The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924014363182 Cornell University Library BF 91.B36 1906a Greek theories of elementary cognition f 3 1924 014 363 182 This "0-P Book" Is an Authorized Reprint of the Original Edition, Produced by Microfilm-Xerography by University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1965 GREEK THEORIES OF ELEMENTARY COGNITION FROM ALCMAEON TO ARISTOTLE BY #+ JOHN ^BEARE, M.A. FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK (SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY) IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1906 IIPK I IRRflPV 354 «.#r r ^b 21& I Eeare, John Isaac, d. 1918. Greek theories of elementary cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle, by John I. Beare ... Oxford, The Clarendon press, 1906. Til. 354 pl' 23-- "Commentaries, monographs, 4c. used" : p. i»i-vtl. 1. Psychology — Hist 2. Senses and sensation. S. Philosophy, An- cient l Title. 7—28078 Library of Congress BF91.B3 i«gl, HENRY FROWDE, MJL PUBLISHER TO THK UNIVERSITY OP OXFORD LONDON, EDINBURGH NEW YORK AND TORONTO PREFACE MOST readers know the difficulty as well as imp. rtance of the de Anima and Parva Naturalia of Aristotle; and any genuine assistance would be welcomed by students who desire to master them. A great deal has been done by editors and others for the elucidation of the former of these works and, indirectly, of the latter, so far as they involve meta- physics, or psychology in its higher reaches. No one.however, has been at the pains to glean and put together systema- tically, from Aristotle himself and his predecessors, whatever may explain or illustrate the parts of his writings essentially concerned with empirical psychology. The results of this, it should seem, would be useful not only to students of ancient Greek psychology, but also to readers who, perhaps knowing and caring little about Greek, might yet desire a clear and objective, even if brief, account of what was achieved for the psychology of the senses by the ancient Greek philoso- phers. The purpose of this book, within the limits defined by its title, is to present such an account; and it will rightly be judged according to the degree in which it fulfils its purpose. Among its most competent critics will be the student who may test its usefulness in connexion with the many passages on the interpretation of which it directly or indirectly bears. To such critics and others its author leaves it ; confiding less, however, in the merits of his work than in the fellow-feeling which all scholars, as well as students of philosophy, have for one who honestly grapples with their common foe, to acrcupts, in whatever form this may present itself. The books used or consulted are named in the list given 159967 iv PREFACE below ; but wherever even a hint has been borrowed, the writer to whom obligation has been thus incurred will always be found referred to in the notes. There are many such references, especially to the publications of H. Diels ; but the mainstay of the whole work has been the actual text of Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. A list of the Greek passages explained or discussed has been added at the end. In some — perhaps most — of these the points raised are of no great interest to scholars, but there is at least one exception ; and it is hoped that what has been said on Arist. 45a 1 " 17-24 may be of some value. The author wishes to thank the Delegates of the Claren- don Press for undertaking the publication of this work. His thanks are also due to the Press Reader and Staff for their great care and accuracy. It remains for him, in con- clusion, to express his deep gratitude to Mr. W. D. Ross, Fellow and Tutor of Oriel College, Oxford, for kindly reading the proofs, and making acute suggestions from which much profit has been derived. He is indebted to Mr. Ross for having drawn his attention to Diels' palaeographical correction of Arist. 985 b 17, mentioned on p. 37, n. a. 9 Trinity College, Dublin, January 10, 1 906. COMMENTARIES, MONOGRAPHS, &c. USED FOR THE FOLLOWING WORK Adam, J. Plato, Republic (Cambridge, 1903). Alexander of Aphrodisias in Arist. De Sensu, Thurot (.Paris, 1875). „ „ „ „ Wendland (Berolini, 1901). ,, „ „ Metaph. Hayduck ( „ 1891). i, „ „ De Anima, Bruns ( „ 1S87). „ „ „ Quaestiones etc. Bruns ( „ 1892). Archer-Hind, R. D. Plato, Phaedo, ed. 2 (London and New York, 1894). „ „ Timaeus (London and New York, 1888). Bacon, R. Opus Mains, Bridges (Oxford, 1899). Baumker, C. Des Aristoteles Lehre von den dussern und innern Sinnesvermogen (Leipzig, 1877). „ Zu Arist ot. ' De Sensu * 2, 438 b 16 ff. (Zeitsch.f. d. bst. Gymn., Sept. 1877, 603 ff.). Beck, H. Aristoteles de Sensuum Actione (Berlin, i860). Becker, Guil. Ad. Aristoteles de somno el vigilia etc. (Lipsiae, 1823). Biehl, Guil. Aristotelis Parva Naturalia (Teubner, 1898). Bitterauf, C. Quaestiunculae Criticae ad Par. Nat. (Monachii, 1900). Bocckb, A. Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren (Berlin, 1819). Bonitz, H. Aristotelis Metaphysica (Bonnae, 1848). „ Aristotelische Studien (Wien, 1862-7). Brentano, F. Die Psychologie des Arist. (Mainz, 1867). Burnet, J. Early Greek Philosophy (London and Edinburgh, 1892). Bury, R. G. Plato's Philebus (Cambridge, 1897). Bywater, I. Heracliti Epliesii Reliquiae (Oxford, 1877). Campbell, L. Plato, Sophistes (Oxford, 1867). „ „ Theaetetus ( „ 1883). Chappell, W. History of Music, vol. i (London, 1874). Dembowski ,J. Quaestiones Aristotelicae duae (Regimonti Pr. (sic), 1881). Diels, H. Doxographi Graeci (Berolini, 1879). „ Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1903). Eberhard, E. Die aristotelische Definition der Seele etc. (Berlin, 1868). Freudenthal, J. Zur Kritik und Exegese von Aristot. irtpl tu» mmk»i> o&ijurrot Ktii V"'*'^ (Rhein. Mus. xxtv, pp. 81-93, 392-419)- ,, Ueber den Begriff des Wortes (pavrmrla bei Arist. (Gottingcn, 1863). „ Zu Aristot. ' De Mem.' 452* 17 ff. (Archiv /. Gesch. der Phil., II. Band, i. Heft, 1889). Freytag, W. Di« Entwickclung der griechischen Erktnntmstheorie bis Aristoteles (Halle, 1905). vi COMMENTARIES, MONOGRAPHS, &C Galenus, Claudius. De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, I. Mtiller (Lipsiae, 1874). Godenius, R. Libelli Aristotelis de Sensu et Sensilibus castigata versio et analysis logica (Francofurti, 1 596). Gomperz, T. Greek Thinkers (E. Tr.) (London, 1905). Gorland, A. Aristoteles und die Mathetnatrk (Marburg, 1899). Grote, G. Aristotle, 3rd ed. (London, 1883). „ Plato and the other Companions of Socrates (London, 1875). Hammond, W. A. Aristotle's Psychology: De Anima and Parva Naturalia, transl. with introduction and notes (London and New York, 1902). Hayduck, M. Emendationes Aristoteleae (Meldorf, 1877). „ Observations criticae in aliquot locos A rist. (Greifswald, 1873)- Hippocratis Opera. E. Littre* (Paris, 1839-61). . Ideler, J. L. Aristot. Metcorologica (Lipsiae, 1834-6). von Jan, C. Musici Scriptores Graeci (Lipsiae, 1895). Jourdain, C. Recherches critiques sur tAge et forigine des traductions latines d 'Aristote, Nouv. id. (Paris, 1 843). Kampe, F. F. Die Erkenntnisstheorie des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1870). Karsten, S. Empedoclis Agrig. Cartn. reliquiae (Amstelodami, 1838). Marchl, P. Des Arist. Lehre von der Tierseele, i. Teil (Beilage zum Jahresberichte des Iiumanistischen Gymnasiums (Metten, 1896-7)). Michaelis Ephesius. In Arist. Parva Naturalia, Wendland (Berolini, 1903). Mullach, F. W. A. Democriti Abderitae Fragtnenta (Berolini, 1843). „ Fragtnenta Philosophorum Graecorum (Parisiis, 1857-79). Neuhauser, J. Aristoteles Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnissver- m'dgen und seinen Organen (Leipzig, 1878). Ogle, Dr. W. Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, trans, and annot. (London, 1882). „ Aristotle on Youth and Age etc., trans, and annot. (London, 1 897). Pacius, J. Aristotelis Parva (ut vocant) Naturalia (Francofurti, 1601). Panzerbieter, F. Diogenes Apollonialcs (Lipsiae, 1830). Philippson, L. uXij av8pam'ivi\ (Berlin, 1831). Poschenrieder, F. Die naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Arist. in ihrem Verhaltnis su den Biichern der hippokratischen Sammlung (Bamberg, 1887). Prantl, C. Aristoteles iiber die Farben (Munchen, 1849). Ritter and Preller. Pontes Philosophiae, Ed. 7 (Gothae, 1886). Rohde, E. Psyche, Ed. 3. (Tubingen u. Leipzig, 1903). Schaubach, E. Anaxagorae Clazomenii Fragtnenta (Lipsiae, 1 827). Schieboldt, F. O. De Imagination Disquisitio ex Arist. Libris repetita (Lipsiae, 1S82). COMMENTARIES, MONOGRAPHS, &c. vii Schmidt, J. Aristotelis et Herbarti Praecepta, quae ad Psychologiam spectant, inter se comparantur (Wien, 1887). Siebeck, H. Geschichte der Psychologie, 1. Teil, I. Abt. (Gotha, 1880). „ Aristotelis et Herbarti doctrinae psychological etc. (Halis Sax. 1872). Simonius, S. Arist. de Sensu et de Metnoria (Genevae, 1566). Sperling, K. Aristoteles' Ansicht von der psychologischen Bedeutung der Zeit als 'Zakl der Bewegung' (Marburg, 1888). Stein, H. Empedoclis Agrigentini Fragmenta (Bonnae, 1852). Stewart, J. A. Notes on Aristotle's ' Nicomachean Ethics' (Oxford, 1892). Sturz, F. G. Empedocles Agrigenfinus (Lipsiae, 1805). Susemihl, F. Various 'Scholae' on passages in Aristotle (Greifswald). Themistius (Sophonias). In Arist. Parva Naturalia, Wendland (Bcrolini, 1 903). Theophrastus Eresius. Op. Omn. Wimmer (Parisiis, 1866). Thurot, C. Etudes sur Arts tote (Paris, i860). Torstrik, Ad. Arist. de Anima (Berolini, 1862). Trendelenburg-Belger. Arist. de Anima (Berolini, 1877). Usener, H. Efncurea (Lipsiae, 1887). Volprecht, A. Die physiologischen Anschauungen des Aristoteles (Greifswald, 1895). Wachtler, J. De Alcmaeone Crotoniata (Lipsiae, 1896). Waitz, T. Aristotelis Organon (Lipsiae, 1844). Wallace, E. Aristotle's Psychology in Greek and English (Cambridge, 1882). „ Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle (Cambridge, 1898). Zeller, E. Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (E.Tr.) (London,i897). „ Pre-Socratic Philosophy (E. Tr.) (London, 1881). „ Plato and the Older Academy (E. Tr.) (London, 1876). Ziaja, J. Aristoteles, de Sensu 1-3 iibersetzt etc. (Breslau, 1887). „ Die ari slot. Lehre vom Gedachtniss etc. (Leobschiitz, 1879). „ Die aristot. Anschauung von .den Wesen und der Bewegung des Lichtes (Breslau, 1896). „ Zu Aristoteles' Lehre vom Lichte (Leipzig, 1901). The following Translations have been consulted :— - (a) Those contained in the Berlin and Didot editions of Aristotle. (b) That of the Parva Naturalia by H. Bender (Stuttgart, not dated). (c) „ „ „ „ F.A.KreuU (Stuttgart, 1847)- (d) Saint-Hilaire, J. Barthe'lemy, Arist. opuscules, trad, en franfais (Paris, 1847). Also, of course, the translations of Plato by Jowett, of Plato's Timaeus and Phaedo by Archer-Hind, and of Aristotle's de Anima by E. Wallace. GREEK THEORIES OF ELEMENTARY COGNITION FROM ALGMAEON TO ARISTOTLE INTRODUCTION § i. The aim of the following pages is to give a close General historical account of the various theories, partly physio- Plan " logical and partly psychological, by which the Greek philosophers from Alcmaeon to Aristotle endeavoured to explain the elementary phenomena of cognition. The pre-Aristotelean writers who applied themselves to this subject, and of whose writings we possess any consider- able information, are Alcmaeon of Crotona, Empedoicles, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Plato. We propose to set forth here their speculations, together with those of Aristotle, as to the so-called Five Senses, Sensation in general, and the psychical processes, such as Imagination and Memory, which involve the syn- thetic function referred by Aristotle to Sense, and named by his Latin commentators the Sensits Communis. We shall concern ourselves as little as possible with metaphysical or epistemological questions, attending rather to what the writers above mentioned, together with Aristotle, did, or tried to do, for empirical psychology, to the extent which .we have defined. Aristotle in his psychological teaching sums up for us the results of the work of his predecessors, whose doctrines he sifted and compared. Accepting, reject- ing, or modifying these, he developed a scheme of psycho- logy which in minuteness and comprehensiveness transcends anything of the same kind achieved before. But if this is to be thoroughly understood, it must be considered in due connexion with preceding schemes ; and to place it in this a INTRODUCTION connexion we have here brought together all that can be positively ascertained of what earlier philosophers had bequeathed to him. This information we have arranged under three heads — I. The Five Senses ; II. Sensation in general ; III. The Sensus Communis. The subject of each heading is dealt with in such a way as to exhibit the teachings of the successive writers from Alcmaeon to Aristotle respecting it ; and with regard to each of the five senses, also, the same order and division have been adopted. Psychology § 2. All the philosophers above named held certain meta- m ^ ta _ physical theories which to some extent, no doubt, ruled physics, their psychological thinking x - But though they were meta- physicians first and psychologists afterwards, the effect of their metaphysics upon their psychology was by no means as great as might be supposed. The extreme generality of their philosophic views in nearly all cases rendered it im- possible, or at least difficult, for them to effect a real junction between these and the particular phenomena of mind with which psychology deals. As regards the latter, all had before them the same concrete facts ; and even those whose fundamental principles differed most widely may sometimes be found giving similar explanations of the elementary phenomena of perception. Hence no grave injury to the practical value of an account of their psychology need be apprehended from the fact that our study of the latter does not connect itself organically with a study of their respective philosophical theories. Theoretically, no doubt, such a connexion is not only desirable, but necessary. A philosophical history of psychology could not be complete without it. But psychology as a science may, and must, stand without metaphysics. Whether the psychologist is a materialist or an idealist (or if the antithesis be preferred, a spiritualist), he will, so far as he is true to the conception of science, deal with the elementary phenomena of percep- tion according to ascertained natural laws. If he touches 1 No one who reads this will be ignorant of what these theories were ; therefore it would be superfluous as well as tedious to give a detailed statement of them here. INTRODUCTION 3 upon questions which exceed the bounds of phenomena, e. g. as to the nature of mind out of relation to the living organism, he passes the limits of science and therefore of psychology, as this term is here employed. As regards the study of mind, empirical psychology, assisted by physiology, will and ought to have the first word, though it cannot have the last. § 3. The ancient Greek psychologists endeavoured to give Apprecia- observation its due weight in determining such psychological anc i en t questions as they raised. For this reason they deserve to be Gre ' k ' psycho- called the founders of psychological science. Their ho^st logy, differences from one another, as well as from their better informed successors, and their helpless ignorance of much which is now familiarly known and fundamental for psycho- logy, contribute to the curious interest which a history of their efforts has for a modern reader. This history is, of course, largely a history of failure. Those, however, who know how far empirical psychology is still from the achievement of its aims will not hastily disparage the Greeks on this account. It was not so much the defectiveness of their psychological methods — defective as these were no doubt — as that of their physical and physiological science that rendered fruitless their best attempts to comprehend the elementary facts of sense-perception, and to place them in an intelligible con- nexion with their conditions. The most ancient Greek psychologists treated psychology as an integral part of physics or of physiology. With the possible exception of Anaxagoras, they looked upon ' knowing,' for example, as one of the many properties of matter. Problems as to the nature of space, critically considered, lay beyond their horizon. They never asked how it comes to pass that we ' project ' our percepts in an extra-organic space, and fall into the habit of speaking of them as outside ourselves. Questions of the objective existence of things whose quali- ties are perceived or known only in virtue of our faculty of cognition did not come up for discussion until some centuries after Thales. Before the Sophists— or * die Sophistik '—all agreed that there is on one hand such a thing as truth B % 4 INTRObUCTflbN (however difficult to discover scmfetlmes), and, on the other, such a thing as its opposite, error or falsehood. The spirit of the Sophistic age, however, dissolved the barrier which divided Truth from Error, making a new departure neces- sary if philosophy and science alike were not to cease utterly among men. For want of positive knowledge and of method, science and philosophy alike were ultimately endangered in the confusion to which undisciplined specula- tion led the followers of Heraclitus. As regards scientific method, it was not to be expected that it could exist at a period when logic — deductive and induc- tive — was as yet unknown, and when the provinces of the various departments of thinking had as yet no boundaries assigned to them. As regards positive knowledge, again, the disadvantages under which the Greek psychologists laboured were insuperable. Pure mathematics had advanced to an important degree of attainment, but empirical sciences, e.g. physics and physiology, were in their infancy. Even Aristotle, like his predecessors, with whom he so often places himself in controversy, possessed only the scantiest means of physical observation. In fact, observation did not go beyond what could be accomplished by the naked eye. Physical experiments only of the most rudimentary kind were possible at a time when, of all our varied mathe- matical and physical implements, inquirers had to content themselves with what they could achieve by the aid of the rule and the compasses. ' Chemical analysis, correct measurements and weights, and a thorough application of mathematics to physics were unknown. The attractive force of matter, the law of gravitation, electrical phenomena, the conditions of chemical combination, pressure of air and its effects, the nature of light, heat, combustion, &c, in short all the facts on which the physical theories of modern science are based, were wholly, or almost wholly, undiscovered V In their attempts at psychology under such circumstances it is not to be wondered at if they met with but little success. They had, for example, to arrive at 1 Vide Zeller, Aristotle, i. p. 443, E. Tr. INTRODUCTION 5 a theory of vision without a settled notion of the nature of light, or of the anatomical structure of eye or brain. They had to explain the operation of hearing without accurate knowledge of the structure of the inner ear, or of the facts and laws of sound, or at least with only some few mathematical ideas gleaned from the study of har- monics. Physiology and anatomy, chemistry and physics, as yet undifferentiated, lay within the body of vague float- ing possibilities of knowledge studied by them under the name of Nature. For want of a microscope their examina- tion of the parts of the sensory organs remained barren. They had no conception of the minuteness of the scale on which nature works in the accomplishment of sensory processes and in the formation of sensory organs. The retina, as well as the structure of the auditory apparatus, was wholly unknown to them. The nerve-system had not been discovered, and the notions formed of the mechanism of sensation and motion * were hopelessly astray. The veins, with the blood or (as some thought) the air coursing through them, were looked upon as discharging the functions now attributed to the sensory and motor nerves. Even Aristotle did not know the difference between veins and arteries. When this difference was first perceived, it was for a time still supposed. that the veins conducted the blood, the arteries the air. Perhaps the climax of our surprise is reached when we find Plato of opinion that not only air, but also drink, passed into the lungs 2 . Yet in this opinion Plato was at one with the best, or some of the best, medical teaching of his time. As early as Alcmaeon of Crotona the brain had been thought of as the central organ of sentiency, and, in short, of mind ; and Plato held that it was so. But Aristotle, again, declares this to be untrue, and holds that the heart is the great organ of perception 1 Vide Galen, de Placit, Hipp, tt Plat. §§ 644 seqq. ; especially 'EpaaicrrpaTos [294 B. C.] piv oiv, tl Kat pq np6o8tv, dAX" cVi yrjpws yt rq¥ d\ij#rj ratv Ptipav upxh" KaTtrAjjaiv' 'ApicroWXijf 61 p'XP* tv KaroTrrpav) ; . . . ivvt- vorjKas ovv 3n tow ipfi\(iToirros «"t tok uaivri of Theophr. § 26 ; see next extract. To ascribe 'apprehen- sive ' power to the &ia(f>avtt within the eye is quite out of keeping with the doctrine of Alcmaeon, nor is he likely to have employed the term avriXrplns. Indeed if surprises one to find even to &ia. Both participles should, notwithstanding the repetition of the article, be referred to the same thing, viz. the ' diaphanous' element in which the image is said to be reflected. C. Baumker (Arist. Lehre von den aussern und innern Sinncsvermbgen, p. 49) notices that in the passage above translated, the words opav ii t<5 oriX/Sowi icn! tu &tatpav('t form an iambic trimeter. * In Plat. Tim., p. 279, ed. Wrobel, pp. 340-1, ed. Meursius. i a THE FIVE SENSES discoveries respecting the anatomy of the eye and the optic nerves are due. It is not possible, however, to determine from the words of Chalcidius how much of the anatomical knowledge of which he speaks was discovered by Alcmaeon, and how much by the others ; nor can much weight be assigned to the authority of this commentator on such matters. But, according to the Hippocratean treatise ITepl 2a/>Ki3i> (or 'Apx&v), the connexion between eye and brain is formed by a 'vein' passing from the membrane which covers the latter to each of the two eyes. Through this ' vein ' the viscous substance of the brain is said to prolong itself into the eyes, where it forms the transparent mem- branes which cover the eyes. In this the light and all bright objects are reflected, and by this reflexion we see. Things, again, are seen because they have brightness, and can therefore be reflected by the transparent membrane of the eye. This fact of reflexion, according to the Pythagorean theory 1 , is accomplished by 'a visual ray' from eye to object, which reaching the object doubles back again to the eye, like a forearm outstretched and then bent back again to the shoulder 2 . The above pseudo-Hippocratean tract may (as Siebeck says) really present us with an account of Alcmaeon's theory of vision. ' The membranes, of which there are many protecting the visual organ, are diaphanous like the organ itself. By means of this quality of diaphan- ousness it reflects (avravyti) the light and all illuminated objects ; accordingly it is by means of this, which so reflects, that the visual organ (rd opiov) sees 3 .' Theiutra- § 4" According to Alcmaeon, therefore, it would seem ocular fire that vision is effected by the ' image,' andby rays which issue ^ag'ere. from within and pass outwards through the water; that fleeted in these rays emanate from a fire within the eye ; as if the co-operate glistening and diaphanous element in the eye were merely 1 It is not improbable that Alcmaeon was to some extent influenced by the Pythagorean teaching : vide Arist. Mel. i. 5. 986" 39 ; Siebeck, Ceschichte der Psychologic, i. 1, pp. 103-106. * Cf. Plat. Epit. iv. 14 ; Diels, Dox., p. 405. 3 C£ Hippocr. viii. 606 L. ; Diels, Vors., p. 104. For ayravyti cf. Eur. Or. 1519, and oyrijvyei criXac, Stob. Flor. ii. p. 392 (Teub.). VISION 13 instrumental. If, as is probable, Alcmaeon, with the towards Pythagoreans and other mathematical philosophers, held ^°* U,ul0 * that seeing is accomplished by means of such rays issuing from the eye, we may suppose that the reflexion in the eye, which is instrumental or subsidiary to vision, is the result of this process : that the visual image is collected somehow by the energy of the internal fire, going out to the object and thence returning to the eye with its impres- sion, which is there mirrored in the diaphanous element l . Thus the fire would represent the ' active ' force of vision, while the water would serve to bring the object seen home to the eye itself. The fact of the fire-flash was regarded as demonstrating the presence of fire in the eye, and a function had to be assumed for this fire in connexion with seeing. The presence of the watery element was manifest, and it, too, required to have its visual function explained , which was most simply done, as it appeared, by making the water the mirror in which the image in the 'pupil' (also manifest to observation) is reflected. Considering the natural obscurity of the act of vision on its psychical side, we need not look for greater accuracy or consistency of view than this on Alcmaeon's part. But there is a popular confusion lurking in the position thus described. The ' visual ray ' hypothesis, which makes seeing an ' act * of the mind or of the eye, cannot be really harmonized with the other hypothesis by which the eye with its aqueous humour is regarded as a mere mirror reflecting objects as is done by a standing pool 2 . 1 Though iia^avh strictly means ' transparent,' and a purely trans- parent substance would reflect no image, this does not prevent the use of the word in such connexion as the present by all writers including Aristotle. Water and air were held to be diaphanous and yet the great instruments of reflexion. Of course when they do ■ reflect * images there are present conditions which modify their mere ' trans- parency ' and render such reflexion possible. ' It is hard to agree with Prantl, Arist. n«|« Xpu/iaruv, p. 37, that Alcmaeon's statement regarding vision and its organ are in harmony - with and anticipate those of Aristotle. Aristotle distinctly denies that the eye contains fire, and explains the ' flash ' differently from Alcmaeon. 14 THE FIVE SENSES Empedocles. Em P e - § 5- According to the doctrine first enunciated by Empe- penerai docles, like perceives like. All bodies are formed of the four view of his elements, earth, air, fire ; water. All have passages (wo'poi) system of , . , . , ., . m thought in ° r pores in them, and from all emanations or effluences us beating (airoppojat) come, and enter into the said pores or passages. vcrfu>s, quoted by Aristotle in the tract de Sensu 6 . It is as follows : *As when 1 Eel. i. 16; Diels, Vors. % p. 181, Vox. proll. p. 322. » So Sicbeck, Gesch. der Psych, i. 1, p. 271, thinks. * fi«xP' T °> v Sarpav, Arist. 438* 26. * Vide Wachtler, Alcm., p. 49. • Arist. 437 b 23 seqq. 16 THE FIVE SENSES one who purposes going abroad on a stormy night maketh him ready a light, a gleam of blazing fire, adjusting thereto, to screen it from all sorts of winds, a lantern which scatters the breath of the winds as they blow, while the fire — that is, the more subtile part thereof— leaping forth shines along the threshold with unfailing beams : thus then did Nature embed the primordial fire pent within the coatings of the eye, videlicet the round pupil, in its delicate tissues, which had been pierced throughout with pores of wondrous fineness, and, while they fenced off the deep surrounding flood, allowed the fire — i. e. the more subtile part thereof — to issue forth (biUa-Kov) . . .' Empedocles here describes either vv x tT ^")i ma y, however, refer to the outer coatings of the eye, while Aeirrf/crij/ oOovyat refers to the capsule of the lens itself. At all events, the finer part of the fire darts forth through these membranes and through the water, as the light does through the sides of the lantern l . 'And the flame innocuous gat for itself a small portion 1 See Prof. Burnet's Early Creek Philosophy, p. 231, and Diels, Vors., p. 206. The latter renders it ti toV Iv pi)ny£i»> ktX. ' so barg sich das urewige Feuer damals (bet der Bildung ties /luges) hinter der runden Pupille in Haute und diinne Gewander eingeschlossen.' If, with Diels, giving up the play on Koipr), we make irvp subject of Xoxdfci-o, we may explain that the 'primordial fire ensconced (or ambushed) itself in the round pupil.' There is no need of r in v. 8. In fact it injures the sense, as ABovgiri Xo^. seems to refer to a further process, not co-ordinate with iipyiiivov. He translates oaov ravaaiTtpov tjiv in vv. 5 and 1 1 ' weil es soviel feiner war,' but the uaov is limitative, indicating the precise amount of the fire which was capable of leaping forth, the same to which Plato, 77m. 45 B-C, refers in the words toO irvpoc Saov to pir Kaiuv ovk 'v rjpfpov. The expression koto fjq\6ir seems to favour Siebeck's view (op. tit., p. 271) that Empedocles contemplates a co-operation between the fire from within and the Attoppoiai from without at the surface of the eye. There seems to be no sufficient reason for following Alexander in rendering these words by Kara ran ovpavov, as Diets does in his ' zum Firmament.' VISION 17 of earth (in the formation of the eye) 1 .' The eye was formed of the elements, for Empedocles further says : * Of these (elements) divine Aphrodite made up the fabric of the tireless eyes 8 .' § 7. In these passages we notice that no reference is Empedo- made by Empedocles to his doctrine of pores and emana- ^ e „£*" tions, so fundamental for perception. Aristotle, too, 'pores 'and observes 3 that Empedocles, while at one time explaining tions': its vision, as we have seen, by means of fire issuing from the |^°f snal lens, at other times explains it by airoppoiai, as if imputing function. inconsistency to his theory of vision *. It is not easy to assent to the suggestion of mere inconsistency ; yet on the other hand it is difficult to reconcile the two standpoints here contrasted. There is indeed another record which seems to bear upon the matter. ' Empedocles mixed the rays with the images, calling their joint-product by the compound term ray-image *.' But this passage is intrinsi- cally suspicious. By the «f5u>\a would seem to be intended something between the inoppoiai of Empedocles and the fl&wKa of Democritus and Epicurus ; and the theory here ascribed to Empedocles, of the mixture of the rays with the biroppoiai to form the aKnvtfotoXov, reminds one too much of the distinctively Platonic theory known later as the avvavytia 6 . Empedocles and Plato both accept the existence 1 Simpl. ad Art's/. Phys, (Diels), p. 331. 3 (Diels, Vors., p. 206). Simpticius instances this, because of the use of the word rv\t here, as illustrating the fortuitousness of the formation of things according to Empedocles ; in which he overstrains the meaning of this word. The position of the adjective is noticeable in the words /; Si Xd| referred to to what Plato calls xaC*To was also 'A

Sia ray axriVui/ koi irp&g to btk run tliaXuv ('K/«r«6oKov t too, i.e. an image pictorially resembling the object, is quite foreign to the visual theory of Empedocles and of Plato l , though proper to that of Epicurus, and (if we can trust the references in Aristotle and Theophrastus) used also by Democritus for the immediate object of vision. From Aristotle's argument against Empedocles, in which he urges that vision is not, as the latter thought, due to fire issuing from the eye, and from the words of Empedocles himself s (or rvp) 8' !£o> liadp&a-Kov kt« ., it is certain that, according to the opinion of the latter, the essential constituent of the eye — the ityiyiov -nvp — was a principal factor of vision 2 , which is effected by visual rays proceeding outwards. From the statements of Theophrastus (§ 9 infra), again, it is equally certain that according to Empedocles vision, like the other senses, is effected by anoppoiai. How are we to harmonize the two positions? They must be regarded as comple- mentary parts of one theory. We really do not know how far outwards Empedocles regarded the rays as proceeding. If we assume that they merely went so far as to meet the azoppoiai, this will to some extent help us to a reconciliation of the views attributed to Empedocles by Aristotle. The assumption would 3 , however, bring the theories of Plato and Empedocles into very close connexion, and tend, at least, to justify Zeller's view of their affinity or identity 4 . The doc- § 8. Empedocles, holding that like perceives like, connects « t Wc ethat - nis doctrine of visual perception with that of the four ceives like' elements, thus: 'With earth we see (6-K^., p. 47. * (ViTrXatreii' Schneider : imXuianiv is suggested by Prantl = ■ shine upon,' and so obstruct. 9 ar,p is to v8up what to ?£<■>&>> cjjUs is to irCp. The light of day corrects the excess of water in the eye ; so the dampness of night corrects the excess of fire, dijp as usual = 'damp air.' VISION ai contains the opposites, viz. the fiery and watery elements, in definite relationship to light and shade, or white and black. A passage of Aristotle 1 corroborates the information contained in the foregoing extract from Theophrastus. ' To suppose that, as Empedocles says, gleaming eyes (yXavica o^ara) are fiery, while black contain more of water than of fire, and that on this account the former, the gleaming, see dimly by day owing to lack of water, and the latter by night owing to lack of fire, is an error; since we must assume that the visive part of the eye in all cases consists not of fire but of water V § 10. Plato in the Menon 3 tells us that Gorgias, as a follower Object of of Empedocles, held the doctrine of pores and emanations ; ccbur. and that by means of this doctrine he furnished an ex- planation of colour as object of vision. According to this, colour is an emanation consisting of figures symmetrical with the pores of the visual organ and for this reason capable of being seen. We read elsewhere also 4 that Empedocles regards colour as ' that which fits into the pores of the eye.' To this Stobaeus 6 adds the statement already referred to (§ 5 supra) that ' Empedocles regarded white, black, red, green (or, with ityjtov for \\xp6v, xhap6v has been adopted ; yet the change may be not worth while making, if the suspicion mentioned below be well founded. i>\pfa is used by Arist. 559 a 18 to denote the colour of the yolk of an egg ; i. e. it means yellow. Cf. Diels, Dox., Prol. p. 50 ; and Mul- lach, Democritus, p. 353. Curiously enough, the same error of i>xpov for vision. 22 THE FIVE SENSES elements 1 .' This is perhaps supported by the fact that in Fragment 71, Empedocles teaches that colours are pro- duced by the mixture of the four elements ". The following criticism of Empedocles' colour-theory by Theophrastus s will help to place this theory itself in a clearer view. Theo- §11.' Empedocles teaches that like is perceived by like,' |^i!ici«s but this gives rise to difficulties as regards his own theory Empe- f the particular senses. ' When he makes the visual organ docles ..... 7 theory of to consist of fire and its contrary, we may observe that it could indeed perceive white and black by the operation of similars ; but how could it perceive grey and the other com- posite coiours 4 ? For h' does not explain such perception (of grey, &c.) as taking ^.lace either by the ' pores ' of the fire or by those of the water, or by others formed of both together 6 ; yet we see these just as well as we see the simple colours. It is, moreover, a strange doctrine that some eyes see better by day, others by night. For the smaller fire is destroyed by the greater 6 , which is the reason why we cannot gaze directly at the sun or at any excessively bright X^opov affects the statement of Stob. (Eel. i. 16. 8 ; Diels, Dor., p. 314) attributing the same ' four-colour ' theory to Democritus. That ^Xopcfc is the true word in Democritus we know from Theophrastus (§ 75). As regards Empedocles, however, we have not this assurance, Theo- phrastus (§ 59) merely telling us that Empedocles held two primary colours white and black, while the remaining colours are formed by mixtures of these. It has been suspected (Diels, Dox., p. 222) that the compiler of the Placita erroneously ascribed to Empedocles the four colours of Democritus. 1 For the ancient and traditional conception (cf. Prantl, Art's/. n«pi Xpafx. p. 30} of white and black, as the primary colours from which the other colours can be obtained by mixing them in various pro- portions, cf. Aristotle, §§ 41-2 infra. * Diels, Vors., p. 203 n/um'f<(rdat. Cf. Theophr. de Sens. § 64 ; also Galen, de Elem. sec. Hipp. i. 2 vii/up yap xpoil) . . . tTijj 6' Jto/jov ko\ tuviiv o Aij/iifc/uror t]r «W. * Arist 438* 5-16. ' The subject of iariv is jj Iprpaais derived from toOto, sc. to ip. >)*• a8 THE FIVE SENSES turned round V Now it was for Democritus to show by what and how this turning process was to be effected, without which seeing would still be impossible. A further point is this. When several objects are seen together, how can we understand the presence of a plurality of impressions at the same time in the same air ? And how do two persons see one another at the same time ? The two impressions must meet as they travel in opposite directions from one to the other, each of them facing the object from which it came. Therefore this again is a point which requires further inquiry and elucidation. But we may add another point. How is it, on Democritus' hypothesis, that each person does not see himself in the course of the process ? As the impressions of one's body reflect themselves from the air in the eyes of others, so they should reflect themselves back in one's own eye, especially if they directly face the latter, and if the phenomenon of reflexion is one which takes place in the same way as the repercussion of sound in an echo ; in which case, according to Democritus, the voice is reflected back (avaK\axrdai) also to the very person who gave it utterance. But this theory of air-modelling, taken all round, is absurd. From what Democritus says, it should follow that the air is continually having formed in it models of all kinds of objects, of which many would cross one another's paths, thus causing an impediment to vision, and being generally improbable. And, moreover, if the impressions made in the air are permanent, one should, even when the bodies from which they come are no longer in view or are far distant, be able to see them still, if not at night, at all events in the day- time ; though, indeed, it would be even more credible that the impressions should remain in the air at night, as the atmosphere is at that time more endowed with animation 2 - ' 1 The image will come to the eye * wrong side on.' 1 «/i^ru^oT»por, which at first seems strange, suits the argument and the theory of Democritus better than Wimmer's conjecture t/i\fruxptSrxv within the living body is constantly being recruited through the respiratory process. Cold tends to expel them VISION 29 Perhaps one might say that in the daytime the sun causes the reflexion of images in the pupil by bringing the light 1 to the eye, and this is what Democritus seems to have meant ; since that the sun should, as he says, condense the air, pushing and striking it off from itself, is an absurd notion. The sun naturally rarefies air instead of condensing it It is to be remarked also, as an anomaly in Democritus' theory, that he gives not the eye alone, but also the remainder of the body its part in visual perception. This he implies when he states that the eye must contain void and moisture for the purpose of receiving impressions more freely and then transmitting t/iese to the rest of the body*. A still ' further anomaly is involved in Democritus' assertion that cognate things best ,see their kindred, while neverthe- less he also asserts that reflexion is due to difference of colour, which would imply that like things are not reflected in their likes. Besides this: how are magnitudes and distances reflected in the eye? this is a question which he undertakes but fails to answer. Thus Democritus, in enunciating his peculiar theory of vision, instead of settling the old problems, bequeaths them to us in a more difficult form than before.' § 15. ' Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, hold that (Demo- the visual affection (W> Spanitbv it&Oos) takes place by the £ , r t ^' e tenn entrance of images (xara tlbv ilanpunv) 3 . visual from the body ; and, as at night and in sleep the body is colder than by day, the quantity of soul-atoms in the air at night is greater than by day. Cf. Arist. 47i b 30 seqq. Diels, Vors., p. 391, now defends ip.tyvx ir, P'*- 1 The text here translated is corrupt and obscure. 1 lv orl trktov bixfrai na\ iw SKktp /iari irapafliSw. These words . suggest the answer which Democritus would have made to Aristotle's question (§ 13 supra) — 'Why on Democritus' theory does not every other mirror, as well as the eye, see}' ' Mirrors,' Democritus would reply, ' are not connected with a bodily organism.' ' Plut.£#0:r.,p.4O3). Theophrastus, as we have seen, and Aristotle, 438' 16, both use this word t'&aKov with reference to Democritus' object of vision. Cicero, too, ad Fam. xv. 1 6. 1 , implies that Democritus himself so used it : ' quae ille Gargettius et iam ante Democritus tldu\a, hie " spectra " nominat.' Yet nowhere do we find the word thus used in the remains of Democritus himself. The term which he employed usually, if not always, was 8«'«Xoy(or 8«'oioVtopd>a) the latter, and impinge theory. upon the eye. Such was the theory of Leucippus and Demo- critus V ' Democritus asserts that seeing is the reception of an image reflected from the object seen. This word image (tiupturis) here means the form («6os) reflected in the pupil. The case is like that of all other transparent surfaces which show an image reflected in them. He holds that certain images (tlorcXa), similar in shape to the things from which they come, streaming off from all the things which are visible, impinge upon the eyes of those who see them, and that thus seeing takes place ; in proof whereof he adduces the fact that in the pupil of the eye of those who see any object there is invariably the image or likeness of the object seen. This is the whole account of seeing according to Democritus V Demo- § 1 6. Democritus is the earliest philosopher in whose theory of recorded writings we find an attempt at a detailed theory the object f colour. The white and the black he refers immediately Colour, its to affections of touch : the former to the smooth, the latter seems to have been, by its derivation, fitted to express generally the anoppojj from an object of whatever sense. It properly signifies not a ' spectrum * but what we mean by (the English word) specimen : i. e, an emanation qualitatively like the thing from which it comes. This, in reference to the sense of sight, would be no doubt a ' specimen ' (in the Latin signification) of the object qua visible : a copy of its figure and colour. In reference to other senses it would denote the qualities respectively which these are fitted to perceive, whether odour, or sound, or taste. Only in reference to the sense of seeing could it coincide in meaning with t'&akov, but as this, which Aristotle calls the sense par excellence, tends to absorb the attention of psychologists, either the word it ixe \ov was narrowed to the idea of Xoi> ( = 17 anoppolj rijr popepqe), or else the latter was extended to cover all the meanings of the more general term. That ieUekov was capable of expressing dSuW, appears from the phrase of Parthenius AcukW 'I0iyf »ijr, the image, or effigy, of Iphigenia. In Laconian J«i«\iVrai was = Attic fufujrai (Etym. Magn. 260, 48). 1 Alexander, in Arist. de Sens. p. 56 (Wendland), and Arist. de Sens. 440* 15-18. ' Alexander ad Arist. de Sensu 438* 5, p. 24 (Wendland). This reproduces the theory of Democritus in the simpler aspect in which Aristotle criticizes it, 438* 5-16. VISION 31 to the rough \ He asserts that the simple (A*Xo) colours » physical are four : white, black, red, and green (x\m P 6v). White is the ^ nction: smooth*. For if anything is not rough, and neither throws primary shadows nor is difficult of penetration, it is, in every case, coloois " bright (\anitp6v). The things that are bright must be straight- bored (dtMrpvira), and hence translucent (biavyrj). Of white objects, those which are hard— as, for example, the flat inner surfaces of bivalve shells — consist of such atomic shapes 4 , for thus they would be shadowless and luminous (tvltyi)) and straight-pored (fiOwropa). Those, on the other hand, which are friable (\lra6vpd) s and brittle (ivdpvtrra) consist of atoms which are spherical but obliquely situated in position with regard to one another, and in their mode of combination in pairs 6 , and their whole atomic structure is as far as possible uniform. This being so, such bodies must be friable, because the amount of conjunction between each pair among their atoms is slight ; and they must be brittle, because the disposition of the atoms is uniform ; while they must be free from shadow, because they are smooth and flat. Things are whiter one than another in proportion as the figures aforesaid are more exact and less mixed with others, and possess the aforesaid order and disposi- tion more perfectly. Such, then, are the atomic figures of which white is composed. Black consists of figures of the contrary kind, those which are rough, uneven (s clXXrjXa xal Kara ivo ov£tv$ttl which seems to mean that a cross-section of the structure would exhibit the atoms in a quincuncial arrangement. Prantl (Htp\ Xp«i/i., p. 52) keeping the older text rot 8w> p6v), again, is formed of the solid and the void, being compounded of both, but the colour varies in tint (8iaX\urr«n») according to their position and arrangement ". 1 \Ve cannot guess what this new factor — the speed of the anoppoal — has to do with colour according to Democritus. There is no thought here of ' rapidity of vibrations.' Mullach {Dent., p. 221) punctuates so as to separate ftuKpepnv from itp6s, wrongly, * The atoms of fire are spherical, Arist. 303* 14. By ' larger (/mi- fovuv) ' here must be meant ' in larger aggregates,' as in next clause. s Diels {Dox., p. 521) compares Arist. 329 b 26 Sippov yap fan to trvyKpaiov ro Ofioycrij' to yap diaKpivtiv, oirtp p6v, and (rouro yap a) and arrangement, this being in them the same as in the black. And, again, he implies it when explaining the colour of rough things which are white. For these, he says, are formed of large figures of which the commissures are not indeed round but serrated \ while the outlines of the figures are broken like stair-steps, or the tops of vallated mounds * erected before a city wall. This feature in the edge of the atom renders it shadowless, so that there is nothing in it to hinder brightness from appear- ing 3 . ... In general Democritus here explains not so much the whiteness as the transparency or brightness of bodies ; since that it should be transparent, and that its pores should not zigzag, is the essential characteristic, or condition, of the structure of the diaphanous body. Again, that the pores of white things should be in straight lines, while those of black should be in zigzag lines, is a condition which Can explain these colours only on one assumption, viz. that colour is an objective thing, which enters into and passes through the pores 4 ; but Democritus does not assume this. He asserts that seeing is due to the emanation and the image reflected in the eye *- But if seeing is due to this (sc. 1 oi irrpupcpr ir, ciWa irpOKp6ovois xf u >t u ' T < j "' et anoppoq.' " Jii tIjv anoppotfv xat rijv fp . ., , ' , ' , , . which the ip) to their several shapes, and (c) to the position of each in sensible its place. The subjective aspects— the qualities— of sensible 2^"^,,. objects are all due to these three things '. Colour has no ted from objective existence, since the colours of bodies are due to the ^ Void* position of the atoms in them 2 . (Cf. Touching, § 2, p. i8a.) Anaxagoras. § ao. Following Heraclitus, Anaxagoras is sharply op- Difference posed to his contemporaries and predecessors in holding, b ^ l e n e c n ip e as he did, that perception is effected not by the operation Anaxa- of like upon like, but of contrary upon contrary. This y?™ s an accords, on the one hand, with his metaphysical doctrine contem- « poranes of voBy a/*iyjjs, and, on the other, with the empirical fact respecting that many perceptions, e. g. that of temperature, seem to J, 1 }'*"'* rest upon a contrast between the condition of the perceiving tion.Uniike organ and the object it perceives. If the temperature of unlike! Ap- water is exactly that of the hand, this may be thrust into plication of it without perception of it as either cold or hot. The the theory contrariety required by the doctrine of Anaxagoras as one of vision - of the conditions of perception exists for all possible cases ; since, according to the Anaxagorean doctrine -nav iv ttavrt, we have within us the contraries of all possible external objects. Our information as to the psychological teaching of Anaxagoras is scanty, yet contains evidence of his being influenced by these principles. 1 Stob. Eel. i. 16 (Diels, Dox., p. 314). 1 Arist. de Gen. et Corr. 316* I rpowlj yap xpo>iiaTi(*» ovk ?x«« $Sr. This, as it stands in Wimmer's and Diels' texts = non minus nigra quam alba lucetn non habent, makes no sense. I have translated according to what I conceive the true reading. 3 Theophr. de Sens. § 59 (Diels, Vox., p. 516). 4o THE FIVE SENSES Empedocles held that white consists of fire, black of water. The others confined themselves to asserting that white and black are the elementary colours, the remaining colours being generated by mixtures of these two. For Anaxa- goras has expressed himself quite generally respecting them x . He held 2 that the elements of all things were originally confused in one mass infinite in number and severally infinitesimal in bulk. This being so, we must conceive that (for him) many and multifarious seeds of things exist in all bodies — seeds with all sorts of shapes, and colours, and savours. . . . Before they were separated from the mass, and while all were still together, no single determinate colour was yet discernible.' ' Colours, accord- ing to Anaxagoras, are not self-subsistent or separable from coloured things. Each colour requires a substrate. It is not possible that all things whatever should be separated from one another ; the process of discrimination 3 is no absolute separation * ; wherefore it is impossible that walking 5 , colour, and, in general, the qualities and states of things, should be really separated from their substrates (tuv vTtoKtuilvtuv) 6 .' It is plain that, owing to his theory of •nav Iv iravrl, Anaxagoras could not hold that there is in nature any pure or simple colour 7 . 1 &n\S>s f'pijKt. PrantI, pressing the yap before 'hva£ay6pat here, infers from the sentence that Anaxagoras with the others held white and black to be primary colours. * Simpl. ad Arist.Phys. i84 b 15-188' 5, pp. 34-5, 156, 175-6 (Diels); PrantI, n f p\ Xpau. p. 58. s i. e. that effected by voiis. * ov yap iravrtXijS Siaa-rracrfiSt iariv 1} Sidxpurit, " pd&uric here seems to mean •movement' in general, which is impossible, according to Anaxagoras, without something that moves. * Simpl. L c. PrantI, Arist. Uipi Xpa/iurup, p. 59, remarks that it was probably this conviction of the inseparableness of qualities from substance that led Anaxagoras to make his famous assertion that snow is black. To the sensible impression that snow is white, he opposed the rational view that snow is water frozen, and that water — the Homeric fukav vSup— is black ; hence snow is really black. The meaning and object of this paradoxical assertion were quite misunder- stood by many ancient writers ; e. g. Cic. Acad. Quaes/, iv. 23. 31. ' CL Arist. l87 b 2 seqq. ftio (part irav iv iravri /u/ui^dat . . . ilKiKpivas VISION 41 Diogenes of Apollonia. § 23. Diogenes held that the ultimate agency in Nature Diogenrf (which included for him Mind in all its manifestations) is J^afthe Air. Thus thought and sensation are activities of the foundation intra-organic air (especially that in or around the brain) "^^ in relation with the outer, or extra-organic air, which physical _, ... . , activity. operates m nature generally. The air m the particular The intra- organs conducted the sensory impressions to that near the ^f^"^ brain, as their central organ ; which, again, seems, in certain perception. cases at least, to have co-operated with the air in the breast, j^age'tne or near the heart. Perception is more perfect the finer chief factor is the intra-organic air, and the more freely the structure of points of the vessels promotes its passage to and fro between the agreement . * r o ^ between brain, the thorax, and the various parts of the bodily Diogenes, 'Seeing takes place, according to Diogenes 1 , by the re- Empe- flexion of objects in the pupil of the eye ; for this, by being theory of ° mixed (utiywuirnqv) with the internal air 2 , produces the sense colour. of vision ; a proof of which is that when there is inflamma- tion of the vessels of the eye, the mixture with the air within being interrupted, vision is impaired, although the image is reflected in the pupil as usual.' ' Those animals see most keenly which have the air 3 within them fine and the veins fine likewise (such fineness of the air and the air-vessels u being the general conditions of perfect sense), and those which also have the eye itself as bright as possible *. The colour which is contrary to that of the eye is best reflected in it * : wherefore those whose eyes are black see best by day, per yap S\ov X«ikoi» r) pe'\av tj kt{. . . . oIk tiveu' orou it irXcitrroy !%< 1 fnurrqv, tovto ioKtiv ttvai njf epvaiv rov irpdyparot. 1 Theophr. de Sens. § 40 (Diels, Vors., p. 344). 1 More especially ro> nep\ rov tyKeepaketv aipi. • Theophr. L c. § 42. 4 Sera re top aipa (sc. Xfirrdv) not rat (jAeffas ?x«i Xcirrdr, &atttp «iri run jXXuv (sc. ala6i t ae 6av fiopiov tov Otov. * The meaning of this is not, at first, clear. But Diogenes believed that NoCr in each roan is Air — 6 iv ijiuv 6W — and a part of the universal NoCt, 6 0f dt, which, of course, is also Air. When the individual row is engaged on its own thoughts, if we then have neither ears nor eyes for external objects, it follows that the operation of these senses is included in that of pour : as it is voCr (<5 i wot riqp) that thinks, so it is the same that perceives. He does not here argue— he assumes — that vow in each person is & ivrot at)p. * De Sens. § 47 (Diels, Dox., p. 512). VISION 43 he seems to have disliked. At all events he never names favourable him. Accordingly we find comparatively little in Plato's ^"J*" dialogues bearing on this subject, and that little not always chology : up to the standard of what was to be expected from a writer jmmeiZd* of his transcendent genius. A few scattered references and '" meta - u t.