rlfc« KF3489.A33"'" """"""""■"''"'>' "illiiliiiiIi'll?™Sf.,IS9'*'^''°" •" 'He United S 3 1924 019 906 233 CORNELL DNIVERSITI SEP 13 1915 LAW LIBRARY. Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924019906233 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS ROYAL MEEKER, Commissioner BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES \ BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS/ (WHOLE 1/?7 (NUMBER 10/ MISCELLANEOUS SERIES: N O MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES APRIL, 1915 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1915 SERIES OF BULLETINS PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. The publication ot the Annual and Special Reports and 6t the bimonthly Bulletin has been discontinued, and since July, 1912, a Bulletin has been published at irregular intervals. Hac number contains matter devoted to one of a series of general subjects. These Bulteti^ numbered consecutively in each series and also carry a consecutive whole number, oeg with No. 101. A list of the series^ together with the individual Bulletins falling under ^°^^' * given below. A list of the Reports and Bulletins of the Bureau issued prior to July 1, m « will be furnished on application. Wholesale Prices. No. 1. Wholesale prices, 1890 to 1912. (Bui. No. 114.) No. 2. Wholesale prices, 1890 to 1913. (Bui. No. 149.) Retail Prices and Cost of Living. \ > No. 1. Retail prices, 1890 to 1911: Parti. (Bui. No. 105: Part I.) Retail prices, 1890 to 1911: Part II— General tables. (Bui. No. 105: Part II.) „ ^, No. 2. Retail prices, 1890 to June, 1912: Part I. (Bui. No. 106: Part I.) Retail prices, 1890 to June, 1912: Part II— General tables. (Bui. No. 106: Part 11.) ; No. 3. Retail prices, 1890 to August, 1912. (Bui. No. 108.) ■ No. 4. Retail prices, 1890 to October, 1912. (Bui. No. 110.) No. 5. Retail prices, 1890 to December, 1912. (Bui. No. 113.) No. 6. Retail prices, 1890 to February, 1913, (Bui. No. 115.) No. 7. Sugar prices, from refiner to consumer. (Bui. No. 121.) : No. 8. Retail prices, 1890 to April, 1913. (Bui. No. 125.) '. No. 9. Wheat and iflour prices, from farmer to consumer. (Bui. No. 130.) No. 10. Retail prices, 1890 to June, 1913. (Bui. No. 132.) : No. 11. Retail prices, 1890 to August, 1913. (Bui. No. 136.) ■ No. 12. Retail prices, 1890 to October, 1913. (Bui. No. 138.) : No. 13. Retail prices, 1890 to December, 1913. (Bui. No. 140.) : No. 14. Retail prices, 1907 to December, 1914. (Bui. No. 156.) \ No. 15. Butter prices, from producer to consumer. (Bui. No. 164.) Wages and Hours of Labor. 1 No. 1. Wages and hours of labor in the cotton, woolen, and silk industries, 1890 to 1912. (Bui. No. 128.) \ No. 2. Wagesandhoursof labor in the lumber, millwork, and furniture industries, 1890 to 1912. (Bui. No. 129.) I No. 3. Union scale of wages and hours of' labor, 1907 to 1912. (Bui. No. 131.) i Np. 4. Wages and hours of labor in the boot and shoe and hosiery and knit goods industries, 1890 to 1912.^ (Bui. No. 134.) ■ No. 5. Wages and hours of labor in the cigar and. clothing industries, 1911 and 1912. (Bui. No. 135.) ' No. 6. Wages and hours of labor in the building and repairing of steam railroad i cars. (Bui. No. 137.) ; No. 7. Union scale of wages and hours of labor. May 15, 1913. (Bui. No. 143.) ~ i No. 8. Wages and regularity of employment in the dress and waist industry of New York City. (Bui. No. 146.) No. 9. Wages and regularity of employment in the cloak, suit, and skirt industry. I (Bui. No. 147.) •' ^ ' ' ' • •^ : No. 10. Wages and hours of labor in the cotton, woolen, ajid silk industries, 1907- to 1913. (Bui. No. 150.) No. 11. Wages andiours of labor in the iron and steel industry in the United States, 1907 to 1912. (Bui. No. 151.) No. 12. Wages and hours of labor in the lumber, millwork, and fumitvtte indus- tries, 1907 to 1913. (Bui. No. 153.) No. 13. Wages and hours of labor in the boot and shoe and hosiery and knit goods industries, 1907 to 1913. (Bui. No. 154.) No. 14. Wages and hours of labor in the clothing and cigar industries, 1911 to 1913. (Bul. No. 161.) "No. 15. Wages and hours of labor in the building and repairing of steam raUroad cars, 1890 to 1913. (Bul. No. 163.) ' {See also third page of corcr. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 05jjyREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS ROYAL MEEKER, Commissioner BULLETI^ BUREAU r OF THE UNITED STATES \ OF LABOR STATISTICS/ " (WHOLE 1/?7 • • 1 NUMBER 10/ M I S C ELLANEOUS SERIE S : NO. 8 MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES APRIL, 1915 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1915 /3j'^6 7 CONTENTS. Introduction and summary 5-16 Minimum- wage legislation in the United States 17-103 Reasons which, have brought about minimum-wage legislation in the United States 17-29 Legislation in force in the United States 30 Comparative analysis of American minimum-wage laws 31-38 Operation of American minimum-wage laws 39-102 California 39, 40 Colorado 40 Massachusetts ■. 41-55 Minnesota 55-59 Nebraska 59 Oregon 59-67 Utah 67-76 Washington 76-102 Wisconsin 102 Attitude of the American Federation of Labor on the legal minimum wage 103 Minimum-wage legislation in Australia and New Zealand 104-173 Introduction 104, 105 Wages-board system , 105-107 Arbitration-court system 107-109 Comparative analysis of minimum-wage laws 109-114 Operations under wages board and arbitration laws ; 114r-117 Effect of acts 117-119 Victoria 119-138 History of legislation 119-122 Mode of constituting wages boards and making minimUm-wage determi- nations 122-124 Typical awards of wages boards 124-129 Effect of wage determinations in increasing wages 129-132 Operation of the law 133-138 New South Wales 138-156 History of legislation for fixing wages 138-140 Development of jurisdiction of wage tribunals 140-149 Functions of industrial boards ^ 141, 142 Procedure in- fixing minimum wage 142 Statistics of boards and awards 142, 143 Industrial agreement-? 143, 144 Minimum wage fixed by Parliament ^ 144-146 Basis of the wages fiied 146-148 Aged, infirm, or slow workers 148 Cost of industrial boards 148, 149 Typical awards of industrial boards 150-156 Queensland , 156-164 South Australia 164-166 Tasmania 1^^' ^^^ 3 CONTENTS. Western Australia 167 New Zealand 168-173 Introduction 168 Summary of provisions of industrial arbitration act , 168-171 Comparison of minimum rates under awards with actual rates paid 171-173 Work of conciliation coimcils and arbitration court 173 Cost of administration 173 Great Britain 174-183 Summary of provisions of trade boards act - 174-176 Organization and work of trade boards 176-178 Prosecutions for enforcement of act 178, 179 Opinion of British Board of Trade upon operation of act 179, 180 Typical determination of a trade board . : 181-183 Trade boards in Germany 184 Minimum wage for female workers in France (proposed law) 185, 186 Text of minimum-wage laws 187-316 Cahfornia - 187-191 Colorado 191-193 Massachusetts 193-195 Minnesota - 195-198 Nebraska 198-200 Oregon 200-204 Utah - 205 Washington 205-208 Wisconsin 208-210 Victoria 210-233 New South Wales 233-258 New Zealand 258-294 Great Britain 295-313 Trade boards act, ]909 '. 295-303 Trade boards provisional orders confirmation act, 1913 303-305 Coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912 305-308 Typical award under coal mines act 309-313 Text of laws of AustraUa and New Zealand directly fixing a minimum wage. . 313-316 Bill recommended by New York State Factory Investigating Commission. . 316-319 List of references 321-32S BULLETIN OF THE U. S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. WHOLE NO. 167. WASHINGTON. APRIL, 1915. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES. BY CHAS. H. VEREILL. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. The minimum-wage movement in this country, which resulted in the enactment of minimum-wage laws in nine States in 1912 and 1913, while perhaps appearing to be a sudden development, was in fact the result of considerable investigation in this country and of long inves- tigation, agitation, and experiment in New Zealand, Austraha, and Great Britain. In Great Britain, especially, investigations of sweated trades and studies of the remedies possible to correct the evil con- ditions found therein, and especially to deal with low wages, had extended over a period of more than 20 years. The experience with the legal minimum wage as a remedy had in New Zealand and Victoria extended over a period of more than 15 years. The reason which has led to the enactment of minimum-wage laws has been much the same in most of the countries, namely, low wages. While investigations in the United States have rarely disclosed con- ditions comparable with those found in some of the sweated industries in Great Britaia and in Austraha, yet aU of them have brought out the fact that in many industries a large proportion of the women were working at wages insufficient to meet the necessary cost of hving if dependent upon their own earnings. The development of the move- ment for a legal minimum wage may be seen from the following hst of the foreign and American States having such laws, with the dates of the first enactments. Minimnm-wage Laws of Various Countries, with Dates of First Enactment. New Zealand : Industrial conciliation and arbitration act, August 3 1 , 1894. Victoria: Factories and shops act, July 28, 1896. South Australia: Factories act, December 5, 1900. New South Wales: Industrial arbitration act, December 10, 1901. 5 6 BULLETIN OP THE BTJEEAU OF LABOR STATlSTlLiiS. Western Australia: Conciliation and arbitration act, February 19, 1902. Commonwealth of Australia: Commonwealth conciliation and arbi- tration act, December 15, 1904. Queensland: Wages boards act, April 15, 1908. Tasmania: Wages boards act, January 13, 1911. Great Britain: Trade boards act, October 20, 1909; coal mines (minimum wage) act, March 29, 1912. United States — Massachusetts: June 4,- 1912; March 21, 1913; May 19, 1913. Oregon: February 17, 1913. Utah: March 18, 1913. Washington: March 24, 1913. Nebraska: April 21, 1913. Minnesota: April 26, 1913. Colorado: May 14, 1913. California: May 26, 1913. Wisconsin: July 31, 1913. The minimum-wage law, as it has been known in recent American discussion, and as it is usually understood in Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, does not refer to a law in which is fixed a single rate below which no worker may be employed, although such laws are in existence in most of the Australasiaii States. The minimum wage, as understood in this country and Great Britain, is a wage fixed by some agency created by law, after due investigation has been made. Two methods have grown up in AustraHa and New Zealand, one or the other of which has been followed in practically all of the States where minimum-wage legislation has been put in force. In Victoria, since the enactment of the first law, July 28, 1896, minimum wages have been estabUshed by wages boards, made up of equal numbers of representatives of employers and employees, pre- sided over by an impartial chairman, who has a deciding vote. These wages boards are set up for each trade or industry and are required to discuss conditions and to determine by agreement the minimum wages to be paid in the various processes and occupations in their own indus- try. These minimum rates, when fixed and published, are for the time being legally binding upon aU employers in the industry within the area for which the board is appointed. This method was intro- duced in South Austraha in 1900, in Queensland in 1908, in Tasmania in 1911, but some modification has been made in more recent legislation. A second method of fixing the minimum wage has been followed in New Zealand since 1894. The compulsory arbitration law of New Zealand, adopted primarily for the prevention of strikes and lockouts conferred upon the arbitration court the authority to fix the condi- MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION— INTEODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 7 tions of employment, including the mmimum wage to be paid, iii the cases coming before it. This method was adopted by New South Wales in 1901, Western Australia in 1902, and the Commonwealth of Australia in 1904. In the States which have the industrial arbitration system, indus- trial agreements of employers and employees under certain conditions may be registered and have the force of awards. They are enforce- able against the parties and such other organizations and persons as signify their intention to be bound by agreement. In some of the States these industrial agreements have become very important. Thus, at the end of September, 1914, 89 such agreements were in force in New South Wales and 84 in Western Australia. An important difference between the wages board and the com- pulsory arbitration method is that the wages board itself takes the initiative in determining wages and conditions of employment for the industry, without waiting for a dispute to arise, while under the com- pulsory arbitration method the court itself does not initiate proceed- ings, but waits until a dispute brings the question of wages or conditions before it for adjustment. Under the wages-board system each trade or industry has its own board, whereas an arbitration court ordinarily deals with all the industries within a district. Another important difference is in the fact that the wages boards consist of persons representing both employers and employees, with an impartial chairman, while the arbitration court usually consists of one member only, who may, however, be assisted by experts or assessors. A recent tendency in AustraHa is to combine the most successful features of the two systems. Thus, Victoria since 1903 and South Austraha since 1907 have had courts of industrial appeals, which may review the determinations of wages boards. Queensland since 1912 has had an industrial court to which appeals may be made. In Tasmania appeal from a wages-board determination may be made to the supreme court. On the other hand. New South Wales introduced in 1908 wages boards (or "industrial boards") in connection with its system of compulsory arbitration, and New Zealand in the same year added conciliation councils, whose functions and methods are some- what similar to those of the wages boards in Austraha. In addition to the laws providing for the fixing of a minimum wage by wages boards or courts of arbitration, the laws specifying a wage below which no worker may be employed, which have already been referred to, are important as limiting the wages for children or apprentices. A special reason for their enactment was to prevent the employment of children or apprentices without any wage or at a premium, as was often done under the pretense of teaching the trade. All of the Australasian States except Western Australia now 8 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAIT OF LABOK STATISTICS. have such laws. In New Zealand the law specifies a minimum of 5s. (11.22) a week for the first year, 8s. ($1.95) a week for the second year, to be increased 3s. (73 cents) a week for each additional year of employment in the same trade until a wage of 20s. ($4.87) is reached. No premium may be paid, nor any deduction made from the wages of any boy or woman under 18 except for time lost through the worker's fault or illness, or on account of the temporary closing of the factory for cleaning or repairing of machinery. Under the corresponding laws the minimum in Victoria is 2s. 6d. (60.8 cents) a week; in South Australia, New South Wales, and Tasmania, 4s. (97.3 cents) a week; and in Queensland, 5s. ($1.22) a week. In Queensland and Tasmania the law provides for an increase in wages, according to years of service, somewhat as in New Zealand. The minimum-wage laws, both in New Zealand and in Australia, met with much criticism and opposition in the earlier years. In spite of this fact, however, they have been extended from year to year, imtil they now apply to practically aU industries in all the States. Thus in Victoria the act of 1896, which at first applied to 6 sweated trades only, has been renewed by the approval of the legislature five successive times. The gradual application to the factories and indus- tries in Victoria may be seen by the addition by action of Parliament in 1900 of 21 trades, in 1901 of 11 trades, in 1903 of 1 trade, in 1906 of 11 trades, in 1907 of 2 trades, in 1908 of 4 trades, in 1909 of 16 trades, in 1910 of 20 trades, in 1911 of 12 trades, in 1912 of 19 trades, and in 1913 of 2 trades. In addition by action of the governor in council under the general authority of the law 8 boards were appointed in 1911 and 1 in 1912. The number of special boards existing or authorized at the end of 1913 was 134, affecting approximately 150,000 employees. The extent of the system in the several States, as shown by available reports on April 30, 1914, may be seen from the following statement. The industrial agreements referred to have the force of awards: New South. Wales: Industrial boards, 208. Number of awards in force, 260. Industrial agreements in force, 71. Membership of unions, about 200,000. Victoria: Wages boards, 131. Number of determinations in force, 129. Persons affected, 150,000. Queensland: Industrial boards, 81. Number of awards in force, 76. Persons affected, over 90,000.' 1 At the end of Juno, 1914, the number ot persons affected by industrial-board awards in Q,^^r,,^„„^ was reported as 90,000 under 92 awards. -^uoouiiana MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION INTKODTJCTION AND SUMMARY. 9 South Australia: Wages boards, 51. ETumber of determinations in force, 54. Persons affected, 25,000. Western Australia: Number of awards in force, 18; number of awards pending, 19. Number of industrial agreements in force, 93. Membership of registered industrial unions, 30,000. Tasmania: Wages boards, 21. Number of determinations in force, 19. Commonwealth of Australia: Number of awards in force, 17. Number of industrial agreements in force, 233. New Zealand: Number of industrial unions, December 31, 1913, 399. Membership of industrial unions, 72,000. Number of industrial agreements and awards in force March 31, 1912, 373. During the period siace the enactment of these laws, the indus- tries of the various States have maintained a steady growth and it is reported that the systems of fixing minimum wages have not been . found a check upon this growth. Such reports as are available from the Australasian States do not disclose any tendency, after the many years during which the laws have been in effect, to make the minimum also the maximum rate. A New Zealand report discussing this question in 1910 showed that in trades where minimum rates had been fixed by the arbitra- tion court, employing some 7,400 workers, 62 per cent were receiving in excess of the minimum established by the court. The investiga- tion covered the four principal cities of the colony. In Auckland 63 per cent received in excess of the minimum; in Wellington, 64 per cent; in Christchurch, 63 per cent, and in Dunedin, 56.5 per cent.^ In the Australasian States the wage rates fixed by the wages boards and industrial courts are not for unskilled and low-grade workers only, but for all occupations, skilled as well as unskilled. The "hving wage" is accepted as the basis for laborers, but above this many rates are fixed, for the several occupations coming under the jurisdiction of a board, according to skUl. Thus, in a typical Victorian determination of the engineering board, while a rate of 48s. ($11.68) for a 48-hour week is fixed for laborers, various higher mini- mum rates are fixed for the other occupations up to 66s. ($16.06) for blacksmiths, fitters, turners, etc., and 72s. ($17.52) for pattern makers.^ For apprentices and learners special minimum rates, below the cost of living minimum for adults, are fixed according to age, the rates usually being increased at regular intervals to the end of a fixed period, when the scale for adults comes into effect. An im- 1 See page 171. 2 gee also page 124 et seq. 10 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. portant duty of the Australasian determiaations and awards is the fixing of the proportion of apprentices and learners. Great Britain in introducing minimum-wage legislation took the Victorian system as a model after an investigation by a commissioner in 1908. The first British legislation was the trade boards act of 1909, enacted October 20, 1909, and in effect January 1, 1910. The law as enacted apphed to four trades : Chain making by hand, paper-box making, lace finishing, and wholesale tailoring. These trades were estimated to employ about 250,000 persons, more than two-thirds of whom were women. The avowed purpose of the act was to deal with sweated industries, and the four first chosen were chosen because of the low wages which they were known to pay. On August 15, 1913, by the trade boards provisional orders confirmation act of 1913, the law was extended practically without opposition to include four other industries: Sugar confectionery and food preserving, shirt making, hoUow ware, and cotton and linen embroidery. These industries have been estimated to employ about 150,000 persons. Under this act one or more wages or trade boards may be estab- lished by the Board of Trade for each of the specified industries. The boards must consist of equal numbers of persons representing em- ployers and employees and a smaller number of appointed members unconnected with the trade. The number of appointed members must be less than half the total number of representative members. One of the members is named by the Board of Trade as chairman. The trade boards are authorized to fix mininaum time rates or mini- mum piece rates, and may fix special rates for any particular class of work. The rates may differ according to district or according to persons. The boards have power to issue permits to slow, aged, or infirm workers to be employed for less than the minimum rate. Before fixing any minimum rate the trade board must give notice of the rate which it proposes to fix and consider any objections which may be filed with it within three months. At the conclusion of the three months' period the rate may be fixed by the trade board and then comes into operation to a Hmited extent. Six months later the Board of Trade must issue an order malring the rate obligatory upon all employers, unless the Board are of the opinion that the circum- stances are such as to make it premature or,otherwise undesirable. For the extension of the act to other trades a provisional order of the Board of Trade is necessary, which must have the approval of ParUament. The methods of the British trade boards in fixing minimum rates are similar to those followed by the wages boards in AustraUa. One minimum rate is usually estabhshed for workers above a certain age engaged in a process or occupation, while for yoxmger workers a minimum rate considerably lower is estabhshed, increasing according to duration of employment. It is claimed that the result of fixing a MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION — INTRODUCTION AND SUMMAEY. 11 graded scale of pay, rising year by year, for apprentices and learners is that employers are induced in their own interest to see that proper instruction is given in order to improve the value of the services of the employee. The following statement shows in part the minimum rates fixed for the ready-made and wholesale tailoring trade in Great Britain: Per hour. Female workers other than home workers 3Jd. (6.6 cents). Female home workers ; . . . SJd. (6.6 cents). Female learners, commencing at 14 and under 15 years of age: Per week of 50 hours. First 6 months 3s. (73 cents). Second 6 months 48. 6d. (fl.lO). Third 6 months 6s. ($1.46). Fourth 6 months 7s. 3d. ($1.76). Fifth 6 months 8s. 4d. ($2.03). Sixth 6 months 9s. 5d. ($2.29). Seventh 6 months lis. 5d. ($2.78). Eighth 6 months 12s. 6d. ($3.04). In the trade in question different rates are provided for learners commencing at 15 and under 16 years of age, at 16 and under 21 years of age, and at 21 years of age and over. This grading of mini- mum rates according to age and experience is a characteristic feature of the determinations of the British and Australian wages boards. It will be noticed that the number of grades aad length of the periods fixed for learners and apprentices are greatly in excess of those thus far fixed by American commissions. An important industry to whigh the legal-minimum-wage principle has been apphed in Great Britain is coal mining, the coal mines (minimum wage) act of 1912 having been enacted March 29, 1912, pro- viding for the establishment of boards for fixing minimum rates for aU ■ underground workers in coal mines, numbering over 800,000, the greatest body of workers anywhere under the protection of a mininmm-wage act. The act expires by limitation three years after its approval unless extended by Parliament. This law was enacted as a compromise in settlement of an important strike, the workers at the time having made a strong demand for the introduction of a minimum wage into the law itself, a demand which was not granted by Parliament. The measure as passed provided for the establish- ment of joint district boards, consisting of representatives of em- ployers and employees, with an independent chairman appointed by them. The boards may fix wage rates, rules, and conditions of work. The country, for the purposes of the law, is divided into 22 districts, each of which has a wages board. The application of the legal minimum wage to the coal-mining industry in Great Britain is espe- cially significant, because of the fact that the employees are very largely adult males and very strongly organized. 12 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. Statistics are not available to show precisely the gains which have resulted to the workers from the operation of these laws, but such information as is available shows very considerable gains in wage rates in particular cases, especially to the lowest-grade workers. The gains also, it has been stated, extend to workers formerly earning above the minimum fixed.* AH of the foreign minimum-wage laws above referred to are appH- cable to men, as well as to women and children, in this respeqt differ- ing from the American laws, aU of which have one principle in com- mon in that they apply only to women and minors. Minimum-wage legislation in the United States began with the enactment of the Massachusetts law of June 4, 1912, which, however, did not come into effect until July 1, 1913. Legislation in Massa- chusetts was followed by similar legislation in eight other States during 1912 and 1913. As regards the scope of the laws, in Cali- fornia, Oregon, and Washington the cominissions have authority to fix the conditions of labor, as well as minimum-wage rates, and in California and Oregon to fix maximum hours, but in California the hours fixed may not be in excess of those fixed by specific statute. In Wisconsin the industrial commission tmder an earlier enactment may fix maximum hours and conditions of labor. In all the other States except Utah the powers granted under these laws are limited to fixing minimum wages. In Utah only the minimum-wage rates are fixed in the act, namely: For minors under 18, not less than 75 cents a day. For adult learners and apprentices, not less than 90 cents a day, with the learning or apprenticeship period limited to one year. For experienced adults, not less than $1.25 per day. The basis for determining the mioimum wage is in all the other American laws the necessary cost of living, but in Coloi'ado, Massa- chusetts, and Nebraska consideration must be given also to the financial condition of the business and the probable affect thereon of any increase in the minimum wage. By exception a lower wage may be paid to those who are physically defective. For learners and apprentices a substandard minimum is provided for m some but not in all of the laws. The American acts do not contain any provision specifically authorizing a commission to limit the number or proportion of apprentices. However, imder its power to limit the number of apprentices to those holding licenses, the Washington commission has undertaken to limit the number of apprentices. The Wisconsin act contains a similar provision. The administration of the laws is, except in the case of Utah in the hands of a commission, either appointed for the purpose or hav- ing general functions in regard to the administration of labor laws. ' See page 120 el seq. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION ^INTKODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 13 In Utah the administration of the law is in the hands of the commis- sioner of immigration, lahor, and statistics. The commissioners are in all cases appointed hy the governor. Preliminary to the fixing of minimum-wage rates, investigation by the commission, either upon its own initiative or upon complaint, is required, the commissioners having authority to subpoena witnesses administer oaths, and examine books. The work of determining the proper minimum wage is in all cases, except Colorado and Utah, in the hands of a subordinate wage board, these boards, however, only serv- ing in an advisory capacity to the administrative commission, which may refer back all or any part of the recommendations for further investigation and consideration or may appoint a new wage board. The wage boards consist of equal numbers of representatives of employers and employees and one or more representatives of the administrative commission or of the public. The boards, upon being estabhshed, consider the results of the preliminary investigations and may make ftrrther investigations, endeavoring in conference to agree upon the minimum wage to be recommended. When the report of the wage boards has been accepted by the administrative commis- sions, pubHc hearings must be held, with due notice. If, after the hearings, no change is considered necessary in the recommendations, they are pubUshed as orders, which become effective after 30 days in Minnesota and Wisconsin and after 60 days in California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington. In Massachusetts the commission enters a decree of its findings and at the same time notes thereon the names of employers who faU or refuse to accept the minimum wage. These names may be published by the commission when advisable. In Nebraska the procedure is as in Massachusetts except that the names of employers paying less than the minimum must be pub- lished within 30 days. In all the States except Minnesota special provision is made for court review. In Oregon and Washington only questions of law may be referred to the cotirt. In California, in addition, the court may set aside a determination if the commission act without or in excess of its powers or if the determination was procured by fraud. In Cahfornia and Wisconsin the determination may be set aside if unreasonable or unlawful; in Massachusetts, if compliance would pre- vent a reasonable profit; in Nebraska, if likely to endanger the pros- perity of the business. In all the States except Massachusetts and Nebraska a penalty of fine or imprisonment, or in some cases of both, is provided for paying less than the minimum wage fixed or for failure to comply with the other conditions of the determination. In Massachusetts and Nebraska the only power of enforcement given to the commission is such as is contained in the authority to publish the names of employers paying less than the minimum wage fixed. 14 BULLETIK OF THE BUKEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. The preliminary work necessary to fixing minimum-wage rates is considerable and only a few of the States have yet reached this point in the administration of their minimmn-wage laws. In Utah, where the rate was fixed in the law, it came into effect with the law without formality. In Minnesota wage orders were issued in Octo- ber, 1914, fixing wages, but an injunction issued the day before the orders were to become effective suspended their enforcement, and the matter is stiU awaiting the decision of the State supreme court. In some of the other States action has been delayed pending the decision of the United States Supreme Court upon the constitution- ality of the Oregon act.^ The wage determinations thus far available^ and the dates when effective, are as follows. It will be observed that the variations for age and experience in the rates fixed in these de- terminations are much less numerous than in those of the British and AustraUan wages boards : OREGON. October 4, 1913, in manufacturing or mercantile establislunents, millinery, dresa- making or hairdressing shops, laundries, hotels, restaurants, telephone or telegraph establishments or offices in the State, for girls between 16 and 18 years, a minimvun wage of $1 a day. November 10, 19] 3, in manufacturing establishments in Portland, for experienced adult women, a minimum weekly rate of $8.64. November 23, 1913, in mercantile establishments in Portland, for experienced adult women, a minimum weekly rate of $9.25. February 2, 1914, in offices in Portland, for experienced adult women, a minimum rate of $40 per month. February 7, 1914, in any industry in the State, experienced adult women, a'minimum weekly rate of $8.25. February 7, 1914, for inexperienced adult women, a minimum weekly rate of $6. Such workers shall be considered inexperienced not more than one year. August 31, 1914, in millinery and dressmaking trades, for women and girls with no previous e.xperience, a preapprenticeship period of 30 days' employment to test fitness for the trade will be allowed at a weekly rate of less than $6. WASHINGTON. June 27, 1914, in mercantile establishments, for any female over 18, a minimum weekly rate of $10. June 27, 1914, in mercantile establishments, for any person under 18, a minimum weekly rate of $6. August 1, 1914, in factories, for any female over 18, a minimum weekly rate of $8.90. August 1, 1914, in factories, for any person under 18, a minimum weekly rate of $6. August 24 , 1914, in laundries and dye works, for any female over 18, a minimum weekly rate of $9. August 24, 1914, in laundries and dye works, for any person under 18, a minimum weekly rate of $6. September 7, 1914, in .any establishment in connection with the operation of a tele- phone or telegraph line, for any female over 18, a minimum weekly rate of $9. October 7, 1914, in any establishment in connection with the operation of a telephone or telegraph line, for any person under 18, a minimum weekly rate of $6 (this order does not apply to messengers in third-class cities or towns who are not continuously employed and who are paid by the piece). 1 See page 66. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 15 February 20, 1915, as stenographer, bookkeeper, typist, billing clerk, filing clerk, cashier, checker, invoice clerk, comptometer operator, or any clerical work of any kind, for any female over 18, a minimum weekly rate of $10. February 20, 1915, as stenographer, bookkeeper, typist, billing clerk, filing clerk, cashier, checker, invoice clerk, comptometer operator, or any clerical work of any kind, for any person between 16 and 18, a minimum weekly rate of $7.50; for any person under 16, a minimum weekly rate of $6. Also the following rules in regard to apprentices: June 27, 1914, in mercantile establishments, for apprentices- First 6 months, a minimum weekly rate of $6. Second 6 months, a minimum weekly rate of $7.50. And not more than 17 per cent of the total number of adult female employees shall be apprentices, and not more than 50 per cent of apprentices shall receive a weekly wage of less than,$7.50. Millinery and dressmaking, one year's apprenticeship — 17 weeks at $3 a week. 17 weeks at $5 a week. 18 weeks at $7.50 a week. Manicuring and hairdressing, one year's apprenticeship, in 4 periods of 3. months each — First period, $1.50 a week. Second period, $4 a week. Third period, $6 a week. Fourth period, $8 a week. Telephone, 9 months' apprenticeship — 3 months at $6 a week. 2 months at $6.60 a week. 2 months at $7.20 a week. 2 months at $7.80 a week. In the smaller exchanges — 4 months at $6 a week. 5 months at $7.50 a week. Laundry, 6 months' apprenticeship — 3 months at $6 a week. 3 months at $7.50 a week. Factories, 6 months to one year's apprenticeship, with two or more periods, beginning at $6 a week. Office employment, 6 months' apprenticeship, at $7.50 a week. MASSACHUSETTS. Brush industry, August 15, 1914: For experienced female employees, a minimum wage of 15J cents an hour. For learners and apprentices, 65 per cent of the above minimum. Period of apprenticeship shall not be more than 1 year. These findings shall apply also to all minors. The material available for arriving at a judgment of the effect of the minimum-wage laws in the various States is as yet very limited. Such laws must be regarded as still in the experimental stage so far as the United States is concerned. A study of their operations over a considerable period of time and under a variety of conditions will be necessary before any definite conclusion as to their ultimate effect can be reached. In Utah, as the wage scale came into force with the law itself on March 13, 1913, there is a considerable period 16 BULLETIN OF THE BUBBAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. of experience to indicate the effect of the law. In the other States where wage rates have come into force, the longest ^^P^"®"!., found in Oregon, where the first determination was October 4, • In Washington the first determination dates back only to June , 1914, and in Massachusetts only to August 15, 1914. in ttie last- named State the wage scale is applicable to only one mdustry, ana that one employing only a small number of persons. In Utah an informal report by the official charged with the admm- istration of the act, after an experience of slightly over a year, stated that (1) the law had been instrumental in raising the wages ol a number of women and girls; (2) it had not increased the pay roll, in estabhshments employing any considerable number ol women, over 5 per cent; (3) it had not caused the minimum to become very nearly the maximum wage. A much larger number of employees are drawmg a wage in excess of the highest minimum than are paid the legal wage itself. (4) Most employers admit that they have obtained increased efficiency since the law came into effect. (5) The law has tended to equalize the cost of production or of selling among the various manufacturers and merchants.' In Oregon the only official report available furnishes no informa- tion in regard to the effect of the wage rates which have been put into force. With the purpose of securing full and accurate information in regard to the effect upon the employees and the industry of a typical minimuin-wage law, an intensive study of the Oregon act, as the minimum act longest in operation, was undertaken by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in cooperation with the Commission on Industrial Relations. 'The results of this study will be pubHshed as a bulletin of this Bureau within a few months. In Washington a survey by the State commission of the three lead- ing industries in which the minimum wage was first established, mer- cantile estabhshments, laundries, and telephone exchanges, showed that while 60 per cent (50 per cent in the stores) of the women employed were receiving less than the minimum wage prior to the application of the law, the wages of practically all of these workers had been raised to the minimum without serious opposition and with- out injury to the industries. No leveling down of wages was found, but, on the contrary, a larger number than formerly were receiving in excess of the wage fixed as the established minimum. The women workers have be6n neither dismissed nor displaced by cheaper em- ployees, and the number replaced by apprentices or minors is reported to be so small as to be a negligible factor.^ In Massachusetts no determination has been in effect for longer than six months and no official information is available to show the effect of the new scale of pay upon either the workers or the industry. 1 See page 75. ' See page 78 et seq. MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES. REASONS WHICH HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION EN THE UNITED STATES. In studying minimum-wage legislation in the United States it may be proper to consider the reasons which have usually been put forward in the States where minimum-wage legislation has been enacted for the passage of the existing laws. These may be summarized briefly as — 1. In many industries a large proportion of the wage earners are women who are dependent upon their own earnings and in many cases are also the principal support of others. 2. A considerable proportion of these women, and, in fact, of all women wage earners, are paid wages inadequate to supply a reason- able standard of living. 3. In a considerable number of these industries, however low the wages paid in some establishments may be, other estabhshments are to be found in the same localities paying a living wage and success- fully competing with those of the lower-wage standard. While there have been within a few years many local investigations of the wages and conditions of women wage earners, the Bureau of Labor Eeport on Condition of Woman and Child Wage Earners in the United States has been most often cited as showing conditions throughout a wide area. Thus this report showed' that in a group of 1,698 women employed in department and other retail stores in seven of the principal cities, 26. 1 per cent were without homes and entirely dependent upon their own earnings, and that of those hving at home 68.5 per cent turned in all of their earnings toward the family sup- port. In a similar group of 5,014 women employed in mOls and factories in the same cities, 17.5 per cent were found to be without homes and dependent upon their own earnings, and among those living at home 77.2 per cent turned in all their earnings to the family. In another part of the woman and child labor investiga- tion it was found that in a group of some 4,800 families with girls 16 years of age and over at work in the cotton, men's ready-made clothing, glass, and silk industries, these girls contributed nearly all their earnings to the family support, the average per cent of total ' Vol. v., pp. 15 and 19 to 21. 82843°— Bull. 167—15 2 17 18 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OP LABOB STATISTICS. earnings contributed ranging from 86 per cent in the glass industry to 96 per cent in the silk industry and 97 in the cotton industry m New England; or, measured in another way, their contributions con- stituted of the total family mcome 27 per cent in. the glass industry, 40 per cent m the clothing mdustry, 35 per cent in the silk mdustry, and 43 per cent in the New England cotton industry.' In the group of women employed in department and other retail stores already referred to, the average weekly earnings of 30.8 per cent were under $6 and of 66.2 per cent under $8. A study of the pay rolls of department and other retail stores in New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, including 36,000 female employees, showed that the weekly rates of pay of 26.4 per cent fell below $6 and of bl.l per cent below $8. In the group of women employed in mills and factories abeady referred to, the average weekly earnings of 40.1 per cent fell below $6 and of 74.3 per cent below $8.^ Sumlar figures are available from the same report covering the four great industries, cotton, men's clothing, glass, and silk. The percentages of women 16 years of age and over whose wages in a representative week fell below $6 and $8 were found to be as follows: PEE CENT OF WOMEN 16 YEAES OF AGE AND OVEE EARNING UNDEE $6 AND UNDEK J8 IN A EEPEESENTATIVE WEEK. Industry. Total number. Per cent earning— Under J6. Under $8. Cotton: New England Southern Men's ready-made clothing Glass Silk 13,744 12,654 10,149 2,774 8,596 38.0 68.0 49.0 64.0 45.4 67.5 90.9 73.1 91.5 71.1 In another section of the woman and child labor investigation, where the wages of over 38,000 women 18 years of age and over were secured, the following percentages were found to be receiving less than $6 and less than $8 in a representative week. 1 Vol. I, pp. 433, 436; Vol. II, pp. 365, 368; Vol. HI, pp. 525, 527; Vol. IV, pp. 259, 261. > Vol. V, pp. 41, 45, and 46. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 19 PEE CENT OF FEMALE EMPLOYEES 18 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER EARNING LESS THAN $6 AND LESS THAN J8 IN A REPRESENTATIVE WEEK, BY INDUSTRIES. [Source: Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage Earners in the United States, Vol. XVIII.p. 23.] Industry. Canning and preserving, fruits and vegetables Canning and preserving, oysters Cans and b oxes, tin Cigar boxes Cigarettes Cigars Clocks and watches Confecticmery Core making Corsets Crackers and biscuits Hardware, etc Hosiery and knit goods Jewelry Needles and pins Nuts, bolts, and screws Paper boxes Pottery Rubber and elastic goods Shirts, overalls, etc Stamped and enameled ware Tobacco and snufl Woolen and worsted goods Total Number. 449 155 225 335 ,071 i,094 696 ,948 307 1,789 ,273 803 ',251 129 427 433 1,213 503 233 1,371 992 1,670 1,915 38, 182 Per cent earning— Under S6. 69.2 99.4 60.2 61.8 33.1 39.3 33.5 55.6 22.1 29.7 54.0 57.9 31.7 31.8 27.2 61.7 40.1 45.5 28.8 56.6 45.0 66.6 29.7 41.1 Under $8. 93.6 100.0 79.5 84.5 75.4 71.3 72.3 81.3 61.9 58.9 82.0 88.2 64.0 67.4 61.6 92.1 74.5 65.8 56.7 89.9 72.7 79.9 38.9 72.7 The wide variation in the wages of women in unskilled occupa- tions in the same industry is illustrated in the following table: COMPARATIVE AVERAGE^ WAGES OF WOMEN IN 4 SELECTED OCCUPATIONS IN 13 SELECTED ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE GLASS INDUSTRY. [Source: Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage Earners in the United States, Vol. Ill, Glass Industry, p. 408.] Total.i Selecting. Wrapping. Washing. Grinding (hand). State. Es- tab- lish- ment num- ber. Num- ber of per- sons. Aver- age wage per hoiu:. Es- tab- lish- ment num- ber. Num- ber of per- sons. Aver- age wage per hour. Es- tab- lish- meut num- ber. Num- ber of per- sons. Aver- age wage per hour. Es- tab- lish- ment num- ber. Num- ber of per- sons. Aver- age wage per hour. Es- tab- lish- ment num- ber. Num- ber of per- sons. Aver- age wage per hour. Pa Ohio... Pa W.Va.. Pa Ohio. . . Pa Ohio... Do... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 26 16 28 24 18 23 79 79 34 28 12 18 29 Cts. 5.9 6.3 6.7 6.9 7.2 8.1 8.1 9.0 9.3 9.5 9.7 11.2 11.9 1 6 4 9 3 6 8 2 7 12 11 10 13 16 6 9 12 7 20 45 4 22 2 3 9 23 Cts. 5.7 7.6 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.3 10.0 10.0 12.1 2 4 3 5 10 7 8 11 9 13 12 6 1 6 10 9 9 4 24. 19 4 6 3 6 Cts. 6.7 6.4 6.6 7.1 7.2 7.6 7.7 8.7 8.9 12.2 12.9 1 2 3 4 6 12 7 11 9 13 5 10 8 10 6 6 6 3 6 6 3 12 3 Cts. 6.2 5.4 6.0 6.6 7.3 7.5 7.9 9.4 9.6 10.0 3 6 7 10 11 8 9 12 6 2 13 4 1 6 3 27 16 2 16 4 4 Cts. 6.2 6.7 7.9 9.7 11.6 12.4 14.3 15.0 Do... W.Va.. Ohio Do 1 In the total division the establishments are given consecutive numbers, these numbers being attached to the same establishments in each of the occupational divisions. As these four occupations are all of a relatively unskilled character, it might fairly be supposed that there would be no great variation in . the rate of wages, yet the table shows that for three of them the 20 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. average wage paid by the establishments at one extreme is at least double that paid by the establishment at the other extreme, while in the fourth occupation, washing, the variation is little short of 100 per cent. In grinding the variation is particulariy great, the differ- ence between 6,2 cents an hour and 15 cents an hour being, on a 58 hour per week basis, the difference between $3.60 and 18.70 a week. The report of the Massachusetts Commission on Minimum Wage Boards disclosed similar variations in rates of pay in the same indus- try and in the same locality.' In England also investigations have shown extraordinary variations in women's wages. In some cases one worker will be getting twice as much for doing a certain piece of work as the woman who works next door. Especially striking instances of this fact have been pointed out in home work, but such examples are not limited to home workers but exist in factories and workshops as well. A firm in Whitechapel has been referred to which pays its tea packers 16s. ($3.89) a week, while another firm in the same neighborhood pays 7s. 6d. (SI. 82) for the same work. One firm of cocoa manufacturers pays Is. 3d. (30.4 cents) for the filling of 1,000 bags. Another close at hand pays only 8d. (16.2 cents).^ "As showing that at present no standard of payments exists in many women's trades. Miss Macarthur, secretary of the Women's Trade Union League, giving evidence before the select committee of the House of Commons, mentioned the case of two cartridge workers who left one factory in the Edmonton district for another newly opened in the district. The one girl is able to earn now about half what she earned at the Edmonton factory, and the other girl in another department is earning double what she earned at Edmonton. So that would show that in one department that firm is paying nearly 100 per cent more, and in another department 40 or 50 per cent less, than the other firm." ^ In Massachusetts a commission on minimum-wage boards was appointed in 1911, the object of which as stated in the law was, "To report on the advisability of establishing a board or boards to which shall be referred inquiries as to the need and feasibility of fixing mini- mum rates of wages for women and minors in any industry." The commission, it was provided, should consist "of five persons, citizens of the Commonwealth, of whom at least one shall be a woman, one shall be a representative of labor, and one shall be a representative of employers.'' The commission, after extensive investigations, submitted its report, recommending the enactment of a law providing for minimum- wage boards, in January, 1912. • Pages 58, 117, and 160. ^The case for wages boards. By J. J. MaUon. (In PremiJire conMrence intemationale des Hp,™ socialfs d'acheteurs, Genfeve, 24-26 septembre, 1908.) pp. 429-449. "gues MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 21 The scope of the investigation of the Massachusetts commission is indicated by its statement in its report that: "To obtain an accurate view of the condition of labor so far as the women and minors are concerned, it is especially of service to ascertain, if possible, not only the wage schedules, but the actual weekly and annual earnings, the variation of these earnings with age and experience, the irregularity of employment due both to industrial conditions and to the physical exhaustion and ill health of the employees, the economic status of the workers in so far as they are aided by other members of a family group, or by charity, or are themselves called on to support others." The commission collected wage schedules from 6,900 persons, and a certain amount of personal and domestic data from 4,672 persons. Employees in 91 estabhshments in 18 localities were investigated. The commission also made use of the material relating to female cotton operatives included in the Federal Bureau of Labor Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage Earners in the United States. "Altogether, information, more or less detailed but all of a thoroughly reliable character, being based upon pay rolls and first-hand inquiries by trained investigators, was gathered covering 15,278 female wage earners engaged in four different occupations in the Commonwealth." The number of employees included in the investigation whose wages were ascertained is shown in the following table : NUMBER OF FEMALE WORKERS UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE AND 18 YEARS OP AGE AND OVER IN THE INDUSTRIES INVESTIGATED. Confection- ery. Stores. Laundries. Cotton. Total. Under 18 years of ^e 301 1,218 467 2,861 130 847 1,088 6,933 1,986 11,859 Total 1,519 3,328 977 8,021 13,845 The average weekly earnings of the employees included in the investigation in the various industries covered are shown in the fol- lowing table. The earnings are expressed in percentages of workers receiving under a specified amount per week. PER CENT OP FEMALE EMPLOYEES 18 YEARS OP AGE AND OVER INVESTIGATED RECEIVING WEEKLY WAGES UNDER SPECIFIED AMOUNTS. Per cent of employees receiving weekly wage — Under $5. Under $6. Under 17. Under $8. $8 and over. Candy factories 41.0 10.2 16.1 23.0 65.2 29.5 40.7 37.9 82.3 47.9 60.1 53.0 93.1 60.4 75.1 66.8 6 9 39.6 Laundries . 24.9 33.2 Total . . 22.2 38.9 55.3 68.6 31.4 22 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OF LABOB STATISTICS. By the above figures it is seen that 41 per cent of the candy- workers, 10.2 per cent of the saleswomen, 16.1 per cent of the laundry workers and 23 per cent of the cotton workers earn less than $5 a week, and that, respectively, 65.2 per cent, 29.5 per cent, 40.7 per cent and 37.9 per cent of them earn less than $6 a week, in these four 'industries, therefore, we find low wage rates for a very considerable number of persons. ■ , j. • The question how far the wages of the above tour industries may be taken as representative of conditions broadly prevalent is answered in part by the figures supplied by the [Massachusetts] bureau of statistics. The following table presents this information in the form of per- centages of workers earning specified amounts per week: PEE CENT OF FEMALE EMPLOYEES IN ALL MANUFACTURING INDUSTEIES RECEIVING WEEKLY WAGES UNDER SPECIFIED AMOUNTS. Per cent of employees receiving weekly wage- Under 86. Under $7. Under $8. $8 and over. Total. 17.7 24.2 33.8 47.7 50.6 65.8 49.4 34.2 IS years to 21 years ^ loo Total 18 years and over i 19.0 36.6 53.7 46.3 100 ' Estimated. Examination of the findings of our own investigators shows that the lowest range of wages is less uniformly distributed within an industry than the statement of an average would suggest. For instance, in the candy industry, with its 41 per cent of adult women receiving less than $5 a week, a comparison of wage rates in 11 different estab- lishments shows that the lowest wages are confined to 4 factories, in 1 of which, indeed, 53.3 per cent of the employees received less than $5, while the other 7 factories paid not one single employee of 18 or over so low a wage. The difference between these factories in the kind and the grade of their product can not account for the differences in the wage scale, as both the higher and the lower wage scale prevailed in the factories manufacturing the cheaper fine of confectionery. Similar differences between different establishments were found in the stores and the laundries. In the stores, indeed, the large and presumably prosperous establishments of Boston in many cases paid a lower wage than was paid in some of the small suburban establish- ments, and lower wages than were paid in Brockton or Springfield. Doubtless similar inequalities between different establishments would be found to prevail in other industries. In so far as this is the case, It is evidence that the industry will bear a higher rate of compensa- tion than some employers pay. These latter, whether because of metfacient management or because they are making unusual profits, are doing business at the expense of their employees These inequalities of waees in the same industry are evidence of the fact to which some of the more thoughtful employers testified— that the rate of wages depends to a large degree upon the personal equation of the employers and upon the helplessness of their employees and to a very inexact degree upon the cost of labor in relation t6 the cost of production. MINIMUM-WAGET^GISLATION UNITED STATES. 23 From the foregoing tables it will be seen that a large number of women of 18 years of age and upward are employed at yery low wages; it is indisputable that a great part of them are receiving compensation that is inadeq^uate to meet the necessary cost of living. The commission was further directed to report on the advis- ability of establishing a board or boards to which shall be referred inquiries as to the need and feasibility of fixing minimum rates of wages for women or minors in any industry. To this part of its duties the commission has given considerable attention. Such a system of legislation has been in operation in the State of Victoria, Australia, since, 1896, and in Great Britain since January, 1910. Some form of fixing legal minimum wages is also in operation in the other Australian States and in New ZeSand. The commission, after discussing the need of minimum-wage legislation in Massachusetts with the reasons for and objections to such legislation, concluded by recommending the enactment of a minimum-wage law, for the following reasons: 1. It would promote the general welfare of the State because it would tend to protect the women workers, and particularly the younger women workers, from the economic distress that leads to impau-ed health and inefficiency. 2. It would bring employers to a realization of their pubhc respon- sibilities, and would result in the best adjustment of the interests of the employment and of the women employees. 3. It would furnish to the women employees a means of obtaining the best minimum wages that are consistent with the ongoing of the industry without recourse to strikes or industrial disturbances. It would be the best means of insuring industrial peace, so far as this class of employees is concerned. 4. It would tend to prevent exploitation of helpless women and, so far as they are concerned, to do away with sweating in our indus- tries. 5. It would diminish the parasitic character of some industries and lessen the bvu-den now resting on other employments. 6. It would enable the employers in any occupation to prevent the undercutting of wages by less humane and considerate competi- tors. 7. It would stimulate employers to develop the capacity and effi- ciency of the less competent workers in order that the wages might not be incommensurate with the services rendered. 8. It would accordingly tend to induce employers to keep to- gether their trained workers and to avoid, so far as possible, seasonal fluctuations. 9. It would tend to heal the sense of grievance in employees, who would become in this manner better informed as to the exigencies of their trade, and it would enable them to interpret more intelligently the meaning of the pay roll. 10. It would give the public assurance that these industrial abuses have an effective and available remedy. An investigation which preceded the enactment of the Oregon minimum-wage law, the results of which determined the action of 24 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEATJ OE LABOR STATISTICS. the legislature, was made by the Consumers' League of Oregon and published in January, 1913.' In presenting its report, the survey committee stated as the out- standing principles and facts which formed the basis of the demand for the proposed minimum-wage legislation the loUowmg: (1) Each industry should provide for the livelihood of the work- ers employed in it. An mdustry which does not do so is parasitic The well-being of society demands that wage-earning women shall not be required to subsidize from their earnings the industry in which they are employed. (2) Owing to the lack of organization among women workers and the secrecy with which their wage schedules are guarded, there are absolutely no standards of wages among them. Their wages are determined, for the most part, by the will of the employer without reference to efficiency or length of service on the part of the worker. This condition is radically unjust. (3) The wages paid to women workers in most occupations are miserably inadequate to meet the cost of living at the lowest stand- ards consistent with the maintenance of the health and morals of the workers. Nearly three-fifths of the women employed in indus- tries in Portland receive less than $10 a week, which is the minimum weekly wage that ought to be offered to any self-supporting woman wage earner in this city. (4) The present conditions of labor for women in many industries are shown oy this report to be gravely detrimental to their health; and since most women wage earners are potential mothers, the future health of the race is menaced by these unsanitary conditions. For these reasons your committee believes that the passage of the proposed bUl for an act creating an industrial welfare commission is most important and we strongly recommend that the Consumers' League urgently petition the legislature for its enactment. The purpose of the Consumers' League of Oregon in making its investigation of the wages and working conditions of women, as stated in its report, "was to secure accurate data (1) as to the wages paid in all lines of work to self-supporting women in this State, (2) as to the cost of living in Portland and the smaller towns of the State, with a view to determining whether wage-earning women are receiving a wage that permits them to live so as to preserve their health and their morals, and to save against future needs, (3) as to conditions which would affect the health or morals of the workers." * * * 1. Cards were distributed among women workers, and when filled out were collected by investigators. To reach workers, no distinction was made in estabhshments. A list of different industries employing women was drawn up and every house on the list visited. Over 2,000 cards were distributed; 509 were collected in Portland. Workers were approached at lunch and closing hour and in their homes. * * * ' Eoport of the Social Survey Committee of the Consumers' League of Oregon on the Wages Hours and Conditions of Worli: and Cost and Standai-d of Living of Women Wage Earners in OreECn With Snorial Reference to Portland. Portland, Oreg., January, 1913 opeciai MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 25 2. A second method was to solicit wage schedules from employers and to ask their views on the labor conditions of female employees and their opinion as to the feasibUity of the proposed bill. 3. A third line pm-sued was that of engaemg to work in different establishments, in order to obtain first-hand information as to con- ditions and to corroborate both employers' and employees' reports. The investigators worked as employees in 12 factories. 4. A fom-th Une pursued was that (a) of visiting boarding and room- ing houses and private families who advertised room and board, in allsections of the city, to discover the actual cost of food and lodging; (6) of visiting department stores for the lowest and average prices on articles of wear; (c) the director of the investigation went to southern, western, and eastern sections of the State, visiting in aU 14 towns, organizing subcommittees to gather wage statistics and collecting in- formation herself on wages, conditions of labor, and cost of living. The result is that information has been gained about 39 occupations employing women, and 8,736 women workers, 7,603 of these being in Portland, 1,133 outside. The report shows in Portland the weekly wages of 3,217 women employees in various occupations. These are briefly summarized in the following table. It should be noted that in some of the occupa- tions the number of employees for whom wages are reported was somewhat small for use in a generalization. PER CENT or WOMEN WHOSE WEEKLY WAGES WERE LESS THAN SPECIFIED AMOUNT— PORTLAND, GREG. Industry or occupatioD Number whose eammgs were reported. Per c«nt whose weekly wages were- Under SS. Under $6. Under Under $7. $8. {Sand over. Department stores Factories Hotels and restaurants Laundries Office help (not including stenographers). Stenographers Printmg trades Telephone operators Miscellaneous Total 2,078 427 213 140 126 85 67 52 2.5 7.3 6.6 13.6 .5 2.4 1.2 5.1 16.1 13.1 3.8 20.7 10.3 2.4 19,3 17.3 6.1 6.2 13.8 7.0 14.3 L4 27.1 S.6 5.9 7.0 9.6 7.7 8.4 68.8 51.8 94.4 52.1 81.7 90.6 73.7 73.1 82.1 68.9 Outside of Portland information in regard to wages was collected for 1,133 women wage earners in 26 towns. The data in regard to some of the occupations are, as in the case of Portland, somewhat meager. 26 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEATJ OE LABOB STATISTICS. WAGE INFORMATION FOE 1,133 WOMEN WAGE EABNEKS IN OREGON (OUTSIDE OF PORTLAND). Industry. 1 Number.! Average of em- monthly I ployees. 1 Condensed milk Woolen mills -■- . . Hotels and restaurants Laundries Office help Retail stores Stenographers* Telephone operators - . Total 18 518 45 140 16 22 1,133 $35.00 38.00 37.60 31.65 39.50 35.50 39.21 50.00 33.07 Summarizing its investigation in regard to cost of living in Port- land, the commission concluded that — Ten dollars a week is the very least on which the average self- supporting woman can Uve decently and keep herself in health in Portland. This means a steady income of $520 per year. How this would have to be spent were women in all cases living as they should, is indicated by the following schedule: Room and board, $25 per month ^ $300 Clothing 130 Laundry bills 25 Car fare 30 Doctor billa 15 Lodge and church dues 10 Recreation, including vacation 25 Education and reading 10 Total 545 If we were to omit the sum allowed for recreation, $25 a year, we would bring the actual cost to $520 a year, or $10 a week, for bare necessities. That a legitimate amount of recreation is a necessity to maintain the efficiency of a worker is a theory that some persons insist upon, but which others refuse to admit. The material in regard to cost of living outside of Portland is based on data secured from 101 young women in the State at large. It showed an average cost of living of $9.82 a week, or $42.55 a month. The details are shown in the following statement: Average amount spent annually by 101 womep, wage earners in miscellaneous occupations in Oregon (outside Portland). Information obtained from Ashland, Baher, Eugene, Forest Grove, La Grande, Medford, Oregon City, Pendleton, Salem, and Vale: Room and board $278. 62 Clothing 137. 50. Laundry 16. 00 Car fare 21 00 Doctor and dentiat \[\ 18 00 Church and lodge. . . . 12 52 ^^^^'^s ;:::;::::;;;::;:::::;;::;:::::; 6:54 Recreation 20 50 ^°^\ 510. 68 $9.82 a week; $42.55 a month. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 27 NEW YORK. The most extensive investigation which has been made in this comitry, with a definite purpose of studying the wages of women and inquiring into the advisabUity of providing a means for fixing mini- mum rates by law, has recently been completed by the New York State Factory Investigating Commission. The concluding part of the report is still in press and is not yet available, but a paper by Dr. Howard B. Woolston, director of the investigation, briefly sums up the results.^ The scope of the New York investigation is defined as follows : First. What wages are actually paid in typical industries through- out the State ? Second. Are these wa^es sufficient to maintain employees in simple decency and working efficiency ? Third. Are the industries able to increase wages upon the basis of the earning capacity of labor ? The investigations of the commission were limited to confectionery, paper-box ^^ and shirt factories, and retail stores. In these four branches of industry women and children were found to constitute from 60 to 75 per cent of the working force. Information concerning rates of pay and actual earnings, taken directly from pay rolls, was tabulated for nearly 105,000 wage earners from 29 prmcipal trade centers in New York State. These numbers included from two- thirds to three-fourths of all employees in the industries in question. Of over 90,000 persons for whom weekly rates of pay were tabulated, more than three-fifths of the males received less than $15 when working full time, and more than three-fourths of the women and girls less than $10 a week. In the stores half the males received less than $14 and half the females less than $7.50. In shirt and paper-box fac- tories half the males received less than $12 and half the females less than $6.50 a week, while in the candy factories wages fell below $1 1 for half the males and below $6 for half the females. More than 7,000 female employees in the fom- industries (one-sixth of the total number of women and girls) were working at rates under $5 per week. As in other investigations of this character, the different rates paid in factories in the same locahty for identical work are strikingly shown. One wholesale candy factory in Manhattan is mentioned, where no male laborer and no female hand-dipper was paid as much as $8 a week, and no female packer as much as $5.50. In another establishment of the same class, in the same borough, every male laborer received $8 a week or over and more than half the female dippers and packers exceeded the rates given in the former plant. 1 Wages in New York. The Survey, Feb. 6, 1915, pp. 505-611. ' Third report of the Factory Investigating Commission (1914) gives the results of the investigation o£ the confectionery and paper-box industries. 28 BULLETIN OF THE BXJEBATJ OE LABOR STATISTICS. One large department store in Manhattan paid 86 per cent of its saleswomen $10 a week or more; another paid 86 per cent of its sales- women less than $10 a week. Apparently no weU-estabhshed stand- ard of wages existed in these trades. The pay is fixed by mdividual bargain and labor is worth as much as the employer agrees to pay. The New York commission as a part of its investigation attempted to ascertain the addition to manufacturmg cost or selling price which would result from a minimum-wage law with rates, of pay fixed according to the necessary cost of living. As the result of this inquiry, It was estunated that by selling for $1 articles marked 98 cents or 99 cents, the total increase in wages in the department stores would be covered without causing displacement of workers, decreasing profits, or improving methods of business. This slight addition to prices would secure an average weekly increase of $1.38 to 4,000 girls and $2.38 to 13,000 women (29 and 36 per cent above their respective average earnings). In order to raise the wages of over 2,000 young women in New York candy factories from an average of $5.75 to a minimum of $8 a week, an additional charge of 18 cents a hundred pounds is all that would be necessary; in other words, by raising the price of candy less than 2 mills a pound, the weekly pay of three-fourths of the women could be raised nearly 40 per cent.' Summing up the results of the investigation of the New York commission in regard to wages in New York, Dr. Woolston says : The results of the investigation have proved conclusively that half the workers in low-skilled lines do not receive sufficient wages to sustain themselves independently nor to support their families properly. Although the earning capacity of most workers is rela- tively high, the large numbers of young women who live at home and the constant influx of immigrants with low standards of comfort depress the rates of wages. Moreover, irregular employment entails great loss of earnings and promotion is generally slow and uncertain even for steady workers with years of experience. The rates fixed by many establishments are not based upon a con- sideration of the needs or efficiency of the workers, nor upon the capacity of the business to pay more, but upon the judgment of an individual manager and the custom in the trade. Because of their youth, their inexperience, and their timidity, most workers can not individually secure advancement; because of lack of organization they can not obtain trade agreements upon wages. Meanwhile this situation of a great multitude of underpaid working people has a direct bearing upon the growth of poverty, vice, and degeneracy throughout the community. If employer and employee will not unite to remedy conditions, the State must act in order to secure public welfare. 1 This estimate in regard to wages in candy factories is from a statement of Dr. Woolston in the American Economic Review, March, 1915, p. 282. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 29 Based upon these investigations and its study of the effect of minimum-wage legislation already existing, the New York commission submitted to the New York Legislature, with its recommendations, a bill providing for the establishment of a minimum-wage commission, modeled upon the Massachusetts act, with enforcement by publication of the names of employers paying less than the minimum rate fixed. The text of this bill is given at the end of this Bulletia.' 1 Much similar information in regard to the wages and conditions of wage-earning women is given in the various reports on recent investigations devoted to the subiect. Some of these reports are the following: Connecticut. Eeport of the Special Commission to Investigate the Conditions of Wage-Earning Women and Minors in the State, 1913. Report of the Bureau of Labor on Conditions of Wage-Earning Women and Girls, 1914. Kentucky. Report of the Commission to Investigate the Conditions of Working Women in Kentucky, 1911. Michigan. Special Investigation of Working Conditions of Women and Girls (inSOth Armual Report of Depart- ment of Labor, 1912-19131. Missouri. Report of the Senate Wage Commission for Women and Children in the State of MiSvSOuri to the Senate of the 48th General Assembly of Missouri, January, 1915. Report on the Wage-Earning Women of Kansas City, published by the Board of PubUc Welfare Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1912-1913. There is also much informatioa in regard to the wages of working women in many of the recent Bulletins of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, especially those in the Women in Industry Series and in the Wages and Hours of Labor Series. LEGISLATION IN FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES. With the purpose of correcting the conditions in the various States, as indicated by the investigations just referred to and by a number of similar studies, minimum-wage legislation has been enacted in nine States. The laws enacted in these nine States are of three distinct types: (1) Where the specific minimum wage is fixed by the legislature and embodied in the statute, as in Utah. (2) Where the minimum wage is fixed by the administrative authority, the minimum wage commission, upon the investigations and recommendations of advisory wage boards made up of repre- sentatives of employers, employees, and the public, and where the only power of enforcement is such as results from the power of the commission to publish the names of those employers paying less than the minimum rate. States having laws of this type are Massachu- setts and Nebraska. (3) Where the minimum wage is determined as in Massachusetts and Nebraska, as above described, but where the commission is given powers of enforcement, and a penalty of fiine or imprisonment or both is provided for in case of violation of the law by payment of rates less than the minimum fixed. States having laws of this class are California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. The laws of the various States have also numerous other differences, most of them of less importance, which may best be seen in the com- parative analysis given below. The California act, it should be pointed out, is in a somewhat different position from any of the other laws so far as its legal validity is concerned, from the fact that in November, 1914, a constitutional amendment was adopted granting specific authority to the legislature to place the fixing of wage rates for women and minors in the hands of a commission, thus removing the subject from the field of legal controversy. Ohio, it should be noted, in 1912 adopted a constitutional amend- ment authorizing the legislature to estabhsh a minimum wage, the authorization in this case extending to men as well as to women and children. The words of the Ohio amendment are as follows: "Laws may be passed fixing and regulating the hours of labor, estabhshing a minimum wage, and providing for the health, safety, and general welfare of all employees, and no provision of the consti- tution shall impair or limit this power." 30 MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 31 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS. LAWS IN FORCE. California: Acta of 1913, chapter 324 (May 26, 1913), in effect August 10, 1913. No wage determination yet made. Colorado: Acts of 1913, chapter 110 (May 14, 1913). No determination yet made. Massachusetts: Acts of 1912, chapter 706 (June 4, 1912), in effect July 1, 1913. Acts of 1913, chapters 330 (Mar. 21, 1913) and 673 (May 19, 1913), in effect Mar. 21, and July 1, 1913. First wage determination in effect August 15, 1914. Minnesota: Acta of 1913, chapter 547 (Apr. 26, 1913), in effect June 26, 1913. Wage orders issued in October, 1914, suspended by injunction. Nebraska: Acts of 1913, chapter 211 (Apr. 21, 1913), in effect July 17, 1913. No wage determination yet made. Oregon: Acts of 1913, chapter 62 (Feb. 17, 1913), in effect June 2, 1913. First wage determination in effect October 4, 1913. Utah: Acts of 1913, chapter 63 (Mar. 18, 1913). Wage rates in effect with the law. Washington: Acts of 1913, chapter 174 (Mar. 24, 1913), in effect June 13, 1913. First wage determination in effect June 27, 1914. Wisconsin: Acts of 1913, chapter 712 (July 31, 1913), in effect August 1, 1913. No wage determination yet made. INDUSTRIES COVERED. California: All occupations, trades, and industries in which the wages paid to women and minors are inadequate or the hours or conditions of labor prejudicial to health, morals or welfare. Colorado: All mercantile, manufacturing, laundry, hotel, restaurant, telephone, or telegraph businesses in which the wages paid to female or minor employees are inadequate. Massachusetts: All occupations in which the wages paid to a substantial number of female employees are inadequate, or in which the majority of employees are minors. Minnesota: All occupations in which the wages paid to one-sixth or more of the women or minor employees are less than a living wage. Nebraska: All occupations in which the wages paid to a substantial number of female employees are inadequate. Oregon: All occupations in which, for any substantial number of women workers, the hoiirs are unreasonable, or conditions detrimental, or wages inadequate, and all occupations in which minors are employed. Utah: All regular employers of female workers. Washington: All occupations, trades, or industries in which the wages of female employees are inadequate or the conditions of work prejudicial to health and morals, and all occupations in which minors are employed. Wisconsin: All occupations in which the wages paid to any female or minpr employee are not a living wage. EMPLOYEES TO WHOM MINIMUM WAGE MAY BE MADE APPLICABLE. California: Women, and minors under 18 years of age. Colorado: Female employees over 18 years of age, and minors under 18. Massachusetts: Female employees, and minors under 18 years of age. Minnesota: Women, and minors (males under 21 years of age and females under 18). Nebraska: Female employees, and minors under 18 years of age. Oregon: Women, and minors under 18 years of age. Utah: Females only. Washington: Women, and minors under 18 years of age. Wisconsin: Females, and minors (under 21 years of age). 32 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. BASIS TO BE USED IN FIXING MINIMUM RATES OF WAGES. CaUfornia: A wage adequate to supply to such women and minors the necessary cost of proper living and to maintain their health and welfare. Colorado: A wage suitable for female employees over 18 years of age, and also a wage suitable for minors under 18, taking into consideration the cost of living, the financial condition of the business, and the probable effect thereon of any increase in the minimum wage. Massachusetts: A wage suitable for a female employee of ordinary ability, and wages suitable for learners and apprentices, and for minors under 18 years, taking into consideration the needs of the employees, the financial condition of the occupation, and the probable effect thereon of any increase in the minimum wage. Minnesota: Wages suflicient for living wages for women and minors of ordinary ability, also minimum wages suflScient for living wages for learners and apprentices. Nebraska: A wage suitable for a female employee of ordinary ability, and wages suitable for learners and apprentices, and for minors under 18 years, taking into consideration the needs of the employees, the financial condition of the occupation, and the probable effect thereon of any increase in the minimum wage. Oregon: A rate adequate to supply the necessary cost of living to women workers of average ordinary ability and maintain them in health. Suitable wages for learners and apprentices. Suitable wages for minors. Utah: Rates are specified in law. Washington: A wage adequate in the occupation or industry to supply women over 18 years of age the necessary cost of living and maintain them in health. Wages suitable for minors in any occupation. Wisconsin: A living wage, that is, a wage sufficient to enable the female or minor employee receiving it to maintain himself or herself under conditions consistent with his or her welfare. PROVISION OF LAW IN REGARD TO FIXING RATES BELOW THE STANDARD MINIMUM OR ISSUING LICENSES FOR DEFECTIVES. California: No provision for special rates for minors or learners. Special license to women only if physically defective by age or otherwise, renewable semiannually. Colorado: Separate minimum rate for minors under 18. Special license for any female over 18, physically defective. Massachusetts: Separate minimum for minors under 18 and for learners and appren- tices. Special license for women physically defective. Minnesota: Separate minimum for learners and apprentices. Special license for women phyisically defective, but the number of such licensed persons shall not exceed one-tenth of the whole number of workers in any establishment. Nebraska: Separate minimum tor minors under 18 and for learners and apprentices. Special license for women physically defective. Oregon: Separate minimum for minors and for learners and apprentices. Special license for women physically defective or crippled by age or otherwise. Utah: Rate for minors and for learners and apprentices specified in law. No provision for defectives. Washington: Separate minimum forminors. Special license for apprentices, forporiod to be specified. Special license for women physically defective or crippled by age or otherwise. Wisconsin: Minors in an occupation which is a "trade industry" must be indentured. Special license commensurate with ability for women or minors unable to earn the living wage. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 33 COMPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND ADVISORY BODIES WHICH FIX MINIMUM WAGES. California: Administrative authority. — Industrial welfare commission, five members, at least one to be a woman. Advisory board. — ^Wage board, equal number of representatives of employers and of employees in occupation, trade, or industry in question, w ith a member of the commission as chairman. Colorado: Administrative authority. — State wage board, three persons, one a representative of labor, one an employer, at least one to be a woman. No advisory wage board. Massachusetts: Administrative authority. — Minimum wage commission, three persons, one of whom may be a woman. Advisory board. — Wage board, not less than six representatives of employers, an equal number of representatives of female employees in the occupation, and one or more disinterested persons representative of the public; the representatives of the public not to exceed one-half of the number of representatives of either of the other parties. One of the representatives of the public shall be named as chairman. Minnesota: Administrative authority. — ^Minimum wage commission, three persons, commis- sioner of labor, one an employer of women, and one a woman, who shall act as secretary. Advisory board. — Not less than 3 nor more than 10 representatives of employers, and an equal number of representatives of workers in the occupation, and one or more disinterested persons to represent the public, not to exceed the number of representatives of either of the other parties. One-fifth of members shall be women, and at least one of the representatives of the public shall be a woman. Nebraska: Administrative authority. — Minimum wage commission, four persons, the governor, deputy commissioner of labor, a member of the political science department of the University of Nebraska, and one citizen of the State. At least one member shall be a woman. Advisory board. — Wage board, not less than three representatives of employers and an equal number of representatives of female employees in the occupation, and three representatives of the public. The chairman of the commission shall be chairman of the wage board and the secretary of the co m mission its secretary., Oregon: Administrative authority.— Induetiial welfare commission, three persons, so far as practicable one representative of the interests of the employing class, one repre- sentative of the interests of the employed class, and one who will be fair and impartial between employers and employees and work for the best interests of the public. Advisory 6oard.— Conference, not more than three representatives of employers, anequalnumberof representatives of employees in the occupation, and not more than three disinterested representatives of the public, and one or more commis- sioners. The chairman shall be named by the commission. Utah: Administrative authority.— CommiBEiOTier of immigration, labor, and statistics. Advisory board. — None. 82843°— Bull. 167—15 3 34 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Washington: Administrative autAont;/.— Industrial welfare commission, five persons, _ commis- sioner of labor and four persons, no one of whom has at any time within five years been a member of any manufacturers' or employers' asBociation or of any labor union. Advisory ftoarrf.— Conference, an equal number of representatives of employers and employees in the occupation and one or more representatives of the public, not exceeding the number of representatives of either of the other parties. A member of the commission shall be chairman. Wisconsin: Administrat'ive authority. — Industrial commission, three persons., Advisory wage board. — Selected so as fairly to represent employers, employees, and the public. PROCEDURE IN FEONG MINIMUM WAGE. California: 1. The commission shall investigate and ascertain the wages paid and the hours and conditions of labor and employment in the various occupations, trades, and industries in which women and minors are employed, with special reference to the comfort, health, safety, and welfare of such employees. 2. The commission may call a conference or wage board if, after investigation, it is of the opinion that in any occupation, trade, or industry the wages paid to women and minors are inadequate to supply the cost of proper living, or the hours and conditions of labor are prejudicial to the health, morals, or welfare of the workers. 3. The wage board shall report to the commission its findings for the occupation, trade, or industry in question, including an estimate of the minimum wage adequate to supply to women and minors the necessary cost of proper living and to maintain the health and welfare of such employees, the number of hours of work per day consistent with the health and welfare of such women and minors, and the standard conditions of labor demanded by the health and welfare of such women and minors. 4. The commission, upon its own motion or upon petition, shall hold a public hearing, after public advertisement giving at least 14 days' notice, upon the minimum wage, the maximum hours of work, and the standard conditions of labor for women and minors. 5. The commission may, after such public hearing, in its discretion, make a man- datory order, to be effective after 60 days, specifying the minimum wage, the maximum hours, and the standard conditions of labor for women and minora in the occupation in question. The labor commissioner shall mail, so far as practicable, a copy of the order to all employers in the occupation in question. 6. The commission may, upon its own motion or upon petition, after a public hearing held after due notice, rescind, alter, or amend any prior order. 7. Upon appeal to the court, the determination of the commission may be set aside only upon the ground that the commission acted without or in excess of its powers, or that the determination was procured by fraud. Colorado: 1. The State wage board shall investigate the wages paid to female employees above the age of 18 years, and minor employees under 18 years of age, if it has reason to believe the wages paid any such employees are inadequate to supply the necessary cost of livmg, maintain them in health, and supply the necessary comforts of Ufe. It shall also investigate the cost of living and take into consideration the financial condition of the business in question and the probable effect thereon of any increase in the minimum wage. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 35 Colorado — Concluded . 2. The wage board shall fix the minimum wage suitable for the female employees over 18 years of age in such business or ia any or all of the branches thereof, and also a suitable minimum wage for minors under 18 years of age employed in the same busiaess. 3. The wage board shall give public notice by advertisement of the minimum- wage determiaation and of a public hearing thereon, to be held in 30 days. Notice shall also be mailed to employers in the business affected. 4. The wage board, after such public hearing or after 30 days if no public hearing is demanded, shall issue an obligatory order, effective after 60 days, speci- fying the minimum wages for women and minors, or both, in the occupation affected. The order shall be published in a newspaper in the county or counties in which the business affected is located, and a copy of the order shall be mailed to all employers in the business affected. Massachusetts: 1. The commission shall investigate the wages paid to female employees in any occupation, if it has reason to believe that the wages paid to a substantial number of such employees are inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living and maintain the worker in health. 2. The commission shaU establish a wage board if, after an investigation, it is of the opinion that in the occupation in question the wages paid to a sub- stantial number of female employees are inadequate to supply the neces- sary cost of living and to maintain the worker in health. 3. The wage board shall endeavor to determine the minimum wage suitable for female employees, and also for learners and apprentices, and for minors under 18 years of age. 4. The wage board shall report its minimum-wage determination to the commis- sion with the reasons therefor and the facta relating thereto. 5. The commission shall review the report of the wage board and may approve, disapprove, or recommit the determinations. 6. The commission shall give a public hearing to employers paying less than the minimum wage approved, after notice of not less than 14 days, if it approves any or all of the determinations of the wage board. 7. The commission shall enter a decree of its findings and note the names of em- ployers not accepting the minimum, if it, after public hearing, finally ap- proves the determinations. 8. The commission shall publish in one newspaper in each county a summary of its findings and recommendations. 9. The commission shall publish the facts as to acceptance of its recommenda/- tions and may publish names of employers following or refusing to follow its recommendations. 10. Upon appeal to the court and court review, if the court finds that in the case of an employer compliance with the minimum-wage decree would render it impossible for hinn to conduct his business at a reasonable profit, it may issue an order restraining the commission from publishing the name of the complainant as one who refuses to comply with the recommendations of the commission. Minnesota: 1. The commission at its discretion may investigate, and at the request of 100 employees shall investigate forthwith, the wages paid to women and minors. Action of the commissicm mandatory under certain circumstances. 2. The commission shall forthwith proceed to establish minimum rates if, after investigation of any occupation, it is of the opinion that the wages paid to one-sixth or more of the women and minors are less than Living wages (suffi- cient to maintain the worker in health and supply him with the necessary comforts and conditions of reasonable life). 36 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Minnesota — (concluded. . . 3. The commission shall determine the minimum wages sufficient for living wages for women and minora and for learners and apprentices. 4. The commission shall issue an order, effective after 30 days, making the wages determined the minimum wages. . . 5. A copy of the order shall be mailed to each employer affected and the original filed with the commissioner of labor. Action of the commission discretionary. 2. The commission, may at its discretion establish an advisory board in any occupation. 3. The advisory board shall recommend to the commiasion an estimate of the minimum wages sufficient for living wages for women and minors of ordinary ability, and an estimate 6i the minimum wages sufficient for living wages for learners and apprentices. 4. The commission shall review these estimates', and if it approves them shall issue an order, effective after 30 days, making the wages determined the mini- mum wages. 5. A copy of the commission's order shall be mailed, so fax aa practicable, to all employers affected, and the original filed with the commissioner of labor. 6. The commission must, at the request of approximately one-fourth of the em- ployers or employees in an occupation, reconsider the rate established. The commission may also reconsider rates on its own initiative. Nebraska: 1. The commission shall investigate the wages paid to female employees in any occupation, if it has reason to believe wages paid to a substantial number of such employees are inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living and to maintain the worker in health. 2. The commission shall establish a wage board if, after investigation, it is of the opinion that in the occupation in question the wages paid to a substan- tial number of female employees are inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living and to maintain the worker in health. 3. The wage board shall endeavor to determine the minimum wage suitable for female employees, and also for learners and apprentices, and for minora under 18 years of age. 4. The wage board shall report its minimum-wage determination to the commis- sion with the reasons therefor and the facts relating thereto. 5. The commission shall review the report of the wage board and report its re- view to the governor. 6. The commission shall give a public hearing to employers paying less than the minimum wage approved, after 30 days' notice, if it approves any or all of the determinations of the wage board. 7. The commission shall enter a decree of its findings and note the names of employers not accepting the minimum wage, if after public hearing it finally approves the determination. 8. The commission shall publish in one newspaper in each county, within 30 days, a summary of its findings, with the names of employers not acceptii^ the minimum wage and the minimum wages paid by such employers. 9. The commission may, on petition of employers or employees, reconvene a wage board or establish a new one. 10. Upon appeal to the court and court review, if the court finds that in the case of an employer compliance with the minimum-wage decree would be likely to endanger the prosperity of the business to which it is applicable, an order shall issue from the court revoking the decree. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION XTNITED STATES. 37 Oregon: 1. The commission shall investigate and ascertain the wages, hours of labor, and conditions of labor of women and minors. 2. The commission shall convene a conference' on the subject investigated, if aft€r investigation it is of the opinion that any substantial number of women workers in any occupation are working for unreasonably long hours or are working under surroundings or conditions detrimental to their health or morals or are receiving wages inadequate to supply them with the neces- sary cost of living and maintain them in health. 3. The conference shall consider and inquire into and report on the subject sub- mitted to it by the commission; the commission shall present to the confer- ence all information and evidence in its possession or under its control which relates to the subject and any witnesses whose testimony it deems material. 4. The conference shall make recommendations to the commission concerning the occupation under inquiry on: (a) Standards of hours of employment for women workers and what are unreasonably long hours of employment for women workers; (6) standards of conditions of labor for women workers and what surroundii^s or conditions — sanitary or otherwise — are detrimental to the health or morals of women workers; (c) standards of minimum wages for women workers and what wages are inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living to women workers and maintain them in health; also, when it appears proper or necessary, suitable minimum wages for learners and apprentices and the maximum length of time any woman worker may be kept at such wages as a learner or apprentice, which wages shall be less than the regular minimum wages for the regular women workers in the occupation. 5. The commission shall consider and review the recommendations of the con- ference and may approve or disapprove any or all of them and may resubmit any of the subjects to the same or to a new conference. 6. The commission shall hold a public hearing concerning any of the recom- mendations which it approves, after notice published not less than once a week for four successive weeks in not less than two newspapers. 7. The commission shall issue an order, effective after 60 days, to give effect to the recommendations, to be mailed, so far as practicable, to all employers affected. Washington: 1. The commission shaU ascertain the wages and conditions of labor of women and minors. 2. The commission shall caU a conference,' if, after investigation, it finds that in any occupation, trade, or industry, the wages paid female employees are inadequate to supply them necessary cost of living and to maintain the workers in health or that the conditions of labor are prejudicial to the health or morals of the workers. 3. The conference shall consider and recommend to the commission the mini- mum wage adequate in the occupation or industry in question to supply the necessary cost of living, and maintain the workers in health and the standards of conditions of labor demanded for the health and morals of the employees. 4. The commission shall review the recommendations of the conference and may approve or disapprove any or aU of them and may resubmit any of the sub- jects to the same or to a new conference. 1 Same as a wage board in otlier States. 38 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAXJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. Washingfton — Concluded. 5. The commiBsion, after approval, shall issue an obligatory order, effective alter 60 days, or, if circumstances are unusual, after a longer period, specifying the minimum wage and the standard conditions of labor. The co mmis sion shall mail, so far as is practicable, a copy of its order to all employers affected. When the minimum wage is fixed, it shall not be changed for one year. 6. Appeal may be made to court, but on questions of law only. Wisconsin: 1. The commission may, upon its own initiative, and shall upon complaint, inves- tigate and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the wages paid to any female or minor employee is not a living wage (sufficient to enable the employee receiving it to maintain himself or herself under conditions consistent with his or her welfare). 2. The commission shall appoint an advisory wage board to assist in its investi- gations and determinations if, upon investigation, it finds reasonable cause to believe that the wages paid to any female or minor employee are not a living wage. 3. The commission, with the assistance of the advisory wage board, shall investi- gate and determine the minimum living wage for all female and minor employees within the same class, as established by the classification of the commission. ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW. California: Upon complaint of underpayment of any person, the commission shall investi- gate and take proceedings to enforce payment. Underpayment a misdemeanor, punishable by fine of not less than $50, or by imprisoimient of not less than 30 days, or by both fine and imprisonment. Underpaid employee may recover unpaid balance. Colorado: Justices of the peace to have jurisdiction in case of violation of act. Violation of act or orders a misdemeanor, piinishable by fine not to exceed $100, or imprisonment not to exceed 3 months, or by both fine and imprisonment. Underpaid employee may recover balance due. Massachusetts: Commission to determine whether employers obey decrees. Names of underpaying employers to be published in newspapers. Minnesota: Commission to enforce provisions of act. Violation of act or orders a misdemeanor, punishable by fine of from $10 to $50, or by imprisonment of from 10 to 60 days. Underpaid employee may recover. Nebraska: Commission to determine whether employers obey decrees. Names of underpaying employers to be published in newspapers. Oregon: Commissioner of the bureau of labor statistics to enforce rulings.' Viola- tion of orders punishable by fine of from $25 to $100, or by imprisonment of from 10 days to 3 months, or by both fine and imprisonment. Underpaid, employee may recover. Utah: Commissioner of immigration, labor, and statistics to enforce act. Underpay- ment a misdemeanor. Washington: Commission to investigate complaint and take proceedings. Violation of order or act a misdemeanor, punishable by fine of $25 to $100. Underpaid employee may recover. Wisconsin: Commission to investigate complaints and take proceedings. Violation of act or order punishable by a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $100. ' See page 66. OPERATION OF AMERICAN MINIMUM- WAGE LAWS. As has already been noted, the period since any of the minimum- wage determinations came into force is too brief to permit, at the present time, the formation of any judgment as to the ultimate effect of the laws, either upon the industry or upon employment therein. The immediate result of wage determinations is not necessarily indic- ative of what the later effect may be. It is likely that employers, when they find themselves compelled to increase the wages of. the lowest-paid workers, wiU endeavor to provide for some system of training which wiU result in an increase of efficiency sufficient to balance the increased rates of pay. In other ways it is probable that the industries and the employees will find means to adapt themselves to the conditions created by the new requirements of the laws. While the brief period during which any minimum-wage determi- nations have been in effect thus limits the value of the conclusions which may be drawn from a study of the operation of the laws, yet the great benefit expected in the case of the worker, on the one hand, and the serious disturbance to the industry which was predicted, on the other hand, warrants a careful study of any material which will throw light on the real effects, however far such material may fall short of covering the whole subject. It has seemed desirable, there- fore, to present rather fully whatever information is available showing the operations of any of the American minimum-wage laws. It should be pointed out that the most of this material is taken from the official reports, and that such conclusions as are stated are the conclusions of the authority charged with the administration of the law. CALIFORNIA. The minimum-wage law in California is administered by the indus- trial weffare commission. While the commission was organized in October, 1913, the work of investigating was not begun until the end of February, 1914. Since its organization the commission has been actively engaged in making investigations as a preliminary step to the appointment of wage boards and the fixing of minimum-wage rates. The commis- sion reports that its investigations have been considerably hampered and delayed by the pubhc interest in and the discussion of a constitu- tional amendment proposed by a resolution of the State legislature of 1913, to be submitted to a vote of the people on November 3, 1914. As there was some active opposition to the passage of the amend- ment, the iavestigations of the commission were in consequence 39 40 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAX7 OE LABOR STATISTICS. delayed until after the results of the election could be known. The amendment was carried by a majority of over 84,000 votes. It is as follows : Section 17J. The legislature may, by appropriate legislation, provide for the estab- lishment of a minimum wage for women and minors and may provide for the comfort, health, safety, and general welfare of any and all employees. No provision of this con- stitution shall be construed as a limitation upon the authority of the legislature to confer upon any commission now or hereafter created such power and authority as the legislature taay deem requisite to carry out the provisions of this section. COLORADO. Although the Colorado act came into effect August 12, 1913, the board was not appointed until March 23, 1914. Then, through delay in securing a permanent executive officer, the board did not begin the study of local wage conditions until August 1, 1914. Data secured after that date forms the basis of the First Report of the State Wage Board of Colorado, for the biennial period ending Novem- ber 30, 1914. Because of this delay in taking up its work, the board notes the fact that the data presented are somewhat fragmentary and incomplete. The board's report shows that it has secured wage data from employers of women in department stores, 5, 10, and 15 cent stores, bakeries, binderies, factories, and laundries. Such data were par- tially checked by statements from the women themselves. The results showed that of the 3,524 employees included, 23 per cent received less than $6 per week, and 54 per cent less than $8. Data were also secured in regard to telephone operatives. The board made no extensive investigations of cost of living, but reports that such facts as it has been able to secure lead to the conclusion that . "the cost of living in Denver is no less than in any other cities where, after extensive investigation, it has been found that no woman can secure the necessities of decent living for less than $8 a week." In regard to certain changes desirable in the law, the report of the board contains the following recommendation : From our experience it is evident that additional legislation is required in order to make efficient the present statute, limiting and denning more clearly the powers and duties of the board. In the fixing of a minimum wage m a particular industry or group of indus- tries, adequate provision should be made for those who really know most about the case to be represented on the determining body. In other words, the wage board should be given power to call together a voluntary subordinate committee. If, for example, the laundry business is under consideration, this subordinate conmiittee should be made to represent men in the laundry business and people employed in laundries — those who best know the needs of their particular occu- {)ation — and, besides these, a certain number from the pubhc at arge. This committee should be authorized to report its findings to the wage board, which is bound to take them into consideration in fixing the minimum wage. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 41 MASSACHUSETTS. The nununum-wage law in Massachusetts came into effect July 1, 1913. The report of the commission upon the first six months of its work* stated that investigations had been made into the wages of women employees in three industries, the brush-making industry,^ the corset industry,' and the confectionery industry,^ and had been begim in other industries. These industries were chosen on account of the large proportion of women workers among the employees and the low wages indicated by information obtained. In the brush and corset industries the study was extended to include every establish- ment within the State employing women. Later the commission took up the investigation of the wages of women in laundries,' and is now engaged upon a study of the wages of women employed in department and other retail stores. Throughout these investigations substantially the same method has been followed. In the investigation of women in department and other retail stores, which is now being carried on, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Commission on Industrial Relations are cooperating with the minimum wage commission in a study of the amount and causes of unemployment or lost time in the same stores and among the same employees as are the subject of study by the muiimum wage commission. The method of the commission provided for securing the fullest possible information in regard to earnings as well as rates of wages. Transcripts of the pay rolls for the preceding 52 weeks for all female employees were taken, and for a large number personal data regarding age, birthplace, family and Hving conditions were also obtained. In addition a study was made of the processes in which women were engaged. The commission reported that its investigation showed that a considerable number of women workers were receiving wages inadequate to supply them with the necessaries of life. Almost ex- actly two-thirds of the brush workers for whom records were available received an average wage of less than $6 per week. A smaller propor- tion of corset workers, 35.5 per cent, received less than $6 a week. The commission was somewhat hampered by the defective records of employers, especially those in regard to time. Certain manufac- turers made the statement that "Not only do a large number of employees work for only part time, but also that failure to work for full time is due not to lack of work in the factory but to choice on the part of the workers." An amendment to the law, requiring the 1 First Annual Report of the Minimum Wage Commission of Massachusetts for the six months ending Dec. 31, 1913. Boston, 1914. s Minimum Wage Commission Bulletin No. 1, January, 1914. Wages of Women In the Brush Factories In Massachusetts. • Ibid., No. 2, January, 1914. Wages of Women in the Corset Factories in Massachusetts. * Ibid., No. 4, October , 1914. Wages of Women in the Candy Factories in Massachusetts. 5 Ibid., No. 5, October, 1914. Wages of Women in the Laundries in Massachusetts. 42 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. keeping of time books, is expected to lessen the di£Biculties of the commission. The conclusions of the commission upon its study of the brush- making industry have been summarized as follows in one of its reports : ^ 1. The industry is a small one. It is apparently not growing in Massachusetts. According to the Thirteenth Census 8,258 persons were engaged in brush making in the United States. Of these, only 1,810 persons were employed in Massachusetts, which, however, is exceeded only by New York in number of persons employed, capital invested, and value of output. It is a business of rather small estab- lishments, although three of the Massachusetts plants are consid- erably larger than most of their competitors in this country or abroad. Most of the Massachusetts workers are women. Elsewhere appar- ently the percentage of men is higher. New York, Ohio, Pennsylva- nia, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Illinois appear to be the chief American competitors of Massachusetts, and there is some competition from abroad, especially in low-grade brushes. Tariff protection has been somewhat reduced. The processes are rather numerous, and those in which women are employed require dexterity rather than strength. They are varied and are fully described in the bulletins referred to. Much of the work is monotonous rather than difficult. Machines are used to a rather limited extent, and machine operators recjuire a period of from three ihonths to a year before at- taining maximum skUl. For a few weeks learners represent no profit, and, in a few cases, loss. Subcontracting exists in some factories. 2. Wages are low everywhere. There is reason to suspect that this fact is a handicap to the industry. It adds to the difficulty of procuring a regular supply of efficient labor, and, in emphasizing the possibiMty of depending for profit upon low labor costs, lessens the incentive to the adoption of the most efficient business methods for reducing the cost of production. Such general tendencies of low wages are probably accentuated in an industry like brush making which "but recently graduated from the household and remains largely a handicraft." 3. Wages in Massachusetts are so low that a large majority of the female employees earn less than the guarded definition of a proper wage suggested by the statute. Two-thirds of the whole number of women employed earn less than $6 a week. The commission is aware that such a statement is not the whole story. To form an intelligent judgment one must know how many hours were worked to produce the earnings in question, and, in the many cases where the time is less than a fuu week, why no more hours were worked. It is frequently said by employers in this and other industries that rates are adequate to produce more than a mere Uving wage, with a suggestion that the meager earnings of the many are due to the choice of the workers themselves. But when one considers how desper- ately many of these young women need money, the fact that so over- whelming a majority do not earn what by any reasonable computa- 1 Minimum Wage Commission Bulletin No. 3, August 15, 1914. Statement and Decree Concerning the Wages of Women in tlie Brush Industry in Massachusetts. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION— UNITED STATES. 43 tion could be called a living wage makes the explanation seem uncon- vincing. In a few cases the faUacy is obvious. A piece rate is fixed which permits a few exceptional workers to make fairly high earn- ings by the exercise of a degree of skill and apphcation which an ordinary girl can not approach. Looked at from the point of view of the workers, the remedy in these cases is also obvious. In a much larger mmiber of cases the difficulty is found in the fact that the worker does not or can not work the full time. Where the cause of this condition rests with the voluntary action of the girl, not super- induced by some physical or mental condition fairly chargeable to the employment, it may perhaps be disregarded ia an inquiry of this character. Where, however, the part time is chargeable to the in- dustry, either for reasons like those suggested or because under the organization of the industry work can not be supplied to the worker sufficient to keep her employed full time, it is a factor that can not be overlooked by a body charged with the duty of fixing mioimum rates adequate for the purposes named in the statute. The question of short time seems to the commission, perhaps, the greatest single diffi- culty in connection with the wage situation in this and other Massa- chusetts industries. It was the subject of careful consideration by the wage board in reaching its determination, and more wiU be said of it in connection with the conclusions of the commission. 4. The investigation showed marked difference of wages between Massachusetts establishments. As in other industries it was found that smaller estabUshments frequently paid better wages than some of their larger and presumably more powerful competitors; and it was shown agam that it is wholly possible for an establishment to exist and prosper in competition with others doing business under the same market conditions but enjoying the real or supposed advantage of lower wages for like processes. This is a factor of importance in de- termining the weight to be given to the matter of mterstate com- petition. 5. The investigation convinced the commission that "the wages paid to a substantial number of female employees in the brush-malmig mdustry were inadequate to supply the necessary cost of hving and maintain the worker in health." It therefore became its duty to estabhsh a wage board for the in- dustry Report of the Industrial Welfare Commission of the State of Oregon on the Power Laundries in Portland, 1914. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 67 appeal from decisions of the commission in matters of fact. Mr. Malarky also presented a brief and took part with the attorney general in the pleadings before both the circuit and State supreme courts. On November 7, 1913, Judge Cleeton, of the circuit court, declared the law constitutional and refused to grant an injunction against the commission. An appeal was taken to the State supreme court, where the hearing was given on February 9, 1914. For the hearing before the State supreme court Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, of Boston, and Miss Josephine Goldmark, publication secretary of the National Consumers' League, submitted a brief showing the benefits of mini- mum-wage legislation. On March 17, the supreme court handed down a decision upholding the constitutionality of the law. Thereupon Miss Elmira Simpson, an employee of Mr. F. C. Stettler, brought suit against the commission on the ground that its rulings would deprive ner of the right to work. The law was agaia upheld, both in the circuit and the State supreme courts. Both cases were appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where the hearing was held on December 17, 1914. Attorney General Crawford and Mr. Louis Brandeis appeared for the commission. The decision of this court has not yet (March 17, 1914) been rendered. UTAH. The Utah muiimum-wage law is peculiar in that it fixes directly the minimum rates to be paid for experienced adult females, for adult learners and apprentices, and for minors. The administration of the law is placed upon the commissioner of immigration, labor, and statistics. The law became effective May 13, 1913, and the follow- ing statement under date of January 20, 1914, from Commissioner Haines, is of particular interest: Our office has investigated some two hundred or more cases of alleged violations of the minimum-wage law since May 13, 1913, which have had any merit and a number that had not. We knew that it was the prime object of the lawmakers to secure for the girls and women affected an increase of wages and in enforcing the law we have always endeavored to look after the interests of the em- ployees first. For this reason, where we find violations, we first give the employers an opportunity to make good to their employees any shortage of wages between what they had been paying and what they were legally required to pay. In some cases, we have secured to a single employee as high as $57 in back wages. The emploj^ers preferred to pay this money rather than stand trial with the liabihty of paying a heavy fine and costs of prosecution, besides the ignominy of being cheap men. In the above manner, we have collected over $6,000 m back pay to employees and up to the present time we have had to bring four prosecutions, three of which we have won and one is still pendmg.' Writing late in 1913, the same commissioner said: The principal businesses affected by the law are the mercantile, candy, knitting, paper-box and overall factories, the woolen mills, laundries, milhneries, hotels and telephone companies. 1 Irene Osgood Andrews, Minimum-wage legislation, Appendix III of the Third Report of the New York State Factory Investigating Commission, p. 208. 68 BULLETIN- OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. Of the employees under 18 years of age, constituting about 6 per cent of the 11,500, a majority were employed as cash girls and wrap- {)ers in the department stores and received about $4 per week, a few ess. The minimum wage raised the wages of this class to $4.50 per week. A number of the department stores supplanted cash girls with cash boys whom they pay $4 a week or $18 per month. Many milhnery stores that were paying girl apprentices from $2.50 to $5 per week also weeded out those who were the least proficient. In the knitting, candy, paper-box, and overall factories, and woolen mUIs where the piece system is in vogue, a few girls were discharged who could not reach the minimmn Wage in their respective classes named in our law. This number, however, was not over 3 per cent of the whole number employed therein. In the inexperienced adult class, those women over 18 years of age with less than one year's experience as salesladies or as appren- tices in milUnery stores and factories, were affected to a considerable extent. The law requires that this class shall be paid not less than 90 cents per day. Many within this classification were drawing about the same wage as was paid inexperienced girls who were under 18 years of age. In some cases, the older girls in the 90 cents per day class were no better salesladies than their younger sisters. Of this class, constituting 10 per cent of the female employees in our State, as stated above, the wages of about 3 per cent were raised to meet the minimum wage. While the law did not become effective until May 13, many of the employers who pay monthly or semimonthly voluntarily caused the law to become effective on May 1. In a number of businesses, the employees who were not considered as possessing the necessary effi- ciency were notified that it was up to them to "make good" in order to retain their employment and the probationary period was fixed at from two to four weeks. As a whole, it seems to be the consensus of opinion of employers that the law has increased efficiency to an appreciable extent. Per- haps not more than 5 per cent of the whole number of female em- ployees were discharged because of this law going into effect and. many of those who lost their employment found employment in other like estabhshments or in other lines. About the time the law became effective, our department was called upon by a nimaber of business concerns to determine what generally would be considered a year's experience as expressed in our law. They were informed that any girl or woman who had worked for the period of one year or more, or who had worked as an apprentice in a miUinery estabhshment or as a laundry girl, teV phone girl or in a factory or mill for a like period, would be consid- ered as "experienced" in their respective avocations. Some of the department stores claim that they experienced con- siderable difficulty with employees coming to them from small country stores and the 5 and 10 cent city stores. This class of employees are 18 years old and over and have had a year's or more experience. Employers are required to pay this class of ghls or women not less than the minimum wage of $1.25 per day and have found that others oi their older employees who are working as minors and "inexperi- enced" are more efficient. This fact is soon manifested in a way that touches their pocketbooks, for the reason that the smaller-paid MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION — UNITED STATES. 69 help are soon at the elbows of their employers asking for an increase of wages with the plea that they are better or fuUy as efficient as the higher-paid employees with a countrjr or small store experience. The law has had a tendency to drive out the Httle errand girl in some establishments who was drawing from $2.50 to $3.50 per week and whose tenure of employment was ofttimes a semicharitable one. Compared with many other Western States of equal and some of greater population, the wage scales of this State for both male and female labor are quite high, and our newly inaugurated minimum-wage law was instrumental in increasing the wages of but a small per cent (possibly 10) of our working girls and young women. In our laundries girls were generally paid from $6 to $7 per week and now they are paid $7.50 per week. In the department stores, the wage was from $4 to $25 and in the millinery estabhshments from $2.50 to $25 per week. Apprentices in the millinery estabhshments must now be paid $4.50 per week or else be permitted to work under instruction for absolutely no wage, in which condition the relationship of employer and em- ployee is not established. Thirty dollars a month or $1 per day was the general -wage of chambermaids in many European hotels and rooming houses. Now it must be $1.25 per day for six days a week where neither board nor lodging is furnished. As a whole, I think the law a fairly good one and have yet to learn where it is causing any considerable amount of oppression or injustice to anyone. Some small establishments, like country printing offices," that employed female apprentices at a wage of from $3 to $4 per week or the first year, claim that they can not afford to pay $7.50 per week or such help during the second year. In no estabhshment of the State, coming under our notice, that employs any considerable number of females, has the pay roll been increased over 5 per cent. I beheve that the average is between 2 and 3 per cent. The law has the tendency to equahze the wages of the inexperienced and the near experienced. I believe that it increases efficiency and what is of equal and greater importance wiU have a growing tendency to secure to competent women a hving wage.' No formal report of the operations of the Utah law has yet been issued, but a paper read by Commissioner Haines before the National Convention of the Association of Government Labor Officials on June 9, 1914, explains the history of the law and discusses the results of its apphcation.^ The paper is given in fuU below: Utah's arbitrary mi ni mum-wage law for women and girls has now been in operation for one full year, a period long enough to form a {)artial conclusion of the merits, in one State at least, of a class of labor aws that is now uppermost in the minds of many students of impor- tant social and economic problems. Before entering into a statement of the physical operations of the law and its practical results so far as may yet be determined, I desire 1 Op. cit., pp. 209-212. 2 Paper read by H. T. Haines, commissioner of immigration, labor, and statistics of Utali, before tlie National Convention of the Association of Government Labor OfEcials of the United States and Canada, at Nasbville, Tenn., on June 9, 1914. 70 BULLETIN OP THE BTJBEATT OF LABOE STATISTICS. to first briefly call your attention to the ways and means by which Utah, one of the youngest States, and one having the fewest number of women and girls depending upon a daily wage for their sustenance, took a short cut through the wide but unknown field of proposed living- wage legislation, and enacted a minimum-wage law for females. Pre- liminary work leading to the preparation and presentation of a bill for the enactment of a minimum-wage law had been performed by a com- mittee of the Federation of Women's Clubs of our State and the bill itself was presented by a woman member of the lower house of the legislatm-e, of whom there were three. This bill followed closely the Provisions of the bill first presented to the Massachusetts Legislature, ut which was later much amended and therefore considerably unUke the Bay State's minimum-wage law in effect to-day. The Utah bill provided for a commission, as have bUls of all other States having miaimum-wage laws now in force or pending. The pro- posed commission was to have been composed of three persons, to be appointed by the governor, one of whom was to have been a woman. Tne bill carried an appropriation of $5,000 to meet the expenses of the commission for inquiring into the wages paid to women and girl employees in the various occupations in which they were engaged, with a view of ascertaining as nearly as possible the adequacy of the then prevailing wages to supply the employees with the necessary cost of living and to maintain them in health. The commission was further empowered to establish a wage board bonsisting of three representative employers and an equal number of representative women employees, and one or more dismterested per- sons representing the public, whose duty it was to determine a mini- mum wage for women in occupations in which prevailing wages were found to be inadequate to meet the requirements of a living wage and to maintain the employees in health. Merchants and manufacturers were quick to notice this effort for proposed legislation affecting their several interests and equally alert in protecting such interests. Arrangements were soon perfected for joint meetings of employers and employees and women's club repre- sentatives with the labor committee oi the lower house. The mer- chants' and manufacturers' committee of the local commercial club strenuously opposed the bill in the form presented, asserting that the publicity feature in which the commission was authorized to publish in the daily papers the names of employers and the material facts of their findings through searching investigations into their businesses, was particularly objectionable and unnecessary. It was also main- tained by them that the proposed investigating machinery was too bulky and that the $5,000 that was proposed to be appropriated was insufficient to carry on the work in the manner outlined. With the women in their fight for the enactment of their biU, or one equally as good, were representatives of labor, and lobbies in the legislative halls were formed and maintained by the contending forces. At the pubUc hearings before the house labor committee able and exhaustive argu- ments were made and heard, and but little advancement was appar- ently made for some time toward an amicable understanding between the participating forces. Finally a subcommittee of the merchants' and manufacturers' committee of the local commercial club drafted a biU that was accepted as a fairly good compromise between them- selves, the club women, and labor representatives, and a substitute biU MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 71 embracing a wage scale as agreed upon was drafted by the subcom- mittee which was later presented to the legislature and finally passed on, ^ ^^® ^°*® ^ the lower house and unanimously in the senate. Ihe original bill contained over 1,800 words and the substitute bill about 200, yet the latter biU was such that it practically accomplishes about all that was sought to be secured through the more verbose and cumbersome measure. The law itself fixes a minimum wage of 75 cents per day for any girl under the age of 18 years; 90 cents per day to a woman''over the age of 18 years, who is mexperienced in the class of work she is employed to perform; $1.25 per day to women who have served an apprentice- ship in the Une of work they are performing. The apprenticeship period is fixed at one year. Thus a woman or girl who has worked one year as a saleswoman must be paid $1.25 per day. Likewise she must be paid as much as if she had worked as an operator in a factory of anykind, in a candy manufactory, laundry, etc., and is following these lines of employment. The merchants' and manufacturers' subcommittee's biU gave $1 per day to apprentices over 18 years of age, but the house committee cut the wage to 90 cents. In estabhshments where the piece system of wages obtains a woman's wages must be equal to the wages "fixed by the minimum-wage law, based on a nine-hour-per-day service, that number of hours constituting a day's work for women in our State. One of the objections raised by the house committee on labor to the minimum-wage bill, as first presented, was to the creation of a new State commission, and hence a new department. In order to elimi- nate this strongly opposed feature, the substitute bill designated the commissioner of the bureau of immigration, labor, and statistics as the officer to enforce the general provisions of the law. This department was already responsible for the enforcement of the nine-hour law for females, the eight-hour law for miaors, and besides charged with other matters pertaining to labor and immigration, together with the gath- ering, compiling, and pubhcation of statistics. Outside of the fixed salaries of the commissioner, two deputies, and a stenographer, rent, etc. (Utah not having a State capitol as yet), the department was allowed $1,500 per year for all traveling, printing, stationery, and other incidental expenses. As the appropriation for the department was fixed before the passage of the minimum-wage law, it may be said that the only sum of money provided by the legislature for oper- ating its minimum-wage law was but $800, which was named in an amendment to the old act creating the bureau of immigration, labor, and statistics as the salary to be paid an additional deputy in the department, and which amendment stated that the new deputy should be a woman. Here I wish to say that, in the absence of any knowledge by this convention of what criticisms may have been made or are being made concerning the operations of the law in Utah, I think the members of the convention will agree with me that it is being administered economically and that the legislature made a "ten strike" in its efforts to economize when it ehminated a $5,000 per year depart- ment and attached the proposed work of such to another department and allowed it but $800 for the performance of the required work. The provision concerning a woman deputy was another concession to the women's club members, who contended that in the investiga- 72 BULLETIN OP a?HE BUEEAtT OP LABOR STATISTICS. tions of alleged violations of the minimum-wage and nine-hour laws, and the general conditions surroimding the employment of labor, a woman official would necessarily prove a helpful acquisition to the operating forces of the department. In this proposition they were partially right, but in passing it may be briefly stated at this point that in the handling of many cases wherein women employers were violators of the law enacted for the benefit of women wage earners, woman's inhumanity to woman was ofttimes manifested in a striking manner through their incourteous treatment of the woman deputy commissioner. Many women employers charged with violating the law stated that they preferred to deal with a man when investigations concerning their conduct toward their own sex were under considera- tion. The most stubborn opposition to the passage of the measure came {)articularly from a representative of one large manufacttiring estab- ishment and from several small country merchants. The manufac- turers' representative contended that in the line of employment which his concern offered to girls and young women there were certain classes of work requiring but ii.ttle skill, for which service they could only afl'ord to pay a low wage and could furthermore give employment to a class of females who possessed but meager mentality and were incapable of performing work that required average physical capacity. The argument advanced by him was that his corporation would necessarily have to discharge a number of females who would prob- ably be unable to secure any other employment, or at least such employment at which they could earn as much as he was paying them in the estabhshment which he represented. Emphasis was placed by him on the probability of such employees becoming a permanent burden to their parents, relatives or friends, who would necessarily have to support them, or else they would become public charges. The small country merchants set up the claim that their businesses did not warrant their paying a woman more than $20 or $25 per month, and in order for them to maintain female help they would have to discharge their experienced girls and employ only those under 18 years of age, or one older who had had less than one year's experience as a sales girl. The practical workings of the law are vet to be told. Briefly, the total number of women and girls in Utah coming under the operations of the law numbered about 12,000. Of the total number only about 6 per cent were under the age of 18 years, and were employed chiefly as errand or bundle girls in department stores, and in candy factories, box and knitting factories. No accoimt was reckoned of the girls and women who, in the packing season, work in the canneries, of which we have quite a number. The operating period of some of these concerns is less than 60 days, and they employ quite a number of young folks of both sexes during that time of year embracing the school vacation for full or part days. However their rates reach the minimum-wage scale. About 10 per cent of the 12,000 regular female employees come witMn the inexperienced or apprentice class, and the remaining 84 per cent in the experienced class. A month prior to the day the minimum-wage law became effective our department sent to every regular employer of female labor of MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION — triSTlTED STATES. 73 whom it had any knowledge a printed copy of the law and also a blank calling for a statement of the number of females employed by them who were under 18 years of age, how many of this class they were paying less than 75 cents per day; how many of the female employees over the age of 18 years were inexperienced and how many were experienced, and how many of these two classes were being paid less thanQO cents and $1 .25 per day, respectively. They were requested to fill out these blanks and mail same to the labor department. In a number of later instances these blanks proved quite useful to us, especially in cases where employers of only a few girls, who kept no pay roUs by which our department might check their weekly wage accounts, and who had faUed to adjust their wage schedules to meet the requirements of the new law. The same employers of female labor were later asked to fill out similar blanks bearing a date subsequent to the law becoming effective, and from this information, ofttimes unwittingly written upon these blanlis, we discovered many violations of the law for which the employers werp obliged to pay thousands of dollars in wages that fell short of being the minimum wage, or else defend a lawsuit in a court of justice. The first complaint we filed was one against an establishment employing about 25 young women. Two weeks after the law went into effect it was reported to the department that this concern was not paying the minimum wage. The commissioner obtained a pay envelope from one of the girl employees upon which was written her name, the amount of her weekly wage, and date thereof, which was $1 per week less than that provided by law. The commissioner called upon the proprietor of this establishment and requested to see the pay roU, a request that was at first denied until the law requiring employers to submit their pay rolls for inspection was presented. This pay roll showed that a number of girls were being paid less than the minimum wage, yet in the face of this fact and the envelope exhibited, the proprietor and the bookkeeper claimed that the estab- lishment was paying the minimum wage. The proprietors dared not face a trial in this case, and a plea of guUty' was entered before the day of trial, and each girl who had been underpaid was handed the balance legally due her. During the fuU year the minimum-wage law has been in operation, our department has collected from employers over $8,000,_ which was given into the hands of employees who were not receiving the minimum wage. In many instances the employers guilty of violating the law did so unconsciously or carelessly, having neglected to imme- diately act upon the notice sent out by the labor department and adjust their pay rolls to meet the requirements of the law. One large department store, employing in the neighborhood of 200 females, and paying semimonthly, was found guilty of violating the law for the reason that it paid its girls under 18 years of age but $9 (two weeks' wages) on the 1st and 16th days of each month, comput- ing the wage on 12 months a year basis, instead of at 52 weeks a year. "V^en their attention was called to this matter, they thanked the labor department and promptly made up to each underpaid employee the balance due her. , • , • v^ Quite a number of employers apparently acted with mdilterence to the warnings of the labor department, evidently thinking that the department charged with the enforcement of the law had enough 74 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. else to do witliout investigating the amount of wages they were paying their help, and seeking refuge behind the fact that the under- paid employee well knew that her job was at stake if she entered a complaint. When the commissioner or deputy comnussioners dropped into their places of business to question them or thek employ- ees, or examine their pay rolls, ofttimes being possessed in advance of their visits with incrimiaatiag facts pertaining to the wages that were being paid in the particular estabushment under investigation, many unpleasant scenes occurred, which usually ended with all concernea getting together, computing the back wages due the under- paid employees, to whom a substantial sum of money was turned over, and a promise on the part of the employer to observe the law in the future, followed by a formal and apparently friendly farewell. The highest individual sum of money which our department has as yet collected in this manner for one girl is $125, but several amounts approachLag that sum have been obtained. The law does not designate our department as a collection agency, but we assumed that for the reason that the law was intended to obtain better pay for girls who were drawing wages insufficient to meet their necessary living requirements, we would be carrying out the spirit of the law if we placed into their hands good hard cash, rather than summon them to appear in court as reluctant witnesses against their employers, and, m most cases, lose them their jobs, after which they would be required to bring a civil action to collect the legal wages due them, and if successful would be obliged to turn over nearly all that had been collected to some attorney for his serv- ices in the case. A wise business man is a respecter of pubUc opinion, and therefore few of such care to antagonize a law established for the payment of a fair wage to men or women. Some merchants and maniiactiirers wiU tell the commissioner of labor that they believe the minimum- wage law to be unconstitutional, and that it is too arbitrary; that it denies to some girls and women the employment that they are very much in need of, but they lack the moral courage to thus speak or pubhsh such views to the world, and draw unto themselves the odium that the laboring classes feel for the employers opposed to laws intended for the betterment of wage earners. Hence our department has had to bring but seven cases for the violation of the minimum-wage law before the courts, six of which we have won and one is stUl pend- ing. A case won has been appealed to the supreme court. - This was a matter wherein a woman proprietor of a dressmaking establish- ment was paying an apprentice but $5 a week, the minimum wage being $5.40. The apprentice had been employed but three weeks and her employer was offered the privilege of paying the $1.20 due the apprentice under the minimum-wage law, or else face a prosecu- tion. She elected to fight, but after an action was instituted against her for her violation of the law, an attorney advised her to pay to the apprentice the $1.20 due, which she did and then asked that the suit be withdrawn. In view of the fact that she slammed the door of her establishment in the face of the deputy commissioner and hung up the telephone receiver when the county attorney was advising her to pay the apprentice and thus avoid prosecution, the forces charged with the enforcement, prosecution, and dignity of the law MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION — UNITED STATES. 15 elected to allow the woman the opportunity of fighting until the supreme court of the State called "time." Thus the constitution- ahty of our little minimum-wage law is to be tested, and others besides the lady have quietly chipped in to help defray the expense of the legal scrap. One contributor is a man whom we had previously convicted of violating the law. Sununarizing its practical effects within the brief period it has been in operation, the law may be said to have been instrumental in raising the wages of a number of women and ghls who most needed the addi-' tional sums of money it has placed in their hands. It has not increased the wage pay roll in estabhshments employing any con- siderable number of women over 5 per cent. As an offset to this, most employers admit that they have obtained increased efficiency, because proprietors or managers of many establishments employing a large number of female workers immediately preceding the date of this law becoming effective made the occasion an opportunity for heart-to-heart talks with their female employees, to emphasize the fact that it would be up to them (the employees) to make good in order to hold their positions. This presentation of the situation is alleged to have had a leavenous effect upon quite a few deficient employees who are now drawing more than the minimum wage. A few small country merchants claim to have been hard hit, and some formerly employing two girls now have but one. A very small number of women and girls who faUed to produce the results fixed as necessary were dismissed from estabhshments, but most of them found other work for which they were better adapted, and conse- quently we can recall but few cases where a woman or girl has been utterly deprived of employment because of this law. In several cases where girls have been discharged because of the activities of our department in compelliag employers to pay the minimum wage, we have found positions that were satisfactory to them. And here, let me say, we have found among the business men of Utah many whole-souled, broad-minded, and philanthropic fellows who have stood ever ready to aid our department and assist us in the enforcement of the law by giving employment to the girl or woman who had been unkindly and unceremoniously discharged because of our insistence that she be paid the minimum wage and all back wages due her, or because she had given, or was wiUing to give, at the sacri- fice of her job, incriminating evidence against her employer. Our progress in the enforcement of the law would often have been impeded had it not been for the cooperation of the men thus referred to. One very important thing the law appears to have not done, as was feared, and that is that it has not caused the minimum wage to become very nearly the maximum wage. Of the 12,000 women wage earners in our State comiag under the provisions of this law, we have not been able to find one woman or girl who was drawing $7.50 per week at the time the law went into effect whose wages have suffered a decrease. The fear of some such action as this, by way of retaliation, was and has been often voiced prior and subsequent to the operations of this law, but the fear in our State appears to have been ill-founded. The situ- ation now is that a much larger number of employees in Utah are draw- ing a wage in excess of the highest minimum wage than those who are paid the legal wage itseU. 76 BULLETIN 6P THE StffiEAtr 05* LABOft STATISTICS. Another beneficial effect for the manufacturer is that it tends to equaHze the cost of production, and the same deduction applies to the merchants, as the minimum wage will also in his case contribute to-the equality in the cost of selhng goods. The hard-fisted manufacturer or merchant who was inclined to purchase his labor for the cheapest price obtainable is now compelled by law to pay for labor about the same price that the more Hberal and. considerate employer is inclined ' , to pay voluntarily. I believe that I am justified in saying that 90 per cent of employers, of women and girls are well satisfied with the law as it now stands and is enforced. Of course employees whose wages it has raised are satis- fied and hope soon to see the minimum wage made higher. The women who are responsible for the enactment of the law feel that they have accompMshed a great good for their sex, and no member of the legislature who voted for the law is apologizing to his constituents for his- action. An intelhgent manager of one of Salt Lake's largest department stores, who was chairman of the subcommittee that drafted the mini- mum-wage law as it appears to-day, ia a paper read before a national convention of merchants, recently held in one of the Eastern States, says of the law: " * * * Whatever its faults or virtues, there is little doubt that good has been uppermost. Without discussing its legal, moral, economic, or industrial bearings, I might venture the suggestion that of far greater importance than minimum-wage legisla- tion for the uplift of women workers is preparatory education which operates automatically to raise the standard of wages in. ratio to the standard of service. It would seem fair that if the State estabhshes a standard of wage it should assume the responsibHity of furnishing service of equal value. Then it must follow that the greatest materia! service we can render the future women and girl workers is to prear- range such environment and education as w3l give them individual independence, self-supporting producing power. We must care better for our womanhood before it is thrown into the thick of the fight for existence and compelled to call to the State for minimum-wage pro- tection. We should now know that we are in a period of change humanizing change, and that along with the development of indus- trial mstitutions and processes has come a new world-wide subcon- sciousness, which pleads the necessity of a fairer distribution of the products of labor, the uplift of the laborer, the better development and conservation of the mental and physical forces, a more humane and scientific apphcation of productive human energy. The minimum wage helps but let us first help the woman to know; she is then a law unto herself." WASHINGTON. The organization, methods, and results of the Washington mini- mum-wage law are shown in detail m the first biennial report of the commission,! recently pubUshed. The work of these commissions in the United States is so entirely new and the mterest m the methods which they foUow is so great that it has seemed best to present at some length the experience of the Wa ^hmgton commission, as shown 1 First Bienaial Report of the Industrial Welfare Commission, 1913-14. Olympia, 1915. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 77 m its report. The following pages are based almost entirely upon the official report, being in large part quoted from it: As directed by the law, which became effective June 12, 1913, the commission, upon its appointment by the governor, immediately undertook an investigation into the conditions of labor and wages paid to women and minors in the leading industries of the State. * * * As the result of these investigations and the facts developed by them, conferences consisting of three employers, three employees, and three disinterested persons were called by the commission for each industry, and these conferences, pursuant to the law, recom- mended to the commission for its adoption or rejection an amount considered necessary to maintain a self-supporting woman in health and comfort. In this maimer legal wage rates have been estabUshed in five of the leading industries of the State, and the recommendations of the sixth industrial conference are now pending. The dates upon which the five became effective and the weekly wage rates are: Mercantile industry, June 27, 1914 $10. 00 Manufactiiring industry, Aug. 1, 1914 8. 90 Laundering industry, Aug. 24, 1914 9. 00 Telephone industry, Sept. 7, 1914. 9.00 General office occupations, Feb. 20, 1915 10. 00 These rates apply to experienced women workers more than 18 years of age, while a flat wage of $6 per week has been estabhshed for aU minors. Apprenticeship hcenses permitting beginners to be paid less than the estabhshed minimum during the term of their indenture and providing for varying periods of wage advancement from $6 per week to the legal rate are being issued by the commis- sion under certain restrictions. * * * While the commission has made provision for beginners to work during stated periods for less than the established wage, it is neces- sary for each such employee to have an apprentice hcense and unless the beginner has such a permit her employer is not only criminally liable if he employs her for less than the prescribed wage, but is also subject to civil suit by the employee to compel payment of the accumulated difference between the wage actually paid and the established rate, unless that difference is voluntarily paid. In order to rigidly enforce the law, the commission does not recognize a plea of ignorance from the less careful and conscientious, inasmuch as printed copies of all orders entered by the commission have been mailed to all estabhshments employing women, in so far as it was possible to do so, no absolutely rehable and complete directory being obtainable. The fact has been discovered, however, that many emploj^ers have filed these orders away in their correspondence without having care- fully noted their provisions, and that others have allowed them to be misplaced or lost, upon which pleas of ignorance have been based, but this condition is being rapidly overcome as the subject is being more widely discussed and better understood. Furthermore this law is not so difficult of enforcement as the eight-hour law for women, as the women themselves aid materially by demanding the increase in their wages provided by the new requirements. Incidentally, too, as the unpaid portion of the wage accumulates and reaches attrac- 78 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. tive proportions the employee is prompted to invoke the aid of the commission to collect it, and so the violation comes to light. This, in general, is a r6sum6 of what the commission has done. A review' of work would not be complete, however, without mention of the case of the Seattle girl who was discharged by her employer for acting on the first laundry conference called by the commission. The provisions of the minimum-wage law fully contemplate the pro- tection of the women workers against the prejudice and revenge of their employers when they are called on by the co m mission to give testimony in any investigation or proceeding relative to the enforce- ment of the act, and this case proved to be a forceful example of the necessity for such a provision in the law. The conmaission asked the employer to reinstate the girl, but this he refused to do, and the facts in the case were then laid before the prosecuting attorney and a warrant issued for the laundryman's arrest. The trial was held and the defendant found guilty and fined $100 and costs. His attorney served notice of appeal, but this has not been taken. Through this trial the employers of the State early learned that the commission would brook no violation of the minimum-wage law. It was a good lesson, for it taught them that the commission, dothed with full authority to enforce the law, proposes to exercise that authority quickly and effectively. None of the dire predictions made prior to the passage of the law have come about to an extent that questions the general efficiency of the law. There has been no wholesale discharge of women em- Eloyees, no wholesale leveling of wages, no wholesale replacing of igner-paid workers by cheaper help, no tendency to make the mini- mum the maximum, while the employers of the State in general have been following the letter and spirit of the law and aiding greatly in its application. These statements are based on a survejr of three of the leading in- dustries of the State, three of those in which the minimum wage was first estabhshed — ^mercantile establishments, laundries, and telephone exchanges. * * * That these effects are true is all the more re- markable from the fact that business conditions existing at the time the wage orders went into effect were not such as in themselves to secure a favorable reception. The sequence of it all is that there are vastly more women workers in the State of Washington to-day receiving a living wage than there were two years ago, when the law was enacted ; that there are more higher-paid girls now than there were then; that the whole wage standard together with the standard of efficiency and discipline has been raised; that industry itself has been taught the lesson that higher-paid workers are better workers. Those industries which could most quickly impose the added cost of the increased wages upon the pubhc by raising the prices of their Eroducts, have of course, been the least hurt, if any have been hurt, y this remedial legislation. Such' others as could not immediately pass the burden on to society where it belongs, as society dictated and indorsed the law, are naturally having some difficulty in ad- justing themselves to the new conditions. Particularly is this true of those industries of this State that come into direct competition with the products of the sweatshops of the East, the cracker and MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 79 candy factories, the garment makers, and the box factories, though tne unusually high freight rates on boxes from the East operate to the advantage of the last named more so than to any of the others. The following letter from a garment manufacturer of Seattle, a man whose products come into direct competition with the sweat- shop labor of New York and Chicago and a man, too, wha was quite strongly opposed to minimum-wage legislation prior to its enactment * * * mdicates his approval of the law after a fair trial and re- flects the general sentiment among that class of employers that realizes the rights and interests of us employees: Personally, I find that my businesa has been benefited, as the necessity for greater discipline and more rigid enforcement of itgifar hours of work has become fully apparent. We have raised our averag? ^eokly j ly roll, I think I am safe in saying, at least $1 per girl, if not more. Some of our help, to be sure, have always done their best_ and have shown but little change, but those who were satisfied with less, the minimum wage has benefited, as they saw they must earn more or quit. I am writing you this personal letter about my personal experience in an individual case. It has been a benefit in this factory in raising the standard of efficiency and in forcing a closer application to duty on the part of the operator and necessarily has been a benefit to the employer. I am not in a position to speak for other factories and industries, but, aside from some hardship that the law may work on the less com- petent, I can not see why it will not give a greater efficiency to our factory forces. Some idea of the industrial effect of this legislation can be gained when it is realized that the industrial welfare commission's prehm- inary sm-veys of the factories, stores, laundries, and telephone ex- changes of the State, showed that 60 per cent of the women employed were receiving less than a hving wage prior to the application of the law, except in the s-tores, where the ratio ran about 50 per cent. The law, m other words, has advanced the wages of practically 60 per cent of the workers in these industries and has done it without serious opposition at a time when business conditions were none too food and when there was every incentive for the employer, if he had esired to hide behind the minimum-wage law and the dire predic- tions previously made, to offset the effect of the increased wages on his expenses by the employment of cheaper labor of whatever kind was available. To be sure, that excuse has been used to some extent, particularly where the employer wanted to get rid of a woman worker for some other reason, but a careful study of the statistics elsewhere published and the summaries of them, will convince even the most ar- dent opponent of minimum-wage legislation, that the women work- ers have neither been dismissed nor displaced by cheaper employees. "I didn't know, until the minimum wage went into effect, that it paid to employ higher-priced women workers," the manager of a 10-cent store told a member of the commission, "but it does. They take more interest in their work, take better care of our goods, are more capable, more efficient, more satisfactory in every way," and these short sentences tell practically the whole story of the effect of the minimum wage. The girl who wants to learn, to amount to something, to be of some value to her employer, to be competent, capable, and efficient, is reaping the benefits of the minimum wage; her less competent, less efl&cient, indifferent sisters are perhaps being hurt by it, if any workers are. The law has not operated to lessen the competition among women workers, as some thought it might; rather has it stimulated 80 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. the rivalry because the women are now being paid more nearly what they earn, and are willing to do more, as before the law became effec- tive the chances for wage advancement were so small as to be dis- couraging. The employers, of course, having to pay more than before, are demanding more than before in the way of services; they are weeding out the incompetents and the misfits, when aU efforts to train them properly fad, but they are not stopping there — they are advancing the more competent, the higher skilled, in a ratio that corre- sponds with the new wage standard. In other words, as the letter of the Seattle garment manufacturer previously (quoted shows, the mini- ■ mum wage has resulted in increasing the efficiency and the morale of the employees in the industries to which it has been applied. The employers are requiring better training of their apprentices now than they did before, for they know that, under the commission's restric- tions, those apprentices wUl soon be entitled to the established wage and they want them to be worth it. * * * There is a tendency, of course, for some women who have worked long enough at a particular occupation to be entitled to the minimum wage, to attempt to get apprenticeship licenses under which they could work for less than the minimum and thereby displace some sister worker, or to get back a position from which they had been dismissed by their employers when it was f oimd they were not worth the wage. Perhaps this is due in part to the fact that for years the average woman worker — the one for whom the wage was established — ^has had it ground into her that her services are only worth a few dollars a week and she therefore does not reaUze the value of her labor, or it may be another indication of that tendency which prompts some women to defeat the spirit of the eight-hour law by working for more than one employer on the same day, yet the wave of disapproval which swept the ranks of the women workers when the commission's wage orders were first becoming effective — disapproval bom of fear that they would lose their employment— has since been dissipated as the women workers have seen none of the evils predicted accomphshed. That there has been no leveling of wages will be quickly seen from a study of the tables hereinafter pubhshed, when it wiU be also discov- ered that in reality the obverse is true and that the whole wage stand- ard, together with the standard of employment and discipline has been raised. That the number of women employed in this State has not been reduced more than the existing business conditions would war- rant, is fuUy substantiated by that survey. That the number of women replaced by apprentices or minors or some other workers is so small as to be an absolutely neghgible factor in the situation, can be reaUzed when it is stated that the total number of minors and appren- tices combmed, in mercantile estabhshments, only equals the per- centage estabHshed by the commission for the number of apprentices alone that would be permitted— 17 per cent— from which fact it can be quickly seen why the commission is not greatly concerned over this feature of the estabhshment of the minimum-wage law. Cost of Living. In carrying the minimum-wage law into effect the commission endeavored to place the question of the cost of Uving before the several conferences m such a manner as to invoke the fullest discussion and MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 81 deliberation upon every possible item of the necessities of life required by a woman wage earner. It did this, not only because of the nature of the question itself, but principally because of the plain instructions of the law which made it necessary to delve into the question to the remotest detail to reach the conclusion it presumed. The tenor of the law is boldly set forth in its second section: "It shall be unlawful to employ women workers in any industry within the State of Wash- ington at wages which are not adequate for their maintenance," and this is enforced by the requirements of section 3, which defines the duties of the commission in the following language: "There is hereby created a commission * * * to establish such standards of wages and conditions of labor for women and minors employed within the State of Washington as shall be held hereunder to be reasonable and not detrimental to health and morals and which shaU be sufficient for the decent maintenance of women." There could be no mistaking such language. It made absolutely plain the policy that should govern the commission and its conferences m determining the lowest wages that could be paid in those industries employing female labor. The "reasonable" requirements for the mamtenance of a self -supporting woman were the basis upon which the minimum was to be fixed, and while it does not specifically mention that the class of women workers to be considered in making determi- nations must be self-supporting, it can not be construed by the widest stretch of the imagination that the legislature contemplated that consideration should be given to any support that might be forth- coming from any source other than the occupation in which women are engaged as wage earners, for if it did the law would do the self- dependent woman no good, and it was for her that it was designed. ^ 5p 'i' 'P •!* "I* "I* Given this policy to foUow, the commission set about gathering the vast amount of information necessary. Three distinct methods were followed: Some 30,000 blank forms were either mailed or distributed personally to as many employers and employees, requesting estimates as to the cost of Uving in the different localities in which they lived, as contemplated by the 30 different items entering into the reason- able annual expenses of a self-supporting woman; personal investiga- tions were made by members of tne conunission and by several paid investigators; and, lastly, 16 informal conferences were held at various points in the State with employers and employees in the mer- cantile, manufactiu'ing, and laundry industries. In this way a vast amount of detailed information concerning these industries, together with the telephone and telegraph, hotel and restaurant, fruit and fish canning, and^ general office occupations, was collected and compiled, * * * . Special emphasiswas placed in all the investigations upon the cost of room and board, necessarily the largest single item of expense and the one most difficult for those of limited means. One of the first facts learned was, of course, that this cost varies in different portions of the State because of different climatic conditions and other influences, and also between large and small cities and between these and rural com- munities, yet the commission had to determine a wage uniform through- out the State and in all localities. Because of this feature of the law one important question is stiU unsatisfactorily -determined: Should the girl living in the smaller town, where some items of expense for 82843°— Bull. 167—15 6 82 BULLETIN OF THE BUKBAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. the city girl, notably street-car fare, are absent and where the others may perhaps be less, receive the same wage as the girl who lives in the city? There was only one way to meet the situation, and that was to determine an average of expense between the city and the smaller community and to fix the wage at that amount. The statistics on this subject, as far as it was possible to obtain them, were gathered from the women workers themselves, with special inquiry always as to room and board. The survey also included such other items as the cost of shoes and rubbers, repairing of shoes, stockings, underwear, petticoats, suit, coat, dresses and aprons, shirt waists, handkerchiefs, corsets, corset waists, gloves, neckwear, hats, umbrellas, repair of clothing, laundry, medicine and dentistry, street-car fare, newspapers and magazines, stationery and postage, association dues, insurance, vacation expenses, amuse- ments, church and other contributions, and incidentals. All this information was compiled and pubUshed, * * * and copies of it were sent to aU the members of the different conferences, each of whom, in turn, presented to the formal conference his or her estimate of the proper allowance for the different items entering into a woman's annual expenditure.. No item was omitted and every condition of each industry that might influence the cost of living among its workers was considered. Whether a girl employed as a saleslady required more for clothing than a factory worker; whether the woman who stands on wet con- crete floors all day ironing in a laundry needs a greater allowance for shoes than either the saleslady or the factory worker; whether the waitress is entitled to more for her laundry than other employees in the same industry or other occupations, are samples of the more or less perplexing questions which necessarily must be satisfactorily determined before a proper minimum wage can be fixed. Hundreds of these queries arose in each conference and as the task of deciding them devolved upon these conferences, the responsibiUty was grave. That the conferees so regarded, even when first confronted with the request to participate in them, became immediately clear to the commission when it experienced difficulty in obtainmg representa- tives to accept the important trust, and this was particularly true of the employees, who apparently felt most keenly the responsibility of assisting to determine the wages their sister workers should receive. Truth demands the statement, too, that among some of the employees there at first appeared a little of that hesitancy which is produced by fear that they personally might suffer in some way from their participation in the conferences, such treatment, perhaps, as the laundry girl in Seattle received when she was discharged by her employer after she had been a member of the first laundry and dye works conference, and this fear is not yet wholly dispelled, though the commission promptly and vigorously prosecuted the laundrj girl's employer and obtained his conviction, and wUl do so again, if necessary. It was no inconsiderable task, therefore, to obtain the members for each of the seven conferences that were called, but after the first two or three had been held the process was not quite so difficult. In each of them, of course, this question of the cost of living was the preeminent issue, and each of them handled the question a little differently, the action of the first having no bearing on the second, MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 83 or the second on the third, or so on. Each was an independent organ- ization, called to decide its own problems, to estimate its own cost, and to fix its own wage with reference to that cost, and this fact will account m great measure for the variations in the allowances for dmerent items on the schedule, as shown in the combined table. In each conference the estimates submitted by the employing and employed members were discussed and compared in open conference of all nine members, and then usually a committee composed of one from each of the three groups — employers, employees, and the public — took these estimates in each instance and by further discus- sion, comparison, and compromise reached a conclusion on each item, if possible, or at least on the allowance which should be made for all the items and it was on that allowance that the minimum wage was based. So it can be seen that the final decision in each conference was the outcome of nine persons' deliberations and not the whim of a single one or the contention of a single group. * * * q^^ie com- bined results of all the conferences are given in the table published below. * * * There will be noticed wide variations in the allow- ance for the same item in different occupations, and these can be explained almost entirely by the demands of the various occupations and partly by the fact that the conferees were only human, their estimates merely their own personal opinions, their decision their own best judgment. The industrial welfare commission, realizing this, perforce accepted the judgment of the conferences, except in one instance where it was evident that something other than consist- ent judgment entered into the decision, and estabUshed the wages as the conferences recommended. * * * AVERAGE ANNUAL COST OE LIVING OP SELF-SUPPORTING WOMEN AS ESTIMATED B^K. SIX WASHINGTON MINIMUM-WAGE CONFERENCES. Women employed in specified industries. Average olalf confer- ences. Item. Mercan- tile. Factory. Laun- dry. Tele- phone and tele- graph. Hotel and restau- rant. Office. Meals and room - . $302. 92 7.12 3.42 2.17 3.77 2.17 17.63 10.23 14.63 4.38 1.16 2.17 1.24 2.33 1.00 6.75 1.40 3.83 21.07 26.42 32.39 11.00 4.84 3.78 3.06 10.54 9.86 5.12 4.71 $242.09 7.98 1.46 2.38 4.37 4.13 21.36 11.34 10.81 4.97 1.68 4.27 1.89 2.48 1.64 7.00 2.20 4.41 16.82 17.50 26.84 3.06 4.48 5.98 7.56 14.28 10.99 5.39 14.54 $254.75 10.46 2.20 2.76 5.42 4.33 25.16 17.25 11.73 6.75 1.07 4.75 2.41 2.87 1.00 10.00 1.37 2.25 10.81 12.33 30.95 2.83 2.25 2.41 7.28 9.66 7.41 4.90 10.66 $266. 93 12.23 1.65 3.32 6.17 3.48 21.24 10.48 10.19 10.17 1.85 3.82 1.56 4.48 1.02 12.39 1.30 2.24 8.30 9.89 28.93 2.66 2.98 1.40 1.12 9.17 12.10 4.88 13.16 $286. 46 11.71 2.06 4.45 6.26 4.71 28.37 16.14 25.44 14.60 1.84 7.36 2.97 3.80 1.80 9.81 1.67 2.38 69.93 11.82 13.05 4.07 2.91 6.71 3.80 13.56 7.23 4.60 13.49 $286.38 9.66 1.36 2.10 4.48 4.00 22.84 15.23 19.33 4.80 1.52 3.68 2.12 3.04 1.92 9.37 1.38 4.64 14.42 12.82 27.69 3.68 4.19 1.07 12.66 16.02 11,21 7.69 10.82 $273. 25 9.86 ■RfipaipTig nf plinft<5 . , 2.01 RtnnViTipp 2.86 4.91 3.80 Suit 22.77 Coat 13.45 16.34 Shirt waists 7.61 1.62 4; 34 Corset waists 2.03 3.17 1.38 Hats 9.22 1.56 3.29 21.73 Medicine and dentistry 14.96 26.62 Newspapers and magazines 4.56 3.61 3.39 5.91 12.21 9.80 Church and other contributions. Incidentals 6.43 11.23 Total 520.00 462. 80 468.00 468. 00 672. 00 520.00 501.80 84 BULLETIN OF THE BUKEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. Minimum-wage Conferences, Practically the entire work of the commission to date is summa- rized in the six industrial conferences held since March 31, 1914, whose recommendations have resulted in the establishment of the minimum wage in all hut one of those industries and the issuance of obligatory- orders governing the conditions under which women and minors are permitted to work in those occupations. That, of course, was the real work of the commission and its action as set forth in this portion of the report is the result of all the preliminary investigations, surveys, informal conferences, tabulations, and formal conferences of the past two years. Parenthetically it might be stated here that the commission has found it, impossible in so short a time to establish these standards in all of the industries of the State and so has directed its energies toward putting the law into operation in the most important and most gen- eral occupations. Furthermore, so far as the fish canneries are con- cerned, the commission's investigations have developed the fact that the experienced women workers in those industries are already receiv- ing a living wage; that the enactment of a minimum wage there would consequently affect none of thera; and also that, inasmuch as these industries operate only a portion of the year, no women workers are dependent upon them for their living the year round. Consequently the commission has thus far taken no action regarding them. The commission's investigations of the six leading industries of the State employing female labor did, however, reveal the necessity of the application of the minimum wage to them and the respective conferences were therefore called. Upon the commission the law placed the responsibility of determining the rules and regulations to govern the selection of the conferees and the mod^ of procedure for conducting the conferences, and in settling the latter point it immediately adopted the regular parhamentary form. In determin- ing the personnel of the conferences, the commission decided there should be three conferees representing employees in the industry concerned, three representing employers, and three disinterested persons to act on behalf of the public. As elsewhere stated, the com- mission immediately encountered considerable diflBculty in selecting the members of the conferences, especially those representing the employees, who hesitated about serving for fear they might lose their positions. The result was that the commission had to take into consideration as many as 50 or 60 persons in arranging for each con- ference, and a great amount of time was consumed in investigating the qualifications of aU those suggested, each member of the com- mission nominating three or more persons whom they knew person- ally or by reputation or with whom they had come into contact dur- ing the prehminary work, for each place in each conference. From these the final selections were made, alternates also being designated, and proceeding in this manner the various formal conferences were called. The important features of them are as foUows: Mercantile Establishments. "The first formal conference concerned the mercantile industry and was held in the senate chamber of the capitol March 31 and MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 85 April 1, 1914. It was attended by all the members of the commis- sion and the following conferees : Employers' representatives— Messrs. J. L. Paine, Spokane: W. M. Cuddy, Tacoma; and George J. Wolff, A-berdeen. ,, t^, t i Employees' representatives.— Mis. Elizabeth Muir, Tacoma; Mrs. Florence Locke, Seattle: and Miss Mayme Smith, Spokane. , ^ „. , t, . ,t^ r. t> i. Public's representatives.— Mis. Frances C. Axtell, Bellmgham; Prof. W. G. Beach, University of Washington; and Mr. J. D. Fletcher, Tacoma. After a fuU and harmonious discussion of all the details involved, the conference unanimously recommended that the commission (1) adopt a minimum wage of $10 per week in mercantile estabhshments; (2) that such concerns be requhed to allow theu- female employees the period of one hour for noon luncheon; and (3) that the commission issue such obhgatory orders as in its judgment were necessary to provide proper toilet facilities, rest rooms, and ventilation m mercan- tile estabhshments where women are employed. Acting upon these Recommendations, the comimssion, on April 28, 1914, issued the following obligatory order as applying to mer- cantile estabhshments, effective June 27, 1914: I. W. C. Order No. 1, April 28, 1914. To whom it may concern: Take Notice.— That pursuant to the authority in it vested by chapter 174 of the Session Laws of the State of Washington for 1913, and pursuant to the recommendations of The conference of representativis of employers and employees in the mercantile occupation, together with representatives of the public, duly held after investigation of s^id occupation, which saiS recommendations were duly approved by said mdustnal ""liTlnSrialwelfare Commission for the State of Washington does hereby order ^^a^No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any female over the ,i of 1 S vears m any mercantUe establishment, at a weekly wage rate of less than $10, ^llesLrwale^ateS hereby declared inadequate as to such employees to supply ^rN^UrranVSouT'shTl'^r^^^^^^^ l-cheon to any female employee £ any mercantUe establishment, such requirement being demanded for the ^TsfE^TytieSel'stablishment where females are employed shall be provided '^ nS order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof . iuia oxuc Edward W. Olson, Chairman, Mrs. Jackson Silbaugh, Mrs. Florence H. Swanson, M. H. Marvin, Mrs. W. H. Udall, Industrial Welfare Commisdonfor the State of Washington. Attest' Mrs. Jackson Silbaugh, Secretary. No.iCE.-Thisorderbecomeseff^^^^^^^^ ^fcinS^^-KdTtSt'oK^^^^^ a copy posted in each room in which women affected by this order are employed. The nrobable terms and conditions affectmg the employment ot m^ors^and apprentices became the subject of an mterestmg and 86 BULLETIN- OP THE BUREAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. lengthy discussion during this first conference. In fact, it appeared for a time that a unanimous decision as to the recommendation for a minimum wage could not be reached until these (questions were deter- mined. However, when informed that according to the law these questions must be determined by the commission and could not be submitted to the conference, the latter confined itself to the recom- mendations noted above. The commission then, proceeding as directed by the statute, issued the following order with reference to the emplojonent of minors, effective on the same date: I. W. C. Order No. 2, April 28, 1914. That pursuant to the authority in it vested by chapter 174 of the Session Laws of Washington for 1913, and after due investi^tion by said commission as to the wages and conditions of labor of minors employed in the mercantile occupation, and the due determination by said commission of the wages and conditions of labor suitable for such minors: The Industrial Welfare Commission for the State of Washington does hereby order that — (1) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any person of either sex under the age of 18 years in any mercantile establishment at a weekly wage rate of less than $6, any less wage rate being hereby declared unsuitable in the premises. (2) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any person of either sex under the age of 18 years in any mercantile establishment, after the hour of 7.30 o'clock after noon of any day, such requirement being hereby declared suitable in thepremises. This order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof (June 27, 1914). Manufacturing Establishments. The commission's second formal conference concerned the manu- facturing industry and took place May 12 and 13, 1914, in the senate chamber of the capitol, with all the members of the commission present. The following-named persons constituted the conference: Representing employers. — Messrs. Fred Krause, Spokane; O. B. Dagg, Seattle; and O. (). Fenlason, Hoquiam. Representing employees. — ^Miss Emma Foisie, Seattle; Mrs. Belle Eobair, Tacoma; and Mrs. F. H. Lawton, Spokane. Representing public. — ^Mrs. W. C. Mills, Tacoma; Mr. Edgar C. Snyder, Seattle; and Prof. W. M. Kern, Walla Walla. The following recommendations were made to the commission by the conference: (1) That a minimum wage of $8.90 per week be estabHshed ; (2) that every manufacturing establishment where females are employed should be properly heated and ventilated; and (3) that adequate facilities and arrangements should be provided so that such employees may obtain rest when in a state of fatigue or in case of illness. Actiag upon these recommendations the commission on June 2 issued the foUowing obligatory order, effective August 1 : I. W. C. Order No. 3, June 2, 1914. (1) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any female over the age of 18 years in any factory establishment at a weekly wage rate of less than $8.90, any lesser wage rate being hereby declared inadequate as to such employees to supply the necessary cost of living and maintain them in health. (2) Every manufacturing establishment where females are employed shall be prcyerly heated and ventilated, and shall provide and maintain adequate facilities and arrangements so that such employees may obtain rest when in a state of fatigue or m case of illness, such requirements being demanded for the health and morala of such employees. This order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof (Aug. 1, 1914). MINIMX7M-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 87 ^^® following order with reference to nainors, effective on tlie same date, was also issued by the commission: I. W. C. Ordee No. 4, June 2, 1914. (1) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any person of either sex under the age of 18 years in any factory establishment at a weekly wage rate of less than $6, any less wage rate being hereby declared unsuitable in the premises. (2) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any person of either sex under the age of 1 8 years in any factory establishment after thehourof7.30o'clock after noon of any day, such requirement being hereby declared suitable in the premises. This order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof (Aug. 1, 1914). Laundries and Dye Works. On May 14 and 15, 1914, the commission held its first formal con- ference on the question of the apphcation of the law to the laundi-ies and dye works of the State, and the foUowing-named persons con- stituted the conference: Representing employers. — ^Messrs. A. Jacobsen, Seattle; Frank Nixon, Raymond; and W. J. Doust, Spokane. Representing employees. — ^Mrs. Julia A. Wilson, Spokane; Mrs. Hilda O'Connor, Seattle; and Miss Joanna Hilts, Seattle. Representing public. — ^Mrs. R. C. McCredie, Sunnyside; Rev. R. H. McGinnis, Tacoma; and Judge E. M. Day, Ballingham. After a stormy discussion of the issues involved, the conference made the following recommendation to the commission: That a mini- mum wage of $8.50 per week be estabhshed in all such industries in the State. The commission promptly rejected the recommendation, on May 15, by the following resolution: Whereas the investigations of the commission reveal that the cost of living for a woman employed in the laundry and dye-works industry in the State of Washington requires more than the sum of $8.50 per week to maintain herself in health and com- fort; and Whereas the conference on the laundry and dye-works industry held at Olympia May 14 and 15 has recommended to this commission the above sum as the minimum wage for such women workers: Therefore be it Resolved, That this commission hereby rejects said recommendation. The comnaission then proceeded to call another conference. The members of the second laundry and dye-works conference were entirely new. It met in the senate chamber of the capitol June 22 and 23, 1914, and was attended by all the members of the com- mission and the following conferees : Representing employers. — Messrs. Frank T. McCuUough, Spokane; A. Schmitz, Seattle; and Charles Erholm, Bellingham. Representing employees. — ^Mrs. Lou Grant, Seattle; Mrs. Eva Miles, Spokane; and Miss Clara Sletsjoe, Seattle. Representing public. — ^Mrs. Serena Matthews, Pullman; Rev. R. D. Snyder, Colfax; and Prof. W. P. Geiger, Tacoma. The conference recommended: (1) That a minimum wage of $9 per week be estabhshed; (2) that the noonday lunch period be not less than one hour, except in laundries in which the employers on request of two-thirds of the employees may have fixed a shorter period: Provided, That no lunch period shall be shorter than 30 minutes ; and (3) that separate lavatories and toilets, properly screened and ventilated and kept at aU times in a clean and sanitary condition, be provided for the women workers. 88 BULLETIN OP THE BUKEAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. The commission rejected the recommendation regarding the lunch period, upon receipt of an opinion from the attorney geiieral that it could not delegate such authority to employees. Acting upon the other recommendations the commission issued the following obliga- tory order June 25, 1914, effective August 24, 1914: I. W. C. Obdeb No. 5, Jtjne 25, 1914. (1) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any female over the age of 18 years in any laundry or dye-works establishment, at a weekly wage rate of less than $9, any lesser wage being hereby declared inadequate as to such employees to supply the necessary cost of living and maintain them in health. (2) Every laundry and dye-works establishment where both males and females are employed shall provide suitable and proper wash and dressing rooms for such employees, and shall provide separate water-closets for males and females, and all such water-closets, wash and dressing rooms shall be properly screened and ventilated and at all times kept in a clean and sanitary condition. This order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof (At^. 24, 1914). By the authority in it vested the commission then issued the fol- lowing order with reference to the employment of minors, effective on the same date: I. W. 0. Obdeb No. 6, June 25, 1914. (1) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any person of either sex under the age of 18 years in any laundry or dye-works establishment at a weekly wage rate of less than $6, any lesser wage rate being hereby declared unsuitable in the premises. (2) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any person of either sex under the age of 18 years in any laundry or dye-works establishment after the hour of 7.30 o'clock after noon of any day, such requirement being hereby declared suitable in the premises. (3) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any female under the age of 18 years in the occupation of "shaker" in any laundry establishment. This order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof (Aug. 24, 1914). Telephone and Telegraph. This conference, which was convened in the senate chamber of the capitol at Olympia on June 26 and 27, 1914, was composed of the following-named persons: Representing employers. — J. M. Winslow, Everett; C. E. MunseU, Wenatchee: and J. W. Newell, Seattie. Representing employees. — ^Misses Zola McCoughlin, Tacoma; May Jenkins, Walla Walla; and Gertrude Wallner, Belhngham. Representing public. — Prof. Henry M. Hart, Spokane; Dr. EUa J. ITifield, Tacoma; and Mrs. Helen Moore Bebb, Seattle. A most pecuhar situation developed in this conference, which did not occur m any of the others, when it was found that the members representing the pubhc were wholly at variance with the other con- ferees as to the cost of hving. This situation arose when it became evident that the members representing the employees were inclined to ignore the actual requirements of a self-supporting woman and to join passively the employers in the contention that a great ma- jority of the girls employed in the industry were hving at home, part of then- hving expenses thus being borne by their parents. To this argument the members representing the pubhc strongly demurred, contendmg that, should less than a hving wage be estabhshed, the parents would, as a matter of fact, be subsidizing the industry to the extent of the deficiency. Consequently there was a spirited discus- MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 89 sion of the issues involved before the following recommendations were made: (1) to estabUsh a minimum wage of $9 per week; (2) to require a lunch period of one hour; (3) that separate toilets, firoperly ventilated and kept in a sanitary condition, be provided or aU female employees, and (4) that all estabhshments be heated and ventilated and that adequate facilities and arrangements be provided and maintained so that women employed may obtain rest when in a state of fatigue or in case of illness. The commission, accepting these recommendations, issued the following obligatory order Jufy 9, effective September 7, 1914: I. W. C. Order No. 7, July 9, 1914. (1) No person, firm, association, or corporation engaged in the operation of a tele- phone or telegraph line shall employ any female over the age of 18 years in any estab- lishment in connection therewith at a weekly wage rate of less than $9, any lesser wage rate being hereby declared inadequate as to such employees to supply the necessary cost of living and maintain them in health. (2) Not less than one hour shall be allowed for a luncheon period to any female employed in any establishment used in connection with the operation of any tele- graph or telephone line, such requirement being demanded for the health of such employees. (3) Every establiahment used in connection with the operation of any telephone or telegraph line, where females are employed, shall be provided with a toilet separate and apart from any toilet used by any male person, and such toilet shall be properly ventilated and kept and maintained in a sanitary condition, such requirements being demanded for the health and morals of such employees. (4) Every establishment used in connection with the operation of any telegraph or telephone fine, where females are employed, shall be properly heated and ventilated, and shall provide and maintain adequate facilities and arrangements so that such employees may obtain rest when in a state of fatigue or in case of illness. This order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof (Sept. 7, 1914). The commission also issued the following obhgatory order with reference to minors, on August 7, effective October 7, 1914: I. W. C. Order No. 9, Amending I. W. C. Order No. 8, August 7, 1914. (1) No person, firm, association or corporation shall employ any person of either sex under the age of 18 years in or in connection with any telephone or telegraph establishment at a weekly wage rate of less than $6, any lesser wage rate being hereby declared unsuitable in the premises: Provided, That this order shall not apply to messengers, in third-class cities and towns, who are not continuously employed and who are paid by piece rate for their services. (2) No person, firm, association, or corporation conducting, operating, or main- taining any telephone, telegraph, or mercantile establishment, or any messenger or parcel delivery service, shall employ any person of either sex under the age of 18 years before 6 o'clock in the morning or after 9 o'clock in the evening of any day. (3) Nor shall any person, firm, association, or corporation employ any person of either sex under the age of 18 years in any telephone or telegraph e"stablishment before 6 o'clock in the morning or after 9 o'clock in the evening of any day. This order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof (Oct. 7, 1914). Hotels and Restaurants. The only formal conference whose recommendations have not yet been adopted by the commission was that for hotels and restaurants which was held December 1 and 2, 1914, with the foUowiug conferees Representing employers.— 3. M. Hitchings, North Yakima; C. Allen Dale, Seattle and Frank Lynn, Taicoma. Representing employees.— TAm. Amelia Berry, Seattle; Mrs. Emma Wilson, Tacoma and Mrs. Fred Regline, North Yakima. Representing public.—'^. D. Lane, Seattle; Miss Janet Moore, Olympia; and Senator Walter S. Davis, Tacoma. 90 BULLETIN OF THE BUEBAU OE LABOB STATISTICS. After a considerable discussion prompted by the various occupa- tions embraced by the industry, the conference made the following recommendations : (1) That a minimum wage of $11 per week for waitresses and $9 a week for all other employees be estabUshed; (2) that no more than $3.50 per week be deducted from these sums for board and no more than $2 per week for room, and that where both board and room are furnished, not more than $5 be deducted; (3) that separate toilets be provided for all woman workers and that such toilets be properly ventilated and maintained in a sanitary condition; (4) that where special uniforms are required, they shall be fur- nished and laundered by the hotel or restaurant, and (5) that the employment of girls in cigar stands or at cigar counters be prohibited. Before any action was taken on these recommendations the com- mission received a formal protest from the Washington Hotel Men's Association against the $9 wage for aU employees except waitresses and also a protest from the cigar-stand girls then at work, against the prohibition on their employment, as recommended by the con- ference. The commission granted the hotel men a hearing December 29, 1914, when they were represented by their attorney, Thomas B. McMahon, of Seattle, and by A. C. Mitchell, secretary of the associa- tion. At this hearing more time was asked by the hotel men and the request was granted. Investigation of the recommendation with reference to cigar-stand girls developed the fact that the com- mission could not legally prohibit the employment of women of mature age in a lawful occupation and that the proposed action was therefore beyond its province. Pending the further hearing requested by the hotel men, the commission is also pursuing an investigation of the $11 wage recommended for waitresses. Office Employees. The commission's last formal conference prior to the compilation of this report concenied the various clerical occupations embraced in general office work and was held in the senate chamber of the capitol at Olympia, December 3 and 4, 1914, and was composed of the following persons: Representing employers.— 'Rany L. Parr, Olympia; G. F. McAulay, North Yakima; and Frank S. Bayley, Seattle. Representing employees.— Miss Gertrude E. McComb, Seattle; Mrs. Ethel Y. Carl- son, Tacoma; and Miss Blanche Crimp, EUenaburg. Representing public.— Urs. Elwell Hoyt, Tacoma; Prof. J. H. Morgan, Ellensburg; and Mrs. Margaret C. Mtinns, Seattle. After an interesting discussion of the subject of suitable apparel for women in business offices, in which employer and employee sub-^ mitted practically the same estimate for annual expenditures, the conference recommended the estabUshment of a minimum wage of $10 per week for all clerical occupations. It also recommended that not less than one hour be allowed for noonday luncheon, and these recommendations were adopted by the commission at its meeting on December 21, 1914, and the orders issued were made effective Feb- ruary 20, 1915. I. W. C. Order No. 10, December 21, 1914. (1) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any female over the age of 18 years as a stenographer, bookkeeper, typist, billing clerk, filing clerk, cashier, checker invoicer, comptometer operator, or in any clerical work of any kind in any establishment whatsoever, in which a minimum-wage rate applicable to such employee has not heretofore been established, as provided by law, at a weekly wage rate of less MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 91 than $10, any lesser wage rate being hereby declared inadequate as to such employees to siipply the necessary cost of living and maintain them in health (2) Not less than one hour shall be allowed for noonday luncheon to any female employee specified m paragraph (1) hereof, such requirement being demanded for the health or such employees. This order shall beconle effective 60 days from the date hereof (Feb. 20, 1915). I. W. C. Order No. 11, December 21, 1914. (1) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any person of either sex between the ages of 16 and 18 years in the occupation of stenographer, book- keeper, typist, bilhng clerk, filing clerk, cashier, checker, invoicer, comptometer operator, or any clerical office work of whatsoever kind at a weekly wage rate of less /n^ *at'^*'' ^^^ ^^f^^ ^^S® ""^^^ ^^^"^^ hereby declared unsuitable m the premises. (2) No person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any person of either sex under the a^e of 16 years in the occupation of stenographer, bookkeeper, typist, billing clerk, filing clerk, cashier, checker, invoicer, comptometer operator, or any clerical office work of whatsoever kind at a weekly wage rate of less than $6, any lesser wage rate being hereby declared unsuitable in the premises. This order shall become effective 60 days from the date hereof (Feb. 20, 1915). This was the only one of the six conferences in which members representing the disinterested pubUc were not called upon to exer- cise their mission of compromise in order to bring the employer and employee closer together m their estimates. It was the only one of the conferences, too, ia which at least one committee composed of one member of the employers, one of the employees, and one of the disinterested pubhc, together with the chairman of the commis- sion, had not been appointed in an endeavor to secure a unanimous agreement for the recommendation of a wage. The estimates of the employers and employees in former conferences had sometimes varied greatly, when the disinterested pubhc by elimination or sug- gestion finally succeeded in effecting a compromise. In this con- iFerence no such service was required, since the employers recognized the justice of the request made by the employees and willingly ac- ceded to it. It is doubtful if a greater benefit has accrued from these confer- ences than the better understanding of the problems on the one hand and the needs upon the other that has characterized the dehbera- tions of all of them. Many who have come from different parts of the State as strangers to each other to sit in these conferences have admitted that only good has come from the honest and earnest con- sideration of the questions which affect alike the employer and em- ployee, and so the most hopeful phase of the whole vexing problem may be found in the breaking up of old prejudices, the giving up of hurtful customs, the recognition of justice, and the acceptance of the larg"er viewpoint. Apprenticeship Rules, The Washington law makes special provision for the inexperienced worker, so that the two classes of workers, experienced and inex- perienced, may be treated separately and the results thus far obtained show the wisdom of this course. The section of the law covering this question reads: For any occupation in which a minimum rate has been established, the commission through Its secretary may issue to a woman physically defective or crippled by age or otherwise, or to an apprentice in such class of employment or occupation as usually requires to be learned by apprentices, a special license authorizing the employment of such licensee for a wage less than the legal minimum wage; and the commission shall 92 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. fix the minimum wa^e for said person, sucli special license to be issued only in such cases as the commission may decide the same is applied for in good faith and that such license for apprentices shall be in force for such length of time as the said com- mission shall decide and determine is proper. The question of apprenticeship came up for discussion ia each con- ference, though it was not formally presented to any of them by the commission and, therefore, was not a subject for recommendation. * * * In dealing with this difficult problem new paths are being fol- lowed siuce the commission is, to a great extent, pioneering as far as the application of this important yet perplexing feature of minimum wages is concerned. The system which is being painstakingly worked out seeks to control the whole apprenticeship problem by the f ranting of licenses to bona fide apprentices and by limitLng the num- er of apprentices in each establishment. This plan not only safe- guards the interests of the apprentice but protects as well the expe- rienced worker in the plant, and it is designed to eliminate the abuses inherent to the apprenticeship question, which, if unchecked, would result in weakening the whole minimum-wage structure, for by limits ing the number of apprentices in each establishment a general dis- placement of skilled workers is prevented. In constructing this policy each occupation in the different industries has been given special investigation and consideration before determining the period of indenture and the wage which shall apply to that particular occupation. That the apprentice may be paid according to the skill she acquires in her advancement toward the minimum wage the terms of the license provide an increase in wages at stated mtervals, computed according to the advancement of the average learner in her earning capacity and based on investigations into the particidar occupation to which the license appUes, the piecework system affording a prac- tical basis iipon which to make these adjustments. The degree of skill required in each particular occupation is also a governing factor m fixmg the period of indenture. From the fact that the e3tal)lished minimum wage is not intended to represent the maximum earning power of a skilled worker, it must not be presumed that the period of mdenture allowed is intended to be the fuU term of apprenticeship, but rather to be that period of time necessary to reach the point of earning the minimum wage. The gradual increase in wages as the apprenticeship proceeds is designed to protect the apprentice from being discharged when her term of mdenture termmates, at which time she should graduate into the minimum-wage class of workers. This method offers no injustice to her employer as the adjustment is regulated according to ker earn- mg ability, while it requires the most careful consideration of each apphcation for an apprentice's Ucense, sometimes personal investi- gation but always the closest scrutiny, smce many who apply may have already served their full period of apprenticeship for that par- ticular industry when the wage went into effect and sometimes seek to Jude that tact. Naturally, under these conditions, difficulties are constantly being presented, which serve to increase the ah-eady com- plex situation. Ihe commission is proceeding slowly that any defects m the system which develop mav be remedied as the proper solution appears, since the effectiveness of minimum-wage legislation is largely dependent upon the manner in which apprenticeships are controUedt. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 93 The mercantile industry lent itself most readily to the satisfactory adjustment of. apprenticeships, the governing pohcy determined for that mdustry bemg defined m a circular issued April 28, 1914, effec- tive on June 27 foUowing, and containing provisions as follows: April 28, 1914, Effective June 27, 1914. (1) Application for license must be made by the apprentice upon printed blanks furmshed by this commission. ^2^ No license will be issued for a longer period than one year. (3) A wage of not less than |6 a week shall be paid to an apprentice during the first six months' period of employment of such apprentice, and a wage of not less than $7.50 a week shall be paid to an apprentice during the second six months' period of employment of such apprentice. (4) No license shall be valid in any mercantile establishment where more than 17 per cent of the total number of adult female employees are apprentices, nor where more than 50 per cent of such apprentices are receiving legs than a weekly wage of $7.50: Provided, however, That in mercantile establishments where less than six females are employed one license will be valid. Upon the expiration of the year's apprenticeship, the licensee must receive the minimum wage of |10 per week. The policy followed in issuing the license does not confine its holder to any one occupation unless she has entered it to learn some particular class of work, in which case the length of her apprenticeship period is shortened accordingly. It wUl thus be seen that the policy of issuing a license for a year in the mercantile industry is designed to give the learner an opportunity to become sufficiently experienced in the different occupations involved to enable her to command the minimum wage at the expiration of that time. In such occupations as nullinery, hairdressing, manicuring, and dressmaking, where the apprentice had been accustomed to pay for the privilege of learning the trade, a three or four months' initial apprenticeship period at a nominal wage is granted. This wage is only sufiicient to pay the learner's streei^car fare and lunches, but provides an advance at the end of that period and other increases which gradually lead her into the legal minimum wage. This system of apprenticeship will probably be the means of abolishing those so-called trade schools sometimes run in connection with such estab- lishments, but wUl not apply to those exclusive trade schools which are not operated for a profit and therefore do not sell their product. In issuing licenses in these occupations the foIlx)wing policy governs: Millinery and Dressmaking. One year's apprenticeship divided into three periods as follows: Seventeen weeks at $3 per week, 17 weeks at $5 per week, and 18 weeks at $7.50 per week. Manicuring and Hairdressing. One year's apprenticeship divided into four periods of 13 weeks each: $1.50 per week for the first period, $4 per week for the second, $6 per week for the third, and $8 per week for the fourth. Telephones and Telegraphs. An absolute policy was adopted with reference to apprentices in telephone and telegraph establishments. The system previously in operation in the larger exchanges was based on an apprenticeship period of 18 months, but the commission, being convinced that 18 94 BXJLLETIlir OF THE BUEBATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. months was a longer apprenticeship term than seemed just, reduced this to nine months, broken into two or four periods, owing to the locality in which the exchange is operated. The wage scale is practically identical with the old system, except that the increases formerly made in 18 months must be completed in nine months. The learner begins at $6 a week, receiving that for the first three months; $6.60 per week for two months; $7.20 per week for the following two months; $7.80 for the last two months, and then $9 per week — the established minimum. In the smaller exchanges the apprenticeship term is divided into but two periods, the learner receivmg $6 per week for the first four months' and $7.50 per week for the last five months. Laundries. The commission adopted the following policy with reference to apprentices in the laundering industry: Tnree months at $6 per week and three months at $7.50 per week. It also determined that no more than 25 per cent of the total number of females employed would be allowed as apprentices; further, that no more than half of those employed on the mangle machines may be a^pprentices, and that the time required to learn to feed a mangle shall not be more than two months. The above limitations, however, have been taken advantage of by laundrymen in but a very few instances, as the survey shows that less than 8 per cent of the total number of laundry employees are apprentices or minors. Many of the large establislunents have dis- pensed entirely with apprentices, relying wholly on seciu"ing the highest skilled help obtamable and paying the minimum wage or over in all cases. Factories. Apprenticeships in the manufacturing industry present a problem more intricate and far more difficult of satisfactory adjustment than do the other industries, because of the miiltiplicity of occupations involved. Some of the occupations in this general industry require very little skiU or time to learn, while others need both mental and physical adaptabihty to the particular work in question as well as a consider- able period of time m which to master their details. The piece-rate plan of payment, which prevails in many factories, becomes an important factor in solving the problem, in that the worker's earning ability is estimated by the number of finished pieces she is able to turn out in a given tune. Hence the amoimt found in the weekly pay envelope depends, not only upoii the accurate knowledge of each intricate operation, but also the speed acquired by each indi- vidual worker. The fact that many of the manufacturing establish-, ments of the State are not extensive enough to keep an entire force of operatives employed continuously at the same kind of emplovment compels many to become f anuhar with a number of different" occu- pations, so that when work becomes slack in one department they can be transferred to another. Because of this condition girls become experienced m several, if not all, of the different departments of the same mdustry, thereby becommg more skilled, although usuaEy not able to attam so great speed as when employed continuously in the MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 95 same kind of work, and when such a condition prevails they are requu-ed to serve a longer term of apprenticeship than when employed in one particular occupation. It will be readily reahzed that the almost endless number of occupations encountered in this industry makes the determination of a specific term of apprenticeship both unwise and unjust. It therefore became necessary for the commission to mvestigate each occupation separately and to issue hcenses based upon the degree of skiU required and the consequent time necessary to become fa,mihar with each occupation involved. In accordance with this policy, hcenses to apprentices in that industry range from six weeks to one year, broken into two or more periods, beginning with a wage of $Q per week and approaching the minimum of $8.90 through these various stages of advancement. Printed notices of instruction with reference to granting of apprenticeship licenses were issued as follows : (1) Application for license must be made to the commiasion upon printed blanks whicli will be furnished on request. ' (2) The application blank must be filled out and sent to the commission by the employee and not by the employer. (3) The term of license and wage to be paid by the employer will be determined by the commission^ based upon previous experience of the applicant and the par- ticular occupation in which she will be engaged. (4) If a license be granted to the applicant it will be effective from the date of the application. (5) Application blanks must be filled out in a complete manner or they will not be considered. Office Employees. It may be assumed that a girl's public school or business college course prepares her in large measure for service in general office work, and therefore only the additional time necessary to become familiar with the work of the particular establishment in which she is serving her apprenticeship need be considered in issuing licenses in such occupations. The general policy followed by the commission stipu- lates that licenses may be issued at a weekly wage rate of not less than $7.50 and that the longest period of apprenticeship in any of the office employments shall not be more than six months. Effects of Minimum-wage Law in Washington, To ascertain the effect of the fixing of minimum-wage rates in Washington, the commission made a survey of some of the larger estabhshments in three of the industries where minimum rates had been put in force. The establishments covered in each survey were deemed to be fairly representative of the industry to which they belonged, and included aU women and minors found on the pay roUs of such establishments at certain dates before and after the fixing of minimum rates. The three industries covered in the commission's survey are set forth in the following tables, the figures having been obtained from 24 of the leading mercantile establishments, from 11 of the largest laundries in the State, arid from a number of the largest telephone exchanges. They were taken from the regular pay rolls for the week ending September 20, 1913, and for the corresponding week of 1914, 96 BULLETIN OF THE BUKEATJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. therefore showing the wage conditions before and after the law became operative. By a careful analysis of the results here given a conclusion as to the general effect of such legislation may be reached, bearing in mind always that the reports for 1914 were taken at a time of business depression, when conditions did not afford the most favorable test. Notwithstanding that fact, each industry covered records an increase in the average wage paid. The entire number of workers included in the report for 1913 is 4,894, as against 4,828 in 1914, or a decrease of 66. In mercantile employment, 1914 shows a decrease of 87, and laundry employment a decrease of 30, while in telephone employment there was an increase of 61. Since the mercantile and laundering industries are apt to respond more quickly to the business pulse, it is safe to assume that the very slight decrease in the number employed in 1914 was wholly due to business conditions and not attributable to the establishment of the wage. Were this decrease greater or were it to be found in those groups of women receiving the minimum or over, the conclusion might reasonably be attributed to the compulsory higher wage, but since it occm-3 wholly within those groups receiving less than the minimum, that contention can not be sustained. This conclusion is fm-ther strengthened by the fact that had the estabUshment of the wage been in any measure the cause, the decrease would have been very much greater. COMPARATIVE WAGES OF FEMALES AND MINORS EMPLOYED IN 24 MERCANTILE ESTABLISHMENTS IN SEPTEMBER,'1913, AND SEPTEMBER, 1914. WeeMy wage.' Total number of females and minors. Females and minors on pay rolls of both 1913 and 1914. Weekly wage.i Total number of females and minors. Females and minors on pay rolls of both 1913 and 1914. 