2321 C84 i "*.«:^4 im m t«f?^ i^» 1^ *»if-4tA& BOUGHT WITH THB INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF m^nvu M* Sage 1891 .A...&.^.5:.£ji Mi.^(lH HJ2321 .CM " ""'"""^ '■"""'' The incidence of taxation. oiin 3 1924 030 264 232 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tlie Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http ://www. arch i ve . o rg/detai Is/cu31 924030264232 PRICE THREEPENCE. Tht Incidence 0/ Taxation. BY B. F. C. COSTELLOE Chairman of the Local Government Committee of the London County Council. WITH THE TEXT OF THE OWNERS' RATE BILL, AND AN APPENDIX ON THE EQUALISATION OF RATES. LONDON : WARD & FOXLOW, 113, CHURCH STREET, N.W. 1893. way in which the subject might be induced to contribute to the common purse, so that the national demand should take the form of a more or less voluntary contribution. I have said that comparatively little has been done, smce these canons were stated, to modify the principles formulated by the father of the science. As regards the three latter rules, it is obvious that they are primarily directed against the mischief of a state of things which belongs to the past. Such precautions were natural to people who thought of the tax-gatherer as the rapacious underling of a tyrant, or the unscrupulous exploiter who farmed Royal dues at a fixed rate and was chiefly concerned to make a profit on the transaction. The rules, of course, are still important, especially the last — but they are subsidiary, and their observance is certain to be forced upon the public power so soon as attention is cogently directed to any important breach. What we are concerned with in the main statement, and, above all, what we are concerned with at this moment in London, is the canon of equality. That on any theory of government immense sums must, year by year, be raised for the public treasury. Imperial and local, and that these can only come, in the end, out of the pockets of some of the members of the community, — this is the given fact. Who ought to pay the bill, and in what share and form, is the problem. That the distribution of the charge as between all the free subjects of the State should be based upon a rule of equality, is the axiom from which all men start. What is equality for the purposes of taxation is the crux. That the rule of Adam Smith is not sufficient, and is not, indeed, correct even so far as it goes, has been practically admitted by later economists, although no one, I think, has taken the trouble to work out an adequate formula. I shall not pretend to do so to-night : but, by way of contribution to the discussion, I shall try to set out some at least of the conditions on which the discovery of the ultimate canon must depend. The development which the principle has taken is curious. The theory is suggested at least as early as the old Poor Law of Elizabeth, when the subjects were expected to contribute to the expenses of the State concerning pauperism " according to their ability." I shall have to consider presently, when I pass to the question of local rates, how these words were interpreted at the time, and how oddly they changed their meaning afterwards. But the truth is that no one has yet devised any satisfactory measure of the abihty of each citizen to bear the common burden. The standard suggested by the Elizabethan legislators was practically the amount of a man's fixed capital, whether real or personal. For reasons which it is unnecessary to consider in detail, Adam Smith had passed to the contrary view that, for the purposes of taxation, income, and not capital, was the only measure, and for a long time there was a prejudice against any kind of assessment on capital values, mainly on the theory that capital was so essential to labour that any impost laid on it must be, in effect, obstructive to industry. Probably there are few responsible economists, even of the old school, who would now maintain that theory ; but in practice its influence is still active, and its effects are at the present time distinctly mischievous to the progress of taxation reform. In considering the question of the equalisation of contribution, John Stuart Mill was led to discuss the still more important formula of the " equalisation of sacrifice." It was at first assumed to be obvious that equity would be done by rating all the holders of the common estate at (say) five per cent., whatever the income of their property might be. The question that occurred to Mill was whether a levy of five per cent, alike on £s°' £5'^^> iTSiOOO, •and ;^50,ooo could in any sense be said to mean " equality of sacrifice." We all agree now that it is in truth a gross unfairness ; and that the plain effect is to tax the poorer employe out of a holiday or a coat, by a levy which means to the rich man not a single folly the less. The logical result, to us, is the necessity of graduating taxes with increasing wealth. The first form, however, which the working out of this principle took in practical politics "was much milder than the suggestion of a graduated tax. It was the theory that you should practically treat, not all incomes, but all increments of income above a certain irreducible minimum, as being the proper basis for taxation. The income necessary for sustenance was to be free, and the balance of the money which a man was free to spend as he ■chose was to be taxed, according to the original canon, equally j>yo rata in every case. This was in no sense a real equalisation of sacrifice. It was rather a way of avoiding it, by removing from the problem the most glaring and palpable instance of the general wrong. Nowadays, we have got further on, in theory, if not in practice. The objection to a "graduated income tax" at the Treasury is now said to be not that it is not equitable, but that it is difficult to arrange, because of our highly specialised methods of collection, I am not insensible to the difficulty ; though I am inclined to reply that Chancellors and permanent officials exist for the purpose of solving just such problems. But it is enough to say here that if there be some difficulty as to income, there is no such difficulty about Death Duties, which even Mr. Goschen began to graduate. Something might surely be done also with the Stamp Duties. As to the Inhabited House Duty, its travesty of ..graduation is sadly in need of improvement. Even as to rates, it should not be impossible to ease the pressure on the poorest grades of property, as is done, in effect, in Paris already. There is, however, another note which strikes the modern economist in running over again the earlier discussions of taxation. It is the tacit axiom that taxation is a necessary evil, to be kept under as far as possible. That it might ever be to the advantage of the individual to use the common machinery for any avoidable purpose, was rarely credited in the time and school of which 1 am speaking. Therefore, in all theoretic arguments, there was a tacit anxiety to avoid making any concession to the objectionable theory that the State was acting as the general agent of its, individual subjects. It was perforce acknowledged that there \yaa a certain amount of common business which could be done only by the State : but the State was regarded as if it had been employed for that strictly limited service, as a paid common servant in the nation's name. The conception seems to have been that the community was to be considered for this purpose as a group of partners who had insured, or had hired a watchman to protect a certam store of spendable commodities belonging to them in unequal shares : and the logical result appeared to be that they must pay insurance, or contribute to the policeman's wages, in proportion to their personal share. In other words, the taxation theory was logically connected with " Anarchy //ms the policeman."' It was tacitly supposed that taxes were paid solely as insurance for the means of personal enjoyment. The more usable money you possessed, the greater was your " stake in the country," and the greater also your fair contribution to the insurance fund. It is in this connection that I have placed, in the synopsis of the present lecture, the name of Joseph Hume after that of Adam Smith. I think it is impossible to appreciate the earlier ideas of the equality of taxation without also remembering the earlier Radical enthusiasm for economy at all costs. The common term in both is the distrust of the activities of the State. It was never doubted, in fact it was an axiom, that so long as the partnership strong-box could be kept secure, then the less the taxpayer paidj the better for him.. The amount of joy which Citizen X. might get out of life, was understood to depend not on the use for him of any funds made ever to the common purse, but on the balance of spendable income lodged to his account in the strong-box. That, his contributions were not insurance — except to a limited extent — and that he and all his fellow-citizens, rich or poor, should and might expect far wider social service for the greater benefit of them all, through the general agency of the State, and, therefore,, with increased taxation, was either denied or ignored. I insist upon this side of the history of the problem, because in this, as in much else, we are dominated to-day in unsuspected cases by an antiquated conception, which no thinking politician of any school could any longer defend. Before going on to Joseph Hume, it may be interesting to. note, in a word, the relation of the theories of taxation already explained to the growth and working of that extraordinary incident of our finance, the income tax. It followed from the canons, that it was orthodox that only revenue should be taxed, and there- fore holders of capital not visibly producing annual returns were not- included in the charge. The "maintenance of the instrument" was: necessary to the continuance of work, and, therefore, it was agreed that the sustenance of the worker ought to be allowed for before th& tax was applied. Equally was it necessary in order to ensure industrial security that the instruments of production, including the life of the worker himself, should be insured against risk, and therefore the premiums were exempted from taxation. I note these points because they are among the few cases in which our existing taxes have consciously conformed to theory. And yet, no tax could show more glaringly than the income tax the injustice of our method of levy. The theory was, as I have said, that there was a certain amount of revenue which could be devoted to personal enjoyment, that this could therefore be regarded as more or less in the nature of a luxury, and that the levy should be made pro rata on each pound of income beyond what was necessary for keeping the industrial machine in order. I think there will be little question now that such a principle does not produce any equality whatsoever, even as regards the problems of the taxation of revenue as distinct from the taxation of capital value. Such a tax errs not only in the methods of collection, but also because there is no attempt made in levying it to differentiate the permanent kinds of income from those which are precarious, or the incomes which depend on wearing personal labour whether bodily or mental, from those which call for no such expenditure, or the income which is derived from the recom- pense of labour, skill, and superintendence, as compared with that otiose " tribute" which is enjoyed by way of interest on capital or rent of land. Had any such attempt been made, it would have been fatal to the reigning theories of taxation. So far was the canon of exempting capital from taxation carried, that Ricardo attacks the legacy duty on the ground that legacy duties involve the laying of an impost on capital, and thus brings out with sufficient clearness the curious inconsequence underlying the whole theory. But the death duties had never, in fact, been dealt with on any intelligible principle — certainly not on the only natural basis that they were a resumption by the community of some portion of realised property, which it did not choose to allow the life-owner to control after his death. The old Radicals would have instinctively recoiled from pressing such a view, lest it should put too much of the common stock of wealth into the hands of that suspected entity — the State. You will not expect me to embark upon so vast a subject ^as the consideration of the reforms in principle which have been or might be proposed for the adjustment of the incidence of Imperial taxation. It would be impossible to discuss to any purpose in a limited space the theory and practice of graduated taxation, or the advantages and defects of the American system of assessment on capital values, or the adequate reform of the death duties, or the true principles to be applied in the taxation of luxuries, especially where they chance to be the common luxuries of the poor. I cannot even pretend to travel back and do justice to the fiscal reforms which constitute Mr. Gladstone's chief claim to political greatness. It would be interesting at another time to show how intimately the main theories of financial reform, which have been effective in the past generation, were