- • physics. observations ; an interesting disquisition in the TheaeteUts Account of (which, however, aims not at psychological but rather at l ^°^ ^ epistemological results) ; and a discussion in the Timaetts, Timaeus. for which the author practically apologizes 1 , form the chief contributions of Plato to the subject of empirical psychology. Plato's physics were submerged in metaphysics. We cannot, therefore, so clearly distinguish the ruling physical ideas which governed his psychology as we could do and have done in the cases of Empedocles, Democritus, and Anaxa- goras. When he proceeds to treat of psychology he descends from first to second causes, and finds himself on uncongenial ground. It is not easy to discover a principle of union between his psychology and his idealism, any more than between his psychology and any ruling physical principles. His physics is virtually contained in his account of the nature and construction of matter, in its four forms, given by him in the Timaeus. He accepts the four Empedoclean forms, earth, air, fire, water ; but does not regard them as primitive. These were constituted by the Demiurgos out of fundamental triangles, by a geometrical process doubtless borrowed from the Pythagoreans. The primitive triangles are the right-angled isosceles, and the right-angled scalene. From these are first constructed the pyramid, the cube, the octahedron, and the eikosahedron. The cube, then, is made to form the foundation of earth, as it is the most solid element; the pyramid forms that of fire ; the octahedron that of air ; the eikosahedron that of water. These four ' elements ' stand to one another in continuous proportion : as fire is to air, air is to water ; and as air is to water, so is water to earth 2 . Plato's psychology 1 The theory of colour in the Timaeus comes in only as a part of the ^povi/ior wai&ia in which the author indulges. Cf. Tim. 59 d. • Tim. 32 a-b. 44 THE FIVE SENSES also is set forth in the Timaeus, in his attempted deduction of the individual from the cosmic soul. This deduction is on the face of it metaphysical, and indeed fanciful in the last degree. When the Demiurgos makes over to the newly created gods the task of fashioning mortal bodies to be joined with immortal souls, we see Plato at a loss how to connect his metaphysics with his physics by any satisfactory rational or scientific tie. The inferior gods borrowed from the Cosmos portions of the four elements 1 , and of these they compacted the organic body. Into this body they introduced the immortal soul with its double circular rota- tions — the circles of the Same and of the Different. This soul they located in the cranium, which is spherical, like the Kosmos, in its external form, and admits no motion but the rotatory. The body had all the varieties of motion, backward, forward ; upward, downward ; right, left. In it were set up the movements of nutrition and sensation, which, however, interfere with, and disturb, the movements of the rational soul in the cranium. Thus its rotations in the circles of the Same and the Different are caused to convey false information. In the course of time, and by the process of education, this state of things is made to improve. Philosophy attempts to restore the mathematical exactitude of the intellectual movements. To all this Plato subjoins a particular account of the senses — their organs, functions, and objects. This will be now. given as far as it concerns the sense of seeing. Function § 25. Neglecting the pupillar image 'Plato held that ^i^f* seeing takes place in virtue of a coalescence between (a) the Plato, like ra ys of the intra -ocular light emanating from the eyes clesfneg- to some distance into the kindred (i.e. illuminated) air; lects the fj^ t h a £ w hich, reflected from external bodies, moves to meet image. it ; and (c ) that which is in the intervening air, and which, 1 It is noticeable how great a hold this doctrine of the four elements (which Empedocles first propounded) took upon the Greek mind. It pervades the whole period from Empedocles to Aristotle, for though not of course accepted in its original form by all writers, it was some- thing with which all had to reckon ; and which influenced even those who rejected it. VISION 45 owing to the diflusibility and nimbleness of the latter, extends itself in lines parallel with the fiery current of vision V ' Of the organs first they wrought light-bearing eyes, and bound them fast in the causal scheme as follows. That part of fire which has the property of not burning, but yielding an innocuous light, they contrived to fashion into a substance homogeneous with the light of day 2 . For the fire within us, being twin with this, they caused to flow through the eyes in its pure form, smooth and dense, having constructed the whole, and especially the central part, of the eyes in such wise as to confine all the remainder, i. e. the denser portion, of the fire within, and to filter forth only such fire as that above described, by itself, in its purity. Whenever, accordingly, there is daylight around the visual current (= the light which flows out from the eyes), this current, issuing from the eyes and meeting with its like, becoming compacted into union with the latter (i. e. with the homogeneous external daylight), coalesces with it into one homogeneous whole s in the line of vision, i.e. in the direction in which the current issuing from within meets front to front with, and presses against, any of the external objects with which it comes into collision. The whole then, owing to the essential homo- geneity of its constituents, becomes sympathetic, so that whenever it takes hold of anything, or when anything takes hold of it, it transmits the movements of such thing into the whole body as far as the soul 4 , and so produces a sensation, viz. the experience on having which we say 1 toC itipX rov fiiTa£v aipa flbiaxyrav ovra r, Stob. Eel. i. 52 ; PluL Epit. iv. 13 (Diels, Dox., p. 404). Prantl (Arist. Uipl Xpaparav, p. 75) remarks that ovvaiyua, the term above translated ' coalescence of rays,' seems to have come into vogue in the later Academy or among the Neo-Platonists. This passage of the Placita sums up fairly enough the doctrine set forth in the following passage of the Timaeus (45 B-46 a) itself. ' There is a play on the terms lutipa and at jjpipov. ' f KirurTOi/ Sfiotov np&s o/joiok (vpnayir y€v6(nvov. 4 ptxpt Trjt tf'vx'jf : up to the ' seat of consciousness,' an expression of which great use is made by most Greek psychologists, and which covers the greatest mystery of psychology. 4« THE FIVE SENSES commonly that we see. But when the kindred fire without has departed into night, the visual current from within is cut off; since, on issuing from the eye and meeting what is unlike it, it becomes itself changed in quality and ex- tinguished : it becomes no longer homogeneous with the neighbouring air, as the latter now contains no fire.' Sleep and § 26. * Therefore it ceases from seeing and tends to bring ms ' on sleep. For when the eyelids, whose structure the gods devised as a protection for the sight, are closed, they imprison the force of the fire within ; and this force weakens by diffusion, and so calms, the internal movements ; and when they have become calm, quietude succeeds. If this quietude is profound, the sleep which descends upon us yields but scanty dreams ; but if certain of the greater movements have been suffered to remain, these, according to their quality, and that of the regions of the body in which they remain, produce "phantasms" of corresponding quality and number, fashioned within us like unto objects seen, and referred outwards to them by us in memory when we awake V ' Does not dreaming (asks Plato in the Republic) consist just in this, that one, whether asleep or awake, regards that which is like something not as merely being like it, but as being the very thing itself which it resembles 2 ?' Plato's § 27. As Mr. Archer-Hind, ad loc, observes, there are ^2^ three fires concerned in the above account of vision: compared (1) that which streams from the eye (to rijt <5ty«wj ptvp-a) ; ofErn^ (2) the fire of daylight in the air; and (3) the fire which docks. ^ the colour of the object seen. The visible object is immersed in the p.tdr)p.tpwbv were not material, and were far other than those of Empedocles 2 - § 28. Light, the medium of vision, is a subject of interest The to Plato, not however from a physical or psychological ^i^"* ° standpoint so much as from that of metaphysics. ' We see,' (Plato he says s , ' with the organ of seeing, and hear with the organ s^at as if of hearing, and with the senses generally perceive their there ™ re respective objects ; but the great Artist who fabricated of hearing.) the senses and their organs has, with regard to seeing, gone more expensively to work than in any of the other • 404* 16. * Cf. Tim, 35 a seqq. * Rep. 507 0-508 B. 48 THE FIVE SENSES senses. The organs of hearing and sound need no third * thing in order that the former may hear and the latter be heard ; nothing, the absence of which would prevent the one from hearing and the other from being heard. The other senses also are exempt from any such need. But the faculty of seeing and the object of this have need of such third thing. For the power of seeing may be in the eye, and the man who possesses it may strive to exercise it, also colour may be present in the object ; but if a third thing called light be not present, the eye can see nothing ; the colour must remain invisible. Light is the precious medium by the intervention of which the object and the organ of vision are brought into conjunction for the exercise of this faculty. The visual organ is not the sun, though the most sunlike (fiKiwbioraTov . . . dpydvmv) of the sensory organs * ; but it receives from the sun, when the latter illuminates the sphere of vision, all the visual power which it possesses. Light wells forth from the sun as from a fountain.' The ebjat § 29. The object of vision is colour. If the eye sees, Colour! 1 ' w hat it primarily sees is this 3 . The visual agency according to Plato* consists of fire. Its visible object too is of the same nature. ' The body of the created world is tangible and visible : that it should be tangible it must consist, in part, of earth : that it should be visible it must have an ingredient of fire 8 .' * Colour, therefore, he regards as a sort of flame from bodies, having its parts symmetrical 8 with 1 It is strange that Plato should here reason as if only this one faculty of sense required a medium — light — between object and organ : as if no medium were required for hearing or smelling. 1 Cf. Goethe, Farbenlehre, Introduction : 'War' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, Wie konnten wir das Licht erblicken ? Lebt' nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft, Wie konnt' uns Gbttliches entziicken?' ' In Charmid. 167 C xp^f 1 " M<" °P? oiiiv ityir ovcra is given as an absurdity. * Theophr. de Sens. § 5. ' xupurBiv hi irvpbs oiiiv av wort iparhv yivoiro, Tim. 3 1 B. • Theophr. 1. c. We are here (as Th. remarks) reminded of Em- pedocles, who required trvpptrpia between the mr&ppouxi and the pores of the organs. VISION 49 those of the visual current 1 j so that (since an emanation 2 takes place from the objects seen, and this emanation and the visual fire must harmonize with one another) the visual agency, going forth to a certain point, forms a union with the emanation from the body, and thus we see. Hence Plato's visual theory would stand midway between that of those who merely say that the visual current impinges upon the objects 3 , and that of those who teach merely that something is conveyed to the eye* from the objects seen.' ' Plato's theory of colour approximates to that of Empedocles, since the symmetry which Plato requires between the parts of the colour and the visual current is like the harmonious fitting (happorrttv) of the airoppoal into the pores required by Empedocles. ... It is strange that Plato should simply define colour as a flame ; for, though the particular colour white may be like this, yet black would seem to be the very reverse ».' We have seen that Plato seems to approve « of the definition quoted in the Menon from Empedocles 7 . Black and white are recognized by Plato as opposite colours 8 . Hence, too, colours admit of gradation, not quantitative, in the sphere of \iiya or woAv, but qualitative, i. e. in point of (catfapo'njy 9 . 1 rg tyit=r

v S\jrti trvpptrpos nai alaBrjris. 7 Prantl (who, objecting to Theophrastus' comparison of Plato's colour theory with that of Empedocles, says that das Game bei Plat on mehr dynamisch betrachtet wird) would have us believe that the Empe- doclean definition of colour is only accepted in a spirit of Socratic irony. Vide his Arist. Farbenlehre, p. 57. • Phileb. 12 E, Protag. 331 D. • Phileb. 33 B. 5o THE FIVE SENSES Genesis of § 30. 'A fourth 1 department of sensibles yet remains whose {^toms. many varieties we have to distinguish. These as a class * we call colours, being a name 3 streaming off from bodies each and all, having parts symmetrical with those of the visual current, so as to be capable of being perceived *. We have already, in what precedes, set forth the causes which explain the origin of vision. Here, then, it is most natural and fitting to discuss the probable theory of colours, showing how the particles which are borne from external things, and impinge upon the visual organ, are some smaller, some larger than and some equal to the parts of this visual organ itself 6 ; that, moreover, those of equal size are unperceived, and are accordingly called transparent, whereas the larger and smaller, the former contracting the visual current and the latter dilating it 6 , are analogous respectively to things cold and hot in application to the flesh 7 , and to things which, in their effects on the tongue (sc. the organ of taste), are astringent, or from their heating effect on it are called pungent 6 . These are the colours black and white : affections of the parts of the visual current which are, as has been said, identical in principle with those of temperature and taste but in a different sense-modality 9 , 1 Reading fd» aapaTav avpptrpa fi6put txovcrav rjj o\^«, and says that Plato would not have used 4>\), when it reaches the humour of the eyes, and is blended with it, but does not glitter, produces a sanguine colour 1 , when its fire mingles with 2 the brightness in the moisture of the eyes, and to this colour we give the name red (ipvOpov) 3 .' The remaining colours are compounded of these four — white, black, bright, and red. ' Bright, when mixed with red and white, becomes golden-yellow (£av06v). What the proportion of parts in the several possible mixtures is, one should not say even if one knew; since there is no necessary law — no plausible account — which one could set forth with even moderate probability respecting them. Red, blended with black and white, gives violet (hkovpyov). If these (sc. the red, black, and white which form violet) are mixed and burnt, and black has been thus added in greater amount, the result is a dark-violet (Sptpvivov). Auburn (imppov) is produced by the mixture of golden-yellow and grey 4 . Grey, again, is formed by the mixture of white and black. Yellow (i>xp6v) by that of white with golden- yellow. When white meets bright and is immersed in intense black, a deep-blue (mavovv x/jfy"*) is produced. When this deep-blue is mixed with white, the glaucous tint — greyish blue — (yXovicos) results. When auburn is mixed with black the product is leek-green. It is clear, from what precedes, to what combinations the remaining colours are to be reduced, so as to preserve the verisimilitude of our fanciful account (yZQov). If, however, one should endeavour to investigate and test our theories by practical experiment, he would show himself ignorant of the difference between the human and 1 xp^f" tvatpov. In 80 E red is named rij? rov 'irvpAf ro/irjf re icai *£op6p£tos Iv vypcS xpot he translates ' pale-buff.' VISION 53 the divine nature; for God has knowledge and power 1 to blend the many into one and resolve the one into many, but no man is able, or ever will be able, to accomplish either of these things.' , § 31. Plato's account of the production of leek-green Plato (irpdaivov or irp&aiov) by the mixture of auburn and black fro^Aii*. receives no support from Aristotle at all events. In the totle »»«\ Meteorologica the latter tells us 2 that there are three iS^ri.- colours — crimson (oivikovv), leek-green (vpatnvov), an d{^"^ violet (aKovpydv), which painters cannot produce artificially positeness by any process of blending. These are the three principal g T ^ k .' colours of the rainbow 3 . According to Democritus (§17 what Ilato supra), however, leek-green can be produced from purple ^^""piato (itopipvpovv) and woad-blue, or else from pale-green and in £ eneraI purplish (itOpQvpOdbis). Aristotle When Plato above calls colour a ' flame,' and speaks of ^j"^}* fire as proceeding from the visible object to the eye, effects of we must bear in mind how many apparently different the " things he understood under the name fire — particularly lustrous. these three : flame, light, and glow. He says 4 : * We must a merely understand that there are many genera of fire, such as S °^"Y r (1) flame (Ao'£), and (2) that which proceeds from flame, Plato (in which does not burn but gives light to the eyes ; and as '™^^' (3) that which, when the flame has died down, is left of fo F Demo- the fire in the glowing embers.' He treats t *Ipiv *ot *VKi t iroparo'i>) 2 , or, as he defines it more 1 Jowett's phraseology has for the most part been adopted. 1 418* 26 seqq. oZ niv ol» iir tout' fori* iparov. Seeing, by a power common to it and the other senses, perceives contraries : there- fore it perceives also the invisible {a6paroi>). By this ' invisible,' however, VISION 57 closely, ' that which Is seen in the light.* So defined, the seen in fte object of sight is colour 1 . This is the most general name^ of The for the immediate and proper object seen in the light. » in e P«- Colour, unlike certain other things * (fire and phosphor- "viable : escent substances), cannot be seen in darkness. Hence in ^"^^ order to understand colour — the object of vision — we must colour, we obtain a true view of the medium of vision— light. Colour ™™ d ™££ overspreads the surface of all that is visible. Now every colour sets up a motion in the diaphanous medium between each coloured thing and the eye which sees it 3 , when the said medium exists actually, not merely in potency. This is the essence of colour. By the motion thus set up in the actualized, i. e. illuminated, diaphanous medium, vision is normally stimulated ; not, as was held by Empedocles, Democritus, and Plato, by itroppoaC, or «I8o>Aa, from the objects of vision. § 34. In order to understand light, therefore, we must con- The dia- sider the nature of the diaphanous, its medium *. This is a £,,"£". thing which is, indeed, visible, but not always or directly; He 1 * »«><* owing its visibility, when it has it, to colour produced in it Light does from without 6 . Instances of the diaphanous are found in air, " ot tra ? el water, and many solids • ; which are diaphanous or trans- space, as is here meant not the absolutely invisible, but only a kotos (cf. 42 i b 3, 422* 20-2) ; and even to is only p6\it 6pufuvo» (4i8 b 29) ; as is also to Xiav \apnp6v, which is a6parov in a different way from o-xdror. Cf. Met. I022 b 34 dbparov Xc'ycrai xai rai oXar pi) fX"V XP^pa *ai re ai\ar. 1 Not that the object of sight, thus restricted, and colour are ab- solutely identical. Cf. Phys. 20i b 4, Met. io65 b 32 uxrntp otii xpu/ia raMv Kai oparov. Their Xoyoi, as Simplicius says ad loc, are Starpopot. * As will appear there are three kinds of ipara : (1) colour (seen only in light) ; (2) fire (seen both in light and darkness) ; (3) phosphorescent things (seen only in the dark). 5 nav XP^I ta KivtjTM6» . . . JV oXXdrpioc xpupa. ' As we shall see (p. 60), the diaphanous in bodies is the vehicle of the colour regarded as in these bodies ; not, like the free diaphanous, the medium which propagates the colour movement to the eye. 58 THE FIVE SENSES Empe- parent, not qua water or air, but because they have inherent assJj^L in them the same natural substance which exists in the eternal body of the celestial sphere 1 . The actualization of this diaphanous qua diaphanous is light, just as its mere potentiality is darkness. Thus darkness is potentially wherever light is actually, and conversely. Light is thus» too, a colour, belonging incidentally to the diaphanous medium when the latter is actualized by the agency either of fire, or of a substance of the same nature as the celestial fire which has in it a principle or element of identity with the terrestrial. As colour can stimulate only the actually trans- parent or diaphanous, it is only in the actuality of this, i. e. in the light, that it can be seen. Fire, however, and certain other things mentioned below, can be seen in darkness. Such, then, is the diaphanous : and accordingly light is not fire, nor a body, nor an emanation from body 2 , but the presence of fire or some such thing in the diaphanous 3 . Colour is a phenomenon in light, as light is a phenomenon in the diaphanous. Darkness, on the other hand, is the privation (orf'pjjo-is) of light — the absence from the dia- phanous of that state which when present in it is light Light is a presence, and therefore those are wrong who like Empedocles suppose it to move locally, and come by a process unperceived by us through successive places from the sun to the earth. Reason and observation are both opposed to this view. If, indeed, the interval said to be thus traversed were a short one, light, if it moved, might traverse it without our perceiving the lapse of time it took; but not so when the intervening distance is so 1 oti «tti Tit tpvais ivunapxovaa i) avrij iv rovTow aptporipots ml iv ry ai&ia tu Svto aaijian. This aafia belongs to the region extending from the Hip to the moon and thence upwards to the empyrean in ever increasing brightness and purity. Cf. Meteor, i. 3. 34o b 6 tA piv yap ava lt*XP l <"^'i»"jr (the 'upper region' viewed downwards as far as the moon) trtpor ttvat aapa (papev irvpos t( koi aepos (Ideler, i. p. 344), de Cael. 286* 11, and the notes of Trendelenburg and Wallace on de An. ad loc. 1 ovrc iriip ovff oXoir aufia ov&' dnoppofj s Ktvo'vvtifiv SjfpovoK final. 1 Eth. Nic. H74» 14, * 12. ' For what follows see Arist. 439* 18 seqq. * xoiyq nr (pvaic Ka\ Sivapis. One thinks of the ' luminiferous ether.' 8 Xopurrq ptv ovk lari. * to iia^avd (439* 2 6) to the qualitative indeterminateness of air or water. The reference is rather to the indeterminateness of their boundaries. The boundary of water is not fixed, but liable to constant fluctuation : that of air is still more indefinite. The relation of xpoia and cirKpanm is one of the cardinal facts in the colour-theory of Aristotle. Hence, though it is true that the iuxpavit, to be a faithful medium for all colours, must itself have none (unless the a\X<$rptoi> xp°>i"* called as), this is not to the point here. * to aLTo JoU«! Kavddit StKTUCOv Ttjt \pias. * XpS>lta iv c'7 to tov &iaa»ois iv aajiari apur/uv^f mpar. VISION 61 species \ It is a quality, and hence has no existence apart species from a substratum of which it may be called an affection ThuHmi- (ir&doi). As a rule, Aristotle would apply the general term tation dne irotoTijy to the permanent colour, while to the transitory (as fact that redness in blushing) he would give the name vddos oT' ila ^ e i T f a \ / « « 1 • vcaiscrctt, wo«ijnicj} irotdrn * \ Yet he can speak of all sensible qualities, not ton- including colour, as to TradrjpaTa rd aIo-awV) be regarded as a species of black whichlimit and golden-yellow as a species of white, the species are £ ho y e hose reduced to six. If, on the other hand, grey and golden- sent the yellow be counted separately, the species are increased to coiouTas eight. The limitation of colour to a certain number of' nfinite species (tftrj) arises from a cause affecting all sensibles citus and (aZ are between extremes which are contraries 6 . Outside these con- Colour trary extremes there are no colours. Inside them the species "g^",™ are limited by them as boundaries. Nor can we by dividing tum, which and subdividing the scale between these fixed extremes get manent an infinite number of colours. Their proper division is throughout ... .„,.,. . thesucces- specinc, since an aWO-qrov is a discrete, not a continuous quan- sion of tity, what continuity it has being merely that of its substrate, "oio'urs' 112 A line or other continuous iitytdos is properly divisible into Y« only an infinite number of unequal parts : a genus, being discrete It^um, quantity, is divisible only into species which are finite in properly number. But if we tiy, by improper division (i. e. by the change"? division of the substrate in which the aladr\r6v inheres), J 109* 36, 227 b 6. * Cf. 8 b 25-10* 24 : irmoYr/f is fourfold (1) «f«r or IwBuns (the former being the more, the latter the less permanent state), (2) wra koto bvvaptv (icaff t trvKTixois tj vyutmie Myoptv), (3) naSt/riKal iroiortfrtt cat iraBrj, (4) tr^jlta T« xai r; jripl tKaaxov /u>p^r/. 3 445 b 4 seqq. * 442* 20. The view of Alexander is that we should read either «£ (so Susemihl) or okra. Cf., however, Theophr. de Causs. PL VI, iv. 1. * To the class of ri avnml/Mra belong (1) relatives (to npit «), (2) con- traries (tu fvavria), (3) as, for which as regards colour there is no one word 4 - The coloured thing, as object in nature, prior to its being seen, is qua visible, only a potentiality of coloration : in the act of vision it is the ivipyua of this. But as potentiality it exists and has its place in nature apart from any visual act Colour, as apprehended by the seeing eye, stands to the object while yet unseen as ivreKiyjua (or hipyeta) to owajus. The perception of colour is the realization of the faculty: the Xpw/xa as perceived is the realization of the Svn ZXiyoy opSat, rjj &' ovk opBat. * That is, Aristotle misses a word corresponding to Spaait as ■T}* none °f tnese i when seen in the dark, is a colour, properly as object so-called, visible. All these things possess in common the quality of smoothness (Xeto'njs) and have the natural property, therefore, of shining in the dark, yet without giving light. Among such phenomena Aristotle (knowing nothing of the properties of the optic nerve or retina) includes the flash seen within the eye when moved rapidly, or struck, when it is closed or in darkness. This flash is, he says, due to the ' smoothness ' of the pupil and its con- sequent power of shining in the dark. A quick movement, he thinks, makes the eye to duplicate itself, so to speak, and thus to become both observed and observer, when the latter, the percipient, sees the shining of the former, the object per-, ceived *. Fire, also, is an object of vision and visible even in darkness *. The fiery element which ordinarily stimulates the potential diaphanous to actuality (i.e. produces day- light), described shortly by Aristotle as of the same nature with the celestial bodies, is not identical with our ordinary fire 8 . It is probably (see p. 58, n. 1) identical with the 1 430* 17 Tpowox yap rira Kai ro £>s itoitl rh bvvapd Sura xpupara ivtpyda xpo>iiara : where vo us is, in t h e manner of Plato (Rep. 5 07 E seqq.), illustrated by ot. * Known to us as phosphorescent. They are ' fiery ' in their nature : «V tx3 oKorti iroift durOrjaiv, olov ra nvpuSi) (paiyafnna Kai Xu/xiroira. ' 419* 3, 437 b 6. ' 437' 3*- * 419* 23-5- * to avu o~a/ja irtpor nvpdt t< Kai aipot 34 ol> 6* VISION 6$ alOjjp, the (afterwards so-called) vinvrov otoix«w, or vipimt 7)o-i?, is yrj. In thus holding that black is the colour of water and white of fire Aristotle is quite orthodox : the same view was held by Anaxagoras and Empedocles. § 40. Reflexion (uvukAckxiv) is an important mode of the Reflexion production of colours, requiring separate treatment. The °,-^f/ „ y presupposition of reflexion is the straightness of the light-ray. proceeds in Aristotle predicates straightness of the ray proceeding to or UneTso all 1 We must, however, for Aristotle (i34 b 28) as also for Plato dis- tinguish under 'fire' three things: &vdpa£ (glow) kq\ rou nvpos. 'Ai}p dia- (jtaivofiivos XcimcoVijth jroui, 786* 6. But fiukurra . . . irCp 1; 4>\6£, oCnj 3" iar\ nairv&t Kiu6ittvoi, 33l b 25. The colour called nvpiitrjt is opposed to white : Acvxor aXX' ov mipa&qt, ' white, not fire-coloured,' is said of Ijkios, 341* 36. ' 6 atjp vpos toXXo iriip, 466* 24. * In the un-Aristotelean tract n# p\ Xpopantv fire is spoken of as light yellow, while all the other elements are named white. 66 THE FIVE SENSES other rays from the eye 1 , and assumes it of all other rays*. All ^^" ar ' phenomena of illumination, by fire or light, are explained reflected, by the reflexion of light — a matter of which the ancients seaiJater were very ignorant s . Reflexion is always and everywhere S ^ l ht S *h taking place. If it were not so we should not, as at struck by present, have universal illumination : we should have only Thenim- a ^ n g nt s P ot where the sun's rays fell unimpeded, while, bow ex- in the rest of the space before us, there would be total phenome^ darkness*. The smooth is the cause of reflexion (as it □on of is a ] so an essential cause or condition of whiteness), which reflexion , . , . of light, therefore regularly occurs in water and in air (if the latter has any consistency) 5 . If the water of the sea be struck, e. g. with an oar, at night, it appears to shine and sparkle. We cannot see this in the daytime, when the stronger light of the sun effaces it. This is a phenomenon of reflexion. The visual ray is reflected from the water upon some (smooth, and hence) bright surface • which returns it to the eye. In such a smooth element a continuous mirror can be formed whose elementary parts (particles of air, or water drops) are so small that only colour, or the gleam of light, but not the form of things, can be reflected in them. Thus the visual ray is reflected from the cloud to the sun. So the rainbow is seen 7 . That in all this Aristotle by ctyts 1 He was compelled, in spite of his own theory of vision, to employ the term tyis (which he found in vogue for visual-ray) in such a manner as to seem to commit himself to the view that the eye sees by rays issuing from a native fire within it For his optical mathematics, 373» 5-18, this does not matter: he corrects what he thinks wrong in it, when he deals with the subject of vision and with ctyir in its psychological sense. * Prantl, p. 118, 656* 29 r\ t' roO rjXiaptvov. 8 37,2 a 29 j) S^rts avanXarai Sxnrtp xal aaintav Xiiav: 372 b 1 5 yiWroi ij aVdicXaaif Trjr Sifrewt (rvvttrra^ivov rov aepos, ' 370* 17 (paiyirai yap to vdap OTiXjSfiv TVjrr6pivov uvarXapitirjs alt' airov rijc oyfrtac irpos ri rav XapirpSui. 7 373* 18 seqq. to viot dip' ov dvaxXdrat ij o^ir irpos tov qXiov' tit it VISION 67 means the ray of light per se, not as something belonging either to the object or to the eye exclusively, appears when he tells us that it makes no difference whether it is the object seen, or the visual agency that changes *. Every case of reflexion is conceived as a weakening, and to that extent a negation, of the action of the light-ray ; and hence it is reflexion that produces the black, which then, mingled with the light, produces colours 2 . To this weakening of the ray is ascribed the curious The phe- phenomenon of the Doppelgdnger s , as when a person sees °°^, e e non his own image reflected from the air in his vicinity. By this, Dopptl- too, is explained the halo that forms around lamp-burners fastfof* alight, the darkened appearance of clouds when seen J*"""?"- reflected in pools of water, &c. The mixture of the light source of with the darkness of the mirroring surface, as well as the c ^^ t M weakening of the ray by or in reflexion, is a cause of from the various gradations of colour. Colour effects in the "/h'l'u^', atmosphere, and especially halos and rainbows, are explained rainbow by Aristotle in accordance with these observations 4 - In re ,i,grccu, the three grades of weakening of the rays of light (or of ""'"• their mixture with the darker element of the mirror) con- sist the three colours of the rainbow, crimson (Qoivlkovv), leek-green (vpimvov), and violet (a\ovpyop). The iris that forms round lamps is to be explained on similar principles ; also the rainbow colours seen in a cloud of spray thrown up, e.g. by an oar 5 . It would not be relevant here to follow Aristotle into all the bearings in which he discusses this subject ; but he pursues it in its connexion with various kinds of matter organic and inorganic : the various classes votiv avvt\ri tA ivoirrpa, oXXa tta uiKp6rijra ktX. : 372' 33 seqq. riiv iv6nrpav it t'riott piv xa< rd n^ura tp/paivfrat, iv iriots ti ra xpapara pivovi 373 b 15 seqq. 1 374 b 22 &iai>. * For what follows cf. Arist. 439 b 18 seqq. * \mapx_fi hi finKkov koX rfrrov fv naat. 4 So Alex. Aphr. 'An-op. *. Awr. i. 2, p. 5 (Bruns). 8 Aristotle (like Plato) speaks of white as xp»/ii tuwpmKfo rijr S^nur, black as XP- avyxpiriKby rrjs S^€Ot: Met. IOS7 h 8 . . . oiok d tA Xcvkov Kai fiekav (Win, e T ^ 8* Xpaiia. CL also Top. 119* 30. VISION 69 ; § 42. Thus black and white are contraries within the Black and one genus or sensory province of colour. All sensory J^^k modalities involve contraries in this way 1 . From these the germs two contraries the other colours are to be explained 2 . conttaooM The transition from white to black is possible through 1"™'"°° continuous degrees of privation : that from white to black these is likewise possible by an ascending scale in the positive "he*"'*" direction. The various colours are species which fall various between the two contraries, and are generated of certain spe °" e 7 combinations of these 3 . It is an axiom with Aristotle that generated 1 • • °y c° m - notning acts on or is acted upon by any casual thing, binations of nor is anything generated by any other thing c asually ^^ aml (to tuxoi* iitb roO tv%6vtos). White is generated from what Three is not white, yet not from every not-white, but only from c ^^ either black, or the intermediate colours. Everything tions of the that is generated, and everything that is destroyed, passes intermedi- frotn its contrary or to its contrary t ox to the intervening ate co]oun - states. These intervening states again are generated from the contraries, as colours from the white and the black. In the province of colour, if we are to pass from white to black, we must come first to crimson (ucow ) and grey (v air6tf>axpa i) rais rotavrats xpoi«ir ovSev ivavriav itoiois olai. One may ask : if iurriat6v) is sometimes spoken Remarks Of by Aristotle as if it stood mid-scale between black and ™£ e a i„ white: but 1 it is also referred to as relatively a kind of black, colours: Golden-yellow also is represented as falling under white 8 , |^d'en- to which it is allied as the succulent (rd kiitapov) is to the y£>'™> sweet (rd ykvici) in the sphere of taste. Red is the colour gre^," 1 * "* produced by light streaming through black, as when the JJufci'ent sun shines through smoke or through a fog 3 . Purple account of (itopQvpow) is distinguished from crimson ((powwow) by production its having more of the dark ingredient. Sometimes the fi™e n > n light of a lamp shows not white but purple, the ray that ^ T m>. is sent from it being feeble, and being reflected from H " e ° ° colours are a dark colour. This increasing weakness of the ray brings generated them is added golden-yellow (£av66v). The white and the golden- yellow are colours of the elementary kinds of matter. Fire is golden- yellow: air and (contrary to Aristotle's view) earth and water are white ; black is partly bare negation, and partly a positive colour produced in the process by which (e. g. by burning) the elements are transformed into one another. An account is given of the methods of mixture, whether of these primary colours or of those which are derived from them, to explain the multitude of existing colours. These; are said to be the effects of: (i) the quantitative preponderance of light or shade in the ingredients, (2) the strength of the ingredients, (3) the pro- portionality of the ingredients, (4) the brilliancy of the mixed colours, (5) the friction and mechanical force employed, (6) burning, dissolving, melting processes, (7) smoothness and shadows (? : the text is doubtful), (8) combination with external light or reflexion of other colours, and especially in connexion with the influence of the medium in which it takes place. The colours of plants, hair, feathers, &c, are discussed. The two modes of producing colour rejected in de Sens. iii. q iraph aWtjka Biais and 13 iirmoKaaw, are accepted here and made to play an important part Light is seemingly conceived as corporeal, in direct contravention of Aristotle's teaching in the de Aninia. The tract assumes a mixture of the colours with the rays of light : so the distinctive colours of feathers are produced. Colours are said to change their appearance according as they are ' mixed with the sun's radiance or only with shadows.' Prantl finds an incongruity between the two views of black colour, in one (79i b 3) of which it is regarded as (u-mSrot) mere impiprir of light, while in the other (79t b 17) it is (lifKnv xt-'ufia) a positive colour, produced, for example, by burning. Zeller, however, thinks the inconsistency only apparent. Vide Zeller, Arist. ii. 490, E. Tr. ; Prantl, n«p« Xpu/i., pp. 167 seqq. and pp. 107-9. ' ' 442 s 22. * Ibid. 1 342 b 4 seqq., 374' 3» b I°i 44o» 10. 76 THE FIVE SENSES from us from purple to leek-green and violet, successively. The bia3f«Qd stronger ray yields crimson against the dark ground the-e from ^ or when mixed witn dark) ; the next in strength gives the colours leck-green ; the weakest, violet. In the tract lltpl X/»a>|udVa>i/, elements. °P < P mw ls mentioned as containing even a greater proportion The phe- of black than violet has. From the seven colours described /«?#« ° aDove a H tne others (according to the doctrine of Aristotle) after- are generated by mixing '. In the tltpl Xpaitidratv, however, (cnpUmcn- though these colours play their part, they are secondary to '<"7 _ the colours of the elements 2 . Visual impressions, primary ror.trasi. positive after-images, continue in the eye after it has ceased this^atter ^ TOm l°°king at the object. If we gaze long and steadily illustrated, at a bright object, that to which we transfer our gaze at first appears of the colour of the former object. If when we have looked steadily at the sun, or some other bright object, we close the eyes and look as it were straightforward (with the eyes closed) in the same line of vision, at first we see the object of the same colour as before : this alters soon to crimson ; the latter changes to purple ; till at last the colour becomes black, and vanishes 3 . In this place Aris- totle notices what are called complementary colour effects, though his account of them is not exact. The golden- yellow of the rainbow is explained by him as a subjective effect of contrast*. The space between the ^oivticoSv and the Ttpiurivov in the rainbow often shows £av06v. This is due to their being next to one another. For tpomtKovv beside -npimvov appears white. As a proof of this we may observe that the rainbow which appears in the blackest cloud has the purest colour tints (p.d\ia-ra &Kparos), and there too it happens that the oiiwcoBi/ and the wpdvtvov. The (/>oiw(coCv in such a cloud appears white as contrasted with the surrounding black ; and also when (as the rainbow is fading) the tpoivtKovv is being dissolved it shows white. A further confirmation of this effect of contrast is 1 442' 25 Ta 8" a\\a fuiicra tic TOimw. 1 Cf. 792* 4 seqq. ' 439 b 5 se qq- 4 375* 7 seqq. Not, as Prantl (ITtpi Xpap., p. 156) says, as a com- flementary colour* VISION 77 that the !ris around the moon appears very white; which is owing to the twofold fact that the colours are in a cloud (which is dark) and seen besides at night 1 . Further effects of contrast are seen by placing white wool side by side with black : and also in the way in which (as embroiderers say) lamplight causes illusions as to colour, owing to the peculiar nature of the illumination shed by it upon the objects 2 . § 45» Aristotle decisively rejects 3 the definition ofArUtotle colour given by Empcdoclcs * and followed by Gorgias, as ^^ apparently by Plato also in the Menon (and, with modifica- theory of tions, in the Titnaeus), viz. that colour is an 'emanation from cur ions re- the object of vision symmetrical with, and therefore semblance perceptible by, the organ of vision.' Since those philoso- this pliers, who hold this theory of visual perception by aitoppoai, ^"^j in any case reduce the perception of colour to a mode the New- of contact between the organ and the object (of which ^v"™,,, a particle thus comes to, and touches, the eye), it would theory of 11 i ...... . , l'g h '- He have been better if they had assumed such contact to cannothave take place through a medium, rather than by aitoppoai hel ^ f" 1 travelling from object to organ. For all the sensory theory, for functions indirectly are, or involve, a mode of contact s , s ^^ ts ' but all except the organ of touch itself 6 operate through Empedo- a medium 7 . In rejecting this view of colour, and the ii g h t does theory of inoppoai on which it was based 8 , Aristotle not travtl - rejected as if by anticipation the Newtonian emission theory of light. There seems at first sight to have been before his mind a glimmering of the now accepted undulation theory; but this impression cannot be sustained when we find him, against Empedocles, vigorously denying that light travels 9 (cf. p. 59, n. 1 supra). 1 375* 19- ' * 375* 22 seqq.; Prantl, Ilepl Xpap., 157-8. 8 440» 15-20. * Cf. Karsten, Emped., p. 488. 5 435* '8 xai'roi ra SKKa aiVflijTijpia i(f>jj alaBavtTM, aWa it iripov. • For the questionableness even of this exception cf. tie An. ii. 11. 422 b 22 scqq. 7 For the emanation theory of colours cf. further Lucretius, iv. 72-86 with Giussani's notes. • So Baumker, Des Arisloteles Lehre von den aussern und innern Sinnesvennbgen, p. 40. • In 4i8 b 16 he maintains that light is a irapowi'd, or that, 78 THE FIVE SENSES Necessity § 46. The diaphanous (described §§ 34-5 supra) Is the medium of objective medium of vision. As in the cases of smelling vision : and hearing, so in that of seeing, there is an extraorganic actualized medium, intervening between the organ and the object 1 , diapka- Without such medium the object could not produce its ncus. De- mociitns characteristic effect upon the organ, or the latter be excited thSku) 111 fr° m lts potentiality to its realization as an organ. Thus that we if the coloured object be placed directly and immediately J^ 1 -J^ on the surface of the eye it cannot be seen 2 . In order, vacuum, therefore, to be affected at all by the colour, the eye requires water, as a medium. This medium is light, or the actualized v ? n pf s ° t diap/ianous. The object must excite a movement (not, cons, both however, a local movement) in the diaphanous medium, colour' 6 whether air or water (for either of these may be media vision. of vision), and this movement must communicate itself Internal somehow to the eye. This medium being absolutely medium— required if we are to see at all, it was a mistake for diaphanous . . , . within the Democntus to think that if there were a vacuum (neither opa, which involves local movement, but an dXXoiWir or qualitative change, which he thinks can take place simultaneously in all parts of the diaphanous medium. 1 438 b 3 aXV c'Tc 4>tc aqp tori to purafcv rov ipapivov Ka\ rou ofi/iaros, ij Sia roirao tdvijarit (arm 17 troioiiaa to 6pav. 1 419' 12 iav yap tk fig to fX " XP"/* a **"'* bvt'I* tT)» tyu> ovk ctyrcrai. s 419 s 15 opatrfiai av axpiftas Ka\ (1 pvpprj^ tvTia ovpava «"ij. 4 Only for the medium of vision has Aristotle a distinctive name — t6 iuHpairtt. He does not name the media of sound and odour, though media are equally necessary for those senses. By later writers they were called (on the analogy of to tuupavis) to dtijy/r and to bioapov respectively. It is remarkable that Aristotle {de Sens. vi. 446* 20- b 27) is quite ready to admit respecting these media, what he denies so stoutly of to Sunpavfs, that in them the stimulus of sense travels locally and takes time to come from object to organ. VISION 79 the stimulation (xfoipm) produced by colour is conveyed through them to the organ Of vision, which is thus on its part stimulated to activity. The medium of colour is the same as that of light, sc. the btaav4s. This belongs to both water and air, not qua water or air, but qua partaking in common of the nature of the celestial element, or aldjjp 1 . Fire and this afaijp, or rd &vu> ii r] Kara tuv \6yov . . . fjf airo\«ijrowri)f ovx caTiv ZipBakphf jtXijv opaviitof, KtiBdntp 6 \Wtvos. 1 For the question whether or how far the sensations realize them- selves in the separate organs without stimulating the faculty of central sense, see the chapter on the Sensus Communis, § 48. 80 THE FIVE SENSES objectively or externally, is also employed on the subjective side within the eye itself, for the purpose of transmitting inwards the Kivtjo-eis received by this organ from without. The eye as a living functioning whole * is named 60akn6s and sometimes ojufxa. It is an organ, consisting of hetero- geneous parts 2 . But the part of this whole which is properly concerned in vision — that <5 /3\«m — is the part generally named % ko'/mj, which we usually render the pupil {vide supra § a, p. 9 n.), but by which, at least from the time of Empedocles forward, the Greek psychologists meant the ' crystalline lens.' Round this internal moist part called r\ Kopt\ comes what Aristotle calls to n&av, probably the iris \ and outside of this again is the white 3 . The pupil and vision are to the eye what body and soul respectively are in the economy of the (Sov as a whole *. The ko'/)jj is the material part most intimately concerned in seeing. There- fore, for its protection, it is covered with a membrane so thin and clear as not to obstruct vision, and has in higher animals a further protection afforded by the eyelids. The need of this precautionary protection arises from the humid constitution of this visual part 5 . There are creatures whose eyes are even better protected, viz. by scales 8 , but these suffer for it in having less acute vision T . The primary organ of touching, in relation to the flesh as medium, is compared with the pupil (as the primary organ of vision) in relation to the whole diaphanous 8 - If the external medium of vision were organically attached to the pupil, both would form one whole, comparable to that formed of the organ of touch proper and the organically connected environment of flesh which is its medium. 1 413* 2 seqq. ij Kopi; Km t) S^fnt. 1 fiopiov avofioio/x'pts. Cf. 647* 4 seqq. For its anatomical structure according to Aristotle, see Philippson, BXij avdpum'un), pp. 230 seqq. s 49 I b 20 ro i' ivrbs tov 6(j>0a\pov tA piv vypbv if /3Xc'irci, (topi/, tA bi ttcp\ tovto, pekav, tA 8' tirros tovtov, \t\)Kov. 4 Cf. 413* 2 : add 108* ll u; o ■ * aydxXacris, which sometimes means refraction, e.g. 373 b 10 seqq. * 438* 9, 370* 16 oJto« niv oiv oSiro ovvfjBtis f/iruv Tait irtpi Tijs d>>a(eXa- trcur Scffatr. For Aristotle's account of it and its relationship to vision and colour see § 40 supra. * Democritus (as we have said) would have replied that the soul which sees belongs to the whole organism, not to the eye alone. VISION 83 to the eye's being of fire, the question at once arises why one sees this fire only when the eye is suddenly and rapidly moved. Again, why does not the eye always see itself, as it does in such a case ? It is impossible to reply that it does so, indeed, but that we are not aware of it ; for we could not be unaware of it if it were true. If a person in full consciousness sees, he must be aware that he sees. To put this phenomenon of the fire-flash in its true aspect, • we need only observe that the surface of the pupil, like many other smooth objects, naturally shines in darkness, without, however, giving light. The phenomenon is one of reflexion (&van\a) 2 ', but neither one nor the other of these night, as (sc. Tivp avOpcLKubts and \6£ ) exists as an element in light. ^)° fl j" e : Should it be said that they do exist in it, but in quantities and 'glow' so small as to be imperceptible, the answer is : if this were tingoUhed" true, light should on the above grounds be sometimes a ' aI1 » and extinguished by day, e. g. in wet weather, or in water, and are not in very cold weather there should regularly be darkness by ff™£u* day, as under such circumstances ignited bodies and flame Vision not 1 ixfivos airrit ahrbv 6pq 6 o*s. Vide supra pp. 53, 65 n. 1. Only the two first could be ' quenched.' G a 84 THE FIVE SENSES due to a are extinguished. No such thing happens to light, however, mg forth 7 * under these circumstances. Further, to say with Plato that from the the eye sees by means of light issuing forth from it " ; that or to the this light either extends and prolongs itself as far as the Therefe n stars > as Empedocles would seem to say'; or that (as Plato aiiupvait, held) when it has reached a certain point outside it PUto^eld organically - coalesces with {ovpfyfaaOaC) the light coming of light from the objects seen — this is all idle talk. If there were to have been such coalescence of internal with external light, it were better that it should take place, to begin with, inside the eye itself. Yet even this is but a vain notion. For what is, or could be, meant by the 'organic coalescence 3 ' of light with light ? Such * organic coalescence ' does not take place between any random things, but according to fixed laws. And how could it happen when, as in the case before us, a membrane, covering the pupil, intervenes between the outer and the inner light ? Hence this popular notion that the visual part of the eye is of fire must be abandoned. False in itself, it has been adopted on mistaken grounds, and can be maintained only by fallacious reasoning. why the § 5 1 * To resume: the pupil consists of water, because eye consists water as diaphanous 4 is homogeneous with the external of water in 1 Aristotle himself uses Styis in the Meteorologica va. such a way as to make one think at first sight that he held the theory here condemned. See Bonitz, Index Art's/. s$3 b 30 ; Ideler, Art's/. Me/eor. i. 6. 3, p. 384 ' Hoc igitur loco Aristoteles videtur lumen ex ipso oculo emittere ut hac ratione singulae res visibiles fiant, quod etiam magis patet ex lis quae sequuntur : ov Siivcurdm rqv oy^iv ri» avdpimav (pfpurdai k\iu/i«vi)i> wpor top iJXiom. Sententiam hanc ab Empedocle et Platonc propositam ipse Aristoteles improbavit, de Sens, e/ sensili c. 2. 437 b (cf. Theophr. de Sens. § 7 seqq.) longeque aliam proposuit (de An. ii. 7. 41 8 b ).' Ideler rightly (cf. 374 b 22, 781* 3), however, holds that Aristotle is there, for his special purpose (i.e. elucidation of certain ' optical ' facts), adopting the current view of ctyir, which served his turn quite as well as his own view would, while avoiding unnecessary or irrelevant matter of dispute. * See, however, § 7 supra, p. 18. 5 avpfyvtoBai : the Greek word involves associations which are not contained in the English ' coalescence,' but which are vital for Aris- totle's argument. * turtp n't irvpbt Tt)P Sifrti) Btrtoy, dXX' j/Saror iraatv, 779 b 19; 780* 4 t] tovtov rov fwplov KitHjcrts opaais, g Stat rou o<\>6akiiov t& fiiv vypoV, j3A«V«i, «h$/>ij. It does not refer to the organ of sensus communis or imply that each organ — here the eye — is not per se capable of having the sensations which belong to it, or even that each special organ involves in its action the immediate or concurrent co-operation of the central organ. 86 THE FIVE SENSES should be conveyed to it through some medium. That light is really conveyed inwards in this way is proved by the accidental experience of those who have received a slash with a sword across the temple, severing 'the passages of the eye 1 .' Such persons have experienced a brilliant illumination, immediately followed by total darkness, as if a lamp had suddenly flared up within them, and then, all at once, gone out. What really takes place in such cases is, that the diaphanous medium, the ' pupil,' which is a sort of lamp, is suddenly cut away. The water on which depends the continuation inwards of the outer diaphanous medium is, for Aristotle, secreted to the eye from the brain. The eye, like the organ of smelling, is formed by an off-growth from the brain a . For the brain is the moistest and coldest of all parts in the organism. From this some of the purest of its moisture is conducted through the 'pores' which connect the eye with the membrane surrounding the brain 3 . Hence it is fitting that the organ of sight, being like the brain moist and cold, should have its seat near the brain. The eye in its embryonic stage is, like the brain, over-moist and owr-large; and again in its later development it, like the brain, gains in consistency, while it is reduced in size. Vision— § 52. Vision is effected, according to Aristotle, by of a process a P r °cess from object to eye, not conversely *. Seeing is from object not the result of a mathematical or other abstract relation "hnugk between object and eye, such as the relation of equal to 1 43& b 14 Sum cxr/iij^rai roiis n6povt rov S/i/ioror. Aristotle here speaks of v6pai : what were they ? Some think of the optic nerves, which are said to have been first known to Alcmaeon by dissections. Even if Aristotle did mean these by what he here calls rcipoi, we still must not imagine that he understood their function as nerves. Such knowledge did not come till after his time. Cf. Dr. Ogle's note to his translation of Arist. de Part. An. ii. io, pp. 176-7: 'On the whole I think it is most probable that by iropoi in this place (sc. de Part. An.) Aristotle means no more than openings or foramina ' ; but he goes on to add that, in our passage de Sens, ii and in de Gen. An. ii. 6, by iropoi are meant the optic nerves as anatomical phenomena. * 438" 28. * 744" 9 seqq. * opujitv tlo&txiiuvoi ri, ovk ('mrc/in-ovm, I05 b 6. VISION 87 equal. If it were so, the distance, for example, of the* medium, object should make no difference to vision, any more than ™£ jj 1 *" • it does to the equality of one equal to another 1 . The object to process from without is not, however, a conveyance of physical, ii-Koppoat, but a K&Tjo-is— more precisely an iWolaxrit — in n ? t t m " ely the diaphanous medium between the object and the eye. e. g. mathe- As to the nature of the Ktvrjo-is, as a fact of physics, modern "j 1 ^^ science has far outrun the simple and vague notions of Aris- But the totle. It is now known how light travels and is reflected : process is how rays from an object, directed through the refractive not one ot ■ • emana- apparatus of the eye, produce, an image on the retina, tion, bnt which, since Descartes'* time, has been recognized as°J a . kind ' *> ° of myijait. the cardinal objective fact for the explanation of vision. Thus the physics and the physiology of vision have been really harmonized, to some extent, as Aristotle tried but failed to harmonize them. But as to the nature of the further (cfojjo-ts which connects the retinal image with the sensorium, or the magic change by which the retinal image in B's eye (as it appears to A) becomes a field of vision (as it is for B) ; how that which, externally regarded, is but a tiny picture is translated into a fact of consciousness, no more is known now than was known in Aristotle's days. §53. Biologically, the sense of touch is more important Compara- than that of sight: it is the most fundamental of all the t " t ^ at% senses. It is the essential criterion of animal existence, senses. It sentinels and defends the seat of life, and without it tas te animals would perish. Next to touch stands taste in point l > l <> lo gi«'tty of vital importance: indeed it is according to Aristotle necessary a mode of touch. The other senses — smelling, hearing, and JheTther 52 seeing — are not only biologically useful, and conduce to the senses preservation of the animal's existence ; but they also con- f e "hei7 tribute to its well-being on an implied higher level o{weli-tein^. « • 1 1 • 1 ,■/• Connexion development a . Creatures which, besides life, have sense- between locomotive 1 De Sens. vi. 446 b 10 seqq. * See the Fifth Discourse of his Dioptrique. 8 De An. iii. 12. 434 b 11 seqq. ; de Part. An, ii. 10. 656* 6 seqq. oaav fiq fiopuv toC (qv aXKa Ka\ rod «v (ijy i) crit pmtKi)(fti' roioCro 8' «o-ri rb rov avSpuirav yivot' q yap p6vov pnrix*i rou dtlov ray riyXy yvwpipur (ifton, t) paKurra it&vruv. Cf. also Top. iii. 2. Il8 a 7 seqq. 88 THE FIVE SENSES power and perception possess a form of existence which is richer in sense-per- variety and more highly endowed in different degrees, ception m Qn the possession of locomotive power seems to rest the animals. r r Bothdeve- need or chief usefulness of the externally 1 mediated possums™ senses — hearing, seeing, and smelling. Accordingly the the animal internal principle or seat of locomotion and that of sense Hence the hi general are for Aristotle the same — the heart, in sangui- pnmaiy ne ous animals, and in non-sanguineous the ' part analogous.' sense- As the locomotive faculty is developed and its powers antUhe 011 differentiated, corresponding development seems to occur primary in the faculty of sensation. It is to animals which possess locomotion locomotive power that seeing, hearing, and smelling are are identi- particularly important, enabling them to take timely precau- animali tions against danger, and to perceive their prey in advance. 