. Brevity in 
 these days is coming to mean a jazz syncopation demanded 
 by shallow persons ; but it is reasonable to require that I 
 condense the rest of this chapter even more severely. 
 
 §129. a. In describing dispersion above I did not give 
 explicit proof that there was no such thing as the so-called 
 normal dispersion, in which (to use conventional terms) it is 
 asserted that the refractive index increases as the wave-length 
 decreases. Conventional experiments superficially seem to 
 
 show that such dispersion does exist. I shall condense the 
 proof that there is never such dispersion. 
 
 b. The light from the filament surface in the last section 
 (or from a vibrating cell, if it be noted that in any azimuth 
 the cross-section of a cell is a closed line) will obviously be 
 sent up to form the spectrum on the field surface from a line 
 of cells which, taken in any plane, is curved and finally closes 
 on itself. It therefore follows at once, by geometry which 
 would take hundreds of words to write with reasonable pre- 
 ciseness but which is readily seen if you make a diagram of 
 these conditions and happen to remember a little geometry, 
 that no dispersion line (band, color) in the spectrum is a 
 straight line — or what amounts to the same thing, is exactly 
 the same color (lying in a straight line perpendicular to the 
 length of the spectrum — perpendicular to the average direc- 
 tion of dispersion). So any spectrum, however formed, if 
 permitted to have lines of sufficient length, will have the 
 ends of those lines perceptibly curved, the curves fading out 
 of visibility (there would be in each band, before it starts 
 curving in the opposite sense with reversed direction of dis- 
 persion, a geometrical line of infinite — or zero — refrangibil- 
 ity, which accounts for the perceptible fading out of visibility 
 and completely agrees geometrically with the fact that the 
 light started from a closed curve structure). Those curves at 
 the ends of the lines in a spectrum are perceptible in many 
 experimental spectrums, and are called wings. And the de- 
 gree of curvature of each wing will truistically vary with the 
 variation, in color. It is recognized by orthodox light theory 
 that so-called normal dispersion is merely a special case of 
 anomalous dispersion (Wood's Optics," 95): as a fact, the 
 details of which I omit, normal" dispersion is a One state- 
 ment of dispersion, or the - °° limit. 
 
 §180. a. As we have seen, as a truism of the principle 
 of asymmetry there can be no ray with equal transverse com- 
 ponents (nor can either of those two components ever become 
 zero). So it is obvious that always, as a ray travels along, 
 it is encountering asymmetries which continually change the 
 relative length or energy of the two transverse components. 
 That is the same in effect of course as these:- (l) one com- 
 ponent may be made so small as to become imperceptible ; 
 (2) they both may be made so; (3) a given ratio of the two 
 may be fairly steadily maintained, but the continual actual 
 change of the two is equivalent to the rotation of the two 
 about the path of travel as an axis ; (4) or those relative 
 changes may be combined in any degree. And such phe- 
 nomenon of change in the transverse components of a ray is 
 named polarisation. It truistically always occurs everywhere 
 in every ray (it is merely the same thing as the 'spiral' flow 
 of ether in a whirl). But it is not usually a perceptible 
 change; for ordinary light travels through whirls which are 
 not arranged in any very steady system (a crystal is obviously 
 a fairly steady system of atoms ; but the fluid air is not), 
 and hence the two components are changed usually in alter- 
 nately more or less opposite ways so that no accumulation of 
 effect takes place; and hence there is said to be "no" pol- 
 arization, and all the rays in such a beam of light have 
 approximately equal transverse components oriented in practi- 
 cally the same proportions in all directions in the transverse 
 plane. From that average condition (in which there is 
 merely imperceptible polarization, although it is convention- 
 ally ' unpolarized light") practically all sorts of departures 
 into perceptible polarizations have been observed and given 
 numerous names (see a modern treatise on optics). Obvi- 
 ously, there is an infinite regress of such polarization phe- 
 nomena; we may name such quantitative variation forever. 
 
 b. Orthodoxly, there is asserted to be a plane polariza- 
 tion , in which one transverse component becomes 0. There 
 
147 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XIII §130e 
 
 can not be any such phenomenon, of course; but we may 
 consider that in plane polarized light one transverse compo- 
 nent ordinarily is imperceptible. Then, orthodoxly, 
 
 the plane of polarization is defined as the particular plane 
 of incidence in which the polarized light is most copiously 
 reflected" (Wood's "Optics," 233). Then a question arises 
 as to direction :- whether that vibration which is greater 
 takes place in that arbitrarily named plane, or in the trans- 
 verse direction perpendicular to it. Wood (ibid., 233, 242: 
 possibly he changes in later editions; I haven't looked) as- 
 serts flatly that the light vibrations take place in that per- 
 pendicular direction. Drude ("Theory of Optics," trans. 
 1902, 253) says that either direction is possible, and that 
 the perpendicular one gives simpler language; and the "En- 
 cyclopaedia Brittanica" (xxi, 933) substantially agrees with 
 Drude. It is a question that has long been debated ; ortho- 
 dox science agrees that the electric vector (in the modern 
 electrodynamic theory ; XIV) is the perpendicular one, and 
 the magnetic the other; but as I am taking the electric vec- 
 tor to be the filiar direction (and to be that direction only 
 when a place on the difference surface is considered) it is ob- 
 vious that this direction of light vibration" depends entirely 
 upon what arbitrary point of view we take (for evidently, if 
 we take a given point of view, the filiar direction relative to 
 that point of view takes every direction when the whole filament 
 is considered, as it closes on itself), and that therefore Drude 
 is correct when he asserts in effect that the directions are ar- 
 bitrary and that he does not know which is the finally con- 
 sistent one. We thus see explicitly that conventional science 
 is not in agreement as to a complete set of consistent direc- 
 tions; and that explicitly supports §99, in which I showed 
 that we need not dispute about directions in this book. 
 
 c. It is obvious that precisely as shown in §129b, be- 
 cause light is sent to a spectrum from curved chains of cells, 
 then necessarily the transverse components must be both ro- 
 tated and changed in relative value (both those changes are 
 actually the same reaction, but it is convenient to consider 
 the reaction from those two nominal aspects). And further :- 
 as one monistic limit, a ray may be considered to approach 
 being perfectly normal to that curved chain of cells, and it 
 would then approach having a normal polarization and hence 
 dispersion; and as the other One limit, a ray may be consid- 
 ered to approach being tangent to that closed chain of cells, 
 and would approach having either zero or infinite polarization 
 in its various aspects, and hence similar dispersions. And 
 each effect when within the One limits would truistically be 
 of different quantitative degree for each color. The actual 
 phenomena are between those limits, so that all light (when 
 it is considered with respect to its transverse components, as 
 is being explicitly done in this section) always and everywhere 
 actually has 'anomalous' or "elliptical" polarization, and 
 "anomalous" rotary polarization, and anomalous rotary 
 dispersion (i. e., each color is differently rotated, so that its 
 wings curve differently, indicating again [§129] that it is not 
 possible actually to separate the three components of light). 
 Combinations of such phenomena are obviously indefinitely 
 numerous, and many are named in textbooks. Volumes of 
 mechanical details would be needed to describe them. 
 
 d. It can be seen, as consistent truisms, that those 
 curved spectrums described in the last paragraph and in 
 §129b are essentially in three dimensions, and that the spec- 
 trums themselves are vibrations of cells in what can be called 
 the reverse direction from the vibrations of the cells which 
 sent out the light that made the spectrums. Therefore, the 
 spectrums (i. e., any spectrum, considering it itself in ulti- 
 mate detail) are definitely the mechanical equivalent of a 
 whirl — they are whirls, which by definition (as we are using 
 
 continuous vibrations) are not verbally allowed to go further 
 and become verbally distinct or fully-formed' whirls. That 
 is to say, when we start to considering a whirl in terms of 
 continuous vibrations, then each whirl itself is, as absolutely 
 continuous matter, transferred, as a spectrum which is that 
 whirl, to all other whirls in the universe. Or, in short, if we 
 start using continuous language of light waves, and keep at 
 it consistently as we have done, then the universe becomes 
 verbally absolutely continuous and all definite whirls become 
 definitely all other whirls — becoming so by transferring them- 
 selves to all others as spectrums, which spectrums turn out 
 
 mechanically to be whirls. That sounds mystic and 
 
 unintelligible, of course. And it is both — except from a One 
 point of view. Even though I have been verbally ostenta- 
 tiously declining to let go our definite, pluralistic whirl from 
 which we started the wave" or continuous description, we 
 see that the waves themselves, as spectra, have become the 
 whirl, and have made that whirl universal, or indefinite, or 
 monistic. So by being logical or self-consistent, it resulted 
 that the whirl disappeared as a pluralistic entity anyway (ex- 
 cept in so far as we definitely consider those cells of which 
 the spectrums are composed as being finite in size). So it 
 truistically follows that for any definite language or science, 
 we must use a corpuscular theory of light. Otherwise, the 
 mysticism, or the ineffable total continuous universe, as mon- 
 istically expressed (i. e., not expressed at all, in any positive 
 sense) in this paragraph, is the inevitable result. However, 
 the foregoing verbal trick of hanging on to a definite whirl 
 (or cell) until we are ready to sum the whole description 
 makes that form of waves" scientific — for the final reason 
 that they are formally explicitly 3-dimensioned. For obvi- 
 ously, all of science, before it has any meaning, must be 
 summed into ineffable religion. 
 
 e. It is obvious further that all actual whirls or atoms 
 are in some degree asymmetrical with respect to their chief 
 main axial diameter and to the two diameters in their filiar 
 plane; i. e., all atoms are spheroids with the three diame- 
 ters unequal in some degree. So it is clear that if atoms are 
 oriented in fairly regular simularity, as in a crystal, there 
 will be a tendency for a ray of light to be cumulatively ro- 
 tated so long as it keeps traveling through more atoms. Also 
 a considerable relative difference in lengths of atomic axes 
 would make the ray tend to have two perceptible dispersions, 
 corresponding to those two comparatively large cumulative 
 causes. Such phenomena and many more similar in principle 
 
 have been observed. If a ray of light be sent through 
 
 a transparent non-crystalline collection of whirls that are in 
 a magnetic field, in the magnetic direction (XI V) it would 
 obviously be rotated some with cumulative effect, and also 
 in decreasing proportion it would be rotated some if passed 
 in any other direction (up to the theoretical limiting direc- 
 tion exactly perpendicular to the magnetic direction). Then, 
 the ray, if sent back over approximately the same path, is 
 observed to have its rotation doubled (which phenomenon is 
 
 called the Faraday effect). Clearly, in the case of 
 
 the ray passing through a crystal each ray is subjected to the 
 total effect of the atomic fields (i. e. , those fields are small, 
 and each ray is as a sum subjected to the effect of all por- 
 tions of the whole field), and the rotation is the algebraic sum 
 of the general, systematized asymmetry of those fields; so, 
 as is experimentally observed, any rotation of a ray is ap- 
 proximately cancelled if the ray is sent back along the same 
 path through the crystal. But in the magnetic field only 
 one direction of asymmetry is introduced (the direction of the 
 magnetic force); hence, if the ray be sent in one direction 
 it is rotated in one way, and if sent in the opposite direction 
 it is obviously rotated in the opposite way, which algebraically 
 
§130e XIII Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 148 
 
 doubles the numerical value of its rotation and gives the Fara- 
 day effect. It therefore directly follows that a magnetic field 
 is a large field around an electrical apparatus or collection of 
 
 atoms, that is equivalent to the field of an atom. As 
 
 the Faraday effect is obviously merely a special case, we also 
 see that there can be indefinite variations of that effect, de- 
 pending on how we complicate electrical fields ; many such 
 variations in the phenomenon have been observed. Perhaps 
 the most discussed variation is the Zeeman effect (for details 
 of it and of other phenomena mentioned in this paragraph, 
 see Wood's 'Optics," XVI, XVII):- briefly, it is observed 
 that the speed or color of a given ray is changed by subject- 
 ing its source to a magnetic field; e. g., the heavy yellow 
 line or band of sodium will be broadened in the spectrum, 
 and then be split in various ways (i. e. , new bands percept- 
 ibly appear where before was perceptibly a continuous band). 
 It is obvious, from all our foregoing descriptions, how that 
 would occur. I might mention explicitly another point defi- 
 nitely involved in the Zeeman effect:- the filament (or any 
 structural part, such as a spherical condensation — remember- 
 ing it moves in an orbit) obviously has two dynamically opposite 
 halves. Now, in all cases any line produced in a spectrum 
 by such a structural part must necessarily consist of at least 
 two parts more or less perceptibly continuous; obviously, if 
 the structure were perfectly symmetrical there would be only 
 two parts, but asymmetries cause the number of parts to be 
 in infinite regress. Therefore, it is obvious that if the source 
 of light is subjected to magnetic force it has superimposed 
 upon it a heavy outer field which makes all the whirls more 
 energetic, and will orient all their chief structures more or 
 less systematically, and hence will spread out their bands in 
 unending modification, with all variety of polarizations of the 
 newly perceptible lines. 
 
 f. Biot's law is to the effect that rotary dispersion is 
 nearly proportional to the inverse square of the wave length 
 (Wood's "Optics," 379). That is obviously equivalent to 
 saying that given the effect of certain transverse components 
 (of 2 components or dimensions of space), the longitudinal 
 component varies approximately as the inverse square. And 
 that law is clearly the rational completion of Balmer's formula 
 and Moseley's law (§128de). All three laws together obvi- 
 ously agree with our general equation in §126fg, and show 
 by direct experiment that the argument of this book is sound. 
 
 §131. a. I have mostly been describing the phenomena 
 of light from the point of view of following the ray out from 
 its source and observing how it changed with respect to its 
 longitudinal component (§§127-9) and with respect to its 
 transverse components (§130) — it being noted that the com- 
 ponents are not actually separable. Now, obviously, the 
 whole of light may be described from the opposite point of 
 view:- considering rays as coming in from all directions upon 
 a cell which is to become a source, and observing how those 
 rays combine — what sort of source they make, or how they 
 modify the cell. Obviously, always the rays must first be 
 built into the structure of the cell as part of the cell, and in 
 the end sent away modified (that being a truism of what a 
 ray is); and conventionally that phenomenon is divided usu- 
 ally into two parts:- (l) some of the ray is sent away {re- 
 flected) almost at once; and (2) the remainder of the ray is 
 more extensively built into the structure of the cell {absorbed) 
 and later on sent away seemingly as new" light. (The 
 orthodox descriptions talk of total absorptions, reflections, 
 etc. ; but obviously, all of that zero and infinity talk about 
 total means merely perceptible," relates to nothing 
 which actually happens if it be explicitly interpreted, and so 
 
 is not scientific and may be ignored). Briefly, all 
 
 those numerous possible phenomena may be described from 
 
 this other point of view by reversing the descriptions already 
 given, and picking out conventional names for the result, so 
 far as there are such names. The point to be emphatically 
 kept in mind in doing that is that the cell is itself bound by 
 a closed line in any cross-section, so that always anoma- 
 lous" and rotary" phenomena will necessarily occur. 
 
 b. Those various details of reflection, absorption, diffrac- 
 tion, scattering, color (all color is in some degree body" 
 color and not in any absolute sense surface color, as ob- 
 viously no light can be reflected by or at a geometrical sur- 
 face), calorescence, fluorescence, etc., will have to be mostly 
 omitted here. I shall imply a few of those phenomena in 
 the next section (the last on light), by showing the principles 
 of so-called cold light. 
 
 §132. a. It was implicitly shown that a self-luminous 
 source of ordinary visible light is a collection of atoms which 
 has some of its principal difference surfaces at V\ as a result 
 of its own internal energy. And that at once implies that 
 those atoms are considerably out of balance, or generally 
 high in potential with respect to most other bodies in our 
 environment; for obviously, most bodies in our immediate 
 environment are not quite self-luminous a — the general po- 
 tential of our earth-surface is slower than that of the luminous 
 sun-surface which is our chief source of visible light. Visible 
 rays come from a source and fall upon the difference surfaces 
 of our usual bodies. First, a little of the light energy is ab- 
 sorbed by those slow atoms, and usually speeds up the whole 
 atomic structure a little, and that gradually and smoothly 
 and without much unbalancing brings some of the surfaces to 
 ^irv. (if all the perceptible surfaces are too far below Vya. 
 to be brought up in speed that way, obviously the body or 
 collection of atoms will be transparent.) It clearly would 
 take a little time thus to speed up the surfaces ; there is a. 
 time lag in all finite phenomena (§§101, 136, 149, etc.); in 
 light that lag is usually too short to be perceptible. [Ex- 
 plicit recognition and use of that lag in light would give for 
 light in the M{varying with)L 2 T~^ member, two coefficients 
 corresponding to the electrical K and U, etc. ; see the dis- 
 cussion of Ohm's law, §136. So it is obvious that the ortho- 
 dox mathematical theory of light will have to be substantially 
 wholly rewritten, if a reasonably consistent mathematical 
 theory of light is desired. This parenthesis suggests several 
 
 volumes of mathematics, omitted here.] Second, 
 
 after that absorption during a little time lag, the cells usu- 
 ally begin to give out rays (to "reflect" the light that falls 
 on them), at a rate and in a form of structure in nearly exact 
 balance with the rays still arriving (so that the angle of inci- 
 dence is approximately equal to that of reflection, except 
 when perceptibly modified by the curved difference surfaces, 
 when various well known modifications of such reflection 
 
 182a xhat is implicitly shown by Le Bon, in "The Evolution of 
 Matter" (Legge's translation, 1911), by giving numerous experi- 
 ments on what he calls "dark light"; i. c ., our usual atoms are just 
 below the limit of visibility with our eyes. Also, invisible atoms 
 continually give out various other invisible rays : quite possibly some 
 of those rays have a velocity V m v , but with intensities below per- 
 ceptibility; but there are probably rays of different orders (X-rays, 
 results of secondary whirl formation, etc.), which naturally are invis- 
 ible, although when given time enough they will register on a photo- 
 graphic plate. Those facts and guesses imply quantitative problems, 
 concerning which Le Bon's book bristles with suggestions. He an- 
 ticipates many important general conclusions of science:- e. g., he 
 gives experimental proof of no constant atomic weights (in several 
 places), and definitely asserts that principle (ibid., 160). But he de- 
 nies the principle with reference to matter (121); or he vaguely as- 
 serts the need of a dualistic Creator, and in definite effect asserts 
 dualism of ether and matter (74). Le Bon is a sort of bad boy of 
 science; he keeps bringing out the family skeletons and advising 
 that they be thrown away— giving first class experiments to prove 
 his point. But he never actually throws them away. 
 
1+9 UNIVERSE 
 
 occur). Those given-out rays are roughly what is conven- 
 tionally known, in other context than this talk of "reflec- 
 tion," as cold light — the name implying that a high percent 
 of the energy received is given out as visible rays; of course, 
 all energy received may be considered to be given out as 
 some sort of rays (calling secondary whirls of any order rays, 
 as is possible: such whirls may be said to be light that has a 
 very large time lag). Sometimes, however, that light is not 
 so nearly exactly balanced as in the phenomenon called re- 
 flection, but makes the difference surface luminous by adding 
 energy that is then given off as rays of perhaps different col- 
 ors and not necessarily in definite relative directions : then 
 the "cold light" is probably a little less cold (a little less 
 efficient ), and the phenomenon is called fluorescence. 
 When there is a perceptible time lag (as there usually is with 
 'fluorescing' solids) the phenomenon is called phosphorescence; 
 the lag may be for hours. Obviously, in principle cell reflec- 
 tion and absorption must be accompanied by some phos- 
 phorescence, and there can be no such thing as an exact 
 fluorescence with a zero time lag. 
 
 b. Obviously, the most efficient cold light is thus re- 
 flected light (or phosphorescence, in somewhat less degree), 
 and it is such because there does not have to be any general 
 raising of the potential of the reflecting atom. Only the 
 chief difference surfaces are smoothly raised to a higher po- 
 tential, without so many unbalances being produced that 
 (truistically) considerable secondary whirl formation percept- 
 ibly occurs (as heat or unsystematic formation, usually; as 
 chemical reactions when continued long enough to be more 
 systematic; as radioactivity, if continued longer still — for 
 perhaps centuries — so as to systematically perceptibly change 
 even elements; or as electricity, when collections of atoms 
 are perceptibly systematized). That sort of reflected light 
 or cold light with no practically perceptible time lag is used 
 by us all the time when the sun is available. When we 
 speak of cold light however, we usually mean that we want 
 a cold" source of light when the sun or other natural 
 source is not available. Obviously, the best such source 
 would be to construct atoms which have an absorbing lag of 
 about twelve hours, and then a phosphorescing lag of about 
 the same time. It can be done of course ; it is a quantita- 
 tive problem and the principles are simple ; such a collection 
 of atoms would be a light storage battery. It is perhaps a 
 difficult quantitative problem, however, and possibly imprac- 
 tical. So we consider other less efficient cold lights. 
 
 c. As the reverse of a fact seen in the last paragraph, 
 all chemical reactions are in some degree phosphorescent 
 — often perceptibly so. Actually, all our sources of artificial 
 light in which we use what we call combustion (as in oil 
 lamps) apply that fact — are reactions in which the phosphor- 
 escence is intense. Because that combustion reaction is so 
 intense, usually there is much secondary formation, using 
 much energy in invisible rays. So if we make the chemical 
 reactions slower, as in a fire-fly or in some decaying woods, 
 there would result more efficient light. Also, it is obvious 
 that if we have more or less a ball of atoms, of great size 
 relative to the size of one atom, there will be many visible 
 rays formed which can not get out, and will build up larger 
 structures than visible waves. So, other things being equal, 
 it would give more light to have thin layers of atoms as a 
 source. Also, if the atoms may readily slip on each other 
 (have weak fields, as in a gas or liquid), they will use consid- 
 erable energy by such motions — with resulting secondary 
 whirl formation. So again, other things being equal, it is 
 preferable to have dense, strong atoms that are crystalized. 
 
 d. I omit the easily seen principles of how to get effic- 
 ient light from radioactivity and heat, except to show how the 
 
 Two XIV §133c 
 
 artificial lights we ordinarily use apply some of the heat prin- 
 ciples. Burning gases are fluids and not very efficient in 
 producing visible light; so they are used to heat mantles that 
 are comparatively thin layers of probably crystallized atoms, 
 and hence by the last paragraph give a larger proportion of 
 visible light. And the general principle of phosphorescence 
 (that the atoms should be raised in potential smoothly; par. b) 
 ought to be used. And that principle perhaps has been used 
 in those mantles (by trial and error — certain rare earths be- 
 ing best so far as is known). Also, the same principles are 
 applied when tungsten is used for lamp filaments. Tungsten 
 except by one chance in infinity is not the best material. 
 
 e. Apparently the simplest form of the quantitative 
 problem of cold light is the electrical. We can in a short 
 interval of time give a strong electrical jolt to a thin crystal- 
 line material and remove that boost in potential before there 
 is time for much secondary formation. Such a voltage jolt- 
 ing is obviously analogous to light vibrations themselves — 
 the jolts are vibrations of large, enveloping magnetic fields. 
 And fairly good cold lights have been made on the electrical 
 principles just stated, by Dussaud ( Harper's Magazine," 
 July, 1903); but Dussaud's seem to me practically to cost 
 more to construct and maintain than is economical. 
 
 f. It appears again, in this summarized practical view of 
 light, that the chief importance of light in our future use of 
 the environment lies in applying it to get the definite struct- 
 ures of atoms. Obviously, if we know the structure of par- 
 ticular kinds of atoms and molecules we can find what 
 structures give particular properties, and what properties are 
 quantitatively consistent (i. e. , are in harmonious periodicity); 
 and subject to such natural quantitative relationships, we ob- 
 viously can design and construct atoms and molecules to 
 meet any given need. That applies, by the total of valid 
 logic, to molecules of our nervous systems also : given enough 
 knowledge, we obviously could make or construct first class 
 brains by giving proper food and environment. This book 
 proves in principle that such civilization is possible. I have 
 extensive ignorance of the quantitative measures. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. Electricity. 
 
 §133. a. In astronomy we discussed formally or log- 
 ically separate whirls one by one; and in light we re- 
 versed that to a certain extent and had collections of whirls 
 which were considered continuous. In each case we were 
 simply following our usual way of observing identical phe- 
 nomena, which have been named differently because we do 
 take those two points of view with them. Now, electricity 
 is the same phenomenon (ultimately, that of reaction by co- 
 hesion, force, love, etc.); but we take another point of view 
 and so the description is in new or different L and T terms. 
 
 b. And this new, but obviously entirely arbitrary point 
 of view of That's and This's consists of taking perceptible or 
 larger whirls (even molar bodies) as unit collections (as elec- 
 trical "circuits," etc.); viewing them sometimes one by one 
 and sometimes as if continuous, and with this additional 
 changeableness of point of view:- (l) sometimes we consider 
 ourselves in a static part of the universe looking at one of 
 those collections that is moving or dynamic (giving us mag- 
 netic electricity or magnetism) ; (2) and sometimes we con- 
 sider ourselves in that moving part looking at a collection of 
 whirls which directly displays no magnetism because we tac- 
 itly or logically move with it (giving static electricity). 
 
 c. That new point of view, in which we see matter or 
 moving ether in a certain aspect, is called electricity (or more 
 precisely, the point of view is called the science of electricity : 
 
§133c XIV Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 150 
 
 electricity itself is matter) : and it obviously is logically in- 
 clusive of astronomy and light. We merely have new con- 
 ventional names (many of which are used in everyday life) 
 for collections of whirls which I have heretofore usually de- 
 scribed without mentioning their electrical" names. The 
 novelty of the new point of view is chiefly that we take two 
 points of view of the phenomena without conventionally be- 
 ing very explicit about what we are doing — and hence are 
 orthodoxly surprised when there bobs up at the end a 
 K-Xzj-X that is equal to V^ (§77). 
 
 d. Let us, in order fully to understand that convention- 
 ally omitted condition in electricity (it does pop up finally, 
 as just stated), consider an astronomical analogy. Suppose 
 we fancy ourselves established at some convenient place in 
 the galaxy field, so that we can view the galaxy filament and 
 the solar system. If we are in that field, then we move with 
 the field let us say; but by ordinary conventions we omit 
 saying anything about our motion, taking the field as static. 
 
 There is nothing abstruse or difficult about that:- if 
 
 we wish to state how we go from Boston to Chicago, we say 
 that we go west, thus verbally or by language agreement 
 taking a static earth — while with reference to (say) the sun 
 we would travel in a complicated path, which was at one 
 time or another pointing in every direction. 
 
 e. In the next two sections we see those two sorts of 
 electricity more in detail. We need to note further here 
 that theoretically we can obtain from each of the two points 
 of view all the phenomena heretofore described. And we 
 obviously can not obtain any new kind of phenomena as elec- 
 trical ones — for all of electricity is merely reactions of two or 
 more parts of a machine (that being a truism of par. c), or 
 additional ways of naming the dots in That... ~KThis... . So 
 former descriptions, with the names or L and T changed, 
 will apply to electricity, necessarily an essential repetition. 
 Therefore, except for brief indication as to how to start any 
 explicit electrical description, I shall omit the possible vol- 
 umes of electrical phenomena. The fact is that electricity is 
 the easiest phenomenon to decribe mechanically ; the reader 
 who has grasped the general idea of mechanics can readily 
 do it for himself if interested. 
 
 §134. a. If any whirl be moved relatively to another 
 whirl, truistically the fields will react (by direct friction if 
 the two are adjacent; by indirect reaction of whatever chain 
 of whirls intervenes, if the two are not adjacent) ; and the 
 reaction or result is conventional!}' called electricity (actually 
 it is conventional electricity if the resulting series of phe- 
 nomena is perceptible; but we take it that any phenome- 
 non is perceptible if we observe closely enough). We 
 
 might of course say that an electrical phenomenon could and 
 does occur as the reaction or relationship of field and filament 
 of one whirl which is either the whole or a standard universe ; 
 but so far as I can make out, conventionally electricity is the 
 reaction of at least two explicit whirls or collections of whirls. 
 
 That conventional definition makes electricity a rela- 
 tionship, or a force, or God the Holy Ghost — which shows 
 (cf. Part One) why the conventional electricity" is so in- 
 tangible or ghost-like. But, as we saw in Part One, we can 
 not have a force alone; the force is a verbal device which 
 implies whatever concrete parts there are which are thus re- 
 lated—and those implied parts are matter. And orthodox 
 science, which holds that an electron is a unit of electricity, 
 obviously holds that a small whirl (a part of an atom) is elec- 
 tricity — which is the same as saying that electricity is mat- 
 ter. And it is quite orthodox to say that electricity is 
 energy. So conventionally, electricity is used as all three of 
 the Trinity. So I shall use it as any of the three (§124<). 
 
 b. As all whirls are, by our verbal agreements, moving 
 
 relatively to each other, it follows that electricity is a uni- 
 versal phenomenon (see par. c for experimental proof) ; elec- 
 tricity, in that One extensiveness, is clearly a new name for 
 asymmetry, incommensurability, or rhythm. It will be ob- 
 vious after a little thought that when two bodies have, in our 
 environment, been in fairly good balance with each other for 
 some time, their fields are mutually balanced pretty well and 
 have no perceptible rhythm, so that we say that the two have 
 zero potential of electricity — are not electrified. Then (l) an 
 unbalance occurring on one side of such equilibrium is called 
 negative electricity (negative potential or direction is what is 
 explicitly meant); and (2) the other, opposite direction of 
 unbalance is called positive electricity. As a fact, we do not 
 even know, with reference to any body of considerable size 
 (say the sun), just what potential our arbitrary zero" elec- 
 tricity is; i. e., it may by such a standard change consider- 
 ably from year to year (truistically, it does change some). 
 
 c. If any two collections of atoms be more or less ener- 
 getically rubbed together (i. e., moved relatively to each 
 other'), and the two collections be made of atoms the axes 
 of whose fields are not readily or quickly changed indirection 
 (i. e. , if the collections are not good conductors, or are 
 
 insulators"), then there will obviously result a consider- 
 able surface unbalance of equilibrium if the rubbings always 
 take place in the same direction (i. e. , do not neutralize 
 each other) ; or, what amounts to the same thing, if the two 
 collections are made of somewhat different sorts of atoms 
 such as a piece of glass and a fur skin (so that the two sorts 
 of atoms are not oriented the same on the molar surfaces, and 
 hence the rubbings, whatever their mutual relative directions, 
 accumulate an unbalance). Such a considerable amount of 
 unbalance is perceptible, and is static electricity. Obvi- 
 ously, such a condition of unbalance would result from any 
 relative motion of two atoms, however small ; but only in 
 special conditions such as described does the unbalance ac- 
 cumulate locally into directly perceptible "static electricity." 
 Thousands of experiments prove that general statement. 
 
 d. Obviously, in the creation of that static electricity 
 the filaments of the atoms are either speeded up or slowed 
 down: are changed in energy. And that changed condition 
 of the filaments tends to persist (except in so far as the fields 
 are of such nature that they distribute the energy unbalance 
 
 conduct it, — as is always the case in some degree: 
 i. e., there are no perfect conductors or non-conductors). So 
 it is evident that in so far as that "charge" of electricity is 
 actually static (in so far as the fields do not readily orient 
 themselves, be conductors, and move the electricity as a 
 "current" elsewhere), then the motion (or lack or decrease 
 of motion) has been taken up by the filaments, and the fila- 
 ments are what we might call the dynamic part of that static 
 electricity. The 'dynamic' electricity, which is thus 'in- 
 side' the "static charge," then consists of a "current" that 
 is the filament of each atom (or, more explicitly, is a part of 
 the energy of that filament if we imply the usual arbitrary 
 zero electrical potential). That "current" is the filiar com- 
 ponent (§125a), and is probably the orthodox "electric 
 force" ; the other transverse component (the circumferential 
 component) is the orthodox "magnetic" direction; and the 
 radial component (the direction in which light travels) is the 
 direction of electric pressure (or attraction — to name it from 
 the opposite point of view), and is perhaps the orthodox di- 
 rection which Maxwell calls "electrical displacement" (see 
 
 also §135c). I have not carefully checked orthodox 
 
 electrical directions, in comparison with those I have just 
 named and the point of view in §135c. The difficulty is that 
 in actual phenomena— as contrasted with the conventional 
 mathematical theory — one direction rather promptly closes 
 
151 UNIVERSE 
 
 on itself (§135c), as do the others with less celerity, so that and the other a 
 
 Two XIV §134j 
 
 like our filiar or current direction just mentioned it has really 
 a continually changing direction, instead of a mathematically 
 abstract fixed one. So it is difficult to judge what directions 
 orthodox mathematics, such as Maxwell's, are referring to. 
 I personally cut the Gordian knot by not bothering to observe 
 when dealing with such theory, but we must know directions 
 
 in practical application. Clearly that current is in 
 
 all directions, and so that component internally approxi- 
 mately balances itself; the magnetic component similarly 
 balances itself; and the static charge therefore exhibits no 
 perceptible magnetism (because dynamic electricity does ex- 
 hibit magnetism it is called magnetic). So the only some- 
 what unbalanced and hence perceptible component is the 
 pressure or attraction, which is the accumulated sum in some 
 given direction resulting from the rubbing. That component 
 obviously corresponds to the direction of propagation of light 
 and truistically is directly analogous to light pressure. So 
 from this point of view electricity can obviously be put in 
 terms identical with light, with unessential L and T differ- 
 ences. And that single perceptible component would evi- 
 dently be very -weak compared with the other components, 
 which become perceptible in dynamic electricity. 
 
 e. To see definitely the ways in which that unbalanced 
 component of force makes the charged body move, we must 
 add other facts about the charge. Clearly, the charged atoms 
 must be just a thin surface layer of the atoms of the charged 
 body. That is a truism of the foregoing definitions, and is 
 directly proved by Faraday's icepail experiment" (Watson, 
 
 Physics," 641-2). It can be seen explicitly by the follow- 
 ing considerations:- A charge can be generated on a body 
 which is a conductor, provided the body is insulated. If in 
 the generation there is exerted enough energy to do more 
 than charge the surface atoms (which on their sides towards 
 the air, are not well supported' or balanced by the mobile 
 air atoms), then the resulting phenomena are called by other 
 names:- obviously, there can be perceptible heat, light, 
 eddy currents, etc. And evidently, for a body which is not 
 a conductor, the resistance to any perceptible charging of 
 inner atoms is greater. Truistically of course all the atoms 
 in any charged body are to some extent modified, or are 
 
 charged imperceptibly. The simple point is that the sur- 
 face atoms are supported by the surrounding non-conductors 
 (air, etc.) in a degree different from their inner support by 
 field friction with other atoms of their sort, and the rubbed 
 unbalance perceptibly accumulates as a static charge. 
 
 f. The charged atoms truistically are in unbalance with 
 surrounding ones. We may take it that the spirals in their 
 outer field surfaces are in effect screw threads, so that the 
 atoms tend to screw themselves along in some direction (be- 
 cause unbalanced, and as a means of getting balanced — just 
 as the solar system is balanced by its revolution about the 
 galaxy main axis). Or, that same tendency to move can be 
 expressed by Bernoulli's principle, or by the principle of any 
 machine, as seen in analogous cases. Clearly, if there is an 
 unbalance 'sideways' (i. e., in any direction in the geomet- 
 rical surface of the charged body) the charged atoms move 
 in that direction, until there is fair sideways balance: that 
 implies all the remaining details of the icepail experiment, 
 of the accumulation of charges on points and more rapid dis- 
 sipation from them, the variation in the appearance of posi- 
 tive and negative "brushes" of light during such dissipation, 
 etc. Thus, rather rapidly all the charged atoms become ori- 
 ented so that their tendency is to move in the (effectual) 
 normal or radial direction to the surface zone they are in — 
 they tend to screw themselves into or away from the body 
 they are on (one direction characterizing a "positive" charge 
 
 negative"). If the charge is on a 
 
 fairly good conductor, which ends in a point, those reactions 
 cause the charge to accumulate thickly there, and a percept- 
 ible brush discharge may take place, which probably is a 
 translatory motion of some of the atoms, and certainly of 
 atoms of the air (for an "electric wind" can be felt). And 
 that phenomenon may accumulate until a spark discharge oc- 
 curs that is still more probably a translation of some charged 
 atoms (for the sparks will make holes in paper, etc.). The 
 problem of just what it is that moves is a quantitative one 
 that can not be definitely decided except by actual measur- 
 ing. I remember reading somewhere that those sparks have 
 been experimentally formed into balls," that move rather 
 slowly; in such cases it is likely that the discharge can be 
 experimentally shown to be a whirl. Obviously, it is theo- 
 retically possible experimentally to make the charged body's 
 surface' give off a collection of atoms, which will form into 
 such a ball, or secondary whirl — of the molar body. That 
 is an electron of huge size — of a molar body. 
 
 g. Ordinarily, the charge is more or less rapidly distrib- 
 uted over the whole surface of the charged body (unless that 
 body is a poor conductor), and truistically, then the electric 
 pressure is the same all over a sphere, and analogously on 
 other bodies, balancing itself without motion of the body. 
 
 h. But if two bodies, with centers A and B, charged 
 with the same kind of electricity, be brought rather near 
 together, obviously the atoms will screw themselves through 
 the air in the same direction with respect to their respective 
 centers (i. e., the atoms of say the first bod}* screw them- 
 selves towards its center A, and those of the other towards 
 B). Those directions are opposite to each other; so charges 
 of the same sign or kind repel" each other, and of opposite 
 signs attract." As charges of opposite sign are always cre- 
 ated by any mutual motion of separation of two bodies, then 
 obviously the attraction" of opposite signs is nothing more 
 than a statement, emphasing affinity,' that is the reverse in 
 form to "inertia" (§88) — absolutely proving these mechanics 
 as it reduces the expression of electricity to truisms (§35). 
 
 i. In the last paragraph the actual perceptible motion of 
 the charged bodies themselves is obviously always preceded 
 by the motion of the atoms on their surfaces in the appropri- 
 ate directions, causing unequal piling up of the charges on 
 those surfaces. That is merely the reverse way of stating 
 the previous distribution of the charge, in par. g. That in- 
 dicates the principles of electrical capacity, etc. 
 
 j. It is obvious that that screwing action actually has 
 components in three dimensions. Or, expressing the ten- 
 dency of the two bodies to move apart or together by Ber- 
 noulli's theorem, their flow relative to each other as a 
 truism gives components of pressure in the two transverse 
 dimensions. Obviously, in no finite, actual, positive science 
 can we absolutely separate those three components, or reduce 
 their number. So we truistically get these important general 
 conclusions :- The zero of potential is arbitrary — is merely 
 the average electrification' of our present environment. So 
 we may take an almost absolute zero of potential as being one 
 which is very near to the body's not existing finitely. And 
 as no two finite bodies can be perfectly balanced, it follows 
 that every two bodies have different potentials; hence, with 
 respect to a fully absolute zero potential every body is of a 
 different potential from every other body, and, as a truism of 
 its existence, attracts every other body with a force having 
 three components. And it is obvious that the component on 
 the straight line between the centers of the two bodies is orthodox 
 gravity, and the other two components are orthodoxly un- 
 named, except implicitly as the square of the distance in 
 Newton's law. That separate component can not exist alone 
 
§134j XIV Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 152 
 
 with finite bodies ; always it is inseparably bound up with 
 two other components — which in electricity I have named the 
 current or electric component, and the magnetic component; 
 or in light, the transverse components ; or are combined in 
 molar mechanics and named chemical affinity (thus when 
 Einstein talks of light being bent, he introduces at least one 
 of those two; when I talk of light corkscrewing, I introduce 
 both explicitly, and talk of 'affinity'; §127). (Thus molar 
 mechanics can be made absolutely identical with electricity, 
 etc., by considering those transverse components as being 
 verbally separate.) So it is obviously truistic that if any two 
 .bodies get into an equilibrium so steady as to have the two 
 transverse or affinity components very smoothly balanced by 
 the bodies' mutual revolutions, then the longitudinal attrac- 
 tion and repulsion is so smoothly balanced that we say there 
 is no "electrical" attraction, and the comparatively minor 
 attraction or reaction remaining externally perceptible is 
 named gravity; and as there is practically no change in it 
 (none was perceptible to Newton), then gravity is said just 
 to exist {implying, when we have knowledge that there are two 
 other components, that gravity travels at infinite speed — 
 
 which truistically drops T out of molar science"). 
 
 This paragraph expresses the ultimate truisms of the nature 
 of gravity, in all three of its Trinity forms. And this section 
 therefore expresses the mechanics of gravity in complete gen- 
 erality — in explicitly implied terms of any variety of machine 
 and in explicitly implied terms of any sort of phenomenon. 
 No further mechanics of gravity can exist. But obviously, 
 many volumes of the explicit mechanics which are only out- 
 lined here could be written if needed. 
 
 k. The verbal trick in getting a consistent descrip- 
 tion or mechanics of gravity obviously is to use finite 
 bodies — 3 dimensions, — and thus not drop time. Newton's 
 law implies, and asserts in so far as it is explicit, two masses 
 at or as geometrical points ; and obviously a consistent me- 
 chanics of gravity is forever impossible for such points. After 
 we have the simple trick of three dimensions, all that is re- 
 quired is a. little intelligence in recognizing the various con- 
 ventional names already given to the reactions of the other 
 two components, and to refuse to ever take them as really 
 splittable — dualistic. In this section I have been explicit 
 about those other two components. But Reynolds's and 
 Erwin's mechanics of gravity use ^-dimension space, includ- 
 ing T. Descartes, with his 8-dimensioned vortices perhaps 
 may be said to have correctly implied the mechanics of gravi- 
 ty. Bjerknes probably has a correct gravity (§94a). Cre- 
 hore with some indefiniteness gives the correct mechanics of 
 gravity in terms of the mathematical theory of electrons 
 ("Sc. Am. Supp.," April 13, 1912). Gautier briefly and 
 generally gives a correct gravity (Le Bon, "Evo. of Matter," 
 98, quoting from "Revue Scien.," Jan. 13, 1904). That 
 makes seven men I know of who have apparently independ- 
 ently stated the mechanics of gravity with fundamental con- 
 sistency. Probably others have escaped my notice. 
 
 §135. a. If the rubbing of the two collections of atoms 
 be continued, obviously the static charge will accumulate, and 
 there will be a greater and greater tendency for the charged 
 atoms either (l) to move bodily in the appropriate direction, 
 or (2) to give off secondaries in that direction (to give off 
 electrons, which will travel in the negative" direction and 
 by the third law of motion kick the remaining part of the 
 atom from which each comes, a little distance in the "posi- 
 tive" direction), or (3) to change the shape, speed, spirals, 
 or ' pressure" of their fields in such a way as to restore equi- 
 librium. Those same tendencies obviously existed with the 
 charge; as soon as they somewhat perceptibly act, then there 
 is an electric current" and we have explicitly recognized the 
 
 existence of those fields (as expressly distinct from their fila- 
 ments or condensations) which previously we neglected ; and 
 we have dynamic electricity. Clearly there is no sharp dis- 
 tinction between static and dynamic electricity — merely the 
 quantitative one of when it is that we care to say that the 
 field reaction ( magnetism") is perceptible. And that is cru- 
 cially proved by the Rowland experiment, which shows that 
 a charge moving fast enough is perceptibly a dynamic current 
 (we saw in the last section that all charges move some). 
 
 b. In the last paragraph we saw that a current may 
 be motion of nominally three sorts. Those three are ulti- 
 mately identical:- i.e., a change of shape or spiral of the 
 field will move the atom somewhat (and will keep on moving 
 it as an "ion," if it is fairly free to move); and that change 
 of the field may accumulate an unbalance which splits a mol- 
 ecule into parts called ions, or splits small secondaries off of 
 atoms as electrons, or with more difficulty splits an atom into 
 different "elements" (as has been done experimentally in 
 vacuum tubes). Truistically, some of that actual motion and 
 actual splitting will happen in any current: but probably the 
 chief part of the current consists of the changed pressure of the 
 fields which exists throughout the circuit. And those various 
 aspects of the same final principle of temporary unbalancing 
 of whirls obviously give unlimited scope for various phenome- 
 na of currents — mention of most of which I omit. The chief 
 point to be noted is that consistently described currents do 
 not need to have a flow of any fixed or proportionate number 
 of electrons" per unit of current (although taking electron 
 in the complete One sense of any size secondary, truistically 
 the current is all electrons). D'Albe ("The Electron Theo- 
 ry") gives as an outstanding defect of the orthodox electron 
 theory that such a fixed flow is required, but does not experi- 
 mentally occur (more modern versions of the theory attempt 
 to avoid the difficulty by tending to revert to the One mysti- 
 cism just mentioned, where an electron may be anything). 
 Electron flow — of scientific, finite electrons — occurs only if 
 the current is somewhat unsteady at the place where the flow 
 is perceptible. Truistically there can be no perfectly steady 
 current; therefore, the size of the jerks in the flow (or the 
 jerks or knocks in the vibration or spirality of the fields) de- 
 termine whether (l) electrons of a given size, or (2) ions, or 
 (3) new elements, or (4) new chemical compounds, etc., 'flow' 
 as the current. In short, theoretically the current may be 
 used to give, or is, a 8-dimensioned spectrum. Such spect- 
 rums are actually exhibited in vacuum tubes (as striations, 
 bands, canal rays, etc.). This description is obviously applic- 
 able to the numerous novel experiments so ably made by 
 Thomson. And the good physicist can readily see from these 
 general mechanics just how the various quantum theories 
 give quantitatively consistent results. They are harmonic 
 periodicity, applied to electrical phenomena. 
 
 c. When the atoms thus form a dynamic current, that 
 collection of atoms which forms the closed circuit of the cur- 
 rent is effectually (i. e. , dynamically) a filament of a larger 
 whir] or 'atom' (and the filiar axis is the electric or filiar di- 
 rection or current direction), of which the field is the magne- 
 tism. And the magnetic direction is the direction of the well 
 known "lines of force" that go around that filament, as the 
 field flows around the filament in Fig. 98n. And the direction 
 qf (static) electrical pressure or displacement (cf. §134d) is the 
 direction of the vector sum of the normals to those magnetic 
 directions — i. e., it is the direction of the main axis of the 
 large whirl of which the current structure is the filament. 
 Thus, in dynamic electricity, we move ourselves into the atom, 
 so to speak — into this big whirl. So the first two compo- 
 nents or directions become perceptible (they are strong com- 
 pared with "static" quantities), and Maxwell's displacement 
 
153 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XIV §136a 
 
 or the static pressure component, which in static electricity 
 is the only perceptible component from our point of view 
 outside the circuit- whirl, becomes imperceptible in most cases, 
 for precisely the same reasons that the analogous component 
 of motion of the solar system (its motion more or less in the 
 direction of its main axis NS , Fig. 107e) is practically im- 
 perceptible to us. But obviously, the whole current circuit, 
 with its magnetic field, constitutes one "statically" charged 
 whirl (§134<d). And in this dynamic electricity, both the 
 electric direction and the magnetic direction are perceptibly 
 closed on themselves. And as truistically some or all of the 
 universe other than that large whirl is effectually a structure 
 that balances with that large whirl, forming a closed "cur- 
 rent with it, the displacement direction itself becomes a closed 
 line. m ° So it is absolutely impossible to establish any direc- 
 tions in the universe, except locally and as finite ones that 
 are portions of an ultimately closed line (§99; that is another 
 aspect of 'curved color,' §128g). That is the rigorously gen- 
 eral way of proving that no principle — nothing essential — de- 
 dends upon direction: that any question of direction is quan- 
 titative, local, practical, a matter of arbitrary agreement (and 
 relative, in ordinary language — instead of space being so, or 
 curved as in Einstein's theory). We also see defi- 
 nitely in this paragraph how a whirl can reverse' by our 
 taking a different point of view. We change the naming of 
 directions, and in doing so necessarily imply changes in nam- 
 ing of speed relationships which we ordinarily assert vaguely 
 by the names static and dynamic. And obviously, the only 
 possible way to understand that reversal is to take both 
 points of view simultaneously (or in general, use inductive and 
 deductive thinking simultaneously), and compare them; and 
 the only way to do that is to take a universal view — solve 
 the One and the Many. It is not an intrinsically difficult 
 problem, being the old childhood problem :- if a monkey 
 sits on a pole and keeps turning to face you, and you walk 
 around the pole, do you go around the monkey or not? But 
 this problem of direction, or change in point of view, or 
 problem of what is the center of reference (in our reality" 
 there is no fixed center or the infinite universe is the center; 
 §100c), or what is the difference between static and dynamic, 
 or what does K~^U~^ = V\ mean, is a puzzling one (because 
 we have been trained to think" — really, to avoid thought 
 — dualistically). It is identically the same problem as that 
 of Good and Evil (XVIII) — and we are so used to solving 
 that, that even children do it correctly several times daily 
 (with etymological felicity calling it con-science). But if you 
 ever start meditating on the problem of Good and Evil, or 
 become so rash as to listen seriously to some dialectrician or 
 other sort of demagog- bandy words about it, then for the re- 
 mainder of you life your will be confused by it, and will be 
 troubled by it, and unable satisfactorily to solve such continu- 
 ally recurring problems of whether it is Good or right to take 
 one slice of bread or two, unless you go into it vigorously and 
 thoroughly and get to the bottom of it in utmost generality 
 as above (or in any terms other than physical, if you do not 
 care for physics ; see XVIII), or unless you permit your brain 
 to die a little so that you can no longer perceive the irritation 
 of such questions. The latter is the usual human solution, 
 
 136c Obviously, as a truism of the principle of asymmetry, any 
 two atoms (especially of different elements) or any two molecules, to 
 some degree form a closed static circuit. So any phenomenon which 
 perceptibly disturbs the static electrical balance creates a perceptible 
 dynamic current. That gives the principles of currents that are ex- 
 perimentally generated by heat, light, percussion, etc. Ultimately 
 any motion anywhere causes— is — a current, so that experimentally 
 the mere making of contact of different elements may give a per- 
 ceptible current. Also, the same general principle explains all kinds 
 of primary and storage batteries, electroplating, etc. 
 
 and gives peace at the expense of living less (the peace of 
 the grave). However, because of the infinite regress, always 
 we will use that peace-of-the-grave solution somewhat — auto- 
 matically, naturally, and hence rightfully and justifiably us- 
 ing it more and more as we get older and personally wear 
 out, finally wisely and contentedly wanting such peace com- 
 pletely. Henry Adam's "Education" did such dying pub- 
 licly, and because he held it up as highly praiseworthy he 
 comforted us, and had a vogue. But Adam s reasons — that 
 the grapes were sour — are obvious nonsense; only because 
 he was the champion snob this country has produced was he 
 able to commit the human indecency of publicly parading 
 his dying — and we are all interested also in any sort of cham- 
 pionship performance. Adams's snobbery took the Higher 
 Expression of indifference; I have tried that myself in my 
 time, and it works fine — the trouble with it being that if a 
 man hasn t already got the various Puritanical vices, that 
 breeds them in him. The Deep Thinking which Ad- 
 ams proudly implied he did is about 79 per cent piffle. 
 
 d. Those magnetic lines" that surround the current 
 may be readily explored experimentally and are described at 
 length in most physics textbooks. It is well known that they 
 have a spiral twist — that giving direct evidence of the nature 
 of whirl fields (experiments of Hittorf, Moulton, Spottis- 
 woode, Stewart s Higher Textbook of Electricity and Mag- 
 netism" ; or see Tunzelmann's ' Electrical Theory," 192). 
 Obviously, if an3 7 body rotates in a fairly balanced way its 
 part (or parts) that is moving in the equator moves faster 
 than the other parts, and as that part is rubbing against 
 something it is thus dynamically equivalent to » current and 
 to a filament. So a magnetic field will be built up about it. 
 That is why the sun and earth are magnets, and why the 
 spherical fields are called magnetic fields ; the present way 
 of viewing the phenomenon is the reverse of that in §11 6c, 
 and shows that astronomy and electricity are indentical in 
 principle. As the equatorial band of atoms becomes a cur- 
 rent, then such a current tends to be of the same shape as a 
 fluid filament, and will therefore speed up the equatorial 
 matter (as observed in the sun, etc. ; and give equatorial 
 currents of air, electricity, and water, as observed on earth). 
 And that tendency of the equatorial bands to get ahead ex- 
 hibits the universal principle of overrunning, asymmetry, or 
 vibrations; i. e., any structure will tend to start a new one 
 on its equator. That sums our descriptions into universal 
 truisms from another point of view. 
 
 e. Therefore any whirl is a permanent magnet; it 
 is not absolute^' permanent, of course, and is always chang- 
 ing some; but its magnetism is due to, and as permanent as, 
 its own structure. Obviously, chemical affinity is in prin- 
 ciple completely analogous to magnetic attraction. Hence, 
 all atoms have some degree of induced" magnetism — i. e., 
 there can be no such thing as a negative U (although other- 
 wise reputable physicists sometimes speculate on such a 
 source of "perpetual motion"). Such magnetism of all atoms 
 truistically exhibits itself in some degree of orientation of 
 the main axes of a collection of atoms in the same direction 
 — a phenomenon usually imperceptible, or else given some 
 other name. In induced magnetism a perceptible field is 
 imposed upon atoms from their environment, and may be re- 
 tained for some time (lag) ; such atoms as Fe may stay so 
 energetically oriented that they are considered permanent, 
 and will in turn throw their environment out of the conven- 
 tional zero magnetic balance. That is quantitative, in 
 
 agreement with orthodox theory, but more generally stated. 
 
 §136. a. I shall now make a brief statement of the uni- 
 fication of all phenomena in terms of both the naming member 
 That. .. X This..., and the measuring M{varying ■with)l?T~' i , 
 
§136a XIV Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 154 
 
 by using Ohm's so-called law. Orthodox science substan- 
 tially recognizes that Ohm's law is not consistently applicable 
 to all measuring of currents, and so correctly holds it to be a 
 rough empirical rule. Hence, I am merely extending ortho- 
 dox science in this chapter. As a fact, Ohm's law is a One 
 law, a valid religious statement which runs A to infinity (as- 
 serts in effect that chemical affinity is the only factor), and so 
 flatly contradicts Newton's law, which runs W to infinity (as- 
 serts that weight is the only factor). If we add the two laws, 
 revising classic logic in order to do it, we get the truth. 
 
 b. Ohm's law (when its implications are explicitly ex- 
 pressed) is as follows :- (l) A steady current in a conductor is 
 directly proportional to the impressed (electrical) force (to E 
 — electromotive force or E.M.F., which in IX was called P), 
 and inversely proportional to the resistance R; or, C=E/R. 
 (That C and R are not the same C and R used elsewhere in 
 this book.) (2) The conductor is supposed to be perfectly 
 homogeneous and of perfectly uniform cross-section; and its 
 resistance is taken as directly exactly proportional to its length 
 and exactly inversely proportional to its area of cross-section. 
 
 c. That law approximately agrees experimentally with 
 a current in fairly good conductors that has had time to be- 
 come as steady as possible. It is very inaccurate — quantita- 
 tively fails considerably — when the conductor is rather poor 
 (say in gases, as an exaggerated example), and when the 
 current is building, or dying out." It is obvious that 
 there is neither any perfect conductor nor perfectly steady 
 current, as would be required to make Ohm's law both logi- 
 cal and accurate; so it is a One law, and never a scientific 
 law. We can see that as a truism:- If we call the length 
 of the conductor L, its cross-section is I? (§68c) ; and sub- 
 stituting for R its value, as given by (2) in the last para- 
 graph, we have C==E/ (L/ L 2 )=EXL. And in that equation 
 C is electrical matter or energy, and Eis a name for force E, 
 and we have the orthodox equation Energy=FXL, it being 
 asserted that there are no dots, or that F and L are perfectly 
 sharp and distinct — that there is exact science, that classical 
 logic and dualism is true, etc. Or, E may be con- 
 sidered to be P in QXP, and hence stands for L 2 ; so that 
 C=EXL is equivalent to C—L s , meaning that Cor matter 
 or energy, as a purely One truism, occupies 3-dimension 
 
 space. Or, in an even more directly obvious way, 
 
 C=EXL asserts that matter C is force E which exists per- 
 fectly smoothly over a straight line — and no matter or struct- 
 ure can thus be infinite, but always closes on itself. 
 
 d. We thus see that essentially Ohm takes a filament 
 and asserts that only a filament exists, and that it exerts a 
 force throughout a line. Newton substantially says that 
 only a field can exist around a point-mass which is a zero- 
 filament, and the force then exists throughout the field, and 
 hence inversely as the square of the distance. Both exag- 
 gerate one half the truth by reducing the other half to zero. 
 
 Of course, neither man saw what he was doing that 
 
 clearly; if he had he naturally wouldn't have done it. 
 
 e. In establishing a current a certain time truistically is 
 required for the motions (§135a) to be setup; there is a lag. 
 Hence, because of that lag, with reference to the steadiest 
 final current U varies; i. e., the magnetic field is not steady 
 (XI). Similarly, the static displacements are not steady (cf. 
 also XII); or the lag also makes K variable (cf. §§75-7) 
 Obviously, always an actual current is flowing over asym- 
 metrical parts so that always there are some local vibrations 
 or rhythms of current — a building up or down, — and hence, 
 K and U can never be in any way steadily proportional to 
 either the L, or to the cross-section L 2 (Ohm's law tacitly 
 assumes that the are), even though that matter symbolized 
 by that space L and L? be made of the same sort of good 
 
 conducting atoms. If the atoms conducting the current vary 
 much, or if the current flows in loosely self-supported atoms, 
 those variations of K and U truistically must be greater. 
 And the fact is that with such atoms the variations are great 
 enough to give wide deviations from Ohm s law. It therefore 
 follows that the rational scientific Ohm's law is C=E.,.X 
 L...=MK- y *U-*L?T- 2 ,— in agreement with IX. 
 
 f. As there is a time lag in every phenomenon (a truism 
 of the phenomenon s existence, as seen before : or this is a 
 brief truistic proof of it :- if the phenomenon did not require 
 time to occur, it would be absolutely instantaneous, and 
 hence absolutely imperceptible, and hence would not be a 
 phenomenon), it follows that that general proof of the vari- 
 ability of K and U applies to the coefficients of all phenome- 
 na. We thus complete the circle of proof and check IX. 
 
 §137. a. That finishes all the general suggestions about 
 the numerous electrical phenomena for which we can reason- 
 ably spare attention and space. In this section I mention 
 three more or less important details, and close the chapter. 
 
 b. (l) Thomson's electron theory has electrons which 
 produce phenomena by the travel of kinks" in their tubes. 
 It may readily be seen that the locus of those kinks is identi- 
 cal with a difference surface. Also, it may readily be seen 
 that his positive electron, or the nucleus" of any atom 
 is identical mechanically with the filament. Our whirl theory 
 is identical mechanically with Thomson's electron theory. 
 We have seen the mechanics of electrons in three dimensions 
 — and that is merely an extension of the electron theory 
 which can not take those 3-dimensioned mechanics far. 
 
 c. (2) Experimenters are now tending to get equal meas- 
 ures for all electrons — tending to show "by figures" that an 
 electron is a fixed, constant unit. Millikan ("The Electron") 
 has done some elaborate and able experimenting tending to 
 show that electrons are all the same size, and constant. Sup- 
 erficially those experiments seem to prove that my proposi- 
 tion that electrons and everything else vary, is wrong. 
 Actually, those remarkably accurate and ingenious experi- 
 ments prove something else, as I shall show — not only about 
 electrons, but about measures of atomic weight, conservation 
 of weight, about Perrin's counting of atoms by means of the 
 Brownian movement, and in general about any sort of experi- 
 menting which becomes so remarkably careful and good that 
 it rather loses sight of its primary object and gets another. 
 
 d. Landolt ("Ency. Brit.," ix, 257) weighed several 
 pairs of substances before and after they had chemically re- 
 acted or combined. He at first found a perceptible difference 
 of weight with some of his experiments — that agreeing with 
 our principle that there would be more or less transfer of 
 secondary whirls (of electrons) between the environment and 
 the substances (e. g., the substances would truistically lose 
 weight as heat if the reactions produced heat). But Landolt 
 apparently thought that the One law of the conservation of 
 weight (i. e., the total weight of the universe does not change) 
 ought to apply to his little parts of the universe; at least he 
 acted as if he thought there ought to be absolutely no change 
 of weight with his parts, and began to make his experiments 
 more elaborate. Instead of driving simply and directly at 
 the point he wanted, as he did at first (and finding some 
 changes), he began in effect to try to average all the condi- 
 tions—to make corrections for all perceptible asymmetries. The 
 effect of course, as a truism, was that he substantially included 
 enough qf the environment in the results of his experiments to 
 make the changes in weight imperceptible. Truistically, if 
 we correct any phenomenon with enough of environmental 
 asymmetries we get a perceptible balance or a zero phenome- 
 
 l7n7r> J' "^r 113 ' 7 S "° unba,an « Perceptible in 
 Landolt s w.der conditions (it is the principle seen in §25c 
 
155 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XV §138c 
 
 that the late Kaiser was right and beautiful if we take in 
 enough of his environment). I. e., the total universe is ab- 
 solutely in balance : and if we observe enough of it at one 
 time we can not perceive any unbalance of that with the rest. 
 So Landolt's measures are probably right in both cases ; but 
 in the case of correcting," where he perceived no change of 
 weight, he proved, not that no change of weight occurred in 
 the chemical reaction, but that none happened perceptibly 
 in the phenomenon of the reaction plus enough of the L and 
 T environment to make a perceptibly standard One. In short, 
 he became technically such a good and careful and exact ex- 
 perimenter that he lost sight of his real point. It is 
 
 possible to be just as intemperate and frenzied in exactness in 
 experimenting as it is to be intemperate in the use of alcohol 
 or in a refusal to make any "material" experiments (to verify 
 dogma). Materialism is the result of taking experiments too 
 seriously; scholasticism or sentimentalism or the Wilson 
 pseudo-idealism is the result of taking principles (or in prac- 
 tice, dogmatic authority) too seriously. Both sorts of intem- 
 perance lead to equal error and human pain. E. g., excessive 
 experiments led to materialism and the Prussian militarism ; 
 excessive dogmatic, dictatorial, unverified dogma or principles 
 led to the Inquisition, etc. Valid science is a temperate 
 balance of experiment and of principle — is rigorously simul- 
 taneously inductive and deductive (as proved in §163j). 
 
 e. And the same thing happened in the antiquated ef- 
 forts to get exact atomic weights. When atomic weights 
 of a given element are found in several ways by means of 
 different chemical reactions, often they perceptibly vary con- 
 siderably (Ostwald, Outlines of General Chemistry," trans. 
 3rd ed., 1912, 126-50). The effort substantially was to sub- 
 ject the given atoms to a severe and lengthy bombarding, 
 and shaking, and smashing (by means of chemical reactions 
 mostly). They thus got nicely worn out and smoothed off to 
 a sort of aged average condition, and if the averaging were 
 sufficiently enthusiastic, obviously any element would give an 
 apparently exact atomic weight. But the conclusion to be 
 derived from that is not that atomic weights are constant : 
 the relevant conclusion is that we can by sufficiently widen- 
 ing conditions of given atoms get an average weight which is 
 perceptibly steady. That correct conclusion as to exact — 
 really, average" — weights is a correct One conclusion ap- 
 plying to a standard universe that includes an elaborate, 
 rather standardized, violent laboratory environment: it tru- 
 istically does not apply to specific atoms in a natural condi- 
 tion. It would be more intelligible if it were made a whole 
 One conclusion :- that in the whole universe all atoms are 
 arbitrary anyway, so ultimately all atoms of all elements 
 have the same exact weight, namely or °° . as we choose, 
 f. The Brovvnian movement consists of motions of very 
 small solids, etc., in a fluid, like the dust in the air that is 
 seen in a beam of sunlight. Evidently, if the particles are 
 small enough their fields, by reacting with the fields of the 
 atoms of the fluid will more or less support them against 
 gravity; i. e., the "movement" exhibits some affinity just 
 as do the structures of our galaxy (XII). Perrin ( Brown- 
 ian Movement and Molecular Reality," Soddy's trans.) sub- 
 stantially concludes that those particles (l) move in straight 
 paths to collisions, (2) are exact and eternal in their motion, 
 and hence (3) that such observed motion proves the existence 
 of exact and absolute atoms, of exact weights, etc. which 
 measures he calculates. (Millikan gets different measures by 
 experiments of a different sort.) Of course, as Perrin him- 
 self unconsciously admits, by tinkering with conditions long 
 enough he does succeed in getting perceptibly steady aver- 
 ages : but he had no such steadiness in his first unsophisti- 
 cated conditions. Truistically, the Brownian particles do not 
 
 move in straight lines, are not perfectly elastic, and do not 
 achieve any perfect or permanent distribution — they actually 
 will either agglutinate, or else will rub themselves into small 
 enough pieces" to 'agglutinate' with atoms of the fluid (re- 
 act chemically' with them; or become a solution, or ions), 
 insofar as they do not agglutinate chiefly by gravity at some 
 stage. Obviously, by catching them in their career at just 
 average condition, "exact" values apparently result. 
 
 g. The first measured weights of electrons varied from 
 about l/lOOO to 1/2000 the weight of a H atom. But the 
 experimenters, in more or less conscious imitation of each 
 other, are getting the conditions of measuring electrons 
 standardized, and getting apparently a more exact value. Of 
 course, those experiments have a value, as they indicate what 
 are the criterions of average environment of electrons. And 
 they really prove that the electron is a variable body that is 
 amenable to changes in conditions (apparent^ 7 much more so 
 than atoms), so that it will behave itself and give a certain 
 value for certain conditions. There would be a real miracle 
 if it wouldn t. As soon as electrons and atoms get into a 
 laboratory they are hustled into a Procrustean bed. 
 
 h. (3) The last minor point is that an alternating cur- 
 rent is a rhythmic current which acts on the same principles 
 as cold light (§132). 
 
 CHAPTER XV. Heat, Chemistry, etc.; and Summary of 
 Part Two by Practical Applications. 
 
 §138. a. The remaining conventional general classes of 
 phenomena are sound, heat, and chemistry. Above I have 
 not fully and specifically considered phenomena under those 
 names; but it was shown that certain principles held univer- 
 sally, and by a few suggestions in this section it will be 
 shown that they apply to these other classes of phenomona. 
 
 b. Sound is identical with light except that sound is the 
 vibrations of atoms (molecules) considered as continuous, in- 
 stead of ether cells considered as continuous. I. e., sound 
 is light of a different order. Orthodoxly sound is considered 
 to be purely a longitudinal vibration. But in such a descrip- 
 tion the transverse forces are tacitly taken for granted, while 
 attention is chiefly focused on the travel of the sound in the 
 longitudinal direction. For obvious structural reasons the 
 longitudinal component is more perceptible in sound. So 
 there is only a quantitative difference between light and 
 sound. Therefore, the general theory of music is obviously 
 analogous to — is — the theory of harmonic periodicity, or is 
 analogous to the principles of the order of lines in spectrums 
 (§101fj). So, as astronomical bodies make larger spectra, 
 or are directly in harmonic periodicity, music of the 
 spheres is a scientific fact. 
 
 c. Heat is obviously, from the facts shown as to surface 
 temperatures of astronomical bodies (XII), the same thing as 
 electricity, except that it is less systematic. E. g., when 
 electricity is formed locally in a large mass of conducting 
 atoms it forms eddy currents — little local circuits. And those 
 result in, or change into, heat. So heat is an eddy current 
 a trifle more unsystematic than a recognized eddy current — in 
 fact, it is not possible to distinguish a dividing line between 
 a systematic or ' electric" current and its so-called degenera- 
 tion into heat (cf. the reverse, footnote 135c). So truistic- 
 ally all phenomena may be described as heat; but when some 
 part of a phenomenon is systematic, that part is convention- 
 ally given another name. What proportion of the whole that 
 part must be to get a name of its own is not agreed upon — 
 nor the degree of system or perceptible balance required to 
 constitute "systematic." The practical means of 
 
§138c XV Two 
 
 drawing an arbitrary line between heat and other phenomena 
 is to compare the reacting substance with the L and T reac- 
 tions of a substance in a thermometer." If we use the 
 same substance in all thermometers (and select conditions so 
 that the time lag causes imperceptible variations), such com- 
 parisons imply an approximately fixed arbitral line between 
 the heat part that perceptibly affects that thermometer sub- 
 stance and the more systematic part of the phenomenon that 
 ordinarily does not (although a part of that systematic part is 
 sometimes called latent heat). But even if everybody used 
 the same thermometer, its substance constantly changes as 
 time passes, so that in principle there would not be the same 
 substance thus to fix approximately the definition of heat. 
 As a fact, thermometers made of different substances show 
 variations as to where or when heat becomes heat. Thus 
 thermometers give direct evidence of an infinite regress. 
 
 d. Those generalities about heat are obviously immedi- 
 ate truisms of the principle of asymmetry. Our natural 
 structures, taken one by one, are mutually asymmetrical in 
 some degree; so if taken in bunches (as atoms are taken, 
 relative to "heat"), the same asymmetry is repeated (in step 
 by step orders' forever), and at some point the asymmetry 
 becomes perceptible. E. g. , a larger observer, for whom our 
 galaxy is an atom, would perceive nearly any change in the 
 galaxy as heat; reactions rather systematic to us (such as 
 the earth's revolution) would be to him minor asymmetries or 
 
 heat.' Truistically, the harmonic periodicity of that arbi- 
 trary dividing line between heat and systematic phenomena 
 
 is itself a kind of spectrum. That shows again that 
 
 regardless of what terms we use to describe any reaction, 
 identically the same terms will consistently describe the total 
 universe. E. g., we could describe the universe in terms of 
 smells or odors — finally writing a mathematical discussion of 
 the periodicity or spectrum of smells :- For obviously, an 
 odor is an evaporation from a body, and would exist in some 
 degree for all bodies, regardless of whether it was perceptible 
 to us. And that evaporation would in some degree change 
 our atmosphere, and would truistically step by step change 
 the universe. ■ Incidentally, if anyone fancies that be- 
 cause we now have a consistent logic to use as a general tool 
 in science, religion, and philosophy, no more "opportuni- 
 ties" exist there — fancies that all the "big work" has 
 been done, — then the mildest truthful opinion I can express 
 of him is that he is a fool. For obviously this book is merely 
 a positive, firm first step in knowledge ; nearly all actual 
 knowledge and its application (no knowledge is really know- 
 ledge until it is applied, for only the application can fully 
 prove it; §35) lies in the future, to be expressed in those 
 volumes I mention omitting. Just now we see how much we 
 must omit of heat. This book is an elementary first step, 
 the essential substance of which probably in a century will be 
 familiar to children of fourteen (they will not need to have 
 many details of the concrete proof at that age — or the con- 
 fusing discussion of classical logic which I have to give), and 
 will be their basis of conscious living. 
 
 e. Those things about heat may be stated another way. 
 We saw (§§134jk, 103, etc.) that gravity is what we may call 
 the unsystematized residue of reaction that is left when we 
 nominally separate out the more or less systematic electrical 
 attractions, or chemical attractions. We may write that:- 
 Gravitation ... X Electricity ..., or Gravitation ... X Chemical Re- 
 actions... . In heat we have seen that we may use the same 
 general formula, thus :- Heat... X Any more-systematized, more 
 definite, or intense' phenomena... . So it follows that if we 
 properly select the names of the intensive factor we may 
 similarly write, Gravitation... X Any 'intense' phenomenon..., 
 which (see §136c, where it is shown that the formula for 
 
 UNIVERSE 1S6 
 
 electricity is L 2 ... XL...) is equivalent to saying An extensive 
 or L? phenomenon... X An intense or L phenomenon...; and that 
 briefly is X, 2 ... XL..., so that if we name any general or ex- 
 tensive phenomenon, such as gravity, we imply but omit ex- 
 plicit mention of the L 2 by saying Gravity... XL... (the con- 
 ventional formula, in valid logic, is F... XL... ; IX), and then 
 put that L 2 back tacitly by talk of the inverse square law — 
 which shows fundamentally why there is such a law. Also, 
 it is obvious that our naming formula is universally applicable 
 and amounts to simply the truism :- L s is the naming of mat- 
 ter, or of Energy, or of the Universe ; or, L s (implying T)= 
 Matter=M(varying ■witti)I?T~' ! '=Energy . That is rigorous 
 
 expression of the proof of the total argument. This 
 
 paragraph is a series of truisms which are so obvious that it 
 
 is a bit hard to stand off from them and see that obviousness. 
 
 f. It further follows in universal generality that the 
 form L ...XL... is a verbal representation of a spectrum ; 
 the 1? is any 2-dimension band, and the L its relative loca- 
 tion with respect to all the other bands (indicated in infinite 
 regress by the dots). Further, it is then obvious that we 
 may interchange the extensive factor and the intensive factor 
 without doing anything but make an arbitrary change in our 
 description (cf. §§7 If, 136c). When we do that, obviously 
 we change from static to dynamic, or vice versa; and that 
 truistically changes the naming of directions — as we saw was 
 explicitly the result in electricity (§135). Hence, there is 
 complete rigor in our argument. Or, this and the last para- 
 graph is a condensation of all valid logic, expressed in "ma- 
 terial" terms, and proved by the mechanics of Part Two. It 
 is rather hard to grasp such violent condensation. But those 
 who like brevity have a sample here. 
 
 g. This section has therefore shown that chemistry is 
 the systematic or intensive part of any phenomenon after the 
 gravity or other extensive factor is verbally 'separated' out. 
 Conventionally, chemistry practically is that part with refer- 
 ence to structures of the order of atoms. But that is an ar- 
 bitrary L and T restriction ; truistically, all this Part (and 
 Part Three, for that matter) gives chemistry — as the A and 
 analogous factors. Chemistry is obviously merely an irra- 
 tional factor of a complete science — of any statement that 
 has an intelligible meaning. Chemistry, as a branch of 
 knowledge, is irrational alone. Similarly, so is any other 
 special science. Thus, so rigorously is science act- 
 ually unified that it is now proved that any branch is irra- 
 tional and meaningless standing alone ; so any specialist in 
 one branch is forced to include other branches in some per- 
 ceptible degree if he is to avoid being at least technically ir- 
 rational or idiotic — or else he has to show that dualism and 
 materialism is true, proving me to be idiotic. Of course it 
 is necessary to have men who specialize, in the quantitative 
 part of certain branches (for implicit rigorous proof of that, 
 see discussion of division of labor, §170ko) ; and it is probably 
 obvious to the reader that no man has the capacity to handle 
 satisfactorily more than a fraction of the measures already 
 made when it comes to definite use and detailed advance of 
 some larger branch. But qualitatively, each specialist in ord- 
 er really to understand anything of his specialty must be able 
 in a general way to sum his branch with all others into the 
 One. The problem of how much to specialize — what pro- 
 portion of life should be spent say in measuring the phe- 
 nomena in the right hind leg of a certain species of fly, or 
 in business in sizing up customers and estimating prices — is 
 obviously a quantitative one, and will have a particular solu- 
 tion for each case. In this book I am consciously and em- 
 phatically being a specialist at being no specialist. That is 
 a highly dangerous specialty, its follower being commonly 
 called a Jack of all trades, and rarely being strong enough to 
 
157 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XV §140d 
 
 avoid becoming a ne'er-do-well. I do not propose to spend 
 much of my life at it. Truistically, any man who steadily 
 and actually narrows himself to a specialty weakens himself. 
 
 h. Explicit chemistry is therefore another library of vol- 
 umes, omitted at this point. Textbook chemistry is largely 
 a collection of empirical facts, except for Richards's com- 
 pressible atoms, the Braggs' and others' work in the struct- 
 ural analysis of atoms (such as Thomson's and others' vacuum 
 tube analyses, Rutherford s and Soddy's and Ramsey's work 
 on those and on radioactivity, etc.), and the beginnings of 
 electro-chemistry and thermo-chemistry. 
 
 i. In its ordinary arbitrary limits chemistry deals mostly 
 with the rather systematized reactions of atoms. But clearly, 
 there are no limits to the orders or classes of such reactions :- 
 
 (1) a few atomic whirls may perceptibly more or less 
 unite as a molecule; then that molecule is obviously a whirl, 
 just as a star cluster, a cyclone, or an electric circuit is ; 
 
 (2) and analogously, two or more molecules may unite to 
 form a higher chemical unit (and such are well known under 
 the various names of crystals, colloids, and biological cells — ■ 
 of all of which, chemical solutions" may be considered the 
 simplest or primitive form) ; (s) then such collections may 
 perceptibly rather unite as a higher sort of unit, such as a 
 man ; (4) sexes unite as couples to form families ; (5) fami- 
 lies form nations; (6) the biological cells always have some 
 reaction or relation with the environment, and thus form a 
 "higher" unit' or chemical compound,' the earth; (7) and 
 the next arbitrary step, with the earth as a chemical unit, 
 leads into astronomy," and so on ad infinitum (and truistic- 
 ally we could have stepped chemically in the other direction, 
 
 down" into electrons, etc.). The third and higher 
 steps above are not conventionally chemistry ; but obvi- 
 ously a cell and a man are identically the same sorts of units 
 that atoms and molecules are. So chemistry may rationally 
 be extended indefinitely, the practical extension of it depend- 
 ing mostly upon convenience and the need to avoid special- 
 izing in a weakeningly narrow degree, and some upon the 
 capacity of chemists. The only thing that rationally can 
 prevent a chemist from working out the sound and applicable 
 details of government in chemical terms is his lack of a sound 
 grasp of chemistry — a human weakness that is forgivable but 
 never praiseworthy. That also applies to other scientists. 
 
 §139. a. It at once follows from the last section that 
 we know all the various sorts of forces, or powers, or energy, or 
 phenomena that there are, or can be. That is merely a truism 
 of the general formula which was established :- Any extensive 
 phenomena... X Any intensive phenomena... ^Energy. Or, as 
 all variously named forces and phenomena are identical, it is 
 truistic that if we are acquainted with one we are essentially 
 acquainted with all, and can never discover a new one. So 
 it is impossible that there are any forces or powers or rela- 
 tionships in the universe now hidden from any one of us, or 
 which can be used by some of us and not by others, or which 
 remain to be discovered to confuse and confound present 
 knowledge. Kings with divine rights, popes, divinely 
 inspired priests and warriors, and other more or less self- 
 deceived quacks under various names, have for ages buncoed 
 the average honest man by substantially claiming that they 
 were privileged with knowledge and control of various eso- 
 teric powers or forces unknown to him and beyond his con- 
 trol. It has now been rigorously shown that such dualists 
 are wrong : after that rigorous proof has become somewhat 
 generally known any pseudo captain of finance who claims 
 to be ordained by Providence to be a trustee for the people 
 (as one coal operator recently did), or any "ich und Gott" 
 autocrat or theologian can be reasonably judged to be either 
 mentally defective or criminal. I think that most of those 
 
 self-privileged aristocrats have been self-deceived (aided by 
 the adulation of their dupes — a lot of soft-headed sheep and 
 sycophants) : they began to talk just as the pseudo- 
 scientist does about the stupendous forces, the secrets 
 of nature that can be understood only by highly trained per- 
 sons like himself, etc., and then believed their own yarns 
 — acquired a swelled head," conceit, egomania, paranoia 
 (degrees of the same thing; Index, "Power-madness"). 
 
 b. But of course the last paragraph proves that qualita- 
 tively there can be no new forces. Quantitatively there is no 
 limit to the number of phenomena we may arbitrarily distin- 
 guish : in fact, we have seen that every structure differs 
 quantitatively from every other, and hence every phenomenon 
 differs quantitatively from every other and may consistently 
 be given a new name. All such newly named phenomena 
 (e. g., the recently named radioactivity and X-rays) are, as 
 we have seen at length in terms of whirls, merely different 
 quantitative aspects of common' phenomena. And it will 
 continue to be so in the future. It is possible now to de- 
 scribe as many such new" phenomena as we have patience 
 for: I could readily describe the phenomenon polarization 
 of smells' (say), and show how to go about perceiving it defi- 
 nitely ; but there is no need for such new ones unless we 
 come on conditions in which they are useful. 
 
 §140. a. Part Two has therefore been formally summar- 
 ized and proved, and shown to be identical with Part One, as 
 the equation Extensive phenomena... X Intensive phenomena...^ 
 Energy. It now remains to show how to apply our know- 
 ledge by describing all the possible ways of deriving energy 
 for our use. Such application will be concrete proof of the 
 foregoing consistently expressed proof — and to repeat, noth- 
 ing else can furnish such final proof (§85). 
 
 b. Obviously, that equation asserts generally that the 
 way to get available power or energy is to apply an intense 
 or high potential phenomenon to some rather extensive or 
 balanced parts of the universe which are truistically thus at 
 low potential; the intense phenomenon then acts as a trig- 
 ger, or releasing, force and sets off a series of secondary whirl 
 formations. E. g. , a match thus lights a fire, and rs typical 
 of all possible ways of getting available energy, as we 
 
 shall see. That is a qualitative way of describing how 
 
 to get energy ; quantitatively, the equation asserts that there 
 are an indefinite number of phenomena that may be used to 
 get energy; we can never finish using the possibilities. By 
 classifying those phenomena under conventional names be- 
 low, we can see the principles of all of them, and theoreti- 
 cally readily use those we judge convenient- — efficient. 
 
 c. Or, we can put the meaning of that equation — of the 
 last paragraph — in more familiar terms :- take some nat- 
 ural" high potential body and put it into perceptible circuit 
 with a low potential body, and use the resulting flow of sec- 
 ondary whirls over the circuit. Those terms are ordinarily 
 used for electricity; but we shall see that they are general. 
 
 d. The chief obstacle to seeing clearly and fully how to 
 get useful energy is the dualistic idea (explicitly embodied 
 in the pseudo law of increase of entropy), that man himself 
 is not an actual energetic factor in that general equation, but 
 that man stands aloof from the affair (machine) and, like the 
 dualistic theological God, "creates" a condition of affairs that 
 then produces the energy. It is glaringly obvious that man 
 is usually an important part of the whole intensive factor 
 Intensive phenomena. . . in the production of useful energy; it 
 is so excessively obvious that man is one part of his machines 
 that science has acquired the habit of omitting statement of 
 the fact, thus getting into so many logical difficulties that the 
 problem has become a mystery." All that is put into con- 
 crete, more intelligible terms in the next paragraph. 
 
§HOe XV Two 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 158 
 
 e. The galaxy whirl, considered as being fairly fluid or 
 homogeneous, is running down" or lowering its potential 
 (XII). But the condensing of secondary whirls constitutes 
 that running-down ; and those reverse structures have differ- 
 ence surfaces in which the potential has increased. And as 
 man results as a further working of precisely the same pro- 
 cess, man is a condensed secondary of one of those conden- 
 sations — of the surface of the earth. Therefore, each man 
 theoretically should be of high potential (cf. Index, "Entro- 
 py, increase of"); and it is a readily observed fact that man 
 is of very high potential relative to his molar environment. Or, 
 to put it less generally but more familiarly, man persistently 
 (i. e., through a relatively long T) produces violent changes 
 in his environment. Other biological structures are of the 
 same order of relatively high potential, but all of them are 
 of considerably less degree in that order than man. That is 
 merely a rather obviously true quantitative guess in definite 
 terms of the view that man is lord of Creation." Relative 
 to our environment it is true; but in general, other biologi- 
 cal structures elsewhere would by the theory of chance excel 
 
 man. So man himself is the high potential trigger 
 
 that is the essential starter of his machines. Man himself 
 is of sufficiently high potential to arrange any series of poten- 
 tials which can occur in our environment (except that he can 
 not directly do that to atoms, which have a higher main dif- 
 ference surface potential), in a circuit that suits himself — and 
 he does so. Other potentials (e. g. , that of a flash of light- 
 ning) may be temporarily higher, but man's potential is high 
 enough to handle — over-top in the long run — all of them (do- 
 ing that actually consists of man's using the atoms of his 
 brain to manipulate the potential variations which always oc- 
 cur when order of structure is given time T to change; Part 
 Three shows why the brain can work that way — essentially 
 it is the ability to unify, connect, things). And man as that 
 high potential part of his machines (his hands are machines, 
 tools, e. g., as are his vocal organs) is obviously not a dualis- 
 tic creator"; this paragraph shows that his potential is it- 
 self a consistent effect of all the universe. E. g., when I 
 write this chapter I am acting as a high potential trigger 
 which after years may, as the result of other men's adding 
 their potential to it, produce quite a fund of available energy 
 in ways quantitatively somewhat different from those used 
 now ; but I am not creating that energy but am simply be- 
 ing consciously pushed by the whole universe to connect up 
 things in terms of L and T (that same thing has been done 
 consciously for ages by humans, under various names :- re- 
 ligion, science, philosophy, system, organization, engineer- 
 ing, government, discipline, education, etc.). I get my 
 energy from the universe, and in all respects act mechanically 
 — which is the same as saying that I act with rationality, or 
 am spiritually or consciously consistent. The sloppy senti- 
 mentalist, the half-baked thinker of the dreamer type, could 
 not support that potential : he would become bewildered, or 
 irrational under it — his refusal to be consistently mechanical 
 being mostly sour grapes, as I happen to know from personal 
 
 experience. This completes the discussion of increase 
 
 of entropy and the second law of thermodynamics. In this 
 paragraph I have been acting like Maxwell's well known de- 
 mon, with one exception :- I have been getting energy con- 
 sistently, whereas the demon, like his inventor in this matter, 
 was capricious or dualistic like the theological God or devil. 
 In short, Maxwell could not solve the One and Many so he 
 invented a hypothetical dualistic God for science :- his demon 
 —identical with theological ones. Such a God is now obvi- 
 ously an offensively "materialistic" nominal link in a disor- 
 ganized machine that is hence not really a machine and will 
 not work. By the simple process of observing the (to us) 
 
 most obvious thing in the world — man in his glaring capacity 
 of being a high potential trigger: man as a fierce, enduring, 
 keen, strong animal, or organized real machine or person,— 
 and seeing it (him) as it is, we know there is no need for 
 such puerile dualistic Gods or demons. And as we saw in 
 §47, and see again here by considering that an arbitrarily 
 skin-bounded man really connectedly extends from Intensive 
 phenomena... to the total One Extensive phenomena... X Inten- 
 sive phenomena..., man ultimately is the whole machine or 
 person, the real God or universe — that being a self-respecting 
 statement of the truth not grasped by the mentally weak 
 dualists who would truckle to a kaiser-like God and whine to 
 him to save their nasty little personal souls. 
 
 §141. a. It therefore follows from the last section that 
 to obtain utilizable energy the general process is to throw a 
 collection of available structures out of equilibrium, and let 
 the secondary whirl formation accumulate as molar motion of 
 lower potential, which molar motion we use in a reverse 
 cycle, or as available energy. Any size structures will 
 do; but for convenience we will talk of atoms :- 
 
 b. I shall give a general description of combustion, as be- 
 ing typical of all such methods. Combustion is always 
 started by relative motion of two or more atoms — frictional 
 rubbing of each other. So some degree of combustion is 
 truistically a universal phenomenon, being merely mutual 
 motion producing secondaries. Conventionally, combustion is 
 such rubbing done long enough and violently enough to pro- 
 duce rather violent secondary whirl formation, and usually 
 to cause such a resulting aging of the whirls (wearing out of 
 their fields and increase of internal condensations) that those 
 condensed whirls in some degree combine (usually "chemi- 
 cally" in our combustion," as O and C into CO2), and in 
 that combining throw off even more violent secondaries, some 
 of the energy of which keeps up the combusting. That also 
 builds up large and intense fields around the structures, and 
 that causes the collection to expand (or to transfer that ex- 
 pansion over some sort of 'circuit' to neighboring collections), 
 and we use that expansion or molar motion as "energy." 
 
 c. That general sort of conventional combustion has vari- 
 ous names that indicate quantitative differences. When the 
 rubbing together of fields is done in such a way that the 
 atoms more or less systematize their expanded fields the re- 
 sult is called electricity. And in such combustion (which 
 usually is not carried far enough to "burn" the rubbing sub- 
 stances) the systematized expanded field, the magnetic field, 
 is transferred by a circuit of atoms (in wires) and is directly 
 used to produce "mechanical motion" by pushing other wires 
 arranged as a "motor." However, that field may be used 
 to joggle atoms violently (as in a lamp filament), and it then 
 produces ordinary combustion (atoms like O that will com- 
 bine with the lamp filament readily and accelerate that com- 
 bustion are kept out, so that in one sense that combustion is 
 
 slow); or, more conventionally, it produces heat. It 
 
 appears from this paragraph that the way to produce elec- 
 tricity directly from heat (even where there are slight dif- 
 ferences in temperatures) is to systematize the relative 
 atomic field motions. It is thus theoretically exceedingly 
 simple to do ; in fact it automatically happens in a small way 
 in thermo-couples. But the practical quantitative solution of 
 the problem involves acquiring knowledge of the actual 
 structures of some atoms, difficult measurements, and the us- 
 ual process of trial and error in the numerous directions in 
 which measurements do not at first reach definitely. 
 
 d. Ordinary combustion of C and O into C0 2 produces 
 what is usually called a change of state. I, e., if we burn 
 coal, by some method (ultimately friction) we "start" the 
 fire. As seen above, that causes violent secondary formation 
 
159 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Two XV §141j 
 
 which accelerates and spreads the fire, and increases the 
 various atomic fields, until in this case they expand into a gas. 
 They are said to change state. That increase of volume is 
 molar motion which we may use (par. b). The expansion 
 may be used directly in the cylinder of a gas engine to push 
 the piston ; or the jolting of that secondary formation may 
 be conducted through the walls of a boiler to water, expand 
 it to steam which is transferred to a cylinder and pushes the 
 
 piston. Etc. So I am using combustion in a general 
 
 sense that includes both "mechanical" energy (i. e., volume, 
 surface, and kinetic energy, and transferred or conducted' 
 or "potential" sorts of those, such as waterfalls, winds, 
 etc.), and so-called non-mechanical energy (i. e. , heat, mag- 
 netic and electric, and chemical energy). Obviously no 
 other consistent qualitative definition is possible. 
 
 e. So all changes of state are capable of producing 
 available energy. That is a repetition in familiar terms of 
 par. b, where it was expressed as change of order of whirls. 
 Such changes change potentials, making energy available. 
 
 f. A general illustration of the essentials of a match" 
 may be given in terms of low temperatures:- Obviously, if 
 a collection of atoms is steadily reduced towards absolute 
 zero" of temperature, it is truistic that their fields are steadi- 
 ly weakened and the atoms become more and more aged and 
 cluster-like (that is proved by Onnes's showing that their 
 electrical resistance is decreased to a point near zero ; 
 XIV). Truistically no actual zero can be reached; but if 
 the atoms were subjected to the very low temperatures for a 
 long enough time the clusters would evidently begin to com- 
 bine, releasing comparatively violent energy as a nova does, 
 and expanding. That expansion would be combustion, started 
 by "cold." It would perhaps, with many sorts of atoms, be 
 of "explosive" violence — faster than an ordinary fire." If 
 element structures had been used, quite likely temporary 
 new elements would form by that process; etc. The pro- 
 cess up to the explosions is the reverse of radioactivity, and 
 the explosions would be radioactivity, although perhaps of 
 much different intensity. It is in principle analogous to the 
 process that causes volcanoes (§122). That extreme cold is 
 a trigger or match more intense than the ordinary match. 
 The fact that electrical resistance suddenly drops considerably 
 at a low temperature is crucial proof of this paragraph. 
 
 g. In the same general way, if any atom be subjected 
 to sufficiently violent action for a short time, or to less vio- 
 lent action for a relatively longer time, the atom will break 
 up into parts (if there is no relatively heavy confining pres- 
 sure or other means permitting the atom to 'recuperate'). 
 Radioactivity is obviously one form of combustion. In it the 
 atom breaks up to a greater extent than in ordinary combus- 
 tion : so the available energy is relatively great, and ordi- 
 nary methods of starting a fire have, in the short duration of 
 time in which they have been applied, produced no percep- 
 tible effect in changing the speed of such radioactive combus- 
 tion. But if the comparatively few atoms in a vacuum tube 
 be subjected to the rather violent and direct jolting of electric 
 currents, they are perceived to break up in various ways. 
 That breaking up is analogous to radioactivity, and truistic- 
 ally releases relatively large amounts of energy : so far as I 
 know the release of such energy has not been experimentally 
 measured. But it is obvious in principle that the vacuum 
 tube and analogous devices will serve as a match to start or- 
 dinary atoms to burning (breaking up), and will thus give 
 available energy from atoms that nowadays we do not use for 
 "combustion." Again the principles of burning a^thing 
 
 are simple; the quantitative problem of getting some combi- 
 nation of atoms which will give such energy that is economi- 
 cally profitable is a difficult one. But by the time coal runs 
 out something much better than coal can readily be devised. 
 
 h. The speeds in atoms are of the order of V\, and so 
 a comparatively little breaking up of atoms gives relatively 
 great energy. Ordinary combustion, in which the degree of 
 secondary formation, or breaking up, is so slight that it is 
 exceedingly difficult to detect any change in the weights, 
 e. g., after the atoms have been burned, gives an amount of 
 energy that is great compared with usual standard molar 
 energy. If we could break one atom totally up, into the ab- 
 solute infinite regress of parts, there obviously (as we saw 
 before) would come from that atom an infinity of energy. 
 But the practical, pluralistic fact is that it would take an in- 
 finite potential to do it (or use up infinite time, if we use a 
 lower potential) — and man can not command anything like 
 such a potential (or time) in practice. The obvious fact is 
 that there never is going to be discovered any cheap and 
 easy method of getting at the vast stores of energy that are 
 in atoms. There is an irresponsible sort of quack who, in 
 praising the flabby folks who have become too weak to 
 work over 44 hours a week, implies that all we have to do is 
 to discover some sort of hocus pocus, and then sit on flowery 
 beds of ease (something like the theologians' various parasit- 
 ical heavens), and casually tap an atom and get anything we 
 want. But no one will ever get anything which he does not 
 pay for exactly and in full. Anyone who tries in any respect to 
 "beat the game" is mentally defective (XVIII). 
 
 i. The source of high potential energy most available at 
 the present time is the radiant heat energy of the sun. Pos- 
 sibly no other general source of energy will ever be used 
 much by man. Anything which that energy will make grow 
 (or in the case of inorganic" matter such as water, ex- 
 pand") may, if suitably arranged, be used as an accumulator 
 or storage battery, which later on is comparatively rapidly 
 discharged. Coal, oil, alcohol, natural gas, wood (any or- 
 ganic fuel), foods, and water and wind power are examples 
 of such sources. Even if we found it expedient to burn (say) 
 sand, we most likely still would use some of those forms of 
 sun energy directly as a match (and more remotely, the en- 
 ergy in that sand may be said to be stored there by the sun ; 
 XII). The principles of such energy utilization as regards 
 "expansion" are already known and applied to a consider- 
 able extent. And the direct utilization of growth" is ob- 
 viously simple in principle. The most of growth on earth is 
 ultimately due to a chemical reaction in chlorophyl (so far as 
 is now known), by which C is taken out of the air, usually 
 more or less directly from the products of previous combus- 
 tion, and combined with other atoms in less stable combina- 
 tions, the sun's radiation furnishing the energy required. As 
 there is comparatively little chlorophyl distributed over the 
 surface of the earth, but little of the sun's radiation is thus 
 stored. Several times more radiant energy falls on the Sa- 
 hara desert than is released by all the coal burned in the 
 world during the same time. It is a quantitative problem to 
 devise a chemical structure which we can manufacture, trans- 
 port, and use in any location at any time, to store up that sun 
 energy. It is truistically possible to do it; but by the prin- 
 ciples of harmonic periodicity it may not be profitable. 
 
 j. Those applications fundamentally depend on a quan- 
 titative knowledge of atomic structures. And this Part of 
 the book, from one point of view, has undertaken to show 
 how such knowledge may be obtained. 
 