concerned with the movement of Free Trade ideas, and how the change has concerned itself pre-eminently with the development of that original canon that taxation should not be obstructive to industry. In Mr. Gladstone's abolition of the tariffs, in matters relating to the income tax and, to a very limited extent, in the tangled history of the death duties, some few broad principles have been applied. It may be rash to say so, but I confess that in the preparation of the other Budgets of the United Kingdom, I cannot discover much trace of any scientific principles at all. If the philosophy of taxation remained stationary, the economic action of the community, both national and local, grew rapidly, and with this grew up an enormous expenditure. This increase affected, not only the national Budgets, but also, and still more, those of the local treasuries ; and it is that movement of local administration and taxation which has produced the question, the settlement of which is pressing upon us most urgently at this moment. By chance, the whole burden of this expenditure has been thrown on "the rates." There has been, in fact, a most extraordinary craze for throwing every form of local charge upon the existing scheme of rating. This is an accidental outcome of the old Poor Law of Elizabeth, to which I have already referred. The misfortune is that the machinery of that Poor Law for assessment was originally conceived on the very crudest basis, and that it has first been falsified and then has broken down. The contribution of individuals was to be measured by a rough standard of ability. This by no means meant at first according to the rental of land. The history of the Act is one of those charming tricks of unreasonableness which cover th.e surface of English history. It was found that the charitable assistance which had been previously given to the helpless poor had broken down ; but as the fact of the existence of such poor could not be ignored, and it was clear that they might become a serious danger to the public, the brilliant idea was conceived that it might be possible to make charity compulsory. It was therefore enacted that a collection for a public charity fund should be made in all churches, and that the clergy should exhort the people to contribute duly, and should keep an account of the expenditure. In 1555 it was found necessary to enact that special collectors should be appointed to take up these' legal alms in churches, and that those who refused to contribute should be summoned before the Bishop to be reprimanded. Presently it was found necessary to enable the Bishop to bind the recusant over to appear before the justices, who were enabled to enforce their exhortations by levying a discretionary sum if the parishioner continued obstinate. P'lfty years later the regular system of overseers and poor rates was created. The provision was that the "ability " of each parishioner to contribute should be ascertained by an assessment of the yearly value of his land, and of such personal property as was locally fixed, such, for instance, as his stock in trade. Such personal property continued to be assessable in law until the third year of this reign, although there was, doubtless, much irregularity in the application of the principle. Coal mines were assessed by the Act of Elizabeth, but sporting or fishing rights were not assessed until 1874. It would be incredible, if it were not so well known, that this great engine of public contributions, upon which, by degrees, almost all local charges have been thrown, should never have been the subject until recent times of any theoretical consideration at all. Even when the injustice of taxing stock and not taxing other personality was declared; it was done merely by a special Act, intended to be annually renewed, and it is by this alone that the rates were confined to realty. For some time past, however, it has been a settled matter that the occupier of a tenement is to pay the whole charge which is levied by all local bodies for all local purposes, and that they should be levied from time to time, as money may be wanted, in the shape of poor rates, or some other rates analogous thereto. It has undoubtedly been also assumed, whenever people thought about it at all, that this tax would go back upon the land. We are still told when this question is in controversy that it is the owners of the land, the ultimate receivers of the rent, who bear the charge, and obviously there is a theoretic argument in favour of that view. It is said that a man will pay in view oi the advantages of any site, whether it be urban or rural, so much in the way of annual outgoings as the advantages of the site make it worth his while to undertake. The whole of this, if no other considerations arose, would be the rent. If other expenses incidental to the occupation or to the rent are thrown upon the tenant, it is said that he will calculate as a whole the annual sum he can afford to pay for the advantages of the site, and will contract with his landlord for only so much rent as remains after he has made provision for these other charges he will have to pay. In other words, if he estimates that his tenancy will be worth to him /loo a year, then if the rates are ;^io, he will be willing to pay the landlord ;^go; but if the rates. are £"30, he will be wilhng, they say, to pay no more than £'jo. Upon this contention the opponents of reform assure us that it does not matter to the occupier what the rates may be, because if he pays so much in rates, he must of necessity pay so much the less in rent. Notwithstanding this theoretical consolation, we are all familiar with the constant struggle caused by the powerful resist- ance of the ratepayers to the raising of the rates. If the theories were really found to be correct in practice, the resentment of the occupiers would not be intelligible. If the rates do fall upon the owner, the occupier has no reason to concern himself with them at all. If he pays the same in any case, why has the opposition of the ratepayer to new expenses always been proverbially vehement ? Probably not because the ratepayer is a fool, but because, in the contest of urban enterprise, the economic theory put forward does not work. In fact, it is practically certain that in London, as regards new increments of local charge, the rate- payer does pay, and does not receive a rebate in any form from rent. Therefore it has become necessary and urgent to- consider how that matter can be put into such a shape that on the one hand the impost shall be borne equitably', and that on th& other hand this resentment of the ratepayer may be removed out of the path of social progress, which is even a more urgent consideration than the first. New charges must arise. We have long got beyond the time when it was thought either desirable or possible to minimize the common budget. It is apparent, and nowhere more apparent than in London, that so long as we can avoid administrative corruption or administrative waste, there are large investments of the public money which will pay the taxpayer far better in the end, at least for the higher purposes, of his life, than any personal use to which he could put the increment of rates. It is with these new charges that I am now concerned. They are not far in the future, for they have been coming upon us, if I am to speak of London, ever since 1855 : and it is the constant increase of such charges, made evident particularly by the rapid — and, at first, unexpected — rise of the School Board rate, which has forced the question of the Incidence of Taxation to the front. I frankly admit that it would probably be impossible, however the incidence of the rates were to change,, to make any startling reduction in the burden carried by the present occupier. To save him from further increment of charge is, in my view, not only distinctly possible, but evidently just. To relieve him of similar increments of charge which have been wrongly put upon him in recent years is also possible, and also just. How far such a reflux of existing rates could go, without producing a risk in the shape of a demand for higher rent, is, I think, a question of degree ; and I conceive that in that case, strange_ as it may sound to some, the landlord's only chance of retaliation would depend materially upon the view taken of the whole transaction by the general conscience of the community. It is extremely difficult to speak broadly of the relations between owners and occupiers in London, because of the extra- ordinary complication which has been introduced by our, peculiar systems of tenure. I must, therefore, say at once that I am endeavouring to state what are, in my view, the broad or average results, although I am perfectly conscious that it is quite possible to bring forward on every conceivable point individual instances, and even a large number of instances of actual tenancies in London to which the stated rules would not appear to apply. But London is large enough, in spite of its complexity, for the appli- catioii of general rules. It contains, roughly speaking, a million inhabited houses. It is true that in a considerable number of the poorer dwellingd the system of compounding has made it apparent that rates will fall not directly upon the artisan occupier, but upon the receiver of the first rent. In that case, however, as you will see at once, the ratepayer whom we have to consider is not the lodger, but the purveyor of lodgings, who, of course, in a vast number of cases, is himself a tenant. On the other hand, there are endless dislocating considerations which could be introduced if we were to aim at unravelling in detail the effect of the dates and periods of current leases upon the incidence of the actual burden as between the lessee and his direct lessor. I do not, hxDwever, for a moment propose to embark upon any such impossible speculation, for I conceive that there is a broad principle which runs through the whole matter, and which is quite sufficient for our guidance in the immediate problem we have to solve. That is the principle that so long as the rates are levied upon the occupier exclusively, all increments of rate which were not before the mind of the occupier at tlie time he made the contract, tend to fall on him, at least under any such conditions as prevail in London. I add the proviso, because I think it is fallacious to confuse the question with an argument derived from the conditions of tenancies and rents in rural districts, where the pull of the market is often against the landlord, as in Essex, although it may also be, as in Connaught, absurdly in his favour. For the present purpose, I am confining myself to those conditions of occupancy and earnings with which we have become familiar since the growth of great urban communities, for which London is not merely a typical, but an extreme, or even an exaggerated case. The value of sites in London has tended, ever since we have had any means of testing it, to rise steadily, constantly, and almost universally. At the time of the last quinquennial valuation we were commonly told by the apologists for property that large areas of London would be found to have depreciated in value, and that, in fact, the growth of unearned increment alleged by land reformers would be found to be a delusion. In the results, however, it appeared that out of 30 valuation lists in which the metropolis is assessed, almost every one exhibited an increase of value as compared with the previous valuations. The County Council has published a return exhibiting the rateable values of every parish and union now included in the County of London, so far as they can be procured, for 13 quinquennial periods, ranging from 1830 to 1891 : and, if allowances be made for one or two peculiar cases, which probably represent merely errors in assessment, there remains only one area which has not been practically continuous in its increase of rental value, and that is the smallest and poorest of the whole, viz., St. George's-in-the East. In fact, the table in question contains some 400 consecutive figures of the valuations of London and its parts, out of which not more than eight show even an apparent backwardation, and many of these must be erroneous. Such figures prove with sufficient clearness that the landlords, in most cases, have the London tenants completely at their mercy, and that it will be impossible, as a rule, either for a tenant entering upon a new occupancy to drive a very successful bargain with the owner, or for a tenant who is in ■occupancy to throw up his tenancy and move away, except for reasons of some magnitude. All that he can hope for is — and this is in practice what happens — that he may get possession of a site which gives him some chance in the struggle of London life at a rent not loo extortionate, and that he will then be allowed to stay there, on lease or otherwise, for some -considerable time without being compelled to suffer a -rise of rent. Doubtless, the average man roughly takes into account the amount of the rates as they stand. Under ordinary conditions it is not possible to calculate beforehand what they may become. The system of rating in the different parts of London