/3F A3V? BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF' ■ ' ' iienrg 191. Sage 1891 ..A- /3^ye have, through visfon, an impression of a tree, so long as that single impression -con- tinues we impute unity to the object and call it one tree. If we now withdraw the eye from that object and fix it upon another tree, so that the impression, although in general like the other, differs in some minor particulars, we impute to this also unity; but we never suppose, upon remembering the first impression, that the two objects are really one and the same. We regard them as two distinct trees, and this is the idea oi plurality. If, however, after experiencing the first impression, we simply close the eyes and. then open them to have the impression repeated with all the circumstances the same, we feel a conviction that the objects in the two cases are identical. That is, not- withstanding the interruption, we are fully persuaded that there was continuity in the existence of the object itself which linked these two impressions together. The inter- ruption of the impressions gives us the idea of succession or time, while their exact similarity supplies the condition of our conceiving that there is a bond which connects these successive impressions. The exact similarity of the impressions, or, to use Hume's own word, their constancy, is all that experience gives us. — 1 2 — : The question now is. How does this invariableness or constancy of the impressions beget the other idea, viz: uninterruptedness of existence or identity? if. It is evident that the senses do not supply it, inasmuch as they do no more than present the several similar im- pressions. Reason cannot have produced the idea because it exists in children before they are capable of reasoning, and is firm and unshaken before they could possibly under- stand the subtile arguments which might be brought forward te prove the fact. The only possible explanation, according to Hume, is that the idea is supplied by the Imagination. Since the impressions occur always with the same attendant circumstances, that, is, with perfect constancy, we come by custom or habit to pass over from one to the other with such facility that we cease to call distinctly into conscious- ness- the numerical difference between them, and, upon this, as its occasion, the imagination supplies the fiction of an identical existence. It will add to the clearness of the foregoing exposition if we consider, carefully what occurs when we hold before the mind the same impression (i. e. the numerically identical impression) of an object, for a certain length of time and while other impressions are changing. In this case, we have the idea of time from the succession of the other impressions without its implying any change whatever in the particular object. That object Continues one and the same' for us throughout this time. Now, when by habit we become accustomed to pass with perfect ease from one impression to another, or to many others, numerically different but exactly similar, the tendency of the mind is to fall into the same disposition as- in the case which has just bfeen singled out, and. the result is that it disregards the succession of these similar impressions; and allows itself to imagine that the variation of time is no more contradictory of continued existence here than there. It is true that when we attend more carefully, we find that there is an interruption, and there is a momentary disposition tp. regard what we before ~ 13 — thought to be a continued existence as a number of distinct but similar impressions. This, in connection with the previous habit of confounding them and regarding the existence as continued, produces perplexity. At such a moment, however, in order to relieve this uneasy feeling, we have recourse to the expedient of conceiving the im- pression as separated from the train of impressions and ideas which we call the mind. In other words, rather than violate the propensity begotten of custom to think the ob- jects of sense as continued existences, we permit ourselves to conceive any given impression oK sense, when not present, as being simply detached from the train but not destroyed, and as coming back to join the train once more when it again appears in consciousness. That is to say, under the fostering care of the imagination the disposition to believe in continued existence has become so strong as to give birth to the idea of distinct and independent existence in order to save that fancy from perishing. As the skillful sophist adroitly changes the import of his terms when the adversary's argument is about to drive him to the wall, so our minds, in this matter, play the sophist with themselves and hold' their ground in spite of rhyme or reason!' In the foregoing account of Hume's speculations as to an external world, I have not always followed his order of presentation or confined ihyself to illustrations which he has used, but I trust, by this freer exposition, I have been able to give a more satisfactory view of the tenets of his philosophy so far as germane to the present dis cussion. It is not difficult to see that the principles on which he would overthrow the philosophical argument for the existence of a material world, if admitted at all, would suffer a wider application. And we find the skeptic thoroughly consistent in the use of the principles which he fancies that he has established. If the validity of the -principle of Causality has been successfully attacked, it can no more ' Cf. Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 355.^363. -- 14 — justify th&; inference to an immaterial world of substance than to a material. Has man a spiritual nature? Is there a substantial something which thinks? Hume answers, there i§,- no proof of it. The appeal to Causality is inept. i* The argument based upon our belief in personal iden- tity is equally inconclusive for him. The same line of reasoning which has served to show the unsubstantial basis of our ideas of continued and independent existence in the sphere of the non-ego is equally potent as against the sub- stantial existence of the ego. Our belief in spirit, likewise, Bproceeds entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted pro- gress of the thought along a train of connected ideas.a Here, then, we find the great skeptic, who, at the out- set., seemed to be so thoroughly at one with Berkeley, shaping his arguments in such a manner as to overthrow at once the belief in spirit and in matter. He who, at first, seemed a friend and ally soon tuf'ns his ordnance upon the fortress of the good Bishop's most cherished convictions and completely demolishes the strong tower of his fondest hopes. We may very well picture to ourselves the con- sternation with which the sincere believer in the world of spiritual existences would behold this work of disstruction and he might well turn him about and take refuge in the encampment of the avowed dogmatists. As was natural enough to expect we find Berkeley's disciple, Reid, awakened rudely from "his . slumber and convinced that only one of two courses lay before him: either to accept Hume's skeptical conclusions as to the existence of spirit, or to vindicate the natural conviction of the existence of Matter. He chose the latter and hence- forth became the champion of the opinion of the vulgar, that we do actually perceive the very things which we naturally suppose that we perceive. Henceforth his doctrine is that we have an immediate and direct, as distinguished from a mediate and inferential, knowledge of material ob- jects whether they be such objects as we may touch and handle or distant objects like the sun and moon which - 15 - fall within the range of vision.' All these are known first hand and that knowledge constitutes the data of Common Sense. Next, as to the process by which the mind becomes possessed of these data, it may be stated, in outline, that he holds that, upon occasion of an appropriate modification of the organ of sense, there arises in the mind a sensation. This sensation is, however, not causally connected with the physical modification. The sensation is immediately followed by a conception of the object which affected the organ of sense and an irresistible belief in the present existence of that object. This conception of the object and belief of its present existence Reid calls Perception. This perception is not the result of reasoning. »There is no reasoning in perceptions, says he. »The belief which is implied in it, is the effect of instinct.a'* Hence it is immediate knowledge which we thus obtain of the objects perceived. After these preliminary statements, I proceed to a more specific exposition of this author's doctrine. The first question which offers itself for solution is as to the e^act nature of sensation which, as we shall find, plays, at once, so arbitrary and so indispensable a part in the system of Reid. Dr. Thomas Brown, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 3 assumes that Reid uses the term to indicate the subjective element which furnishes the matter or content of the percept. In other words, sensations are what, in German, are called Empfindungen. He thus inter- prets the word in the sense of his own philosophy, and considers perception, in Reid's system, what it is in his ' Reid's Works, p. 298 et" passim. It will be noted that Reid, in .