9^', But of all the senses which perceive through external mediated media, seeing is of highest biological as well as psycho- !fjhHJ» s logical importance. In the latter aspect, i. e. in its bearing highest upon the development of knowledge and experience, the value. It superiority of this sense is most striking. Even apart from u m its jts practical uses the exercise of the senses is desired by direct con- seqoences us for its own sake, that of the sense of seeing, however, hiSiest more than all the rest. For this most of all leads to valne knowledge, disclosing to us multitudinous qualities of fcicaiiy. things, and showing us their natures 2 . Its superiority to In indirect hearing is intrinsic and indisputable, as a vehicle of first- consc- qaences, hand intelligence. Yet hearing may incidentally have however, more e ff e ct in education. Hearing is that which makes heating ° is more learning possible ' ; and it is through learning that general psycho^ truths are chiefly reached, while seeing gives us the par- logically', ticulars whence they are derived. Thanks to the fact that hearing all bodies are coloured, all are visible ; and it is chiefly by depend jjje sense of seeing that we perceive the common sensibles by orai figure, magnitude, motion, number. Animals that can a?d I the d ° n remember distinct visible qualities of things store up the nse of knowledge thus derived, and from the storehouse of memory language. 1 All are mediated, not all externally mediated. • Met. i. 98o»2i- b 26. ■ . ■ * ru pavOavav : the Greek pupil was an dx/ioarip. VISION 89 experience la elaborated; from this and by this again comes scientific knowledge, which arises as the details of experi- ence become organized under general conceptions 1 . The matchless clearness and distinctness of visual impressions, to which all perceptions of form are primarily due 2 , renders these peculiarly suitable not only for being remembered but also for being arranged, i.e. grouped and classified, under such conceptions. Nevertheless, owing to the part played in mental development by teaching and learning, hearing, on which the use of language depends, has in some ways the advantage over seeing. Thus it is found that persons who are congenitally blind are intellectually better developed than those who are congenitally deaf (436" 15). § 54. The evidential value of sight 3 is in certain cases The superior to that of touch, and corrects the illusions of the evidential latter sense. For example, if two fingers of the hand are v » I . ues of crossed, and a small object placed between them so as touching. to be in contact with both, it will to the sense of touch X* 16 ?*" 11 ? 1 illusion of appear as if two objects. The sense of sight proves that it the crossed is only one. The sense of sight is also superior to touch in „|q^ by purity ; hence the pleasures of seeing are morally higher the sense than those of touching*. Possession of sight is ' more Ethical" choiceworthy ' than that of the olfactory sense s . Sight superiority being our most ' evidential sense (ti'apyto-ranj) its results to touch, as affecting our feelings — exciting passions and emotions — Sl ?^ t are proportionately vivid 6 . Passions or emotions arti- movements ficially stimulated through this sense approach nearest to ^d P deter- the impressiveness of reality. The ideas of danger which mines our it conveys inspire fear with an immediacy and force not to direction. be equalled by those of the other senses 7 . Sight, too, is of illusions of * 981* 5 drov «'* iroWov rrjs i/iimpias cwoij/iaruv /ii'a itadokov yivijTtu iztpX ruv ifiolav v7r(S\Tj\|/ir. * Top. ii. 7. 1 13* 31. * Cf. 46o b 20,956* 36, 1011* 33. Heraclitus (apud Polyb. xii. 27, Fr. XV, Bywater) says o(pBa^fiol ran urwv dic0ij3c'<7TffMH fiaprrvpir, an opinion founded on the theory that the eyes contain more fire. * N.E. x. 5. 1176" 1. * Rhet. i. 7. 1364" 38. ' Probl. 886 b 10-37. T Cf. Horace, Ars Poet. 180-1 : Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem, ■ Quam quae sunt oculis subiecta fidelibus.' 9Q THE FIVE SENSES right, not primary importance as directing our movements in space 1 . proper * l * s by this sense that the notions of ' before* and ' behind ' aioflijTi. are determined. Moving ' forward ' means moving in the but as to ° , objective direction in which the eyes naturally look. ' Even crabs ^"Ihe which move sidewards may be said in a way to move distances of forward, since they move in the direction in which their Sieves naturally look.' \\ ud \\ ^ et ^' s sense > to °' ,s subject to illusions, as is every the sun as individual sense taken by itself when it refers its immediate foo^in datum to an object 2 . Thus regarding the fact that the diameter, colour seen is white, the sense of seeing is almost incapable touch ot °f error : hut as regards the distance at which the white, regarding referred to an object, is from us, or as regards the object •Common to which it is referred, error is frequent. So, too, with Senables* re gard to the magnitude of objects. Thus the sun's disk Such are appears almost invincibly as if it were but a foot wide. ^™ of This impression is not due to any pathological state, nor is inference it the result of scientific ignorance on our part 3 . In the seij^f best of health and with sound knowledge of the facts, this perception. ; s the momentary impression given us by sight as we look knew at the sun 4 ; and thus it is that we are liable to err as nothing of re p-ards each and all of the 'common sensibles.' Such errors, colour- ° blindness, however, as well as those committed in attributing the immediate data of sight to wrong objects, are not really errors of vision: they are errors of judgment. Surreptitious judgments tend to become inextricably mixed up with the immediate impressions of seeing as of other senses. Of errors arising from colour-blindness, or of this phenomenon itself, Aristotle seems to have had no notion. y^"? 1 , & <;<;. A remarkable case of illusion is referred to in the illusion (or ■ * JJ 1 De Incess. An. 7'2 b 18. 1 Sxnrep to opav (fir!) rou liiov aKrjfftg, tl 6' SvBponot to Xkoi> ij jiij, ovu SkrjBit aii, 430 b 29 (we must either read so, inserting «ri or irtpi before rov ISiov, or at least make the gen. one of ' respect.' It goes with the predicate. ' The seeing of the particular quality ' is an ungrammatical translation) : cf. 428 b 18, 442 b 8. * Galen observes the omission on Aristotle's part to determine any- where the manner by which we perceive the position, magnitude, and distance of objects. Cf. Galen, de Placit. Hipp, et Plat. § 638. * 4S8 b 28. Vision 91 ' Meteor ologica \ « Owing to the feebleness of the visual ray hailBcin»- (fyts) it is often refracted by the air even when not condensed ^p ,^. in the way described. Such was the case in the strange The two experience of a certain person whose sight was weak at^j^™ the time, and to whom, as he walked, it appeared as if the same his own image always preceded him, and kept looking back if one towards him 8 . This illusion was due to the visual raygJJJ^ being bent back from the air around him which (just as by the distant, or thick, air often does) became like a mirror, so s^bj^cts that the ray could not displace or penetrates it, and hence doubled. was compelled to return to the eye s . So capes at sea persons sometimes seem raised above the water, and heavenly wnte m ", bodies loom larger when near the horizon.' In the hand. Problems*— an un-Aristotelean work— many curious but ^!° x l ca ! ed * persons see trifling remarks occur on this and similar subjects. The objects most important concern (a) the difficulty, or impossibility, ^piana'. " of moving one eye voluntarily without at the same time t}° nofln "- moving the other in the same way ; (6) the fact that one discerns object appears as two to a person who by inserting the stral R ht - finger beneath the eyeball displaces it 6 ; (c) that myopic line better persons write in very small characters ; (d) that objects ^ ^ e appear multiplied to persons in a state of intoxication or /"HP and mental distraction 6 ; (e) that straightness in a line is better wptaeirTit. discerned with one eye than with two, which is explained by reference to the necessary convergence of rays from both eyes when both are used ; (/) that 6 fivu\jr brings Objects near in order to see them, while 6 w/>f 2_I0 - * This (as already remarked, p. 67) reminds one of the ' Doppel- ganger,' or the ' Brocken-'spectre.' 3 What is very remarkable here is the seemingly frank acceptance by Aristotle of a theory of vision warmly repudiated by him in de Sens. ii. We must assume that he in such cases expresses himself from the popular point of view. So we have to speak of the sun 'rising' and ' setting.' * 957* 38 seqq. * Also referred to de Insom. 46i b 30; Met. x. 6. 1063' 6-10. * This phenomenon is explained by comparison with the illusion of the crossed fingers representing one object as two. The Wvijmc does not come from each eye to the same part of the soul, which accordingly sees twice. The 'different parts of the soul' thus represent what we might think of as non-identical parts of the retinae. 9* THE FIVE SENSES them at a distance. In the tract on Dreaming illusions of sight are mentioned which, however, are, it is stated, really errors of judgment for which the sight per se is not to blame. Such are hallucinations, and the illusion of those on ship-board to whom the shore, not the ship, seems to be in motion. Aristotle says also * that defects of long and short sight are due not to anything wrong with the soul, but to defects in the visual organ itself. If an old man could have a young man's eye he would see as well as the young man. The sensory weakness of old age is caused not by an affection of the soul itself, but by an affection of that wherein the soul resides ; as happens in cases of intoxication and illness. 1 4o8 b 21. THE ANCIENT GREEK PSYCHOLOGY OF HEARING Alcmaton of Crotona. § I. * We hear with the ears, says Alcmaeon, because they Function have vacuum in them ; for this (vacuum) is resonant. The "hmnng. sonant object produces sound in the cavity (of the outer Air within \ i .1 . / r > . . » , / the ear, thr ear), and the air (of the intra-tympanic ear) re-echoes (tor ac torof this sound) 1 .' The effect of the external sonant object v ea !u? g : is first conveyed to the hollow chamber of the outer, i. e. external the extra-tympanic, ear, from which the mvov, or air of the ""{Je,^ intra-tympanic ear, takes it up and reverberates it to the to the ' point of sense,' which for Alcmaeon was the brain, or in the brain 2 . § 2. 'Alcmaeon says that we hear by means of the vacuum The «»«;» within the ear, for this it is that transmits inwards the u,p for sounds (which come from without) at every immission D f Alcmaeon ' the soniferous air-waves (into the outer ear). For all vacua are resonant V I have chosen here the text of Pseudo- Plutarchus, which gives *<»><£, instead of that of Stobaeus, 1 Cf. Wachtler, Alcmaeon, p. 40 ; Diels, Dox. 506. 23 ; Theophr. dt Sens. 25 axoinv piv otv (jt]0(yy(tr8ia Ac ru koiXoi, tov aipa o" avn)\t'a>. * Diels proposes two different corrections — toCto yip hx*' 1 * W&V" yiaBai) 81a to koiKov, and ruvro yap i;^oui> tyBlyyiaOai tia to koiXok. Neither is necessary. The subject of tpOtyytaSat should be taken quite generally, as if = t6 ^o^oCh. Diels renders our text— 'sonura autem edere (sc. ro kiv6v) cavo, h. e. propter cavernam auris interioris.' But if kmhSv here = 6 ii\p, as would seem from Arist. 4i9 b 33, the form of the sentence forbids us to regard it as subject to tpBiyytaBau Nor can ™ koi'Ao) be the hollow of the intra-tympanic ear ; it is rather the external meatus, with the apparatus in general by which the vibrations of the outer air are caught and conducted inwards to the tympanum. Philipp- son (CXrj ivBpunrivn, p- 107) saw this when he (unnecessarily however) proposed leox^V f° r wiXy here. ' Diels, Dox. 4o6 b 21, Act. Plac. iv. 16. 2 'AXx/iatW unowv i\pat r» ntvif T(i fvrus tov writ' Toiiro yap thai ro Jiij^oCy kutq rijv tou td* v/ioto? (iV^oXq** iraJTO yap to una fori. 94 THE FIVE SENSES which gives icotXa, agreeing in every other respect. As Wachtler says, the Kcvtfv and the a^p are here equivalent terms. He quotes most appositely Arist. de An. ii. 8. 41 9 b 33 rd t\ Ktvbv dpO&s \eytrai Kvpiov rov &kov(W boKti yap etvat kcvov 6 ar\p. But here the arjp in the koTXov or outer part of the ear must be distinguished from the arip or Kevov of the inner part. The former receives and intro- duces the sonant stimulus from the atmosphere ; the latter catches it up and transfers it to the brain. The trans- ference is referred to in Theophrastus by avrr)x f w> ' n tne passage from Aetius by 8it)x°w (with the use of which compare rd bloap-ov, rd buxpavts, and, especially, rb owjx& — late terms used to signify the respective media of odour, colour, and sound). The simple r)\ilv ' n Dotn passages denotes the action of the air within the ear — as of confined air generally — in taking up, or ' echoing,' sound, apart from the notion of transmitting it. No better commentary on these extracts can be found than that contained in Arist. de An. ii. 8. 4i9 b 33-420" 19. Cf. infra § so. Aicmaeon § 3. Alcmaeon was, says Wachtler, the first who represents attempted to explain the phenomenon of sound and our tioaofthe perception of it by reference to the structure of the ear teJf. itself, and the manner in which this was affected by air mining j n motion from without. Empedocles to some extent c^not a e follows or agrees with him. Their successors generally mcre . regard the ear as little more than a conductor of air to the sensorium, most of them holding sound, as a perception, to result from a percussion of the brain or other inward organ by the air thus conveyed through the ear 1 . 1 In the passage from Aetius itvevpa cannot mean ' breath,* yet it is scarcely identical with ifo. It appears to signify the latter set in motion by the external sonant object, and entering, with its sound- waves, into the external ear. Cf. Pseudo-Hippoc. deflat. 3 (vi. 94 l) irvtvpa Si to pen e'v Toitri o~/iao~i vtra jcaXcfrai, ro Si c£a> r&v aa/iurmi' ajjp, from which it appears that nvtipa was treated as the general term for air by some writers. Cf. the use of vrov irveiipa in Aristotle. In connexion with the meaning of irvtvpa here one may perhaps quote a curious observation of Aristotle, Hist. An. i. 11. 492* 13, respecting Alcmaeon: K«j>a\ijc popiov, Si ov axoiei, Sirvow, to ovf 'AAk/um'uv yap oiiK a\t)6ij Xt'yfi, (pupivot avcatvtlv ruf alyas Kara ra Zira. HEARING 95 Empedocles. § 4. ' Empedocles teaches that hearing is caused by the Function impact of the air-wave against the cartilage which is" 1 ^ 1 ^. suspended within the ear, oscillating as it is struck, like the gong a gong 1 .' For xpvlpubfi Sitfp (Plut.) Stobaeus has x '^/ 3 ?/"/) within ovittp. A variant is KoxXtdba, for which Pseudo-Galenus, ^. e h ear '.. Hist. Phil, (referred to by K,arsten, p. 483), gives Ko\\i. y.\v (sc. the intra-tympanic part) &v<&vvp.ov, rb 5* (sc. the 'concha') \oj3os' o\oj» 5* (K \6vbpov k wrl (i. e. the bony part farthest in resembles the external ear in form) th o m aKorjv ylvtadai Kara irpopmoaw irvtv- utiTOC T<5 \oii6paifi, Strip ifapTijoBai firoc toy urac Kuuuyos Sliqv alupobptvmi xal rimTo/Mvoy. 96 THE FIVE SENSES that the gloss koxXiojoci would seem to be derived. How far Empedocles attempted (like Aristotle) to distinguish between inner and outer ear is" not plain ; yet everything depends on our knowing this if we are to understand him. It is probable, however, that by the \6vipos he meant some structure which he found by dissecting the internal ear. Neither he nor yet Aristotle seems to have had any accurate knowledge of the 'ossicles' — the malleus, incus, and stapes — in the tympanic cavity, bridging the way from the tympanic membrane to the fenestra ovalis, and trans- mitting vibrations from the one to the other. This being so, the use of the word alupovixevov here is the more curious. 'Empedocles says that hearing results from the sounds coming from without, whenever the air, being set in motion by the voice, rings within (the ear). For the organ of hearing, which he terms " the fleshy" bone," is a sort of gong which rings internally. The air, when it is set moving, beats against the solid parts, and thus causes the ringing sound V The ' solid parts ' are the same as the ' gong '. We notice that &kotJ is used in two senses here ; first of the hearing, secondly of the organ of hearing, ijx"" an ^ ^X os are use ^ with special frequency of ringing sounds, but particularly of those which rever- 1 Cf. Diels, Dox. 501-2 ; Theophr. de Sens. § 9 ; Karsten, Emped., p. 483 tt\v V aKoqv airb rav Z£u8tv yivarBat ^uT°f' &mrtp yap final Kadava tS>v 'aav i}\av [ru> ! ^\oviTa?] ttjv aKotjv, ffV npocrayopfvci aapKtvov Z£ov [6v, is it necessary ? He explains ( Vors., p. 209) ku8u>>' aapmvot S{ot thus: 'das Gehor ist gleichsam eine Glocke der g/eic/tges/imm/en (?) Tone. Er nennt es fleischigen Zweig.' Keeping "urutv, then, we might suppose the meaning to be that the ku8&»> took up and rang to the V-o<£oi with which it was framed by nature to harmonize, or was, as Empedocles would say,, (ipptrpos. There are sounds which we cannot hear, as there are colours which we cannot see, though other creatures may hear or see them. HEARING 97 berate within a cavity. Hence they are here employed with idiomatic propriety for the \/fos, and in its turn sets in motion the air in the inner chamber, which transmits the vibration to the brain. According to Empedocles, as the organ of vision contains a lantern, so the organ of hearing contains a bell or gong, which the \j/6()>os from without causes to ring: this ringing, as we are vaguely left to suppose, being conveyed inwards by a subsequent process to the ' point of sense,' and the feeling or perception of sound being thus awakened. § 5. ' Empedocles explains hearing by stating that it is Theo- due to intra-aural sounds. But it is strange of him to £nticue» suppose that he has made it self-evident how we hear, ¥ n, P e : • 1 .... , , , docles by merely stating this theory of a sound, as of a gong, theory of within the ear. For suppose that we hear the outer sounds ^J n ^ [ t by means of this gong ; by what do we hear the gong itself, that hears when it rings? For this — the very point of the whole! ^<^g- j inquiry — is neglected by him 1 .' Karsten too hastily inferred from to-wOev here that this, not i£mdtv, should be read in the former passage, Theophr. de Sens. § 9, drrd t«i» l£co6ev \jf6oi are referred to in the two different passages : the \f/6ots, uroiroy ri> ouadai d^Xov c aKoiovaiv, tvSov jroiijaairra y(/6(j)oi> Cxrntp Kv&avos. ray ftiv yap 7£u ti infivov axovufifv, fKtlvou Si if>o(}>ovvTOt iia W; tovto yap avro Xftirtrui (tiniv. 'Eaaifliv rather should be i(a>6tv. No sound comes from within. BEABE H 98 THE FIVE SENSES to the outer sounds : but to us the sounds of the ' gong ' itself are a fresh ittcognitutn : how do we hear them ? With another gong ? object of § 6. ' Empedocles treats of all the special senses according E^!5" to the same principle, and teaches that we perceive by the docks* ex- f ac t of the airoppoiai fitting duly into the pores of each sense- of the organ. Whence it happens, according to him, that no one distinctive se nse can discern the objects proper to any other, inasmuch of each as the pores in the organs of some senses are too wide, in ^^ those of others too narrow, for the alien sensible object which emana- should enter them, so that in the former case the emanations doesthe° W fr° m the object pass right through without touching, principle while in the latter they are not able to effect an entrance perceives at all 1 .' Empedocles and his reporters have given us no lite' bear rea i c j ue to tne var ; ou3 wa ys in which his principle that on Empe- ' r r docies' ' like is perceived by like ' was carried out by him in the hearing? psychology of perception. We can only conjecture how Theo- ^ he would have applied it in the case of hearing. Probably criticism, the anoppotai of sound, being air, ' fit ' the pores of the ear qtta containing air essentially. The principle itself is a deduction from the metaphysical theory that ' like affects like,' and seems intended merely to procure for the latter its psychological application 2 . The smallness of the part actually given to it in practice, in reference to hearing, however, is only one among many instances, ancient and modern, of the difficulty of bringing metaphysical theories to bear in any real way upon concrete psychical facts. Theophrastus, whether fairly or not, criticizes its applica- bility here, as follows: 'It is not by sound (\}r6\f(3ia) empty and as free as possible from moisture, and if, moreover, they are well bored, both in the rest of the body and in the head and ears ; and if, in addition, the bones are dense and the brain well tempered, and the parts surrounding it as dry as possible. For thus the vocal sound enters in one volume, as it passes in through a vacuum large and without moisture and well bored ; and is dispersed swiftly and equably throughout the body, and does not slip out and away 1 .' While Democritus agrees with others in the main, his theory has the peculiarity of making the stimulus of hearing affect not merely the organ of hearing proper but the whole bodily organism. On this point Theophrastus afterwards directs his criticism, and to this he here draws attention in the words ttXtiv on ktI. For Democritus' reduction (in which most 0wrioXo'yoi agreed) of all senses to modes of one, viz. touching, cf. Arist. de Sens. iv. 442" 29. It is a question what the "external membrane,' on the tsvkv6tt\s of which hearing so much depends, means. It does not seem to be the tympanum, as, from the tenor of the passage, density of this would appear to be an obstruction to the entrance of the arjp, and therefore to hearing. It is rather the membranous covering of the inner surface of the concha, which has for its office to collect and conduct the drj/) inwards. The vvkvottis of this would (from Democritus' standpoint) prevent the d?j/> from slipping through and being lost (8ieKmin-eu>) before it could pass inside and effect its purpose. ThepecnU- § 8. 'In this Democritus is as indefinite as other philoso- ljtm ° f ' P ners » but the strange and peculiar point in his theory is tcs' theory the entrance of sound at all parts of the body, and its criticized 2 dispersion through the whole body after it has entered by Toeo- by the organ of hearing ; just as if this sense of hearing 1 Theophr. /&£««. 55-6; Diels, Zter., p. 515, Hot., p. 391 ; Mullach, Democr., pp. 212-13, 342-4. The translation is from the text as given by Diels Vors., keeping irvKvovfiivov, which suits aBpoav a little below, but rejecting Schneider's rjj atorj for «u. HEARING 101 were effected not by its proper organ, but by the body as phnutus. a whole. For even if the whole body is sympathetic to the ^u™"* operation of the organ of hearing, it does not follow from criticism, this that the whole body has the sense of hearing. For it is sympathetic to ihe operations of all the senses alike, and not only to those of the senses, but also to those of the soul. Such then is Democritus' account of seeing and hearing. The other senses he explains in about the same fashion as that in which most other philosophers explain them V § 9. In the above extracts from Theophrastus the par- Object of ticular object of hearing is referred to as a>vrj — voice or J^£ e : vocal sound. This word is not of course equivalent to Hearing a sound in general, but it is taken, as often, for the leading ^j " n ^'" type of sound 2 . It is chosen simply because speech is one Sound is ' r « • • . . . . . - , a Strom of the most interesting and important kinds of sound, of atoms. Democritus and others regarded sound as affecting the ^'JJj thc auditory apparatus materially or mechanically, in the form atoms of an inrush of air. Sound is a stream of atoms emanating ^"the^T 1 Theophr. de Sens. 57 ; Diels, Dox,, p. 515, Vers., p. 392 ; Mullach, Dcmocr. 213-14, 345. Theophrastus overlooks the fact that Democritus, according to the- previous statement of Theophrastus himself, denies that we hear with the rest of the body, and gives the reason why we do not Mullach renders the words nairatt yap toGto yt 6/ioiwr irnul, koI oil fiuvov Tnit ala8x\afaiv uXXa cm rjj ^mxs : ' enimvero omnibus (sensibus) hoc similiter ascribit, neque his tantum sed etiam animae,' making the subject of woul Democritus instead of aS>p.a. The toCto yt ffoiej merely = arvpirdo-x'i, which Theophrastus has not wished to repeat. Mullach seems to think that we have here a general reference to the way in which Democritus explained all the senses and the soul materially. What Theophrastus means is that Democritus has just as good or bad reasons for diffusing the operations of the other senses over the whole body, as for doing this with the sense of hearing. In all these operations the whole organism by sympathy has a part, as in psychical operations generally. If, however, as Theophrastus would argue, the whole body cannot on this account be said, for example, to see, neither can the whole body be said 'to have the sense of hearing. For the possibility of sensory function without sense-organs or even nerves, see Haeckel, Origin and Development of the Sense-organs, and G. J. Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 81. 1 Cf- Plato, Charm. 168 D oiov t) axofj, , oin uXXou rivor qp aKotj f/ tfioipijr. Tj yap i Nat. air tones. ioa THE FIVE SENSES broken op from the sonant body and causing motion in the air Into'uke between this and the ear. The sound atoms are not sup- forms and posed to reach the ear alone, but together with air frag- ^feor. ments which resemble them. These fragments, following the Expiana- ] aw that like consorts with like, come together according to pitch and their similarity of shapes and sizes. Probably the purity of J™ 1 ^ ° f s° un ds depends on the similarity, the pitch and volume on the magnitude, of their constituents. ' Democritus says that (when sound is produced) the air is broken up into bodies of like form, and, thus broken, is rolled along by and with the fragments of vocal sound V Epicurus says of v). The nature of vrj, as resulting from a blow (wXjjyjj) struck on a portion of arjp, is dealt with more in detail by Plato 3 and Aristotle. We have no further particulars than those above given to show us what the views of Democritus were on the nature of sound. 1 i.e. the atoms sent off by the sonant body. Cf. Diels, Vors., p. 389 ; Plut. Epit. iv. 19 § 3 AjjpuKpiTOS Ka'i ro* aipn (prjaiv fir upoiO(T\!)pova 6p{nrTia6ai odfiara jtal avyKaXivSt'iirdai toic ck rijr i/wwjt Bpaiapatrtv. For o^ioiocr^ij/ioca cf. Theophr. tie Sens. § 5° "' $Aej3fs («0 K " T " Toir 6(f>6a\p.ovt tv8eiat xat liviKfiot, ur opoiotrxiyovtiv ("='to conform') toic airoTwrovfuvois' to yap &p6avqs, the atoms from the sonant body. If the latter are homogeneous, those into which they mince (dpinrrttp) the air are also homogeneous. Cf. Arist. 4l9 b 23 tijv Cptyiv tou aipos. 1 Plut. Epit. iv. 19 ; Diels, Dor., p. 408 'EnUovpns ttjv cpavqv thai ptipa iiciTffiiroiuvov arro rS>r (pofoiirrav x\ jfxovvrav q yjrori, cf. its application to Xdyot by Plato, Soph. 263 E to hi y an c'xciVijr [t^s ^"AlV'] /5'Sjio 81a tou CTOjiarus lov ptru <}>66yyov x/xAijrai Auyot. HEARING 103 Anaxagoras. § 10. ' Anaxagoras held that sense-perception is effected According by the. action of contraries x upon one another, for like is p h„stuT unaffected by its like ... on this same principle he explains Anaxa- smelling and hearing*, the former taking place together fjIpKei t he with respiration (inhalation), the latter by the fact of sound ?^£] s entering and making its way through the ear to the brain : perceived for the bone which encloses (the brain) forms a cavity into **£%££ which the sound rushes 3 .' Large organs better perceive hearing. great and distant objects : small organs the small and uS near objects. ' The larger animals have more sensory with lar ser . - , . . organs power, and in a word sensory power is proportionate to have the the magnitude (of the organs of sense). For all animals over'o'thera which have large, clear, bright eyes see large objects and in per- see them at long distances, while those which have small "n*™ eyes see contrariwise : and it is likewise in the case of 5i ualities hearing. For the large animals hear the great sounds volume. and those coming from afar, while the small sounds escape them, but small animals hear the small sounds and those close by them V § 11. 'When Anaxagoras states that the larger animals Theo- have greater sensory power, and, in a word, that sensory ^™^ power is proportionate to the magnitude of the sensory Anaxa- organs, the question arises : if this be true, whether have ftatetient the small animals or the large animals the more perfect tha . t a , ni- . raals have sense ? For it would seem to be a mark of more exact afoeiioit ia 1 In this principle Anaxagoras followed Heraclitus, and probably Alcmaeon. 1 How the principle is applied to hearing Theophrastus does not say. 5 Theophr. de Sens. §§ 27-8 ; Diels, Vors., p. 323 'kvalayopat hi yiffodat /tin roic ivavriott' to yap o/iutov arrndis into rou d/toiou ... uxravrat hi Kai 6(r(ppaivf, tic o ipmnrtiv rov ilrotpov. With Wachtler (Alcmaeon, p. 42) I have taken tok iynicpakov as object of irtpiixov. 4 Theophr. I.e. § 29; Diels, Vors., p. 323. The text translated is that given by Diels with Schneider's insertion, accepted by Diels and based upon Theophr. § 34 tA p.iy*Bos rS>v ai'o-^ri)piui>. io 4 THE FIVE SENSES proportion sensory power that the small objects should not escape it *, magnitude. ant * '* ' s not unreasonable to suppose that the creature (Perhaps which is able to discern the smaller objects should be able gores did to discern the larger objects as well. Thus it seems that not mean t h e srna n animals are better off (on his showing) than the larger large in respect of some senses, and, so far, the sensory haZTfiner P ower °f the larger animals is inferior to theirs. If, how- sensory ever, on the other hand, it appears that many objects escape mitten.) the senses of the smaller animals, so far the sensory power of the larger animals is superior 2 .' If Anaxagoras for greater magnitude had substituted higher development his proposition would have been more important. Except so far as size and higher organization accompany one another, there is no fixed relation between the perfectness of sense and the size of the sense-organs or of the animal. It may be, however, that Anaxagoras merely meant that the larger animals have greater, or more voluminous, sensations ; not that they have finer sensory discrimination than the smaller animals possess s . Chjutot § 12. The object of hearing, as already observed, is often ^^^ s (. referred to under the special name of $wvq — vocal sound, physically « Anaxagoras held that vij is produced by the breath (or wfcUn a ' r m motion) which collides against the fixed, solid air and, motion by by a recoil from the shock, is borne onwards to the organs of hearing, just as what is called an " echo " is produced V 1 Cf. Aristotle 442 b 14. * Theophr. §§ 34-5 ; Diels, Dox., pp. 508-9. Romanes (Mental Evolution in Animals, pp. 80 seqq.) gives ' a general outline of the powers of special sensation probably enjoyed by different classes of animals,' referring to the investigations of Engelmann and Haeckel on the same subject. * For what Aristotle meant by better sensory faculty (anpifiua alaOfatwv) as regards hearing and smelling, cf. de Gen. An. v. 2. 781* I4-78l b 29, infra § 26. * Diels, Vors., p. 325, Dox., p. 409 'Ava£ay6par t))p . yivi- 0601 iri/tvparos avrinia-dvTot piv artptpviif dipt, T/J t inrof P*XP l T ** v °KOav irpo ylvcadai. For this cf. Arist. de An. ii. 8. 4i9 b 25 seqq., where the production of sound generally is illustrated by reference to the way in which an echo is caused. Aristotle (42o b 5) distinguishes oc Tic iariv ip'frixov' ratv yap d^vjuf oldiv (pavti, aWa KaB' d^toidnjra Xcytrai iv rote iialv aipa mvt'iv ruy ivr6s' iitv ii tvpvripa ov ivapBpov 81a to p.r) irpoirniiTTtiv np&s ijpipoiiv. ic6 THE FIVE SENSES by the same thing (viz. air), and from this same thing all derive their intelligence as well (ttji» &AAi}v i»dVu») V Plato. Function § 14- ' Plato and his followers think that the air in the ^f h^Sn^. head receives a shock, and that this air is then reflected into The audi- the intellectual centres 2 , and thus the sensation of hearing encad? 1 ™ 1 takes place*.' This account of Plato's view must be corrected from the according to the following passages. ' Plato explains the liver, hearing through the operation of vocal sound, for vocal sound is a shock, communicated by the air through the ears to the brain and blood, till it reaches the soul ; and the motion, caused by this shock, proceeding from the head to the liver, is hearing *.' ' Hearing, which we have now to examine, is a third mode of sensation within us, and we must set forth the causes to which the affections of this sense are due. Vocal sound in general we must assume to be the shock conveyed by the air, through the ears, to both brain and blood 5 , propagated to the soul ; and the movement produced by this shock, beginning from the head and terminating in the region of the liver, is hearing .' 1 Diels, Vors n p. 350 lravra r<5 avrif *ni (jj Ka\ 6py . * Diels, Dox., p. 500. 14 ; Theophr. de Sens. § 5 a*oi\v Si Sia rijf <}>arfir opl^traC (pavrjv yap (ivai irXijytjv vn aipos iyn«pd\ov teal a'/tarot St &rav p*xpi "fa>X.H s t T h" &' ^ lto Tavrqs ntVijiny diro Kfai>t)v BZpfv Tt\v SC irup inr' aipos iyKKpakov t( ko! alparot p*xp l tyiX*l s irXijyijv SiaSiSojiivrpf, rrjv Si fur avrtjs Ktvqaiv, ano rijs K«pa\fis fiiv apx°l'* vr l v > TtKfvTuxrav Si irtpl rr/v tov ijnarot tSpav, axorjv. Plato's con- ception of the physiological fact of hearing is thus summarized by Zeller, Plato 428 n., E. Tr. : ' The sensations of hearing are caused by the tones moving the air in the inside of the ear, and this motion is transmitted HEARING 107 § 15. We can hear nothing which does not possess or Object of yield 4>urf. «If the sense of hearing is to hear itself, it^. e: must possess tfuovrj; in no other way could it hear itself 1 .' What rood Distinguishing kSyos (rational speech) from Itavoia (thinking), ^ „ : Plato calls the former * a stream accompanied with sound, ? sho = k ,. r imparted proceeding from the soul, through the mouth 2 . 'He by the air, defines vocal sound ($ W nj) as [on its physical side] air ^™£f ,<£ in motion, impelled from the seat of intelligence, through brain and the mouth, and [as physiological stimulus of hearing] a pr ^agated shock caused by the air, through the ears, to the brain and "> the soul; ... . ' , . ... the motion blood, propagated to the soul. Vocal sound, is by an which extension of the term, also used in the case of irrational f^oA* 1 "* animals and lifeless things, to signify neighings, and mere having noises, but properly it is articulate speech, considered as ^soul"* "illuminating" the object of intelligence 3 .' 'According to Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, vocal sound is incor- poreal. For it is not the air, but the figure bounding the air, or its surface, that, in virtue of a certain sort of shock, becomes vocal sound. But every surface is in- through the blood into the brain and to the soul. The soul is thus induced to a motion extending from the head to the region of the liver, to the seat of desire, and this motion proceeding from the soul is d*<»;.' In this summary two inaccuracies appear. The construction of tyK«pu\ov ri (en! tttfiaTus is not with But (as Zeller following Stallbaum takes it) but with irXr)yi}i>: the conjunctions r< ieai were enough to show that these words could not be co-ordinated with i'u'/>« after iirii or with <3rv after 8ui, but must be regarded as objective genitives after ir\i)y>;c, thus giving Plato's true meaning, according to the suggestion of Mr. Archer-Hind in his note, which he does not, however, follow in his translation. In the next place Plato does not speak of hearing as ' a motion proceeding from the soul.' Like every other form of sensa- tion, it is for him a motion proceeding through the body to the soul, in- volving an affection of both conjointly. Cf. Philet. 33 D and Tim. 43 C. 1 Charm. 168 D. a Sophist. 263 E, Theaet. 206 D. • Diels, Dor., p. 407' 22, b 13, Plut. Epit. iv. 19, Stob. Eel. i. 57 XlXarai/ tjjk s (pbiri'foucra ra voovptvov. It is noticeable here that koI iy«cpiiXou xai a'/iurof seems to show that the writer neglected or missed the true construction of the corresponding words of Plato, Tim. 67 a. 108 THE FIVE SENSES corporeal. It is moved, indeed, together with bodies, but, in its own nature, it is absolutely bodiless ; as, when a stick is bent, it is the material of it that is bent, but its surface is not affected thereby V Theo- § 16. 'Plato states that vocal sound is a shock com- viSSTof municated b y the air through the ears to the brain and iiato's blood, propagated to the soul.. According as it is swift cf ^^. n or s ' ow m * ts motion, it is shrill or grave in its tone. One llato's ex- vocal sound is in accord with another when the beginning of differ- of the slower is similar to the ending of the more rapid 2 .' e /ftT° f Theophrastus seems to have intended, by the change he introduces into the order of Plato's words, to indicate that which has been above (p. 106, n. 6) given as their true con- struction. He makes it plain that the shock is imparted to the brain and blood, and that, grammatically, xAijyjj governs eyKtakov ko.1 at/ioros. The blow — the shock — is, in the case of speech, due to the soul causing the air in the respiratory organs to strike against the sides of the ap-nipia., or windpipe (Arist. 420 b 28). ' In the same way we must look for the explanation of sounds, which present themselves to us as shrill or grave according as they are swift or slow, their movements now harmonious, at other times discordant, according to the similarity or dissimilarity of the motion excited in us by them. For when the movements of the preceding and more rapid sounds are ceasing, and have just arrived at a speed similar to that of the movements with which the succeeding sounds, adding their movements to the pre- ceding, stimulate them, then the slower sounds catch them up, and doing so excite no confusion, and introduce no 1 Diels, Vox., p. 409' 25, Plut. Epit. iv. 20 n.v6ay6pas VIXutov 'A.pi aipa, uWa to o-x'IP" tu iripl Toy aipa «tm tijv inupavtuiv Kara nolap TrXij^iv ywicrSai ' ttaaa hi (jripaaiv, airq bi atroparot vavrai KadiaTTjKtf Sxrn€p ) piv titHpavtia o&blv nwxei, i) bi JAij ( 7 KapirTopivij. * Diels, Dor., p. 525. 17, Theophr. tie Sens. § 85 fs«i» bi cirai nXrjyrjv into atpot fyK£ Tip) ra^t'iav Kai jlpa&e'iav' avp &' otav q apX'l T 'l s flpabfiaf opoia jj tj TcXf urj rrfi ra%iias. HEARING . 109 alien element ; but Introducing into them the beginning of a slower movement, after the pattern of that formerly faster but now slowing down, they blend and form with them one single auditory affection of shrill and deep combined; whence it is that they afford pleasure (ijoowjv) to the foolish, but joy ((ipo(rivriv) to the wise, as the latter contemplate, in them, the divine harmony, thus showing us its own copy in mortal movements V § 17. In translating this passage, a special difficulty Plato did arises from the want of an English word to distinguish ^ e * e idvr)ijuvri. The former is the general name, including noises ; y^i? - *he latter is properly used of vocal and articulate sound, divided but often extended to include musical sounds whether "ndjLJ?! produced by voice or otherwise. Cause of _,.,'/.., . . .. sound in Taking sound first in the more general sense, he dis- former, tinguishes between its actual and potential aspects. There m °" e ^ ene " are certain things which are incapable of producing sound, Three e.g. wool; others are capable of producing sound, eg. foroiJjS? bronze, and smooth hard substances. As the former are, («) » even potentially, soundless, the latter are potentially sonant, {££>£, ($) „ 1 Cf. Rep. 530C-531 C, with Adam's Commentary thereon. ' De Sens. i. 437* 6-17. 1 Plato, Tint., 47 c, Archer-Hind's Trans. * For what follows see de An. ii. 8. 4ia b 5 seqq. "a THE FIVE SENSES shock com- even when not actually sounding \ ' As it is possible for toit'by a* a P" 5011 possessing the faculty of hearing not to hear blow from actually at some given moment, so a thing may have the else, (c^a property of sounding without always actually doing this. movement When, however, that which can hear realizes its potentiality, inamedmm r • ' implied in and also when that which can sound does sound, then the celestial 116 reauze d faculty of hearing and the realized sound both con- spheres do cur; so that the former may properly be named "actual hear- ty? ' ing" (aicouo-is), and the latter "actual sounding" (t/fo'^o-is).' Vi ^ ra ^ on Actualized sound is a local movement of something 2 , bodies. Air and involves the relation of some one thing to some other bou^media thing. in some third as medium 3 . This third thing is normally of sound, air in the case of land animals. That which physically notxhe™' causes sound is a shock or blow. This cannot occur when medium, only one thing is concerned ; for that which gives the blow determi- and that which receives it are two different things. That riant or which sounds does so in relation to something else, and in a factor of , / sound. Air medium, for the blow implies local movement ( aipt here to refer to a blow struck by one solid in the mere air or water and yet producing sound. As Torstrik in his clear note on 4i9 b 20 says, ' iam ei in mentem venit stridor ille vel sibilus quern virga vel flagro cfficimus celeriter discusso ' aere : ibi enim to iv u quodammodo etiam rou n-oor & vices gerit.' 2 The terms fluid and solid are generally opposed inter se by Aristotle as well as by moderns. ' For ifi/iafibv i/'o/i/iou here cf. Hermathena, No. xxx, ' Miscellanea,' P- 73- * Cf. 6s6 b 13-16, together with 420* 18 seqq. 5 656 b l6 To it rijf OKOqi alaBrjTrjptop aipostltai (paptv, 425* 4. BfcARE X ii4 THE FIVE SENSES proper u to hear when it has been set in motion as one continuous ^f? of body. Owing to the fact that it is so easily dispersed, chamber this outer air yields no audible sound unless the solid • the ear" which has been struck is smooth. In this case the air to This taia which the shock is communicated rebounds in a single united sonnd- mass, owing to the nature of the superficies of the said solid ; "f ^°7 eme ° ts for the superficies of a smooth body is one. Anything, air, and therefore, which is capable * of causing motion in a single thenTto ma s s > of air, which reaches continuously to the organ of the soul, hearing, is capable of producing sound 2 . For the organ scrinm. " °f hearing proper is physically homogeneous with the air peicocritns (crMid>v»js aipi) 3 . Since then the air is one 4 it follows that implicitly criticized, when the outer air is moved, the inner air is moved also s . Ammals Hence it is not true that an animal hears with all parts of receive air the body ", nor does the air enter the body at all parts ; ofthe PaitS f° r the part which should receive the movement, so as to body: nor give it effect for consciousness, has not in every part of. hear It the body an inner air at its disposal such as it has in the ail pans, gar^ jj u t on t h; s ; nner a j r hearing depends. Air in ender general is soundless owing to its being easily dispersed : Watt ibie wn en a portion is prevented from being dissipated, and condition- this is affected by the shock of a blow, it yields or transmits y " sound. Now the air within the ears 8 has been built into its chamber in order that, being undisturbed by the general movement of the atmosphere, it may be sensitive to the different kinds of auditory movements propagated towards 1 Not all things are so capable : ov it) near oioy iau irarafj; /3cXcV>j HtXovqp. * As Trendelenburg says : the air at the surface of the solid struck is here referred to as being one : that air which propagates the sound to the ear is referred to as one and continuous. » For the above cf. 4io b 5-420* 4, 6s6 b 16, 781* 14 seqq. 4 420* 4 : I translate iva dipa, the restoration of Steinhart, cf. 4l9 b 35. * 420* 5 : I translate Torstrik's reading 6 turo Ktvitrat. * This implicitly controverts, with the same unfairness as Theophras- tus shows, tie theory of Democritus. See §§ 7-8 supra. 7 ov yap itavrg l\a aipa to nvr\a&pfvov pipos noX fp^v^oy. ' 420* 9, 6s6 b 15, where the expression r& yap Ktvliv KaXoiptvov aipot wXripit fOTtK refers to the hollow of the ears in connexion with the whole occiput, or hinder portion of the cranium, which Aristotle strangely regarded as vacant, or containing air only. HEARING "5 It, The external medium which is to receive and transmit all sounds must in itself be free from sound l . The outer air is therefore per se soundless, a quality which it owes to its being so easily dispersed. But the air within the ear — the portion of air which is the essential element in the organ of hearing — as distinguished from the outer air which is the external medium — has a proper motion of its own. Thus it has a peculiar resonance, like a horn ; and this, while it lasts, is a sign that the auditory faculty is unimpaired. When this ceases, it is a proof of deafness. We can hear to some extent under water ; because the water does not enter the air-chamber of the ear. If it did so, hearing would be at an end. Hearing ceases to be possible, also, if the tympanic membrane is injured, just as blindness ensues if the membrane covering the eye is injured. As the water- holding eye is joined with the watery brain, so the air- holding ear is connected with the air-holding hinder part of the cranium 2 . Perhaps the air in the ear is ultimately connected with that in the lungs — the origin of all the air in the body 3 . At all events the essential part of the organ of hearing is the air-cell which has been thus described as ' built into ' the ear. § ai. Is it the striker that sounds, or the thing struck? Which The answer is that both do so, each in its own way. Sound ^^^£1* is a movement of something mobile; something that is or the thing struck ' moved like things which rebound from smooth surfaces. The sound, on- surface must be smooth, in order that the air may rebound J lke 1 J2 ht > from it in a single mass (iOpow). Sound, unlike light, travels in the air from the sonant body to the ear. This is plain from the fact of our seeing a blow struck at a distance, but not hearing the sound of the blow till some time after*. Articulate sounds are due to the conforma- 1 4l8 b 26 fori . . . Siktik6v . . . iy6ov . . . to fyotfiov. 9 49 1 * 3 1 rovrov ( sc - 'he whole cranium) Hi pipy to pin npScSior Pptypa . . . tA &' oniaBiov Ivlov . . . vnl> piv ovv to fipiyfia 6 »'yK»(j>d\6s f ap\r)v tou olaSifrriplov ilvcu toB Trjs OKoijs. * 446* 20 seqq. 12 n6 THE FIVE SENSES tion of the moving air. Such sounds are less accurately heard at long distances, because the form of the movement in the air becomes altered on its way to the ear 1 . Qualitative § 22. Differences of quality such as sharp and grave ofM^dT are potentially existent in the sounds themselves, but are *.g.fitcA, actualized only in the actual ^odmo-is with its correlative exist . _, potentially a/cowriy. These two— yfr6t} on ] y distinguishable by reason. Just as with- > actaaiiy, out light colours are not seen, though potentially in the ^ D ^ coloured objects, so without V«tyrj(ns — the actualization of heard, sound — and its correlative Skowis — the actual perception colours. °f sound — the quality of sharp or grave is not heard. The terms These terms, sharp and grave (6£v ko.1 /3a/nJ), thus applied . fapv meta- are really metaphorical, being transferred from objects of EfreiSLi toucn to those of hearing. The sharp is that which moves to sound, the sense much in a little time ; the grave that which nature of mov es it little in much time. The sharp as heard is not sharp and literally swift, nor the grave slow ; yet the quality of the Origin of former as perceived is due to the rapidity of the motion Tib^P"° fl t ^ iat causes '*! while the quality of the latter is owing to frequencies, the slowness of the corresponding motion *. There seems of h hearing, to ^ e an analogy between that which to the touch is sharp lite all or blunt, and that which to the sense of hearing is sharp or involves or grave. The sharp as it were pierces, while the blunt a/Mapvy$ here differ substantially from aprijpia (sc. q rpaxfta) further down (535 b 15)1 hence I have rendered it by 'windpipe.' 'Aprtipia of course had not come yet to mean ' artery.' HEARING 119 which this is subservient is the lung, possession of which is due to the fact that land animals have more heat than others. The region of the heart 1 is that which primarily needs respiration and its cooling effects; hence the necessity that the air should enter this region as it does in the process of respiration. One consequence of this arrange- ment is that a shock can be imparted by the soul, which tenants that region, to the inhaled air ; by this shock the latter is struck against the trachea, as it is called 2 ; and by the stroke vocal sound is produced. § 25. For, as has been said, not every animal sound is Voice is vocal sound : not e.g. clucking with the tongue, or coughing. j°^ £"** The production of voice implies that the orgah which animate communicates the shock in the first instance must be si ^JJ^y^ animate, and have some mental representation accompany- s ° me ing its action 3 . There must be this representation, because Voice is voice is significant (armavriKos) sound 4 , and does not merely j£J~ u ^, e imply any shock imparted to the air inhaled, as for one Waft example, in coughing. On the contrary, in uttering voice, why™*' one uses the inhaled air in order to make that which is in fishes are the trachea strike against the walls of the trachea itself. Hence it is that one cannot utter voice while in the act of inhaling or exhaling, but only while holding the breath. He who thus holds the breath and speaks, excites, in doing this, a movement in the fund of breath held in. Fishes do not inhale ; therefore they do no* possess a windpipe, and hence they have no voice*. § 26. ' In accurate hearing as well as in accurate Meaning smelling two things are involved : one is the discernment duioM'of as far as possible of the different qualities of the objects perfect of these senses ; the other is the power of hearing or ThTsfon- smelling at a long distance. The power of keenly dis- n at« ra , 1 1 Here the lung is said to be in the * region of the heart' ; cf. 668 b 33 seqq. * irpos rqv Ka\ov)iivrj» apn}piay. ' itl ln^vxoy cfrat to rvrrrov tu njv KpavrjV. * Even the inarticulate sounds of the voice of the lower animals (ol dypa/iparoi ^6 ' Certain animals, as was to have been expected, have running r ' into blood- the organ of hearing situated in the head. For what is rounding 11 " called the vacuum in the cranium is really full of air, and the brain, the organ of hearing, as we hold, consists of air. Now passages (iropot) lead from the eyes into the blood-vessels around the brain ; and a passage leads back, likewise, from each of the ears and connects it with the hinder part of the head V ' The organs of sight, like all the other organs of sense, are attached to passages (ewl iropmv), but while the organs of touching and tasting consist either of the body, or of some part of the body, of animals, those of smelling and hearing are themselves passages filled with connatural - spirit (uAi/pcis p6viiia piv 3vtv tov fiavOavw, Sera pi) ovwirat run ^6ai> akoitiv. Evidently the connotation of patBartui was less wide than that of our ' learn.' 124 THE FIVE SENSES the auditory sense, and can not merely hear sounds, but also distinguish by this sense (Sia«r0dvcrat) the different qualities of significant sounds 1 .' But the importance of hearing as an instrument of education arises chiefly from the fact already mentioned that words (dvo^ara) arc in their nature general («n/ji/3oXa). They are marks of typical mental impressions associated with them by both speaker and hearer. They stand for notions. The impressions of sight, on the other hand, are primarily of the nature of particulars and appeal rather to the individual. Those received from Ao'yos through the sense of hearing are, almost from the first, of the nature of universals, and therefore almost directly (i. e. so far as we understand them) stimulate the faculty of intelligence. But when words are combined in sentences, and form trains of reasoning, their mind-develop- Written ing effect is still more obvious. When to that of spoken j^^te^f words we add the effect of words written, and remember to spoken also that language with its symbolic power ranges over the SBagI " whole tract of ocular as well as other sensible experience, we can easily understand the paramount intellectual effect ascribed by Aristotle to the sense of hearing. He is, how- ever, careful to point out that hearing has not these grand results directly, but only Kara o-u///9«/3r)Kd*r. Like every other sense its immediate data consist of particulars a . Ethical § 29. ^ n ' ts bearing upon moral character, hearing, which importance makes U s acquainted with music, is in Aristotle's opinion of hearing. ** _ .. , The modci of very great importance. No other sense can compare or kind* of or com p ete w ith it in this respect. 'Why is it' (the writer of Object of the Problems asks) 'that the object of hearing alone among »lone nfi tne objects of sense possesses character (JjOoslxu), that is, directly affects the emotional temperament of the hearer ? This, he affects the . « • ,. «. * . emotions, adds, is true of it, even when the music is unaccompanied Mnsical ^v words. Neither colour nor odour nor savour has a sound the J 1 Hist. An. ix. I. 6o8 a 15-21. * Hence, in de Sens. i. 437" I3» atumarht &v belongs to what follows, and the comma should stand not after &v, but after (laBr/a-ios, or else in both places. What the writer wishes to guard against there is the false notion that the full significance of \6yos is matter of immediate perception by the sense of hearing. HEARING i«5 similar effect 1 .* «The movements set up in us by music 'notion' are of the nature of action, and actions are the " notation " J^Sh!* of character*. We must not merely take our share in the 'notation' pleasure which all derive from music, but consider whether , ? „ f „^ cter and how far it has an influence on the mind and character. ^ oti ° f n A l That it has this influence would be plain if it could becomposi- shown that by its means our characters are qualitatively o?«mpL determined (irotol rn>ei to rj6ri yw6y.t0a). That this, how- Music ever, is true is proved not only by many other sorts of p^a^ music, but particularly by the compositions of Olympus ; and P le »- for these raise the hearers to a high pitch of excitement intimately (iroi« raj yfrv\as iv0ov"/"«"'»'• unquestionably spurious Problems, do we find this subject of con- treated technically. There are, however, in the de Sensu Laura's a few references which assume on the reader's part familiar analogies 1 Prod. xix. 27. 9i9 b 26-9. Aristotle, was not the writer of the Pro- blems, yet they were chiefly inspired from his works, and so may serve as evidence for his general doctrine in this and many other matters. 1 Prob. 9I9 b 35-7 «' °« KivJjOfis aural vpaKTinat flaw, al tic irpa£tK rjdavs ar)pa depends on (as has been shown) in a certain way one, (though in involves* anot her way at the same time not one); and if again one: for a concord is a ratio, it follows that hearing {jt\v IlkotJv) depends its i s a ratio of some sort. Hence it is that each excess of perception either the sharp or the grave spoils the hearing (as it cordance of spoils the concord) 1 .' 'Nature has an eagerness for con- Mnnd iVe tra " es > ^d of these, not of similars, composes concord (rd A concord evyLtyovov).' 'Art, imitating nature, also brings contraries by«j!r e together. Painting, mixing together white and black, ittipyua of yellow and red, renders its representations " consonant " Is this (trvptpuvovs) with their originals ; while music, mixing sharp really sol notes ^e6yyovi) with grave, and short with long-sustained, parently? in sounds of different timbre (ev biacpopois u>vta) do not all arrive at the point of sense coinstantaneously, but only seem to do so, and that this seeming is due to the fact that the interval separating their different arrivals is too short to be noticeable. . . . This, however, is not the case, for it is impossible that there should be a time-interval too short to be noticeable V Such a theory would involve an instant of blank or vacant consciousness, which we cannot admit. ' The term &pjzowk»? is ambiguous, for it may refer either to the mathematical knowledge of music, or to the perception by the ear of musical consonance. Those who have a good ear perceive the facts of such consonance. The mathema- ticians, on the other hand, know the reasons of these facts. For mathematicians can demonstrate the causes of musical concords, yet it often happens that those who have this power have no perception of the concrete particulars V § 31. A writer in the Problems asks : Why does the Why does interval between the extremes in the octave (in certain cases) le^unT escape the ear, and the composite whole pass for unison? sonom? The answer suggested is, that ' this unisonous effect is due a that the to the fact that each sound— the high and the low— seems * ounds in identical with the other. For in sounds equality arises ' identical from proportion, and the Equal is a branch of the One 8 .' XS'ratio' ' Degrees of consonance (says Chappell) depend upon the to one * another.' 