THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICACIO A HISTORY OF THE GREEIs-EAOKS MITCKELL 5feui ^ork Hate QlolUge of Agriculture At GlorttBll MttiuerBttH 3tl(ara. 5J. 1. Hihtarg HG 604.M6™"""'™'"'>"-"'™''' *lliilHlBSi!Miffif,"''^'=''^' *'•" special 3 1924 013 815 414 •X^-^rv--"'^ Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924013815414 THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS ISSUED IN COMMEMORATION OF THE COMPLETION OP THE PIEST TEN YEARS OP THE UNIVERSITY'S EXISTENCE AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD OP TRUSTEES ON THE RECOMMENDATION OP THE PRESIDENT AND SENATE EDITED BY A COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE SENATE EDWAED CAPPg STABB WILLARD CUTTING EOLLIN D. SALISEnEY JAMES KOWLAND ANGELL "WILLIAM I. THOMAS SHAILEB MATHEWS OABL DAELING BUCK FREBEEIC IVES CABPENTEE 03KAE BOLZA JULIUS STIEGLITZ JACQUES LOEB THESE VOLUMES ARE DEDICATED TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OP OtJR TIME AlfD COUNTRY WHO BY WISE AND QENEROtTS GIVING HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SEARCH AFTER TRUTH IN ALL DEPARTMENTS OP KNOWLEDGE HISTORY OF THE GREENBACKS A HISTORY OF THE GREENBACKS WITH SPECIAL KEFERENCE TO THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ISSUE: 1862-65 BT WESLEY CLAIR MITCHELL OP THE DEPAKTMENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS SECOND SERIES VOLUME IX CHICAGO THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 1903 / ^\ Gb CopyHght 1903 BY THE UNIVEE8ITY OF CHICAGO TO J. W. M. AND L. M. ML PREFACE Apologies must be made both for the bulkiness and for the fragmentary character of the following monograph. These defects are due to the same cause: an attempt to utilize all the well-authenticated statistical material bearing upon the subjects treated. The amount of labor entailed by this attempt was so large that I have been unable to carry the discussion beyond the first four years in the history of the greenbacks. Even within this brief period two impor- tant topics are passed over. Nothing is said of the effects of the greenbacks upon foreign trade, and no comparisons are made between American and foreign experiences with paper money. The former topic is omitted frqm lack of time to get the refractory statistical data relating to it into significant shape ; indeed, my dealings with the figures incline me to doubt whether any other than a speculative treatment is feasible. As for the latter topic, I soon discovered that foreign comparisons presented too large a subject to be dealt with as a side issue in such a monograph as the present. Moreover, the consequences of the abandonment of the specie standard in which I have been most interested are such as can be traced only when one has much fuller information regarding prices, wages, and the like than are available to the student of foreign experiments with inconvertible paper currencies. All of the statistical data employed in the course of the discussion are presented at length in the Appendix in such form that they can be readily verified, or employed in new combinations. The tables have passed through the hands of two computers. While I can hardly hope that no errors Preface of transcription, computation, or printing remain uncor- rected, I should be surprised to find any of sufficient consequence to affect the validity of the conclusions drawn. Pour of the chapters have appeared at various dates as articles in the Journal of Political Economy, and one has been reprinted in Sound Currency and the Report of the Indianapolis Monetary Commission. Three of these articles have been entirely rewritten, and the fourth has been care- fully revised. Professor J. Laurence Laughlin and Dr. Herbert J. Davenport, of the University of Chicago, and Professor T. S. Adams, of the University of Wisconsin, have read differ- ent parts of the book and made valuable suggestions and criticisms. Miss Maude L. Radford, of University College, Chicago, has looked over all the chapters and done what she could to amend crudities of expression. My thanks are also due to the late Professor Charles F. Dunbar, and to Colonel Carroll D. Wright, for answers to troublesome inquiries by letter. W. C. M. Univebsity op Campobnia. TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I. HISTORY OF THE LEGAL-TENDER ACTS Chaptee I. The Suspension of Specie Payments 3 I. State of the Finances, March, 1861. II. Chase's Administration of the Treasury, March to June, 1861. III. Financial Legislation of the Extra Session of Congress. IV. The $150,000,000 Bank Loan. Chapter II. The First Legal-Tender Act - ii I. The Legal-Tender Bills. II. Debate in Congress. III. Attitude of Secretary Chase. IV. Passage of the Act. Chapter III. The Second Legal-Tender Act - 82 I. Government Finances, January to June, 1862. II. The Second Legal-Tender Act. III. The Postage Currency Act. Chapter IV. The Third Legal-Tender Act 100 I. The Finances from July to December, 1862. II. The Joint Resolution of January 17, 1863. III. The Third Legal-Tender Act. Chapter V. How Further Issues of Greenbacks Were Avoided in 1864 and 1865 119 I. The Congressional Pledge to Issue no More U. S. Notes. II. Financial Difficulties of 1864. III. Secretary McCuUoch and the Alley Resolution. IV. Recapitulation. PART II. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE LEGAL- TENDER ACTS Chapter I. Preliminary Sketch - 135 Chapter II. The Circulating Medium - - - - 141 I. Gold and Silver Coin. II. Bank Notes. III. Old Demand Notes. Table of Contents IV. " Shinplasters" and Fractional Currency. V. Minor Coins. VI. Treasury Notes. VII. Recapitulation. Chaptee III. The Specie Value of the Paper Currency - 182 I. The Markets for Gold. II. Factors Which Affected the Gold Price of the Currency. III. The Course of Depreciation, January, 1862, to December, 1865. Chaptee IV. Prices 239 I. Falkner's Table of Relative Prices. II. A New Table of Relative Prices by Quarters. III. Relative Prices Paid by the Federal Government for Supplies, rv. Relative Prices of Various Necessities at Retail. V. General Causes of Price Fluctuations Other than the Currency. VI. The Currency as a Cause of the Price Fluctuations. Chaptee V. Wages - 280 I. Falkner's Table of Relative Wages. II. Scope of the Data Concerning Wages in Table XII of the Aldrich Report. III. New Tables of Relative Money Wages Based upon the Data in Table XII of the Aldrich Report. IV. Relative Money Wages in the Coal, Iron, Glass, and Pottery Industries. V. Relative Salaries of School-Teachers. VI. Relative Wages of Farm Laborers. VII. Tables of Relative Money Wages Based upon the Mate- rial in Vol. XX of the Tenth Census. VIII. Pay of Government Employees. IX. Increase in Living Expenses. X. Relative Real Wages. XI. Conclusion. Chapter VI. Kent - - . . 352 I. Urban Rents. II. Farm Rents. Chapter VII. Interest and Loan Capital 360 I. The Problem of Lenders and Borrowers of Capital. II. Purchasing Power of the Principal of Loans. III. The Rate of Interest. Table of Contents xv Chaptee VIII. Profits 380 I. Profits as a Share in the Distribution of the Product. II. Profits in Different Industries. III. Statistical Evidence Regarding Profits. Chaptke IX. The Production and Consumption of Wealth 392 I. Production. II. Consumption. Chapter X. The Greenbacks and the Cost of the Civil War 403 I. The Problem and the Method of Solution. II. The Greenbacks and Expenditures. III. The Greenbacks and Receipts. IV. The Greenbacks and the Public Debt. V. Conclusion. STATISTICAL APPENDICES Appendix A. Gold Value of the Paper Currency, 1862-65 423 Table 1. Monthly Highest, Average, and Lowest Gold Price of $100 of Paper Money in the New York Market. Table 2. Daily Highest and Lowest Value in Gold of 1100 in Currency. Appendix B. Relative Prices of Commodities 429 Table 1. Relative Prices of Farm Products. Table 2. Relative Prices of Various Commodities at Wholesale. Table 3. Relative Prices paid by Federal Government for Supplies. Table i. Relative Prices of Various Commodities at Retail. Table 5. Comparison of the Relative Prices of Twenty- three Commodities at Wholesale and at Retail. Appendix C. Relative Wages 470 Table 1. Wage-Series from Table XII of the Aldrich JReport. Table 2. Wage-Series from Vol. XX of the Tenth Census. Table 3. Relative Salaries of School-Teachers. Index - - 569 XVI Table of Contents Charts — Chart I. Chart II. Chart III. Graphic Illustration of the EflFect upon the New York Banks of the $150,000,000 Loan 31 Fluctuations in the Gold Value of $100 in American Paper Money from January, 1862, to December, 1865 211 Relative Prices at Wholesale and the Value of Gold Coin in Currency 277 PART I HISTORY OF THE LEGAL-TENDER ACTS CHAPTEK I THE SUSPENSION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS I. State of the Finances, March, 1861 : Appointment of Secretary Chase — Financial Difficulties Inherited from the Buchanan Administration — ^Morrill Tariff Act. II. Chase's Administration of the Treasury, March to June, 1861: Improvement in the Credit of the Government — Chase's Attempts to Borrow. III. Financial Legislation of the Extra Session of Congress: Chase's Program — Loan and Tax Laws — Inadequacy of Taxes Levied. IV. The $150,000,000 Bank Loan: Why Chase Applied to the Banks — Plan of the Bank Loan— Chase's Refusal to Draw on Banks and his Issue of Treasury Notes — Effect of the Loan on Condition of the Banks — Second 150,000,000 Loan — Third $50,000,000 Loan — Effect of Finance Report and Trent Affair — Depletion of Bank Reserves and Suspension of Specie Payments. I. STATE OF THE FINANCES, MAECH, 1861 On the day after his inauguration President Lincoln sent to the Senate the nomination of Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, as secretary of the treasury. Political considerations VFere of chief weight in determining this appointment. Mr. Lincoln perceived that the support of the various elements of which the young Republican party was compounded would be necessary to secure the success of his administration. So Seward, the recognized leader of the radical wing of the party, was made secretary of state; and Chase, the most prominent representative of the conservative wing composed of anti-slavery Democrats, became secretary of the treasury.' In addition to political availability, Mr. Lincoln thought Chase possessed peculiar personal qualifications for the 1 Cf. NicoLAY AND Hat, Abraham Lincoln, A History (New York, 1890), Vol. Ill, p. 351. 3 History of the Gkeenbacks position. True, his thirty years' connection with the Cin- cinnati bar, and the term in the Senate and two terms as governor of Ohio, that constituted his experience of public affairs, had brought him little familiarity with fiscal ques- tions. But they had shown that he had a clear intellect, administrative ability, and untiring industry. And, above all, they had given him a name for strict integrity that would be of especial weight in gaining the public confidence indispensable to success in the management of the then dis- credited treasury. Though Mr. Chase brought with him little knowledge of financial administration, his mind was deeply impressed with certain financial theories. From his former Democratic afEliations he had imbibed the "hard- money " principles of Jackson and Benton and their dislike for paper currencies. Personal observation of the unsound methods of banking then prevalent in the western states had strengthened these convictions and inspired in him an indiscriminating distrust of the issues of all banks whatso- ever. The early suspension of specie payments and issue of an irredeemable currency of legal tender paper in the Civil War occurred, then, under the administration of a secretary of the treasury who cherished a strong predilection for metallic money.' It was with great reluctance that Mr. Chase resigned his seat in the Senate to undertake the arduous task of manag- ing the treasury in the face of threatening war.^ The difli- 1 Three considerable biographies of Chase have been published, one by RoBEKT B. Waeden, An Account of the Private Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, Cincinnati, 1874; 8vo, pp. xxiii + 83S (valuable chiefly for copious extracts from Mr. Chase's private papers) ; the second by J. W. ScHncKEES, Life and Public Services of S. P. Chase, New York, 1874 ; 8vo, pp. xv + M9; the third by Peofessoe A. B. Haet, Salmon Portland Chase ("American Statesmen" Series), Boston and New York, 1899 ; 8vo, pp. xi + 465. See also Hugh McCuLLOCH, Men and Measures of Half a Century (New York, 1888), chap, xvi, and W. M. EvAETS, Eulogy on Chase, appended to Schuckees's Life. 2 Cf. Chase's letter to the governor of Ohio, ScHncKEEs, op. cit., p. 207, and letter of F. A. Conkling to E. G. Spaulding, October 17, 1875, in Spaulding, History of the Legal Tender Paper Money Issued during the Great Rebellion, 2d ed. (Buffalo 1875) Appendix, p. 84. • ;. Suspension of Specie Payments 5 culties of his position were increased by the disorganized condition in which the federal finances had been left by the preceding administration. When Mr. Buchanan was inaug- urated his secretary of the treasury, Howell Cobb, of Greorgia, found himself embarrassed by a redundant revenue, to reduce which Congress had just passed the tariff act of March, 1857, lowering the duties upon imports. Unfortu- nately the financial crisis of 1857 and the commencement of the Mormon troubles followed hard upon the date when the new tariff took effect ; the one, in conjunction with the new tariff, decreased the treasury receipts from customs by a quarter, the other increased the expenses of the War Depart- ment. So, instead of a surplus the fiscal year 1858 pre- sented a deficit in the revenue.' To meet the shortage Congress authorized the issue of $20,000,000 of one-year treasury notes. ^ As the deficit recurred the next year, a fifteen-year loan of $20,000,000 was made;' and in March, 1859, when the one-year treasury notes began to fall due, it was necessary to extend their term to July, 1860.* Even by that time the financial situa- tion had not improved sufficiently to enable the government to pay the notes out of revenue, and another loan of $21,000,000 had to be authorized to procure the necessary funds.' Early in September, 1860, Secretary Cobb invited bids for $10,000,000 of this loan, a sum sufficient to meet the notes coming due before January, 1861. When the bids were opened, October 22, it was found that the whole sum had been taken at par or at a small premium. Payment of the subscriptions was to be made thirty days later. But in 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury^ December, 1858, pp. 3, 4. 2 Act of December 23, 1837, 11 Statutes at Large, p. 257. 3 Act of June 14, 1838, ibid., p. 365. * Act of March 3, 1859, ibid., p. 430. 6 Act of June 22, 1860, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 79. History of the Greenbacks November Mr. Lincoln's election was followed by threats of secession from the southern press. A sudden business revulsion resulted, for everyone was anxious to prepare his affairs for the coming storm.' The subscribers to the loan were timid and embarrassed. To encourage them, Cobb offered an additional thirty days for making payments to all who would deposit one-half of their bids on the appointed day. Though most of the bidders accepted the offer, some preferred to forfeit the 1 per cent, deposits sent in with the bids rather than to take the bonds. From the $10,000,000 offered the treasury realized only $7,022,000.' Convinced by this ill-success that an attempt to negotiate the remaining $11,000,000 of the loan would fail, Cobb requested Congress to substitute treasury notes for the bonds and to pledge the public lands unconditionally for their redemption. Further, he asked authority for a new loan of $10,000,000 to supply the deficit in the revenues due to the contraction of business.^ Six days after sending this report to Congress Cobb resigned, giving as his reason that Georgia required his services.* Going home, he entered the campaign to persuade his state to secede, and a little later became vice-president of the Confederacy. President Buchanan appointed as Cobb's successor Philip F. Thomas, of Maryland. Despite the change in secretaries. Congress acted on the second of Cobb's recommendations by authorizing the issue of $10,000,000 of one-year treasury notes at par to those bidders who would accept the lowest rates of interest.' The day after the act was approved, I Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1860, p. 7 ; cf. W. G. Sumnee, A History of American Currency (New York, 1875), p. 189. 'Report of the Secretary [of the Treasury, December, 1860, pp. 8, 9, and 480-83- Senate Executive Document No. 2, p. 11, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. ' 3 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1860, p. 9. *E. McPheeson, Political History of the Rebellion, 4th ed. (Washington, 1882), 5 Act of December 17, 1860, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 121. Suspension op Specie Payments 7 Thomas invited proposals for one-half of this loan. The response showed how low the national credit had sunk; $1,831,000 was offered at 12 per cent, or less; $465,000 more at rates between 15 and 36 per cent. All offers at 12 per cent, or under were accepted.' To explain why the government was compelled to pay such high rates of interest is not difficult. Public confi- dence in the Buchanan administration was shaken; particu- larly, confidence in the management of the Treasury Depart- ment which for four years had been contracting debts to meet annually recurring deficits. The check to business following the election in November had intensified the uneasiness. One secretary of the treasury had resigned to aid the secession movement; his successor was distrusted as a southern sympathizer. South Carolina had already adopted the ordinance of secession ; other states were on the eve of following her example. At Washington there was disorganization and indecision. Under such circumstances it was natural that there should be hesitation in New York about lending to the government. But the needs of the government were imperative. The full amount of the five millions offered was required to meet the treasury notes and interest on the debt due January 1. Foreseeing the failure of the public sub- scription, Mr. Cisco, the head of the subtreasury at New York, induced the New York banks to take at 12 per cent, interest whatever part of the $5,000,000 might not be bid for. Their offer was accepted by Secretary Thomas.^ After the banks had paid a part of the money into the treasury they became convinced that Thomas intended "to transfer the money into the confederate region where it would be captured." Accordingly, they withheld payment of the I B. B. Miscellaneous Document No. 20, p. 3, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 Ibid,, loc. cit. 8 History of the Geeenbaoks next instalment and sent representatives to confer with Mr. Buchanan.' The result was that Thomas resigned, ostensi- bly because he could not agree with the president "in the measures .... adopted in reference to the .... condition of things in South Carolina." ^ He was succeeded January 11 by General John A. Dix — a man who commanded the full confidence of the North — and the balance of the loan was paid. Dix found the treasury empty, $350,000 of unpaid war- rants accumulated, and a deficit in the revenue which was expected to reach nearly $27,000,000 by the end of June.