•holding that the distant object is immediately known, does not intend to say that we have, first hand, a knowledge of distances. The power of esti- mating distance is acquired, vid. Works, p. 177 and others. 2 Works, p. 185. An Inquiry into the Human Mind, Chapter 6, Section 20. 3 Lecture 25. — i6 ^- 'i own, viz : merely the act by which these mental states are referred ^ outward to the external world and apprehended as objectiv^e. The only difference, according to this inter- pretation, between the sensation which suggests a quality and that quality as immediately known is that sensation is ■the mental modification regarded as such, the quality the mental modification as referred out. But as to matter, they are one and the same and, of course, being identical, they cannot be unlike each other. But when we turn to Reid we discover that he, over and over again, insists that the sensation which is the sign of a quality bears no resemblance whatever to the quality as perceived. It is true that, in speaking of this want of likeness, instead of using the term »qualities as perceiveda, he says »external objectsa; and Brown understood him to use this term, not of what is directly before the mind in perception, but of the object mediately known. Brown was so fully persuaded in his own mind of the absurdity of the doctrine that we are competent to know external objects themselves immediately, and directly that he would not suffer himself to attribute such a view to Reid, and, for this reason, he is led to regard the Common Sense philo- sophy as utte-rly confused and self-contradictory. But the fact is that Reid does not intend to affirm that the thing perceived, — i, e. the mental modification, — is unlike that which it represents, but he means to assert that the sen- sation is a state of mind which bears no resemblance to the quality it suggests and as that quality is perceived.' The qualities as known, Reid. would have us believe, are not different from the actually existent objects- in the ex- ternal world. What we know is not a mere quality, but the thing itself To assert, therefore, that the sensation is unlike the external object is to deny any likeness between the sensations and the qualities they suggest as those qua-- lities are immediately present to the mind. That Reid regarded the sensation as, in no sense,- Supplying the matter of the qualities as they are perceived. * ' a host of passages might be adduced. One or two must suffice. »The primary qualities«j says he, »are neither sen-- sations, nor are they resemblances of sensations. This appears to me self-evident. I have a clear und" distinct notion of each of the primary qualities. I have a clear and distinct notion of sensation. I can compare the one with the other, and when I do so, I am not able to discern a resembling feature. « Here it is evident that he speaks of the primary qua- lities as known, not as unknown causes which are only in- ferred. He asserts emphatically that there is not a re- sembling feature between -them and any sensation. Let us hear him again : »I touch the table gently with my hand and I feel it to be smooth, hard and cold. These are the qualities of the table perceived by touch; but I per- ceive them by means of a sensation which indicates them. This sensation not being painful, I commonly give no at- .tention to it. It qarries my thought immediately to the thing signified by it, and is itself forgot as if it had never been. But by repeating it and turning my attention to it, and abstracting my thought from the thing signified by it, I find it to be merely a sensation and that it has no simi- litude to the hardness, smoothness or coldness of the table which are .signified by it.a^ The hardness, smoothness and coldness of the table are the qualities perceived; they are the qualities as present to the mind. The sensations which suggest' them, so far from supplying the miatter of bur notions of these qualities, are » \. generally forgot and are as if they had never been. And when we hold them up in memory and. contemplate them, we find them entirely unlike the qualities. It seems evident, then, that Dr. Brown failed to" apprehend Reid^s doctrine of sensation, but confounded it with another quite different. In order that we may get a still more definite notion 1 Essays on the Intellectual Powers 11. ch. 17, Works, p'. 31+. 2 Essays on Int. Powers, II. cli. 16, Works, p. 311. 2 — i8 — both of wliat Reid does not, and what he does, mean, it will be- worth our while to consider a misapprehension of a philosopher of far greater learning than Brown and one whftt is usually much more accurate in the account he gives of the opinions of others. I refer to Sir Wm. Hamilton, who in Note C, appended to his edition of Reid's Works, represents that philosopher as stating »that the primary- qualities of material existences, Extension, Figure, etc., are suggested to us through the secondary, which, though not sufficipnt causes of our conceptions, are the signs on occa- sion of which we are made to 'conceive' the primary.a' The misapprehension is shown by the assertion that Reid regarded the secondary qualities as signs of the pri- mary. It is proper to call to mind, ■ in this connection., that Reid accepted the distinction between the primary and se- condary qualities, and" gave as the essential mark by which they are to be discriminated, the directness and distinctness of our notions of the primary compared with those of the secondary. ''i He gives two different enumerations of the primary qualities. One in the Inquiry into the Human Mind, chap, 5. § 1.3, which includes Extension, Figure, Motion, ! Hardness and Softness, Roughness and Smoothnesg. The second catalogue is in the Essays on the Intellectiuil Powers, 11, chap, i/t, and professes to follow Locke's enumeration, s In this passage, Reid gives the primary qualities as Exten- sion, Divisibility, Figure, Motion, Solidity, Hardness, Soft- ness and Fluidity. The secondary qualities are, of course, Sound, Colour, Tastes, Smells, etc. Now Hamilton asserts that Reid jegarded these latter, so far as they come into I Reid's Works, p. 820. ' Essays on Int. Powers, 11, ch. 17, Works, p'. 314. 3 Works, p. 119. 4 Works, p. 313. 5 Cf. Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding. B. II. ch. 8. § 9, und ch. 9. § 26., — 19 — consciousness, as the sensations which suggest tSe primary qualities. On the other hand, an examination of Reid's statements reveals the fact that he held that each and every primary quaUty has a peculiar sensation which suggests it and which, no sooner performs its office of suggesting than it is for- gotten. In proof, I adduce the following passage: »Having a clear and distinct conception of primary qualities, we have no need, when we think of them, to recallj their sen- sations. When a primary quality is perceived, thq sensation immediately leads our thought to the quality signified, and is itself forgot. We have no occasion afterwards to reflect upon it; and so we come to be as little acquainted with it as if we had never felt it. This is the case with the • sen- sations of all primary qualities when they are not so pain- ful or pleasant as to draw our attention.a' In this passage, the sensations connected with the pri- mary qualities are spoken of as peculiar to the qualities respectively. It is perfectly certain that Reid did not in- tend to confound these sensations with the secondary qua- lities, otherwise he would never have asserted that we come to be as little acquainted with them as if they had never existed. Such an assertion would be a strange one to make concerning colour, heat, cold, etc., as they are known. If further proof be necessary, we find, in the Inquiry into the Human Mind% the following passage concerning the sensations which suggest hardness, softness, figure and motion: » All these, by means of certain corresponding sen- sations of touch, are presented to the mind as real external qualities: the conception and belief of them are invariably connected with the corresponding sensations by an original principle of human nature. Their sensations have no name in any langunge; they have not only been overlooked by the vplgar, but philosophers ; or if they have been at all taken 1 Essays on Int. Powers, 11. ch. 17, Works, p. 315. 2 Chap. 5. § 4, Works, p. 123- — 20 — , notice of, they have been confounded with the external qua- lities which they suggest. v. Tb© portion of this passage which I have itaHcized contains statements in relation to the sensations ' which sul^gest these primary qualities which could never have been made concerning the secondary qualities as they are present in consciousness. In truth, there is no reason for believing that Reid regarded the secondary qualities as sensations at all, in the technical sense in which he etiiploys the term. And, in relation to one, at least , of these qualities, he expresses himself in no ambiguous language. I refer to his statements concerning colour to which he assigns a peculiar sensation, entirely distinct from it, by which it is suggested. His words are as follows: »In seeing a coloured body, the sen- sation is indifferent and draws no attention. The quality in the body, which we call its colour, is the only object of attention; and therefore we speak of it as if it were perceived and not felt There are some sensations, which, though they are very often felt, are never attended to nor reflected upon. We have no conception of them; and, therefore, in language there is neither any name for them, nor any form of speech which supposes their ex- istence. Such are the sensations of [i. e. which suggest] colour and of all primary qualities; and therefore those qualities are said to be perceived and not felt.