§142a XVI Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 160 
 
 PART THREE 
 
 SPIRITUAL UNIFICATION; or HUMANICS 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. Biology. 
 
 §142. a. This last Part will describe perceptibly organ- 
 ized or systematized collections of atoms, with reference 
 
 (1) to their relationships with the remainder of the universe; 
 and with reference (2) to their relations among themselves ; 
 and (s) to their own internal relations between their own 
 structural parts. Or, in terms of our naming formula, we 
 shall see respectively the expansion of the specific points of 
 view:- (l) "Material" Environment... ^Organized or Living 
 Matter...; (2) Other Organisms... X A Given Organism...; 
 and (s) Other Organs or Parts of a Given Organism... Y. A 
 
 Given Organ. . . . I shall not trouble to treat those 
 
 obviously exhaustive heads with any formal separateness ; 
 
 (2) and (8) are clearly conventional forms of standard uni- 
 verses ; and other similar standard universes will be considered 
 — all of which will always imply the complete (l). In fact, I 
 chiefly take the single organism man and discuss him as being 
 of primary interest to us — it being understood that the more 
 complete formulas are thus implied. Therefore, because 
 this Part is chiefly concerned with describing a standard uni- 
 verse :- man (and mostly a smaller one that represents him :- 
 his mind or nervous system), it is called humanics — a poor 
 name perhaps, but the best I could find. 
 
 b. I stated that we had to deal with perceptible organ- 
 ized or systematized collections of atoms.' All atoms are 
 organized with their fellows — meaning simply that all are re- 
 lated, continuous, reacting. So when we here discuss per- 
 ceptibly related ones, the only difference this Part has from 
 One and Two is that some difference in L and T is implied. 
 And I do not know definitely how much that difference is : 
 no one has ever said explicitly how much, so the reader can 
 please himself as to whether he will say that the atoms of a 
 brick are perceptibly to himself organized— whether he will 
 say the brick is alive. It is usually tacitly agreed that the 
 atoms of an electric circuit are organized or systematized per- 
 ceptibly ; so there is no essential difference and not even any 
 conventionally definitely asserted difference between an elec- 
 tric current and a living" structure. That impossi- 
 bility of making a sharp distinction between living and not 
 living is more explicitly shown in the rest of this chapter. 
 Here we simply note than any general statement or implica- 
 tion of the nature of "life" promptly shows that there is no 
 dualism or real difference between living and non-living mat- 
 ter. So the total universe is alive or is life; and we may 
 write a general statement :- Imperceptibly organized matter. . . 
 X Perceptibly organised matter... = Life. For truistically life 
 in general or Life is possible only when perceptibly organized 
 matter is supported by — inseparably related to — impercept- 
 ibly organized matter. It is the problem of the One and the 
 Many in terms of life,' and it is not necessary to repeat 
 the solution here more explicitly than is given by that 
 
 condensation in the last sentence. So the only general 
 
 problem as to what it is that is "alive" is a quantitative one 
 of how much evidence of organization we want. I shall take 
 it that everything is perceptibly to me alive; when I wish to 
 put other quantitative limits on what I say is 'alive,' I vary 
 those limits as convenient, and as implied by the context. 
 
 §148. a. When we describe the universe in terms of the 
 naming equation "Material" Environment... X Organised or 
 
 Living Matter... = L{fe, or Universe, the description is conven- 
 tionally named biology. The Living matter... term is the in- 
 tensive factor; and as we implicitly saw, conventional biology 
 emphasizes it, by making it a standard universe in which 
 Environment... is usually merely implied. Obviously, all 
 particular sciences follow a similar procedure. But, in agree- 
 ment with the pseudo principles of classic logic, men form- 
 erly failed £0 recognize that the dots or infinite regress had 
 to be in that general equation, as indicating that there was 
 no essential difference between Environment... and Living 
 matter...: and they therefore asserted that living matter or 
 life was an absolutely separate, dualistic creation, and 
 that living matter was endowed with vitality, ' and environ- 
 ment essentially or absolutely was not. Then, to retain 
 classic logic consistency, those vitalists had to hold that 
 each species had an absolutely distinct variety of that vital 
 principle, and hence existed absolutely distinct and separate 
 from its absolute creation. But that was glaringly contra- 
 dicted by facts, as was finally overwhelmingly shown by Dar- 
 win and others. So the theory of evolution (§145) asserts 
 that our biological equation is right, and supports this book. 
 
 b. But conventional science still holds that its present 
 state of knowledge furnishes us with no link between the 
 living and the not living" ("Ency. Brit.," Art. ' Biology"), 
 and that assertion (which the doctrine of evolution truistic- 
 ally repudiates) is a sort of half-hearted surviving trace of 
 vitalism. So I shall explicitly show (§144) the identity of 
 living and not living matter. 
 
 c. It is obvious, and will be made explicitly more so in 
 various places below, that there can be and are numerous 
 perceptibly different organized structures ; and that they are 
 often made up of perceptibly different smaller parts, such as 
 organs, cells, parts of cells, etc. Over a million species of 
 
 living things are actually distinguished. As a result, and 
 also because of the classical logic view that each species is a 
 unique quantity, no definite biological quantitative standards 
 are agreed upon ; we saw that there is no agreement on 
 the fundamental one :- of how much organization constitutes 
 
 life. So for the biological sciences there is not any 
 
 general formulation of the measuring member M(varying 
 with)L?T~ 2 (but cf. §148). Obviously, such measuring mem- 
 bers may be formulated and used at any time people wish to 
 agree upon standards ; the theory of it is given in IX, and 
 below such extensions of present science are occasionally 
 implied. In the biological sciences it is usually readily per- 
 ceptible that there can be no exact science (cf. Jordan's In- 
 troduction) ; that fact has long been observed, and some 
 scientists term the sciences in Part Two the "exact" sciences, 
 and humanics the "inexact" sciences. Some of the intem- 
 perate experimenters of the German Landolt's type (§137), 
 who tend to materialism, rather hold that humanics can not 
 be made science at all — which is throwing the baby out with 
 his bath on a large scale ; on such a large one that those 
 
 scientific inhumanists' can not see their ridiculousness. 
 The intelligent reader sees that the biological sciences are, 
 truistically, as susceptible to "exact" measurement as any 
 other, but are more difficult in the only sense any science may 
 be difficult :- so many details are perceptible that memory 
 becomes overburdened, and some confusion may result. 
 
161 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVI §144c 
 
 d. Perhaps the simplest way to use measures generally 
 in the biologic sciences is to use the formulas of Part Two, 
 applying them to collections of atomic galaxy whirls making 
 up the biological cell. I may briefly describe the quantita- 
 tive complications that could ensue :- The molecules of what 
 is usually considered to be living matter are each composed 
 of an average of 1000 atoms, as a reasonable estimate. Thus 
 there are (say) 1000 stellar galaxies in mutual combination 
 and reaction, as one biologic molecule. Then there are 
 numbers of those molecules which go to form a rather stable 
 or static structure called a crystal ; and numbers that form a 
 more dynamic colloid ; and numbers of such crystals and col- 
 loid structures go to form a biologic cell. (That cell itself 
 often perceptibly exhibits the same two contrasting parts, 
 the nucleus, and its surrounding more dynamic or colloidal 
 protoplasmic substance — the two corresponding to the two 
 parts of a machine, or to the filament and field of a whirl. 
 The cell itself often has other condensations that are percept- 
 ibly variable — showing that the parts of such a machine start 
 on the infinite regress.) As a reasonably low guess there are 
 something of the order of 100,000 of those large molecules 
 in an average cell — giving 100,000,000 stellar galaxies (sub- 
 stantially as a minimum) in one cell. And it is estimated that 
 in one man there are about two billion cells in the nervous 
 system ; so if the cells of the nervous system are of average 
 weight there are perhaps in a man a total of something over 
 a hundred billion biologic cells — giving us far over a billion- 
 billion equivalents of stellar galaxies in one man. So if I 
 were to describe a man with the roughness and indefiniteness 
 which was required in XII to condense the description of 
 the stellar galaxy to 25,000 words, I would need at least 
 25,000 billion-billion words — and that rough description of a 
 man would nearly surely fill more than ten million times all 
 
 the printed paper now on earth. If we applied our 
 
 measuring formulas in any such definiteness the result would 
 be unmanageable. But because a cell is in general equiva- 
 lent to a single whirl, and a collection of cells into an organ 
 makes the organ equivalent to a whirl (§981), and because 
 organs react together as That. . . X This. . . , we could use our 
 measuring formulas (use L and T) with respect to cells or 
 organs. At any rate it has been made generally ob- 
 vious that there are enough different parts perceptible in a 
 man to make it truistic that he will exhibit many phenomena. 
 And it is perhaps equally clear that if we had not first seen 
 the elementary descriptions of single structures — the easy 
 ones of "physics" — we would be nearly incompetent to de- 
 scribe man. 
 
 e. So I shall expand biology by considering those various 
 That...XThis...'s, thus implying the L's and T's of the 
 measuring member. If we take the factor Living beings... as 
 a standard universe, the chief useful conventional expansion 
 of it is that of mental and physical :- Other physical organs. . . 
 X Nervous system. . . =Body. . . X Mind. . . =Living beings. That 
 is substantially an internal division of organisms, giving the 
 conventional sciences physiology and psychology (and obviously 
 leaving Environment. . . more or less implicit). But it will be 
 seen, if it is not already obvious, that no method of splitting 
 the biologic That...XThis.. . into its various dots is conven- 
 tionally followed which is based upon any consistent principle 
 other than the immediate usefulness of it. Clearly, any num- 
 ber of ways of dividing humanics into branches could be de- 
 vised. But I shall follow the usual method of making those 
 immediately useful divisions. What is at present im- 
 mediately useful will not long be so; my guess is that biolo- 
 gy will superficially change enormously in a century. But 
 the formulas given, explicitly imply expansions needed in the 
 future. However, humanics is such a vast subject that there 
 
 is not likely to be any general agreement soon as to the best 
 ways of splitting. It is of course a quantitative problem ; 
 but as we are intensely interested in ourselves, violent con- 
 troversies will continue — indicating that inexact" scientists 
 are still alive, vigorous, and capable of learning. 
 
 §144. a. It is orthodoxly held ("Ency. Brit.," "Biolo- 
 gy ') that the uniquely distinctive properties of living matter 
 are these three [in this paragraph I practically use the words 
 of that article, and they are not very precise]:- (l) Living 
 matter has a chemical composition that "invariably" contains 
 C, H, O, and N in complex compounds (called protein or al- 
 bumen), united with a large proportion of water, and as such, 
 in its primary unmodified state, known as protoplasm. (2) It 
 universally disintegrates and wastes by oxidation; and 
 concomitantly grows or reintegrates by the intussusception 
 [imbibition, intercalation, interpenetration :- eating, in short] 
 of new matter — an addition of new matter not to the surface 
 of the living mass, but by interposition between the existing 
 molecules of the latter, and hence differing from agglutina- 
 tion or accretion to the surface in the manner in which a 
 crystal grows. (3) Living matter perceptibly undergoes cyc- 
 lical changes — in the ordinary course of nature all living 
 matter proceeding from pre-existing living matter, in well 
 known cycles of birth, growth, and the cessation of the ex- 
 istence of that individual. ■ To quote verbatim :- 'But 
 
 in addition to those distinctive characters, living matter has 
 some other peculiarities, the chief of which are the depend- 
 ence of all its activities upon moisture and heat, within a 
 limited range of temperature, and the fact that it usually 
 possesses a certain [a perceptible] structure or organization." 
 
 b. The general defect with that argument that living 
 matter is absolutely distinct from non-living matter is that it 
 is taken for granted without proof that all its quantitative 
 words are perfect or absolute (that all its observations and 
 experiments are exact), whereas not one is, or can be. E.g., 
 there is no perfect intussusception and no perfect agglutina- 
 tion; even the electron theory, which was generally accepted 
 when the article cited was written, holds that in some de- 
 gree there is always a combination of the two ways of in- 
 creasing, (jf the writer did not hold that electron theory, 
 then he should have stated hone he considered the two ways 
 possible — for otherwise he could not be regarded as having 
 said anything.) This matter of disproving that par- 
 ticular orthodox vague jumping to sharp conclusions is 
 itself scarcely worth the space used by this paragraph of gen- 
 eral disproof. But this paragraph, appropriately changed 
 verbally, directly destroys all classic logic arguments wherein 
 sharp essential distinctions are asserted — and in such gener- 
 ality is useful, even though merely destructive. 
 
 c. It will now be shown explicitly why all matter is liv- 
 ing. Conventional living matter is matter perceptibly organ- 
 ized within that narrow range of conditions, the organization 
 being evidenced by its having those three characteristics. In 
 brief, given on earth a certain rather narrow equilibrium of 
 conditions, which has existed for the long time needed (long 
 because narrow), we observe that certain chemical elements 
 get into rather elaborately organized states. By every way 
 in which the principle of continuity or relationship has been 
 stated, that result is essentially a truism with the conditions. 
 By every principle, we would expect such living" matter 
 to exist: given certain sorts of elements time enough in 
 fairly steady conditions they truistically must organize. It 
 is truistically inconceivable how there could fail to be liv- 
 ing" matter. Of course, the problem of why there are the 
 now actually existing quantitative sorts of living forms re- 
 quires for its solution the whole history of the earth : Darwin 
 and his successors have been giving much of it. All of such 
 
§144c XVI Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 quantitative description can not be given, as it involves the 
 infinite regress. But this whole book shows that, given con- 
 ditions quantitatively steady enough, perceptible molecular 
 organization into "higher" and "higher" orders (e. g. .solu- 
 tions, crystals that are gaseous or liquid or solid, colloids, 
 protoplasm, nucleuses and cells, organs) truistically occurs. 
 And just as there is no sharp line between a primary and a 
 secondary whirl (§101e), similarly there is no absolute dis- 
 tinction between atom, molecule, solution, cell, organ, and 
 so on ad infinitum ; they pass imperceptibly from one to 
 another, as we shall see in more detail from time to time. 
 
 For a more explicit and detailed statement of how life 
 
 could "originate" on earth, see Chamberlin's Origin of the 
 Earth, "and Moore's excellent Origin and Nature of Life ; 
 also Bastian's Origin of Life," which is disputed. 
 
 d. By the principles of periodicity, it is obvious that the 
 quantitatively harmonic elements on earth tend to organize 
 themselves into one elementary' combination of the next 
 higher order (into perceptibly living matter), just as the so- 
 lar system organized by Bode's law, etc. Conventional liv- 
 ing" matter on earth is therefore one perceptible alive 
 element' out of many possible such elements which occur 
 in various environments; i. e., our protoplasm (mostly of C, 
 H, O, and N) is one element in a periodic table of alive ones. 
 And that is obviously theoretically true and necessary :- For 
 suppose that conditions on Jupiter are now steady enough 
 for some colloidal formation that will progress into a cell. 
 Then if that cell is going to be strong enough to withstand 
 the greater gravity pull of Jupiter (to give just one instance 
 of a collection of harmonious conditions there, which differ 
 quantitatively from those here), the elements of the cell would 
 be heavier and stronger, by our measures here, than our C, 
 H, O, N are. Possibly C would be replaced on Jupiter by 
 something as strong and heavy as our Fe; the Jupiter C — 
 which is quantitatively not our C — would perhaps be thus 
 strong, measured by our standards. Protoplasm' on Jupiter 
 would still bear about the same quantitative relation to Jupi- 
 ter's periodic table that ours does to our table; but by the 
 principle of asymmetry, Jupiter's would be somewhat out of 
 step with ours so that the intervals in it between elements 
 differ from ours. And if conditions were relatively more un- 
 stable on Jupiter than here, probably there the Jupiter-C 
 would be replaced by Jupiter-Si (say). It is likely that in 
 more violent past ages here, protoplasm mostly contained Si 
 instead of C (in short, there truistically are species' of liv- 
 ing" matter, although possibly there is only one such spec- 
 ies' or 'element' existing in our present conditions). There 
 is some evidence that the chemical composition of living" 
 matter here is not so sharp as asserted by the authority cited 
 in par. a (cf. Bastian, "Origin of Life," XII). 
 
 e. So there is nothing absolute about the chemical com- 
 position of living" matter. Such matter follows the prin- 
 ciples of all matter in orderly organization. Probably some 
 perceptible degree of living" organization forms in some 
 level of the surface zone even in such comparatively violent 
 bodies as the sun. Such protoplasm would probably be much 
 
 different from ours. The basis of the protein of the 
 
 earth protoplasm is an amino acid, the molecule of which may 
 be said to be acid at one end and alkali at the other — chemi- 
 cally analogous to the two poles of a magnet (Moore, "Ori. 
 and Nat. of Life," 116). And obviously, such an atomic 
 electric circuit is alway possible in any conditions, but would 
 truistically with varying conditions vary in its constituent 
 elements — just as vice versa any "element" is magnetic if 
 we give it proper conditions (XIV). 
 
 f. The second so-called absolute characteristic of living 
 matter is said to be (par. a) that it wastes by oxidization, and 
 
 grows by interpenetration. That obviously means in general 
 and consistently:- (l) that if we have under certain condi- 
 tions a given perceptibly organized matter, it will, analo- 
 gously to a whirl, give off secondaries of a certain sort (which 
 in our protoplasm, in quantitative agreement with conditions, 
 happen to have an increased number of O atoms — are oxi- 
 dized); and also (2) that the same organized matter will, like 
 a whirl, take in secondaries, and perceptibly distribute them 
 internally. There is evidently nothing essentially unique 
 about that process, as it is the only process (it is reversible, of 
 course) which can occur with any natural structure — as shown 
 in all of Part Two. The authority cited omitted ex- 
 plicit mention of the fact that that oxidized waste also is of 
 an intussusceptible character — but again not perfectly so. 
 
 g. And the third alleged unique feature of living mat- 
 ter (cyclic processes) is obviously nothing more than a repe- 
 tition or truism of the fact that there is both waste and 
 growth. The two (waste and growth), as a harmonic peri- 
 odicity depending on the relative sizes and numbers of the 
 inner structures of the given structure, as in all other kinds 
 of natural structures (Part Two) accumulate into a certain vi- 
 bration or rhythm. Ether cells, by the same cycle, were 
 said to give off light"; obviously, these biologic cells by 
 the same principles 'vibrate' (incidentally, certain sorts of 
 waves are therefore, by the mechanics of XIII, given off by 
 living cells — which waves are truistically sufficient to explain 
 telepathy, mind-reading, and similar phenomena; cf. §146). 
 So again all other natural structures have the same processes 
 as organic ones. The difference is the L and T of cycles. 
 
 h. It further follows by the same principle of harmonic 
 periodicity that a certain internal structure of a given live 
 cell, in agreement with its environment follows a certain 
 course of growth and waste. I. e., for a given mass of pro- 
 toplasm, forming a biologic structure, and considered as a 
 standard universe, we have the equation:- Environmental 
 structures. , . XLine organs or structures. ..^The life of the living 
 being. And that truism asserts all the general principles of 
 heredity — asserts that quantitatively both acquired and in- 
 herited characteristics go into the living being and are trans- 
 mitted by him or it. The equation further asserts all the 
 general principles of the size and form of the living being, 
 and thus determines the species. If we expand that stand- 
 ard universe to include all such perceptibly living" beings, 
 we have :- Environmental structures. . . XLiue organs organized 
 as all living beings. . . =Ljfe. And that obviously valid equa- 
 tion asserts the principles of formation of "living" beings 
 from so-called dead matter, the variability of all species, etc., 
 ad infinitum. Or more specifically, to revert to the first of 
 this paragraph, the so-called principle of biological teleology 
 (that an organism is fitted to its environment so well that it 
 seems to be "designed" or "purposed" for it, — "Ency. 
 Brit.," xxviii, 1024; for teleology, see §86) is more correctly 
 expressed by completing that "principle," and sayingthat the 
 environment is also in harmony with the organism:- for our 
 truistic equation asserts that both the environment and the or- 
 ganism (or organisms) react on each other to produce, mon- 
 istically, a perfect fit. In short, Darwin's "mechanical" 
 explanation of the observed fact that there are no constant 
 species, which explanation is expressed by the phrase "nat- 
 ural selection" (or Spencer's "survival of the fittest"), is 
 obviously a truism. Darwin's phrase perhaps tacitly empha- 
 sizes Environment... too much (and Spencer's, Organisms...); 
 for the balance is continuous or dynamic — mutual between en- 
 vironment and organism. So, as the principle of balance or 
 'fitness" is universal (being merely the dynamic balance 
 That... X This...; §114c, IX), applying equally in the form 
 or name no constant atoms,' "no constant species " 'no 
 
163 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVI §145b 
 
 constant anything,' or no exact science, therefore I express 
 it in those ways and finally as harmonic periodicity, which 
 
 has been shown to apply to biology. That ultimately 
 
 absolutely unifies biology with other sciences, and indicates 
 the complete quantitative theory of humanics. 
 
 i. In discussing living cyclic processes in par. g it was 
 implied that there was birth and death. Incidentally, as it 
 has been proved that the cycle is the same for all natural 
 processes or structural parts of the universe, the fact that 
 those two everyday names for the "ends" of the cycle are 
 not the same is direct evidence that it has been observed, 
 and may be, that no cyclic process of a part can be exactly 
 repeated — that no cycle short of the universe is perfectly re- 
 versible (index, Cycles"). Classic logic views of 
 
 birth and death are that they are sharp, exact, absolute pro- 
 cesses — that before birth the organism did not exist, and at 
 some exact time (the birth) it came into existence, and then 
 ceased to exist at some later exact time (its death). The ob- 
 vious fact is that there is no such definite thing or time as 
 birth or death — they are L and T words which roughly and 
 without much exactness apply to a given living being (§80m). 
 It is not possible, as shown in Part Two, to give any exact 
 space and time for the formation of any secondary, or its sub- 
 sequent consolidation with something else — for its birth and 
 death. It is now directly observable that we can not say 
 exactly when an organism is born, or where; or when or 
 where it dies. There is no agreement as to whether a chick- 
 en is born when the sperm cell and ovum unite, or when the 
 egg is laid, or when it hatches; and even if there were such 
 an agreement, obviously it takes time for the cells to unite, 
 time for the egg to be laid, and time for the chicken to peck 
 out of the shell, each of the three being just as surely a time 
 and space process as life" itself. And physicians are not 
 agreed as to when a man dies ; and if they were, the facts 
 would refute the accuracy of the agreement:- often all the 
 larger organs certainly perceptibly cease to work, and after 
 that ordinary "death" the man is resuscitated; various org- 
 ans are perceptibly kept alive away from the remainder of 
 the body; when the man" dies his organs are in some de- 
 gree still alive (e. g. , his hair will often continue to grow). 
 In short, birth and death in any exact or in any essential 
 sense are names like zero and infinity — One words that name 
 a limit, and apply to nothing quantitative or scientific (to 
 nothing that is exressed in finite terms), or to nothing in our 
 personal lives. Birth and death when scientifically or plural- 
 istically used signify merely some arbitrary quantitative 
 measure that is roughly guessed at as a matter of convenience 
 and are nothing essential or constant; e. g. , a man s con- 
 sciousness, or what might be called his own personality or 
 actual self which is perceptible to himself, obviously by no 
 means is born and dies coincidentally with his physical birth 
 and death"; also, as far as he perceives, his self dies and is 
 born daily at the beginning and end of sleeping soundly. So 
 obviously, there can be no possible agreement, so far as his 
 own perceptions are concerned, between a given man s guess 
 and that of others as to his own birth and death. 
 
 j. So the obvious rigorous explanation of "birth" and 
 "death," as being things supposed to be absolute entities, or 
 absolute processes really different from any other processes, 
 is very simple :- there are no such things, and no explana- 
 tion is needed. The reader will say, that notwithstanding 
 all that talk, he will die. Of course he will, in the custom- 
 ary sense (but see §146lm). But he has never existed as 
 something uniquely separate and distinct from any other 
 thing, and so he obviously, as a mere truism, can not abso- 
 lutely cease to exist when he does not previously really exist 
 —but will keep on in the future as he has in the past, bearing 
 
 continually changing quantitative relations with all other 
 things. When he says he dies, he means that some certain 
 degree of change of relations occurs :- what that degree is has 
 not been measured, and can not exactly be, and varies for 
 each man anyway. He has been having changes of relations 
 all his life, and each one is a unique quantity; hence his 
 death is not in any essential respect a new thing, although it 
 too is another unique quantity, with which he is perceptually 
 quite familiar — having become so from having experienced 
 a process imperceptibly different from it in going to sleep 
 
 thousands of times. The theory is obviously rigorous. 
 
 I also happen to know from experience what I am talking 
 about, as I was physically, mentally, and medically dead 
 once, and was resuscitated. When I was a boy I wanted to 
 know how chloroform worked : so as usual in similar cases I 
 tried it on myself; and I accidentally killed myself. The 
 
 reader may verify the experiment himself if he likes. 
 
 I have used more space for birth and death than the intrinsic 
 difficulty of the problem warrants. But such emphasis seems 
 to be required because orthodox theology revolves so persist- 
 ently about death. Obviously, the way to remove the re- 
 puted sting of death is to know precisely what is meant by 
 death. The theologians have held up death as a horrible 
 bogey, just as a peculiarly stupid nurse frightens a child with 
 the dark — the nurse usually, as an automatic punishment 
 called poetic justice, coming to fear it herself. There is 
 no such thing as the theological dualistic death from which 
 the theologians promise to save" us — if we will be good" 
 by doing as they order, and turn various privileges, powers, 
 etc. , over to them. Since I died I have had no fear of death 
 (and the theologians messed up my nervous system consider- 
 ably when I was younger); often when I persistently over- 
 work I find that it would be a great relief if I knew I could 
 at once go to sleep permanently. I have no doubt that 
 Metchnikoff ( Prolongation of Life") is correct in saying 
 that it is a fact that people who grow old normally ( balanc- 
 ed ly) desire death. Certainly his principle is correct, though 
 not always stated consistently. We take up the subject, un- 
 der "immortality," later (see Index). 
 
 k. This section, particularly par. h with its formulas, 
 outlines biology explicitly. I now proceed to expand some 
 of the more important aspects a little, starting with evolution. 
 
 §145. a. We have seen that the modern doctrine of evo- 
 lution is in effect the equation Environment... X Perceptibly 
 living species... = Life, or God, or Universe, and hence is iden- 
 tical with the argument of this book ; and implies the use of 
 the valid logic (the doctrine almost explicitly asserts the use 
 of such logic, in that "natural selection" is orthodoxly ad- 
 mittedly a truism, or circular reasoning) ; and explicitly uses 
 "mechanical" or positive language; and admittedly sums 
 into the principle of continuity, or universal relationship (see 
 Jordan's, Ritter's, and Patten's books). Of course, various 
 materialists and other sorts of dualists have perverted the 
 meaning of evolution into almost every sort of pseudo doctrine. 
 It would probably be a waste of time to consider explicitly 
 those perversions, except the most pernicious one (par. c) :- 
 that natural selection means might makes right' — means a 
 continuous "fight" for existence, universal repulsive 'force, 
 a nature red in tooth and claw, and all the rest of that 
 Nietzsche - Treitschke - Bernhardi - Bismarckian blood-and- 
 iron" unbalanced attempt to run one irrational factor to in- 
 finity. However, if any reader prefers to take it that one of 
 those perversions is orthodox evolution," then he may name 
 the rigorously consistent principles given here anything he 
 likes, and take it that I reject such orthodox evolution." 
 
 b. The valid logic was not explicitly stated in past at- 
 tempts to say what evolution meant (although Jordan, Patten, 
 
§14Sb XVI Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 164 
 
 and Ritter clearly used it). But obviously, the important 
 points shown by Darwin and others to be proved by the ob- 
 servable facts may be stated thus:- (l) all observed species 
 vary or are not constant (implying the infinite regress from 
 the biological point of view) ; (2) each creature and-or spec- 
 ies varies as a result of interaction with its environment, that 
 environment including other creatures and species as well as 
 "non-living" bodies (that implying the infinite regress from 
 all other points of view) ; (s) and all that is considered a 
 mechanical or positive way of understanding the whole uni- 
 verse, in terms of "life." That is clearly directly 
 
 equivalent to our equation Environment... X Perceptibly living 
 species. . .=Life, or Universe. And equally obviously it is 
 identical with the total of what was proved in Part Two:- 
 All other atoms... X A given atom... = Universe; or with the 
 That... X This. ..=Meaning of Part One. Species are more 
 easily perceptible, as being natural structures, than atoms 
 are ; so the general unification of science naturally took place 
 first in a fairly definite way in biology — as evolution. 
 
 c. But classic logic implies that there is a linear series 
 of facts that proceeds in a non-circular manner from an ab- 
 solute "lower" to an absolute higher" (whatever that may 
 mean: the high" aristocrats seem to think they know, but 
 cf. Index, ' Direction"). So the aristocrats (who considered 
 that men also proceed thus in absolute order of class caste 
 from peasant to kaiser) ignored, or were too defective men- 
 tally to see, the fact that any living structure reacted with its 
 environment (implying both attraction and repulsion, depen- 
 ing solely on point of view [index, "Direction"]; and also 
 obviously implying that even the environment is as good" 
 as the king, or has structures essentially the same). They 
 jumped to the unwarranted conclusion that evolution was 
 represented by the pseudo, unfinished equation' Living 
 structurei Living structure 2, 3, 4, etc., — quite analogous to the un- 
 finished materialistic equation — interpreting such equa- 
 tions' to mean that there is an absolute order of caste, so that 
 as a truism of such dualism those presumably higher" in 
 the scale always try to push down or back, or fight, those 
 lower." They took the phrase survival of the fittest" 
 (§144h), and instead of interpreting it correctly as a circular 
 truism that means a mutual give and then take in infinite re- 
 gress, they assumed the customary arrogant, selfish, or cruel 
 premise of the aristocrat (who when very aristocratic is the 
 pathologically insane egomaniac — or when no perceptible 
 nerve lesion exists, paranoiac), that they were the fittest or 
 best, and concluded that therefore they must follow the law 
 of evolution by fighting the others. Now, obviously, from a 
 One or infinite point of view, such an argument of repulsion 
 can be quite true, just as we saw Reynolds s pressure to be. 
 But it would largely capsize ordinary language to apply that 
 sort of language to finite individuals — our ordinary language 
 uses both the One and °° , action and reaction, repulsion 
 and helping (§114c). But the aristocrats didn't have the 
 intelligence to see the absurd contradiction, while pretending 
 to speak ordinary language, of making evolution one irrational 
 factor always acting in one direction. So they and their 
 dupes fancied that along the road might makes right" 
 they were becoming supermen ; but obviously they were 
 merely proving the truth implied in the old adage:- whom 
 
 the gods destroy they first make mad. All aristocratic 
 
 doctrine, when put into humanistic form, primarily holds that 
 there is a real order of caste in men (fixedly separate or dis- 
 continuous), and that the aristocrat is the best, or the essen- 
 tially superior, or the divinely ordained or called," or the 
 partner of Gott or Jehovah, or the otherwise privileged person 
 (getting something for nothing — a truistically impossible ac- 
 tion without a reaction). Every such doctrine is at bottom 
 
 wrong— as I trust I have made so glaringly obvious that even 
 a mild aristocrat will have enough mental capacity to see it 
 (and of course thereby automatically cease to be a dualist). 
 But it is usually not possible, by the use of so mild a force 
 as words, to "convince" the very defective brain of the 
 "higher" aristocat, such as a kaiser or a hysterical woman. 
 
 d. Taking the simplest view that everything is alive, 
 natural selection means that all parts mutually react, just as 
 the organs of a man's body act together. Certain parts are 
 of course rejected from a given place ; but that equally im- 
 plies that the part is attracted to another place. There is 
 ultimately exactly as much pluralistic repulsion or the con- 
 ventional "force" or "fighting" as there is attraction or the 
 conventional "love" or ' peace." There is no need to carry 
 the first to the degree of internecine warfare, or to carry the 
 second to the degree of deadly stagnation or boredom ; an 
 excess of one is, by the principles of action and reaction, as 
 bad as an excess of the other (§§114c, 163b). 
 
 e. Because the valid logic implied by the rational evo- 
 lution was not definitely stated, conventional science explic- 
 itly recognized as an unsolved problem a biological form of 
 the One and Many:- whether (l) variation in an organic 
 structure is inherent, or proceeds from within, or (2) is 
 acquired, or comes from without." Obviously, (l) asks 
 whether the structure is an absolutely separate universe, not 
 affected by other adjacent universes, and (2) asks whether it 
 is continuous with the single universe, so that the without ' 
 can affect it. That obviously asks whether the Many or the 
 One is true : it is answered by Part One. The specific, 
 practical answer here, in biological terms, is that the ordi- 
 nary live structure itself contains perceptible parts, which 
 produce some perceptible variations from within, just as if the 
 structure were a little universe (i. e., incommensurability 
 truistically applies within the structure); also, variation must 
 similarly (in some quantitative degree) be acquired from 
 without. As a matter of observed fact, both sorts of varia- 
 tion seem to occur perceptibly, although it is disputed; and 
 obviously, if both sorts thus occur, that directly shows that 
 circular reasoning is valid, and that there exists also the in- 
 exactness of the infinite regress thus implied. And as both 
 those contradictions to the classic logic were more or less evi- 
 dent to biologists, they hesitated to admit that both sorts of 
 variation were possible: they were in the same dilemma as 
 Van der Waals (§82). But the biologists (except for Jordan, 
 Ritter, Adami, Patten, and a few other first class thinkers 
 I do not definitely remember) were not so clear as to what 
 that fundamental difficulty was (although in a vague way the 
 problem is given as "bathmism" ; "Ency. Brit.," x, 36). 
 And they have stated the problem less broadly :- whether 
 acquired characteristics are inheritable. We take up that 
 problem, in the less general terms of heredity, in §147. In 
 that form it is turned into the One and Many problem that 
 has recently been named Mendelism:- the more fanatic, ma- 
 terialistic Mendelians hold that each character or property of 
 an organism is an absolutely separate unit (aa-_absolute bio- 
 logic 'atom') — that the Many is absolute. 
 
 f. That covers evolution generally. Obviously, by ex- 
 panding the general evolution formula (naming the dots), 
 
 evolution" becomes coextensive with humanics — with all of 
 knowledge, as all things are alive. So if the reader does not 
 like the particular names I have used in that evolution equa- 
 tion, he has an unending choice of names just as good. The 
 expert biologist is usually a prolific inventor of new names (as 
 he has practiced with the naming rather than the measuring 
 member), and a number of branches of evolution are named 
 ( Ency. Brit.," "Evolution"); but as the principles have 
 been seen the reader will not be loaded with them here. 
 
165 UNIVERSE 
 
 §146. a. We shall get a view of the principles of bio- 
 logical sex, growth, and reproduction by considering our stellar 
 galaxy to be a live structure and noting definitely what those 
 terms mean with respect to its mechanics. So I am going to 
 describe the universe in terms of sex. That obviously takes 
 the term quantitatively further than is conventional; that 
 extention of the term applies only in this section. At 
 
 Three XVI §146g 
 
 individuals to form societies. (identically the same process 
 of uniting is exhibited by ether cells, and by higher" ord- 
 ers of structures, as we saw in Part Two; here we merely 
 have new names for such structures.) The cell that 
 
 the birth of the galaxy whirl (XII) it is comparatively fluid — • 
 i. e., all condensations are small (at least, smaller as a rule 
 than later on). So it is virtually young — meaning that all 
 "epigenetic or acquired" reactions or "factors" (i. e., 
 all asymmetries coming, -when noticed, from whirls in the gal- 
 axy whirl's environment — from without"), and all "genet- 
 ic" or inherent reactions (i. e., all asymmetries coming, 
 ■when noticed, from its inner structures — from "within") can 
 be readily (i. e. , in comparatively small L and T) met or 
 fairly balanced by secondary whirl formation. But as the 
 galaxy whirl gets older, the condensations get heavier (the 
 whirl becomes more a cluster; XII), and truistically an asym- 
 metry has to accumulate more before it can budge some of 
 those heavy condensations from their orbits to make the bal- 
 ancing secondary. Also, truistically such an accumulated 
 reaction has a comparatively large effect upon the whole gal- 
 axy, and is more perceptible than a small, younger one. 
 
 b. If the galaxy whirl is considered a biologic cell, that 
 implies that in its environment there are, besides other cells 
 of the same order, natural structures smaller than it, those 
 being less perceptibly organized structures — single molecules 
 of food, etc. 
 
 c. The whirl is continually exhibiting secondary forma- 
 tion at its field difference surface (its cell skin) — either taking 
 in food or rejecting waste, as secondary whirls or as some 
 form of whirl combining. Obviously, the fact that an actual 
 cell ever forms in a given environment truistically implies 
 that at the time the general sum of the asymmetries is for 
 the food" to organize — that the cell grows. (There is also 
 an inner" cell life, due to secondary formation at the fila- 
 ment difference surface — at the skin of the cell nucleus, etc., 
 — of which we have seen the principles in astronomical de- 
 scriptions.) But at the same time the biological cell is giv- 
 ing off waste. So, unless the environing cells can eat or in 
 some way remove the waste of the first cell, shortly the food 
 supply is interfered with by waste, and the cell stops growing. 
 
 d. If the food supply is sufficient (if there is a tendency 
 for the environment to maintain rather steadily an asymme- 
 try in the direction of growth, instead of there being an en- 
 vironment that is practically balanced, as we tacitly assumed 
 is the perceptible case — a fact, in the few thousands of years 
 we have observed it — in our galaxy in XII), the cell keeps 
 on growing, and getting older and hence unable (too unbal- 
 anced) to maintain such a steady growth. So at some stage 
 of the growth an asymmetry accumulates sufficiently to cause 
 the whole whirl to split — either by the mechanical equivalent 
 of dumbbell splitting (§117) into two nearly equal parts (bio- 
 logic "reproduction" by "fission"), or more usually by more 
 or less perceptibly unequal splittings, just as with astronomi- 
 cal whirls — in which case the biological reproduction is known 
 as gemmation or budding, sporulation, etc. To save the 
 reader's attention I ignore the fine distinctions in such terms. 
 
 e. Truistically (§55, etc.), in no case can the splitting 
 or reproduction be exactly equal — and in that fact of univers- 
 al quantitative inequality of natural structures is exhibited all 
 of sex, that same inequality or sex (sex is there used as a re- 
 lationship word) including or resulting in the further tend- 
 ency (l) of one cell to connect perceptibly with other cells 
 to form multicellular individuals, (2) of such joined cells to 
 become "specialized" organs, and (3) of such multicellular 
 
 grows too large,' so that it splits, has grown so old that it 
 has a perceptible asymmetry, or inequality of halves, or sex. 
 One unequal part is male and the other female — and it is ar- 
 bitrary which is which, and I do not know which part is male 
 with reference to distinctions in human sex. For sex is again 
 our general problem of direction (§99b): i. e., fundament- 
 ally it is impossible that there be any essential difference in 
 the sexes, as the difference is quantitative and reversible. 
 Also, any part of the Many has a sex relative to any other 
 part of the Many (not directly stateable, of course, when the 
 parts are of different orders — as we saw was the case with 
 temperature or any potential) ; for sex is simply asymmetry 
 of equilibrium, and always with two natural structures there 
 is some — some attraction and repulsion, in chemical or elec- 
 trical terms. Sex is the fundamental human name for po- 
 tential. (The term tropism is often used for such perceptible 
 variations in biologic potentials, and asserted to be a chem- 
 ical" process, etc. Also, some biologists use as a general 
 name for it, more especially with respect to the cell and its 
 food and waste, the probably preferable term osmotic pressure, 
 which is one form of our chemical affinity.') When no such 
 asymmetry is perceptible we inaccurately say that the biologic 
 potential is zero — that the body is asexual or neuter. And 
 as mentioned, different order structures, such as a man and 
 the galaxy, although not directly comparable in potential or 
 sex, may be so compared by using the inverse square law. 
 
 That is the total general theory of sex. It probably 
 
 is not quite intelligible yet. And I can see no present need 
 to figure out the comparative sex of chemical structures, etc. 
 
 f. It therefore is a truism that all growth (or waste) may 
 be considered a chemical exhibition of sex. And all so-called 
 asexual reproduction is by this rigorous theory sexual. Any 
 secondary whirl formation is an exhibition of sex. But the 
 quantity of such asymmetry is not enough to be ordinarily 
 called sex until a biologic organism exhibits an attraction for 
 another organism similar to the attraction of unlike electrical 
 charges or magnet poles — with which it is identical in prin- 
 ciple. That sex attraction is exhibited by all single 
 
 cells if they are given enough time, thus :- The galaxy 
 whirl, even if adjacent whirls clear out its cell waste and 
 provide food, obviously keeps on condensing into a cluster or 
 growing older (see par. m for a special exception— or §123), 
 and its then relatively non-fluid or "ossified" internal condi- 
 tion stops its growth ; and in the fairly steady conditions 
 which promote such growth no asymmetries tend to rise that 
 are sufficient to split the cell into new ones. And now we 
 take it that the cell or galaxy is so much condensed that it is 
 hard to split as a whole. But, at the same time this cell is 
 thus reaching a sterile old age with respect to the sexual 
 comparisons or reactions of its own parts, other cells in its 
 environment truistically are developing a similar potential — 
 but again truistically differing some in quantity. So by the 
 time the food and waste in the neighborhood can no longer 
 produce an internal sex effect on these galaxies considered as 
 cells, resulting in "asexual" reproduction by direct fission, 
 the potential of the food and waste no longer masks or bal- 
 ances the difference in potential of two neighboring cells, and 
 the two combine, in the same way that two clusters or whirls 
 do. That combining makes the new cell somewhat fluid, 
 restores its youth, and starts a new cycle. So far as has been 
 observed, all biologic cells do have such external sex" un- 
 ions, given a long enough time to age or to mature sexually. 
 
 g. Those phenomena obviously do not necessarily have 
 
§146g XVI Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 166 
 
 to proceed in the direct step by step fashion described. Just 
 as two or more atoms need not 'wholly' interpenetrate each 
 other and form some new elementary atom, but may form a 
 more or less interpenetrating union (the fields and various 
 condensations in them to some degree coalescing) to produce 
 ions, solutions, molecules, crystals, colloids, etc., so two or 
 more cells need not wholly interpenetrate each other in such 
 a sexual union, but may have a partial union and thus build 
 themselves up into a special organ. And organs may simi- 
 larly build into an individual; the individuals into a percept- 
 ible family and a society ; and the society may theoretically 
 go on and build with others into a perceptible society of all 
 the living beings in the universe. (There are practical diffi- 
 culties in communicating with individuals in a galaxy so far 
 off that even ordinary light will not travel to it; we shall be 
 for a while doing practically quite well if we can have per- 
 ceptible communication and hence social relationship, not 
 largely destroyed by censors, with the people of Asia.) I. e., 
 the dynamic unbalance between the environment of food and 
 waste on the one hand and a few cells that are at nearly the 
 same potential may be quantitatively just enough to cause a 
 partial union of the cells. That can consistently be called a 
 sex union; but conventionally that lesser degree of union is 
 not called one. That union may be perceived as a direct 
 growing together of ' processes" of the skin (forming con- 
 nective tissue"); or the cells may join in other quantitative 
 degrees — acquiring a single enveloping skin just as the solar 
 field difference surface is a dynamic skin of the solar system. 
 Such a union may be wholly of cells about alike, in which 
 case there is an undifferentiated multicellular individual (more 
 conventionally, it is called a colony, etc., of Mnicellular ones). 
 Of course no such collection can be perfectly undifferentiated 
 • — but some lower plants have no perceptible organs (' Ency. 
 Brit.," 728-SO). The "growth" of such "undiffer- 
 entiated" individuals is obviously by internal sex processes, 
 producing fission. But that produces no new individual; 
 and obviously, as their cells grow old two multicellular indi- 
 viduals can not ordinarily unite sexually as can two cells, for 
 the cell connections and outer skins interfere with such a pro- 
 cess. But as the cells of an individual can not be perfectly 
 undifferentiated or balanced, it follows that as the cells grow 
 old and more solid the unbalance tends to accumulate at 
 some outer location (by the principle of volcanoes; §122i), 
 and the potential difference (sex differentiation) is there built 
 up high enough to renew the growth of some of the cells and 
 throw them off as a newly born or started individual — 
 that internal sex process in its simple or primitive" form 
 being, I think, conventionally called asexual reproduction by 
 terminal budding (sex is not conventionally understood well ; 
 so conventional names for the varying sorts of reproduction 
 are vague). Truistically, that budding is a cumulated per- 
 ceptible differentiation of the previously seemingly undiffer- 
 entiated colony — an example of biologic hysteresis or lag. 
 
 h. Again, it is not necessary that that internal sex pro- 
 cess or differentiation go to the limit of differentiation into 
 two individuals. For obviously, certain cells in an organism 
 may get perceptibly out of balance with their neighboring 
 cells, and the unbalance may be slight enough to permit the 
 two sets of cells to react with each other as two organs — 
 the unbalance being thus sexually compensated by the re- 
 action of the two organs together in a conventionally recog- 
 nized division of labor — a truism that is expressed by the 
 formula, Cells in one organ... "KCells in another organ... (not- 
 ing the dots or infinite regress). Truistically, the number of 
 such organs can be increased as far as the stability of the en- 
 vironment (climate) permits (the natural" determination of 
 the number of organs follows the same principle of periodicity 
 
 as the balancing of "increasing returns" with "decreasing 
 returns" in economics [§l70o], or the number of planets); 
 always, in order that the individual may exist, two perceptible 
 relationships must remain:- (l) there must be a circulation 
 of small food and waste structures to and from all organs (as 
 in the respiratory, digestive, blood and lymph circulation in 
 a mammal; or railroad and other transportation in a per- 
 ceptible society) ; and (2) a quicker circulation of field pres- 
 sure' or "trigger energy" or electrical potential, to maintain 
 for the individual a tolerable balancing reaction of organs 
 (such more rapid balancing or unified control is exhibited by 
 or as the nervous system in mammals, and by as yet unper- 
 ceived circuits in plants, and by verbal, telegraphic, post, 
 and other communications in a society). Those two are of 
 course merely the two usual aspects of the same need ; that 
 one need can be summed :- 'coordinating (or generally bal- 
 ancing) structures or organs.' And recently it has been ob- 
 served that there is a more or less perceptibly continuous or 
 regressing series of coordinating structures of which those 
 two sorts are verbally too sharply distinguished:- There are 
 "chemical" processes of coordination (largely taking the 
 place of a definite nervous system in lower organisms), con- 
 sisting of internal secretions poured into the circulating 
 streams of food and waste. The substances are named har- 
 mones and colyones ; the first are said to have been observed 
 to raise the energy potential of the organs they serve to keep 
 balanced, and the second to lower it. All organs, as a truism 
 of secondary formation, must give off secretions (they are 
 what I have been calling 'waste'); so chemical coordination 
 in some degree is universal — but obviously may be said to be 
 rather haphazard coordination. The circulatory systems are 
 quantitatively more systematic coordinations. And the nerv- 
 ous system is quantitatively even closer coordination, which 
 works by direct field pressure rapidly (by electric currents). 
 Obviously, the next general quantitative step would be a 
 perceptible communication by waves given off by the nervous 
 system or other organs ; such would connect the parts of the 
 given individual even more closely (rapidly), and also connect 
 him with other individuals rapidly. And a slightly percept- 
 ible beginning of such a step in coordination is observable as 
 telepathy, etc. That would be the last usually named quan- 
 titative step; the next general step would be gravity, in a 
 sense or form that has no biological name now. 
 
 i. Thus we see how organs are specialized. It is 
 merely a statement in biological terms of the infinite regress 
 of structures. A number of such orders are actually percept- 
 ible in biology ; inside the cell itself there are perceptible 
 some orders or differentiation of groups of molecules, the cell 
 nearly always having one perceptible grouping, the nucleus 
 and the protoplasm (an internal female and a male part). 
 That regress, or such mechanics, is proved by many observed 
 facts. E. g. , there are numbers of probably correct observa- 
 tions (Paul Portier) that often cells and the body fluids con- 
 tain perceptibly living smaller individuals (symbiotes) — with 
 individual "sex" life, etc. The regress of such 'individuals' 
 truistically is infinite — their perceptibility is quantitative. 
 
 j. It is even more obvious that an individual with differ- 
 entiated organs can not unite externally sexually with another 
 individual — fully interpenetrate. For the connective tissue 
 is in the way — furnishes bonds that too strongly preserve the 
 individual's balance against such amphimixis. So the differ- 
 entiated individual can achieve general balance of potential 
 in only two practical ways:- (l) by internal sex processes— 
 i. e., by feeding, etc. ; and by reproducing itself "asexual- 
 ly" by re-growing a cut-off part, by budding, by spore for- 
 mation or germ cell formation in general, or by other varieties 
 of parthenogenesis : (2) by external sex processes — in some 
 
167 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVI §H6o 
 
 way combining its germ cell with one of the opposite sex. 
 The only process conventionally known as sexual, with re- 
 spect to that differentiated individual, is the second. But it 
 is now clear in detail that those various ways which the in- 
 dividual uses to keep himself in balance with the environment 
 (or it is equally true stated vice versa :- those ways the en- 
 vironment uses to keep the individual fairly balanced — to 
 "preserve" him) do not differ at all in kind (they all reduce, 
 from the point of view of the individual, to self-preservation), 
 but merely have different names for different quantitative de- 
 grees. The process in general is living," and is usually 
 arbitrarily divided into metabolism and reproduction, thus :- 
 Metabolism... X Reproduction... = Vital process, or Life. 
 
 k. Therefore, with a differentiated individual (unless it 
 be externally — i. e., artificially" — cut into pieces and kept 
 in a clean nutritive environment, as Carrel has shown), the 
 part of the process conventionally known as Reproduction... 
 or sex does not rejuvenate the whole individual, but rejuve- 
 nates only a certain cell or certain cells. So truistically, as 
 far as the greater quantitative part of the individual is con- 
 cerned, he (she, or it) can not ordinarily be made young by 
 an external sex process (precisely as no physical potential can 
 be raised for a total structure; §§140-1, etc.), and hence he 
 for the most part grows old and in the ordinary sense dies. 
 Therefore, theoretically, assuming surgical skill millions of 
 times greater than now available, we could temporarily get 
 the connective tissue sufficiently out of the way to allow all 
 the cells of an individual to go through an external sex pro- 
 cess (with the cells of perhaps another individual), and thus 
 the individual could be made substantially immortal. Of course 
 that is a stupendous job for some sorts of organisms. 
 
 1. It is thus clear why man grows old and dies. Briefly, 
 it is because he grows so much connective tissue as a means 
 of preserving a steady balance with the environment, that the 
 tissue prevents a general rejuvenation when that is needed, 
 and so only apart of him can begin the cycle over again {ex- 
 cept when and as disorganized from being a man into his 
 chemical constituents : his atoms are individually reorgan- 
 ized then, but we do not call them the ' man"). Or, we 
 
 gain one advantage at the expense of another. And 
 
 as a rather obvious fact, the truth of which is further implic- 
 itly shown in the next chapter, what we call our self or 
 personality or consciousness consists of a series of mental 
 phenomena in only one direction of time, so that if we were 
 able to go through the complete external sex sort of immor- 
 tality in a way perceptible to others, we would not see it as 
 a perceptible continuity of our personality (nature has made 
 one analogous step in such immortality in making butterflies, 
 and as it didn't do them enough good, truistically they do 
 not make another such step). In thus regaining our youth I 
 judge we would forget our former self. That is a quantita- 
 tive guess; self is a quantity as yet unmeasured, and my 
 guess may be in a slight degree wrong. A child is a rejuve- 
 nated part of his parents ; and that part does not consciously 
 remember his 'aged self* that was his parents, or is not con- 
 sciously immortal in that directly personal sense, although he 
 is unconsciously thus immortal — inherits instincts (§158de). 
 
 m. There is another view of preventing growing old 
 that of internal sex processes, or Metabolism... . It is theo- 
 retically possible by keeping the proper food supply going to 
 the cells and sweeping out the waste, to cause all pairs of 
 adjacent cells to become sexually polarized and to coalesce, 
 rejuvenating them enough to produce the subsequent needed 
 fission. Such a process theoretically runs Metabolism... to- 
 wards the infinity limit, it then becoming mostly inclusive of 
 and identical with Reproduction... (we saw in §104, etc., that 
 one factor ultimately includes the other; e. g., the change to 
 
 butterflies in the last paragraph probably more properly be- 
 longs in the customary extent of the factor of this paragraph ; 
 the biological factors are also finally the same, or the so-called 
 fundamental instincts ,, of self-preservation and reproduction are 
 ultimately identical. That method of continuous rejuve- 
 nation (if the degree of it is mild enough) gives a perceptible 
 immortality in the sense that the personality could manage to 
 change slowly enough to remember itself. But that method 
 requires more quantitative knowledge than we have now. In 
 order to achieve absolute immortality in that way, truistically 
 we would have to have infinite quantitative knowledge, which 
 is impossible for finite creatures. So we, as finite creatures, 
 can not achieve absolute self" or 'creature' immortality — 
 the proposition being unescapably self-contradictory. Con- 
 sidering ourselves as finally and really infinite (which is the 
 exact truth ; §47) we already have absolute immortality — as is 
 now obviously proved in a biological sense. 
 
 n. The practical way of applying the principles of age 
 in order to live longer is truistically to make as good quanti- 
 tative judgments as possible in keeping a balance of Metabo- 
 lism... X Reproduction... . Or, as Reproduction... directly 
 affects but a few cells of man, it is better practice, after pro- 
 viding for normal sex life (which of course has much influence 
 indirectly in producing the result we are to see), to make 
 narrower standard universes of Metabolism. .. , such as Food... 
 "KWaste..., and keep those reasonably balanced. Such 
 practical balancing is excellentlj' described in Fisher and 
 Fiske s How to Live.' Metchnikoff's idea of prolonging 
 life by keeping the intestines somewhat clear of poisoning 
 
 bacteria is obviously one step in a general balance. 
 
 An obvious practical fact, usually overlooked, is that a man 
 may spend most of his time or energy in carefully maintain- 
 ing his physical balance, leaving little to be otherwise useful 
 to himself or others. Then he is rather worthless on the 
 whole (except as an exaggerated professional example of 
 physical culture," a few of which are educative). Much 
 Anglo-Saxon overeating" is a proper instinctive spending 
 of the body or health to get and use additional energy. 
 In order to get the potential for beginning this book, for five 
 years I deliberately ate quantities of sugar which I knew 
 would end my life some years sooner (other things being 
 equal) ; I figured that it was worth the spending of health, 
 and possibly I have thereby acquired other means of regain- 
 ing more years — and what are a few years in the darkness of 
 ignorance and sloth worth anyway? In man, the or- 
 gan upon which most strain or unbalance tends to come di- 
 rectly, assuming the others to be fairly normal, is ordinarily 
 the nervous system. So if it is kept active and well nour- 
 ished (balanced), the other organs will be kept in fair balance 
 and some youth by it. If you grow a quantitatively new 
 idea, truistically the nervous system, and in turn the whole 
 body, is in some degree rejuvenated bj r it. But if the idea 
 is radical, unbalanced, not so," similarly you die some. I 
 may mention that my health is fine, and getting better; that 
 indicates that this book is generally sound. 
 
 o. As the various organs become more highly specialized 
 truistically each of them tends to become more and more 
 definitely polarized ('magnetically') with certain of the indi- 
 vidual's cells, named germ cells, which are highly unbalanced 
 so that they strongly tend to combine with other oppositely 
 unbalanced germ cells in an external sex process (and in turn 
 truistically incline the whole individual thus). Those germ 
 cells sum up the polarity unbalances of the individual s other 
 cells. So they are comparatively unstable ( variable"), and 
 various perceptible degrees of sex are possible with them. 
 I. e., those germ cells apparently always divide by gemma- 
 tion before they are mature ; and some germ cells give 
 
§146o XVI Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 168 
 
 several generations parthenogenetically and then the next 
 generation requires sex amphimixis ; and some germ cells 
 can be fertilized by chemical structures of » lower" order, as 
 shown by J. Loeb. Obviously, sex, even in its usual meaning, 
 is nothing exact and constant — a fact in agreement with our 
 total argument. Also, it is a fact that many sorts of cells 
 (e. g. , some of man's blood cells) subdivide, and lead what 
 is usually called a parasitic existence, with sometimes an ex- 
 ternal sex life. I. e., in a highly differentiated individual, 
 sex processes are perceptibly duplicated in infinite regress 
 (cf. symbiotes, par. i). And that shows further that a so- 
 called individual or person is perceptibly by no means an ex- 
 act or absolute individual. If we look closely at a man, from 
 any point of view he is not an exact individual (cf. §47). 
 
 p. Some sorts of individuals (such as many plants) bal- 
 ance their various organs by producing germ cells of both 
 sexes. But obviously, by the principle of asymmetry, each 
 such individual tends to be more one sex than the other — to 
 have a sum of unbalance other than exact zero. In agree- 
 ment with that, it is observed that such double-sex individuals 
 preferably cross-fertilize. 
 
 q. So, consistent with the last paragraph, an individual, 
 as it becomes more differentiated, tends to become more per- 
 ceptibly and definitely sexed — tends to have a chemical or 
 electric polarity of its own, as a summed up potential of all 
 its atoms. Consequently, that highly differentiated individ- 
 ual s germ cells in turn react on the rest of it and produce 
 perceptibly specialized organs conventionally called sex or- 
 gans — we saying that their function determines the sex, al- 
 though it is true vice versa, sex being perceptibly circular,' 
 like valid logic. So it definitely appears that perceptible 
 sex," being the summing up of the polarity of every atom 
 in the body, is a quantitative condition, subject all the time 
 to changes. I. e., a man may be more male one day than 
 the next — a fact tacitly accepted by everybody, in respect to 
 such marked variations as the age of puberty, etc. 
 
 r. It then is a further truism, that for a highly differen- 
 tiated species like man, the fertilized ovum, which is the 
 perceptible beginning of an individual, is theoretically of a 
 certain polarity, and hence is definitely sexed. Recent ob- 
 servations show that ordinary sex is substantially fixed by 
 fertilization (J. Loeb, Organism as a Whole," VIII; for 
 general proof that cells themselves often perceptibly show sex 
 in all the variability here described as pertaining to the 
 whole organism, see Loeb's book, or "Ency. Brit.," "Cy- 
 tology ). But theoretically, {{proper quantitative measures 
 are taken, the sex of any organism can be changed at any 
 time. And it is now obvious that the male organism is at- 
 tracted, actually forced, towards a female organism in the 
 same way that gravity and electric charges work. 
 
 s. This section gives the mechanics of the so-called vital 
 force (or forces) in enough detail to show how it works, and 
 that it is identical with the force or relationship of any phe- 
 nomenon. It has also implicitly but clearly appeared that 
 all biologic processes are mutual (act according to the third 
 law of motion) — being a balancing of forces from within and 
 forces from without,- — that answering ultimately the biologi- 
 cal problem of g!45e. That balancing obviously takes place 
 in infinite regress in full agreement with Thai... X This... . 
 
 §147. a. Conventional biologists usually imply the ques- 
 tions answered in the last section by:- "the problems of 
 heredity. Heredity is the general relationship, or more or 
 less perceptible continuity or identity of successive genera- 
 tions. And as that conventional definition obviously involves 
 the implied assertion of the One in the ideas "relationship" 
 and identity, and of the Many in the ideas that there is 
 a perceptible change and successive generations," and as 
 
 the observable evidence is of interest to men and easily seen, 
 then the problems of heredity obviously tend to involve 
 biologists in an at least tacit discussion of the One and Many. 
 And heredity actually has been the subject of debate for 
 years. It is equivalent to the debate among physicists as to 
 whether atoms are real or not. 
 
 b. The usual form of the biological question is whether 
 acquired characteristics are inherited. The average man, 
 automatically using the valid logic, has for ages naturally 
 held that they are inherited — and by customary agreements 
 as to the use of language, is of course right, as we shall see. 
 u. But the biologists for some years tended to hold in 
 effect the idea that all life is derived from previous life (and 
 that is a One truism — for an atom, etc., is necessarily alive 
 if anything is); hence, they tacitly held (what is obviously 
 another One truism) that any cell has all characteristics. I. e., 
 the biologists, being scientists and constrained to split things 
 into the Many in order to use positive language, vaguely but 
 in effect held that there was perceptible an infinite regress of 
 characteristics in any living cell : they thus tacitly used the 
 formula, Inherent characteristics =UJe. That formula as- 
 serts the truth of infinite pluralism, and is of course quite 
 right (Part One). And by such language, truistically all 
 characteristics are inherited, and logically there is no such 
 thing as an acquired characteristic. Some of the best Eng- 
 lish biologists are now rather definite in their use of such a 
 language, which form (cf. Reynolds's theory, §9l) is not or- 
 dinary language. E. g., Bateson in effect says that a new 
 characteristic becomes perceptible in an individual when some 
 of the individual s other infinite characteristics become im- 
 perceptible and hence no longer mask or hide that "new" 
 one. That is obviously a backwards, Nirvana sort of lang- 
 uage (for in everyday language we would say that that 
 
 new one was old, etc.). The same infinite pluralism may 
 be seen to be implicitly used by J. Arthur Thompson, in his 
 
 Heredity" (especially in VII, to which the reader may re- 
 fer for details (for a briefer statement of the debate in some 
 detail, see "Ency. Brit.," "Heredity"). 
 
 d. Therefore, {/those biologists would say that they are 
 talking infinite pluralism, which is formally opposite to ordi- 
 nary language, then they would be quite right. But they 
 would obviously mean the same as the everyday language 
 conclusion that there are both inherent and acquired charac- 
 teristics, and that both are inherited. Such everyday 
 language of course takes it for granted that when we talk 
 positively of characteristics we mean perceptible ones, so that 
 the formula (indicating the infinite regress of characteristics 
 or properties into imperceptibility) is :- Acquired characteris- 
 tics. . . X Inherited characteristics. . . =Life. As a practical con- 
 venience it is better to stick to everyday language in biology 
 
 unless it be decided to change to infinite pluralism in all 
 science. It was shown in the last section that every phe- 
 nomenon can be expressed consistently in terms of sex. But 
 to make such a mere quantitative change in language is most 
 probably undesirable— it is a matter for the decision of the 
 majority (§17 Ik). To reverse language nearly wholly, in 
 order to agree verbally with English biologists seems to me 
 radical but then I am more conservative than the majority. 
 ■ The English have taken on Weismann's theory of con- 
 
 tinuous germ plasm (see next par.), which in its primary state 
 was a correct and needed assertion of scientific continuity in 
 biologic terms, and consistently and correctly carried it out 
 to a logical end. At first the British, following Darwin's 
 and Lamarck's commonsense that acquired characters are in- 
 herited (which commonsense was of course exaggerated to a 
 formal infinity by materialists in spite of Darwin's mass of 
 data to the effect that such inheritance was slight in degree), 
 
169 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVI §HTh 
 
 opposed that idea of Weismann's, and the beginning of the 
 present British theory was soundly established by American 
 biologists, led by Jordan and Brooks. After that valid infin- 
 ite pluralism in biology was established by Americans, they 
 naturally (i. e., with the practical commonsense which Ameri- 
 cans substitute for the showy and less sound European erudi- 
 tion that often is nothing but ponderous piffle that awes the 
 foolish) gradually changed to the more useful everyday lang- 
 uage of Acquired characteristics... X. Inherited characteristics... 
 — and that sound and readily intelligible and useful form of 
 biology is being expanded in America now by such first class 
 men as Patten (who has unified the steps in the evolution 
 of man), Ritter (who has been writing the argument of this 
 book in terms of biology), Wilson, Kellogg, and Conklin. 
 
 e. And there are some biologists who are wrong — the 
 materialists, led as is usual with materialists by a German, 
 Weismann, who elaborated his originally valid idea of biolog- 
 ical continuity into a detailed assertion that there is a finite 
 and definite set of classes of entities which determine inher- 
 ent character, namely :- idants, ids, determinants, and bio- 
 phores ("Ency. Brit.," Heredity") — which has much less 
 meaning and logical soundness than the poetic assertion that 
 little girls are made of sugar and spice and everything nice. 
 Those materialistic biologists are sharp, exact, precise, rather 
 insistent that there is nothing in life but what can be seen 
 from their experiments, generally scornful of everything not 
 falling within their finitely much narrowed purview. In fact, 
 although Weismann discussed general principles specifically, 
 he is by some claimed to have reversed his stand on the fun- 
 damental matter of acquired characteristics. In the article 
 "Heredity" just cited it is stated that lately Weismann 
 has admitted the possibility of some direct modification of 
 the germ-plasm in the body of the individual acting as its 
 host." In short, he years ago vacillated about principle, and 
 seems to be doing it again. That is a direct, rigorous proof 
 of the unreliability of Weismann :- that he has perhaps twice 
 shown that he is incapable of recognizing the difference be- 
 tween principle and measures or experiment — between quali- 
 tative and quantitative — between the One and the Many. 
 The German chemist Ostwald showed the same fun- 
 damental incompetence (total, if we judge him strictly by his 
 words — which of course is not practically possible), in the 
 1908 preface to his "Outlines of General Chemistry," in his 
 remarks about accepting the "reality" of atoms, which re- 
 versed his previous views of the principles involved. As 
 those men were perhaps typical pre-war Germans, having 
 perhaps more intellectual integrity than the average German, 
 those readily verifiable facts about them tend to show that 
 the pre-war German was not able to distinguish measures' 
 or expediency from principle, a part from the whole, a scrap 
 of paper" from an ultimate consistency of mind or moral" 
 obligation — that the pre-war German had become so mater- 
 ialistic that all of the general equation he could grasp was a 
 a few unfinished This's. Or, apparently his most extensive 
 conception was a few This's that summed into his former 
 aristocratic State. And that is what an aristocrat or autocrat 
 essentially is — a materialist, a provincial minded or weak 
 minded person who considers himself and a few associates to 
 be essentially the best, and the only people who need to be 
 considered. So he naturally wants to be "boss," and pose 
 
 in the lime-light. This paragraph is important in 
 
 that it indicates a method of judging the worth of men, and 
 implies the principles governing "changing one s mind. 
 Fundamental principles are simple enough for a normal child 
 to understand. So when a man fails to grasp principles, and 
 stick by them, then truistically he is shallow and superficial 
 and incompetent. There is but little excuse for an adult's 
 
 ever being definitely wrong in principle and needing to 
 "change his mind" in the matter. When an adult vacillates 
 with regard to principle, especially unconsciously, he is of 
 little worth. But quantitative matters or measures are always 
 changing. So the reliable man sticks to his principles, but 
 always is changing his mind" — his judgment — to agree as 
 well as he can with changing quantitative circumstances. 
 
 f. The usual technical way nowadays of naming the un- 
 its of the Many in the infinite-pluralism equation Inherent 
 
 Characteristics =Lj/e is to say that each character is a unit 
 
 Mendelian characteristic. Such a characteristic in analogous 
 to an atom — a real atom in a universe of an infinity of them :- 
 
 Atoms ^Universe. So the briefest way to describe Men- 
 
 delism is to say it is a biological atomic theory. But some 
 biologists tend to be materialistic about the theory — holding 
 in effect that there are a limited number of such character- 
 istics, each a finite, constant, fixed unit that can be juggled 
 around forever without change. However, much direct evi- 
 dence has been accumulated (by Castle and other good ob- 
 servers) showing that there are no such sharp finite units. 
 
 g. A Mendelian character, in ordinary language, is a 
 finite 'biologic atom' which passes without much change from 
 generation to generation. Sometimes a unit characteristic is 
 observed to appear that was not perceptible in previous gen- 
 erations — thus starting what is often considered a new spe- 
 cies. Such an appearance is known as a mutation, or a 
 
 discontinuous" change, in distinction from a variation, a 
 slight change or continuous step by step process from gen- 
 eration to generation. But clearly that distinction is merely 
 a quantitative one. Obviously, by the principle of periodic- 
 ity there must be organic structural parts ( biologic atoms') 
 in such various L and T relations ; as a truism of our use of 
 L and T there can not be an infinity of organisms between 
 two actually perceptibly different organisms, giving a perfect 
 continuity of steps between. So truistically, neither a mu- 
 tation nor a variation is perfectly continuous or discontinuous, 
 but both are perceptible quantitative different steps in the in- 
 finite regress that applies to all structures. So we see from 
 the direct point of view of heredity, that we can formulate a 
 spectrum or a periodic table of elements of the inheritances 
 (biologic structures). And it is obvious from the last section 
 that there is no absolute distinction between one generation 
 and the next. So the table of biologic elements' of any gen- 
 eration is also in infinite regress in generations — which is 
 quantitatively absolutely identical with all other phenomena, 
 and again (cf. §144h) theoretically establishes a science of 
 biology as definitely quantitative and exact as that of (say) 
 electricity. There is no theoretical difficulty in making bi- 
 ology as "exact" as any science. But if biology were to use 
 any such roughly approximate equations as pass for exact 
 astronomy the perceptible inaccuracies would be ludicrous, 
 h. Thus it is rigorously shown that any atomic mechan- 
 ics may be studied from biologic processes. But that huge 
 mass of possible knowledge, and further details of heredity, 
 must be omitted at this point. The general important prac- 
 tical conclusion about heredity is that probably most of our 
 traits are the results qf a quantitative balancing for millions of 
 years, and hence are mostly rather stably balanced with them- 
 selves (internally) and with the environment. So unless we 
 change that balance very considerably, we truistically usually 
 can not change a trait much. Obviously, it is excessively 
 poor quantitative judgment to fancy that if we cut off the tails 
 of rats for a few generations, then they ought to begin to be 
 born without tails; for evidently, to cut off their tails makes 
 little difference in their lives. If we cut off the tails of a 
 million generations, then the accumulation of little changes 
 might make something perceptible begin to happen to their 
 
§H7h XVI Three 
 
 tails. However, to make a perceptible change in their tails 
 quickly something that will intensely and widely throw the 
 rat out of balance must be done :- so if we cut off their heads 
 a violent unbalance results, and there is obviously an absence 
 of tails thereafter; in fact, there is an absence of the whole 
 rat in future generations — the rat has promptly and definitely 
 acquired a number of negative characteristics. That is not a 
 usual point of view; but it indicates what is reasonably good 
 judgment as to inheritance. In multicellular beings, truis- 
 tically the general communication and transportation systems, 
 the general coordinating organs (§146), serving to change 
 as the environment does and keep a balance, are most easily 
 variable. So it is a reasonable judgment that (say) man s 
 nervous system may be fairly readily modified, and that such 
 an acquired character may be transmitted in perceptible 
 measure (but usually of course in much less degree than its 
 acquired degree). That is in agreement with the practical 
 judgment of all who believe that some education is desir- 
 able (for statement of the Environment... part of the continu- 
 ing changes caused by education, see §166c). So it is a 
 rigorous truism that human nature does change. The total 
 facts of this book show that it can and does do nothing else 
 but change. But a good bit of the change is probably cycli- 
 cal, canceling in the long run. However, when the climate 
 stays fairly steady, as it seems to have done for at least the 
 past 9000 years (Osborn, "Men of the Old Stone Age"), 
 there is a steady accumulation of nervous endurance and 
 hence extended grasp, and quite probably of increased inten- 
 sity — a very important change in human nature. In 
 
 a One sense — i. e., in the sense that there is a universal per- 
 fect balance — human nature does not change : but in pre- 
 cisely the same sense it is infinite in its manifestations, and 
 hence is also always absolutely new and different. So the 
 sententious people who assert no change, even in a One sense 
 assert but half the mystic truth — and sententious people are 
 those who deal in such half truths. But in any quan- 
 titative sense, theoretically men change. And so far as I can 
 judge the facts, men have better nervous systems or minds 
 or spirits now than at any time in known history, in the usual 
 sense of "better" (given in XVIII). So prospective parents 
 may correctly conclude that their child can be improved both 
 by direct inheritance of traits they have acquired, and indi- 
 rectly by their giving the child better nurture or environ- 
 ment; and that it is probable, as a general average in a 
 steady climate, that the child will be better. As a matter 
 of fact, ordinary intelligent parents, guided automatically by 
 the universe or commonsense (or, to use the old phrase :- by 
 the grace of God), have held such an idea for centuries in 
 spite of the fact that recently (and probably at various times 
 in the past) it was in opposition to materialistic biologists, 
 and in spite of the pessimistic folks with their half-truthful 
 croak that "human nature never changes." 
 
 §148. a. In the sciences other than humanics, the asym- 
 metry or the potential between any two structures (or be- 
 tween any two 'factors,' as That... and This...) may vary 
 in any degree towards the limits and °° (§80m), and no ex- 
 plicit comment or name is conventionally applied to the dif- 
 ference in potential; sometimes enough difference causes a 
 new name to be applied to the phenomenon, but not directly 
 (§83). But throughout humanics there is an important dif- 
 ference of terms :- those differences of potential are named, 
 thus :- as soon as an unbalance goes quantitatively far enough 
 the condition is given a name which is largely a relationship 
 word, or explicitly implies a quantitative ratio, or implies a 
 measurement (is in effect an ordinal number; §43b) — there be- 
 ing many such names. The general name of large unbal- 
 ances in biology and psychology is abnormality or disease (in 
 
 UNIVERSE 17 ° 
 
 psychology, specifically a mental or nerve disease or insanity). 
 And that part of humanics that treats explicitly of such un- 
 balances is called pathology : practical or applied pathology 
 is called medicine. In ethics such unbalances are called 
 evils; in sociology, crimes, etc. ; in economics they are called 
 usury, profiteering, greed, etc. ; in everyday life unbalances 
 of less degree than those "abnormalities" are bad manners, 
 queerness, tactlessness, etc. There are thousands of such 
 words, direct or implicit. In general, our life from an L and 
 T or practical, quantitative point of view is the preservation 
 of a balance (we must preserve a certain balance to exist; 
 §§114c, 149, etc.). So all humanic words tend strongly to 
 imply at least, a judgment or guess as to the measures of all 
 things with regard to their balancing effect on our lives. A 
 whole branch of science, ethics (XVIII), is explicitly con- 
 cerned with such judgments ; and all practical sociology and 
 economics is similar. 
 
 b. As a consequence all of humanics is so permeated 
 with at least implications that such quantities have already 
 been measured or judged that it is difficult to state any of 
 humanics "impersonally" or "impartially" or "unpreju- 
 dicedly," as the "exact" scientists would say. But obviously 
 such a persistent inclusion of quantitative judgments makes human- 
 ics actually more of an "exact'" science than the conventional 
 "exact" sciences. For always humanics carries along a state- 
 ment of at least rough measures, and tends thus to be some- 
 what reasonable or not quite silly; whereas conventional 
 "exact" science perhaps half the time drops statement of the 
 measures that Kelvin substantially says is the basis of science 
 (§2c) and thus has a persistent tendency, repeatedly seen in 
 Part Two, to run to or » . which is religious expression — 
 and is merely silly or radical when claimed to be scientific. 
 E. g. , when in §146 I started naming all processes sex, I 
 promptly derived a language which was far from intelligible 
 and was much more vague than is everyday language, which 
 by 'sex' means well known tacit quantitative measures; and 
 when I showed in XIV that everything could be expressed 
 as electricity, I did precisely the same thing, but it was not 
 noticeable that such language became quantitatively indefin- 
 ite. In "exact" sciences we may obviously drop definite 
 statement of measures and experiments — and even talk of in- 
 increase of entropy, which is positively silly, — and still seem 
 to be conventional and to be reasonable in judgment, whereas 
 we are actually being wildly radical. Truistic with those 
 definite facts, scientists who blatantly claim they are ex- 
 act" are airing their hopes — practicing 'make-believe' (§155). 
 Such blatant exact" experimenters are often the worst radi- 
 cals — depart worst from actual measures and usefulness. 
 
 c. In brief, all the humanics are forced by conventions 
 of the ordinary man's speech to carry along continually some 
 more or less explicit statement of judgment as to quantities. 
 Humanics are thus in actual practice far more nearly exact, 
 and demand far more knowledge of and direct reference to 
 experimental facts, and in one word are far more scientific, 
 than are the so-called exact sciences. So humanics theoreti- 
 cally are not only better mental training in science (they are 
 too hard to be dumped first on an untrained mind), but are 
 more directly useful, and serve as the best check I know of 
 upon wild inaccuracy, and that irrational running to zero and 
 infinity which we have seen so often occurs in the hard- 
 fact," experimental" sciences (e. g., Steinmetz's silly 
 socialism, and even more puerile excursions into general 
 science). (I hold no brief for biologists, or other humanics 
 expert; I am not one, and never expect to be one, but sim- 
 ply state the simple principles and a few glaring facts.) The 
 practical objection to humanics is not that they are vague, 
 but that they are so difficult that we are likely in them to 
 
171 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVI §149d 
 
 become quantitatively confused. To approach humanics with 
 any considerable chance of remaining consistent, and fairly 
 balanced quantitatively, we need to train some on the simple 
 exact sciences taken correctly as inexact. A vol- 
 ume or more of rather obvious conclusions from the idea of 
 this section is omitted here. But it is to be noted that these 
 quantitative measures in humanics are not very systematic, 
 and often are not what we would call conscious and hence 
 definite. This paragraph is quite true, while at the same 
 time it is true that definite, systematic measurements are 
 badly needed in nearly every branch of humanics (experts 
 in humanics have no grounds for acquiring that smug self- 
 satisfaction from the fancied perfection" of their science 
 that attacks as a severe dry-rot many exact" men). 
 
 d. It follows further that to understand any of the hu- 
 manics, we must definitely know the general theory of what 
 is quantitatively abnormal, and get some standards as to 
 what degree of departure from the balance constitutes ab- 
 normality. The fact is that in no branch of humanics is there 
 any very definitely agreed upon standard of what is normal. 
 But there is a remarkably close tacit average agreement as to 
 human measures, and if we know the general principles and 
 are fairly average ourselves (i. e., not unbalanced or abnor- 
 mal), we shall find ourselves using those measures before 
 formal science can definitely make them. E. g., it has been 
 found that in a fairly steady market the prices of foods were 
 in much closer relative proportion to their actual nutritive 
 worths than dieticians were able to figure until after many 
 years' work ; even yet it is likely that the market price may 
 be more accurate in the long run than formal experiments. 
 
 §149. a. In this section we briefly consider biological 
 abnormalities, and the applied science that deals with them :- 
 medicine. A biological abnormality or disease is defined as 
 "any departure from the normal [i. e., "common" or aver- 
 age] standard of structure or function [i. e., use] of a tissue 
 or organ" ("Ency. Brit.,"xx, 915). That implies that the 
 normal, or health," is an exact balance. That is not a use- 
 ful, soundly scientific definition; as every thing is always 
 asymmetrical relative to others, that definition asserts pessi- 
 mistically that all organs, etc., are diseased. So if the 
 encyclopedia gives the orthodox definition, it appears in a 
 general way that the conventional theory of measures in hu- 
 manics is confused over the One and Many. (We shall see 
 that such is often actually the case; e. g., the usual ethical 
 rule for conduct, do unto others as you would that they do 
 unto you, is quantitatively wrong; §162). So we may at once 
 make a consistent scientific general agreement, applying to 
 the whole of humanics, that for the "average" individual (or 
 organ, or any structure), from any point of view, there is a 
 certain quantitative departure on one side of the precise aver- 
 age balance, and another (usually about the same in size) on 
 the opposite side, which departures from an exact average 
 are quite tolerable, pleasant, and normal (a more precise and 
 definite picture of this is given in Fig. 163 for ethics, which 
 may be substituted analogously for the present rough intro- 
 ductory statement in biological terms) ; and departures fur- 
 ther than that are for the time being abnormal — or disease, 
 or painful, or "wrong." Truistically with asymmetry or in- 
 commensurability, the normal quantities on each side, are, for 
 each individual, different from other individuals', and are al- 
 ways changing for a given individual — what is one man s 
 meat is another man's poison (but in a very mild degree, usu- 
 ally). This quantitative matter of abnormalities is 
 
 the theory of harmonic periodicity ; previously our attention 
 was on the structures that were built up out of broken down 
 ones, and now it is on the breaking and broken down ones. 
 
 b. Truistically the general cause (the "aetiology") of 
 
 any disease (or other abnormality or wrong") is a sufficient 
 departure from the balance. (There really is no such unbal- 
 ance ultimately or religiously, as we saw in §114c; a disease 
 exists verbally, in formal L and T terms, when we are con- 
 sidering a finite part of the universe, such as an individual — 
 
 which is what we saw in terms of logic in §25). The 
 
 disease may be perceptible after a short time lag; and per- 
 ceptibly cease after a similarly short lag, upon the cessation 
 of the unbalance (in which latter case it is an acute" one). 
 But the time lag may be greater, so that the unbalance only 
 slowly throws various structures out too far; the stractural 
 unbalance is then likely to lag, as a chronic ' disease, for a 
 similar time after the removal of the cause." Ob- 
 viously, therefore, if we do not in experience learn what are 
 the normal limits of our balance, and properly manoeuver to 
 keep within them (be temperate), we shall have disease. It 
 is a practical need that we learn such human quantities. And 
 we get such knowledge by having a sort of sensation to which 
 we give the general name pain when we exceed the limit. 
 We may readily observe that there is no sharp distinction be- 
 tween a feeling of pain and one of pleasure; there is a vague 
 neutral zone between, agreeing with our difference surface 
 and the total theory of That...XThis... (cf. §163). If we 
 do not feel (observe) sufficiently keenly, or interpret a sensa- 
 tion as being a pain when it comes of too much unbalance, 
 or if there is considerable time lag of the sensation and we 
 overlook its cause, then truistically we get out of a fairly 
 pleasant balance without at the time definitely knowing it 
 and correcting it, and sooner or later we die if the unbalance 
 cumulates. So pain is the physical (or mental, if you prefer 
 that word) price we pay for being stupid — if we are. And 
 so far as I have observed we are all of us sufficiently obtuse 
 mentally to get pained occasionally. 
 
 c. Clearly, all of our perceptible life is the consciousness 
 of an unbalance or difference of potential (l) between the 
 environment and ourselves, and subsequently, as a circular 
 process, (2) between our own organs, and in turn (3) between 
 them and the environment — and (4...) so on ad infinitum 
 until our bodies wear out. If there were no such local un- 
 balances we would perceive nothing — as has been shown re- 
 peatedly. Obviously, such perceptions of unbalances can be 
 continually experienced without accumulating abnormally only 
 by a cyclic process — by going first in one way and then the 
 other, giving off and then taking in secondaries across differ- 
 ence surfaces of the body. A general example of that 
 
 is the cycle or rhythm of feeding:- We eat, and a certain 
 amount of food, having flavor near the average, is pleasant; 
 but too much food, or food that is too much or too little flav- 
 ored, is unpleasant or painful, and if too painful perceptibly 
 kills (with slight time lag). Then after eating we do not 
 eat for a while, using or assimilating that food, and get 
 pleasantly hungry. If we go too long without food it be- 
 comes painful, and a cumulation of the unbalance in that 
 direction also kills us. In precisely the same way any struct- 
 ure is changed in order ( killed") by too much unbalance. 
 
 d. All observed organisms tend to be active roughly as 
 a whole for a while, and then be similarly quiet — so that 
 there is a large or individual' rhythm of anabolic and kata- 
 bolic processes. Numerous examples are so well known that 
 they may be omitted. In the case of man that rhythm is in 
 general an alternation of waking and sleeping; i. e. , after 
 we have been active for a while, accumulating a, general ex- 
 cess of anabolic results, the coordinating nervous system, in 
 some more or less yet unmeasured quantitative manner stops 
 unifying or making perceptibly conscious" the individual, 
 and each organ more or less disconnects from the others, 
 and rests, and recuperates from the stock of food previously 
 
§H9d XVI Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 172 
 
 accumulated. Obviously, during sleep we are more or less 
 dead. But we can not be absolutely dead, for the unifying 
 relationship of (say) gravity always persists between the ether 
 cells that are our bodies or minds. 
 
 e. The important point to note now is that if we go 
 through life keeping within the pleasant limits, sleeping at 
 the right times to give a painless, rather unconscious recup- 
 eration from the pleasing anabolic activity which always tends 
 to accumulate painful fatigue poisons (waste), then we can 
 as a general rule be perceptibly happy, or comfortable, or 
 cheerful — or truistically optimistic. But if we went along in 
 that pleasant existence very long, obviously we would (due 
 to the fact that our perceptions are poor) (l) fail to remember 
 just what were our quantitative limits, and would (2) also 
 fail to exercise our organs to the verge of those limits so that 
 they would keep the habit of having such limits for pain. As 
 a truism of both those reasons, we would either accidentally 
 occasionally run over the limit into pain, or else would re- 
 duce our limits of tolerance so much that our nervous systems 
 would have to make a painfully intense effort to stay inside 
 them, and we would be bored" — that boredom obviously 
 meaning a painful effort and impatience at maintaining a deli- 
 cacy of balance that is narrow (the result of too much cod- 
 dling in this case). In both events we would suffer pain. In 
 the case of boredom, it is sensible to choose to be pained in 
 some way in order to restore a reasonable wideness of percep- 
 tion that likes an ordinary unbalance (thus avoiding being an 
 
 exquisite, or a mollycoddle or achieving an artistic tem- 
 perament" ; cf. §159h, etc.). It sounds paradoxical; but it 
 is merely a case of harmonic periodicity. An application of 
 the same principle is furnished by this book:- I get tired of 
 maintaining a careful precision of statement — making That. . . 
 and This... react in a delicate balance. The normal reader 
 is also tired by it: we are both bored by all precise, "ex- 
 act, meticulous, hard fact," sure thing" discussion hav- 
 ing such narrow limits of tolerance, even though I show that 
 absolute accuracy is impossible. But that boring of myself 
 and you shows directly that those who fancy that they want 
 a life without pain, or exact science, are not aware of its nat- 
 • ure. We do not want to play a "sure thing" life, or have a 
 really exact science; we want to gamble more or less, de- 
 pending on the limits of what we (and especially the others 
 affected appreciably by it) can stand without much pain — 
 and if we can't do that we become bored so much that the 
 pain of being a mollycoddle or a similarly narrow Puritan is 
 greater than the hurts of quantitative risks and mistakes (for 
 rigorous theory of gambling, see footnote 163h; deliberate 
 cumulative gambling is death). And what we thus actually 
 want is hence proved to be what we can have: we can not 
 have any hard facts, sure things, or exact science, for there 
 are no such things. After your experience of being bored 
 by the precision of this book — by its "austere mechanics" — 
 you are truistically experimentally competent to judge just 
 how much of a sure thing in any part of life you want, and 
 can dodge falling into being a mpllycoddle of either the lux- 
 urious type or the Puritanical mentally narrow and timid 
 
 (i. e., precise) type. In brief, I have demonstrated 
 
 by directly verifiable biological facts that there can be and 
 must be if an enjoyable life is to be preserved long, « temper- 
 ance in being temperate — an infinite quantitative regress in 
 temperance. The present age perhaps is intemperate chiefly 
 in demanding hard facts, and exact science and experiments. 
 The German materialists are a sufficiently horrible warning 
 example of such intemperance; but as it has not before been 
 proved that such intemperance is possible, I had to prove it 
 was by some intemperate precison as a sample (cf. §85). 
 
 f. Consequently, occasionally as individuals, because 
 
 individually we are finite, we must accidentally (from our 
 point of view) be pained; and occasionally to escape the 
 worse pain of boredom we must deliberately (from our finite 
 point of view) subject ourselves to pain. The fundamental 
 error of the parasite is that it, she, or he is too stupid to 
 act on the latter fact. We dislike the parasite because its 
 actions imply a fear of pain — a fear of vigorous departure 
 from the balance, — so that we judge it a coward. Clearly, 
 the pre-war German docility, the acceptance of military 
 discipline and of paternalism, was one grade of para- 
 sitism, and implied some degree of shirking of life just as the 
 poor workman shirks. And the resulting narrowing of per- 
 ceptions led to or caused the customary autocratic egotisms of 
 the leaders' that the shirks were then afraid to and incom- 
 petent to hold to account. It is quite rigorous! j' consistent 
 
 and circular, you see. So from another point of view 
 
 it is obvious that a general unbalance in our lives must ac- 
 cumulate (due to subjecting ourselves to pain, to hard 
 work," in order to maintain perceptions), so that finally we 
 as individuals die. But as a general thing, if we are fairly 
 intelligent, life is pleasant and free from pain. The man 
 who suffers very much does so largely because he fails to use 
 enough intelligence to avoid it — and not as a result of extrin- 
 sic bad luck, an unkind Providence, etc. It seems to be 
 reasonable arithmetic to judge that, because we have a fairly 
 wide tolerance for unbalances, whenever the L and T sum of 
 pain in our lives reaches 25 per cent (with pleasure amount- 
 ing to the other 75 per cent) we are automatically dead. So 
 in a quantitative sense it is a reasonable guess that the actual 
 amount of unhappiness, and-or warranted quantitative pessi- 
 mism in people s lives is not likely ever to go as high as 25 
 per cent. Also, a quantitative amount of optimism equal to 
 100 per cent is never warranted. And as we by experience 
 vaguely know those quantitative facts, we find a large amount 
 of verbal pessimism to be as wrong (and because it tends to 
 unbalance us by suggestion, to be as offensive to us), as is a 
 large amount of optimism or asserted gladness. An at- 
 tempted 100 per cent "glad game" is totally illogical and 
 hence much more offensive than the bad guessing in a 50 per 
 cent grouch"; but Mrs. Porter asserts ("American Maga- 
 zine," Nov., 1918: I have not read "Pollyanna" — I didn't 
 think I needed it after a course of Christian Science and some 
 years of the wonderfully" glad people in advertisements) 
 that Pollyanna" herself sensibly tried merely to have any 
 inaccuracy of estimate of pain fall in favor of optimism [obvi- 
 ously that is correct in principle], and did not try to be a 100 
 per cent quantitative optimist. As a general problem in prin- 
 ciple, ignoring expression of quantities, the One is perfect, 
 and so in our everyday language the "real" truth is that opti- 
 mism is perfectly right, and pessimism totally incorrect. 
 Also, because all of the Many (because every finite structure) 
 in time ceases to exist as such, or "dies," and as death is 
 a zero quantity customarily named "undesirable," then from 
 a general Many (infinite pluralism) point of view, pessimism 
 is totally correct. So if we talk infinite pluralism, by ordi- 
 nary verbal agreement pessimism is correct. And relation- 
 ship or God the Holy Ghost words may validly imply either 
 pessimism or optimism, depending on the customary way of 
 considering the "direction" that they imply or name. 
 
 g. Truistically, therefore, the panacea for all diseases 
 is to restore the balance. And such a panacea is obviously a 
 special quantitative problem for each case, and often practi- 
 cally impossible for the general reason that we can not 
 perceive in the time available just what and how much the un- 
 balances are, or-and just what to do to restore balance. In 
 time we may acquire much of that quantitative knowledge; 
 but always it will be impossible practically to keep a finite 
 
1T3 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVI §l*9j 
 
 individual alive eternally (§146m). A German, Ehrlich, 
 formulated a theory of a reputed real panacea which was to 
 be in effect a chemical substance (i. e., had a molecule not 
 so elaborate in structure as a living" organism), that would 
 act as does a general sort of internal secretion — traveling in 
 the body and restoring each cell to a balance, whatever its 
 diseased unbalance. As is usual with the ideas of material- 
 ists, that theory of a panacea exhibits the failure of its author 
 to grasp the nature of the One; for a real panacea is a One, 
 and anything that approaches being a panacea approaches be- 
 ing infinite — a simple truism of which Ehrlich seemed to be 
 ignorant:- For such a chemical panacea would obviously 
 have to be infinitely varied to meet and adjust the infinite 
 possible unbalances ; and Ehrlich personally could not have 
 made a chemical of that sort, and no individual man could have 
 swallowed one molecule of it if Ehrlich had. Further, he 
 apparently overlooked the time factor: for in order to cure a 
 disease such a panacea truistically would have to work faster 
 than the nervous system does, and in the ordinary sense of 
 
 the word, a chemical" will not do so. ■ As a matter 
 
 of obvious fact, in a strictly rigorous sense there is already a 
 real panacea in existence, available for use by everyone, and 
 actually used by everyone:- the universe. There is no finite 
 cure-all for any unbalance — biological, sociological, psychologi- 
 cal, etc., — and truistically can not be. As stated, the restora- 
 tion is a special quantitative problem for each case, and like 
 all quantitative problems can not be accurately solved, though 
 practically a fairly good solution is usually readily obtainable. 
 
 h. But we can work out some general rules for the res- 
 toration of unbalances, which may be quantitatively adjusted 
 to particular cases. Physicians already know and apply 
 these rules, and continually try to get closer adjustments of 
 measures. So I shall be brief in outlining them, although 
 the total universe could be described in terms of these rules 
 for curing disease. We need to agree first, as a tru- 
 ism of conventional meanings of words, that a disease is 
 "cured" when the organs chiefly involved are restored to 
 within normal limits. Truistically, it is never possible to re- 
 store the various structures to exactly the same condition that 
 existed before the disease. And also, the diseased structures, 
 their host, the physician, his medicines or tools, and all the 
 rest of the environment are mutually interacting in effecting 
 the cure, sometimes one and sometimes another of those fac- 
 tors being quantitatively more important. No one of the fac- 
 tors is ever totally absent, and no one of them alone effects a 
 cure. The physician and his tools may be perceptibly miss- 
 ing in a given cure, they blending with all the other unper- 
 ceived environment; but when nature thus 'alone" does the 
 work, there is usually a comfortable, healing knowledge that 
 a physician is available — which makes him an actual factor. 
 
 i. Medically, a disease can be "functional" or "organ- 
 ic." When it is functional, it is meant that there is some 
 unbalance or structural defect ("lesion") inside cells or other 
 structures, which lesion is so small that it is not perceptible 
 structurally, but is shown only by the poor functioning or 
 working of the structures. When it is organic, the lesion is 
 perceptible or "gross," so that both the structure or organ 
 and the functioning are perceptibly abnormal. Truistically, 
 ultimately the function and the organ are identical, and the 
 distinction of functional and organic is a quantitative one 
 and in practice is continually being further shown to be ar- 
 bitrary and never distinct. It is also possible to 
 
 divide all diseases into (l) those caused by poisons (unbal- 
 anced secretions) given off from the insides of cells or organs, 
 and (2) those caused by the introduction from without of 
 'poisons' (which consist of any largely unbalanceable foreign 
 objects, such as improper food or other chemicals or objects, 
 
 including live objects such as microbes and bacteria) :- Un- 
 balances by foreign poisons. . . X Unbalances by internal poisons. . . 
 ^Disease. There are obviously an infinity of such classifica- 
 tions possible ; the doctors find it convenient to use a number 
 of such, but as the principle of them is obvious I may omit 
 them here — thus omitting volumes of quantitative experi- 
 mental detail. Such abnormal details, by their nature of 
 being very asymmetrical, would truistically give us the most 
 easily perceptible facts about biology. Such pathologi- 
 cal details are offensive to a normally balanced person — that 
 meaning that he judges them to be an unbalance he himself 
 wishes to keep away from. As everything is connected, such 
 a personal point of view can not ever be totally avoided, 
 in spite of the erroneous, dualistic standard of complete im- 
 personality" recommended by some materialists. So obvi- 
 ously, a doctor who can succeed in so thoroughly considering 
 any disease as a case' that he has no perceptible personal 
 attitude towards it, thereby shows that he has lowered or 
 narrowed his ability to observe (and diagnose and treat) in a 
 quantitative degree perhaps dangerous to the patient — has 
 unduly killed his brain. But the non-medical man should 
 recognize that the physician must in some measure avoid 
 feeling too much personal sympathy in order to work; and 
 in the effort to do that, many doctors acquire an outward 
 habit of pretending to do so which helps them to ignore their 
 sympathy enough, but which make-believe by no means in- 
 dicates their actual perceptions or state of mind (§155). I 
 mention such a familiar condition with respect to doctors be- 
 cause the same outward pretense of indifference and imper- 
 sonality is often displayed in a normal degree by other men 
 for their work, and it is well to interpret it correctly. It is 
 especially so with scientists, who apparently coolly discuss 
 all sorts of abnormalities : the keen observer, by understand- 
 ing the principles (§155), can readily see under the make- 
 believe. Generally speaking, the person who actually is too 
 impersonal or calloused, pretends, in a half-conscious effort to 
 balance his defect, to be very sympathetic with many things 
 and becomes gushing, ' gay," sloppy" — sentimental or 
 mildly hysterical (e. g.,the professional patter of the average 
 trained nurse). But of course the few great doctors have the 
 strength not to need those pretences — can be steadily nat- 
 ural and unaffectedly poised, leaving their total strength un- 
 hampered in seeing more than the ordinary man can — e. g., 
 Weir Mitchell, Goldthwait, Cabot, the Mayos. That applies 
 to other men, of course ; e.g., as Dewey says in his Intro- 
 duction, I indulge in make-believe about the trick' with 
 words; I do it about another subject, too; hence I have not 
 the requisite strength to write this book properly. (I may 
 mention that the last ten lines were not in the version of the 
 book Dr. Dewey saw.) It thus is beginning to ap- 
 pear in a few details how very widely in our lives the hu- 
 manic quantitative estimates extend. We have already seen 
 that classic logic is incompetent in them : we now see that 
 the classical logic views as to the need of impersonality in 
 science are erroneous — in a way directly offensive to normal 
 people. So it begins to appear just why and how logic" — 
 
 classic logic — got its bad name among men. Also, the 
 
 reader begins to see evidence that in humanics things are not 
 always what they superficially appear to be, and why only a 
 knowledge of principles, coupled with conscious experience 
 in estimating the measures of men, gives definite understand- 
 ing in humanics. Such understanding shows that our judg- 
 ments of human motives are usually very inaccurate (§148c). 
 j. As I must omit the classifications and descriptions of 
 biological unbalances in detail, we may briefly note some of 
 the principles of cancer, as being a sort of practical general 
 summary of diseases. In cancer some cells get out of balance 
 
§149j XVI Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 174 
 
 (out of the control of the rest of the body); and start what is 
 substantially an "individual" life of their own (and perhaps 
 they exhibit 'external' sex, although no definite observation 
 of that exists so far as I know). Obviously, there are two 
 general ways in which cancer can start:- the body cells 
 and organs other than the cancer cells — other than the cells 
 which later get out of control and are cancer — get relatively 
 weak or subdivided (become lacking in strong unity of bal- 
 ance, just as galaxies grow old) in innumerable ways, so that 
 certain otherwise normally strong cells have too high a po- 
 tential relative to those other cells and hence start out as un- 
 controlled cancer cells ; or (2) the body cells in general stay 
 in normal strength of balance, or perhaps have even stronger 
 balance or unity than usual, and some undue external stimu- 
 lus or irritation acts on the cells that become cancer to jar 
 them into such a relatively high potential that they start off 
 individually. In the first case the cancer cells stay normal 
 and the body control or potential drops; in the second the 
 body stays at normal potential and the cancer potential goes 
 above normal — both producing the same relative effect. (The 
 directly quantitatively opposite disease to cancer is gangrene 
 or abscesses, where some cells get so relatively weak that 
 they die. All diseases, including cancer, in part exhibit some 
 dying of cells — agreeing with the principles of cycles and of 
 
 valid logic.) So again as mere truisms, the remoter 
 
 causes of cancer are very numerous, and cancer is theoreti- 
 cally an infinite series of particular diseases in which there is 
 locally an over-high relative potential that in effect is a re- 
 versal of the multicellular organism back to unicellular life 
 (analogous to the breaking up of too highly condensed star 
 clusters), or is a 'biological socialism' (§175d) — although 
 some cancers tend to differentiate into multicellular organs, 
 that may be called a higher ' series or order of cancer, and 
 is a less radical biologic socialism. So all the orthodox theo- 
 ries of the cause of cancer are probably right, the varying 
 theories applying to the varying sorts of cancer (see Ency. 
 Brit., ' Index, s. v. Cancer"; Bainbridge, The Cancer 
 Problem," Sec. IV). And various differences in cancer po- 
 tential are observed :- some cancers are quickly brought un- 
 der control by the rest of the body (as in' benign tumors"), 
 and are often absorbed (e. g. , warts on a child's hands), the 
 potential not being able to remain above that of the rest 
 of the body. Other cancer cells act as if they had great ex- 
 cess of potential, grow rapidly, and can not be checked in 
 
 any way yet found that does not also kill the host. 
 