^ To meet immediate requirements he offered the remaining half of the $10,000,000 treasury-note loan authorized the preceding December. An improvement in the credit of the government was indicated by the fact that whereas 12 per cent, interest had been paid for the first $5,000,000, the second was borrowed at an average rate of 10§ per cent.* But the sum thus realized did not last long and further borrowing became necessary. Judging from Cobb's failure that it would be impossible to negotiate the balance of the $21,000,000 loan of June 22, 1860, under the terms of the law which forbade the sale of stock below par, Dix applied to Congress to authorize a new bond issue. He even suggested calling on the states to return the $28,000,000 of surplus revenue deposited with them in 1836.' Congress, however, would only pass a $25,000,000 loan act." Dix then urged 1 Correspondence between Mr. George S. Coe, one of the bankers concerned, and E. G. Spaulding, in H. KiKG, Turning on the Light (Philadelphia, 1895), pp. 186-9. 2 Letter of resignation, G. T. CnETia, Life of James Buchanan (New York, 1883) , Vol. II, p. 404. 3 Cf. Dix's letter to the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, H. S. Miscellaneous Document No. 20, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. * Cf. J. J. Knox, United States Notes, 2d ed. (London, 1885), p. 76. ^H. B. Miscellaneous Document No. 20, p. 6, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 Act of February 8, 1861, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 129. The bonds were to bear 6 per cent, interest and " to be reimbursed within a period not beyond twenty years and not less than ten years."— Sec. 2. Suspension of Specie Payments 9 that the states be permitted to add the pledge of their faith to that of the federal government for the repayment of the loan ; but the House refused to consider a bill for this pur- pose.' Nevertheless, when bids for $8,000,000 of the new loan were invited in February, the whole sum was subscribed on terms that made the average rate of interest 6.63 per cent., indicating a further improvement in the national credit." Such small loans, however, could afford but temporary relief. The real difficulty was the insufficient revenue. To stop the necessity of borrowing by increasing the treasury receipts was the nominal purpose of the last important law passed during the Buchanan administration. Bills to raise duties on imports had been presented at every session of Congress since 1858; but all had failed of adoption, until, shortly before the presidential election of 1860, the Morrill tariff act passed the House. It was not taken up by the Senate until the following session, and even then its progress for a time was blocked. But finally, after many of the southern sena- tors had left Washington, it was passed and became a law two days before the close of Mr. Buchanan's term.^ As a revenue measure the new schedule was foredoomed to failure. The heaviest duties were levied on articles largely produced in the United States ; sugar and molasses were lightly taxed, while coffee, tea, and wool worth less than 18 cents per pound, were entirely free. Revenue was thus sacrificed to protection. During the quarter, January-March, the customs receipts were $9,800,000; in the succeeding three 1 Congressional Globe, 36tli Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 871, 872. 2 Bids were reoeiTed for $14,460,250 at the rates ranging from 75 to 96.10. Of these bids $8,006,000 were accepted, all below 90.15 being refused.— Senctie Executive Docu- ment No. g, pp. 19-30, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. The average rate was 90.478.— Batley, National Loans of the United States, p. 151. 'Act of March 2, 1861, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 178. Cf. F. W. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, 2d ed. (New York, 1893), p. 158. Sec. 1 of the act author- ized a loan of $10,000,000. 10 History op the Geeenbacks months, when the new tariff was in effect, they were $5,500,- 000 — a decrease of over 40 per cent' Thus, instead of improving the position of the treasury, the new tariff served only to increase the financial embarrassment.^ II. chase's administeation of the treasury, march to JUNE, 1861 It was at a tiine, then, when the revenue of the govern- ment was insufficient to pay its expenses even on a peace footing, and when distrust and frequent borrowing had much impaired its credit, that Mr. Chase, with small experience of financial operations, undertook to raise the means for waging a most expensive war. Prom April to June the ordinary receipts of the treasury were $5,800,000, its expenditures $23, 500,000.' To fill the deficit there was but one recourse — borrowing. Disadvantageous as were the terms on which the recent loans had been made, it was to a new loan that Mr. Chase was forced to resort. On the whole, he was in a more favorable position for borrowing than Cobb, Thomas, or Dix had been. True, the political situation had become more grave. Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas had fol- lowed South Carolina's example in seceding from the Union, and when the new administration was installed at Washing- ton it saw itself confronted by a rival government in Mont- gomery. But to offset this, Buchanan, who had become thoroughly discredited in the North, had given place to 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, p. 30. 2 On the condition of the finances at the commencement of the Civil War, cf. R. J. WAiiKEE, American Finances and Resources (London, 1864) ; Von Hock, Die Finanzen und die Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten (Stuttgart, 1867), pp. 437-40; M. B. Field, if emories of Many Men and of Some Women (London, 1874), pp. 250-52; John Sheeman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet (Chicago, 1895), Vol. I, pp. 251-4; Knox, op. cit., pp. 70-83; J. G. Blaine, Twenty Tears of Congress (Norwich, Conn., 1884), Vol. I, pp. 396-401; A. S. BoLLES, Financial History of the United States from 1861 to 1885 (New York, 1886), pp. 4r-6, 3 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 30-32. Suspension of Specie Payments 11 Lincoln, in whom the people reposed greater confidence. In raising his first loan Mr. Chase had the benefit of this feel- ing. Moreover, the credit of the government was improved by a temporary increase of revenue. The Morrill tariff act, approved March 2, was to go into operation April 1. Import- ers took advantage of the intervening thirty days to pass their goods through the custom-houses as rapidly as possible in order to escape payment of the higher duties imposed by the new schedule, thus increasing the receipts from customs for the months of February and March.^ Under the existing laws the secretary had authority to borrow some $41,000,000. (1) Of the $21,000,000 loan of June 22, 1860, Cobb had negotiated $7,022,000, leaving a balance of $13,978,000 which could be issued in 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds — a resource available under the law, however, only when the bonds could be sold at par. (2) The two $5,000,000 treasury-note loans raised by Secretaries Thomas and Dix had exhausted the authority to borrow under the act of December 17, 1860 ; but (3) Dix had issued only $8,006,000 of the $25,000,000 of 6 per cent, stock provided for by the act of February 8, 1861. The disposal of the remainder of this stock — $16,994,000 — was not hampered by the customary provision forbidding sales below par. (4) Finally, the opening sections of the Morrill tariff act author- ized a loan of $10,000,000 upon 6 per cent, ten-twenty -year bonds at par, or upon 6 per cent, treasury notes ; but the pro- ceeds of this loan could not be applied to the service of the current fiscal year which would end June 30, 1861. However, this act made the authority to borrow, existing under other laws, more available, by permitting the president ' ' to substitute treasury notes of equal amount for the whole or any part of any of the loans for which he is now by law authorized to 1 Cf. American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 290, and Hunt's Merchants' Maga- zine, Vol. XLIV, p. 666. 12 History of the Greenbacks contract and issue bonds." The treasury notes so issued were to bear interest at 6 per cent. , be receivable for govern- ment dues, convertible at par into 6 per cent, bonds, and could be made redeemable at any time within two years ; but, like the bonds, they could not be issued to creditors or sold for coin at less than par.' Mr. Chase began by advertising, on March 22, 18,000,000 of the 6 per cent, stock which, under the act of February 8, could be sold to the highest bidder.^ Ten days were allowed for making proposals. When the bids were opened, April 2, it was found that the loan had been subscribed three times over at rates ranging from 85 to par.^ This indicated an encoura- ging improvement in the credit of the government, for the offers for an equal amount of the same stocks made to General Dix less than two months before varied from 75 to 96.10 and amounted to $14,460,250, as compared with $27,182,000. But Mr. Chase thought the treasury notes, which he had authority to issue tu lieu of the bonds, could be sold at better prices.* Consequently he accepted only the bids at 94 and above, amounting to $3,099,000, and on April 6 invited bids for the balance — $4,901,000 — in treasury notes.** Unfortu- nately, the departure of the expedition to relieve Fort Sumter became known in the meantime. The news created much uneasiness, and when the bids were opened April 11, but one-fifth of the sum had been taken. Financiers who were interested in the success of the loan procured a delay, however, 1 Act of March 2, 1861, Sec. 4, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 178. On Chase's authority to borrow, see his report of July 4, 1861, Senate Executive Document No. 2, p. 11, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. ^Senate Executive Document No. 2. p. 31, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 Schedule of bids, ibid., pp. 32-49. *Since the treasury notes bore 6 per cent, interest and were receivable for all government dues, large importers derived a profit from investing in them the money held in readiness for the payment of customs duties. Cf. American Annual Cyclo- pcedia, 1861, p. 297. ^Senate Executive Document No. 2, pp. 11 and 50, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. Suspension of Specie Payments 13 and by dint of their efforts subscriptions were secured for $5,340,000, of which sum $2,500,000 were taken by a single New York bank.' The means thus provided were soon exhausted by the large government disbursements, and it became necessary to borrow again. On May 11 the balance of the 6 per cent, stock of the February loan — $8,994,000 — was advertised for sale.^ Bids came in very slowly, and a failure of the subscription seemed probable. Such an event would have seriously affected the price of all government securities. In self-defense, the Chamber of Commerce of New York and the banks of New York and Boston came to the aid of the treasury. A card was issued signed among others by J. J. Aster, August Belmont, James Gallatin, A. T. Stewart, Moses Taylor, and George S. Coe, calling attention to the government loans and inviting " all capitalists and moneyed institutions to avail themselves of these opportuni- ties for investment."^ To give the committees appointed by the chamber and the banks more time to secure subscrip- tions, Mr. Chase postponed the opening of the bids four days, and also offered to consider bids for treasury notes at par in place of bonds, should that form of security be pre- ferred by any subscriber.* Finally, bids ranging from 60 to 98 w6re obtained for $7,441,000 of the stock, and bids at par for $1,684,000 of the treasury notes. All the latter bids were accepted, and of the former all those at 85 or above — an amount of $7,810,000.= From this loan of $8,994,000 the treasury realized the sum of $7,922,553.45.* ^Ibid., p. 51. Of course only $4,901,000 of the bids — the amount advertised — ■were accepted. The treasury realized $7,814,809.80 from $8,000,000 of securities sold. — Ibid., p. 11. See American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 296, on the difficulty experienced in negotiating the treasury notes. 'Senate Executive DocumentNo. 2, p. 52, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 American Annual Cyclopcsdia, 1861, p. 297 ; cf. " Federal Finances Examined" (anon.), HunVs Merchants' Magazine,^ ol.XINlI, p. 504; and ibid., Vol. XLIV, p. 791. i Senate Executive Document No. 2, p. 53, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 5J6id., pp. 58and60. 6 /6i(J., p. 11. 14 History of the Geeenbaoks Requiring still more money, the secretary asked for pro- posals for the balance of the 6 per cent, twenty-year loan of June 22, 1860, amounting to $13,978,000/ As 6 per cent, government bonds could then be bought in the market at 84, the offer of this stock which the act forbade to be sold below par was a mere formality; but, by advertising the bonds, Mr. Chase complied with the terms of the law, and was ena- bled to issue treasury notes for the full sum.^ Three bids, aggregating $12,000, were received; but they had been made under misapprehension and were withdrawn.' On account of this loan, however, Mr. Chase issued, by the end of June, $2,584,550 iu treasury notes at par.* Finally, just before Congress met, the treasury was again in need. Five million dollars were required to carry it along until new means of securing funds could be devised. As the two-year treasui^ notes were selling at a discount of 2 to 2-| per cent., they were not directly available. But the banks agreed to advance the amount required for sixty days and take 6 per cent, treasury notes as collateral security.^ Two points in this review of the operations of the secre- tary of the treasury from March to July are of significance: 1. When hostilities opened the federal government was receiving less than a quarter of its revenue from taxation ; for the remaining three-quarters it was depending upon hand- to-mouth borrowing." From March 7, 1861, when Mr. Chase was installed, to July 1, there had been an addition of $14,- 412,529.40 to the public debt.' 1 Senate Executive Document No, 2, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11. 2 Cf, Appleton's Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 297. s Seriate Executive Document No. 2, p. 11, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. * Of this sum $1,710,650 was sold for coin, and $873,900 was paid to creditors.— Ibid., pp. 60-62. 5 Cf. American Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, p. 297; and Hunt's Merchants'" Ma^ga- zine. Vol. XLVII, p. 505. 6 From April to June, 1861, the receipts from customs, sales of public land, and miscellaneous sources, were $5,800,000, from loans $17,600,000.— iJeport of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, p. 30. ' Senate Executive Document No. 2, p. 18, 37th Cong., 1st. Sess. Suspension of Specie Payments 15 2. Mr. Chase had of his own accord inaugurated the policy of issuing interest-bearing treasury notes running one or two years, in preference to long-time bonds, whenever they would fetch a higher price, disregarding the fact that such a course exposed the treasury to the danger of being called upon to redeem its notes while hard pressed for funds to meet current demands.' III. FINANCIAL LEGISLATION OF THE EXTEA SESSION OF CONGEESS Such was the situation when Congress convened in extra session July 4. Emphasizing the need of extraordinary measures, President Lincoln's message recommended that "at least 400,000 men and $400,000,000" be placed "at the control of the government."^ The financial program of the administration was outlined in a report submitted by Secretary Chase.' It was estimated that the government would require |320,- 000,000 to meet the expenditures of the coming twelve months. Of this sum the secretary thought that "not less than $80,000,000 should be provided by taxation, and.that $240,- 000,000 should be sought through loans." The $80,000,- 000 would defray the expenses of a peace footing, estimated at $66,000,000, the interest on the public debt, $9,000,000, and provide an annual sinking fund of $5,000,000. By revising the Morrill tariff. Chase thought the customs could be made to yield a revenue of $57,000,000. An additional $3,000,000 from sales of public lands would leave $20,000,- 000 of the $80,000,000 to be raised by direct tax or by inter- nal duties as Congress might decide. To secure $240,000,000 by borrowing new loans to the 1 Mr. James GaUatin, president of the Gallatin Bank of New York, advised strongly against this policy. See his Two Letters to the Bon. S. P. Chase, etc., New York, 1861. 2 Lincoln's Complete Works, ed. Nicolay and Hat, Vol. II, p. 60. 3 Senate Executive Document No. 2, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 History of the Geeenbacks full amount would be necessary ; for the $21,393,450 which the secretary still had authority to borrow under existing laws ' was available only when creditors were willing to accept payment in 6 per cent, treasury notes at par, which, Mr. Chase admitted, was "not to be expected." He sug- gested (1) a national loan of $100,000,000 in 7.3 per cent, treasury notes, running three years ; (2) a loan of like amount in 7 per cent., thirty-year bonds; (3) the issue of not over $50,000,000 of 8.65 per cent, one-year treasury notes to meet any need unprovided for by the proceeds of taxation and the other loans. But, said Mr. Chase, "the greatest care will .... be requisite to prevent the degradation of such issues into an irredeemable paper currency, than which no more certainly fatal expedient for impoverishing the masses and discrediting the government of any country can well be devised." ^ If Secretary Chase erred in thus proposing at the outset to rely upon borrowing to secure three-quarters of the means for waging the war because he doubted the readiness of the people to submit to heavy taxation. Congress was neither wiser nor bolder than he. With his report were submitted drafts of bills embodying its suggestions.' After one hour's debate, entirely taken up by Mr. Vallandigham in an attack upon the policy of the president, the House passed the $250,000,000 loan bill by a vote of 150 to 5.* In the Senate a few verbal amendments were made;^ these were quickly concurred in by the House," and eight days after its intro- duction the bill was approved by the president.' 1 The issue of $2,584,550 treasury notes under the act of June 22, 1860 (p. 12, above) , had reduced the balance of that loan remaining to be borrowed to $11,393,450. Besides this there was the $10,000,000 loan authorized by the act of March 2, 1861. •-Senate Executive Document No. 2, p. 12, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 Ibid., p. 14. 