1913 1914 1913 1914 1913 1914 1913 1914 J3.00 20 5 4 1 18 8 25 4 100. 2 141 17 204 16 192 4 188 6 50 5 193 9 15 20 i 48 1 12 15 16 3 4 ■"■■677 9 103 7 216 9 26 26 $14.00 60 2 164 2 27 15 14 26 66 4 5 4 67 3 23 37 7 9 9 6 42 6 194 33^ 25 18 33 57 6 5 6 71 1 23 42 3 10 6 10 41 1 100 1 19 10 10 17 38 3 3 4 38 2 16 27 3 7 6 4 31 3 50 14.50 3 4.00 60 18 72 2 254 4 311 48 490 44 441 4 370 13 72 8 355 16 22 37 ■■"276" 6 66 67 114 25" 14 1,323 26 132 11 372 13 38 36 15.00 114 4.50 16.50 2 5.00 16.00 24 6.50 16.50 22 6.00 17.00 13 6.50 17.60 18 7.00 18.00 36 7.50 18.50 3 8. 00 19.00 4 8.60 19.50 5 9.00 20.00 63 9.60 21.00 1 10.00 22 00 17 10.60 25.00 .. . 31 11.00 27 50 3 11.50 30.00 9 12.00 35.00 6 12.60 Over $35.00 Total 4 13 00 13.50 3,189 3,102 1,571 1.571 ' The minimum wage became eOective June 27, 1914. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION — UNITED STATES. 97 According to the above table, out of the total of 3,189 women and minors found on the pay rolls in September, 1913, 1,571, or 49.2 per cent, were still employed in September, 1914, three months after the minimum-wage determination became effective in that industry. Comparing the wages received in 1914 with those received in 1913, it is seen that 636 employees had been advanced to the $10 legal mini- mum wage, and of those receiving more than $10 per week in 1913, 147 had been advanced to a higher wage in 1914, making a general increase to 783 employees, or 49.8 per cent of the total shown. COMPARATIVE WAGES OF FEMALES AND MINORS EMPLOYED IN 11 LAUNDRIES IN SEPTEMBER, 1913, AND SEPTEMBER, 1914. Weekly wage.i Total number of females and minors. Females and minors on pay rolls of both 1913 and 1914. Weekly wage.i Total number of females and minors. Females and minors on pay rolls of both 1913 and 1914. 1913 1914 1913 1914 1913 1914 1913 1914 te.oo 4 7 8 1 $9.75 8 63 16 42 8 49 7 19 5 12 5 37 5 50 25 35 5 61 12 26 8 11 3 25 1 29 4 21 3 27 3 13 4 6 3 26 2 6.25 1 2 3 15 5 4 4 22 6 16 6 17 6 13 i 1 2 76 3 20 10. 00 25 6. SO 10.50 6.75 18 5 62 10 25 74 18 41 22 66 7 35 2 7 12 4 1 11 '"■'267' 9 47 11 00 24 7.00 11.50 3 7.25 12.00 31 7.50 12. 50 6 7. 75 13.00 16 8.00 13.50 7 8.25 14.00 9 8.50 14.50 2 8. 75 15. 00 and over Total 23 9.25 665 635 260 260 9.50 I The Tninimnm wage became elective Aug. 24, 1914. According to the above table, out of a total of 665 women and girls foxind on the pay rolls of 11 estabhshments in 1913, 260, or 39 per cent, were still employed in September, 1914, after the minimum wage had become effective in that industry. In 1913 there were 286 women receiving less than $9, while in 1914 only 46 received less than that amount. These 46 girls were either minors or apprentices. In 1913, 66 girls were receiving $9, while in 1914, after the minimum wage became effective, this number was increased to 267. In 1913 only 379 women were receiving $9 or more, while in 1914 there were 589 receiving this amount. 82843°— Bull. 167—15 7 98 BXJLX,ETIN OF THE BUKEAU OF LABOR STATISXICS. COMPAEATIVE WAGES OF FEMALES AND MINORS IN TELEPHONE EMPLOYMENT IN SEPTEMBER, 1913, AND SEPTEMBER, 1914. Weekly wage.' Total number of females and minors. Females and minors on pay roUs of both 1913 and 1914. Weekly wage.i Total number of females and minors. Females and minors on pay roUsofboth 1913 and 1914. 1913 1914 1913 1914 1913 1914 1913 1914 $6.00 62 3 13 90 12 106 27 66 86 74 64 92 55 52 3 23 23 12 58 12 28 7 12 129 2 82 17 1 4 35 5 48 17 38 45 41 42 52 29 i 2 68 2 58 $9.90 28 110 18 30 9 22 16 21 5 2 30 282 126 42 49 31 20 19 28 12 3 36 12 69 10 21 5 16 ^^l 3 3 26 6.30 10.20 109 6.60 10.60 33 6.90 10.80. 7.20 11.10 7.50 11.40 18 17 7.80 11 70 8.10 12.00 8.40 12.50 ll 8.70 13 00 2 9.00 Over $13. 00 Total 34 9.30.. . 9.60 1,040 1,091 565 565 1 The minimum wage became effective Sept. 7, 1914. According to the above table, out of a total of 1,040 women and girls found on the pay rolls in September, 1913, 565, or 54.3 per cent, were still employed in September, 1914, after the minimum wage had become effective in that industry. In 1913 there were 539 girls receiving less than $9, while in 1914 only 230 were employed at so low a rate. These were all minors or apprentices. In 1913 only 64 girls were receiving S9 per week, while in 1914, after the minimum wage became effective, this number was increased to 129. Out of a total of 539 girls, 309, or 57.3 per cent, had been advanced to the mini- mum or over, the number receiving $9.90 in 1913 having been increased from 28 to 282 in 1914. In 1913 there were 437 girls receiving over $9, while in 1914 this number was increased to 732. Hon. Opinions of the Attorney General. _ Oltmpia, Wash., October 2A, WIS. .E.W.Olson, *' ChairTnanof the Industrial Welfare Commission, Olympia, Wash. Dear Sm: I am in receipt of your letter as follows: I desire to obtain your opinion upon the following points, relative to the powers of the Industrial Welfare Commission for the State of Washington, as estabhshed by chapter 174, Laws 1913, State of Washington : (1) In the event that any conference called by the commission shall find the health or morals of women or minors to be perniciously affected by the employment of said women or minors in any industry (a) for a number of hours per day or week not specifically prohibited by the eight-hour law, or (b) during a period of each 24 hours not at present specifically prohibited by law; and m the event that such conference shall recommend to this commission that such number or arrangement of hours be changed, does the power reside m this commission to issue an obligatory order em- bodying such recommendation? (2) .^^jPj' ^^^P^*' ^liat the cost of maintenance for women workers shall be found to vary m different parts of the State, does the power reside in this commission, upon the recommendation of any conference, to issue an obligatory order whicll shall specify different wage minimums in different parts of the State for women workers in the same industry or occupation? MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. 99 First. In my opinion chapter 174 of the Laws of 1913 does not repeal chapter 37 of the Laws of 1911, commonly known as the " eight- hour law for women." It would seem, therefore, that the com- mission has no power to issue an obligatory order embodying a rec- ommendation of a conference as to the number of hours per day or week, or the number of hours within any 24 hours, women may be employed, where such women are witmn the terms of the eight- hour law. Second. From a careful reading of chapter 174, supra, it is my opinion that any order fixing a minimum wage for women must be general throughout the State as to the particular trade or industry affected. These questions, however, are by no means free from doubt, and if it is deemed advisable to enter orders in conflict with the con- clusions above stated, I would suggest that such orders be entered, and the matter of the determination of their vahdity be left to the courts. Yours respectfully, W. V. Tanner, Attorney General. Olympia, Wash., January IS, 1914. Hon. E. W. Olson, Chairman Industrial Welfare Commission, Olympia, WasTi. Dear Sir: You have requested the opinion of this ofiice upon the following question: Does the power reside in this commission, in pursuance of the duties imposed upon it in section 10 of chapter 174, Laws of 1913, to determine and define what shall con- stitute an occupation, trade or industry? Section 10, chapter 174, Laws of 1913, provides in part asfoUows: If, after investigation, the commission shall find that in any occupation, trade or industry, the wages paid to female employees are inadequate to supply them necessary cost of living and to maintain the workers in health, or that the conditions of labor are prejudicial to the health or morals of the workers, the commission is empowered to call a conference composed of an equal number of representatives of employers and employees in the occupation or industiy in question, together with one or more disinterested persons representing the public; but the representatives of the public shall not exceed the number of representatives of either of the other parties; and a member of the commission shall be a member of such conference and chairman thereof. * * * No particular classification being directed by statute, it foUows that the commission is authorized to exercise a reasonable discretion in making proper classifications for the purposes of investigations and conferences. You are advised that the commission has authority to make investigations and to determine and define, within reasonable bounds, what shall constitute an occupation, trade, or industry for the purpose of investigations and conferences. We must not be understood as advising that the commission is authorized to make, or is justified in making, arbitrary classifications or distinctions, so as to include withia such classifications or definitions, occupations, trades, or industries having obviously no reasonable relation one to the other. Yours respectfully, Scott Z. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General. 100 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOE STATISTIOS. Oltmpia, Wash., January 13,, 1914- Hon. E. W. Olson, Chairman Industrial Welfare Commission, Olympia, Wash. Dear Sie: We are in receipt of your request, which is as follows: I desire to request from you whetter or not Under the provisions of section 13, chap- ter 174, Laws of 1913, it shall be necessary for this commission to submit to a confer- ence for its recommendations the question of the adoption of rules to be followed in issuing through the secretary of the commission to a woman physically defective or crippled by age or otherwise, or to an apprentice in such class of employment or occupation as usually requires to be learned by apprentices, a special license author- izing the employment of such licensee for a wage less than the legal minimum wage. Section 13, chapter 174, Laws of 1913, provides: For any occupation in which a minimum rate has been established, the commission through its secretary may issue to a woman physically defective or crippled by age or otherwise, or to an apprentice in such class of employment or occupation as usually reqiiires to be learned by apprentices, a special license authorizing the employment of such licensee for a wage less than the legal minimum wage; and the commission shall fix the minimum wage for said person, such special Ucense to be issued only in such cases as the commission may decide the same is applied for in good faith and that such license for apprentices shall be in force for such length of time.as the said commission shall decide and determine is proper. No reference is made in said section to a conference, and nowhere in the act is there provision made for submitting to the conference for its recommendation the question of the adoption of rules to be followed with reference to the provisions of section 13, supra. You are, therefore, advised that the matter of the license referred to in said section is within the discretion of the commission, subject to no condition with reference to recommendations of a conference, except that a minimum rate must have been established for such occupation. Yours, respectfully, Scott Z. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General. Regulations of Commlstton Governing Procedure ot Conterencea. The Industrial Welfare Commission for the State of Washington, duly appointed and qualified as provided by chapter 174 of the Ses- sion Laws of 1913 of the said State of Washington, having heretofore made investigation as provided by law concerning the employment of women and minors in the mercantile industry, the wages paid said women and minors, and the conditions surrounding their work and employment in said industry, and being fuUy a(Msed in the premises, finds as follows: That in the said mercantile industry within the State of Wash- ington the wages paid to female employees in said industry are in- adequate to supply them necessary cost of Uving and to maintain the workers therein in health, and that the conditions of labor therein are prejudicial to the health and morals of the workers: Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon this commis- sion by law and in piu-suance thereof, it is hereby ordered that a con- ference be called for the consideration of wages paid and conditions of labor m said mercantile industry, said conference to be composed of an equal number of representatives of employers and employees MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION UNITED STATES. ;/ ;/ lOT in said industry, together with an equal number of disintereltedNpe^' sons representing the public as hereinafter provided, the dat^pf jihe- first convention of said conference to be fixed by this comnilssiM after the representatives of said conference have been diily selected' as hereinafter provided. The term "commission" shall mean the Industrial Welfare Com- mission of the State of Washington. It is hereby further ordered that the following rules and regula- tions be, and the same are hereby, adopted as the rules and regulations governing the selection of representatives and the mode of procedure of said conference. 1. A conference shall consist of nine persons and a member of the commission who shaU be chairman of said conference, three to repre- sent the employers, three to represent the employees, and three to represent the pubhc. One of the members representing the public shall be appointed by the chairman as chief interrogator. A mem- ber of the commission shall act as chairman of the conference. 2. The method of selecting members of the conference shall be as follows: Each member of the commission shall nominate and send nine names to the secretary thereof. Three of these shall be employers in the industry for which the conference is being called; three shall be. employees in said industry, and three shall be disinterested per- sons to represent the public. The secretary in turn shall then send a complete hst to each member of the commission for his or her in- vestigation, a period of at least one week being allowed for that pur- pose, after which the commission, sitting in regular session or any special session of the commission called for said purpose, shall select from among these names nine persons who shall constitute the con- ference, of whom at least one employer and one employee shall be from that portion of the State east of the summit of the Cascade Mountains. 3. After the selection of the members of the conference in each industry as provided in the foregoing section, the commission shall, from the names remaining, select nine alternates who shall have the same qualifications for membership on the conference as the regu- larly selected members ; these alternates to fill any vacancies that may occur, according to a definite priority to be determined by the com- mission at the time of their selection. 4. A conference thus selected may, upon request by the commis- sion, be called together at any time and place that the commission may designate, provided that each member of said conference shall be given at least 10 days' notice of such meeting and at the time of serving such notice shall be provided with a copy of the report of the findings of the commission in its investigation of the wages and con- ditions of labor of women and minors m the trade or mdustry for which the conference is called, and shall serve until discharged by the commission. 5. When the conference is called to order by the chairman, it shall deliberate under parliamentary law, and no question shall be discussed that is not germane to the conditions of labor or cost of Hving of working women or minors as applied to that particular trade or indus- try. Roberts's Rules of Order shall govern. 102 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAXJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. 6. The commission may at its discretion fill any vacancies that may occur in its conferences. 7. The conference in its deliberations shall proceed on the principle estabhshed by the commission that a minimum wage or condition of labor of women and minors shall be general throughout the State as to the particular trade or industry affected wherever same shall be estabhshed. 8. The chair shall not permit the discussion of the question as a whole until after each item of the cost of Hving has been taken up in the order given in the estimate blanks prepared by the commis- sion, unless otherwise directed by a majority vote of the conference. After proper dehberation and discussion of questions that have been presented to the conference by the commission, the conference shall then, upon request of the commission, proceed to make recommenda- tions upon such questions as the commission may designate. 9. The members of the conference so selected shall be paid their actual traveling and hotel expenses while attending said conference (out of the regular appropriation set aside by the legislature) , pro- vided that evidence of such expense be filed with the commission and sworn to in the manner provided by law, and it is further pro- vided that before being allowed said . expenses are to be approved by the commission. 10. The secretary of the commission or a shorthand reporter shall be present at each conference and shall record the minutes of the meetings, and shall be ex officio secretary of said conference. 11. No member of the conference shall be entitled to speak more than twice on any subject, or more than five minutes at a time, except by unanimous consent of the conference. 12. The commission may amend, modify, or suspend, by a two- thirds vote, any of the foregoing rules or regulations. Dated at Olympia, Wash., March 10, 1914. WISCONSIN. The Wisconsin act came into effect permissively July 1, 1913, and compulsorily July 1, 1914; that is, the law authorized the commission, upon its own initiative, to undertake investigations for the purpose of wage determinations after July 1, 1913, but directed that such investigations must be taken up upon complaint after July 1, 1914. Preliminary to the Wisconsin law becoming fuUy effective, the commission undertook an investigation of wages, cost of Hving, etc., for female and minor employees. The results of this investigation have not yet been published. A recent letter from the commission, in response to an inquiry, states that the whole question has been delayed because the commission is awaiting the action of the supreme coiirt on the Oregon law. MINIMUM- WAGE LEGI&LATION — UNITED STATES. 103 ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR ON THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGE.' From the report we have given, it will be observed that the move- ment for a minimum wage for women and minors has gained consider- able headway in our country, and that sentiment in favor of a hving wage is rapidly crystallizing. That this growth of sentiment among the people is due to the activities of the organized wage earners there can be no doubt. The organized labor movement has insisted from the beginning upon the estabhshment of a living wage as a minimum, and it has through the force of organized effort, succeeded in estab- lishing minimum wages and maximum hours of labor far superior to those prescribed by the wage boards of other countries. There is a marked difference, however, between the laws of other countries and the laws enacted or proposed in various States in our country. In England and in Austraha authority is vested in wage boards to fix minimum wages for men workers as well as for women and minors; whereas in America these laws relate exclusively to women workers and to minors. If it were proposed in this country to vest authority in any tribimal to fix by law wages for men, labor would protest by every means in its power. Through organization the wages of men can and wUl be mamtained at a higher minimum than they would be if fixed by legal enactment. But there is a far more significant ground for opposing the establish- ment by law of a minimum wage for men. The principle that organ- ization is the most potent means for a shorter workday and for a higher standard of wages apphes to women workers equally as to men. But the fact must be recognized that the organization of women workers constitutes a separate and more difiici3t problem. Women do not organize as readily or as stably as men. They are therefore more easily exploited. They certainly are in a greater measure than men entitled to the concern of society. A fair standard of wages, a living wage for aU employed in an industry, should be the first con- sideration in production. None are more entitled to that standard than are the women and minors. An industry which denies to aU its workers and particularly denies to its women and minors who are toilers a hving wage is unfit and should not be permitted to exist. We recognize, of course, that in our time legislation of this character is experimental and that sufficient experience with it has not been had to enable us to secure comprehensive and accurate information as to its tendency and its effect upon wages and industrial conditions; therefore, we recommend that for the information of the labor movement the executive council be instructed to watch develop- ments where such legislation is in force and to record carefully the activities, the decisions, and the trend of minimum-wage boards. We recommend that in aU minimum-wage laws the organized workers should see to it that provision is made for the representation on minimum-wage boards of the organized wage earners, and that the laws are so changed or drawn and administered as to afford the largest measure of protection to women and minor workers — those they are designed to protect. 1 From Eeport of Executive Cotmca in Report of Proceedings of the Thirty-third Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor. Washington, 1913, pp. 63 and 64. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.' INTRODUCTION. The models and the experience upon which all of the minimum-wage legislation in Great Britata and the United States are based are to be found in the history of the movement ia Austraha (ia Victoria, especially) and New Zealand srace the introduction of the system ia those countries, in Victoria in 1896 and in New Zealand in 1894. Two systems based on different principles exist ia Australia and New Zealand for the regulation of wages and conditions of employ- ment. A wages-board system exists ia Victoria and Tasmania, and an industrial arbitration-court system ia New Zealand and Western Australia. In New South Wales and, since 1912, in Queens- land and South Austraha the two systems are combiaed, wages or industrial boards as weU as industrial arbitration courts forming a part of the system. Under the wages-board system in Victoria the board determraa- tions may be reviewed by the court of iadustrial appeals. In Tas- mania an appeal may be made to the supreme court. Under the mixed system ia existence ia New South Wales the industrial boards are under the control of the iadustrial covit, and the awards of the iadustrial boards may be reviewed by the court. A.siaular method is followed in Queensland and South Australia. There is also an arbitration court of the Commonwealth of Australia, which has power to deal with wages. The power of the Conunonwealth court, how- ever, is limited to matters extendiag beyond the limits of a single State. The chief aims of the wages-board system are to regulate wages, hours, and conditions of employment by the decision of a wages board or compulsory conference (called a special board) of representa- tives of employers and employees, presided over by a neutral chair- man. A determiaation of this board, unless disapproved by the court on review, applies compulsorily to the entire iadustry and area for which the board was created. The wages board is usually brought iato existence for any specified industry or group of industries by petition or application, followed by authorization ia a resolution of Parliament. Under the industrial arbitration com-t system, the chief purpose of which is the prevention and settlement of iadustrial dis- 1 This section is based largely upon a summary given in the Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 7, 1914, pp. 920, et seq. 104 MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION AUSTBALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 105 putes, an industry does not come under review until a dispute has actually arisen. Most of the acts, however, have given the president of the court power to summon a compulsory conference. The scope of the arbitration court's authority is even broader than that of the wages boards, applying to any industrial matters. WAGES-BOARD SYSTEM. The wages-board system was introduced in Victoria by the factories and shops act of 1896. The original bill made provision only for the regulation of the wages of women and children, but it was afterwards amended in Parliament to extend the system to adult employees of both sexes. The act of 1896 made provision for the regulation of wages in six sweated trades only. By an act of 1900 the operations of the law were extended to include aU persons employed, either inside or outside a factory or workroom, in any trade usually carried on therein. The act of 1907 extended the system to trades and businesses not con- nected in any way with factories, making provision for the appoint- ment of wages boards for metropolitan shop employees, carters and drivers, and persons employed in connection with buildings or quarry- ing, or the preparation of firewood for sale, or the distribution of coal or coke. The act of 1909 extended the system to the mining industry, and those of 1910 extended the operation of the act to the shires. Originally the wages board was elected, but the difficulty of com- piling electoral rolls led to the adoption of the simpler system of nomination, which has proved satisfactory. The board fixes the wages and hours of work and may limit the number of improvers who may be employed (usually by prescribing one to a certain number of journeymen employed). The board fixes the wages of apprentices and improvers according to age, sex, and experience, and may fix a graduated scale of rates calculated on the same basis. Apprentices bound for less than three years are im- provers unless the minister sanctions the shorter term of apprentice- ship on account of previous experience in the trade. The minister may sanction the employment of an improver over 21 years of age at a rate proportionate to his experience. Workers in the clothing trade must be paid piece rates. Manufacturers may, by leave of the board, fix their own piece rates if calculated upon the average wages of time workers as fixed by the board. Licenses for 12 months to work at a fixed rate lower than the minimum rate may be granted by the chief inspector of factories to persons unable to obtain employ- ment by reason of age, slowness, or infirmity. Such licenses are renewable. Penalties are fixed for the direct or indirect violation of determi- nations, the violation being ascertained by examination of the records of wages which are required to be kept. 106 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. The court of industrial appeals has power to review the determina- tions of the boards. In Tasmania the wages-board system was introduced by the act of 1910 (January 13, 1911) and came into operation March 31, 1911. The experience, therefore, is limited. South Australia enacted the wages-board system in 1900, 1904, and 1906, but the first-named act was rendered inoperative owing to the failvire of ParUament to enact the regulations necessary for carrying it into effect. The act of 1904 revived the wages-board system respect- ing women and children in white-goods trades. 'The action of this statute was paralyzed by a decision, the effect of which was to prevent a graduated scale of wages, such as fixed by the Victorian boards. The necessity for some protection to the persons intended to be bene- fited by these statutes was xu-ged in the annual reports of the chief inspector of factories, but until 1 906 without effect. Many employers, however, voluntarily comphed with the board's determinations during the period when, because of the failure of the law, they were without legal force. The system was brought into full operation by the act of 1906, which preceded the Victorian act of 1907 in extending the system to other trades, and was of a wider scope than the Victorian act. In New South Wales industrial boards were introduced under the industrial disputes act, 1908, the arbitration-court system having been in existence from 1901 to that date. The act of 1912 introduced the mixed system of industrial boards and an industrial court. Wages boards were introduced in Queensland under the wages boards act of 1908 and this act with the amendiQg acts continued in force imtil repealed and replaced by the industrial peace act, 1912, which came into effect January 1, 1913. This act, whUe embodying the principal provisions of the wages boards acts, provided for the establishment of an industrial court of appeals. AU boards estab- hshed under the repealed acts continued in existence and their deter- minations were recognized as awards under the new act. The various steps and method in the procedure in fixing wages in Victoria are briefly summarized in the following statement: PROCEDURE IN FIXING MINIMUM WAGE. 1. A resolution of Parliament authorizes one or more special boards for a trade or group of trades. 2. The governor in council establishes the boards. 3. The board may, on its own initiative, make investigation and a determination fixing minimum time and piece rates of wages, maximum hours of labor, minimum rates for overtime and holidays, the proportionate number of apprentices and improvers, and the minimum rates for them, etc. 4. The determination of the board is signed by the chairman and published in the Government Gazette and comes into force at a date fixed by the board, but not within 30 days of the determination. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION- ^AUSTBALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 107 5. The determination may be suspended, by order of the governor in council, for not exceeding six months, whereupon the board must forthwith reconsider and amend or adhere to its determination. If it adheres to its determination the suspension is revoked by an order effective not later than 14 days. 6. The determination may be brought before the industrial court on appeal by a majority of the representatives of employers or a majority of the representatives of employees on the board or by any employer or group of employers who employ not less than 25 per cent of the total workers in the trade or by 25 per cent or more of the workers in the trade. The minister may at any time refer a determination to the court. 7. In case of appeal or reference the governor in council shall appoint two persons upon nomination of representives of employers and employees respectively on the special board and these two persons with the president of the court (one of the judges of the supreme court) shall constitute the industrial court. 8. The determination of the court shall be final and without appeal and may not be reviewed or altered by a board without the leave of the court. 9. The determination of the court shall be forwarded to the minister by the registrar and shall be published in the Government Gazette. 10. The validity of a determination of any board may be challenged before the supreme court. ARBITRATION-COURT SYSTEM. The first Australian act wkereby one party to a labor dispute could be summoned before and presumably made subject, as in proceedings of an ordinary court of law, to the order of a court was the South Australian act of 1894. The principles of this act have been largely followed in other States, but it proved abortive in operation in its own State and in many respects was superseded by the wages-board system which was brought into operation by the act of 1906. West- em Australia passed an arbitration act in 1900, repealed and reen- acted with amendments in 1902 and 1909, the whole being consoh- dated in the industrial arbitration act of 1912. The court system was adopted in New South Wales in 1901, and various changes having been subsequently introduced, a consolidation was made in 1912, the system including industrial boards as well as an arbitration court. Queensland, which had been under a wages-board system since 1908, introduced the combined system under the industrial peace act of 1912. The Commonwealth principal act, passed in 1904, apphes only to industrial disputes extending beyond the hmits of a single State. INDUSTRIAL UNIONS. The arbitration act, framed to encourage a system of collective bargaining, to facilitate appUcations to the court, and to assure to the worker such benefits as may be derived from organization, virtually creates the industrial union. This, except in New South Wales and Western Australia, has been quite distinct from the trade-union; it is not a volimtary association, but rather an organization necessary for the administration of the law. The New South Wales act of 1901 required all trade associations to register as "industrial unions," pre- 108 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEAXT OF LABOB STATISTICS. scribing the separation of industrial and benefit funds and enforcing strict and proper management, the industrial funds being available in payment of penalties incurred for breaches of the arbitration act. Industrial unions (or "organizations" as they are styled in the Com- monwealth act) may be formed by employers or employees. They must be registered and must file annual returns of membership and fimds. Before unions of employers are registered, there must be in their employment a minimum number of employees. In New South Wales and Western Australia the minimum is 50; under the Com- monwealth act 100. Unions of employees must, in Western Austraha, have a membership of 15; by the Commonwealth act a membership of 100 is required. The union rules must contain provisions for the direction of business, and, in particular, for regulating the method of making apphcations or agreements authorized by the acts. In West- em Australia rules must be inserted prohibiting the election to the xmion of men who are not employers or workers in the trade and the use of imion funds for the support of strikes and lockouts; a rule must also be inserted requiring the unions to make use of the act. INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENTS. Employers and employees may settle disputes and conditions of labor by industrial agreements which are registered and have the force of awards. Such agreements are enforceable against the parties and such other organizations and persons as signify their intention to be bound by them. POWERS OF COURT. Failing agreement, disputes are settled by reference to the coiu-t. In the Commonwealth this consists of a judge of the high court. The court may (and on the application of an original party to the dispute must) appoint two assessors at any stage of the dispute. In the States the president of the tribimal (usually a judge of the supreme court) is assisted by members (the number varying under the various acts) chosen by and appointed to represent the employers and employees, respectively. Cases are brought before the court by either employers or em- ployees. The consent of a majority of a union voting at a specially summoned meeting is necessary to the institution of a case; the Commonwealth act requires the certificate of the registrar that it is a proper case for consideration. The powers of the court are more numerous and varied than those of the Victorian boards; it hears and makes awards upon all matters concerning employers and employees. The breadth of its jurisdiction may be gathered from the Commonwealth definition of "industrial matters," viz: all matters relating to work, pay, wages, reward, hours, privileges, rights, or duties of employers or employees, or the mode, tenns, and MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION ^AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 109 conditions of employment or nonemployment; and in particular, but without limitmg the general scope of this definition, the term includes all matters pertaming to the relations of employers and employees, and the employment, preferential employment, dismissal or nonemployment of any particular persons, or of persons of any particular sex or age, or being or not being members of any organiza- tion, association, or body; and any claim arising under an industrial agreement; and all questions of wnat is fair ana right in relation to any industrial matter having regard to the interest of persons imme- diately concerned, and of society as a whole. The object of the court is to prevent and settle industrial dis- putes; and, when disputes have occurred, to reconcile the parties. The court may fix and enforce penalties for breaches of awards, restrain contraventions of the acts, and exercise all the usual powers of a court of law. The court is to bring about an amicable agreement, if possible to conciliate and not to arbitrate, and such agreement may be made an award. In order to prevent a matter coming into dispute the president of the arbitration court may convene a compulsory confer- ence under his own presidency. Attendance of persons summoned to attend is compulsory. Provision is made in the recent act whereby, if there is no settlement arrived at in the conference, the president may refer the matter to the court and then arbitrate on it. There are four ways in which a matter may be brought before the coijrt: (a) By the registrar certifying that it is a dispute proper to be dealt witn by the court in the pubUc interest. (6) By the parties, or one of them, submitting the dispute to the court by plaint in the prescribed manner, (c) By a State industrial authority, or the governor in councU of a State in which there is no such authority, requesting the court to adjudicate. {d) By the president referring to the court a dispute as to which he has neld a conference without an agreement being reached. AU parties represented are bound by the award, and also all parties within the scope of a common rule. The court possesses full powers for enforcement of awards. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS. LAWS IN FORCE. Victoria: Factories and shops act, 1912, enacted December 7, 1912. Factories and shops act, 1912 (No. 2), enacted December 31, 1912. Factories and shops acts amendment act, 1914, enacted November 2, 1914. New South Wales: Industrial arbitration act, 1912, enacted April 15, 1912. Minimum wage act, 1908, enacted December 24, 1908 (fixing legislative mini- mum wage). 110 BULLETIIT OF THE BXTBBATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. Queensland: Industrial peace act, 1912, enacted December 7, 1912. Factories and shops act, 1900, enacted December 28, 1900 (fixing legislative minimum wage). Factories and shops act amendment act, 1908, enacted April 15, 1908 (fixing legislative minimum wage). South Australia: Factories act, 1907, enacted December 21, 1907. Factories act amendment act, 1908, enacted December 23, 1908. Factories act amendment act, 1910, enacted December 7, 1910. Industrial arbitration act, 1912, enacted December 19, 1912. Tasmania: Wages boards act, 1910, enacted January 13, 1911. Wages boards act, 1911, enacted September 14, 1911. Factories act, 1911, enacted January 10, 1912 (fixing legislative min i mu m wage). Western Australia: Industrial arbitration act, 1912, enacted December 21, 1912. Australia (Commonwealth) : • Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act, 1904, enacted December 15, 1904. Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act, 1909, enacted December 13, 1909. Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act, 1910, enacted August 29, 1910. Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act, 1911, enacted November 23, 1911. New Zealand: Industrial conciliation and arbitration act, 1908, enacted August 4, 1908. Industrial conciliation and arbitration amendment act, 1908, enacted October 10, 1908. Industrial conciliation and arbitration amendment act, 1910, enacted December 3, 1910. Industrial conciliation and arbitration amendment act, 1911, enacted October 28, 1911. Industrial conciliation and arbitration amendment act, 1913, enacted Ootober 3, 1913. Factories act, 1908, enacted August 4, 1908. Factories act, 1910, enacted December 3, 1910. Shops and offices act, 1908, enacted August 4, 1908. Shops and offices amendment act, 1910, enacted December 3, 1910. NAME OF TRIBUNALS. Victoria: Court of industrial appeals. Special boards. New South Wales: Court of industrial arbitration. Industrial boards. Queensland: Industrial court. Industrial boards. South Australia: Industrial court. Wages boards. Tasmania: Unlimited. Western Australia: Arbitration court. Commonwealth of Australia: Court of conciliation and arbitration. New Zealand: Arbitration court. MIKIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION ^AUSTEALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. Ill -,. HOW TRIBUNAIlS ARE BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE. Victoria: Court constituted by governor in council from time to time. Special boards by governor in council on resolution of Parliament. New South Wales: Industrial court (judge) constituted by act. Industrial boards by the minister on recommendation of industrial court. Queensland: Industrial court constituted by the act. Industrial boards by governor in council on recommendation of court. South Australia: Court constituted by act of 1912. Wages boards by the governor in council on resolution of Parliament. Taemania: For the clothing trade, by the act; for other trades, by a resolution of Par- liament. Western Australia: Court constituted by the act. Commonwealth of Australia: Court constituted by the act. New Zealand: Court constituted by the act. INDUSTRIES TO WHICH THE ACTS APPLY. Victoria: To any process, trade, business, or occupation specified in a resolvition. Government servants are not included. New South Wales: To industrial groups named in schedule to act, and those added by proclamation. Includes Government servants. Queensland: To callings specified in schedule to act, and to those added by governor in council. South Australia: To processes, trades, etc., specified in act, and such others as may be authorized by Parliament. Tasmania: All trades or groups or parts thereof. Western Australia: All industrial occupations. Commonwealth of Australia: Industrial disputes extending beyond limits of any one State or in Federal capital or northern Territories. New Zealand: All trades. HOW A TRADE OR INDUSTRY IS BROUGHT UNDER REVIEW. Victoria: Usually by petition to minister. New South Wales: Reference by court or minister, or by application to the board by employers or employees. Qiieensland: By petitions and representations to industrial registrar. South Australia: Court — Matters or disputes submitted by minister, registrar, em- ployers, or employees, or by report of wages board. Wages boards by petitions, etc. Tasmania: By application of parties. Western Australia: Industrial disputes referred by president or by an industrial union or association. Commonwealth of Australia: Industrial disputes either certified by registrar, sub- mitted by organization, referred by a State industrial authority or by president after holding abortive compulsory conference. New Zealand: By application of union or individual employer. PRESIDENT OR CHAIRMAN OF TRIBUNALS. Victoria: President of court, one of judges of supreme court appointed by governor in council. Chairman of board appointed by governor in council on nomination of board or, failing that, on nomination by minister. New South Wales: Court appointed by governor. Chairman of board appointed by minister on recommendation of court. 112 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. Queensland: Court appointed by governor in council. Chairman of board any person elected by board. If none elected, appointment is by tbe governor in council on recommendation of court. South Australia: Court — President. Wages board, appointed by governor in council on nomination of board or, faihng nomination, a stipendiary magistrate. Tasmania: Any person elected by the board. If none elected, appointment by the governor in council. Western Australia: President, a judge of the supreme court, appointed by governor. Commonwealth of Australia: President, appointed by the governor general. New Zealand: A judge of the supreme court. NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF TRIBUNALS. Victoria: Court, president and one representative each of employers and of employees. Board, not less than 4 nor more than 10 members and a chairman. New South Wales: Court, one judge. Board, chairman and 2 or 4 other members. Queensland: Court, one judge. Board, not less than 5 nor more than 13 (including chairman). South Aiistralia: Court, president only. Wages board, not less than 5 nor more than 11 (including chairman). Tasmania: Chairman and not less than 4 nor more than 10. Western Australia: Three, including president. Commonwealth of Australia: President only. New Zealand: Three. HOW ORDINARY MEMBERS ARE APPOINTED. Victoria: Members .of court by governor in council on nomination of representatives of employers and employees on special board. Members of board nominated by minister. But it one-fifth of employers or employees object, representatives are elected by them. New South Wales: Appointed by minister on recommendation of industrial court. Queensland: By employers and employees, respectively. South Australia : By governor on nomination of employers and employees, respectively. Tasmania: By governor in council on nomination by employers and employees. Western Australia: Appointed by governor, president directly, and one each on recom- mendation of unions of employers and workers, respectively. Commonwealth of Australia: President appointed by governor general from justices of high court. New Zealand: By the unions of employers and workers, respectively. DECISIONS— HOW ENFORCED. Victoria: By factories department in courts of petty sessions. New South Wales: By registrar and industrial magistrate. Queensland: By inspectors of factories and shops, department of labor. South Australia: By factories department. Tasmania: By factories department. Western Australia: By arbitration court on complaint of any party to the award or registrar or an industrial inspector. Commonwealth of Australia: By proceedings instituted by registrar, or by any organi- zation affected or a member thereof. New Zealand: By arbitration court on complaint of union or inspector of awards. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION ^AUSTKALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 113 DURATION OF DECISION. Victoria: Until altered by board or court of industrial appeals. New South Wales: For period fixed by tribunal, but not more than three years. Queensland: Twelve months and thereafter, until altered by board or court. South Australia: Until altered by board or by order of industrial court. Tasmania: Until altered by board. Western Australia: For period fixed by court, not exceeding 3 years, or for 1 year and thenceforward from year to year until 30 days' notice given. Commonwealth of Australia: For period fixed by award, not exceeding five years. New Zealand: For period fixed by court, not exceeding three years. APPEAI, AGAINST DECISION. Victoria: To the court of industrial appeals. New South Wales: To industrial court against decision of boards, except those boards presided over by a judge. Queensland: To industrial court. South Australia: To industrial comrt. Tasmania: To supreme court. Western Australia: No appeal except against imprisonment or a fine exceeding £20 ($97.33). Commonwealth of Australia: No appeal. Case may be stated by president for opinion of high court. New Zealand: No appeal. IS SUSPENSION OF DECISION POSSIBLE PENDING APPEAL? Victoria: Yes; for not more than 12 months. New South Wales: No; except by temporary variation of award by the court. Queensland: Yes; for not more than 3 months. South Australia: Yes. Tasmania: Yes. Western Australia: No suspension. Court has power to revise an award after the expiration of 12 months from its date. Commonwealth of Australia: No appeal. New Zealand: Yes; in case of strikes. CAN PREFERENCE TO UNIONISTS BE DECLARED? Victoria: No. New South Wales: Yes. Queensland: No. South Australia: No. Tasmania: No. Western Australia: No. Commonwealth of Australia: Yes; ordinarily optional, but mandatory if in opinion of court preference is necessary for maintenance of industrial peace or welfare of society. New Zealand: Unionism essential. PROVISION AGAINST STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS. Victoria: None. New South Wales: Strikes, penalty £50 ($243.33) and preference to unionists canceled. Lockouts, penalty £1,000 ($4,866.50). 82843°— Bull. 167—15 8 114 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Queensland: Strikes £50 ($243.33), lockouts £1,000 ($4,866.50), unless notice of inten- tion given to registrar and secret ballot taken in favor. In the case of public utili- ties compulsory conference also must have proved abortive. South Australia: Penalty £500 ($2,433.25) or imprisonment 3 months. Tasmania: Penalty for strike or lockout on account of any matter in respect to which a board has made a determination, for an organization, £500 ($2,433.25), for an individual £20 ($97.34). Western Australia: Employer or industrial union, £100 ($486.65); other cases, £10 ($48.67). Commonwealth of Australia: Penalty, £1,000 ($4,866.50). New Zealand: Penalty— Employer, maximum fine of £500 ($2,433.25); employee, £25 ($121.66) unless 14 days' notice is given in writing. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR CONCILIATION. Victoria: None. New South Wales: Special commissioner. Three conciliation committees for colliery districts. Registered agreements. Queensland: Compulsory conference. Registered agreements. South Australia: Compulsory conference. Industrial court. Registered agreements. Tasmania: None. Western Australia: Compulsory conference. Registered agreements. Commonwealth of Australia: Compulsory conference. Court may temporarily refer to conciliation committee, re^tered agreements. New Zealand: Council of conciliation, with 3 commissioners. All industrial disputes must be referred to council before they can come before the arbitration court. OPERATIONS UNDER WAGES BOARDS AND ARBITRATION LAWS. The grounds usually alleged by the employers in seeking awards or determiaations are that their business is hampered by "unfair" competitors, who pay only a sweating wage. Employees allege that they are sweated, or are entitled to an increase in their wages by reason of the prosperity of the trade in which they are engaged or because of an increase in the cost of living. In Austraha and New Zealand the "living wage" is usually ac- cepted as the basis in wage determinations and awards, and above that various rates are fixed for the several occupations coining under the jurisdiction of a board, according to skill. In a number of the States the law gives a definition of the living wage for the guidance of the board or court.' 1 For Victoria see p. 220; New South Wales, pp. 146-148; South Australia, pp. 165, 166; Tasmania, pp. 166, 167; ^^'este^D Australia, p. 167. See also M. B. Hammond, Judicial interpretation of the minimum wage in Australia, American Economic Review, June, 1913. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION ^AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 115 In New South Wales there were on April 30, 1914, 208 industrial boards in existence. Awards of boards and of the court in force numbered 260, of which 65 were awards of the industrial court vary- ing previous awards of boards. In Victoria there were on AprU 30, 1914, 131 wages boards in exist- ence, affectmg about 150,000 employees. The number of determi- nations in force was 129. All the boards authorized, with the excep- tion of three, had met for the purpose of fixing wages, hours, etc. The court of industrial appeals in Victoria had heard 12 appeals from determinations of wages boards. In one case the decision was upheld ; in 10 cases decisions were reversed or amended; in one case the board, imable to come to a determination, referred the matter to the court, which exercised its power of fixing a proper wage where the average wage paid by employers did not afford a living wage. Of these decisions three were in force on April 30, 1914, the others having been superseded by amended determinations. The court also heard an appeal for modification of its determination with respect to a trade, and decided to modify such determination by reducing the working hours and increasing the wages in certain cases. The number of industrial boards authorized in Queensland since the acts came into force was on April 30, 1914, 92. The number of employees affected by awards in force at that date is not available, but the number affected by awards in effect on June 30, 1914, was given as 90,000.' In 76 cases awards were in force, but 4 had been varied on appeal to the industrial court. Under the industrial peace act, 1912, all wages boards established continued in exist- ence, and their determinations were recognized. In South Austraha there were, on April 30, 1914, 51 trades under boards, with about 25,000 employees. Fifty-four determinations were in force, includ- ing six made by the industrial court, in Heu of wages boards, on the minister for industry reporting the inability to appoint boards as authorized or the failure of the constituted boards to discharge the duties required under their appointment. In Western Australia awards had been made for 36 industrial unions, but only 18 re- mained in force on April 30, 1914; 19 expired between December 4, 1912, and the end of 1913, and had not been reviewed by the court at the latter date.' The wages-board system was inaugurated in Tasmania in 1911. Up to April 30, 1914, resolutions authorizing the appointment of 23 boards were carried in Parhament, and 21 boards had made determinations. Two other boards had com- menced work, but had not issued their determinations. The num- ber of Comnaonwealth conciUation and arbitration court awards in force on April 30, 1914, was 17. ' Queensland. Department of Labour. Eeport of the Director of Labour and Chief Inspector of Fac- tories and Shops for the year ended June 30, 1914, p. 2. 116 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. BOARDS FOE THE REGULATION OF WAGES AND HOURS AND CONDITIONS OF LABOR AUTHORIZED AND CONSTITUTED, AWARDS, DETERMINATIONS, AND AGREEMENTS IN FORCE, APR. 30, 1914. [Source: Labour Bulletin of the Commonwealtli Bureau of Census and Statistics, Melbourne, Australia, No. 5, January-March, 1914, p. 67.] Particulars. Com- mon- wealth. New South Wales. Vic- toria. Queens- land. South Aus- tralia. West- Aus- tralia. Tas- mania. Total. 1. Boards authorized, constituted, and in force: Boards authorized Boards constituted Boards dissolved or superseded 2. . In existence 2. Boards constituted which have made awards or determina- tions: Boards which had made or varied awards or determinations Boards which had not made any award or determination 3. Awards and determinations in force' 4. Scope of State awards and deter- minations: 3 Applying to the whole State Applying to metropolitan area only Applying to metropolitan and country towns Applying to country areas 5. Commonwealth awards in force in each Stat« 6. Industrial agreements in force 7. Commonwealth agreements in force in each State .-. 17 1217 •224 16 1208 147 61 44 12s 137 132 1 131 127 129 81 48 109 109 14 14 525 509 17 492 422 70 675 46 162 163 187 10 1 Excluding special demarcation boards. 2 Boards constituted and subsequently dissolved or superseded. In New South Wales 16 boards were dissolved owing to alteration in the sectional arrangement of industries and callings. Tn Victoria 1 board was superseded by 3 boards. » In addition, 12 awards and determinations had been made, but had not come into operation on the 30th of April, 1914. Of that number 7 were in Victoria, 4 in Queensland, and 1 in South Australia. The figures are exclusive of awards and detennmations which had expired by effluxion of time and had not been renewed on the 30th of April, 1914. The total number of boards authorized in the five States in which the board system is in force was 525, the total number constituted being 509, of which 17 had been dissolved or superseded. The num- ber of boards in existence at the end of April, 1914, was accordingly 492, of which 422 had either made original awards or determinations, or varied existing awards or determinations, and 70 had not made any award or determination. The difference between the number of boards in existence and the number which had made awards or determinations is accounted for mainly by the fact that in New South Wales a number of boards constituted under the act of 1912 had not made awards, owing to existing awards made under the act of 1908 being still in force. This is shown in the line, "awards and determinations in force," in which it may be seen that the total number in force (including awards made by the Common- wealth and Western Australia arbitration courts) was 575. In New South Wales the number of awards in force includes 90 awards under the act of 1908. This leaves 170 awards in force made by 147 boards under the new. act. In explanation of the fact that the num- MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATIOK ^AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 117 ber of awards in force in this State under the new act exceeds the number of boards in existence, it may be mentioned that several of the boards have made separate awards for different districts and branches of industry. Of the total number of awards and determinations in force on April 30, 1914, 82 were the result of awards made by industrial courts (either original or appellate jurisdiction), in addition to the 17 Commonwealth and 18 Western Australia awards. Of the Commonwealth awards there are seven in connection with the shipping industry and the award affecting postal electricians which apply to each of the six States. There are four awards which apply to five States, two of which apply to four States, one to three States, and two to two States. The total number of awards, determinations, and agreements in force under the various acts at the end of April, 191 4, was 990, com- prising 575 awards and determinations and 415 industrial agreements.* The total number of individual awards and determinations which came into force during 1913 was 270 (264 State and 6 Common- wealth). The number of industrial agreements registered' during that year was 165 (56 State and 109 Commonwealth), making a total for the Commonwealth of 435 awards, determinations, and agree- ments, affecting wages, hours, or other conditions, which came into force in 1913. This constitutes no less than 44 per cent of the total nmnber (997) of awards, determinations, and agreements in force at the end of 1913. EFFECT OF ACTS. The question whether the operation of the acts has bettered the monetary position of the operative may be answered in the affirma- tive. Starting from the lowest point, the provision of an absolute min i mum wage per week has stopped one form of gross sweating, that of employing apprentices and learners without payment. Another case is that of the "white workers" and dressmakers; with these the lowest grade was the "outworkers," who were piece- workers. In some branches of the Victorian trade, in 1897, the wages paid to outworkers for all classes of certain goods were only from one-third to one-half the wages paid in the factories for low-class production of the same line of stuff. By working very long hours the outworkers could earn 10s. ($2.43) per week. The average wage of females in the clothing trade in 1897 was 10s. lOd. (12.63) per week; there were, however, in that year 4,164 females receiving less than £1 ($4.87) per week, and their average was 8s. 8d. ($2.11). It was almost a revolution when a minimum wage of 16s. ($3.89) per week of 48 hours was fixed by the board, when pieceworkers' rates were ' Including agreements under section 24 of the Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act and under section 7 of the Queensland industrial peace act, 1912. 118 BULLETIN OF THE BtTEEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. fixed to insure a similar minimum, and when outworkers were placed on the level of pieceworkers. Many employers refused to continue to give out work and took the workers into the factory on time work. The wages boards have since fixed the minimum wage per week in the industries mentioned to be: Dressmakers, 21s. 6d. ($5.23); shirt workers, 22s. 6d. (15.47); and underclothing makers, 20s. ($4.87). As a result, it has been found by special investigation made in Novem- ber, 1912, in regard to wages in manufacturing iadustries, that the average wages for all female workers in Victoria engaged at dress- making and millinery was 17s. lid. ($4.36), and for shirt workers, white workers (underclothing), etc., 193. Id. ($4.64).' The period since the begioniag of minimum-wage legislation in New Zealand and Australia has been a period of steady growth of industry, not checked, so far as is apparent, by the effect of wage regulation. In New Zealand since 1894, the date of the concilia- tion and arbitration act, the reports of the Department of Labor have each year shown an increase in the number of factories, and an increase in the number of factory employees has been recorded in each year except two, the increase to 1913 amounting to 193 per cent.^ In Victoria an increase both in number of factories and of factory employees has been recorded each year since 1896, the increase in employees between 1896 and 1913 amounting to 171 per cent.^ In New South Wales the increase in the nimiber of per- sons employed in manufacturing between 1901, the date of the first wage-regulating law, and 1912 was 74 per cent (62 per cent for males and 135 per cent for females).* The extent to which wage changes are effected by wages-board determinations, by court awards, and by other methods may be seen from the following record for the year 1913: METHODS BY WHICH CHANGES OF WAGES WERE EFFECTED IN THE VARIOUS AUSTRALIAN STATES DURING 1913.5 [Source: Comznonwealth of Australia, Bureau of Census and Statistics. Labour and Industrial Bianch. Report No. 5. December, 1914, pp. 68 and 69.] Methods by which changes were effected. Number of changes.* Nimiber of work- people ^ected. New South Wales: Voluntary action of employers Direct negotiations Negotiations, intervention, or assistance of third party. Award of court under Commonwealth act Agreement registered under Commonwealth act Award under State act Registered agreement imder State act 10 1 2 6 lis 15 Total. 149 364 2 1,507 1,090 86,909 746 89,618 ' See also page 131. 2 Twenty-third Annual Report of the New Zealand Department of Labor, 1914, p. 7. » Report of the Victoria Chief Inspector of Factories ana Shops for the year ended Dec. 31, 1913, p. 5. < Offloial Yearbook of New South Wales, 1913, p. 889. ^ In this table an industrial award or agreement under the Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act is counted as one change only, although such award or agreement may be operative in more than one State. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION — ^VlCTOKIA. 119 METHODS BY WHICH CHANGES OF WAGES WERE EFFECTED IN THE VARIOUS AUSTRALIAN STATES DURING 1913— Concluded. Methods by which changes were effected. Number of changes. Number of work- people affected. Victoria: Voluntary action of employers 1 10 2 3 9 56 12,000 1,542 75 Direct negotiations Negotiations, intervention, or assistance of third party Award o f court under Commonwealth act 1,958 Agreement registered under Commonwealth act 1,707 31 972 Determination under State act Total 81 49 254 Queensland: Voluntary action of employers Direct negotiations 7 2,320 Negotiations, intervention, or assistance of third party Award of court under Commonwealth act 2 6 24 2 235 Agreement registered under Commonwealth act. 303 Award under State act 13,014 Registered agreement under State act Total 41 16 645 South Australia: Direct negotiations 1 1 2 6 12 4 Negotiations, intervention, or assistance of third party. . . 24 Award of court under Commonwealth act 359 Agreement registered under Commonwealth act. Award or determination under State act Registered agreement under State act 1,030 Total 26 4,574 Western Australia: Voluntary action of employers Negotiations, intervention, or assistance of third party. Award of court under Commonwealth act 1 1 3 15 112 Agreement registered under Commonwealth act Award under State act Registered agreement under State act 2,559 Total 20 3,036 Voluntary action of employers 1 2 11 Direct negotiations 90 Negotiations, intervention, or assistance of third party 3 3 3 2,568 12 3,005 Commonwealth: 2 30 4 3 24 213 36 12,011 4,336 101 Negotiations, intervention, or assistance of third party 4,487 Registered agreement under State acts 5*108 Total 312 166,132 VICTORIA. fflSTORY OF LEGISLATION. It is now more than 18 years since the wages-board system came into effect in Victoria, and it seems to be fully established and gen- erally accepted by both employers and employees. In the early years of the system's operations, however, every step in the extension of the principle was obstinately fought, and many times the very 120 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. existence of the system was at stake. The first law when enacted, July 28, 1896, was a temporary measure, to be in force to January 1, 1900, unless Parhament wa^ in session, in which case it was to lapse at the end of the session unless reenacted. It was reenacted February 20, 1900, to become effective May 1, 1900, but again as a temporary measure for two years or until the end of the session of Parliament, and a royal commission was created June 18, 1900, to study the subject. This law lapsed upon the end of the session of Parliament September 10, 1902. By the factories and shops continuation act of 1902 (December 5, 1902) the law was revived, to contiaue in force untU October 1, 1903. In 1903 the law was again reenacted, to con- tinue in force until December 31, 1905. On October 6, 1905, before the expiration of this act, the law was again reenacted and was this time made permanent. Since 1905 there have been no fundamental changes in the act, and in 1912 the existing legislation was consoli- dated, with some slight amendments, in the factories and shops act of 1912.^ Two amending acts have since been passed, dated December 31, 1912, and November 2, 1914, but not making any important changes. When the first wages boards were authorized in Victoria under the act of 1896, the act was intended as a temporary measure to be applied to six specially sweated trades. These were : Bootmaking. Baking, employing mainly men. Clothing. Shirts. Underclothing, employing mainly women. Furniture, in which the employment of Chinese was extremely important. When the law was reenacted in 1900, 21 additional special boards were provided for, as follows: Brickmakers. Pastry cooks. Butchers. Plate glass. Carriage. Pottery. Cigar makers. Printers. Confectioners. Saddlery. Coopers. Stonecutters. Engravers. Tanners. Fellmongers. Tinsmiths. Jewelers. Woodworkers. Jam. Woolen. Millet-broom makers. The successive additions of special boards by later acts of the Victorian Parhament are of interest as showing the gradual extension of the system of wage boards in practically aU the industries of Victoria. 1 A full account of the parliamentary contest over wages-board legislation in Victoria is given by Prof. Hammond in an article on "Wages boards in Australia: I. Victoria" in the Quarterly Journal of Eco- nomics, November, 1914. MINIMUM -WAGE LEGISLATION VICTORIA. 121 Special boards received parliamentary authorization, as follows: In 1901, 11 boards: Aerated-water makers. Artificial manure. Bedstead makers. Brass workers. Brewers. Brush-workers. In 1903, 1 board: Dressmakers. In 1906, 11 boards: Agricultural implement makers. Cardboard-box makers. Candle makers. Cycle trade. Farriers. Flour millers. In 1907, 2 boards: Glassworkers. In 1908, 4 boards: Bread carters. Hairdressers. In 1909, 16 boards: Carpenters. Carriage builders. Carters. Drapers. Blectroplaters. Grocers. Ham and bacon curers. Hay, chaff, coal, and wood dealers. In 1910, 20 boards: Boiler makers. Boot dealers. Bricklayers. Coal miners. Electrical installation. Engineering. Factory engine drivers. Gold miners. Hardware makers. Hotel employees. In 1911, 12 boards: Asphalters. Cordage. Commercial clerks. Country -shop assistants. Furniture dealers. Gardeners. Iron molders. Leather-goods makers. Maltsters. Oven makers. Wickerworkers. Milliners. Paper-bag makers. Soap and soda makers. Starch makers. Waterproof clothing. I Kcture-trame makers. I Ice makers. I Wireworkers. Men's clothing. Organ builders. Painters. Plumbers. PoUsh makers. Quarry men. Eubber goods. Tuck pointers. Lift attendants. Marine-store dealers. Mining-engine drivers. Plasterers. Slaughterers for export. Stationers. Tea packers. Tilers. Undertakers. Watchmakers. Grocers' simdries. Livery stable. Night watchmen. Tramway. Tie makers. Wholesale grocers. 122 BULLETIN OP THE BUKEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. In 1912, 19 boards: Bag makers. BillposterB. Biscuit. Builders' laborers. Butter. Dyers and clothes cleaners. Electrical supply. Felt hatters. Fibrous plasterers. Gaa meter. In 1913, 2 boards: Paper. I Photographers. Under an authorization contained in the principal act, the governor in council in 1911 appointed 8 boards: Horsehair. Meat preservers. Motor drivers. Nail makers. Office cleaners. Storemen, packers, and sorters. Straw hat. Tentmakers. Timber fellers. Country printers. Country saddlery. Country woodworkers. Fuel and fodder. Chaff cutters. Country agricultural implements. Country flour. Country fuel and fodder. and in 1912, 1 board: Aerated-water carters. There were on April 30, 1914, 137 special boards existing or au- thorized, affecting about 150,000 employees. Of these boards 131 were in existence and 129 determinations were in force. MODE OF CONSTITUTING WAGES BOARDS AND MAKING MINIMUM- WAGE DETERMINATIONS.' Before a special board is constituted, it is necessary that a resolu- tion in favor of such a course should be carried in both houses of the legislature. It is usual for the minister administering the factories act to move that such a resolution be passed. The minister may be induced to adopt such a course by representations made by either employers or employees, or both, or by the reports of the officers of the department. The reasons alleged by employers for desiring a board are, usually, unfair competition; and those by employees, low wages, and often the employment of excessive juvenile labor. If the minister is sat- isfied that a case has been made out, he moves the necessary resolu- tion in Parliament, and when such resolution has been carried, an order in council is passed constituting the board. Once a resolution has been passed or a board appointed the min- ister through the governor in council has f uU power to group or divide trades, to adjust the powers of different boards by taking from one and adding to another, to define the parts of the State over which any determination shall operate, and generally to administer so as to secure the greatest measure of benefit. The order constituting the board indicates the number of members. The number must not be less than four or more than ten. The minister then invites, in the daily press, nominations for the requisite number of representatives of employers and employees. These representatives must be, or have been, employers or em- 1 Victoria. Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories, Workrooms, and Shops for the year ended Dec. 31,1911. Melbourne, 1912, pp. 4 and 6. MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATION VICTORIA. 123 ployees, as the case may be, actually engaged in the trae to bed affected. The full names and addresses of persons willing to act should be sent in with particulars as to then- coimection with the trade during the three years last past. Where there are. associations of employers or employees, more than the necessary number of nominations are often received. In such case, the minister selects frona the persons whose names are sent in the necessary number to make up a full board. The names of persons so nominated by the minister are published in the Government Gazette, and unless within 21 days one-fifth of the employers, or one-fifth of the employees, as the case may be, forward a notice in writing to the minister that they object to such nominations, the persons so nominated are appointed members of the board by the governor in council. If one-fifth of the employers or employees object to the persons nominated by the minister — and they must object to all the nomi- nations, and not to individuals — an election is held. The chief inspector conducts such elections, the voting is by post, the ballot papers being forwarded to each elector. Within a few days of their appointment the members are invited to meet in a room at the office of the chief inspector of factories, and a person (always a Government officer and usually an officer of the chief inspector's department) is appointed to act as secretary. The members must nominate a chairman within 14 days of the date of their appointment, but if they can not agree to a chairman, he is appointed by the governor in council. The times of meeting, the mode of carrying on business, and all procedure is entirely in the hands of the board, whose powers are defined in the factory acts. Vacancies in special boards are filled on the nomination of the minister without any possibility of either employer or employee objecting. The result of the labors of a board is called a "determination," and each item of such determination must be carried by a majority of the board. The chairman is a member of the board. His function is usually confined to conducting the proceedings. He does not exercise his vote except in cases where the board is equally divided, when his casting vote determines the question at issue. When a determination has oeen finally made, it must be signed by the chairman and forwarded to the minister of labor. The board fixes a date on which the determination should come into force, but this date can not be within 30 days of the last fixing of a price or rate of pay. If the minister is satisfied the determination is m form, and can be enforced,. it is duly gazetted. In the event of the minister considering that any determination may cause injury to trade, or injustice in any way whatever, he may sus- pend same for any period, not exceeding six months, and the board 13 then required to reconsider the determination. If the board does not make any alteration, and is satisfied that the fears are ground- less, the suspension may be removed by notice in the Government Gazette. Provision is made by which either employers or employees may appeal to the court of industrial appeals against any determination of a board. This court consists of any one of the judges of the 124 BULLETIN OF THE BTJBEATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. supreme coiirt as president, and two other persons appointed for the occasion by the governor ia council on nomination of the represen- tatives of the employers and employees respectively on the special board from \7h0se decision appeal is made.^ An appeal may be lodged (a) by a majority of the representatives of the employers on the special board; lb) a majority of the repre- sentatives of employees on the special board; (c) any employer or group of employers, who employ not less than 25 per cent of the total number of workers in the trade to be affected; or (d) 25 per cent of the workers in any trade. The court has all the powers of a special board, and may alter or amend the determination in any way it thinks fit. The decision of the court is final, and can not be altered by the board, except with the permission of the court, but the court may, at any time, review its own decision. The minister has power to refer any determination of a board to the court for its consideration, if he thinks fit, without appeal by either employer or employee. The decision of the court is gazetted in the same way as the deter- mination of the board, and comes into force at any date the court may fix. The determinations of the board and the court are enforced by the factories and shops department, and severe penalties are provided for breaches of determmations. No prosecution for any offense against any of the factories acts, or for any breach of any determination, can be brought except through the department. TYPICAL AWARDS OF WAGE BOARDS. The scope and method of the determinations of the Victorian boards may be best seen from an examination of typical awards. Several of these are given in full in the following pages :^ WAGES PEE WEEK OF 48 HOURS FIXED BY BRASS WORKERS' BOARD (IN FORCE NOV. 7, 1913). MinjinuDi w^e. Apprentices (male or female). Improvers (female).' Brass molders Brass finishers Brass polishers Core makers, male Core makers, female Dressers, i. e., persons who remove sana faults in castings and superfluous metal caused by jointing, gating, and venting, or who pickle castings. Furnace men Persons working on ships, Is. (24 cents) per day extra as "dirt money." 57s. (113.87). 67s. ($13.87). 50s. ($12.17). 51s. ($12.41). 30s. ($7.30). 45s. ($10.95). 47s. 6d. ($11.56). 14 years, 6s. ($1.46). 15 years, 7s. 6d. ($1.83). 16 years, 10s. ($2.43). 17 years, 12s. 6d. ($3.04). 18 years, 15s. ($3.65). 19 years, 20s. ($4.87). 20 years, 30s. ($7.30). Proportion (within any factory or place): One ap- prentice to every 3, or frac- tion of 3, workers receiving at wage rates or piecework prices not less than 4Ss. ($10.95). 1st year's experience, 6s. ($1.46). 2d year's experience, 8s. ($1.95). 3d year's experience, 10s. 4th year's experience, 12s. 6d. ($3.04). 5th year's experience, 15s. (*3.65). 6th year's experience, 20s. ($4.87). 7th year's experience, 25s. ($6.08). Proportion (within any factory or place): One im- prover (male or female) to each person receiving at wage rates of piecework prices not less than 45s. ($10.95). I This provision was made in act of Nov. 2, 1914. « Reptrt of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Shops for the year ended Dec. 31, 1913, Appenaiz D. ■ Wages of males same as apprentices. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION — ^VIOTOBIA. 125 Time of beginning and ending work: Time of beginning, 7.30 a. m.; time of ending, 12.15 p. m. on the day on which the half holiday is observed. Time of beginning, 7.30 a. m.; time of ending, 5.30 p. m. on the other working days of the week. Overtime. — That the following rates shall be paid for all work done: (a) Within the hours fixed in excess of 48 hours in any week — (1) In connection with the repairing of the employer's machinery or tools, time and a quarter. (2) All other work — First 2 hours, time and a quarter. Thereafter, time and a half. (&) Outside the hours fixed — In connection with the repairing of the employer's machinery or tools, time and a quarter. All other work — © Between midnight and 7.30 a. m., time and a half, (li) Between 12.15 p. m. and 2.15 p. m. on the day on which the half holiday is observed, time and a quarter, (ui) Between 5.30 p. m. and 8 p. m. on the other working days of the week — First 2 hours' work, time and a quarter. Thereafter, time and a half. (iv) Between 2.15 p. m. and midnight on the day on which the half holiday is observed, time and a half, (v) Between 8 p. m. and midnight on the other working days of the week, time and a half. Sundays and public holidays. — ^All work done on Sundays, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Foundation Day, Bight Hours Day, Christmas Day, Boxing Day, and New Year's Day shall be paid for at the rate of double time, but if any other day be by act of Parliament or proclamation substituted for any of the above holidays, the special rate shall only be payable for work done on the day so substituted. Piecework. — ^This board has determined that the employer may fix piecework prices to be based on the wage rates determined. WAGES PEE WEEK OF 48 HOURS FIXED BY BOOT TRADE BOARD (IN FORCE JAN. 1, 1913). Minimum wage. Apprentices. Improvers.* Adult males employed wholly or partly m manu- factuilng boots, shoes, and slippers of every descrip- tion, either by hand or machinery. Persons under 21 years of age (other than apprentices or improvers) employed sole- ly on errands, sweeping, last carrying, sorting, and heel-nail feeding— Under 15 years of age Over 15 and under 16 years of age. Over 16 years of age FEMALES. Females employed clicking (but not skiving or trim- ming) insides or outsides of uppers, or stuff cutting, sffia fitting, or preparing for makers or finishing (but not ironing and sizing of uppers or socking). Females with four years' ex- perience and over operat- mg wax-thread machines. All other females with four years' experience and over. 54s. (S13.14). 7s. (tl.70). Qs. (t2.19). 54s. ($13.14). 64s. ($13.14). 323. 6d. ($7.91). 25s. 6d. ($6.20). Males. 1st year, 7s. 6d. ($1.83). 2d year, 12s. 6d. ($3.04). 3d year, 17s. 6d. ($4.26). 4th year, 22s. 6d. ($5.47). 5thyear,27s. 6d. ($6.69). 6th year— 1st 6 months, 32s. 6d. ($7.91). 2d 6 months, 35s. ($8.52). Proportion: One appren- tice to every 3, or fraction of 3, male workers em- ployed and receiving not less than S4s. ($13.14), or earning at piecework rate not less than S4s. ($13.14). Females. 1st year, 7s. 6d. ($1.83). 2d year, 10s. ($2.43). 3d year, 12s. 6d. ($3.04). 4th year, 16s. ($3.89). Proportion: One female apprentice to every 3 or fraction of 3 female work- ers employed and receiv- ing not less than 25s. 6d. ($6.20), or earning at piece- work rate not less than 25s. 6d. ($6.20). Males. Proportion: One im- prover to 10, or over 10, male workers employed and receiving not less than 54s. ($13.14), or earning at piecework rate not less than 54s. ($13.14). Females. Proportion: Two female improvers to every female worker employed and re- ceiving not less than 25s. 6d. ($6.20), or earning at piecework rate not less than 25s. 6d. ($6.20). 1 Wages same as apprentices. 126 BULLETIN OP THE BTJBEATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. Time of beginning and ending work: Time of beginning, 7.45 a. m.; time of ending, 12.15 p. m. on Saturday. Time of beginning, 7.45 a. m.; time of ending, 6 p. m. on the other -working . days of the week, Overtime. — Any male employee over the age of 16 years who, within the hours of commencing and ending work as fixed in this determination, works in any week in excess of 48 hours shall be paid for such extra time at the rate of 3d. (6 cents) per hour in addition to the wage rate set forth in this determination. Any person who is er^ged outside the hours specified in this determination as the time of beginning and endmg work upon each day shall be paid for such overtime at the rate of 3d. (6 cents) per hour in addition to the wage_ rate set forth in this deter- mination in the case of adult males, and at the rate of time and a half in the case of females and boys under 16 years of age. Special rates for public holidays. — AH work done on Good Friday, Easter Monday, or the days on which New Year's Day, Eight Hours Day, Christmas Day, and_ Boxing Day are observed as public holidays, shall be paid for at the rate of double time. Piecework. — ^A sdiedule of piecework prices has been fixed by the board. WAGES PEE WEEK OF 44 HOURS FIXED BY BRICKLAYERS' BOARD (IN FORCE FROM JAN. 5, 1914). Minimuni wage. Apprentices. Improvers. Foreman bricklayer in charge of three or more employees. Bricklayers employed where the artificial temperature is 130° F. or over. Bricklayers employed on sewerage work, drainage work, orunderground work not connected with build- ing construction. Bricklayers employed on alterations or repairs to boilers, flues, ovens, fur- naces, or retorts. All other bricklayers 77s. ($18.74). 132s. ($32.12). 77s. ($18.74). 77s. ($18.74). 71s. 6d. ($17.40). 1st year, 10s. ($2.43). 2d year, 17s. 6d. ($4.26). 3d year, 30s. ($7.30). 4th year, 35s. ($8.52). 5th year, 46s. ($10.95). Proportion: One appren- tice to every 3 workers or fraction thereof receiving not less than the mini- mum wage of 71s. 6d. ($17.40). 1st 6 months, 10s. ($2.43). 2d 6 months, 15s. ($3.65). 2d year, 23s. lOd. ($5.80). 3d year, 36s. 8d. ($8.92). 4th year, 49s. 6d. ($12.04). 5th year, 60s. 6d. ($14.72). Proportion: One improver to every 4 workers orfrac- tion thereof receiving not less than the minimum wage of 71s. 6d. ($17.40). Definitions. — Whenever occurring, the following expressions shall have the meanings hereby assigned to them (that is to say): {a) Metropolitan center shall mean the Melbourne general post office; (6) Any other center shall mean the respective town halls of Ballarat, Bendigo, Geelong, and Warmambool. And all distances from a center shall be computed by the radius. Allowances. — The following extra rates shall be paid to any persons wheresoever employed — 1. (a) On all work distant from the metropolitan center 3 miles and up to 6 miles, Jd. (1 cent) per hour extra. (6) On all work distant from the metropolitan center over 6 miles and up to 16 miles, Id. (2 cents) per hour extra. 2. (a) On all work distant from any other center 3 miles and up to 6 miles, id. (1 cent) per hour extra. (5) On all work distant from any other center over 6 miles and up to 8 miles, Id. (2 cents) per hour extra. Provided always that where the locality of the work is nearer to the employee's residence than to the center, all distances shall be reckoned from the employee's residence, which in such case shall be deemed to be the center. Time of beginning and ending work. — The time of beginning and ending work for persons (other than those employed on sewerage work, drainage work, or underground work not connected with building construction) shall be — Time of beginning, 7.45 a. m.; time of ending, 5.15 p. m. on each of five days in the week. Time of beginning, 7.45 a. m.; time of ending, 12 noon on the other working day of the week on which the half holiday is usually observed. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION VICTORIA. 127 Overtime. — (A) Any person (other than a peison employed on sewerage work, drainage work, or underground work not connected with building construction) who is engaged outside the hours specified in this determination as the time of beginning and ending work upon each day, shall be paid for such overtime as follows, namely: (a) On the weekly halt holiday- Between 12 noon and 5 p. m., time and a half. And thereafter until midnight, double time. (6) On the other working days of the week — Between 5.15 p. m. and 10.15 p. m., time and a half. And thereafter until midnight, double time, (c) Between midnight and 7.45 a. m., double time. (B) Any person (other than a person employed on sewerage work, drainage work, or underground work not connected with any building construction) w;ho, within the hours of commencing and ending work as fixed in this determination, works in any week for any time in excess of 44 hours shall be paid for such extra time at the rate of time and a quarter. (C) Any person employed on sewerage work, drainage work, or underground work not connected with building construction who works in any week for any time in excess of 44 hours shall be paid for such extra time at the rate of time and a quarter. Special rates for Sundays and public holidays. — All work done on Sundays, Good Friday, and Easter Monday, 26th January (Foundation Day), 21st April (Eight Hours Day), Christmas Day, Boxing Day, and New Year's Day diall be paid for at the rate of double time; but if any omer day be by act of Parliament or proclamation substi- tuted for any of the above-named holidays, the special rate shall be payable only for the day so substituted. Piecework. — ^A schedule of piecework prices has been fixed by the board. WAGES PEE WEEK OF 48 HOURS FIXED BY CARDBOABD-BOX TRADE BOARD (IN FORCE MAR. 3, 1914). Minimum wage. Apprentices. Improvers.! MALES. Guillotine cutters.. . Cloth or paper cut- ters. Carton setters Carton cutters All others FEMALES. Guillotine cutters . . . Cloth or paper cut- ters 60s. ($14.60). 60s. ($14.60). 58s. ($14.11). 52s. 6d. ($12.77). 48s. ($11.68). 60s. ($14.60). 60s. ($14.60). 27s. 6 From February, 1902, to July, 1908, the court of industrial arbi- tration made 89 awards. From July, 1908, to April, 1912, 213 wages boards under the industrial disputes acts, 1908-1910, issued 430 awards. During the four years ended June, 1912, the transactions of the industrial court in regard to boards and awards were as follows. 1 The remainder ot this section to page 145 is from the Offlcial Year Book ot New South Wales, 1913, p. 923 et seq. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION NEW SOUTH WALES. 143 OPERATIONS or THE INDUSTRIAL COURT IN EACH OF THE YEARS 1909 TO 1912. Constitution of boards. Boards Awards. Year. Appli- cations Recom- dis- solved.. mend- Made. Varied. ceived. ed. 1909.. 105 100 3 45 1910.. 44 38 13 102 35 1911.. 34 34 7 54 60 1912. . (') 0) '1 153 1 The figures for this year can not be used for comparative purposes, as under the system of the 1912 act (operating from April, 1812) the court, on its own motion, and without application to it, recommends the constitution of boards. » Until Apr. 17. The operations of the year ended June, 1913, are subject to the industrial arbitration act, 1912, which was operative from April 18, 1912. The transactions for the year ended June 30, 1913, were as follows: Boards constituted 211 Boards dissolved 13 Awards rescinded 2 Awards varied 29 Injunctions granted 2 On June 30, 1913, the number of boards in existence, including those under the 1908 act, was 196, in addition to one special board. The number of awards of boards for the year was 113, while 33 awards were varied. The awards of the court numbered 6 and variations and amendments 35. INDUSTRIAL AGREEMENTS. Trade-unions were empowered under the industrial arbitration act, 1901, to make written agreements with employers in regard to any industrial matters, the practice of collective bargaining, which had been followed by weU-organized unions for years, then first receiving statutory sanction. Agreements relating to any industrial matter could be made by an industrial union with another industrial union or with an employer, and when filed were binding between the parties. Rescissions and variations of agreements also had to be made in writing and duly filed. Between 1901 and 1908,28 industrial agreements were filed, of which 11 were subsequently extended as common rules of the in- dustry concerned. The vahdity of this procedure being questioned, the high court of Australia decided in December, 1904, that it was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of the court of arbitration to declare a common rule, that there should be in exist- ence an award, order, or direction made by that court in pursuance of a bearing or determination upon a reference under the act. In November, 1905, the court of arbitration declared, byjudgment, that the court had no power to make an award, unless a dispute had been initiated and referred to the court for determination. Thus an agree- ment was not convertible into an award for. the purpose of making it a basis for a common rule. Under the industrial disputes act, 1908, 144 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. the power of the industrial union of employees to make an agreement was continued. Each agreement would be binding on the parties and on every person while remaining a member of the contracting trade-union or branch. Under the industrial arbitration act, 1912, the agreement may be enforced in the same manner as an award; its maximum duration is fixed at five years, as against three years under the previous enactments. Otherwise, conditions relating to agree- ments were not altered materially. Following is a statement of the number of agreements filed in each year since 1902: AGREEMENTS FILED IN EACH YEAR, 1902 TO 1905. Agree- Agree- Agree- Year. ments Year. ments Year. ments filed. filed. filed. 1902.. } 28 1906... 13 1910. . . 21 1903.. 1907... 11 1911... 27 1904.. 18 1908... 12 1912... 44 1905.. 6 1909. . . 28 1913... 36 The noticeable increase in the number of industrial agreements made between 1905 and 1913 as compared with previous years reflects the measure of encouragement afforded to voluntary collective bargaining. In December, 1913, 65 agreements were in force, to which 38 unions had been contracting parties. MINIMUM WAGE FIXED BY PARLIAMENT. The minimum wage act, 1908, which is consolidated with the facto- ries and shops act, 1912, provided that the minimum wage should be not less than 4s. (97.3 cents) per week in respect of any person em- ployed in preparing or manufacturing any article for trade or sale, or in any factory under the factories and shops act, or working at any handicraft; or any shop assistant as defined by the early closing act. Provisions apply also to overtime, nightwork, and the payment of premiums for employment. Contraventions or breaches of the act or of the regulations are reported to the minister for labor and industry by inspectors, and proceedings may be instituted with the authority of the minister. During the year 1910 26 informations were laid in this connection; 11 cases resulted in convictions, 7 were withdrawn on payment of costs; 7 were withdrawn in view of other convictions against the particular employers, and 1 case only was dismissed. In 1911 only two informations were laid, both in Newcastle, and both resulting in convictions, while in 1912 only one information was laid, resulting in a Sydney employer being fined. The provisions as to the minimum wage are in operation over the whole State. They are observed carefully throughout the districts subject to inspectorial supervision as to factories and shops, though in many large country towns outside these areas, and not ordinarily included in the inspector's itinerary, infringements may occur, particularly in MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATIOlir NEW SOUTH WALES. 145 dressmaking and millinery establishments, the breaches being attrib- uted mainly to ignorance. Overtime is classified under two heads, Yiz, by the week of 48 hours, and also, on any working day, after 6 p. m., when tea money is payable. Many clothing factories com- plete the week's work in five days, and aU work done on Saturday is actually overtime. A case being submitted, it was held, on appeal to the high court, that tea money is payable only in the instance when work is done on any day after 6 p. m. The minimum-wage system has tended to destroy systems of night- work for women, carried on really in violation of the international agreement entered into by Great Britain. The reasons which led to the enactment of the minimum wage act of 1908 in New South Wales are explained in the report of the Depart- ment of Labor and Industry for the year 1908. The report says: At the end of the year the minimum wage act was passed, provid- ing for a weekly wage of not less than 4s. (97 cents) to all persons coming within the definition of "workman" or "shop assistant." That such a measure was necessary is evidenced by the fact that iu the workrooms in the metropohtan district no less than 514 girls whose ages ranged from 13 to 21 years were, at the end of 1908, in receipt of less than 4s. (97 cents) a week, and in the Newcastle dis- trict there were 272 girls employed in the dressmaking and millinery workrooms receiving less than 4s. (97 cents) a week, the majority being paid no wages at all for their services. A very broad and comprehensive definition is given to the terms "employer" and "workmen," and the minimum wage act also apphes to any person coming within the definition of ' 'shop assistant" in terms of the early closing act. * * * -phe payment of a premium or bonus on behalf of employees iu coimection with the manufacture of articles of clothing or wearing apparel is prohibited. The system of so-caUed apprenticeship without payment originally carried with it the recognition of an obUgation to teach the trade, especially in the dressmaking and milliaery industry. This aspect of the case had, to a very great extent, been forgotten in the large workrooms, the training received for some time being more that of general discipline than of a technical character. With a minimum wage of 4s. (97 cents), an employer will find it worth while to teach her employees so as to bring in a return, in work, for the outlay as speedily as pos- sible, and she will probably not so readily discharge a girl whom she has trained for six months in her own ways unless she gives a great deal of trouble. Having so improved their hands, the employers will, I think, prefer to pay a shilling or two extra a week rather than be continually changmg and taking on inexperienced hands at the minimum wage. It is, of course, to be expected that a number of hands who were tolerated merely because they cost nothing in wages will no longer be allowed to crowd the ranks of certain trades, as no employer wdl now keep a girl who does not exhibit a reasonable apti- tude for her work, but tms should tend to improve the trade as a whole.^ 1 New Soutli Wales Department of Laboiir and Industry. Report on tlie working of the factories and shops act; early closing acts; shearers' accommodat on act, etc., during the year 1908. Sydney, 1909, p. 14. 82843°— Bull. 167—15 10 146 BULLETIN OP THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. The report issued a year later shows the results attending the operation of the act in the following statement: This act, which applies to the whole of the State of New South Wales, came into operation at the beginning of the year, and a large amount of inspection has been carried out with a view to the en- forcement of same. The anticipations of the department regarding this measure have to a great extent been reahzed, as there has been a marked reduction in the amount of overtime worked, especially in cases of the younger girls. The payment of 6d. (12 cents) tea money and a minimum overtime rate of 3d. (6 cents) an hour have had the desired effect, and overtime is now almost limited to the older or more competent hands. At the end of 1908 there were between 500 and 600 girls whose ages ranged from 13 to 21 years employed in the workrooms of the metropolitan district, and nearly 200 in the Newcastle district, in receipt of less than the minimum wage of 4s. (97 cents) a week, the majority of whom were being paid no wages at all for their services. These figures are irrespective of a large number who were similarly employed by the numerous small dressmakers and milliners, whose workrooms do not come within the definition of factory. It is safe to say that, from the statistics for 1909, not a single boy or girl is at the present time being eniployed in any factory in the metropohtan, Newcastle, Broken Hul, Hartley, Goulburn, and Albury districts in receipt of a weekly wage of less than 4s. (97 cents). It is satisfactory to report that very httle diffi- culty was experienced in securing a ready comphance with the act in the large majority of factories and workrooms in the metropohtan district, but there was some opposition on the part of the small subm-ban dressmaker or milhner, who objected to both teach and pay beginners, no doubt overlooking the fact that a girl should require to know very Httle to be worth at least a penny an hoiu- to her employer ' BASIS OP THE WAGES FIXED. Since 1908 the number of trades in which wages are regulated by awards has extended so rapidly that but few occupations remain without the jurisdiction of industrial tribunals. The principle running through the awards of boards, etc., is the stipulation of an adequate living wage, and the minimum adult wage ranges between 8s. and 9s. (11.95 and $2.19) per day for any class of labor. The question of the cost of living enters into the determination of a hving wage, and judgments and awards tend more and more to embody all the factors determining effective wages, rather than to compromise between the standards of employer and employee. Because of the fact that it used the cost of living as the basis for its wage awards, and because the information available to guide it was regarded as inadequate, the court of industrial arbitration, New South Wales, in October, 1913, initiated an inquiry into the cost of 1 New South Wales Department of Labour and Industry. Report on the worlting of the factories and ' Shops act; early closing acts; shearers' accommodation act, etc., during the year 1909.. Sydney, MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION NEW SOUTH WALES. 147 living and living wage. The court, as the result of its inquiry, delivered its judgment on February 16, 1914.i The attitude of the court in regard to the basis used in its awards and its conclusions upon its inquiry may be seen best by quotations from the original judgment. Upon the question of what consideration should be given to the in- dustry in case it appeared unable to pay a living wage, the court said: If the standard of that famUy and of others whose conditions were referred to was the average standard of their industries, and if it appeared clearly that those industries could not contiaue if they had to pay a wage which would raise that standard, ought these industries to DO swept away ? Certainly, if they could not give a fair living wage. The court's reasoning and conclusions in considering and fixing the minimum wage are indicated in the following quotations: To make the lowest wage always the Hving wage would be to debar the manual worker, who in the immense majority of cases must remain a manual worker all his life, from any possible improvements in his conditions. His wage might go up or down, but only in strict agree- ment with the increase or diminution of his expenses, so that really it would be always the same. Is this fair? I do not think so. Bfe should have his share in prosperous times. He is stiU contributing the same share toward the work of the community. Where the result of that work is fortunate, and everybody benefits, why should he not benefit also? True, his share is humble; ambition, backed up with natural aptitude and a resolute will, is the mam cause of the progress of the commimity, and, amongst other things, of its advance ia wealth; and manual labor is, as such, the instrument of the men so endowed. But it is an indispensable instrument, and it is supplied by human beings and free citizens, whose share in the general life of the community is great and important, and for whose welfare iadeed, in conmion with that of everybody else, the community life exists at all. I think they should, in good times, get more than a hving wage. I consider that I am justified ia acting on this view, because it is what happens when there are no courts of arbitration, and I am sure that these were not intended to deprive the worker of his natm-al advantages. Indeed, it might be put another way: It might be said that as prosperity increases the standard of living rises and carries the living wage with it. This would be true, but I do not think it is well to call what may be a mere temporary change, which may last for only a few years, a change of standard. To my mind, that expression should be limited to change of a more fixed and perma- nent character, such as become generally accepted as necessary conditions; such, for instance, as the adoption of footwear, both boots and stockings, a change not yet, I think, quite universal in the case of children. This is very different from the changes wrought by a wave of prosperity, and to my mind (though I can understand others taking a different view) it is better to keep the two things 1 New South Wales Industrial Gazette, Vol. V, No. 1, March, 1914, pp. 100 to 149. 148 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. separate, and to have the true living wage in sight even when one departs from it. I entered upon this investigation with a practical end in. view; to fix a wage which might assist boards and save time and expense. I doubt whether the mere fixing of the strict living wage wiU, of itself, do this to a sufficient extent. Being of opinion that more than a hviag wage should be given, I ought to say how much. This I now do after much thought and with a great sense of responsibility. I suggest to the boards that the minimum wage in Sydney for unskilled workers should be, for light work, 8s. 6d. ($2.07) per day, for ordinary work 8s. 9d. ($2.13) per day, and for heavy work 9s. ($2.19) per day. TMs is in the metropohs; as to the country parts, it is evident to me that the hving wage itself is much less than in Sydney, and, therefore, the minimum wage should also be less. Umortunately, according to Mr. Knibbs's tables, and in fact, the cost of hving varies in different parts of the country; * * *. The evidence in this inquiry related mainly to the city, and even that which came from the country was not such as to enable me to distinguish between one part and another. I think, therefore, that I can do nothing at present as to the country. I have been strongly inclined to fix a minimum laborer's wage there, the rents in the metropohs being so much higher than in country towns, but on the whole I fear I have not enough material to justify me in this; it might be too low or too high; anda general rate for the country might not suit the variances between the dififerent parts. As to existing awards, in any case in which a wage of less than £2 8s. ($11.68) is prescribed, appHcation may be made to the board to increase it to that amount. I do not wish to appear in any way to dictate to the boards, which are quite independent bodies, and, moreover, circumstances may vary, but in my opinion now that a Hving wage has been declared, no one should get less. This refers, of coiu"se, only to those getting less than that wage; not to the rest of the award. AGED, mPIRM, OR SLOW WORKERS.' Apphcations for variations from award rates were made, under the industrial disputes act, 1908, and its amendments, to the registrar of the industrial court, and to any tribunal which might be consti- tuted for the purpose by an industrial board. Under the industrial arbitration act, 1912, the registrar alone has power to determine when and how such variations shall be permitted. For the year ending December 31, 1913, 485 apphcations were lodged for permits to pay less than award rates; 355 were granted and 130 refused. The number of permits canceled was 6, and 65 appli- cations for permits were withdrawn or not proceeded with. COST OF INDUSTRIAI, BOARDS.^ The boards constituted from the commencement of the industrial arbitration act, 1912, to June 30, 1914, numbered 227, but of that number 16 were for various reasons dissolved before the date last 1 Official Year Book o£ New South Wales, 1913, p. 931. 2 New South Wales Industrial Gazette, Vol. VI, No. 4, p. 1328 and p. 13S3. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION NEW SOUTH WALES. 149 mentioned. Of the remaining 211 boards, 195 were in existence Jime 30, 1913. The boards constituted during the financial year 1913-14 munbered 18, but there were during the same period two cancellations. Boards are ordinarily constituted for a period of three years, and the boards which were constituted during the year 1913-14 may therefore be regarded as having been constituted in the main in extension of the scheme of boards determined upon during the preceding year. The awards issued by boards during the course of the year 1913-14 numbered 245, of which 123 were principal and 122 subsidiary awards. The awards of 1913-14 exceeded in number those issued during the previous year by 109; but of the awards of 1912-13, 105 were of principal character and only 30 were subsidiary awards. The total cost to the department on account of fees and expenses of industrial boards for the year 1913-14 was £13,655 15s. lOd. ($66,455.91), or £2,603 12s. 4d. ($12,670.50) more than the cost under the same heads for the previous year. The average cost per board for the year 1913-14 was £100 8s. 2fd. ($488.65), or £26 12s. 6d. ($129.57) less than the cost per board during the preceding year. The average cost per board for each year, 1908 to 1914, was as foUows: £ s. d. 1908-9 95 1 3 ($462.62) 1909-10 86 9 7 ($420.85) 1910-11 84 8 ($410.73) 1911-12 91 1 6 ($443.22) 1912-13 - 127 8i ($618.22) 1913-14 100 8 2f ($488.65) The average cost of a single award in the year 1912-13 was £72 Os. 6id. ($350.52), whereas the cost for 1913-14 was £66 18s. ($325.57). The economy of £5 2s. 6fd. ($24.96) per award thus indicated in favor of the year 1913-14 is more apparent than real, because the proportion of subsidiary awards in the later year was approximately 50 per cent, whereas in the earher year it was only 22 per cent. The details of the cost of industrial boards for the year ending June 30, 1914, were as follows: Fees: £ s. d. Chairman 5,432 14 2 ($26,438.28) Other members 5,752 7 6 ($27, 993. 93) Allowances, etc. : Chairman 661 8 5 ($3,218.81) Othermembers 981 13 10 ( $4, 777. 40) Miscellaneous: Typing 88 14 11 ( $431.88) Vehicles 738 17 0( $3,595.61) Total 13.655 15 10 ($66, 455. 91) 150 BITLLEIJN- OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. TYPICAL AWARDS OF INDUSTRIAL BOARDS. Building Trades Group, No, 9 Board — Sawmills, etc.. Metropolitan and Newcastle Award.^ [Published in the Government Gazette No. 80 of 6th May, 1914.] In the matter of an application by the New South Wales Sawmill & Timber Yard Em- ployees' Association. This board having considered the above-mentioned application and heard evidence, and having heard Mr. John, secretary of the apphcant union, for the union; Mr. Corke for the Sydney & Suburban Timber Merchants' Association, and for certain associated box and case man- ufacturers and employers of machinists in cooperages ; Mr. Bell for the Furniture Manufacturers' Association; Mr. Spier for H. McKenzie (Ltd.) ; Mr. N. Phelps-Richards for the Master Builders' Association; and Mr. Cook for Hely Bros. (Ltd.), and considered also other objec- tions or claims for exemption, awards as follows: 1. Area. This award shall apply to the whole area for which the board is constituted. 2. Hours of work. An ordinary week's work shall not exceed 48 hours. Ordinary working hours shall be from 7.30 a. m. to 12 noon and from 12.45 p. m. to 5 p. m. on week days, and 7.30 a. m. to 11.45 a. m. on Saturdays. Employers may fix a different starting time not earlier than 7 a. m. : Provided, That the ordinary workin" hours in any such case shall run from the fixed starting hour, and that in each such case the hours so fixed shall be posted along with this award and notbe varied except upon 21 days' notice. 3. Wages. Workmen in the industries covered by this award shall be classified as follows, and be paid wages by the hour at rates which, computed by the week, are not less than those set opposite the name or description of each class. £ s. d. Circular sawyers who work, sharpen, and set any saw 3 6 ($16.06) Circular sawyers cutting timber 9 inches and over in depth 3 6 ($16.06) Circular sawyers cutting timber between 6 inches and 9 inches in depth 3 ($14.60) All other flat cutting-bench circular sawyers 2 14 ($13. 14) Crosscut sawyers employed in cabinetmaking, and in furniture factories.... 3 ($14.60) Crosscut sawyers employed in joinery workshops 2 18 ($14.11) Crosscut sawyers in box or case factories who crosscut box or case material over 6 inches in width 2 18 ($14. 11) Other crosscut sawyers using any power-driven saw 2 14 ($13. 14) Recuttiiig band sawyers, diameter of wheel being 60 inches and over. 3 6 ($16.06) Recutting band sawyers, diameter of wheel being over 48 inches and under 60 inches 3 ($14.60) Becutting band sawyers, diameter of wheel being 48 inches and under 2 14 ($13. 14) Log-band sawyers (vertical or horizontal) 3 8 ($16.55^ Log sawyers, other than band sawyers 2 18 ($14. 11) Log sawyers, other than band sawyers who sharpen and set their saws 3 6 ($16.06) Edging sawyer to log-band saw 2 18 ($14. 11) Fret sawyers or detail band sawyers who work a wheel 3 feet or under in diameter 3 ($14. 60) Detail band sawyers who work a wheel over 3 feet in diameter 3 6 ($16. 06) ' New South Wales Industrial Gazette, Vol. V, No. 3, p. 852 et scq. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION NEW SOUTH WALES. 151 £ s d Settersto log-band sawyers 2 16 ($13. 63) Boarding frame sawyers 2 16 ($13.63) Circular-saw sharpeners 3 6 ($16. 06) Circular-saw doctors 3 18 ($18. 98) Log and recutting band-saw doctors, sharpening for one machine.. 3 18 ($18.98) Log and recutting band-saw doctors, sharpening for more than one machine 4 6 ($20.93) Wood turners 3 9 ($16. 79) Order men, talleymen, and measurers 2 18 ($14. 11) Order men are men who receive orders from order office, and are responAble for same being properly selected or measured; or men who select, mark, or measure timber for mill or joinery orders. All such order men must be capable at supering their orders. Tallymen are persons employed to tally timber. Meas- urers are persons employed to measure timber. Laborers who are regularly employed 2 14 ($13. 14) But such laborers, if put to do the work hereafter described as "casual," shall not, if they are paid under this clause, within three months of their engagement, be dismissed (except for mis- conduct, or inefficiency due to illness) ; should any laborer in vio- lation of this provision be dismissed within such three months, he shall be paid the rates for casual labor for the full period of his employment, and immediately upon dismissal become en- titled to such back pay as may be necessary. Timber carried off rafts or sunken punts, which has been sub merged — ^by regular hands — shall be paid for at the rate of 4^6.. ($0.09) per hour extra; the same increased rate shall apply to all work done on rafts or sunken punts in respect of timber which has been submerged. Machinists working shaper, Boult's carver, or general joiners' machine 3 9 ($16. 79) Machinists working molding machine, or any two, three, or four sided planer, who grind their own knives or cutters 3 8 ($16. 55) Machinists working molding machines, or two, three, or four sided planer, who do not grind their own knives or cutters 3 2 ($15.09) Machinists working spoke turner, spoke throater, or spoke planer.. 3 ($14.60) Machinists working tenoning machine, buzzer, jointer, or door- planing machine 3 3 ($15.33) Machinists working the dimensional planer 3 6 ($16.06) Machinists working mortising or boring machine 2 15 ($13. 38) Machinists working a sand or emery papering machine, or em- ployed at sand or emery papering by any mechanical device or method 2 16 ($13. 63) Machinists employed in coopers' workshops, who set up a Crozier or cooper's jointer, and grind knives or cutters for same 3 8 ($16. 55) Machinists who work a Crozier machine 2 18 ($14. 11) Machinists who work a truss machine 2 16 ($13. 63) Machinists who work a cooper's jointer 2 16 ($13. 63) Timber benders bending timber by mechanical or other device or method 3 (jE14. 60) Machinists working any woodworking machine not otherwise enumerated ^ 2 16 ($13., 63) Tool grinder , 3 8 ($16. 55) Box or case makers or repairers ,. 3 ($14. 60) Nailing-machine operators 2 14 ($13. 14) Printing-machine operators , 2 14 ( $13. 14) Crane attendant or dog-man 2 15 ($13. 38) 4. Casual labor. The term casual labor is applied to the work of receiving timber from beyond the Commonwealth from ships' slings, or by hand from any vessel, lighter, or raft, onto any wharf, or carrying or stacking same off any vessel, lighter, raft, or dump on a wharf, into any yard or place. (2) Casual laborers are persons (other than regular employees) employed to do such work. 152 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAtJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. (3) The wages of casual laborers shall be paid once a week, and at the end of each ]ob. Any casual laborer when dismissed shall be jjaid within 15 minutes from the time of ceasing work, and any time that he is kept waiting beyond 15 minutes shall be paid for at ordinary rates. (4) One hour shall be allowed for meals. (5) No casual laborer having begun work shall, without reasonable excuse, cease until the job is completed, unless he is released or discharged by his employer; but one man shall not (except for misconduct or incompetence) be displaced to make room for another. (6) The ordinary rate of pay for casual laborers shall be Is. 6d. ($0.37) per hour. Timber carried oft rafts or sunken punts which has been submerged shall be paid for at the rate of Is. lOJd. ($0.46) per hour, and the same increased rate shalPapply to all work done on rafts or sunken punts in respect of timber which has been submerged. For overtime until midnight the rate shall be 2s. ($0.49) per hour, after midnight, 3s. ($0.73) per hour. For working during the customary meal hour of the yard, if required, 2s. ($0.49) per hour. 5. Boy labor. Unapprenticed boys shall be paid not less than the following rates per week: Boys under 17 years of age, 16s. ($3.89) ; between 17 and 18 years of age, 228. ($5.35) ; between 18 and 19 years of age, 28s. ($6.81) ; between 19 and 20 years of age, 34s. ($8.27) ; between 20 and 21 years of age, 40s. ($9.73). 6. Apprentices. Boys may be apprenticed to learn the business or trade of a woodworking machinist, a wood turner, a saw doctor, or sawing and saw shaipening combined. All such apprentices shall be indentured under the apprentices' act, 1901, except as regards the clause relating to transfer. In the event of such slackness of work as to prevent the master from providing instruction for the apprentice, he may transfer the said appren- tice to another master to be agreed upon mutually, and the transferee shall assume the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the transferor. A copy of each indenture of apprenticeship shall, within 14 days of the making thereof, be given by the employer lo the parent or guardian of the apprentice, who shall lodge same with the industrial registrar. A boy may be employed for not more than tluee months on probation, and if he is apprenticed, such time of probation shall count as time of his apprenticeship. The wages of apprentices shall be not less than: For apprentices between 16 and 17 years of age, lis. ($2.68) per week; between 17 and 18, 16s. 6d. ($4.01); between 18 and 19, 22s. ($5.35); between 19 and 20, 27s. ($6.57); between 20 and 21, 32s. ($7.79). Should any apprentice, during the third or any subsequent year of his apprentice- ship, produce a certificate from the examining body that he has attended a two years' coiu-se, and passed an examination at a technical college in wood machining, wood turning, saw doctoring or sawing and sharpening, he shall be entitled to 2s. 6d. ($0.61) per week in addition to the above rates for the remainder of his term. There shall not be more than one apprentice for every two journeymen earning not less than the minimum wage in the process or occupation which the apprentice is to learn. 7. Pieceworh. In box and case making, daywork or piecework, or both systems concurrently, may be adopted by the employer at his option. Each employer may fix hia own log of prices; but they shall be so fixed as to enable the average worker to earn not less than the prescribed m inim u m wage for the class of work he does, and when fixed shall be posted along with this award. 8. Overtime. For overtime worked after the ordinary knock-oft time, the rates shall be as follows: On week days for the first two hours, time and a quarter, then time and a half to mid- night, then double time; on Saturdays, time and a half. For overtime worked before the usual starting hour, commencing at 6 a. m. or later, the rate shall be time and a half, and any man called upon to work before the usual starting time shall be allowed three-quarters of an hour for breakfast not later than 8 a. m. If double shifts are worked, the employees working the night shift shall be paid 10 per cent additional to the ordinary rate of wages. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION NEW SOUTH WALES. 153 9. Sundays and the days on which New Year's Day, Anniversary Day, Good Friday, Easter Monday, King's Birthday, Prince of Wales's Birthday, Eight Hours Day, Christmas Day, Boxing Day, and the Union Picnic Day (if a Saturday) are observed, shall be paid for, if worked, at double rates. But in builders' workshops Prince of Wales's Birthday and the Union Picnic Day need not be treated as holidays under this award. Other holidays gazetted for the whole State shall be paid for, if worked, at time and a half rate. 10. Payment of wages. Should any employer cause his employees to wait beyond 15 minutes before start- ing to pay (unless tlu-ough some unavoidable circumstance) such employees shall be entitled to payment at ordinary rates for all time kept waiting. Any employee dis- charged before the regular pay day shall be paid all money due to him on appucation. 11. Settlement of disputes. Should any dispute arise out of this award, parties are recommended to refer to the settlement of disputes committees of the Sawmill Union, and the Sydney & Suburban Timber Merchants' Association, or the Master Builders' Association 12. Preference to unionists. If and so long as the rules of the applicant union permit, or the union admits any competent workman of sober habits and good repute to become a member on appli- cation in writing and the payment of an entrance fee not exceeding 5s. ($1.22), to be paid at the option of the applicant within 14 days from the commencement of his employment, and a contribution not exceeding 13s. ($3.16) per annum, to be paid within 3 months of initiation at the like option, in one sum or by installrnents, and without ballot or election of any kind, then, as between members of the applicant union and other persons offering their labor at the same time, members of the appli- cant union shall be employed in preference to such other persons, other things being equal. This, however, shall not affect the existing employment of any nonunionists during the currency of such employment, nor for the purpose of this provision shall such employment be deemed to have terminated should such nonunionists be merely put off through slackness of work and be waiting to be put on by the same employer; neither shall an employer be compelled to give preference to any member of the applicant union who may have been previously discharged for dishonesty, miscon- duct, or neglect. 13. Birth certificates. For the purpose of ascertaining the age of any boy subject to this award, an employer who takes reasonable care may rely on any birth certificate or statutory declaration as to age, unless or until he has notice of its being inaccurate. Boys employed in the industry shall furnish birth certificates or statutory declarations as to their age on the application of their employer. 14. Election day. On all State and Federal election days employees shall be entitled to cease work at 4 p. m. 15. Exemption. Exemption from the provisions of this award relating to holidays is granted to Hely Bros. (Ltd.): Provided, The companj; observes the holidays of the country award in this industry, and a complete exemption (if the country award be meantime observed) is granted to the same company for the period of one month to enable application to be made to the court for an alteration of the boundaries of the jurisdiction of this award. 154 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. 16. Duration. This award shall be and remain in force for a period of three years from the date of gazettal. _, . F. A. A. Rtjssell, Chairman. Denman Chambees, Phillip Street, Sydney. Notes. Posting awards.— Employers in the industries in respect of which this award is in force are to keep a copy of the award exhibited at the place where the industries are carried on so as to be legible by their employees, subiect to a penalty of £10 ($48.67). See Industrial arbitration act, sec. 68 (2) ^ . ^ Aged, infirm, and sUm workers.— The Industrial registrar is the tribunal to determme where and on what conditions any aged, inflrm, or slow worker may be permitted to work for less than the mmimum wage and has power to revoke or cancel any such permit. See Industrial arbitration act, sec. 27. Domestic Group, No. 5 Board — Laundries.^ [Published in Government Gazette No. 75 of 29th April, 1914.] In the matter of an application by the Factory Employees' Union, of Australama to the Domestic Group, No. 5 Board, to determine industrial matters. Award. The Domestic Group, No. 5 Board, having heard the above-mentioned applicar tion, makes the following interim award: 1 Hours of toftor.— Forty-eight hours as a maximum shall constitute a week s work and shall be as follows : On the first four days of the week from 8 a. m. until 1 p. m. and from 2 p. m. until 5.30 p. m.; on the fifth day from 8 a. m. until 1 p. m. and from 2 p. m. until 6 p. m.; and on the sixth day (Saturday) from 8 a. m. until 1 p. m. The above provisions do not apply to carters. Sorters and packers may work on Saturday until 4 p. m: Provided, That in such case they shall cease work on the following Monday at 2.30 p. m. ; and shall not in any week work more than 48 hours without payment for overtime. 2. Faiyes.— Wages shall be paid by the week in cases in which weekly wages only are herein provided, and by the week or by the day in the cases in which provision is hereia made for wages by the week or the day, and wages shall be paid at piece rates in the cases for which piece rates only are herein provided, and at piece rates or by the day in the cases for which piece rates or wages by the day are herein pro- vided; and the lowest rates of wages and prices for piecework payable to employees shall be as follows: (a) Folders, 12s. ($2.92) per Week; folders feeding mangles, 14s. ($3.41) per week. Folders are to be employed in all the different processes of folding, shaking out, attending to mangles of all descriptions. This indicates their employment: (6) Shirt machinists: Begianers, 12s. ($2.92) per week; employees doing 6 dozen per day, 16s. ($3.89) per week; employees doing 8 dozen per day, 17s. 6d. ($4.26) per week; employees doing 10 dozen per day, f 1 ($4.87) per week; employees doing 12 dozen per day or over, £1 3s. 6d. ($5.72) per week. (c) Collar machinists: Beginners, 12s. ($2.92) per week; employees doing 25 dozen per day, 168. ($3.89) per week; employees doing 30 dozen per day, 17s. ($4.14) per week; employees doing 35 dozen per day, 18s. 6d. ($4.50) per week; em- ployees doing 40 dozen per day, £1 ($4.87) per week; employees doing 50 dozen per day or over, £1 3s. 6d. ($5.72) per week. (d) Shirt and collar machinists doing boiled-starch work: Beginners, for the first three months, 12s. ($2.92) per week; after three months, £1 2s. 6d. ($5.47) per week. (e) Body ironers, 16s. 6d. ($4.01) per week; sleeve ironers, 13s. ($3.16) per week. (/) Learners in hand ironing: For the first three months, 2s. ($0.49) per day; for the next three months, 2s. 6d. ($0.61) per day; and thereafter at the full rates * herein provided. One learner shall be allowed for every six persons or fraction thereof employed in the laundry. (g) General employees, hangers-out, etc. Under 21 years of age, 16s. ($3.89) per week; 21 years of age or over, 17s. 6d. ($4.26) per week. General employees are to be employed as hangers-out, and make themselves gen- erally useful. 1 New South Wales Industrial Gazette, Vol. V, No. 3, p. 858 et seq. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION" — NEW SOUTH WALES. 155 (h) Women working in washhouse, £1 2s. ($5.35) per week; casual hands, 4s. ($0.97) per day. (i) Starch ironers. Employees engaged in the ironing of any starched garment shall receive one-third of the price charged to the customer. (j) Shirts ironed by hand. Mixed shirts, Is. 9d. ($0.43) per dozen; full-bosomed shirts, 2s. ($0.49) per dozen. (h) Shirts blocked out by hand and polished by machine. Is. 3d. ($0.30) per dozen. (I) Backing up machine-ironed shirts, 8d. ($0.16) per dozen. (m) Shirts ironed by machine and body ironers, 6d. ($0.12) per dozen, (ra) Plain ironers, 6d. ($0.12) per dozen, or 3s. 6d. ($0.85) per day, at the option of the employer. Such option to be exercised at the commencement of the em- Eloyment. Plain ironers are to be engaged ironing all the different kinds of tdies', gentlemen's, and children's body linen, and all the different smaller articles to be done up in the laundry which are not starched. A plain ironer, if engaged on any starched work, shall be paid not less than one-third, as pro- vided in clause (i) above. (o) Hand collar and cuff ironers, 5d. (10 cents) per dozen. Ip) Sorters. For the first three months, 15s. ($3.65) per week; for the next three months, 18s. ($4.38) per week; after the first six months, £1 ($4.87) per week. For every five sorters employed in a laundry or fraction thereof, a girl under the age of 17 years may be employed at sorting at not less than 14s. ($3.41) per week. Such girl, on attaining the age of 17 years, shall receive the wage of 159. ($3.65) per week for the first three months, 18s. ($4.38) for the next three months, and £1 ($4.87) thereafter, as above provided. (g) First starchers, £1 2s. ($5.35) per week; one assistant starcher, 15s. ($3.65) per week. Starchers have to prepare their starch and to be engaged in the starch room rubbing down and brushing out the work. (r) Starch machinists, 15s. ($3.65) per week. Starch machinists are to be in attendance upon the different kinds of starching machines and to straighten out the work after it has been starched. («) Employees operating starch machines and rubbing down, 158. ($3.65) per week. It) Male employees in washhouse, 21 years of age or over, £2 8s. ($11.68) per week. In laundries where three or more machines are in work, persons under 21 years of age may be employed to assist at the following rates: Fifteen years to 16 years, 13s. ($3.16) per week; 16- years to 17 years, 15s. 6d. ($3.77) per week; 17 years to 18 years, 17b. 6d. ($4.26) per week; 18 years to 19 years, £1 ($4.87) per week; 19 years to 20 years, £1 5s. ($6.08) per week; 20 years to 21 years, £1 7b. 6d. ($6.69) per week. In laundries where one machine only is in work, persons under 21 years may be employed at the following rates: Under 19 years, £1 ($4.87); 19 years to 20 years, £1 58. ($6.08); 20 to 21 years, £1 10s. ($7.30). Male workers in washhouse are to be in attendance upon all the differ- ent kinds of machinery in the washhouse, and to keep the same clean. (u) Boys sitting in cart, in charge of the same, whilst the carter is away, up to 16 years of age, 10s. ($2.43) per week; 16 years or over, 158. ($3.65) per week. (v) Overtime shall be paid for at not less than the following rates : To female employ- ees, time and a half the first two hours, and double time thereafter; to male employees, time and a half for the first hour, double time for the second hour, and 5s. ($1.22) per hour thereafter. (w) All employees engaged in the different departments of the laundry may be shifted for the time being from one to another, providing the wages paid in the depart- ment where any employee may be shifted to are not on a higher scale than the wages paid in such employee's permanent or regular department. And in the event of any employee being shifted into a department where a higher scale of wages is paid, then and in such case the higher rate shall be paid to such employee. 3. Notice. — One week's notice shall be given on either side to determine employ- ment. Where such notice is not given by the employer, one week's wages shall be paid in lieu thereof; and where an employee, other than a casual hand, leaves without giving the week's notice, he or she shall forfeit any wages due not exceeding one week's wages. 4. Engagement and dismissal o/ hands. —Employ era shall not, in the engagement or dismissal of their hands, discriminate against members of the emplojrees' union, nor in the conduct of their business do anything for the purpose of injuring the said union, either directly or indirectly. 5. Holidays and holiday rates.— The following days shall be holidays: New Year's Day Good Friday, Easter Monday, Eight Hours Day, the King's Birthday, Christmas 156 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEATJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. Day, or the day on which any of the above may be observed by the Government of New South Wales. The holiday shall be paid for at ordinary rates to workers by the day or week. All work done on a holiday shall be paid for at not less than double time; but this condition shall not apply to carters as regards holidays falling on a Monday : Provided, That the employees shall, as far as possible, make up the time taken for holidays, and to enable this to be done, the working hours hereinbefore provided shall not be obligatory during the week in which a holiday takes place. 6 Exemption of charitable laundries.— The Sisters of the Good Samaritan Order, the Sisters of the Good Shepherd Order (Ashfield), the Committee of the Church of England Home, and the Rescue Home of the Salvation Army (Stanmore) are granted exemption from the provisions of this award as regards the inmates of the said institu- tions and in so far as such inmates are employed in and about the work of laundries upon the following conditions: (a) The working hours of the said inmates shall not exceed 48 hours per week. (6) No work from outside shall be done by the said inmates on the holidays above specified, except Easter Monday, (c) The management of each of the said institutions shall cooperate with the New South Wales Laundry Association in regulating the price charged to customers, so as to avoid undercutting or cause a reduction of wages. Provided, That in the event of the above conditions not being complied with, the exemption hereby granted shall be liable to be rescinded by the board. 7. Currency and extent of award. — The provisions of this award shall come into operar tion on the 1st day of May, 1914. This award shall be binding till the 30th day of June, 1914, throughout the metropolitan area of the State of New South Wales. * * « W. H. MocATTA, Chairman. UravERSrrT Chambers, Phillip Street, Sydney, April S4, 1914- QUEENSLAND. The first minimum-wage legislation in Queensland was in the wages boards act of AprU 15, 1908, modeled generally on the Victorian legislation. A feature differing from the Victorian law was the one permitting boards to be appointed by the governor in council without special parUamentary authorization. The act permitted the boards to be estabhshed with jurisdiction throughout the State, or Hmited, if desirable, to any special locality. As in most of the other Austra- han States, the legislation was aimed primarily at sweating. The experience under the wages boards act down to Jxme 30, 1912, is summarized in the report of the chief factory inspector for that year. During the four years in which the wages boards acts were in existence prior to June 30, 1912, 71 boards were established, of which number 30 were brought into existence during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1912. During the last year, also, numerous amend- ments were made in the act. The character of these amendments, as stated by the chief factory inspector in his report for the year 1912, is summed up in the following statement. The chief factory inspector has also in a number of cases indicated the reasons which suggested the change in the law.' An important amendment repeals that section wherein it was Eroyided that, if a man worked at an occupation for which a board ad fixed a wage rate, even for less than one hour, he had to be paid 1 Report of the Director of Labour and Chief Inspector of Factories and Shops for the year ended June 30, 1912. Brisbane. 1912. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION QUEENSLAND. 157 ^at rate for the whole of the time worked by him on that day. This has been removed, and a new section provided, which stipu- lates that, if a man works at two or more occupations for which a board has fixed a wages rate, he shall be paid the highest rate for the whole of the time so worked. As an instance, say he works one hour at Is. 6d. (36.5 cents), another at Is. (24.3 cents), and another at 9d. (18.3 cents), these three rates being fixed by a board, he must receive Is. 6d. (36.5 cents) per hour for the three hours worked, or 4s. 6d. ($1.10), whereas otherwise he would receive 3s. 3d. (79.1 cents). All other time worked dm-ing the same day at work for which no rate had been fixed would oiuy be paid for at such rate as may be agreed between employer and employee. More power has now been given to the chairman to obtaia evidence, as he will have the power of a police magistrate on such matters. Again, aU members of boards, including chairmen, must now take an oath of office that they will not make any false or inaccurate state- ments, and win faithfully discharge their duties without fear or favor. It is also provided that now a board has to determine rates for repairing work, also duration of time of meals or "smoke oh," or other intervals of cessation of work, and the time and place of pay- ment of wages. Another important provision has been inserted, which permits of an employer continuing to employ his apprentices when, through depression of trade, he has to dispense with his other employees, thereby exceeding the proportion of apprentices determined by the board; but this can not be done without the permission of the min- ister after full inquiry has been made into the bona fides of the case. Provision is also made which wiU prevent the possibUity of em- ployees being classed as partners on being caught breaking the law by working during prohibited hours; this, therefore, makes such a possibUity unlawful unless work is done under the written permission of the chief inspector. Instances have occurred, particularly among the Chinese furniture makers, where the employees, on being found working after hours, were declared to be partners; hence the necessity for amending the act in this particular. A very important and necessary amendment is that which empowers the chief inspector to issue licenses to aged, slow, and infirm workers pending confirmation of the special board relating to their occupa- tion. Under the original act the special board granted such hcenses, and instances of considerable hardship occurred through workers having to await the meeting of the board before being able to secure employment, no employer beiag agreeable to give the minimum wage until the board had dealt with the apphcation; and very often, especially in regard to boards outside the Brisbane district, the meet- ings were few and far between. It is now possible for an old, slow, or infirm worker to secure a Hcense immediately on apphcation, and certainly not later than four days afterwards. An employee must now claim arrears of wages within 14 days after they are due, and may, within one month after such claim, recover such arrears in any court of competent jurisdiction, but if the arrears extend over a period not exceeding 12 months, the balance remaining after paying employee the wages as previously stated shall be paid 158 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. into the consolidated revenue of the State. The object of this amend- ment is to prevent the possibility of an employee knowingly working for a wage less than that determined by a board, with a possible intention of putting in a claim for the higher wage after the arrears of same had acciunulated for a period up to 12 months as provided ia the original act. One very important addition is that relating to the power given the governor in council to rescind an order in council whereby it is now possible, where it is desirable, to alter the title of a board or extend its jurisdiction. Under a new section employers are protected against unscrupu- lous employees making false statements as to age, experience, or diu-a- tion of previous employment. A perusal of the amending act wiU disclose a number of minor but none the less valuable amendments, which help to render its admin- istration less difficult. As the members of special boards are appointed for a period of three years, fresh appointments were made in connection with 23 boards to date; in a few instances the retiring members were reappointed, whilst in others the personnel of the board was completely changed. The determinations have, with one exception, considerably raised the average of wages paid, as a comparative perusal of the appendices of this and preceding annual reports will show. In some instances the increase in the weekly wage amounts to over 50 per cent, and, generally speaking, the rates of piecework have been mcreased very much in comparison with those prevailing prior to 1908. The munber of apprentices and improvers in proportion to the number of other workers has been fixed, in a great many instances to the entire satisfaction of all parties concerned, and taking the acts and the determinations made thereunder with their appUcation to the trades and callings affected, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that the resxilts of this legislation have been eminently satisfactory, and in this opinion I am supported by the expressions of approval which I have received daily during the preceding 12 months from those intimately interested — the employers and the employees. 160 BULLETIN" OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. OPERATIONS OF WAGES BOARDS APPOINTED FROM [Source: Report of the Director of Labour and Chief Inspeo- Title of board. Request for board made by- Number en- rolled. Em. ployers. Em- ployees, Carpentry and joinery board — Brisbane Ironworkers assistants' board — Brisbane Meat industry board— Brisbane Men's and boys' clothing board — Brisbane Printing board— Brisbane Furniture trade board— Brisbane Boot trade board — Brisbane Carting trade board — Brisbane Bread and pastry cooking trade board — Brisbane Saddle, harness, and collar making trade board — Brisbane Masters and engineers of river and bay steamboats and barges — Brisbane board for. Shop assistants' board — Brisbane - — Coal working and lightering Industry board— Brisbane Gas stoking industry board— Brisbane House painting and decorating trade board — Brisbane Hairdressing industry board — Brisbane Tinsmithing trade board — Brisbane Tramways employees' industry board— Brisbane Meat industry board for the southeastern division Tanning, currying, and fancy leather dressing industry board for the southeastern division. Plumbing, gasfitting, and galvanized iron working trade board for the southeastern division. Sawmilling industry board for the southeastern division Shore engine drivers' and boiler attendants' industry boardforthe southeastern division. Bricklayingtrade board forthe southeastern division Coach builders' and wheelwrights' trade board forthe southeastern division. Stonemasons' trade board forthe southeastern division House painting and decorating trade board for the southeastern division. Coal mining industry board for the southeastern division Carpentry and joinery trade board forthe southeastern division Dock laborers' mdustry board forthe southeast coast _ Printingtrade board for the southern division Bread and pastry coo king trade board forthesoutheastern division. Brewing, malting, and distilling industry board for the south- eastern division. Gas working industry board for the southeastern division Ironworkers assistants' board for the southeastern division Cooks for the southeastern division, board for Meat industry board for the central division Coopers' trade board for the southeastern division Printing trade board for the central division Furniture makers' board for the southeastern division Meat industry board for the northern division Carting trade board for the southern division Saddle, harness, and collar making trade board for the soutbeast- ern division. Electrical engineering industry board Candle making industry board Iron, brass, and steel molding trade board — Brisbane [[ Bread and pastry cooking trade board for the central division. .... Iron, brass, and steel molding trades board for the southeastern division. Brickmaking and pottery industry board for southeastern division. Coal gas lampllghting, cleaning, and repairing industry board — Brisbane. Coal mining industry board for the State, exclusive of the south- eastern division. Shipwrights' trade boardforthesoutheast coast Engine drivers, flremeu, greasers, and assistant firemen's industry board for the central division. Builders laborers' board- Brisbane Hotel, club, and restaurant employees' board— Brisbane' .... Orchestral musicians' board — Brisbane Printing trade board for the northern division Sugar manufacturing industry board for the central division Plastermg trade board for the southeastern division. . Rope making industry board Warehouse laborers' board— Brisbane Wool, hide, skin, and produce stores laborers' board— Brisbane! ^ ' Cartmg trade board for the central division Employees. do. do do do Minister Employees- do do..... do do .do. .do. .do. .do. .do. .do. .do. .do. .do. .do. Employers. Employees. Employers. Employees. .do., .do.. .do. Employers- Employees. ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do Employers. Employees. Employees. do ....do ....do ....do Employers. . Employees. . Employers.. Employees.. do .. /....do \Employers. . do Employees.. Employers. . Employees.. ....do ....do Employers. . Employees.. do ....do ....do ....do 44 244 42 22 16 16 80 6 41 65 11 7 49 155 47 15 16 60 190 46 20 1 20 61 10 12 2 65 70 126 9 31 10 MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION QUEENSLAND. 161 THE ENACTMENT OF THE LAW TO JUNE 30, 1912. tor of Factories and Shops for year ended June 30, 1912.] Members of board appointed — Chairman of board named by- Date of first meeting. Date of an- nouncement of determination. Date determina- tion came into force. Amount of tees paid to board. ,1908., 1908.. 1908.. Oct. 17, ....do ....do ....do do. Oct. 22, Nov. 7, do. Nov. 28 do. Dec. 5, ....do Dec. 24, 1908.. ....do ....do Feb. 6, 1909... ....do Mar. 29, 1909.. June 11, 1909. . do i, 1908., i9'08.'."! .do. June 28, 1909.. do July 8, 1909.... do do July 31, 1909.. Aug. 26, 1909.. Sept. 14, 1909.. do Oct. 11,1909... Nov. 4, 1909... do do do Nov. 16, 1909.. Nov. 18, 1909.. Feb. 24, 1910.. Mar. 4, 1910... Mar. 10, 1910.. Apr. 7, 1910... Apr. 18, 1910.. June 20, 1910.. July 21, 1910... Sept. 1, 1910... Sept. 22, 1910.. Sept. 27, 1910.. Oct. 4, 1910.... Oct. 13, 1910.. Nov. 1,1910.. Nov. 24, 1910. , do Dec. 1,1910... Mar. 2, 1911.... Apr. 27,1911... May 4, 1911 May 11, 1911.... May 13, 1911.... May 18, 1911.... Sept. 21, 1911... Sept. 29, 1911... do Oct. 30, 1911.... Board ....do.... ....do... Minister.. ....do.... ....do... Board Minister., ....do... Board Minister.. ....do.... ....do.... Board ....do ....do.... ....da.... Minister... ....do Board Nov. 20,1908.... Nov. 19, 1908.... Nov. 18,1908.... Dee. 10, 1908 Dec. 4, 1908 Jan. 13, 1909 Dec. 11,1908 Jan. 22,1909 Feb. 12, 1909.... Jan. 8, 1909 Feb. 27, 1909.... Jan. 19, 1909... Feb. 11, 1909.. Feb. 3, 1909... Feb. 16,1909.. Feb. 26, 1909.. Mar. 5,1909... May 19, 1909... July 29, 1909... July 19, 1909... Minister. , Board.. do. ....do do... Aug. 3, 1909. Aug. 5, 1909. Aug. 9, 1909. Aug. 6, 1909 Aug. 24, 1909... .do Aug. 17, 1909. .do Sept. 6, 1909.. ....do... ....do... ....do... Minister.. ....do... ....do... Board Minister.. Board Minister.. do... Board Minister., do... Board do... do... Minister., do... Board Minister., do. Board.. do... do... Minister. , Board do... Minister. , Board do... do... Minister.. Board do... do... Dec. 2, 1909.., Nov. 4, 1909.. Nov. 17,1909., Deo. 2, 1909.., Jan. 18, 1910.. Jan. 12, 1910.. Jan. 11, 1910.... Jan. 19, 1910.... Dec. 21, 1909... Feb. 1,1910.... Apr. 15, 1910... Apr. 21, 1911... Apr. 26, 1910... June 28, 1910... May 31, 1910... July 27, 1910... Sept. 1,1910.. Nov, 3, 1910.. Oct, 21, 1910.. Oct. 29, 1910., Oct. 25, 1910.. Nov. 15, 1910.... Dec. 20, 1910..., Apr. 20, 1911 . Jan. 10, 1911.. Feb, 8, 1911.. Mar, 13, 1911... June 12, 1911... June 27, 1911... Feb. Feb. Jan, Sept, July Aug, Apr. May July Oct, Sept 27,1909... 6,1909... 16,1909... , 19, 1910.. 3,1909... 5,1909... 28,1909.. 26,1909.. 15, 1909... 1,1909.... . 17, 1909.. Mar. 25,1909.. Mar. 11, 1909. Feb. 8, 1909.. Oct. 17, 1910.. Oct. 1,1909... Nov. 1,1909.. May 31, 1909.. June 12, 1909. Sept. 4, 1909.. Nov. 1,1909.. Oct. 11, 1909.. Aug. 6, 1909.. Jan, 14, 1910.. Feb. 27, 1909. Apr. 3, 1909.. Mar. 27, 1909. May 26, 1909., June 16, 1909. Aug, 31, 1909. Aug. 9, 1910.. Deo. 8, 1909.. Dec. 1,1909... Sept. 16, 1909., Nov. 4, 1909... July 22, 1910.. Nov. 4, 1909.., Feb. 11, 1910. , Sept. 6, 1909... Fel). 1,1910... Apr, 1,1909... May 1, 1909.... Apr, 26, 1909.. June 14, 1909.. July 1,1909..., Sept. 27, 1909.. Sept. 5, 1910... Jan, 1, 1910.. ....do Oct. 4, 1909., Jan, 1,1910.., Aug. 8, 1910. Oct, 4, 1910... Apr. 13, 1910. Deo, 20, 1909. Aug, 5, 1910.. Jan. 28, 1910.. Oct. 26, 1910.. June 6, 1911 June 20, 1911.... Nov. 21, 1911.... Oct, 18, 1911 Oct. 24, 1911 Nov. 28, 1911.... Feb. Mar, Aug, Apr, Nov, May June July Aug. Oct, 18,1910.. 15,1910.. 11, 1910., 5,1910.. 10,1910., 30,1910.. 20,1910. 15,1910.. 15,1910. 12, 1910.. Jan, 1,1910.... Mar. 31, 1910.. Oct. 24, 1910... June 1,1910... Jan. 10, 1910... Sept. 5, 1910... Feb, 26, 1910., Nov, 21, 1910.. Mar, 14, 1910.. Apr. 13, 1910.. Sept, 1,1910... May 1,1910..., Dec. 1,1910... July 1,1910..., Aug, 1,1910.. June 30, 1910. Oct. 3,1910..., Nov, 1,1910.. Sept, 28, 1910., Nov, 16,1910.. Nov, 10,1910.. Feb, 22, 1911.. Nov. 10, 1910. . May 31, 1911.., Jan. 31, 1911-.. . Oct. 14, 1910.. Dec. 19, 1910. Dec. 2, 1910. . Mar. 5, 1911.. Deo. 12, 1910. Junes, 1911... Feb, 23, 1911. June 16, 1911. June 20, 1911 . Mar. 1,1911.. Apr. 29, 1911.. Oct. 24, 1911.. Mar. 25, 1912. June 30, 1911. Julys, 1911... Feb. 28, 1912. Jan. 17, 1912.. Jan. 3, 1912... Jan, 27, 1912.. Julys, 1911... July 10, 1911., Apr. 1,1911.. May 1,1911... Nov. 4, 1911.. Mar. 25,1912. July 14, 1911.. July 24, 1911.. Mar. 25, 1912. Jan. 1,1912... Jan. 8, 1912... Jan. 29, 1912.. $476,70 513, 42 228, 73 5,399,38 1, 130, 24 733, 62 1,007.37 1, 338, 29 394, 19 2, 955. 18 354,04 638, 73 453.80 143, 56 153, 29 43,80 209.26 76,65 142, 35 844. 34 396, 62 601,01 675, 46 142,35 734, 84 234.81 111. 93 1,640,01 504, 90 47,45 246, 97 86,38 69,35 29,20 79,08 228. 73 116, 68 195,88 136.05 128.96 60,88 856.60 136. 26 27,98 38,93 195.88 36,50 300,51 34.07 93.68 64,75 130. 18 628, 02 168. 16 119. 23 176. 19 34.07 81.51 142. 35 139. 91 122.88 82843°— Bull. 167—15 11 162 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. OPERATIONS OF WAGES BOARDS APPOINTED FROM Mar- ginal num- ber. Title of board. Request for board made by- Em- ployers. Number en- rolled. Em- Ironworkers assistants' board — Brisbane Meat industry board — Brisbane Men's and boys' clothing board— Brisbane Printing board — Brisbane Carpentry and joinery board — Brisbane Boot trade board — Brisbane Carting trade board — Brisbane Bread and pastry cooking trade board — Brisbane Saddle, harness, and collar making trade board for the southeast- em division. Masters and engineers of river and bay steamboats and barges, Brisbane board lor. Shop assistants' board— Brisbane Gas stoking industry board— Brisbane House painting and decorating trade board — Brisbane , Coal working and lightering Industry board — Brisbane Hairdressing industry board — Brisbane Tinsmlthing trade board— Brisbane Chemists assistants' board — Brisbane Men's and boys' clothing board— Brisbane Carting trade board for the central division Storemen for the central division, board for .- Tramways employees' industry board — Brisbane ■•----■ Carpentry and joinery trade board for the central division Furniture trade board- Brisbane Men's and boys' clothing trade for southeastern division Carpentry and joinery trade board for the Mackay division Storemen for the Mackay division, board for. . .- Employees. Employees. Employees. do Employees. Employees. 41 3S 42, 204 42 14 10 133 2 602 790 554 318 190 179 1,524 706 186 130 515 210 480 525 20 11 ' Amendments. MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATION QUEENSLAND. THE ENACTMENT OF THE LAW TO JUNE 30, 1912-Coiioluded. 163 Members of board appointed— Chairman of board named by- Date of first meeting. Date of an- nouncement of determination. Date determina- tion came into force. Amount of fees paid to board. Mar- ginal ber." Nov. 2, 1911 Nov. 9,1911 Nov. 20, 1911 do Mlnister.... 64 Board 65 66 do 67 do Board... 68 Dec. 6, 1911 Dec. 8,1911 Ministor Sept. 7, 1911'... Sept. 29, 1911 1.. Oct. 4,1911 69 do Sept. 25,1911... 70 Dec. 14,1911.... do Jan. 3, 1913. do Board 71 do Minist/ir Aug. 16, 19111... Aug. 26, 1911 72 73 do Jan. 16, 1912 do Board 75 HiinlRtAr 76 Jan. IS, 1912 Har. 7,1912 do do Jan. 3, 19121 Jan. is, 1912 . 77 78 do Mar. 21, 1912.. .. Mar. 22, 1912 Board Jan. 3, 19121 June 21, 1912. Jan. 8, 1912... 79 do Apr. 22, 1912 149.64 80 81 Apr. 11,1912.... Apr. 15, 1912 Minister 82 do June 14, 1912 7.30 83 Apr. 26,1912 Apr. 29, 1912 BoMd 84 do June 25 1912 85 do do 86 May 23, 1912 .do 87 88 do 89 164 BULLETIN OF THE BXJREATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. The wages-board system was in 1912 replaced by a system of indus- trial or wages boards with an arbitration coiirt, by the industrial peace act of 1912. The immediate cause of this legislation was a general strike in 1912 which for a time paralyzed the industries of the country The industrial boards are constituted by the governor in council on recommendation of the industrial cotu-t, but without any preliminary parhamentary resolution. The members of the boards are appointed by the governor in council after an election of their representatives by the employers and employees, respectively. Each board elects its own chairman. The jurisdiction of the boards extends to any indus- trial matter or dispute in connection with the industry or calling for which the board was created. The act of 1912 created an industrial court, consisting of a judge appointed by the governor in council. Appeal may be taken from the awards of the industrial boards to this court. The court has power also in case of any willful or unnecessary delay on the part of the board to take over aU questions in the hands of the board and to exercise the functions of the board and issue an award in the place of the board. The court also has jurisdiction over any industrial ma<^ ters and industrial disputes which may be submitted to it by the minister or by an employer employing not less than 20 persons, or by not less than 20 employees in any calling. In such a case the coiu-t exercises the powers and authority of a board and as such makes awards and orders. At the end of April, 1914, it was reported that 92 industrial boards had been authorized, of which 81 were at that time in existence. The number of awards in force was 76. On June 30, 1914, the number of employees affected by the 92 awards then in force was 90,000. SOUTH AUSTRALIA. Mmimum-wage legislation in South Austraha dates from the factories act of December 5, 1900. As in most of the other Australian States, the special purpose of the act was to do away with sweating, which according to the reports of the chief inspector of factories was prevalent in the clothing trades. The chief inspector reported that he had even found that manufacturers in other Australian States were shippmg then- materials to South Australia to be made up at the very low rates there prevailing and to be returned to those States and sold. In form the South Austraha act of 1900 was modeled on the Vic- torian legislation. A statutory mmimum of 4s. (97.3 cents) a week was fixed and the estabhshment of wages boards was authorized for factory and outworkers engaged in the manufacture of: (1) White work, (2) boots and shoes, (3) furniture, (4) bread, and "such other MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATION SOUTH AUSTEALIA. 165 manvif acturing trades or businesses as may be from time to time fixed and determined by resolution of Parliament." The act was to go into effect as soon as regulations were accepted by Parliament. Regulations were drawn up and submitted to Par- liament in 1901. The proposed regulations, however, were not approved, and it was not until 1905 that the appointment of any boards was secured. This, however, was not under the act of 1900, but under the act of 1904, applying only to clotlung and white work and including all females, and males under 21. The first determina- tion vmder the clothing board was issued December 1, 1905. The determination of the shirt-making and white-work board was issued early in 1906. Even then, because of opposition and defects disclosed in the act, the determinations were held invalid. The report of the chief factory inspector, however, shows that many of the manufac- turers conformed to the rates fixed by the boards. In 1906 Parliament provided for boards similar to the Victorian model iu 8 trades, namely, bread making, boots, brick making, butchering, dressmaking, carriers and drivers, furniture making, and shirt making and white work. Boards were at once appointed in these 8 trades and determiaations became effective in September, 1906. In 1907 the various factory acts were consohdated in the factories act of 1907, in effect January 1, 1908, under which it was necessary to draw up new regulations. Opposition to the enforcement of the act again developed and the regulations were withdrawn in Parliament. New regulations were approved under date of September 30, 1908, from which the actual beginning of operations of the wages-board system in South Australia may be said to date. The industrial arbitration act of 1912, enacted December 19, 1912, substituted for the wages-board system formerly in effect a mixed system of wages boards and an industrial court resembling that of the New South Wales act of 1912. Under the new law the wages boards were continued, but were subordinate to the industrial court, whose powers were made considerably broader than those formerly granted to the wages boards under the old system. The boards, however, are not appointed on the recommendation of the industrial court as in New South Wales, but by the governor in council upon the nomina- tion of employers and employees, respectively. The boards nominate their president, who is then appointed by the governor. As in most of the Austrahan States the basis which the boards use in fixing the minimum wage is the "living wage." The South Aus- tralian act provides that ' ' the court shall not have power to order or prescribe wages which do not secure to the employees affected a living wage. ' Living wage ' means a sum sufficient for the normal and 166 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. reasonable needs of the arerage employee living in the locality where the work under consideration is done or is to be done." At the end of April, 1914, it was reported that 56 boards had been authorized, 51 of which were at that date in existence. Approxi- mately 25,000 employees were in the trades which had been brought under the jurisdiction of boards. At the same date 54 determina- tions were in force, 6 of which had been made by the industrial court after the minister of industry had reported the inabiUty to appoiat boards as provided for by the law or the failure of the duly appointed boards to discharge the duties in accordance with their appointment. TASMANIA. Tasmania was the last of the Australian States to adopt mini- mxun-wage legislation. The wages board act of 1910 (January 13, 1911), which came into operation March 31, 1911, followed the Victorian model, but apphed only to clothing and wearing apparel, including boots and shoes. The system could be extended to other trades only by parhamentary authorization. In 1912 Parhament authorized the creation of 19 additional boards, as foUows: Bakers and pastry cooks' board. Flour millers' board. Bricklayers and stonemasons' board. FumituTe makers' board. Brickmakers and pottery makers' board. Hotels, coffee palaces, restaurants, and Butchers' board. clubs' board. Carpenters and joiners' board. Ironmolders' board. Carters and drivers' board. Jam makers' board. Coach builders' board. Painters and decorators' board. Engineeis' board. Pastoral industry board. Plasterers' board. Printers' board. Timber trade board. Threshing machine boar-d. The wages boards are appomted by the governor in council on nominations by employers and employees. As in Victoria, each board consists of not less than 4 nor more than 10 members and a chairman, selected either by the members, or in case of default ia selection, appointed by the governor. At the end of April, 1914, 23 boards had been authorized and 21 were in existence. The act provides for no court of appeal, but permits an appeal to the supreme court on grounds of legaUty. The minister of labor, however, is authorized to suspend or refer back for reconsideration any determination. The act also forbids a lockout or strike on account of any matter in respect to which a board has made a determination. For viola- tion of this provision severe penalties are imposed, namely: In the case of an organization £500 (12,433.25) and in the case of an individual £20 (S97.33). As originally passed, the act of 1910 provided that the mimmum wage to be fixed should be based on and could not exceed "the MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS TASMANIA. 167 ETerage prices or rates of payment (whether piecework prices or rates of wages prices or rates) paid by reputable employers to employees of average capacity." As in Victoria and some of the other States, the form of reference to "reputable employers" was considered ob- jectionable by employees as it limited the wages to be fixed to those paid at the time. The objectionable provision was repealed in the act of September 14, 1911 (wages board act, 1911). The basis now prescribed in the law for fixing minimmn wage is shown in the follow- ing quotation from the act of 1911: Sec. 22. (1) The board, for the purpose of determining the lowest prices or rates of payment which may be paid, shall take such evidence as it deems sufficient, and shall take into consideration — (a) The nature, kind, and class of the work; (6) The mode and manner in which the work is to be done; (c) The age and sex of the workers, and in addition, as regards apprentices and im- provers, their experience at the trade; and (d) Any matter whatsoever which may from time to time be prescribed. (2) The board shall ascertain what prices or rates are fair and reasonable as the lowest prices or rates to be paid, taking into consideration the evidence and the matters and things mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, and shall make their determination accordingly; and the board (if it thinks fit) may fix different prices or rates accordingly. WESTERN AUSTRALIA. In Western Australia an abortive industrial conciliation and arbi- tration act was passed December 5, 1900, and as amended February 19, 1902, became operative in that year. The act of 1902 was mod- eled on that of New Zealand, including an arbitration court of three members and district concihation boards. The present act, which is a consolidation of previously existing laws, is the industrial arbitration act of 1912, enacted December 21, 1912. The act provides for a court of arbitration, appointed by the gov- ernor, one member to be appointed on the recommendation of the industrial imions of employers and one on the recommendation of the industrial unions of employees, the third member, who acts as president, to be a judge of the supreme court. The powers of the court are very broad, extending practically to any industrial matter. In fixing the minimum wage in its award, the living wage is the standard, the law providing that "no minimum rate of wages or other remimeration shall be prescribed which is not sufficient to enable the average worker to whom it apphes to live in reasonable comfort, hav- ing regard to any domestic obligations to which such average worker would be ordinarily subject." At the end of April, 1914, it was reported that 18 awards were in force. In addition, there were 93 industrial agreements, which under the law have the force and effect of awards. The membership of .registered industrial unions was reported as 30,000. 168 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OE LABOR STATISTICS. NEW ZEALAND. INTRODUCTION. The first of all the laws providing a means for fixing the legal mini- mum wage was the New Zealand Industrial Conciliation and Arbi- tration Act of 1894, enacted August 31, 1894, and in force January 1, 1895. The New Zealand act was primarily a compulsory arbitration act for the prevention and settlement of strikes and lockouts. The authority conferred upon the arbitration court to fix conditions of employment included fixing the minimum rates of wages to be paid in the cases coming before it. The New Zealand law has been many times amended,^ but has remained from the beginning primarily an act for the settlement of disputes and the fixing of wages by an arbitration court. In 1908 councils of conciliation were introduced, with functions and methods somewhat similar to those of the wages boards, and disputes were required to be heard by the conciliation tribunal before they could be referred to the court of arbitration. Thus under the present law a large proportion of the disputes are settled by the coxmcils of conciliation. The number of awards and agreements actually in force March 31, 1914, was 445. During the period since the act came into force the number of factories has increased from 4,109 in 1894-95, to 13,469 in 1913-14. The number of factory workers had increased within the same period from 29,879 to 87,517, an increase in number of employees having been recorded each year except two.^ New Zealand, like most of the Australian States, has also an act fixing a minimum wage below which no person may be employed. This law was first enacted October 21, 1899, and is now embodied in the factories act, 1908. This law fixes the minimum wage at 5s. ($1.22) a week for the first year of employment in the trade, 8s. ($1.95) a week for the second year, with additions of 3s. (73 cents) a week for each year of employment in the same trade until a wage of 20s. (14.87) is reached. The piu-pose of this provision of law was to prevent the employment of children and apprentices without any wage or at a premium, as was often done under the pretense of teach- ing the trade. SUMMARY OP PROVISIONS OF INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION ACT. The main provisions of the New Zealand law may be summarized as follows:' Industrial Districts. Under the regulations of the act the Dominion of New Zealand is divided into eight industrial districts. 1 The later acts are: Oct. 18, 1895; Oct. 17, 1896; Nov. 5, 1898; Oct. 20, 1900 (consolidation act); Nov. 7, 1901; Sept. 24, 1903; Nov. 20, 1903; Nov. 8, 1904; Oct. 27, 1905 (consoMation act); Oct. 31, 1905; Oct. 29, 1906; Aug. 4, 1908 (consolidation act); Oct. 10, 1908; Dec. 3, 1910; Oct. 28, 1911; Oct. 3, 1913. The text of the law as exist- ing early in 1900 was priated in Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, No. 33, pp. 207 et seq. The text of the law as existing early in 1903 was printed in Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, No. 49, pp. 1282 et seq. 2 Twenty-third Annual Report of the New Zealand Department of Labour, 1914, p. 7. »New Zealand Official Year Book, 1914. WeUington, 1913, pp. 661-665. MINTMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION NEW ZEALAND. 169 Registration of Industrial Unions and Associations. Any society consisting of not fewer than three persons in the case of employers or fifteen in the case of workers in any specified Industry or iadustries in an industrial district may be registered as an ''industrial union" on comphance with the requirements for regis- tration. Any iucorporated company may also be registered as an industrial tmion of employers. Any two or more industrial unions of either employers or workers ia any industries may form an "in- dustrial association," and register the same under the act. Indus- trial associations are usually formed for the whole or greater part of New Zealand, comprising the unions registered m the various indus- trial districts. Such registration enables any union or association — (1) To enter iuto and file an industrial agreement specifying the conditions of employment agreed upon. This agreement (which is bindiug only on the parties to it), although required by the act to be limited to a period of not more than three years, remains in force until superseded by another agreement or an award of the court of arbitration, except where the registration of the union of workers concerned is canceled. (2) In the event of failure to arrive at an industrial agreement, to bring an industrial dispute before a council of concihation set up for the purpose, and, if necessary, before the court of arbitration. It should be noted that while employers may individually be cited by a workers' union or association, workers can be cited by employers only when such workers are voluntarily registered under the act as an industrial union or association of workers. The constitution of councils of concihation and of the court of arbitration is explained later on in this section. A council of concilia- tion has no compulsory powers; it merely endeavors to bring about a settlement. If a settlement is effected it may be filed as an "indus- trial agreement." In most cases, however, it has been found that on arriving at a settlement through the council of concihation the parties prefer to have the agreement made into an award of the court of arbitration, and in such cases the dispute is formally passed on to the court for that purpose. If the members of the council agree upon a unanimous recommenda- tion, but donotget an "industrial agreement " signed by all theparties, the recommendation is now (vide the 1911 and 1913 amendments) filed for one month, and if no party disagrees with the same within that~ time the recommendation becomes automatically binding on the parties. If a complete settlement is not arrived at, the council is required by the act to refer the dispute to the court of arbitration, which, after hearing the parties, may make an award, and any items of the dispute that have been agreed upon before the council may be em- bodied by the court into its award without any further reference. Such an award is, hke an industrial agreement, binding on all the parties cited, and is also binding on any other employers subsequently commencing business in the same trade in the district. Unless the district is further hmited by the court in the award, the award apphes to the industrial district in which it is made. Pending the sitting of the court of arbitration to hear the dispute, it is the duty of the council to endeavor to bring about some provisional agreement. 170 BULLETIN OP THE BtTBEAtr OP LABOR STATISTICS. Awards are also required by the act to be limited to a period of not more than three years, but, nevertheless, remain in force until super- seded either by another award or by a subsequent agreement, except where the registration of the union of workers has been canceled. Under the act in force from 1901 to 1908 power was given to any of the parties to a dispute, when once filed for hearing by the board of conciUation appointed under that act to hear all disputes in the district, to refer the same to the court of arbitration direct without waiting for a hearing by the board. This provision was repealed in 1908, when all disputes were again required to be heard by the con- cihation tribunal before being referred to the court of arbitration. In 1911, however, a clause was inserted to enable an industrial asso- ciation, party to a dispute extending over more than one industrial district (and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of a concihation coimcil), to apply direct to the coiu-t of arbitration for the hearing of the dispute. Registration also enables a imion or association to cite before a magistrate any party committing a breach of an award or industrial agreement. Parties generally prefer, however, to hand over any such cases to the labor department to cite or otherwise dispose of as it thinks fit. Under the act individual employers have the same powers as unions or associations of citing other parties, although they seldom exercise those powers. Constitution of Conciliation Conncils. The act provides for the appointment of not more than four con- ciliation commissioners to hold office for three years; three have been appointed and each of the eight industrial districts is placed under the jurisdiction of one of them. When a dispute arises the union, association, or employer desiring to have the same heard makes apphcation to the commissioner m. the form provided, stating the nature of the dispute, and the names of the respondents, and recommending, at its option, one, two, or three assessors to act as representatives on the council to be set up. On receipt of the apphcation the commissioner notifies the respond- ents and calls upon them to similarly recommend an equal number of assessors to represent them. The assessors must, except in special cases at the discretion of the commissioner, have been engaged in the industry. Councils of concihation are thus set up for each dispute as it arises. Constitution of tlie Court of Arbitration. The court of arbitration is appointed for the whole of New Zealand, and consists of three members, one of whom — the permanent judge of the court — possesses the same powers, privileges, etc., as a judge of the supreme court. Of the other members, one is nominated by the various unions of employers throughout the Dominion and one by the unions of workers, and their appointments are determined by a majority of the imions on each side, respectively. Like the members of the former boards of conciUation, they hold office for three years, and are eligible for reappointment. The judge and one member con- stitute a quorum. All decisions of the court are arrived at by the judgment of a majority of the members present at the sitting, or, if those members present are equally divided in opinion, the decision of the judge is final. The court has fuU power to deal with questions MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION NEW ZEALAND. 171 brought before it, and, except in the case of matters which may be ruled to be beyond the scope of the act, there is no appeal from its decision. Breaches. Breaches of awards and industrial agreements are punishable as follows: A union, association, or employer by fine not exceeding £100 ($486.65) for each breach; a worker by fine not exceeding £5 ($24.33) for each breach. Penalties are recoverable at the suit of either an inspector of awards (by action in the magistrates' court or the arbitration court), or any party to the award or agreement (by action in the magistrates' court), but there is a right of appeal from the magistrates' to the arbitration court. Actions for the recovery of penalties must be commenced within six months after the cause of action has arisen. COMPARISON OF MINIMUM RATES UNDER AWARDS WITH ACTUAL RATES PAID. The department of labor of New Zealand in its report for 1909 makes extensive comparisons of the actual rates paid ia various industries in the four chief industrial centers with the minimum rates paid under arbitration awards. In commenting upon its figures, the department report says: ^ Appended to this report appears the result of an investigation, as far as factories are concerned, into the extent to which the arbitra- tion court in fixing a minimum wage has or has not lowered the average wage, or injured high rates for especially good workers. It has so often been asserted with blind confidence that every award of a minimum wage has "leveled down" all wages, that it will come as a surprise to the general pubhc to fitnd how few workers have to accept the minimum wage, which is not, as has been so often stated, "the award wage," but a limit of wage below which no persons in that particular trade may be paid. In the bootmaking trade, for instance, in Auckland 66 per cent, in Wellington 85^ per cent, in Christchurch 66 per cent, and in Dunedin 50 per cent of the workers receive wages above the minimum wage. In Auckland 91 per cent, in Wellington 57^ per cent, in Christchurch 50 per cent, and in Dunedin 26 per cent of the cabinetmakers receive above the minimum wage named in the award. Plumbers and gas fitters receiving wages above the award minimum are: In Auckland 66 per cent, Wellington 19 per cent, in Christchurch 84 per cent, in Dunedin 59 per cent. It is of no use laboring the matter here by quoting figures too profusely, since the whole state of the case can be seen by any person studying the table, but the investigation has served to prick one of the bubbles so freely blown by opponents of the act when trying to gain the sympathy of those whose wages have been for years protected by the industrial courts from the undercutting of unscrupvdous mates or the forcing- down methods of greedy exj^oiters. The same report makes similar comparisons in a large number of industries. ^ In the tailoring trade, including factory-made clothing, 1 Eighteenth Annual Beport of the New Zealand Department of Labour, 1909. Wellington, 1909, p. xiii. 2 Idem., pp. 133 et seq. 172 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU 0¥ LABOR STATISTICS. a trade in wMch the majority of employees are women, similar differences were found, as is shown in the following table: PER CENT OF WOEKEES RECEIVING MORE THAN THE MINIMUM AWAED RATES. Auckland (city). Wellington. Christchurch. Dunedin. Sex. Miniinuni rates under awards. Per cent receiving more than Ttiini- mum. Minimum rates under awards. Per cent receiving more than mini- mum. Minimum rates under awards. Per cent receiving more than mini- mum. Minimum rates under awards. Per cent receiving more than mini- mum. $12.17 $6.08-7.30 64 24i $13.38 6.08 37J-100 74-90 $13.38 6.08 27-100 26-100 $13.38 6.08 33J-87 Females 34-57 Total 47 77 46 55 The report of the New Zealand department for 1910 makes similar comparisons of actual rates paid and minimum rates under awards. Upon its figures for the year 1910 the report contains the following comment:' Again this year I append a table of an investigation, as far as factories are concerned, showing rates paid to workers as compared with the minimum wage under awards, etc. For this purpose the wages of 7,374 workers have been compared. Of this number,.- 2,785 received the minimum wage, and 4,589 in excess of it, or a total of 62 per cent. In making this comparison only the wages of persons over the age of 21 are taken; and on reference to the return it will show how each industry governed by an award is dealt with. Un- fortunately, owing to the difficulty of making comparisons, some of our principal industries have not been dealt with, as the awards provide for two or three rates to be paid to certain classes of em- ployees, and the schedules received from employers do not always separate the workmen into the various classes. However, there is sufficient evidence to show that in our manufacturing industries at least an average of 50 per cent of the workers compared received more than the rates granted in the awards of the court of arbitration. Such a result must be exceedingly gratifying to those interested in the industrial legislation of the Dominion, especially in view of the fact that opponents of the act have stated in and out of season that the majority of workers are receiving only the minimum wage, and that the work accomplished by the first-class man gets no more recog- nition than that of the ordinary employee who makes no special effort to deserve extra monetary reward. If this allegation is true in regard to workers outside manufacturing industries — ^which I very much doubt — the figures quoted by the department in this report hardly bear out the contention in regard to many of our leading manufactur- ing industries. I find in regard to the cities the returns show that in Auckland, out of 2,119 employees compared, 782 receive the minimum rate and 1,337 in excess, equal to 63 per cent. In Wellington 1,513 employees have been compared, 535 of whom receive the minimum rate and 978 in excess of the minimum, or 64 per cent. In Christ- church 2,367 have been compared, 869 of whom receive the minimum 1 Nineteenth Aimual Eeport of the New Zealand Department of Labour, 1910. Wellington, 1910i pp. xi, xii. MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATION NEW ZEALAND, 173 rate and 1 498 in excess of minimum, or 63 per cent. In Dunedin 1,375 employees have been compared, of whom 599 receive the mini- mum and 776 in excess of the minimum, or 56i per cent. WORK OF CONCILIATION COUNCILS AND ARBITRATION COURT. The work of the concUiation councils and arbitration court during the year ended March 31, 1914, may be summarized as follows i^ Industrial agreements 42 Recommendations of councils of conciliation 166 Awards of the arbitration court 93 Applications for awards refused 3 Enforcements of awards (conducted by department) in arbitration court 8 Interpretation of awards 20 Other decisions (amending awards, adding parties, etc.) 48 Appeals from, decisions of stipendiary magistrates in enforcement cases 5 Appeal from registrar's decision to reftise registration of union 1 Magistrate's courts: Enforcements of awards, etc. (conducted by department) 425 Enforcements of awards (conducted by unions) 4 Enforcements of act 7 Permits to underrate workers granted by inspectors of factories and secretaries of unions 208 Of 433 cases for breaches of awards in which the proceedings were taken by- the labor department, 401 were decided in favor of the department and 32 were dismissed. In four cases conducted by unions, one conviction was recorded, and three cases were dismissed. COST OF ADMINISTRATION. The cost of administration of the act by the arbitration court and councils of concUiation during the year 1912-13 was £8,171 19s. 6d. (139,768.91), made up as foUows:^ Salaries of members of arbitration court 2,800 0(113,626.20) Salaries of conciliation commissioners 1,500 ( $7,299.75) Salaries of arbitration court officers 165 ( $802.97) Fees paid to assessors, councils of concilia- tion 1,473 15 ( $7,172.00) Traveling, etc., expenses of arbitration court 1,249 13 11 ( $6,081.64) Traveling, etc., expenses of conciliation commissioners 373 10 7 ( $1,817.78) Traveling, etc., expenses of conciliation as- sessors 610 0( $2,968.57) Total 8,171 19 6 ($39,768.91) The cost of administration for the year 1913-14 was £415 16s. 8d. ($2,023.65) less than ia the preceding year, the differences being chiefly in traveling expenses.^ 1 Twenty-third Annual Eeport of the New Zealand Department of Labour, 1914, pp. 18 and 19. 2 New Zealand Official Year Book, 1913. Wellington, 1913, p. 674. GREAT BRITAIN.' SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF TRADE BOARDS ACT. Minimum-wage legislation in Great Britain was initiated by the trade boards act which came into operation January 1, 1910. The original act provided for the establishment of trade boards authorized to fix minimum rates of wages in four trades, selected as beiag espe- cially subject to sweating. These trades were the following: 1. Ready-made and wholesale bespoke tailoring, employing up- ward of 200,000 persons, about one-third of whom were men. 2. Paper-box making, employing about 25,000 persons. 3. Machine-made lace and net finishing, and mending or darning op- erations of lace curtain finishing, employing about 10,000 persons. 4. Certain kinds of chain making, employing some 3,000 persons, two-thirds of whom were women. By the trade boards provisional orders confirmation act enacted August 15, 1913, four additional trades were brought within the scope of the act. These were: 1. Sugar confectionery and food preserving, employing about 80,000 persons. 2. Shirt making, employing approximately 40,000 persons. 3. Hollow ware, employing about 15,000 persons. 4. Linen and cotton embroidery, employing about 3,000 persons. - In 1913, and again in 1914, the Board of Trade took steps to secure the extension of the act, by Parliament, to power laundries. On both occasions, however. Parliament declined to grant the necessary authorization because of defects in the bill presented or lack of the information desired prehminary to definite action in the case. The act provides that the Board of Trade may make a provisional order applying the act to any other trade if they are satisfied that the rate of wages prevailing in any branch of that trade is "excep- tionally low" as compared with that in other employments, and that the other circumstances of the trade are such as to render the appli- cation of the act to the trade expedient. No provisional order extending the act to any additional trade has effect unless and untU it is confirmed by ParUament. The principal function of trade boards is to fix minimum rates of wages; that is to say, rates of wages which in the opinion of the trade board are the lowest which ought to be paid to workers in the trade and district for which the rates are fixed. Every trade board consists of equal numbers of members repre- senting employers and members representing workers in the trade, to- ' This section is based largely upon an official report entitled " Memoranda in reference to the working ot the trade boards act " presented to Parliament by the Board of Trade, May 27, 1913. London, 1913, H. C. 134. 174 MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION GREAT BKITAIN. 175 gether with a smaller number of "appointed members," who are per- sons unconnected with the trade and appointed by the Board of Trade. The membership of the trade boards in existence in June, 1913, is shown in the following statement, which also indicates the cases in which members were elected and those in which members were nominated by the Board of Trade: MEMBERSHIP OF TEADE BOARDS, JUNE, 1913. Ap- pointed mem- bers. Representatives of— Additional members chosen by Board of Trade. Total repre- Trade. Employers. Workers. senta- tive Elect- ed. Nomi- nated. Elect- ed. Nomi- nated. Em- ployers. Work- ers. mem- bers. 3 3 3 3 5 3 6 ie' 4 io' 8' 6 12 8 18 13 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 20 Paper-box making (Great Britain) . . . 38 is' 4 io' 10 TailorinET f Great Britain) 30 20 Total 36 21 20 37 8 8 130 Nine district trade committees, covering the whole country, have been estabMshed by the paper-box trade board (Great Britain) and seven district trade committees, covering the whole country, have been estabMshed by the tailoring trade board (Great Britain). No minimima rate of wages can have effect in an area for which a district trade committee has been estabhshed, unless the committee has recom- mended it or has had an opportunity of reporting to the trade board. The district trade committees consist partly of appointed members, partly of representative members of the trade board, and partly of representatives of local employers and local workers. The local rep- resentatives have in all cases been nominated by the Board of Trade. The membership of the 16 district trade committees mentioned above is shown in the two following tables: MEMBERSHIP OF PAPER-BOX DISTRICT TRADE COMMITTEES (EXCLUSIVE OF APPOINTED MEMBERS), JUNE, 1913. Distriot.1 Representative members of the trade board chosen to act on committees. Local representa- tives. Additional mem- bers chosen by Board of Trade. Total repre- senta- tive mem- bers. Employ- ers. Work- ers. Employ- ers. Work- ers. Employ- ers. Work- ers. 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 7 5 4 4 5 6 4 5 5 7 5 1 1 1 1 14 Liverpool Lgeds 14 14 Leicester 12 16 1 2 1 2 18 London 16 Total 23 23 44 44 6 5 144 1 Tho fli-jfriots arc here named, for the sake of brevity, after the principal centers of the trade in the sev- erll arIsS The dStdcte covere,i by the committees are set out in fuU in the regulations for the paper-box trade board (Great Britain). 176 BULLETTN OF THE BUEEATJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. MEMBERSHIP OF TAILOEING DISTRICT TRADE COMMITTEES (EXCLUSIVE OF AP- POINTED MEMBERS), JUNE, 1913. District.! Representative mem- bers of the trade board chosen to act on the committees. Local representatives. Total rep- resentative members. Employers. Worters. Employers. Workers. 3 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 4 3 6 8 8 6 5 29 6 6 8 8 6 5 29 6 18 24 22 18 14 26 18 Leeds Leicester London Bristol Total 22 22 48 48 140 1 The districts are here named, for the sake of brevity, after the principal centers of the trade in the sev- eral areas. The districts covered by the committees are set out in full ra the regulations for the tailoring trade board (Great Britain). 2 Including 1 additional member nominated by the Board of Trade. ORGANIZATIOi^ AND WORK OF TRADE BOARDS. The act requires the trade boards to fix mmimum time rates of wages for their trades. It also gives them power to fix general minimum piece rates. These rates, whether by time or piece, may be fixed so as to apply to the whole trade or to any special process or to any special class of workers or to any special area. Before fixing any minimum rate of wages a trade board must give notice of the rate which they propose to fix, and must consider any objections that may be put before them within three months; and when the rate has been fixed notice of it must be given by the trade board for the information of the employers and workers affected. Any rate so fixed immediately has a hmited operation, as follows: (a) An employer must pay wages at not less than the minimuTn rate, unless there is a written agreement under which the worker agrees to accept less. If there is no such written agreement, wages at the minimum rate can be recovered from the em- ployer as a debt (but the employer will not be liable to a fine). (&) Any employer may give notice to the trade board that he is willing to be bound by the rate fixed and be liable to the same fine for underpayment as if the rate had been obligatory. No employer will receive a contract from a Government depart- ment or local authority unless he has given notice to the trade board in this manner. The limited operation described above continues (unless the Board of Trade direct to the contrary in any case in which they have directed the trade board to reconsider the rate) imtil the Board of Trade make an order making the rate obligatory. Sych an order must be made by the Board of Trade six months after notice of the fixing of the rate has been given by the trade board, unless the MINIMUM-WAGE LEGHSLATION- — GBEAT BEITAIlir. 177 Board of Trade consider it premature or otherwise undesirable to make an obligatory order. In that case the Board of Trade must make an order suspending the obligatory operation of the rate. After the expiration of six months from the date of any order of suspension the trade board may apply to the Board of Trade for an obligatory order. On any such appHcation the Board of Trade must make an obligatory order unless they are of opinion that a further order of suspension is desirable. When a minimum rate has been made obhgatory by order of the Board of Trade, any agreement for the payment of wages at less than the minimum rate is void, and payment of wages at less than the minimum rate, clear of all deductions, renders the employer liable to a fine of not more than £20 ($97.33), and to a fine not exceeding £5 ($24.33) for each day on which the offense is continued after conviction therefor. Employers may arrange with their workers for payment either by piece or time. If the workers are paid by piece for doing work for which a minimum time rate but no general minimmn piece rate has been fixed, two courses are open to the employer: (a) He may fix the piece rate himself, in which case he must be able to show, if challenged, that his rate would yield to an ordinary worker, in the circumstances of the case, at least as much money as the time rate fixed by the trade board {it is not necessary for Jiim to sJiow that the piece rate which he has fixed yields every worTcer, however slow or incapa- ile, at least the same amount of money as the minimum time rate would yield, nxyr, on the other hand, is it sufficient for him, to show that the piece rate which he has fixed wiU yield the equivalent of the minimum tims rate in the case of a specially fast worTcer) ; or, (&) he may, if he chooses, apply to the trade board to fix a special minimum piece rate for the persons he employs. In cases where a trade board are satisfied that a worker is affected by an infirmity or physical injury which fenders him incapable of earning the minimum time rate, and that he can not suitably be employed on piecework, they may grant to the worker a permit of exemption; and so long as the conditions prescribed by the trade board on the grant of the permit are complied with, an employer is not liable to penalty for paying the worker wages at less than the minimum time rate. 82843°— Bull. 167—15 12 178 BULLETIN or THE BUREAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. The minimum rates of pay for adults fixed by the trade boards up to the present time are as follows : MINIMUM WAGE RATES FIXED FOR ADULTS BY TRADE BOARDS FOR GREAT BRITAIN. Trade. Females. Chain making Wholesale tailoring. La£e finishing Paper-box making. Confectionery ^ Shirt making* 6d.-7A A board may fix rates for repairing articles. See section 152 post. For additional powers as to apprentices and improvers, see section 182 post. 2 As to persons under 21 years of age, other than apprentices or improvers, see section a According to section 29, act No. 2558, Nov. 2, 1914, casual work shall mean work duriae any week for not more than one-half the maximum number of hours fixed by the special board in respect of any particular process, trade, business, or occupation and the determination of any special board with respect to casual work shall always be subject to this provision. , ,., ^ ,„^ ^ ^.^ ^ , 4 It wUl be noted that, under paragraphs (1) and (2), two different classes of overtune can be fixed Under (1) and (2) the boards are bound to fix the number of hours lor a week's work' and the wages rate for any time in excess. Under (2) they may fix the times 214 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. {d) It may fix a higlier rate to be paid for any hoiu' or fraction of an hour worked on any day in a factory before or after the ordinary working hoiirs of the factory. Special rates tor (3) In addition to the powers conferred by this section every special fdav?''^ ™^ '"'^' t'o^rd may exercise either or both of the following powers, namely: (a) It may fix special rates for work to be done on a Sunday or public holiday; or ^ For time ooou- (fe) It may fix special rates to be paid to any employee who works Smdfrom woA^ away from his employer's place of business for time occupied in travel- ' ing between the employer's place of business and work or between the employee's residence and work. Apprenticeship (c) May prescribe the form of apprenticeship indenture to be used; "if o'ar'd m a V W When in this act or any regulations thereunder the number of the vary overtime or hours of Work per week or the overtime rates of pay are fixed for any hours. class or classes of workers, a special board when exercising any of the powers conferred by this section instead of fixing the number of work- ing hours per week of overtime rate for the class or classes of workets to be affected by the determination of such board fixed by the factories and shops acts may fix a different number of working hours or overtime rate as the case may be. Piecework gj;c. X42. Where pursuant to this act by any determination of a P""*- special board both a piecework price and a wages rate are fixed for any work, the piecework price shall be based on the wages rate; but no determination shall be liable to be questioned or challenged on the ground that any piecework price is a greater or less amount than such price would be if based upon the wages rate. Outsidework. ggc. x43. For wholly or partly preparing or manufacturing outside a factory articles of clothing or wearing apparel or boots or shoes a piece- work price only shall be fixed, and the board shall on request of any occupier of a factory or shop or place fix a wages rate for any work done by persons operating at a machine used in such factory or shop or place. Basis for gj.^ ^44. (1) Any special board instead of specifying the lowest price." ^^ °^ piecework j)rices wfdch may be paid for wholly or partly preparing or manufacturing any articles may determine that piecework prices based on wages rates fixed by such special board may be fixed and paid there- for subject to and as provided in the next following subsection. (2) Any employer who pursuant to such determination fixes and pays piecework prices shall base such piecework prices on the earnings of an average worker working under hke conditions to those for which the piecework prices are fixed and who is paid by time at the wages rates fixed by such special board. Every such employer shall if required by the chief inspector so to do forward a statement of such prices to the chief inspector, pfferine lower (3) Any person who having fixed a piecework price as in this sec- price an offense, ^j^j^ provided either directly or indirectly or by any pretense or device pays or offers or permits any person to offer or attempts to pay any person a piecework price lower than the price so fixed by such first- of beginning and ending work upon each day, and, having done so, must fix a higher rate for all time worked outside those hom-s. If these two powers were exercised independ- ently of one another, they would clash. It has been found necessary, when any board wishes to exercise both powers, to adopt a form such as follows: Time of beginniTig and ending worlc. — That the time of beginning and ending work shall be— Time of beginning, 7.30 a. m.; time of ending, 12 noon on the day on which the halt holiday is observed. Time of beginning, 7.30 a. m.; time of ending, 6 p. m. on the other working days of the week. Overtime. — That the following rates shall be paid for all work done: (a) Within the hours fixed in clause in excess of 48 hours in any week, time and a quarter. SI Outside the hours fixed in clause, time and a quarter, many trades it is found better to exercise only me power of fixing ovOTtime rates on the week's work, without fixing the time of begiiming and ending. This course has the advantage of elasticity, allowing employers and employees to arrange their hours of work to suit themselves, according to the conditions and locality of their work. 1 The only days which a wage board has power to name as public holidays are: 1st January (New Year's Day), 26th January (Foundation Day), Gtood Friday, Easter Sat- urday, Monday, and Tuesday, 21st April (Eight Hours' Day), 3d June (King's birth- day), first Thursday in September (Eoyal Agricultural Show day, in looahties named in the Boyal ACTicultural Show Act), 25th December (Christmas Day), and 26th Decem- ber (Boxing Day). MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS ^VICTOKIA. 215 mentioned person or who refuses or neglects to forward a statement of such prices when required to do so by the chief inspector, shall be deemed guilty of a contravention of the provisions of this part.^ (4) In proceedings against any person for a contravention of the Burden of proof provisions of the two last preceding subsections of this section the onus "" delendant. of proof that any piecework price fixed or paid by such person is in accordance with the provisions of such subsections shall in all cases lie on the defendant. Sec. 145. When in any determination a special board has fixed a ?%®°,f,J^°'"^ wages rate only for wholly or partly preparing or manufactming either P"™ lorbldden. inside or outside a factory any articles or for doing any work then it shall not be lawful for any person to pay or authorize or permit to be paid therefor any piecework prices, and the receipt or acceptance of any piecework prices shall not be deemed to be payment or part pay- ment of any such wages. Sec. 146. When in any determination a special board has fixed piece- Effect on piece- work prices for wholly or partly preparing ormanufacturing any articles vary InTusu^ and in the description of the work in respect of which such piecework course. price is to be paid such board enumerates several operations, and when any one or more of such operations is by the direction or with the ex- pressed or implied consent of the occupier of the factory or his manager or foreman or agent omitted, such omission shall not affect the price to be paid in connection with the particular work, but such price shall, unless otherwise provided in such determination, be that fixed as the price for the whole work described. Sec. 147. Notwithstanding anything contained in this act the price Piecework or rate of payment to be fixed by any special board for wholly or partly P^t™ '"ages preparing or manufacturing any article of furniture ^ shall wherever practicable be both a piecework price and a wages rate. The piecework price shall be based on the wages rate fixed by such board. Sec. 148. Where it appears to be just and expedient special wages Special rates, rates may be fixed for aged infirm or slow workers by any special board.' Sec. 149. All powers of any special board may be exercised by a Exercise of majority of the members thereof. powers. Sec. 150. During any vacancy in a special board (other than in the Vacancies. oflace of chairman) the continuing members may act as if no vacancy existed, provided no member of the board objects.* Sec. 151. The chairman of any special board may reqiuie any person Chairman to (including a member of a special board) giving evidence before a board o^th™ "^ ' ^ to give his evidence on oath and for such purpose shall be entitled to administer an oath accordingly to such person. Sec. 152. A special board shall have power to determine the lowest Prices for re- prices or rates to be paid to any person or persons or classes of persons P*"'"'8- employed in repairing — (a) Any articles of clothing or wearing apparel or furniture in respect to which such board may make a determination; or (6) Any articles which are subject to the determination of a special board for any process trade or business. Sec. 153. Where by the determination of a special board the wages of Wages of ap- an apprentice or of an improver are to vary in accordance with his expe- P™° "'°°' rience or length of employment in his trade, then for the purpose of determining the wages he is entitled to receive, any time during which such apprentice or improver has worked at his trade shall be reckoned in his length of employment in such trade. Sec. 154. "When fixing the wages rate to be paid to persons (other than Varying rates. apprentices or improvers) under 21 years of age for any particiUar class of work any special board may fix different rates having regard to the length of experience of such persons in such particular class. Sec. 155. No special board shall sit during ordinary working hours in aJ?5'^'^"^ any trade except by mutual agreement of the representatives of the em- ^^g^s: ployers and employees on the board, or by the direction of the minister. 1 Penalty, section 226. ,,„ j,„ " For additional powers of furmture board, see sections 152 and 156 post. » Verv few boards have exercised their powers under this section. Under section 202 the chief inspector can grant a license to an old, slow, or inflrm worker to work for less than the minimum wage, but it is questionable whether in case a board had fixed rates, the chief inspector could legally grant a license to work tor anything less than the rate « ti^aotice°t?e iaoards do not usually decide important points during a vacancy. 216 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOB. STATISTICS. (4) MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS AS TO SPECIAL BOAHDS. Additional Sec. 156. The special board heretofore appointed with regard to arti- ^ire bo^d^ °'" ^^^^ °^ furniture may also determine the lowest prices or rates which may be paid to female workers employed as upholstresses whether as carpet hands table hands or drapery 'hands, also to male persons employed in planning and laying carpets or linoleums or floor cloths or fixing draperies or making and fixing window Venetian and wire blinds if a resolution shall have been passed by both houses of Parliament de- claring it is expedient for the special board so to do. E^es fixed by Qbc. 158. (1) Special boards may be appointed ii order to determine gSw^ivers eto!'*^® lowest prices or rates which may be paid to any person or persons to supersede rates or classes of persons wheresoever employed in the process trade or fixedr by other business of either the whole or any part of the ironworking trade (for cSes. ^^™® which a special board has not been constituted) including— (a) Engineering. (6) Boiler making. (c) Blacksmithing. (d) General ironwork. (2) The lowest prices or rates which may be determined under amd pursuant to the factories and shops acts by any special board ap- pointed — In the occupation of a fireman, boiler attendant, or engine driver in connection with the use of steam boilers or steam engines other than steam boilers or steam engines connected with mines; or Under the provisions of paragraphs (a), (6), (c), and (d) of this sec- tion — for any person or persons or classes of persons shall be the lowest prices or rates to be paid to such person or persons or classes of persons where- soever employed, notwithstanding that any other rates are deteimined with respect to such person or persons or classes of persons by any other special board. Extension of ggc. 159. (1) Any special board appointed- Sir mglne drivers, (s) In the occupation of a fireman boiler attendant or engine driver in connection with the use of steam boilers or steam engines other than steam boilers or steam engines connected with mines; or (b) In the occupation of a fireman boiler attendant or engine driver in connection with a steam engine or steam boiler in or about mines of every kind — is hereby given power to determine the lowest prices or rates which may be paid to any person or persons or classes of persons employed in the occupation of assistant engine driver greaser or trimmer m connection with the use of steam engines or steam boilers. (2) Such special board may exercise all the powers conferred on special boards under this act so far as any person or persons or classes of persons mentioned in this section are concerned. t)owere'of"oartere ^^°- ^^^- {^"^ Notwithstanding anything contained in this act, the board. carters board appointed on the 1st day of December 1909 is hereby given power to determine the lowest prices or rates which may be paid to any person or persons or classes of persons employed in or in connec- tion with any stable (other than a livery stable) in which are stabled the horses used in his business trade or occupation by any person subject to the determination of the said special board. (2) Such special board may exercise all the powers conferred on special boards under this act so far as any such person or persons or classes of persons mentioned in this section are concerned; , o^? turntture ^^°- ^^^- Notwithstanding anything contained in this act the mem- trade, bers of any special board to determine or fix the lowest price or rate which may be paid to any person for wholly or partly preparing or manufacturing any particular articles of furniture shall not be elected, and the governor in council may from time to time appoint such special board. boys*° 'olottiSig . ^^°- 1^2. In the case of the special board for men's and boys' cloth- board, ing, the representatives of the employers shall consist of three repre- sentatives of makers of ready-made clothing and two of makers Of order clothing, and the rolls for any election of such respective representa- MINIMUM- WAGE LAWS ^VICTOKIA. 217 tives shall be prepared and votes given in such manner as may be pre- scribed. Sec. 163. Notwithstanding anything contained in this act the special Extension of board called the iron molders board appointed on the seventeenth day molSers°boaid°° of December one thousand nine hundred and one is hereby given power to determine the lowest prices or rates which may be paid to any person or persons or classes of persons employed in the process trade or busi- ness of a steel molder and to exercise-all the powers conferred on special boards under this act so far as the process, trade, or business of a steel molder is concerned.' 2. (1) (added by act No. 2447 of December 31, 1912). In addition to the powers it already possesses the special board heretofore ap- pointed and called the hotel employees board is hereby given power to either — (a) Fix prices and rates to be paid to employees without ta,king into consideration either board or lodging; or (6) Fix prices and rates to be paid to employees varying according to whether full or partial board or lodging is received by the employee. (2) When the board makes a determination having exercised either of these powers it shall be an offence for any employer to accept any payment from any employee under the jurisdiction of the said board for either board or lodging. (5) DURATION, PUBLICATION, AND APPLICATION OP DETERMINATIONS OF SPECIAL BOARDS AND COURT OF APPEALS. Sec. 164. Any price or rate determined by any special board shall Price or rate to from a date (not being within 30 days of such determination )2 fixed by '■®™^'°- such board, be and remain in force untU amended by a determination of such special board; but such determination may at any time be amended or revoked by the court of industrial appeals. Sec. 165. (1) The determination of any special board shall be signed Application of by the chairman thereof and published in the Government Gazette and aetormmation. shall apply to the area or locality (including the whole or any part or parts of Victoria) defined by the governor in councU as the area or locality within which the determination of such special board shall be operative.^ (2) Every amendment of any determination of any special board at any time made shall apply to the same part or parts of Victoria as the determination amended. Sec. 166 (as amended by act No. 2447 of December 31, 1912). No Children of em- determination of a special board shall prevent the B9ns or daughters of P"'y'- any employer being employed by him in any capacity whether he has or has not the fuU number of apprentices and improvers, and he shall not be bound to pay his sons and daughters the rates fixed by any determination. 1 The following provisions respecting the coal miners' board have been added by sec tion 30, act No. 2568, November 2, 1914: . , x, ^ ,. ^ , (1) In addition to the powers it already possesses the special board heretofore ap- pointed and called the coal miners board may if it thinks fit as part of its determination make rules regulating the cavilling for places which are worked at piecework prices on any coal mine. ji j. j (2) Such cavilUng shall be carried out by the employees affected. (3) Any person guilty of any contravention of any such rules or of any tailurft to cmv out the decision or requirements of any such cavil shall on information laid by any person aggrieved be liable on conviction by any court of petty sessions consisting of a police magistrate with or without justices to a penalty of not more than £60 (S243.33). 2 It maybe noted that it is only a price or rate that must stand for 30 days. Any part of a determination which docs not fix a price or rate apparently can be brought mto force without any period of waiting. Although this section prevents a price or rate commg into force until after the lapse of 30 days, nothing in the factories arid shops acts requires nreliminarv notice In practice, the department endeavors to give reasonable notice in the Government Gazette, but there have been instances when circumstances have rendered that impossible, and the determination has come mto force immediately on arlere is nothing in this section to indicate upon whom the duty lies of publishing a deten^ination in the Government Gazette. The amended determination of the hair- ^2^s boSd was sent to the minister of labor in December. 1911. The minister refused to galette it Application was made to Mr. Justice Cussen for a mandamus. The judge refused the application. 218 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OE LABOR STATISTICS. Payment for Sec. 167. Where any person is employed to perform two or more *r° e of wort"^° classes of work to which a rate fixed by a special board is applicable "^^ ^ • then such person shall be paid in respect of the tune occupied in each class of work at the rate fixed by the board for such work.^ Rate of wages Sec. 168. When any person is employed during any part of a day for throughout day. ^^ employer at work for which a special board has fixed a wages rate then all work whatever done by such person during such day for such employer whether inside or outside a factory or Aop or place what- soever or wheresoever shall be paid for at the same wages rate. Determination Sec. 169. There shall be kept printed, painted, or affixed in legible to be posted. Roman characters, in some conspicuous place at or near the entrance of each and every factory or shop or place to which the determination of a special board applies, in such a position as to be easily read by the persons employed therein, a true copy of the determination of the spe- cial board as to the lowest prices or rates of payment determiued by such board. Employees See. 170 (as amended by section 43, act No. 2558, November 2, not to he paid In -j^g-I^^N Where a piecework price or a wages rate has been fixed by goods. ^j^^ determination of any special board for wholly or partly preparing or manufacturing either inside or outside any factory any articles or for doing any work no person shall either directly or indirectly require or compel any person affected by such determination to accept goods of any kind or board and lodging ia lieu of money or in payment or part pay- ment for any work done or wages earned and the receipt or acceptance of any goods or board and lodging shall not be deemed to be payment or part payment for any such work or of any such wages. (6) VALinrrY of detekmination. Determination Sec. 171. (1) If any person desires to dispute the validity of any f '^B^thFSiireme determination of any special board made or purporting to have been oomt only . made under any of the provisions of this act or any act repealed thereby it shall be lawful for such person to apply to the supreme court upon affidavit for a rule calling upon the chief inspector to show cause why such determination should not be quashed either wholly or in part for the illegality thereof; and the said court may make the said rule abso- lute or discharge it with or without costs as to the court shall seem meet. (2) Every determination of any special board shall unless and until so quashed have and be deemed and taken to have the like force valid- ity and effect as if such determination had been enacted in this act, and shall not be in any manner liable to be challenged or disputed; but any such determination may be altered or revoked by any subsequent deter- mination under this act.