«' ■ Nothing would seem clearer than that he intends to teach that, corresponding to the qualities as perceived, there are sensations peculiar to each respectively which suggest them, but are not, in the case of any primary qua- lities, to be confounded with any secondary qualities. In addition to what we have learned, from these cri- ticisms, as to sensation, it is well to note the following specifications: I"- Sensations are purely mental. They are not I Essays Int. Powers, II. ch. i8. Works, p. 319, 21 affections of the body, in any sense, and consequently are not localized in it.' 2'"'. They have no object. That is, they are not only subjective in the sense that they exist only in the mind, but also that they, do not represent or image anything outside the mind. ' 3^"^. They are, in no proper sense, the result of the operation of our intellectual powers. It is only as we are sentient beings that we experiejice them. They are, there- fore, simply feelings.'' We must not suppose, however, that our author intends to represent sensations as the mere feelings attendant upon the exercise of the perceptive pow- ers which are designated by the German term, die Be- tonung der Empfindungen, inasmuch as he is careful to state, and to insist upon it, that each sensation is antecedent in time to the perceptive act with which it is associated. ^ This makes it impossible for us to identify the sensation with that feeling which arises in connection with the act of cognition and depends, for its existence, upon that cogni- tion as its sine qua non. The next question which it behooves us to consider is as to the nature of the relation between the sensation and the corresponding perception. We have already seen that it does not furnish the matter of the percept. It is, moreover, not to be regarded as an effect for which we are compelled to suppose an external material cause. Indeed Reid considers it as the fundamental mistake of the great body of philosophers that they made an appeal to the principle of Causality in substantiating the existence of an external world. What, then, is the relation bet^yeen the sensation and the percept? ' Essays on Int. Powers, H, ch. i6. Works, p. Jio- 2 df. Inquiry into the Human Mind, ch. 2. § i.. Works, p. 105, and Essays on Int. Pomers. II, oh. 16. Works, p. 310. 3 Inquiry, ch. 6. § zi. Works, p. 186 e; seq. _^^' _„ 22 — : In answer, our author tells us that, the sensation is the natural sign ' of the object perceived. This doctrine of natural signs, which was borrowed by Rgid from Berkeley/ plays so important a part in our author's system that it demands more than a passing mention. These natural signs fall into three classes. i='. Where the connection is established by nature, but only learned by experience, as, for example, between causes and their efifects.3 •2"'^. Where not only the connection between sign and thing signified is established by nature, but where the passage from one to the other is without reasoning or ex- perience, that is, is instinctive. Such signs are : frowns, smiles, certain exclamations of pain, joy, etc.s 3'''*. »A third class of natural signsa, to quote Reid's own language, »comprehends those which, though we never before had any notion or conception of the thing signified, do suggest or conjure it up, as it were by a natural kind of magic and, at once, give us a conception and a belief of it.a'* Thus dur mental states suggest to us the ego. »The notion of hardness in bodies as well as the belief of it, are got in a similar manner; being, by an original prin- ciple of our nature annexed to that sensation which we have when we feel a hard body. And so naturally and necessarily does the sensation convey the notion and belief of hardness, that hitherto they have been confounded by the most acute inquirers into the principles of human na- tyre, although they appear, upon accurate reflection, not only to be different things, but as unlike as pain is to the point of the sword.«5 Our notions of all the qualities of external , objects and belief in their existence are connected ' Inquiry, ch. z. § 3, Works, pp. 121, izz. =! Cf. Berkeley's Principles of Knowledge, § 65 ; New Theory of Vision, §§ 144, 147; Minute Phil. Dial. IV. §§ 7, 11, iz. 3 Inquiry, ch. 5. § 3. Works, pp. izi, izz. 4 Ibid. 5 Inquiry, ch. 5. § 3. Works, p. izz. — 23 — thus with sensations, which sensations nsuggest them or conjure them up by a kind of natural magic«. In another place, he says, »our faculty of perceiving lies doi-mant until it is roused and stimulated by a certain corresponding Sensation. « ' This power of perceiving, it should be carefully noted, > owes nothing to the sensation except that it is roused and stimulated by it to action. Upon this, as its occasion, it forms its own notion of, or fi conceives v. the object and creates a firm belief of its present- existence. There is no inference from the nature of the sensation to the object. There is no reasoning, nor, in fact, any conscious procee- dure from one step to another legitimated by it."" The conception of the object and the belief in its present exis- tence are the direct result of our constitution. We are so created that when the appropriate sensation is present nothing more is needed; the corresponding perception arises as though it were an inspiration. »We are inspired with the sensation, amd we are inspired with the corres- ponding perception, by means unknown.d* As to the entire series of the phaenomena of sensation and perception, it may add to the clearness of our vieWs, if there be introduced here a passage from the works of an eminent disciple of Reid, Dugald Stewart, in commenting upon the doctrine of his master: »To what, then, it may be asked, does this statement amount? Merely to this: that the mind is so formed that certain impressions produ- ced on our organs of sense by externail objects, are followed by correspondent sensations and that these sensations, (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter than the words of a 4anguage have to the things they denote), are foUo^ved by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions are made; ! Ibid. ch. 6. § 21. Works, p. i86. " Inquiry, ch. 6. § 20. Works, p. 185. 3 Ibid. ch. 6. § 21. Works, p- 188. — 24 — that all the steps of this process are equally incomprehen- sible ; and that, for anything we can prove to the contrary, the connection between the impression and the sensation, and the sensation and the perception may be both arbitrary; that it is, therefore, by no means impossible that our sensa- tions may be merely the occasions on which the corres- pondent perceptions are excited; and that, at any rate, the consideration of these sensations, which are attributes of mind, can throw no light oii the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and qualities of body. From this view of the subject, it follows that it is the external . objects themselves, and not any species or images of the objects, that the mind perceives; and that, although, by the constitution of our nature, certain sensations are rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as' it would be on the sup- position that the mind were all at once inspired with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever.a ' It is with these statements of Reid and his disciple before us that we are to interpret the doctrirje of immediate perception. Our knowledge of the object perceived is said to be immediate, not in the sense that, we have direct insight into its nature or that we 'know it as immediately contiguous to the mind. It has already been stated that an immediate knowledge of the actually existent sun and moon is claimed. »The contiguity of the object «, says Reid, Dcontributes nothing at all to make it better under- stood; because there appears no connection between con- tiguity and perception, but what is grounded on prejudices drawn from some imagined similitude between mind and body, and from the supposition that, in perception, the object acts upon the^mind or the mind upon the object.«' The knowledge is immediate, in the sense that it is the ''Stewart's Works, Vol. II. pp. rti. 112. 