is so complex that it is never possible to say, with certainty, whether the rates of a given parish are likely to go up next year or not. Under the conditions of a market such as I have described, the average man, of necessity, takes a fairly sanguine view, and hopes for the best. In other words, he calculates roughly for rates of about five or six shillings in the pound, as the case may be, and resolves to do his best to keep them below that figure if he can. But the conditions of metropolitan government in recent years have made it inevitable that he should fail in keeping them ■down. The new demands have forced themselves upon us, and they have inevitably grown. No better instance could" be taken in illustration of the statement that the increment of charge falls truly upon the occupier, than the School Board rate itself. We all know how little the average ratepayer expected, even down to the last moment, that the nation would take up the work of education at all, or would charge the cost, if there were any, upon his rates. Even when the Bill was in the House, every one argued and agreed that a rate of a penny or two was all that it would mean. In the result the lessees, if there had been any, who made an accurate forecast of their probable rates in 1869, must find themselves to-day upon this one head nearly a shilling the worse. And if one follows out the same system, is it not equally clear that even if a shopkeeper or householder had held on all the time, say, for a running tenancy from year to year, he would •certainly not have been able at any point between 1869 and the present time to say to his landlord, " The education rate ■costs me £$ a year, therefore, you must reduce my rent by that amount, or I will leave." The value of the site to the occupier may or may not have risen in the interval ; but the one thing ■certain is that the tenant will not have been able to obtain any rebate upon the plea that his local charges have increased. Broadly speaking, therefore, this shilling in the pound has been borne by the ratepayer, and it is largely for this reason that we have had a constant succession of rows in the School 13 Board elections. The ratepayers' political force has stopped the rate of progress. I am not discussing the policy. The ratepayer may be right or wrong ; but he has had a great deal to say for himself, because he has borne that charge not as a matter of considered justice, but by an accident of the law. But in the case of the great municipal improvements, the bar to progress is infinitely worse. The expense of these improvements has been very great. It is not merely a question of new streets,, but of a reform of the whole drainage system and of other public services equally important to London as a city. The Metropolitan, Debt has increased enormously, and yet the Metropolitan Board and the County Council have not done more thati make a sensible beginnmg of what requires to be done. Remark that mucti of this has been done to improve the value of the land of London as a building estate. It is difficult to make this plain, because of the curious fact that, until the present moment, the statistics of London have never been collected at all. But the Council has. been able to make a beginning in the way of demonstrating what hardly requires to be proved — -that the construction for example,, of a great arterial street does improve not only the value of the frontage of the street itself, but also of large areas of land adjacent to the point of improvement. It is possible to show in the case of earlier improvements, such as the widening of High Street, Shoreditch, in 1887, how the tide of resulting prosperity and the equivalent rise in the curve of rent has spread not only along the street, but over the whole district aflected, within a. limited period of time. The construction of the Victoria Embank- ment did not appear at first to have produced any startling effect on the business habits of London, but it is now manifest that it poured little streams of profit into the hands of the Duke of Norfolk, Lord Salisbury and the other fortunate owners, including the City Corporation, who held lands between the River and the Strand. But perhaps a better instance still is to be found in one of the projected improvements of the present year. The Tower Bridge is approaching completion. It is very necessary that the Southern approach to it should be so improved as to create a great thoroughfare. The new street, as it happens, will open up a very much improved and, therefore, cheaper traffic route from certain of the great goods stations where there are, I am told,, large dep6ts of materials required for building. The result is, as. the experts in the matter tell us, that the opening of the new street will, in fact, cheapen new houses, and by so much increase the value of building sites in many parts of London north of the River. The Council has raised since 1889 two millions of capital debt. A large part of this is required for the completion of the main drainage system. No one has ever proposed to deny that drainage is an improvement of the landlords' property. Indeed it has been a universal tradition until Mr. Ritchie's. Act that all sewer rates, great and small, ought to be treated 14 as owners' rates, to be levied directly from the landlord, and not from the occupier at all. Mr. Ritchie's Act, whether by ■design or carelessness, repealed this rule as regards London, ■and threw everything in the nature of a sewer rate back on the occupier. 1 do not know that anyone has suggested that any occupier in the Metropolis has been able to obtain any reduction of rent because of this perfectly gratuitous increase of his liabilities. Neither have I heard that there has been any effective protest against a change of liability which, besides being unreasonable in itself, was retrospective in its effect, and ■a distinct interference with the conditions of existing contracts of tenancy. These considerations may be of polemical interest presently, but for the moment I am only concerned to insist upon the fact that the expense of London improvements has enormously increased the value of London as a building estate. For these improvements the ratepayer has already paid in one form or another. But it is not the tenant who derives the profit from these improvements. On the contrary, because of the improvement of his landlord's property and its consequent increase in value, the occupier is charged a higher rent. 1 say it is no wonder that we have the ratepayer arrayed in the path of social progress as an obstructionist : and it is, therefore, one of the most urgent of all reforms that the incidence of local ■charges should be made more just. It would carry me beyond the present purpose, if I were to •attempt any exact appraisement of what local expenditure may be considered to be incurred chiefly or partly for the owner. That almost every form of urban government and civilization goes to increase the value of London as a building estate is manifest. Even police and education help to secure and to improve the ducal rents. Drainage is admittedly an owner's rate. Sanitation and streets are not very different. Fire brigade and open spaces evidently help him. To cross-river communications and arterial thoroughfares he would be glad to contribute, if there were no public purse to draw upon. Housing expenses are not only an " improvement," but they are also the result of the sins of owner- ship. Lighting is clearly a service to the property. If people make streets and invite the public into their transmitted fields, then they must make and keep their fields in a habitable condition. Such considerations may serve to show how large a share of the London rates the owner, as agamst the occupier, might be fairly asked to bear. I am aware that there are arguments per contra. I do not attempt, at this moment, to apportion the result. That some share, and a large share, is proper to be charged upon owners, if we were now devising a new scheme of local taxation, is all I require to prove : and that, I think, is plain. If I have succeeded in showing that the occupier does bear increments of local charges, and that of the increments recently •accruing a large part at least are chirges which ought to fall upon the owner, I have still to deal with a third problem. The 15 very same persons who tell us that the occupier has nothing to ■complain of, because he does not now bear the charges, turn round and tell us also that if we attempt to transfer any portion •of the charge to the owner, we will effect nothing, because he will raise his rent, and thus put it all back upon the occupier as before. It is a splendid inconsistency : and I must also point out that it does not follow, even if this danger might be real, that the legal change should not be made. It is the business of the law to say how, and by whom its charges ought equitably to be borne. If, among other unjust things, the conditions of competition enable landlords to evade these liabilities, there is at least no reason why the law should not make that as difficult for them as it can. But I am satisfied that it is not true that the landlords of London would in fact be able to evade a proposed transfer of future or recent charges from the occupier to the owner. In the first place, I remark that the creation of the Landlords' Property Tax serves as an experiment and an analogy. It was intended by Parliament to fall upon the landlord. For reasons of ■collection, it was levied from the occupier under strict conditions which empowered him by law to deduct it out of rent, and the burden has certainly not been shifted at any time upon the shoulders of the tenant. Many startling things have been said by politicians ■and by experts on this subject, but I have never heard that anyone was hardy enough to say that the fluctuations of the Landlords' Property Tax, which have at times been great, have ■ever affected rents in the slightest degree. The truth is that the imposition of a new direct charge upon the owner does not, either in practice -or in economics, make it any easier for him to get a higher rent from his tenant. That the State imposes a new tax upon him is no more relevant to the outcome of his bargains with his tenants, than if he had lost money at Monte Carlo. There is nothing in the existence of an owner's rate which either increases the value of the property to the occupier or the practical capacity ■of the tenant to pay. I say that there is nothing of this nature involved in the nature of the proposal that I am placing before you ; but even if this be more than the truth, I think it is impossible to show, if the sentiment of the community was in favour of the change and the charges were of sufficiently moderate amount, that any general rise of rent would follow. The truth is, that metropolitan conditions as regards tenancy are abnormal. I believe it is largely true to say, that in London, from the con- ditions of the market, there is not truly an "economic rent." It is impossible to tell beforehand what amount of rent might conceivably be got out of any given site in London ; though I believe the owner is getting a rent just as large as under the circumstances he can get, yet I am sure that that rent is con- ditioned not so much by strictly economic conditions as by what one may call, for want of a better word, the moral conditions of the market. i6 There will always, however, be a keen demand for sites, and therefore I believe that an attempt merely to divide the existing:: London rates between the occupier and the owner would give rise to dangerous conditions. It vs^ould tend to create a landlords' ring. An attempt would be made to roll back the owners' share on to the rent, and the occupiers, unless rents happened to be depressed at the same time, would run a risk of severe pressure. I do not say the attempt would necessarily or always succeed ; but, in any case, so great and sudden a dislocation of rents would be a public misfortune. In a word, I think it is possible so to put a certain share of taxation upon the owners in London that they cannot roll it back on the occupiers, though, for many reasons, this is not so easy to accomplish as reformers at one time supposed. I have endeavoured to sketch very roughly the conditions of the problem. It remains to suggest what plans are practically open to a willing Government. For a considerable time past the "relief of the ratepayer" has served as a political commonplace without being in the least understood. The cry has been largely exploited in the interests of the owners, and the first form which that movement took in the' financial operations of the nation was the demand which came from the owners of the land — Conservatives and Liberals alike— for a series of ' ' Exchequer doles " towards the local expenses. This has been proved to be a thoroughly bad system in every way. In the first, place, the expenditure was so engineered that it tended to assist the owners to the utmost and the occupiers not at all. In the second place, there was no check over the mis- application of such grants to countervail extravagance. If it is really intended to give relief of local rates, the local authority must somehow be made responsible. It is essential, relief or no, that the local authority should remain effectively answerable to their constituents for the amount of the rate. I need not insist on this side of the question, because Sir Thomas Farrer has made it obvious already. The utter absence of scientific principle is nowhere more evident than in this very system of Exchequer doles, which has been carried out by Government in a way as completely self-contradictory and indefensible as any system of taxation could well be. What methods, then, are there by which anything can be done for the relief, not of rates as such, but of the occupier's undue burden? Everything has been thrown upon the rates, and the amount of them has become in some places commensurate with the Imperial revenue itself. If they were really a charge on land, a quota taken for public objects out of rent, we, at least, should not object. But the "ratepayer" in London is not the owner, but the payer of rent, and we are satisfied that his relief is not only just, but urgent. There are— and in this I address myself particularly to the London problem — four ways conceivably open for the relief of the occupier. 