1 De Sens. vii. 447* 7. * De Sens. vi. 446 b 5-26. ' De Sens. vii. 448* 19-26. * Analyt. Post. i. 13. 79* 1-5. * Prod. xix. 14. 9l8 b 7-12 iia rl \av8avti to iia nturwy, xai Aokci opSQw vov final ; ... tj in &oMp i avrbs ftvui toiui 8£yyot ; (Didot) iia ri araAoyor Wrijc cVl 86yyai', to A" urov tov Ms, (Otherwise von Jan, op. cit. p. 85 n.) ia8 THE FIVE SENSES w°*i proportion that coincident vibrations bear to those which thissug- "sound apart" [i.e. are dissonant]. The unison alone is Wn^lL" P erfect consonance, because therein only do all vibrations the octave coincide V But the degree of consonance in the octave is jrie^S^of g reater than that in any other interval, because in this, all inter- whose total ratio is i : 2, the proportion between coincident vals? Be- , . . .... . , cause its and non-coincident vibrations is i : i, i.e. greater than in 13X10 U 'bi an ^ otner- ^ n tne proportionality thus maintained of con- in integral sonant to non-consonant vibrations in the octave appears to whUe'those rest the ,ec l uau ty' spoken of above ; and on this equality, of other again, rests the 'approach to oneness' which causes the Sways in- mte rval to be unnoticed and the sounds taken for one. Toive in Aristotle speaks with less subtlety of this matter. ' It is one of the . . ..... . , . , terms an easier to perceive a thing (in its proper nature) when single improper t j lan wnen blended with something else, e.g. wine when The octave unmixed than when diluted, or honey, or a colour, or the S^ssed^* note highest in pitch (vjJttj) when by itself than when in the the ratio octave V ' Also the quarter tone escapes notice : one hears integral the melodic rise and fall of the voice as a continuum, but number the interval between the extremes in the quarter tone passes the other' unnoticed 3 .' 'Why' — it is asked in the Problem s* — Ms the j°^™ ls octave the most pleasing of all intervals ? Perhaps because Fundamen- its ratios are expressible by integral terms, while those of the of tiT*" 1 other intervals are not so. For since the string of highest pleasing pitch, the vrjrq, is (in its rate 6 of vibration) double the string avfup^ia. lowest in pitch, the iit&rr\, for every two vibrations of the ltisax Jan, op. tit. pp. 96, 101 nn. ; Wundt, H. and A. Psych, p. 69 (E. Tr.). * Arist. de Sens. vii. 447" 17-20^ * Arist. de Sens. vi. 446 s 1-5. * xix. 35. 920* 27 seqq. * Only by this parenthesis can the sense be given. The njrn was but half as long as the tordrn. The passage, therefore, implies more accurate knowledge of the vibration of strings than Aristotle possessed. HEARING no Integers are not compared with integers, but there is a fraction over. The case is similar with the fourth : the interval 3 : 4 cannot be expressed as a ratio of one to any integral number; it appears i:i|. Or perhaps the octave is most perfect because it is made up of the fifth and the fourth, and is the measure of the melodic series V ' We are delighted with concordance of sounds because such concordance is a blending of contraries which bear a ratio to one another. But a ratio is a fixed arrangement — a thing which, as has been said, is naturally pleasing V ' If we take two vessels equal and similar to one another, but the one empty, the other half full, and cause them to sound together, they form an octave with one another. Why is this ? Because the sound coming from the half full vessel is double the other (in rate of vibration) V The Problems, from which these extracts are taken, are later than Aristotle, and in some ways represent more highly developed theories of music and of harmonics than those of Plato or Aristotle. § 32. It would seem, and has been urged by many, e. g. Probable by Trendelenburg, Arist. de An. p. 107 (Belger), that J^^ a portion of what Aristotle wrote on the subject of vocal the tract sound must have been somehow lost. In his work de Gen. treating of An. v. 7. 786 b 23, we read: 'As to the final cause of so . Qn f T . he . , . missing voice in animals, and as to what voice and sound in treatise general are, an explanation has been offered already, partly telhatnV in our work on Sense-perception, and partly in that on 'KamnSm The Soul*.' Again further down: 'With regard to voice, let this suffice for the information not definitely given already in the works on sense-perception and on the soul *.' 1 Prob. xix. 35. 920* 27-38. The Didot punctuation after /uXuSi'ac (•38) is here adopted j also Bekker's t' «'«u>o for rf/ictv o ("36). 1 xix. 38. 921* 2-4 avfKpavia oc xaipoptv Sri Kpaaris ton Xoyov ijowik ivavriav irphs AXXnXa' A fiiv ovv \6yos ru£ic, J r/y (piaa ifii. * Probl. xix. 50. 922 b 35-9. * Cf. 786 b 23 nVof /if» ovv SvtKa avr]v 1\u ra (aa nil rt fWi ifuavfi ical Skat 6 ^6u» K 130 THE FIVE SENSES In the de Sensu, however, while the physical properties of the objects of seeing, smelling, and tasting are examined and described, those of hearing and touching are entirely omitted. There, for the psychological import of the five senses, we are referred back to the work de Anitna : while as to the physical character of the objects of all five, we are promised a discussion to follow ; yet while three of these are discussed two are passed over. There is no formal or set treatment of them in that little tract 1 . The frag- ment riepl 'Akovo-jw is un-Aristotelean. Its opening words agree with the views of sound-transmission ascribed by Alexander * to Strato, whom therefore Brandis (too hastily as Zeller thinks) regards as the author. 'According to the II«/)l 'Akovo-tSv (8o3 b 34 seqq.), every sound is composed of particular vibrations (ir\»jyaQ which we cannot distinguish as such, but perceive as one unbroken sound : high tones, whose movement is quicker, consist of more vibrations, and low tones of fewer. Several tones vibrating and ceasing at the same time are heard by us as one tone. The height or depth, harshness or softness, in fact every quality of a tone, depends (8o3 b 26) on the quality of the motion originally created in the air by the body that gave out the tone. This motion propagates itself unchanged, inasmuch as each portion of the air sets the next portion of air in motion with the same movement as it has itself.' (Zeller, Arist. ii. pp. 465-6 nn., E. Tr.) 1 CL de Sens. iii. 439* 6-17 W iron ttl Xcyfiy driovv ovruv o'ov . . . tf H ov ... Sfioiat Si «n irfj«. * Ad Arist. de Sens. (p. 126, Wendland). von Jan, pp. 55 seqq., 133, ascribes the irrpt 'Axovcn-uy to Heraclides. THE ANCIENT GREEK PSYCHOLOGY OF SMELLING Alcmaeon. § I. WE have little direct information respecting Ale- Function maeon's psychological theory of the sense of smell. All"«^Xr & that remains is the following, contained .in two passages g£^j B b which I extract, the one from Theophrastus, the other from air inhaled the late compilation of Aetius. )j|£3ff * He taught that a person smells by means of the nostrils, and carried drawing the inhaled air upwards to the brain, in the respi- ratory process V Not the nostrils alone, therefore, but these in connexion with the brain form the olfactory apparatus. ' He held that the authoritative principle — the intelligence — has its seat in the brain ; that, therefore, animals smell by means of this organ which draws in the various odours 2 to itself in the process of respiration 3 .' Besides these two direct references to Alcmaeon, there is a probable allusion to him bearing on the same subject. Socrates in the Phaedo, reviewing the history of his own mental develop- ment, tells his friends that in his youth he had been interested in psychological questions, and that of these one which presented itself was ' whether it is the brain that furnishes us with the senses of hearing and seeing and smelling 4 .' The various theories referred to by Plato in .this passage are sufficiently distinctive to show that in mentioning each he is thinking of some particular philo- sopher. The theory which referred sensation to the opera- 1 Theophr. de Sens. § 25 ; Diels, Vors., p. 104 oafypaivtoBu Si puAv &pa rip dwnrvf u> aVdyoira to nviipa npoc ror >. * In the following paragraphs the terms 'smell' and 'odour' are sometimes used indifferently for the object of the olfactory sense. So, too, ' taste ' is sometimes used for ' savour." * Aet iv. 17. 1, Diels, £>ox., p. 407, Vors., p. 104 «» t£ «y«$aXp tuui to qyc/joyixdy* tovto ovv oaak6t ir ijcr#pr] Si ylvtaBat 17/ avairvojj" oio jcai /iciXtcrra 6trpaivfd0ai Toirove die (Kpobpordni roC uoBparos ij xiVijfftr. 8 Aetius, iv. 17. 2, Diels, Dox., p. 407, Vors., p. l8l'E/iirfdoicXfjr tois avairvoaU Tair ajrA tov irvdpovos avyuanplvfaBm tjjh oldish to S3L Yt as h e does, that persons smell most acutely follow if who inhale the breath in greatest amount (rovs itX«To-toj> of Em* ivuntuiiivovt) ; for respiring is of no avail for this purpose docles if the sense is not in a healthy condition (pri vyiaivovarji), or Respira- is not, so to speak, (av((pyn4vr)s itojs) open. There are many ^directf* P ersons w ^° ( no matter how much they inhale) are in- the cause capacitated (ireirjjp5o-0ai) for smelling, and have no perception —^ "^ whatever of odour. Moreover, those whose (ol bvimvoot) directly, breathing is distressed, or who are ill (irovoOvres), or sleep- ptdocles i°g (KaOevbovres), should, on Empedocles* theory, perceive thought, odours more keenly than others, as they inhale most air. The contrary, however, is the case. That the act of respiration is not directly (/ca0* airo) the cause of smelling, but only indirectly (icara o-v/x/3«/3»jko's), is both evident from the case of the other animals (i.e. those which do not respire yet have this sense), and is further proved by the patho- logical states just referred to 2 .' OJmr, § 5. 'Most odour emanates,' says Empedocles, 'from according 1 Theophr. de Sens. § 19; Diels, Vors., p. 179 to Si mpl ritt aMac aiaOrjtjtis not Kpivofttn t rov tyufyov, oCt ocTfijj n)v oaitfjv odrt rots aXXoir roit &poytvio\v rj ^vXaiv iv yfvati ko'l ocr^iijr iv iv ptkiav pvKTrjpmv iptvvav (nviifiaru B") Sua airikant rroiuv Airakjj ntp't wolf. This is Diels' reading. He adopts Buttmann's tippma for the rip- para of Plut. de Curios., the xippara of Quaes/. Na/. — the inconsistency and obscurity of which show the text to be corrupt. By uppara Empedocles denotes not ' fissa ferarum ungula ' as Lucretius (vide infra) seems to render, but the iirdppoiai — the material particles which are the proximate object of, and which stimulate, the sense of smell. This seems better than (a) to read with Karsten rippara \='cubilia extrema, ultimi ferarum recessus*; or (b), with Sturz, to interpret rippara piXtav as = ' extremitates membrorum,' i. e. ' pedes,' i.e.' pedum vestigia ' j or (c) to accept, with Schneider, xippara as a derivative of Ktipat (which would be impossible) ='cubilia'; or finally (d) to follow Stein (Emped., p. 70) in adopting frAjiaru (Duebn.) = 'the soles of the feet,' or ' vestigia.' Plutarch, Quaes/. Na/., explains the meaning to be that the dogs rat anoppoas avakapfiavovoiv, At ivanokiimt ra tirjpia tj S\g. Lucretius had the lines before him when he wrote : ' turn fissa ferarum ungula quo tulerit gressum promissa canum vis ducit,' de Iter. Na/. iv. 680 : which reads as if he translated uppara (xtipa) by l fissa ungula.' (nvtv/iara 8') is Diels' supplement of the words quoted from Empedocles by Alexander, who denies Empedocles' theory of odours being diroppoui, asserting that neither odour nor colour can be dispersed (buumaoOai) in material particles, as Empedocles' line of reasoning would imply. i3v Si o*rcvur ov hvvatsBai. 1 Arist. de Sens. iv. 442* 29; Mullach, Democr., p. 405. SMELLING 137 of " figures " V Theophrastus tells ite that in his theories odour de- respecting smelling, touching, and tasting, Democritus ^i,° or ' resembled most other philosophers V For him, as for most definite of the other '""P* , by stating objects of these senses : they too were but variations of that it is the tangible, their qualitative distinctness being merely "f 6 "',"? subjective — due to QavraaCa 3 . Having explained in detail emanating the various sensations and objects of tasting, he probably odorous thought that those of smelling— closely related as they are to ^"^ those of tasting— could be easily explained on the analogy thenostnis. of these, as deducible from the figures of the atoms which caused them. However this may be, ' he neglected to add a definite account of odour ; all he tells us respecting it is that the finer matter, passing by emanation from the heavy, produces odour. What the particular natures of the agent and patient in this sensory operation are he did not go on to inform us, though this was the main point *.' Anaxagoras. § 8. 'Anaxagoras asserts that we exercise the sense of Function smell in connexion with the respiratory process V ' Large "s^eWne. animals (according to Anaxagoras) hear loud sounds, and at Smelling great distances . . . small animals low sounds and those close w uh j t in- by. And it is likewise as regards the sense of smell ; for air nalat i° n - 1 Theophr. de Odor. § 64; Diels, VorSi, p. 390 W it) nor* Aijpxi- icpiTor rove pin xvpoiie irpor Tijf ytvaiv airoSiSoai, rat o' oapis f irpos Tar inroKfipivas alaBrjatit ; ai (pitriy, iWa iravra iradi) tt\s alaBrflnas dXXoiou/w'injr, «£ ijr yivtoBai rrpi Xpuvraaiav. 1 Theophr. de Sens. § 83 ; Diels, Vors., p. 396 ; Box., p. 524 ir«pi Si oaprjt irpo(ra(popi(fiv irapijittv trX^y toitovtov, ort to Xfnrov anoppt'ov aVo ruv fiapiuv irouXiqv oSpijv' iroion Si rt tijx (pvoiv h» vtto nVot iratrx*', oyKtrt Ttpaai6i\Ktv, Snip uras §» Kvpturarov. Of o&pr)v Diels (Dox. I.e.) says ' servavi ut Democriteum.' For the Epicurean and probably Demo- critean theory of smelling, cf. further, Lucret. iv. 673-86 with Giussani's notes. 8 Theophr. de Sens. § 28 j Diels, Vors., p. 323 i>oairus li na\ 00- 1< ri tA " Xt * Tl > v < "P a »«"XXp», oapaivta6 yap ivapporrciv rots iropots iroici rt]\> atS <1 Tit ecij rj Kpdirti ovppirpos, brjhov its alaOavoptvov av. The suggestion formerly made by Diels (Dox., p. 510, 16 n.) to read (ra) » irtpi rbv tyniipaXov (f>XffiS>v—ga.ve at all events the required sense, so far as it went ; but the difficult «ai oi remained. The MSS. XiirroraTor 8' iv olr r/ tidBcats aavppirpos, ku\ ov uiiynxrBai cannot stand. Diogenes could not have said that the air or the brain is Xtm-orarov in those whose sense of smell is defective, for according to him the greater the thinness of the air in the brain, and the greater the fineness of its ducts, the more excellent is the faculty of smelling. SMELLING 141 passage (he smells more acutely), for thus it Is more «nlm«ls in quickly discerned. Wherefore in some of the other ^'^ animals the sense of smell is more perfect than in man. Not but that man, too, if the given odour were sym- metrical, so as to blend duly, with the (intra-organic) air, would have this faculty in its highest perfection 1 .' In Diogenes, all the elements which were mixed to form man's body, and all elements whatever, are reducible to irjp — the one substance from which all phenomenal sub- stances are differentiated. Of the physical nature of dpr]aiv piv ovv o£vrari)>' o'r Aa^toToc ar)p iv 177 n«pa\rj' r&xurra yap ptiyvvcrBai' Kai irpos tovtois c'av eXicp Jia paKporipov (jwcporipov ? Diels) xai oTtwripov' darrov yap ovru xpiiifaBai' Sionep cwa ruv (aav Atrippaim- Kartpa ran avdpunav firm' ov pt)V aKKa, avppirpov y* ovarjs rijs oa/ujc rai iipt it pis tijv tpaoiv, uakurra &t> alaBavmBai r&» avBpamov. Diels' sugges- tion pitpoTi'pov is supported by the sense. Perhaps paKporipov was a correction of some one who remembered what Aristotle says (de Gen. An. v. 2. 7$i b 10) about the more acute sense of distant sounds and odours being connected with longer tubes inwards from the orifices of the ear and nose. 8 Theophr. de Sent. § 6 ; Diels, Dox., p. 500 mp\ tl or na\ yiatuc Kai i5g nidl conceptions on the subject of odour — the object of the obscurely sense of smell — than on the subjects hitherto dealt with, eyed crea- see i n g» hearing, and their objects. It is not as clear what turesdo the physical nature of odour is as what the natures of which to colour and sound are. The ground of this is, that our them are olfactory sense is not exact in its perceptions, but inferior nificantof to that of many other animals. Mankind have but an sence'of imperfect sense of smell ; they perceive none of the objects danger of this sense, except in connexion with their pleasurable- contrary. ness or unpleasantness, which at once betrays the imper- 1 Rep. 584 B-C 3. ' 421* 27 aXXa ra yiv Zxpwri . . . rh ii roipairrlov. ' De Sens. v. 443 b 6-12. For the above analogies see also § 19 infra. i4« THE FIVE SENSES between the two senses which are modes of touch (i.e. &4>q and ytvcris), and the other two which perceive through an external medium 1 . Organ ot § 15. The organ of smelling is (as Aristotle thinks, InanhnaU contrar y to the opinion of previous psychologists, who held generally, it to be of fire) constituted of air in animals which respire, of and ser- water in the case of aquatic animals. In the former class p™ 15 - it is, perhaps, furnished with a ww/ia, or cover, analogous respiring to the lid which covers the eye (see infra § 18, p. 151). """"h - The veins or pores of this covering must be opened by the breath inhaled, before smelling can take place 2 . This explains why it is that we perceive odour only when inhaling, not when exhaling or holding the breath, and that under water we cannot smell, since inhalation is there impossible. Aquatic animals can smell under water just because probably they are without this covering of the organ of smell (vide infra, § 18). 'The organs of smell are placed with good reason between the eyes. For as the body consists of two parts, a right half and a left, so also each organ of sense is double.' This is not so obvious in the cases of taste and touch as in the senses of hearing, seeing, and smelling. ' There are two nostrils, though these are combined together. Were they other- wise disposed, and separated from each other as are the ears, neither they nor the nose in which they are placed would be able to perform their office. For in such animals as have nostrils olfaction is effected by means of inhala- tion, and the organ of inhalation is placed in front, and in the middle line. This is the reason why nature has brought the two nostrils together, and placed them as the central of the three sense-organs, setting them, as it were, on either side of a single line, in a direction parallel to the inhalatory motion V ' In the generality of quadrupeds and viviparous animals there is no great variety in the forms of the organ of smell. ... In no animal is this so peculiar 1 445» 5-8. * DeAn. ii. 9. 42 i b I4seqq.; de Sens. v. 444 b 22seqq. » Arist. de Part. An. ii. 10. 6s6 b 31-657* II (Dr. Ogle's Transl. with a few changes). SMELLING 147 as in the elephant, where it attains an extraordinary size and strength, for the elephant uses its nostril as a hand. . . . Just as divers are sometimes provided with instruments for respiration, through which they can draw air from above the water, and thus may remain for a long while under the sea, so also have elephants been furnished by nature with their lengthened nostril ; and when they have to traverse the water, they lift this up above the surface, and breathe through it. ... A nostril is given to the elephant for respira- tion as to every animal that has a lung, and its proboscis is its nostril. ... In birds and serpents there is nothing which can be called a nostril, except from a functional point of view. ... A bird, at any rate, has nothing which can be properly called a nose. In its beak, however, are olfactory passages, but no nostrils. ... As for those animals that have no respiration, it has been already explained why it is that they are without nostrils, and perceive odours either through gills, or through a blow-hole, or, if they are insects, by the hypozoma ; and how their power of smelling depends, like their motions, upon the innate spirit of their bodies which in all of them is implanted by nature and not introduced from without V ' Another part of the face is the nose, which forms the passage for the breath. . . . Through this part is performed respiration. It is, indeed, possible to live without breathing through the nose, but through this alone smelling; i. e. the sense by which we perceive odour, is effected. Its parts — for it is bipartite — are the septum, which is of cartilage, and an empty duct on either side of this *.' ' Nature, as it were en passant, employs the respiratory process, in the case of certain animals, for the purpose of the sense of smelling. Hence, almost all animals have the sense of smell, though all have not the same sort of olfactory organ V § 16. The sense of smelling operates through a medium — Medium of smelling : 1 Arist. de Part. An. ii. 16. 6s8 b 27-6$9 h 19 (Dr. Ogle). * Arist. Hist. An. i. II. 49* b 5-'7- * Arist. de Respir. 7. 473* 23-7 ; cf. de Sens. v. 444' 25-8 for similar words. LI 148 THE FIVE SENSES air or air or water x . Aquatic animals appear to have a sense of latteris the °dour. This sense is possessed alike by sanguineous and medium of by bloodless animals, and generally by all which live in the odour for ...,,,. , ° ' , , . aquatic air V™ iv "*P l ; \ for some of the last come from great dis- CTeatures. tances directly to their food when they have got the scent general of it *. What the organ of smelling (or hearing) is in the ^tbT' case of fishes and otner animals that live beneath the water 4 dia- ^ is not known 3 . But the medium is in general the same Includes as that OI " seeing, viz. the diaphanous : only it is not qua b? 111 - diaphanous that it serves asjnedium of smelling, but (§19 ever qua infra) qua having the power of washing or rinsing its native noS'b "this quality out °f the sapid dryness (p. 152, n. 1). How the a medium medium acts, or how odour is conveyed through or by it but eta*' from the odorous object to the organ, had been considered capable of before Aristotle's time. Older writers took the essential andabsorb- constituent of the organ of smelling to be fire 4 , and regarded "j^f f odour itself as a fumid exhalation (kowpu5)js ivaOvptcuris) the *«/»'ir)t aiaOvfuaeis is energetically contradicted) requires this very assumption of oo-jjij being i'k impos ; for the wholesome effect of ooyiy on the brain is derived from the heat of the former. Cf. 444 b I o-u/i/i«rpos yap avrav (sc. tup ov/iav) ij tffp/ioTrjr, and also 444* 22~4 f] yap rijf oap')S iCvafut Stpfiri ti\v tpva-iv. Though arjp is hot and moist, I cannot think that it is to air and not fire that the heating effect of 00-/117 is intended to be ascribed in these passages. How the inconsistency is to be explained is another matter. See infra, § 22. SMELLING 149 exhalation-theory,' It furnished them with the analogy had made which they sought for to explain the transmission of the ^ "£"* odorous particles through the medium. Heraclitus implied ment of his acceptance of it when he asserted that * if all existing ^!Si* things were reduced to "smoke" 1 (i.e. the above fumid «° »* fi ™. exhalation) the nose would be the organ which would object to perceive or discern all things.' Aristotle {de Sens. v)^{™^- though he regards odour as naturally ' hot,' rejects this evapora- theory of its being Kairwuojjs iivaOvntatrts, for other reasons H° n rac ij tnf but particularly because (a) since fumid exhalation does not held the occur under water, it leaves inexplicable the fact that fishes theo^o"" have the olfactory sense ; and because (6) this theory is ° do "-. analogous to, and must stand or fall with, the theory ofofperfec- emanations, which he has already declared to be untenable. ^"glory" All that has been urged against the theory of avoppoaC sense, (a) in relation to the other senses, may be used m argument ™^p t i on> against it in relation to the sense of smell. Aristotle (p n j<*. probably intends here to confute Plato, who regarded all nation. odour as either Kairv6s or 6/ifxM *• Perfection of the sense J e he e ^° d r s m " of smelling, as of the senses of seeing and hearing, involves having two things, viz. (a) perception of its object at a long ^J^ distance; and {b) nice discrimination of differences of connected quality in the object. The latter element of perfection ^n. The depends on the purity of the organ, and the freedom from la " er °? alien matter of the membrane which covers it. The former f the con- element depends on the length of the passages in the organ ^ n u r ^ n ° f which convey the external stimulus inwards to the ' point of Depen- sense.' These rules of perfection hold alike, indeed, for the of f °"o£ he three organs which have external media, viz. those of seeing, ftnction hearing.and smelling*. We are led to infer that the operation Tilpirm of smelling is ultimately effected by the crv^vrov irvtOjua, or ««w«- connatural spirit, with which the olfactory channel is filled. This spirit conveys the dV/iTj, or stimulus of 6o oar see without first raising and removing the eyelids. But organ may hard-eyed creatures are without anything of this sort ; they ^no°m. see at once whatever presents itself to them in the diapha- while that nous medium of vision V ' They do not need, besides eyes, respiring an eye-opening apparatus, but see directly, once there is creatures 1. 1 0i ,w . *, . . ISWlthoUt anything to be seen'. In the selfsame way in the non-it. Re- respiring animals the olfactory organ seems to stand jP^ 11 ""^ uncovered, like the eye in the case described ; while in tingently, creatures which respire this organ seems to have upon it economy a sort of lid (irfiua) or curtain (eiriKd\vuu.a), which the breath of nature, • . 1 ,«./■/*• . . . , , . , joined with inhaled lifts off and removes, the veins and pores being then smelling dilated ; hence they can smell only when inhaling. In in "f^ m creatures which do not respire, this lid may be regarded as permanently removed V * The reason why animals which respire cannot smell under water is now manifest. To smell they should inhale air, and for them to do this under water would be impossible V The connexion, therefore, between the sense of smell and respiration is not, as Empedocles thought, necessary, but merely contingent (§15 supra) 5 . § 19. Physically regarded, odour consists of the Dry, just Object of as taste consists of the Moist, and as the object of smell ^J'~ is actually, such is the organ potentially '. As, therefore, regarded there is a sensible analogy between tastes and smells, so£f^'" ''" there is a physical analogy also, resting on their origin between respectively. ' Our physical conception of odours must be taste, so analogous to that of savours, inasmuch as the sapid moist 5£"|!" <1 r (see note i, p. 15a) effects, in water and air alike, in the cold on sphere of another sense, what the (nutrient) dry effects in^°^^ rt 1 Arist. de An. ii. 9. 42i b 26-32. * 444* 27-8. » 42i» 32-422* 3 and 444 b 21-8. 4 422* 3-6. 8 Theophr. de Sens. § 21 ; Diels, Von., p. I79» ' 422* 6-7. i5a THE FIVE SENSES the 'font/ the water (moist) only 1 . We attribute diaphanousness to istsuader k°th water an< * a ' r > But '* ' s not m virtue of this quality •water. DeC that either of these is a vehicle of odour, but in virtue of the power which the so-called diaphanous has of rinsing out, and so contracting, the quality of sapid dryness from objects which possess it. Again, if the dry produces in water and air an effect as of something washed out into these, there must be an analogy between savours and odours. . . . Plainly, odour is, in water and air, what savour is in water. This explains why excessive cold, as of frost, dulls the odour and taste of things ; as it destroys the kinetic heat by which sapidity — the base of odour — is wrought into the substance of the moist. That the object of smell — odour — exists not only in air, but also in water, is proved by the case of fishes and testacea, which are seen to • possess the faculty of smelling, in spite of the fact that water does not contain air (since air generated under water always rises to the surface and escapes), and though these creatures do not respire. Hence, if we grant that air and water are both moist, it follows that we may define odour as the natural substance of the sapid dry in a moist medium* ; and whatever is of this nature is an object of smell 3 . Odour § 20. We may see by comparing the things which have ""taste** °d° ur wit* 1 ^ e things which have it not, that the property physically of odorbusness originates in that of sapidity. Simple Stances substances (viz. the elements earth, air, fire, water) are which do tasteless, and hence they are inodorous 4 - The elements not possess 1 442* 27-443* 2. The nutrient dry produces sapidity in water : the sapid moist produces odorousness in air and water. The quality of sapidity is derived from to £np&v, which, however, to be tasted, has to be presented in a moist vehicle, or medium. In this medium it can be called the sapid moist, and as such it is the foundation of odour. The tyxypov $ipoi> is the ultimate, the tyxvpov vypav the proximate cause of odour. Hence Aristotle uses either expression — sapid dry (443» 2) or sapid moist (442 b 29)— in this connexion, and Torstrik's iijpoV for vypiv in 442 b 29 is needless. 2 In air or water ; air is hot and moist as water is cold and moist. * Arist. de Sens. v. 442 b 30-443* 8 and 443'' 6-16. * Cf.Theophr. U«pi 'Oapiav, i.lai 0071m to piv SKov i< (ui£tat 1 1V1 xaddntp 01 xv/uu* to yap Sptucrov airav aoopov, Cxnttp aj^vpov, JtA kiu to dirXa aoSfia, otbv CSap aljp nip' ij &€ yr) paKurra rj povr) odpqv c^ci, diu paXitrra petKTi). SMELLING ' 153 are inodorous because in them the moist and the dry are taste have without sapidity, until some added ingredient introduces it. ^£0^ '' Sea-water, on the other hand, possessing savour as well as "«» varie » dryness *, possesses odour also. Various other substances sapidity. are found to vary in odorousness directly in proportion to °^°™ °£ d _ their sapidity. Such are salt as compared with soda, wood sicaiiy the as compared with stone ; bronze and iron as compared with samc • gold 2 . 'In fact odour and savour are physically almost the same affection, though each is realized for sense under different conditions from the other 3 . Odour is in its nature possessed of heating power *, a property which, as we shall see, makes it conducive to the health of the brain. Odour § 31. Odour is transferred from the odorous object to the ^ngh olfactory organ in a medium which, as we have seen, may be jtsmedium. air or water. Its passage through the medium is not ; s the only instantaneous ; unlike light, it requires time to travel. m b ^ ted A person who is nearer to an odorous object perceives which its odour sooner than one who is farther off 5 . Odour is \^*™ wafted to us in the air, so that we can smell distant objects, transitu. So savour is propagated through water, and, no doubt, if we were denizens of the water, we should be able to taste things, as we now smell them, from a distance 6 . The stimulus of smell like that of hearing takes time to reach us. The only object of sense which involves no time of transit is the object of vision, colour, which depends on light : for light has no transit-time. Its diffusion is co-instantaneous in diverse places. In reading this account of odour travelling through a 1 fijpoTi/ro : sea-water, according to Aristotle, contains earth, the distinctive characteristic of which is dryness, de Gen. An. iii. 11. 76l b 8-12 ; Meteor, iv. 4. 382* 3 Myirai &i riov oTot)((luv iHiairara £ijpov fliv yij, * 3 Ti6ifit6a ii vypov oapn viap, £ ijpou it yjjv. 8 443* 8-21. Aristotle's theory of odours depends on his theory of tastes, hence a good deal of the above must, to be understood, be read in the light of what will follow in the section on Tasting. 3 440 b 29-30. UaBos = the effect of the (tyxv/ioy) £i}p in the vypov — of air and water, or of water only. * 444» 24-5. • 446* 2* * 422" 11-14, 447* 6-9. Taste, for Aristotle, is, however, a mode of Touch, 434 b 18-24. 154 ' THE FIVE SENSES medium one should not forget that Aristotle steadfastly opposed the theory of iitoppoaC, or particles floating from the object to the organ. What he believed was that the object caused a change (iciVtjo-is or irddos) in the adjacent part of the medium, which change, propagated onwards to the point where medium and organ meet, became the stimulus of perception. (See de An. iii. 12. 434 b 27 seqq.) Odour U § 22. 'Odour is not fumid evaporation 1 , consisting of poration*' earth and air. Popular though this idea of it has been, other we must reject it. Yet all writers incline to take odour as fumid or - . . humid. evaporation in some form, whether fumid or humid 2 , or A^^t either indifferently 3 . The humid is mere moisture, but incon- fumid evaporation is, as we have said, composed of air between an( * earth. The former, when condensed, forms water ; views of the latter, a species of earth. Odour is not either of these, on this The one, too, consisting as it does of water, is tasteless, and point m therefore without odour; while the other evaporation cannot pans of* occur in water, and would not, as physical basis of odour, Sensu - account for the fact that subaqueous or aquatic creatures possess a sense of this 4 .' It causes much surprise when, on turning from the chapter in which we read as above to an earlier chapter of the de Sensu, we find it stated that odour, the object of smell, is (KQmv&li\s ivaOvnCacrit) fumid evaporation : the proposition denied so energetically three chapters later. ' The olfactory organ is essentially composed of fire ' (we read in ch. ii) ; ' for the olfactory organ is potentially what the olfactory sense (as actualized) ' is actually. The object is that which causes the actualization of each sense; so that the sense itself must, to begin with, have the corre- sponding potentiality. Now odour, the object of this sense, is fumid evaporation, which arises from fire ; hence the 1 Cf. 34 I b 6 seqq., 357 b 24 seqq. xatrvuSij; avaOvpuiais is, in plain English, a form of smoke, Kum6s. ' ' Mistlike evaporation,' dr/u'r. ' It will be remembered that Plato reduced i9 in all forms to either tunrvas or 6/j/^Xr;, i. e. to the Kairva&qs uvaBvpiaait or the dr/11'r of our passage. * De Sens. v. 443* 21-31. ' J yap ivtpytiq f) Str^pifinr, tovto bvvdfut ri £a(jtpavTiKiv, where tJ except into pleasant and unpleasant, titefor overlooked the distinction between the pleasantness of b^^f certain odours per se and that of others which depends on cc^ed appetite for the food from which they arise. But there is pleasure a close connexion between the taste of things and the ielt in the nutrient faculty of the soul, and animals find the odour of odour, e.g. * of flowers, food pleasant when they have an appetite for the food itself, dttlepfe*. ^hen tnev are satisfied and want no more food, they cease sant odoms to feel the odour of it pleasant. Their agreeable or dis- /«-°« 0E " agreeable quality belongs to such odours only incidentally, pleasant, i. e. as a result of their relationship to food ; but just because and those . , . .... ,, . , . , . pleasant of this relationship, all animals without exception perceive '"" V"* them. But there is a different class, viz. that of odours which The latter are/rr se agreeable or disagreeable, as for example, those of odoure can flowers, which have nothing to do with appetite (though they be divided preserve health, as below explained) either as stimulating or many as dulling it. Odours of the former class are divisible into species as %& many sub-classes as there are different classes of savours. there are savours. Those of the latter class are not divisible in the same way. cSss^oTso These latter odours are perceptible to man, and man divisible, only, as agreeable or disagreeable. Other animals perceive pleasure in on ty those of the former kind. If they perceive such this kind odours as those of sweet flowers, they are not in the least The lower degree attracted by them. If they perceive the odours k do which to man are essentially disagreeable, they evince not the slightest repugnance to them, unless, indeed, besides being disagreeable, they are noxious or pernicious, like the fumes of charcoal and brimstone. By the latter animals and. men alike are affected, and animals, like men, shun them on account of their effects. But certain plants, which to us smell offensively, seem no way offensive to the lower animals, nor do they concern themselves with them, except as affecting their food. subdivision into genera and species, and can only be classed as either pleasant or unpleasant. anima. cot. SMELLING 157 § 24. The reason why the perception of such odours is R «**?* confined to man is to be found in the comparative size perception and coldness of man's brain, which is, in proportion to his £$££* bulk, larger and moister than that of any other species of of flowers, animal. Now odour is naturally akin to the hot, and^*^,, being introduced through the act of respiration, in the , ? an . notto case of all animals which respire, it mounts up to the animals: brain, and tempers with its heat the coldness of that organ ^'"^ which might otherwise be excessive. The heat which tive large- odour contains renders it light, so that it naturally ascends jj^.° into the region of the brain, and thus produces in the latter brain - Hi » .... , , * , ., ... , gTeatersen- a healthy tone and temperature \ While this is true of S uiveness odour in all animals alike, man. for the reason above given, '° odour . , ' ' (as proved has, in his perception of odours essentially pleasant or by this per- unpleasant, an additional provision for the same purpose. ^^ It was nature's own device for counteracting the dangers additional arising from the greater size and coldness of the human ^ae by brain. Man's richer endowment in this sense, evidenced n " nre for by his perception of pleasures and pains of odour in which of his brain other animals have no share, is thus and thus only to be ex- j^^^ plained. This is the sole purpose of his perception of such effect of odours. That they effect this purpose is manifest enough, haled. for odours sweet per se are funlike sweet tastes, which Hence sweet taste often mislead) universally found to be beneficial, irre- (of food) spectively of particular states of health or appetite 2 . In ^^. be " 1 For medicinal effects of 00711} cf. Tbeophrastus, TJtpl 'Oo-puv, §§ 42 seqq. ; Athenaeus 687 D (Kock, Com. Att. ii. p. 368) ou« alias on al iv rq> tyKt in rjovqpg ovrus — iytfias pipos /uyurror, oapas iyma\

s tliriiv, 444" 32, seems to indicate uncertainty on this point) perceive them objectively, or in their effects, at all events they do not feel pleasure or pain in these odours as such. Their sense of them lacks the vividness and force with which they impress the consciousness and benefit the health of man. 1 445" 30. * olov Patf (' Abfarbung ') m ml trXwrw, 445* 4-14, 443* I. * On the ground of Alexander's stating that certain physicians held this opinion, Zeller doubtfully refers it to Alcmaeon. SMELLING 159 nourished by it is composite. Even water, when unmixed, mistaken does not suffice for food ; that which is to form part of the £^ our *" animal system must itself be corporeal ; but air is even «<«j<»» of less capable than water of assuming the required corporeal capable of form forming 10Tm ' food.which Besides, food passes into the stomach, whence the body must be derives and assimilates it. The organ by which odour is s ?^ perceived is in the head, and thither — to the respiratory odour goes ■ ., <. . % 1. ■ t» .. >. upwards to tract— odour goes in the process of inhaling. .But, not the brain; going to the stomach, it is impossible that odour should ^5°™" act as food 1 . the stomach. 1 De Sens. v. 445* 16-29 ; de An. ii. 3. 414* 10. THE ANCIENT GREEK PSYCHOLOGY OF TASTING Alcmaeon. Organ and § *• ALCMAEON says 'it is with the tongue that we function of discern tastes. For this being warm and soft dissolves The ' the sapid particles by its heat, while by its porousness and tongue is delicacy of structure it admits them into its substance and porous like * a sponge, transmits them to the sensorium 2 .' In the Placita he is ^so^ reported as teaching 'that tastes are discerned by the the sapid moisture and warmth in the tongue, in addition to its soft- which it ness 3 .' Diogenes of Apollonia compares the tongue to a dissolves sponge, and Alcmaeon seems to, have had the same idea. It bv its rot warmth absorbs the sapid juices of food, and then transmits them moisture. to wnat Alcmaeon regarded as the sensorium — the brain.- Heipiess- This very popular and superficial view of the matter may psvehology ^ e compared with that which ha3 still to serve for the to explain psychology of tasting, little though it helps us as regards the essential point, viz. how it comes to pass that the sapid particles are perceived as tastes. ' In the ordinary course of things these sensations are excited by the contact of specific sapid substances with the mucous membrane of the mouth, the substances acting in some way or other, by virtue of their chemical constitution, on the endings of the gustatory fibres 4 .' Anatomy, Physiology, and Chemistry, despite the enormous advantage they give the psychologist of to-day, have been able to advance the psychology of taste little beyond the popular and super- ficial stage at which Alcmaeon left it. Here, as in Touching, Psychology tends to merge itself in Physiology. 1 Theophr. de Sens. 25 ; Diels, Vors., p. 104 yXarrji ti tovs x v l">vt rpiV«»" x^iapav yap oiirav ri)ra itai &ira\anjra. So Wimmer reads for MSS. TTJV /*. Trjr iirakoTTiros. 1 Plut. Epil. iv. 18, Diels, Dox., p. 407 ; Vors., p. 104 'AXkjWwc r«j» vypZ> koi ry x^ la PV T V '" T S y^"> TT V v P^ f V) f"*\oKOTtfri iiaxpivtaBai roit Xypovr. i Foster, Text-Book of Physiology, § 865, p. 1398. TASTING 161 Empedocles. § a. ' As to tasting and touching, Empedocles says Taste: its nothing definite respecting either of them, not stating the^^j mode in which or the causes by which they are effected, W. the except merely to enunciate his general principle that all symme&i- sensation whatever is due to the fitting of emanations into ?» Aristotle : ' Taste is a mode of touch. Now the natural primarily substance water tends to be tasteless, but it is necessary ^ u ^ ter ' either that the water should have in itself the various particles genera of sapid qualities, though imperceptible owing to tesUmdiy their minuteness, as Empedocles holds, or &c. 4 ' In accord- s™* n size > ance with this is the view ascribed to Empedocles by Aelian f ore not that the sea contains particles of sweet water among the perceptible 1 Theophr. de Sens. §9; Diels, Vors., p. 177 mp\ hi yiiatat nil i(f>Sjc 011 &iopl((rai Kaff itaripav ovrt irus ovrt &i' & yiyvovrai, rrXqy to Koivav on ra ivapp&rrtiv toU tropins a'aOrjais io~riv. * Aet. iv. 9, Diels, Dox., p. 397 ; Vors., p. 180 Uapptviitjt, 'E/ureoVwcXqr, 'Ava£ay6pas, CttfpoKpvros, 'EnUovpos, HpoxXd'dijr napa rat o-vpptrpiat rwv tt&pav rat Kara ptpos al alaOtfruv cnurrov (icdoTj ivapp&TTOVTOt. 5 Theophr. de Sens. § 20 ro jrtpl rifv airoppo^v . .• . ir«pi hi nj* AQqv *a\ ytvaiv oi pfSioy. * Arist de Sens. \\. 44 1« 3. ■ EA1E M ifo THE FIVE SENSES severally, predominating salt. * Empedocles of Agrigentum says that of puJftt* there IS a certain portion of sweet water in the sea, though and fruits, not perceptible to all creatures, and that it serves for the derived., nourishment of the fishes. He declares that the cause of this sweetness which is produced amidst the brine is a natural one 1 .' Unfortunately Aelian omits to state what natural cause Empedocles assigned for the sweetness of sea-water ; yet we may connect his view of this with what Aristotle tells us above, that Empedocles regarded all genera of taste as existing in water, but in particles too small to be separately perceptible. The several sorts of particles might combine according to their affinities, and when enough of them come together, and are combined like with like, the perceptibly sweet, Utter, harsh, acid, and other tastes appear 2 . We must further connect with this view the statement attributed to Empedocles that wine is water which has undergone fermentation 3 . ' The differ- ences of taste in plants correspond to the variations in the manifold of their nutrient particles, and hence in the plants themselves, since they assimilate the kindred particles, from that which nourishes them, differently (in different soils), as we see in the case of vines. It is not differences in the vines that make the wine good or bad, but differences in the soil which nourishes them*.' The nourishment of 1 Aelian, Hist. An. ix. 64 'EfiircSoxXiif 6 'Axpayavrivot \iyti ri ctvat yXvcv fv 177 daXdo-cry vSap, oil itaat bijkov, rp6Xoiou 7r Hop. Wine is water that has penetrated from the rind of the vine inwards, and undergone decomposition or fermentation within the wood. * The version is from the text of Galenus, Hist. Phil., with Diels' (irapa) : rue $ia6pas cXkoptuv rat ilri rov rpitpovros i/ioioptptiar. The r^r (y^s} iroKv/itpciat of Diels [Vors.) is unfortunate, as Empedocles held not yv but vSap for the source of xv/«h'. Cf. Diels, Dox., p. 439; Vors., p. 172. TASTING 163 plants, according to Empedocles, is effected by the attrac- tion of kindred elements into them through their pores from the earth in which they grow. Demdcritus. §4. According to Democritus, 'The atomic figure hasThe«#«/ absolute existence (naff aM *nov). The acid taste (<5£w>) he ^'jfj sour declares to be formed from atomic shapes that are angular, titter, winding, small, and thin (yaivot i&fj 2 T ayrjuan nal iroX.vKaiiiTrj *„„„'„/ koI puKpbv tal Xcnrov). . .'. The sweet taste (ykvKvv) is com- "teuton; posed of shapes which are spherical and not too {ayav) according small. . . . The astringently sour ((rrpvQvov) is composed of t0 ^ e < shapes large and with many angles, and having very little shapes of rotundity. . . . The bitter (wiKpoV) consists of shapes small, ^^1°™ smooth, and spherical, having got a spherical surface which the organs actually has hooks attached to it (tjji> nfpHptpaav tl\tf\6ra case . Bat nal Kaunas Iyovo-oA . . . The saline is composed of large the bod . ll y ..it. 1 ■> state of ^ shapes, not spherical, but in some cases also not scalene 3 , person has and therefore without many flexures. . . . The pungent*^^^ (Ipiuvs) is small, spherical, and regular, but not scalene. . . . account. In the same way he explains the other " powers " (hwdutis) of each taste-stimulus, reducing them all to their atomic figures (avdywv fit to o-xwioto). Of all these shapes he says that none is simple or unmixed with the others, but that in each taste there are combined many shapes, and that each one and the same taste involves somewhat of the smooth, the rough, the spherical, the sharp, and the rest. But of the shapes that which is chiefly involved determines 1 Tbeophr.de Sens. §69. * So Diels, ' ut ex y&vot,' Dox.,p. 51711. * Diels, Vers., p. 393 aXX' iv iviar xai (ot) trcaXnyay. See next page, note 3. M % i6 4 THE FIVE SENSES the effect upon sensation, and the sensible "power" of the whole. It makes much difference also what the bodily state is with which the shapes come into relation ; for from this it happens sometimes that the same stimulus (ro aM) produces contrary subjective effects, and that contrary stimuli produce the same subjective effect V Theophr. § 5. « Democritus investing each taste with its characteristic flan!?' figure makes the sweet that which is round and large in restates this its atoms ; the astringently sour that which is large in its theory of . , -j tastes. For atoms, but rough, angular, and not spherical ; the acta, as Stin^lS its name imports, that which is sharp in its bodily shape every other (6£hv tw oy(c&>), angular, and curving, thin, and not spherical ; ^^' * f the pungent that which is spherical, thin, angular, and curving ; touching, the saline, that of which the atoms are angular, and large, and crooked (aicokwv) and isosceles ; the bitter, that which is spherical, smooth, scalene 4 , and small. The succulent (kntapov) is that which is thin, spherical, and small V We need not here endeavour to reproduce the reasons given, on the authority of Theophrastus, for the assignment of the particular shapes to the production of the respective tastes. To us the whole theory seems almost a play of fancy; yet we must not forget that to its author it was a serious attempt, on the most scientific and common-sense lines at that time known, to account physically for these sensations. Our interest in it is mainly and primarily historical. Except for the general idea of atomism, this theory of ' atomic shapes ' has little affinity to any modern scientific theory of taste, physiological or psychological. Democritus, as sufficiently appears from what precedes, 1 Theophr. de Sens. §§ 64-7 ; Diels, Vors., p. 393 ; Mullach, Democ, p. 219. 1 Mullach reads (\ovra (tkoX^vIuv ; Diels keeps the MSS. o-KoAioVqra, * crookedhess.' 3 Theophr. de Caus. PL vi. I. 6. I have given this extract for com- parison with the preceding. It shows that some degree of consistency was observed in the respective descriptions of the corpuscular shapes which according to Democritus go to form the various stimuli of taste. It may be noted that here the atoms of the saline are described as l«** 'One might, as against Democritus, well ask how it is mova ior that the different tastes are generated from or succeed '!» tr od nc - tion ? one another. For either the atomic figures must be altered so as, for instance, from scalene and angular to become spherical ; or, assuming that all the various shapes which give rise to certain tastes are in (the moist founda- 1 Cf. Arist. de Sens. iv. 442* 29. s Theophr. de Sens. § 57. 5 Theophrastus argues as if Democritus had asserted ax^ara alone to be the cause of the perception of sensible qualities. * Theophr. de Cans. PL vi. 2. 3 ; Diels, Vors., p. 390. 13 ; Mullach, Dtmocr., p. 350. i66 THE FIVE SENSES tion), e.g. those of the sour, the acid, and the sweet, some must be separated from the rest — those, that is, which determined the previous tastes in each case respectively, and were proper to them severally — while the others should hold their ground ; or else, in the third place, some must go out from the mass and others must come in. Now since alteration in the atomic figures is out of the question, the atom being incapable of change, it remains either that some must leave and others must enter, or else, simply, that some must stay, while some leave. Both these latter hypotheses are untenable, however, unless it can be shown further what it is that produces these movements — what is their efficient cause V Democritus held that the moist — rb vypov — is, as it were, a iravcrntpnta of tastes 2 . This moist is in every case the foundation of taste ; the element in which the taste atoms are, so to speak, suspended. If now a change takes place in a given taste, so that, e.g., from v6s it becomes y\vnvs, either the atoms proper to aTpvtpv6rr\s, in some given moist medium, alter their shape (which is impossible) to suit yXvmJnjs ; or else from the portion of the moist medium which is, in the given case, the vehicle of (rrpvv6rrjt, those atomic shapes depart on which this quality depended, leaving behind them those proper for ykvuvnis (as there must have been some such, since tastes are never composed of atomic shapes of one single kind, but all, or many, are associated in each case, the predominating kind fixing the quality of the whole) ; or else from that portion of the moist medium which yielded arpv(f>v6Tr\s all the atomic shapes which character- ized the taste before depart, while other shapes, suitable to ykvKvrris, are then imported from somewhere in the wider 1 Theophr. de Caus. PI. vi. 7. a ; Diels, Vors., p. 390. 20. * Cf. Arist. de Sens. iv. 441* 6 § vXiji/ roiavnjv dvai [to Hap] olov iranrirtpjiltai ^v^iuv, (eat aitavta fuv f £ v daror ylve, which produces its effect in the medium by the force or efficiency of rd 6cpp.6v 1 , Theophrastus states that the different species of tastes were popularly regarded as seven in number, or eight if the saline is separated from the bitter. Thus the number of these would correspond with those of the different species of odours and of colours 2 . Anaxagoras. § 7. ' Anaxagoras held that touching and tasting discern Tasting their objects in the same fashion (sc. by contraries). For x '°" that which is equally hot or cold with the organ of sense junctions affects it with the feeling neither of heat nor of coldness the operm . when it comes in contact with it, nor do they perceive the tion ofcon- . ■ > 1 <• 1 1 it. tranes, or sweet or the acta by means of these themselves, but they of unlike discern the cold by contrast with the hot, and the drinkable ^°£ ie (sc. sweet, of water) by contrast with the saline, the sweet The cold (generally) by contrast with the acid, according to the w ^ er ee deficiency of each of these respectively, as compared with warm and ■ vice versa r its opposite: since all alike, he says, exist within us 3 , and so in According to the Anaxagorean theory of irav iv iravrC, •" s ,! in & !t all qualities — those of taste as well as others — are found bitter together : where one is, there are all the rest. But some JJJlt m" 1 Cf. Theophr. de Caus. PI. vi. 1-7, for an exposition of his own (which is probably a more detailed Aristotelean) account of taste, and a criticism of that of Democritus. ' Theophr. de Caus. PI. vi. 4. 1-2 (he concludes : 6 ti apiOpit 6 t5» firri (caipnirarof xa\ (pvaiKinaras) ; Arist. de Sens. iv. 442* 19-29. For Democritus' theory of tasting cf. further Lucret iv. 615-32, with Giussani's notes. * Theophr. de Sens. § 28 ; Diels, Vors., p. 323. 8 rhv abrov ti rp&imr koI TiJK a' To yap Spoiae Btppav km ^rv^pov aCrt Btppalvuv oirt ^v\tiv irkxjjia{pv, oiii tl) to yXvxu xai to o£i 4V avriiy yvapLCttv, a\\a Tip piv Bfppy to yyvxP 6 ") T V 4 ' aX/ivpa>TO varipov, rw d' o|«I to yXwci Kara T^v l\X«^iK nj» ixdarou' nana yap iwirapx fprpiv iv four. 168 THE FIVE SENSES if"* 5 * 6 preponderate, others are comparatively deficient in certain &t ns» cases. ' This being so, in all composite substances we must therefo 4 * conce ' ve many sorts of matter with all sorts of qualities where one to be inherent, and germs of all things, possessing forms Sef j^ 1 and colours and savours of all kinds. Thus, too, human some one beings are constructed, and all other animals — all things Ltesa^d *h at possess a soul V Thus in the human body and in character- the organs of sense are found these infinitesimal specimens total. Thus of all sorts of qualities ; and the senses as above explained oreanUms owe t ^ le ^ r discriminating power to the opposition between too; so the qualities of the sense-organ and its object in each required case - With regard to the physical nature of the saline contrariety taste, as exhibited in sea-water, we have the following : organ and ' Anaxagoras supposed that when the moisture which stimulus originally flooded all the earth had been subjected to present, the scorching heat of the sun in its revolutions, and the Sfe^f'the finest part of the water had thus been evaporated, the sea. sediment which remained became salt and bitter 2 .' 'A third opinion as regards the manner in which the sea became briny is that the water which forms it, being filtered through the earth, and contracting by infiltration the qualities of this, becomes saline, because of the earth containing such tastes within itself; whereof writers produced a proof in the fact that salt and natron are obtained from mines dug into the earth; and they assert that in many places in the earth sharp or acid savours are found V 1 Simplic in Phys. Art's/. (Diels) pp. 34-5 ; Diels, Vors., p. 327. 29 ; Schaubach, Anax., p. 85 tovtov Si ovras ixdirrutv W7 ookcIi» tvuvai woXXd re rai lravroia iv itaai roil avyKptvoptvois /ecu mtppara iravrav xpq/idrav Kal l&eas iravroias ixovra ml \poiat sal ^Bovis. Diels renders this last word here Geriiche : in Diogenes (see infra, p. 170 n. I ) he renders ijcWijr Ceschmack. But there seems to be no reason for regarding the meaning as different in the two cases. Probably the ideas of smell and taste are united in ^oonj, here and in Diogenes, very much as they both enter into the meanings and associations of our words savour and savoury, ijtovi} thus being to *vpA what nidor is to odor. * Aetius, iii. 16. 2, Diels, Dox., p. 381, Vors., p. 322. 32 'Arafaydpor roD car' ipxh" Xi/ivafovrcr vypov irtpiKaivros into rijs qAiaicfjf irtpupopat ml rou Xcirrorarov i^arpiaBivros t Is AXvui&a itai irmpiav to Xotirov vnocrrrjvai. 