2 Essays on Int. Powers, II, ch. 14. Works, p. 306. — 25 ^ •result of no process of reasoning or inference, but of the constitution of our nature whereby the object is conceived and beUeved in independently of all consciousness of pro- cess. When the appropriate modification of the organ of sense is present, the sensation comes into existence imme- diately and by reason of our original constitution. The sensation being present, and our faculty of perception being, in consequence, set in operation, of its own nature that faculty expresses itself in the appropriate conception and belief. We have now before us Reid's explanation of the modus operandi of our perception of an external world. It is manifest that the spirit of his system demands that the data of Common Sense should be treated with all the respect due to a revelation. He considers it the office of philosophy simply to give such an explanation of the origin of these data as shall leave no point of attack upon the truthfulness of the revelation. He undertakes to give such an explanation as shall silence forever the quibbles of the profane. It becomes our duty now to examine the system which has been expounded with a view to determining how far our author has succeeded in his design of vindicating to the mind such methods of cognizing external objects as shall justify the popular belief in the substantial reality of those objects. It is- clear that Reid does not differ from Hume in claiming a knowledge of material objects in their transcen- dental existence. He does not believe that we know Ding- an-sich. Again, it cannot be shown that he has proved that the conception and belief, which constitute the percept as distinguished from the sensation, are themselves anything more than mental modifications. It must be admitted that there is a confused use of language on his part which suggests that he wished to claim that the actual external reality, as external to and distinct from the mind, is yet identical with the conception formed of it. His frequent — 26 — assertions that we know the very things themselves would seem to> point that way. If such be- his intended meaning, he has involved himself in such absurdity as to destroy all right to serious consideration as a philosopher. The conception of an object Reid also calls the notion of it, and this, together with the belief in its existence are, b'eyond all question, subjective. Whatever he meant to claim it cannot be admitted that his »immediate knowledge)^ as expounded by himself, is anything more than the presence of a mental image of an object and a belief in the substantial existence of that object which, at best, arise under such circumstances as to render us certain that they answer to actual reality outside the mind. It should be mentioned, in this connection, that Reid defines Memofy also as a faculty of immediate knowledge, differing from Perception only in that it is an immediate knowledge of the past.^ The knowledge is just as imme- diate in one case as in the other. Perception of the distant and memory of the past are both inexplicable conceptions and beliefs. Now it is obvious that when we call up' in memory an object, which is no longer within the sphere of sense, the mind does not fix upon an actual material object in any sense except that a mental image of it is formed. It may have passed out of existence in the form in which we once knew it. We picture it as once existent and believe that it then existed as it now., appears to »the mind's eye.« All that can possibly be meant here is that the conception by the mind of the object as existent at a certain time and the belief in this past existence are trustworthy as certifying the fact of the real existence at the time. The same must be admitted of our perceptioars of distant objects as explained by our author. The sun in' the heavens is conceived as now existent and. believed in as such. There cannot be anything here, more than in the I Essays on Int. Powers, III, ch. ..-Works, p. 339. cf. Inquiry ch. 2, §. 3. — 27 — other case, except that this vouches for what no%v exists, while that vouches only for what once existed. On what then does Reid base his assertion that such immediate knowledge answers to an objective world of matter? Hume admitted that men, everywhere, irresistibly believe in external objects as really existent. Yet, inasmuch as nothing is really known except the mental impression, he denies that that is proof of the existence of anything but itself. Wherein does the real difference lie? The fundamental difference consists in this, that, while Hume regards this belief in the independence and sub- stantiality of the objects of sense as the result of a growth and derived from impressions and ideas quite different, Reid considers it as received at first hand, as the expression of our original constitution when thg proper conditions are fulfilled. It is not that the mind has, out of habit or custom, come to project its images outwat'd and regard them as distinct and independent and substantial; it is that our nature is so fashioned that we immediately form, under appropriate conditions, notions of objects as external and substantial, and irresistibly believe in their existence as such. It is thus really a revelation through our mental nature. It is, in one sense, the voice of our creator in us and to us. Reid will allow no process by which error might be introduced. We may liken it to that doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures which makes the writers of the sacred books mere amanuenseg, who record the very words of the Holy Ghost. And like those who hold this view, Reid thinks- that he has the ipsis&ima verba of Gpd. Surely, if this be true, we have a knowledge of an external world which should be implicitly trusted. There &re two assumptions, then, which underlie all Raid's conclusions: First, Whatever notions, ideas and beliefs are original, in the sense that they are the direct result of the exercise of our powers as originally fashioned, are. the voice of God — 28 — and therefore are true and correspond literally with what is real in Our environment. Second, Our conception of a substantial .world as external and material, and belief in it as such, is original,-^ in the sense explained. ' As to the first of these, it is plain that it cannot be proved. It cannot be dealt with scientifically at all. It is a dogma. To undertake to base a system of scientifiijij knowledge on such a founda,tion is utterly at variance with all sound principles of investigation. But grant the truth of the first assumption, and admit it as legitimate, no proof has been given of the second. Are we to accept it. without proof? In fact, it cannot be proved. It is one of the great problems of psychology at the present day to trace the growth of these very notions of the externality and substantiality of what we call mate-? rial things. It is surely asking too much of the science that _ it allow the question to be closed by the ipse dixit of Dr. Thomas Reid. > With the failure to establish this, his subsumptibn, his .argument falls to the ground. He has abounded in asser- tions and dogmatism, but we find no answer to the skepti- cism of Hume. We are not surprised to learn that the great skeptic was not impressed with the arguments of his opponent! when submitted to his inspection. Whatever fallacies dis- figured Hume's system, they had not been exposed nor his conclusions disproved. The reader of the works of both, who approaches them with a candid spirit, ca,nnot fail to. be impressed with the conviction that Hume's spirit is that of the true philosopher while Reid everywhere sinks to thfe - level of the dogmatist; -and though the inquu-er may not be ready 'to accept, the results which Hume reaches, he must still recognize, the fact that his methods open wide the door to investigation, while the direct . tendency of Reid's procedure is to relegate all questions to the limbo — 29 — of the marvellous, or to invoke for their solution the dens ex mackina. This criticism of Reid's Philosophy might be extended to greater length and numerous inconsistencies might be pointed out, but the end with which we started has been reached. We have been enabled to view it as a refutation of Hume and to estimate its value in this regard. We must now pass on to the consideration of what we shall find to be a more developed phase of the Philosophy of Common Sense, I mean the Natural Realism of Sir William Haihiltpn. Sir Wm. Hamilton stands at the head of the Scottish school, aud his system of philosophy, though savagely attacked hy numerous thinkers, is still dominant in many quarters of the English-speaking world. For learning and for profundity of thought he enjoys a reputation surpassed by tione and equalled by few. It is, then, but fair that' his contribution to the problem as to whether it be possible to vindicate to the mind a legitimate knowledge of an external world distinct from mind should receive the most careful and candid examination. So far as professions and asseverations go, we shall not find Hamilton second to Reid, or to any man, in his reverence foi- Common Sense. He also contends most strenuously that what men by virtue of their original con- stitution, and therefore universally, believe must be accepted as infallibly true. Time and again, he insists that these data must be presumed trustworthy until proved false. »To suppose their falsehood," says he, »is to suppose thaf we are created capable of intelligence, in order to be made the victims of delusion; that God is a "deceiver and our nature a lie.a' This applies to all forms of natural and original cognitions and beliefs, and among these is the irresistible conviction of mankind that they know imme- diately an external material world. I Reid's Works, Note A. p. 743. N. B. Hamilton affixed to his edition of Reid's Worjts a number of Supplementary dissertations designated Note A, Note B. etc. — 30 — Hn proof that we have an original and direct knowledge" of an external world, not the least among Hamilton's ar- guments is that based upon the consciousness of a funda- menfal contrast between the ego and the non-ego. In factj every act of consciousness involves this recognition of the *ego and non-ego in contrast. It must then be considered as original. But if fundamental and original, this conscious- ness of the contrast is irrefragable proof that there is such a contrast in reality. And since the non-ego of which we are conscious is extended, figpred, etc., it is a material non-ego. I quote Hamilton's own language: »The third condition of consciousness, which may be held as uni- versally admitted, is that it supposes a contrast, — a dis- crimination This discrimination is . of different kinds and degrees. »In the first place, there is the contrast between- the: two grand opposites, self and not-self, — ego and non-ego> — mind and matter. We are conscious of self only in and by its contradistinction from not-self; and are conscious of not-self only in and by its contradistinction from self.