17 There is first of all the possibility of a local death duty, in the shape of a sur-tax upon some appropriate portion of the Imperial death duties ; secondly, the plan of a local sur-tax upon some portion of the Imperial income tax ; thirdly, the imposition of an improvement rate ; and fourthly, the laying of a direct and specific rate on the value of land, as distinct from building. This last, which is the most scientific of the four proposals, has been heretofore associated with the name of Mr. Moulton, and is at this moment in process of being put into the practical shape of a draft Bill by my committee of the Council. None of these schemes, however, are free from considerable incidental difficulties. I will deal with a municipal death duty first. For many reasons this is the cleanest and clearest way of dealing with the problem before us. As I state it and as I understand it, it is a direct attempt to municipalise the unearned increment of metropolitan landlords. I should define it thus. As soon as the Imperial death duties have been recontrived and placed on such a basis as will suit the Imperial demand, there should be a power created by which a local authority in London — say the County Council — should direct the levy of a sur-tax of a certain amount, for which they should be responsible, over and above the Imperial death duties. This sur-tax is, of course, intended to fall equitably upon all interests on real property in London. Theoretically such a fund ought to give a large revenue. The rental value of London is ;^40,ooo,ooo a year. If it is worth twenty years' purchase, and if it passes from one generation of owners to another on an average once every twenty years, then any death duty should be paid on ;£'40,ooo,ooo a year, and, if so, a sur-tax of 2^ per cent, should, broadly speaking, represent a million. The yield of the Imperial death duties on realty is at present very far short of that proportion ; but this is largely due to the obsolete methods of collection and assessment employed, and we have every reason to believe that the existing Parliament will not pass without effecting a change in this respect. But it will be possible and very desirable, once the Imperial death duties are reorganised, to take the reformed succession duty, assuming that that touches all interests in London lands, — the interests of the leaseholders as well as the interest of the freeholder — and deal with it as the basis of a local sur-tax. if a real assessment were made of all the interests in realty in the County of London at their true capital value, and if the County Council were enabled to put a sur-tax on them of the amount suggested, the result ought to be an increase of the metropolitan revenue by a large part of a million annually. Such a tax could certainly not be thrown back on the rents. It is not, in fact, paid by the holders of the property at all. The existence of a death duty means that we all recognise the right of the State to permit a man's descendant to enter into the enjoyment of his property on any terms it pleases to impose. The State need recognise no vested interests after death, for there is nothing in the theory of property -whereby a man can claim an indefeasible title to hand on his interests as he pleases, either to his personal descendants or to the chance objects of his post mortem benevolence. Such a concession is a pure allowance by the law for the general advantage, and if the public authority chooses, for just ends, to tax it by an additional i\ per cent, that does not much concern the present holder of the property, nor does it offend at all against vested interests. It is indeed evident that such a tax would be found to incur less resentment than any other form of the taxation of land. ' I ought to add at once that this is not a London matter only. The great difificulty of any such new tax is that it could not well be confined to London. It should, at the least, be a tax applied to all urban lands as distinct from rural lands, for we may say broadly that urban land takes the bulk of the unearned increment. If we can get at mines, or deer forests, or other special properties as well, it will be so much the better. If, however, it is to be applied to all urban lands, it is evidenTthat there is no single authority to which you can appeal for an adjustment of the percentage rate. If, on the contrary, the percentage is not somehow voted by the local authorities, you will in effect be running the risk of falling back into the system of Exchequer doles, under a new name. To avoid the confusion that would arise in the collection of a tax varying with every town in the country, it' seems to me that the Legislature might pass an annual Bill declaring a stated rate for the year, say i\ per cent., to which all urban lands should be liable, but leaving each corporation to take up the tax or not as they choose. Thus local responsibility would be preserved, whilst at the same time ease of collection was ensured. If such a tax once entered into our system of finance, I am convinced it would become one of the most popular methods of raising money for local purposes that could be devised. One objec- tion that is made against such a tax is that by raising the death ■duties to any considerable extent they will be evaded. My answer to this is that already a considerable amount has been raised in such a duty, and there the attempts to evade it have not been fatal. The action of the death duties will have to be extended in any case. Immense properties escape by settlement, and the question now IS to bring this settled land, as well as that belonging to hmited hability companies into the net of the death duties. In truth, it is evident that the vole of death duties in the system of raising revenue is and will be very greatly extended. As It extends the machinery for its collection will, as a matter of course, be perfected. It has already been very much improved within the last ten years. My contention is merely this • That, as the death duties are in principle a convenient and just means of raising a large part of the public charges, so whatever death duties cover the interest in urban lands is peculiarly a ju^ and convenient means of raising a large part of the public charges bv which urban land is gaining every day. 19 I am quite aware that there exists in high financial quarters an this country a paramount prejudice against any " confusion," as it is called, of Imperial and local taxation. So far as the •death duties are concerned, the principle of sharing a source of revenue between the Imperial and local budgets has been •already admitted, although it has been applied in such a form as to give the least advantage with the maximum of mischief. But I do not hesitate to say that the prejudice itself is without foundation. It exists in no other country. Both in America and in France — and in neither of these countries are the ■conditions altogether unlike our own — there is a marriage of Imperial and local taxation, and the results are regarded by all parties concerned as distinctly admirable. I am not aware that the principle has been applied in either case to the death duties, which are, in fact, less developed in either country than they have been .among ourselves ; but the system of the centimes ■additionnelles, which is the basis on which our current London proposals have been suggested, is paramount in France, both as regards the impost on real property and as regards the other direct taxes upon personalty and business, which roughly corres- pond to an imperfect income tax. It is clear that there are certain general conditions which must in any such case be kept in view. The collection of the principal impost and the sur-tax must remain, no doubt, in the hands of the Imperial officials; •but beyond the addition of a few extra figures on the demand note and the quarterly transmission of a cheque, to the local authorities, it matters nothing to the Income Tax Commissioners whether they collect a single tax of 6d. or a total sum of gd., •consisting of an Imperial 6d. and a local sur-tax of 3d. I confess that for myself I cannot see the argument against this course, and I certainly see overwhelming reasons in its favour. You are aware that there is not at present any machinery by which such an application can be effected. Our own Land Valuation Committee reported some time ago, and I believe most ■experts are now convinced, that it would be possible to separate the valuation of the site from the general rateable value as now •recorded. I am most anxious, as I suppose we all are, that the ■necessary reform of the Metropolitan Valuation Act for this purpose ■should be made forthwith. But we do not want to wait for the ■delays which may beset such a proposal, in order to proceed with the relief of the occupier and with the imposition of a reasonable share of the cost of London improvemements upon the owner. The immediate question, therefore, is by what machinery you can, even upon the present assessment, proceed effectively in that direction ? I think it is clear that the only machinery available is some impost on rent, and it is, to my mind, obvious that the precedent of the Landlord's Property Tax — which was devised and successfully guarded for the very purpose of making the owner and not the occupier pay — is the best to follow. It is this scheme which we are proposing in the measure which is being promoted as a private bill. We ask leave to arrange with the Income Tax Commissioners for a levy in London of a sur-tax upon the Land- lord's Property Tax, limited, for the present, to 4d. m the pound,. , the proceeds of which are to be handed over— less the proper allowance for collection — to the County Council to form an. Improvement Fund. Upon this fund we have asked to be enabled to charge all the capital charges which may hereafter arise either for the great " permanent improvements " of London or for works, of permanent public utility of an analogous nature, such as are now chargeable to capital account and defrayed out of debt extending over long periods. Some natural surprise has been expressed because we have proposed to throw upon the new fund only one half of the charges arising from the Strand Improvement and the other large schemes for which powers were sought in the present session. I confess I think that a great blot on the Bill ; but we were, in fact, unable to ask for a larger proportion^ because we had practically given notice of these schemes at an, earlier stage of the proceedings upon the footing that the expense should be divided between the owners and occupiers of the metropolis. Like most compromises, which fail to conciliate the enemy, it has proved a misfortune ; but before Parliament, we were bound by it for the present year. We have proposed > however, to charge against the first year's rate a certain amount of immediate capital charges relating to the current capital expenditure of the Council, in order that the operation of the proposed change of incidence may not be unnecessarily delayed.. Upon this plan* it is expressly arranged that every payer of rent shall deduct the tax from every receiver of rent upon the full amount he pays. You will see at once that by such a plan each profit rent in the ascending series of interests will pay its propor- tionate share of the main charge. If an intermediate leaseholder — as is constantly the case — pays a leasehold rent of £8b but gels, himself from a sub-lessee ;^ioo, then that fortunate leaseholder will have to pay his 4d. for his profit of ;^20, because it is obviously a portion of the land value, and is, in fact, a case of the purest unearned increment. There has been much talk of difference of opinion in the Council ; but the talk is merely a device of the enemy. The only point about which there was any question was a certain attractive suggestion, made by the Vice-Chairman,. which, however, he ultimately withdrew. Mr. Harrison's amend- ment was designed for the purpose of reheving certain leaseholders. He proposed an ingenious scheme, which was stated in his own words, in my memorandum. The point of it was that the parties who. were to bear the real burden of the owners' rate, (or, as it was then called, the Improvement Rate), were the persons who received the rents at the bottom of the scale, viz., the owner of the ground rent, and of any rent or rents subsequent thereto up to a figure which made one-fifth of the gross value. For the present purpose * As will be seen by the reprint of the Bill in the Appendix. 