^ (7) SUSPENSION OP DETERMINATION. Power to sus- Sec. 172. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this act the P™*^' governor in council may at any time for such period or periods as he thinks fit not exceeding six months in the wholeby order published in the Government Gazette suspend the operation of the determination of any special board.^ When the operation of any determination (whether 1 This section imposes the duty upon the employer of paying an employee in accord- ance with the period of time occupied under each determination, or under different parts of the same determination. In cases where several determinations are operative this may become a difficult matter, and necessitates the times being carefully kept and prop- erly booked. It was the difnculty of carrving out the provisions of this section that induced the appointment of the coimtry shop assistants board, which fixes a flatratefor all shop assistants in the districts to which the determination extends, whether they be drapers, grocers, or fancy goods sellers, etc., as it was considered impossible to allocate the time in a country store to each of the many classes of employment. Compare section 141 (6) as to payment of a pro rata amount for less hours worked than those fixed by the board and section 168. 2 The court of industrial appeals has power to amend a special board's determination. (See sectionl76(6).) No change should he made in the determination of a board or of the court of industrial appeals unless on some ground w hich may reasonably be considered as permanent, or at least likely to last for some considerable tune. Mr. Justice Hood, In re the Bread Board, 13A.L.B..,689. 8 This provision became law on Sept. 27, 1897, by virtue of section 6 of the factories and shops act, 1897 (No. 1518), and thepower of suspension was exercised on only one occasion. On Nov. 26, 1897, the governor in council suspended the first determination of the boot board, which was made on Nov. 3, 1897, and was to come into force on Nov. 29, 1897. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS ^VICTOBIA. 219 publislied in the Government Gazette or not) is so suspended it shall be the duty of such special board to forthwith hear receive and examine evidence as to such determination, and thereupon such special may either adhere to the said determination or may make such amendments therein as to such board seema proper. (2) In the event of such special board making any such amendments, Publication of such determination as so amended shall forthwith be published in the ^nation '^^**''" Government Gazette and shall for all purposes be deemed and taken to be the determination of such special board from such date as may be fixed in such amended determination, and the suspended determina- tion shaU thereupon have no further force or effect. (3) In the event of such special board notifying the minister that Removalof sus- such board adheres to its determination without amendment such sus- P™s">°- pension of the operation of such determination shall by an order in council published in the Government Gazette be revoked from such date not later than 14 days as may be fixed in such order. Sec. 173. Where the minister is satisfied that an organized strike or Power to sus- industrial dispute ia about to take place or has actually^ taken place in 1^™^^ ™ °^® °' connection with any process trade business occupation or employ- ment as to any matter which is the subject of a determination of a special board or of the court of industrial appeals the governor in council may by order published in the Government Gazette suspend ' for any period not exceeding 12 months the whole or any part or parts of such determination so far as it relates to the matter in reference to which such organized strike or industrial dispute is about to take place or has taken place, and such suspension may at any time by an order published in the Government Gazette, be removed by the governor in council or altered or amended in such manner as he thinks fit. Part VIII. — Court of Industrial Appeals. Sec. 174 (as amended by section 51, act No. 2558, November 2, 1914). Constitution of (1) There shall be a court of industrial appeals for deciding all appeals ''°'^'''-- against a determination of a special board and for dealing with any determination of a special board referred to the court by the minister. (2^ Such court shall consist of a president and two other persons. (3) A court of industrial appeals consisting of the president and of 9°?^ consti- two other persons as aforesaid shall be constituted from time to time comwil^ ^ "^ "" as occasion requires by order in council published in the Government Gazette. (4) (a) The president— . President to sit (i) Shall be such one of the judges of the supreme court as the gov- l^dust'rial ap- ernor in council appoints; peals. (ii) Shall be entitled to hold office as president for such period as the governor in council thinks fit; and (iii) Shall sit in every court of industrial appeals constituted from time to time. (6) The two other persons, constituting a court of industrial appeals Two other per- shall be such persons as are appointed by the governor in council upon oSion r^ufc^ nomination as hereinafter provided; but they shall act only in the court of industrial appeals for which they are appointed. (5) (a) When a determination of a special board is appealed against Nomination of in accordance with the provisions of this act or is referred by the min- s6nt°'^employers ister for the consideration of the court of industrial appeals then within and employees on 21 days from the date of the appeal or the reference (as the case may cwrt. be)— The representatives of the employers on such special board shall nominate one person to represent the employers, and The representatives of the employees shall nominate one person to represent the employees. (6) Nominations shall be made in writing and shall be forwarded to the minister. „ , , „ , . , (c) Only persons who are bona fide and actually engaged in the trade concerned or have been so engaged for at least six months during the three years immediately preceding such nomination shall be eligible for nomination. 1 The power of siaspenslon under section 173 has never been exercised. 220 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAtT OP LABOR STATISTICS. Default of nom- (6) If default is made in nominating an eligible person to represent "™""^- . the employers or the employees (as the case may be) or if any vacancy Vacancies. ^^ g^ court occurs by reason of death, resignation, incapacity, refusal to act, or otherwise, the minister may nominate some similarly qualified person to represent the employers or the employees (as the case may require) on such court. President and (7) The president and the two other persons constituting a court of t^^h^^app^ industriai appeals shall hear and determine every appeal and refer- and references, ence to such court; and subject to this act a majority shall decide. Eemuneration (8) Every person appointed to represent the employers or the em- sLttaT "fmpFoy^ ployees on a court of industrial appeals shall be paid a fee of £2 ($9.73) ers and employ- for every full day of attendance at such court. ecs on court. (9) (a) Subject to the public service acts the governor in council may appoint a registrar of the court of industrial appeals who shall be an officer of the factories branch of the dejjartment of the chief secretary. Registrar. (J) The registrar shall attend the sittings of the court of industrial appeals. Eules of prao- (10) The governor in council may make general rules to carry into **™' effect the provisions of this act with respect to the court of industrial appeals and in particular with respect to the summoning of and pro- cedure before any such court and the publication of such rules. Sub- ject to such rules (if any) the court may regulate its own procedure. (11) In the construction of the factories and shops acts any refer- ence to the court of industrial appeals shall (unless inconsistent with the context or subject-matter) be deemed to include a court of indus- trial appeals constituted from time to time at. aforesaid. Principles as to Sbo. 175. Where any determination made by a special board either tiOTs ^°*®''™"^ before or after the commencement of this act is being dealt with by the court, such court shall consider whether the determination appealed against has had or may have the effect of prejudicing the progress main- tenance of or scope of employment in the trade or industry affected by any such price or rate; and if of opinion that it has had or may have such effect the court shall make such alterations as in ita opinion may be necessary to remove or prevent such effect and at the same time to Living wage, secure a living wage to the employees in such trade or industry who are affected by such determination. Appeal to Sec. 176. (1) Notwithftanding anything contained in this act a '^™^- majority of the representatives of employers or a majority of the repre- sentatives of employees on any special board or any employer or group of employers who employ not less than 25 per cent of the total num- ber of the workers in any trade or 25 per cent or more of the workers in any trade, may at any time in the prescribed manner appeal against such determination to the court. For the purposes of thia subsection the court shall accept the records given by the chief inspector in his latest annual report. ' (2) The minister may without appeal at any time after the making of a determination by a special board refer such determination for the consideration of the court and may also refer any appeal made as herein- before provided for the consideration of the court. (3) No appeal against or reference to the court of a determination which has been published in the Government Gazette shall have the effect of suspending or delaying the operation of such determination. (4) Every determination of a special board referred to the court by the minister and such documents relating thereto as may be deemed necessary shall be forwarded by the chief inspector to the registrar of of the court. (5) Except as hereinafter provided no barrister and solicitor or agent shall be allowed to appear before or be heard by the court. By the direction of the court or with the consent of both parties to the appeal or reference either party may at its own cost be represented by a barris- ter and solicitor or agent. In appeals by a minority of employers or 1 The power given by this section is to be distinguished from the power to challenge a determination before the supreme court under section 171 post, in vrhim latter case it is only challengeable for illegality. While the court is considering the determination the board has no powers whatever, nor has it any power to alter or amend the determination after- wards until such time as it obtains leave to do so from the court under subsection (9) of this section. Compare section 180. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS VICTOEIA. 221 employees as provided under subsection (1) of this section the court may give such directions for the representation of parties as may in the circumstances appear to be proper. (6) The court shall have and may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on a special board by this act and may either increase or decrease any prices or rates of payment (whether piecework prices or wages rates) and shall have full power to amend the whole or any part of any determination of a special board.' (7) The court shall have and may exercise in respect of the summon- ing sending for and examining of witnesses, documents and books in respect of persons su mm oned or giving evidence before the court the same powers as are by the evidence act 1890 conferred on a board or com m ission appointed .or issued by the governor in council: Provided, however, That every summons to attend the court may be signed by the registrar. (8) No evidence relating to any trade secret or to the profits or finan- cial position of any witness or party shall be disclosed or published without the consent of the person entitled to the trade secret or non- disclosure. (9) The determination of the court shall be final and without appeal and may not be reviewed or altered by a special board without leave of the court, but the court if satisfied upon affidavit that a prima facie case for review exists may either give such leave or may direct a rehearing before the court, when the court may itself alter or amend its determination. (10) The determination of the court shall be forwarded to the min- ister by the registrar. ' An appeal to the court of indiistrial appeals from the determiiiation of a wages board Is In the nature of a rehearing, and the court is not confined to a consideration of the materials which were before the board in coming to a conclusion as to what should be the minimum wage in the trade, process, or business for which the special board was appointed. Mr. Justice Hood, in re the Bread Board, 13 A. L. E. 689. Mr. Justice Hodges, In re the Ice Board, 16 A. L. E. 46. Appended is a list of the cases in which determinations were referred to the court of industrial appeals. On September 14, 1904, an appeal was made to the court by a group of six employers against me determination of the artificial manure board on the ground that the wage for adults, 40s. 6d. ($9.85), was too high, and it was suggested that 36s. ($8.76) be not exceeded. The court fixed the wages of adults at 36s. ($8.76) per week. On September 17, 1906, the determination of the fellmongers board was appealed against by the representatives of employers on that board, who stated that the hours should be 54, and not 48, and that the proportion of improvers should be increased. The court fixed the number of hours per week at 64, but did not alter the proportion of improvers. Again, on October 2, 1906, the court was appealed to by the employees, and as a result, . in 1909 the court fixed the hours at 48 per week Instead of 64, and some of the rates fixed at 42s. ($10.22) were amended to 45s. ($10.95). On October 11, 1906, the representatives of employers on the printers' board appealed against the board's determination, stating that the condition of the trade did not then warrant an increase In wages. The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the deter- mination of the board. . . The starch board being unable to arrive at a determination, the matter of determmmg the wages of the employees in that trade was referred by the minister of labor to the court of industrial appeals, and the court drew up a determination, which came into force on June 29, 1907. , ^ ^. ^,. ,, , , j ,j On August 15, 1907, the employers' representatives on the bread board appealed against the increase in wages in the determination of the board. The court dealt with the matter, and in its determination, which came into force on September 15, 1907, the minimum wage of 64s. ($13.14) was altered to 60s. ($12.17) per w'eek._ On November 12, 1909, an appeal against the determination of the ice board was made bv the reoresentatives of employers on that board, who considered that the rate for chamber hands, Is. 3d. (30.4 cents) was too high. The court amended the wage and fixed it at Is. (24.3 cents) per hour. . . , x,. ,. • t > t. j On November 16, 1909, three representatives of employers on the handressers' board aTvnpalpd asainst the determination of their board, on the grounds that the mmimum wS of certain male and female workers were too high and that the proportion of tonrovers was too low. As a result of their representations, the proportion of unprovers SS ammded by the court, but the mmimum wages fixed for males and females were "^n^^Tnlv 24 1912, an appeal was lodged by the representatives of employers on the hnil^rSeS' board aeamst a rate of 64s. ($13.14) fixed for a certam class of laborers. A sSSntarTapplalwas lodged on August 15 1912, against a rate of 48s ($11.68) feed te SS cl£ss of laborers. The court flxerf four rates for laborers at 64s., 62s., S oVirt ixainn 14 $12 65. $12.17, and $11.68), respectively. o'n Seoemblr 21 1912, tiie liin'ister of labot referred de first determination of the „„^™ir^»i Plerks' boarcl for the consideration of the court, more particularly with re^ to mt^ to be paU to remale typewriters. No decision W yet "been given. 222 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. Publications, Sec. 178 (aa amended by section 52, act No. 2558, Nov. 2, 1914). (1) The minister shall cause each determination of the court to be published in the Government Gazette and such determination shall apply to every part of Victoria to which the referred determination applies or is expressly apphed. (2) The production before any court judge or justice of a copy of the Government Gazette containing a determination of the court shall be conclusive evidence of the making and existence of such determina- tion and of the constitution of such court and of all preliminary steps necessary to the making of such determination. (3) The provisions of this act for or relating to the enforcement of any determination of a special board shall equally apply to any deter- mination made by the court, and such provisions shall with such substi- tutions as may be necessary be read and construed accordingly. Sec. 179 (as amended by section 53, act No. 2558, Nov. 2, 1914). A determination of the court of industrial appeals may be dealt with by the governor in council in the same way in every respect as if it were a determination of a special board. Court may re- Sec. 180. The court of industrial appeals may revise or alter its own terminations! determination at any time and from tmie to time on the application of either the representatives of employers or representatives of employees on the special board . Powers of Sec. 181 (as amended by section 54, act No. 2558, Nov. 2, 1914). In presidentof court, addition to the powers otherwise conferred upon the court of industrial appeals, the said coiuii shall have all the powers of the supreme court which last-mentioned powers shall be exercised only by the president; and the court of industrial appeals shall in every case be guided by the real justice of the matter without regard to legal forms and solem- nities and shall direct itself by the best evidence it can procure or that is laid before it whether the same be such evidence as the law would require or admit in other cases or not; and if the court considers any further evidence or information which would assist the court could be obtained, the court shall intimate in open court what further evi- dence or information the court desires. Part IX. — ^Appkentioes and Improvees. (1) APPEBNTICES AND IMPROVEES. Special boards SECTION 182. (1) When determining any prices or rates of payment ^p«nS Lid every special board shall also determine— improvers, etc. (a) The number or proportionate number of apprentices and improv- ers who may be employed within any factory or shop or place or in any process trade business or occupation ;' and (5) The lowest prices or rates of pay payable to apprentices or im- provers when wholly or partly preparing or manufacturing any articles as to which any special board has made or makes a determination or when engaged in any process irade business oroccupation as to which any special board has made or makes a determination.^ Board to con- ^2^ The board when so determining may — andexrorlence^^' W. Take into consideration the age, sex, and experience of such ap- pentices or improvers; (6) Fix a scale of prices or rates payable to such apprentices or im- provers respectively according to their respective age sex and experi- ence; and (c) Fix a different number or proportionate number of male and female apprentices or improvers. 1 It will be noted that a board is given power to determine the number or proportion- ate number of apprentices and improvers who may be employed— (1) In any factory or shop or place; (2) In any process, trade, busmess, or occupation. Boards have always fixed the number with reference to a factory, shop, or place, or with reference to an individual employer. It is difficult to see how a fixing of the number in a process, trade, business, or occupation could be practically administered, seeing that there woiild be no means of deciding how many improvers or apprentices any particular employer would be entitled to. > 2 Any improver may, at the option of his employer, be put to any class of work. It is allowable for a board to Sx varying rates for improvers according to the work at which they are employed. The case is different, however, regarding apprentices. An appren- tice has to be taught the whole of the trade to which he is apprenticed, and oiuy one scale of payment can be fixed, no matter what his work. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS VICTORIA. 223 (d) Prescribe the form of apprenticeship indentures to be used. (3) In fixing the number or proportionate number of apprentices the board shall not fix a less number or proportionate number than one ap- prentice for every three or fraction of three workers engaged in the par- ticular process trade business or occupation and receiving the mini- mum wage or earning at piecework not less than the minimum wage fixed for the time by such determination. (4) Provided that where prior to the 4th day of January, 1911, all the apprentices of any employer have been engaged so that all of their terms of apprenticeship would expire within 18 months of one another, such employer shall be exempt from the operation of this act and froin the determination of any special board so far as limitation of apprentices is concerned for a period not exceeding the term of apprenticeship in the particular trade from the said 4th day of January, 1911, so that it shall be lawftil during such period as each apprentice of such employer com- pleted his first, second, third, fourth, fifth, or sixth year, for the em- ployer to take another apprentice to supply his place, so that a due and not disproportionate number of skilled workmen shall be secvired: Provided, That at the expiration of such period of exemption the number of apprentices is not in excess of the number such employer would be entitled to employ in proportion to the number of persons other than apprentices and improvers employed. Sec. 183. No person who has a greater number of apprentices in his Act not contra- employ than is prescribed in the determination of a special board shall J^g "" certain be or be deemed to be guilty of a contravention of this act if he proves — (a) That such apprentices employed by him were under indentures of apprenticeship entered into before the 31st day of December, 1910; or (5) That the date of entering into the indentures of apprenticeship in respect to the last apprentice employed by him and for three months previous thereto he had in his employ such number of persons other than apprentices and improvers as at that date entitled him to the num- ber of apprentices (including such last apprentice) in his employ. Sbc. 184. Where any indentures of apprenticeship are entered into Wages of ap- with respect to any trade to which the determination of a special board P''™™^^- applies and the wages to be paid to the apprentice are stated in such indentures then notwithstanding anything contained in this act and notwithstanding any subsequent alteration of such determination by such special board the wages to be paid to such apprentice during the currency of such indentures shall be the wages stated in the indentiires. Sec. 185. (Act 2386.) (Eepealed by section 4, act 2447.)' (2) APPEENTIOES. Section 186. Where any apprentice '-^ under the age of 21 years has Determinations been "bound in writing by indentures of apprenticeship for a Period of °°i5, appJ^Q^ii,3s^' not less than two years, no provision in any determination of a special board shall invalidate cancel or alter such deed of apprenticeship in any way whatever if such deed of apprenticeship was signed by all parties thereto before the notice of motion for the resolution for the appointment of such special board was given in either House of Parliament. Sec. 187. (1) No indenture of apprenticeship shall be deemed to be Al'senoe of invalid under this act by reason only that such indenture is not under ^ seal. (2) No indenture of apprenticeship shall be entered into after the passing of this act in connection with any trade working under this act except in the form ^ (if any) prescribed by any special board dealing with such trade and approved of by the minister. 1 Section 185 was a machinery section designed in the consolidating act to provide against the expiry of sections 182,183, and 184, which were only in force till December 3 1912. The repeal of section 188 merely has the effect of making sections 182, 183, and 184 permanent. , „ ,, . .. „ ^ „. , ! Section 5 defines "Apprentice." "Apprentice" means any person under 21 years of age hound by indentures of apprenticeship or any person over 21 years of age who with tte sanction of the minister il bound by indentures of apprenticeship. a The power of a special board to prescribe the form of indenture will be found in sec- tions 141 and 182. 224 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. Sec. 188 (as amended by Bection 31, act No. 2558 November 2, FaUure to carry 1914). (1) Any failure eitber by an employer or an apprentice to dentme™^ °' "'' carry out the terms of an indenture of apprenticeship shall be deemed to be a contravention of this section.^ (2) When the minister is satisfied that there is any such failure either by an employer or apprentice he may direct that proceedings shall be instituted^^against the employer or apprentice, as the case may be. (3) A court of petty sessions may for any such contravention — Penalty. (a) Impose a penalty not more than £10 ($48.67) and in addition — Power ol court (J) Order the defendant to enter into a recognizance within 14 days ^- Z^f^Z^fn in any sum of not more than £50 ($243.33) with such sureties as the mzance mcertam ^^^^ tjjjujjg fit of not more than £50 (1243.33), each to carry out the terms covenants and conditions of the indentures; and may further order that in default of entering into the recognizance as aforesaid the person or persons in default be imprisoned for a term of not more than one month unless such recognizance be sooner entered into and for a second or subsequent contravention impose a penalty on the defend- ant of not more than £25 ($121.66) and in addition may estreat the recognizance (if any). (c) Or impose on any employer a penalty not more than £25 ($121.66) if the court is satisfied that the apprentice has not been taught the trade in accordance with the indenture of apprenticeship and that the employer has not given to the court any satisfactory explanation of such failure to teach the apprentice the trade. The whole or any part of such penalty may be applied for the benefit of the apprentice or other- wise as the minister determines. Power to bind Seo 189. The minister may grant permission in writing to any certain appren- „„-„„„_ tices pertjoii-^ (a) To be bound for less than three years as an apprentice to any trade subject to the determination of a special board; (6) Who may become over 21 years of age during the term of his apprenticeship to complete the term of his apprenticeship; (c) Who is over 21 years of age to be bound by indentures of appren- ticeship.^ Apprentices for Sec. 190. Except in cases where the minister has given his permis- vMirs*'^ *^''*®Bion in writing as aforesaid all apprentices unless bound by indentures of apprenticefliip which bind the employer to instruct such apprentice for a period of at least three years shall be deemed to be improvers for the purposes of this act.^ (3) PBOHIBITION OF CERTAIN PREMIUMS AND GTTAEANTIES. No premium Section 191. Any person who either directly or indirectly or by any prmticS^or m- pretense or device requires or permits any person to pay or give or who provers. receives from any person any consideration premium or bonus for engaging or employing any female as an apprentice or improver in pre- paring or manufacturing articles of clothing or wearing apparel shall be 1 Where either an employer or an apprentice considers that the other is committing a breach of any of the covenants full information should be sent to the chief inspector of factories ^vith the duplicate copy of the indenture. Inquiry will then be made, and steps taken by the olBcers of the factories department to enforce observance of the ^ce- ment. 2 Any person of working age and under 21 can enter into apprenticeship for a term of three years or over in any trade subject to the determination of a special board, but if it is desired that the term of apprenticeship be less than three years, an application should be made to the minister of labor, on the form provided for that purpose, which may be obtained at the oiUce of the chief inspector of factories. That permjssion wUl be granted freely in case it is desired to enable a young worker to complete his experience in his trade. If, lor instance, he had served three and a half years' apprenticeship to one employer, and desired for any reason (his first indentures having expired or been canceled) to complete five years' experience by serving one and a half years with another employer, he would be granted permission as a matter of course. If, on the other hand, he had no experience, and wished to be bound newly to a trade for less than three years, the minister would require strong reasons for permitting apprenticeship for a term which would be con- sidered too short to enable him to completely master his craft. A form of applicatiori under any of the paragraphs of this section may be obtained at the ofSce of the chief inspector of factories. ^Section 5 defines "improver." "Improver" means any person (other than an apprentice) who does not receive a piecework price or a wage rate fixed by any special board for persons other than apprentices or improvers an J who is not over 21 years of age or who being over 21 years of age holds a license from the minister to be paid as an improver. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS — ^VICTOKIA. 225 guilty of an offense and shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not more than £10 ($48.67); and the person who pays or gives such con- sideration premium or bonus may recover the same in any court of competent ]urisdiction from the person who received the same. Sec. 192. Any shopkeeper (other than a registered pharmaceutical No premium to chemist) who either directly or indirectly or by any pretense or device shopkMDw*'^ ^"^ requires or permits any person to pay or give him or who receives from ' any person any consideration premium or bonus for engaging or employing any person in connection with the selling of goods or in con- nection with the business of a hairdresser or barber as an apprentice or improver in a shop shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not more than £10 ($48.67) ; and the person who pays or gives such consideration premium or bonus may recover the same in any court of competent jurisdiction from the person who received the same. Sec. 193. (1) Except with the consent of the minister in writing, no Certain guaran- person shall require or permit any person to pay any sum of money or *'®^ illegal- enter into or make any guaranty or promise requiring or undertaking that such person shall pay any sum of money in me event of the behavior or attendance or obedience of any apprentice improver or employee not being at any time satisfactory to the employer. (2) Any such guaranty or promise as aforesaid or to the like effect entered into or made after the commencement of tiiis act without the consent of the minister as aforesaid shaU be null and void, and any person who without such consent makes or requires such guaranty or promise shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not exceeding 10 pounds. (3) Any sum which after the commencement of this act is paid in pursuance of such a guaranty or promise as aforesaid or to the like effect made in contravention of this section shall be returned to the person paying same ; and the person who has so paid any such sum may if the same is not returned to him on demandT recover the same with costs in any court of competent jurisdiction from the person who received the same. (4) IMPROVERS. Section 194. The minister is hereby authorized to grant to any License to un- person over 21 years of age who has satisfied him that such person has Se^s^ow"™"^ ^^ not had the full experience prescribed for improvers by the special board a license ' to work as an improver for the period named in such license at the wage fixed by the board for an improver of any like experience. Part X.^ — ^Miscellaneous. (7) old, slow, and infirm workers. Section 202. (1) If it is proved to the satisfaction of the chief . Aged, slow, or inspector that any person by reason of age slowness or infirmity i3™™™^<""i'ers. unable to obtaiu employment at the minimum wage fixed by any special board, the chief inspector may in such case grant to such aged or infirm or slow Worker a hcense ''for 12 months to work at a less wage (to be named in such Ucense) than the said minimum wage, and such license may be renewed from time to time. 1 Tills license sliould always be produced at the chiel inspector's office when appli- cation is made for renewal. a These licenses are only granted in extreme cases to people who, through age, some physical or mental defect, or through some permanent weakness, are unable to do any- thing like an average day's work. They are not granted to any but persons who have served in and learned the trade for which they desffe a license. For example, a laborer would not be granted a Ucense to work as a slow worker in the saddlery trade, nor would an old or infirm saddler be allowed in the bootmaking trade. Applications should be backed up by full information as to the age, slowness, or infirmity of the appli- cant and should be made on the form suppUed for that purpose at the oflice of the chief inspector of factories in Melbourne. It should further be remembered that these appli- cations should not properly be granted on the ground of inexperience at the trade. In that case an improver's license (sec. 194, ajite) is more applicable. Within the metro- politan district the applicant should, if possible, atteud^at the chief inspector's office to make the application. 82843°— Bull. 167—15 15 226 BULLETIN OF THE BTJKEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. (2) The number of persons so licensed as slow workers employed in any factory shall not without the consent of the minister exceed the proportion of one-fifth of the whole number of persons employed in such factory at the minimum wage fixed for adults or at piecework prices: Provided, That one licensed slow worker may be employed in any registered factory and any person who without such consent, em- ploys any greater number than such proportion shall be guilty of a contravention of this act. (3) Any person who, either directly or indirectly or by any pre- tense or device pays or offers to pay or permits any person to offer or pay any such aged or infirm or slow worker at a lower rate than that fixed by the chief inspector in such license shall be deemed to be guilty of a contravention of this act. (4) In the event of the chief inspector refusing to grant such license such person may appeal to the minister who may grant such hcense in the place of such inspector. Part XII. — Offenses, Penalties, and Legal Proceedings. Two justices to SECTION 219 (as amended by section 36, act No. 2558, November 2, toKr** ™ "^1914). Where any person is charged with an offense against this act, such charge shall be heard before and all penalties imposed by this act shall be recovered before a court of petty sessions consisting of a police magistrate sitting either with or without justices; and where in this act it is provided that anything may be done by any justices the same shall be done by a police magistrate either with or without any other justice or justices. Proceedings Sec. 220 (as amended by section 37, act No. 2558, November 2, 1914). against offenders. ^-^^ Every offense against the provisions of this act shall be reported to the minister, who may if he think fit direct proceedings to be taken against the offender and all courts shall take judicial notice of the signature of every person who is or shall be, or shall have been minis- ter, chief inspector of factories and shops or assistant chief inspector of factories and shops to every document required to be signed for the purposes of the factories and shops acts. (2) All proceedings directed to be taken by the minister against any person for contravening any of the provisions of this act may be taken by any member of the police force or by any inspector. (3) Where the minister has directed proceedings to be taken against any offender, if the court or justices amend the information warrant or summons for any variance between it and the evidence on the part of the prosecution, such direction of the minister shall be sufficient authority for the continuance of the proceedings against the offender after such amendment thereof by the court or justices. Defense. Sec. 221. In proceedings before courts of petty sessions for any con- travention of the provisions of this act it shall not be a defense that the occupier of a factory or shop was not in the State at the time an alleged offense against any provision of the said act was committed ; and for any Service of sum- such contravention service of a summons by leaving the same with '"''°^' some person apparently of the age of 16 years or upwards at the usual place of business in Victoria of the person named in such summons shall be deemed to be good and sufficient service thereof. siS^^°^\rm^ ^^°- ^^2 .(^^ ameiided by section 38, act No. 2558, November 2, 1914). ceedings before T^^ following provisions shall have effect with reference to proceed- justices. ings beforecourts of petty sessions for offences under this act: (a) The information if for any offense in connection with the prepa- ration or manufacture or stamping of furniture or the unlawful paying or receiving any sum of money in connection with the employment of an apprentice or improver, shall be laid within 12 months after the commission of the offense; and if for any other offense shall be laid within two months after the commission thereof; '{fl) In proceedings against any person for employing any apprentices or improvers in excess of the number or proportionate number as deter- mined by a special board, the onus of proof that the provisions of this act and of such determination with regard to the number or propor- tionate nunaber of apprentices or improvers who may be employed have been complied with shall in all cases be on the defendant; MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS VICTOBIA. 227 (i) The onus of proof that the person named in a summons as an em- ployee of the defendant in a certain capacity was not employed in the capacity named in such summons shall m all cases be on the defendant. Sec. 223. The production before any court judge or justices of a Evidence of de- copy of the Government Gazette containing the determination of any termination. special board shall be conclusive evidence of the due making and exist- ence of such determination and of the due appointment of such board and of all preliminary steps necessary to the making of such determination. Sec. 224. When any determiniation of a special board is amended or Effect of repealed, such amendment or repeal shall not directly or indirectly 3S^?^wf n "' aftect any legal proceedings of any kind theretofore commenced under <"'"'''™"'™°°- the provisions of this act for any breach of such determination or any right existii^ at the time of such amendment or repeal under the pro- visions of this act. Sec. 225 (as amended by section 39, act No. 2558, November 2, 1914). Power to re- Where any employer employs any person who does any work for him Stoed'^bv^sne^ for which a special board has determined the lowest prices or rates, then board, such employer shall be liable to pay and shall pay in full in money without any deduction whatever to such person the price or rate so determined, and such person if he has made demand in writing on such employer within two months after such money became due may within 12 months after such money became due take proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover from the employer the full amount or any balance of such sum so demanded due in accord- ance with the determination, any smaller payment or any express or implied agreement or contract to the contrary notwithstanding.' Sec. 226 (as amended by section 40, actNo. 2558, November2, 1914). Penalty for (1) Where a price or rate of payment for any person or persons or classes ^ftion' ^^^'' of persons has been determined by a special board and is in force, then any person — (o) Who either directly or indirectly, or under any pretense or device, attempts to employ or employs or authorizes or permits to be employed any person, apprentice, or improver at a lower price or rate of wages or piecework (as the case may be) than the price or rate so determined ; or (6) Who attempts to employ or employs or authorizes or permits to be employed any apprentice or improver in excess of the number or proportionate number so determined; or (c) Who is guilty of a contravention of any of the provisions of this act with relation to any special board's determLaation or of a contra- vention of any of the provisions of Part VII or of section 202 of this act shall be guilty of an offense ' against this act, and shall on conviction be liable to a penalty for the first oSense of not more than £10 ($48.67), and for the second offense of not less than £5 ($24.33) nor more than £25 ($121.66), and for the third or any subsequent offense of not less than £50 ($243.33) nor more than £100 ($486.65). Provided, That me minister may permit any student of the Univer- Permission for sity of Melbourne or any student taking full day courses of technological ?o'^'|^quire" praS study at any workingmen's college or any school of mines or any other tical knowfedge technical college or technical school in Victoria to enter and work in in factories, etc. any factory shop or place during the time he is a student at any such institution for the purpose only of acquiring practical knowledge and skill in the trade earned on in such factory shop or place; notwith- standing that he is not paid the rates provided by any determination in force in the trade concerned. 1 Under this section an employee may sue for his wages at any time within 12 months. The time within which the factories department can prosecute lor an offense is, however, limited by section 222 to two months, and in some cases to 6 and 12 months. It is very essential, therefore, that any employee who is being underpaid should begiven information promptly , so as to allow sufhoienttime to make the necessary inquiries in connection with the preparation of the case. A case in point was where inrormation was given after the lapse of one month. The employer in the country was really a trustee living in a different country town. Before the inspector had ascertained the Sets in the case and the real parties to proceed against, the remaining month had expired, and the employee had to be left to take his own proceedings. Moreover, if claims are allowed to become stale, experience shows that they are more difiacult to sub- stantiate. Compare section 232 post. » A saddler was engaged by the employer's foreman to do piecework at a lower rate of Eay than that flxedby the saddlery board. The employer, a member of the saddlery oard, paid the rates as agreed. HeU, that there was evidence of every element of the offense created by the section, and that the defendant was rightly convicted. Billing- ham V. Oaten (191U, V. L. E. 44, 17 A. L. R. 36. 228 BULLETIlir OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Power for court Sec. 232 . A court of petty sessions in addition to imposLag a penalty of arrearF*^" ^°^ ^ contravention of any of the provisions of this act or the regulations made thereunder or of a determination of a special board may order the offender to pay to any person in respect of whom he has been convicted of a contravention as aforesaid and who is or has been in his employ such sums for arrears of pay or overtime or tea money (for any period not exceeding 12 months) ' as the court may consider to be due to such person and any such sum may be recovered by distress and in default of payment the offender shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not more than three months with or without hard labor. Discharge tor- Sec. 239. Any employer who dismisses from his employment any bidden. employee by reason merely of the fact that the employee — (a) Is a member of a special board; or (6) Has given information with regara to iliatters under tUs act to an inspector; or (c) Has after having given reasonable notice to his employer of his intention absented himself from work through being engaged in other duties as member of a special board shall be liable to a penalty not more than £25 ($121.66) for each em- ployee so dismissed. Part XIII. — Regulations.^ Kegulations. SECTION 242. The governor in council may by order published in the Government Gazette make regulations — For prescribing thejprovisions of this act and regulations thereunder to be posted in factories, and the forms of and particulars to be given in records to be made or kept by occupiers of factories; For requiring occupiers of factories to furnish all information neces- sary for preparing lists and rolls of electors none of whom shall be under the age of 18 years for special boards, and for determining the mode of preparing such Usts and rolls and the mode of electing members of such boards, the appointment and duties of returning officers and the times and places of meeting of special boards and their mode of pro- cedure; For imposing penalties not exceeding £5 ($24.33) on any person fail- ing or neglecting to comply with any regulations made imder this act; For prescribing the rates of pay to be given to the chairman and to members of special boards for attendance at the meetings of such boards; and Generally for the better carrying out of the provisions of this act. Regulations under the Factokies and Shops Acts.' Whereas by the factories and shops acts it is enacted that the governor in council may, by order published in the Government Gazette, from time to time, make, alter, and repeal regulations for the purposes therein mentioned, and generally tor carrying into effect the provisions of the said acts: Now therefore his excellency the governor of Victoria, with the advice of the executive council thereof, doth by this order repeal the regulations made on February 14, 1911, and on August 4, 1911, under the provisions of the factories and shops acts, and doth make the following regulations — ^that is to say: 1 A comparison of this section with section 225 ante shows that thereare two niethods by which an employee may obtain through the court wages due to him. Under this sec- tion an employer must be convicted in a prosecution against him taken by the chief in- spector of factories to enable the court to order payment of all arrears. Under section 225 the employee himself must issue a civil summons for the recovery of his wages. Compare section 226 ante and footnote thereto. 2 The validity of the regulations made or purporting to be made under the provisions of this act can only be tested before the supreme court. ' The law relating to factories and shops in Victoria, compiled by H. M. Murphy, chief inspector of factories and shops, Melbourne, 1913, pp. 123 et seq. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS ^VICTOEIA. 229 Chapter I. electing members of special boards. Section 137. 1. The chief inspector shall prepare rolls of electors, none of whom shall be under 18 years of age, in the form of Schedule I hereto, and each employer and each employee shall have one vote. Employers to forward lists. 2. Every employer (whenever by notice in writing required by the chief inspector so to do) shall forward a list of persons employed by him in the form of Schedule II. Employer's rolls. 3. The employer's rolls for occupations usually carried on in a factory shall be prepared from the register in the factories office, for all other occupations, from the lists forwarded by employers in accordance with section 137 (4) of the factories and shops act 1912. Employee's rolls. _ 4. The roll of electors for employees shall in all cases be prepared from lists specially obtained from employers in each case. Enrolling employees. 5. Every employee, not under 18 years of age, whose name has been omitted, and who will be affected by the board to be appointed, who produces evidence to the satisfaction of the chief inspector that his ordinary occupation when at work is employment in the process, trade, business, or occupation in regard to which the lowest prices or rates of payment are to be determined by any special board shall be enrolled as an elector of representatives of employees on such special board. Notice. 6. The chief inspector shall notify every elector enrolled for the pur- poses of a special board that his name has been duly enrolled. Appeal. 7. If the chief inspector fail, neglect, or refuse to enter any person's name on the elector's roll, such person may appeal to the minister, who may direct the chief inspector to enter such person's name as an elector on the roll, or may dismiss the appeal, and such decision shall be final. 8. No person shall be entitled to be enrolled both as an elector of rep- resentatives of employers and as an elector of representatives of employees. Dates for election. 9. When an election is necessary and the rolls of electors have been prepared as herein prescribed the minister may by notice in the Gov- ernment Gazette appoint a day on or before which nominations of can- didates for election may be received by the returning officer, and a day for the election of candidates should the number of nominations exceed the number of vacancies to be filled. 10. The undersecretary shall be returning officer for the purposes of the election of any sjiecial board, and he may, by writing under his hand, appoint a substitute to act for him. 11. The returning officer, the substitute returning officer, and every clerk employed to count the votes at any election shall, before enter- ing on any of his duties, make and sign before some justice the following declaration: 230 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OF LABOK STATISTICS. Oath. I, , do solemnly declare that I will faithfully and impar- tially, according to the best of my skill and judgment, exercise and perform all the powers, authorities, and duties reposed in or required of me by the regulations under the factories and shops acts, as returning officer (or substitute of the returning officer, or clerk employed in count- ing the votes) for the election of special boards. And I do further solemnly promise and declare that I will not, at any such election, attempt to ascertain, save in cases in which I am expressly authorized by law so to dOj how any person has voted; and that if in the discharge of my said duties at or concemiog any such poll, I learn how any person votes, I will not, by word or act, directly or indirectly, divulge or discover the same, save in answer to some ques- tion which I am legally bound to answer. Nominations. 12. Every candidate as a representative of employers on any special board shall be nominated, in writing, by 10 electors, and every candi- date as a representative of employees on any special board shall be nominated, m writing, by 25 electors, provided that a nomination by not less than one-fifth of the whole number of employers or of employees (as the case may be) on the electors' roll prepared by the chief inspector of factories shall be sufficient. Every sadi nomination shall contain the written consent of the candidate to his nomination and shall be delivered or posted to the returning officer so as to reach him before 4 o'clock on the day of nomination. 13. Should the number of persons so nominated for any special board as representatives of employers or as representatives of employees not exceed the number to be so elected, the returning officer Ehall report to the minister that such persons so nominated to the special board have been duly elected as representatives of employers or as representatives of employees (as the case may be). Publication of nominations. 14. Should the number of persons nominated either as representa- tives of employers or as representatives of employees exceed the number to be elected on any special board, the returning officer shall publish the names of persons so nominated in the Government Gazette, and a poll shall be taken on the date fixed by the minister. The poll shall be taken by voting papers only, and no voting paper shall be allowed which is received by the returning officer after 4 o'clock in the after- noon of the day for taking the poll. Roll. 15. No additional names shall be added to the roll of electors after the returning officer has published in the Goverimient Gazette the names of persons nominated until after that particular election is over. Voting papers. 16. Every voting paper shall contain the names of each of the candi- dates for election either as a representative of employers or employees (as the case may be). The chief inspector shall cause a voting paper to be posted at least four days prior to the date of such election to every elector whose name and address are on the roll of electors. Voting. 17. Each elector shall strike out on the voting paper forwarded to him all the names except those of the candidates for whom such elector desires to vote, and shall forthwith return such voting paper to the returning officer by placing it in a ballot box at the office of the chief inspector of factories, or posting it. No voting paper shall be allowed in which more or fewer names are left uncanceled than the number of persons to be elected. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS ^VIOTOEIA. 231 Counting vote. 18. The returniag officer shall, as soon as practicable after the hour fixed for receiving voting papers, count the votes received, and report to the minister the election of those candidates, not exceeding the number to be elected, who have received the greatest number of votes. Casting vote. 19. In case of two or more candidates receiving an equal number of votes, the returning officer shall have a casting vote. 20. In all cases not herein provided for the rules and usages at parlia- mentary elections shall be allowed so far as they may be applicable. meetings 01" special boards and payment op membees. Section 242. Nomination of chairman. 21. Every special board shall meet at the office of the chief inspector of factories for the purpose of nominating a chairman, and thereafter at such other times and places as may be arranged by such special board. Secretary. 22. The chief inspector may direct some officer to act as secretary to each special board. Minutes. 23. Entries of all proceedings of any special board shall be kept by the secretary with the names of the members who attended each meeting. Conduct of meetings. 24. The mode of conducting the business for which any special board is appointed may be fixed by such special board, or may be left to the decision of the chairman. Determination. 25. Every determination shall be coinmunicated to the minister, in writing, by the chairman of such special board. 26. After the determination of any special board has been commu- nicated to the minister such board shall adjourn sine die, and shall meet again only when convened by the minister of labor or by the chairman of such special board. Fees. 27. The chairman of a special board for attendance at a meeting may be paid £1 ($4.87) for each meeting of the board extending over the morning 'and afternoon of any day, and £1 ($4.87) for a meeting of the board commenced during the afternoon of any day and continued after 7 p. m. the same day. For a meeting either during only the fore- noon or afternoon the chairman may be paid 10s. (12.43). 28. Every member of a special board for attendance at a meeting may be paid 10s. ($2.43) for each meeting of the board extending over the morning and afternoon of anyday.and 10s. ($2.43) for a meeting of not less than four hours of a board commenced during the afternoon of any day and continued after 7 p. m. the same day. For a meeting either during only the forenoon or afternoon of any day each member may be paid 5s. ($1.22). Expenses. 29. Any representative of employers or employees residing not less than 40 miles from Melbourne shall be entitled to be paid train fare only from such place of residence and a sum of 10s. ($2.43) per day for traveling expenses. 232 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Ohaptee VII. POEMS TO BE KEPT IN A FACTOKT OR SHOP OR POBWABDED TO THE CHIEF INSPECTOR. Record of work done inside a factory. 2. The true record of the names, work, and wages of all persons employed in a factory, and the ages of all persons so employed under 21 years of age, required to be kept by section 22, shall be in the form and contain the particulars prescribed by Schedule VII hereto, and such record shall be forwarded to the chief inspector within 7 days after October 31 in each year. Record of employees in shops, etc. 3. The true record of the names, work, and wages of the persons employed, and the name and age of every person employea under 21 years of age, required to be kept by sections 126 and 197, shall be in the form and contain the particulars prescribed by Schedule VIII, and such record shall be forwarded to the chief inspector within 7 days after February 1 in each year. Record of work done outside a factory. 4. The record to be kept by the occupier of every factory, and every occu_pier of a factory within the meaning of section 23, of the work done outside a factory, and the name and address of the person by whom the same is done, and the prices paid in each instance for the work, shall be in the form of and contain the particulars specified in Schedule IX hereto for each and every week of the year. Record of fines imposed. Section 22. 6. The record of all fines levied upon his employees by the occupier of any factory shall be kept in the form of Schedule XI, and a copy of such schedule shall be forwarded to the chief inspector within 7 days of the 1st February in each year. Chapter X. MODE OF APPEALING TO THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL APPEALS. 1. Every appeal under the provisions of section 176 of the factories and shops act 1912 against the determination of a special board diall be instituted by the person entitled to appeal and desiring so to do, for- warding to the minister of labor a notice, in writing, containing par- ticulars of such desire. 2. The notice of appeal shall state the character in which the appel- lant claims to appear, and when the appeal is by a single employer or group of employers employing not less than 25 per cent of the total number of workers shall set out particulars of the numbers of workers employed by each appellant. The notice shall be written in l^ible characters, and shall clearly and distLnctly set forth or otherwise identify separately the item or items in the determination against which appellant is appealing, and his grounds of objection to such item or items. 3. The notice of appeal shall be signed in a legible manner by each appellant, and the full address and occupation of each appellant shall be given opposite each signature. 4. Such notice shall name some address for service, not more than 5 miles from the general post office, where notices, orders, summonses, documents, and written communications may be left for the appellant or appellants, and all notices, orders, summonses, documents, and written communicationB served or left at such address shall constitute effective service on the appellant or appellants, if there be more than one. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS ^VICTORIA. 233 5. Two copies of the notice of appeal shall be forwarded with the onginal. 6. The chief inspector of factories, and the registrar of the court of industrial appeals may allow any employer or employee in the trade affected by a determination against which an appeal has been lodged to make a copy of the notice of appeal for the purpose of entering an appearance against such appeal. 7. Any employer or employee in the trade affected by the determi- nation which is the subject of an appeal who desires to be heard by the court against such appeal, shall, 7 days at least before the hearing, notify the registrar of me court of industrial appeals of such desire, and shall give his full name, his occupation, and address in such notifi- cation. 8. The chief inspector of factories shall attach to such notice of appeal a list containing the names and addresses of the members of the special board the determination of which is the subject of appeal, and also, when necessary, a certificate giving the number of persons em- ployed in the trade affected by such employer or group of employers, and also the total number of persons employed in such trade as indi- cated in Appendix A of the chief inspector's last annual report issued prior to such appeal, or in the case of appeal by the workers in any trade, a certificate giving the number of persons employed in such trade as indicated in Appendix- A of the chief inspector's last annual report. 9. Noncompliance with these regulations shall not prevent the hearing of an appeal or of opposition thereto unless the court so orders. NEW SOUTH WALES. INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION ACT, 1912, NO. 17. An Act to provide for tlie regulation of the conditions of industries in cer- tain particulars by means of industrial conciliation and arbitration, and for the repression of lockouts and strikes; to establish and define the powers, jurisdiction, and procedure of an industrial court and certain subsidiary tribunals; to preserve certain awards and industrial agree- ments; to repeal the industrial disputes act, 1908, the industrial disputes amendment act, 1908, the industrial disputes (amendment) act, 1909, and the industrial disputes {am,endment) act, 1910; to amend the clerical workers act, 1910, and certain other acts; and for purposes consequent thereon or iruMental thereto. Part I. — Peeliminakt. Section 1. This act may be cited as the "Industrial arbitration act, ^'i^ort title. 1912." Sec 2. This act shall commence on and from a date to be pro- Commence- claimed by the governor in the Gazette: ^^^ " Provided, That the provisions of this act relating to the registration of industrial unions and the appointment of boards, and all provisions necessary for such registration and for making such appointments, shall come into force on the passing of this act. Sec. 4. (1) The industrial disputes act, 1908, the industrial disputes Eepeal and amendment act, 1908, the industrial disputes (amendment) act, 1909, ^^^""s^- and the industrial disputes (amendment) act, 1910, are repealed. (2) All awards, orders, and industrial agreements made under author- Awards, ity of the acts hereby repealed and in force at the commencement of this act shall, until rescinded under this act, continue in force for the respec- tive periods fixed by such awards, orders, or industrial agreements, and shall be deemed to have been made under this act. In construing any such award, order, or industrial agreement references to the registrar shall be read as references to the registrar appointed under this act, and for the purpose of any appeal from the registrar references to the indus- trial court shall be read as references to the court of industrial arbitration constituted by this act. 234 BXTLLBTIN OF THE BUEEATJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. Summonses is- (3) All summonses issued at such commencement under sections ^"®*- 41, 43, or 55 of the industrial disputes act, 1908, and returnable before the industrial court, shall continue in force, but shall be returnable be- fore, and shall be heard and determined by the court of industrial arbitration constituted by this act, or by the registrar or an industrial magistrate on being referred to him by the court. For the ijurpose of carrying out the above provisions, the enactments of the industrial disputes act, 1908, shall continue in force and shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to the hearing and determination of any such matter by the court of industrial arbitration constituted by this act, and to the enforcement of any order of such court. All documents relating to any such matters or proceedings, and filed or deposited with the industrial court shall be handed over to the court of industrial arbitration, and filed with such court. The registrar. (4) The registrar appointed under any act hereby repealed, and holding office at the commencement of this act, shall be deemed to have been appointed hereunder. Regulations. (5) AH regulations made under the acts hereby repealed, and in force at the commencement of this act, shall, mutatis mutandis, apply as if made under this act. Definitions. Definitions. Sec. 5. In this act, unless the context otherwise indicates "appren tice " means an employee under 21 years of age who is serving a period of training under an indenture or other written contract for the pur- pose of rendering him fit to be a qualified worker in an industry. "Award" means award under this act, and includes a variation of such award. "Board" means industrial board constituted under this act. "Boarding house" shall include a lodging house, and shall mean a house in which five or more paying boarders or lodgers, not being members of the proprietor's family, are accommodated. "Calling" means craft or other occupation. "Court" means covat of industrial arbitration established by this act. "Employee'' means person employed in any industry, whether on wages or piecework rates or as member of a butty gang, but shall not include a member of a family in the employment of a parent, and the fact that a person is working under a contract for labor only, or sub- stantially for labor only, or as lessee of any tools or other implements of production, or any vehicle used in the delivery of goods, shall not in itself prevent such person being held to be an employee. "Employer" means person, firm, company, or corporation employing persons working in any industry, whether on behalf of himself or itself or any other person or on behalf of the government of the State, and includes the chief commissioner for railways and tramways, the Sydney Harbor trust commissionerSj the metropolitan board of water supply and sewerage, the Hunter district water supply and sewerage board, and any council of a municipality or shire, and includes for the purpose of constituting a board, a director, manager, or superintend- ent of an employer as defined as aforesaid. "Improver means an employee under 21 years of age who is serving for the purpose of rendering him fit to be a qualified worker in an industry or special section of an industry. "Industrial agreement" means industrial agreement made and filed under any act hereby repealed, or under this act.' "Industrial court" means industrial court constituted by the repealed acta. 'Industrial magistrate'' means industrial magistrate appointed under this act. 1 Section 13 of the acts of 1901 reads as follows: Any industrial union may make an agreement in writing relating to any industrial matter (0) with another industrial union, or (6) with an employer, which, if it is made for a specified term not exceeding three years from the making of the agreement, and if a copy thereof is filed with the registrar, shall be or become an industrial agreement within the meaning of this act. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS — NEW SOUTH WALES. 235 "Industrial union" means industrial union registered as an indus- trial union under this act. "Industrial matters" means matters or things affecting or relating to work done or to be done, or the privileges, rights, or duties of em- ployers or employees in any industry, not involving questions which are or maybe the subject of proceedings for an indictable offense; and, without limiting the ordinary meaning of the above definition, includes all or any matters relating to — (a) The wages, allowances, or remuneration of any persons employed or to be employed in any industry, or the piecework, contract, or other prices paid or to be paid therein in respect of such employment. (6) The hoiUB of employment, sex, age, qualification, or status of employees, and the mode, terms, and conditions of employment. (c) The employment of children or young persons, or of any persons or class of persons in any industry, or the right to dismiss or to refuse to employ or reinstate in employment any particular persons or class of persons therein; but not so as to give preference of employment to members of industrial unions, except in accordance with the provisions of section 24, subsection 1, paragraph (g) ; (d) Any established custom or usage of any industry, either general orin any particular locality; (e) The interpretation of an industrial agreement or award; "Industry" means occupation or calling in which persons of either sex are employed for hire or reward. "Judge" or "the judge" means the judge of the court of industrial arbitration, and includes an additional judge of the court. "Justice" means justice of the peace, and includes a magistrate. "Lockout" (without limiting its ordinary meaning) includes a clos- ing of a place of employment, or a suspension of work, or a refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of his employees with a view to compel his employees, or to aid another employer in com- pelling his employees, to accept terms of employment. "M^istrate" means stipendiary or police magistrate. "Members of a board" and "members of a conciliation committee" include the chairman of the board and of the committee respectively. "Metropolitan district court" means district court of the metropoli- tan district, holden at Sydney. "Minister" means minister of the Crown administering this act. "Necessary commodity" includes — (a) Coal; (6) Gas for lighting, cooking, or industrial purposes; (c) Water for domestic purposes; and (d) Any article of food, the deprivation of which may tend to en- danger human Hfe or cause serious bodily injury. "Prescribed" means prescribed by this act or by regulations made thereunder. "Registrar" means industrial registrar appointed under this act. "Repealed acts" means the acts repealed by this act. "Schedule" means schedule to this act, and any amendment of or addition to such schedule made in pursuance of this act. "Strike" (without limiting its ordinary meaning J includes the ces- sation of work by any number of employees acting in combination, or a concerted refusal or a refusal tmder a common understanding by any number of employees to continue to work for an employer with a view to compel their employer, or to aid other employees in compelling their employer, to accept terms of employment, or with a view to enforce compliance with demands made by them or other employees on employers. . , , , , ■ "Trade-union" means trade-union registered under the trade-umon act, 1881, and includes a branch so registered. Industrial unions. Sec. 6, The registrar may, on appUcation made as hereinafter pro-, g^^gf«o° »' vided, register under this act as an industrial union of employers any „, g^pi^yg^g person or association of persons, or any incorporated company, or asso- ciation of incorporated companies, who or which has m the aggregate 236 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. throughout the six months next preceding the date of the application for registration employed on an average, taken pra: month, not less than 50 employees. Such application shall be made as prescribed, and, if made by an association or company, shall be signed by a majority in number of the governing body thereof. Eeglstr ation Sbq. 7. Any person or body whose registration under the act No. 59, aote" and"aot (rf 1^^^' ^ ^^ industrial union is at the commencement of this act in force, 1901. and any trade-union registered under section 9 of the industrial (dis- putes act, 1908, whose registration under that act is at the said com- mencement in force, shall, unless and until such registration iscan- celed, be deemed to be an industrial union. Registration of gj;c_ g. (1) Tbe registrar may, on application made as hereinalter SemplOTees°'°° provided, register under this act any trade-union of employees. On such registration the trade-union shall be an industrial union until such registration is duly canceled. (2) Such application shall be made in writing as prescribed by the committee of management of the trade-union, and sha,ll be signed by a majority in number of the members of such committee. Notice of any such application shall be published as prescribed. The registrar may require such proof as he thinks necessary of the authority of the said members to make the said application. (3) Any such application may be refused by the registrar if he is of opinion that the organization applying is not a bona fide trade-union, or if registered under this act would not be a bona fide industrial imion, or if it appears that another trade-union to which the members of the applicants' union might conveniently belong has already been regis- tered as an industrial union. (4) The registrar shall fix a day for considering any objections on the above ground to the granting of the application, and shall notify the same as prescribed. (5) No branch shall be registered, unless it is a bona fide branch of sufficient importance to be registered separately. (6) Any decision of the registrar under this section in respect of an objection taken as aforesaid, or on refusal of registration, shall be sub- ject to appeal to the court as prescribed. (7) The court may, for any reasons which appear to it to be good, can- cel the registration of any industrial union, provided that, save where otherwise mentioned in this act, such cancellation shall not relieve the industrial union or any member thereof from the obligation of any award or industrial agreement, or order of the court or a board, or from any penalty or liability incurred prior to such cancellation. Cancellation of Sec. 9. (1) The coiit may cancel the registration of an industrial request'S'union 'I'^o'i i^ proof is given to its satisfaction that a majority in number of ' the members of the union, by secret ballot taken as prescribed, require such cancellation: (2) Provided, That such power of cancellation shall not be exercised while any award or any industrial agreement relating to members of any such umon whether made under the repealed acts or this act is in force. The court may Sec. 10. The court may, if satisfied that an industrial union is ^cel registra- jngtigating to or aiding any other union or any of its members in a lockout or strike for which such other union or any of its members are liable to a penalty under this act, in its discretion cancel such registration and cancel any award or industrial agreement relating to such industrial union or the members thereof wim the consent of all other parties bound by such award or industrial agreement. Industrial agreement. ■ J°^f f° "^'^^ ^^°' ^^- ^^^ industrial union of employees may make an agree- mentef ^^^^ ment in writing with an employer or any other industrial union relat- ing to any industrial matter. Any such agreement if made for a term specified therein not ex- ceeding five years from the making thereof, and if filed at the office of the registrar, shall be an industrial agreement within the meaning of this act, and shall be binding on the parties, and on all persons for MINIMUM- WAGE LAWS NEW SOUTH WALES. 237 the time being members of such unions, but may be rescinded or varied m wnting by the parties. Any variation of any such agreement, if hied as aforesaid, shall be binding as part of the agreement. Any such industrial agreement may be enforced under this act. Sec. 12. If after the commencement of this act any trade-union of ■'°"^"5*'J,*i employees, not being an industrial union, enters into and executes f|^^^|°^ r^f* m the manner prescribed by the rules of such union any agreement trar. relating to any industrial matters with an employer or an industrial union of employers, either party to such agreement may file the same m the office of the registrar. Any such agreement, if made for a term specified therein not exceeding five years from the making thereof, shall, in so far as it relates to industrial matters, be binding on the parties, and on all persons for the time being members of such unions, and shall be enforceable in the same manner as an industrial agree- ment made under this act. Such agreements may be rescinded or varied by the parties, and any such variation if filed as aforesaid shall be binding as part of the agreement. Part II. — ^The Indtjstrial Court and the Boards. Constitution of the court. Section 13. (1) There is hereby constituted a court to be' called the Constitution of court of industrial arbitration. It shall be a superior court and a "'• court of record, and shall have a seal, which shall be judicially noticed. The court shall have the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it by this act, and also the jurisdiction and powers conferred in the industrial court by the clerical workers act, 1910. Subject to the said act, with regard to jurisdiction, the provisions of this act shall apply so far as they are applicable for the purpose of making and enforcing awards under the said act. (2) The industrial court established by the repealed acts is dis- The Judge of solved, and the jpresent judge of that court shall be the judge of the ™"i't- court of industrial arbitration, and shall hold such office subject to the provisions of subsections 6 and 7 of this section. Wtenever the office of the judge becomes vacant, the governor may appoint a supreme court judge or a district court judge, or a barrister at law of five years' standing, to be the judge. (3) The governor may appoint a supreme court judge or a district. Additional court judge, or a barrister at law of five years' standiiig, to be judge to J™S6. act as an additional judge of the court. Such additional judge shall have the same rights, powers, jurisdiction, and privileges as the judge of the court. (4) The governor may appoint a supreme court judge or a district Deputy judge, court judge, or a barrister at law of five years' standing, to be deputy judge to act temporarily in the absence of the judge of the court. Such deputy judge shall, while exercising the jurisdiction conferred on him, have the same salary and all the rights, powers, jurisdiction, and privileges of the judge of the court. (5) The court shall be constituted by the judge or additional or Judge to con- deputy judge of the court sitting alone, or, in the cases hereinafter in ™'"*^ ^^^ court, this act provided, with assessors. Should both judge and additional judge be sitting at the same time, each shall constitute the court under this act. (6) The present or any future or additional judge of the court shall be Tenure of olBca liable to be removed from office in the same manner and upon such ■'"^®- grounds only as a supreme court judge is by law liable to be removed from office. (7) Where a supreme court judge holds the office of judge of the Salary, court, his annual salary as supreme court judge shall continue. Where a district court judge holds such office his annual salary shall be £1,000 ($4,866.50) in addition to his salary as district court judge. Where a bamster at law is appointed to such office his annual salary shall be the same as that prescribed for a district court judge holding such office. Sec. 14. The court, in addition to the jurisdiction and powers con- Powers of the f erred on it by this act, shall have the powers and may exercise the""""' ' 238 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. jurisdiction hereby conferred on industrial boards and on the chairmen thereof and on the chairmen of conciliation committees, and on the industrial registrar and an industrial magistrate. Constitution of the boards. Dksolution ol Sec. 15. All the boards appointed under the repealed acts are at the pe^ed acts. ' '*^ commencement of this act dissolved, except where at such commence- ment any part-heard matter is before any such board, in which case such board may continue to act and deal with and determine such matter in the same manner as if this act had not passed. On such matter being determined, the board shall be dissolved on proclama- tion to that effect, made by the governor in the Gazette. Boards 'or in- Sec. 16. (1) Industrial boards shall, on the recommendation of the mKtriesinsched-pjjyj.j^ be constituted by the minister under the board designations mentioned in the first column of Schedule I, and under such further or other board designations as the governor may from time to time proclaim, for any one or more of the industries or callings mentioned m the second column of such schedule, and from time to time added to such second column by the governor on resolution passed by both houses of Parliament, and for any such transposition, division, com- bination, rearrangement, or regrouping of such industries or callings as the minister, on the recommendation of the court, may direct. Appointment (2) The minister shall appoint a chairman who shall be recom- o c airman. mended by the court for all the boards which may be constituted under each of the board designations mentioned in the first column of Schedule I . Such chairman shall preside over and be a member of all such boards. Appointment (3) The minister shall appoint the other members of such boards who bers """" shall be recommended by the court. Board consti- (4) On the chairman and members being appointed a board shall be tuted. deemed to be constituted. • Members. (5) Each such board shall, besides its chairman, consist of two or four other members, as may be recommended by the court. 0ns- half in nimiber of such other members shall be employers, and the other half employees, each of whom has been or is actually and bona fide engaged in one of the industries or callings so specified: Provided, That where the employers or the employees m the industries or call- ings consist largely of females, members may be appointed who are not engaged in the industries or callings: Provided also, That where, in the opinion of the court, no suitable employer or no suitable em- ployee in the industry can be found who is willing to act on the board on behalf of the employers or employees, as the case may be, such court may reco mm end any person whom it considers to be acquainted with the working of the industry to represent the employers or em- ployees on the board, and the minister shall appoint such person. oaSnEs""**''"' °' (^) Where it appears to the court that a question has arisen as to the right of employees in specified callings to do certain work in an industry to the exclusion of the employees in other callings, the court may, on application made by any such employees, constitute a special board to determine such question. Such board shall consist of a chairman and such number of other members as the court fixes, but so that — (a) One-half in number of such other members shall be employers and the other half employees, each of whom has been or is actually and bona fide engaged in one of the said callings; (b) Suchof thecallingsasthecourtconsiderstobedirectlyintereeted in the question shall be represented on the board by an employer or employers, and by an employee or an equal number of employees. The chairman and other members of any such board shall be ap- pointed by the court. The determination shall have effect as an award of a board. diitrTe^in sche'd- ^^';- ^'^- .^^^ '^^? minister shall, on the recommendation of the court, ule u. '^ constitute industrial boards for the industries and callings mentioned in Schedule II as amended or added to in pursuance of&is act. Appointment. ^2) The minister shall— (a) Appoint chairmen who shall preside at and be members of such boards; MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS NEW SOUTH WALES. 239 (b) Appoint the other membera of such boards. The persons so appointed shall be recommended by the court. (3) Each such board shall have jurisdiction as to matters relating to Jurisdiction, such of the said industries or callings or sections thereof as may be specified by the court in its rccommendatipn to the minister. (4) Each such board shall, besides the chairman, consist of two or Members, four other members, as may be recommended by the court, one-half in number of whom shall be employers and the other half employees, each of whom has been or is actually and bona fide engaged in one of the industries or callings so specified: Provided, Tha,t where the employers or the employees in the indus- tries or callings consiBt largely of females, members may be appointed who are not engaged in the industries or callings: Provided also, That where, in the opinion of the court, no suitable em- ployer or no suitable employee in the industry can be found who is will- mg to act on the board on behalf of the employers or employees, as the case may be, such court may appoint any person whom it consid- ers to be acquainted with the working of the industry to represent the employers or employees on the board. (5) The provisions of this act relating to boards shall apply to any Application of board constituted under this section. bowds ^"^ (6) The governor may on resolution passed b^ both houses of Par- Amendment of liament amend Schedule II or add thereto other industries. Any such Schedule ll. amendment or addition shall be published in the Gazette. Sec. 18. If any member of a board, without reasonable excuse, neg- Failureofmem- lects on two successive occasions to attend meetings of the board duly attend. convened, or to vote when present at any such meeting on any ques- tion duly submitted to the board, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £5 ($24.33), and the governor may declare his office vacant, and thereupon such member shall cease to hold office. Sec. 19. Each member of a board shall, upon his appointment, take ^ ? * '? *° ^^ an oath not to disclose any matter or evidence before the board or the b* j™ '' mem- court relating to trade secrets; the profits or losses or the receipts and outgoings of any employer; the books of an employer or witness pro- duced before the board or the court; or the financial position of any employer or of any witness; and if he violates his oath, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £500 ($2,433.26), and, on convic- tion of such offense, he shall cease to hold office. Sec. 20. (1) The minister, on the recommendation of the court. Dissolution of may at any time dissolve a board; he may also on such recommenda- ^"gyai ^ aera- tion remove any member of a board from his office on the ground that ber. such member is of unsound mind, or in prison, or has abandoned his residence in this State, or is not properly discharging his duties as a member of such board. (2) Subject to the above provision, the members of a board shall Period of office, hold office until the expiration of three years from the date of their appointment, and then shall cease to hold office: Provided, That a member may resign his office. (3) A new board may be appointed under this act to take the place of a board that has been dissolved, or the members of which have resigned, or have ceased to hold office. Members ceasing to hold office on a board shall be eligible for appoint- ment to the new board. The provisions of this act relating to the constitution and manner of appointment of boards shall apply to the appointment of such new board. , , , , Sec. 21. (1) Where, from any cause, a member of a board ceases to hold office, the minister may appoint a duly qualified person, who shall be recommended by the court, to his office for the residue of the period for which such member was appointed. (2) Where a person is appomted to any vacancy on a board, the board as newly constituted may, if no member of the board objects, continue the hearing of and may determine any part-heard case. Sec 22. Every appointment of a member of a board shall be Puh-. -^PP"'"*^®?'^ lished in the Gazette, and a copy of a Gazette containing a notice of ^ such appointment purporting to have been published in pursuance of this act shall be conclusive evidence that the person named in such New board. Appointment to vacancies. 240 BULLETIN OP THE BUEEAXT OF LABOR STATISTICS. notice was legally appointed to the office named, and had power and jurisdiction to act in such office, and such appointment shall not be challenged for any cause. Sec. 23. The members of a board shall be paid such fees as may be fixed by the governor. PaBT III. — ^JtTEISDICTION OF BOAEDS AND OF THE CoURT. Power of board to make recom- mendation. Charitable stitutions. A w s board. rd of Applications to court to vary recommenda- tions. Determmation by cotirt. Section 24. (1) A board, on any reference or application to it may, with respect to the industries or callings for which it has been consti- tuted, make an award — (a) Fixing the lowest prices for work done by employees and the lowest rates of wages payable to employees, other than aged, infirm, or slow workers; (6) Fixing the number of hours and the times to be worked in order to entitle employees to the wages bo fixed; (c) Fixing the lowest rates for overtime and holidays and other spe- cial work, including allowances as compensation for overtime, holidays, or other special work; {d) Fixmg the number or proportionate number of apprentices and improvers and the lowest prices and rates payable to them; h) Determining any industrial matter; m Rescinding or varying any award made in respect of any of the industries or callings for wmch it has been constituted; {g) Declaring that preference of employment shaU be given to mem- bers of any industrial union of employees over other persons offering their labor at the same time, other things being equal: Provided, That where any declaration giving such preference of employment has been made in favor of an industrial union of. employees, such declaration shall be canceled by the court of arbitration if at any time such union, or any substantial number of its members, takes part in a strike or instigates or aids any other persons in a strike; and if any lesser num- ber takes part in a strike, or instigates or aids any other persons in a strike, such court may suspend such declaration for such period as to it may seem just. (2) Where an institution carried on wholly or partly for charitable purposes provides for the food, clothing, lodging, or maintenance of any of ite employees or any of its inmates who are deemed to be employees, the board in its award aa to the wages of such employees or inmates, shall make due allowance therefor. The board may exempt such institution from all or any terms of the award where the food, clothing, lodging, and maintenance provided by the institution, together with the money if any, paid by the institution to such employees or inmates as wages, are at least equal in value to the value of the labor of such employees or inmates. Sec. 25. (1) The award of a board shall be signed by the chairman and forwarded to the registrar who shall forthwith publish the same in the Gazette and notify the parties. On such publication every award shall take effect and be binding on all persons engaged in the industries or callings and within the locality and for the period not exceeding three years specified therein. (2) Within 30 days of such publication any of the parties to the proceedings before the board, with the consent of the court, and any other person, with the hke consent, may in manner prescribed make application to the court for variation or amendment of such award, or for rehearing in respeict to any matter in or omission from the award. (3) If the board refuses to make any award, any of the said parties may, within 14 days after such refusal, make application to the court to make an award as to any matter included in a claim or reference made to the board. (4) On any such application the court may confirm, or vary, or rescind the award thus appealed from, or make a new award, and may make such order as to the costs of the appeal aa it thinka just. At such hearing the members of the board other than the chairman shall, if any person making the application so desires, sit with the court as assessors. (5) The pendency of an appeal shall not suspend the operation of an award appealed from. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS NEW SOTJTS WALES. 241 Sec. 26. Employees employed by the Government of New South Wages oi Gov- Wales or by any of its departments, including the chief commissioner"™™* employ- for railways and tramways, the Sydney Harbor trust, the metropolitan ' board of water supply and sewerage, and the Hunter district board of water supply and sewerage shall be paid rates and prices not less than those paid to other employees not employed by the Government or its departments doing the same class of work under similar circumstances. But the fact that employment is permanent, or that additional privi- leges are allowed in the service of the Government or its departments, shall not of itself be regarded as a circumstance of dissimilarity. The court or an industrial board shall not fix rates and prices for such first- mentioned employees lower than those fixed for such other employees. Sec. 27. (1) Any aged, infirm, or slow worker who may deem himself ^o®' PJ * ^ '" unable to earn the minimum wage prescribed by any award , may apply s^wVorkeS' " to the registrar for a permit in writing to work for less than the wage so prescribed. (2) The registrar shall be the tribunal to determine whether and on what conditions such permit shall be granted, and shall have power to revoke or cancel any permit. (3) The registrar shall forthwith notify the secretary of the industrial union of the trade or calling in which such applicant desires to be employed, of the grant of such permit and of the conditions contained therein. (4) The said union may at any time after such notice apply to the registrar in the manner prescribed for the cancellation of such permit. (5) An appeal against any such determination shall not lie from the registrar to the court except on the ground that the trade or calling concerned is one in which no such permit should be granted. Sec. 28. Unless otherwise expressly provided in this act, an award. Variation of whether made under this act or the repealed acts, may be rescinded, *^""- added to, or varied only on application or reference to a board in pur- suance of this act. But the court may, at any time, on its own initiative or on application made to it, prohibit.any proceeding of a board or vary or rescind any award made under this act or the repealed acts. Sec. 29. Subject to the right of appeal under this act, and to such ^AT,^'^ *" •" conditions and exemptions as the board may, and is, hereby authorized "™^- board or court to deal with the dispute shall not be affected by reason nierely that no member of the union is employed by any party to the dispute, or is personally concerned in the dispute. (2) An industrial dispute shall not be referred for settlement to a References ap- board by an industrial union or association, nor shall any application V^°^^ ^7 ™"™- be made to the court by any such union or association for the enforce- ment of any industrial agreement or award or order of the court, unless and until the proposed reference or application has been approved by the members of the union or of each of the imions concerned in maimer following; that is to say: (a) By resolution passed at a special meeting of the union and con- firmed by subsequent ballot of the members, a majority of the votes recorded being in favor thereof, the result of such ballot to be recorded on the minutes. (3) Each such special meeting shall be duly constituted, convened, . Special meet- and held in manner provided by the rules, save that notice of the pro- ™^* posal to be submitted to the meeting shall be posted to all the members, and that the proposal shall be deemed to be carried if, but not unless, a majority of all the members present at the meeting of the industrial union vote in favor of it. (4) A certificate under the hand of the chairman of any such special Certiflcate of meeting shall, until the contrary is shown, be sufficient evidence as to ^en™^ ^^' the due constitution and holding of the meeting, the nature of the pro- posal submitted, and the result of the voting. Sec. 108. In every case where an industrial dispute has been referred .s p e c i a l pro- to the board the following special provisions shall apply : dSput'e!" "'^^ (a) Until the dispute has been finally disposed of by the board or the court neither the parties to the dispute nor the workers affected by the dispute shall, on account of the dispute, do or be concerned in doing, directly or indirectly, anything in the nature of a strike or lockout, or of a suspension or discontinuance of employment or work, but the rela- tionship of employer and employed shall continue uninterrupted by the dispute, or anything preliminary to the reference of the dispute and connected therewith. (6) If default is made in faithfully observing any of the foregoing provisions of this section, every union, association, employer, worker, or person committing or concerned in committing the default shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £50 ($243.33) . (c) The dismissal or suspension of any worker, or the discontinuance of work by any worker, pending the final disposition of an industrial dispute shall be deemed to be a default under this section, unless the party charged with such default satisfies the court that such dismissal, suspension, or discontinuance was not on account of the dispute. Sec. 109 (as amended by act TSTo. 239, 1908). (1) Every employer f^l^JSIkH who dismisses from his employment any worker by reason merely of the fact that the worker is an officer or a member of an industrial union, or merely because such worker has acted as an accessor on a council of conciliation or has represented his union in any negotiations or con- ference between employers and workers, or merely because such worker is entitled to the benefit of an award, order, or agreement, is liable to a penalty not exceeding £25 ($121.66), to be recovered at the suit of an mspector of awards in the same manner as a penalty for the breach of an award. . . , • j? (2) A worker shall be deemed to be dismissed withm the meanmg of this section if he is suspended for a longer period than 10 days. (3) In every case where the worker dismissed was immediately pre- ceding his dismissal a president, vice president, secretary, or treasurer of an industrial union, or an assessor for a council of conciliation, or represented his union in any negotiations or conference between em- ployers and workers, it shall lie on the employer to prove that such worker was dismissed for a reason other than that he has acted in any of the said capacities. . , , , r.„™i„-„: +„ Sec. 110 If during the currency of an award any employer, worker, ^Cmnbrning to industrial union, or association, or any combmation of either employers or workers has taken proceedings with the intention to defeat any of the 278 BULLETIN OP THE BTJEEATJ OE LABOE STATISTICS. provisions of the award, such employer, worker, union, association, or combination, and every member thereof, respectively, shall be deemed to have committed a breach of the award, and shall be liable accord- ^h- ... Appointment Sec. 112. Whenever an industrial dispute involving technical of experts. questions is referred to the board or court the following special pro- visions shall apply: (a) At any stage of the proceedings the board or the court may direct that two experts nominated by the parties shall sit as experts; (6) One of the experts shall be nominated by the party, or, as the case may be, by all the parties, whose interests are with the employers; and one by the party, or, as the case may be, by all the parties, whose interests are with the workers; (c) The experts shall be nominated in such manner as the board or court directs, or as is prescribed by regulations, but shall not be deemed to be members of the board or court for the purpose of disposing of such dispute; (a) The powers by this section conferred upon the board and the court respectively shall, whilst the board or the court is not sitting, be exercisable by the chairman of the board and the judge of the court respectively. Powersofboard Sec. 113 (as amended by act No. 33, 1911). (1) In order to enable or court. ^^^ board or court the more effectually to dispose of any matter before it according to the substantial merits and equities of the case, it may, at any stage of the proceedings, of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties, and upon such terms as it thinks fit, by order — (a) Direct parties to be joined or struck out; (6) Amend or waive any error or detect in the proceedings; (c) Extend the time within which anything is to be done; and (d) Generally give such directions as are deemed necessary or expedient in the premises. (2) The powers by this section conferred upon the board may, when the board is not sitting, be exercised by the chairman. (3) The powers by this section conferred upon the court may, when the court is not sitting, be exercised by the judge. CJontempt of Skc. 114. If in any proceedings before the board or court any person board or court, willfully insults any member of the board or court or the clerk, or willfully interrupts the proceedings, or without good cause refuses to give evidence, or is guilty in any other manner of any willful contempt in the face of the board or court, it shall be lawful for any officer of the board or court, or apy constable, to take the person offending into custody and remove him from the precincts of the board or court, to be detained in custody until the rising of the board or court, and the person so offending shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £10 ($48.67). Obstraetion of Sec. 115. Every person who prints or publishes anything calculated board or court, ^q obstruct or in any way interfere with or prejudicially afiect any matter before the board or court is liable to a fine not exceedine £50 (1243.33). Power to pro- Sec. 116. If, without good cause shown, any party to proceedings M^ to attend^ before the board or court fails to attend or be represented, the board or court may proceed and act as fully in the matter before it as if such party had duly attended or been represented. Proceedings to Sec. 117. Where any change takes place in the members constituting change ^n board ^^^ board or the court, any proceeding or inquiry then in progress shall or court. not abate or be affected, but shall continue and be dealt with by the board or the court as if no such change had taken place: Provided, That the board or the court may require evidence to be retaken where necessary. Proceedings not Sec. 118. (1) Proceedings before the board or court shall not abate reason of drath ^ ^^ reason of the seat of any member of the board or court being vacant for any cause whatever, or of the death of any party to the proceedings, and in the latter case the legal personal representative of the deceased party shall be substituted in his stead. Recommenda- (2) A recommendation or order of the board, or an award or order of voU^for^intoi- ^'^^ court, shall not be void or in any way vitiated by reason merely of mallty. any informality or error of form, or noncompliance with this act. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS — NEW ZEALAND. 279 Sec. 119. (1) The proceedings of the board or court shall be con- Prooeedinga ducted in public : public. Provided, That, at any stage of the proceedings before it, the board or court, of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties, may direct that the proceedings be conducted in private; and in such case all persona (other than the parties, their representatives, the ofHcers of the board or court, and the witness under examination) shall withdraw. (2) The board or court may sit during the day or at night, aa it thinks fit. Sec. 120. (1) Any board and the court, and, upon being authorized Power of entry, in writing by the board or court, any member of such board or court **"• respectively, or any officer of such board or court, or any other person, without any other warrant than this act, may at any time between sunrise and sunset — (a) Enter upon any manufactory, building, workshop, factory, mine, mine workings, ship or vessel, shed, place, or premises of any kind whatsoever, wherein or in respect of which any industry is carried on or any work is being or has been done or commenced, or any matter or thing is taking or has taken place, which is made the subject of a refer- ence to such board or court; (6) Inspect and view any work, material, machinery, appliances, article, matter, or thing whatsoever being in such manufactory, build- ing, workshop, factory, mine, mine workings, ship or vessel, shed, place, or premises as aforesaid; (c) Interrogate any person or persons who may be in or upon any such manufactory, building, workshop, factory, mine, mine workings, ship or vessel, shed, place, or premises as aforesaid in respect of or in relation to any matter or thing hereinbefore mentioned. (2) Every person who hinders or obstructs the board or court, or any member or officer thereof, respectively, or other person, in the exercise of any power conferred by this section, or who refuses to the board or court, or any member or officer thereof respectively duly authorized as aforesaid, entrance during any such time as aforesaid to any such manufactory, building, workshop, factory, mine, mine work- ings, ship or vessel, shed, place, or premises, or refuses to answer any questions put to him as aforesaid, is liable to a fine not exceeding £50 ($243.33). Sec. 121. "With respect to the Government railways open for traffic Government the foUowing special provisions shall apply, anything elsewhere in this i^"^^r^- act to the contrary notwithstanding: (a) The society of railway servants called "The Amalgamated So- ciety of Railway Servants," and now registered under the acts of which this act is a consolidation, shall be deemed to be registered under this act; (6) In the case of the dissolution of the said society, any reconstruc- tion thereof, or any society of Government railway servants formed in • its stead, may register under this act as an industrial union of workers; (c) The minister of railways may from time to time enter into indus- trial agreements with the registered society in like manner in all respects as if the management of the Government railways were an industry, and he were the employer of all workers employed therein; (rf) If any industrial dispute arises between the minister and the Procedure in society it may be referred to the court for settlement as hereinafter °^^ °' disputes, provided; («) The society may, by petition filed with the clerk and setting forth the particulars of the matters in dispute, pray the court to hear and determine the same; (/) Such petition shall be under the seal of the society and the hands of two members of the committee of management; {g) No such petition shall be filed except pursuant to a resolution of a special meeting of the society duly called for the purpose in accordance with its rules, and with respect to such resolution and the procedure thereon section 107 shall apply; Ql) Such petition when duly filed shall be referred to the court by Jurisdiction of the clerk, and the court, if it considers the dispute sufficiently grave to *"""*• call for investigation and settlement, shall notify the minister thereof, 280 BtTLLBTIK OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. and appoint a time and place at which the dispute will be investigated and determined, in like manner as in the case of a reference, and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same accord- ingly and to make award thereon; (i) In making any award under this section the court shall have regard to the schedule of classification in the Government railways act, 1908; (j) In any proceedings before the court under this section the minister may be represented by any officer of the department whom he appoints in that behalf; (k) All expenses incurred and moneys payable by the minister under this section shall be payable out of moneys to be appropriated by Parliament for the purpose; (1) In no case shall the board have any jurisdiction over the society, nor shall the society or any branch thereof have any right to nomi- nate or vote for the election of any member of the board; (m) Except for the purposes of this section the court shall have no jurisdiction over the society; (n) For the purposes of the appointment of members of the court the society shall be deemed to be an industrial union of workers, and may make recommendations to the governor accordingly. Awards to con- Sec. 122. Whenever any portion of a district is severed therefrom, tmue in force. ^^^ either added to another district or constituted a new district or part of a new district, every award and industrial agreement in force in the district from which such portion is severed shall, so far as it is in force in such portion, reinain in force therein until superseded by another award or industrial agreement. Permit to work Sec. 123 (as amended by act No. 239, 1908). Where in any award mui^wage ™™'' provision is made for the issue of a permit to any worker to accept a wage below that prescribed for ordinary workers in the trade to which the award relates the following provisions shall apply; (a) The application for a permit shall be in writing, signed by the applicant, and addressed to the person authorized by lie award to issue the same; (6) Such person shall fix a time and place for the hearing of such application, being not later than two days after the receipt by him of the application, and shall give notice of such time and place to the secretary of the industrial union of workers in the trade to which the award relates; (c) Such notice shall be in writing, and may be deUvered to the secretary personally or left at the registered office of the industrial union within 24 hours after the receipt of the application; (d) Such secretary, or some other person appointed in that behalf by the union, shall be afforded an opportunity to attend the hearing so as to enable the union to express its views upon the application; (e) No such permit shall be granted to any person who is not usually employed in the industry to which the awara applies; (/) A permit shall be valid only for the period for which it is granted. Notiflcatims in Sec. 124. Any notification made or purporting to be made in the evidence.* * Gazette by or under the authority of this act may be given in evidence in all courts of justice, in all legal proceedings, and for any of the purposes of this act by the production of a copy of the Gazette. simaS™to^e ®^°- ''■^^ ^^^ 'Eveiy document bearing the seal of the court shall be judicially no- fs'^^i'^^d ^^ evidence without further proof, and the signature of the ticed. judge of the court, or the chairman of the board, or the registrar, or the clerk of awards shall be judicially noticed in or before any court or person or officer acting judicially or under any power or authority contained in this act: Provided, Such signature is attached to some award, order, certifi- cate, or other official document made or purporting to be made under this act or any enactment mentioned in the schedule hereto. (2) No proof shall be required of the handwriting of official position of any person acting in pursuance of this section. ess® ra"' simday ^^°- ^^^- (^) ^° P^''^°'^ ^'^^^ ^erve or cause to be served on Sunday void. ^^y order or other process of the court, and such service shall be void to all intents and piirposes whatsoever. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS NEW ZEALAND. 281 (2) Every person who commits a breach of this section is liable to a fine not exceedmg £10 ($48.67), to be recovered ia a summary way under the justices of the j)eace act, 1908. (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to annul, repeal, or ia any way affect the common law, or the provisions of any statute or rule of practice or procedure, now or hereafter ia force, authorizing the service of any writ, process, or warrant. Sec 127. (1) The governor may from time to time make regulations Regulations, for any of the following purposes: (a) Prescribing the forms of certificates or other instruments to be issued by the registrar, and of any certificate or other proceeding of any board or any officer thereof; (b) Prescribing the duties of clerks of awards, and of all other officers and persons actiag in the execution of this act; (c) Providing for anything necessary to carry out the first or any subsequent election of members of boards, or on any vacancy therein or in the office of chairman of any board, includiag the forms of any notice, proceeding, or iastrument of any kiad to be used in or in respect of any such election; (a) Providing for the mode in which recommendations by iadustrial unions as to the appointment of members of the court shall be made and authenticated; (e) Prescribing any act or thing necessary to supplement or render more effectual the provisions of this act as to the conduct of proceed- ings before a board or the court, or the transfer of such proceedings from one of such bodies to the other; (/) Providing generally for any other matter or thing necessary to give effect to this act or to meet any particular casej (g) Prescribing what fees shall be paid in respect of any proceeding before a board or the court and the party by whom such fees shall be paid; (ft) Prescribing what respective fees shall be paid to the members of the board; (i) Prescribing what respective traveling expenses shall be payable to the members of the court (including the judge) and to the members of the board ; and (j) For any other purpose for which regulations are contemplated or required in order to give full effect to this act. (2) All such regulations shall come into force on the date of the gazetting thereof, and shall, within 14 days after such gazetting, be laid before Parliament if in session, or if not in session, then within 14 days after the beginning of the next session. Sec. 129. Except as provided by subsection 5 of section 65 and sub- Expenses of ad- section 2 of section 74 hereof, all charges and exjsenses incurred by the ™™'stration. Government in connection with the administration of this act shall be defrayed out of such annual appropriations as from time to time are made for that purpose by Parhament. Sec. 130. No stamp duty shall be payable upon or in respect of any stamp duty registration, certificate, agreement, award, statutory declaration, or^-^^^^^^ ^• instrument effected, issued, or made under this act: Provided, That nothing in this section shall apply to the fees of any court payable by means of stamps. Sec. 131. Except as provided by section 121 hereof, or by the special -,,^'=t*o°^J„^^P; provisions of any other act, nothing in this act shall apply to the Crown ^^vemment de- or to any department of the Government of New Zealand. partments. INDUSTEIAL CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION AMEND- MENT ACT, 1908, NO. 239. Section 1. This act may be cited as the iadustrial conciliation and Short title. arbitration amendment act, 1908, and shall be read together with and deemed to form part of the industrial conciliation and arbitration act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the principal act"). _ Sec. 2. This act shall come into operation on the 1st day of January, Act m eflect. 1909. 282 BULLETIN OP THE BUEEATJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. Definition "strike.'! of Definition "lookout." Paet I. — Stkikes and Lockouts. Section 3. (1) In this act the term "strike'' means the act of any number of workers who are or have been in the employment whether of the same employer or of different employers in discontinuing that em- ployment, whether wholly or partially, or in breaking their contracts of service, or in refusing or f aiUng after any such discontinuance to resume or return to their employment, the said discontinuance, breach, refusal, or failure being due to any combination, agreement, or common under- understanding, whether express or implied, made or entered into by the said workers: (a) With intent to compel or induce any such employer to agree to terms of employment, or comply with any demands made by the said or any other workers; or (6) With intent to cause loss or inconvenience to any such employer in the conduct of his business; or (c) With intent to incite, aid, abet, instigate, or procure any other strike; or (d) With intent to assist workers in the employment of any other employer to compel or induce that employer to agree to terms of em- ployment or comply with any demands made upon him by any workers. (2) In this act the expression "to strike " means to become a party to a strike, and the term "striker '' means a party to a strike, of Sec. 4. In this act the term "lockout" means the act of an employer in closing his place of business, or suspending or discontinuing his business or any branch thereof: (a) With intent to compel or induce any workers to agree to terms of employment, or comply with any demands made upon them by the said or any other employer; or (6) With intent to cause loss or inconvenience to the workers em- ployed by him or to any of them; or (c) With intent to incite, aid, abet, instigate, or procure any other lockout; or (d) With intent to assist any other employer to compel or induce any workers to agree to terms of employment or comply with any de- mands made by him. Sec. 5. (1) When a strike takes place in any industry every worker who is or becomes a party to the strike and who is at the commence- ment of the strike bound by any award or industrial agreement affecting that industry shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £10 ($48.67). (2) When a lockout takes place in any industry every employer who is or becomes a party to the lockout, and who is at the commencement of the lockout bound by any award or industrial agreement afiectiag that industry, shall be liable to apenalty not exceeding£500 ($2,433.25). (3) No worker or employer shall be liable to more than one penalty in respect of the same Btnke or lockout, notwithstanding the contiau- ance thereof. (4^ No proceedings shall be commenced or continued imder this section Eigainst any worker or employer who is a party to a strike or lockout if judgnient has already been obtained under the next suc- ceeding section in respect of the same strike or lockout against any industrial union or industrial association of which the worker or em- ployer is a member, p^ons'not^a? ^^°' ^' ^^^ Every person who incites, instigates, aids, or abets an ties to strike or unlawful strike or lockout or the continuance of any such strike or lockout. lockout, or who incites, instigates, or assists any person to become a party to any such strike or lockout, is liable, if a worker, to a penalty not exceeding £10 ($48.67), and if an industrial union, industrial asso- ciation, trade-union, employer, or any person other than a worker, to a penalty not exceeding £200 ($973.30). (2) Every person who makes any gift of money or other valuable thing to or for the benefit of any person who is a party to any unlawful strike or lockout, or to or for the benefit of any industrial union, indus- trial association, trade-union, or other society or association of which any such person is a member, shall be deemed to have aided or abetted the strike or lockout within the meaning of this section, unless he proves that he so acted without the intent of aiding or abetting the strike or lockout. Penalties. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS NEW ZEALAND. 283 (3) When a strike or lockout takes place, and a majority of the members of any industrial union or industrial association are at any time parties to the strike or lockout, the said union or association shall ,be deemed to have instigated the strike or lockout. (4) In this section the term "unlawful strike " means a strike of any workers who are bound at the commencement of the strike by an award or_ industrial agreement affecting the industry in which the strike arises. (5) In this section the term "unlawful lockout" means a lockout by any employer who is bound at the commencement of the lockout by an award or industrial agreement affecting the industry in which the lockout occurs. Sec. 7. Every penalty hereinbefore referred to shall be recoverable Recovery at the suit of an inspector of awards ia the same manner as a penalty °' P™alties. for a breach of an award and not otherwise, and all the provisions here- inafter in this act contained with respect to the enforcement of an award shall, so far as applicable, apply accordingly. Sec. 9. (1) If any person employed in any of the industries to which .Special penal- this section applies strikes without having given to his employer, within i^teteira^^ one month before so striking, not less than 14 days' notice in writing, signed by him, of his intention to strike, or strikes before the expiry of any notice so given by him, the striker shall be liable on summary conviction before a magistrate to a fine not exceeding £25 ($121.66). (2) If any employer engaged in any of the industries to which this section applies locks out without having given to his employees, within one month before so locking out, not less than 14 days' notice in writing of his intention to lock out, or locks out before the expiry of any notice so given by him, such employer shall be liable on summary conviction before a magistrate to a fine not exceeding £500 ($2,433.25). ^3) This section applies to the following industries: (a) The manufacture or supply of coal gas; (b) The production or supply of electricity for light or power; (c) The supply of water to the inhabitants of any borough or other place; (d) The supply of milk for domestic consumption; (e) The slaughtering or supply of meat for domestic consumption; (/) The sale or delivery of coal, whether for domestic or industrial purposes; (g) The working of any ferry, tramway, or railway used for the public carriage of goods or passengers. (4) Every person who incites, instigates, aids, or abets any offense against this section, or who incites, instigates, or assists any person who has struck or locked out in breach of this section to continue to be a party to the strike or lockout shall be liable, on summary conviction before a magistrate, to a fine not exceeding in the case of a worker £25 ($121.66), or in the case of an industrial union, industrial association, trade-union, employer, or any person other than a worker, £500 ($2,433.25). (5) Nothing in this section shall affect any liability under section 5 or section 6 of this act, save that when a judgment or conviction has been obtained against any person under any one of those sections no further proceedings shall be taken or continued against him under any other of those sections in respect of the same act. Sec. 10 (as amended by act No. 33, 1911). (l)_When an industrial Su^^^swn of union or industrial association of workers is convicted under section 9 ^^g^ of this act of having incited, instigated, aided, or abetted a strike by any of its members in breach of that section, or the continuance by any of its members of a strike commenced in breach of that section, or when judgment is obtained under section 6 of this act against an industrial - union or industrial association of workers for a penalty incurred by it for inciting, instigating, aiding, or abetting a strike by any of its mem- ' bers or the continuance of any such strike, or for inciting, instigating, or assisting any person to become a party to any such strike, the court in whichttie conviction or judgment is obtained may in the said convic- tion or judgment order that the registration of the union or association shall be suspended for such period as the court thinks fit, not exceed- ing two years. 284 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. (2) During any such period of suspension the said union or associa- tion shall be incapable of iastitutlng or continuing or of being a party to any conciliation or arbitration proceedings under the principal act or this act, or of entering into any industrial agreement, or of taking or continuing any proceedings for the enforcement of an award or indus- trial agreement, or of making any application for the cancellation of its registration. (3) During any such period of suspension the operation of any award or industrial agreement m force at any time duriug that period shall be suspended so far as the award or industrial agreement applies to persona who are members of that union or association, or who were members thereof at the time when the offense was committed in respect of which the said judgment or conviction was given or obtained, and also so far as the award or industrial agreement applies to the employers of any such persons: Provided, That in making the order of suspension the court may limit the operation of this subsection to any industrial district or districts, or to any portion thereof. (4) Durmg any period of such suspension no new industrial union or industrial association of workers shall be registered in the same indus- trial district in respect of the same industry. (5) The industrial union or industrial association against which any such order of suspension is made may appeal therefrom in the same man- ner as from the judgment or conviction in respect of which the ord'er is made, and on any such appeal the court in which it is heard may con- firm, vary, or quash the order of suspension, and may make such order as to the costs of the appeal as the said court thiuks fit. (6) The variation or quashing of an order of suspension on appeal shall take effect as from the date on which the order is so varied or quashed, and not as from the date of the order. (7) Every judgment or conviction in respect of which any such order of suspension is made shall be subject to appeal to the court of arbitra- tion, whether on a point of law or fact, whatever may be the amount of that judgment or of the fine imposed by that conviction. Part II. — Enforcement of Awards and Industrial Agreements. Ap;)iication of SECTION 12. This part of this act applies to all awards and industrial provisions. agreements whether made before or after the commencement of this act, and to all breaches of awards or industrial agreements whether committed before or after the commencement of this act, save that all proceedings for the enforcement of any award or industrial agreement which are pending at the commencement of this act may be continued in the same manner as if this act had not been passed. Penalties. Sec. 13. (1) Every industrial union, industrial association, or employer who commits a breach of an award or industrial agreement shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding JEIOO ($486.65) in respect of every such breach. (2) Every worker who commits a breach of an award or industrial agreement shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £5 ($24.33) in respect of every such breach. Recovery Sec. 14. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 21 hereof, every of penalties. sudi penalty shall be recoverable by action in a magistrate's court, and not otherwise. (2) Every such action may be brought in any magistrate's court in any industrial district in which the award or industrial agreement is in force or in which the cause of action or any part thereof arose, and shall be heard and determined by a magistrate only. (3) Every such action may be brought at the suit of an inspector of awards or at the suit of any party to the award or industrial agreement. (4) A claim for two or more penalties against the same defendant may be joined in the same action, although the aggregate amount so claimed may be in excess of the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court in an ordinary action for the recovery of money. (5) No court fees shall be payable in respect of any such action. ^6) No industrial union or industrial association shall be capable of bringing any such action until a resolution to that effect has been MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS NEW ZEALAND. 285 passed at a meeting of the members of the union or association, in accordance with the rules thereof. (7) In every such action the summons shall be served on the defend- ant at least five clear days before the day of the hearing of the action. Sec. 15. Unless within two clear days before the day of the hearing .Defendant to of any such action the defendant delivers to the plaintiff or to the^'^^"" ™- clerk of the magistrate's court a notice of his intention to defend the action he shall not be entitled to defend the same except with the leave of the magistrate, and the magistrate may without hearing evidence give judgment for the plaintiff. Sec. 16. In any such action the magistrate may give judgment for Powers of the total amount claimed, or any greater or less amount as he thinks ™as>strate. fit (not exceeding in respect of any one breach the maximum penalty hereinbefore prescribed), or, if he is of opinion that the breach proved against the defendant is trivial or excusable, the action may be dis- missed, and in any case he may give such judgment as to costs as he thinks fit. Sec 17. (1) Every penalty recovered in any such action shall be Application of recovered by the plaintiff to the use of the Crown^ and the amount P^^^^'^'' "^^oov- thereof shall, when received by the plaintiff, be paid into the public account. (2) When the plaintiff is any person other than an inspector of awards the amount of the penalty shall be paid into court or to an inspector of awards and not to the plaintiff, and shall thereupon be paid by the clerk of the court or by the said inspector into the public account. Sec 18. In any such action the magistrate may, if he thinks fit, be- Magistratemay fore giving judgment, state a case for the opinion of the court of arbi- ^*^** ''^^' tration and may thereupon adjourn the hearing or determination of the action. Sec 19 (as amended by act No. 33, 1911). (1) Any party to any such Appeal to court action may, if the amount of the claim is not lessthan£5 ($24.33), appeal of arbitration, to the court of arbitration against the judgment of the magistrate in that action. (2) Except as provided by this section, there shall be no appeal from the judgment of the magistrate in any such action. - (3) On any appeal under this section the court of arbitration shall have the same powers as the supreme court has in respect of an appeal from a magistrate's court, and the determination of the court of arbi- tration shall be final. (4) In respect of any such appeal sections 153 to 158 and sections 160 and 161 of the magistrates' courts act, 1908, shall (subject to the provisions of this section) apply, and shall be read as if the references therein to the supreme court were references to the court of arbitration. (5) No such action shall be removed into the supreme court. Sec. 20. The judgment in any such action shall be enforceable in . Enforcement of the same manner as a judgment for debt or damages in the magistrate's .J™g™ent. court, and in no other manner: Provided, That, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in section 27 of the wages protection and contractors' hens act, 1908, where appli- cation is made in pursuance of any such judgment for the attachment of the wages of any worker an order of attachment may be made in respect of the surplus of his wages above the sum of £2 (19.73) a week in the case of a worker who is married or is a widower or widow with children, or above the sum of £1 ($4.87) a week in the case of any other worker: Provided also, That, for the purpose of any such application for attachment, all wages which may at any time thereafter become due to the judgment debtor by any employer, although they are not yet earned or owing, and whether they become due in respect of any con- tract of service existing at the time of the application or made at any later time, shall be deemed to be a debt accruing to the judgment debtor within the meaning of the provisions of the magistrates' courts act, 1908, relating to the attachment of debts; and on the making of any order of attachment in respect of such wages the employer shall pay into court from time to time as those wages become due and paya- 286 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Recovery penalties. Procedure. ble Buch sum as is sufficient to satisfy the charge imposed thereon by the order of attachment: Provided also, That no charge upon or assignment of his wages, when- ever or however made, by any worker shall have any force whatever to defeat or affect an attachment, and an order of attachment may be made and shall have effect as if no such charge or assignment existed: Provided also, That no proceedings shall be taken under the imprison- ment for debt limitation act, 1908, agaiiist any person for failing or refusing to pay any penalty or other sum of money due by him under this act. . . i Sec. 21. (1) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, any action for the recovery of a penalty under this act may be brought by an inspector of awards in the court of arbitration instead of in a magis- trate's court. (2) The decision of the court of arbitration in any such action shall be final. (3) The procedure in actions so brought in the court of arbitration shall be determined by regulations to be made by the governor in council in pursuance of this act. (4) The provisions of sections 15, 16 and 17 of this act shall, so far as applicable, extend and apply to any action so brought in the court of arbitration, and shall in respect of any such action be read as if every reference in those sections to a magistrate was a reference to the court of arbitration, and as if every reference therein to the clerk of the magistrate's court was a reference to the registrar of the court of arbi- tration. (5) A certificate of the judgment of the court of arbitration in any such action, under the hand of the registrar of that court, specifying the amount payable under the judgment and the parties thereto, may be filed in any magistrate's court or magistrates' courts, and the said judgment shall thereupon be deemed to be a judgment duly recovered in an action for a penalty under this act in the court or in each of the courts in which a certificate has been so filed, and shall be enforceable in all respects accordingly. Governor may Sec. 22. The governor may by order in council make regulations, makeregulations. consistent with ttds act, prescribing the procedure in actions broi^ht under the foregoing provisions of this act and in appeals to the court of arbitration. Enforcement o£ Sbc. 23. When an order for the payment of money is made by the ot^oourt' '" ^ * ^ court of arbitration, and no other provisions for the enforcement of that order are contained in this act or in the principal act, a certificate under the hand of the registrar of the said court, specifying the amount payable and the persons by and to whom it is payable, may be filed in any magistrate's court, and shall thereupon be enforceable in the like manner as a judgment given by the last-mentioned court in an action for the recovery of a debt. Judgment re- Sec. 24. If in any action judgment is given under the foregoing membera of urSon provisions of this act, whether by a magistrate's court or by the court or association, of arbitration, against an industrial union or industrial association, and is not fully satisfied within one month thereafter, all persona who were members of the said industrial union or industrial association at the time when the offense was committed in respect of which the judgment was given shall be jointly and severally liable on the judgment in the same maimer as if it had been obtained against them personally, and all proceedings in execution or otherwise in pursuance of the judgment may be taken against them or any of them accordingly, save that no person shall be liable under this section for a larger sum than £5 ($24.33). Unsatisfied Sec. 25. Judgment recovered at the suit of any person for a penalty fc^MtioS" *under this act shaU not, untU and unless it is fully satisfied, be a bar to any other action at the suit of any other plaintiff for the recovery of the same penalty. Action within Sec. 26. No_ action shall be commenced for the recovery of any pen- alty under this act save within six months after the cause of action six months. MINIMUM- WAGE LAWS NEW ZEALAND. 287 Part III. — Conciliation. Section 27. (1) After the commencement of this act no industrial PassinK of oon- dispute shall be referred to any board of conciliation under the prin- """»'""^ ""^'is. cipal act. (2)_ In the case of an industrial dispute which at the commencement of this act has already been referred to a board of conciliation, further proceedings for the settlement of that dispute shall be taken in the same manner as if this act had not been passed. (3) After the commencement of this act no person shall be elected or appointed aa a member of a board of conciliation; and all persons theretofore so elected or appointed shall retbe from office on the expira- tion of the term for which they were elected or appointed. Sec. 28. (1) After the commencement of this act no industrial dis- Disputes re- pute shall be referred to the court until it has been first referred to a S"oncmatiJu°"^ council of conciliation in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) Every party to a dispute so referred to a council of conciliation shall be either an industrial union, an industrial association, or an employer. Sec. 29. (1) The governor may from time to time appoint such per- Appointment sons as he thinks fit (not exceeding four in number) as conciliation comn3ssioners°" commissioners (hereinafter referred to as "commissioners") to exer- cise the powers and jurisdiction hereinafter set forth. (2) Every commissioner shall be appointed for a period of three years, but may be reappointed from time to time, and may at any tune be removed from office by the governor. (3) Every commissioner shall exercise his jurisdiction within such industrial district or districts as may be from time to time assigned to him by the governor by order in council. (4) Everjr commissioner shall receive such salary or other remu- neration as is from time to time appropriated by Parliament for that purpose. (5) If on or before the expiry of the term of office of any commissioner he is reappointed to that office, all proceedings pending before him or before any council of conciliation of which he is a member may be con- tinued and completed as if he had held office continuously. (6) If from any cause any commissioner is unable to act, the gov- ernor may appoint some other person to act in his stead during the con- tinuance of such inability, and while so acting the person so appointed shall have all the powers and jurisdiction of the commissioner in whose stead he is acting. (7) If any commissioner dies or resigns his office, or is removed from office, or if his term of office expires without reappointment, all pro- ceedings then pending before him or before any council of conciliation of which he is a member may be continued before his successor or before the said council, as the case may be, and for this purpose his successor shall be deemed to be a member of that council, and all the powers and jurisdiction vested in the first-mentioned commissioner as a member of that council shall vest in his successor accordingly. (8) When in any case no commissioner is immediately available to deal with any dispute which has arisen, the governor may appoint some person to act as a commissioner for the purpose of dealing with such dispute, and while so acting the person so appointed shall have all the powers and jurisdiction of a commissioner, and any commissioner so appointed shall be paid such fees as may be fixed by regulation. (9) No appointment made in pursuance or intended pursuance of subsection five or subsection seven of this section shall in any court or in any proceedings be questioned or invalidated on the ground that due occasion for the appointment has not arisen or has ceased. Sec. 30. (1) Any industrial union, industrial association, or em- Application to ployer, being a party to an industrial dispute, may make application comciloF"onoUi° in the prescribed form to the commissioner exercising jurisdiction ation. within the industrial district in which the dispute has arisen that the dispute may be heard by a council of conciliation ._ (2) No such application shall be made by an industrial union or industrial association unless the proposed application has been ap- 288 BULLETIN" OP THE BTJEEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. proved by the members in manner provided by section one hundred and seven of the principal act. (3) Two or more industrial unions, industrial associations, or em- ployers may join in making a joint application in respect of the same dispute. A) Every application made under this section shall state: (a) The name of the union, association, or employer making the application (hereinafter, together with any other unions, associations, or employers subsequently joined as applicants, termed "the appli- cants"); (6) The name of all industrial unions, industrial associations, and employers whom the applicants desire to be made parties to the pro- ceedings (hereinafter, tog:ether with any other unions, associations, or employers subsequently joined as respondents, termed "the respond- ents"); (c) A general statement of the natme of the dispute; (d) A detailed statement of the claims made by the applicants against the respondents in the matter of the dispute; (e) The proposed number of persons (being either one, two, or three) whom the applicants desire to be appointed on the reco mm endation of the applicants as assessors to sit with the commissioner in the hear- ing and settlement of the dispute; (/) The names of the persons so recommended by the applicants; (5) Every person so recommended as an assessor must be or have been actually and bona fide engaged or employed either as an einployer or as a worker in the industry, or in any one of the industries, in respect of which the dispute has arisen (whether in the same or in another indus- trial district) : Provided, That if in any case, by reason of the special circumstances of that case, the commissioner is of opinion that it is impracticable or inexpedient that all the assessors should be persons so qualified, he may appoint as one of their assessors, on the recommendTation of the applicants, a person who is not so qualified. (6) Any person so recommended as an assessor may be one of the par- ties to the dispute, or may be a member of an industrial union or indus- trial association which is a party to the dispute. (7) If the commissioner to whom the application is made is of opinion that any person so recommended is not duly qualified in accordance with this act, he shall reject the recommendation, and the applicants shall then recommend some other qualified person in his place. The provisions of subsection 2 of this section shall not apply to any such substituted recommendation. The decision of the commissioner as to the qualification of any person recommended as an assessor shall be final. (8) If and as soon as the commissioner is satisfied that the proposed number of qualified persons h&ve been so recommended by the appli- cants, he shall by writing under his hand appoint those persons as asses- sors for the purpose of the said application. Hearing dis- Sec. 31. So soon as assessors have been nominated in manner afore- P" ^" said the commissioner shall appoint a day and place for the hearing of the dispute, and shall in the prescribed form and manner cite the re- spondents to attend at the hearing thereof, and in the meantime to recommend qualified persons for appointment as assessors at the said hearing, equal in number to the number so appointed on the recommen- dati-on of the applicants. Qualification _ Sbc. 32 (as amended by act No. 33, 1911). (1) The foregoing provi- o?asses5ors'. ™ sions as to the qualification of assessors recommended by the applicants shall also apply to assessors recommended by the respondents. (2) If the commissioner is of opinion that any person so recommended by the respondents is not duly qualified in accordance with this act he shall reject the recommendation, and shall require the respondents to recom m end some other qualified person, and so also in the case of any such subsequent recommendation, and the decision of the commissioner as to the qualification of any person so recommended shall be final. (3) If and as soon as the commissioner is satisfied that qualified per- sons to the required number have been recommended by the respond- MINIMUM- WAGE LAWS NEW ZEALAND. 289 ents lie shall by writing under his hand appoint those persons as asses- sors for the purposes of the appUcation. (4) Unless the respondents recommend the required number of qual- ified persons as assessors at least three clear days before the day ap- pointed for the heaimg of the dispute, the commissioner shall forthwith appoint on behalf of the respondents such number of qualified persons as is necessary to supply the full number of assessors required. (5) The recommendation of assessors by the respondents shall be in wntmg, signed by or on behalf of the respondents. If they can not agree in the recommendation of assessors, separate recommendations may be made by the several respondents, and in that case the commis- sioner may appoint as assessors such of the qualified persons so recom- mended as he thinks fit. Sec. 33. (1) On the appointment of assessors in accordance with the Constitution of foregoing provisions, the commissioner together with the said assessors "ouncil. shall be and constitute a council of concihation (hereinafter referred to as the council), having the powers and functions hereinafter provided. (2) The assessors shall be entitled to receive out of the consolidated fimd such fees as are prescribed by regulations. (3) The validity or regularity of the appointment of any assessor by a commissioner shall not be questioned in any court or in any proceed- ings. Sec. 34. (1) If at any time before the council has completely exer- Vacancy In cised the powers vested in it by this act any assessor dies, or resigns his "o'™*'^- office, or is proved to the satisfaction of the commissioner to be unable by reason of sickness or any other cause to act as assessor, the commis- sioner may, on the recommendation of the applicants or respondents, as the case may be, appoint some other qualified person as an assessor in Ueu of the assessor so dying or resigning his office or becoming imable to act. (2) If the applicants or respondents, as the case may be, can not agree on any such recommendation, they may make separate recom- mendations, and the commissioner may thereupon appoint as an assessor such one of the qualified persons so recommended as he thinks fit. (3) The powers and functions of the council shall not be affected by any such vacancy in the number of assessors, and during any such vacancy the council may, so far as it thinks fit so to do, exercise all its powers and functions in the same manner as if it were fully constituted. Sec. 85. (1) It shall be the duty of the council to endeavor to bring Powers and du- about a settlement of the dispute, and to this end the council shall, in "^ council, such maimer as it thinks fit, expeditiously and carefully inquire into the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settle- ment thereof. (2) In the course of the inquiry the council shall make all such sug- gestions and do all such things as it deems right and proper for inducing the parties to eome to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. (3) The procedure of the council shall in all respects be absolutely in the discretion of the council, and the council shall not be bound to proceed with the inquiry in any formal manner, or formally to sit as a tribunal, or to hear any addresses or evidence save such as the council deems necessary or desirable. (4) The council may on the inquiry hear any evidence that it thinks fit, whether such evidence would be legally admissible in a court of law or not. (5) The inquiry shall be either public or private, as the council thinks fit. (6) Meetings of the council shall be held from time to time at such time and at such places within the industrial district in which the dis- pute has arisen as the commissioner appoints. (7) No such meeting shall be duly constituted unless the commis- sioner is present thereat, but the absence of any of the assessors, shall not prevent the exercise by the council of any of its powers or functions. (8) In all matters other than the making of a recommendation for the settlement of a dispute the decision of a majority of the assessors present at a meeting of the council shall be deemed to be the decision of the council, but if the assessors present are equally divided in opinion the 82843°— Bull. 167—15 19 290 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. commissioner shall have a casting vote, and the decision of the council shall be determined accordingly. (9) A record of the proceedings of every council of conciliation shall be made and preserved in manner prescribed by regulations, or^ in default of such regulations, in such manner as the commissioner thinks fit. (10) The commissioner shall have the same power of summoning wit- nesses and of taking evidence on oath, and of requiring the production of books and papers, as if the inquiry were the hearing of a complaint heard before a justice of the peace under the justices of the peace act, 1908, and all evidence given on oath before the council shall for all purposes be deemed to have been given in a judicial proceeding before a court of competent JTirisdiction. (11) No person shall be bound at any inquiry before the coimdl to give evidence with regard to trade secrets, profits, losses, receipts, or outgoings in Ms business, or with respect to his financial position, or to produce the books kept by him in connection with his business. (12) If any person desu-es to give any such evidence as is mentioned in the last preceding subsection, or to produce any such books as afore- said, he may, if the commissioner thinks fit, do so in the presence of the commissioner alone sitting without the assessors; and in such case the commissioner shall not disclose to the assessor, or to any other per- son, the particulars of the evidence so given or of the books so produced, but may inform the assessors whether or not, in his opinion, any claim or allegation made by the applicants or respondents in the inquiry is sub- stantiated by the said evidence or the said books. Parties to dis- Sec. 36. (1) An employer being a party to the dispute may appear Eetorecounof '^"^ before the council in person, or by his agent duly appointed in writing in that behalf. (2) An industrial union or industrial association being a party to a dispute may appear before the council by its chairman or secretary, or by any number of persons (not exceeding three) appointed in writing by the chairman, or appointed in such other manner as its rules prescribe. (3) No barrister or solicitor, whether acting under a power of attorney or otherwise, shall be allowed to appear or be heard before the council. Absence of par- Sec. 37. If any or all of the applicants or respondents fail or refuse *'^' to attend or to be represented at liie inquiry,, the council may neverthe- less proceed with the inquiry in the same manner so far as practicable as if all the said parties were present or represented. Commissiraer Sbc. 38. The commissioner may at any time before or during the ou?pmSS! ^ inquiry make an order joining any industrial union, industrial associa- tion, or employer as an applicant or respondent, or striking out the name of any industrial union, industrial association, or employer as an appli- cant or respondent. Terms of settle- Sec. 39. If a settlement of the dispute is arrived at by the parties in dusWa? ""^^ ^^^ course of the inquiry, the terms of the settlement shall be set forth ment. as an industrial agreement, which shall be duly executed by the parties or their attorneys, and all the provisions of the principal act and of this act with respect to industrial agreements shall apply to any such agree- ment accordingly. Provisional ar- Sec. 40. If no settlement of the dispute is arrived at by the parties rangemen . |jj ^j^g gg^ygg gf ^j^g inquiry, the council shall endeavor to induce the parties to agree to some temporary and provisional arrangement until the dispute can be determined by the court of arbitration. Voluntary set- Sec. 41. The commissioner may at any time, if he thinks fit, after ®^™ • application has been made to him under section 30 of this act, and whether assessors have been appointed or not, take such steps as he deems advisable, whether by way of a conference between the ap- plicants and respondents or otherwise, with intent to procure a volun- tary settlement of the dispute. „™ tn^^otHA 'rt/'" ^^'^- ^2- (1) ^°* earUer than one month or later than two months pute after the date fixed in pursuance of section 30 hereof for the hearing of the dispute, the council shall, unless a settlement of the dispute has been sooner arrived at by the parties and embodied in an in- dustrial agreement duly executed in manner aforesaid, deliver to the clerk of awards for the industrial district in which the dispute has arisen a notification under the hand of the commissioner that on settlement of the dispute has been arrived at. MINIMUM- WAGE LAWS NEW ZEALAND. 291 (2) The notification shall be accompanied by a copy of the applica- tion made to the council by the applicants, together with a record 01 the proceedings of the council, every such copy and record being under the hand of the commissioner. Sec. 43. (1) Before dehvering any such notification to the clerk of Recommenda- awards the council may make such recommendation for the settle- ""^ °' •^""""U- ment of the dispute according to the merits and substantial justice of the case as the council thinks fit, and may state in the recommendation whether, in the opinion of the council, the failure of the parties to arrive at a settleruent was due to the unreasonableness or unfairness of any of the parties to the dispute. (2) No such recommendation shall be made unless it is unanimously agreed to by all the assessors, and the commissioner shall have no vote in respect of the making or nature of any such recommendation. (3) The recommendation of the council shall be signed by all the assessors, and shall be delivered to the clerk of awards under the hand of the commissioner, together with the notification. (4) The recommendation of the council shall be pubhahed by the clerk of awards in such manner as may be prescribed. (5) The recommendation of the council shall in no case have any binding force or effect, but shall operate merely as a suggestion for the amicable settlement of the dispute by mutual agreement, and as a public announcement of the opinion of the council as to titie merits of the dispute. Sec 44. (1) If beforfe the delivery of the notification of the council Memorandum to the clerk of awards as aforesaid a partial settlement of the dispute menf '*' settle- is arrived at by aU the parties thereto, the terms of that partial settle- ment may be reduced to writing, executed by all the parties thereto or their attorneys or representatives; and such writing (hereinafter termed a memorandum of partial settlement) shall be delivered by the council to the clerk of awards, together with the notification afore- said and the recommendation (if any_) made by the council. (2) No such memorandum of partial settlement shall in itself have any binding force or effect, but the court of arbitration may, if it • thinks fit, in making its award in accordance with the provisions here- inafter contained in that behalf, incorporate iu the award the terms of the said memorandum, or any of those terms, without making in- quiry into the matters to which those terms relate. Sec. 45. The council may at any time state a case for the advice Council may or opinion of the court of arbitration. ™'^ ''^''• Sec 47i (1) When an industrial dispute has been referred to the Powers of court in pursuance of this, act the court shall have the same jurisdic- "<""■'■ tion in the matter of that dispute as if the same had been referred to the court by the applicants in pursuance of the principal act after a reference to a board of conciliation, and all the provisions of the principal act shall, so far as applicable, apply accordingly. (2) Subject to the provisions of the principal act as to the joinder or striking out of parties, the parties to the proceedings before the court shall be the same as in the proceedings before the council. Sec. 49. The governor may from time to time, by order in council. Regulations, make such regulations as he deems necessary for carrying this part of this act into effect. Sec. 50 (as amended by act No. 33, 1911). (1) The following sections Provisions of of the principal act (referring to boards of conciUation) shall extend Sg" to coSnl and apply to councils of conciliation under this act — namely, sections cife. 108, 113, 114, 115, and 120. (2) In those sections every reference to a board shall be read as a reference to a council of conciliation. (3) For the purposes of those sections a dispute shall be deemed to have been referred to a council of conciliation so soon as the council is fully constituted in accordance with this act. Sec. 61. When any payment of wages has been made to and accepted AoMptance of by a worker at a less rate than that which is fixed by any award or ^f^^ industrial agreement no action shall be brought by the worker agamst his employer to recover the difference between the wages so actually paid and the wages legally payable, save within three months after the day on which the wages claimed in the action became due and payable. 292 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Certiflcate of Sec. 62. Where by any award or induetrial agreement the age at a p?oof M^r whicli young persons' may be employed is limited, or the wages payable to young persons of certain ages are fixed, then, in so far as the em- ployer is concerned, it shall be sufficient proof of the age of any young person desiring employment if he produces to the employer a certificate of age granted by an official of the labor department; and in any pro- ceedings against an employer who has acted in reliance on any such certificate for a breach of the award or industrial agreement the cer- tificate shall be conclusive proof of the age of the young person so employed. Copy of award Sec. 63. (1) In tbe case of any factory or shop to which any award to be posted. ^j, jjKjugtnal agreement relates a printed or typewritten copjr of the award or industrial agreement shall at all times be kept affixed in some conspicuous place at or near the entrance of the factory or shop, in such a position as to be easily read by the persons employed therein. (2) For any breach of the provisions of this section the occupier of the said factory or shop shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £5 ($24.33) on summary conviction on the information of an inspector of awards. (3) In this section the terms "factory" and "shop" have the same meanings as. in the factories act, 1908, and the shops and offices act, 1908, respectively. p e r m i t s for Seg. 65. Where in any award or industrial agreement made before workers'^ ^ ^ the commencement of this act provision is made for the issue by the chairman of a board of conciliation or in any other manner which is rendered impracticable by the provisions of this act of permits to workers to accept a wage below that prescribed for ordinary workers, all such permits may be granted by an inspector of awards in manner provided by section 123 of the principal act. Extension of Sec. 67. Whenever it is proved to the court that an industrial agree- dustrSl'"'' agreed Dient (whether made before or after the commencement of this act) is ment. binding on employers who employ a majority of the workers in the industry to which it relates in the industrial district in which it was made, the court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of any party _ to that agreement or of any person bound thereby, make an order ex- tending the operation of that agreement to all employers who are or who at any time after the making of the said order become engaged in the said industry in the said district, and all such employers shall there- upon be deemed to be parties to the said agreement, and shall be bound thereby so long as it remains in force. Validation of Sbc. 68. (1) If anything which is required or authorized to be done proceetungs, etc. ^y ^.j^g principal act or by this act is not done within the time limited for the doing thereof, or is done informally, the court of arbitration may, if it thinks fit in its discretion, on the application of any person interested, make an order extending the time within which the thing may be done, or validating the thing so informally done. (2) Nothing in this section shall apply so as to authorize the court of arbitration to make any such order in respect of judicial proceedings theretofore aheady instituted in any court other than the court of arbi- tration. Awards prevail Seo. 69. Every award or industrial agreement shall prevail over any over con rao . contract of service or apprenticeship in force on the coming into oper- ation of the award or industrial agreement so far as there is any incon- sistency between the award or industrial agreement and the contract; and the contract shall thereafter be construed and have effect as if the same had been modified, so far as necessary, in order to conform to the award or industrial agreement. da^ofiwM^ ^ ?^°- ^^- ■'■? '''^^l^g its award the court may, if in its discretion it thinks fit, direct that any provision of the award relating to the rate of wages to be paid shall have effect as from such date prior to the date of the award as the court thinks fit. aJarfsan'daere" ^^"^ '^^- ^° ^""^^^ °^ industrial agreement made after the com- ments apply mencement of this act shall affect the employment of any worker who is employed otherwise than for the direct or indirect pecuniary gain of the employer: Provided, That this section shall not be deemed to exempt any local authority or body corporate from the operation of any award or indus- trial agreement. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS NEW ZEALAND. 293 Sec. 72. When an industrial dispute has been referred to the court, Court may re- the court may, if it considers that for any reason an award ought not to ™^_^ *° ™^'=« bemademthematterof that dispute, refuse to make an award therein. Sec. 73. (1) Notwithstanding anything in section 21 of the principal r»T,PBii,,«o^ < act, the cancellation under that section of the registration of an indus- registatton trial union shall not be prevented by the pendency of any conciliation or arbitration proceedings, if the application for cancellation haa been made to the registrar before the commencement of the said proceedings. (2) The said section and this section shall extend and apply to con- cihation proceedings before a council of conciliation under this act. (3) For the purposes of this section conciliation proceedings before a council of concihation shall be deemed to have commenced so soon as the commissioner has appointed assessors on the recommendation of the applicants, and shall be deemed to have ceased so soon as the notifica^ tion of the council has been delivered to the clerk of awards, or the dispute has been settled by an industrial agreement. (4) For the purposes of the said section and this section arbitration proceedings shall be deemed to be pending and in progress so soon as the notification of the council has been delivered to the clerk of awards. Sec. 74. (1) The provisions of an award or industrial agreement shall Effect of subse. continue in force until the expiration of the period for which it was 1"®''* legislation. made, notwithstanding that before such expiration any provision in- consistent with the award or industrial agreement is made by any act passed after the commencement of this act, unless in that act the con- trary is expressly provided. (2) On the expiration of the said period the award or industrial agreement shall, during its further subsistence, be deemed to be modi- fied in accordance with the law then in force. INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION ACT, 1911, NO. 33. Section 2. Where the registration of a union or association is can- Cancellation of celed for the purpose of the issue of a fresh certificate or of the union or to^ affleot" awa"d' association being registered under a new name, such cancellation shall etc. ' not affect the operation of any award or industrial agreement in force to which the original union or association was a party. Sec. 3. Where it is proved to the court that an industrial agreement Industrial (whether made before or after the commencement of this act] is binding bl^^Sade tato on employers who employ a majority of the workers in the industry to award. which it relates in the industrial district in which it was made, the court shall, on the application of any of the parties to the agreement, declare the same to be an award unless, in the opinion of the court, such agreement is, by reason of its provisions, against the public good or is in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. Sec. 4. (1) Notwitlistanding anything to the contrary in the prin- . Dispute cover- cipal act, an industrial association of employers or workers may make in|™tr^i ^S application to the court in the first instance for an award to apply to triot. more than one industrial district. (2) The application shall contain the particulars mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection four of section 30 of the industrial conciliation and arbitration amendment act, 1908, and such of the provisions of that section as are applicable shall extend and apply accordingly. (3) The application shall be filed with the clerk of awards in each of the industrial districts in which the award is intended to apply. (4) Notice of the application shall be given in the prescribed form to the parties who it is intended shall be bound by the award. (5) The application shall be heard at such place or places as the parties may agree on, or, in default of such agreement, as the court, on the application of any party after notice in lie prescribed form to the other parties to the clispute, directs. , ,. (6) THie court may, if it thinks fit, make an award upon such appli- cation, and that award shall bind as parties all trades-unions, in- dustrial unions, industrial associations, and employers in all or one or more of the industrial districts for which the application has been filed. 294 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Counter pro- Sec. 5. (1) Not later than three cleax days before the hearing of a posaltobelodged. dispute the respondents shall lodge with the commissioner a statement in detail admitting such of the claims of the applicants as they desire to admit, or making a counter-proposal with respect to the claims of the applicants or some or one of 1h.em, and a copy of that statement shall be sent to the applicants by the commissioner. (2) On the hearing of ihe dispute no counter-proposal by the re- spondents shall be considered other than those contained in the said statement except with the leave of the commissioner on such terms and conditions as he deems just. (3) This section shall extend and apply with the necessary modi- fications to a dispute brought before the court in the first instance pursuant to section four of this act. Provision for Sbc. 6. Notwithstanding anything in section 92 of the principal act, S.'cOTtoto cS"^^ ^^^ court may, on the application of any party to an award, extend the award so as to join and biud as parties thereto all trade-unions, indus- trial unions, industrial associations, and employers in New Zealand who are connected with or engaged in the same industry as that to which the award applies: Provided, That llie court shall not act under this section unless it is satisfied that the conditions of employment or of trade are such as make it equitable to do so. Procedure Sec. 7 (as amended by act No. 7, 1913). (1) When a recommendar ment* is''arr^ed ^°^ °^ ^ council of conciliation is filed with the clerk of awards to- at. gether with the notification that no settlement has been arrived at, the clerk shall, as soon as practicable, give notice in the prescribed form to the parties to the dispute of the fiung of the recommendation and of the place where it may be seen, and requiring them if they disagree with the recommendation to signify their disagreement within one month, and, if they so desire, to state reasons for such disagreement. (2) If within the time aforesaid no notice of disagreement has been filed, the clerk shall as soon as possible thereafter give notice in the prescribed form to the parties of the fact, and the recommendation shall, as from seven days after the date of that notice, operate and be enforceable in the same manner as an industrial agreement duly exe- cuted and filed by the parties; and the clerk shall indorse the recom- mendation accorcungly. (3) If any party to the dispute duly signifies his disagreement with the recommendation, the dispute shaU be referred by the clerk to the court for settlement, and thereupon the dispute shall be before the court, and the court may, after hearing any of the parties that have signified their disagreement, incorporate the terms of the recommenda- tion in an award. (4) If it appears to the court that any reason given for disagreement with the recommendation is trivial or frivolous, it may disregard such disagreement, and the parties so disagreeing shall be deemed to have concurred in the recommendation. (5) Where a notification that no settlement has been arrived at has been deKvered to the clerk of awards and the council makes no recom- mendation for the settlement of the dispute, the clerk shall forthwith refer the dispute to the court for settlement, and thereupon the dispute shall be deemed to be before the court. reSteir'to the ^^°- ^- ^^ *^^ ^^^^^ "^ ^^^^^ ^^^°g ^° registrar, or of his absence, all cotirt to refer to references m the principal act to the registrar to the court shall here- olerk ot awards, after be deemed to be references to the clerk of awards of the industrial district to which the subject-matter relates. oontedtv°with • ^^^'-.l^'- No award of the court shall contain any provision that is statutory provi- inconsistent with any statute which makes special provision for any of sions. the matters before the court. ti^sl'Si'thecourt ^^^°- ^ -■ ^ ^"i"g °* *^e court shall be held in the cities of Auckland, ^ ■- Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin at least once in every three months to deal with any disputes which have been referred to the court. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS GREAT BRITAIN. 295 GREAT BRITAIN. TRADE BOARDS ACT, 1909. An Act to provide for the establishment of trade boards for certain trades. \20th October, 1909.] ESTABLISHMENT OP TRADE BOARBS FOR TRADES TO WHICH THE ACT APPLIES. Section 1. (1) This act shall apply to the trades specified in the Application of scheduletothisactand toanyothertradestowhichithasbeenapplied f\ '° certain by provisional order of the Board of Trade made under this gection. "^aes. (2) The Board of Trade may make a provisional order applying this act to any specified trade to which it does not at the time apply if they aresatisfied that the rate of wages prevailing in any branch of the trade is exceptionally low, as compaied with that in other employments, and that the other circumstances of the trade are such as to render the application of this act to the trade expedient. (3) If at any time the Board of Trade consider that the conditions of employment in any trade to which this act applies have been so altered as to render the application of this act to the trade unnecessary, they may make a provisional order that this act shall cease to apply t» that trade. (4) The Board of Trade may submit to ParKament for confirmation any provisional order made by them in pursuance of this section, but no such order shall have effect unless and until it is confirmed by Par- liament. (5) If, while a bill confirming any such order is pending in either house of Parliament, a petition is presented against any order com- prised therein, the bill, so far as it relates to that order, may be referred to a select committee, or, if the two houses of Parliament think fit so to order, to a joint committee of those houses, and the petitioner shall be allowed to appear and oppose as in the case of private bills. (6) Any act confirming a provisional order made in pursuance of this section may be repealed, altered, or amended by any subsequent pro- visional order made by the Board of Trade and confirmed by Parliament. Sec. 2. (1) The board of trade shall, if practicable, establish one or Establishment more trade boards constituted in accordance with regulations made "gr trades to under this act for any trade to which this act applies or for any branch whicli act applies. of work in the trade. Where a trade board is established under this act for any trade or branch of work in a trade which is carried on to any substantial extent in Ireland, a separate trade board shall be established for that trade or branch of work in a trade in Ireland. (2) Where a trade board has been established for any branch of work in a trade, any reference in this act to the trade for which the board is established shall be construed as a reference to the branch of work in the trade for which the board has been established. Sec 3. A trade board for any trade shall consider, as occasion re- ,9*°^^?) duties quires, any matter referred to themby a secretary of state, the Board of °'™'^^''°^™^- Trade, or any other Government department, with reference to the industrial conditions of the trade, and shall make a report upon the matter to the department by whom the question has been referred. MINIMUM RATES OE WAGES. Sec. 4. (1) Trade boards shall, subject to the provisions of this sec- Duties and tion, fix minimum rates of wages for time work for their trades (in this |oMds with r^ act referred to as minimum time rates), and may also fix general mini- spect to mini- mum rates of wages for piecework for their trades (in this act referred to mum rates ol as general minimum piece rates) , and those rates of wages (whether time ™^^- or piece rates) may be fixed so as to apply universally to the trade, or so as to apply to any special process in the work of the trade or to any special c&ss of workers in the trade, or to any special area. 296 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OE LABOR STATISTICS. If a trade board report to the Board of Trade that it is impracticable in any case to fix a minimum time rate in accordance with this sec- tion, the Board of Trade miay so far as respects that case relieve the trade board of their duty. (2) Before fixing any minimum time rate or general minimum piece rate, the trade board shall give notice of the rate which they propose to to fix and consider any objections to the rate which may be lodged with them within three months. (3) The trade board shall give notice of any minimum time rate or general minimum piece rate fixed by them. (4J A trade board may, if they thini it expedient, cancel or vary any minimum time rate or general minimum piece rate fixed under this act, and shall reconsider any such minimum rate if the Board of Trade direct them to do so, whether an application is made for the purpose or not: Pronded, That the provisions of this section as to notice shall apply where it is proposed to cancel or vary the minimum rate fixed under the foregoing provisions in the same manner as they apply where it is proposed to fix a minimum rate. (5) A trade board shall on the application of any employer fix a special minimum piece rate to apply as respects the persons employed by him in cases to which a minimum time rate but no general minimum piece rate is applicable, and may as they thinlc fit cancel or vary any such rate either on the application of the employer or after notice to the employer, such notice to be given not less than one month before can- cellation or variation of any such rate. Order giTOig Sec. 5. (1) Until a minimum time rate or general minimum piece to '^^*°SmmuS ■'^t* fi^ed by a trade board has been made obligatory by order of the rates of wages. Board of Trade under this section, the operation of the rate shall be limited as in this act provided. (2) Upon the expiration of six months from the date on which a trade board have given notice of any minimum time rate or general TniniTmiTn piece rate fixed by them the Board of Trade shall make an order (in this act referred to as an obligatory order) making that minimum rate ob- ligatory in cases in which it is applicable on all persons employing labor and on all persons employed, unless they are of opinion that the circumstances are such as to make it premature or otherwise undesirable to make an obligatory order, and in that case they shall make an order suspending the obligatory operation of the rate (in this act referred to as an order of suspension). (3) \^Tiere an order of suspension has been made as respects any rate, the trade board may, at any time after the expiration of six months from the date of the order, apply to the Board of Trade for an obligatory order as respects that rate ; and on any such application the Board of Trade shall make an obligatory order as respects that rate, unless they are of opin- ion that a further order of suspension is desirable, and in that case tliey shall make such a further order, and the provisions of this section which are applicable to the first order of suspension shall apply to any such further order. An order of suspension as respects any rate shall have effect until an obligatory order is made by the Board of Trade under this section. (4) The Board of Trade may, if they think fit, make an order to apply generally as respects any rates which may be fixed by any trade board constituted or about to be constituted for any trade to which this act applies, and while the order is in force any minimum time rate or general minimum piece rate shall, after the' lapse of six months from the date on which the trade board have given notice of the fixing of the rate, be obligatory in the same manner as if the Board of Tradehad made an order making the rate obligatory under this section, unless in any particular case the Board of Trade on the application of any person inter- ested direct to the contrary. The Board of Trade may revoke any such general order atanvtime after giving three months' notice to the trade board of their intention to revoke it. paytog"wagls"ta r.^''^-^' ^^\ ^^?!"® ^"^y minimum rate of wages fixed by a trade board accordance with "^^ "een made obligatory by order of the Board of Trade under this act, minimum r a t e an employer shall, in cases to which the minimum rate is applicable, Sade oMgatoT Pf ^ '^?^?? 1° ^"^^ P^'^^^'^ employed at not less than the minimum rate ■ clear of all deductions, and if he fails to do so shall be liable on summary MINIMXTM-WAGE LAWS GKEAT BRITAIN. 297 conviction in respect of each offense to a fine not exceeding £20 (§97.33) and to aline not exceeding £5 ($24.33) for each,day on which the offense IS continued after con\dction therefor. (2) On the conviction of an employer under this section for failing to pay wages at not less than the TniTmnnm rate to a person employed, the court may by the conviction adjudge the employer convicted to pay, in addition to any fine, such sum as appears to the court to be due to the person employed on account of wages, the wages being calculated on the basis of the minimum rate, but the power to order the payment of wages under this provision shall not be in derogation of any right of the person employed to recover wages by any other proceedings. (3) If a trade board are satisfied that any worker employed, or desiring to be employed, on time work in any branch of a trade to which a minimum time rate fixed by the trade board is applicable is affected by any infirmity or physical injury which renders him incapable of earning that minimum time rate, and are of opinion that the case can not suitably be met by employing the worker on piecework, the trade board may, if they think fit, grant to the worker, subject to such conditions, if any, as they prescribe, a permit exempting the employment of the worker from the provisions of this act rendering the minimum time rate obligatory, and, while the permit is in force, an employer shall not be liable to any penalty for paying w^es to the worker at a rate less than the minimum time rate so long as any conditions prescribed by the trade board on the grant of the permit ■are complied with. (4) On any prosecution of an employer under this section, it shall lie on the employer to prove by the production of proper wages sheets or other records of wages or otherwise that he has not paid, or agreed to pay, wages at less than the minimum rate. (5) Any agreement for the payment of wages in contravention of this provision shall be void. Sec. 7. (1) Where any miTiiTmim rate of wages has been fixed by a Limited opera- trade board, but is not for the time being obligatory under an order *^°g °wSSi™hS of the Board of Trade made in pursuance of this act, the minimum rate not been made shall, unless the Board of Trade direct to the contrary in any case in obligatory, which they have directed the trade board to reconsider the rate, have a limited operation as foUows: ■ (a) In all cases to which the TniniTtimin rate is applicable an employer shall, in the absence of a written agreement to the contrary, pay to the person employed wages at not less than the minimum rate, and, in the absence of any such agreement, the person employed may recover wages at such a rate from the employer; (6) Any employer may give written notice to the tede board by whom the minimum rate has been fixed that he is willing that that rate should be obligatory on him, and in that case he shall be under the same obligation to pay wages to the person employed at iiot less than the miniTmiTn rate, and be liable to the same fine for not doing so, as he would be if an order of the Board of Trade were in force making the rate obligatory: and (c) No contract involving employment to which the minimum rate is applicable shall be given by a Government department or local authority to any employer miless he has given notice to the trade board in accordance with the foregoing provision: , m_ j Provided, That in case of any public emergency the Board of Trade may by order, to the extent and during the period named in the order, suspend the operation of this provision as respects contracts for any such work being done or to be done on behalf of the Crown as is specified in the order. . . (2) A trade board shall keep a register of any notices given under this section: . . ... , , The register shall be open to public mspection without payment ot any fee and shall be evidence of the matters stated therein; Any copy purporting to be certified by the secretary of the trade board or any officer of the trade board authorized for the purpose to be a true copy of any entry in the register shall be admissible m evi- dence without further proof. 298 EULLETIIT OP THE BTJEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Provision tor Sec. 8. An employer stall, in cases where persons are employed on em^Ioy^T™y piecework and a minimum time rate but no general minimum piece piecework rate has been fixed, be deemed to pay wages at le^ than the minimum where a mini- rate — buT'no^'general (°) ^^ cases where a special minimum piece rate has been fixed mininnun piece under the provisions of this act for persons employed by the employer, rate lias been if the rate of wages paid is less than that special minimum piece rate; (6) In cases where a special minimum piece rate has not been so fixed, unless he shows that the piece rate of wages paid would yield, in the circumstances of the case, to an ordinary worker at least the same amount of money as the minimum time rate. Prevention of Sec. 9. Any shopkeeper, dealer, or trader, who by way of trade evasion. makes any arrangement express or 'implied with any worker in pur- suance of which the worker performs any work for which a minimum rate of wages has been fixed under this act, shall be deemed for the purposes of this act to be the employer of the worker, and the net remuneration obtainable by the worker in respect of the work after allowing for his necessary expenditure in connection with the work shall be deemed to be wages. Consideration Sec. 10. (1) Any worker or any person authorized by a worker may of complaints*^ complain to the trade board that the wages paid to the worker by any to infraction of employer in any case to which any minimum rate fixed by the trade minimum rates, board is applicable are at a rate less than the minimum rate, and the trade board shall consider the matter and may, if they think fit, take any proceedings under this act on behalf of the worker. (2) Before taking any proceedings under this act on behalf of the worker, a trade board may, and on the first occasion on which pro- ceedings are contemplated by the trade board against an employer they shall take reasonable steps to bring the case to the notice of the employer, with a view to the settlement of the case without recourse to proceedings. CONSTITUTION, PROCEEDINGS, ETC., OF TRADE BOARDS. Constitution Sbc. 11. (1) The Board of Trade may make regulations with respect o? tradT^boarfs! *° *^® constitution of trade boards which shall consist of members ' representing employers and members representing workers (in this act referred to as representative members) in equal proportions alid of the appointed members. Any such regulations may be made so as to apply generally to the constitution of all trade boards, or specially to the constitution of any particular trade board or any particular class of trade boards. (2) Women shall be eligible as members of trade boards as well as men. (3) The representative members shall be elected or nominated, or partly elected and partly nominated as may be provided by the regu- lations, and in framing the regulations the representation of home workers on trade boards shall be pro\'ided for in all trades in which a considerable proportion of home workers are engaged. (4) The chairman of a trade board shall be such one of the members as the Board of Trade may appoint, and the secretary of the trade board shall be appointed by the Board of Trade. (5) The proceedings of a trade board shall not be invalidated by any vacancy in their number, or by any defect in the appointment, election, or nomination of any member. (6) In order to constitute a meeting of a trade board, at least one- third of the whole number of the representative members and at least one appointed member must be present. (7) The Board of Trade may make regulations with respect to the proceedings and meetings of trade boards, including the method of votmg; but subject to the provisions of this act and to any regulations so made trade boards may regulate their proceedings in such manner as they think fit. of^dkfriit^rade Sbc._12. (1) A trade board may establish district trade committees committees. connsting partly of members of the trade board and partly of persons not being members of the trade board but representing employers or MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS GREAT BEITAIN. 299 workers engaged in the trade and constituted in accordance with regulations made for the purpose by the Board of Trade and acting for such area aa the trade board may determine. (2) _ Provisions shall be made by the regulations for at least one • appomted member acting as a member of each district trade com- mittee, and for the e^ual representation of local employers and local workers on the committee, and for the representation of home workers thereon in the case of any trade in which a considerable proportion of home workers are engaged in the district, and also for the appoint- ment of a standing subcommittee to consider applications for special minimum piece rates and complaints made to the trade board under this act, and for the reference of any applications or complaints to that subcommittee. (3) A trade board may refer to a district trade committee for their report and recommendations any matter which they think it expe- dient so to refer, and may also, if they think fit, delegate to a distract trade committee any of their powers and duties under this act, other than their power and duty to fix a minimum time rate or general minimum piece rate. (4) Where a district trade committee has been established for any area, it shall be the duty of the committee to recommend to the trade board minimum time rates and, so far as they think fit, general mini- mum piece rates, applicable to the trade in that area, and no such minimum rate of wages fixed under this act and no variation or can- cellation of such a rate shall have efiect within that area unless either the rate or the variation or cancellation thereof, as the case may be, has been recommended by the district trade committee, or an oppor- tunity has been given to the committee to report thereon to the trade board, and the trade board have considered the report (it any) made by the committee. Sec. 13. (1) The Board of Trade may appoint such number of per- Appointed sons (including women) as they think fit to be appointed members of "oards*"^^ °' ^ " trade boards. (2) Such of the appointed members of trade boards shall act on each trade board or district trade committee as may be directed by the Board of Trade, and, in the case of a trade board for a trade in which women are largely employed, at least one of the appointed members acting shall be a woman: Provided, That the number of appointed members acting on the same trade board, or the same district trade committee, at the same time, shall be less than half the total number of members representing employers and members representing workers. APPOINTMENT OP OPFICERS AND OTHER PKOVrSIONS FOR ENFORCING ACT. Sec. 14. (1) TheBoardof Trade mayappolntsuch officers asthey think Appointment necessary for the purpose of investigating any complaints and other- °'°™''6'^- wise securing the proper observance of this act, and any officers so ap- pointed shall act under the directions of the Board of Trade, or, if the Board of Trade so determine, under the directions of any trade board. (2) The Board of Trade may also, in lieu of or in addition to appointing any officers under the provisions of this section, if they think fit, arrange with any other Government department for assistance being given in carrying this act into effect, either generally or in any special cases, by officers of that department whose duties bring them into relation with any trade to which this act applies. Sec. 15. (1) Any officer appointed by the Board of Trade under this Powers of offl- act, and any officer of any Government department for the time being °*''^- assisting in carrying this act into effect, shall have power for the per- formance of his duties — (a) To require the production of wages sheets or other record of wages by a,n employer, and^records of payments made to outworkers by per- sonsgiving out work, and to inspect and examine the same and copy any material part thereof; (6) To require any person giving out work and any outworker to give any information which it is in his power to give with respect to the names and addresses of the persons to whom the work is given out or 300 BXTLLETIIT OE THE BUREAU OE LABOR STATISTICS. from whom the work is received, as the case may be, and with respect to the paym.ents to be made lor the work; (c) At all reasonable times to enter any factory or workshop and any place used for giving out work to outworkers; and (d) To inspect and copy any material part of any list of outworkers kept by an employer or person giving out work to outworkers. (2) If any person fails to furnish the means required by an officer as necessary for any entry or inspection or the exercise of his powers under this section, or if any person hinders or molests any officer in the exer- cise of the powers given by this section, or refuses to produce any docu- ment or give any information which any officer requires him to produce or give under the powers given by tms section, that person shall be liable on summary conviction in respect of each offense to a fine not exceeding £5 ($24.33); and, if any person produces any wages sheet, or record of wages, or record of payments, or any list of outworkers to any officer actiag in the exercise of the powers given by this section, knowing the same to be false, or furnishes any information to any such officer knowing the same to be false, he shall be liable, on summary con- viction, to a :Sne not exceeding £20 ($97.33), or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, with or without hard labor. Officers to pro- Sec. 16. Every officer appointed by the Board of Trade imder this whHi required*'^ ^'^*' ^^^ every officer of any Government department for the time being assisting in carrying this act into effect, shall be furnished by the board or department with a certificate of his appointment, and when acting under any or exercising any power conferred upon him by this act shall, if so required, produce the said certificate to any person or persons affected. Power to take Sec. 17. (1) Any officer appointed by the Board of Trade under this ce^toS'^"''' P''°" act, and any officer of any Government department for the time being assisting in carrying this act into effect, shall have power in pursuance of any special or general directions of the Board of liade to take proceed- ings under this act, and a trade board may also take any such proceed- ings in the name of any officer appointed by the Board of Trade for the time being acting under the directions of the trade board in j)ursuance of this act, or in the name of their secretary or any of their officers authorized by them. ( 2 ) Any officer appointed by the Board of Trade under this act, or any officer of any Government department for the time being assisting in carrying this act into effect, and the secretary of a trade board, or any officer of a trade board authorized for the purpose, may, although not a counsel or sjlicitor or law agent, prosecute or conduct before a court of summary jurisdiction any proceedings arising imder this act. SUPPLEMENTAL. Regulations as Sec. 18. (1) The Board of Tradeshallmakeregulations astothenotice nroSce '"°^ ^ ^® given of any matter under this act, with a view to bringing the matter of which notice is to be given so far as practicable to the knowl- edge of persons affected. _ (2) Every occupier of a factory or workshop, or of any place used for giving out work to outworkers, shall, in manner directed by regula- tions under this section, fix any notices in his factory or workshop or the place used for giving out work to outworkers which he may be required to fix by the regulations, and shall give notice in any other manner, if required by the regulations, to the persons employed by him of any matter of which he is required to give notice under the regulations: If the occupier of a factory or workshop, or of any place used for giv- ing out work to outworkers, fails to comply with this provision, he shall be liable on summary conviction in respect of each offense to a fine not exceeding 40s. ($9.73). Regulations to Sbc. 19. Regulations made under this act shall be laid as soon as pos- Parliament °" ^^^^ before both houses of Parliament, and, if either house within the next 40 days after the regulations have been laid before that house re- solve that all or any of the regulations ought to be annulled, the regu- lations shall, after the date of the resolution, be of no effect, withoutprej- udice to the validity of anything done in the meantime thereunder or to the making of any new regulations. If one or more of a set of regular MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS GBEAT BRITAIN. 301 tions are annulled, the Board of Trade may, if they think fit, withdraw the whole set. Sec. 20. (1) His Majesty may, by order in council, direct that any Interchange of powers to be exercised or duties to be performed by the Board of Trade ?.°'^^J?,„^f7!f° under this act shall be exercised or performed generally, or in any spe- partmSST cial cases or class of cases, by a secretary of state, and, while any such order is in force, this act shall apply as if, so far as is necessary to give efiect to the order, a secretary of^ state were substituted for the Board of trade. (2) Any order in council under this section may be varied or revoked by any subsequent order in council. Sec. 21. There shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament — Expenses (1) Any expenses, up to an amount sanctioned by the treasury, S^to'efl^''t°^ ^"^ which may be incurred with the authority or sanction of the Board of "" ' Trade, by trade boards or their committees in carrying into effect this act; and (2) To appointed members and secretaries of trade boards and to oflS- cers appointed by the Board of Trade under this act such remuneration and expenses as may be sanctioned by the treasury; and (3) To representative members of trade boards and members (other than appointed members) of district trade committees any expenses (iacluding compensation for loss of time), up to an amount sanctioned by the treasury, which may be incurred by them in the performance of their duties as such members; and (4) Any expenses, up to an amount sanctioned by the treasury, which may be incurred by the Board of Trade in making inquiries, or procuring information, or taking any preliminary steps with respect to the application of this act to any trade to which the act does not apply, includmg the expenses of obtaining a provisional order, or promoting any bill to confirm any provisional order made imder, or in pursuance of, the provisions of this act. Sec. 22. (1) This act may be cited as the trade boards act, 1909. Short title and (2) This act shall come into operation on the 1st day of January, commencement. 1910. Schedule. teades to which the act applies without provisional order. 1. Ready-made and wholesale bespoke tailoring and any other branch of feiiloring in which the Board of Trade consider that the system of manufacture is generally similar to that prevailing in the wholesale trade. 2. The making of boxes or parts thereof made wholly or partially of paper, car4board, chip, or sunilar material. 3. Machiiie-niade lace and net finishing and mending or darning op- erations of lace curtain finishing. 4. Hammered and dollied or tommied chain making. Regulations. 1. A trade board shall be established for those branches of the ready- made and wholesale bespoke tailoring trade in Great Britain which are engaged in making garments to be worn by male persons. 2. The board shall consist of not less than 29 and not more than 37 persons, namely, 3 or 5 appointed members, and members representing employers and workers, respectively, in equal proportions. The chairman and deputy chairman shall be such of the members as may be nominated by the Board of Trade. 3. Ten members, representing employers in the above branches of trade who are occupiers of factories within the meaning of the factory and workshop acts and are not habitually engaged in subcontracting, shall he chosen by the Board of Trade as follows: Two members after considering names supplied by such employers in Scotland. , , . Two members after considering names supphed by such employers m the counties of Northumberland, Durham, and Yorkshire. 302 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. One member after considering names supplied by such employers in tbe counties of Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire, Cheshire, Flint, Denbigh, Carnarvon, Anglesea, Merioneth, and Montgomery. One member after considering names supplied by such employers in the counties of Derby, Stafford, Shropshire, Hereford, Worcester, War- wick, Oxford, Northampton,' Rutland, Leicester, and Nottingham. One member after considering names supplied by such employers in the counties of Lincoln, Huntingdon,^ Cambridge, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex (outside the metropolitan police boundary). Two members after considering names supplied by such employers in London and the counties of Essex (within the metropolitan police boundary), Middlesex, Hertford, Bedford, Buckingham, Stirrey, Kent, and Sussex. One member after considering names supplied by such employers in the counties of Berkshire, Hampshire, Dorset, Wiltshire, Gloucester, Somerset, Devon, Cornwall, Monmouth, Glamorgan, Brecknock, Radnor, Cardigan, Carmarthen, and Pembroke. A casual vacancy among members representing such employers shall be filled in the same manner. Three members representing employers in the above trade (other than those employers who are occupiers of factories within the meaning of the factory and workshop acts and are not habitually engaged in sub- contracting) shall be chosen by the Board of Trade after considering names supplied by such employers. A casual vacancy among members representing such employers shall be filled in the same manner. 4. Thirteen members representing the workers shall be chosen by ' the Board of Trade after considering names supplied by workers in the above trade, due regard being paid to the proper representation of home workers. A casual vacancy among members representing workers shall be filled in the same manner. 5. The Board of Trade may, after giving an opportunity to the trade board to be heard, extend the functions of the trade board by bringing within their scope any other branch of tailoring covered by paragraph (1) of the schedule to the trade boards act. The Board of Trade shall give thiee months' notice of their intention to bring any such branch of work within the scope of the trade board by advertisement in the London Gazette and Edinburgh Gazette, and so far as practicable in trade papers. 6. The Board of Trade may, if they think it necessary in order to secure proper representation of any classes of employers or workers, after giving an opportunity to the trade board to be heard, nominate additional representative members on the trade board, and such repre- sentative members may be nominated either for the whole term of office of the board or for any part thereof. The number of such addi- tional representative members shall not at any time exceed six, three on each side. 7. The term of office of the first trade board shall be three years. 8. Any representative of employers who ceases to be an employer and becomes a worker at the trade shall vacate his seat. Any repre- sentative of workers who becomes an employer in the trade shall also vacate his seat. The question of fact shall in each case be determined by the chairman. 9. Every member of the board shall have one vote: Provided, That the chairman, or in his absence the deputy chairman, may, if he think it desirable, and shall at the request of more than half of the members representing employers or workers, take a vote of the representative members by sides, and in such a case the vote of the majority of mem- bers of either side present and voting shall be the vote of that side. In such a division the appointed members shall not vote, but in the event of the division resulting in a disagreement the question shall be decided by a majority vote of the appointed members. 10. Any representative of employers or workers who fails, without reasonable cause, to attend one-half of the total number of meetings in one year shall vacate his seat, but shall be eligible to be nominated again. ' Excluding the city of Peterborough. 2 Including the city ol Peterborough. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS GREAT BRITAIN. 303 11. Any question upon the construction or interpretation of these regulations shall, m the event of dispute, be referred to the Board of Trade for decision. July 25, 1910. TRADE BOARDS PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION ACT, 1913. Chapter clxii. — An Act to confirm certain provisional orders made by the Board of Trade under the trade boards act 1909 (Aug. 15, 191S). Whereas the Board of Trade have made the provisional orders set , forth in the schedule hereto under the provisions of the trade boards act 1909: and Whereas it is requisite that the said orders should be confirmed by Parliament: Be it therefore enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in this present Parliament assembled and by the authority of the same as follows : 1. The orders set out in the schedule hereto shall be and the same are hereby confirmed and all the provisions thereof shall have full validity and force. 2. This act may be cited as the trade boards provisional orders con- firmation act 1913. Schedule. orders confirmed. Provisional order made in pursuance of section 1 of the trade boards act, 1909, with respect to the sugar confectionery and food-preserving trade. Whereas the trade boards act 1909 applies to the trades specified in the schedule to that act and to any other trades to which it has been applied by provisional order of the Board of Trade made under section 1 of that act and the Board oi Trade have power under that section to make a provisional order applying that act to any specified trade to which it does not at the time apply if they are satisfied that the rate of wages prevailing in any branch of the trade is exceptionally low as compared with that in other employments and that the other circum- stances of the trade are such as to render the application of that act to the trade expedient; and Whereas the trade boards act does not apply to the trade specified in the appendix to this order and the board as respects that trade are satisfied as aforesaid: Now therefore we the Board of Trade in pursuance of the powers given to us by section 1 of the trade boards act 1909 and by any other statute in that behalf do hereby order that from and after the date of the act of Parliament confirming this order the following pro- visions shall have effect (that is to say): Article 1. The trade boards act 1909 shall apply to the trade speci- fied in the appendix to this order. Art. 2. This order may be cited as the trade boards (sugar confec- tionery and food preserving) order 1913. APPENDIX. Trade. Sugar confectionery and food preserving (that is to say) the making of sugar confectionery cocoa chocolate jam marmalade preserved fruits fruit and table jellies meat extracts meat essences sauces and pickles the preparation of meat poultry game fish vegetables and 304 BULLETIN OP THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. fruit for sale in a preserved state in tins pots bottles and similar recep- tacles the processes of wrapping filling packing and labeling in re- spect of articles so made or prepared. Provisional order made in pwsiumce of section 1 of the trade hoards act, 1909, with respect to the shirt-making trade. Whereas the trade boards act 1909 applies to the trades specified in the schedule to that act and to any other trades to which it has been applied by provisional order of the Board of Trade made under section 1 of that act and the Board of Trade have power under that section to make a provisional order applying that act to any specified trade to which it does not at the time apply if they are satisfied that the rate of wages prevailing in any branch of the trade is exceptionally low as compared with that in other employments and that the other circum- stances of the trade are such as to render the application of that act to the trade expedient: and Whereas the trade boards act does not apply to the trade specified in the appendix to this order and the board as respects that trade are satisfied as aforesaid : Now therefore we the Board of Trade in pursuance of the powers given to us by section 1 of the trade boards act 1909 and by any other statute in that behalf do hereby order that from and after the date of the act of Parliament confirming this order the following provisions shall have effect (that is to say): Article 1. The trade boards act 1909 shall apply to the trade speci- fied in the appendix to this order. Art. 2. This order may be cited as the trade boards (shirt-making) order 1913. APPENDIX. Trade. Shirt making (that is to say) the making from textile fabrics of shirts pajamas aprons and other washable clothing worn by male persons excluding articles the making of which is included in paragraph 1 of the schedule to the trade boards act 1909 and excluding articles which are knitted or are made from knitted fabrics. Provisional order made in pursuance of section 1 of the trade hoards act 1909 with respect to the hollow ware making trade. Whereas the trade boards act 1909 applies to the trades specified in the schedule to that act and to any other trades to which it has been applied by provisional order of the Board of Trade made under section 1 of that act and the Board of Trade have power under that section to make a provisional order applying that act to any specified trade to which it does not at the time apply if they are satisfied that the rate of wages prevailing in any branch of the trade is exceptionally low as compared with that in other employments and that the other circum- stances of the trade are such as to render the application of that act to the trade expedient: And whereas the trade boards act does not apply to the trade specified in the appendix to this order and the board as respects that trade are satisfied as aforesaid : Now therefore we the Board of Trade in pursuance of the powers given to us by section 1 of the trade boards act 1909 and by any other statute in that behalf do hereby order that from and after the date of the act of Parliament confirming this order the following provisions shaU. have effect (this is to say): MINIMtTM-WAGE LAWS GREAT BEITAIN. 30t5 Abticie 1. The trade boards act 1909 shall apply to the trade speci- fied m the appendix to this order. Art. 2. This order may be cited as the trade boards (hollo-w ware) order 1913. APPENDIX. Trade. Hollow ware making that is to say the making of hollow ware in- cluding boxes and canisters from sheet iron sheet steel or tin-plate including the processes of galvanizing tinning enameling painting, japanning lacquering and varnishing. IV. Provisional order made in pursuance of section 1 of the trade boards act 1909 with respect to the linen and cotton embroidery trade. , Whereas the trade boards act 1909 applies to the trades specified in the schedule to that act and to any other trades to which it has been applied byprovisional order of the Board of Trade made under section 1 of that act and the Board of Trade have power under that section to make a provisional order applying that act to any specified trade to which it does not at the time apply if they are satisfied that the rate of wages prevailing in any branch of the trade is exceptionally low as compared with that in other employments and that the other circum- stances of the trade are such as to render the application of that act to the trade expedient: and Whereas the trade boards act does not apply to the trade specified in the appendix to this order and the board as respects that trade are satisfied as aforesaid: Now therefore we the Board of Trade in pursuance of the powers given to us by section 1 of the trade boards act 1909 and by any other statute in that behalf do hereby order that from and after the date of the act of parliament confirming this order the following pro- visions shall have effect (that is to say): Article 1. The trade boards act 1909 shall apply to the trade speci- fied in the appendix to this order. Art. 2. This order may be cited as the trade boards (Unen and cotton embroidery) order 1913. APPENDIX. Trade. Liaen and cotton embroidery (that is to say) those branches of the trade of making up articles of linen or cotton or mixed linen and cotton, which are engaged in the processes of hand embroidery drawn-thread work thread drawing thread clipping top-sewing scaUoping nickeling and paring. COAL MINES (MINIMUM WAGE) ACT, 1912. Chapter 2. — An Act to provide a minimum wage in the case ofworhmen, employed underground in coal mines {including mines of stratified ironstone), and for purposes incidental thereto. Section 1. (1) It shall be an implied term of everjr contract for the Minimum employment of a workman underground in a coal mine that the em- ^||® 'empioTOd ployer shall pay to that workman wages at not less than the minimum underground in rate settled under this act and applicable to that workman, unless it is coal mines, certified in manner provided by the district rules that the workman is a person excluded under the district rules from the operation of this provision, or that the workman has forfeited the right to wages at the minimum rate by reason of his failure to comply with the conditions with respect to the regularity or efficiency of the work to be performed by workmen laid down by those rules; and any agreement for the pay- ment of wages in so far as it is ia contravention of this provision shall be void. 82843°— Bull. 167—15 ^20 306 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOB STATISTICS. For the purposes of this act, the expression "district rules" means rules made under the powers given by this act by the joint district board. (2) The district rules shall lay down conditions, as respects the dis- trict to which they apply, with respect to the exclusion from the right to wages at the minimum rate of aged workmen and infirm workmen (including workmen partially disabled by illness or accident) , and shall lay down conditions with respect to the regularity and efficiency of the work to be performed by the workmen, and with respect to the time for which a workman is to be paid in the event of any interruption of work due to an emergency, and shall provide that a workman shall forfeit the right to wages at the minimum rate if he does not comply with conditions as to regularity and efficiency of work, except in cases where the failure to comply with the conditions is due to some cause over which he has no control. The district rules shall also make provision with respect to the persons by whom and the mode in which any question, whether any workman in the district is a workman to whom the minimum rate of wages is applicable, or whether a workman has complied with the con- ditions laid down by the rules, or whether a workman who has not complied with the conditions laid down by the rules has forfeited his right to wages at the Tm'Tiimnm rate, is to be decided, and for a certifi- cate being given of any such decision for the purposes of this section. (3) The provisions of this section as to payment of wages at a mini- mum rate shall operate as from the date of the passing of this act, although a minimum rate of wages may not have been settled, and any sum which would have been payable under this section to a workman on account of wages if a minimum rate had been settled may be recov- ered by the workman from his employer at any time after the rate is settled. Settlement of Sec. 2. (1) Minimum rates of wages and district rules for the pnr- miTiiTn um rates p^ggg ^f ^j^jg ^^t shall be settled separately for each of the districts trict nUes™ '^" named in the schedule to this act by a body of persons^ recognized by the Board of Trade as the joint district board for that district. Nothing in this act shall prejudice the operation of any agreement entered into or custom existing before the passing of this act for the payment of wages at a rate higher than the minimum rate settled under this act, and in settling any minimum rate of wages the joint district board shall have regard to the average daily rate of wages paid to the workmen of the class for which the minimum rate is to be settled. (2) The Board of Trade mayrecogrdze asajoint district board for any district any body of persons, whether existing at the time of the passing of this act or constituted for the purposes of this act, which in the opinion of the Board of Trade fairly and adequately represents the workmen in coal mines in the district and the employers of those work- men, and the chairman of which is an independent person appointed by agreement between the persons representing the workmen and employers respectively on the body, or in default of agreement by the Board of Trade. The Board of Trade may, as a condition of recognizing as a joint dis- trict board for the purposes of this act any body the rules of which do not provide for securing equality of voting power between the mem- bers representing workmen and the members representing employers and for giving the chairman a casting vote in case of difference be- tween the two classes of members, require that body to adopt any such rule as the Board of Trade may approve for the purpose, and any rule so adopted shall be deemed to be a rule governing the procedure of the body for the purposes of this act. (3) The joint district board of a district shall settle general minimum rates of wages and general district rules for their district (in this act referred to as general district minimum rates and general district rules), and the general district minimum rates and general district rules shall be the rates and rules applicable throughout the whole of the district to all coal mines in the district and to all workmen or classes of work- men employed underground in those mines, other than mines to which and workmen to whom a special minimum rate or special dis- trict rules settled under the provisions of this act is or are applicable, MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS GEEAT BRITAIN. 