«' Here we have again dogmatic assertion, but no proof. We must accept as self-evident that our consciousness of the contrast is original; and that what is original is the voice of God. Further still, that the necessary interpre- tation of the contrast is that which is upon the face of it, and that there can be no such thing as the objectification of subjective elements in obedience to the voice of nature. The* truth is that, if this positing a non-ego in contrast with the ego, be a condition of consciousness and there- fore of all intellectual activity =, the presumption is that it is subjective. It is a priori and, though given only along with experience, all experience supposes it. I Lectures on Metaphysics, Lee. ii, cf. Lee. i&. .: ^ It must be remembered here that consciousness in Hamilton's system is a generic faculty,, and all mental phajnomena are but specific manifestations of it. vid. Lee. on Metaph. Lee. \x et passim. — 31 — But passing on from this, we are next to consider more particularly what Hamilton claims as being involved in our direct cognition or consciousness of the non-ego or material world. It should be noticed that, while insisting that the belief of the multitude is valid and represents reality, he yet de- mands for the philosopher the right to interpret tihe deliv- erances of Common Sense and to determine just what is original and fundamental in them. Reid had undertaken to vindicate the belief in what we may call its crude form. Hamilton, on the other hand, teaches that the philosopher must be allowed to eliminate what has grown up around, and has been incorporated with, the original element. Or, in other words, these sacred convictions of the vulgar which he has so feelingly recommended to our reverence are, after all, only viixed with Common Sense. The untaught rustic, then, must not be appealed to! The philosopher alone can .judge of Common Sense! The element given, first hand, is very different from the complex percept made up Tiy the incorporation of acquired perceptions. In truth, Hamilton will not think of indulging the unsophisticated multitude in the beUef that they know directly any object outside their own bodies. The existence of bodies external to the physical organism of each individual he can only - infer from the affections which they determine in his organs of sense and which he learns to recognize as due to those bodies as their causes. Our own physical organisms, how- ever, we cognize immediately and know them as consti- tuting a material non-ego in contrast with the ego. These bodies being affected, it matters not how, sen- sations arise and are localized more or less definitely in the sentient organism. » Sensation proper is the universal condition of perception proper. We are never aware of the* existence of our own organism, except as it is somehow affected; and are only conscious of extension, figure and the other objects of Perception proper, as realised in the relations of the affections of our sentient organism, as a f' — 32 — body extended, figured, etc.«^ Again, »Sensation proper is the conditio sine qua non of a perception proper of the primary qualities. For we are only aware of the existence of our organism, in being sentient of it, as thus or thus- atfected; and are only aware of its being the subject of extension figure, division, motion, etc., in being percipient of its affections j as like or as unlike, and as out of, or locally external to, each other.«° »In the consciousness of sensations^ relatively localized and reciprocally external, we have a veritable apprehension, and, consequently, an im- mediate perception of the affected organism, as extended, divided, figured, etc.«3 The mind, being present wherever we are conscious that it acts, or » all in the whole and all in every part« of the organism*, becomes conscious of the sensations as »out of each other «, as » relatively localized and reciprocally external «, and so cognizes the extension,,: figure, etc., of the body directly. Tftis consciousness of the extended non-ego, in contrast with the ego, is the sum- total of our immediate cognition of matter. It should be borne in. mind that it is only the primary qualities which are thus directly perceived, for of the secondary and the secundo-primary qualities he does not claim an immediate knowledge except so far as the secundo- • primary have in them an element of the primary. These primary qualities we- know as now and here manifested and hence we are said to know them immediately, s There is direct inspection, which is, according to Hamilton's view, impossible in the case of that which does not exist at the time and at the point where the cognizing power is liter- ally present. 1 Reid's Works, Note D*, p. 884. 2 Ibid. p. 880. 3 Ibid. p. 884. " .,; 4 Lectures on Metaphysics, Lee. 25. . i' 5 It should not escape attention that with Hamilton immediate knowjr| edge is -possible only of -what is literally contiguous to the knowing prin- ciple and existent when known. Reid's use of the -word has been explained. — 33 — By reference to Hamilton's analysis of the qualities of matter, we find that he represents the primary qualities as belonging to Body either as it (i) occupies space, or as it (2) is contained in space. Considered as occupying space, it has (a) extension in the three dimensions of length, breadth and thickness, (geometrical solidity), which again involves I, number, n, magnitude and in, figure.. As occupying space. Body also implies (b) absolute incompressibility (solidity phy- sical). As Body is contained in space, we predicate of it (a) mobility and (b) situation. Our author does not hold that all these phases of our apprehension of Body, in its^ relations to space are given by perception. The notion of absolute incompressibility, he tells us, »w a conception af. the understanding not an apprehension through sense.v.'^ It arises from »the impossi- bility of conceiving the compression of body from an ex- tended to an inextended, its elimination out of space.a " »This impossibility of conceiving ***' affords the positive notion of an insuperable power in body of resisting such impression or elimination.« 3 This, then, is not perceived at all, it is inferred. This being the case, absolute incom- pressibility dees hot enter here into account, because we wish to know what is immediately perceived. Further, it does not appear that, in the consciousness of sensations as localized and reciprocally external, we apprehend mobility and situation. This, then, leaves as the sum-total of this immediate perception, the recognition of the extension of our bodies in the three dimensions which involve number, magnitude and figure. We really perceive nothing directly but extension.'' In connection with this, I quote the following pass^e: »Matter, or body, is the name either of something known or of something : Reid's Works, Note D, p. 84^. ^Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Cf. Lectures on Metaph. Lee. 5 and Discussions, Appendix I, (A). 3 y:r — 34 — unknown. Erf^ so far as matter is a name for something known, it iheans that which appears to uS .under the forms of extension, solidity, divisibiHty, figure, motion, roughness, smoothness, colour, heat, cold, etc.; in short, ,zf is- a common name for a certain series, or aggregate or complement, of 'appearances or phaenomena manifested in coexistences ' We know, then, only appearances or phaenomena, and our entire direct knowledge consists of a cognition of the appearance or phaenomenon called extension. The passages quoted, with the necessary inferences from them, should leave no doubt, one would think, that the only object immediately known is a subject-object. It is clearly implied that we know nothing but extension, nothing but- phaenomenon. Can we regard phaenomenon as an object -object? Whatever we may say of its origin; by whatsoever hypothesis we account for the appearance, it would seem that it, itstif, is no more than a subjective representation. Phaenomenon, as such, cannot have an objective existence; and it is only by forgetting the mean- ing of the word that one can use it at all- except as ex- pressing what exists only in the mind. But when we take in connection wifh this, numerous other passages in which Hamilton asserts that we have a direct knowledge of the non-ego itself we are at a loss to understand his meaning. How shall we interpret, for iri- stance, the following passage so .as to make him consistent with himself? Natural Realism; founded in Common Sense, makes it incumbent' oh him who expounds it .»to show that we have not merely a notion, a conception, an imagina- tion, a subjective representation, — of extension, for ex- ample, — 'called up or suggested' in some incomprehensible manner to the mind, on occasion of an extended object being presented to the sense; ^ but that, in perception of such an object, we really have, as by^ nature we believe 1 Lectures on Metaph. Lee. 8. 