 Cancer when once started reacts unbalancedly in various ways 
 with the body, and if not checked finally kills it in some of 
 those ways. We may look upon the unbalance from any of 
 the quantitative points of view already mentioned :- (l) It 
 uses an undue amount of food, tending to starve the rest of 
 the body. (2) It throws some of its cell waste into the gen- 
 eral circulation, and that is sometimes perceptibly damaging. 
 Those are the inner and outer points of view with respect to 
 
 cells. Considering the body as made up of organs, 
 
 there are two similar points of view:- (l) The cancer cells 
 take up space needed by other organs and thus tend to block 
 or choke or squeeze them out of existence and grow in their 
 space. (2) The other organs similarly block off the cancer 
 cells, and tend to kill them. (A secondary result of that is 
 that often the cells in the interior of a tumor are blocked off 
 [the tumor, being largely undifferentiated, may itself help do 
 that blocking off], and die and decompose, more or less poi- 
 soning the host.) All diseases truistically go through 
 
 similar reversible processes — which are obviously the second- 
 ary whirl formations of Part Two. Cancer is a disease in 
 which the differences of potential are easily seen. In diseases 
 due to the introduction of foreign live organisms there may 
 
 usually be greater differences of potential; the processes go 
 faster, and 'overrunning' (acquired "immunity"), etc., make 
 them harder to see clearly. 
 
 k. From that summary of the general processes in a dis- 
 ease the general methods of treatment are obvious being 
 truistic. All diseases — all so-called wrongs and evils — are 
 local asymmetries which we judge we want in better local 
 balance. So we move around some of the things outside the 
 L and T that apply to the given local asymmetry, in order to 
 get a "smoother" (i. e. , wider space and time) distribution 
 of the asymmetry, which thus becomes locally narrow — or 
 cured, as it falls within the limits of toleration (par. a). So 
 truistically the most important thing to note about the cure 
 of any disease or evil is that it is a local process, and that the 
 universe as a whole is all right and needs neither any general 
 or total cure (reformation), nor any local reform so violent 
 or fanatical that it over-cures and makes an unbalance in the 
 opposite direction as bad as the one reformed. (To cure a 
 man of indigestion, and charge him all he owns for doing it, 
 so that he starves, doesn t help him much — a simple fact 
 which second-rate "specialists" are too dense to see.) The 
 words cure and reform conventionally have taken on consider- 
 able implication that an essential or One meaning is intended 
 — that everything or the whole [usually a standard universe] 
 is wrong. The kindest thing which can with fair truthful- 
 ness be said of such an implication is that the quantities are 
 grossly exaggerated. Such radical cures or reforms are hence 
 so bad that they have cast a suspicion of incompetence upon 
 those who claim to cure anything. In actual practice the 
 ostentatious reformer or healer is usually as wrong as the 
 local unbalance he fancies universal— but in the opposite way. 
 1. As a typical application in practice of that general 
 theory of reform or cure, we may consider medical cures more 
 specifically. A certain lot of cells are out of balance, and 
 (l) the balance must, as a truism, be restored either (A) by 
 stimulating them in some way to a higher potential or to a 
 lower potential as may be necessary, or (B) by acting vice 
 versa on the other cells of the organism — or (C) we can com- 
 bine those two. And (2) as a further truism (of L and T, as 
 this is a quantitative problem), either of those variations of 
 potential may be produced either (A) by a direct and intense 
 action on the cells whose potential is to be varied, or else 
 (B) by a more or less indirect and extensive action upon the 
 celW environment (or a combination of the two, of course), so 
 that the environment in turn acts on the cells, varying their 
 potential. (That obviously makes the two arbitrary methods 
 ultimately identical.) And finally (s) either of those two 
 must be either fast or slow, compared with whatever standard 
 
 velocity we choose. Those three truisms are of course 
 
 trite and obvious ; but as they constitute complete quantita- 
 tive statement of the methods of restoring all unbalances it 
 is well to have an explicit statement of them — as the obvious 
 is usually overlooked in emergencies (i. e., in unbalances). 
 
 m. So we may in general treat a disease by simply put- 
 ting the patient into a different environment; if the unbal- 
 ances are slight and obscure the chances are that "nature" 
 will cure it — even though that 'change of environment' is so 
 slight as to consist of merely "absent" mental treatment, if 
 the patient is made quite cognizant of such treatment, by 
 (say) such a perceptibly concrete variation of the environment 
 as paying for it. If he has to work a bit vigorously to pay 
 for a change of air," the change will probably cure him — 
 while just the reverse change will cure another with about 
 the same unbalance. In such cases of change of scene the 
 method is slow, and the environment is changed in unknown 
 degree, and acts indirectly. In a more severe disease the 
 patient may die before that method has time to work ; and 
 
175 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVI §H9p 
 
 when a patient dies it is commonsense finite judgment to hold 
 
 that there was no cure. All that obviously indicates 
 
 whatever there is of good in laissezfaire methods : in case of 
 nearly complete quantitative ignorance about an evil, the 
 only sensible thing to do is to let it mostly alone while find- 
 ing out something definite (it is of course impossible to let it 
 absolutely alone), and to supply the slight 'change in envi- 
 ronment' by explicitly recognizing that the universe or "Prov- 
 idence" is treating it. Truistically, a little way out on the 
 infinite regress all treatments become laissez faire (it is the 
 practical end of no exact science). But the other side of that 
 verbal half-truth is that we are always tinkering with all un- 
 balances and that those tinkerings also have infinite regresses 
 so that there is from that point of view no such thing as lais- 
 sez faire. Therefore, any rational laissez faire is that applied 
 to an evil so slight as scarcely to be painful, or is that which 
 is used when we do not know with reasonable certainty what 
 to do and have not had time to observe the details. 
 
 n. The opposite extreme of cure, both in shortness of T 
 and in direct application of the action to the diseased cells 
 (i. e., L is also short'), is surgery, where the diseased cells 
 are forthwith removed as completely as possible, or else poi- 
 sonous secretions or foreign substances are removed, or mis- 
 placed cells replaced. Obviously, in such a cure the most 
 nearly accurate quantitative knowledge that can be obtained 
 is required, as well as skill and art in directly applying it in 
 the shortest possible time. Perfect surgery truistically con- 
 sists of opening all the diseased cells and repairing them 
 atom by atom or electron by electron, etc., restoring a nor- 
 mal balance, and doing it so fast and so directly that no sec- 
 ondary damage is done to the organs. Clearly, we are not 
 likely to get very close to that speed and delicacy soon ; 
 surgery in practice must leave some unbalances in the organ- 
 ism (there are usually some new ones also, made by the sur- 
 gery) to be cured afterwards — largely by laissez faire. 
 
 When such remaining unbalances are about as bad and-or as 
 hard to cure as the original ones, truistically the surgery is 
 practically useless. And when the surgery kills the patient 
 with any perceptible directness, by ordinary language it is 
 truistically a failure, and I will not bore the intelligent read- 
 er discussing contrary quibbles. The surgeon who speaks of 
 a successful operation, the patient dying, is a materialist. 
 
 o. Between the extremes of laissez faire and surgery are 
 all varieties of cures. The most commonsense cure is of 
 course to use the various methods in combination :- Suppose 
 a man stuck a fairly large splinter into his hand, that intro- 
 duced enough poisonous germs to infect the wound. We at 
 first naturally use direct methods, cleaning out the wound 
 and disinfecting it as intensely as possible without causing 
 appreciable damage to healthy tissue. If the infection is 
 very hard to kill otherwise (which I do not think is the case 
 nowadays), we deliberately cut out some perhaps healthy 
 tissue so as to be sure to reduce the danger of infection, and 
 then cure the deliberately made unbalance later. By those 
 intense, direct methods we get as much cell balance as can 
 be quickly obtained, and as can be achieved with some cer- 
 tainty that we were getting at the right cells. In applying 
 those direct methods we protect the patient's nervous system 
 by anaesthetics, both locally and generally, as may be neces- 
 sary to prevent any accumulation of marked unbalances due 
 to pain upsetting the nervous system and indirectly other or- 
 gans (and later the patient can recover from that anaesthetic 
 poisoning slowly and hence with tolerable discomfort). Then 
 we begin the indirect, usually slower methods. We intro- 
 duce (usually via the digestive tract) various chemicals into 
 the circulation of blood and lymph which are to exercise a 
 balancing effect on the abnormal conditions still existing 
 
 about the wound and secondarily elsewhere. A trifle of defi- 
 nite knowledge of such drugging, with respect to killing for- 
 eign organisms, exists, and is constantly being added to; but 
 very little is definitely known of the effects of other sorts of 
 chemicals: and not much is known of the secondary effects 
 (unwitting unbalancings) of the infection-killing drugs. So 
 that indirect method of drugging is theoretically useful, but 
 practically in its infancy — a fact well recognized by leading 
 physicians, though they are often doubtful whether it is wise 
 to admit it to the average man, and thus give him a chance 
 to jump to unwarranted conclusions and despairing states of 
 mind. Yet I quite agree with Cabot that the patient ought 
 to be told the truth : for the proof that such » principle is 
 correct, see throughout XVIII ; also, there is obviously no 
 more reason why a man should become mentally a molly- 
 coddle and be protected from truth, than that he should 
 
 be a mollycoddle protected from vigorous work. Then 
 
 the next sort of indirect treatment is to feed the patient 
 properly, so that the normal parts of him will have their po- 
 tential raised somewhat if possible, as a means of healing the 
 wound. Similarly, we put him in an agreeable, restful en- 
 vironment — and do not go out of our way to tell him unpleas- 
 ant truths just then. But possibly the most effective indirect 
 treatment available (and it may include as a part of it those 
 just mentioned) is to get the man to think that he is going to 
 get well quickly and want to. Then the strongest coordi- 
 nating factor of his whole organism, the nervous system, is 
 actively engaged in having the whole body give out proper 
 secretions, etc., to restore the unbalance in the hand. There 
 is nothing mysterious about that : it is what the nervous sys- 
 tem is for — why it differentiated into a definite organ. But 
 because for so long the dualists have taught that mind and 
 matter are essentially different, the average man often has a 
 vague notion that thinking" he will get well will not do 
 any good without material drugs. So there is no objec- 
 tion to helping his thinking with foods, drugs, and envir- 
 onment; those material things are part of his thinking 
 anyway, and if he is correctly told that they themselves will 
 help some, his thinking is likely to be normal. The direct 
 treatment thus supplements the indirect treatment ; we apply 
 all the quantitative knowledge we have, in the proper times 
 and places, and get a cumulation of good effects. And when 
 we run into ignorance, we stop and leave the rest to nature, 
 p. But clearly the most sensible way to treat a wound 
 is to avoid getting it — the man ought, as a general rule, to 
 have kept his hand away from splinters, — such indirect treat- 
 ment, given by keeping the nervous system alert, being more 
 efficacious and comfortable than any other, up to a certain 
 point. In brief, a quantitative knowledge of the probable 
 situations of life should be obtained, and unbalances treated 
 before they accumulate to a very painful degree — that being 
 the principle of preventive medicine. A reasonably intelligent 
 man can usually manage to avoid any serious injury; and by 
 keeping in good balance by means of food, work, etc., is not 
 likely to be painfully affected by swallowing or otherwise ab- 
 sorbing disease germs and other foreign matter from the un- 
 avoidable ordinary environment. If he finds it advisable to 
 expose himself to injury and infection, he can, by the same 
 indirect methods, anticipate and ameliorate effects by creating 
 such resistance. Considerable knowledge has already been 
 gained by medical science as to how to create a chemical an- 
 tagonism to infection. And preventive medicine, like 
 
 other sorts of treatment, can not be perfect. The chief ob- 
 jection to it is that it itself will cause unbalances if taken too 
 seriously and overdone. Also, chemical indirect methods of 
 preventing infection (e. g., typhoid vaccination) cause per- 
 ceptible diseases that may on occasion be as undesirable as 
 
§H9p XVI Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 176 
 
 those they prevent. The use of preventive medicine by an 
 inhabitant of Cuba against frost-bite is usually not sensible, 
 q. Perhaps the most exaggerated idea advanced in medi- 
 cal science in recent years is the mental healing one — and of 
 those who propagate that idea the Christian Scientists seem 
 to be the most emphatic. Those mental healers are obvi- 
 ously to a large quantitative extent right: clearly, if we can 
 be cheerful, and confident that we are strong enough to 
 'down" any disease, we shall most likely prevent our get- 
 ting any disease — barring accidents not worth while trying 
 to foresee and avoid. It does help a certain more or less 
 hysterical type of person to avoid disease temporarily (it tru- 
 istically in the long run harms), to come flat out with the 
 absurdly exaggerated assertion that there are no perceptible 
 unbalances — no disease and no evil. The hysterical person 
 has an aristocratic type of brain, in which from some cause 
 (usually from generations of parasitism and docility: often 
 from intense shocks, etc.) the perceptions are much narrowed 
 and in that actual unbalance with the environment there is a 
 tendency to consider everything more or less wrong. So if 
 such a brain, in a violent effort to -cure itself, asserts em- 
 phatically enough that there is no unbalance, the direct, 
 temporary sum of the two unbalances is a balance — health — 
 so far as the hysteric can see. So from his point of view (but 
 usually a hysteric is a woman — about twenty to one), there 
 is not any disease, and he is rather immune. And when he 
 has a mortal error" that he has got a disease (in our every- 
 day language his "mortal error" is a concrete fact), he 
 stimulates (frequently with a healer's" help) his brain to 
 assert even more intensely that he is all right. It is truistic- 
 ally possible for a man to grow on a new leg in place of a 
 lost one if he can think a new leg with enough intensity. 
 But as as a matter of commonsense in quantitative matters, 
 he is not likely to, and would be sensible not to waste time 
 trying. Mrs. Eddy's very elaborate glad game" obviously 
 
 has occasional usefulness medically. Incidentally, 
 
 Mrs. Eddy s Science and Health" is a striking example of 
 a mystic book. It is not science; science is pluralistic ex- 
 pression (X), and her book is surprisingly mostly the oppos- 
 ite — being an almost continual jingle of One words, which 
 judged by everyday pluralistic language, is largely nonsense. 
 But she keeps at the ineffable One so long that the book act- 
 ually does give a sort of religious grasp of things if the read- 
 er can avoid objecting to its nonsensicality from the scientific 
 point of view (so it appeals religously to over-sophisticated 
 people who have learned mostly what isn't so; Index, "Re- 
 birth"). There are numbers of such mystics in the Middle 
 Ages: the Catholic church usually approved of those classic 
 ones. I rather think her book is useful when understood for 
 what it is. If she thinks science is a fashionable word it is 
 rather a good thing that she misuses it some, as it is bad for 
 science for it to be fashionable. And perhaps unquestionably 
 Mrs. Eddy cured herself by her unusually persistent ineffa- 
 bilities. What she had was severe hysteria: ample proof of 
 that will be obvious to the fairly close observer who reads a 
 panegyric of her:- Sibyl Wilbur's The Life of Mary Baker 
 Eddy": cf. §155. 
 
 r. It is therefore obvious that the quantitatively best 
 way to restore an unbalance is to use a practical, balanced 
 combination of the reasonably easy available ways. Leading 
 physicians nowadays definitely take the unified view of man 
 given by this chapter, and apply the unified methods outlined 
 in this section. The practical idea of the Mayos was to get 
 a unified competent diagnosis. Goldthwait has improved 
 that idea by showing definitely that the human being is a 
 unit, and then collecting a coterie of experts to treat those 
 who chiefly have something wrong with their skeletons. 
 
 Goldthwait thus finds a way, so far as formal organization can 
 do it, of getting the advantages of specialization without its 
 worst disadvantages (the disadvantages, for obvious reasons, 
 
 almost unavoidably crop out in large organizations). 
 
 In sociological analogies, we have seen that a nature cure 
 is laissez faire. Obviously, the surgery cure is a revolution, 
 going as far as a reign of terror. Autocracies try the Chris- 
 tian Science cure of jingo patriotism, paternalism, and saber 
 rattling, thus giving mental healing in an exaggerated way 
 by specious promises and scaring off devils, until some social 
 abscess blows up; and then there is usually a resort to social 
 surgery. Existing democracies more or less blunderingly try 
 more moderate methods, analogous to the cure for the splint- 
 er wound, and usually manage to muddle along some way — 
 which is better than blowing up. A conscious democracy 
 with a fair amount of intelligence obviously would use pre- 
 ventive medicine, and get along healthily ; for preventive 
 medicine is merely having keen enough nervous systems to 
 observe a slight departure from a balance, starting correct- 
 ing it at once if it tends to accumulate. Obviously, 
 
 this section indicates the general method of correcting all 
 difficulties or wrongs. An intelligent child can understand 
 the method, and grasp the fact that it is truistically rigorous. 
 But the application of the method requires careful quantita- 
 tive judgment as to just what and where the unbalance is 
 (actual diagnosis, rather than mere complaining or calamity 
 howling), and as to the available means of curing it with the 
 least disturbances of other balances. That application truis- 
 tically involves an infinite regress of measures, is absolutely 
 insoluble with accuracy, and for acceptable practical solution 
 needs strong, vigorous, keen observers, who see not only the 
 unifying relations in their specialty, but their extension. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. Psychology. 
 
 §150. a. Psychology is the description of the universe 
 (or usually in practice, a standard universe), taken or made 
 from the reverse point of view, or in the opposite direction, 
 from that in which we start with ordinary or "objective" 
 That's and This's. Or, in the book up to this point we take 
 That s and This s as positive' or given, and make an equation 
 That. . . X This. . . =Meaning, and consider that the Meaning is 
 our result or conclusion, or what we are "after"; but in 
 psychology we start with Meaning, usually calling it the 
 mind (or some synonymous name), and going in the reverse 
 way, split it into arbitrary parts. Thus, we have an equation 
 from both points of view:- That... X This... ^Meaning— 
 Feelings... XIntellect... . And for those psychological terms 
 Feelings... and Intellect... we may substitute numerous other- 
 wise "psychologically" named factors, which are simply new 
 names for That's and This's. 
 
 b. Clearly, that definition of psychology is circular. And 
 the total of all descriptions of the universe, including psy- 
 chology, is thus explicitly circular — as Feelings... XIntellect... 
 (or some equivalent pair of factors) is identical with the vari- 
 ous That... XThis...'s but is reached by starting from where 
 they end." So the definition of psychology, and the fact 
 that there is psychology, are consistent with the solution of 
 the One and Many, and with valid logic — is final general 
 crucial proof of the validity of everyday logic. 
 
 c. Classic logic, with its dualisms, goes in only one di- 
 rection and hence can not give a consistent definition of psy- 
 chology as a science. For proof of that, see the attempts of 
 Ward ("Ency. Brit," "Psychol."— xxii, 548) to give one, 
 and his admitted failure to make such dualism work. (He 
 was a very able British psychologist and philosopher; his 
 
177 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVII §150g 
 
 from it and split 
 state their rela- 
 
 "Pluralistic Philosophy" and "Realm of Ends" are in effect 
 identical with the argument of this book, but formally not.) 
 
 Ward in the place cited finally defines psychology as 
 
 the science of individual experience." If we take ' indi- 
 vidual to mean any organized structure, then obviously 
 individual experience" is equivalent to Meaning; and the 
 science of Meaning obviously is to start' 
 it into parts — into That s and This s — and 
 tionships. And that truistically implies that conventionally 
 our experience, or mind, or soul, or whatever it is preferred 
 to call it, is perceptibly a continuous thing, or is really" a 
 Mniverse — implies that we are persons, or are organized. 
 When we come to examine our consciousness minutely, we 
 sometimes seem to note breaks ; and that has confused the 
 matter. I imply the solution of that as we proceed. 
 
 d. That much of this section gives a consistent state- 
 ment of psychology in the whole of knowledge, from a con- 
 ventional point of view that ignores theory of measurements. 
 A more rigorous description or definition of psychology (that 
 implies the solution of its conventional difficulties, and makes 
 it an exact science in the sense that it is as directly meas- 
 urable as is, say, electricity) is:- (l) ps3 - chology goes in one 
 direction, using arbitrary T or time to assert such a conven- 
 tion or convenience, while (2) the objective sciences go in the 
 opposite direction, so that the two together cancel the direc- 
 tions" and cancel L and T (i. e., cancel all quantities as be- 
 ing arbitrary), and give us the real continuous universe or 
 Meaning. Or, to put that briefly, psychology is dynamic and 
 the objective sciences are static, and only the combination of 
 the two sorts" of sciences gives a really complete or con- 
 sistent knowledge (§80, IX) — or a consistent epistemology, 
 as the philosophers name it. Or, to put it into still more 
 intelligible detail :- Precisely speaking, the so-called object- 
 ive or material sciences do not exhibit a relationship known as 
 time. Obviously, we can not experiment, in a test tube say, 
 in the "past" or in the "future" (§85d) — all our concrete, 
 objective experiments consist of a comparison of space loca- 
 tions (identities) in tlie present. And as the present is a 
 zero time-duration (is the limit between the past and the fut- 
 ure), it follows that precisely speaking there can be no such thing 
 as a strictly objective or concrete science : all our so-called con- 
 crete science is obviously multiplied by that zero (that zero 
 time or T), and simply does not exist alone (i. e., as really 
 orabsolutely "concrete"), and truistically can not. In short, 
 objective or material science (the science of matter that is 
 sometimes asserted to be different, distinct, dualistic from 
 "mind") is absolutely static in form and impossible. And 
 on the other hand, again speaking precisely, in our observa- 
 tion of that concrete space or L — in all our "experimenting" 
 with L in the "present" — we really do not perceive L, but 
 perceive a relationship that we call a time interval — a T 
 which is not zero, but an L which is zero. Or, speaking 
 precisely, subjectively or mentally we do not consider things 
 of thought as occupying space, but consider them as a series 
 of time intervals, which is the "opposite" of space. Or, sub- 
 jectively, the One is formally infinite time, and space is zero: 
 objectively, vice versa the One is formally zero time, and 
 space infinite: and only both together give* formally the 
 complete expression of the truth (§147h), that expression ob- 
 viously containing the formal inevitable contradiction of the 
 One and Many. Therefore, there is in the science of psy- 
 chology (the science 'opposite' material science) always a zero 
 L, and hence such a distinct science can not exist. 
 
 e. The sum of the matter is that in all of science which 
 has any consistent existence we combine subjective and objective, 
 material and spiritual, concrete and ideal, static and dynamic 
 (IX), and get an absolutely unified science, in which it is 
 
 possible to make consistent but arbitrary L and T measures, 
 and which is therefore arbitrarily pluralistic — that Many sum- 
 ming into a One. Thus, psychology is inseparably combined 
 with so-called concrete science. And it is irrational to pre- 
 tend (as do the materialists) that they are separable. 
 
 f. The precise equation for all knowledge is therefore :- 
 Objective parts implying L... ^Subjective parts implying T...— 
 Universe, in which T is 1JL, so that we have the truism :- 
 L.../L... = l, or Universe. We can analyze that equation in 
 more detail:- We have That... X This... = Meaning, and 
 Meaning= Feelings. . . Xlntellect. . . or =Feelings. . . X Conscious- 
 ness... . In those equations (cf. Part One) That... Y, This. . . 
 is, explicitly, M's that are static; so truistically, That... X 
 This...=ML... . And Feelings... X Intellect... is, explicitly, 
 M's that are dynamic; so M/ T. ..= Feelings. . . X Intellect... . 
 The solution of the One and Many requires that we combine 
 the two, in which case, by §86, we have a series of truisms. 
 
 So ps3'chology comes in circularly, and can not be 
 
 dispensed with as a part of any exact ' science. Half 
 
 of the measuring, or scientific" (§39e), member of our gen- 
 era] equation — i. e., the term T — is psychological; and that 
 member M(varying with)l?T~^ thus implies an absolute, uni- 
 versal, circular, ineradicable identity of mind and matter. 
 That is true with such glaring obviousness that I have been 
 able to write this book up to the present point by tacitly 
 taking it for granted. The total theory of measurement — of 
 what is strictly science — is now explicit, and we see that 
 there absolutely can not be any science not inseparably con- 
 nected with persons. There is nothing strange or novel 
 about that : it is merely the obvious fact that science is made 
 
 by men. The substance of pars, d-f is repeated, in a 
 
 more conventional and intelligible form, in §158 on memory. 
 
 g. It is thus rigorously proved that mind and matter are 
 identical — are not parallel" in the sense of (l) mutual in- 
 teraction (except of course the immediate implication of such 
 is identity), or of (2) occasionalism," or (3) pre-established 
 harmony (see Index, Teleology," for disproof of this third 
 dualism), or (4) the "monism" of Spinoza which had mind 
 and matter parallel attributes of One Substance ( Ency. 
 Brit.," xxii, 600-1). In epistemology (i. e., in the most 
 general solution of the One and Many) we must have (as a 
 necessary truism of language; §§83-8) primarily at least two 
 points of view which may logically interact, and so we take 
 this contradiction:- (l) we take things' (matter) one by one 
 (arbitrarily calling that separation":- space or L); (2) then 
 oppositely we take consciousness or mind as continuous 
 (arbitrarily calling that continuity in taking things:- time or 
 T). That fundamental reaction or contradiction of static 
 (one by one "things") and dynamic ( taking" those things) 
 is truistically a prerequisite of any positive language. If we 
 do not want to talk, then obviously there is never any need 
 for any distinction between mind and matter. But if we do 
 use language, then all complete statements must truistically 
 contain the formal contradiction between mind and matter; 
 i. e. , all sound "scientific" statement must contain both con- 
 crete science and psychology — both L and T. So any valid 
 science may be said to be either concrete or spiritual (psycho- 
 logical), depending entirely upon the arbitrary quantitative 
 consideration of whether L or T respectively is more empha- 
 sized (hence man's spirit or soul is essentially the same as 
 the mental activity of any animal, but differs quantitatively 
 in the degree in which he uses T — which difference often is 
 
 not enough to speak of). In the foregoing parts of 
 
 this book I have conventionally emphasized L, as I was talk- 
 ing of conventional material" sciences. In fact, so conven- 
 tional is it thus to emphasize L, I often had to assert explicitly 
 that there was a T included (cf. IX). If I were to go back 
 
§150g XVII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 178 
 
 and emphasize T, more or less ignoring L, the descriptions 
 would become psychology. In that case various names other 
 than the "physical" ones used would be more conventional. 
 That extensive psychology will not be given, but the use of 
 such psychological names will be indicated in this chapter. 
 §151. a. There is thus no essential difference between 
 psychology and concrete science. The quantitative difference 
 is that psychology emphasizes T. There are two chief aspects 
 of that quantitative difference. One is that psychology is so 
 emphatic about T that in its conventional texts the problem 
 of the One and Many is so nearly explicit that the texts seem 
 much like "philosophy." The second is that psychology is 
 always implying by its names a measured judgment — normal 
 or abnormal quantities. We noticed that in §148, and I 
 shall not again take it up explicitly. 
 
 b. As psychology starts from Meaning, or the universe 
 considered as mind, the tacit emphasis is obviously on the 
 fact that there is a continuity. In order to talk about a con- 
 tinuity, it must be split or analyzed" (a real continuity is 
 as such absolutely ineffable). And psychological splittings 
 were so perceptibly not real splittings that always there was 
 a disturbing knowledge in the psychological writer s mind 
 that he was trying to assert two opposite things at once. At 
 first, say in Descartes's time (or even more in that of Aqui- 
 nas), before there was much clear thought on the subject, 
 the mind was made sharply dualistic with matter (though the 
 link, God, was then manufactured to repair the error), and 
 the mind was broken into similar sharp dualisms known as 
 
 faculties" — such as the faculty of memory, the faculty of 
 will, of feeling, attention, and so on as far as the ingenuity 
 of the psychologists could invent. Such faculties were held to 
 be constant, exact mental atoms.' But it is now unfash- 
 ionable to hold that there are any such things — there too ob- 
 viously is no sharp line or distinction between the arbitrary 
 parts — so that even materialist German thinkers like Muen- 
 sterberg, although they in effect use such 'mental atoms,' 
 shy away from the name faculty. So now, more than ever, 
 the psychological writer of much sincerity and competence is 
 constantly engaged in a rather perceptible struggle with the 
 One and the Many. And that struggle is painful to himself 
 and often to the reader. There is obvious in Ward's article 
 
 Psychology" (a treatise of nearly 100,000 words, "Ency. 
 Brit.," xxii) a constant rejection of explicit dualism, result- 
 ing in a painful uncertainty as to how the logic must go. 
 The result is that nearly every psychological term is usually 
 run by good thinkers like Ward (who have not advanced as 
 far as our first class American psychologists like Dewey) into 
 all three Trinity forms. Hence the confusion as to the con- 
 ventional meaning of such words is dire — for one Trinity 
 meaning is used about as often as another, and in the ortho- 
 dox absence of explicit solution of the One and Many no logi- 
 cal distinction is clearly pointed out. ■ As we know 
 
 the solution of the One and Many, that conventional diffi- 
 culty will no longer bother us by making most psychological 
 writings vague and unintelligible — except that it will take us 
 about a generation to get used to that solution, and to learn 
 to apply it with easy skill. This book will look, to those of 
 of a few generations hence, as unnecessary and clumsy as the 
 old arguments that there are antipodes look to us. 
 
 §152. a. Psychology usually discusses individual ex- 
 perience — takes a man as being the universe, usually cor- 
 rectly as a standard universe. But obviously, we can let the 
 single man unbrokenly include the total universe, and the 
 mental sum of him in that aspect is (l) "social psychology." 
 If we take him bounded by his skin, then there is a psychol- 
 ogy of single although related men, or (2) "individual psy- 
 chology." The principles of the two are obviously identical; 
 
 the differences are quantitative, and due to the fact that the 
 means of communication existing between members of a 
 society are not so good as a rule as communication by the 
 nervous system of one man. No quantitative distinctions 
 between individual psychology and social psychology have 
 been definitely agreed upon ; I shall indicate the principles 
 of both in this chapter, and give a few applied details of soc- 
 ial psychology under its usual name sociology in XVIII, XIX. 
 
 b. In concrete science we split the universe into parts 
 on the criterion of their having principal difference surfaces 
 at V\ — which splitting could never make any part exact. In 
 precisely the same way the entities of psychology, the ment- 
 al parts, are tacitly divided and named by that criterion as 
 arbitrary quantities. It has been found by observation that 
 changes in the nervous system produce directly corresponding 
 change in consciousness, and that such changes do so more 
 directly and intensely than do changes in other organs. Even 
 more directly, it is observed that changes in consciousness 
 are accompanied by electric currents in the appropriate parts 
 of the nervous system — truistically indicating organized field 
 structure (XIV). So by the whole of valid logic and the de- 
 scription of the universe up to this point, it follows that the 
 nervous system is in general identical with the mind or soul 
 or consciousness. And as perceptible consciousness is ob- 
 servably accompanied by, and identical with, electric cur- 
 rents in appropriate parts, and as such currents are based on 
 V\ (XIV), it follows that quantitatively perceptible conscious- 
 ness or soul is the result of such energy transfers to such con- 
 scious parts of the nervous system as suffice to cause their 
 principal difference surfaces to acquire a velocity of V\. That 
 is obviously directly proved by the readily verifiable fact that 
 if any stimulus — any transfer of energy to or from the ner- 
 vous system — gets proportionally weak it will fail to give a 
 perception; and if too intense, it will also fail (§156). 
 
 c. Those same quantitative conclusions are identical with 
 biological facts :- The nervous system is composed of cells 
 called neurons. Each neuron has at least one main process 
 or thread-like extension of itself that may sometimes be sev- 
 eral feet long, called the axon ; and usually has small pro- 
 cesses named dendrites. The axon and dendrites in turn 
 usually divide into still smaller processes called fibers, and 
 some of those fibers unite the cell with other neurons, and 
 others may unite it with other sorts of cells in the body (by 
 means of at least seven recognizedly different small organs 
 that are nerve endings," not counting at least two sorts of 
 nerve endings in the retina, etc.); and so far as can be ob- 
 served there is no discontinuity in those unions ("Ency. 
 Brit., xix, 40l). So obviously the nervous system is a con- 
 tinuous coordinating organ, joining the body structurally 
 perceptibly into an 'individual' (i. e., "continuous") organ- 
 ism. No other general structure of the same order or 
 size as the whole body does thus coordinate it; the 
 various circulations in the body coordinate it by means of 
 
 their small "chemical" structures. And if there is 
 
 such a thing as consciousness or mind in the universe, it must 
 by our solution of the One and Many (it must, as a truism, if 
 the universe is not chaos) be identical with the whole uni- 
 verse, and a part of it must be identical with some structural 
 partof the universe. Consequently, as there must verbally 
 be consciousness" (or some equivalent name for the Tin 
 the general equation), it directly follows from the facts in 
 the first part of this paragraph that biologically the quantita- 
 tive or perceptible consciousness of the whole body must be 
 identical with the nervous system structure. Such was seen in the 
 last paragraph to be the observable fact. So this and that 
 paragraph circularly and rigorously prove the general argu- 
 ment of this book, and explicitly demonstrate the verbal 
 
179 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVII §153a 
 
 machine or equation :- Nervous system or cells. . . X Perceptible 
 consciousness. . . = Consciousness, or Soul, or Mind. 
 
 d. Therefore the customary meaning of personal con- 
 sciousness (not necessarily .te^-consciousness) is obviously a 
 quantitative meaning, given by the equation :- Environment, 
 including parts of the nervous system not perceptibly working... X 
 Perceptibly working parts of the nervous system, or personal con- 
 sciousness... = Consciousness {in general, or One consciousness), 
 or Soul, Mind, etc. That obviously rigorous equation (which 
 may logically be either for the whole universe or for a stand- 
 ard universe, according as we interpret the extent of Envi- 
 ronment, implies the solution of all psychological problems. 
 Most such conventional problems are matters of definition — of 
 observation of the language agreements used, to see to which 
 Trinity part a term used belongs : thus, I have used the term 
 consciousness in both members of that equation, as it is ob- 
 vious that conventional psychology and everyday talk do use 
 that word about equally in the two logically contradict- 
 ory senses (we also use it as a relationship word — against 
 which additional and worst puzzle the mathematical symbols 
 protect us; §80e-g). In order to be precise, I used the ad- 
 jective personal to indicate the Many usage. But psychology 
 and everyday usage give the term soul mostly a One mean- 
 ing; so it is fashionable in psychology either to avoid the 
 word (because as a One word it obviously is not a scientific or 
 Many word), or else practically to deny that man has a soul. 
 In everyday life it is getting to be bad taste to mention the 
 soul — for that psychological reason, and also for the common- 
 sense reason that we wish to avoid casual talk of something 
 we are uncertain of. But evidently, as soon as we make the 
 logical distinctions in the equation we know the nature of 
 soul, and there is no embarrassment in using it — although as 
 soul" has been used with such gross irrationality in the 
 past (especially in the theological phrase immortal soul," 
 meaning a personal immortal soul) the word may retain a 
 taint of stupidity, and perhaps may better be avoided. 
 
 e. Volumes of detailed psychological solutions explicitly 
 implied by the equation of the last paragraph must be 
 omitted. The reader is amply able to expand into the de- 
 tails that interest him the few general suggestions needed 
 here. The most important solution implied by that equation 
 is that there is no such thing as personal immortality — for 
 the most excellent reason that no fixed, constant, distinct, ex- 
 act, "real" thing or person, or a personal consciousness, or a 
 personal or Many soul exists or can exist. As a glaring tru- 
 ism, if a certain thing can not exist it can not be immortal; 
 a prerequisite for immortality is existence. A person, or 
 personal consciousness, or a personal soul, is a continually 
 changing thing, as we shall see in more and more detail as 
 we proceed, and as is obviously a fact from the slightest ob- 
 servation of our own consciousness:- e. g., our personal soul 
 changes so much that quantitatively it totally ceases to be 
 perceptible every time we go to sleep; and hence it never 
 
 is perceptibly "immortal" for so long as a few days. 
 
 But obviously, as our nervous system (and-or mind), exactly 
 speaking, includes or is the total universe, truistically in a 
 real or One sense we are immortal. I. e., time simply does 
 not apply to us, ultimately, so that right now this instant, we 
 have all the time there is — which we may equally logically 
 say is infinite time or zero time. In that One sense you are 
 an exact, fixed person — for you are, with absolute organic 
 connection in infinite regress, the total universe or God, and 
 as such immortal if we wish to say so (§47). We take up 
 the moral aspects of immortality in §167h. 
 
 f. Because personality is a quantitative thing it is also not 
 correct to say that it absolutely ceases to be — absolutely 
 dies. Death (§146lm) is itself a quantitative thing and not 
 
 absolute. So it is quite possible that there may be in some 
 quantitative degree (probably a slight one) sometimes a per- 
 ceptible amount of personality that survives what the doctors 
 call death (but probably for only a short time). I. e., at 
 medical death the person's nervous system may still in the 
 cortex, for a while hold a physical organization or physiologi- 
 cal unity sufficient in degree to give off psychic waves, still 
 organized as being the dead person," that might constitute 
 a telepathic message to a living" person. It may be pos- 
 sible that those waves could affect a wireless coherer or some 
 such machine as Edison is reported making (which would be 
 more reliable than persons). That is all theoretically pos- 
 sible; the phenomenon is merely a quantitative one, and in 
 many cases the cortex shows no evidence of change shortly 
 after death. It is even possible that such telepathic mes- 
 sages have been received : judging from the triviality of those 
 reported by various people, and their grossly mutually con- 
 tradictory nature, if any are genuine some such quantitat- 
 ively defective, moribund personalities" might have sent 
 
 them. But that does not imply personal immortality: it 
 
 proves the opposite, merely showing that personality is quan- 
 titative and changing when by a person we mean a finite 
 one. It may be an experimental fact that some messages 
 from the dead were received after the sending cortexes 
 were organically disintegrated. If such happens, it is as a 
 first approximation quantitative proof of a time lag in the re- 
 ceiver s brain. On the few occasions I have perhaps got 
 telepathic messages from the living there was a time lag; 
 apparently a message was stored up until my brain was about 
 half asleep before it could get attention. But regardless of 
 those quantitative possibilities, the truistic disproof of per- 
 sonal immortality is rigorous. Those possibilities obviously 
 
 imply others, omitted here. We saw (§144j) that in 
 
 biological terms there is no finite real personality; so 
 there can not be a real personal immortality. And as direct 
 experimental proof of the principle that there is no personal 
 immortality, when I was dead (§144j) I was totally uncon- 
 scious of my personality in the conventional sense. I know 
 another man who was dead once and his experience as to 
 having no personality is the same as mine. 
 
 §153. n. In orthodox psychology the nervous system or 
 consciousness in general is considered to extend out in a 
 vague way, and join on in some unstated way to the object- 
 ive things which are perceived" — in short, orthodoxly the 
 environment is joined to us thus by the nervous system. So 
 there is a well known word, with many synonyms, for that 
 really-joined-on Environment. . . (including parts of the nerv- 
 ous system not perceptibly working):- feelings; with 
 synonyms such as emotions, associations, sensations, subcon- 
 sciousness, the unconscious, or even consciousness. (There 
 are many such words that in principle are synonymous; 
 but all of them, including the ones mentioned, imply some- 
 what different quantitative splittings of the universe — though 
 there is some disagreement about those implied judgments.) 
 Also, there is a well known word, intellect, for the perceptibly 
 working parts of the nervous system, or for the directly per- 
 sonal consciousness. And the term intellect also has many 
 synonyms (varying somewhat quantitatively) :- thoughts, 
 ideas, mind (in the sense of personal mind), sensations, per- 
 ceptions, apperceptions, reflection, the conscious, conscious- 
 ness, understanding, the reason, judgment, brains, sense, 
 commonsense, etc. Therefore, we have for our explicitly 
 general psychological equation in §152d, the more common- 
 place one :- Emotions. . . ^.Intellect. . . =Consciousness, or Mind. 
 But there are commonplace words for that [One] Conscious- 
 ness which are more precise. The word will (the psychologi- 
 cal or mental will) is almost always used to name the climax 
 
§153a XVII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 180 
 
 or summing-up of any mental action, and is obviously usually 
 identical with that One Consciousness. Ordinary synonyms 
 for will are behavior, experience, mental life, conduct, pur- 
 pose, volition ;~ again there can be a quantitative difference 
 in even those One words ; that difference implies a quantita- 
 tive comparison of extent of various standard universes used 
 — an important logical point. So we may write the general 
 psychological equation (omitting the measuring member, 
 which is the same as in concrete science), in commonplace 
 terms, as :- Emotions. . . ^Intellect. . . = Will. 
 
 b. We may substitute synonyms, and get various illumi- 
 nating equations :- Subconscious. . . X The Conscious. . . —Intui- 
 tions. . . X Perceptions. . . = Behavior; Associations or Memory. . . 
 X Reflection or Apperceptions. . . =Mental life; or, Intuitions. . . X 
 Sensations... = Experience, or Self; or > Intuition or fringes of 
 consciousness. . . X.Self... = Will. Clearly, we can take any of 
 the numerous psychological terms and by substituting them 
 in that equation assign to them a well-defined, rigorously 
 logical meaning. And we see that some words (e. g. , con- 
 sciousness) may conventionally be put in any place in the 
 equation about equally well ; e.g., above I shifted self from 
 the standard universe meaning to the intensive factor, in 
 which latter place it is obviously identical with James s ex- 
 tensive description of the personal self or personality in his 
 chapter on the consciousness of self ( 'Psychology," X). A 
 number of those terms conventionally are usually relationship 
 words, and would most appropriately serve to replace the X 
 (cf. §168b); such words are association and reflection, and 
 often intuition. Hence, it is obvious that only a defi- 
 nite knowledge of the solution of the One and Many can de- 
 termine just what a common psychological term does mean 
 in a given case; for we continually shift the Trinity form of 
 those terms. E. g. , when we have a faint desire to empha- 
 size the importance (i. e., quantity) of intellect, we pair it 
 as Intuitions... X Intellect..., which rather implies that feelings 
 too are intellect or faint intuitive thought. And when we 
 get specially weary of the erudite fanatics and eulogists of 
 the intellectual life who assert or imply that the intellect is 
 the real part of life, we use some such correct formula as 
 Intuitions, or Instincts, or Feelings. . . X Sensations. . . , which 
 leaves out any explicit mention of intellect — although obvi- 
 ously it is replaced by a synonym (i. e., the dots assert a 
 connected or organic infinite regress ; so Sensations. . . means 
 the pleonastic phrase organized or classified" sensations' 
 — which is truistically identical with the usual meaning of 
 intellect, or with the necessary meaniug of reason," if reason 
 is to have any consistent meaning). 
 
 c. In the equation Emotions... X Intellect... = Will, it is 
 obvious, as a truism of definition and by direct observation, 
 that Emotions. . . finally (if we consider the whole universe) is 
 the extensive factor that refers to all the parts of the universe 
 and their workings which are not positively (we might say 
 name-ably) perceptible to us as Intellect... . So obviously, in 
 numerousness of details included in a given state of mind, 
 Emotions... greatly exceeds Intellect... . That is the same as 
 saying that the greater part of our behavior or mental lives 
 rests upon or is emotions or intuitions or feelings in the sense 
 that the more numerous details are emotions — and such num- 
 erousness is what we usually mean when we say greater" 
 or higher." It is probably the correct quantitative fact :- 
 that usually in behavior practically the vast majority of the 
 details which we say are consciously" involved are so vague 
 and indefinite in consciousness that we call them emotions, 
 so that the only definitely perceptible mental detail in ordi- 
 nary behavior is consciousness that those numerous emotions 
 exist. Such mental life, in which the intensive Intellect... 
 almost vanishes, is called instinctive or habitual or intuitive 
 
 or reflex action and may symbolically be represented thus :- 
 Feelings. .-. XIntellect. .= Will. Evidently, if conscious- 
 ness or Intellect., disappears (as it may from one point of 
 view be said to do in reflex action), then, from a psychologi- 
 cal point of view, provided we retain our usual language 
 agreements, the behavior has quantitatively changed, so that 
 the individual as such is not concerned perceptibly (is not 
 conscious), but the organ (or organs) of a lower" order, 
 which produced the reflex, is conscious. And that is a pass- 
 ing from one order of structure to another, so that, in precisely 
 the same way that temperatures of different orders of struct- 
 uces are not directly comparable, here the same intensive 
 factor (now called intellect) can not be directly compared — 
 i. e., a quantity of consciousness perceptible to an organ is not 
 directly perceptible to the whole organism (a principle — that 
 of periodicity — obviously truistic in those familiar terms). 
 
 d. So in "purely reflex" action, a different order of 
 'individual' (an organ, or part of the usual individual") 
 logically has a perceptible amount of consciousness, or Intel- 
 lect. . . . That amount is not directly perceptible to the in- 
 dividual"; e. g. , we have no intellectual consciousness or 
 control of our heart, but still we do have a degree of cogni- 
 zance and control of it (I can deliberately vary my heart 
 action by running), which we may say is a dot of Intellect... 
 (so rigorously that factor never becomes zero), but which we 
 usually say is some part of Emotions. . . (and when the naming 
 or structural-relation thus changes or reverses we have to 
 introduce the inverse square law to preserve language agree- 
 ments). That is obviously precisely the same as saying that 
 the structures of a certain given order inside an atom have 
 temperatures which are not directly perceptible to us, or are 
 not at all temperatures as such in the usual sense to us — but 
 which temperatures are ordinarily definitely existent to us 
 when translated by the space law (inverse-square, to 'expand' 
 the order ), and which temperatures can never become ab- 
 solutely or <*> (because in that case the order of struct- 
 ure changes, and we become directly congnizant of them — 
 just as we directly perceive our heart as soon as it departs 
 only a little towards or"). So we see that we can shift 
 a dot' from one psychological factor to its mate — change 
 what for want of a better name I shall call the numerousness 
 of a factor ; — that being a truism of the fact that they are ar- 
 bitrary anyway. But, if we wish to retain our ordinary 
 language or logic, we can not run either to or » . (That is 
 the psychological form of the proof that entropy can not and 
 does not increase to infinity.) And all of that is precisely 
 the same as saying that the two factors are irrational if taken 
 separately ; and that neither ever has any exactness. In 
 concrete science all that is a little difficult to observe directly 
 in some cases, as we are not very familiar with "material" 
 facts ; but in psychology it is glaringly evident. 
 
 e. The foregoing describes from only one of the two 
 well known points of view the tendency of the two factors to 
 vary in numerousness. Many men, on occasions when they 
 notice the existence of perceptible sensations (the existence 
 of Intellect...) of course promptly perceive a number of dots, 
 and tend to deny and ignore the vague emotions. Evidence 
 of that is shown in the proverbial assertion that man is the 
 
 reasoning" animal, implying that he relies solely on the 
 numerousness of Intellect. . . , instead of being in fact mostly 
 affected by Emotions... (cf. §150g). On the other hand it is 
 conventionally implied that other animals have no such per- 
 ceptible sensations or Intellect... or reason, but are guided by 
 emotions instincts. Truistically animals have some quantity 
 of perceptible Intellect... and reason (animals have no "reas- 
 on" in the sense of classic logic; neither has man; §25). 
 Probably animals have it in much less degree — a quantitative 
 
181 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVII §153i 
 
 problem. If man has reason, then truistically animals, atoms, 
 etc., also have it, in different degree — though like tempera- 
 ture, the reason" of different orders of structures is not 
 directly comparable. But when men start thus exaggerating 
 the numerousness of the parts that are perceptibly included 
 in Intellect..., they are likely to forget the more numerous 
 parts in Emotions..., which in extent constitute the most of 
 God or the universe and which equally with the over-vaunted 
 reason guide us and support us. Those who thus illogically 
 prune and preen themselves on their "reason" exhibit small 
 measure of reason, and are popularly named variously :- in- 
 tellectuals, erudite persons, the sophisticated, highbrows, 
 know-it-alls — and scholar shows such a tendency to imply in- 
 temperate intellectuality that perhaps it is safer not to ac- 
 quire that title. 
 
 f. We can see more of those two opposite tendencies to 
 exaggerate either emotions or intellect by considering what 
 the theologians call a rebirth or getting salvation or being 
 saved, and the psychologists call a religious experience. 
 
 There are many names for the phenomenon. Under 
 
 certain circumstances we may get a large and intense flow of 
 energy through apparently the most of our nervous system 
 (most probably actually through some large part), which we 
 designate by various names. E. g. , we may see what we 
 consider a beautiful picture, or scene, or action; or we may 
 observe in ourselves or others some good, heroic, or otherwise 
 remarkable and appropriate, suitable deed or quality ; or we 
 may observe the general fitness of things, the apparent per- 
 fect purpose' of the universe or God, or the remarkably 
 consistent characters of such men as Christ and Lincoln; and 
 whatever it is that thus serves to make it more or less per- 
 ceptible to us that the whole universe is absolutely consistent 
 and fitted together as a real whole or organism or person, 
 serves as a sort of trigger to release in greater or less degree 
 energy from many nerve cells, and we have a greater or less 
 flood of nervous energy which gives us such an unusual sense 
 of well-being that we call it by a variety of names serving to 
 mark it off from our more routine experiences:- ecstacy, 
 rapture, inspiration, frenzy, transport, ineffable joy or felicity 
 or peace, being one with God, mystical union with God or 
 Christ or the saints, rebirth, intoxication (both spiritual," 
 and with alcohol and other drugs, as we shall see), orgy, or- 
 gasm, aura (as of an epileptic or hysterical fit) — and when it 
 is definitely abnormal or pathological in degree it is named 
 an epileptic, hysterical, or other sort of nervous explosion, 
 convulsion, or fit; and mania. In the mildest mentally per- 
 ceptible degree that flood of energy is humor [or when in the 
 reverse 'direction,' but with analogous principles, is pathos], 
 and results in a laugh — or in less degree, in a smile. So the 
 reader has had a religious experience: even dogs smile. Pos- 
 sibly the reader has not had a rebirth that verges on the edge 
 of the pathological, as do most of those described in James's 
 "Varieties of Religious Experience," and as do those the 
 theologians seem to require — but such more or less pathologi- 
 cal ones are unnecessary, and a bit dangerous (§162, etc.). 
 But as will appear (especially in §162), the reader, if fairly 
 normal, has had ample religious experience to understand of 
 his own observation all such experience — religious experience 
 is as common as eating meals, although the somewhat patho- 
 logical varieties fortunately are not common : the theologians 
 have merely grossly overrated the rarity and pricelessness of 
 their wares, as does the usual patent medicine advertiser. I 
 have had religious experiences myself that verged on the 
 pathological ; and instead of making capital of them, as has 
 usually been done in the past by those with such experiences 
 (in that they or their disciples substantially claim that they 
 saw or talked with God, or were otherwise tremendously 
 
 favored), and implying that others ought to have similar ex- 
 periences in order to have the real thing," I shall prove in 
 a way that you can verify that (unless you need to know by 
 personal experience what you are talking about in order to 
 write a book like this) they are fine things to avoid (§§162-S). 
 
 g. When we have a religious experience, frequently its 
 chief characteristic is the vividness, or perceptibility, of the 
 parts of it — just as perceiving a joke consists of seeing in- 
 tensely the point, that being a mild rebirth. That stimula- 
 tion of our nervous system thus frequently causes a large 
 number of the dots of Emotions... to surge into vivid percept- 
 ibility and hence to become a part of Intellect , and we 
 
 seem to perceive the total universe — to see all of God, or 
 actually to perceive all the dots in the infinite regress. E. g., 
 the devil took Christ onto a high mountain and showed him 
 all the kingdoms and their glories (Matt. 4); quite possibly 
 Christ did have some such perceptible view of the infinite re- 
 gress, which he could most intelligibly express in his day in 
 that way — and quite likely he thus in effect condemned the 
 violent rebirths recommended by the theologians by attribut- 
 ing that one to the devil" : instead of saying of them, Oh 
 
 joy , he said, Oh hell As a matter of formal 
 
 logic, we can perceive that total infinite regress at any time, 
 so that we can with logical consistency write the explicitly in- 
 finite pluralistic truism:- Intellect = Universe. Then 
 
 logically intellect becomes the total of everything; but so 
 does emotion, or any other Many thing we care to name, and 
 we have the trouble of learning a new form of language. 
 
 h. On the other hand we are accustomed to calling cer- 
 tain vague perceptions emotions or feelings. So ordinarily, 
 instead of changing our names for those, when in a rebirth 
 they become vividly perceptible, by nominally shifting some 
 of them over into Intellect..., we merely say that the factor 
 (or the sort of experience named by the factor) Emotions... 
 has vastly increased. So there is truistically a tendency in 
 such cases to consider the equation the infinitely pluralistic 
 
 one, Emotions = Universe. Perhaps most people 
 
 who have had a marked religious experience tend thus to 
 consider it emotional, and unconsciously to exaggerate the 
 view into an assertion that religion is wholly emotional. Of 
 course if wholly so they merely change to a new language (cf. 
 last par.). If we assume that Christ did have the religious 
 experience mentioned in the last paragraph, we may note 
 that his reaction to it was to tell the devil to get hence, 
 which is obviously a refusal to change from the usual agree- 
 ment to consider the One real, to either an intellectual or an 
 emotional infinite pluralism. It can be noted that Christ, 
 with extraordinary consistency considering the general incon- 
 sistency and ignorance of his time, adhered to the reality of 
 the One. Such consistency is so remarkable in such circum- 
 stances that it not only reasonably well demonstrates the ex- 
 traordinary consistency and hence fair approach to perfection 
 of his own character (so that his reporters were forced by the 
 sheer weight of it to make a roughly correct report), but it 
 also makes it probable that Christ mostly initiated, or at least 
 served to crystallize, the general establishment of our present 
 language agreements. That is the greatest work any man can 
 do for the race, provided the agreements are the best possible. 
 And it has been shown throughout the book that ours are the 
 most economical (for the next step, more suitable for improved 
 minds, see footnote 100c). For the ethics of economy of 
 time, see §165. Here, we have a definite, specific proof of 
 Christ's greatness — an improvement on intuitive guesses. 
 
 i. Thus we see in vividly verifiable detail how mental 
 facts are so fluid,' so inseparably connected, that a careless 
 exaggeration of them led to the centuries-long warfare of 
 science and theology, of reason and authority. Very roughly 
 
§153i XVII Three UNIVERSE 
 
 speaking, science tended to assert that the truth was, Intel- 
 lect =Meaning; and theology, that it was Emotions ■== 
 
 Meaning. If we consider such to be roughly the historical 
 fact, then obviously both were fanatics, and partly wrong if 
 they claimed to be using everyday language (§49j-l). 
 
 j. We have seen that in a condition of fair mental bal- 
 ance the parts of Emotions... are more numerous but lack 
 in vividness or intensity, whereas those of Intellect... are few 
 in number but intense. So considering the whole nervous 
 system as a structure, some few cells (experiment shows that 
 they are apparently always in the cortex) are, in any given 
 mental act, rather intensely energetic and hence conscious, 
 and constitute the intellect. Those cells may be considered 
 surrounded by -some sort of difference surface (nobody knows 
 what or where the variable boundary actually is : I am going 
 no further than to state a mere mechanical truism), on the 
 other side of which, and in fair balance with it, just as the 
 filament is in fair balance with the field, is the remainder of 
 the universe, the remaining nerve cells that directly are the 
 emotions being immediately adjoining. 
 
 k. A number of variously stated truisms of that are ob- 
 vious. One is that our intellect or conscious perceptions or 
 sensations at a given time consists approximately of some cer- 
 tain cells ; then at another time, with truistically changed 
 perceptions, our personality is truistically composed in some 
 measure of other cells; or, the seat of the soul" is variable. 
 Hence it follows that at a given time it is possible for two 
 more or less coordinate souls to exist in one person. E. g. , 
 one soul may be doing automatic writing while another soul 
 is carrying on the usual routine; or less emphatically, most 
 of us can at times read with our eyes and talk and think of 
 something else. Also, it is truistic that there can be occa- 
 sions when one part of the cortex suffers some abnormally 
 great disconnection from another, so that distinctly different 
 personalities may appear alternately in an individual. Such 
 different personalities have actually been observed in the 
 same person up to six or eight. Often a normal individual, 
 by getting drunk with chemicals, will successively, as one 
 part after another of his cortex is in effect disconnected by 
 (say) the alcohol, exhibit a series of perceptibly different per- 
 sonalities. If he has normally used his top cortex to hide 
 from people the unpleasantness of the rest of him, those other 
 parts then show up undisguised — in vino Veritas. 
 
 1. Such truisms of par. j may be multiplied indefinitely. 
 The only other explicit one I shall notice is that practically 
 always Intellect... may perceptibly give two general person- 
 alities:- (l) the general personal consciousness, or thoughts; 
 and (2) a perceptible consciousness that we have that first 
 consciousness — semiconsciousness, or awareness of an ego. 
 Thus we may more or less perceptibly have at least two 
 simultaneous consciousnesses — which is a direct and crucial 
 proof that any part has an infinite regress. 
 
 §154. a. The expansion of Emotions... ~X Intellect... — 
 Will (which expansion is largely a matter of writing it in 
 terms of synonymous conventional symbols and indicating the 
 implied quantitative differences) is all of psychology, and is 
 so simple in principle that an intelligent child ought to be 
 able to do it formally ; but so difficult quantitatively (requir- 
 ing such good observation and judgment of billions of per- 
 ceptible structures that go to make one man) that the ablest 
 men can not as yet do very well at it (cf. §§1671, 170). I 
 proceed to discuss briefly some of the chief expansions, and 
 sum them up in considering the One member Will in §157. 
 
 b. The earliest fairly definite use in psychology of a 
 valid logic, and hence direct implication of forms of that 
 equation, so far as I can find is in Dewey s Psychology." 
 James afterwards in his Psychology" obviously tacit!} 7 used 
 
 182 
 
 valid logic. But he said he didn't, and was vague and con- 
 tradictory about it. Perhaps the majority of psychologists in 
 this country now use sound logic. 
 
 c. Valid psychology in recent years has adopted the 
 useful but dangerous (countenancing fanatics and fads) ex- 
 pedient of dropping old names for new, in order to drop the 
 old "faculty" or dualistic errors. The chief new name is 
 "the subconscious," and its rather verbally-irrational syno- 
 nym "the unconscious." That new name is obviously equiv- 
 alent to the ancient terms emotions and feelings, so that we 
 have Subconscious... X Intellect... = Will. So far as I happen 
 to have noticed, Morton Prince in "The Unconscious" first 
 definitely dropped the dualistic idea that the subconscious is 
 a dualistic faculty — a sort of fixed, constant sub-individual in 
 us. Prince's logic, while not explicit, is valid, although he 
 formally inclines towards infinite pluralism. Coriat's general 
 principles, in "Religion and Medicine," are substantially 
 the same in form as here given. 
 
 d. There has been much talk about the ideas of Freud. 
 His theory is substantially this :- Dreams are always dis- 
 guised realizations of suppressed or unfulfilled wishes, which 
 in sleep can get past a "psychic censor" ; those suppressed 
 wishes may be referred to sexual matters. Further, mental 
 antagonisms (one part of the mind or nervous system contin- 
 ually suppressing or inhibiting another) obviously fatigue the 
 nervous system, and lead to disease if persisted in; so in 
 cases of various unbalances the mind should be analyzed on 
 the basis of dreams, and by the conclusions of such psycho- 
 analysis the suppressions removed and a comfortable balance 
 
 effected. Quantitatively, those ideas are useful, as 
 
 we shall see ; but Freud has the usual defects of the German 
 materialists :- he persistently takes a part for a whole, or is 
 a dualist. E. g., in ordinary everyday meanings of words, 
 dreams are by no means always disguised, nor are they neces- 
 sarily the realizations of anything in the shape of suppressed 
 or other sort of long-entertained wish — all of which can be 
 observed by any normal person who will take the trouble to 
 (say) overeat just before sleeping, and repeat the perform- 
 ance until he manages to get a remembered nightmare. Of 
 course, such a dream can be tortured verbally into being the 
 realization of a suppressed wish (perhaps a wish that the 
 owner of the over-burdened digestive apparatus might die) — 
 for everything is ultimately identical. And Freud might 
 logically validly express everything as sex; tbe reader has 
 seen it done in §146. But Freud pretends to use everyday 
 language — in which are named other effective instincts. 
 
 e. Clearly, suppressed wishes are merely the conven- 
 tional Feelings..., and the psychic censor" is Intellect... . 
 There is no real antagonism" between the two, but simply 
 an unbreakable, interacting relationship. At times we prefer 
 to let what is ordinarily known as one sort of emotions be- 
 come more perceptible, and discharge (proceed cyclically) as 
 Will, rather than let another sort do so. In that case, com- 
 paratively speaking, one sort or set is inhibited," just as 
 there is more attraction or love' between some electrical 
 charges than between others. Truistically however, if for a 
 long time we keep one set of emotions in definite interaction 
 ( harp on one subject" too much) we fatigue unduly not only 
 the structures that engage in that conscious" activity, but 
 also the structures that are inhibited and do not get enough 
 exercise. So if we are intemperate (unbalanced), truistically 
 the brain sleeps unbalancedly ( poorly"), and some of the 
 possible temporary personalities will perceptibly bob up as a 
 dream. Obviously, we can not possibly sleep" absolutely 
 — any more than we can die" absolutely. So necessarily 
 there are, even in sleep, some parts of the cortex not quite so 
 completely disconnected as others, and a slight unbalance 
 
183 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVII §155b 
 
 due to former fatigue of the brain or to some unbalance of 
 other organs (or both : both interact on each other) may be 
 perceptible as a dream. And obviously, the brain will neither 
 go to sleep nor awake perfectly instantaneously. So there 
 is always on the occasions of waking" or going to sleep" 
 a period of especially perceptible dreaming. During those 
 periods the brain truistically is partly disconnected although 
 somewhat in working condition; so if a suggestion" (any 
 stimulus) be given it then, the suggestion can flow usually 
 through only narrow channels, and hence it makes an unus- 
 ually large impression on those channels ; for obviously, ordi- 
 narily a large part of the cortex is engaged in judging and 
 sifting and switching an idea or stimulus all about, so that 
 its owner will not rashly follow some wrong" suggestion"; 
 so ordinarily a suggestion will have a more distributed effect. 
 That indicates the principles of the use of suggestion," 
 hypnotism (where a part of the brain by too much concentra- 
 tion is put to sleep — which truistically is unbalancing for a 
 normal brain, but may be desirable in certain circumstances, 
 just as running a Marathon may be), and such phenomena. 
 The same thing is directly exhibited by hysterics :- A hys- 
 teric is a person with abnormally narrowed Intellect... (i. e., 
 perceptible sensations are much less numerous than with a 
 normal person ; or a hysteric is never wide awake — 
 hasn't an 'open mind"), and hence she is very suggestible. 
 But at the same time most suggestions made to her do not 
 become perceptible to her, and hence fail. When one does 
 "take" it "takes" hard — often producing hysterics' . 
 
 f. So we can judge somewhat from dreams (if we are 
 good observers, with excellent judgment) as to what some of 
 
 the unbalances of an unduly fatigued person are. 
 
 It is possible to get one part of the brain so intensely work- 
 ing when awake that even though it is tired it will keep on 
 working after the remainder of the brain is asleep, giving 
 dreams that are an exaggerated continuation of consciousness 
 
 — of the "censor" himself. Also, as modern life more 
 
 often interferes with what are commonly called the sex ap- 
 petites than with those given other names, it is naturally 
 likely that more often the person who finds life a bit too hard 
 will have dreams that give some of the sex nerves a chance 
 to exercise, perhaps indirectly. I rarely remember a dream, 
 but I do remember two vivid ones during the war in which I 
 ate all the sugar I wanted. Neither the Biblical Joseph nor 
 a Freud is needed to psychoanalyze those, and in ordinary 
 language they were not the result of suppressed sex wishes — 
 or suppressed wishes of any sort, as I never concealed from 
 myself or anyone interested my wish for sugar. But, 
 
 it is glaringly obvious that it is just as correct, in order to 
 find out what his unbalances are, to observe the conscious 
 mental life of a person. Except in occasional cases the men- 
 tal balances are right on the surface in waking life with but 
 slight disguises (§155). As a matter of fact, most dream an- 
 alysis is shrewd guessing from observations of conscious life. 
 So a complete statement of a rational psychoanalysis is :- 
 Observations of dreams or other partial personalities that are usu- 
 ally emotions... X Observations of ordinary consciousness... . 
 
 §155. a. We have seen that even in the mental life of a 
 person who when awake is badly unbalanced there is a tend- 
 ency to get a general balance by means of the underworked 
 parts exercising during sleep. When there is such a consid- 
 erable persistent unbalance during waking hours that no such 
 fair balance can be thus, or similarly, attained, then the indi- 
 vidual truistically either will die, or else will go more 'insane' 
 (become more unbalanced, so that Intellect... or perceptible 
 sensation is more narrowed — in which condition truistically 
 there is more hope that automatically rest and thus balanc- 
 ing will be obtained:- i. e., insanity is nature's method of 
 
 balancing a man with the environment, by removing what 
 we call the control of the matter from his hands when his own 
 control, with only normal" checks, is rapidly destroying 
 himself). The general theory of that is clear, so I omit the 
 numerous quantitative facts that are known. But before such 
 a considerable unbalance can accumulate that there arises 
 much dream-balancing, or hysteria, or double personalities, 
 or aristocratic egomanias (obviously involving a narrowing of 
 Intellect... — an inability to see other people very well); or 
 before such a considerable unbalance can accumulate that 
 there arise graver insanities with perceptible nerve lesions — 
 before any of those nerve unbalances can accumulate much, 
 there is a general more or less normal method of psychologi- 
 cal balancing that is observable in everyone, is confusing 
 even when recognized and understood, but which is conven- 
 tionally unrecognized except in its quantitatively excessive 
 form that is well known under the name hypocrisy. Havelock 
 Ellis somewhat explicitly recognizes it as Bovarism" in 
 Impressions and Comments." We may somewhat descript- 
 ively name it psychological reversal, or psychological or 
 mental inversion, or much better, make believe. It is the psy- 
 chological phenomenon less intense than hypocrisy, and so 
 not quantitatively immoral (§163b). (Clearly, the milder 
 
 stages of hypocrisy must be moral and useful— for truistically 
 nothing that is quantitatively wholly bad [0 or °° ] can ex- 
 ist.) It is well known to children as make believe. It is 
 the generalized and balanced form of the glad game" or of 
 Christian Science (§149fq): for sometimes it is more neces- 
 sary to pretend a degree of calmness than to pretend joyous 
 excitement. It is the mental phenomenon that makes it so 
 hard to determine anyone's conscious motives (even our own), 
 b. There being but slight recognition of this mental 
 phenomenon as such, and no conventional name for its more 
 normal forms, obviously the way to make it known to the 
 reader is to describe it in some detail — and even then some 
 
 people will likely deny its existence. 
 
 We may take 
 
 the popular routine story writer and his readers as exempli- 
 fying make believe. Many men find the world monotonous, 
 and seek a rest from an unbalance of bordom in excitement, 
 in the unusual, in the vividly emphatic. For proof of that 
 note the popularity of the movies — and in his day, of Shakes- 
 peare. Shakespeare hurls his meaning across with such vio- 
 lence that although the slang he used is three centuries 
 behind the times, it still is sufficiently intelligible to me to 
 be occasionally even painfully vivid ; and his emphasis is still 
 more heightened by the fact that what he says is mostly right 
 and his poetic meter good (footnote 165d). The average 
 writer has difficulty in finding or inventing circumstances to 
 describe which actually are unusual and hence lacking in 
 monotony, or in seeing them in other than the routine way, 
 and especially in being self-consistent (i. e., right, ' convinc- 
 ing" — as Shakespeare mostly was) about what he does see — 
 and that lack of consistency truistically destroys to a large ex- 
 tent what he does say, so that his real difficulty is to say 
 something. So our writer goes along writing what is intrinsic- 
 ally mostly nothing — and that in phrases so abused by misuse 
 that they couldn't bear much load of meaning. So every 
 once in a while he forces his Emotions... to give, so to speak, 
 a hop, skip, and jump : he rising up to give in an apparently 
 excited manner three cheers for this, that, or the other thing. 
 (That is usually called pep and punch.) The reader lets or 
 makes his emotions imitate those excitements pretended by 
 the writer ; and that artificial pretence of unbalanced emo- 
 tions does work backwards in some degree and give the 
 emotions some exercise, getting them slightly (and pleasantly, 
 if attention is kept off the fact that finally the pretense is in- 
 consistent, and not in agreement with the tremendously 
 
§15Sb XVII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 184 
 
 exciting and also calm real universe) out of their monotony. 
 I rather like to read such stuff myself, and enjoy it. There 
 are some of those writers so fearfully inconsistent, though, 
 that I can't stand them:- Hohvorthy Hall, Gertrude Ather- 
 ton, Fannie Hurst, Kathleen Norris, Conrad, Hergesheimer. 
 
 c. Precisely that sort of make believe is more or less 
 practiced by everyone — some going in the direction of excite- 
 ment, and some in the opposite direction of calm. We may 
 note several exaggerated cases that possibly run into hypoc- 
 risy:- The hard, callous man who will ruthlessly foreclose 
 the widow's mortgage (perhaps quite justly : the point is 
 that it hurts him negligibly to do it) often becomes a deacon 
 in the church and pretends much sentimental piousness, 
 and a sweetly concerned missionary interest in the be- 
 nighted heathen" who usually practice Christ's ethics bet- 
 ter than he ever will; if he is a particular brute he may go 
 so far as to build a hospital for suffering cats. The deacon 
 helps to get his narrow egotism expanded a bit (and thus 
 saves it from accumulating into a perceptible insanity) by 
 glaringly advertising a kindly unselfishness he has very little 
 
 of. The female parasite that becomes a Society 
 
 leader and an ostentatious charity worker and church 
 worker," or a general community uplifter, is pretending 
 to herself and others that she has not the character of a para- 
 site. And such make believe, or reversal of the original 
 quantitative fact, obviously does give her some proper Emo- 
 tions... and helps to balance her life mentally. Usually she 
 does not know she is doing that, and will indignantly deny 
 
 it. In the same way a kaiser or other demagog can 
 
 not understand that he does not actually care for his people 
 much, but exploits them. His unbalance has perceptibly to 
 himself been balanced by a pretense of much love, and much 
 talk about it. ■ And in trying to get this book pub- 
 lished I found that there are deacons in science who do a 
 large amount of talking about the need of research, etc., 
 that is make believe. E. g., Angell, now president of Yale, 
 in my opinion talks too well on the subject (cf. his inaugural 
 address, etc.). Before I could believe that there were such 
 fine deacons' and demagogs in science I applied twice to 
 Angell (while he was head of one and then another institu- 
 tion chartered to advance science) for help with this book — 
 giving him some of the most competent endorsements of the 
 book. The first time he wrote me vaguely that he imagined 
 there were established precedents to guide in the matter. 
 The second time he ignored it. I am sorry for Yale. 
 
 d. Children deliberately and consciously practice a nor- 
 mal, moral pretense in their games of make believe. James, 
 without being very definite about it, in effect calls the same 
 game by adults the will to believe. If we deliberately 
 
 assume — pretend to possess — what are ordinarily the psycho- 
 logical or physiological results of certain emotions, we in 
 considerable degree cause those emotions in ourselves : men- 
 tal phenomena work backwards (valid logic is circular). 
 Actors often perceptibly exhibit the phenomenon of assumed 
 emotions producing the actual ones. Obviously, when our 
 unbalance is slight in degree, and we practice a correspond- 
 ingly slight degree of backwards pretence of emotions, we 
 can, and usually do, remain conscious of what we are doing. 
 In that case, where there is definite consciousness of what we 
 are doing, and no effort to deceive others, the process is ob- 
 viously normal, and useful (primarily to oneself, or selfishly); 
 and such a quantitative degree of reverse emotions I call make 
 believe. In order to be normal it must be consciously and 
 undeceptively an unbalance being balanced — it is an unbal- 
 ance of course, and while permissible is not the highest type 
 of either sanity or morality (it is the psychological aspect of 
 the zone BC, B'C', Fig. 168b). The deacon and the 
 
 Society leader usually are so very unbalanced that their ex- 
 aggerated form of psychological reversal becomes so real to 
 them that it deceives themselves, and then they try to get 
 others to believe it. And that over-doing or intemperance in 
 make believe is hypocrisy (the psychological aspect of the 
 milder part of the zone of the immoral, Fig. 163b), and is a 
 mild degree of insanity not usually considered pathological — 
 i. e. , nature has taken control, unconsciously to themselves, and 
 is trying to balance their brains : but as the deacon and the 
 Society leader mildly fool themselves in only a few activities 
 when they are hypocrites, they are mildly and tolerably 
 insane — are just partly killed off by the universe or God. 
 When the deception becomes general, so that there is a more 
 or less systematized misconception in most activities (or when 
 there is an intense misconception or seeing of things as they 
 are not, in one or a few activities), then we customarily as- 
 sert a pathological insanity. The "glad game" or Christian 
 Science carried too far — not on appropriate occasions bal- 
 anced by a reverse 'sad game' — is truistically a mania. 
 
 e. Therefore, a general test for the mental sanity or 
 balance of a person, which can be readily applied, is to note 
 whether he is conscious of what seems to other people to be 
 his most pronounced make believe — whether he is sane 
 enough to know where he verges on insanity (the man who is 
 certain he is quite sane, that he knows it all and knows it 
 right, is usually at least close to pathological insanity). 
 E. g., that test of sanity may readily be applied to me:- In 
 this book I emotionally pretend a calmness and commonplace 
 conventionality that may sometimes not be in strict quantita- 
 tive accordance with fact. I am quite aware of it: the 
 method of make believe I use is that in every case of reason- 
 able quantitative doubt as to the fact, I incline to empha- 
 size its commonplaceness. That is what is recommended as 
 rhetorical understatement; as a matter of fact it is admission 
 of lack of sufficient strength to get along without that bias 
 (cf. §149i): I do it for my own protection, so as to stay bal- 
 anced with certain quantities. So make believe is the 
 
 explicit process that is sometimes vaguely called mental self- 
 control. To admit that we need to control ourselves — to be 
 temperate — at a certain point is to admit that we are too 
 weak to go beyond it (§159). And this make believe has 
 been neglected because men object to admitting weakness 
 explicitly (for obviously good reasons). So I have definitely 
 shown that the man who disclaims any weakness in any 
 respects, and consequent need of control, is really so weak 
 as to be in imminent danger of a lunatic asylum. The direct 
 result of avoidance of this subject of needed control, in 
 the various special points we each need it, has obviously re- 
 sulted in numbers of people passing the limits of normality 
 into hypocrisy. An enlightened public opinion on the mat- 
 ter will largely stop it — and I judge cut our taxes in two. 
 
 f. The recognition of make believe has possible practical 
 value in enabling us to play consciously (and hence sanely 
 and rationally) a general mental balancing process instead of 
 the theoretically one-sided glad game, or Christian Science, 
 or proceeding in heedless and unwarned ignorance and be- 
 coming hypocrites. Such a practical "serenity" game is 
 described by Dorothy Canfield Fisher in "Fellow Captains"; 
 this section gives the theory which shows its ultimate rigor 
 (cf. §170jm). And in addition to its practical value, make 
 believe shows truistically that even in the man who superfic- 
 ially appears the most unbalanced mentally there is an actual 
 close approach to a balance. It appears that hypocrisy ordi- 
 narily begins in a normal man as a conscious pretence — and 
 then is not hypocrisy. But his unbalance for various reasons 
 (for them, cf. the description of Fig. 163b) tends to become 
 so great that his make believe becomes imperceptible to him 
 
185 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVII §156e 
 
 — and again strictly is not hypocrisy from his point of view, 
 and so from a general point of view is a mild insanity. But 
 he was responsible for his hypocrisy when it was on the verge 
 of leaving consciousness ; and in practical life we continue to 
 hold him responsible until he passes into the zone of definite 
 pathological insanity (§§157, 163). It therefore fol- 
 lows that everyone's intentions are always good. It is truis- 
 tically impossible that anyone, from his point of view at the 
 time of the action, can have an improper motive (§25) — on 
 the same principle that man can not make a real error. That 
 follows also from the theory of responsibility, and will be 
 made clearer in §157 and the next chapter. 
 
 §156. a. This section sums up the quantitative prin- 
 ciples of psychology. The Weber law or the Weber- 
 
 Fechner law (I shall make no distinction; see "Ency. Brit.," 
 "Weber's law,' or James's Psychology," I, 533-49) as- 
 serts, as presumably stating the results of psychological ex- 
 periments, that in order that the intensity of a sensation may 
 increase in arithmetical progression the stimulus must increase 
 in geometrical progression — it being explicitly noted (l) that 
 in all cases there is a limit at both ends' (usually called the 
 upper threshold and lower threshold) of the perception of 
 sensations; (2) that there is frequently a very perceptible 
 time lag in the building up and dying out of the sensation 
 (especially with "chemical" sensations of taste and smell); 
 and (3) that usually those progressions are perceptibly inex- 
 act near the thresholds. For experimental details 
 
 and discussion, see the authorities cited. 
 
 b. If we take Emotions... X Intellect... — Will as being 
 explicitly a standard universe, referring to the summed up 
 sensations or sensation of an individual at a given small time 
 interval, we may write it Emotions. . .XIntellect. . . = The given 
 summed up arithmetical increase between the thresholds. And 
 the Weber-Fechner law asserts that those summed up sensa- 
 tions are roughly the result of geometrical progression in the 
 stimuli [the Emotions... X Intellect...] — which obviously is a 
 truistic way of stating those equations (the X,or the inverse 
 square law, in the first members indicates such progression), 
 and is in agreement with the argument of this book. Or, 
 the Weber-Fechner law is orthodoxly stated thus :- the dif- 
 ference between any two stimuli is [as the Will, or as a One 
 sum] experienced as an equal magnitude if the ratio of the 
 stimuli remains unaltered (subject to the inexactness stated 
 in the last paragraph). That is obviously identical in prin- 
 ciple with Richards's general corrected gas equation (§82), 
 p...X»...=^ constant — and hence is the assertion that psy- 
 chological experiments are in agreement with all our general 
 equations. It is thus proved in a directly experimental way 
 that psychology orhumanics is identical with "exact" science. 
 
 c. And it is directly obvious that this Weber experi- 
 mental (psycho-physical) interpretation or truistic assertion 
 of our general equation Emotions. .. XIntellect. .. = Will is also 
 an assertipn of harmonic periodicity in a 'reverse' or time 
 way, thus:- We saw that in the case of atoms (structures of 
 the same order) in general only certain fairly close approxi- 
 mations to periodical "elementary" sizes could survive in the 
 same environment for a given duration of time. I. e., each 
 surviving elementary size has an upper and a lower threshold 
 beyond which the structure becomes unstable as a whole (be- 
 cause of its reactions with an always incommensurate environ- 
 ment). Now, in psychology there is a recognized periodicity 
 inside the thresholds (which of course implies the reverse :- a 
 similar periodicity of the thresholds). The Weber-Fechner 
 law asserts just that perceptible periodicity inside a higher- 
 order structure like man — a 'spectrum' inside the thresholds, 
 and a different order of 'spectrums' of thresholds, in infinite 
 regress. E. g., upon all humanic spectrums inside the 
 
 thresholds there is superimposed a quantitative periodicity of 
 normal and abnormal, pleasure and pain, good and evil, with 
 their thresholds again subject to inexactness (as are all differ- 
 ence surfaces), and to the same time lags (§163). 
 
 That threshold periodicity is probably anatomically observ- 
 able. Thus we saw in §152c that there were seven (etc.) 
 perceptible sorts of nerve endings. Theoretically, those of 
 course indicate a periodicity of senses (hearing, temperature 
 sense, muscular sense, etc.) — each sense being a psj'chologi- 
 cal atom' (higher-order structure) analogous to an atom. 
 
 d. The proper mathematical statement of that quantita- 
 tive theory is omitted. I have not formulated it, although a 
 good mathematician could readily make an abstract formula- 
 tion. But a somewhat definite mathematical statement would 
 take me years to hammer out, as I know only enough details 
 of mathematics to see that an explicit revision of calculus 
 would be a necessary preliminary step, so that all conven- 
 tional zeros and infinities may be handled consistently. But 
 a general mathematical statement may be made similar to 
 the mathematical theory in Marshall s Principles of Eco- 
 nomics" (6th ed., 838-58). His (economists') "marginal 
 utilities are thresholds, and his demand curve" xy a =c 
 (840) more explicitly is x... Xy. . .^Universe. In that place 
 Marshall shows fairly definitely the final infinite regress of 
 superimposition of one spectrum on another. But before we 
 get far on that infinite road to accuracy (as Marshall's eco- 
 nomic equations show), the pains of complexity become more 
 than the pain of a slight quantitative gamble or guess. 
 
 e. The general reader will nearly surely not understand 
 the foregoing remarks in this section about the ultimate quan- 
 titative mathematics or measuring theory or periodicity of 
 science. I am quite aware that I do not grasp it myself; 
 i. e., at some stage of the game of going from That to This to 
 see just what is the complete expression of the two I become 
 confused with the details and quit the process with some re- 
 sidual inaccuracy. Any mathematical statement of it, re- 
 gardless of the cleverness and ingenuity of its nomenclature 
 and logical consistency, must do the same quitting at some 
 point. Thus it appears that the difficulty of this section is 
 not a difficulty in essential knowledge, but one of grasping 
 infinite detail in detail. It simply can t be done perceptibly. 
 But we sum up the details as a One readily enough. In 
 short, in this section I deliberately got aboard the infinite re- 
 gress, and kept persistently at describing it, implying the 
 attempt to get at and seize the dots by mathematics, and the 
 inevitable result is to me a perceptible quantitatively baffled 
 confusion. If the reader has had enough mental endurance 
 to follow on that chase (analogous to a kitten's chasing its 
 tail), he too will feel baffled. But we need that ex- 
 plicit, conscious experience so as to know what to expect in 
 the infinite regress. I used to be pained by it, and many 
 people have been pained to the extent of making despairing 
 qualitative errors about this fleshly prison, ignorabimus, etc. ; 
 but obviously, there is no need of feeling that way and we 
 automatically will not as soon as we really understand the 
 matter (it will probably take most people months to get over 
 previous bad mental habits). The thing to do is to judge 
 how far along the details on the infinite regress will do us 
 any appreciable good — have any marginal utility, or in or- 
 dinary terms, are worth the trouble (of getting, using, etc.). 
 As soon as we get that far, then truistically we should at 
 once get off the regress by summing it into a universe or a 
 standard universe (i. e., acting on the sum or Will, as implied 
 in the next section). If in that process we have not had 
 enough endurance to follow all the appreciable details (if we 
 have not had enough mental integrity to perceive that it is 
 raining, and that ordinarily we have to come in out of it), 
 
§156e XVII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 186 
 
 then we can rest peacefully assured that the universe will 
 accumulate enough effects of the overlooked details to force 
 us at the proper time either to see them and react on them 
 in a way to preserve our lives, or die. We all truistically 
 finally die of the accumulation of such stupidity. But it 
 would kill us even more promptly to hang on too persistently 
 to any infinite regress ; so we exhibit wisdom by reasonably 
 guessing at how much stupidity to exhibit. This para- 
 graph is the general psychological statement of the essentials 
 of what is valid in pragmatism (see Jordan's Introduction for 
 a better one). Any attempt to grasp too many of the Many 
 is painful, and hence from our points of view as individuals 
 is wrong and foolish (but cf. §159g) — even if the attempt be 
 disguised in the mathematical theory which I indicated and 
 even though all the mathematicians assert that they can fully 
 grasp such quantitative details. Finally, Fechner, like other 
 German materialists, substantially asserted that he could 
 grasp the ultimate quantitative expression of his law. James 
 ("Psy.," I; 534, 549), as a sort of germ of his future prag- 
 matism, sarcastically repudiates the possibility of Fech- 
 
 ner's being quantitatively so omniscient. — ■ The 
 
 Puritanical conscience consists largely of an agonized hanging 
 on to the infinite regress. Some of that — some serious- 
 ness ' — is obviously needed to avoid reasonable possibility of 
 overlooking something important, and as a means of expand- 
 ing limits of perception and increasing mental endurance and 
 strength (§159). Such persistent "worrying" (or the up- 
 to-date names for it are psychic complexes, Freudian repres- 
 sions, sense of inadequacy, etc. — in everyday terms it is 
 modesty) made able, fine, useful men of the early Adamses, 
 Lincoln, and others who had the strength to stand it and who 
 had something to do, thus stopping that mental effort at a 
 healthy, wise, balancedly modest point, summing it into Will 
 and thus getting a mental rest. But too much of it without 
 the balancing doing made Henry Adams a querulous snob. 
 
 §157. a. We now consider Will, in Emotions... ^Intel- 
 lect... = Will. That term is the mental term that probably 
 is most often used (both in everyday life, and in formal psy- 
 chology) to name the summed up universe or personal stand- 
 ard universe from the mental or subjective point of view. 
 Perhaps the term for the same thing which is used nearly as 
 often is ' thought" (or one of its variations). But as seen, 
 nearly any psychological term may be used in a One sense. 
 Obviously, anything which we find applying to Will also ap- 
 plies identically to any term which replaces Will in the equa- 
 tion: the only difference is that the various terms in a vague 
 sort of way indicate standard universes of varying sizes when 
 such standard ones are being used. 
 
 b. When we receive a nerve stimulus the energy travels 
 through parts of nerve cells toward the cortex, and probably 
 acts as a trigger to release more energy from the cells them- 
 selves (i. e.,the jolt starts considerable secondary formation in 
 the cells [they are "irritable" to such]: they renew that en- 
 ergy or structural loss from food). At any cell or cells in the 
 path the energy may be very largely (or entirely so, as far as 
 is perceptible in the cortex) collected together or focused (just 
 as small asymmetries accumulate to cause a whirl to be given 
 off); and then (equivalent to secondary whirl formation — 
 this time in larger quantity) that energy from that 'focus' or 
 ganglion is sent out in more or less branching nerve paths to 
 muscles, which in their turn react with the environment (it 
 may be some internal organ). As the environment gave the 
 original stimulus the cycle is complete (but not exact in any 
 finite space). Truistically (by the principle of continuity), 
 all such energy cycles must affect in some degree the nerve 
 cells that give conscious sensation (I shall take it that such 
 cells are in the cortex — a quantitative fact supported roughly 
 
 by observations). Those energy flows that go out to cause the 
 muscles to move, will also in some degree irradiate and affect 
 the cortex ; and the movement of the muscles will also do 
 the same. Obviously there is an infinite regress of reactions. 
 All those sensations which only vaguely get to the cortex, and 
 there are, each of itself, below the threshold of perceptibil- 
 ity, are usually named emotions or feelings. Those emo- 
 tions as an accumulation are perceptible. From them, 
 truistically we are clearly but roughly conscious of our 
 identity with the total universe; for obviously those conscious 
 emotions necessarily include reactions with everything. At 
 the same time other stimuli from the environment are strong 
 enough to travel up to the cortex and be perceptible there. 
 Even those stimuli are a collection; e. g., we can not per- 
 ceive by any definite sensation a single atom, but get a sen- 
 sation accumulated usually from many thousand atoms. The 
 sensations which we (arbitrarily, as just seen) consider sep- 
 arately perceptible are obviously Intellect... . Now, as seen 
 above in physiological detail, those perceptible sensations, 
 together with the emotions in general, are focused in some 
 cell or cells in the cortex (we can see now that the phenom- 
 enon is truistic with continuity). And as before, that energy 
 must be discharged. We perceive that focusing and discharge 
 and name it will. 
 
 c. Or, if the discharge does not at once take place to 
 voluntary muscles, but first discharges partly to involuntary 
 muscles and partly to other nerve cells, then that first focus- 
 ing and discharge is usually not called will, but is named 
 thought, or reflection, or consciousness, or nearly any other 
 spiritual term. But obviously, even that phenomenon is 
 identical in principle with will" : merely quantities are dif- 
 ferent between a discharge mostly to one set of organs (vol- 
 untary muscles) and one to another set (involuntary muscles 
 and perhaps chiefly to other nerve cells). It is truistically 
 impossible for the discharge to take place absolutely com- 
 pletely to any one part of the universe ; in all cases some of 
 it goes to other brain cells and involuntary organs and is re- 
 flected back as further emotions, etc., in regress. (There 
 are no absolutely involuntary" organs, but merely organs 
 which can not be directly and with fair precision controlled 
 by the cortex.) So the difference between will, thought, 
 etc. , is quantitative. And this paragraph obviously implies 
 the principles concerning "men of action" or executives, 
 thoughtful men, meditative or contemplative men, etc. The 
 only one I need state is the obvious general one that no man 
 can be wholly one sort, and that the normal, wise man will 
 keep a fair balance of being the various sorts (cf. the evils of 
 Adams's thinking," stated in less precise terms in §156e). 
 
 d. In strict logic it is evident that the act of will (or of 
 thought, etc.) is either definitely (l) the 'process' between the 
 accumulation of nervous energy and its discharge ; or (2) the 
 whole process of accumulation and discharge (the whole pro- 
 cess is obviously identical in principle with an electrical cur- 
 rent). Truistically, in the first case there actually is no finite 
 or pluralistic process "between" the accumulation and the 
 discharge; the term "will" in such a view is a pluralistic- 
 ally non-existent limit or division between the two, or is a 
 zero term. And the second case makes the "will" the con- 
 tinuous name summing all the infinite details of that accumu- 
 lation and discharge in really unending cycles, and "will" 
 is then infinite (possibly as a formal standard universe). In 
 either case, will is obviously consistently Will in our equation 
 
 a One in full agreement with our whole argument. 
 
 e. And that gives the complete solution of the age-long 
 squabble about the freedom of the will. We may look at 
 the solution in two ways (the first in this paragraph; the 
 second in the next). (l) The introspective observer 
 
187 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVII §158c 
 
 sees what he calls his will (or mind, or thought, etc.) appar- 
 ently as a continuous and hence infinite affair, and promptly 
 and consistently says it is free. Clearly, from such a point 
 of view it can not react with anything as it is everything, and 
 hence can not logically be in any chain of cause and effect. 
 Various systems of philosophy and ethics have been based on 
 vague statements of that way of observing the will as infinite, 
 or as at least a formal One. But on the other hand the ob- 
 server notes that if he considers the universe divided into the 
 Many (even if he takes that pluralism as being roughly per- 
 ceptible parts of merely his own mental action), then his will 
 is not any of those parts, but is a sort of limit to them — is 
 perceptibly zero. In brief, a tangible Many "will" persist- 
 ently eludes him ; — as proof, try to touch it yourself, from 
 that point of view. Then he in some way asserts that his 
 will is nothing — that it is "worse" than "determined" :- 
 that he (his will) is the sport of circumstances, or that 
 he is ' predestined," or in the absolute clutch of fate, 
 or not as I will, but as thou wilt," or in Nirvana, etc., etc. 
 