3 Ibid., pp. 65 ff. and 71 ff. * CongressiOTial Globe, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 61. i-Ibid., pp. 109 and 127. ^ibid., p. 147. ' 12 Statutes at Large, p. 259. Act of July 17, 1861. Suspension of Specie Payments 17 So hurriedly, indeed, was the work done that a supple- mentary act had immediately to be passed.' Together, these two laws authorized the secretary to borrow $250,000,000,^ for which he could issue in such proportions as he might deem advisable, (1) 7 per cent, twenty-year bonds at par; (2) 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds "at any rate not less than the equivalent of par for the bonds bearing 7 per centum interest;" (3) 7.3 per cent, three-year treasury notes, fundable in 6 per. cent, twenty-year bonds; or (4) treasury notes, either bearing interest at 3.65 per cent, and payable in one year, or bearing no interest and payable on demand. These demand notes were to be receivable for all public dues and of denominations as low as $5 ; but their issues were not to exceed $50,000,000. Finally, 6 per cent, treasury notes, " payable at any time not excee'ding twelve months from date," might be issued to the amount of $20,000,000. To facilitate the negotiation of the loan, it was provided that any part, not above $100,000,000, might be borrowed abroad, and the principal and interest made payable in Europe; and that the secretary might "deposit any of the moneys obtained on any of the loans .... in such solvent specie-paying banks as he may select." Legislative indorsement was also promptly given to Sec- retary Chase's suggestion of increased taxation. August 5 a revenue act was approved which (1) raised the tariff by 1 Tbid., p. 313. Act of August 5, 1861. 2 The amount of securities, however, that might be issued under these acts was not definitely limited ; for Sec. 1 of the act of August 5 provided that holders of the three-year 7.30 notes might exchange them for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds. —12 Statutes at Large, p. 313. The total issues under the acts were as follows : 6 per cent, bonds - $189,321,350 Demand treasury notes, no interest 60,030,000 7.30 treasury notes 139,999,750 $389,351,100 K. A. Baylet, National Loans of the United States, p. 78. Of the 6 per cent, bonds only $50,000,000 was sold for money; the remainder, $139,321,350, was issued in exchange for 7.30 notes.— I6id., p. 153. 18 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS imposing duties on tea, coffee, sugar, and molasses — important revenue articles admitted free or at low rates by the Morrill act;' (2) apportioned between the states a direct tax of $20,000,000, of which, however, there was small hope of collecting the quotas of the disloyal states, amount- ing to $5,000,000; (3) levied a tax of 3 per cent, upon the excess of incomes above $800.^ While certain features of this scheme of taxation encountered opposition, members of Congress evinced a striking readiness to waive objections and vote for any bill that the administration and the leaders of the houses held to be a "war necessity.'" The striking feature of the plan of finance thus recom- mended at the commencement of the war by the secretary of the treasury, and adopted by Congress, was the reliance upon borrowing to meet all the extraordinary military and naval expenditures. The taxes imposed were expected to yield revenue sufficient only to defray the ordinary expenses of government, to pay interest on the public debt, and to provide a small sinking fund. Nothing shows more forcibly the inadequacy of this policy than the quickness with which the necessity for increased taxation made itself apparent. The heavy expenses of the months following the adjourn- ment of the extra session begot a general conviction that a firmer foundation for the financial operations of the govern- ment was indispensable. When Congress reassembled in December it was met by a strong popular demand for a vig- orous tax policy. "The country presents," said the Boston Advertiser, "the spectacle of a people praying to be taxed." * An examination of the newspapers of the time shows how 1 Cf. " Comparative Kates of Duty, 1842-61," Bunt's Merchants' Magazine Vol. XLY, pp. 506, 507. 2 12 Statutes at Large, p. 292. 3 As examples of this disposition see the remarks of Senators McDoTigall, of California, and Wilkinson, of Minnesota.— Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 1st Sess p. 399. 4 February 4, 1862. Suspension of Specie Payments 19 literally this was true.' Urged forward by public opinion, the same Congress that had in August deemed $80,000,000 a sufficient revenue to raise by taxation, resolved in January with but six dissenting votes in both branches, to levy taxes that would " secure an annual revenue of not less than $150,- 000,000."" Mr. Chase, also, took a firmer stand, advocating in his report of December, 1861, an increase of the customs duties on tea, coffee, and sugar, and direct taxation aggre- gating $50,000,000.^ With increasing experience his appre- ciation of the "great importance" of raising the "largest possible amount" of revenue by taxation became keener. " It is hardly too much," he declared to Congress in 1863, "perhaps hardly enough, to say that every dollar raised [by taxation] for extraordinary expenditures or reduction of debt is worth two in the increased value of national securities." * In the same report he explained his failure to recommend heavy taxation to the extra session of Congress in July, 1861, by pleading the impossibility of foreseeing at that time the magnitude and length of the war.* IV. THE $150,000,000 BANK LOAN While these bills were pending in Congress and before the resources provided by them could be availed of, it was necessary to provide funds for the immediate wants of the 1 Cf. New York Times, June 20 and July 23, 1861, and January 13, 1862 ; New York Herald, December 31, 1861, and January 7, 8, and 9, 1862; New York Tribune, June 26, 1861, and February 3, 1862 ; New York Commercial Advertiser, January 3, 11, and Feb- ruary 26, 1862; Springfield (Mass.) Bepublican, January 7, 15, and 21, 1862; Boston Daily Advertiser, January 11, 13, and 24, 1862 ; Boston JoMrmaJ, Januarys, 1862; Boston Post, January 28, 1862 ; Philadelphia Press, January 18 and February 5, 1862 ; National Intelligencer (Washington), January 11, 1? 2. Cf. the letters urging heavy taxation received by the Ways and Means Commi^ ,ee, Spaulding, op. eit., pp. 23, 24; Speech, KosoOB CONKLINS, Cmigressional Globel 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 633; " Memorial of the New York Chamber of Commerce," Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 95, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., and Edward Eveeett'-u Atlantic Monthly, March, 1862, Vol. IX, pp. 393-7. 2 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong.,; id Sess., pp. 344, 349, 376. 3 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 13 and 13. 4/6sd., 1863, p. 12. ' 5 Jbicj., p. 10. C/. chap, ii, p. 72, below. 20 History of the Gebenbacks treasury. Mr. Chase accomplished this by issuing "for payment to public creditors or for advances of cash," $14,- 000,000 in two-year 6 per cent, treasury notes, and $13,- 000,000 in 6 per cent, notes running but 60 days.' This, however, was but a temporary makeshift and the more serious task remained of providing for the regular and continuous expenses of the war. For this purpose the secretary at once set about negotiating a large loan under the ample powers conferred upon him by the extra session of Congress. Borrowing abroad was out of the question; for European capitalists were unwilling to lend.^ Reliance upon a popular loan seemed hazardous, not only because of the ill success of recent ventures, but also because the market for bonds was stocked with the securities of several states which were negotiating war loans.* Circumstances seemed, then, to indicate the banks as the most available source from which to obtain means. Fortunately the course of events had been such as to render the banks, at least in the northern Atlantic states, unusually strong. In the previous November the sudden panic following Mr. Lincoln's election had caused the banks to curtail discounts. A severe pressure for money followed and a suspension of specie payments was averted in New York only by the combination of bank reserves and the 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, p. 8. These issues were made in accordance with the acts of June 22, 1860 {12 Statutes at Large, p. 79), and March 2, 1861 (J6id., p. 178). 2 " It is utterly out of the question, in ofir judgment," said the London Economist of August 24, 1861, " that the Americans cai ^ 'btain, either at home or in Europe, any- thing like the extravagant sums they ai ^ sking for. Europe won't lend them ; America cannot."— Sconomjsi, 1861, pp. 92 c t28. Cf. Blaine, Twenty Years of Con- gress, Vol. I, pp. 409, 410. 3 New York and Pennsylvania had authi ized loans of $3,000,000 each ; Connecti- cut, New Jersey, Indiana and Ohio loans of $2. 000,000 ; Massachusetts, Maine, Illinois, and New York city had each offered loans of .'1,000,000, Iowa of $800,000, Michigan of $500,000, and Rhode Island of $100,000.— Ba«4:( rs' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, " Notes on the Money Market," and Appletos's American Annual Cycloposdia for 1861, pp. 297, 307, 308. Suspension of Specie Payments 21 issue of clearing-house certificates.' But most of the paper held by the banks was good ; liquidation proceeded favorably and the threatened danger passed. The acute pressure was followed by general stagnation. In the unsettled state of the country there was a general disposition to avoid new undertakings and to keep old ones on a most conservative basis. The result was that the banks could make no new loans. ^ During the winter difficulty was experienced in making collections in the southern states. In the spring many firms resorted to intentional failures to rid themselves of northern obligations,' and in May a law was enacted directing that such debts should be paid, not to the creditors, but into the Confederate treasury.* The cessation of remittances from the South caused in May and June a series of failures affecting especially large jobbing houses.' But, owing to the very conservative nature of the business that had been done in the preceding half year, the crash did not become 1 Bankers' Magazine (New York), Vol. XV, p. 500; Sunfs Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XLIV, pp. 75-92, 196, and 327 ; Sumner, History of American Currency, New York, 1875, p. 189; DuNBAB, Chapters on the Theory and History of Banking, New York, 1891, pp. 68-73. The Boston banks rejected the use of clearing-house certificates, but allowed 50 per cent, of balances at the clearing house to be paid in a bank's own notes. — Dunbar, op. cit., p. 79; c/. "Report of the Massachusetts Bank Commis- sioners," Executive Document No. ZS, pp. 48-50, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 " Inactivity, or increasing stagnation," wrote Mr. James Gallatin to Chase in March, " is the characteristic of our business affairs." — Two Letters to the Honorable 8. P. Chase {Hew York, 1861), p. 5; c/. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XLIV, pp. 787 ff. s Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XL VI, p. 316; American Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, p. 313. 4 See text of the act in American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 310 ; J. C. Schwab, The Confederate States of America (New York, 1901), p. 113. ^Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XLV, p. 105. The indebtedness of the South to the North was estimated on the basis of R. G. Dun & Company's annual circular for 1861 at $300,000,000.— Iftid., Vol. XLVI, p. 317. The losses of northern creditors were usually reckoned at $200,000,000. Cf. "Report of the Massachusetts Bank Commissioners," October, 1861; Executive Document No. g5, p. 50, 37th Cong., 3d Sess.; New York Tribune, September 18, 1861; President's Message, December 3, 1861, in A. Lincoln, Complete Works, ed. Nicolat and Hat, Vol. II, p. 99. Schwab considers this estimate exaggerated, op, cit,, p. 111. 22 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS general. It had the effect, however, of making the times yet more dull; the transactions of the New York clearing house declined from $129,000,000 in the second week of March, to $80,000,000 in the corresponding week of August.' The banks were not seriously weakened by the failures,^ but found it still more difficult to lend their capital. From December, 1860, to August, 1861, bank loans in New York diminished $23,000,000; in Boston the fall from January to July was $2,000,000 and in Philadelphia $3,000,000.' This decrease of loans was accompanied by a slight decline in circulation, a more decided increase in deposits, and a marked gain in the amount of specie held. Small imports — due partly to the Morrill tariff, but chiefly to the depression of trade — and heavy exports of grain — the result of good crops at home and poor crops abroad — combined to turn the balance of payment toward the United States.* During the spring and summer months sterling exchange sold from two to three points below par in New York.* Not only was the usual drain of specie to Europe stopped, but the current was kept flowing in this direction, so that, though the receipts from California declined and considerable amounts were sent into the interior, specie accu- mulated in the vaults of the New York banks to an unprece- 1 See table of clearings in H. B. Executive Document No. 2S, p. 107, SVth Cone 3d Sess. 2 The Massachusetts commissioners stated in October that the losses of the Boston banks by the repudiation of southern debts would not exceed in amount the undivided profits on hand.— Executive Document No. 25, p. 50, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 See table, p. 30, below. *So large was the exportation of breadstuffs during the summer and autumn of 1861 that it more than offset the effect of the blockade in decreasing shipments of cotton. The movement is somewhat concealed by the usual statements of commerce by years ending June 30; but appears clearly in the official table of imports and exports of merchandise at the port of New York by months. From January to April imports exceeded exports, but from May to December there was an excess of exports, amounting to five million doUars in June, two in July, two in August, four in September, five in October, six in November, and six in December.— See tables in Hitnt's Merchants" Magazine, Vol. XL VI, pp. 277-81. ^Bankers' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, p. 736. Suspension of Specie Payments 28 dented degree. August 17 the ratio of the specie held by the associated banks of New York to their deposits and circulation was 50 per cent. ; for Boston it was 27, and for Philadelphia 39 per cent.^ Thus the banks were unusually- strong; but they were making little profit because the stag- nation of trade gave them few opportunities of lending to business men. Consequently, when Mr. Chase appealed to them to assist the government, the banks were both able and willing to render efficient aid. A conference of representatives of the New York, Boston, and Philadelphia banks,^ held August 10-17 in New York, at the secretary's invitation, drew up in consultation with him a "plan for assisting the United States government." ' Fifty million dollars was to be advanced to the treasury by the associated banks of the three cities. In return they were to receive at par a like amount of treasury notes running three years and bearing interest at 7.30 per cent. Further, the banks were given the option of taking a sedond $50,000,000 of the notes on the same terms October 15, and a third $50,000,000 December 15.* Mr. Chase considered the plan highly advantageous to the government. In the face of war he was borrowing money at "a rate of interest only 1.3 per cent, higher than the ordinary rate of 6 per cent." Besides he received $50,000,000 immediately to meet the pressing 1 See table, p, 30, below. 2 "It was greatly desired," said one of the most prominent of the New York bankers, " to include also the banks of the West, but it was found impracticable to secure the co-operation of the state banks of Ohio and Indiana ; and the state banks of Missouri, the only other organization under a compacted system, were surrounded by combatants."— Letter of George S. Coe to E. G. Spaulding, October 8, 1875, Spaulding, op. cit. Appendix, p. 90. 3 Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 8, 9. A detailed account of the conference is given by A. S. Bolles in LippincotVs Monthly Magazine, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 200-206; reprinted in Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XLI, pp. 363-7. *For text of this agreement see Bankers' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 162, 163. 24 History of the Geeenbacks demands upon the treasury.' To the banks the plan offered profitable employment for their idle capital.^ The banks which thus undertook to lend the government $150,000,000 in four months' time had an aggregate capital of but $120,000,000. Although unusually strong in specie at the time the agreement was made, their combined coin reserves amounted only to $63,200,000.' This sum would hardly more than pay the first instalment of the loan. To prevent its being exhausted at the very beginning, it was necessary that the banks should be able to replace very rapidly the specie which they paid to the government. They counted on doing this in two ways: First, they would sell the securities received from the goverment to the public for cash. It was part of the agreement that the treasury should help in this by opening public subscriptions to the loan in all parts of the country. Second, the specie given to the government would be speedily paid out again in dis- bursements for the immense purchases of war supplies. The coin would thus be restored to the channels of trade, and naturally fiow again into the banks. If the banks could collect specie in these two ways as rapidly as they paid it out to the government, they could continue to supply the treasury with funds indefinitely. But the moment even a brief delay occurred in the return of specie to the banks trouble would come. The reserves would be depleted by the drafts of the treasury, and suspen- sion would be inevitable. Such a delay would happen if anything occurred to make the public slow in buying the 1 Chase's letter to Trowbridge, Warden, op. cit, pp. 386-8. 2 At first the banks decided to divide the $50,000,000 among themselves in proportion to their respective capitals. This would have given the fifty-four New York banks $29,500,000, the forty-six Boston banks $15,500,000, and the nineteen Philadelphia banks $5,000,000. But the Boston banks finally decided that they could not take more than $10,000,000; so that the New York institutions had to make up their subscriptions to $35,000,000— Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XLV, p. 331. 3 See table, p. 30, below. Suspension of Specie Payments 25 7.30 treasury notes from the banks, or to interrupt the government's payments of specie out of the subtreasury, or to prevent men from depositing again in the banks the coin received from the government. The situation, both of the banks and of the treasury, was thus very precarious. The plan might work well in fair weather, but in the first storm it was likely to collapse. Mr. Chase, however, seems to have been unconscious that danger lurked in the scheme. At the very outset the banks encountered an unforeseen obstacle. The independent subtreasury system required all dues to the United States to be paid into the treasury in coin.* This would compel the banks to send the specie lent the government to the subtreasuries, there to lie in the vaults until paid out in disbursements to public creditors. But provision had been made by Congress with the special intent of removing this difficulty.