307 or minea^to which and workmen to whom the joint district board declare that the general district rates and general district rules shall not be applicable pending the decision of the question whether a special district rate or special district rules ought to be settled in dieir case. (4) The joint district board of any district may, if it is shown to them that any general district minimum rate or general district rules are not applicable in the case of any group or class of coal mines within the district, owing to the special circumstances of the group or class of mines, settle a special minimum rate (either higher or lower than the general district rate) or special district rules (either more or less strin- gent than the general district rules) for that group or class of mines, and any such special rate or special rules shall be the rate or rules applicable to that group or class of mines instead of the general dis- trict minimum rate or general district rules. (5) For the purpose of settling minimiim rates of wage, the Joint district board may subdivide their district into two parts or, if the members of the joint district board representing the workmen and the members representing the employers agree, into more than two parts, and in that case each part of the district as so subdivided shall, for the purpose of the minimum rate, be treated as the district. (6) For the purpose of settling district rules, any joint district boards may agree tiiat their districts shall be treated as one district, and in that case those districts shall be treated for that purpose as one combined district, with a combined district committee appointed as may be agreed between the joint district boards concerned, and the chairman of such one of the districts forming the combination as may be agreed upon between the joint district boards concerned, or, in default of agreement, determined by the Board of Trade, shall be the chairman of the combined district committee. Sec. 3. (1) Any minimum rate of wages or district rules settled Revision of under this act shall remain in force until varied in accordance with wags'™ cf*dis^ the provisions of this act. trict rules. (2) The joint district board of a district shall have power to vary any minimum rate of wages or district rules for the time being in force in their district — (a) at any time by agreement between the members of the joint district board representing the workmen and the members representing the employers; and (5) after one year has elapsed since the rate or rules were last settled or varied, on an application made (with three months' notice given after the expiration of liie year) by any workmen or employers, which appears to the joint district board to represent any considerable body of opinion amongst either the workmen or the employers concerned; and the provisions of this act as to the settlement of minimum rates of wages or district rules shall, so far as applicable, apply to the variation of any such rates or rules. Sec. 4. (1) If within two weeks after the passing of this act a joint Provision tor district board has not been recognised by the Board of Trade for any bnngmg act into district, or it at any time after the passmg of this act any occasion "P*™™"' ®™- arises for the exercise or performance in any district of any power or duty under this act by the joint district board, and there is no joint district board for the district, the Board of Trade may, either forthwith or after such interval as may seem to them necessary or expedient, appoint such person as they think fit to act in the place of tne joint district board, and, while that appointment continues, this act shall be construed, so far as respects that district, as if the person so appointed were substituted for the joint district board. The Board of Trade in any such case where it appears to them that the necessity for the exercise of their powers under this provision arises from the failure of the employers to appoint members to represent employers on a board when the workmen are willing to appoint mem- bers to represent workmen, or from the faUure of the workmen to appoint members to represent workmen on a board when the employers are willing to appoint members to represent employers, may, if they think fit, instead of appointing a person to act in place of the joint dig- . trict board, appoint such persons as they think fit to represent the employers or the workmen, as the case may be, who have failed to appoint members to represent them; and in that case the members so 308 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. appointed by the Board of Trade shall be deemed to be members of the board representing employers or workmen as the case requires. (2) If the joint district board within three weeks after the time at which it has been recognized under this act for any district fail to settle the first minimum rates of wages and district rules in that district, or if the joint district board within three weeks after the expiration of a notice for an application under this act to vary any minimum rate of wages or district rules fail to deal with the application, the chairman of the joint district board shall settle the rates or rules or deal with the application, as the case may be, in place of the joint district board, and any minimum rate of wages or district rules settled by him shall have the same effect for the purposes of this act as if they had been settled by the joint district board: Provided, That, if the members of the joint district board represent- ing the workmen and the members representing the employers agree, or if the chairman of the joint district board directs, that a specified period longer than three weeks shall for the purposes of this subsection be substituted for three weeks, this subsection shall have effect as if that specified period were therein substituted for three weeks. Interpretation, ggc 5. (i) Jn this acl^ tooh^nai™ ^ The expression "coal mine" includes a mine of stratified ironstone; The expression "workman" means any person employed in a coal mine below ground other than — (a) a person so employed occasionally or casually only; or Co) a. person so employed solely in surveying or measuring; or (c) a person so employed as mechanic; or (d) the manager or any undermanager of the mine; or (e) any other official of the mine whose position in the mine is recog- nized by the joint district board as being a position different from that of a workman. (2) If it is thought fit by any persons when appointing a chairman for the purposes of this act, or by the Board of Trade when so appointing a chairman, the office of chairman may be committed to three perBons, and in that case those three persons acting by a majority shall be deemed to be the chairman for the purposes of this act. diSaSon*'^* ^^ ^^^- ^' ^^^ 'Sais act may be cited as the coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912. (2) This act shall continue in force for three years from the date of the passing thereof and no longer, unless PaxUament shall otherwise determine. Schedule. Districts. — Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland, Lancashire and Cheshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Cleveland, Derbyshire (exclusive of South Derbyshire), South Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire, Shropshire, North Staffordshire, South Stafford (exclu- sive of Cannock Chase) and East Worcestershire, Cannock Chase, War- wickshire, Forest of Dean, Bristol, Somerset, North Wales, South Wales, including Monmouth, and the mainland of Scotland. Where a mine, though situate in one of these districts, has for indus- trial purposes been customarily dealt with in the same manner as a mine situate in an adjoining district, that mine shall for the purposes of this act be treated as situate in the latter district, if the joint district boards of the two districts so agree. MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS — GEEAT BRITAIN. 309 TYPICAL AWARD UNDER COAL MINES ACT. South Wales, Including Monmouth District. Whereas at joint meetings held at Cardiff, on April 3, 1912, of the representatives of the colhery owners of South Wales and Monmouthshire and the representatives of the workmen employed at the collieries, a joint district board was constituted for the purpose of the coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912; and I, Viscount St. Aldwyn was appointed chairman of such board; and whereas, on April 18, 1912, such board was duly recognized by the Board of Trade as the joint district board for the district of South Wales (including Monmouth); and Whereas the joint district board failed to settle the first minimum rates of wages and district rules within three weeks after the time at which it was recognized and the members of the board representing the workmen and the members representing the employers agreed to substitute the specified period of 10 weeks for 3 weeks, for the purpose of subsection (2) section 4 of the coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912; and Whereas rules of procedure for the conduct of the business of the board, and a clas- sification of the workmen to whom the act applies, were agreed to by the board; and Whereas it was agreed to by the board that the standard rates of December, 1879, or the eqiiivalent as provided by clause 10 of the conciliation board agreement of December, 1910, should be taken as a basis for the general minimum rates of wages, plus the percentage additions from time to time payable under the said agreement, and that special district minimum rates less than the general district rates should be applicable to coal mines in Pembrokeshire; and Whereas it was decided by my casting vote that a standard rate of 3s. (73 cents) should be taken as the basis for the minimum day wage rate of laborers over 18 years of age, and it was subsequently decided by my casting vote that the age for an adult workman of every class, except haulers, trammers, and riders, should be 21 instead of 18, and that on this understanding the minimum day wage rate of laborers should be reconsidered; and Whereas the board has failed to settle the first general minimum rates of wages and district rules, and the first special minimum rates of wages for Pembrokeshire, within the aforesaid period of 10 weeks; Now I, as chairman of the board, in pursuance of the terms of the coal mines (mini- mum wage) act, 1912, having heard the parties, do hereby settle the said rates, rules, and special rates, as follows, viz: Schedule I. paet I. General District Minimum Rates of Wages. The general rates of wages shall be the standard rate hereinafter fixed for each class of underground workmen, to which is to be added the percentage from time to time payable under the conciliation board agreement of December, 1910. standard rate of DAT WAjGE. Class 1. — Worhmen over 21 years of age. s. d. 1. Collier in charge of a working place, who is a regular piece- worker, and is prevented from earning piecework wages by a fault in the seam or other cause arising in the colliery and beyond his own control, or by a request from the manage- ment to work away from his place on more than seven days during a period of three months 4 7 ($1.12) (In any other case the minimum day wage rate of such a collier working at day wages away from his working place shall be the minimum day wage rate applicable to the class in which he is working.) 2. Collier in charge of a working place who is not a worker at piecework (subject to the above rule) 4 3 ($1.03) 3. Colliers' helpers 3 4 (si.'i cents) 4. Timbermen and repairers or nppers doing timbering'work: Regular pieceworkers 4 7 ($1.12) Day wage men 4 3 ($iio3) . 5. Ilii)pera (not doing timbering work). 4 (97.3 cents) 6. Assistant timbermen and assistant rippers 3 4 (81.1 cents) 7. Roadmen 3 7 (87.2 cents) 310 BULLETIN- OF THE BTJREAIT OF LABOR STATISTICS. 8. Htichers: s. d. Leading 3 10 (93.3 cents) Ordinary 3 6 (85.2 cents) 9. Hostlers and laborers 3 2 (77.1 cents) 10. Underground hauling engineers, electric, steam and com- pressed air: Main haulage 3 4 (81.1 cents) Subsidiary haulage 3 2 (77.1 cents) 11. Underground pump men, electric, steam and compressed air: Main pumps 3 4 (81.1 cents) Small pumps 3 2 (77.1 cents) 12. Fitters, if employed entirely underground 3 4 (81.1 cents)- 13. Electricians, if employed entirely underground 3 5 (83.1 cents) 14. Rope splicers, if employed entirely underground 3 10 (93.3 cents) 15. Masons and pitmen, if employed entirely underground 4 2 (11.01) 16. Cog cutters 3 5 (83.1 cents) 17. Timber drawers and airway men 3 10 (93.3 cents) 18. Shacklers and sprag men, and watermen 3 2 (77.1 cents) 19. Lamp lockers, lamp lighters, oilers 3 (73 cents) 20. Coal-cutter men 4 3 ($1.03) Class 2. Boys under 15 years of age 1 6 (36.5 cents) Boys over 15 and under 16 1 9 (42.6 cents) Boys over 16 and under 17 2 (48.7 cents) Boys over 17 and under 18 2 3 (54.8 cents) Boys over 18 and under 19 2 6 (60.8 cents) Boys over 19 and under 20 2 9 (66.9 cents) Boys over 20 and under 21 3 (73 cents) Class 3. Haulers above 18 years of age: 1. Day haulers 3 11 (95.3 cents) 2. Night haulers 3 8 (89.2 cents) Tonnage haulers, above 18 years of age, for hauling coal 4 2 ($1.01) Riders above 18 years of age 3 9 (91.3 cents) Trammers above 18 years of age 3 3 (79.1 cents) In collieries where night haulers are now paid day hauling rates that practice shall continue. PART II. Special District Minimum Rates of Day Wage for Coal Miners in Pembrolceshire. Class 1. — Mines east of the River Claddau. The rates fixed are standard rates of December, 1879, to which ia to be added the percentage from time to time payable under the conciliation board agreement of December, 1910. s. d. 1. Coalhewers 3 (73 cents) 2. Underground enginemen 2 7 (62.9 cents) 3. Hitchers and banksmen 2 7 (62.9 cents) 4. Roadmen, repairers, haulers, riders, and beam men 2 6 (60.8 cents) 5. Trammers over 16 years of age 2 2 (52.7 cents; 6. Boys under 15 years (increasing by a standard rate of 2d. (48.7 cents) with each year of age until placed in one of the above classes) 1 O (24.3 cents) Class 2. — Mines west of the River Claddau. The minimum rates of day wages shall be the following net rates: Cutters and repairers, 3s. (73 cents); assistant cutters, assistant repairers and hitchers, 2s. 9d. (66.9 cents); trammers, beam men, and unskilled laborers, 2s. 6d. (60.8 cents); boys under 16, Is. (24.3 cents); from 16 to 18, Is. 6d. (36.5 cents); from 18 to 20, 2s. (48.7 cents); after 20, their class rate. PAET HI. The several scales applicable to boys in this schedule shall apply to boys who have started underground work at 14, and have continued to work underground. A boy MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS GEEAT BRITAIN. 311 starting underground work at a later age than 14 to be paid the minimum provided for the age a year below his actual age until he has had a year's experience of under- ground work. Afterwards the minimum applicable to his age shall apply. The mirdmum wages fixed by this schedule shall be free from any deductions for explosives. AH customs, usages, practices, or conditions for the payment of extra or additional wages, or fot the supply of fuel, now existing at the respective coal mines to which the minimum wages fixed in this schedule are to apply, shall remain in full force and virtue notwithstanding anything contained in this schedule, except that the mini- mum day wage fixed for workmen doing haulers' work is to include payment for dooring. Schedule II. DISTRICT RULES. 1. The following rules shall apply to the working of all coal mines, subject to the coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912, hereinafter called "the act," within South Wales and Monmouthshire. 2. In these rules the word "workman" means any person to whom the coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912, applies; the word "pay" means the period in respect of which workman's wages are for the time being payable, and the word "day" means a colliery working day. 3. A workman who has reached 63 years of age shall be regarded as an aged workman within the meaning of the act, and shall be excluded from the right to wages at the minimum rate. A workman who from physical causes is unable to do the work ordinarily done by a man in his position in the niine or who is partially disabled by illness or accident shall be regarded as an infirm workman within the meaning of the act, and .shall be excluded from the right to wages at the minimum rate. Where there is no disagreement as to whether a workman has reached the age of 63 years, or is infirm, or partially disabled by illness or accident, a certificate signed by the work- man affected and the manager of the mine shall be conclusive evidence in reference thereto: Provided, That in a case of a workman partially disabled hj illness or acci- dent, such certificate shall only apply during the period of such partial disablement. 4. A workman shall forfeit Ms right to wages at the minimum rate on any day on which he delays in going to his working place or work at the proper time, or leaves his working place or work before the proper time, or fails to perform throughout the whole of the shift his work with diligence and efficiency and in accordance with the reasonable instruction of the official having charge of the district in which such work- man shall be engaged. 5. A workman shall regularly present himself for work when the colliery is open for work, and shall forfeit his right to wages at the minimum rate during any pay in which he has not worked at least five-sixtha of his possible working days, urJess pre- vented from working by accident or illness. In case of accident or illness the work- man shall, if required, submit himself to the examination of a duly qualified medical man to be appointed by the employer; and in case he shall refuse to do so, he shall forfeit his right to wages at a minimum rate during that pay. Every collier and collier's helper shall at all times work, get, and send out the largest possible quantity of clean coal contracted to be gotten from his working place, and shall perform at least such an amount of work as, at the rate set forth in the price list or other agreed rates applicable, would entitle him to earnings equivalent to the minimum rate. If at any time any workman shall, in consequence of circumstances over which he alleges he has no control, be unable to perform such an amount of work as would entitle him under the price Kst or other agreed rates to a sum equal to the daily Tnlnimum rate, then and in such case, he shall forthwith give notice thereof to the official in charge of the district in which he shall be engaged, and if such official shall not agree that the workman can not earn at the work upon which he shall be engaged a sum under the price list or other agreed rates equal to the daily minimum rate, then the matter shall be decided in the manner provided by rule 8. The man- agement shall be at liberty to remove the workman to some other part of the colliery. If any workman shall act in contravention of this rule, he shalfforfeit the right to wages at the minimum rate for the pay in which such contravention shall take place. 6. If a case of emergency in or about or connected with the colliery shall render a workman's services for the time being unnecessary; and such workman shall be informed of such emergency when or before he reaches the pit bottom or a station within 300 yards therefrom, then such workman shall forthwith return to the surface (facilities being given) and shall not be entitled to any payment in respect of that shift. If the workman travels to his working place and is there informed or discovers that something has happened to prevent him working in his place and is offered but refuses 312 BULLETIN" OF THE BUEEAU OE LABOR STATISTICS. other work which he may properly be called upon, to perform, he shall not be entitled to claim any wages in respect of that shift. In the event of any interruption of work during the shift of any workman due to an emergency over which the management has no control, whereby he shall be prevented from working continuously imtil the end of his shift, then he shall be entitled only to such a proportion of the minimum rate for the shift as the time during which he shall have worked shall bear to the total number of hours of such shift. Facilities shall be given to enable hiTn to ascend the mine as soon as practicable. 7. (1) In ascertaining- whether the minimum wage has been earned by any work- man on piecework, the total earnijags during two consecutive weeks shall be divided by the number of shifts and parts of shifts he has worked during such two weeks. Upon the average earnings of any workman for two weeks being ascertained in accord- ance with this rule, the wages of such workman shall be adjusted and the amount found to be due to or from hfm ascertained and paid or debited to him as the case may be, and in the latter event the amount debited shall be deemed to be a payment on account of wages to become subsequently due to him. (2) In cases where workmen are working as partners on shares and pooling their earnings, no member of such partnership shall be entitled to be made up to the mini- mum rate if the average earnings per day of the set over the whole week shall amount to the Tni-niTimiTin rate. (3) In ascertaining the earnings of workmen employed upon piecework for the pur- poses of the mi-nimiim wage there shall not be deducted from the gross earnings for the helper more than the actual wages paid to the helper by the workman. All rates of wages so paid to the helper by the workman shall be registered with the management. No workman on piecework shaU, without the consent of the management, fix the wage paid to Ms helper at more than a standard rate of 6d. (12.2 cents) per day, plus percen- tage, above the minimum standard rate fixed for the class of helper in schedule 1. 8. Should any question arise as to whether any particular workman employed underground is a workman to whom the minimum rate is to apply, or whether a work- man has failed to comply with any of the conditions contained in these rules, or whether by noncompliance with any of these rules such workman has forfeited his right to the minimum rate, such question shall be decided in the following manner: (a) By agreement between the workman concerned and the official in chajge of the mine. Failing agreement, by two of&cials of the coUiery representing the employer on the one side and two members of the committee of the local lodge of the Workmen's Federation (or not more than two representatives appointed by them) on the other side. Again failing agreement, by the manager of the mine and the district miners' agent. (6) Still failing agreement, by an umpire to be selected by them (or if they disagree in the selection, by lot), without delay, from one of the panels constituted as herein- after .provided. Three panels of persons having a knowledge of mining to be prepared by the two chairmen of the employers' and workmen's representatives on the joint district board. One of such panels shall be constituted for questions arising in the Newiwrt district, one for questions arising in the Swansea district (including Pembroke- shire), one for questions arising in the Cardiff district. In case of difierence as to the constitution of any panel, such panel shall be settled by the independent chairman of the joint district board. The Newport district shall consist of collieries situated to the east of the Rumney River. The Swansea district shall consist of collieries situated westward of the Clyndi River, and of a Une drawn from the top of that river into the Neath River at Ystradvellte. The Cardiff district shall consist of coUieries situated between the Newport and the Swansea district. If required by either employer or workman, a panel may be revised at the end of every 12 months from the constitution thereof. For the determination of any question arising under this rule, the employers and workmen respectively shall be entitled to call such evidence as they may think proper before the person or persons who may have to determine such question, and such person or persons may make such inspec- tion of workings as he or they may deem necessary for the proper determination of the matter in question. Any questions that may arise for determination imder paragraph (a) of this rale shall be determined within a period of three clear days from the date upon which the question to be determined first arose, and any question to be determined by the umpire shall be determined within seven clear days from the said date, or such further time as the umpire shall appoint in writing. The colliery representative and the dis- trict miners' agent shall be entitled to attend and represent the employers and work- men, respectively, before the umpire. 9. A certificate in writing of any decision by any person or persons under the last preceding rule shall be given by such person or persons to both or either of the parties when requested, and such certificate shall be of conclusive evidence of the decision. Any certificate so given as to the infirmity of a workman may be canceled or varied MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS — GEEAT BRITAIN. 3 IS on the application of eitlier party after the expiration of six weeks from the date of the certificate. Any application to cancel or vary such certificate shall be determined as a question under the last preceding rule. The expenses and charges of the umpire shall be paid by the joint district board, and apportioned in the same manner as the expenses of the joint district board . 10. Except as expressly varied by these rules, all customs, usages, and conditions of employment existing at the respective coal mines to which these rules are applicable ehall remain in full force unless ordered by mutual agreement. 11. Overmen, traffic foremen, firemen, assistant firemen, brattice men, shot firers, master haulers, farriers, and persons whose duty is that of inspection or supervision are not workmen to whom the coal mines (minimum wage) act applies. 12. In the event of any question arising as to the construction or meaning of these rules, it shall be decided by the independent chairman of the joint district board. (Signed) St. Aldwyn. July 5, 1912. TEXT OF. LAWS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND DffiECTLY FIXING A MINIMUM WAGE. VICTORU. [Factories and shops act, 1912, No. 2386 (Dec. 7, 1912).] Minimum wage. Section 49. (1) No person whosoever unless in receipt of a weekly wage of at least 2s. 6d. (60.8 cents) shaU be employed in any factory. (2) No person whosoever unless related in the fijst or second degree by blood or marriage to the employer shall be employed outside a factory in wholly or partly preparmg or manufacturing any article for trade or sale unless in receipt of a weekly wage of at least 2s. 6d. (60.8 cents). Prohibition of certain premiums and guaranties. 191. Any person who either directly or indirectly or by any pretense or device requires or permits any person to pay or §ive or who receives from any person any consideration premium or bonus for engaging or employing any female as an appren- tice or improver in preparing or manufacturing articles of clothing or wearing apparel shall be guilty of an ofiense and shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not more than £10 ($48.67); and the person who pays or gives such consideration premium or bonus may recover the same in any court of competent jurisdiction from the person who received the same. 192. Any shopkeeper (other than a registered pharmaceutical chemist) who either directly or indirectly or by any pretense or device requires or permits any person to pay or give him or who receives from any person any consideration premium or bonus for engaging or employing any person in connection with the selling of goods or in connection with the business of a hairdresser or barber as an apprentice or improver in a shop shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not more than £,W ($48.67); and the person who pays or gives such con- sideration premium or bonus may recover the same in any court of competent jurisdiction from the person who received the same. 193. (1) Except with the consent of the minister in writing no person shall require or permit any person to pay any sum of money or enter into or make any guaranty or promise requiring or undertaking that such person shall pay any sum of money in the event of the behavior or attendance or obedience of any apprentice improver or employee not being at any time satisfactory to the employer. (2) Any such guaranty or promise as aforesaid or to the like effect entered into or made after the commencement of this act without the consent of the minister as aforesaid shall be null and void, and any person who without such consent makes or requires such guaranty or promise shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not exceeding £10 ($48.67). (3) Any sum which after the commencement of this act is paid m pursuance of such a guaranty or promise as aforesaid or to the like effect made in contravention of this section shall be returned to the person paying same; and the person who has so paid any such sum may if the same is not returned to him on demand recover the same with costs in any court of competent jurisdiction from the person who received the same. 314 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. NEW SOUTH WALES. [Minimum wage act, 1908 (Dec. 24, 1908).) Minimum wage. Section 4. No workman or shop assistant shall be employed unless in the receipt of a weekly wage of at least 4s. (97.3 cents), irrespective of any amount earned as overtime. Whosoever employs any such person in contravention of this section shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £,2 ($9.73). Sec. 5. Whosoever, either directly or indirectly, or by any pretense or device, requires or permits any person to pay or give, or receives from anjr person any con- sideration, premium, or bonus for the engaging or employing by him of any female in preparing, working at, dealing with, or manufacturing articles of clothing or wearing apparel for trade or sale shall be liable on conviction to a penalty not exceeding £10 ($48.67); and the person who has paid or given such consideration, premium, or bonus may recover the same in any court of competent jurisdiction from the person who received the same. ' QUEENSLAND. [Factories and shops act 1900 (Dec. 28, 1900) sec. 45, as amended by factories and shops act amendment act 1908 (Apr. 15, 1908) sec. 12.] Section 12. Subsection 1 of section 45 of the principal act is repealed, and the following subsection is inserted in lieu thereof: 1. Every person who is employed in any capacity in a factory or shop shall be entitled to receive from the occupier payment for his work at such rate as is agreed on, being not less than: (a) In the case of a person linder 21 years of age, a rate of 5s. ($1.22) per week during the first year of his employment, with an annual increase of not less than 2s. 6d. (61 cents) per week during each year of the next succeeding five years of his employ- ment in the same trade. (6) In the case of a person not under 21 years of age who has been employed in any capacity in a factory or factories or shop or shops for a period of not less than four years (whether such employment is continuous or not), a rate of not less than 15s. ($3.65) per week for the first year, and 17s. 6d. ($4.26) per week for the next and suc- ceeding years. Every such weekly wage shall be paid in sterling money, and shall not, under any circumstances or pretense or device whatsoever, be subject to any diminution BO as to reduce the amount thereof to a less sum than is hereinbefore prescribsd for each worker respectively. SOUTH AUSTRALIA. [Factories act, 1907 (Dec. 21, 1907).] Section 114. (1) No occupier of a factory shall pay any employee therein a weekly wage of less than 4s. (97.3 cents). Penalty, £10 ($48.67). Sec 115. (1) No person shall either directly or indirectly, or by any pretense or device — (a) Require or permit any person to pay or give, or (6) Receive from any person any consideration, premium, or bonus for engaging or employing a female as an ap- prentice or improver in preparing or manufacturing articles of clothing or wearing apparel. Penalty, £10 ($48.67). (2) The person who pays or gives such consideration, premium, or bonus may recover the same in a court of competent jurisdiction from the person who receives the same. Sec. 116. (1) Except with the consent in writing of the minister, no person shall require or permit any person — (a) To pay a sum of money; or (6) To enter into or make a guaranty or promise requiring or undertaking that such person shall pay a sum of money in the event of the behavior or attendance or obedience of an apprentice, improver, or employee not being satisfactory to the employer. Penalty, £10 ($48.67). MINIMUM-WAGE LAWS — SOUTH AUSTEALIA. 315 (2) Any such guaranty or promise, or a guaranty or promise to the like effect, entered into or made after the commencement of this act without such consent shall be void. (3) Any sum which after the commencement of this act is paid in contravention of this section shall, unless repaid upon demand, be recoverable with costs in a court of competent jurisdiction. TASMANIA. [Factories act 1911, sec. 63 (Jan. 10, 1912).] As to the payment of wages. 63. In order to prevent persons being employed in factories without reasonable remuneration in money the following provisions shall apply: I. Every person who is employed in any capacity in a factory shall be entitled to receive from the occupier such payment for his work as is agreed on, being not less than 4 s. (97 cents) a week for the first year of employment in the trade, 7 s. f$1.70) a week for the second year, and 10 s. ($2.43) a week for the third year, 13 s. ($3.16) a week for the fourth year, 16 s. ($3.89) a week for the fifth year, 19 s. ($4.62) a week for the sixth year, and thereafter not less than a wage of 20 s. ($4 .87) a week, unless such person is the holder of a license to work at a less wage under section 28 of the wages boards act, 1910. II. Such rate of payment shall in every case be irrespective of overtime. III. Such payment shall be made in full at not more than fortnightly intervals. rV. If the occupier makes default for seven days in the full and punctual payment of any money payable by him as aforesaid, he is liable to a fine not exceeding 5 s. ($1.22) for every day thereafter during which such default continues. V. Without affecting the other civil remedies for the recovery of money payable under this section to a person employed in a factory, civil proceedings for the recovery thereof may be taken by an inspector in the name and on behalf of the person entitled to payment, in any case where the inspector is satisfied that default in payment has been made. VI. No premium in respect of the employment of any person shall be paid to or be received by the occupier, whether such premium is paid by the person employed or by some oflier person; and if the occupier commits any breach of the provisions of this paragraph he is liable to a fine not exceeding £10, ($48.67). VII. In any case where a premium has been paid or received in breach of the last preceding paragraph, or where the occupier has made any deduction from wages, or received from tiie person employed or from any other person on his or her behalf any sum in respect of such premium or employment, then.irrespective of any fine to which he thereby becomes liable, the amount so paid, deducted, or received may be recovered from the occupier in civil proceedings instituted by an inspector in the name or on behaU of the person concerned. NEW ZEALAND. Provisions to secure reasonable remuneration to persons employed in factories. [The factories act, 1908 (Aug. 4, 1908).] Section 32 (as amended by act of Dec. 3, 1910). In order to prevent persons being employed in factories without reasonable remuneration in money, the following provisions shall apply: (a) Every person who is employed in any capacity in a factory shall be entitled to receive from the occupier such payment for his work as is agreed on, being not less than 53. ($1.22) a week for the first year of employment in the trade, 8s. ($1.95) a week for the second year, lis. ($2.68) a week for the third year, and so on by additions of 3s. (73 cents) a week for each year of employment in the same trade until a wage of 20a. ($4.87) a week is reached, and thereafter not less than a wage of 20s. ($4.87) a week. (aa) No deduction shall be made from the wages of any boy or any woman under 18 years of age, except for the time lost through the worker's illness or default, or on account of the temporary closing of the factory for cleaning or repairing the machinery. (5) Such rate of payment shall in every case be irrespective of overtime. * * * (J) No premium in respect of the employment of any person shall be paid to or received by the occupier, whether such premium is paid by the person employed or by some other person; and if the occupier commits any breach of the provisions of this paragraph he is liable to a fine not exceeding £10 ($48.67). 316 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. (g) In any case where a premium has been paid or received in breach of the last preceding paragraph, or where the occupier has made any deduction from wages, or received from the person employed or from any person on Ms or her behalf any sum in respect of such premium or employment, then, irrespective of any fins to which he thereby becomes liable, the amount so paid, deducted, or received may be recovered from the occupier in civil proceedings mstitated by an inspector in the name and on behalf of the person concerned. Section 9 (as amended by act of Dec. 3, 1910). In order to prevent shop assistants being employed in shops without reasonable remuneration in money, the following provisions shall apply: (a) Every person who is employed in any capacity in a shop shall be entitled to receive from the occupier payment for the work at such rate as is agreed upon, being in no case less than 5s. ($1.22) per week for the first year, Ss. ($1.95) per week for the second year, and lis. ($2.68) per week for the third year until a wage of 20s. ($4.87) a week is reached, and thereafter not less than 20s. ($4.87) a week. (5) Such rate of payment shall in every case be irrespective of overtime. * * * (/) No premium in respect of the employment of any shop assistant shall be paid to or be received by the occupier, whether such premium is paid by the shop assis1> ant employed by some other person; and if the occupier commits any breach of the provisions of this paragraph he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £10 ($48.67). (g) In any case where a premium has been paid or received in breach of the last preceding paragraph, or where the occupier has made any deduction from wages, or received from the shop assistant, or from any person on behalf of the shop assistant, any sum in respect of such premium or employment, then, irrespective of any fine to which he thereby becomes liable, the amount so paid, deducted, or received may be recovered from the occupier in civil proceedings instituted by the inspector in the name and on behalf of the shop assistant concerned. BILL RECOMMENDED BY NEW YORK STATE FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMMISSION. An Act to protect the health, morals and welfare of women and minors employed in indus- try by establishing a wage commission and providing for the determination of living wages for women and minors. Section 1. A State wage commission, hereinafter referred to as the commission, is hereby created, consisting of three commissioners, to be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, one of whom shall be designated by the governor as chairman. The commissioner of labor shall also be an ex officio member of the commission but shall not have a vote on orders, decisions, or deter- minations. The term of office of appointive members of the commission shall be for three years, except that the first members thereof shall be appointed for such terms that the term of one member shaE expire on January first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and on January first of every succeeding year. Successors shall be ap- pbinted in like manner for a fuU term of three jrears. Vacancies shall be filled in like manner by appointment for the unexpired time. The commission shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed. The commission shall publish an official bulletin from time to time and shall make an annual report to the legislature of its investigations and proc6edit^s on or about the first day of February. Sec. 2. The commission may appoint and remove a secretary and such other em- ployees as may be needed to carry out the provisions of this chapter. The authority, duties, and compensation of aU subordiaates and employees shall be fixed by the commission. Sec. 3. Each commissioner shall be paid ten dollars for each day's service. The commissioners and their subordinates shall be entitled to their actual and necessary expenses while travelinjg on the business of the commission. The salaries and com- pensation of the subordinates and aU. other expenses of the commission shall be paid out of the State treasury upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Sec. 4. The commission shall hold stated meetings at least once a month during the year and shall hold other meetings at such times and places as the needs of the public service may require, which meetings shaE be called by the chairman or by any two members of the commission. All meetings of the commission shall be open to the pubhc. The commission shall keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each commissioner upon every question and records of its examinations and other official action. MINIMUM-WAGE BILL NEW YORK. 317 Sec. 5. Any investigation, inquiry, or hearing which the commission is authorized to hold or undertake may be held or taken by or before any commissioner or the secretary, and the decision, determination, or order of a commissioner or the secre- tary, when approved and confirmed by the commission and ordered filed In its ofiice, shall be deemed to be the decision, determination, or order of the commission. Each commissioner and the secretary shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have power to administer oaths, certify to official acts, take afadavits and depositions, issue sub- poenas, compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, accounts, ■papers, records, and documents before the commission or before any wage board created pursuant to this chapter. Sec. 6. The commission shall adopt reasonable rules regulating and providing for the method of making investigations; the conduct of hearings, investigations, and inquiries; the organization and procedure of wage boards created pursuant to this chapter; and otherwise for carrying into effect the provisions of this chapter. Sec. 7. The commission or a commissioner or secretary or a wage board in making an investigation or inquiry or conducting a hearing shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure. Sec. 8. A subpoena shall be signed and issued by a commissioner or by the secre- tary of the commission and may be served by any person of full age in the same manner as a Bubpcena issued out of a court of record. If a person fails, without reasonable cause, to attend in obedience to a subpoena, or to be sworn or examined or answer a question or produce a book or paper, or to subscribe and swear to his deposition after it has been correctly reduced ia writing, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Sec. 9. If a person in attendance before the commission or a commissioner or the secretary, or before any wage board, refuses, without reasonable cause, to be examined or to answer a legal and pertiaent question or to produce a book or paper, when ordered so to do by the commission or a commissioner or the secretary, the commission may apply to a justice of the supreme court upon proof by affidavit of the facts for an order returnable in not less than two nor more than five days directing such person to show cause before the justice who made the order, or any other justice of the supreme court, why he should not be committed to jail. Upon the return of such order the justice shall examine under oath such person and give him an opportunity to be heard; and if the justice determines that he has refused without reasonable cause or legal excuse to be examined or to answer a legal and pertinent question, or to produce a book or paper which he was ordered to bring, he may forthwith, by warrant, commit the offender to jail, there to remain until he submits to do the act which he was so required to do or is discharged according to law. Sec. 10. Each witness who appears in obedience to a subpcena before the commis- sion or a commissioner or the secretary , or before a wage board or person employed by the commission to obtain the. required information, shall receive for his attendance the fees and mileage provided for witnesses in civil cases in the supreme court, which shall be audited and paid from the State treasury in the same manner as other ex- penses of the commission. A witness subpoenaed at the instance of a party other than the commission, a commissioner, the secretary, or wage board or person acting under the authority of the commission, shall be entitled to fees or compensation from the State treasury, if the commission certify that his testimony was material to the matter investigated, but not otherwise. Sec. 11. The commission may cause depositions of witnesses residing within or without the State to be taken in the manner prescribed by law for like depositions in civil actions in the supreme court. Sec. 12. Upon request of the commission, the commissioner of labor shall cause the bureau of statistics and information or other bureaus of the department of labor to gather such statistics and information as the commission may require. Sec. 13. Every employer of woinen and minors shall keep a register of the names and addresses of and the wages paid to all women and minors employed by him, the occupation of each and the number of hours that they are employed by the day or by the week, and their actual working hours for such penods, and every such employer shall on request, permit the commission or any of its members or its sec- retary or agents to inspect such register. Every such employer shall also furnish in writing to the commission any information concerning the foregoing matters that the commission may require. Sec. 14. The terms "living wage" or "living wages" shall mean wages sufficient to supply the necessary cost of living and to maintain the worker in health, and where the words "minimum wage" or "minimum wages" are used in this act they shall be deemed to have the same meaning as "living wage " or 'living wages." Sec. 15. The commission shall have power to investigate wages and working con- ditions in any occupation in the State in order to determine whether living wages are 318 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. paid to women and minors employed therein. Such, investigation shall also be made at the request of not less than one hundred persons engaged in any occupation in which any women or minors are employed. The names of the persons making such request shall not be made public. Sec. 16. If after such investigation the commission has reason to believe that a sub- stantial number of women and minors employed in the occupation investigated receive less than living wages, the commission shall establish a wage board consisting of an equal number of representatives of employers in the occupation in question and of persons to represent such employees in said occupation and of one or more disin- terested persons appointed by the commission to represent the public. So far as practicable the selection of members representing employers and employees shall be through election by employers and employees affected, respectively. The commis- sion mall designate the chairman from among the representatives of the public and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all questions arising with reference to the validity of the procedure and of the determination of the board. The members of wage boards shall be compensated at the same rate as jurors in civil cases in the su- preme court in the county of New York and shall be allowed the necessary traveling and clerical expenses incurred in the performance of their duties, which shall be paid as are the expenses of the commission. Sec. 17. Each wage board shall have access to all of the statistics and information gathered by the commission with reference to wages and conditions in any occupa- tion under investigation and any other data pertinent thereto. Each wage board shall, after a careful investigation and after such public hearings as it finds necessary, endeavor to determine the amount of the living wage, whether by time rate or piece rate, suitable for a female employee of ordinary ability in such occupation or any or all of the branches thereof, and also suitable minimum wages for learners and apprentices and for minors below the a^e of eighteen years. In determining such living wage the board may take into consideration the financial condition of the indus- try and distribute any advance in wages that may be found necessary, to take effect at specified intervals. If the majority of the members of the wage board agree upon such wage determinations, they shall report such determinations to the commission, together with a statement of the reasons therefor and facts relating thereto. Sec. 18. If the commission deems proper, it may, after it receives the report of a wage board, recommit the subject or any part thereof to the same or to a new wage board. If the report of a wage board is accepted by the commission, a summary of its findings and determinations shall be published in the bulletin of the commission and in such other manner as the commission may deem advisable. Copies of the full report of the wage board, together with the testimony taken before it, shall be kept on file at the office of the commission and open to public inspection. The com- mission shall hold a public hearing on the report of the wage board, notice of which shall be published in such newspapers as the board may prescribe, at least once, not less than thirty days prior thereto, and given by mail to all parties in interest who have filed requeste therefor with the commission. The commission, upon considera- tion of the report and findings of the wage board and the testimony taken at the pub- lic hearing, shall then determine the amount of the living wage by time rate or piece rate suitable for a female employee of ordinary ability in the occupation investigated, or any or all of the branches thereof, and also suitable minimum wages for learners and apprentices and for minors below the age of eighteen years. The commission shall fix a time when its determination of such living wage shall take effect, which shall be not less than thirty days from the date of entry of such determination. In determining such living wage the commission may take into consideration the finan- cial condition of the industry and distribute any advance in wage that may be found necessary to take effect at specific intervals. A summary of the findings of the com- mission and its determinations and recommendations shall be published in the bul- letin of the co mm ission and in such newspapers as the commission may prescribe and in such other manner as the commission may deem advisable. A summary of such findings, determinations, and recommendations shall be mailed to all persons who have filed rejjuests therefor with the commission. If the wage board fails to submit a report within a reasonable time fixed by the commission, the subject may be referred to a new wage board, or the commission itself, after notice that the board has failed to make any determinations or recommendations, may proceed to hold a public hearing and determine the amount of the living wage in the manner herein- before provided. Sec. 19. In any occupation or branch thereof in which a minimum time rate of wages only has been fixed, the commission may issue to a woman physically detective a special license authorizing her employment for a wage less than the legal minimum MINIMUM-WAGE BILL NEW YOEK. 319 wage: Provided, That the number of such licensees shall not exceed one-tenth of the entire number of women and minor workers in any establishment. Sbc. 20. Whenever a miaimum-wage rate has been established In any occupation, the coramission may, upon petition of either employers or employees, reconvene the wage board or establish a new wage board and any recommendation made by such board or action thereby shall be dealt with ia the same manner as the recommendation or act of a wage board under sections seventeen and eighteen hereof. Sec. 21. The commisedon may inquire into wages paid to minors iu any occupation in which the majority of employees are minors and may, after giving public hearings, determine the Tninimnm ^vage suitable for such minors. When the commission has made such a determination it shall proceed in the same manner as if the determination had been recommended to the commission by a wage board. Sec. 22. The commission shall from time to time make inquiry to determine whether employers in each occupation investigated are obeying its orders and deter- minations and shall publish in such newspapers as it may designate the names of those employers who fail to comply therewith. The type in which the employers' names shall be printed shall not be smaller than that in which the news matter of the paper is printed. Such publication may also be made in any other manner that the commission may determine to be necessary or proper. Sec. 23. Any newspaper neglecting to publish the findings, orders, determinations, recommendations or notices of the cpmmission at its regular rates for the space taken shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars for each offense. Sec. 24. No member of the commission and no newspaper publisher, proprietor, editor, or employee thereof, and no other person shall be hable to an action for dam- ages for publishing the name of any employer in accordance with the provisions of this act, unless such publication contains some willful misrepresentation. Sec. 25. Any employer who discharges or in any other manner discriminates against any employee because such employee has testified or is about to testify, or has served or IS about to serve upon a wage board, or is or has been active in the formation thereof, or has given or is about to give information concerning the conditions of such em- ployee's employment, or because the employer believes that the employee may testify or may serve upon a wage board, or may give information concerning the conditions of the employee's employment in any investigation or proceeding relative to the enforce- ment of this act, shah be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars and not more than one thousand dollars for each offense. Sec. 26. This act shall take effect October first, nineteen hundred and fifteen. A SELECT LIST OF REFERENCES TO BOOKS AND PERIODICALS (IN ENGLISH) ON THE MINIMUM WAGE. BIBLIOGRAPHIES. New York (City) Public library. The minimum wage, a preUmLaary list of selected references. 1913. 9 p. Pearson, P. M., ed. Intercollegiate debates. N. Y., Hinds, cl913. v. 3 (Contains debate between Oklahoma University and Missouri University, and a debate at Ottawa University, with list of references, p. 81-184) Reeder, C. W. Bibliography on the minimum wage. (In Ohio Industrial commis- sion. Dept. of investigation and statistics. Report No. 1, 1914, p. 23-33) Williamson, C. 0. A list of selected references on the minimum wage. Reprint of Appendix IV to 3d report of the New York State factory investigating commis- sion. Albany, 1914, p. 387-113. PERIODICAL REFERENCES. Abbott, Edith. Women's wages in Chicago; some notes on available data. (Journal of political economy, v. 21; p. 143-158, Feb. 1913) Bosworth, L. M. The living wage of women workers; a study of incomes and expend- itures of 450 women workers in the city of Boston. Philadelphia, 1911. 90 p. (Suppl. to the Annals of the American academy of political and social science. May, 1911) Brown, H. La Rue. Massachusetts and the minimum wage. (Annals of the American academy of political and social science, v. 48: 13-21. July, 1913) The case for the minimum wage. Articles by Florence Kelley [and others] (Survey, V. 33: 487-515, Feb. 6, 1915J Country labour and the minimum wage. (Economist, v. 76: 1283-84, May 24, 1913) Dilke, C. W. Sweating and minimum wage. (International, v. 1: 5-12, Dec. 1907) Evans, E. G. A case for minimum wage boards. (1) Experience vs. prophecy; (2) The system on trial. (Survey, v. 31: 440-441; 497^98, Jan. 10 and 24, 1914) The social aspects of the public regulation of wages [Together with] Discussion. (American economic review, v. 5, no. 1, Suppl. Mar., 1915. p. 270-299) Gough, G. W. The wages boards of Victoria. (Economic journal, v. 15: 361-373, Sept. 1905) Hammond, M. B. Wages boards in Australia. (Quarterlyjoumal of economics, v. 29: 98-148; 326-361, Nov. 1914 and F«b. 1915) Judicial interpretation of the minimum wage in Australia. (American eco- nomic review, v. 3: 259-286, June, 1913) The minimum wage in Great Britain and Australia. (Annals of the American academy of political and social science, v. 48: 22-36, July, 1913) Holcombe, A. N. British minimum wages act of 1909. (Quarterly journal of eco- nomics, V. 24: 574-77, May, 1910) The legal minimum wagp in the U. S. (American economic review, v. 2: 21-37, _ March, 1912) Keiley, Florence. Minimum wage boards. (American journal of sociology, v. 17- 303-314, Nov. 1911) Minimum wage laws. (Joumalof political economy, v. 20: 999-1010, Dec. 1912) 82843°— Bui. 167—15 21 321 322 BtTLLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. Kellogg, P. U. Immigratioii and the minimuin wage. (Annals of the American academy of political and social science, v. 48: 66-77, July 1913) Kennaday, Paul. Victorian wage boards and the New Zealand conciUation-arbitra- tion act. (Yale review, v. 19: 32-54, May 1910) Mallon, J. J. Sweating and the Trade boards act. (Progress, v. 7: 157-169, July 1912) The legal minimum wage work. (New Statesman, v. 2, Suppl. X-XII, Feb. 21, 1914) Markham, A. B. The coal strike. (Quarterly review, v. 216: 554-73, 1912) Millis, H. A. Some aspects of the minimum wage. (Journal of political economy, V. 22: 132-159, Feb. 1914) The minimum wage. (General discussions.) (American labor legislation review, v. 3: 92-115, Feb. 1913) The minimum wage act; a substantial review of the text of the British coal mine act. (Engineering magazine, v. 43: 451-453, June 1912) Minimum wage legislation; both sides, a debate. (Independent, v. 80: 409, Dec. 14, 1914) Minimum wage legislation of 1913. (American Labor legislation review, v. 3: 434r-37 Oct. 1913) National retail dry goods association. Bulletin on miriihium wage. (Special, no. 6. Jan. 10, 1914) Annual report . . of secretary. (Special, No. 7, Jan. 12, 1914) Persons, C. E. Women's work and wages in the United States. (Quarterly journal of economics, v. 29: 201-234, Feb. 1915) Pigou, A. C. Minimum wage for agriculture. (Nineteenth century and after, v. 74: 1167-1184, Dec. 1913) Bowntree, B. S. The effect of minimum wage legislation upon British industry. (Financial review of reviews. July, 1914. p. 774r-785) Ryan, J. A. Minimum wage and the minimum wage boards. (Survey, v. 24: 810- 20, Sept. 3, 1910) Seager, H. R. Thetheory of the minimum wage. (American labor l^jalation review, V. 3: 81-91, Feb. 1913) Smith, Constance. Working of the Trade boards act in Great Britain & Ireland. (Journal of political economy, v. 22: 605-629, July, 1914) Webb, Sydney. The economic theory of a legal miTiimiiTn wage. (Journal of polit- ical economy, v. 20: 973-998, Dec. 1912) Wise, E. F. Wage boards in England. (American economic review, v. 2: 1-20, Mar. 1912) Working conditions in New York stores. (National civic federation review, v. 4: 1-32, July 15, 1913) BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS. Andrews, I. O. ... Minimum wage legislation . . . Albany, Lyon, 1914. 219 p. (Reprinted from Appendix III of the 3d report of the New York State factory investigating commission.) Australia. Bureau of census and statistics. Legislative regulation of wages and terms of contract. [In its Official yearbook. 1901-1912. p. 1030-40) (Tribunals for the regulation of wages . . p. 1038-39) Brandeis, L. D. ... Frank C. Stettler, plaintiff in error, vs. Edwin V. O'Hara . . . constituting the [Oregon] Industrial welfare commission, defendants in error. Brief for defendants . ., Louis D. Brandeis, Counsel. New York, [1915] 398 p. At head of title: Supreme Court of the U. S. October term, 1914. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION LIST OF BEFERENOES. 323 Brown, R. G. Minimum wage cases. Frank C. Stettler, vs. Edwin V. O'Hara . . . Brief and argument for plaintiffs in error. Minneapolis, 1914. 106 p. Supreme court of the U. S. October term, 1914. No. 507. The minimum wage, with particular reference to the legislative minimum wage under the Minnesota statute of 1913 . . . Bev. ed. Minneapolis, Minn., The Review pub. co., 1914. 98 p. Central debating league. The minimum wage; a debate . . . University of Chicago in the 16th annual contests of the Central debatii^ league against Michigan and Northwestern, Jan. 17, 1914, question: "Resolved, that the states should estab- lish a schedule of minimum wages for unskilled labor, constitutionality con- ceded." (Chicago, The Delta sigma rho, 1914. 51 p.) Chapin, R. C. ... The standard of living among workingmen's families in New York City . . . New York, Charities publication committee, 1909. 372 p. (Rus- sell Sage foundation publications) Clark, v. S. Minimum wage boards. {In his The labour movement in Australasia; a study in social-democracy. N. Y., Holt, 1906. p. 138-153) Colorado. State wage board. First report for the biennial period ending November 30, 1914. Denver, 1914. 28 p. Connecticut. Ccynvmission to investigate conditions of wage-earning women and minors. Report . . . Special act number 276. Report presented to the general assembly of 1913. Hartford; Published by the State, 1913. 297 p. Consumers' league of Oregon. Social survey committee. Report . . on the wages, hours and conditions of work and cost and standard of living of women wage earners in Oregon with special reference to Portland . . . Portland, Keystone press, 1913. 71 p. Cotterill, C. C. A living wage, a national necessity . . . London, Fifield, 1912. 86 p. Gt. Brit. Bd. of Trade. Trade boards act, 1909. Memoranda in reference to the work- ing of the trade boards act . . . London, H. M. Stationery off., 1913. 28 p. (Parliament, 1913. H. of C. Repts. and papers No. 134) — — • Trade boards act, 1909. Memorandum explaining the principal provisions. [London, 1913]. 3 p. Hom^ dept. Report to the secretary of state for the Home department on the wages hoards and industrial conciliation and arbitration acts of Australia and New Zealand. By Ernest Aves. London, 1908. 226 p. (Cd. 4167.) Parliament. House of commons. Select committee on home worh. Report . . , together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence . . Or- dered ... to be printed 8 August, 1907. London, 1907-8. 247 p. (Par- liament, 1907. H. of C. Repts. and papers 290) Select committee on trade hoards act provisional orders hill. Special reports . . . together with the proceedings and the minutes of evidence London, 1913. 61 p. (209) ■ Report and special report . . . London, 1914. 205 p. (317) Kansas City, Mo., Board of public welfare. Bureau of labor statistics. Report on the wage-earning women of Kansas City . . . and the Annual report of the Factory inspection dept. for the year April 15, 1912-April 21, 1913. Kansas City, 1913. 106 p. Kelley, Florence. The present status of minimum wage legislation. New York, National consumers' league, 1913. 7 p. Kentucky. Commission to investigate the conditions of working women. Report . . . Frankfort (?), 1911. 55 p. McSweeney, E. T. The case against the minimum wage . . before the 5th meeting of the executive council of 1911-12, Massachusetts State board of trade. February 14, 1912. Boston, 1912. 23 p. 324 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. Mallon, J. J. The caae for wages boards. {In International conference of conaumers' leagues, 1st, Geneva, 1908. [Compte rendu] p. 429-449) Extending the Trade boards act . . . London, 1913. 10 p. Minimum wage in practice . . . n. p., 1914. 12 p. Massachusetts. Commission on minimum wage boards. Report . . . January, 1912. Boston, 1912. 326 p. (H. doc. 1697) Minimum wage commission. Bulletin No. 1 — January, 1914 — Boston. No. 1. Wages of women in the brush factories of Massachusetts, 1914. No. 2. Wages of women in the corset factories of Massachusetts, 1914. No. 3. Statement and decree concerning the wages of women in the bruahindua- try in Massachusetts, 1914. No. 4. Wages of women in the candy factories in Massachusetts, 1914. No. 5. Wages of women in the laundries in Massachusetts, 1914. Michigan. Dept. of labor. Special investigation of working conditions of over 1500 women and girls. (In its 30th Annual report for 1912-13. p. 22-28; 29-81) Minnesota academy of social sciences. Papers and proceedings of the 6th annual meeting of the Minnesota academy of social sciences . . . Mankato, Minn., 1913. 246 p. (Its Publications, v. 6, no. 6. State regulation of prices and wages.) Mitchell, John. The wage earners and the minimum wage for women and children. (In Ms The wage earner and his problems. Washington, Ridsdale, 1913. p. 90-104) Money, L. G. Chiozza. The minimum wage in practice. (Jn his Future of work . . . London, Unwin, 1914. p. 174r-194) ^ A minimum wage in agriculture. (In his Future of work . . . London, Unwin, 1914. p. 162-173) National anti-sweating league. Annual report. 1st, 1907- London, 1908- — — Sweated workers and trade boards . . . London, 1913. 11 p. National committee for the prevention of destitution . . . The case for the national minimum . . . London, 1913. 89 p. New South Wales. Dept. of labour and industry. Report on the working of the fac- tories and shops act; early closing act; minimum wage act . . . during 1911- Sydney, 1912- [Reports accompanied by awards are issued also in New South Wales industrial gazette.] New York (State) Factory investigating commission. Outline of a proposed plan for a wage investigation. New York, 1913. 15 p. 3d report . . . 1914. Albany, 1914. 676 p. (Forthcoming) 4th report. 1914. (Contains wage investigation.) New Zealand. Department of labour. Awards, recommendations, agreements, etc., made under the Industrial conciliation and arbitration act ... v. 1- Aug., 1894- WeUington, 1901- — Digest of decisions and interpretations of the Court of arbitration under the Industrial conciliation and arbitration acts, comp. and ed. by D. M. FLndlay . . Wellington, 1909. 62 p. Suppl. No. 1- 1909- Wellington, 1910- Ohio. Industrial commission. Department of investigation and statistics. Report. Columbus, 0., 1914. No. 1. "Wages and hours of labor of women and girls employed in mercantile establishments in Ohio in 1913." Oregon. Bureau of labor statistics . . . Wages and occupations of female workers. (In iti 5th biennial report. 1913. p. 54-56.) Circuit court. Frank C. Stettler, plaintiff, vs. Edwin V. O'Hara, Bertha Moores . . . constituting the Industrial welfare commission of the State of Oregon, defendants. Opinion of Hon. T. J. Cleeton, judge of the above entitled court . . . Portland, 1913. 11 p. MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATION LIST OF EBPEEENCES. 325 Oregon. Industrial welfare commission . . . Frank 0. Stettler, plaintiff and appellant vs. Edwin V. O'Hara . . . constituting the Industrial welfare commission of the State of Oregon, defendants and respondents. Respondents' brief . . . Portland, 1913. 78 p. ■ Biennial report. 1st- 1913-14- Salem, 1915- Orders. No. 1- 1913- Report on the power laundries industry in Portland. Salem, 1914. 52 p. Queensland. Department of labour. Wages and working hours. (In its Report, 1913- Brisbane,' 1913-) Department of public works. [Wages boards in Queensland. Proceedings under The wages boards act of 1908.] Brisbane, 1909-1910. 40 numb, leaflets. Reeves, W. P. The minimum wage law in Victoria and South Australia and indus- trial arbitration. (In his State experiments in Australia and New Zealand. London, Richards, 1902, v. 2: p. 47-181) Ryan, J. A. A living wage, its ethical and economic aspects. N. Y., Macmillan, 1906. 361 p. Shop assistants union (England). The case for minimum wages in the distributive trades. April, 1914. Smith, Constance. The case for wages boards. London, National anti-sweating league, 1913. 94 p. Snowden, Philip. The living wage . . . London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1912. 189 p. Appendices: B. The Trade boards act, 1909. — 0. The Coal mines (Mini- mum wage) act, 1912. South Africa. Economic commission. The question of legal minimum wages and allied questions. (In its Report, Jan., 1914. Pretoria, 1914. p. 41—46) South Australia. Chief inspector of factories. Report, 1912- Adelaide. Streightoff, F. H. The living wage. (In his The standard of living among the indus- trial people of America. Boston, Houghton, 1911. p. 154-162) Tasmania. Chief inspector of factories. First annual report, 1911-12 — Tasmania, 1912 — Tawney, R. H. Studies in the minimum wage. No. 1. The establishment of mini- mum rates in the chain-making industry under the Trade boards act of 1909. London, 1914. (No. 2. The establishment of minimum rates in the tailoring trade. Announced for early publication.) TJ. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletins. No. 38 — Jan., 1902. Victoria, Report of the chief inspector of factories, work- rooms and shops for the year ended 31st Dec, 1900. No. 40 — ^May, 1902. Working of compulsory conciliation and arbitration laws in New Zealand and Victoria. — ^The compulsory arbitration act of New South Wales. No. 49 — Nov., 1903. Labor conditions in New Zealand, by V. S. Clark. No. 56 — ^Jan., 1905. Labor conditions in Australia, by V. S. Clark. No. 80— Jan., 1909. Minimum wage act, 1908, New South Wales. No. 86— Jan., 1910. British Trade boards act, 1909. No. 91 — Nov., 1910. Working hours of wage-earning women in selected indus- tries in Chicago, by M. L. Obenauer. No. 96 — Sept., 1911. Working hours, earnings and duration of employment of women workers in selected industries of Maryland and California, by M. L. Obenauer. No. 116 — Hours, earnings, and duration of employment of wage-earning women in selected industries in the District of Columbia, by M. L. Obenauer. No. 119 — Working hours of women in the pea canneries of Wisconsin, by M. L. Obenauer. No. 122 — Employment of women in power laundries in Milwaukee, by M. L. Obenauer. 326 BTTLLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin^ — ^Concluded. No. 146 — ^Wages and regularity of employment in the dress and waist industry in New York City. No. 147 — Wages and regularity of employment in the cloak, suit and skirt indus- try .. . No. 160 — Hours, earnings, and conditions of labor of women in Indiana mercan- tile establishments and garment factories, by M. L. Obenauer. Report on condition of woman and child wage earners in the U. S. Wash- ington, 1910-13. Contents: v. 1. Cotton textile industry. — ^v. 2. Men's ready- made clothing. — ^v. 3. Glass industry. — v. 4. Silk industry. — v. 5. Wage- earning women in stores and factories. — v. 16. Family budgets of typical cotton- mill workers. — ^v. 18. Employment of women and children in selected industries. Victoria, Australia. Chief inspector of factories. Report . . 1912- Melbourne. Washington (State) Industrial welfare commission. Biennial report. 1st. 1913- 1914. Olympia, 1915. Order No. 1, 1914. Report of the commission on wages, conditions of work and cost and stand- ards of living of women wage earners in Washington. Olympia, March, 1914. nip. Report of survey of wages, hours and conditions of work of women wage earners in the telephone and telegraph industry . . . Olympia, 1914. 11 p. Webb, Sidney, and Webb, Beatrice. The national minimum (In their Industrial democracy. London, Longmans, 1902. p. 766-795) Western Australia. Colonial secretary's office. Reports of proceedings before the boards of conciliation and the court of arbitration ... v. 1- Perth, 1904- Table showing minimum wages -established under awards ... up to Dec. 31, 1911. (In Reports of Proceedings before the boards of conciliation . . v. 10- Perth, 1912-) Wisconsin. Industrial commission. Women and children in industry. Data for women's clubs and other civic organizations. Madison, 1914. 22 p. MINIMUM- WAGE LEGISLATION. LAWS IN FORCE FIXING A MINIMUM WAGE OR PROVIDING FOR THE CREATION OF AGENCIES FOR FIXING A, MINIMUM WAGE. Australasia. Australia (Commonwealth). Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act, 1904, enacted Dec. 15, 1904. Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act, 1909, enacted Dec. 13, 1909. Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act, 1910, enacted Aug. 29, 1910. Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration act, 1911, enacted Nov. 23, 1911. New South Wales. Industrial arbitration act, 1912, enacted Apr. 15, 1912. Minimum wage act, 1908, enacted Dec. 24, 1908 (fixing legislative minimum wage). Queensland. Industrial peace act, 1912, enacted Dec. 7, 1912. Factories and shops act, 1900, eniacted Dec. 28, 1900 (fixing legislative minimum wage). Factories and shops act amendment act, 1908, enacted Apr. 15, 1908 (fixing legis- lative minimum wage). South Australia. Factories act, 1907, enacted Dec. 21, 1907. Factories act amendment act, 1908, enacted Dec. 23, 1908. Factories act amendment act, 1910, enacted Dec. 7, 1910. Industrial arbitration act, 1912, enacted Dec. 19, 1912. MINIMUM-WAGE LEGISLATION LIST OF KEFERENCES. 327 Tasmania. Wages boards act, 1910, enacted Jan. 13, 1911. Wages boards act, 1911, enacted Sept. 14, 1911. Factories act, 1911, enacted Jan. 10, 1912 (fixing legislative minimum wage). Victoria. Factories and shops act, 1912, enacted Dec. 7, 1912. Factories and shops act, 1912 (No. 2), enacted Dec. 31, 1912. Factories and shops act amendment act, 1914, enacted Nov. 2, 1914. Western Australia. Industrial arbitration act, 1912, enacted Dec. 21, 1912. New Zealand. Industrial conciliation and arbitration act, 1908, enacted Aug. 4, 1908. Industrial conciliation and arbitration act amendment act, 1908, enacted Oct. 10, 1908. Industrial conciliation and arbitration act amendment act, 1910, enacted Dec. 3, 1910. Industrial conciliation and arbitration act amendment act, 1911, enacted Oct. 28, 1911. Factories act, 1908, enacted Aug. 4, 1908. Factories act, 1910, enacted Dec. 3, 1910. Shops and offices act, 1908, enacted Aug. 4, 1908. Shops and offices amendment act, 1910, enacted Dec. 3, 1910. These laws may be found in the following publications: Statutes of the various States. Annuaire de la legislation du travail (Belgium). International labor office Bulletia (French, German, English editions). Germany. Home work act {Hausarheitgesetz) of Dec. 20, 1911. (Not a minimum wage act, but authorizes the establishment of trade boards for advisory purposes for certain branches of industry and in certain localities where home workers are employed.) Great Britain. Trade boards act, 1909. An act to provide for the establishment of trade boards for certain trades. 20 Oct., 1909. (9 Edw. 7, ch. 22.) (In U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin No. 86, 1910. p. 185-191.) • (In Quarterly journal of economics May, 1910. v. 24 : 578-88.) (In Andrews, I. O. Minimum- wage legislation. Reprinted from Appen- dix III of the 3d report of the New York State factory investigating commission. 1914. p. 169-181.) Trade boards provisional orders confirmation act, 1913. An act to confirm certain provisional orders made by the Board of Trade under the trade boards act, 1909 [15th Aug., 1913]. 5 p. Coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912. An act to provide a minimum wage in the case of workmen employed underground in coal mines . . . 29th Mar., 1912. (2 Geo. 5, ch. 2.) (In Bulletin of the International labor office (English ed.) v. 7, 1912. p. 109-112.) (In Andrews, I. O. Minimum wage legislation. 1914. p. 182-187.) United States. California. Industrial welfare commission. (Laws of 1913, ch. 324.) Colorado. State wage board. (Laws of 1913, ch. 110.) Massachusetts. Minimum wage commission. (Ch. 7Q6, acts of 1912, as amended by chs. 330 and 673, acts of 1913.) Minnesota. Minimum wage commission. (Laws of 1913, ch. 547.) 328 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEATJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. Nebraska. Minimum wage commission. (Laws of 1913, ch. 211.) Oregon. Industrial welfare commission. (Laws of 1913, ch. 62.) Utah. No board. Commissioner of immigration, labor and statistics charged with enforcement of law. (Laws of 1913, ch. 63.) Washington. Industrial welfare commission. (Laws of 1913, ch. 174.) Wisconsin. Industrial commission, (Laws of 1913, ch. 712.) The laws creating these minimum wage boards may also be found in Bulletin No. 5 of the legislative reference department of the Michigan State library, and in "Mini- mum-wage legislation," by I. 0. Andrews, reprinted from Appendix III of the Third report of the New York State factory investigating commission. 1914. INDEX. A. Page. Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of, diSerent States 33, 34 Aged, slow, or infirm workers. New South Wales 148, 154 Aged, slow, or infirm workers, permits for 10, 32, 66,91, 100 American Federation of Labor, attitude of, on the legal minimum wage 103 Apprentices Emd learners, fixing proportion of, Australia 9 Apprentices and learners, fixing proportion of, Washington 80, 92, 93 Apprentices and learners, gradedTscaleofpayof, ready-made clothing, Great Britain 10, 11 Apprentices and learners, substandard mmimum provided for 12 Apprentices, award of industrial board, sawmills. New South Wales 152 Apprenticeship rules, conferences of industrial welfare commission, Washington 91-95 Australia: Arbitration court, powers of. 108, 109 Arbitration court system 107-109 Basis of minimum-wage rates 9 Boards authorized and constituted, and agreements, awards, and determinations in force, 1914. . 116 Conciliation, special provisions lor 114 Decisions of wage tribunals, enforcement, appeals, duration, etc., of 112, 113 Establishing or fixing the minimum wage, method of 6, 7, 106, 107 Industrial agreements 108 Industrial agreements, awards, etc., number of, 1914 8,9 Industrial unions 107, 108 Industries to which acts apply Ill Laws, comparative analysis of 109-114 Laws in force and dates of enactmeot 6, 6, 109, 110, 326, 327 Laws in force, text of 210-258,313-315 Leg^lation, history of, Victoria 119-122 Minimum-wage acts, effect of 117-119 Operation of the minimum-wage law, Victoria 133-138 Strikes and lockouts, provision against 113, 114 Union labor, preference for 113 Wage determmations, effect of, in iacreasing wages 129-132 Wage tribunals, name, creation, membership, etc., of 110-112 Wages, average weekly, before and after determination of minimum wage, Victoria 130, 131 Wages, average weekly, in indxistries subject to the determinations of special boards, Victoria, 1896 to 1900 129 Wages, average weekly, of all employees before wage board determinations, and in 1913, Victoria 131,132 Wages boards and arbitration laws, operations under 114-117 Wages boards, mode of constituting, and of making wage determinations, Victoria 122-124 "' 5-board system 105-107 5 boards, typical awards of, Victoria 124-129 y js, changes m, methods by which effected, and workpeople concerned 118, 119 Australia and New Zealand, minimum-wage legislation in 104-173 B. Basis to be used in minimum-rate fixing, different States 9, 12, 32 Basis. (See atoo Cost of living.) Bibliography and references, select list of. 321-328 Boot tradle, wage determinations of special boards^ Victoria 125, 126 Boy labor and birth certificates, award of industrial board, sawmills. New South Wales 152, 153 Brass workers, wage determinations of special boards, Victoria 124, 125 Bricklayers, wage determinations of special boards, Victoria 126, 127 Brush industry in Massachusetts, wage board report on 47, 48 Brush makers' wage board, Massachusetts, condensed preliminary report of 44-52 Brush makers' wage board, Massachusetts, first findings and determmations of 62 C. California: Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of 33 Basis of minimum-wage rates : 32 Constitutional amendment authorizing legislature to establish minimum wage 191 Employees to whom the laws may apply 31 Enforcement of the law 38 Industries covered 31 laws in force and dates of enactment 6,31,327 Laws in force, text of. 187-191 Operation of the minimum-wage law 39, 40 Procedure in fixing minimum wage 34 Bates below standard minimum, provision of law as to, and licenses lor defectives 32 Canneries, average monthly wages of women in, Oregon 25 Canning and preserving, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States. . 19 Cans and boxes, tin, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts, United States 19 Cardboard box trade, wage determioation of special boards, Victoria — 127 329 330 INDEX, Page. Cigar boxes, female worSers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States. . . ' 19 Cigarettes, female worlcers earning less than specified weekly amounts, trnited States 19 Cigars, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 Clocks and watches, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts, United States 19 Clothing, men's ready-made, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States :. 18 Clothing, ready-made, award of trade board as to learners and time rates in. Great Britain 180-183 Coalmines (minimum wageVact, 1912, Great Britain 11 Coal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912, Great Britain, text of .' 305-308 Coal mines (minimum wage) act. Great Britain, typical award under '. 308-313 Colorado: Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of 33 Basis of minimum-wage rates 32 Cost of living, for self-supporting women, Denver and other cities 40 Employees to whom law may apply 31 Enforcement of the law 38 Industries covered 31 Laws in force and dates of enactment 6, 31,327 Laws in force, text of. 191-193 Operation of the minimum-wage laws 40 Procedure in fixing minimum wage 34, 35 Rates below standard minimum, provision of law as to, and licenses for defectives 32 Conciliation, special provisions for, Australia li4 Condensed milt, average monthly wages of women workers in, Oregon 25 Confectionery, -female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 Confectionery, females earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 21 Confectionery, wage determination of special boards, Victoria 128 Constitutionality of minimum-wa^e laws, defense, Oregon 66, 67 Core making, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 Corsets, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 Cost of living: Average annual, self-supporting women, 'Washington 83 Living wage, basis of minimum wage, Australia and New Zealand 9, 115 Living wage, basis of minimum wage. New South Wales 146-148 Living wage, basis of minimum wage. South Australia 165 Living wage, basis of minimum wage, "Western Australia 167 Living wage_, legal definition of, Victoria 220 Self-supporting woman, Denver and other cities 40 Self-supporting woman, lowest level of decency, Boston 45 Self-supporting women, Oregon 26 Self-supporting women, Washington 80-83 Cotton, wages in, and females earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 18,21 Crackers and biscuits, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States. . 19 D. Defectives, licenses or permits for 10, 32, 66, 91, 100 Department and other retail stores; Average monthly wages of women wage earners, Oregon 25 Female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 21 Female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts, Portland, Oreg 25 Wages, etc., of females in, Utah 68, 69 Wages, etc., of females in, Washington 84-86 Disputes, settlement of, award of industrial board, sawmills. New South Wales 153 Disputes. (See also Strikes and lockouts.) E. Earnings of female employees: Amounts, specified weekly, and women earning less than specified amounts, by industries, United States 18, 19, 21 Amounts, specified weekly, in all manufacturing industries, and women earning less than spec- ified amounts, by age groups. United States '. 22 Average monthly wages in specified industries, Oregon .~ 25 Average wages, comparative, in 4 selected occupations, glass industry, in specified States 19 Wages, comparative weekly, of females and minors, in laundries, Washington 97 Wages, comparative weekly, of females and minors, in mercantile establishments, Washington . . 96 Wages, comparative weekly, of females and minors in telephone employment, Washington 98 Effect of minimum-wage laws: Australia and New Zealand 117-119 Massachusetts 46,47 New South Wales and Victoria 118 New York 27-29 Utah 69-76 Washington 78-80, 95-98 Bnrployees to whom minimum-wage laws may apply .' 12,31, 111 Enforcement of minimum-wage laws 38, 112 F. Factories, apprenticeship rules, Washington 94,95 Faotories,in Portland, Oreg., women earning less than specified weekly amounts in 25 Factories, in Portland, Oreg., women workers in, conferences concerning 61 France, minimum wage for female workers in ; 185, 186 Fruit and vegetable canning, women and child workers in, conferences concerning, Oregon 65 G. Germany, laws in force, designation and dates of enactment 327 Germany, trade boards in 184 Glass, average hourly wages of women in, coinpared, in 4 selected occupations, specified States 19 Glass, female workers earning less than speomed weekly amounts, United States 18 INDEX. 331 Great Britain: ^^S^- Goal mines (minimum wage) act, 1912 , 11, 305-308 Coal mines (minimum wage) act, typical award under 308-313 Enforcement ot trade boards act, prosecutions for 178, 179 Laws in force, designation and dates of enactment 6, 327 Laws in force, text ot 295-313 Learners, ready-made clothing, award of a trade board as to 180-183 Minimum-time rates for female workers, ready-made clothing, award of a trade board 180 Minimum-time rate for male workers, ready-made clothing, award of a trade board 182 Tailoring trade, minimum rates fixed 11 Trade board, typical determination ofa 180-183 Trade boards act, operation of, opinion of British Board of Trade upon 179, 180 Trade boards act, summary of provisions of 174-176 Trade boards, membership of, June, 1913 175 Trade boards, organization and work of 176-178 Trade committees, membership of, June, 1913 176 H. Hairdressing and manicuring, apprenticeship rules, Washington 93 Hardware, etc., fenile workers earning less than speoifled weekly amounts. United States 19 HoUdays, award of industrial board, sawmills and laundries, New South Wales 153, 156 Hosiery and knit goods, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States. . 19 Hotels and restaurants, average monthly wages of women workers in, Oregon 25 Hotels and restaurants, minimum-wage conference concerning, Washington 89, 90 Hotels and restaurants, women earning less than specified weekly amounts in, Portland, Oreg 25 Hours of work and wages, award of industrial board, sawmills and laundries, New South Wales. . . 150, 151, 164-156 I. Industries covered by minimum-wage legislation: Australia and New Zealand 8, 9, 111 Great Britain 10, 11, 174 United States 31 J. Jewelry, female workers earning less than specifi.ed weekly amounts, United States 19 L. Laundries and dyeworks, minimum-wage conferences concerning, Washington 87, 88 I/aundries, apprenticeship rules, Washington 94 Laundries, average monthly wages of women workers in, Oregon , 25 Laundries, females earning less than specified weekly amoimts in, United States . .• 21 Laundries, comparative weekly wages of females and minors employed in, Washington 97 Laundries, women earning less than specified weekly amounts in, Portland, Oreg 25 Laws in force, text of. (See Minimum- wage laws ia force, text of.) Learners, ready-made clothing, award of a British trade board as to 180-183 Licenses or permits for defectives, etc 10, 32, 66, 91, 100 Living, group methods of, brush makers' wage board report on, Massachusetts 45, 46 Living wage. (See C!ost of living.) M. Manicuring and hairdressing, apprenticeship rules, Washington 93 Manufacturing establishments, minimum-wage conferences concerning, Washington 86, 87 Massachusetts: Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of 33 Basis of minimum-wage rates 32 Brush makers' wage board, condensed, preliminary report of 44-52 Brush makers' wage board, rules of procedme 43, 44 Employees to whom laws may apply 31 Enforcement of the law 38 Industries covered 31 Laws in force and dates of enactment 6, 31, 327 laws in force, text of. % 193-195 Minimum-wake commission, conclusions and decree of 52-55 Operation of the minimum-wage laws 41-55 Procedure in fixing minimum wage 35 Hates below standard minimum, provision of law as to, and licenses for defectives 32 Wage determinations, by trades or industries, and dates effective 15 Mercantile establishments, comparative weekly wages of females and minors employed in, Wash- ington 96 Mercantile establishments in Portland, Oreg., women workers in, conferences concerning 62,63 Mercantile establishments, minimum-wage conferences of industrial welfare commission, Washington 84-86 Mercantile establishments. (See also Department and other retail stores.) Millinery and dressmaking, apprenticeship conditions, order of the industrial welfare commission concerning, Oregon 64, 65 Millinery and dressmaking, apprenticeship rules, Washington 93 Minimum wage, basis of. (5ee Cost of livmg.) Minimum wage, capacity of workers to eam^ brush makers' wage board report on, Massachusetts. . 48-51 .Minimum wage, effects of, on financial conditions of industry: Massachusetts, brush makers' wage board report 46, 47 New York 27,28 Utah 75,76 Washington 79,80 Minimum-wage laws, comparative analysis of, Australia and New Zealand 109-114 Minimum-wage laws, comparative analysis of. United States 31-38 332 INDEX. Mininium-wage laws, text of: Page. Australia and New Zealand) directly fixing minimum wage 313-316 California 187-191 Colorado :. 191-193 Great Britain 295-313 Massachusetts 193-195 Minnesota 195-198 Nebraska 198-200 New South Wales 233-258,314 New Zealand 258-294,315,316 Oregon 200-204 Queensland 314 South Australia 314, 315 Tasmania '. 315 Utah 205 Victoria 210-233, 313 ■Washington 205-208 Wisconsin 208-210 Minimum-wage legislation, list of laws In force 326-328 Minnesota: Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of. 33 Basis of minimum-wage rates 32 Employees to whom the laws may apply 31 Enforcement of the law 38 Industries covered 31 Laws in force and dates of enactment , 6, 31, 327 Laws in force, text of 195-198 Operation of the minimum-wage laws 55-59 Procedure in fixing Tninimnm wage '. 35, 36 Rates below standard Tninimnm, provision of law as to, and licenses for defectives 32 N. Nebraska: Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of. 33 Basis of minimum-wage rate 32 Employees to whom the laws may apply - 31 Enforcement of the law 38 Industries covered - 31 Laws in force and dates of enactment i 6, 31 Laws in force, text of 1 198-200 Operation of the minimum-wage law 59- Procedure in fixing mlnimnm wage 36 Rates below standard minimum, provision of law as to, and licenses for defectives 32 Needles and pins, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 New South Wales: . Aged, infirm, or slow workers , 148, 154 Basis of wages fixed 146-148 Boards and awards, statistics of 142, 143 Conciliation, special provision for 114 Decisions of wage tribimals, enforcement of, appeals from, duration, etc., of 112, 113 History of legislation for fixing wages 138-140 Industrial agreements 143 144 Industrial agreements, awards, etc., mmiber of, 1914 8 Industrial boards, cost of 148, 149 Industrial boards, functions of 141, 142 Industrial boards, typical awards of, sawmills, etc., and laundries 150-156 Industries to which the acts apply Ill Jurisdiction of wage tribunals, development of 140-149 Laws in force and dates of enactment 5, 109, 326 Laws in force, text of 233-258,314 Minimum wage, method of determining 7 Minimum wage, procedure in fixing 142 Parliament, mimmum wage fixed by 144-146 Strikes and lockouts, provision against ! ! . . 113 Union labor, preference for 'il3,153 Wage tribunals, name, creation, membership, etc., of 110-112 New York State Factory Investigating Commission:' Bill recommended by 316-319 Minimum-wage law, operation of, in England, inquiries as to 179,180 Minimum-wage law, operation of, in Victoria, inquiries as to 133-133 Scope and result of its mquiry 27-29 New Zealand: Arbitration court and conciliation councils, work of 172 Arbitration court, constitution of 170 Awards, breaches of 170 Conciliation, special provision for !.!!!!!..!!!!!!!!! 114 Conciliation councils, constitution of 169 Cost of administration .'.!!!.!!!!!!!!!]!.!!!!!! 173 Decisions of wage tribunals, enforcement of, appeals from, duration, etc., of 112,113 Industrial agreements, awards, etc., number olt 9 Industrial districts 168 Industrial imions and associations, registration ies 169 Industries to which the acts apply V.V.'.W.'.V.'.V.V. . . 'ill Laws in force and dates of enactment .1 s" ilO, 327 Laws in force, text of. !!!!!..!!! !!!!!!!!!!!'258^294! 315, 316 Minimum wage, method of determining 6 Minimum wages under awards, per cent of workers receiving more than . . 171 Strikes and lookouts, provision against 114 INDEX. 333 New Zealand— Concluded. Page. Union labor, preference for 113 Wage tribunals, name, creation, membership, etc. , of. 110-112 Wages, actual rates paid, comparison of, with mitilmnni rates under awards 170-172 Nuts, bolts, and screws, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts, United States . 19 O. Occupation, fixing minimum wage for a particular, questions as to, submitted to attorney general, Minnesota '. 66 Occupations or trades, average weekly wages in, under wage board determinations, Victoria isi, 132 Office employees, apprenticeship rules, Washington 95 Ofiice employees, minimum-wage conferences of industrial welfare commission concerning, Wash- ington 00,91 Ofiice help, average monthly wages of women workers, Oregon 25 Office help, women earning less than specified weekly amounts as, Portland, Oreg 25 Ohio liegfeiati^e authorized to establish minimum wage 30 Oregon: Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of 33 Basis of miniminn-wage rates 32 Department stores, Portland,womeneamingless than specified weekly amounte in 25 Employees to whom the laws may apply 31 Enforcement of the law 38, 66 Factories in Portland, women workers in, conferences concerning 61 Fruit and vegetable caimlng, women and child workers in, conferences concerning 65 Industrial welfare commission, act creating unconstitutional, defense 66, 67 Industrial welfare commission, report of, January 1, 1915 59-67 Industries covered 31 Laws in force and dates of enactment 6,31,328 Laws in force, text of. '.... 200-204 Mercantile establishments in Portland, women workers in, conferences concerning 61-63 Millinery and dressmaking, apprenticeship conditions, order of industrial welfare commission concerning 64,65 Operation of the minimum-wage laws 59-67 Procedure in fixing minimum wage 37 Rates below stan(Sird minimum, provision of law as to, and licenses for defectives 32 Wage determinations, by trades or industries, and dates effective 14 Overtime, award of industrial board, sawmills. New South Wales 152 P. Paper boxes, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 Payment of wages, award of industrial board, sawmills. New South Wales 153 Penalties. (See Enforcement of minimum-wage laws.) Piecework, award of industrial board, sawmills. New South Wales 152 Posting of awards of industrial boards, sawmills, New South Wales 154 Pottery, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 Printing trades, women earning less than specified weekly amounts in, Portland, Oreg 25 Q- Queensland; • Conciliation, special provision for 114 Decisions of wage tribunals, appeals from, duration, etc., of 112, 113 Industrial agreements, awards, etc., number of , 1914 8 Industries to which the acts apply Ill Laws in force and dates of enactment 6, 110, 326 Laws in force, text of. 314 Minimum wage, method of determining 6 Minimum-wage legislation 155-164 Strikes and lookouts, provision against 114 Union labor, preference for 113 Wages boards, operations of, to June 30, 1912 160-163 Wage tribunals, name, creation, membership, etc., of 110-112 R. Betail stores. (5ee Department and other retail stores.) Kubber and elastic goods, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 S. Self-support, essentials and cost of , brush makers' wage board report on, Massachusetts 44, 45 Shirts, overalls, etc., female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States ... 19 Silk, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 18 South AustraUa: Conciliation, special provision for '. 114 Decisions of wage tribunals, enforcement, appeals, duration, etc., of 112, 113 Industrialagreements, awards, etc., number of, 1914 9 Industries to which the acts apply Ill Lawsin force and dates of enactment 5,110,326 Lawsin force, text of 314, 315 Minimum-wage legislation _. ._. 164-166 Minimum wage, method of determining 6 Strikes and lookouts, provision against 114 Union labor, preference for 113 Wage tribunals, name, creation, membership, etc., of 110-112 334 IKDEX. stamped and enameled ware, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United States 19 Stenographers, average monthly wages of women workera as, Oregon ".'.'.'."' 25 Stenographers, women earning less than specified weekly amounts as, Portland, Greg 25 Strikes and lockouts, provision against, Australia and New Zealand 113, 114 Subsidies to industry, brush makers' wage board report on, Massachusetts 46 Sweated industries and British trade boards act 10, 174 Sweated Industries, Victoria 120 T. Tasmania: Conciliation, special provision for 114 Decisions of wage tribunals, enforcement, appeals, duration, etc., of 112, 113 Industrial agreements, awards, etc., number of , 1914 9 Industries to which the acts apply ' / Ill Laws in force and dates of enactment 6, 110, 327 Laws in force, text of 315 Minimum-wage legislation 166, 167 Minimum wage, method of determining 6 Strikes and lockouts, provision against „ 114 Union labor, preference for 113 Wage tribunals, name, creation, membership, etc., of 110-112 Telephone and telegraph estabhshments, appreuticesmp rules, Washington 93, 94 Telephone and telegraph, minimum-wage conference of industrial welfare commission, Washington. 88, 89 Telephone employment, comparative weekly wagSs of females and minors in, Washington 98 Telephone operators, average monthly wages of women workers as, Oregon 25 Telephone operators, women earning less than specified weekly amounts as, Portland, Greg 25 Tobacco and snufE, female workers earning less than specified weekly amotmts. United States 19 V. Union labor, preference to, Australia and New Zealand 113,153 Utah: Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of 33 Basis of minimum-wage rates 32 Employees to whom the laws may apply 31 Enforcement of the law ., 38 Industries covered - 31 Laws in force and dates of enactment 6, 31 ,328 Laws in force, text of 205 Operation of the minimum-wage laws •. 67-76 Rates below standard minimum, provision of law as to, and licenses for detectives 32 V. Victoria: Conciliation, special provisions for 114 Decisions of wage tribunals, enforcement, appeals, duration, etc., of 112, 113 History of legislation'. 119-122 •Industrial agreements, awards, etc., number of, 1914 8 Industries to which the acts apply Ill Laws in force and dates of enactment 5, 109, 327 Laws in force, text of 210-233, 313 Minimum wage, method of determining 6 Operation of the law, 4 questions as to, answered by chief factory inspector, Melbourne 133, 134 Strikes and lockouts, provision against 113 Union labor, preference for 113 Wage determinations, effect of, on increasing wages 129-132 Wage tribunals, name, creation, membership, etc., of 110-112 Wages boards, mode of constituting, and of making wage determinations 122-124 Wages boards, typical awards of, 5 industries 124-129 W. Wage determinations and dates when effective, 3 States 14, 15 Wage determinations, effect of, in increasing wages, Victoria 129-132 Wage rates, minimum, basis of. 9 12 32 Washington: ' ' Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of 34 Apprenticeship rules, conferences of industrial well^e commission concerning 91-95 Basis of minimtun-wage rates ; 32 Cost of living, self-supporting women ',[',', 80-83 Employees to whom the laws may apply "[["][["[[[] '. 31 Enforcement of the law '.'.".". ! 38 Factories, apprenticeship rules ,..: *'.'.'.".'.".'."."*.".*.'.".".""^."!!!.'!^.'"""! 94 95 Hotels and restaurants, conferences of industrisd welfare commission concerning '. 89! 90 Industrial welfare commission, conferences of. 84 Industrial welfare commission, opinions of the attorney general in regard to powers of 98-100 Industrial welfare commission, rules governing conferences of 100-102 Industries covered ... 31 Laundries and dye works, conferences of industrial welfare commission conreriiing " 87, 88 Laundries, apprenticeship rules - 94 Laundries, comparative weekly wages of females and miiiors in, 1913, i9i4 97 Laws in force and dates of enactment 6 31 3" Laws in force, text of. 205-208 Manicuring and hairdressing, apprenticeship rules ............_..................!!!!!!!.. 93 IITDEX. 335 Washington — Concluded. Page. Manu&cturing establishments, conferences of industrial welfare commission concerning 86, 87 Mercantile establishments, comparative weekly wages of females and minors in, 1913, 1914 96 Mercantile establishments, conferences of industrial welfare commission concerning 84-86 Millinery and dressmaking, apprenticeship rules 93 Minimum wage, effect of 78-80 Minimum-wage law, effects of 95-98 Office employees, apprenticeship rules 95 Office employees, conferences of industrial welfare commission concerning 90,91 Operaticm of the minimum-wage laws 76-102 Procedure in fixing minimum wage 37, 38 Rates below standard minimum, provision of law as to, and licenses for defectives 32 Telegraphs and telephones, apprenticeship rules 93, 94 Telegraphs and telephones, conferences of industrial welfare commission concerning 88, 89 Telephone employment, comparative weekly wages of females and minors in'. 98 Wage determinations, by trades or industries, and dates effective 14, 15, 77 Western Australia: Conciliation, special provision for 114 Decisions of wage tribunals, enforcement, appeals, duration, etc., of 112, 113 Industrial agreements, awards, etc., number of, 1914 9 Industries to which the acts apply. , Ill Laws in force and dates of enactment 6, 110, 327 Minimum-wage legislation 167 Minimum wage, method of determining 7 Strikes and lockouts, provision against 114 Union labor, preference for 113 Wage tribunals, name, creation, membership, etc., of 110-112 Wisconsin: Administrative and advisory bodies, composition of 34 Basis of minimum-wage rates .- 32 Employees to whom the laws may apply 31 Enforcement of the law 38 Industries covered 31 Laws in force and dates of enactment .' 6, 31 , 328 Laws in force, text of : 208-210 jOperation of the minimum-wage laws 102 Procedure in fixing minimum wage 38 Rates below standard minimum, provision of law as to, and licenses for defectives 32 Woolen and worsted goods, female workers earning less than specified weekly amounts. United 19 States 19 Woolen mills, average monthly wages of women workers in, Oregon •.... 25 o (Continued from second page of coverj) Women in Industry. No.l. Hours, earnings, and duration of employment of wage-earning women in selected industries in the District of Columbia. -(Bui. No. 116.) No. 2. Working hours of women in the pea canneries of Wisconsin. (Bui. No. 119.) No. 3. Employment of women in power laundries in Milwaukee. (Bui. No. 122.) No. 4. Hours, earnings, and conditions of labor of women in Indiana mercantile establishments and garment factories. (Bui. No. 160.) Workmen's Insurance and Compensation (including laws relating thereto). No. 1. C&xe of tuberculous wage earners in Germany. (Bui. No. 101.) No. 2. British National Insurance Act, 1911. (BuL No. 102.) No. 3. Sickness and accident insurance law of Switzerland. (Bui. No. 103.) No. 4. Law relating to insiu-ance of salaried employees in Germany. (Bui. No. 107.) No. 5. Workmen's compensation laws of the United States and foreign countries. (Bui. No. 126.) No. 6. Compensation for accidents to employees of the United States. (Bui. No. 155.) Industrial Accidents and Hygiene. No. 1. Lead poisoning in potteries, tile works, and porcelain enameled sanitary ware factories. (Bui. No. 104.) No. 2. Hygiene of the painter's trade. ' (Bui. No. 120.) No. 3. Dangers to workers from dusts and fumes, and methods of protection. (BuL No. 127.) No. 4. Lead poisoning in the smelting and refining of lead. (Bui. No. 141.) " No. 5. Industrial accident statistics. (Bui. No. 157.) No. 6. Lead poisoning in the manufacture of storage batteries. (Bui. No. 165.) Conciliation and Arbitration (including strikes and lockouts). No. 1. Conciliation and arbitration in the building trades of Greater New York. (Bui. No. 124') No. 2. Report of the industrial council of the British Board of Trade on its inquiry into industrial agreements. (Bui. No. 133.) No. 3. Michigan copper district strike. (Bui. No. 139.) No. 4. Industrial coiurt of the cloak, suit, and skirt industry of New York City. (Bui: No. 144.) No. 5. Conciliation, arbitration, and sanitation in the dresa and waist industry of New York City. (Bui. No. 145.) Labor Laws of the United States (including decisions of courts relating to labor). No. 1. Labor legislation of 1912. (Bui. No. 111.) No. 2. Decisions of courts and opinions affecting labor, 1912. (Bui. No. 112.) No. 3. Labor laws of the United States, with decisions of courts relating thereto. (Bui. No. 148.) No. 4. Decisions of courts and opinions affecting labor, 1913. (Bui. No. 152.) No. 5. Labor legislation of 1914. (Bui. No. 166.) Foreign Labor Laws. No.. 1. Administration of labor laws and factory inspection in certain Bfiropean countries. (Bui. No. 142.) Miscellaneous Series. No 1 Statistics of unemployment and the work of employment "Sfflces in the . United States. (Bui. No. 109.) No. 2. Prohibition of nightwork of young persons. (Bui. No. 117.) No 3 Ten-hour maximum working day for women and young persons. (Bui. 'No. 118.) No. 4. Employers' welfare work. (Bui. No. 123.) No. 5. Government aid to home owning and housing of working people in foreign countries. (Bul. No. 158.) No 6 Short-unit courses for wage earners, and a factory school experiment. (Bul. No. 159.) No 7 Industrial survey of Eichmond, Va.i for the purposes of vocational educa- tion. (Bul. No. 162.) U. S. DEPAi^TME^fT OP LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS ROYAL MEEKER, Commis«loner BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES} BUREAU QF LABOR STATISTICS f HOLE 1/?Q JMBER VOzf fW I NUMBER LABOR LAWS OP THE UNITED , STATES SB RIES: No. 6 DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR 1914 MAY. 19JS WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1915 SERIES OF BULLETINS PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. The puhlicaiioxl of the AnnufU and Special Reports and of the/bimonthly Bulletin fwt*^. been discontiniiedr and since /££%; IW5, a Bulletir^- has been published at irregular iniervals,- Each number cohtdinsmatter devoted^td-orCe'of a stn-ies orffen^al siibfects* ^ These ifidle- iiris arenumbered consecutively in each series jind'edsq-caf^y a consecu^ve tphoie' nim^her, heair^nirig i6ith Ifo, 101\.. -A ^ist of the series^ together with the' individitat Bitlleiiiis falling under each^ is given below^ A list of the Reports arui -Bulletins , of the ^Bureau issued prior to July It 191^^ will be furnished on application. -' ' :/'i. Wholesale Prices. • . No. 1. Wholesale prices, 1890 to'1912. (Bui. No. 114.) No. 2. ."Wholesale prices, 1890 to 191.3. (Bul.iNo. 14ft.) Retail Prices and Ctist of Living. - ~ ^ - ; ' No. - 1; Retail prices, 1890 to 1911: Part I. (Bui. No. 105: Part 1.) > : - ' .Retailpricea, 1890 to 1911: Part II— General rabies, (Bui. No.l\)5: Part /n.) •-; _ , . -r- ■' No. 2. Retail prices, 1890 to June, 1912: Part I. (Bui. No.106: Pa-rt I.) : Retail prices, 1890 to June, 1912: Part II-^General tables. (Bul^ No. 106: Part II.) ---,. / - No., 3. P>,etail prices, 1890 to August, 1912. - (Bui. No. 108;) No. 4. Retail prices; 1890 to-October, 1912. (BuL No. 110.) . No. 5. Retailprice3,lS90 to December, 1912. (Bui. Noi 113'.) . ^ No. 6. Retail prices, 1890 to February, ,1913.-: ;(Bul.' No. 115:) , ; No. 7. Sugar prices, from refiner to consumer. (BuLNo.121.) No. 8.- Retail prices, ISadto April, 1913. (Bul.No. 125.).- ■ - - ■-, No. 9. Wheat and flour prices, from farmer to consumer. (Bul^-No .J30 ) - - ' N<3. 10. Retail prices, 1890 to June, 1913. (Bui. No.' 132:) v*: -■: No. 11. Retail prices, 1890.to August, 1913. (Bui, No.' 136.) - .' ' No. 12. Retail prices, 1890 tb:October, 1913.- (Bui. No. 138.) ' No. 13. Betailprices, 1890 to December, 1913. (Bui. No. 140.) " - .No. 14. Retail prices, 1907 to December, 1-914. (Bui. No,-a56.) No. 15. Butterprice3,irQm producer to consumer.- (Bui. Sor 164.) J- Wages attd Hours of labor. J No. 1. Wages and hours of labor in the cotton, woolen, and sift; industries,- 1890 to 1912. (Bui. No: 128.) _ , -. - ' '-'" No. 2. Wages and hours of labor ia the lumber, mill-work,: and furniture indus- tries, 1890 to IgK.'' (Bui. No. 129.) -,,---.-,_-: --;•- "No. 3. Union scale of wages and hours of Jabor, 1907 to 1911: (Bid.. No. 131.) No. 4. Wages and hours of labor in the boot and .shoe and hosiery and knit goods - industries 18,9.0-to 1912. (Bui. No, 134.) - -,-, - No. 5. Wages and hours of labor in the cigar and clothing industries,''191l' and :: 1912. (^Bui. No.,1350. - . -. -, ■^^■■- ' No. iB: Wages and hours of labor in the buildingand repairing of steam railroad ' cars, 1890 to 1912. ;(Bul. No. 137.) • " ,_ ' i.-". No. 7. Union scale of wages and hours of labor, May 15, 1913. . (B.ul. No. 143.) ' No. 8. Wagos and regularity of einployment in the dress and waist indiistry of New York Oity._ (Bui. No. 146.) ' . ..„• No. 9. Wages and regularity of employment in the cloak, stiit, andskirt industry. (Bui. No.. 147.) ._ '-■_-: No. 10. Wages and hours of labor in the cotton, woolen,: and silk industries, 1907^ .„.; to 1913. (Bui. No. 150.) . ' _, " No. 11.. Wages and hours of Iabt)r in the iron and steel industry in the Uflited States, 1907 to- 1912. (Bui. No. 151.) " . .. . ■ No. 12. Wages and hours of labor in the lumber, millwork, and furniture indua- _', "- tries, 1907 to. 1913. (Bui. No. 153.) , . , . . • '- No. 13. Wages and hours of labor in the boot And shoe and hosiery and xmderwear industriea, 1907 to 1913. . (Bui. No. 154.) . ,- - ' No. 14. Wages and hours of labor in the clothing and cigar industries, 1911' to 1913. (Bui. No. 161.) : "■ , i'xw. No. 15. Wages and hours of labor in the building and repairing of steana mih-oad cars, 1907 to 1913. (Bui. No. 163.) . - , ""^ No. 16. Wages and hours of labor in the iron" and ateel industry in 'the United States, 1907-to 1913. (Bui. No. 1138.) ^ ^mtea- i/See alto third page of cover. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS ROYAL MEEKER, Commissioner BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES) /WHOLE ICQ BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS f ' ' ' 1 NUMBER ID" LABOR LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES SERIES: No. 6 . DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR 1914 MAY, 191S WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1915 /3r^^<° CONTENTS. Review of decisions of courts affecting labor, 1914: Introduction 15, 16 Decisions of courts 16-46 Contract of employment 17, 18 Wages 18-20 Hours of labor 20-22 Factory regulations 22 Railroads 22 23 Mines 23 Restrictions of employment 23, 24 Women and children 24 Liability of employers for injuries to employees 24-32 Workmen's compensation 32-42 Employers' liability insurance 42 Relief associations. . ^ .\ < 42 Labor organizations T. .'..l.'.i:S^\ 42-46 Decisions of courts affecting labor: Decisions under statute law 47-269 Alien contract labor — importation — construction of statute — "offer of employment " (United States v. Dwight Manufacturing Co.) 47, 48 Alien contract labor — violation of statute — nature of action — penalties (Grant Bros. Construction Co. v. United States) 48, 49 Antitrust law — monopolies — restraint of trade — exemption of labor organizations — constitutionality of statute (International Harvester Co. of America v. State of Missouri) 49, 50 Antitrust law — unlawful combinations — monopolies — laundries — con- struction of statute (State ex rel. Moose v. Frank) 50 Arbitration of labor disputes — award — exceptions — procedure (In re Georgia & Florida Railway) 50-53 Boycott — blacklisting — conspiracy — combination in restraint of trade — antitrust law (Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States) 53-55 Civil-service employees — ^pension funds — deductions from salaries — constitutionality of statute (Hughes v. Traeger) 56, 57 Contract of employment — breach — suits — limitations (Pennsylvania Co. j;. Good) 57,58 Convict labor — State employment — constitutionality of statute (Shen- andoah Lime Co. v. Mann) 58, 59 Convict labor — working out costs — action for excess work (Tennessee Coal, Iron & RaUroad Co. v. Butler) 60 Employers' liability — abrogation of defenses — classification of em- ployments — constitutionality of statute (Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Stilwell) 60, 61 Employers' liability — abrogation of defences — constitutionality of workmen's compensation act (Crooks v. Tazewell Coal Co.) 61, 62 3 4 CONTENTS. Decisions of courts affecting labor — Continued. Deciflions under statute law — Continued. ' Page. Employers' liability — abrogation of fellow-servant doctrine — constitu- tionality of statute (Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce) 62-64 Employers' liability — employment of children — age limit— constitu- tionality of statute — misrepresentation of age (Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. V. Beauchamp) 64j 65 Employers' liability— guards for dangerous machinery — laundries — application of law — assumption of risks (McClary v. Knight) 65, 66 Employers' liability — ^guards for dangerous machinery^ — n^ligence (Phillips V. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co.) 66, 67 Employers' liability — guards for dangerous machinery — proximate cause — damages (Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Armuth) 67, 68 Employers' liability — guards for dangerous machinery — safety from location (Smith v. Mt. Clemens Sugar Co.) 68, 69 Employers' liability — guards for dangerous machinery — saws (Pulse v. Spencer) 69 Employers' liability — mine regulations — certified foreman — trial by jury (Myers v. Pittsburgh Coal Co.) 70 Employers' liability — ^mine regulations — duty of foreman — assumption of risks (Humphreys v. Raleigh Coal & Coke Co.) 70, 71 Employers' liability — mine regulations — failure to employ mining boss (Baisdrenghien v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.) 71 Employers' liability — mine regulations — ^inspection (Piazzi v. Kerens- Donnewald Coal Co.) 72 Employers' liability — mine regulations — ^lead and zinc mines — appli- cation of statute (Big Jack Mining Co. i). Parkinson) 72 73 Employers' liability — mine regulations — ^violation of statute — assump- tion of risks — fellow service (Maronen v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.) 73 Employers' liability — ^negligence — evidence — guards for dangerous machinery (Byland v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co.) 73 74 Employers' liability— pension funds— election of rights (Longfellow v. City of Seattle) 74 75 Employers' liability — ^railroad companies— blocking frogs — "yards" (George v. Quincy, O. & K. C. Railroad Co.) 75 Employers' liability— railroad companies— "cars" (McGrady v. Char- lotte Harbor & Northern Ry . Co.) 75 76 Employers' liability — railroad companies — contributory negligence proximate cause — violation of ordinance — damages (Wabadi Rail- road Co. V. Gretzinger) 76 77 Employers' liability— raib-oad companies— electric railroads (Hughes V. Indiana Union Traction Co.) 77 Employers' liability- raib-oad companies— Federal and State statutes (Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes) 77 78 Employers' liability— railroad companies— Federal and State stat- utes—death of employee without dependents (Jones v. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co.) 78 79 Employers' liability— railroad companies— Federal and State stat- utes-persons entitled to benefits (Taylor v. Taylor) 79 gQ Employers' liability— railroad companies— Federal and State stat- utes—safety appliances (Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co. v. Horton) 80 Employers' liability — railroad companies — ^Federal statute — assump- tion of risks— safe place (Farley v. New York, N. H. & H. Railroad C°> 81 CONTENTS. 5 Decisions of courts affecting labor— Continued. Decisions under statute law — -Continued. Page. Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — ^benefici- aries — next of kin — illegitimate children (Kenney v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co.) 81,82 Employers' liability — ^raiboad companies — Federal statute— contribu- tory negligence (Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole) 82 Employers' liability — ^raUroad companies — Federal statute — exclusive application — interstate commerce — ^jurisdiction of courts — "on duty" (North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary) 83,84 Employers' liability — ^railroad companies — Federal statute — exemp- tion from liability — ^relief associations (Hogarty v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co.) 84,85 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — ^brakeman placing car in train — safety appliances (Thorn- broi;. Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. Co.) 85,86 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — interstate commerce — building addition to freight shed (Eng v. Southern Par cific Co.) ; 86,87 Employers' liability — ^raiboad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — construction of bridge on cut-oft (Bra vis v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.) 87,88 Employers' liability — ^railroad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — construction of tunnel (Jackson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.) 88 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — interstate commerce — employee carrying coal to heat repair shop (Cousins v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.) > 88, 89 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — employee sleeping in shanty car (Sanders v. Charleston & "W. C. Ry. Co.) 89 Employers' liabiUty — raihoad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce— engineer in roundhouse to attend to repairs (Padgett v. Seaboard A. L. Ry.) 90, 91 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — interstate commerce — fireman on switch engine (Illinois Central Railroad Co. V. Behrens) 91,92 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — interstate commerce — ^instalUng block-signal system (Saunders v. Southern Ry. Co.) 92 Employers' hability — railroad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — ^installing block-signal system — employee on way from work (Grow v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.) 92, 93 Employers' liability- — railroad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — repairing cars — defective grindstone (Opsahl v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.) 94 Employers' liability — railroad companies — ^Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — repairing engine (Law v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.). 94, 95 Employers' liability — ^railroad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — repairing .telegraph line (Deal v. Coal & Coke Ry. Co.). . 95 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — roundhouse employee (La Casse v. New Orleans, T. & M. Raih-oadCo.) 96 6 CONTENTS. Decisions of courts affecting labor — Continued. DecisioDB under statute law — Continued. Page- Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — ^interstate commerce — testing engine after repairs (Lloyd v. Southern Railway Co.) 96,97 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — interstate commerce — transportation of lumber by private railroad (Bay v. Merrill & Ring Lumber Co.) 97 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — interstate commerce — weighing empty cars (Wheeling Terminal Co. v. Russell). 97, 98 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — negligence — contributory negligence (Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Swann'sAdmx.) 98,99 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — negK- gence — -course of employment (Reeve v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.).. 99 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — ^reference to statute — comparative negligence (Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Lindsay) 99,100 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — relief associations — release (Wagner v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co.). . . 100-102 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — safety appliances (Pennell v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co.) 102 Employers' liability — railroad companies — Federal statute — safety appliances — hauling bad-order car — status of workman riding home (Dodge V. Chicago G. W. Raihoad Co.) 102, 103 Employers' liability — railroad companies — injuries to employee's family riding on pass (Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Thompson). . 103, 104 Employers' liability — railroad companies — operating railroad (Sartain V. JeSerson City Transit Co.) 104 Employers' liability — railroad companies — orders of superior — injury to brakeman (Ainsley v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co....- 105 Employers' liability- — railroad companies — orders of superior — yard and bridge men (Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. v. Lain) 105, 106 Employers' liability — railroad companies — safety appliances — electric trains (Spokane & I. E. Railroad Co. v. Campbell) 106, 107 Employers' liability— railroad companies— State statute— extraterri- torial effect — jurisdiction of courts (Tennessee C, I. & R. Co. v. George) 107, 108 Employers' liability — regulations concerning electric wires — substi- tute provisions (McClaugherty v. Rogue River Electric Co.) 108, 109 Employers' liability— right of action— election— effect of workmen's compensation act (Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Ujack).. 109,110 Employers' liability— safe place (Rosholt v. Worden-Allen Co.) 110, 111 Employers' liability— safe place — scaffolding (Bomhoff v. Fischer). . Ill, 112 Employers' liability— statutory notice (Meniz v. Quissett Mills) 112 Employers' liability— statutory notice (Rodzborski v. American Sugar Refining Co.) 112, 113 Employment of children in mines— age limit— construction of statute— "any mine" (Cole v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co.) 113, 114 Examination and licensing of plumbers— class legislation— constitu- tionality of statute (Davis v. Holland) II4 115 Factory regulations— wash rooms— constitutionality of statute (People V.Solomon) ^5 .^^g CONTENTS. 1 Decisions of courts affecting labor— Continued. Decisions under statute law — Continued. Page. Hours of labor — eight-hour law — employment by State — constitution- ality of statute (Ex parte Steiner) 116, 117 Hours of labor- -eight-hour law — policemen and firemen (Albee v. Weinberger) 117, 118 Hours of labor — eight-hour law — public works — constitutionality of statute (Sweetser v. State) 118, 119 Hoiirs of labor — eight-hour law — public works — lock and dam furnish- ing power (Chattanooga & Tennessee River Power Co. v. United States) 119 Hours of labor — ^public laundries — constitutionality of ordinance (Ex parte Wong Wing) ; 119,120 Hours of labor — ten-hour law — constitutionality of statute (State v. Bunting) .' 120, 121 Hoiu"s of labor of women — constitutionality of statute — liberty of con- tract — equal protection of the laws (Riley v. Massachusetts) 121, 122 Hours of service — railroads — casualty or unavoidable accident (United StatesD. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.) 122,123 Hours of service — ^railroads — constitutionality of statute — interstate commerce (Erie Railroad Co. v. New York) 123, 124 Hours of service — railroads — emergencies — construction of statute (United States v. Southern Pacific Co.) 124, 125 Hours of service — railroads — emergencies — fireman watching engine (Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States) ■ 125 Hours of service — railroads — employee on duty (Osborne's Admr. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co.) 125-127 Hours of service — railroads — movement of trains (Great Northern Ry. Co. V. United States) 127 Hours of service — railroads — offices operated night and day (United States V. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.) 128 Hoiirs of service — ^railroads — offices operated night and day (United States t). Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.) -. 128,129 Hours of service — ^railroads — switch tenders (Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States) 129 Hours of service — railroads — telegraph operators — ^knowledge of supe- riors (United States v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co.) 129, 130 Hours of service — railroads — unavoidable accident — construction of statute (United States v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.) 130, 131 Hours of service — ^railroads — unavoidable accident — construction of statute (United States v. Chicago. M. & St. P. Ry . Co.) 131 Hours of service — railroads — unavoidable casualty — construction of statute (United States u. New York, 0. & W. Ry. Co.) 131-133 Hours of service — railroads — waiting time (United States v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co.) 133 Injunction — contempt — limitation of actions (Gompers v. United States) 133-135 Injunction — contempt — ^review on habeas corpus proceedings (Ex parte Heffron) 135-137 Labor organizations — boycotts — antitrust law— knowledge of members of organization (Lawlor v. Loewe) 137-140 Labor organizations — boycotts — antitrust law — liability of members- for damages (Lawlor v. Loewe) 140-142 8 CONTENTS. Decisions of courts affecting labor — Continued. Decisions under statute law— Continued. _ ^ ^ag*- Labor organizations— conspiracy— transportation of explosives in pas- senger trains in interstate commerce— evidence (Ryan et al. v. United StaL) V^^^^"' Labor organizations— protection of employees as members— constitu- tionality of statute (Coppage v. Kansas) 147-160 Labor organizations— strikes— inciting to injury of persons (State v. Quinlan) - 160-162 Labor organizations— unlawful combinations— restraint of trade- in] unction— liability of members (Irving v. Neal) 162-164 Labor organizations— unlawful combinations— restraint of trade— injunctioii— prevention of competition (Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal). 164^167 Mechanics' liens— constitutionality of statute— interference with right to contract (Rittenhouse&Embree Co. I). Wm.Wrigley, jr., Co.) 167 Mechanics' liens— liens of subcontractors— attorneys' fees— constitu- tionality of statute (Becker D. Hopper) 168 Mechanics' liens— materialmen— effect of stipulation by contractor (Humet). Seattle Dock Co.) 169,170 Mine regulations — constitutionality of statute — status of statutory commission (Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania) 170, 171 Mine regulations — ^weighing coal — constitutionality of statute (Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple) - 171, 172 Minimum wages — constitutionality of statute (Simpson v. O'Hara) . . 172, 173 Minimum wages — ^industrial welfare commission — ^powers of com- mission — constitutionality of statute (Stettler v. 'Hara) 173-177 Mothers' pensions — construction of statute — widow (Debrot v. Marion County) 177,178 Railroads — qualifications of employees — constitutionality of statute — freight conductors (Smith v. Texas) 178, 179 Railroads — safety appliance act — construction — electric railways (Spokane & Inland Empire Railroad Co. v. United States) 179 Railroads — safety appliance act — construction — switching (Chicago, B. &Q. RaiboadCo. v. United States) 179,180 Railroads — safety appliance act — construction — switching (United States V. Pere Marquette Railroad Co.) 180, 181 Railroads — safety appliance act — construction trains (La Mere v. Railway Transfer Co. ) 181, 182 Railroads — safety appliances — constitutionality of statute — electric headlights (Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Georgia) 182, 183 Railroads — safety appliances — repair (United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.) 183 Seamen — failure to pay wages — construction of statute (The City of Montgomery) 183, 184 Strikes — mention in advertisements for employees — constitutionality of statute (Commonwealth v. Libbey) 184-186 Sunday labor — class legislation — constitutionality of city ordinance (City of Marengo v. Rowland) 186 Union labor — rate of wages — labor on public works — constitutionality of statute (Wright v. Hoctor) 186-188 Wages — assignment — consent of wife — constitutionality of statute (Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Marshall) 188,189 Wages — payment — redemption of scrip — constitutionality of statute (Regan v. Tremont Lumber Co.) 189 CONTENTS. ^ 9 Decisions of courts affecting labor— Continued. DeciBions under statute law— Continued. Page. Wages — payment in scrip — constitutionality of statute (Keokee Con- solidated Coke Co. V. Taylor) 190 Wages — payment on demand after discliarge — construction of statute- piecework (Kirven v. Wilds) 190 Wages — payment on termination of employment — railroads — con- stitutionality of statute (Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Schuler) 190, 191 Wages — rates on public works — municipal ordinance — constitutionality —powers of municipal corporations (Malette v. City of Spokane) . . . 191-195- Wages — semimonthly pay day — constitutionality of statute (Erie Rail- road Co. V. WilUams) 195, 196 Wages — semimonthly pay day — constitutionality of statute — imprison- ment for debt (State v. Prudential Coal Co. ) 196, 197 Workmen's compensation — abrogation of defenses — compulsion — lim- iting amount of recovery — constitutionality of statute (Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board) 197-203 Workmen's compensation — abrogation of defenses — exclusion of small employers — constitutionality of statute (Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. V. Blagg) 203, 204 Workmen's compensation — acceptance of act by employer — time of taking effect of act (Coakley v. Mason Mfg. Co.) 204, 205 Workmen's compensation — "accident" — definite time as factor (Lion- dale Bleach, Dye & Paint Works v. Riker) 205, 206 Workmen's compensation — accident arising out of employment (Henry Steers, Inc., v. Dunnewald) 206 Workmen's compensation — actions — default of contributions (Barrett V. Gray's Harbor Commercial Co.) ,. 206, 207 Workmen's compensation — amount of compensation — commutation to lump sum (Mockett v. Ashton) 207 Workmen's compensation — amount of compensation — disability (De Zeng Standard Co. v. Pressey) 207-209 Workmen's compensation — amount of compensation — loss of motion of arm — payments by insurance company (Barbour Flax Spinning Co. V. Hagerty) 209 Workmen's compensation — amount of compensation — partial disability (O'Connell v. Simms Magneto Co.) 209, 210 Workmen's compensation — ^benefits — impairment of earning capacity (International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Commission) 210, 211 Workmen's compensation — benefits — loss of member (Limron v. Blair) 211, 212 Workmen's compensation — ^benefits — permanent injury and subse- quent death (In re Burns) 212 Workmen's compensation — benefits — permanent injury not causing incapacity (In re Ethier) 212, 213 Workmen's compensation — benefits — separate allowances (In re Nichols) .-. 213 Workmen's compensation — casual employment (In re Cheevers) 213 Workmen's compensation — casual employment (In re Howard). . . . 213, 214 Workmen 's compensation — casual employment (Sabella v. Brazileiro). . 214 Workmen's compensation — casual employment — amount of compensa- tion (Schaeffer v. De Grottola) 214 Workmen's compensation — casual employment — waiters (In re Gaynor) 214, 215 10 CONTENTS. Decisions of courts affecting labor — Continued. Decisions under statute law— Continued. Page. Workmen's compensation — classification of employments — railroad construction (State -v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry. Co.) 215, 216 Workmen's compensation — constitutionality of statute (Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co.) 216-218 Workmen's compensation — constitutionality of statute (Matheson v. MinneapoUs Street Ry. Co.) 218-221 Workmen's compensation — constitutionality of statute — election — ^pro- ceedings (Young V. Duncan) 221-223 Workmen's compensation — constitutionality of statute — exolusiveness of remedy — election (Shade v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co.) 224, 225 Workmen's compensation — constitutionality of statute-^title — wages (Huyett V. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.) 225, 226 Workmen's compensation — contract of employment made in another State (American Radiator Co. v. Rogge) 226 Workmen 's compensation — dependency — finding of board (In re Bent- ley) 226 Workmen's compensation — dependency — finding of board (In re Her- rick) 226, 227 Workmen's compensation — dependency — presumptions — ^wife living apart from husband (In re Gallagher) 227 Workmen's compensation — dependency — presumptions — wife living apart from husband (In re Nelson) 227, 228 Workmen's compensation — dependents of minors (Dazy v. Apponaug Co. ) 228 Workmen's compensation — dependents of minors — ^benefits (In re • Murphy) 229 Workmen's compensation — depositions for use of industrial accident board — letters rogatory — power of courts (In re Martinelli) 229, 230 Workmen's compensation — distribution of compensation (In re Janes).. 230 Workmen 's compensation — election — incapacity (Gorrell v. Battelle) . 230, 231 Workmen 's compensation — election — minors — notice — constitution- ality of statute (Troth v. Millville Bottle Works) 231, 232 Workmen's compensation — election of remedies — exclusiveness (The Fred E. Sander) 232 Workmen's compensation — employers' liability — "willful act" (McWeeny v. Standard BoUer & Plate Co.) 232-234 Workmen's compensation — employment during part of year — compu- tation of weekly payment (Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co.).. 234,235 Workmen's compensation — evidence necessary to support finding (Reck V. Whittlesberger) 236 Workmen's compensation — exclusiveness of remedy — proceedings under common law — nature of award — measure of damages (Mc- Roberts v. National Zinc Co.) 236-238 Workmen's compensation — extrahazardous employment — workman (Wendt V. Industrial Insurance Commission) 238, 239 Workmen's compensation — farm laborers (In re Keaney) 239, 240 Workmen's compensation— "fortuitous event"— hernia (Zappala v. Industrial Insurance Commission) 240 241 Workmen's compensation— "incapable of use" (In re Meley) '241 Workmen's compensation— incapacity for work (In re Sullivan) 241 CONTENTS. 11 Decisions of courts affecting labor— Continued. Decisions under statute law — Continued. Page. Worlcmen's compensation — injury arising out of and in course of em- ployment (Terlecki v. Strauss) 241, 242 Workmen's compensation — injury arising out of and in course of em- ployment — climbing off roof for lunch — intentional and willful misconduct (Clem v. Chalmers Motor Co.) 242,243 Workmen's compensation — injury arising out of and in course of em- ployment — employee going off premises for lunch (Hills v. Blair). 243, 244 Workmen's compensation — injury arising out of and in course of em- ployment — employee going out to lunch (In re Sundine) 244 Workmen's compensation — injui-y arising out of and in course of em- ployment — punching time clock (Rayner d. Sligh Furniture Co.). . . 244 Workmen's compensation — injury arising out of and in course of em- ployment — riding to and from work (In re Donovan) 245 Workmen's compensation — injury arising out of employment (Bayne v. Riverside Storage & Cartage Co.) 245, 246 Workmen's compensation — injury arising out of employment — effect of previous injury (Milliken v. A. Towle & Co.) 246, 247 Workmen's compensation — injury in course of employment — disease — causation (Newcomb v. Albertson) 247, 248 Workmen's compensation — injury in course of employment — effect of preexisting disease (Voorhees v. Smith Schoonmaker Co.) 248, 249 Workmen's compensation — injury in course of employment — evidence of cause of death (Muzik v. Erie Railroad Co.) 249 Workmen's compensation — injury in course of employment — review by courts (De Constantin v. PubUc Service Commission) 249, 250 Workmen's compensation — injury in course of employment — ^use of forbidden appliance (Reimers v. Proctor Publishing Co.) 250 Workmen's compensation — injury of employee by negligence of third party (Meese v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.) 250, 251 Workmen's compensation — injury of employee by negligence of third party — settlement — separate claim against employer (Newark Pav- ing Co. V. Klotz) 251-253 Workmen's compensation — medical and hospital services (In re Panasuk) 253 Workmen 's compensation — medical and surgical treatment — ^refusal to permit operation (Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co.) 253-255 Workmen's compensation — nonresident alien beneficiaries — ^injuries causing death (Gregutis v. Waclark Wire Works) 255, 256 Workmen's compensation — permanent injury — aged employee — amount of compensation (Bateman Manufacturing Co. v. Smith). . 256, 257 Workmen's compensation — permanent injury — death — aged em- ployees (City of Milwaukee v. Ritzow) 257 Workmen's compensation — permanent total or partial disability — loss of fingers — amount of benefits (Sinnes v. Daggett) 257, 258 Workmen's compensation — personal injury — occupational disease — lead poisoning (Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works) 258, 259 Workmen's compensation — personal injury — occupational disease — lead poisoning (Johnson v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.).. 259,260 Workmen's compensation — ^personal injury — occupational disease — optic neuritis (In re Hurle) 260-282 12 CONTENTS. I Decisions of courts affecting labor — Continued. Decisions under statute law — Concluded. Page. Workmen's compensation — railroad employees — election (Oonnole v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.) 263 Workmen's compensation — review of decisions of industrial board — certiorari (Courter v. Simpson Construction Co.)'. 264 Workmen's compensation — ^review of findings of board of arbitration (In re Diaz) 264 Workmen's compensation — ^right of action by parent for loss of serv- ices of minor child (King i;. Viscoloid Co.) 264, 265 Workmen's compensation — seamen — scope of law {TheFred E. Sander) . 265 Workmen's compensation — serious and willful misconduct (In re Nickerson) 265,266 Workmen's compensation — "service growing out of and incidental to employment" — employee on way to work (City of Milwaukee v. Althoff) 266 Workmen's compensation — settlement with third parties liable for injury — ^release — separate claim for death — deduction for wages (In reCripp) 266,267 Workmen's compensation — subrogation of employer to right of action against third person — assignment of right (McGarvey v. Independent Oil & Grease Co. ) 267, 268 Workmen's compensation — ^total and partial disability (Duprey v. Maryland Casualty Co.) 268, 269 Workmen's compensation — workman — child under 14 years employed by father in mill (Hillestad v. Industrial Commission) 269 Decisions under common law 270-339 Boycott — injunction — ^right to strike — unfair lists (Burnham v. Dowd) 270-272 Contract of employment — employment for life — ^reformation of written contract obtained by fraud (Pierson v. Kingman Milling Co.) 272-274 Contract of employment — ^grounds for discharge — disobedience of rules (Corley v. Rivers) 274, 275 Contract of employment — term (Resener v. Watts, Ritter & Co.) 275 Employer and employee — conditional resignation — discharge — dam- ages (Nesbit V. Giblin) 275,276 Employer and employee — liability of employer for wrongful acts — assault on third party (Matsuda v. Hammond) 276 Employer and employee— liability of employer for wrongful acts- false imprisonment (Birmingham Ledger Co. v. Buchanan) 277 Employer and employee— liability of employer for wrongful a^ts— trespassers— authority of railroad brakeman (Tarnowskit). Lake Shore &M. S. Ry. Co.) 278 Employers' associations- violation of resolution to maintain open shops— recovery of liquidated damages (United Hat Mfrs. v. Baird- UnteidtCo.) 278-283 Employers' liabUity— assumption of risks— incompetent fellow servant (Walters v. Durham Lumber Co.) 283 284 Employers' Uability— duty of employer to instruct— negligence (McOarty v. R. E. Wood Lumber Co.) ° 284 Employers' liability— municipalities— governmental functions- cleaning streets (Mayor, etc. , of Savannah v. Jordan) 284 285 Employers' liability— obedience to orders— assumption of risks- contributory negligence— safe place to work (Magnuson v . Mac Adam) . 285 CONTENTS. 13 Decisions of courts affecting labor — Continued, Decisions under common law — Continued. Page. Employers' liability — ^railroad companies — contributory negligence (Stone V. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.) 286 Employers' liability — ^railroad companies — minors — assumption of risks (Adams ii. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.) 286,287 Employers' liability — safe place to work — approved machines (Ainsley V. John L. Ro] ^r Lumber Co.) 287, 288 Employers' liability — status of employee riding from work — street railways — passes (Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. ■;;. Isgrig). 288 Employers' liability — status of employte riding on engine in viola- tion of rules — ^trespasser (Dixon ■;;. Central of Georgia Ry . Co.) 289 Employers' liability — status of employee riding to work (Klinck v., Chicago Street Ry . Co. ) 289, 290 Employers' liability — warning of new dangers — strikes — injury to guards (McCalman v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.) 290, 291 Employers' liability insurance — malpractice of company's physician (May Creek Logging Co. i). Pacific Coast Casualty Co.) 291, 292 Interference with employment — actions — e-vidence (Johnson v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.) 292-294 Interference with employment — conspiracy — actions for damages (Bausbach v. Reiff) 294-296 Interference with employment — procuring discharge — conspiracy (Heffernan v. Whittlsey) 296, 297 Labor organizations — collective agreements — effect on individual contract (Gulla v. Barton) 297, 298 Labor organizations — ^inducing breach of contract — ^injunctions (New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivem) 298-301 Labor organizations — injunction — ^boycott (Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr) 301-303 Labor organizations — ^injimction — conspiracy — ^boycott (Hoban v. Dempsey) 303-305 Labor organizations — injunction — contempt — picketing — e\ idence (Sona V. Aluminum Castings Co.) , 305, 306 Labor organizations — injunction — contempt — violation by incitinc: others to violence (United States v. Colo et al.) 306-309 Labor organizations — ^injunction — ^right to relief — mandamus directing issue — ^peaceable parading (Baltic Mining Co. v. Houghton Circuit Judge) 310-313 Labor organizations — ^interference with employment — conspiracy — ■ boycott — injunction (Clarkson v. Laiblan) 313, 314 Labor organizations — ^interference with employment — ^injunctions — damages (Fairbanks v. McDonald) 314, 315 Labor organizations — legality — ^interference with employment — con- spiracy (Mitchell V. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co.) 315-320 Labor organizations — legality — ^interference with employment — strikes (Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co.) 321 Labor organizations — libel by printing in paper pubKshed by associa- tion — damages (United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer) 322,323 Labor organizations — powers — ^fines upon members — ia\ estigation (Monroe v. Colored Screwmen's Benevolent Association) 323, 324 Labor organizations — relief funds — disposition — liability for wrongful use (Atty. Gen. ex rel, Prendergast et al. v. Bedard et al.) 324, 325 14 CONTENTS. Decisions of courts affecting labor — Concluded. Deciflions under common law — Concluded; ^^^'■ Labor organizations — right to strike — ^procuring discharge (Roddy v. United Mine Workers) 325, 326 Labor organizations — strikes — conspiracy — ^incitement to commit crime — liability as principal (People v. Ford) 326-329 Labor organizations — strikes — picketing (In re Langell) 330-332 Labor organizations — strikes — picketing — ^injury to business — dam- ages (Berry Foundry Co. v. International Holders' Union) 332-334 Relief associations — railroatls — application for membership — fraudu- lent representations (Daughtridge v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.) 334, 335 Strikes — martial law — insurrection — power to hold and to try offenders (Ex parte McDonald) 335-338 Strikes — ^use of house as part of employee's compensation — damages for ejection (Lane v. Au Sable Electric Co.) 338 Wages — collection — identification card (Roumelitis v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.) 338,339 BULLETIN OF THE U. S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. WHOLE NO. 169. WASHINGTON. MAY. 1915. REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR, 1914. BT LINDLET D. CLARK, A. M., LL. M. INTRODUCTION. This is the third annual bulletin devoted to the subject of the interpretation of labor laws by the courts, the preceding bulletins in this series being No. 112 and No. 152. During the publication of the bimonthly bulletins of this Bureau, ending with No. 100, practically every bulletia contauied some pages of material of this nature. The present series began with the year 1912. The decisions reproduced are mainly those rendered by the Federal courts or by the State courts of last resort, though in a few cases the opinions of subordi- nate courts of appellate jurisdiction have been used. Not aU cases of the classes considered have been noted, the purpose being to show the construction placed upon labor legislation and the application of the common law to the labor contract and its incidents by the selec- tion of representative cases. Questions of constitutionahty and those affecting the development of the new forms of legislation, together with cases affecting the status and powers of organized labor, have received the fullest attention. Opinions of the Attorney General of the United States construing Federal labor legislation have appeared in the two preceding bulletins named, but no opinion of this class was handed down by this official during the year 1914. The method of presentation is that which has been systematically followed in the past — i. e., an abridged statement of facts, followed in most instances by quotations from the opinions of the court, show- ing the conclusions reached and the grounds therefor. In a number of cases, however, this procedure has been departed from by a very brief statement of the conclusions showing the application of the statute in question to the particular point referred to the court for decision. The National Reporter System, published by the West Publishing Co., has been depended upon for the court decisions reproduced, except in the matter of reports of cases decided in the courts of the 15 16 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOB STATISTICS. District of Columbia, for which the Washington Law Reporter was used. The decisions presented are those appearing in the foregoing pubUcations during the calendar year 1914, with the exception of a few decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States on cases argued during the calendar year named, the opinions being rendered early in 1915. The reporters, etc., covered are as follows: Supreme Court Reporter, volume 34, page 48, to volume 35, page 25. Federal Reporter, volume 208, page 497, to volume 217, page 688. Northeastern Reporter, volume 103, page 401, to volume 106, page 1087. Atlantic Reporter, volume 88, page 977, to volume 92, page 512. Southeastern Reporter, volume 80, page 225, to volume 83, page 672. Southern Reporter, volume 63, page 505, to volume 66, page 456. Southwestern Reporter, volume 161, page 1, to volume 170, page 1199. Northwestern Reporter, volume 144, page 209, to volume 149, page 720. Pacific Reporter, volume 136, page 849, to volume 144, page 576. Opinions of Attorney General, volume 30, pages 241 to 288. Washington Law Reporter, volume 42. Perhaps the most interesting class of decisions, as well as one of the most numerous, is the group relating to the subject of workmen's compensation — a type of legislation which was enacted for the pur- pose of doing away with litigation. However, the type of law is new in the United States, and many expressions are used which seem to require legal definition, while the construction of the laws must nec- essarily be made authoritative by a process of adjudication. Many points are of minor importance and doubtless represent chiefly a desire to secure early definiteness in the construction of the details of the acts. The Federal employers' habfiity act continues to be the subject of numerous decisions as to its scope, considerable diver- gence as to hberality being noticed. Interesting and important decisions relative to labor organizations are also presented in this bulletin, notably the closing up of thelong, protracted Danbury Hatters' Case (p. 140), the dissolution of the injunction in the case Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. (p. 315), and the declaration of imconstitu- tionahty of the so-called coercion law of Kansas (Coppage v. Kansas, p. 147). DECISIONS OF COURTS. Coiu-t decisions are divided into two groups, dependent upon whether they are based upon statutes or upon the principles of the common law not enacted into statute form. In this review, however this distinction is not observed, but the cases are grouped in a general way according to the subject matter considered. BE VIEW OF DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOB. 17 ' CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. The question of the labor contract has been the subject of but few laws, so that the decisions under this head are chiefly those that apply the principles of the common law. The reformation of a written contract obtained by fraud was passed upon in the case Pierson v. Kingman Milling Co. (p. 272), in which an injured workman signed a release on the presumption that he was secured in employment for life. The court held that the contract shoTild be made to conform to the oral representations made at the time, and that such a contract was enforceable, not being within the statute of frauds, and not void for indefiniteness. The proper form of procedure in case of the breach of a contract of this nature was considered in Pennsylvania Co. v. Good (p. 57), the plaintiff being held in this instance to be barred by the statute of limitations. That an employee may properly be discharged before the end of the term for which he was engaged when he violates the rules of his employer was held in Corley v. Rivers (p. 274). The effect of the terms used in a contract for employment was considered in Resener v. Watts, Ritter & Co. (p. 275), the court holding that, in the absence of other facts, a hiring on a monthly or yearly salary would be presumed to bo a hiring at will. It was held in Nesbit v. Giblin (p. 275) that a conditional resignation must be accepted within a reasonable time if the employer desires to terminate the contract, and that damages will lie for a dis- charge after conduct which would indicate the purpose of the em- ployer to continue the employment. The liability of an employer for the wrongful acts of his employees was declared in the case Bir- mingham Ledger Co. v. Buchanan (p. 277), where the agents of a newspaper company forcibly detained newsboys to prevent their taking employment with a rival. An unratified assault on a third party by an employee was held not to make the employer liable in Matsuda v. Hammond (p. 276) ; while a judgment declaring the non- hability of the employer for a fatal assault by the employee on a trespasser was reversed in Tamowsld v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co. (p. 278). The existence of the relation of employer and employee came up for consideration in some cases in which workmen were being trans- ported to or from their places of employment. In Indianapolis T. & T. Co. V. Isgrig (p. 288) it was held that a street railway employee riding home on a pass containing a stipulation exempting the com- pany from liability for death or injury while using the same was a passenger and entitled to protection as such, the pass being presumed to be a part of the employee's wages, and not a gratuity. In Klinck v. Chicago Street Ry. Co. (p. 289) the same view was taken; while in Charleston & W. C. R Co. v. Thompson (p. 10.3), this principle was held to apply to the members of an employee's family riding on a pass, 85590°— Bull. 169—15 2 18 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. such pass being held to be a part of the employee's compensation, and permissible as such under the Federal law known as the "Hep- burn Act." A fireman riding as a passenger on an engine in violation of rules was held to be a trespasser, for whose death by accident the company was not liable (Dixon v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., p. 289). The right of an employee to recover damages where a third party interferes to procure his discharge was considered in Bausbach v. Eeiff (p. 294), in which a verdict in favor of a group of workmen who were charged with conspiracy to procure the discharge of an em- ployee was reversed, and a new trial ordered. In Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (p. 292) it' was held that while a letter demanding the discharge of an employee was prima facie evidence of interference, the evidence faUed to disclose the causal connection necessary, and the company was held not to be liable in this case. In another case, Heffernan v. Whittlsey (p. 296), an employee secured the discharge of his rival, who thereupon sued the company and the interfering employee. Conspiracy was not found, nor was there sufficient evi- dence to support the charge of malice against the company, so that it was discharged from liability, while the worker who instigated the charges was held liable in damages. WAGES. The question of minimum wages received its first notice in the courts of this country last year in connection with the Oregon statute. In Stettler v. O'Hara (p. 173) the constitutionality of the statute was upheld, and the power of the commission to which its enforcement was committed to make local and specific apphcations of the act was affirmed. In Simpson v. O'Hara (p. 172) the act was again held to be constitutional, as not being inimical to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. The rate of wages was considered in another aspect in Wright v. Hoctor (p. 186), a statute requiring union labor to be employed and fixing the rate of wages at $2 per day being held unconstitutional. The question of rates fixed by ordinance was involved in the case Malette v. City of Spokane (p. 191). In this case the validity of the ordinance was sustained, as within the power of the State to deter- mine under what conditions it would make contracts, acting through its municipalities. The question of the time of the payment of wages arose in Erie R. Co. V. Williams (p. 195), the New York law requiring semimonthly payment of wages by raikoads, etc., being held constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court of Tennes- see (State V. Prudential Coal Co., p. 196) held unconstitutional a law of that State providing for a semimonthly pay day for corporations running a commissary or supply store, and providing penalties for EEVIEW OP DECISIONS OP COUETS APFECTING LABOB. 19 failure to comply with the act, the ground being that since an employer who violated the act might be imprisoned for such violation, the spirit of the law which forbids imprisonment for debt was contravened, so that the statute must fall. The requirement of the redemption of scrip is embodied in a Virginia statute which was before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. V. Taylor (p. 190), the constitutionality of a law requiring mining and manufacturing companies to redeem in cash store orders issued by them as payable only in merchandise being affirmed. The same view is taken of a very similar point in Regan v. Tremont Lumber Co. (p. 189), the Supreme Court of Louisiana upholding the statute of that State. Statutes providing penalties for failure of the employer to pay wages due workmen on their discharge were considered in two cases. In Elrven v. WUds (p. 190) the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed a judgment for a penalty awarded a discharged workman by the court below, while in C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schuler (p. 190) the Supreme Court of Indiana declared unconstitutional a statute providing a cumulative penalty for the failure of railroad companies to pay their workmen any wages due on the termination of employ- ment. A statute of Indiana requiring assignments of wages of a married man to have the written consent of his wife was considered in C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Marshall (p. 188), this provision being sustained as constitutional and of general application, and not restricted to wage brokers only. That an employer should not be held for the mistaken payment of wages to a person fraudulently holding an identification card, the employer himself not being negligent, was held in RoumeUtis v. M. P. R. Co. (p. 338). Under this head may be noted the case Hughes v. Traeger (p. 56), under which a civil-service employee undertook to prevent the retention of any portion of his salary for the establishment of a pension fund. The provision of the law authorizing such reten- tion was held to be constitutional. The constitutionality of the mechanics' lien law of Illinois was con- sidered in Rittenhouse & Embree Co. v. Wm. Wrigley, jr., Co. (p. 167). The statute undertook to permit a subcontractor to secure a lien the same as a contractor, whether or not the contractor could obtain the lien or was by his contract or conduct divested of a right thereto. This provision of the act was held to be unconstitutional. The ques- tion of constitutionality with reference to the mechanics' lien law of Wyoming was raised in the case Becker v. Hopper (p. 168). The point involved was as to the right of a subcontractor to a mechanic's lien in the absence of a direct contractual relation with the owner of the property. The coTirt held that the statute giving a lien under such circumstances is valid. Another provision of the same statute 30 BULLETIN OF THE BUKEAU OF LABOE STATISTIOS. allowed attorneys' fees to the plaintiff or complainant in case ho was successful, no reciprocal benefit being allowed a successftd defendant. This provision was held to be unconstitutional, as not affording the equal protection of the law to the respective parties. The effect on a subcontractor's rights of a stipulation by a contractor that no mechanics' liens should be filed was before the Supreme Court of Ore- gon in the case Hume v. Seattle Dock' Co. (p. 169), the court holding that such stipulation could not preclude the subcontractor's rights. Questions of the henability of certain classes of material were also considered in this case. HOURS OF LABOR. Laws hmiting the hours of labor on public works were considered in four cases, the Federal statute of August 1, 1892, being before the court in Chattanooga & Tennessee Eiver Power Co. v. United States (p. 119), the defendants claiming that the fact that the lock and dam on which they were engaged would furnish them water power took the work out of the statute. This contention was rejected by the court on the ground that the Government had let the contract for the purpose of procuring a benefit to navigation, and that the incidental use of the power developed did not control. The eight-hour law of Oregon was considered in two cases, in one, Ex parte Steiner (p. 116), the superintendent of the State hospital was convicted of violation of the law in requiring a laborer on the asylum farm to work for more than eight hours; in the other case, Albee v. Weinberger (p. 117), the mayor of Portland was arrested for a violation of the law in per- mitting and requiring a fireman and a poUceman to work for more than eight hours. The supreme court of the State held that such employment was not a violation of the law. The question of the constitutionaHty of a Maryland statute appHcable to contractors with the city of Baltimore was considered in Sweetser v. State (p. 118). The statute was upheld against the contention of depriving contractors of property without due process of law, and of discrimination on account of being applicable only to the city of Baltimore. Private employment is regulated by a general statute of Oregon limiting to 10 per day the hours of labor of employees in mills, fac- tories, etc. This statute was declared to be constitutional in State V. Bunting (p. 120). An ordinance of the city of San Francisco pro- hibiting work in laundries between the hours of 6 p. m. and 7 a. m. was held by the Supreme Court of Cahfornia to be constitutional in Ex parte Wong Wing (p. lie). The constitutionality of a statute limited in its application to women and children was contested in Riley v. Massachusetts (p. 121), the Supreme Court of the United States sustaining its constitutionality, including the detail requirino' the posting of a schedule of work time and penalizing any departure therefrom. ' BEVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 21 The Federal hours of service act for railway employees gave rise to a considerable number of decisions. The question of emergency was considered in United States v. N. P. R. Co. (p. 122), in which a train wreck delayed the return of the crew so that it had a six and one-half hours' rest instead of eight hours as required by the statute, the company being held excusable. In United States v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co. (p. 130) it was held that a wreck jsausing a delay after the employee had left a terminal was a justifiable cause for overtime work, even though a lay off might have been made at an intermediate station other than the starting point of the crew; the attempt to haul a damaged car by means of a chain in violation of the statute was held, however, to be such a cause for delay as could have been avoided, and not an emergency within the meaning of the act. Where trains were delayed by a heavy snowstorm and the crews laid off to avoid violation of the le-hoiu" law, it was held (N. P. R. Co. v. United States p. 125) that keeping a fireman on duty to watch and keep up fires was such a violation of the statute as to incur penalties. The same conclusion was reached in G. N. R. Co. v. United States (p. 127), where a fireman was required to watch an engine while tied up at a siding, the coiu't holding that such service was within the law governing the "movement" of trains. A technical violation of the law was admitted by the defendant in United States v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co. (p. 131), where the water that had to be used for the engine was warm and impure and the injectors of the engine, though in good condition, failed to work properly, but the situation was held to be one of unavoidable acci- dent. The death of a member of the household of a telegraph opera- tor and the sickness of such operator were held to excuse the rail- road company in United States v. N. Y. O. & W. Ry. Co. (p. 131) in a proceeding to recover penalties under the hours of service act; so also of the sickness of an operator in the case United States v. S. P. Co. (p. 124). The Federal statute in its apphcation to telegraph operators makes a distinction between offices operated continuously and those operated only during the daytime. It was held in United States v. A. C. L. R. Co. (p. 128) that an office regularly kept open from 6.30 a. m. to 10.15 p. m. was one continuously operated, so that the 9-hour limit must control. So in United States v. M. K. & T. R. Co. (p. 128) the employment of an operator from 8 a. m. to 12 noon and from 1 p. m. to 7 p. m., and another from 7 p. m. to 12 midnight and from 1 a. m. to 6 a. m., was held to be continuous service within the mean- ing of the act. A telegraph operator working overtime, although he had instructions not to do so, was held to have violated the law so that his employer was hable in United States v. O.-W. R. & N. Co. (p. 129), since it is an absolute and positive duty of the carrier to 22 BTJLLETIir OB' THE BtrKfiAtT OP LABOK SlATlSflCS. enforce the law, and nonperformance ia not excvised by the plea of reasonable diligence. A switch tender was held in M. P. E,. Co. v. United States (p. 129) not to be classed with "operators, train dispatchers, etc.," whose hours of service are limited to 9 per day. Employees whose train was delayed by waiting while other trains were passing, and who were relieved for an hour and a half in the meantime by a switching crew, were held to be continuously on duty in United States v. N. P. R. Co. (p. 133), the court saying that if the rest period could be thus broken up into small fragments there would be no sufficient- opportunity for either sleep or rest. In Osborne's Admr. v. C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co. (p. 125) an employee riding free under orders, or "deadheading," was held not to be during such time on duty so as to come within the provisions of the 16-hour law. A New York statute regulating the hours of service of railroad em- ployees was held in Erie R. Co. v. New York (p. 123) to be void after the enactment of the Federal statute on the subject, even though the latter law was not to go into effect until a subsequent date, the Supreme Court of the United States holding that when Congress so acts as to indicate its purpose to take charge of a subject within its powers, the regulating power of the State ceases to exist. FACTORY REGULATIONS. The constitutionahty of the Ilhnois law requiring certain employ- ers to furnish wash rooms was before the court in People v. Solomon (p. 115), the contention being that it was discriminatory as weU as unreasonable and ambiguous. These contentions were rejected by the com-t, and the constitutionality of the law upheld. RAILROADS. With a single exception the cases under this head relate to the Federal safety appliance law, the exception being the case Atlantic C. L. R. Co. V. Georgia (p. 182), in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld as constitutional a statute of Georgia prescrib- ing the headlight equipment for railroad locomotives, with certain exceptions as to tramroads, miU roads, etc. In Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co. v. United States (p. 179) the circuit court of appeals held that the Federal safety appliance law was applicable to an interurban electric line. The statute was held also to apply to a terminal or transfer company handling interstate cars (La Mere v. Ry. Transfer Co., p. 181). In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States (p. 179) it was held that the prohibition against handling cars with defective coupling apparatus applied to switching operations as well as to long hauls, but that the requirement of the coupling of REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COJJBTS AFFECTING LABOR. 23 the air brakes on 50 per cent of the cars of a train was not applica- ble in switching movements between yards 2 mUes apart. The oppo- site view was taken with reference to air brakes in United States v. Pere Marquette R. Co. (p. 180). In United States v. C. & O. R. Co. (p. 183) the repeated handling in switching of a car with a defective apparatus was held to constitute a violation of the statute. MINES. A statute of Pennsylvania authorizes and provides for the consti- tution of a board to decide as to pillars and boundaries between adjacent mining properties. The constitutionality of this act and the status of such a commission were considered in Plymouth Coal Co. V. Pennsylvania (p. 170), the Supreme Court of the United States upholding the act as valid. The Ohio Legislature in 1914 provided for the weighing of coal at mines, authorizing the industrial commis- sion of the State to enforce the provisions of the act, and to use its discretion in fixing a standard to be observed. The contention was made that such a law is unconstitutional, interfering with the em- ployers' rights. This contention was rejected in RaU & River Coal Co. V. Yaple (p. 171), the presumption being that the commission would proceed in accordance with the terms of the act, while if it should not, an appeal would lie to the courts of the State. The min- ing law of Alabama, as enacted in 1896-97, prohibited employment of boys under 12 years of age in coal mines in the State. In the code revision the age limit was advanced to 14 years, and the expression "any mine" incorporated in the act. This was held in Cole v. Sloss- Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. (p. 113) to make the act applicable to ore mines as well as to coal mines. RESTRICTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. A statute of Texas provided for the establishment of local boards to examine and certify plumbers as a condition precedent to their engaging in their occupation. This statute was held in Davis v. Holland (p. 114) to be unconstitutional because permitting all mem- bea-s of a partnership to practice if only one has been certified, while individual plumbers must each secure a license, so that the law was of unequal apphcation. The Supreme Court of the United States in Smith V. Texas (p. 178) held unconstitutional a statute of Texas restricting the employment of railroad conductors to persons who had had certain specified experience, the court holding that the require- ments were arbitrary and unreasonable, and so in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Under this head may be noticed the restriction on the importation imder contract, etc., of alien laborers. In United States v. Dwight 24 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Mfg. Co. (p. 47) the questions of what constitutes " an offer of employ- ment" within the meaning of the act, and a proper declaration of the violation of the act were discussed at some length, the conclusion being reached that the prosecution had been brought in due form. In Grant Bros. Construction Co. v. United States, (p. 48) the liability of the company for the acts of its agents and the propriety of assess- ing separate penalties for each laborer brought in in violation of the law, even though all came at the same time, were upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. Other cases that may be considered here for lack of a better clas- sification relate to the employment of convicts. A Virginia statute, known as the convict lime grinding act, provides for the manufac- ture and sale of Ume, convicts being employed to do the work. In Shenandoah Lime Co. v. Mann (p. 58) the constitutionality of this law was upheld as against the contention of the company that the State was thus engaging in internal improvement and using public funds for private purposes in violation of the statute. In Tennessee C. I. & R. Co. V. Butler (p. 60) the plaintiff was permitted to recover a balance claimed by him on account of being kept at work under a sentence to work out costs for a longer time than the law permitted. For the same reason as the above a case involving the constitution- ality of a city ordinance prohibiting the keeping open of barber shops on Sunday (City of Marengo v. Rowland, p. 186) is noted here, the ordinance in question being declared unconstitutional as discriminat- ing against a single business. WOMEN AND CHILDREN. The status of youthful employees and children employed under lawful age is considered under the headings "Liability of employers for injuries to employees" (Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, p. 64; McCarty v. R. E. Wood Lumber Co., p. 284; Adams v. C. & 0. R. Co., p. 286); "Workmen's compensation" (HUlestad v. Industrial Commission, p. 269); and a case relating to woman labor appears under "Hours of labor" (Riley v. Massachusetts, p. 121). Laws that relate somewhat indirectly to employment, but that contemplate the care of cluldi-en untU they attain a suitable age to work, are those known as "Mothers' pension laws." The Iowa stat- ute on this subject providing for the care of the children of widows was held not to cover the case of the children of a divorced woman (Debrot v. Marion County, p. 177). LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES. The vahdity of an Indiana statute was decided in VandaUa R. Co. V. Stilwell (p. 60), the law distinguishing between the defenses avail- able for employers of five or more persons and those employing a less number. The court in .this case held such a provision constitutional. REVIEW OF DECISION'S OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOB. 25 The abrogation of defenses by the statute was also upheld. A like question arose in Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce (p. 62), in which the company contended that a statute of Mississippi extending to "other corporations and individuals using engines" the liability fixed by the constitution for railroad corporations was invalid. This con- tention was rejected by the supreme court of the State, and the abro- gation of the defense of feUow service upheld. The Supreme Court of Illinois (Crooks v. Tazewell Coal Co., p. 61) had before it the valid- ity of the workmen's compensation act of that State in its effect on the defenses of an employer not accepting its provisions, the court holding that even though the employee had accepted the statute, if the employer rejected it, it did not apply, and damages at common law would be recoverable in a proper case. The incompetence of a feUow servant was held the cause of liability of the employer in Walters v.Durham I^umber Co. (p. 283), the court holding that a workman assumed the risk of negligence of his fellow servant, but not of the negligence of the employer in selectiag incom- petent employees. The employing company was held hable for injuries to a boy under 1 6 years of age employed at a punch press m violation of the stat- ute of Illinois which permits the employment of children over 14, but restricts the employment of those under 16 years of age at desig- nated dangerous employments (Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co.w. Beauchamp (p. 64). The Supreme Court of the United States held that classifi- cations of this nature were witliin the power of the State, and did not violate the rule as to due process of law. The rule as to minority was before the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Adams v. C. &. O. R. Co. (p. 286), under the principles of common law. In tlds case a 17 year old boy was kept on duty as a section hand for about 20 consecutive hours, and the court ruled that on account of liis youth he could not be held to be presumed to have fuUy appreciated the danger of such extraordinary employment. In another case before the same court, McCarty v. R. E. Wood Lumber Co. (p. 284), the duty of the employer to instruct an inexperienced youth was emphasized, and the failure to do so was held to charge the employer with liability for a resultant injury. A number of decisions turned on the failure of the employer to provide or maintain guards for dangerous machinery. Thus in Pulse V. Spencer (p. 69) it was held the duty of the employer to see that a guard was in place when it was feasible, even though there might be times when under the statute it might be removed for certain opera- tions, and that the employee in removing the guard" at such times was not guilty of negh':;ence as a matter of law. An unguarded Avringer or extractor in a laundry was held to be within the provisions of a West Virginia statute requiring machinery to be guarded in manufacturing or mercantile, etc., establishments (McClary v. Knight, p. 65). In 26 BULLETIN OF tHE BUEEAtJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. Phillips V. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. (p. 66) the question was considered as to whether an injury not due to contact with an unguarded mar chine, but due to flying objects thrown from the machine, was v^-ithin the statute requiring guards for dangerous machinery; the court held that the law covered such a condition, and in the absence of contribu- tory negligence recovery might be had for the employer's neghgence in faihng to provide the necessary protection. A somewhat similar point was involved in Smith v. Mt. Clemens Sugar Co. (p. 68), in which it was contended that a gearing did not require a guard because so far removed from the floor as not to be dangerous. It was held that since employees were required to approach this gearing several times daily, that contention could not be maintained. The question of proximate cause arose in C. H. & D. R. Co. v. Armuth (p. 67), an employee's hand having been caught in imguarded cogwheels when it slipped from a lever which he was operating. The failure to guard the machinery and the slipping of the hand were considered to be concurring causes, and the former, being in violation of the statute, was the proximate cause, and entailed Habihty unless the employee was negligent in permitting his hand to shp. Negligence in the discharge of the common-law duty of warning the employee of new dangers was held to make the employer hable for injuries to a strike guard sent to a point to which deputy marshals had also been summoned, neither party being informed of the other's presence or purpose (McCalman v. I. C. R. Co., p. 290). Several liabihty cases involved the construction of statutes regu- lating the operation of mines. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States (Myers v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., p. 70) reversed the judgment of the circuit court of appeals and aflSxmed the judgment of the trial court in a case involving the liabiUty of the employing company for the death of a man from electric shock, the court hold- ing that the employment of a certified foreman did not reheve the company from responsibility where the electrical installation was not in charge of such foreman. In Humphreys v. Raleigh Coal & Coke Co. (p. 70) the Supreme Court of West Virginia reached the same conclusion in a very similar case, the court holding that the employ- ment of a mine foreman was not intended to absolve the employer from his duty as to equipment and maintenance. Failure to employ a mining boss to inspect the mine was held to be the proximate cause of an injury in Baisdrenghien v. M. K. & T. R. Co. (p. 71); so also in Piazzi v. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co. (p. 72), where, though an inspector was employed, he had not marked a dangerous place. The mine law of Oklahoma was held in Big Jack Mining Co. v. Parkinson (p. 72) to apply to lead and zinc mines no less than to coal mines. Violation of the statute as to hoisting was considered by the Supreme Court of Montana, the court finding that under the rule the deceased BBViBW OF DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTIKG LABOR. 27 workman was, in effect, a station tender and that his death was due to his own negligence, so that no recovery could be had (Maronen v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., p. 73). The regulation of railroad operations by statute afforded the basis for a number of decisions that have been reproduced, the principal statute taken account of being the Federal liability act of 1908. The hours of service law and the safety appliance laws are also involved in some cases. The liability act referred to abrogates the defense of assumption of risk where the violation of safety statutes contributes to the injuries complained (>f, but the defense was held to be available in Farley v. N. Y. N. H. Sc H. R. Co. (p. 81), where a locomotive engineer was killed by contact with electric wires, he being held to have assumed the risk. The question of contributory negligence was considered in Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole (p. 82), in which the rule for the comparison of the negligence of the employer and the con- tributory negligence of the employee was discussed. The Suprerde Court of the United States (N. C. E. Co. v. Zachary, ' p. 83) insisted on the exclusive appUcation of the Federal statute to cases coming within its scope; an employee absent for a brief time from his engine on a personal errand was held nevertheless to be on duty at the time and engaged in interstate commerce. The relation- ship of Federal and State statutes is also considered in Jones v. C. & W. C. R. Co. (p. 78), the result in the instant case being that no recovery could be had for the death of a man who left no dependents, though if the State law had prevailed relatives might have recovered damages. So in Taylor v. Taylor (p. 79), where the father of a deceased workman sued to procure the paying over to himself in accordance with a statute of New York of one-half the damages recov- ered by the widow under the Federal statute, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the State law could not be effective, the Federal statute controlling, and reversed a contrary judgment of the New York Court of Appeals. In Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes (p. 77) an action brought under the Federal act but shown on trial not to involve an interstate question, was decided in the same suit under the common law in force in the State, such proceeding being approved by the Supreme Court. The relation of State and Federal statutes in their attempts to secure the use of safety appliances was passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case (S. A. L. R. Co. v. Horton, p. 80) in which a judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina that sought to make operative a State statute was reversed, the Supreme Court holding that the Federal law must be considered as excluding supplementary legislation in that field. Negligence of the employer in his failure to comply with safety appliance laws was offered as ground for recovery in Pennell v. P. & R. R. Co. (p. 102), the Supreme Court of the United States holding that the statute requiring 28 BULLETIN OP THE BTJKEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. automatic couplers did not require such a device between the tender and engine, so that the company was not liable for a failure to provide one. In Dodge v. C. G. W. R. Co. (p. 102) a defective couphng at the rear of the last car of a train, though perhaps indirectly responsible for a derailment, was held not to be a violation of the safety appliance act. The status of a workman riding home was also considered in this case, the court holding that he was in the present instance a mere licensee, exercising at his own risk the privilege that he was taking. The provisions of the Federal statute as to accepting benefits from relief associations were considered in Hogarty v. P. & R. E. Co. (p. 84), the case having been first tried under the State law, the trial result- ing m a verdict in favor of the defendant company. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that though the Federal statute was not brought into the case until the special defense was entered upon, the plaintiff was entitled to a trial under that statute under the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States that it must be considered as enforceable by the State courts the same as State legislation, and under it the acceptance of rehef benefits would not exempt from the right to further recovery. Failure of the plaintiff to expressly base his case on the Federal statute was held by the Supreme Court of the United States (G. T. W. R. Co. v. Lindsay, p. 99) not to prevent a re- covery under the act. Another point considered in this case was as to the doctrine of comparative negligence laid down by the act in question, the court holding that contributory negligence on the part of the employee would in no wise diminish the recovery where the injury is due to the employer's failure to conform to the Federal safety laws. The acceptance of rehef benefits from one of two parties charged with liability for an injury was involved in Wagner v. C. & A. R. Co. (p. 100). The company sued was not the plaintiff's em- ployer, but was the owner of the tracks over which his employer's tram was rxmning at the time of the injury. The Federal statute therefore did not apply as between the present parties, since the rela- tion of employer and employee did not exist. It did apply, however, between the plaintiff and his employer company, which had paid rehef benefits and taken a purported release from further habihty, which release the present defendant sought to present as a bar to further action. Since under the Federal statute such payments of rehef benefits would not bar an action as against an employer, the court held that it was invalid as against the plaintiff in the present case. The absence of the proof of neghgence on the part of the company, as viewed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, led to a reversal of a judgment of the trial court in C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Swann's Admx. (p. 98) ; while in Reeve v. N. P. R. Co. (p. 99) the term "negligence" as used in the act was held to mean neghgence in the performance of KEVIEW OP DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOE. 29 BMsme duty, so that an injury to a workman caused by horseplay of fellow employees was held not to give rise to an action. A point in frequent litigation is as to the scope of the Federal statute, or the limits set to its application by the term "interstate commerce." Thus a brakeman setting an intrastate car into an inter- state train was held by the Supreme Court of Kansas to be within the act. The car in question had a defective coupler, and the point was raised as to the apphcation of the Federal safety appliance law to it; the court held that the law was intended to embrace all cars used on railroads which are highways of interstate commerce (Thornbro V. K. C. M. & O. E. Co., p. 85). Other employees held by the different courts to be within the act were a blacksmith repairing cars used in interstate commerce (Opsahl v. N. P. E. Co., p. 94); a boiler maker repairing an engine used in interstate commerce (Law v. I. C. E. Co., p. 94); a telegraph lineman engaged in repairing lines used in directing the operation of interstate trains (Deal v. Coal & Coke E. Co., p. 95); an engineer going into a roundhouse to look after repairs to his engine used on an interstate run (Padgett v. S. A. L. E. Co., p. 90) ; an engineer testing his engine after repairs prior to going on an interstate run (Lloyd v. S. E. Co., p. 96); a workman installing a block-signal system (Saunders v. S. E. Co., p. 92) ; an employee returning from work on a block-signal system riding on a motor tricycle to his boarding place in cars furnished by the company (Grow V. O. S. L. E. Co., p. 92); a workman engaged in building an addition to a freight shed (Eng v. S. P. Co., p. 86) ; an employee car- rying coal to heat a repair shop (Cousins v. I. C. E. C, p. 88) ; a track worker injured while asleep in his shanty car on a sidetrack (Sanders V. C. & W. C. E. Co., p. 89); and employees engaged in weighing empty cars after interstate transportation to determine the net weight of contents (Wheeling Terminal Co. v. Eussell, p. 97). The follow- ing were held to be excluded: A workman engaged on the construc- tion of a new bridge on a cut-off (Bravis v. C. M. & St. P. E. Co., p. 87) ; a tunnel worker on a cut-off not yet in use (Jackson v. C. M. & St. P. E. Co., p. 88); a fireman on a switch engine handling inter- state and intrastate traffic indiscriminately, at the time of the injury moving several cars loaded with freight whoUy intrastate (I. C. E. Co. V. Behrens, p. 91); and a hostler in a railroad roundhouse kiUed by the explosion of the boiler of a locomotive whose last run was intrastate (La Casse v. N. O. T. & M. E. Co., p. 96). The Federal statute was also held not to apply to the operations of a private road handhng logs to be sent to mills within the State of origin (Bay V. Merrill & Eing Lumber Co., p. 97). The question of beneficiaries under the act was considered in Ken- ney v. S. A. L. E. Co. (p. 81), the Supreme Court of North Carolina holding that a statute of that State defining the rights of inheritance 30 BULLETIN or THE BTJBBAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. from illegitimate cMldren determined who might be beneficiariea Tinder the Federal act. State statutes regulating railway service present a few points that were considered of importance, among these being a case (George v. Q. O. & K. C. R. Co., p. 75) in which the Missouri statute requiring frogs, etc., in yards to be blocked as a matter of safety to persons employed in such yards was construed. Against the company's con- tention that a sidetrack at a station was not a yard within the mean- ing of the statute, the court held that the portion of the tracks around every station used for the purpose of switching or placing cars is a yard. Another definition required was that of the term "car," as used in a Florida statute which makes the company liable for injuries caused by agents or coemployees in running cars or other machinery; in McGrady v. C. H. & N. R. Co. (p. 75) a hand car was held to be a car within the meaning of the act, and the work of placing it on a track was declared a part of the running of such car. In Hughes v. I. U. T. Co. (p. 77) the feUow-servant law of Indiana applicable to railroads was held not to cover electric roads. A somewhat different view was taken in a case (Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. Campbell, p. 106) in which the Federal safety appUance law was held to apply to electric trains. (See also Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. United States; p. 179.) The train in question was in interstate use, and a failure to supply the equipment of train brakes, etc., was held to fix the employer's liability for an injury due to insufficient brakes. That a laborer unloading ties on the roadbed for an extension of a railroad line in process of construction was engaged in the operation of the railroad within the terms of the Missouri statute was held in Sartain v. J. C. T. Co. (p. 104). A Pennsylvania statute fixes the liability of the employer where injury results from neghgent orders to which the subordinate was bound to conform. This statute was held to apply in Ainsley v. P. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. (p. 105), where a brakeman went down the steps of a moving car in an effort to locate the defect in a brake that was not working properly; so also in Chicago & Erie R. Co. v. Lain (p. 105), where a similar statute of Indiana was held to support recovery in a case in which the plaintiff was injured while occupying a position of danger in accordance with his foreman's orders. The point was also made that the injured workman, being what is known as a yard and bndge man, was not engaged in the movement of trains and so was not within the act. This contention the court rejected, stating that smce his duties exposed him to the dangera of the movement of trains he was protected by the statute. At common law also the employee may depend on the employer's orders and recover in case injury fol- lows negligence in this respect (Magnuson v. MacAdam, p. 285) REVIEW OP DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 81 Tlie United States Supreme Court upheld a judgment affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals rendered under an Alabama statute which fixed the liability of the employer, but provided that actions under it must be brought in the courts of the State of Alabama and not elsewhere. The Georgia courts held that they could take juris- diction under the act regardless of this limitation, which view was approved by the Supreme Court (Tennessee C. I. & R. Co. v. George, p. 107). The violation of a city ordinance Umiting the speed of trains through the municipality was held in Wabash R. Co. v. Gretzinger (p. 76) to be the proximate cause of the death of a freight conductor whose train was on a sidetrack, the switch leading to which had been opened by some unknown person after having been closed and locked. Negligence in failing to properly and safely guard machinery to prevent injury to employees was claimed in Byland v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. (p. 73), the negUgence consisting in allowing metalhc nuts to faU into a powder-mixing machine, resulting in an explosion in which the plaintiff was injured. The connection in this case was held not to be direct enough to bring it within the act. It was also held that a prima facie case of negUgence could not be made in a HabOity suit merely by reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loqidtur. The necessity of an adequate compliance with the requirements prescribed by statute was emphasized in McClaugherty v. Rogue River Electric Co. (p. 108), the statute in question being one regulating elec- tric installations. In Rosholt v. Worden-Allen Co. (p. 110) the dis- tinction between the common law and the statute applicable to the case in hand is pointed out, and the liabihty of the company was then affirmed because of its failure to make an elevated runway safe within the meaning of the statute. A sinular law of New York was under consideration in Bomhoff v. Fischer (p. Ill), the duty of the employer to furnish a proper scaffolding being held to be nondelegable. If a machine was known to be dangerous, even if of an approved type and make, the employer may still be held to liabiUty for failure to make it safe (Ainsley v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., p. 287). The negligence of a repair man in taking a place of danger without notice to persons moving trains on the tracks in the vicinity was held to bar a recovery for his death in Stone v. A. C. L. R. Co. (p. 286). Somewhat technical features were considered in cases decided by the highest courts of Massachusetts and New York, the question of sufficiency of notice being decided in the plaintiff's favor in the former court in Meniz v. Quissett Mills (p. 112), the attorneys retained by the plaintiff to assist him, having written a letter to the defendant, within the proper period, stating that they had been retained to prosecute the case, mentioning the circumstances, time, and place of the injury. In Rodzborski v. American Sugar Refining Co. (p. 112) the New York 32 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Court of Appeals held that a letter simply asking that the case of the injured man be investigated, without statement as to the cause of the injm-y, was not sufl&cient compliance with the terms of the statute. The right of an injured employee to elect his remedy after the injury was maintained by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Ujack (p. 109), that State having a workmen's compensation act and a liability statute, while a common-law action was held also to be possible. The power of a claimant to make a choice of rights was before the Supreme Court of Washington in Long, fellow V. City of Seattle (p. 74). In this case the widow of a city fireman had claimed and procured the allowance of a pension for her- self and minor daughter under a State law and subsequently sued for damages. This action was held to be barred by the acceptance of the pension benefits, this ruling applying to the mother; as to the daughter, who had no rights under the pension fund, it was held that she might proceed in an action to recover damages. That the work of keeping clean the streets of a city is a govern- mental function in the exercise of which a municipality will not be Hable for injuries to an employee was held in Mayor and Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Jordan (p. 284), even though the superiors of the injured workman knew of the defective condition of the instrumen- tahty causing the injury. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. As indicated in the introduction, the importance of securing authoritative definitions of the terms used in this new class of laws is doubtless responsible for the fact that a considerable number of cases have been brought to the courts of last resort under these acts. Administration by commissions, and the simphfication of legal pro- cesses where actions at law are resorted to, have certainly done much to relieve the courts of the burden of Htigation in damage suits, and the cases appearing in the Reporter System for the year are practi- cally aU presented in this bulletin with greater or less fullness. Ques- tions of constitutionality have been raised in comparatively few cases, the courts in the larger number of the States in which compen- sation laws have been enacted having already passed upon the general question. This question was raised, however, in a case under the Illinois statute (Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., p. 216), in which the plaintiff sought to recover in a suit at law even though both he and his employer had accepted the terms of the elective compensation act of the State, and certain payments had been made thereunder. Seven main contentions were made against the act, aU being overruled by the court, largely on the ground that the act was elective in form and effect — a fact which even the abrogation of defenses in cases where it was not accepted did not modify. The Minnesota statute was also REVIEW OF DECISIONS OP OOUBTS AFFECTING LABOR. 33 called in question, a plaintiff employee claiming that it violated the provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States as to protection of rights and equality before the law (Matheson v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co., p. 218). The law was sustained ia the present instance largely on the same grounds as in the Deibeikis case, the court riding that the classifications and exclusions found in the act did not invalidate it. The Kansas statute also (Shade v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., p. 224) was upheld against similar contentions, and the remedy imder it was declared exclusive, emphasis being laid, as in the preceding cases, on the elective nature of the law as reheving it from the charge of depriv- ing persons by statute of their constitutional rights. The opposite view was reached by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board (p. 197). This com-t held that the abrogation of defenses made the act in fact compulsory, even though elective in form, thus ia effect estabhshing a limitation on recovery for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to personal property, in violation of the State constitution. It may be noted that in this position the court formally rejected the views of the courts of last resort of a number of States, distinguishing statutory provisions in some cases, and in others pointing out the absence of constitutional provisions similar to those existing in Ken- tucky. On a petition for rehearing, which was rejected, specific suggestions were made as to points to be modified in order to make such a law constitutional. Single points were raised in Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg (p. 203), in which the constitutionahty of the Ohio statute was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States on the point of the exclusion of small employers from the provisions of the act abrogating defenses; in Yoimg v. Dimcan (p. 221), in which the form of election under the Massachusetts statute was claimed to deprive the employee of a right to trial by jm;y and of property rights, the court overruhng this con- tention; and in Huyett v. P. R. Co. (p. 225), in which a technical question as to the title was raised, the act being sustained. In this last case also it was decided that the term "wages" as used in the act meant actual earnings at the time of the injury, and not any less or greater amount than might have been customary. Among the specific terms coming up for definition is the word "accident," this expression being held in Liondale Bleach, Dye & Paint Works v. Riker (p. 205) to imply a degree of definiteness as to the specific time or occasion of the occurrence. This was a case in which the compensation was claimed for an eczema possibly due to working in acids. The Massachusetts statute substitutes for the word "accident" the expression "personal injury," and this was held 85590°— Bull. 169—15 3 34 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. in Johnson v. London Guarantee & Accident Co. (p. 259) to coyer the case of a workman who had become affected Avith lead poisoning through continuous exposure. Compensation was also allowed where a workman suffered from optic neuritis induced by poisonous coal-tar gases to which he was exposed in inspecting processes of manufacture (In re Hurle, p. 260). The Michigan statute, on the other hand, was held in Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works (p. 258) not to include a case of lead poisoning, even though the word "accident" was not used, the court holding that the term "personal in- jury" was evidently meant by the legislature to cover only such cases as could be sued for under previous statutes, which related to acci- dents only. Under the Washington statute it was held (Zappala v. Industrial Insurance Commission, p. 240) that a hernia claimed to have been caused by severe strain was the result of a "fortuitous event" for which compensation should be paid, the court overruUng in this instance the finding of the commission. The statutes are not uniform in the form of expression as to whether the injury or accident shall arise out of and in the course of employ- ment. In Henry Steers, Inc., v. Dunnewald (p. 206) an accident that might by inference be supposed to have occurred in the course of employment was held not to arise out of it, so that no recovery could be had. The employee in this instance was drowned probably while on his way to work and near the place of his employment. Under the same (New Jersey) statute it was held that circumstantial evidence might support the inference of an injury in the course of employment (Muzik v. Erie R. Co., p. 249). Compensation was al- lowed under the same statute in Terlecki v. Strauss (p. 241), a. case in which the injury occurred while an employee was combing her hair to remove particles of wool at the conclusion of the day's work, the hair being caught in moving machinery. Anchylosis due to an infection following the improper treatment of a fracture was held in Newcomb v. Albertson (p. 247) to be a result of the accident so as to allow compensation under the New Jersey law. Where the injury occurred as the result of using a forbidden agency, the Supreme Court of New Jersey (Reimers v. Proctor Pub. Co., p. 250) held that it was not an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. Compensation was permitted under this act in a case in which a work- man had apparently aggravated a preexisting condition of disease by forcible exertion, death ensuing (Voorhees v. Smith Schoonmaker Co., p. 248). The Wisconsin statute provides compensation where injury occurs while one is "performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment." This was held (City of Milwaukee v. Althoff p. 266) to cover an injury to a workman on the way to the place of his employment after he had received instructions from his foreman REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COTTETS AFFECTING LABOB. 35 where to go. Under the Michigan statute a workman leaving a roof for lunch at the invitation of his employer, and injured while coming down in a way of his own choosing, was held to be within the protec- tion of the act, even though the other workmen came safely by another course (Qem v. Chalmers Motor Co., p. 242). The question of willful and intentional misconduct was raised in this case, but the court held that there was no proof of such conduct as to be a bar to the claim. In another case under this statute (HiUs v. Blair, p. 243) a section hand on his way home from his working place at noon was held not to be within the protection of the act, as he had, in effect, left the premises of his employer, though killed in some unexplained manner along the right of way of the raUroad. The Michigan statute was held (Rayner v. SHgh Furniture Co., p. 244) to cover the case of an employee injured while running to punch the time clock when the noon whistle blew, the rules requiring employees to punch the clock before going out. Another case under this statute was that of Bayne v. River- side Storage & Cartage Co. (p. 245), where the question of causal con- nection between an alleged sprain and death from pneumonia was decided favorably to the claimant, the court reaching this conclusion largely on the finding of fact by the State compensation commission. Under the Massachusetts law the injury must arise out of and in cotu-se of employment. In the case In re vSundine (p. 244) a girl in- jured while going out to lunch by the use of the only means of access to the workshop was held to come within the act; so also of an em- ployee who was injured while riding from his place of work in a wagon fxu-nished by the employer (In re Donovan, p. 245). In the case MiUiken v. A. Towle & Co. (p. 246) the Massachusetts law was held not to cover the case of a teamster who, due to an injury of some years' standing, showed evidence of lapse of memory and wandered aimlessly about, finally faUing into a swamp, where he contracted pnemnonia and died. The West Virginia statute was construed in De Constantin v. Public Service Commission (p. 249) not to cover the case of a workman employed on construction work of a railway and killed by a train while on his way to work, the evidence showing that the route used by him wete not the only or even the proper means of access to his place of employment. Casual employees are excluded from the benefits in most of the States, this condition under the Massachusetts law having been changed by an amendment of 1914. The case In re Cheevers (p. 213) was decided under the old law, and an independent teamster occa- sionally employed by a coal dealer was held to be engaged in casual employment when he worked scattered days in February, 1913, his last previous employment being a few days in February, 1912; so also in a case under the same act (In re Gaynor, p. 214), the employee in this case being a waiter whose services were employed for but a 36 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAT7 OF LABOR STATISTICS. single day, he having never worked for the same employer before. Where, however, a workman was regularly employed to do a certain class of work and was ordered to do the same kind of work under slightly different conditions, he was held to be under the protection of this act (In re Howard, p. 213). A pieceworker in a tannery, injured on the &st day of his employment imder an arrangement as to continuance that was somewhat indefinite, was held by the Supreme Court of New Jersey not to be a casual employee, since his work was of the same general kind as the business of the establish- ment (Schaeffer v. De Grottola, p. 214) ; so also of a longshoreman who was killed two hours after beginning work under a new employer, the court holding that the custom of hiring longshoremen, subjecting them to frequent changes of employers, did not render their employ- ment casual, since it was a particular part of a service recurring with some regularity and fair prospect of continuance (Sabella v. Brazi- leiro, p. 214). Questions of dependency arose in several cases under the Massa- chusetts law. In the case In re Gallagher (p. 227) a woman, living apart from her husband for justifiable cause and receiving partial support from him, was held not to be presumptively wholly depend- ent upon him under the earher form of the law. An amendment of 1914 declares in favor of such presumption, but this amendment did not affect the present case. So also in the case In re Nelson (p. 227), where the wife had Mved apart from her husband several times for varying periods, and was so hving at the time of the death of her husband, though there had been no talk of permanent separation or divorce. A wife Hviug apart from her husband and receiving no support took nothing ia the case In re Bentley (p. 226), while a par- tially dependent chUd received an award of a hmited amount. A daughter capable of self-support, but Hving with her father and caring for him from a sense of duty, receiving most of his wages, was held entitled to compensation under the Massachusetts act (In re Herrick, p. 226). Parents and brothers and sisters of a minor whose earnings were contributed to the support of the famUy were held to be the dependents of such minor (In re Murphy, p. 229). The Su- preme Court of Khode Island affirmed a decree allowing no compen- sation for the death of a minor (Dazy v. Apponaug Co., p. 228), it not appeariug that the contributions of the deceased son were required to provide the family with the necessaries of hfe. It was held in King V. Viscoloid Co. (p. 264) that the mother of a minor son might sue at common law for the loss of his services even though he had taken compensation under the Massachusetts statute. The question of incapacity was passed on by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in a case (In re SuUivan, p. 241) in which a workman who had lost an arm as the result of an injury reported himself unable KEVIEW OF DECISIONS OP COURTS APFEOTTNG LABOR. 37 to secure work for some six months after his recovery from the wound, although he tried to do so. The court held that he was enti- tled to compensation until work was secured, since the inability to obtain work resulted directly from the injury. The same view was taken in Duprey v. Maryland Casualty Co. (p. 268), where a workman who was able to work only while sitting had not been able to secure such employment, though competent to render it if obtainable — this in the face of an agreement to accept a lower award. The same court held that a hand was "incapable of use" so as to entitle the workman to compensation as for the loss of a hand, where the injured hand could be used only as a hook on account of injuries to the flexor tendons (In re Meley, p. 241). The New Jersey Supreme Court had before it a question involving an injury to the leg of a plumber which disabled him from following his occupation. The lower court awarded a ben- efit for total disability, involving the payment of benefits for 400 weeks. This was reversed by the supreme court (Bateman Mfg. Co. V. Smith, p. 256), the term being reduced to 175 weeks, which is the period specified for the loss of a leg. The injm-ed man in this case was 73 years of age, and the fracture refused to knit on account of his age. The Wisconsin statute takes note of advanced years and reduces the amount of compensation payable to aged employees in cases of permanent injury. This was held in City of Milwaukee v. Ritzow (p. 257) not to call for a reduction of death benefits in a case where a man 80 years of age was killed in the course of his employment. The statute of Washington provides for permanent partial disabihty, limiting the amount of the benefits payable therefor, and makes a separate provision for permanent total disabihty, defining the same. In Siones v. Daggett (p. 257) the supreme court of the State affirmed an award for permanent partial disabihty in the case of a man who had lost several fingers of each hand as against his claim that he was totally disabled. Closely related to the foregoing is the determination of the amount of compensation. A case before the Supreme Com-t of New Jersey involved the right of a workman to compensation for the permanent impairment of function of an arm, without, however, affecting his earning capacity. The award was made (De Zeng Standard Co. v. Pressey, p. 207) on the basis of the relation of the degree of disabihty to the total loss of function, the court rejecting the contention that there could be no statutory disabihty unless the earnings have been impaired. Another case before this court involved the decision of the question of relative disability, the injury being to the elbow of the right arm and causing loss of motion. An award was made (Barbour Co. V. Hagerty, p. 209) as for the loss of the arm. This was reversed by the supreme court, with instructions to take note of any payments that had been made from insurance funds secured by the • 38 ' BULLETIN OP THE BTJEEAU OP LABOE STATISTIOS. einployer. O'Connell v. Simms Ma^eto Co. (p. 209) was another case before the New Jersey court where multiple injuries were allowed for, the award being the total of the amounts for each injxiry. This judg- ment was reversed by the supreme court on the ground that the dis- abilities were not such a proportion of a total disabUity as to justify the award made. The method of procedure was principally involved in another case under the New Jersey statute (Mockett v. Ashton, p. 207), where a lump sum had been awarded without an indication as to what continuing payments would have been proper, the supreme court reversing the finding on the ground that there was no sufficient support for it under the statute. A case involviag elements similar to the Pressey case above arose under the Wisconsin statute (Inter- national Harvester Co. v. Industrial Commission, p. 210) , in which there was permanent impairment of the sight of an eye but no reduction in earnings. An award had been made by the commission on the ground of permanent partial disability, based on the likelihood of his diffi- culty in securing employment on account of defective sight. The supreme court of the State reversed this finding, holding that there was no material evidence on which to base the ruling of the commis- sion. The Michigan statute contains a schedule for certain specific injuries, fixing the term during which disability shall be deemed to exist, that for the loss of a foot being 125 weeks. In Limron v. Blair (p. 211) the court reversed an award allowing compensation during the time of actual total disability plus 125 weeks, to commence at the conclusion thereof, but deducting 6 weeks for the time when the foot was amputated, the ground being that the total period could not exceed 125 weeks unless his total disabUity lasted longer, since the statute "speaks in terms of disability" and does not provide specific indemnities. The Massachusetts statute provides for specific losses certain compensation "in addition to aU other compensation." This was held (In re Nichols, p. 213) to sustain a finding for separate allow- ances for the loss of a finger and for the death of the workman from blood poisoning which subsequently developed; so also where there was permanent total disabihty for which compensation was recover- able, separate full compensation for the death which ensued being also due (In re Burns, p. 212). In case of permanent iajury of a phalange of a finger not resulting in permanent incapacity no com- pensation was allowed under the Massachusetts act authorizing com- pensation where injury produces incapacity for use (In re Ethier, p. 212). The distribution of the amount of an award for death was before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts (In re Janes, p. 230) . There were two minor beneficiaries, the deceased father being a widower at the time of his death. One child also died about a week after the father's REVIEW OP DECISIONS OP COURTS APFECTrNG LABOR.