31 ■we may take it that the gross value is the rack rent. The theory was that the value of the site, apart from building, might be roughly taken at one-fifth, in the absence of any means of valuation. But it was also, I think, erroneously assumed that this fifth was the te^ fifth — the ground rent and the rent immediately •above it in the ascending scale. You will have observed that these proposals correspond with the second and third possibilities of the four I named. The term *' improvement rate " has been used, and may usefully be appro- priated, to describe the various forms of the proposal to create a new rate for purposes touching the improvement of the land, so arranged ■as to throw the whole weight either on the ground rent itself, or, if that is too small, then upon the rent that stands nearest to the soil. It is, I fear, unfortunate that the whole agitation was at one time popularised in the form of a cry for the taxation of " ground rents " — as if these forms of the unearned increment were the only rental incomes which escaped unjustly. The ground rent is an obvious and clear case of the mischief; but it is neither the only case, nor the most important. From speaking of ground rents, some of our friends have passed on to speak of " ground values," as if that phrase were more appropriate to the ultimate freehold estate in the land, and as if that alone was the proper subject of the taxation we are now considering. To me it is, I confess, a truism that if we are to tax land values by any rate on income, the burden must be apportioned fairly among all receivers of rent, who share in the increase of the value ■of the site. Whether they are ground landlords, or leaseholders who have gained a profit rent on sub-leasing, or occupiers whose •tenement has come to be worth much more than they pay for it, can make no difference to the reason or justice of the case. I think it is not difficult to show that a mere proposal to tax ground rents, if it stood alone, would be neither adequate or equitable. What the ground rent in any actual case may be, is an accident. By ground rent, I mean a rent directly received 'by the owner of the freehold upon a long lease. In most cases this is a building lease, and the ground rent is one which was fixfed at the time when the property first " ripened " into building value. Such rents are of small amount, and represent a considerable, but, at the same time, a moderate advance upon the antecedent occupation value for agricultural or "vacant land" purposes. But there are also ground rents, as, I believe, on the Cadogan estate, which ar6 fixed at some hundreds a year, and represent a large proportion of the modern rack rent of the tenements. It is impossible to base any equitable assessment of charges even as between the various freeholders themselves, upon the amount of ground rent they may appear to receive. The ground rent may be fined down by the payment of a capital sum : and, if the tax were put upon ground rents only, this expedient would, of course, be universally adopted. Again, I believe it often happens that in a developed building estate, the proprietor sets upon a given field a certain total ground 22 rent of, say, ;^xoo. A builder arranges to take the field and build upon it fifteen houses. For his convenience the ground rent i& apportioned upon ten of these houses at £io apiece, while the remaining five stand at a peppercorn. The truth is that it is not the ground rent, but the actual value of the freehold reversion, which i& in the minds ot those who desire to throw back the whole of this taxation upon the freeholder. But I venture to think they do not always see clearly what they themselves propose. In the desire to take due account not merely of the annual rental, but also of the improved value of the reversion, all financial reformers will be at one. My proposal is to attack this element of value by means of a death duty, or, in broader terms, by way of some charge on capital values. I see no way of attacking it through a tax on income ; I am certain that the expedient recently propo^ed^ however ingenious, is not capable of being carried through. Before I return to the proposal I have named second — the local surtax on the landlord's income tax, which I call a " Rent Duty" — I ought to direct your attention to that peculiar element in all these calculations which we must call for simplicity " building value." It is of the essence of Mr. Moulton's theory that while an impost laid upon all land values equally will have economically no tendency to raise rent, an impost laid upon building, as distinct from land, should tend to make rents rise. With this as a thereotic proposition one need not quarrel ; but I have already said that the conditions which govern rents in London are by no means strictly economic. As far as I can see, there is only one way by which the upward tendency of rent in London could be counter- vailed, and that is by placing a tax on vacant land. Such a tax, in a perfectly moderate form, is embodied in our recent proposals, and it is an integral part of the plan. It seems to me to be a vital part of any scheme for taxation of land value. I confess I cannot see on what principle the exclusion from taxation of building land held vacant for a speculative rise can be defended. It is commonly defended as a case of the imaginary law that taxation ought never to be laid on capital value. I venture to say there is no such law : but even if there were, the present case is hardly one to which it can be rationally applied. For the fact is that such vacant land is producing a return — which might be even stated in the ledger as an annual return— to its owner ; only from a certain speculative instinct he prefers to take that return in the form of a lump sum to be realised at a future sale, rather than in the form of present annual rent. It is commonly said that it is somehow wrong to tax land of this character, because you would thereby " force it into the market." I can see no reason, from the point of view of the community, and especially i of the poorer part of it, why this land should not be brought into the market as soon as it is reasonably suitable tor building, or, in other words, as soon as it is considered to have a " building value." Until that point is reached, it will not be assessed. When it is so assessed, ex hypothesi, it is to the advantage of the 23 •community that it should be used for housing purposes. I am not forgetting that the partisans of open spaces are afraid lest by such a proceeding the total free space of the metropolis would be diminished. To this contention I will only here reply, that if the community wants, as it most assuredly does, free spaces for the purposes of common health and recreation, it ought to buy and hold them : and it will be able to buy them at a more reasonable rate if speculative holders of land have to pay their fair assessment, instead of being privileged, as they now are, to hold their lands against the community and shut up from everybody else, entirely free of any annual burden. I do not myself suggest that the taxation law should .penalise the retention of an ample amount of free space about each house ; though I confess I could never understand upon what reasonable theory the Earl of Ilchester was allowed to retain for his private use a park of enormous value, practically free from effective rating. Apart from the possible effect on rents, however, I do not see that the investment of capital in London houses has any special claim to be exempt from local charges. It happens that, not only in law but in fact, the structures affixed to the soil become inseparable from it. The actual rent is paid, in the common •course of things, not upon the site but upon the tenement. We all agree that to the expert it is possible to assess a theoretic value for the site without regard to structures; but he would do it in effect by imagining the existing structures to be burnt down or •otherwise removed. The " value " of the property, in the familiar sense of the word, is its value as it stands. It is upon that basis that it is now assessed. It would be difficult, and in many cases ■altogether misleading, if you were to take the figures of a correct present value and to attempt to divide them into two parts, one of which should represent the site and the other the building. I do not mean to say that such a process would not in a large number of cases be applicable enough ; but I desire to bring out what is an •essential point both in the scientific and in the practical considera- tion of the problem, by noting that in a large number of cases any such attempt would fail. There are instances, such as that of Millbank Prison, where the existing structures on the whole detract from the value of the site. There are many instances where the present value of the buildings, considered by themselves, together with the present value of the land, if it could be sold at once at Tokenhouse Yard as a " cleared site," would largely exceed the present fair valuation. For these reasons 1 think it is quite clear that as soon as land valuation can be introduced, it will take the form, not of three columns, but of two ; not, that is, of a valuation of the property as it stands, subdivided into two factors for land and structures, but of two independent assessments, one of which will represent the property as it stands, while the other will be the " cleared site value." I mention this in order to emphasise my conviction that it is not really possible in practice accurately to disentangle the return 24 of the fixed capital which has become annexed to the soil, frcmi the rent which, i.s paid for the use of the site itself. It may be inconvenient that the two should be confused, but the fusion is in the nature of the case. I cannot better illustrate this than by recurring to Mr. Harrison's amendment. I know that that proposal commended itself to some on the theory that it would lay the proposed charges upon the land rather than upon the buildings, whereas a rent duty cannot profess to draw any distinction, but taxes all rents alike. It is, nevertheless, easy to show that in many cases the working of any rule for piling up the tax upon the last fifth, would have been to penalise the builder himself. To make this clear it will be convenient that I should explain at once how the alternative methods of deductions would really work. Let us suppose the case of a house now occupied from year to year at a rent of £'i.io. Suppose it held by a sub-lessee, who himself pays ;^ioo a year to the original lessee. Suppose, further, that the original lessee pays £']0 a year to the builder, and that the builder pays a ground rent of £"10 to the freeholder. You will- see at onc^ that such a case is normal enough, provided that we are dealing with a property the original building lease of which was granted 60 or 80 years ago. You will also observe that the successive layers of profit rent, after the first, represent the purely speculative gains of those who have turned the unearned increment, due to public improvements and the general progress of the community, into an annual revenue for themselves. The building return, say £"60, was, of course, obtained by putting down capital in the shape of bricks and mortar. How much of this was normal interest and how much speculative profit made out of the prospective value , of the site, it is never possible to say. The ground rent of /lo represents perhaps £,^ of speculative profit, by way, of anticipation of the building value, and £^ for the prior value for some other useful purpose, say as a nursery garden. The rent duty would recognise no distinction of persons. It would require from each receiver of rent a small contribution, pro rata, towards those improvements of the metropolis which are assumed to be for the common benefit. It is said that this is hard on the builder. I do not say ihat it is perfect. It was never intended to be more than the first item of a larger plan ; but in that sense, I see no harm, and much reason, in making all the interests pay. What would happen if the Improvement Rate were thrown back to the bottom of the scale ? If the Owners' Rate were 4d.