 This first way (with those two aspects :- °° and 0) of 
 
 looking at the solution is obviously two One views of the uni- 
 verse — one aspect calling the will everything, and the other 
 substantially calling the universe infinite pluralism so that 
 everything which, like the will, then becomes a relationship 
 or a zero limit between the parts is 'nothing" with respect 
 to the Many. Or, the second aspect calls the universe itself 
 Nirvana or zero or nothing. There is a wide choice of ex- 
 pressions as to just what that Buddhistic or fatalistic or non- 
 Anglo-Saxon view is. At any rate it is obvious that those 
 two possible ways of viewing the universe give different 
 names to the condition of the will; but clearly both classes of 
 those names mean the same:- which in Occidental everyday 
 language is that the will is free. (If the will is zero, obvi- 
 ously it is just as free as if it were infinite — as it is a truism 
 that nothing can control a zero.) I have above com- 
 bined the discussion of the relationship form and the One 
 form of the three Trinity forms of the term will. That per- 
 mits the use of clearer familiar terms. From a logical point 
 of view it would be clearer to give the three views. 
 
 f. (2) The second and more common way of considering 
 the Trinity puzzle of the will depends upon whether will is 
 considered used in the One member or in the Many member 
 of the equation. Obviously, by our Anglo-Saxon verbal 
 agreements, if in the One member then the will is free. If 
 a man observes himself (his will), so far as he can perceive at 
 the time he does what he wants to (even when he says he does 
 not want" to do something, he obviously stiH prefers to do 
 it for some remoter reason — to do it rather than accept the 
 result of not doing it) : he makes of will a standard universe 
 and it is free. But he (l) can later on recall by memory his 
 actions, and then see them as being his reactions as an indi- 
 vidual with the other parts of the universe; or, he (2) can at 
 any time observe other individuals reacting with other parts; 
 and in each case he readily perceives that what formerly to 
 him, or what at the time to the other individuals, was or is 
 the standard universe free will, is, in his now wider, and per- 
 haps whole, universe, a unit of the Many — that those standard 
 Will's now come over into the Many side as being parts:- as 
 Wills..., or more explicitly, Intellect.... And of course, 
 from such a point of view the individual will is determined. 
 But with final accuracy, the person is really the total uni- 
 verse (§47) ; in that case his will is finally absolutely free (by 
 Anglo-Saxon language) — for the obvious reason that there is 
 nothing besides it to control it. The Oriental "pre- 
 destination," although it apparently speaks of a determined 
 will, now clearly means a free will (par. e) . 
 
 g. That gives the general solution of the problem of th e 
 
 will, of reason, mind, thought, God the Father, etc. Obvi- 
 ously, the practical, everyday solution of the problem is that 
 if we see enough of the universe — seeing that it as a whole 
 works consistently and along the path of no resistance, — we 
 ourselves completely will to go or be carried along that path. 
 In that case, from our point of view, the will is free. But 
 from a Many point of view our finite will is completely de- 
 termined. If we fancy we resist going in that inevitable path 
 we are merely suffering from stupidity. 
 
 §158. a. In this section we get the explanation of mem- 
 ory. In objective science our quantitative or Many 
 
 agreement is that space is a fixed relationship which remains 
 or endures. I. e., London and Chicago are in certain rela- 
 tive spaces which can at any time during a considerable per- 
 iod be objectively viewed in such fairly steady relationship 
 by anyone who cares to verify such an assertion about them. 
 Or, we can and do experiment objectively by observing space 
 relationships or coincidences; and at any time the experi- 
 ments with such space relationships can be fairly accurately 
 repeated. So we say that space endures — or just is, and re- 
 mains so; — that a structure or unit of the Many is objectively 
 verifiable by anyone because of the formally fixed and con- 
 stant space relationships. We can in theory perform an 
 
 experiment" in any part of space — and in practice, if we 
 
 take the trouble to go there, etc. But, we commonly 
 
 say that with time it is different — that we can experiment" 
 only in the present. Now, the obvious truth is that all of 
 that concrete" relationship of space has been asserted by 
 means of using time, so that the space endured, and we could 
 go about in it anywhere — if we had the time — and experi- 
 ment. In short, the arbitrary, concrete" invention space 
 is the exact counterpart, formal opposite, or reacting part or 
 symbol or mechanical balancer, of the arbitrary mental" 
 time. We do not conventionally say that there is any men- 
 tal" space — our' thoughts" do not conventionally occupy" 
 space. And in the same way our thoughts do occupy finite 
 time, so that there is no objective time in the way there 
 is objective space. Space is outer memory or object- 
 ive relationship, and time is inner memory. Obviously, 
 without memory or an arbitrary mental agreement of inner 
 
 duration" (just as space" may be said to be outer dura- 
 tion"), there can not possibly be an arbitrary enduring relat- 
 ing space. All that gives the abstract or relationship 
 meaning of memory — its more usual sense. The real present 
 is either 0or<» — a One term and-or meaning. Nothing plur- 
 alistic or Many can possibly happen in it. So we can not 
 really perform any experiment in the present. All experi- 
 ments are performed in the past and remembered. Clearly, by 
 classic logic it is impossible to have any experiments. 
 
 b. To get the Many meaning of memory in perhaps the 
 simplest way we may write the infinite pluralism equation 
 
 Many =0»e, and note that we have been considering it 
 
 objective. The subjective form (the form that emphasizes T 
 
 of the implied L and T) is obviously Memories =Meaning. 
 
 (If we put a Many term memory in our usual psychological 
 equation it conventionally would be an explicit name for part 
 of Intellect. . . , and implicitly a part of Emotions. . . ; see rest 
 of section : to devise a definite psychology with an equation 
 
 ... X Memories. .. = Will would obviously require mostly a 
 
 new nomenclature.) So truistically Memory is 
 
 the psychological term that corresponds to the physical" 
 mass or M... . Therefore, when we use M in any science 
 which implies the use of L and T (and all sciences do; IV) 
 a part of its meaning is memory (cf. pars. c-e). Therefore, 
 in all our measuring members M(varying with)I?T~^, the M 
 rigorously and precisely means mass and-or memory. 
 
 c. The mechanics of our memory, as a matter of truisms, 
 
§158c XVII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 188 
 
 are obviously as follows :- Any structure is the result, or 
 "record," of what has previously happened to it in infinite 
 regress. Evidently, every asymmetry in the universe has 
 left its mark in any and every structure — has in some more 
 or less minute degree modified that structure. So any pres- 
 ent asymmetry of the structure exhibits in some degree all 
 those past records. And that inclusion or identical relation- 
 ship of the total past in the present" asymmetry is memory 
 — stated mechanically or physiologically, and giving memory 
 primarily its relationship form. As all M^s truistically are 
 such relationship, or (using conventional Many terms) are 
 entities in such relationship (Part One), we see again that 
 a memory is an M. So truistically all M*s have — are — -an 
 infinite memory. To assert that any structure has the ad in- 
 finitum record or memory of the past is identical with saying 
 that its structural parts have a certain L and T relationship— 
 both L and T being with finally correct equal emphasis in- 
 cluded in the assertion. That, and the last paragraph, is 
 
 hence essentially a repetition of §150d-g. The real 
 
 difficulty in explaining memory is that its meaning is 
 so glaringly obvious and continually used that there is the 
 usual troublesomeness in disengaging, so to speak, the know- 
 ledge of it from ourselves and setting it off a little ways from 
 under our noses, so as to look at it objectively." 
 
 d. So truistically, if anything happens to a biologic cell 
 (if there occurs an asymmetry in it) the cell tends to act in 
 the same summed up way it did in the past, subject to modi- 
 fication due to the fact that the present happening does not 
 exactly duplicate anything in the past. Hence there tends 
 to be a rough general fixity of function and-or of structure on 
 the one hand, and a balancing modification of it due to 
 changes in the environment on the other. So in a fairly 
 steady climate (environment) there goes on side by side a 
 rather steady balance of (l) remembered' form and function 
 and (2) a slight change to meet slight changes. 
 
 e. When such a monistic memory is exhibited by nerve 
 cells in a degree that is objectively perceptible to us, but is 
 not perceptible as a memory to the individual exhibiting it, 
 we call it instinct; or if it is in a still lower degree of per- 
 ceptibility to us we name it reflex action, or tropism, etc. And 
 there is a vague degree of memory which so far as I can de- 
 termine is experienced at times by everyone, that might be 
 called an emotion of memory. I have that emotion of memory 
 as an occasional vague feeling that some present incident and 
 a great deal more like it happened to me in the far distant 
 past — whereas if I examine into the matter I find that nearly 
 surely it didn t. Apparently, the frequent occurrence of 
 that emotion of memory to various people accounts for the 
 belief in transmigration of souls. Truistically, in a One sense 
 we do have a 'memory' of "past existences"' — actually of all 
 such existences. But the usual orthodox quantitative belief 
 that one individual" soul goes or transmigrates as a con- 
 stant unit to a later one is obviously wrong dualism of the 
 
 Maxwell-atom type. For years I have occasionally 
 
 experienced memory-emotions when stimulated by some 
 French word or phrase — particularly old names of places. It 
 obviously would be quite easj T to make an exaggerated quan- 
 titative guess that I am a reincarnation of a Frenchman, al- 
 though so far as I happen to know I am over 95 per cent 
 British blood, and no French (for the benefit of the anthro- 
 pologists :- I am definitely Nordic type, cephalic index about 
 68 — a marked long-head). Obviously, as it is theoretically 
 possible for our emotions to dig out the most ancient memo- 
 ries in a vague way, almost any sort of queer belief (even the 
 
 insane" man's belief that he is Caesar) is based on adequate 
 psychological cause, and is correct in a One sense. But us- 
 ually such queer beliefs rest upon rather silly quantitative 
 
 judgment. All the mystics are qualitatively right; but the 
 average mystic states a preposterous quantitative hash. 
 
 f. Memory commonly means perceptible memory. Any 
 nerve cell consists of whirls which are moving in certain 
 paths ; and that activity of the cell is normally probably just 
 on the threshold of perceptibility. If a stimulus (asymmetry) 
 comes along and speeds up some of those whirls the activity 
 becomes (say) perceptible. That stimulus obviously does 
 not change the total of the whirl paths much (the structural 
 energy of the cell is enormous compared with it), but does 
 probably change a few paths considerably. Now, if another 
 stimulus of sufficient energy comes to that cell, as a general 
 quantitative truism the whirls speed up to perceptibility in 
 about the same paths as before, and hence the perception 
 is somewhat of a repetition, or memory, of the first one. The 
 second stimulus is somewhat different from the first, and so 
 gives a perception quantitatively different from the memory 
 also produced. Hence, the feel of the memory is differ- 
 ent from the feel" of the total perception — and also the 
 "feel" of resulting irradiations (which result analogously 
 to Huygen's law) is more or less different. So using that 
 second stimulus as a standard, the partial result of it which is 
 the memory is recognized as such a memory or repeated reac- 
 tion. Obviously, the infinite regress is included in that defi- 
 nition and truistic proof of the existence of ordinary memory ; 
 
 and it is a circular definition. It is readily seen that 
 
 memory can not be consistently defined or asserted by classic 
 logic. E. g., by that logic a child's first perception can not 
 be a memory, and he has no perceptible memories ; then the 
 second perception can be in part a duplicate of the first, but 
 as the child has no single memory, he has absolutely nothing 
 to serve him as a standard by which to judge that the second 
 is in part stimulating a memory — and so on forever, he never 
 having a memory. In practice the classic logic in effect en- 
 dows the child s mind with absolute creative power, making 
 the child God, who then in some unstated way manufactures 
 out of nothing a standard memory, by which to know he has 
 a memory. So classic logic essentially assumes memory (§35) 
 — and can be shown in precisely the same truistic way to as- 
 sume everything else. Therefore, the existence of memory 
 proves by intimate evidence the argument of this book. 
 
 g. We now look at that memory process from the re- 
 verse point of view. As the whirls of a cell are moving in a 
 certain general arrangement of paths, truistically only a cer- 
 tain stimulus (a certain general field asymmetry in the form, 
 say, of an electric current) can readily "go through" it — be 
 conducted by .the cell in the stimulus's cyclic path from the 
 environment through will and moving-muscles back to envi- 
 ronment, and in or by that conduction stimulate the cell to 
 perceptibility or consciousness. So a given stimulus 'searches 
 out' its paths, and selects those made of cells already moving 
 in 'periodicity' with itself. If the stimulus is very novel (is 
 due to something unfamiliar in the environment — as the gi- 
 raffe was to the man who saw one for the first time), there is 
 no adapted path or memory rut for it to go through, and it is 
 likely not to go through perceptibly ; for it gets rapidly dif- 
 fused by the resisting cells it comes to (the man in that an- 
 cient story showed that fact by his exaggerated assertion that 
 there was no such animal). Hence, we fail to see some 
 thing consciously and perceptibly until literally millions of 
 practically the same stimuli pound and pound at our nervous 
 systems until they (the stimuli) finally get "high" enough up 
 or far enough along to be perceptible. E. g., an aristocrat 
 
 any hereditarily or otherwise "privileged" or "divine" 
 person — is as such truistically "narrow" minded even to the 
 extent of paranoia, and is hence correspondingly violent or 
 coarse in his actions (is in an unbalanced degree an exquisite 
 
189 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVII §159b 
 
 or do-nothing and oppositely crudely active: e. g., Oscar 
 Wilde, the Medici popes, and parlor radicals) ; yet the race 
 for centuries took such aristocrats to be really the best be- 
 cause their actions were sufficiently unbalanced in both direc- 
 tions to furnish stimuli that would pound through nerve paths 
 to attention. Those stimuli from the aristocrat were in fact 
 uncommon or noticeable; but such easily noticeable unbal- 
 ances are not the best, but tend to be pathological. Prob- 
 ably that fact as to the defectiveness of aristocrats, militarists, 
 and all varieties of privileged persons has got up to the con- 
 sciousness of the majority of people in this country, now that 
 another and worse war has pounded it in ; we now take such 
 mental red pepper when we feel we need it by reading of the 
 crimes and scandals of the aristocrats — in low life and high 
 life — in the newspapers, with a saving knowledge that they 
 
 are pathological. And we have the opposite aspect of 
 
 the same thing (which is what makes us need such red pep- 
 per in varying quantities and form) :- a stimulus may be so 
 very well known that it goes through deep memory ruts so 
 smoothly and continually that it causes no perceptible change 
 and as a usual thing we do not notice it. That is another 
 way of saying why it is difficult to express the obvious. 
 Also, when stimuli go through thus easily we say we be- 
 lieve" whatever it is that they assert, whereas in fact we 
 usually don't notice whether it is nonsense or not. 
 
 h. The conclusions from the last paragraph are obvious :- 
 Unless we already have fairly definite memories of a certain 
 sort of stimulus, such a stimulus will not reach perceptibility 
 unless it is comparatively violent or comparatively long re- 
 peated (or both). In either case the learning of the new 
 thing is obviously likely to be fatiguing — perhaps painfully. 
 Also, unless the learner has a thorough grasp of the One (i. e. , 
 actually has, at least vaguely, indefinite memories of anything 
 which could be presented as a stimulus), the new stimulus he 
 is to learn" or incorporate into his nerve cells is likely to 
 be so thoroughly unknown to him as to cause fear; and the 
 learner" may be one in a negative direction by taking act- 
 ive measures to get away from the stimulus. Fear is obvi- 
 ously merely the structural nerve resistance to a new stimulus 
 that is violent enough to force itself painfully through partly 
 into perception (so persons who are so dense as to be sub- 
 stantially impervious to an idea are "fearless"; §170r). 
 On the other hand we may wear memory ruts so deep that 
 conscious resurrection of the memories is difficult. In either 
 case there is truistically a nerve unbalance or instability. 
 The live person neither partly runs away nor partly dies by 
 deep ruts, but is balanced by grasping the One. 
 
 i. The technical word that asserts that stimuli thus seek 
 out their paths and cause perceptible memories, is association. 
 Obviously, we could name as many sorts" of association as 
 we like (doing that used to be a favorite indoor game among 
 psychologists); but all those names would be in effect equiva- 
 lent to "cause and effect" or "relationship." Association is 
 the psychologists' usual name for God the Holy Ghost. 
 But often there seems to be, as an unfortunate legacy from 
 the old dualistic faculty psychology, the dualistic idea that 
 memories are distinct, constant-atom, exact things that are 
 as such stored in pigeon holes in the brain to be taken out at 
 any time, in perfect preservation. Truistically, all stimuli 
 in part cause "new" ideas or perceptions (i. e., cause some 
 ideas so novel that no perceptible memory accompanies them ; 
 e. g., breakfast this morning is perceptibly and uniquely this 
 morning's breakfast, and not any other morning's breakfast) ; 
 and in the remaining, usually much greater, part all stimuli 
 cause "old" ideas — cause memories. So truistically memo- 
 ries of the Many can not possibly be preserved unchanged, 
 or even brought to consciousness after a certain time (during 
 
 which they have worn considerably). Quite likely anyone 
 can resurrect a few apparently trivial memories that have been 
 apparently unchanged for a comparatively long time : but 
 only a small percentage of such memories can be resurrected 
 — in proof of which try to make a list of what you ate at each 
 dinner for a month past. Of course, in a One sense memo- 
 ries are all there"; but quantitatively most of them can not 
 be unchangedly stimulated enough to be perceived. 
 
 j. It is perhaps already obvious to the reader that it is 
 possible to keep on and describe the whole universe in detail 
 in terms of memory. It can readily be done with nearly any 
 psychological term, because most are customarily used as 
 each part of the Trinity. But the foregoing will have to 
 serve, instead of the explicit volumes, to imply the expansion 
 of the details, and to show that the expansion is identical 
 with the expansion of the description of anything. 
 
 §159. a. It has become obvious that there is no essent- 
 ial difference between any two so-called faculties. Ideas and 
 perceptions and concepts and memories and sensations, etc., 
 are all essentially the same; the difference is quantitative :- 
 some of them contain more of quantitative time and the im- 
 plied space, and some contain less. Usually that difference 
 takes the form of collecting some whirls (formally at least: 
 nobody has measured' the actual facts) into a unit higher" 
 structure (and such quantitative difference will have to be 
 considered by the laws of periodicity, inverse square, etc., 
 when such measuring is made). Thus, a concept is usually 
 taken as » collection of ideas (some sort of nerve struct- 
 ures) organised together; a law is a higher order of concepts, 
 etc. But obviously, when we say That... X This... = Mean- 
 ing we have asserted that always there is such an organism 
 or relation. So our psychological equation Emotions... ^In- 
 tellect. . . = Will asserts all those possible quantitative variations 
 in psychological terms. Such quantities are in detail usually 
 considered to be ethics; — the development of the measuring 
 member would definitely be psychology, until such time as 
 that naming of measures also took on a definite meaning of 
 normal or abnormal — right or wrong. So I shall not verge 
 further on ethics here, but close this chapter with this sec- 
 tion, which gives a general quantitative summary of the psy- 
 chological equation by showing its application as (l) the 
 mental solution of any problem, and as (2) the statement of 
 the character or properties of genius. 
 
 b. Obviously, if we have a problem it is expressed 
 as That . . . X This. . . = z Meaning, and has its mental counter- 
 part as Emotions... ~>i Intellect... =^ Will. As we have seen 
 (index, "Explanation"), the problem is solved" when we 
 have so many dots perceptible that some of them are familiar 
 to us, and we recognize that the dots with unbreakable rela- 
 tionship run in infinite regress. So the mental method of 
 solving any problem is to keep on looking at whatever it is 
 we want to know about until the various stimuli from it force 
 enough perceptions or sensations into consciousness for us to 
 see their unbroken relationship and to see that they are 
 familiar — and hence may be correctly fitted in to our living. Of 
 course, all the stimuli or dots which do not become percept- 
 ible are related — as we know after we have once grasped the 
 solution of the One and Many. But sometimes in order to 
 get a surely familiar (i. e., fitted,' useful, applicable) one it 
 is necessary to make those stimuli from the thing keep on 
 coming in for years before the right stimuli will get through 
 to perceptibility. There is no need to try to relate or 
 connect the perceptible ones into a system or organization 
 — into concepts or laws or those pernicious baby-pacifiers 
 called hypotheses. They are so related — as parts of the uni- 
 verse, — and the object is to keep struggling until we see the 
 details and hence truistically their unity or relationship. That 
 
§159b XVII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 190 
 
 of course indirectly amounts to trying to relate the percep- 
 tions; but the emphasis is different:- when we try" to 
 make concepts that are those pernicious hypotheses, we have 
 our attention on the matter of relationship, instead of keeping 
 it on the thing itself (men in the past then usually got ex- 
 cited and tried to "prove" the relationship — which in practice 
 means irrelevantly to clamorously assert its existence, and is 
 worse than painting the lily). The relationship exists; and 
 if we are intelligent we know it exists before we start: so 
 we should put our effort on seeing the thing as it is. When 
 there are enough details perceptible they automatically snap 
 together into an obvious relationship in our brain — the nature 
 of the universe makes them do so (it is a truism that they do) 
 and not any effort on our part. And until there are 
 enough they truistically will not systematize — and that is all 
 that can be said of them. The man who tries to force" 
 them to do so, calling the result a hypothesis, thereby shows 
 that he is innocent of making or discovering" any laws, and 
 does not even know what such a process may be. We do 
 not formulate laws or great" generalizations as if we were 
 the capricious God of the dualists : we pound perceptions 
 into our minds — observe and observe and work to observe 
 some more — and the laws formulate themselves.' 
 
 c. That is the whole of the method of solving prob- 
 lems. Every man truistically is competent to solve any 
 problem (even if he is a congenital idiot) provided he can 
 keep on pounding in stimuli long enough and hard enough. 
 The idiot quickly gets tired of paying attention and quits 
 (that is what an idiot is in psychological quantitative terms — 
 an early quitter"). The man who formulates laws also gets 
 tired of paying attention, but he does not quit so soon as the 
 idiot, or confine himself to an eight hour day (although of 
 course many persons are too weak to work well even eight 
 hours). As a general rule heretofore, the man, who by some 
 means more or less accidental so far as he "purposed" or an- 
 ticipated (and always those means resolve themselves into 
 sufficiently intensely and persistently pounding stimuli in) — 
 the man who by some means had once got a grasp of the One 
 or whole realized that a relationship did exist between the 
 things he was observing (and also between them and him- 
 self, so that he was "interested," or knew that they mat- 
 tered, or that his work was worth while, and hence worked 
 vigorously with no energy wasted on considering "what's the 
 use?"); so he was able to take his mind off the effort to see 
 relationship, and put it at seeing the things. Naturally such 
 men were able afterwards to solve many problems, and were 
 able to avoid getting so tired that they practically had to 
 quit. But it is now definitely proved that such a grasp of the 
 whole is highly useful, and how it is; and it is shown just 
 how to get it. So it is possible for anyone consciously and 
 with a positive and correct method to go at solving any problem 
 — and solve it if he does not get so tired as to quit. Some men 
 have tougher brains than others, as we shall see. Religiously 
 or qualitatively men are alike — are essentially alike and abso- 
 lutely equal.. Quantitatively, or in a skin-bounded sense, no 
 two are equal — just as no two atoms are equal. 
 
 d. The last two paragraphs are rigorous theory. We 
 may now look at the Many aspect of solving any problem. 
 There are, so far as I know, only two quantitative tricks that 
 are of much importance in solving problems (perhaps other 
 men will find others of more importance for them). One is 
 to learn the feel" of persistently grubbing down into our 
 vague ideas and memories — into Emotions..., or the modern 
 subconscious, — so that we can tell when the perception feels 
 as if it were coming up clearly; then we are able to keep on 
 at just the right time until we yank up into perceptibility the 
 sensation (observation) we need. That sensation is always 
 
 there and will come up if kept after long enough, and if we 
 keep on taking in additional observations from the outside to 
 reinforce it as may be necessary. It is difficult to keep on 
 when the perception with vague consciousness first comes — 
 there being then a strong desire to call it finished or observed, 
 and to spout the resulting half-baked ideas as a lot of senti- 
 mental mush (often called "idealism"); the trouble with 
 Woodrow Wilson was that he indulged himself by usually 
 quitting important things on that last hard but essential lap 
 (hiding the indulgence from himself by polishing phrases and 
 performing other trivial and easy austerities) ; all aristocrats 
 become so by indulgence on that last fierce lap — as I happen 
 to know from having tried it for a while. That digging 
 
 after perceptions can be made more successful by getting 
 into an environment that makes the worker mentally uncom- 
 fortable and irritable. Apparently the best way to achieve 
 that emotional irritability is to overwork (that can be con- 
 trolled and irritating associates usually can't) : of course the 
 solver has got to pay for that irritation in decreased health. 
 That discomfort, like all quantitative things, can be over- 
 done (§163); at a certain stage the solver's digestive appa- 
 ratus will get out of gear, and fail to feed his brain fast 
 enough, thus counteracting the irritation s good effect of shak- 
 ing ideas loose from the bottom. A minor trick I have used 
 is to eat much sugar and a little chocolate to make my brain 
 work vigorously and also irritatedly. Tea and coffee and to- 
 bacco happen to work too violently for me; and I think the 
 present version of the book is made much more balanced and 
 reasonable by the war's having habituated me to a normal 
 consumption of sugar — although I doubt whether I could 
 
 have done the preliminary rough work without it. The 
 
 second general trick of solving a problem is to go at it in the 
 reverse way when we get too tired of one direction. All our 
 everyday formulas have two terms, That... and This...; 
 when the brain is so tired that it will not work well to pull 
 up more dots of That..., then start on This... and dig up 
 
 a few dots of it. Any normal person, by applying 
 
 those simple principles, devising quantitative means suitable 
 to himself, can solve any problem if he can keep at it. But 
 he will have to pay for it by wear and tear of himself — which 
 as a general rule will be replaced by better growth up to a 
 
 certain point of 'reversal' — of "elastic limit. " And 
 
 I have unavoidably above given the impression that digging 
 out this book was 'hard work." Being interested, I have 
 considered it play, and have for so many years automatically 
 used the phrase 'when I finish the book and goto work,' that 
 my associates adopted it. So solving life properly is fun. 
 
 e. From an objective point of view genius consists of 
 the genius's having a body, particularly a nervous system, 
 strong enough to stand intense work for a long time. Or, 
 put in terms of the psychological equation, the genius is a 
 man who can endure an unusually large amount of both Emo- 
 tions... and of Intellect. . . (of vivid feelings and perceptions), 
 and keep on standing them without becoming so painfully 
 fatigued that he quits. Obviously, that is merely a quanti- 
 tative, unessential difference from the average man. That 
 man is of precisely the same quality as the genius — is funda- 
 mentally and in principle the genius's equal, and so can use 
 himself as a standard by which to judge a genius ; he also, 
 as a truism of the biological equations, can train himself, by 
 reacting with the environment, to endure more and more 
 work and thus acquire nerve strength and irritability — there 
 are no measures as to how far the average man can go in such 
 training in his available time. The average man can see that 
 he himself ultimately, and in a real, accurate sense, is God : 
 his definite perceptions of that identity quantitatively include 
 a certain part of the whole infinite regress of possible ones. 
 
191 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVII §159j 
 
 The genius has more numerous perceptions and more vivid 
 ones ; but clearly his can not be essentially greater. The 
 genius is not so much of a quitter as the average man ; so he 
 lives more of life in a given calendar time. 
 
 f. The insane person also has vivid departures from the 
 normal balance. The important quantitative difference be- 
 tween him and the genius is that the insane man is not suffic- 
 iently conscious of his departure from the normal balance to 
 be able to come back to a balance and compare his departure 
 with that, and also recuperate. In short, the insane person 
 has gone so far from the normal that he has structurally dam- 
 aged his nervous system (or vice versa, if preferred ; the act- 
 ual process is usually small cyclic steps in a vicious circle") ; 
 so he can not really do the work required of genius. The 
 genius can stand the same departure without perceptible 
 damage — just as one person tears a muscle with a load that 
 another carries with ease. So the insane person truistically 
 shows exceedingly poor quantitative judgment about some 
 things — usually not about many things. Unless his insanity 
 quickly kills him his nervous system achieves a "natural" 
 balance by having some part of it become very narrow in the 
 limits it tolerates, to compensate for the wide vagaries of the 
 damaged parts. In those narrow parts he is truistically ap- 
 parently saner than the average man — is radically conserva- 
 tive or is reactionary or stand-pat. The real genius 
 
 on the contrary can shoot out to wide limits in any subject — 
 to limits perhaps wider than the insane person's — and do it 
 at will; and then return to a normal balance, and judge with 
 fair accuracy how far he went, and the quantitative propor- 
 tions of all things he observed on those excursions from the 
 normal. So this proper sort of genius would be a better bal- r 
 anced man than the average man — would live a more normal 
 and steady life, and his opinions or judgments would be con- 
 siderably more sane (i. e., more accurate). Well; as 
 
 a matter of fact, so far as I have observed, the men who have 
 been usually named as the world s great geniuses have failed 
 to reach that theoretical superior balance in at least a few 
 things. They apparently all shot out so far in one or a few 
 respects that they damaged their brains and did not have 
 good judgment in such matters afterwards — were fanatics in 
 them. Generally speaking, the average man has taken a few 
 similar flights in genius, and has become mildly fanatical or 
 a practically permanent crank or eccentric. But he is still 
 better balanced, even as an individual, than those acclaimed 
 geniuses, as he didn't usually shoot out so far (cf. §171k). 
 
 I am quite aware that on whatever subjects I happen 
 
 to be, unconsciously to myself, a fanatic, in those subjects I 
 am unable to recognize other similar fanatics as being fanatic : 
 and I would consider as being fanatic in those subjects those 
 who are not. So in strict principle I am incompetent to 
 judge whether those acclaimed geniuses have all failed to 
 reach a superior balance. This application of the principle 
 that there is no exact science is respectfully urged for con- 
 sideration by those who are cocksure in their opinion that 
 others may be fanatics and cranks, but they themselves never. 
 
 g. So obviously the man who insists on his right to be 
 erratic, or unconventional in many minor things — upon his 
 right to have an "artistic temperament," or to have any sort 
 of special privileges (he usually disguises that crude demand 
 under some such queer phrases as living one s own life, 
 "the new freedom," having a "career") — the man who in- 
 sists on such "rights" is demonstrating his own inferiority; 
 is demonstrating that his brain is too weak to avoid that mild 
 degree of unbalance or insanity called fanaticism. So truist- 
 ically it follows that all the pre-war Teutonic chatter about 
 the superman is ordinary fanaticism. For, to repeat, there 
 can be no man essentially superior to another; and the 
 
 quantitatively superior man exhibits his superiority not by an 
 unbalanced, peppy," noticeable departure from the normal, 
 but by a closer, more delicate adjustment to the normal, and 
 by his temperate preservation of average standards. That 
 genius has to make wide departures from the normal in order 
 to gain experience and judgment as to how to keep more bal- 
 anced; but he makes those departures so far as possible at 
 his own risk and expense, and as a necessary evil instead of 
 a praiseworthy performance, and does it unobtrusively, and 
 goes as little away from the normal as will serve — with the 
 clear knowledge that it is insanity and death to persist in 
 those departures. On the contrary, the aristocrat, particu- 
 larly the exaggerated superman and artistic" type, consid- 
 ers that just the opposite conduct is proper. The ordinary 
 socialist and the red" type — the contract-breaking, output- 
 limiting, class-conscious workman — are precisely like the 
 other kinds of aristocrats in persisting in departing from the 
 normal. I think an intelligent child can see how wrong 
 those two sorts of aristocrat or radical are. 
 
 h. The genius receives impressions from the environ- 
 ment and those cause him to work to get more, and so on 
 until he has a very full life — lives more. Most other people 
 note that sort of life and want it. But many decline to work 
 to get it; so they fail to get enough exercise for their abili- 
 ties, whether they be muscular or mental (or both). Hence 
 they develop a chief make believe of verbally railing at what 
 they call their monotonous, uninteresting, meager, unsuit- 
 able, etc., environment, and at their narrow circumstances 
 and lack of opportunity, etc., etc. — you probably have heard 
 it ; labor leaders will demand shorter hours and then in the 
 next breath thus bewail the natural result of loafing. It of 
 course has become easier for those make-believers to talk that 
 way than it is for them to go to work and use the infinite op- 
 portunities for seeing and living that lie right at hand, and 
 the talking widens their horizon a little — balances them 
 some, as we saw in discussing make believe. Obviously, 
 truistically that talk sets up all aristocracy — miracles, some- 
 thing for nothing, privilege — as a desirable goal. Then some 
 of their neighbors who are more energetic (such as kaisers, 
 popes, demagogs, and all grabbers and grafters whether of 
 academic honors, Society leadership, fame, or cash) take that 
 guessed-at goal of mediocre make believe as being the real 
 thing, and go chase it. Thus the upper ten" and the 
 submerged tenth" actually directly mutually support and 
 cause each other — the numerous stupid weaklings formulating 
 the ideals" ; as the tramp and the kaiser are both after the 
 same thing (dualistic miracles, something for nothing), it 
 naturally is needful to give them the same name :- aristocrat, 
 i. Mostly I have verbally taken the conventional point 
 of view that genius refers to mental ability. Mental endur- 
 ance is of course truistically the representative" ability of 
 the whole individual, and is also the rarest in the direct form 
 of Intellect... . But obviously, anyone who exhibits the same 
 delicate, conscious balancing or poise in his life, is equally a 
 genius. As a matter of obvious truism, the real genius can 
 not be so one-sided as to exhibit merely good Intellect... — a 
 fact shown best I think by Howe, who has an extraordinarily 
 well balanced intellect and hence knows its place ( Ventures 
 in Common Sense," and "E. W. Howe's Monthly"). He 
 must also exhibit a balanced whole life. I am convinced that 
 a good mother needs and shows the highest type of genius, 
 j. All that quantitative description of a genius — a per- 
 son with excellent organs — is clearly general, and is indefinite 
 as to what structures, etc., constitute such organs. No one 
 knows very much about that. But I have given a wide circle 
 of truistic description of the genius, and in principle anyone 
 can enter himself at any point in that circle that comes easy 
 
§159j XVII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 192 
 
 to him, and by sticking consistently to it, make of himself 
 in his own environment his own particular sort of genius — 
 which in the end means mostly a person sufficiently widely 
 and vividly experienced to live, and to enjoy living, an ex- 
 quisitely temperate life (which by no means is an ascetic life ; 
 XVIII) ; then secondarily he adds to that as great perform- 
 ance according to his special capacity as he can. Breeding 
 is perhaps the best name for such genius, that produces the 
 only sort of useful and enduring work — except that in prac- 
 tice breeding" has been somewhat grabbed by the aristo- 
 crats as a name for coddling, emasculation, and subsequent 
 hysterical forays into imagism, cubism, or whatever be the 
 fashionable cult of the day. I should call Lee, and Ford, 
 and Rockefeller well-bred, and the latest New York Society 
 leaders mild boors. 
 
 k. The foregoing description of genius has been mostly 
 from the objective point of view. Many geniuses have said 
 what genius is, from the subjective point of view of their feel- 
 ings. Those avowals mostly divide into two sorts:- (l) that 
 the genius they exhibit consists of the fine frenzy of creative 
 work; (2) that the genius exhibited consists of the delightful 
 peace and sense of belonging properly with things and hence 
 of getting all of life, which follows that fine frenzy. Both 
 sorts of geniuses are in substantial agreement that the frenzy 
 comes from outside" — naming it inspiration, revelation, etc. 
 
 1. Their agreement that the frenzy comes from without 
 themselves tacitly takes for granted that they are bounded 
 by their skins. Thus they assert that they themselves did 
 not create any of the relationships that they saw — that those 
 relationships existed. That much of their avowals is consist- 
 ent (par. b). The rest of the conventional implications of 
 inspiration," revelation" is truistically nonsense. Those 
 geniuses observed the universe and saw that it was beautiful 
 or completely fitted together; and that gave them a rebirth 
 (§153), which ultimately consists of the consciousness that 
 they themselves are an inseparable part of the universe — a 
 beautiful fit, reacting and hence useful. That part of their 
 revelation was usually so vague with them that they in 
 general effect verbally contradicted it by implying that they 
 personally were apart from God or the universe so that the 
 revelation had to be handed down to them. So far as I 
 know, Christ was the genius most definite about the fact that 
 the essential truth is that he too was an inseparable part of 
 
 the whole — a Son (§162e). Any fairly intelligent 
 
 person can readily see that the general agreement of geniuses 
 is essentially that they had a rebirth in some degree. And any 
 person with a fair amount of mental endurance can readily 
 experience a rebirth, and thus subjectively experience in some 
 measure precisely what the geniuses did. 
 
 m. Most geniuses seem to hold that frenzied creative" 
 work is a desirable departure from the normal. We have 
 seen that such unbalances are not themselves good (par. f). 
 But so common is that defective view that insane persons are 
 
 sometimes mistaken for geniuses. But as noted, 
 
 others hold the opposite view that genius gives a sense of 
 peace, and of a blissfully calm and finished universe or God. 
 
 n. Clearly either way is correct as a One view. In 
 a practical or quantitative view, the temperate conclusion 
 is that the genius will avoid exaggerating or overdoing 
 either the peace aspect (which may expand into Buddhistic 
 or Oriental quietism, or European mistaking of laziness and 
 inert self-indulgence for cosmic leisure") or the frenzy 
 (which may expand into mania, or the New York pained hur- 
 rying to nowhere in particular or wearisome punch" at 
 nothing special). So you have to decide for yourself what is 
 a temperate, exquisitely adjusted balance of the two for you. 
 Christ seems to have recognized the two classes of genius and 
 
 their tendency to exaggerate their partial point of view, and 
 for himself to have adopted an excellent balance. So again, 
 in the next most important fundamental point in full living, 
 Christ was correct. And Lincoln was explicit both in word 
 and deed about the need of such balance in life. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. Ethics and Economics. 
 
 §160. a. Ethics is the branch of science which chiefly 
 expresses whether or not we as persons like a given thing — 
 the science of happiness. It expands, according to vague 
 general agreement, into the applied science of how to get 
 what we want or like, and avoid what we do not like. We 
 vaguely and indefinitely call what we like moral, and what 
 we do not like immoral. Sometimes with even more conven- 
 tional vagueness we put a neutral collection of unmoral things 
 between the moral and the immoral — those being the things 
 that are almost perfectly balanced as far as is perceptible to 
 us. So ethics is frequently said to be the science of morals. 
 The moral and the immoral commonly tend to be named thus 
 from a "subjective" point of view. From a more or less 
 "objective" point of view the moral is termed the good, and 
 the immoral the bad or evil or sin. So from that view ethics 
 is the discussion of the problem of Good and Evil. But as 
 "objective" and "subjective" are ultimately identical and 
 are necessarily both included in any science (XVII), and as 
 everyday ethical conclusions tacitly agree with that conclu- 
 sion by making no definite distinction between inner" and 
 "outer" good things, I shall not bother in this brief discus- 
 sion of ethics to make such formal distinction, except to show 
 (§161b) that those two great technical schools of ethics, 
 hedonism and idealism (which respectively go after or ap- 
 prove objective morality or pleasure, and inner morality 
 or ' ideals" or virtue"), are identical in meaning, and not 
 opposing and dualistic as often conventionally held. 
 
 b. Ethics as such a science is emphatically a collection 
 of quantitative or Many judgments — as we see definitely as 
 we proceed. All mental and material things are ethically 
 judged from the point of view of our personal Many selves as 
 criterions. If those things have no unbalances or asymme- 
 tries perceptibly affecting the survival of ourselves, then tru- 
 istically with that neutrality we say they are not news," 
 not interesting," practically negligible," or, formally, 
 are unmoral. If— emphasizing L — those things are a little 
 further away from the exact balance, we perceive them, and 
 like them because they are within the limits of asymmetry 
 that conduce to the continued existence of our structure. If 
 they go a little further from the balance (Fig. 168b), they 
 come into a questionable zone, in which we do not know 
 whether they are more pleasant or more painful ; they are 
 startling news, and are of dubious or questionable mor- 
 ality. Still further away things become unquestionably pain- 
 ful or damaging to our organism, and we name them bad or 
 immoral. E. g., under ordinary conditions, to drink a drop 
 of water is negligible; a glassful, pleasant; two glasses, per- 
 haps doubtful; and several gallons of forced drinking, prob- 
 ably fatal. And the same quantitative variation in 
 
 the goodness of a thing occurs when we emphasize the T 
 point of view. Thus a raindrop hitting us is usually unmoral ; 
 speed it up some and it gives a "stimulating" tingle; but 
 speed it fast enough and it will be fatal. So obviously, to 
 get a comprehensive idea of what is good and what bad, we 
 have to be explicit as to L and T — something that conven- 
 tionally is only vaguely done (e. g., we then see in §165 
 that economy of time" is an important ethical law that is 
 conventionally sometimes ignored even in practice). 
 
193 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §161b 
 
 c. All such conventional ethics expand still further into 
 asking why. Or, that extension may be called an expansion 
 into the One — to infinity ; or to its logical equivalent, zero 
 or Nirvana. That expansion of ethics is ordinarily called re- 
 ligion. I. e., conventionally ethics refers to the Many, or 
 science, or pluralism, or quantity; and religion refers to the 
 One, or what is formally non-science, or monotheism or mon- 
 ism, or quality. Or, if we write our ethical equation in the 
 form Idealism. . . X Hedonism. . , = The Good, or Morality, the 
 Many member conventionally is ethics, and the One member 
 religion. By our total argument the two are essentially 
 identical : there is merely the formal difference between 
 them that there is between the Many and the One. And I 
 shall make that formal distinction just as I have made the 
 same general distinction throughout the book (§89). Ethics 
 sums into religion. It is obviously not possible to state any 
 valid ethics or any valid science which does not. 
 
 d. Theology, to be definitely consistent, must include as 
 being identical, ethics and the sum of ethics into religion (cf. 
 §89). Thus theology would omit the summation of other 
 sciences into religion. But orthodox theology purports first 
 to be a science (it actually tries to be logic, taken far enough 
 to prove the existence of God). And at the same time it du- 
 alistically purports to be not science but religion ( Ency. 
 Brit.," xxvi, 778; cf. remarks of Ryan, footnote 49b); e. g., 
 the average theologian seems determined that the warfare of 
 science and theology means the warfare of science and re- 
 ligion. So theologians are broadly inconsistent as to what 
 they are, and as to responsibility for what they say. 
 
 (1) As a science, all of conventional theology that is called 
 Christian which I can find holds God to be essentially a dif- 
 ferent sort of being from man — a sort of superior, divine (as 
 absolutely opposed to human), aristocratic potentate like a 
 kaiser, who by fiat created the world, and by his autocratic 
 will now irresponsibly rules it, etc., etc. That dualistic the- 
 ology is obviously, by this whole book, wrong. Also, as 
 Christ seems to have held as being his fundamental observa- 
 tion that he was inseparably connected with God and man 
 (§1591), then orthodox "Christian" theology is not Christian 
 but is flatly anti-Christian, as it contradicts Christ fundament- 
 ally. (It may be held that Christ is in places reported to 
 have held opposite fundamental views. If Christ did hold 
 such opposite views, then I flatly repudiate Christ's funda- 
 mental teachings as being wrong: and this whole book is 
 verifiable proof that they would be, in such case, wrong. But 
 what Christ actually did teach is obviously a quantitative or 
 historical problem that can never be absolutely solved.) 
 
 (2) Further, so-called Christian theology for centuries was 
 largely based on the doctrine of apostolic succession — which 
 is still held by many theologians. That basic doctrine is in 
 substance this:- essentially, the ecclesiasts have been (in 
 some claimed mystic way) given a dualistic divine" right 
 to rule the members of the church (and others, if the others 
 will tolerate it) — an aristocratic privilege which clearly agrees 
 essentially with the claim to rule made by kaisers. The 
 world has had probably more trouble with the churches' du- 
 alistic "divinity" — with that ecclesiasticism which perhaps a 
 majority of theologians claim is religion — than it has had with 
 kaisers' identical claims. In so far as conventional theology 
 quietly tolerates such essentially wrong ecclesiasticism, to 
 that extent theology is nonsense. If Christ did give any 
 such power to church authorities or meant to give it (as he is 
 reported to have done by one writer, Matt. 16, 18-19, in a 
 weak pun made in a language unknown to Christ— and for 
 that reason alone probably a forgery), then it is proved by 
 the total of this book that we either have to repudiate such 
 an error, or be irrational aristocrats ourselves, and like the 
 
 theologians who hold the doctrine, set ourselves up as being 
 
 essentially better than ordinary folks. (3) Further, as 
 
 a last fundamental doctrine, the theologians tend to claim that 
 the Bible is ' inspired" in some essential sense, and hence 
 is correct. The claim is logically completely wrong, in any 
 definite, positive sense; of course, in a One sense man can 
 not make an error, and it is fairly easy to see that the Bible 
 is the inevitable result of certain conditions, and hence accu- 
 rately displays an ultimate chain of cause and effect, and so 
 is ultimately right in a mystic, ineffable way. But it has 
 been so often shown that the Bible repeatedly actually con- 
 tradicts itself, and gives many evidences of having been in 
 spots forged by grafters and deluded fanatics, that it would 
 tend to be a calumny on the mental integrity and enlighten- 
 ment of the fairly unbiased reader for me to assume that he 
 needs to have it explicitly shown him here. There- 
 fore, as on those fundamental things orthodox theology is so 
 obviously self-contradictory, stupid, and disingenuous, I can 
 not decide just what theologians think theology is. 
 
 e. The final general remark needed in the introduction 
 of ethics is that the tacit verbal agreement underlying all of 
 ethics is that good consists of activity or life, and evil or bad is 
 the absence of activity or death — the basis of quantitative guess- 
 ing as to the amounts of such good or happiness, or evil and 
 unhappiness, being their perceptibility or consciousness. 
 
 §161. a. Fundamentally, we consider that to be good 
 which is — which exists. Ultimately, unless we commit the 
 silly self-contradiction of asserting a defective, wrong universe 
 or God, we believe and assert that whatever is, is right — is, 
 from a universal point of view, good. Possibly our word God 
 etymologically simply means good — the sum total that is 
 good. Words for God in other languages mean Being in a 
 general sense — like our phrase Supreme Being. In still 
 other languages the word for God seems to be etymologically 
 an assertion of human striving to expand consciously into uni- 
 versal being — by prayer, etc. So it seems to be a historical 
 fact that in a One sense the Good is that which exists, and is 
 otherwise verbally called God. By our solution of the One 
 and Many, truistically the One is absolutely good (also, any- 
 thing else), so that whatever exists is good. If we say 
 
 the One is good, we can not by the same language agreement 
 say it is evil, or that any part of it is bad. But if we wish, 
 we can change our total language agreement, and say that 
 the One is absolutely evil. That would not agree with con- 
 ventional verbal names ; but it has been repeatedly shown 
 in analogous cases that the final meaning would be the same 
 — Evil would simply be what we now name Good. 
 
 b. We thus see explicitly, as a truism of the One and 
 Many, that our whole basis of ethics or good or God is the 
 observation that they are synonymous with existence, or be- 
 ing, or life in general. "Really" or monistically good, right, 
 morality, God, existence, being, energy, Meaning, conscious- 
 ness or reason, and life in general or activity, are synonyms. 
 In the last paragraph we have seen that not only is the 
 equivalence of good and life and God a principle tacitly ac- 
 cepted by men for ages, as is more or less clearly evidenced 
 by etymology of words, but that it is in agreement with all 
 the proofs in this book. So far as I can judge, all the many 
 schools of ethics in general effect accept and start from that 
 One principle ("Ency. Brit.," Ethics"). As stated in the 
 last section, those schools divide into two sorts:- (l) one is 
 verbally "objective," emphasizing L or outer space' more, 
 by preferring to call Being energy or life or things' ' ; and 
 its adherents are called hedonists, epicurians, utilitarians, 
 evolutionists, biological evolutionists, and various other names 
 denoting shades in doctrine; and (2) the other school is verb- 
 ally "subjective," emphasizing T or the inner life" more, 
 
§161b XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 194 
 
 by preferring to call Being reason or conscience (a synonym 
 for One consciousness), or the ideal; and its adherents are 
 called idealists, rationalists, intuitionalists, and various other 
 names indicating minor differences in doctrine. As is clearly 
 recognized in conventional ethics, the idealists or intuitional- 
 ists are vague but comprehensive or extensive (thus empha- 
 sizing Emotions...); and the utilitarians are concrete and 
 definite or intense (emphasizing Intellect...). So obviously 
 we have the ethical schools united in the equation Idealism. . . 
 X Utilitarianism... = God, or Good, or Life. Clearly the two 
 schools react oppositely verbally, but actually supplement 
 each other, and are not contradictory as is orthodoxly held 
 
 by classic logic. — There are many books of controversy 
 
 between the two schools. The total battle is essentially 
 identical with that over the problem of mind and matter, and 
 it is perhaps unnecessary to repeat in further detail than just 
 given the solution of it in technical ethical terms. We could 
 go ahead and expand ethics in terms of that equation. It 
 theoretically would be an excellent way of grasping ethics. 
 But there is the practical difficulty that our ideas of that 
 equation are decidedly messed up by the dualistic Paul in 
 the Bible. He recommended (so far as I can pick a consist- 
 ent statement out of his self-contradictions) that this present 
 evil world (or Hedonism... or Utilitarianism...) be made zero, 
 and that the world of the spirit be made the total goal — be 
 made infinite. Paul s logic in the matter is very confused ; 
 he was continually tackling the problem of the One and the 
 Many (e. g., I Cor., Chaps. 12-14), and usually expressed' 
 his form of solution by denying both essentially and formally 
 the Many which he had just the minute before been using to 
 express the ineffable — a form of obfuscation still a favorite 
 among doctrinal theologians and other aristocrats. So if I 
 were to start expanding that equation in ordinary intelligible 
 terms the reader probably would shortly be in a nearly help- 
 less and highly irritating maze of verbal contradiction be- 
 tween his long familiarity with Pauline stupidities, and things 
 as they actually are when named by the same names. Paul 
 and Kant are very much alike; both vigorously deny in effect 
 the need of paying serious attention to the Many, which both 
 vigorously use to express themselves. Paul's remarks were 
 influential in producing the Inquisition and other ecclesiasti- 
 cal atrocities which still continue (cf. footnote 172c); and 
 Kant's, the nearly equally unpleasant world war (Dewey, 
 "influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays," 
 1910, p. 65). Both men were too unbalanced to get along 
 well with the Many; Paul, in practical terms, seems to have 
 had an overdose of learning in youth, to have been unfor- 
 tunate in love in about all the ways possible, and so fond of 
 eating and drinking as to exacerbate his epileptic tendencies; 
 so he messed up the Bible with cures for his own ailments, 
 
 erroneously assuming that all humans had 'em. It 
 
 seemed to be unnecessary in this book to give more than 
 that general citation of the evidence that Paul asserted an er- 
 roneous dualism and ecclesiasticism which is the opposite of 
 Christ's, and brief mention of evidence in other places that 
 Paul's doctrine is in general wrong. I judge that such brief 
 evidence will convince the good observer. But since I wrote 
 that, an excellent book of detailed proof that Paul contra- 
 dicted Christ has appeared :- I. Singer s The Rival Philoso- 
 phies of Jesus and Paul." A number of articles showing 
 Paul's wrongness have appeared in the last twenty years. 
 
 c. The point of the last paragraph, from which we are 
 to proceed, is that there is general agreement that the One is 
 to be named Good, or God, or life, etc., and that we need 
 pay no direct attention to whether we take a material" or 
 a "spiritual" name for that good. The reader may take his 
 choice, and we shall obviously go along together; personally 
 
 I have no preference in the matter so far as I can perceive, 
 and without especially noticing which I am using, use both 
 sorts. But that agreement that activity or life in gen- 
 eral is good is a One statement. We must, to say anything 
 definite about any part of that ineffable good, shift to science 
 — use Many expression. The first direct truism is that as no 
 unit of the many has any but arbitrary "existence" (and-or 
 as the Many is formally opposite the One), then the Many is 
 
 evil; or, we have the infinite pluralism, Evils =Good. 
 
 We could just as truly write it Goods =Evil. But such 
 
 a formally correct infinite pluralism is not consistent with our 
 usual language agreements. We require an explicitly con- 
 trasted machine That...X.Tkis... (§100c), so that we shall 
 not fall into materialism. So we may tentatively write :- 
 Evils... y.Goods...= = Good, or etc. And that is the everyday 
 form we use in asserting whether a given thing (any part,' 
 whether an idea" or a thing") is a good" or a bad." 
 So obviously, in our verbal practice the opposition" between 
 good and evil is merely language mechanics. It is also obvi- 
 ous that our language varies the Trinity form of the terms. 
 
 d. But that equation Evils... X Goods... = Good is of no 
 particular use to us, as it definitely represents little more 
 than our bare verbal mechanics :- our standards of dividing 
 the Many into good and evil are only truistically implied by 
 that equation. But it is the great human equation used by 
 everybody, rather than the formal That. . . X This. . . =Meaning. 
 And that ethical equation is equally a formal or verbal affair 
 in which the Evils... and the Goods... obviously require defi- 
 nitions (standardized measurements) before they have particu- 
 lar meanings. Yet that obvious fact is usually overlooked by 
 people (a point which explains much that is otherwise strange 
 in history) :- it is so vivid to those people that they mean 
 their standards of measurements that usually those standards 
 and the theory of them (the theory of periodicity in ethical 
 terms) remain unstated and confused in their minds and their 
 hearers . The result is, of course, sooner or later a verbal 
 squabble (polemics), which truistically is interminable so long 
 as the need of explicit measures is not met. 
 
 e. Obviously, in no other way than by considering the 
 experience of the race (and making more measures if needed) 
 can the question of just what is right for a given man be set- 
 tled fairly well :- the solution is to take ethics explicitly as a 
 science, as definitely measurable as any science. That popu- 
 lar ethical equation shows the ethical solution of the One and 
 Many ; and with that we may stop using it. 
 
 §162. a. As existence or activity is truistically the ulti- 
 mate good or happiness, and is historically so accepted, it 
 follows as a further truism that the ultimate or greatest or 
 absolute happiness is the knowledge or infinite perception 
 that everything is connected together absolutely or organized 
 or related together "personally" as the One or the universe. 
 Obviously, that is in agreement with the ordinary ways of 
 naming the greatest experienced happiness as :- ecstacy, in- 
 effable joy or felicity or peace, rapture, etc., or a rebirth or 
 religious experience (§153f): such happiness or general ethi- 
 cal good is "seeing God," or being God, etc. 162 " Also, it 
 
 162a The mildest evidence of a rebirth may be said to be a laugh 
 —a sort of spilling over of nervous energy that has been set flowing 
 by humor as a trigger. As we have casually seen from time to time, 
 anything is humorous (witty, etc. : I am using humorous in a rough 
 way) if it makes our perceptions of relationships spread out consider- 
 ably wider (usually, also implicitly in a shorter time) than is usual. 
 Thus the barbarian or the child finds it humorous to see the discom- 
 fiture of another person: it causes him to see that by his (the bar- 
 barian's) having a wider balance or relationship with the universe 
 than he was conscious of having before he noticed the other's failure 
 to have it, he avoids such discomfiture. If the barbarian sees a little 
 more extensively he observes that the other's discomfiture is a failure 
 
195 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §162e 
 
 is a further truism that the object of life is to live. Further, 
 the truism agrees with the usual intimate desire that God be 
 a person" — with the rather general idea that a person or 
 any real God, or that true spirit" or soul," is more 
 than the materialists' supposed arithmetical addition of hard, 
 separate atom or thing to hard, separate atom; or the phil- 
 osophers' arithmetical pantheism. Quite obviously, the ulti- 
 mate truistic necessity of there being such a real One, or an 
 actual universe, is that there be inseparable relationship. 
 When that relationship is perceived, truistically it makes us 
 see that we are not lonely, not unneeded, not separate and 
 apart, but are joined inseparably to everything. In ethics 
 that relationship or force is called love. So our rigorously 
 ultimate ethical good is equivalent, to use the God the Holy 
 Ghost part of the Trinity, to the usual conventional assertion 
 that God is love. Finally, it agrees explicitly with Christ's 
 One statement which he said was the first and great" law 
 (Matt. 22, 37):- "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with 
 all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind." 
 
 b. The last paragraph rigorously shows, by all the evi- 
 dence of history, and with explicit logical consistency, that 
 this book, in its destruction of agnosticism and establishment 
 of a unified science, is in common phrase a means of giving 
 
 life more abundantly — shows that religion in a real sense 
 is synonymous with life. Further, the paragraph definitely 
 proves that whether we consciously know it or not, we are 
 ultimately God, and do love him absolutely — that being 
 merely the conventional ethical way of saying that we are 
 organically One. So I do not issue any law in the sense 
 of a command, commandment, or fiat, handed down as by one 
 in authority : I merely say that the facts, which may be 
 readily verified by the reader, are to the effect that he does 
 
 "love God" that way. ■ / am no "authority" except 
 
 in so far as I am comparatively an extremely minute part of 
 the universe — one "fact." The whole universe, all the facts, 
 is the authority, and it issues, is, principles that are obeyed 
 — not principles that may be followed if a stiff-necked and 
 weak-brained generation of fools fancies it will kindly conde- 
 scend to obey them, paying for that stupidity by having 
 about a half-life. 
 
 c. To express that infinite, ineffable good, happiness, or 
 God positively, and 'apply' it with more or less definiteness to 
 our personal lives, we divide it into parts or the Many (Part 
 One). Probably the most usual everyday means of doing 
 that are these two:- (l) We shift the One term Good or 
 God (or any of its synonyms) to a Many or God the Son form 
 
 in perception of relationships that actually in a wider sense is his 
 (the barbarian's) own failure (§47); and it then is not funny (neither 
 is the barbarian longer a barbarian). But truistically, any compara- 
 tively quick perceiving of a wide fitness of things (which is often 
 given by the observing of an apparently or superficially contrasting 
 state of affairs, which we see we can overcome or change— of which 
 we see the deeper unity) gives us a surge of nervous energy, a mild 
 rebirth. That flood naturally irradiates to all the organs of the body, 
 and when it is in mild enough measure it produces, apparently as a 
 sort of summing of a speeding up or increased living of all parts of 
 the body, various muscular rhythms that are laughter. It may pro- 
 duce weeping, but not often in a person unaccustomed to weeping. 
 Or, if in greater measure it may more or less paralyze temporarily : 
 it can, by variation in intensity, produce numerous sorts of biological 
 phenomena— to the extent of trances, manias, etc. The universe 
 may obviously be described in terms of humor— quantitatively ex- 
 tended from conventional measures into such increased ones. 
 
 The danger that exists in being explicitly humorous is that jokes 
 usually involve the use of some contrast to heighten the flood of per- 
 ception of relationship, Many people fail to see that such a contrast 
 is a contrast, and intended as one, unless it is carefully labeled "con- 
 trast" or "joke"— and the label truistically spoils the trigger action. 
 So it is especially dangerous to put jokes in a scientific or other com- 
 munication that purports to be usually straightforward rhetoric. 
 There are no jokes in this book. 
 
 and use the general equation God the Sons... X Our selves... = 
 Good. (2) We tacitly take it that human beings are the uni- 
 verse which is of primary importance to us (that they consti- 
 tute our standard ethical universe), and use the human form 
 Neighbors. . . X Ourselves. . . =Good. 
 
 d. That first equation, God the Sons... X Ourselves... = 
 Good, or God, is often expanded so that God the Sons... is 
 explicitly Christ, the Virgin Mary, the apostles, and all the 
 saints and prophets. Clearly the equation is right, provided 
 its circular, identical logic is understood and used — provided 
 it is understood that Christ, and the saints, etc., are essen- 
 tially the same as ourselves, and (on that side of the equa- 
 tion) are not One or perfect or divine." Consistently, 
 God the Sons... includes Carlyle s heroes, our friends, 
 etc. (see §166m). But obviously, often the equation is not 
 used in that valid way :- at least four deities often are 
 used as absolutely dualistic or essentially contrasted with our- 
 selves. And just as aristocratic and dualistic as that, and 
 patterned on such wrong usage, there conventionally follows 
 substantially a. fixed classification or caste of saints, prophets, 
 popes, cardinals, archbishops, on down to the yellow dog — 
 which last Christ, in his effort to dis-establish such aristocracy, 
 too emphatically logically, but with perhaps justifiable emo- 
 tional disgust over such stupidity, said would be first. 
 
 e. The second equation, Neighbors... X. Ourselves... = 
 Good, or God, is obviously a valid That... X This... in human 
 terms. This total book proves its rationality. Also, as we 
 shall see in detail as we proceed, it is obviously the formula 
 for democracy; it is the formal and more accurate expression 
 of the "Golden Rule," do unto others as you would that they 
 do unto 3'ou ; and it is the formal and more accurate expres- 
 sion of Christ's statement of the second great commandment 
 on which, together with the first, hangeth the whole law, 
 and the prophets" (Matt. 22, 89-40):- "Thou shalt love thy 
 neighbor as thyself." Christ stated that the two (see par. a 
 for the first :- love God) are alike — as obviously by valid logic 
 they are, one being the One assertion of the universe in ethi- 
 cal terms, and the other being the identical Many expression. 
 Christ also asserted correctly that the Golden Rule was fun- 
 damental general law (Matt. 7, 12). 162e 
 
 162e In my opinion the remainder of Christ's probable sayings in- 
 dicate rather clearly that he (1) actually did distinguish the One and 
 the Many, (2) had a general knowledge of the valid logic (e. g., 
 when he shifts expression from the usual Many terms to a One form, 
 he often indicates the shift by stating something to the effect that 
 the saying is for those with "understanding"), and (3) as a general 
 thing used the valid logic consistently, so that his definite recogni- 
 tion of the general ethical and religious law was based on competence 
 and ability, and not upon a happy accident, so far as he was person- 
 ally concerned, of largely subconscious cerebration. Many men hit 
 upon and state correctly ultimate general principles: everyone's 
 brain works out such all the time — it really being unavoidable. E.g., 
 Luke (10, 27) puts the general ethical law in the mouth of a lawyer, 
 and not in Christ's — presumably as having been distinguished from 
 the trivialities in the Jewish law (Lev. 19, etc.) by the lawyer and 
 people in general. And then the lawyer promptly asked Who is my 
 neighbor? — showing that his stating of the fundamental law was ac- 
 cidental and parroting (or it raises a doubt as to the reliability of 
 Luke's reporting). The able, competent man is the one who recog- 
 nizes what he has done or said, asserts such recognition, and (unless 
 by more facts convinced of a mistake and explicitly acknowledging 
 such) thereafter consistently adheres to it. That last requirement is 
 the one on which most of us fail; we usually have not the strong 
 grasp on the truth which enables us to stick to it. It is easy to find 
 the truth, but hard to "live" it, because in living it we must always 
 
 avoid getting confused by the actually present infinite regress. 
 
 So it appears definitely that Christ recognized the essential truth (cf. 
 §1591), stated it correctly in a rough way, and probably managed to 
 stick to it pretty well. And he did that in the face of dualism and 
 autocracy on all sides of him (the pre-war militaristic Prussian was a 
 meek lamb, with a gentle and gentlemanly Kultur, compared with 
 the scoundrels in Christ's day) ; and he did it clearly enough to get 
 
§162f XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 196 
 
 f. Obviously, in both those equations the extensive factor 
 (God the Sons... in the first, and Neighbors... in the second) 
 is in practice liable to be confused or misunderstood, although 
 logically by our total argument both are equivalent simply to 
 Environment... . We just saw that God the Sons... is grossly 
 confused. And the ordinary meaning of neighbor is not defi- 
 nitely inclusive of environment. In fact, the lawyer asked 
 Christ to define neighbor (footnote par. e), and Christ accord- 
 ing to report responded with the parable of the Good Samari- 
 tan, which as an answer is (as it is written in Luke) irrational, 
 irrelevant, and dualistic. (I. e., the parable shows that the 
 Samaritan acted — perhaps exaggeratedly- — as a man who is 
 conscious of being a neighbor to the man who fell among 
 thieves would act in order to show that consciousness — to be 
 moral. That is obviously irrelevant to the question Who is 
 my neighbor?; and the point is further confused by the de- 
 tails of the men who passed by; for obviously, in principle 
 they were neighbors, which is the point, but were substan- 
 tially asserted not to be.) The Bible is very full of such 
 
 irrelevancies — logical evasions of the point. The 
 
 same problem is in the even more ancient question :- Am 
 I my brother's keeper? And it is nowhere positively answered 
 in the Bible, so far as I can find, and is not fully answerable 
 without explicit solution or the One and Many. So we may 
 more precisely and intelligibly combine our two equations 
 into this one:- Environment... X Ourselves... = Good. The 
 equation then explicitly includes everything, and shows that 
 atoms, etc., rigorously are neighbors. The total evidence 
 set forth by this book obviously goes to prove that the equa- 
 tion is valid : that all things are related to us (that we act- 
 ually do love all things as being our neighbors — are in some 
 degree our brother's keeper, even when that brother is an 
 electron in another galaxy). That is a definite and inclusive 
 answer, and proof of the answer, to all possible questions of 
 principle in ethics. It remains to discuss some of the quanti- 
 tative aspects of the equation. 
 
 g. A more convenient form of that explicit equation 
 would obviously be one stated in more conventional ethical 
 terms. Perhaps the simplest and most directly intelligible 
 is this:- Unselfishness... Y,Selfishness...=Good; or, Unselfish 
 acts or phenomena... X. Selfish acts or phenomena... =Good. 
 That equation obviously means that we are a machine reacting 
 with the environment, and shows that primarily we should 
 consider that the environment is attracting or related or lov- 
 ing, and that we give to it (are unselfish to it), so that it in 
 turn gives to us so that we, still retaining ourselves as the 
 point of view (the intensive factor), thus get, or are selfish. 
 Obviously, selfishness and unselfishness are then merely 
 points of view of the Many; Selfishness... is ourselves or the 
 intensive factor; and Unselfishness..., the environment in 
 general or the extensive factor. We could say that we and 
 the environment are mutually repulsive, or opposed to each 
 
 his solution stated fairly well by dualistic reporters who had but lit- 
 tle knowledge of what they were really saying. So it seems reason- 
 able to regard Christ as an unusually great genius — or saint, or 
 prophet, if you prefer those terms. But that is a quantitative judg- 
 ment, and is merely my personal opinion, for which I have given 
 considerable evidence; there is much in the Bible that is explicitly 
 attributed to Christ which is grossly wrong both quantitatively and 
 qualitatively; and it is not possible to find out absolutely what he 
 did teach, as it is a quantitative question. So if you consider that 
 Christ was about as wrong as right, then I have to agree that possibly 
 it is so; if we take the Bible literally, as many theologians say we 
 must, then I have to agree that assuredly you are right. But, it is 
 unessential whether we regard Christ as an extraordinarily fine man 
 or not: it is rigorously proved that he is essentially the same as any 
 other unit of the Many, and his quantitative size is unessential as a 
 matter of principle. As a matter of practical living, we ought to be 
 able to estimate him quantitatively, as will implicitly appear. 
 
 other with "force," or fight. Even then truistically each 
 is transferring or giving something to the other (in physical 
 terms, transferring secondary whirls); so in ordinary lang- 
 uage we might as well call that giving a loving one. 
 
 h. The quickest proof of the validity of Unselfishness... 
 XSelfishness. . .=Good seems to be this:- If we are absolutely 
 selfish — are real Nietzschean supermen, — so that we totally 
 separate ourselves from other things, obviously they can give 
 us nothing; we would be in an absolute vacuum and would 
 necessarily become zero ourselves. On the contrary, if we 
 were absolutely unselfish — perfectly altruistic, as the extreme 
 socialists and the I.W.W. and Tolstoy and parlor intellectu- 
 als in general theory seem to pretend to be, — then obviously 
 we would totally give away all we had, including ourselves, 
 and would become zero, or absolutely go out of existence — 
 another impossibility. Clearly, the Many statement of 
 selfishness and unselfishness is like that of all other machines 
 or That... X This... 's of the universe:- both Many parts must 
 remain finite, and the sum total will actually be a perfect 
 balance of the two (which two spread out to include ulti- 
 mately the whole universe). So that balanced reaction must 
 consciously be striven for (it ultimately exists, whether we 
 are alive enough to be conscious of it or not, as shown in 
 §114c: the profiteer who tries to grab something without 
 giving adequate return pays for it by having his brain die 
 some). It is the same solution seen repeatedly heretofore. 
 For an excellent statement in detail (and with no obtrusion 
 of technical logic) of how selfishness and unselfishness should 
 be balanced, see Lee's "The Lost Art of Reading" and 
 "Crowds." A definite application of the principle to actual 
 industry or everyday living or economics" is made by Tay- 
 lor under the name "scientific management" (§168j, etc.). 
 
 i. Christ's Many statement of that ethical solution (and 
 a number of men anticipated him in making it) is :- do unto 
 others as you would that the}' do unto you; or, love your 
 neighbor as yourself. Clearly, that is vaguely a statement of 
 Unselfishness... ^Selfishness... . But equally clearly, 'if it is a 
 Many or quantitative statement, definitely interpreted as such 
 it is not true — is illogical. I. e., Christ s form of state- 
 ment verbally tacitly assumes that you and your neighbor are 
 quantitatively equal, and such is never the case. Practically, if 
 I loved one neighbor as much as I loved myself, I quite ob- 
 viously would not have much love left to lavish on neighbor 
 number two — for love is definitely chemical affinity and grav- 
 ity, and as a Many individual I have a certain limited quan- 
 tity of it. (Of course it is unlimited, if I lapse into mystic, 
 One expression : but we are speaking scientifically, or in 
 everyday quantitative terms.) Or, if I definitely treated a baby 
 in the way I wanted the baby to treat me, obviously he would 
 have cause for grave complaint. In short, the conventional 
 quantitative statements of the ethical equation are only rough 
 implications — they are glaringly wrong if taken explicitly. 
 The reader may say that they are intelligible — that we under- 
 stand what is meant by them. I agree that if we are not in 
 the defective upper ten or submerged tenth (who usually do 
 their grabbing under a verbal aegis or bluff" of the Golden 
 Rule), in ordinary routine circumstances we know pretty well 
 what we ought to do; and when we do it we are likely to 
 say that the doing did agree with the orthodox rules. But 
 those rules are obviously such an uncertain mixture of One 
 expression in a Many guise that we are practically nearly 
 without any valid quantitative ethical theory. But of course 
 much of valid existing economics and allied subjects are act- 
 ually ethical and serve in the place of the direct ethical rules 
 that the theologians have failed to supply although it was 
 their duty to do so: e. g., Taylor's principles of management 
 are a precise and workable statement of those defective and 
 
197 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §163b 
 
 missing ethics. As a One proposition all men are equal, be- 
 cause each man ultimatelj' is God. But when we react to- 
 gether as skin-bounded men we are by no means equal, and 
 can not possibly work by a rule which tacitly asserts such 
 non-existent Many equality — as the Golden Rule and its usual 
 theological and grafting (e. g., socialistic or red") inter- 
 pretations do. E. g., even the coarse statute or lawyers law 
 does nothing else but define and handle individual inequali- 
 ties. A murderer is treated by it quantitatively differently 
 from a minor, and a murderer has effectually asked, by his 
 deeds, for such quantitatively different treatment. Sound 
 law does nothing else but divide people into classes depend- 
 ing on their actual size, as measured by their acts, etc. ; 
 the unsound law to which we object as being class" legis- 
 lation unnaturally and never really successfully tries to divide 
 men into fixed, constant, exact-science classes, instead of 
 recognizing that men are unequal and are continually by their 
 own acts and merits fixing their varying classes (XIX). 
 
 j. So Christ's Many law or Golden Rule is inaccurate, 
 although as a rough general approximation it probably was 
 needed as a first step in democracy (or perhaps it is more 
 precise to say that the One implication the law correctly gives 
 was first needed). The more accurate law might merely 
 have confused men in that crude age. But now we have bet- 
 ter nervous systems, and can go beyond that child's step in 
 democracy — i. e., perhaps the majority have strong enough 
 nervous systems. So we shall explicitly consider our equa- 
 tion or law quantitatively, and get the statements of what we 
 ought to do, expressed in terms of what we actually do do. 
 For we saw in the last paragraph that we do not follow the 
 inaccurate Golden Rule. By thus becoming conscious of 
 what we do, we very perceptibly get a more abundant life, 
 and can also anticipate the future somewhat — make states- 
 manship a science, instead of having it as in well known hist- 
 ory, a sort of black art that rarely works, and so partly in 
 pursuance of an instinctive sense of decency that make peo- 
 ple hide defects and shortcomings from the pained gaze of 
 others, conducted as much as possible in secrecy. 
 
 §163. a. We have seen (§ 160b) that within certain nar- 
 row limits of reaction of Environment... X Ourselves. .. = Un- 
 selfishness... XSelfishness. . .=Good, or Energy the quantitative 
 summation or standard universe of Good or Energy is so little 
 perceptible to us as to be considered morally indifferent, or 
 unmoral. I. e., a perfect or nearly perfect balance or mor- 
 ality is not directly perceptible to us (see par. b). A con- 
 sideration of that fact shows why what we call happiness, 
 or a fair balance in life, is so elusive, and why there are so 
 many conflicting opinions as to what it is and how to get it, 
 and why as a usual thing if we deliberately and consciously 
 "seek" for happiness the very seeking is an unbalance that 
 causes us to fail to get happiness or a fair balance. Obvi- 
 ously, in our daily small acts with the environment (whether 
 they be "spiritual" or "idealistic" acts with our fellows, or 
 even "spiritual" reactions of parts of our own selves or nerv- 
 ous systems; or "material" or "utilitarian" acts with 
 "things," such as wearing clothes or eating), a single act is 
 usually not accompanied by any perceptible pleasure or pain 
 —to us the act is simply unmoral. But evidently each of 
 those acts actually does tend (l) in a direction towards a vital 
 or moral or "good" balance, or else (2) away from it. And 
 if those acts, instead of being temperately rhythmic (first in 
 one direction and then in the other), tend steadily to accumu- 
 late in one direction (either in the direction of zero activity 
 or doing nothing, an intemperate parasitism; or in the direc- 
 tion of infinite activity, an intemperate hurry, mania, radical- 
 ism, fanaticism, etc.), then it is evident by simple arithmetic 
 that we shall run into a painful unbalance, and as a truism 
 
 achieve unhappiness. — 
 little things" or trifles, 
 
 Those unmoral acts are the 
 
 or tnries, and in many lives sum up arith- 
 metically to more than the big" things, and so have the 
 greater effect on happiness. A man moral in the big, per- 
 ceptible things can readily accumulate great unhappiness by 
 being in sum very immoral in unmoral things. And many 
 men who are noticeable scoundrels in some big things have 
 kept themselves well balanced in the unmoral or little things 
 and so have been on the whole rather happy — in spite of the 
 fact that the big immoralities inevitably subtract something 
 from their sum of possible happiness. Truistically the un- 
 moral things are not perceptibly indifferently moral in sum: 
 each one is a dot in Emotions. . . . But if a man seeks 
 happiness, he in practical effect magnifies each of those un- 
 moral acts into perceptibility, and thus becomes a sort of ex- 
 perimental laboratory of morality instead of a live person : 
 he takes out the wheels to see what makes life go round, 
 and it truistically largely stops going, and the world correctly 
 labels him over-conscientious, pious, a neurasthenic, a prig. 
 He does not gain happiness, but often imagines that he has 
 committed the unforgivable sin (the dualistic, fancied abso- 
 lute zero" in ethics). The truistic remedy again is 
 
 temperance. Instead of nearly totally neglecting the un- 
 moral acts, or of trying to force each to a perceptible morali- 
 ty, we take a middle course of letting them accumulate for a 
 while (a week, a month, ten years — it is a quantitative prob- 
 lem, and primarily needs good judgment by each person for 
 himself), and then take out the wheels temporarily and ex- 
 amine them, and correct tendencies as may be necessary. It 
 is not likely to hurt anyone much to go to (say) a dance once: 
 
 but a hundred times might. So obviously there is no 
 
 mystery about getting happiness, nor any injustice in its be- 
 stowal. The rain does fall alike on the just and the unjust. 
 But there is the additional fact that the unjust in the long 
 run never have sense enough to take advantage of the oppor- 
 tunities thus afforded : they merely complain of the weather, 
 b. We saw further (§160b) that beyond the amounts of 
 Energy or Good which are unmoral, there is a range or zone 
 or spectrum of amounts in which the acts are perceptibly 
 pleasant or right or moral. Beyond that is a doubtful zone; 
 then an immoral zone; then an unlimited zone of destructive 
 but imperceptible immorality in which the individual is killed 
 as such — changes to whirls of a different order. I may most 
 clearly show those zones, with their limits, on a rectangular 
 hyperbola, analogous to the hyperbola used in Fig. 104b to 
 show the forms of That... X This... = Energy. This human- 
 istic naming of the parts of the hyperbola serves to make that 
 
 more general equation clearer. We have the equation 
 
 Unselfishness... X.Seffishness...=Good, or Energy. Let the 
 axes of Fig. 168b (see next page) show the two factors as in- 
 dicated. The points of perfect balancing of all structures are 
 on a line at 45° to the axes — one point being at O as shown, 
 this point being for a given Many man (compare that with 
 the physics statement of balance, §114c). The rectangular 
 hyperbola through O is for the equation Unselfishness~KSelf- 
 ishness= Energy (a constant standard universe) — a perfect equa- 
 tion (no dots or regress). Truistically, the man will be in 
 a rigorous monistic Nirvana if he stays on that perfect hyper- 
 bola at O. In a Many existence, a slight departure from 
 the balance destroys some of the man and makes some other 
 part grow, the change being a decrease of (say) extensive 
 factor and an increase of intensive — the unbalance not being 
 great enough to cause a general change to some other order 
 of structure. I. e. , if there is too violent or extensive a 
 change in some part of the man, other parts can not perform 
 an equally reacting change, and the man dies. So we can 
 take it as being a rough approximation that so long as the 
 
§163b XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 198 
 
 man remains organically a man he oscillates back and forth 
 from O on a curve which on an average may be represented 
 by the hyperbola from D to D'. Beyond that, on the dotted 
 portions, the man as a whole structure changes definitely and 
 
 ' Zone of imperceptible 
 
 \Limit of perceptible pain 
 
 or destructive pain- 
 
 °r. death 
 
 , of <J» iflvin0: 
 
 *&****.** 
 
 <» m 
 
 -, V 
 
 03 
 
 -4 
 
 Unselfishness . . . 
 
 (.Extensive factor) 
 
 Fig. 163b. 
 
 perceptibly to other orders of whirls that can no longer be 
 represented by this average curve of one organism or order. 
 
 c. We take it that the man in his swings from O to 
 either A or A can not consciously perceive the departure 
 from O; so A and A are the limits of the unmoral — A being 
 the selfish or intensive limit, and A the unselfish or extensive 
 limit. (Hereafter without further statement, the prime let- 
 ters are extensive limits, and others intensive limits — and 
 analogously with zones.) Then, so long as the man oscillates 
 inside A and A he is in the zone of the unmoral. In those 
 oscillations truistically some structures in his body are being 
 broken down and others built up — but imperceptibly directly 
 to him. So he continues to exist averagedly or as one man 
 on (represented by) the perfect curve ; but some parts of him 
 move off the curve and perform cycles. And obviously, those 
 cycles of small, imperceptible quantities of energy or struct- 
 ural changes in time sum to a perceptible quantity, which, if 
 in moderate amount, is perceptible and moral and gives hap- 
 piness. But if most of his departures from the balance O are 
 in the same direction, then parts of his body truistically are 
 being continually worn out without being substantially re- 
 grown (and possibly other structures increased), so that the 
 accumulation finally runs past the limits of morality and hap- 
 piness — finally into death. We all finally wear ourselves out 
 by being unable to keep moral acts accurately cyclic. 
 
 d. From (say) A to B our acts become directly percept- 
 ible, and easily within the limits our unit man-structure tol- 
 erates (cyclically substantially re-grows), and are moral or 
 pleasant or happy (subject to the possible accumulations with 
 
 time, par. c). So truistically our acts in the A to B 
 
 or moral zone stay fairly well within the tolerable limits of 
 another man, assuming that he is quantitatively of about the 
 same strength as ourselves, which roughly in most cases he 
 is. But it is obvious that structures of different order must 
 have curves different from the curve for men (i. e., atoms or 
 birds couldn't enjoy and thrive on what we do) ; and those 
 'different' curves obviously can not be directly compared, 
 but can be by means of the inverse square law, just as tem- 
 peratures of different order structures may be — that showing 
 
 that quantitative ethics is theoretically unified with all other 
 sciences (and incidentally, also that our ethics are identical 
 with those of birds and animals when properly translated). 
 Further, it is obvious that by the theory of incommensurabil- 
 ity the extensive limits and the intensive limits can not beat 
 the same distance from O, although they are roughly shown 
 so in the figure. Also, of course A and B (and the other 
 limits, etc.) are only approximate for a given man during 
 some comparatively short period of time. The man is always 
 changing- — and obviously the limits, etc., are glaringly never 
 sharp and definite anyway. All that is a brief indi- 
 cation of quantitative ethics — which is explicitly identical 
 with the other sciences we have seen, and clearly not exact. 
 
 e. Then from B to C is a zone which is so intense (or so 
 extensive) that it is a doubtful zone: we do not know whether 
 it is pleasant or painful. E. g. , we enjoy one hearty laugh, 
 even though it feels a little too hearty ; but two in close suc- 
 cession (before we have time for re-growth) are likely to be 
 painful and immoral. We have to gamble a bit in this world, 
 there being no exact science; and ethically we gamble by 
 getting into this doubtful moral zone occasionally — and with 
 courageous abandon when we do(§§149e, 159, footnote par. h). 
 
 f. The doubtful moral zone BC (and B'Cf) might rather 
 consistently be called the zone of legal morality. I. e., law- 
 yer's law usually undertakes to designate the limit C of 
 doubtful morality as being the permissible legal limit. Such 
 law recognizes that this limit is different for different persons ; 
 but it recognizes it only in a rough way as beween minors 
 and adults, as to some differences of man and woman, and as 
 between some conditions of health and disease. Obviously, 
 
 every man has a particular personal limit C. As a 
 
 general rule, the poorer (according to customary judgment) a 
 man's brain and-or body is, the lower (closer to O) his pain 
 endurance for one given act is ; or vice versa, the highly 
 strung" or better trained man can stand much more of one 
 act. Theoretically the statute law should make dis- 
 tinction as to the actual inequalities of men in infinite regress : 
 practically the law correctly does so as far as the majority 
 perceptions go. Perhaps the next practical step in the law 
 will be the majority recognition that aristocrats (whether in 
 the upper direction such as kaisers, dualistic theologians, 
 and financial pirates, or in the other direction of shirking, ir- 
 responsible, socialistic workmen) are mentally defective, and 
 must in some respects be treated as minors (held irresponsi- 
 ble for most contracts, promises, etc.). Those people are 
 instinctively always asking for such privileges; we see that 
 their instinct agrees with the facts about them, and should 
 not be completely thwarted (as is implicitly shown by XIX). 
 But they in turn truistically should be explicitly deprived of 
 the adult rights that go with adult responsibilities. E. g., 
 in many places a labor union can not be effectively held to a 
 contract; if they do not want to be, then the obvious solution 
 is to make them legally incompetent to bargain — including 
 authorized procedure by which they can leave such a status 
 whenever they feel disposed to put away such childishness. 
 
 g. It follows as a truism that when any man considers 
 himself moral, or humanly justified, in continuing to react 
 with others quite out to the limit C permitted him by 
 the lawyers' law, then he is badly wrong. The man who 
 says business is business," and means by that phrase that 
 he will strive to take everything the law allows him before 
 jailing him, and the lawyer who aids him in that sort of busi- 
 ness, theoretically hold the pre-war Kultur which demanded 
 a continual striving away from the balance — an absolutely 
 wrong view. None of them in practice make such abso- 
 lute scoundrels of themselves : they automatically act better 
 than they profess to. Obviously, if a man thus tries to keep 
 
199 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §163h 
 
 acting in the zone of doubtful morality he rather quickly ac- 
 cumulates an immoral unbalance that damages both himself 
 and others. Generally speaking he damages himself consider- 
 ably more than any other one person ; for obviously his activities 
 are usually spread over many others, but the reaction is con- 
 centrated on himself. If he and his accomplices, the lawyers, 
 can stand that reaction, and also stand the knowledge that 
 we see that they are fundamentally wrong morally and hence 
 undesirable citizens and neighbors — if they can pay that high 
 price, I think we can tolerate the damage they do us without 
 trying to fight them with their own fire, the statute law, 
 which they have in their pseudo theory spoiled (§173), and 
 have somewhat spoiled in practice. If financial pirates and 
 their business is business lawyer-accomplices had enough 
 intelligence to understand the high price they pay in personal 
 deterioration for that profiteering (and profiteering is an atti- 
 tude of mind — a desire to get all that can be grabbed- — rather 
 than the actual amount that is got), they would automatically 
 stop it. So the best way for us to eliminate such legally 
 permitted grabbing is to show the self-deceived grabbers 
 
 what they pay out of their skins. It is probably 
 
 a fact generally recognized, even by lawyers themselves, that 
 the average lawyer considers it entirely moral and in every 
 way right for everybody, including himself, to act continually 
 up to the limit explicitly forbidden by lawyers law. This 
 paragraph rigorously proves that to the extent which that 
 notorious fact applies, the legal profession are morally and 
 mentally inferior. In my opinion the fact applies to a large 
 majority of lawyers. But of course the legal profession con- 
 tains some very able and honest men : Lincoln was such an 
 exception. And the leading lawyers seem to have a surpris- 
 ingly contemptuous opinion of most of their colleagues : e.g., 
 Storey ("Reform of Legal Procedure," 3, 5, 6) approvingly 
 quotes able lawyers :- Taft:- "The administration of crimi- 
 nal law in this country is a disgrace to our civilization ; 
 Vance:- "The American lawyer has proved a failure ; 
 "The legal profession in America is blighted by serious 
 faults. The first is a low moral tone, manifesting itself, in 
 its worst form, in deliberate preying on the public. * The 
 second is a lack of the knowledge of the law as a science, 
 as distinguished from a knowledge of the law as a craft.' 
 For the legal theory of what is wrong with lawyers see §173. 
 h. The remarks in the last two paragraphs about the di- 
 rection in which we act may be generalized :- Clearly, if we 
 continually strive to go away from the balance O, we are 
 striving to accumulate an unbalance. If we keep on trying 
 to grab more and more things for ourselves (go out continu- 
 ally towards the asymptote on the Selfishness... branch) we 
 are trying to make unselfishness zero, and will inevitably 
 blow up (get irretrivably out of balance, and change order of 
 structure; in business terms, "fail" unless we go to pieces 
 physically first and die or have to "retire"). And precisely 
 the same result occurs if we try to keep going in the other 
 direction — try to be too altruistic. As a general scientific 
 fact, we have seen that any given structure, so long as it re- 
 mains substantially itself, always tends to oscillate back to a 
 balance (§114c). Therefore, unless there are valid conscious 
 reasons why we should seek death (as may sometimes be the 
 case — truistically, as it is quantitative), we ethically should 
 try to pull ourselves and others back to a balance together; 
 we should not (using ordinary language agreements) try to 
 repulse people steadily, or use "force" or "might" or (in 
 the latest weaselly euphemism) "direct action" on them, or 
 "drive" them; but we should love them, or like them or co- 
 operate with them, or work with them— those phrases indicat- 
 ing the reciprocating give and take or rhythmic cycles that 
 give balance. Kultur, or 
 
 'blood and iron," words, by ordi- 
 
 nary verbal agreements, assert or imply that we are trying 
 to create an unbalance — be superior, better, aristocrats 
 (except of course parlor radicals and Nietzsche use them to 
 make-believe that they are brave, fierce, wild creatures). 
 And obviously, to assert that we try to create more unbalance 
 is to assert a fundamentally wrong principle — actually it is a 
 stupid assertion that we are seeking death and destruction. 
 And as we shall see (§169d) — and this is the point those 
 repetitions are driving at:- such a wrong principle is intoler- 
 able. We will not and can not and never do tolerate such 
 wrongness in principle, regardless of what we may carelessly 
 and ignorantly say about it. All this is obviously identical 
 in principle with the theory of genius (§159), and need not 
 
 be further expanded. We saw an example of the 
 
 practical attempt at such a wrong principle by the people 
 who consider it even permissible to go continuously as far as 
 the law allows. Precisely the same stupidity is exhibited in 
 the various "public be damned" attitudes. The railroads 
 found by direct experiment that it did not pay ; now most 
 railroad officials are so imbued with such ultimate human 
 wisdom (expressed in common terms :- it pays to be polite, to 
 avoid friction, to be pleasant, to smile, not to get into any 
 fight that can be avoided [and all which do not directly in- 
 volve principle should be: §169d]) that they are our best 
 men. Some labor leaders seem to have adopted the public 
 be damned" policy. They will get their experimental wis- 
 dom to the contrary rather more violently and painfully than 
 have others, because as a usual thing a labor leader s mind is 
 
 very poor. Precisely the same error inheres in all 
 
 "class wars," or in the idea that labor and capital are con- 
 flicting rather than merely interacting. As a matter of fact, 
 as a rule in this country the successful business men (exclud- 
 ing numbers of momentarily successful money-grabbers, 
 brokers, and others whose alleged services consist mostly of 
 price gambling 16311 ) very clearly recognize the truth of that 
 
 i63h Gambling is an economic and an ethical and psychological 
 loss to everyone who in any given gamble is not with definite con- 
 sciousness engaged directly in it, and who thus has not the gambler's 
 selfish satisfaction in obtaining the quantitative answer concerning 
 which the wager is made at once or quickly (the gambler arbitrarily 
 increases the importance of that answer in most cases by a money 
 stake larger than would be needed otherwise). For economic proof, 
 see Marshall's "Economics," (135,843); to make that proof rigorous 
 and also extend it to ethics and psychology, apply it to the Weber- 
 Fechner law as given in §156. It therefore rigorously follows (see 
 more familiar proof given below in this footnote) that the gamblers 
 (including all business price-gamblers) get a selfish satisfaction (not 
 recognized by Marshall) at the expense of other people. It is pre- 
 cisely the same as the obvious fact that the man who does not know 
 has to risk himself, and also in some degree the comfort of other peo- 
 ple, in finding out. And usually the price-gambler keeps stretching 
 his own perceptions into the doubtful zone, so that his pleasure turns 
 into pain and immorality — which is some part of the cause of the 
 high death rate of stockbrokers and similar gamblers. Fun- 
 damentally, to give the proof of the wrongness of gambling in more 
 familiar terms, gambling in the widest sense is our guessing at quan- 
 tities, which is forced upon us by the principle that there is no exact 
 science. In that wide and very usual conventional meaning, we can 
 do nothing in practical life but gamble. But in a narrower sense, 
 gambling consists of making it of greater importance to guess 
 than is ordinarily necessary. The gambler increases his stakes in 
 order to make his guess at a quantitative result of more importance 
 or perceptibility to himself; and obviously that consists in trying 
 to make activities depart from their normal balance {except in the 
 possible case where the gambler needs the psychological stimulus and 
 can and will substantially restore the disturbed balance). The gam- 
 bling forced upon us by 'no exact science' is usually an attempt to 
 go towards the balance, and then in temperate quantities is moral 
 (e. g., when I started to work out this book one expert adviser said 
 I was immorally gambling with my sanity). Obviously, the well 
 recognized difficulty in deciding as to the morality or desirability of 
 gambling is due to the fact that we have to decide whether a given 
 act (not intention: all intentions from the point of view of the holder 
 
§163h XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 200 
 
 ethical principle and apply it to the best of their ability. 
 Their chief difficulties in applying it consist some in the op- 
 position of the little ignorant, mildly incompetent business 
 men, but mostly in the opposition of the class-conscious, 
 output-limiting sort of labor, who still are ignorantly inclined 
 to fight" and who have not enough mental integrity to 
 keep their contracts (to say A=A and stick to it). 
 
 i. At the limit of doubtful or legal morality (say C, Fig. 
 163b), the perceptions of given acts become painful, and in- 
 crease until at D we pass beyond the limit of perceptible 
 pain into the zone of imperceptible pain (into unconscious- 
 ness or death), in which zone the unit personal structure 
 changes to structures of different orders, and the man ceases 
 to be an individual man. If we pass beyond D into the zone 
 of unconsciousness the system may recuperate and after a 
 time re-unify and return to consciousness. Almost daily the 
 accumulation of unmoral acts forces us into the zone beyond 
 D, where we are unconscious in sleep. When we undergo 
 that phenomenon usually there are enough reserve parts (per- 
 haps nerve cells) to permit us, as unit individuals, to pass 
 through the zone of pain CD so rapidly as to make it imper- 
 ceptible. When we are in the zone of perceptible 
 
 pain CD we are obviously being automatically warned by 
 nature to get back to a balance (as a truism, or mechanical 
 automatism, that departure from the normal is pain); and 
 we usually heed that warning. So truistically pain or suffer- 
 ing in this Many sense is not a One evil at all, but a positive 
 good that saves us (for by verbal agreement, to be saved, to 
 exist, is good). Further, the next perceptible step on the 
 outward swing from the balance is Many unconsciousness; 
 and obviously that is not Evil either, but is usually merely a 
 means of automatically stopping us as unit individuals in our 
 swing out, so that we may have a chance to recuperate. But 
 sooner or later we swing into the unconscious zone and can 
 not recover as personal individuals, but as such are perman- 
 ently unconscious or dead." But we see again that this 
 is merely a little wider cycle than any before, and not essen- 
 tially different from the others. In no case was one of those 
 cycles a perfect cycle; i. e., in no case did we ever, at any 
 step of the actually infinite regress along the curve, come 
 back exactly to our previous personality. 
 
 j. We have seen that the whole individual does not 
 actually stay on the perfect hyperbola. This curve is merely 
 the average — a general way of showing the principles. What 
 actually happens is that there are parts of the individual or- 
 ganism which are in periodicity with the whole organism (or 
 galaxy'), and those parts build up and break down to some 
 degree without definitely changing the unit organism (just as 
 do the parts of the stellar galaxy). We may say that the 
 smallest part remains such in the unmoral zone (for a time: 
 I omit explicit discussion of the T's), but at about the limits 
 A, A changes into structures of different order — perhaps joins 
 on as a part of a larger structure; perhaps break up into de- 
 bris : no one yet definitely knows those quantitative details. 
 Then the next heavier or higher structure survives inside 
 
 are good, as we have seen) tends toward a balance, or an unbalance. 
 The gambler who disturbs any equilibrium, hoping to grab some 
 profit for himself in the resulting confusion and uncertainty, is im- 
 moral in cases where he can not demonstrate an increased balance 
 for others, or where he does not restore the particular unbalance he 
 causes — or even try to. The gambler who proposes to make a busi- 
 ness of — keep on — making such unbalances is himself extremely im- 
 moral, but may perhaps be morally permitted to spoil himself if he 
 wants to, in order to give normal people occasional moral gambles. 
 In this matter we run into the quantitative regress practically, and 
 can't be certain whether stockbrokers are moral or not. With a 
 steady climate, it is likely that in a few years we shall develop 
 enough not to need such "artificially" violent activity as price 
 gambling, and then the present-day broker will be immoral. 
 
 the moral limits B, B'. And so on. The equation for those 
 parts is M{varying with) L?T~ 2 — Energy . That 'smallest part' 
 which survives in the unmoral zone is a standard universe 
 Energy or Unmoral emotion; then there is a "larger" standard 
 universe Consciousness; etc. M truistically can be an ethical 
 unit (cf. §158) — whether an "act of love" or a square 
 meal being immaterial to the theory, but of primary import- 
 ance in practical measuring — in determining the selection, 
 naming, and evaluating of ethical coefficients. The quantita- 
 tive theory of ethics is as nebulous as electricity was three 
 centuries ago; hence, I have too little definite quantitative 
 experience to make a competent suggestion as to what sort of 
 ethical units should be used ; but a tentative guess is that if 
 ethics is to be a fairly definite branch of science it will occupy 
 the ground between psychology and economics, with units of 
 money and human effort (cf. §§168b, 172b for equational 
 statement of that). F. W. Taylor's scientific management 
 was the first rather definite work that substantially made 
 ethics a science, taking it out of its previous status of theo- 
 retical mushy idealism ' and practical exploiting. Taylor 
 was therefore a pioneer of the size of Christ, Newton, Dar- 
 win. His work is now being extended in a practical way, 
 usually under the name of management engineering, by such 
 leaders as Cooke, Thompson, Hathaway, the Gilbreths. In 
 a theoretical way his work is being extended under so many 
 names in the colleges as to make it seem that the name 
 ethics may not survive the odium of its theological misuse. 
 