2 He refers to Reids doctrine. — 35 — we have, an immediate knowledge Or consciousness of that external object as extended.«' It is not strange that, in view of all this, such thinners as John Stuart Mill'^ and James H. Stirling 3 should have regarded Hamilton's teachings on this subject as hopelessly contradictory. It is clearly incumbent, however, on any one who approaches the deliverances of so great a thinker as Sir W". Hamilton to distrust such conclusions until he has examined his system with great care and thoroughness. Upon such careful examination, we shall find that our author brings in to the assistance of the faculty of per- ception what, in his philosophy, is known as the Regulative Faculty. It is by and through this, in connection with what is given directly in perception, that he thinks to reach a knowledge, proper and immediate, of the thing which is thus known as extended. The Regulative Faculty is, for Hamilton, sthe power the mind has of being the native source of certain ne- cessary ox a priori cognitions; which cognitions, as they are the conditions, the forms, under which our knowledge in general is' possible, constitute so many fundamental laws of intellectual nature.a'* These a- priori cognitions are prin- ciples of Common Sense', and whatever we are forced to think in accordance with them is knowledge first-hand or immediate cognition. We cannot resist the conviction of its truth. Among these a priori principles, we find one which j>regulates« our mental proceedure in relation to the real as distinguished from the phaenomenal. It is the principle of Substance and Accident or Phaenomenon. This principle compels us to think as the correlative of the phaenomenal, a substantial world. »We cannot think a quality existing I Reid's Works, Note D, p. 84Z. ■ 2 Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, chaps. ^, 2. 3 Analysis of Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 1—30. 4 Lectures on Metaph. Lee. 38. 3* - 36 - absolutely, in or of itsfelf. We are constrained to think it as inhering in some basis, substratum, hypostasis or sub- stance.K ' »As the phaenomena appear only in conjunction, we are compelled by the constitution of our nature to think them conjoined, in something; and as they are phaenomena, we cannot think them as phaenomena of nothing, but must regard therp as the properties or qualities of something that is extended, solid, figured, etc. But this something absolutely and in itself, — i, e, considered apart from its phaenomena, — is to us zero. It is only in its qualities, only in its effects, in its relative and phaenomenal existence, that it is cognizable or conceivable; and it is only by a law of thought which compels us. to think something ab- solute or unknown as the basis or condition of the relative and known, that this something obtains a kind of incom- prehensible reality for us.«=_J In these passages, we have a key to the apparent contradiction of our author in claiming an immediate and direct knowledge of the thing as extended while he dis- claims any pretensions to a perception of anything but the" phaenomenal. We are not said to be conscious of sub- stance itself, or to have any knowledge of it except that it exists. »This substance cannot be conceived by us except negatively, that is, as the unapparent — the inconceivable correlative of certain appearing quajities. If we attempt to think it posiftvely, we can think it only by transforming it into a quality or bundle of qualities, which, again, we are compelled to refer to an unknown substance, now supposed for their incogitable basis.« s The only immediate knowledge given, then, under this principle of Substance andPhaeno- menon is that the 'quality or phaenomenon is the phaeno,;. menon of something. That something we call substance. When we apprehend extension then, we apprehend it as ' Discussions, Appendix I, (A). ^2 Lectures on Metaph. Lee. 8. 3 Discussions Appendix I. (A). — 37 — extension of something; i. e. we know, not exteni^ion qua extension but, the ^object as extended.^. Thus the mind, in perceiving under the conditions imposed by the Regulative Faculty, must recognize the existence of substance in con- nection with, and inseperable from, its consciousness of the phaenomenon of extension. ~ I have endeavoured, in what has preceded, to give a fair and unbiased statement of Hamilton's teachings on the point under consideration, and I trust that what he intends to convey has been made intelligible. ' It now remains for us to enquire whether this doctrine as it has been stated vindicates to the mind an infallible knowledge of a material non-ego. It will be observed in all that has been said about the necessity that we should think a substance or substratum for qualities that there has been no assertion that we must think one kind of substance as distinct from another. And, in fact, all that the principle of Substance and Accident can be held to force us to admit is simply the existence substance. This may be said to be original, or intuitive, or first-hand, knowledge, or a datum of Common Sense. But as to what particular substance is to be supposed in any given case, this is left to -inference and must be learned, if learned at all, in an entirely different way. The same is true, we may mention by way of illustration, of the principle of Cause and Effect. It forces us to suppose a cause for every event, but it imposes of itself no necessity of predicating this or that particular cause. This is left to inference after a comparison of the data, in each individual case. In truth. Sir William virtually admits that the piin- ciple of Substance of itself gives us no specific information when he declares that the notion of suljstance. is negative! We must have positive characteristics of one or the other of two things before we can distinguish them from each other. How, then, can we assert that there are two Discussions, Appendix I (A.) passim. -- 38 - substances without knowing what one has and the other has not.« But further, we find expUcit statements, on our author's part, that it is only by inference that we come to distinguish the substance which extension supposes, i. e. Matter, from that implied by feeling, willing, and thinking, i. e. Spirit or Mind. »Thus,« says he, »mind and matter as known and knowable are only two different series of phaenomena or qualities; mind and matter as unknown and unknowable are the two substances in which these two different series of phaenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we zxe. compelled to make from the existence of known phaenomena; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series to inhere in one.«-^ The principle of Substance and Attribute compels us to infer or rather to predicate the substance. So far it is a datum of Common Sense. But the inference of the duality of the substances is based upon an entirely different ground. In this case, it is »the incompatibility of the two series of phaenomena [feeling, willing etc., on the one hand, and extension, on the other] to inhere in one« substance. Immediate knowledge, at best, must end with substance as extended, etc. That it is matter, and not spirit, which is the substratum in which extension inheres, Hamilton can only know, if at all, at second hand. There is, then, no immediate or direct cognition, of any kind, of the existence of a material non-ego. If there be such a cognition, it is mediate and indirect. We are entitled, then, to say that our author has' not made out his case, so far as an im- mediate knowledge of Matter is concerned. But is he justi- fied in inferring the existence of two substances, an im- material for the phaenomena of thought, a material for those of extension? His only plea is that there are two incompatible series Lectures on Metaph., Lee. 8, — 39 — of phaenomena. Extension cannot inhere, in the same sub- stance with feeling and willing. But it is surely a pertinent question, Hou can we know of this incompatibilily. unless we can obtain some positive knowledge of substance? To assert that thought and ex, tension cannot both belong to the same substance implies that we have positive knowledge of more than the phaeno- menal. For, as phaenomena, are not both these series re- lated to mind? As extension appears is it not imaged by the mind? —'- But further, Hamilton agrees with Kant in declaring that space is a form of thought' Now if Space be « /^t^w of thought, there can be no incompatibility between space and thought to inhere in one, Is extension so different from space as to become incompatible with thought. Exten- sion is only empirical space, and this empirical reality of space in relation to all possible external experience cannot be construed to be inconsistent with its transcendental ideality. => Hear the words of Hamilton himself: »Extension is only another name for space and our notion of space is not one which we derive exclusively (?) from sense, — not one which is generalised only from experience; for it is one of our necessary notions, — in fact, a fundamental condition of thought itself. The analysis of Kant, indepen- dently of all that has been done by other philosophers, has placed