> £7. must be levied from the occupier. In either case the occupier will deduct the whole £0. from the man we call the sub-lessee. It is at the next step that the difference begins. By the Bill the sub-lessee deducts from the original lessee, not 480 pence, but 400 pence, and the original lessee will deduct from the builder 320 pence, who, in his turn, will recover 40 pence from the ground landlord. By Mr. Harrison's table the occupier, the sub-lessee 25 and the, original lessee would each have deducted the full ;^2 in turn. The builder would, therefore, have paid 480 pence. The whole of this sum would have been supposed to travel back, so. that the whole of these last twenty-four pounds of rental^-the ultimate fifth — whoever may happen to own them, would pay the entire 480 pence. They would be taxed, in effect, is. 8d. in the pound. But in the case supposed, £1^ out of the £21^ are actually in the hands of the builder himself. He, therefore, would have to pay 59 per cent, of the whole tax — that is, £1 3s. 4d. — notwith- standing that he had spent the capital : whereas the profit leaseholders, who are n9t supposed to have spent anything, would escape scot free. By the old plan of taxing the ground rent only,* the whole £2 would have to be paid by the freeholder. In the case supposed, he will have a land value rent attributable to urban improvements of £^, and he will have, no doubt, a reversion to a valuable property after 40 or 50 years, which is, for present uses, of very little money value. The two lessees, who are getting £50- of pure " land value-" between them, and who may have also a leasehold reversion, would pay not a penny under either of the last mentioned schemes of collection. I cannot think that such a plan could pass. I do not suggest to you, however, that any of these immediate plans are capable of working mathematical justice. I never heard of a scheme of taxatiqn which did. I do not hesitate to say that no system will adequately reach the owners of land values and compel them to contribute their share to local expenses, unless it includes as a part of its machinery the collection of a local sur-tax from a reformed succession duty. I am not without hope that Sir William Harcourt may make his Budgets historic, not only by bringing up the Imperial death duty to a reasonable level, but also by making some provision for a local sur-tax on all interests in urban land. Before I pass to say a word on the fourth plan — the separate assessment of the value of the site and the imposition of a special rate thereon — I must not forget that sundry other proposals for the relief of the occupier are before us. Though it would be evidently hopeless to discuss them all, it may tend towards clear- ness if I state them at once. I take first, in order to dismiss it as indefensible, the plan of " Exchequer doles," which previous Chancellors invented, and which Mr. Goschen largely developed. If an argument is wanted on the subject, I think Sir Thomas Farrar's book contains an ample and most lucid refutation. But it is worth while to observe here that, so long as it lasts, the grant ought to be just as between London and the rural counties. At present, the quotas are flagrantly wrong. The Local Government Board, and indeed all the official world, agree that London is unfairly treated to an extent which is variously estimated at * This has been adopted, unfortunately, in Mr. Dalziel's very interesting Bill for the Taxation of Land, which is now before the House of Commons. 25 anything from a ad. rate upwards. In round figures, we are deprived of about ;^40o,ooo, which, upon a fair allotment ot the " doles," we should receive. This is an incidental item m the claim of the London ratepayer against the Treasury ; and there are many more, such as the gross under-valuation of Government property, which we cannot go into here. Next, I may put aside the old suggestion of an immediate division of rates between owner and occupier, based upon the Scottish plan. I am not forgetting that Lord Hobhouse and, indeed, my own Committee, at one time gave a doubtful support to this proposal, not in itself, but as a portion of a wider scheme. Neither will I now say that when we have dealt with the more vital questions I am here discussing, it would not be well to transfer all local rates as soon as possible on to this more reasonable basis. But I think it is quite clear, in the light of all recent discussions, that a sudden attempt — whether it be retrospective or no — ^to divide existing rates at one stroke between the occupier and the owner, would fail to afford the relief that is required, and would, on the contrary, produce a dangerous dislocation in rent. I do not gather that any party at the present time is pressing this as an immediate measure, and therefore I need not complicate my argument by discussing it any further. Another proposal is to ascertain the owners of land values, and levy a tax from them directly. To this there can be no objection in principle. The difficulty is that the absence of registration of title, and the enormous complexity of legal owner- ship, would make it a very cumbrous machinery to set in motion. And if it ever were set up, the problem of handing down the proper shares of burden from the freeholder to the occupier would involve almost exactly the same delicate questions of adjustment as are involved in the current schemes, which assume .that the total impost will be collected, as usual, from the occupier first. There remains what I have called the scientific plan — the proposal which involves an amendment of the Valuation Act so as to give us an expert assessment of the land value separately. If we are to take it theoretically, I think you will see that there is great scientific value in the idea of commencing by an assessment of the site values, apart from any return for fixed capital placed upon the land. If we had this assessment, and if the whole of the values in question were in one hand, and could be taxed directly in the shape of rent, it would be comparatively simple to put an effective charge upon it. I need not tell you that the problem in London is almost the antipodean opposite of such a simple case. The site value is complicated at every turn with considerations in the nature of capital expenditure, or of what is very roughly called the " building value." Even if it were in one hand, it would be by no means true that the profit is always received directly in the shape of rent. But, so far from being in one hand, all such values are split up among 27 various interests, ascending from the occupier, who is often the owner of site values himself, through the leaseholder — whose name is legion — back to the noble duke who owns the fee. Even if we had a direct valuation of land inserted in the ratebooks, we should still, so long as we collect our owner's rate primarily from the occupier, be obliged to face the same difSculty, and to decide in what proportion each ot the persons who successively pay rent for that tenement, is to deduct from his immediate landlord. As I have said, I am myself engaged with my committee in the endeavour to solve this problem without further delay : and I believe it can be done. But the difficulties are far more serious than is commonly understood. It is not at all impossible to value a tenement as if it were a 'cleared site,' though the existing assessment authorities would hardly like to undertake it without assistance. The difficulty comes after you have provided for this and agreed upon the measure of the specific rate which the rate collector shall levy from the occupier. How is the burden to be laid upon the right shoulders ? To send it all back to the ground landlords — even if it were possible — is clearly wrong. As already noticed, the rate would then fall, if there was a peppercorn rent, upon the only person whom it ought to avoid, namely the builder. We must find a rule which will allow each payer of rent to deduct from each receiver of rent, so much as will leave him still to bear that just proportion of the tax, to which his rental interest in the site value really corresponds. That problem is not insoluble ; but it is idle to say it is easy. Even when you have made your formula as exact as it can be made, there will still be exceptional cases, where, for reasons beyond anyone's control, an existing site value cannot be utilised by some or all of the apparent owners. Such cases must, I think, be left to a tribunal. They are not half so difficult or complex as those conundrums, which now occupy the rating com- mittees, as to the precise philosophy of " the hypothetical tenant." But it is a more practical consideration that, for the solution of such a problem, we require some free parliamentary time. I am not clear that, even if a perfect scheme were ready to-day, it would not still be worth while to obtain a moderate Rent Duty, if possible, as an instalment of reform. That, at least, has been the Council's view. The Council has constantly declared, with only an insignificant minority, its demand not merely for an immediate relief of the ratepayer, but also for effective, complete and scientific taxation of land values. There has never been any substantial difference of opinion among the majority. Even on the question of the method of deduction, the amendment was withdrawn, and the Bill, as it stands in the appendix, was approved almost with unanimity, — with the declaration, however, that it was not proposed as a solution of the whole problem, but only of the immediate difficulty as to the deadlock in street improvements. This particular small measure which, has been laid before the House of Commons is avowedly the beginning of a larger scheme. 38 It does not pretend to throw upon the freeholder the full share he ought to pay, chiefly because it is explicitly intended to act in combination with a municipal death duty, or with some other method of taking toll of the capital value of his reversion. Freeholders are not the only persons who possess reversions. They are, of course, the commonest case, but then their interest is also, in many cases, somewhat remote. An intermediate leaseholder may have carved a lease for forty years out of an unexpired term having seventy years to run, or he may have granted an occupying lease of seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years even out of a term •of fifty or sixty. In the case supposed, the leaseholder's reversion may be of greater present value in cash than the reversion of the freehold itself. It must not in equity or common sense be forgotten that the freeholder's reversion, although it may be of enormous value when it comes, can only be said to be worth, for present purposes, its present value. Upon what exact scale this should 'be estimated is an actuarial question. By the calculations of Somerset House it undoubtedly escapes, at present, at an absurdly easy rate. But in any case it is clear that a reversion at more than fifty years from the present time is of very small value now, however large its value may be when it comes. The monstrous thing is that our present system of re-payment of debt is so arranged, as Mr. Harrison showed in the tables he produced before the Town Holdings Committee, that it constantly happens that the occupier and leaseholder between them not only pay the annual interest, but also pay off the whole of the capital debt raised to represent the cost of improvements, the ultimate profit of which will arrive at the freeholder, when his reversion falls in, absolutely free of charge. The flat injustice of this is beyond dispute : but what I am now endeavouring to make plain is that a remedy must be found for it by some impost on capital values, such as is a local sur-tax on a death duty. I cannot detain you further. I will only point out, finally, that the settlement of this financial grievance, though it may seem a dry and unexciting matter in itself, is by far the most vital of the London questions of to-day. Improvements, even if urgent, cannot and should not be made, when they involve a large addition to the ratepayers' unjust burden, until some new source of revenue is found for London and until the occupier is relieved and the owner forced to pay. If the stalwarts of "property defence" were either public-spirited or prudent, they would go out to meet the reform. The longer it delays, the more drastic it -will be. A BILL To authorise an Improvement Rate or Charge in the Administrative County of London. 56 and 57 Vict. — Session 1893. WHEREAS the burden of the cost of permanent improvements and' works effected by the London County Council (hereinafter called " the Council") unduly presses and will press upon the occupiers of houses and tenements within the County unless specially provided for and it is expedient that the Council should have power to levy a new rate as hereinafter provided. And whereas the objects of this Act cannot be attained without the authority of Parliament. MAY IT THEREFORE PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY That it may be enacted, &c. 1. This Act may be cited as the " London Owners' Improvements. Rate Act 1893." 2. In and for the purposes of this Act — " The County " means the administrative county of London according to the boundary thereof for the time being. " Hereditaments " means and includes all lands tenements and hereditaments within the county. 