 That equation in ethics therefore has the same theory 
 
 of periodicity as in any other science (cf. §158 in psychology; 
 for ethics the structures are of different size). And the 
 mathematical discussion of those zones and limits (which con- 
 stitutes some of the definite details of periodicity') is obvi- 
 ously identical with the economic theory of marginal values, 
 etc. (which is simply a general discussion of our daily problem 
 Is it worth quite that much to me?). A marginal value" 
 is above called » zone,' etc. (see Marshall's "Economics"). 
 
 So all of science is again seen to be rigorously unified 
 
 and we now see in the most familiar detail that it is not 
 necessary, for a complete understanding of the variations of 
 any thing, that the conventional "measures" be made. In 
 short, it is possible to state the principles of all science a pri- 
 ori. It could not be strictly a priori: it would actually be the 
 conclusions from watching our own nerve cells act; but that 
 is usually called a priori, although there obviously is no es- 
 sential experimental difference between watching one of our 
 nerve cells work and watching the galaxy work. However, 
 the man who restricted himself to watching one of his nerve 
 cells act would almost certainly be so excessively poor in 
 practical judgment (in sense of proportion, or ability to guess 
 well at the proportions of phenomena in general — "sense of 
 proportion is the common name for periodicity,' and as 
 artists admit they ought to have it, some may be distressed to 
 hear that it means not only practical, but "worse" :- scien- 
 tific) that his observations would be practically worthless — 
 which shows why any man who specializes too much has poor 
 
 judgment and is poor as an executive. Several volumes 
 
 of expansion of those facts must be omitted at this point (the 
 rhetoric has already passed the point of condensation that is 
 tolerable) — such as showing that the solution of the One and 
 Many proves that a priori and a posteriori are ultimately iden- 
 tical — which is the same as saying that valid logic uses "de- 
 ductive reasoning and inductive" reasoning simultaneously 
 and hence without ultimate distinction. 
 
 §164. a. The last section gives in a rough elementary 
 way the quantitative establishment of ethics as a science. 
 We are now ready to consider some of its general principles 
 and applications. 
 
201 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §164e 
 
 b. As ethical good or happiness is activity or life, it fol- 
 lows that the basic ethical or human aim is to get all qfit that 
 is quantitatively compatible with various Many aims or purposes 
 or relationships — in short, have a sense of proportion or peri- 
 odicity in living" (a direct truism). The active achieve- 
 ment of that is virtue, righteousness, merit, morality, etc. ; 
 and the failure to achieve such fair quantitative balance is 
 sin, iniquity, ungodliness, wickedness, etc. For as seen, if 
 we swing too far from the balance and get too much of what 
 otherwise is life, the pleasure quantitatively reverses into 
 pain or immorality, and some structural part reverses or 
 
 dies" and we actually get less life. So the prime ethical 
 aim is to build up a biological structure (chiefly the nervous 
 system) that is more extensive and intensive, so that it will 
 survive greater excursions from the balance — for otherwise 
 much of a swing, much "prosperity," hurts instead of pleas- 
 ing (truistically, too much prosperity" hurts). We have seen 
 that such a strengthened individual is usually called a genius. 
 And such increase of quantitative tolerance by many men is 
 called progress, or increase of civilization. Or, in physical 
 terms, the nervous system is more differentiated (the quanti- 
 tative details are as yet unmeasured), so that slight parts of it 
 reverse when we experience numerous phenomena, or dots in 
 our formula — which thus makes the formula or ' life" pleas- 
 
 urably perceptible a long way out. And all that is a 
 
 definite, truistic, intelligible way of saying that the prime 
 ethical aim is included in what is usually called education — a 
 life-long process of extending or leading out the nervous sys- 
 tem to grasp and tolerate more life, including of course tru- 
 istically the application of what is grasped — a process of 
 grasping skill or art, and the use of that skill or art. (Con- 
 ventionally, education" often tends to mean verbally only 
 a taking in of stimuli; but as a truism the cycle must be 
 completed by an equally proper discharge of them, as do- 
 ing" things, or the application of such half-education.) And 
 equally obviously, that education requires the education of 
 the moral man s neighbor. For if his neighbor is not able to 
 make as wide excursions as he can, then he is not able to re- 
 act (live) with his neighbor without hurting the neighbor and 
 in the reaction hurting himself. In short, if you get ahead 
 of your age you pain yourself as much as you do your neigh- 
 bors, and more than you pain any one neighbor. There are 
 two quantitative modifications of that:- (l) if you are more 
 widely educated than your neighbor, you can keep away 
 from him somewhat, and react directly with material 
 things — invent something, make things, enjoy nature," 
 etc., — a theoretically rather unsatisfactory sort of procedure, 
 in that it is not direct reaction with the same order of whirls :- 
 men ; (2) and you can distribute your reactions among many 
 people, so that no one of them is much pained ; but that is 
 also truistically unsatisfactory, in that they can not react 
 equally hard and make it interesting (just as an expert ball 
 pitcher would not care to pitch to a girl). So if you see any- 
 one priding himself on knowing more than his neighbors (so 
 that incidentally he ought to act as a sort of superior spokes- 
 man or Woodrow Wilson for them), you can correctly con- 
 clude at once that he is wrong about it, and probably knows 
 much less. If he actually knew appreciably more it would 
 be a misfortune to him, and he would say that it was a mis- 
 fortune, instead of being puffed up. 
 
 c. So truistically the basic sin is ignorance or stupidity ; 
 for ignorance is a narrowing of life. And obviously, sin is an 
 unessential quantitative matter (in its ordinary meaning). 
 All of us soon reach the point where we can not perceive fur- 
 ther, and where we have to stay ignorant. Our intentions 
 are always good, and thus there can be no One sin — no un- 
 forgivable sin. But there is, as we saw, a species of stupid 
 
 person who substantially asserts that he wants to be contin- 
 ually trying to depart from the balance. Formally or logic- 
 ally he is guilty of One or absolute sin ; but of course he in 
 practice does not do it — merely is stupid in high degree. 
 
 d. So the basic practical or quantitative rule of ethical 
 procedure is truistically (l) that we must try to make our 
 perceptions of life a little wider, but that we must not do it 
 more often or vigorously than will allow us each time to get 
 a cycle of rest by going in the opposite direction ; and (2) that 
 while we are doing it we must see to it that we do not make 
 our neighbor react unduly far, so as to pain him much (pro- 
 vided he is fairly normal or right). That is obviously identi- 
 cal with the psychological rule for being a genius (§159), or 
 the biological rule for living a healthy life (§149e), with the 
 addition that now we are explicit about considering the effect 
 on our neighbor. (Of course in the two former rules our 
 
 neighbor is implicit in Environment... .) And that 
 
 ethical rule is obviously identical with the conventional funda- 
 mental law of life:- the law of self-preservation. Clearly, that 
 law tacitly assumes that life is worth living — that good is 
 activity or life. And the law includes the principle that 
 while we are cyclically stretching our lives we will be equally 
 careful to preserve our neighbor s life so as to obviate his 
 too large reaction in ours. Or it may be said that I have 
 merely verbally expanded the ordinary moral law (the one 
 that gives the right" of self-preservation), by asserting the 
 principle of the so-called sanctity of human life. The 
 
 expansion makes the law intelligible, and proves it, by show- 
 ing the truisms upon which it rests — and shows that the total 
 argument of this book is in accord with the fundamental 
 
 judgment of the race. It then becomes evident that 
 
 the right" of self-preservation and the sanctity of human 
 life" are-is not One or absolute. As is obviously the fact, 
 and as we now see is correct in principle, in Many practice 
 or living the right and the sanctity is accorded to others only 
 in the measure in which they in practice accord it to us. 
 The principle is that we give to others the sanctity of their 
 lives just as far as we can — giving them the benefit of any doubt 
 because we recognize their ultimate Oneness and identity 
 with us. That law, thus fully expressed, is conventionally 
 called the law of humanity. Obviously, when the Germans 
 in sinking various ships acted on what they called military 
 necessity, or upon any other similar tacit assertion that their 
 own lives were essentially superior in value, they violated 
 that fundamental ethical law or law of humanity, and in the 
 most vivid practical way (i. e., by deeds) showed in that case 
 at least that they were unable to grasp fundamental princi- 
 ples. Yet, by the conventional theory of lawyers' law (which 
 theory is wrong), the Germans were legally right (cf. §173) 
 just as they contended ; Wilson, by equating the law of hu- 
 manity and legal law, did poorer thinking than the Germans. 
 
 e. That basic ethical rule, the law of humanity, is obvi- 
 ously merely a fairly definite quantitative statement of love 
 for our neighbors. It also can be seen to be inclusive of the 
 more or less synonymous virtues of duty, reliability, service, 
 kindness, cooperation, responsibility, loyalty, toleration, faithful- 
 ness, politeness, cordiality, interest and ardor, etc. There are 
 numerous ethical names for that controlled, and temperate, 
 and balance-seeking or loving, human interaction with the 
 environment and-or other humans, which action yet strives to 
 grow as large as it may, having due regard for conditions. 
 Those various names designate various combinations of react- 
 ing parts as being given in certain conditions. Truistically, 
 our statement of the principles refers to all combinations and 
 conditions, and hence covers the principles of those virtues. 
 
 ■ But we saw (par. d, (l), (2)) that in following the 
 
 basic rule we always have an intensive factor and an extensive 
 
§164e XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 factor. So we need to consider the character of our conduct 
 when emphasizing (l) one factor, and then (2) the other. 
 Truistically, each cycle of conduct consists of emphasis on 
 one factor, and then reversal onto the other — of unselfish- 
 ness and then resting selfishly ; of working and then having 
 its pay get us work from others. Any definite and applic- 
 able knowledge of ethics requires explicit grasp of the char- 
 acter of such cycles, which is given in the next four sections. 
 §165. a. Fundamentally, the intensive or personal 
 factor in Unselfishness... X Selfishness... emphasizes T, and 
 the extensive or environmental factor emphasizes L. We 
 shall definitely consider the gaining of the greatest happiness 
 from those two points of view of T and L. That gives prin- 
 ciples which we all know and use, but which we have been 
 taking as commonsense, rather than lofty ethics. 
 
 b. As a truism, if there is some activity, some part of 
 the universe, for us to become conscious of, then the less 
 time T we use in becoming conscious of it — living it — the 
 more we live, provided we do not damage ourselves (and 
 others) so that we can not then use the time saved to live 
 more. In short, one aspect of the fundamental ethical prin- 
 ciple is, that other things being about equal the faster we can 
 and do live the better we are. So economy of time is moral, 
 and waste of time is immoral. That does not require 
 
 hurrying"; it means being conscious of living as much as 
 we are grown able to be, pleasurably, in a given time — rath- 
 er than being chiefly conscious of a clock or some equivalent 
 during that time, which is what hurrying, or being consciously 
 
 efficient, is. The human aim of science for centuries has 
 been economy of time — to state that aim from one aspect 
 (the complete aim is the conscious use of energy, life more 
 
 abundantly, which includes both L and T explicitly). 
 
 Probably nearly everyone knows all that. But as it is not 
 particularly recognized by the Oriental ethics of the Bible 
 we are not accustomed to seeing it expressed. The following 
 is obviously the way it happened that the Bible and Christ 
 substantially overlooked and omitted explicitly expressing 
 
 half of ethics, so that it remained for future generations 
 to add that half or T aspect as science":- We see vividly 
 that our own consciousness emphasizes T; but there is more 
 difficulty in being conscious of objective" things, or of 
 emphasizing L. So Christ and other Orientals (and this is 
 the only general way in which Christ is not mentally an Oc- 
 cidental), took for granted as obvious the T aspect, and spent 
 their efforts in seeing and talking about the space extension 
 of man (unified by the relationship of love) finally into God. 
 
 It is an example of make believe. The result was 
 
 that the universe itself or God automatically corrected that 
 omission of a definite T by shoving us along into a clearer 
 view of the morality of the economy of time- — we gradually 
 learning to use time better and better. So if we take the 
 novel view, but nevertheless in fact the practically true one, 
 that theology or the ethics of the Bible (apart from its inci- 
 dental dualism due mostly to Paul, which the race in general 
 never swallowed — only the theologians and other aristocrats) 
 is Many expression emphasizing L, then we may take it that 
 
 science is the T emphasis; and we have the valid equa- 
 tion Biblical ethics or theology. . . XScience. . . =God. Evidently 
 in that view of history and ethics there has been no warfare 
 of science and theology, but a necessary reaction. And all 
 that shows better than anything else I know of, that "Provi- 
 dence takes good care of us — that the universe runs itself a 
 great deal better than is often recognized. "Science" is 
 usually supposed to refer to objective things or L chiefly, but 
 is here considered in its human aspect: thus the equation 
 shows fundamentally the tendency of extensive and intensive to 
 reverse into each other. Also that equation is the widest 
 
 historical generalization covering the past thirty or forty cen- 
 turies rather definitely, that I can formulate (the expressions 
 for man and woman are wider, and perhaps nearly as definite, 
 as we shall see). The more or less obvious expansion of this 
 paragraph would require volumes, omitted here. 
 
 c. The other aspect of the gaining of greatest happiness 
 is the L aspect, or objective factor, or emphasis on neighbors 
 in wider and wider circles. Economy of time first benefits 
 ourselves, and so from that ordinary commonsense point of view 
 is Selfishness... . The objective aspect of morality consists of 
 
 first benefitting others — is altruism or Unselfishness. . . . 
 
 Obviously, as soon as we give to others a pleasurable reaction 
 with ourselves, they usually in turn directly react to give us 
 pleasure. So in that wider view the extensive factor changes 
 into, or identifies itself with, the intensive factor — just as we 
 saw in par. b happened vice versa (§71f). 
 
 d. The chief increase in the consciousness of extensive 
 morality — our chief gain in abundance of life from an L point 
 of view — that has taken place since Christ s time, has been 
 through, or is, the invention and use of vastly more machin- 
 ery. (I use machinery for any part of the universe — -any tool 
 — which we may employ as an intermediary, or perceptible 
 connection, between us and the more remote environment, 
 such as pencil, paper, gun, locomotive, telegraph, clothing, 
 fishing tackle, steamship, chair, house, lathe, etc.). The 
 deliberate invention and use of machinery is the most directly 
 moral conduct possible to us in the L aspect — it is a truism. 
 For obviously, a tool is, while we use it, essentially a con- 
 scious spacial extension of our body or nervous system or spirit 
 
 165b As an incidental general proof of the correctness of the fact 
 that the race has for centuries taken T as being so obvious as not to 
 need explicit recognition (cf. §150), it may be noted that it is consid- 
 ered that Bergson made a first class discovery in explicitly noting 
 the "subjective" existence of time or T. (Of course, many men did 
 it before Bergson— e. g., Ward, in "Realm of Ends," claims to;— 
 but perhaps they failed to emphasize it enough.) Aside from having 
 pointed out the importance of time (actually it is of importance only 
 from a formal or logical point of view: I was unable to make out 
 whether Bergson knows time is a mere form, or not), Bergson's phil- 
 osophy seems to me to be trivial and vapid — the sort of stuff that 
 pleases "intellectuals" and ladies at tea parties. He fails to handle 
 even that time rationally in the only book of his I have ever had the 
 plodding patience to read through:- "Creative Evolution." Itseems 
 needful to notice Bergson because James recommended him so high- 
 ly. It is simple why Bergson affected James so much:- James had 
 been over-emphasizing the "objective" for years (while in that state 
 of mind he acquired the dualistic Muensterberg — an error in his 
 judgment of men in the opposite direction from his acceptance of 
 Bergson), and had worked himself into the place where he saw 
 he must go on to One continuity— to infinite pluralism more defi- 
 nitely than he had often previously guessed at it. James was chiefly 
 a psychologist, and so that step was easiest for him via the T conti- 
 nuity of consciousness. So Bergson's emphasis on T, together with 
 its equivalent idea, the ultimate Oneness or identical infinite plural- 
 ism of consciousness which is given by Bergson explicitly in recog- 
 nizing or emphasizing Emotions..., was the last gentle push needed 
 by James to enable him to sum to monism (Bergson calls Emotions... 
 "intuitions" in an esoteric sort of way which seems to be pleasing to 
 people who are too lazy to think clearly but like to make believe that 
 they think— and very puzzling to the philosophers who politely took 
 James seriously, to whom Bergson has become a sort of conventional 
 enigma). So James in his first uncritical exuberance of gratitude 
 naturally attributed to Bergson what was really in James. James 
 had a rebirth, and wrote "Radical Empiricism," which is in agree- 
 ment with this book although not commonly recognized to be of such 
 a nature. I. e., James at the end was no dualist or finite pluralist, 
 as he is usually supposed to be; but he did not live long enough to 
 
 cool off, and see just what had happened to his views. The 
 
 reader of James should remember that James led a very sheltered 
 life; that gave him a delightful urbanity and sweet generosity, but at 
 the same time it made his judgment of men poor and decreased his 
 sense of personal responsibility for what he said until he apparently 
 verged on being willing to be considerably inaccurate, not to say 
 radical, in order to be entertaining. I like James as a man; but 
 technically he is unreliable— a carelessly exuberant enfant terrible. 
 
203 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §166c 
 
 or soul, and hence is additional life. If a man uses the tele- 
 phone, he obviously extends his senses and hence soul defi- 
 nitely as far as the other instrument. When we travel on a 
 steamer we definitely put a large tool onto ourselves, with 
 which we effectively and pleasurably (in sum anyway, in 
 spite of seasickness) react with a comparatively large lot of 
 environment. The man who controls the steamer (by vari- 
 ous communicating apparatuses) can, if well trained, feel the 
 environment through the steamer and feel the parts of the 
 steamer, precisely as he can feel his own internal emotions or 
 internal parts of himself. We reach out across a continent 
 and get things with a railroad, and live there as definitely as 
 we "enjoy life" by taking, with some other tool, a morsel of 
 food from the plate before us. It is not customary to think 
 of the use of machinery as being moral — as being perhaps in 
 most cases more moral than going to church. But the mere 
 statement of its morality becomes a self-evident truism. I6H 
 Machinery is a quantitative good, and so may be over-used or 
 under-used; and often is. We also sometimes misuse our 
 hands, which are also extensions of our bodies and tools. 
 
 e. We have seen (par. c) that the L aspect and the T 
 aspect of morals inevitably merge with each other. That is 
 the same as saying that Unselfishness... Y. Selfishness... truis- 
 tically becomes M{varying with)L?T~^, M being any organic 
 individual or natural structure (cf. §16Sj). That obviously 
 agrees with the general law, mass varies with velocity, and 
 may be expressed as the general ethical law (which may be 
 put in many other forms) :- happiness quantitatively amounts 
 to the extensiveness (L) of used perceptions that can be 
 compressed or speeded" (T) into a given lifetime. 
 
 f. I omit all but a few ways of considering that general 
 scientific form of the ethical law. There is nothing novel 
 about that law, it clearly being simply a positively explicit 
 statement of the truism that happiness or good is activity (or 
 of Christ's general summation) from which we started — a cir- 
 cle of reasoning proving our expression of observations. 
 
 §166. a. It therefore follows that that maximum living, 
 and-or maximum morality or happiness, consists (l) of con- 
 sciously perceiving (reacting with) the environment (includ- 
 ing in environment the parts of our own nervous systems or 
 souls that are, to begin with, very dimly Emotions...) just as 
 far out or extensively (L) as we can without going so far as 
 to have such interaction become unconscious or painfully 
 
 I65d (Jerald Stanley Lee, in "The Voice of the Machines," shows 
 in effect and with overwhelming detail that machines are moral, and 
 when intelligently used are part of us. Lee I think is a great poet 
 — and much evidence of the correctness of that estimate lies in the 
 fact that he could actually feel the morality of machinery at a time 
 when ordinary poets sniffed at machinery. Their objections really 
 meant that they were too callous and uneducated (§164b) to be able 
 to get the real feel of an extension of themselves through a tool; or 
 sometimes they did feel such an extension, and with equal nerve 
 callousness lost sight of the fact that they were using a machine, and 
 
 denied that they were. Poetry is the first form in which truth 
 
 is somewhat acceptably stated. That first statement would be so 
 novel and repulsive as not to "penetrate" very well unless made per- 
 ceptibly rhythmic in some respect. The poetical rhythm (and usu- 
 ally rhyme) is a formal device that makes the measuring more or less 
 automatically pound its way up to the cortex (in the same quantita- 
 tive way that a slight but rhythmic stimulus will shake a strong 
 bridge down), in spite of the hearer's pain over receiving the new 
 truth or idea itself (cf. §§158-9). And great poets like Lee have a 
 sense of proportion (of rhythm, of harmonic periodicity) for ideas 
 themselves, so that they can (with most persons whose brains are not 
 attuned to jazz — dualism) make ideas reverberate into rebirths, so to 
 speak. There is a primitive form of that in the Song of Songs and 
 Job; the queer new poets we have nowadays seem to have an un- 
 stated intuition that the highest poetry is » rhythm of ideas. But 
 their idea that they can get it by throwing away ordinary poetic 
 rhythms is equivalent to the delusion that if we are the fortunate 
 possessors of $10, by throwing it away we will have a million. 
 
 damaging (including not damaging others), and doing it as 
 fast as we can (T), so that our memories of all the parts of 
 the process will be vivid or intense; and then (2) stopping 
 that swing out from the balance before it cumulatively pain- 
 fully disintegrates or changes the structural order of our soul 
 or nervous system, and then (after stopping) swinging back 
 in the cycle, resting" or recuperating in order to do it all 
 over again. Each such swing by the theory of incommensur- 
 ables tends to sum perceptibly in one direction from the bal- 
 ance (i. e., each actual swing is partly Unselfishness... and 
 parti}' Selfishness..., but one or the other, by incommensur- 
 ability, is preponderant, and often perceptibly so) ; hence, 
 the maximum recuperation or final total morality consists of 
 swinging about as often with one preponderance as the other. 
 
 • All that can evidently be stated in mathematical 
 
 terms of maxima and minima. 
 
 b. The last paragraph probably seems as dry as dust, 
 theoretical, abstract, etc. Yet it is a complete and definite 
 solution of What are the important'' things of life?, of What's 
 the use? — as we shall in this section proceed to see in a few 
 details. It had to be put dryly or unemotionally ' in order 
 to say so much. Of course the quantities which are tolerable 
 or pleasant to any given person can be solved" or measured 
 only as a special case for himself (and usually he has only 
 himself to do that measuring for him). Clearly, the amount 
 of living or morality of a given person depends upon the sum 
 of toughness of his cells. If he starts with all his cells in 
 good balance, strong and healthy (has a good constitution") 
 he can usually live more than can a person less well endowed. 
 But it is clear that if he has « constitution strong enough to 
 understand or perceive the general scheme of the last para- 
 graph just once (and I judge that 90 per cent of children 
 reach that strength at some time in their 'teens), then by 
 conscious ( intelligent") "nurture" of his self he can readily 
 build that self up and live far more than a person of better 
 inheritance who does not consciously go after what he wants 
 
 but trusts to luck. There is no space to expand 
 
 this important paragraph — showing, e. g., that such varying 
 inheritance is absolutely just (the key to that proof of justice 
 being that here we are talking quantitatively). 
 
 c. In a fairly steady environment there truistically is a 
 tendency towards wider definite organization (XVI). The 
 steadiness of the environment of man is in a wide sense con- 
 sidered under the name climate. In a narrower sense steady 
 environment consists of fairly stable societies, owning an ac- 
 cumulating amount of tools in the shape of recorded truth 
 (traditions, proverbs, books, science," religion," etc.), 
 as well as more material ephemeral wealth. It truistically 
 follows that with a fairly steady climate men automatically 
 (rather unconsciously the first time; and on perceiving the 
 results on that occasion, more or less purposely" thereafter) 
 swing out in those happy cycles of the last two paragraphs. 
 Doing so establishes a physiological memory (§158c), so that 
 they as a rule acquire ability to swing further and further 
 pleasurably. (Some go too far, and some not far enough, of 
 course, and are killed off; or, in teleological terms, those 
 excessive ones are not sufficiently desirous of being moral and 
 happy to have the "will to live" — a truism.) That ability 
 of individuals to swing further and further truistically implies 
 a more definite, perceptible, and extensive social organiza- 
 tion. And that increase of ability is in general progress, or 
 advancing civilization. It is a circular process of cause be- 
 coming effect, and vice versa, like the cycle of universal 
 structural 'vibration' that underlies it. And the tools or 
 machinery of accumulated truth" (the social inheritance" 
 which is the steady social environment) obviously acts upon 
 each individual in that pretty steady environment and tends 
 
§166c XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 204 
 
 to cause him to build his self up and live beyond the point to 
 which his physiological cell inheritance would go without 
 being thus supported. In short, it obviously may be quantita- 
 tively possible that "nurture" in the form of social inheri- 
 tance" will "civilize" a man (cause him to have more life or 
 happiness) in perhaps a more effective way than his inherited 
 characteristics — than his congenital cell memories. The en- 
 vironment — the social structure around him — may serve him 
 as a better memory,' as a stronger constitution, than his 
 congenital "personal" one. That quantitative possibility is, 
 in some measure, held to be the actual fact by those who con- 
 sider humanics to be primarily sociology. For a very 
 explicit assertion that the possibility is realized in fact, and 
 that sociology is the master science, see Kidd s The 
 Science of Power, and his remarks in Ency. Brit., xxv, 
 
 331. It thus becomes obvious that the difference 
 
 between sociology and ethics (taking ethics" conventionally 
 as being more emphatically personal") is a mere matter of 
 quantitative guessing. My personal guess is that Kidd and 
 some other sociologists (more particularly the amateur sort, 
 who perennially rediscover a perceptible social structure or 
 relationship into a One, and usually give it a new name) are 
 specialists who exaggerate their specialty somewhat. The 
 principle underlying that guessing is :- Social inheritances or 
 social nurture... X Personal or congenital physiological inheritance 
 and-or nurture. . . =Social or moral individual life (or, Sociolo- 
 gy... X Personal biology or personal ethics... =Life); and my 
 guess is that the perceptible phenomena may be about as often 
 
 ethical" as sociological. So, to summarize this 
 
 paragraph :- the general application of the complete ethical 
 principle gives us the broad outline of what is commonly 
 called sociology by modern writers (it is sometimes called 
 evolution, or social evolution; also civilisation, social aesthetics, 
 culture, etc.; cf. §171 ). 
 
 d. The generally accepted most important" thing in 
 life, or its supremest happiness, is religion" — specifically 
 one or more religious experiences. Sometimes the greatest 
 thing in the world ' is said to be love, and sometimes the 
 
 power' that money, etc., gives; but as love and power 
 (over nature or material things, others, and-or oneself) are 
 simply the humanistic names for universal relationship of 
 identity it is obvious that that again means that the perception 
 of them, which we may conventionally and conveniently call 
 a religious experience, is the greatest thing. And obvi- 
 ously, that general judgment as to the greatest thing is rig- 
 orously proved by the foregoing to be correct. For a religious 
 experience or rebirth (§153f) is a swing out so far (L) that 
 the infinite regress is more or less perceptible, and a swing 
 out so quick (T) that the perception is vivid. It is now obvi- 
 ous that a swing too far destroys the man (§163). 16M 
 
 i66d n seems to me to be the fact that most geniuses, prophets, 
 saints, seers, etc., have swung out so far on some rebirth that they 
 were unable to recover very well, and hence were never afterwards 
 quite sane in one or two respects. I. e.,they did not in some respect 
 recover the ability to judge what was the normal balance (§159f),and 
 so were not able afterwards to "control" themselves. They usually, 
 however, were quick to see and condemn similar intemperance in get- 
 ting a feeling of universal unity in others when it took the form of 
 power madness — especially when that power was represented by 
 money, which is the sort of power easiest to perceive. So as a means 
 of keeping ourselves temperate in getting rebirths in the more usual 
 everyday forms of power and love, it is useful to note some of the 
 
 intemperances in the rebirths themselves. Often the genius 
 
 fancied that he should keep on in that state of ecstacy or rebirth or 
 definite perception of unity or power or intoxicated expansiveness; 
 Swedenborg did manage to keep on considerably, and became rather 
 definitely insane. Sometimes the genius temporarily allowed it to 
 run along too much, and then violently avoided it the rest of his life 
 (became, so to speak, intemperately sane like a standpatter — a mild 
 insanity in the opposite direction). Some saints got such a painful 
 
 e. But obviously, if we in a reasonably tolerable way 
 i. e., not too unbalancedly — see the infinite beauty of God 
 or the universe, or see our own personal inseparable unity 
 with God, or see that we are personally a part of the uni- 
 verse and hence ultimately indispensable or needed or useful, 
 and fit in or are beautiful ourselves, or are not lonely and 
 "unsupported" but are held up by infinite grace" (or pow- 
 er or energy, if we prefer more definite terms) — if we see 
 that general unity, without the ecstacy or happiness being 
 too painfully poignant or nervously destructive, it follows 
 that on that occasion of rebirth we have seen or experienced 
 or understood the fundamental scheme of life and can hence- 
 forth know how to live — how to get the important thing out 
 
 of life. That is of course repetitious. I have been 
 
 deliberately repeating the description of a reasonable re- 
 birth in various of the many conventional ways, so that the 
 reader can scarcely avoid recognizing his own similar ex- 
 periences (I shall give even more familiar descriptions of it 
 from time to time below) ; and can scarcely avoid recogniz- 
 ing that a rebirth is, in brief, a conscious grasping or perceiv- 
 ing or being (§28h) the infinite regress that applies to any 
 experienced unit of the Many. In that case (in the case that 
 the reader actually sees what this book by consistent logic 
 and direct evidence in all varieties of phenomena shows to be 
 the truth), he can then understand that the important things 
 in life are those rhythmic stretchings of his life or abilities — 
 those used or cyclic perceivings of love or power or unity — 
 as far as they will go pleasantly (for himself as well as others). 
 And on occasions he may indulge in a cycle which is a bit 
 poignant (such as earning a million dollars — earning it), as a 
 means of increasing his ability to live (and all that is merely 
 
 rebirth that instead of calling it the usual "seeing God" or talking 
 with God, they named it the opposite; thus Christ talked with the 
 devil (§153g), and Luther said he threw his inkwell at the devil. In 
 rough generality, one of two more or less opposite mental or physio- 
 logical make-ups is required to get a violent rebirth:- (1) the victim 
 much have a much disconnected ("unstable") nervous system so 
 that one circuit may from rather usual stimuli get violently over- 
 loaded; such a condition may be "natural" (as in hysterics, para- 
 noiacs, and other rather weak-minded or suggestible persons), or 
 may be acquired by drugs, or by various disease poisons; (2) the 
 victim must have a rather strong nervous system, which he by 
 persistent 'stretching' finally gets more or less as a whole into an 
 explosive condition. As the brain in a strong rebirth is perceptibly 
 "exploding" ("seeing" violently, or to a considerable extent break- 
 ing up into different order structures), violent rebirths usually are 
 accompanied by hallucinations (i. e., by perceptible internal 'emo- 
 tions' or sensations, which effectively stir up considerable collections 
 of memories, and hence if violent enough seem to be real visions, or 
 voices, etc. Usually, the first experience of those internal percept- 
 ible explosions (all sensations give or are slight 'explosions,' or 
 structural changes) is misinterpreted — considered "real." So the 
 person having the violent rebirth sincerely makes a report of various 
 extraordinary "visions." By overworking (strongly keeping up a 
 concentrated strain of attention for two or three weeks), I can pro- 
 duce 'hallucinations' in my brain. The "seers," etc., of India do it 
 that way (if they would concentrate on something more important 
 than their navels the procedure might be useful to them) ; so far as I 
 can judge, anyone can do it if he tries long enough, or judiciously 
 uses various drugs (nitrous oxide, hasheesh, e. g.), or a little starva- 
 tion. My first experience of those hallucinations was a bit startling; 
 but I readily learned to recognize them for what they were (so that 
 technically they are not hallucinations). As they are very wearing 
 on the brain I have for some years avoided getting them. Quite 
 likely if I had not known a little psychology and hence on the first 
 experience recognized the danger of a violent rebirth, in spite of its 
 feeling of infinite well-being and of power more vivid than money (or 
 even money plus champagne plus a banquet) can give, I also might 
 have been intemperately setting myself up in the prophet business 
 and grabbing for additional such power more unscrupulously than 
 the worst financial pirate — and paying for it out of my skin, as all 
 such deluded persons do, by going more or less insane (i. e., by 
 breaking down my brain somewhat and being unable to perceive — 
 enjoy — any but destructive overdoses, like a drug addict). 
 
205 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §166h 
 
 the truism that the important thing in life is really living). 
 
 f. It then is obvious that any occupation is essentially 
 able to give you those continual pleasant rebirths in a desir- 
 able and supportable cycle. The athlete at school engages 
 in such cycles largely with his muscles; if he does not shirk 
 (indulge himself by quitting before the last final effort or 
 concentration or unifying or summing of his powers; §159d), 
 or if on the other hand he does not overdo it and get into a 
 condition where he does not easily recuperate (go stale," 
 or otherwise injure" himself), then he obviously is stretch- 
 ing his capacities (including his soul or nervous system), and 
 in some degree feels (both directly with his own nerves, and 
 also by the plaudits of others; Index, Fame") that he is 
 really infinitely fitting in, is being successful" or needed 
 and an indispensable active part of an organism. (The reason 
 the athlete sometimes does not take kindly to books," even 
 when he has the available energy, is that somebody has given 
 him the erroneous idea that the writer has done all the work 
 for him ; also, nobody has shown him just how books fit in — 
 assuming that those offered him do, — or is able to judge the 
 athlete's success" with them especially well.) The athlete 
 usually Can not juggle words well enough to express all that 
 definitely (word juggling is another form of athletics with 
 more possibilities and dangers than football) ; but obviously 
 that is what he feels — a bubbling well of nerve enthusiasm 
 that draws its energy from all the environment and then 
 pours it out in floods, effectively and joyously and with in- 
 creasing quantity (provided not overdone), back to the envi- 
 ronment. His athletic contests are hence, rigorously, a 
 definite species of religiousness — an explicit religious experi- 
 ence he can grasp and apply. If his teachers can make it 
 clear to him that Greek verbs will bring him into perceptible 
 contact and union with all of life, and hence are ultimately 
 of infinite "importance" and use and beauty, then he will 
 tackle Greek verbs in the same way, and get just as much 
 religion, or the habit of success and power and the whole- 
 hearted work that accomplishes the impossible," out of 
 those verbs. And obviously, Greek verbs are as inseparably 
 connected with the whole unit life or God as athletics are. 
 Their comparative values are small, so that few people are com- 
 petent and interested judges of either; so the person who 
 customarily gets his religion by either can get but little act- 
 ual guidance and support from others, and is likely not to 
 have the strength to keep himself out of quantitative difficul- 
 ties — all of which we implicitly see in discussing value. 
 
 If you are engaged in growing potatoes, then potatoes are 
 obviously a link that connects you inseparably with all, along 
 a path over which can flow all the energy, or life, or activity 
 you are capable of sustaining and enjoying. There is no 
 limit to the spiritual equation Environment... X Potatoes... = 
 Universe or God. This book rigorously proves that there are 
 more emotions, more facts, more sensations, more mathemat- 
 ics, more uses, directly and inseparably connected with Po- 
 tatoes... than you will ever be able to grasp definitely. It is 
 obviously just as moral or just as religious to exercise your- 
 self, to live, with that potato equation as with the general, 
 bookish one Unselfishness. . . XSelfishness. . . =God— and much 
 more so than it is to go to church and hear a minister do it 
 indirectly for you. In actual practice, if you truly under- 
 stood and hence got enthusiastic about either equation, if you 
 began to enjoy "real life," or to be highly active because 
 you wanted to be and enjoyed being, then you shortly would 
 have made yourself many other equations— would have neces- 
 sarily gained many "interests." The equation you started 
 with is merely your prime quantitative standard. Any form 
 of That...XThis... sums into a valid religion. 
 
 g. "Real" living or moral and happy life therefore 
 
 consists in persistently observing' (that including all varie- 
 ties of reacting" with) things as they are until we con- 
 sciously get a vision or perception of their relationship into 
 the One, and then further consists in thereafter repeating 
 those rebirths in rhythmic cycles that are temperately pleas- 
 urable to us and our neighbors. Usually the mistake we 
 make is intemperately running one factor too high — hurrying, 
 grabbing, jumping to conclusions, getting rich quick ; or, 
 in the negative direction, wasting time, shirking (which in 
 higher executive circles is called passing the buck), and, in 
 general, quitting. Clearly the fundamental error in life is to 
 get so in the habit of making that mistake of intemperance 
 that we begin to assert that such an unbalance is right, and 
 so begin to try to run various things or factors to infinity, and 
 others to zero, thus logically absolutely separating them, 
 and becoming a dualist or aristocrat — more or less dead, im- 
 moral, wicked, insane, irrational, etc. As a rule nature or 
 Providence" automatically controls us subconsciously in 
 greater part, so that such a mistaken outlook in life is usually 
 mostly verbal, and such a verbally wrong person ordinarily 
 does not become pathologically insane. Ordinary men often 
 try to follow and emulate an insane leader, but nature 
 automatically stops those quantitatively ordinary men far 
 short of achieving such insanity or gross radicalisms. They 
 take it out in talk — one reason why talk is cheap. 
 
 h. Perhaps the most common of such general mistakes 
 of intemperance (apart from ordinary loafing by the poor 
 workman, and passing the buck by the cheap executive — us- 
 ually a politician) is the view that the essential way of having 
 a rebirth (or the spasmodic cure of that opposite loafing) is to 
 have theological technicalities pounded into us with sufficient 
 violence, more or less as ' Billy" Sunday does it (cf. footnote 
 d). Usually that violent pounding of the brain with a nar- 
 row set of stimuli (if the hearer is not wise enough to avoid 
 it) results in putting all but a few nerve channels somewhat 
 to sleep (mildly hypnotizing most of the brain), and then and 
 thus overloading the active ones until they perceptibly ex- 
 plode — frequently into an obvious hysterical or even more 
 
 maniacal convulsion. Precisely the same effect can 
 
 be got in possibly most cases by putting the brain largely 
 out of connection (to "sleep") with alcohol; in that case the 
 ordinary affairs of life coming through the remaining channels 
 keep them at an explosive pitch of intensity, and that truist- 
 ically gives the somewhat drunken man the customary mod- 
 erate rebirth — a feeling of extraordinary well-being and of 
 power and complete living and infinite love. (Some men, 
 apparently "stolid" ones that take up food and stimuli rather 
 slowly, are not much affected that way by alcohol; if they 
 were to take enough they would be, but usually some other 
 organ breaks down or rebels before the brain gets that ef- 
 fect). The worship of Bacchus (some of the ritual of which 
 survives in present-day "communion"), as well as the use of 
 alcohol in conviviality (that word itself means a loving organi- 
 zation or unity of men), are objective proofs of the fact that 
 alcohol does give such rebirths. The objection to that sort 
 of rebirth is the same as the objection to the emotional theo- 
 logical sort, or to any sort of ecstacy caused by persistent 
 harping on one narrow theme (such as the oratory of the 
 demagog, etc.):- the person who experiences it is likely to 
 overlook the fact that its value lies in the perception of the 
 One; so he is liable to become narrowed instead of expanded, 
 making an idol of alcohol, or of the church, by consider- 
 ing it the end, rather than the means of the rebirth — just as 
 money, or red tape, or oratory, or a narrow specialty is often 
 mistaken for the reality. A further objection to alcohol is 
 that it often wears out the nervous system faster than it can 
 recuperate (thus introducing the economic problem of whether 
 
§166h XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 206 
 
 the rebirths are worth the time needed for recovery). Prob- 
 ably in former days when men were more stolid alcohol did 
 not have that latter objection, and was much more of a good 
 than an evil. But it seems to be a fairly safe guess that al- 
 cohol destroys a present-day keen and quick brain faster than 
 it can recuperate; if so, its use by such men is immoral. 
 The change in the nervous systems of mankind has perhaps 
 on that ground of giving too violent rebirths (which is the 
 crucial point) made the use of alcohol in appreciable quantity 
 in some degree immoral for the majority of the mature male 
 adults of this country. It has nearly surely long been defi- 
 nitely immoral for all the females (for psychological reasons 
 implied in §170). It is possible that the alcoholic rebirths 
 are somewhat needed by the young male adults, and by the 
 more stolid. But it also seems to be a reasonable guess that 
 this country needs legal prohibition:- for any kind of rebirths 
 in excess is immoral, as has been seen; the men in the liquor 
 trade by obvious principles would be, and in glaring fact in- 
 creasingly were, in general, fools who were determined, for 
 quick money profits, to force an excess of alcohol upon peo- 
 ple; and the only practical way to deal with them is to 
 eliminate them — as is being done. Alcohol is very easy to 
 make, and those who can profitably use it can also develop 
 self-reliance by making their own. 
 
 i. In contrast with those usually overdone ways of get- 
 ting rebirths by overworking some narrow channel, we may 
 observe the most usual way of getting the important things 
 out of life. In fact, so common is this way we are to see, of 
 living a real religious life, that it is rarely recognized as such. 
 But the fact that it tacitly is actually recognized as such 
 by most persons is evident from the glaring fact that they 
 spend more effort, time, and money on this way than on all 
 others combined. And that fact is truistic proof that the 
 race is fundamentally sound, vigorous, right, religious, lov- 
 able — in spite of all the superficial intellectual" idiocies 
 and radicalisms with which it is afflicted ; in spite of all its 
 ephemeral warring creeds and dualistic theologies. This or- 
 dinary temperate way of being religious and moral, of getting 
 the important things out of life, is marriage. 
 
 j. It is perhaps evident from the mere mention of it 
 that the most vivid or intense as well as extensive direct ex- 
 perience or personal experimental evidence that a human be- 
 ing can have that he or she is directly and inseparably related 
 to the rest of the universe is sexual intercourse under normal 
 matrimonial conditions. It is shown by the discussion of sex 
 in §146 to be a truism that the climax or orgasm of sex union 
 is the most perceptible normal rebirth that an individual can 
 
 have. That orgasm theoretically differs quantitatively 
 
 (in L and T) with respect to man and woman; for that and 
 other remoter modifying details of this paragraph, see §170. 
 Further, the sex cycle of both man and woman is completed 
 only by the birth and up-bringing of a child ; so in that the 
 intensity, and physiological extensity, of the rebirth is di- 
 rectly extended in perceptible infinite regress. In short, the 
 prolonged infancy of the child leads to the progress of the 
 child, but perhaps mostly does it because the prolonged in- 
 fancy first gives the parents (the father usually does not so 
 fully use this opportunity as the mother) a wider grasp of 
 reality, so that they then impart it in some degree to the in- 
 fant. John Fiske first worked out the details of that. ■ 
 
 This paragraph can not be adequately discussed in less than 
 a volume. The short parenthesis about the father's often 
 neglecting his opportunity might profitably be expanded that 
 much. Some additional comment is given in §§167, 170. 
 In the rest of this section we may briefly note a few general 
 ideas implied by this paragraph. 
 
 k. The chief implication is that such sex life is rhythmic 
 
 if normal, and so, for persons with fairly keen and sensitive 
 brains, requires monogamy. For such persons a greater de- 
 gree of promiscuity (even legal monogamic unions that are 
 intended to be temporary) is obviously likely to be destruct- 
 ively intense (cf. par. 1). So various sorts of sex promiscuity 
 or deliberate temporariness (including levity and carelessness 
 in divorce; par. n) is obviously moral for a barbarian, and is 
 the mark of a barbarian or a person still so youthful or unde- 
 veloped as to be psychologically in the barbaric stage; but 
 it is immoral for an adult in the degree in which he is civi- 
 lized. (Those quantitative remarks apply to a male ; they ap- 
 ply in much greater degree to a female; see §170). 
 
 1. The general historical evidence in support of the last 
 two paragraphs is the fact that in older theologies sex inter- 
 course was rather definitely recognized as being a religious 
 rebirth, and a ritual was made of it — i. e., sex intercourse 
 became a formal way to "worship." Such promiscuity, even 
 though verbally sanctified by the theologians, as alcohol is 
 now doing, slowly became too violent even for the coarser 
 men, and was mostly dropped before Christ, although occa- 
 sional sects still arise among callous people which try to ritu- 
 alize sex intercourse. Immediate objective evidence in 
 
 support of the two paragraphs is that literature uses sex, or 
 romantic" love, or passion, as the chief spring of action. 
 
 m. The important practical implication of par. j is that 
 in a normal marriage each spouse truistically is to the other the 
 chief or primary or most important God the Son in existence, or 
 ever in existence. That conclusion sounds queer, of course; 
 various demagogs and autocrats, especially the priests, so fill 
 the air with verbal clamor that we must come to them to be 
 furnished with the chief God the Son, that being obliging and 
 peaceably inclined and a trifle lazy we have grown superfic- 
 ially accustomed to taking their word for it. Yet that odd 
 looking conclusion (that a person's own, selected spouse is 
 his or her chief God the Son) is glaringly a truism in a normal 
 marriage (it is quantitative, and not invariably true) :- Christ, 
 or the pope, or a deified Nero, or even a local autocrat or 
 boss, is obviously much further off from us in most ways than 
 our spouse, and so we necessarily primarily react with the 
 environment through the spouse (if the marriage is fairly real 
 or successful — as I judge about 75 per cent of marriages in 
 this country are: more than in any other country or in any 
 past age). At the beginning of marriages, when the relation 
 is novel, the conclusion is usually clearly asserted by the 
 couple:- as they do not understand orthodox theological 
 terms (even though it pleases them to use such terms ritual- 
 istically), they use direct and intelligible terms and see and 
 state that to each the spouse is the most important, "best," 
 finest, etc. , person in the world (it being further tacitly ac- 
 cepted that persons — structures of our own order — are the 
 most important thing to us; even in a machine shop). And 
 that statement made of spouses is clearly equivalent to our 
 conclusion as expressed in ethical terms. And the conclusion 
 is further proved by the obvious facts that the majority of 
 people (l) are primarily interested in working for their spouses 
 and for the more or less parts of their spouses :- children ; 
 and (2) generally use the spouses as a chief standard by 
 which to judge their own acts. It is quite true that a mar- 
 ried couple often do not keep on very long stating the con- 
 clusion definitely in words to each other; it is too real and 
 obvious for ritualization. (if we keep on repeating the same 
 thing after the novelty wears off, it implies either that we do 
 not with any definite conviction believe it or really under- 
 stand it, or that we still doubt whether the hearer does.) It 
 becomes so obvious to them that they are each other's chief 
 God the Son that when the theologian talks about Christ's 
 being the primary God the Son they really do not know what 
 
207 
 
 he means (and usually he does not either: if he does he is 
 publicly depreciating his wife, if he has one) ; so with a deep 
 consistency not appreciated by the theologian, they go to 
 church if it doesn't rain and drop a penny in the plate. 
 
 n. Clearly therefore marriages are not made in heaven 
 but are heaven if they are made. The theological claim that 
 the priest can by fiat make a marriage (so that it does exist — 
 each spouse being the chief God the Son to the other in fact, 
 so that the marriage is indissoluble in the sense that what is, 
 is) is obviously a trifle too silly to be discussed by this book. 
 (Our neighbors for various evident reasons need to know 
 when a marriage is entered into; so the priest fundamentally 
 
 serves as a town crier.) Obviously, a marriage may be 
 
 entered into honestly by the partners and may be successful 
 for a while, but may in fact cease to exist because of a differ- 
 ent rate of growth of the spouses. Or, the spouses may have 
 been mistaken, so that the marriage never in fact existed — 
 regardless of what the priests or lawyers may assert concern- 
 ing it. The existence of a marriage is a question of quanti- 
 tative fact. If by ordinary agreements as to measures it does 
 not exist, then the principle truistically is that the priest or 
 legislator or judge who asserts that it does exist is either a 
 liar or a fool, or both (that of course applies to the men who 
 refuse divorce entirely, or base it upon arbitrary grounds — as 
 will appear). As the legal and-or theological ceremony of 
 marriage is necessarily a quantitative guess that a marriage 
 will exist in fact, it follows that if it does not come into ex- 
 istence, or happens to go out of existence, then another 
 quantitative announcement called divorce is truistically re- 
 quired. A volume is needed for a definite discussion of the 
 quantities involved. Possibly the safest practical way to 
 judge whether a divorce should be announced is this :- if a 
 person applies for a divorce he [or she] obviously thereby 
 publicly admits that either he has been sufficiently foolish to 
 make a mistaken judgment in an extremely important matter 
 or is in effect such a poorly developed person as to want sex- 
 ual promiscuity (or both) ; so if the legal formal existence 
 of the marriage will force that public humiliation, it is rather 
 obviously proved to be not a real marriage and to warrant a 
 legal divorce. There is no space to consider the complicated 
 quantitative problems of children, support of children and 
 other directly economic problems, remarriages, etc. String- 
 ent divorce laws, however, neither solve nor obviate such 
 problems, but simply wholly or partly deny that they arise 
 when no legal divorce is granted — which is as silly as deny- 
 ing that the sun rises, and as immoral as any other lie. 
 
 o. It is probably a historical fact that up to modern 
 times most men verbally considered woman to be an inferior 
 and a sex machine (meaning that she was chiefly a means of 
 gratifying sex appetite), or to be without a soul (for details, 
 see §170h). St. Paul, with genuine Prussian or Athenian 
 arrogance and stupidity, very definitely asserted woman to 
 be inferior and to be a sex machine; and the orthodox theo- 
 logians and many men verbally have not yet developed past 
 that barbaric coarseness and primitive dualism. (I am of 
 course aware that such radical, classical logic talk has been 
 largely make believe — that the mass of commensense men in 
 
 practice but slightly inclined to such nonsense.) It 
 
 follows even more strongly in the face of that historical tra- 
 dition and present orthodox theology, that the much noticed 
 tendency of the men of this country to consider women to be 
 more or less "angels" (l) is a proof of the progress in civili- 
 zation, (2) is a proof of the general correctness of the conclu- 
 sion as to who is the chief God the Son, and (3) indicates the 
 general moral soundness of the people of this country (the 
 upper ten and the submerged tenth that aristocratically agree 
 with Paul are merely almost negligible scum and dregs). 
 
 UNIVERSE Three XVIII §166p 
 
 Perhaps the men have overdone the "idealizing," resulting 
 in some damage to women. It has been a good thing for the 
 men in some ways, but possibly rather bad for numerous 
 women. I. e., many women has been so weak (narrow vis- 
 ioned: unable to stand prosperity") as to take a selfish ad- 
 vantage of American men, and become more or less parasitic. 
 Such women substantially consider that to catch a man in 
 marriage is to have secured a living for the rest of their lives 
 without work or further return to the man. In practice it is 
 possible that the woman is not able to live up to the high 
 place that is assigned her before she works for it and earns 
 it. It seems to be becoming more or less necessary for the 
 American man to require the woman to earn her high place. 
 That of course is an individual quantitative problem to be 
 personally solved by each man and woman. The only general 
 solution I can see for it is this rough one that must be modi- 
 fied for special cases :- The worst sort of female parasite is 
 probably the woman who after capturing a husband and a 
 living thinks it right to keep the living and drop the super- 
 fluous husband. She is the alimony chaser. I found by a 
 too slight investigation that apparently the majority of finan- 
 cially fairly well-to-do women have the poisonous belief that 
 if they wish to divorce their husbands they will still be en- 
 titled to support — the alleged right having accrued simply 
 by matrimonial capture. Mrs. Gertrude Atherton plainly 
 implies ("Delineator," Dec, 1916, p. 12, "What is Femin- 
 ism?") that men ought to be "clever enough" to sup- 
 port financially all women without independent means." 
 So perhaps we need a general educative law that divorce will 
 be granted much more easily than at present, and that ali- 
 mony will be granted only in rare (described) cases. That 
 would be equivalent to serving formal notice that men can 
 not be matrimonially exploited, and such feminine parasitism 
 
 or something-for-nothing as there may be, would die. 
 
 The difficulty of passing such laws lies in the fact that men 
 of the Prussian Pauline type who wish to domineer over their 
 wives, and the equally barbarous meek and docile type of 
 women who like it, are a very noisy minority. They prefer 
 and demand difficult divorce laws, with women convinced 
 that they are financially dependent on men, as such laws 
 save their face in such coarse and callous conduct. E. g. , 
 §79 of Cummings's Marriage and Divorce Laws of Massa- 
 chusetts mentions a matrimonial atrocity explicitly permitted 
 by that presumably civilized state which is so nauseating as 
 to be unfit to print in anything but a book on lawyers' law 
 or pathology, where such things are expected. It is not ac- 
 cidental that the rate of insanity is much higher in Massa- 
 chusetts than in Western states which, as a cause and a result 
 of such cleanliness, have freer divorce laws. 
 
 • p. There are numbers of people who assert in one way 
 or another that marriage is not the most effective or desirable 
 way of living the best life. As the problem is a quantitative 
 one, and as the theory given above is rigorous, it obviously 
 follows that such opposite opinions are quite correct for cer- 
 tain abnormal persons. Frequently those who assert such 
 opposite opinions merely indicate by them that they are not 
 
 normal. Perhaps adverse opinions are expressed most 
 
 often by those who have not been married. As they have 
 had no experience of marriage we may neglect them as being 
 incompetent until they are able to give theoretical support 
 
 for their views. Possibly the next largest class who 
 
 consider marriage of secondary importance or even undesir- 
 able, are the hysterical, or others of the aristocratic, parasitic 
 types who have narrowed, abnormal nervous systems. Many 
 hysterics are sexually insensible (or, in order to be differ- 
 ent" and thus attract attention, or to seem to be refined" 
 — a corpse would be much more so, — they keep pretending 
 
§166p XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 to be sexually anaesthetic until it probably comes to be so) ; 
 hence it is probable that they could not get a rebirth by mar- 
 riage, and their adverse opinion is correct for their pathologi- 
 cal selves. Many men will be saved years of trouble if the 
 hysterics refrain from marrying for parasitic purposes. In all 
 cases people with narrowed nervous systems are obviously 
 liable not to be able to withstand that necessarily long con- 
 tinued need of delicate mutual adjustment between two per- 
 sons which builds up the successful marriage. So they are 
 forced by their defects to make marriage a secondary part of 
 
 moral living. The last general type of people who 
 
 oppose marriage may roughly be named the artistic sort 
 — meaning those who tend to be the unbalanced genius who 
 wants not a full life but a career," a career being an os- 
 tentatious bid for attention and reward with considerable 
 neglect of the essential point that they should be earned. It 
 is possible that such people by avoiding marriage may thus 
 conserve energy to produce useful work. Newton prided 
 himself on not marrying. Newton also became practically 
 insane for some months and for years wasted his abilities by 
 acting like a prima donna. It is obvious that if a person can 
 manage to generate enough enduring nervous energy to keep 
 steady in a normal married life, and still have enough over 
 to use for the occasional abnormal requirements of any unus- 
 ual work, then such work, by the principles of a flywheel or 
 rhythm, tends to be balanced and enduringly useful — not 
 momentarily spectacular and bizarre, and usually grossly ex- 
 aggerated to the point of vitiating dualism. It is well known 
 that the person who is able to depart widely from the normal 
 usually finds it difficult to retain enough surplus energy to 
 balance himself [herself] in marriage : his wife finds it hard 
 at times to live with him. But clearly, if he is not strong 
 enough to balance himself with a fairly normal wife (but he 
 usually picks a hysteric; e. g., Carlyle, Socrates), he is not 
 strong enough to do enduring work. The bizarre, rather 
 dualistic stuff - he does do will be very noticeable, but some 
 stronger man will always have to straighten out the mess and 
 throw most of it away. In brief, this last class of opponents 
 of marriage is identical in character with the hysterical and 
 more or less pathological class of unbalanced persons; the 
 
 artistic" or career" class is simply less unbalanced, 
 q. Because marriage is so important we may readily 
 judge people s general character and the value of their work 
 by their attitude towards it:- The youth's usual scorn of 
 marriage merely indicates ordinary human conservatism to- 
 wards the unknown and unexperienced. The extreme 
 
 socialists (§175c) disapprove of marriage or want promiscuity 
 or various other barbaric modifications of marriage. The late 
 kaiser, Paul, and the theologians, with similar aristocratic 
 dualism also consider woman essentially inferior. And their 
 
 work is useful chiefly in showing how not to do it. 
 
 There is an extreme type of feminist who substantially says 
 that women should fight men — makes an absolute dualism of 
 the two. It is hard to say just what that ultra-feminist does 
 want, as she (or perhaps it would be biologically more accu- 
 rate to say it) is very self-contradictory; but she seems to 
 say that women should oppose marriage, although it will be 
 a good thing if the woman can get a man to support her if he 
 will not then hold her to the responsibilities of marriage. 
 At least that is what I make out of what Mrs. Gertrude Ath- 
 erton says feminism is in the Delineator" (Oct. -Dec, '16; 
 also cf. par. o). If that is what she meant, then this book 
 is not the proper place for fitting comment. Mrs. Atherton 
 says she was delicate, with a weak back, and strolled through 
 the woods, and considered her two children as dolls, and her 
 husband looked after the housekeeping and did the cooking 
 when the cook left and died shortly. I understand that such 
 
 is what she thinks is fitting; it sounds somewhat like hysteria 
 to me, but I would not venture to guess that the lady has 
 hysteria or ever had it. (I quote some quite restrained re- 
 marks about the husbands of hysterics from p. 911, Health 
 and Disease in Relation to Marriage and the Married State," 
 edited by Senator and Kaminer:- "it almost appears strange 
 that so many marriages of hysterical persons last until their 
 natural end and are not dissolved long before that. ** [The 
 husbands of hysterics] appear predestined for their severe or- 
 deal which they often endure so bravely as to call forth the 
 wondering admiration of their sympathizing friends and 
 medical advisers.") Mrs. Atherton herself rather implies 
 that she is an artist, and in that connection, in Woman's 
 Home Companion," Dec, '18, warns young women not to 
 marry if they have talent, letting their careers pass them by, 
 and then substantially says that when they get older they 
 may have commonsense enough to refrain from passion and 
 marriage. She says that one's sense of responsibility for 
 what one writes is satisfied when one sees the last proof sheet 
 (that isn't so for me), and objects to the continuing responsi- 
 bility of children and a husband. All that is obviously a du- 
 alistic chopping of the world into separate parts, and open 
 praise of lack of enduring strength, or patience, or reliability 
 (which is the normal woman's charm and valuable contribu- 
 tion to the race; §170). And in consistency with that 
 "artistic" temperament, her writings are hard, brilliant, 
 self-contradictory, and shallow. In the true artist's equa- 
 tion Style or form... "Kldeas or substance. .. = Truth or Useful 
 Work, she attends emphatically to style and does write tech- 
 nically well — is easy and sharp and facile and flashing, and 
 hence as noticeable as a conflagration. But she attends so lit- 
 tle to getting in real substance, that what she does say in that 
 fine style is practically worthless. Quite likely she will 
 make for herself a fairly enduring name among the famous, 
 which she implies is her desire: so did Ananias. 
 
 r. On the other hand we have women whose explicit 
 recognition of the fundamental value of matrimony is so clear 
 and balanced that it with others like it is the base of religion 
 and the stabilizer of all work and character. In the same 
 magazine with Mrs. Atherton's disruptive screams ( Worn. 
 Home Com.," Dec. 'l8), Mary Heaton Vorse, in her usual 
 calm and truthful manner, gives a description of a home that 
 is explicitly dotted out' to a One and a normal rebirth ; the 
 argument of this section is the bare logical skeleton of her 
 more humanly intelligible remarks. And Maude Rad- 
 ford Warren has written much about the normal woman that 
 is more appreciated by an intelligent person than Mrs. Ath- 
 erton s brilliant errors — although the style is not "up" 
 to the taste of a jaded woman of the world" (i. e., one 
 mentally mutilated by tea fights) and other sorts of "Artists" 
 who need tobasco and various sorts of catastrophes and New 
 York inspiration before their worn-out nerves begin to regis- 
 ter perceptibly. I think that Dorothy Canfield Fisher 
 
 most clearly and beautifully shows in her books the most im- 
 portant things. In the story "Vignettes from a Life of Two 
 Months" (in The Real Motive") she precisely describes a 
 normal yet infinite religious experience in caring for a baby. 
 All of her books have the same temperate activity that is at 
 the same time so universal as to pleasurably stretch the life 
 of anyone as far as it will go. And that is actual art (§17l), 
 because it is true and important; it is clearly both the One 
 and the Many, apparently overwhelmingly infinite, yet at 
 the same time most simple and commonplace. By being 
 a simple, everyday mother, like most American mothers ex- 
 cept probably with more enthusiasm and liking for that most 
 difficult job, Mrs. Fisher experienced enough to write an ex- 
 pression of universal motherhood:- "Home Fires in France. " 
 
209 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §167c 
 
 As a religious writing I believe that book is better than Job. 
 
 §167. a. We saw in the last section that maximum or 
 most moral living consists of a series of c)'cles as far out (L) 
 and as fast (7*) as we can comfortably live them. Then we 
 saw that any sort of life or activity (expressed generally as 
 any That... X This...) is capable of giving that maximum life, 
 but that the most direct way, both extensively and intens- 
 ively, of getting it is the immediately personal way of mar- 
 riage. Evidently, in such personal union Unselfishness... )K 
 Selfishness... has Selfishness... and Unselfishness... directly 
 personally and hence very perceptibly represented respect- 
 ively by one s self and one s spouse. Then the dots that 
 must pertain represent, first, children, then one's work or in- 
 terests, and so on ad infinitum. We shall in this section 
 make a rough general survey of those dots and the reactions, 
 omitting from it explicit consideration of the important dots 
 children (it becomes verbally complex and takes much space 
 to take children even nominally distinct from the spouses). 
 
 b. We first, for simplicity, consider a married couple, 
 W...Y.M..., with the man, conveniently named M, the in- 
 tensive factor M. .. or Selfishness..., and observe their reac- 
 tions (more or less omitting explicit mention of the dots), as 
 a means of getting the general names and an understanding 
 of such activities. Then we apply those familiar names to 
 
 the wider whole universe. If M considers himself, he 
 
 is a skin-bounded God the Son, and ultimately is God the 
 Father; and as the latter his wife W is si part of himself with 
 which he reacts. In order to get that ultimate One feeling 
 or life or happiness, he must be able to react so intensely 
 with W that he perceives the reaction from her as identical 
 with his own actions. So when M shifts from ineffable mon- 
 ism or mysticism to a positive and tangible science or plural- 
 ism or practical life which clearly supports and gives 
 definiteness to his religion, W truistically becomes to him his 
 most important God the Son. So M uses his reactions with 
 W as standards, or class names, or base of judgment, of his 
 interactions with the Many, and it is at those standards we 
 are to look briefly. Clearly, there are thousands of sorts of 
 human interactions conventionally named (i. e., meas- 
 ured); so I shall not go further than show the method. If 
 the reader will refer to Hobbes's "Leviathan" (part On 
 Man," especially Chaps. 6, 10), or to Cabot's "What Men 
 Live By," or most modern American texts on ethics, he will 
 find implications that will guide him as far as he cares to go 
 further with those humanistic names. Hobbes wrote about 
 three centuries ago, so his logic is much too sharp; but 
 Cabot uses the valid logic excellently — almost explicitly, 
 showing that he is a first class thinker and reliable. 
 
 167b That implies a valuable practical point. Those men (and 
 women, of course) who before the publication of this book were so 
 sound and balanced that they automatically and tacitly used the valid 
 logic in a perceptible fashion, and applied it consistently through a 
 wide range of practical details, thereby demonstrated their unusual 
 reliability, and the thorough excellence of their characters. You can 
 trust them; the most of them made some easily-found logical mis- 
 takes, but those mistakes were superficial and trivial, the characters 
 
 of the writers preventing any serious error. But you can not 
 
 in the future broadly judge men that way; for any fairly intelligent 
 child will be able in the future ostensibly to use the valid logic. You 
 can not safely judge my character by the fact that I use the valid 
 logic, for I am conscious of doing it, and have formal rules to follow. 
 We saw (§43) that the one logical error is to exaggerate anything to 
 zero or infinity. So as long as I do not do that (as long as I formally 
 avoid becoming absolute when talking of the Many, and vice versa 
 with the One) I am logically unassailable. But, now that I know 
 how to be logical and find it reasonably easy to be so, it is obvious 
 that I can in practical effect lie to you rationally if I so desire, by 
 the simple process of subtly overemphasizing various quantitative or 
 practical measurements. You see, before the valid logic was formally 
 stated, anyone who tried that little game of subtle exaggeration ot 
 emphasis (anyone who was not inherently honest-which means 
 
 c. If the man M reacts with his wife W with his atten- 
 tion primarily on the fact that he acts because he likes to, and 
 without waiting to see any resulting reactions from W, then 
 he obviously is playing. Truistically (taking it that he is 
 fairly normal) he will stop such activity as soon as he becomes 
 a trifle tired of it. So such play is pluralistically free — i. e. , 
 there is no perception of constraint, of subsequent reaction 
 that has to be met appropriately. (In a One sense, the man 
 is always absolutely free; §157.) But, if M has his atten- 
 tion perceptibly on the fact that his action with W produces 
 a desired reaction, then M is working; and he is pluralistic- 
 ally perceptibly constrained or not free — for he has to control 
 his action so as to produce the desired reaction, which is 
 equivalent to saying that W controls his action. When he is 
 playing, his action as a truism of definition is selfish ; when 
 he is working his action is usually called unselfish, because he 
 
 inherently sane and hence reliable) was practically certain to fall into 
 the trap of going to zero or infinity, and use dualistic logic. So those 
 men who before not only rather definitely used the valid logic, 
 but also applied it to wide classes of details consistently, are the most 
 reliable. Cabot's logic is applied extensively. Jordan has applied 
 valid logic to practically every phase of life and knowledge (§49p). 
 Dewey has applied it for many years to the multitudinous details of 
 psychology, philosophy, pedagogy, and ethics (§49p). Lee has ap- 
 plied valid logic to democracy. Taylor and many of his co-workers 
 — Gantt, Cooke, etc. — have applied valid logic to the vast domain of 
 industry. Hoover definitely uses valid logic ("Saturday Evening 
 Post," Dec. 27, 1919) in the wide range of economics and sociology, 
 and has also applied it in actual business. Taft uses valid logic with 
 remarkable steadiness and precision. Lorimer and Bok have applied 
 valid logic in their publications, by trying to give as much as they 
 could to the other fellow, and using commonsense in publishing truth 
 (and the fact that they have made a financial success of it is direct 
 evidence that the American people are sound, and appreciate such 
 reliability). And Ellery Sedgwick is doing the same thing with the 
 "Atlantic." Lorimer has also written sound logic extensively (in 
 his various letters of "old Gorgon Graham," which seem to me in- 
 trinsically much better than Montaigne), and George Ade, Tarking- 
 ton, Harry Leon Wilson, E. W. Howe, Stephen Leacock, and Dunne 
 are still doing so. Schwab and Grace and Foster are applying the 
 same thing to the difficult job of making steel. Mrs. Fisher, Mrs. 
 Vorse, and Mrs. Warren (§166r) have applied valid logic to the ex- 
 tensive range of daily living, and Mrs. Fisher has done it in peda- 
 gogy also. A. D. Little is a successful pioneer in soundly applying 
 chemistry to industry — the widest engineering of the future. And 
 that list is not complete — there are Edison and Wanamaker and Ford 
 and others. So there are as great men and women now as there 
 were in the olden days — in my opinion greater and better. And this 
 footnote shows definitely why they are great (for proof that those 
 people are courageous, which is also a necessity of greatness, and 
 another aspect of reliability or honesty, see footnote 170r). And I 
 judge that there will be better people in the next generation. If 
 there are not, that generation should be ashamed of its failure, and 
 go to work in silence to remedy it, instead of with gentle futility 
 
 reminiscing over past glories. So obviously you may judge a 
 
 man's general character or reliability by those principles. But that 
 judgment depends upon your own sanity, temperance, or reliability: 
 you truistically must use youself as a standard of comparison. If 
 you think that if George Washington said some man was great, then 
 you can take his judgment and be correct, you are wrong: you have 
 to use yourself finally to judge Washington's reliability, and merely 
 because you do not mention or think of that basic estimate does not 
 in the least change the fact that you use yourself as the standard and 
 that you are doing the judging (else you truistically are merely 
 mouthing some words that are meaningless to you). So why should 
 anyone be so silly and verbally cowardly as to say that he is accept- 
 ing the judgment of "posterity" and other such "authorities"? — but 
 of course the reader who has lasted so far in this book has too much 
 intelligence to fool himself that he can dodge responsibility that way. 
 
 Also, no positive logical way can be devised to catch a liar who 
 
 knows the valid logic, if he keeps his wits about him (for a lie in that 
 sense is a conscious quantitative perversion, and there can be no ex- 
 act science: possibly a lie in the old sense is a conscious total or flat 
 or qualitative or 0-x perversion; but that is now merely a logical 
 error, and silly to tell to anyone with a knowledge of logic). But 
 the liar always labors under the disadvantage that he is less intelli- 
 gent than other persons (otherwise, he would not be so foolish as to 
 lie). So in the long run all liars are certain to be detected. 
 
§167c XVIII Three UNIVERSE 
 
 is primarily attending to a reaction of W — an objective thing. 
 (But clearly, monistically there can be no distinction between 
 selfish and unselfish ; and pluralistically the distinction after 
 a few steps along the dots fades out.) The essential point 
 in M's ■working is that he can not stop when he likes, but 
 must attend to W's reaction and stop either before he likes 
 or keep on after fatigue sets in, depending on W's wishes. 
 If M must keep on working until unduly fatigued his work is 
 named drudgery (and there correspondingly, in the opposite 
 direction, remain some parts of him unduly under-used, or 
 bored, or "suppressed"). Also, such undue lack of freedom 
 is named slavery, which obviously can not be absolute. 
 
 d. If we use "religious" terms for M's activities we get 
 some verbally unconventional conclusions. So long as M is' 
 free, or playing, in his activities with W, his activity is 
 equivalent to what is called worship. Worship is primarily a 
 selfish activity — play. It obviously does not do Christ him- 
 self as a skin-bounded person any good to be worshiped now; 
 he is dead, and personally knows nothing about it. It does 
 the worshiper good — stretches his perceptions somewhat, in 
 an effort to encompass as much as Christ did (although when 
 the worshiper labors under the delusion that he is graciously 
 doing something that Christ highly appreciates and hence is 
 "working," probably his perceptions are being blunted: I 
 should call such activity self-worship; cf. the late kaiser s 
 
 "worship" of Gott). When worship is considered to 
 
 be controlled by its object, then it obviously begins to be in 
 the borderland between play and work, and its most usual 
 name is service. But there is so much lack of perception as 
 to the true nature of worship that conventional distinctions 
 are confused :- the minister serves the Lord by worship- 
 ing" by some schedule, and he gets paid for it (he has his 
 attention in some degree on the money that will come back 
 or else he is a species of dualist:- economic idiot); but the 
 layman worships because he likes it, and hence he pays for 
 the privilege. (Sometimes however he works at worshiping 
 so as to be paid the approbation of the community — in which 
 common case "religion" becomes actually a sort of police 
 force" in which the "pillar of the church" shines — but at a 
 terrific cost to society, as such worship involves some ly- 
 ing; e. g., the well-' policed" Middle ages; see Walsh's 
 Catholic "The Thirteenth, Greatest of Centuries.") Ritual is 
 a formal routine of worship. When it becomes thoroughly 
 rutted into the nervous system it will obviously run through 
 so easily as to give, if in large enough doses, a mild and nor- 
 mal rebirth (mostly of an emotional nature, because it is im- 
 possible for a sane intellect to accept as literal truth most 
 rituals). Like the use of all things, the temperate use of rit- 
 ual is good (I like to hear the Episcopal musical ritual so far 
 off that I can't distinguish the obnoxious words); but if rit- 
 ual is taken seriously, or as a substitute for work or actual 
 thinking, it becomes pernicious just as do fairy stones if they 
 are believed. Fairy tales ignore the existence of relation- 
 ship, of cause and effect, to some extent. If it is not recog- 
 nized that such is the fact, and that we are playing at being 
 foolish and thoughtless (as we, even as little children, clearly 
 are doing in "Alice in Wonderland"), then fairy tales truist- 
 ically are immoral. Fairy tales are often supposed to exer- 
 cise the imagination." But obviously, unless clearly taken 
 as a lesson in how not to do it as in Alice, they truistic- 
 ally kill the imagination (a reaching out for the unknown 
 next related or consistent thing or fact). In moral ritual we 
 do not play at being foolish and thoughtless, but play at be- 
 ing children again, with disregard of practically all intellect- 
 ual relationships : we are stirring up pleasant emotions. So 
 
 ritual is primarily emotional. Corresponding to it on 
 
 the intellectual side is prayer, in Ritual... X Pray •er...= 
 
 210 
 
 Emotions. . . X Intellect. . . = Worship,— that standard universe 
 Worship being expanded thus :- Unselfishness. . . XSelfishness. . . 
 ="Deeds , '...XWorship...= Work...XPlay... =Ltfe, from 
 which we may see the principles. There is not a great deal 
 of intellect about some orthodox prayers (in which case they 
 have reversed to Ritual...); but obviously Prayer... is effica- 
 cious in the same sense that intellect is (§§153-4). 
 
 e. Because people have been uncertain and often self- 
 contradictory as to what they did mean by those various re- 
 ligious" terms, those terms are vague. They conventionally 
 show a tendency to be used as both extensive and intensive 
 factors ; above I had to guess at the more common usage, 
 and I did that simply as a means of showing the principles (I 
 have no perceptible desire to regulate verbal usage, but am 
 glad to take conventional meanings if there is consistency in 
 them). That conventional uncertainty as to the meaning of 
 "religious" words itself shows that the average man does not 
 
 take orthodox "religion" or theology very seriously. 
 
 We may note further that there is conventionally no widely 
 agreed-upon word that indicates intemperance in religion — a 
 proof that theologians in effect urge intemperance. The 
 word pious, which formerly eulogistically denoted excellence 
 in the important things of life (tacitly taken as being the re- 
 ligious things), is now tending to indicate intemperance in 
 religion and hence wrongness. Sometimes fanatic, or 
 "religious crank," is used to indicate too much religion." 
 When the man M gets to worshiping W too much he is said 
 to be fascinated or bewitched by her, or to put her on a ped- 
 estal. Most Americans tend to exaggerate that worship at 
 first; it then is perhaps usually useful — just as a rather vio- 
 lent religious rebirth is needed at first. But no doubt just 
 one such departure from a balance is often so violent as to 
 be damaging. It is much less damaging in any case if its 
 nature is recognized, so that it is consciously made temporary 
 enough to be tolerable, and no ignorant disappointment be 
 afterwards felt because the world no longer runs along at 
 
 white heat. A woman naturally does not have very 
 
 intense rebirths or worship of her spouse (§170; I am aware 
 that shallow hysterics of the Marie Bashkirtseff sort make- 
 believe considerable tempests-in-a-teapot) ; so she is in far 
 less danger from rebirths of her own. She is therefore liable 
 to be coy or to "run away" at first in a make believe that 
 causes the man to depart more widely from his balance — in 
 some cases in destructive measure. 
 
 f. Thus we have observed M react with W without our 
 explicitly considering W's point of view. Obviously, if M 
 takes both his point of view, and also W s point of view, he 
 truistically takes a monistic view of the restricted standard 
 
 universe W . . X M. . , or of the whole universe W X M. 
 
 In short, the view becomes ineffable, inexpressible. The es- 
 sential of Many language and practical life is that we retain 
 a given point of view in any given statement (A=A; §22). 
 Obviously, the way to consider W's point of view is to write 
 the formula M...XW... and repeat the foregoing discussion 
 with W substituted for M. In that case some quantitative 
 changes would occur, as a woman W is perceptibly different 
 from a man in numerous quantitative ways (§170). But, we 
 can take the point of view of an observer O and note the in- 
 teraction of M and W thus :- ( W X M) . . . X 0. . . . That is a 
 very precise logical way of considering it : in actual practice 
 O is a temporary personality' of M or W, or one of the dots, 
 which in a so-called impersonal manner observes the two us- 
 ual' personalities (§153k) M and W interact, thus:- W..(.) 
 XM..(.), in which either of the (.)'s may be O. Then, 
 from the point of view of O, when both M and W are working 
 to make their dots action that is agreeable to the other (when 
 both M and W are attending to the agreeableness of their 
 
211 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §167h 
 
 activity to the other), the conduct is called cooperation. Other 
 names for it are reciprocity, mutual helpfulness, team work, 
 partnership. When more than two persons are engaged in 
 that mutually-regarding activity, the combination is called a 
 democracy— but I shall not trouble to make the perhaps con- 
 ventional distinction that cooperation is mutual reaction be- 
 tween two, and democracy, between more than two. 
 
 Obviously, cooperation or democracy is impossible by strict 
 classical logic. For in cooperation each one of the at least 
 two parts of the machine (team) which is working, substan- 
 tially contains in itself a secondary personality (or structure) 
 that is a duplicate in miniature of the reacting part (and so 
 on in regress), so that the reactions of the reacting parts 
 are known simultaneously with its own actions. And that 
 statement is illogical by classical logic ; it is really an asser- 
 tion that The Many=The One — i. e. , that upon a given act 
 simultaneous One knowledge of a subsequent act is possible 
 (cf. §150). Or, to put it in everyday terms, we know we 
 can feel our own actions and at the same time feel roughly 
 (inaccurately) how the reactions of our partner will subse- 
 quently affect him; and we can thus work together. But by 
 the classic logic that is not possible. So we have eliminated 
 such nonsensical logic. But the reader can now see in ulti- 
 mate detail that it is rather difficult to say precisely what co- 
 operation or democracy is. The race, in its usual manner of 
 being considerably better than it is able to say, by practical 
 trial and error established democracy in a general way before 
 it could recognize democracy well enough to describe it. 
 
 g. It is also obvious why it has taken the world so long 
 to decide that it wanted democracy, or even that democracy 
 is right. The universe forces us to apply democracy ; no 
 other sort of action is possible, for democracy is merely the 
 action of That... X7%«. .. in which That and This are always 
 really identical with each other — their infinite regress of dots 
 in a very few steps being merged into an identity so far as 
 we can definitely perceive. The difficulty the race had in 
 being conscious of that was the difficulty each man has in 
 putting himself in the other man's place, in being sympa- 
 thetic, or in being what is commonly called unselfish (and 
 the inevitable penalty he pays for such blindness is that he 
 truistically unseeingly blunders into other men or parts of the 
 universe and painfully damages his skin ; the aristocratic 
 grabber who deliberately shuts his eyes to the damage he is 
 causing usually rapidly becomes so blind to other things 
 that often he hasn't sense enough to dodge such simple 
 things as soft living). We see others suffer or be happy, and 
 that (by the universal That...XThis... law) causes us in a 
 less degree to suffer or be happy ; but then the stupid or 
 rather blind person considers that feeling with nearly sole 
 reference to himself (restricts his vision of the universe or 
 tends to make the zero error— which is the same sort of stu- 
 pidity as putting out his eyes), or else he with equally bad 
 estimation of measures guesses that he ought to make those 
 others do what would be appropriate action for him (thus 
 substantially making the infinity error by jumping to a vague 
 sentimental monism and insisting that the others should have 
 just his feelings, and must do just as he would do — which is 
 what Paul seems to me to have meant by charity or love" 
 in I Cor., 13; or it is a frequent variety of socialism or uplift; 
 or it is the usual "missionary spirit," or the altruism of the 
 silly Tolstoy or Wilson sort: note that in the typical Wilson 
 case the vague sweet altruism tending to infinity followed the 
 zero talk of perfect neutrality). 
 
 h. The aristocrat, "swelled head," egotist, or privileged 
 or protected or mildly selfish or hysterical person, quite 
 frankly sets himself up to be fixedly or constantly superior to 
 others. Even the exceedingly stupid extreme socialists or 
 
 proletariat and I.W.W. s have shown that the idea of that 
 superiority is always present in such people ; it psychologi- 
 cally consists simply of the truism that one's self is easier to 
 see, and so on casual or stupid inspection does bulk large. 
 In the development of the brain that aristocratic point of view 
 naturally comes first; it can be observed as a stage in the 
 growth of vigorous children. So that selfish, superior" 
 point of view determines the older historical forms of govern- 
 ment. It similarly determines the line or military or ec- 
 clesiastical or bureaucratic form of organization — they are 
 all essentially the same, there being a superior" head man 
 and formally fixed ranks of inferiors, in a line, so to 
 speak (or, in common terms, the buck may and must always 
 be passed down but never up). Obviously, such formally 
 fixed ranks can not possibly actually exist, and never do 
 (§§37, 1 7*) ; in so far as the line or military or bureaucratic 
 or king or pope type of organization is actually what it osten- 
 sibly is, it simply fails to exist, and hence is in that degree a 
 failure — non-existent (obviously, if in practice any bureaucrat 
 and his line actually tried to pass the responsibility or buck 
 always down they would become unbearably ridiculous in 
 their own eyes; so they naturally use democracy some). 
 That theor}' or principle is absolute. Even the presumably 
 fixed heads of the extreme line type are not actually fixed or 
 constant (XIX; note the forced abdications of the czar and 
 kaiser). There is no exact or constant science; by the same 
 
 principle the theory of line organization is wrong. ' In 
 
 precisely the same way, M can not in principle be the su- 
 perior" or "master" of W. Paul's command that wives sub- 
 mit, etc., is in principle absolutely wrong. In the same way 
 there can be no infallibility of the pope, either in actuality 
 or as an official rule; "infallibility" is the same as saying 
 that in some way the pope (or a kaiser, or president of a coal 
 mine) is absolute, and he is not, and can not be made so in 
 
 any Many sense (Parts One and Two). In the same 
 
 way, Christ as an individual was not a real Master, or a 
 divine or absolute God ; what Christ said can not be appli- 
 cable to anyone but himself (and is not ultimately correct, 
 even for himself). I judge that Christ did not set himself up 
 as a Master, or an infallible leader, or a superior we must 
 follow (for much evidence of the soundness of that guess, see 
 Singer's "Rival Philosophies of Jesus and Paul"). But if he 
 
 did, then he obviously was thoroughly wrong verbally. 
 
 In the same way, there can not be any true or absolute 
 creed, or any superior, fixed, constant authority. This 
 
 book I think tells the truth fairly well for this day; but any 
 man who accepts me for an authority without verifying for 
 himself what he believes of what I say, and taking the re- 
 sponsibility of such belief, is either a fool or a scoundrel, or 
 both. Also, if the race can not in a short time restate the 
 truth considerably better than I state it, then I think the 
 race would be a sorry affair, composed of dubs. Incidentally, 
 practically all fathers and mothers naturally have morals or 
 intelligence enough to want their child to become better than 
 themselves, and more often than not they succeed in making 
 him so. Yet some theologians in bland disregard of such 
 commonsense would have us believe that Christ acted as the 
 dog in the manger and wanted to remain better than we, and 
 "superior," and that he actually was so poor in his work that 
 he failed to help anyone after him to become better than he 
 
 was. And in the same way that all aristocracy is 
 
 wrong, al\ fixed classes or castes of people are wrong. The 
 actual fact is that no class is fixed, and hence any assertion 
 that one is, is untrue, and any attempt to make it completely 
 so is immoral. So truistically, all hereditary titles (i. e., 
 presumably hereditably fixed) are immoral. And all entailed 
 wealth is immoral. And the inheritance of wealth similarly 
 
§167h XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 212 
 
 tends to be immoral, as we shall see (§§168, 173); it would 
 be flatly immoral if it were possible to say just who owned 
 any given thing. (We can properly say, as was done above, 
 that classes, hereditary titles, organizations, etc., are flatly 
 immoral because those are mere formal ways of stating rela- 
 tionships, and a relationship is or is not; but wealth is a 
 Many thing, and the problem becomes explicitly quantitative 
 
 and never absolute; footnote 175e.) And in the 
 
 same way, it is immoral to fancy that we have » personal im- 
 mortal soul (such would be self-contradictorily an absolute 
 Many soul). Some of the foregoing aristocratic immoralities 
 are rather directly derived from the belief in an immortal 
 personal soul or a practical attempt to achieve it in a more 
 or less quantitative fashion. In order to keep this book short 
 I have to omit the glaring historical evidence of how man has 
 suffered from his erroneous belief in personal immortality. 
 
 Thus we see a general statement of the long train of 
 
 immoralities which result from being aristocratic — seeing 
 our self so well as to let it shut off seeing our neighbor very 
 well — being selfish, in short. 
 
 i. The opposite immorality of complete altruism, or of 
 considering our neighbor as practically everything and our 
 self as negligible need not be considered further (except in- 
 directly as socialism, §175). The fact is that such verbal or 
 ostentatious altruism is a make believe for self-glorification in 
 most cases — note Tolstoy's selfishness to his family. 
 
 j. Although there is not much of actual exaggerated 
 altruism, there is a practical error nominally in that altruistic 
 or unselfish direction, which is usually of mild quantitative 
 degree and so not very immoral, but which does destroy some 
 cooperation. There does not seem to be any technical or 
 otherwise refined" name for it (like other immoralities it 
 instrinsically is not refined; but it isn't yet so bad that we 
 have had to invent euphemisms for it). Primarily it is inter- 
 fering with another s business — wanting a finger in all pies. 
 It is the reformer s itch — the idea that if you would only 
 let me do it, I could do it so much better." It is butting in 
 — the craze to give advice, or instruction, to establish a cen- 
 sorship, to be didactic, or to act as the traditional autocratic 
 schoolmaster (e. g., Wilson). Of course, avowed aristocrats 
 often act in this nominally helpful, altruistic way : all forms 
 of intemperance, by the principle of rhythm, balance them- 
 selves by reversing to the opposite direction, to asceticism, 
 just as the drunkard at times goes on the water wagon." 
 This butting in is sentimental democracy, or a sort of emo- 
 tional, over- idealistic, vague effort to get a democracy to- 
 morrow by high-speed, incompetent guessing. The idealistic 
 dreamer does not care to be bothered with working out the 
 hard, distressing practical details, and so is usually densely 
 ignorant of practical methods of getting his large ideals" 
 applied. That is the general defect of our American 
 efforts at democracy. It is a generous error (provided the 
 butter-in doesn t insist too much on having his own way, or 
 upon grabbing too much lime-light, even to a place in his- 
 tory") — a mildly exaggeratedly-unselfish one that is a useful 
 relief from too much selfishness, and as a verbal counterbal- 
 ance to aristocratic talk (such as too proud to fight," "all the 
 traffic will bear"). It is the same in nature as the American 
 man's idealization of woman (for which I have an apparently 
 ineradicable fondness ; so the reader should be on his guard in 
 judging the quantities in my discussion of woman — the theo- 
 ry is simple, and that given is all right). In spite of the 
 fact that we like that defect (we always prefer our errors at 
 the moment, else truistically we would discard them as fast 
 as we can drop the habit of them), it often causes trouble, 
 even though it is useful as a counterbalance to the European 
 aristocratic view of woman as a toy and drudge. From 
 
 another point of view this exaggeration of unselfishness is the 
 result of our looking at the other man and saying that he is 
 our quantitative equal — "as good as I am. But he actu- 
 
 ally is always either better or worse, just as no two atoms are 
 ever equal. If he actually were our quantitative equal, then 
 the advice which works for us would work for him, and butt- 
 ing in would be moral. We perhaps largely get the habit of 
 butting in from the bombastic Declaration-of Independence, 
 which asserts that all men are free and equal : monistically 
 it is true, but ethics is a Many subject, and ethically it is not 
 true (a matter of ordinary commonsense fact, or as is proved 
 rigorously by Parts One and Two and specifically in XIX) ; 
 so our efforts to act as if it were true are mildly immoral. 
 
 k. Well ; that is not nearly so startling as we, in our 
 ritualistic worship of the Declaration, at first fancy. When- 
 ever we stop playing at being Idealists with a very big I, 
 and goto our daily work and forget about being self-conscious 
 "Leaders" of the Wilson and kaiser sort, the majority of us 
 then see that we can not run our job and the other man's 
 too — that being our brother's keeper does not quantitatively 
 extend so far as doing his thinking and eating his meals for 
 him. So we then act so as to give him the best chance to 
 run his own job — to react with us, in a team. The best busi- 
 ness men of this country clearly have founded their success on 
 the basic principle of helping the other fellow react in his 
 way, democratically — regardless of how much some of them 
 may be considered to have failed to apply that principle to 
 all the people. It is exceedingly difficult to apply the prin- 
 ciple of democracy to any of the people with perceptible accu- 
 racy ( satisfaction") to both sides, and if we start with a 
 few (instead of lazily slumping to a defective-brain aristoc- 
 racy :- 'me over all" in one direction, or socialism [§175] in 
 the other), there is hope that a few of us can grow big 
 enough to apply it to all. Ford probably manages to please 
 most of his customers, dealers, employes, and himself; but 
 I understand that some of his competitors do not think he is 
 democratic, and like the socialists want the automobile busi- 
 ness divided equally between the able makers and the dubs. 
 In our simple case of W...y(M..., M is obviously co- 
 operating with W when he attends to her actual ability to 
 react — works so that she can act in her best way — without her 
 having M as a dictator, or other verbally-unselfish Leader of 
 The People. In order that M maj' be able to work that way 
 he has to be able to see that W is not his quantitative equal 
 so that she can not be expected by him to react to his acts as 
 he would to such acts. He must have the really good observ- 
 ing ability, mostly lacking in the socialists and autocrats, of 
 seeing what W quantitatively is, and hence how she can best 
 react, and letting her react that way, and expecting her to, 
 and anticipating such action. That is all hard to do. Obvi- 
 ously, all acts of M and W interfere with each other some- 
 what — there can be no perfect judgment and adjustment of 
 them. So the object of M and W is to work together as ac- 
 curately as possible in a series of cycles. Truistically, if 
 either fails to act democratically the algebraic sum of the cy- 
 cles of at least one of them (other things staying fairly steady) 
 accumulates in one direction, and there is an explosion of 
 some degree — perceptible conflict; there is conflict in an im- 
 perceptible degree, or incompatibility, as soon as one of the 
 team stops trying, when working (cf. par. m), to make his or 
 her reactions fit with the other's best abilities. And all that 
 is the complete principle (in one of its indefinite number of 
 forms of expression) of the labor-capital problem. Capital 
 has intelligence enough to see that it is to its advantage to 
 try to cooperate with labor; hence there need be no conflict 
 on the capital side — which helps some, and delays the explo- 
 sions. But although most workmen intrinsically have ample 
 
213 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §167m 
 
 intelligence to see that it is to their interests, both financial 
 and in mental comfort and contentment, to cooperate, it is 
 not to the immediate interest of the labor leaders to have in- 
 dustrial peace (for the same reasons that petty kings of an 
 olden day started fights). In the long run it would pay the 
 leaders to cooperate; but they have untrained brains, and 
 most of them can't see that. And it seems that, like the sub- 
 jects of olden kings, most workmen have not the intelligence 
 to handle that more complicated problem of making their 
 leaders see. So it is likely that for some time labor in gen- 
 eral will not try to cooperate, and there will be conflict on 
 the labor side. The practical solution obviously is for capital 
 to try to show labor in general the facts, and to try to get 
 the labor leaders in particular to see those facts. Some of 
 the more autocratic leaders will perhaps require legal treat- 
 ment by psychiatrists. In the same way we can react 
 
 cooperatively with material" things instead of with another 
 person — have the formula Material things. . . X The man M..., 
 or Material things. . . X Ourselves. ... If we use those material 
 things or react with them with some intelligence as to how 
 they can react, and will last, can be replaced, will not be 
 wasted, etc., such material democracy' is called conservation 
 in economics, and by more familiar names in business. Any 
 stupid use of material things is waste :- material aristocracy. ' 
 One of the conspicuous characteristics of aristocrats is that 
 they are wasters — partly deliberately so in order to exhibit 
 their mental defect, aristocracy, to the world, but largely 
 because they prefer to loaf rather than to acquire sense 
 enough to make a balanced use of things. The confirmed 
 manual laborer has the highest pecentage of waste (except 
 paupers and criminals and insane). E. g., he has an idea, 
 vaguely but often vociferously expressed, that he is the only 
 worker (that only more or less direct manual labor is work), 
 stupidly overlooking the fact that he left school, and refuses 
 mental work or study, because he found that to be too hard 
 work for him; thus, simply because he won t do the work re- 
 quired, he wastes his opportunities and a large part of his life. 
 