this. truth beyond the possibility of doubt, to all those who understand the meaning and conditions of the problem But • taking it for granted that the notion of space is native or a priori, and not adventitious or a posteriori, are we not at once thrown back into idealism? For if extension itself be only a necessary mental mode, how can we make it a quality of external objects, known to us by sense: or how can we contrast the outer world, as the extended, with the inner, as the inextended 1 Lectures on Metaph. Sec. Z4, et al. 2 Cf. Kant Kritik d. r. Vemunft, p. 79, Berlin, 1870. _f:/" _ 4Q — world? To this difficulty, I see only one possible answer. It is this: >^#^ It cannot be denied that space, as a necessary notion, is native to the mind; but does it follow, that, because there is an a priori space as a form of thought, we may not also have an empirical knowledge of extension as an element of existence? a' I have transcribed this long passage because it plainly grants that extension is no more incompatible with thought than space since they are really the same; and further, because Hamilton acknowledges that he is reduced to the necessity of pleading that, after all, it is not impossible that extension may belong to. another world than that of the ideal! After so humble a plea, can he ever pluck up courage again to assert that it cannot be congidered as an affection of the same substance with thinking, feeling and willing? Now unless he be ready ' to declare it absolutely im- possible that extension may be a form of thought, by what right does he suppose for it a different substratum, — matter as. distinct from mind? Sir Wm. Hamilton has, himself, enunciated the principle that we are not to multiply entities unnecessarily ° — entia praeter necessitatem non multiplicanda sunt. The Law of Parcimony then forbids that we should suppose two substances when there is a possibility that all the phaenomena should be referred to one. We are thus forced to the conclusion that Hamilton, even though we allow him the free use of the principle of Substance and Quality, has not proved the existence of a material non-ego as distinct frofti mind. We are now to proceed one step further and enquire into the legitimacy of the knowledge which is vouched for by the principle of Substance and Quality or Accident as that principle is accounted for and explained by Sir William Hamilton. We have already seen that he regards it as a law imposed upon the mind by the Regulative Faculty, which ' Lectures- on Metaph. Sec. 24, ad fin. f Lectures on Metaph. Lee, 39. — 41 — faculty furnishes us with a priori and necessary convictionSj or fundamental laws of our intellectual nature. But not all these fundamental cognitions^ or laws, are regarded by our author as positive data of ^i power of the mind. Some of them are due to the exercise of the power of apprehending truth, and they are therefore given as absolutely valid in all their legitimate applications; others are due to a. powerlessniss of the thinking principle. The inability to conceive, in such cases, entails upon us a negative necessity "of accepting certain laws and conforming our thinking to them. sThere is a class, a says he, »of natural cognitions which we may properly view as so many positive exertions of the mental vigor S,nd the cognitions of this class we consider as positive. To this class will belong the notion of Existence and its' modifications, the principle of Identity and Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, the intuitions of Space and Time, etc. But besides these, there are other necessary forms of thought which, by all philosophers, have been regarded as standing precisely on the same footing, which to me seem to be . of a totally different kind. In place ot being the result of a power, the necessity which belongs to them is merely a consecjuence of the impotence of our faculties."*' The principles which are referred to this mental impotence as explaining them are Cause and Effect and Substance and Accident or Phaenomenon. "^ • This impotence renders it impossible for us, in case of the occurrence of any event, to represent it in thought as an absolute beginning, that is, as coming into existence without any relation of dependence upon anything previously existent. Neither can we think it as having an infinite non-beginning, that is, as never having begun to exist at all, but as having existed as we now know it from all eternity, though now, for the first time it has come within 1 Lectures on Metaph. Sec. 38. 2 Ibid. Sec. 39 ad init. ,/^ ^ 42 — the sphere of our knowledge. We cannot, therefore, think the eveiti' as unconditioned. We must think it as con- ditioned, that is, as standing in some connection with something which existed before. This necessity does not . arise, according to our author, from a positive apprehension of the relation it sustains to that other something, but is a negative necessity arising from sheer powerlessness of the human mind. We are thus un'der the necessity of con- ditioning in order that we may construe to thought, and this is called the Law of the Conditioned.^ In like manner, when we apprehend a phsenomenon such as we designate a quality, we can not think it as absolutely relative, that is, as related, yet related only internally, so that there is no relation to anything out of itself; nor can we represent it in thought as unconditionally conditioned, that is, as conditioned or determined in its existence, and as conditioned or determined by nothing. It is well here to quote Hamilton's own language: »A phaenomenon is a relative — ergo, a conditioned — ergo, a thinkable^ But try to think this relative as absolutely relative, this conditioned, as unconditionally conditioned, this phaenomenon as phaa- nomehon and nothing more. You cannot; for either you do not realize it in thought at all , or you suppose it to be the phaenomenon of something that does not appear;*: you give it a basis out . of itself; you think it not as the absolutely, but as the relatively relative; not as the un- conditionally, but as' the conditionally conditioned; in other words, you conceive it as the Accident of a subject or substance. This is an instance of the Conditioned, and constitutes the special case, the particular law, of Sub- stance and Phaenomenon. The law of Cause and Effect is another subordinate application of the same general prin- ciple. « '' ' Lectures on Metaph. Lee. 38, 39. I>iscussions; Essay I. Ibid. Ap- pendix I (A). 2 Reid's Works, Note H, p. 935. Tiiis work, as originally published, ended with p. 914, in the middle of Note D***. The remaining portion? — 43 — The Law of the Conditioned j as formulated by Ham- ilton is this: »A11 that is conceivable in thought lies bet- ween two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must.«' The Law of non-Contradiction, which is given as positively necessary, prohibits our accepting both- of the extremes as true while the Law of Excluded Middle re- quires us to accept one as true. Yet neither of these ex- tremes, though one of them^ is true, can be realized in thought; instead thereof we must think something as true which is neither one extreme nor the other. In other words, either extreme as unconditioned is unthinkable. We are under a necessity of thinking the relative or the conditioned; and only as we think this relative or conditioned is our thinking positive. This is called » purifying the condition* of Relativity.* To illustrate further: We cannot think ab- solute Beginning (the one extreme), nor infinite non-Begin- ning (the other extreme); we can only think the apparently new existence as another form of a previously existing something which we conceive as its cause. - We cannot think phaenomenon as phaenomenon absolutely relative (one extreme), or as phaenomenon ifncondition'ally conditioned (the other extreme); we must think it as related to, and conditioned by^ substance. Next, we are to notice that this condition of relativity imposed by the Law of the Conditioned on our thinking is not a condition of things. Our author's language is very explicit on this point: »This condition (by which, be it observed, is meant the relatively or conditionally relative, and therefore not even the relative, absolutely or infinitely) — this condition is not insuperable. We should think it not as a law of things, but merely us a law of thought; for we find that there are contradictory opposites, one including Note H, was published, after Hamilton's death, by his. Editor, H. L. Mansel, and incorporated with the seventh edition. I Lectures on Metaph. Lee. 38 cf. Discussions, Essay I, on Cousin. ^f — 44 — of which y by the rule of Excluded Middle, must be true, but neither of which can by us be positively thought as possible.a' .' One of the great merits claimed by Hamilton for this Law of the Conditioned is that, by the explanation which it affords of the genesis of the principle of Cause and Effect, it enables us to put an end to the famous contro- versy concerning the Freedom of the Will. It is impossible to, conceive an act of Will as unconditioned, as an absolute beginning, and therefore as free. »We are unable to con- ceive an absolute commencement; we cannot therefore con- ceive free volition. A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape- from necessitation How, therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is. possible in man or God, we are utterly unable, speculatively, to understanii, But, practically, the fact that we are free is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability; and this fact of liberty cannot be redargued on the ground that it is in- comprehensible, for the philosophy of the Conditioned proves, against the necessitarian, that things there are which may, nay must, be -true of which the understanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the possibility.