3. There shall be leviable in respect of hereditaments throughout the County a rate to be called " The County Improvements Rate " or such other name as the Council may determine, the proceeds whereof shall be applicable by the Council as follows : (i) In providing one-half of the sums required in each year for redemption of stock or repayment or replacement of money borrowed and expended on capital account for the purposes of the following Improvements if the same be authorised by Parliament viz. : (a) The New Central Street from Southampton Row to the Strand with the subsidiary streets and works ; (b) The New Approach to the Tower Bridge in the parishes of Bermondsey and St. John Horsleydown ; and (c) The Ferry between Rotherhithe and Ratcliff described in and proposed to be authorised by the London Improve- ments Bill now pending in Parliament ; (2) In payment of the sum required in each year for payment of interest and charges in respect of one-half of the money so borrowed and expended ; (3) In providing the sums required in each year for redemption of stock or repayment or replacement of money borrowed for and expended on any permanent improvements and works of public utility eifected or to be effected by the Council and charged to capital account and in payment of the sum required in each year for payment of interest and charges in respect of money so borrowed and expended ; The expression " permanent improvements " in this section means any works of which the Council have power to spread the cost and of which they resolve to spread the cost over a period of at least fifty years. 4. The Council when estimating or revising the estimate of the amount which they will require to raise in each financial year by- 30 •contributions to meet the expenditure for general county purposes shall ■estimate the amount which they require to be raised by means ot ine County Improvements Rate to meet the expenditure to be defrayea out ■of moneys raised by that rate during the same year, and the amount so estimated shall be taken into account in ascertaining the arnounts to De 'levied by contributors in respect of expenditure for general County pur- poses, and such estimate shall be open to inspection by any person without payment and shall be conclusive for all purposes whatsoever. 5. If and whenever any agreement is arrived at between the Treasury ■and the Council with respect to the collection of the County Improve- 'ments Rate by this Act authorised along with the Property Tax under Schedule A of the Act 5 and 6 Victoria cap 35 the following provisions •shall have effect : (i) The Council may fix and determine in respect of each financial year the amount of the rate in the pound on the gross value of lands tenements hereditaments and heritages in the County which in their judgment will be necessary to produce the amount required to be levied in respect of that year under the powers of this Act as the County Improvements Rate, and such rate shall be charged upon the value at which such lands tenements hereditaments or heritages within the 'County are assessed for the payment of Property Tax under Schedule A of the Act 5 and 6 Victoria cap. 35 but shall not exceed the rate of fourpence in the pound upon such value. And such rate shall be demanded and collected along with the Property Tax payable under the said Schedule A. (2) On or before the first day of November in each year the Council shall furnish the Commissioners of Inland Revenue a certificate under their seal stating the amount in the pound in respect of such value as they have resolved should be levied as and by way of the County Improvements Rate, and a separate column shall be provided in the demand note for Property Tax under Schedule A, which shall specify separately the amount to be collected in respect of the Improvements Rate. (3) Every occupier of any lands tenements hereditaments or heritages being tenant of the same and paying the Improvements Rate, shall deduct from the rent payable by him to the landlord for the time being an amount in the pound after the rate at which the Improve- jnents Rate is fixed, and every such deduction shall be made and allowed in the same manner in all respects as a deduction from rent in respect of Property Tax charged under the said Schedule A, and all ■the rules and regulations in the said schedule and all the provisions of the said Act relative thereto shall mutatis mutandis extend and apply to the said Improvements Rate. 6. In the event of no agreement being arrived at between the Council and the Treasury as to the collection of the said Improvements Rate •then the following provisions shall have effect : (i) The amounts which the Council require to be levied by means of the said Improvement Rate may be demanded by the Council by the precepts by which they demand county contributions for the purpose of the county rate. (2) The amounts required to be levied by means of the County Improvements Rate shall be stated in the precepts of the Council separately from the arnounts required for contributions for general county purposes or special county purposes and shall not in the case of any parish or place exceed a sum equivalent to fourpence in the pound on the total of the gross value of the hereditaments in such ■parish or place as stated in the totals of the gross values of the 31 ■valuation lists for the time being in force under Section 17 of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869. (3) As regards any parish or place within the county not included in the unions subject to the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 the amount ■of the contributions required by the Council to be levied by means of the said Improvements Rate shall not exceed a sum equivalent to fourpence in the pound on the gross value of the hereditaments in such parish or place according to the valuation list then in force for the purpose of the assessment for the relief of the poor.* (4) The several authorities and persons empowered to levy and ■collect the county rate shall (subject to the provisions of this Act) levy and collect the amount required for contributions under this Act along with the rate for general county purposes and in any demand note the amount stated to be levied in respect of County Improvements Rate shall be distinguished from the amount stated to be levied for other purposes. (5) Where the occupier of rateable property in the county is liable "to pay a rent in respect thereof he shall in the first instance pay the County Improvements Rate but he shall be entitled to deduct from such rent in respect of the amount ■which he shall have paid for the said rate an amount in the pound after the rate at which the Improve- ments Rate is fixed and where a person entitled to receive a rent in respect of which anj such deduction shall have been made is also ■liable to pay rent in respect of the same rateable property or any part thereof he shall be entitled in his turn to deduct from any rent payable by him in respect of the same property an amount in the pound after the same rate. (6) All persons or corporations entitled to receive rent in respect of hereditaments in the county and their representatives and assigns according to their interests shall allow the deduction directed by this Act on receipt of the residue of the respective rents which they are entitled to receive and the occupier or other person liable to pay rent in respect of any such hereditament in the county shall by virtue of ■any such deduction be discharged of an equivalent amount of rent as if the same had been actually paid by him to the person entitled to receive such rent. 7. -The Improvements Rate shall be assessed and payable in respect ■of unoccupied houses and buildings and of vacant land including land on which there are uncompleted buildings as well as in respect of houses and buildings which are occupied and of other land and shall so long as the house building or land upon which the rate is charged remains unoccupied or vacant be payable by the owner thereof on demand. If and so far as at the commencement of a new tenancy or occupation of any house or building or land any arrears of the Improvements Rate remain due in respect thereof then such arrears shall be payable on ■demand by the first tenant or occupier thereof and any tenant or occupier who shall have paid such sum may deduct the amount paid by him in respect of the house building or land. A proper receipt for the payment by such tenant or occupier of any arrears of Improvements Rate payable in respect of the house building or land shall be and operate as a release and discharge of the tenant or occupier from such part of any rent payable by him as shall be equal to the amount paid by him in respect of such rate. * This clause was not, in fact, necessary, because an agreement was under- stood to be practically arrived at, under which the sur-tax might have been levied with Schedule A. 33 8. (i) The Overseers and Assessment Committee acting under th& Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 shall in making out the next valuation, list or supplemental valuation list after the passing of this Act ™clude- or add and assess all unoccupied houses and buildings and vacant lana including land on which there are uncompleted buildings so far as such houses buildings and land would not but for the provisions of this Act: be included in such lists and shall cause the totals of the gross and rateable values of such buildings and lands to be ascertained and, included in or added to the valuation lists to be made under the said. Act after the passing of this Act ; (2) The totals of the gross values of such buildings and land shall' for the purposes of this Act be added by the Council to the totals, of the valuation lists printed in accordance with Section 17 of the- Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 ; (3) As regards any parish or place within the County not included in the unions subject to the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 the separate valuation and assessment of uncompleted and unoccupied houses and buildings and vacant lands shall be made and prepared ia like manner as the basis or standard for the county rate in such parish or place ; 9. All the provisions of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869 with respect to proceedings on appeals shall extend and apply to any supple- mental valuation list and hereditaments contained in any valuation list under this Act and every valuation and assessment made under this Act in respect of any parish or place not included in the unions subject to- the said Act shall be subject to appeal in the same manner as the valuation lists forming the basis or standard of the county rate. 10. All the provisions of the Local Government Act 1888 as. applicable to the county relative to the assessment and raising of sums for general county purposes shall subject to the provisions of this Act extend and apply to the assessment and raising of the County Improve- ments Rate. 11. The Council shall keep separate accounts with respect to the sum raised by the County Improvements Rate and the apphcatioa thereof. 12. The County Improvements Rate shall be a charge and encum- brance on the freehold of the hereditaments in respect of which it is made, and shall not be a rate tax charge imposition assessment or out- going payable by the tenant or occupier within the meaning of any existing contract to pay rates taxes charges impositions assessments or outgoings in respect of the hereditaments the subject of such contracU and any deed agreement covenant or contract made after the passing of this Act purporting to deprive or which would have the effect of depriving any tenant or other person of his right under this Act to deduct any County Improvements Rate paid by him from the amount of his rent, or purporting to provide for the cancellation or alteration of the terms of any tenancy in the event of such a rate being imposed as authorised by this Act, or tending otherwise to defeat the intention of this Act shall so far as it purports to have or might have that effect be void. 13. All costs and expenses of the Council in the execution of this Act (except so far as they may be otherwise provided for by this or any other Act) shall be defrayed as payments for general county purposes within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1888 and the costs charges and expenses preliminary to and of and incidental to the preparing applying for obtaining and passing of this Act shall be paid ■ by the Council in like manner. APPENDIX ON THE EQUALISATION OF RATES IN LONDON.