1 Alexander, in Arist. Meteor., p. 67 (Hayduck); Diels, Vors., p. 322. 35 T P' T V °« oo£a wpi tfaXmrai/r iartv as Spa to Coup to Sia rijf yrjs Sirj8oi~ TASTING 169 Diogenes of ApolUmia. § 8. ' Diogenes held that, owing to the porousness of the o^nnd tongue and its softness, as well as to the fact that the vessels^™ of from the body converge into it, the various sapid juices are the tongue diffused from it, being drawn to the sensorium and the abloX" intelligent governing power, as if squeezed from a sponge V 1Uce a Theophrastus also states that, according to Diogenes, tasting blood yes- is effected by the tongue owing to its porosity and ^L ^ 16 softness or delicacy of structure \ On the same authority converge we learn that, according to Diogenes, the tongue is in the slg^fi.* "" highest degree capable of discerning * pleasure (see note),' cance of , • . . ... . . , Ine tongne inasmuch as it is most delicate in structure and porous, and, f or dia- moreover, all the vessels extend into it: whence, too, itsE° osiiof . .. illness. great significance as indicating the condition of persons who Diogenes are ill 3 . ' For it (the air) is various in character, exhibiting An'lxa- varying degrees of heat and cold, of dryness and moisture, g°r*0 "set pfvov u! tunrXivov (cf. Arist. 445 E 14) atrriji- aXpvpov ylvtrai rii ("^«» 7tj» . yqv roiouTOVf \vfiois iv aiirij' o J aifptiov tiroiovyro to xai aXat opvrTtoBai iv miTrj xai virpa' ciVai oV xai of«is X v f ^ iraXXa^ov rijr yfjc. Theophrastus says that Anaximander and Diogenes of Apollonia were of this opinion, * which Alexander, 1. c, ascribes to Anaxagoras and Metrodorus. Cf. Diels, Dox., p. 494, who quotes Arist. Meteor, ii. 2. 355 s 21 seqq. and 353 b 5 seqq. Empedocles (Diels, Dox., p. 381) spoke of the sea as Upas rrjt yijs i KKatopivrjs imo tov qXi'ov, as if suggesting by analogy an explana- tion of its saline quality. Olympiodorus refers to Heraclitus for the same figure, which Aristotle allows as a poetic metaphor, but dismisses with contempt as a scientific dictum. 1 Actius, iv. 18, Diels, Dox., p. 407, Von., p. 343. 4" A»oy«Vijr rfj apato- Tijri (here = /iai/drijTt) Tijf yXwmjs kcli Tg pakaKOTijTi xai Sia to trvvdnTci* rat a7ro tov trapaTot (It avrl,v ■tjSvayi ri Toirrav iarlv : cf. Xen. A nab. ii. 3. 16 rov paai' ovopd(frat Kaff fjftov r]V (KOOTOV. 1 Such teaching may have determined, to some degree, Aristotle's theory of the heart as sensorium. s Plato, Tim. 65 C-D. TASTING 171 the pores (r$ It t&t v6pm ota8vva ^ Ktla) ; they are presented as astringent when they dissolve (ivordKovra) and rinse (pivTovra) the tongue ; the contrary are smooth and sweet V § 10. ' With regard to savours .(xv/xuv), Plato, in treating Plato's of water, mentions four species of water. Among *«/* |Jbjective (xv\olt) he places wine, verjuice (6it6v), oil, honey, while tastes. among the affections (v&Btai) which water undergoes, he c i°s of places the earthy taste (rbv yea>br\ \vp\6v). And it is by !" at "' these particles 2 compressing and contracting the pores 3 mem). At- that (tastes are generated) 4 . The rougher particles t J™fJ™ i ' are the astringent tastes, those less rough 6 are the harsh, saline. That which acts as a detergent or kathartic on the pores ^„/fj£** t * (rd be pvnnnbv rdv iroomv nal aitoKadaprtKov) is the saline. "" eft in. , . 1 . , . i • „ tastes, ei- 1 hat which is detergent in an extreme degree, so as actually plained. to dissolve (Stare koX UrnMiv) their tissues, is bitter. Those Slfweaof particles which are warmed by. the heat of the mouth, and, taste as a ascending, dilate the pores are pungent. Those which \^ ca cause fermentation 9 are acid ; those which together with clearly be- the moisture that is in the tongue tend to relax (oiaxvrucd) m i n d, so and restore it to its normal state (owraTuca els riw d>vtriv) are far ** thii V ' was pos- sweet' 1 . The part of the Timaeus which Theophrastus had sible at the in view here is the following : ' These (earthy particles) h ™e' x . " if they are very rough (jpa.yyTepa) are astringent (trrpvipvd) planation in taste, if less rough, they are harsh (aionjpd). Those of particular. them which are detergent (p'vnrud) and rinse (airoir\.vvovra) 8 the whole environment (ttav rb irepl r^i» yKQrrav) of the 1 Tim. Locr. 100 E. . ' The ygiva pipi\ of Tim. 65 D. 9 I read iropovr after Philippson for the, to me, unintelligible xv/iovr. Plato has tpXcfiia in the corresponding place in the Timaeus, and iropaw here occurs farther on. 4 In spite of Diels' remark on the condensation and brevity of Theo- phrastus in quoting Plato, it seems that there must have been — as Wimmer held — something lost here. I supply the sense as above. * Cf. T\oaov rpaxivoiaa, Plato, Tim. 65 D. * KVKoirra : cf. (ftrip n Ka\ (ipwriv, Tim. 66 B. 7 Diels, Dox., p. 525. 4; Theophr. de Sens. § 84. ' Similar terms are used by Aristotle in connexion with the physical stimulus of taste. i7» THE FIVE SENSES tongue, if they do this immoderately, and fasten upon it so as to dissolve some of its very tissues, as is the power of alkalies (q r&v XCrpwv livams), all under such circumstances are named bitter ; those which come short of the character of the aforesaid alkalies, and have the rinsing effect in but a moderate degree, are called saline {h\vn&), being without rough bitterness, and appear rather agreeable than otherwise. Those which go into partnership (KowwvfoavTa) with, and are soothed (Aeatro/xeva) by, the warmth of the mouth, being both set aglow themselves and, in turn, acting as counter-caustics (avTiK&ovra) on that which caused their heat, being borne upwards by their lightness towards the senses of the head (irpdy ras rrjs K«pa\TJs alndrjo-eis), and cutting through all that they come in contact with — on account of these powers all such are called pungent (bpipia). But when these same earthy particles have been progres- sively fined down by decomposition, and insinuate them- selves into the narrow veins (sc. of the tongue), being as they are symmetrical with such particles of earth and air as are already in these, so that, setting these particles in motion, they cause them to be mixed together (itepi SAAtjAo), and, as they are mixed, to tumble about, and, entering severally into different places, to produce concavities which envelop the things that enter them, and which, being but hollow globules of water, become dewy vessels of air, when the dewy cellule of each, whether earthy or pure, has enveloped a particle of air ; so that those of them which are of pure moisture form transparent encinctures for the air, and are called bubbles, while those which are made of the earthy moisture, that sways and rises in all parts alike, exhibit what is called seething or fermentation : then that which is the cause of all these affections is denominated acid. An affection the opposite of all those thus described is that arising from an opposite cause, when the collocation of the entering particles in the moist environment, being naturally akin to the normal condition of the tongue, glazes and smoothes over the roughened parts, while, as for those abnormally contracted or dilated, it contracts the latter and TASTING 173 relaxes the former, and re-establishes all as far as possible in their normal state. Every such remedy of the violent affections being, when it takes place, pleasant and agreeable to every one, is called sweet 1 .' In this passage Plato, largely by the aid of a vivid and not unscientific imagina- tion, attempts to describe what would now be called a chemical process. In thus explaining the effect of the Btimuli of taste upon the organs, he has taken a considerable step beyond his predecessors, so far as they have left us any knowledge of their views on this subject. Modern empirical psychologists have at command more perfect knowledge of the gustatory tissues and structures, but the conception which still vaguely dominates theories of tasting, is that of chemical changes set up by the sapid particles in the gustatory apparatus. Chemistry as a science did not exist in Plato's time, or for many centuries afterwards, and it is, therefore, the more surprising that he should have had recourse to an idea which is purely chemical for his explanation of at least one of the objects of taste — the acid. In this he shows a conception far in advance of all predecessors, and more developed than that of Aristotle. § 11. 'Most forms of waters intermingled with one^^? 7 another are, taken as a whole class, called saps z when they (x?p<»). have been filtered through the plants that grow out ofin^^. the earth 8 ; but having, owing to their various mixtures, s™ ™ odi - severally acquired dissimilar natures, they present, for the water, pro- rest, many nameless kinds ; yet there are four of them which |j° ce< * by are of a fiery nature, and which, being most transparent, have through received special names: — (1) That which warms the soul^'JI^* together with the body is wine. (3) That which is smooth Four spe- and dilates the visual current (biaKpirubv oxfrtots), and there- (1) w i ne; ' fore presents itself as bright in appearance, and glistening ('5 ° ,l > (3) and oily — a thing of oily species— such is resin, or castor- verjuice. oil (kLki), or common olive-oil (l\aiov) itself, or other things J f h e e 1 ° h at a U n'd 1 Plat. Tim. 65 d-66 c. its effects 1 xv/i°' is here used by Plato in the sense in which -xvXof is regularly used by Theophrastus. * vbarvtv ttit) . . • {ipirav y.iv tA yivot tta rav in. y ijs vruv rjfftjptva xv/iol \ty6fifvoi. 174 THE FIVE SENSES opon the of the same power. (3) That which relieves the tension 3T °f *^ e passages in the mouth and restores their natural condition (iia\vrtK6» /^XP l ^vvcus r&v ire pi rb v), producing by this property sweetness to the taste — this has received the name of honey as its most general appellation. (4) That which dissolves the flesh (SiaAvruov ttjs crapicos) by burning, a frothy kind of substance (pw8«s yivos), is, when singled out from all the other saps and taken by itself, what has been named verjuice V For Plato the organ of tasting is * the tongue ' ; he (Hke Aristotle) does not speak of * the palate ' as concerned. Plato does not probe into questions (a) respecting the proper organ of this sense, or {b) regarding its relationship to touch or smell. Aristotle. Objtct ud § 1 2. Tasting is the variety of touching which peculiarly ^"l "aistto subserves nutrition. The object of taste, viz. the gustable, Taste a is something tangible 2 : this explains why it is not per- tonchT "its cept'ble through a foreign body interposed as a medium ; medium for the sense of touch acts through no foreign (i. e. extra- to the organic) medium. The tongue is, however, itself a medium, body. The though internal, i. e. belonging to the body. It is related its flesh is, to the organ of taste proper, as e. g. air is to the organ medhun of °^ h earm g *• Moreover x^Mo's, the object of taste, is con- taste. The veyed in the moist as its vehicle, and the moist is a tangible: nSS" ° which again exhibits the object of taste as tangible. The of taste, object of taste, being conveyed thus in the moist vehicle, taste. is naturally regarded as connected in its physical origin Water/*r w j t j 1 wa t er . Views have differed as to the nature of this se tasteless. Derives connexion. Empedocles held that the water already as such femn earth contains fully developed within itself all sorts of savours, when which, however, are so infinitesimally small as to be imper- throngh ceptible ; others again have held water for the material out this - , p ky- of which, as out of a seminary (irai»opaC of taste, as Empedocles ° ™£ held. Without any contributory activity on the part of the perceives water, such hiafyopal are wrought into it by an extraneous abu^nd cause, which affects it as agent affects patient. Just so one the s °^ can impart a taste to water by washing something sapid in Two mean- it. Such is the way in which nature produces all savours — i a ^ e ° f xvpoi — by sifting or straining the moist element (of water) through the dry (of earth), and so imparting to the former its sapid quality 1 . H ence the gustable — x v H°'s or T & ytvorov — may be physically defined as the affection produced in the moist by the dry 2 , and capable of converting the faculty of taste front potentiality to actuality |S . Were we creatures living in water instead of air 4 , we should indeed perceive the sweet if infused into this water; yet our perception would still be one of touch : not even then would it be perceived through the water as external medium. It would be per- ceived immediately, owing to the sweet being blended with the particular moisture with which we happened to be in contact, just as in the case of the water which we drink and find sweet. It is not thus, i.e. by mixing with the medium, that colour is perceived. Taste has no medium externally to the organ: its medium is the so-called organ (the tongue) itself when moistened. Nothing produces the sense of taste without moisture ; everything which excites this sense has moisture actually or potentially ; as for example, the saline, which is in itself easily liquefied, and by its lique- faction tends to actualize the potential liquidity or moisture of the tongue. The sense of taste, like the others, has for its object a genus embracing contraries. It perceives the gustable and the non-gustable, meaning by the latter either that which is sapid but only in an infra-sensible degree, or else that the taste of which is destructive of the sense. The difference between the palatable and unpalatable in drinks seems the foundation of the matter. Both are objects of taste, but while the former is natural and normal, the 1 441* 4-44i b 14- * Sc tA rptyipov frpSv, 441* 24. • 44i b i» * 4 M * 11. 17* THE FIVE SENSES latter is in its tendency destructive. The 'drinkable/ too, as an object is perceptible by touch as well as taste. The § 13. Since the object of taste is moist *, the tongue, qua jwaforgan, organ of taste*, must be neither actually moist nor incapable be^ctuSl °^ b ecormn S moist. The sense of taste is passively affected moist: only by the object. Hence the part of the body which is to be the potentially g^n r t his sense should be something capable of being capable moistened, while yet preserving its distinctive nature, not moj^fed. something actually and always moist s . A proof that the Tastin s: organ should be thus capable of being moistened, yet not impededby ° ... , . , , , . . . excessive actually moist, is found in the fact that tasting is lmpos- "x 3 ™?*-™ s *ble, or difficult, when the tongue is either quite dry, or moisture excessively moist. In the latter case, when we attempt to To'mra.'an taste something, what ensues is merely a tactual perception organ of of the moisture of the tongue, in which the sense of taste proper is merged and disappears. With this tactual per- ception the organ is preoccupied, as it might be with a previous taste, if a person after tasting something of very strong savour were immediately to try to taste some other savour. So it is that sick persons find sweet things bitter, because the tongue is full of bitter moisture. The tongue is an organ of touch as well as of taste 4 . With this same part wherewith we taste, we can perceive any given object of touch 6 . The ele- § 14. None of the elements — not even water — has a taste fe?se taste- P er se ~ All tastes arise from some sort of mixture in the 1 422» 34 seqq. * Sc the tongue (533* 26 tA tu>v \vpmv uttrOijrripioy tiji> yXuTrav), popu- larly regarded as the organ of taste : all this has to be considered in the fuller light of Aristotle's discussion of the organs of touch and taste. * aa(6fi€voy : preserving its distinctive nature as an organ of taste. The moistening which the organ has to undergo is only subsidiary to its gustatory function, which primarily depends on something else than the moisture, viz. upon the sapid stimulus of which the moisture is but the solvent or vehicle. The moisture is a means — something secondary- employed by the organ for its proper purpose ; thus were the organ to be- come actually moist, it would forsake its distinctive and proper character. * Aristotle, notwithstanding what he says 423 b 17, often speaks of the tongue as organ — instead of intra-organic medium — of taste. Cf. § 12 supra. * 423' 17-18. TASTING 177 moist medium. Wine and all sapid substances, which, from Uu. All a state of vapour, are condensed into moisture, become JJJJJ jj 1 * water. Others are affections of water itself caused by some- mixture thing mixed with it. The taste ensuing corresponds to that "hTcie. which is thus mixed with the water 1 . Moreover no simple 7» s . te <«*: element — only a mixture of elements — can effect the pur- nutriment; pose of nutrition. Hence there is a fundamental con- HJ^'V* nexion between taste and nutrition 2 . The object or final composi- cause of this sense is nutrition 8 . Yet only the sweet m o?s°and actually nourishes : all other varieties of taste are, like the d /y- ° nI r saline and the acid, merely ways in which nature seasons however/ the sweet to make it the more suitable for its purpose *. j^™]^ In the case of objective tastes, as of colours, the contraries Between are relatively simple, i. e. the sweet and the bitter. These ^remes are the elements of the other tastes *. Next to the sweet, o( ™'" t and perhaps as a variety of this, comes the succulent f a n saiiiu, (\map6s) ; the saline and the bitter are closely akin ; while h ™ h, mt between the sweet and bitter come the harsh (avorripos), astringent, the pungent (iptnis), the astringent (arpvipvos), and the acid !££ ere m (<5£»5s). If the succulent is a kind of sweet, there appear se^en to be seven leading varieties of tastes, as there are ofjjte, as of colours 6 . The faculty of taste is that which is potentially ^.oxamd such as each of these objective tastes is ; while the object of taste is that which in each case makes the faculty actually such T . § 15. Taste is a sort of touch, if only because it has to With do with nutrition. Nutriment must be something tangible, (""h'lnd Sound, colour, and odour do not nourish, nor do they cause >'* modi- either growth or decay. Hence tasting must be (as we have t^e n e- said) a mode of touching, as it is that which perceives "f^ 11 / ' the nutrient tangible. All animals with the sense of touch desire possess i mOvpia, or the impulse towards what is pleasant. i lwtiv i ua )- Moreover they have a discriminating perception of their > 358 b 18, 443 1 26 seqq. » 44 i b 24 seqq., 44** 1 seqq. ' 436* 15 f) &f ytvcrtt 8»A rqv rpoipqv, 435* 22, 434* 18 q ytvau Sxnrtp &av«'y. food and They have hearing in order that they may be able to heart is the apprehend significant sounds conveyed through the air to true organ their ears : and they possess in the tongue an organ of touch , . , , , _ , and taste; wherewith to convey such sounds to others. But they ma£i/is/i P ossess taste on account of the difference between the agree- connect able and the disagreeable in food and drink ; in order that wi^tthe" t^ey mav b e a b' e to apprehend this difference, and accord- heart, ing to such apprehension, may direct their movements ceUence ia to the seizure or avoidance of certain things as food. tonch and Serpents and saurians have a peculiarly delicate and keen sense of taste, nature having endowed them with tongues long and forked, with a fine extremity furnished with hairs. This formation of the tongue doubles the pleasure which such creatures feel in agreeable tastes, since the sense itself is thus possessed of twofold power *. The organ of taste like that of touch is connected with the vital organs. The region of the heart is the foundation of the senses, of which two — those of touch and taste — are manifestly connected with the heart 3 - Of all animals man is the most finely sensi- 1 Arist. tie An. iii. 12. 434* 18-26. * Depart. An. 66o b 6-10. * 469 s 12-16, 656* 27-31. TASTING 179 tive as regards touch. Man's tongue, too, is soft 1 , which makes it particularly sensitive in touching; and tasting, the tongue's proper function, is a kind of touching. Man's sense of touching is the most perfect, and in it he excels all other animals. Next comes his sense of tasting. In the other senses he has no superiority to the lower animals, many of which, on the contrary, have better sight and hearing, and a keener olfactory sense a . As to the way in which the organ of taste discharges its function, Aristotle has made no real advance beyond the positions taken up by Alcmaeon or Diogenes. 1 66o» 20-22 reading fj y\S>rra /laXaxij, instead of Bekker's ij /*. yX. * 494 b 16-18, 421* 17-26. N a THE ANCIENT GREEK PSYCHOLOGY OF TOUCHING Alcmaeon — Empedocles. Touching, § i. The pre-Aristotelean psychologists have left com- though the paratively little on record respecting this sense, although mental it was, according to the opinion of several of them, the H^ii™ fundamental sense — that from which the others are treatei developed, or at least in some way derived. Not indeed until we come to Aristotle himself do we find a real or business-like attempt to treat of touching. True, Plato gives a detailed account of the objects of the sense, as he conceived them ; but of the organ, or its operation, we read little in his remains or those of his predecessors. That little has, however, in accordance with the plan hitherto followed, to be here set forth in its entirety. Alcmaeon. According to Theophrastus x Alcmaeon altogether omitted to. treat, at least in his writings, of the sense of touching — its organ or mode of operation. Theophrastus makes a Empe- similar statement of Empedocles, with this difference that while, according to him, the former seems to have omitted phrastns' all reference to touching, the latter, though not indeed cnticism of treating it with complete neglect, failed to give a distinct dodes* and detailed theory of touch. He merely threw out the ?he°fonc-° general suggestion that this, like the other senses, is to be tion of explained by the operation of ' emanations ' entering into actung. ^^ fitting the 'pores' of the organ 2 . Theophrastus is of opinion that the Empedoclean theory of perception by * emanations ' is even less plausible with regard to touching (and tasting) than in reference to the other senses. ' How,' he asks, * are we to conceive sensible distinctions of taste or touch as made by means of emanation (airoppojj) ? how 1 Theophr. de Sens. § 26. 1 mp\ Si ytwruvs «i)S ov oiopi'fmu tad' iKaripav oBrt nas offrf oi" A yiyvovrai, irXiJi* to kouiov on tu ivapp&rrtiv rots nopois maffqaic torn', Theophr. de Sens. §§ 7, 9. Also Arist. de Gen. et Corr. A. 8. 324 b 26 seqq. TOUCHING 181 are we to discriminate " the rough *' or " the smooth" by its fitting into •« the pores * " ? * Yet Empedocles seems to bring all the other sensations under the sense of touch. • He says of all alike that they are caused ultimately by "emanations" entering and fitting into the pores of the respective organs. Whence it is that one sense-organ is not susceptible of the sensations proper to another ; since the " emanations " which fit the pores of one are too large or too small for those of another, and therefore are not followed by the due sensory effect Those that are too small pass right through the pores urithout touching (ov\ &in-<$/«i>a) its sides ; those that are too large cannot enter at all V Thus the primary condition of the proper exercise of each and every sense-organ is found to consist in a fact of touch — the due contact between the ' emanation ' and the inner surface of the pore ; yet of the sense of touching he has propounded no special theory. No idea of the sensory function of nerves existed till long after Empedocles ; and the seeming ' immediacy ' of touch was, perhaps, what debarred it in his opinion from being easily explained in detail by the theory of iiroppoaC, which operate at a distance and through a medium 3 . The difficulty felt in applying his general theory to touching was of course felt also in reference to the kindred sense of tasting. Accordingly we have from Empedocles no particular information as to either the objects or the organs and functions of touching and tasting. Democritus. § a. Here, too, we are disappointed. The whole tenor of Demo- the physics and psychology of Democritus himself, as well as J-j^^ the assertions of Aristotle, make it perfectly clear that for other Democritus the sense of touching was the primary sense, 5^f ° ; Democritus and most of the " physiologi " who treat of '°° ch » J** i. 7 ..fails to sense do a very extraordinary thing : they represent all give a par- objects of sense as objects of touch. If, however, this J^^ is true it plainly follows that each of the other senses is account 1 De Sens. § 20. ' Theophr. de Sens. § 7. 8 By onoppoai too he explains the properties of the magnet. Cf. Alex. Quaes/, ii. 23, p. 72. 9 (Bruns). i8z THE FIVE SENSES of this. a kind of touch, which is manifestly impossible 1 .' Thi3 p?ijSrties was not onl y a biological but a physical conclusion. It of atoms was the opinion of Democritus that we see, hear, smell, each/w taste, and touch by the agency of atoms, which are the relation" sole ultimatelv real 5 the ultimate 'things.' We must to one distinguish carefully between res naturae, i. e. such ' things ' ultimate za we P erc eive, and the atoms, or real things, which reason or primary alone reveals. The physical qualities of each atom are properties' weight and solidity. To these must be added local motion, of res which in each and every atom goes on eternally. It has also (atom- geometrical qualities— -figure and magnitude. The primary p?«esi physical qualities of res naturae are also weight and solidity. All other Their weight depends on the number and size of the atoms are only i" them ; their solidity (which is only comparative) on the sabjec- density of the atoms. The differences of the atoms com- ' affections pared inter se when forming sensibilia consist of order, °f?" ^' figure, and position. AH differ from H A in order; A differs from H in figure ; I from H in position '*. Besides atoms, void was postulated to explain the possi- bility of movement. The principal ' distinction ' (biaopd) for Democritus seems to have been that of figure: hence the name ' figure ' is frequently employed to designate the atom. Thus the only ultimate properties or qualities of sensible things are tangibilia, and from the physical point of view we see how all the objects of sense had to be reduced to those of touch. Only the above-named qualities are objectively real; the rest are subjective, due to our sensibility. § 3. Such are our sensations of taste, colour, smell, sound, and (among tangibles) temperature. It would seem then 1 Arist. de Sens. iv. 442' 39. This criticism appears to exhibit Aris- totle as incapable of profoundly apprehending the idea of biological development. Yet, strangely, he himself most firmly held the theory that Touch is the original sense from which all others have been differentiated. Vide Sensation in General, § 23, and Sensus Communis, § 49. * Cf. Vision, § 19, p. 37 n. 2 supra. Theophrastus (de Sens. §§ 61 seqq.), in stating the physical qualities of the atoms, seems to use o-KXijpdrijr loosely for mwti/d'ri/t — hardness for solidity. Plato (§ 6 infra) did not confound these. TOUCHING 183 ■as if the desirability of a full investigation of the sense of why De- touching should have impressed itself upon Democritus *. "S^^. But we are told he left this part of his subject without any amine the attempt at originality of treatment. The fact of his not ?™ h o{ having attempted such investigation may perhaps be/o^»- explained (a) by his ignorance of the nerve-system, and {b) by assuming that he felt the difficulty of satisfying him- self with any explanation of the way in which the merely physical, conceived as such without original reference to mind, could ' pass into ' the mental. This difficulty confronted him — as it must confront every one — most formidably, just at the point where the ultimate analysis of sense (or what seemed to him to be so) is reached. To this may be traced the half-heartedness, barrenness, or absence of early physiological psychology with reference to the organ and functions of touching. To this also is due the fact that even modern physiological psychologists, when they come to deal with the sense of touching, have to be content with conclusions which scarcely take us outside the province of anatomy. It is chiefly, if not solely, in that province that real advances have been made beyond the position in which this sense was left by the ancients. True, modern psychologists have dis- tinguished, as the ancient Greeks failed to do, between cutaneous sensations (of touch proper, and of pressure), sensations of temperature, and muscular sensations; and attempts have been made, not very successfully, to connect each of these with their proper nerves or nerve-endings. But these are small matters. The biological question as to the differentiation of touch into the other senses remains now as it was then — a mystery only vaguely soluble by reference to a long process of evolution. And — to say nothing of the metaphysical difficulty of accepting touch as the ultimate authority for objective reality — there was yet another biological question, viz. that of the history of this parent-sense. How did touch itself, with all its implicit powers of development, arise? Democritus could not answer. 1 ax'b'w o/ioitM iroui toTs nXtiorots , Theophr. tie Sens. § 57. 1 84 THE FIVE SENSES This question we, too, must still either shelve, or slur over in the best way we can. All attempts at explaining a * transition* from the physico-physiological to the psychical or conscious fact have been futile. Most moderns prefer to speak or think of the so-called two facts as really one, but with two (or more) different aspects. We hesitate even to think of such ' transition.' Anaxagoras. Tocch § 4- Anaxagoras teaches that sensation is effected by the who* 11 * interaction of opposites ; for like is incapable of being senses) per- affected by its like. This principle he tries to carry out coatrarie*. w * tn reference to each particular sense. Touching (and iP^T'l tastm g) distinguish their objects as seeing and hearing the ■water do, i.e. by interaction of opposites. That which is of the'wT ^like temperature with the hand does not by its contact be of the give us the sense either of coldness or of heat. By the tra^oftiie warm we cognize the cold, as by the saline we cognize the hand, the ' potable ' 1 . Except for this we have scarcely any record it neither of Anaxagoras* teaching regarding the sense of touch. b °id^f i« ^ s Theophrastus informs us, Anaxagoras has not left on no tem- record his views of the more corporeal senses a . Diogenes J* 11 ** 1 *- a i so having left no opinions on record concerning the sense of touching, we pass on to Plato. Plato. Organ and § 5. Plato, too, has treated this sense with comparatively T f ™^ ? f slight care 3 . He has given little to determine the nature treated of the organ and function of touching. It is distinguished, regajdby ne says, from the other senses in that it is not confined Plato. to some particular part, but diffused all over the body. He that the reckons the sensations of touch among the noiva iradrjixara — tactile those belonging to the whole body as pleasant or painful 4 — 1 Theophr. de Sens. §§ 27-8. * § 37 oi fiijXoi ii rat trupmjcwrjpof aloBrprilt. 3 Theophr. de Sens. § 5 nXdruv . . . ov y.rp> cipqKf yr mpl iiraaav oXXi fuivov irtpl aKorjc Ka\ o^tus. * Tim. 64 A. Here Plato comes near recognizing the stnsus communis of modern parlance, i.e. a 'general feeling' such as that of comfort or discomfort, nausea, faintness— a totally different thing from Aristotle's sensus communis. TOUCHING 185 among which he names hot and cold, hard and soft, heavy and *a»se u du- light, rough and smooth. In the Timaeus, 6 1 D seqq., he drafts o"oto *" an explanation of some of these objects of touching. ' First 5"^°* then,' he says, ' let us see what we mean by calling fire hot. not, like' We must consider the matter as follows, remembering the *„^^ power of dividing and cutting which fire possesses and certain exercises upon our body. That the sensation is a sharp fherefbre' 1 ' one, we are all well enough aware ; and we must take <» lls ^ into account the fineness of its edges and sharpness of f touch its angles 1 , besides the smallness of its particles and the *°"" i ■"•*- swiftness of its motion, all of which qualities combine to Names render it so vehement and piercing as keenly to cut Jj n " ; on J" whatever meets it, remembering the genesis of its figure, made by that this more than any other substance separates our co i < i > bodies and minutely divides them, whence the sensation ^eavy- 1 .if.! . .• , hght.hard- that we now call heat justly derives its quality and name, soft.rongh- The opposite condition, though obvious enough, still must ^p^", not lack an explanation. When the larger particles of objective moisture which surround the body enter into it, they j^^id displace the smaller, and because they are not able to physically. pass into their places, they compress the moisture within us ; and, whereas it was irregular and mobile, they render it immovable owing to uniformity and contraction, and so it becomes rigid. And what is against nature contracted struggles in obedience to nature and thrusts itself apart ; and to this struggling and quaking has been given the name of trembling and shivering ; and both the affection and the cause of it are in all cases termed • cold.' § 6. Hard is the name given to all things to which Explana. our flesh yields; and soft to those which yield to the hard-soft: flesh : and so also they are termed in their relation to each exa 5 t }y • » , anticipates other 3 . Those which yield are such as have only a small Locke's ac- count of 1 For an account of the elementary structure of fire in accordance hardness, with Plato's geometrical physics, see Timaeus 53 C seqq. * Cf. Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, ii. 4. 4 * And, indeed, hard and soft are names that we give to things only in relation to the constitutions of our own bodies ; that being generally called hard by us, which will put us to pain sooner than change figure by the pressure of any part of our bodies ; and that, on the contrary, 186 THE FIVE SENSES base of support ; and the figure with square surfaces, as it is most firmly based, is the most stubborn form ; so, too, is whatever from the intensity of its compression offers the strongest resistance to external force. Heavy § 7. Of ' heavy ' and * light ' we shall find the clearest be invSti- explanation if we examine them together with the so-called gated to- 'below' and 'above.' Here follows an argument showing the notions that the popular notion of the universe being divided into ^f£f^ an «pper and a lower portion, to the latter of which all These bodies naturally tend, is false ; the truth being that, as the oniyr°/i- un i yer se is a sphere, there is really no such thing as an tine. The upper and a lower region in it. ' Whence (Plato goes on 63 A) a~whoie, these names (" upper " and " lower ") were derived and under being what conditions we use them to express this division of spherical, . * really con- the entire universe we may explain on the following ^k^fe- hypothesis. If one were in that region of the universe fiction, which is specially allotted to the element of fire, the region of "body* wherein is to be found collected in greatest mass the fiery is its ten- element to which our earthly fire is attracted ; and if dcncy towards its he, possessing the requisite power, takes his stand on kindred ^jg m ass and separates from it portions of the fire and element. * * Thus earth weighs them in scales, when he raises the balance and earth. 'The f° rc ibly drags the fire into the alien air, evidently he direction overpowers the smaller portions more easily than the tendency larger ; for when two masses are raised at once by the is called same force, necessarily the smaller yields more readily to 'com- , ', J . ' . , ' ward 'or the force, the larger, owing to its resistance, less readily; Lew. The hence the larger mass is said to be heavy and to tend down- contrary ° ' direction is wards ; the smaller to be light and to tend upwards. This FireTsiight ^ exactly what we ought to detect ourselves doing in our because it own region. Standing as we do on the earth, we separate from the"* 7 portions of earthy substances, or sometimes earth itself, ?" th - and draer them into the alien air with unnatural force, for But if we ° were ten- each portion clings to its own kind. Now the smaller em'pwan! mass yields more readily to our force than the larger, and 'tried a nd follows quicker into the alien element ; therefore we soft which changes the situation of its parts upon an easy and unpainful touch.' TOUCHING 187 call it " light," and the place into which we force it " above "; to detach while to the opposite conditions we apply the terms «« heavy" l* 1 ^ * and " below "... In every case it is the tendency towards should find its kindred element that makes us call the moving body earthfe "heavy," and the place to which it moves "below"; while here > *" d r 4 our notions to the reverse relations we apply the opposite names. . . . of»/>and Of the affection "smooth" and "rough" any one could ^dbe perceive the cause and explain it to another: the latter reversed, is produced by a combination of hardness and irregu- rough, «• larity ; the former by a combination of uniformity and P lained - density V § 8. For Plato the organ of touching was undoubtedly Thefune- what he called flesh — rdp$ and its concomitants, °'j^ t be as well as of the soul in its mortal nature, he has, as explained yet, given no account. These, however, cannot be really tu'jxpia- explained apart from the sensible qualities of body, nor nation of can the latter be explained apart from the former. Nor followed can they be dealt with together. He has, therefore, to b ? an a , c " ..... .... , , . countofthe assume provisionally the several distinct sensory faculties, former. to a particular account of which he purposes afterwards ^imLus to return a . The promised account is, however, nowhere Locms satisfactorily rendered. In what follows the organ and Aristotle's function of touching remain almost without an attempt doctrine - , _, . r o t tnat tne at explanation. In the Ttmaeus Locrus s , however, we qualities of have a few remarks bearing on this subject. Though {j^j* JJJ? not by Plato, they deserve to appear here for comparison all tan- with Plato's views. 'AH the sensible affections (^M t^b™* 1 Plato, Tim. 61 C-64A. Mr. Archer-Hind's translation has been for the most part adopted. 1 Tint. 61 C-D irpurrov fir ovv \map\fiv aurfli/trie bfi i-oit Xcyofu'voir atl' aapKos it xal tuv wtpl aapita yiv«riv, ^vjfit t« Saov dinjroV, oGirw 8«XnXu- 8ap*v. TOyx '" *' °^ Tt touto x w P tt T&* ir«pS to naBtipara Sua ala8r[Ta oCt f'wira avtv tovtwv Si/vara Uapug X«x#")''ai, to Si Spa irx'Hov oi Svvarov. imoBmov dq irpdrtpov Bdrtpa, to 8' xmorfdivra iitamptv a!6is' "ma o!v «'£ qr t4 iraBrjpara Xryi/rai tow yivtoiv, tara irpirtpa fjp'tv ra irtpi tr&pa not ^vx9» oVra. I adopt here Mr. Archer-Hind's aio-tfnra for oiVflnrjicd of MSS. » Tim. Leer. 100 d-e. , i88 THE FIVE SENSES and the viable were the first created properties of body : without earth no tangible, however; without fire, no visible. of body, as they are called, are named in relation to the sense of touching 1 (irorl rhv aQav jcXqffereu); while some of them are denominated from their tendency towards the earth (porta irorl rap \i&pav). It is touch that distinguishes the vital properties (ray farinas ow vtv£ is the real organ of touch, or whether the «*' *""*. real organ is not rather something internal, to which in this connexion. It may be observed that this opposition covers that of soft-hard ; see § 16, p. 195, n 6 infra. 3 330* 25 aurcu 8" ovkcti *h iXarrovt (avayovrai). * tovto fiiv ovv Xaat fin Tit ovk mroxpavrac aWa m6avSic btaXiiautv, Them, de An. ii. 1 1, p. 72. 21 (Heinze; ii. 13a 20, Spengel). * 422 b 32. * 423 b 26. T 33 Q,> 3 T ^ M'* YV WP ^tppiv Ka\ £ijpoV 6 4' aqp Btpftitv Kal \1yp6y . , . to 8' viup ifrvxpb" itai vypoV tj Si yrj \\rvxpbv Ka\ (ipiv. TOUCHING 191 Occurs simultaneously with contact between the flesh and True this an object. For if one were to take a thin membrane and ^Jf strain it close around the flesh, this membrane would, just ™ a y witi » like the naked flesh, seem to take the impression of touch between C into consciousness co-instantaneously with the occurrence "^" d b ™ of contact between it and an object. Yet such a membrane so it would would not, of course, be the organ of touch; though if, ^m b a r ^ D e e instead of being thus placed artificially round the flesh, strained it were connatural with it, the sensation of touch would over' the pass through it even more quickly, and still more would ** n - it seem to be itself sensitive. A decisive argument to medium of the contrary is this: immediate contact between the flesh £" t ch ^ and an object causes sensations .of touch ; but no other ever, is sense-organ has its specific sensations excited by immediate J-"/^ ' contact with its object. Hence we must conclude that flesh is a flesh is only to be looked on as a medium of the sense of body itself. touch, somewhat as the air would be of the other senses, if J' *? this fact (of the it were a natural growth around our bodies. On the latter medium supposition we should have been thought to perceive sound, {j?^ £°JjJ" colour, and odour by one and the same organ ; and seeing, the organ hearing, and smelling would be held to be in a manner one body) that and the same sense. ' As matters stand, however, owing to makes us 1 r /. e t .• uncertain the separateness from us (i.e. from our bodies) of the medium not only through which the movements stimulating each of these what '!* three senses pass, the difference of their several organs is but manifest 1 . But now as regards touching, this remains Jne^^ 1 423* 10. I take 8i" off yiyvovrat al ai&SrjiTcit as Simplicius did, and as IS one or Baumker (pp. tit., p. 43) does, referring it to the medium-air, which is not according to the above hypothesis irtpin€s iipiv, but oiupior/uVor. It is hard to see how Wallace's translation (which follows Themistius and Trendelenburg's note) can be acquitted of tautology. ' Now, how- ever, as matters stand, by reason of the difference in the organs by which the movements are effected, the organs of sense which we have mentioned are clearly seen to be different from one another (the italics are mine).' If the air were luitv irtpimvKoc, then (according to Aristotle's notion here) the sensibility to colour, sound, and odour would be as widely diffused over the surface of the body as is the sensibility to tangibles. The connatural air, no matter where the n/vijo-ir affected the periphery of the body, would transmit this kIvtjo-is to the sensorium, and the local separateness which marks and distinguishes the organs of seeing, hearing, and smelling would disappear. iq« THE FIVE SENSES uncertain 1 .' Hence those two senses — of touch and temperature— which, according to Aristotle's principle of determining sensory faculties according to their objects, ought to be separated, remain for ordinary consciousness combined in one single sense. Notwiih- § i a. There must, however, be such a medium of sense u^such M ^ esn ' notwithstanding its effect in defeating our attempts a. medium at analysis of the sense of touching. ' An animate body l^cessary. cannot be composed of air or water singly a : it must be In order to something solid. Accordingly it must be composed of a the qnJi- mixture of earth and these two other elements, i.e. it should te "bod* 17 ** e suc ^ a thing as flesh and what is * analogous to flesh ' viz. ulid- tend to be. Hence by implicit necessity the body must hct-aid De interposed as medium between the organ of touch and we require its object, and cohering naturally with the former, through medium, which body the varieties of sensation classed under touch The biiit» *^ alike pass notwithstanding their severalty and plurality. of several That touching does comprise several kinds of sensation is ^*f proved by the sense of touch immediately connected with mediated the tongue. For in virtue of the tongue, which is one and thesame the same organ, one has the sensation of all the other medium U objects of touching and also that of taste. Now, if the case of the rest of the flesh (as well as that of the tongue) had also tongue. been endowed with a sense of taste, touching and tasting would have been regarded as one and the same sense 3 . As it is, however, they are seen to be two, owing to the fact that their organs are not thus each capable of discharging the other's functions. Can things § 13. One might ask : if every body possesses a third submerged dimension — depth : and if two bodies, between which there in water * touch one is a third, cannot touch one another : and if, further, that S^fthings which is moist and fluid has, by implication, body, as it 1 423* 11. What remains uncertain? The answer is: both the things in question, viz. (1) what is the organ of touching (whether the flesh or something internal) ? and (2) is the sense of touching really not one but a plurality ? This uncertainty arises from the i) avls (the external medium) would stand to f/ (top?} were it naturally united with this, so as to form part of the whole living organism *. Flesh is a peculiar medium, yet a medium all the same 6 . § 16. 'It is by touching that the distinctive qualities By toueh- (buufiopal) of body as body are discernible, i. e. the qualities "duties which characterize the different elements respectively, hot which be- cold, solid fluid, of which we have already treated in our body as work on the elements *. Now the organ which perceives j°^^_ these is that of touching, being that part wherein primarily The organ what we call the sense of touching resides. This is a part p er c e i ves of the body which is potentially such as the object which the* mnst «... ,, v, " . , . , be poten- affects it is actually. For to perceive by sense is to be tuily affected in a way in which the (agent or) object so acts w £ at ,he upon the organ (the patient) as to impart to the latter actually. actually the quality which the object itself actually has, but ™ U the° ne which the organ before had only potentially. This explains aAAoi<«m, 1 656* 29 n! fiiv &io i) both lie within the class to iirra : the one consists of such iirra as are not actually but only potentially Touching 197 and, on the other hand, such tangibles as are in excess of our tactual capacity; for example, things like a thunder- bolt, which, if touched, would destroy usV § 17. ' Among the senses that of touching is fundamental. The sense The attribute which first distinguishes animal from merely ^ fnnda- living forms is tactual sensibility. Just as the function of mental , • • . SCDSC. It* nutrition may exist apart from the sense of touching and from possesion sense generally, so the sense of touching may exist apart j^otshes from all the other senses. Plants or vegetables possess animal the nutrient function : it is by the possession of the sense veggie. of touch that animals first rise above and are distinguished To possess from vegetables V ' If a body is to possess sensory faculty, animal it must be either simple or compound. But it cannot be j^ es simple, for if it were, it would not possess the sense of be com- touching, which it must, however, possess, if it is to possess i^^y' sensory faculty, or even live, at all, as will be manifest elements from the following considerations. Since an animal is an qualities animate body, and every body is tangible, and that which corre :. is perceived by touch is the tangible, it follows that the to the body of an animal must have the sense of touch, if the {^{^"ydi animal is to live and preserve itself. For the other senses, come under smelling, seeing, hearing, perceive their objects through f e t ^^ media ; but if the animal body comes into contact with As earth some other, but does not possess the sense of touch, it will f or the be lacking in the guidance needful to enable h to shun ^^fi 10 " tangibles of the dangerous sort, and to seize on those soft (or desirable for its food. Such an animal would be incapable *° j; re £' ' of preserving its existence V needed for ' It is manifest that the body of an animal cannot be tion of simple, i. e. composed wholly of a single element, e. g. a /fr*!j,° t J c ° r li or air. For an animal cannot possess any other sense if of touch it have not that of touching, since this is what distinguishes composite tangible, the other of such as are tangible, but only with an effect destructive of the organof touch, or even oflife and perception generally. Philoponus understood this, but Trendelenburg does not seem to do so, for he misunderstands Philoponus, whose note, he thinks, proves him to have read toO iirriKm for rav inrav. 1 For the preceding paragraphs see dt An. ii. H. 423* 1-424* 15. * De An. ii. 2. 4i3 b 4 seqq. * Dc An. iii. 12. 434* 8-18. 198 THE FIVE SENSES of ail and defines the animal. Now the other organs of sense seasibUity might conceivably be formed without 1 earth, since they all 111 P?*J? effect sensation by some medium or third thing, external consisting ' ™.i too exdu- to the body, through which each perceives its object. The any one sense of touch, on the contrary, as its very name shows, element, acts only by immediate contact between its organ and the ixfno feel- tangible object. If the other senses perceive by a sort of inginhair contact it is at least a mediated contact, one brought to or bone per u. Plants, pass by the intervention of a third thing. This sense alone ^j°S f °^ perceives its objects — or is held to do so — immediately 2 . the most Thus if an animal is to possess touch, its body cannot no'senii^ consist of any one of the elements of which the externally bilit y- mediated sense-organs might consist (i. e. of air or water alone). Earth is necessary as an element in the apparatus of this sense 3 . Yet earth alone without, e.g. fire, is not enough, this sense being a mean between all tangibles, and capable of discerning not only the distinctive qualities of earth, but also the qualities denominated hot and cold *, and all other tangibles. The organ of touch, in fact, is, or should be, the most composite of all the organs. This is natural to expect, since it discerns a greater variety of objects than other organs, and its objects have more than one form of opposi- tion 6 . We have no sensibility in bone or hair, since such parts are formed too largely of earth alone. Plants, for the same reason, are destitute of sensation °. Without touch no other sense can subsist, and its organ consists neither 1 43S» 11-15. Here ?£a>yijr=' without earth.' Cf. Pind. Isth. v. [vi.] 72 where, by a metaphor, yKaaaa i' owe ?£pa>av='b.is word is not without understanding.' The obvious opposition here between ra uXXu and 1} ir) below makes it certain that by 5\\a is meant not trroi^cia, but aiV^rijpia. * 435" l 7- Aristotle here adopts the popular view of privation animal, nor, to be an animal, is any other necessary, of touch Hence the objects of the other senses— colour, sound, ^°^ odour — do not, when felt in excess, destroy the animal, but death to only the organs : unless, indeed, incidentally, as when with E^ m " a sound a thrust or a blow is incidentally associated, or as intbe . 0,htt when, by the sights or odours, other things are set in action may de- which by their contact destroy the animal. Taste, when !l r ° y n ^ e * ' ' organ or it destroys an animal, does so only so far as its object is its ftmc- tangible. But all excess of the tangible qualities of the excels o? hot or cold, or the hard, destroys animal life. In every the'an- e < . < . ..... gible de- province ot sense, indeed, excessive action in the object stroys the destroys the organ of the sense : so that this happens also ^ mal '* with regard to the organ of touching. The latter organ, however, is one on which the animal's life depends, and without which no animal exists. Hence with destruction of this organ, not only the organ itself but the living animal perishes forthwith 1 . § 19. 'The flesh, or what is "analogous," is per se the The organ Principium of the body of animals. An animal is defined ° f tonchin e * * ' [u e. using by having sensation, but particularly that of touching — the the popu- primary sense. The organ of this sense is a bodily part such fl" sn ?fo' as has been described, viz. a y.6piov duoioptpis, such as v&p£*. a pip"* This is either the essential organ of touching, as the icopij is Touch'u 1 " of vision : or else it has been conjoined with the essential the on . e * sense in organ as its auxiliary or instrument ; just as if one were which all to conceive the whole iuupavis, or external medium of^™ k ^ vision, joined with and superadded to the pupil. In the Man's case of the other senses it would have been superfluous for toSiigenee nature to produce this fleshy environment, but the sense due to ^ 1 De An. iii. 13. 435' 12-* 1-I9- * 6s3 b 19 seqq. The d/ioio/Mpij (e.g. flesh, bone, hair) no matter how much subdivided severally yield parts still homogeneous with one another and the whole. An 'organic' part, e.g. the hand or face, could not be so divided into hands or faces. 200 THE FIVE SENSES fineness of of touch requires it, this organ being of all others the most oftonST: corporeal in its character 1 . All animals have one sense not, how- in common — touching. Hence the part wherein this is this alone, naturally generated is without a common or generic name ; tot abo to f or m some animals this part is the same (viz. !] is the only sense essentially requisite for animal existence. There is no inconsistency between this and the statements found in 436 b 13, 455' 7, that r/ i' u . due to \ 1 t_. , ,, the mter- Qpovetv (or rb gvviivai), the latter being probably not awpa- action of moV, and declared that while the lower animals possess h 88 ™ 1 ^" sense-perception, man alone has intelligence. In all thisguished 1 De An. ii. 3. 414* 31 seqq. He varies slightly in his statements, but generally speaking adheres to this arrangement. 2 DeSens. §§25-6. ao4 SENSATION IN GENERAL sensation we do not discover what we wish to find, namely, how teliect. Alcmaeon would have distinguished between the fact of sense-perception in general and merely physical facts, or how he would have stated the fundamental characteristics in which all the varieties of sense-perception agree. He most probably was, however, of opinion that there is even / in sensation a peculiarity which distinguishes it from merely physical processes (see Rohde, Psyche, ii. p. 171 n.). Empedocles. Empe- § 4. Empedocles, as we may infer from our records, thought he approaches more nearly to an appreciation of these ques- solvedthe tions. As we have already repeatedly observed, he held that his^theory all the particular operations of sense are effected by imoppoal ofporesand en tering the pores of the sensory organ, when each organ cal emana- has its fitting object supplied, and when relations of sym- boTin metry 1 subsist between the imoppoal from the object and the reality he pores of the organ. Here, then, we find a conception of sCTifed it. a common characteristic of all varieties of sense-perception : Neither this requisite al tilaBrjaat) Arj/xoVpirof rrXciovr fiiv (hat ras alaBrjans Tar alcrBrjrav tu bi fiij ava\oyi((iv (avaXoytai, Diels) ra aurdijra ra irXqdci (sc.rui/ td as actualized percepts, which would be very awkward, even if legitimate. Interesting as it would, no doubt, be to find Democritus (who stood at the head of the 'science' of that time) conceiving tones which our ears cannot hear, colours which our eyes cannot see, and so on, as well as the infra-sensible atoms them- selves on which his physical theory rested, yet it is more than questionable whether — on the strength of an excerpt (such as that here under discussion) five hundred years at least later than the writings of Democritus, and of a doubtful reading or interpretation of it — we have any right whatever to attribute such conceptions to him. Besides, such a theory would implicitly objectivize the so-called secondary qualities, contrary to all that we know of his teaching. Adopting Diels' rather than Zeller's con- struction, we might as well, and with equal justification, find in the words the germ of some such theory as that of so- called 'latent mental modifications,' or that of perceptions insensibles afterwards developed by Leibniz. Our alvdrj- on which seeing depends, is formed in by the the part of the eye which is different in colour from the ofcra? 011 object. We perceive heat and cold by touch only when traries. But the object touched is hotter or colder than the organ. physical, So with the other senses. We perceive all qualities in the and ***■? j, object according: to the excess or defect of them in the organ. partplayed ■> *» , ..