* 39 death, and the compensation awarded was ordered to be paid one-half to the guardian of the survivor and one-half to the administrator of the deceased child, the supreme court holding that the insurer had no right of appeal in the matter, as its liability was not affected. The computation of weekly payments in the case of a workman who was employed only a part of the year was passed upon by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co. (p. 234), the covirt holding that the average weekly wages must be arrived at in such a case by dividing the actual average annual earn- ings by 52, the method of computation by multiplying a day's earn- ings by 300, prescribed for certain cases as a method of determining annual earnings, not being appHcable under the circumstances. The Massachusetts law requires medical and surgical services to be furnished injured workmen, and this duty was held (In re Panasuk, p. 253) to call for an active effort to render the necessary aid, not being discharged by the mere publishing of Hsts of doctors. In Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co. (p. 253) the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the refusal of an employee to aUow an operation when first pro- posed did not necessarily debar a claim for compensation, the injured man being ignorant and unacquainted with the Enghsh language. It was pointed out, too, that there was no evidence that an immediate submission to the operation would have secured recovery. The question of the serious and wiUful misconduct of a workman such as woTild debar recovery was considered by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts (In re Nickerson, p. 265), the court holding that the term meant more than negligence or even gross neghgence, and that thoughtless acts, not deliberate, would not constitute such conduct. The Ohio law as originally enacted permitted an action for damages independent of the compensation act where the injury was due to the willful act of the employer. This was held (McWeeny v. Stand- ard Boiler & Plate Co., p. 232) to permit recovery where the foreman gave neghgent orders and insisted on obedience to them in the face of protest. This subject is now strictly regulated by statute. The question «f election was before the Supreme Court of Khode Island (Coakley v. Mason Mfg. Co., p. 204), the company having accepted the provisions of the act on September 26, 1912, the act coming into effect five days later. Against the plaintiff's contention that an acceptance would not be valid before the act became effective, the court ruled that the rights of the parties were determined by this election. Where acceptance of the compensation law is presumed in the absence of a contrary election, the employee claiming benefits imder the act is not required to show that no such election has been made, but the fact must be offered by the employer as an affirmative defense (GorreU v. BatteUe, p. 230). This case also presented ques- tions of incapacity, the court ruling that the act contemplates com- 40 ' BULLETIN OF THE BUBEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. pensation for incapacity due to injury, wliere the loss manifests itself in inability to perform obtainable work or inability to secure work. That special notice of refusal to accept the terms of a compensation act must be given to the guardian of a minor under the New Jer- sey statute was held in Troth v. MiUvUle Bottle Works (p. 231), general notice not being sufficient. An earlier opinion was cited in this case affirming the applicability of the statute to preexisting contracts. A claimant who had received benefits under the com- pensation law of Washington was held (The Fred E. Sander, p. 232) not to be entitled to recover in an action in admiralty. In an earlier proceeding by the same claimant, seeking to recover in admiralty for injuries (The Fred E. Sander, p. 265), the defense was interposed that the State compensation act had abolished actions for personal in- juries. The court held that the State could not limit the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty over maritime torts, and overruled the excep- tions, the acceptance of benefits not having appeared in this proceed- ing. That the compensation law of Kansas provides an exclusive remedy where it has been accepted was held in McRoberts v. National Zinc Co. (p. 236), the plaintiff having sought to secure both benefits under the compensation statute and damages at common law. The difference between an award of damages and an allowance of com- pensation was also pointed out. The Washington statute permits damage suits against an employer who is in defaiilt in payments to the State accident fund, but this was held (Barrett v. Gray's Harbor. Commercial Co., p. 206) not to validate an action for injuries by a workman in a case where the accident happened during the 30-day period allowed for the making good of a shortage, the payment hav- ing been made within the allowed time. Cases involving the neghgence of a third party were considered in a few instances. In Meese v. N. P. R. Co. (p. 250) , the death of a brewery employee was occasioned by the neghgence of a railroad company, and against the contention that the only recovery open to the wife and children was under the workmen's compensation act of Washing- ton, it was held that this act had no relation to cases involving the habUity of persons not in the status of employer and employee, the "Lord Campbell's Act" of the State being imaffected thereby. A dif- ferent situation was presented in a New Jersey case (Newark Paving Co. V. Klotz, p. 251), where a workman was killed in the course of his employment by the negligence of a third party, the payment of damages and the securing of a release by such third party being held not in any way to affect the statutory right of the claimants to compensation. A very similar condition was considered by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case In re Cripp (p. 266) where a teamster was injured by the negligence of a street railway company, which immediately settled with him and secured a release. BEVIBW OP DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 41 The injiiries resulted subsequently in death, and it was held that the widow's rights under the compensation act wero independent of any- thing that the workman might have done with respect to his per- sonal injuries. The Wisconsin statute contains a provision for the subrogation to the employer of an injured employee's right of action against a third party occasioning injury. In McGarvey v. Inde- pendent on & Grease Co. (p. 267), the employer, for a consideration, assigned this right of action to the employee, whom it had already compensated. The court held in this case that the employee was entitled to sue alone without the employer as a party plaintiff. The question of classification was passed upon by the Supreme Court of Washington in State v. C. M. & P. S. R. Co. (p. 215), the industrial insurance department of the State having levied a premium rate for tunnel construction work in the instance in question, and the company contending that the lower rate governing steam raUroad construction work should apply. The supreme court held that the employments were clearly separable and the "enterprise classifica- tion" would not govern. The Washington statute apphes to "extra- hazardous" occupations, making an enumeration and concluding that if there should be or arise any other extrahazardous occupation or work it should come under the act. In Wendt v. Industrial Insurance Commission (p. 238), a carpenter placing shelving in a store and attempting to sharpen his chisel in a workshop belonging to the employer in another Hne, was held to be engaged in extrahazardous employment and within the provisions of the act, overruhng the finding of the commission. That a farmer may accept the provisions of the Massachusetts statute as to certain classes of employees with- out obhgating himself as to all was held in the case In re Keaney (p. 239). A child employed in his father's mill in violation of the statute limiting the age at which children may be so employed is not a workman within the provisions of the Washington compensation act so as to permit recovery from the State accident fund (Hillestad V. Industrial Commission, p. 269). In Connole v. N. & W. R. Co. (p. 263), the Ohio statute was construed as not appMcable to railroad and other employees in the absence of active election in behalf of workmen working only in the State, approved by the State habUity board of awards ; the provision of the statute abrogating defenses was held not to apply in tMs instance. The New Jersey compensation law excepts nonresident alien dependents from its benefits. The court of errors and appeals of that State held (Gregutis v. Waclark Wire Works, p. 255) that since the remedy of the employee, if he had survived, would have been under the compensation act, the case was governed by that act, and no cause in favor of nonresident alien suit- ors existed under the death act of the State. 42 BULLETIN OF THE BTJREATT OF LABOE STATISTICS. It was held in American Radiator Co. v. Rogge (p. 226) that the New Jersey law covered all accidents occurring in. that State, regard- less of the place of the contract of employment. The power of a court to issue letters rogatory to obtain the testimony of foreign witnesses for hearings before the State industrial board was denied by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts (In re Martinelli, p. 229), since the relationship of the court to the industrial board did not warrant such exercise of power. The relationship of the indus- trial board of Illinois to the courts was considered in Courter v. Simp- son Construction Co. (p. 264), the statute undertaking to provide a review of the decision of the industrial board by the supreme coiu:t of the State on a writ of certiorari. This detail of the statute was held to be invalid, since its effect would be to violate a constitutional provision. It was further held that the lower courts could not be deprived of their power to review the proceedings of the board, and that this might be done by writs of certiorari from the circuit courts. Under the provisions of the Massachusetts statute it was held (In re Diaz, p. 264) that the findings of the industrial accident board have the same weight and effect as the verdict of a jury, and will be so accepted by the reviewing courts. What evidence is necessary to support a finding of the industrial accident board of the State was considered by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Reck v. Whittles- berger (p. 236), the court holding that in the absence of direct evidence hearsay evidence based on fresh and available som-ces of information would suffice. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE. A single case appears under this head, the question involved being the scope of the policy of insurance. This was held in May Creek Logging Co. V. Pacific Coast Casualty Co. (p. 291) not to protect the employer in a case in which damages were recovered against it by reason of the malpractice of a company surgeon. RELIEF ASSOCIATIONS. The only case to be considered under this head in the present bulletin is that of Daughtridge v. A. C. L. R. Co. (p. 334), in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a declaration by an apphcant for membership in a railroad relief association that he was in good health in so far as he was aware was not fraudulent, he having been examined and passed by the company's physician, every mark or indication of disease relied upon in the present action being then existent and observable. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS. Under this head wiU be considered not only cases involving organ- ized labor directly, but injunction and contempt proceedings growing out of certain acts connected with labor disputes, and the application EEVIEW OF DEOISIOITS OP COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 43 of the antitrust laws, etc., to conditions corresponding in some degree to those that operate in labor organizations. Perhaps the most notable case in this field is that involving the liability of the individual members of the hatters' union for injuries resulting from a boycott conducted by the union through its oflficers (Lawlor v. Loewe, p. 137). The Supreme Court of the United States held in this case that the individual members had notice of the acts done and were hable under the Federal antitrust law for resultant damages, affirm- ing the judgment of the appeals court (same case, p. 140). An injunction was granted under the same statute to forbid a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and the maintenance of blacklists and the estabhshment of a boycott by retail lumber dealers (Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, p. 53). Two closely related cases involving unlawful combinations in restraint of trade were considered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, based on activities of union carpenters and joiners. In Irving v. Neal (p. 162) a petition for an injunction under the Federal antitrust law was denied on the ground that such rehef under that act could be had only at the instance of the Government, though unlawful combination under the act was found. It was held, however, that the State statutes had been vio- lated and that civil remedies, including injimctive rehef, were avail- able to the complainants. In the other case (Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, p. 164) the complainants were held not to have proved injurious acts in pursuance of an imlawful agreement such as would warrant the issue of an injunction. The Arkansas antitrust law was held (State ex rel. Moose v. Frank, p. 50) not to forbid an agreement between proprietors of laundries to fix prices for their work. The constitutionahty of the antitrust law of Missouri was attacked (International Harvester Co. of America V. State of Missouri, p. 49) on the ground that the exemption of labor organizations from its prohibitions was a violation of the constitutional provision requiring equal protection of the law, this contention being rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States. The construction of the Newlands Act, successor to the Erdman Act, providing for the mediation and conciUation of disputes between railroad companies and their employees, was before the court on exceptions to certain defimitions and statements used by the arbitra- tors. The court held (In re Ga. & Fla. Ry., p. 50) that the statute contemplated practically a common-law arbitration, and that so long as the board kept within the agreed terms as to its jm-isdiction and purposes the courts should not intervene. Tlie final proceeding growing out of the Buck Stove & Range case against the American Federation of Labor is the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States (Gompers v. United States, p. 133), in which that court held that the penalties for contempt assessed by 44 BULLETIN OP THE BTJEEAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. the courts for the District of Columbia must be set aside on account of the statute of Hmitations. The jurisdiction of courts in contempt proceedings was considered in Ex parte Heffron (p. 135), the appellate court aflBrming its right to release on habeas corpus persons impris- oned for contempt for violating an order improperly issued. The injunction issued by the court below was modified as being in part in excess of the powers of a court to issue. A judgment for contempt was affiamed in Sona v. Aluminum Castings Co. (p. 305), where it was in evidence that serious assaults had been committed by persons hav- ing knowledge of the issue of the injunction. The power of a court to issue an injunction was considered in Baltic Mining Co. v. Houghton Circuit Judge (p. 310). The court below had issued an injunction and then ordered a dissolution on the ground that it had not had the power to take such a step. The supreme court directed the reinstatement of the injunction, showing at some length the grounds for its action. An injunction was held properly issued in a case (Burnham v. Dowd, p. 270) in which a mason's union had procured a boycott against a materialman who had furnished material for use in work on which nonunion masons had been employed, damages being also allowed for unlawful interference with the business of another. Persons inciting others to violence were held to have violated an injunction in United States V. Colo et al. (p. 306), and to be guilty of contempt of court, as well as of the actual cpmmission of acts of violence. Incitement to the commission of criminal acts during a strike was held to be proved, and the criminal statutes of New Jersey to have been violated, in State v. Quinlan (p. 160). In People v. Ford (p. 326) a conviction for man- slaughter was sustained in a case in which incitement to violence was proved, one of the defendants being possibly an actual participant in the killing. Another case involving criminal prosecution was that of Ryan et al. V. United States (p. 143), in which the defendants had been convicted of conspiracy to commit crime in the transportation of explosives by interstate trains. The evidence was held sufficient to affirm the judgment in the case of 25 of the defendants, a new trial being granted in the case of 5 others. The relative status of civil and military authorities was considered in Ex parte McDonald (p. 335) in a habeas corpus proceeding in which persons sentenced by a mihtary court during a strike were held to have been improperly sentenced by this body, but not entitled to release, since they might properly be detained for a trial before the civil courts. The extent to which an injunction may go in restraining the activi- ties of organized labor was given full consideration in Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. (p. 3 15) , the circuit court of appeals revers- ing a decree of the district court which practically prevented organized EEVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COUBTS AFFECTING LABOR. 45 activities. The same court had before it a case (Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co., p. 321) arising out of the same dispute, the evidence in this case, however, showing that violence and intimi- dation had been resorted to. In this case an injunction forbidding acts of violence and also the use of persuasion and the payment of strike benefits was modified so as to allow the use of peaceful methods, while restraining acts of violence and coercion. An injunction was allowed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, together with damages for loss of employment, in Fairbanks v. McDonald (p. 314), in the case of a dispute between labor unions lead- ing to the members of one being discharged by their employers. In Roddy V. United Mine Workers (p. 325) no recovery was allowed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to a nonunion man who was dis- charged at the instance of the union, there being no contract for his employment for any definite time. That a labor imion might be restrained from estabhshing a boycott against a workman of the same craft so as to cut-him off from employment was held by a Missouri court in Clarkson v. Laiblan (p. 313). The Supreme Court of Massa- chusetts refused to interfere with the carrying out of an agreement between a union and a group of employers which would largely exclude from employment the plaintiffs, who were members of another union (Hoban v. Dempsey, p. 303), the court holding that the contract was freely made by the parties to it without a motive to injure the plaintiffs, though it might have the effect of restricting their employ- ment. An injunction was refused a boycotted company in Gill En- graving Co. V. Doerr (p. 301), where a union was enforcing its rule not to do any work for customers whose work was not done entirely in union shops. The injury to the plaintiff was not denied, but was held to be only incidental to the main intent, which under controlling decisions was held to be lawful. Interference with business was found to be so direct in New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern (p. 298) that the Massachusetts Supreme Court held the petitioning company entitled to an injunction against inducing breach of con- tract and other interference with beneficial business intercourse. A statute intended to protect members of labor unions in their employment while retaining their membership was held unconstitu- tional in Coppage v. Kansas (p. 147), in which case the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas. There was an extended dissenting opinion by Justice Day, who pointed out that to hold this act unconstitutional practically decided the invalidity of similar laws in thirteen other States and Porto Rico ; while the prevailing opinion stated that, with the single exception of the Supreme Court of Kansas, no court of like rank had ever upheld such a law, an earlier decision of the Supreme Court and six State courts of last resort having held such laws unconstitutional. 46 BTJLLETIN OP THE BTJKEATT OP LABOB STATISTICS. • The question of picketing was specifically considered by the Supreme Court of Michigan (In re Langell, p. 330) on proceedings to review contempt charges against Langell for the violation of an injunction prohibiting picketing. The, power of the court below to issue such an injunction was challenged, but was upheld by the supreme court, as was the conviction for a willful violation of such injunction. While sustaining the legality of peaceful picketing, the Kansas City court of appeals (Berry Foundry Co. v. International Holders' Union, p. 332) held that in the present instance intimidation and coercive means had been used, so that an injunction forbidding the same was held to have been properly issued, and an award of damages for injury to business was affirmed. Matters of internal organization were considered in Monroe v. Col- ored Screwmen's Benevolent Association (p. 323), in which it was held that the levying of a fine by a union upon certain of its mem- bers for violations of rules did not give the aggrieved members access to the courts for redress of their alleged grievances. So in an em- ployers' association, an agreement by its members to pay a stipu- lated sum as hquidated damages for violation of the rules of the association was held enforceable in United Hat Manufacturers v. Bau-d-Unteidt Co. (p. 278). The effect on individual contracts of a collective agreement made by a labor union was considered in Gulla v. Barton (p. 297), the Supreme Cotirt of New York, appellate division, holding that such collective agreement was of such vaUdity as would support a recovery of the difference between the amount stipulated therein and the employee's wages under a contract made in ignorance thereof. The habihty of a union for hbel was affirmed in United Mine Work- ers of America n. Cromer (p. 322), the Coxn-t of Appeals of Kentucky affirming an award of damages for the pubhcation in the union paper of the name of the plaintiff in a hst of persons designated as "detest- able scabs and blacklegs." The HabOity of union officials for rehef funds collected for the bene- fit of strikers and their families was affirmed in Attorney General ex rel. Prendergast et al. v. Bedard et al. (p. 324). The statute of Massachusetts which requires employers to insert in advertisements for employees notice of strikes or other disputes, if any exist, was held to be constitutional in Commonwealth v. Libbey (p. 184) and a conviction for its violation affirmed. A case not directly affecting organized labor, but growing out of a labor dispute, was Lane v. Au Sable Electric Co. (p. 338), in which no punitive damages were allowed for the ejection of an employee from his dweUing, where he had gone on strike and faUed to vacate the house furnished him by the employing company, the court holding that the relation of landlord and tenant had never existed and that the relation of employer and employee had terminated when the workman struck, and he had thereby lost all claim to the occupancy of the dwelling. DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR, 1914. DECISIONS UNDER STATUTE LAW. Alien Contract Labor — Importation — Construction of Stat- ute — "Offer of Employment" — United States v. Dwight Manufac- turing Co., United States District Court, District of Massachusetts {Nov. 19, 1913), 210 Federal RepoHer, page 74. — The Government brought action to enforce penalties against the company named on 122 counts for the importation of ahens in violation of the immigration act of February 20, 1907, chapter 1134, 34 Stat. 900 (U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 503). The company contended that the facts alleged did not present an offense under the act, and the question before the court was as to the sufficiency of the charge. The act defines contract laborers, who are excluded by it, to be persons "who have been induced or sohcited to migrate to this country by offers or promises of employment or in consequence of agreements, oral, written, or printed, express or imphed, to perform labor in this country, of any kind, skilled or unskilled." The following extracts from the opinion by Judge Dodge discuss some of the points of law involved: Each coTmt describes the alleged offer as follows: "That if said alien would migrate from said * * * to [here naming a place in the United States], said defendant would employ and pay said ahen to perform for said defendant at said [place within the United States] certain manual labor, that is to say, to operate and assist in operating divers machines used by the defendant in its mill at said [place within the United States] iu the manufacture of cotton fabrics. Having thus described the alleged offer or promise of employment made to the ahen named, each count next alleges that the defendant unlawfully assisted him to migrate by prepaying his passage to a place within the United States; follows this by allegations that, induced by the offer and assisted by the prepajonent, he did migrate to the United States; and concludes with allegations that he was not at the time an alien entitled to enter the coimtry, that the defendant well knew the fact to be so, and that it owes the prescribed penalty. The company objected that the ahens named in the counts were not sufficiently alleged to have been contract laborers within the definition given in the act, maintaining that no offer of employment sufficient to make the ahen a "contract laborer," even if he was induced or sohc- ited by it to migrate to this country, had been set forth. The court rejected this view, saying: If, as this declaration alleges, the aliens named were in fact induced to migrate by offers no more specific as to terms and conditions 47 48 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. amount to be paid, the character of the labor, or the terms of the payment, than the offers described as above, I do not think the court could properly say that they were not "contract laborers" within the act; nor do I see how the court can properly say that offers made in the terms alleged could not have induced any of them to migrate. This win be a question for the jury, as will also the further question whether or not, if they were so induced, and were therefore "contract laborers," the defendant knowingly assisted their migration as charged after they had thus become " contract laborers." I am unable to hold that the declaration has not sufficiently alleged them to have been contract laborers. The court further held that where the declaration alleged that the corporation made the offers of employment to the aliens and prepaid their transportation, the fact that it did not specify whether the offers were made by an officer of the corporation or by some other person, and did not allege whether they had authority, whether the offers were oral or in writing, or their terms, did not render it demurrable. Alien Contract Labor — Violation of Statute — Nature of Action — Penalties — Grant Bros. Construction Co. v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States (Mar. 16, 1914), ^4 Supreme Court Reporter, page 4^2. — The company named and certain agents had been found guilty of a violation of the immigration law of Feb- ruary 20, 1907 (34 Stat. 898), the Supreme Court of Arizona having assessed penalties of $1,000 each in 45 cases. (114 Pac. 955; see Bui. No. 95, p. 289.) A number of the errors alleged to have been committed by the court below related to procedure and need not be noted here. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who delivered the opinion of the court, summarized the evidence, which was to the effect that the company was engaged in the construction of a railroad in south- em Arizona 'and had employed an agent to secure workmen. This person employed assistants to follow his suggestions and cooperate with him in the, work in which he was engaged. The board of inquiry of the immigration office decided that 45 men in a group of workmen crossing the boimdary line from Mexico were aUens, and it was found that their immigration was due to representations made by the company's agents. Among the complaints made against the trial court was one that the case had been treated as a civil suit rather than a criminal pro- cedure, and that the depositions of absent witnesses had been read and the jury instructed to return a verdict for the Government if the evidence reasonably preponderated in its favor. Objections to this procedm-e were overruled by the Supreme Court, the court holding that the action was civil and attended with the incidents of a civil action. DECISIONS OP COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 49 As to the amount of penalties recoverable Mr. Justice Van Devanter said: Still another contention is that, as all the men named in the petition were brought into the United States at one time, there was, but a single violation of the statute, and only one penalty could be recov- ered. The statute declares that "separate suits may be brought for each alien thus promised labor or service," and this plainly means that a separate penalty shall be assessed in respect of each alien whose migration or importation is knowingly assisted, encouraged, or solicited in contravention of the statute. The judgment of the court below was therefore affirmed. Antitrxtst Law — ^Monopolies — ^Restraint op Trade — ^Exemp- tion OP Labor Organizations — Constitutionality op Statute — International Harvester Co. of America v. State of Missouri, United States Supreme Court (June 8, 1914), 34 Supreme Court Re- porter, page 859. — Judgment was secured by the State of Missouri against the company named in the supreme court of that State, excluding it from doing business in the State, and this was affirmed in the United States Supreme Court. The company was charged with violation of the State antitrust law, and based its defense on certain objections to the constitutionality of the statute, one of which was that it denied equal protection of the laws in excluding combinations of wage earners from the prohibitions against combi- nations to lessen competition and regulate prices. This is the item of iaterest from a labor point of view. In dealing with it Mr. Justice McKenna, who delivered the opinion of the court, spoke in part as follows: PlaiatifiE in error makes three contentions: (1) The' statutes * * * (2) discriminate between the vendors of commodities and the vendors of labor and services; and (3) between vendors and purchasers of commodities. These contentions may be considered together, both involving a charge of discrimination, — the one because me law does not embrace vendors of labor; the other because it does not cover purchasers of commodities as well as vendors of them. Both, therefore, invoke a consideration of the power of classification which may be exerted in the legislation of the State. And we shall presently see that power bas very broad range. A classification is not invalid because of simple inequality. We said in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 106, 19 Sup. Ct. 609, by Mr. Justice Brewer: "The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact of inequality m no manner determmes the matter of constitutionality." We have said that it must be palpably arbitrary to authorize a judicial review of it, and that it can not be disturbed by the courts 85590°— BuU. 169—15 4 50 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. "Unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched." [Cases cited.] Whether the Missouri statute should have set its condemnation on restraints generally, prohibiting combined action for any purpose and to everybody, or confined it as the statute does to manufacturers and vendors of articles, and permittiag it to purchasers of such articles ; prohibiting it to sellers of commodities and permitting it to sellers of services, was a matter of legislative judgment; and we can not say that the distinctions made are palpably arbitrary, which we have seen is the condition of judicial review. It is to be remembered that the question presented is of the power of the legislature, not the policy of the exercise of the power. To be able to find fault, therefore, with such policy, is not to establish the invalidity of the law based upon it. Antitrust Law — Unlawful Combinations — Monopolies — Laundries — Construction of Statute — State ex rel. Moose, Atty. Gen. V. Frank et al., Supreme Court of ArTcansas {July 13, 1914), 169 Southwestern Reporter, page 333. — ^A complaint was brought by the State against Aaron Frank and others to recover a penalty for an unlawful combination in violation of the antitrust law of the State of Arkansas. Judgment was in favor of the defendants in the circuit court of Pulaski County on a demurrer to the complaint, which judg- ment was on appeal affirmed. The decision turned on the construc- tion of the statute, the State conceding that an agreement to fix the price of laundering, as had been undertaken by the proprietors of the defendant laundries doing business in the city of Little Rock, was not an agreement to fix the price of any article of manufacture, mechanism, or merchandise, forbidden by the statute, but holding that such agreement was an undertaking to fix the price of a com- modity, convenience, or repair, within its prohibitions. This conten- tion the court rejected, discussing the terms used at some length, and citing cases sustaining its views as to the nonapplicability of the statute, the opinion of Judge Smith, who spoke for the court, con- cluding as follows: If the business of laundering is not a commodity, then an agree- ment fixing prices for the performance of that service is not withm the inhibition of the antitrust act. The business of laimdering is a mere service done, whether performed by hand or by machinery, and an agreement to regulate the price to be charged therefor is in its last analysis merely an agreement to fix the price of labor, or services, and the legislature of this State has not made such an agreement imlawful. ARBriRATION OP LaBOR DISPUTES— A WARD EXCEPTIONS ^PRO- CEDURE— 7n re Georgia & Florida Railway, Ukited States District Court, Southern District of Georgia {July 30, 1914), 215 Federal Re- DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 51 porter, page 195. — ^A board of arbitrators had been, appointed under the provisions of the Newlands Act providing for the mediation and conciliation of disputes between raDroad companies and their em- ployees (38 Stat. 103, ch. 6, Acts of 1913), and exceptions were filed to its award. The statute provides for a permanent board of media- tion and concihation, and for the appointment of arbitrators in cases in which this board does not secure the adjustment of the questions involved. Before the appointment of the arbitrators, an agreement in writing must be made by the parties, stipulating that the arbitra- tion is to be made under the provisions of the act, stating specifically the questions to be submitted to the arbitrators for decision, and stipulating that a majority of the board of arbitrators shall be com- petent to make a valid and binding award. Awards, papers, pro- ceedings, and testimony, certified under the hands of the arbitrators, are to be filed with the clerk of the court of the district wherein the dispute arose, and unless exception is taken thereto within a fixed period, for error of law apparent on the record, such awards are to be binding upon the parties for the term agreed upon. In the case in hand f oiu- exceptions were offered to the award of the arbitrators, one as to the interpretation of the word "arbitration" made by the chairman of the board to the effect that "all matters of arbitration are matters of compromise," the contention being that if this view influenced the award it was error. As to this the court said that there was nothing on the record to show how this remark of one member of the board affected the award. Another exception was as to the correctness of the issue before the board as indicated by a statement by the arbitrator representing the employees. The other exceptions relate to the principles used in arriving at the con- clusions reached by the board. Judge Sheppard, who delivered the opinion of the court dismissing all the exceptions, recited the foregoing facts and quoted portions of the statute under which the arbitration was had, and said : It is observed by the express terms of the statute that the award shall be final and conclusive upon the parties unless set aside for error apparent upon the record. Thus, we are met at the threshold of the inquiry with the query: Do the exceptions stated above present within the purview of the statute such errors of law as can be reviewed by the court ? The only precedent that has rewarded the industry of the court for construction of the act in question is the case which construed the Erdman Act, In re Southern Pacific (C. C.) 155 Fed. 1001, OBul. No. 74, p. 206], where the provisions of the statute for review by the court for errors apparent on the record were pre- sented. There it was held that an arbitration under the former (Erd- man) act, containing essentially the same provisions as section 4 of the present act, was substantially a common-law arbitration, and the power and autiiority of the board rest solely upon the written sub- mission entered into by the parties, which limits and determines not 52 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. only the rights of the parties, but also the extent of the powers of the arbitrators, and that the submission is to be construed according to the rules governing contracts and not those governing pleadings. By reference to paragraph 5 of section 4, it is required that the agreement shall state specifically the matters to be submitted to the board for its decision. Obviously, it was the right of either party under the statute to have prescribed the scope of the inquiry, and to ha,ve defined the principles of law or conditions of fact upon which the inquisition was to proceed and the award to be established. Doubtless any departure from accepted rules, or failure on the part of the board to follow the adopted criteria, or the nonobservance of the restrictions imposed by agreement upon the latitude of the board's investigation, would have been cause for error apparent upon the record to which exception would He as provided in the statute. There were, however, no Umitations by the agreement to arbitrate put upon the scope of the inquiry, or any method prescribed as to now the board was to ascertain a reasonable wage to be paid the employees. It appears that the alleged errors presented by the excep- tions raise questions of mixed law and fact put in issue by the submis- sion without limitation, and having been heard and determined by the court constituted by consent of the parties called to arbitrate, that is to say, to hear, compare, adjust, and adjudicate the controversies, is as conclusive of the matters submitted, as well as the process by which they were reached, as the verdict of a jury. It would seem on the facts that their judgments are reviewable for only such errors as would warrant setting aside a common-law arbitration — such error as goes to jurisdiction, right or authority of the court to determine. The award has not been assailed, it will be observed, on any ground that would avoid it for lack of jurisdiction; or any ground that would be cause for setting aside the award of a common-law arbitration; it is not pretended that it was not a legally constituted board, or that the statute under which it was organized was invaUd, or that the board traveled beyond the scope of the matters properly submitted by agree- ment of the parties. By the agreement, the parties accepted the modus operandi of the statute for a speedy and expeditious adjust- ment of their differences, and thereby voluntarily waived any rights to have the questions involved determined by the strict and cumber- some rules of the courts of law. Arbitration, it is agreed, generally is a substitution by consent of the parties of a simple expeditious tri- bunal in lieu of courts whose procedure is circumscribed by definite rules of law. It is plain from the text of the act that Congress, appreciating the necessity of a forum for the arbitration of distracting controversies which often arise between employees and employers, estabhshed a tribunal to which the parties at their option might resort for a speedy determination of such controversies on their merits, without the de- lays incident to trials in courts of law. If the awards of such courts are to be set aside on technical grounds, or because their proceedings were not according to the rules of law, it would tend to set at naught the good offices of Congress as expressed by the act and leave to the courts at last, in spite of legislation to the contrary, the settlement of such controversies. It was undoubtedly the intent of the legislature that such awards should be final except for such error that would avoid the proceedings ab initio. DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 53 The exceptions should be dismissed, and the award affirmed, and it will be so ordered. On appeal to the circuit court of appeals (217 Fed. 755, decided Oct. 30, 1914), that court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that an award is subject to exception only on some ground which affects the jurisdiction, right, or authority of the arbitrators to make the same, and that such review can extend only to questions affecting the legality of the proceedings or the conclusiveness of the award, and views expressed by the arbitrators or reasons given for their decision are immaterial. Boycott — Blacklisting — Conspiracy — Combination in Re- straint OF Trade — Antitrust Law — Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, United States Supreme Court {June 22, 1916), 34 Supreme Court Reporter, page 951. — The associa- tion named brought its appeal to the Supreme Court to review a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York enjoining it as an unlawful combination under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The appeal resulted in the decree of the court below being affirmed. The association was made up of retail lumber dealers ia a number of States, iacluding New York and Massa- chusetts on the north and Maryland on the south, and among its activities was the distribution of a document known as the " official - report," in which, on account of "an interest in common with your fellow members in the information contaiued iu this statement," certaui information was communicated "ia strictest confidence, and with the understanding that you are to receive it and treat it in the same way." Following these statements was a Mst of wholesale dealers who had been reported as having solicited or quoted or sold directly to consumers. Members were also encouraged to report in detail any instance of such action on the part of wholesalers, the names being obtained and placed on the Ust as the result of complaints made by individual retailers. Counsel for the association stated that complaiats of this nature were investigated and if serious and well founded were acted upon by the board which, if satisfied that the wholesaler made a practice of selling to consumers and customers of the retail trade, directed the name of such wholesaler to be reported for the official Ust. The name could be removed on satisfactory assurance that the wholesaler was no longer selhng in competition with retailers. Having stated these facts Mr. Justice Day, who deliv- ered the opinion, said in part: The reading of the official report shows that it is intended to give confidential information to the members of the associations of the names of wholesalers reported as soliciting or selling directly to con- 54 BULLETIN OP THE BTJEBATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. sumers, members upon learning of any such instances being called upon to promptly report the same, supplying detailed infornaation as to the particulars oi the transaction. These Msts were quite com- monly spoken of as blackhsts, and when the attention of a retailer was brought to the name of a wholesaler who had acted in this wise it was with the evident purpose that he should know of such conduct and act accordingly. IVue it is that there is no agreement among the retailers to refrain from deahng with listed wholesalers, nor is there any penalty annexed for the failure so to do ; but he is blind indeed who does not see the purpose in the predetermined and period- ical circulation of this report to put the ban upon wholesale dealers whose names appear in the list of unfair dealers trying by methods obnoxious to the retail dealers to supply the trade which they regard as their own. In other words, the circulation of such information among the hundreds of retailers as to the alleged delinquency of a wholesaler with one of their number had and was intended to have the natural effect of causing such retailers to withhold their patronage from the concern Msted. The Sherman Act has been so frequently and recently before this court as to require no extended discussion now. [Cases cited.] It broadly condemns all combinations and conspiracies which restrain the free and natural flow of trade in the channels of interstate com- merce. In Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Eange Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. Eep. 492 [Bui. No. 95, p. 323], after citing Loewe v. Lawlor [208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, Bui. No. 75, p. 622], this court said (p. 438) : "But the principle announced by the court was general. It [the Sherman Act] covered any illegal means by which interstate com- merce is restrained, whether by unlawful combinations of capital, or vmlawful combinations of labor; and we thiflk also whether the restraint be occasioned by unlawful contracts, trusts, pooling arrange- ments, blacklists, boycotts, coercion, threats, intimidation, and whether these be made effective, in whole or in part, by acts, words, or printed matter." These principles are applicable to this situation. Here are whole- sale dealers in large number engaged in interstate trade upon whom it is proposed to impose as a condition of carrying on that trade that they shall not sell in such manner that a local retail dealer may regard such sale as an infringement of his exclusive right to trade, upon pain of being reported as an unfair dealer to a large number of other retail dealers associated with the offended dealer, the purpose being to keep the wholesaler from deahng not only with the particular dealer who reports him, but with all others of the class who may be informed of his delinquency. " Section 1 of the act * * * is not confined to voluntary restraints, as where persons engaged in interstate trade or commerce agree to suppress competition among themselves, but in- cludes as well involuntary restraints, as where persons not so engaged conspire to compel action by others, or to create artificial conditions, which necessarily impede or burden the due course of such trade or commerce, or restrict the common Uberty to engage therein." United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 541, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141. This record abounds hi iastances where the offending dealer was thus DECISIONS OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOB. 55 reported, the hoped-for effect, unless he discontinued the offending practice, realized, and his trade directly and appreciably impaired. But it is said that in order to show a combination or conspiracy within the Sherman Act some agreement must be shown under which the concerted action is taken. It is elementary, however, that con- spiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct testimony, and may be iof erred from the things actually done; and when, in this case, by concerted action the names of wholesalers who were reported as having made sales to consumers were periodically reported to the other members of the associations, the conspiracy to accomplish that which was the natural consequence of such action may be readily inferred. The circulation of these reports not only tends to directly restrain the freedom of commerce by preventing the Hsted dealers from entering into competition with retailers, as was held by the district court, but it directly tends to prevent other retailers who have no personal grievance agaiast him, and with whom he might trade, from so doing, they being deterred solely because of the influence of the report circulated among the members of the associations. In other words the trade of the wholesaler with strangers was directly affected, not because of any supposed wrong which he had done to them, but because of the grievance of a member of one of the asso- ciations, who had reported a wrong to. himself, which grievance, when brought to the attention of others, it was hoped would deter them from deahng with the offending party. This practice takes the case out of those normal and usual agreements in aid of trade and commerce which may be found not to be within the act, and puts it within the prohibited class of undue and unreasonable restramts, such as was the particidar subject of condemnation in Loewe v. Lawlor [supra]. The argument that the course pursued is necessary to the protec- tion of the retail trade and promotive of the public welfare in pro- viding retail facilities is answered by the fact that Congress, with the right to control the field of interstate commerce, has so legislated as to prevent resort to practices which unduly restrain competition or unduly obstruct the free flow of such commerce, and private choice of means must yield to the national authority thus exerted. A retail dealer has the unquestioned right to stop dealing with a wholesaler for reasons sufficient to himself, and may do so because he thinks such dealer is acting unfairly in trying to undermine his trade. "But," as was said by Mr. Justice Lurton, speaking for the court in Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433, 30 Sup. Ct. Eep. 535 [Bui. No. 89, p. 414]', "when the plaintiffs in error combine and agree that no one of them will trade with any producer or wholesaler wio shall sell to a consumer within the trade range of any of them, quite another case is presented. An act harmless when done by one may become a pubhc wrong when done by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of a conspiracy, and may be prohibited or punished, if the result be hurtful to the pubhc or to the mdividual against whom the concerted action is directed." 56 BULLETIN OF THE BTJBEATT OF LABOE STATISTICS. Civn^SEKViOE Employees — Pension Funds — ^Deduction feom Salaries — CoNSTiruriONALrrT of Statute — Hughes v. Traeger et at., Supreme CouH of Illinois {Oct. 16, 1914), 106 NoHheastem Reporter, page 431. — ^This was a suit by Edward J. Hughes against John E. Traeger and others on a bill ia chancery to prevent the retention of any portion of the complaiaant's salary under the provisions of the civil-service pension law of the State (Laws of 1911, p. 158). This act provides for the estabhshment of such a fund, chiefly by the retention from salaries and wages by the comptroller of the munici- palities to which the act applies of the stmi of $2 per month for each employee withia its scope. The complaiut charged that the statute ia question was unconstitutional, so that from a decree for the defendant officials the case was taken on a writ of error from the circuit court of Cook County to the supreme court, this court holding that the statute was constitutional. The status of the complainant and the operation of the law are discussed in the following quotation from the opinion of the court, which was dehvered by Judge Dunn: By section 1 of the pension fimd act its provisions do not apply to temporary or probationary employees or to laborers, except, in case of the latter, upon their request. It apphes, therefore, onfy to those holding permaaent positions, and those positions, whether called offices or places of employment, have substantially the same char- acteristics, without regard to the character of the services rendered. The bill states that the complainant was employed ia the civil service of the city, but necessarily, under the provisions of section 10 of the civil-service act, he was appointed by some appointing officer acting under some authority d!erived from the city coimcil. By virtue of that appointment, and without legard to any agreement or contract, the complainant was entitled to hold his position and receive its emoluments imtil discharged for cause in the manner prescribed by the civil-service act; -but he was not bound to perform the duties of his position for any length of time. He would violate no obUgation by leaving the service of the city at any time. There were no terms of service agreed upon. The respective rights and obligations of the city and the complainant were not fixed by con- tract, but by law and the action of the coimcil authorizing his ap- pointment. He did not hold his position or perfoird its mities by virtue of any contract. He had no property right in his position or the salary attached thereto, and no right to compensation growing out of any contractual relation. His position was subject to the same legislative control as may be exercised over any public office. Offices created by statute are wholly within the control of the legis- latiire, which may at pleasure create oi aboUsh them, modify their duties, shorten or lengthen their terms, increase oi diminish the salary, or change the mode of compensation^ and the power of rnunicipal corporations, within the limits prescnbed by the constitu- tion or by statute, is of the same absolute character. DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOB. 57 The effect of the law was to reduce the salary which the complain- ant would receive, $2 a month, but he was not thereby deprived of his property, for he had no property in his unearned salary. It is true that the complaiaant acqmres no vested interest in the fund created by the statute, for there is no contract by the State or the city that the disposition of the fund may not Ibe changed ia the future, and ia such event the complainant's expectancy imght be destroyed. The $2 a month deducted from the pay of each employee does not become the property of such employee and can not be controlled or disposed of by him. The fund created by these deductions remains subject to the disposition of the legislature, and the employees can not prevent its appropriation in another way -than that designated by the statute. It is not their property, and the statute does not amoimi to a contract by the State to use it in the manner provided by the statute. A change in the disposition of the fund would not, however, violate any right of the complainant, for until the happen- ing of the event designated by the statute for its distribution he has no vested right in the fund, but only an expectancy created by the law, which the law may revoke or destroy. Pennie v. Keis, 132 U. S. 464, 10 Sup. Ct. 149; State v. Tiustees, 121 Wis. 44, 98 N. W. 954. It is argued that, if the money retained be regarded as pubHc money, the act is void as an appropriation of pubMc money for private use and allowing extra money to pubUc ofl&cers for services already performed. In Firemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Lounsbury, 21 111. 511, 74 Am. Dec. 115, it was held that the raising of fimds for the rehef of the distressed, sick, injured, or disabled members of the Firemen's Benevolent Asso- ciation of Chicago and their immediate f amiUes was a pubhc charity, for which the legislature could make provision. Judge Dillon, writ- ing of pensions for municipal services, in his work on Municipal Cor- porations, vol. 1, sec. 430 (5th ed.), says that these annuities — "are, m effect, pay withheld to induce long-continued and faithful service, and the public benefit accrues in two ways: First, by encouraging competent and faithful employees to remain in the service and re- frain from embarking in other vocations; and, second, by retiring from the public service those who, by devoting their best energies for a long period of years to the performance of duties in a public office or employment, have by reason thereof or of advanced age become incapacitated from perfo'rming the duties as well as they might be performed by others more youthful or in greater physical or mental vigor." In Commonwealth v. Walton, 182 Pa. 373, 38 Atl. 790, legislation Uke that in question was sustained against a similar objection. The purpose of the legislation is within the constitutional power of the general assembly. Contract of Employment — Breach — Suits — Limitations — Pennsylvania Co. v. Good. Appellate Court of Indiana (Dec. 19, 1913), 103 Northeastern Reporter, page 672. — This was an action by John S. Good against the raUroad company named for damages for alleged breach of contract of employment. Judgment was in his favor in the circuit court of Marion County, and the company appealed. The employee set forth that, in 1882, following the receipt of an 58 BULLETIN OP THE BTJEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. injury, his claim for damages was released in consideration of an agreement by the company to employ him as watchman, during his life, at certain wages. He was employed in this capacity for some time and discharged May 22, 1902, on account of which this action was brought. The company in its appeal argued that Good's right of action expired by the statute of Mmitations in May, 1908. He had brought suit in 1904, but his counsel had voluntarily dismissed it after a partial trial because of rulings by the court which he believed were erroneous. As to the remedies which Good originally had and his election between them, the court, speaking by Judge Lairy, said: Upon such a breach, appellee had a right to pursue either of two remedies. He might treat the contract as still subsisting, hold him- self in readiness to perform and sue on the contract for the wages due him thereunder, or he could treat the contract as terminated by the breach, and sue at once for the entire damages resulting to him from such breach. [Cases cited.] The cause of action for a breach of a contract accrues at the time the breach occurs, and the statute of limitation begins to run from that date. If appellant had elected to treat the contract as stiU subsisting, and to sue under it for his wages, his cause of action as to each install- ment of such wages would have accrued at the time when such in- stallment was due and payable by the terms of the contract, and the statute of limitations as to each installment would run from the time it became due. In this case appellee elected to treat the contract of employment as terminated by his discharge, and to sue for the entire damage resulting to him. This right of action accrued on the date of his discharge, and the statute of umitations expired on the 22d day of May, 1908. Convict Labok — State Employment — Constitutionality of Statute — SJienandoah Lime Co. et al. v. Mann et al., Supreme Cmirt of Appeals of Virginia {Jan. 15, 1913), 80 Southeastern Reporter, page 763. — An act of the General Assembly of Virginia, known as the " Con- vict lime grinding act," which was approved March 14, 1912 (ch. 295, Acts of 1912, p'. 586), provides for the employment of convicts at grinding oyster shells and limestone rock, provides for procuring the material upon which they are to work and the instrumentalities with which they are to do the work, and provides for the sale of the prod- uct of their labor and for their support from the proceeds. An ap- propriation of 130,000 is made by the act to carry its provision into effect. The Shenandoah Lime Co. brought suit against William Mann, governor of the State, and other State officials, in the circuit court of the city of Richmond, for an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the act, on the ground that the law was imconstitutional as it DECISIONS OP COURTS AFFECTING LABOB. 59 violates section 185 of the Virginia constitution, which forbids th-e State from becoming a party to or interested in any work of internal improvement, except pubhc roads, or engaged in carrying on such work. It was also contended that the act is obnoxious to section 188 of the constitution because it appropriates public funds for a private purpose or business,- and because it amounts to the taking of the property of the lime company without due process of law, contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. The court held that the law was constitutional and dismissed the bill of the company, whereupon an appeal was taken to the Supreme Com"t of Appeals of Virginia, where the decision of the lower court was afBrmed. Judge Harrison, after reviewing the facts in the case, spoke in part as follows: It is apparent from the title, preamble, and the body of this act that its dominant pm-pose is to provide suitable employment for certain long-term or dangerous convicts confined in the penitentiary, and that the other provisions of the act are merely tributary to that end. We are of opinion that the machinery for grinding oyster shells and hmestone rock, and the temporary structures for housing the convicts pending the work contemplated by the act in question do not come within the meaning of the term "internal improvements," as that term is used in section 185 of the constitution. Whatever interpretation that term may have elsewhere, it has no such meaning in Virginia, where for nearly, if not quite, 100 years it has acquired a definite and weU-recognized meaning. Its meaniag as thus defined and understood throughout the legislation of the State, and the deci- sions of her courts has included and had reference to the channels of trade and commerce, such as turnpikes, canals, railroads, telegraph lines, including in more recent years telephone lines, and other works of a like quasi pubhc character. The manifestly dominant purpose of the act being, as already seen, to provide employment for convicts who could not be used in the usual employments under existing statutes, there can be no question that the State is acting within its poHce power in providing the present means for employing such convicts. We are warranted, upon abundant authority, in holding that the exercise by the State of its poHce power, in enacting the "Convict lime grinding act" under consideration, can not be defeated because of any conflict with section 185 of the constitution. We are further of opinion that the act does not violate section 188 of the Virginia constitution. It does not, as contended, appropriate public funds for a private purpose; nor does it amount to the taking of the property of complainants without due process of law, con- trary to the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. It being the purpose of the act to furnish employment to convicts, as appears from the act itself, and that purpose being, as already seen, a valid exercise by the State of its police power, the appropriation which the act carries is clearly for a public purpose and not for a private purpose. 60 bulletin of the bueeatj op laboe statistics. Convict Laboe — -Woeking Out Costs — ^Action foe Excess WoEK — Tennessee Goal, Iron & Railroad Go. v. Butler, Supreme Gourt of Alabama (June 4> 1914), 65 Southern Reporter, page 804- — ^Alex Butler brought action against the company named in the city court of Birmingham, where his suit prevailed. . Butler had been convicted of petty larceny. He was hired from. Jefferson County to the de- fendant company to work during the term of his sentence. After serving his sentence of 110 days at hard labor he proceeded to work out his costs, which amounted to $29.35, at the rate of 40 cents a day as provided in the sentence. Under the law he was entitled to work out the costs at the rate of 75 cents a day. He claimed as damages the value of the labor which he had performed in excess of the legal amount, and the court held that his further imprisonment after the valid part of the contract was illegal, and aflSrmed the judgment in his favor. Employers' Liability — Abrogation of Defenses — Classipica- TiON of Employments — Constitutionality of Statute — Vandalia Railroad Go. v. StilweU, Supreme Gourt of Indiana (Mar. 10, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 289. — Charles StilweU was a freight brakeman in the employ of the company named, and sued the com- pany for damages for personal injury. The &st paragraph of the complaint charges neghgence of the engineer ia backing an engine and cars against a car on which appellee was riding in the course of his duty, whereby he was thrown from the car and injured, and no question is raised as to its sufficiency. The second paragraph alleges the railroad's liability under the employers' liability act of March 2, 1911 (Acts of 1911, p. 145). The railroad company demurred to this paragraph, and assigned the overruling of the demurrer as error in appealing from the judgment of the circuit court of .Morgan County in favor of the employee. Judge Myers delivered the opinion of the court, affirming the judgment of the court below. As to the groimds of defense he said: The specific grounds of challenge of the constitutionality of this act is [a,re] that it makes an employer liable for an injury to an employee arising out of dangers and hazards inherent in the nature of the employment, without fault of the employer, and thereby deprives appellant of its liberty and property without due process of law, in violation of article 14, ia amendment of the Federal Constitution, and of section 12, art. 1, of the State constitution, and that it makes employers of five or more persons liable, and leaves employers of less than five persons free from the obligations, and liabilities imposed by the act, and thereby denies appellant the equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment to me Federal Con- stitution, and section 23, art. 1, of the State constitution. Analyzing the effect of the law, the court concluded that the statute does not change the law as it formerly existed as to when an DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOE. 61 employee assumes the risk, or is negligent, or as to the burden of proof as to negligence, but does destroy the fellow-servant rule and changes the rule as to burden of proof as to knowledge or constructive knowledge of the defect in the place, tool, or appliance; that the statute creates no liability on the part of the employers where there is no negligence, and hence does not deprive employers of liberty or property without due process of law. Judge Myers discussed at length the question of the classification making the act applicable only to employers of five or more workmen, and concluded that it must be considered a reasonable classification on the ground that unless courts are satisfied that there can be no reasonable basis for such a classification, they wiU not overthrow the statute. The following brief quotations are taken from the discus- sion on this point: The question resolves into the proposition under the broadest views of the case, whether the classification made by the statute here involved rests upon some material or substantial basis, and operates upon all alike within the class. This statute * * * operates upon conditions which by reason of numbers are not and can not be the same, though the relation should be close, but which wiU be the same in case the number is reached, in analogy to classification by population, in addition to the fact that there is a natural relation of increase of danger from mere numbers, even though there should seem to be some mequality between so small a difference as between four and five, but that is an inseparable incident of the power of classification. As to the application of the act to railroads. Judge Myers said: It is next urged that the act does not apply to railroads for the reason that they are not engaged in "business, trade or commerce," in the language of the act. "Business" is defined as that which occupies the time, attention, or labor, of men for the purpose of profit or improvement, as their principal concern. [Cases cited.] "Commerce" is defined as traffic and something more; it is inter- course, transportation; and the latter is commerce itself. It includes not merely traffic, but the means and vehicles by which it is accom- plished. As used in the Federal Constitution, it, of course, applies to relations between citizens of different States, foreign nations, and the Indian tribes, and is broad enough to embrace intrastate traffic, and transportation, as well. We have no difficulty in determining that the statute embraces railroads. Employees' Liability — ^Abrogation of Defenses — Constitu- tionality OF Workmen's Compensation Act — OrooTcs v. Tazewell Coal Co., Supreme Court of Illinois (Apr. 23, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 132. — ^Louis Crooks brought action against the com- pany named for damages for personal injury, alleged to have been caused by its negligence in failing to construct an entry in its mine 62 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. of sufficient height and width to permit him safely to drive coal cars through it, and in allowing coal and refuse to accumulate on the tracks. The company had elected not to come under the workmen's compensation act of the State (Acts of 191 1, p. 314), and consequently, in accordance with its provisions, was deprived of the defenses of assumed risk, negligence of fellow servants, and contributory negU- gence. It questioned the constitutionahty of the act, but contended that, since the employee had elected to come within the provisions of the act, he was limited in the amount of his recovery by the act, and must bring his proceeding under it. The court affirmed a judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County for the plaintiff, and followed the decision in Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261 111. 454, 104 N. E. 211 (see p. 216), in holding that the act is constitutional, and also that where either party elects not to be bound by the act, and so notifies the proper authorities, there is no contract under the act, and the employee is not Umited in his recovery by its terms. Employers' Liabilitt — ^Abrogation of Fellow-servant Doc- trine — Constitutionality of Statute — Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, Supreme Court of Mississippi (Mar. 2, 1914), 64 Southern Reporter, page 461- — S. W. Pierce, the plaintiff, recovered in the circuit court of Covington County, the sum of $17,500 as damages for personal injuries resultiag in the loss of a leg, suffered while an engineer in the employ of the company named. The engine which he was driviag on a logging road, hauUng a train carrying employees to the company's camp, met in head-on coUision another engine pulling cars from the camp. The constitutionahty of the statute (ch. 194, Acts of 1908) abohshing the fellow-servant rule among certain employees was brought in question, the company advancing two reasons: (1) It violates section 193 of the Mississippi constitution, which largely took away the defense of fellow service in personal- injury suits against common-carrier railroads; (2) it violates the equahty clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Judge Reed, in dehvering the opinion of the court, spoke in part as foUows: We quote the first section of the chapter: " Every employee of a railroad corporation, and aU other corpora- tions and individuals, using engines, locomotives or cars of any kind or description whatsoever, propelled by the dangerous agencies of steam, electricity, gas, gasoline or lever power, and running on tracfe, shall have the same rights and remedies for an injury suffered by him from the act or omission of such railroad corporation or others, or their employees, as are allowed by law to other persons not employed. * * *" *^ DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOE. 63 It has been held that section l93 apphes only to railroad corpora- tions engaged in the business of common carrier, or those denomi- nated "commercial railroad companies," and that it does not apply to railroads owned and operated as an adjunct to the main business of their owners, such as construction company roads, roads used ia connection with mines and lumber corporations and logging roads. Construction Co. v. Heflin, 88 Miss. 314, 42 So. 174, [Bui. No. 69, p. 446]. The railroad in the case at bar is a logging road. It win be noticed that the final sentence of section 193 provides for the extension of the remedies therein in the following language: "The legislature may extend the remedies herein provided for to any other class of employees." It is not argued by counsel for appellant that the legislature could not extend the remedies to employees of logging roads. It is conceded that this may be done. It is claimed that the words were at once a grant and a limitation; that by neces- sary inference the limitation amounted to a denial to the legislature of a power to grant any remedies curtailing the fellow-servant rule other than those provided in the section. It is true that by the statute (ch. 194, Acts 1908) there is a broader and fuUer statement of the abrogation of the fellow-servant rule than that contained in the section of the constitution. The makers of the constitution, by sec- tion 193, provided for the abrogation of the fellow-servant doctrine to a certain extent. It was said by Mr. Chief Justice Whitfield in the case of Ballard v. Oil Co., 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 533 [Bui. No. 49, p. 1363], that it was the pur- pose of the framers of the constitution to authorize legislation to abohsh the fellow-servant rule in the case of railroad corporations whose business was known to be inherently dangerous in so far as such liti- fation [legislation] would be in accord with the principles announced y the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. He further stated in his opinion in that case that "the purpose of the last clause of section 193 was to extend the remedies therein provided for to any other class of employees of corporations or persons whose business was, like that of raihoads, inherently dangerous, or whose business was so different from the business of other corporations or persons as to furnish the basis for a classification of the business of such cor- porations, or persons, under which their employees might be per- mitted to sue without reference to the feUow-servant rule, while the employees of corporations, or persons not having that sort of business, could not so sue; in other words, to permit a classification based on 'some difference bearing a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed.' * * * It is not therefore to be supposed that the last clause of the section meant any more than that there might be other classifications of the employees of corporations or individual persons based also on some distinguish- ingdifference in the nature of the businesses." We can not believe from an entire consideration of the section, and in view of its evident purpose, that the final sentence was intended as a restriction. In truth, we do not see that it is necessary to regard it as a grant in order that the legislature should be able to enact a statute to abohsh the fellow-servant rule in proper classes of em- ployees. The legislature is intrusted with the general authority to make laws at discretion, unless there is a clear constitutional pro- hibition. 64 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOB STATISTIOS. Now as to the contention that chapter 194 violates the equalitj clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States: Counsel for appellant contend that this violation is accompUshed by the inclusion of the words "and running on tracks." We can not agree with counsel that this is so. It has been held that section 193 of the constitution excludes all railroads except com- mercial railroads, or those engaged in the business of common car- rier. We see in the act of the legislature the purpose to extend the remedy provided by the abrogation of the fellow-servant doctrine to all employees of all railroad corporations, including the conmiercial railroads, and including also all other railroads, such as logging rail- roads and those connected with lumber and other enterprises using such engines, locomotives, and cars "running on tracks." We un- derstand the words "running on tracks" to define such engines, locomotives and cars propelled by the several dangerous agencies named as are used in aU of the diflFerent kinds of railways. The statute was meant in its broad expression to exclude no kind of rail- ways in Mississippi. The statute provides that the remedies extend to all employees using engines, locomotives, or cars owned and operated by railroad corporations and aU other corporations and individuals. In short, the class made by the statute is all employees using such engines, locomotives, and cars of all kinds and descriptions propelled by the dangerous agencies specified and riuming on tracks, that is, on a defined way such as used oy railroads. We deem this a reasonable classification which applies equally to all in the same situation. An attempt was made to carry this case to the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of error, which that court dismissed for want of jiu-isdiction (35 Sup. Ct. 133). One groimd was that the classification in the statute which has been mentioned was so unequal as to cause the statute to be iu conflict with the fourteenth amend- ment; and the other that chapter 215 of the Mississippi Laws of 1912, enacted after the happening of the accident, but before the trial, providing that from the proof of the happening of an accident there should arise a prima facie presumption of neghgence, was wanting in due process because retroactively applied to the case. Mr. Chief Justice White, who delivered the opinion, said in con- clusion : As it results that at the time the writ of error was sued out it had been conclusively settled by the decisions of this court that both grounds relied on were devoid of merit, we think the alleged consti- tutional questions were too frivolous to sustain jurisdiction, and we therefore maintain the motion which has been made to dismiss, and our judgment wiU be, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Employers' Liability — Employment of Children — Age Limit — Constitutionality of Statute — ^Misrepresentation op Age — Sturges & Bum Manufacturing Co. v. Beauchamp, United States Supreme Court {Dec. 1, 1913), 3 4 Supreme Court Reporter, page 60. — ^Arthur Beauchamp, the defendant in error, was injiu-ed DECISIONS OF COURTS AJ-PECTING LABOE. 65 while employed by the company named as a press hand to operate a punch press used in stamping sheet metal, being at the time under 16 years of age. He brought an action through his next friend in the superior court of Cook Coimty, 111., to recover damages for the injury sustained, relying on a statute of Illiaois (Laws of 1903, p. 187, Kurd's Stat. 1909, p. 1082), which, by section 11, prohibited the employment of children under 16 years of age in various hazardous occupations, including that in which the injiu-y occurred. A ver- dict wassrendered for Beauchamp in the trial court, which judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the State. (250 111. 303, 95 N. E. 204.) The case was then taken to the Supreme Court of the United States on error, where the judgment of the State court was affirmed. Mr. Justice Hughes, who dehvered the opinion of the court, after stating the facts, said: The Federal question presented is whether the statute, as con- strued by the State coiu't, contravenes the fourteenth amendment. It can not be doubted that the State was entitled to prohibit the employment of persons of tender years in dangerous occupations. [Cases cited.] It is urged that the plaintiff in error was not per- mitted to defend upon the ground that it acted in good faith relying upon the representation made by Beauchamp that he was over six- teen. It is said that, being over fourteen, he at least had attained the age at which he shoulcfhave been treated as responsible for his statements. But, as it was competent for the State, in securing the safety of the young, to prohibit such employment altogether, it could select means appropriate to make its prohibition effective, and could compel employers, at their peril, to ascertain whether those they employed were in fact under the age specified. The imposition of absolute requirements of this sort is a familiar exercise of the pro- tective power of government. [Cases cited.] And where, as here, such legislation nas reasonable relation to a purpose which the State was entitled to effect, it is not open to constitutional objection as a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. [Cases cited.] It is also contended that the statute denied to the plaintiff in error the equal protection of the laws; but the classification it estab- lished was clearly within the legislative power. Employees' Liability — Guards foe Dangeeous Machineey — Laundries — ^Application of Law — Assumption of Eisks — Mc Clary V. Knight, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia {Dec. 9, 1913), 80 Southeastern Reporter, page 866, — T. A. McClary was employed in Knight's laundry to rim the engine and washers. He was directed to oil one of the washers, and after having done so, was endeavoring to replace the belts on the pulleys of the line shaft overhead. He was standing on top of the washing machine, when his sleeve was 85590°— Bull. 169—15 5 66 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATT OF LABOR STATISTICS. caught in a belt, throwing him into a running wringer or extractor near by, which had no covering over it, and injuring him to such an extent that amputation of his leg was necessary. He sued Knight and obtained a judgment in the circiiit court of Cabell County, W. Va., which judgment was aflBrmed by the State supreme court of appeals. In considering whether a laundry was an estabUshment within the meaning of chapter 19, Acts of 1901, requiring safety guards in "manufacturing, mechanical, and other estabhshments," Judge Poffenbarger, for the court, said: The gravamen of the second count of the amended declaration is failiure to guard the wringer or extractor, or provide a cover of some sort for it. A steam laundry may not be a manufacturing establish- ment, but it is mechanical in the sense that it is filled with r unnin g machinery. Whether this is the sense in which the word "mechan- ical" was used or not, such a laundry is an estabUshment "whore the machinery, belting, shaftings, gearings, drums, and elevators" are so arranged and placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein. The judge then considered the question as to whether the machin- ery was of such a nature as to be dangerous to the employee and impose upon the master the duty to put a cover or guard over it, and gave his opinion that the evidence submitted was sufficient to carry the question to the jury. He then took up the contention that McClary had assumed the danger of injury as a risk of his employment and said: If the omitted duty had been one imposed by the common law, the plaintiff's right of action would be precluded, by his assumption of the risk of the injury he suffered. He knew as much about the plant and machinery as the master himself, having worked there for nearly four years and in many other similar places. But the duty left unperformea by the master was a statutory one, and the great weight of authority is to the effect that a servant working around unguarded machinery which the statute requires to be guarded does not assume the risk of such injury as iflay ensue. The statute does not in terms ehminate assumption of risk, nor say the omission of duty shall be neghgence on the part of the master. But, to make the statute effective, it is necessary to exclude the assumption of risk and give a right of action for the omission of duty. Employees' Liabilitt — Guards for Dangerous Machinery— Negligence— PMBijJs v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., Kansas Oity Court of Appeals {Apr. 6, 1914), 165 Southwestern Reporter, page 118S. — Champ Philhps brought action against the company named for personal injuries sustained by him by the breaking of the steel driver of a shoe-tacking machine which was not guarded, and the consequent flying of particles which caused the loss of an eye. Sec- DECISIONS OP COXTBTS APFECTING LABOR. 67 tion 7828, Kevised Statutes of Missouri, 1909, requires the machinery 'm all manufacturing, mechanical, and other establishments in the State, when so placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein or thereabouts while engaged in their ordinary duties to be safely and securely guarded when possible. Philhps was 18 years of age at the time of the accident. The machine which he was using breaks off and drives into the shoes as tacks pieces of wire at the rate of 400 per minute. The driver, which was necessarily small and of highly tempered steel, frequently broke and flew with great force, sufficient to pierce the skin of an operator. The plaintiff had been working at the machine for five weeks before the injury. He was obliged while at his work to stand facing the machine and about two feet from it. The result of the trial in the circuit court of Boone Comity was a judgment in the plaintiff's favor, from which the company appealed. The following extract from the opinion of the court of appeals, as dehvered by Judge Trimble, shows the grounds on which the judg- ment below was affirmed: The main question to be disposed of is: Does the statute apply to a case of this kind, where the injury is not caused by the employee coming into contact with an unguarded machine, but is caused by the lack of a guard to prevent broken pieces from flying from the machine when such breakage is of such frequent and ordinary occur- rence as to notify the master that the machine as located and oper- ated is dangerous and hkely to injure employees ? We can see no reason why the statute should be given the narrow construction contended for by defendant. The object of the statute is the safety of the employee. It would seem that if that safety would be imperiled either by the employee's inadvertently coming in contact with the machine or by the machine's working in such way as to give notice that it was likely to actively injure the employee the machine would be "dangerous to persons employed therein or thereabouts," within the meaning of the statute. In the case before us, the negligence charged against the master is that it failed to guard when it could have done so. The evidence tends to show that the failure to guard was the real cause of the injury, and nothing that the plaintiff did or failed to do had any part therein. In all of the cases cited as holding the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, such neghgence was bottomed on some act, or omission to act, on the part of the employee which he should not or should have performed m the exercise of the prudence of an ordi- nary man. Employers' Liability — Guards for Dangerous Machinery — Proximate Cause — Damages — Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Railway Co. v. Armuth, Supreme Court of. Indiana {Dec. 19, 191S), 108 Northeastern Reporter, page 738. — Henry F. Armuth brought action against the railway company named for damages for personal 68 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. injury, because of the failure of the company to conform to the statute requiring the guarding of dangerous machinery. (Burns, A. S. 1908, sees. 8021-8052.) The employee's hand slipped from a lever which he was operating, into unguarded cogwheels a few inches away, causing the loss of two fingers. He had secured a verdict in the circuit court of Marion County, and the company appealed. The coiu-t held that the failure to guard the machinery and the slip- ping of the hand were concurriug causes of the injury, and that the former, being in violation of statute, was the proximate cause; so that the company was hable unless the shpping of the employee's hand was due to his fault, which question was for the jury. There was therefore no ground for reversal of the judgment on this point, but it was reversed and a new trial granted the defendant because the trial judge had erred in allowing the jury to consider as elements of damages the employee's loss of time and expense for medical and hospital treatment, although the complaint alleged and the evidence imphed only that there were such loss and such expense, without showing the amount of same. Employees' Liability — Guards for Dangerous Machinery — Safety from Location — Smith v. Mt. Clemens Sugar Co., Supreme Court of MicUgan (Mar. 26, 1914.), I46 Northwestern Reporter, page M6S. — George W. Smith brought action for damages for personal injuries received while employed by the company named in looking after the juice pumps at its factory, and from a judgment in his favor the company appealed. Each of the pumps was connected with a tank 8 feet high. Above the tanks was a hme conveyor, an iron trough 2| feet in diameter, through which ran a spiral attachment, which pushed the refuse hme along until it was finally discharged into the sewer. A stream of water ran into the conveyor, and was controlled by a valve 9 feet from the floor, which plaintiff found it necessary to operate to increase the flow of water. After turning on the water, he started to come down the ladder, which had been broken and mended, and one of its sides gave way. His left hand went into a gearing 3 feet away, and he received an injury such as to necessitate the amputation of his arm between the elbow and wrist. The cog gear was about 9 feet from the floor, and was not guarded in accordance with the statute requiring the guarding of gearing and other dangerous machinery. As to the question whether the statute apphed to this gearing the court, speaking by Judge Brooke, said: It is urged that defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted upon the ground that under the facts in this case DECISIONS OP COUBTS AFFECTING LABOB. 69 the statute relied upon can not apply, and therefore that no aegli- gpnce on the part oi the defendant was shown. It is said that the gears in question, situated as they were some 9 feet from the floor, were safeguarded by their position. If, as the evidence introduced by plaintiff seems to show, it became necessary for one or other 01 the employees of defendant many times each day to mount a ladder and attend to a portion of the work within 3 feet of the exposed gearing, we think it can scarcely be said, as a matter of law, that the "position" was an adequate safeguard. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether an exposed gearing can be placed in any posi- tion which as a matter of law would be considered as an equivalent to the statutory safeguard. But at aU events the charge upon the subject was as favorable to defendant as it was entitled to demand. The judgment was therefore affirmed. Employees' Liability — Guards foe Dangeeoits Machinery — Saws — Pulse et al. v. Spencer, AppeUafe Court of Indiana {May 20, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 263. — Ruben Spencer was injured, as was alleged, by the failure of his employers properly to guard a saw. The principal use of the saw which caused the injury was that of cambering joists. When it was used for that purpose, it could not be guarded in the rear by a spreader, but for the work which the employee was doing at the time of the accident the spreader might have been in place, but was not. The saw was operated exclusively by this employee, and the defendant contended at the trial, and asked an instruction to the effect, that his removal of the guard, if it took place, was negligence per se. The circuit court of Bartholomew County rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the appellate court affirmed this judg- ment, holding, among other things, that the instruction mentioned was properly refused. On this point Judge Lairy expressed the opinion of the court as f oUows : Under some circumstances a guard required by statute may be removed without constituting a violation of the statute. The act itself provides that such a guard may be removed for the purpose of making repairs, and the courts have held that machinery is not required to be guarded when the use of guards would materially interfere with its usefulness. The evidence in this case shows that the principal purpose for which the saw in question was used was that of cambering joists, and that, when used for such purpose, the use of a spreader or guard was impracticable. In view of this evidence, the spreader might be properly removed when the saw was used for cambering joists, and such a removal would not con- stitute a violation of the statute, and would not be negligence per se. 70 bulletin of the btteeatj of laboe statistios. Employees' Llabilitt — Mine Regulations — Ceetifibd Foeet MAN — ^Teial by Juey — Myers v. Pittsburgh Coal Go., United States Supreme Court {Apr. 6, 1914), S4 Supreme Court Reporter, page 659. — John Myers was killed while employed by the coaJ com- pany in the movement of coal cars in the mine. His widow brought an action in the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to recover for his death, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the coal company. A judgment rendered in her favor was reversed by the circuit court of appeals, without directing a new trial and without sending the case back to the trial court. The case was then brought to the United States Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, where the judgment of the circuit court of appeals was reversed and the judgment of the trial court against the coal company was aflSrmed. The action of the circuit court of appeals was based largely upon the want of definite proof as to the manner in which Myers came to his death, but the Supreme Court held that there was ample testimony to submit to the jury, and that the trial court properly left the question to the jury upon testimony which, when fairly considered, might sustain the verdict. The coal company objected to the charge given to the jury as to its liability when the mine was in charge of a didy qualified mine fore- man. In disposing of this objection, Mr. Justice Day said: The record shows that there was testimony tending to show that the electrical system was in charge of the electrician of the coal com- pany enrployed as superintendent of electrical equipment, who had charge of the purchase, installation, care, operation, and maintenance of the electrical equipment used by the company, and who was not subject to the mine foreman. The court submitted to the jury the question whether the coal company had committed to the mine fore- man the electrical system of hauling in the interior of the mine, or whether such system was in charge of an electrical engineer not accountable to the mine foreman, distinctly telling the jiiry that if the mine foreman was in charge in this respect, the company would not be responsible, but if they found that the coal company had excluded from the control of the mine foreman the electric haulage system, and that the negligence of the coal company was the direct and proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's husband, there must be a recovery. The charge in this respect was as favorable as the company was entitled to have given. Employees' Liability — ^Mine Eequlations — Duty op Foee- MAN — ^Assumption of Risks — Humphreys v. Raleigh Goal 1913), 136 Pacific Reporter, page 968. — August Maronen was employed in the company's mine and was" killed in September, 1911, while being hoisted through a shaft, by falling from the cage, the fall being due to the fact that the cage doors were not closed. Section 8536, Revised Codes, Montana, provides that cages must be equipped with steel doors and that such doors "must be closed when lowering or hoisting the men." Maronen's widow and children brought suit against the company in the district court. Silver Bow County, where judgment was for the company. This judgment was afiBrmed by the Supreme Court of Montana. The evidence submitted showed that no station tenders were em- ployed to close the cage doors, but a rule adopted required the first man who entered a cage to close the doors before the cage was hoisted. It appeared that Maronen had entered the cage first and had not closed the doors before the signal was given to hoist the cage. After reviewing the law and evidence, Judge HoUoway, for the court, con- cluded: Our conclusion is that the trial court was justified in finding that Maronen was to all intents and purposes a station tender in the sense that it was his duty to close the door when he entered the cage to be hoisted, and that his death resulted from his failure to discharge a duty which could be and was rightfully imposed upon him; and, because he could not have succeeded upon these facts in an action if he had been injured only, neither his heirs nor personal representa- tives can succeed in this one. Employers' Liability — Negligence — Evidence — Guards for Dangerous Machinery — Byland v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., Supreme Court of Kansas (Nov. I4, 1914), 144 Pacific Reporter, 74 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOB STATISTICS. foge 251. — ^Tobias Byland was an employee of tlie company named, and was injured and sued the company. Judgment was for the defendant in the district court of Cherokee County, and this was affirmed on appeal. The questions decided are sufficiently shown in the syllabus prepared by the court, which is as follows: In an action to recover for injuries caused by the explosion of defendant's powder mill, there was no substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, fairly tending to prove what actually caused the explosion. Held, following Brown v. Railroad Co., 81 Kans. 701, 106 Pac. 1001, "it is not sufficient to show circumstances which would indicate that the other party might have been guilty of negh- gence, especially when the evidence furnished suggests, with equal force, that the injury might have resulted without fault on the part of the other party"; and that the court rightly sustained a demurrer to the evidence. Where, in an action founded upon negligence, the plaintiff alleges specifically the negUgent acts of the defendant upon which he reues to recover, he must prove the negligence alleged, and will not be allowed to make a prima facie case relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Plaintiff was injured by the explosion of defendant's powder miU, and alleged, among other acts of neghgence, failure of the defendant to provide some appliance to prevent metaUic thumb nuts from falling through a defective screen, and alleged that, by reason of the absence of sudi an appHance, metallic thumb nuts found their way into the inflammable mixture and caused the explosion. At the time the explosion occurred, the plaintiff was not at work near the machine, but stood outside the building, where it was located, and 50 feet therefrom. He was not injured by the thumb nuts falling upon him nor by coming in contact with the machine. Held, that the pro- visions of the factory act (section 4679, Gen. Stat. 1909), requiring machinery to be properly and safely guarded for the purpose of pre- venting or avoiding mjury to employees in factories, has no appUca- tion, and that plaintiff could not maintain an action under the statute. Emploteks' Liability — Pension Funds — ^Election of Eights— LongfeUow et al. v. Oity of Seattle, Supreme Court of Washington (Dec. 4, 1913), 138 Pacific Reporter, page 855. — ^A statute of the State of Washington empowers incorporated cities and towns having a paid fire department to compensate the widows and dependents under 16 years of age of firemen killed while on duty, by granting a pension equal to one-half the salary being received by the fireman at the time of his death. The city of Seattle made the statute operative within that city. James Longfellow was thrown from a fire wagon in Novem- ber, 1910, and lolled. The widow filed a claim for a pension for her- self and minor children, one of whom was a daughter between 16 and 17 years of age. The claim of the widow was allowed and payments were made to her, beginning in January, 1911. In December, 1910, bECISlONS OF COURTS AITEOTING LABOS. 76 the widow also filed a daim for damages for $10,000 for the death of her husband, due to the wrongful and negligent act of the city. The claim was rejected and in September, 1911, she brought suit in the superior court of King Coimty for the sum of $8,500 in her own right and for $1,500 as guardian of her daughter Myrtle, who was over 16 years of age. The city contended that the acceptance of benefits from the pension fund barred a right of action for damages and judg- ment was entered for the city. An appeal was taken to the supreme court of the State where it was decided that by accepting benefits from the pension fimd the widow had barred her right to recover damages. It was held, however, that as the daughter had no rights under the pension law she had a right of action in the courts. Employers' Liabiltt — Railroad Companies — Blocking Frogs — "Yards" — George v. Quincy, Omaha & Kansas City Railroad Co., Kansas City Court of Appeals {May 4) i914), 167 Southwestern Reporter, page 15S. — Andrew P. George, a brakeman on the road of the company named, was killed on November 7, 1907, and his administrator brought action for his death. After switching out a car to the sidetrack at the station at KirksviUe, the brakeman was recoupling the two separated portions of the train, when his foot became caught in an imblocked frog, and as a result he was run down and instantly killed. Section 3163, Revised Statutes, Missouri, 1909, required the com- pany, on or before September 1, 1907, "to adopt, put in use, and main- tain the best known apphances or inventions to fill or block all switches, frogs, and guardrails on their road, in all yards, divisional and terminal stations, and where trains are made up, to prevent, as far as possible, the feet of employees or other persons from being caught therein." The company made claim that the location of the frog was not in a "yard" under the meaning of the statute. The court held, on the contrary, that the portion of the tracks around every station, used for the purpose of switching or standing cars, is a yard. On rehearing, the court also decided that the statute was not invalid for uncertainty or impossibihty of performance in requiring "the best known apphances or inventions" to be used. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — " Cars " — McGrady v. Charlotte Earior cfc Northern Railway Co., Supreme Court of Florida {Jan. 9, WI4), 63 Southern Reporter, page 921.— Will McGrady brought suit against the railway company named for per- 76 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAXJ OF LABOK STATISTICS. sonal injuries suffered by the negligence of another employee while they were placing a hand car upon the track. The action was brought under the provisions of section 3150 of the General Statutes of 1906, which makes the company hable for injuries "caused by negligence of another employee by the rimning of the locomotives or cars, or other machinery of such company." A demurrer to the declaration was sustained in the circuit court of De Soto County, and judgment rendered for the company; on appeal, however, this judgment was reversed, the supreme court deciding that a hand car is a "car" within the meaning of the act, citing Ryland v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 57 Fla. 143, 49 So. 745; Thomas v. Georgia R. & B. Co., 38 Ga. 222, etc.; and that the placing of the hand car upon the track was a part of the running of such car, so that the accident came within the scope of the statute. Employees' Liability — Railroad Companies — Contkibutory Negligence — Proximate Cause — Violation op Ordinance — Damages — Wabash Railroad Co. v. Gretzinger, Supreme Court of Indiana (Feb. 19, 1914), IO4 Northeastern Reporter, page 69. — This action was brought by the administratrix of one Beedle, for the benefit of herself as widow and of her infant child, to obtain damages for the death of Beedle in a railroad collision. Beedle was conductor of a freight train, which ran upon a siding in the city of Delphi, so that the rear end was 250 feet from the switch target, upon which the switch leading to the siding was closed and locked. Beedle attended to various duties, secured his orders, and went into the caboose to begin making up a report. In the meantime the switch had evi- dently been opened by some unknown person. A passenger train then approached at a rate of about 20 miles an hour, and when about 300 feet from the target the engineer saw that it indicated an open switch, and appUed the air brakes, but was unable to prevent the collision in which Beedle was killed. A city ordinance required that trains should slow up to 6 miles an hour while passing through the city. If the train had been running at the required rate, it could have been easily stopped in time. Judgment was in the plaintiff's favor in the circuit court of Howard County, and was on appeal affirmed on groimds which appear in the following quotation from the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Morris: Appellant claims that, because Beedle knew that the passenger train was in the habit of exceeding the ordinance speed limit at this Elace, he thereby assumed the risk of danger. Such doctrine can not e recognized. Violations of ordinances, nowever often repeated, do not render them obsolete. The engineer of the passenger train, in exceeding the lawful speed Hmit, was thereby guilty of negligence per se. Appellee's decedent assumed no risk of danger from such neghgence. [Cases cited.] DECISIONS OF COUETB AFFECTING LABOE. 77 While it is true that the accident would not have happened in the absence of the open condition of the switch, it is also true that it would not have happened had the speed of the passenger train not exceeded 6 miles per hour. Where two causes restdt in an accident, the question of the dominant or proximate one is ordinarily for the The evidence here warranted the jury in finding that the \mlawful speed was the proximate cause of the mjury, as alleged in the com- plaint. Beedle was 26 years old, healthy, temperate, and industrious, and had already risen to be conductor, his salary being $100 per month, of which amount he turned over $70 to his wife and child. Under these circimistances the court decided that the verdict of $10,000, the statutory hmit, rendered by the jury in the circuit court of Howard County was not excessive; also that the fact that the widow had remarried should not be considered in awarding damages. The judg- ment of the court below was consequently aflfirmed. Employees' Liability — Railroad Companies — Electric Rail- roads — Hughes v. Indiana Union Traction Co., Appellate Court of Indiana {Jun^ 3, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 537. — Earl Hughes, a motorman on an interurban electric railroad of the com- pany named, was injured on August 13, 1908, by the alleged negli- gence of his fellow employees on the car. This was a repair car, and the other employees had entire charge of the loading with materials. A pike pole fell off and struck and injured the motorman while he was operating the car. The coemployees' hability act of Indiana, Bxu"ns' A. S. 1908, section 8017, provides that railroads shall be hable for injuries to employees resulting from the negligence of other employees in certain cases. The court aifirmed a judgment of the circuit court of Tipton County in favor of the defendant company, Judge Shea, in dehvering the opinion, reviewing the history of legisla- tion and decisions creating a distinction between steam and electri- cally operated railroads, and holding that the act did not apply to the latter. Employees' Liability — Railroad Companies — Fedeeal and State Statutes— Wabash Railroad Co. v. Hayes, United States Supreme Court (May 25, 1914), 34 Supreme Court Reporter, page 729. — This case was before the Supreme Court on a writ of error to the appellate court of Illinois to review a judgment in favor of John R. Hayes, who was injured while in the employment of the appellant company. The point of interest is the ruling of the Supreme Court as to the apphca- tion of the Federal statute of 1908. In the original action the plaintiff Hayes had set forth a good cause of action under the Federal statute, 78 BULLETIN OF THB BUSEAV OF LABOE STATISTICS. and alleged that the injuries complained of were received while he was engaged by the company in interstate commerce. On the trial it appeared that the injury was not received in such commerce, and it was ruled that the Federal act had no apphcation to the case. The court then ruled that the case might be heard on the declaration and determined according to the principles of common law prevailing in the State, the company contending that " even though the allegation that the injury occurred in interstate commerce proved imwarranted, the declaration could not be treated, consistently with the Federal act, as containing any basis for a recovery under the law of the State, common or statutory." This contention was rejected by the appel- late court of Illinois, and the Supreme Court, in its opinion which was dehvered by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, sxistained its position, as appears from the following quotations: Had the injury occurred in interstate commerce, as was alleged, the Federal act undoubtedly would have been controUing, and a recovery could not have been had under the common or statute law of the State; in other words, the Federal act woidd have been exclu- sive in its operation, not nierely cumulative. On the other hand, if the injury occurred outside of interstate commerce, the Federal act was without apphcation, and the law of the State was controlling. The plaintifiE asserted only one right to recover for the injury, and in the nature of things he could have but one. Whether it arose under the Federal act or under the State law, it was equally cognizable in the State court; and had it been presented in an alter- native way in separate coimts, one containing and another omitting the allegation that the injury occurred in interstate commerce, the propriety of proceeding to a judgment under the latter count, after it appeared that the first coxild not be sustained, doubtless would have been freely conceded. Certainly, nothing in the Federal act woidd have been in the way. Employees' Liabilitt — Railroad Companies — Federal and State Statutes — Death of Employee without Dependents — Jones V. Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co., Supreme Court of South Carolina {July 16, 191 4), 82 Southeastern Reporter, ■page 416- — This action was brought by the administrator to recover damages for the death of E. D. Clary, for the benefit of his brother and sister. The deceased had not married, and his father and mother were dead. The circuit court of Abbeville County directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the Federal employers' Ua- bUity act superseded the State statute on the same subject, imder which this action was brought. As the Federal act allows no com- pensation in case of death except to dependents, and there was no direct evidence that the brother and sister were dependent, it was held that no action would lie. The supreme court affirmed the DECISIONS OE COXTETS AFFBOTIITG LABOE. 79 judgment in favor of the railway company, Judge Hydrick, who delivered the opinion, discussing the question at issue as to the statute governing the case as foUows: Appellant contends that, as the act of Congress gives a right of action in favor of dependent relatives, while the State statute gives the right in favor of relatives, whether dependent or not, the two statutes do not cover precisely the same field, and therefore the State statute was not superseded, in so far as it gives a right of action in favor of relatives who are not dependent. This is a miscon- ception of the scope of the legislation of Congress. It deals with the Hahility of interstate carriers by railroad for injuries to their employees while both are engaged in interstate commerce. It creates and determines that Habifity. It is paramount and exclu- sive, and necessarily supersedes the State law upon that subject. Therefore the liability of such carriers for such injuries must be tested solely by the act of Congress, which can not be pieced out by the State law on the same subject. [Cases cited.] Employees' Liabilitt — Raileoad Companies — Fedeeal and State Statutes — Peesons Entitled to Benefits — Taylor v. Taylor, United States Supreme Court {Feb. 24, 1914), 34 Supreme Court Reporter, page 350. — The plaintiff is the widow and the defendant the father of one Howard Taylor, who was kOled through the negligence of an interstate railroad company, by whom he was employed. The widow, as administratrix, brought suit against the raiboad com- pany for damages, under the act of Congress of April 22, 1908, known as the employers' liability law, and recovered a judgment in her favor. The father of the decedent then filed a petition in the supreme court of Orange County, N. Y., for an order directing the widow to pay over to him one-half the net proceeds of the judg- ment in accordance with the statute of distribution of the State. The motion was denied and an order entered that the widow was entitled to receive and retain for her own use all the net proceeds of the judgment. This order was reversed by the appellate division of the supreme court and the judgment of reversal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York. The case was then brought to the United States Supreme Court on error, the widow contending that the Federal statute should govern the distribution of the pro- ceeds of the judgment, instead of the State law. The United States Supreme Court upheld the contention of the widow and reversed the New York State Court of Appeals, which had held that the State law appHed. Mr. Justice McKenna, who delivered the opinion of the court, after reviewing a number of cases, said in part: It is clear from these decisions that the source of the right of plaintiff in error was the Federal statute. As said in one of the cited 80 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAXJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. cases, her cause of action was "one bejrond that which the decedent had, — one proceeding upon altogether different principles." It came to her, it is true, on account of his death, but because of her pecuniary interest in his life and the damage she suffered by his death. It was her loss, not that which his father may have suffered. The judgment she recovered was for herself alone. He had no interest in it. Any loss he may have suffered was not and could not have been any part of it, as we have seen. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal and State Statutes — Safety Appliances — Seaboard Air Line Rail- way Co. V. Horton, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 27, 1914), 34 Sufreme Court TiepoHer, pa.ge 635. — James T. Horton brought action against the railway company named for damages for personal injuries under the Federal employers' liability act, in the superior court of Wake County, N. C. His injuries were caused by the bursting of an engine water glass which was not protected by a guard glass. Judgment was in his favor, and this was affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, but was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. In the trial court the judge had appeared to consider the State laws on the subject as in force as well as the Federal statute, as far as not inconsistent with the latter; but Mr. Justice Pitney, in deUvering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, said: It is settled that since Congress, by the act of 1908, took possession of the field of the employer's Hability to employees in interstate transportation by rail, all State laws upon the subject are super- seded!. Second Employers' LiabUity Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. E. Co.), 223 U. S. 1, 55. The Federal statute bars the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk in any case where the violation by the com- mon carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees con- tributed to the injury or death of the employee. As to the application of these provisions the court said: By the phrase "any statute enacted for the safety of employees," Congress evidently intended Federal statutes, such as the safety appEance acts and the hours of service act. For it is not to be con- ceived that, in enacting a general law for establishing and enforcing the responsibility of common carriers by railroad to their employees in interstate commerce. Congress intended to permit the legislatures of the several States to determine the effect of contributory negli- gence and assumption of risk, by enacting statutes for the safety of employees, since this would in effect relegate to State control two of the essential factors that determine the responsibility of the employer. decisioks op courts affecttng labob. 81 Employees' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute—Assumption OF Risks — Safe Place — Farley v. New York, New Haven <& Hartford Railroad Co., Supreme Court of Errors of Con- necticut {July IS, 1914), 91 Atlantic Reporter, page 650. — ^Action was brought by the admmistrator of the estate of John H. Bottomley for the death of the latter while employed as engineer on the road of the company named. He was in charge of a locomotive hauling an interstate freight train, and was killed by contact with or proximity to an electric wire over the center of the track, when going back over the tender to ascertain the height of the water. The wires were used for electrical operation of the passenger trains over a section of the road. They were, where no bridge made it necessary to lower them, 22i feet above the level of the top of the rails. Under the bridge where the accident occurred they were brought down to a height of 15 feet 4J inches. The locomotive was of medium size and of a type in long and common use on the road, the tenders varying in height from 10^ to 13 feet. Bridges were numerous on the part of the road where the accident happened, and the wires under them came down to varying heights, from the height of the one in question to about 18 feet. The engineer had been over the electrified section frequently, more often in the daytime; the electrification had taken place inore than three yeaps before the occurrence of the accident on September 28, 1911, and he had been employed during aU that time. The time- tables furnished him contained a notice that there was danger within 14 inches of the wires, and he had signed a receipt for a special notice to that eflFect. Judgment in the superior court of New Haven County was for the defendant company, on the ground that the employee had assumed the risks of his situation, and the plaintiff appealed. The judgment was affirmed, however, the court saying that the Federal employers' liabiHty act aboHshed the defense of assumption of risk only in cases where the violation of safety statutes contributes to the injury or death. Employers' LiAsiLrrY — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — -Beneficiaries — Next of Kin — Illegitimate Children — Kenney v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., Supreme Court of North Carolina (Sept. 30, 1914), 82 Southeastern Reporter, page 968. — This was an administrator's action to recover damages for the death of one born out of wedlock. The mother of the deceased employee was not living, but left two sons and a dependent daughter who were bom in wedlock. The only question considered by the court was as to the right of action of the claimants under the Federal statute, which authorizes recovery for the benefit, among others, of the next 85590°— Bull. 169—15 6 82 BULLETIN OP THE BTJEBAU OP LABOB STATISTICS. of kin dependent upon a deceased employee. The North Carolina Re- visal, section 137, authorizes the distribution of the estate of a deceased illegitimate child dying without issue among his mother and "such persons as would be his next of kin if all such children had been bom iu lawful wedlock." The superior coiu-t of Bertie Cotinty rendered judgment in the plaintiff's favor, which was on appeal affirmed, two judges dissenting. Chief Justice Clark, who delivered the opinion of the court, cited Cutting v. Cutting, 6 Fed. 268, and McCool v. Smith, 66 U. S. 459, and said in part: The object of the act of Congress was to permit a recovery for wrongful death or injuries on interstate railroads, and that the recov- ery should go to the next of kin in the cases specified; the next of kin being determined by the law of the State in which the action is brought, for the status of the citizen, and the statute regulating descent and distribution is purelj^ a State matter with which Congress has no concern. By the reasoning in the case above cited the words "next of Mn" are taken, like the word "heirs," as meaning those to whom the property would go, but who are the heirs and who are the next of kin is a matter purely of State regidation. Employees' Liabilitt — Raileoad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Conteibutort Negligence — Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit (June 16, 1914), ^H Federal Reporter, page 948. — Cole was rear brakeman and flagman on a freight train of the company named. He was injured by a collision when another train proceeding slowly on account of cautionary sig- nals ran into the rear of his standing train while he was asleep in the caboose. It was urged that he was so negligent in not flagging the other train that all right of recovery was barred. In denying this contention and affirming a judgment of the trial court in the plain- tiff's favor. Judge Knappen, who deUvered the opinion of the court, said in part: Under this act, no degree of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, however gross or proximate, can, as a matter of law, bar recovery; for, as said in Norfolk & W. Ry Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, 122, 33 Sup. Ct. 654 [see Bui. No. 152, p. 92], the direction that the diminu- tion shall be "in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee" means that: "Where the causal negligence is partly attributable to him and partly to the carrier, he shall not recover full damages, but only a proportional amount bearing the same relation to the full amount as the negligence attributable to the carrier bears to the entire negligence attributable to both." To say that plaintiff's negligence equals the combined negUgence of plaintiff and defendant is impossible. decisions of cotjbts affecting labor. 83 Employees' Liabilitt — Raileoad Companies — Federal Stat- ITTE — Exclusive Application^Interstate Commerce — Jurisdic- tion OF CouETs — "On Duty" — North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary, United States Supreme Court {Feb. 2, 1914), H Supreme Court Reporter, page 305. — James A. Zachary brought suit in the superior court of Guilford County, N. C, to recover damages for the negligent killing of one Burgess, an employee of the Southern Rail- way Co., which occm-red in April, 1909. -Under the State law the lessor is responsible for aU acts of negligence of its lessee occurring in the conduct of business upon the lessor's road (Logan v. North Caro- lina R. Co., 116 N. C. 940, 21 S. E. 959), upon the ground that a railroad corporation can not evade its pubhc duty and responsibility by leasing its road to another corporation, in the absence of a statute expressly exempting it. The responsibility is held to extend to employees of the lessee injured through the negligence of the latter. The Southern Railway Co. was the lessee of the North Carolina Railroad Co., and action was brought against the latter company imder the State law. Judgment was rendered against the company in the lower court and aflBrmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The case was then taken to the United States Supreme Court on error, where the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings, the contention of the raiboad company that suit should have been brought imder the Federal employers' liability act of April 22, 1908, instead of under the State law, being upheld. The following language, taken from the opinion dehvered by Mr. Justice Pitney, sets forth the grounds on which the conclusion of the court was reached: In order to bring the case within the terms of the Federal act defendant must have been, at the time of the occurrence in question engaged as a common carrier in interstate commerce, and plaintiff's intestate must have been employed by said carrier in such commerce. If these facts appeared, the Federal act governed, to the exclusion of the statutes of the State. [Cases cited.] Having found that the employer was an interstate carrier, Justice Pitney took up the point of Bm-gess's employment, as follows: It was, however, further held by the Supreme Court of North Carolina that deceased, at the time he was Tolled, was not in fact employed by the Southern Railway, the lessee, in interstate commerce. It is argued that because, so far as appears, deceased had not pre- viously participated in any movement of interstate freight, and the through cars had not as yet been attached to his engine, his employ- ment in interstate commerce was still in futuro. It seems to us, however, that his acts in inspecting, oiling, firing, and preparing his engine for the trip to Selma were acts performed as a part of inter- state commerce and the circumstance that the interstate freight cars had not as yet been coupled up is legally insignificant. [Cases cited.] 84 BULLETIN OF THE BUKEAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. Again, it is said that because deceased iad left his engine and was going to his boarding house, he was engaged upon a personal errand, and not upon the carrier's busiaess. Assuming (what is not clear) that the evidence fairly tended to indicate the boarding house as his destination, it nevertheless also appears that deceased was shortly to depart upon his run, having just prepared his engine for the pur- pose, and that he had not gone beyond the hmits of the railroad yard when he was struck. There is nothing to indicate that this brief visit to the boardiag house was at aU out of the ordinary, or was inconsistent with his duty to his employer. It seems to us clear that the man was still "on duty," and employed in commerce, not- withstanding his temporary absence from the locomotive engine. [Cases cited.] . We conclude that, with respect to the facts necessary to bnng the case within the Federal act, there was evidence that at least was sufficient to go to the jury. It is doubtful whether there was sub- stantial contradiction respecting any of these facts; but this we need not consider. Employees' Liabilitt — Eaileoad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Exemption from Liability — Relief Associations — Hogarty V. PhiladelpJiia & Reading Railway Co., Supreme Court of Pennsyl- vania (May 22, 1914), 91 Atlantic Reporter, page 864- — WiUiam J. Hogarty, an employee of the company named, lost his right arm on February 1, 1910. It was alleged in the declaration that the injury was due to the neghgent construction and maiutenance of the defend- ant's road. The court of common pleas of Philadelphia County first gave binding instructions for the defendant, and then entered judg- ment in its favor, and the plaintiff appealed. The defense set up was that the plaintiff had accepted benefits as a member of its relief association. The plaintiff rejoining that the Federal employers' Ha- bUity act forbids this defense, the defendant claimed that the Federal act did not apply, as the plaintiff had pleaded at coromon law, or if it did, that there was a variance between the pleading and the proof. The plaintiff finally contended that, if he should formally have pleaded the Federal statute, he was entitled to amend accordingly. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a trial of the case under the Federal act. Judge Moschzisker delivered the opinion, from which the following is an extract relating to the point mentioned: The Federal statute was not brought into the case at bar untU a special defense was entered upon, .and then the plaintiff promptly drew attention to its express prohibition of aU defenses of the char- acter of the one offered; just as in the ordinary industrial accident case, although not formally pleaded, a plaintiff may claim the benefit of any particular provision m our fellow-servant act, or our factory act, if the circumstances caU for it. True, the law depended upon at bar happened to be a Federal statute; but, since the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that this statute must be treated by State courts, in each instance, as though an act of their DECISIOKTfe OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOB. 85 own legislature, for all practical purposes it is a Pennsylvania statute, in the same category as the two acts to which we refer; and its pro- vision that "any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever," the purpose of which is to enable a common carrier to exempt itself from hability for neghgence to its employees, "shall to that extent be void," is the announcement of a broad rule of pubhc poHcy appli- cable to all cases within the scope of the statute, with hke effect as though promulgated by one of our acts. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — Brakeman Placing Car in Train — Safety Appliances — TJiomhro v. Kansas City, Mexico <& Orient Railway Co., Supreme Court of Kansas (Mar. 7, 1914), 139 Pacific Reporter, page 4-10.- — Action was brought in the district court of Sumner County for the death of J. N. Thornbro from an injury received while in the employ of the company named. The judgment was in favor of the plaintiff, and this was affirmed on appeal. The action was based upon the Federal employers' liability act of 1908, and alleged also violation of the safety appliance act as taking away the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence in accordance with the terms of the first-mentioned act. The company was conceded to be engaged in interstate commerce, and the question was whether the employee at the time of the injury was also so engaged. A freight car, from a point in the State of Oklahoma and destined for another point in the same State, was to be taken up by the interstate train of which the decedent was a brakeman at Custer City. It had another car, which was not to be taken, in front of it on the siding. The engine hauled these cars to the main track, and the brakeman received his injuries in uncoupling the cars, by reason of having to go between the cars, because the car which was to be taken had a coupler which was not automatic, and was defective and unsafe. As to the question of his inclusion under the terms of the em- ployers' liability act the court, speaking by Judge Benson, said: In order to recover under the act referred to, both the company and the employee must be engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169. The precise contention of the defendant is that the car in question, starting from one point, to be transported to another point in the same State, was an instrument of intrastate commerce; and that it had not become a part of an interstate train, and so the brakeman was not engaged in interstate commerce. On the other hand, the plaintiff contends that the duties of the engineer and brake- man in picking up this car and putting it into the train, consisting largely of interstate cars, carrying interstate freight, had such con- nection with interstate commerce as to bring their work within the purview of the act. 86 BtTLLBTIM" OF THE BTJBEAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. No decision of the Federal Supreme Court has been cited upon the precise point in controversy, and the circuit courts appear to be at variance. ^ Several cases bearing upon the question were reviewed and dis- cussed quite fuUy at this poiat in the opinion, and the court con- tinued: Referring to the test applied iu the Lamphere case [196 Fed. 336; see Bui. No. 112, p. 86] — '^^ Was the relation of the employment of the deceased in iaterstate commerce such that the personal mjiu^ to him tended to delay or hinder the movement of a train engaged in inter- state commerce" — an affirmative answer is as obvious here as there. It can not be doubted that the work of the deceased had a real and substantial relation to iaterstate commerce. Taking up the contention that the coupler was defective and' did not meet the requirements of the Federal safety appliance acts, the court briefly reviewed the acts iu question, and said in part: Construing these acts, the Federal Supreme Court, iu Southern Ry. Co. V. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2, held that they were intended "to embrace aU locomotives, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce." It must be regarded as settled that the car in question should have been equipped with a coupler as specified in the statute. Employees' Liability — ^Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — Building Addition to Freight Shed — Eng v. Southern Pacific Co., United States District Court, Dis- trict of Oregon (Dec. 22, 1913), 210 Federal RepoHer, page 92.— The court, speaking by Judge Bean, in holding that the plaintiff's employ- ment at the time of his injmy was in interstate commerce, used the following language: When a carrier is engaged in both intrastate and interstate com- merce, using the same instrumentalities, appliances, and employees in both classes of commerce, it is difficult to draw the line of demarcation between the two classes of employment; but the result of the deci- sions up to this time seems to be that, when the work in which the employee was engaged at the time of his injury is so closely connected with interstate commerce as to be a part thereof, it comes within the statute. Now, freight sheds, depots, and warehouses or other facih- ties provided and used by a carrier for receiving, handling, and dis- charging interstate freight are, I take it, instrumentalities used in interstate commerce under the doctrine of the cases, and are so closely connected therewith as to be a part thereof for the purposes of the Federal employers' liability act. Claim is made that, since plaintiff at the time of his injury was at work framing a new office in the freight shed, he is in the position of one employed to construct buildings, tracks, engines, or cars, which have not yet become instrumentalities of commerce. But the freight DECISIONS OP COUETS APFECHNQ LABOB. 87 shed in question was being so used by the defendant in its interstate business. The work in \s^ch the plaintiff was engaged, as appears from the complaint, was in the nature of the repair of an instrumen- tahty so used, and not in the construction of new work. Employers' Liability — ^Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — Construction of Bridge on Cut- off — Bravis v. Chicago, Milwaukee <& St. Paul Railway Co., United States Circuit Court of Appeals, EigMh Circuit {Oct. 12, 1914), ^17 Federal Reporter, page 234. — Nick Bravis sued the company named in the District Court of the United States for the District of Minne- sota. Judgment was for the defendant on a directed verdict, and the plaintiff brought error. In his complaint the plaintiff pleaded negU- gence of the company, but did not allege that he or the company was engaged in interstate commerce. At the close of his evidence he made an amendment changing the single count of the complaint so as to bring the action under the Federal employers' habUity act. The company admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce, but denied that it employed the plaintiff in such commerce, and the court upheld its contention. The company was engaged in straightening curves in its road, and the plaintiff was employed in building a bridge on a cut-off to avoid a curve about 3 miles in length. The employee went from the nearest point on the railroad to the camp where he boarded, at Chanhassen, on a hand car furnished by the company. The gang in which he was employed consisted of about 15 men, and they used two hand cars to transport themselves from and to Chan- hassen. As they were returning to camp one evening the plaintiff, who, with his companions, was engaged in pumping the forward hand car, fell off the rear of it, and the rear hand car ran over him and in- jured his right hand before the men upon it could stop it after they saw him. In delivering the opinion of the court, affirming the judgment of the court below. Judge Sanborn said: The chief contention of counsel for plaintiff in support of their speci- fication of error in this case is that the facts established by the evi- dence sustain the conclusion that the plaintiff was employed in inter- state commerce while constructing the bridge on the cut-off. But there were no rails on the roadbed on this cut-off. It never had been used, it was not then used, and until it should be ironed it could not be used, by the defendant in interstate commerce. The Federal employers' liability act protects only those employed in interstate commerce. Those employed in the preparation or con- struction of roadbeds, rails, tieSj cars, engines, and other instrumen- tahties which are intended for use in interstate commerce, but have never been and are not in use therein, are not employed in interstate commerce, and are not protected by that act. There was no error in 88 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. the ruling of the trial court that an employee engaged in the construc- tion of a bridge, 600 feet distant from a railroad, on a cut-off more than a mile in length, which had never been provided with raUs or used as a raUroad, was not employed in interstate commerce, although his employer was engaged, and when the cut-off should be completed intended to use it, in iaterstata commerce. [Cases cited.] Employees' Liability — Railroad Companies — ^Federal Stat- TJTE — Interstate Commerce — Construction of Tunnel — Jack- son V. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., United States District Court, Western District of Washington (Feb. 2, 1914), ^10 Federal Reporter, page 495. — This action was brought under the Fed- eral employers' habihty act of 1908, and the defendant company demurred to the complaint, which demurrer was sustained by the court, holding that there was no case presented under the act. The question raised is as to whether the employment was in interstate commerce, the fact being that the employee was at work in the con- struction of a tunnel which would be used ia interstate commerce when completed. The court, speaking by Judge Neterer, said in part: The plaintiff was not himself engaged upon any interstate com- merce, nor was he injured by anyone connected with the operation of any of the agencies which actually transported interstate com- merce. The building of this cut-off is a facihty which is to be used by the defendant, when completed, as an engine or cars, or any other apphance under construction might be considered for use when com- pleted. The act deals only with the habUity of a carrier engaged in mterstate commerce for injuries sustained by its employees while engaged in such commerce. Employers' Liability — Eaileoad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — ^Employee Carrying Coal to Heat Repair Shop — Cousins v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., Supreme Court of Minnesota (June 26, 1914), 148 Northwestern Reporter, page 58. — Charles W. Cousins brought action against the raih-oad company named, imder the Federal employers' liability act, for damages for injuries received while he was wheeling a barrow full of coal to one of the car repair shops. The only question was whether this employment brought him within the provisions of the act. Judge Bunn, in deHvering the coiu't's opinion affirming a judgment of the district court of Ramsey County in the plaintiff's favor, said in part: The men in the shop were engaged in repairing cars that had been and were to be used in mterstate commerce. Plamtiff, when he was injured, was wheehng coal to be used in heating the shop so that these men could do their work. DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOB. 89 In Pederson v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western E,. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648 [Bui. No. 152, p. 85], the court said: "The true test always is: Is the work in question a part of the interstate commerce in which the carrier is engaged?" It was held that a man carrying bolts to be used in repairing a rail- road bridge over which interstate commerce moved was employed in interstate commerce. The court found no merit in the point that plaintiff was not actually repairing the bridge when injured, but was merely carrying to the place where the work was to be done some of the materials to be used therein, saying: "It was necessary to the repair of the bridge that the materials be at hand, and the act of bringmg them there was a part of the work. In other words, it was a minor task which was essentially a part of the larger one, as is the case where an engineer takes his engine from the roadhouse to the track on which are the cars he is to haul in inter- state commerce." That the men engaged in repairing the cars were employed in inter- state commerce is well settled. That an employee carrying materials to the shop to be used in repairing the cars would be employed in interstate commerce the Pederson case decides. It seems no exten- sion of the construction thus given to the statute to hold that an employee carrying coal for use in heating the shop where the repairs were made is employed in interstate commerce. The repairs could not be made unless the shop were heated. We think the Pederson case controls the case at bar. Employers' Liability — ^Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce— Employee Sleeping in Shanty Car — Sanders v. Charleston c& W. C. By. Co., Supreme Court of South Carolina (Apr. 2, 1914), 81 Southeastern Reporter, page 283. — Sanders was employed by the railway company with an iron gang relaying rails. He was injured while asleep in his shanty car, on a train which stood on a sidetrack, which was struck by an incoming train. He brought suit in the common pleas circuit court of Edge- field County, under the Federal employers' Mabihty act and obtained a judgment against the company. The company appealed the case to the State supreme court on the ground that at the time of the injury Sanders was not employed in interstate commerce. This court, however, decided that the employee was engaged in interstate commerce when injured, following the opinion in Pederson v. Del. & L. W. Ry. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648. Judge Gage, who gave the opinion of the court, said: When the plaintiff [Sanders] was in the bunk of his shanty car, in the "sleep that knits up the raveU'd sleeve of care," and getting strength to lay rails next day, the law imputed to him actual service on the track, and extended to him the rights of such a worker; "for the letter (of the law) kiUeth, but the spirit giveth life." 90 bulletin op the bxjkeatj of labor statistics. Employees' Liability — Raileoad Companies — ^Fedeeal Stat- ute — Inteestate Commerce — Engineer in Roundhouse to At- tend TO Repairs — Padgett v. Seaboard Air Line Railway, Supreme Cmirt of South Carolina {Nov. 18, 1914), 83 Southeastern Reporter, page 633. — This action was brought by Clara V. Padgett as adminis- trix of the estate of Lewis H. Padgett, for the death of the latter, an engineer in the employ of the company named, which occurred on the morning of January 12, 1913. Padgett had recently been promoted from freight engineer to a passenger run between Columbia, S. C, to Savannah, Ga., so that he was engaged in interstate com- merce. Further facts are stated ia the opinion dehvered by Judge Eraser, as follows : When the train reached Columbia, the engine was detached and carried to the yard at Cayce, a station near Columbia. The engineer ran his engine into the yard near the roundhouse, and left it upon a siding in the yard. He left his engine about 10.30 on the lltn day of January, 1913. Mr. Padgett's regular run would have required hiTTi to leave Columbia at 6.10 a. m. on the morning of the 12th. He was detained in the yard for a while so that he might take out another train, if necessary. It was not necessary, and he was noti- fied that he would make his regular run. The company had built a small boarding house at Cayce for the convenience of its trainmen, but let out the management of the house to a private party. When Mr. Padgett was notified that he would be required to make his regu- lar run, ne went to the boarding house and found it full. He then went back on the yard, into the roundhouse, and into an engiae, and went to sleep. At about 4.30 o'clock on the morning of the 12th, the engine in which Mr. Padgett was asleep was run out of the round- house down to the coal chute, to be supplied with coal, water, etc., for its trip. At the coal chute Mr. Padgett waked and got off the engine. He inquired where his engine was and was told it was in the roundhouse on track No. 3. The last seen of Mi-. Padgett alive, he was going in the direction of the roundhouse. When it came time to call hini ne could not be found, and the engine went off without him. A Mttle later he was found in an open, uncovered pit in the roundhouse dead. His engine had been standing with the step over the pit. The pit was a Uttie over 8 feet deep. There were no lights in the roundhouse. Suit was brought in behalf of his widow and dependent children for negUgence under the Federal employers' habihty act. The de- fendant answered, denying neghgence. It denied that the deceased was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his death. It pleadedTthat the deceased was a trespasser in the roundhouse, con- tributory negligence, and assumption of risk. The judgment was for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. The court denied the contention of the company that a verdict should have been directed for it on the ground that there was no evidence that the employee came to his death while engaged m interstate commerce. It held that the evidence, though circum- stantial, pointed to the conclusion that Padgett's purpose in go ing DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 91 to the roundhouse was not to further any end of his own, but to make sure that repairs which had been found the night before to be needed were properly and promptly made. It was also held that the question as to neghgence of the company and assumption of risk on the part of the engineer had been properly submitted to the jury, and affirmed the judgment of the court below. Employers' Liabilitt — Kailroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — Fireman on Switch Engine — Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Behrens, Administrator, Supreme Court of the United States {Apr. 27, 1914), 34 SuprcTne Court Reporter, page 646. — Joseph Behrens brought action for the death of his intestate, under the Federal employers' liability act, against the company named, in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judgment being for the plaintiff, the company took the case to the circuit court of appeals on a writ of error, and that court certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The decedent was a fireman and came to his death through a head-on colhsion. The nature of his work in general and at the time of the injury and the reasoning of the court in arriving at the conclusion that as he was not engaged in interstate commerce at that time his case was not within the provisions of the statute, are shown in the following extract from the opinion as delivered by Mr. Justice Van Devanter: The crew handled interstate and intrastate traffic indiscrimi- nately, frequently moving both at once and at times turning directly from one to the other. At the time of the coUision the crew was moving several cars loaded with freight which was wholly intrastate, and upon completing that movement was to have gathered up and taken to other points several other cars as a step or link in their transportation to various destinations within and without the State. The question of law upon which the circuit court desires instruction is whether, upon these facts, it can be said that the intestate, at the time of his fatal injury, was employed in interstate commerce within the meaning of the employers' habdity act. The coiu't considered briefly the status of the railroad as a highway for both interstate and intrastate commerce, the interdependence of the two classes of traffic in point of movement and safety, the practi- cal difficulty in separating or dividing the general work of the switch- ing crew, and the nature and extent of the power confided to Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitiition, and concluded: Here, at the time of the fatal injury the intestate was engaged in moving several cars, aU loaded with intrastate freight, from one part of the city to another. That was not a service in interstate commerce, and so the injury and resulting death were not within the statute. That he was expected, upon the completion of that 92 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. task, to engage in another whicli would have been a part of inter- state commerce, is immaterial under the statute, for by its terms the true test is the nature of the work being done at the time of the injury. The question is accordingly answered in the negative. Employees' Liability — Kaileoad Companies — Fedeeal Stat- ute — Inteestate Commeece — Installing Block-signal System — Sawnders v. Southern Railway Co., Supreme Court of North Carolina {Nov. 25, 1914), ^3 Southeastern Reporter, page 573. — B. B. Saimders, administrator of the estate of his deceased son, Kemp Saunders, brought action against the company named under the Federal employers' liability act for the death of the latter while in the employ of said company. The employee was engaged in installing a block- signal system between two points in the State of North Carolina, in place of one already in use, along a portion of the railway used in interstate commerce. He was killed by a train while crossing the tracks to reach his work train. Referring to the decisions in a num- ber of cases, the court held that the employee was engaged in inter- state commerce, saying: We think it clear that one engaged in installing and equipping the road with the block signals was engaged in doing somethmg which was a part of the interstate commerce in which the defendant was engaged, to the same extent as one engaged in repairing a bridge or a track in such commerce. Employees' Liability — Raileoad Companies — Fedeeal Stat- ute — Inteestate Commeece Installing Block-signal System — Employee on Way feom Woek — Grow v. Oregon Short Line Rail- road Co., Supreme Court of Utah (Feb. 5, 1914), 138 Pacific Reporter, page 398. — Action was brought by Cecilia Grow as administratrix of Cyrus L. Grow, for the death of Grow by accident, against the com- pany named. Grow was in the employ of the company, engaged in in- stalling a block-signal system. At the time of the injury he was riding on the track on a motor tricycle to the place where the outfit of the crew was located, and where the men boarded and lodged in cars furnished by the company. A train, late and going with great speed, approached the tricycle without signals or warning and without a headlight, the engineer not keeping a lookout nor seeing the tricycle irntU within a car length of it. The foreman of the block-signal sys- tem installing crew, who was with Grow on the tricycle, saw the train and jumped in time to save himself, but Grow was struck and killed. At the completion of the evidence in the district court of Weber County, the court directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff DECISIONS OP COUKTS APFECTING LABOB. 93 appealed, and the judgment was reversed and the case remanded. The defendant applied for a rehearing, but this was denied. Several questions were argued, but the most important was whether the employee was engaged in interstate commerce under the provisions of the Federal employers' liability act. This question was answered in the aflBrmative, as is shown by the appended quotation from the opinion by Judge Straup : Counsel for both parties have largely argued the case upon the proposition or theory of whether the case is within or without the provisions of the act of Congress relating to the liability of interstate common carriers by rail to their employees. We think the rule announced in the Pederson case [229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, Bui. No. 152, p. 85], is decisive of the question here. If, as there annoimced, an employee engaged in repairing a car, engine, or track, or constructing or repairing a switch or bridge along a track used in interstate commerce, is, within the meaning of the act, employed in such commerce, then, do we think, was the deceased here also employed in such comimerce. The evidence, without dispute, shows, and the defendant, on the record, unquaMfiedly admitted, that the signals were installed to carry on, and were in furtherance of, the interstate commerce in which the defendant was engaged. On the record it is clear that thw were put in for no other purpose. The further point is made that the deceased, at the time of the injury, was not engaged in any work, but was on way to his abode; hence the relation of master and servant did not then exist between him and the defendant, and for that reason he was not then "employed in such commerce." We think that also is answered against the respondent by the Pederson case. But the observations of the court in the case of Phila., B. & W. R. Co. v. Tucker, 35 App. D. C, 123, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 220 U. S. 608, 31 Sup. Ct. 725, are here pertinent: * * * "We think the better rule, the one founded in reason and supported by authority, is that the relation of master and servant, in so far as the obligation of the master to protect his servant is concerned, com- mences when the servant, in pursuance of his contract with the master, is rightfully and necessarily upon the premises of the master. The servant in such a situation is not a mere trespasser nor a mere Ucensee. He is there because of his employment, and we see no reason why the master does not then owe him as much protection as he does the moment he enters upon the actual performance of his task." We think the relation of master and servant between the deceased and the defendant with respect to the latter's liability for the charged negligence as clearly existed at the time of the injury as though the deceased then had been actually engaged in his work along the track. From these considerations it follows that the case falls within the provisions of the congressional act in question. 94 BXJLLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTI08. Emploteks' LiABrLiTT — ^Raileoad Companies — ^Federal Stat- ute — ^Interstate Commerce — ^Repairing Cars — ^Defective Grind- stone— OpsaM V. Northern Pacific Railway Co., Supreme Court of WasUngton (Feb. 16, 1914), 1S8 Pacific Reporter, page 681.— The plaintiff, a blacksmith in the employment of the company named, received injuries to the fingers while using a power grindstone which was in a very defective condition, its use in such condition being a violation of the State factory law. As he was repairing cars used in interstate commerce, he brought the action under the Federal em- ployers' liabihty act of 1908. The defense of assumption of risk was pleaded by the defendant company, but was not allowed, and judg- ment was rendered in the plaintiff's favor in the superior court of Pierce County. On appeal the supreme court affirmed this judgment, holding that as the action was brought under the Federal statute, which abrogates the defense of assumed risks in any case where the common carrier violates "any statute enacted for the safety of employees," such violation contributing to the injury complained of, that statute governed in this case.* Employers' Liabilitt — Railroad Companies — ^Federal Stat- ute — ^Interstate Commerce — Repairing Engine — Law v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. et al.. United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit {Nov. 4, 1913), 208 Federal Reporter, page 869.— Johja Law was injured while employed in the repair shop of the railroad com- pany named, and while engaged in repairing a part of an engine used in interstate commerce. He was helping a boiler maker, when on account of the latter striking a glancing blow, a nut flew and hit Law in the eye. He brought suit, making claim for damages both at common law and under the employers' habihty act. Judgment was for the defendants on a directed verdict in the District Court for the Western District of Teimessee, and the plaintiff appealed. The circuit court of appeals held that no recovery could be had at common law because the injury was caused by the negligence of the boiler maker, who was a feUow servant of the plaintiff. It held, however, that the plaintiff had been engaged in interstate commerce, and that a recovery was possible under the employers' habiUty act; the judg- ment was therefore reversed and a new trial ordered. Judge Knap- pen, speaking for the court, discussed the question of interstate commerce, using in part the following language: Was the plaintiff engaged in interstate commerce ? In the instant case the engine was in the shop for what is called "roundhouse overhauling." It had been dismantled at least 21 days > Attention ma; be called in this connection to the case Seaboard A. L. By. Co. v. Horton (p. 80), in vliich tlie Supreme Court of the United States held that such a binding together of State and Federal laws was not posslbLe. DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOK. 95 before the accident. Up to the time it was taken to the shop it was actually in use in interstate commerce. It was destined for return thereto upon completion of repairs. It actually was so returned the day following the accident. We have not here a case of original construction of an engine not yet become an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It had already been impressed with such use and with such character. Under the existing facts, can the length of time required for the repairs change the legal situation ? If so, where is the hne to be drawn? How many days temporary withdrawal would suffice to take it out of the purview of the act? And is it material whether the repairs take place in a roundhouse or in general shops ? Is not the test whether the withdrawal is merely temporary in character? In Northern Pacific Ey. Co. v. Maerkl, 198 Fed. 1, 117 C. C. A. 237 [Bui. No. 112, p. 84], the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit held that an employee engaged at the railway shops in making repairs upon a refrigerator car theretofore used in interstate commerce, and intended to be again so used when repaired, was within the protec- tion of the employers' Uabihty act. The repairs there in question were substantial m their nature, requiring at least a partial dis- mantling of the car, which had been m the shop two days when the accident occurred. The rule announced by this decision commends itself to our judgment. Employees' Liabilitt — ^Railkoad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce— Repairing Telegraph Line — Deal V. Coal <& Coke Railway Co., United States District Court, Northern District of West Virginia (July 2, 1914), 216 Federal Reporter, page 285. — David F. Deal was injured while employed in repairing a tele- graph line belonging to the company named, and used in directing the operation of interstate trains. As the only reason for a Federal court to have jurisdiction was that the employee was under the Fed- eral employers' liability act, the company demurred to the complaint on the ground that the employment was not included within the pro- visions of this act, but the court decided against this contention. Judge Dayton, in delivering the opinion, said: The Supreme Court, in Pederson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648 [Bui. No. 152, p. 85], has certainly held that an iron worker engaged in carrying bolts to repair a bridge upon an interstate carrier's roadbed is entitled to the benefit of the act. It says: "That the work of keeping such instrumentalities in a proper state of repair while thus used (in interstate transportation) is so closely ■ related to such commerce as to be in practice and in legal contempla- tion a part of it." I am able to see little difference between the necessity for the proper repair of the bridge over which the interstate commerce passes and the necessity of repairing the telegraph line owned by the company and by the operation of which the movement of such commerce over the bridge is controlled and directed. 96 bulletin of the bureau op labob statistics. Employers' Liability — Kailroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — Eoitndhouse Employee — La Casse V. New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railroad Co., Supreme CouH of Louisiana {Mar. SO, 1914), 64 Southern Reporter, page 1012.— Evelina. La Casse brought suit for the death of her husband caused by the explosion of a locomotive boiler while in the employ of the defendant railroad company. The question whether the employment came under the provisions of the employers' habihty act arose in a somewhat unusual way, since in this case it was the defense which contended that it was so included. If it were, suit would have to be brought by the personal representative, and the action by the widow would fail. The court's decision, however, was that the employment was not within the scope of the act. The statement in the opinion, deUvered by Judge Provosty, as to the work which the employee was doing, and the discussion of his status with respect to the hability act, are in part as follows: His functions consisted in receiving the locomotives that came to the roundhouse, taking care of them, and having them filled with water and steamed up, ready for use, when called for. We do not agree with defendant that this case does come under the Federal statute. If the fact that a locomotive or a car might be used the next day, or whenever next needed, in interstate commerce, were equivalent to being actually at the time in use in that commerce, the efifect would be that whenever a railroad did not confine itself to intrastate commerce, but engaged also in interstate commerce, every one of its employees would at all times be engaged in interstate commerce when at their work. Two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, Pederson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. E. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648 [see Bui. No. 152, p. 85]; St. L., S. F. & T. R. R. Co. v. Scale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651 [see Bui. No. 152, p. 87], are rehed upon by defendant's learned counsel; but these decisions, as we understand them, are very far from having that broad scope. In those cases, although the connection was but slight, there was a direct engage- ment in interstate commerce, whereas a locomotive or an empty car, which has completed an intrastate run and may on its next run be used in like manner interstate, can not be said to be actually engaged in interstate commerce. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — Testing Engine after Repairs — Lloyd V. Southern Railway Co., Supreme Court of North Carolina {May 26, 1914), 81 Southeastern Reporter, page 1003. — W. L. Lloyd brought action under the Federal employers' liability act against the company named for personal injuries resulting from a defective ash-pan mechanism on an engine which had just come from the repair shop, and which he was to take as engineer on a regular interstate run after a trial trip to ascertain whether it was in proper order. The DECISIONS OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOR. 97 court affirmed a judgment of the superior court of Guilford County in favor of the plaintiff, deciding that the employment was in interstate commerce, and in its opinion by Judge Walker, said as to this point: He was put in charge of this engine, and his duty, as engineer, required him to inspect it for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was in proper condition for its run from Spencer, N. C, to Monroe, Va. It was in commission for the purpose of moving interstate traffic between these two points. It was not necessary to constitute it an instrument of interstate commerce that it should have started on its journey. This engine was to be employed wholly in interstate commerce, and has been so used since the aay of the injury. The work of reparation had been finished in the shops, and the engine was nm out on the track, preparatory to her next interstate rim. She had been thus used before, and her runs were merely suspended temporarily for the purpose of repairing her, after which the inter- state runs would be resumed. Plaintifl: was overlooking his engiae, expecting to take it out that day or the next to Monroe, Va. His work was done only in a preparatory stage of interstate commerce, but was a part of it.- Emplotebs' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — Transportation of Lumber by Private Railroad — Bay v. Merrill <& Ring Lumber Co., United States District Court, Western District of Washington {Feb. 20, 1914), 211 Federal Reporter, page 717. — August Bay was injured while employed by the company named, and brought suit. At the trial a nonsuit was granted, and the plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was denied. The company was engaged in logging operations, and had a logging railroad of standard gauge connecting with the Great Northern Railway. The products were carried to Puget Sound in Washington, in which State the logs were cut, and there sold to various mills, which sawed them into lumber, about 80 per cent of which went into other States and countries. The company's charter gave it the power to act as a common carrier, but it had never carried or offered to carry anything but its own products. Accordingly the court held that it was not engaged in interstate commerce, and that the plaintiff was not within the provisions of the Federal employers' liability act. Employers' Liability— Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Interstate Commerce — Weighing Empty Cars — Wheeling Terminal Co. v. Russell, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit (Dec. 8, 1913), 209 Federal Reporter, page 755.— RusseU, the original plaintiff in this case, had recovered a judgment in the District Court of the United States for the District of West Virginia, where- 85590°— Bull. 169—15 7 98 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. upon the defendant appealed. The employee when injured was at work as one of a crew engaged in weighing empty cars which had been used in interstate transportation and weighed while full, the object being to ascertain the net weight of contents. The judgment was aflarmed on appeal, the court determining among other points that Russell was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the in- jury. The following is an extract from the opinion, delivered by Judge Rose, with regard to this point: The cars were being weighed to determine the net weight of the interstate load carried by them to the West Virginia consignee. Those who were engaged in ascertaining such weights were them- selves employed in that commerce. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. V. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651 [Bui. No. 152, p. 87]. The cars had been employed in interstate commerce. It was not shown that they had been withdrawn from its service. The reason- able presumption, therefore, is that they remained in it. In practice such presumption will not work injustice. The defendant carrier will usually have little difficulty in showuig, when it wishes to do so, where the cars were to be taken aiid for what purpose. For the plaintiff to trace them may be difficult and expensive. Emploteks' Liability — Railroad Companies — Fedeeal Stat- ute — Negligence — Contributory Negligence — Cincinnati, New Orleans cfc Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. Swann's Administratrix, Court of Appeals of Kentucky {Oct. 22, 1914), 169 Southwestern Reporter, page 886. — ^M. B. Swann, an employee of the company named, was killed by a train, and his administratrix brought action for damages. In the first suit, brought under the State law, the court of appeals reversed a judgment of the trial court against the raUroad company, with instructions to direct a verdict in its favor, on the groimd of contributory negligence. As this defense would only reduce the damages under the Federal employers' fiability act, the former suit was dismissed, and the present one brought under the act mentioned. A judgment was again entered in favor of the plaintiff m the trial court, the circuit court of Boyle County. There was no dispute as to the employee being engaged in interstate commerce. He was acting as foreman of a crew engaged in putting in water columns near the tracks at Williamstown Station. While standing on the end of the ties looking into a pit excavated for a water column, he was struck by the engme of an express train runnmg 30 or 40 mUes an hour and killed. He was not seen by the engineer until too late to take any steps to save him, on account of a sharp curve which the train had just rounded. The court held that the employers' liabihty act requires a showing of negligence on the part of the railroad company in order that DECISIONS OP COTTRTS AFFECTING LABOB. 99 recovery may be had for injury or death of any employee, and that this negligence must consist of failure to discharge some duty owed to the employee; and that, unless the negligence charged involves defects in cars, equipment, etc., the State law must be looked to in determining whether the acts or omissions complained of amount to negligence. It appeared that it was the duty of Swann to know, and he did know, the schedule time of the train in question, which on this occasion was only two minutes late; also that it was not necessary for him to occupy the place of danger in which he stood. It was held that the employees in charge of the train owed no duty to him to slow down or give him warning of its approach, and that the fact that there were rules requiring slower speed and warnings in approaching such places as the one where the injury occurred did not entitle him to rely on the observation of those rules, as they were not enacted for the benefit of the class of enaployees to which he belonged. The judgment of the trial court was therefore again reversed and a new trial granted, with directions, if the facts should prove substan- tially the same as on the previous trial, to direct a verdict for the defendant company. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Negligence — Course of Employment — Beeve v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., Supreme Court of WasTiington {Nov. 16, 1914), 144 Pacific Reporter, page 63. — Mike Reeve was a laborer for the com- pany named, whose duty it was to assist in supplying the company's baggage, maU, and other cars with water and fuel, and to aid other- wise in fitting them for service. On the evening of June 23, 1911, while sitting on the floor in the door of a baggage car with his feet out- side, he was pushed out by one of two other employees who were wrestling inside the car, and sustained severe injuries. The Federal employers' Uability act provides that any common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, resulting in whole or in part from negligence of any of its officers, agents, or employees. The court held that the word "negligence" was limited to negligence of officers, agents, or coem- ployees while in the performance of the duties of their employment, and hence the company was not liable under the circumstances of this case. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Reference to Statute — Comparative Negligence — Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Lindsay, United States Supreme Court {Apr. 6, 1914), 34 Supreme Court Reporter, page 581.— George Lindsay 100 BTTLLETIN OF THE BTJBEATT OP LABOK STATISTTOS. brought suit against the railway company named, in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of lUinois, to recover damages for a personal injury sustained while he was employed by the com- pany, allegmg that the injury was caused by its negligence ia failing to comply with the provisions of the Federal safety appliance act. Judgment was given ta his favor, which judgment was afErmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The case then went to the United States Supreme Court, where the judg- ment of the lower court was again affirmed. The points of interest tod the conclusion of the court are indicated below in the language of Mr. Chief Justice White, who spoke for the court: In the trial court it is insisted the operation and effect of the employers' habUity act upon the rights of the parties was not involved because that act was not in express terms referred to in the pleadings or pressed at the trial. But the want of foundation for this conten- tion becomes apparent when it is considered that in the complaint it was expressly alleged and in the proof it was clearly established that the injury complained of was suffered in the course of the opera- tion of interstate commerce, thus bringing the case within the emr ployers' liability act. Aside from its manifest unsoundness, con- sidered as an original proposition, the contention is not open, as it was expressly foreclosed in Seaboard Air Line R. Co. /y. DuvaU, 225 U. S. 477, 482, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Relief Associations — Release — Wagner v. Chicago <& Alton Railroad Co., Supreme Court of Illinois {Dec. 2, 1914), 106 North- eastern Reporter, page 809. — Joseph M. Wagner recovered a judgment amounting to $15,000 against the company named in the superior court of Cook County, for personal injuries. This was aflBrmed by the appellate court, which, however, required a remittitur of $387.09, the portion contributed by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., Wagner's employer, to the benefits he had received from the relief fund. The Alton company then brought a writ of certiorari to the supreme court, and is therefore designated as the plaintiff in error in the opinion. The employee, conductor in charge of a switching crew, was knocked from a position on a car step by a semaphore post alleged to be too near the track of the Alton company, over which trains of the Burlington company were operated under a license. It was held that if the post was in fact located too near the track, such location constituted negli- gence on the part of both railroad companies, and that the fact was properly for the determination of the jury, which had found in favor of the employee. The remaining question related to the release of the company by acceptance of benefits from the relief fund, and involved DECISIONS OP COUKTS AFFECTING L. the application of the Federal and State laws to in view of an agreement at the trial that the question*&**^€S^ate commerce was eliminated, the company sued not being the employing company. Two of the judges presented a dissenting opinion on this point. Judge Cooke, who dehvered the opinion of the majority of the court, aflSrming the judgment below, discussed the question mentioned as follows: Defendant in error had no cause of action against plaintiff in error under the Federal employers' liability act, as that act applies only where the relation of master and servant exists. To meet the case of defendant in error, the plaintiff in error proved that he was, and had been since 1902, a'member of the relief department of the Burling- ton company; that the employees of that company made monthly contributions to the relief fund; that the company maintained the department and bore the operating expenses; that he had accepted from the relief fund, as benefits, the sum of $1,231 ; and that $1,349.59 had been paid in his behalf for hospital bUls, physicians' services, and the like. In rebuttal defendant in error was permitted to prove that at the time he was injured the engine and cars were engaged in inter- state commerce. The admission of this evidence m rebuttal is assigned as error. There can be but one satisfaction for an injury, and, if defendant in error made a settlement with the Burlington company and released it from further liability, it was a release, also, of plaintiff in error from all liabUity, as the Burlington company was a joint tort-feasor. The contract of defendant in error with the rehef department pro- vided that the voluntary acceptance by him of benefits after receiving an injury should operate as a satisfaction of further claims against the employer on account of such injury, and it is the law of this State that such an acceptance, with the knowledge that the contract con- tained such a provision, operates as a satisfaction and bar to a sub- sequent suit for damages. Eckman v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Raikoad Co., 169 111. 312, 48 N. E. 496 [Bui. No. 15, p. 245]. The State law in this regard has been modified, however, by the Federal employers' liabdity act as to cases where injuries are received by certain employees of an employer engaged in interstate commerce. The Federal act provides that any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liabiUty created by the act, shall to that extent be void, provided that in any action brought against any such -common carrier under the act such common carrier may set off any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief, benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto, on account of the injury or death for which the action is brought. When plaintiff in error attempted to prove a satisfaction by the payment of benefits by its joint tort-feasor, the Burlington company, to defendant in error, it was proper for defendant in error, in rebuttal, to show that no vaUd release had been given the Burlington company by him. As between defendant in error and the Burlington company the Federal enoployers' Uability act clearly apphed, and if, as the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly neld, that law super- 102 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. sedes all State laws on the subject, then the release given by defendant in error to the Burlington company was not valid and womd not have precluded recovery by him from that company. If it was not valid so far as the Burlington company was concerned, it was clearly invalid as to plaintiff in error and constituted no defense to this action. Employees' Liability — -Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute—Safety Appliances — Pennell v. Philadelphia cfc Beading Rail- way Co., United States Supreme Court {Jan. 5, 1914), ^4 Supreme Court Reporter, page 220. — The plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of J. A. Pennell, deceased, brought an action for damages for death by wrongful act in the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Pennell was employed by the defendant company in the capacity of fireman on one of its loconio- tives, and, it was alleged, came to his death by the failure of defendant to comply with the requirements of the safety appliance acts of Con- gress and the rules and directions of the Interstate Commerce Com- mission in that defendant failed to affix between the locomotive and its tender an automatic coupling device. The action was prosecuted under the act of Congress relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad engaged in interstate commerce to their employees while so engaged. The trial court directed the jury to render a verdict for the defendant, upon which judgment was entered, and it was aflBrmed by the circuit court of appeals. (122 C. C, A. 77, 203 Fed. 681.) The case was then brought to the United States Supreme Court on error, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the court holding that the safety appliance law is entirely satisfied by providing the automatic coupler between the tender and the cars constituting the train — ^that is, on the rear end of the tender — and not necess.arUy between the engine and the tender. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Federal Stat- ute — Safety Appliances — Hauling Bad-order Car — Status of Workman Riding Home — Bodge v. Chicago Great Western Rail- road Co., Supreme CouH of Iowa {Mar. 24, 1914), 146 North- western Reporter, page I4. — This action was brought for the death of a conductor in the employ of the company named, from an accident which occurred November 22, 1911. A verdict was directed for the defendant, and the plaintiflF appealed. The interstate train of which he was conductor picked up a car which had a defective couphng and hauled it on the rear of the train, the bad coupling being, however, on the rear end. This car had been fastened to another car by a chain, and as a convenient way of carrying the chain along it was attached to the brake rod with a wire, the decedent Dodge taking part in doing DECISIONS OP COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 103 this. After arriving at Des Moines at the completion of the trip, Dodge got upon an engine ©f a freight train going out over the track on which he had just come in, in order to ride to his home. This engine was derailed, and the engine in leaving the track turned, crushing him to death between the engine proper and the tender. A piece of chain, which was probably part of the one in question, was found, and it was claimed that this was the cause of the derailment. Counts of the declaration were based upon both the Federal employ- ers' liability act and the safety appliance act. The court in affirming the judgment for the defendant decided that Dodge was not at the time of the accident engaged in interstate commerce; that the con- dition of the car had nothing to do with the accident or injury; and that Dodge was not at the time either an employee or a passenger, but a licensee, to whom the company owed only the duty of ordinary care. The following quotation is from the opinion by Judge Withrow: The accident did not result from any causal connection with the defective condition of the car, but from a cause which was unrelated to it, excepting that the chain had previously been used to couple that car to another one, but which at the time of the movement of the car was not so used. Under these facts, which are not in dispute, we think the provisions of the safety appliance act are without application. As to the status of the decedent at the time of the accident Judge Withrow said in part: We conclude that the decedent, at the time of the accident which resulted in his death, was neither an employee nor a passenger, as such terms are used in fixing liability. Assuming that he, with others, had by permission enjoyed the privilege of riding upon the engine towards his home, af^-er his OWn service had ended, he was but a licensee. Being such, and giving to the evidence all the weight and force that can be properly claimed for it, the standard of duty towards him for his protection would be that the defendant, thus permitting the decedent to ride, would be held only to the exercise of ordinary care, and that the licensee exercises the privilege at his " own risk of obvious or patent dangers, and under such conditions the defendant owed him no active duty excepting upon the discovery of his danger. Employers' Liability— Eailro ad Companies— Injuries to Employee's Family Riding on Pass — Charleston cfe W. C. Ry. Co. V. Thompson, Court of Appeals of Georgia {Aug. 30, 1913), 80 South- eastern Reporter, page 1097. — A judgment was obtained against the railway company, by Lizzie Thompson, for injuries sustained by her through the negUgence of the company, while riding on one of its trains on a pass issued to her as the wife of a railway laborer. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Georgia. 104 BULLETIN OF THE BXJEEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. The following language from the syllabus by the court gives the conclusions reached : As a general rule, a stipulation in a free pass given by a carrier, to the effect that the person who accepts it assumes all risks of injury in transportation is enforceable; and as to a passenger who has accepted transportation under such a pass a carrier is hable only for injuries resulting from wantonness or willful negligence; but an excep- tion to this rule is presented in the provision of the "Hepburn Act" (Act June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 [U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1286]), which permits a railroad company to issue free trans- portation to its employees and members of their f amihes. As between such employees and the railroad company which employs them, the privilege and benefit of being afforded transportation without cost may be regarded as a part of the consideration paid for the services of the employee and may be treated as an element of value within the contemplation of both parties at the time of entering into the contract of employment. Consequently the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury that, ii the plaintiff (the wife of an employee) was traveling on a free pass, she would not be entitled to recover. Employers' Liability— Railroad Companies — Operating Rail- road — Sartain v. Jefferson City Transit Co., Kansas City Court of Appeals {Nov. 2, 1914), I'^O Southwestern Reporter, page 4-11. — Henry W. Sartain sued the raUroad company named for damages for personal injuries. Judgment was in the plaintiff's favor in the circuit court of Cole County, and the defendant appealed. The decision involved the construction of the Missouri statute. Revised Statutes of 1909, sec- tion 5434, under which the action was brought, and which provides that railroad companies shall be liable for damages sustained by any agent or servant thereof while engaged in the work of operating such railroad by reason of the negligence of any other agent or servant thereof. The work which the plaintiff was doing at the time of the injury consisted of unloading ties from a wagon onto the roadbed of an extension of the railroad line, which extension was in process of construction. The company contended that he was not engaged in operating a railroad, but the court, after citing and discussing the cases in point, held that the law of the State is that such employees — those who, though not employed in actually moving a train, are doing work which is directly essential to enable the trains to move — are within the statute. As negligence on the part of a fellow employee in dropping a tie and mashing the plaintiff's foot was alleged, and the jury by its favorable verdict had found this to be the fact, the court affirmed the judgment below. decisions of coukts affecting laboe. 105 Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Orders of Su- perior — Injury to Brakeman — Ainsley v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Jan. 5, 1914), 90 Atlantic Reporter, page 129. — The employee Ainsley secured judgment in the court of common pleas of Allegheny County for personal injuries, which judgment was afiSrmed on appeal. At the time the plaintiff below was injured he was in the employ of the defendant company as a brakeman on a passenger train. He was on duty on a train which left the city of Pittsburgh between 2 and 3 o'clock on the morning of October 31, 1909, bound for Colum- bus, Ohio. Shortly after it had started it was discovered that the air brake on one of the cars was not working properly, and the plain- tiff got on the lower step of a Pullman car in an effort to locate the brake which needed attention. While leaning out from that step while the train was stiU in motion, he was brushed from the car by coming in contact with a fence which the defendant company had constructed between its passenger tracks to prevent persons from crossing over them at grade. He was severely injured, and, from the judgment which he recovered in the court below, the defendant company appealed. It was held that the evidence justified findings by the jury that the brakeman's act was in obedience to peremptory orders by the conductor, and that the latter was a person to whose orders the brakeman was "bound to conform" under the State statute; also that the question of assumed risks had been properly submitted to the jury, and on their finding that the apparent hazard was not so excessive as to make obedience to the orders an act of negligence, the liability of the company was sustained. Employees' Liability — Railroad Companies — Oedees of SuPEEiOE — ^Yard and Bridge Men — Chicago <& Erie Railroad Co. V. Lain, Supreme Court of 'Indiana {Jan. IS, 1914), 103 Northeastern Reporter, page 84?. — Henry Leroy Lain sued the company named for damages for personal injury and secured a favorable verdict in the circuit court of Fulton County. This was set aside for defect in the complaint, and this being amended, a verdict for the plaintiff was again rendered on the second trial, from which the company again appealed, the supreme court on this occasion sustaining the judg- ment of the court below. The suit was brought under Burns' A. S. 1908, section 8017, which provides that every railroad, corporation in the State shall be liable for damages for personal injury suffered by any employee while in its service; the employee so injured being in the exercise of due care and diligence, "where such injury resulted from the negligence of any person in the service of such corporation, to whose order or direction the injured employee at the time of his injury was bound to conform, and did conform." 106 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. Lain was directed by a foreman to move a car which was standing on a switch track, and in order to carry out this order placed himself upon the track behind the car, with his back to other cars standing on the same track. While in this position, under further orders of the foreman, an engine and cars ran at high speed against the cars standing on the track behind Lain, and he was crushed and sustained serious injuries. Among other contentions of the company, it was claimed that the employee was guilty of contributory negligence,- and that on accoimt of the nature of his employment he was not covered by the statute. With regard to these matters, Judge Cox, who delivered the opinion of the court, said in part: Under the allegations of the complaint, the position taken by appellee was not of itseK dangerous and could only become so by the violation of duty on the part of the foreman, and he was not bound, in the exercise of due care, to anticipate that the foreman who was, under the averments of the complaint, present and acting for the master would violate the duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent his position from becoming a dangerous one. [Cases cited.] Finally it is claimed by counsel that the complaint afiirmatively shows that appcUee was a carpenter and not an employee engaged in the operation of trains, and that for that reason he can not come within me provisions of the statute which is invoked to establish his cause of action. It is not averred in the complaint that appellee was employed and working as a carpenter, but, on the contrary, it is averred that he was one of the appellant's "yard and bridge men"; that as such he was ordered to move a car on one of the tracks of appellant's switch yard; and that, while doing this, he was injured by the movement of other cars and an engine in the yard and on that track. This obviously brings appellee within the appHcation of the statute within the rule laid down in Indianapolis, etc., Co. v. Kinney (1908) 171 Ind. 612, on page 617, 85 N. E. 954, on page 957, where it was said: "We do not mean that it is essential to the bring- ing of an employee within the statute that he should be connected in some way with the movement of trains, but it seems sufficient if the performance of his duties brings him into a situation where he is, without fault, exposed to the dangers and perils flowing from such operation and movement, and is by reason thereof injured by the negligence of a fellow servant described in the act." Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — Safety Appli- ances — Electric Trains — Sfokane & Inland Empire Railroad Co. V. Campbell, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Cir- cuit {Oct. 19, 1914), ^17 Federal Reporter, page 518.—Edg&T E. Camp-' bell brought action against the company named for personal injuries suffered while running as motorman an interstate electric train of the company DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 107 That the provisions of the safety appLance act as amended now apply to interstate electric trains was held by the court, Judge Wol- verton, who delivered the opinion, speaking in part as follows on this point: There can be no doubt that when the primary act was passed, electrically propelled trains were not within the legislative mind, and where "locomotive engine" occurs reference was had to a steam- propelled engine. And likewise when "engineer" is spoken of, it had relation to a person in charge of a steam-propelled locomotive. The electric railroad has since come into very, general use, with its driving engines called motors, and its employees in charge of the engines are called motormen or enginemen. In a narrower sense, a locomotive engine is spoken of as an engine propelled by steam; but when the statute, as the amendment does, extends the provisions of the act to apply to all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce, and to all other locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles, it broadens the significance so as, without question, to include motors electrically propelled, used upon raUroads engaged in interstate commerce. So, also, the original act, with its amend- ment, includes the operators of such engines, whether called engi- neers or motormen. We think the statute is broad enough to require that electrically propelled engines and trains engaged m interstate commerce, as well as steam-propeUed engines and trains, shall be equipped with air brakes for their efficient operation and control. Employers' Liability — Eailroad Companies — State Stat- ute — Extraterritorial Effect — Jurisdiction of Courts — - Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, United States Supreme Court {Apr. IS, 1914), ^4 Supreme Court Reporter, page 587. — Wiley George was injured while employed by the defendant company in Alabama, the injury being due to a defect in the locomotive on which he was employed. He brought suit for damages in the city court of At- lanta, Ga., basing his right to recover on section 3910 of the Alabama Code which makes the master liable when an injury is caused by the defective condition of machinery, etc. The company defended upon the ground that the courts of Georgia did not have jurisdiction, as section 6115 of the Alabama Code provided that "all actions under section 3910 must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Alabama, and not elsewhere." The company contended that inasmuch as the law provided that action under it should be brought in the Alabama courts only, it would be a denial of full faith and credit to the acts of Alabama, by the State of Georgia, contrary to the provisions of article 4, section 1 of the Constitution of the United States, if the Georgia court took jurisdiction. The contention of the company was overruled and George obtained judg- ment in his favor, which j udgment was affirmed by the Georgia Court 108 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. of Appeals. (11 Ga. App. 221, 75 S. E. 567.) In the United States Supreme Court the judgment of the State court was afiirmed, Mr. Justice Lamar deMvering the opinion of the court, from which the following is taken : There are many cases where right and remedy are so united that the right can not be enforced except in the manner and before the tribunal designated by the act. For the rule is well settled that "where the provision for the liability is coupled with a provision for the special remedy, that remedy, that alone, must be employed." [Cases cited.] But that rule has no application to a case arising under the Ala- bama Code relating to suits for injuries caused by defective machinery. For, whether the statute be treated as prohibiting certain defenses, as removing common-law restrictions, or as imposing .upon the master a new and larger liability, it is in either event evident that the place of bringing the suit is not part of the. cause of action — the right and the remedy are not so inseparably imited as to make the right dependent upon its being enforced in a particular tribunal. The cause of action is transitory, and like any other transitory action can be enforced "in any court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Alabama." The courts of the sister State, trying the case, would be bound to give full faith and credit to all those substantial provisions of the statute which inhered in the cause of action, or which name condi- tions on which the right to sue depend. But venue is no part of the right, and a State can not create a transitory cause of action and at the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court having jurisdiction. Employers' Liability — Regulations Concerning Electric Wires — Substitute Provisions — McClaugherty v. Rogue River Electric Co., Supreme Court of Oregon (Apr. 7, 1914), HO Pacific Reporter, page 64. — James McClaugherty, a minor a httle less than 21 years of age, met his death May 27, 1911, from an electric shock while installing an electric motor, for this purpose running wires on a certain pole, which carried among others some 2,300-volt wires. He was not instructed whether or not to cut off the current from these wires while doing the work, and did not do so. The company had provided means of interrupting the current, instead of conforming to the statutory regulations as to electric wires included in the employers' liability act, Laws of 1911, page 16. As to the necessity of strict com- pliance by employers with those regulations, the court, in its opinion delivered by Judge Bean, said: The contention of the defendant assumes that under the employers' HabUity act the company was at liberty to furnish substitutes for those things req^uired by the terms of the act; that is, instead of "full and complete insulation" being provided at all points where employees are liable to come in contact with the wires carrying electricity of a DECISIONS OF OOUBTS AFFECTING LABOR. 109 dangerous voltage, instead of dead wires not being mingled with live wires, nor strung upon the same support, and the arms or sup- ports bearing live wires being "especially designated by a color or other designation which is iastantly apparent," and instead of such live wires being strung far enough from the poles or supports to permit the repairmen to engage in their work without danger of shock, all as required by the act, the defendant could furnish cut-off switches so that the current of electricity could be shut off, and then the com- pany would not be neghgent, notwithstanding the fact that the pro- visions of the statute were not complied with. Such, however, is not the law. The requirements of the statute as to the safeguards enumerated are positive and mandatory. There are no alternatives. The judgment of the court below in the plaintiff's favor was there- fore affirmed. Employers' Liability — Right of Action — Election — Effect OF Woekmen's Compensation Act — Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. V. Ujack, Supreme Court of Arizona (Mar. 17, 1914), 139 Pacific Reporter, page JfiS. — The employee Ujack was injured, and brought action against the company employing him. Judgment was for plain- tiff in the superior court of Yavapai County, and the supreme court affirmed this judgment. The defense relied upon was that the plain- tiff's only remedy was a proceeding under the workmen's com- pensation act, since he did not previous to the injury elect to reject the provisions of that act. The court decided that an employee has the option to elect any one of three forms of procedure after the injury, and that the adoption of one becomes exclusive only on com- mencing a suit in accordance with his election. Quotations are made in the opinion from various sections of the constitution and the work- men's compensation act. Among other things, speaking by Judge Ross, the court says: The appellee [Ujack] contends that he was entitled, under the facts of the case, to maintaia his suit for personal iajury imder the employers' liability law, while the appellant insists that his exclusive remedy was to be found in the compulsory compensation law. The controverted question may be disposed of \>j a correct answer to this question : Does the compulsory compensation act, when not dis- affirmed prior to injury, limit the remedy of the injured emploj^ee to the compensation provided ia that act, or may he after the mjury elect between his remedy xmder the act and the other remedies of the common-law UabUity or employers' habUity ? The appellee was in the employment of appellant at the time the workmen's compen- sation law took effect, and had been in such employment for more than 10 days thereafter when he was injured. Neither the employer nor the employee had taken any affirmative action in recognition of the law, either to approve or repudiate it. The constitution says: "The legislature shall enact a workmen's compulsory compensation law * * * by which compulsory com- pensation shall be required to be paid to any such workman by his 110 BULLETIN OF THE BUKEATT OF LABOB STATISTICS. employer. * * * Provided, that it shall be optional with said employee to settle for such compensation, or retain the right to sue said employer as provided by this constitution." This mandate to the legislature was carried out in the enacting of the workmen's compulsory compensation law, and, in doing so, there was created a new civil action heretofore unknown to our laws, available to the employee injured in the circumstances provided by law. It is optional with the injured employee as to whether he will accept the compensation. The emplojree's right to exercise this option being a constitutional right, legislation is impotent to deprive him of it. If the employee is never injured, he can make no claim for "such com- pensation," nor exercise his option. After the cause of action has accrued to the employee, he may choose to accept the compensation allowed under this act, and the legislature is competent to prescribe the steps he shall take in its enforcement, but it can not require bini to elect, in advance of any injury, or the accrual of any right, which remedy he will pursue for redress. Therefore any expressions in the workmen's compulsory compensa- tion act that seemmgly require that the employee shall elect, in advance of injury, his remedy for redress should be read and con- strued in view of the constitutional provision permitting him to exercise his option, after the injury, either to claim compensation or sue for damages. The last sentence of section 14 reads: "Any suit brought by the workman for a recovery shall be held as an election to pursue such remedy exclusively." This seems to us a plain declaration by the legislature that the employee is at hberty to pursue any of the rem- edies provided by law until he adopts one by instituting a suit for redress, when the one adopted becomes exclusive. Employees' Liability — Safe Place — Bosholt v. Worden-AUen Co., Supreme Court of Wisconsin {Dec. 9, 191S), I4.4 Northwestern Reporter, page 650. — John Rosholt was injured by falling from a runway on a building the roof of which, as a carpenter, he was en- gaged in constructing. While carrying planks from a pile to the place where they were to be nailed on the roof, he stepped on the end of a loose plank composing the runway and fell through to the basement of the building, a distance of about 30 feet. The principal contention of the defendant in appealing from a judgment rendered for the plaintiflE in the circuit court of Milwaukee County was that there was no neghgence on its part. On this point the court, speaking by Judge Barnes, said: Section 2394-48 reouires every employer, among other things, to furnish a place of employment " which shall be safe for employees." Section 2394-49 provides that no employer " shall require, permit or suffer any employee to go or be in any employment or place of em- ployment which IS not safe." Section 2394-41, subdivision 11, pro- vides that " the terms ' safe' and ' safety' as applied to an employment or a place of employment shall mean such freedom from danger to the bf e, health or safety of employees * * * as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit." DECISIONS OF OOUBTS AFFECTING LABOR. Ill It is obvious that these provisions make some radical changes in the common law as it existed when the act was passed. * * * it is also apparent that the employer no longer fulfills his duty by furnislung a "reasonably" safe place. Instead, he must furnish one which is as free from danger as " the nature of the employment wUl reasonably permit." We think it must be said in the instant case that the jury might well find that the place of employment was not as free from danger as the nature of the employment would reasonably permit. The lay- ing of two or three tiers of planks instead of one would in all proba- biUty have prevented the accident. It is almost a certainty that the nailing down of the tier that was laid would have prevented it. So would the erection of a substantial guardrail immediately outside of the joists or purlines on which the planks rested. It may well be that there were other things which might have been done to make the place safe which the nature of the work would reasonably permit, but the enumeration given is sufiScient. A jury would be well within its rights in saying that the nature of the work would reasonably permit either of the first two things mentioned to be done, and probably the third. The jury has found that the place was not "safe" within the meaning of the statutory definition of the word, and we think the evidence was ample to warrant such a finding. As to the questions of assumption of risk and contributory negli- gence, the court said : The defense of assumption of hazard was abolished by subdivision 1 of section 2394-1 as to all employees. Were it still a defense, it m^ht and probably would defeat recovery on the part of the plain- tiff. But leaving out of consideration assumption of hazard, we think there is httle evidence in the record which would warrant the jury in finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Cer- tainly the jury might find on the evidence, as it did, that there was no contributory negligence on his part. Employers' Liabilitt — Safe Place — Scaffolding — Borrihof v. Fischer et at, Court of Appeals oj New York {Feb. 3, 1914), IO4 Noriheastem Reporter, page ISO. — This case was appealed from the decision of the appellate division of the supreme court, which had reversed a judgment in the plaintiff's favor in the trial court. The court of appeals aflSrmed the judgment of the trial court, reversing the appellate division. The facts and the legal point involved are included in the court's opinion, deUvered by Judge Miller: This plaintiff, an employee of the defendant Fischer, was injured by the fall of a scaffold or runway, and the important question now to be decided is whether section 18 of the labor law (Consol. Laws, ch. 31) makes said defendant responsible for the accident, although the scaffold or runway was actually constructed by the defendant Ken- nedy. Both defendants were engaged in the construction of a build- ing. Keimedy was the general contractor, and was doing the mason 112 BULLETIN OF THE BXJBEAU OP LABOR STATISTIOS. work. Fischer was a subcontractor, doing the iron work. At the time of the accident employees of both were working on a structure 12 feet high, called a penthouse, on the roof of the building. The plaintiff was sent from the roof of the penthouse by his foreman to fetch a tool, and on his return the planks leading to the penthouse shpped off and fell with him. It is now settled law that the said statute is to be liberally con- strued to accomplish its beneficent purpose, that is, the better pro- tection of workmen engaged in certain dangerous employments, ,and that the duty imposed upon the employer to furnish safe scaffolding, etc., can not be delegated. Scaffolding is thus made by statute a place to work which it is the duty of the employer to furnish. He can no more delegate that duty to some other contractor engaged in the work than to an independent contractor of his own, or one of his own employees, and it can be of no- consequence whether he directly employs, or tacitly suffers, another to perform that duty for him. In this case some means of access to the roof of the penthouse was necessary. The appellant furnished none whatever. His employees were thus left to choose between the runway or the less convenient ladder, both furnished by another. Having furnished none of his own, he must be held to have adopted the means at hand, or the statute loses its efficacy. Employers' Liability — Statutory Notice — Meniz v. Quissett Mills, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Feb. 26, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 2S6. — This was an action under the employers' Uability act, Stat. 1902, ch. 106, sec. 71 et seq., and the only question raised was as to the sufficiency of a notice given, under the requirements of Stat. 1909, ch. 514, sec. 132. The attorneys retained by the plaintiff to assist him wrote a letter to the defendant, within the time limit, stating that they had been so retained, mentioning the , circumstances, time, and place of the injury. This was held by the court to be a sufficient notice, although it did not state in terms that it was intended to be such notice, nor that it was signed on behalf of the injured employee. Employers' Liability — Statutory Notice — Rodzborski v. Ameri- can Sugar Refining Co., Court of Appeals of New YorJc (Feb. 24, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 616. — John Rodzborski was injured February 5, 1907, as his complaint alleged, by the starting of a con- veyor, used to convey coal on a large belt, while the employee was removing snow from the belt. The employee was unable to speak or write English. The trial court rendered judgment in his favor, and the appellate division of the supreme court affirmed this judgment. The court of appeals decided that the plaintiff's evidence, though meager and in conflict with that of the defense, was sufficient to sus- tain the verdict of the jury. The judgment was reversed and a new DECISIONS OP COUETS AFFECTING LABOB. 113 trial ordered, however, on other grounds, the principal point of interest being as to the notice required under the employers' liability act (Consol. Laws, ch. 31, sec. 201). This section provides: No action for recovery of compensation for injury or death under this article [employers' liability] shall be maintained unless notice of the time, place and cause of the injury is given to the employer. * * * The notice required by this section shall be in writing and signed by the person injured or by some one in his behalf, * * *. One Laboda sent to the company a letter, of which no copy was retained, but which he testified read as f oUowe : To the American Sugar Refining Co., Brooklyn. Gentlemen: Kindly investigate the case of John Rodzborski that has been injured on the 5th day of February, 1907, while cleaning a belt in the boiler room, between South Third and South Fourth Streets; John Rodz- borski has been made a cripple and not able to do any work, and won't be for some time to come. As to the sufiiciency of this notice with respect to the cause of injury Judge Werner, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: It will be seen that the form of the paper which is here claimed to be a notice in comphance with the above-quoted section resembles a letter asking for charitable aid more than it does a notice; but, if we make a due allowance for the ignorance of the plaintiff and assume that the service of this paper was intended to be a compliance with the statute, it is impossible to say that it states any "cause" of the injury. It refers to an injury sustained "while cleaning a belt." No defect in the belt or machinery is claimed, and the defendant might have searched in vain for the cause of the injury. This lack of detail in the, notice is not a mere inaccuracy in stating the cause, but an utter absence of the statement of any cause whatever. The record was not clear as to whether or not there was any signa- ture on the letter which was claimed to be a notice. The court said in part on this point: We simply say that the language of the statute seems to be plain and unequivocal. It must be "signed by the person injured or by some one in his behalf." That direction is at once so plain and so thoroughly within the understanding of the average layman that it would be doing violence to the intent of the legi lature to say that a notice with no signature has been "signed by the person injured or by some one in his oehaK." Such a notice may therefore be signed by a plaintiff himself, or by his mark when he is illiterate, or by some one on his behalf, but it must be signed. Employment of Children in Mines — Age Limit — Construction OP Statute — "Ant Mine" — Cole v. Sloss-Sheffield Ste.el & Iran Co., Supreme Court of Alabama (May 14, 1914), 65 Southern Reporter, page 85590°— Bull. 169—15 8 114 BULLETIN OF THE BUKBAIT OF LABOE STATISTICS. i77.