 The summary of this and the last paragraph is that 
 
 we should, as a demonstrated moral principle, try to pay 
 others fully and in carefully precise measure for what they 
 do for us; and we should, instead of indulging in wordy sen- 
 timentality about altruism, be careful that others pay us in 
 just measure for what we do for them. It is immoral to fail 
 to pay; it is equally immoral to fail to get our money's 
 worth. Actually, the universe is exactly balanced all the 
 the time (§11 4c): ultimately, the universe does not keep 
 books" or "extend credit." And it is merely a truism that 
 the most moral life most widely 'sees' or gets that balance. 
 1. The last paragraph is a mathematically definite state- 
 ment of democracy. Truistically, we can never achieve a 
 perfect democracy : it involves the infinite regress, and we 
 must be continually guessing at the dots or quantities. We 
 see that a basic requisite for the practice of democracy is to 
 "size up" the other man as he is — not to take men as quan- 
 titatively equal. So it is again obvious (see §164bc) that 
 the fundamental practical need in being moral (in doing anything 
 right — in being "successful") is to make a fairly accurate 
 quantitative judgment of ourselves, others, and things. There is 
 nothing very novel about that conclusion ; it is merely a spe- 
 cific statement of Socrates's "know thyself," or of the gen- 
 eral object of science. Nearly everybody tacity accepts that 
 conclusion in practice, and primarily tries to estimate himself 
 and others. All personal gossip consists of making such esti- 
 mates; even the astronomer figures his "personal equation. 
 Most of what we call news is personal gossip. And in spite 
 of the beratings we receive from those butters-in who urge us 
 to "higher things," we keep on with personal gossip. And 
 
 we are profoundly right. As there is no exact science we 
 can never be accurate about men. But even when a physi- 
 cist measures the length of a standard yard his measure is a 
 series of personal opinions as to just when two marks coincide. 
 If we indulge in personal gossip with consciousness of why 
 we are doing so, and of what we want (a mutual comparison 
 and checking of values, and training in estimating persons), 
 we are acting very morally. 
 
 m. If M can with reasonable accuracy estimate W's 
 characteristics, then, and only then, can he consciously trust 
 her and thus be able consciously to rely on her reactions, so 
 that he can at times let her take the load of responsibility of 
 running things while he rests, or goes the other way in his 
 cycle. That is an essential part of democracy. But the 
 only conscious phrase we have for it, so far as I can find, is 
 In God we trust" — and as will appear, we usually do not 
 
 know what it means. ■ The aristocrat fancies that he is 
 
 always superior, always on duty and strained away from the 
 balance in that direction, that he is personally indispen- 
 sable, that the dear people can t get along without him; for 
 according to his dualistic theory there is no one available to 
 react with him on a formal equality. In the practically 
 pathological case of aristocracy of the late kaiser, we see him 
 substantially taking on the theoretically unceasing infinite 
 burden of instructing Gott what to do. But in the democ- 
 racy of M and W, if M really trusts W, first he can do his 
 work, and then so to speak abandon himself to her, and rest 
 himself while she takes up the tension of the proper and ex- 
 pected reaction. He can do his work: and then rest (go 
 through the other part of his cycle) without a care" — with 
 an actual conscious temporary lack of responsibility. Theo- 
 retically, in no other way except that general democratic way 
 can he actually rest. (Also, truistically a man can never have 
 all his parts simultaneously resting, nor any one organ abso- 
 lutely resting: for brevity I omit such precision below — such 
 explicit inclusion of the infinite regress of democratic action.) 
 In theory it is not possible for a person in a line organization 
 or bureaucracy to rest; for in principle there he must al- 
 ways carry the burden of his rank or duty. When anyone 
 gets the idea that he must maintain his rank or his awful 
 responsibility or dignity or position, that he is the 
 fixed boss or "leader," then in his conscious pseudo theory he 
 misses moral democratic living and can not rest. Of course it 
 is impossible that he actually stay in just that one side of the 
 cycle ; after he unduly fatigues himself with his silly beliefs, 
 nature (the rest of the universe) makes him rest — -blowing up 
 his brain to do it if he is too stubborn, or killing him. But 
 probably there are numbers of people who have never con- 
 sciously and willingly slacked up the tension of being an 
 aristocrat (the tension of conflict in par. k) and been a con- 
 scious democrat — rested, had peace. When we trust God we 
 actually, in Many or practical life, estimate or judge that all 
 the things, including people, directly concerned, take on the 
 responsibility of reacting while we rest. Every time we go 
 to sleep we have thus trusted God ; and when we get insom- 
 nia we haven't. An aristocrat often can not be consciously 
 democratic enough to trust the part of God which is his 
 wife as far as she deserves — much less the people he 
 condescends to "lead," or the employer whose wishes he 
 tolerates. This paragraph states the ultimate applica- 
 tion of religious experience in daily life. If the reader has 
 not had conscious experience of such a last step in democracy 
 he may think it queer that this paragraph means anything in 
 particular. But if he keeps on trying to understand it he 
 may see its great importance. Anyone who fails to act on 
 the principle stated will in due time be dealt some painful 
 but just reactions by nature. A few years ago a notoriously 
 
§167m XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 214 
 
 autocratic financial pirate died in a long-drawn-out quivering 
 fear — a truistically "natural" reaction conventionally named 
 poetic justice. A fairly intelligent person would consider 
 that a high price to pay for the ' privilege" of aristocratically 
 grabbing wealth — especially when it is noticed that that 
 pathological condition was merely the explosion of years of 
 fear. Nature finds no least difficulty in extracting millions of 
 dollars worth of payment in pain from the profiteering boob 
 who thinks he can run the game by his silly rules. 
 
 n. I do not urge or beg anybody to trust God, or find 
 rest in God — or more practically, in his wife, or friends. I 
 merely point out the fact that everybody does actually trust 
 God, and does so by trusting, knowing, the people and 
 things nearest him. If he observes that fact, becomes con- 
 scious of it, he thus gains more life and happiness, because he 
 can consciously rest. Complete morality not only implies life 
 more abundantly or wider activity with economy of time, but 
 it also implies the other side of the cycle :- rest, or peace. 
 Democracy includes both activity and peace. The man who 
 whines of a heavy burden is not religious, not a democrat. 
 
 §168. a. We now consider some conventional ethical 
 names for the reactions of ourselves with a wider environ- 
 ment of persons and things than the W. .. XAf. .. in the last 
 
 section. We have seen that in general we get the 
 
 important things of life by acting cyclically with our environ- 
 ment — the important thing is the consciousness, and hence 
 enjoyment, of those cycles. There are a number of ways of 
 naming or recognizing such consciousness — of estimating or 
 asserting what we call the worth or value of certain activities. 
 We consider worth, or value, in this section. It will become 
 implicitly an obvious truism that all worths or values are 
 identical; so I shall make no effort to separate material" 
 and ' spiritual" values (that is already covered by §161 — we 
 seeing that hedonism and idealism are essentially the same). 
 The term value usually has a relationship meaning — is a God 
 the Holy Ghost or abstract. So it is often confused. 
 
 b. If M and W cooperate in W. ..XM. .., the result, 
 from the point of view of naming values (which names or val- 
 ues here become Many terms), is ordinarily tacitly this :- 
 Love... X Work, or worship, or loyalty... ^=Happiness. That 
 equation looks queer because we probably use the factors 
 more often as relationship words; if we write W. ..XAf. .. 
 with such words used conventionally as relationships to re- 
 place (§80e) the X, we may write, W...{love, work, worship, 
 loyalty, or payment in any material or spiritual way)M. . . , in 
 which those various values definitely name the general X. 
 Those values relate any That... and This..., and apply or act 
 both ways, so to speak. I. e., in an ultimate sense any 
 reaction of Other men... X.Given men... implies that each factor 
 is paid by the existence of the relationship symbolized by 
 the X, — the relationship necessarily going in both directions, 
 to each set of men, or being ultimately circular. (That is 
 the explicit ethical or economic form of the truism of exist- 
 ence, §22.) But in humanics we usually name the values 
 differently for each of the two directions of relationship, thus :- 
 Labor — > 
 
 Employes. 
 
 -Wages] Employer - 
 
 That difference in 
 
 names is an implicit commonsense recognition of the fact that 
 no finite cycle may be exactly reversed (index, Cycle"), and 
 is the same as the theory of direction of reaction in thermo- 
 chemistry. We may write W...XM.,. in terms of value:- 
 
 W...\ y T _ \ M... ; or the democratic formula, thus:- 
 
 <— Love 
 Other men and things. 
 
 {Reaction^ ) 
 <— Action ) 
 
 Given men. 
 
 The 
 
 Reaction— > 
 <— Action 
 
 love W gives to M is quantitatively different from the love M 
 gives to W; in the same way the quantities or measures on 
 
 the two sides of the relationship in the democratic formula 
 are not identical, which agrees with the last section. (Bas- 
 icly, that is the principle of incommensurability ; §50.) 
 
 c. The last paragraph gives the theory of values explic- 
 itly and rigorously. "The volumes of its expansion are mostly 
 omitted at this point, there being below merely a few gen- 
 eral suggestions as to that expansion. I shall use values 
 mostly as Many terms, as that is more definite and simple. 
 
 d. The general value-equation is obviously :- Fame or 
 money... X Work, or worship, or loyalty, or service... = Happi- 
 ness. In short, we name the reaction to our activity :- fame 
 (good repute, honor, respectof the community, 'face," etc.), 
 or money (wealth, or any material or other thing which we 
 agree to let money symbolize). If we acted and could per- 
 ceive no reaction, then truistically we would not be able to 
 know that we acted, and so would be in a monistic Nirvana 
 — or, in Many life, would stop acting, and be dead. So, as 
 ultimate truism, we are paid' for all our actions; the im- 
 portant things of life are measured by those payments, or are 
 made perceptible to us by them (that statement substantially 
 makes payments into relationships, though our formula is 
 using them as Many terms). Of course, we can and do make 
 a standard universe of our skin-bounded self, and get numer- 
 ous reactions or much pay as the reflected emotions which 
 follow each act of will. If we act morally we truistically get 
 such reactions — as sense of well-doing, peaceful conscience, 
 
 virtue is its own reward. ' But if we deceive ourselves, 
 lie, suppress the truth, or fail to react fully to things, prosti- 
 tute our brains by pretending to believe self-contradictory 
 theology and other inconsistent stuff, refuse to see or admit our 
 mistakes, or otherwise act in an aristocratic manner, it is ob- 
 vious that we shall primarily cut down those reactions that 
 are emotions, and deprive ourselves of some happiness. In 
 short, the punishment of the liar, profiteer, or other sort of 
 aristocrat, is that he contradicts or opposes his own nervous 
 system until it fails to act, so that it partly dies — or comes 
 to believe his own lies, or commits piecemeal suicide by 
 stupidity. The liar can often deceive other men into making 
 payments to him that are too great for the work he did ; but 
 obviously the liar pays for such over-payments' by partly de- 
 stroying himself with the lie — literally takes it out of his own 
 skin. And the persons who were so foolish as to let them- 
 selves be deceived by the liar get the rest of their money's 
 worth by being painfully partially destroyed as an automatic 
 lesson (which even an idiot will consciously or morally profit 
 by if accumulated enough) to observe actual facts for them- 
 selves when they are of direct importance (and not be easy 
 marks or boobs that furnish a constant temptation to vigorous 
 
 men to become exploiters). It is therefore directly 
 
 obvious (and in agreement with our total argument), that it 
 makes no difference in principle whether we measure morality 
 by inner' or by outer' payments — by spiritual or by mater- 
 ial measures (§§167k, 114c). Obviously, the temperate and 
 most moral man balances the two sorts of measures, circu- 
 larly, so that each serves as a check or measure on the other. 
 Clearly, the man who "idealistically" professes to think that 
 there is nothing of appreciable value outside his skin in the 
 
 material" world is a trifle insane — as is his brother crank 
 who Scientifically" fancies his nervous system is a vacuum 
 as to Emotions. ... So for brevity I pay no explicit attention 
 to whether value is inner or outer, but tacitly include both, 
 e. Whether we are conscious of the fact or not, we 
 measure our happiness by fame and-or money. We may 
 work for our own approval, in which case we have fame as 
 inner self-respect or self-love. Some people claim they want 
 only that (e. g., all highbrows and "Artists," etc., who 
 talk of art for art's sake," "knowledge for knowledge's 
 
215 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §168h 
 
 sake, ' etc. , ad nauseam). Clearly, such talk is equivalent 
 to the dualistic assertion that their skin-bounded self is the 
 universe or God, which is so obviously wrong that it shows 
 that those Artists" are make-believing that they are suc- 
 cesses — talking as if ordinary outer fame, especially money, 
 were sour grapes. But, though inner fame may be thus 
 exaggerated, some is essential; e. g., all initiative is the re- 
 sult of anticipating to ourselves that a certain action which 
 people do not know they want (or which they even emphati- 
 cally deny they want when they first see it — as, for instance, 
 sometimes happens to this book), will first please us, while 
 we wait for their later approval and their then giving to us 
 praise and-or money. In such initiative we have to take 
 a chance on being right. And while we normally value the 
 inner self-respect some, we also by ordinary commonsense want 
 that confirmed (§17ljk)— which is proved by the fact that the 
 promoter charges high prices for his services :- he has to 
 take a chance that he is right, and has seen better than prac- 
 tically all other people in a certain detail ; usually he is 
 wrong, and gets negative instead of positive pay. 
 
 f. And just as there is a normal limit of extent of activ- 
 ity (Fig. 163b), so there is a limit beyond which either hav- 
 ing fame-money, or the effort (ambition) to get it, is painful 
 and immoral. Fame-money is the re-action. Clearly, when 
 we work or play we should primarily have our attention on get- 
 ting our acts performed : we are at the time not directly con- 
 cerned with fame-money or payment, but are concerned with 
 sending our energy or pre-payment in the contrary direc- 
 tion. So it is truistic that if we get too much fame-money, 
 or if we attend to getting pay primarily, or exaggerate pay by 
 collecting all the traffic will bear or the value of the ser- 
 vice" (i. e., use a practical monopoly to gouge the other 
 fellow until he is pained into legal rate making — an evil to 
 everybody, but one which inevitably follows such gouging), 
 then we must take or have taken our attention in some de- 
 gree off the work or play and naturally do it unsatisfactorily. 
 
 g. Only by primarily attending to getting fame-money 
 is it likely that we shall get more than is good for us (the 
 only other way of getting too much that is at all common is 
 by inheritance). And although the direct effort to get fame- 
 money is wrong (just as the negative aspect of it, rate fixing, 
 is wrong), an indirect or secondary effort to get it is essential. 
 I. e., in our resting half of the cycles we should observe 
 whether we get it or not; and if we do not get it, then we 
 must come to one or both of these conclusions:- (l) our act 
 was rather worthless to others; i. e., is "wrong"; (2) the 
 other persons' reaction or pay is wrong. Then we must in- 
 directly go after fame-money by modifying our future action. 
 And that obviously is another way of stating democracy, but 
 
 I need not repeat the details in those new terms. We 
 
 may note the reverse aspect of that:- We should examine 
 at times the fame-money we are getting to see if it is actual, 
 and examine the people who pay it to see if they are moral 
 in awarding it (to see mostly whether they are competent to 
 judge whether they are getting their money's worth). In 
 short, we are morally bound to examine the gift horse and 
 the donor. Willingly or appreciatively to receive praise or 
 money (particularly a "tip") from an aristocrat for any serv- 
 ice other than such service as a defective may estimate fairly 
 well is to make oneself an aristocrat in some measure. E. g., 
 a grocer may safely give an aristocrat a standard food and 
 willingly receive the standard price (maybe not in the present 
 disordered market) ; but if the late kaiser were to approve 
 my remarks on ethics, I should promptly begin to try to find 
 out why. Or, if a child of ten said that this book was fine, 
 I should value his good will towards me, but would not think 
 his judgment of the present form of expression of much value 
 
 (though he could easily judge the book when put in his lang- 
 uage). But I would value the general judgment of this book 
 by the average college student of twenty, as being consider- 
 ably more competent in my opinion than that of the pope, or 
 the average lawyer or theologian or business gambler, or of 
 
 practically any radical or materialist. To be more 
 
 specific about the foregoing generally stated principles :- The 
 practice of tipping is a mildly aristocratic one, which however 
 damages democracy by its extensiveness — being a training 
 school of economic and ethical vice. A man gives a waiter a 
 dollar, and expects the waiter to judge him to be superior" 
 — to return the money in measures of fame, good repute. 
 (That is the case when the tip is willingly given; in the case 
 where we are forced to tip or suffer worse consequences, it is 
 in a mild degree blackmail.) The essential character of a tip 
 is that it is money paid which is over the price that it was 
 implicitly contracted to pay for a certain thing; so truistic- 
 ally the only way the receiver of the tip can pay for it (all 
 things must be paid for; §1 14c) is to give fame to the giver 
 (for otherwise, the receiver implicitly says that the service 
 which he was implicitly under contract to give was to be an 
 inferior and careless sort — which even by such coarse morals 
 and economics as the legal law is equivalent to his breaking 
 the contract). That reaction (of the receiver giving fame to 
 the donor) could be moral ; but in practice the pay for the 
 tip which the tipper gets (when it isn't blackmail paying for 
 the tolerable performance of a contract otherwise paid for) is 
 almost necessarily a cheap, dishonest sort of fame; for the 
 receiver obviously ordinarily has not data enough on which to 
 form a reliable judgment. And that amounts to debasing 
 personally the receiver of the tip — amounts to his admitting 
 that he belongs to a class which is essentially inferior; and 
 to his saying that he will sell his opinions even when he can 
 not properly form them (which truistically is some destruction 
 of his self-respect). Also, the donor is debased by willingly 
 receiving such servile abasement — even paying for it and 
 thus showing that he thinks it a fine thing which he himself 
 is willing to do when the tip is a bit larger (or else uncom- 
 fortably shows himself and others that he is weak in some 
 degree by submitting to such minor blackmail). Ob- 
 viously, in order to be very precise about the principles of 
 tipping this should be extended to several pages. A suffic- 
 ient practical proof of the truth of the above rough quantita- 
 tive statements is that a self-respecting person does not take 
 tips. Also, the best business men will not tolerate tips; 
 e. g., Filene does not permit his employes to accept tips, and 
 his employes are usually not the sort who would debase them- 
 selves to get them. The intelligent reader I believe 
 
 will agree that I display a proper sense of proportion in giv- 
 ing a half dozen lines to showing the principles of the large 
 and important" subjects of monopoly pricefixing, rate making 
 and regulation, etc., and dozens of lines to tipping. If our 
 very children have their innate honesty or sense of correct 
 price principles warped and distorted by such common prac- 
 tice as tipping, we had better talk in their terms of cents, as 
 the same simple principles apply in large terms of mil- 
 lions. I try always to begin at the beginning. 
 
 h. Money (or any other material thing) is obviously a 
 part, and hence a symbol, of the total universe or God, and 
 hence of our "real" selves or souls, considering them mon- 
 istically. And ultimately, real value is relationship (pars, ab) 
 — or in human terms is love. We really ultimately do every- 
 thing for love — which from usual points of view is named 
 fame, good repute, honor, respect, recognition, face" by 
 the Chinese, etc. But that love can be expressed definitely 
 only by symbols of the Many (Part One) — to express love or 
 give payment is again the problem of the One and Many. 
 
§168h XVIII Three 
 
 We give another person love or actual value in a Many or 
 practical or everyday way only when we give him some of our 
 lives or activity in terms of L and T. We can not absolutely 
 give another person such Many love (for absolutely, love is 
 inseparable, and he already has our love) ; the giving of it is 
 merely symbolical — involves L and T. So truistically, any 
 part of the universe may be used to symbolize or measure 
 that part of our life we give to another. By ordinary conven- 
 ient agreement we select a part that is as durable as possible, 
 which as a small and hence easily transported unit represents 
 considerable human work in its original production and as 
 nearly as possible a steady (and preferably equal) amount of 
 actual work to reproduce at later times ; a part which is 
 homogeneous, readily dividable, and readily recognizable as 
 itself and not a similar substitute, and which has an actual 
 usefulness or intrinsic value as a "raw" material in industry. 
 Such a standard Many part is usually what is actually meant 
 by a unit of "money" ; and the best substance yet found to 
 meet those truistic requirements is gold (for details see En- 
 cy. Brit.," "Money," or modern economic texts). The es- 
 sential characteristic that would make a part of the universe 
 a unit of absolute money (a constant for the measurement and- 
 or relating ["exchange" is the technical term] of human life 
 or work, like physics's exact constants) is its acceptability as 
 a symbol of a constant unit amount of life by everybody on 
 sight, without question, at any time — so that the unit symbol 
 has an "absolute market." There obviously can be no such 
 absolute money — no exact science. If we could rely on a 
 person's promise to give a unit of life on demand, and could 
 agree and stay agreed on what a unit is, money would be un- 
 necessary — a nuisance. But men's brains are entirely too 
 lacking in steadiness or durability, from many obvious causes 
 of which dishonesty is but a trifling one. So we need a dur- 
 able symbol of a man's brain condition at any given time, 
 and the barter of any Many parts as such has disadvantages 
 (see "Ency."). And obviously, if gold is agreed to be mon- 
 ey, then anything else by logic, form, or agreement is abso- 
 lutely not money ; and, dropping the agreement, then by 
 physics, anything less enduring, steady, and certain than 
 gold is in a less degree available as a money. A simple 
 promise to pay is not money, but is the real thing (relation- 
 ship, love, "credit") which money is used to symbolize. The 
 equation is:- Parts of human life, or Human effort or work, or 
 its Products... (^Credit— >)Money [actual physical parts, such 
 as units of gold, apart from agreements]. . .=Standard or whole 
 universes of living, or Certain transaction, or the sum of Money 
 where it is the agreed-upon standard. The principles of money 
 are obviously the solution of the One and Many. The usual 
 befuddlement about money, from which comes most financial 
 panics, etc., consists in or arises from confusing money and 
 credit (cf. footnote 28b). That covers the principles, but 
 some practical details of money are in the footnote. 168 
 
 I68h j_ The meaning of the proverb that money (or love of mon- 
 ey) is the root of all evil is that questions of money are the practical 
 ways of stating the problem of the One and Many, and obviously lies 
 in two practical difficulties we have with money:- (1) the standard 
 unit of money or Money... constantly changes with reference to what 
 it "buys" or evaluates (that change is commonly implied by the 
 phrase "high cost of living," and is the economic form of the law 
 mass varies with velocity, and is practically due to the fact that the 
 truistic requirements of a good money are imperfectly met by all sub- 
 stances, gold in particular having been rather continually relatively 
 easier to produce for some centuries) ; and (2) the psychological or 
 human nature aspects of the same difficulty, which we may consider 
 under two heads:- (i) when men do agree that (say) gold is money 
 they rarely stick to the agreement but actually try to make the ab- 
 solute error of having credit money (we consider that below); (ii) it 
 is so hard justly to measure human acts in terms of money (the Su- 
 preme court practically gave up the problem of saying what is "fair 
 value") that people have often made the One assertion that life can 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 i. So in a fairly civilized or moral society, money will 
 serve as a roughly accurate measure or symbol of all values. 
 Words of love, or fame, will constitue a "spiritual symbol, 
 and at the same time a proportionate measure of money will 
 be given as a "material" symbol, for each work or service. 
 
 not be measured, and so have refused to try to use money consist- 
 ently except as a measure of the most concrete things (e. g., aristo- 
 crats for centuries have substituted more or less careless tips and 
 "patronage" for definite and considered payments). The more pre- 
 cise statement of that proverb is that the root of all evil is the dual- 
 ist's stupid effort to get something for nothing— to get something for 
 too little payment; to get something for one of his "kind" words or 
 careless promises, which he thinks costs him nothing, but which 
 when insincere costs him (truistically destroys) a part of his nervous 
 system. So the sentimentalist's objections to such a "vulgar," "ma- 
 terial" thing as money are practically invariably the aristocratic ef- 
 fort to get a "privilege" (to get something for nothing); or else his 
 objections are more or less thoughtless parrotings of the aristocrat's 
 objections. As a practical rule, when anyone is so "refined" that he 
 avoids mentioning the precise price he wants for something, it can 
 usually be correctly judged that he intends to try to get a money 
 price that he himself, at least subconsciously, thinks is more than 
 the buyer should pay. 
 
 ii. Those practical difficulties with money can easily be theoreti- 
 cally obviated. The natural or truistic law that the unit of economic 
 mass, say the gold in one dollar, varies [in value] with velocity may 
 be analyzed into two practical parts:- (1) that a unit of gold meas- 
 ures, originally or as a nominal static measure (the 'nominal' means 
 that 'we neglect in economics the fact that the physics mass of that 
 gold itself varies with physics velocity; the economic law mass varies 
 with velocity is a higher order of the physics law, as I had to indicate 
 by the bracketed phrase in line 3 of this paragraph) the amount of 
 average human effort or life (love) required to extract it from the 
 environment; and then (2) that its continuing or dynamic value after 
 that depends upon the cost in effort at which it can be passed from 
 buyer to seller, and the average effort required at that particular 
 time to extract a similar dollar from the environment. I. e., the gold 
 unit "wears out" (is partly lost) on passing, requires effort to care 
 for and pass, requires effort to recognize, requires even more effort in 
 case a symbol of the symbol gold is used to "recognize" or verify 
 that actual gold is represented and maybe had (but in theory, though 
 not so in present practice, as implicitly appears, the greater effort in 
 recognizing that secondary symbol is more than compensated for by 
 savings in not having to move the actual gold; see textbooks for 
 details) ; also, with increasing knowledge, so far a new unit of gold 
 can be produced with usually less effort. Obviously, those things 
 (which I have so roughly stated as to cause some expert economists 
 to tear their hair — but I shall keep on endangering hair in order to 
 get essentials clear of the numerous details that litter up men's 
 minds) — those things truistically cause the gold dollar to vary in 
 value — in the amount of human effort it pays for. And in theory, 
 all we have to do to make a gold dollar constant in value is to com- 
 pute those changes and apply a suitable correction at any one or 
 more of the infinite "number" of steps in the process. We note be- 
 low some suggested ways. Of course those variations are in infinite 
 regress, and can not be in a finite time accurately provided for. But 
 the worst objection to that theoretical stabilization of the gold dollar 
 is that it doesn't touch the worst difficulty with finances:- that after 
 agreeing on a dollar we then try to make the absolute error of abol- 
 ishing it (by using credit or relationship direct, instead of that Many 
 money). Of course, we could also undertake to include in the com- 
 putations an estimate of how far we shall daily succeed in throwing 
 away our money unit. But it is much easier to decide whether we 
 want a money or not and then exhibit a little elementary intelligence 
 by sticking to it — sticking to A=A financially and morally (§22). 
 
 iii. If promises of possible gold (in some degree representing 
 actual gold, and the rest credit — what we shall call fictitious money, 
 as it is partly pure fiction), such as printed notes of any sort which 
 do not actually represent 100 per cent gold, pass so rapidly or in such 
 volume as to show clearly to most people that the actual gold does 
 not exist, the value of the fictitious money truistically decreases- 
 such money becoming worth only the fraction or per cent of its face 
 value that represents actual gold. If the bearer of the fictitious 
 money is fairly sure he can in time get the actual gold, the value 
 of his "money" will perhaps lack something of decreasing that much 
 if he can compute how much interest he may lose. But it is truist- 
 ically impossible on the average to keep the value of such fictitious 
 money above the human effort it in fact represents. I. e., in plain 
 language, if we have a 40 per cent gold reserve, in the long run our 
 fictitious money issued against that will theoretically be worth 
 
217 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §168i 
 
 Obviously, then words will begin to have a definite conscious 
 value. As it is now, the customary opinion is that mere 
 words" are practically valueless: talk is cheap." It is the 
 most expensive thing there is; but the fact is that by the 
 classic logic, and in practice when used by aristocrats or dual- 
 ists, words are unreliable and nearly valueless to us except 
 as showing how not to use them. The selfishness or stupidity 
 of the aristocrats, which makes them unable to say A=A 
 with a dollar and stick to it, also makes their words in prac- 
 tice unreliable and unstable, and has considerably dislocated 
 all measures of humans. But that unreliability with words 
 obviously costs the aristocrat some destruction of himself: he 
 pays in pain and in loss of some of his life for what he spoils 
 — his selfishness and get-rich-quick schemes with words as 
 well as money are simply stupidity or ignorance :- he pays for 
 them, and pays much more than an intelligent person cares 
 
 40 per cent of its face value (a little less in fact, to provide for cost 
 of printing it, etc.). That is a simple truism, and inescapable: the 
 fictitious money is 40 per cent money and 60 per cent not money 
 but credit, and nothing can change that fact; the credit may be 
 good, and worth nearly its face value, in which case the gold miner 
 exchanges his gold for the fictitious money with but a slight loss from 
 the nominal pay he gets for producing it; but just now in this coun- 
 try it costs about an average of §1.50 of presumable gold to produce 
 $1 actual gold (probably most of the loss of gold producers is hidden 
 in the long run as underpayments for their improvements in method). 
 And truistically everybody who accepts the fictitious money is gam- 
 bling, and in fact does not know what actual gold is worth in terms 
 of (say) food (a fact that is glaringly true just now, and always at 
 rhythmic intervals with fictitious or "watered" currency). I. e., 
 when there is fictitious money all actual money truistically ceases to 
 exist; or, we have destroyed the unit of money we agreed on (by as- 
 serting that credit is money, when in fact it is not — although credit 
 is absolutely indispensable: it merely should be correctly named); 
 the gold still exists of course, but is no longer a standard of money, 
 but merely partial security of often widely fluctuating value; or, 
 in technical economic terms, Gresham's law (good money drives out 
 poor: people keep the poor, and circulate, give to their neighbors, 
 any legal money which is nominally but not actually worth so much) 
 — Gresham's law goes to the limit, and the nation possesses no actual 
 money, but merely printed promises, hopes, dreams, "blue sky," or 
 what not — you accept some of such money, and become a creditor 
 (not an owner), and by the inevitableness of facts have to figure on 
 what you will lose if you keep it long enough to give somebody a 
 chance to fail to pay. And that that is true practically is proved by 
 the notorious facts about panics, "reserves," etc. 
 
 iv. This country, in spite of repeated resulting disasters called 
 panics (we are in one now — a long-drawn-out sort — the change from 
 our customary rapid panics being due to certain features of the new 
 banking laws: the Roman empire got in the habit of having our new 
 sort, and naturally there shortly wasn't any Roman empire)— our 
 country issues all sorts of things which look like real money but 
 which are pure-money-substitutes and actually fictitious— so that by 
 what we may call the ultimate Gresham's law, which works by facts 
 and not by congressional fiats, we usually have no actual money at 
 all, but a governmentally conducted credit system or bank, run by 
 people who are often densely ignorant of money or the One and the 
 Many, and who are mostly financially irresponsible for results. No 
 man and no government can possibly make fictitious money real 
 money, because truistically it is not. To issue fictitious money which 
 looks like real money, and is intended to, is obviously the same sort 
 of stupid dishonesty as mislabeling and adulterating our own food 
 and expecting it to fool our digestive apparatus. 
 
 v. We saw in the text that there are a number of practical or 
 perceptible reasons why an actual gold dollar varies in value, and 
 that like any other unit of the Many it varies in infinite regress in 
 value— in relation to, buying power of, reaction with, any other thing 
 or set of things. Irving Fisher has shown that the unit of value can 
 be stabilized by varying from time to time the weight of gold in a, 
 dollar to correspond with the variations in work required to get gold 
 and the other usual needs of life. Obviously, if the work required to 
 get such a variable unit of gold thus varies precisely as does the work 
 required to get other needs, the value of the dollar truistically does 
 not vary for those other needs, and insofar as that stabilization is 
 accurate a dollar may be accepted as a steady unit. Fisher gives a 
 good short statement of the practical proof and details of it in 
 "American Problems in Reconstruction" (Frieoman, editor), (and 
 he has a book, "Stabilizing the Dollar," which I have not read; I 
 
 to pay. But words have thus been debased so much that 
 now neither what a man says nor the word of praise or cen- 
 sure which he is awarded for it is regarded as of much conse- 
 quence unless definitely accompanied by money measurement. 
 It is right in principle that money can measure any kind of 
 value. Money actually does talk — honestly and definitely 
 (except the part that is water). Even the aristocrats' money 
 talks far more honestly than their words do — for they vary 
 the value of their words infinitely and they can t juggle gold 
 so violently. Words ought to talk much more precisely than 
 money does; the present greater reliability of money will 
 help to rehabilitate words if both are used consciously and 
 
 consistently. Those principles practically show the 
 
 average characteristics of government officials and other per- 
 sons who occupy nominally important positions — who have 
 more title than work, like the imposingly gaudy doorman of 
 
 don't know whether he proposes to stabilize the fictitious or the act- 
 ual dollar). (Other methods of stabilization have been proposed in the 
 past which are ultimately identical with Fisher's, are theoretically as 
 sound, and have more or less the same practical objections; two are 
 mentioned on p. 227, Gide's "Pol. Economy" [2nd Am. ed.], one of 
 which is to water the currency — issue fictitious money — in amounts 
 as are needed to correct the varying gold value; my §123 implicitly 
 shows one way of stabilizing the dollar — and the unfortunate results 
 of a too stable dollar in such a millennium.) As noticed before, Fish- 
 er's method can't accurately stabilize the dollar, as it deals with the 
 infinite regress (his method is substantially the economic equivalent 
 of Einstein's theory, §66, with a jelly-fish dollar — financial papers 
 call it the dancing dollar). But although that theoretical difficulty 
 is readily obviated in the same way that we live in everyday life, 
 it includes two practical difficulties (in addition to that of guessing 
 how much the next congress will water the currency), that make the 
 stabilization in my guess undesirable:- (1) It is impossible to change 
 even nominally the weight of a gold dollar continuously; it can be 
 changed practically only occasionally, and the intervening time in- 
 tervals will allow unequaled opportunities for grafting, "leaks," and 
 almost sure-thing gambling at the expense of the government (I 
 have seen an analogous thing done). (2) But the worst defect of 
 such stabilization is that substantially all the people of the world 
 would have to accept the gold standard and change the weight of 
 the unit simultaneously and equally to make the method safe. If 
 they did not and just the United States stabilized the dollar as far as 
 was practically possible, then truistically we would be forced to buy 
 or sell all the gold supplied or demanded by the other peoples with 
 their different units (theoretically the present more or less natural 
 laws of foreign exchange would prevent that; but practically they 
 wouldn't, for the simple reason that our unit would move in appreci- 
 able steps — or if the changes were arbitrarily restricted to stop that, 
 then we would have a fictitious stabilization superimposed on a ficti - 
 tious money, a double attempt to say A=A and A is not=A identi- 
 cal with our "free-silver" stupidities). It is doubtful if we have 
 enough gold and other commodities thus to meet such world supply 
 and demand and thus stabilize it at our unit. We might be able to 
 do it successfully materially; but the psychological side then comes 
 in, to the effect that it would put a terrific strain on the honesty of 
 some men (to say nothing of the worse strain on their intellectual 
 knowledge of prices), so that if those men crumpled our condition 
 would be far worse than now. In our present state, if all men were 
 fair minded there truistically would be no painful price variations 
 except as a result of intellectual ignorance as to what are fair prices 
 (inability to gauge supply and demand); and in our present state 
 no great temptation to gouge is ordinarily loaded on one man, so that 
 all but the few defectives are fairly honest; also, now the majority 
 tries to work out what are fair prices, and the intellectual result is 
 sure to be far more accurate than the guesses of the wisest, best in- 
 informed stabilizing committee. That present state, I judge, is pref- 
 erable; further, for most of the people to be engaged perforce in 
 often estimating values — even concrete money prices — is the best of 
 educations, and a paternalistic stabilizing board, or any sort of rate 
 making commission in theory deprives them of such real living. 
 There are flabby minded people who would be glad of such an ex- 
 cuse to avoid more of the work or really vigorous life of getting their 
 money's worth; they sit in apathetic, half-dead sloth and yelp like 
 a whipped puppy to the government to protect them from foreign or 
 some other sort of competition, from the middleman, or, in short, 
 from having to live. They need a nurse — not a government. 
 
 vi. So it appears that besides some ordinary self-reliant work, 
 the practical thing we need financially is an actual dollar — a Many 
 
§168i XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 218 
 
 a department store. Such persons chiefly get fame as pay : 
 and that is largely what they work for. And as just noticed, 
 fame unaccompanied by, or unmeasured in terms of, money is 
 an unreliable guide. In a business, ordinarily the money 
 profits are a reliable measure of the worth of the fame re- 
 ceived ; the pompous business title-bearer works for casual 
 words of fame, doesn't do much worker the business, and so 
 profits fail, and in the end he loses his job and has acquired 
 ill fame as a final result of that failure to make money. 
 But obviously, in politics, as ordinarily viewed, there is no 
 such money check, and the fame which is worked for is un- 
 reliable. Or it is even worse than that:- a government offic- 
 ial is often given money-measured fame for the money he 
 takes from the whole people and gives as nearly gratis as 
 possible to his fame-bringers — is rewarded in the degree 
 he succeeds in financially ruining the country. So truistically 
 the average official tends to be irresponsible and incompetent 
 
 unit that is fairly steady and so serves rather definitely to symbol- 
 ize human relationship or credit or promises to pay. Promises are 
 credit, are dealt with by banking, and perceptibly include the es- 
 timating or measuring of thousands of human characteristics and of 
 material possessions; banking is the relating factor, the coordinator, 
 the Holy Ghost of finances or "business." Every transaction in 
 credit obviously is a perceptibly unique quantitative problem. And 
 the pay which is promised is finally money : in sum it is a standard 
 universe or One, and is made up of unit Many parts or dollars. The 
 total problem of "money" is to agree that a certain mass of (say) 
 gold is a dollar — that gold itself is the dollar, and not the chance of 
 getting it, — and then to stick to that agreement definitely. If we 
 like we can have that mass or weight of gold vary by certain stated 
 rules; that is a mere matter of convenience, and in my opinion is in- 
 convenient; but the essential point is that we be definite about 
 sticking to that agreement; which means in practice simply that all 
 money be the actual bonafide gold, or a secondary symbol of such 
 actual, possessed, available gold and that such symbol be so defin- 
 itely and easily distinguishable from promises to pay if the gold hap- 
 pens to be available that a child can tell which is money and which 
 is some species of mortgage or promise. 
 
 vii. And the solution of that problem of money itself is obvi- 
 ously child's play. The difficulty is fundamentally to get men to 
 stop trying to fool themselves as to what they own and what they 
 hope to own, and the only cure for that is education, or in numerous 
 cases, death. A practical partial cure for it is to take the govern- 
 ment out of the banking business. Our government has so thoroughly 
 demonstrated its inefficiency in business in the past few years that 
 there seems to be no need to state the evidence and reasons why the 
 government should not engage in banking, which when properly 
 conducted is the most difficult of all businesses and the most indis- 
 pensable — the flywheel of all business. The government would 
 then simply make fair rules for the bankers (a job more than enough 
 for the wisest government), fix the weight of a gold dollar, issue sec- 
 ondary symbols of the gold it stores, see to it that nobody else is- 
 sues anything that can be easily mistaken for such actual money, 
 and in particular keep itself from doing so. I am aware that there 
 will be the customary protest that that will make the currency in- 
 flexible, restrict it, etc. Naturally: it eliminates the fictitious mon- 
 ey which never nourished us anyway, and truistically never can, and 
 which we with painful offensiveness vomited up at frequent inter- 
 vals. And that clears the way for bankers to do a real business with 
 credit — issuing any sort of credit instrument that works well, so long 
 as it does not deceive its holder as to its nature. If bankers or any- 
 body else try to do business on make-believe, deception, lies, they 
 truistically will fail. If the bankers and other people haven't the 
 slight intelligence to see that we can't correctly estimate the value 
 of anything with a fictitious unit which isn't a unit, with a dollar 
 which is largely and in an unknown degree water, and next (which 
 is where the rub comes) haven't the strength or moral courage to 
 drop such wildcat currency, then the simple answer is that the nation 
 has gone to the devil. Our method of fooling ourselves by is- 
 suing fictitious money as to what are hopes and what are achieve- 
 ments (real money) is the economic or business form of a continual 
 Pollyanna "glad game" (§149f). Naturally human nature, espec- 
 ially that of the "tired business man," can't stand the strain of such 
 continual ecstacy or departure from a sane balance, and we neces- 
 sarily have revulsions from such abnormally optimistic, price-raising, 
 speculating tensions — those sick-spells, forced upon us as resting 
 periods by the absolutely just universe, being panics, depressions. 
 
 and more interested in attending to getting fame for himself 
 (note the plethoric plethoricalness of their speeches) than to 
 working for the government, the whole people. There 
 
 is no general remedy except education — especially in sizing 
 up men, and in considered, careful use of words in praising 
 the able officials. There are one or two minor practical helps 
 which are obvious:- As the business of government, in terms 
 of money, is to spend money for the greatest good of the 
 greatest number, then the available money check consists in 
 rating the success of government officials by the smallness of 
 the percentage taxes are of peoples' total income; if they can 
 buy mental and material improvements with double the sum 
 of taxes which triple the people's income, they have been 
 highly successful. My rough guess is that we pay about 25 
 (twenty-five) per cent of our incomes, if not more, for gov- 
 ernment (federal and state and county, etc.), and that a fair 
 business man could supply better for 5 (five) per cent. Of 
 course that guess includes an estimate of actual cost of in- 
 direct taxes: good officials would have to abolish those 
 (they are immoral on other grounds; §l76d), in order to per- 
 mit themselves to be judged by a reliable money standard. 
 And, as there is no definite money check on him, the good 
 official will exhibit both good taste and ordinary fairness by 
 endeavoring to keep the government from engaging in busi- 
 ness, or from interfering specifically in any private business, 
 except to restrain defective individuals from violating general 
 laws. Other details are given in appropriate places. 
 
 j. It also follows that in principle Taylor's doctrine of 
 scientific management (expressed briefly in The Principles 
 of Scientific Management") is perhaps the most explicit and 
 extensive advance in ethics or the science of living that has 
 been made since Christ (§163j). Taylor required (l) co- 
 operation or democracy, as it has been explicitly described 
 above. That basic conscious human Many machine" or 
 loving society is then (2) to be maintained in a delicately 
 adjusted balance by careful and explicitly conscious measur- 
 ing of its reactions — by a deliberate application of science 
 or measuring to humanics, with a conscious economy of time. 
 Obviously, only such a continually adjusted human machine 
 is the maximum democracy or maximum life — Taylor had no 
 get-rick-quick scheme or hocus-pocus panacea, but would 
 definitely measure and consider each quantitative or Many 
 problem in accordance with its perceptible facts — a glaring 
 exhibition of commonsense that has irritated the shirks, sen- 
 timentalists, quacks, and bright wonder-workers and sys- 
 tem mongers ever since (we have 'systems" in business 
 now, instead of in philosophy ; the philosophers have learned 
 better). And then, as the final general principle, Taylor 
 showed (3) that a definite money value could be given a 
 democratic reaction; and that the actual use of such a symbol 
 or measure did give all the theoretical benefits of democracy 
 — in definite practice did give life more abundantly. Of 
 course, Taylor's work is so extraordinarily extensive that it 
 has been perverted by some smaller men, and labor in gen- 
 eral has not had enough intelligence to grasp it. Ostwald, 
 for instance, took it up and perverted it considerably, to fit 
 and agree with the pre-war German materialistic idea of "ef- 
 ficiency," which bids fair to make the word efficiency join the 
 
 word pious. Taylor was a supremely great man. He 
 
 was a democrat more beautifully balanced than Lincoln. 
 There is no space to go into much further explicit detail of 
 his principles (§I74g). Essentially such detail consists of 
 the establishment of human measures— is the science of hu- 
 manics. And that science will develop just as has physical 
 science, having for its goal the continually more accurate ex- 
 pression of human measures in terms of money, 
 
 k. So men play or worship for inner fame, or self-respect 
 
219 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §168o 
 
 or self-approval; and work for money or for outer fame. But 
 in both play and work the primary attention is on the game 
 or activity; and on the rest side of the cycle the attention 
 goes to the payment, which is the reaction. So when we 
 name what men play or work for, we have to name the re- 
 action or payment, and do not state the character of their 
 activity. The equation is:- What the play or work is for... X 
 Work or play. . . =Meaning. Usually we incline towards con- 
 fusing the parts of that equation in our minds. But obvi- 
 ously, no intelligent man works for fame or money as an end. 
 The end," or the One Meaning, includes the pleasure of his 
 own activity or living; in a continuing society that is neces- 
 sarily supplemented and completed by the perceptible ap- 
 proval of others whose opinions he values, expressed in fame 
 or money (preferably in both, as checking each other). The 
 fame and money, combined with the work and play, give the 
 man some degree of rebirth, or a Meaning. That Meaning is 
 conventionally named power — which thus really means ener- 
 gy, or universe, or God. So we again finish the circle, get- 
 ting the truism that the use of living is to live. 
 
 1. So truistically men work or play for the sense or 
 feeling of power it gives. The man who wants to work or 
 play so that he gets his pay from somebody far off is correct 
 in thinking that getting it increases his life (the L or ex- 
 tensive factor is increased) ; but he often makes the practical 
 mistake of neglecting his own affairs or family to care for the 
 heathen" or make love to another man s wife, so that he 
 largely loses the intensive factor and by doing so destroys 
 
 much of his ability to enjoy the wider L. And the 
 
 "ambitious" man who strives to pile up more fame or money 
 as a sort of end in itself is merely more or less fnsane (power- 
 mad); probably it is kinder to him to agree that his brain is 
 defective in a pathological degree. The sane man who 
 strives for power, the properly or morally ambitious man, is 
 clearly conscious that the equation has two factors {Fame or 
 money... X Work... =Power), and that the intensive factor — 
 the one he primarily sees, and chiefly tries to get directly — 
 
 is the work. Obviously, this working and playing to 
 
 get power is identically the same as striving for activity 
 or life or happiness, or getting religious experiences or re- 
 births, or the same as being a genius. And clearly, the same 
 principles apply ; power is Meaning, or the springs of ac- 
 tion," or God, or energy, or the universe, named from the 
 
 point of view of value. So a man works for power 
 
 because it essentially is religion. But as we saw (§§153, 
 162), a rebirth can be too violent, and easily drive a man 
 mad (cf. §173e). And it is even more easy to get too much 
 power, which is one sort of rebirth (one which is 'reinforced' 
 by perceptible "objective" things), and go mad — become 
 unbalanced or overloaded to perhaps the degree of pathologi- 
 cal insanity. We consider the details of power-madness in 
 various places. We may note here that the selfish grab- 
 ber of power, either in money or fame, usually gets it if he 
 grabs a little vigorously — and then he pays for it by its de- 
 stroying him in a just degree. He always pays. 
 
 m. As the money or fame acquired should truistically be 
 in fair balance with the work delivered (because the two are 
 a cycle, Money... X Work...; §167k, 114c), it then is an 
 equivalent truism that if a man is given more fame or money 
 than he can use, both he and the people who give it are 
 wrong and immoral. (As verbal love or fame is so carelessly 
 given, for brevity and precision let us confine this discussion 
 chiefly to money.) Clearly, if the man is given so much 
 money that he can not use it all before he dies to pay for 
 things he can actually perceive for himself (including of 
 course fair money payments for all the services he receives, 
 especially for the reactions of his immediate family), he then 
 
 can not take the money with him, and truistically has been 
 shown by such reaction of the universe to have been over- 
 paid. Carnegie discovered that the man who dies rich dies 
 disgraced ; clearly that is a first class discovery, that makes 
 him a peer of all the great prophets. He also made other 
 first class discoveries (see his ' Problems of To-Day," which 
 is surprisingly valid, the only logical error of much import- 
 ance being his idealization of woman substantially to infinity). 
 And he handled men in a first class manner, which is a good 
 deal harder to do than to make first class discoveries and 
 shows him to have been a great democrat in character. So 
 I judge that Carnegie fully earned all the money he got — 
 which is something I think can not be justly said of many 
 manual laborers. There are of course numbers of rich men 
 who are just as bad grabbers as are loafing workmen and ex- 
 treme socialists; the first step in the process of dealing with 
 them is to learn to distinguish one when he appears. But 
 there are many rich men who have thoroughly earned their 
 money, and are peers of Carnegie:- Rockefeller, Eastman, 
 Ford, Hoover, Wanamaker, Edison, Schwab — to name only 
 a few well known ones. 
 
 n. The principle obviously is that a man gives work or 
 energy to others on his catabolic swings from the balance; 
 and then as a just reward (in physics terms, a necessarily 
 equal reaction) should receive as much money as he can use 
 to get him in return an equal amount of energy on the ana- 
 bolic sides of the cycles. If he labors prodigiously for others 
 as those rich men named above have done, then by all laws 
 and morals he must consume equally prodigiously to keep 
 
 balanced. There can be no exact science; so it is 
 
 not possible that the man die with exactly no money left. 
 But if he is highly intelligent or moral, after paying his fam- 
 ily what they have actually earned, he obviously would have 
 left (or owe) but a trifling fraction of what he earned. So it 
 is an absolutely rigorous principle that if a man has wealth 
 left when he dies, it belongs to the people and should be re- 
 turned to them. Or, no man can morally bequeath wealth 
 nor can others morally permit him to. As a fact, our com- 
 mon law for centuries has held that principle and it is vaguely 
 enforced as inheritance taxes. A man is disgraced if he dies 
 wealthy, provided he hold that in principle he ought to die 
 wealthy. But of course his family and others may have act- 
 ually earned some of the money that is merely nominally his 
 and should be awarded that part (as a right, and not as a 
 gift or "bequest," in whatever amount or percentage the 
 majority thinks just). Clearly, to give a child wealth so that 
 he need not ' work," or may have advantages, or op- 
 portunities" (or whatever else the euphemism may be), is 
 
 (1) to cheat the people out of money that they overpaid, and 
 
 (2) to cheat the child out of a chance to live just that amount 
 of life (for in order to got rid of that wealth he has to rest" 
 and die inwardly in an amount corresponding to that wealth 
 — he truistically having to pay for it, and that being the only 
 way left him to earn it). The son who inherits his father's 
 wealth is as pitiful an object as a son loaded with his father s 
 surplus fat, assuming the foolish father could devise means 
 of fastening that fat on him (the simile is grossly vulgar: so 
 
 is the inheritance of wealth). There being no exact 
 
 science, obviously there will never be any general agreement 
 as to how much the family of a deceased rich man has earned 
 and how much infancy' care his children should receive, and 
 how much ought to go back to the state. If the simple prin- 
 ciple is accepted, I think it safer to let each rich man decide 
 his own case, subject to revision if much disagreed with. 
 
 o. It is obviously just as immoral for a man to want to 
 die in debt, and without paying his family (especially his 
 wife), as it is for him to want to die wealthy. Most men 
 
§168o XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 recognize that side of the truth. Sometimes society decides 
 that it has not paid the man enough, and morally discharges 
 the debt by pensioning the man or his family. Truistically, 
 the man should not have permitted himself to be thus under- 
 paid, and society should not make a mistake that requires such 
 correction. But it is obvious that these money measures are 
 in such a primitive state of uncertainty and vagueness that it 
 is scarcely just to criticize anyone for making a mistake of a 
 fairly small percentage of his total earnings in either direc- 
 tion. Problems of fame are even more uncertain than 
 
 those of monoy. The outstanding qualitative one is of course 
 obviously solved rigorously :- that it is immoral for a man to 
 desire to leave a hereditary title to descendants; his descend- 
 ants are immoral to accept it, as are the public who approve. 
 Such titles are an attempted dualism. 
 
 p. There are some people who fancy the world owes 
 them a living — owes them money and fame enough to permit 
 them to survive, regardless of how they work. Truistically, 
 such people in effect assert that they have a right to rest all 
 or most of the time, and do no work or little. That is para- 
 sitism, being an assertion of getting something for nothing — 
 an absolutely wrong, immoral, impossible principle (§§88, 
 114c, etc.). Frequently the delusion that the world owes 
 him a living takes the form:- that one man deserves as much 
 fame and money as another — that men are quantitatively 
 equal ; that is obviously wrong and impossible for the same 
 reasons (it is considered in detail, as a form of socialism, in 
 §175). My observation of the world have been that those 
 who hold such delusions are the submerged tenth" (or are 
 becoming members) — people who are so nearly worthless and 
 unreliable and generally obnoxious that they richly deserve 
 to starve to death (which they usually do do, in a slow way). 
 Further, the submerged tenth are so callous, unfeeling, and 
 generally defective in nervous action that in my best judg- 
 ment it hurts them much less to starve than it does me to 
 have to notice such unlovely beings. It is quite true in a 
 wide sense that nature, including us and them, has made 
 those nasty beings what they are ; it is also equally true that 
 nature, with finally beautiful consistency and justice and fit- 
 ness, is now eliminating them without much pain to them by 
 starving them. The fairly correct judgment or meas- 
 ure of the deserts of those dregs of humanity is:- I see the 
 process of their elimination, and in my nervous system there 
 is pain from their squalor; they themselves are considerably 
 more comfortable in their condition than I am in seeing it 
 (else truistically they would struggle out of it). (They all 
 the time have the very mild pain of degenerating, and I have 
 it only when I have to notice them; hence, although my pain 
 is more intense, they have pain and its causes longer (T), 
 which kills them more effectively than it does me.) So be- 
 cause I can not practicably help being always in indirect 
 contact with those slum-dwellers and lazy casual laborers and 
 shirking dregs (they breed crime, and disease, and dirt in 
 general, which can not be even perceptibly isolated), I desire 
 to give them enough money, love, etc., to make their condi- 
 tions fairly tolerable to me, in return for my trouble. But, 
 obviously that is a selfish activity on my part. Those dregs 
 are so obnoxious that I selfishly slow up the rate at which 
 nature is eliminating them. The good which I get out of 
 that selfish action is that I keep my perceptions keen and 
 uncalloused by avoiding subjecting them to the sight of too 
 intense misery (misery from my point of view) : those dregs 
 have to pay for my improvement by dying more slowly. They 
 fancy of course that by their whinings that the world owes 
 them a living, and other misapplied One conclusions as to the 
 
 equality of man, they get desirable pay. In the same 
 
 way there are some men on earth who richly deserve hanging. 
 
 We are selfish when we do not hang them; for the real ob- 
 jection to capital punishment is that it badly destroys the 
 nervous systems of those who have to do the killing or see it; 
 so tee, for our benefit, avoid killing when we can. I 
 am aware that this paragraph sounds a little unconventional 
 at first. But I think the reader can readily see that it is a 
 point of view that conduces to the widest grasp of facts as 
 they are. Of course, it is correct to take the other point of 
 view that theoretically we can ultimately lift any given hobo 
 or all present hoboes (in several generations, if required) to 
 a quantitative level with ourselves. Certainly we can; we 
 can also make a Venus of Milo of mud, and then turn it into 
 marble. But by using marble already available, or working 
 with more promising human material, we can do much more. 
 While we were uplifting the given hoboes a new crop would 
 grow from our neglected children. We simply have to do 
 what we can to keep those dregs from damaging us : to re- 
 move from them all hope of patronage' will itself in con- 
 siderable degree stop such damage (§l76g). Given 
 
 a steady climate the standard of living steadily rises. The 
 submerged tenth (as a result of the efforts of geniuses who 
 entertained no parasitic delusions) now live physically as 
 comfortably in this country as the wisest people did three or 
 four centuries ago (and those dregs do not profit by such op- 
 portunities). But truistically there must always be, as long 
 as there are men, a zone or difference surface of mankind, 
 composed of men merging into organic structures of other 
 orders (dying off): it is merely the infinite regress. Such a 
 difference surface, by absolute principles, is at (or is) each 
 end" of society:- being the aristocratic upper ten" at 
 one end, and the aristocratic submerged tenth" at the 
 other end. So regardless of how much we raise the standard 
 of living, in the very nature of things those two degenerate 
 or dying zones or ends or difference surfaces of society re- 
 main — that being a truism. It is absolutely impossible to 
 remove such zones. If we rescue" one hobo, or one finan- 
 cial pirate (i. e. , educate him as well as know how :- make 
 his brain of mud' grow), and get him thus into normal hap- 
 piness, we have to neglect rather painfully and unjustly to 
 them perhaps a dozen fairly normal persons so that they start 
 slumping into one of those dying zones. 
 
 q. This section gives only the outlines of the theory of 
 values. The last paragraph would require a volume to notice 
 merely the details we use daily. E. g., it implies that the 
 principle truistically is that "punishment" should be auto- 
 matic or natural (the offender's attention being called merely 
 to that automatic reaction), and never be the formally capric- 
 ious fiat which punishment is dualistically supposed to be by 
 aristocrats (§173b). And that shows that the top scum and 
 the bottom dregs — the two aristocratic ends — are not essen- 
 tially evils: they are. the natural results or punishment of 
 certain sorts of living, and are useful in teaching us how not 
 to do it. We have to pay something to learn, and we pay by 
 being annoyed by their presence. 
 
 §169. a. We have seen that morality consists of con- 
 sciously maintaining a balance from a Many aspect, that re- 
 sulting in more or less vivid religious experience or Life or 
 gain of power in a One aspect. But obviously, that point of 
 view of ethics is mostly a personal or subjective one — a state- 
 ment of how we view our own happiness, or get it. We now 
 see a short equivalent statement of how we view such morali- 
 ty in others. Such 'objective ethics' strictly is sociology. 
 
 b. We first judge the morality of others, and then com- 
 pare that morality with our own. That truistically amounts 
 to putting the appropriate conventional names into our ethics 
 equation Unselfishness. . . X Selfishness. . . =Happiness. 
 
 c. As there can be no exact science, it follows that no 
 
221 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §169g 
 
 one can be perfectly temperate no matter how hard he tries 
 to keep balanced. So truistically we should tolerate in various 
 degrees a quantitative failure of others in temperance. As a 
 One proposition or principle, as all action in the universe is 
 finally balanced (§114c), we should, as a truism, tolerate any 
 quantitative departure from temperance in others, as it is only 
 local (§25c). But such departures have for us zones of pleas- 
 ure, pain, death, etc., just as our own acts have (Fig. 163b). 
 So we in Many practice must (if we care to preserve our- 
 selves) limit our toleration in quantity by the principles of 
 §168. But so long as the other person does not consciously 
 intend to hurt us by his departures (except perhaps for what 
 he thinks is for our benefit), we must in principle tolerate his 
 acts if (l) we have any available means, in case we disagree 
 with his judgment, of separating ourselves from him by 
 enough space (making L greater), or-and (2) can make T 
 brief enough for us to endure:- for obviously, the extensity 
 and intensity for us of his acts can be lowered by such with- 
 drawal on our part until they are easily bearable by us. So 
 the general Many principle of toleration is to increase L and 
 decrease T with respect to the acts of others who try to be 
 temperate. If the other person is practically unable to con- 
 trol his acts even though intending to do so, and we 
 ourselves are practicably unable to move away from him, 
 then we effect the needed increased L and decreased T by 
 putting him in jail or an insane asylum, in accordance with 
 the guesses at measures of the majority (§171k). In the case 
 of married partners such a needed change obviously may, and 
 in principle must, be provided by divorce. And so on. 
 Clearly there is a vast science of toleration (of the best ways 
 of getting a balance, Others' actions... (<— Toleration-^) Our 
 actions... =Happiness of society) omitted at this point. 
 
 d. We shall next consider toleration from the One 
 point of view. If any man consciously asserts that he pro- 
 poses to make either factor of any That. ..X This... formula 
 become either zero or infinity, then he verbally is absolutely 
 wrong in principle — he asserts that the One is something 
 other than what it is, denies God; and his assertion is abso- 
 lutely intolerable. In short, he in effect asserts that we must 
 stand from him some infinite action, and he is verbally infin- 
 itely intolerable. As an actual fact, he cannot perform any 
 such infinite action: his logic is silly. But of course his 
 conduct is then formally unpredictable, and in principle intol- 
 erable. Formally or in principle or from a religious or One 
 point of view, any dualism is intolerable. There can be no 
 compromise with formal error. That is absolute. And when 
 the dualist insists on acting so far as he can according to such 
 lawless assertions, we are absolutely justified in killing him, 
 and are morally obligated to do so if it is not practicable or 
 convenient to restrain him otherwise — that being a truism too 
 obvious to need explication. But of course it is usually easy 
 to restrain such foolish or insane persons, as their weak brains 
 make them generally weak : for our own well-being we ought 
 selfishly to avoid killing except as a last resort, as it is too 
 crude and violent— as I happen to know from direct observa- 
 tion of numerous killers and killings, and as the reader can 
 readily verify from history if he suspects the obvious theory 
 and hasn't made the observations. 
 
 e. It therefore follows that socially we have a balance of 
 rights and duties, of pay and work, of privileges and obliga- 
 tions, thus :- Rights. . . XDuties. . . = Privileges. . . X Obliga- 
 tions... = Ethical or natural law {or Legal law, if those are legal 
 rights and duties)= Liberty, Equality, Fraternity , Freedom, Law 
 of humanity, etc. That equation indicates the general prin- 
 ciples of those much-discussed terms; those principles are 
 merely various points of view of the general That...X This... 
 formula, and I shall give only a few further suggestions about 
 
 them, putting those suggestions in terms of freedom of speech, 
 — the principles clearly applying to those other terms. 
 
 f. In a One sense we obviously in our ultimate capacity 
 as God can say anything we like. So truistically we have 
 
 One freedom of speech. In a logical Many sense, 
 
 compared with the One sense, there can be no freedom of 
 speech — it being determined absolutely, by the same prin- 
 ciples that the Many will is (§157). We practically 
 
 use the equation Freedom of speech... XDuties or obligations 
 of speech... = Law, or Contracts. There, of course, free 
 speech by technical logic is not free ; but practically, obvi- 
 ously by that equation (or natural law) we as individuals have 
 complete freedom of speech if we want to tell the truth and 
 also want to tell such truth as is quantitatively tolerable to 
 the majority as well as to ourselves. (E. g., it would be 
 painful to our skin-bounded selves to talk all the time ; so 
 we do not want to. But obviously, if we stop to sleep we 
 personally have not absolute freedom of speech — although 
 we do not regard such actual restriction as any restriction on 
 our Freedom of speech... .) If we do not want to be truthful 
 and temperate in speech in that way (or haven't the ability 
 to be so), then inevitably the other men (if they are to sur- 
 vive, be moral, etc.) must constrain our speech in some de- 
 gree—for they, like ourselves, have a One right to a just or 
 balanced sum of speech into Social contracts or unification. 
 Speech from us that is tolerable to others and fairly accurate 
 under given conditions of L and T, may become painful to 
 others or-and somewhat untrue with different L and T. That 
 principle is usually tacitly accepted — definitely and glaringly 
 so in time of war, when men have neither the energy nor 
 the time to bother with much intemperateness of speech in 
 an obvious minority. The principle is simply one way of say- 
 ing mass varies with velocity. So we, from our point of 
 
 view, are as a general rule (are, except when we use initiative) 
 moral when we conform our speech and want to conform it to 
 the limits of toleration of our neighbors. If it pains them to 
 hear certain assertions, over or below certain amounts of 
 speech, or certain speech in certain places or times, then 
 (l) courtesy or minor kindness, (2) good morals, and last 
 (3) the statute law, make us want to conform, or constrain 
 us to conform, to their measure of nerve toleration (Fig. 
 163b). But, there is the other side of that Many balance. 
 Our neighbor may be badly wrong in his estimation of the 
 truth, and so narrowly tolerant of any speech but his own as 
 to indicate brain defects (cf. the lese-majeste laws of the late 
 kaiser). All aristocrats — Bourbons, reactionaries, autocrats, 
 incompetents, parasites, hysterics — consistently hate criti- 
 cism to such an abnormal degree as to try to restrict the 
 speech of others, while trying to retain for themselves the 
 right to speak recklessly. So at times it is desirable that the 
 moral man take the initiative, and with carefulness and tern- 
 perateness, exceed somewhat the traditional limits set up by 
 those defectives, and pain them by his speech, if that speech 
 is designed to be useful to the majority of people. 
 
 g. There is another aspect of the problem of measuring 
 the freedom of speech. We may consider that aspect in 
 readily grasped concrete terms, although the principles will 
 be obviously general :- If the authorities of a college hire a 
 teacher, they evidently have the right as a rule (unless 
 there is explicit statute law which asserts that it is not to the 
 best public interests — and there may be such law in places, 
 and it is an interesting quantitative question whether the 
 Constitutional provision for freedom of speech is such a law) 
 to require of the teacher a constraint in his speech that is in 
 their opinion in keeping with his official position, and also in 
 fair agreement with their own views of the truth. They pay 
 the teacher for his speech, and the}' clearly have a right, 
 
§169g XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 \f they demand it (and if the majority have not decided by law 
 that it is against public interest; §17 Ik). (The teacher does 
 not have to accept such a contract, and of course should not 
 
 if he does not agree with the authorities ; etc.) But, 
 
 if they demand that constraint in speech they should put it 
 explicitly in the contract that they do; for the teacher obvi- 
 ously has an equal right to take it for granted otherwise that 
 he is constrained only by the usual laws about speech, and 
 there is a presumption that the authorities are the high-grade 
 tolerant men described in the next paragraph, and are not 
 too cowardly to put any such requirement in the contract or 
 so stupid as to forget to. Also, although if they de- 
 mand it they have an unquestioned right to require such re- 
 stricted speech (subject always to what the majority say is to 
 the public interest: it is possible that the public will soon 
 hold that the Constitutional requirement of free speech 
 applies definitely to a quasi-public institution like a college), 
 they truistically have to pay these prices for the exercise of 
 that right:- (l) No intelligent person can believe that such 
 a restricted teacher is always stating what he believes to be 
 the complete truth (as a truism he has no right to, and 
 his credibility can not extend beyond his restrictions). 
 (2) The teacher to be comfortable may not inquire or observe 
 beyond the limits of his restrictions. If he does go beyond 
 the authorities limits he is in danger of finding that he is not 
 speaking the full quantitative truth. So he is often narrowed 
 to those limits — not necessarily so, of course; unusual men 
 have energy enough to take a chance on being uncomfortable 
 and resigning or being discharged. (3) The authorities form- 
 ally set a limit on their own growth or lives, and forbid any 
 useful criticism (perhaps they may welcome" private or 
 secret criticism — which is easily pigeonholed), and similarly 
 in effect forbid any progress in their school. (4) They in 
 some circumstances (not in all : it is a quantitative matter) in 
 clear effect assert to the world that they are not strong 
 enough to bear the possible truth about things ; and also that 
 (under some circumstances) they haven't enough sense to 
 select a teacher who will talk with judgment, discretion, and 
 courtesy — or the courage and will power promptly to admit 
 the occasional mistake the wisest authorities will make, and 
 
 discharge the temperamentally unfit teacher. Clearly 
 
 they have to pay those various prices, subject to the various 
 actual circumstances, whether they wish to or not: there is 
 no way to get something for nothing. 
 
 h. Also, there is a price automatically extracted of those 
 who insist on too much freedom of speech — of the teacher 
 who fails in fitness and courtesy. If his words are of so little 
 weight, exert so little force, that he can expect to speak 
 them quite freely, with no appreciable sense of responsibility, 
 then he has advertised them as being in his own view practi- 
 cally worthless. Truistically the highly moral person 
 
 (the genius; §159) conforms to the following rule, which de- 
 fines what freedom of speech (and analogously, any other 
 liberty, right, or privilege) means to him :- He has such a 
 wide personal limit of toleration that he pleasurably receives 
 all the words that others wish to say, on the basis that none 
 of them can exert enough force to go beyond the limits of 
 what unduly pains and unbalances him, but that all he has 
 time to attend to, especially the adverse ones, can teach him 
 something — even if no more than that the author of them is 
 pathological. But with respect to others, he will carefully 
 weigh his words (without overdoing it and becoming n pre- 
 cisian or other variety of prig who underrates his audience by 
 fancying that they are unable to enjoy an occasional stiff 
 jolt), so that they will serve to give pleasurable and healthful 
 activity to normal people. In short, the moral genius allows 
 others all the freedom of speech they want (he may point out 
 
 but he will- 
 
 169h 
 
 that careless freedom will harm themselves) 
 ingly and enduringly severely restricts his own. 
 And the aristocrat is opposite :- He allows himself intem- 
 perate, exaggerated, dualistic speech — swearing (§43k). 
 But as we saw, he wants others to restrict their speech, and 
 above all to refrain from any criticism or verbal opposition. 
 The aristocrat is "touchy" and personally secretive, like an 
 old-style diplomat, and inordinately sensitive to criticism of 
 himself — which although superficially contradictory to the fact 
 that his brain is narrowed, is seen to be consistent when it is 
 considered that what brain he has is strongly exercised on his 
 own ego. The aristocrat is often unable to recognize his 
 neighbor's existence until his neighbor makes a slight criti- 
 cism that would not trouble the normal person; but then the 
 aristocrat observes the criticism with painful intensity. That 
 queer but consistent susceptibility of the aristocrat or parasite 
 accounts for the curious thing known as Society," which 
 with superficial paradoxicalness runs on the they-say s of 
 
 servant girls, waiters, and rumor. But at the same 
 
 time it is quite possible that (say) the authorities of the col- 
 lege could properly consider that they had not time or ener- 
 gy to attend to any sort of disagreeing views. A censorship 
 is desirable in certain circumstances. But in most cases a 
 censorship is probably immoral, and indicates that those who 
 establish it and those who docilely and weakly submit to it 
 are aristocrats — at least that is what the Constitution implies 
 is the view of the majority in this country (§173). 
 
 §170. a. We saw under biology that the race has auto- 
 matically in its progress and as a marked part of the progress 
 divided into, reacting sexes, Female... X Male..., which are 
 quantitatively perceptibly different. We saw under ethics 
 (§166) that the conscious reaction of the sexes then truistic- 
 ally gives the maximum of life in normal cases, and hence 
 the maximum of morality or happiness. (There is no abso- 
 luteness about that quantitative proposition, which is a state- 
 ment applicable to present conditions ; under conceivable 
 conditions perceptible differences in human sex could disap- 
 pear.) And as a further ethical truism, we saw (§167k) that 
 maximum morality or democracy requires that in all reactions 
 we consciously recognize the quantitative differences of the 
 two parties or factors. So as an obviously circular or rigor- 
 ous truism, we need a general theory of quantitative differ- 
 ences of human beings as a general basis of being moral — as 
 
 i69h e, g_ t this book would have been easy play to write if I could 
 have written as many words as I thought of — letting loose without 
 regard to a complete fair balance and emphasis. But often it re- 
 quired painful nerve tension or concentration to condense and save 
 the reader's attention while at the same time making no omission of 
 important points, and getting what seemed to be a fair balance of 
 emphasis. The degree of success with which I accomplished that 
 general quantitative balance while at the same time avoiding inflict- 
 ing any of that tension on the reader is the degree in which the book 
 is "literature." In my judgment that degree is low. But the point 
 of the example is that the principles of freedom of speech give the 
 
 standards for determining what is "literature." Incidentally, 
 
 the only way to conceal that tension from the reader — to make the 
 book seem easy, simple, natural, and true as a matter of course — is 
 not to have it. And the only practical way not to have it is to keep 
 thinking hard just what you do mean — if anything— and rewriting 
 it; after enough of such work you are really thinking clearly, and 
 naturally can say it easily, with no tension. The difficulty with this 
 book (or with any similar scientific book) which stops its being liter- 
 ature, is that as fast as I work out something clearly then I intro- 
 duce the next step, which isn't clear and shows tension and lack of 
 "finish." There are numbers of sentences in this, the umpty- 
 somethingth, version which have no appreciable meaning; so if you 
 strike a doubtful one it is not safe to judge that I meant something 
 or that I didn't. A thought for literary experts:- nature is never 
 neatly finished and dead like Henry James, or largely full of crude 
 raw material like Whitman, imagists, futurists, impressionists; 
 nature 'tries' to be finished enough to still keep going; so maybe 
 this book is a species of literature. 
 
223 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §170d 
 
 was also shown in §1671. We have implicitly seen that such 
 a theory is the application to humanics of the law mass varies 
 with velocity, or is an application of harmonic periodicity ; 
 or more definitely, the increased use of money as a symbol of 
 human measures is the application of such a theory (named 
 economics) ; and finally, in practice such a theory of quantita- 
 tive differences in human beings is given by jurisprudence 
 (XIX). Obviously, those various aspects of the theory of 
 human quantities imply its complexity — the numerousness of 
 its perceptible details. But it is imperative if we are to suc- 
 ceed in life that we not only have some clear knowledge of 
 that theory, but that we apply it. 
 
 b. So throughout this book I have been trying to show 
 clearly the general ways of estimating human characters. To 
 do that I have used three rough classes:- (l) The first class 
 comprises those who successfully try to be temperate and 
 balanced — moving in cycles of activity and rest so that the 
 activity and rest perceptibly balance. (2) Then there is the 
 fringe or zone of dualists or aristocrats on each side of the 
 first class, made up of those who go too far in both rest and 
 activity, acquiring a steady accumulation of either too much 
 rest (parasitism, loafers), or, at the other end, too much 
 activity (egotism, power-madness, hysteria, etc.) — and some- 
 times both, in succession, like manic-depressive insanity 
 ("Ency. Brit.," xiv, 60S). This class is not normal, but is 
 not usually considered to be pathologically abnormal ; so its 
 members are in practice considered to want to be unbalanced 
 and hence to be responsible for their unbalance — although in 
 a broader view nature is merely killing them off, and ulti- 
 mately the universe is concerned and responsible. (3) And 
 last there are the definitely pathological persons on each end 
 
 of society, who are insane and considered irresponsible. 
 
 Those aristocrats in class (2) and the pathological varieties of 
 them in (3) are the same sort of people Christ called scribes 
 and Pharisees (Matt., 5, 20; 12, 38; 16; 23; Luke, 7, 30, 
 etc.; 20,46; 11; Mark, 3; 7; 8; 12). I have merely 
 been more definite about them, used their modern names, 
 and shown the biology of their defectiveness. I have not 
 "condemned" them, but I have shown that the universe is 
 simply destroying them. And I have been more accurate in 
 my descriptions than is the Bible. We saw that truistically 
 there must be those abnormal classes at the two ends" of 
 our race (§168p), just as there are painful zones on each side 
 of normal activity (§163). In a wide sense it is beautiful that 
 those abnormal classes exist (§25c): for as we saw, they are 
 needed to show us how not to do things, furnishing evidence 
 of what would happen to us if we became intemperate. I 
 know quite a lot about those abnormal classes from direct ex- 
 perience in being intemperate in numbers of ways myself. 
 
 c. But the statement of those broad measures or classi- 
 fications of people may be profitably extended here by a brief 
 practical application of the theory of human measurements or 
 character judgment to normal people. Our perceptions have 
 to be keener in judging such balanced people, for truistically 
 there is less variation in L and T to be observed in them. 
 So we may note the general differences between woman and 
 man, as a general example of normal human measurement. 
 
 d. The basis of all measurement is L and T (Part One). 
 So we observe man and woman with the purpose of finding 
 in what fundamental way their activities have a perceptible 
 difference in L and T; and when we note a definite variation 
 that holds for normal persons we have the total theoretical 
 solution of their quantitative differences. Obviously, that 
 same principle applies to the finding of the differences m all 
 other human classes: the principle is merely the truism that 
 a property or characteristic is an L and T difference. 
 
 Or, we can take this view of what we are about to do:- The 
 
 foregoing ethics has in general been static or abstract," or 
 theoretical' in the conventional sense of not being directly 
 used as a whole. We are now going to summarize concretely 
 or get some dynamic ethics (in popular estimation, I am defi- 
 nitely rushing in" — dynamically — where angels fear to 
 
 tread). The obvious L and T variation between man 
 
 and woman that always normally occurs (also, in principle 
 the variation is a truism of the theory of sex, §146), is that 
 the sexual cycle of woman is longer or slower in T than that 
 of man (or physiologically definitely involves more biologic 
 L). The total normal cycle of woman obviously includes 
 copulation, pregnancy, and birth and suckling of the infant 
 — a matter of months; — whereas the cycle of man is, so far as 
 is similarly perceptible, surely not more than a few days, 
 and is practically only a few minutes. 170 So it is obviously 
 truistic that as a whole the nervous system of woman normally 
 works more slowly and hence less intensely than that of man. 
 Therefore, woman's nervous system as a whole is more inte- 
 grated or strong, is more stable or extensive, or extensively 
 unified, so that she is of a more child-like or undifferenti- 
 ated" type than man, and does not react so violently with 
 the environment as man, but can endure more of a long- 
 continued reaction with the environment than man. Clearly 
 all those general traits of women are merely truisms of our 
 original observation of her slower sex cycle. And those dif- 
 ferences between woman and man are I think usually agreed 
 by most observers to exist. E. g. , the final and most remote 
 truism we just got is that woman can endure a longer reaction 
 
 i70d That of course implies that copulation for a woman is not 
 of itself what might be called a practically satisfying act — implies 
 that she has no orgasm in the sense that man has. I know of no di- 
 rect proof that such is a fact, although it is obviously theoretically a 
 truism; appropriate measures of physiologic processes, such as blood 
 pressure, would probably give such evidence. But there is ample 
 indirect evidence that copulation perceptibly alone, does not satisfy 
 the normal woman; some such evidence is given, e. g., by various 
 nervous abnormalities of prostitutes — or by the very fact that prosti- 
 tutes are female rather than male. The proposition is clearly quanti- 
 tative, and what is quantitatively true of it in the present age by no 
 means was fact in the past, or need be in the future: e. g., in many 
 fishes the sexes would theoretically have a practically equal (and 'fin- 
 ishing') orgasm; and man was once a fish, and theoretically can 
 again be one. It seems probable that just now man and woman are 
 tending to become less dissimilar in immediate results of copulation 
 (more "human," or alike, in the terms of popular man-woman dis- 
 cussions) ; but that is a rash guess, which even if correct now might 
 not continue to be true in slightly changed conditions. I men- 
 tion those vague suggestions, for which there is slight direct experi- 
 mental guidance, to show how much variation is possible. E. g., it 
 is probable that for twenty or thirty centuries women have been de- 
 veloping more and more a definite orgasm; some trends of history 
 seem to show such a change — a comparatively rapid one to be thus 
 perceptible. And if that is true, then the most important quantita- 
 tive change and hence cause in history — the chief "key" to history 
 — for that period would be that relative change in man and woman . 
 As a fact, some historians think that the most important key for that 
 period is the rise and decay of religious systems; it is shown (par. h) 
 that woman is chiefly responsible for man's perception of religion 
 (the theory of the morality of marriage, §166, implies it); so truistic- 
 ally religious changes are themselves due to relative changes in man and 
 woman. Thus sex biology may serve to show a clearer history. — — 
 Truistically, any That...Y.This... formula may validly serve as a base 
 of history, or quantitative description of the past of this earth (which 
 usually includes mankind as the chief object of interest). The 
 "best" history is the one which uses the most vividly familiar and 
 perceptible terms ("facts") for the two factors (provided they are not 
 too vivid). It is generally agreed now that history should be more 
 vivid and familiar or "real" than it has been made — especially that 
 Kings..., Generals..., Priests..., and such terms are rather frothy (are 
 merely the scum that implies the deep, important, familiar flows of 
 history), and hence give history that is not especially relevant to the 
 actual understandable factors, such scum being only superficially 
 vivid. Also, history based on kaisers and such scum truistically is 
 pathology; so necessarily it is as unpleasant as listening to a poor 
 hysteric detail her symptoms — and analogously, mostly isn't so. 
 
§170d XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 224 
 
 with the environment: and that is usually in quite percept- 
 ible agreement with comparative death statistics, and with 
 the generally accepted fact that women are more patient. 
 
 e. Those immediate general truisms are obviously easy 
 to get. They refer to the whole nervous systems of woman 
 and man. But when we estimate a person's character we 
 divide it into parts — analyze' it. So we must now make 
 a step often confused in people's minds. We change the 
 point of view from the total or the large standard universe of 
 Environment. . . X Woman. .., or Environment. . . XMan. .., or 
 Woman... XMan..., to the smaller standard universe of 
 Other parts of woman {or man)... yCGiven parts of ■woman (or 
 man)... . As soon as we do that we note that we may use 
 the ordinary psychological equation for woman (or man), 
 Emotions... X Intellect... =Nervous system. We have observed 
 that woman's nervous system is comparatively stable as a 
 whole. We have seen that the larger part of the nervous 
 system is concerned in producing emotions, and that only a 
 small part (perhaps a part of the cortex) is concerned in pro- 
 ducing conscious intellect or perceptions. Now, because it 
 is a truism (the total argument or thesis of this book) that 
 any That...y.Tkis... does ultimately exactly balance, then 
 Emotions. . . X Intellect... must theoretically balance in a given 
 person, regardless of which of the factors is most easily per- 
 ceptible. So it follows that as woman's nervous sj r stem as a 
 whole is slow, then the larger part, her emotions, must be 
 slow and steady and sure and stable, etc. ; and then that her 
 intellect, in order to balance that in the long run, must be 
 fast — or is intense, weak in a broad sense, jumps at conclu- 
 sions, sees details excellently but begins to be unable to see 
 details when they extend widely. 
 
 f. In precisely the same way, man's emotions are fast, 
 intense, unreliable or undeveloped over a long time (com- 
 pared, of course, with the average woman's), not so enduring 
 as woman's, not very perceptibly unified or religious, fickle, 
 violent, etc. And his intellect comparatively is slow, strong, 
 steady, controlled, extensive, "thoughtful," "reasonable," 
 unified, cold, hard, persistent or reliable, or philo- 
 sophical" or inventive (i. e., abstractly religious). 
 
 g. Clearly, man and woman are in general the reverse' 
 or complement of each other. As soon as we consciously 
 follow the theory of quantities by using specific That...Y. 
 This... formulas with definite observation of just what sort of 
 universe we are considering, it is easy to keep consistent 
 even in such a puzzling problem as that of the nature of man 
 and woman (and below we proceed with more details). In 
 fact, it is almost too easy, for I readily get verbal contrasts 
 between the two which sound as if man and woman were as 
 different as night and day; but actually the two are so much 
 alike, just as all human beings are closely alike, that it is 
 often impossible to perceive many of these quantitative differ- 
 ences in a given couple. So the reader is requested not to 
 take these clear verbal differences too emphatically quantita- 
 tively, and to note carefully that all the practical conclusions 
 I draw are obviously based on my clear recognition that the 
 differences in man and woman are quantitatively slight usually. 
 
 h. It is clear that woman, by slow, steady, reliable uni- 
 fication of emotions (in practice, by the application of them 
 to the holding together of the family and the property of 
 man), has in actual effect had more to do in directly establish- 
 ing religion or civilization than man has had. (E. g., it was 
 seen in §gl55f, 166r that women today are foremost in 
 expressing in a directly applicable way [par. j] fundamental 
 advances in religious practice. Even Taylor's scientific man- 
 agement is not such a direct or humanly familiar and appli- 
 cable binding together" or religion as Mrs. Fisher's books.) 
 Obviously, all the great religious or human generalizations or 
 
 conclusions have been first formulated by the emotions of 
 woman, and weakly or "intuitively" expressed by her com- 
 paratively poor intellect. And a superficially queer 
 
 thing truistically resulted and still results from her poor in- 
 tellectual expression of those generalizations. She was not 
 able, because of the rapid and weak way she jumps at intel- 
 lectual conclusions, to state or observe clearly consciously or 
 intellectually the relationships between her various conclu- 
 sions — she can not very well come to the point. So 
 she used an apparently dualistic logic- — one omitting formal 
 assertion of identifying relationships. (I. e., woman actually 
 is formally logical in a classical sense : man does not natur- 
 ally tend to use classical logic, but was so overwhelmed with 
 the truth of woman s emotional conclusions that he formally 
 copied woman's curious logic, which when considered explic- 
 itly and intellectually, and not emotionally or vaguely con- 
 sciously [§17cd], is invalid.) So when woman had two 
 general conclusions, she could not intellectually or consciously 
 directly relate or identify them ; hence she would intellect- 
 ually ignore them, allowing her emotions to work on them, 
 and soon they would automatically pop up into consciousness 
 in a related or run-together condition — telescoped together, 
 so to speak, precisely as the classic logic works it. And 
 neither she nor man knew how it happened — could say how 
 it happened. So man with his steady intellect objected to 
 that unconscious method of telescoping, and asserted sincerely 
 that woman has no soul (in recent years it has been the mild- 
 er assertion that woman is illogical — that being asserted in 
 the face of the glaring fact that woman uses the classical 
 logic man professes to use). It evidently does follow that 
 she was not conscious of her mental processes : and as soul 
 substantially means consciousness, it superficially did follow 
 that she had no soul. 
 
 i. On the other hand, man, with his comparatively strong 
 intellect, appropriated the general conclusions obtained by 
 woman and strung them together (by the invalid classic logic 
 — his very using of which is truistic proof that he didn't know 
 how to get the conclusions he appropriated). He called 
 that intellectual doing reason," or religion, or science, or 
 law-making, etc., after the fashion of the day, and claimed 
 that it is a superior process, and that he therefore is "superi- 
 or" to woman (formerly it was the essentially identical but 
 verbally more emphatic assertion that woman has no soul). 
 And woman in effect accepted man's criterion of general 
 superiority." Even yet all but a few rarely wise women 
 (and truistically they can't express themselves clearly) accept 
 that intellectual criterion of comparison as being correct and 
 essential: e. g., the "advanced" woman, the extreme fem- 
 inist, asserts her equality by specifically claiming to be intel- 
 lectually the same as man, and proceeds to "prove" it by 
 being intellectual" (a few typical examples are given later). 
 It has been seen to be truistic under present conditions that 
 in general woman can not equal man intellectually (of course 
 numerous individual women intellectually excel the majority 
 of men) ; the historical fact (so glaring that even some of the 
 advanced" women have enough intellect to see it) is that 
 there are no women intellectual geniuses who begin to be in 
 the first class (some of those "advanced" women then whine 
 that woman hasn't been given an opportunity to be a gen- 
 ius intellectually— which shows that they are intellectually 
 incapable of grasping the simple generality, or seeing the 
 often glaring fact, that genius pays for all the opportunity it 
 ever takes). The rigorous principle obviously is that intellect- 
 ual superiority, which by customary meaning of words is as a 
 rule man's, is not a complete or essential criterion (woman 
 is superior in emotions, which, as we shall see, is a variety of 
 genius just as important and necessary and praiseworthy). 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §1701 
 
 That superiority is merely man's ostentatious, showy, some- 
 what superficial, secondary male characteristic like the similar 
 proud and arrogantly displayed tail of a rooster — and nobody 
 claims that his tail makes the rooster superior to the hen, 
 although as a tail the rooster s tail is superior to the hen s. 
 
 j. The question of superiority" is the quantitative one 
 of direction: as we saw in §99, there can be no solution" of 
 it, as it is merely an agreement as to methods of measurement. 
 There are no absolute directions, and so men essentially are 
 neither superior nor inferior to women, but are merely quanti- 
 tatively different. The same principle obviously applies to all 
 races" of men, etc. : they are quantitatively different. 
 Whether one is superior to another depends entirely on what 
 is agreed as to arbitrary directions. 1703 In the case of woman 
 and man, woman is superior in Emotions. .., and man in Intel- 
 lect... . Woman does the usually unnoticed foundation work, 
 patiently stabilizes the important everyday things of life, 
 half-consciously formulates all the fundamental religious rela- 
 tionships and turns them over to man, and gives a practical 
 example of normal, useful rebirths. The man does the in- 
 tellectual expressing of the further formal or logical union of 
 that essential foundation work ; it is a less extensive work, 
 but emotionally intense, so that man notices it and makes a 
 lot of talk about its and his superiority. For an example 
 take this book. I make some vivid, wide generalizations that 
 are emotionally intense, and which require a cool, enduring 
 intellect (I notice that even some men who merely read it 
 can't keep cool — moderately judicious); and by bygone ideas 
 I would receive credit for far superior work than could be 
 done by woman. Well; nw generalizations are useful and 
 did require intellectual steadiness; but they are substantially 
 slight and indeed almost negligible in comparison with the 
 vast foundations of facts and relationships established by 
 people before me — the valid greater part of such substance 
 being furnished by woman. I merely happen to do the spec- 
 tacular showy part; but I personally am under no delusion 
 that it is superior' to be show}'. 
 
 k. We saw that maximum morality requires cooperation 
 and hence fairly accurate judgment of woman by man, and 
 vice versa, and a primary knowledge that in cooperation the 
 two reacting parties are not quantitatively equal. It follows :- 
 (l) that cooperation, or maximum life under given conditions, 
 required that at first man and woman be comparatively much 
 different so as to force the perception of the differences of W 
 and M (in W...XM... of §167b) upon each other— that the 
 
 17 °i I judge that the differences in various races (white, black, 
 etc.) may best be summarized by saying that they are perceptibly 
 different in virtual racial ages. They are different quantitatively, 
 just as a boy is different from an old woman; and there is obviously 
 no question of essential superiority. For precisely the same reasons 
 that children born of a boy and a woman of forty-five are likely to be 
 not of the best inherent quality, and are also likely to receive inferior 
 nurture, intermarriage of differently aged races is in some degree ob- 
 jectionable—although some things resulting from refraining may be 
 more so (§176h). However, the conditions of life of a race make 
 the race virtually grow older or become younger, just as a galaxy 
 fluctuates in virtual age (and as can a person in considerable degree, 
 though not nearly so much). So it is possible to make the races ap- 
 proach, some fair equality of age. It may become necessary to do it; 
 for as we improve our tools it becomes more and more impracticable 
 and immoral (a waste of life) to keep the races "pure" (§176). If 
 the races are to be kept somewhat pure, then the earth s population 
 must be kept less. The population in a better and wiser civilization 
 than we have achieved will have to be consciously controlled, instead 
 of being, as now, more painfully controlled by rain, potato bugs, 
 power-mad statesmen's wars, etc. Those are questions largely for 
 future men; they can best be solved by the people who are to use 
 the solutions. We rather unnecessarily trouble ourselves when we 
 undertake to solve such quantitative problems for the posterity that 
 is more than twenty years ahead-and about one man in a million 
 can make a sensible guess that far ahead; and I am not that one. 
 
 man be intensely male and the woman intensely female. 
 (Before such sex differentiation occurred, the environment was 
 similarly intensely different from the rather undifferentiated 
 or rather non-sexed individuals — the same principle, giving 
 amphimixis of individuals after several generations, etc. ; cf. 
 §146.) It follows next (2) that the perception of such wide 
 and easily seen differences of M and W made M and W pro- 
 gress so that they could see, and react to, less differences : 
 then they would be pained by such great differences. So it 
 results as a truism of (2) that M and W normally, or in the 
 course of that progress or increasing" civilization (attain- 
 ment of more delicate differentiation under fairly steady cli- 
 mate), tend to have less wide sex differences. To abbreviate 
 that complete cyclic statement of progress" given by (l) 
 and (2) :- all human phenomena with steady climate tend to 
 approach a balance perceptibly (that is obviously identical 
 
 with the theory of genius, §159). So, as an example, 
 
 the genius, the properly developed person, will more and 
 more tend to stop bragging about his or her extreme sexuality. 
 Stallions and some male savages have to be kept away from 
 the opposite sex ; but in this reasonably civilized country 
 even young men and women associate to their mutual benefit. 
 And that tendency of the sexes to become less violent- 
 ly different — of each sex to become more of a balanced gen- 
 ius that includes in itself much of the other sex — is obviously 
 accelerated by woman's make believe that man is superior 
 because of his intellect (wise women are practically conscious 
 that is a make-believe, and smile kindly at the man, or the 
 womanlike Mrs. Atherton, who takes intellect very seriously), 
 and by her trying to imitate man's intellect to some extent 
 and to do some of man's work, such as voting and other- 
 wise wrestling with the extensive environment (where even 
 the strutting male frequently comes out second best; note 
 the infant manufacturers who wail to the government for 
 suckle and protection from bad men in a cruel world). 
 Clearly, that makes the woman understand man better, and 
 enables here to cooperate with him, and is moral provided she 
 does not overdo it and really fool herself with the exagger- 
 ated feminism of Mrs. Atherton, that obviously tends to 
 dualism, with the practical conclusion that men and women 
 conflict. But balanced feminists like Mrs. Fisher, Mrs. War- 
 ren, Mrs. Vorse (§166r), who both believe in being women 
 first, with woman's superiorities, and act on that belief, and 
 who then try some of man's intellectualities in order to un- 
 derstand man better, are truistically the best sort of women 
 there can be (and incidentally, the intellectual work is good, 
 as it has a sound, honest base). 
 
 1. The man's idea that his intellectuality makes him 
 wholly superior is rather silly, and so mildly immoral. But 
 the man has a sort of make believe that is the counterpart of 
 woman's. Originally it was called chivalry, and consisted of 
 his claiming to like to practice the womanly superiorities of 
 emotional gentleness or patience, faithfulness or endurance, 
 etc. That helped him become more feminine. And such 
 pretense truistically would destroy somewhat his masculine 
 strength of intellect. 1701 So male chivalry is recognized (in 
 
 1701 On the contrary, and as an indication of the consistency of 
 this argument, it is obvious that pretence or make believe (§155) by 
 woman does her less perceptible damage, as her intellect is already 
 of a nature to pretend more or less automatically (which is shown by 
 the fact that it is women who usually have hysteria, which is an un- 
 due exaggeration of this normal feminine characteristic). So we 
 usually do not expect the mediocre woman to be very truthful, though 
 such truthfulness (especially in keeping his contracts) is demanded 
 of the mediocre man, and is beginning to be demanded even of the 
 casual laborer and labor leader and diplomat and press agent. But 
 the mediocre woman is required by the majority to be emotionally 
 stable or reliable, which in practice is translated into the demand that 
 she be sexually chaste, whereas that is not required of the mediocre 
 
§1701 XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 this country at least) as being an offensive pretence or else a 
 meaningless ritual. But men of this country have generally 
 substituted for that chivalry a real belief that women are 
 more or less angelic (§166o). Such idealization of woman 
 truistically tends to make men acquire somewhat the feminine 
 superiorities, and works better than the ritualistic forms of 
 the decaying chivalry. 
 
 m. From an intellectual or spiritual point of view we 
 may get rid of the objectionable vagueness of such idealiza- 
 tion, and its frequent untruthful exaggeration of the quanti- 
 tative differences between man and woman (which encourages 
 parasitism, and all the less evils that any considerable inac- 
 curacy does), by explicitly recognizing their ability to exper- 
 ience normal emotional rebirths and thus give men religion. 
 The normal woman is angelic, and an essential complement 
 or comfort" or partner (cf. par. p) to man, in that she does 
 not have the vivid and shrill variety of rebirth (with all that 
 implies) of the normal man or of the emotionally narrowed or 
 unsexed" female (usually one who is clearly a hysteric, 
 such as St. Theresa). That normal-emotion, feminine sort of 
 actual genius is not dazzling or brilliant" from an intellect- 
 ual point of view; yet it is fully as valuable in life as the 
 male sort of genius. As a man I naturally take the point of 
 view that it is harder to achieve that feminine genius than to 
 make the shallow even though universally extensive generali- 
 ties which a man can make. So like any normal man I have 
 very little use for the glittering intellectual woman; but 
 I have a profound interest in the talk of a woman who has 
 developed considerable intellect on the honest base of her own 
 superiorities. Women have trouble in grasping intel- 
 lectually or consciously a universe that is much larger than 
 their own family or circle of friends (men have the opposite 
 characteristic; e. g., I have it badly enough to pass my own 
 wife on the street without seeing her when I happen not to 
 be thinking of people). So they tend to pick out a man who 
 can generalize intellectually for their religious guide. So 
 women tend to take Christ more seriously than men do. 
 
 n. Concretely, man can honestly and practically idealize 
 women, without any danger of making parasites, by under- 
 taking to some extent to feel with his wife the importance of 
 family life, and especially the deep and wide sort of continu- 
 ous rebirth which is experienced in caring for children. For 
 the details of that, see the books of the sound women writ- 
 ers; I have the male incompetence to state them without 
 making a mess of it. Women who use their superiorities 
 readily make a fine standard universe out of their homes (or, 
 of a small circle of associates, if they are unmarried), which is 
 perceptible enough to them to be a very real religion. A 
 man who does not want to attend to those multitudinous de- 
 tails of woman s life thereby implies that he wants to depart 
 from the balance instead of approach it — and hence is im- 
 moral. Men will not have the patience to stand much of 
 that domesticity ; it will be work ; but work is an essential 
 part of happiness, and of course the man should not subtract 
 energy from his intellectually-enduring work, whatever it is. 
 That concrete idealization of woman by men will ob- 
 viously also profoundly discourage the radical feminists and 
 parasites who object to much domestic life — especially those 
 
 man. In short, a difference in "moral standards," meaning sex 
 standards, is, for mediocre men and women, consistent with facts as 
 they are, and is moral. If the mediocre woman were as truthful and 
 hence intellectually as just as is the mediocre man, she would stop 
 complaining so much about the unchasteness of the mediocre man. 
 That man is more just, and hence makes little complaint of the un- 
 truthfulness of the mediocre woman. That truthfulness in man pays 
 or compensates the mediocre woman for her chastity — balances it. 
 Of course, both, in order to lead fuller lives — be more highly moral, 
 — ought to eliminate their mediocre traits. 
 
 who object to being personally responsible for the care of 
 children. All female parasites are the lazy women who do 
 not care to use their emotional patience; so practically they 
 dodge personal care of children. They experiment more or 
 less irresponsibly with children, and having acquired obliga- 
 tions, turn the real care of the child over to servants. 
 
 o. That explicit statement of cooperation between man 
 and woman, with definite recognition of their quantitative 
 differences, is equivalent to the theory, in economics, of spec- 
 ialization (or division) of labor, or to the combined laws of 
 increasing returns and of diminishing returns. These quanti- 
 tative differences of the sexes, from that economic point of 
 view, give the great natural" division of labor that produces 
 
 the greatest results. We have seen that any machine 
 
 must have at least two reacting parts before it will work, or 
 logically even exist. If all persons do the same things, then 
 truistically humanity as a whole would not be a machine, or 
 a mutually reacting democracy : there would not be any 
 
 competition" or love or friction, but merely a zero inter- 
 action of men, and hence no economic product of such a so- 
 ciety' (Parts One and Two). I. e., if we run what is usually 
 called competition to infinity, the race itself merely logically 
 disappears. (It practically would be like trying to run num- 
 erous series-wound dynamos in parallel — and the physicist 
 can finish extending that simile to all aspects of this problem. 
 The dynamos would be destroyed.) If we are all alike eco- 
 nomically, meaning that we in general all try to do the same 
 job (suppose everybody tried to catch fish — and nobody sup- 
 plied water, or fishing gear, or needs for cooking), the prod- 
 uct diminishes to zero — or the race perishes. When numbers 
 of the same sort of bacteria live together, doing the same 
 things, they interfere and their growth practically stops, etc. 
 The same law of diminishing returns is a universal truism stat- 
 ing that the growth of any structure or organization slows up 
 as we depart from the optimum balance of direct action and 
 reaction (it is a partial statement of periodicity ; see Index). 
 