„. I by soul in But all qualities exist in our organs 3 , though in different | tfoVof %r- proportions ; so that the contrasts required for perception eifiens to c f objects are always possible in experience. This doctrine, ^rn/i««- k oweverj r perception by contrast (of qualities within to in other qua ltties without the organism), together with the other words, the ^ ' , . peculiarity doctrine of Ttav iv itavri, does not go far to clear up the involved— distinctive an d general features of sense-perception, or obscurity, furnish us with a point of view from which to contemplate 1 For the conception of j lowever . f hard for Theophrastus 2 to show that the psychology of Diogenes, like that of Empedocles, pro- vides no ultimate discriminant between sensory and other processes, but tends rather to merge psychology in physics. When Diogenes, for example (after the manner of Empe- docles to some extent), explains oV<£/njo-is by the ovuixtrpia between the odour, wafted to the organ of sense, and the air around the brain, in consequence of which avmierpia the odour and the said air are blended together ; Theophrastus naturally asks : what then is there to distinguish this from all other kinds of itpao-ty ? Diogenes must either deny that there is anything to distinguish them, or acknowledge that he has omitted to state it, if there is. He would probably, if pressed to choose, have accepted the former alternative. Plato. Plato's § 9. Plato is the first writer who confronts the problem lotion of bef° re us with a clear conception of its meaning. He \ sensation: defines sensation in general (dlffdrjcrts) as a 'communion of meat «>m- soul and body in relation to external objects. The faculty monto belongs to the soul : the instrument is the body. Both in soal and & , ' .... , body, but common become by means of imagination apprehensive of S^Tt"* external objects V In the Philebus Plato himself says : the body ' Suppose that some of the affections which are in the body The'dii? fr° m moment to moment exhaust themselves in the body fusion of alone before — or without — reaching the soul, thus leaving thr'otgh" the latter unaffected ; while others pass through both, and 1 According to the doubtful testimony of the Placita, Aet. iv. 5. 7, Diels, Dox., p. 391, Diogenes placed to qyt/ioiWy in the dprijpiaxi? KOikia rr/s KapSias. ' De Sens. § 46. ' Plut. Epit. iv. 8, Diels, Dox., p. 394. 'By means of imagination '<= 6u (pavratriat. This gives to (payraaia the prominence which later psychologists attributed to it, but which it does not really, in this con- nexion, receive from Plato. ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES an impress on both a sort of tremor of a quite peculiar kind, the body, in which both— body and soul— participate When body Se^* and soul in this way partake of this common affection and bilit y of are moved by this common movement, if you should call The pans this movement sensation (afo-oVjo-iy) you would speak quite {j[JJ h ed a Jj£ correctly 1 .' In the Timaeus again Plato gives his general therefore conception of sensory affection. ' We have 2 yet to consider ™ e ™°^out the most important point relating to the affections which sensation. ,, , . , , , - , Mato.inhis concern the whole body in common, viz. the cause of the conception pleasurable and painful qualities in the affections which °t™«*w*, we have discussed, and also the processes which involve distinguish sensations produced through the bodily organs, and are j h v e e cognl " accompanied by pains and pleasures in themselves. This element then is how we must conceive the causes in the case off™^. every affection, sensible or insensible, recollecting how we denned above the source of mobility and immobility ; for in this way we must seek the explanation we wish to find. When that which is naturally mobile is impressed. by even a slight affection, it spreads abroad the motion, the par- ticles producing the same effect upon one another, until, coming to the centre of consciousness 3 , it announces the property of the agent ; but a substance that is immobile is too stable to spread the motion round about, and thus it merely receives the affection but does not stir any neighbouring part; so that, as the particles do not pass on one to another the original impulse which affected them, or transmit it to the entire creature, they leave the recipient of the affection without sensation 4 . This happens in the case of the bones, hair, and generally the parts formed of earth 6 ; while the former conditions apply chiefly to sight 1 PhiUb. 33 D-34 A. From this passage, with the exception of the Sw tyavraoias, an insertion borrowed from later psychology, that quoted above from the Placita seems derived. ■ Tim. 64 A-C (Archer-Hind's version for the most part). In what follows oiaflijait is confusedly treated as = feeling plus cognitive sensation. * to oJpoVi/io* : I cannot render it with Mr. Archer-Hind the * sentient part ' : it includes more than this. * draurdnrov itapiax* to iradoV. » Cf. Arist. de An. iii. 13- 435" *4 seqq. P a si* SENSATION IN GENERAL and hearing, because these contain the greatest proportion of fire and air 1 .' In another passage a he explains the cause of sensation, and its disturbing effects upon intelligence, as resulting from interaction between the elements which form the body and those external to it. ' For great as was the tide sweeping over them (sc. the bodies of newly created creatures) and flowing ofT— the tide which brought them sustenance — a yet greater tumult was caused by the effects of the bodies that struck against them ; as when the body of any one came in contact with some alien fire that met it from without, or with solid earth, or with liquid glidings of water, or if he were caught in a tempest of winds, borne on the air ; and so the motions from all these elements rushing through the body penetrated to the soul. This is in fact the reason 3 why these have all alike been called, and are still called, sensations (aio-0ij — any fixed interaction point to which the scattered data of sense could rally 2 , and °\tf r - . which could therefore constitute a starting-point for science. cipuns and * perdpun- He asked himself the question how the interaction of not"difle? subject and object in sense-perception per se differs from from purely the physical interaction between things in nature, and was Interaction.' convinced that, for the school of Heraclitus and Protagoras Sensation at a n events, there is no difference. One cannot read did not for . . ... Piato,asfor Plato s energetic and eloquent words without perceiving Aristotle, t j iat U p to t he present stage of the argument he is with itself a Protagoras heart and souL Here then we discover a wide s^heu.° f S ulf separating him from his pupil, Aristotle. The latter tor the did not think it necessary to go outside the province basis of 1 Plato, Theaetet. 156A-157C; Zeller, Pre-Socratics, (E. Tr.) ii. 449. 1 Cf. Arist An. Post. ico» 11. ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES 215 of perception itself to discover a germ of the synthetic objective power which should lay the foundation of experience \ an ^^ experience capable of being developed, under the presiding j^"?. help of universal conceptions, into science. Having notounder- conception of a Koivij a&rfljjonj, or synthetic faculty of sense, JJjJJ 1 ^ Plato treated the subject of alaOr\t>rj and vAtj, to distinguish the material of notionally -^ object from its shape, by which, therefore, this distinction G15QD- guishable. in its primary form is best illustrated. A lump of wax has Bct . tlli * always and must have some shape. The shape and the notional J r r distinction wax are inseparable except by abstraction — an act of character thinking. The shape must have a matter or material, the of idealism material a shape. The shape and material are different perience indeed, but do not differ as, e. g., two lumps of wax would from its differ from one another. These are locally and really very incep- ' ' tionon- separable; not so the shape and material of one lump. npiiids! The shape of one lump of wax cannot perish without the material sharing its fate ; nor can the material perish — it cannot even be thought away — without the shape also vanishing. If the lump ceases to have any form it ceases to exist ; and so, too, if it ceases to have any matter. We may name the shape and the material separately, and by different names.but we cannot even imagine a material s ubstance with- out some shape, or a shape without m aterial. Matter and form are thus correla^velerms notionalIy(Xjyu) distinct, i.e. ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES 219 1 distinguishable by an effort of mental abstraction, and by this only. Such distinction borrowed from objects in space was transferred by Aristotle to every concrete individual ; not merely those possessing physical properties, but all others, including the entities with which metaphysical speculation undertakes to deal. In regard to every indi- vidual thing (rJ8e u) of any kind, therefore, Aristotle dis- tinguishes (i) its matter, (2) its form, (3) the composite consisting of both. Neither matter nor form by itself \ constitutes the individual— the root ti. It is constituted jor consists of both together. This distinction of form and matter is, as made by reason or thought, the first step towards the idealizing of experience, and the introduction, or discernment, of the characteristic which distinguishes L sensation generally from purely mechanical or other kinds of physical interaction. In virtue of it, or our power to make it, experience and all that it can contain is from the first endowed with a character derived from mind. j § 15. To form Aristotle gives precedence in rank and The pro- importance. The reason of this for him is, no doubt, that t^t^ge form, though itself unknowable in nature apart from matter, is « pn>- i is what renders things capable of being known. All the?^ 1 ,^,. determinate qualities of things, all the predicates by which tion ' °* they can be the subject of conversation or reasoning, come of mere under the head of form. The determination of the ' form ' ma ) ler > Le> matter of a thing is a progress in the complete knowledge of that without thing. The reverse process, by which knowledge of form is h°a™'no e obliterated, would ultimately leave our minds a blank. For apprehen- mere matter is a mere negative. It has per se no predicates, Hence and nothing real could bTTxn is that in virtue of ™^ r ^ which it lives— that which is the seal and mark of the a/«rm'too. potentialities of its o-fi/ia qua «Xi». The soul is not a ro'Je n, "^^^ neither is it something joined to, and capable of separation " en a from, the o-fyta 1 , any more than form generally from matter, matter of It is \lrv\ri, however, that gives meaning or intelligibility to T n h y e s ° ^i the organic body whose functions are adapted to its main- is not an tenance, and employed for its sake. Thus the ivrtXix"" Jhtaktod: and the ri\os are identical. While, however, the V^XV bat only an is no r6it n — no concrete individual thing — we cannot say J^™„™ a this of o-u/ia. The latter indeed taken per se, and with- notional out soul as a dead body might be, is no longer what it The body was when animated or fit for the habitation of soul : it is 1S *° \ only to ., no more an animal body than an &0dkp6s deprived or i»o*«>«- incapable of vision (o\jnt), such as an eye of stone, would be ^j ^f an eye in the same sense as one with its native power. It not be could now have the name it formerly bore only in an ofsouli " ambiguous or homonymous way. Yet, though not the anJ so "f same as what it was, it is a concrete individual thing ; which explained could not be said of its *i the *h>Xn Per se, out °^^} r of relation to the o-<3/ua. The body when lifeless is still istic hypo- . a substance, a ro'fie n, though no longer Ifxi/roxo'v tc There- forget an ,_fjDre body cannot be said to be itself the eftos or form of «plana- ( soul. In other words soul cannot be explained materially — auributes as consisting of any form of material body however fine. °^ he j Body is always of the nature of a subiectum : the subject of we most I attributes and predicates : not itself an attribute or pre- }°°£ "^ dicate. We can no more say that body is the soul of an »i) of the seal ring, without taking the iron apprehends or the gold of which the latter may be composed, but quite (L^tfK indifferently as to this material element. In the same, qualities) of or in an analogous, way, sense-perception is related to its ofsoise^ objects. It apprehends the colour or taste, or other sensible perception, quality of things, being affected by each thing not in so onlyappre- far as such thing is a ro'8e u or substance, but in so far as it heads form ^ a T0l0V ^ ;. e< possesses particular quality s . For form ■' irMvidual, apprehends form. The soul, which is the oi cf- 4S 8b 2, 43** 16. * 424* 17 r6 ieiertKOV t£>v aXaBipriov tiiav iivtv fijf vXijr, cf. 425'' 23, 434' 29. clouy in 424* 17, required on general grounds, and supported by its use in 434* 29, is certainly sound. * oix V ««™» tKf'iiav "KiyiTM dXX' p roiovdi xai Kara tAk Xuyov. 4 Vide 87 b 28, ioo» 16. * 424* 24. * For this thought that the organ must be a mean between the ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES a»5 its organ (altrflijrijpiov) are In a way* the same and yet not undent the same 1 . They are different in conception (Aw objects when such a person is exercising his knowledge in some ^duals ; particular concrete case *, he furnishes the parallel for the the univer - • • » ' sals arc actually percipient organ of sense after it has been affected, within the and while yet affected, by its object. A change has passed ^JicnU^ over the organ of sense, but not one which impairs it. or indi- There are two kinds of change which a thing may undergo ; outside the one in a direction depriving: it of its qualities or func- soul > and .. lL ■ , . , , , , . ... . outside the tions ; the other in the way of developing or realizing its body. Only powers 2 . The change which the percipient undergoes, J,^"™ when affected by the percipiendttm, is a change of the latter inside the sort, one which brings, the faculty from potentiality to this firs^at actual realization, like the change from liturrripri to Otutpla moment of which fulfils the potency of the firKrnjM&w. perception. The object which causes the change has its own actual existence in the world, apart from the relation of sense. It would exist even if no one perceived it. It actually exists, and is potentially perceptible. So, conceived in relation to an absent object, the sensory organ is perceptive, or capable of perceiving it. The object has its own actual qualities s — its form, which sense finds in it at the moment of perception. Thus, for Aristotle, the object is what Kant would call a Ding an sich. Between sense and thought, however, though paralleled for the above illustration, there is the great difference that thought can discover its own objects within itself, for it deals with universals (ra ko.66Kov). Sense-perception must await stimulation from without, as it can only deal with particulars (rh Ka0' tKaoTov) *■ Universals are in a manner within the soul itself 8 . Hence it follows that thinking is in one's 1 417* 29 i rjtrj BtapStv ivrt\t\tl(f &v, kcu Kvpius f'lrurra/icvof r6tt to A. ' liio TBOttovt fivai rfjt aWotwrtos, rr/v rr «Vl Tar trrtprpuat diadiatit lUTafioXqv xai tI/v «Vi rht !£fit «ai ri/v e? opinion of Democritus, as we have already observed. Can mocritas it have really been the opinion of Aristotle himself? He the other allows that taste is a modification of touch. When we senses to be com e to deal with the common sense — that central bureau diceren* tiaied from which receives and elaborates the reports of the several ftrdid° W senses*— we shall have reason to think that on this point Aristotle the two philosophers agreed. At all events, Aristotle's (despite theory of the evolution of soul requires a close relation verbal pro- between touch and the other senses of which it is the with De- pre-supposition (see p. 248, n. 1). The ascending forms of mocritus sou i are ijk e t ij e ascending figures. As the triangle is Suggested implicit in the tetragon, so the faculty of nutrition — or the ™ e L^„ nutrient soul — is implicit in the sentient soul. We seem senses in * ascending to be led up by him to the parallel thought of an ascending according scale within the sentient soul — a scale which reaches from to the ^a,} a t its lower to o^l/is at its higher extremity. We have meaning of _ - . . Aristotle: an involution of the sense of touching in every other sense, 'uuti'" S ' however highly developed s . But Aristotle does no more snuUing, than bring us to the threshold of this conception. He saingf' A nowhere (except in the case of ytva-is, which is &4>rj ris) , sense is explicitly defines the relationship between the other senses the more successively and that of touch. Yet we may, with much 1 De An. ii. 5. 4i7 b 24. * 415* 3-5. 8 Cf. 435* 18. ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES 331 probability, infer his view of their respective relationship to the form of it, by simply reversing the order in which he arranges the without* senses for discussion. When he states x that Sfu is the sense * e raatter par excellence, he doubtless means that this sense, in a greater hended by degree than any other, exhibits the power of apprehending ^J* 1 " form apart from matter. Touch possesses this power, but in brings as the lowest degree. Taste comes — or would seem to come — threshold ■ next above touch.for sensations of taste proper are impossible of iotein- . - gence (as without contact of the tongue with the sapid substance, and distinct ytBcriy is cuprj ris. It, however, superadds a determination of f^ m '5? a " e * form foreign to mere touch qua touch : the sapid qualities of «>w which body are known through it alone, as they could not be by apprehend mere touch. Next in order as we go up comes smelling, pure form, which is allied on the one hand to tasting and touching — being subservient directly in its most important use to the purpose of tasting — and on the other hand to hearing and seeing, in virtue of its operating through a medium (rb iypov) with which the media of hearing and seeing are "in a certain way identical. For the medium of hearing, viz. air, is iypov, and the vypov and the buupavis, as we learn from the constitution of the (top?/, have much in common. Next above smelling comes hearing, and the scale culminates in the sense of seeing. Hearing apprehends :. less of the matter, more of the form of its object than smelling does: and the same can be said of seeing as compared with hearing. Seeing is the most pure — touch- ing, the least pure — form of sense. Thus the progress in the ascending scale of sense is at the same time a progress towards the scale of intelligence, from the threshold of which again (if we can determine a threshold), we should proceed still upwards step by step guided by the same clue, the higher step being always that which leads towards the purer form — towards the universal. Finally, though vovt apprehends its objects only under conditions determined by perception, yet it endeavours to free them more and more from all such conditions. § 24. Each sense is capable of perceiving objects which ^ ch ,^ n>e 1 429* 2 ij tyit fiaXioro a'oBrjoic. 232 SENSATION IN GENERAL and then- are contraries — opposites in the same genus *. This power ■^,!^. it owes to its involving what Aristotle calls a uta&rns f**. 000 ". between the opposite extremes in the scale to which its differences object belongs. To this its discriminative power is due*. roodliit ^ or Aristotle tms doctrine of pto-ortis is of cardinal im- Morede-" portance in the theory of sense-perception. Without «p!ana- understanding it we must fail to grasp his explanation tionofthe of how aT; of the physical elements which constitute its ahdrjri, and therefore is capable of taking the ' form ' of 1 434* IO in if oicrrrip oparov cat aapdrov Jjv iras 17 (Tis is complete, i.e. when the particular sense is itself. No actually perceiving its object, then the percipiens and operation perceptum are qualitatively one. When the percipiendum ° fth -*. has become perceptum, the unlike have become like. This oa the per- proposition is only another way of stating that the sense perception, has received or apprehended the form of the object 3 . The per- There is no reciprocal relation, in Aristotle's opinion, piVdpea- between the object and the organ 4 . There is a par- ade are ticipation between the two. related as patient to agent, necessary . r ' ,,.,., . correlates, in a common fact, the resultant of which is the perception. Utterhas Here we are reminded of the Protagoreo-Heraclitean its own theory, already stated 8 above, which Plato sets forth in the Stencewitn Tlieaetetus. But Aristotle holds with the unquestioning q°3iiti« fidelity of a 'natural Realist' that the 'common fact' is percep- one in which the object is revealed in its true, i.e. inde- whdi^t " P en( ^ ent ' qualities. The object exists independently, as prepared well as being an alaQr\T&v, or a ' possibility of perception.' itself The relation between to aloQiyra and al kolt' hipyaav when the al(T0TJ(reit is sometimes described as one of unity ; at its being other times as one of similarity 6 . The meaning in 1 439* x 3- * 4 ! 7 b 6 tit aM— not aM. Cf. b l6, cn-1 tjj* (J>v When the eye actually perceives, it ?£"• has apprehended the colour — which as quality belongs to relation the form — of its object. How far Aristotle carries this ^ IZ^,,, doctrine appears from the passage in which he states that 4 ""' ****• there is a real meaning in saying that the organ or subject ri atai^riv of seeing, when regarded as its own object, is coloured 1 . jj„°"'° f f The ko/jtj is per se of no particular colour, but holds the form, mean between any two colours as well as between the extremes of black and white. In virtue of this its quality of pcvoYip — which again involves its bearing a Xo'yos or proportionality to its object — it is capable of apprehending all colours, i. e. of taking any given colour, as form. § 36. The objects of sensation in general are classified by Classifica- Aristotle 2 as ra f5ia, ra koivA, and ra koto om/j$f/3?jicdV. The objects of two former are said to be properly and in themselves per- sensation ceptible 3 . The Toto are illustrated by the examples of («) rd M.o, colour, sound, taste. They are denned by two marks, (a) ^n 7 ^™"^ that they are perceptible by one and only one sense, (6) eviiPtfy- that it is not possible to be mistaken respecting them 4 , or " " at all events that error respecting them is at its minimum. One cannot be mistaken in thinking that what he sees is colour or what he hears is sound, though he may easily be so as to what the coloured or sonant thing is. The Koivi are illustrated by kIvtjctis and ripty-ta, aptO/ioy, irxwa, piytOos*. These are said to be Koivd, because they are I8ia to no one sense but common to all ; for — the writer goes on — k(wjja"cjfyo-ir T uv l&iav aXrjBtjs fW i) or» iXiyurrov fyovaa to ifnv&ot. * lade Sens. i. 437'' 9 some MSS. give o-toW instead of faitta, some omit this altogether. In 442 b 5, we have to Tpoxu *« to X«ioi>, to o£u koI rd apflXv ro iv to«c Syxoit, added. * 418*18. That the word murair is hardly meant to be pressed appears not only from this illustration, but also from 442 b 6 Kowa tS>» aMqatar «/ Si w naaov, dXX' tytos y tal dipijf. A wholly different reason for this application of the term xou>rf to the objects so strangely confined in a 3 6 SENSATION IN GENERAL Ta icara jkos aMrrri are not directly perceived objects of sense, but rather inferences from direct per- ceptions. One sees a white object, but says or thinks that he sees, e. g., * the son of Diares.* That this is not a direct perception is obvious from the mere fact that the organ of vision is nowise affected by the object in its incidental character l . The colour affects the dpt) ; the magnitude is also, as stated above, ko0' avrb ala-drjrov * ; but the fact that the white object is the son of Diares does not at all impress the organ of sense: this fact is merely associated incidentally — kot& ) Jxoiup ala6t) noun)* : the Koiva are the direct objects of the a are directly perceptible only to 1} koihj alodrjcrit. ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES 237 organs. There are, accordingly, in the organs the primordial air, fire, earth, water, of which all things whatever consist. By like we know like. By the fire within us we see fire, by the water we see water, by the earth, earth, and by the air, air. This notion of identity of elements in objects and organs, with its implied explanation of knowledge, was adopted even by those who asserted the heterogeneity of yjn>xfi and the objects of knowledge. The difference arising from such heterogeneity for them was that instead of knowing like by like we know each thing by its contrary: hot by cold, white by black, &c. So Anaxagoras, who (with Alcmaeon and Heracljtus) held the theory of cognition by contraries, required for explanation of knowledge the assumption within the organism of all the elements which constitute external objects, though only in order that each external percipiendum might thus have in the organism its necessary opposite. We have seen already how Aristotle en- deavoured to reconcile these opposing views of cognition. He held that perception is not simply an affection of like by like or of unlike by unlike, but of unlike by an unlike which, however, becomes like, having assimilated the percipient to itself in that process of iXWaxm which every perception involves. With Empedocles and Plato he held the doctrine of the above four elements, to which he ascribed four fundamental contrary attributes hot, cold, dry (solid), moist (fluid). Of these the bodily tissues are formed l ; and of the tissues again the organs are constituted. At the basis of his whole theory of, perception there is for him, as for his predecessors, the thought that the fundamental com- munity of elementary constitution in ala-drjTa and aMrir-qpia is the cause of our being able to perceive objects. The i\\oCu>ms (by which he reconciles these different views) implies in every case a medium by, as well as through, which al(r6i}Ti. and aMrjTrjpta are brought into correlation. For this medium has a common nature with the aforflijroV 1 Cf. 389'' 27 • K pt¥ yap rail/ drot^ctaiv tA 6poioptprj, in rovrav V as vXijr ra 3Xo ipya rrjt vtriae. The $p.ou>p.eptj in the body are composed of homogeneous parts. Thus all the parts of flesh are flesh, all those ot bone are bone, and so on. 238 SENSATION IN GENERAL and the aLvOrjrfipwv. Thus the required conditions of perception are established (see further, §§ 31-34 infra). Aristotle'* § 38. Aristotle rejected the naTve materialism of Empe- asdJuT docles and Democritus 1 . He also rejected the sensational tingnished scepticism of Protagoras. He took a middle course, hold- material- ing that things potentially perceptible exist in themselves, wdMies™" w ^^ e faculties or potentialities of perception * exist ' in our and Demo- organs. It is not true, he says 2 , that nothing would exist if hamihc * l were not perceived. Yet when perceived it is by virtue spsi- of its form, not of its matter, that it is so ; and for us its form idealism of is due to the act of mental apprehension which perception I £T )ti !f°? as ' involves. At the actual moment of perception the thing basis of the qua perceived and the organ qua perceiving, are so related of "etch as to ^ e > m f° rm > an unity- He did not, with the early physio- sensoiy logists, regard the sense-organs as mere channels by which £w^al the elements of things outside are conducted into the consntn- organism, and so the things are known s . We do not take tion of the . , ,,<■ <■«• « 1 . • organ. The in the matter but only the form of things. As the noetic fendamen- g^} ; s ^ T fc oi Qr fifa € »j £ J e t }, e pj ace Qr f orm f tal con- ' r tianeties forms, so each faculty of perception in the sentient soul is the'foor m an f ^ os *L yip irc0v«v to vypibv &avtp xal raXXa tiro rov ivavriou . . . 1J piv ovv nip (cat fj yrj oiSiv nt ovd' aXXo oiiiy, 3 (V imapx' 1 'vavri6Trjs iv iitaaTfp, raiirj] jraVra tal voiovm xai Trdo-^ovo-i. * 30a* ai-3. «40 SENSATION IN GENERAL four do- that consists in ^4 •**• the Xdyos -njs n(i£ter se, hot or cold, or hard or soft, but a mean between all pairs of differences coming under either category. § 31. The media of the organs of touch and taste are Media in- altogether internal to the body. That of touch is the^^ nd 1 Cf. 99 b 35, 432* i& ■ UK R 24* SENSATION IN GENERAL to the a£p( (with the skin), which covers or forms the periphery organs. ^ ^ body ; that of taste is the ' potentially moist ' vdp£ of ^j 1 ?*' the tongue. The organs of seeing, hearing, smelling, have affinities media external to the body; but though external, these ^J^ 11 ^ media have a peculiarly close relationship not only with the the one objects ' but also with their respective organs, so that they on the*" ' have ^eir internal lodgment or representation in every case o;her, with within the bodily organ. Thus the organ of hearing has air the object. . ... . , . . . , , , . as external medium, but a portion of air is also lodged in, or built into, the organ itself 2 . The organ of seeing has the diaphanous for its medium. Externally this is the air : but internal to the organ there is a cell full of water 3 . This water as internal medium co-operates with the air as external, for both act visually in virtue of their common property rd iuupavh. It is not easy to gather a definite idea respecting the internal and external media of smelling from the various statement of Aristotle respecting this sense. In the case of animals which respire he regards the medium of smell as air. This externally is affected by the odorous object and transfers the affection continuously to the olfactory organ, by which it is then inhaled and conducted to the ' point of sense." Thus for such animals air internal and external to the organ constitutes the medium of smell. But for the class of animals which do not respire some different medium must be assumed. Fish can smell, as can other subaqueous creatures. Consequently Aristotle infers that the common medium of smelling in the case of all creatures which possess this power is rd Zuupavh — not, however, as such, but qua capable of absorb- ing or contracting the effect of iyyyfios vyp6rr\s *. At all events, the medium of smell and the essential constituent of the organ of smell consist either of air or water 5 , i. e. of common elements. 1 eg. the colour of objects is the inxparis in them. * 430*9. * Anatomy had not taught Aristotle to distinguish two cells. * 443* i« * t] fup yap nopi viarotf 9 &' aKoq aipof, 9 &' iaippijirtt Oaripov rovruv, 425*4- ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES 243 § 3a. There is one passage l , however, in which. Aristotle Aristotle's speaks with apparent decision, and in a very different way, "^^y of the constitution of the olfactory organ and of its object. I™* °* , c t 1 apparent) summing up at the end of a long polemic against as regards Empedocles and Plato, who regarded the essential part Jj 1 ^ «^ n " of the visual organ as consisting of fire, Aristotle, having stituent corrected what he thought amiss in their views of the eye, theor^n'of as well as in those of Democritus, proceeds as follows :. smelling. ' If the facts be as here stated, and if we must refer the essential part of each of the sensory organs to some one of the elements, we must suppose that in the visual organ this consists of water ; in the organ of hearing it consists of air ; while in that of oo-pri(r is is actually this to 6ap oopriptiait it is actually hot, it must prior to such 3t 5 Koiviv navruv, which denies that nip is the R a «44 SENSATION IN GENERAL Apparent § 33. Since the organs of touching and tasting have, ^j^ according to the various standpoints from which Aristotle TT? Uin '1b- re S ar ^ s * em — tne current or popular, and that which he the term approved of— either no medium or no external medium ; «u\rff7Tw*a. ajjjj s ; nce moreover the organ of touch is either (according to the popular view) distributed all over the periphery of essential constituent of any particular organ of perception, while here it represented as potentially constituting i\ oaQprpnt. The argu- ment of Baumker (op. tit., pp. 47-8), assented' to by Neuhauser (Art's/. Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermbgen, p. 21), Zeller (Arist. ii, p. 63 n. E. Tr.) and others, that, the particle tl being read, as it probably should be, before 8« in 438 b 17, we may regard the whole passage as written by Aristotle from an alien stand- point, does not carry conviction. Nowhere does Aristotle object to the principle which connects the separate organs of sense, respectively, with certain elements as essential constituents. On the contrary he accepts it, and makes it the basis of his argument, e.g., in 647' 9-14. The main objection urged in tie Sens. ii. is to the fact that Empedocles, Plato, and probably others (including e.g. Alcmaeon), regarded the eye as constituted of fire; for that they found a difficulty in making the five organs square with the four elements 437" 21, does not contain an objection against this general principle ; nor does Aristotle explicitly recur to the latter point, on which his difficulty was as great as theirs. But his dogmatic assertions here that to Atttikuv consists of earth and to oaippavriKov, or r) oaippqats, of fire, are scarcely to be reconciled with the statements of the de Anima (425" 5-6, 435* 11 seqq.). And besides this, the explanations of 00711) here and later in the de Sensu (443* 21 seqq.) are irreconcilable with one another. The best way of getting over the difficulty is to suppose that he does not mean to say that the aimxov consists of earth alone, but only predominantly ; which is certainly what he means in other places. But with regard to So-tppqmc or to do-f/ipoiTKoV this is not effectual as a solution. Such discrepancies as remain, however, may be explained either on the hypothesis of interpolation, or on that of a change of views on the part of Aristotle. The de Sensu seems to contain preliminary essays on certain subjects of the larger work de Anima, which may therefore (notwithstanding many references, e. g. 436" 1 seqq.) be regarded as possibly later. It is not to be supposed that Aristotle in his earlier works held the same views as in his later ; any more than that Spinoza, while still a follower of Descartes, held the views of the author of the Ethica. He doubtless passed through a long process of mental development, and the many works connected with his name, even when they are, like the de Sensu and de Anima, of unquestionable authenticity as a whole, could not be expected to be everywhere in agreement with one another. As well might one expect tq find in Kant's early essays the ' Copernican thought' of the Critique of Pure Reason. See infra, pp. 245 n. 3, 248 nn. I and 2. ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES 245 the body, or (according to his own view) vaguely regarded as ivros n ; there are several passages in which these organs of non-mediated perception, or rather of perception by contact [or quasi-contact; vide Touching, § 13], are set in contradistinction to the others, and the name aicrOiirripia seems almost appropriated, for the time being, to the latter. Thus *, at the beginning of the third book of the de Anima, having declared that we perceive by touch all the tangible qualities of body, and that, when we perceive the other qualities, we do so by organs which act through media composed of the elements, Aristotle proceeds to treat these mediated organs as if they alone were called alx o/unov ov (sc. to uIo~8i\tik6v), ntirovBbs t' u/ioiWai tuii ftrnv olov cVhipo? The passages quoted by Baumker to justify his views on the above points are far from adequate to their purpose. But we cannot here go into the details of a full discussion. 1 432* 10-14. * 424 b 2I-425• 13. Though Aristotle here names them 'the five,' he was, as we have already seen, perfectly aware that touch is differentiable ITS COMMON AND PECULIAR FEATURES 047 to prove this most difficult proposition is obscure, but may lo-caUed be outlined thus. Assuming 1 that there exists no body'Jj^. or affection of body other than those known to us in this Aristotle'* world *, our present five senses make all the bodies in this J^JhSf 1 sphere accessible. Hence if we assumed any further sense, conclnsion. it would either have no object, or would merely duplicate some existing sensation ; either of which suppositions would be intolerable. Therefore no further sense beyond the five is to be assumed. The stress of the argument is laid by Aristotle on the second proposition, viz. that our present senses give us the perception of all known bodies; which is thus proved. The four elements are the basis of all existing v ivraiBa aupaTav. This assumption, although not mentioned till the end, is the major of the whole deduction. «48 SENSATION IN GENERAL so perceived. Touch and taste give us knowledge of (or the faculty of knowing) all possible tangible qualities, i. e. all those which do not require an external medium. The remainder are perceived by the remaining senses ; for their organs consist of the elements which constitute external media, viz. air and water. All the externally non-mediated aurtfnrd are airrd : and a^iij per se is capable of perceiving all these. Touch has its organ and medium framed essentially of earth and fire, which, through their vddrj, represent to us the biay.a qua aG>\xa. Thus, so far as these two elements go, nothing that exists in our world is unprovided for by touch l . The externally mediated aMrjTrjpia, on the other hand, provide for the perception of the non-tangible properties of things ; and this they do by their being essentially constituted of air and water, which are the only elements capable of serving as external media. But they are sufficient, for they mediate for all aZotfnrd not already provided for through touch. Thus either mediately or immediately (or rather by media external and internal, or media internal only) access is given us, by our organs of perception, to knowledge of all the bodies arid properties of body which exist in our world, of which we can form any conception. Hence no other alrj, the means of perceiving all which do not need an external medium, i. e. all whose liatpopai belong to body qua body, and characterize the two oToixeia, fire and earth. It has, by organs constituted of air and water, the means required for perceiving all the o.U6x\t6. which do need an external medium : i. e. those whose biafyopal do not depend on fire and earth. No afodijiw, therefore, remains inacces- sible to perception with our present senses '. 1 In the parenthetic words 424 b 30 t^ci i' oSrow to 425* 2 ii apipoa Aristotle shows how it is conceivable that there should be a reduction in the number of alaBrfr^pm, or a duplication of alaBlpw or (what comes to the same thing) of a\oBr\xa\ but leaves it plain that in no such case could we imagine the list of our alaBi^ont to be usefully increased. For (a) we can conceive one aitrdiji-ij/Hoi' so constituted as to perceive two heterogeneous ai'o-dijra; as, for example, if air is medium for both ^6os and xp° a , an d if it be necessary that an alaBijrijpiov essentially of air should perceive both of these. Again (b) we can also conceive two ai W faculty of synthesis as such, we must content ourselves with conscious- . ness of per- stating the functions ascribed by Aristotle to the koivt} (/H^arf- a "°"0'7 6vos ; sensation (V) the consciousness of our sensory experiences, i. e. the to by the power by which we not only perceive, but perceive that we pre-Pla- jjq so . ^ tne faculty of imagination, i. e. reproductive the repre- imagination — to tpavrcumKov ; (e) the faculty of memory and notso^ reminiscence, y-vfuit) koX avdpvrjcni ; and (f) the affections of much. sleeping and dreaming. To ascertain, therefore, how much of Aristotle's theory respecting this had been anticipated, we must survey the works of his predecessors. As they do not (until we reach Plato) distinctly formulate the idea of a synthetic faculty, we can only examine what they may have done to explain the various phenomena of mind above- mentioned as attributed by Aristotle to the agency of the 1 Though Aristotle uses this actual term but seldom (cf. 425' 27, 450* 10, 686* 31), often employing equivalents like n>>urov alv al alaBijcrtis. Cf. also Plut. Epit. iv. 17, 1, Diels, Dox. t p. 407, where, however, the term to r\y(p.ovm6v shows how far we are from the text of Alcmaeon. This Stoic term is pro- bably derived from the Aristotelean to ifyovpxvor, 1113' 6. Plato, no doubt, refers to Alcmaeon in Phaedo 96 B : rac mod^am napi^av tou , axovfiv cai Spar xai 6a(ppulvia6ai. It is to Alcmaeon and Plato that Aristotle probably alludes, 469* 22 : 010 xai ttuttl rta'iv alaOavfa-Bai rd fea iia tod €yKt« r« sal r» wot »orl t4 «'ko- voiovr avra (sc to 7 fforfpon iratrg yoovptu . . . ri oZf Sijtror* to t x« nj» ^vxh" i 1 at pa yap avSpairoit mpiKapbtov ion *6t)pa, Frag. 1 09, D iels, Vers. p. 2 1 2. * Plut. Epit. v. 24, Diels, Dox., p. 435 Kartyvfrv toO «V t$> a'pari Otppov aipperpor. * He distinguished, however, between the evidential value ota'aBtjais and vot-s, between oxoWij and yvqirin yimait, Sext. Math. vii. § 138. * (Kflttot piv yap airkioc Tavrov •^ruxh" K"\ »ovv' r'o yap aXtjSis thial tA $ot- voiuvov, Arist. de An. i. 2, 404* 27. * CL pseudo-Hippocr. Epistulae ix. 392 L mp\ i\a£ outvoter; the heart (taptiiq) pao-iXU, opyijt u0tjv6s; the liver ifprap) irtffvpirjc atrtov. SENSUS COMMUNIS »55 the liver or abdomen, respectively. He is also credited 1 h»ving with a bipartite division of the soul, placing rd XdyueV in "E^* the thorax, while distributing rd Hkoyov all over the body. ">d «. In fact, however, we can depend very little on information dmsion'of coming from a pseiido-Hippocratean writer of the second tise soul - century, or from the Plaeita, respecting points like this. According to the physical principles of Democritus, sense and thought result from emanations coming to us from things and entering the pores of our bodies, but especially the pores of the proper organs, penetrating to the atoms of the soul, and so in some way bringing to our minds the ideas of the things from which they have come. Thus it is with the perceptions of our waking life ; and thus it is also that we dream when asleep. For in sleep, too, tTouAa of things and persons stream into our bodies, or, being already lodged in them, then become active, and visions ' of the persons or things from which they originate arise in our minds 2 . Sleeping, according to Democritus, is a cooling Sleeping, of the heat-atoms of the body, or rather the expulsion, si ^^f under the pressure of the environment, of a certain number » certain of them s . This cooling affects the outer parts chiefly, and heat-atoms the vital heat retires to the interior, sc. to the neighbourhood *" d soul " of the heart. Amid these vague and indefinite notions we with con- cannot discover any inkling of a synthetic faculty by which ^"'^uai the effects of luroppoal in the way of sensation were collected heat round and arranged for the purposes of systematic experience, § 6. We might, at first sight, expect to discover, in His connexion with what Democritus says of tpavraa-ia, some J^^^ clue to his attitude respecting the central sense. But we give no find at once that by Xa, which are ever coming when we are awake, sink deeply into our bodies, destined in sleep to arise, as it were, ' from the depths ' and present themselves to consciousness. » Cf. Arist 472» a-i5i 4°4» 5~i6. «5« SENSUS COMMUNIS of centnl ductive imagination, but merely the presentative faculty: ^£^£° r that faculty whereby things appear, or present themselves, on hu to us in ordinary perception. He taught that the * secondary ]?^J? qualities' (as they were called by Locke) have no objective only pre- existence: they are only affections of our sensibility He formed according as it is qualitatively altered \ The same thing re'nsema- ^a* a PP ears (4>^f€a6ai) to us sweet may appear to others uon, of bitter, &c. As regards the function of reproductive imagina- oTreiii?' t * on » therefore, which Aristotle ascribed to the Koivrj afakov. |» m ha * e Censorinus tells us that Anaxagoras held the brain to be the or ^v\v source of all the senses 2 . It seems at all events certain that takln & the place of for him, in general, vovs or (its equivalent in his psychology) roGsin V'UX'} would have fulfilled the functions of koivtj (uo-0rjv tov vovv '. where Diels observes on p6vov ' nam qui praecedunt sensus ipsi judicium ferunt.' BIAtl S »58 SENSUS COMMUNIS the Apyli r&p v&vtuv 1 .' Though Clidemus did not, like Anaxagoras, make vous the explanatory principle of all things in general, he regarded it as the true percipient subject in the case of hearing. The implication by contrast here would certainly seem to be that the subject in the case of every sense was for Anaxagoras i»oS? itself, while the sensory organ was but a mere instrument or channel. But it is almost idle to speculate as to how Anaxagoras would have conceived a theory of synthesis, when of this faculty itself he does not appear to have felt the necessity. Diogenes of Apollonia. Diogenes § 8. Diogenes, who (notwithstanding his revival of the memoir theory of Anaximenes which made air the principium of and remi- a u things) is one of the most interesting of the pre-Platonic HU aatid- psychologists with whom we have undertaken to deal 2 , pationsof stan( j s a i one among the latter in having discussed, even of Aris- though indirectly, the subject of memory and reminiscence, antral ** e seems to nave ^ e ^ a theory of the psychical function organ of f the air in (or around) the brain in its relation with that] £ ence for in (or around) the heart in the thorax ; which reminds one Diogenes: Q f -Aristotle's doctrine of the connexion of three of the trie air round the senses with the brain, or rather with the membrane surround- braia m . ing this, and then with the heart, to which the brain or connexion o * * with the , its membrane was only an intermediate station. We have Sorax, or already seen how he connected the several special senses ronnd the w ith the air in the brain : how the eye, when images fall on the pupil, conveys its message by means of the air in this organ to the inner air, and so on 3 . The air animates the whole body, being conducted through it with the blood in the veins. Thinking is due, he says, to the activity 1 Zeller (Pre-Socratics, ii. 369, E. Tr.) infers that Anaxagoras made KoCr the true subject of perception in the case of each and all of the alcrdr] of or ir amzui S faculty, whether of sense or intelligence, on the neces- which consciousness and memory depend ; and that he qxthetfc regarded this as seated chiefly in the air in the region of ficnlty. the heart — whether in the lungs 2 or, as the compiler of the Placita tells us, in ' the arteriac cavity ' of the heart. Plato. Jkto § 9. Plato of course does not even name a koivti afo-tfTjo-ij, synthesis to but he investigated carefully the function of synthesis whose ascribed^ i m P ortance was paramount in his psychology. He ascribed to thought it not to sense, as Aristotle did, but to thought. Yet there eencef Yet * s reason f° r regarding this difference — from the psycho- he ia many logist's point of view, not from that of the metaphysician or the way for epistemologist — as one of method more than anything else. Aristotle's jj psychologist has ever been able to answer satisfactorily sensus the question where sense-perception ends and thinking com- We* m*y"* mences ' ^ a order, therefore, to be in a position to compare therefore, Aristotle's doctrine of Koivr\ ato-Orjo-ts with Plato's doctrine of 1 Cf. Arist. 469* 12 tio al(r6r)avfpus IvravBa (sc. tls tijv mpblav) trmrttvavaas opofuv, ti\v T( ytvaiv mii Trjv A(prjf, Surrt Kal rar uXXar amryKaiov. 1 Diogenes probably held that the'coiXiai of the heart communicated directly with the lungs. Cf. Arist 496* 22 xoi daXv [sc. a! xotXiai] ils rov irytljxova TfTpijiuvai traaat. SENSUS COMMUNIS a.$t$r\K6'} in common relation to any one sense, while they were directly afo-flj/rd ^f^^* to the koivt! aur&jo-iy, fulfilling as this did the function here senses. ascribed by Plato to ^v\rj. With this, and the use of aladavunfOa as referred to above, the thought of tj icoinj 1 Theaet. 185 B oCt* yap Si Axorjt oOrt <«' ctyfur ol6i> tc ro xoii/iv \ap- fiavtat iripl avran. 1 aAX* avrij it avrtjt q ifnix'l Ta KM >"* M°' oioi> koX rb &v6notov, (c) tv ical itoWi, (d) rb jcoAok nai rb alirxp6v, (e) rb iyaObv av~ ra.ajxifii>jjavra(6fievov) itself as standing beside the cliff yonder beneath the tree? ' Next he might make answer to himself and say : ' it is a human being,' thereby guessing correctly, or he might mistake and say : ' What I see is something made by shepherds — a figure of a human being.' If in company with some one, he would give audible utterance to these attempts to pronounce; his efforts at opinion (8o'£a) would take the form of discourse (\6yos). But if he is alone he proceeds to discuss (biavoaiiuvos) the matter with himself, keeping it to himself for a good while 2 . Thus alo-flrjo-i?, (ftavraaia, pvTJpilt &°£ a > Sufooia, and \6yos are brought into relation with one another ; the object of presentation is compared with that of memory or thought, and a judgment or opinion, true or false, is formed of the relation between them s . (rkaedo) § 16. Notwithstanding that in the Theaetetus Plato specnjL s P ea ks of the soul as being, by itself, without the use of 1 Phaedo 73 C-E. For association of interests superadded to and reinforcing association of ideas, cf. Lysis 219-20. * Phtteb. 38 c seqq. ' Here, it may be observed, we have to do with what Aristotle calls the perception of to koto $t$i\*&s. SENSUS COMMUNIS 269 any bodily organ, able to recover by reminiscence its Horn u to temporarily lost impressions, he in various places speaks ^'xb^" of it, and even of its highest functions, as having a bodily faculty of seat or organ. * I speculated,' says Socrates ', ' as to whether Iynt the blood is the part of us with which we think and per- ceive 2 , or else the air, or the fire, within us ; or whether it is none of these, but the brain is that which supplies the sensations (6 irap^v ras alarOrjaas) of hearing, seeing, and smelling 3 ; and whether from these arise memory (ixvrjpti) and opinion (oo'fa), while from memory and opinion, when fixed and stable (Xa/Sovo-Tjs ' to fjpene'iv Kara ravra), arises scientific knowledge (^irionj/Mj).' Here the organ <■> (ppovovntp is evidently made to include reference to the processes of sense-perception, and also to those which imme- diately follow — memory and the other processes referred by Aristotle to the koivti alo-flrjo-iy. Thus the Platonic Socrates enumerates all or most of the suggestions made by former writers to explain the * seat ' of perception and thinking — by Empedocles and Kritias (al/na), Diogenes of Apollonia (aijp), Heraclitus (irvp), and Alcmaeon (0 tyK4a\os). In the Timaeus Plato himself adopts the last of these suggestions, making the brain the seat of the intellectual functions of soul. Hippocrates, as well as Alcmaeon, had already held the brain to be the essential organ of sense and thought. ' This is that which interprets for us the impressions derived from the air (ij/iTi> r&v diro rov ije'pos ytvopivtav kp\u\veus) if it is in a healthy condition ; but it is the air that supplies it with intelligence (rJjv li Phaedo 96 C, with Archer-Hind's notes. * £ (ppovoifui/ : cf. M t& p6niu>i/, Tim. 64 B, which also evidently includes sense-perception. 'He does not mention touching and tasting here. 4 Hippocr. de Morbo Sacro, 17. 270 SENSUS COMMUNIS of plants, to contain in it the Divine seed, he moulded in a spherical SfMpaXov rt IhpvoQai) ; that in virtue of it plants have — not, indeed, the ' sense ' which is an element of cognition, but only — feeling, pleasant or painful, with the accompanying appetites or impulses s . The three § 1 8. The three souls or parts of soul were connected sounnthe through the cerebro-spinal marrow on which they were Timaeus. all ' strung ' together. The head was the separate abode of the immortal 4 soul ; the mortal soul was planted apart 1 Tim. 73 c-D (Archer-Hind). ' 77 B. ' a 5o£rjr fuv Xoyurpov r« rat vov pArtcm rh prfiiv, aioBqottos Si rjttiat jum a\ytiv!jc fura cinBvfuSiv. In this sentence aic means not the sensory factor, or element, of knowledge, but what is generally known to modern psychologists as ' feeling' : the pleasurable or painful element in consciousness. It is in this sense that Plato here ascribes mo-dijcrtf to plants (rpura). Aristotle denies it of plants in this as well as in the sense of perception, making it the attribute of (ua exclusively. As for the Greeks the term aitrfiijo-ir had to express the sense of pleasure or pain as well as the factor of cognition, so with us till lately the word ' feeling ' did duty for both, and is commonly used in this ambiguous way in the works of English writers of the last century. Plato distinguishes cognitive alaBtjois from rfiovjj ical Xwrj iiiptiyiilvos Ipar, Tim. 42 A. In Pkilebus also (e. g. 32 d) rj&ovi) and Xwnj together = 'feeling,' cf. § 19 infra. * For what follows see Grote, Plato, iii. 272-5. In the Phaedrus 246 b Bviaos and tmSv/ua seem reckoned in with the immortal soul, the body only being mortal. SENSUS COMMUNIS tji from ft in the trunk, with the neck as an isthmus of separation between the two. 'Again, the mortal soul was itself not single but double : including two divisions, a better and a worse. The gods kept the two parts separate; placing the better portion in the thoracic cavity nearer to the head, and the worse portion lower down, in the abdominalcavity : the two being divided from each other by the diaphragm, built across the body as a wall of partition.' 'Above the diaphragm, and near to the neck, was planted the energetic, courageous, contentious, soul ; so placed as to receive orders easily from the head, and to aid the rational soul in keeping under constraint the mutinous soul of appetite, which was planted below the diaphragm. The immortal soul was fastened or anchored in the brain, the two mortal souls in the line of the spinal marrow continuous with the brain ; which line thus formed the thread of connexion between the three. The heart was established as an outer fortress for the exercise of influence by the immortal soul over the other two. It was at the same time made the initial point of the veins — the fountain from whence the current of blood proceeded to pass forcibly through the veins round to all parts of the body. The purpose of this arrangement is, that when the rational soul denounces some proceeding as wrong (either on the part of others without, or in the appetitive soul within), it may stimulate an ebullition of anger in the heart, and may transmit from thence its exhortations and threats through the many small blood-channels l to all the sensitive parts of the body ; which may thus be rendered obedient everywhere to the orders of our better nature. . . . The third or lowest soul, of appetite and nutrition, was placed between the diaphragm and. the navel. This region of the body was set apart like a manger for con- taining necessary food : and the appetitive soul was tied up to it like a wild beast ; indispensable, indeed, for the 1 For Plato, as for Aristotle, the blood-vessels take the place of nerves, conveying sensations through the body; cf. Tim. 65 C, 67 B, 70 a seqq., 77 E- 27* SENSUS COMMUNIS continuance of the race, yet a troublesome adjunct, and therefore placed afar off, in order that its bellowings might disturb as little as possible the deliberations of the rational soul in the cranium, for the good of the whole. The gods knew that this appetitive soul would never listen to reason, and that it must be kept under subjection altogether by the influence of phantoms and imagery. They provided an agency for this purpose in the liver, which they placed close upon the abode of the appetitive soul. They made the liver compact, smooth, and brilliant, like a mirror reflecting images ; — moreover, both sweet and bitter on occasions. The thoughts of the rational soul were thus brought within view of the appetitive soul, in the form of phantoms or images exhibited on the mirror of the liver ', When the rational soul is displeased, not only images corresponding to this feeling are impressed, but the bitter properties of the liver are all called forth. . . . When the rational soul is satisfied, so as to send forth mild and complacent inspirations, — all this bitterness of the liver is tranquillized, and all its native sweetness called forth. . . . It is thus through the liver, and by means of these images, that the rational soul maintains its ascendancy over the appetitive soul ; either to terrify and subdue, or to comfort and encourage it.' ' Moreover, the liver was made to serve another purpose. It was selected as the seat of the prophetic agency ; which the gods considered to be indispensable, as a refuge and aid for the irrational department of man. Though this portion of the soul had no concern with sense or reason, they would not shut it out altogether from some glimpse of truth. The revelations of prophecy were accordingly signified on the liver, for the instruction and within the easy view of the appetitive soul ; and chiefly at periods when the functions of the rational soul are suspended— either during sleep, or diseases, or fits of temporary ecstasy. 