— Willie Cole, a miaor under tlie age of 14 years, employed by the company named, was killed in its ore mine near Bessemer, Ala., June 17, 1911. This action was brought by his administrator, and the complaint alleged that the death was proximately caused by the defendant's violation of Code 1907, section 1034. The original act of 1896-97 prohibited employment of boys under 12 years of age in the mines of the State, and its title showed that it applied to coal mines only. In the revision 12 was changed to 14, and "the mines" to " any mine." The supreme court held that this change manifested a legislative intent to make the provision applicable to mines of all other kinds as well- as to coal mines. It therefore reversed the judg- ment for the defendant company entered in the city court of Besse- mer, and remanded the case for a new trial. Examination and Licensing of Plumbers — Class Legisla- tion — Constitutionality of Statute— Davis v. Holland, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas {May SO, 1914), 168 Southwestern Reporter, page 11. — The Kevised Statutes of Texas, articles 986-998, provide for the establishment of plumbing boards in cities of the State coming within certain descriptions, and for the examination and certification of plumbers, together with other provisions. E. S. Davis and others brought a suit in the district court of Dallas County to require W. M. Holland and others, mayor and commissioners of the city of Dallas, to carry out the provisions of the statute in question. Judgment m this court was for the. defendants, whereupon Davis and his asso- ciates appealed, the appeal resulting in the judgment of the court below being affirmed. There were several questions as to the application of the law to the city of Dallas, but they are not of general interest. The court decided, however, that the city was within tLe description of those municipalities contemplated by the legislature in the enactment of the statute. Another contention was as to the constitutionality of the statute, and on this point the court held that it was unconstitu- ' tional, on grounds that appear in the following quotation from the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Rasbury: .1-^* ^u ^"J*^®^ ^^Sfd' however, by counsel for appellees, that, even though the general laws under discussion are applicable, they are nevertheless without force or validity, because unconstitutional as being m contravention of article 1, section 3, * * * [of the consti- tution of the State] which provides that: "AU freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no men, pr set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate pubUc wT^''*l' "'' P"^ileges, but in consideration of public service." With such contention we agree. The rule is that all laws affecting a particular class of busmess or vocation in order to meet the require DECISIONS OF OOUBTS AFFECTING LABOR. 115 ments of the section of the constitution cited must affect all of the specified class uniformly and alike. [Cases cited.] The two con- cluding articles of the act under discussion do not comply with that rule, smce their effect is to permit a firm or partnership of plumbers to practice their trade in the event only one member thereof has suc- cessfully passed the examination before the board, while every plumber not a member of such a firm or partnership must in any event submit to the examination and be licensed by the board before he may do so. Thus, by acjjuiring membership in a firm, one who has failed to pass the examination required by law and which should be the test ahke for all would be permitted to practice his trade in competition with one who had passed the exammation, and by which method a privilege would accrue to one of the specified class not conferred upon all others in the same class. Faotokt Regulations — Wash Rooms — Constitutionality of Statute — People v. Solomon, Supreme Court of lUinois {Oct. 16, 1914), 106 Northeastern Reporter, page 458. — George W. Solomon was convicted in the Sangamon County court of failing to provide wash rooms for employees, as required by an act of the Illinois General Assembly, Laws of 1913, page 359, entitled: "An act to provide for wash rooms in certain employments to protect the health of employees and secmre public comfort.'' The first section of the act is as follows: Section 1 . Every owner or operator of a coal mine, steel mUl, foundry, machine shop, or other hkebusmess in which employees become covered with grease, smoke, dust, grime and perspiration to such extent that to remain in such condition after leaving their work without washing and cleansing their bodies and changing their clothing, will endanger their health or make their condition offensive to the public, shall provide and maintain a suitable and sanitary wash room at a con- venient place in or adjacent to such mine, mill, foundry, shop or other place of employment for the use of such employees. The remaining sections relate to equipment, enforcement, and penalties. In the Sangamon County court a motion was made to quash the information on the ground of unconstitutionality, also unreasonableness and imcertainty. This motion was denied, and on trial the defendant was convicted, whereupon he sued out a writ of error to the supreme court. Judge Craig delivered the opinion of the latter court, sustaining the act against the charges named, using in part the following language: Any act of this kind, to be vaUd, must apply to all employers of labor similarly situated or to all employers of labor where conditions obtain that would require wash rooms. The question remains: Has this object been accompUshed by naming, ^ecifically, certain em- ployments to which the act applies in the first section of the act, followed by the words, "or other Uke business iii which employees become covered with grease, smoke, dust, grime and perspiration to such extent that to remain in such condition after leaving their work 116 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. without washing and cleansing their bodies and changing their cloth- ing, will endanger their health or make their condition oflEensive to the pubhc" ? By a fair' construction of the law it applies not only to the employ- ments named, but to all other like business of an established or permanent character in which the "employees become covered with grease, smoke, dust, grime and perspiration to such extent that to remain in such condition after leaving their work without washing and cleansing their bodies and changing their clothing, wiU endanger their health or make their condition offensive to the pubUc." Under such construction the law will apply to all employments in which the conditions exist that make such a law necessary, and it would not be special or class legislation. Nor, as we construe this law, is it ambiguous and uncertain. It applies to the employments specifically mentioned in the act and to aU other like busmess of permanent character where the same con- ditions prevail and where there would be the same reasons for the law to apply. For the above reasons we are constrained to hold the law vahd and constitutional, and accordingly the judgment of the county court of Sangamon Coimty will be affirmed. Hours op Labor — ^Eight-houe Law — Employment by State — Constitutionality of Statute — Ex parte Steiner, Supreme Court oi Oregon {Dec. 23, 1913), 137 Paciiic Reporter, page 20^. — Steiner, who was the superintendent of the Oregon State Hospital, was arrested on a criminal complaint charging him with the violation of the pro- visions of chapter 61 of the General Laws of Oregon, 1913. This law provides that eight hours shall constitute a day's labor in all cases where the State is the employer, either directly or indirectly, and makes its violation by a contractor, subcontractor, or agent a misde- meanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. The acts complained of were that Steiner required an employee to perform labor as a farm hand at the asylum farm for more than eight hours in one day; also that at the same time and place an engineer was required to labor in excess of eight hours. Steiner applied for a writ of habeas corpus after he was arrested on the ground that the statute was in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution and in contravention of section 20, article 1, of the State constitution, which provides " No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges * * * which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." The writ of habeas corpus was denied, Judge Burnett dissenting. Judge McNary, in giving the opinion of the court, said in part: The State has undoubted power to prescribe for itself such rules of conduct as it deems best suited for the particular work in which it is engaged. By the legislative act in question the State simply declares that no person shall oe permitted or required to perform labor for it, KEOISIONS OF COUBTS APFEOTING LABOB. 117 or for any of its administrative agencies, more than eight hours in a calendar day, and that none need apply who desire longer hours of employment. To the contractor of State work, it says no one can work for you in excess of eight hours in a day. No barrier is placed about a laborer preventing him from seeking employment elsewhere. His liberty of selection is not interfered with, nor his right to labor frustrated. Any individual may, with propriety, declare a policy not to employ within the line of his undertaking any person for a longer period of time than eight hours in a day, or any other unit of time that might appeal to his altruism, and direct his agent to observe that regulation. And by parity of reason, the State, speaking through the legislature, may, with equal fitness, inaugurate a rule of conduct not to work its employees more than eight hours a day, and legally direct its instrumentalities of government faithfully to observe such mandate. The terms of the employment are by this statute pubUcly proclaimed, and if a person insists upon working more than the hours limited by the act, he must seek elsewhere the engagement of his labor. Hours of Labor — Eight-hour Law — Policemen and Fire- men — Albee v. Weinberger, Supreme Court of Oregon {Feb. 17, 1914), 138 Pacific Eeporter, page 859. — H. R. Albee, mayor of Portland, Oreg., apphed for a writ of habeas corpus to Andy Weinberger, constable. This was granted by the court. Albee had been arrested on complaint that he had violated the provisions of chapter 61, General Laws of Oregon, 1913, in permitting and requiring, as mayor, a designated fireman and a specified policeman to labor at their several duties more than eight hours in one day, when there was no emergency demanding the performance of such extra service. The supreme court held that the statute was not violated, not being ap- plicable to the designated employments. The statute in question (chapter 61, General Laws of 1913) fixes an eight-hour day in all cases where labor is employed by the State, county, school district, municipality, or municipal corporation or subdivision, either directly or through another, except in cases of necessity, emergency, or where public policy absolutely requires it. Judge Moore first quoted the section in question, and, holding that policemen and firemen are not laborers within the meaning of this act, used in part the following language: Giving to the term "laborer," as used in the enactment quoted, the most extensive definition applicable, it is not believed that a fireman or a policeman, employed by the city of Portland, or the services which he is ordinarily required to perform for it, makes either a laborer within the meaning of that word. It wiU be remembered that by law of that municipality all officers and members of the fire and police departments are required to take and subscribe their names to an oath of office. . , „ i , i The firemen and policemen of the city of Portland, when once selected, are not subject to dismissal upon the whim of the appointing 118 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. power, or at the command of some political boss. Goverued by the civil-service rules, a member of the fire or poUce department can hold his public position as long as he pleases, provided his physical ability continues, and he remains faithful to the trust. The ap- pointmg power being thus unable permanently to discharge a fire- man or a policeman, he is neither a servant nor an employee, but, having taken an oath faithfully to perform the duties devolving upon him, he is an officer, and therefore not a laborer within the meaning of chapter 61, Gen. Laws Oreg. 1913. It was also held that in any case the statute had not been violated, Judge Moore saying on this point: The services required to be performed by the firemen, though arduous and dangerous at times, requiring vigor and courage, the work so demanded is not constant; and, while the members of the fire department must at all times be ready to respond to alarms whenever given, they are not subjected to active toil 8 hours in any 24, except in cases of emergency which the statute recognizes as a deviation from the prescribed rule. PoUcemen, however, must, during the time limited for a per- formance of their duties, persistently and constantly patrol their beats, except when entering a building in the interest of the service, or answering an inquiry or protecting, delivering, or committing a person when arrested. While on duty they are not permitted a moment's rest but are actively engaged in the execution of their work as guardians of the peace and safety of the commimity. In the case at bar, as the members of the police department are divided into three shifts of eight hours each, the changes of the watch relieve those who have been on duty from performing more than the pre- scribed number of hours of service, except in cases of emergency. Therefore, on both grounds referred to here, there has been no violation of the provisions of the statute. It follows from these con- siderations that the petitioner should be discharged; and it is so ordered. Hours of Labor — Eight-hour Law — Public Works — Con- stitutionality OF Statute — Sweetser v. State, Court of Appeals of Maryland {Mar. 18, 1914), 90 Atlantic ReporUr, page 180.— Frank B. Sweetser was convicted in the criminal court of Baltunore City of violating the hours of labor law, Acts of 1910, ch. 94, sees. 2 and 3, which provides that in the case of contractors with the city of Baltimore (as well as the city itself) 8 hours shall constitute a day's labor, that employment shall not be for longer except in cases of emergency, that additional pay shall be given in case of longer hours, and that the pay shall be the current rate of per diem wages in the locahty where the labor is performed. On appeal the judg- ment of conviction was affirmed. The contractor in question had employed men at an hourly wage of 19 cents, the usual wage for sunilar labor being 11.90 per day of 10 hours. WhUe not required to do so, the men worked 10 hours in order to receive the full daily wage. DECISIONS OF COUBTS AFFECTING LABOB. 119 The defense was largely on the ground of the unconstitutionaUty of the law. The first point was that the contractors were deprived of property without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. While stating that sev- eral similar laws had been declared unconstitutional in other States, the court followed, among other cases, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124 (Bui. No. 50, p. 177), and quoted extensively from the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan therein, sustaining the law. Other objections, that the law places an unauthorized restraint upon a municipal corporation, and that it denies the equal protection of the laws because of the fact that it is applicable to contractors with Balti- more only, were also determined to be invalid. Hours of Labor — Eight-hour Law — Public Works — ^Lock AND Dam Furnishing Power — Chattanooga <& Tennessee River Power Co. v. United States, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit {Dec. 2, 1913), 209 Federal Reporter, page ^5.— The company named was convicted in the district court of violation of the eight-hour law of August 1, 1892, ch. 352, 27 Stat. 340 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2521). This statute forbids the employment of laborers and mechanics by a contractor on a public work of the United States more than eight hours within a calendar day, except in cases of emergency. The company contended that the building of the lock and dam on which it was engaged was not a "pubhc work." The facts, as admitted by the demurrer of the company to the complaint, which the lower court overruled, were that the company contracted to build the dam, furnishing the materials, except a specified portion which was furnished by the United States, and to vest title in the United States; and it does this work in considera- tion of a grant of right to use the water power produced by the dam. The coxirt of appeals afl&nned the decision and judgment of the lower court, on the ground that the principal object of the building of the dam by the Government was the benefit to navigation, and that it was a public work within the act. Hours of Labor — Public Laundries — CoNSTrrurioNALiTr of Ordinance — Ex parte Wong Wing, Supreme Court of California (Jan. 16, 1914), 138 PO'dfic Reporter, page 695. — Wong Wing was convicted of violation of the provisions of an ordinance of the city of San Fran- cisco, requiring cessation of work in laimdries between the hoiu-s of 6 o'clock p. m. and 7 o'clock a. m. He applied for a writ of habeas 120 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOR BTATISTIOS. corpus, and contested the constitutionality of the law. The court discharged the writ, a part of the opinion of the court being as follows: This court and the Supreme Court of the United States have declared constitutional an ordinance very similar to the one before us, where the restriction upon the hours of labor required the cessa- tion of work in pubhc laundries between the hours of 10 o'clock p. m. and 6 o'clock a. m. It is settled law that such ordinances operate alike upon all persons and property s milarly situated, and that the motives impeUing the legislators who adopt such regulations are immaterial, unless it appear that the laws operate inequitably. We are therefore^ to determine whether the limitation of the time of labor in pubhc laundries to 11 hours each day is a restriction so unreasonable that it invades the constitutional rights of persons engaged in the laundry business. We can not say that it does. Very many, perhaps a majority of, occupa- tions, employments, and forms of business in San Francisco are conducted during less than 1 1 working hours a day. The authority of the municipal legislature to prescribe hours of cessation from labor in laimdries must be conceded, under the authorities cited above, and we think the fair measure of the extent of that power s the usual period of business activity in similar sorts of employment. We can not say, therefore, that the restriction of the hours of activity pro- vided m the ordinance here attacked is an unconstitutional exercise of the legislative will of the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco. Hours of Labor — Ten-hour Law — CoNSTrruriONALrrT of Statute — Staie v. Bunting, Supreme Court of Oregon (Mar. 17, 1914), 139 Pacific Reporter, page 731. — F. O. Bunting was convicted in the circuit court of Lake County of employing a man to labor in his manufacturing establishment for more than ten hours in one day, in violation of the act, chapter 102, Acts of 1913. This conviction was affirmed on appeal over the defendant's contention that the act in question is unconstitutional. In setting aside the arguments made against the act. Judge Bean, who dehvered the opinion of the court, used in part the following language: By the adoption of the fourteenth amendment it was not designed nor mtended to curtail or limit the right of the State under its poUce power to prescribe such reasonable regulations as might be essential to the promotion of the peace, welfare, morals, education, or good order of the people. In order to warrant declaring the act violative of the fundamental law, it should be shown that in the light of the world's experience and common knowledge the act under consideration is palpably and beyond reasonable doubt one that will not tend to protect or conserve the public peace, health, or welfare in its enforcement. It is by, no means clear beyond a reasoaablo doubt that the law will not promote the peace, health, and general welfare of citizens of the State, or that longer hours of labor in fagtories would not be injurious to the health E DECISIONS OF OOTJETS AFFECTING LABCSt. IM as declared by the act, or that the act is repugnant to the Constitution. The presumption, therefore, is in favor of the wisdom and the cor- rectness of tne legislative finding and determination that the law is a necessity for the protection of the health, well-being, and general welfare of the public; that the regulation prescribed by the enact- ment will tend to correct the evil at which it is aimed. The courts can not set aside the legislative decree without intrenching upon the prerogatives of a coordinate branch of the State government, and usurping the powers of the legislature. The law does not prevent Sie laborer from working as many hours er day as he sees fit, and does not violate his right to labor as long as e may desire, but only prohibits his being employed in any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment more than a certain number of hours in any one day. The act applies to all the people in the State who employ labor in mills, factories, or manufacturing establishments. In the very nature of things the occupations affected by the law furnish a reasonable basis for the statutory regulation. In the light of the former decisions of this, court the classification is not unreasonable. [Cases cited.] It is contended by counsel for defendant that the provision for employees to work overtime not to exceed three hours in any one day, conditioned that payment be made for said overtime at tne rate of time and one-half the regular wage, renders the whole act void. It is clear that the intent of the law is to make 10 hours a regular day's labor in the occupations to which reference is made. Apparently the provisions permitting labor for the overtime on express condi- tions were made in order to faciUtate the enforcement of the law, and in the nature of a mild penalty for employing one not more than three hours' overtime. It might be regarded as more difficult to detect violations of the law by an employment for a shorter time than for a longer time. This penalty also goes to the employee in case the employer avails himself of the overtime clause. Reasonable modes of enforcing a statute should be upheld. Legislative provisions are frequently made that a portion of a fine for the infraction of a statute shall be paid to the informer. The aim of the statute is to fix the maximum hours of service in certain industries. The act makes no attempt to fix the standard of wages. No maximum or minimum wage is named. That is left wholly to the contracting parties. The statute under which the complaint is made in this case is not violative of the Constitution of the United States or of this State. As a consequence, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. HouKs OF Labok of Women — Constitutionality of Statute — Liberty of Contract — Equal Protection of the Laws — Riley v. Massachusetts, United States Supreme Court (Mar. 23, 1914), 34 Su- preme Court Reporter, page 469. — Richard G. Riley was convicted in the superior court for the county of Bristol upon a criminal complaint brought against him charging him with the violation of a statute of the State which limits the hours of labor of women and children and requires a schedule of work and meal hours to be posted, with penalties for departure therefrom. 122 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. The specific charge upon which the conviction was based was the employment of a woman at a time other than set forth in the sched- ule posted in her workroom in a cotton miU. The conviction was aflBrmed by the supreme judicial court of the State, 210 Mass. 387, 97 N. E. 367 (Bui. No. 99, p. 715) ; and the case then went to the United States Supreme Court on error, where the decision of the State court was afl&rmed, Mr. Justice McKenna dehvering the opinion, which is in part as follows : Section 48, it is urged, not only prohibits the employment of wo- men more than 10 hours a day, but that (quoting the section) "the employment of such person [woman] at a time other than as stated in said printed notice, shall be deemed a violation of the provisions of this section. " The provision is arbitrary and unreasonable, it is insisted, in that it requires the employer to post a notice in a room in which women and minors are permanently employed in laboring only six hours a day, and makes it a crime if such person is allowed to work for five minutes at a time other than as stated in the notice. But if we might imagine that an employer would so enlarge the restrictions of the statute, or be charged with violating it if he did, we yet must remem- ber that, as it was competent for the State to restrict the hours of employment, it is also competent for the State to provide administra- tive means against evasion of the restriction. [Cases cited.] Neither the wisdom nor the legahty of such means can be judged by extreme instances of their operation. The provision of section 48 can not be pronounced arbitrary. As said by the supreme judicial court, the statute "requires the hours of labor to be stipulated in advance, and then to be followed until a change is made. It does not by its terms establish a schedule of hours. This is left to the free action of the parties. Nor does it in the sections now under consideration restrict the right to labor to any particular hours. It simply makes impera- tive strict observance of any one table of hours of labor while it remains posted. In other words, the purpose of the posting of the hours of labor is to secure certainty in the observance of the law, and to prevent the defeat or circumvention of its purpose by artful practices. Hours of Service — Railroads — Casualty or Unavoidable Accident — United States v. NoHhem Pacific Railway Co., United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Aug. S, 1914), 215 Federal Re- porter, page 64- — The company named was prosecuted for alleged viola- tion of the hours of service act in keeping a conductor and two brakemen on duty more than 16 hours without 8 consecutive hours off duty. The crew which operated train No. 303 usually left Tacoma at 1.40 p. m., arriving at Portland at 6.45 p. m., making, with the 30 minutes they were required to report before starting, 5 hours and 35 minutes. Returning they left Portland at 7.25 a. m. and reached Tacoma at 12.35 p. m., being on duty 5 hours and 40 minutes. Between Tacoma DECISIONS OP COURTS APFEOTING LABOH. 123 and Lake View is a single track over which 28 trains of three different railroad companies are operated daily. On the date in question, May 12, 1913, train No. 303 left Tacoma at 1.40 p. m., as usual, but another train was derailed on the track in front of it about 10 minutes later and 6 minutes before the two trains would have met. It was a serious wreck with loss of life and much damage to the train and track. The crew of train No. 303 were delayed until 6 p. m., when they were transferred to train No. 314, which had come from Portland, and took that train back into Portland, arriving at 12.30 p. m. on the next day. After being off duty 6J hours at Portland they made their regular run the next morning and in so doing were on duty a total of about 17 hours without having had 8 consecutive hours off duty. The court decided that these conditions constituted a case of unavoidable accident, and that the company was not liable, affirming a judgment of the district court to this effect. Hours of Service — Railroads — Constitutionality of Statute — Interstate Commerce — Erie Railroad Co. v. People of the State of New Yoric, Supreme Court of the United States (May 25, 1914), SA Supreme Court Reporter, page 766. — The State of New York brought action against the railroad company named to recover a penalty for violation of the labor law as amended by chapter 627 of the Laws of 1907. The latter act made it imlawful for any operator of a railroad to require or permit any telephone or telegraph operator who spaces trains under the block system to be on duty for more than 8 hours in a day of 24 hours, except in cases of emergency. The trial term of the New York Supreme Court found the company guilty and liable to a fine of $100. The appellate division reversed this judgment and their judgment was in turn reversed by the court of appeals. The United States Supreme Court finally reversed this last judgment, finding the statute unconstitutional because Con- gress, by enacting the Federal hours of service act applying to inter- state railroads, had removed the subject from the field of State control. The complaint charged the company with requiring and permitting one David Henion, a telegraph operator, to be on duty more than 8 hours on the first day of November, 1907. The Federal act did not go into effect until March 4, 1908, so that the alleged offense occurred between the enactment and the taking effect of that act. Mr. Justice McKenna, in deHvering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, spoke in part as follows: The relative supremacy of the State and national power over interstate commerce need not be commented upon. Where there is conflict, the State legislation must give way. Indeed, when Congress acts in such a way as to manifest its purpose to exercise its constitutional authority, the regulating power of the State ceases to exist. [Cases cited.] 124 BTTLLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. This is the general principle. It was given application to an instance like that in the case at bar in Noruiern P. R. Co. v. Wash- ington, 222 U. S. 370, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160. [See Bui. No. 99, p. 718.] The [State supreme] court held that the act of Congress did not apply because of its provision that it should not take effect until one year after its passage, and until such time it should be treated as not existing. We reversed the judgment on the ground that the view expressed was not "compatible with the paramount power of Congress over interstate commerce," and we considered it elementary that the police power of the State could only exist from the silence of Congress upon the subject, and ceased when Congress acted or manifested its purpose to call into play its exclusive power. The reasoning of the opinion and the decision oppose the conten- tion of defendant in error and of the court of appeals, that the State law and the Federal law can stand together, because, as expressed by the court of appeals, "the State has simply supplemented the action of the Federal authorities," and, on account of special con- ditions prevailing within its limits, has raised the limit of safety; and the form of the Federal statute, although "not expressly legal- izing employment up to that limit, fairly seems to have invited and to have left the subject open for supplemental State legislation if necessary." We realize the strength of these observations, but they put out of view, we think, the ground of decision of the cases, and, indeed, the necessary condition of the supremacy of the congressional power. It is not that there may be division of the field of regulation, but an exclusive occupation of it when Congress manifests a purpose to enter it. Regulation is not intended to be a mere wanton exercise of power. It is a restriction upon the management of the railroads. It is induced by the public interest or safety, and the "hours of service" law of March 4, 1907, is the judgment of Confess of the extent of tiie restriction necessary. It admits of no supplement; it is the pre- scribed measure of what is necessary and sufficient for the puolic safety, and of the cost and burden which the raUroad must endure to secure it. Hours of Service — Railroads — Emergencies — Construction OF Statute — United States v. Southern Pacific Co., United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit (Nov. IS, WIS), 209 Federal Reporter, page 562. — The. United States brought action against the railroad company named to recover penalties for alleged violation of the hours of service act of 1907. The company maintains at Ogden, Utah, a train dispatcher's office operated continuously day and night. There was employed there a chief dispatcher, who had charge of the office and supervision of the six operators. These men worked ordinarily in eight-hour ' ' tricks," two working together. Op- erator Johnson was taken ill on August 27, 1912, and did not report for duty until September 2. The company being unable to find a properly qualified substitute, other operators were kept at work 12 DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 125 hours per day, as follows: Hoover on August 27, 28, and 29; Sewall on August 29, 30, and 31 ; Small on August 30 and 31 and September 1; and Miller on September 1, 2, and 3. The complamt demanded a $500 penalty on each of the 12 counts arising from these facts. The chief train dispatcher did not ordinarily have anything to do personally with the operation, but could operate the telegraph. The hours of service act allowed operators to exceed the eight-hour limit in cases of emergency, for not more than three days in one week. The district court rendered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the circuit court also held the sickness of the operator and the impossibility of getting another to constitute an emergency within the meaning of the law, overruling the contention that the railroad company was obliged to keep extra operators under pay for use in such cases. Hours of Service — Eailroads — Emergencies— Fireman Watch- ing Engine — Northern Pacific Railroad Go. v. United States, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (May 4, i914), 213 PederalReporter,page 577. — The company named was charged with violation of the hours of service act in two instances. In each the train was held up by an unusually heavy storm and snowfall, and the crew, with the exception of the fireman, relieved from duty in connec- tion with the movement of the train. The fireman in each case was required to continue watching his engine. The court held that the law was violated by this action, since, though the firemen were not actually engaged in the movement of the train while thus employed in watching and keeping up the fires, they were not enjoying the period of rest that the law contemplated and was intended to secure for all members of a train crew after the designated term of service. The case was held not to come within the provisions of the act as to emergencies, "if for no other reason, because the uncontradicted evidence, as well as the answer of the defendant company itself, shows that each of the trains in question was stopped by direction of the railroad company, sidetracked, and their respective crews laid off for rest within 16 hours from the time they left Missoula, for the very purpose of complying with the said statute, excepting only the two named firemen." Hours of Service — Eailroads — Employee on Duty — Osborne's Administrator v. Cincinnati, New Orleans cSi Texas Pacific Railway Co., Court of Appeals of Kentucky {Mar. 2^, 1914), 164 Southwestern Reporter, page 818. — F. H. Osborne was killed while employed by the company named, as a brakeman, in interstate commerce, on January 17, 1912. His administrator brought suit under the Federal 126 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OF LABOK STATISTICS. employers' liability act, alleging violation of the hours of service act, as well as negligence of the engineer and conductor of the train. Judgment was for the defendant company on both points in the circuit court of Pulaski County, and on appeal, the court of appeals found no proof of negligence, either in the matter of overemployment or otherwise, and aflBrmed the judgment of the court below. An unusual point was raised in coxmection with the contention as to the hours of service, Osborne having ridden on January 16 under orders from a point some mUes distant from his place of duty, on the day of the fatal injury, as a "deadhead." As to this. Judge CarroU, who deHvered the opinion of the court, said in part: Without going into detail as to the time Osborne was engaged on duty in the 24 hours preceding 6.15 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, it is sufficient for the purposes of this case to say that, if the time during which Osborne was "deadheading" on the 16th between Somerset and Oakdale is to be counted as hours of service, he had been on duty 16 hours in the aggregate in a 24-hour period without having had 8 consecutive hotirs off duty before he left Oakdale on the morning of the 17th at 6.15 a. m. So that the question arising is: Was Osborne engaged in service, within the meaning of the 'act, while "deadheading" during the five hours that it took the passenger train on which he was riding to run from Somerset to Oakdale ? He had been ordered by me train dispatcher to "deadhead" from Somerset to Oakdale so that he might be in Oakdale on the morning of the 17th in time to leave with his train at 6.15 a. m., and it is shown that he received compensation for the time it took the train on which he was ' ' deadheading ' ' to run from Somerset to Oakdale. The record further shows that, when a railroad employee is "deadheading," as Osborne was in going from Somerset to Oakdale on the 16th, he does not have any duties whatever to perform in connection with the movement of the train on which he is "deadheading"; that he really occupies the attitude of a passenger free from any care or responsi- bility relating to the operation or management of the train. Although we have made a very thorough examination of the cases involving the construction of tms act, we have not found one pre- senting or deciding the question whether an employee who is "dead- heading" is engaged in service connected with the movement of any train within the meaning of the act. The Interstate Commission, however, has promulgated rule No. 74, providing that "employees 'deadheading' on passenger trains or on freight trains and not required to perform, and not held responsible for the performance of, any service or duty in connection with the movement of the train upon which they are 'deadheading,' are not while so ' deadheading' ' on duty' as that phrase is used in the act regu- lating the hours of labor." This construction, although it does not have the binding force of a court decision, is yet entitled to great weight on account of the important duties this high commission exercises in administering these remedial Federal statutes, and we concur in its soimdness when applied to the facts of this case. Oppos- ing this interpretation, the argument is made for the plaintiff that DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 127 this act should be so construed aa to secure for employees relief from cares or responsibilities or orders or authority of any Kind connected with their employment during the hours of rest specified in the act. But the act is not fairly susceptible of this construction. In care- fully chosen words it describ&s an employee as a person who is "actually engaged in or connected with the movementof any train," and the hours of service feature of the act only applies to such a described peraon. The plain reading of the act forbids its application to an employee who is not actuafly engaged in or connected with the move- ment of any train, a,nd the railroad company does not violate the act, nor doas the employee come within its protecting provisions, imless it be shown that he was actually engaged in or connected with the movement of the train in the manner we have described for a longer period than the act allows without having the rast allowed by the act. This being our construction of the act, Osborne, at the time of his death, had not been engaged in service for a longer period than 16 consecutive hours, nor had he been on duty 16 hours in the aggregate in 24 without having liad at least 8 consecutive hours off duty before he again went on dutj', as, when there is added to the 5 hours' rest he had at Oakdale between 12.45 and 5.45, the time he was "deadheading," he was off duty considerably more than 8 hours. HotTRS OF Service — Railroads — Movement of Trains — Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Feb. 24,1914), 211 Federal Reporter, page 309. — This action was brought by the Government against the railway com- pany named for violation of the hours of service act. One Ed. Bergen, a fireman, after having been employed for 16 hours, was kept at work for 8 additional hours as an engine watchman while the train and locomotive were tied up at a siding. The lower court had rendered judgment for the United States, and on the defendant's appeal this judgment was affirmed. Judge Morrow, speaking for the court, said: We can not believe that it was the intention of Congress that the word "movement" should be restricted to the actual revolution of the wheels of a train or locomotive engaged in interstate commerce, for, if that interpretation were the correct one, obviously the very object of the act, the promotion of the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads, would be frustrated. The sidings of a rail- road are a part of its system and are indispensable to the proper operation and movement of its trains. Tying up on a siding for any purpose, whether to await orders, or for the passing of other trains, or for any other purpose connected with the transportation of freight or passengers, is as much a part of the general movement of a train as the actual runiiing thereof on the main hne and at scheduled periods. The fact that during the 24-hour period he was employed for 16 hours as fireman and for 8 hours as engine watchman does not lessen the offense. 12^ bulletin op the bukeatj op labor statistics. Hours of Sebtiob — Railroads — -Offices Operated Night and Pay — United States v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit {Feb. 3, 1914), ^H Federal Reporter, page 897. — In this case the trial court had rendered a judg- ment for the defendant, who was charged with violation of the hours of service act in employing certain telephone and telegraph operators for about 11 hours daily. This decision was reversed on appeal. The question of construction hinged on the interpretation of the clauses "continuously operated day and night" and "operated only during the daytime." If the office, which was regularly kept open from 6.30 a. m. to 10.15 p. m., should be adjudged to belong to the former class, the operators could be legally employed only 9 hours, and the law had been violated; if to the latter, they might be employed up to 13 hours. The court decided that since this office must be classified under one or the other of the two designations, it must be the former. Judge Knapp, who delivered the opinion of the court, discussed this matter fully, concluding his remarks as follows: If this conclusion gives greater effect to the words "operated only during the daytime" than to the words "continuously operated night and day," we think the objects of the law require that preference be accorded to a construction which recognizes the legislative intent to Eermit 13 hours of service in offices kept open only such number of ours in the aggregate as do not materially or substantially exceed the length of an ordinary day, and to prohibit more than 9 hours' serv- ice in offices kept open such number of hours in the aggregate as nec- essarily include a material or substantial portion of the night. Hours of Service — Railroads — Offices Operated Night and Day— United States v. Missouri, Kansas cfc Texas Railway Co., United States District Court, District of Kansas (Jan. 13, 1913), 208 Federal Reporter, page 957. — This was an action by the Government to recover a penalty for violation of the hours of service act (U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1321). This provides that operators, train dispatchers, etc., in offices and stations operated continuously night and day shall not be permitted to remain on duty more than 9 hours out of 24, while in those operated only during the daytime a longer period is allowed. A statenvent of facts was agreed upon, and the case referred directly to the court without trial by jury. The alleged offense consisted in employing one operator daily from 8 a. m. to 12 noon and from 1 p. m. to 7 p. m., and another operator from 7 p. m. to 12 midnight, and from 1 a. m. to 6 a. m., in the office at Coffeyville, Kans. Since neither operator was employed continuously, and the office was closed entirely between 6 a. m. and 8 a. m., the company contended that the 9-hour Umit of service did not apply to this situation. The court decided against this contention and found the company guUty of vio- DECISIONS OF COUBTS AFFECTING LABOK. 129 lation of the law,. Judge Pollock, who spoke for the court, saying that from the facts as stipulated he was of the opinion, on both authority and the very reason of the matter, that defendant had violated the act as charged. Hours of Service — Railroads — Switch Tenders — Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. United States , United States Circuit Court of Ap- peals, Eighth Circuit {Feb. 16, 191 4), 211 Federal Reporter, page 89S. — The district court, on the trial of the railway company for alleged vio- lation of the hours of service act, had rendered a judgment in favor of the United States. On appeal, this was reversed. The question was as to whether E,. ConneU and J. W. King, switch tenders in Kansas City, were included among the "operators, train dispatchers," etc., who the act provides shall not be employed more than 9 hours during any 24, or whether they might be employed up to 16 hours. Judge Garland, in delivering the opinion of the coiu"t, said : When aU is said about the duties of these men, it comes to this: Their primary duty was to throw these switches whenever necessary, and the telephones were used to inform them from time to time what was wanted in regard to the switching and in reporting to those who intended to use the switches, the preparation that had been made for -such use. It did not differ except in complexity of operation from the service performed by a brakeman who runs ahead of his train, turns a switch, and swings his hand by day, or lantern by night to signal the engineer. If one is within the proviso of section 2, so is the other, unless it be held that the mere use of the telephone briags one switchman within the 9-hour provision and leaves another who does not use it under the 16-hour clause, although the service performed is the same. But we apprehend that there will be no contention that Congress fixed the period of 9 hours for certain employees because of the use of the telephone. The difference in the hours of labor fixed by section 2 was based upon the character of the service rendered by the employee, not upon the use of the telephone. R. ConneU and J. W. King, beyond question, were not operators or dispatchers. Hours of Service — Railroads — Telegraph Operators — Knowledge of Superiors — United States v. Oregon- Washington Railroad da Navigation Co., United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington (April 23, 19U), 213 Federal Reporter, page Q88. — The United States brought action against the raihoad company named for violation of the hours of service act in permitting one Longabaugh, a telegraph operator at a station operated day and night, to work more than the 9 hours limited by the act, on April 21, 1913, and the 9 succeeding days. The stipulated facts showed 85590°— Bull. 169—15 9 130 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAIT OF LABOE STATISTICS. that the employee was agent at Wallula, and after acting as agent from 7 a. m. to 7 p. m. remained on duty as telegraph operator until 12 midnight; also that before the employee performed any excessive hours of service he was instructed by his superior officer not to work in excess of 9 hours in any 24-hour period. The sole question for decision was whether these instructions constituted a defense on the part of the company. This question was decided in the negative, Judge Rudkin, who deUvered the opinion, saying: It is now well settled that the safety appliance act and kindred statutes impose positive and absolute duties on carriers, the non- performance of which is not excused by the exercise of reasonable diligence or due care on their part, and the hours of service act admits of no other rational construction. It is urged that the words "require or permit" imply consent or knowledge on the part of the employer, and this is perhaps their common significance; but the word "permit" also means a failure to prohibit by one who has the power and authority to do so, and in my opinion the term is here used in the latter sense. I am of opinion that the knowledge of the agent, Longabaugh, was the knowledge of the company, and that the instructions given by his superior officer not to work excessive hours, or want of knowl- edge on the part of his superior officers that he did in fact work excessive hours, is no defense. Hours of Service — Railroads — Unavoidable Accident — Con- struction OF Statute — United States v. Atchison, Topeica c& Santa Fe Railway Co., United States District Court, District of Arizona (Apr. 10, 191 4), 212 Federal Reporter, pagelOOO.—The United States brought action against the railway company named for violation of the hours of service act. Two distinct violations were alleged. In the first case the delay which made the overtime employment necessary was brought about by the derailment of a freight train ahead of the passen- ger train concerned. The statute provides that the act shall not apply "where the delay was the result of a cause not known to the carrier or its officer or agent in charge of such employee at the time said employee left a terminal and which could not have been fore- seen." After a full discussion of the point the court decided that the word "terminal" in this case would be construed to mean the point where the crew began its run, and not the intermediate station where the train might have been tied up and the crew eventually replaced by another. Judgment was given for the defendant, therefore, on the counts involving this alleged violation. In the second instance the train hauled, by means of a chain, a freight car with a broken drawhead, which car did not contain live stock or perishable freight. This in itseK was unlawful, and it ap- peared that it contributed to the delay. On this part of the complaint DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 131 the company was adjudged guilty. Judge Sawtelle, who deUvered the opinion of the court, spoke as follows : The proviso in the statute allows the carrier credit for all lawful delays caused to a train crew on its run by casualty, unavoidable acci- dent, or act of God, or by any cause not known to, or which could not have been foreseen, by the officers or agents of the carrier at the time the crew started from its terminal on its run, but allows no credit for delays not covered by the proviso; and, consequently, if the train is delayed by casualty, accident, or act of God, or other lawful cause, for one hour at one place and another hour at another place, and then is delayed another hour at another place by a cause which was known- to or could have been foreseen by the officers and agents of the carrier at the time the crew left the terminal or started on its run, and the regular schedule time of the train was 16 hours, and ui consequence of the delays mentioned, the time taken for the run is 19 hours, the carrier is liable, because it was entitled to have spent 18 hours only on the run, and not 19 hours. It being thus unlawful to haul this car with chains, and the evidence without dispute showing that delays to the train between Cliffs and Winslow were caused by this car, it follows that such delays were not the result of casualty or unavoid- able accident, and not within the proviso. Hours of Service — Railroads — Unavoidable Accident — Con- struction OF Statxtfe — United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., United States District Court, Western District of Wis- consin (Apr. 16, 1914), 212 Federal Reporter, pagedlJ^. — Suit was brought against the railroad company named for violation of the Federal hours of service act by keeping four employees on duty for IS-J hours on July 18, 1912. A plea to guilty of technical violation of the law was filed. The delay in reaching the destination and relieving the men from duty was caused by the use of warm and impure water from a creek, this being made necessary by heavy switching on a temporary logging road. The injectors of the engine were in good condition, but failed to work properly with the water thus supplied, so that finally the engine had to run alone to the end of the line and secure water and go back and haul the train to the terminus. These circumstances, the court decided, constituted a case of unavoidable accident, so that the company would not be compelled to pay a penalty, but only the costs of the proceedings. Hours of Service — Eailroads— Unavoidable Casualty — Con- struction OF Statute — United States v. New York, Ontario & Western Railway Co., United States District Court, Northern District of New York (Sept. 11, 1914), 216 Federal Reporter, page 70^.— The railroad company named, operating a railroad with termini in New Jersey and New York, employs at its division headquarters in Nor- wich, N. Y., train dispatchers and also so-called "copy operators," 132 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. who act as assistants to the dispatchers in a clerical capacity, two ol whom, however, are competent to act as dispatchers in emergencies. Violations of the Federal hours of service act were charged against this company, occurring on November 14, 1912, and July 22, 1913. On the former date the mother of a dispatcher, who was a member of his household, died suddenly, and a copy operator, who had had 8 hours' rest since performing his regular duties, was called upon to serve as dispatcher after the previous dispatcher had worked his regular "trick" of 8 hours and 1 hour additional; the substitute worked as dispatcher from midnight until 7 a. m. On the latter date the dispatcher was taken severely iU, and the same copy operator served during the same hours. The judgment was in favor of the defendant, the court holding that the company was exempted from responsibility for the over- time work of the employee by the terms of the act. The grounds upon which this decision are based are shown by the following extracts from the opinion as delivered by Judge Ray: After providing for the time beyond which in any 24 hours the operator can not be employed without incurring the prescribed penalty, the act provides as follows: "Provided that the provisions of this act shall not apply in case of casualty, or unavoidable accident, or the act of God." As to the transaction of July 22, 1913, the sudden and unexpected sickness of Brookins absolutely disabled him. It was not an accident, within the commonly accepted definition of the word. Was it a casualty ? Brookins was a part of the railroad itself, in that he was one of its employees engaged in the running and operation of its trains. Without Brookins and others like him the road could not operate, and hence, when he broke down suddenly and unexpectedly, the railroad itself, through its operating forces, was acted upon. If Brookins, on his way to take the trick, had been run over by an automobile and killed or seriously injured, without fault on his part, so as to disa,ble him, there would have occurred, not only an acci- dent (unavoidable so far as he and the defendant railroad were concerned) but a casualty. In my judgment in such a case the provisions of the act would not apply. After showing that the death of the dispatcher's mother in the even- ing a short time before the time for him to commence duty was "either a casualty, an unavoidable accident, or the act of God," the opinion continues: If, then, a casualty, or an unavoidable accident, or an act of God, occur and intervene, making it necessary to work an employee over- time, assuming the railroad company has done its duty in having in its employ a reasonable number of employees to take care of ordinary conditions, including mishaps and occurrences reasonably 'to be appre- hended and liable to occur, and the employee is worked overtime the act does not apply. ' bECISIONS OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOB. 133 The other contention of the defendant, that the law did not in any case apply to the employee Towner, a "copy operator," since in the previous employment during the 24 hours he had not been an operator or train dispatcher, was held to be untenable. Judge Ray saying in part: I think Towner was within the reason and the spirit of the act. He could not within a given 24-hour period work 8 or 9 horn's as copy operator, and later and within the same 24^0^* period work 8 or 9 hours more as train dispatcher. The very object or purpose of the law would forbid this. For the reasons previously given, however, the railroad was held within the proviso of the act, and not guilty of the offense alleged. HouES OF Service — Railroads — Waiting Time — United States v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., United States District Court, Eastern District of WasJiington (Apr. 21, 1914), 213 Federal Reporter, page 539. — In this case employees were engaged in running a train during a period covering altogether 17^ hours in one day, but during that time, for 1^- hours while the train was waiting for other trains to pass, their train was placed in the hands of a switching crew and the regular crew relieved from duty. The court held that there was nevertheless a violation of the law, saying that if the necessarily brief period which trainmen have for rest and recreation can be broken into small frag- ments, they will be wholly deprived of any substantial period for either sleep or rest. The decision in M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 34 Sup. Ct. 26 (see Bui. No. 152, p. 128), was considered as governing this case. In.junction — Contempt — Limitation of Actions — Oompers et al. V. United States, Supreme Court of the United States (May 11, 1914), 34 Supreme Court Reporter, page 693. — The proceedings against Samuel Gompers, John Mitchell, and Frank Morrison for contempt in violating the iajunction issued against them and others for continuing a boycott against the Buck Stove & Range Co. were noted in Bulletin No. 152, page 218, and in previous bulletins there mentioned. The matter was brought from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia on a writ of certiorari, the principal defense of the petition- ers being that of the statute of hmitation^. Rev. Stat., sec. 1044, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 725. Their contention that this statute was applicable and barred the carrying out of the penalty was sustained by the court in its opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Holmes, from which the following is quoted: It may be assumed for the purpose of our decision that the evidence not only warranted but required a finding that the defendants were 134 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. guilty of some, at least, of the violations of this decree that were charged against them, and so we come at once to consider the statute of Umitations, which is their only real defense. The statute provides that "no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense not capital, except * * * unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within three years next after such offense shall have been committed." The opinion then recited various speeches and writings of the defendant Gompers, giving the dates of the same, extending up to November, 1908. Continuing, Mr. Justice Holmes said: The charges against Mitchell and Morrison are mainly for having taken part in some of the above-mentioned pubHcations, but need not be stated particularly, as all the acts of any substance in Mitchell's case and aU in that of Morrison were more than three years old when these proceedings began. The boycott against the company was not called off until July 19 to 29, 1910, and it is argued that, even if the statute applies, the con- spiracy was continuing until that date (United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 607, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124), and therefore that the statute did not begin to run until then. But this is not an indictment for conspiracy, it is a charge of specific acts in disobedience of an injunction. It is urged in the first place that contempts can not be crimes, because, although punishable by imprisonment, and therefore, if crimes, infamous, they are not within the protection of the Constitu- tion and the amendments giving a right of trial by jury, etc., to persons charged with such crimes. It does not foUow that contempts of the class under consideration are not crimes, or rather, in the language of the statute, offenses, because trial by jury as it has been gradually worked out and fought out has been thought not to extend to them as a matter of constitutional right. These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental charac- teristic of crimes as that word has been understood in English speech. So truly are they crimes that it seems to be proved that in the early law they were punished only by the usual criminal procedure, 3 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, N. S. p. 147 (1885), and that, at least in England, it seems that they still may be and prefer- ably are tried in that way. [English statute and English and Ameri- can cases cited.] No reason has been suggested to us for not giving to the statute its natural scope. The English courts seem to think it wise, even when there is seeming reason for the exercise of a summary power, to leave the punishment of this class of contempts to the regular and formal criminal process. Re Macleod, 6 Jur. 461. Maintenance of their authority does not often make it reaUy necessary for courts to exert their own power to punish, as is shown by the English practice in more violent days than these, and there is no more reason for pro- longing the period of liability when they see fit to do so than in the case where the same offense is proceeded against in the common way. Indeed, the punishment of these offenses peculiarly needs to be DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOK. 135 speedy if it is to occur. The argument loses little of its force if it should be determined hereafter, a matter on which we express no opinion, that in the present state of the law an indictment would not lie for a contempt of a court of the United States. Even if the statute does not cover the case by its express words, as we think it does, still, in dealing with the punishment of crime a rule should be laid down, if not by Congress, by this court. The power to punish for contempt must have some hmit in time, and in defining that hmit we should have regard to what has been the pohcy of the law from the foundation of the Government. By analogy, if not by enactment, the limit is three years. Injunction — Contempt — Eeview on Habeas Corpus Proceed- ings — Ex parte Heffron et al., St. Louis Court of Appeals (Dec. 31, 1913), 162 Southwestern Reporter, page 652. — William H. Heffron, George Ringler, and Oscar Close had been imprisoned for failure to pay a fine levied against them in contempt proceedings in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis. The present case was an original proceeding instituted in the St. Louis court of appeals through a suing out by the parties named of a writ of habeas corpus, the claim being set up that they were improperly restrained of their liberty. The result of the hearing was that the writ was granted and the men released. The petitioners were members of a waiters' union, and with others had been enjoined, among other things, from either singly or in numbers stationing themselves or congregating upon the sidewalk adjoining and in front of plaintiff's p.ace of business, for the purpose of distributing cards or circulars containing statements concerning plaintiff or its business or of addressing remarks concern- ing plaintiff or its business to persons passing along the sidewalk; from either singly or in numbers patrolling the sidewalks adjoining such place of business, and from preventing or attempting to prevent by the use of force, violence, threats, menaces, or intimidation any person from patronizing the plaintiff's place of business or any of its employees from performing their duties. The petitioner Close was charged with having committed an assault on one Primm within a short time after he had left the plaintiff's establishment, while the other parties were charged with violations of the picketing provisions without violence or intimidation so far as appeared on the record. Judge Nortoni, who delivered the opinion of the court, stated first that there could be no doubt that a court of equity would restrain persons confederated through a conspiracy to entail substantial injury upon the business of another, as by persuasion of his patrons against their will or interfering with his business through violence or threats, and stated that in the present instance "The judgment of conviction and the commitment issued thereon are whoUy insuffi- 136 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAXJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. cient to justify the punishment as for contempt o' the three peti- tioners for the reasons: First, that the court was without power to make the broad and sweeping order for a violation of which peti- tioners Heffron and Ringler are convicted; and, second, because it does not appear from the finding of facts that petitioner Close vio- lated the terms of the order on which he was convicted." Cases were cited to support the proposition that one imprisoned as for con- tempt for violating an order which the court was without authority to make may be released on habeas corpus, of which proposition the court said, "There can be no doubt." Of the injunction itself Judge Nortoni said in part: Obviously so much of this injunction as merely restrains defendants singly or in numbers from stationing themselves or congregating upon the sidewalk adjoining and in front of plaintiff's business for the purpose of distributing cards or circulars concerning plaintiff or its Dusmess or of addressing remarks concerning plaintiff or its business to persons along the sidewalk avails nothing. While it was competent for the court to enjoin the defendants from congregating and stationing themselves upon the sidewalk in front of the premises of the catering company so as to interfere with the free ingress and egress from its place of business, no such inhibition is to be found in the order, but instead, it proceeds in broad and sweeping language as though any congregation or standing upon the sidewalk by them was unlawful. In this the injunction exceeded the power of the court in that behalf, unless such conduct is to be prohibited on other grounds. So much of the injunction as purports to enjoin the petitioners "either singly or in numbers" from patrolling the sidewalk adjoining plaintiff's business avails nothing, for it does not appear what the court intended thereby. This is vague and indefinite. The word "patrolling" involves the idea of one walking to and fro as a guard, but in and of itself implies nothing unlawful. It was certainly com- petent for the coiu't to enjoin patrolling against patrons or prospective patrons of plaintiff's busmess from entering there or for thie purpose of interfering with its employees. It was competent, too, for the court to enjoin such patrolling as might interfere with the free use of the sidewalk to afforcf ingress and egress to plaintiff's premises, or such as would be accompanied with threats, intimidation, violence, or con- duct that should annoy and deter plaintiff's patrons or employees, but nothing of this kind is enjoinea. So much of the injunction as inhibits the defendants from preventing or attempting by the use of force, violence, threats, menaces, or mtimidation to prevent any person from patronizing plaintiff's place of business is certainly vahd and within the power of the court. So, too, is that portion of the order which forbids petitioners from compelling or attempting to compel by threats, intimidation, or acts of force or violence any of the employees of plaintiff to fail to perform their duties as such employees. The court then reviewed the evidence on which Heffron and Ringler were convicted, and concluded: So it appears that, though these petitioners were found to have been engaged in patrolling and picketing, these words in and of them- DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTING LABOB. 137 selves imply nothing unlawful, and there is no finding that in pursuing the patrolling and picketing they interfered with the free access as by ingress and egress to the premises of the catering company or threat- ened, intimidated, or coerced either plaintiff, any of its officers, employees, patrons, or in any wise conducted themselves in a manner obnoxious to the law. As to the assault on Primm by petitioner Close it was said : The injunction forbids the petitioners from exercising violence or assaulting any person patronizing plaintiff's said place of business or any of plaintiff's employees. If Primm, whom the court finds was assaulted by the petitioner Close, was either a patron of the catering company or one of its employees, the facts should have been so found by the court and stated in the judgment convicting him, for no intendments or implications may be invoked in aid of it. It may be that Close committed an unprovoked assault upon Primm on the sidewalk near plaintiff's place of business, for which Close would be answerable under the criminal laws of the State or under the ordi- nance of the city, but this alone is not sufficient to render him subject to imprisonment as for contempt for violating the order of the court, which restrains such conduct only when directed against a patron or an employee of the catering company. The mere fact that Primm had recently come out of the catering company's place of business is not sufficient under the strict rule which obtains to sustain the con- viction for contempt because of an assault upo^i him, for we can not infer, and it is not implied, that Primm was either a patron or an einployee of the catering company. it is clear that both the judgment of contempt and the commitment thereon are insufficient to justify the conviction and imprisonment of the petitioners, and they should therefore be discharged. Labor Organizations — Boycotts — ^Antitrust Law — Knowl- edge OF Members of Organization — Lawlor et al. v. Loewe et al., VnitedStates Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (Dec. 18, 1913),-209 Federal Reporter, page 721 . — This case was before the circuit court of appeals on a writ of error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, to review a judgment entered November 1 5, 1912, in favorof the plaintiffs for the sum of $252,130, being the amount of a trebled verdict for damages, with interest, costs, and counsel fees. The case is known as the Danbury Hatters' Case, and has been before the courts for nearly a decade. Loewe & Co. were makers of hats in Danbury, Conn., and their products were boycotted by the hatters' union because of a refusal of the employers to unionize their shops. Action for damages was brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the Supreme Court held the act applicable to the case (Bui. No. 75, p. 622). The question under consideration in the present in- stance was as to the liability of the individual members for the damages found to have been suffered by the company, the circuit 138 BULLETll^ OS THJi BUBEAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. court of appeals affirming the finding of the court below to this effect. On further appeal, this was afl&rmed by the Supreme Court (p. 140, post). The facts are set forth with sufficient fullness in the portion of the opinion of the court quoted below, which was delivered by Judge Coxe. When this cause came on for the second trial all of the fundamental questions of law had been disposed of. That the antitrust act is ap- i)Hcable to such combinations as are alleged in the complaint is no onger debatable. It makes no distinction between classes, employ- ers and employees, corporations and individuals, rich and poor, are alike included in its terms. The Supreme Court [208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, Bui. No. 75, p. 622], particularly points out that al- though Congress was frequently importuned to exempt farmers' organizations and labor unions from its provisions, these efforts aU faued and the act stiU remains, after nearly a quarter of a century of trial, unmarred by amendment, in the language originally adopted. In short, the court held that if the plaintiffs proved the conspiracy . or combination as alleged in the complaint, they were within the anti- trust act and entitled to the damages sustained by them. The plaintiffs proved, either without contradiction or by testimony which the jury was justified in accepting as true, the following propo- sitions: First. That they were engaged in making hats at Danbury, Conn., and had a large interstate business, employing union and nonunion labor. Second. That the individual defendants are members of a trade- union known as the United Hatters of North America, which was organized in 1896 and, with a few exceptions unnecessary to con- sider, paid dues to the local unions at Danbury, Bethel or Norwalk, Conn. These dues, after deducting a certain percentage for the ex- Senses of the local unions, were sent to the treasurer of the United [atters. Third. That the United Hatters were affihated with the American Federation of Labor, one of the objects of the latter organization be- ing to assist its members in any "justifiable boycott" and with finan- cial help in the event of a strike or lockout. Fourth. That the United Hatters, through their connection with the Federation of Labor and affiliated associations, exercised a vast infiuence throughout the country and, by the use of the boycott and secondary boycott, had it in their power to cripple, if not destroy, any manufacturer \/ho refused to discharge a competent servant be- cause he was not a member of the union. Fifth. That in March, 1901, the United Hatters had resolved to unionize the plaintiff's factory and informed Mr. Loewe to that effect, their president stating that they hoped to accomplish this in a peaceful manner, but if not, they would resort to their "usual meth- ods." Sixth. That on the morning of July 25, 1902, the plaintiffs' employ- ees were directed to strike and the union men left the factory on that day, the nonunion men the day after. Seventh. That this strike temporarily paralyzed the plaintiffs' business, and they were not able to reorganize untQ January, 1903, and then with a force many of whom were unskilled. DECISIONS 01' COURTS AFFECTING LABOK. 139 Eighth. That almost immediately after the strike a boycott was established and agents of the hatters were sent out to induce the plaintiffs' customers not to buy any more hats of them. This boycott was successful, and converted a profit of $27,000 made in 1901 into losses ranging from 117,000 in 1902 to $8,000 in 1904, destroying or curtailing a large part of the plaintiffs' business carried on between Danbury, Conn., and several other States. It appears, then, that a combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade was entered iuto to the great damage of the plaintiffs and that all of the defendants who participated therein or aided and abetted the active workers in the conspiracy or contributed to its support are Hable if they knew of its existence. The principal question of fact, therefore, is, did the defendants know of the conspiracy or is the evidence of such a character that the jury were justified in finding that they must have known of its existence ? And here it is important to remember that the law does not require the proof of conspiracy by direct and positive proof. This is true even in criminal cases and the reason therefor is plain. Conspirators do not put their agreements in writing; they do not disclose their identity or publish their plans. They work in the dark, they may never be seen together, their acts may have no apparent relation to each other, but if it appears that they are all working to accomplish an unlawful purpose which is for their common benefit and in the gains of which aU are to share, a jury is justified in finding the existence of a conspiracy. It is not necessary that there be a formal agreement between the conspirators. If the evidence satisfies the jury that they acted in concert, understandingly and with the design to consummate an unlawful purpose, it is sufficient. It is not necessary that each conspirator shall know of all of the means employed to carry out the purposes of the conspiracy. As to the defendants who were in the employ of the plaintiffs at the time of the strike and participated therein, we understand that it is not pretended that they were ignorant of the general purpose of the United Hatters. As to the remainder, estimated by the defendants' counsel to be about 90 per cent, it is contended that they knew nothing of the purpose of the strike except that it was "to establish union conditions in that particular (Loewe's) factory." The defendants reside in Bethel, Norwalk or Danbury, all in the same general locality and so near that it is highly improbable that an event of vital importance to one union would not be known to the other two. But in order to show that the dispute between Loewe and the- union excited general interest in the community, newspaper articles published in these towns were introduced in evidence, not as proof of the circumstances therein narrated but to show the improba- bility of the defendants being ignorant of matters which were con- stantly being made public and were of vital significance to them, relating as they did, to a controversy which might impair or destroy their own means of livelihood. As to 115 of these defendants it was stipulated that if called as witnesses they would testify "that they read with more or less regularity some local newspapers in their respective towns, but not completely or invariably." As to the Journal of the United Hatters, it was stipulated that the secretaries 140 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. of the local unions in question received copies which were distributed in the various factories without charge, so that the workmen there could read them if they desired to do so. The plaintiffs introduced the minutes of the meetings of the local unions of which the defend- ants were members; also extracts from the Federationist, a monthly- journal of the Federation of Labor and a notice, warning all members of labor unions that th^ would be held responsible for unlawful acts of such unions, their officers and agents. A copy of this notice was sent to aU hatters whose names appeared in the Danbury Directory. It can not be denied that all this evidence was competent as to those who actually received it or had knowledge of it and we think it was for the jury to say whether it was sufficient to put the alleged con- spirators upon notice of the iEegal measures by which it was proposed to enforce the demands of the defendants. Without attempting to review the testimony in detail, it suffices to say that the jury were fully justified in finding that the measures adopted by the defendants prevented the free fiow of commerce between the States. The great bulk of the plaintiffs' business was in States other than Connecticut, to which States the product of their iactoTj was shipped and the proof shows that they suffered great Eecuniary loss, equal at least to the amount found by the jury, ecause of their inability to sell to their interstate customers. After discussing the question of the admission of certain testimony, the court decided that while only acts taking place before the com- mencement of the suit were or could be considered, damages subse- quently resulting from such acts had been properly shown in testimony and considered by the jury in arriving at the total damages. The opinion concludes as follows: No one can examine this voluminous record without being impressed with the fact that the trial was conducted with perfect impartiality and with a determination on the part of the judge that bom parties should have an absolutely fair trial. We are convinced that the defendants have had such a trial and that no error was committed which would justify us in imposing upon the parties the expense and delay of a third trial. The judgment is affirmed with costs. Labor Organizations — Boycotts — Antitrust Law — Liability OF Members for Damages — Lawlor v. Loewe, Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 5, 1916), 35 Supreme Court Reporter, page 170.— This case was before the Supreme Court on a writ of error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals; see Lawlor v. Loewe, above. For other proceedings growing out of this controversy see 139 Fed. 71 (Bui. No. 61, p. 1067); 148 Fed. 924 (Bui. No. 70, p. 710); 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (Bui. No. 75, p. 622); 187 Fed. 522 (Bui. No. 96, p. 780); see also 130 Fed. 633; 142 Fed. 2l6. The facts briefly stated in the present opinion, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Holmes and sustained the judgment of the court of DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 141 appeals, appear in greater fullness in the opinion of the court of appeals, given above. The opinion in the present instance is brief, and is reproduced practically in fuU: This is an action under the act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, sec. 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210, for a combination and conspiracy in restraint of commerce among the States, specifically directed against the plain- tiffs, (defendants in error,) among others, and effectively carried out with the infliction of great damage. The declaration was held good on demurrer in 208 XL S. 274 [Bui. No. 75, p. 622], where it will be found set forth at length. The case now has been tried, the plaintiffs have got a verdict, and the judgment of the district court has been affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 209 Fed. Rep. 721 ; 126 C. C. A. 445 [p. 137, ante]. The grounds for discussion under the statute that were not cut away by the decision upon the demurrer have been narrowed still further since the trial by the case of Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, 234 U. S. 600 [p. 53, ante]. Whatever may be the law otherwise, that case establishes that, irrespective of compulsion or even agreement to observe its intima- tion, the circulation of a list of "unfair dealers," manifestly intended to put the ban upon those whose names appear therein, among an important body of possible customers combined with a view to joint action and in anticipation of such reports, is within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act if it is intended to restrain and restrains commerce among the States. It requires more than the bhndness of justice not to see that many- branches of the United Hatters and the Federation of Labor, to both of which the defendants belonged, in pursuance of a plan emanating from headquarters made use of such lists, and of the primary and secondary boycott in their effort to subdue the plaintiffs to their demands. The union label was used and a strike of the plaintiffs' employees was ordered and carried out to the same end, and the purpose to break up the plaintiffs' commerce affected the quality of the acts. (Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 299 [28 Sup. Ct. 301, Bui. No. 75, p. 622].) We agree with the circuit court of appeals that a combination and conspiracy forbidden by the statute were proved, and that the question is narrowed to the responsibility of the defendants for what was done by the sanction and procurement of the societies above named. The court in substance instructed the jury that if these members paid their dues and continued to delegate authority to their officers unlawfully to interfere with the plaintiffs' interstate commerce in sueh circumstances that they knew or ought to have known, and such officers were warranted in the belief that they were acting in the matters within their delegated authority, then such members were jointly liable, and no others. It seems to us that this instruc- tion sufficiently guarded the defendants' rights, and that the defend- ants got all that they were entitled to ask in not being held chargeable with knowledge as matter of law. It is a tax on credulity to ask anyone to believe that members of labor unions at that time did not know that the primary and secondary boycott and the use of the "We don't patronize" or "Unfair" list were means expected to be employed in the effort to unionize shops. Very possibly they were 142 BULLETIN OF THE BXJKEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. thought to be lawful. See Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604 [34 Sup. Ct. 693, p. 133, ante]. By the constitution of the United Hat- ters the directors are to use " all the means in their power" to bring shops "not under our jurisdiction" "into the trade." The by-laws provide a separate fund to be kept for strikes, lockouts, and agitation for the union label. Members are forbidden to sell nonunion bats. The Federation of Labor with which the Hatters were affiliated had organization of labor for one of its objects, helped affiliated unions in trade disputes, and to that end, before the present trouble, had provided in its constitution for prosecuting and had prosecuted many what it called legal boycotts. Their conduct in this and former cases was made public especially among the members in every possible way. If the words of the documents on their face and with- out explanation did not authorize what was done, the evidence of what was done publicly and habitually showed their meaning and how they were interpreted. The jury could not but find that by the usage of the unions the acts complained of were authorized, and authorized without regard to their interference with commerce among the States. We think it unaecessary to repeat the evidence of the publicity of this particular struggle in the common newspapers and union prints, evidence that made it almost inconceivable that the defendants, all living in the neighborhood of the plaintiffs, did not know what was done in the specific case. If they did not know that, they were bound to know the constitution of their societies, and at least well might be found to have known how the words of those constitutions had been construed in act. It is suggested that injustice was done by the judge speaking of "proof" that in carrying out the object of the associations unlawful means had been used with their approval. The judge cautioned the jiu-y with special care not to take their view of what had been proved from him, going even farther than he need have gone. (Graham v. United States, 231 U. S. 474, 480.) But the context showed plainly that proof was used here in a popular way for evidence and must have been understood in that sense. Damages accruing since the action began were allowed, but only such as were the consequence of acts done before and con- stituting part of the cause of action declared on. This was correct. (New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co. v. EstiU, 147 U. S. 591, 615, 616.) We shall not discuss the objections to evidence separately and in detail as we find no error requiring it. The in- troduction of newspapers, etc., was proper in large part to show pubMcity in places and directions where the facts were hkely to be brought home to the defendants, and also to prove an intended and detrimental consequence of the principal acts, not to speak of other grounds. The reason given by customers for ceasing to deal with sellers of the Loewe hats, including letters from deflers to Loewe & Co., were admissible. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1729 (2). We need not repeat or add to what was said by the circuit court of appeals with regard to evidence of the payment of dues after this suit was begun. And in short neither the argument nor the perusal of the voluniinous brief for the plaintiffs in error shows that they suffered any injustice or that there was any error requiring the judg- ment to be reversed. Judgment affirmed. decisions op courts affecting laboe. 143 Labok Organizations — Conspiracy — Transportation of Ex- plosives IN Passenger Trains in Interstate Commerce — Evi- dence — Ryan et al. v. United States, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit (June S, 1914), 216 Federal Reporter, page 13. — Frank M. Ryan and 29 others were convicted, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, of conspiracy to commit a crime against the United States, and of transporting, aiding and abetting the transportation of dynamite and nitroglycerin in passenger trains and cars in commerce between the several States of the United States, and brought a writ of error. From 1905 until 1911 a strike was in force by the International Association of Bridge & Structural Iron Workers against the Amer- ican Bridge Co. and all concerns affiliated with it. From 1906 on explosives were used to blow up buildings and bridges under con- struction by the National Erectors' Association and others where the open-shop plan was followed. The number, distribution, and destructiveness of these explosions, and the connection with them of the labor unions mentioned, of which nearly aU the plaintiffs in error were officers or members, will be shown in quotations given from the opinion of the circuit court of appeals, which was delivered by Judge Seaman. After stating the substance of the various counts of the indictment, which charge an unlawful transportation of explo- sives, prohibited by sections 37, 232, et seq., of the Criminal Code, he said: The charges are, not only necessary but in truth, limited to offenses against the United States, which are alone within Federal cognizance, and if the primary contentions on behalf of all the plaintiffs in error are tenable, as stated by counsel at the outset of their argument for reversal, it is plain that none of the convictions can be upheld. Under our system of criminal jurisdiction the requirement is ele- mentary that Federal cognizance is strictly limited to violation of the Federal criminal statutes; and offenses against the State, either statutory or common-law, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State courts respectively. After further discussion of the indictment and the objections to it on the part of the plaintiffs in error, Judge Seaman continued: The authorities concur, as we understand their import, in these definitions of the conspiracy denounced by section 5440, R. S. (as preserved in section 37 of the Criminal Code), namely: That it is distinguishable from the common-law offense of conspiracy, in that it requires for completion and conviction that "one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy"; that, when so carried . forward by anj' overt act, it constitutes an offense entirely irrespective, either of its success or of the ultimate objects sought to be accomplished by conspiring "to commit any offense agamst the United States"; that "liability for conspiracy is not taken away by its success, that is, by the accomplishment of the substantive offense at which the conspiracy aims ; and that the 144 BULLETIN OF THE BUHEAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. conspiracy so denounced may either intend and be accomplished by one or several acts which complete the offense, or it niay be made by the parties a continuing conspiracy for a course of conduct m violation of law to effect its purposes. Considerable space is then given to a discussion of the nature of the evidence and to the facts presented therein, involving numerous cases of the destruction of property, life also being destroyed, under circumstances showing a fixed plan and the purpose to achieve an apparent end, the whole extending over a series of years, from 1906 to 1911. Following is a summary: The premises of fact which are settled by the above recitals — lay- ing out of view the far more serious course of crimes which appear m evidence as committed pursuant to the primary conspiracy — may be recapitulated as follows: Executive officers, members, and agents of the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, were engaged in a joint undertaking — rightly charged as a conspiracy — to use dynamite, nitroglycerin, and so-called "infernal machines," in required quantities, at many places in various States, either in succession or simultaneously as planned, through agents not residing in such places. For such use these explosives were pro- vided and stored at various storage places, arranged for the purpose in various States, to be carried by the agents for use as required, in special carrying cases provided for the purpose, to distant places with needful dispatch and secrecy, so that interstate carriage on passenger cars as averred in the counts, was made necessary for use thereof in other places and States as constantly ordered by the con- spirators ; and all expenses for such explosives and for their storage and carriage as described "were paid out of the funds of the Inter- national Association," and "drawn upon checks signed by the sec- retary-treasurer, John J. McNamara, and by the president, Frank M. Ryan" (plaintiff in error). In 25 instances proven such interstate carriages were performed by an agent, as averred in the coimts respectively, for designated use of the explosives. Furthermore, the twofold fact of conspiracy for use of the explosives, and that the defendants McManigal, both McNamaras and Hockin were con- spirators therein is, in substance, conceded in the argument to be established by the evidence; and it is undisputed that the evidence proves the defendant Edwin Clark to be another member of such conspiracy. These basic facts directly bearing upon the issues are followed up with connecting evidence of the following nature: Written corre- spondence on the part of many of the plaintiffs in error, both between one and another thereof and with other defendants, inclusive of the above-mentioned conspirators, together with letters from one and another of such conceded conspirators to one of the plaintiffs in error and to other defendants, properly identified, constitute one volume of printed record; and these letters furnish manifold evidence, not only of understanding between the correspondents of the pur- poses of the primary conspiracy, but many thereof convey informa- tion or directions for use of the explosives, while others advise of destruction which has occurred, and each points unerringly not only to the understanding that the agency therein was that of the con- DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 145 spirators, but as well to the necessary step in its performance of trans- porting the explosives held for such use. This line of evidence clearly tends to prove and may weU be deemed convincing of the fact of conspiracy on the part of many, if not all, of the correspondents ; and many, if not all, of the uses of explosives therein referred to are established by other evidence to have occurred, together with direct evidence of carriage of explosives for such use, as cnarged. The president of the association was the plaintiff in error Ryan, and John J. McNamara was its secretary and treasurer, up to his conviction and sentence (for crimes committed in California) in 1911, thus covering the entire period embraced in the present charges. Under its organization provision was made for monthly reports to show all expenditures of association funds and publication thereof iu the official journal. On December 13, 1905, Ryan wrote to Mc- Namara, that it was best to discontinue such publication "while this trouble is on," and in February ensuing the ofHcial magazine published a notice by the ' ' executive board ' ' of the association that publication of such reports would cease ' ' during our strike " and until further instruc- tions. The last letter in evidence, written by John J. McNamara, April 13, 1911 — the day after his arrest and the concurrent arrest of McMani- gal — may well be mentioned in this connection both for its general bearing and for its statements that "some organization matters must be surrounded with the utmost secrecy," and that, "even after some- thing has been accomplished, experience has proven the least said about it the better"; also a circular, entitled "Important Warning," dated June 16, 1911, signed jointly by plaintiff m error Ryan and by Hockin (who was one of the original plaintiffs in error and the undisputed director of the explosions), and sent to the officers and members of the association, in effect cautioning all members to keep silent on aU actions of the officers thereof of which they may have information, in the view that "traitors wiU be more active than ever at this particular time." The executive board of the association constituted the managing directors of its policy and affairs, and one of their duties was examination and audit of aU expenditures for payment out of its funds. President Ryan and several other plain- tiffs in error constituted this board and held frequent meetings at the headquarters in Indianapolis (aside from their respective visits to "fields of operation"), throughout the period during which explosives were purchased, stored, and transported as proven, in performance of their various duties and purposes. We do not understand that minutes of their meetings are in evidence showing their action upon any expenditures during this period, nor does it appear whether record of the fact or items was preserved in any form other than the checks therefor; but the fact of pajonents from such fimds of the association (with many of the checks in evidence) for aU expenditures involved herein, is established, as recited in the bill of exceptions, together with the fact that checks therefor were signed by Ryan and McNamara. While it is true that Ryan testifies for the defense, in substance, that he signed such checks in blank, leaving them with McNamara for use in payments, and was imacquainted with the items or purpose entering therein when completed, his credibility in such version was for determination by the jury. So the question was plainly presented for their determination, whether Ryan and other 85590°— Bull. 169—15 10 146 BULLETIK OP THE BITREATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. members of the executive board performed their duties in respect of such expenditures and were advised of their purpose, as a just deduction from all circumstances in evidence pertinent to that inquiry. Plainly the absence of direct proof of affirmative action by the board can not foreclose an inference of such action, in the light of the above-mentioned order in reference to expenditures made diu-ing the "trouble," together with another official statement of proceedings of the board (produced from a publication in its recog- nized official organ, "Bridgemen's Magazine" of April, 1910), em- bracing various matters ruled upon, wherein the published minutes, signed by the secretary-treasurer, conclude as foUows: "The items set forth above do not include all the matters considered by the executive board. It goes without sajdng that many questions were presented and acted upon that are not deemed of sufficient importance to be recorded in these columns. Such items, however, were of vital interest to the persons directly interested and were of necessity presented to and considered by the executive board." Many witnesses, who appear to be disinterested, testify to facts and circumstances which tend strongly in support of one and the other class of charges under the indictment, but specific mention of their testimony is not deemed needful. One feature of circumstantial evidence is brought out by the testimony and justly pressed for con- sideration, as tending to prove the conspiracy in all its phases, namely: That the use of explosives for destruction of property as described embraced exclusively "open-shop concerns" and was continuous and systematic from the commencement of such course up to the time of the above-mentioned arrest of the McNamaras and McManigal, and then ceased throughout the country. The chief direct testimony in the record, however, is that of the defendant Ortie E. McManigal, which is plainly subject to the chal- lenge of its independent force, by way of proving the charges, under his relations of record and confessed course of criminahty, and thus requires special mention and reference, as well, to the extraordinary array of corroborating evidence furnished in support thereof, as an indispensable requisite for its consideration as proof against the plaintiffs in error. His testimony is remarkable, ooth for its story of wicked conduct in a systematic course of crimes committed by himself, from the time of his alleged employment in 1907 by Herbert S. Hockin (one of the plaintiffs in error, who has withdrawn his writ) to carry out the objects of the conspiracy, down to the time of his arrest at Detroit, April 12, 1911, and for its directness and complete- ness upon both classes of issue, inclusive of identification of several of the plaintiffs in error as actors in the conspiracy. In each of the 25 transactions of unlawful carriage of explosives charged in these counts, he testified that the explosives were taken by himself from the storage places, and were personally carried on passenger cars in trains as described, for use in destroying property, and were so used by him. In each instance the transactions are set forth with abun- dant details of date, places and incidents (on direct and cross examina- tion), which afford the utmost of reasonable opportunity to test their verity; and the extent and comprehensiveness of the evidence intro- duced in corroboration of this testimony impress us to be not only extraordinary, but thorough for aU requirements to authorize its submission to the jury, under proper instructions for testing its force DECISIONS OP COUKTS AFFECTING LABOR. 147 and credibility, upon which no error is assigned. The elements of coiToborative evidence are numerous, including records of telegraph, telephone, railroad, and express companies, hotel registers in many places, testimony of trainmen and many other witnesses for identifi- cation of the various trips and carriages, letters and many exhibits of explosives and "infernal machines," identified as taken from various storage places disclosed by McManigal and other witnesses. We are of opinion, therefore, that the general challenge for insuffi- ciency of evidence must be overruled ; that support for the charge of conspiracy, to say the least, by no means rests on the testimony of McManigal ; and that no error appears in submission of his testimony for consideration by the jury. The sufficiency of the evidence to charge each individual plaintiff in error with participation in the crime was discussed, and in the case of 25, conviction by the lower court was affirmed, while in the case of 5 a new trial was granted. Laboe Organizations — Protection of Employees as Mem- bers — Constitutionality of Statute — Coppage v. Kansas, Supreme Court of the United States {Jan. 26, 1915), 35 Supreme Court Reporter, page 240. — ^The Supreme Court had before it for the determination of constitutionality chapter 222 of the acts of the Kansas Legislature of 1903, sees. 4674, 4675, G. S. 1909. As enacted, the statute was en- titled "An act to provide a penalty for coercing or influencing or making demands upon or requirements of employees, servants, laborers, and persons seeking employment." It was declared un- lawful for any employer or agent of an employer to require an agree- ment, either written or verbal, from employees or prospective em- ployees not to join or continue to be members of a labor organization. Violations were declared misdemeanors punishable by fine or im- prisonment. T. B. Coppage was a superintendent employed by the St. Louis & San Francisco Kailway Co. at Fort Scott, Kans., and about July 1, 1911, requested one Hedges, a switchman who was a member of a labor organization, to sign an agreement to withdraw from the union. Hedges refused to sign the agreement and also to withdraw from the organization, whereupon he was discharged. From a conviction in the trial court Coppage appealed, claiming that the statute in question was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Kansas, however, upheld the statute and affirmed the penalty (State V. Coppage, 87 Kans. 752, 125 Pac. 8; Bui. No. 112, p. 119). Further- appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the judgment of the court below was reversed by a divided court, and the statute declared unconstitutional. A brief dissenting opin- ion was written by Mr. Justice Holmes, and a more extended one by Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Justice Hughes concurring therein. The prevailing opinion, concurred in by five others, was written by Mr. 148 BULLETIN OF THE BUREATT OF LABOE STATISTICS. Justice Pitney. On account of the great interest of this case, both the prevailing opinion and those written in dissent are here repro- duced in practical completeness. Mr. Justice Pitney having cited the law and stated the facts on which the action was based, said: At the outset, a few words should be said respecting the construc- tion of the act. It uses the term "coerce," and some stress is laid upon this in the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court. But, on this record, we have nothing to do with any question of actual or implied coercion or duress, such as might overcome the will of the employee by means unlawful without the act. In the case before us, the State court treated the term "coerce" as applying to the mere insistence by the employer, or its agent, upon its right to prescribe terms upon which alone it would consent to a continuance of the relationship of employer and employee. In this sense we must understand the statute to have been construed by the court, for in this sense it was enforced in the present case ; there being no finding, nor any evidence to sup- port a finding, that plaintiff in error was guUty in any other sense. There is neither finding nor evidence that the contract of employment was other than a general or indefinite hiring, such as is presumed to be terminable at the wiQ of either party. The evidence shows that it would have been to the advantage of Hedges, from a pecuniary point of view and otherwise, to have been permitted to retain his member- ship in the union, and at the same time to remain in the employ of the railway company. In particular, it shows (although no reference is made to this m the opinion of the court) that as a member of the union he was entitled to benefits in the nature of insurance to the amount of fifteen hundred dollars, "which he would have been obliged to forego if he had ceased to be a member. But, aside from this matter of pe- cuniary interest, there is nothing to show that Hedges was subjected to the least pressure or influence, or that he was not a free agent, in all respects competent, and at liberty to choose what was best from the standpoint of his own interests. Of course, if plaintiff in error, acting as the representative of the railway company, was otherwise within his legal, rights in insisting that Hedges should elect whether to remain in the employ of the company or to retain his membership in the union, that insistence is not rendered unlawful by the fact that the choice involved a pecuniary sacrifice to Hedges. [Cases cited.] And if the right that plaintiff m error exercised is founded upon a constitutionalbasis it can not be impaired by merely applying to its exercise the term "coercion." We nave to deal, therefore, with a statute that, as construed and applied, makes it a criminal offense punishable with fine or imprisonment for an employer or his agent to merely prescribe, as a condition upon which one may secure certain employment or remain in such employment (the employment being terminable at will), that the employee shall enter into an agreement not to become or remain a member of any labor organization whUe so employed; the employee being subject to no incapacity or disability, but on the contrary free to exercise a voluntary choice. In Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161j [28 Sup. Ct. 277, Bui. No. 75, p. 634], this court had to deal with a question not distinguishal)le in principle from the one now presented. DECISIONS OP COTTRTS AFFECTING LABOR. 149 Mr. Justice Pitney then stated with some fullness the provisions of the Federal statute that was under consideration in the Adair case (30 Stat. 424, 428; sec. 10, act of June 1, 1898). This case involved the discharge of a man on account of his membership, though the statute also included a prohibition similar to the Kansas statute as to agreements not to join a labor union. Continuing, Mr. Justice Pitney said: Unless it is to be overruled, this decision is controUing upon the present controversy; for if Congress is prevented from arbitrary inter- ference with the hberty of contract because of the "due process" provision of the fifth amendment, it is too clear for argument that the States are prevented from the hke interference by virtue of the corresponding clause of the fourteenth amendment; and hence if it be unconstitutional for Congress to deprive an employer of liberty or property for threatening an employee with loss of employment or dis- criminating against him because of his membership in a labor organi- zation, it is unconstitutional for a State to similarly punish an em- ployer for requiring his employee, as a condition of securing or retain- mg employment, to agree not to become or remain a member of such an organization while so employed. It is true that, while the statute that was dealt with in the Adair case contained a clause substantially identical with the Kansas act now under consideration — a clause making it a misdemeanor for an employer to require an employee or applicant for employment, as a condition of such employment, to agree not to become or remain a member of a labor organization — the conviction was based upon another clause, which related to discharging an employee because of his membership in such an organization; and the decision, naturally, was confined to the case actually presented for decision. In the pres- ent case the Kansas Supreme Court sought to distinguish the Adair decision upon this ground. The distinction, if any there be, has not previously been recognized as substantial, so far as we have been able to find. The opinion in the Adair case, while carefully restricting the decision to the precise matter involved, cited (208 U. S. on p. 175), as the first in order of a number of decisions supporting the conclusion of the court, a case (People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257 [77 N. E.1073, Bui. No. 67, p. 888]), in which the statute denounced as unconstitu- tional was in substance the counterpart of the one with which we are now deahng. But, irrespective of whether it has received judicial recognition, is there any real distinction ? The constitutional right of the employer to discharge an employee because of his membership in a labor union being granted, can the employer be compelled to resort to this extreme measure ? May he not oner to the employee an option, such as was offered in the instant case, to remain in the employment if he will retire from the union; to sever the former relationship only if he pre- fers the latter? , Granted the equal freedom of both parties to the contract of employment, has not each party the right to stipulate upon what terms only he will consent to the inception, or to the con- tinuance, of that relationship? And may he not insist upon an express agreement, instead of leaving the terms of the employment to be im^ed ? Approaching the matter from a somewhat different 150 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. standpoint, is the employee's right to be free to join a labor union any more sacred, or more securely founded upon the Constitution, than his right to work for whom he will, or to be idle if he will ? And does not the ordinary contract of employment include an insistence by the employer that the employee shall agree, as a condition of the employment, that he will not be idle and will not work for whom he pleases, but will serve his present employer, and him only, so long as the relation between them shall continue ? Can the right of making contracts be enjoyed at all, except by parties coming together in an agreement that requires each party to forego, during the time and for the purpose covered by the agreement, any inconsistent exercise of his constitutional rights ? These queries answer themselves. The answers, as we think, lead to a single conclusion: Under constitutional freedom of contract, whatever either party has the right to treat as sufficient ground for terminating the employment, where there is no stipulation on the subject, he has the right to provide against by insisting that a stipu- lation respecting it shall be a sine qua non of the inception of the eniployment, or of its continuance if it be terminable at will. It follows that this case can not be distinguished from Adair v. United States. The decision in that case was reached as the result of elaborate argument and full consideration. We are now asked, in effect, to overrule it; and in view of the importance of the issue we have reexamined the question from the standpoint of both reason and authority. As a result, we are constrained to reaffirm the doctrine there applied. Neither the doctrine nor this application of it is novel; we wiU endeavor to restate some of the grounds upon which it rests. The principle is fundamental and vitd. Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property — partaking of the nature of each — ^is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are ex- changed for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of Hberty in the long-established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the Eoor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other onest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money. To avoid possible misunderstanding, we should here emphasize, what has been said before, that so far as its title or enacting clause expresses a purpose to deal with coercion, compulsion, duress, or other undue influence, we have no present concern with it, because nothing of that sort is involved in this case. We do not mean to say, therefore, that a State may not properly exert its police power to prevent coercion on the part of employers towards employees, or vice versa. But, in this case, the Kansas court of last resort has held that Coppage, the plaintiff in error, is a criminal punishable with fine or imprisonment under this statute simply and merely because, while acting as the representative of the railroad company and dealing with Hedges, an employee at will and a man of full age and understanding, subject to no restraint or disability, Coppage insisted that Hedges should freely choose whether he would leave the employ of the company or would agree to refrain from associa- DECISIONS OF OOUKTS AFFECTING LABOE. 151 tion with the union while so employed. This construction is, for all purposes of our jurisdiction, conclusive evidence that the State of Kansas intends by this legislation to punish conduct such as that of Coppage, although entirely devoid of any element of coercion, compulsion, duress, or undue influence, just as certainly as it intends to punish coercion and the hke. Now, it seems to us clear that a statutory provision which is not a legitimate police regulation can not be made such by being placed in the same act with a police regulation, or by being enacted under a title that declares a purpose which would be a proper object for the exercise of that power. Nor can a State, by designating as "coercion" conduct which is not such in truth, render criminal any normal and essentially innocent exercise of personal hberty or of property rights; for to permit this would deprive the fourteenth amendment of its effective force in this regard. We of course do not intend to attribute to the legis- lature or the courts of Kansas any improper purpose or any want of candor; but only to emphasize the distmction between the form of the statute and its effect as appMed to the present case. Laying aside, therefore, as immaterial for present purposes, so much of the statute as indicates a purpose to repress coercive prac- tices, what possible relation has the residue of the act to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare? None is suggested, and we are unable to conceive of any. The act, as the construction given to it by the State court shows, is intended to deprive employers of a part of their liberty of contract, to the corresponding advantage of the employed and the upbuilding of the labor organizations. But no attempt is made, or could reasonably be made, to sustain the purpose to strengthen these voluntary organizations, any more than other voluntary associations of persons, as a legitimate object for the exercise of the police power. They are not public institu- tions, charged by law with public or governmental duties, such as would render the maintenance of their membership a matter of direct concern to the general weKare. If they were, a different question would be presented. As to the interest of the employed, it is said by the Kansas Supreme Court to be a matter of common knowledge that "employees, as a rule, are not financially able to be as independent in making contracts for the sale of their labor as are employers in making a contract of purchase thereof. " No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will be inequaUties of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances. This apphes to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and employee. But the fourteenth amendment, in declaring that a State shall not " deprive any person of hfe, hberty or property without due process of law," gives to each of these an equal sanction; it recognizes "hberty" and "property" as coexistent human rights, and debars the States from any unwarranted interference with either. And since a State may not strike them down directly it is clear that it may not do so indirectly, as by declaring in effect that the pubhc good requires the removal of those inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of their exercise, and then invoking the pohce power in order to remove the inequalities, without other object in view; The police power is broad, and not easily defined, 152 BULLETIN OP THE BtTREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. but it can not be given the wide scope that is here asserted for it, without in effect nullifying the constitutional guaranty. In our opinion, the fourteenth amendment debars the States from striking down personal liberty or property rights, or materially re- stricting their normal exercise, excepting so far as may be incidentally necessary for the accomplishment of some other and paramount object, and one that concerns the public welfare. The mere restric- tion of hberty or of property rights can not of itself be denominated "public welfare," and treated as a legitimate object of the poUce power; for such restriction is the very thing that is iohibited by the amendment. * It is said in the opinion of the State court that membership iu a labor organization does not necessarily affect a man's duty to his employer; that the employer has no right, by virtue of the relation, "to dominate the life nor to interfere with the liberty of the employee in matters that do not lessen or deteriorate the service"; and that "the statute implies that labor unions are lawful and not inimical to the rights of employers." The same view is presented in the brief of counsel for the State, where it is said that membership in a labor organization is the "personal and private affair" of the employee. To this line of argument it is sufficient to say that it can not be judicially declared that membership in such an organization has no relation to a member's duty to his employer; and therefore, if freedom of contract is to be preserved, the employer must be left at liberty to decide for himself whether such membership by his employee is con- sistent with the satisfactory performance of the duties of the em- ployment. Of course we do not intend to say, nor to intimate, anything incon- sistent with the right of individuals to join labor unions, nor do we question the legitimacy of such organizations so long as they conform to the laws of the land as others are required to do. Conceding the fuU right of the individual to join the union, he has no inherent right to do this and still remain in the employ of one who is unwilling to employ a union man, any more than the same individual has a right to join the union without the consent of that organization. Can it be doubted that a labor organization — a voluntary association of workingmen — has the inherent and constitutional right to deny mem- bership to any man who will not agree that during such membership he will not accept or retain employment in company with nonunion men ? Or that a union man has the constitutional right to dechne proffered employment unless the employer will agree not to employ apy nonunion man ? (In all cases we refer, of course, to agreements made voluntarily, and without coercion or duress as between the parties. And we have no reference to questions of monopoly, or mterference with the rights of third parties or the general public. These involve other considerations, respecting which we iatend to intimate no opinion. See Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33- 46 N E 297 [Bui. No. 11, p. 529]; Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 213, 214; 76 N. E. 5 [Bui. No. 64, p. 896]; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492; 57 N. E. 1011 [Bui. No. 31, p. 1294]; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353; 74 N. E. 603 [Bui. No. 60, p. 702]; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. Law 729, 738; 65 Atl. 165, 169 [Bui. No. 70, p. 746].) And can DECISIONS OP COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 153 there be one rule of liberty for the labor organization and its mem- bers, and a different and more restrictive rale for employers? We think not; and since the relation of employer and employee is a voluntary relation, as clearly as is that between the members of a labor organization, the employer has the same inherent right to pre- scribe the terms upon which he will consent to the relationship, and to have them fairly understood and expressed in advance. When a man is called upon to agree not to become or remain a member of the union while working for a particular employer, he is in effect only asked to deal openly and frankly with his employer, so as not to retain the employment upon terms to which the latter is not willing to agree. And the liberty of making contracts does not include a liberty to procure employment from an unwilling employer, or without a fair understanding. Nor may the employer be foreclosed by legislation from exercising the same freedom of choice that is the right of the employee. To ask a man to agree, in advance, to refrain from affiliation with the union while retaining a certain position of employment, is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional freedom. He is free to decUne the employment on those terms, just as the employer may decline to offer employment on any other; for " It takes two' to make a bargain." Having accepted employment on those terms, the man is still free to join the union when the period of employment expires; or, if employed at wiU, then at any time upon simply quitting the employment. And, if bound by his own agreement to refrain from joining during a stated period of employment, he is in no different situation from that which is necessarily incident to term contracts in general. For constitutional freedom of contract does not mean that a party is to be as free after making a contract as before; he is not free to break it without accountability. Freedom of contract, from the very nature of the thing, can be enjoyed only by being exercised; and each particular exercise of it involves makuig an engagement which, if fulfilled, prevents for the time any inconsistent course of conduct. So much for the reason of the matter; let us turn again to the adju- dicated cases. The decision in the Adair case is in accord with the almost unbroken current of authorities in the State courts. In many States enact- ments not distinguishable in principle from the one now in question have been passed, but, except in two iastances (one, the decision of an inferior court in Ohio, since repudiated; the other, the decision now under review), we are unable to find that they have been judicially enforced. It is not too much to say that such laws have by common consent been treated as unconstitutional, for while many State courts of last resort have adjudged them void, we have found no decision by such a court sustainmg legislation of this character, excepting that which is now under review. The single previous instance in which any court has upheld such a statute is Davis v. State of Ohio (1893), 30 Cine. Law Bull. 342- 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 894; where the court of common pleas of Hamilton County sustained an act of April 14, 1892, (89 Ohio Laws 269) which declared that any person who coerced or attempted to coerce employees by discharging or threatening to dis- charge them because of their connection with any lawful labor organi- 154 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU 01" LABOR STATISTICS. zation should be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction fined or imprisoned. We are unable to find that this decision was ever directly reviewed; but in State of Ohio v. Bateman (1900), 10 Ohio Dec. 68; 7 Ohio N. P. 487, its authority was repudiated upon the ground that it had been in effect overruled by subsequent d!^ecisions of the State supreme court, and the same statute was held unconsti- tutional. The right that plaintiff in error is now seeking to maintain was held by the Supreme Court of Kansas, in an earher case, to be within the protection of the fourteenth amendment and therefore beyond legis- lative interference. In Brick Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297; 26 Pac. 848 [Bui. No. 56, p. 311]; the court had under consideration chapter 120 of the Laws of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1901, sees. 2425, 2426), which declared it unlawful for any person, company, or corporation, or agent, officer, etc., to prevent employees from joining and belonging to any labor organization, and enacted that any such person, company, or corpora- tion, etc., that coerced or attempted to coerce employees by discharg- ing or threatening to discharge them because of their connection with such labor organization should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction subjected to a fine, and should also be Hable to the person injuredin punitive damages. It was attacked as violative of the fourteenth amendment, and also of the bOl of rights of the State constitution. The court held it unconstitutional, saying: "The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as com- pletely within the protection of the constitution as the right to hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the hberty to go when and where one will. * * * Every citizen is protected in his right to work where and for whom he wiU. He may select not only his employer but also his associates. He is at liberty to refuse to con- tinue to serve one who has in his employ a person, or an association of persons, objectionable to him. In this respect the rights of the em- ployer and employee are equal. Any act of the legislature that would undertake to impose on an employer the obligation of keeping in his service one whom, for any reason, he should not desire womd be a denial of his constitutional right to make and terminate contracts and to acquire and hold property." In five other States the courts of last resort have had similar acts under consideration, and in each instance have held them unconsti- tutional. In State v. Julow (1895), 129 Mo. 163; 31 S. W. 781 [Bui. No. 2, p. 206]; the Supreme Court of Missouri dealt with an act (Missouri Laws 1893, p. 187), that forbade employers, on pain of fine or imprisonment, to enter into any agreement with an employee requiring him to withdraw from a labor union or other lawful organ- ization, or to refrain from joining such an organization, or to by any means attempt to compel or coerce any emmoyee into withdrawal from any lawful organization or society." In Gillespie v. The People (1900), 188 III. 176; 58 N. E. 1007"[Bul. No. 35, p. 797]; the Supreme Court of Illinois held unconstitutional an act (Kurd's Stat. 1899, p. 844) declaring it criminal for any individual or member of any firm, etc., to prevent or attempt to prevent employees from forming, joining, and belonging to any lawful labor organization, and that any such person "that coerces or attempts to coerce employees by discharging or threatening to discharge them because of their con- nection with such awful labor organization" should be guilty of a DECISIONS OP COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 155 misdemeanor. In State, ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg (1902), 114 Wis. 530; 90 N. W. 1098 [Bui. No. 47, p. 938]; the court had under consideration a statute (Wisconsin Laws 1899, ch. 332), which, like the Kansas act now in question, prohibited the employer or his agent from coercing the employee to enter into an agreement not to become a member of a labor organization, as a condition of securing employ- ment or continuing in the employment, and also rendered it unlawful to discharge an employee because of his being a member of any labor organization. The decision related to the latter prohibition, but this was denounced upon able and learned reasoning that has a much wider reach. In People v. Marcus [supra] the statute dealt with (IS". Y. Laws, 1887, ch. 688), as we have already said, was in substance identical with the Kansas act. These decisions antedated Adair v. United States. They proceed upon broad and fundamental reasQp- ing, the same in substance that was adopted by this court in the Adair case, and they are cited with approval in the opinion (208 U. S. 175). A like result was reached in State, ex rel. Smith v. Daniels (1912), 118 Minn. 155; 136 N. W. 584 [Bui. No. 112, p. 122]; with respect to an act that, like the Kansas statute, forbade an employer to require an employee or person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to make an agreement that the em- ?loyee would not become or remain a member of a labor organization, 'his was held invalid upon the authority of the Adair case. And see Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500, 513 [Bui. No. 78, p. 586]. Upon both principle and authority, therefore, we are constrained to hold that the Kansas act of March 13, 1903, as construed and apphed so as to punish with fine or imprisonment an employer or his agent for merely prescribing, as a condition upon which one may secure employment under or remain in the service of such employer, that the employee shall enter into an agreement not to become or remain a member of any labor organization while so employed, is repugnant to the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment, and therefore void. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes was brief, dependence being had upon earlier expressions of his views rather than upon a present restatement. It is as follows : I think the judgment should be aflEirmed. In present conditions a workman not unnaturally may believe that only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 [18 Sup. Ct. 383, Bui. No. 17, p. 625]. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 570 [31 Sup. Ct. 259, Bui. No. 93, p. 644]. If that behef, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it seems to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins. Whether in the long run it is wise for the workingmen to enact legis- lation of this sort is not my concern, but I am strongly of opinion that there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to pre- vent it, and that Adair v. United States [supra], and Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 [25 Sup. Ct. 539, Bui. No. 59, p. 340], should be overruled. I have stated my grounds in those cases and think it unnecessary to add others that I think exist. See further Vegelahan 156 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. V. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 108 [44 N. E. 1077, Bui. No. 9, p. 197]; Plant V. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505 [57 N. E. 1011, Bui. No. 31, p. 1 294] . I still entertain the opinions expressed by me in Massachusetts. In the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Justice Hughes concurring, attention was called to the fact that similar legislation in fourteen other jurisdictions would be invalidated by the decision in the present case. Cases were then cited to support the statement that the right of contract as a part of individual freedom was never- theless subject to regulation in the interest of the public welfare, the local legislature being the judge of the necessity of such legislation, its enactments ' ' only to be set aside when they involve such palpable abuse of power and lack of reasonableness to accompMsh a lawful end that they may be said to be merely arbitrary and capricious, and hence out of place in a Government of laws and not of men, and irreconcilable with the conception of due process of law." Mr. Justice Day distinguished between the portions of the Federal act imder consideration in the Adair case, pointing out that the ques- tion at that time was declared to be the making it a criminal offense for an employer to discharge an employee from service because of his membership in a labor organization. He was therefore "unable to agree that that case involved or decided the one now at bar." Con- tinuing, Mr. Justice Day said : There is nothing in the statute now under consideration which prevents an employer from discharging one in his service at his will. The question now presented is. May an employer, as a condition of E resent or future employment, require an employee to agree that e wiU not exercise the privilege of becoming a member of a labor union, should he see fit to do so? In my opinion, the cases are entirely different, and the decision of the questions controlled by different principles. The right to join labor unions is undisputed, and has been the subject of frequent affirmation in judicial opmions. Acting within their legal rights, such associations are as legitimate as any organization of citizens formed to promote their common in- terest. They are organized under the laws of many States, by virtue of express statutes passed for that purpose, and, being legal, and acting within their constitutional rignts, the right to join them, as against coercive action to the contrary may be the legitimate subject of protection in the exercise of the police authority of the States. This statute, passed in the exercise of that particular authority called the police power, the limitations of which no court has yet undertaken precisely to define, has for its avowed purpose the protection of the exercise of a legal right, by preventing an employer from depriving the employee of it as a condition of obtaining employment. I see no reason why a State may not, if it chooses, protect this right, as well as other legal rights. The act under consideration is said to have the effect to deprive employers of a part of their liberty of contract, for the benefit of labor organizations. It is urged that the statute has no object or purpose, express or implied, that has reference to health, safety, DECISIONS OP COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 157 morals, or public welfare, beyond the supposed desirability of leveling inequalities of fortune by depriving him who has property of some part of his "financial independence." But this argument admits that financial independence is not independence of law or of the authority of the legislature to declare the policy of the State as to matters wmch have a reasonable relation to the welfare, peace and security of the community. This court has many times decided that the motives of legislators in the enactment of laws are not the subject of judicial mquiry. Legislators, State and Federal, are entitled to the presumption that their action has been in good faith and because of conditions which they deem proper and sufficient to warrant the action taken. The act must be taken as an attempt of the legislature to enact a statute which it deemed necessary to the good order and security of society. It imposes a penalty for "coercing or influencing or making demands upon or requirements of employees, servants, laborers, and persons seeking employment." It was in the light of this avowed purpose that the act was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Kansas, the ultimate authority upon the meaning of the terms of the law. Of course, if the act is necessarily arbitrary and therefore unconsti- tutional, mere declarations of good intent can not save it, but it must be presumed to have been passed by the legislative branch of the State government in good faith, and for the purpose of reaching the desired end. The legislature may have believed, acting upon conditions known to it, that the public welfare would be promoted by the enactment of a statute which should prevent the compulsory exaction of written agreements to forego the acknowledged legal right here involved, as a condition of employment in one's trade or occupation. It would be impossible to maintain that because one is free to accept or refuse a given employment, or because one may at will employ or refuse to employ another, it follows that the parties have a constitutional right to insert in an agreement of employment any stipulation they choose. They can not put in terms that are agaiast public policy either as it is deemed by the courts to exist at com- mon law 01* as it may be declared by the legislature as the arbiter within the limits of reason of the public policy of the State. It is no answer to say that the greater includes the less and that because the employer is free to employ, or the employee to refuse employment, they may agree as they please. This matter is easily tested by assuming a contract of emplojonent for a year and the insertion of a condition upon which the right of employment should continue. The choice of such conditions is not to be regarded as whoUy unre- stricted because the parties may agree or not as they choose. And if the State may prohibit a particular stipulation in an agreement because it is deemed to be opposed in its operation to the security and well-being of the community, it may prohibit it in any agreement whether the employment is for a term or at wiU. It may prohibit the attempt in any way to bind one to the objectionable undertaking. Would anyone contend that the State might not prohibit the im- position of conditions which should require an agreement to forego the right on the part of the employee to resort to the courts of the country for redress in the case of disagreement with his employer? While the employee might be discharged in case he brougnt suit 158 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. against an employer if the latter so willed, it by no means follows that he could be required, as a condition of employment, to forego a right so obviously fundamental as the one supposed. It is therefore mis- leading to say that the right of discharge necessarily embraces the right to impose conditions of employment which shall include the surrender of^rights which it is the policy of the Sta,te to maintain. It may be that an employer may be of the opinion that member- ship of his employees in the National Guard, by enlistment in the militia of the State, may be detrimental to his business. Can it be successfully contended that the State may not, in the public interest, prohibit an agreement to forego such enlistment as against public policy ? Would it be beyond a legitimate exercise of the police power to provide that an employee should not be required to agree, as a condition of employment, to forego affiliation with a particular poHt- ical party, or the support of a particular candidate for office? It seems to me that these questions answer themselves. There is a real and not a fanciful distinction between the exercise of the right to dis- charge at wiU and the imposition of a requirement that the employee, as a condition of employment, shall make a particular agreement to forego a legal right. The agreement may be, or may be declared to be, against public poHcy, although the right of discharge remains. When a man is discharged, the employer exercises his right to declare such action necessary because of the exigencijBS of his Dusiness, or as the result of his judgment for other reasons sufficient to himself. When he makes a stipulation of the character here involved essential to future employment, he is' not exercising a right to discharge, and may not wish to discharge the employee when, at a subsequent time, the prohibited act is done. What is in fact accomplished, is that the one engaging to work, who may wish to preserve an independent right of action, as a condition of employment, is coerced to the signing oisuch an agreement against his will, perhaps impelled by the neces- sities of his situation. The State, within constitutional limitations, is the judge of its own policy and may execute it in the exercise of the legislative authority. This statute reaches not only the em- ployed but as well one seeking employment. The latter may never wish to join a labor union. By signing such agreements as are here involved he is deprived of the right of free choice as to his future conduct, and must choose between employment and the right to act in the future as the exigencies of his situation may demand. It is such contracts, having such effect, that this statute and similar ones seek to prohibit and punish as against the policy of the State. It is constantly emphasized that the case presented is not one of coercion. But in view of the relative positions of employer and employed, who is to deny that the stipulation here insisted upon and forbidden by the law is essentially coercive. No form of words can strip it of its true character. Whatever our individual opinions may be as to the wisdom of such legislation, we can not put our judgment in place of that of the legislature and refuse to acknowl- edge the existence of the conditions with which it was dealing. Opinions may differ as to the remedy, but we can not understand upon what ground it can be said that a subject so intimately re- lated to the welfare of society is removed from the legislative power. Wherein is the right of the employer to insert this stipulation in the agreement any more sacred than his right to agree with another DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 159 employer in the same trade to keep up prices. He may think it c[uite as essential to his "financial mdependence" and so in truth it may be if he alone is to be considered. But it is too late tf> deny that the legislative power reaches such a case. It would be difficult to select any subject more intimately related to good order and the security of the community than that under consideration — whether one takes the view that labor organizations are advan- tageous or the reverse. It is certainly as much a matter for legis- lative consideration and action as contracts in restraint of trade. It is urged that a labor organization — a voluntary association of workingmen — has the constitutional right to deny membership to any man who will not agree that durmg such membership he will not accept or retain employment in company with nonunion men. And it is asserted that there can not be one rule of liberty for the labor organization and its members and a different and more restrictive rule for employers. It of course is true, for example, that a church may deny member- ship to those who unite with other denominations, biit it by no means follows that the State may not constitutionally prohibit a railroad company from compelling a workingman to agree that he will, or will not, join a particular church. An analogous case, — viewed from the employer's standpoint, would be: Can the State, in the exercise of its legislative power, reach concerted effort of employees intended to coerce the employer as a condition of hiring labor that he shall engage in writing to give up his privilege of association with other employers in legal organizations, corporate or otherwise, having' for their object a united effort to promote by legal means that which employers believe to be for the best interest of their business ? I entirely agree that there should be the same rule for employers and employed, and the same liberty of action for each. In my judgment, the law may prohibit coercive attempts, such as are here involved, to deprive either of the free right of exercising privileges which are theirs within the law. So far as I know, no law has undertaken to abridge the right of employers of labor in the exercise of free choice as to what organizations they will form for the promo- tion of their common interests, or denying to them free right of action in such matters. But [it] is said that in this case all that was done in effect was to discharge an employee for a cause deemed sufficient to the employer —a right inherent m the personal liberty of the employer protected by the Constitution. This argument loses sight of the real purpose and effect of this and kindred statutes. The penalty imposed is not for the discharge but for the attempt to coerce an unwilling em- ployee to agree to forego the exercise of the legal right involved as a condition of employment. It is the requirement of such agree- ments which the State declares to be against public policy. I think that the act now under consideration, and kindred ones, are intended to promote the same liberty of action for the employee as the employer confessedly enjoys. The law should be as zealous to protect the constitutional hberty of the employee as it is to guard that of the employer. A principal object of this statute is to pro- tect the liberty of the citizen to make such lawful affiliations as he may desire with organizations of his choice. It should not be neces- sary to the protection of the liberty of one citizen that the same right in another citizen be abridged or destroyed. 160 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. If one prohibitive condition of the sort here involved may be at- tached, so may others, until employment can only be had as the result of written stipulations, which shall deprive the employee of the exercise of legal rights which are within the authority of the State to protect. While this court should, within the limitations of the constitutional guaranty, protect the free right of contract, it is not less important that the State be given the right to exert its legislative authority, if it deems best to do so, for the protection of rights which inhere in the privileges of the citizen of every free country. The Supreme Court of Kansas in sustaining this statute, said that ' ' employees as a rule are not financially able to be as independent in making contracts for the sale of their labor as are employers in making a contract of purchase thereof," and in reply to this it is suggested that the law can not remedy inequalities of fortune, and that so long as the right of property exists, it may happen that parties negotiating may not be equally unhampered by circum- stances. This view of the Kansas court, as to the legitimacy of such considerations, is in entire harmony, as I understand it, with the former decisions of this court in considering the right of State legisla- tures to enact laws which shall prevent the undue or oppressive exercise of authority in making contracts with employees. Certainly it can be no substantial objection to the exercise of the police power that the legislature has taken into consideration the necessities, the comparative ability, and the relative situation of the contracting parties. While all stand equal before the law, and are alike entitled to its protection, it ought not to be a reasonable objection that one motive which impelled an enactment was to protect those who might otherwise be unable to protect themselves. I therefore think that the statute of Kansas, sustained by the supreme court of the State, did not go beyond a legitimate exercise of the police power, when it sought, not to require one man to employ another against his will, but to put limitations upon the sacrifice of rights which one man may exact from another as a condition of employment. Labor Organizations — Strikes — Inciting to Injury of Per- sons — State V. Quintan, Supreme Court of New Jersey {June 5, 1914), 91 Atlantic Reporter, page 111. — Patrick Quinlan was convicted in the court of quarter sessions of Passaic County of advocating, encour- aging, or inciting the killing or injuring of a class of persons, it being alleged that, at the time of a strike, he uttered in a public meeting the following words: "I make a motion that we go to the silk mills, parade through the streets, and club them out of the mills; no mat- ter how we get them out, we got to get them out." Quinlan took exceptions to the refusal of the trial judge to quash the indictment, one point being as to the sufficiency of the statute under which con- viction was had. The statute in question declares guilty of high misdemeanor any person who, in public or private, by speech, writ- ing, or otherwise, advocates, encourages, incites, etc., * * * DECISIONS OF COTJETS AFFECTING LABOB. 161 the killing or injuring of any class or body of persons, or of any individual. In its opinion, delivered by Judge Kalisch, the supreme court held that the statute is not in violation of the constitution as being uncertain in describing the offense, saying, "There is no organic law or rule of sound public policy that requires the legislature to define the meaning of English words in common and daily use." Another contention was that the indictment, in order to charge the offense, must set out that as the result of the utterance of the words alleged there was a killing or injury of a class or body of persons or of an individual. Authorities are quoted to show that this contention is unsound, and the court said in part: It is germane to the matter under discussion to observe here that the section of the crimes act on which the indictment in the case sub judice is founded is not an innovation upon, but declaratory of, the common law. Stephen, in his Digest of Criminal Law (Ed. 1877) p. 33, says: "Every one who incites any person to commit any crime commits a misdemeanor, whether the crime is or is not committed." The framers of the act had evidently in mind the prevention of breaches of the pubhc peace and the protection of human life and limb, and deemed that these could be best effected by making it a high misdemeanor for any one who shall, in public or private, by speech, etc., or by any other mode and means, advocate, encourage, or incite to such breaches of the law, irrespective of the fact whether such breaches of the law actually took place or not. The gravamen of the statutory offense hes in the incitement or encouragement to the commission of the offenses denounced, and not in the actual commission of them. As to the admission of remarks made by a speaker just before Quinlan made the motion alleged, the coin-t said: A reference to Mrs. Jones's remarks shows them to have been of an inflammatory character, but the argument made is that they were irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial, because the issue before the court and jury was whether the defendant at that time and place uttered the language charged on the indictment. It is further argued that her remarks were not part of the res gestae, since it was not shown that they were made in furtherance of a common design, or that the defendant was in any way concerned in their making. But this objection is fully answered by the language used by the defend- ant when he rounded out the peroration of Mrs. Jones, as described by the State's witness Tracey. Mrs. Jones said: "I want you people to go to the mills and I want you people to advise the people to join you in this strike. If they refuse, I want you to go mto the mUls and I want you to drive them out of the mills. I want you to knock them out of the mills, even if it takes yovir extreme force." It was following this that the defendant made the motion in which he used the language set out in the indictment. We think the tes- 85590°— BuU. 169—15 11 162 BULLETIN OF THE BTJBEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. timony was properly admitted as a part of the res gestae. It was clearly within the issue, for the defendant was charged with advo- cating, encouraging, and inciting the injviring of a class of persons, and the testimony tended to show that he was participating with Mrs. Jones in a common design to that end. The conviction was therefore afiirmed. Labor Organizations — Unlawful Combinations — Restraint OF Trade — Injunction — Liability of Members — Irving et al. v. Neal et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York (Nov. 6, T913), 209 Federal Reporter, 'page J^ll. — This case arose from a bill in equity brought by Charles R. Irving and Robert Casson, copartners and citizens of Massachusetts, seeking an injunction against Edward H. Neal, individually and as secretary of the joint district council of New York and vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and others. The complainant firm had been put on an "unfair list" maintained by the labor organiza- tion, and its name was also omitted from the "fair" list distributed to builders, architects, and owners of property using or hkely to use woodwork or trim for interior finish of buildings, the complainant company being manufacturers of such material. Strikes were also threatened if the notices in such circulars and letters as were sent were not comphed with. Judge Ward stated the foregoing facts and continued with the opinion of the court in part as follows : The particular case of a sympathetic strike threatened by the defendant Blumenberg, a business agent of the joint district coimcU at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in this city, resulted in the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting the individual defendants, both individually and officially, from inter- fering with the complainant's business. The case now comes up on final nearing. I find that the allegations of the biU as to particular instances in which the purpose of the combination was earned out or sought to be carried out against the complainants are true as matter of fact. The defendants contend that, even if this be so, the bill should be dismissed as without equity against them because they have not individually pubMshed "unfau-" lists or called or threatened sympathetic strikes, and further because no "unfair" lists have been published or sym- pathetic strikes called for the past two years. Txiey are, however, members of the United Brotherhood and of the local unions repre- sented by the joint district council and are officers either of the brother- hood or council. Several of them did actually take part in some of the particular instances stated in the bill. At aJl events, if the thing principally complained of, viz., an agreement not to work on non- umon trim enforceable by fine is unlawful, they are liable for anything done to carry it out, even though they did not individually participate. DECISIONS OF COITETS AFFEOTIJTG LABOB. 163 The agreement is a part of tlie organic law of the associations of which they a,re members and officers, and, of course,, they can not say they are ignorant of it or do not participate. The admissions of their answer are to the contrary. I think this proposition consistent with the opinion of the circuit court of appeals for this circuit in Lawlor v. Loewe, 187 Fed. 522, 109 C. C. A. 288 [Bui. No. 96, p. 780]. So also, assuming that the acts complained of in the biU or some of them have been discontinued, further commission of them m'ay be, properly enjoined if they are unlawful. There can be no question: First, that a combination does exist between the various local unions which constitute the United Brother- hood; second, that one of the purposes of the combination is to compel the imionization of all manufacturing carpenter shops ; third, that the object is to restrain competition between open shops and union shops; and, fourth, that this object is to be accomplished principally by an agreement to refuse to work on any job where non- union trim is used. It further appears that an agreement exists between the Master Carpenters' Association, composed of the principal employers of carpenters in Greater New York, and the joint district council, whereby the builders agree to use only union trim, which I think the builders were coerced into making by the unions. The effect of it is that nonunion trim, except of neghgible sizes, can not be sold throughout almost the whole of that territory. It is said that workmen have a right to refuse to work for any reason they choose, good or bad, which is satisfactory to themselves. This is true, but it does not follow that they have a right to combine to do so some 200,000 strong over the whole country. Doubtless the pur- pose of the combination is to advance their own interests without actual malice against manufacturers who do not wish to operate their miUs in accordance with the requirements of the unions. This, how- ever, is true of almost every combination in restraint of trade. The combination in this case results aU the same in directly restraining competition between manufacturers. The precise question of law to be determined is whether this fea- tm"e of the combination, there being no right of action at common law, is made imlawful by, and may be enjoined under, any statute. I think it is shown to be unlawful under the Sherman law by the decision of the Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 [Bui. No. 75, p. 622]. But because the Sherman law prescribes the remedies, both criminal and civil, at law and in equity, it is held in this circuit that only the prescribed remedies can he pursued. From this it follows that the mjunctive rehef can only be had at the instance of the Government, and therefore that the complainants can not recover. National Fire- proofing Co. V. Mason Builders' Ass'n, 169 Fed. 259, 94 C. C. A. 535 [Bui. No. 84, p. 427]. Section 340 of the general business law of this State (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 20) makes any combination, whereby competition in the supply or the price of any article in common use m the State is restrained, a misdemeanor. Interior trim such as the complainants manufacture is such an article; but, as the law confers the remedy by injunction on the State and elaborately prescribes the procedure, I am bound to follow the suggestion made in the National Fireproofing 164 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. case, supra, that under this act also in]'unctive rehef can be had only at the suit of the State. Section 580 of the penal law of this State, subd. 6, makes it a mis- demeanor for two or more persons to conspire to commit any act "injurious to trade or commerce." Without discussing the multitude of decisions cited by counsel, the reasoning in the case of Loewe v. Lawlor, supra, seems to me enough to show that the combination in this case is such an act. See, also. People v. McFarlin, 43 Misc. Rep. 591, 89 N. Y. Supp. 527. As the act says nothing whatever about civil remedies, I think any appropriate remedy is available to one especially injured by violation of it. While there is no evidence of a special hostility to the complainants in particular, as maintaining an op«n shop, the proofs show a per- sistent campaign has been made by the combination to compel them to unionize their shop. They suffer in a way different from the com- munity at large. This entitles them to all available civil remedies, among others to injunctive relief. A decree will be entered granting a permanent injunction in accordance with this opinion. Labor Organizations — Unlawful Combinations — Restraint OP Trade — Injunction — Prevention op Competition — Paine Luw^ her Co. (Ltd.), v. Neal et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New Yorlc (Nov., 1913), 212 Federal Reporter, page 259.— This case is closely connected with that of Irving et al. v. Neal et al. , 209 Fed. 471 [see p. 162], as it arose out of the same, labor conditions. This bill in equity was brought by 8 complainants, residents of States other than New York, and manufacturers of wood trim, sash, and similar wood products. As to differences between the two suits, the opinion, delivered by Judge Mayer, said: Here both the complaint and the relief sought are more compre- hensive. There is no question involving an existing strike. The record is barren of any proof of acts of violence, nor is there satisfac- tory proof that the agreements and acts complained of were, at the time of the commencement of the suit, directed against these par- ticular complainants. Plainly and briefly stated, the suit is brought on behalf of nonunion manufacturers to settle in a private litigation an economic question of ceaseless importance in respect of which in the particular trade here involved there has been a long and bitterly (though peacefully) fought struggle; each side contending for what it believed to be its rights and welfare. The defendants named in this bill consist of officers of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, who were also officers or agents of the joint district council; union manufacturers of floor, sash, and trim in New York; and master carpenters whose business it is to install trim, doors, sash, and other woodwork in buildings. Agreements between the master carpenters and the joint district council, and between the Manufacturing Woodworkers' DECISIONS OF COUKTS APFBCTING LABOE. 165 Association and the joint district council are set forth in the bill, an injunction being sought to prevent these agreements from being carried into effect. After stating the allegations as to acts alleged to have been done in pursuance of the conspiracy the opinion continues : The testimony is voluminous, but I think the essential facts may be summarized as follows: (1) The journeymen carpenters in the Borough of Manhattan and in parts of the Borough of Brooklyn very genersuly belong to the Brotherhood of Carpenters. (2) Owing to the fact that merqbers of the brotherhood refuse to work with non- union members and to the further fact that employers in the building trades deem it wise to employ brotherhood men, it is difficult and under ordinary circumstances impracticable to erect carpenter work in the Borough of Manhattan and m parts of the Borough of Brooklyn except with union labor. (3) That the Brotherhood of Carpenters has a by-law that its members will not erect material made by non- union mechanics. (4) The Brotherhood of Carpenters has given notice that its men will abide by this by-law. (5) The by-law is enforceable by fine. (6) On several occasions in the past few years the members of the brotherhood have quit work where complainants' products were being used and where the products of other so-caUed nonunion mills were being used. (7) The enforcement of the by-law in question by the Brotherhood of Carpenters and the provision in the agreement with the master carpenters relative to the use of non- union trim have lessened the sale of complainants' products in the Borough of Manhattan and in some parts of the Borough of Brooklyn. (8) The workmen have adopted and pursued the policy complained of to-better their condition in a continuing economic struggle with no malice to the particular complainants herein, but as part of a plan to accomplish a nation-wide unionization of their trade. (9) The contractors or master carpenters have entered into their trade agree- ments after elaborate negotiation and for the purpose of establishing and maintaining peaceful relation which shall obviate strikes and other disturbing labor troubles. For the complainants to succeed they must establish: (1) An agree- ment offensive to the common law or a State or Federal statute; (2) or any acts done in pursuance thereof; and (3) such injury as will warrant injunctive relief in a litigation between private parties. Assuming the agreement and its operation to be a combination in restraint of trade, the common law gives no right of action to a third person. The remedy, if any, must therefore be found in statutes which, a^ I understand the trend of modern decisions, are said to be declaratory of the common law but afford new or additional remedies. This brings us to a consideration of the Federal so-called Sherman anti- trust law and the New York State antitrust law (General Business Law, sec. 340). I agree with Judge Ward in his opinion filed con- temporaneously herewith [Irving v. Neal, supra] that:_ "There can be no question, first, that a combination does exist between the various local unions which constitute the United Brother- hood; second, that one of the purposes of the combination is to com- pel the unionization of all manufacturing carpenter shops; third, that 166 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. the object is to restrain competition between open shops and union shops; and, fourth, that this object is to be accomplished principally by an agreement to refuse to work on any job where nonunion trim is used." I further agree that the combination in the case before him results in directly restraining competition between manufacturers and oper- ates to restraLa interstate commerce ia violation of the above-referred- to Federal and State statutes. As the agreement between the joint district councU and the master carpenters and -the agreement between the Manufacturing Wood- workers' Association and the United Brotherhood and the joint dis- trict council are but steps in the course of the combination and effective extensions of its purpose and results, I am of the opinion that these agreements are also condemned by the two statutes referred to — and this irrespective of the motives which actuated any of the de- fendants, masters, or workmen. But injunctive rehef may be had under either statute only at the instance of the United States or the State of New York, as the case may be, and therefore complainants can not recover in this suit. Nat. Fireproofing Co. v. Mason BuUders' Ass'n [169 Fed. 259 ; Bui. No. 84, p. 427]. As I can not agree with the contention of the counsel for comriiaia- ants that either subdivision 5 of section 580 or section 530 of the renal Law is appHcable to the case at bar, there thus remains for consid- eration oiuy subdivision 6 of section 580 of the Penal Law of New York. Subdivision 6 of section 580 of article 54 of the Penal Law (for- merly section 168, subd. 6, of Penal Code) has long been on the stat- ute book. It provides: "If two or more persons conspire to commit any act inju- rious * * * to trade or commerce * * * each of them is guilty of misdemeanor" (formerly part of section 168 of the Penal Code). The prevention of competition in business has been held to be an act injurious to trade in contemplation of law. Kellogg v. Sowerby, 190 N. Y. 370, 83 N. E. 47; People, etc., v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251, 34 N. E. 785. It is further held by the New York Coiu-t of Appeals: "A civil action is maiatainable by one who suffers injury as the result of a conspiracy forbidden by the criminal law to recover the damages which he has sustained at the hands of the parties to the combination." See, also, In re Debs, 158 U. S. at page 593, 15 Sup. Ct. 900. Under this statute the motive of the parties is immaterial. The gist of the offense is the agreement to prevent competition. But before a private Utigant may recover he must show either that he has suffered special injury as the proximate result of the wrong or that the conspiracy was directed against him. Cranford v. Tvrrell, 128 N. Y. 341, 28 N. E. 514. So, here, it is true that the complainants may be injured by the general situation; but theirs is not a special injury in the sense of Cranford v. Tyrrell, supra, nor of the Irving case. Assuming, for the purpose of illustration, the agreement complained of to be un- lawful, it was impersonal and intended to accomplish a general result DECISIONS OF COUMS AFFECTING LABOB. 167 as disting:uislied from selecting these particular complainants as the object of its operation. National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Ass'n, supra. In such circumstances the pohcy of the lawmaking power (here, Congress and the New York Legislature) seems to be to remit these problems to the responsible and duly sdiected public oflBcials. A decree in a htigation at the instance of the Government or the State is binding universally to aU practical intents and purposes. It is presumably in the public interest as distinguished from any individual interest and operates for the benefit of all (as distinguished from meeting a particular instance of wrong or injury) on a method or manner of conducting business whether the complaint be against enaployer or employee. Of the many cases cited I find none authoritative where a general business situation in the case of employers or a general trade situation in the case of employees was corrected by injunction at the instance of private suitors. Ample remedy is provided at common law or by statute for recovery of money damage in actions by private htigants. The courts have time and again extended the equity arm to prevent the commission or continuance of injury directed against particular persons and have protected employers against violence and sympa- thetic strikes; but where the purpose of an iaj unction is, as m the case at bar, .to attempt to control a large body of men generally to work or not to work on a class of goods or in a kind of manufacture (as distinguished from a specific instance or instances as above dis- cussed), the remedy of injunction is not to be granted in a litigation between private parties. Finally, it may be remarked that, in any event, on this branch of the case, the complaint does not seek an injunction against the master carpenters nor does the proof justify the granting thereof. Mechanics' Liens — Constitutionaltt of Statute — Intekfek- ENCE with Right to Contract — Rittenhouse cfc Embree Co. v. WiUiam Wrigley, jr., Co., Supreme Court oflUinois (June 16, 1914), 105 North- eastern Reporter, page IJfi. — This case involved the constitution ahty of the Illinois statute, Laws of 1903, page 238, section 21, providing that every mechanic or other person who shall furnish any labor or material for any contractor shall be known as a subcontractor and have a lien the same as a contractor, whether or not the contractor could have obtained a hen or was by contract or conduct divested of the right to a lien. The court held that this statute is vmconstitutional as de- priving the owner of the right to contract, in a manner not within the police power of the State, in so far as it gives a right to a lien where the original contractor has waived his right to lien before any labor was performed or materials furnished, following its previous opinion in the case of Kelly v. Johnson, 251 111. 135, 95 N, E. 1068 (Bui. No. 98, p. 484). 168 bulletin of the btjeeatj of laboe statistics. Mechanics' Liens — ^Liens of Subcontkactors — ^Attorneys' Fees — Constitutionality of Statute — Becker v. Hopper, Supreme Court of Wyoming (Jan. 27, 1914), 138 Pacific Reporter, page 179. — This was an action to recoTer the value of materials furnished in the construction of a building, the contract not having been made with the owner of the building but with his contractor. The statute of Wyoming, section 3799, CompUed Statutes of 1910, gives the sub- contractor a right to a mechanic's lien, though there is no direct con- tractual relation with the owner of the property. It was contended that this was unconstitutional, which contention was rejected by the court, Judge Beard, who delivered the opinion, saying: We are content to follow the decisions of the courts of last resort in a large majority of the States where the question has been decided, holding that such statutes, giving subcontractors a lien for labor and materials actually entering into the structure, do not violate consti- tutional provisions, and are valid. The question was fully and care- fully considered by the circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit, in Jones V. Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co., 86 Fed. 370, 30 C. C. A. 108, in an elaborate opinion by Judge Lurton, in which many cases are reviewed, and that decision was aflBrmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Great Southern Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 24 Sup. Ct. 576, 48 L. Ed. 778, in the footnote to which case many addi- tional cases are cited. Another question of constitutionality was raised with reference to a provision of the statute awarding attorneys' fees to the plaintiff or complainant if he shall obtain a judgment or decree, no reciprocal benefit being allowed a successful defendant. As to this the court said in part: The decisions are not uniform on this question. In some of the States similar statutes have been held valid, and in other invalid, as violative of the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees to every person " the equal protection of the law" ; and the provisions of State constitutions that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation, and that no special law shall be enacted when a general law can be made apphcable. The decision most frequently referred to and cited in support of the decisions holding such statutes unconstitutional is Gulf, etc., Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255 [Bui. No. 11, p. 504], holding invahd a statute of Texas allowing attorney's fees to any person having a bona fide claim against a rail- road company for services, or for damages for stock killed. The opinion then cited Davidson v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 Pac. 354, and Mills v. Olsen, 43 Mont. 129, 115 Pac. 33, in which similar provisions were held unconstitutional, and said : The reasoning in those cases, supported as it is by the authorities therem cited, appears to us to be sound, and not shaken by the de- cisions holding the contrary. We are impelled to the conclusion that the statute awarding attorney's fees m this class of cases is imconsti- tutional and void. The judgment in the plaintiff's favor was therefore modified and affirmed. decisions of courts affecting laboe. 169 Mechanics' Liens — ^Materialmen — ^Effect of Stipulation by CoNTRAOTOB — Hume V. Seattle Dock Go. et al., Supreme Court of Oregon {Jan. 6, 1914), 137 Paciiic Reporter, page 752.— R. A. Hume filed a lien on the Chamber of Commerce Building owned by the dock company, for the amount due him on material he had furnished a contractor for making cement blocks and tile for use in fireproofing the building. The company contended that Hume had no right of hen, as its contract with the principal contractor contained a stipu- lation that no mechanics' liens should be filed. Hume obtained a judgment in the circuit court of Multnomah County, Oreg., and this judgment was afiirmed by the supreme court of the State, on appeal. Judge Eakin, in referring to the contention of the dock company, said: There is a great conflict in the cases, accounted for in most instances by the difference in the relative statutes. Where there is a covenant in the contract against liens or an express stipulation that hens shall not be filed, the courts of a great many of the States hold that such stipulation will not bind the laborer, materialman, or subcontractor unless he has assented to it. [Cases cited.] But, on the other hand, a few States follow the holding in Pennsyl- vania, as stated in Schroeder v. Galland et al., 134 Pa. 277, 19 Atl. 632 [since modified by statute], it being held that a mechanic's hen can not be filed by a subcontractor for work or material furnished by him toward the erection of the building, and that the only connection between the owner and the subcontractor is through and by means of the contract between the owner and the contractor, so that the subcontractor is chargeable with notice of all its terms and stipula- tions and is bound thereby. ,By this rule the laborer is not con- sulted, and he must accept the work under the conditions of the original contract, in the making of which he had no voice. It was to protect the worlonan against such conditions that our hen law was enacted. A hen is not given through the contractor by subro- gation but is a direct and independent hen to each claimant against the property. Therefore we conclude that the materialman or laborer, to be bound by the stipulation in the original contract against hens, must have assented thereto, or at least notice of that condition must be brought home to him, which was not done in this case. The dock company also took the position that the sand and cement furnished by Hume, from which the cement blocks and tile were con- structed, were not Uenable. In disposing of this contention. Judge EaMnsaid: The question is whether material furnished to the Maclte Fire- Proofing Company at its factory for the purpose of manufacturing blocks and tile for use in the construction of the Chamber of Com- merce Building was henable. The appeahng defendant contends that raw material used to manufacture a commercial article is not Uenable, and also that the identity of the material is lost. We under- stand the rule to be that the henability of the material does not 170 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. depend on its suitableness in its crude condition for use in construc- tion of the building or on its identity being maintained, but whether it was furnished especially for the manufacture of something to be used in such structure. Of course crude material for the manufacture of an article for the market generally without reference to any par- ticular structure would not be Henable against the buUding in which it was used. We think that the material furnished by the plaintiff in this case was lienable. Mine Eegulations — Constitutionality op Statute — Status OP Statutory Commission — Plyvfwwth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 24-, 1914), 34 Supreme Court Reporter, page 359. — ^An act of the State of Pennsylvania, section 10 of article 3, act of June 2, 1891, requires owners of adjoining coal prop- erties to leave a pillar or boundary of coal between their properties of a sufficient thickness to secure the safety of the employees of one party in case the other abandons his workings. The necessity for such a barrier and its dimensions are to be determined by a commis- sion or board consisting of the engineers of the adjoining property owners and the mine inspector of the district. The inspector of mines in Luzerne County requested by letter that the Plymouth Coal Co. have its engineer meet the engineer of a company owning adja- cent property in his office at a time set, to decide as to the thickness of the barrier piUar to be left between the properties of the two companies. This the Plymouth company declined to do, whereupon proceedings were had and an injunction issued requiring a barrier pillar at least 70 feet wide to be left, subject, however, to subsequent proceedings as to the necessity for such a pillar on findings by the engineers of the respective companies and the inspector of the dis- trict. The company's contentions were that the law violated the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, the provision of the statute being "so crude, uncertain, and unjust as to constitute a taking of property without due process of law." Mr. Justice Pitney, who delivered the opinion of the court, first declared that the poHce power of the State reached to the dangerous business of mining coal, citing a number of cases. The opinion of the court below was quoted from at some length, showing the con- struction put upon the law in question by the State courts, the con- clusion being that such a piUar must be left unless the persons au- thorized to decide the question as a tribimal of experts should deter- mine that none is needed. The case of Kern v. Delano, 235 Pa. 478, 84 Atl. 452, was also cited as presenting the view of the supreme court of the State as to the exclusive nature of the jurisdiction of this board, the court saying that even the action of one property DECISIONS OF COURTS APFECTIHTG LABOR. 171 owner in removing the coal from its mine up to the boundary line could not deprive the statutory tribunal of its authority, or confer jurisdiction upon a court of equity to determine the width of the boundary barrier. Proceeding, Mr. Justice Pitney said: The legislature has not defined with precision the width of the piUar, and it is very properly admitted that, in the nature of things, this woul(i have been impossible, because the width necessary in each case must be deternuned with reference to the situation of the particular property. From this it necessarily results that it was competent for the legislatm-e to lay down a general rule, and then establish an administrative tribunal with authority to fix the precise width or thickness of pillar that will suit the necessities of the par- ticular situation, and constitute a comphance with the general rule. Administrative bodies with authority not essentially different are a recognized governmental institution. Commissions for the regula- tion of public service corporations are a famUiar instance. It is to be presumed, until the contrary appears, that the adminis- trative body would have acted with reasonable regard to the property rights of plaintiff in error; and certainly if there had been any arbi- trary exercise of its powers its determination woTild have been sub- ject to judicial review. It is further objected that the statute provides for no appeal from " the determination of the tribunal. But in such cases the right of appeal on other than constitutional grounds may be conferred or withheld, at the discretion of the legislatm-e. As already pointed out, an appeal on fundamental grounds in this instance seems to inhere in the very practice prescribed by the statute for the enforce- ment of the determination of the statutory tribunal. Were this not expressed in the act, it would none the less be implied, at least so far as pertains to any violation of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Mine Regulations — Weighing Coal — Constitutionality of Statute — Rail <& River Coal Co. v. Yaple et al., United States Dis- trict Court, Northern District of Ohio {May 20, 1914), ^H Federal Reporter, page 27S. — ^The coal company named brought action against the defendants, constituting the Industrial Commission- of Ohio, for an injunction to restrain them from enforcing the provisions of the Ohio law of February 5, 1914 (104 Ohio Laws, p. 181), entitled "An act to regulate the weighing of coal at the mines." The act provides that the miners shall be paid for the total weight contained in the cars sent out by them, but that the amount of impurities shall not exceed a percentage to be determined by the industrial commission. The court denied the injunction and sustained the constitutionality of the law in an opinion from which the following is quoted: The State constitution was amended by adding to article 2 the fol- lowing sections : "Seo. 34. Laws may be passed fixing and regulating hours of labor, establishing a TniniTTinTn wage, and providing for the comfort, 172 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OP LABOR STATISTICS. health, safety and general welfare of all employees; and no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this power. "Sec. 36. Laws may be passed * * * to provide for the regu- lation of methods of mining, weighing, measuring and marketmg coal, oil, gas and other minerals." Without determining the soundness of the argument that the act, indirectly at least, establishes a minimum wage, in that it insures the miner full pay for all coal mined in accordance with the prescribed regulation, it may not be said that, in supplying an incentive for more effectually securing the removal of fine coal and coal dust to the sur- face, and thereby minimizing or dissipating the danger arising from their continued presence in the mines, the act does not provide for the health, safety, and general welfare of employees. The Ohio act does not restrict the right of contracting for the labor of miners by the day, week, month, or year, or in any other manner (except as to quantity) that the operator may deem proper. If the miner or loader by the terms of his employment is to be paid by the ton or other weight, the right of contract is then curtailed to the extent that he shall be paid according to the total weight of the coal contained in the mine car, such contents to include, however, no greater percentage of slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or other impurities than is unavoidable, as determined by the industrial commission. It must be presumed that the industrial commission will perform its official duty and fix a standard which will exclude all slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or other impurities, except such as is unavoidable. The operator, if given the unrestricted right of contract, could do no more. If, dissatisfied with the commission's order, which by statute is made prima facie reasonable and lawful, he may petition for and obtain a hearing before the commission as to those features, and may there- after have a speedy review of its action by the supreme court of the State. Minimum Wages — Constitutionality of Statute — Simpson v. O'Hara et al., Supreme Court of Oregon (April 28, 1914), HI Pacifi-c Reporter, page 158. — This action was brought to test the constitu- tionahty of the Oregon minimum wage law. As to the one question presented in addition to those in the case of Stettler v. O'Hara et al. [see p. 173], Judge McBride, who dehvered the opinion of the court, said: It is suggested on this appeal that in the case of Stettler v. O'Hara this court did not pass upon the contention raised in the pleadings, and upon the argument, that the minimum wage act is inimical to that portion of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Consti- tution of the United States which provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges orimmunities of citizens of the United States." Having determined in the preceding case that the police power of the State legitimately extended to the right (o prevent the employ- ment of women and children for unreasonably long hours or at unrea- sonably small wages, and that the State had the right to use the machinery of a commission to determine to the extent stated in the opinion the length of time and at what wages such persons, might be DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOE. 173 employed, it would seem to follow as a natural corollary that the right to labor for such hours and at such wages as would reasonably seem to be detrimental to the health or welfare of the community is not a privilege or immunity of any citizen. Local self-government lies at the very foundation of freedom, and the private and local affairs of a community are sacred from the interference of the central power, unless oppressive and unreasonable encroachment on the lib- erties of the citizen rend ere such interference imperatively necessary, and such is not the case here. Minimum Wages — Industrial Welfare Commission —Powers OF Commission — Constitutionality of Statute — Stettler v. O'Hara et al., Industrial Welfare Commission, Supreme Court of Oregon (Mar. 17, 1914), 139 Pacific Reporter, page 7^5.— Frank O. Stettler brought suit against the members of the Industrial WeKare Commission of Oregon to vacate and annul an order of the commission and enjoin its enforcement. The constitutionality of Laws of 1913, page 92 (ch. 62), was brought in question by this action. The provisions of the act and the facts in the case are stated by the court as follows: On February 17, 1913, the legislative assembly passed an act en- titled "To protect the lives and health and morals of women and minor workers, and to estabhsh an industrial welfare commission and define its powers and duties, and to provide for the fixing of minimum wages and maximum hours and standard conditions of labor for such workers, and to provide penalties for violation of this act." The title is followed by a declaration of the evils that it is desired to rem- edy, as foUows: "Whereas, the welfare of the State of Oregon requires that women and minors should be protected from conditions of labor which have a pernicious effect on their health and morals^ and inade- quate wages and unduly long hours and unsanitary conditions of labor have such a pernicious effect; therefore, be it enacted by the people of the State of Oregon." The first section provides : "It shall be unlaw- ful to employ women or minors in any occupation within the State of Oregon for unreasonably long hours ; and it shall be unlawful to employ women or minors in any occupation within the State of Ore- gon under any such surroundings or conditions — sanitary or other- wise — as may be detrimental to their health or morals ; and it shall be unlawful to employ women in any occupation within the State of Oregon for wages which ai'e inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living and to maintain them in health; and it shall be unlawful to employ minors in any occupation within the State of Oregon for unreasonably low wages." Then follows the creation of the commis- sion under the name of "Industrial Welfare Commission," to be appointed by the governor, and provisions defining its duties. Among its duties are those of ascertaining and declaring, in a man- ner prescribed by the statute, standards of employment for women and children, including rates of wages, hours of labor, and sanitary and other conditions such as may affect health or morals. From the mat- ters so determined by the commission, there may be no appeal on 174 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. any question of fact, but there is a right of appeal from the commis- sion to the circuit court from any ruling or holding on a question of law included or embodied in any decision or order by the commission, and from the circuit court to the supreme court. In due course, the commission made the following order: The Industrial Welfare Commission of the State of Oregon hereby orders that no person, firm, corporation, or association owning or operating any manufacturing establishment in the city of Portland, Oregon, shall employ any woman in said establishment for more than nine hours a day, or fifty hours a week; or fix, allow, or permit for any woman employee in said establishment a noon lunch period of less than forty-five minutes in length; or employ any experienced adult woman worker, paid by time rates of pajrment, in said estab- lishment at a weekly wage of less than $8.64, any lesser amount being hereby declared inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living to such woman factory workers, and to maintain them in health. The amended complaint sets out all these matters in greater detail, to which the commission replied by way of demurrer on various grounds, the first of which raises the questions here discussed, namely: That "it does not state facts showing that the act or order complained of is an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State." The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff elected to stand on the amended complaint without other facts being adduced. Judgment was rendered dismissing the suit, and the plaintiff appealed. In its opinion, written by Judge Eakin, and upholding the consti- tutionality of the law, the court states that the purpose of the suit is to have determined judicially whether the regulation by the legisla- ture of the hours of labor during which women may be employed in any mechanical or manufacturing establishment, mercantile occupa- tion, or other employment requiring continuous physical labor, or the establishment of a minimum wage to be paid therefor is in viola- tion of the State or Federal Constitution, some of the features of these questions being practically new to the courts of this country. Cases on both sides were considered at length, and it was conceded that the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution is a bar to such legislation if it can not be justified as a poHce measure; and it was assumed that provisions enacted by the State under its police power that Have for their purpose the protection or betterment of the pubUc health, morals, peace, and welfare, and reasonably tend to that end, are within the power of the State, notwithstanding they may apparently conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Fed- eral Constitution. The principal question for decision therefore was whether the provisions of the act are within the police power of the State. It appeaa-ed from the cases cited that statutes having for their purpose provision for maximum hours of labor for employees upon DECISIONS OF COTJETS AFFECTING LABOR. 175 public works, maximum hours for women and children employed in mechanical, mercantile, or manufacturing establishments, maximum hours for laborers in mines or smelters, and the fixing of minimum wages for laborers upon public works were constitutional, the coiu-t saying that the last is so held in Malette v. Spokane, 137 Pac. 500 (see p. 191), even where the expense is borne by private individuals, so that the only question for decision here is as to the power of the legis- lature to fix the minimum wage in such a case. Continuing the court said: In speaking of the Oregon 10-hour law. Chief Justice Bean, in the case of State v. MuUer [48 Oreg. 252, 85 Pac. 855, see Bui. No. 67, p. 877], says: "Such legislation must be taken as expressing the belief of the legislature, and through it of the people, that the labor of females in such establishments in excess of 10 hours in any one day is detrimental to health, and injuriously affects the public welfare. The only question for the court is whether such a regulation or limita- tion has any real or substantial relation to the object sought to be accomplished, or whether it is 'so utterly unreasonable and extrava- gant' as to amount to a mere arbitrary interference with the right to contract. On this question we are not without authority." These are some of the grounds upon which maximum 10-hour laws are sustained, and we have cited them here as applying with equal force to sustain the women's minimum wage law, and as bringing it within the police power of the legislature. The State should be as zealous of the morals of its citizens as of their health. The "whereas clause" quoted above is a statement of the facts or conclusions con- stituting the necessity for the enactment, and the act proceeds to make provision to remedy these causes. , "Common belief" and "common knowledge" are sufficient to make it palpable and beyond doubt that the employment of female labor as it has been conducted is highly detrimental to public morals, and has a strong tendency to corrupt them. The Legislature of the State of Massachusetts appointed a commission known as the commission of minimum wage boards to investigate conditions. In the report of that commission in January, 1912, it is said: "Women in general are working because of dire neces- sity, and in most cases the combined income of the family is not more than adequate to meet the family's cost of living. In these cases it is not optional with the woman to decline low-paid employment. Every dollar added to the family income is needed to lighten the bur- den which the rest are carrying. * *_ * Wherever the wages of such a woman are less than the cost of living and the reasonable pro- vision for maintaining the worker in health, the industry employing her is in receipt of the working energy of a human being at less than its cost, and to that extent is parasitic. The balance must be made up in some way. It is generally paid by the industry employing the father. It is sometimes paid in part by future inefficiency on the part of the worker herself, and by her children, and perhaps in part ulti- mately by charity and the State. * * * If an industry is per- manently dependent for its existence on underpaid labor, its value to the Commonwealth is questionable." With this common belief, of which Mr. Justice Harlan says "we take judicial notice," the court can not say, beyond aU question, that the act is a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by tiie fimdamental law, and has no real or substan- 176 BULLETIN OP THE fiUEEATJ OF LABOB STATISTICS. tial relation, to the protection of public health, the public morals, or public welfare. Every argument put forward to sustain the maxi- mum hours law, or upon which it was established, applies equally in favor of the constitutionality of the minimum wage law as also within the police power of the State and as a regulation tending to guard the public morals and the public health. Plaintiff, by his complaint, questions the law also as a violation of section 20 of article 1 of the constitution of Oregon. As we under- stand this contention, it is that the order applies to manufactiu-ing estabhshments in Portland alone, that other persons in the samp business in other localities are unaffected by it, and that it is dis- criminatory. The law by which plaintiff is bound is contained in section 1 of the act quoted above. If he wUl, he can comply with this provision without any action by the commission, and it applies to all the State alike. The other provisions of the act are for the purpose of ascertaining for those who are not complying with it what are reasonable hours of labor, and what is a reasonable wage, in the various occupations and localities in the State to govern in the application of section 1 of the act, and for the purpose of fixing penalties for violations thereof. Counsel seems to consider the order of the commission as a law which the commission has been authorized to promulgate; but we do not understand this to be its province. Section 4 provides: "Said commission is hereby authorized and empowered to ascertain and declare * * * (a) standards of hovirs," etc. By section 8 it is only after investigation by the com- mission, and when it is of opinion therefrom that any substantial number of women in any occupation are working unreasonably long hours or for inadequate wages, that it shall, by means of a conference, ascertain what is a reasonable number of hours for work and a minimum rate of wages, when it may make such an order as may be necessary to adopt such regulation as to hoiu-s of work and minimum wages; and section 1 of the act shall be enforced on that basis. There is nothing in the record suggesting that there is a substantial number of woman workers in the same occupation as those included in the order complained of here working imreasonably long hours or for an inadequate wage in any other locality than Portland. Other cases as they are discovered are to be remedied as provided therefor, but the law is State-wide, and it does not give the plaintiff unequal protection of the law, nor grant to others privileges denied to him; neither does it delegate legislative power to the commission. It is authorized only to ascertam facts that wUl determine the localities, businesses, hours, and wages to which the law shall apply. Counsel urges that the law upon this question interferes with plaintiff's free- dom of contract, and refers to the language used In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, to wit: "Liberty, in its broad sense as understood in this country, means the right, not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to hve and work where he will," etc., as a change brought about by the larger freedom enjoyed in this country, and guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and the constitution of the various States m comparison with conditions in the earUer days of the common law, when it was found necessary to prevent extortion and oppression by royal proclamation or otherwise, and to establish reasonable compensation for labor; but he fails to take note that by DECISIONS OP GOUETS AFFECTING LABOB. 177 reason of this larger freedom the tendency is to return to the earlier conditions of long hours and low wages, so that some classes in some employments seem to need protection from the same conditions for which royal proclamation was found necessary. The legislature has evidently concluded that in certain locahties these conditions prevail even in Oregon ; that there are many women employed at inadequate wages— employment not secured by the agreement of the worker at satisfactory compensation, but at a wage dictated by the employer. The worker in such a case has no voice in fixing the hours or wages, or choice to refuse it, but inust accept it or fare worse. Plaintiff further contends that the statute is void for thejeason that it makes the findings of the commission on aU questions of fact conclusive, and therefore takes his property without due process of law. Due process of law merely requires such tribunals as are proper to deal with the subject in hand. Reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to be heard before some tribunal before it decides the issues are the essentials of due process of law. It is sufficient for the protection of his constitutional rights if he has notice and is given an opportunity at some state of the proceeding to be heard. We think we should be bound by the judgment of the legislature that there is a necessity for this act, that it is within the police power of the State to provide for the protection of the health, morals, and welfare of women and children, and that the law should be upheld as constitutional. Mothers' Pensions — Constkuction of Statute — Widow — Be- hrot V. Marion County, Supreme Court of Iowa (Feb. 19, 1914), 145 Northwestern Reporter, page 467. — The district court of Marion County denied an apphcation of Olive Debrot, a divorced woman, for the sup- port of her three minor children under the mothers' pension act, and this decision was affirmed by the supreme court. The language of the act permits payments to the mother of dependent children only when she is a widow. The court, speaking by Judge Deemer, said in part: It wiU be observed that section 2 of the act undertakes to define the word "widow," or to extend its ordinary meaning, by providing, in substance, that a mother whose husband is an inmate of any of the State institutions shall, for the purposes, of the act, be considered a widow so long as the husband is confined therein. The effect of this section in broadening the term is, according to all the canons of con- struction, to exclude aU other persons who might, by interpretation or construction, be thought to be within the terms or spirit of the original act, although not within its letter. The old maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," is especially applicable to statutes, and of special significance where attempt is made to specifically broaden the scope of a general term. [Cases cited.] Aside from this, however, it appears from a reading of all the stat- utes quoted that the common-law liability of both husband and wife for the support of their children is recognized, and provisions are made to enforce this liability by appropriate proceedings. This lia- bility of either or both parents to. support their minor children is not, of course, affected by a divorce ob tamed by one from the other. It 85590°— Bull. 169—15 12 178 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. continues in spite of the divorce until the children reach their ma- jority, or until the death of the parents. [Cases cited.] There is no allegation in the application that the father of the children is unable to support them, and the only showing with refer- ence to Debrot is that he is living in the State of Connecticut, and there procured a decree of divorce from his wife on service by publica- tion. This divorce did not sever the relation of parent and child, although it may have dissolved the marital relations theretofore existing. We must construe the act in question without reference to the present residence of one of the parents, for, if the mother is a widow within the meaning of the statute under which relief is sought, it is entirely immaterial where her divorced husband lives, or what his financial ability. Railroads — Qualifications of Employees — Constitutional- ity OF Statute — ^Freight Conductors — Smith v. State of Texas, Supreme Court of the United States (May 11, 1914), ^4- Supreme Court Reporter, page 681. — W. W. Smith was arrested and convicted for violating chapter 46, Texas Laws of 1909, section 2 of which reads as follows : If any person shall act or engage to act as a conductor on a railroad traia in this State without having for two (2) years prior thereto served or worked in the capacity of a brakeman or conductor on a freight train on a line of railroad, he shall be deemed guilty of a mis- demeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, and each day he so engages shall constitute a separate offense. Smith was 47 years of age, and had been in the raUrpad business for 21 years as fireman and as engineer on freight, mixed and passenger trains. On July 22, 1910, he acted as conductor of a freight train between two Texas towns, and this constituted the offense with which he was charged. He contended that the statute was unconstitutional as violating the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Con- stitution of the United States, and this contention the Supreme Court upheld, reversing the decision of the court below. Mr. Justice Lamar, in dehvering the court's opinion, cited cases and discussed the general power of regulation of such employment in the interest of the public, ^nd continued as follows: This and the other cases establish, beyond controversy, that, in the exercise of the police power, the State may prescribe tests and require a hcense from those who wish to engage m or remain in a private calling affecting the public safety. The liberty of contract is, of course, not unlimited; but there is no reason or authority for the proposition that conditions may be imposed by statute which will adniit some who are competent and arbitrarily exclude others who are equally competent to labor on terms mutually satisfactory to em- ployer and employee. None of the cases sustains the proposition that, under the power to secure the public safety, a privileged class DECISIONS OF COXTETS AFFECTING LABOR. 179 can be created and be then given a monopoly of the right to work in a special or favored position. The statute here under consideration permits those who had been freight conductors for two years before the law was passed, and those who for two years have been freight conductors in other States, to act in the same capacity in the State of Texas. But barring these exceptional cases, the act permits brakemen on freight trains tp be promoted to the position of^conductor on a freight train, but excludes all other citizens of the United States from the right to engage in such service. The statute does not require the brakeman to prove his fitness, though it does prevent all others from showing that they are competent. The act prescribes no other qualification for appoint- ment as conductor than that for two years the applicant should have been a brakeman on a freight train, but affords no opportunity to any others to show their fitness. It thus absolutely excludes the whole body of the public, including many railroad men, from the right to secure employment as conductor on a freight train. Eailkoads — Safety Appliance Act — Construction — Electric Railways — Spokane Judge Dorsey said: In the petition for a rehearing we are requested to modify and extend the opinion. While in no particvdar receding from the posi- tion taken in the opinion herein, we have thought proper to make certain statements therein more explicit: First. The provisions of the present compensation act, as far as they affect the employer, are unobjectionable, as they do not conffict with any provisions of the constitution. Second. Any employee coming within the provisions of the act may voluntarily agree to accept its provisions fixing and limiting his recov- ery in case of injury. Third. He may hkewise voluntarily accept the provisions of the act fixing the amount that shall be recovered in the event of his death, and said sum shall be paid to his dependents, if he leaves any, and if not, to his personal representative. The legislature has no power to direct that this sum shall in any event be paid into the compensation fund. Fourth. Some provision should be made in the act whereby the employee signifies his acceptance of the provisions of the act by some affirmative act on his part. Silence on this subject should not be construed into acceptance. Fifth. Provision should be made in the act for appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for review in all cases where compensation is DECISIONS OF COtTETS AFFECTING LABOR. 203 denied or where a less sum is allowed by the board than that claimed by the injured employee. For the reasons indicated in the opinion, the act in its entirety is void. Workmen's Compensation — ^Abrogation of Defenses — Exclu- sion OF Small Employers — ^Constitutionality of Statute — Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg, Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 5, 1915), SB Supreme Court Reporter, page 167. — This action was based on provisions of the workmen's compensation act of Ohio, the question being raised as to the constitutionality of a provision abrogating the defenses of certain employers. This act (sections 1465- 37 to 1465-108, G. C), in its original form, estabUshed an elective compensation system with an insurance fund to be maintained by premium payments by employers accepting its provisions. Employ- ers of five or more persons faihng to accept the provisions of the act were deprived of the defenses of fellow service, contributory negli- gence and assumption of risks. Under an amended constitution the law in its present form is compulsory, but the case in hand arose under the elective act. The defendant company, plaintiff in error in the present instance, was sued by Harry O. Blagg to recover damages for injuries received by him while in its employment, and, not having accepted the provisions of the act, it was deprived of the defenses named. Blagg recovered a judgment in the court of common pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, which judgment was affirmed in the court of appeals and the supreme court of the State. The case was then brought on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States on the question of constitutionality, and specifically as to the vaHdity of the provision distinguishing between employers of five or more workmen and those employing less than five persons. The Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Day, sustained the law as constitu- tional in an opinion which, following the statement of facts, reads mainly as follows: The fact that the negligence of a fellow servant is more hkely to be a cause of injury in the large estabhshments, employing many in their service, and that assumed risk may be different in such estab- Kshments than in smaller ones, is conceded in argument, and, is, we think, so obvious, that the State legislature can not be deemed guilty of arbitrary classification in making one rule for large and another for small establishments as to these defenses. The stress of the present argument, in the brief and at the bar, is upon the feature of^the law which takes away the defense of con- tributory negligence from estabhshments employing five or more and still permits it to those concerns which employ less than five. Much of the argument is based upon the supposed wrongs to the employee, and the alleged injustice and arbitrary character of the legislation here involved as it concerns him alone, contrasting an employee in 204 BULLETIN OF THE BTJBEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. a shop with five employees with those having less. No employee is complaining of this act in this case. The argument based upon such discrimination, so far as it affects employees by themselves con- sidered, can not be decisive; for it is the well-settled rule of this court that it only hears objections to the constitutionality of laws from those who are themselves affected by its alleged imconstitutionality in the feature complained of. [Cases cited.] This court has many times affirmed the general proposition that it is not the purpose of the fourteenth amendment in the equal pro- tection clause to take from the States the right and power to classify the subjects of legislation. It is only when such attempted classifi- cation is arbitrary and unreasonable that the court can declare it beyond the legislative authority. Certainly in the present case there has been no attempt at unjust and discriminatory regulations. The legislature was formulating a plan which should provide more adequate compensation to the beneficiaries of those kflled and to the injured in such establishments, by regulating concerns having five or more employees. It included, as we have said, aU of that class of institutions in the State. This is not a statute which simply declares that the defense of contributory negligence shall be available to employers having less than five workmen, and unavailable to employers with five and more in thei!