^ The law of August 5 had relaxed the rigor of the subtreasury system so far as to permit the secretary " to deposit any of the moneys obtained on any of the loans .... in such solvent, specie-paying banks as he may select," and allowed " moneys so deposited" to "be withdrawn from such deposit for deposit with the regular authorized depositaries, or for the payment of public dues."' Under this law the banks expected that the loan to the government would be managed in the same manner as a loan to a private person ; they would credit the United States with a deposit of $50,000,000 upon their books, against which the secretary of the treasury could draw as he had occasion. But Mr. Chase's instinctive distrust of bank issues permitted no modification of the subtreasury system. 1 Acts of July 4, 1840, sees. 19 and 20, 5 Statutes at Large, p. 385 ; and of August 6, 1846, sees. 18, 19 and 20, 9 Statutes at Large, p. 59. 2 See the letter'of Mr. E. G. Spaulding, who drafted the section in question, op. cit.. Appendix, p. 51; and remarks of W. P. Fessenden, chairman of the senate finance committee. Congressional Globe, 37th Cong,, 1st Sess., p. 396. id 3 Sec. 6, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 313. 26 History of the G-eeenbaoks He declined to make payments in bank checks on the ground that, though the eastern institutions were ready to pay such checks in coin, their western correspondents on whom they might draw would possibly ask creditors of the government to accept bank notes in satisfaction. He therefore insisted that the loan be paid in specie into the vaults of the sub- treasury. Much against their will, the banks complied.' Nor was this the only point in which the banks found the policy of the treasury an obstacle to the success of the loans. Beside borrowing from the banks to secure funds, Mr. Chase took advantage of his discretionary power to issue non-interest-bearing treasury notes.^ Though payable on demand in gold at the subtreasuries, and receivable for taxes and customs dues, these notes were accepted with reluctance. To facilitate their circulation, the secretary and other treasury officials signed a paper agreeing to take them in payment of their salaries, and General Scott issued a circular setting forth the superior convenience of paper money to soldiers desiring to send home a portion of their pay.' But the banks feared the government paper money would drive their own issues from circulation, and declined to receive the demand notes except on "special deposit." Should they receive the notes as current funds, bankers said, they would 1 Secretary Chase's reasons for refusing to draw directly on the banks are given in a letter to Mr. Trowbridge,CWAKDEN, Life of Chase, p. 387). The side of the banks is represented in G. S. Coe's letter to Spaulding (History of the Legal Tender Paper Money, 2d ed., Appendix, pp. 91, 92) ; J. E. Williams's letter to Chase of October 4, 1861 {ibid., pp. 97-9), and his War Loans of the Associated Banks to the Government in 1861, (New York, 1876) ; James Gallatin, The National Finances, Currency, Bank- ing, etc. (New York, 1864). Most writers have concurred in the opinion that Mr. Chase's refusal was an error. Cf. Our National Finances, What Shall be Done? [anon.] (Boston, 1862); Spaulding, op. cit.. Introduction to 2d ed., pp. 1-4, and Appendix, pp. 51-3; F. A. Conkling, ibid.. Appendix, p. 85; J. S. Gibbons, The Public Debt of the United States (New York, 1867), pp. 135, 136; H. V. PoOE, Money and its Laws, 2d ed. (New York, 1877), pp. 562-4; Hoeace White, Money and Bank- i ing (Boston, 1896), pp. 150-52. ' °~ 2 Acts of July 17, 1861, sec. 1, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 259, and of August 5, 1861, ''"'■■eo. 5 {ibid., p. 313). 3 Text in American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 299. Suspension of Specie Payments 27 be under obligation to redeem them in coin on demand, and this would increase the burden which their reserves had to carry, and so endanger the maintenance of specie payments. Furthermore, the existence of a large amount of obligations, which the treasury might be called upon to redeem in coin at any moment of panic, was a standing menace to the sol- vency of the government, and in so far injured its credit, and made more difficult the rapid sale of the securities held by the banks to the public, on which the success of the loans depended. But it was in vain that the banks appealed to Mr. Chase to cease his issues. He replied: " If you can lend me all the coin required, or show me where I can borrow it elsewhere at fair rates, I will withdraw every note already issued, and pledge myself never to issue another; but if you cannot, you must let me stick to United States notes." ' Unable to induce the secretary to alter this reso- lution, the banks again reluctantly yielded.^ But though the position of the banks was weakened by Mr. Chase's refusal to allow the proceeds of the loan to remain on deposit until paid out to the creditors of the government, and by his issue of paper money, all went well for a time. Mr. Chase appointed agents in over two hundred 'Letter to Trowbridge, Waeden, pp. cit., p. 388. 2 The banks were the more annoyed at Mr. Chase's refusal to make payments in checks drawn upon them and at his issue of treasury notes, because when the arrangement regarding the loan was made they had understood him to agree to conform liis action in these respects to their wishes. See J. E. Williams's letter of October i, 1861, to Chase and George S. Coe's letter of October 8, 1865, to Spaulding in Spaulbing, op. cit, Appendix, pp. 97-9 and 92 respectively. Mr. Chase, however, said in his report of December, 1861, that " it was .... understood that the secre- tary of the treasury should issue a limited amount of United States notes, payable on demand" (p. 9). On the inconvenience caused the banks by the issue of the demand notes, see "Objections to Government Demand Notes, by a New York Bank OiHcer," Bankers" Magazine (New York) , Vol. XVI, pp. 353-7 ; Geoege Maksland, " The Banks and the Greenbacks," Bankers'' Magazine (New York) , Vol. XXXI, pp. 173-81 ; Bolles, Finan- cial History of the United States, 1861-85, pp. 34 and 37; H. V. Poor, Money and its Laws, 2d ed. (New York, 1877), pp. 564 ff. ; J. K. Upton, Money in Politics, 2d ed. (Bos- ton, 1895), pp. 72 ffi. ; E. M. Bkeckeneidge, "The Demand Notes of 1861," in Sound Currency, (New York, October, 1898), Vol. V, pp. 336, 337. 28 History of the G-ebenbacks towns to receive subscriptions for 7.30 treasury notes/ and issued an urgent address, appealing to the people to assist in making the "national loan" successful.^ His efforts were warmly seconded by the newspaper press, which explained the advantages of the loan to investors, and represented sub- scription as an act of patriotism. On their side the New York banks strengthened themselves by putting their coin into a common fund, and reviving the organization entered into to check the panic of the preceding November. The "loan committee," then appointed under the chairmanship of Moses Taylor, was entrusted with the superintendence of the execution of the contract with the government. It was part of the arrangement that the stock of specie should not be allowed to fall below one-fourth of the net liabilities, exclusive of circulation and the credit given the treasury. In case any bank failed to maintain this proportion of reserve, the loan committee was directed to charge interest on the deficit, and to pay the interest received to the institutions holding the highest percentage of specie.' The associated banks agreed to divide the subscriptions to the loan between themselves in proportion to their respect- ive capitals. Each bank was to pay 10 per cent, of its sub- scription into the subtreasury at once, and to place the bal- ance to the credit of the government upon its books.* Against these credits Mr. Chase was to draw only as fast as 1 See list in Bankers' Magazine, (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 308-10. Aside from treasury ofilcials there were 148 agents.— H. S. Executive Document No. 66, p. 2 38thCong., 1st Sess. 2 Text is to be found in Banlcers' Magazine, Vol. XVI, pp. 290-2. The notes were offered at par, and were to draw interest from August 19, but on taking the bonds subscribers were required to pay interest from that date to day of subscription, so that the interest received by the purchaser began with the date of his purchase. 3 Cf. note 1, p. 32, below. The best authority for the banking operations is the "Report of the New York Loan Committee," June 12, 1862, published in the Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, and in H. B. Executive Document No. 25, 37th Cong. 3d Sess pp. 123-42. * See text of agreement of banks with government, and proceedings of the meet- ing of bankers in reference to it.— Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVI, pp. 161-70. Suspension of Specie Payments 29 he needed funds for disbursement. It was anticipated that his drafts would be about 10 per cent, of the loan a week.' Consequently, the effect of the transaction may be traced in the weekly bank returns of the three cities. In New York the first instalment of the loan, $3,500,000, was paid into the subtreasury August 19, 1861.^ Comparing the reports of August 17 and August 24, one finds a decrease of $2,600,- 000 in the specie holdings of the banks, and a like increase in the coin held by the subtreasury.^ At the same time the balance of the government loan was added to the line of dis- counts, increasing the loans reported by $29,000,000. Finally, the sum placed upon the books of the banks to the credit of the government to be drawn against produced a nominal increase of $26,500,000 in the deposits.* Similar changes are seen on comparing the situation of the Boston and Philadelphia banks on August 17 and 31. In Boston payments to the subtreasury diminished reserves less than $300,000, while discounts and deposits were increased $3,600,000 and $4,200,000, respectively, in consequence of the government loans. The Philadelphia banks lost $600,- 000 in specie during the two weeks, and increased their dis- counts $4,600,000 and their deposits $3,700,000. But the situation immediately began to change. The banks paid over the loan in instalments of about $5,000,000 at intervals of six days.^ Each payment thus made into the subtreasuries decreased the sum credited to the government as a deposit. Loans also declined, for as fast as the 7.30 ^American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 64. Cf. Chase's letter of October 2, 1861, to Larz Anderson, in Schhckees, Life of Chase, pp. 430, 431. 2 "Report of the New York Loan Committee," Bankers^ Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 139. 3 For this and the similar subsequent comparisons see the table showing the condition of the banks of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, p. 3u, and the accom- panying chart. * Cf. " Report of the Bank Commissioners of Massachusetts, October, 1861," H B. Executive Document No. 25, p. 56, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 Letter of G. S. Coe, in Spaulding, op. cit., Appendix, p. 92. 30 History of the Greenbacks CM MP3dOi:-eOOiOicOMKlOfiOOifSCOCOOii-(CO'*OOMOOClC-0"f5CiC-Ot-oOoO»nc>3tOOtr-M-*0>'rt(»OQOCSiH-^-*eO-*WtrDI:-t:-i:-oO 01COT-l-*'*lr-i-HM7HOU3COOOGl«5C-inMt-CO-»*OSOmOeiOC>10CSOTHO-* O t-MOOiooi«»rarHOw>ra-*c-i?a Qdodo6aiooodoooi6o6odcJcviclMOtDtDC0t--*O "1*5 CO ^^ m CDe05-(tr-M"*30eO->*-*NOS"*THCOTHr-D-000!MOOl:-m5Dt-Ot-COi-(tO'»t^O lCaa*.DC10W£'C300»n-rHrHOOCO«-^7a-Tllc-Oi-^KI^COeD-^OiiraOD03C003 S-^eooicD^HOsO'^t-ecTHcoeDcooi-^HD'-HCOeoo -HOOSOaC^ f ^ S, I \/ r ■^ 1 \ s/ 1 ^ \ N D., Obv( i 1 \ \ 110 JOO "s. ] ( \ \ \ \ V Li \ V ^ -^ \ V 1 J » ". 5 1 o 60 60 *-< i P- 1^ ^ i ^ ^ V. ■^ N ^ — ■^ bo n\\ ■^ ts« vve: ^ ^ V^ ' \ \- -- --- ^ ^ — ^ ■^ 7^ s* Cl«. \r\ X. «> o.\ .s ST TV' 0.4 "3 ^ s- ' 32 History of the Greenbacks notes were sold to the public through the treasury agencies the proceeds were remitted to the banks and deducted by them from the loan to the government. From August 31 to September 28 the decline of bank loans was $15,000,000 in New York, $2,000,000 in Boston, and $2,000,000 in Philadelphia. The corresponding decline in deposits amounted to $23,800,000, $2,400,000, and $2,700,000 re- spectively. The point of crucial importance for the success of the bank loan, however, was the change in the stocks of specie held. The payments into the subtreasuries drained the bank reserves of about $5,000,000 a week. This loss was offset in part by the re-deposit in the banks of money paid out by the government to army contractors and other creditors, and in part by sums received from the treasury on account of sales of 7.30 notes to the public through the sub- scription agencies — though it was not until September 3 that the banks received any reimbursement from this latter source.' For the first five weeks the withdrawal of specie from the banks so far exceeded receipts as to cause a rapid reduction of reserves. From August 17 to September 21 the New York banks lost $13,000,000 of specie. Whither the money had gone is shown by the contemporaneous gain of $11,000,000 in the coin held by the New York subtreas- ury. During the same time the Philadelphia banks lost $2,000,000, or over 30 per cent, of their specie. In Boston the reserves increased slightly for the first three weeks and the subsequent loss was less serious than in the other cities, a trifle less than 20 per cent. In New York the loan com- mittee found that the loss of coin reduced the reserves of some of the associated banks below the stipulated propor- tion of 25 per cent, to net deposits, making necessary a 1 " Report of the New York Loan Committee," B. B. Executive Document No. 25, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 128. Suspension of Specie Payments 33 reapportionment of the specie for the first time on Sep- tember 2.' After September 21, however, the tide turned. " The disbursements of the government for the war were so rapid," said Mr. Coe, a New York bank president, "and the consequent internal trade movement was so intense, that the coin paid out upon each instalment of the loan came back to the banks through the community in about one week."^ Such fresh deposits, together with the reimbursements received through the treasurer from the public subscriptions to the loan, came to exceed the payments of specie into the subtreasury, and the reserves consequently rose again. By the middle of Octo- ber the New York banks held $5,500,000 more specie than on September 21. Meanwhile government disburdsements had reduced the specie holdings of the subtreasury by $6,000,000. In about the same period the reserves of Boston banks gained $1,500,000 and those of the Phila- delphia banks $1,700,000. Encouraged by the gain in specie, the banks agreed to take a second $50,000,000 of the 7.30 three-year treasury notes October 1, fifteen days earlier than the time agreed upon in August, although they had not yet completed their 1 The apportionment was at first managed by charging interest upon the defi- ciency of reserve; but on September 21 this account was closed, and "thereafter the specie apportionment was made by requiring the banks to exchange loan certifi- cates for specie whenever their specie was less than 25 per cent, of their net deposits, exclusive of the amount to the credit of the government." Prom September 21 to December 30 a daily apportionment of specie was made in this fashion. The com- mittee issued loan certificates drawing 7 per cent, interest to banks whose reserves had fallen below the limit, for 90 per cent, of the amount of 7.30 notes, or assistant treas- urer's receipts for payments on the loan, deposited with them. An issue of $10,000,000 of such certificates had been authorized by the banks April 24, 1861. This was increased to $15,000,000 December 18, to $20,000,000 December 28, and to $25,000,000 January 20, 1862. The total issues were $22,585,000, and the largest amount outstand- ing was $21,960,000 from February 3 to February 7, 1862. The interest amounted to $396,436.32. Certificates were issued to thirty-nine of the fifty associated banks, thirty-one of which paid more interest than they received. All the certificates were redeemed by April 28, 1862.— J6id., pp. 126-33. 2 Letter of October 8, 1875, in Spaulding, op, cit, Appendix, p. 93. 34 HiSTOET OF THE GeEENBACKS payments upon the first loan.' There was but one ominous sign — -the popular subscription under the management of the treasury department had not been an unqualified success. In the hope of stimulating the lagging subscriptions, the Boston banks had issued a card September 11, saying: The banks are meeting their engagements and furnishing the $50,000,000 with no practical iaconvenience to themselves or the mercantile community; and if no more money was required no diflBculty woiild be experienced But ivho is to furnish the next $50,000,000% Are the banks expected to do so? If they are, the men of means, large and small, must take and pay for the first 150,000,000 during the present month or early in October — other- wise it cannot be accomplished.^ But, despite such appeals and the efforts of the secre- tary and the press, subscriptions became so slow, after about $45,000,000 of the first loan had been sold to the public, that the treasury agencies were closed and the banks under- took to dispose of the second $50,000,000 themselves without the aid of the government.^ Changes in the accounts of the banks, similar to those resulting from the first loan, followed the taking of the sec- ond. On comparing the reports for September 28 and Octo- ber 12, one sees an increase of loans amounting to $30,000,- 000 in New York, $3,300,000 in Boston, and $8,600,000 in Philadelphia. At the same time, the credit given the gov- ernment upon the books of the banks created a corresponding increase of deposits amounting to $32,600,000, $5,500,- 1 Cf. Bankers' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, p. 397, and "Keport of the New York Loan Committee," ibid., Vol. XVII, p. 140. ^Bankers' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 366, 367. 3 Chase's letter to Trowbridge, Waeden, op. cit., p. 387. The banks continned, however, to receive drafts from the treasury on account of the sales made to the public by the treasury agencies on their account. The final cash reimbursement was not received in New York until January 13, 1S&2.