1 Plato rejects vaticination from victims. Tim. 72 B artp^iv it toG fir [sc t4 rjnap] yiyovt rv\ov Ka\ ri pavrtla apvtportpa i a • ...... , . , , , . as element better if, distinguishing aI navQavti for want IvOpmitos*. In the Laws 6 Plato implicitly confirms this ° l I ?™' ~ classification in the words £u\A»j/3orji/ bl povs fiera rS>v terms ior KaWiarmv aMriatmv (sc. T?js cty«a>s kvrd possess and which has no self-consciousness {Tim. 77 b). Cf. Zeller, Plato 432 n., E. Tr. ' Repub. 436 A. « 961 D . BEAKS T 274 SENSUS COMMUNIS is forgotten by readers. The cognitive (or the subservient to cogni- tion) probably was con- ceived by Plato as belonging to the canial part of soul. Tasting referred by Plato to the heart. Touching proceeds, through the capf, in to In Timaeus 65 a, 71 A, we learn that Ipui, aftrdrjo-tt flXoyor, Tjtiovrj, Xvwrj, Oappos, 6/3os, 0vp.6s, i\irls are seated in the thoracic and abdominal parts of soul ; whence it is obvious to infer that the other a"o-0rjo-is — that conducive to cogni- tion — belongs to the cranial part. Sight and hearing are ministers of reason 1 . Against this it might seem as if Plato attributes cognitive power to the lower or abdominal soul, when he says that images are presented on the mirroring surface of the liver for the purpose of warning or encouragement. But on examination of the passage (Tim. 71 b) we find that the effects conveyed to this organ from the brain only impress the appetitive part with feelings or emotions, without necessarily implying that it has any cognitive function 2 . § 20. It is at first somewhat surprising, after this, to find that Plato in explaining the physiology of tasting 3 refers its sensations to the heart. ' When earthy particles enter in by the small veins which are like test-tubes on the tongue extending from it to the heart 4 , these give rise to astringent tastes.' Does the heart then, for Plato, as for Aristotle, take a direct share in the mechanism of sense? The sense of touching is for Aristotle that most obviously and directly traceable to the heart as its organ ; we cannot discover from Plato whether he connected it with this, as he contents himself with referring the con- sciousness of the sensations of touch to a movement propagated by the o-ap£ onwards until it reaches the 1 Tim. 47 B-C 1 im . . . 17 <oj9oi piv awro (sc. to (nt6vfir)riKov) ; also just before (71 A) flUorts Of avrd, i>s Xoyov \iiv out* %vvt\\fpi.a olAvntp loKipt'ia rr)t yXwmjt nrapira (VI rr)v Kapbiay, Tim. 65 C. SENSUS COMMUNIS «75 • centre of consciousness V He does not speak of odours SmtiKng as affecting the brain; when they are disagreeable, injjj^ certain cases, they irritate all the cavity of the body lying the cavity between the head and the navel 2 . Sound is, as we know, betwixt the a stroke caused by the air, transmitted through the ears, h h ead a a £. < } affecting the brain and blood, and propagated * to the soul ' ; Hearing and the motion produced by it, beginning in the head and ^J"^. ending in the liver, is hearing*. He uses only vague terms ginning to designate the sensoria concerned in dreaming. Pungent £1^ ^ e d tastes are caused by substances which affect the tongue ending and fly up towards the ' senses of the head V From all H ve r. this we can see how difficult it is to gather what Plato Did ^ lat0 , ° conceive regarded as the common seat or organ of the alo-fljjo-tiy as any one elements of cognition, or, indeed, whether he held that there J^" was any one such seat. The brain at one time (in accord- to the ance with the view that the function of synthesis is^nmon? intellectual) seems to be the organ to which the senses should refer their messages ; while, soon after, the heart or the liver is found in possession of similar prerogatives. § 31. Plato suffers from the consequences of what Galen Peiplexi- ascribes to his merit— the adoption of three hpxal*. To^^f* this initial want of centralization are traceable the per- tripartite plexities into which he leads us, and which he must himself J^° a have felt, respecting the various sensory functions, and the bodily parts concerned in each. This initial subdivision of the soul into ' parts,' located in three different portions of the body, makes it impossible for him to give a con- sistent or systematic account of the psychical facts. We cannot, therefore, elicit from his writings any evidence as to views of his own respecting a koiv&v ai6ti)tos avvt irpor rat rrjt Kf^aXijr altrBijatu. • Cf. Galen, de Placit. Hipp, et Plat. §§ 505 and 519, on /mV olr «&- \Ayas 6 nXdruv «Hn r« Kal fuptj V"*x5» ovojuif« tovto, fuuporipm) ov Kofuu \6yav. T 2 276 SENSUS COMMUNIS cannot extract a clear or simple meaning. With regard, however, to the synthetic faculty which arranges the data of sense in memory, &c, we find that he has treated most of its functions in a way which closely anticipates much of what Aristotle afterwards taught. Not, however, attributing it, as Aristotle did, to sense, he ascribes to it functions which far transcend those ascribed to it by Aristotle. He lays what may have been the foundation of Aristotle's theory of it as the faculty which distinguishes and compares the data of sense, and of the theory of imagination, memory, and reminiscence. Indeed, the terms in which he expressed himself respecting these, and the similes he employed for the purpose of elucidating them, have remained part of, and have deeply influenced the language of, psychology, to the present day. In fullness of detail on such points Aristotle surpasses him ; but all the main or cardinal psychological ideas respecting the functions of synthesis are already, at least in outline, to be found in Plato. The difference between him and Aristotle on this point was mainly a difference of method. He chose to classify all functions of synthesis as parts of the activity of the understanding. This, indeed, as an epistemologist or metaphysician, he was wise in doing; but for the purposes of empirical psychology Aristotle's attribution of synthesis to the faculty of sense is unquestionably sound. Aristotle. l.Senmt § 22. According to Aristotle each sense, regarded as 7n pmen- subservient to cognition, is, as regards its proper aio-flijiw, tatzve con- a ^ vaiJLls (ripo>e0a) that s '"^"' u „ is white differs from sweet} By sense-perception (aio-0»jo-«) as the djs- of course, for these objects are both aio-flrjrd. But it ^ n | U ^ K cannot be the work of any single sense, even of the most P arin B » Cf. infra., pp. 283, 325-8. * Cf. de Sens. vii. 447" 9"»«- • 426 b l2-427» 16. 278 SENSUS COMMUNIS faculty comprehensive of all — that of touching. It cannot at all EraTthe events be done by the instrumentality of adp(. For v&p£, ■xoxot to perceive sweet, has to come into contact with the object; though though sight does not need to do so in order to perceive sofcnda- w / n t em i^ therefore, the organ which perceives both be cmnot that on which touching depends, this organ cannot be a&pfc l . thiifciK> ^ or can the comparison be effected by the two senses, tion, which touching and seeing, acting together 2 . It is impossible for fined to separate entities (Kexupurpivois) to pronounce that white is tactual different from sweet. Both objects must be present to the tions. Nor judgment of one self-identical agency, not each to a different hTconccrt a g encv from the other, as if for instance / were to perceive »ith any the one and you the other 3 ; for such would really be the suffice^ 11 * 6 case if two senses took part in the comparative judgment. The act That which pronounces white and sweet to be different parison ala-d-qrd must be not two agents, but one and the same. And T'tth 3 not on ty must it he one and the same agent, but its agency things at the moment of comparison must likewise be one. It hebrooght must act at one an d the same instant of time with reference before a to both the things compared. The two must be perceived jndg^g co-instantaneously in one single instant *. When the com- faiction at paring faculty pronounces one of the things compared to time. be different from the other, then, too, it pronounces the other to be different from the one. The very relation of difference into which the objects are brought thus involves identity in the judging subject. Hence (a) this is self- identical, and (b) its judgment respecting the one thing takes place at the same instant 6 as its judgment respecting the other. In short it is but one comparative judgment. 1 In 455» 20-25 we see how closely allied, for Aristotle, are the kou^ alaOrja-is and the sense of touching — ro Aimitov. It occurs to him here (426 b 15), therefore, that the sense of touching may to some seem to be the one which discerns sweet and white, for tasting which perceives sweet is a mode of touching. But—while he does not utterly discard this assumption, and indeed the organ of touch proper and that of the sensus communis are, at bottom, one— he is careful to show that the flesh— the medium of touching, cannot be the organ of such comparing and distinguishing sense. * 426 b 17. s 426 b 19- * 426 b 23. * 426 b 29 eV a^aplirra XP°>"f- SENSUS COMMUNIS 279 When I judge white to be different from sweet, at that same time I judge sweet to be different from white; and I who judge am the same in both relations. § 24. There is need of explanation, however, if we are to How one • , - r - , and the understand how one and the same sensory faculty can thus ^ act at one and the same time with reference to objects like ["^"J White and sweet, which as perceived affect sense differently, co-instan- The same subject cannot, so far as it is undivided (ibtalpirov), ^afFcreoi and so far as it acts in an undivided time (h ifaaipiru objects in Xpovy), be affected at once with opposite movements CO m P ari- (kutjo^is). In whatever way sweet moves the sense, bitter s ° n . or ... . . distinc- moves it in the opposite way ; and white moves it in a way ti on . In different from either. Yet if, as experience teaches us, such °° e e "^^ comparison is a fact, the above simultaneous action must be faculty is possible somehow. Perhaps the solution is that the faculty anotherU which pronounces (to uplvov) on the difference of such quali- « divisible /111 >• ..!/•! • aI1 " n0t ties (whether homogeneous or not) is in itself when it so acts, single, numerically one, undivided and indivisible 1 ; yet, in its re/a- lhls s "s- tions z , not self-identical, but divided (Kf\u>piiriitvov) 3 . If this answer. be! so, one and the same percipient subject would, in virtue of its partibility of relationship, apprehend the several objects, while in virtue of its local and numerical identity it would grasp them together, and bring them into one rela- tion with one another *. § 35. Yet is this explanation really admissible ? The This same numerically and locally (nnru koI \&ya -in relation to the faculty of conception. 3 The difficulty with which Aristotle here contends is put sharply in tie Sens. vii. 447^ 17 seqq. It is there shown that so far as a sense is a single faculty (durante) and the time of its action indivisible, so far its ivipyua is and must be single. There is but one 'movement'— once for all— possible, in a single time-instant, for such a faculty. That such a faculty should perceive white and sweet. Or any other two objects co-instantaneously, in order to compare or distinguish them could not be admitted. In the same chapter it is afterwards shown that there is a way of regarding sense in which it is not such a simple, single, faculty as this, but endowed with the breadth and comprehensiveness of the sensus communis. ' 4*7* 3- a8o SENSUS COMMUNIS satisfactory in its potential relationships be (or exhibit) contraries, but not fnither ex- m its realized relationships, while remaining one and the pianation: same. As, for instance, the same surface cannot at once for though the agent be white and black, so (it might be argued) the same one ^^^ sensory faculty cannot at once receive the forms * of white and discri- and black. This difficulty is real, Aristotle admits ; yet TflT/bT il mav » he thinks, be met. In a passage of the Physics 2 , tcuntially arguing that 6 yjiovos is api6pLos Kivrjar«os Kara rd itporepov tal as regards varepov, the geometrical point, jj oriypuj, and the unit of ^ctefvet *^' me » ™ r ""> are compared. Each has two aspects, in one how can it of which it is a itepas or limit. In this aspect the and the vvv is not a xpwos. As in the nation space-line, so in the time-line, the ' now,' which some call «a™in a point, is at once the beginning and the end, according to which the the aspect in which we view it. It is the end of the past, r& m is the beginning of the future. Thus it would fittingly illus- £*^j^ trate the position of the percipient subject in relation to am] twa. different things and focussing them all at the same time. As the vvv can be at once both beginning and termination, while numerically one and the same, so this subject, while preserving its self-identity, maybe related at once to different, and even opposite, objects, such as black and white, or sweet and white 2 . The kowt) aladrjais, like each special alo-0t]o-is, is 1 ra *78ij : the distinctive function of sense is the reception of forms without matter. * 220* 5-26 aladtiTinbv tov Ibiov — is a mean between the ivavrla of its province : and rd aZo-ffynicoi/ ■ndvTotv 1 is likewise a mean between the aladi\T& of all the 1 Cf. 44 9 » 17. ' A further explanation of the kow) a'aB^ait is attempted in de Anima 431" 2oseqq. in which Aristotle endeavours, by the aid of the idea of a proportion between pairs of numbers or quantities, to illustrate the relation between the central sense and its objects, whether homo- geneous or heterogeneous, e. g. white and black, or white and sweet. The difficulties of this passage, however, are so great that they have baffled commentators from the earliest times to the present. See Torstrik's edition of the de Anima, pp. 199-202; Trendelenburg (Belger), pp. 426-32, with the passages from Simplicius and Philoponus there quoted; Kampe, Erkenntnisstheorie des A rist., pp. 108-9 n. Also see the judicious notes of E. Wallace, ad loc. Until the disputed points of reading and interpretation are settled for this passage, we cannot venture to rely upon it for trustworthy guidance as to Aristotle's con- ception of the sensus communis. The insertion, however, of a second reference to this matter, in connexion with the psychology of reason and will, shows plainly enough that Aristotle intended to use to the full his conception of nal To anfiXv (to iv oyKoir). These are said 2 to be perceptions • common to all the special senses, or if not to all, at least to sight and touch.' Wherefore (810') with reference to these percepts errors take place (diraTuvrai), while with reference to the special or proper (wepl r Ibimv) objects of each sense, such as colour, no such error occurs, or at least it occurs only in the lowest possible degree 3 . Two points are remarkable in Aristotle's statement respecting these Koivd. First, that though they are called icoiva naaStv, this is corrected and their perception restricted to sight and touch ; secondly, that after declaring the above alv piv l&lay a\r)8fc {ittiv f t on 6\iynrrov c^ovaa TO >)riv8os. SENSUS COMMUNIS 283 mony ? If so, why ? There is an incongruity in Aristotle's wtne of position as to the relation between 'special' and • general' S^vit sense l . «Mj al - , . , , ,, , , * , nnmber, sense tor the perception of these, e. g. of Kii^cris and »;p*^iia. a nd so on, Were there such special sense, then when we saw an object °{ . a11 .. r ' J objective moving or at rest, its movement or rest would, for us, be, necessity, in relation to the proper object of seeing, as sweetness is now to colour ; i. e. a merely incidental percept. We sec an object of a certain colour to be sweet. This only means that an uniform experience has taught us to connect its colour with this particular taste. We are accustomed to find the taste and the colour together in the object. There is no necessary connexion between them, however, as there is between a body and its movement or rest. Were there a special sense for the perception of movement or rest, the latter, as Ibtov of such sense, might and no doubt would connect itself customarily, but never necessarily with the Km of other senses. We should by the assumed special sense perceive movement per se, not, as now, always in a moving body. Thus a gulf would be created in experience between movement and rest and bodies ; and the same 1 See pp. 277, 286 n., 32S" 8 - 3 425* 16 raura yap iravra Kivyatt al y koi xpovov: 451* 17 otitou irporov aloBijTiicov ko) $ \povov aioBavopxBa : 452 b J seqq. * 4 l8 ' 8l 8 425* 14 rav koivuv . . . 2n> UaoTfl aloSrjati ataBavoytOa mra f*j9fj9i)KOf, where the seeming inconsistency with 425* 15 is easily removed, by observing that the Kowd, which to each special aurBrjtris are (» 15) Kara av^f^iKos, are not so but are strictly proper to i) Koivq madman. 3 42S b 22—5 T <*> v Koifo}v Kai (TTOfjeioyv rots trvfiftfftqicoo-iv oiff uTrtip^ci ra iSta, Xf'yu Si olov KivTjots Kai fuytdos, & . Now, for example, we cannot we can perceive anything without perceiving it to have piytBos n *. j^L™, As things stand, moreover, every alo~8r)Tov has number : every without visible alo-B^rov, at least, has magnitude. If we had an 18101; th^itha* ala-OriTriptov of number or magnitude, what Aristotle thinks m««osand is that then number would only have the incidental and But the occasional connexion with alo-Bi\T& which sweetness now has ™^' t4 with whiteness ; and this would exemplify the consequent avu8*Bii*6t disorganization of all experience, and the necessity for>^"' objective experience of maintaining the Kotvd as kou»<£. the sensus »- . . , , ,. . , , , communis, If, however, the koivq are perceived directly by the koiwj incidental aI7 th «ir themselves to the (coiotj alo-flrjo-is simultaneously, even sentation, though their perception was successive. In their detach- j^ m *y ment from their aUOrjri, they may give rise to ^xwrdo-fxara of illusion, which become sources of illusion. Even at their first ^.J^ 1 * occurrence, while the object is present, they may be produced sources of illusion, and require to be brought to order by a ^to.™" standard. Thus we, despite our better knowledge, continue to see the sun a foot in breadth. The controlling faculty of sense (rd xipwv koX ittinplvov) *, however, which is that which estimates the objective reference of aMrjiiara, may correct such illusion. The organ of this is the nvpiav al ' Secondly, there is a point of view whence we can 1 425 b 1 1-25 : by using alo-6av6fif8a Aristotle excludes the assumption that it is by intelligence that we become conscious of perceptions. 1 Viz. the original d^ic or Spatric and the oifnt fyeut. * f" m Spiral to opav : ' to become conscious of seeing ' means (so far as the argument has proceeded) that ' one who sees should see the seeing agent.' * The point is argued as if ' to perceive that one perceives ' were the same thing as ' to perceive the perceiving subject.' 1 It has one meaning as expressing the act of special sense ; another — and this is the point to which Aristotle is leading up— in reference to the act of the *oii«j awaavrar OKoiattfV — na\ rj otyir yc irou, tartp IfyiTat avrrf iavrrjV, xpupa ti avrf/v avaynri lynx* Sxpor yap tyu oiibiv pfj iror* Tojj. * 455* 15 seqq. ' U7°* *9i with Prof- ]• A. Stewart's note. IUII U aco SENSUS COMMUNIS Qavricriutra, and on occasion also pvtyiovrif/xara, subsidiary to the higher functions of intelligence and reason l . In spite of the importance assigned to consciousness in the N.E., 1. c, it remains in general for Aristotle a psychical ■ndptpyov, utterly without the importance assigned to it by modern psychologists. Science, perception, opinion, and discursive intelligence, are all concerned primarily with something other than themselves, viz. with their respective objects. The man of science does not as a rule think of himself as thinking; he thinks of his particular object; and of. himself only indirectly, or when some interruption to the natural flow of his thought occurs 2 . 1L Sauus § 30. The word ^ ! .. ect * n tne one grade it is the faculty of presentation ; in the raaia) cor- other, the faculty of representation, or the reproductive ^f^h oI imagination. Corresponding distinctions hold as to the these. use of the concrete .3i seqq. The alafffniara are themselves alaBijra, 46o b 3. 1 Cf. Met. I074 1 " 35 tpaiffTM &' ail iTXXov i) (in<7Tq/*i; mil {/ aMija-it Ka\ 17 h6£a xai 17 tidvota, aurijr &' iv rrapipya. The psychological distinction between self and its energy in thought or action, while important as revealing to us our existence, is, we may observe, as a matter of fact, one of which little use is normally made in practice ; and then chiefly either for the purposes of psychology and cognate studies, or because some- thing abnormal occurs, which interrupts the current of objective thinking ' and forces the thinker in upon himself. ' In accordance with the use of (palvfrai, as in atWatrraaCa, or to QavrcumKov, subordi- in Aristotle's psychology, is that of the faculty by which ^d^'' Qavrdvpara, mental presentations, are in the first instance Xon p e j j ■ 1 ~ . rather to lormed, and in the second reproduced, in the absence of the mental ala6r\T&. to which they are ultimately affiliated. Such repro- gJ^jlF* duction is thus described. The impressions of sense, the altrO-q- tioa ofthe para, do not disappear or perish with the instant of their which" first perception. They leave traces (ixovaC) of themselves 2 , or *«"«»«» persist, ' within us.' These traces are somehow stored up. ductive This * storing up ' is effected by successive Qavraatai, i. e. J™*^"^ ' appearances ' or presentations through immediate sense ; and in and when a store of aZo-0jj/xaTa has been formed, the ground "ji^t"*" is prepared for avradvraavravla and rj *totw; a.lavracry.aTa are brought into clear consciousness by employed, the fiovaC, or traces of themselves left by the aWOrntara. The organ of sense-perception is related to an external, or extra- organic, stimulus : that of reproductive imagination receives its stimulus from within the organism. Thus, when the senses are not occupied with ' external objects,' the fyavratrta may be actively employed ; and, indeed, it has least to do when the senses are engaged with the outer world energetically and effectively. Confused and obscure, or difficult, sensory perception is, however, apt to stimulate tj>avTaurravTacria t) v>ro rrjt (car ivipytian alaOrjOtos yuio/ttini nVijcric : cf. 429* I. * The organ in which the av^irfit, or /unmi, or whatever name the effect of 17 Kar ivipytiav €uavravrxuria resembles thinking in the one particular of not requiring external stimulation, as alo-flijo-i? does, on each occasion of its exer- Difference cise. Therefore it is that QavraapaTa and ko^oto at their °jj£||^i lowest level become somewhat difficult to distinguish 2 . vafnum. But fyavTavfxaTa are indispensable for the exercise of vo'i/o-is 3 . J]^j tne Indeed, in one place Aristotle goes so far as to name material , . . , . .... of K(iijavraavracrla are not of course purely corporeal: they are, like J^y "„,„,, all the processes of life and mind, and in accordance with in the the definition of ala-drjais given by Plato and Aristotle, which* ° movements of the soul through the body. Leaving this to *»*▼»»'« ■ . > a . 1 • 1 • i dependsare be understood throughout; Aristotle gives a predominantly movements physiological account of the nature of (pavravla. Yet this I^^j is an activity of faxy. It is that on which memory and together. recollection depend. Without its aid sense-perception \%gj£ would be confined to momentary ivepyeuu, lacking in con- importance tinuity, unassociated, incapable of forming a basis of £,,„■„. 1 In 4i3 b 22 there are good reasons for doubting the genuineness ol the words na\ Qarrturiav ; cf. 414*" I, 415* 10, 4i4 b 16, 428' 10. Cf. Freudenthal, op. til., p. 8. *' 4°3 S 8 to votiv' tl 8' earl *ai roOro tyurraaia ric $ pr) &rtv (fximraaias , 433* 9 " TU TV* fairairiav Ti&i'i) we vdtjolr Tina, 432* 12 ra di lrpurra vottfiaTa Tin fltoiW tou /117 ^aiToo-para «i»ai ; ' 449 b 3° set M' 4 427 b 28 tou VOtip . . . tovtov it to pit (pavraaia ionti uval TO it »94 SENSUS COMMUNIS linreipCa. As the work of t6 alaOrfriKbv v&vrav, it gives the alvQurA. their first objective reference: it extends ex- perience from rh 'o«x to rcL koivA. and rh Kara. ffVju0airao>iara or ' schemata ' which accom- pany our concepts that they have the requisite clearness and distinctness, and also are capable of being remembered. Together with perception and thinking it forms also the basis of desire and will 2 . For the productions of art and literature its efficacy is prodigious, and quite indispensable. Who Antipheron of Oreus was we do not know : perhaps a madman, who mistook (as we learn from de Mem. i) his mere ^avraanara for jon/j//xov«v/jtaro ; but Aristotle, as well as Shakespeare, distinguishes the poet as one who has the faculty of giving ' to airy nothing a local habitation and a name 3 .' Rolnatm* § 32. As to the real or physical nature of the Kivrj(T€K in residual which the faculty of imagination consists, Aristotle of course impres- can tell us nothing. We do not know whether they are form the regarded by him as (what would now be termed) mechanical physio- or chemical. In this respect, modern psychologists have no ground of great advantage as compared with him. The correspon- ^£^J dences between his description of this faculty and that given to ArU- by Hobbes (as pointed out by Freudenthal, op. cit., p. 24 n.) aiso'tons. are verv we ^ worth noticing. ' When a body' (says Hobbes) Com- « i s once set in motion, it moveth, unless something else spondences .... ,, , . , , . between hinder it, eternally . . . and, as we see in the water, though A *1 stotle the wind cease the waves give not over rolling for a long Hobbes, as time after, so also it happeneth in that motion. . . . For after ^J? the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it V With this compare Arist. 459 b 9 seqq., 46o b 28 seqq. Again : ' imagination, therefore, is nothing but decay- ing sense ' — the proposition laid down by Hobbes — might 1 43o b 32. * 432 b 16. 433* 9~ b z8. 1 Cf. Arist. Poet. I4S5» 3 2 and § 38 infra. ' Leviathan, pt. i. ch. 2 ; also Physics, iv. ch. 25. SENSUS COMMUNIS 295 be a translation of $ 21 Qavrcurla lv. ' Those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense continue also together after sense ' is a paraphrase of Arist. de Mem. 2. 45 a * I *>* y°P ^x ot " ri T <* itpiyfiara itpbs aK\rj\a r$ t(£i}s, ovtu xai al Kivrjveis. § 33. The Kivrjfftis in the organs either continue latent or latency of propagate themselves to the central organ of perception*. ^Jjf 1 ™ 1 Their latency is caused by the inhibition exercised upon men &. ho,r them by stronger xiwjo-tis, in the continued use of the Their aladfaas in external perception, or else by the activity ? mer eawe of thinking. These stronger (Hi/jjo-eiy extinguish the weaker scionsness; as a stronger light causes a weaker to pale before it 3 - But ^manner under favourable circumstances they make their way to of this. the central organ and re-emerge into consciousness, i.e. ] ate ^t they either when they become strong enough to remove the are for , , : , & , Aristotle obstacles, or when the inhibiting movements become potential; weaker, as in sleep. When latent the kh>jj«i? are, in m con " scionsness Aristotle's phrase, potential ; when they emerge into con- they sciousness, they are actual*. They are conveyed from the acl ^/ e special organ to the organ of central sense, and so from Their latency to consciousness, by ' the medium of the blood •. In between this organ of central sense they then produce a secondary 'be special ° . ... r... , org*" 1 "no affection of consciousness with an image of the object of the central 1 1370* 28, a passage of the Rhetoric, of which work Hobbes made an analysis. ' 459 b 7. 46»' 6. * 46o b 3a, 461* 20, 464 b 4- 4 46i b 12. • Or with the blood, by the o-i^vtok imcvpa, see 6s9 b 17-20, 744* 3. * 461 s 25~ b 18, especially b II mruWoK tow tr\« roit oluBTjTrjpiois tuvovvrau ao* SENSUS COMMUNIS organ is perception, copying this l as it was in its first presentation '. w&c ' This secondary image is what Aristotle calls the Qavravpa. ei^funm The faculty, and sometimes the process, by which Qavrdanara w hidi arise is called by him QavracrCa, which (in the chapter ^ithrtie ex P ress b r devoted to its explanation) is defined as • a move- blood in ment within the ££or produced by actualized perception V Relation" ThusQavraaCa is an exercise of the koivt) aZo-0T/di>ra«rpia connected and greatly with the matter of scientific contemplation (Qtotpta) such influences contemplation is impossible. Thus avrdcriiaTa are to of men. V vor]avraala on conduct; but to the lower animals 7 Qavrao-ia with o/>e£is alone presents the motives of action. All the pleasures possible to man are either present in perception (tv ry al l\nt(tiv /itXAoj-To). The pleasures accompanying memory and expectation are due to the avrdiTfj.aTa involved in these mental states ; for the ^avrdafiara are attended with 1 For the inner stimulus is qualitatively like the cuter ; 9 (pavraoia ■ /cuTjo-i'f Tir . . . cat Tavn)v d/iotai* avdyKj) ttvat rjj atcrdqira, 428 b IO-14. * 450* IO to fpamaafia TJjr KOivrjs alcrSijcriois iraBot c'otiV. 3 For 17 avraoia generally, in itself and in its relationship to other psychical faculties, see de An. iii. 3. 428 b 2-429" 9. 4 Cf. Rhet. 1370" 28 : ' When one remembers or hopes or fears («Xiri- (om) a (pdyravfia of the object remembered or hoped for or feared accompanies his mental act.' * 432* 2 seqq., 445 b 16. « 432* 7-10, 449" 31 seqq. ' 429" 4~8. SENSUS COMMUNIS 297 alavr/xira>i>) as quantitative, illustration and then proceeds in his thinking of it without any regard U se of geo- whatever to its quantitativeness. In the same way, too, ifthe™ etrical , object be properly quantitative but of indeterminate quantity the way in (as when we say, e. g. ' any given circle '), in spite of this ^redrawn 7 one connects it first with some determinate quantity — as We cannot if of some particular size — and then thinks of it for the objects of purposes of his problem in abstraction from such deter- toons'" • •> ™ . before our mmateness 3 . The reason why one must do this — why we mind cannot exercise the intellect on any object unless under exce P' } n J J connexion such conditions, and also why we cannot, as is likewise with time- true 4 , exercise the intellect except under the condition of con nons * time, even though dealing with conceptions not in time* — requires separate discussion, but the fact remains s . After Nearness this it is not surprising that ^awdo-fiara and vorifiara should J,J^ ~ in Aristotle's treatment of them sometimes approach one miium in another so closely as to appear confused. Thus we read 8 treatment. 1 Rhet. i. 2. 1370* 28-35 ; de Mot. An. 701* 4-5. The ^>avraa\uaa are all rooted in alo-Brmara, which if pleasurable make them pleasant • 449 b 30-450* 13. S "on &' jj noaov flavor. 4 Aristotle had not before spoken of this point, yet he assumes it without hesitation, and it is the one most germane to his succeeding discussion of memory. ' Aristotle nowhere attempts to explain the reason of the fact thus stated and assumed here. ' 45S 11 23, where, however, amaaiia appears suspicious. Simplicius does not seem to have read it : if kept, it has to bear a different sense from what it bears in the context (e.g. 458 b 18) before and after. Without it, too, the meaning of the passage is perfect. ao8 SENSUS COMMUNIS that dreamers sometimes have a reflection or thought which exceeds the scope of the dream, and this reflection is called a avrtopara 1 , and in the construction given to avrdav- raaCa seems to have become itself invested with rationality. !£3^j* Yet Aristotle does not intend this. The terms AoyicmKJj or \oyt- and /JouAevTiKjj need not be taken to mark powers inherent onlyrara ' n < t >avTa ^ a t but powers only belonging to it Kara oiifi/3*/3rj/co's, «wi«- i. e. from its relation to the noetic faculty. Thus tpavraata properly or o1&vTa if tne original sensory impression has been not con- correctly taken — if the primary • * 702' 19 (fianratria Hi yiiHrai t) tia vo,)afut tj &i' alaBrfirtat. Here the word is used, says Bonitz, Ind. Art's/. 81 i b 26 latiore sensu : the image which stimulates Spirit may be suggested by a thought or by a percep- tion. The subject is the $ov\tvr\iu) ipavraaia, in which, as explained above, the avraavra ds > (fiavTcuria as having this wider application, and qWrdo-juara smells', and corresponding to alaBrmara of every aM^n, follows ["oUJfthrt necessarily from the theory of memory laid down by we have Aristotle. As we shall see memory acts by means of a £^ a * f Q&vtcutim, nor would it be possible for us to remember these, the perceptions of any sense unless we had ^avricrixara of these. The fact, therefore, that we can remember sounds, smells, and tastes, and feelings, as well as sensations, of every sort proves that all these as well as ctyis leave avrd(riiaTa answering to them in the mind. But, in explaining the phenomena, of dreaming (vide infra § 37), Aristotle virtually asserts that the aladrjfxara of all ' the senses come under the service of aiTaaia (459 b 30-33). § 36. We have seen that ij koii>?j alavraaias) ani row (ftiovs . 3oo SENSUS COMMUNIS the senses Sleeping and dreaming are affections of the «otw| ataOriaii. noTsome The reason why plants do not sleep and wake is that they »?iy- • have no aMijvis ; all animals, however, sleep. Sleep affects cause of oil the special senses : no animal sleeps with some of its its/faa/ senses while awake with the others. This simultaneous cause. affection of all the senses by sleep confirms, if it does sou! haTits not prove, what has been asserted, viz. that sleep is due iyrtxixna to an affection of the koiotj aXwoj> itvtvfia) *. This region is the whl ^ h j I centre of motive power as well as of sensation and percep- forits Ition. That kimjo-i? and tuo-07jo-is should have the same scat Seepcon- was to be expected ; for all icfo)jo-is is normally attended neets its w jth some dl,or an internal phantasm or feeling. Thus the primary with the organ of sense-perception is the organ of both perception nutrient 1 455' 3<>- b 13- * 454 b ^S~7- 8 to ifftiyopivat is the rikot, 455 b 13-28. ' Cf. 456* 3-26. SENSUS COMMUNIS 301 and motion. Hence the efficient cause of sleep, and the P"*-?" 1 conjunction of movement with the dream consciousness. A eJjjtJu noticeable thing about it is that though we remember our [™°J^ dreams when we awake, we do not remember our dream to brain movements 1 . This connexion, however, between aX*0rig- T °i* opinion ; nor can it be a function of the individual senses, t i on of for these are suspended during sleep. The fact of our per- n " d *, r ." ceiving sensible qualities in the 6vranS rristen 0f to lis P" nc ip' e or source of generation (apxji). Familiar ofimpres- instances of such persistence of sensory effects in the oreanTof organs after the cessation of the stimulus are found in the ^ase: phenomena of seeing, (a) When we look at the sun and after- then turn our eyes away from it, we can see nothing for images of a w hile, owing to the persistence of the light impression, oi colours, (3) If we look steadily at some vivid colour, for example, tw^and^" at white (Eluding 'bright') or green (X«vaivtTtu (tar* tiSvoplav, $ av/ij9ai'wi Tqr S\fri» ipav. irapaniptlv does not here mean ' turning the gaze aside.' It gives the idea of looking along a line. We must keep the eyes focussed for distance as before— so Aristotle says — and look as if still gazing at the sun, but with eyes shut. * As Aristotle above noticed positive so here he notices negative after-images. 3°4 SENSUS COMMUNIS *•&. the ease with which we are imposed upon by dream shapes emotional, or occurrences. Illusions of one sense, which occur even in states - waking moments, may be set right by the help of some other sense ; as the evidence of sight corrects the false judgment of touch respecting the apparently two marbles between the crossed fingers. But no such resource is open to us in dreaming. The central sense, whose normal ten- dency is to confirm and approve the reports it receives from each particular sense, unless when some one sense contradicts another, naturally inclines during sleep to affirm the objec- tive reality of the (jyamdvuaTa which arise before it. At such times no one particular sense is free to question another ; touch, for example, is then incapable of contradicting the report of sight, or vice versa. Thus the illusion is effectual. The residual impressions in the organs may stimulate the central sense precisely in the same kind of way as do the alo-OquaTa of which they are relics. The one icfoj)avrdOtit * holds for dream con- sciousness also. the blood objects, just as the aWdrJuara of waking life do. around the we are deceived into supposing that we see what we only during dream of. What fetters and embarrasses the critical faculty what " °^ t ^ ie centra l sense is the pressure of the blood round the hampers heart during sleep. If the remnant or residual impression faculty of which thus comes before the mind's eye in sleep resembles central the primary impression— the alavT&ai>TdVfiaTa which then present themselves and are mistaken for objective things or events 2 . It is caused purely by the residual impressions, not by any effects of outward things conveyed through the special senses while we sleep. § 40. Aristotle begins his discussion of memory by dis- &»»* tinguishing this from reminiscence or recollection, and ^T^^nnL stating that many persons with retentive memories are and rtmi- slow and dull at recollecting. He thinks it necessary also Memory 1 There seems to be an incongruity between this and Aristotle's repeated assertions (e.g. 45s* 9-12) that the external or special senses are suspended during sleep. * 462* 8, » 29-31- X 3 308 SENSUS COMMUNIS (f-w) to distinguish memory from perception and from expectation. gnisl^j All three have to do with (pavrdo-ixara * : but while those from p». of expectation refer to the future, and those of perception ceptioa and * ' . » eipecta- to the present, those of memory refer to past time*. ToWes 1 "" ^ he operation of avraa-Ca, as presentative faculty, alike referentt in expectation, memory, and perception, makes it for elapsed. Aristotle more necessary than it would seem to us to ♦arrmrui distinguish them carefully. As the distinction between per le in- , different these three faculties — or applications of one faculty — turns yicmo™ alt °gether on the differences of time-reference (to which the opera- tude and motion) is a product of the KOivri alia, through which the re- iiiustia- ■ membered fact may connect itself with time elapsed. This 'i 00 * holds of scientific and philosophic truths or theorems. These latter, not being directly representable to imagination, must be schematized, i. e. connected with dmirdVfxara. Thus only sire they capable of being remembered, i. e. indirectly, or, as Aristotle says, Kara jicd's. The reason why we cannot remember except by the aid of aj>riaTa is that we can remember directly nothing which we have not first perceived; and only perception generates the fy&vraana, which is the instrument of memory. This explains how memory belongs not merely to creatures possessing intellect, but to many of the lower animals. These do not possess intellect, and if memory 1 449* 24 h M V W"? °" r * <""ot . See p. 3 1 3. By n 680s is suggested the genesis of the «f it. The alnByru or irndXtfifnt is affected by the lapse of time : from this affection arises the relative character of the /ioinj, its <£ir, in which consists the time-perspective of memory. There are some places in which !$te = ' having,' but this is certainly not one of them. ' This passage (449 b 30 seqq.) more clearly than any other exhibits the relation of dependence on the lower in which the higher mental faculties are placed by Aristotle, in accordance with his theory of the gradual evolution of scientific knowledge from individual sensible experience. 3io SENSUS COMMUNIS were a function of pure intellect, none of them would be able to remember \ However, many of them manifestly do remember. Those which cannot remember are those which lack the sense of time. If memory were a function of pure intelligence, even man could not remember 2 ; for our intellectual acts are not capable of being remembered per se, but only indirectly, in virtue of their sense-derived 4>ain-d<7/xara. - Memory, therefore, is a function of the same part of the soul to which imagination belongs. All facta capable of being presented to imagination can be directly remembered ; all others can be remembered only so far as they link themselves with (pavrdj^ara, i.e. only indirectly. How do § 4j. How then do we, by the help of b l 5)' Freudenthal (op. cit., pp. 20 scqq.) examines minutely into Aristotle's statements to discover, if possible, an exact account of his conception of this memory image, but to little purpose. He concludes, with every appearance of truth, that the rwrot were, for Aristotle, not really like seal-impressions, but rather qualitative or ' chemical ' changes of tissue, not involving mechanical movement. The question of agree- ment on this point between Aristotle and Hobbes is merely a question how far Hobbes followed Aristotle. SENSUS COMMUNIS 311 a piece of wax *. The question now arises : Is this impres- to iu sion, thus taken, what we remember?, Do we not remember £f^ rather that of which it is an impression — the object, or nectedwith event, which produced it in the mind? For if what we ^fo^T remember is this impression, we do not remember the past *° me w, 7- at all : it is a mere mistake to think we do. But if we really remember the past object or event (as experience proves that we do), how is it possible to do so through an impression which is not past but present? This Aristotle proceeds to treat as the real question to be answered. He imagines an objector to say that it would be as easy to suppose a person seeing some colour, or hearing some sound, which was not present to sense, as to suppose him knowing the past, which is now gone. To this he replies": do we not as a matter of fact, in a certain way, see and hear the non-present ? Do we not in pictures see absent persons? Now this will illustrate what takes place in remembering by means of a (pAvraana. A picture is not merely a painted object : it is more than this. It is a likeness of some person or thing. While per se numeri- cally one and the same thing, it may be viewed in two The relations. In the same way, the ^tivrav^a before the^j.^,^, mind in memory — the impression bequeathed by sense to can ** imagination — may be regarded purely and simply as a either (1) dvra6fnvov ita rijf fda6fi ixpvn avrqv, alov (aypafpjjftd n [7 A iraBot at pi'r)M v ""<"'• I suspect this of being a gloss on to yivd/icvoi']. q yap yivofiivti xiin)av- ofan'ap- t6xt\lot* for ixmniovtiixara ; they confound their fancies with pearance. ^^ eX p er ; ences# Such was the mental condition of Anti- pheron of Oreus, and certain other deranged persons ; they recounted the events or objects which merely presented themselves to their imaginations as though these were facts of their past experience which they remembered '. The practical value of the mnemonic art rests on the truth of what has been above stated. Mnemonics aim at training a person to regard certain presentations not merely as single or unrelated, but as in connexion with, or as likenesses of, certain objects. Thus the former become reminders (jj.vt]y.oveuy.aTa) for the latter. Rem;. § 42. Memory, in general, can accordingly be defined niicence as the relationship which a ^dvraajxa (or mental presenta- 1 In discussing the subject of dreams Aristotle refers to the way in which ^ayraiTjurra can be mistaken for alaB^/urra, and how certain forms of hallucination arise ; cf. 46o b 3-27. SENSUS COMMUNIS 313 turn), as a likeness, bears to that of which it is a dvrao oJ tpavraajm (OTI, i>c tUwv l\ti irjiir uXXo Tt ov tUav, which use of ofror ixov . . . lot tx" would explain cfir. Freudenthal accordingly supports the view that ?£ir here comes from the intransitive «x*"'> DUt fi n ^ s it hard to get a German equivalent. He likes the word 'Stand,' but thinks it unidiomatic. His own rendering p. 36 n. is : die Andauer einer Vorstellung ah eines Abbildes von dent, dessert Vorstellung sie is/. I prefer to use ' relative state,' or ' relationship,' rather than ' state,' as its equivalent, and base my right to do so on Aristotle's definition I022 b IOoXXov 6i r parrot/ <£ir A«'y StdBtais Kaff r)vi)ilf) Kaicac 8id*«iTat to iiaKtlutvov, cat r) Kaff airo 4) irpii iXXo. * 45 1 » 20- b io, Aristotle here seems to criticize (unfairly, as Plato's alrrt) iv «Wjj shows) the definition (accepted by Plato, Philebus 34 b) of di/d/wjo-w as = avr)uijt draXij^ric. He points out that this is possible by a fresh exercise of a"o-6tyr"' or uddrimt, and that these, though they lay the basis of memory, cannot synchronize with it, for memory implies that time has elapsed since the autdi\) is its result or sequel; cf. duokovdri, last note. SENSUS COMMUNIS 315 lesson indeed ; but not according to the conditions of re- collection: not by means of the ' further internal spring 1 .' § 43' Given the internal spring, however, acts of remi- So-alled niscence are facilitated by the natural law that the Kivrjrus amadou left in our organs by sense-perception (in which the ideas A f ,j^h, lt which we wish to recall, or the (pavrd^fiara with which they natnrally are associated, must have originated) tend to reproduce S" ^"" themselves in a regular order of succession whenever they in regular return to consciousness. The order in which they do so "rderU depends mainly on the objective order of the sensible either • 1 »r.< necessary experiences by which they were generated. There are r habitual, movements in nature which are followed by others accord- Th f ing to necessary mechanical law. Such, however, is not on which the case with the mnemonic movements. These follow the ™ e e p ™n^ law of custom ; i. e. they tend to succeed one another in follow the a certain order, and do so succeed as a general rule. If the or j e r. connexion between antecedent and consequent among our II is wlth / , , 1 . cnstomary Kivr)iptiv to avafiifwr/o-KtaSai toi'twx, wi ivoucnqj nXt tovot ipx 1 !* fl it fy |iavfldvownv ava/uiiinjiTKfoBai. 1 Tbemistius (Sophonias), who illustrates the ' necessary connexion " by the relation of the idea aiheat to that otjlre, &c, seems to miss the purpose of the distinction made here by Aristotle. What the latter really means is to deprecate the notion that we can expect in the succession of internal Kivlpi « that invariablcness which we find in many of the movements of nature. Therefore, in 45 i b 11, irtyvxtv f) Wnjo-ir ijj t ytvicr&at /i«ri Trjvit seems to express a general law applying to merely physical as well as to psychical Ktiupmr ; only that while in the former it is often true «'| awjywjr, in the latter it holds merely i6t 1 (see 452 b 1-3). Reminiscence for Aristotle implies voluntary effort Taking the passage as Themistius does, I fail to understand how the succession of Kinjo-cic ii avayKj\s could be relevant to the explanation of efforts at reminiscence. If avriyxn operated, voluntary efforts would be needless. 3i« SENSUS COMMUNIS wry with repeated experiences. The effects of custom vary also and ex- with the nature of the experience. There are experiences AsanJe wmcn we never forget when once they have occurred to frequency us, one single occurrence sufficing to produce a firm conr ^^^ nexion between the successive Mvrjiras. Other experiences confirms require to be frequently repeated before a firm connexion and custom k produced. The rule is that the connexion is strengthened l^eood* * n P ro P ort ' on to the frequency of the experience. What we nature. often rehearse in our minds we easily and quickly recollect, custom becoming as it were a second nature. Process of When a person sets himself to recollect something he voluntary ma y, j qt a w hjl e fail, but afterwards succeed. His pro- *t re- cedure .is like that of one searching for something lost. collection . . . . , , , described. After exciting many trams of movements he at last rouses that particular train in which' the idea which he desires to recall is to be found. Recollection depends upon our exciting some Kfoijo-is which has a customary connexion with that one which we want to revive. When it succeeds, it reinstates in consciousness the required sequence of ideas. The case of When we make the voluntary attempt to recollect we act revil™ upon these principles ; but even when we recover ideas in- of ideas voluntarily (as we may do) the process is similar: the Kivrjo-t is the same and ideas following the order which the objective events of ** ws \ which they are the representatives pursued. In our voluntary niscence efforts, therefore, availing ourselves of this known fact, we 'huntine deliberately .' hunt up' (driptvonev) the order of succession, up* of an endeavouring to come as near as we can to what this was of a 'good in objective experience. We start the train of reminiscence start.' either from a present intuition ' or from some other, which Connexion . * of ideas by promises to carry us whither we wish to go. We may "entrant' De S m w ' th a """J ^ (representative movement) like the contiguity one we seek, or contrary to it, or contiguous to it 2 . The o™fcme> Karfjirtis of its like are specifically identical with those of 1 For what follows vide 45 i b 18-23. 1 The contiguity directly referred to here is probably that of space : yet contiguity in the time order is not excluded. For though we have been told that in this order the former xi'i^mr recalls the latter, yet we are not debarred from reversing the process. We can even start as has just been said anb roi) viv, which would necessarily imply ' hunting ' backwards. SENSUS COMtaUftIS 3*7 that which we seek to revive ; those of its contrary are concomitant with them ; while those of the contiguous idea form part of a whole of movements set up by both, so that but a portion of this whole remains to be revived *. Whether we recollect by voluntary effort, or the idea comes back to us without our making or after we have ceased to make 8 the effort, the psychical process is just the same. The succession of ideas is generally determined in one of these three ways. In order to illustrate the psychical process there is no need to refer to remote cases, or those in which the links in the series of ki^t/mis are very numerous. The simplest cases will serve for illustration. The cardinal fact is that the Kivrjcrtts have a regular order which they tend to follow, corresponding to the order in which the aio-OTJuara, or sensible impressions, on which they are based took place. Therefore, in trying to revive a vanished idea 3 , one should choose as his starting-point the beginning of the train of ideas in which it is likely to be found. When this is done reminiscence proceeds most easily and quickly. As the sequence of the kiitJo-«c corresponds to the objective sequence of events to which they refer, we should try to think of some event in this latter series. Thus a icforj: the direction in which he shall subsequently move. When the realm one starts, intending to reach a certain terminus, if his mind °l™£ m chances not to move in the former or old x path leading the realm thither, it is borne by custom to some more familiar ° 4) "„ "£ * terminus. For, as we have said before, custom in these influence o« matters is a second nature ; and frequency of repetition assocu- produces ' naturalness ' of sequence in our Kivfatis. But as ^"^ in objective nature events occur which are unnatural or due tend to to chance, we can easily see how in the sphere of custom Noughts * irregularities are to be expected. Indeed they should occur out of the a fortiori in the latter sphere, since in this natural law has track."' less control 2 . Such is a true explanation (sc. by reference to rixn) °f fects like that above-mentioned. If, however, (b) there happens to be some intervening cause which diverts our thoughts from their true direction, and, as it were, switches them off towards itself, such failure to recollect is more easily and obviously accounted for. So when we wish to recollect a name, it often happens that some other name beginning with the same sounds carries our thoughts off to itself, and we either pronounce this wrong name, or blunder upon some compound which is a jumble of both together'. § 45. But, in trying to recollect an experience (object Impor- or event), nothing is of so much importance * as knowing kiting the time of the experience, either dcterminately or inde- *•» &a* 1 452* 24-30. l&v ovv ft}/ 3iA naXaiov (Btklcer) gives the correct sense. The same three or four initial notes may form the commencement of a variety of tunes. Thus I have heard a person sing a few notes and then ask — ' What song am I thinking of? ' The different answers given show, how easily one's ' mental ear' may go off in a wrong series of notes, before hitting upon the right series in which a few notes more would infallibly recall the required tune. * 452* 29 seqq. «'irfl &' in roir io-is, cf. M E. 1103* 19-23 (Stewart). * Themistius (Sophonias) gives as examples of such words HXtvpuria (in Aetolia) and jr\«vptnr, Aiu^rfvgc and A«»xr0«Vgr. 4 452 b 7-453' 4. 33o SENSUS COMMUNIS of what terminately. For the faculty whereby we remember !s recollect.' *^ at ^y which we perceive and estimate lapse of time. It is also that by which 1 we cognize distances in space, Distafut and magnitudes in general*. The mode in which we if marked P er ceive distances in time is analogous to that in Which in oar w e perceive distances in space : i. e. by representative tioas like Kivij(r€is within us. We have ' within our minds ' a distance- d " t ^ ce k^wjo-is 3 , i.e. one which represents or stands for the objec- Memory tive distance ; and so, too, we have a time-ic/w/o-tr similarly In time? 11 re ' ate d to the objective time elapsed. As several objective space or time distances are to one another, so are the sub- jective space or time Kivrjcrtts, which represent them, to one another. But besides these nwfaets, which symbolize the time and space distances, we have ' in our minds ' Kivrjcrm corresponding to the forms * (eftij) of the objective experiences themselves which are projected at such distances. Now; Fraction if these experiences are to be properly and fully recollected, tinK^naik it is of cardinal importance that the kiwj ZH ^odXijtoi j>oijo-cu, r>)i> /icy BE 6/ioius »o«i, dirl 8f t£>»' 61 Tar KA »ofi - avrtu yap i^miatv its ZA nobs BA. orav ovv S/ia fj Te tou itpayparos ytvt)Tai mVijcrir koi q tow xpovov, Ti5tc tj /ivij/iij ivtpyci. The last sentence gives the clue to the meaning of this passage as a whole. Here no doubt Aristotle had introduced a diagram with letters of the alphabet to illustrate his argument. This diagram perished. To suppose (with Wendland, p. 13) that the diagram given by Themistius (Sophonias) may be the one given by Aristotle himself is impossible, for the simple reason that it would have committed Aristotle to a geometrical blunder. The diagram, however, having been lost, the letters were easily corrupted. The MSS. differ widely in recording them. To reconstruct Aristotle's figure we must divine his meaning first from the remainder of the context. The hazards of this are apparent. Vet it is indispensable, and needs no apology. There would be some satisfaction in introducing tolerable sense (even if merely hypothetical) into a passage which as it stands has for ages baffled commentators. The cardinal thought in our passage is that of mnemonic representation. As usual Aristotle thinks of one sense in particular — the sense of sight — while speaking of the procedure of reminiscence in reference to all sensible experiences. Like Ribot he holds that memory is (primarily and chiefly) vision in time. Having asserted that we distinguish longer and shorter times by the organ whereby we cognize different luyiOq, he briefly indicates how this is done, and restates his theory of perception, as basis of his theory of memory, by representative analogy or similarity. That which in the ' outer world ' consists of spatial objects in spatial relations (ra ptyaKa xa\ jriSppu) is, as perceived, represented ' internally ' by Kivfja-tK— psychical affections— which are (a) similar, i.e. 