- service. This provision is part of a general plan to raise funds to pay death and injury losses by assessing those estabhsh- ments which employ five and more persons and which voluntarily take advantage of the law. Those remaining out and who might come in because of the number employed are deprived of certain defenses which the law might abohsh as to all if it was seen fit to do so. If a line is to be drawn in making such laws by the number employed, it may be that those very near the dividing hne will be actmg under practically the same conditions as those on the other side of it, but if the State has the right to pass police regulations based upon such differences, — and this court has held that it has, — we must look to general results and practical divisions between those so large as to need regulation and those so small as not to require it in the legislative judgment. It is that judgment which, fairly and reasonably exercised, makes the law; not ours. We are not prepared to say that this act of the legislature, in bringing within its terms all establishments having five or more employees, including the deprivation of the defense of contributory negligence where such establishments neglect to take the benefit of the law, and leaving the employers of less than five out of the act was classification of that arbitrary and unreasonable nature which justifies a court in declaring this legislation unconstitutional. It follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio is aflSrmed. Wokkmen's Compensation — Acceptance of Act by Employee — Time of Taking Effect of Act — Coakley v. Mason Manufacturing Co., Supreme. Court of Rhode Island {July 10, 1914), 90 Atlantic Reporter, page 107S. — Marian Coakley brought an action in the superior court of Providence and Bristol counties against the com- DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 205 pany named to recover damages for personal injuries received May 19, 1913. The company's defense was based on the fact that on the 26th day of September, 1912, it had filed its acceptance of the com- pensation act, so that it was liable only under the terms of this act, which had been passed by the legislature in the previous April, to take effect October 1. It was contended by Coakley that this acceptance was not valid, and that the act was not in effect for any purpose previous to October 1 ; but the court held that the acceptance was valid, and any proceedings must be brought under the act, which view the supreme court affirmed. Workmen's Compensation — "Accident" — Defincte Time as Factor — Liondale Bleach, Dye & Paint Works v. Biker, Swpreme Court of New Jersey {Feb. 25, 1914), 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 929. — Judgment was rendered for the employee, Riker, in the court of com- mon pleas of Morris County, under the workmen's compensation act. This was reversed on appeal, and a new trial granted by the supreme court. Riker had worked in the bleachery of the defendant company 10 days when he was affected with a rash, pronounced to be a condi- tion of eczema, which might have resulted from the acids used in the bleachery. In rendering the decision. Judge Swayze, who delivered the opinion, reviewed the most important English cases bearing on the point as to whether this state of facts constituted an "accident" under the statute, and concluded as follows: We .need not, of course, consider cases where there has been an accident and disease has followed. We have considered that question in Newcomb v. Albertson, 89 Atl. 928 [see p. 2471. The English courts seem at last to have settled that, where no specific time or occasion can be fixed upon as the time when the alleged accident happened, there is no "miury by accident" within the meaning of the act. This seems a sensible working rule, especially in view of the provisions of the statute requiring notice in certain cases within 14 days of the occurrence of the injury — a provision which must point to a specific time. We need not consider in this case the question of the effect of a finding by the trial judge as in Brintons, Limited, v. Turvey [an Eng- lish case in which a wool comber was infected by anthrax]. Not only is there no such fimding of fact, but the learned trial judge rested upon a construction of the statute which makes the word "accident" include " those events which were not only the result of violence and casualty, but also those resulting conditions, which were attributable to and caused by events that take place without one's foresight or expectation." This, however, is to make the employer's liability turn on resulting conditions rather than on the fact of injury by accident. There may indeed be compensation awarded for resulting conditions where you can put your finger on the accident from which 206 BULLETIN OP THE BUBBATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. they result; but the ground of the action fixed by the statute is the injury by accident, not the results of an indefinite something which may not be an accident. Workmen's Compensation — ^Accident Arising Out of Employ- ment — Henry Steers, Inc., v. Dunnewald, Supreme Court of New Jersey {Feb. 25, 1914), 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 1007. — The plaintiff, Lena Dunnewald, recovered judgment for compensation in the court of common pleas of Hudson County for the death of her intestate, which judgment was reversed by the supreme court. Dunnewald was employed in building a bridge over a river near its outlet in a bay. He was to be at work at 11 o'clock on the evening of April 13, 1912, to assist in placing the new drawbridge construction in place of the old. He left his house to go to work at 9 o'clock, having some miles to go, the last part of which was across a trestle, etc., and was difficult and dangerous. His body was found several days later in the bay. The supreme court held that the facts would not authorize an infer- ence that the death was caused by accident arising out of the employ- ment, although the inference might be drawn that it was caused by accident in the course of the employment. As both elements were necessary to support a recovery under the act, no recovery could be had, and the judgment of the court below was reversed. The English cases similar to this one were discussed as supporting this decision. Workmen's Compensation — Actions — Default of Contribu- tions — Barrett v. Gray's Harbor Commercial Co., United States Dis- trict Court, Western District of Washington (Dec. 3, 1913), 209 Federal Reporter, page 95. — The Washington workmen's compensation act, Laws of 1911, chapter 74, section 4, requires employers to pay to the State, to create an accident fund, a percentage of wages paid, such payments to be made in advance, based on past pay rolls, and to be adjusted at the end of each year on the basis of the actual pay roU for that year. It further provides that any shortage on such an adjustment shall be made good before February 1, following; and by section 8, that if any workman be injured while the employer is in default for any payment and after demand for the same, the employer shall not be entitled to the benefits of the act, but the workman shall have a right of action. The commission created is empowered to make regulations for the administration of the act. The company named was notified on February 28 of a shortage due on its adjustment, with a demand for payment within 30 days. The plamtiff was injured during that time, and before the payment had been made, but it was afterward made during the time lunited. He brought suit, and the company demurred to the complaint. This DECISIONS OF COTJETS AFFECTIKG LABOB. 207 demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff held to have no right of action, on the ground that the demand was presumably in accordance with the regulations of the commission, and did not become effective untU the expiration of the 30 days, and that on payment within that time the company was entitled to the benefit of the act. Workmen's Compensation — Amount of Compensation — Com- mutation TO Lump Sum — Mockett v. Ashton, Supreme Court of New Jersey {June 7, 1918), 90 Atlantic Reporter, page 127. — Mockett was iajured while in the employ of one Ashton, and compensation in a lump sum was awarded by the court of common pleas of Camden County. In granting the defendant a new trial, Judge Swayze, who delivered the opinion of the supreme court, said: The judge found that the petitioner's eyesight was affected about one-third; that he had distressing pains in his head, and his nervous system was much below par; that his disability was partial in character and permanent in quality. He therefore decided to com- mute petitioner's compensation to %\ ,000. Since the petitioner claims the benefit of the statute, the statute must be our guide. The schedule contained in the statute does not provide specifically for the injuries involved in this case. The compensation, therefore, must bear such relation to the amounts stated m the schedule as the dis- abihties bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule. We are not informed what sum per week the trial judge thoi^ht justified under this statute, nor now he reached his result. The statute provides that the amoimts payable periodically as compen- sation may be commuted to a lump sum provided the same be in the interest of justice. We can not' pass upon the justice of the result reached by the trial judge unless we know the sum payable periodi- cally, the method by which he reached his result, and the reasons that induced him to commute the periodical payments into a lump sum. Long v. Bergen Common Pleas, 84 N. J. Law, 117, 86 Atl. 529. The case does not even show that he ever determined, as the statute requires, the relation borne by the petitioner's disabilities to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule, nor that he even determined the amount of the periodical payments before commuting them. It seems that he treated the case as if it arose under the common law, and awarded, as a jury might have done in an ordinary action, such sum as seemed to him just. Workmen's Compensation — Amount of Compensation — Dis- ability — De Zeng Standard Go. v. Pressey, Supreme Court of New Jersey (Nov. 6, 1914), 92 Atlantic Reporter, page 278. — This was a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act. The court, in an opinion by Judge Parker, affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas of Camden County, deciding some questions of interest in interpreting provisions of the act as to amount of compensation 208 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. and nature of disability necessary to entitle a claimant to com- pensation. The opinion is quoted for the most part, as foUows: This case arises under the workmen's compensation act, and the principal question argued is whether the petitioner should receive an award for the permanent impairment of the function of his right arm, when it is shown that he has been earning the same pay as he earned before the accident. The petitioner as a carpenter in the employ of the prosecutor earned 120 a week. He sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment which caused a fracture of the bone of the forearm known as the "radius" at or near the elbow, and which is admitted to have caused the permanent loss of 30 per cent of the use of his arm. After two weeks he went back to work under the same employer, at the same wages, and after a time entered the employ oi his son at the same wages. Later on when work became slack he worked independently, receiving the same pay for the time he was actually employed. In this proceeding the court awarded him 30 per cent of $10 for the period of 200 weeks, under the provision of the act: "Where the usefulness of a member or any physical function is permanently impaired, the compensation shall bear such relation to the amount stated in the schedule as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule." The 30 per cent, however, was awarded upon the number of weeks as a base, and consequently the award was the sum of $10 per week for a period of 60 weeks. This is not the method sanctioned in James A. Banister Co. v. Kriger, 84 N. J. Law, 30, 85 Atl. 1027 [see Bui. No. 152, p. 178], where this court sustained an award for the full period with relation to the percentage of the weekly wage on application of the minimum clause. Applying that rule to the present ease, the award would have been for 200 weeks at a minimum of $5 per week; but the petitioner does not question the form of the award, and plainly the prosecutor is not injured by it. The prosecutor's principal claim is that there can not be a statutory "disability" when it appears that the earnings of the petitioner had not been impaired. With this we can not agree. It may well be that for a time an injured employee might be able to earn the same wages as before the accident; but, as we read the act, the disability intended thereby is a disability due to the loss of a member, or part of a mem- ber, or of a function, rather than to mere loss of earning power. Even if this were not so, it does not follow that the injured employee had not sustained a distinct loss of earning power in the near or not remote future and for which the award is intended to compensate. If it were a question of damages at common law, the elements of damage would consist of present loss of wages, probably future loss of wages, pain and suffering, and temporary or permanent disability, which loss the jury would be at Hberty to assess quite independently of the fact that the plaintiff was earning the same wages, except so far as that fact might be evidential with regard to the extent of the disability. Next it is argued that, because the petitioner worked for the prosecutor for 55 weeks at full wages, these 55 weeks should be DECISIONS OF COUBTS AFFECTING LABOE, 209 deducted from the 60 weeks for which the award was made. The answer is that the prosecutor was under no obligation to employ the petitioner at $20 a week or any other sum, and that inasmuch as he chose to do so without any imderstanding, express or implied, that petitioner was not worth those wages, or that part of them should be treated as moneys paid under the compensation act, he must be pre- sumed to have paid the money as wages and because he thought the petitioner was worth that amount. Workmen's Compensation — ^Amount of Compensation — Loss OF Motion of Arm — ^Payments by Insurance Company — Barbour Flax Spinning Co. v. Hagerty, Supreme Court of New Jersey (Feb. 25, 1914), 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 919. — Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner, Hagerty, in the court of common pleas of Hudson County, for $5 per week for 200 weeks, for the loss of motion of his right arm at the elbow, consisting of permanent inability to bend it more than 90 degrees. The amount of compensation awarded was the same as the law provides for the loss of an arm. The law provides that compensation for injuries not specified shaU bear such relation to the amounts stated in the schedule of the act as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule. On appeal the supreme court held that the award could not be justified under the provision just mentioned, and therefore reversed the decision and remanded the case for a new trial. It was in evidence that the petitioner Hagerty had received the statutory weekly compensation for his injury for a period of 52 weeks, for which no credit had been given. As to this the court said: The petition avers that it was received • from the insurance com- pany of the defendant. The admission at the trial was that it was paid, by the defendant. If that is true, or if the premium for the insurance had been paid by the defendant, credit should have been given. If, however, the payment was by virtue of insurance paid for by the petitioner, the defendant is entitled to no credit therefor. Workmen's Compensation — ^Amount of Compensation — Par- tial Disability — O'Connell v. Simms Magneto Co., Supreme Court' of New Jersey (Nov. 25, 1913), 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 922.— The only question in this case was as to the amount of compensation. The injuries consisted of fractured skuU, broken collar bone and ribs, injury to eye, paralysis of right side of mouth, injury to right nostril and impairment of use of right ear and right arm. Making an allow- ance for each of these, and totaling them, the judge of the lower court arrived at a total of 340 weeks, and judgment was rendered awarding compensation to the petitioner for that length of time. 85590°— Bull. 169—15 ^14 210 BULLETIN OF THE BXJREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. On appeal, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for revision of the compensation, Judge Swayze, who delivered the opinion, saying: The evidence of the petitioner shows conclusively that the dis- ability of the petitioner is far from total. Under the statute only 400 weeks' pay could have been allowed for total permanent dis- ability, such as loss of both hands, arms, feet, or eyes. None of the injuries suffered by the petitioner are specifically provided for in the schedules contained in the act, and allowance therefor must have been made Tinder the provision that the compensation in other cases shall bear such relation to the amounts stated in the schedule as the disabihties bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule. There is no evidence that the disabilities of the petitioner stand to total disability in the proportion of 340 to 400. On the contrary, the evidence makes it clear that the proportionate extent of the dis- ability is very much less. The difficulty arose probably from the desire of the trial judge to award what he thought was fair compensa- tion. This was, however, disregarding the statute, not following it except in form. Workmen's Compensation — Benefits — Impairment of Earn- ing Capacity — International Harvester Oo. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, Supreme Court of Wisconsin {May 1, 1914), 147 NortTv- westem Reporter, page 53. — Ernest Koenig, an employee of the com- pany named, was injured March 5, 1912, by a particle of steel entering one of his eyes. The piece of steel was removed by a magnet, but the employee was incapacitated for work for 10 weeks and 4 days, and there was permanent impairment of the sight of the eye. He was paid for his loss of time and doctor's bills as provided by the act. He resumed work for the company at his former employment, operating a drill press, and up to the time of the hearing for compensation had earned apparently a little more per day at piecework after the resump- tion of work than before the accident. The industrial commission in its decision said that it was "satisfied from its investigation of injuries of this character and from the testimony that a man injured as appH- cant was injured can perform the labor that applicant was doing prior to the injury without difficulty." It further said: "The commission is also convinced that in most employments a one-eyed man is physi- cally able to earn substantially the same wage as a man with two eyes." The commission also found that the apphcant's loss of wage because of permanent partial disability was $2.16 per week, and ordered the company to pay him $1.41 per week for 15 years. This finding was based on the hkehhood that it would be less easy for the employee to secure work on account of his defective sight. The statute provides that the loss in wages for which compensation may be made shall con- sist of such percentage of the average weekly earnings of the injured DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOK. 211 employee as shall fairly represent "the proportionate extent of the impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in which he was working at the time of the accident." The court discussed the grounds on which the award of the com- mission can be set aside, which are stated in the statute as fol- lows: (1) That the commission acted in excess of its powers; (2) that the award was procured by fraud; and (3) that the findings of fact do not support the award. It held that the first ground would cover cases where the commission made a finding of fact without any- thing upon which to base it, and after full consideration of the sup- posed basis of the finding that the employee's deficiency in earning power amounted to 15 per cent of his former wages, which basis con- sisted largely of the results of investigations made by the commission itseK, and consideration of the statutes of other States, etc., the court decided that there was no material evidence, also that the loss of earn- ing power of a man with one eye was not the subject of judicial notice; and that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded to the commission for further hearing, or judgment entered for the Har- vester company, as the circuit court should determine. Three judges dissented, holding that "it was in evidence that the claimant lost an eye, and, in the exercise of common knowledge and observation, the commission was authorized to infer from this that his capacity to obtain employment was impaired." Workmen's Compensation — Benefits — Loss or Member — Limron v. Blair et al., Supreme Court of Michigan {June 1, 1914), 1^7 Northwestern Reporter, page difi. — Philhp Limron made application to the receivers of the Pere Marquette Railroad Co. for an award of compensation for injuries sustained. These consisted of the loss of a foot, and other injuries, which were still producing total disability at the time of the hearing, the disability apparently being largely due to injuries to the shoulder. The law provides for payment of one-half wages for the period of total disabihty not exceeding 500 weeks, and that in case of injury consisting of loss of certain members the disa- bility shall be deemed to exist for certain periods, that for loss of a foot being 125 weeks. The industrial accident board awarded the payment to the injured employee in this case for the time of his actual total disability, and for 125 weeks to commence at the conclu- sion of such disability, less 6 weeks' disability incident to the ampu- tation of the foot, the total period not to exceed 500 weeks. The court reversed this award, holding that he should be paid compensation for not less than 125 weeks in any case, but for only that length of time unless his 'total disability lasted longer than that period, in which case compensation would be paid for the period of disability only. 212 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAXJ OF LABOK STATISTICS. The court expressed the view that the statute " does not provide a specific indenmity for the loss of a member in addition to compensa^ tion for disability," since it "speaks in terms of disability," and "when the period of disability ends compensation ceases." Workmen's Compensation — Benefits — Permanent Injury and Subsequent Death — In re Burns, Supreme Judicial Court of Massch chusetts {May 21, 1914), 106 Northeastern Reporter, page 601. Bridget Burns filed a petition under the workmen's compensation act for the injury and death of her husband, John J. Burns. A decree was entered in her favor in the superior court of Suffolk County in accord- ance with a decision of the industrial accident board, and the insurer appealed. The decree was affirmed. Burns received a fracture of the spine, with severance of the spinal cord, which caused paralysis of the legs and all portions of the body below the fracture. He was taken to a hospital and given medical care, but an extensive bedsore formed because of the necessity of his remaining motionless, which finally resulted in blood poisoning and death. The court decided that the decision of the industrial accident board must be sustained on matters of fact where there was evidence to support them; and this principle was applied to the finding that the death was proximately caused by the injury and to the finding that the injiu-y was not caused by the serious and willful misconduct of the employer. The court remarked that this latter phrase involves conduct of a quasi criminal nature, the intentional doing of something either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences. The court also held that compensation was rightly given for the death of the husband as resulting proximately from the injury and for the permanent incapacity of both legs. Although there was no direct physical or external injury to the legs, it was held that their useless- ness resulting from the broken spinal cord was an injury to them. It was held, however, that this compensation for permanent incapacity ceased after the death of the. injured person, at least in the present case, where no award was made for a definite time on account of it. Workmen's Compensation — Benefits — Permanent Injury not Causing Incapacity— /ti re Ethier, Supreme Judicial Court of Massa- chusetts {May 20, 1914), 106 Northeastern Reporter, page 376. — In this case it was held that the Massachusetts workmen's compensation act and its amendment, which provides that the same , amount as for loss of the member shall be paid "in case an injury is such that the hand, foot, thumb, finger, or toe is not lost, but is so injured as DECISIONS or COURTS AFFECTING LABOE. 213 to be permanently incapable of use," does not provide for damages for permanent injury for the injury of a phalange not resulting in the permanent incapacity of the entire finger. Workmen's Compensation — Benefits — Separate Allowances — In re Nichols, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Feb. 27, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 566. — The administratrix of a deceased employee began a proceeding for compensation, and the decree of the superior court of Suffolk County awarded her the damages specified by the act for the death of an employee. The employee himself had received 12 weeks' compensation for the loss of "at least one phalange of a finger" in addition to the amount for disabihty. Afterwards blood poisoning developed and he died. The insurer contended that the payment for loss of the finger should be deducted from the compensation awarded to the widow. The court, however, disallowed this deduction, since the payment for 12 weeks for the loss of a part of a finger is expressly stated to be "in addition to all other com- pensation." Workmen's Compensation — Casual Employment — In re Gheevers, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Nov. 24, 1914), 106 North- eastern Reporter, page 861. — ^The compensation act of Massachusetts excepted from its provisions cases where "employment is but casual," untU an amendment in 1914 removed this exception. Cheevers was engaged in the teaming business on his own account, employing men and having three or four teams, but was occasionally employed by a coal dealer, who engaged him personally with his team, to handle coal. The last period of employment included February 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 25, 1913, the last-named date being that of the injury. The last previous period had been February 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7, 1912. Under these circumstances the court held that the employment was casual, and affirmed a decision of the industrial accident board denying compensation. Workmen's Compensation — Casual Employment — In re How- ard, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {June 17, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 636. — ^Arthur Howard was injured in the employ of the Edison Electric Illuminatiag Co., and the insurer claimed that the employment was casual. This contention was based upon the fact that, Howard's employment being to trim trees to keep the wires of the company clear, he was at the particular time of the accident trimming a tree through which none of its wires ran. He was acting, according to the statement of agreed facts, under the 214 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. orders of his foreman, who in turn was acting under the orders of the superintendent of the company. The court upheld a decree granting compensation, saying: In the present case Howard was employed to trim trees, and was to receive his orders from the company through Kennedy. It was no part of his business to inquire into the right of the company to trim any particular tree. He was to receive his orders from Kennedy and to obey them. At the time he was hurt he was doing what he had been hired to do. The work was not casual. Workmen's Compensation — Casual Employment — SabeUa et al. V. Brazileiro, Supreme Court of New Jersey (Oct. 1, 1914), 9.1 Atlantic Reporter, page 1032. — ^This case arose from the death of a long- shoreman, which resulted from injury occurring two hours after he began work at a ship. The principal question was whether the em- ployment was casual; and it was held that the work of a class of longshoremen who are ready to work when called upon and are not at work for any one employer constantly, because the latter has a ship in port only a part of the time, is not casual, the court saying that " an employment is not casual — that is, arising through accident or chance — where one is employed to do a particular part of a service recurring somewhat regularly with the fair expectation of its con- tinuance for a reasonable period." Workmen's Compensation — Casual Employment — ^Amount op Compensation — Schaeffer v. De Grottola, Supreme Court of New Jersey {Feb. 25, 1911^, 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 921. — George De Grottola petitioned the court of common pleas of Essex Coimty, which awarded him compensation of $10 per week, the maximum compensation, against his employer Schaeffer. On appeal, this award was aflBrmed. The employee began work on Monday morn- ing for this employer, shaving skins of a kind not usually handled in his estabhshment, and was injured about 11 o'clock. He was work- ing by the piece, and the arrangements as to continuance were some- what indefinite, but the court decided that the employment was not "casual," but work in the regular business without hinit as to time. As to the amount of compensat on, which would be one-half his weekly earnings, it was held that, as he had earned $1.60 up to 11 a. m., he might properly be found to be earning at the rate of $4 per day and therefore entitled to the maximum limit of $10 per week. Workmen's Compensation — Casual Employment — Waiters — In re Gaynor, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Feb. 27, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 339. — The decision in this case OteClSlOlifS Of COUbTS AFfECTtirQ LABOft. ^15 turned upon the question as to whether the employment of one Gaynor was covered by the tenns of the workmen's compensation act. The industrial accident board had made an award in his fator, and the superior court of Suffolk County issued a decree affirming this decision. This was reversed by the supreme judicial court on the groiuid that the employment came within the exception of the statute of "one whose employment is but casual." The employee had been hired to act as a waiter at a banquet on a certain day, receiving stipulated wages and his transportation to and from the point of service, and was injured while preparing to serve the ban- quet. He had never worked for the same employer before, and the employment was to terminate on that day. This was customary in the business of catering, the employers not usually employing any waiters regularly. Under these circumstances the court deter- mined that the employment was "casual," so that no compensation could be received for the injury. Workmen's Compensation — Classification of Employments — Eaileoad Construction — State v. Chicago, Milwaukee <& Puget Sound Railway Co., Supreme Court of Washington (July 16, 1914), 141 Pacific Reporter, page 897. — This was an action by the State to recover a premium payment from the company named under the State insurance law. The industrial insurance department of the State had classified certain work done by the railroad company as tunnel construction, requiring under the law a premium rate of 6| per cent. The company insisted that the work should be classified as steam radroad construction work, upon which a contribution at the rate of 5 per cent is required. The view contended for by the company was accepted by the superior court of King County, where- upon the State appealed and secured a reversal of the judgment of the court below, with a direction to enter judgment in accordance with the views maintained by the State. "The compensation act of the State, chapter 74, Acts of 1911, pro- vides for a number of classes of hazardous and extrahazardous employments, fixing the premium rates for each class, rates for tunnels and for railroad construction being as above indicated. It is further provided (sec. 4, subd. 3) that if in a single estabhshment several occupations are carried on which are in different risk classes the premium shrH be computed according to the pay roU of each occupation if clearly separable, otherwise an average rate shall be charged for the entire estabhshment. The supreme court held that this provision controlled the case, since the pay roU for the timnel construction was separable. The opinion was delivered by Judge Main, Judge Chadwick dissenting and holding that the enter- 216 BULLETIN OP THE BTTEEAU OP LABOB STATISTICS. prise rate should be a single one, covering all classes of occupations thereon. From the opinion of Judge Main the following is quoted: The trial court found, not only the actual pay roU for workmen employed in the timnel, but that the railroad other than the tunnel had been previously constructed and was in operation. If the operations involved m the construction are so interrelated as not to be clearly separable, then the enterprise classification would prevail. In other words, when the various occupations are separable, each occupation takes the rate of its particular class. But where they are not separable the equalized classification for the enterprise fixed by the statute controls. Workmen's Compensation — Constitutionalitt op Statute — Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., Supreme Court of TUinois (Feb. 21, 191^), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 211. — Joseph Deibeikis brought action against the company named for injuries alleged to have been sustained while employed in its machine shop. The company pleaded in defense that before the injury both parties had elected to be governed by the terms of the workmen's compensation act (Laws of 1911, p. 315, which was in force at the time of the happening of the injury, but has been superseded by Laws of 1913, p. 335) ; that the company had posted the required notices, and had done all that the act required of it; that the employee had accepted certain sums of money under the act, and that the company was ready to pay any further sums due; that the employee was governed by the terms of that act, and should adjust his grievances thereunder instead of bringing an action on the case. The plaintiff demurred on the ground of the unconstitu- tionality of the act. The demurrer being overruled, judgment was entered against him, upon which he appealed. The supreme court upheld the constilutionality of the act. Judge Cooke in delivering its opinion took up the provisions of the act in detail, as follows : As we understand the points made, the grounds relied upon are that the act is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It is not a proper exercise of the police power; (2) it is class legislation; (3) -it delegates judicial powers; (4) it vests the judiciary with executive powers; (5) it deprives appellant of the right of trial by jury; (6) it subjects appellant to unreasonable search; (7) it deprives appellant of his right to contract and of his natural right of waiver. Statutes similar to the one here under discussion have been passed in various States of the Union, and in a number of those States the courts have decided some of the questions here raised by appellant contrary to his contentions. [Cases cited.] Taking up the points raised by appellant in the order in which they have been set out above, we are unable to see where it can be con- tended that this act is an attempt to exercise the police power. It will be observed that the act is elective, and that no employer or employee is compelled to accept or come within its provisions unless DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 217 he chooses to do so. Therefore, unless the employer or the employee elects to come within the provisions of the act, he is not affected by any of the provisions thereof. This is subject, however, to one exception, tinder the conditions specified in section 1, an employer is deprived of the common-law defenses of assumed risk, contributory negUgence, and that the injury or death was caused, in whole or in part, Dy the neghgence of a fellow servant. To deprive an employer, under such circumstances, of the right to assert those defenses is not an exercise of the police power, but is merely a declaration by the legislature of the pubhc policy of the State in that regard. The right of the legislature to aboUsh these defenses can not be seriously questioned. The rules of law relating to the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the effect of neghgence of a fellow servant were estabUshed by the courts, and not by our constitution, and the legislature may modify them or abohsh them entirely, if it sees fit to do so. [Cases cited.] The classification made by section 2 of the act [which names the occupations to which the act appHes] is not questioned or attacked in any way, but appellant seems to rely upon sections 21 and 22 as con- stituting class legislation. The classification in section 2 seems to be a perfectly valid and reasonable one. If it is vahd and reasonable, there appears no. ground upon which to challenge the vahdity of sections 21 and 22. These sections merely limit an "employee," as the term is used in that act, to include only such as may be exposed to the necessary hazards of carrying on any employment or enterprise enumerated in section 2. These sections are meant to exclude any one who may be occupying a mere clerical position, and whose work is such that he is not subject to any of the hazards of the general business in which the employer is engaged. This is a proper and reasonable classification, and does not violate any inhibition of our constitution. It is contended that section 3 makes an improper classification, in that it deprives the employee of his common-law remedies, while the employer is parmitted to retain them. This is clearly a misappre- hension, as the proviso in that section enlarges the remedy of the employee, and correspondingly restricts that of the employer. By this proviso, in case an em^oyee receives an injury as the result of the mtentional omission of the employer to comply with statutory safety requirements, the employer, although having elected to come withm the provisions of this act, can not avail himself of anything in the act to affect his Hability under such circumstances. The other objections urged may all be answered by the statement that the act is elective and not compulsory. Being elective, the act does not become effective as to any employer or employee, unless such employer or employee chooses to come within its provisions. Having once elected to come within the provisions of the act, as long as such election remains in force the act is effective as to the party or parties making the election, and, in case an employer and an employee both elect to come within the provisions of the act, the act itself then becomes a part of the contract of employment, and can be enforced as between the parties as such. Under this view, it can not be said that by this act judicial power is delegated to boards of arbitrators, contrary to the provisions of our constitu- 218 BULLETIN OF THE BUREATT OP LABOR STATISTICS. tion. Parties to a contract may make valid and binding agreements to submit questions in dispute or any disagreement that may arise to a board of arbitrators composed of persons or tribunals other than the regularly organized courts, and such agreements will be en- forced. Either party feeling aggrieved at the award has the right [under provisions of the act] to appeal to a court of record, where the matter is heard de novo, and where either party has the right to demand a trial by jury. It wiU thus be seen that, even though the employee should elect to come within the provisions of the act, he is not whoUy deprived of a trial by jury. It is contended that section 9 also deprives the employee of his Uberty and property, that section 10 violates the inhibition against unreasonable search and seizures, and that sections 11 and 13 de- prive the employee of his right to contract and of his natural right of waiver. These contentions are all fully answered by the state- ment that the employee is not compelled to submit to the provisions of the act, but has the power to elect whether or not he wiU come within its terms and be bound by them. If any of the provisions of the act are objectionable to him, he is not required to subject himself to the act. If he does elect to do so, he can not be heard to complain that the contract he has voluntarily entered into is an unsatisfactory one. The act is not subject to the objections urged, and the judgment of the circuit court is accordingly aflBrmed. Workmen's Compensation — Constitutionality of Statute — Matheson v. Minneapolis Street Railway Oo., Supreme Court of Min- nesota (July 3, 1914), 148 Northwestern Reporter, page 71. — Ole Matheson brought action against the street railway company named for personal injuries. He was an employee of the city of Minneapolis, and while engaged in laying paving along and near the railway track of defendant, in one of the streets of that city, was struck by one of the defendant's street cars and received injuries which necessitated the amputation of his leg. He alleged in his complaint that the injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant. Defendant, in its answer, among other things, alleged that plaintiff, the city, and defendant had all accepted, were acting under, and were governed by the provisions of part 2 of chapter 467, Laws of 1913 (sees. 8195-8230, G. S. 1913), commonly known as the workmen's compen- sation act; and that plaintiff's rights were limited and confined to and were measured and determined by the relief provided for in part 2 of that act. Plaintiff demurred to this portion of the answer, con- tending that the statute relied on was unconstitutional, and appealed from an order overruUng the demurrer. On this appeal the court sustained the constitutionality of the workmen's compensation act and affirmed the judgment of the court below. The act comprises part 1 and part 2, the latter being an elective compensation law, while the former provides that employers electing DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOK. 219 not to become subject to the proyisions of part 2 shall be deprived of the defenses of the employee's negligence (unless willful), assump- tion of risks, and fellow service. Judge Taylor, who delivered the opinion of the court, having stated the foregoing facts, said, in part: It is claimed that the act violates the equality provisions of the State and Federal constitutions for the reason that it abrogates these three defenses, in actions under part 1, brought against employers who elect not to accept the provisions of part 2, but permits such defenses to be interposed, in actions under part 1, brought against other employers, and also for the reason that the act exaudes from its provisions domestic servants, farm laborers, casual employees, and such railroads and railroad employees as are within the legis- lative domain of the United States. That the defenses mentioned may be entirely abohshed, or abolished as to certain classes of employ- ments only, is too weU settled to require argument. [Cases cited.] The power to abolish such defenses rests upon the principle that no person has any property right or vested mterest in a rule of law, and that the legislature may change such rules at its pleasure. [Cases cited.] Plaintiff contends, however, that the classifications made by the act are unwarranted, and that the constitutional requirement that aU persons shall receive the equal protection of the laws is infringed unless such defenses are abrogated as to all employers, or remain available to all employers, and unless the act applies to the classes excepted from its operation as well as to those included therein. We think it is within the discretion of the legislature to place in a class by themselves those employers and those employees who, for the reason that they are engaged in interstate commerce, are subject to the laws which have been, or may be, passed by Congress. Within the domain of interstate and foreign commerce, the power of Congress is supreme; and the legislature may well refrain from including, within the operation of the State laws, those persons as to whom such laws are, or may be, rendered nugatory by the laws of the United States. Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261 111. 454, 104 N. E. 211 [p. 216]. The suggestion that the present law does not exclude from its operation all who are engaged in interstate commerce, but only those who are engaged in such commerce by railroad, is sufficiently answered by the decisions affirming the vahdity of laws which apply only to those engaged in interstate commerce by railroad. Other courts have held, and we think for sufficient reasons, that the exclusion of domestic servants, farm laborers, and persons whose employment is casual only, frona the operation of laws providing compensation for injured workmen is within the proper discretion of the legislature. [Cases cited.] We also think that the legislature is well within its prerogative when it places in one class employers who become subject to the provisions of part 2 of the act, and m another class employers who do not become subject to such provisions; also when it places in one class employees who become subject to such provisions, and in another class employees who do not become subject thereto. Employers who become subject to part 2 thereby tender to their employees, as a consideration for exemption from common-law liabilities, rights and privileges which 220 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOB. STATISTICS. did not previously exist, and offer to assume the burden of duties and obligations which were not previously imposed upon them. Em- ployees who become subject to part 2 thereby tender to their employers Lmmimity from common-law actions as a consideration for the rights and remedies provided for by part 2. These propositions become binding contracts in respect to all who accept them, and remain as contmuing offers to those who have not accepted them. An employer or employee, who, at his option, may secure all the advantages possessed by any other, is hardly in a position to claim that he is discriminated against. The defenses of contributory negli- gence, assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow servant were doubtless abrogated in the cases s{)ecified, and not abrogated in other cases, to induce an acceptance of the provisions of part 2 of the act. But notwithstanding this purpose, the act permits any employer to place himself within either class of employers at his election, and to change from one to the other if he so desires; it also permits any employee to place himself within either class of employees at his election, and to change from one to the other if he so desires. Such legislation is not discriminatory and is not inhibited by the consti- tution. Furthermore, if. its vahdity rested upon the distinction between the two classes of employers and the distinction between the two classes of employees, we could not say that such distiaction is so fanciful and arbitrary, or so wanting in substance, that the legis- lature is prohibited from applying rules to one class which it does not apply to the other. This is in harmony with the holding of other courts. The act provides that every employer and every employee shall be presumed to have accepted and become subject to part 2 of the act, "unless otherwise expressly stated in the contract, in writing, or unless written or printed notice has been given," in the maimer pre- scribed in the act, that he has elected not to become subject thereto. It is beyond question that the legislature has power to create this presumption and to require those who elect not to come under the provisions of part 2, to give notice thereof in the manner prescribed. The act also provides the maimer in which one who is subject to the provisions of part 2 may thereafter change and become not subject thereto, and the maimer in which one who is not subject to such provisions may thereafter change and accept them. The choice is no less voluntary and optional because a party is deemed to have accepted these provisions, unless he give notice to the contrary, than it would be if he were deemed not to have accepted them until he gave notice to that effect. The section of the act most vigorously assailed is section 33 (sec. 8229, G. S. 1913), which provides for cases in which the employee is entitled to compensation from his employer under part 2, for in- juries which occurred under circumstances also creating a liability against a third party. In case such third party is also sulbject to the provisions of part 2, the employee may either recover from his em- plover the relief prescribed by the act, or may bring an action against such third party, but can not proceed against both. If he proceed against the third party, his recoverj^ is hmited to the rehef prescribed by the act. If he takes compensation from his employer under the act, the employer becomes subrogated to his right of action against the third party and may recover the aggregate apaount payable to the DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 221 employee with costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorneys' fees. In case such third party is not subject to the provisions of part 2, the employee may maintain an action against him without waiving any rights against the employer and the damages recoverable are not limited to the relief prescribed by the act; but, if the employee recover from such third party, the employer is entitled to deduct, from the compensation payable by him under the act, whatever amount is actually; received by the employee from the third partj;. In other words, if a sum equal to, or exceeding, the compensation payable under the act is actually collected from the third party, the employer is relieved from liability, but, if the sum actually collected be less than the amoimt payable under the act, he must make good the defi- ciency. If, instead of prosecuting an action against such third party, the employee collects compensation from his employer, the employer becomes subrogated to the rights of the employee against the third party and may maintain an action against him for the recovery of the damages sustained by the employee, but, after reimbursing himself for the compensation payable to the employee, and for me costs, attorneys' fees, and expenses of collecting the damages, the employer must pay over to the employee any surplus remaining of the amount collected. We find nothing in these provisions contravening any of the provisions of the constitution. They apply to and bind only those who have voluntarily accepted and agreed to them. A careful exammation of the entire act satisfies us that it contains nothing prohibited by either the State or Federal constitution. The fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution applies only to proceed- ings under the Federal laws, and has no bearing upon the instant case. Section 4 of article 1 of the State constitution, securing the right of trial by jury in all cases at law, expressly provides that such right may be waived. Where employer and employee both become subject to the provisions of part 2 of the act, they thereby waive a jury trial as to matters governed by such provisions. Such right remains unchanged, however, as to all other matters and all ouier persons. The rights set forth and declared in section 8 of article 1 of the consti- tution do not appear to have been infringed. The prohibition con- tained in section 13 of article 1 has no bearing upon the case whatever. The fact that the provisions of part 2 of the act apply to those only who elect to be governed thereby, obviates the objections to the act, not hereinbefore considered, which are based upon the provisions contained in the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution and section 2 of article 1 of the State constitution. Workmen's Compensation — Constitutionality of Statute — Election — Proceedings — Young v. Duncan, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {June 17, 1914), 106 Northeastern Reporter, pagel. — Hazel Young was injured while in the employ of Jefferson E. Duncan. She brought a common-law action, and a plea in abatement made by the defendant was sustained on the ground that the em- ployer was a subscriber under the workmen's compensation act, and the case was decided in favor of the defendant on this point. 222 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. Parti, sections, of the act provides that: "An employee * * * shall be held to have waived his right of action at common law to recover damages for personal injuries if he shall not have given his employer, at the time of his contract of hire, notice in writing that he claimed such right, or, if the contract of hire was made before the employer became a subscriber, if the employee shall not have given the said notice within 30 days of such subscription." The plain- tiff claimed that this rule did not apply, since the employer had not given to her the notice required by part 4, section 21, as amended by Statutes of 1912, chapter 571, section 16, which requires every subscriber to "give notice in writing or print, to every person with whom he is about to enter into a contract of hire, that he has provided for pay- ment to injured employees by the association." This section provides no penalty for its nonobservance, nor does it in terms affect the status of the employee in any respect. The court held that the re- quirement for notice by employees in section 5, in the case of em- ployers who were under the act, was in no wise modified by or dependent upon the provisions of section 21 ; and that the employee's failure to give notice was a waiver of the right to sue. Judge Rugg, who delivered the opinion, said in part On this point: If the employee's right to avail himself of the act depended upon actual notice to him of the fact of insurance by the employer, hardship to the employee often might result. There would be strong ground for the argument that the only right of an employee woma be at common law unless the employer gave the required notice; a conse- quence manifestly at variance with the general purpose of the act and one which in many instances would work great hardship. There is no indication in the act itself that part 1, section 5, and part 4, sec- tion 22 [21], were intended to be correlative or interdependent. Each stands alone with distinct uses and purposes. As thus interpreted the act is plain and easy of comprehension. If an employee desires to avoid the act, and preserve his common-law rights, he must give notice to that effect in the absence of fraud when he enters the em- ployment rather than when he is notified of insurance by toe em- ployer, or he is held to have availed himself of the act. This construc- tion in the vast majority of cases will forward the beneficent aims of the act better than any other. It was also urged that as so interpreted, part 1, section 5, was un- constitutional as depriving the employee of a right of trial by jury, and of property rights. As to this contention Judge Rugg said: It is urged that it deprives the plaintiff of her constitutional right to a trial by jury. If that question properly is presented and insisted upon, undoubtedly an employee has a right to trial by jury on the point whether the employer was in truth a subscriber under the act and whether notice had been given by the employee at the time of the contract of hire of an election to rely upon his common-law rights in cases where claim is asserted that such notice had been given. DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOE. 223 The issue of fact whether the parties have come under the operation of the act may be tried to a jury. It may be assumed that a right of action for personal injuries at common law is a property right. But the right of trial by jury respecting it goes no further m a case like the present than the right to have the question whether she had retained such a common-law right under the act determined by a jurj. But, so far as that right existed in the case at bar, it was waived. The section in question aflfects no existing prop3rty right. It deals with no property right after it has come into being. It affects a situation which antedates any property right arising out of tort. It simply estabhshes a status between subscribers under the act and their employees in the absence of express action by the latter mani- festing a desire to elect a different status. No complaint justly can be made that the section compels the employee to elect without suffi- cient knowledge. Ignorance of the law commonly is no excuse for conduct of failure to act. The employee is not required to act with- out inquiry as to the fact of insurance by the employer. He has only to ask for information. That is nothing more than is required in most of the affairs of life in order that one may act intelligently. The requirement that the election be made at the time of the con- tract for hire is reasonable. Difficulties of a serious nature might be presented if the right of election were allowed to be exercised after the happening of the accident. The possibility that the employee in a given instance may not Icnow all his rights does not affect the constitutional aspects of the law. The employee is not compelled to give up any common-law or con- stitutional right. It is a matter of choice whether he avails himself of the one or the other. Reasonable provisions are made for the exer- cise of his election. The section is not op3n to objection as class legislation, or as denying equal protection of the laws. It applies to all employees ahke. In this respect it is no more vulneraDle than the employers' habihty act, which establishes remedies for the benefit of employees, the weekly payment law or many other acts of like nature. The act is constitutional and is not op?n to criticism in the rcspscts urged by the plaintiff. It follows that judgment rightly was ordered for the defendant in the action at law. The employee had made no claim under the compensation act. The insurer, following the law, had notified the industrial accidjnt board of the accident, and a commission of arbitration was formed, which made an award in favor of the plaintiff. A claim for review by the industrial accident board, filed by her, was withdrawn, and the superior court entered a decree in accordance with the findings of the arbitration committee. The act as Amended provides that when a decree o^ the superior court has been entered "there shall be no appeal therefrom;;* * * where the decree is based upon a decision of an arbitpatio^n; committee." The court held that this was a reasonable provision, and that there was no ground of appeal from the decree of th'e'superipr court. 224 bulletin of the bubeau op labor statistics. Workmen's Compensation — Constitutionality of Statute — ExcLUsivENEss OF Remedy — ELECTION — SJiode V. Ash Grove lAme (& Portland Cement Co., Supreme Court of Kansas (Apr. 11, 1914), 139 Pacific Reporter, page 1193, 144- Pacific Reporter, page 2^9. — Frank D. Shade brought action against the company named for damages for personal injury. The action was dismissed on the ground that the employee's remedy under the compensation law of the State was exclusive. Shade thereupon appealed. The supreme court held that while the action should have been brought under the compensation act, it should not have been dismissed, but an award made under the proper act. Judge Benson, who delivered the opinion of the court, in discussing this point, spoke in part as follows: The petition contained averments sufficient for a cause of action under the factory act (Gen. Stat. 1909, sees. 4676-4683), under which it was obviously drawn; but it also contained charges of negligence sufficient to sustain a cause of action independent of the act. The first [compensation] . act applied to employers within its pur- view, who elected to come \mder its provisions, and to accept there- under, but by the later statute, which took effect March 12, 1913, it is declared that the employer shall be deemed entitled to come within its provisions unless he shall file with the secretary of state a notice of his election not to accept thereunder, and the employee is put in the same situation. The plaintiff was injured March 13, 1913. "The defendant filed a statement of its election not to come under the act on March 17. The plaintiff never filed a like declaration. It will therefore be seen that on March 13, the date of the injury, both parties were under the provisions of the act; neither having elected to the contrary, although the defendant did so a few days afterward. It follows that the plaintiff could not recover otherwise than under the workmen's compensation act, but it is not perceived how this de- prived the court of jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, or afforded grounds for a dismissal of the action. The district court clearly had jurisdiction. The action should be reinstated for the pur- suit of any appropriate remedy that the present petition or any reasonable amendment may warrant. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. This case again came before the court on a rehearing on November 14, 1914. The court in its opinion, delivered also by Judge Benson, aflirmed the former opinion as to the exclusiveness of the remedy, and in addition upheld the constitutionality of the act, the oUowing quotations giving the line of reasoning pursued: It was held in the former opinion that, where the employer and employee are both under the compensation act, the remedy afforded by that statute is exclusive. It is argued that this conclusion is un- sound, and that it should be held that the employee may stiU resort to the factory act for relief. Upon a reexamination of the question, the court remains satisfied with the views stated in the former deci- sion for the reasons stated in that opinion, and in the opinion in McRoberts v. Zinc Co., 144 Pac. 247 [see p. 236]. DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 225 It should also be observed that an employee is not deprived of the right to the benefit of the factory act nor of common-law remedies without his consent. They remain open to his election, if made before the injury, by filing a declaration "that he elects not to accept there- under ' ; that is, under the provisions of the compensation act. Laws 1913, ch. 216, sec. 8. The provisions of the Federal and State constitutions, guaranteeing due process and equal protection of law invoked by the plaintiff are not violated by this statute, as decided in many jurisdictions. The act classifies occupations with reference to the nature of the busi- ness and number of employees. This feature is strenuously objected to as a violation of the constitutional safeguards referred to. Similar provisions are found in like statutes of other States, and have gener- ally been sustained. After discussing some of the decisions referred to, the opinion takes up other objections as follows: The objection based upon the supposed deprivation of a right of trial by jury is equally untenable, as determined in many adjudicated cases. The same is true of the arbitration feature and the rules for determining compensation. Without reviewing seriatim all the specific objections made to this statute under the general charge that it violates constitutional safeguards, it is sufficient to say that they have all been met in judicial decisions in other jurisdictions after the most thorough and patient examination. It seems unneces- sary, now that the validity of such laws has been so generally main- tained, to review the many adjudicated cases, and restate in detail the well-settled principles upon which they are based. Briefly it may be said that the operation of the system of compensation pro- vided by the statute rests upon the free consent of employer and employee, given in the manner provided by the act. Without such consent on nis part, the employee retains ail his remedies under com- mon and statutory law. It is a matter of election. Workmen's Compensation — Constitutionality of Statute — Title — ^Wages — Huyett v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey {Oct. 16, 1914), 92 Atlantic Reporter, page 58. — This was a case arising from death by injury in the course of employment, the plaintiff being administratrix of the deceased em- ployee. The judgment in the supreme court was in favor of the plaintiff, and the company appealed. The court of appeals quoted the opinion and affirmed the judgment of the supreme court ia favor of the plaintiff, deciding two points raised. The first was as to the constitutionality of the act, the contention of the defense being that as the title of the act mentioned only "injuries received by an employee," provision for payments of com- pensation for death was not properly included. The court said: "Whether the injuries result in death or not, they are naturally and properly spoken of as injuries received by an employee." 85590°— BuU. 169—15 15 226 BtTLLETIN OP THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. The second question related to the definition of "wages," the amount of compensation being based on "wages received at the time of injury" in certain cases, on "daily wages" in others, and on "wages" in a third case. The deceased employee was earning, at the time of his fatal injury, a somewhat larger amount than he previously had been earning. The court held that aU the provisions referred to wages at tl^e time of injury, and that any injustice caused by these provisions must be corrected by the legislature rather than by the courts. Workmen's Compensation — Contract of Employment Made in Another State — American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, Supreme Court of New Jersey {Nov. 6, 1914), 92 Atlantic Reporter, page 85. — This was a proceeding by John F. Rogge as administrator against the company named for compensation for the death of a workman in the course of employment with the company. The employee died in New Jersey from an injury received in that State, but the contract of employment was made in New York. The supreme court aflfii-med the judgment ren- dered for the plaintiff under the New Jersey compensation act in the court of common pleas of Union County, holding that the act covers all accidents occurring in the State, and that the only method by which an employer desiring to avoid coming under the provisions of section 2 regarding compensation can do so is by giving notice of rejection as provided in the act. Workmen's Compensation — Dependency — Finding of Board — In re Bentley, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Feb. 27, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 432. — The industrial accident board found from the evidence that the wife of the decedent Bentley was not dependent upon him at the time of the injury and that his chUd was partially so, neither having been living with him at the time, and awarded $1 per week for 300 weeks to the child alone. The claimants appealed, but the findings of fact not being subject to review, and the evidence not having been reported, it could not be contended that they were not warranted as matter of law. The order was therefore sustained as correct. Workmen's Compensation — Dependency — Finding of Board — In re Herriclc, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Feb. 27, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page -^j8.— The superior court of Suffolk County issued a decree awarding compensation to the. daughter of George Herrick, and the insurer of his employer appealed. All the evidence having been reported, the supreme judicial court held that it was a question of law whether there was some evidence on which DECISIONS OF COTJETS AFFECTING LABOR. 227 to base the finding that the daughter was dependent on her father. It decided that there was such evidence and therefore afiirmed the decree of the court below. Judge Sheldon, speaking for the court, said in part: She [the daughter] received practically all of his wages; she testi- fied that aU of her support came from him. That but for her sense of duty, because she thought that her father needed her care, she might have continued to earn enough for her own support, and to be independent of him, can not be decisive as matter of law against her claim. The board well might base its conclusions upon the facts as they were and not upon what might have been the case if her sense of filial duty had been weaker. Workmen's Compensation — Dependency — Peesxbiptions — ■ Wife Living Apart from Husband — In re GallagTier, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Oct. 24-, 1914), 108 Northeastern Reporter, page 558. — Mary E. Gallagher was the widow of an em- ployee who received an injury on December 17, 1912, and died from its effects on January 15, 1913. She had been hving apart from him for justifiable cause for about four years, and he had con- tributed to her support by order of court. She had been obliged, however, to labor and earn a large part of the needful amount. The industrial accident board held that under these circumstances -she would be conclusively presuined to be wholly dependent upon her husband, as a wife living with her husband is presumed to be by a provision of the act. On appeal by the insurer this decision was reversed. The court called attention to the fact that since the death of Gallagher the legislature, at the session of 1914, had amended the act by providing that if, at the time of the husband's death, the industrial accident board shall find the wife was living apart for justifiable cause or because he had deserted her, she is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon her husband, but held that the industrial accident board should determine the question of depend- ence in the present instance under another clause of the statute, which provides that the award shall be made in accordance with the facts as they existed at the time of the injury. Workmen's Compensation — Dependency — Presumptions — Wife Living Apart from Husband — In re Nelson, Supreme Judi- cial Court of Massachusetts {May 19, 1914), 105 Northeastern Re- porter, page 357. — Alice E. Nelson instituted proceedings under the workmen's compensation act for the death of her husband, Alvin K. Nelson. The superior court of Suffolk County decreed compensa- tion to her and the employer appealed. 228 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU 0¥ LABOR STATISTICS. The act provides that a wife hving with her husband shall be con- clusively presumed to be dependent on him. In the present case the wife and husband had lived apart several times for periods of a few months, and at the time of his death had not lived together in the sense of occupying the same house for nearly a year, she being in Nova Scotia during the last six months while he was at work in Boston. There had been no talk of permanent separation or divorce, but she appears' to have been largely supporting herself and their child for the year mentioned. Under these circumstances the court held that they were not "hving together" in the sense meant by the language of the statute, and that the industrial accident board should ascertain the extent of dependency as a matter of fact. Workmen's Compensation — Dependents of Minors — Dazy v. Apponaug Co., Supreme Court of Rhode Island (Jan. 2, 1914), 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 160. — This was a petition by the father of a minor who had been killed as the result of an accident while in the employ of the company named. The superior court of Kent County had rendered a decree granting compensation only to the extent of the $200, which is, under the provisions of the act, to be paid as expenses of last sickness and burial where there are no dependents; and this was affirmed by the supreme court, on the ground that after the death of the son the family was still able to save some money" weekly. Judge Vincent, speaking for the court, said in part: The superior court found that the father was not wholly or partly dependent for support upon the earnings of his son at the time of the injury and therefore was not entitled to receive compensation under the terms of the workmen's compensation act. The superior court, however, ordered the respondent to pay to the petitioner the sum of $200 for the expenses of the last sickness and burial of the son. We think that the decision of the superior court was correct. The test of dependency is not whether the petitioner, by reducing his expenses below a standard suitable to his condition in hfe, could secure a subsistence for his family without the contributions of the deceased son, but whether such contributions were needed to provide the family with the ordinary necessaries of life suitable for persons in their class and position. Boyd Workmen's Compensation, sec. 234. The petitioner is not bound to deprive himself of the ordinary neces- saries of life to which he has been accustomed in order to absolve the respondent from the payment of damages, nor can he on the other hand demand money from the employer for the purpose of adding to his savings or investments. The expression "dependent" must be held to mean dependent for the ordinary necessaries of life for a person of his class and position and does not cover the reception of benefits which might be devoted to the establishment or increase of some fund which he might desire to lay aside. decisions of coxjets affecting laboe. 229 Workmen's Compensation — Dependents of Minors— Benefits — In re Murphy, SupreTne Judicial Court of Massachusetts (June 17, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 635. — Daniel Murphy insti- tuted proceedings against the Bigelow Carpet Co. and its insurer for compensation for the death of his minor son, Walter Murphy. The boy had earned $5.67 per week, and contributed all of this to his father for the support of his family, which consisted of the father, mother, and nine children, including Walter. The act provides that in the case of partial dependents " there shall be paid such dependents a weekly compensation equal to the same proportion of the weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly dependent as the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents bears to the earnings of the deceased at the time of his injury." The industrial accident board found that, although the father was a partial depen- dent in the sense that he had other income, the earnings of himself and other children, the rule quoted obviously did not apply in such a case, and the amount of compensation should be the same as for a total dependent, in this case the minimum amount permitted by the statute, or $4 a week, for the 300 weeks specified in the act. The court adopted this view, saying in its opinion delivered by Judge Hammond : In the present case the father had a large family which he was legally bound to support, and this he was bound to do, whether the children could help or not. The amount contributed by Walter went to help the father in the support of the whole family. Whether it is wise to distinguish as to the support of the individual members of the family in a case hke this, as the msurer suggests, is for the legislature. Workmen's Compensation — ^Depositions foe Use op Indus- trial Accident Board — Letters Rogatory — Power op Courts — ■ Jn re Martinelli, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Oct. 23, 1914), 106 Northeastern Reporter, page 557.— Sylvio Martinelli as administrator petitioned the superior court of Hampden County to issue letters rogatory to obtain the testimony of witnesses in the Kingdom of Italy to be used in hearings before the industrial accident board for the recovery of payments under the workmen's compensa- tion act for the death of two persons for whose estates he was admin- istrator. The petition was granted in the trial court, and the insur- ing company concerned took exceptions thereto and appealed the case, the appeal resulting in the action of the court below being reversed. Speaking of the uses of letters rogatory, and the power of a court to issue the same. Judge Rugg, who delivered the opinion of the court, used in part the following language: Letters rogatory as a means of procuring the evidence of witnesses in foreign States are not much in use in this Commonwealth. The 230 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. statutes make ample provision to this end by means of depositions. The power to issue a commission rogatory in order to prevent a failure of justice is inherent in a court. But it always has been recognized that such power can be put forth only in aid of a cause actually pending in the court, which issues the letters. It is not averred in the application nor contended in argument that the proceedings before the industrial accident board are pending in the superior court. Manifestly they are not so pending. The ma- chinery of the workmen's compensation act does not contemplate the ascertainment of facts in that court. It is not within the power of a court, even of general jurisdiction, to issue letters rogatory to obtain testimony to be used before a tri- bunal over whose procedure and trials it is given no authority until the case itself may be brought before it for review. Therefore, it' is not within the authority of the superior court to prociire evidence for use before a tribunal over whose proceedings it has no more inti- mate supervisory power than it has over the industrial accident board. Wokkmen's Compensation — Distribution of Compensation — In re Janes, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Feb. 28, 1914), 104. Northeastern Reporter, page 556. — John C. Janes, the employee, died as a result of injuries which arose out of and in the course of his employment. Janes was a widower. The industrial accident board found that his two minor children were living with him at the time of the injury and were whoUy dependent. One child died about a week after the father's death. The decree of the superior court was to the effect that the sum payable as compensation should be divided between the guardian of the surviving child and the administrator of the deceased child. The guardian of the living child did not appeal from this decision, but the insurer did. The court decided that the insurer had no right of appeal in the matter of the distribution of the compensation, the amount being the same in any case. This ruling was said not to intimate an opinion as to the soundness in law of the decree sought to be called in question. Workmen's Compensation — Election — Incapacity — GorreU v. Battelle, Supreme Court of Kansas {Nov. I4., 1914), 144 Pacific Reporter, page 244- — James H. GorreU brought action under the worlanen's com- pensation act against A. C. Battelle. Compensation was awarded in the district court of Franklin County for partial incapacity for the maximum period and in a lump sum, whereupon the defendant ap- pealed. The petition alleged that the defendant had not filed with the secretary of state an election not to accept the terms of the act. This allegation was denied, and on appeal it was contended that the plaintiff should have proved that no such election had been made. DECISIONS OP COtTETS AFFECTING LABOB. 231 This was, however, overruled by the court, as is shown by the fol- lowing paragraphs from the syllabus prepared by the court: The statutory presumption that aU employers affected by the work- men's compensation act (Laws 1911, ch. 218, amended by Laws 1913, ch. 216) are within its provisions obtains until the contrary appears, and nonhability to an action for compensation because of an election to stand outsid-e the provisions of the act is an affirmative defense. An employer, who in good faith denies habihty on the groimd of such an election, should ask the court to investigate that subject first, and thereby save the time and expense of a further trial. In aU but the most exceptional cases, the certificate of the secretary of state wUl settle the dispute, and the court may require the production of such certificate at any time. Unless the record on appeal clearly discloses that the defense was specifically and unequivocally brought to the attention of the trial court while it had possession of the case, this court will consider the defense as abandoned. Plaiatiff was a carpenter and a brick mason by trade and, in a period of dullness in those trades, was employed by the defendant as a car repairer. His right eye was struck by a piece of steel and destroyed and the sight of the left eye greatly injured, so that he had been able to get only laborer's work and had not been able to do even that satisfactorily. Compensation was awarded on a weekly basis and commuted to a lump sum. The court affirmed the judgment below as to this also, as is shown by the following paragraph of the syllabus : The workmen's compensation act awards compensation for inca- i)acity to work as a result of injury. This means compensation for OSS of earning power as a workman as a result of injury, whether the loss manifest itself in inabUity to perform obtainable work or inability to secure work to do. Workmen's Compensation — Election — ^Minors — Notice — Con- stitutionality OF Statute — Troth v. Millville Bottle Worlcs, Su- preme Court of New Jersey (Oct. 9, 1914), 91 Atlantic Reporter, page 1031 . — Troth, an employee of the bottle works, filed a petition against it for compensation for injury to an eye, and an order that the defend- ant pay the petitioner |5 per week for 100 weeks was entered by the Cumberland court of common pleas. Troth was a minor and an ap- prentice, his contract dating from September 25, 1909, and expiring on the same date in 1913. The injury occurred December 22, 1911, and the compensation act took effect earher in 1911, but, as is appar- ent, after the contract of employment was made. A notice that the employer would not be bound by the terms of section 2 of the act, which provides for workmen's compensation, had been posted and also given by means of the pay envelopes. The court held that this was not, in the case of a minor, a sufficient com- pliance with the statute, which provides that the section shall apply unless notice is given to the parent or guardian of the minor. 232 BULLETIN OF THE BTJKEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. As to the constitutionality of the law as applied to pree?dsting contracts, the court quoted and followed the Wisconsin decision in Borgnis v. Falk, 133 N. W. 209 (see Bui. No. 96, p. 799), and held the provision vahd. The judgment of the court below was accordingly aflBrmed. Workmen's Compensation — Election of Eemedies — Exclxj- siVENESs — The "Fred E. Sander." United States District Court, Western District of Washington {Mar. 6, 1914), 212 Federal Reporter, page 545. — James A. Thompson brought action in admiralty agaiast the vessel named for damages for personal injuries received by him. In his libel the employee admitted the receipt of $360 from the Industrial Insurance Comimission of the State of Washington, but averred that the same was a gratuitous payment out of a fund provided by the State, that the defendant had never contributed anything to said fund, and that the amount was in no manner accepted as payment for the injuries. In taking exceptions to the libel, the defendant contended that the receipt of this money under the compensation act consti- tuted an election which barred the bringing of an action, and the court upheld this contention. Judge Neterer, who delivered the opin- ion, said: The common-law right of action being withdrawn, it is immaterial whether payment has been made by the employer to the "accident fund" or not. The fact that the defaulting employer is not protected against actions for injury in case of default of payment after demand will not defeat the injured workman's right to take under the act, should he so elect. But for the enactment of the workmen's compensation act of the State of Washington, libelant would have two remedies; one his common-law action for damages against the owners, and the other a proceeding in admiralty. The selection of the one remedy would bar a proceeding in the other. A party can not enforce both remedies, and will be required to elect whether to pursue his common-law remedy or proceed in admiralty. The workmen's compensation act, while it took away the common-law action, provided in its stead another remedy. If the libelant determined to obtain relief from the sub- stitute which is provided for his common-law remedy, and received compensation under such act, then he can not proceed in admiralty and thus obtain double compensation for the injury of which he complains. Workmen's Compensation — Employers' Liability — "WiLLFtrL Act"— McWeeny v. Standard Boiler & Plate Co., United States Dis- trict Court, Northern District of Ohio (Jan. 15, 1914), 210 Federal Reporter, page 507. — John J. McWeeny was very seriously injured whUe in the employ of the defendant company. He sued the com- pany, in spite of the fact that the company had complied with the DECISIONS OP COUETS APFBCTIKG LABOR. 233 provisions of the -workmen's compensation act of Ohio, relying on the provision of section 21-2 of that act that nothing in the act shall affect the civil liability of the employer when the injury has arisen from the willful act of the employer or any of his agents or servants, or from the failure of any of them to comply with any statute for the protection of the life or safety of employees. He recovered a verdict of 114,000, and the company moved for a new trial, which was denied. The nature of the willful act claimed by the plaintiff, and the view taken by the trial court as to what constitutes such an act, is shown in the following extracts from the opinion of the court as delivered by Judge Day: The plaintiff and other employees of the defendant company to- gether with a man named Fisner, the foreman, having charge of the work, were engaged in erecting a large sheet-iron tank to be used for the storage of chemicals. This tank was composed of large iron plates which were lifted in position by means of a derrick and boom erected upon a scaffolding placed within this large metal tank. Shortly before the accident occurred, the attention of Fisher, the foreman, was sev- eral times directed to the fact that the mast of the derrick was leaning 2 feet, that one of the guy lines was weak, and several of the men said to him that the mast should be straightened and the guy lines should be tightened and replaced. Fisher refused to do this, and, notwithstanding the fact that his attention was called to the defects in this derrick several times and that a strain of a ton load was being placed upon the guy lines and the derrick, the foreman with an oath directed McWeeny and the other men to proceed with the lifting of the heavy iron plate. They did so, and while engaged in this work the scaffolding and derrick coUapsed, injuring McWeeny and several other of the men. The evidence tends to show that the foreman at the time of this unfortunate occurrence was himself in a place which was of no danger to him. From an examination of these sections [20-1 and 21-2] it is appar- ent that, where an employer has complied with the provisions of this act in paying the premiums into the funds and in posting the neces- sary notices, the employee in case of injury, or his representative in case of death, can not recover for negligence or the want of ordinary care; but if the injury results from a willful act, or from the violation of a statute or ordinance or order of any duly authorized officer, which statute, ordinance, or order was enacted for the protection of the hfe or safety of the employee, then in such event the employee can either take the benefits provided under this act or sue ia court to recover. The defendant contends that the willful act in contemplation of this statute must have been an act done intentionally with a purpose to inflict injury. The court charged at the trial, in part: "To constitute a willful act in this case, you must find that the action of Fisher was such an action as to evince an utter disregard of consequences so as to inflict the injuries complained of. In other words, the negligent action was such recklessness reaching in degree to utter disregard of consequences which might probably foUow. If 2S4 BULLETIN OF THE BtTEEATT OP LABOB STATISTICS. the action of Fisher in ordering McWeeny to work on this scaffold and in connection with this derrick was done under such circumstances as to evince an utter disregard for the safety of McWeeny and the. other employees working there in connection with him, then that action was a willful act.' If the contention urged by defendant that a willful act had to be an act coupled with an intention to injure the employee were the correct construction of those terms of the statute, then the employers of laborers, so long as they themselves or their employees did not criminally injure their employees, could incur no liability no matter how recklessly or carelessly they conducted their business without any regard to the safety of those employed. Extreme cases of this sort will seldom arise. I can not believe that the legislature intended that the term "willful act" should be nar- rowed down to mean a deliberate intent to do bodily injury and nothing else.' This compensation act was passed for a purpose; its primary purpose was to protect the men engaged in the various occu- pations in Ohio. . In my opinion, the case was fairly tried, and the issues fairly sub- mitted, and the motion for a new trial will be overruled. Workmen's Compensation — Employment Duking Part of Year — Computation of Weekly Payment — Andrejwski v. Wol- verine Coal Co., Supreme Court of Michigan {Oct. 2, 1914), 148 North- western Beporter, page 684- — ^Anne Andrejwski brought proceedings under the compensation act for the death of her husband, which occurred on November 18, .1912, as the result of an accident in the course of his employment in a mine of the company named. The employer and employee had elected to come under the compensation act, and the plaintiff was the sole dependent and entitled to compen- sation. The only question was as to the amount of the weekly pay- ment to be made to her. The mine in which the deceased worked was not operated during the whole of any year. For the year imme- diately preceding it had been operated 148 days, and coal had been sent up and paid for "on his number" on 131 days, the pay for it amounting to $507.45. It was customary, however, for two or three of the miners to work together, and send the coal up on the number of one of them, so that this did not indicate correctly the amount earned by him. During the remainder of the year he had worked as a cement-block layer and earned 1487.14. The section relating to amount of compensation, on the construction of which the award in this case depended, is as follows: Sec. 11. The term "average weekly wages" as used in this act is defined to be one fifty-second part of the average annual earnings of the employee. If the injured employee has not worked in the employ- 1 It may be noted that the legislature of Ohio, in February, 1914, amended the law so as to deSne the term "willful act" to mean "an act done Imowingly and purposely with the direct object of Injuring another." CECtSlOiJS of couStS aSfeoMng lAboe. 235 ment in which he was working at the time of the accident, whether for the employer or not, diu-ing substantially the whole of the year immediately preceding his injury, his average annual earnings shall consist of three hundred times the average daily wage or salary which he has earned in such employment during the days when so employed. If the injured employee nas not worked in such employment during substantially the whole of such immediately preceding year, his aver- age annual earnings shall consist of three hundred times the average daily wage or salary which an employee of the same class working substantially the whole of such immediately preceding year in the same or a similar employment in the same or a neighboring place, shall have earned in such employment during the days when so em- ployed. In cases where the foregoing methods of arriving at the aver- age annual earnings of the injured employee can not reasonably and fairly be applied, such annual earnings shall be taken at such sum as, having regard to the previous earnings of the injured employee, and of other employees of the same or most similar plass, working in the same or most similar employment, in the same or neighboring locality, shall reasonably represent the annual earning capacity of the injured employee at the time of the accident in the employment' in which he was working at such time. The court held that the methods of determining the weekly wages provided by the first, second, and third sentences of the section quoted were apphcable only to employments which continue during substan- tially the entire calendar year, and that these methods could not reasonably and fairly be applied to the present case. The, method which the court concluded should be used in computing the compen- sation in this case is shown by the following quotation from the opinion as delivered by Judge McAlvay: To charge this employment with compensation for injuries to its employees on the same basis as employments which operate during substantially 300 days in the year would be an apparent injustice, as such compensation would be based on the theory of impossible earnings by the employee in that employment which operated upon the average a trifle over two-thirds of a workdng year. This was recognized and provided for by the legislature by omitting from the foiu-th classification any requirement relative to the average daily wage or salary of an injured employee. This construction, in prin- ciple, appears to be supported by the English cases involving ques- tions of like character. [Cases cited.] In the record is an exhibit showing the annual earnings paid by appellant to the deceased from 1904 to 1912, inclusive, amounting to $5,175.21. From this table we find that the average annual earnings paid to him during that period were $575.02, which we will take as a basis for the computation of the compensation to which the claimant IS entitled. Having determined his average annual earnings there remains nothing ftirther to do, except to determine the average weekly wages, by dividing this sum by 52, the result of which is $11.06, as such average weekly wages. One-half of this amount, being $5.53, would be the amount to be paid weekly to the claimant for a term not exceeding 300 weeks. 236 bulletin op the btteeau op labor statistics. Wokkmen's Compensation — Evidence Necessary to Support Finding — Reck v. WJiittlesierger, Supreme Court of MicJiigan (July 24, 1914), 148 Northwestern Reporter, page 247. — Rudolph Reck, a baker, died January 12, 1913, of septic pneumonia, resulting, as his physician testified, from an infected wound in his hand. This was claimed to have been caused on December 26, 1912, from a nail in some fuel with which he was firing an oven in the defendant's bakery. No one in the shop knew of the accident at the time. He finished his work that day and worked nearly two days thereafter, and did not call a physician until January 2. The physician who attended him testified that death resulted from the wound, and the industrial acci- dent board based its award on the determination of the arbitration committee that the applicant for compensation, Reek's widow, was entitled to $2,250. The board, finding no direct evidence, admitted hearsay evidence, consisting of what Reck told his family and fellow employees as to the cause of the injury. In accordance with the law, the employer notified the board of the accident before Reek's death and made a second report after it, both reports stating that a nail was run into or scratched Reek's left hand while he was throwing wood into the furnace. The court held that, while the "elementary and fundamental principles of judicial inquiry should be observed," so that hearsay evidence should not be admitted, yet the decisions of the accident board should not necessarily be reversed under the rule that error is always presumed to be prejudicial. Since the reports of the employer, made while the sources of information as to the cause of the accident were fresh and available, were suflacient evidence on which to base the finding of the board, the court afiirmed its order. Workmen's Compensation — Exclusiveness of Remedy — ^Pro- ceedings Under Common Law — Nature of Award — Measure of Damages — McRoherts v. National Zinc Co., Supreme Court of Kan- sas (Nov. 14, 1914), 144 Pacific Reporter, page 247.— E. F. McRoberts was injured whUe in the employment of the company named and sought to recover in an action, claiming both benefits under the com- pensation act and damages at common law. Under the compen- sation act of the State election to accept its provisions is pre- sumed in the absence of an affirmative rejection, which action had not been taken, so that both parties were within its provisions. The company demurred to the declaration, contending that McRoberts was not entitled to claim on both bases but must elect the ground of his procedure. The district court of Wyandotte County overruled the objections of the company, and the case proceeded to trial on the question of damages at common law, the court saying that the claim under the compensation law would be taken under advisement for DECISIONS OF COTJKTS AFFECTING LABOE. 237 future action. The result of the trial was a verdict for the plaintiff in the full amount claimed, whereupon the company appealed, insist- ing that the remedy provided by the compensation law is exclusive where it applies. This contention was sustained by the supreme court, citing its decision in Shade v. Cement Co., 92 Kan. 146, 139 Pac. 1193 (see p. 224). The decision in the case cited had not been announced when the present case was tried nor when the appeal was taken, but it was conceded at the present time that the case should be settled under the compensation law in accordance with the ruling in the Shade case. The question was therefore submitted as to whether, under the record as presented, the judgment of the court below might be treated as an award of compensation. The court held that this was impossible, since to do so would be for it to try and determine an issue that was not considered nor decided by the trial court. Judge Johnston, speaking for the court, said in part: The elements which enter into a recovery of compensation differ radically from those which warrant a recovery of damages, and the evidence which would support the issue in one is inappropriate to offer in support of the other. Compensation for partial or total disability depends mainly on the average earnings of the injured employee for certain periods preceding the injury, while the damages awarded were not measured by earnings, but were based on the loss which resulted from pain and suffering endured by appellee and to be endured in the future, as well as the loss sustained by the dis- figurement of his hand. The extent of the incapacity resulting froiti the injury is an important question for determination. Is the disa- bihty total or partial, and, if partial, is it of a permanent nature? The age of the employee is a consideration, as well as the grade of employment in which he had been engaged for the year preced- ing the accident; and, in determining what is a just average of the earnings of the employee, it is important to know whether his employ- ment had been casual or continuous, and whether he had been engaged by more than one employer. No issue was formed on the matter of earnings, and the attention of the jury was not called to the evidence relating to wages and the award which the jury made was not based on an average of earnings. On the contrary, as we have seen, the jury were instructed to measure the recovery by the pain and suffer- ing which appellee had endured before the trial and would probably undergo in the future — a measure wholly inconsistent with that pre- scribed in the compensation statute. Maximum and minimum limi- tations are placed on the average of the earnings of an employee, and there is also a provision that payments for total and partial disability shall in no case extend over a period of eight years. Here, as we have seen, no consideration was given to any limitation, and the jury were authorized to award damages that appellee might sustain throughout his life by reason of the injury. If compensation is to be contested, an issue should be framed iDetween the parties as to the right to compensation, each having an opportunity to offer testi- mony in support of the issue, and the compensation should be meas- ured as the statute provides. There is no basis on which this court 238 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATT OF LABOR STATISTICS. can treat the v^dict as an award of compensation, nor is it warranted in directing a judgment for any amount on the record, as it stands. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for a new trial under the compensation act. Workmen's Compensation — Extrahazardous Employment — Workman — Wendt v. Industrial Insurance Commission, Supreme Court of Washington {June 23, 1914), 14-1 Pacific Reporter, page 311. — Clara Wendt made application to the industrial insurance commis- sion of Washington for an allowance under the compensation act for the death of her husband, George Wendt. The commission rejected the claim but the superior court of Pierce County overruled this decision and allowed the claim. On appeal by the commission, this judgment was aflBrmed, the employment being declared extrahaz- . ardous within the meaning of the act. Wendt' s employer, the Stone- Fisher Co., conducted a department store, and in connection there- with had a repair shop for their delivery wagons and automobiles, separate from the store, and equipped with power machinery of various kinds run by an electric naotor. The company employed from one to three carpenters in putting up shelving in the store and other work, and Wendt was the head carpenter previous to his death on March 20, 1912. On that day he attempted to turn on the current so as to use a grindstone to sharpen his chisel. In doing so his hand came in contact with the copper contacts of the switch. The wire which carried the current to the repair shop had become crossed with a high-tension wire, and he was instantly killed by a current of 2,700 volts which passed through his body. Judge Morris, who delivered the opinion of the court, having stated certain provisions of the act, said: Section 4, in referring to the particular classes of industry covered by the act, includes in class 5 of construction work "carpenter work not otherwise sj)ecified"; in class 29, under the heading "Fac- tories (using power-driven machinery)," "working in wood not other- wise specified"; in class 34, under the same heading, "machine shops not otherwise specified." The same section provides that, if an employer, besides employing workmen in extrahazardous employ- ment, shall also employ workmen in employments not extrahazard- ous, the provisions of the act shall apply only to the extrahazardous departments and employments and the workmen employed therein. It bemg shown that the deceased at the time of his injury was em- ployed m a "workshop where machinery is used," that the workshop was a place "wherein power-driven machinery is employed and man- ual labor is exercised, * * * over which place the employer of the person worlang therein has the right of access or control," and that he was injured "upon the premises," it seems to us there is no escape from the conclusion that his injury is within the purview of the act. DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTIKG LABOR. 239 As to the contention that the employer must also be engaged in an extrahazardous business, the court said: The act recognizes in section 4 that the same employer may at the same time be engaged in employments both within and without the purview, of the act, so far as the hazardous character of the employment is concerned; in which case the act shall apply only to the extrahazardous departments, and to the workmen employed therein. And in this connection it matters not which is the prin- cipal business, and which is the incidental business. If the employer conducts any department of his business, whether large or small, as an extrahazardous business within the meaning and defined terms of this act, his workmen would come within me class desig- nated by the act, and be entitled to the protection of the act. Such interpretation we believe iaUs within the letter ^s well as the spirit of an act that, because of its humaneness and declaration of a new public policy, should be interpreted liberally and broadly in harmony with its purpose to protect mjured workmen and their dependents independent of any question of fault. Workmen's Compensation — Farm Laborers — In re Keaney, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Feb. 27, 1914), 104- North- eastern Reporter, page 438. — Patrick Keaney instituted a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act to secure compensation for an injury suffered while employed at farm labor by a market gardener. The industrial accident board and the superior court of Suffolk County decided against his claim, and he appealed, but the decree of the court below was affirmed. The employer hired four drivers and four helpers, who were largely engaged in delivering his products in the city of Boston. These men worked on the farm when not employed in delivery, while others, including Keaney, were con- stantly employed in farm labor. The employer had adopted the act as to the drivers and helpers by securing insurance intended to cover them only, and the contention on behalf of the injured employee was that in so doing he had placed himself under its provisions as to all his employees. The court held that this would probably be true in cases other than those of the excepted classes of employers and employees, but that if a farmer desired to come under the act in part he might do so. Judge Rugg, who delivered the opinion, said further: The act is a practical measure designed for use among a practical people. There appears to be no reason for saying that a farmer may not adopt it if he desires. Any contract of insiurance made by. him under its terms is valid and enforceable. On the other hand, if he does not desire to make it available for all of his employees, there is no insuperable objection to his undertaking an insurance for a limited portion of them. If there are those, separable from others by classifioation and definition, whose labor is more exposed 240 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOK STATISTICS. or dangerous or whom lie may desire to protect for any other reason, there is nothing in the act reasonably interpreted to show- why he may not do so. If construed to compel farmers to msure for all their laborers if they undertake to insure any of them, the inevitable tendency would be to discourage resort to the act m any respect. Workmen' s Compensation — ' ' Fortuitous Event' ' — Hernia — ZappaU V. Industrial Insurance Commission, Supreme Court of Washington (Nov. 17, 1914), lU Pacific Reporter, page 5^.— The industrial insurance commission rejected the claim of John Zappala for compensation for an alleged injury causing hernia. On appeal to the superior court of Chehalis County the claimant secured a jury verdictr in his favor, and the case came before the supreme court on the appeal of the commission. The opinion of the latter court sustained the judgment of the court below, being delivered by Judge Morris. Speaking of the main question of the interpretation of the language of the act, and quoting the testimony of the injured man as to the circumstances of the injury, he said: The determinative question arises under section 3 of the act, pro- viding that: "The words 'injury' or 'injured,' as used in this act, refer only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished from the contraction of disease." The respondent was in the employ of a cooperage company, and on the day of the alleged injury was pushing a heavily loaded truck. The language of the respondent in describing the circumstances under which the injury was received was: "That the car ran harder than usual, and he tried three or four times to start it but could not move it. Then he put aU his strength into it, gave a jerk and hurt himself; felt a sudden pain; could not move for a little while ; put his hands where he felt the hurt and called for help ; looked at himself and saw a swelling, a small lump where he was hurt ; that he had never had any pain there before or any previous rupture." After discussing the definition of the word "fortuitous," and the principles of interpretation involved, the opinion continues : The sustaining of an injury while using extreme muscular effort in pushing a heavily loaded truck is as much within the meaning of a fortuitous event as though the injury were the result of a fall or the breaking of the truck. To hold with the commission that if a machine breaks, any resulting injury to a workman is within the act, but if the man breaks, any resulting injury is not within the act, is too refined to come within the policy of the act as announced by the legislature in its adoption and the language of the court in its inter- E rotation. When the appellant admits that the breaking of the truck ecause of the application of unusual force with resultant injury to the workman is covered by the act, then it must admit that the tearing of muscles or the rupture of fibers, or whatever it is that causes DECISIONS or COTJETS AiTECTlNG LABOE, 241 hernia, while exercising unusual effort, is likewise covered by the act; for there can be no sound distinction between external and internal causes arisiag from the same act and producing the same result. Following the above, both the British and American cases are discussed and quoted as upholding the conclusion that a hernia occurring under such conditions should be regarded as a fortuitous event. Workmen's Compensation — "Incapable of Use" — In re Meley, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Oct. 23, 1914), 106 North- eastern Reporter, page 559. — Thomas H. Meley brought a proceeding against his employer and the latter's insurer under the compensation act for injuries to his hands. The insurer appealed from the award of the industrial accident board. A provision of the amendment to the act was in controversy which is to the effect that the additional amounts to be paid "in case of the loss of a hand, foot, thumb, finger, or toe," shall also be paid "in case the injury is such that the hand, foot, thumb, finger, or toe is not lost but is so injured as to be incapa- ble of use; provided, that when the incapacity ceases the additional payment shall also cease." The industrial accident board had held that the right hand was incapable of use, and the court held that there was evidence to support this finding, since it showed that the flexor tendons of nearly all the fingers and of the thumb were cut, and that the hand could be used only as a hook. The court also held that the statute warranted giving additional compensation for an injury to one finger of the left hand. Workmen's Compensation — Incapacitt for Work — In re Sulli- van, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (May 23, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 4^3. — William T. Sullivan suffered on February 7, 1913, an injury which resulted in the amputation of an arm. He was able to work on May 31, but on account of the loss of his arm did not secure work imtil October 25, although he tried dili- gently to do so during the meantime. The court held that the phrase "incapacity to work" in the compensation act covers not only physi- cal incapacity, but inability to obtain work resulting directly from a personal injury, and that the petitioner was entitled to compensation for the entire time until he began work. Workmen's Compensation — Injury Arising Out of and in Course of Employment — TerlecTci v. Strauss et al.. Supreme Court of New Jersey (Feb. 25, 1914), ^^ Atlantic Reporter, page 1023.— The petitioner in this case was injured while engaged in combing 85590°— Bull. 169—15 ^16 242 BULLETIN OF THE BTJKEAU OP LABOK STATISTICS. particles of wool out of her hair at the completion of her day's work, her hair being caught in moving machinery. A judgment of the court of common pleas of Mercer County awarding her compensation was affirmed, the court holding that this injury was received in the course of and arose out of the employment. Workmen's Compensation — Injuet Ahising Out of and in Course of Emplotment — Climbing off Roof for Lunch — ^Inten- tional AND Willful Misconduct — Clem v. Chalmers Motor Co., Supreme Court of Michigan {Jan. 5, 1914), 1^4 Northwestern Reporter, page 848. — Charles S. Clem was killed while in the employ of the de- fendant company, and the State industrial accident board allowed a claim of $3,000 for his death which award was on certiorari proceed- ings affirmed, one judge dissenting on the ground that the injury was due to intentional, wiUful misconduct. The nature of the accident and the contentions of the defendant are sufficiently shown in the following extracts from the opinion as delivered by Judge Moore. Having quoted some of the provisions of the compensation act (No. 10, Acts of 1912), Judge Moore said: We have quoted sufficiently from the act to show that it is a very marked departure from the old rule of Hability on the part of the employer to the employee. It is clear that as to the employer, who has accepted the provisions of the act, the risks of the employee, arising out of and m the course of his employment, are not assumed as heretofore by the employee but must be compensated for accord- ing to the provisions of the act, unless the employee is injured by reason of his intentional and willful misconduct. The first question, then, is: Did Mr. Clem receive a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment ? And the second question is: Was he injured by reason of his intentional and willful misconduct? The questions are so interwoven that they may well be discussed together. Mr. Clem, with others, was employed on a December day constructing a flat roof on a large building only 19 or 20 feet high. It would add not only to the comfort of these men but to their efficiency as workers to have them about 9 or 10 o'clock par- take of a luncheon, which from the fact that hot coffee was served was called a coffee lunch. The luncheon was ordered by the foreman of the company. It was prepared on the premises, and when it was ready the men were directed by the subforeman to go and partake of it. All of them started to do so. They did not in doing so leave the premises of the appellant. All of them but three went down the ladder. Mr. Clem went down the rope which projected over the eaves 7 feet. If he had kept hold of the rope until he reached the end of it, if he was a man of ordinary height and his arms were of the ordinary reach, his feet would be within 5 or 7 feet of the ground. If, when the call to come to lunch was made, Mr. Clem, in responding to the call, had inadvertently stepped into an opening in the uncompleted roof or in company with the others had, in the attempt to reach the ladder, DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOE. 243 got too near the edge of the roof and fallen and been hurt, would it be claimed that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment ? The getting his luncheon under the conditions shown was just as much a part of his duty as the laying of a board or the spreading of the roofing material. The injury, then, having arisen out of and in the course of his employment, can it be said that compensation shall be defeated because of his intentional and willful misconduct? His primary object was like that of all the other men to get to and partaike of his luncheon. There is nothing to indicate that he uitendBd or expected to be hurt. Nearly all the other men went down by the ladder. He went down by a rope where, if his plans had carried, he would have had to make a drop of only 5 to 7 feet. Is that such intentional and willful misconduct as to defeat compensation under the act? There is scarcely a healthy, wide- awake 10-year old boy who does not frequently take a greater chance and without harm. For a man accustomed to physical toil, judged by what is occurring daily, it can not be said that such an act should be characterized as intentional and willful misconduct within the meaning of the statute. Workmen's Compensation — Injury Arising Out of and in Course of Employment — Employee Going off Premises for Lunch — Hills v. Blair et al., Supreme Court of Michigan (July 24, 1914), 14^ Northwestern Reporter, page 243. — Leone H. Hills made appHcation for an award of compensation before the industrial acci- dent board against the receivers of the Pere Marquette RaUroad Co. on account of the death of her husband, who had been a section hand on the railroad. The board awarded compensation to the apph- cant, and the receivers appealed. Hills on the day of the accident, November 16, 1912, had failed to take his dinner as was usual, it being customary for the crew to eat their lunch at a car house. At noon he started to hurry to his home along the tracks, a distance of about 2,000 feet. As he went along a footpath between the tracks, a freight train was approaching from his rear. A httle later his body was found about half the distance from the car house to where he would have left the track near his home, having evidently been thrown against a switch standard, which was bent. It was in dispute whether he probably, in walking or running alongside the train, went too near it and was thrown by it, or whether he attempted to board it to ride, or after having so boarded it attempted to get off when he found that the speed was increasing and the train was not to stop at that station. The board having taken the former view in accordance with the theory of- the plaintiff, the coiirt held that it should adopt the same view, there being no direct evidence as to how the accident occurred. It held, however, that the injury did not arise out of and in course of the employment, and the order granting the award was reversed, the eiriployee having left the place of his employment during the inter- 244 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEATJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. mission allowed for the eating of lunch, and not remaining on the premises, in which case the relation of employer and employee wotild not have been broken. Workmen's Compensation — Injury Arising Out of and in Course of Employment — Employee Going Out to Lunch — In re Sundine, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (May 21, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 433.— F. L. Dunne & Co. were mer- chant tailors; Edward Olsen made clothing for the company in its workshop, and Emily Sundine was employed by Olsen. The nsur- ance company holding Dunne & Co.'s risks admitted that under the Massachusetts compensation act it was hable for injuries to the employees of the independent contractor, but contended that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. The injury was sustained while the employee was out of the workshop for the purpose of getting lunch, and upon a flight of stairs which was not under the control of -either the company or Olsen, but which fur- nished the only access to the shop. Judge Sheldon, in expressing the decision of the court that the compensation must be paid, said: Her employment was by the week. It would be too narrow a con- struction of the contract to say that it was suspended when she went out for this merely temporary purpose, and was revived only upon her return to the workroom. It was an incident of her employment to go out for this purpose. Nor do we regard it as decisive against the petitioner that she was injured while upon stairs of which neither Olsen nor Dunne & Co., had control, though they and their employees had the right to use them. These stairs were the only means available for going to and from the premises, where she was employed, the means which she practically was invited by Olsen and by Dunne & Co. to use. It was a necessary incident of the petitioner's employment to use these stairs. We are of opinion that according to the plain and natural meaning of the words an injury that occurred to her while she was so using them arose "out of and in the course of" her employment. Workmen's Compensation — Injury Arising Out of and in Course of Employment — Punching Time Clock — Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co., Supreme Court oj Michigan (Apr. 7, 1914), 146 North- western Reporter, page 665. — The employee, Rayner, was running to punch the time clock, which he was required to do when the noon whistle blew. He ran into another employee, whom he could not see on account of obstructions on the floor, and received injuries which eventually resulted in his death. The court held that going to punch the clock was a part of his employment, and affirmed the award made by the industrial accident board granting compensation to his widow- decisions of courts affecting laboe. 245 Workmen's Compensation — Injury Arising Out op and in CoimsE of Employment — Eiding to and from Work — In re Don- ovan, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Fel. 27, 1914) ^04 Northeastern Reporter, page 431. — The employee Donovan secured a decree in his favor in the superior court of Suffolk County. From this the insurer of his employer appealed, and the point of interest was as to whether the injury, which occurred while the employee was riding from his place of work in a wagon furnished by the employer, was within the scope of the act. The court decided that it was, affirm- ing the decree of the court below. In the opinion delivered by Judge Sheldon, the discussion of the EngUsh cases on the point by Prof. Bohlen in 25 Harvard Law Review, 401 et seq., was referred to, and the court said: From his discussion and the cases referred to by him, and from the later decisions of the Enghsh courts, the rule has been established, as we consider in accordance with sound reason, that the employer's MabUity in such cases depends upon whether the conveyance has been provided by him, after the real beginning of the employment, in compliance with one of the implied or express terms of the con- tract of employment, for the mere use of the employees, and is one which the employees are required, or as a matter of right are per- mitted, to use by virtue of that contract. [Cases cited.] The finding of the industrial accident board that Donovan's trans- portation was "incidental to his employment" fairly means, in the connection in which it was used, that it was one of the incidents of his employment, that it was an accessory, collateral or subsidiary part of his contract of employment, something added to the princi- pal part of that contract as a minor, but none the less a real, feature or detail of the contract. Workmen's Compensation— Injury Arising Out of Employ- ment — Bayne v. Riverside Storage & Cartage Co., Supreme Court of Michigan {July 24, 1914), H^ Northwestern Reporter, page 412. — LU- lian Bayne instituted proceedings for compensation for the death of her husband because of an accident alleged to have arisen out of his employment with the company named. The employee, a strong, well man, employed in moving furniture, quit work August 27, 1913, after lifting at apparent disadvantage a heavy article, complaining that in lifting it he had hurt his back. He took to his bed and next day a physician was called. He became much worse and another physi- cian, called September 6, found him suffering from pneumonia of two or three days' duration, and in serious condition. This physician had him removed to a hospital, where he died. It appeared that on August 24 Bayne had danced on a boat, had become heated, and complained of being chiUed; that on the after- noon of the 26th he had carried a heavy object, and in setting it down thought he "must have kinked his back"; and on the morning 246 BULLETIN OP THE BTJBEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. of the 27th said the jar of his wagon going over the car track hiu-t his back. Physicians were heard, other than the one who originally at- tended him, and some were of opinion that there was no connection between the alleged injury and the pneumonia, while others asserted that the disease was directly caused by the injury. The court there- fore upheld the determination of the board awarding compensation, concluding its opinion as follows: Assuming that the court would have the right to brush aside whoUy improbable expert testimony or correct the commission for not doing so, we do not feel warranted in saying that the opinion evidence favorable to claimant is wholly improbable. There is there- fore a dispute of fact, which the commission has determined. Workmen's Compensation — Injury Arising Out op Employ- ment — Eppeot of Previous Injury — MiUilcen v. A. Towle <& Co., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Jan. 8, 1914), 103 North- eastern Reporter, page 898. — The industrial accident board rendered a decision awarding damages in the amount of $1,950 to CaroUne MiUiken as dependent of Frank T. Milhken, deceased, and the superior court of Suffolk County issued a decree in accordance with this decision. The insurance company holding the employer's risk ap- pealed, and the decree was reversed by the supreme judicial court, on the ground that the injuries received did not fall within the classifica- tion of the statute. Four or five years before the death of Milliken, and while employed by the same company as teamster, he had suffered a fall from his wagon, striking on his head. Three months before October 8, 1912, and also on that day, he showed evidence of lapse of memory. At 5 o'clock on the date given above he was directed to drive his wagon to the stable to be put up for the night. He wandered about, and finally left his horse, wandered into a swamp, and remained there until morning buried, except for his head, in the cold mud and water, from which experience he contracted pneumonia and died. Judge Loring, in dehvering the opinion of the court to the effect that these facts did not constitute an "injury arising out of his employment," said: The industrial accident board found: "That the loss of memory with which the employee, Milliken, was seized was not in itself a fatal disorder, and that he would not have met his death as he did but for the horse and wagon and his effort to get them to the stable." The dependent's [claimant's] contention is that MiUiken's death was caused by pneumonia brought on by his falling into the swamp and lying there all night; that, imder these circumstances, falling into the swamp and lying there all night was a personal injury which caused his death. The fact that Milliken "would not have met his death as he did but for the horse and wagon and his effort to get them to the stable" Decisions of coxtets affecting labor. 247 g06s no farther than to show that the personal injury suffered by Milliken was a personal injury "in the course of his employment." The difficulty in the case arises from the provision that the personal irijury must be one "arising out of" as well as one "in the course of his employment." There is nothing in the employment of driving a wagon which makes it Hkely that the employee wiU aUght from his wagon, wander to and fall into a swamp, and lie there all night. The distinction between the case at bar and a case within this clause of the act is well brought out by what is suggested by a remark of the majority of the industrial accident board. If the horse driven by Milliken had run away and Milliken had been thereby thrown out and killed, the personal injury in fact suffered in that case would have been one which from the nature of his employment would be likely to arise, and so would be one "arising out of his [the employee's] employment." It seems plain that if MiUiken's death was caused by a personal injury, it was the one which happened some four or five years before the occurrence here complainea of and before the workmen's com- pensation act was passed. Workmen's Compensation — Injuky in Course of Employment — Disease — Causation — Newcomb v. Alhertson, Supreme Court of New Jersey {Fel. 25, 1914), 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 928. — William E. Albertson entered a petition against Leverett Newcomb under the workmen's compensation act. Judgment was rendered, for the peti- tioner in the court of common pleas of Cumberland County, and the case was taken up on certiorari, when the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. Albertson was employed as a chauffeur and sustained a fracture of the arm because of the crank of the automobile "back-firing. " While under treatment in the hospital, where he went with the privity and acquiescence of the employer, an abscess of the thumb developed, caused by an unpadded splint. Ankylosis of the thumb followed, and this in turn caused injury to the first two fingers. In deciding that these injuries arose in the course of the employment. Judge Swayze, who dehvered the opinion of the court, said: Section 11 of the workmen's compensation act (P. L., p. 136) pro- vides for compensation for personal injuries to an employee by acci- dent arising out of and in the course of his employment. The defend- ant expressly confines his argument to the award of compensation for the injury to the thumb ana two fingers. The only question for us is whether those injuries were due to the accident. 'The question is not, strictly speaking, whether the accident was the proximate cause of the ankylosis of the thumb, or whether the infection was the nat- ural result of the accident. An English case was then quoted, in which it was said: It seems to me enough if it appears that the employment is one of the contributing causes without which the accident which actually 248 BTJLLETIK OP THE BUREAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. happened would not have happened, and if the accident is one of the contributing causes without which the injury which actually followed would not have followed. Continuing, the court said: In the present case it is said that the chain of causation is broken because the infection was due to the failure of the physician to take proper precautions. There is no finding to that effect, and the evidence is not before us. We can not assume that the infection could be caused only by the negUgence of the physician, and it is therefore unneces- sary to decide whether such negligence would amount to such a break in the chain of causation that Sie employer would not be Uable. We think that the trial judge was right in finding that the injury in fact resulted from the accident and in holding the employer liable. Workmen's Compensation — Injury in Course of Employ- ment — Effect of Preexisting Disease — Voorhees v. Smith Schoon- maker Oo., Supreme Court of New Jersey (Nov. 6, 1914), 92 Atlantic Reporter, page 280. — The facts of this case, in which the court afiirmed a judgment of the court of common pleas of Somerset County in favor of the widow of a deceased employee, are given in the portion of the opinion of Judge Parker, who spoke for the court, quoted below: The principal question raised is whether the court of common pleas was justified in finding that the death of Ira Voorhees, the employee, resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The deceased, a man of middle age or over, worked in a woodworking shop of prosecutor, and at the time of the seizure just preceding his death was working at a task of furrowing 16 posts, each six inches square and weighing about 100 pounds apiece. To do this he had to get each post up on the table of the furrowing machine and push it forward against the knives by body pressure, which was exerted by pushing his abdomen forcibly against the end of the post. Each post had to be run through twice. After Voorhees had finished 13 of the posts he sat down, evidently in great pain, and shortly afterward sent for a doctor, who had him taken home, where he died 3 days later. He vomited blood and passed bloody stools, and the doctor pronounced the trouble internal hemor- rhage. After death the undertaker, as he testified, found the body in such condition that he had it buried a day earlier than originally intended. It was in evidence that there was a large bruise on the abdomen where the pressure had been exerted on the ends of the posts. The effort of the defense was to show that death was produced by a rupture resulting from cancer. The family refused to consent to an autopsy, but that was their right. It must be conceded that much of the evidence points to cancer and an internal rupture of some kind. But it was quite plain, and the trial court was fuUy justified in finding, that the rupture occurred while the deceased was in the very act of doing some unusually heavy work. So that, even if deceased was suffering from internal cancer, it was quite DECISIONS OF COXJETS AFFECTING LABOE. 249 within the province of the court to find that the proximate cause of death was the unusual and forcible pressure on parts weakened by disease, which but for the unusual strain would have held out for a considerable period. Workmen's Compensation — Injury in Course of Employment — Evidence of Cause of Death — Muzilc v. Erie Railroad Co., Supreme Court of New Jersey (Jan. 9, 1914), 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 24-8. — This case under the workmen's compensation act rested on the question as to whether the fact that the death of the employee arose in the course of his employment must be proved by direct evidence, or would be iof erred from the circumstances which existed in the case. The decree of the loWer court was reversed for correction in minor particulars, but the effect of the decision was to uphold the finding in favor of the plaintiff. Judge Voorhees, who spoke for the court, said: The first point made by the defendant is that there is no evidence that Muzik's death was caused by an accident in the course of his employment. It is true that no direct evidence of these facts was produced. The man was found after the train had gone out, some 3 or 4 feet from the railroad, lying with his feet toward the track, with an injury in his head, and died shortly; the case being one of a broken neck. 1!he Bergen County court of common pleas found that the deceased came to his death by accident, while in the railroad's employ, and in the course of it. I do not think that we can question this finding. The facts shown clearly indicate that the deceased was struck by the train after he had given the waybills, iu pursuance of his duty as such employee, to the train agent, and this, of course, would be while in the course of his employment. Workmen's Compensation — Injury in Course of Employment — Review by Courts — De Constantin v. Public Service Commission, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (Sept. 29, 1914), 83 South- eastern Reporter, page 88. — The plaintiff, De Constantin, was the acting royal consul of Italy, and niade application to the court for an order requiring the public service commission to allow a rejected claim for compensation on behaK of the dependents of Giuseppe Zippi. Zippi was kiUed by a train on the main line of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. He was in the employ of a firm engaged in construction work on a portion of the road. While his death occurred a few min- utes before the time for him to begin work in the morning, the evidence did not show that the main line where it happened was the only or even the proper route for access to his place of work, and the com- mission rejected the claim on the ground that the injury was not in the course of employment. The court sustained this view and 250 BtrLLETIN OF THE BtrSEAtJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. refused the order applied for. Its conclusions as to the two questions involved are shown in the following syllabus prepared by the court: The jurisdiction to review acts of the public service commission, respectmg the administration of the workmen's compensation fnnd, conferred upon the supreme court of appeals by section 4.3 of chapter 10 of the Acts of 1913, is original, not appellate. An injury incurred by a workman in the course of his travel to his place of work, and not on the premises of the employer, does not give right to participation in such fund, unless the place of injury was brought within the scope of employment by an express or implied requirement in the contract of employment of its use by the servant in going to and returning from his work. Workmen's Compensation — Injury in Course of Employ- ment — ^Use of Forbidden Appliance — Reimers v. Proctor Publish- ing Co., Supreme Court of New Jersey {Feb. 26, 1914), ^^ Atlantic Reporter, page 931. — The father of Gustave A. Reimers entered a petition under the compensation act and secured a judgment in his favor in the court of common pleas of Hudson County. This was reversed by the supreme court. The son had been injured while using an automobile in distributing newspapers, the testimony show- ing that he had been expressly forbidden to use the same. As to this Judge Swayze in dehvering the opinion said: The principal question in the case for us is whether there was evidence justifying an inference that the death was by accident arising out of and in the course of the emplojmient. There was evidence justifying an inference that the decedent was employed by the defendant as a general utility man, and that among nis duties was the distribution of newspapers. He had at one time used an automobile of the defendant, and had met with an accident which damaged the machine. The defendant then borrowed an automo- bile, and its president and one of his sons, who was in its employ, both forbade decedent to use the car. Nevertheless he used it fre- quently to distribute the newspapers. There is no evidence that anyone except the president had authority to authorize its use; but the use was so frequent a-nd so public that, if there was nothing more in the case, the trial judge would have been justified in finding that the decedent was authorized to use it notwithstanding the pro- hibition. The difficulty is that both the president and his son testi- fied that the decedent had been told not to use the car on the day the E resent accident happened. The son in particular told him, just efore he went out, to let the car alone. There is no conflicting evidence on this point, and, if these witnesses are to be believed, the decedent took the car on the occasion when the accident happened in disobedience of express orders just received. If there was author- ity to use it before, there was a revocation. Workmen's Compensation — Injury of Employee by Negli- gence of Third Party— Jfeese etal. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., DECISIONS OP COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 251 United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Feb. 16, 1914), 211 Federal Reporter, page 234. — This was an action to recover damages for the death of Benjamin Meese. Meese was an employee of a brewing company, and was engaged at the time of the accident which caused his death in placing Government stamps upon barrels which were being rolled down skids and placed on cars on a siding of the railway alongside his employer's plant. The railway com- pany caused a train to be run upon the siding against the car on which he was standing, causing several barrels to roll upon him. It was not contended that the agents of the railway company were not negligent, but the contention was that the wife and children must recover, if at all, under the workmen's compensation act of Wash- ington. The court decided that the statute providing for recovery for death caused by negligence was not repealed by the compensation act, as far as third persons are concerned in such cases, as appears from the following extracts from the opinion, which was deUvered by Judge Morrow: With respect to the declaration of policy contained ia the first section of the act, it is to be noticed that it is specifically directed against "the common-law system governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries in hazardous work." The present action is not one arising under the common-law system, and it is not against the employer of the decedent. The plaintiffs ia error, as the wife and children of the decedent, had no right of action against the defendant at common law, whether the defendant was an employer or a third person not an employer. Their right of action was purely statutory, and is based upon sections 183 and 194 of the [Rem. & Bal.] Codes and Statutes of Washington. The question here is : Have the plaintiffs in error a remedy under the prior statute ? They have if that statute has not been repealed by the compensation act. It is not claimed that it has been repealed by that act in express terms. Can it be said that it has been repealed by implication ? It is plain that it has not, when we con- sider that by the compensation act it is provided that if a workman is injured away from the plant of his employer by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, and the injury results in the death of the workman, his widow, children, or dependents may elect whether to take under the compensation act or seek a remedy against such other. What that remedy against the other is is clearly indicated by the remainder of the section pointing to a right of action under the prior statute. Workmen's Compensation — Injury of Employee by Negli- gence OF Third Party — Settlement- Separate Claim Against Employer — Newarlc Paving Co. v. Klotz, Supreme Court of New Jer- sey {Feb. 24, 1914), 91 Atlantic Reporter, page 91. — Hattie Klotz, pe- titioner in this proceeding for compensation, was administratrix of a workman who had been employed by the defendant company. 252 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAXJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. Klotz was employed by the company to wheel stone and cement to a concrete mixer at work on the repavement of a street. He went to this work at 7 o'clock in the morning, but, when he arrived there, it was found that, owing to the pipes of the concrete mixer having been frozen, no work could be done until this had been re- paired. Before the mixer was fixed so as to permit the resumption of work, Mr. Klotz, while fixing up his wheelbarrow, was struck by a street railway car and killed. Prior to the trial in this case, the petitioner received $800 from the street railway company, and released, by a release under seal, that corporation from liability. Having held that the evidence justified a finding that Klotz's death was due to an accident arising out of and xa the course of his employment, the court further held that the settlement with the corporation whose wrong caused death did not bar the recovery of compensation, and that the employer had not a right by way of sub- rogation to the claim of the employee against that corporation. The judgment of the court of common pleas of Essex County in favor of the petitioner was affirmed. The reasons for this conclusion are set forth in the following quo- tation from the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Swaj'^ze : If the statutory compensations were subject to deductions by reason of payments made by a third person, the tort-feasor, to the f»erson injured or to his dependents, in satisfaction of the liability or the tort, this object of the statute [of a fixed amount of compen- sation for a definite period] would be thwarted, and in effect the commutation to a lump sum would take place without any order of the court and at the will of the injured party or his representatives. If, on the other hand, the employer were allowed to recover of the tort-feasor by action in the name of the employee or his representa- tive, he would be able to recover in advance of payments by him and at a time when the extent of his own liability could not be ascertained. These considerations suffice to show that the right to compensation under the statute and the right to recover damages of the tort-feasor are of so different a character that the rule of law appealed to by the prosecutor is inapplicable. The release, therefore, of the claim against the street railway coiild not be a bar to the right to compen- sation under the statute. It was conceded that this conclusion made it possible for an injured workman to secure double compensation — a difficulty that was sought to be met by a subsequent amendment. There is also an amendment to the original act which subrogates the employer to the rights of the injured workman to an action against the negligent ■ third person, or releases the employer from liability if an adequate compensation has been recovered by the injured man from such third DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 253 person. This amendment, however, was not in effect at the time of the injury, and was held by the court not to furnish a guide for its rulings in the present case. Workmen's Compensation — Medical and Hospital Services — In re Panasuk, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {May 21, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 368. — From a decree in the superior court of Suffolk County in favor of the employee, Theodore John Panasuk, in a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act, the insurer, the American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., appealed, the decree of the lower court being affirmed. The Massachusetts compensation act provides for the furnishing by the insuring association, during the first two weeks after injury, of medical and hospital services and medicines. The employee concerned was at work for the Taunton Wool Stock Co., and a splinter became embedded in his hand, causing an abscess and necessitating a surgical operation and several dressings thereafter. The industrial accident board found that the employee was an illiterate foreigner, unable to read, write, speak, or understand the Enghsh language. A notice, signed by the Taunton Dye Works & Bleachery Co., a separate corporation from that for which the employee worked, was posted near his working place, giving the name of the insurance association and the names of "Doctors to whom to go in case of accident and receive free medical attendance. " The employee reported his injury to the foreman, who did not advise him regarding his right to medical attendance, and he went to a physician, who found need of an immediate operation. The physician wrote to the superintendent of the employer, which did not then furnish any attendance. It was held that the industrial accident board had jurisdiction to consider the question of the right of the employee to compensation for the amount paid by him for medical attendance; and that the duty of the association to "furnish" medical treatment means something more than a mere passive readiness to provide it if called for; rather, an active effort to render the necessary aid. Workmen's Compensation — Medical and Surgical Treat- ment — Refusal to Permit Operation — Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co. et al., Supreme Court of Michigan (Dec. 20, 191S), I44 Northwestern Reporter, page 563. — Helen Jendrus brought suit against the company named and the insurance company which carried its compensation risks for the death of her husband, Joseph Jendrus. A finding for the claimant for the amouut of compensation provided for death by injury, made by the arbitration committee, 254 BULLBTIlir OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. was aflSrmed by the industrial accident board, and on certiorari it was again afSriined by the supreme court. The defendants' claim was that death was caused not by the accident, but by the refusal of the employee to allow an operation to be performed when first proposed, and that the refusal of medical and surgical treatment offered by the employer barred him from compensation. The opinion of the supreme court, dehvered by Judge Stone, quotes the opinion and finding of facts by the industrial ac'cident board as foUows: In this case the deceased, Joseph Jendrus, was injured by a severe blow on the abdomen. The doctors attending the injured man diagnosed the injury as a probable rupture of the intestine, and advised an operation. The accident occurred about 1 o'clock in the afternoon of February 14. At about 8 or 8.30 in the evening the doctors sought to operate on the injm-ed man. It appears that he could not talk Enghsh, and communication was had with him through an interpreter. The injured man shook his head, indicating a refusal to be operated on. The matter of an operation was again brought up by the doctors on the following morning, February 15. Jendrus, at that time, refused to submit to the operation, but con- sented at about 11.30 a. m. The operation was performed about 1.30 p. m. on February 15. It seems that during the operation the patient vomited, and the vomit was drawn into the lungs, causing pneumonia, and resulting in his death a few days later. The oper- ation disclosed a rupture of the intestines which was not sutured, and the post-mortem examination showed the same to be in process of healing at the time of death. All communication with the deceased after the injury was through an interpreter. The board is of the opinion that the refusal to be operated on when first requested and the further action of deceased in delaying consent to the operation until nearly noon on the day following the accident was not so unreasonable and persistent as to defeat the claim for compensation in this case. He did submit to the operation after being convinced that it was absolutely necessary. The opinion of Judge Stone concludes: In none of the cases cited by appellants' counsel was the operation anything more than a minor operation for a trifling injury. We think the cases clearly distinguishable from the instant case, which involved a major operation ol a serious nature. None of the testi- mony in the case goes to the length of showing that Jendrus' life would have been saved had the operation been submitted to at 8 o'clock on the evening of February 14, which was the first time that Dr. Hutchings had reached the conclusion that an operation was necessary. Peritonitis had ab-eady set in, and the vomiting had commenced, and vomitus of a fecal nature was then being expelled. That it was the injury which caused the peritonitis is not questioned; that it was the peritonitis which caused the vomiting of fecal matter is not questioned; that it was the taking of fecal matter into the lungs which caused the pneumonia is claimed by all of the surgeons who testified. There is testimony that he might have recovered without any operation, although that result could not have been reasonably DECISIONS OF C0T7BTS AFFECTING LABOR. 255 expected. Under all the circumstances of the case, including the fact that Jendrus was a foreigner, unable to speak or understand the EngUsh language, that he was suffering great pain on the evening of the 14th, that he was unacquainted with his surroundings, and that he did consent to, and did submit to, an operation within 15 or 16 hours after it was first foimd necessary, in the judgment of the sur- geons, we can not hold, as matter of law, that the conduct of Jendrus was so unreasonable and persistent as to defeat the claim for com- pensation by his widow. Neither can we hold that Jendrus by his conduct in the premises in causing a delay in the operation was guilty of intentional and willful misconduct. We can not say, as matter of law, that the industrial accident board erred in its conclusions of law in aflBrming the action of the committee on arbitration. No other questions of law are presented by the record. Workmen's Compensation — Nonresident Alien Beneficia- ries — Injuries Causing DEATS—Oregutis v. Waclark Wire Works, Supreme Court of New Jersey {Apr. H, 1914), 91 Atlantic Reporter, page 98. — This was an action by Eva Gregutis as administratrix to recover damages for the death of a workman who left dependents resident in Russia, but none in the United States. It was conceded that there was no right of recovery under the State compensation act, since nonresident beneficiaries are excluded therefrom. The question was raised whether or not the act of 1848 allowing recovery for injuries causing death was applicable in the present instance, the court (a single judge sitting) ruling that it was not. The opinion of Judge Bergen is in part as follows: That such nonresident ahens have a right of action imder certain conditions is settled in this State (Cetofonte v. Camden Coke Co., 78 N. J. Law, 662, 75 Atl. 913, [Bui. No. 90, p. 833]), but such right depends upon the condition that a party, injured through the negli- gence of the defendant, would, if death had not ensued, be entitled to maintain an action in respect thereof (P. L. 1848, p. 151; 2 Comp. Stat. 1910, p. 1907, sec. 7). I think it must be concieded that, if the deceased had suffered an injury, not resulting in death, he would have been bound by the compensation provided for in the act of 1911 (P. L., p. 134), and could not have brought suit for his injuries in disregard of that act, and, if he could not, then it would foUow that the condition upon which a right of action is given to the personal representative of a deceased person is not present. In addition to this, the act of 1911 covers all cases of death, and compensation therefor, where the con- tract of the employee is subject to section 2 of the act, and to that extent the act of 1848 is inconsistent with it, as the later act provided a different procedure and rule of damages, and, being inconsistent, it can not be apphed to the class of cases enumerated in the statute of 1911, for that act repeals all inconsistent legislation. The conclusion I have reached is that, where an employee contracts to work under section 2 of the employers' Uability act, the damages to be paid by the employer in case of death are limited by that act, 256 BULLETrif OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. and that an action by next of kin can not, in such case, be main- tained in disregard of the act. Compensation is given, in lieu of damages, to dependents, and not to next of kin as such. The power of the legislature to give or withhold a right of action in such case, and to declare to whom, and in what amount, compensation shall be made, can not be doubted. This complaint admits an employment governed by the second section of the statute of 1911, but avers that because, under that act, nonresident dependents are excluded from compensation, it does not apply to them, although it would apply to the compensa- tion of the employee if he were seeking compensation for injuries on his own behalf. This does not state a cause of action in the present state of the law on this subject. The case was subsequently taken to the court of errors and appeals (92 Atlantic Reporter, p. 354), in which the judgment of the supreme court was affirmed, the court stating that the "death act" (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1907) limited recovery to cases where the decedent would, if death had not ensued, have been entitled to maintain an action. It cited paragraph 7 (sec. 2) of the workmen's compensa- tion act of 1911, which provides that when an employer and an employee shall by agreement, either express or implied, accept the provisions of the act, compensation for personal injm-ies or death shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the act; the next paragraph provides that this agreement shall be a surrender of aU rights to any other method of settlement, and shall bind personal representatives, widow, and next of kin. Continuing, Judge Tren- chard, who dehvered the opinion of this court, said: By force of these provisions, therefore, the decedent, if he had suffered, an injury not resulting in death, would have been Hmited to the recovery of the compensation provided for in section 2 and by the procedure and in the forum, provided in the workmen's com- pensation act, and he could not have brought suit for his injury in disregard of that act. It follows, therefore, that the condition upon which a right of action is given to the personal representatives of a deceased person by the death act is not present in the case at bar. Whether, in a proceeding begun under the workmen's compensa- tion act in the common pleas court, the administratrix could recover under paragraph 12 (2), "expenses of last sickness and burial not exceedmg two hundred dollars," upon the theory that there were "no dependents," is a question we have not considered, since it is not before us. The judgment below will be affirmed, with costs. Workmen's Compensation — Permanent Injury — Aged Em- ployee — Amount of Compensation — Bateman Manufacturing Co. V. Smith., Supreme Court of New Jersey {Feb. 25, 1914), 89 Atlantic Reporter, page 979. — James E. Smith was injured, while employed by the company named, by a radiator falling and crushing his right DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 257 leg. He was 73 years old and, on account of his age and the inabil- ity of the bones to knit, this accident caused permanent disability in his occupation as plumber, which requires standing. The judge of the court of common pleas of Camden County awarded compensation for total disability or for 400 weeks. This award was reversed by the supreme court and compensation awarded for 175 weeks, the compensation specified for loss of a leg. In rendering this decision the court said that the award must be limited by the schedule contained in paragraph 11 of section 2 of the act and that the age or health of the employee, although causing an accident to have a different effect, does not affect the amount of compensation. Workmen's Compensation — Permanent Injury — Death — Aged Employees — City of Milwaukee v. Ritzow et al., Supreme Court of Wisconsin (Oct. 6, 1914-), 106 Northwestern Re-porter, page 480. — The Wisconsin workmen's compensation act provides that in case of the permanent injury of an employee who is over 55 years of age the compensation shall be reduced by 5 per cent, if over 60 years of age by 10 per cent, and if over 65 years of age by 15 per cent. Other subdivisions provide that, in case of the death of an injured employee, a sum equal to the compensation for permanent injury or disability shall be paid as benefits to the surviving dependents of the employee. In the present case the employee, a man 80 years of age, was kiUed in the course of his employment, and the industrial com- mission awarded his widow an amount equal to four times his last average annual earnings, which is the amount provided for permanent disability, without making any 15 per cent reduction. The circuit court of Dane County affirmed this award, and the city appealed to the supreme court. The latter court held that the term "permanent injury" was used in the ordinary sense, and did not include injury resulting in death, in spite of the fact that the reason for the reduc- tion in such cases might be stronger than in cases where the employee survives with permanent disability. The fuU award was therefore affirmed, two judges dissenting, the court saying that it was so easy for the legislature to specify if it had desired to reduce death bene- fits as well as those for permanent disability that its failure to do so inclined the court to the view that such was not its intention even though the "reason of the statute as to reduction of compensation applies stronger to the condition not included in its strict letter than to that which is." Workmen's Compensation — Permanent Total or Partial Dis- ability — Loss of Fingers — Amount of Benefits — Sinnes v. Dag- gett et at, Supreme Court of Washington (July SO, 1-914), H^ Pacific 85590°— Bull. 169—15 17 258 BULLETIN OF THE EUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. Reporter, page 5. — ^The industrial insurance commission awarded compensation for partial disability in the amount of $1,200, in addi- tion to $45 for loss of time, to Thomas Sinnes, for the loss of several fingers on each hand. He appealed, the superior court of King County affirmed the award, and he again appealed, contending that his disability was total and permanent. The accident occurred while he was in the employ of the Moore Logging Co. The compensation act provides that permanent total disability means the loss of both legs or both arms, or one leg and one arm, total loss of eyesight, paralysis, or other condition permanently incapacitating the workman from performing any work at any gainful occupation. It also states that permanent partial disability means the loss of either one foot, one leg, one hand, one arm, one eye, one or more fingers, etc. ; and that for permanent partial dis- ability the workman shall receive compensation in a lump sum in an amount equal to the extent of the injury, to be decided in the first instance by the department, and not in any case to exceed the sum of $1,500. The supreme court held that the questions involved were ques- tions of law; that the injury was within the definition of permanent partial disability, and there was no reason for the granting of a jury trial; and that the amount of compensation was within the discre- tion of the commissioners, limited only by the prescribed maximum of $1,500. The action of the court below in dismissing the appeal was therefore affirmed, and the award of $1,200 allowed to stand as originally made. Workmen's Compensation — Personal Injury — Occupational Disease — Lead Poisoning — Adams v. Acme White Lead cfc Color WorTcs, Supreme Court of Michigan (July 25, 1914), 1 4.8 Northwestern Reporter, page 485.~S&Tah E. Adams made claim against the defend- ant named for compensation. The industrial accident board en- tered an award in her favor, and the defendant brought certiorari, when the decision was reversed. The husband of the claimant, Augustus Adams, left work in the defendant's plant at the closing hour May 29, 1913, and was unable to resume work, dying on June 27, 1913. He had been employed since the previous December at work which brought him in contact with red lead. The industrial accident board held that the language of the Michi- gan act, which specifies, "a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment," omitting the words "by accident" originally found in the English statute, was broad enough to include occupational diseases. It also found that it would not be justified in holding the part of the act referred to invalid on constitutional grounds. In discussing the question whether the act includes and DECISIONS OF COUKTS AITECTING LABOK. 259 covers occupational diseases, the supreme court held that an occu- pational disease is not an accident, since it is expected that, in spite of the greatest precaution, a certain percentage of employees will contract such diseases ; that the occurrence of such a disease therefore lacks the element of being unforeseen and unexpected, which is characteristic of an accident. The purpose of the act is taken up, and it is shown that it is intended to provide compensation for injuries, either directly or by suit against employers not accepting the act, whether or not the injury resulted from an employee's negli- gence or the negligence of a feUow servant, and without regard to any assumption of risks. Since no action at all was allowed at com- mon law for occupational diseases, this was taken as an indication that the words "personal injury" were intended to mean injury by accident. The requirement that the employer shall make a report within 10 days of the happening of the accident resulting in a per- sonal injury was shown to tend in the same direction, since it may be in many cases impossible for the employer to know that disability is the result of an occupational disease resulting from the employ- ment within that length of time. The Massachusetts decisions (In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N. E. 336, [p. 260] ; Johnson -y. London Accident & Guarantee Co., 104 N.E. 735, [p. 259]), which hold occupational diseases to be included under the law of that State were distinguished, on the ground that the word "injury" is used throughout the act, in the place of "accident" in the Michigan act ; and a decision in New Jersey (Hichens v. Magnus Metal Co., N. J. Law Journal (Com. PI. June 25, 1912), p. 327), is cited as upholding the present decision not to consider such diseases as included. The court further held that if the legislature intended to include occupational diseases, that part would be unconstitutional, as violat- ing the provision of the constitution that "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The controlling words in the title of the workmen's compensation act are said to be "providing compensation for accidental injury to or death of employees," which language it was held would not aUow to be included in the body of the act provisions for compensation for occu- pational disease. Workmen's Compensation — Personal Injury — Occupational Disease — ^Lead Poisoning — Johnson v. London Guarantee & Acci- dent Co. {Ltd.), Supreme Judicial Cowt of Massachusetts {Apr. 4, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 7S5. — The industrial accident board found that the employee, who was 72 years of age, and had been employed at lead grinding for 20 years, had been incapacitated by lead poisoning since March 13, 1913, and the superior court of Suf- 260 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OF LABOE aTATISTIOS. folk County issued a decree awarding him damages. The company- appealed. Judge Crosby, in delivering the ©pinion of the court affirming the decree of the court below, said: The main inquiries raised by the appeal are: (1) Has the employee suffered a personal injury within the meaning of the act ? (2) If so, what was the date of the injury? (3) If the date of the injury was subsequent to July 1, 1912 [the date of taking effect of the amended act] , did it arise out of and in the course of his employment ? Under the act, "personal injury" is not limited to injuries caused by external violence, physical force, or as the result of accident in the sense in which that word is commonly used and understood, but under the statute is to be given a much broader and more liberal meaning, and includes any bodily injury. Aside from the decisions under the English act which provides for compensation for "personal injuries by accident," it is clear that "personal injury" under our act includes any injury or disease which arises out of and in the course of the employment, which causes incapacity for work and thereby impairs the abiUty of the employee for earning wages. The case of Hood & Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co., 206 Mass. 223, 92 N. E. 329, is decisive of the case at bar. In that case, it was held that for a person to become infected with glanders was to suffer a bodily injury by accident. This question recently has been considered fully in Hurle's Case, 104 N. E. 336 [see p. 260] , which decided that an employee having suffered an injury which resirlted in total blindness caused by absorbing poison in the course of his employment, which incapacitated him from labor, had suffered a "personal injury" within the meaning of the act. In view of the finding of the board that Johnson had suffered from lead poisoning fourteen years before and had had no recurrence of the disease until he became incapacitated for work on or about March 13, 1913, and the further finding that there had been "an absorption of lead poisoning since July 1, 1912, and that the date when the accumulated effect of this poisoning manifested itself, and Johnson became sick and unable to work, was the date of the in- jury," we are of opinion that the board was warranted in finding that the injury was received when he became sick and unable to perform labor. Until then he had received no "personal injury," although doubtless the previous absorption of lead into his system since July 1, 1912, finally produced the condition which terminated in the injury. [Citing a number of British cases.] As the physical incapacity of the employee for work has been found by the board to have been caused by the gradual absorption of poison into his system subsequent to July 1, 1912, resulting in personal injury on or about March 13, 1913, there seems to be no reasonable conclusion other than that such injury arose out of and m the course of his employment. (Hurle's Case, and cases cited.) Workmen's Compensation— Personal In jimY— Occupational Disease— Optic Neuritis— /n re Hurle, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Feb. 28, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 336.— William Hurle made claim against the Plymouth Cordage Co. em- ' DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOE. 261 ployer, and the American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., insurer. The insurer appealed from a decree of the superior court of Suffolk County, made on the findings and decision of the industrial accident board ordering the insurer to pay certain amounts to the employee, and the supreme judicial court affirmed this decree. Judge Rugg in dehvering the opinion of the com-t states the facts of the case and dis- cusses the point on which the decision hinges, in part, as follows: This is a case under the workmen's compensation act. The facts as found by the industrial accident board are that the employee is totally incapacitated for work by personal injury which arose out of and in course of his employment, and which caused total loss of vision in both eyes, and which resulted from an acute attack of optic neiuitis induced by. poisonous coal tar gases. His work was about furnaces for producing gas by the burning of coal, in the top of which were several holes through which after opening a cover he could watch the fire. It was his duty to see that the furnaces were supplied with coal and burning evenly and to prevent incandescent spots caused by the burning by forced draft. It was necessary for him to open one or another of these holes about 70 times a day, and when- ever these holes were opened poisonous gases were given forth. The inhalation of these caused his bhndness. The question to be decided is whether this was a "personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment" within the mean- ing of those words in Stat. 1911, ch. 751, p. 2, sec. 1. Unquestionably it arose out of and in the course of his employment. The only point of difficulty is whether it is a "personal injury." The words "personal injury" have been given in many connections a comprehensive definition. They are broad enough to include the husband's right to recover for damage sustained by bodily harm to his wife, the alienation of a husband's affections, the seduction of one's daughter and other kindred tortious acts. At common law the incurring of a disease or harm to health is such a personal wrong as to warrant a recovery if the other elements of Uability for tort are present. Hunt v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 8 Allen 169^ 85 Am. Dec. 697; Allen v. Boston, 159 Mass. 324, 34 N. E. 519; Deisenreiter v. Malting Co., 92 Wis. 164, 66 N. W. 112; Wagner v. Chemical Co., 147 Pa. 475, 23 Atl. 772 [and other cases cited]. "The Engfish workmen's compensation act affords compensation only where the workman receives "personal injury by accident." It adds to the personal injury alone required by our act the element of accident. Yet it has been held frequently that disease induced by accidental means was ground for recovery. The opinion then refers to the case of Hood & Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co., 206 Mass. 223, 92 N. E. 329, in whi«h it was decided that infection from glanders while cleaning a stable was included in the phrase "bodily injuries accidentally suffered," and concludes as follows: There is nothing in the act which leads to the conclusion that "personal injuries was there used in a narrow or restricted sense. 26^ BULLETIN OF TSE BUEEATT Of LABOR SlAtlSTICS. The provisions as to notice of the injury (part 2, sees. 15 to 18, both inclusive, as amended by Stat. 1912, ch. 172, and ch. 571, sec. 3) indi- cate a purpose that information shall be given as to the time, place, and cause of the injury as soon as practicable after it is suffered. But this requirement can be complied with in the case of an injury caused by the inhalation of a poisonous gas producing such results as here are disclosed, as weU as in the case of a blow upon the body. An argument may be drawn from the provisions of part 3, sec. 18, as amended by Stat. 1913, ch. 746, sec. 1, in favor of a liberal interpreta- tion of "personal injuries." By the section as originally enacted the duty was imposed upon every employer to keep a record of all injuries, but he was required to make return to the industrial accident board only of "an accident resulting in a personal injury." By the amend- ment, which of course has no effect upon the legal rights of the parties in the present action, but which may be resorted to for discovery of legislative intention, the employer is required to make return of the occurrence of an injury" and to state "the day and hour of any acci- dent causing the injury." If these words are accurately used, a dis- tinction is drawn between the injury and the accident causing the injury. The authority conferred upon the board of directors of the Massachusetts Employees' Insurance Association by part 4, sec. 18, is to "make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the pre- vention of injuries" and not for the prevention of accidents. See also Stat. 1913, ch. 813. The name "industrial accident board," which is the administrative body created by part 3, is a mere title and can not fairly be treated as restrictive of its duties. The difference between the English and Massachusetts acts in the omission of the words "by accident" from our act, which occur in the English act as characterizing personal injuries, iS significant that the element of accident was not intended to be imported into our act. The noxious vapors which caused the bodily harm in this case were the direct prod!uction of the employer. The nature of the work- man's labor was such that they were bound to be thrust in his face. The resulting injury is direct. If the gas had exploded within the furnace and thrown pieces of cherry hot coal through the holes into the workman's eyes, without question he would have been entitled to compensation. Indeed there probably would have been common- law liability in such case. Dulligan v. Barber Asphalt Co., 201 Mass. 227, 87 N. E. 567. There appears to be no sound distinction in principle between such case and gas escaping through the holes and striking him in the face whereby through inhalation the vision is destroyed. The learned counsel for the insurer in his brief has made an exhaustive and ingenious analysis of the entire act touching the words "injury" or "injuries," and has sought to demonstrate that it can not apply to an injury such as that sustained in the case at bar. But the argument is not convincing. It might be decisive if accident had been the statutory word. It is true that in inter- preting a statute words should be construed in their ordinary sense. Injury, however, is usually employed as an inclusive word. The fact remains that the word "injury" and not "accident" was employed by the legislature throughout this act. It would not be accurate but lax to treat the act as if it referred merely to accidents. Warner V. Couchman, [1912] A. C. 35, at page 38, decisions op coxjets aitecting labor. 263 Woekmen's Compensation — Eaileoad Employees — Election — CouTwle V. Norfolk cfe Western Railway Co., United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio (Sept. 2, 1914), 216 Federal Reporter, page 823. — T. J. Connole brought action against the railway com- pany named. The defendant company moved to strike out a para- graph of the petition in which the allegation was made that the com- pany was his employer as defined in the Ohio workmen's compensa- tion or State insurance act, and had not complied with the provisions of the act. The compensation act gives a right of action to the employee in cases where an employer under the act is in default on premiums to the State insurance fund, the employer being in such action deprived of the defenses of fellow-service, contributory negh- gence, and assumed risk. The defendant's claim is stated as follows in the opinion delivered by Judge Sater: The defendant's position is that, even if both were engaged in purely intrastate business at the time plaintiff was injured, the defendant, being also an interstate carrier engaged in interstate com- merce, is not amenable to the provisions of the Ohio act unless it and some, at least, of its workmen working only in this State, with the approval of the State liability board of awards, had voluntarily accepted the provisions of such act by filing their written acceptances thereof with such board, and unless such acceptances had also been approved by such board; and that in that event the defendant would be subject to the provisions of the act for the period only for which the premiums called for by the act had been paid. The earlier portions of section 51 make the act applicable to employers and employees engaged in interstate or foreign commerce (notwithstanding any Federal act affecting them) to the extent only that both are engaged in intrastate work alone at the time of the happening of an injury to an employee; that is to say, the work must be clearly separable and distinguishable from interstate or foreign commerce to bring the employer and its injured employee within the terms of the statute. After thus making the act applicable to such persons, the section further provides: "And then only [shall the provisions of the act apply to them] when such employer and any of his workmen working only in this State, with the approval of the State liability board of awards, and so far as not forbidden by the act of Congress, voluntarily accept the provisions of this act by filing written acceptances, which, when filed with and approved by the board shall subject the acceptors irrevo- cably to the provisions of this act to all intents and purposes as if they had been originally included within its terms, durmg the period or periods for which the premiums herein provided have been paid." The court sustained the defendant's contention, interpreting sec- tion 51 of the act as excluding railroad companies and their employees who are engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce except when they have made active election to come within the provisions of the act, and ordering the paragraph of the petition under consider- ation to be stricken out. 264 bulletin of the bueeatj of labor statistics. Workmen's Compensation— Retiew of Decisions of Indus- trial Board— Certiorari — Courier v. Simpson Construction Co., Supreme Court of Illinois (Oct. 6, 1914), 106 Northeastern Reporter, page 350. — Mrs. Amanda E. Courier instituted a proceeding before the industrial board, as guardian of a minor son, for compensation for the death of her divorced husband, George B. Courter, who stepped upon a rusty naU whUe in the employment of the defendant company and died a few days later as a result of the injury. The industrial commission awarded a weekly sum of $8.41, one-half the wages of the deceased, for 416 weeks, to be paid to the guardian until the son became of age, and afterwards to himseK. The de- fendant brought certiorari for a review of the decision. The act attempted to make the decisions of the board reviewable by the supreme court on certiorari, but the court held that it could not assume this jurisdiction, the provision of the act being invalid as violating the clause of the constitution limiting the original jurisdic- tion of the supreme court to certain classes of writs, of which cer- tiorari is not one. It held, however, that the legislature had no constitutional authority to take away the right of review by the courts, since such action would be violative of the "due process of law" provision of the constitution. It' held, further, that the ques- tion whether the board acted illegally or without jurisdiction might be reviewed by writ of certiorari, and that this writ should issue from the circuit courts, they being the only ones having original jurisdic- tion over that writ. Workmen's Compensation — Review of Findings of Board of Arbitration — In re Diaz, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Pel. 28, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page S84.— The industrial accident board awarded compensation to Diaz, who had been, injured in an elevator accident, and the superior court of Suffolk County issued a decree in accordance with their finding. Section 11 of the workmen's compensation act of 1911, as amended by Stat. 1912, ch. 571, sec. 14, provides that a decree of the committee of arbitration awarding compensation to an injured employee shall have the same effect as though rendered in an action heard by a court, except that there shall be no appeal therefrom on questions of fact. There being no question of la,w raised in this case, the coiu-t determined that the finding had the same weight and effect as the verdict of a jury, and would be upheld as there was some evidence to sustain it. Workmen's Compensation— Right of Action by Parent for Loss of Services of Minor Child— Zmgr v. Viscoloid Co., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Dec. 1, 1914), 106 Northeastern DECISIONS OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOR. 266 Reporter, page 988. — The mother of a minor son injured in the employ of the company named brought action under the common law for the loss of his services. It was agreed that, even though the son had received full compensation under the law, she was entitled to recover unless this right of action was barred by the provisions of the work- men's compensation act. The court held that the minor did not and could not waive this independent right of the parent, nor had the act, either expressly or by implication, taken away this common-law right, and ordered a judgment in her favor for the sum previously agreed upon as the proper one i the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Workmen's Compensation — Seamen — Scope of Law — The "Fred E. Sander," United States District Court, Western District of Wash- ington {Oct. 20, 1913), 208 Federal Reporter, page 724.— John A. Thompson brought an action in rem in admiralty to secure damages for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by reason of the negligence of the owners and those in charge of the schooner named, which sailed between San Francisco and Puget Sound points in Washington. He had been injured while loading and storing piling in the schooner's hold. The agent of the owners intervened as claimant for the vessel, and filed exceptions to the libel, on the ground that the workmen's compensation act of Washington abolished actions for personal injuries. Judge Neteror decided, however, that a State has no power to abolish or limit jurisdiction of courts of admiralty for maritime torts conferred by the Constitution, and consequently overruled the exceptions. Workmen's Compensation — Serious and Willful Miscon- duct — In re NicTcerson, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {May 23, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 604- — Lester Nick- erson received fatal injuries while in the employ of the Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., and his widow brought proceedings under the compensation act. The insurer claimed that he was guilty of serious and willful naisconduct, which would bar the receipt of benefits by his dependent. Nickerson was employed to do general cleaning, painting, and whitewashing, and some of his work had to be done near machinery and shafting, which portion he had been instructed to do during the noon hour, when the machinery was shut down. About half past 11 on the day of the injury he had a conversation with the superintendent about work on a wall near shafting, and was told that that work should be done at noon, that it was about half past 11, and that the superintendent would ascertain the exact time and tell him. A few minutes later he went to work, and was caught, 266 BULLETiiT Ot THE BUBEATT OP LABOR STATISTICS. his body drawn into the shafting, and injuries inflicted which caused death. The court afBrmed a decree of the superior court of Suffolk County granting compensation, holding that the term "serious and willful misconduct" means something more than negligence or even gross negligence, and that disobedience to orders, to constitute such misconduct, must be deliberate, not merely a thoughtless act on the spur of the moment. Workmen's Compensation — "Service Growing out of and Incidental to Employment" — Employee on Way to Work — • City of Milwaukee v. Alihoff et al., Supreme Court of Wisconsin (Feb. S, 1914), 14s Northwestern Reporter, page 238. — -The circuit court of Dane County entered a judgment afhrming an award of $2,138.11 as compensation made in favor of Minnie Althoff , on account of the death of her father, William A. Althoff. The deceased, in accordance with a city ordinance fixing the hours of labor at eight, began work at 8 a. m. and finished at 5 p. m. He was required to report to his foreman at 7.30 each morning to receive instructions as to where he was to work. On the morning of May 3, 1912, he reported thus, and on receiving his instructions proceeded toward the place where he was to work. While on the way he fell on a sidewalk and injured his knee. He died on September 21, 1912, and it was found on sufficient evidence that his death was due to the injury which he received when he feU. On appeal the supreme court affirmed the judgment, holding that the accident was within the terms of the statute, which provides that compensation shall be paid where the employee at the time of the accident is "performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment." The following is quoted from the remarks of Judge Barnes, who delivered the opinion of the court: In the instant case, when the servant reported to his foreman and received his instructions for the day and proceeded to carry out these instructions by starting for the place where he was to work, we think the relation of master and servant commenced, and that in walking to the place of work the servant was performing a service growing out of and incidental to his employment. Workmen's Compensation — Settlement with Third Parties Liable for Injury — Release — Separate Claim for Death — Deduction for Wages— /n. re Cripp, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Feb. 27, 1914), IO4 Northeastern Reporter, page 565.— Julia Cripp, as widow of a deceased employee, secured a decree awarding compensation in the superior court of Suffolk County. Cripp was injured by coming in collision with a street railway Qar while driving a truck. He settled with the railway company on the DECISIONS Of COtJfetS AFFECTING LABOB. 26*7 day of the injury, and gave a release. He was able to work for a time, but the injuries ultimately caused his death. The statute pro- vides that "where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the subscriber to pay damages in respect thereof, the employee may at his option proceed either at law against the person to recover damages, or against the association for com- pensation under this act, but not against both, and if compensation be paid under this act the association may enforce in the name of the employee, or in its own name and for its own benefit, the liability of such other person." It was held that the employee made an election in settling with the company, the same as though he had brought suit, but that the widow's rights upon his death were distinct. As to this Judge Braley, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: Stat. 1911, ch. 751, is not penal, but is based on the theory of com- Eensation. Primarily its object is to provide, in place of wages which e can no longer earn, the means of subsistence for the employee injured without "serious and willful misconduct" on his part, if he survives, or for the widow, and other dependents, if death ensues either with, or without, conscious suffering. The insurer under section 6, where death results, is to pay the dependents wholly relying upon the employee's earnings for support, compensation, and by section 7, a wife living with her husband at the time of death is con- clusively presumed to be such dependent. The right of recovery expressly given to the widow can not accrue until his death. Having been created for her benefit it is independent of his control, and under section 22 can be discharged only by herself where she is the sole dependent, or by those authorized to act in her behalf. The law provided that in case of death, payments should be made to a dependent widow for a period of 300 weeks from the date of the injury. In refusing to allow a deduction for the time the em- ployee worked after the injury and before death, the court said: It is also urged, that the board erred in not deducting, from the period computed, the time during which the employee resumed work. The decision was right. The statute says that compensation shall aecruefrom the date of the injury. (Stat. 1911. ch. 751,pt. 2,sec. 6.) The only exception is that, where before death weekly payments have been made to the employee, the amount payable to dependents begins from the date of the last of such payments. We see no sufficient reason for erdarging the exception. A practical working rule easily applied has been provided, which should not be set aside even if in some cases its application may seem somewhat ineqidtable. If a change is deemed advisable it should come through legislative enactment. Woekmen's Compensation — Subrogation of Employer to Right of Action against Third Person — ^Assignment of Eight — McGarvey v. Independent Oil cfc Grease Co., Supreme Court of Wis- 268 BULLETIN OP tSE BUEEAtT OP LABOR STATISTICS. consin (Apr. 9, 1914), llfi Northwestern Reporter, page 895. — The plaintifif, an employee of the Harley-Davidson Motor Co., while in the course of his employment, was injured by actionable neghgence of the Oil & Grease Co.; the defendant. Plaintiff made claim against his employer, the motor company, for compensation, and the claim was settled. Under the workmen's compensation act this operated to transfer the employee's right of action against the OU & Grease Co. to the motor company. The latter company for a sufficient con- sideration and in due form assigned this right to the employee, and he commenced action in the circuit court for Milwaukee County. The defendant demurred because the motor company was not joined as a party plaintiff. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant appealed. The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court below, holding that such a right of action, existing in favor of the employer by subrogation, could be assigned as any other cause of action. Woekmen's Compensation — Total and Partial Disability — Duprey v. Maryland Casualty Co., Supreme Judicial Court of Massa- chusetts {Nov. 4, 1914), ^06 Northeastern Reporter, page 686. — Joseph T. Duprey brought proceedings against the casualty company as insurer of his employer, and the insurer appealed from a decree in his favor in the superior court of Suffolk County on findings of the industrial accident board. This decree was affirmed. It was admitted that the injuries, which occurred October 12, 1912, were received in the course of employment. The employee had been paid as compensation the sum of $7.50 per week, an amount equal to one-haK his wages, during the period from the injury untU June 12, 1913. The committee of arbitration decided that total disability ceased at that date and stated that Duprey agreed that payment for partial disabihty for two years, based on one-half the weekly wages, would be just, and it made an award accordingly. The industrial accident board found that the employee was incapacitated for all work except what he could do while seated, and that he had' en- deavored to find such work and was not able to do so. It therefore awarded him a weekly compensation of $7.50, based upon total disability, from June 12, 1913. The court held that the employee did not waive his rights by his agreement before the committee to a settlement on the basis of partial disabihty, and that the insurer could not now object to the admission of the evidence of a physician before the board in addition to the evidence taken by the committee, since it did not make objection before the board. It also held that the fact that the employee was a man of failing physical powers and would be incapacitated for work DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOB. 269 in a few years did not bar him from compensation if his incapacity to work was the result of his injuries. It held finally that he was totally incapacitated for work by being unable to do any work which he could obtain, although he had a limited physical capacity for some work. Workmen's Compensation — Workman — Child under 14 Years Employed by Father in Mill — Eillestad et ux. v. Industrial Commis- sion of Washington, Supreme Court of Washington (July I4, 19H), 1^1 Pacific Reporter, page 913. — Isaac A. Hdlestad and wife brought pro- ceedings before the industrial commission for compensation for the death of their son, 13 years of age. The complainants owned and operated a shingle miU. The son was anxious to work, and his father at length promised him a packer's job when it should be vacant. In the meantime the boy went to work collecting bolts, which were scat- tered about up the creek 80 rods from the mill, and floating them down, and while thus employed was drowned. The industrial com- mission rejected the claim, but in the superior court of Whatcom County there was a verdict for the claimant, from which the com- mission appealed. The supreme court decided that, there being no agreement for wages or earnings, the boy was not a workman under sections 3 and 4 of the act, the former of which defines a workman as any person in the employment of an employer carrying on any of the industries scheduled in section 4, and the latter providing that in computing the pay roU the entire compensation received by every workman engaged in extrahazardous employment shall be included, whether in the form of salary, wage, piecework, profit sharing, pre- mium, or otherwise. The court held that these provisions contem- plate that there must be an actual contractual relation between the parties to work for pay of some sort. In the absence of proof of such relation, it was held that the father assumed the risk in allowing his son to work at a hazardous employment. It was further held that a child under 14 employed in any factory, miU, etc., in violation of section 6570 of Rem. & Bal. Code is entitled to no compensation, and that this rule applies even though there is no positive connection between the violation of the law and the death of the child; and that the employment in driving bolts down the stream was employment in such a mill. It therefore reversed the de- cision of the court below and sustained that of the industrial commis- sion, and ordered the claim to be dismissed. DECISIONS UNDER COMMON LAW. Boycott — Injunction — Right to Strike — Unfair Lists — Bum^ ham V. Dowd, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (March 31, 1914), i04 Northeastern Reporter, page 841. — Fred G. Bumham and others were engaged in a wholesale and retail business, part of their trade being in masons' supplies. Edward F. Dowd and his associates were members of a voluntary unincorporated labor union in Holyoke, Mass., this union being connected with the building trades council of the city, representing some 14 unions. These unions cooperated in the customary agreements as to working with persons not members of the unions, or doing work for "unfair" employers, or handling "unfair" material. In July, 1911, one Gauthier employed nonunion masons in some construction work in Holyoke, for which Buruham furnished materials. In August the union voted to refuse to handle any building material of any firm that furnished stock to Gauthier or to any "unfair" contractor. Notice of this action was sent to the building trades council, which in turn notified Burnham that Gauthier was "doing work contrary to laws of building trades council," and was "therefore recognized by us as being unfair," and expressed the hope that Burnham would cooperate in the matter. Burnham con- tinued to supply material to Gauthier, and was subsequently declared unfair, notice of this declaration being sent to various owners and contractors in the city, in substance threatening to strike if they should purchase masons' supplies from the plaintiff. This action was brought for the purpose of securing an injunction against the union and council to prevent their carrying out the threatened action, which would tend to result in the loss of their business; damages were also sought. In the superior court of Hamp- den County the matter was referred to a master, whose report was before the supreme judicial court for consideration. This report dis- closed the facts set forth as constituting an injury to the plaintiffs' business, against which an injunction should be allowed as well as damages for injuries already caused. In sustaining these findings Judge Sheldon stated the facts as given above, and continued, saying in part: These contractors and owners feared, and it was intended that they should fear and they were justified in fearing, that these threats would be carried out; and in consequence thereof they ceased or refrained from buying supplies of the plaintiffs, as otherwise they would have done, and the plaintiffs' sales of masons' supplies were considerably dirainished and their profits lessened in consequence of these facts. This state of affairs will continue, to the serious loss and 270 DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 271 damage of the plaintiffs, unless they shall promise not to sell to any one considered unfair by the imion. The defendants did not act from actual personal malice toward the plaintiffs ; but their acts were done in pursuance of their union prin- ciples and purposes, as above stated, and without caring for the injurious consequences to the plaintiffs. Indeed these injurious consequences were anticipated and contemplated by the defendants. They did not attempt to declare or enforce any boycott against the plaintiffs, except as this is included in the acts that have been men- tioned. The defendants have no real trade dispute with the plaintiffs. No one of the members of the union is, or so far as appears ever has been, employed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have not interfered or sought to interfere with the employment of any of those members, or with the rates of pay, the periods of labor, or any of the conditions of such employment. The matter that lies at the foundation of these proceedings is a dispute between the union and Gauthier. He em- ploys or has employed nonunion labor; the defendants (including under this term aU the members of the union) object to this. They have a right to say that they will do no work for him unless he will give to them aU the work of their trade, that they wiU do all or none of his work. That was settled by our decision in Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 [Bui. No. 70, p. 747]. But the second point decided in Pickett v. Walsh, supra, is in our opinion decisive of the principal question raised in this case. It was there held that the members of a labor union who are employed by a contractor to do work upon a building, and who have no dispute with that contractor as to work which they or their fellows are doing for him, can not law- fully strike against him for the mere reason that he is doing work and employing some of their fellows upon another building upon which nonunion men are employed to do like work, not by him, but by the owner, of that buUding. The language and reasoning of that decision are applicable here. The reason of the decision was that, as the court said, such a strike "has an element in it like that in a sympathetic strike, in a boycott and in a blacklisting, namely: It is a refusal to work for A., with whom the strikers have no dispute, because A. works for B., with whom the strikers have a dispute, for the purposs of forcing A. to force B. to yield to the strikers' demands." So in the case at bar, the threat of the defendants was to strike against owners and contractors, with whom the defendants had no dispute, for the purpoae of forcing those owners and contractors to refuse to buy masons' supplies from the plaintiffs, and thus by the loss of business and the profits to be derived therefrom, force the plaintiffs to refuse to sell to Gauthier or others whom the defendants might call unfair, and thus put a pressure upon those persons which should force them to cease employing nonunion masons and to give all their mason work to the defendants. This was a step further than what was held in Pickett V. Walsh to be an unlawful combination for an unjustifiable in- te ference with another's business. It was in intention and effect a boycott ; and it was none the less so because it was aimed at only one branch of the plaintiffs' business. There is no more right to interfere with one branch of a merchant's business, to obstruct it and lessen its profits, and so far as may be done to destroy it entirely, than there 272 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAXT OF LABOK STATISTICS. is to interfere with, obstruct and destroy ths whole of that business. The difference is merely one of degree, not of kind. The defendants contend earnestly that each one of them has a per- fect right to refrain from deahng himself, and to advise his friends and associates to refrain from dealing, with the plaintiffs, and that they have a right to do together and in concert what each one of them lawfully may do by himself. But that is not always so. It is especially true in dealing with such questions as these that the mere force of numbers may create a difference not only of degree, but also of kind. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492 [Bui. No. 95, p. 323] . So in Pickett v. Walsh, it was held among other things that "what is lawful if done by an individual may become unlawful if done by a combination of individuals." This principle is peculiarly applicable to cases like the one at bar. There is no such thing in our modern civilization as an independent man. No single individual could continue to exist, much less to enjoy any of the comforts and satisfactions of life, without the society, sym- pathy and support of at least some of those among whom his lot is cast. Every individual has the right to enjoy these, and is bound not to interfere with the enjoyment of them by others. That right indeed is usually one of merely moral obligation, incapable of en- forcement by the courts, but it is none the less an actual wrong for any body of men actively to cause the infringement of that right in definite particulars; and especially where such an infringement is made possible only by the concerted action of many in combination against one and results in direct injury to his business or property, the courts should interfere for the protection of that person. The question of damages remains to be dealt with. Upon that we find no error in the master's report. That the plaintiffs have sus- tained substantial damages is manifest; and the mere facts that it may be impossible to determine the total amount of their loss, and that it may be difficult to ascertain with absolute certainty the money value of even the damages that can be proved, is no reason for refus- ing to allow to the plaintiff what has been found to be capable of sub- stantial proof. Doubtless merely speculative damages or any dam- ages that have not been proved can not be recovered ; but this does not require absolute mathematical demonstration or prevent the drawing of reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances in evidence. The result is that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree enjoining the defendants from keeping the names of the plaintiffs upon their unfair list, from threatening to strike or to leave the work of any owner, builder or contractor by reason of such persons having purchased masons' supplies from the plaintiffs or having dealt otherwise with the plaintiffs, and from ordering or inducing a strike against an owner, builder or contractor for such reason, and that the plaintiffs shall re- cover from the defendants the sum of $500 with interest from the date of the filing of the master's report, and their costs of suit, and have execution thereof. Contract of Employment — Employment for Life — Reforma- tion OF Written Contract Obtained by Fraud — Pier son v. Kingman Milling Co., Supreme Court of Kansas {Mar. 7, 1914.), 1^9 DECISIONS OF COURTS ATFECTING LABOB. 273 Pacific Reporter, page SQJ,.. — Frank Pierson brought action against the company named for reformation of a contract. Pierson had been injured while in the employ of the company in 1906, one leg being broken and the other so badly hurt that it was amputated. The next day he signed a release in consideration of medical services, etc., which paper was read to him, as he claimed, in such a way as to include a provision that he should, in pursuance with an agree- ment already reached orally between him and the secretary and treasurer of the company, be employed by it for life. This pro- vision, as a matter of fact, was not written into the document. He was personally unable to read the paper at that time on account of his weakness, the anaesthetic, etc. As soon as he was able to go to work he was employed by the company, and continued to work for it until May, 1911, when he was discharged. On the trial of the case in the district court of Kingman County the judgment was for the defendant. On appeal, this was reversed and the case remanded. The court decided first that the statute of frauds did not prevent the enforcement of the contract because it was not signed by the company; for it was possible for it to have been performed within one year, because the employee might have died within that time. The plaintiff's wife was present at the time the paper was read and signed, and it was argued that the opportunity which she had, but of which she did not avail herself, to read the document consti- tuted constructive notice to Pierson of its contents, and that he could not bring the action for fraud after two years because of the statute of limitations on that kind of actions. The court, however, adopted the rule that if one of the parties assumes to read the con- tract to the other, and purposely misreads it, he can not take advan- tage of the other's want of care in relying upon his reading of it. It was also held that if the agreement to furnish employment was actually a part of the contract, the paper was not a unilateral con- tract, but should be reformed to show the actual contract. As to the contentions of the defense as to the indefiniteness of the contract, and the matter of the ratification by the company of the contract made by the secretary and treasurer, the court, speaking by Judge Mason, said : This court is of the opinion that the contract relied upon by the plaintiff is not too indefinite to admit of enforcement; that it rests with the employer to select the character of work to be done, so long as it is suitaole to the employee's capacity; and that the compensa- tion, unless fixed by agreement, is to be such as is ordinarily paid for similar services. The contract is also objected to on the ground that the duration of the employment is too indefinite. We think this objection unsound, and this view is supported by the authorities. [Cases cited.] 85590"— Bull. 169—15 18 274 BXTLLETIHr OF THE BXTBEAXJ OF LABOR STATISTICS. The most difficult question presented is whether there was any evidence of original authority on the part of the secretary and treasurer of the company to make the contract for life employment, or of subsequent ratification of his action. We shall assume that there was no showing sufficient to support a finding of original au- thority on the part of Jay Holdridge to bind the company by a con- tract with the plaintiff to give him employment during his life, but we think there was sufficient evidence of ratification to take that question to the jury. Giving to the evidence the liberal interpretation to which it is entitled when attacked by demurrer, we think the inference might reasonably be drawn that the plaintiff was given employment ia pursuance of the agreement to provide him with permanent work; that both the president and vice president, as welt as the secretary and treasurer, Toiew of his belief that the writing contained a pro- vision on the subject; and that a ratification of the promise thereby resulted. Contract of Employment — Grounds fob Discharge — Diso- bedience OF Rules — Corley v. Rivers, Supreme Court of Mississippi {Apr. 27, 1914), ^4 Southern Reporter, page 964-. — The employee Corley brought suit for the balance of wages as manager of the defend- ant's plantation, after his discharge from his employment, the con- tract having been for one year, and he having served somewhat over two months, and received two months' pay. The jury in the circuit court of Tallahatchee County returned a verdict in favor of the plain- tiff for the fuU amount, and a remittitur was entered by the court, which deducted the amount which he received during the year from other employment after his discharge. On appeal the supreme court reversed the judgment, Judge Reed saying in delivering the opinion: Appellant had rules for the government of his plantation. Under these, the manager was enjoined not to abuse or whip tenants, and he was not permitted to carry a pistol. The evidence shows that appellee had trouble with the tenants. He whipped two of them on different occasions. Thereupon appel- lant informed appellee that he did not want his tenants al)used and whipped, and that appeUee ought not to carry a pistol. Appellant further said that appellee must get rid of the one he was carrying or he would be discharged. Appellee refused to give up his pistol and left the employment. The rules shown in this case are reasonable. We commend them. To us they seem consistent with justice and the fair administration of the law m the land. The owner must have found them advisable for the successful management of his business. When appellee entered the service of appellant, it became his duty to observe these rules. His failure to comply with them was sufficient to render his services as manager unsatisfactory, and to justify appellant in discharging him. Appellant should only be held liable to pay for the balance owing for services up to the time when appellee left the plantation. Upon DECISIONS OF COXJKTS AFFECTING LABOR. 275 the trial, appellant tendered this amount. Judgment should have been for the same, with such costs as may have accrued in the case till the tender was made. Contract of Employment — ^Teem — Resener v. Watts, Bitter & Co., Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia {Dec. 9, 1913), 80 SoutTi- eastern Reporter, page 839. — H. A. Resener who was employed as a traveling salesman by the company named quit its service and brought suit in May, 1910, to recover commissions alleged to be due him under the terms of his contract of employment. Verdict was in his favor in the circuit court of CabeU County, W. Va., but the com- pany secured an award of a new trial, whereupon Resener took the case to the State supreme court of appeals. The award of a new trial by the lower court was here reversed, and judgment was entered on the verdict. The right to recover depended upon whether the employment was for a year or at will, and it was decided that the employment was for the latter. The following syllabus by the court states the conclusions reached : An employment upon a monthly or annual salary, if no definite period is otherwise stated or proved for its continuance is presumed to be a hiring at will, which either party may at any time determine at his pleasm-e without liability for breach of contract. The burden of proving that such hiring was obligatory for a year rests on the party who seeks to establish that the contract covered that period. Unless the understanding was mutual that the service was to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring, and is determinable at the will of either party. Employee and Employee — Conditional Resignation — Dis- CHAEGE — Damages — Neshit v. Gihlin et al.. Supreme Court of Ne- hrasTca {June 23, 191 4), 148 Northwestern Reporter, page 138. — Fred L. Nesbit was employed by Giblin & Co. as a traveling salesman, and was under contract for one year from December 21, 1909, at a salary of 12,100. In May, 1910, the firm wrote to the salesman criticising him for selling certain furnaces at a lower price than they thought proper. He replied on May 20, stating that he would be glad to have his resignation accepted, and that he would remain in Milwaukee, where he then was, until he heard from them. They did not answer, and in a few days he went on to Minneapolis, his next field of work, and continued to take orders. June 6 the firm wrote him in regard to certain advertising matter, stating that they would continue to issue it until November, and would forward copies to him as issued, thus showing the expectation that he was to continue in their employ. June 20, the firm wrote him that they accepted his resignation of 276 BULLETIN OF THE BXJEBAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. May 20. He replied that conditions as to opportunities to secure other employment had changed, and as they had not accepted his resignation at the time, he considered himself stiU in their employ. They then took steps to terminate his employment, and he was unable to obtain employment until the latter part of December, 1910. The judgment in the district court of Douglas County was in his favor for $1,054.13, and the defendant appealed. The supreme court affirmed the judgment, stating that the following instruction of the trial judge, the giving of which was one of the grounds of appeal, was correct: You are instructed the letter written by the plain tiif on the 20th or 21st day of May, 1910, was not of itself a letter of resignation, but was what might be termed in law a conditional resignation, and by the terms and conditions of said letter the defendants had the right to accept or reject the said resignation on or before the time fixed by the said letter of said date. And in this connection you are further instructed the defendants did not comply with the terms and con- ditions of said letter on that date, and as a matter of law, had no right to accept said resignation at a later time than that fixed by the terms and conditions of said letter, unless you find from a preponder- ance of the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct toward the defendants subsequent to the time he left Milwaukee for Minneapolis, or unless you further find that the defendants had dis- covered other misconduct of the plaintiff that occurred prior to the time they answered the letter written by the plaintiff at Milwaukee, Wis., dated on the 20th or 21st day of May, 1910. Employee and Employee — Liability of Employer for Weong- FUL Acts — Assault on Third Party — Matsuda v. Hammond d al., Supreme Court of WasUngton (Dec. 27, 1913), 137 Pacific Reporter, page 328. — Mrs. Hammond was the owner of a market stand, the business of which was conducted by John Bell. Bell went to Mat- suda's place of business to collect a bill and during an argument that ensued, assaulted Matsuda, who brought an action for damages against both Bell and Mrs. Hamrhond, his employer. He obtained a judgment in the superior court. Pierce County, Wash., which on appeal was set aside by the supreme court of the State, as to its effect on Mrs. Hammond, on the ground that the act of Bell was one not authorized by his employer so as to make her liable. Judge FuUerton, for the court, said in part: An employer is hable for the unlawful and criminal acts of his employee only when, he directly authorizes them, or ratifies them when committed, or, perhaps, continues an employee in his employ- ment after he has knowledge that the employee has committed, or "is hable to commit, unlawful acts while in the pursuit of his employer's business. The Uability does not arise from a mere contnact of em- ployment to do a legitimate and lawful act. decisions of couets affecting labor. 