— Executive Document No. 25, p. 128, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. Of the $45,000,000 sold, $24,700,000 were disposed of by private agents and the balance by department oificials. It was by his success in obtaining subscriptions for over $5,000,000 of 7.30s that Jay Cooke attracted Mr. Chase's atten- tion. — See S. R. Executive Document No. 6S, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. Suspension op Specie Payments 35 000, and $4,600,000 respectively. But, instead of falling off as in August, the reserves of the banks increased, main- taining a high level throughout October, November, and the first half of December. Of course, as successive $5,000,- 000 instalments were paid into the subtreasuries by the banks, their deposits declined again after October 12, as they had after August 31, and the loans were reduced by con- tinued receipts from the proceeds of the popular subscrip- tion. By November 16 (the last report made before the taking of the third loan) the fall of deposits in New York was $18,000,000, and of loans $19,000,000. The corre- sponding figures for Philadelphia were $1,300,000 and $2,700,000; and for Boston (October 12 to November 9) $1,100,000 and $2,300,000. All this time, while supplying the federal treasury with specie on so large a scale, the banks had also to furnish the usual accommodations to the mercantile community. But they were able to serve both the government and the public with comparative ease. For, as the Massachusetts bank commissioners reported in October, 1861, " the prostration of business robbed them of their usual customers, and the operations of the government, which have given rise to a new activity exerted in the public service, have caused the making of very little business paper, such as banks are in the habit of discounting. Public contractors are usually paid in cash at intervals shorter than the average length of bank accommodations, and they have little occasion to bor- row money.'" The last instalment of the first $50,000,000 was paid into the subtreasuries by the banks October 24, and payment on the second loan was begun five days later.^ The operation 1 Executive Document No. 25, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 56. 2 " Eeport of the New York Loan Committee," Bankers' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVII, pp. 139, 1«. 36 History op the Greenbacks proceeded smoothly, the decline of the reserves being insig- nificant, and the banks determined to take a third $50,000,- 000 of government securities November 16, a month before the date set in the agreement of August. But, because of the difficulty experienced in disposing of the three-year 7.30 treasury notes to the public, they declined to accept more of these securities, and received instead twenty-year 6 per cent, bonds at a rate equivalent to par for 7 per cent.,' in the expectation that such bonds could be sold at a profit in Europe.^ At the same time, the banks were given the option of taking on January 1, 1862, a fourth loan of $50,000,000 upon the same terms as the first and second.' In pursuance of this arrangement, the government was given credit upon the books of the banks for $45,795,478.48 — the proceeds of the $50,000,000 bonds at the given rate* — which increased once more the sum of loans and deposits.' For several weeks after the third loan was taken every- thing went well. The banks continued to pay regular instal- ments on the second loan into the subtreasuries of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, and did not make the first payment on the third until December 10.' Meanwhile the specie reserves increased slightly in each of the three cities, so that by December 7 New York banks held as much coin as at any time since August, and the Boston and Philadelphia 1 This rate is S9.S22i(oSiSl— Executive Document No. 2S, p. 129, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. This arrangement was made under authority of sec. 7 of the act of August 5, 1861, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 313. 2 See the letter from a New York bank president published in the New York Tribune, December 25, 1861, p. 7. 3 Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, p. 10. ilbid., loc. cit. Of. Executive Document No. 26, p. 129, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 For New York the gain from November 16 to November 30 was $25,500,000 in loans and $25,100,000 in deposits. For Philadelphia the corresponding figures are $2,400,000 and $3,400,000. The Boston banks gained $3,600,000 in loans from the second to the fourth week in November and $3,500,000 in deposits. 6 " Report of the New York Loan Committee," Bankers^ Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 140. Suspension of Specie Payments 37 banks were actually stronger in specie than at the time when the first government loan was made. About this time, however, two untoward events occurred. The first was the publication, December 10, of the annual report of the secretary of the treasury. In his report to the extra session of Congress in the preceding July, Mr. Chase had estimated that receipts from customs dues and sales of public land would yield during the current fiscal year (July 1, 1861, to June 30, 1862), a revenue of $60,- 000,000, while the expenditures of the government would probably reach $318,519,582.' Enormous as this budget seemed, the succeeding months proved its inadequacy. The December report showed that the estimate of expenses should be increased $214,000,000, while the estimate of revenue from customs and land sales should be reduced $25,000,000.^ But more than this, it had been generally felt that the plan of borrowing from banks could be only a temporary makeshift to serve until a permanent policy was matured. It was hoped that the report of December would present a definite plan of finance based upon adequate taxation. But Mr. Chase pro- posed taxes yielding only $50,000,000,' and put his main reliance upon a scheme for reorganizing the banks of the country in such a way as to compel them to buy a large amount of government bonds.* The disappointment caused by the report was keen.^ The second event was the Trent affair. November 8, 1861, Captain Wilkes, of the American warship San Jacinto, removed two commissioners of the Confederate States — 1 Senate Executive Document No. 2, pp. 5 and 8, S7tli Cong., 1st Sess. 2 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 11, 12. 3I6id., p.,15. 4J6id!.,pp. n-20. 5(y. "Federal Finances Examined" (anon.) Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Yo\, XLVII, December, 1862, p. 507 ; Appleton '« Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, p. 66 ; Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, (Norwich, Conn., 1884), Vol. I, p. 407. 38 HlSTOEY OP THE GREENBACKS Messrs. Mason and Slidell — by force from the British steamer Trent, plying between Havana and Southampton. In the United States lively satisfaction was felt in this cap- ture, and Wilkes was dined by clubs and thanked by Con- gress. But when the news reached England, November 27, there was great indignation over what was felt to be a wan- ton insult to the British flag ; and the government dispatched a queen's messenger to Washington to demand the surren- der of the prisoners and an apology. If this demand were not complied with in seven days the English ambassador was instructed "to repair immediately to London." This was a plain threat of war. Intelligence of the action taken by the English cabinet was received in New York on December 16. As the report had gone out that the Confederates would not be released it seemed highly probable that the federal gov- ernment would be involved in a second war." The receipt of the news on the 16th caused a panic in the New York markets. On the stock exchange government secu- rities fell 2-2J per cent. Shares of all kinds participated in. the decline,^ and sterling exchange rose two points.' Wall street was filled with rumors of an agreement among the banks to suspend specie payments, and men with balances in banks began to turn them into special deposits.* Next day a meet- ing of the associated banks was called to consider the situa- tion. A motion was made to suspend specie payments at once, but the proposal failed of adoption. Instead, in the hope of quelling the panic, the banks unanimously adopted a series of vigorous resolutions, declaring that there was "nothing iu the position of the loans to the government to 1 Cf. J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. Ill (New York, 1895), pp 520-43. '^Bankers' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 558 and 491; and stock quota- tions, ibid., p. 559. 3 Ibid., Vol. XVI, p. 736. * Ibid., Vol. XVI, pp. 491 and 558. Suspension op Specie Payments 39 cause uneasiness," and that they saw " no reason, justifica- tion, or necessity for a suspension of specie payments. " ' But these resolutions availed little. While the banks continued to pay specie into the subtreasury at the usual rate, the money paid out by the goverment to contractors and others, owing to the alarmed state of the public mind and the fear of a suspension, did not flow back as before into their reserves.^ This cut off the chief source from which the reserves had been recruited. Meanwhile the banks of Boston and the "West began to draw heavily upon their balances in New York, so that the deposits fell off $17,000,000 in three weeks.' To meet this double drain — coming from the sub- treasury and the interior banks — the New York institu- tions had no available resource. Over $50,000,000 of their resources seem to have been locked up in government securi- ties,* which could not be sold to obtain specie ; for the fall in the price of stocks made it impossible to dispose of 7.30 treasury notes at home except at a heavy sacrifice,^ and the danger of war with England cut off all hope of negotiating the 6 per cent, bonds in Europe." The result of the situa- tion was a rapid depletion of the reserves. The week that Mr. Chase's report on the finances was published the New York banks lost $2,900,000 of specie. The next report — made after the receipt of warlike news from England — 1 See copy of the resolutions in Hunfs Merchants^ Magazine^ Vol. XLVI, p. 101. Cf. the comment in the New York Tribune, December 23, p. 8, and December 30, p. 8; New York Herald, December 19, p. 6; and New York Times, December 30, p. 4. 2 Cf. letter from a New York bank president in New York Tribune, December 25, 1861, p. 7. 3 Cf. New York Tribune of December 23, p. 8, and of December 30, p. 8. The table, p. 30, above, shows that the Boston banks increased their specie, while those of New York were losing rapidly. * Cf. Bankers' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, p. 560. 5 Most of the 7.30 notes sold by public subscription had been taken by " small investors, and they were already again offering them in the market to an extent which reduced the price to 96 for those that were indorsed and 98 for clean notes." — American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 299. 6 Letter from bank president in New York Tribune, December 25, 1861, p. 7. 40 History of the Greenbacks exhibited a further loss of $2,600,000. During the next seven days the rate of depletion was even more rapid, and the loss for the week amounted to $7,400,000. Under such a drain the complete exhaustion of the reserves was evidently a question of only a short time. Saturday, December 28, the banks held another meeting to decide what measures should be taken. After a "rather stormy " session of six or seven hours, the resolution to sus- pend specie payments upon the following Monday, Decem- ber 30, was carried by a vote of 25 of the institutions represented to 15.' 1 Of. " Remarks made by Mr. James Gallatin at the Meeting of Bank Officers, .... December28, 1861,"Ba7ifceT-s'Jfaffa0J»ie (New York), ■?^ol. XVI, pp. 625-31; H.W. Domett, History of the Bank of New York, 2d ed. (New York, 1884), p. 97, and accounts of the meeting in the New York daily papers of December 30, 1861. It is to be noted that suspension was rather a measure of precaution to prevent further depletion of the reserves than one of necessity; for on the day when suspen- sion was decided upon the New York banks held $4,600,000 more specie than they had at the commencement of the year. Their attitude was expressed in Mr. Gallatin's remarks: "The government must suspend specie payments or we must, and it is only a question of a few more days' time as to who'suspends first and who shall hold the specie now in our vaults. If we hold it, the people and the government will be alike benefited. If government takes it, the whole will be expended and hoarded by a few people." — Bankers^ Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, p. 627. At the time of suspension the account of the banks with the government stood as follows (iftid., p. 560) Subscribed to Received back Loan Paid in from Government emment Banks of New York $102,056,835 $81,056,835 $27,125,000 $21,000,000 Banks of Boston 29,159,095 23,159,095 7,750,000 6,000,000 Banks of Philadelphia 14,579,548 11,579,548 3,875,000 3,000,000 $145,795,478 $115,795,478 $38,750,000 $30,000,000 The government made its last cash payment to the banks January 13, 1862, and the banks paid the last instalment of money due upon the second loan January 15, and on the third loan February 4. January 24 the banks still owed the government $9,375,000. (C/. " Report New York Loan Committee," Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, pp. 139, 140, and comment on the money market, ibid.. Vol. XVI, pp. 560 and 655.) There was a vexatious delay In the delivery to the banks of the securities they had purchased. The 7.30 treasury notes for the portion of the first loan which was not sold to the public ($5,625,000) were not received by the banks till January 24, 1862. The notes for the second loan were delivered in four instalments between January 22 and February 5; and the 6 per cent, bonds for the third loan in nine instalments between January 27 and March 5.—" Report of the New York Lqan Com- mittee," loc, cit. " As fortunately as unexpectedly," reported the New York Loan Committee June 12, 1862, in regard to the operation, "it has resulted profitably for the associ- ates, and has probably enabled them to employ their means to nearly as much Suspension of Specie Payments 41 "The suspension of the banks [of New York] was received in commercial and monetary circles without surprise." ' The banks of Philadelphia, which had lost nearly $2,000,000 of specie in a fortnight, followed suit; and so did those of Boston, although the latter had managed to increase their reserves $1,600,000 between December 7 and 21, and had then lost but $1,100,000 by the 28th, thus suspending with $2,300,000 more specie than on August 17, when the con- tract for the first government loan was taken. With the exception of the banks of Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky, and a few scattered institutions,the suspension of specie payments immediately became general.'' The suspension of the national treasury followed of neces- sity hard upon that of the banks. As Mr. Chase said, after the banks had ceased paying in specie, it was "certain that the government could no longer obtain coia on loans in any adequate amoimts." ' Consequently the treasury was obliged to cease redeeming in coin the demand treasury notes in circulation.* The responsibility for the suspension of the banks and advantage as would have been done but for the political disturbances of the country. Most of the government securities which have been sold by the associates have been sold by themselves at different times, and it is not possible for your committee to state the amount of interest for the capital invested which has been received thereon ; but the associates still hold a large amount of them, the market value of which is much higher than the price at which they were taken." — Loc. cit., p. 14S. Moreover, the banks drew interest at 7.3 per cent, upon the entire $50,000,000 of the first loan from August 19, upon the second from October 1, and upon the third from November 16. As they paid up these loans at the rate of about $5,000,000 per week, not completing the payments on the first loan till October 24, 1861, on the second till January 15, 1862, and on the third till February 4, 1862, they were for a considerable time paid interest on funds that had not left their possession. On that portion of the first loan sold to the public, the banks received interest from August 19, 1861, to the dates of sale, amounting altogether to $621,290.—" Report of the New York Loan Committee," Bankers'' Magazine, pp. 139-42, and Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1861, p. 9. 1 New York Tribune, December 31, 1861, p. 3. 2 df. Part II, chap, ii, sec. ii, below. 3 Letter to Trowbridge, Waedek, Life of Chase, p. 388. *0n the subsequent history of these treasury notes see Part II, chap, ii, sec. iii, and chap, iii, sec. ii, below. 42 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS government has frequently been placed upon Mr. Chase for his issue of demand treasury notes and his refusal to draw directly upon the banks in making payments.' Examination of the condition of the banks, as shown in their weekly reports, however, hardly bears out this opinion. Doubtless the position of the banks would have been stronger had the secretary conformed his policy to their wishes. But, inas- much as no serious trouble had been experienced up to the second week of December, despite Mr. Chase's refusal to do as the banks desired, it seems unreasonable to attribute the sudden loss of specie in the last three weeks of December, which caused suspension, to the policy pursued by him throughout — especially when the result is so adequately accounted for by the depression due to the unfavorable treasury report and to the fear of a war with England. These events made clear the weakness inherent in the plan of the bank loan. Suspension was inevitable whenever any- thing occurred to check the re- deposit in the banks of money paid out by the treasury, or to prevent the banks from replenishing their reserves by selling the securities received from the government. A severe blow to the national credit would inevitably produce such effects. It so happened that the publication of the disappointing treasury report and the Trent affair were the first occurrences of this nature momen- tous enough to arouse general uneasiness. Had there been no threat of war with England, and had the condition of the federal finances revealed in the report of December been less gloomy, the banks would probably have been able to carry out their program of taking a fourth $50,000,000 of treasury notes on January 1. Suspension would then have been postponed, but, in all probability, not prevented. To assume that the banks could have continued indefinitely to carry their double burden — supplying both government and I For examples see the citations in note 1, p. 26, and note 2, p. 27, above. Suspension of Specie Payments 43 public with loans — is to assume that no serious reverse would have befallen the national credit; for, as has been twice said, a disturbance of public confidence would have led to the withdrawal of deposits and the hoarding of specie; the government securities held by the banks would have become unsalable and suspension would have followed. As it was, the specie standard was abandoned within six months after the Civil War had fairly begun. The country was left at the beginning of the new year, 1862, with a mixed circulation of paper money which neither the issuing banks nor the federal treasury were prepared to redeem in coin. How Congress met the situation thus created forms the subject of the following chapter.' 