* Since the foregoing lecture was delivered many changes have taken place. The Owner's Rate Bill was, in accordance with the opinion of several of the highest authorities on the Law of Parliament, introduced as a Private Bill. On the invitation of Mr. James Lowther, who acted apparently for an association of property owners, it was ruled out of order by the Speaker. There was no opportunity for any effectual discussion of the point, and, of course, no appeal. The grounds alleged were (i) a wholly novel interpretation of a standing order relating to the Council's Money Bills — which, as it was settled very recently by the late Government, had no reference whatever to proposals for rating reform ; and (2) the theory that, though other munici- palities had presented Private Bills to change the incidence of local charges, London is too large a place to be so dealt with by anything but a public statute. The first point- was, at the best, a technicality, and could have been set right by a resolution of the House ; but the second was fatal, not only to this Bill, but to all hope of immediate progress on these lines. If London may not proceed, in its internal finance, by Private Bill, it is helpless. An important and opposed Public Bill in the hands of a private member is now-a-days little better than waste paper. A debateable measure on a comparatively new and contentious subject, touching the London ratepayers only, is one which it is, under present parliamentary conditions, most difficult to induce any Government to adopt, and still more difficult to make them pass. The only escape from the deadlock would appear to be by the passage of an express standing order declaring that the Council may proceed by Private Bill under any conditions that may be thought expedient. Meanwhile it became clear ^that some alternative relief must be proposed. The hard-pressed ratepayers cannot wait while we are mending the breakdown of the parliamentary machine. The first alternative was, of course, a municipal death duty. It was • Some of the matters embodied in this Appendix will be found, with further information, in the Memorandum on the Bill prepared by me for the Local Government and Taxation Committee, and afterwards issued with the Council's minutes (Steel & Jones, Spring Gardens, S.W.) 34 thought, until the last moment, that Sir William Harcourt was determined at least to take in his first Budget the preliminary step of adjusting to a consistent and reasonable level the chaos of Imperial death duties. Therfe is no indication that he was ever willing to do more ; but this, as a necessary condition precedent of any local surtax, would have been welcome to London reformers. For reasons sufficiently discussed at the time, the great Budget has vanished. It is doubtful enough whether it will even reappear next Easter. Even if it should, it will by itself do nothing for London, and the Chancellor has no plan. One obvious measure is within his power — the equitable readjustment of the Exchequer contribution so as to restore to London the three or four hundred thousand pounds by which she was underpaid in 1888 — but it is suggested that he will not t6uch so delicate a subject for fear of the provincial votes. In these circumstances, there remained one possibility. The burdens of London rating are notoriously unequal. The bitterness of the pressure is most felt in the poorest and most populous quarters. If the charge could be equalised, then, although no absolute relief would be given to the body of ratepayers as a whole, a great actual relief would be felt where the worst hardship now exists. To do this completely it would be necessary, first of all, to provide for the metropolis some new and efficient form of central financial control. No such proposal has just now a chance of immediate or early success. The problem therefore was to make an approach toward equalisation in some way which would be automatic, equitable, sufficient and safe. Few who are not experts have any idea of the wild inequality, or rather chaos, which at present holds. There are in London 200 different rating areas, in each of which at least seven, and often ten, distinct rating authorities can require their quotas of the local charge. The result is that in 1892-3 the total of rates levied, if we take only the larger areas, varied from 4s. in St. James's, Westminster, to 7s. 5d. in Bromley. This is sufficiently absurd, seeing that every other great city works upon either an absolutely uniform rate, or at least a practical uniformity of charge. But the case is far worse when the details are known. The Council has published charts and returns showing the parishes arranged in order of their " rateable value per head," and showing also the excess in each case of the local charges beyond the common burdens. A summary of the results in the 27 independent parishes is printed on pp. 38-39. Broadly speaking, the heaviest burdens fall where there is least wealth to support them. These inequalities of London rating as between the various parishes, and especially as between the richer and poorer districts, have, to put it plainly, long amounted to a public scandal. The result is not only the financial unfairness. There is an aggravation of the general feeling of injustice as to the present incidence of rating among the large masses of occupiers so oppressed, and there is a dangerous local parsimony in the areas 35 adversely affected. The East End is badly lighted and poorly cared for in sanitation, street maintenance and other matters, chiefly because the burden of rate is already so severely felt that the smallest increase is a terror. The main cause is that Westminster and St. George's, Hanover Square, do not share municipal expenses with Poplar and St. George's-in-the-East. The practical difficulty of any complete scheme of equalisation lies, of course, in the question of control. So long as large sections of expenditure are to be dealt with by local autonomy, without any supervision beyond the present system, it would be obviously impossible to throw the resulting cost directly on the metropolis as a whole. Possibly it may be always felt to be the better plan to forego an ideal equality of taxation, in favour of a higher degree of local responsibility. The effort towards equalisation, so far as it has gone, has not followed any consistent principle. The chief effort after fairness has been in Poor Law finance, because of the large powers of control already vested in the Local Government Board. The first step was to create a Common Poor Fund for the metropolis, fed by a rate levied evenly on rateable value, and fixed annually at the amount required for .the statutory distribution. Out of this fund, certain kinds of service are paid, for in whole or in part ; and it is the opinion of the experts that this process, though the result is far from perfect, has been carried almost as far as it can go. Outdoor Relief is beyond its reach, until some general rule can be found which all Boards shall apply. Much of the Poor Law Debt and certain optional charges are also outside it ; and so long as local control remains there must be a margin of cos borne locally, to serve as a check on local extravagance. Besides the Common Poor Fund, there are, of course, the central precepts, which raise, evenly over the whole total of rateable value, the cost of the work of the County Council, the School Board, the Metropolitan Asylums Board and the Metro- politan Police. Further payments for equalisation have come in the form of charges taken out of the County Fund. Some are levied as charges on the Exchequer Contribution — already most unjust to London — for certain medical and lunacy expenses ; others, such as Mr. Ritchie's grant of 4d. per head on indoor poor, and half the cost of electoral registration, and certain grants for main roads, are practically added to the Council's rate. The result of all these varying plans is to equalise the Metropolitan charge to the extent of 3s. 3d. in the £ out of an average of a little more than 5s. There remains a balance of about ^'2,750,000 of metropolitan charge which is unequalised : and it is this balance solely which is responsible for the startling and oppressive inequalities above noted, and which turns what might be a level of about 5s. into a disparity running from 7s.' 5d. to 4s. It remains to inquire what are the constituent charges making up this balance. For this purpose, upon the figures of the year i888-g, as analysed in the Council's last volume of statistics, we have in round numbers the following totals: — 36 Poor Law Charges not yet distributed : — £ Outdoor poor (important in certain unions only)..- igi.ooo Special expenditure borne on poor rate (certain parishes only) 41,000 Poor Law Debt=;f 2,4.65,477 : giving a total annual charge of ... ... ••• ... 204,000 Other expenditure for poor relief proper 42,000. Expenses of assessment, elections, cost of col- lecting poor rate, and various payments for public and common charges other than ^poor relief, still borne on the nominal poor rate ... 126,000 - Total ... 604,006.'; That is to say, after deducting the out-door relief and other special expenditure ... ... ... 232,000 A total, for purposes more or less common, of ;^372,ooo. , Local Management Charges for purposes mainly of common concern : — Sanitation ... ... ... ;^i90,ooo. Local sewers and urinals ... 113,000. Lighting 232,000. Scavenging and Street Maintenance 827,000 Mortuaries, &c. 8,000 Establishment, elections, legal & incidental expenses 192,000. Cost of collection of rates ■ ... 50,000. Local Management Debt^;^3,685,840 : giving an annual charge of 420,000 . Total ; ^2,032,ooo These totals of ;^372,ooo and ;^2,o32,ooo represent practically the whole common charge now remaining undistributed. They represent in all a further possible "common rate " of is. 3d. beyond the 3s. 3d. above stated. They take, of course, no account of exceptional City finance or of what may be called the " sporadic "j charges now incurred on those special local accounts as to which some of the 84 Metropolitan and 112 City parishes (or groups of them) may by law elect to incur public expense and raise a raXtf and others may not do so. These exceptional charges include Free Libraries, Baths and Washhouses, Maintenance of Local Open Spaces, Burial Boards, Square, Estate and Garden Rates, and Church or Rector's Rates, which make up about ;^ioo,ooo in all. The proposal to which these considerations appear to point is. that a further step towards equalisation should be now made, by means of grants from a common fund, towards local municipal services of common concern, to be levied evenly on rateable value, and distributed in some ratio to local needs. Of the various possible, standards of distribution there is only one "which seems to be immediately practicable ; that is to make the ratio of population to rateable value a basis for aid from a central fund, for th& expenses of public health and lighting. Broadly speaking, th^ needs of each area for most local expenses (other than street maintenance proper) vary normally as its population. The principle of the Equalisation Bill is to create a Municipal Common Fund, by means of an equal levy of a sixpenny rate on rateable value, and to make out of it grants to local sanitary authorities in aid of the heads of expense which concern the public health of the metropolis as a whole. In these expenses will be included, in effect, the bulk of the charges above summarised under the head of sanitation and local sewers or lighting, as well as a large part of the expenses included under the head of " scavenging street maintenance," to which there would fall to be added a proportion of the establishment and other general charges. The total of these figures may be put at something over a million. The grants in aid (amounting in all to £840,000) are to be calculated in proportion to the population of sanitary districts — on the theory that, as already stated, the municipal necessities of local iarea.s for the purposes which touch the public health are broadly propor- tionate to their excess of population and their deficiency of rateable wealth. As in the areas under Schedule B of the Act of 1855, the Districts Boards are the sanitary authorities, they will necessarily be the unit to receive any grant ; but they will be bound to distribute their total grant among their constituent areas in proportion again to their relative populations. The sixpenny rate is not intended to be really levied. It is only a basis for calculation, and against it the local grants will be set off. The balances, as they are shown in the Table annexed, will then be paid or called for as the case may be. Other proposals of great value as to the separation of the whole equalisation accounts from the county rate, and the prescribing of a clear and intelligible form for demand notes and rate papers, are included in the bill; and their effect will be to provide a new and important check upon any tendency to extrava- gant expenditure by any of the various local bodies. The practical effect is to relieve the areas where the municipal needs and the pressure of the health and lighting charges are greatest, by con- tributions from the areas where there is a high average of rateable value per head. It remains to note one thing which has caused much miscon- ception. This Bill, being only one stage of a large reform, deals with one class of local burdens only. It does not, for example, touch the inequalities arising from the undistributed balance of Poor Law, whether for outdoor relief or otherwise. It does not deal with the varying charge of the Local Debt, which must be dealt with, if at all, in an entirely different way. It leaves untouched a considerable balance of street and establishment and other charges included in the Vestry General Rate — as well as the Libraries, Baths, and other local levies. It does not solve the City problems. It leaves aside the questions which arise as to compounding allowances, empties, and cost of collection generally. 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