 On the other hand, if some persons react with others 
 
 — in an explicit machine, or That... XThis..., — then we begin 
 to get an organism, or a perceptible or increasing product (a 
 mere truism for growth; see Index). The product goes on 
 increasing until there is a balance of "competition" (which 
 does not imply "fighting," but a reaction) with organization 
 
 a balance of specialization with a coordination, or general 
 growth, or integration of social or any other sort of structure. 
 Beyond that balance the same diminishing return recurs. 
 I. e. , the principle is shown by the hyperbola representing 
 That... X This... (Figs. 104b, 163b). Germany in rough ef- 
 fect tried to make a total specialized organization of the whole 
 state (a military, or bureaucratic, or paternalistic one), and 
 being a vigorous people, blew up into a war; Rome, having 
 largely weak people, went towards the zero side and slumped 
 more or less into nothingness. It was intemperate "effic- 
 iency, or too much organization or centralization ; it was 
 like trying to make the digestive tract [government] extend 
 directly to every cell in the body, which scheme would, to 
 succeed, have to destroy all the body but the digestive tract. 
 When we try to have the government "pass a law" to regu- 
 late every little detail we are destroying the government and 
 incidentally ourselves. Also, every little law adds to the tax 
 Dil '- So obviously, we have the general economic law 
 
 implied by the following formulas, which are in agreement 
 with our whole argument :- Various organizations or compan- 
 ies or " staffs"... X The specialised men in each... ; or, Special- 
 ties. . . X Particular men in each. ..; or, Increasing returns. . . X 
 Diminishing returns. . . ; or, Capital. . . X Labor. ..; or, Supply. . . 
 XDemand... . There must be a division of labor, or a "ma- 
 chine," or temperance or balance in economics (§§114c, 149, 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §170p 
 
 etc.); otherwise destruction results. I have tried in 
 
 this one paragraph to give a general outline of the whole of 
 economics. So it is extremely condensed. But as the prin- 
 ciples are obviously identical with the principles of That...X. 
 This... I shall not add a chapter of repetition of them in 
 terms of economics. The reader who wishes to see directly 
 and vividly in some detail such economic principles is referred 
 to the first fifty pages of Reeve's "Cost of Competition." On 
 p. 45 of it Reeve gets a general economic equation equivalent 
 to our That... XThis... equation, although his explicit logic is 
 wrong. The remainder of the book is, as economics, piffle, 
 although it is a beautiful mystic statement of altruism carried 
 substantially to infinity and contains some extraordinarily 
 useful facts. He shows the difference in money price that 
 exists between what the producer gets and what the consumer 
 pays (it is a surprisingly large per cent — probably after making 
 some needed deductions from Reeve's figures amounting now 
 to 50 per cent); he calls that amount, which is got by the 
 middleman, the cost of competition, and proposes that it be 
 wiped out by turning buying and selling over to the govern- 
 ment (which he tacitly takes as being practically perfect in 
 all respects). As a matter of obvious fact (which shows the 
 truistically correct solution of the middleman problem), that 
 cost of competition ' is actually the cost of ignorance, and 
 is borne in rather perceptibly just proportion by everybody :- 
 the producer doesn't know just what it costs him to produce, 
 how much, when, and what to produce, who wants it, when, 
 where, and how much, and how to get it there, etc. ; and 
 the usual ignorance of the consumer is too abysmal to detail 
 in the limits of this book — he wants what he wants when he 
 wants it, he usually resents being asked to use his mind ap- 
 preciably in the matter, etc. The middleman is mostly en- 
 gaged in trying to do the responsible thinking for those two 
 — and such thinking is almost the hardest and highest priced 
 work there is ; — so usually he doesn't actually doit (can't, 
 in many cases), but simply gambles, and nature takes the 
 cost out of him by spoiling his goods in some way. And for 
 reasons so obvious as not to need statement, although the 
 chief ones have been stated, the government is less fitted to 
 do that thinking than are the people more direct^' concerned, 
 and government participation in the affair will not only theo- 
 retically increase that cost of ignorance, but in recent prac- 
 tice painfully did do so. The only solution of middleman 
 costs is responsible thinking — plain, old-fashioned gumption 
 or intelligent and active self-reliance (including some in the 
 middleman himself). Marshall broadly states the prin- 
 ciples of this paragraph in his Book IV, Chap. XIII (he has 
 difficulty in being definite about the One and Many — specific- 
 ally, the infinite regress) ; but his extended application is fine, 
 p. We may definitely come back to man and woman. 
 Clearly, in order that there may be a division of labor so that 
 all persons shall not try to do the same kind of work and so 
 in practice destroy the race, it is necessary that persons be 
 necessarily quantitatively different (that is merely the reverse 
 aspect of incommensurability) : we ought not (as a figurative 
 truism) put square pegs in round holes. We saw that women 
 and men are the two natural divisions of the race for such a 
 primary division of labor, or general specialization. So if we 
 take a married couple as a standard universe, there is natur- 
 ally a specialization of jobs ; but, that specialization can not 
 be complete in practice (an attempt at it gives line organiza- 
 tion, or too much organization, Pauline pseudo ethics, and a 
 burned-up couple). I. e., the man must "compete" a little 
 in being rather feminine, and the woman must exercise 
 some in being rather masculine. So obviously, generally, 
 and in agreement with practice in this country, there should 
 not be any particular line drawn as to what jobs are for men 
 
 and what for women. A woman would be aboutas useless and 
 misplaced in a life job as a professional philosopher as I 
 would be as a governess. But although some women com- 
 plain that they are barred from industry, etc., I think they 
 could get a job as philosopher as easily as I could one as gov- 
 erness — and I am not aware that any cruel person is stop- 
 ping me from being a governess. In most jobs a woman can 
 not get as much pay as a man, for the simple reason that 
 she is not so responsible or reliable:- her intellect is as 
 a rule not so dependable, as seen; and also, she is not 
 expected to stick to the job, but is expected to marry (and 
 if she does not, or does not get some other job which mostly 
 uses her superiorities, she is naturally correctly judged to be 
 a somewhat wasted and spoiled human being, not of great 
 value). Nobody would be likelj' to stop me if I experimented 
 at being a governess; but I would justly receive an ama- 
 teur s pay and fame. If I tried to make governess-ing my 
 life work, I should naturally expect to be considered a fool 
 for wasting my other abilities in order to be a mediocre gov- 
 erness — but, if I thought I would accomplish really more as a 
 governess, I would stick it out and prove the others to be the 
 fools. The same principles apply to women; I should expect 
 a woman who tried to be primarily a philosopher to fail to do 
 nearly so much as she would in more suitable jobs; a number 
 of practical failures are available as evidence; and I would 
 unhesitatingly call any young woman who started out to be a 
 professional philosopher a fool. But I would not otherwise 
 try to stop her; maybe she would prove me wrong, and 
 make a success at it, in which case I would conclude both 
 that she was a biological sport, and that the female proper- 
 ties were changing faster than I expected. In the mean- 
 time, if I were hiring philosophers I shouldn t pay her more 
 than about half what I should pay a run-of-the-mine male one. 
 
 That general principle of utilizing the properties of 
 
 people applies to all businesses and all partnerships. It is 
 simple to use our broad, natural formula Emotions. .. X 
 Intellect. . . to classify all persons on a comparative scale be- 
 ginning with high intellectual strength at one end and going 
 to comparatively high emotional superiority at the other (the 
 difficulty is to guess reasonably accurately where a given per- 
 son belongs on the scale; also, there is another scale of in- 
 trinsic measures of at least equal importance — e. g. , two men 
 may have a good balance of the two strengths so far as it is 
 possible for a male to have, and yet one man may intrinsic- 
 ally have fifty times the strength, power, drive, assimilative- 
 outputing capacity of the other). I used man and woman 
 because they naturally tend to occupy the respective ends of 
 that comparative scale, and thus automatically enter into the 
 widest specialization combined with non-specialization:- mar- 
 riage (which is thus an extreme but sound type of all busi- 
 nesses, in opposition to the unsound line organization). (That 
 comparative' scale is the extensive factor, and the intrinsic' 
 scale the intensive factor of the rigorous theory of human 
 measurement. Obviously they can not be separated ; but I 
 shall not go further into the mathematical theory ; see Index, 
 "Harmonic periodicity.") E. g., of two men, one is more 
 enduring intellectually [perhaps not perceptibly so] and un- 
 stable emotionally than the other; so in a business the intel- 
 lectually strong man should be given a thinking, planning, 
 investigating, imagining, talking, or salesman job; while the 
 other should be in an executive, managing, conserving, buy- 
 ing, organizing, steadying-flywheel job, with general mild 
 wet-blanket duties to counteract the other and make him 
 more useful (and that obviously won't hold if the intrinsic 
 measures of the two differ widely ; in that case the only satis- 
 factory way to get an actual democracy or sound business or- 
 ganization, is to put the weak man in a position in which he 
 
§170p XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 is not expected to give continual reactions; a pygmy can t 
 wrestle with a giant satisfactorily to anybody, and no business 
 title or other hocus-pocus can make a pygmy into a giant; to 
 expect a manual laborer, who usually has the nerve develop- 
 ment of a child [cf. army tests] to tell Ford how to run the 
 business is a ridiculous travesty on democracy or any other 
 aspect of commonsense; but the laborer is competent to say 
 what he thinks about his own job, and such remarks, which 
 he has obvious democratic right and psychological need to 
 make, although they probably mean something much differ- 
 ent from what they actually say, are valuable to the greatest 
 business genius). And actual people do not fixedly occupy a 
 
 constant place on those scales ; they change. That 
 
 is the general theory of all business or industry, or of hand- 
 ling men (including women). It is the definite application of 
 democracy, which explicitly notes that men are not quantita- 
 tively equal. Handling men is the greatest of all jobs be- 
 cause it is the hardest:- requiring responsible thinking (of 
 course including estimate of measures), and then application 
 of that to men (which requires more intrinsic energy or drive 
 than they have, at least in the affairs concerned). House- 
 keeping, including handling a husband and children, is tru- 
 istically just as hard. Usually the actual objection that is 
 found by women to housekeeping comes from the fact that 
 women who object are too mediocre to grasp and-or intrinsic- 
 ally measure up to the possibilities of the job. 
 
 q. So the fundamental practical ethical and-or economic 
 error a person can make is to fail to find what he is quantita- 
 tively fitted to do, and then to fail to do it. The average 
 proper job for a man has been seen to differ somewhat from 
 the one for a woman. So in general the economic doctrine of 
 extreme feminists, tacitly or explicitly to the effect that wom- 
 en ought to be given the same work as men, same pay, etc., 
 is wrong. Mrs. Charlotte Perkins Gilman's "Woman and 
 Economics" seems to be the leading '"authority" for that 
 extreme feminism. The book is the sugar-coated picture of 
 a matrimonial establishment which actually is what is now 
 usually known as an apartment hotel (male real estate in- 
 vestors took the hint that many women wanted thus to duck 
 hard, life-giving responsibility and supplied them with their 
 Utopia — at a price). Her man and woman do the same sort 
 of work [i. e., they have vaguely a "career" — nature not 
 specified, as it would have been distressing to be too intimate 
 with responsible work], and return at night to glance at 
 the children, who merely vaguely happened, and are in charge 
 of an assumed-competent nurse [who more or less material- 
 izes out of the nowhere, and who rather seems to be of neu- 
 tral sex]. It is a "lovely" picture. The glaring practical 
 defect with it is that in her grossly amatuerish way she sub- 
 stantially forgets that the nurse and the more hidden domes- 
 tics who run the apartment hotel and the children, are parts 
 of the race; she substitutes them as zero-counters for moth- 
 ers, in blissful disregard of the multitude of actual economic 
 facts involved. Obviously, her book, as economics, is merely 
 silly. What it means is that she wants to eat her cake and 
 have it too ; and naturally a person showing such dense ig- 
 norance of fundamental economic principles does not even 
 know what real cake is — what a sound woman can get out of 
 life. Her book is typical of many such female books. 
 
 r. Finally some men may object that they do not wish to 
 
 become any more like women than they can help. The 
 
 characteristic which is probably most commonly named as the 
 essential masculine trait is courage. And that is truistically 
 correct :- for courage is the outward result of conscious know- 
 ledge or intelligence, and can be possessed only by those who 
 have consistent, sure, stable intelligence and the intense 
 emotion needed at any given time to back it up — live by it, 
 
 or stick to it. We are afraid only when we are ignorant; 
 when we are not fairly sure what is going to happen we wor- 
 ry, which is minor fearing. And obviously, a woman would 
 not have as much courage as a man. 170r Often men admire 
 the patience of women to the degree of holding that women 
 have more courage, or a better sort than men ; I am inclined 
 to be that way myself. But that simply means that those 
 men are more or less conscious of a deficiency in patience: 
 for precisely speaking a woman is usually cowardly with re- 
 spect to the unknown or unpredictable antics of a mouse, or 
 a washing or other sort of machine, etc. ; but they have much 
 
 170r Roughly speaking, a man is said to have (noticeable) courage 
 only when he is actually afraid of the immediate unknown Many, 
 and, with a little make believe, pretends not to be afraid — or, per- 
 haps to speak more precisely, forces himself to go on in spite of the 
 actual and inevitable fear. (His capacity for intense emotions truis- 
 tically gives him that courage in a degree superior to a woman's; as 
 a rule the woman can't concentrate her whole nervous system to that 
 pitch of intensity, or conscious sticking point.) If we knew every- 
 thing, courage would then disappear with all other things into the 
 ineffable One, and we would have infinite courage or zero courage, 
 just as it pleases us to say. So the courageous man actually intel- 
 lectually grasps a very wide sort of God or Meaning (he may call it 
 "carrying on," or "playing the game," etc.), and makes it work 
 backwards, to pull him over the fear of the immediate unknowns he 
 will never be able to know accurately (e. g., the common saying that 
 soldiers become "fatalists" means that they thus substantially con- 
 sciously use the One more frequently than other people use the same 
 
 thing under the name religion). So it is a truism that the 
 
 braggart (who is verbally a truculent, militaristic, aristocratic bully) 
 is not especially courageous; he actually is either make-believedly 
 whistling to hide his fear and exaggerating the hiding of it so much 
 as perhaps to be hypocritical and thus prove that he is too much 
 afraid; or else he is so stupid and dull witted that he is unable to see 
 that there are unknown things that ought to make him pause a bit. 
 Usually the militarist is a mixture of both, and too stupid to see that 
 he is exhibiting some cowardice. But he always exhibits cowardice 
 by expressing the earnest desire that people load themselves down 
 with arms and armor so as to be "prepared" — to protect him, pre- 
 sumably. That glaringly contradicts his "war-like spirit," and much- 
 advertised courage. So it is a truism that the worst objection to the 
 militarist is the directly human one that he is too cowardly — is not 
 quite a man. (Or, if he is not actually afraid to be without increas- 
 ing protection, then when he says it is needed he is either stupidly 
 parroting someone else, or is lying for some selfish purpose of his own 
 
 — both of which are higher grades of cowardice.) Of course, 
 
 there is such a thing as a foolhardy ignoring of ordinary prudence — 
 the question of armament is a quantitative one, and the reader will 
 have to judge for himself. Truistically, the best defence against any 
 variety of bully or militarist is to have a well balanced, self-reliant 
 
 nervous system, It is now obvious that the truly courageous 
 
 man is the one who in numerous things in practical life has used the 
 valid logic soundly. So all the unusually reliable men and women 
 mentioned in footnote 167b are obviously also courageous. Most of 
 them have shown easily observable courage in various ways; so such 
 objective evidence in turn proves the principles here. And clearly, 
 the supreme courage is that possessed by the real leaders of the race 
 —is that courage which with full consciousness of the risks run will 
 unselfishly, without demand for, or any certainty of, payment for 
 themselves, support others in right-doing. This book is verbally a 
 trifle novel in spots, and I have found that it takes truly courageous 
 persons to admit that they approve it (the argument is so self- 
 evidently true that I have never seen anyone try to attack it; and ap- 
 parently people accept the book as substantially correct, so it clearly 
 is simply a matter of their courageously facing the "unknown," the 
 slightly novel, and either standing on their own feet and taking it, 
 or running away). So for some years I have had an unusual oppor- 
 tunity to gauge people's real courage. And I find a surprisingly 
 large amount of it in this country— and a negligible amount in Eu- 
 rope: there they occasionally blow-up prominently with some half- 
 baked radical idea, but there is little steady, hard working courage. 
 Of course, there are numbers of persons in this country, occupying 
 nominally important positions, who are painfully timid; I have 
 learned to recognize them pretty well (mostly by their large and im- 
 portant sounding talk, which is very cock-sure in tone, but vague as 
 to specific facts) : some day I may publish an interesting list of 
 
 them. It requires no appreciable courage, of course, to work 
 
 out and publish or support ideas of our own. Even if the ideas are 
 silly kind nature usually keeps us from seeing it to a fatal degree. 
 
UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §171f 
 
 courage" of the sort called fortitude, which is patient en- 
 durance of the disagreeable and somewhat passive acceptance 
 of the unknown. The equation tacitly used is Fortitude or 
 
 bravery... yCCourage or bravery... =Cour age, etc. So 
 
 truistically, the more a man knows about women the more 
 courage he has, or the more masculine he is. And he can 
 know about them only by becoming more like them — getting 
 a better balance of that equation. The exaggerated males, 
 with too much specialized courage and not enough fortitude, 
 ' are the masters, superiors, bosses" of their wives (who pub- 
 licly exhibit their condition by following their lords a trifle 
 in the rear, like little dogs) ; such aristocratic, bullying, mili- 
 taristic males, from the time of the over-masculine Greeks 
 down to the pre-war Prussian military bully, have been over- 
 emotional, sentimental, cruel, brutal, and treacherous — and 
 have invariably been soon licked and wiped out by more bal- 
 anced men. A person with so much male courage as to be 
 pathological is called a sadist : with pathological feminine 
 endurance or fortitude, a masochist (often the sexes reverse 
 in that highly exaggerated psychological unbalance). So 
 the man or woman who labors under the delusion that it is 
 nice to achieve large quantities of the respective braver- 
 ies — who disdains to be a little like a woman, or a man — 
 should read some of that highly unpleasant sex psychiatry, 
 and see what will happen to him or her in some degree. So 
 we see that there must be temperance in democracy or divi- 
 sion of labor — especially in the great natural one of sex. 
 §171. a. The summing up of ethics or sociology or eco- 
 nomics is known as art (when mostly outer' or objective), 
 and culture or civilization (when mostly "inner' or subjective). 
 
 b. It is generally held that art is the method by which 
 things are best done — art being there substantially a relation- 
 ship word. So truistically that which most perceptibly fits 
 with its environment, is most obviously related to it or iden- 
 tified with it, is the best art — art there being the correspond- 
 ing Many word. The One word for art is usually beauty. 
 Clearly the universe is completely related or absolutely fitted 
 together, and so is absolutely beautiful:- Environment... 
 {<^Art, or relating^)0bjects of art...=Beauty, or Art. 
 
 c. Those definitions of art make it commonplace, norm- 
 al. Any easily perceptible moral or balanced action or the 
 result (mental or material) of such action is art by those defi- 
 nitions — or, when in some less degree, is skill, skillful, effic- 
 ient, workable, useful, etc. So art as a Many word tends to 
 refer to things out near the normal limits of activity (Fig. 
 168b); we use other names for quantitatively less things. 
 So obviously, if we speak of anything as being artistic it us- 
 ually means that it stretches our nervous system so far away 
 from the balance that the thing gives us in some more or less 
 perceptible degree a rebirth. And hence, when used as a 
 One word, art more or less consciously means religion, with 
 the added meaning that art is definitely any sort of summa- 
 tion into the One: religion actually is that (§166e), but in 
 practice "religion" usually means only an ethical summation 
 —the word ethical then being restricted arbitrarily to human 
 actions. It thus appears that the almost interminable dis- 
 putes as to what is art and what is not, and as to who is an 
 artist, and the value of art, are due chiefly to the facts 
 (l) that the word is used almost equally often as each part of 
 the Trinity ; (2) that art tends to refer to matters near the 
 normal limits, and there are no agreed-on measures of those 
 limits (or even any conventional recognition that the disputes 
 over art refer to such quantitative matters); and (3) that be- 
 cause art gives religious rebirths, the priests and the artists 
 are in competition so that exploiters in both classes have de- 
 liberately added to the confusion (there are many examples; 
 e. g., Mohammedan theologians forbid some arts). 
 
 d. But clearly there need be no disputes about the theory 
 of art. That theory is identical with the principles of morals 
 represented by Fig. 163b. But until fairly definite measures 
 are made in humanics there can be no reasonably definite 
 standard of judgment as to whether a given thing is artistic. 
 If art in the Many sense be taken as things in the narrow 
 zone of doubtfully pleasant, just below the painful or patho- 
 logical zone, then obviously there are only narrow limits of 
 tolerance within which things are art, and what is art for one 
 person may easily and often does lie entirely outside that zone 
 for another. Quantitative judgment as to the zone in which a 
 thing falls is called taste — and obviously there can be no in- 
 telligent disputing about taste until such time as we have 
 systematic human measurements. But by means of that theory 
 many prattlers about art may readily be shown to be persist- 
 ently self-contradictory and hence to have negligible taste. 
 
 e. We can readily make a thing quite true or consistent 
 with the universe (ultimately, it can not be otherwise), but 
 at the same time make it so abnormal — so far outside our 
 everyday balance — that we can stretch to it, vividly grasp its 
 actual consistency or have a rebirth from it, only if we make 
 a painful effort. It would be art to us if we grasped it. But 
 by ordinary standards it is not worth grasping, just as it is 
 scarcely worth while to strain to see the beauty in the late 
 Kaiser (§25c), (four purpose is to see beauty directly; if we 
 have a wider purpose, such as to solve the question of the 
 beauty of the whole universe, he is an excellent detail to 
 puzzle over and sharpen our wits on, as he is so confoundedly 
 ugly at first sight. A highbrow drama is an example of such 
 over-high art" that ordinarily is not art, but an offensive 
 abnormality. I can get various rebirths from Ibsen s plays 
 if I work hard enough ; but I have to supply from myself so 
 many of the relationships that the abnormal Ibsen omitted or 
 erroneously denied, that the result is not worth my work, 
 except occasionally as an intrinsically worthless rebus in the 
 puzzle column to sharpen my perceptions on. So by my 
 measurement Ibsen was a brain-sick man, and not an artist. 
 
 f. Because art generally implies exercise up to the pain- 
 ful limit (C or C', Fig. 163b), the average artist seems to 
 fancy that the more he stretches the better artist he is — that 
 he ought to be abnormally strained. He then has the ar- 
 tistic temperament" — and is wrong, as we saw in discussing 
 genius (§159f). Artistic stretches are usually consid- 
 ered to consist only of stretching Intellect... to see the One 
 — to be 'masculine.' But obviously, it is just as real art to 
 stretch the activity of the emotions; and truistically, by this 
 whole book, the highest art is a well balanced amount of both 
 (and of course it is impossible to separate the two — run either 
 to or °°). The masculine way is commonly called artistic 
 or literary idealism [a considerably different idealism from any 
 of the philosophical meanings], and tends to be general, ab- 
 stract, and impersonal. The second or feminine way is real- 
 ism, and tends to be definite, concrete, and personal. When 
 a man tries to be a thoroughgoing realist he obviously (to me 
 at least, and in theory — unless he happens to be too feminine) 
 makes an awkward, unconvincing mess of it — actually evolves 
 a rather disconnected list of things. (There is a modern ten- 
 dency for realism to mean any kind of obscenity — a dualistic 
 disconnection of any things from their fitting place and use; 
 — that is the pathological exaggeration of things, especially 
 obnoxious in the hands of the females who do it, as they can 
 
 go further.) Although it is explicitly considered by 
 
 usual conventions that art should primarily be intellectual, 
 the good artists instinctively make the balance of intellect 
 and emotion. Then the second raters try to copy that, and 
 exaggerate, the men overdoing being realists, and women 
 vice versa (e. g., Mrs. Atherton's books); or, the second 
 
§171f XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 raters do not know enough even to try to balance themselves 
 and so exaggerate their own sex properties (e. g. , Wilson s 
 obscenely autocratic exaggeration of ideals in his New Free- 
 dom," the very name of which implies that he alone knows 
 about that ancient idea). Henry James is a good example 
 of a "realist" — giving thousands of rather useless details, 
 making us work hard to coordinate or unify them. And that 
 is not realistic art at all, but masculine intellectual gymast- 
 ics, which is usually as damaging as having to go out and 
 aimlessly walk ten miles for "exercise"; some people do it, 
 of course, and say it is fine — thereby furnishing considerable 
 evidence that they have not much of importance and real in- 
 terest to do. In consistency with that principle I have sev- 
 eral times told the reader that he need not burden his memory 
 with the details in this book — that they are not art, not par- 
 ticularly fitting and useful, for anybody but the specialist 
 whose business and interest it is to work with them. So that 
 realism of the highbrow or Henry James and Walt Whitman 
 type is not art, but a conscious straining after art that is over- 
 done. (Incidentally, Whitman seems to me to be as large and 
 gorgeous a bluffer as Paul, and not a democrat but a hobo 
 aristocrat; I tend to become intemperate when I point out 
 Whitman's painful abnormalities, as only thus can they be 
 fittingly described: so I omit statement of the evidence). 
 
 Extremely good examples of balanced art I think are 
 
 Dorothy Canfield Fisher's 'Understood Betsy," which at 
 first glance seems to be idealism so simple is its realism, al- 
 though it probably inclines toward realism, and Gerald Stan- 
 ley Lee's Crowds," which at first seems realism so fully 
 does it show in vivid detail just what the great human gen- 
 erality or ideal, democracy, is. The artistic equation clearly 
 is Realism... ~X Idealism. ..= Art, or Aesthetics; and if a piece 
 of art is sufficiently great it has both the factors smoothly 
 joined, like the universe, and conceals its art by giving us a 
 grasp of the infinite regress without making us work too hard. 
 Such first class art is thus so simple and commonplace in its 
 details that those familiar things catch the observer or reader 
 or hearer of the art, and push him out to grasp the rest of 
 the universe. Thus all good art is an obvious and readily 
 graspable solution of the One and Many. A good picture 
 makes us understand and be God by suggesting the unbreak- 
 able relationship of the universe. And a good machine does 
 precisely the same thing. Obviously, for both factors of 
 that general artistic equation the formula Style.. . X Substance... 
 (§166q) holds, and we need some training in Style..., logic, 
 method, form, tricks of the trade, or whatever we call it, 
 before we can fully appreciate art. And the volumes needed 
 to expand that science are omitted at this point. 
 
 g. Truistically, when a man or a people becomes boast- 
 fully and ostentatiously artistic it is a symptom of either 
 degeneracy or crude ignorance. The commonplaces of life 
 are beautiful or artistic, and the normal man needs very little 
 of what is technically art. Too much art is precisely the same 
 as too much food, and leads to the same degeneration that 
 too much prosperity of any sort does. The person who con- 
 sumes' much art, and claims he appreciates it either has pro- 
 digious assimilative capacity or is a hypocrite (§155) — usually 
 the latter; which agrees with the well known facts as to the 
 intemperance of dull and sodden aristocrats in art. 
 
 h. Culture or civilization or progress is obviously a sum- 
 ming up of all art, considering art chiefly from the spiritual 
 aspect, or taking it to be relationship. So clearly culture is 
 a continuous growth of all things (usually considered from 
 the ethical point of view), which growth must, in a fairly 
 steady climate, take place as the result of stretching a little 
 more in our cycles, but no more than can be happily endured 
 by the majority. A person who has become cultured" (who, 
 
 e. g. , is finished" in a finishing 
 the possessor of real culture. 
 
 230 
 
 school) is obviously not 
 Because culture is such 
 
 an inclusive word, naming the change in all our personalities 
 and rather explicitly in some of the environment, it is clear 
 that it is not very precise to say that one person differs from 
 another in culture. Such words as culture and civilisation may 
 be called exaggerating words, or spread-eagling words. They 
 are so inclusive that even as Many terms they tend to mean 
 too much, and to elude the grasp of the strongest mind; so 
 it is more sensible to leave them to demagogs, aristocrats — 
 vague-thinking persons who are fond of large words. The 
 man who claims that he is highly cultured or civilized (or, 
 what amounts to the same thing, that he is a member in full 
 standing of a highly cultured nation) is truistically claiming 
 that he is in a great number of things quantitatively much 
 superior to others. Nearly all of us are superior in some 
 things to other persons : I can wash my own face much more 
 satisfactorily to myself than can any other person. But a 
 sweeping claim to superiority is usually grossly inaccurate; 
 and unless accompanied by some definite evidence of its cor- 
 rectness is properly held to indicate egotism — a mild form of 
 insanity in which one's self is over-estimated. 
 
 i. The pre-war Germans summed up their dualistic, 
 materialistic errors in their Kultur, claiming a high superior- 
 ity for it, and congratulating themselves on possessing it. 
 They considered it substantially finished, and that it was 
 their duty to impose it on others — which is the usual theo- 
 logical missionary spirit (see remarks on butters-in, §167j). 
 
 j. And finally we see that art and culture, like religion, 
 tend to become ritualistic — and then of course cease be- 
 ing anything more than a comfortable, resting play or less 
 intense imitation of the real, vigorous thing. When Homer 
 made the Iliad" the most vigorous minds of that day were 
 stretched and trained by it in a fine balance for that age : it 
 made them grasp the universe or God in a fashion, starting 
 with what they were familiar with — it was the current relig- 
 ion. But nowadays the Iliad is so narrow that it scarcely 
 stretches the perceptions of a child. And its former familiar or 
 simple realisms are no longer full of implication-ghosts and 
 so truistically do not serve as good starting points from which 
 to grasp anything; and the poem s argument is very much 
 out of balance when compared with our everyday morality — 
 with our more delicately balanced standards. So truistically 
 the Iliad is not real art now; as a fact, it bores me, as it 
 does others I have questioned. But because it formerly was 
 the highest art (I readily see the now practically dead reas- 
 ons why it was), many people have been made familiar with 
 it and now do use it as a ritual art thing, and get some pleas- 
 ure out of it, and possibly even very mild rebirths. In pre- 
 cisely the same way people get even more than that out of a 
 treasured lock of somebody's hair, etc. That hair is not art 
 now (in its day and place it was better art than any man- 
 made technical art"). To most other people the more or 
 less dead hair is a little offensive — "trash," from their per- 
 sonal point of view. So, to me from points of view other 
 than the historical and of sympathy with the people who act- 
 ually like it as a ritual, the "Iliad" is trash. About three- 
 fourths of the Bible is similarly trash to me — some of it quite 
 offensive. And to me many of the "Old Masters" and other 
 antiques are atrocious trash from the point of view of art. I 
 see no great objection to those things being used as art ritu- 
 als by those who wish. But reasonably sensible people are 
 well aware that numbers of those who praise the Bible, those 
 old masters, etc., are merely hypocrites. But in spite of the 
 danger an honest person thus runs of being classed with the 
 hypocrites, there is an advantage in using the old art first 
 to develop on, "cut one's teeth on" (provided we omit the 
 
231 
 
 UNIVKRSE 
 
 Three XVIII §lTlm 
 
 immoral ones such as "jack the Giant Killer" and much of 
 the Bible). For the old ones that still remain decently bal- 
 anced by our standards have had enough merit to survive the 
 judgment of many men; and modern works are cluttered 
 up with pathological puzzles such as Ibsen and Whitman. 
 
 What actually happens is that the good of a great work 
 
 becomes assimilated into our body of knowledge (becomes a 
 part of our physical" bodies, in fact), and the unsuitable 
 parts die — change into something else. No work of art in a 
 Many sense can survive in a perceptibly distinct form (§152f). 
 So the moral man will take his art temperately:- using what 
 is good both of the old and of the new — avoiding spending 
 too much time on playing with easy ritualistic art, and avoid- 
 ing the unbalanced "Art" which, like the poor aristocrats, 
 we have always with us — that "Art" being in fact the prod- 
 uct and pet of such aristocrats. And truistically ethics, or 
 what is quantitatively right and wrong, changes with time, 
 just as does art. We have to be similarly temperate as to 
 ethics, or its sum :- culture. 
 
 k. It therefore follows, as the sum of this chapter, that 
 the majority, which rules in any sort of democracy (and act- 
 ually rules throughout the universe, as a principle; and 
 perceptibly rules among the people of this earth if they be 
 considered over a long time — even though their governments 
 be called autocracies, etc. ; XIX) — that the majority is always 
 
 right FOR THE GIVEN TIME AND PLACE IN WHICH IT EXISTS. That 
 
 is obviously a mere truism. We may apply it with reference 
 to this book, and thus see its evident truth, and the use of 
 
 the principle. This book is mostly a brief formulation 
 
 of what the vast majority of people have worked out in the 
 past and handed on to us, and which we tacitly believe and 
 act on — act upon so nearly completely, in fact, that in some 
 cases we have forgotten how to express it. So the book sub- 
 stantially accepts majority views as being right in most cases; 
 I personally rest in secure and serene contentment upon the 
 fact that our ancestors saw things as I do. ( Communion of 
 saints" is the queer theological phrase naming that serenity 
 coming from the conservative way in which we act; the 
 phrase implies that the majority, as thus symbolized by the 
 previously accepted good observers, rules; and the phrase is 
 grateful to us because it delicately implies that we too are 
 equal to those great men — as in fact we are, when we thus ac- 
 cept and use their teachings.) In short, I substantially agree 
 with the vast majority of the dead and the living: that tru- 
 istically is equivalent to saying that I love them and love my- 
 self. But, after getting on that sound foundation with most 
 other people, in some rather negligible ways (say to the effect 
 that the earth is cold inside) I stretch a trifle further than 
 others do, and get a few lesser conclusions that are in the 
 minority. Now, I have deliberately endeavored to keep on 
 that majority base while I stretched, and thus to have per- 
 ceptibly connected those slight minority conclusions with the 
 majority ones. (The aristocrats, especially the tribe of fa- 
 natic Artists, try to jump up off that base, and stay up and 
 be "superior.") I may be right in those slight minority con- 
 clusions; I of course think I am. But, those conclusions are 
 not yet right for the race. They may be actually wrong: 
 what I took to be consistency with the sound majority base 
 may be a defect in my brain — for I often make mistakes. 
 And even if those few minority conclusions are correct, as a 
 glaring truism they can not be used by the majority until the 
 majority at least see that they are true. So they are not 
 right in a practical or Many sense for the majority until they 
 can stretch up to them and make them a part of their conclu- 
 sions. Although I may be quite right from a broader L,^ and 
 especially T, point of view, I most assuredly am 'wrong" for 
 the majority here and now until they can at least see that I 
 
 am right : for as a truism (to repeat it again, as many people 
 do not see it), the majority can not usefully, safely, or mor- 
 ally know or apply my minority conclusions when they do not 
 know them. (So truistically all views that it is possible to 
 rule by fiat, by passing a law," are obviously merely silly.) 
 I would be right in a minority conclusion in the long run if the 
 conclusion is right; for then others would have time to hear 
 of it, discuss it, verify it, and acquire skill applying it, and it 
 would then, after a time, be a majority conclusion (even if / 
 didn t formulate it, the universe would shortly pound it thus 
 
 into people via somebody else). In short, education 
 
 has to come in as a relationship between me as a minority in- 
 dividual in regard to some minor views of mine (and every- 
 body is in some respects similarly in the minority), and the 
 majority, before any improvement in precision of balance, or 
 advance, will work. And then, the majority move ahead 
 together. The majority... {^-Education— $)The individual or 
 minor ity...= Democracy, or a Republic. 
 
 1. So I as an individual may be emphatic in this book at 
 times — be individualistic ' — in stating my occasional slight 
 minority conclusion. But I obviously am not fighting' the 
 majority, or considering them wrong"; nor do I feel any 
 resentment if they do not instantly agree with me. In fact, 
 it literally would be deadly dull for the majority and for me 
 if we did agree completely : I enjoy the reaction or formal 
 opposition in the mere quantitative matters in which we vary, 
 and I am not in the least polemical, or impatient, or try- 
 ing to impose Kultur on anybody. So from a broad basic 
 view, I am not particularly disturbed if you have not got 
 sense enough to see that I am right; I will even take your 
 point of view occasionally and agree that it is perhaps I who 
 
 lack the sense. And that shows how it is that only 
 
 in a democracy can there be rather intense individualism: it 
 is not a paradox, but simply the circularity of the demo- 
 cratic equation in valid logic. The majority is always 
 
 right at the time. And truistically the majority judgment is 
 always wrong when a considerable period of time is included, 
 as things change. And of course a minority of one theoreti- 
 cally always perceives first such change as in fact exists. But 
 usually the minority of one who thinks he perceives a change 
 is mistaken — or even if he isn t, noisily exaggerates the size 
 of the change. So you must ask minorities for clear proof. 
 m. And the majority is credited with hitting a head that 
 sticks or stretches up above the crowd. As a practical work- 
 ing rule in the past, it was advisable. Possibly we may now 
 safely make a distinction. I admittedly stretch up above the 
 crowd to or in a few little minority conclusions (some will say 
 the admission exaggerates the facts: I am consciously exag- 
 gerating here for verbal clearness). But with just as much 
 emphasis as that with which I stick my head up, I keep my 
 feet on the base, and promptly pull my head down and ask 
 the majority to stick their heads up and verify what I saw, 
 assuring them that the view is pleasing and that nothing there 
 will hurt a moderately vigorous person (of course some timid 
 stick-in-the-muds will call me a liar, as R. S. Woodward in 
 clear effect did for several months ; and numbers of rubber- 
 stamps will say to get somebody else to do it first, as in effect 
 Stewart Paton, W. W. Campbell, etc., did tell me). It is a 
 reciprocal game — the democratic game. To change the fig- 
 ure:- you hold me up to see, and I tell you where to look, 
 and hold you up to see. You held me up first, unconsciously 
 to yourself, and now I have simply come down and offered to 
 hold you. As I said, that democratic game may be a safe 
 game to play now, but I have indicated some men who in 
 effect didn't think so. All the aristocrats, bosses, authori- 
 ties," demagogs, have pretended to jump up off the com- 
 mon" earth, and stay up, above the herd" or majority, 
 
§171m XVIII Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 232 
 
 "superior" to them; or else those pluralists had a trifle more 
 sense and recognized that the "herd" was holding them up, 
 and asserted that they were privileged or divinely appointed to 
 be held up all the time — that it was essential that they be, — 
 whereas it obviously was merely quantitative. So the major- 
 ity cracked their heads as a practical solution. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. Sociology and economics. 
 
 §172. a. The theory or principles of democracy (§§167- 
 170) is the theory of sociology :- simply that all society, re- 
 gardless of how it is considered divided into parts, reacts as 
 our general machine That. . .X This... . As noticed, the only 
 difference between ethics and sociology is the quantitative 
 one that sociology includes the consideration of as many peo- 
 ple as we care to mention, distributed over as wide L and T 
 as we like; whereas ethics is tacitly taken to be more re- 
 stricted, and hence tends to be confined largely to our own 
 selves. Truistically, it is not essential that ethics and sociolo- 
 gy consider only persons, and in practice they do not strictly 
 do so, but confine themselves mostly to persons, thus being 
 an extension or application of psychology. When those 
 sciences are explicitly quantitatively extended to include some 
 of the environment, often under the technical name wealth 
 (including money, property, etc.), they are called economics. 
 
 b. We have seen (chiefly in §1 68b) that ethics, sociology, 
 and economics may be represented by suitably selecting 
 names out of this extended equation :- That, or Neighbor, 
 Spouse, Others, Environment, Climate, Employers, Capital, or 
 Supply... 'X.This, or Ourself, Certain given men, Employes, La- 
 bor, or Demand. . . =Meaning, Happiness, God, Real Life, Co- 
 operation, Democracy, Society, Industry, Commerce. And for 
 the X or relationship sign we may substitute these relation- 
 ship names in various conventional ways :- activity [or 
 (^—Activity—}); see §168b], action-reaction, cause-effect, 
 love, payment or labor-wages, or payment in any material or 
 spiritual way, loyalty, education, etc. 
 
 c. So I necessarily gave the principles of sociology and 
 economics in the last chapter, in giving ethics. The quantita- 
 tive, Many application of them, if it were given in enough 
 detail to include rather useful everyday facts, would extend 
 to volumes, and must be omitted at this point. And I must 
 omit reference to important facts about existing foreign gov- 
 ernments, etc. 172c So I shall merely show in principle and 
 
 1,2c The explicit reason fordoing so is that I am a retired lieuten- 
 ant in the Navy, and Federal law limits my speech in certain matters 
 (see "Navy Regulations, 1920," issued in accordance with Sec. 154.7 
 of Rev. Statutes of U. S., by the last administration, Arts. 113, 100, 
 etc.). The last manuscript version of this book was written under 
 that Wilson gag law, which was in keeping with his make-believe 
 "pitiless publicity," and I had to make some queer looking omissions 
 in order to conform to the law. But the new administration substan- 
 tially abolished that gag law in a general order, June 14, '21. The 
 only restrictions I can find in the law now that affect this book is 
 that I am not permitted to comment on ourforeign policy (I couldn't 
 have done so anyway, as nobody has confided it to me; but I have 
 refrained from guessing what it may be); that I am not permitted to 
 comment on foreign governments; and that I am forbidden to praise 
 or censure other persons in the Navy. I had no desire to censure any- 
 body in the Navy at present (Wilson, the late commander-in-chief, 
 is no longer in the Navy); so the law has cut out some specfiic 
 praise. I have had to dodge mentioning foreign governments: 
 nothing in this book is intended to refer to any existing foreign na- 
 tion or government, except insofar as such is merely remotely and 
 unspecifically implied as a naturally inseparable part of the uni- 
 verse. That of course makes odd blanks. And there are traces in 
 the book, which I haven't succeeded in revising out, of obedience to 
 the Wilson gag. I once wrote a version which declined to obey the 
 Wilson gag as unconstitutional. But it later seemed better taste to 
 obey it (i. e., all American citizens were responsible for the law, and 
 
 scientifically that the Constitution of the Uuited States is a 
 general valid statement of democracy, and is substantially in 
 agreement with natural law, and then make a few general 
 further applications of sociology and economics. 
 
 §173. a. The total Constitution is an explicit assertion 
 of a That...XThis... Many machine, or democracy — as we 
 now begin to see. The preamble repeats in six conventional 
 ways that the total purpose is to establish explicitly a relation- 
 ship, or love, or a mutually reacting machine. I. e., the 
 preamble explicitly names the X sign as being six conven- 
 tional names (all of which are implied to be identical [§28h] 
 by the first):- (l) The preamble names the X sign as being 
 "more perfect union"; the body of the Constitution gives 
 the conventional names of the That... sand This... s, and 
 the preamble primarily asserts:- That... (<— Forming un- 
 ion— >) This... = Union, or United States. The preamble thus, 
 by the use of the phrase "more perfect" troubles grammar- 
 ians, but soundly implies the infinite regress. The Declaration 
 of Independence with bombast and cock-sureness ignores that 
 
 infinite regress. (2) Then the preamble states that 
 
 the Constitution is to establish justice. That is the legal or 
 juridical term for balance or temperance between all That s 
 and Tkis's; justice means reciprocal love or payment :- That... 
 
 (<— Justice, or Payment, etc.— >) This... . (3) The next 
 
 synonym for the universal relationship which gives democracy 
 is "domestic tranquillity." That, even more explicitly than 
 
 justice," asserts that no painful departure from the balance 
 is desired — that no fanatical, radical, pathological activities 
 or persons of that sort are desired. That is a purpose clearly 
 in full consistency with the ethical principles that oppose all 
 
 aristocracy or excess. (4) Then the Constitution is 
 
 to provide for the common defense. That obviously recog- 
 nizes the possibility that other nations may (unlawfully, in » 
 
 natural" sense; i. e. , in some degree insanely) try to de- 
 part from a natural, mutually self-preserving balance with 
 this nation, and hence in a dualistic, wrong fashion, aggress. 
 (A formal, legal, logical establishment of the correctness of 
 this part of the Constitution is omitted here; footnote 172c). 
 Then, if there is such aggression, the language clearly pro- 
 vides that this nation may defend itself. We saw (§164d) 
 that that is fundamentally moral, or in agreement with nat- 
 ural law. But the Constitution does not in any place provide for 
 aggressive war; therefore, as aggressive war is national aris- 
 tocracy or insanity in some degree, it is unconstitutional to 
 declare any but a defensive war — which truistically is a war 
 against an aristocratic nation which perceptibly attacks us 
 first. The next paragraph is a parenthetical one which con- 
 siders that, and its implications (which are of importance). 
 
 (5) Next, the preamble purposes to "promote the 
 
 general welfare." That is an assertion that the people in 
 general are to "progress," or to become more and more civi- 
 lized. It obviously explicitly asserts as a purpose of the Con- 
 stitution all the remaining natural ethical laws stated in the 
 
 last chapter. (6) Finally, it purposes to "secure the 
 
 blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." That is 
 a sort of One summation of all the other purposes, as liberty 
 
 or freedom is usually a monistic term (§169). So it 
 
 follows that the Constitution (if its body adheres to the prin- 
 ciples laid down in the preamble — as we shall see it does) is 
 
 I could scarcely be courteous to the reader and flatly decline to obey 
 his wishes, as expressed by his legal representatives; so in the later 
 version I made that null-law ridiculous by temperately obeying it). 
 The present law seems to me sound— but if I were to say it is needed 
 I would unfortunately imply that there were foreign governments so 
 aristocratic as to be unbalancedly touchy (§169h), even to the re- 
 marks of an insignificant individual like me: so I refrain from even 
 the non-particularized remote implication that such a government or 
 people may now exist. 
 
233 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XVIII §173b 
 
 with extraordinary completeness and explicitness based upon 
 and in agreement with natural law. I know of no other ex- 
 plicitly stated legal law which has such completeness and 
 definiteness of statement. In fact, as shown in the next para- 
 graph, the Constitution is naturally valid law which not even 
 yet, after over 180 years, is followed in its principles by law- 
 yers in their pseudo science of the law, which adheres to 
 the classic logic and dualism and is wrong. 
 
 b. A positive legal or statute or lawyers law is, accord- 
 ing to the lawyers ( Ency. Brit.," Art. Jurisprudence"), 
 a command or order' set by a sovereign [or superior] person, 
 or sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the 
 independent political society wherein that person or body is 
 sovereign or superior." All rules or natural laws or princi- 
 ples which are set and followed by men living in a state of 
 nature [i. e., without a ' sovereign"], or which are set by 
 "equal sovereigns" [i. e.,all international law], and all those 
 rules in a state with such a superior but which rules are not 
 explicitly ordered by the superior, are themselves not laws in 
 that lawyers' sense, but are or accompany anarchy (ibid., p. 
 572). So truistically, orthodoxly the lawyer's law, and his 
 so-called science of the law, is logically a step by step, prem- 
 ise on premise, affair that proceeds in only one direction — is 
 classic, dualistic logic in legal terms, — that can not consider 
 or formally admit mutual interaction, or any real science of 
 action and reaction, or any democracy, or be finally circular 
 and actually provable like valid logic. The lawyers law 
 requires a superior, an aristocrat, and denies that a state of 
 natural interaction or democracy or That... KThis... can be 
 law, but explicitly asserts that it is anarchy, or an absence of 
 
 positive lawyers' law. It therefore is obvious by this 
 
 whole book that that strict theory of lawyers' law is wrong; 
 that it is flatly contrary to the Constitution and to all true 
 rights and morals ; and is unconstitutional for this country. So 
 truistically a lawyer by his legal theory is incapable of correctly 
 interpreting the Constitution, and in general is not competent 
 to interpret any law validly. For, in keeping with that legal 
 theory, strict lawyers must hold that if there is a doubt as to 
 what a law (or also the juridical acceptation of a custom or 
 practice— a "common law") means in a given case, the 
 doubtmust be settled (l) by a careful and strict investigation 
 and interpretation of the wording of the law; and failing that 
 solution the doubt must be settled (2) by interpreting the 
 law as having the intended meaning of its promulgators, as 
 historically given. In short, strict lawyers recognize only 
 the superior sovereign, and attach infallibility to his (their) 
 word or presumptive word. But it is obvious by this whole 
 book that such logical or juridical infallibility is impossible : 
 no word can be given an exact meaning, and all meanings of 
 words change with time, and there is no possibility of histori- 
 cally determining exactly any intended meaning (in fact, 
 frequently the sovereign, instead of being superior, was ignor- 
 antly unaware of what he did mean). So the only rational 
 way to resolve a doubt as to the meaning of a law in a given 
 case where there is self-contradiction or omission, is to make 
 its meaning "balance," or agree with natural law, in as close 
 agreement as possible with the wording of the lawyers law 
 (the judge should not be permitted to depart further than 
 that from the code, as such further departure constitutes that 
 pernicious juridical legislation for which the orthodox pseudo 
 theory, while exaggeratedly claiming the opposite, actually 
 serves as a cloak or make-believe; see footnote h :— and a 
 practical suggestion is obvious:- that the judge be required to 
 report clearly the omission or self-contradiction to the legis- 
 lature—that giving a method by which the judge and legis- 
 lator can democratically work together if they have enough 
 intelligence, instead of often conflicting). I. e., interpret the 
 
 defective law reasonably," and thus eliminate any impossible 
 and confusing hope of the infallibility of a non-reacting or 
 non-democratic sovereign." Obviousty no other practical 
 method of applying the law is actually possible. In legal 
 practice that law of reason" actually is followed, as the un- 
 escapable laws of nature force at least its unconscious accept- 
 ance. Our investigation hence sums up into the simple rule 
 that it should be followed consciously and so with less bung- 
 
 ling and pettifogging. 
 
 So by natural law or morality or 
 
 eommonsense (and also by the plain statements of the Consti- 
 tution itself), the sum total of the Constitution provides for a 
 healthy, natural democracy, and implies that it is unconstitu- 
 tional to declare an aggressive war: and Amend. X, which 
 
 173b All that, as explicitly stated, gives the strictly orthodox legal 
 theory of jurisprudence. It hinges on the conception of sovereignty, 
 as seen. But that theory of law has been combated by the real 
 leaders in the law since prehistoric times (see Maine's "The Ancient 
 Law"). The article "Jurisprudence" from which I quoted the ortho- 
 dox theory acknowledges that legal struggle between explicit classic 
 logic and what is in effect our valid logic — between aristocracy and 
 democracy. Our Constitution, as we shall see in more detail, rejects 
 the orthodox classic theory of law. But Marshall, as an early chief 
 justice of our Supreme court, in some degree forced the aristocratic 
 pseudo theory upon lawyers (see footnote h, which also shows how 
 he was wrong and in disagreement with the Constitution). So it is 
 probably the quantitative fact that most lawyers in this country 
 weakly follow the arrogant and physiologically forceful but legally 
 and intellectually stupid Marshall, and accept that wrong legal theo- 
 ry. Of course, the able leaders in law have been in effect steadily 
 combating Marshall's autocratic stupidities (Lincoln is quoted to 
 that effect in footnote h) . But until a rigorous solution of the One 
 and Many was available the battle was indecisive: now there isn't 
 any battle, and I shall merely read the burial service for Marshall 
 
 and his quibbling bullies. In practice, lawyers for ages have 
 
 to a very large extent openly followed our valid theory of law, and 
 our lawyers to a considerable extent practically accept and apply the 
 Constitution. We proceed to see the historical facts in proof. Sir 
 Henry Maine is a reliable authority on such facts, his "Ancient 
 Law" from which I shall quote being accepted by most lawyers 
 (some of course being too stupid to see what he was talking about). 
 Maine tried to enunciate the principle of "reason," or valid logic, or 
 of our constitutional cooperating-sovereignty, as being the theory of 
 law, and did make considerable success of the attempt; but as we 
 just implicitly saw, the "Ency. Brit," holds that technically he 
 failed. But our leaders in law in effect accept Maine's valid theory. 
 
 Maine shows that what is technically called "equity" [etymo- 
 
 logically that part of the law which deals with actual justice, the re- 
 maining part, or "law," consisting of mere classic logical quibblings] 
 began to be formulated in earliest history on the laws of nature, or 
 justice, or eommonsense valid logic, as a relief from the obvious in- 
 justices, delays, and stupidities of the classic logic law, which were 
 far worse then than now. Maine (ibid., Chap. II) defines equity (in 
 part) as having its authority grounded, not on any lawyer's "sover- 
 eign," but on the nature of the principles to which it is alleged that 
 all law ought to conform [i. e., it ought to be sensible, 'balanced']. 
 It has a higher sacredness [legal sanction] than that of ordinary law. 
 Maine says (III):- "The progress of the Romans in legal improve- 
 ments was astonishingly rapid as soon as the stimulus was applied to 
 
 it by the theory of Natural Law." Thus it appears that I am 
 
 saying nothing new, but am showing the valid theory of the law that 
 lawyers themselves largely practice and tacitly accept. Of course, 
 as a truism, if there hadn't been mostly truth and validity in what 
 lawyers actually did, in contradiction to their mere talk, long ago 
 there would have ceased to be any lawyers. So in spite of the em- 
 phatic clearness with which I state the sound theory of the law in 
 this section, I am not radical—am not trying to "reform" law. I 
 merely suggest that in practice it would help them to stop wasting- 
 time and effort if lawyers would preach what they frequently pract- 
 ice — if they would consciously (intellectually; in theory) accept the 
 Constitution : because natural law will make them in effect accept it 
 anyway. Such acceptance would make jurisprudence actually a 
 science, so that a man could then safely engage in the study of law 
 without danger of debauching his intellect — debauching it so thor- 
 oughly that, according to the legal authorities quoted (§163g), it 
 often debauches his morals (which include emotions). Such valid 
 jurisprudence, except for the mere suggestions of this section, must 
 be omitted from this book; but a number of legal leaders have the 
 competence to formulate that science:- e.g., Taft, Hughes, Pepper. 
 
§lT3b XIX Three 
 
 reserves to the people powers not delegated to the govern- 
 ment, explicitly makes it legally unconstitutional for anybody 
 but the people to declare an aggressive war. The first im- 
 portant need for that consistent interpretation of the Con- 
 stitution is :- to announce to everybody that as a nation we 
 will be democratic, and not aristocratic and predatory (the 
 advantages of which are implied below), and definitely and 
 explicitly to make our armament a police force (which solves 
 rigorously the fundamental question in the problem of dis- 
 armament, the remainder of that problem obviously being a 
 never-ending quantitative one; §176ef). — - The second 
 
 and last important need for such a consistent interpretation is 
 fundamentally the same as the first:- the destruction of the 
 aristocratic, dualistie delusion that there can be a superior, 
 capricious sovereign. This consistent interpretation is a gen- 
 eral concrete destruction of the conventional theory of uncon- 
 stitutional lawyers' law, showing constructively that the 
 constitutional or legally sound theory of law, as well as the 
 naturally sound theory, is that the people themselves spoke 
 and speak the law to themselves. Specifically, that constitu- 
 tional point of vieta obviously abolishes all orthodox legal sanc- 
 tions, or "evils" (ibid., 576) that in orthodox law follow on 
 the refusal of an inferior to [essentially] obey the superior. 
 Those sanctions are truistically a tertium quid or a logical 
 link (§§23-4) invented (in a really impossible way) out of 
 nothing, to make an otherwise glaringly unworkable theory 
 of law seem to weakly-seeing people to work. Of course 
 those sanctions could make an infinite pluralism that is form- 
 ally valid (Part One); but the actual practice of the lawyers 
 is that it is assumed to begin with (and it is a libel against 
 the race — and reacts somewhat on the lawyers themselves, 
 making them into what they say others are, §163g), that 
 humans do not want to obey the laws and have to be forced 
 to do so, and have evils or sanctions threatened them. Sanc- 
 tions are the lawyers' holy things or idols, like the theolo- 
 gians' dualistie God (see also par. c). So sanctions" 
 
 give a negative, repulsion way of founding law. The nega- 
 tive way is the best first way (Index, Negative"), and is 
 quantitatively useful with barbarians and present defectives : 
 Moses used the negative way, and most lawyers have not 
 been able to improve on Moses. The Constitution does. 
 
 c. The Constitution having thus effected in an extraor- 
 dinarily able way which is perhaps but slightly appreciated, 
 a complete and valid reversal of orthodox lawyers' law in its 
 preamble — having made in it a succinct statement of valid 
 natural law, — the preamble was followed by the body of the 
 Constitution, in which the various reactions or reacting parts 
 are definitely named. As that was a Many or quantitative 
 procedure obviously it can never be exactly perfect. And 
 that practical existence of the infinite regress, or of the fact 
 that there can be no exact science, was provided for in three 
 explicit ways (which indicates the framers' practical recogni- 
 tion of the importance of the principle):- (l) Art. V al- 
 lows amendments. (2) Amend. I provides free speech, 
 and specifically freedom to assemble peaceably and criticize 
 the government and talk back to it. That obviously means 
 that nobody in the democratic nation was to be assumed to 
 be infallible, or essentially superior, even officially, or to be 
 so superiorly wise that he could safely do without interaction 
 with his fellows. It also means that the founders of our na- 
 tion were not afraid of adverse criticism — that they were suf- 
 ficiently men to have the courage to take it, however much 
 they humanly disliked it — were sufficiently past the infantile 
 stage of mind growth to be aware that they sometimes made 
 mistakes and could be helped by criticism, and were strong 
 enough themselves to tolerate tranquilly the intemperate 
 speech of the few inevitable unfortunate defectives — in short, 
 
 UNIVERSE 234 
 
 were cognizant of the advantages of free speech and strong 
 enough to pay the price for them. (3) The Constitution 
 
 chiefly is concerned in specifying the acts permitted to the 
 government, in the formula People... X Government..., Govern- 
 ment... (or more precisely Government officials... : government 
 of course constitutionally includes people ; but I verbally gen- 
 erally use that conventional abbreviation) — Government... be- 
 ing the intensive factor and truistically most emphatically 
 and explicitly talked of. But Amend. IX ("the enumeration 
 in the Constitution of certain rights [of the people] shall not 
 be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo- 
 ple") explicitly provides for that customary and necessary 
 verbal vagueness, and allows the regress in People... . We 
 saw in the second sentence in par. b that lawyers assert that 
 such natural rights or ordinary laws of nature are not laws in 
 a legal sense, but are anarchy. The Constitution here con- 
 tradicts (or legally abolishes, if that face-saving phrase is pre- 
 ferred) that barbarous legal pseudo principle. So if this 
 Amendment means anything that is recognizably consistent 
 with the ordinary meaning of the words it uses, it means that 
 the rule of reason is to be used, and that the orthodox legal 
 "procedure," stinking of sanctions, is interdicted. 
 
 d. The remainder of the Constitution names the various 
 practical This's and That's which must be definitely put to- 
 gether as a machine in order to achieve the Constitution s 
 general purpose of obtaining a democracy, or general That... 
 XThis... . The Constitution merely keeps on at that process 
 until it becomes reasonably certain (for the time being, at 
 least) that no clever exploiter or legal grafter, or other species 
 of defective, can find a verbal or "legally" uninterdicted op- 
 portunity to run some That or This far out of balance (with- 
 out check other than the natural limit). But as direct 
 
 evidence that it is not practically possible to rule by fiat, we 
 just saw that the sweeping interdiction or law" enunciated 
 by Amend. IX against the pseudo legal theory and procedure 
 has not yet worked, after over 130 years, because the major- 
 ity of the people have not insisted that it be definitely com- 
 plied with. So there is no magic in the Constitution, even 
 though it is an extraordinarily valid statement of democracy, 
 to make it work unless people want it to and themselves do it. 
 
 But the Constitution as at first written and amended 
 
 seriously failed to be sufficiently explicit in providing such a 
 balance, in that it did not definitely assert that there could 
 be no (legally) fixed classes, such as superior' owners and 
 their slaves. That defect, in view of the fact that some slave 
 owners insisted on being essentially aristocratic, inevitably 
 brought on the Civil war, as such fixed class distinction was 
 not only naturally immoral, but was in direct violation of the 
 stated democracy or varying That... XThis. .. . That war 
 corrected the deficiency, which truistically would not have 
 caused war, but would merely have produced an agreed-upon 
 amendment when the point was called into question if the 
 rule of reason, and not the lawyers dualistie procedure, had 
 been followed. (Of course, numerous sorts of exploiters sup- 
 ported the lawyers in their short-sighted procedure [par. f] ; 
 they still do — as otherwise such silly verbal quibbling could 
 not last. Please do not understand me to fancy that lawyers 
 unsupported could maintain such a monstrous barbarism as 
 their unconstitutional theory of the law. Also, a lawyer 
 has to deal almost invariably with defectives who don't admit 
 defectiveness [with criminals who more or less can't, and with 
 litigants who are usually so angry as to have judgment so de- 
 fective as to want to fight, which strictly speaking makes 
 them oitl-laws or mildly insane by the Constitution]; so the 
 lawyer has an enormously difficult job to handle his clients 
 and not become like them, with a fighting or unconstitutional 
 procedure. A physician's patients admit defectiveness; yet 
 
235 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XIX §lT3f 
 
 he has trouble avoiding the acknowledged danger of becoming 
 
 like them. The dyer's hand, etc.) Similarly, the 
 
 Constitution does not now with complete explicitness assert a 
 perfect balancing; it is impossible that it do so in a finite 
 time, as such would require the complete assertion of the in- 
 finite regress. Several possibilities of further explicit balanc- 
 ing by further amendments are sometimes suggested:- e. g., 
 one allowing Federal divorce laws; and one definitely for- 
 bidding willing of wealth unearned by the legatee, as such 
 bequests arbitrarily disturb the natural balance, and also fail 
 glaringly to give people equal natural opportunities. But, 
 truistically, jfwe follow the rule of reason, and the Constitu- 
 tion's own explicit general enactment of such a balance, we 
 can never have another civil war. (And personally, I think 
 we would better add amendments very sparingly ; if we 
 haven't got sense enough to get along by legislating under a 
 reasonably steady basic law requiring us to keep balanced, 
 we aren't likely to acquire sense in the process of making a 
 
 jellyfish of it.) But, e. g., at any time that the lawyers 
 
 and their exploiting supporters undertake to uphold persist- 
 ently (cf. §169d) the orthodox, unconstitutional legal theory 
 of law, we truistically sooner or later shall inevitably come 
 into another civil war. The Constitution as a statement of law 
 is valid and natural law (the best rules and instructions yet 
 made, for the biggest game ever played, and of interest to 
 those who can understand them — we are all in the game); 
 but even that soundness cannot of itself mend deficiencies in 
 men's nerves or souls. Our own dynamic daily majority use 
 of the principle of the Constitution makes it work, and keeps 
 us out of civil war and lesser troubles. 
 
 e. We need not here notice all the That s and This s 
 balanced by the Constitution. I shall state the chief balances 
 as being enough to give the general principles of its practical 
 
 workings. The chief balance is in providing for the 
 
 election of the important government officials more or less 
 directly by the people, with limited time of service in the cases 
 needing it (par. h), and explicit means of removal in all 
 cases:- there was definitely established, with explicit L and 
 T measures, the formula People... X Government... . That 
 explicit mutual control or interaction of people and arbitrary 
 Many government (not the absolutely sovereign government 
 of the dualistic lawyers' law) obviously formally, and legally 
 in a constitutional sense even if not in a lawyers' sense, re- 
 moved all fixed, aristocratic governing classes — eliminating 
 orthodox sanctions, fiats of superiors, etc. The places of 
 power were limited in time, so that even if their incumbents 
 went power-mad, they would automatically shortly be re- 
 moved, before their power-mania had time enough to grow 
 much or do much harm. That principle of time measure is 
 an exceedingly important one in practice, and might profit- 
 ably have a volume devoted to it. Anyone will go power- 
 mad if given a little more power than his character or nerves 
 can stand (§1681); similarly anybody will go insane if given 
 enough food so that the excess poisons him enough (nature 
 often kills completely in that case before the insanity is long 
 apparent). Power does not usually kill quickly, and many 
 men are seen in places too large for them fattened or swollen 
 up with pride, "dignity," and various sorts of queer and 
 sometimes dangerous unbalances. (Such swelled heads 
 occur in business; but they rapidly kill the business.) Any 
 excess, all prosperity, will unbalance a man if it measures a 
 little more than his particular endurance. Prosperity and 
 poverty are perceptible departures from the balance. They 
 make a man stronger if they do not pass into his painful zone 
 (Fig. 163b). But if they just pass into that zone they ac- 
 cumulate a fatigue or poisoning, and truistically destroy the 
 man if not removed soon enough. A little power thus always 
 
 makes a little, weak man show himself to be such by making 
 him perceptibly unbalanced or ridiculous. Usually he begins 
 to show it by being dignified" and pompous (like many men 
 who have similarly slightly poisoned their nervous systems 
 with alcohol); then he becomes either too secretive, or too 
 talkative — usually mostly the first, although there is often a 
 cyclic rotation of the two, as in the case of Wilson. After 
 that the symptoms are very variable, approaching paranoia 
 and similar insanities. The newly rich" are over-prosperous 
 
 in money. • We can observe power-madness in many 
 
 different people. The healthy young have a normal physio- 
 logical cockiness, with a belief that they could handle some 
 big job without going mad; but if we are older we doubt if 
 we are big enough to take Lincoln's job and stand quite 
 steady although we may not be afraid to try. So the Con- 
 stitution sets a time limit on power, to save us and to save 
 the man given official power. 
 
 f. The next balance in the Constitution is the abolish- 
 ment among the people of all fixed classes (i. e., those with- 
 out a time limit — in full agreement with the natural law that 
 there are no physical constants), by interdicting titles of no- 
 bility (Art. I, §IX, 8 ; §X, l). That makes an always variable 
 or natural balance:- Other men... X,Any given man... . The 
 same sort of balance is further obviously explicitly extended 
 inside our nation by more or less prohibiting bills of attainder, 
 the suspension of habeas corpus, ex post facto laws, internal 
 tariffs, and all internal privileges or "preferences" (Art. I, 
 §§IX, X; Art. IV). Then, in further explicit assertion that 
 the "rights" or dots of Other men... (or Bodies of other men... 
 or States..., as contrasted with the intensive factor Govern- 
 ment...) could not be fully stated in those internal balancings, 
 Amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States 
 by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
 reserved to the States respective]} 7 , or to the people") sup- 
 plies that explicit statement, and clearly and definitely makes 
 our formula for all the people, including government:- States, 
 or other people... X Government, or given people... == Union, or 
 Democracy, or Republic. Obviously, there is a beautiful nat- 
 ural validity, and definiteness , about that general internal bal- 
 ance. We may note the illuminating fact that as soon 
 
 as there arose a dispute over the right to have the dualistic, 
 fixed classes, owners and slaves, that dispute as to balances 
 would be identically or synonymously expressed by putting 
 it into any other That... X This... form. The first form that 
 is wider than Slaves. . . X Owners. . . is States. . . X Government. . . 
 (named "states' rights"). The problem of plain slavery was 
 too easy to solve if kept in the simple human terms Slaves... 
 XOzeners... : many aristocrats could not blind themselves to 
 the fact that there were not many perceptible "blessings of 
 liberty" for the slaves. So those exploiters evaded in the 
 age-old way — putting the problem into larger or wider terms 
 to confuse the issue, and in some degree to hide their own 
 wrongness from themselves (a sort of reverse make believe). 
 (I speak with no animus against former slave owners, but 
 sympathetically give simply the obvious facts: my own fam- 
 ily on both sides lost their slaves by the Civil war.) Clearly 
 the problem of slaves and the problem of states' rights are 
 identical in principle. To assert that states have a right to 
 withdraw from the union is equivalent to asserting that there 
 exists a right for men to try to separate and become fixedly 
 apart, just as slaves and owner are (nominally ; but impossibly 
 in fact). Such an assertion is also in direct contradiction of 
 the contract made in the Constitution, which requires the as- 
 sent of both parties to terminate. No such assertion will ever 
 be true (except in a quantitative sense, when men degenerate 
 and are quantitatively unable to hold together in as large a 
 union as now; cf. §176). Always exploiters will try to put 
 
§lT3f XIX Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 236 
 
 that same simple principle of the Constitution — balanced co- 
 operation — into wider terms. But with a rigorous solution of 
 the One and Many we shall be very stupid if we get confused 
 and exploited. Quite often in history the Monroe doctrine 
 has been given an imperialistic, aristocratic interpretation by 
 the dualists ; but as the reader may readily see that by writing 
 a few formulas we will not go into it; also, see footnote 172c. 
 
 g. The Constitution thus made first a balance between 
 government officials and the remainder of the people ; and 
 then a balance between all the parts into which the people 
 were arbitrarily or conveniently divided. In short, it explic- 
 itly abolished privilege, or aristocracy, or unearned power or 
 other unearned perquisites. And it did not do that in any 
 sweet, sentimental, vague way: it got right down to definite 
 measures, to L and T science, to brass tacks, with such 
 precision that it worked pretty well. The Constitution is 
 science of the highest order. And as it was made by the 
 whole people it is another indication of the fact that the im- 
 portant average or majority judgments of men are sound. 
 
 h. Then the Constitution proceeds to the details of the 
 government officials. It makes a balance of executive and 
 of legislative branches, relating them by the judiciary, thus :- 
 Legislature. . .\4— Judiciary , or Jurisprudence-^ •) Executive... = 
 Government. The Constitution, in the absence of its makers 
 specific knowledge as to relationship terms, is a trifle vague 
 verbally or formally as to the judiciary; but it obviously as- 
 serts that formula, which implies all the sound principles. 
 The judiciary in reality has no power in the usual sense, but is 
 merely a connecting link or relationship that interprets, or 
 makes each branch perceptible' to the other. The judiciary 
 is the sociological governmental Holy Ghost (in wider sense, 
 "public opinion" is — represented mostly by the press). The 
 judiciary, having no power, is hence, so long as it attends to 
 its legitimate and constitutionally allowed business, and 
 keeps away from holding the lawyers' law, truistically in no 
 danger of becoming power-mad ; so with implicit recognition 
 of that, the framers did not put a definite time limit on the 
 terms of judges. Obviously, the business of the judiciary 
 is to say what is truth ; the truth has what is commonly ac- 
 cepted as one form of power, that of prevailing" — i. e., 
 of simply being, or existing:- as the ultimate relationship of 
 identity (§28h). The press has power" only as it tells 
 the truth. The judiciary and the writers as such truistically 
 have no power : insofar as they are diligent in finding truth 
 and honest and skillful and courageous in giving it to others 
 they are good workmen and deserve high payment — and that 
 pay which is then theirs to spend is their power. But, as we 
 see below, by unconstitutional lawyers law the judiciary is 
 the agent of a superior sovereign, and as such has power (both 
 delegated power, which ultimately is the only sort anybody 
 can have, and the nominally first-hand power of in effect leg- 
 islating). If the lawyers do not agree that all that is 
 
 true, then they automatically assert that the judiciary should 
 be given a term limited in time or else terminable at will 
 without cause by the sovereign (and they also automatically 
 assert that their job is not to find the truth and state it, etc.). 
 I am quite aware that Marshall in effect disagreed with the 
 view that the judiciary has no actual power constitutionally ; 
 by so doing he proved himself a poor thinker and incompe- 
 tent judge. To give crucial evidence of Marshall s errors :- 
 He (together with the notoriously aristocratic imperialist 
 Hamilton) held that a state is sovereign in a lawyers' dual- 
 istic sense, and can not be sued, without its consent (Bryce, 
 "American Commonwealth," New York, 1908, p. 235). 
 That view truistically makes the judiciary the agent of the 
 sovereign and thus gives it power (which as a matter of hist- 
 tory and common law — which common law the Constitution 
 
 in direct effect enunciates as law — was long ago in England 
 forcibly taken away from the judiciary). And 
 
 in general proof of all that, in direct legal terms, the Su- 
 preme court, before Marshall was on it, with ordinary com- 
 monsense and reason, decided that the Constitution did not 
 hold a state to be thus sovereign (Bryce, ibid., 235). As a 
 result of that, and probably of Marshall's and the lawyers' 
 and exploiters' dualistic views, Amend. XI was added in 1798 
 ("the judicial power of the United States shall not be con- 
 strued to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or 
 prosecuted against any one of the United States, by citizens 
 of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
 State"). By that states have in practice repudiated their 
 debts, and otherwise acted as a capricious sovereign in an 
 immoral and unbusiness-like way — like a robber baron, or 
 a dead-beat kaiser or pauper. According to its practical and 
 to its customary legal interpretation, that Amendment is the 
 one blot or error in the Constitution. By the Constitution 
 (strictly interpreted: see below), and by all natural law, no 
 state is absolutely sovereign; neither is the Federal govern- 
 ment; and so constitutionally all are liable for damages for any 
 mistakes, and subject to suits. (To admit that would be simple 
 
 173h That interpretation (that he considered the judiciary the 
 agent of the "sovereign") is the most charitable opinion to take" of 
 Marshall's views; and I have adopted it because I haven't bothered 
 to read much of Marshall's autocratic dictums. I am inclined to be- 
 lieve that the historic fact is that Marshall was much more unintelli- 
 gent and irresponsibly lacking in knowledge of jurisprudence and its 
 history than that mild opinion indicates. I am inclined to think that 
 he was, with customary irresponsible, aristocratic power-madness, 
 trying to make the judiciary into the orthodox lawyers' "sover- 
 eign." And that seems to be the customary view of Marshall's ex- 
 ploits. That "sovereign" status of the judiciary was historically 
 nearly an invariable phenomenon in all races of the Western world, 
 where aristocracies which claimed to be the depositary and adminis- 
 trators of the law succeed "sacred" kings (we call that the buying 
 up and capturing of the courts by the rich). And they all regularly 
 failed to work and broke down (Maine, "An. Law," I), the people 
 demanding that the law be written in codes. And that dualistic and 
 naturally unworkable pseudo judiciary is explicitly provided against 
 in the Constitutiuion, which gives the legislature the duty of enunci- 
 ating laws (so that it is none of the judiciary's business to legislate), 
 and the executive the duty of examining them and sending them 
 back for reconsideration (if thought needed), and of executing them. 
 So obviously, all that is left for the judiciary to do is to discover and 
 state the truth (so far as it can) regarding those various matters (un- 
 fortunately, the Constitution speaks of judicial "power"; but obvi- 
 ously, no meaning other than 'duty to speak truth' can consistently 
 
 be got from that carelessly used word). Marshall could have 
 
 discovered that legal history if he had tried; and a trifle of intelli- 
 gence would have made it clear to him that this present statement 
 of the nature of the judiciary as a truth-stater is the constitutional 
 one. But actually Marshall wasn't a judge at all: he was a grabber 
 after power — essentially a robber baron, a kaiser, a bar-room bully. 
 
 So by direct implication — by directly assigning the power 
 
 elsewhere, — the Constitution prohibits the judiciary (practically, the 
 Supreme court) from issuing any binding or compulsory interpreta- 
 tion or fiat as to a law's constitutionality. The judiciary can merely 
 try to show the congress and executive that a given law contradicts 
 the Constitution in principle, if it thinks the law does. As we have 
 seen, any matter of principle can be shown rigorously, and so clearly 
 that a child can see it. So if the judiciary can not show congress 
 and the executive that the law is wrong, and have them repudiate it 
 of their volition, then the law is a law. (Of course, if there is a fre- 
 quent conflict of opinion in such matters, and recalcitration, the gov- 
 ernment would come to a standstill; but the practical solution is 
 obviously for the people to throw out all its officials, including im- 
 peaching the Supreme court, and get some representatives who 
 
 haven't gone power-mad.) Lincoln clearly saw the substance 
 
 of all that, and stated it at his first inaugural (quoted in J. T. Rich- 
 ards's "Abraham Lincoln, the Lawyer-Statesman," 170):- "If the 
 policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole 
 people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court 
 *** the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to 
 that extent resigned their government into the hands of that emi- 
 nent tribunal." 
 
237 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XIX §174c 
 
 good business and elementary morality and constitutional 
 law.) Now, by referring to the wording of that Amendment 
 it is at once obvious that the aristocrats did not state openly 
 or definitely what they apparently were trying to get :- the 
 legal right for a state, as absolute sovereign, to repudiate, 
 shirk, any of its acts or contracts (the Constitution repeatedly 
 interdicts that lawyers' pseudo principle that the king can 
 do no wrong," or the pope is infallible, etc.). The Amend- 
 ment does not give or state such a legal right by its words, 
 but is merely a legal evasive statement of such probable in- 
 tention on the part of the grafters, but undoubtedly not the 
 intention of the majority the grafters pretended to represent. 
 So it is not necessary to repeal that Amendment, for it can 
 obviously be interpreted justly thus:- upon the request to 
 the Federal government of any person who has been refused 
 redress by a state acting on that pseudo principle, the Fed- 
 eral government may, in strict accord with this Amendment, 
 and must, by the rest of the Constitution (and by all natural 
 law and morality), institute a new, separate, and distinct suit 
 of its own against the contract-breaking state for damages to 
 the public welfare, etc. By such good Constitutional law 
 those repudiating states would undergo on their own motion 
 a quick and permanent change of heart, and pay what they 
 still owe. Also, such practice would educate lawyers as to 
 what the Constitution both says and means. 
 
 i. The expansion of details of the last paragraph must 
 be omitted. We can merely note the most essential fact:- 
 that the Constitution explicitly provides a democratic or 
 balanced-cooperative government or organization of officials, 
 and not the line organization that we saw was flatly wrong in 
 principle (§§37f, 167). The next section implicitly shows the 
 meaning of that. Another important explicit agree- 
 ment of the Constitution with natural law is that Amend. XVI 
 allowing graded income taxes is a definite recognition of the 
 democratic or moral principle (§§167-8) that men are not 
 equal in a quantitative sense. That same principle is obvi- 
 ously implicitly recognized by every definitely quantitative 
 statement in the Constitution. And that Amendment is ob- 
 viously also competent practically to stop inheritance of un- 
 earned wealth (§168mn), if a definite basic law is needed. 
 
 j. That makes the Constitution an enactment of all nat- 
 ural law and moral law — except perhaps it does not definitely 
 assert the morality of economy of time (although the whole 
 of it does promote economy of time, as is implied in the next 
 section), and except that Amend. XI is practically a blot 
 and should be eliminated. 
 
 §174. a. Many people hold that in practice democracy 
 or the Constitution does not work well. E. g., Faguet thinks 
 so, and gives such views emphatically (and what he fancies is 
 proof of them) in a book called "The Cult of Incompetence" 
 — his name for democracy. Many hold that the Prussian 
 autocratic type of organization gets things done, while democ- 
 racy can not — that democracy muddles along in a chuckle- 
 headed way, and wastes, and wastes, and wastes. We have 
 seen that theoretically autocracy, or the line or king or sanc- 
 tion type of organization is absolutely wrong and can not 
 possibly exist in reality. For, autocracy requires theoreti- 
 cally an absolute superior to hand down orders without there 
 being a reverse, equal reaction ("Theirs not to make reply"). 
 Autocracy tries to go to infinity — claims in theory that it does. 
 Socialism goes in the opposite direction from autocracy— to 
 zero, in its impossible dualistic or equally aristocratic theory ; 
 i. e., (as we see in §175) it theoretically has nobody giving 
 orders (or as everybody is explicitly a government official, 
 the government is or «>, just as we choose to say). Obvi- 
 ously, in a strict theoretical sense both socialism and autocracy 
 are impossible (Part One; specifically, Index, "increase of 
 
 entropy"); and the two are essentially identical (as and » 
 logically are the same), merely going in opposite directions. 
 But if we take the two in a quantitative sense, as species of 
 actually existing organizations which therefore truistically do 
 not strictly go to those extreme limits that in a Many or act- 
 ual sense are impossible, then necessarily the two are merely 
 attempts to depart, in the two respective directions, from the 
 balance; see Figs. 104b, 163b. So both are persistent in- 
 temperances or aristocratic, and both are immoral and kill. 
 Democracy is obviously simply the temperate mean between 
 the two. We shall look at some of the practical details of that 
 very simple principle — that of That...XThis... or of Social- 
 ism... (<— Democratic reactions- ->) Autocracy... (cf. Fig. 104b). 
 A more or less autocratic ruler (no absolute one is pos- 
 sible) will usually get a thing done in a shorter time than a 
 democracy will (if he gets it done at all). But it is not done 
 so well or so completely. If he keeps on for a while getting 
 the same thing done, its accumulated deficiencies in com- 
 pleteness of being done (in L, formally) will amount to its 
 not being done. Or, the autocracy will blow up, go to 
 pieces, change into another sort of structure (cf. recent hist- 
 ory ; and change of structure in Part Two resulting from any 
 persistent accumulation of potential). 
 
 b. A reasonable general conclusion is that those who 
 prefer, or fancy they prefer, having things done in a some- 
 what autocratic manner (we of course repudiate absolutely 
 the impossible absolute autocracy or line organization), are 
 those who tend to be somewhat impatient, and imagine that 
 they could do things a lot better than other people (they are 
 likely to take that radical," autocratic view if they have 
 never done very much themselves: young people and labor 
 leaders are much affected that way in practice, while often 
 verbally make-believing with opposite-direction socialism). 
 But all of the conspicuous autocrats in history so far have 
 failed (gone power-mad and made quite a mess) — from Alex- 
 ander down to Wilson, who made an extraordinarily good 
 ruler for war, where an autocrat is needed. 
 
 c. In democracy there is recognized a mutual natural 
 (i. e., inevitable; see Part Two) interaction between parts of 
 the Many. When two people in a democracy thus cooperate 
 the first tells the second what he wants in the way of reac- 
 tion. As there is no exact science he can not possibly tell 
 the second just what he wants — he can not give an accurate 
 or completely intelligible order or law. So, because the 
 second has a recognized right (legal and natural) to react, he 
 assimilates such part of the order as he can, and reacts with 
 (l) an 'objection' to such part of the order as he thinks is 
 unfitting (is not as accurate as he can make it, or thinks he 
 can), and with (2) a question as to what other parts of the 
 order mean, if he fails to understand them. Truistically, 
 every order must theoretically (because of the infinite regress) 
 have a part that is thus objectionable and a part unintellig- 
 ible. If we are dealing with a keen man he will definitely 
 perceive such two parts of each order: if we have a thoroughly 
 disciplined" soldier of the docile Prussian type, whose busi- 
 ness is "not to reason why," then his mentality or soul or 
 nervous system has of course in some measure been destroyed 
 by that "discipline," so that he will take an order as being 
 "perfect" — as coming from a divine-right superior. Then, 
 in our democracy, the first cooperating man after giving an 
 order considers the second's objection and question, and re- 
 vises the order if desirable. And that action-reaction con- 
 tinues until both are sufficiently intelligible to each other and 
 in agreement, to get the order done properly and well, to the 
 satisfaction of both. It takes more time, of course. But the 
 two men are helping, each the other, to get the thing done 
 so that it satisfies both (so far as it was practicable for them 
 
§174c XIX Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 to go along in the infinite regress), and so they both grow 
 and are conscious of living — are happy. On the con- 
 trary, an autocrat will in ' first class" militaristic fashion bark 
 his order at his theoretical slave (who in a first class" line 
 organization is frequently definitely admonished not to think :- 
 all autocrats try to keep the lower classes" ignorant; e. g., 
 the Catholic church used to bury people alive for reading the 
 Bible — "Ency. Brit.," xvii, 89l). And then the slave very 
 promptly — on the jump" — goes in an unthinking (i. e., 
 more or less dead) way and does a poor job which he does not 
 understand or care for very much. Of course, an imbecile 
 or even a horse can excellently perform some few trivial or- 
 ders well — such as March ! or Halt! Obviously, the longer 
 such orders are barked at the slave, the more stupidly he 
 performs them, and the more narrowed he becomes- — except 
 for the occasional toughly enduring one who steadily dislikes 
 them. Also, the autocrat who barks them misses most of 
 the possibilities of learning from the other person: the auto- 
 crat does not have to think much (thinking is hard work ; so 
 his order that the slave do not think is actually an order that 
 the slave do not by thinking force him — the autocrat — to 
 think :- theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and 
 die." ° Finally the slave (perhaps in the third or fourth 
 
 1740 Obviously, it is the work done under such autocratic or line 
 organization that is the sort of work objected toby intelligent people. 
 Clearly, that sort of work is what has given "work" most of its bad 
 name; that sort can not be anything but painful and degenerating 
 and debasing if it accumulates enough. For its characteristic truis- 
 tically is that its need or use or place in the universe, or its relation- 
 ship, is not perceptible to either the worker or the autocratic boss in 
 Usually the worker knows less about its wider 
 
 relationships than the boss; but the boss in turn knows less of its 
 minor and internal relations, so he is subject to the same drudg- 
 ery and discontent — as the inevitable result of not acquiring compe- 
 tence at the job by using the democratic way of learning it. 
 
 There is pleasure and joy in all work if its relationships (finally, its 
 religious character) are seen; it is a normal rebirth (§166e). So the 
 way to eliminate the sort of work which is objected to, and to elimi- 
 nate the demand for shorter hours and other labor troubles, is (1) to 
 educate the employer (and his agents) to stop being autocratic, and 
 (2) to educate the employe to stop being a more or less willing slave 
 who is too lazy to think and keep at thinking. Because of the infin- 
 ite regress that simple and obvious principle will never be perfectly 
 applied and we can never finish trying to apply it better. I shall 
 give a few details of its present application:- Primarily, labor in 
 general are mentally children, compared with employers; their lead- 
 ers are usually men with very strong emotions and courage, but are 
 deplorably weak and untrained mentally and hence short-sighted, 
 and truistically unable to use any but autocratic methods themselves 
 (the top leaders are of course honest; but many of the lower ones are 
 too stupid intellectually to be honest). Ample evidence of all that, 
 and of other quantitative facts I assert briefly here, is in the news- 
 papers, and reports of investigations, trials, army tests. The major- 
 ity in this country have tacitly long recognized that incapacity of 
 labor, and have treated them as a class something like minors (not a 
 fixed class: any laborer can leave the class in either direction sim- 
 ply by evidencing changed size; obviously, the whole Constitution 
 consists of dividing people into classes, into This... and That..., but 
 explicitly not into fixed classes which disregard actual size or worth 
 of men). I. e., the majority substantially exempted labor from keep- 
 ing its contracts, from abstaining from conspiracies, and from keep- 
 ing the peace. Now labor has developed into a strong, overgrown 
 boy, and the majority are finding it necessary to class labor legally 
 more and more with adults — and labor, like most boys in that condi- 
 tion, is complaining, and demanding that people "stop pickin' on 
 me." Of course labor should still be granted some of the legal privi- 
 leges and immunities granted to immature persons — but fewer, as 
 
 they in fact grow. The "one big union," the I. W. W., and 
 
 the "closed shop" ideas are obviously the same:- an effort to make 
 labor sole dictators, autocrats, or the lawyers' aristocratic "sover- 
 eign." Of course it is wrong: but I rather think it better wisely to 
 "ignore" the labor-children in that matter and let them wrestle with 
 that problem of autocracy themselves; the rank and file of labor are 
 suffering severely from the autocracy of their leaders, which natur- 
 ally gets worse in the degree in which they succeed in getting closed 
 shops, etc. Of course the rank and file should be shown what sort 
 
 generation) sees that he is being deprived of most mental 
 activity, and that there can be nothing worse to fear; so he 
 then fails entirely to obey the autocrat and kills him — and 
 usually take on the job of being autocrat himself. In the 
 previous process of carrying out the orders he has learned 
 more — the autocrat merely pushed the button, and truistic- 
 ally the longer he is an autocrat the more incompetent he 
 becomes. So even in that autocracy there actually is a re- 
 action. It is the final reaction of the slave s killing the auto- 
 crat — in that violent way taking his turn at objecting and 
 questioning. After many such fatal cycles, in a steady cli- 
 mate both autocrat and slave learn to see better, and with 
 such mental growth learn the advantages of less violent ways 
 of getting things done. So obviously, in the autocracy in the 
 long run advance in doing things properly is slower than in 
 a democracy. But in an autocracy particular orders are exe- 
 cuted with far more speed (provided they are made trivial or 
 detailed enough — such as the orders for marching through 
 Belgium in 'steen volumes, none of which worked well), but 
 with steadily decreasing morale ' or life or happiness or ef- 
 fectiveness. So in a democracy, if it is agreed, as in 
 
 the late war, that for a while it is imperative to get things 
 done quickly even though a bit poorly and unintelligibly, 
 then such autocratic barking will produce at once extra- 
 ordinarily effective results (and incidentally a large crop of the 
 power-mad, composed of men who have to be entrusted with 
 imitation money or authority). But obviously, that sort of 
 autocracy can not continue and produce good results; truis- 
 tically the incompetency would accumulate until the whole 
 thing blows up (e. g., the last election was the slaves' 
 present-day moderate way of eliminating the power-mad 
 Wilson, who ran a fine autocracy). An autocracy (also, a 
 socialism) is the sociological get-rich-quick scheme. 
 
 d. It is thus obvious that aristocrats — kings, military 
 autocrats, priests (with their identical-twin brothers:- soc- 
 ialists or savages; §175) — have been a necessary stage in the 
 growth of the race or advance in civilization. They violently 
 emphasized — at two extremes — that there was more life 
 when there was perceptible social organization (or division of 
 labor; §170). So they proceeded to make classes, or divide 
 labor — probably back in the prehuman stage. Naturally 
 they did it violently, crudely, coarsely — by our standards; 
 but they were doing excellently by universal standards. And 
 that lumbering, slow-moving, nearly imperceptible, and us- 
 ually verbally denied democracy has, after a million or more 
 years, become our conscious democracy. 
 
 e. In a democracy a thing can not be done to the com- 
 plete satisfaction of both parties to the reaction (par. c). The 
 democrat truistically has intelligence or "life" enough to see 
 that, and 'object' (we see the incompleteness of our actual 
 
 of power-mad baby -czars they are suffering: and legal measures 
 should betaken to see that employers who do not care for the closed 
 shop, and the public, are protected from the unions' breaking the 
 peace; and that the unions keep their contracts. There should be 
 temperate, non-autocratic labor unions, of course. Some reasonably 
 strong organization of labor is needed by employers to keep them re- 
 minded of the fact that they must not be autocrats. I think the facts 
 are that most actual employers today are intelligent enough, and 
 have enough self-control, to act democratically— and do do so fairly 
 well themselves; the actual difficulty is that the larger ones have to 
 delegate much of their job to agents (managers, foremen, etc.), and 
 those agents haven't the capacity to be democratic— and it is a huge 
 job to impart it to them. Finally, as employers are quantita- 
 tively superior in most of the characteristics that make a man valu- 
 able in industry, then by the principles of genius (§164db), or free 
 speech (§169h), or democracy in general, employers should let labor 
 make young asses of itself in various ways (as it has been doing) and 
 still be patient and make no more reprisals than they would on their 
 erratic college sons; and by the same principle they should initiate 
 ameliorations in the lot of labor which are just and pay—no charity. 
 
239 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XIX §175c 
 
 handling of the infinite regress). (So, incidentally, because 
 there is so much conscious 'objecting' or perhaps divine dis- 
 content" as a needed part of democracy, short-sighted peo- 
 ple mistakenly conclude that autocracy is better — for in it 
 dissatisfaction occurs as a matter of course and is dully and 
 silently accepted, as per lese majeste and gag laws: 'theirs 
 
 not to reason why, theirs but to do and die.") 
 
 Because of such failure of perfect satisfaction, and objection, 
 obviously one party of men in a democracy are conscious that 
 they can not advance faster than another party ; so a con- 
 scious balance, or majority rule (§l7lk) is willingly sought. 
 Nature of course forces an autocracy to keep in balance; but 
 the autocratic pseudo theory denies it, and each party tries 
 to deprive the other of satisfaction (i. e., push it down; the 
 euphemism is:- keep it in its place"); so naturally, as 
 soon as such people thus stupidly accumulate a violent unbal- 
 ance, an objection in the shape of a war restores it. 
 
 f. So a democracy as a truism of its nature tries to edu- 
 cate its members. Any democratic reaction (cf. especially 
 par. c) is, truistically, education — a drawing out of the vision 
 or activity of each party ; which is the reverse way of saying 
 that each party gives to the other love or more abundant life. 
 An aristocracy (autocracy or socialism) is simply a more vio- 
 lent natural or unpremeditated education, and hence is suit- 
 able for the callous people who need such violence in order 
 to begin to perceive. The reader will note that our theory 
 does not condemn" aristocracy, but simply concludes that 
 it is good for those who need it. So democracies de- 
 liberately set about training the spirits and-or bodies of their 
 children so that they can react well in a democracy. Usually 
 only the formal training is called education. But it would 
 necessarily proceed, when consistently done, as democratic 
 reactions ( work," etc.) of a character graduated to the per- 
 ceptions and mental endurance of the children — and it would 
 not stop except at death ; at a certain stage the apprentice- 
 democrat will be put at producing reactions of immediate use 
 to others, that stage theoretically beginning at three or four 
 years of age, and the apprentice part of it (or stage of partly 
 
 earning a living") being completed at from sixteen to thirty 
 (in practice, of course, the child begins to support himself 
 more abruptly). That lengthy last sentence generally de- 
 scribes a consistent education: I omit the volumes of expan- 
 sion. Dewey, in "Democracy and Education, gives an 
 extraordinarily sound consideration of the principles of educa- 
 tion which is based directly on the democratic principle — on 
 That... X This... . The reader can get the rigorous expansion 
 in that book, which I think is the best statement of the gen- 
 eral theory of education that has been written — and there are 
 many good books on education. Dewey shows (ibid., XXI V) 
 that the formal subject of education (which he there names 
 philosophy, just as we here name it democracy) sums into 
 infinity or religion — gives a rebirth. 
 
 g. Education worthy the name is truistically an all- 
 'round" education (one that at least in effect recognizes the 
 infinite regress) which finally gives ability to estimate the meas- 
 ures of men, and hence to react cooperatively with them. Aristo- 
 cratic ideas of education considerably neglect that summing 
 up, erroneously emphasizing the need of an accumulation of 
 facts. Just an accumulation of facts is not education— a tru- 
 ism so obvious that I shall not waste the reader's time with a 
 
 proof of it. Democracy gives balanced education, as 
 
 seen ; so circularly, valid education gives democracy. So 
 truistically, a sound education gives ability to be useful to 
 others. It is not a private affair in which the scholar stuffs 
 himself with more or less dead and rather useless classics 
 and then fancies that he feels pleased because he has spent 
 so much time prinking his brain, and is superior in knowing 
 
 rather dubiously applicable stuff. All facts can be useful, of 
 course (just as the kaiser is beautiful; §25c). So education 
 is measured by its practical or Many usefulness — which is the 
 same as saying that we must apply to it the theory of value 
 (§168). The most definite measure of usefulness is money. 
 So Taylor s principles of educating or management, which 
 insist that at least some money measurement be required, 
 soundly formulate a democratic measuring rod that had been 
 increasingly used by men as they have developed in keen- 
 ness, delicacy, and definiteness of perception or living. 
 