1 General accounts of the $150,000,000 bank loan and the suspension of specie pay- ments are to be found in Report of the Secretary of the Treasury^ December, 1861, pp. 8-10; letter of Chase to Trowbridge, in Warden, Life of Chase, pp. 386-8; ScmjCKEEa, Life of Chase, pp. 225-31 ; " Report of the Loan Committee of the New York Banks," Executive Document No. 25, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 125-42, and Banle- ers^ Magazine (New York), Vol. XVII, pp. 136-49 (details of the management of the loan by the New York banks) ; Geoeqe S. Coe, letter of October 8, 1875, to E. G. Spaulding, in latter's History of the Legal-Tender Paper Money, 2d ed. (Buffalo, 1875), Appendix, pp. 89-96; republished under title, "Financial History of the War," in Bankers^ Magazine, Vol. SXS, pp. 536-44 (written from point of view of the banks, as is the next also) ; J. E. Williams, The War Loans of the Associated Banks to the Government in 1861 (New York, 1876) ; American Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, article "Finances of the United States," and pp. 61-6 (impartial); "Federal Finances Examined " (anon) ; Hunfs Merchants^ Magazine, Vol. XLVII, pp. 506 ff. (criticism of Mr. Chase); Von Hock, Die Finanzen unxi die Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten (Stuttgart, 1867), pp. 442-6 (deficient in information); W. A. Beekey, The M(mey Question, 4th ed.. Grand Kapids (Mich.), 1878, pp. 154-8 (version of the " greenback " party) ; Bolles, Fivnncial History of the United States, 1860-85, pp. 20-42 (loosely written) ; W. G. Sumnbk, History of Banking in the United States, (New York, 1896) [Vol. I of History of Banking in all Nations], pp. 458-61. CHAPTER II THE FIRST LEGAL-TENDER ACT I. The Legal-Tender Bills : Spaulding's Legal-Tender Bill — Discussion in Committee — The Bankers' Convention — Revision of Spaulding's Bill. II. Debate in Congress: Constitutional Argument — Argument from Experience — Eco- nomic, Moral, and Fiscal Objections — Argument from Necessity — Alternatives Proposed — A Temporary Measure. III. Attitude of Secretary Chase: Chase's Reluctant Assent to Legal-Tender Clause — Later Denial of Necessity for It — Opinions of Financial Critics. IV. Passage of the Act: Three Substitutes for Legal-Tender Bill — Vote in House — Senate Amendments — Votes in Senate — Conference Committee — Pro- visions of Law — Attitude of the Business Public and of the Press. I. THE LEGAL-TENDEE BILLS On the very day that the New York banks suspended specie payments, a proposal was made in Congress that the United States resort to the issue of an irredeemable paper currency of legal-tender notes. This bill, so promptly pre- sented, originated in the following manner: In his report of December 9 Mr. Chas^ had estimated the probable deficit for the coming six months at $214,000,000. To secure this sum he proposed an increase of only $50,000,000 in taxation and for the remainder reliance upon loans. With the purpose of making it easier to borrow he suggested a national reorganization of the state banking system requiring all banks to purchase United States stocks to hold as security for their circulating notes' — a proposal ^Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 11-20; Notes Explanatory of Mr. Chase's Plan of National Finance (Washington, 1861). p. 15. 44 The Piest Legal-Tendek Act 45 out of which the national banking system developed some two years later. According to the usual course of business this report was read in the House of Representatives and referred to the Committee of Ways and Means. The large amount of work which devolved upon this committee had made neces- sary a division of labor among its members. The chairman, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, whose radical anti- slavery opinions, imperious temper, and vigorous use of invective had made him the Republican leader of the House, devoted himself to pushing the appropriation bills. To the remaining eight members fell the task of preparing new measures. They organized in two subcommittees, one of which, presided over by the leading tariff advocate of the day, Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont, undertook to frame a program of war taxation, leaving the other subcommittee to consider the loan bills.' It was to this second subcommittee that Mr. Chase's national currency scheme was submitted. The chairman was Elbridge G. Spaulding, a Buffalo banker who had been state treasurer of New York and had served two terms in Congress. His colleagues were a retired Boston merchant, Samuel Hooper, who had entered politics as a Republican after accumulating a fortune in business, and Erastus Corning, an Albany millionaire possessing executive ability but no talent for speech-making. These three gentlemen immediately adopted the secretary's plan and began to draft a bill for a national currency secured by a pledge of govern- ment bonds. But on Saturday, December 28, they learned that the New York banks had decided to suspend specie payments on the following Monday. Suspension would of course drive gold from circulation and leave the country 1 E. Gr. SpAUiiDiNG, History of the Legal-Tender Paper Money Issued During the Great Rebellion (Buffalo, 1869), pp. 7, 8. 46 HiSTOET OF THE GeEENBACKS with no other currency than the $33,000,000 demand notes issued by the treasury, the notes of the suspended state banks, and small change of silver and minor coins. Even when redeemable in specie the bank notes, issued by some 1,600 different institutions according to no general plan and varying widely in value, made a very unsatisfactory currency. Moreover, bank notes could not legally be accepted and paid out by the federal treasury under the provisions of the subtreasury law. Mr. Chase's plan for reorganizing the banking system would perhaps furnish a sounder circulation, but the banking bill contained sixty sections and was certain to encounter opposition from the friends of state banks that would delay its enactment sev- eral months. "So long a delay," thought Mr. Spaulding, "would be fatal to the union cause." Accordingly, he "changed the legal tender section, intended originally to accompany the bank bill, into a separate bill, .... and on his own motion introduced it into the House by unanimous consent on the 30th of December.'" After being twice read in the House of Representatives, this bill was referred back to the Committee of Ways and Means. Upon its wisdom the members of the committee were equally divided. Of the subcommittee, Spaulding and Hooper favored the bill, while Coming opposed it. Thaddeus Stevens at first objected to the legal-tender clause as unconstitutional; but he soon overcame his scruples and decided to vote for the bill. Morrill, of Vermont, and Horton, of Ohio, joined Corning in opposition. Maynard, of Tennessee, and Stratton, of New York, took no part in the discussion ; but the former was inclined to support the proposal, while Stratton was undecided. There was thus a deadlock in the committee — -four members favored and four 1 Spauldikg, op. cit., p. 14. This was H. R. bill No. 182. It authorized the issue of $50,000,000 of legal-tender treasury notes. For text see Spadlding, pp. 14, 15. The First Legal-Tendee Act 47 opposed the bill. The ninth member, John S. Phelps, of Missouri, was not in Washington at the time. But finally the wavering member, Stratton, consented to vote for the bill in order that it might go before Congress for considera- tion.' Thus, after a narrow escape from defeat in the com- mittee, the legal-tender bill was formally reported to the House by Mr. Spaulding, January 7, 1862.^ Mr. Spaulding's reasons for urging a legal-tender bill upon Congress at this juncture were given in a letter to a gentleman who ventured to suggest that heavy taxation was preferable to the issue of irredeemable paper as a method of securing revenue. Spaulding wrote: The treasury-note bill .... is a measure of necessity and not one of choice We will be out of means to pay the daily expenses in about thirty days, and the committee do not see any other way to get along till we can get the tax bills ready, except to issue tem- porarily Treasury notes We must have at least $100,000,000 during the next three months, or the Government must stop payment. And the letter closed with an intimation that unless the gentleman could suggest some other plan for raising the said $100,000,000 it would best become him not to criticise the bill.' By the publication of copies of the legal-tender bill in various newspapers, the country was quickly informed of the radical step which Congress was considering. When the bankers of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia who had been supplying the government with funds heard of the proposal, a number of the most prominent went to Washing- ton to persuade Secretary Chase that the situation could be 1 Spaulding, History, p. 16. 2 This second bill (H. K. bill No. 187) differed from the first in increasing the issue of legal-tender notes from $50,000,000 to $100,000,000 and in making the demand notes authorized in July, 1861, also a legal tender. For text see ibid., pp. 16, 17. 3 Letter of E. G. Spaulding to Isaac Sherman, January 8, 1862, Spaulding, History, pp. 17, 18. 48 HiSTOET OF THE GeEENBAOKS met with a remedy less heroic than the issue of an irredeem- able paper currency. January 11, 1862, these gentlemen had an informal conference with Mr. Chase, the members of the House Committee of Ways and Means, and of the Senate finance committee.' As spokesman for the banks, Mr. James Gallatin, presi- dent of the G-allatin Bank of New York, pointed out the evil consequences that would follow the emission of legal-tender paper money, and submitted an alternative plan for relieving the necessities of the treasury. The main features of his proposal were: first, heavy taxation; second, the sale of long-time bonds at their market value. Adequate taxation, he argued, would give the long-needed assurance that the treasury had ample revenue to pay interest on loans. Bonds could then be sold on better terms, especially after the futile attempt to fix a minimum value for them by legislation forbidding sales below par should have been abandoned.^ Simple and efficient as this plan seems, it did not meet with the approval of the secretary or the congressional committees. Mr. Spaulding, who replied to Gallatin, stated the grounds of their dissent as follows: Mr. Spaulding objected to any and every form of " shinning " by government through Wall or State streets to begin with; objected to the knocking down of government stocks to 75 or 60 cents on the 1 Spaulding, op. cit., pp. 18-20.— The bankers who took part in this conference seem to have had no official position as delegates of the association of banks. However, they were men of such prominence that much weight was attached to the opinions they expressed on financial topics. According to Spaulding, Coe, Vermilye, Martin, and Gallatin came from New York ; Haven, Walley, and Bates from Boston ; and Eogers, Mercer, and Patterson from Philadelphia (.ibid., p. 19). But that the views of these gentlemen were not shared by all their associates appears from the letters received about this time by Mr. Spaulding from other bankers (ifcid., p. 23-5). See also the New York Herald financial column dated January 13, 1862. 2There were four other points in Mr. Gallatin's plan: (1) cessation of issue of demand notes beyond the $50,000,000 already authorized ; (2) the issue of $100,000,000 of two-year treasury notes receivable for government dues except customs ; (3) sus- pension of the subtreasury act so as to allow banks to become government deposi- tories; (4) authorization of temporary loans secured by pledges of government stock.— Ibid., p. 20. The Fikst Legal-Tender Act 49 dollar, the inevitable result of throwing a new and large loan on the market, without limitation as to price; claimed for treasury notes as much virtue of par value as the notes of bants which have suspended specie payments, but which yet circulate in the trade of the North; and finished with firmly refusing to assent to any scheme which should permit a speculation by brokers, bankers, and others in government securities, and particularly any scheme which should double the public debt of the country, and double the expenses of the war by damaging the credit of the government to the extent of sending it to " shin " through the shaving shops of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia.' This reply of Mr. Spaulding to Mr. Gallatin is interesting because it shows plainly the curious inconsistency in the position taken by the promoters of the legal-tender bill from beginning to end of the discussion. They professed to advocate the issue of paper money upon the ground of sheer necessity. By this means alone, said Mr. Spaulding, in the letter quoted above, could the immediate wants of the treasury be met. To substantiate this argument it was of course necessary to show that no other feasible method of obtaining funds existed. When, then, bankers declared that there was an alternative, that the government could secure means by adopting a policy of vigorous taxation and selling its bonds at their market value, the only logical answer for the friends of the legal-tender bill was to show that the bankers were mistaken. But such was not the answer that Mr. Spaulding made. He replied instead that selling bonds below par was more objectionable than issuing paper money. And in this view the committee of Congress apparently concurred. Thus, when the delegates of the banks called attention to the possibility of borrowing, the argument for the legal- tender bill was shifted from the ground of necessity to that of expediency. The choice lay not between irredeemable paper money and federal bankruptcy, but between irredeem- 1 Spaulding, p. 21. 50 HiSTOKY OF THE GkEENBAOKS able paper money and borrowing at high rates of interest. The financial leaders of the government deliberately pre- ferred the former course. Whether their choice was wise or not, even from the strictly financial point of view; whether the increase of debt, which Mr. Spaulding saw would result from selling bonds below par, was avoided by the issue of paper money ; whether " the knocking down of government stocks to 75 or 60 cents on the dollar" was prevented, are questions that must be left for the chapter on the effect of paper issues upon the cost of the war.' As has been said, Mr. Spaulding's reply convinced the congressional committees that the legal-tender bill was a better method of relieving the embarrassment of the treasury than the bankers' proposal to sell bonds at their market value. Subsequently, however, the delegates of the banks succeeded in formulating a plan which received the indorse- ment of the secretary of the treasury. New loans of $250,- 000,000 or $300,000,000 and the enactment of the national banking bill advocated in Mr. Chase's report were its chief points. The issue of demand notes in excess of the $50,- 000,000 already authorized, and the making those already issued a legal tender, was to be avoided as unnecessary.^ But this plan also was rejected by the committees of Con- gress as inadequate to the crisis. Plainly, it would be of small avail to authorize bonds at par when capitalists would buy them only at a discount, and to sales below par the commit- tees would not agree. Consequently, the attempt of the repre- sentative bankers of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia to give the government the benefit of their advice came to nought. The plans suggested by them are of interest, how- ever, because they show that in the opinion of experienced 1 Part II, chap, x, below. C/. Henby Adaus, Historical Essays (New York, 1891), pp. 289-93 and 63, 64 below. 2 Spaulding, pp. 21, 22. The First Legal-Tender Act 51 men the legal-tender act was not the only escape from the difficulties into which the treasury had drifted. After the convention of bankers had broken up, Mr. Spaulding added another section to the legal-tender bill, recast it in pursuance of suggestions from Secretary Chase,' and introduced it again into the House of Representatives, where it was made the special order for January 28, 1862. As it came before Congress the measure provided for the issue of $100,000,000 of United States notes to be " a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private," and exchangeable for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds of which the secretary was authorized to issue $500,000,000.'* Upon the appointed day the House resolved itself into a committee of the whole upon the state of the Union, and Mr. Spaulding made an elaborate introductory speech, explaining and rec- ommending the bill.' But opposition to the making of treasury notes a legal tender developed at once, and it was not until after four weeks of earnest discussion that the fate of the bill was decided. What motives actuated Congress in its final decision can best be learned by study of the debate. II. DEBATE IN CONGRESS* Logically, the first point in the case of the promoters of the treasury-note bill was the proof that Congress had power under the constitution to make paper money a legal tender in the payment of debts. Foreseeing that this power 1 Spaulding, pp. 26, 27. 2H. E. bill No. 240, ibid., p. 27; full text in Congressional Globe, 37tli Cong., 2d Sess., p. 522. i Congressional Globe, loc. cit., pp. 523-6; Spauldino, pp. 28-42. 4 In the following section I have attempted to give an analysis of the whole dis- cussion in both houses of Congress, rather than to show the attitude of prominent individuals. Accounts of the debate from the latter point of view are numerous. See, e. g.: Spaulding, pp. 28-152; J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress (Nor- wich, Conn., 1884), Vol. I, chap, xix; J. J. Knox, United States Notes, 2d ed. (London, 1885), pp. 119-37; A. S. Bolles, Financial History of the United States, imi-188S (New York, 1886), Book I, chap, iv; J. F. Rhodes, History of the United 52 History of the Greenbacks would be challenged, Mr. Spaulding read an unoflicial opinion of the attorney-general, Edward Bates, which was interpreted, not quite fairly, to mean that Congress could make treasury notes a legal tender since it was not forbidden to do so by the constitution.' To this it was answered that under the tenth amendment Congress possessed no powers except those explicitly or implicitly granted it, and therefore that no authority for making paper money a legal tender could be inferred from the silence of the constitution on the point.^ So conclusive was this reply that the supporters of the bill found it necessary to seek other ground for their con- tention by deducing the right to make paper bills legal tender from some of the powers expressly delegated to Con- gress. Appeal was made to the clause authorizing Congress "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution " the powers specifically granted it. Mr. Spauld- ing coupled this clause with the authorization to levy war. "This bill," he argued, "is a necessary means of carrying into execution the powers granted in the constitution ' to raise and support armies' and ' to provide ajiA' maintain a. navy.'"^ Thaddeus Stevens added the necessary clincher by saying: " Whether such necessity exists is solely for the decision of Congress."* Two attempts were made to over- State, /rom 1850 (New York, 1895), Vol. HI, pp. 561-7; J. K. Upton, Money in Poli- tics, 2d ed. (Boston, 1895), pp. 75-89; J. L. Laughlin, Beport of the Monetary Com- mission (Chicago, 1898), pp. 408-10; F. A. Walkee, Money (New York, 1891), pp. 369-73; F. A. Walkeb and Henbt Adams, " The Legal-Tender Act," North American Review, April, 1870; "The Greenbacks in Congress," Sound Currency, Vol. Ill, No. 4, January, 1896. i Congressional Gio6e, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, p. 525; Spaulding, pp. 15, 16. Bates's real meaning seems to be that Congress is no more prohibited from making bUls of credit a legal tender than it is from issuing them, and the latter right no one contests. ^Ibid. See remarks of Messrs. Pendleton, p. 550; Cowan, p. 791 ; Sheffield, p. 640; Thomas, p. 681; CoLLamer, p. 768; Pearce, p. 803 ; Crisfleld, Appendix, p. 48 ; Bayard, p. 795; Conkling, p. 635; Wright, p. 662. 