'analogous * to the objective experiences, and (6) related to one another as the latter are to one another. Between the outer or objective sphere and the inner or subjective which thus represents it the parallelism is complete. Therefore, says Aristotle, what difference does it make whether the mind moves in the inner or knows in the outer sphere? In virtue of the identical proportions, the 'moving' in the one is the 'knowing* in the other. Applying what is thus said of perception to the ex- 3*3 SENSUS COMMUNIS ranslons of § 46. A person may erroneously think that he remenv " m07 " bers, fancying that there is a time-mark or date affixed planation of memory and recollection, he proceeds: In the inner world of memory events and objects no longer perceived have their t'Sij and aitovrfjiutra (distances in time or space) depicted in imagina- tion. There are within us Kivrjatit representing events and othefs also representing the times of these events. If the 'same' event has occurred twice in our experience distinct memory would require that its inner diot should be connected with different time-Kii^o-tir, respectively analogous to the real time-dTrwrhj/iara. Thus the same ftios of an event may, by being associated with different time-Mvijo-cir, be capable of recalling different portions of past experience ; whose difference, however, would not be remembered but for the distinct time-w^o-eir conjoined with it in relation to each portion. In accordance with these preconceptions of Aristotle's meaning I write the passage as follows : aa-mp otr il n}? AB BE Kimrai, iroiei [? iwj] rr)v (Ar) TA' avaXoyov yap 1} Ar TA — n oJ» /ioXXov rip Ar TA x\ tip AZ ZH mil [? «-o«] ; i) (ot») i>t 1} AB (BE) itpiit rr)V Ar TA, ovras 7 irpbt t!)v V rairat oSv a/ia jciwirai. &i> St tifl/ (AZ) ZH jSavXirrai yorja-at, r^v fiiv (AB) BE 6poiat vou, avrl 6i tot 6, I, rat K, A, vtxl' avrai yap €}(Ovaip at AB (BE) irpot AZ ZH, otoc ovv Spa kti. 2 i_i The figure was, as I take it, somewhat like , — this. In this triangle, divided ' similarly,' AB BE stands for the «J8ot representing either the objective event Ar TA, or the simi- Ar AZ lar event AZ ZH. But — «= — ; therefore I A ZH the two are distinguished by the different time-marks associated with their common , tl&ot. When, therefore, AB BE stands for ^ Ar TA it has the time-Kinjo-ir 6, corresponding to the objective time I ; when it stands for AZ ZH, it has the time- mark K corresponding to the objective time A. The time-marks and objective times cannot be represented in the same geometrical diagram with the tiSot and the objective events ; because their distinguishing functions would thus be lost, and the' question W ovv p.a\\ov would re- main unanswerable. Premising this, I translate : ' As, therefore, the mind, if it moves subjectively through AB BE, knows (the objective event) AT TA, since AB is to BE as Ar is to TA, why does it in fact know AT TA rather than AZ ZH? (The answer is) : because as AB (BE) is to Ar (FA), so is 6 (the subjective time-mark of the former) to I (the objective time of the latter). Hence the mind moves in these lines (viz. AB BE, Ar TA) simultaneously (i. e. it moves subjectively in the former, objectively in the latter ; or while moving in the one it knows the other, according to the principle laid down in 452 b 13 tin olu tioUrti kt\.). But if a person wishes to think (not of Ar TA, but) of. AZ ZH, his mind moves as before (6/101W) in the representative il&os- SENSUS COMMUNIS 323 to the Sa>ra(rfta before his mind. The contrary error is Conditions impossible. A person who really remembers something, f^J™ cannot delude himself into thinking that he does not re- Memory , member this. One cannot remember without being clearly niscence conscious of doing so, and indeed remembering consists ^ essentially in such consciousness, i. e. the recognition of the Remi- image of a past experience as an image of the experience "J""" a which it represents and which was therefore ours. The time- process of Ktvt]airradvra avapipvtjaKtaBai ttrtiw oioo ov\\oyurp6s rtf* on yap irpartpor u8t¥ § •JKouatf f[ Tl TOit&TOV »iraBf, crvXXoyifcrai o ayaptpvyaitoptros, «ai y a 3H SENSUS COMMUNIS That memory and remi- niscence involve a corporeal, and not merely a psychical, process, shown. (a) We continne involun- tarily who are capable of rational deliberation ; for such delibera- tion also is or involves a sort of inference *. § 47. Memory, like every function of the koiw) afodqo-if and of ataBrjais generally, involves a corporeal as well as a psychical process 2 . Recollection, too, the search for a missing idea, involves a corporeal process. This is proved by (a) the bodily discomfort caused by fruitless and per- sistent efforts at recollection ; and (6) by the fact that sometimes even after giving up the attempt to recollect a person suddenly remembers what he failed to recall when he tried. The explanation of this can only be that, after the voluntary effort has been given over, the process which ttrriv olav fijTi)0-ir nr. toCto i* oir ka\ to j3ovXcvtikoi> wrdp^n, (jivaei pdvoic M9«'j3i/«i< (453* 10-13). 1 i>, aXka irtpii rav irpbs ra tcXij . . . 'AXXa 6i)i(voi TtXor Ti, trait i}o-«r properly belong to body, and only metaphorically, or Kara orp^f/fyieo'r, to V^JW- Cf. de Anima, i. 3. 406" II seqq. SENSUS COMMUNIS 325 it set lip still continues, and that this process is one which trying to goes on in the body. Such persistence of a corporeal ™°*£ a process independently of, or in spite of, the will is not we have uncommon in persons of the ' melancholic ' temperament. ™ u a r m inds Just as one who throws a stone cannot by a mere effort *°! :ease of will stop its course when once it has left his hand, so (*; Such one who sets the process of recollection going excites, in ^Xrts the part of the body which (as will be seen) is the seat of sometimes memory (as of koiot) a*j/»j), the analogy would lose its , whole point if the pupil itself were not the organ of vision. Again *, Aristotle describes the stimulation of the eye qua diaphanous as being Spavn — actual seeing, which would seem to prove that in his opinion seeing has its seat in the pupil, not merely that it is effected through it The passage 8 in which he draws a parallel between 6 6v, dXX" ivrie. The irpurov atadijrfipiov and the «(tx<>toi> are the same thing looked at from different standpoints. * 42i»22,494 b 12-18. * 455* 22 tovto &' Spa to (SnTi/tM paKurB' vnap\u. * With this dictum of Aristotle that touch is the primary sense, Dr. Ogle compares the words of John Hunter : ' Touch is the first sense, because no animal that has a sense (as far as I know) is without it, while there are many animals without the others'; and again, 'Touch I call the first sense ; it is the simplest mode of receiving im- pressions ; for all the other senses have this of touch in common with the peculiar or specific ; and most probably there is not any part of the body but what is susceptible of simple feeling or touch' (J. H., Museum Cat. iii. 53, 51). Dr. Ogle resists the temptation to find in this view of Aristotle the theory that the higher sensibilities have been ' evolved by gradual differentiations of parts, originally endowed in common with the rest of the body with sensibility to resistance and temperature, both of which are included by Aristotle under touch j in other words, that the remaining special senses are but modifications of touch or general sensibility.' He resists this natural temptation be- SENSUS COMMUNIS 329 extent. For even if Aristotle nowhere expressly identifies the organ of touch with the kouAv (or irp&rov, or rf/uov) aUrOrir/ipiov of perception, they are certainly for him most intimately associated. This central organ was the heart or the region of the heart. I § 50. Plato and Alcmaeon had taught that the train was The heart, jthe organ of intelligence 1 - Aristotle deliberately rejects J°^ e wa$ this view 2 . Plato looked upon the brain as an enlarged for Arfs- portion of the spinal marrow ; Aristotle declared it to be ^glLiof something quite different 3 . The brain, says Aristotle*, isCe °^[ nd itself as much without sensibility as the blood or any ofiS" the secretions ( 6tiovv tuv n(pirT 461* 8, 464 b 8 seqq. 1 The potential are those which have been already in consciousness, but have sunk into latency, the actual are, we must suppose, the waking. perceptions which accompany us into the land of sleep : those which have not yet ceased to affect consciousness, or keep occurring up to the moment when sleep supervenes. * 46l b 14 f'£ airrov, SC. rov miiaros. * Sxnrtp 01 nfir\aojiivoi fia.Tpa\oi ol avi6vrts iv Tq> vtlart Tt]KOfitvov toC A\6t. Some well-known invention — possibly for the amusement of chil- dren—of the time is referred to. So Kant refers to Vaucanson's ' duck.' 8 For the function of the blood in disseminating xivqacir, cf. Plato, Tim. 70 a seqq. and § 18, p. 271 supra. * 656 b 5 {kkovtu yip r\ Tqtiy r<»a7«iri&fl/»(SrnrOT altrQifrutrp/ iripytiav. SENSUS COMMUNIS 333 of sensation are necessarily conveyed through the parts which have in them the purer and cooler blood ». These, therefore, are in the head near the brain which cools the blood in the small vessels that traverse the membrane surrounding it. Unconsciousness results from compression of the • veins of the neck V Probably Aristotle would have accounted for this by the interruption of the course of the aladrjnKTi ivipytia through these veins towards the heart. § 53. But in the conveyance of sensory effects from the The real outer organs, besides the blood, another agency has to be J^]^ l ° taken into account, namely the 'connatural spirit* (avpupvrov mission of irveCjuo). ' The organ of smelling and that of hearing are pre ssions wopot which are in connexion with the outer air, and are from . *} e .. special to full of connatural spirit V The iropos of the organ of the central hearing terminates in the region where in some animals the p'o^fy pulsation of the connatural spirit, in others the process of res- the ain- piration, is located 4 , i.e. in the heart or the 'part analogous 6 .' tnifra. For Aristotle's curious explanation of the process of learning The wi P°\ r t« • \ t • <■*/•.. connected from dictation, based on the connexion of Akot) with the with the i> flia ruv KaOaparfpov txpirrav to ui/ia popiav avaynaXov aKpifitOTtpas yiyvtoOm, 6s6 b 3. 1 455 b 7- Such unconsciousness is to be distinguished, says Aristotle, from that of sleep. ' 744* I 7 5" SapTjaic ual 9 d*oij . . . irXrjpt tr ov/upvrov irwu/xaror. ' 78I' 23-5 6 pin ovp Ttjt OKoijs (jropot) . . . b to itvtvpn rA tri^vrov . . . Toilrj; irtpaivti. * 4S6* 7 seqq. 334 SENSUS COMMUNIS then for vopoi, whatever they were, conveyed in Aristotle's opinion most have m °re than the blood 1 . We are told expressly that those ; contained of hearing and smelling are full of otJ^vtov -nvtvpa, and as well as this in such a connexion as to lead us to think that the FoVpbSo ^^A" 1 ** thz sensory agency in them. On the other hand the « veins' Aristotle often refers to the blood in a manner which leads a/rwi'th one to suppose that he regarded it — at all events in its tie blood, grosser form — as a mere impediment to the transmission of the of sensory impressions. It is this that, when it gathers origin and around the heart in sleep, fetters rd iciptov — the faculty of teumceof judgment 2 . The residual movements in the outer sense- ^JJ£^ organs are liberated successively 3 in sleep as the blood in processes these organs is diminished. The senses that are most found in the exact — ojcpi^orarai — are found in the parts where the blood- m^pxrm vessels are finest and thinnest, and where the blood is coolest and purest, i.e. near the brain *. Thus on the whole it would appear — though Aristotle has not worked his conception out clearly — as if he conceived the sensory effects to be conveyed with the blood, in the same vessels, but not to be affections of the blood itself or primarily connected with it, but rather with the (rv/xo«u, not with Neuhauser {op. at., p. 131) as 'losing their determinateness.' * 46i b 18. * 46l» 8 seqq. SENSUS COMMUNIS 335 the wfCfMu A similar doubt affects us as to what Plato con- ceived to be the exact agency in the conveyance of sensory impressions. Are the 4>\4pui, by which in the Timaeus he represents these impressions as distributed through the body, agents of such distribution in virtue of the blood contained in them, or in virtue of the air which (according \ to Plato) they also contain? The former is the assumption . made by Zeller K Our difficulty with respect to Aristotle largely arises from his use of the ambiguous word vopoi to designate the vessels, or connexions generally, of the sensory organs. In some cases this possibly means nerves 8 . ' In others it certainly means blood-vessels. We are unable to say always which it is in any given case s . At all events the cv^tpvTov -nvivfia. was conceived by him as having its ipxrj in the heart, where also that of the blood lies. From this ipxrj the (ripupvrov itvevpa diffuses vital heat throughout the body. The avpipwov irvtvua is different, of course, from the irvtvua of respiration, but takes the place of the latter in creatures which do not respire. It was certainly, on the other hand, the opinion of Aristotle that the blood-vessels are channels of sensory processes. On the whole it seems probable that, while the blood in these vessels was (as Aristotle himself might say) avvaCriov, or a joint agent in the conveyance of such processes from the organs of outer ! to the organs of inner sense, the vTov itvtvp.a, we should (from Aristotle's point of view) have penetrated to the inmost secrets of sense-perception, not merely as regards the origin of the (te<7-o'r?js or Xo'yos which essentially characterizes a sensory organ, but also as regards the means provided by nature for the distribution of sensory messages within the organism, and the conveyance of sensory impressions, from the eye and ear and other external senses, to the organ governing them all \ The tuv aarpuv QTOl\tilf. INDICES I. ENGLISH Absent, the, how known, 311, Acid, how produced, 17a. Actions, the notation (aijimola) of character, 135. Adam, J., in. Aelian, 161, 163. After-imagu, negative and poiitive, 76, 3°>-3- Air, all thingi reducible to, 141 ; not known as elastic medium of sound, no; cause of smelling, 131; ordin- ary, diaphanous, 57; do things in, touch one another? 193; odorous, 138; inodorous, 149; around brain and in thorax, 358 ; in general, soundless, 114 ; hot and moist, 15] ; not = void, 113; less suitable than water for intraocular medium, 85; carried in the blood-vessels, 334; soul-atoms in, 28 ; source of sense and intelligence, 105-6 ; of order in world, 309 ; its colour white, 65 ; that in ear has proper motion and resonance, 115; air and water, ordinary media of vision, 78. Air-chamber, built into ear, 1 14. Air-vessels, in hearing, 105. Air-vibrations, 110. ALCMAKON,on vision, 1 1-13; hearing, 93-4 j smelling, 130-3 j tasting, 160; touching, 180; sensation in general, 303-4; scnsus communis, a.M-a ; «5. 49. 81, 86, 97, 158, 337, 360, 369. Alexander of Aphrodislas, 16, 30, 68, 73, 109, 130, 136, 1 j8, 166, 168. Alexis, 157. Analogy of odonrs to tastes, sensible and physical, 145. Anaxagoras, on vision, 37-40; hearing, 103-4; smelling, 137-40; tasting, 167-8; touching, 184; sen- sation in general, 308-9; sensus communis, 356-8; 65, 337. Anaximenes, his air theory revived by Diogenes, 358. Animals, large compared with small as regards sensory power, 103 ; as to olfactory sense, 138; the lower, their guide in conduct, 396; those which possess time sense, have memory, 308. Antipheron of Oreos, 394, 312. Apperception, synthetic unity of, 180. Aquatic creatures, perceive odour, 1 48. Archer-Hind, Mr., 18, 34, 46, 49, 53, 107, no, in, 143, 187, 311. Aristotle, on vision, 56-91 ; hear* ing, 111-130; smelling, M4-59! tasting, 174-9; touching, 188-301; sensation in general, 3 1 5-49 ; sensns communis, 376-336; compared with Plato as regards synthesis, 376; with Anaxagoras and Empedocles as re- gards colour-theory, 65; appears to treat black as positive, 69 ; applies conception of form and matter to explain (a) relation of soul to body, (i) of perci piens to percipiendum, 316-17; attributes to each alotfijaii the function of 1) koivtj, 377 ; his confused statements as to anatomical connexions of organ of hearing, 133; criticizes Democritus on vision, 83 ; criticizes Plato on odours, 143-3, 155-6; his principal objection to psychology of Empedocles, 353 ; on memory, 395 ; definition of t Serisu, vii, an early essay on Sensut Communis, 282. * Diacritic ' effect of white, 50. Diagrams, geometrical, 309. Dialectical psychology, 6. Diaphanous, the, II, 13, 35, 57; the vehicle of colour in bodies, 57-60 ; not apart from body 59 ; universally diffused, 59 ; pcr.ne.ited body, 60 ; both medium of vision and vehicle of colour in bodies, 60 ; resides in all bodies, 68 ; actualized, the ob- jective medium of vision, 78-9 ; sub- jectively, within eye, 80; its function as regards odonr, 152. Diaphragm, 271. Diares, the sun of, 236, 286, 287. Dictation, power of learning from, explained, 120. . Dels, H., 37, 206., Dim-sighted by day, 20. Ding an sir A, ri axairfro* a, for Aris- totle, 229. Diogenes of Apollonia, on vision, 41-2; hearing, 105-6; smelling, 140-1 ; tasting, 169-70 ; touching, 184 ; sensation in general, 209-10 ; sensus communis, 258-60; on air round brain, 41 ; account of perception, 41 ; conditions of perfect sense, 41 ; air the source of mind in general, 41, 85; air in thorax, 41; vision by contrariety of colour, 41 ; visual theory criticized by Theophras- tus, 42; no theory of colour, 42; theory of hearing foreshadows that of Aristotle, 105 ; compares man with other animals as to olfactory sense, 141 ; approximation to Aris- totle, 210; theory of memory and reminiscence, resemblance to Aris- totle's, 259 ; perceived need of syn- thetic function, 260, 269. Discernment of light from darkness differs from seeing some particular iparir, 288. Discordant or harmonious sounds, 108. Discrepancies in Aristotle, 144. Discreteness of alaSi/ri with continuity of their substrates, 61, Discrimination, not absolute separa- tion, 40 ; of heterogeneous sensible!, how effected, 277-83. Dissection, practised by Alcmaeon, 1 1, Dissonance, 128. Distance (and magnitude), how seen, 29, 39, 330; its effect on articulate sound, 116. Distinguishing and comparing, faculty of, 7. Divination by victims, 273. Division of continuous and discrete quantity, 61; improper or indirect, 01 ; of ala6r)T&, not infinite, 62. Dopptlgangtr, an effect of ' reflexion,' 67. Dove-cote, Plato's simile of, 266. Dreams, 46 ; Democritns on, 255 ; Arist. on, 299 seqq. ; ' this is only a dream,' 306; governed by laws of association of klvt\4" I 5 J like Alcmaeon, a physician, 15 j his theory of vision and Plato's, 18, 46-8, 49, 54, 57; held that light travels, 58, 59; Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle, views on colour, 65; Aristotle rejects his theory of light travelling, 77, 80, 81 ; on vision criticized, 83 ; his explanation of yXavaurrjs, 85; agrees with Alcmaeon on hearing, 94 ; the icuiSuv within the ear, 95 ; differs from Alcmaeon on hearing, 97 ; Theophrastus asks, ' How do we hear the K&ilaw itself?" 97; theory of smelling criticized by Theophrastus, 134; his theory of Aw&ppotat as to touching and tasting unsatisfactory, 161 ; on tastes, criticized by Aris- totle, 174; his theory of touching criticized by Theophrastus, 180-1, 301 ; his theory of (v/tiUTpia, 333 ; forced to recognize \6yos as true tpvms of bodies, 340; theory of temperaments and genius, 253; no doctrine of synthesis, 353, 360, 369. Empirical psychology, 1, 3, 8. Energy, exhaustion and repair of, 300. Engelmann, 104. Enthusiasm us, divination by, 373. Epicurus, 7, 17, 18. Epistemology, 314. Equal, the, a branch of the one, 137. Erasistratus, 5, 339. Error, 4 ; of sight and of inference or judgment, 90. Euripides, 13, 356. Eustachian tubes, 95, 131. Evaporation, fumid, 343 ; from food, 301. Expectation, 364. Experiments, 4. Eye, as optical system, 9; a mirror, 10 ; outgrowth from brain, 13, 86; constitution of, 19; differences of, 19; gleaming, 31 ; best constitution of, 33; its essential feature for Demo- critus, 34; ' duplicates itself ' when moved, 64 ; compared by Empe- docles to lantern, 15-16, 83; the embryonic, over-moist and over- large, 85-6. Eye-ball, displacement of, causes double vision, 306. Faculties, higher, depend on lower, 309. Faculty, comparing and distinguishing, 7; judging and controlling, 303; the central, normally seconds reports of special senses when uncontra- dicted, 306. Falsehood, 4. /■'arbenlthre, Aristotle's, 69. Feeling, 370; no single term for, in Greek, confused with cognitive aiaSriatt, 373-4. Fenestra ovalis, 96. Fever patients, their hallucinations, 3°3- Fiery element, not our fire, 64. Fifth, in music, 1 39. Figure, of atoms, 36, 182 ; geometrical, 397. 3°9- Fire, intra-ocular, 10, 11, 13, 18; smaller destroyed by greater, 32; its atoms spherical, 33 ; three fires con- cerned in vision, for Plato, 46, 48 ; kinds of, for Plato, 65 ; visible in darkness, 57, 64; visual organ, not of, 83-3; extinguishable, not so light, 83 ; by it in organ of touch we discern hot and cold, 340; how far contained in aiaS-qrripta, 348. Fishes, in Achelous, 118; voiceless, 119. Five senses, 1, 3, 207. Flame colour, 34. Flesh, need of, as medium of sensation, 193. Fluid and solid, 190. Forgetfulness, total, 318. Forgetting, Plato's definition of, 159, 364. Form, ranks higher than matter, 219; implicitly universal even in percep- tion, 234. Forward and backward, meanings of, 90. Foster, Sir M., on olfactory function, 133; on odours, 143; on taste, 160. Four elements, 18. Fourth, in music, 129. F'reudenthal, J., 393, 393, 294, 310, 3'3- Frogs, artificial, illustration from, 333. Galen, 5, 35 ; agrees with Aristotle that light does not travel, 59, 95 ; approves Plato's three dpx * oi^vxii a75.339- Gas, our idea of, represented by iijp or xamit, 149. Gellius, A., 102. Generation, 335. Genus, divisible only into species, which are finite, 61 ; a discrete quantity, 61, 317. Geometrical qualities of atoms, 37. 34» INDICES Geometrical diagrams, their function in thinking, 309. Gills, odour perceived through, 147. Glaucous, 5a. Glittering, 51'. Goethe, Farbtnlehrt, 18, 48; his theory of colour like that of Aris- totle, 69. Gold-colour, 33. Golden-yellow, 51, 61, 75. Gong (or trumpet) within ear, 95, 97. Gorgias, colour theory of, 21, 47 ; his definition of colour rejected by Aris- totle, 77. Grave or shrill, 108. -Green, 31 ; Democritus' account of, 31 ; of growing fruits, 34. Grey, not explicable by Kmpedocles, 22, 52, 61 ; is white compared to black, black compared to white, 70, 75- Grote, G., no, 273. Habituation, 315 (see Custom). Haeckel, 101, 104. Hallucination and illusion, visual, 91-2. Halo round lamps, 67. Hamilton, Sir \V., 318, 324. Hard-eyed creatures, their perception of colours, 145. Harmonics, 125. Harmony, of spheres, 109, no; of sounds, 108. Hayduck, M., 150. Hearing, psychology of, 93 seqq. ; Alcmaeon on, 93-4 ; Empedocles, 95-9; Democritus, 99-103 ; Anaxa- goras, 103-4 » Diogenes, 105-6 ; Hato, 106-11; Aristotle, 111-30; medium of, 47-8 ; due to air within ear, 93 ; Alcmaeon on, 93-4 ; a mode of contact, 99; like perceives like, 98; conditions of perfect, 100, 105, 1 19-2 1 ; a mechanical sense, 101 ; immediate stimulus of, 101-2 ; au- ditory motion propagated to liver, according to Plato, 106, 275 ; ethical worth of, 110-11; psychological worth of, 1 11 ; sense of, a ptaoTqs or A070S, 116; analogy of, to touch, 116; man's sense of, compared with that of lower animals, nt; more important than seeing for intellectual development, i23;biological,psycho- logical.and ethical worth of, 123-5; hearing gives Inowledge cf uni- versal!-, seeing of particulars, 123-4; affects emotional temperament, 1 24 ; air-cell in ear, 242, 257 ; organ of, 93i 95. 99. I0 3. '°5» Io6 ie W> 113 seqq.; object of, 94, 95, 99 seqq.; 104, 106 seqq.. Ill seqq. Heart, organ of sentiency, 5, 132; Aristotle's conviction of this con- firmed by certain doctrines of Plato, 170 ; organ of touch and taste, i;8, 194; its beat, 243; directly com- municates with lungs, 260; centre both of movement and of sensus communis, 300 ; heart v. brain as organ of sensus communis, 329-31. HeraClides, vibration theory of sound, 110. Heraclito-Protagorean sensational scepticism, 54-6. Heraclitus, 4 ; eyes better witnesses than ears, 89; on odour, 149, 169; used iibovri = odour, 170; his xaVra ficT, 213, 237, 269. Hermathena, 113, 323. Herophilus, n, 329. Hippocrates of Cos, 12, 369; held brain to be bloodless, 330. Hippocrates, pseudo-, 94. Hobbes, 294-5 ; ' alter ego of Aris- totle ' as regards memory and associa- tion, 310, 318; illustrates efforts of reminiscence as a sort of hunt, 318. Homer, 265. Honey, 174. Horace, 89. Hot and cold analogous to white and black, pungent and astringent, 50. Hound, following scent, 135. Hunter, John, on primariness of sense of touch, 328. Hypermetropic vision, 91. Hypozoma, odours perceived through, 147. Ideas, ■ a- ■ jciation ' of, 267, 315 seqq. Ideler, J. L., Mcleorologica, 25, 84. Illusions of touch, the ' crossed fingers,' 89, 201, 304; of sense, not the 'special,' but the 'common,' 90; of sight, 90 ; faculty of, 302 ; two assumptions explain those of dream- ing. 303; strong emotion renders liable to, 303; of movement, 304; of memory, 322. Image, visual, 10; not really in mirror, 25 ; seeing due to, 35; after-, positive and negative, 76. Imagination, I, 7, 351, 263; pro- ductive and reproductive, 263, 290, 305 ; effect of pathological states on,. 305 ; ' poetic,' 305 ; active at night, in sleep, 305. Impressions, residual, stimulate sense like alaOriiiara, 304 ; mnemonic, physical character of, 310. I. ENGLISH 343 Inconsistency, Aristotle's (real or ap- parent), respecting tarf, 154-5. Inhalation, condition of smelling, 138, 150. Inhibitory movements, 195. Inodorous, the four elements, 14a ; substances, also tasteless, 152-3. Inspiration, 372-3. . Intangible, meanings of, 196. Intelligence, seizes the universal, sense, the particular, 224. Interests, association of, 268. Intermediate grades (of colour, &c), serve as contraries to either extreme, 70 ; colours, 70. Intoxication, its effect on vision, 91. Invariableness of sequence in kipijotii, 3>5- Invisible, the, in what sense object of seeing, 57. Iris, around moon, 77. ' Irrational ' combinations of blacks and whites, 70. Judgment, the comparative, 278; overpowered in sleep, 302. Juxtaposition theory of colour com- position, 69. Kampe, F. F., 148 ; on stnsus com- munis, 281. Kant, 244, 280. Keats, 318. Keen sight, 20. Kelvin, Lord, 247. Kind, differences of, merged in differ- ences of degree, 200. Knowing, a property of matter, 3. Knowledge, 6. Kock, T., Com. Att., 157. Kritias, 269. Laconian hounds, 12 1. Lantern, simile, 19. Latency, of Kiv^atts, 295. Law, mechanical, 315 ; in remini- scence, laws of similarity, contrariety, and contiguity (in space or time), 3>6-«7- , , -Leek-green,.33, 52, 61, 67. Leibniz, 207. Lens, crystalline, 9, 10, 20. Leucippus, 24, 29. Lid of eye, its analogue in olfactory organ, 146. Life, definition of, 217; vegetable and animal, 222. Light, 57-8; does not travel, 58, 153; not = fire, not a body, but a 'presence,' not an emanation, 58; - colour of diaphanous, 59, 79; the entoptic, 64 ; rays of, proceed in straight lines, 65; required within the eye, 85. " Like, perceives and knows like, 18, 24, 209. Liver, the, a mirror, 27 a. Living bodies, 317. Locomotion, connexion between faculty of, and mediated perception, 88. Locrian Timaeus, 1 70. Lost, portion of Aristotle's work on sound, 129-30. Lucretius, 74, 77, 135, 206, 255. Lungs, drink passes into (according to Plato), 5, 115, 260. Lustre, a ' sort of colour ' in in- determinate bodies, 60. Lyncean eye, Aristotle's conceived equivalent for microscope, 74. Madness and genius, 305. Magnet, 181. Magnitude (and distance), how seen, 29, 39 ; invisible, 73, 236. Man, his superiority in touch, 178; causes of his superior intelligence, 200-1, 328. Marrow, spinal, 270, 319. M athematical facts easi ly remembered, 317; knowledge of harmonics, pos- sible without musical ear, 127. Matter, a mere negative, 219; and form, inseparable, save by abstrac- tion, 318. Measure, of melodic series, the octave, 129. Media, of sensation, 7; medium of vision, hearing, smelling, 78; in- ternal, 241 ; external, connected with internal, 242 ; air and water, sole extra-organic, 246. Mediation, difference between touch and other senses regarding, 193. Medium, of sensation in general, 8, 237-8 ; of vision, 57-60, 78-9 ; of colours, itself colourless, 78; of taste, tasteless, 79 ; of odour, in- odorous, 79; of sound, soundless, 79. "5- Melancholia, 305. Melancholic (temperament), 325. Membrane (tympanic), 96, 1 15. Memory, 1,7; and reminiscence, 250, 256 ; Parmenides on, 258 ; of chil- dren and aged persons, 259, 363 ; Plato's definition of, 264 ; illustrated by wax-block, 26,4-5; conditions of good , 26 j ; and ex pectat ion, pleasures of, 296 ; retentiveness of, compatible with dullness, 307 ; distinguished 344 INDICES from perception and expectation, 308 ; organ of, 308 ; definition of, 308-9, 31 2-13 ; organ of - that of cognition of time motion and magni- tude, 308 ; a l(it fl wd»or, 309, 313; hi ipairraa //a, relative, 310-u ; why lower animals have, 309-10; not a function of pure intellect, 310; defective, causes of, 311; confusion of, with imagination, 311-12; both posterius and prius of reminiscence, 314; is 'vision in time,' 310; illu- sions of, 321-3. Metaphysics, 2. Method, scientific, 4, 6. Microscope, want of, 5. Milk, 318. Mirror, the eye a, 25 ; the liver a, according to Plato, 272. Mirroring (in pupil), 82. Mirrors, why they do not 'see,' 29; small, reflect colours, not forms, 66. Mist, 31S. Mixture, of bodies, 19 ; of black and white, 69 ; needed for nutriment, 177 ; of elements in blood, 253. Mnemonic art, 312. Mnemosyne, 265. Modes, of music, 125. Moist, the sapid, 151-2; in tasting, 176. Monadic units, 71. Movement, how seen, 39; in dia- phanous, not local, 78 ; its centre « that of sensus communis, 300 ; that of sound, local, 112; that in sleep, not remembered, 301 ; sensory, in the blood, illustrated, 332. Mullach, V. \V. A., Dtmocritus, 21. Musical ear, not required for harmonic theory, 1 27. Myopic vision, 91. Names, recollection of, 319. Natural law, less rigorous in sphere of mind, 319. Naturalness, an effect of custom, 319. Nature, second, custom is, 316. Nerve-System, sensory and motor, un- known, 5 ; optic, 10, 86 ; blood- vessels function for, 106, 271, 333. Neuhauser, J., 244, 325, 334. Night, vision by, 20, 22, 23. Not^s, some musical, begin many tunes, 319. Nut-brown, 34. Nutrient things tangible, 177. Object, of hearing, 98 ; of vision, 48 ; relation of, to organ as agent to , patient, a 13 ; of sense, 7 ; of smell and hearing travel in media, 78, 153- Observation, 4. Occiput, vacant or contains only air, 114. Octave, 109, 117, 127, 128. Odour, Alcmaeon on, 133; Empedocles, 135 ; Democritus, 137; Anaxagoras, 138-41 ; Diogenes, 14c— 1 ; Plato, 141-4; Aristotle, 151 seqq. ; rela- tion to savour, 153; has heating power, 153; travels, 153; notfumid or other evaporation, 1 54 ; of flowers, 156 ; of brimstone and charcoal, 156; not nutrient, 158; stands ' midway between ' objects of touch and taste, and objects of seeing and hearing, 158; a 'dyeing' or 'wash- ing ' (fta^fj fl jAmu), 158; essentially of tire, 243 ; divisible only into pleasant or unpleasant according to Plato, 142; this contested by Aris- totle, 155-6; all either 'vapour ' or ' mist,' 142 ; belongs to intermediate condition of air or water, 142 ; by man perceived only in connexion with pleasure or pain, I44; the pleasure of, compared with those of sound and colour, 144; distinguished by man imperfectly as colours by ' hard-eyed ' creatures, 144; sensible and physical analogies of, to taste, 145, 151 ; the particular, 145; cap- able of classification, 155-6 ; in one aspect parallel to savour, in another not, 1 56 ; pleasant (a) per se, {!>) in- cidentally, 156; relative to health, 156-7 ; some not related to appetite, 1 56 ; man perceives not so well as lower animals, 156; pleasant, not injurious, 157 ; odorous bodies, 135. Otfle, Dr., 86, 146, 147, 328-30. Olfactory apparatus, 131 ; sense in whom keenest, 133. Olympiodorus, 169. Olympus, music of, 125. One, the, generically, specifically, numerically, 233. Optic nerves, 10. Order, of atoms, 36; of xtyr/of is corre- sponds to objective order of events, 315- Oreus, Anlipheron of, 312. Organ, of vision {see Vision, Hear- ing, &c). Can each special, without organ of sensus communis, have sensation ? 85, 325 seqq. ; of sense, a mean, 1 96; illustrated, 233; no reciprocal action between it and object, 234; no organ consists of one single element but of all four, I. ENGLISH 345 *39i»48; of sense, general definition of, 389 ; merely channels for Demo- critus, »4; large organs perceive large and far-off objects, small per- ceive small and near objects, 103 ; instrument merely of soul, 106, 361 j situated 1*1 w6po», 133 ; formed of Apoiofu/rij, 340; Ossicles of ear, unknown, 96. . Painters, colour effects, 73. Painting and mnsic, 1 26. Filiate, 339. Panzerbieter, F., 170, 259. Parallelism of sentient* soul and its {arts, of animated organism and its a\u$r)Tqpia, JI5-I7. Parmenides, theory of memory, 358. Parthenius, 30. Parva Naturalia, preliminary essays on psychological subjects, 244. Past, the, how known, 310. Patchwork, character of the Aris- totelean works, 15^,. Perceiving that one perceives, 388-9. Perceptible, actually and potentially, 6a. Perception, its essence, for Demo- critus, 34 ; for Diogenes, 41 ; of colour, 63; externally mediated, in connexion with development of loco- motive faculty, 88 ; by contraries, (Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras), 103 ; of distant objects, man inferior in, 121 ; not distinguished by ancient Greeks from sensation, 202 ; ' in- sensibles,' 207 ; not always in one's power, 229-30; essential conditions of, 238 ; visual, two aspecs of, 288-9 ! by special senses, suspended during sleep — Aristotle's seeming inconsistency, 307 ; representative, 321. Persistency, of niveous in organs, 291 seqq., 302. Phantasmata, 46; mnemonic, two aspects of, 311. Philippson, L., 80, 93. Philolaus, 109. Philoponus, 197. Phonograph, illustrates power of learning from dictation, 120. Phosphenes, 10, 64, 82-3. Phosphorescent things, visible in dark- ness, 57, 64. Physical qualities of atoms, 37. Pindar, 19811. Pitch and purity of sound, I03_, 108. Plants, why they have not aloft/ait, 326; why destitute of intelligence, 359. Plato, 5-7, (Alcib. I) 10 ; his theory of vision, 43-56 ; hearing, 106-1 1, smelling, 141-4; tasting, 170-4; touching, 184-8 ; on sensation in general, 310-15 i on sen* 05 com- munis, 360-76; colours, infinite, 34; Plato and Democritus, 43 ; on colours, 43; on psychology, 43; reduces the four elements to geo- metrical figures, 43 ; his physics, 43 ; primitive triangles, 43 ; rational soul in cranium, 44 ; on intra-ocular light, 44; on visual function, 44; on organ of vision, 44 ; the Demiurgos, 44 ; visual sensation, what, 45 ; sleep and dreaming, 46 ; and Empedocles as regards vision, 46, 49 ; visual fire ' quenched ' in darkness, 46 ; medium of vision, 47 ; compared with Empe- docles as to colour-theory, 49 ; pri- mary colours, 53 ; deprecates experi- mental test of his colour-theory, 52 ; agrees with Democritus and differs from Aristotle as to leek-jjreen, 53; agrees with Aristotle as to ri \tiov, 53; his theory of colour, not atom- istic, 54 ; Plato and Democritus, criti- cized by Aristotle, 62 ; his theory of constitution of visual organ criticized, 83 ; anticipates Aristotle as to psycho- logical importance of hearing, 1 1 1 ; reference to Alcmaeon, 131 ; his theory of the non-classification of odours, 143; 'general feeling,' 185; the ' tangibles, ' 185 ; anticipates Locke, 185 ; his explanation of 'heavy* and 'light,' 'upper* and 'lower,' 186; treats of object, not of function, of touching, 187 ; his definition of alaOTjats, 210-11; does not distinguish awOTjoK as perception from same as 'fteling? 311; his episte- mology, 3 14 {see 270); contrasted with Aristotle as to natme of aioe-qou 214-15 ; Phaec'o, basis of, attacked by Aristotle, 2 2 1 ; ascribed synthesis to thought alone, 260 • for him to koiko are perceived by no bodily organ of sense, 262 ; anticipates Aristotle on memory, 266; the as- sociation of ideas (in reminiscence), 267 ; implicitly distinguishes cogni- tive aioSjjOis from aiaOrjoit — feeling, 270 {see 2 1 4); adopted three apxai of tf'vx'l, 275; Plato and Aristotle, their views of synthetic faculty, 376 ; his definition of avannjais unfairly criticized by Aristotle, 3 1 3 ; did he 1 regard the blood, or the air in the blood , as distributory of sensory nnj- attsi 335- 34* INDICES Pleasure, of smell, not merely nega- tive, 144. Pleasure and pain accompany . 54, 60. 62, 66, 68, 69, 75, 76,318. Presentation (and representation), 250 ; faculty of, 390. Primary colours, 21 ; according to Empedocles, 22. Primary (, and secondary) qualities, 25, 5 2 - Primary qualities, of each atom per u, 37- Priscianus Lydus, 301. Projectiles, 1 10. Prophecy and inspiration, 272-3. Proportion, in mixture of black and white, 70. Protagorco-Heraclitean doctrine of perception, 54-6; sensational scep- ticism, 213. Psychology, without metaphysics, 2 ; as conceived by Greeks, 8 ; helpless as regards tasting, 1 60. Pupil, of eye, 0,10; pupil and vision to i ixpHakiios what soul and body are to rd (vov, 80 ; a sort of lamp, 86. Pure (and impure) colours, 71. Purity of colour, 33, 72 ; of sound, 102. Purple, 3.1, 75. Pythagoreans, 49; called superficies X/*'". 59. 7'» 7*i lo 9- Qualities, 'primary and secondary,' 25 ; subjective, 54-6 J four primary, of matter, 329. Quantity, determinate and indeter- minate, 297. Quarter-tone, 128. Rainbow, 66, 67, 76. Ratio, of blacks to whites in colour- composition integrally expressible, or not, 70; harmonic, 109; of mix- ture ot elements in bodies, their true glials, 240. Rational psychology,' 6, Rational soul, how it controls appe- titive, 272. Ray, visual, 12. Ray-image, 17. Rays, Empedocles' theory of, 18; con- fluence of, 1 8. Realism, Aristotle's, 238, Reason (and sense), J ; does not cog- nize time, 308. Reasoning, trains of, 1 24. Recollection, illustrated by dove-cote simile, 267 ; see Reminiscence. Red, consists of same atoms as hot, 3». 33. 5 J . 75- Reflexion, vision due to, 11, 12, 41 ; not due to, 25 ; cause of image, 25 ; Democritus and, 26 ; docs not for Diogenes completely explain vision, 42 ; a means of colour-production, 65, 66 ; taking place everywhere and always, 66 ; a weakening of the 6/15,67,82; of sound, 113. Reflexions, plurality of, how seen, 28, 39- Refractive property of crystalline lens, 9. Rcid, on touching, 247. Remembering, without recollecting, 313. Reminders, 312. Reminiscence, illustrated by dove-cote simile, 366; differs from memory, 3°7> 3 2 3! differs from re-learning, re-experiencing, 314 ; efforts of, de- scribed ,316; cond itions most favour- able for, 316-17 ; involuntary as well as voluntary, governed by laws of association, 317 ; failures of efforts at, (a) from chance, (b) from dis- tracting causes, 319; diagrammatic illustration of, from similar triangles, 321-2; involves corporeal process, 3H- Representation, 290. Representative raant;, 118; twofold purpose of, 118; Empe- docles' theory of, followed by Plato, '33- Retention (/ivqpn), illustration of, by wax-block, 267, 289; distinguished from recollection (dya/ifr/im), 313. Retina, 5,9; non-identical parts of, 91. Retinal image, unknown, 87 ; stimu- lation, 10. Revelations (inspired) received only I. ENGLISH 347 by persons of low type, interpreted by those of superior intelligence, 373. Rhythm, 1 10. Ribot, 310. Rohde, E., 304, 305, 353. Romanes, G. J., 101, 104, 148. Saline taste of sea, 168. Sanguineous animals, 148. Sapidity, its origin, ! 7 j. Saps (x"/">< or x vKo ' l )i >7«i fonrfold, Savour, genera of, in water, 161 ; a genus included between contraries, •75 i physically defined, 175. Scale of sense within sentient soul, 131. Scales on eyes, creatures having, 8a Scent followed by hound, 135. Schaubach, E., Anaxagoras, 168, 170. Scientific method, 4. Sea, shines at night when struck, 66 ; contains sweet particles, 161 ; its saline taste, 168 ; water of, contains earth, 153. Seal-ring, 234, 310. Secondary and primary qualities, 3j, 37. 25<>- Seeing (j« Vision), 7; inanimate things should see if seeing is but mirroring, 39 ; takes place without image, 39 ; due to reflexion, 41 ; explanation of, 49 ; not result of merely mathematical relation between eye and object, 86 ; contributes to well-being ol animal, 87-8 ; inferior to hearing in its in- direct — superior in its direct — results, 88-9 ; highest of the externally me- diated senses in biological impor- tance, 88 ; its evidential worth, 89 ; gives particular, hearing universal, knowledge, 133-4; subjective me- dium of the water in eye, 243 ; how we see that we see, 388 ; the agent of, coloured, 388. Seething, in production of acid, 173, Self, consciousness of, 273; conception of, 390. Sensation, in general, 303-49 ; Alcmaeon on, 203-4 '• Empedocles, 304-5 ; Democritus, 205-8 ; Anaxa- goras, 208-9; Diogenes, 209-10; Plato, 210-15; Aristotle, 215-49; chief questions concerning, 203, 326; quality of sensation, 24; seat of, the heart, 132 ; Empedocles, account of, 136; not distinguished from per- ception, 202; from feeling, 273-4; do sensations realize themselves in special organ alone? 79, 335-9. Sensationism, 54-6, 263. Sense, exact impressions through, im- possible, 34; exercise of, painful, 309 ; sense and thought, distin- guished, 339; 'higher' in proportion as it apprehends form without matter, 331 ; source of its discrimi- native power, 233; each particular at times invested by Aristotle with functions of sensus communis, 333 ; relation between organ and object of sense, how conceived by Aristotle, a 33"4 I Aristotle's theory of it, to be consistent, should attribute synthesis to its most elementary functions, 386; one sense corrects another, 304 ; mediate senses, biological worth of, 87-8; all connected with brain, 132; the five senses, 207; not more than the five, 246-9 ; the senses instruments of soul, 261 ; the special, suspended during sleep- Aristotle's inconsistency, 307. Sensible distinctions, due to ts relation to special senses not clearly stated by Aristotle, 325-8 j its organ and the organ of touch, 328-30. Septum of nose, 147. Sequence, invariable or &t M rd toAi; among xiv^atis, 315; necessary in physical, not in psychical, sphere, 3'5 1 of psychical xipijatu corre- sponds to objective sequence of events, 3'7- Shadows, in reference to colour pro- duction, 32. Shakespeare, 294, 305. Sharp and grave, 108, 117. Shield pierced, illustration from, 194, Shock, physical cause of sound, 113; of voice, 119. Siebeck, H., Gesch. der Psych., 11, 15, 16, 206, 252. Sight, sense of (compare Vision and Seeing), 9 ; Aristotle on, ,16-92 ; perfect conditions of, 80-1 ; by day and night, 81 ; far and clear sight, 81 ; sense of its biological worth, 87-8 ; the guide o movement, 89 ; most immediate in its effect on the emotions, 8y ; its aesthetic worth, 89 ; errors of, false judgments as to distance, and magnitude, and illu- sions, e. g. as to tJAjoj neSiaius, 90 ; defects of, not due to defects of ^"X'lt 9 2 i biologically more im- portant than hearing, 123 ; superior to touch as evidence, 201, 304. Similarity, 316-17 (see Association). Simplicius, 17, 30, 191. Sleep, 46; its causes, 25 j, 254, 255, J 5&-7> 300-I ; affects all special senses together, 300; affects all animals, 300 ; phenomena on border- land of, 307. Smelling, 131-59 ; Alcmaeon on, I31-3; Empedocles, 133-6; Demo- critus, 136-7; Anaxagoras, 137-40; Diogenes, 140-1 ; Plato, 141-4; Aristotle, 144-59. Medium of, for Plato, 48; modem psychology as to function of, 133 ; at distance, 138 ; during inhalation, 138, 150 ; due to air round brain, 140 ; in whom most acute,i40; organo{,n\, 146-7; func- tion of, not explained by Plato, 141 ; object of, not classifiable into genera and species, 14 1-2 ; its pleasures not merely negative, 144; man's sense of, imperfect, 144; difficulty of treat- ing psychologically, 144; medium of, 147-9, 3 4>i organ of, consists of fire, 148, 243 ; organ of, in fishes and insects unknown, 1 48, 150-1 ; con- ditions and elements of perfect, 149 ; is to health as taste to nutrition, 158; wnsfl of, n idway between touch and ".a ; . and sight and hearing, 158. Snr-o'.h, the, cause of reflexion, 66 ; shines in darkness without giving light, 83. Smoothness of ' pupil,' 64. Snow, black, 40. Socrates, when young, interested in psychology, 131, 269 ; his complaint against Anaxagoras, 256. Solidity and hardness, 182. Sophists, 3. Soul, its relation to body, as form to matter, 2 1 7 seqq. ; material accord- ing to Democrit'ua, 44; atoms of, 2 4. '55 i transmigration of, absurd, 220; not to be explained materially, 221 ; not like body a rrfic ri, 221, 223 ; not u magnitude, 222 ; and body not one thing, nor yet two things — the expressions improper, 222; unity and plurality of, illustrated, 225; three kinds of, 225; like a book, 263 ; the rational, in cranium, 272. Sound, pitch of, 108-10, 117, 127-30 j sound- (or air-) wave, 95 ; inippouu of, 98 ; a stream of atoms, 99, 101 ; why perceived by ears alone, 99 ; vocal, 99 ; caused by air in motion, 104; incorporeal, 107; a shock, 108 ; either 5- Stallbaum, 107. Stewart, Prof. J. A., 289, 319. I. ENGLISH 349 Stimulus of perception, 8. Stobaeus, 7, u, 15, 17, «, Stoic school, 7, 131. Strata (or Heraclidei), originator of vibration theory of sound, 110, 116- 17. 130- Structure of organs of sense, 339- 40. Substrate is what is changed, its qualities alternate, 63. Sun, shines crimson through fog, 7a. Superficies (Imip&vtia) is to solid de- terminate body as colour (.xpoii) to the diaphanous in such body, 68. Superposition, theory of colour com- position, 70 ; better than juxta- position, 73. Susemihl, P., 61. Sweet, things seem bitter, 1 76; the nutrient, 177. Symmetrical pores, 19, si. Symmetry between objects and pores of organs, postulated by Farmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Demo- critus, Epicurus, and Heraclides, 161. Syncritic effect of black, 50. Synthetic function, 351; ascribed to intellect by Plato, to 0X081)011 by Aristotle, 315, 361-2. Tangibles, the tiajpopai of body qnS body, 141 ; the ultimate, 190. Taste, a mode of touch, 87, 174, 177; biological worth of, 87-8; sensations of, how effected, 170-1 ; the various, explained, 171-3 ; and nutrition, 174. Tasteless substances, inodorous, 153. Tastes, pungent and astringent, analo- gous to hot and cold, and to white and black, 50 ; and odours, physical and sensible analogies between, 145; pleasant, often deceptive, 157; of j ilnnts and fruits, 163; only sub- jective, 163 J seven species of, 167, 177 ; where one is, all are; none exist in water per se, 1 74 ; medium of, 174, 175; contraries, 175; in- volve mixture, 1 76. Tasting, ancient Greek psychology of, 160-179; Alcmaeon on, 160; Empedocles, 161-3 ; Democritus, 163-7; Anaxagoras, 167-8; Dio- genes,! 69-70; Plato, 1 70-4; Aristotle, 174-9; effected by contraries, 167 ; impossible if tongue be excessively dry or moist, 1 76 ; referred to heart by Plato; organ of, 160, 161, 164, 169, 170, 175 seqq.; objict of, 160, 161, 163 seqq., 168, 169, 171 scqq., I7 4 scqq. Tear, how formed, {I. Temperament, o eye, so; the four, theory of, 253. Test-tubes (Ami/mm) of tasting, 170, »74- Themistius (Soph.). 1 13, 385,315,319. Thinking, in one's power, 339-30. Thought and sense, distinguished, 229. Timaeus Locrus, 187. Time, not cognized by roxk bnt by alotrjois, 308 ; importance of, for reminiscence, 319 seqq. ; sense of, is faculty of memory, 330. Time-conditions, thinking dependent on, 297. Time-intervals, imperceptible, 73 ; none absolutely imperceptible, 137. Time-marks, mnemonic, 331-2. Tissues, bodily, formed of the four elements, 237. Tones, height and depth of, 109. Tongue, like sponge, 169; properly medium, not organ, of taste, 174-5 • is organ of touch, 176. Torstrik, A., 113, 114, 153, 385, 298. Touching, 180-201 ; Alcmaeon on, 180; Empedocles, 181; Democritus, 181-4; Anaxagoras, 184; Diogenes, 184 ; Plato, 184-8 ; Aristotle, 188- 201 ; all senses, modes of, 24 ; in- volves a medium, 77 ; its essential organ Is not o6p(, but related to o&pl as *ipr) to ti) tuupavii as a whole, 80 ; sense of, biologically regarded, 87-8; analogy of, to hear- ing, 116; organ of, requires earth and fire, 197 ; possession of, dis- tinguishes animal from vegetable, 197; its organ most composite of all, 197-8 ; for Aristotle as for Demo- critus involved in all the other forms of sense, 330, 32S ; can exist with- out the other senses, 230; really a cluster of senses, 189; sense of, not the sensus communis, 278; in- ferior to sight as evidence, 301 ; corrects sight, 306; its organ and that of sensus communis, 338 ; the primary sense, and origin of all others, 180, 197, 339; man's sense of, pre-eminently fine, 144; object o(, 183, 188, 195 seqq. Train, of avians, 319. Transparency. 50, 51. Transparent bodies, 19. Trendelenburg, V. A., 114, 139, 197, 281. Trojan horse, Plato's simile, 261. Trumpet (or gong) within ear, 95. Truth, 3. Tympanic cavity, 96; membrane, 115. Tympanum, 93. 350 INDICES Unconsciousness, its came, 333. Unison, 127. Unit lengths or powers, 71. Units, monadic, 71. Universe, visible and tangible, 188. Vacua, resonant, 93. Vacuum, effect of, in vision, J 7 ;«the air, 93; determines sound-production, "3- Van Helmont, 149. Vanished (idea), 317. Vaucanson, his automaton, 333. Veins, 5. Verjuice, 174. Vibrations (of air), 93 ; vibra.ion- frequency, no, 128; coincident, 128. Violet, 52, 61, 67 ; dark violet, 52. Visible in darkness, 64. Vision, 9-92 ; Alcmaeon on, n-13; Empedocles, 14-23 ; Democritus, 2 3 - 37 i Anaxagoras, 37-40 ; Dio- genes, 41-2; Plato, 42-56; Aris- totle, 56-92 ; by night, 42 ; medium of, 47-8; not by avoppoai, 57, 87; involves no temporal process, 59 ; impossible, if object be placed on eye, 78 ; function of, 79 ; organ of, 79, 82 ; perfect, conditions of, 80 ; implies process only from object to eye, 86 ; relation of object to organ, 87 ; double, 306 ; hypermetropic, 91 ; multiple, 91 ; myopic, 91 ; in time, — memory, 320; object of, 17, 26, 30 seqq., 40, 48 seqq., 56 seqq. Visive (partofeye), 21. Visual, agency (fire), 48 ; current, 45; ray, proceeds in straight line, 65; power, differences of, 19 ; organ proper, Ivt&s, 85; illusions and hallucinations, 91-2. Void, existence of, asserted by Demo- critus, 23 ; space, colourless, 59. Von Jan, C, 128, 130. Vortex-ring, 113. Wachtler, J, Alcmaeon, II, 15, 93, °*' IO * _ „ Wallace, E., a8t. Water, intra-ocular relation to fire in visnal function, 11-13, 16 seqq., 25- 6, 80-3; diaphanous, 57; black, 65; essential part of visual organ, 84-5 ; of eye, a secretion from brain, 85 ; the cold and moist, 152 ; per se" tasteless, but qualified to sapidity, 167 ; four species of sapid, 171 ; can things submerged in, touch one another? 193. Wax-block, illustration of memory, 264. Weakening of tyis, three grades of, corresponding to chief rainbow colours, 67. Wendland, P., 321. White, cognized by the fire in eye, 19 ; — the smooth, 30, 31 ; a posi- tive, 36, 68 ; diacritic, 50, 68 ; and black ' analogous to ' hot and cold, pungent and astringent, 50 ; dilates visual current. 51 ; a primary colour (for Plato, the others being black, bright, and red), 52, 61 ; the colour of fire, 65; and black analogous to light and darkness, 68 ; and black explained, 68-70; of eye, 85 ; white- ness, white thing, 55-6. Windpipe, the, 118, 335. Wine, 173. Woad-colour, 33, 53. Words, avuBoXa, 123. Wundt, W., 109, 128, 143. Xenophanes, singled out principal rainbow colours, 53. Yellow, b\f!iv, 52. Zeller, Prof. E., 18, 75, 95, 106, 116, 130, 148, 158,206,244, 273, 313, 335. Zig-zag pores, 35. II. GREEK irrf<», 95- , ' &1P&PVMTot : Afp. if&poi, 119. ASiatptrot, 379. Atwapia, 301. &t,P, so, 4a, 93, 105, 113 ieqq., I48, 318. . ala0&yo8at, 201 seqq., 113 tcqq., 251, 261. ataSrjim, 187 seqq. ataBtjais; (a) in general, toi seqq., def. Plato, 2 1 6, def. Arist., 333 seqq., KpiTiKJi, 133 ; = fftSot alattfriav, 238 ; only five ala0i) 2 3°, 3 5° seqq. Synonyms for, 250, 278, 284, 287, 328 ; aifftfqo-w - ahOrjTTipm, 240. alo$T)T7ipioi>, 224 seqq., 239 seqq., 267, 328 seqq. atotiiTiK&s, 202 seqq., 235 ; ri aladTj- tikuv vavrwv, 281. alaSrirSs, 206-7, 229, 234. alaipiioBai, 95. ^ xcn 7> 93 se( 11- > ** T " oicOiT/ipiof rijf d*., 242. d«oAov88». »>4 (sub Emped. and Democr., passim), itiraau, dist. dW fdraw, 3' 8. d- StiKcAiimjr, 30. SuKtkov, 25, 29, 99, 254. . tiaStais, 23. 8100171? (? «■ 81067710;) Democr. ■> rdfit , 37. l8a - . Sidxpurir, 170. aiaxpiTiKiit, 31, 51, 53, 68, 173. OldXCKTOf, Il8. Suupavfa, 13, 57 seqq., 78. StaxfcaBcu, 34. &axtfi«ai : t£ 28. ivappJmuv, 49. ivepytia, 217, 220 seqq., 379. JKoroicr^, 254. |yrcXc'x<"i. 3I7 r 320 seqq. «t<5» : to i., 85. <£ it X aripijais, 65 ; = relative state, 3°9. 3>3- tfoSos: tf. pvTjprj;, 364. «fa; = av*v (or x&>/*'r), 198, fni'Socrif (is alTii, 234. hmxakvppa, 151. irucplvttv : to iripiov ital hucfiaror, 187. «TiXa>2iT«a', 20. e»t»XaTT«il', 20. crtruXaats, of colours, 72. ixirpuaOrjatt, 36. ur, 43, 256. BtppSt : to 0. Strtp wottT y6yipa ra ia7fibi', 265. Kifijais, 54, 63, 70, 78 ; of sensory stimulation, 79 seqq. ; of air vibra- tions (?), 109 ; chief among rd noivd, 262, 285 ; ' residual,' 293 sqq. ; se- quence of psychic mvfiotts, 313 seqq.; different trains of, 319; time and distance represented by psychic mv^- ous, 320-3. «ofXos, 93. koiv6s : Td*.iro0ij/iaTa, general /tilings (Plato), 184 ; 4 x. aMtjais, 250 seqq. ; Td *. (Plato), 263; rd *. (Arist.), 235, 28a seqq. Kopij = pupula, 9, 80, 242, 327. xoiprj (limped.), 16. *oX*<*> 93- Kpaais, oi ' temperaments,' 253, 258. Kplvitv, 196, 238 ; to it pivot, 281. KpiTtn6s : to pioov up., 333 ; tivaptu up., 241, 276 seqq., 326. Kvptos: rd Kvpian alaOqra = Td f&a, 336; TO KvptOV Kai luiKplVOV, 287. icutwv, in ear, 24, 95 seqq. ktvitos : to X., of eye, 80. Xo7ot, ratio, 117, 225; discourse, 123; X. and fuairris, 232, 238, 240 seqq.; conception, 218, 225, 279. Aofus, 31. Xoxht"]< Plato, 263 seqq.; Arist., 307 seqq. ; the prius and posterius of di-i/iKijim, 314. latiirfrtv/M, 294, 31a. /Jon?, 292 seqq. , fiopiOIO/«/>fa I99, 237. ifiotopofxpos, 30. ipuuoaxxliovuv, 102. ivopia, 124. ofut, of sound, 108, 116; of taste, 164. u/>aV : t<) d/wc, 288. ipar6s, 56. Apim66s, 113. ^-ia/ifa 130 seqq. docppaivfoBai, 130 seqq. uaippavTi/tis: rb Uippamitir, 243 seqq. Satpprjau, 1 30 seqq. ; 4 ia^pufla — « katppavTlK&v, 243. oil, 93 seqq. owffio : )} ir< i/iimj 05 ; ij Kara Xiyo*, 2 1 7 seqq.; oi5, 13a, 136, 33* seqq. waraJiSt, 334. wfxWor, 33, 53, 67. Tp€Of)vTt)t, 91. vp6npoaaos, 35. rowdc, 138. »!/>, its varieties for Plato and Aris- totle, S3, 65, 83. vvpwSjjs : Til irvjxMi?, 64. nana, of olfactory organ, 151. pfTv : nipTa (5 : rd or., of sensory organs, 232, 338, 239 seqq. x«'* a, » 334- ovynptois, 170. (Tiijeufis, 31. oi>AAo7«7/i(55, 323-4. avp$aivur: ra card avitBtfii*°. 2 55. 2( >3> representative, 366, 290 seqq. ; ^>. XiryiffiW;, 0ov\fvriicii, 298. ^airac/jo, 290 seqq. , 45. 57 set|q., 65, 83. Xkaipis, 21. Xoavi;, limped., 19. X»"i = ivi 5 2 - PASSAGES OF GREEK AUTHORS EXPLAINED OR DISCUSSED Empedocles apudhnsX. 437" 23 seqq., 15-16- Empedocles a/wrf Diels, Vorsokrati- ier(p. 211), 135. Plato, Timaeus, 67 E, 51 ; 67 B, 106-7; 77 B, 270, 273. Aristotle, 438* 5-16, 25-6; 439* 26, 60; 44°* 3-5. 7"- a ! 43o" 29, 90; 4I9" 5 seqq., 113; 781* 30 seqq., 120-1; 437* 13, 124; 918" 7-12, 127-8 ; 920* 27 seqq., 128 ; 415* 5, 438" 20-5, 443* 21 seqq., I48, 154- 5. 243-6; 421" 18, 150; 442" 29, 443* ». >5»! 443" '7. 445* »«. 157-8; 423* 10, 191 : 424* 12, 196; 435* »-»5. «98; 459° 3. 2 « 2 ; 4 2 4* 16, 225; 447 b 9 seqq., 223, 279; 424* 21-425* 13, 246, 249; 426" 28, 280; 431* 20 seqq., 281; 425* '5*. * 2 7. 284-5; 438'' 22-5, 284; 449" 30-450* 13, 297; 432* 12, 298; 459 b M. 3°3i 449 35-450* 25. 223* 25, 433" 7, 30S; 449° 24, 3°9. 313; 45°* 27-3J. 3»; 45i" 4-". 315; 45^ '3 seqq., 31S; 45»* »4-3°. 3'9! 45* '7" 2 4- 3 2I ~ 3! 453" »°-»3. 3 2 3-4; 455* 22, 328-9; 461" 17-27, 334. Oxford : Printed at the Clarendon Press by Horace Hart, M.A.