«^ The doctrine of the Conditioned » shows that there is no ground for inferring from the inability of the mind to conceive an alternative as possible, that such alternative is really im- possible.K-'i It is plain enough, from the foregoing, that Hamilton considers the free volition as a case of absolute commence- ment. Though, from mental iriipotence, we are left without an alternative except to think something different from either , of the extremes, one of those extremes is really true. Ab- solute Beginning is a reality though the Law of the Con- I Discussions, Appendix I (A). ■' Ibid. 3 Lectures on Metaph., Lee. 40. — 45 -- ditioned form us to think a cause. The Law of the Con- ditioned is no law of things. Now what shall estop us from applying all this to the other case of negative necessity determined under the Law of the Conditioned, to wit, the necessity of thinking Sub- stance as the correlative of Phaenomenon or Attribute? There is precisely, the same sort of ground, according to Hamilton for the belief in cause as there is for believing in substance, and our inability to construe in thought » absolute begiiining« and » infinite non- beginning « is just the same in kind as our inability to conceive phaenomenon as »relatively relative« or »unconditionally conditioned«, that is phaenomenon as phaenomenon and nothing more.' What other conclusion does Hamilton leave for us but that our inability to conceive one or the other of these contradictories, (what, in either case, would amount to conceiving it as phaenomenon and nothing more), is no reason why one or the other of them is not true, or that phaenomenon exists without a subject, attribute without a substratum ? Nay, the Law of Excluded Middle, which rests upon a positive ne- cessity, being due to mental vigour and not to weakness," forces us to concede that one or the other of these in- comprehensible extremes is true and that no mean between them can be allowed. But if either extreme be true, phaenomenon exists as phaenomenon and nothing more, which implies that substance is a mere figment of the imagination. Not only is there no positive necessity, then, of believing in the existence of substance, we are under a positive necessity of believing that phaenomena do not inhere in it! Of course the negative necessity which does not give us a law of things, must yield to the positive ne- cessity which does. Thus does Hamilton, for those who accept this portion of his philosophy, bid the ghost of substance down. This advances beyond Hume. That in- I Vid. pp. 91, 92 of this ms. = Vid. supra, pp. 88, 89. cf. Lee. 38 on Melaph. '0^\ — 46 — dividual, much abused though he be for his skepticism and cast out as a publican and .a sinner, never went further than to declare that, when tested by the criteria of philos- ophy, there was no evidence for the existence of substance as the substratum of the phaenomenal. But Hamilton so uses his Law of the Conditioned as to force all who carry it out consistently to deny that attributes can inhere in substance! Nor are there any causes either! Truly the ranks of the Philosophical Nihilists have received a notable reinforcement ! It seems scarcely necessary to say that when Hamilton has thus failed to vindicate to the mind a knowledge of substance as constituting the non-ego in general, that his explanation of the manner in which extra -organic objects (i.' e. objects different from our own bodies) are known cannot assure" us of their real existence. It has been mentioned that he holds that these extra organic bodies are known to us only by inference from the effects which they produce in us: »Tho primary qualities of things ex- ternal to our organism we do not perceive, i. e. immediately know. For these we only learn to iijfer, ■ from the affections which we come to find that they determine in our organs; — affections which, yielding us a perception of organic extension, we at length discover by observation and induction, to imply a corresponding extension in the extra- organic agents.a ' But no inference based upon the prin- ciple of Cause and Effect ought to satisfy one who follows Hamilton, that what he is under a negative necessity of supposing to be due to a cause is not really an absolute beginning. We cannot allow Hamilton to impose extra- organic objects upon us unless he can give us some better reason for their existence than that certain effects imply them as causes. And here we may rest this discussion. I had intended to show how largely many of Hamilton's views are due to I Reid's Works, Note D*. p. 881. — 47 — the influence of Kant, but this would really be aside from the purpose of this essay. It may be said, however, that so far as he is strong as a philosopher he is Kantian. His weakness is that he has undertaken to combine the philos- ophy of Reid with that of Kant. This has proved as im- possible as the mingling af oil and water. And as the philosophy of Kant it by far the more potent of the two elements, its tendencies really override those of what has been borrowed from Reid. One word more and this task is done. The author of thiese pages does not wish to be set down as accepting the agnosticism of Hume. He has had in view simply to estimate the Common Sense Philosophy as an answer to Hume's skepticism, and although he does not believe that that skepticism has been refuted by either Reid pr Ham- ilton, he yet believes that we have evidence for the ex- istence of substance, howbeit there is no reason why we should postulate the existence oi tivo substances. There is no evidence that all series of phaenomena are not the manifestations of the same substance. It does not differ whether we call it spirit or matter or neither; no name we may give it can add to our knowledge concerning it. SOURCES USED. This list of authors does not embrace, of course, all the works the study of which has contributed . to the preparation of this dissertation, but only those author's whose views are criticisec]^ or such as deal directly with this phase of Philosophy. Berkeley (Bishop George), Works, 3 vols. 1820. Brown (Dr. Thomas), Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 4 vols., Edinburgh, 1820. Hamtlton" (Sir Wiluam), Lectures on Metaphysics, 2 vols., London and Edinburgh, 1869 — 1860. — Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, i vol.. New York, 1868. Supplementary Dissertations appended to his Edition of Reid's -Works, 7"^- edition, Edinburgh, 1872. Hume (David), Works, Edinburgh, I837. Essays, Literary, Moral' and Political. London — without date — The Globe Ed. Huxley (Thomas Henry), The Life of Hume — One of the vols, entitled English Men of Letters, edited by John Morley, New York, 1879. Mansel (Henry Longueville), Metaphysics, New York, 1871. Philosophy of the Conditioned, London and New York, 1866. Martineau (James), Essays, Philosophical and Theological, Boston, 1870. — 49 — Mill (John Stuart), Examination of Sir Wm.'Hamilton's Phi- losophy, 2 vols., New York, 1873. Murray (J. Clark), Outline of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, I vol., Boston, 1870. Reid (Thomas DD.), Works, collected and edited by Sir Wm. Hamilton, with Supplementary Dissertations, 2 vols., 7"'- ed., Edinburghj 1872. Spencer (Herbert), Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., New York, 1873. Stewart (Dxjgald), Collected Works, edited by Sir Wm. Ham- ilton, 10 vols., Edinburgh, 18 15 4 — 1859. Stirling (James Hutchison), Sir William Hamilton: Being the Philosophy of Perception. An Analysis, London, 1865. Thornwell (James Henley DD.), Collected Works, 4 vols., Richmond, 1871. Ubberweg (Dr. Friedrich), History of Philosophy, from Thales to the Present Time, translated by George H. Morris,. A. M. with additions, specially on English and Amejican Philosophy by Noah Porter, D. D., L. L. D., President of Yale College. New York, 1873. LIFE. I was born in Abbeville District, South Carolina, Oct. 7*- 1845. After six years spent at preparatory schools, I joined Erskine College in Get. i860. Within a few months,, the outbreak of the civil war closed the institution and my education was not pursued further until 1865. For the next two years, I studied the classics and mathematics with private instructors. For three years, 1867 — 1876, I was a student of the Theological Seminary at Columbia, S. C Having completed the course of that institution, I was for the next two years, 1870 — 1872, a student of the University of Virginia, where I pursued, as special studies. Philosophy under Dr. Mc.Guffey and Greek undfer Dr. Gildersleeve. In 1872, I was chosen Professor in Davidson College, North Carolina., Leave of absence was granted me in 1875 and I spent a year at the University of Leipzig hearing the lectures of Professors Heinze, Wundt, Drobisch, Striimpell Curtius and Roscher. I returned to Leipzig again the present year and have heard the Lectures of Professors. Voigt and Heinze. Leipzig, Aug. y^' 1880. James Fair Latimer.