3/6id., p. 524. Similar arguments were made by Messrs. Blake, p. 686; Howe, Appendix, p. 54; Stevens, p. 688. ilbid. The First Legal-Tendee Act 53 throw this position. Such an argument, said Mr. Crisfield, amounts to a claim of unlimited authority; for, if one granted it, by asserting that the act was necessary "to insure public safety," Congress could enact any law, no matter how injudicious, provided it were not expressly forbidden by the constitution.' Mr. Pendleton took different ground. Granted, he argued, that Congress could make treasury notes a legal tender if this were necessary to pay the army, it still remained to prove that this necessity existed. He himself was unable to see the necessity in the pending case. There- fore, to him the bill was unconstitutional.^ A second form of the "necessary means" argument was made by Mr. Bingham, of Ohio. Congress, he said, has power to regulate commerce, and the determination of what shall be lawful tender in discharge of debts is a necessary incident of this regulation.^ But it was answered, first, that it was a mere subterfuge to pretend that regulation of com- merce was the object of the bill;* second, that the power of Congress over commerce extended only to " commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes," while a legal-tender act affected only transac- tions between individuals;^ and third, that the substitution of a paper for a metallic standard, so far from "regulating and promoting" commerce, tended rather to "disturb and destroy" it.' Senators Howard and Sherman elaborated a third varia- tion of the argument. Making treasury notes a legal tender they held was one of the necessary and proper means for borrowing money.' Senator CoUamer anticipated this con- tention, and replied that where power was granted to do a 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix, p. 48. 2 Ibid., p. 550. sjbid; p. 637; cf. remarks of Mr. Kellogg, p. 679. 4 Mr. Crisfield, Appendix, p. 49. 5 Mr. CoUamer, p. 769. 6 Mr. Crisfield, Appendix, p. 49. ^ Mr. Sherman, p. 790 ; Mr. Howard, p. 796. 54 HiSTOEY OP THE GeEENBAOKS certain thing in a certain way it was not permissible to seek inferential authority to accomplish the same end in a differ- ent manner. Now Congress was empowered to raise money first, by levying taxes, second, by negotiating loans. The issue of legal-tender notes, being neither a tax nor a loan, came under neither of these express grants ; and not coming under the express grants, no authority could be inferred for it as a means of raising money.' The last argument for the constitutionality of the bill — the one that foimd no adequate answer — was Charles Sum- ner's. He called attention to the fact that Congress had long been conceded the right to issue treasury notes. Review- ing the financial history of the American colonies, he showed that ten of the thirteen had at different times issued paper money, usually making it a legal tender. In America, he argued, " the legal tender was a constant, though not insepa- rable incident of the bill of credit." The conclusion was that the unquestioned power of issuing treasury notes carried with it the right to make the notes a legal tender.^ But, after spending much time and ingenuity in debating the constitutional questions raised by the legal-tender clause, the members of Congress apparently concluded that they had multiplied words to little purpose. While a few declared that constitutional scruples would prevent them from voting for the bill,' the more general feeling was that it would be unreasonable to decide a question of such importance upon a 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 767. ^Ibid., pp. 797, 798. An amusingly fantastic argument for the constitutionality of the bill was made by Senator McDougall of California, who attempted to deduce the right to issue legal-tender treasury notes from the power to coin money, by showing that the word "coin" was etymologieally equivalent to the word " stamp," and therefore that the right of coinage must include the right to stamp paper notes. Unfortunately for the argument, the canon of interpretation which insists that words are used in the constitution in strict accordance with their etymological significance did not commend itself to the lawyers of the Senate. — Ibid., Appendix, p. 60, for his argument ; with which compare the remarks of Mr. Thomas, p. 681. 3£. g.. Senators CoUamer, ibid., pp. 767, 770; Powell, p. 804; Saulsbury, p. 804. The First Legal-Tendbk Act 55 doubtful technicality which could be settled only by the courts. If the measure was expedient there need be little hesitation at such a crisis in construing liberally the powers of Congress.' The fate of the bill was affected, then, much less by the inconclusive constitutional argument than by the debate upon the merits of the issue of legal-tender notes as a financial policy. Considering the bill thus upon its merits, the opposition called attention prominently to the lessons of experience. Could it be shown that the resort to an inconvertible paper currency had always been attended in the past with evil results, a strong presumption would be created against the wisdom of a repetition of the experiment. Consequently rhetoric was employed to picture in vivid colors the unhappy consequences that had followed the issue of paper money by France during the Revolution ,^ by England in the Napol- eonic wars,^ by Austria,* and Turkey,^ by Rhode Island * in colonial days, by the Continental Congress in the War of Inde- pendence,' and finally by the Confederate States, then fairly launched upon the paper-money policy.^ To break the force of these historical parallels, which told so heavily against the bill, its supporters sought to show that causes, which under different conditions had led to deprecia- tion, would not be operative in the case of the United States in 1862. Thus, it was said, the continental notes of the American Revolution depreciated because of the poverty of the country, which offered no security for their redemption; the vastly greater wealth of the nation in 1862 would prevent a repetition of the experience.' The depreciation of the issues 1 Bemarks of Fessenden, Congressional Globe,Slth Cong., 2d Sess., p. 767; Wilson, p. 788; Alley, p. 659; Sherman, p. 791; Pike, p. 658; Campbell, p. 686. 2 Mr. Cowan, ibid., p. 792 ; c/. Sumner, p. 798; Pike, p. 657. 3 Mr. Morrill, p. 631; cf. Spaulding, p. 526; Stevens, p. 689. * Mr. Morrill, p. 631. 5 Mr. Simmons, p. 794. 6 Mr. Sheffield, p. 164. ' Mr. Collamer, pp. 767-8; Sumner, p. 798; cf. Kellogg, p. 680; Pike, p. 656. 8 Mr. Horton, p. 665. 9 Mr. Kellogg, p. 680. 56 History of the Geeenbacks of Louis XIV was explained on the ground that France was then exhausted by heavy taxation to maintain a profligate court.' The cases of the French Revolution and the Con- federate States were accounted for by the fact that these governments were revolutionary/ Some gentlemen even denied that depreciated currencies had proved evils. "It would be far from a blunder," said Senator Howe, " to say that the ' golden age ' of England was during that long period when the only currency she knew was one of irredeemable paper ;"^ and Mr. Kellogg declared the paper issues of the Revolution had increased confidence, clothed the army, and revived commerce.* Another supporter of the bill tried to evade the historical argument by maintaining that the true lesson of experience was that of moderate issues.^ But no one seems to have taken these ingenious pleas very seriously, for it was easy to show that one of the striking lessons of experiments with paper money is that such moderation, which the issuer at first intends to observe, has almost invariably been soon forgotten.' If the argument from experience was strongly against the bill, the cognate economic argument was hardly less so. The opponents of paper issues assumed the offensive, declaring emphatically that the proposed legal-tender notes were cer- tain to depreciate in value. Mr. Lovejoy said: It is not in the power of this Congress .... to accomplish an impossibility in making something out of nothing. The piece of paper you stamp as five dollars is not five dollars, and it never will be, unless it is convertible into a five dollar gold piece ; and to pro- fess that it is, is simply a delusion and a fallacy.' 1 Mr. Howe, Appendix, p. 55, Ctyngressicmal Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 Mr. Kellogg, p. 680; Howe, Appendix, p. 55. 3 Appendix, p. 55 ; c/. Spaulding, p. 526. 4 Ibid., p. 681. 6 Mr. Pike, p. 657. 6 Messrs. Thomas, p. 682; Cowan, p. 793; Morrill, pp. 631, 886 ; Pomeroy, p. 884j CoUamer, p. 770; Lovejoy, 691. ^ Ibid., p. 691. The Fiest Legal-Tender Act 57 Various shifts were tried to meet this attack. Mr. Kellogg boldly asserted that the legal tender quality of the notes would prevent fluctuation of their value ;' but more faith was put in the reply that the total wealth of the country was security for the notes, and this security being ample the value of the paper would not decline.^ The rejoinder to this was first, that the security for the notes was not the total wealth of the people, but only such part of it as the govern- ment could obtain by taxation ; and second, that though the security for ultimate redemption might be ample, the notes would nevertheless depreciate in value if the holders were unable to secure immediate payment.^ A different argument to show the improbability of depreciation was based by Thaddeus Stevens upon the quan- tity theory of money as expounded by McCuUoch. " The value of legal tender notes," said he, " depends on the amount issued compared with the business of the country. If a less quantity were issued than the usual and needed cir- culation, they would be more valuable than gold."* The opponents of the bill replied, not by attacking the quantity theory, but by insisting that all experience showed that, after one issue of paper money had been made, other issues were sure to follow, until the currency became redundant and depreciated. "The experience of mankind," said Mr. Thomas, " shows the danger of entering upon this path ; that boundaries are fixed only to be overrun ; promises made only to be broken." ^ " The same necessity," added Mr. Pomeroy, " which now requires the amount of inconvertible paper now authorized, will require sixty days hence a similar issue, and then another, each one requiring a larger nominal amount to 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 681; cf. the answer of Senator CoUamer, p. 767. 2 Messrs. Spaulding, p. 524; Howe, Appendix, p. 55; Kellogg, pp. 680, 681. 3 Cf. Mr. Morrill, p. 630, Thomas, p. 682. * Ibid., p. 668. 5 Ibid., p. 682. 58 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS represent the same intrinsic value." ' To such assertions, backed by the weight of historical evidence, the supporters of the bill could respond only that the case of the United States would be an exception; the American government would not yield, as other governments had done, to the temptation to make further issues.'' Some of the more astute friends of the bill admitted the probability of a redundant currency, and relied, not on limi- tation of issues, but on a funding scheme to prevent depre- ciation. Section one of the bill provided that holders of legal-tender notes could at any time exchange them at par for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds.^ Under this arrange- ment, it was supposed, the value of the notes could never be less than that of the bonds, and, as bonds could by law not be sold for less than par, it followed that the notes could not greatly depreciate.* Unfortunately for the argument, even while Congress was debating the bill, bonds were selling in New York at ninety cents upon the dollar in notes of the suspended banks.' Hence the force of Mr. Morrill's remark: " By making our notes a legal tender we make them better for a moment than we can make our bonds, and men might be willing to exchange bonds for the notes ; but notes for bonds never.'" Having proved to their satisfaction that the legal-tender notes would depreciate, the opponents of the bill pursued their advantage by dwelling upon the evil consequences that would result. Coin would disappear from circulation, said they, prices would rise suddenly, fixed incomes would decline, 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 884. Mr. Pomeroy, however, sup- ported the bill whea amended to provide for payment o( interest in coin. Cf. also Collamer, p. 770; Lovejoy, p. 691; Horton, p. 664; Cowan, p. 793; Morrill, p. 631. 2 Of. the remarks of Messrs. Pike, p. 657 ; Hooper, p. 617 ; Stevens, p. 688. 3 See text o( bill, ibid., p. 522, and Mr. Stevens's explanation, p. 688. Cf. Spaulding, p. 526. * Mr. Hooper, ibid., p. 617. 5 Mr. Pendleton, p. 551. 6 Ibid., p. 630. The First Legal-Tender Act 59 creditors be defrauded, and the widows and orphans would suffer/ Senator CoUamer showed how depositors in savings banks would lose by depreciation,^ and Senator Fessenden how labor would be injured by a rise of prices exceeding the rise of wages.' Finally, Mr. Crisfield represented forcibly the instability of a paper standard of value and the conse- quent danger to business.* To all of this the promoters of the bill found it hard to reply. On the other hand they sought support in the contention that the country needed more money ,^ and that the government should regulate the paper currency fur- nished by the banks." Of course the rejoinder was, first, that, granted the existence of the doubtful need of more money, the issue of a depreciated paper currency was a very bad method of supplying it ; and, second, that if the bank- note currency required regulation the proper means was a reorganization of the banking system, not a legal-tender act. Not content with showing the economic evils of a depre- ciated paper currency, the opponents of the bill denounced it roundly as immoral. To pay contractors and soldiers in depreciated money, they declared, was dishonorable. "The bill says to the world," asserted Mr. Horton, "that we are bankrupt, and we are not only weak, but we are not honest." ' The injustice, however, extended not only to creditors of the government, but to all persons who would be compelled to accept in payment money of less value than that which they had contracted to receive.' And by thus encouraging the 1 Cf, the remarks of Messrs. Pendleton, Congressional Globe, :^7th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 551; Morrill, p. 630; Horton, p. 664; Sheffield, p. 641; Fessenden, p. 765. 2 Ibid., p. 770. Cf. the reply of Senator McDougall, Appendix, p. 60. 3/6id., p. 766. ilbid.. Appendix, p. 50. 5 Cf. the remarks of Messrs. Alley, p. 659; Hooper, p. 617; Kellogg, p. 681. 6 Senator Doolittle, Appendix p. 57. i/tjd., p. 664; cf. also Sumner, p. 798; Fessenden, p. 765; Crisfield, Appendix, pp. 49, 50; Pearce, p. 804. 8 Cf. Messrs, Pendleton, p. 549; Thomas, p. 682. See Sherman's attempted reply, p. 790. 60 HiSTOEY OP THE GeEENBACKS debtor to defraud his creditor, urged Senator Pessenden, the bill would lower the moral standards of the people.' To these charges, also, the promoters of the bill had little to say. Upon the fiscal aspect of the bill the case of the opposition was hardly less clear. First, they declared, the resort to an irredeemable paper currency was a practical confession of bankruptcy, and would therefore injure the credit of the government, and make less favorable the conditions on which it could borrow. "We .... go out to the country," said Fessenden, '• with the declaration that we are unable to pay or borrow at the present time, and such a confession is not likely to increase our credit." ^ Second, it was pointed out that the depreciation of the currency would cause the prices of everything which the government had to buy to rise, and thus would vastly increase the cost of the war. As Senator Cowan put it, the government "might as well lose 25 per cent, on the sale of her [^sic^ bonds, as to be obliged, in avoiding it, to pay 25 per cent, more for everything she buys." ' This discussion of the economic, moral, and fiscal conse- quences of issuing a legal-tender paper currency produced in Congress the feeling that under ordinary circumstances such a proposal would be indefensible. The vigor with which the opposition had presented the case against the bill made a deep impression. On the other hand, the reasoning by which the supporters of the bill had sought to establish the constitutional power of Congress to make treasury notes a legal tender was felt to be inconclusive. The force of the telling argument from experience had not been broken; the probability of depreciation had not been disproved ; no ade- quate reply had been found to the indictment of the bUl on 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 765; cf. Messrs. Conkling, p. 635; Horton, p. 664. 2 Ibid., p. 765. Cf. Messrs. Vallandingham, Appendix, p. 44; Sheffield, p. 641; CoUamer, p. 769; Horton, p. 664; Crisfield, Appendix, p. 49; Willey, p. 796; Snmner, p. 798; Thomas, p. 682. 3 Ibid., p. 793; cf. the remarks of Sheffield, p. 641, and Morrill, p. 630. The First Legal-Tendee Act 61 moral grounds; and, finally, it had not been denied that resort to paper issues would injure the credit of the govern- ment and increase the cost of the war. So generally was the objectionable character of the measure realized that Senator Fessenden could say: All the opinions that I have heard expressed agree in this : that only with extreme reluctance, only with fear and trembling as to the consequences, can we have recourse to a measure like this of making our paper a legal tender in payment of debts.' And yet an argument was found that overcame the "extreme reluctance" of a majority of the members and induced them to vote for the bill. This argument was the plea of absolute necessity. As has been seen, it was to necessity that Mr. Spaulding had appealed in justification of his first draft of the legal-tender bill.^ In opening the debate in Congress he repeated the argument with emphasis. "The bill before us," said he, "is a war measure, a measure of necessity and not of choice, presented .... to meet the most pressing demands upon the Treasury." ^ The cry of necessity was taken up by the other supporters of the bill, who relied upon it to meet all the objections urged by the opposition.* How effective a plea it was is shown by the influence it had upon those who appreciated the ills of a paper currency. "Beneficent as this measure is, as one of relief," said Mr. Alley, "nothing could induce me to give it sanction but uncontrollable necessity."* "I shall .... sup- port the bill," said Mr. Doolittle, "as a measure of war neces- sity, with more misgivings as to its effect at home and abroad, than of any other measure for which I have given my vote in this body."^ 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 763. 2 Mr. Spaulding's letter quoted, p. 44, above. 3 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 523. I Cf. the remarks of Messrs. Campbell, p. 686; Walton, p. 692; Edwards, p. 684; Stevens, p. 687 ; and of Senators Sherman, p. 789 ; Howe, Appendix, p. 55 ; MoDougall, Appendix, p. 58. s Ibid., p. 659. * Ibid., Appendix, p. 58. 