 §175. a. As noted in §174a, socialism is essentially the 
 same aristocracy as autocracy : it merely would strive to be 
 intemperate by going in the other direction from the balance 
 (Figs. 163b, 104b). Autocracy would go to the extreme 
 Many limit of having one man give all orders, with no reac- 
 tion : socialism would go to the opposite extreme of having 
 everybody equal in the government, so that again there 
 
 is no reaction. There is little agreement as to what 
 
 socialism" means. I shall give a consistent statement of 
 its possible meanings, assuming that it is different in some 
 way from democracy and autocracy ; and if people who call 
 themselves socialists can not find their beliefs included in 
 those meanings, then they are in some degree either demo- 
 crats or autocrats, and would be more intelligible if they 
 named themselves conventionally. 
 
 b. Numbers of high-minded and generally admirable 
 men view the race as being very emphatically an organism, or 
 a One. It is, of course. Then they call that One socialism. 
 Or, they name the universal relationship of identity or 
 "brotherhood," socialism. Obviously, as a One word, or as a 
 relationship or Holy Ghost word, socialism is permissible and 
 sound. But sociology, or some such phrase as communion of 
 saints or human equality or brotherhood of man, is the more 
 conventional One name or relationship name. In that sense 
 socialism is of course a synonym for democracy, or for any 
 other of the numerous One words or relationship words — and 
 is of course absolutely ineffable, meaning nothing definite 
 until it is put in positive That... X This... terms. Many of 
 those admirable One socialists admit that they can not give 
 such a statement. They simply mean that they prefer to be 
 religious in terms of human beings:- Other men. .. X Us. . .= 
 Socialism, or Human equality (i. e., identity), or Religion. Us- 
 ually those men begin to describe democracy as well as they 
 can when they shift to positive Many words; in practice they 
 are democrats, with a tendency to have more faith than the 
 average in the capabilities of government officials — which of 
 course makes them better men than those who have a faith 
 
 less than the actual facts warrant. The objection to 
 
 such high-minded or religious socialism is that it does not say 
 what it means very well, and so is a cat's-paw for scoundrels. 
 
 c. The socialist who expresses himself in Many terms, 
 especially the extreme socialist, usually definitely states bis 
 aristocratic belief in fixed classes — and their antagonism. In 
 practice at any rate, his difference from the autocrat is that he 
 believes that his class, the proletariat or working" class, is 
 the "superior," and should rule — and should, as the mildest 
 view, seize all property and distribute it equally," what- 
 ever that may mean. The justification for that is that autoc- 
 racy doesn't work, and is unjust [that is true; but it does 
 not justify the same methods by a different set of men]. Such 
 definite socialism was mostly made in Germany, largely by 
 Marx — although the idea and practice of socialism is older 
 than the race (see next paragraph). (The technical logical 
 objection to Marxian and Many socialism is that it is materi- 
 alistic — a dualism so obvious that I won't waste the reader's 
 time with formal statement of it.) The reason is ob- 
 vious why the socialist should fancy himself the opposite of 
 
§175c XIX Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 240 
 
 the autocrat in principle, whereas he is merely opposite in 
 direction and is also an aristocrat:- The autocrat does have 
 a perception of the natural relationship or ultimate identity 
 of men. So he vigorously does something about it: he pro- 
 ceeds to organize men, so that they percepiiby to themselves 
 get that religion in terms of humanity — and along with that 
 fuller mental life truistically get « higher material standard 
 of living. The autocrat naturally exaggerates that idea and 
 doing, in order to pound it into the duller people, and he 
 shortly reaches the limit of his capacity and begins to fancy 
 that he personifies the relationship — that being the divine 
 right of kings (and the weak ones he lifted out of animal sav- 
 agery also highly appraise that great work). The autocrat 
 does act by the idea that if a little is good more is better: 
 but I have trouble myself seeing in practice that that isn't so 
 past the point of balance, and nobody can judge exactly where 
 that point comes. A socialist sees that relationship of man, 
 and he sees the autocrat's mistake of going too far. So the 
 socialist thinks he can personify that relationship by talking 
 about it and keeping everybody from the intemperance of the 
 other or more material sort of doing into which the autocrat 
 fell. And the socialist promptly falls into talking intemper- 
 ately — personifying himself more or less as a sort of abstract 
 mouthpiece of the divine human race. And his verbal intem- 
 perance is usually atrocious. As seen, democrats try 
 
 to balance talking and doing" — in practice act on the 
 fact that mind is matter. So truistically they are conscious 
 that ultimate relationship, unfailing cause and effect, does 
 exist, and that there is no need to exaggerate either aspect. 
 So democrats do not have to symbolize the divine right of 
 the autocrat or the socialist by a lot of fuss and feathers, a 
 special ship and entourage to get to Paris, glittering uni- 
 forms, high masses, the dirty collar and hair of the "high" 
 thinker, etc. The objection to those symbols (more import- 
 ant than the time and money they waste) is that we are prone 
 to forget that they are symbols, and take the idol for the re- 
 ality. In democracy the real boss or acting person constantly 
 changes, the person who gives the reaction becoming the 
 boss or acting person. (Of course a moderate amount of sym- 
 bolization of the person who is expected to do certain acting 
 is convenient.) The essential thing that makes red tape be 
 red tape is that a Many formality is erroneously substituted 
 for an existing relationship: red tape is idolatry in trivial 
 things for trivial people. 
 
 d. Socialism therefore truistically means in theory abso- 
 lute government ownership, everybody a government official, 
 and no division of labor. So there is nothing novel about the 
 practice of socialism. It is simply a new name for the way 
 in which solitary wild animals live:- Each member of 
 the species (except when nature forces some democracy upon 
 him in the form of temporary family : perfect socialism is im- 
 possible) takes what he wants when he wants it (or else fights 
 for it, if another animal disputes the want). He does every- 
 thing especially for himself, and hence gets ail he produces. 
 I. e., property is common; and there is substantially no spec- 
 ialization of work with its necessary reactions or 'law' or 
 ordering' between individuals. Each animal is in the "gov- 
 ernment," holding an office equal to any other (except for 
 unavoidable natural sex, etc.), with natural result that there 
 is no government in any ordinary sense. Clearly, perfect 
 socialism implies (l) an impossible quantitative equality, or 
 (2) the impossibility that two finite beings can not interfere 
 in finite space. But the sincere socialists can join (if I may 
 say join') the solitary animals and at once have their Utopia 
 as closely as nature permits. Thus socialism practically is 
 extreme savagery. Most savage tribes of men are on the up- 
 ward path to democracy via a violent autocratic reaction from 
 
 that worse savagery, 
 
 In a One sense we all are in the 
 
 government, and we all are equal (to the universe or God or 
 infinity — which ought to be enough to satisfy a reasonable 
 person), and all property is under the government (even the 
 common law asserts that). 
 
 e. Possibly no socialist would urge going to the extreme 
 of animal savagery. But it has become obvious that both the 
 socialist and the autocrat are aristocratically fancying that 
 they should (in opposite directions) get a government with 
 fixed classes — with of course fixed superiority (and its ma- 
 terial symbol or measure:- money or property) for his re- 
 spective class. Both being contrary verbally to natural law, 
 each fancies he is fighting the other: actually, the two are 
 naturally interacting, but doing it somewhat violently and 
 painfully — nature s method of pounding sense through to 
 their consciousness. The democrat is the man with sufficient 
 intelligence to see the actual principle, and to desire a bal- 
 anced cooperation of Citizens and their property... ^Official 
 government and its property ... , or Labor... XCapital... . 175e 
 
 176e Ultimately, all the unbalanced theories of the socialists and 
 of the autocrats are simply a demand for more life, more activity, 
 more "good." Those unbalanced theories are-is a selfish demand — 
 an excessive demand — of ignorant persons for the right to live — for 
 self-preservation. And that demand usually practically takes the 
 form of a demand for the ownership of property — regardless of the 
 disguises it may wear. We saw (§164d) that it is a fundamental law 
 that all of us, as a payment for existing ourselves, must allow others 
 the "right" to exist. So far we mostly have discussed that "right" 
 in terms of people — giving democratic reactions between people. But 
 it was definitely stated that the right to exist truistically involves the 
 need or "right" to react with so-called material things. And such 
 things are property, as we shall now see (money is the general repre- 
 sentative or measure of property; §168h). Mostly I have discussed 
 relations with people because people are perceptibly moving and vari- 
 able, so that the balancing of reactions with them is more difficult 
 than a balancing with property, which is less variable and exacting 
 than people:- land will not usually move away, or actively hit back; 
 and a cow is not so difficult to react with as a spouse. So it is com- 
 paratively easy to get the principles of property and keep balanced 
 with property. But that does not lower the intrinsic importance of 
 property in human life. In any normal life it is just as imperative 
 that property be temperately owned and handled as it is that we be 
 temperate in other things. I must omit volumes of details of prop- 
 erty : but such details are important, and must in actual life be given 
 
 an equal place with personal or so-called spiritual democracy. 
 
 Clearly, if by agreement we allow the "right" of existence to each 
 normal man, we truistically allow some similar quantitative right to 
 the "material" means of existence:- food, shelter, clothing, etc. 
 Thus we allow a right to property:- for if anyone deprives a man of 
 material air or material water, the man will die; and the same prin- 
 ciple applies to all other property in varying quantitative degree. 
 Volumes on that variation in degree must be omitted (e. g., just what 
 does a stockholder in a holding company own?). But we may here 
 summarize, and consider the essential part of the right to property :- 
 which is the indispensable right to "own" (i. c ., as surely and posi- 
 tively control, or anticipate-all-the-reactions-of, as is humanly pos- 
 sible in such a quantitative matter) land, that is possessed by each 
 person, and includes the equally indispensable right to some water, 
 air, and produce, that goes with the land. The principle of each per- 
 son's right to such property is that truistically he has the right in 
 proportion to his own reactive or cooperative measure of worth as a 
 person (with proper distribution as to T during his life-time— a huge 
 quantitative subject of pensions, minors, etc., which I omit). If his 
 reactions with other men have a given value or quantity, then as a 
 simple truism he has a right to control or own an amount of land 
 which is the same fraction of the total land (measured by its useful- 
 ness or desirability) as his work is of the total of all men's work 
 (measured the same way). So obviously, as the next inevitable tru- 
 ism, socialistic talk about dividing property equally is glaringly im- 
 moral, as men are not quantitatively equal. That principle of 
 
 ownership needs volumes of expansion into practical details. The 
 chief need in that expansion is to consider the matter dynamically. 
 One of the gravest troubles men have had has been in more or less 
 accepting the static, dualistic proposition that if a man once gets 
 legal possession that possession becomes a fixed, unchangeable fact, 
 an eternal aristocratic "privilege"— so that property accumulates by 
 inheritance in the hands of a privileged few who neither earned it in 
 
241 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XIX §176b 
 
 f. Men ordinarily are normally at a given time some- 
 what slightly unbalanced pleasurably either towards more 
 centralization or autocracy in official government, or else to- 
 wards more socialism. Those varying classes form two nat- 
 ural parties; but it is not possible to give steady names to 
 the two, for as soon as a party becomes too violently auto- 
 cratic (e. g. , the Wilson administration) it automatically flops 
 over or reverses to a dangerously exaggerated socialism. 
 And as both extremes are radical, names of parties tend to 
 reverse- — as has occurred several times in our history (and 
 during the confusion a substantial third party arises tempor- 
 arily). So truistically the most highly moral or balanced man 
 will change from one party to another, remaining always in 
 opposition to the party which is most unbalanced. The in- 
 telligent men thus hold the balance of power in a democracy. 
 
 g. As a practical fact, Marxian and similar socialists are 
 rather ignorant persons, and fail to seethe difficulties of man- 
 aging a large organization, and particularly of getting one 
 made. They rather fancy that simply to name a man gen- 
 eral manager will automatically enable him to run the largest 
 railroad properly — will make him in facta, general manager — 
 overlooking the truth that actually generations of toughening 
 and sharpening of nerve fiber is needed as an educative pre- 
 liminary to prepare a man to begin to see' a railroad system. 
 So the ignorant and sentimentalists tend to want government 
 ownership expanded. And there are many selfish persons 
 calling themselves socialists who think that they can manage 
 to grab an easy job if there are enough available — thereby in 
 effect admitting that they expect to see socialism fail. Those 
 socialists are in principle identical with the autocratic politic- 
 ian who in his heart believes that to the victor belong the 
 
 spoils." On the other hand, the autocrats, with a 
 
 stupidity going in the opposite direction, exaggerate the dif- 
 ficulties of that job; but by then inconsistently fancying that 
 they personally can measure up to it, at least in prestige, 
 "pull," etc., they insist that it be quietly given to them to 
 
 be run by divine right. ■ The democrat has to estimate 
 
 men in fair agreement with the facts, and steer between those 
 aristocratic exaggerations. Being a democrat is a hard job. 
 
 §176. a. So the success of any human organization de- 
 pends upon the size of men. The limit of the organization 
 here is one man reacting democratically with all the other 
 people in the world, as a perceptible organic whole, or as a 
 world state or league. 
 
 b. That single organization would, from the human 
 
 fact nor pay for its continued possession (except by personal deteri- 
 oration and crippling; §168d). Socialism is the natural reaction 
 against that erroneous static view; socialism usually exaggerates 
 equally in the opposite direction. But at the same time even the 
 autocrats usually accepted theoretically the principle which annulled 
 or compensated for that exaggerated static practice:- that the legal 
 owner of property owed continued proportional pay to other peo- 
 ple in return, usually called a tax. And as we shall see (footnote 
 176d), owners paid too much as taxes (but apart from that brief note 
 I must omit that vast dynamic expansion). The compensation made 
 for their error by the socialists is their personal discomfort and all- 
 ' round failure and more or less approach to animal-like squalor, that 
 gives us the valuable evidence that we do not want socialism (as a 
 well known practical fact, as soon as socialists bestir themselves to do 
 something more than talk, the primitive savagery they begin to exper- 
 ience is ample lesson for them, and they reverse to a rather extreme 
 
 autocracy) My general guess about property is that there 
 
 has been and is now an astonishingly just perceptible distribution 
 of wealth; but people's statements of the principles on which they 
 fancied they accomplished that distribution are just as astonishingly 
 wrong and self-contradictory-being one long series of emphatic 
 make believes (due to the simple fact that as both socialism and au- 
 tocracy in practice say they will take your property if they can it is 
 the part of wisdom-except in democracies, where the reverse holds 
 -to conceal what you have, how you got it and where, and what you 
 are going to do with it, etc.). 
 
 point of view, chiefly require a man of so much strength that 
 he would not go power-mad ; and of such keenness of vision 
 for details that he would not be afraid of too many unknowns 
 and as a result be the opposite of power-mad, and so worry 
 himself into uselessness and red-tape (all autocrats, circularly, 
 
 have attacks of timid red-tape; cf. §169h). Or, the 
 
 nominal head of the people of the world could be a commit- 
 tee of some sort — a collection of men. However, one man 
 (by the principle that no two men are quantitatively equal) 
 would actually at any given time lead the committee and be 
 the head of the world. But, in the usual committee the 
 men are so nearly equal that no one man can in fact lead for 
 long; so the responsibility is practically divided, with the 
 truistic result that the committee is a socialism, and dawdles 
 along not doing much ; and even worse, when the committee 
 is so large as to be called a congress, the nearly-equal mem- 
 bers are liable to spend time in childish bickering, irrelevant 
 to their duties, in what is actually a comparison of strength 
 — unless some man is strong enough to sit on them. The 
 advantage of a committee is that if the strongly-working real 
 manager of it goes power-mad he grows weak, and another 
 man in the committee is in duty bound to replace him: the 
 committee-scheme automatically puts the proper time limit on 
 its members. A committee is also a device that allows the 
 person or persons who select it to have several guesses as to 
 who is the man able to do the work. So a committee, or 
 triumvirate, or legislature, etc. , is itself in principle » rather 
 unconscious or slow-moving democracy, which inclines toward 
 being a socialism if the members are mediocre and about 
 equal, and toward autocracy if it has strong members who 
 
 begin to go power-mad. And from the point of view 
 
 of environment, that world state, if it is to be a fairly per- 
 ceptible democracy (is to exist in fact), requires that there 
 be sufficient celerity and explicitness of communication, both 
 mental and material, between that one man and the others 
 to enable him and them to act and react perceptibly (and 
 similarlj', but in varying degree, between any and all other 
 combinations of men). E. g., if some men steadily insisted 
 on departing from the democratic balance, then that one man 
 must have that fact communicated to him soon enough to en- 
 able him to react (before they went far enough to damage 
 themselves or others much) — that being an effort to educate 
 them into a desire to go towards the balance. Then if after 
 reasonable reaction of that sort they continued to act so as to 
 break up the democracy, the communication should be suffic- 
 iently good to enable others to see that the recalcitrant or 
 "lawless" ones were defective in some degree, and to have 
 them either restrained, or killed, as expedient. Evidently, 
 communication inside the United States is such as to enable 
 the Constitutional government and the people (who have 
 been trained into sense enough to use it) to do precisely that 
 — and do it rather definitely, although slowly in come diffi- 
 cult cases. But I think it is obvious that it could not have 
 
 been done here two centuries ago. So from the point 
 
 of view of communication, a world state at present will work 
 with some perceptible defects. The principles of harmonic 
 periodicity will apply to it: and so it is quantitatively pos- 
 sible that a world state would be of such a size that if nomi- 
 nally formed it might be out of harmony with other world 
 quantities and break down — with disastrous damage in the 
 exploding. On the other hand, communication is now so 
 good that we already have considerable of the opposite de- 
 fect:- of being pained because we have messages or things 
 we can send and want to send to others, and there is no or- 
 ganized (definite) agreement that those others will take them. 
 If we arbitrarily get in the way of a world state that by the 
 same principles of periodicity is about to form naturally," 
 
§lT6b XIX Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 242 
 
 we also shall get hurt, just as if we stood in front of a moving 
 train. And as communication (under a steady climate) is 
 constantly improving, that pain is constantly increasing; and 
 we shall be forced sooner or later definitely to organize the 
 communications (establish a world state), just as the thirteen 
 colonies had so much trouble that they substantially had 
 to make the Constitution. It is a question of quantitative 
 judgment as to what we ought to do now. 
 
 c. So if we think we can steadily get a man who is of 
 sufficient size (replacing him fast enough to keep him from 
 going power-mad or the opposite, and at the same time be- 
 ing able to leave him in office long enough to learn the job), 
 and if we also think that communication is good enough, and 
 if we think that the various peoples have sense enough to try 
 to react democratically a little (to hold up their end")> it 
 follows that we shall be consciously conforming with natural 
 law to establish a world state. We of course are already 
 more or less in a world state — in a universal state, for that 
 matter (with gravity reactions, etc.). If we had a more 
 conscious, more explicitly organized state, it would truistic- 
 ally give a more abundant life, in terms of cash and every- 
 thing else. But if we pretend to run a world state and in 
 fact do not, we destroy some of our life (unless we have the 
 strength to pay highly for a while for the education, and are 
 able to survive the violent civil war explosions). So if we 
 fail to start a world state at once it is because we are afraid 
 to tackle the unknown and do not amount to much as men, 
 unless there is fair quantitative evidence that it would fail, in 
 which case to start it would be reckless stupidity. In that 
 latter case the part of wisdom is to build up a world state 
 gradually for a while longer by more definite treaties, postal 
 and similar conventions, international courts, etc. (which is 
 precisely what the thirteen colonies did for some years, un- 
 consciously acquiring education for the final definite crystal- 
 lization). It is a quantitative problem. No man can 
 
 be absolutely sure which way it should be decided. I omit 
 my opinion in the matter (see footnote 172c). 
 
 d. If it be decided to start a world state, the determina- 
 tion of the principles of the organization is easy. They are 
 in our Constitution, and are simply the principles of democ- 
 racy, or of That... ~X.Th.is... . There being no exact science, 
 the application of those principles truistically will not work 
 
 perfectly. No man, from his personal or imperfect 
 
 Many point of view can be satisfied with a fairly just democ- 
 racy or balance ; from such a point of view any sort of fair 
 balance in-a world state involves his making sacrifices. But 
 those are his payments for what he gets in return. We have 
 seen throughout the book that it is impossible to get some- 
 thing for nothing. Because consciousness is life, truistically 
 the intelligent man wants to know he pays, and how much; 
 and the highly intelligent man (as shown in §§164db, 169h, 
 footnote 174c) wants to initiate payment — pay first; sacrifice. 
 We need an apparent digression:- that it is thus rigorously 
 truistic that an indirect tax is wrong, immoral, and bad busi- 
 ness (i. e., in a democracy; in an aristocracy it is an evil 
 needed to compensate; cf. last of footnote 175e). 176 
 
 I76d Xhose remarks on taxation, and the more explicit remarks in 
 par. g below on tariffs, are true only in rigorous theory. As will im- 
 plicitly appear, customary methods of indirect taxation more or less 
 correct conventional errors in principles of taxation; and such prac- 
 tical balancing is of course correct. The orthodox theory of 
 
 taxation is that taxes are "a self-levied contribution which each man 
 pays according to his ability" (Hadley, "Economics," §498) so that 
 it becomes an unsolved 'question "whether we should try to tax the 
 strong man at a relatively higher rate than the weak man" (ibid, 
 §517). Thus it appears that the orthodox theory is uncertain; but 
 that there is a general view that in strict justice all men should pay 
 an equal fraction of what they receive, although orthodoxly, in prac- 
 tice perhaps it is better to tend towards having the poor or weak man 
 
 Most of the people who agreed to our Constitution made sac- 
 rifices, and were willing to do so (as is proved by the fact 
 that they did). That is largely how it happened that the 
 Constitution is so extraordinarily good :- it was consciously 
 paid for by everybody, without any perceptible aristocratic 
 privileges being given as bribes — no log-rolling. To form 
 a world state, various nations would consciously have to pay 
 for the organization at once and would not very perceptibly 
 
 pay a smaller fraction (speaking in economic terms of concrete 
 wealth). Both those general ideas of taxation (equal fractions; and 
 the weak a smaller faction) are wrong (even with regard to un- 
 earned wealth got in an aristocracy by inheritance or grabbing; then 
 the correct principle is that all which is unearned should be repaid). 
 The successful, "wealthy" man in a democracy, usually in just- 
 ice ought to pay some smaller fraction of the concrete wealth 
 (property; money) he gets, than does the less successful, "poor" 
 man. And it is a continually asserted quantitative fact, which prob- 
 ably is true, that the successful man does thus "pay less than his 
 share" — which probably shows again that we act better than we say 
 in our make believes. And the way we achieve that probably correct 
 result, in the face of a wrong orthodox theory, and sometimes in the 
 face of actual efforts to make the successful man pay a larger fraction 
 because he is "able" to, is to levy indirect or secret taxes. They of 
 course get passed on to the poor nearly entirely (in ways so simple 
 and well known that the person who is not a fool or a self-blinded 
 aristocratic grabber scarcely requires statistical proof of it, although 
 that can be got from many stock-selling circulars) ; and that serves 
 to restore a correct quantitative balance. The really correct thing 
 to do glaringly is to state openly that an indirect tax is wrong (fit 
 only for savage socialists and barbaric autocrats, and naturally tend- 
 ing to make us similarly blind and partly dead when used on us), 
 and that we won't use it but will directly tax everybody, taxing 
 the successful some agreed -on smaller faction of their wealth (putting 
 the aristocrats in jail, if such extreme measures are needed to stop 
 
 their grabbing). The rigorous truism (footnote 17Se) is that a 
 
 man should return to society services equivalent to what he receives 
 (that is the truism that action equals reaction, which we have seen is 
 universally true; the orthodox theory of taxation is wrong in that it 
 expresses that truism only partially, as we shall see). Obviously the 
 "successful" man in a democracy (who is not always rich in concrete 
 property, although he usually is nowadays) is one who of his own 
 initiative or enterprise, or at least without being "watched" or sup- 
 ervised by others at the expense of much of their lives, gives all the 
 work or reaction that he can. The successful man gets useful things 
 done: gives better products and methods, etc., that help us all indi- 
 rectly. The unsuccessful or really poor man is one who fails to give 
 much reaction to others, doesn't like his job or care to do it well, or 
 has to be watched by foremen, policemen, etc. So what he gives to 
 society is meager and of poor quality; but he usually puts energy 
 into demanding good pay, and consequently ordinarily receives much 
 more than his fair share of concrete pay — of wealth. So as a rule the 
 successful man has already, before he comes to pay taxes, given pro- 
 portionately more to society than the poor ones. So he ordinarily 
 should pay a smaller fraction in taxes. It is a quantitative proposi- 
 tion, of course with a few exceptions: the rigorous theory is that the 
 man in a democracy who has deserved little should pay a larger frac- 
 tion of concrete taxes if (as is usually practically unavoidably the 
 
 case) he gets a larger fraction of concrete pay. And it is clear 
 
 from the fundamental theory of taxation (the theory of That...~X 
 This...) that the best hope of achieving reasonably just taxation, 
 which next to honest money is perhaps the most important economic 
 balance wheel, lies in taxing people from several points of view. 
 I. e., no "single tax," no solution of the infinite regress involved in 
 taxing a single sort of unit of a man's wealth is practically soluble 
 very far out, and so it is better to try to average the important items 
 of wealth. Any single thing, such as land, could theoretically furnish 
 a just base of all taxes. The practical difficulty with the land single 
 tax is in determining just who owns or controls or uses a given bit of 
 land (e. g., as one of thousands of equally difficult questions:- How 
 much use does an aviation company make of the land it flies over; 
 or may it drop monkey-wrenches anywhere free of charge?). That 
 probable solution of this quantitative problem of the base of taxation 
 is opposite that of the base of money (§168h); for it easy to deter- 
 mine the actual controller of a given piece of actual money. 
 
 And obviously, the foregoing general theory of taxation fits with the 
 actual general practice in this country (except that we are a bit vague 
 yet about putting a profiteer or financial aristocrat in jail if need be). 
 So it would be intelligent, and save much money, to enunciate and 
 practice those simple principles openly. 
 
243 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Three XIX §176g 
 
 get repaid for a time. So obviously, any world state will have 
 to be made largely on credit (T), by the able men who can 
 work now for a benefit in the future — just as most large busi- 
 nesses are made. There would perhaps be an immediate 
 spiritual" return in some dropping of the tension of national 
 distrust and refusal of credit (which distrust is concretely 
 shown in expensive armaments) ; but many people are too 
 defective nervously to see that (especially some armament 
 makers who are quite similar in every way to liquor dealers; 
 §166h). And it is certain that some men will betray that 
 trust: the aristocrat we have always with us. If a nation in 
 the world state betrayed the trust we could not put it in 
 jail or an insane asylum; and the milder equivalent, ostra- 
 cism or boycott, might not work ; then we would have to kill 
 it off more or less — perhaps a more unpleasant and expen- 
 sive business than not having such a world-state obligation. 
 
 e. As we have seen, democracy is a conscious effort to 
 approach a balance, and truistically if successful prevents 
 war — which is the social surgery needed to cure an unbalance 
 which is bad (§149n) — the attempted cure for hell. When 
 the pain of an unbalance becomes great, the nation with the 
 weaker nervous system becomes maniacal first and starts the 
 war. The nation that keeps on preparing for war more in- 
 tensely than another nation openly admits its fear of the other; 
 and such open indulgence in cowardice (footnote I70r) and 
 babying of its nerves" will truistically make it wear out its 
 nervous systems, just as any coward who gives way to his 
 fears gets panicky : and it finally starts a war as a welcome_ 
 relief from that pain of fearing — often becoming so crazy 
 with that pain that it sincerely fancies the other nation at- 
 tacked first. Obviously, any aristocracy, in consistence with 
 its pseudo principle of repulsing the other nation and grab- 
 bing from it a place in the sun' and any other little thing, 
 must keep piling up its preparedness as much as it can 
 (thus, by the unavoidable laws of nature as just seen, giving 
 way to cowardice and destroying itself). A democracy tries 
 to approach the balance, but it recognizes the inevitable nat- 
 ural fact that always there must be a fringe of defective 
 aristocrats at each end of society (§168 p) ; hence, democ- 
 racy forms a police force large enough to take care of the 
 probable number of aristocrats who will go insane enough to 
 need watching or become violent. But as that police force 
 is an admission by the democracy that its educative efforts 
 have inevitably failed of perfect success, it will truistically try 
 to reduce the force. And that being in accord with natural 
 law, all other advantages follow:- the democracy does not 
 become cowardly, or panicky; it saves expense; etc. 
 
 f. There are three sorts of extreme pacifists in theory 
 (none in practice, as the theory is quite wrong and can't 
 work) :- autocrats or militarists, socialists, and religious ob- 
 jectors, (l) The theory of the autocrats or militarists is that 
 they will prepare so thoroughly that they can or will lick the 
 rest of the world, and thus there will be absolute peace. It 
 doesn't work, as we just saw, but it does superficially sound 
 nice enough to delude those extremely pacific militarists. 
 (Another pet delusion of those queer pacifists is that pre- 
 paredness" is national insurance. Insurance is distribution 
 of a risk over L and T. The risk of war is naturally distrib- 
 uted over the whole nation, so it is merely silly to talk of 
 distributing it further. And as regards T distribution:- in- 
 stead of storing up wealth, as insurance premiums, to pay 
 for war when some other extreme pacifists become violent, 
 they spend it on "preparedness," and then have to get more 
 out of an impoverished nation. But a police force is, intelli- 
 gently, an admitted expense— what it costs a democracy for 
 its failure to teach extreme pacifists to think.) (2) The so- 
 cialists in theory are extreme pacifists in that they would 
 
 have everybody an official of a single world government, so 
 that there would be absolute peace because there would be 
 nobody to fight. Incidentally, they in practice will first 
 wage a war of extermination on those who disagree, (g) The 
 first two extreme pacifists claim they want absolute peace, 
 and are willing to fight for it. The third sort is the religious 
 objectors who are going to get absolute peace by refusing 
 to fight. Obviously, their religious scruples' amount to try- 
 ing absolutely to confuse the One and the Many; also, they 
 deny that anything can be intolerable and they thus practi- 
 cally deny the One or religion (§169d), and force sane men to 
 restrain them or kill them — which is war, merely under its 
 
 zero name. So the difference between the aristocratic 
 
 preparedness and the democratic preparedness is this:- the 
 aristocrat has a fake panacea for war (in three guises) that 
 actually produces or is an unbalance or disease for which war 
 is one cure; so they consider it admirable to increase their 
 panacea" or armament: democratic preparedness recog- 
 nizes that war is a last (or surgical) cure for a bad disease, 
 a definite admission of democracy s imperfection and hence 
 an armament or police force that we want to keep as low as 
 possible. The aristocrat boasts of his preparedness, and 
 flaunts it in the face of the world : the democrat regrets the 
 need of his preparedness, but tries to keep it adequate to 
 deal with the probable number of rather crazy aristocrats. 
 A genius with words can do the race an enormous ser- 
 vice by inventing good distinctive names for the two things :- 
 democratic preparedness and aristocratic preparedness. 
 
 g. The next general quantitative result of a world state, 
 or partial trial at one, is that it tends towards an economic 
 balance, and so repudiates commercial exploiting or repul- 
 sions. In short, as is definitely recognized in effect by the 
 Constitution (Art. I, §X, 2), any tariffs or imposts, or duties 
 on imports or exports, between the parts of a democracy tend 
 to disrupt it and destroy life, and so are immoral and explic- 
 itly forbidden. As a truism there must be free trade (even 
 though there is no formal world state) if we are to be moral 
 in our economic relations with other nations : the instinctive 
 conclusion of mankind is glaringly to that effect, as is proved 
 by the fact that at no time in history has appreciable moral 
 
 stigma attached to smuggling. A tariff for revenue 
 
 only is an obvious logical self-contradiction, and so spoils the 
 brains of those who try to "believe" it:- for it truistically 
 by the infinite regress protects some industries. Also, a tar- 
 iff that is merely thus largely for revenue is an indirect tax, 
 
 and immoral on that ground. If infant" industries 
 
 need to be protected for n time (and they practically do, as 
 will implicitly appear), a direct bounty is obviously the open, 
 non-secret, moral procedure. But that protection of infant 
 industries is moral only temporarily; it is immoral and para- 
 sitical for anyone to accept aid long, just as it is for a grown 
 child to live on his parents — and as unlovely. (I have heard 
 of "key" industries: any argument for continued pro- 
 tection for such is merely the wailing of a spoiled baby 
 lacking in resourcefulness and self-reliance ; for rigorously, 
 no industry or part of the Many can be absolutely essential 
 or changeless.) In the long run, if you are unable to get 
 better or-and more work delivered to you for a given price 
 from me, than you can from any other laborer on earth, then 
 truistically that laborer ought to do it for you:- for I am not 
 of superior clay that you should take poorer work from me. 
 You might today take my poorer work, if you thought that 
 I would thus learn, and tomorrow give you so much better 
 work than anybody else that you thus gained in the long run 
 (that shows how a bounty for infant industry is right, just as 
 it is economically right to support a child — and a volume of 
 details on the two subjects is omitted:- e. g., the parents 
 
§lT6g XIX Three 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 244 
 
 ordinarily get their money repayment for supporting a child 
 directly from society at the time [not later from the child], 
 the care of the child increasing their earning capacity). In 
 the long run you are immorally wasting human life if you do 
 not buy in the best market:- your life, the life of the better 
 laborer, and that of the poorer by making him a privileged 
 aristocratic parasite. So the intelligent, democratic way is 
 obviously to stop putting up those immoral tariff barriers to 
 the best market. We shall usually prefer to react with those 
 closer to us if they actually prove themselves to be friends 
 by giving us good work (they have the economic advantage 
 under normal conditions of being at less expense for trans- 
 portation, and our inspection of the goods). But if a heath- 
 en in the other hemisphere can prove himself the better 
 man by overcoming that natural economic handicap, then he 
 is a better friend than the slack, incompetent workman next 
 
 door. The biological and other human ways in which 
 
 poor workmen get the job in an aristocracy and then pay for 
 their privilege are these:- They verbally tell the aristo- 
 cratic, fiat ruler that they depend on his protecting them, and 
 standing for their poor work; they thus acknowledge that 
 the aristocrat is superior, and that they (all tariff-protected 
 business men who approve the tariff and all union-protected 
 workmen who approve making the employer pay regular pay 
 for poor work) are rather worthless, and they thus confirm 
 the aristocrat in his power-madness at the expense of degrading 
 themselves mentally — it is the road to uselessness. The aristo- 
 crat is similarly debased by that self-abasing, incompetent, 
 and lying adulation, and his business is always really in an 
 unhealthy, running-down condition. The good business man 
 obviously can not afford to be tariff-protected, as it makes 
 him soft and flabby, and wastes his time running to Washing- 
 ton with whines that not even a self-reliant baby would emit, 
 and worst of all it costs him the public's good will. And in 
 precisely the same way the labor unions can not afford their 
 aristocratic game of protecting incompetents. 
 
 h. The last general quantitative result of a world state, 
 or partial one, which I shall consider explicitly is the racial 
 one. Because of the comparative difficulty of transportation 
 and communication in past ages, various races have stayed 
 rather steadily in somewhat different environments (climates) 
 and truistically have lived at different rates, and so are now 
 biologically different in a way which can most intelligibly be 
 expressed as different virtual ages. The difference is so slight 
 as not to cause mutual sterility (no doubt such sterility oc- 
 curred in the past, and by the principles of periodicity nature 
 promptly eliminated the weaker), and to make it unprofitable 
 to give specific comparison here of such ages. Truistically 
 intermarriage of those races produces a biological unbalance, 
 just as the children of a couple of the same race wide apart 
 in age are noticeably variable. Some of those half-breeds 
 have little survival strength; a few are a mixture which is 
 better than either parent stock (and of such half-breeds we 
 spring). We have almost no knowledge of what crosses are 
 good in the long run : it truistically clearly is silly to say that 
 we imperatively must preserve racial purity." And equally 
 clearly and truistically one race is not essentially superior to 
 another — merely quantitatively different. Truistically, if 
 we force races to refrain from intermarriage, that increases 
 the difference, until inevitably the unbalance will precipitate 
 a race war in which one race is exterminated — and the advo- 
 cate of race purity has no real facts to show that it won't be 
 his race to go (I cheerfully agree that I have the usual human 
 belief that it wouldn t be my race ; and that I like my racial 
 qualities and wouldn t care to take a chance on mixing them; 
 but that is merely healthy emotion, and I retain, or have got, 
 sense enough to know that I am ignorant of actual facts — 
 
 and I have read Madison Grant's "Passing of the Great 
 Race," and a lot of other such cheap, dualistic guesses.) 
 So a democratic state will, just as the Constitution does, take 
 races as essentially equal but quantitatively unequal, and will 
 let alone (§149m) the question of intermarriage until there 
 are some more-definite facts. It will be grateful to the per- 
 sons whose strength or foolhardiness or environment forces a 
 crossing, for having furnished data. Jf we decide that we 
 must not cross with a certain race, that means that we will 
 exterminate them — or become hypocrites and be exterminated. 
 
 i. Connected with that is the problem of birth control. 
 The United States has over 85 inhabitants to the square mile 
 — nearly 20 acres or ordinary city blocks to each person. 
 If present knowledge were intelligently and vigorously used 
 our land might be made to support 20 times that number. 
 But practically, every increase of population causes some un- 
 balancing which is often perceptible. Aristocrats hold that 
 unbalances should be increased, and consistently with that 
 they often explicitly want the birthrate increased — ordinarily 
 the more aristocratic, militaristic, and imperialistic a person 
 is, the more he objects to what he calls race suicide. (That 
 phrase race suicide' is scarcely rational:- if I avoid getting 
 fat I do not commit suicide, and a race that avoids over- 
 growth does not; the phrase is stupidly used by aristocrats 
 to beg the question as to actual facts.) The upper ten aris- 
 tocrats of course want more people to lord it over and use as 
 cannon fodder. And the submerged tenth aristocrats breed 
 .like nearly thoughtless rabbits. Neither have enough intel- 
 ligence to understand democracy or temperance, but again in 
 this case proceed on the pseudo principle that an unbalance 
 is desirable — that if a little is good, more is better. Some 
 few couples are geniuses at producing say as many as ten 
 vigorous, useful children: but the ordinary family with five 
 nowadays is a calamity to the state and early death to that 
 parent who takes the responsibility seriously. In the old 
 days large families were worse on both children and parents ; 
 but in those days people were so stupid that the majority 
 blundered into an accidental death before thirty, so that 
 quantity was then of more importance. Democracy requires 
 a balanced degree of racial increase. Perhaps we are up to 
 the point in our history where the greatand useful pioneering 
 will be in quest of quality, to restore and if possible maintain 
 the balance Quantity... X Quality... . That pioneering has 
 already been begun as regards the race itself by the average 
 person in this country — which birth control is probably the 
 most important symptom of our sound social health. The 
 pioneering in business ethics — the intelligent building-up and 
 seeking of good will" — is perhaps the next. 
 
 j. So it appears that a consciously formed world state 
 will not necessarily end war. Any severe climatic variation 
 is likely to cause war — and would, unless men were agile 
 enough mentally to meet the change rapidly with appropriate 
 balancing of Unselfishness... X Selfishness... . A world democ- 
 racy based on the sound principles of the Constitution will 
 ordinarily prevent disturbances of much size — will ordinarily 
 prevent a "war." The chief danger will be the same as al- 
 ways in the past:- a power-mad, selfish boss and citizens too 
 unintelligent to size him up and to see where they will land 
 if they follow him a little way on his primrose path to sudden 
 glory and wealth. There is no automatic way to end war : 
 it all depends on men in the end. Wars cure the worst un- 
 balances by weeding out the worst aristocrats — and a new 
 crop starts at once. A knowledge and use of democracy can 
 keep the aristocrats from growing, by education if that is 
 
 done well enough. And that is work. When we get 
 
 out of balance with the environment there is in effect a "nat- 
 ural war called famine or-and pestilence. Democracy 
 
245 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Appendix A 
 
 involves keeping a tolerable balance with the environment 
 (cf. footnote 175e). Part of that is called maintaining the 
 standard of living; and roughly, in business the standard of 
 living' is called overhead. The aristocrat dualistically fancies 
 that such standard (including various heavy business expendi- 
 tures for costly stationery and palatial furnishings, etc.) 
 is a sacrosanct affair that must be maintained of itself. But 
 an intelligent child can see that if that standard and over- 
 head does not enable its possessor to react better, with both 
 material and men, and thus do better than any "cheap 
 foreign labor, then that expense is in some degree a waste 
 — a destructive evil instead of a good. 
 
 §177. a. Thus any democratic state involves us in quan- 
 titative problems impossible of accurate solution, with grave 
 perils on each side of the balance. That is what life is : we 
 like it. Everything in the universe is engaged in the same 
 sort of balancing, and in time wears out and changes into a 
 different order structure, just as we all die — thus being a 
 part of keeping the perfect balance of the whole. 
 
 b. The race has for ages been increasing its life or hap- 
 piness — extending its limits of conscious balance with the 
 environment, and becoming more consciously God. Thus the 
 race has grasped and enjoys the universe in a rough way, and 
 has grasped the material earth in a rather definite way ; 
 and has already substantially formed a more or less organized 
 world state, thus also grasping its human members in a rather 
 definite way. Most of the race enjoy braving and balancing 
 the dangers at those two limits or outer zones — and thrive on 
 them, even though those dangers sound objectionable when 
 explicitly described as in the last section. The spreading of 
 the limits of consciousness into those dangers is an increase 
 of the definiteness of relationship — of love. Because the race 
 is as a verifiable fact now consciously related to a wide extent, 
 
 we as .1 truism of that fact love the race unless we are de- 
 fective. But there are a few of the race who get out into 
 those danger zones and are so weak as to be damaged and be 
 unable to get back to a balance, or see that they want to. 
 They are the aristocrats — the submerged tenth on and as one 
 dying fringe or breaking-up difference surface of the race, 
 and the upper ten on the opposite fringe. Those fringes are 
 where the consciousness of relationship or love begins to dim. 
 But in a wide sense we see we love those failing and quitting 
 aristocrats as being inevitable in the nature of things, and as 
 interesting and entertaining horrible educative examples. 
 
 c. And that generally satisfactory condition of human 
 affairs, with always some perceptible unbalances that are on 
 the way to a balance if we take enough time into view, out- 
 lines what we have seen in this book. The book is a de- 
 scription of the universe, given chiefly in terms of humans 
 because those are familiar and intelligible. It is a rigorous 
 unification of the universe, because that infinite universe is 
 our ultimate selves — we being God in that religious aspect. 
 That unification is expressed as the solution of the One and 
 Many. The race for centuries has tacitfy been using that 
 solution or logic — knowing the principles and applying them 
 to the objective world as science, and to ourselves as morality 
 or democracy. 
 
 d. The essentials may be briefly stated, although it re- 
 quired a number of pages to make them positively evident :- 
 The One is the Many. We grasp and are the One by 
 working personally with the Many in a temperate or demo- 
 cratic way. From the point of view of our feelings or sense 
 of well-being that balanced rhythmic grasp of the One is 
 happiness; from the point of view of our seeing or know- 
 ing or intellect that balanced rhythmic grasp of the One is 
 ineffable beauty. 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
 ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 No attempt is made to include ordinary abbreviations, or to in- 
 clude those used in short passages wherein they are first explained 
 (in several such cases abbreviations are used in a sense different 
 from that listed below as their usual meaning). 
 
 "Encv. Brit." "The Encyclopaedia Brittanica," 11th ed. 
 
 Daniell's "Physics." Alfred Daniel], "A Text Book of the 
 Principles of Physics," 3rd ed. (l902). 
 
 Marshall's "Economics." Alfred Marshall, "Principles of 
 Economics," 6th ed. (l910). 
 
 Watson's "Physics." W. Watson, "A Text-book of Phys- 
 ics," 5th impression (1904). 
 
 Wood's "Optics." Robert W. Wood, "Physical Optics," 
 1st ed. (1904). 
 
 Subscripts that are used in the text with several of the abbrevia- 
 tions below, are given separately. 
 
 A (l) a general symbol for any given thing; (2) chemical 
 affinity, or intensive factor of dynamic molar energy. 
 
 C variable numerical coefficient for molar or static masses. 
 
 Ent entropy, or extensive factor in heat energy. 
 
 Energy energy. 
 
 F force. 
 
 G variable numerical coefficient of 'dynamic' or gravitation 
 masses; also sometimes used, as indicated by context, 
 as the conventional gravity constant. 
 
 variable numerical coefficient for dynamic heat; also 
 used, as indicated by context, as orthodox heat constant. 
 
 variable numerical coefficient of static heat: also used, 
 as indicated by context, as constant Joule s equivalent. 
 
 variable numerical coefficient of static electricity ; also 
 used, as indicated by context, as the conventional con- 
 stant specific inductive capacity. 
 
 length or space — one unit measure of length, 
 mass — specifically, one unit or part of the universe. 
 
 potential of electricity or intensive factor of elec. energy. 
 
 quantity of electricity or extensive factor of elec. energy. 
 
 a conventional constant used in heat. 
 
 time — one unit measure of time. 
 Temp temperature, or intensive factor of heat energy. 
 That that; anything, as compared with a This. 
 This this ; any given thing. 
 
 U variable numerical coefficient of 'dynamic' electricity; 
 also used, as indicated by context, as the conventional 
 constant permeability. 
 
 velocity. 
 
 average velocity of light in a ' vacuum" in our neigh- 
 borhood. See §126b for other subscripts, 
 weight. 
 
 (l) current of electricity; (2) see §82a. 
 
 (l) distance, same as L; (2) differential symbol. 
 
 Continued on Next Page 
 
 H 
 
 J 
 
 K 
 
 L 
 
 M 
 
 P 
 
 Q 
 
 R 
 
 T 
 
 V 
 
 w 
 
 c 
 
 d 
 
Appendix A 
 
 [subscript] zero or standard formal unit (§71b). 
 
 length, same as L. 
 i unit magnet pole. 
 % [subscript] dynamic. 
 
 any number. 
 > pressure, 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 radius, same as L. 
 
 [subscript] indicates a relationship word, 
 [subscript] static, 
 volume, 
 indicates infinite regress (§33g). 
 
 1 H 
 
 l.i « i.- 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 PERIODIC TABLE OF ELEMENTS 
 
 o 
 
 I 
 
 II 
 
 in 
 
 rv 
 
 V 
 
 VI 
 
 VII 
 
 VIII 
 
 a He 
 
 399 
 
 3 Li 
 
 6.94 
 
 4 Be 
 9.1 
 
 SB 
 
 11. 
 
 6C 
 
 12.00 
 
 7N 
 14.01 
 
 80 
 16.00 
 
 9F 
 19.0 
 
 
 loNe. 
 
 20-2 
 
 11 Na 
 23.00 
 
 12 Mg 
 24-32 
 
 13 Al 
 27.1 
 
 14 Si 
 28.3 
 
 15 P 
 
 31-04 
 
 16 S 
 32.06 
 
 17 CI 
 3S-46 
 
 
 18 A 
 39.88 
 
 19 K 
 39"> 
 
 20 Ca 
 40.07 
 
 21 Sc 
 44.1 
 
 22 Ti 
 
 48.1 
 
 23 V 
 Si-o 
 
 24 Cr 
 52.0 
 
 25 Mn 
 54-93 
 
 26 Fe 27 Co 28 Ni 
 55.84 SS 97 5S.6S 
 
 
 
 ' 29 Cu 
 
 63-57 
 
 30 Zn 
 65-37 
 
 31 Ga 
 69.9 
 
 32 Ge 
 72. S 
 
 33 As 
 74.96 
 
 34 Se 
 79.2 
 
 35 Br 
 7992 
 
 
 36 Kr 
 82. 02 
 
 37 Rb 
 85-45 
 
 38 Se 
 87.63 
 
 39Y 
 88.7 
 
 40 Zr 
 go.6 
 
 41 Nb 
 
 93-5 
 
 42 Mo 
 96.0 
 
 43- 
 
 44 Ru 4S Rh 46 Td 
 101.7 102.9 106.7 
 
 
 47 As 
 107.88 
 
 48 Cd 
 112.40 
 
 49 In 
 
 H4.8 
 
 50 Sn 
 118. 7 
 
 SI Sb 
 120.2 
 
 S2Te 
 
 JZ7S 
 
 X 1 i 
 
 120. P2| 
 
 54 X 
 130.2 
 
 55 Cs 
 132.81 
 
 s6Ba 
 137-37 
 
 57 La 58 Ce 55 
 139.0 140.2514 
 
 Pr 60 Nd 61-62 Sm 63 Eu 64 Gd 65 Tb 66 Ds 
 0.6 144.3 150.4 152 157-3 159. 2 162. s 
 
 67 Ho 68 £r 69 Tu 70 
 163.5 167.7' 168.5 173 
 
 fb 71 Lu 72— 
 • S 1750 
 
 73 Ta 
 181. s 
 
 74 W 
 184.0 
 
 75- 
 
 76 Os 77 Ir 78 Pt 
 190.9 193. 1 19s. 2 
 
 
 79 Au 
 197.2 
 
 80 Hg 
 200.6 
 
 81 Tl 
 204.0 
 
 82 Pb 
 207 . 20 
 
 83 Bi 
 208.0 
 
 84 Po 
 (210.0) 
 
 85- 
 
 
 86 Em 
 (222.0) 
 
 87- 
 
 88. Ra 
 226.0 
 
 89 Ac 
 (227) 
 
 90 Th 
 232. IS 
 
 UrX2 
 (234) 
 
 92 Ur 
 238.2 
 
 
 
 This periodic table of elements and their atomic numbers is adapted 
 from Millikan's, "The Electron," published in 1917. The weights of 
 elements not in the order of their atomic numbers are in italics. 
 
 1 Hydrogen 
 
 32 Germanium 
 
 63 
 
 Europium 
 
 2 Helium 
 
 33 Arsenic 
 
 (54 
 
 Gadolinium 
 
 3 Lithium 
 
 34 Selenium 
 
 65 
 
 Terbium 
 
 4 Beryllium 
 
 35 Bromine 
 
 66 
 
 Dyprosium 
 
 5 Boron 
 
 36 Krypton 
 
 67 
 
 Holmium 
 
 6 Carbon 
 
 37 Rubidium 
 
 68 
 
 Erbium 
 
 7 Nitrogen 
 
 38 Strontium 
 
 69 
 
 Thulium 
 
 8 Oxygen 
 
 39 Yttrium 
 
 70 
 
 Ytterbium 
 
 9 Fluorine 
 
 40 Zirconium 
 
 71 
 
 Lutecium 
 
 10 Neon 
 
 41 Niobium 
 
 72 
 
 
 
 11 Sodium 
 
 42 Molybdenum 
 
 73 Tantalum 
 
 12 Magnesium 
 
 43 
 
 74 
 
 Tungsten 
 
 13 Aluminium 
 
 44 Rhuthenium 
 
 75 
 
 
 
 14 Silicon 
 
 45 Rhodium 
 
 7 
 
 Osmium 
 
 15 Phosphorus 
 
 46 Palladium 
 
 77 
 
 Iridium 
 
 16 Sulphur 
 
 47 Silver 
 
 78 
 
 Platinum 
 
 17 Chlorine 
 
 48 Cadmium 
 
 79 
 
 Gold 
 
 18 Argon 
 
 49 Indium 
 
 80 
 
 Mercury 
 
 19 Potassium 
 
 50 Tin 
 
 81 
 
 Thallium 
 
 20 Calcium 
 
 51 Antimony 
 
 82 
 
 Lead 
 
 21 Scandium 
 
 52 Tellurium 
 
 83 
 
 Bismuth 
 
 22 Titanium 
 
 53 Iodine 
 
 84 
 
 Polonium 
 
 23 Vanadium 
 
 54 Xenon 
 
 H5 
 
 
 
 24 Chromium 
 
 55 Caesium 
 
 86 
 
 Emanation 
 
 25 Manganese 
 
 56 Barium 
 
 87 
 
 ■ 
 
 26 Iron 
 
 57 Lanthanum 
 
 88 
 
 Radium 
 
 27 Cobalt 
 
 58 Cerium 
 
 89 
 
 Actinium 
 
 28 Nickel 
 
 59 Praseodymium 
 
 90 Thorium 
 
 29 Copper 
 
 60 Neodymium 
 
 91 
 
 Uranium X2 
 
 30 Zinc 
 
 61 
 
 92 
 
 Uranium 
 
 31 Gallium 
 
 62 Samarium 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX C 
 
 GEOLOGIC TIME SCALE 
 
 Prepared by H. F. Osborn 
 and by C. A. Reeds after 
 Schuchert. Reproduced 
 from Osborn's "Origin 
 and Evolution of Life." 
 The times given are much 
 too short (§112hi; XII). 
 
 MILLIONS 
 
 OF 
 
 YkARS 
 
 s<s 
 
 AGE 
 UPHIBIANS 
 
 INVERTEBRATES 
 
 EVOLUTION 
 INVERTEBRATES 
 
 EVOLUTION 
 
 UNICELLULAR 
 
 UFE 
 
 CRETAdEOUS 
 
 PENNSYLVANIAN 
 
 MISSISSIPPI AN 
 
 OfiDOVlCIAN 
 
 KEWEENAW AN 
 
 SUOQURIAN 
 
 LAUWtNTIAN 
 
2+7 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Index Cycl 
 
 INDEX 
 
 How to Use. 
 
 '4.8b' refers to section and paragraph; 
 'ftSb,' to footnote; 'Fb,' to section and para- 
 graph in Preface; 'One,' to Part One; 'ii,' to 
 page ii in Introductions; 'IX,' to Chap. IX. 
 
 This Index is not full. The names of per- 
 sons are not always the actual legal names; 
 the names of subjects are not always the act- 
 ual names used in the text. The Index is a 
 compromise, with no special consistency ex- 
 cept in an attempted ready usefulness. It is 
 not satisfactory to me, except in that it is 
 the best I could do in a reasonable time. In 
 theory it should be less so to the reader. 
 
 aberration, 127, 17c; see light, 
 absolute, 28b; see perfect. 
 
 — zero, 80e, 114g, 134j, 141f. 
 abstract, 28f, 59. 
 
 action at distance, f 77b, 88a. 
 
 — -reaction, 86e, 98b, 167; see balance. 
 
 Adam and Eve, 100c. 
 
 Adami, G. 145e. 
 
 Adams, H. etc. f48b, 135c, 156e, 157c. 
 
 — W. S. 115a. 
 Ade, George, fl67b. 
 
 affinity (chem.) 74e, 134hj; see sol. sys. 
 age, 146k-n; ages (geologic) App. C; 
 
 see astronomy, 
 agnosticism, 5, 22h, 23, 32, 35d, 40g, 
 
 88d, Ac, iv. 
 Albertus Magnus, f 48b. 
 'Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
 
 ("Carroll") 23a, 99a, 167d. 
 Ampere, A. M. 76, 74b, 77, 83f, 94g. 
 analysis, 21b. 
 Ananias (Biblical) 166q. 
 Angell, James R. 155c. 
 Angstrom, A. J. 121c. 
 anthropocentricism, 73h, lOOcd. 
 applied or used, 85e. 
 a priori and a posteriori, 163j. 
 Aquinas, Thomas, 24c, 46d, f48b, 151b. 
 aristocrat, v, 7j, 14d, 37e, 48d, 85c, 88j, 
 
 89i, 100c, 105d, 139a, 141h, 145c, 
 
 147e, 149r, 158g, 159f-n, 162di, 163f-h, 
 
 166q, 167h, 168-9, 171jkm, 173-4. 
 Aristotle, 26g, f48b. 
 armaments, 176d-f; see war. 
 Arrhenius, S. A. 107a, 108b. 
 art, 171 ; artistic temperament, 159g, 
 
 166pq, 168e. 
 assimilation, 120b ; see growth, 
 assumption, 22, 88b, 97a. 
 astral planes, lOOg. 
 astronomy, XII; ages, 111c; velocities, 
 
 111; unified with electricity, 135d; 
 
 see solar system, etc. 
 asymmetry, 98; see incommens., balan. 
 Atherton, Gertrude, 155b, 166oq, 170k. 
 athletics, 166f. 
 
 atom, 74e, 15j, 89, 90, 119a; no con- 
 stant — , 101J, 128e, fl32a; getting 
 energy out, 141; see Richards, etc. 
 
 attraction, repulsion, 134g; see gravity, 
 authority, 162b, fl67b. 
 autocracy, 174 ; see aristocrat. 
 Avogadro, Amedes, 89g. 
 axis (filiar, and main) 98n. 
 
 balance, 114c, 146s, 7j, 163, 177; see 
 
 temperance, genius, democracy. 
 Balmer's formula, 128de, 130f. 
 banking, fl68h. 
 Bastian, H. Charlton, 144cd. 
 Bateson, Wm. 147c. 
 batteries, storage, f'135c. 
 behavior is tic psychology, 49o; see 
 
 Dewey. 
 Being, 22, 93, 95e, 161b; see ether, 
 
 assumption. 
 Bergson, H. fl65b, 20a, 64c. 
 Berkeley, George, lc. 
 Bernoulli's theorem, 95, 98hi, lOOd, 
 
 lOlg, 102, 114b, 126a; see fluid theo. 
 Bible, 85c, 99a, 160d, 161b, 165b, 170b, 
 
 171j. 
 biologists, British, 147, flOOc. 
 biology, XVI ; definition, 142-3 ; see 
 
 organ, Jordan, Darwin, life, etc. 
 birth, 144ij, 96d, 8m; control, 176i. 
 Bjerknes, V. F. K. 94, 95d, 113b, 114b, 
 
 124f, 134k, 84c. 
 "blood and iron" 145, 163h. 
 Bode's law, 117g, 128de. 
 Bok, Edward, fl67b. 
 books, 49k. 
 
 boundary, 47, 55c, Two; see V\. 
 Boyden, U. A. 127k. 
 Bradley, F. H. iv, v. 
 Bragg, W. H. and son, 101J, 138h. 
 breeding, 159j. 
 brevity, 30g, 50h, 138f, Db. 
 brokers (stock) 163h. 
 Brooks, Wm. K. 147d. 
 Brownian movement, 137cf. 
 Bryce, James, 173h. 
 Buckle, H. T. 49o, 87b. 
 Buddha, Buddhism, 39a, 49, 5 9 e g, 
 
 157e ; see Nirvana, 
 business, 163gh, Fe, vi, vii, 173e; see 
 
 labor, sizing up men, money, etc. 
 business is business 163g. 
 butters-in, 167j. 
 
 Cabot, Richard C. 149io, 167b. 
 
 calculus, 30b-f, 104h. 
 
 Campbell, W. W. 171m. 
 
 cancer, 149j. 
 
 capital, see labor, wealth, property. 
 
 Carlyle, Thomas, 162d, 166p. 
 
 Carnegie, Andrew, 94g, 168m. 
 
 Carnegie Institution, F. 
 
 Carnot, M. F. Sadi, 104. 
 
 Carrel, Alexis, 146k. 
 
 Carrington, Hereward, 101k. 
 
 Castle, Wm. E. 147f. 
 
 cataslrophies, 100J. 
 
 Catholics, 24c, 46d, f48b, f49a, 86d, 
 149q, 174c. 
 
 cause and effect, 86; see relationship. 
 
 caution, f49g. 
 
 Cavendish, Henry, 89j. 
 
 cell (biologic) 120h, 143d; (ether) 97d, 
 Two; (nerve) 152c. 
 
 center (of reference) 40f, 881, 100c. 
 
 Chamberlin, T. C. lc, 113cd, 117be, 
 118d, 122g-i, 144c. 
 
 chemistry, 138g-i; see atom, etc. 
 
 chicken and egg, problem of, 109. 
 
 Chinese, 17c, 168h. 
 
 chivalry, 170l-n. 
 
 Christ, 6, 19c, 24c, 29, 39h, 47i, 48b, 
 49, 89i, 153f-h, 155c, 159ln, 160d, 
 162, 165, 167h, 168j, 170bm. 
 
 Christianity, see Christ, religion. 
 
 Christian Science, 149q, 49a, 155. 
 
 circular reasoning, 22, 35f; see logic. 
 
 civilization, 166c, 171; see progress. 
 
 classes (by legislation) 162i, 163f, 167h; 
 (of men) XVIII, XIX, 173f i. 
 
 classic logic, 23a; see logic. 
 
 Clausius, R. J. E. lc, 80-2, 100J. 
 
 climate, 99d, 112g-m, 122, 166c. 
 
 coefficients, 71, IX, 68, 77d, 83f. 
 
 cohesion, 47j; see friction, force. 
 
 cold, astronomical bodies cold inside, 
 see planets. 
 
 cold light, 132. 
 
 combustion, 141. 
 
 comets, 120; see solar system. 
 
 commensurability, 50; see incommens. 
 
 commonsense, v, 2f, 39, 49lt. 
 
 competition, 170o; see balance, demoe. 
 
 Conklin, Edwin G. 147d. 
 Conrad, Joseph 155b. 
 
 conservation (of resources) 167k; of en- 
 ergy) see energy, religion. 
 
 constants, 50d, 82, 89k, 100c. 123d. 
 
 Constitution of U. S. 173, 7j, 37d, 169h. 
 
 continuity, 26, 86; see relationship, in- 
 finity, unification. 
 
 contradiction, 26-7, 28e, 51; see One 
 and Many. 
 
 Cooke, Morris Lllewellyn, vi-vii, Gb, 
 114c, f 167b, 163j. 
 
 cooperation, vii, 167; see balance. 
 
 Copernicus, 40f. 
 
 Coriat, I. H. 154c. 
 
 courage, 170r, Fc, Gb, 150h, 176e. 
 
 credit, 167k, 168h. 
 
 Crehore, A. C. 134k. 
 
 criterion of molar bodies, 105; see V\. 
 
 culture, 166c, 171; see progress. 
 
 cure, 149h. 
 
 "curved" color, 128g; — space, 60; 
 see Euclid. 
 
 cycles, 50e, lOlf, 144i, 149c, 164e, 166m. 
 
Cyni Index 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 248 
 
 cynicism, 21b. 
 
 Darwin, C. 87b, 89i, 144ch, 145, 147d. 
 
 — G. H. 113d. 
 
 death, 80m, 114g, 144ij, 1461, 163g. 
 
 deism, 47i. 
 
 democrat, XIX, 173-4, 167-70, 7j, 48c, 
 49ru, 105d, 149r, 162j. 
 
 Democritus, 89c. 
 
 Descartes, 24c, 46d, 134k, 151b. 
 
 description, 85a. 
 
 devil, 49f; see God. 
 
 Dewey, John, iii-v, Cc, Gb, 15b, 17d, 
 21a, 22f, 23a, 35d, 87b, 49op, 128g, 
 149i, 151b, 154b, 161b, fl67b, 174f. 
 
 difference surface, 98n, 47g, 80m. 
 
 dimensions (of space) 59, 62, 63h, 78a; 
 languages of different — 62; theory, 
 68; dimensional equations, f38c, 68. 
 
 directions, 99b-d, 32b, 43f, 50e, 88k, 
 lOli, 104j, 130b, 134d, 135c, 145c, 
 146e, 170j; in light, 125a; elec. 134d. 
 
 division of labor, 170o-q. 
 
 divorce, 166no. 
 
 dogmatism, 5, 39f, 44g, 48d, 85c. 
 
 Doppler effect, 127g. 
 
 Drude, P. K. L. 130b. 
 
 dualist, 5b, 19, 21, 49, 89k, 104b; see 
 materialist, aristocrat. 
 
 Dunne, F. P. ("Mr. Dooley") fl67b. 
 
 dynamic, 73, 77h, 98j, IX; see static. 
 
 Eastman, George, 168m. 
 
 economics, 156d, 170o, XVIII, XIX; 
 
 see Marshall, A., money, taxes, etc. 
 Eddington, A. S. 74a, 107e, 112i. 
 Eddy, Mary Baker Glover, 149q. 
 Edison, Thomas A. 152f, f 167b, 168m. 
 education, 174fg, 163b; see learning. 
 Ehrlich, Paul, 149g. 
 Einstein, A. 66, vii, 36h, 42b, 57b, lOOcj, 
 
 125b, 127g-k, 128g, 134j, 135c, f 168v. 
 elasticity, 97d, XI, 74f. 
 electricity, XIV, 75-7, 15j; static, 134; 
 
 mag. 135; see electron, Ampere, etc. 
 electron, 89bf, 98y, 120h, 137bg. 
 element, 101J, 118e, App. B; see har- 
 monic periodicity, atom, etc. 
 Ellis, Havelock, 155a. 
 emotions, 153, 17d, 20d, 30g, f94g. 
 "Encyclopaedia Brittanica"l7a. 
 energy, 15i, IX, 39g, 100J; getting — 
 
 139-41. 
 entropy, 71h, 77-82; increase of, 80, 
 
 140de, 174a. 
 equality, no quantitative, 105d; see 
 
 One and Many, quantitative, 
 equation, 39a; see mathematics, 
 error, man can not make, 25b. 
 Erwin, M. 94, 84c, 96d, 98i, 101J, 124f, 
 
 126c, 128d, 134k. 
 ether, 93-4, Two, 66a, 125d ; see Being, 
 ethics, 160, 170, XVIII. 
 Euclid, Euclidian space and time, 60-2, 
 
 33g, f 38a, 57, 66, 87b, 104e. 
 evil, 85e; see good, 
 evolution, 145, 98p; see progress. 
 
 exact, no exact science, 40-2, 50, 66, 
 25d, 26g, 35fg, 36g, 52b, 82b, 85d, 
 881, 98j, lOOcl, 137e, 143c, 147g, 
 148b; see infinite regress. 
 
 exaggeration, 43k. 
 
 executives, f94g, 157c, 170p. 
 
 expediency, 40k. 
 
 experiments, 1, 84b, 85e, 88fj, 158a; 
 excessive, 137c-g; see proof. 
 
 explanation, 40h, 85a. 
 
 factors, 71e-gi, IX, Two. 
 
 faculties, 154bc, 159a. 
 
 fairy tales, 167d. 
 
 faith, 5, 40j. 
 
 fame, 168, 166f; see power-madness. 
 
 Faraday, M. 87b, 89dj, 98i, 99j; 130e. 
 
 fear, 158g; see courage. 
 
 feminism, 166o-r, 170k. 
 
 field, 98n; see tube of force, fluid theo. 
 
 fighting, 145, 175e; see war. 
 
 filament, 98n, Two. 
 
 Filene, A. L. and E. A. 168g. 
 
 Fisher, Dorothy Canfield, 155f, 166 r, 
 
 167b, 170k, 171f, Cc. 
 — Irving, f 168h ; and Fiske, E. L. 146n. 
 Fiske, John, 166j. 
 Fizeau, A. H. L. 124g. 
 Flourney, Theodore, 101k. 
 fluid theories, 94, XIII. 
 force, IX-XI ; all forces known , 139 ; 
 
 fields of, 89; residing, 73f; of words, 
 
 52e; see gravity, elec, love, etc. 
 Ford, Henry, 47j, 159j, fl67b, 168m. 
 Foster, James H. f98g, fl67b. 
 fourth dimension, 62, 66g, 128g. 
 Franklin Institute, 127a. 
 freedom, 169e; of speech, 169f-h, 173c; 
 
 of will, 157e-g. 
 Freud, 154d-f, 156e. 
 friction, 97h, 15f, 98c; see force. 
 
 galaxy, 107-9, XII; spectrum, 128h-k. 
 
 gambling, fl63h. 
 
 Gantt, H. L. fl67b. 
 
 Gautier, 134k. 
 
 genius, 159e-n, fl66d, 169h, 170ik. 
 
 geocentricism, 100c; see center. 
 
 geology, 122g-i. 
 
 Germans, pre-war, lc, 19a, 49, 147e, 
 
 164d, fl72c. 
 Gibbons, James, Cardinal, f49a. 
 Gilbreth, F. B. and Lillian M. 163,j. 
 Gilman, Charlotte Perkins Stetson, 170q. 
 glacial ages, 112g-m. 
 glad game, see make believe. 
 God, 21cd, 25b, 29, 46-7, 98m, 104b, 
 
 123e, 140d, 153f, 158i, 159e-n, 161, 
 
 166m; see Trinity. 
 Golden Age, 87b. 
 Golden Rule, 162eij. 
 Goldthwait, Joel E. 149ir. 
 good, Good and Evil, XVIII, 160-1, 
 
 135c, 100J. 
 government, see Constitution, democrat, 
 
 aristocrat; — ownership, 168i, 170o. 
 Grace, Eugene G. f 167b. 
 
 grain theory, see Reynolds. 
 
 grammar, 27e, f30b. 
 
 gravity, 74, 134jk, 64d, 70, 73d, 75c, 
 
 83f, 91f, 103, 108, 120i, 138e, 146h; 
 
 see solar system, Newton . 
 Gresham's law, fl68h. 
 growth, 98o-q, Two, 76d, 80fm, 100m, 
 
 109, 120h, 146. 
 guessing, 106; see quantitative, 
 gyroscope theory, 96d. 
 
 Haeckel, Ernest H. v. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, 173h. 
 
 — Sir Wm. R. 2g. 
 
 Hale, George E. lc, 122e. 
 
 "Hall, Holworthy" 155b. 
 
 hallucinations, f 166d. 
 
 happiness, 163, XVIII. 
 
 harmonic periodicity, harmonic propor- 
 tions, 801, 83g, 84a, lOObj, 101J, 110a, 
 118e, 120f, 128d, 156c, 163j, 170p, 176b. 
 
 Hathaway, H. K. 163j. 
 
 heat, 78-82, 138c-e; see entropy, etc. 
 
 heaven, 123. 
 
 hedonism, 160a, 161b. 
 
 Hegel, G. W. F. iii, v. 
 
 Heraclitus, 42b, 66h. 
 
 heredity, 147. 
 
 Hergesheimer, J. 155b. 
 
 Hering, Carl, 53b. 
 
 high cost of living, fl68h, 176j, 176g. 
 
 Hinks, A. R. 107a. 
 
 history, 165b, f 170d; length of, 112m. 
 
 Hobbes, Thomas, 167b. 
 
 Homer, 171j. 
 
 Hoover, Herbert, f 167b, 168m. 
 
 Hopkins, E. M. 49r. 
 
 housekeeping, 170p; see mother. 
 
 Howe, E. W. 159i, f 167b. 
 
 Hughes, Charles E. f 173b. 
 
 human nature changing, 147h. 
 
 humanity, law of, 164d. 
 
 humor, f 162a, 34b, 43k, 50h, 153f. 
 
 Hurst, Fannie, 155b. 
 
 Huygens's principle, 124d, 125b, 126, 
 128a, 158f. 
 
 hypocrisy, see make believe, aristocrat. 
 
 hypotheses, 159b. 
 
 Hyslop, J. H. 101k. 
 
 hysteria, 37e, 101k, 154e, 166pq. 
 
 Ibsen, 170c, 171j. 
 
 idealism, v, 20, 49r, 160a, 161b, 163i; lit- 
 eral-}' idealism, 171f. 
 
 identity, 28; see One and Many, logic. 
 
 idolatry, 14d, 49q, 52c, 85c, 173b. 
 
 ignorance, 5, 164c; see agnosticism. 
 
 immortality, 152d-f, 101k, 123e, 144j, 
 146k. 
 
 implicit, implication, v, 52. 
 
 incommensurability, 50, 125a, 126a, Two. 
 
 increase of entropy, see entropy. 
 
 individualism, 1711, vii; see democracy, 
 hysteria, power-madness, balance. 
 
 industrial democracy, 170p. 
 
 ineffable, iv, v, 34, 40k, f51h, 162c; see 
 infinite regress. 
 
249 
 
 inertia, 88; see motion. 
 
 infinite regress, 36gn, V, 20d, 24d, 42c, 
 51e, 52b, 53e, 61a, 72e, 76d, 77d, 96d, 
 100g, 101i, 135e, 141h, 1531, 173c. 
 
 infinity, 43, 50g,24c; see number. 
 
 Inquisition, 161b. 
 
 insanity, 155ab, 159fg. 
 
 intellect, 153, XVII; see reason. 
 
 intentions, good, 155f. 
 
 interest (psychological) 159c. 
 
 intuition, see intellect, Bergson. 
 
 inverse square law, 76d, 73, 77cf, 80j, 
 83g, 94e, 156b; see structure. 
 
 ion, 135; see atom. 
 
 irrationalism, see agnosticism. 
 
 James, Henry, fl69h, 171f. 
 
 — William, v, vi, 15b, 49p, 113d, 153bf, 
 
 155d, 156e, fl65b. 
 Job (Biblical) f 165d, 166r. 
 job, any religious, 166f; see sizing up 
 
 men. 
 Jordan, David Starr, v-vi, Cc, Gb, lc, 
 
 23a, 84c, 87b, f94g, flOOc, 143c, 
 
 145abe, 147d, 156e, 167b. 
 Joule, J. P. 79. 
 judgment, 42d, 51a, iv. 
 Judgment Day, 86d. 
 judiciary, 174h. 
 "just and unjust 1121. 
 
 K, 75-7, 68c, 66f, 136. 
 
 Kaiser, 25c, 50e, 85c, 88j, 137d. 
 
 Kant, I. 4b, 19a, 104b, 108e, 113b, 161b. 
 
 Kellogg, Vernon, vii, 147d. 
 
 Kelvin (Wm. Thomson) 2g, 3b, 7e, 
 
 96df, 98o, lOlj, 112i, 148b. 
 Keyser, Cassius J. 60c. 
 Kidd, Benjamin, 166c. 
 kinetic, 77h ; theories, 89, X-XI, Two, 
 
 15j, 104. 
 Klyce, Laura Kent, Cc. 
 — S. 5a, 7i, f 34c, 49t, 99d, 138g, 144j, 
 
 152f, 153f, 158e, 159d, 162b, fl66d, 
 
 170m, fl70r, 1711m, fl72c. 
 Knight, Austin M. 122c. 
 Kultur, 163gh, 171i. 
 
 labor, labor leaders, 174bc, vii, 163h, 
 167k, 170p, 176g. 
 
 lag, lOlf, 132a, 138e, 146g. 
 
 laissez faire, 149mr. 
 
 Lamarck, chevalier de, 147d. 
 
 Landolt, H. 143c. 
 
 Langmuir, Irving, lOlj. 
 
 language, One; model of, VIII; of dif- 
 ferent dimens. 62; see One and Many. 
 
 Laplace, marquis de, 118e, 113c, 114c. 
 
 Larmor, Sir Joseph, 79a, 80c. 
 
 lawyers, lawyers' law, vii, 163fg, 173. 
 
 Leacock, Stephen, f 167b. 
 
 learning, way of, 158g, 159b. 
 
 least action, 98m, 104fg. 
 
 Le Bon, G. f 132a, 134k. 
 
 Lecky, W. E. H. f48b. 
 
 Lee, Gerald Stanley, Cc, 159j, 162h, 
 fl65d, f 167b, 171f. 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Leibnitz, G. W. 30f. 
 
 lever, 15f, 100m. 
 
 life, 143-4, 5c, 112m, whole book; 
 maximum, 166-7. 
 
 light, XIII, 15j, 101k; formation of, 
 124-8; bending of, 125b, 127g; color, 
 126d ; corpuscular, 130d ; dispersion, 
 128-9; polarization, 130; reflection, 
 131; refraction, 1281; veloc. 36b, 127. 
 
 — year, 107d. 
 
 Lincoln, A. 34b, f 94g, 153f, 156e, 159n, 
 168j, fl73b, 173h. 
 
 line organization, 37f, 167h, 174c. 
 
 literature, 99a, f 169h, 171f. 
 
 Little, Arthur D. f 167b. 
 living, world owes a" 168p. 
 
 Loeb, J. 146or. 
 
 logic, One, IV, VI, 4; Christ's, 153h ; 
 necessity in, 34-5; rule, 43h-k, 44; 
 users of valid, f 167f ; woman's, 170h. 
 
 logistics, 4a, 44h. 
 
 Lorentz, H. A. 66, 127j. 
 
 Lorimer, George H. f 167b. 
 
 love, 47b, 162, XVIII; see force. 
 
 Luther, Martin, fl66d. 
 
 machine, 15f, 21b, 47j, 50e, 86f, 98j, 
 100m, 165d; language, 63i. 
 
 magnetism, see elec. ; persona], 101k. 
 
 make believe, 155, 48d, 149i, fl68hvii. 
 
 Maine, Sir Henry J. S. fl73bh. 
 
 majority, 171k-m, 173g. 
 
 man, 46-7, Three ; average, 6b, 171k-m ; 
 compared with woman, 170; great 
 men, fl67b; measurement of, 148, 
 140e; part of machines, 140de; theo- 
 retical, 40k; see classes, sizing up m. 
 
 Many, 14b, 65; see One and Many. 
 
 marriage, 166j-r. 
 
 Marshall, A. 84c, 156d, 163j, fl63h. 
 
 — John, fl73b, 173h. 
 
 Marx, Karl, 174. 
 
 mass, IX, 96b; varies with velocity, 41, 
 
 66, 72e, Two. 
 
 materialism, materialist, 49h, 80, 46de, 
 
 7, 51h, 66i, 88j, S8m, 100c, 137d, 
 
 145, 146e. 
 mathematics, Be, 3, 9, 30, 36k, 39a, 
 
 43-4, 49p, 58, 60-2, 104k. 
 matter, IX, Two, 98m. 
 Maxwell, J. C. 2g, 15d, 46c, 74f, 80f, 
 
 89, 90b, 95d, 98cijy, 104, 105, 134d, 
 
 135c, 140e. 
 Mayo, W. J. and C. H. 149ir. 
 measures, measurement, 2, 32, 36i, 40k, 
 
 67, 84a, lOlj, 148. 
 
 mechanics, 86f, VIII, 98, Two, 9, vi; 
 
 gravity, f 74b and see gravity, 
 medicine, 149. 
 memory, 158, 36f. 
 Mendelism, 145e, 147g. 
 Merriam, John C. Fd. 
 Metchnikoff, E. 144j, 146n. 
 meteor, meteorite, 120jk. 
 method, 86, One; see trick of words. 
 Michelson-Morley experiment, 66ag, 
 
 127gj. 
 
 Index Paci 
 
 middleman, 170o, Fi. 
 
 militarist, f 170r, 176f, 52c; see aristocrat. 
 
 Mill, J. S. 49o. 
 
 millennium, 123. 
 
 Miller, Eugene, 84c, 113d. 
 
 Millikan, R. A. 41c, 89h, 128e, 137cf. 
 
 mind, 153, XVII; and matter, 150fg. 
 
 Mitchell, S. Weir, 101k, 149i. 
 
 modesty, 5b, f94g, 156e. 
 
 molecule, see atom, structure. 
 
 money, 168. 
 
 monism, 49, 17c, v. 
 
 Montaigne, M. de, fl67b. 
 
 Moore, Benjamin, 144ce. 
 
 Moseley's law, 128ek, 130f. 
 
 Moses, 173b. 
 
 motion, 361, 72a, 73b, f98d; laws of, 
 
 87-8, log. 
 mother, 159i. 
 
 Muensterberg, H. 151b, f 165b. 
 music, lOlf; see harmonic periodicity, 
 mystery, 4c, 40j, 1001. 
 mystic, 20, iv, 34, 49, 71a, 73b, 88c, 90d, 
 
 lOOh, 130d, 158e. 
 
 name, 35e, 48, 49r, 76d, 90; see logic. 
 
 Napoleon I, f94g. 
 
 nebula, 107, XII; nebular theory, 113. 
 
 nebulosity, 121. 
 
 negative ( — form easier) 41, 88cd, 173b. 
 
 neighbor, 162; see ethics. 
 
 Newcomb, Simon, 128d. 
 
 newspapers, 158g, 173h. 
 
 Newton, I. 74, 87-8, 2a, 15g, 30f, 49p, 
 64d, 66b, 75a, 77i, 83f, 89i, 93, 97e, 
 98m, lOOln, 114c, 117g, 127j, 134jk, 
 136d, 163j. 
 
 New York, 99b, 101k, 123a, 159n. 
 
 Nietzsche, F. W. 49ei, 145a, 162h, 163h. 
 
 Nirvana, 43e, 881, 163b; see Buddha. 
 
 non-Euclidian space, see Euclid. 
 
 Nordmann, C. 127f. 
 
 Norris, Kathleen, 155b. 
 
 Northrup, E. F. 102, 117f, 124f. 
 
 nova, 117d. 
 
 number, 43, 26, 36h, 44, 50, 55, 58. 
 
 observation, 22i. 
 
 Ohm's law, 136, 75a, 77i. 
 
 One, One and Many, 14-16, 28, 49, 157, 
 One, whole book. 
 
 Onnes, H. K. 141f. 
 
 ontology, see Being, ether. 
 
 opportunity, 138d, 166f, 40k. 
 
 optimism, 149f. 
 
 oratory, f 28h. 
 
 orders of structure, see structure. 
 
 organism, XVI, 15f, 86df; see struct- 
 ure; organs, 146hi. 
 
 Osborn, H. F. 112h-j, 147h, App. C. 
 
 Ostwald, W. 137e, 147e. 
 
 overeating, 146n. 
 
 "overhead' 176j. 
 
 overrunning, lOlf; see incommensurab. 
 
 pXv, 82-3, 71i. 
 pacifists, 176f. 
 
Pain Index 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 250 
 
 pain, 163; see good. 
 
 panacea, 149g. 
 
 panic, business, fl68h, Fe. 
 
 pantheism, 47i. 
 
 parallels, 60i. 
 
 paranoia, 37e, 158g. 
 
 parasite, 149f, 155c, 166op; see aristoc. 
 
 Paton, Stewart, 171m. 
 
 patience, 170r. 
 
 Patten, Wm. lc, 84c, 145abe, 147d. 
 
 Paul, Paulineism, 6c, 89bi, 161b, 165b, 
 166o, 167gh, 17lf; see Christ. 
 
 payment, 168, 89k. 
 
 Pearson, Karl, 49p. 
 
 Pepper, George Wharton, f 173b. 
 
 perfect, lOli, 104b; gas, 82; see ex- 
 act, One and Many. 
 
 periodicity, see harmonic periodicity. 
 
 periodic table, 801, lOOj, 119, 144d, 
 App. B. 
 
 permeability, see U. 
 
 Perrin, M. Jean, 137cf. 
 
 personality, person, 42d, 47ij, 86d, 
 101k, 152ef. 
 
 pessimism, 149f. 
 
 phenomenon, 98o, 139b. 
 
 philosophy, 39, iii, 7d, 52h, 66h, 88 f, 
 89c. 
 
 phlogiston, 15}. 
 
 physicians, 149. 
 
 physics, physical science, 67a, 68e-i, 
 IX, Two." 
 
 planetesimal, 113, 115, 120k. 
 
 planets, 117f (see solar system); cold 
 inside, 119a, 122j; direc. of revo. 112c. 
 
 Plato, lc, f48b. 
 
 play, 167c-m; see democracy. 
 
 Plotinus, 15c. 
 
 pluralism, 17b; see materialist, logic. 
 
 poetry, fl65d. 
 
 Poincare, J. H. 3c, 30b. 
 
 "Pollyanna" 149f, fl68hvii. 
 
 pope, see aristocrat, theologian. 
 
 Porter, Eleanor H. 149f. 
 
 Portier, Paul, 146i. 
 
 possible, 101k ; see quantitative. 
 
 potential, 73h, 76, 134b, 146e; — en- 
 ergy, 801 ; infinite, zero, 80, 99b-d ; 
 of man, 140 e. 
 
 power, 73h (see energy): human, 166df, 
 168kl, 173h ; see rebirth, power-mad. 
 
 power-madness, 1681, 173e, 174b, 176, 
 85c, 139a. 
 
 pragmatism, 49p, 156e. 
 
 prayer, 167d. 
 
 prediction, 85d. 
 
 Prince, Morton, 154c. 
 
 principle, 147e, 169; see qualitative. 
 
 printing, typography, E, F, f34c, 40g. 
 
 privilege, 48d ; see aristocrat. 
 
 problem, see solution, One and Many. 
 
 progress, 98p, 147k, 170k. 
 
 prohibition, 166b. 
 
 proof, 35, 22, 49b, 50e, 53e, 88j. 
 
 property (physics) 56, 88bd, 119c, 128ef; 
 (wealth) f 175c. 
 
 prophet, prophecy, 85d. 
 
 prosperity, 164b; see power-madness, 
 protection (tariff) 170k, 176dg. 
 psychic phenomena, 101k, 152f. 
 psychology, XVII; modern, 154c; see 
 
 will, mind, etc. 
 Ptolemaic astronomy, 100c, 127i. 
 punishment, penology, 168q. 
 Puritan, 135c, 149e, 156e. 
 purpose, 5, 42d, 100J, lOlf, 144h. 
 
 qualitative, 40, iii, 5, 66, 148, 162i; 
 
 see One. 
 quantitative, 40, iii, 4e, 37, 66, 148, 
 
 162i; see Many, 
 quitters, 21b, 159. 
 
 race, fl70j, Three; end of, 1121; puri- 
 ty and war, 176h. 
 
 radioactivity, 119a, 141g. 
 
 Ramsey, Sir Wm. 138h. 
 
 realism, 20; literary, 171f. 
 
 reality, 49g, 100c, iii; see truth. 
 
 reason, reasoning, 25a, 153be; induc- 
 tive and deductive, 163j ; see logic. 
 
 rebirth, 162, 153f-h, 28h, 40h,48e, 85b, 
 98m, 149q, 166dfh, 1681, 171c. 
 
 Reeve, S. A. 84c, 89be, 92, 93e, 97, 
 100c, 113c, 170o. 
 
 regress, see infinite regress. 
 
 reincarnation, 158e. 
 
 relationship, 28fgh, 44ef, 47h, 57, 58i. 
 
 relativity, 66; of color, 128g; see Ein- 
 stein. 
 
 religion, 39, 6, 85b, 160cd; any job re- 
 ligious, 166f; see rebirth, ethics, 
 One, Trinity, Christ, theologian. 
 
 responsibility, 164e, XVIII. 
 
 rest, 361 (see static); 167m (see democ). 
 
 reverse, reversal, 32b, 50e, 98k, 104j, 
 135c. 
 
 Reynolds, Osborne, 91, 49g, 84c, 87b, 
 89be, 93e, 95d, 97, 100c, 104j, 126c, 
 134k, 145c, 147c. 
 
 rhetoric, 52gh. 
 
 rhythm, see balance. 
 
 Richards, T. W. 81-3, Cc, lc, 23a, 84b, 
 89, 90c, 92b, 93f, 100c, 119d, 138h, 
 156b. 
 
 riddle of universe, 14de, 40hj, 49k. 
 
 Riley, Woodbridge, lob. 
 
 ring, single surface, VIII. 
 
 Ritter, Wm. E. 84c, 145abe, 147d. 
 
 ritual, 167d, 171j, 97b. 
 
 Rockefeller, John D. 159j, 168m. 
 
 rotary engine, 62i. 
 
 Rowland, H. A. 135a. 
 
 Russell, Bertrand, 3c, 15c, 44d, 62f. 
 
 Rutherford, E. 138h. 
 
 Ryan, J. A. f48b, 160d. 
 
 salvation, see rebirth. 
 
 sanctions, 173bc. 
 
 Saturn, 113, 118-9. 
 
 Schwab, Charles M. fl67b, 168m. 
 
 science, 39, 85ce, iv, vi, vii, 2, 10, 28a, 
 
 165b, whole book, 
 scientific management, 168j ; see Taylor. 
 
 "scrap of paper" 35c, f48b, 147e. 
 
 secondaries, 98w; see structure. 
 
 Sedgwick, Ellery, f 167b. 
 
 selfish, see aristocrat. 
 
 self-preservation, law of, 164d, fl75e. 
 
 sentence, 31-3, 37. 
 
 separation, 26; see dualism. 
 
 sex, 146, 98p, 154df, 166J-1, 170. 
 
 Shakespeare, 155b. 
 
 sharp distinctions, etc. 52. 
 
 Shaw, James B. 2g, 3c. 
 
 Sidgwick, Alfred, 49p. 
 
 sin, 164c, 163. 
 
 Singer, I. 161b, 167h. 
 
 single surface ring, VIII. 
 
 simple, 71h. 
 
 sizing up men, Fe, 52c, 148, 157c, 162J, 
 1671, 170, 176a; see measures. 
 
 snobs, 135c. 
 
 socialism, 175, 149j ; see aristocrat. 
 
 sociology, 169, XVIII, XIX; social en- 
 vironment, 166c. 
 
 Socrates, 166p, 167k. 
 
 Soddy, F. 138h. 
 
 solar system, 110-22; birth, 111; end, 
 112f, 120a; gravity in, 113, 114c; 
 retrograde motions, 118d; see plan- 
 etesimal, planets, sun, etc. 
 
 Sollas, W. J. 112h. 
 
 solution of any problem, 159, 33g, 40k. 
 
 soul, 152d, 153k, 46; woman's, 170h. 
 
 sovereignty, 47h, 173bh. 
 
 space, V, 32g, 36, One; space and time 
 inseparable, 64, 150; see time. 
 
 specialist, vii, 138g, 149k, 170o-q. 
 
 spectrum, 128, 156c; of smells, 138d; 
 see harmonic periodicity. 
 
 Spencer, Herbert, 36b, 144h. 
 
 Stallo, J. B. 49p. 
 
 standard universe, 28b; see universe. 
 
 static, static and dynamic, 73, f74b, 
 f 76a, 77h, 98j, 108d, 133, 135c, 138f, 
 150g. 
 
 Stefan's law, 79c. 
 
 Steinmetz, C. P. 148c. 
 
 Storey, M. 163g. 
 
 storms, 120e, 122c. 
 
 structure, 15 f, 86f, 76d, 83g, lOOej, lOli, 
 105, HOe, 128ef, 144c, 158c; see per- 
 son, machine. 
 
 subconscious, 153b, 154. 
 
 subjectivism, iv, v. 
 
 submerged tenth, 168p; see aristocrat. 
 
 subscripts, 71b. 
 
 Substance, 77i; see matter, Being. 
 
 sun, see solar system; heat of, 115; 
 spots, 120e, 122de. 
 
 Sunday, Wm. A. 166h. 
 
 Sundman, 83c. 
 
 superman, 145c. 
 
 surgery, 149rn, 176e. 
 
 swearing, 43k. 
 
 Swedenborg, E. 98m, f 166d. 
 
 symbol, 30, 53e. 
 
 systems, Ab, 20b, 47h. 
 
 Taft, Wm. H. 163g, 173b, f 167b. 
 
251 
 
 UNIVERSE 
 
 Index Zoro 
 
 tariff, 170k, 176dg. 
 
 Tarkington, Booth, fl67b. 
 
 tautology, 34, 51c. 
 
 Taylor, Frederick W. 168j, Cc, f'94g, 
 
 fl67b, 162hi, 163j, 174g. 
 taxes, 168in, 175e, f 176d. 
 
 teleology, 42d ; see purpose. 
 
 telepathy, 101k, 146h, 152f. 
 
 temperance, 149e, 50f, fl66d; see bal- 
 ance. 
 
 temperature, 77-82, 71b, 110, 153d ; see 
 heat, entropy. 
 
 theologian, theology, vii, 6, 39g, 48b, 
 49, 107h, 144j, 160d, 171c; see aris- 
 tocrat, Christ, Trinity, rebirth. 
 
 theory, see qualitative; physical theo- 
 ries, X; defects of orthodox, 96. 
 
 Theresa, St. 20d, 170m. 
 
 thermodynamics, see heat, entropy. 
 
 Thompson, J. Arthur, 147c. 
 
 — Sanford E. 163j. 
 
 Thomson, Sir J. J. Cc, 15j, 66b, 77b, 
 89h, 90c, 98ij, 100c, 118e, 137b, 138h. 
 
 three bodies, problem of, 83. 
 
 Tikhoff, 127f. 
 
 time, time and space, 36, 33g, V, 150-1, 
 158; economy of, 165; see space. 
 
 tips, 168g. 
 
 titles, 167h, 168o. 
 
 toleration, 169. 
 
 Tolstoy, 162h, 167gi. 
 
 transcendentalist, iv, 36k. 
 
 "Transcript, Boston Evening" 14d. 
 
 trick of words, iii, 2f, 9, 12, 20a, 98m. 
 
 Trinity, 24c, 27-9, 43b, 48-9, 62, 71, 
 88, 134aj, 151b, 157, 171bc. 
 
 tropism, 158e, 146e. 
 
 truism, 35f, 12; see logic, identity. 
 
 truth, 28f, 47h, 49ist, 581; see reality. 
 
 tube of force, 98i. 
 
 Tunzlemann, G. W. de, 74af, 135d. 
 
 Turner, 122e. 
 
 two bodies, problem of, 83, 98e. 
 
 U, 75-7, 136; see electricity, unifica- 
 tion, inverse square. 
 
 unification, 74f, IX, iii, A, 9, 66dh, 
 74d, 77g, 136, 138g. 
 
 unit, 40c, 69b; see measurement, time, 
 space, etc. 
 
 universals, 20c. 
 
 universe, 25b; infinite number of, 
 lOOg; outside of, 47fg, lOOe (see 
 boundary); see One and Many, etc. 
 
 unknown, unknowable, 4c, 36b, 40j ; 
 see agnosticism. 
 
 upper ten, 168p; see aristocrat. 
 
 Utopias, 123. 
 
 vacuum tube phenomena, 135, 141g. 
 
 value, 168; see payment, money. 
 
 Vance, 163g. 
 
 vibrations, see fluid theories, light. 
 
 V\, lOOcf, 74d, 105a, 152a; see light. 
 
 volcano, 120e, 122i. 
 
 Vorse, Mary Heaton (Mrs. O'Brien), 
 
 166r, fl67b, 170k. 
 vortex whirls, 90d, XI, Two. 
 
 Waals, J. D. Van der, 81-2, 84b, 89d, 
 104, 145e. 
 
 Walsh, J. J. f48b, 48d, 167d. 
 
 Wanamaker, John, f 167b, 168m. 
 
 war, 176, 173abd, 174e, 35d; see mili- 
 tarist, aristocrat, blood and iron. 
 
 Ward, James, 150c, 151b, f 165b. 
 
 Warren, Maude Radford, 166r, fl67b, 
 
 170k. 
 waves, 98y, XIII; see fluid theories, 
 wealth, inheritance of, 167h, 168m-o, 
 
 173i, fl75c. 
 weight, 70-1; conservation of, 137c-g; 
 
 see atom. 
 Weismann, A. 147. 
 Wells, H. G. 29c, 49a. 
 whirls, XI, Two; experimental, 101-2. 
 White, A. D. 48d. 
 Whitehead, A. N. 62f. 
 Whitman, Walt, 169h, 171f j. 
 Wilde, Oscar, 158g. 
 will, 157. 
 
 Wilson, Edmund B. 147d. 
 • — Harry Leon, f 167b. 
 — Woodrow, 159d, 164bd, 167gjk, 171f, 
 
 fl72c, 173e, 174bc. 
 woman, see feminism, man. 
 Wood, R. W. 130b. 
 Woodward, R. S. F, 171m. 
 words, iv, 27-8; cheap, 168i; inflection 
 
 of, f30b; have force, 52e; see logic, 
 
 sentence, 
 work, 167c-m; objectionable, fl74c; 
 
 see democracy, 
 world state, 176-7. 
 worry, 156e, 170r. 
 worship, 167d. 
 
 X-rays, lOljk, 128ek. 
 
 Zeeman effect, 130e. 
 
 Zeno, 15g, 94d ; see One and Many. 
 
 zero, 43; see infinity, number. 
 
 zodiacal light, 121. 
 
 Zoroaster, 32b. 
 
GOMSeRVATlON.1983