277 Employer and Employee — Liability of Employer for Wrong- FVh Acts — False Imprisonment — BirmingJiam Ledger Co. v. Buchanan, Court of Appeals of Alabama (June 11, 1914), 66 Southern Reporter, page 667. — Alfred Buchanan brought action against the newspaper company named for unlawful imprisonment. Judgment was in his favor in the circuit court of Jefferson County, and on appeal this was affirmed. The plaintiff was one of a number of newsboys who were detained by agents of the defendant company until an extra should be gotten out, one of the objects of the detention being to prevent the boys from selling the papers of other publishers. The court held that lack of evidence that the door was locked or other steps taken by any agent of the company whose name could be given by witnesses was not important, since the circumstances and conditions furnished sufficient proof that an agent or agents of the company caused the imprison- ment. That the evidence was adequate as to the acts being in the course of employment was held by the court, as shown by the follow- ing quotation from the opinion, which was dehvered by Judge Walker: Nor was proof lacking that each of such representatives of the defendant who participated in the wrong complained of was acting within the "course of his employment" in the sense in which that and similar expressions are commonly used in statements of the doctrine of respondent superior as a part of the law of principal and agent. For the conduct of its agent to impose liabihty upon the defendant it was not necessary for the latter to have authorized anybody forcibly to detain a newsboy in order to secure his services when desired. If the wrong was committed by the agent while he was executing his agency on the defendant's premises, not for a purpose of his own having no relation to the business of the defendant, but as an incident to the carrying on of that business, 'in the transaction of which he was engaged at the time, the defendant is liable though it did not authorize the agent to resort to such means in rendering the service for which he was employed. [Cases cited.] There was evi- dence tending to prove that the participation of each of the agents of the defendant who were referred to in the several counts of the com- plaint in the wrong to the plaintiff for which the defendant is sought to be charged with liability was an incident to the making of prepara- tions for the circulation and sale of an issue of the defendant's paper, which obviously was one of the main objects of the business in which the defendant was engaged, the furtherance of which was not foreign to the business the agent was employed to transact. As to the allowance of punitive damages the court said: The court properly refused the written charge requested by the defendant, to the effect that the plaintiff could not recover punitive damages. Such damages may be awarded for an unlawful detention of one's person committed with actual malice or its legal equivalent. "The mahce required as an element for the recovery of such damages exists if there is a wanton disregard of the rights of the injured party. 278 bulletin op the bureau of labor statistics. Employer and Employee — ^Liability of Employer for Wrong- ful Acts — ^Trespassers — ^Authority of Railroad Brakeman — Tarnowski v. Lake Shore cfe Michigan Southern Railway Co., Supreme Court of Indiana {Feb. 5, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 16. — This was an action by a father for the death of his minor son, who was alleged to have been killed by being kicked and pushed from a moving freight train on which he was a trespasser, by a brakeman named Hunt employed by the railroad company named. A verdict had been directed for the defendant in the circuit court of St. Joseph County, and the plaintiff appealed. The question involved related to the company's authorization of the brakeman to eject trespassers. Judge Morris, speaking for the court, said: Appellee concedes that the conductor was authorized to eject trespassers and tramps from the train, and that it was competent for him to delegate such authority to Hunt, but that no such delegation was proven. That defendant was Uable for an injury wantonly inflicted on a trespasser by an employee in ejecting him from the train, while the employee was acting within the scope of his authority, is not denied. If the evidence was such as to warrant a finding that the conductor authorized the brakeman to keep tramps or trespassers off the train, this judgment must be reversed. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to warrant such a finding and should have been submitted to the jury, and the judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Employers' Associations — ^Violation of Resolution to Main- tain Open Shops — Recovery of Liquidated Damages — United Hat Manufacturers v. Baird- Unteidt Co., Supreme Court of Errors of Con- necticut {July 13, 1914), 91 Atlantic Reporter, page 373. — This case was by stipulation of the parties taken from the superior court of Fairfield County to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut for its advice upon a finding of facts. The plaintiff is a nonstock corporation of the State of New York, composed of 56 companies, corporations, and individuals engaged in the manufacture of fur felt hats, with places of business in the States of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. The defendant was a corporation located at Bethel, Conn., and was a member of the association. The purposes' and objects of the association, as recited in its certificate of incorporation, were to improve business conditions of its members, to maintain harmonious relations between them, and to promote, subserve, and encourage social intercourse between them. Its by-laws provide that the decisions, prohibitions, orders, and regulations of the association and its board of directors shall be obligatory upon all members of the association, who agree to pay to DECISIONS OF COVETS AtFECTlirG LABOfi. 279 the association the sum of $5,000 as hquidated damages for the violation or failure to comply with any such decision, etc. This sum is not to be considered as a penalty, but as damages, and it is stipu- lated that it shall not be necessary to prove any special damages. No member may resign until after 90 days' notice in writing, nor until all dues, fines, etc., are discharged. The board of directors has authority to settle all disputes between members of the association and their employees except as to cessation and resumption of work, the use of the union label, and the forfeiture of bonds, penalties, etc. The United Hatters of North America is an unincorporated asso- ciation of journeymen hatters having over 9,000 members, and owning a union label, which it permits to be placed in hats manufactured in factories employing its members solely and commonly called ' ' union or closed shops." From July 1, 1907, to January 14, 1909, the members of the plaintiff and its predecessor (the Wholesale Fur Felt Hat Manufjicturers' Association) employed exclusively in their factories members of the United Hatters' association. The plaintiff's predecessor entered into an agreement, to which the plaintiff succeeded, with the United Hatters that any disagreement between employer and employee should be submitted to arbitration. The United Hatters continued to act under this agreement until a difficulty arose which led to a resolution by the United Hat Manufac- turers (plaintiff herein) to discontinue the use of the union label in all shops unless the United Hatters would put their men back at work in the establishment in which the difficulty occurred. All union em- ployees thereupon went out on strike, and the plaintiff association, after about 10 days, undertook to open by employing workmen indi- vidually instead of through stewards, i. e., on an open-shop basis, under a resolution passed at a meeting at which the defendant com- pany was represented. Some employers were able to resume work in this way, but the Baird-Unteidt Co., being in a strongly unionized dis- trict (the Danbury district), was unable to get workmen, and, together with other manufacturers similarly situated, undertook to get the plaintiff association to rescind its open-shop resolution, which failing, they tendered their resignation from the association, the defendant not being indebted at the time to the association unless for the 15,000 claimed as damages for its violation of the resolution in hiring union workmen, which action was taken less than 90 days from the first notice of intention to withdraw from the association. The board of directors thereupon authorized the president of the plaintiff asso- ciation to proceed against the withdrawing members for a recovery of the damages provided for in the by-laws, which action was afterwards ratified by the associat'on, though not by the three-fourths vote required for the levy of a fine or assessment. No evidence of special 280 BULLETIN OP THE BUEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. damage was offered, but the sum of $5,000 was claimed as damages for the breach of the resolution. The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Wheeler. As to certain claims made by the defendant with regard to the illegality of the association and of its by-laws, he said : The defendant claims this action must fail, since the plaintiff asso- ciation is, because of its organization and its by-laws, illegal, and therefore its resolution, whose violation is the basis of the action, was invalid. The foundation of this claim is threefold, because : ( 1 ) The real purpose and object of the association was to permit it to order a sus- pension of work by its members ; (2) to make agreements relative to the use of the union label ; and (3) because the members of the plaintiff were engaged in interstate commerce, the association was a violation of the Sherman Act (act July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200]), as its purposes were in restraint of trade. Employers, as well as employees, may form associations for mutual grotection and benefit. Each member of such an association submits is freedom to contract, to a greater or less extent, to the will of the association. The consideration of submission is the benefit presumed to flow from the action of members bound together for common ends. Unity of action of the members gives strength to ^ the association, without which it can not serve its purposes or accomplish its ends. By-la,ws and regulations are a part of the machinery by which the association operates. Members must therefore submit, while mem- bership continues, to all lawful by-laws and regulations enacted by the association for its government. The objects of this association, as stated in the articles of associa- tion and by-laws, are most worthy. Neither they nor the finding show that the purpose of the association was to permit it to order a suspen- sion of work and to agree ia reference to the use of the union label. It is too late to question the right of a labor union to make by-laws providing for strikes and to issue its order for a strike in an effort to secure lawful objects by lawful means. Eey lolds et al. v. Davis et al., 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457 [Bui. No. 77, p. 393]. And it may prose- cute the strike by any means neither illegal nor in violation of the equal or superior rights of others. So, too, the association of employers may enact a by-law givinc it the right to order a shutdown of the factories of its members, provided the objects sought be within its lawful purposes and the means used be lawful. And the employer has the right freely to hire his labor in the market without denial or unfair restriction of this right. The order of the association to stop work may curtail this right, but it is not, for this reason, illegal. A by-law providing for a fine upon the members of either an em- ployers' or a laborers' association for disobedience of its lawful orders IS not unlawful. Each may involve coercion of its members; it may temporarily take away the livelihood of the employee, and it may mjure, and, if continued, ruin, the business of the employer. Each member has agreed to this species of coercion in the behef that the common interest of all will best be served by the united action of many. Obedience to the lawful orders of the association is the condi- tion of membership voluntarily encountered by previous assent to the DECISIONS OF COUHTS AFFECTING LABOK. 281 by-laws. If the defendant intended to claim that this part of the by-laws was illegal, we have already answered that a by4aw of this character was not illegal. The argument of the defendant rests upon the premise that this resolution "that each member offer situations to operatives as indi- viduals" amounted to an order for a cessation of work. If the em- ployees accepted employment as individuals, it is said they would forfeit their membership in the union. If they maintained their membership, the employers could not run their factories. As the hatters' union dominated this industry in the Danbury dis- trict, enforcement of the vote would mean, it is said, a lockout and suspension of work. Therefore it is argued the vote was equivalent to a lockout. The argument assumes these consequences. The facts of record show that consequences of this character were not intended. The vote is not to be read in the light of possible consequences. Its meaning is undoubted. A vote that each member offer situations to operatives as individuals is a declaration for the open shop. Its pur- pose was to preserve to employers the right to contract for their labor regardless of its membership m the union. The right to so contract is one of the inahenable rights of every employer of labor. Every employer and employee has, under the law, such freedom of contract. The law will not take it from him, much less declare illegal his effort to establish his right to it. We see nothing in the record upon which to found the argument that the use of the union label was the object of the plaintiff. So far as appears, the label had nothing whatever to do with the resolution in question. We do not think it is necessary to discuss the proposition that a vote by employers to conduct their factories as open shops and to exercise their right to hire their labor as individuals, and not as members of a labor union, is a restraint of trade within the Sherman Act. Nor do we think the proposition tenable that the object of the association was the making of the arbitration agreement which the plaintiff had with the United Hatters, and that it was void because it involved the exclusive employment by the members of the plaintiff of union labor. The arbitration agreement does not bear this construction, and its making was a mere incident of the business of the plaintiff. More- over, it did not relate to, or enter into, the vote for the operi*shop. The recovery is sought for the violation of a resolution of the plain- tiff, under section 2 of Article VIII of the by-laws that: "All members agree to pay to the association the sum of $5,000 as liquidated damages for the violation of, or failure to comply with, any of the decisions, orders, prohibitions, and regulations, passed or made by the association, in accordance with these by-laws." The opinion then takes up the provision of the by-laws just quoted, and shows that it is properly construed not as a penalty, but as liquidated damages. It also takes up the matter of the resignation, and shows that it became effective upon its receipt by the association on September 9, so that the running of defendant's shop after September 20 as a union shop was not a violation of the by-laws of the association of which it had ceased to be a member. 282 BULLETIN OP THE EUEEAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. Taking up the question of the agreement entered into at the time the shop was opened, the court concludes its opinion as follows: The only other violation of which the plaintiff complains is the entering into the so-called Father Kennedy agreement and the open- ing of its factory in pursuance thereof. The open-shop resolution of January 28, if enforced, would deprive the United Hatters of the jurisdiction and control of all employees of the members, and would prohibit the employment of exclusively union labor. That it would precipitate a contest with a powerful labor organization was self-evident. The first resolution, that of January 14, voting to discontinue the use of the union label, was voted for by the defendant. The finding does not show whether the resolution of January 28 was, in fact, voted for by ihe defendant or not. It matters not; it was duly adopted, and bound all members, the nonacquiescent as well as the acquiescent. All of the factories of the Danbury district, except the two open- shop factories, remained closed after the United Hatters withdrew then- men on the day following the January 28 resolution. Many efforts were made to settle the strike. Finally two of the clergy, acting as self-appointed mediators, brought about an agreement signed by all the members of the plaintiff in the Danbury district and by the officers of the United Hatters. This was an agreement in which each of the contracting parties agreed, in consideration of the promises of the other, to do certain things. It was an evident attempt to devise a plan under which work could be resumed pending the 90 days' notice of intent to resign of the members of the plaintiff and upon the resignations becoming effective, secm-ing the return of these members to the closed shop, and to the complete resumption of the jurisdiction of the United JEatters over the employees of each member. The plan was designed to avoid the liability which this action seeks to enforce. The very fact that these members entered into an agreement with the United Hatters concerning the opening of their shops and the conditions under which the members of the hatters' r.ssociation should resume work was a breach by these members of the open-shop resolution. The agreement was a cover, so manifest that it needs no argument to demonstrate it, for the purpose of having the factories of the mem- bers ostensibly run as open shops, but in reality run as closed shops under the jurisdiction of the United Hatters. The open-shop resolution meant that the employers should be. free to hire where they pleased and at such wage as the market for labor fixed, and that the employee should be free to choose his employer and to make his own conditions of employment. The agreement took from each the right to freedom of contract. These employers knew what they were engaged upon, for, simultaneously with this agreement, they agreed with each other to idemnify against any liability which might arise to the plaintiff. Had they in good faith intended to run an open shop, would they have felt it essential to make provision for the contingency of their agreement being held to be a violation of their obligation to the plaintiff ? In fact, the agree- ment was to hire exclusively union labor. The contracting employers included all the manufacturers with two exceptions in the chief industry of the Danbtu-y district. DECISIONS OP COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 283 We held in Conners v. Connolly et al., 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 [see Bui. No. 152, p. 289], such an agreement against public policy and void. Meritorious as the effort of these mediators to settle a strike -of fatal consequence to large communities was, we can not let our sympathy for the peacemaker cause us to forget that the security of society depends in great measure upon the preservation, inviolable, of the obligations of men. We think this agreement a plain vfolation of the resolution of January 28. Fuially the defendant claims the plaintiff had no authority to insti- tute this action, since it was not authorized by a three-fourths vote of all the members of the plaintiff, as is required by Article IX, sec- tion 1, of the by-laws in proceedings relative to any fine or assessment. We have expressed the opinion that the recovery of the $5,000 under section 2 of Article VIII is not an action brought to recover a fine or assessment, but a sum determined as liquidated damages for a breach of any of the lawful decisions, orders, prohibitions, and regulations of the plaintiff, and hence section 1 of Article IX has no relation to an action to prosecute the collection of this sum. Such an action is an incident of the business of the plaintiff, and committed, as are the ordinary, business affairs of every corporation, to its directors, whose authority is complete, except as curtailed by charter, by-laws, or the law. In this case there was no such curtailment. The plaintiff ratified the action of the directors, but we think this did not add to the powers already vested in them by virtue of their office. The superior com-t is advised to render its judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000, with interest from June 14, 1909. Employers' Liability — ^Assumption op Risks — Incompetent Fellow Servant — Walters v. Durham Lumber Co., Swpr erne Court of North Carolina (Apr. 22, 1914), 81 Southeastern Reporter , page 453. — ■ S. A. Walters obtained a judgment against the lumber company in the superior court of Durham County, N. C, for injuries sustained while employed by it. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the State, on appeal. Several points were before the court, but those of particular interest relate to the liability of the master when injury is due to the incompetency of a fellow employee, and the risk assumed by an employee from the negligence of such fellow servant. These points were disposed of by Judge Walker, delivering the opinion of the court, in effect as follows: "If the master becomes aware that the servant has become, for any reason, unfit for the service in which he has employed him, in such a sense as to endanger the safety of his other servants, it will become his duty to discharge the unfit servant; and if, failing in this duty, one of his other servants is injured by the negfigence of the unfit servant, he will have an action for damages against the master." Thompson on Negligence, sec. 4050. The charge as to the assumption of risk was correct and in accord- ance with the law as we have often declared it, and also substantially 284 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. in response to defendant's own prayer. Plaintiff assumed the mk involved in the negligence of his fellow servant, but not that arising out of the negligence of the master in selecting him, if he knew that he was incompetent, as the risk in that event would be caused by the master's own negligence. Employees' Liability — Duty of Employer to Instruct — Negligence — McGarty v. B. E. Wood Lumber Go., Supreme Court of Appeals oj West Virginia (Nov. 4, 1913), 80 Southeastern Reporter, page 810. — Lee McCarty was a boy 17 years of age, employed by the company named at taking lumber from a conveying table in its mill and loading it on a truck. While stooping to block the truck, his clothing was caught by a set screw in a revolving shaft and he was drawn to the shaft and severely injured. Judgment was given in his favor against the company in the circuit court of McDowell County, W. Va., in the sum of $15,000, which judgment was afl5rmed by the supreme court of appeals of the State. The following quo- tation from the opinion of Judge Robinson explains the position taken by the court: At the time of the injury plaintiff had worked only five days. When he was put to work at the end of the table no instructions as to lurking dangers were given him, nor was he at any time warned. Defendant claims that there was no duty on it to instruct or warn plaintijGE as to dangers from the revolving shaft, that the shaft was plainly visible to plaintiff, and that he was of sufficient age and dis- cretion to know that it was dangerous. But a careful consideration of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the danger of the set screw in the revolving shaft was not so patent as of itself to warn plaintiff. It was so situated as not to be patent to him while engaged m his duty. He was not required to make close inspection of the shaft. It was the master's duty to have it reasonably safe. Under all the circumstances. shown it can not be said to have been so. One might avoid the shaft and the sprocket wheels, as it seems plaintiff did, and stiU be caught by the long projecting set screw not so patent as were the major parts of the machinery. It was clearly defendant's duty to instruct plaintiff of the presence of the set screw. Situated as it was, a little thing hidden generally by the presence of the table and the truck, a prudent man might not observe it for many days of service in proximity to it. Moreover, plaintiff was young and inex- perienced m working about machinery. This fact made it even more incumbent on defendant to instruct him as to the danger of the sur- roundings in which he was placed to work. Employers' Liability — Municipalities — Governmental Func- tions — Cleaning Streets — Mayor and Aldermen of City of Savannah V. Jordan, Supreme Court of Georgia {Sept. 19, 1914), ^^ Southeastern Reporter, page 109. — T. B. Jordan was injured by the breaking of the DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTING LABOE. 285 axle of a cart in which he was hauhng street garbage for the street and lane department of the city named. It appeared that his superiors had had notice of the defective condition, and had ordered him to continue the use of the cart; but the city claimed exemption from liability on the grovmd that it was "exercising a governmental function delegated to it by the State, and the court took this view and sustained the city's demurrer to the complaint, reversing the action of the supe- rior court of Chatham County. The following is an extract from the syllabus prepared by the court: The duty of keeping the streets of a municipality free from matter which, if allowed to remain, would affect the health of the public is a governmental function, the exercise of which would exempt the municipaUty from liability to a suit for damages to an employee without fault, who is injured by reason of a defective cart in which he is hauling " the sweepings of the streets " of such municipality, and which has been furnished him for that purpose by the agents of the municipahty. Employees' Liability — Obedience to Oedees — ^Assumption of KiSKS — CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE SaFE PlACE TO WOEK Magnuson v. MacAdam et al., Supreme Court of Washington (Jan. 7, 1914), 137 Pacific Reporter, page 485. — Magnuson was employed by MacAdam as a common laborer paving streets. While an attempt was being made to move a concrete mixer by its own power, Magnuson was ordered by the foreman to take hold of a tongue attached to the front axle of the machine, to guide the machine. He obeyed the order and was injured by the tongue swerving and striking him as one of the front wheels struck a stone on the street. A judgment was given in his favor in the superior court. King County, from which MacAdam appealed to the State supreme court, where the judgment was affirmed. The point of interest and the basis of the conclusions of the court are stated below in the language of Chief Justice Crow: Respondent (Magnuson) insists that appellant (MacAdam) was negligent in failing to provide him with safe appliances and a safe place in which to work, while appellants, in support of their motions, contend that all dangers incident to respondent's employment were open and obvious, or by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence could have been known to him, and that he assumed the risk of such dangers. Respondent had a right to rely upon the orders and superior knowledge of the foreman, who represented appellants. The evidence shows that the attempt to move the machine by its own motive power was under the immediate supervision of appellants' foreman, and that respondent acted in obedience to his specific orders. It was the foreman's duty to look after respondent's safety. This being true, respondent did not assume the risk, nor can he be held guilty of contributory neghgence as a matter of law. [Cases cited.] 286 bulletin of the bureau of labos statistics. Emploteks' Liabilitt — Railroad Companies — Contributort Negligence — Stone v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. et al., Supreme Court of South Carolina {Dec. 15, 1913), 80 Southeastern Reporter, page 433. — The widow of Samuel B. Stone brought suit to recover damages for the death of her husband, alleged to have been caused by the negli- gence of the railroad company and a conductor and an engineer in its employ. Stone was a car repairer, working in the yard and under the rules of the company. One rule of the company required that a blue flag or light be displayed by men working under or around cars, and other employees were forbidden to move or couple another car to a car on which the blue signal was displayed. Stone had a blue flag protecting the car on which he was at work, but removed it at the request of the yard conductor in order that a train might come in on the track to get some cars. He then crossed over to another track and sat down under the end of a box car. The car was struck by a train, injuring Stone and causing his death. The company contended that death was due to the negligent violation of its rules by the dece- dent, and that there was no liability on its part. The -widow obtained a judgment, however, in the common pleas circuit court of Richland County, S. C, and this judgment was reversed by the State supreme court. The following language, taken from the opinion of the court, shows the grounds for reversal: In this case, there is no testimony tending to excuse the violation of the rule. There is not a particle of testimony that the conductor or engineer or any one else knew that Stone had gone under the car. It is argued that he did it to get out of the rain in order that he might read over his list of "bad orders," or cars to be repaired, or make en- tries in his books of repairs that he had already made. It would be a mockery of justice to say that the .master must make, promulgate, and enforce rules for the safety of his servant, and allow the servants to set them at naught upon such a flimsy pretext, and hold the master liable for injuries resulting therefrom. Employers' Liability — Railroad Companies — ^Minors — As- sumption of Risks — Adams v. Chesapeake <& 0. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Appeals of Wes< Virginia {Feb. 13, 1914), 80 Southeastern Reporter, page 1115. — One Adams, a boy 17 years of ag ?, was employed as a section hand by the railway company. After having worked for seven or eight hours on the tracks, he was stationad at a dangerous cut to keep the track free from obstruction during the night and was struck by a train and killed at 4 o'clock on the morning of March 1, 1910, after having been on duty for about 20 consecutive hours. Fannie Adams, administratrix, obtained a judgment of $2,000 against the company in the circuit court of CabeU County, W. Va., and this judgment was aflBrmed by the supreme court of appeals of DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 287 the State. The company contended that no Uabihty attached to it, as the decedent had assumed the ordinary risks of the employment, but the court rejected this contention. The duty of an employer toward a minor employed in a hazardous place is made clear by the language, below, taken from the opinion of Judg} Poflenbarger: The law imposes a peculiar duty upon masters in favor of minor servants, on account of their inexperience and inability to appreciate danger. On3 who employs a minor and places him at work m a dan- gerous place is und 3r a duty to apprise him of the dang jr and show him how to avoid it, except in very plain cases of obvious danger, and the younger the servant the high3r the duty of the master. As shown by the dec aration and proof, the plaintiff's decedent was only 17 years old, wherefore it was the duty of his employer to apprise him of all dangers conn?cted with his work, or incident to his service, of which he did not have knowlcdg\ No ground upon which to distinguish the danger from overwork and loss of sleep of the servant from other dangers attendant upon it is perceived. Where minors are concerned, ordinary risks are, for evidential pur- poses, always treated at the outset of the inquiry as extraordinary, and the buiden of estabhshment of the servant's comprehension of the particular risk rests upon the employer. Employees' Liability — Safe Place to Work — ^Approved Ma- chines — Ainsley v. John L. Roper Lumier Co., Supreme Court of North Carolina (Mar. 11, 1914), 81 Southeastern Reporter, page 4- — A judgment was given against the lumber company named in the superior court of Beaufort County for the negligent killing in August, 1912, of one of its employees — a boy 14 years of age. The boy was operating a lathing machine when he was struck by a piece of wood thrown back by the saw, and killed. One contention of the com- pany was that as the lathing machine used was one "known, ap- proved, and in general use," no legal Hability attached to it by failure of the machine to work properly. It was proved, as evidence of the unsafe condition, that not infrequently pieces of timber were hurled back from the machine, threatening the safety of the employee, and that these pieces of timber made dents and marks on the wall 20 feet back. In afSrming the opinion of the lower court, Judge Hoke, who spoke for the State supreme court, said : It is the accepted rule in this State, apphed in numerous decisions of the court, that " an employer of labor, in the exercise of ordinary care, that care that a prudent man should use under hke circum- stances and charged with a Uke duty, must provide for his employees a reasonably safe place to do their work and supply them with ma- chinery, implements, and appliances reasonably safe and suitable for the work in which they are engaged, and such as are known, approved, and in general use." [Cases cited. 288 BULLETIN OP THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. Judge Hoke then quoted from the opinion in the case, Marks v. Cotton Mills, 135 N. C. 136, 47 S. E. 432, after which he said: From this we think it follows that an employer is not protected, as a conclusion of law, because he is operatmg a machine which is "known, approved, and in general use," but, although such a ma- chine or appliance may have been procured, if its practical operation should disclose that employees are thereby subjected not to the ordinary risks and dangers incident to their employment but to obvious and unnecessary dangers which could be readily removed without destroying or seriously injuring the efficiency of the im- plement, such conditions, if known or if allowed to continue, might permit the inference of culpable negligence against the employer; that he had not, in the particular instance, measured up to the standard of care imposed upon him by the law, a position upheld by many authoritative cases and by text writers of approved excellence. Employers' Liability — Status op Employee Kiding prom Work — Street Railways — Passes — Indianapolis Traction & Ter- minal Co. V. Isgrig, Supreme Court of Ivdiann {Feb. 5, 1914), 104- Northeastern Reporter, page 60. — This action was brought against the street railway company named for negligence in causing the death of the decedent, who had been its employee, and a judgment for plain- tiff for $5,000 was given in the Hamilton circuit court. He was riding to his home after completing his work, and had been given a pass, which contained a stipulation exempting the company from liability for death or injury whUe using the same. One question arising was as to whether the decedent was a passen- ger or a fellow servant with the operators of the car. The court followed its former decisions in deciding that he was a passenger. This left only the controversy as to whether the terms of the pass were binding upon him and upon his widow and child. As to this Judge Erwin spoke as follows in delivering the opinion of the court, which sustained the decision of the court below: If that question must be answered in the affirmative, then the cause must be reversed. If it is answered in the negative, then the other alleged errors are not available. The answer to this question seems to depend upon the fact as to whether the appellee was a pas- senger for hire, or whether the pass given was a gratuity bestowed upon the servant. It seems to be settled in many of the States that,, where a pass is issued as a gratuity, the clause providing that the holder assumes all risks of accident is binding. It is equally well settled that, where there was a consideration for the transportation that a stipulation on the ticket or pass that the carrier should be exempt from liability for injuries resulting from the negligence of its servants, such stipulation is contrary to pubUc policy and void. [Cases cited.] The evidence in this case established the fact, without any dispute, that the appellant gave to all its employees tickets such as the one shown to have been given decedent, and it is fair to pre- sume that this one was given as a part of the wages of decedent. decisions of couets affecting labor. 289 Employers' Liability — Status op Employee Eiding on Engine IN Violation of Rules — Trespasser — Dixon v. Central of Georgia By. Co., Court of Appeals of Georgia (Jan. 20, 1914), 80 Southeastern Reporter, page 612. — Dixon was employed as a fireman by the railroad company and was killed while riding on one of its engines as a passen- ger, having left the passenger coach in which he was riding and got upon the engine, contrary to the rules of the company. His widow brought suit for damages in the city court of Americus, Ga., where judgment was given in favor of the company, this judgment being affirmed by the court of appeals. The following syllabus by the court explains the grounds upon which its action was based: Where a locomotive fireman in the employment of a railway com- pany was riding upon a train as a passenger, and voluntarily left the coach in which he was riding and got upon the engine, either by the express permission or without the disapproval of the engineer, it not appearing that there was any rule or custom of the railway company permitting the employee to ride upon the engine, but it being on the contrary a violation of the rules of the company for him so to do, ho was a trespasser, and his widow had no cause of action against the railway company for his homicide, resulting from the derailment of the train, caused by a switch which was defective, or which had been negligently left open. EmpIoyers' Liability- — Status of Employee Riding to Work — Klinckv. Chicago Street Railway Co., Supreme Court of Illinois {Fei.21, 1914), 104 Northeastern Reporter, page 669. — Charles A. Klinck, an employee of the company named, while attempting to board one of its cars, was thrown to the ground and seriously injured, the injury being due, as was alleged, to the negligence of the employees in charge of the car. He secured a verdict of $6,500 in the superior court of Cook County, which judgment was affirmed by the appellate coxirt, whereupon the railway company appealed to the supreme court, which affirmed the decisions below. The circumstances were determined to be such as to warrant the jury in finding in the plaintiff's favor on the questions of negligence and due care, and this left remaining the questions whether the plaintiff was a passenger or an employee in his relation at the time he was injured, and, if a passenger, whether the condition indorsed on his employee's ticket, purporting to release the company from liabihty for personal injuries, was a bar to his recovery in the action. Judge Cooke, speaking for the court, said in part: The great weight of authority, however, is to the effect that when the employee, either by virtue of his contract of emplojonent or under a rule or custom of his employer, is accorded the same means and privileges of transportation over the lines of his employer as an ordinary passenger for hire, then, while riding upon his employer's 85590°— Bull. 169—15 19 290 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. cars at a time when, under his contract of employment, he is neither under the control of his employer nor obliged to perform any service for him, he is to be regarded as a passenger, and that, under such circumstances, it is immaterial that the employee be either going to or coming from his place of work. The opinion then discusses the cases setting forth this rule, and distinguishes those cited by the company as upholding their view that the injured man stood in the relation of an employee, and continues as follows: The ticket on which Khnck was intending to ride having been given to him, under his contract of emplojmient, as part of the consideration for his services, he was a passenger for hu*e, and the stipulation on the back of the ticket releasing plaintiff in error from habihty for personal injuries was therefore void. In Dugan v. Blue Hill Street Railway Co., 193 Mass. 431, 79 N. E. 748, it was said: "Where a pass is issued as a gratuity the clause providing that the holder assumes aU risks of accidents is binding out where such a pass is issued to an employee as one of the terms of his employment the clause is not binding." [Cases cited.] Employers' Liability — Warning of New Dangers — Strikes — Injury to Guards — McCalman v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. et al., United States .Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit (June SO, 1914), 215 Federal Reporter, page 465.- — Charles E. McCalman brought suit for damages for personal injuries against the company named and another railroad company, and judgment was for the defendants on a directed verdict in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. During a strike McCalman had been employed as a guard, and with others was located at a certain crossing. Deputy marshals were sent to that crossing in response to a telephone message that there was trouble there, without warning to either group of the presence of the other. The marshals mistook the guards for strikers, attacking them without warning or provocation, and in the clash that resulted the plaintiff was shot and permanently and seriously injured. On appeal by the plaintiff the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for jury trial. Judge Warrington, who delivered the opinion of the court, said in part: It must be conceded that the plaintiff was engaged in a hazardous employment during the conditions usually attending such a strike as the one then prevailing at the Nonconnah yards; and yet it is now plain enough that a new and distinct peril was added to that employ- ment, though whether this was due to any breach of duty on the part of the defendants is the problem. Three engines had been torn up, and for quite a while "a state somewhat of riot and insurrection" had prevailed there. DECISIONS OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOR. 291 It IS a general rule as respects any hazardous occupa'tion that the master shall inform his servants of all perils to which they will be exposed, which are or should reasonably be known to him, except such as are obvious to the servants or through the exercise of ordinary care on their part may be foreseen and in either event injury therefrom may reasonably be avoided. This duty of the master so to inform his servants extends to any change made by him which introduces into their service a new element of danger. And the duty so imposed upon the master is of a primary character and is therefore nondelegable. The defendants bore a contractual relation to McCalman and so owed him the duty not to enhance the peril of his service without notice. Plainly it would not have been sufficient merely to notify him of the coming of the deputies, though even this, as we have seen, was not done. The chief darker rationally to be apprehended lurked in the telephone message, "There was trouble at Nonconnah"; and the deputies approached the crossing with that belief. The nature of the danger, if under all the circumstances it was one reasonably to be anticipated, did not lessen defendants' duty to McCalman; for the knowledge of these new conditions would have enabled him to decide whether to remain at the crossing or discontinue his service. The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded. Employees' Liability Insurance — Malpractice of Company's Physician — May Creek Logging Co. v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., Supreme Court of Washington (Nov. 17, 1914), HA Pacific Reporter, page 67. — This was an action by the logging company named to re- cover on its policy of insurance written by the casualty company, which policy undertook to indemnify the iasured company against specified kinds of losses. The logging company had been compelled in an action at law to pay damages to one of its employees, Klodek, for the malpractice of a surgeon employed by it; see 129 Pacific Reporter, page 99, Bulletin No. 152, page 241. Medical and surgical treatment were furnished Klodek under an arrangement by which the company collected a monthly fee from its employees, in consideration of which it undertook to furnish and provide suitable medical care and treat- ment for its injured employees. In its complaint the company alleged that this custom of providing medical and surgical treatment was known to the insurance company, and contended that the fiabUity of the latter company covered such a condition as arose in the present case. The logging company had tendered to the casualty company the defense of the action when Klodek had sued for the malpractice of the logging company's physician, but the casualty company de- cHned. Judgment was against the logging company in the sum of 14,500, which judgment was on appeal afiirmed, requiring at the set- tlement the sum of $4,856.85, and this action was brought to recover this sum, together with the fees and expenses amounting to $1,000, with interest on the total. In the superior court of King County 292 BULLETIN OP THE BUBEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. judgment had- been rendered for the casualty company on its demur- rer to the complaint of the logging company, whereupon this appeal was taken, the appeal resulting in the judgment of the court below being afiirmed. Judge FuUerton delivered the opinion of the court, first stating the facts as above, after which he said : The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the loss suffered by the appellant was not a loss covered by the conditions of the policy. This conclusion we think is the only conclusion that can be properly drawn from the facts shown by the record. The respond- ent s liability of course depends upon the conditions of its policy. If it has thereby undertaken to answer for losses arising from claims of damages on account of the neghgent failure of the appellant to perform a special contract wherein it undertook to furnish an em- ployee with hospital, medical, and surgical services, then it is liable to answer to the suit of the appellant, otherwise not. We can not think the policy bears this interpretation. It purports to cover only losses arismg from claims of damages by the appellant's employees on account of accidental injuries suffered by the employees while in the prosecution of the appellant's logging business, and the departments dependent upon and the operations connected therewith. Hospital, medical, and surgical services are no part of the logging operations, and the injured employee while in the hospital was performing no service connected with the appellant's logging business. And while the appellant alleges that it is the custom of logging companies to deduct a hospital fee from the wages of each of its several employees, and use the fee in the pa;7ment of services to be rendered such employees as become sick or iajured and that the respondent knew of this custom, we can not think the facts in any way alter or modify the terms of the insurance. Aside from the fact that the recovery was had upon a specific contract, and not upon the custom, the insurance is only against losses arising from neghgence in the logging operations, not from losses arising from negligence in the maintenance of the hospital. Interference with Employment — ^Actions — Evidence — John- son V. Aetna Life Insurance Co., Supreme Court of Wisconsin (May 1, 1914), 147 Northwestern Reporter, page 32. — Frank E. Johnson brought action against the Aetna Life Insurance Co. for procuring his discharge from his employment with the Simmons Manufac- turing Co. The jury in the circuit court of Milwaukee County rendered a verdict in his favor, and assessed actual damages at $294 and punitory damages at $5,000. In lieu of the granting of a new trial the platatiff was permitted to remit $4,000 punitory damages, and judgment was entered on the verdict as amended, whereupon the company appealed, securing a reversal of the judgment of the court below. Johnson had been injured m. the employ of the manufac- turing company, had resumed work after recovery, and had brought suit for the injury. His case in the suit against the insurance com- pany rested on the fact that it had written to Vincent, the superin- DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 293 tenclent of tlie manufacturing company, advising him to discharge the employee, on the ground that it was not for the interest of the mami- facturing company to retain employees who had brought suit against it for damages. The testimony of Vincent and of Mr. Simmons (pre- sumably the president and chief owner of the manufacturing com- pany) was to the effect that Vincent disregarded this communication, and did not bring it to Simmons' attention; that Simmons noticed that Johnson was still working, and on his own initiative ordered Vincent to discharge him. Judge Barnes, who delivered the opinion of the court, stated the questions to be decided, and discussed the law applicable to the first, showing that such an interference with employment, if proved, would create a right of action, as follows : This appeal presents two questions: (1) On the facts found by the jury, was the plaintiff entitled to judgment ? (2) Has the finding of causal connection between the acts complained of by the plaintiff and his discharge sufficient support in the evidence ? The first question must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. We agree with defendant's counsel that if their client was justified in doing what it did in the way of procuring Johnson's discharge, the fact that it acted from malicious motives would not give a right of action. The presence of malice would permit the recovery of punitory damages, if defendant acted without justification, but would not in itself create a cause of action where none existed without it. Malice makes a bad case worse, but does not make wrong that which is lawful. [Cases cited.] But the plaintiff had the right to dispose of his labor wherever he could to the best advantage. This is a legal right entitled to legal protection. Such right could be interfered with by one acting in the exercise of an equal or superior right. As against all others, the plaintiff was entitled to go his way without molestation ; and, if any one assumed to meddle m his affairs, he did so at his peril. [Cases cited.] Undoubtedly cases might arise where an insurer such as the defendant might be justified in saying to the insured that it would cancel its policy unless a certain employee was discharged. Such employee might be so careless of his own safety or the safety of his fellow servants that the insurer might not care to assume the added hazard that would be liable to follow from such conduct. We have no such case before us, however. The jury might well find in the present case that the purpose which the defendant had in mind was to deprive the plaintiff of his earning power so that he could not successfully carry on his suit to recover damages for the injuries which he had received. This savors too strongly of oppression to be considered a legitimate reason for a third party interfering with the relations between employer and employee. On the question of evidence, however, the court held that while the writing of the letter was enough to make out a prima facie case, and to entitle the plaintiff to a judgment if no other testimony was offered, yet, since there was no evidence showing causal connection between 294 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OE LABOR STATISTICS. the letter and the discharge, and there was positive uncontradicted evidence that the discharge resulted from other causes, there was no conflict of evidence to go to the jury, but the judgment, as a matter of law, should be for the defendant. Two judges dissented from this view of the case. Inteeperence with Employment — Conspiracy — ^Actions for Damages — Bausbach v. Reiff et al., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania {March SO, 1914), 91 Atlantic Reporter, page 22^. — ^A previous report of this case (85 Atl., p. 762) was noted in Bulletin No. 152, page 271. There the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the action of the court of common pleas of SchuylkUl County in granting a nonsuit, and remanded the suit to that court for trial. The result was a ver- dict in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions, the result being a second reversal with orders for a new trial. Bausbach brought action against Reiff and a number of others for the loss of his employment with a brewery company, where he had been chief engineer for five years. He had reported the theft of mer- chandise from the company by an employee, who had been discharged as a result of this disclosure as to his conduct. On July 18, 1910, a committee of employees presented to the manager of the brewery a paper, signed by the defendants, reading as follows : ' ' We, the under- signed, do hereby declare that we refuse to work after twenty-four hours' notice to the employers of the Rettig Brewing Co. as long as George Bausbach is employed at same plant." As a result Bausbach was immediately discharged. In the opinion delivered by Judge Potter, the court states that the third assignment of error is as follows: If you find, of course, that these men were justified in requesting the dismissal of this man Bausbach, the plaintiff, on account of his making it so unpleasant for them that they did not care to work with him, that is the end of this case; yom- verdict should be in favor of the defendants. The opinion continues: The first, second, twelfth, and thirteenth assignments are to lan- guage used in the charge and in answering points with respect to which substantially the same question is raised, and that is whether employees, to whom-a fellow workman is for any reason disagreeable, may lawfully combine for the purpose of procuring his discharge by notifying the employer that they wiU refuse to work if the workman to whom they object is retained. Several quotations are made from the authorities as to conspiracy for this purpose, the following being from the opinion in De Minico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N. E. 317 (Bui. No. 95, p. 349): The plaintiff had a right to work, and that right of his could not be taken away from him or interfered with by the defendants, unless it DECISIONS OF COUETS ATFEOTING LABOE. 295 came into conflict with an equal or superior right of theirs. The defendants' right to better their condition is such an equal right. But to humor their personal objections, their hkes and dislikes, or to escape froin what "is distasteful" to some of them, is not in our opin- ion a superior or an equal right. * * * One who betters his con- dition only by escaping from what he merely dislikes, and by securing what he hkes, does not better his condition within the meaning of those words in the rule that employees can strike to better their condition. The opinion then applies this principle to the facts of this case as follows: In the light of these authorities, which point out a sound distinction between what a single individual may lawfully do and that which a combination of individuals may do, the instructions of the trial judge which are the subject of the first three assignments of error were inadequate and erroneous. The united action of the defendants was put upon the same basis as that of any single one of them; the trial judge using by way of illustration a supposed act by Reifl, the first defendant named. It does not appear that the jury were instructed that an act which might be lawful if done by one person might become unlawful if a number of persons combined to do it. The only fair interpretation which could be placed upon the instructions given was that, "if Frank G. Reiff or any other one of these defendants" had the right to threaten to stop work if plaintiff was not discharged, the entire 28 men who signed the paper might lawfully combine to do the same thing. This was not a sound statement of the law. Again, it appears that the jury were instructed that, if plaintiff "worked on the nerves" of his coemployees, if he made himself "objectionable," "obnoxious," "unpleasant," or "distasteful" to them, they had the right to unite to procure his discharge by threatening to strike. This was going too far. The jury might very well have been instructed that, if plaintiff's habits, or his character, or his conduct while at work towards his fellow workmen was such as to render him an unfit associate for ordinary workmen of good character, it would have been sufficient reason for interference by his fellow workmen with his em- plo3Tnent. They had the right to combine to advance their own mterests in any proper way, but not for the purpose merely of infiict- iug injury upon another. It appears from the evidence that some of the defendants had disagreements with plaintiff, and gave some reasons for dishking him. But none of them testified that these dif- ficulties caused them to sign the paper. Eighteen of the defendants gave no testimony whatever, and there was nothing to show that plaintiff had in any way made himself obnoxious or distasteful to them, nor was there anything in the evidence to show that they signed the paper for any other reason than that alleged by plaintiff, which was that he had reported to the company a theft by the night watchman. The first, second, third, twelfth, and thifteenth assign- ments are sustained. The trial court had struck out from the testimony a paper given Bausbach by the company's manager at the time of his discharge, stating in effect that he had been discharged through no fault of his 296 BULLETIN OP THE BXTEEAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. own, but at the demand of employees, because be bad reported the dishonesty of one of them. The opinion cites and quotes authorities on the subject of res gestae, and concludes that as a verbal statement to the same effect made by the manager to the employee at the time of discharge would have been admissible as a part of the res gestae, there was no good reason for excluding the written statement. The court held that it was unnecessary to consider the remaining assignments of error, as those considered were sufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial. The judgment was therefore reversed. Intbkfeeence with Employment — Pegctjeing Dischaege — CoNSPiEAOT — Heffeman v. WMttlsey et al., Supreme Court of Minne- sota (June 26, 1914), I48 Norihwestem Reporter, page 63. — E. W. Hef- feman brought action against F. C. Whittlsey and the railroad com- pany by which he had been employed for damages for procuring his discharge. The plaintiff, who was a telegraph operator, had been in the employ of the company as ticket seller. Whittlsey was station agent in charge of the same station. They had had trouble over the commissions on telegrams, and Heffeman being sustained, Whittlsey retired as agent. Plaintiff continued as operator and ticket seller until he was discharged. The ground for the discharge was that he had sold several tickets to a certain point over a certain route at the higher rate of fare which would be charged over another route and failed to credit the company with the excess received. The railroad com- pany in its answer alleged that it had reasonable groimds to believe, and did believe, that the charges were true. Whittlsey admitted that he caused the charges against plaintiff to be investigated, alleged the truth of the charges and his belief and good faith in the matter. Both denied conspiracy and the other allegations. The jury in the district court of Waseca County gave a verdict for damages against both defendants, and, on motions for judgment or a new trial being denied, the defendants separately appealed, with the result that the judgment as to the company was reversed, while that as to Whittlsey was affirmed. The court held that the view of the trial court was correct, that the railroad company had a right to discharge plaintiff without cause, and that some other act must, therefore, be proved against it, and the only claim was that it conspired with Whittlsey falsely to charge plaintiff with dishonesty in his position. The only basis for this, since Whittlsey had no connection with the company, was the claim that one PhUUps, the detective who procured the evidence which caused the investigation, was in its employ. The jury had returned a. special finding that Phillips was so employed, and the court held that the verdict cotild not stand unless there was suffi- DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 297 cient competent evidence to support this finding. The burden of proof of this was on the plaintiff. Whittlsey testified that he em- ployed Phillips on his own account and paid for his services. The officers of the railroad testified that PhiQips was not employed by them; that they had no suspicion of plaintiff and knew nothing about any charges or investigation until the evidence gathered by Phillips was presented to them. The defense attempted to get Phillips as a witness, but did not succeed. The admissions of Phil- lips of employment by the company, which were admitted on the trial, were ruled inadmissible and the other evidence insufficient. Continuing, the court, speaking by Judge Bunn, said: The admission of these declarations was prejudicial error, as with- out them the evidence is too shght to enable us to say that it is sufficient to justify the verdict; much less is it sufficient to warrant holding that the error did not affect the result. We win not discuss the question whether in any event the com- pany can be held liable for doing a lawful act with a bad motive and with malice. If the evidence sustained the charge of a conspiracy between the company and Whittlsey to make false charges against plaintiff's integrity in order to procure his discharge, resulting in his being "blacklisted," it is probable that there would be a liability. Joyce v. Great Northern, 100 Minn. 225, 110 N. W. 975. But that there is no liability in the absence of mahce can not be doubted. In the present case we ffiid the evidence of a malicious conspiracy entered into between Whittlsey and the company, or joined in afterwards by the company, insufficient to make applicable as against the company the doctrine contended for by plaintiff. As to defendant Whittlsey, the evidence is sufficient to justify a finding that the charges made against plaintiff were false, and that he acted out of motives of ill wUl, and with a desire to injure plaintiff. The verdict as against him was justified by the evidence, and we think it should stand, notwithstanding that, as against the company, it must be set aside. Labor Organizations — Collective Agreements — Effect on Individual Contract — Gulla v. Barton, Supreme Court of New Yorlc, Appellate Division, Third Department (Nov. 11, 1914-), 1^9 New York Supplement, page 952. — Joseph GuUa sued Lizzie Barton, as surviving partner of a brewery firm, for wages alleged to be due him. On trial of the case at the trial term for Madison County the plaintiff" put in his evidence, and at that point a nonsuit was granted on motion of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, with the result that a new trial was granted. The plaintiff had worked in the brewery of the defendant for 69 weeks, for which service he had been paid $9 per week. During this time an agreement was in force between the defendant and the Malt- sters' Union, of which plaintiff was a member. This union was a 298 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. local body incorporated in New York, and a branch of an interna- tional union. Under this agreement the union was to prevent strikes and allow the use of the union label, while the employer was to conduct the business as a union brewery, and to pay all employ- ees $18 per week. Upon learning of this agreement, the employee asserted that he would bring action for the additional $9 per week to which he believed himself entitled, and from that time he was paid $18 per week for his labor. Judge Kellogg, who delivered the opinion of the court, after stating the facts substantially as above, said: The agreement referred to was a valid contract, which may be enforced in any proper manner. The renewal of the agreement [for a second year] mdicates that it was beneficial to the defendant's firm. . The union entered into the contract for the benefit of the plain- tiff and the other employees in the defendant's brewery, and for the benefit of all union worlanen. It is urged, however, that the plaintiff can not maintain an action upon the agreement, and that he has waived the benefits of it by contracting for himself. Apparently he did not know of the agree- ment between defendant and the union until a dispute arose between the plaintiff, the defendant, and other employees. The evidence does not show any act of the plaintiff, made with a knowledge of the facts, which would waive the benefits of the contract with the union in his behalf. We have, therefore, a situation where the plaintiff received from week to week the wages contemplated by the contract of employment between, himself and the defendant, and his union unbeknown to him had made a contract for his benefit, based upon a separate consideration passing from the union, that he as a member thereof should receive a greater compensation. In payment for the labels and the use of the union name in marketing the brewery prod- uct, the defendant had agreed to pay a stated wage to the plaintiff and to the other men workmg with him as members of the union. The union label had force and value, and the union had strength by reason of the moneys which it received as fees and dues from the plaintiff and other members. The plaintiff is therefore connected with the consideration and was a party intended to be benefited by the agree- ment. Smith V. State of New York, 203 N. Y. 106, 96 N. E. 409. The judgment appealed from should therefore be reversed, and a new trial granted. Labor Organizations — Inducing Breach of Contract — In- junctions — New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern et al., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (May 26, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 885. — The company named brought action agaiiis( several officers and members of the Journeymen Plasterers' Benevo lent Union of Boston, No. 10, to secure an injunction. A master was appointed in the proceeding, who heard the testimony, and the case was reported for decision by the fuU court on the pleadings and his report. It is stated in the opinion that no exceptions were taken to DECISIONS OF COURTS AITECTING LABOR. 299 the report of the master. He found that the plaintifE company was engaged in the work of mixing and applying to the surfaces of build- ings a kind of plaster called gunite by means of a so-called cement gun, which mixes sand, cement, and water, and is operated by two men, one operating the gun or mixing machinery, and the other the nozzle through which the gunite is applied by means of compressed air. Since the work of the nozzle man is very hard, it was customary to have the gun man and nozzle man exchange places every half day, or, if the nozzle man was a plasterer, and the skilled plasterer who usually followed to smooth up the work had learned the nozzle man's duties, for them to exchange. Further facts are given as foUows : The object of the local union, as defined in its constitution, is: "To unite together all the practical journeymen plasterers working within the jurisdiction of this union for the purpose of securing united action in whatever may be regarded as beneficial to their united interest." And the master specifically finds that : "One of the main objects of the International Association and of Union No. 10 is to exercise a control by concerted action over the relations of practical plasterers and those who may, from time to time, require their services." In the fall of 1912 McGivern, on behalf of the union, told the com- pany's superintendent, referring to a certain building, that the latter would have to employ union plasterers to operate the nozzle, or he would call a strike, and for a time union plasterers were so employed. On February 28, 1913, the gun company entered into a contract with the Old Colony Heal Estate Trust to coat with gunite the walls of a building which the trust was erecting. The officers of the union, learning that the gun company did not intend to employ union men, informed Farley, an acting trustee of the trust, that there would be trouble. After part of the interior plastering had been done the plasterers, and also the lathers and metal workers, left and refused to return to work until a contract was made for the outside work to be done by the contractor who was doing the inside plastering, and who would use union men. The gun company wrote a letter to the trust releasing it from its contract. The records of the union showed the receipt of a report from Taylor, one of the defendants and the union's business agent, on the matter of this job, and a vote to take action in the way of striking on the inside work, as was actually done. It appeared that the gun company had no objection to employing union men, but that the plasterers' union did not recognize the regular workmen using the machinery as plasterers, unless of course they were first ordinary plasterers, and there appeared to be no union to which they were eligible. 300 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. The opinion, delivered by Judge De Courcey, further states: The master made certain specific findings and conclusions, among which are these: "4. That there is a division of sentiment among members of the unions as to the use of the cement gun and process, the defendant McGivern and others being in favor of its use, and others in the majority being hostile to its use, based upon the fear that it will reduce the work of practical plasterers; that the present attitude of the local union officials is that the union should control the operation of the nozzle of the gun, and not the rest of the machinery; that the demand of the defendants is that the plaintiff employ skilled plas- terers only, who are members of the union, to operate the nozzle, as well as to follow after the nozzle in smoothing the surface covered; that the object of the defendants is to compel the plaintiff to unionize its business and to run a closed shop so far as the work of plastering goes, in order to secure all of that work for the members of their union under union conditions; and that it was to accomplish this object that the strikes were called on the job upon the Howard Street building. "5. That the defendants have conspired together for the purpose of creating and enforcing a boycott against the plaintiff and of hinder- ing and interfering with the prosecution of its business and of injuring the same unless it accedes to their demand. "6. That the defendants, in pursuance of said conspiracy, are engaged in watching and seeking out work proposed to be given to the plaintiff and in coercing those in control thereof not to make with the plaintiff any contract for such work, and in causing the rescission of such contracts as they .discover to have been made with the plaintiff." "8. That the strikes were strikes against a subcontractor for the purpose of forcing him to coerce the main contractor to coerce the owner of the budding to coerce the plaintiff to yield to the demands of the union. "9. That the defendants have instituted a boycott against the plaintiff and intend to continue enforcing the same, unless prevented from so doing." The court discussed the law applicable to the case, and expressed its decision that an injunction should be granted, as follows: Without further recital of the details, it is apparent that the record discloses a combination on the part of the defendants to do acts which the law does not justify, notwithstanding that the ultimate motive by which they were inspired was to advance their own inter- ests. The plaintiff had a written agreement with the owners of the building to apply the coating of gunite. Under our decisions it was unlawful for the defendants, by means of strikes and otherwise, to intentionally induce the owners to take away from the plaintiff its rights under that agreement. Such conduct is not legally allowable as so-called trade competition or defense of self-interest. A combination to procure a breach of contract is an unlawful con- spiracy at common law. [Cases cited.] Further, if Monahan, who had the subcontract to do the interior plastering, also had the con- tract for this exterior work, his union workmen, unless prevented by their contract of employment, might have gone out on a strike unless DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 301 he agreed to give all of the plastering work to them or their associates, because we assume that the apphcation of stucco or cement to the exterior of a building may be found to be work such as practical plasterers have a right to compete for. But it was not lawful for them to strike to compel Monahan, with whom they had no trade dispute, to compel the general contractor to compel the owner to compel the plaintiff to give to the defendants the work thej^ demanded. In other words, it was an unjustifiable interference with the plaintiff's business to injure others in order to compel them to coerce the plaintiff. Martin, Modern Law of Labor Unions, sec. 77, and cases cited. The acts of coercion and procuring breaches of contract mentioned in the sixth finding plainly are not justified by the law of this Commonwealth. It is unnecessary to con- sider further the unlawfulness of such a secondary or compound boy- cott in view of the full discussion of the subject in the recent opinions of this court in Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 [Bui. No. 70, p. 347], and Burnham v. Dowd, 104 N. E. 841 [page 270], in which cases are collected the authorities in this and other jurisdictions. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree enjoining the defendants from causing or taking part in any boycott against the plaintiff's business, by coercing others, through intimidation or threats, to withdraw from the plaintiff their beneficial business intercourse, and from causing or inciting any sympathetic strike against the plaintiff or its customers for the purpose of preventing the use by the plaintiff of its machinery or process for applying gunite, or for the purpose of com- pelling it to discharge any of its nonunion workmen. Laboe Organizations — Injunction — Boycott — GiU Engraving Co. V. Doerr, United States District Court, Southern District of New YorTc {May 19, 1914), ^H- Federal Reporter, page 111.— The GiU Engraving Co. brought action against William Doerr, individually and as business agent for the New York Photo-Engravers' Union No. 1, and others. The decision disposes of a motion for an injunc- tion against the defendants pendente lite, by dismissing said motion. The controversy had been going on for a number of years between the company and the union, which included most of the photo-engravers in New York. The company at first conducted an open shop, but finally employed only nonunion workmen. In March, 1914, the union took action by which the members refused to do any work for customers of their employers who did not agree to have all their work done in union shops. The GUI company appeared to be the only concern of importance affected by this action. The result was that the larger part of the customers of the company left it, so that it lost most of its business and the rest was threatened. In expressing the decision of the court that these facts did not warrant the issuance of an injimction, Judge Hough spoke as follows: As to the purpose with which defendants have acted, I am of opinion that hostility to the Gill company is subordinate and incidental. 302 BULLETIN OF THE BtTKEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. All nonunion businesses are treated alike; naturally the greater tne business the greater the aggregate dislike, but the quaUty of hatred is the same, irrespective of size. That Gill company is hurt is grati- fying but incidental; the procedure would be the same werg com- plainant nonexistent. Doerr told nearly the whole truth when he wrote, "We will do all of (your customers') work or none." If he had added "and if they can get it done otherwise after this we will think up something else," he would have told the whole truth, be- cause the great and all-absorbing object -of defendants' endeavors was and is to get all the work in the trade, or at any rate aU the work worth having, for their own members. Before applying the law to the findings of fact, much that was men- tioned in argument may be laid aside. It is not shown that any national statute has been violated; nor that any principle p'^ecuhar to national law (e. g., iaterstate commerce) is concerned; nor that the question presented is comphcated by disturbance of the peace, phys- ical trespass, or violence; nor that any Government fimction (e. g., mail transportation) has been interfered with. These exclusions make the case purely local. The jurisdiction of this court is an inci- dent, depending on the New Jersey iacorporation of a business wholly conducted in New York City. Therefore I think it desirable that the law of New York should be appHed so far as I am capable of discov- ering it, unless the decisions of Federal courts superior to this compel different treatment. It is asserted that the defendant's acts constitute a crime under New York Penal Code, section 580. I dechne to consider such viola- tion as ground for injunctive relief pendente Hte. I am sure that penal statutes are meant to be enforced in criminal courts ; their use as bases for injunction is usuaUy illegitimate and always illogical; even the not infrequent fact that prosecuting officers do not enforce the statute against some citizens and rigidly enforce it against others does not justify an attempted administration of criminal law by courts of equity. It is further urged that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy or combination in violation of sections 340, 341, General Business Law of New York (the Donnelly Act). It seems plain enough that this is true, but it is settled that for such cause a private party on his own suit is not entitled to injunctive rehef. Irvmg v. Neal, 209 Fed. 471 [see p. 162]; Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 212 Fed. 259 [see p. 164]; affirmed in 213 Fed. (C. C. A., April 7, 1914). Therefore this motion is to be decided by what is usually called common law; i. e., the law of New York as evidenced by the decisions of its courts, supplemented only by the inquiry as to whether any controlling divergence of opinion is found in the appellate tribunals to which this court is more directly responsible. The leading cases in New York [cases cited] all show that the court sits primariljr to decide a question of fact, viz: What is the object of the combination ? Applying this rule to this case, it is held that the object of defend- ant's combination is not to injure GiU company, though such injury has occurred and was foreseen. The object is to increase the power of the union, so as to get more, better, easier, and better-paid work for its members ; this is now regarded as laudable. As to the means employed, everything lately done and alleged as ground for present action consists in threatening strikes. This is the DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 303 exercise of a legal right. If defendants have sought to attain a legal end by legal means, that a motive, or part of a motive, was hate of GUI company is immaterial. That wrong and injury are being done in this matter is plaia enough. Why does the law refuse or neglect to correct it? An- drews, J., has-, I think, given the best answer in Foster v. Retail Clerk's Assn., 78 N. Y. Supp. 860: "Injury * * * jg never good, but to suffer it may entail less evU than to attempt to check it by legal means. * * * Jn i}j^q i^gt analysis this freedom to commit injury, and the bounds imposed upon it are regulated by what has been thought to be public policy." The cases cited could be used to show that no bounds have been imposed in New York on wrongs quite as great as that wrought upon complainant. Defendants have called attention to one fact not found in any case known or shown to me. The Gill company has declared war on the union by discharging aU members found in its shop. It is said this should deprive complainant of the aid of equity, and Sinsheimer v. United Garment Workers, 77 Hun, 215, 28 N. Y. Supp. 321, is rehed on. It is not seen why a person otherwise entitled to protection for his business is deprived of it because he will not employ a certain class of workmen; the nonpref erred workmen are not, therefore, given any right to injure the man who does not prefer them. In the United States courts for this circuit. National Fireproofing Co. V. Mason Builders"' Assn., 169 Fed. 259 [Bui. No. 84, p. 427], is controlling. It accepts the New York cases fuUy, piously regrets the injuries committed, and writes the epitaph of litigation such as this by declaring that, when equal legal rights clash, equity is helpless. This is true; it would have been just as true to point out that the result of legalizing strikes, lockouts and boycotts under any circum- stances must be that those who understand the use of such legal tools can always keep within the law and accomphsh their main purpose while inflicting aU necessary "incidental" injury. Considering that the rules as laid down in New York have not been shown to be transgressed, motion denied. - Labor Organizations — Injunction — Conspiracy — Boycott — Hohan v. Dempsey, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {Feb. 28, 1914), lOJj. Northeastern Reporter, page 717. — ^The opinion in this case, delivered by Judge Rugg for the court, in afl&rming the decree of a single justice dismissing a biU praying for an injunction against the carrying out of a contract between the agents of steamship com- panies and an organization of longshoremen, states the facts and fully discusses the law applicable thereto: The plaintiffs are members of a labor union of longshoremen. There are two groups of defendants, the one members of a different labor union of longshoremen, and the other representatives of certain trans-Atlantic steamship companies. The plamtiffs seek to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with an agreement which consists of 30 articles covering most, if not all, of the conditions of labor Hkelyto 304 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. arise in the course of such employment. One paragraph provides in substance that all longshoremen employed by the contracting trans- Atlantic steamship Hnes shall be members of the defendant union whenever such men are available, and whenever such men are not available, then other men may be employed until the defendant union can supply men, but in any event men not members of the de- fendant union may be employed until the end of the day. It is con- tended that this clause is so illegal that performance of the contract ought to be enjoined at the instance of third parties. A trial was had before a single justice who, at its conclusion, found that the "con- tract was freely and fairly entered into between the contracting par- ties without any purpose or motive on the part of the representatives of the International Longshoremen's Association [the defendant union] to injure the plaintiffs or to coerce them into joining the union or unions, although I am satisfied that the legal effect of the contract may deprive the plaintiffs of employment by the trans- Atlantic steam- ship lines," and ruled as matter of law that the bill could not be main- tained and entered a decree dismissing it. The plaintiff's appeal brings the case here. It is famihar law that the findings of fact made by a single justice are not to be set aside unless plainly wrong. There was testimony from witnesses from both groups of defendants that their purpose in entering into the contract was not to harm the plaintiffs, but pri- marily to secure the welfare of each party to it. The steamsnip agents testified that they had previously dealt with several different organizations or local unions; that the committees representing these bodies were cumbersome in numbers, not small enough to make an effective body, and in consequence, in case of disagreement as to working conditions, there was difficulty in getting an adjustment; and that work was not done expeditiously and weU, and it was felt that if an agreement was made with one strong union, under good control and management, it would be easier to get an adequate supply of labor and to settle troubles that might arise; and that no coercion or intimidation was exercised over them by the defendant union, and that they acted voluntarily with a view single to their own interests in signing the contract. The advantage to the defendant union lay in securing a permanent arrangement covering all labor conditions, with preference in employment for their own members. The uncon- tradicted direct testimony was to the effect that the dominant motive on the part of both parties was to gain benefits for themselves and in no sense to harm the plaintiffs. Of course the defendants must be presumed to have intended the natural results of their acts, whatever may have been their oral statement respecting it. But it is plain from this summary of testimony that the finding that there was no purpose to injure the plaintiffs or to compel them to join the de- fendant union was supported by evidence. The tortious acts and motives which frequently have been found to exist in cases involving industrial disputes are absent in the case at bar. There have been no violence, threats, or intimidation. The question remains whether upon the facts found the plaintiffs are entitled to rehef. This is a simple case where employers and a union of employees have made an agreement freely and without any kind of constraint, the terms of which do not require the breaking of DECISIONS OF COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 305 contractual relations with anyone, to the end that aU the work of a specified kind be given to the members of a union so far as they are able to do it, for a limited period of time. There was nothing of the boycott about the contract, for an essential element of the boycott is intentional injury to somebody. An agreement of this sort under the circumstances disclosed is within tlie protection of Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 584, 78 N. E. 753, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 7 Ann. Cas. 638 [Bui. No. 70, p. 747]. It is within the lawful principles as to the conduct of business expounded at length and with great clearness in MarteU v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N. E. 1085, 64 L. R. A. 260, 102 Am. St. Rep. 341 [Bui. No. 53, p. 958]. See, also, Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598; s. c. on appeal [1892], A. C. 25. Those principles are the law of this Commonwealth. It is not necessary to repeat or restate them. They are decisive against the contentions of the plaintiffs. Although there is evidence which would warrant a finding that the defendant union represents "practically the whole of the longshore- men of the port of Boston," this has not been found as a fact. It is apparent both from the frame of the bill, the trend of the trial as disclosed on the record, and the findings of the single justice, that the hearing did not proceed upon the theory of an unlawful monopoly or a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Those issues were not tried out. Such questions can not be raised at this stage of the case and they are not passed upon. Labor Organizations — Injunction — Contempt — Picketing — Evidence — Sona et al. v. Aluminum Castings Co., United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit (June IS, 191S), 21Jf. Federal Reporter, page 936. — This case was before the court of appeals on a writ of error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, to review a judgment by that court sentencing to imprisonment George Sona and one Sudsinski for con- tempt of court. The persons named were pickets in a strike by a local of the International Molders' Union against the company named. The company had secured a restraining order and preliminary injunction, of which the persons named had notice. It was in evidence that Sona had assaulted an employee of the company, doing him "serious bodily harm," and that Sudsinski, though com- mitting no assault, had been guilty of picketing, impeding, and obstructing the streets, alleys, and approaches to the premises of the company in a threatening and intimidating manner. These acts were regarded as contempt of court, and a sentence of imprison- ment was assessed on each party. A number of technical questions were involved as to the sufiiciency of the petitions and affidavits which led to the arrest, and while certain defects were apparent, the court held that these had been waived by the subsequent proceed- 85590°— Bull. 169—15 20 306 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OP LABOR STATISTICS. ings and the acts of the defendants, and the judgment was affirmed. On the question of evidence the court said in part: As to the sufficiency of the proof to sustain conyiction: As to the assault charged against Sona, no question of the sufficiency of the proof could well be made; there was direct testimony thereof. As to Sudsinski, the question, of course, relates only to the charge of obstructing and intimidating. Complainant concedes that the injunction was not intended to restrain peaceable picketing, and the district judge rightly, as we think, so interpreted the order. There was express testimony that it was the regular practice for picketers to march back and forth in front of the plant for about an hour each morning and evening, including the time when employees were entering and leaving the plant; that Sudsinski was one of the regular and prominent picketers, usually walking with two or three and sometimes about a dozen picketers in a "biinch"; that the picketers marched either in single file or by twos; and that, during this picketing, there were in the immediate vicinity of the plant from 20 to 50 and sometimes 100 people, apparently largely strikers, walking back and forth. The controlling question was one of fact whether this picketing was peaceable or whether, on the other hand, it was calculated to intimidate and obstruct employees. There was testimony tending to show a piu-pose to intimidate and obstruct. One of the witnesses testified that he had heard some of those so walk- ing around or standing "hollering different things"; that he at one time heard them "call the other men cattle"; and that Sudsinski was in the crowd that particular evening. Respondent Sona, as a witness, admitted that he knew that "there had been a lot of trouble around there"; that he had heard that, men had been assaulted on the street cars on their way to work and been pulled off street cars; that he had heard that the company had to protect its men by cooking and serving meals inside the works. (There was express testimony that the employees were boarded by the company after the strike was declared.) Sudsinski would not unnaturally be as famiUar with those general conditions as was Sona. The latter and his associates in the alleged assault followed the employees alleged to have been assaulted from the works to the place where the collision occurred. Judge Angell, who presided at the hearing below and who saw and heard all the witnesses, was convinced, as shown by his find- ing, that the picketing in question was done in such a manner as to intimidate, threaten, and obstruct the employees of the company, and aU persons seeking employment from it. In view of the testi- mony referred to, we can not say, as matter of law, that the court was not justified in reaching the conclusion arrived at notwithstanding the absence of testimony of actual violence or disorderly conduct on Sudsinski's part. ' Labor Organizations — Injunction — Contempt — Violation bt Inciting Others to Violence— ZZmietZ States v. Colo et al., United States District Court, Western District of ArTcansas (Sept. 1,1914), 216 Federal Reporter, page 654.— On May 9, 1914, the United States Dis- trict Court for the Western District of Arkansas, in the case of DECISIONS OF COURTS AITECTING LABOB. 307 Mammoth Vein Coal M inin g Co. v. Hunter et al., rendered a decree en- joining the defendants in that case, and all other persons, from in- terfering with the property of the company or with its nonunion miners. On the 13th of June the company filed a motion for an at- tachment against several striking union men for violation of the decree, and on the 20th filed a similar motion against still others. The cases against all the defendants who had been arrested were tried together. On July 27, after the evidence on the original cases had been taken and the cases submitted, a motion was made to reopen them to allow additional testimony to be intro- duced, growing out of an alleged attack on mine No. 4 by an armed mob, the killing of two of the company's employees, and the biirning and blowing up of its property. The motion was sustained as to P. R. Stewart, but was denied as to aU others. Motions were then filed for attachments for contempt against John Manick, Frank Gripando, Loyd Claborn, Pink Dunn and George Burnett, charging them with having been members of the mob. Testimony was then introduced as to the occurrences of July 17. Three of the defendants were charged with intimidation of certain miners on a train going to mine No. 4 on June 15. After some review ' of the testimony in regard to this. Judge Youmans, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: After a consideration of all of the testimony, I am convinced that Bmris, Robinson, and Manick did use threats on that occasion against the employees of the company and endeavored to intimidate them, and that in so doing they knowingly violated the court's orders. In my opinion the presence of armed guards and a deputy United States marshal, ^ho met the train at the stopping point, alone prevented an attack on the employees. As to a charge against Robinson the court said : Sandy Robinson is separately charged with having cut some sacks of feed belonging to the Mammoth Vein Coal Mining Co. on the plat- form at Prairie Creek. This was on May 18. The feed was being unloaded from a Midland Valley car for the purpose of being taken to mine No. 4. The testimony is that Robinson was there and engaged in an altercation with a mine guard, and that he took out his pocket- knife and cut five sacks. I am convinced that this is true, notwith- standing his denial, and the testimony of witnesses tending to show that he was not there. With regard to the nature of the charges against Stewart, Judge Youmans said: The defendant P. R. Stewart, at the time of the occurrences herein mentioned, was president of District No. 21 of the United Mine Workers of America. He was present during the trial of the case of Mammoth Vein Coal MLaing Co. v. Hunter et al. He heard all the testimony, sat with counsel for the defendants during the trial, and heard the opinion of the court when it was handed down. He there- fore had full knowledge of the issuance of the injunction and its 308 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. terms. The charge against him consisted of certain statements made by him. On May 25 Stewart went from Fort Smith to Midland in an automobile in company with Paul Little, State prosecuting attorney. While at Midland, Stewart made some statements in front of McGee's drug store. After quoting from the testimony of Little and other witnesses and of Stewart himself as to this occurrence, which testimony showed that Stewart suggested that the strikers should be armed and that he would assist them in procuring arms. Judge Youmans said: It will be seen that Mr. Stewart did not deny any of the testimony giren by the witnesses as to what he said in front of McGee's store at Midland. He explains it by saying that he "had information that a guard named Bailey, and some other guards, had insulted some girls," and that that made him pretty mad. He said: "It was my idea to arm the men in the Hartford Valley so that they could protect their own homes, and so that they could protect the women and children." There was nothing, so far as the attitude of the State and county officers towards offenses committed by employees of the Mammoth Vein Coal Mining Co. was concerned, to warrant him in assuming authority to supplant the legal methods for the enforcement of the law. He.maae a speech at Hartford the next night at a gathering at which Mr. Little was present. After quotiag the testimony of Little to the effect that the remarks of Stewart on this occasion were similar to those on the previous day, the opinion continues: Stewart made this statement at Hartford more than 24 hours after he had made the statement in front of McGee's store at Midland. If the first statement was made in anger, the second was made after his temper had had ample time to cool. It was made afterjthe prose- cuting attorney had, in response to iaquiries, stated the information he had gathered. There was no reason to presume that the officers and the courts were not able to cope with all violations of the law. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Stewart saw fit to repeat his threat, and that, too, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney, who permitted it to pass unrebuked. The conviction can not be avoided that the real object of Stewart was to prevent the operation of the mine as an "open shop." The coal company "had determiaed to run its mine as an "open shop." The union was opposed to such operation. If the coal com- pany had no legal right to run its mine as an "open shop," there must have been some way, by orderly procedure in the courts, to prevent it. The union was endeavoring to prevent such operation, but not by legal proceedings. If it could accomplish its purpose by legal means, no one had a right to complain, its first effort was not by legal means. On the 6th of April its members and sympathizers assem- bled on the company's property, assaulted its employees, and com- pelled them to stop work. That method was unlawful. At the instance of the coal company, all persons engaged in that attempt, and all others, were enjoined from in any manner interfering with the company's property or employees. Notwithstanding the injunc- tion, assaults were threatened. ■ Shots were fired into tha mine DECISIONS OF COURXS AFFECTING LABOR. 309 inclosure. It was necessary to keep armed men about the mine. From some time in June to the 15th of July deputy United Stales marshals wei e stationed at the mine. Even when men went to Mid- land for supplies, it was necessaiy foi them to go armed. Certain evidence was then reviewed, after which the court said: The conclusion is unavoidable that if the membeis of the union had obeyed the orders of the couit, oi if the officers of the county had shown the same disposition to prosecute violations of the law when committed by union men as when committed by employees of the company, it would not have been necessaiy for the laltei to carry arms. It was the policy of Stewail, accoiding to tha argument of counsel, to have the union maintain such an attitude as would make the employment of armed guards, if not actually necessary, at least apparently so from the viewpotat of the coal company, and thus cause to be added, to the usual cost of the production of coal, such sum, by the expense of maintaining guards, as would result in loss to the company, and bring about the suspension of operation as an "open shop." According to that plan, the company was to be kept in a constant state of apprehension of an a1 tack to the extent that it would continue to maintain guards, but it was in fact the intention of Stewart that the attack should never be made. Such an experi- ment in tight-rope walking could not result otherwise than in failure. Putting on Stewart's acts and speeches the construction most favor- able to him, he incited to action forces which he could not control. Occupying a position in which his influence could have operated powerfully for the maintenance of law and order, he saw fit to so deport himseK as to incite to and encourage mob violence. He knowingly played with fire with a reckless disregard for consequences. His conduct was at variance with his declaration made on the witness stand, of respect for the court's order and his intention to be governed thereby. Language or conduct intended to incite others to a violation of the court's order is a contempt of court. U. S. v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900; U. S. v. Haggarty, 116 Fed. 510 [Bui. No. 43, p. 1291]; U. S. ■;;. Gehr, 116 Fed. 520. The effect of Stewart's policy, speeches, and conduct is seen in the events of the 17th of July. The occurrences of the date just mentioned, when the attack by the union men on mine No. 4 took place, were reviewed, and the evi- dence of participation by the various defendants taken up. The conclusion reached is shown by the following quotation from the opinion: The testimony on behalf of Clabom is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in his favor, and he will be discharged. Burris, Robinson, Stewart, Manick, Giipando, Dunn, and Burnett will be adjudged guUty of contempt. The term and place of imprisonment of each is designated at this point and the opinion concludes as follows : It is proper to say, in this connection, that a conviction upon a charge of contempt for an offense which is also a crime does not bar a prosecution for the crime. 310 bulletin" of the bukeau os" labob statistics. Labob OeganizatioNs — ^Injunction — Right to Relief — ^Man- damus Directing Issue — Peaceable Paeadinq — Baltic Mining Co. V. Houghton Circuit Judge, Supreme Court of Michigan (Dec. 10, 1913), 144 Northwestern Reporter, page 209. — The Baltic Mining Co. and others had procured from the circuit judge of Houghton County a preliminary writ of injunction restraining certain acts of violence and intimidation charged in their original hiU of complaint. A few weeks later the judge issued an order dissolving the writ pre- viously granted by him, on the ground that it had been unadvisedly issued, since he did not have the power to take such a step. The present proceeding was to procure from the State supreme court a writ of mandamus directing the circuit judge to set aside and vacate this order of dissolution, thus leaving the preliminary injunction in force. This writ was issued on hearing before the court, some expla- nation also being made as to the effect of the original injunction so reinstated. • The origiaal bill of complaint on which the injunction was issued was directed against the Western Federation of Miners, its district and local unions and their officers and members. This complaint stated that when a general strike was inaugurated in July, 1913, upward of 4,000 miners employed by the complaining company, not allied with the union, refused to participate in the strike and sought to continue labor, but were interfered with by threats and violence imtil work was suspended in many places. Allegations were made of assaults, picketing, threatening parades, riotous and threatening gatherings in large numbers, and "in instances too numerous to mention or specifically set forth" of assaults and beatings of employees of the petitioners. The defendants filed no answer to this complaint, but moved a dissolution of the temporary injunction granted, on the ground that the allegations in the complainants' biU were too general in their nature, not properly verified, and not supported by any showing on which a temporary injunction should or could have been granted. The court adopted this view and dissolved the injunction, but reserved the right to issue a restraining order without notice, upon showing made by affidavits by the complamants. About a week afterwards affidavits were submitted setting forth the conditions that had developed immediately after the dissolution of the injunc- tion. The following is quoted from the opinion of the court in this connection: The affidavits, 84 in number, are freighted with narratives of riot- ing, acts of violence, threats, insults, and intimidation of men, women, and children too numerous to attempt to repeat here, fuUy sub- stantiating and showing continuation of the unlawful conduct by defendants alleged in complainants' bill. The affiants testify posi- tively from personal experience and observation. The affidavits are not only made by employees of complainants and their families, DECISIONS OF OOURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 311 but by others, oflBicials and private citizens, in many walks of life. They tell of the strikers, members of the defendant federation, and their sympathizers parading with noise and insults and threats, attacking, assaulting, and driving back peaceable workmen going to their employment, of men irregularly grouped together in bands of from ten to a dozen to mobs of six and seven hundred at various times both day and night, with threatening demonstrations and words, of their laying in wait for and attacking employees of complainants as they went to and from their work, assaulting them with clubs and rocks, snatching from them their dinner pails and trampling them upon the streets, applying to them vUe and vulgar epithets, threaten- ing violence not only to themselves, but to their famihes, to kill, to dynamite, and to blow up their houses. They tell of peaceable citi- zens of long residence in those communities, with their estabhshed homes and families there and whose only offense was an attempt to continue work where and as they had been employed for many years, being assaulted on the highways, mobbed, their clothing torn from them, spit upon, coal ashes and slops thrown on them, bottles and rocks hiu-led at them often inflicting serious injuries, even in sight of their wives watching from their homes, of boarding houses and homes of nonunion men being surrounded and stoned, with taunts and insulting threats, of women and girls struck with missiles and injiu-ed on such occasions, of mobbmg trains, defying the civil authorities, resisting and assaulting officers, of resort to firearms in which employees of complainants and others were wounded, and other overt acts of lawlessness, disorder, and violence clearly substantiating the allegations in complainants' bill, and fairly indicating concerted action on the part of defendants to promote the strike by an aggressive pohcy of force and intimidation. Upon such showing the trial court again refused to grant any relief, and this application for a mandamus followed. The court then took up the gromids on which its conclusion was reached that the injunction should not have been dissolved, using in part the following language: Briefly stated, respondent's answer is that, though disposed to grant a restraining order, he had no power to do so because of the insufficiency of the biU. The question before us, therefore, is, primarily, one (jf law. The return shows respondent exercised no discretion as to the injunction, holding, as a matter of law, that he had no power to do so. The bill is certainly not demurrable. It states a case with sufficient averments and general allegations of facts which, if sustained by proof on final hearing, would entitle complainants to the relief asked. The contention that the bill of complamt is not properly verified is untenable. As before stated, it is sworn to positively by seven affiants of their own knowledge, with the usual reservation found in the fofm of such jurats, "except as to matters therein stated upon information and belief," and the material allegations in the bill essential to entitle complainants to relief if proven are stated without qualification. The chief charge of insufficiency against the biU is that its aver- ments are too general, more in the nature of. conclusions than dis- tinct -statements of facts, and state no specific acts of particulai 312 BULLETIN OF THE BXJEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. individuals, with time, place, and attending circumstances such as good pleading demands. While it is permissible, and sometimes requisite, to set forth the facts and acts relied on fully and with par- ticularity in a biU, as a rule general certainty is sufl&cient in a pleading inequity. It is not required to relate the details. " It is not neces- sary to charge minutely all the circumstances which may prove a general charge; for those circumstances are properly matters of evidence which need not be charged to let in proof." Story, Eq. Pleading, section 28. As a pleading this bUl contains a sufficient, though general, statement of the essential ultimate facts involved in the controversy, which, taken as true, confer on the court authority to grant permanent rehef by injunction, and if necessity is shown, temporary relief until final hearing. We are impelled to hold that the respondent misconstrued the law and his official duty, under the showing made. When such an application is made for preliminary protection, the questions to be passed upon and determined from the showing are only the necessary factors in granting or denying a temporary restraining order. "It is not necessary that the complainant's rights be clearly established, or that the court find complainant is entitled to prevail on the final hearing. It is sufficient if it appears that there is a real and substantial question between the parties, to be investigated in a court of equity, and, in order to prevent irreme- dial injury to the complainant before his claims can be investigated, it is necessary to prohibit any change in the conditions and relations of the property and of the parties during the litigation." Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield M. U. No. 220 (C. C), 159 Fed. 513 [Bui. No. 78, p. 586]. And this is especially true when not only the safety of property but the peace of a community and the choice of action and even the lives of peaceable citizens and their families, when in the pursuit of their lawful avocations, are menaced by dis- order, threats, and violence. The power and duty of courts of equity to restrain, on proper application, conspiring labor organizations and their members, as well as others in the conspiracy, from molesting by violence, threats, and intimidation, or any other unlawful interference with, those engaged in any lawful employment and those employing them, is too well established and too thoroughly reviewed by our own authori- ties to call ioT citations from other States or discussion here. We are constrained to hold that the writ prayed for must issue herein, directing respondent to vacate his order setting aside and dissolving the temporary injunction theretofore granted by him and continue the same as indicated in the order to show cause issued by this court, until final hearing of said injunction suit, or until changed conditions shown to the court render the same no longer necessary. This court, as such, is not concerned with strikes or their continu- ance, as such. Courts do not grant injunctions to restrain strikes lawfully conducted. They are only concerned with them- when lawlessness and acts of violence and intimidation develop from them. To avoid any misapprehension, let it be understood, and, if neces- sary, further provided, that parades directed to and loitering at and around the premises of complainants or the homes of their employees, and so timed and conducted as to meet and obstruct such employees DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 313 goin^ to and from their work during morning and evening changes of shift, and any and all meeting and parading accompanied by acts of violence, threats, insults, or hostile demonstrations toward com- plainants or their employees either by act or word are in no sense "peaceable meeting and parading," but directly to the contrary, and aU such conduct must be regarded as strictly within that provi- sion of the injunction prohibiting defendants "from impeding, ob- structing, molesting, or disturbing the employees of the said com- plainants or any of them by threats, violence, insults, gatherings, parades, or any form of intimidation whatsoever or by any acts of any kind calculated or intended as or for intimidation of the said employees or any of them." Let a writ of mandamus be issued as above indicated. Labor Organizations — Interference with Employment^ CoNSPmACT — Boycott — Injunction — Olarkson v. Laiilan et at., St. Louis Court of Appeals {Dec. 2, 1913), 161 Southwestern Re- porter, page 660. — James L. Clarkson brought action in equity for an injunction against Frederick Laiblan and others, officers of Local Union No. 1 of the International Brotherhood of Composition Roofers, Damp and Water Proof Workers of St. Louis, Mo., which is affiliated with the Building Trades Council of St. Louis. Clarkson had been a member of the local union from 1903 to 1906, at which time he went into the roofing business on his own account and became an employer, which fact terminated his membership in the union. In January, 1909, he sold out his business to the St. Louis Roofing Co., and the company attempted to employ him as a fore- man. Patrick F. Garvey, the business agent of the local union, was present at the shop on the morning of February 21, 1909, when Clarkson was handed a slip of paper assigning him to the position as foreman of a gang of roofers. After ascertaining that not all the union men present were to be put at work, Garvey protested against work being given to Claikson, with the result that the order to the latter was recalled. On March 16, 1909, Claikson entered into a contract with the St. Louis Roofing Co. to roof a number of buildings as a subcontractor. Thereupon Garvey threatened a strike, and this contract was. as a result canceled by the St. Louis Roofing Co. Further facts, and the grounds for the decision affirming the decree of the St. Louis circuit court for the plaintiff, are stated as follows in the opinion written by Judge Nortoni: It appears that there are about 225 roofers in all in St. Louis and all but about 20 of them belong to the union. Nearly, or about, one-half of this number were in the employ of the St. Louis Roofing Company at the tinde. Moreover, it appears that 90 per cent of all the men engaged in the various building trades, save bricklayers, are members of the various building trades local unions, which are affiliated 314 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. together. It does not appear that any of the defendants personally, save Garvey, interfered with the plaintiff, or that they personally threatened his employer, the St. Louis Roofing Company, but the case concedes that Garvey was the business agent of the union of which the other defendants were officers. Among other things, it was the duty of Garvey to see that none but union men were per- mitted to work, without special permission from himself or the union. Among other things, plaintiff testifies that Garvey informed him that he "could stay at his own little business,"— that is the business that he had theretofore sold out. And it appears clear enough that Garvey's threats communicated first to the foreman and then to the manager of plaintiff's employer caused him to lose his position as a foreman of the gang, and afterwards occasioned the cancellation of his several contracts. None of the defendants took the stand, and the case rests alone upon the evidence of plaintiff and his several witnesses, who fully corroborate him throughout. Obviously the court did not err in decreeing a perpetual injunction against all of the defendants on this evidence. It is certain that a man's occupa- tion, whether it be that of a roofer, laborer, or what not, partakes of the character of property, and he is entitled to have it protected by the process of injunction, when other persons confederate and conspire to and actually interfere with its prosecution in such a manner as to work substantial injury upon him. The evidence is abundant that Garvey was acting within the scope of his authority as business agent of the union, and carrying out both the letter and the spirit of its rules and regulations in so doing. It is certain that neither one man nor a multitude organized together have the right to coerce an employer, through threats to impair his business or cause a loss to him, to discharge another person from his services. See Swaine v. Blackmore, 75 Mo. App. 74. Here, through the organi- zation of the union and the membership therein were entirely proper and lawful, the end sought to be achieved in coercing plaintiff's eniployer to discharge him and to terminate and refuse further bene- ficial business intercourse with him was unlawful. Therefore, the confederation being present, a conspiracy against the rights of plaintiff appears well estabUshed. Labor Organizations — Interference with Employment — 1n- 3VNCTIONS— Damages— Fairianks et al. v. McDonald et ah, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Nov. 21^, 191 Jj), 106 Northeastern Reporter, pagfi 1000. — The plaintiffs m this case claimed membership in a voluntary unmcorporated local trade-union, while defendants were members and officers of another local trade-union. The purpose of the suit was to restrain defendants'from interfering with the em- ployment of plaintiffs and other members of their local union and for damages for unlawful interference with their employment resulting in their discharge by their employer. A decree was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the superior court of Essex County, and the defendants appealed. The decree was affirmed, the reasons given DECISIONS OF COUBTS AFFECTING LABOB, 315 being shown in the opinion dehvered by Judge Sheldon, which is largely quoted herewith: In addition to the facts found by the master, we are clearly of opinion that it must be inferred from the facts reported by him that Atwill and Gage, acting for the members of their union, intended to compel the plaintiffs' employers to discharge the plaintiffs and to refuse to give to the plaintiffs any further employment, and that this was done, not for the purpose of securing for the members of the defendants' imion aU the work that was to be had from these em- ployers, but to depriye the plaintiffs of employment and make it impossible for them to obtain their livelihood by their labor, unless they should become members of the defendants' union upon whatever onerous terms the latter should choose to impose. The defendants did not say to their employers, "You must give us all yoiu' work or none of it," as they might have done without ex- ceeding the limits of allowable competition. They required their em- ployers to refuse absolutely to employ the plaintiffs,, for the purpose of putting upon the latter an unfair pressure. In contemplation of law, they acted from mahce toward the plaintiffs, and did to them an unlawful injury, by causing their exclusion from the labor market. This case resembles in principle Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N. E. 841 [see p. 2701, and much of the reasoning of that decision is applicable here. The main object of the bill is to protect the plaintiffs from the irreparable injury to which they are exposed by the unlawful acts of the defendants. It is only incidentally that the ' plaintiffs seek to recover damages for the losses already caused to them. Substantial damages have been given only to the plaintiff Fairbanks. Upon the findings of the master we can not say that he was not entitled to the sum allowed him. Burnham v. Dowd, and cases cited. He has not however been given damages for the permanent loss of access to the labor market, and is not barred from having further relief by way of injunction. It is too plain for discussion that neither one of the plaintiffs was required, before bringing this biQ, to seek relief within the defendants' union or to exhaust any remedy that might there have been available. The decree appealed from contains however some minor errors, which ought to be corrected. So modified, the final decree appealed from must be affirmed. Labor Organizations — Legality — Interference with Em- ployment — Conspiracy — Mitchell et al. v. Hitchman Coal c& Coke Co., United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit {May 28, 1914), ^H Federal Reporter, page 685. — The company mentioned brought suit against John Mitchell and others to restrain them from attempting to organize the company's mine workers and to induce them to join the union known as the United Mine Workers of America. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia issued a decree granting a permanent injunction. This de- cision is found in 202 Fed. 512, and noted in Bulletin No. 152, pages 316 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. 137-151, where the history of the controversy between the company and the United Mine Workers is quite fully detailed. In the present decision the decree was reversed, with instructions to dismiss the suit. After reviewing the facts, Judge Pritchard, who delivered the opinion, expressed the court's idea of the importance of the matter as follows: That it is advisable to secure a just and fair solution of the labor problem by which equal protection to capital and labor may be secured is imdoubtedly the wish of every patriotic citizen regardless of his station in life. That one who toils for his living is justified in employiag all lawful methods for the preservation of his right as an American citizen to secure fair remuneration for his services is estab- lished by the Federal and State courts. That such a person also has the right to join with others simLlarlj situated, in order to promote their welfare as a class, is also established as the law of the country. But while this is so, it is equally well settled that the miae owner is entitled to the fuU protection of the law in the conduct of his business and the enjoyment of his property. After quoting from the opinion of Judge Dayton in the district court, the court says as to the lawfulness of labor organizations : The learned judge insists that the common law imder which labor organizations have been declared unlawful in England is still in force in West Virginia, and that therefore this organization is unlawful, unless by statutory enactment the common law has been modified or abrogated to such an extent as to allow an organization of this kind to exist in that State. We do not deem it profitable to enter into an extended discussion of this phase of the question, beheving as we do that, while there are decisions at common law by the courts of England in support of the contention that labor unions are unlawful, yet such rule has not pre- vailed in this country, except in a few of the earher decisions of our courts. Even in England combinations of this character were only proceeded against, as a general rule, when they were criminal or pro- hibited by statutory law. Next the purposes of the union are discussed, and the decision made that they are lawful. The following are extracts bearing upon this point: The court below in its opinion referred to a number of provisions contained in the constitution and rules of this organization which in its judgment rendered the same unlawful; the first being that a member is required to promise that he wUl cease to work whenever called upon to do so by the organization. A careful examination of this provision fails to show on its face anything unlawful, while on the other hand common experience teaches us that a rule of this character is essential for the preservation of labor organizations. Without a provision of this kind, there would be no power of securing concert of action; no means by which imited effort could be secured for the accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the Organization. It is also insisted by the court below that under these rules the operator has no right to employ nonunion men even if he should desire to do so. DECISIONS OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOE. 317 If the United Mine Workers of America in pursuance of this rule should resort to coercion, threats, intimidation, or violence for the purpose of preventing the mine owner from employing nonunion men, such conduct would be imlawful, and the courts would promptly restrain anyone who might be a party to such transaction. Indeed, it would be unlawful for an individual to undertake, by coercion, intimidation, or threats to prevent a mine owner from exercising his own free will as to the employment of nonunion laborers, or as to any other thing which ho might deem necessary to be done in order to protect his property rights. However, in this instance, the plaintiff has adopted a policy by which only nonunion men may be employed. If the plain tifi' may for the purpose of protecting its interests adopt a policy by which oidy nonunion men can secure employment at its mines, and such conduct be sanctioned by the law, by what process of reasoning can it be held that the defendants may not adopt the same method in order to protect their interests ? If the plaintiff is to be protected in the use of such methods, and the defendants are to be restrained from using lawful methods for the purpose of successfully meeting the issue thus raised by the plaintiff, then indeed it may be truth- fully said that capital receives greater protection at the hands of the courts than those through whose efforts capital in the first instance was created. But such is not the law, and when we con- sider the testimony as respects the conduct of the defendants, at and before the institution of this suit, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff has not by a preponderance of the evidence shown that these defendants employed unlawful methods as alleged in the bill. It further appears that the plaintiff is paying the nonunion men the same wages that are being paid union men. Therefore, under these circumstances, is it not as reasonable to infer that the plaintiff is endeavoring to place the laborers of that section in a position where it would be master of the situation, as it is to infer that the defendants are seeking to destroy the business of the plaintiff ? WTaile it is true that the plaintiff has a perfect right to refuse to employ union labor, is it not equally true that union labor, as we have stated, may by the employment of legitimate means do that which is necessary to keep its forces together ? Shutting down a mine by calling out men in obedience to their obligation is what is known as a "strike." Rule No. 10, which relates to strikes, is in the following language: "No strike shall take place at any time under the jurisdiction of subdistrict 5 of district 6, except for specific violation of agreement. That is, screens irregular; failure to pay on pay day without explana- tion; violation of mining laws by operators, or reductions of scale wages imtil the grievance of the mine affected has been thoroughly investigated by the officers of district 6, U. M. W. A. and operators interested. Any man or men that cause a stoppage of work at any mine in violation of this rule, shall be subject to dismissal at the will of the company." This very clearly sets forth the causes wherein strikes are justifiable. The evidence in this case fails to show that these defendants have at any time tried by violence, intimidation, or fraud to induce the union men to quit working for the plaintiff. 318 BULLBTIK OP THE BUKBAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. A consideration of the purposes of this organization as set forth in its constitution impels us to the conclusion that there is nothing con- tained therein to justify the contention that its purposes are unlawful. At the final hearing the plaintiff [company] mtroduced certain documentary evidence bearing upon the question as to whether the defendants [Mitchell and his associates] had entered into a Combina- tion with operators and coal producers in Ohio, western Pennsyl- vania, Illinois, and Indiana, competitive fields, to compel the plam- tiff to submit to contractual relations with the United Mine Workers of America relating to the employment of labor and production, contrary to the wishes of plaintiff. The documentary evidence consisted of the declarations of a small percentage of the miners and operators who were present at these conferences. It was not shown that either before or after these declarations were made that those participating in the conference had entered into a conspiracy for an unlawful purpose. _ Indeed, these declarations were brought out in response to a proposition on the part of the miners for an increase of wages. A fair interpretation of the evidence shows that it was the purpose of the defendants to induce the miners of West Virginia to become members of the organization, and thereby secure as high wages as possible, compatible with the suc- cessful operation of the mines of that State by the respectiveowners. They had a perfect right to form a combination to accomplish such purposes by peaceable and lawful methods, and so long as they re- frained from resorting tO unlawful measures to effectuate the same they could not be said to be engaged in a conspiracy to unionize plaintiff's mine. As we have already stated, the evidence fails to show that any unlawful methods were resorted to by these defendants in this in- stance. Therefore the court erred in holding the organization to be unlawful upon the theory that it was guilty of a conspiracy. The opinion of the court below is based upon the ground that the defendants, and those associated with them prior to and at the time of the institution of this suit, had formed themselves into a con- spiracy for the purpose of unionizing the plaintiff's mines without its consent, and for violation of the constitution, common and statu- tory law of West Virginia. Chief Justice Fuller, in Pettibone v. United States; 148 U. S. 197, 13 Sup. Ct. 542, defined "conspiracy" as follows: "A 'conspiracy' is * * * a combination of two or more per- sons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful pur- pose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means." Being of opinion that this is a lawful organization, it necessarily follows that, in order to entitle the plaintiff to the rehef which it seeks, it must be made to appear that at, and before the institution of, this suit, the United Mine Workers of America were attempting to carry out the purposes of their organization by the use of unlawful means. Considerable evidence was introduced by the plaintiff as to what occurred in the vicinity of the plaintiff's mine. [Quotations are here made from the evidence.] While it is not denied by the defendants that they sought by peaceable methods to induce those employed by the plaintiff to join DECISIONS OP OOUETS APFBOTING LABOE, 319 the union, yet they stoutly contend that at no time since the mine has been operated as a nonunion mine have they employed unlawful methods. While Hughes was a representative of the organization, his author- ity only permitted him to use argument and persuasion to induce the employees to become members of the organization. Even though it appears by the evidence in question that the con- duct of the defendants [United Mine Workers] was reprehensible in the highest degree at the time that the mine was being run on a union basis, we conceive of no possible theory upon which such evi- dence would be competent as affecting the conduct of the defendants ia this instance, inasmuch as the evidence fails to show that after the mine began to be operated on a nonunion basis that they united and conspired to use violence, intimidation, and coercion to prevent the plaintiff from operating its mine. In other words, this record clearly shows that the plaintiff for the avowed purpose of protecting its interests adopted a pohcy by which its mines were to be operated on a nonunion basis. At the time of the adoption of this policy by the plaintiff, the negotiations between plamtiff and defendants ceased, therefore the question now presented is : Have not the defend- ants the right as an organization to use all means within their power to organize miners into unions, provided that in so doing no unlawful methods are employed ? As to the view of the court below that the Sherman antitrust law had been violated by the United Mine Workers, the opinion reads: The court below, among other things, expressed the view that the United Mine Workers of America constituted a combination or con- spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, under what is known as the Sherman anti- trust law. We do not deem it necessary to discuss this proposition at any great length. In the first place, there is nothing in the pleadings to raise the question as to whether the United Mine Workers of America are liable under the statute in question, and any evidence that may have been introduced bearing upon this point was therefore immaterial and should have been rejected. There is another reason why we think that this question can not under any view of the case arise in this controversy, to wit, we do not understand that a private person can question the validity of a combination or conspiracy under the Sherman antitrust law for the purpose of having the same declared to be unlawful. The court below also reached the conclusion that the defendants have caused and are attemptuig to cause the nonunion members employed by the plaintiff to break a contract which it has with the nonunion operators. The contract in question is in the following language : "I am employed by and work for the Hitchman Coal & Coke Com- Bany with the express understanding that I am not a member of the Tnited Mine Workers of America, and will not become so while an employee of the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company; that the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company is run nonunion whUe I am in its employ. If at any time while I am employed by the Hitchman Coal & Coke Com- 320 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. pany I want to become connected with the United Mine Workers of America, or any affiliated organization, I agree to withdraw from the employment of said company, and agree that whUe I am in the employ of that company, that I wiU not make any efforts amongst its employees to bring about the unionizLag of that mine against the company's wish. I have either read the above or heard the same read." It wUl be observed that by the terms of the contract that either of the parties thereto may at wiU terminate the same, and while it is pro- vided that so long as the employee continues to work for the plaintiff he shall not join this organization, nevertheless there is nothing in the contract which requu-es such employees to work for any fixed or definite period. If at any time after employment any of them should decide to join the defendant organization, the plaintiff could not under the contract recover damages for a breach of the same. In other words, the employees under this contract, if they deem proper may, at any moment join a labor union, and the only penalty provided therefor is that they can not secure further employment from the plaintiff. Therefore, under this contract, if the nonunion men, or any of them, should see fit to join the United Mine Workers of America on account of lawful and persuasive methods on the part of the defendants, and as a result of such action on their part were to be discharged by the plaintiff, it could not maintain an action against them on account of such conduct on their part. Such being the case, it would be unreasonable to hold that the action of the defendants would render the United Mine Workers of America liable in damages to the plaintiff because they had employed lawful methods to induce the nonunion miners to become members of their organization. Under these circumstances, we faU to see how this contract can be taken as a basis for restraining the defendants from using lawful methods for the purpose of inducing the parties to the contract to join the organization. In concluding the opinion, Judge Pritchard said in part: It should be understood once and for aU that, so long as capital employs legitimate means for the protection of property rights, it is to be accorded the protection of the law; but this does not mean that capital may, by improper methods, form combinations for the pur- pose of preventing labor from organizing for mutual protection. Likewise, it should be definitely understood that the laboring men have the right to use peaceable and lawful methods to imite their forces in order to improve their condition as respects their abUity to earn a decent hving; give their children moral and intellectual train- ing; and secure the enactment of legislation requiring mine owners to adopt such methods as may be necessary to keep their mines in a sanitary condition, and, above aU, to adopt methods to minimize, as much as possible, the occurrence of the awfid catastrophes by which so many human lives have been lost. For the reasons stated the decree of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to dismiss the bUl. decisions of courts affecting labob. 321 Labor Organizations — Legality — Interference with Em- ployment — Strikes — Bittner et al. v. West Virginia-Pittsiurgh Coal Co., United States CircuU Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit (May 28, 1914), ^14 Federal Reporter, page 716. — The questions involved in this action were the same as those in Mitchell et al. v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., 214 Fed. 685 [see p. 315]. In this case, however, the evi- dence showed that violence, intimidation, and coercion were resorted to by the defendants in the case. The district court had granted a prehminary injunction restraining them from the acts of violence, etc., and also from the use of persuasion and other peaceable methods, and from aiding the striking miners by furnishing them money from what was known as a rehef fund, etc. The defendants made a motion to modify the decree so far as it restrained them from the peaceable methods, and, this motion being disallowed, appealed. Judge Pritch- ard, in expressing the court's decision that the decree should be thus modified, said: We think the decree of the lower court in so far as it restrains the defendants from any acts of violence, intimidation, and coercion is proper in view of the evidence. While this is true, nevertheless we are of opinion, for the reasons stated in the case of Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., that the court below erred in entering that Eortion of the decree whereby it is provided that these defendants shall e restrained from resorting to peaceable and lawful methods for the purpose of organizing the miners of that section. It follows that the decree of the lower court should be modified by adding thereto the following proviso : Provided, however, that this restraining order is not intended to prevent any of said employees of the plaintiff company from quitting work for said plaintiff and from severing the relations of master and servant existing between the plaintiff and said employees at the time this order is entered, or from striking or persuading his feUow employ- ees to quit work and strike for their mutual protection and benefit. Provided, further, that this injunction is not intended to prevent any employee of the plaintiff who had ceased to work for said plaintiff to use persuasion, but not violence, to prevent other men from accept- ing employment with the plaintiff in his place. Provided, further, that this injunction is not intended to prevent the employees of plaintiff from joining any lawful labor union and from receiving the nonemployment benefits paid by such union. Provided, further, that this injunction is not intended to prevent the defendants, their associates, agents, and fellow members of the United Mine Workers from supporting any of plaintiff's former em- ployees who have ceased to work for said plaintiff, nor is this injunc- tion intended to prevent any member of the labor union to which such employees ceasing to work for the plaintiff belong from legally assist- ing said employee in securing better terms of employment and in endeavoring to persuade, without violence, any other laborer from taking the place of said striking employee. The decree of the lower court as thus modified is affirmed. 85590°— Bull. 169—15 21 322 BULLETIN OF THE BUKEAXJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. Labor Oeganizations— Libel by Printing in Paper Pub- lished BY Association— Damages— I7mfe(2 Mine Workers of Amer- ica et al. V. Cromer, CouH of Appeals of Kentucky (June 19. 191 Ji), 167 Southwestern Reporter, page 891 .— Reid Cromer brought action against the United Mine Workers of America and G. B. Reed, to recover damages for libel. Judgment in the circuit court for Laurel County- was in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $500, and the defendants appealed, the appeal resulting in the judgment of the court below being affirmed. The first ground assigned for reversal was that the United Mine Workers of America is not a corporation, but a voluntary association, and is not therefore suable in the name of the association. It was held, however, that this defense was waived by not being raised in the proper manner, the association having answered to the merits of Cromer's pleas. As to the case itself. Judge Clay, in delivering the opinion of the court, spoke as follows: The libel complained of was printed in the United Mine Workers' Journal, a newspaper published at Indianapolis, Ind., under the auspices of the United Mine Workers of America, and is as follows: '"The strike breakers in our little strike here are not practical men. They are here to defeat our purpose. They will no't be desirable when we return to work, and will be ordered peremptorily by their employer to move on, go elsewhere over to Indiana, Illinois, etc., to again ille- gitimately enjoy benefits and conditions established by union, good and honest men. Believing that it behooves us to keep you readers informed as to who these men are, we are concluding with a list of the names of the detestable scabs and blacklegs whom we want you to be continually on the lookout for." In the hst of names printed in the paper is the name of Reid Cromer. It appears from the petition that Reid Cromer was a miner. There was a strike in the vicinity in which he was employed. He and his associates did not participate in this strike, but continued to work. It is further charged in the petition that the defendants falsely and maUciously, and with the intent and purpose of injuring plaintiff in his calling and occupation as a coal mmer, made the pubUcation complained of. After setting out the publication, it was alleged that defendants, by the use of the words "detestable scabs and blacklegs," meant that 'plaintiff and his associates were detestable cheats and gamblers, and these words were so understood by their acquaintances and the public generally; that the effect of such publication was to bring them into the contempt, hatred, ridicule, disgrace, and odium of their acquaintances and the pubUc. It was further charged that the publication was intended to and did prevent plaintiff from obtain- ing employment in his occupation as a coal miner, and that he had been damaged in the sum oi $3,000. In addition to a general denial of the allegations of the petition, defendants pleaded that the words "scabs and blacklegs," as used in the article complained of, are uni- versally accepted among miners, and especially among the miners of Laurel County, and by all the persons who knew the plaintiff, as DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 323 meaning that the plaintiff was a person who assisted in breaking strikes, and who accepted lower wages for his work than those ■vmo were known as "the United Mine Workers." The ordinary meaning of the word "blackleg" is a swindler; a dishonest gambler. It also means a strike breaker. Webster's International Dictionary. In the latter sense it is used as a term of opprobrium by workingmen. It is well settled that all written words, which hold the plaintiff up to contempt, hatred, scorn, and ridicule, and which, by thus engender- ing an evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking men, tend to deprive him of friendly intercourse in society, are libelous per se. [Cases cited.] The rule that words are to be understood in mitiore censu [in the less objectionable sense] has been superseded. Words are now construed by the courts in their plain and popular sense. Under this rule, the words "detestable blackleg" are, we think, libelous per se. Labor Organizations— Powers — Fines upon Members — In- vestigation — Monroe et al. v. Colored Screwmen's Benevolent Asso- ciation No. 1 of Louisiana, Supreme Court of Louisiana {Oct. 21, 1914), 66 Southern Reporter, page 260. — John M. Monroe and others brought petition for mandamus against the labor union named, which is Local No. 237 of the International Longshoremen's Asso- ciation. In February, 1912, a strike was declared by the two locals of the association in GuKport, Miss., and the defendant association passed a resolution assessing a fine of from S5 to 125 against any of its members who should go to Gulfport and work while the contro- versy was on. In May the twenty-two plaintiffs in this case went to Gulfport and engaged in work for the employers concerned in the strike. On the next day the defendant association was notified, and it assessed fines of from $5 to $25 on the several plaintiffs. Later plaintiff Monroe was before the association at meetings, and asked an investigation, and one was made by a special committee, which went to Gulfport, and reported that the work was not done by the plaintiffs with the consent of the Gulfport locals, as the plaintiffs claimed, but against their wishes. On their failure to pay the fines the plaintiffs were expeUed from the association, and their working cards withdrawn, without which it was impossible to secure employ- ment in their hne in New Orleans; and the mandamus was sought to compel the association to furnish the cards. Judge Provosty ■dehvered the opinion of the court, affirming a judgment for the respondent association in the civil district court of the parish of Orleans. After stating the facts and the contentions of the parties, he spoke as follows: In support of their contention of their having been condemned without a hearing, they show that under section 4 of article 30 of the by-laws and article 24 of the constitution of the defendant associa- tion they are entitled to a trial before the grievance committee of the associa^aon. 324 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOE STATISTICS. It is true that there is such a committee, and that it is "the duty of said committee to investigate all grievances and report the result of their investigation to the association, at the next regular meeting for final disposition," but we think that the plaintifPs have had the full benefit of a hearing before a committee of their own choice, and that, imder aU the circumstances of the case, they had had all the hearing they can possibly be entitled to. And, besides, there can be and is no denial of the fact that the work they did in Gulfport was without the consent of the locals of that city; and hence that the said section 3 of the rules of the inter- national association was violated, the penalty of which is expulsion. Of what possible use, then, could any further hearing be to them? Their only contention in that connection is that the strike in Gulf- port was ended ; and that therefore they violated no rule of the asso- ciation. But the said section 3 of the rule of the international asso- ciation is not confined to strikes, but reads: "Any member who may allow himself to be employed at any work coming under the jurisdiction of another local without the consent of the local having jurisdiction of the work, shall," etc. So that the plaintiffs violated this rule even if the strike was ended. On the question of whether the Gulfport locals had already ad- justed their differences with the ship agents and stevedores or were stiU "asking for recognition and regulation in handling cotton," the judgment of the said investigating committee, rendered as it was after hearing and approved by the association, is conclusive upon the courts. 6 Cyc. 827. As to the said section 3 of the rules of the international associa- tion being in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the learned counsel of plaintiffs has not pointed out in what respect it is. The contention, if well founded, would render unlawful such associations as the defendant, the lawfulness of which is well recognized. Cyc, Labor Unions; Longshore-Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Or. 527, 38 Pac. 547. Labor Organizations — Relief Funds — Disposition— Liabil- ity FOR Wrongful VsE—Attomey General ex rel. Prendergast et al. v. Bedard et al., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts {June 17, 1914), 105 Northeastern Reporter, page 993. —Joseph Bedard and others ap- pealed from a decree in equity issued from the supreme judicial court, Suffolk County, requiring them to pay into court certain amounts of money alleged to have been in their hands as a trust fund, and to have been wrongfully appropriated or expended. The information, after alleging the raising of a fund by subscription for the relief of the strikers, alleged on information and belief that the personal defend- ants, conspiring and agreeing together, had used substantial portions of the fund for purposes entirely different from those for which it was donated by the contributors and for purposes other than the proper promotion of the objects of the trust; that it had in part been im- properly used for the private and personal uses of the defendants and their associates; that they or some of them had drawn sums there- DECISIONS OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOK. 325 from as salaries; that substantial amounts had been contributed for the board and private expenses of one of the defendants, who was confined in jail; that large amounts had been paid for the transporta- tion to other cities of children for uses in connection with appeals for further contributions; that sums had been paid to counsel and others engaged in defending one of the defendants and others against crimi- nal charges; and that large sums had been turned over to the Indus- trial Workers of the World. The decree of the lower court was affirmed with modifications necessary to make plain the exact liability of the several defendants. Judge Sheldon said in part, in delivering the court's opinion: According to the averments of the bill, the. fund in question was raised by subscriptions as a relief fund, to relieve the necessities of a very great number of men who had engaged in a strike, and who thus had been left without any means of mamtaining themselves and their families. The fund was raised and should be applied for the purposes of a public charitable trust. [Cases cited.] liie evidence heard by the master is not reported, and we can not say that his findings were wrong. The defendants received the money in question as a trust fund. They must account for it, and can be credited only with disbursements which actually were made for proper purposes. They must be charged with everything for which they have not properly accounted. This is a sound principle, and is abundantly supported by authority. [Cases cited.] It was for the defendants to keep the trust fund distinguished from other moneys in their hands; and the consequences of any failure on their part to comply with this duty must fall upon themselves. [Cases cited.] We can not doubt that the defendants, the custodians and managers of this fimd, are under the same obligations as if they expressly nad been made the trustees thereof. [Cases cited.] Labor Organizations — Eight to Strike— Procxteing Dis- charge — Roddy V. United Mine Workers of America et al., Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Mar. 10, 1914), 1^9 Pacific Reporter, page 126. — J. H. Roddy brought action against the United Mine Workers of America and against the district and local organizations affiliated with the same and their individual members, for damages suffered by bim by reason of loss of his employment. It was alleged that the defendants had procured his discharge by threats to strike if the plaintiff, a nonunion man, was retained. Judgment in the district court of Coal Coimty was for the defendants, and on appeal this was affirmed. Judge Brewer in delivering the opinion dis- cussed the question involved, cited the authorities, and set forth the views of the court as follows: We take it as fundamental that any man, in the absence of a contract to work a definite time, has a right to quit whenever he chooses for any reason satisfactory to him, or without any reason. 326 BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOB STATISTICS. We think under the better authority that what an individual may do, a number of his colaborers may join him in doiug, provided the thing to be done is laArful. We quote the words of Chief Justice Alton B. Parker, in Nat'l Protective Assn. v. Gumming, 170 N. Y. 320, 63 N. E. 369 [Bui. No. 42, p. 1118]: « * * * Whatever one man may do alone, he may do in combination with others, provided they have no unlawful object in view. Mere numbers do not ordinarily affect the quality of the act. Workingmen have the right to organize for the purpose of securing higher wages, shorter hours of labor, or improving their relations with their employers. They have the right to strike, that is, to cease working in a body by prearrangement udtD a grievance is redressed, provided the object is not to gratify maUce or inflict injury upon others, but to secure better terms of employment for themselves. A peaceable and orderly strike, not to harm others, but to improve tneir own condition, is not in violation of law." In Clemmitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38, 42 N. E. 367, it is said: "So far as appears by these instructions none of the appellants were under any continuing contract to labor for their employer. Each one could have quit without incurring any civil hability to him. What each one could rightfully do, certainly all could do if they so desired, especially when their concerted action was taken Seaceably, without any threats, vio.ence, or attempts at intimi- ation." And in Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 35 Atl. 53, it is said: "One who procures the discharge of an employee not engaged for any definite time, by threatening to terminate a contract between himself and the employer, which he had a right to terminate at any tin^e, is not subject to an action by the employee for damages, what- ever may have been his motive in procuring the discharge. Quotations were made from Cook's Trade and Labor Combina- tions on the question of the right to strike, expressing views similar to those set forth above, and the opinion concludes: A petition based on the charge that the plaintiff, a nonmember of a labor union, was discharged from his employment because of the demands therefor made by the authorized agents and committees of a labor organization, who informed the common employer that if such nonunion man was not discharged the imion men would strike does not state a cause "Of action for damages against either the labor organization or the individual members thereof, and a demm-rer to such petition was properly sustained. Labor Organizations — Strikes — Conspikact — iNcrrEMENT to Commit Crime — ^Liability as Principal — People v. Ford, District Court oj Appeals, Third District of California {Sept. 10, 1914), IJfi Pacific Reporter, page i 075.— Richard Ford and H. D. Suhr were indicted separately for the murder of one E. T. Manwell on the 3d of August, 1913, in Yuba County, Cal. Conviction was had in the superior court of Yuba Coimty in a joint trial, the verdict being for murder in the second degree, with a sentence of life imprisonment. DECISIONS OF COURTS AFPEOTING LABOK. 327 Both defendants appealed, and by stipulation the appeal of defendant Suhr was to be heard upon the same transcript of record as that of Eord. The judgment of the court below was aflBrmed by the court of appeal as to both defendants, and a rehearing was denied by the supreme court on November 9, 1914. The circumstances leading up to the killing of ManweU were briefly that the defendants were officers and active workers of the Industrial Workers of the World, referred to in the opinion as the I. W. W. The disturbance resulting in the crime under consideration arose out of conditions in the hop fields of Yuba County, the conditions of employ- ment being complained of and a strike organized with the attempt to enforce certain demands as to conditions of employment. It appears from the evidence that on the day of the kiQing of Manwell there were at a large ranch owned by one Durst some 2,000 or 2,500 people of different nationalities, men, women, and children, gathered to pick hops, the picking having begun about the middle of the pre- ceding week. Insanitary lodging conditions and unnecessary hard- ships in the performance of work aroused dissatisfaction, which found expression on Saturday, August 2. Suhr and Ford sent telegrams to different points, informing their associates in the I. W. W. of a strike on the Durst ranch, and asking for speakers and money to support the strikers. The opinion states that: Much testimony was admitted describing in detail the conditions existing at the Durst hop fields. We do not think it necessary to set out this testimony. It showed a situation calling for some radical reform measures in order to make it a desirable place for such num- bers of people to work, both in respect of their moral and physical well-being. Bad as these conditions were, however, they furnished no justification for the tragic events of that Sunday and need not be dwelt upon. Ford was the leader and spokesman of these hop pickers. He conducted their meetings, of which there were several, during Sunday before the 5 o'clock meeting at which 'Manwell was Mlled. These meetings were in the main orderly, but plainly disclosed Ford's mastery and power to lead and control the more or less excited and turbulent body of persons comprising a considerable part of the assembled masses of striking and disappointed people, looking to their leader for guidance and relief. Suhr's telegrams show that it was an I. W. W. movement. In the earlier part of the day Constable Ander- son made an effort to arrest Ford, but being challenged to produce a warrant, and not then being able to do so, and after some rather rough handling by persons around Ford, he desisted, but later a complaint was sworn to before a justice of the peace at Wheatland, and a war- rant was duly issued thereon and placed in Anderson's hands. Manwell was killed at a meeting of the hop pickers at about 5 o'clock' and a deputy sheriff died of gunshot wounds received at that time. Two hop pickers were killed, and other serious injuries inflicted on parties on both sides. There was no claim that Ford 328 BTTLLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. fired the shot which resulted in Manwell's death, though confessions made by Suhr were such as to give rise to the inference that he may have done so. As to the contention of the defendants, appellants in the present instance, the opinion reads: As we understand defendant's position, it is that defendant was at most engaged in conducting a strike, which was not an unlaw- ful act, or that, if he was committing a trespass, it was but a misde- meanor; that, whatever his acts or his words spoken which may have led to the killing, they should have been alleged, and as his acts and words concerned only an undertaking not unlawful, or, if unlawful, was but a misdemeanor, the killing as matter of law, must be held not to have been miu-der in either degree; that, unless the defend- ant's acts and words constituted a felony, he could not be held for murder because they resulted in the death of some one, and at most his offense would be manslaughter because lacking the essential elements of murder. It is hence contended: First, that evidence of a conspiracy was not admissible and can not be considered because the conspiracy was not pleaded; and, second, that evidence which fell short of showing a conspiracy to commit a felony would not support the verdict. We confess to some difficulty in discovering precisely defendant's contention, but have given it as we understand it. The indictment was for murder and was charged in the language of the statute. We entertain no doubt as to the admissibility of evidence of a conspiracy under such an indictment, where the murder was committed while the conspirators were engaged in the consum- mation of some other unlawful act. Upon the question of the responsibility for the acts of the conspira- tors, we conceive the law to be that where one person unites with one or more other persons in an enterprise to commit an unlawful act, whether a felony or misdemeanor, with the intention to withstand all opposition by force, and is present aiding and abetting the deed, and murder is committed by some one of the party in pursuance of the original design, or the unlawful act results in death, he is guilty as the principal or immediate offender. It was not the theory of the prosecution, as claimed by defendant, "that every labor leader is responsible for all the acts of striking work- men, and that each labor leader can be tried under an indictmeat baldly stating that the said labor leader has personally done a specific thing, in this case murder, whereas, in fact, it is sought to hold him responsible for the act of another." The theory of the prosecution was that Ford, as the leader in this instance, was engaged in the unlawful act of resisting arrest by a peace officer armed with a lawful warrant, and that by his words and acts he incited the persons then under his leadership to aid and assist him in such unlawful act, and that Manwell met his death through the act of one or more of these conspirators thereunto induced by Ford. Another complaint was that the trial judge had refused to give charges as to the 'awfulness of a strike and a boycott, and that men have a right to quit work for any reason or no reason singly or in a body, and peaceably to picket or request others to cease work. As to this the court said: DECISIONS OP COUETS AFFECTING LABOR. 329 It is urged that, under the instructions given, the jury might have assumed that striking or picketing or boycotting was an unlawful act, and, to prevent such assumption by the jury, defendant was entitled to have the instructions given. There was no evidence that the kUling occurred whUe the conspirators were in the act of striking, picketing, or boycotting. There was evidence that many of the hop Eickers quit work Sunday morning on their part a strike; that a oycott was declared and was in operation early in the day against certain businesses being carried on in the camp — a store, a restau- rant, a near-beer booth, and a shooting gallery. Manwell was killed at a meeting of hop pickers held at about 5 o'clock of that day under circumstances which will hereinafter be more fully set forth. Suffice it at this point to say that, while ,'t may be assumed that the hop pickers were assembled at this meeting originally to consider or talk over their grievances, it soon, under the leadership of Ford, took on altogether a different complexion. He made it Imown to the people that the officers of the law were approach- ing with an intention to arrest him, and he called upon his followers to stand by him and prevent his being taken. This they did promptly upon the coming of the officers into their midst, and there quickly followed, not only Manwell's death, but other tragic and fatal hap- penings which showed that the sole purpose of the actors was to prevent Ford's arrest at all hazards. The tragedy may be said to have remotely had its origin in the strike; that is, if there had been no strike, there might have been no officers there, and no occasion for their being there. But, so far as the strike and the occurrences of the earlier part of the day are concerned, they became collateral to the events happening at 5 o'clock and immaterial to the issue being tried. The legal right of the parties to strike was not an issue and furnished no justification for killing Manwell in their effort to protect their leader, Ford, from arrest. , The opinion details at length the evidence showing the circumstances of the killing of Manwell, including the appeals of Ford to the strikers to stand loyal and not let the officers take him, saying, "If they do come, I hope you tear them into dog meat, " the crowd responding, "Yes, make mincemeat out of them." Having summed up this evidence, the court said: The principles of law already to some extent pointed out, it seems to us, are clearly applicable to the case here presented, and that the jury were fully justified in finding defendant Ford guUty as a prin- cipal in the murder of Manwell, although he did not himself fire the fatal shot. The conclusion of the jury that the unwarranted attack upon the sheriff and his assistants while in the execution of a lawful duty, resulting in the death of a deputy sheriff and Manwell, was the direct result of Ford's acts and conduct was, we think, fully justified by the evidence. The testimony as to Suhr was then reviewed, and both the evidence of witnesses and his confessions apparently voluntarily made were found to support the judgment in his case, so that after an examina- tion of the whole case the judgment as to both defendants was affirmed. 330 BULLETIN OF THE BTJEEAtT OP LABOR STATISTICS., Labor Organizations — Strikes— Picketing— /n, re LangeU,- Su- preme Court of Michigan {Jan. 5, 1914), 144 NoHhwestem Reporter, page 84I . — Proceedings were brought against Harry LangeU for con- tempt of court in violating" a strike injunction, and lie having been found guilty, the case came before the supreme court on a writ of certiorari. The judgment was affirmed by the majority of the court, while three signed a dissenting opmion. The majority opinion was written by Judge McAlvay, and from it the following is quoted: The petition in these proceedings gives a sufficient r&um6 of the biU to show it charged that complainant in the manufacture of engines at its foundry and plant in Lansmg, Mich., employed a large number of men; that on May 18, 1912, many of these employees, including petitioner, being members of this molders' union, went on a strike and, acting in concert, had been guilty of illegal acts with intent to injure the business of complainant and compel it to accede to their demands as to a scale of wages and hours of work and by acts of violence toward its employees had intimidated them and caused many of them, who desired to do so, to refraia from working for coraplamant and picketed its premises for the purpose of iatimidating its employees and iajuring its business, thereby causing its employees to refrain from work; that such picketing and other unlawful conduct and vio- lence had continued for a long time before the filing of its bill of com- plaint, and such picketing was then being maintained continuously about its premises, and intimidated its employees and others from coming to work or transacting business with it. The said injunction restrained all of the defendants, including peti- tioner, as follows: "(a) From in any manner interfering with the em- ployees of the complainant by way of threats, personal violence, intim- idation, or any other unlawful means calculated or intended to pre- vent such persons from entering or continuing in the employment of the complainant or calculated or intended to induce any such person or persons to leave the employment of the complainant. (6) From congregating or loitering about or in the neighborhood of the premises of the complainant with intent to interfere with employees of com- plainant or from picketing said premises or the approaohes thereto, OB in any manner interfering with the employees of complainant or from in any manner interfering with or obstructing the business or trade of complainant, (c) From in any manner interfering with the free access of employees of complainant to complainant's premises in the city of Lansing, their place of work, and from in any manner inter- fering with the free return of said employees to their place of business or to their homes or elsewhere." Copies of the restraining order were, on July 5, duly served upon the defendants, including the petitioner in these proceedings, (jn July 6 following, the petitioner, who resided about 2 miles from com- plainant's premises, at 5.30 o'clock in the morning, stationed him- seK in the highway directly opposite to one of the entrances to com- plainant's premises and remamed there while its employees were passing and crossing the street to enter complainant's premises to go to work. Three or four other members of the molders' union a£o were present in the vicinity standing 50 feet or more from the peti- tioner. They said nothing to the workmen as they passed and made DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 331 ao physical attempt to interfere with them. They were stajading at or about the same places occupied by pickets on the preceding Satur- daj', and at other times, when petitioner and other strikers were present as pickets, and some of them hooted and called "scab" at the workmen entering complainant's plant. The contentions of petitioner which require consideration are: That the court had no jurisdiction to issue the restraining order against picketing; and that there was no evidence in the case tending to show a violation of the restraining order by petitioner in any respect. This court has held that a circuit court, in chancery, has jurisdiction to issue an injunction restraining interference by labor organizations, and the members of the same, during a strike with the rights of an employer by picketing his premises. Beck v. Team- sters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Ideal Mfg. Co. v. WajTie Circuit Judge, 139 Mich. 92, 102 N. W. 372. The first con- tention, therefore, requires no further consideration. From our examination of all of the evidence in the record, we are satisfied that there was evidence in the case tending to support the finding of the circuit judge. The testimony of petitioner shows that he was a person having some authority in the molders' union; that he understood that the restraining order prohibited picketing and that in his opinion the court had no authority to issue such an order; and that if anyone "went there, without saying anything to the em- ployees or making any disturbance, it would not be punishable. It is clear, from his testimony, that he went there because he thought that he could do it with more discretion than the ordinary members; that he went there willfuUy and in defiance of the order, under the impression that a silent picketing was not unlawful. It appears from the evidence that he had been active and present on former occasions when there was open interference with the employees. It is urged that because petitioner stationed himself at this place and said nothing and did no overt act of interference that his acts, if found to be picketing, were lawful. Such a contention is supported by many authorities. The later and more reasonable rule, however, holds that all picketing is illegal. "The doctrine that there may be a moral intimidation which is illegal, announced by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, was among the first real steps taken in this country toward overturning the rule permitting peaceable picketing * * * and was a forerunner of the lq,ter rule that there can be no such thing as peaceable picketing and consequently that all picketing is illegal." 24 Cyc. 836, citing Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077; Franklin Union V. People, 220 111. 355, 77 N. E. 176; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582; Beck v. Teamsters' Protective Union, supra. The proceedings are affirmed. The dissenting decision, written by Judge Kuhn, is for the most part as follows : After a careful reading of the record in this case, I am not con- vinced that the petitioner should have been found guilty of contempt. In the case of Beck v. Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 520, 77 N. W. 13, 22, in defining a picket, this court said: "As appUed to cases of this character, the lexicographers thus define the word 'picket': 'A body of men belonging to a trades-union sent to 332 BULLETIK OP THE BUREAU OF LABOK STATISTICS. watch and annoy men working in a shop not belonging to the union, or against which a strike is in progress." Cent. Diet.; Webst. Diet. The word originally had no such meaning. This definition is the result of what has been done under it ana the common appUcation that has been made of it. It has also been defined as "relays of guards in front of a factory or the place of business of the employer for the purpose of watch- ing who should enter or leave the same." Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. V. Glass Blowers' Assn., 59 N. J. Eq. 49, 46 Atl. 208. Also "as the establishment and maintenance of an organized espionage upon the works and upon those going to and from them." Otis Steel Co. V. Local Union, 110 Fed. 698. Under these definitions, it is necessary, in order to have picketing, to have a deliberate, organ- ized action on the part of at least more than otfe person. No organ- ized action is shown by this record. This petitioner went on the street of his own motion. He was not a part of a body of men sent to watch and annoy, within the definition in the Beck case. He was only in the immediate vicinity of the plant for a few minutes. He interfered with no one; made no threats. I find nothing in the record to warrant the finding that he annoyed the workmen; in fact, the workmen who were sworn testified that he did not talk to them nor interfere with them in any way. The order of the circuit judge finding the prisoner guilty of criminal contempt should be vacated and set aside, and the petitioner discharged. Labor Organizations — Strikes — Picketing — Injury to Busi- ness — Damages — Berry Foundry Co. v. International Holders' Union, Kansas City Court of Appeals {Jan.- 19, 1914), 164 South- western Reporter, page 245. — The original proceeding in this case was the filing by the company named of a bill for an injunction against the union and other defendants and for damages for unlawfiU acts charged in the petition. The circuit court of Buchanan County issued a temporary injunction which was afterwards made perpetual, and gave the plaintiff damages in the sum of $2,000. An appeal was taken to the supreme court, but on accoimt of the insufficiency of the sum involved it was transferred to the court of appeals. The company conducted a foundry in the city of St. Joseph, Mo., its employees formerly belonging to an organization known as union labor. Following a decision to pay their workmen by the piece instead of by the day, the managing officer of the union conferred with the chief officer of the company, and on their fa iling to agree a strike was threatened, which began on the following Monday, the men quitting work and a portion of them engaging in picket duty. In response to advertisements, other workmen came to take the vacated places, some being turned back by the strikers, while others took employment in spite of the opposition. The testimony was in abso- lute conflict as to the nature of the picketing engaged in and the con- DECISIONS OF COUBTS AFFECTING LABOB. 333 duct, of the strikers and of the employees of the plaintiff company. On this point Judge Ellison, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: Whichever of the parties is right in this radical difference of fact is entitled to prevail; for it has been determined by the supreme court of the State that laboring men have a legal right to strike and quit work in a body, and that they have a right to post men near by to quietly and peaceably persuade other workmen not to take their places. City of St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 [Bui. No. 78, p. 601]; Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212, 32 S. W. 1106 [Bui. No. 4, p. 440]. But they have no right to break the law by using force, intimidation, or threats. Nor have they any right to conspire to break up their late employer's business. Door Co. v. FueUe, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997 [But. No. 81, p. 434]. The evidence was then discussed, the contradictory charges and the obvious falsity of some of the testimony introduced by the de- fendant union being set forth. The conclusions derivable from this testimony, and the decision of the court as to damages, appear in the concluding portion of Judge Ellison's opinion, which is as follows: Amid all the contradiction of witnesses and the exaggeration of statement, the indisputable fact stands out that defendant's manager, Wilkerson, in resentment over plaintiff's changing the plan of work and payment of wages, determined to ruin plaintiff's business and ordered a strike. The testimony showed that such, in effect, was his threat, and he sat by in court and did not deny it. And in carrying out the strike, instead of mild, peaceful, and merely persuasive means, defendants terrorized those who were willing to work, so that they were compelled to stay inside the foundry premises and eat and sleep there, and, if they went abroad, were frequently compelled to have the protection of officers. In our opinion the trial court came to the only conclusion justified by a proper consideration of the evidence. We think the trial court properly allowed damages as prayed in defendant's biU. We think they are not justly hable to be called speculative, or remote. With what was shown to have been done by defendants, serious and substantial damages must necessarily have followed. And they were iu such conservative amount (being put at $2,000 by the trial court) that we think there would be no justifi- cation for us to reserve the judgment on account of some supposed error in ascertaining them, when the whole record plainly shows a greater sum than the judgment. It appears that on account of the assaults, threats, and mtimidations of defendants, plaintiflf was com- pelled to provide for new employees inside the buildings; beds were put up, and a restaurant established. We do not think there was any error in allowing loss of profits as a part of the damage. If one loses profits by the wrongful act of another, there is no more reason why he should not be reimbursed for such loss than if it had been of some other nature. The only diffi- culty concerning such character of damage (it being in some degree intangible) is that it is frequently impossible to show it with that degree of certainty the law requires, and it becomes so much a mat- 334 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEAT7 OF LABOR STATISTICS. ter of guess and speculation that it is disallowed. But in this case, it seems to us to have been demonstrated by the records of the com- pany's business, expenses, income, numbers employed and mode of operation, immediately preceding defendant's unlawful interference and immediately afterwards. The conclusion of the trial court was manifestly right, and the judgment will be affirmed. All concur. Eelief Associations — Railroads — ^Application for Member- ship — Fraudulent Representations — Daughtridge v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., Supreme Court of North Carolina {Mar. 11, 1914), 80 Southeastern Reporter, page 1080. — Charles Daughtridge sued the railroad company to recover for sick benefits claimed to be due him from its relief department, of which he was a member. The com- pany contended that the claim was invalid on the ground that Daughtridge had certified in his application for membership that he was correct and temperate in his habits, and so far as he was aware, in good health and had no injury or disease, constitutional or other- wise, when in fact he was afilicted with syphilis. The employee recovered a judgment in his favor in the superior court of Edgecombe County, North Carolina, and this judgment was affirmed by the State supreme court. The followiug language from the opinion of Judge Hoke shows the position taken by the court : In reference to regular contracts of insurance, section 4808 of Revisal makes provision as foUows: "AH statements or descriptions in any apphcation for a poHcy of insurance, or in the pohcy itself, shall be deemed and held representations and not warranties; nor shall any representation, unless material or fraudulent, prevent a recovery on the poficy." In Alexander's Case (150 N. C. 536), Associate Justice Brown, de- livering the opinion, said: "The company was imposed upon (whether fraudulently or not is immaterial) by such representations, and induced to enter into the contract. In such case it has been said by the highest court that, 'Assuming that both parties acted m good faith, justice would require that the contract be canceled and the premiums returned.' " (Citing Insurance Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 6 Sup. Ct. 837.) WhUe, therefore, it is the fully established position as to ordinary contracts of insurance, coming within the statutory provision, there are so many conditions distinguishing this from such a contract that we think his honor was clearly correct in his view that the contract of membership in the relief department is unaffected by the statute, and, * * * that, in order to sever the plaintiff's membership and deprive him of its benefits, it was necessary to show that the vitiating statements were knowingly false, or made with a fraudulent purpose to mislead the defendant. From a perusal of plaintiff's evidence, uncontradicted in these respects, so far as the record shows, it appears that plaintiff was required by the company to join the rehef department; that he was examined by the physician of the DECISIONS OF COUKTS AFFECTING LABOE. 336 company, who himself seems to have written out the answers in the application; that every mark or indication of syphilis, now relied upon by defendant to defeat recovery, was existent and observable at the time of examination made, and, further, that for the six months that plaintiff was employed, and until he was paralyzed, after 48 hours of. continuous and very heavy work "taking only time to eat," there had been deducted from his pay roll 75 cents, the monthly charge for membership, and that there is no offer to return any part of this amount. While these considerations might not, of themselves, avail to change the terms of a contract otherwise plain of meaning, they, or some of them, are relevant where interpretation is permitted, and were no doubt given consideration by the company m framing their printed form of application for membership. For it will be observed that, in this form signed by the plaintiff, the representa- tions are not positive in terms, as in usual and voluntary applications, for insurance, but, as heretofore noted from the evidence, they are prefaced and affected by the statement: "I certify that I am correct and temperate in my habits, that, so far as I am aware, I am now in good health and have no injury or disease, constitutional or other- wise, except as shown in the accompanying statement made by me to the medical examiner which statement shall constitute a part of this application." From the language of the stipulation with the relevant facts and circumstances attending its execution, we concur, as stated, with the court below, in holding good faith on the part of the appUcant is all that the company have required, or should reasonably require, and that the cause in this respect has been properly submitted to the jury. Strikes — Martial Law — Insurrection — Power to Hold and 'TO Try Offenders — Ex parte McDonald et al., Supreme Court of Montana {Oct. 8, 1914), ^4^ Pacific Reporter, page 947. — This was a habeas corpus proceeding in which Mitchell McDonald and others were petitioners, and a separate proceeding by Dan Gillis. Following disturbances of the peace in connection with local industrial disputes, Governor Stewart, on September 1, 1914, issued a proclamation de- claring the county of Silver Bow to be in a state of insurrection, pro- claiming martial law in it, and ordering military forces there xmder the command of Major Donohue. The forces went into the county and took military possession of it, which continued at the time of the decision of this case. On September 12, McDonald and five others filed in the supreme court petitions for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that they were being unlawfully detained by the governor and Major Donohue and other military officers, who were named as respondents, in that they had been arrested without warrant and were being held without bail, to be tried, without a jury, before an alleged court or tribunal set up by the miHtary authorities, upon charges to them unknown, and this notwithstanding they had infringed no law. The respondents made return, setting forth their official character, the 336 BULLETIN OF THE BUBEAU OP LABOE STATISTICS. proclamation of the governor and one made by Major Donohue upon his arrival in the county; and that the county was still in a state of insurrection, and the detention of the nven, alleged to be leaders of the insurrection, was necessary for the purpose of the military occupa- tion. This answer also stated that it was the purpose to surrender them to the civil authorities as soon as it could safely be done with reference to the suppression of the present state of insurrection. Upon the return and the evidence taken at the hearing, the court made an order denying the release of the petitioners, with leave to re-petition after 30 days, if at that time they had not been delivered to the civil authorities and the courts were then open and able to execute their process. On September 24, 1914, Dan Gillis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging unlawful detention by the same respondents, and also that he had been restrained by virtue of a commitment issued on September 21 by Jesse B. Roote as major and judge of a certain summary court set up by the military authorities upon a charge of assaulting and resisting an officer, in which proceeding said Roote had assumed to adjudge the petitioner guilty and to sentence him to be imprisoned in the county jail for the term of 11 months and to pay a fine of 1500. The petition alleged that the com-ts of the county were open for the trial of causes. The return to this petition made by the military officers as respond- ents admitted the detention and defended on the ground of the authority of the summary court, and of the lack of jurisdiction of the supreme court to discharge the petitioner. The supreme court held first that the governor had the constitu- tional right to detail the militia to a portion of the State where a state of insurrection existed, and that his determination that such a state existed and continued to exist was conclusive upon the court. Discussing further the cases of the five petitioners who had been simply arrested and held. Judge Sanner, who delivered the opinion, said: It was distinctly asserted in the returns, and established to our satisfaction by the evidence taken upon the hearing, that McDonald and his copetitioners had not been arrested and were not being held for trial before any court-martial or other military tribunal, but that they had been arrested as leaders and inciters of the insurrection, and were being held as necessary measures for its suppression, to be turned over to the civil authorities for trial as soon as that could safely be done. After a consideration of all that was said in argu- ment and of practically all the accessible literature on the subject, we are convinced that the theory which accords the least power to the governor and to the militia in cases of insurrection is that he acts as a civil officer of the State, and that the military forces under him operate as a sort of major police for the restoration of public order; and we confidently assert that under this theory the arrest DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. 337 and detention, under the circumstances stated, can be justified and must be upheld. The release of McDonald and his copetitioners was therefore denied; but since the justification is necessity, and since it can not obtain beyond the period of such necessity, we granted leave to reapply, having in nund that the course of events might or naight not demonstrate the detention of these petitioners beyond the time indicated to be unnecessary. Taking up the case of GiUis, Judge Sanner discussed the question of the jurisdiction of the court, taking the view that the martial law which coiild lawfully be proclaimed by the governor was not suffi- ciently inclusive to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or the convic- tion of a civilian for crime, without trial by jury. With regard to another contention of the mihtary authorities, Judge Sanner said in part: It is insisted, however, that under aU the decisions the executive can estabUsh martial law in time of war when the ordinary tribunals are not open, that an insurrection is war, and that the proof at bar shows the civU. tribunals of SUver Bow Coimty to have been closed. , When in domestic territory the laws of the land have become suspended, not by executive proclamation, but by the existence of war, the executive may supply the deficiency by such form of martial law as the situation requu-es, but we deny that insurrection and war are convertible terms. Judge Sanner said that the court was not influenced by the argu- ment that in case of prolonged insurrection, the summary trial of offenders would be preferable to detention; also that the statutory provisions for change of venue take care of the possibility that a trial by jury, fair to the State, could not be had in the courts of Silver Bow County on account of the state of public feeling, and con- tinued : Martial law, however, is of all gradations, and although the gov- ernor can not, by proclamation or otherwise, establish martiallaw of the character above discussed, he is not barred from declaring it in any form. We must therefore assume that, in using that phrase in his proclamation, he meant only such degree or form of martial law as he was constitutionally authorized to impose. As we have seen above, he was authorized to detail the militia to suppress the insurrection and to direct their movements, without regard to the civil authorities, and thej could in the performance of their work take such measm-es as might be necessary, including the arrest and detention of the insmrectionists and other violators of the law, for delivery to the civil authorities ; but neither he nor the military under him can lawfully punisb. for insurrection or for other violations of the law. The courts can not be ousted by the agencies detailed to aid them; nor can their functions be transferred to tribunals un- known to the constitution. The conclusion as to GiUis's case was as follows: The trial and commitment of petitioner Gillis were void, and his detention thereunder can not be upheld. But he is not entitled to 85590°— Bull. 169—15 22 338 BULLETIN OF THE BUEEATJ OF LABOE STATISTICS. his release. The recowi discloses an abortive attempt to try and punish him for an alleged violation of the laws of the State. He must, therefore, be remanded to the custody of respondent3, to be dealt with according to law. Strikes — Use of House as Part of Employee's Compensa- tion — Damages for Ejection — Lane v. Au Sable Electric Co., Supreme Court of Michigan {June 1, 1914), 14"^ Northwestern Re- porter, page 546. — Wdham Lane was chief operator at the substation of the defendant company at Muskegon Heights. As a part of his compensation he had the use of a dwelling house. After a strike by other employees oi the company he also left his employment. The company gave him notice to vacate the house, and then evicted him. He testified that the furniture was damaged to the extent of $14.50, which the company conceded, and judgment was entered for this amoimt in the circuit court of Muskegon County on a directed ver- dict. The plaintiff carried the case up by writ of error, claiming that it should have been given to the jury on the question of whether excessive force was used, and also upon the question of damages because of mortification, humiliation, and injured feeling, caused by having his household effects put into the street in the presence of onlookers. The court affirmed the judgment of the court below. Judge Moore, who deHvered the opinion, saying: The record is barren of proof of forcible entry or of the exercise of excessive force It also shows that most of the onlookers were strikers or sympathizers with the strikers and the plaintiff. The relation of landlord and tenant between the parties did not exist. It was the relation of employer and employed; the plaintiff being in possession of property belonging to the employer by virtue of his employment. When the plamtiff volimtarily severed the relationship which entitled him to the use of the property, that moment he ended his right to its use. Suppose a maid servant was employed at a monthly wage of $20 and the use of a furnished room in the house of her employer, and should then go on a strike and refuse to do any work, could she stiU insist upon the right to use the furnished room ? A statement of the proposition shows its unrea- sonableness, and yet it is like the instant case in principle. Wages— Collection — Identification Card— .BowmcZifts v. Mis- souri Padjic Railway Co., St. Louis Court of Appeals (April 7, 1914), 165 Southwestern Reporter, page 818. — John Roumelitis was a Greek employed as a laborer by the railroad company named. On quitting his employment he left without securing from the section foreman the usual identification card, intended to show that the holder was en- titled to the sum represented by a certain item on the pay roll. Later a friend wrote for the employee a letter requesting the foreman to send DECISIONS OF COURTS AJPFECTING LABOB. 339 the card to a certain address. This was done, but some other Greek secured the card and collected the money, the paymaster supposing him to be Roiunelitis. The cotirt, in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff and determining that the company was not liable to him, spoke by Judge Reynolds, as follows : This identification card is in no sense commercial or negotiable paper. It is not even an order for the payment of money. Its use is solely for the purpose of identifying the bearer of it, as one entitled to receive pay as his name appeared on the pay rolls of the company. It was m such form as to warn the person in whose favor it was issued that the holder of it was the man who was entitled to be paid as his named amount appeared on the pay roll. When the plamtiff here, presumed to know this, directed that it be sent to a given address by mail, he took the risk of its falling into wrong hands, for he must be held to have known that it would serve the purpose of identifying whoever had possession of it as the man entitled to receive the money. Hence it was at his risk and his risk alone and on his express direction that the appellant transmitted this identifica- tion card by mail, addressed to respondent at a designated number in the city of St. Louis. That it arrived there is not questioned. That some one other than the plaintiff obtained possession of it and used it for identification and so obtained the pay check is clear. But surely appellant is not at fault for tJiat and can not be charged with negUgence. This on the famifiar maxim that "where one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occiured must sustain it." INDEX. Allen contract labor: Page. Action and penaKles 48,49 "Offer of employment" 47,48 Antitrust law: Exemption of labor organizations 49,60 Liability of members of labor organizations under... . . 137-142 Monopolies . 49 50 Restraint of trade 83-55 Arbitration oflabor disputes (United States statute) . . 50-53 Assignments of wages. {See Wages.) Blacklist . 63_56 Boycotts: Combinations in restraint of trade 53-55, 162-167 Interference with employment 313, 314 Liability of members oflabor organizations for damages 137-142 Rival unions 303-305 Shop employing only nonunion men 301-303 Uulairlists 270-272 Children: Age limit as affecting liability, etc 113,114,269 Duty to instruct 286,287 Misrepresentation of age 64, 65 Civil-service pension funds 66, 57 Collective agreements, effect on individual contract 297, 298 Combinations 50,53-55,162-167 Company doctor, liability for negligence of 291, 292 Conspiracy: Evidence 143-147 Incitement to commit crime 325-329 Interference with employment 294-297, 303-305, 313-321 Contempt of court: Evidence 305, 306 Inciting others to violence 306-309 Limitation of actions 133-135 Review of writ of injimction on habeas corpus proceedings 135-137 Contract of employment: Breach 57,58,275,276 Disobedience as ground for discbarge 274,275 Excess work by convict 60 Life employment 57,58,272-274 Review of decisions on 17,18 Strike as terminating 338 Term 276 Use ofhouse as part compensation 338 Convict labor 68-60 Eight-hour day 116-119 Employer and employee: Acts of employee injuring third party '.. 276-278 Employers' associations, enforcement of rules of 278-283 Employers' liability: Abrogation of defenses 60-64,197-204 Assumption of risks 65,66,70,71,73,81,283-287 Child unlawfully employed 64, 65 Classification of employments 60,61 Contributory negligence 76, 77, 82, 98, 99, 285, 286 Course of employment 83, 84, 99 Duty of employer to instruct 284,286,287 Effect of workmen's compensation act 109, 1 10 Employees, etc., riding free 102-104, 288-290 Evidence of negligence 73,74 Extraterritorial effect of State statute 107, 108 Federal and State laws 77-80 Federal railroad statute 79-103 Assumption of risks 81 Contribntory negligence 82, 98, 99 Comparative negligence 99, 100 Contracts of waiver 84,85 Interstate commerce, inclusions and exclusions under 85-98 Interstate commerce, review of decisions as to 29 Reference to statute 99,100 Fellow service 73 Incompetence of fellow servant 283,284 Mimicfpalities 284,285 Orders of superior 105,106,285 Fenslon funds 74,78 341 342 INDEX. Employers' liability— Continued. -^"S*- Fioximate cause of injury 67,68,76,77 Eeview of decisions on 24-32 Safe place to work 81,110-112,285,287,288 Safety regulations as affecting 65-69,72-77,108,109 Statutory notice of injury 112,113 Waivers 74,75 Warning of new dangers ^%^^ Who may recover damages 78-82 Employers' liability insurance 291,292 Examination and licensing of plumbers 114,115 Factory regulations: Application to laundries 65,66 Review of decisions on 22 Safety from location 68,69 Violation as affecting emplojers' liability 65-69,73 Washrooms, constitutionality of law requiring 115,116 Hours of labor: Effect of emergency or accident 122-125,130-133 In public laundries 119, 120 Liability of employer for violation of statute 129,130 Of fectory and shop employees 120,121 Of females.., 121,122 Of policemen and firemen 117,118 On public worljs .". 116-119 On railroads 122-133 Review of decisions on 20-22 Injunction 133-137,162-167,270-272,298-320 Interference with employment 292-301,313-321,325,326 Labor organizations: Boycotts.. 137-142,162-167,270-272,298-305,313,314 Collective agreements 297,298 Damages.... 137-142,278-283,314,315,322,323,332-334 Exclusive employment on public worJcs 186-188 Fmes 323,324 Inciting to injury 160-162,306-309,326-329 Legality 315-321 Liability of members for damages 137-142,162-164 Libel by imion paper 322,323 Mandamus for injunction 310-313 Picketing 305,306,321,330-334 Protection of employees as members 147-160 Relief funds, accountability for 324,325 Eestramt of trade 162-167 Review of decisions on 42-46 Rival unions 303-305 Strikes 160-162,321,325-338 Transportation of explosives in interstate passenger trains 143-147 Unlawful combinations 143-147,162-167 Martial law courts, powers of 335-338 Mechanics' liens, right to 167-170 Mine regulations: Boundary commission 170,171 CertiGed foremen 70,71 Classes of mines 72,73 Employment of children 113,114 EmpIojTnent of mining boss 71 Inspection 72 Review of decisions on 23 Violations as affecting employers' liability 70-73 Weighing coal 171,172 Minimum-wage laws, constitutionaliiiy of 172-177 Mothers' pension law, construction of 177, 178 Pension funds 56,57,74,75 Railroad regulations: Application to electric railways 77,106,107,179 "Cars".. 75,76 City ordinance 76,77 Construction trains 181,182 Headlight law 182,183 " Interstate commerce" 83 -98, 123, 124 "Movement of trains" 127 OfSces operated day and night 128, 129 "On duty" 83,125-127,133 "Operating railroad " 104 QuaUflcations of employees 178,179 Review of decisions on 22,23 Safety appliances 85,86,102,103,106,107,179-183 Switch tenders as operators, etc 129 Switching as operation of trains 179-181 Violation as affecting employers' UabiUty 75-77,85,86 Waiting time 133 "Yards^' 75 Relief associations: Acceptance of benefits 84,85,100-102 Fraud in application for membership 334,335 Review of decisions on 42 Strikes: Legality of 270-272,321,325,328 Mention In advertisemants for help 184-186 Sunday labor 184 INDEX. 343 Wages: rage. Assigntnent,wife's consent to 188,189 Fraudulent use of identiflcation card 338,339 Payment in scrip 189,11(0 Payment on termination of employment 190, 191 Eatesof 172-177,186-188,191-195 Review of decisions as to 18-20 Seamen's 183,184 Time of payment 195-197 Workmen's compensation: Abrogation of defenses . 197-204 Accident 205, 206, 240, 241 Aged employees . . 256,257 Amount of benefits 207-214,256-258 Ap;plication of law to foreign contract 226 Arising out of and in coiuse of employment 206, 241-247, 266 Casual employment 213-215 Classification of employments 216,216,238-240 Constitutionality of statute 197-204,216-226,231,232 Court aid, review, etc 229,230,236,249,250,264 Death separate benefits for 212,213,266,267 Default of contributions 206, 207 Dependency 226-229 Disability or incapacity 207-213,230,231,241,256-262,268,269 Disease 205,247-249,258-262 Distribution of benefits 230 Election to accept 109,110,204,205,221-225,230-232,263 Excluslveness of remedy .- 224, 225, 232, 236-238 In course of "employment 241-245, 247-250 Intentional and willful misconduct 242, 243, 250 Limipsums 207 Medical and hospital services 253-255 Negligence of third party 250-253,266,267 Nonresident aUen beneficiaries 255, 256 Occupational disease 25S-262 Parent's separate right of action 264, 265 Part-time labor, computation for 234,235 Previous injury 246, 247 Procedure 226,227,229,230,236-238,251-253,264,267,268 Refusal to accei>t medical treatment 253-255 Review of decisions on 32-42 Seamen 265 Subrogation to rights of action 267, 268 Unlawful employment of child 269 "WiUfulacf' 232-234,265,266 List of Cases. .^dams V. Acme Whit3 Lead & Color Works 268, 259 Adams v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry . Co 286, 287 Ainsley v. John L. Roper Lumber Co 287, 288 Ainsley ». Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co 105 Albeeo. Weinberger 117,118 American Radiator Co. ». Eogge 226 Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co 234, 235 Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Georgia 182, 183 Attorney General v. Bedard 324, 325 Baisdrenghien ». Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co 71 Baltic Mming Co. v. Houditon Circuit Judge 310-313 Barbour Flax Spinning Co. v. Hagerty 209 Barrett v. Gray's Harbor Commercial Co 206, 207 Bateman Manufacturing Co. ». Smith 266, 267 Bausbach II. Reifl 294-296 Bay V. Merrill & R ing Lumber Co 97 Bayne v. Riverside Storage & Cartage Co 245, 246 Becker ». Hopper 168 Bentley, inre 226 Berry Foundry Co. v. International Molders' Union 332-334 Big Jack Mining Co. ». Parkinson 72,73 Birmingham Ledger Co. v. Buchanan 277 Bittner ». West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co 321 Bomhoft p. Fischer 111,112 Bravis ». Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co 87,88 Bumham 1). Dowd 270-272 Bums, inre 212 Byland ». E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co 73,74 Cement Gun Co. v. McGivem 298-301 Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Thompson 103,104 Chattanooga & Tennessee River Power Co. v. United States 119 Cheevers, in re 213 Chicago & Erie Railroad Co. ». Lain 106, 106 Chicago, B.& Q. Railroad Co. ». United States 179,180 Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. c. Armuth 67,68 Cincinnati, N.O.&T. P. Ry. Co. !). Swann's Admx 98,99 City of Marengo ». Rowland 186 City of Milwaukee 11. Althofl 266 City of Milwaukee ». Rltzow 267 344 LIST OF OASES. Page. City of Montgomery, Tlie 183,184 City of Savannah v. Jordan 284,285 Clarkson ». Laiblan 313,314 Clem K.Chalmers Motor Co 242,243 Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. Ey. Co. v. Marshall 188,189 Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Schuler 190,191 Coakley !>. Mason Manufacturing Co 204,205 Cole ». Sloss-Sheffield Steel & lion Co 113,114 Commonwealth v. Libbey 184-186 Connole v. Norfolk & Western Ey . Co •- - - 263 Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Ujack 109, 110 Coppage y. Kansas 147-160 Corley 0. Rivers 274,275 Courter y. Simpson Construction Co 264 Cousins V. Illinois Central Eailroad Co 88, 89 Cripp.inre 266,267 Crooks D. Tazewell Coal Co 61,62 Daughtridge v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co 334, 335 Dav& 1). Holland 114,115 Dazy 11. Apponaug Co 228 Deal ». Coal & Coke Ey. Co 95 Debrot v. Marion County 177, 178 Deibelkis K. Link-Belt Co 216-218 De Constantin v. Public Service Commission 249, 250 De Zeng Standard Co. c. Pressey 207-209 Diaz, in re 264 Dixon v. Central of Georgia-Ry. Co 289 Dodge ». Chicago G. W. Railroad Co 102,103 Donovan, tare ■ 245 Dupiey ». Maryland Casualty Co 268,269 Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce 62-64 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States 53.^55 Eng D. Southern Pacific Co 86,87 Erie Railroad Co. D. New York 123,124 Erie Railroad Co. v. Williams 195,196 Ethier,inre 212,213 Fairbanks!). McDonald 314,315 Farley 11. New York, N.H. & H. Railroad Co 81 FredE. Sander, The (election) 232 Fred E. Sander, The (scope of law) 265 Gallagher, in re 227 Gaynor, inre 214,215 George c. Quincy, O. & K. C. Railroad Co 75 Georgia & Florida Railway, inre 50-.'53 Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr 301-303 Gompers ». United States 133-135 Gorrellc. Battelle 230,231 Grand Trunk Western Ey. Co. v. Lindsay 99, 100 Grant Bros. Construction Co. v. United States 48,49 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States 127 Gregutis v. Waolark Wire Works 235, 256 Grow V. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co 92,93 Gulla». Barton 297,298 Heflemani). Whittlsey 296,297 Heflroii, ex parte 135-137 Henry Steers (Inc.) v. Dunnewald 206 Herriok , in re 226 , 227 Hillestadv. Industrial Commission 269 Hills u. Blair 243, 244 Hoban ti. Dempsey 303-305 Hogarty v. Philadelphia & E. Ry. Co 84,85 Howard, inre [ ] ..-....- ^i^^n Hughes 1). Indiana Union Traction Co '. . " ' " 77 Hughes ». Traeger 56,.57 Hume c. Seattle Dock Co 169 j-q Humphreys!). Raleigh Coal & CokeCJo 70 71 Hurle, inre !.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 260-262 Huyett V. Pennsylvania Eailroad Co 225,226 Illinois Central Railroad Co. D. Behrens ' ' " 91 92 Jnr] ian apolis Traction & Terminal Co. ti. Isgrig !.!!!!!!!!!!!!!.!!!!!!!!!"."!'!!"'!" bsS Intern ational Harvester Co. !). Industrial Commission ' ] 210 211 International Harvester Co. of America t). State of Missouri 49 50 Irving 1. Neal ;. 162-164 Jackson D. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co gg Janes, inre 230 Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. t). Blagg 203 204 Jendrus c. Detroit Steel Products Co ..!!!.!!!!!!!!!!!! 253-K5 Johnson v, Aetna Life Insurance Co [ 292-294 Johnson V. London Guarantee & Accident Co 259,260 Jones V. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co 78, 79 Keaney,inre ." j39 j4q Kenney v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co g| j!3 Kentucky State Journal Co. I). Workmen's Compensation Board 197-203 Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor igg King D. Vlicoloid Co 264 2*5 Kirveni). Wilds ] " '195 Kltack ». Chicago Street Ry. Co ......".' 289 290 La Casso ». New Orleans, T. 4 M. Eailroad Co .- 8g LIST OF OASES. 345 Page. La Mere ». Railway Transfer Co 181,182 Lane ». Au Sable Electric Co ' '" 338 Langell, in re ' ' 330-3S2 Law!). Illinois Central Railroad Co '..'..'.'.'. '.'. 94,95 Lawlor ». Loewe (knowledge of members) 137-140 Lawlor v. Loewe (liability of members) . . . 140-142 Limron c. Blair " ' 211,212 Liondale Bleacb, Dye & Paint Works c. Riker 205,206 Hoyd ». Southern Railway Co 96,97 Longfellow ». City of Seattle '. '.".'".' 74,75 Magnuson ». McAdam 285 Malette ». City of Spokane 191-195 Maronen v. Anaconda Mining Co 73 Martinelli, in re ....!.!!!!!...!...!!!.!!!!!.!!! 229, 230 Matheson v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co 218-221 Matsuda v. Hammond ■ 276 May Creek Logging Co. ». Pacific Coast Casualty Co 291,292 Mayor, etc., of Savannah v. Jordan 284, 285 McCalman v. Illinois Central Railroad Co 290, 291 McCarty ». R. E. Wood Lumber Co 284 MoClary ». Knight 65,66 MoClaugherty v. Rogue River Electric Co 108, 109 McDonald, ex parte 335-338 McGarvey ». Independent Oil & Grease Co 267, 268 McGrady ». Charlotte Harbor & Northern Ry. Co 75,76 McRoberts v. National Zinc Co 236-238 McWeeny ». Standard Boiler & Plate Co 232-234 Meese ». Northern Pacific By. Co 250, 251 Meley, inre 241 Meniz o. Quissett Mills 112 MilUken v. A. Towle & Co 246, 247 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States 129 Mitchell V. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co 315-320 Mockett V. Ashton 207 Monroe v. Colored Serewmen's Benevolent Association 323,324 Murphy, inre 229 Muzikv. Erie Railroad Co 249 Myers ». Pittsburgh Coal Co 70 Nelson, inre 227,228 NesbltB. GibUn 275,276 Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz 251-253 Newcomb v. Albertson 247, 248 New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern 298-301 Nichols, in re 213 Nickereon, in re 265, 266 North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary 83, 84 Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States 125 O'Connell v. Simms Magneto Co 209, 210 Opsahl V. Northern Pacific Ry. Co 94 Osborne's A dmr. r. Cincinnati, N. 0.,& T. P. By. Co 125-127 Padgett c. Seaboard A. L. Ry 90,91 Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal 164-167 Panasuk, inre 253 Pennell v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co 102 Pennsylvania Company v. Cole 82 Pennsylvania Company B. Good 57,58 Peoples. Ford 326-329 Peoples. Solomon 115 lie Phillips V. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co 66, 67 Fiazzi V. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co 72 Pierson v. Kingman Milling Co 272-274 Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania 170, 171 Prendergast v. Bedard r 324 , 325 Pulse t>. Spencer 69 Rail& River Coal Co. v. Yaple 171,172 Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co 244 Reck V. Whittlesberger 236 Beeves. Northern Pacific Ry. Co 99 Began s. Tremont Lumber Co 189 Beimers s. Proctor Publishing Co 250 Eesener s. Watts, Bitter & Co 275 Blley s. Massachusetts 121, 122 Eittenhouse & EmbreeCo. s. Wm. Wrigley, jr., Co 167 Roddy c. United Mine Workers 325,326 Eodzborskic. American Sugar Refining Co 112.113 Eosholts. Worden-AllenCo 110,111 Eoumelitis s. Missouri Pacific By. Co 338,339 Ryan et al. ». United States 143-147 Sabellas. Braziliero 214 Sanders s. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co 89 Sartain s. Jefferson City Transit Co 104 Saunders 8. Southern Ry. Co 92 Schaefiferp. DeGrottola 214 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. s. Horton 80 Shades. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co 224,225 Shenandoah Lime Co. ». Mann 58,59 Simpsons. O'Hara 172,173 Slnnes s. Daggett ~ 257,268 346 LIST OP OASES. Page. Smelting Co. !). Ujaok 109,110 Smith ». Mt. Clemens Sugar Co 68,69 Smith ». Texas 178,179 Sonai). Aluminum Castings Co 306.306 Spokane* I.E. Railroad Co. c. Campbell 106,107 Spokane & I.E. BailroadCo. v. United States 179 States. Bunting , 120,121 State t), Chicago, M. & P. S. By. Co 216,216 State ». Frank 60 State 0. Prudential Coal Co 196,197 State B. Quinlan 160-162 Steiner, ex parte 116,117 Stettler 1). O'Hara 173-177 Stone V. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co 286 Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. ». Beauchamp 64,65 Sullivan, in re -■ 241 Sundine, inre 244 Sweetsero. State 118,119 TamowskiB. Lake Shore &M. S. By. Co 278 Taylor t). Taylor 79,80 Tennessee Coal, I. . Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co 128,129 United States K. New York, O. & W. Ry. Co 131-133 United States ». Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (waging time) 133 United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (unavoidable accident) 122, 123 United States!). Oregon-Washington E. & N. Co 129,130 United States v. Pere Marquette Bailroad Co 180, 181 United States v. Southern Pacific Co 124, 125 Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Stilwell 60,61 Voorhees v. Smith Schoonmaker Co 248 249 Wabash Railroad Co. v. Gretzinger 76 77 Wabash Bailroad Co. v. Hayes 77 78 Wagner v. Chicago & Alton Eaihoad Co 100-102 Walters v. Durham Lumber Co 283 284 Wendt V. Industrial Insurance Commission !...!..!.!!! ^ I .! 1 ! 238* 239 Wheeling Terminal Co, w. Russell " 9798 Wong Wing, ex parte !.!.!!!!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 119 120 Wright v. Hoctor 18fwl88 Young ». Duncan ...!.....!..!.!. ^.i.i.!!!.!! 221-223 Zappalaf. Industriallnsurance Commission ]!!!'!*!JiI!I!ii 240 241 (Continued from sv'^arvi page of cover.) Women in Industry. , No. 1. Houis, eamingg, and' dwration of employment of wage-earning women in selected industries in the Bistrict of Col uiabia. (Bui. No, 116.) ] No. 2. Working hours of women in the pea canneries of Wisconsin. (Bui. No. : 119-) . ■ No. 3. Employment of wonien in power laundries in Milwaukee. (Bul. No. 122.) \^o. 4. Hours, earnings, aad conditions of labor of women in Indiana mercantile estabiishmenta and garment factories. (Bul. ;No. 160.) Workmen's insurance and Coinpensation (including laws relating thereto). Nt). 1. Care of tuberculous wage earners in Germany. (Bul. No. 101.) - — No. 2. British National Insurance Act, 1911. (Bul. No. 102.) "ilo, 3. Sickness and accident insurance law of Switzerland. (Bul. No. 103.) No. 4. Law relating to insurance of salaried employees in Germany. (Bul. No. 107.) , ^o. 5, Workmen's compensation law.3 of the United States and foreign countnea. ■- (Bul. No. 126.) ,'■ - '•^o. 6. Compensation for accidents to employees of the United States, (Bul. - , No. 155.) ; ' ^ ,-■■ ' Industrial A.ccidbits and Syg'iene. No. 1. Lead poisoning in potteries, tile works, and porcelain enameled sanitary ware factories. (Bul. No. 104.) No. 2. H:,-.giene of the painters' trade. (Bul. No. 120.) No. 3. Dangers to workers from dusts and fumes, and methods of protection. - ~ 'Ko. 2. Decisions of courts and opiniona affecting labor, 1912. (Bul. No. 112!) ■ " No. 3. Labor laws of the United States, with decisions of courts relating thereto. (BuJ. No. 148.) ■ "No. 4. Decision? of courts and opinions affecting labor, 1913. (Bul. No, 152.) '" 5. Laborloglrlatioa of 1914. -(Bul. No. 1660- ■ ' Foreign Labor Laws. »- _ - N o. 1. 4.dmini3tTation of labor laws and factory inspection in certain European countries. (Bul. No. 142.) Miscellaneous Series. No 1. Statistics of unemployment and the work of employment offices in the United States. (Bul, No. 109.) No. 2. Prohibition of nightwork of young persons. (Bul. No. 117.) No 3. Ten-hour maximum working day for women and young persons. (Bul. No. 118.) ' ' ' No. 4. Employers' welfare work. (Bul. No. 123.) _ ' _ , _ No. -5. ^&DVemment aid to home owning and housing of worldng people in foreign - / ',' countries. (Bul. I^o. 158.) i ■ No 6 Short-unit courses for wage earners, and a factory school experiment. ■ ' " (Bul. No.- 159.) No 7 Industrial survey of Eichmond, ya., for the purposes of vocational educa- ■ '■ tion. (Bul. No. 162.) -. _ - - tmnf^o' 8 Minimum-wage legislation in the United States and foreign countries. - -■ ■ (Bul. No. 167.) 'i- t h