62 HiSTOKT OF THE GeEENBACKS That the assertion of necessity might carry the added force of official sanction, Secretary Chase was induced to send a note to the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means to be read to the House. He wrote: I have felt, nor do I wish to conceal that I now feel, a great aver- sion to making anything but coin a legal tender in payment of debts. It has been my anxious wish to avoid the necessity of such legislation. It is, however, at present impossible, in consequence of the large expenditures entailed by the war, and the suspension of the banks, to procure sufficient coin for disbursements, and it has therefore become indispensably necessary that we should resort to the issue of United States notes.' This letter made the bill an " administration measure," and so was an important factor in its success. Desire to support the government at all costs led members to whom an irre- deemable currency was very repugnant to vote for the bill when the secretary of the treasury declared it to be nec- essary. " I have .... had great doubt as to the propriety of voting for this bill . . . ." said Mr. Hickman, "but, being assured .... that the Treasury, and perhaps the Admin- istration, regard this as a governmental necessity, I am dis- posed to waive the question of propriety or expediency, and to vote for it as a necessity." ^ 1 CmtgressioTial Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 618. Cf. Mr. Chase's letter to Spaulding, in the latter's History, p. 59; and McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century (New York, 1889), pp. 170, 171. 2 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 690. Cf. Sumner's conclusion: ** Surely we must all be against paper money — we must all insist upon maintaining the integrity of the (rovemment — and we must all set our faces against any proposi- tion like the present, except as a temporary expedient, rendered imperative by the exigency of the hour. If I vote for this proposition it will be only because I am unwilling to refuse to the Government, especially charged with this responsibility, that confidence which is hardly less important to the public interests than the money itself. Others may doubt if the exigency is sufficiently imperative, but the secretary of the treasury, whose duty it is to understand the occasion, does not doubt. In his opinion th© war requires this sacrifice Your soldiers in the field must be paid and fed. Here there can be no failure or postponement. A rem- edy which at another moment you would reject is now proposed. Whatever may be the national resources, they are not now within reach, except by summary process. Eelactantly, painfully, I consent that the process should issue" (pp. 799, 800). See also McDougall, Appendix, p. 58. The Piest Legal-Tender Act 63 In replying to the plea of necessity, the opposition can- didly admitted it would be better to issue a forced currency than to stop payment, provided there were no alternative. ''If the necessity exists," said Senator Pessenden, "I have no hesitation upon the subject and shall have none. If there is nothing left for us to do but that, and that will effect the object, I am perfectly willing to do that.'" But that such was the case was emphatically denied. " It has been asserted .... with the utmost apparent sincerity," said Mr. Horton, "that this is a measure not of choice, but of necessity. But Mr. Chairman, that assertion is only reiterated, not proved. Where is the proof that this is a matter of neces- sity? There may be proofs abundant, but they have not been produced." " Not only did the opposition deny the necessity, but they were ready also with suggestions of other means of securing the needed funds. One suggestion was adequate war taxa- tion. "Not a dollar of tax has been raised," said Mr. Thomas, "and yet we are talking of national bankruptcy, and launching upon a paper currency. I may be very dull, but I cannot see the necessity, or the wisdom, of such a course.'" It was by this time generally acknowledged that the omission to impose heavy taxes at the extra session of July, 1861, was a serious blunder which Congress should repair as soon as possible.* But the supporters of the bill argued^ that the pending situation could not be met by taxa- tion, for the needs of the treasury were too pressing to wait until new taxes could be assessed and collected. 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 764. 2I6Jd., p. 663; of. pp. 664, 665. 3 Ibid., p. 682 ; cf. the remarks of Eoscoe Conkling, p. 633 ; Wright, p. 663 ; CoUamer, pp. 770, 771 ; Bayard, p. 796. 4 A joint resolution to raise $150,000,000 per annum by taxation had been adopted by a vote of 134 to 5 in the House, January 15, and 39 to 1 in the Senate on the 17th. —Ibid., pp. 349, 376. ^B.g., see remarks of Mr. Walton, ibid., p. 692. 64 History of the Geeenbaoks To this the rejoinder was made: If it will take too long to wait for the proceeds of taxes, let the government supply its immediate wants by selling bonds at their market value, and in the meantime frame a permanent system of taxation that will yield an adequate revenue.' This plan was the same that the delegation of bankers had urged upon the secretary and the committees of Congress,^ and it encountered the same opposition. Senator Howe was unwilling, as Mr. Spaulding had been, that government bonds should be sold below par. "The experience of half a century," said he, "has demon- strated that the use of money is not worth more than six per cent; that sum the Government ought to pay."' Senator Fessenden replied : " Money in the market is always worth what it will sell for. It is an article of merchandise like anything else, and the Government has no reason to suppose, unless it can offer much better security, that it should get money at a better rate than anybody else." * But there were other men who, while apparently ready to admit that government need not always insist on receiving quite par for its bonds, still believed that under existing cir- cumstances the discount demanded by lenders would be ruinously high. "I maintain," said Thaddeus Stevens, " that the highest sums you could sell your bonds at would be 75 per cent, payable in currency, itself at a discount. That would produce a loss which no nation .... could stand a year." ' Of course it was not possible without offering a loan to determine precisely at what rates the government could sell its bonds; but the opponents of the bill believed that Mr. 1 See the speeches of Mr. Lovejoy, p. 691 ; and Senators Cowan, p. 793, and Bayard, p. 796. 2 See p. 48, above. 3 Congressicmal GlobCf 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix, p. 56. *Ibid., p. 763. 6 Ibid., p. 689; e/. the remarks of Messrs. Edwards, p. 683, and Pike, p. 656. The First Legal-Tender Act 65 Stevens and Mr. Spanlding exaggerated when they predicted that the price realized would range between 50 and 80.' Should a plan of finance based upon taxation heavy enough to inspire confidence in the management of the treasury be adopted, they were convinced that the government could secure loans without serious sacrifice.^ And further, their fiscal argument showed that an increase in the cost of the war would not be avoided by the rival plan of issuing an incon- vertible paper currency.'' Still a third alternative was proposed by the opposition — the issue of treasury notes without the legal-tender quality. This suggestion was embodied in the three rival plans intro- duced into the House as substitutes for the bill.* The dis- cussion of their merits naturally elicited debate upon the efficacy of the legal-tender clause. The supporters of the bill were ready enough with assertions of the importance of the clause to the success of the measure;" but they found it difficult to explain precisely what its value was. One said, "By making these notes a legal tender we prevent the money sharks from robbing our soldiers of their hard earn- ings."" Another argued that unless the United States notes were made a legal tender, the banks would seek to depre- ciate them in order to retain the field of circulation for their own issues.' A third declared, "If we make the government issues a legal tender, the demand for specie will be so limited that they will maintain their value."* Finally, Senator Sherman argued that the banks would not receive the gov- ernment notes unless compelled to do so by the legal-tender clause, and that if not received by the banks as current funds 1 Cf. Mr. Spaulding, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 524. 2 Cf. the remarks of Roscoe Conkling, p. 634, and of Senator Cowan, p. 793. 3 P. 60, above. * P- 'Sj below. 5£. {/., Mr. Pike, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 657. 6 Mr. Blake, p. 686; cf. the similar remarks of Messrs. Edwards, p. 683, and Shellabarger, p. 690 ; Campbell, p. 687 ; and of Senator Henry Wilson, p. 788. ' Mr. Kellogg, p. 681. * Mr. Campbell, p. 687. 66 History of the Greenbacks the notes would become hopelessly depreciated.' In response Senator Fessenden pointed to the clause authorizing the sub- treasuries to receive the notes on deposit at 5 per cent, interest. This clause would make discrimination against the notes impracticable, he argued; for should the banks refuse to receive notes as deposits they would lose business, because the holders would prefer to deposit with the subtreasuries, which would pay 5 per cent, interest instead of with banks.^ If these attempts to prove the utility of the legal-tender clause seem rather weak, so do the criticisms urged by the opposition. The advocates of the rival bills proposing to issue treasury notes without the legal-tender quality might have been expected to dwell upon the fact that their plans left the standard of value undisturbed, and so avoided a depreciation that would unsettle business, lower real wages, defraud creditors, and increase the cost of all supplies gov- ernment had to buy. Instead, they attempted only to show that the legal-tender clause would impair faith in the paper currency. "The fair inference is in the mind of every man, however stupid," said Senator Cowan, "that you yourselves first doubted the validity of it, and that, therefore, you attempted to give it this quality of paying debts perforce, to compensate it for the lack of essential value." ^ From this review it is clear that the position of those who urged the argument of necessity for the legal-tender bill in Congress betrayed the lack of consistency noticed in Mr. Spaulding's reply to the bank delegates.* When the oppo- sition suggested that the wants of the treasury could be met either by borrowing or by issuing treasury notes not a legal tender, it was incumbent on those who mantained the posi- tion that the bill was "a measure not of choice but of neces- 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 790, 791. 2 Ibid., p. 766. sibid., p. 792; c/. the remarks of Messrs. Crisfield, Appendix, p. 50; and of Sena- tors Fessenden, p. 766 ; and Simmons, p. 794. i P. 49, above. The First Legal-Tendek Act 67 sity" to deny the possibility of securing funds by these methods. But such a denial was not attempted. Instead they tried to show that the issue of an irredeemable paper currency was a better method of securing means than bor- rowing at a discount or issuing treasury notes not a legal tender. It is curious to note the naivete with which the most strenuous promoters of the legal-tender bill asserted in one breath that it was a measure of sheer necessity, and in the next breath admitted the existence of alternatives. Mr. Spaulding himself said after emphasizing the necessity: " We have this alternative, either to go into the market and sell our bonds for what they will command, or to pass this bill."' And Thaddeus Stevens, who began by asserting the necessity, shifted, before concluding, to this position: "Here, then, in a few words lies your choice. Throw bonds at 6 or 7 per cent, on the market, .... or issue United States notes." ^ Obvious as is the contradiction, the opposition failed to call attention prominently to it. By thus allowing ,the logic of the argument from necessity to pass unchallenged, they left room for the impression to arise that the paper issues of the Civil War can hardly be made the subject of serious criticism, because "necessity knows no law." But while Mr. Spaulding and his fellows were strenuous in protesting the necessity of the legal-tender act as a measure of immediate relief, they were careful to state that it was intended to be temporary, and not to inaugurate a regular paper-money policy. "When peace is secured," said Mr. Spaulding, "I will be among the first to advocate a speedy return to specie payments."^ Fessenden dwelt on the point at length. He said : 1 Congressional Olobe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 524. 2 Ibid., p. 689 ; cf, the remarks of Mr. Blake, p. 686, and the divergent views as to the nature of the alleged necessity expressed by Mr. Hooper, p. 617, and by Senator Sherman, p. 791. 3 Ibid., p. 526. This promise was well kept. See the prefaces of Spaclding's History, 68 History of the Greenbacks The .... secretary of the treasury .... has declared that in his judgment [the bill] is, and ought to be, but a temporary measure, not to be resorted to as a policy, but simply on this single occasion, because the country is driven to the necessity of resorting to it. I have not heard anybody express a contrary opinion, or, at least, any man who has spoken on the subject in Congress. The chairman of the committee of Ways and Means, in advocating the measure, declared that it was not contemplated, and he did not believe it would be necessary, to issue more than the $150,000,000 of treasury notes made a legal tender provided by this bill. All the gentlemen who have spoken on the subject, and all pretty much who have written on the subject, except some wild speculators in currency, have declared that as a policy, it would be ruinous to any people ; and it has been defended, as I have stated, simply and solely upon the ground that it is to be a single measure, standing by itself, and not to be repeated.' Similar and hardly less emphatic statements were made by other members of Congress.^ If any one possessed such ideas of the beneficence of an irredeemable paper currency as afterward animated members of the Greenback party, he kept them to himself. III. ATTITUDE OF SECRETARY CHASE In discussions of the financial policy pursued by the federal government the impression soon gained currency that the legal-tender acts were unavoidable necessities. This impression was deepened by the fact that when the unhappy consequences of the laws began to make themselves felt, members and friends of the administration took the ground that, however deplorable in its effects, such legislation had been inevitable from the beginning of the war.' After peace 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 764. 2 Cf. remarks of Morrill, ibid,, p. 631 ; Pomeroy, p. 884. 3 Cf. Lincoln's message to Congress, December 1, 1862, Complete Works, ed. NicoL AY AND Hay, Vol. II, p. 264 ; letters of Seward and Stanton in Spaulding's History, introduction to 2d ed., pp. 27, 29. A number of letters of like tenor from other men of prominence are given in Spauldiug's Introduction and Appendices. The Fiest Lbgal-Tendee Act 69 was restored this became the common doctrine of the Repub- lican party. It is a very notable fact, however, that Secretary Chase — the one man most conversant with the financial situation of the government in the winter of 1861- 62 — came afterward to the conclusion that the passage of the legal-tender bill was a blunder. His attitude toward the measure is worthy of careful attention. Apparently the sudden suspension of specie payments bewildered Mr. Chase for a time. It seemed to make neces- sary a recasting of his financial program,' and for the moment he was at a loss what to do. The only man in official circles who had a definite plan in mind was Spauld- ing, and while others hesitated, he pushed forward the simple though crude expedient of issuing legal-tender notes most vigorously. All Chase's traditions and all his official utter- ances committed him to opposition. But not knowing pre- cisely how to avoid the measure, he promoted the meet- ing between the bankers from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, and the financial committees of House and Senate, in the hope that some feasible plan for raising funds without resort to legal-tender notes might be agreed upon.^ His hopes were destroyed by the unwillingness of the Congressmen to consent to the sale of bonds at their market price — an unwillingness shared in some measure by most of the opponents of the legal-tender bill in Congress.' After this disappointment the secretary of the treasury appears to have surrendered the lead to the Committee of Ways and Means. He could formulate no plan which commanded the 1 Cf. Report of the Secretai-y of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 7. 2 See sec. i of the present chapter. 3 All of the substitutes for the legal-tender bill proposed in the House provided that the bonds to be issued should not be sold below par. See p. 75 below. There were few men who sympathized with Senator Cowan's vigorous declaration that he preferred a " shave of forty per cent." upon bonds to an inconvertible paper cur- rency.— Conffressiono! Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 793. 70 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS confidence of others, and so acquiesced unwillingly in what the energetic Mr. Spaulding proposed.' When Spaulding sent him the legal-tender bill for revi- sion, Chase returned it with a letter, dated January 22, expressing his exceeding regret that it was found necessary to resort to a legal-tender act, but expressing also his hearty desire "toco-operate with the committee [of Ways and Means]. "^ This letter was regarded by a majority of the committee as "non-committal on the legal-tender clause." So they sought and " after considerable delay " obtained a more explicit approval of the bill as a measure of necessity, part of which was read to Congress.* Chase's feeling at this time is best indicated by the frank letter which he sent to Spaulding February 3: Mr. Seward said to me on yesterday that you observed to him that my hesitation in coming up to the legal- tender propo- sition embarrassed you, and I am very sorry to observe it, for my anxious wish is to support you in all respects. It is true that I came with reluctance to the conclusion that the legal-tender clause is a necessity, but I came to it decidedly, and I support it earnestly. I do not hesitate when I have made up my mind, however much regret I may feel over the necessity of the conclusion to which I come.* It is clear from these letters that Spaulding and not Chase was the real financial leader in the critical months of January and February, 1862.'' Spaulding's position was recognized by a colleague in the House, who referred to him as "the able and distinguished Representative who has 1 It should be noted that Chase was daily receiving letters from business men ■whose views he was bound to consider, urging him to agree to the treasury-note bill. But a small minority of his correspondents seem to have stood out against the legal- tender clause.— C/. Hakt, S. P. Chase, pp. 250, 251. 2 Spaulding, p. 27. 3 Ibid., p. 45 and p. 62 above. * Spaulding, History, p. 59. Cf. Chase's letter of similar tenor written the next day to Bryant.— Wabdbn, Life of Chase, p. 409. 5 Cf. Chase's report of December, 1862, pp. 8, 9. The First Legal-Tendee Act 71 originated this measure and carried it triumpliantly over the Administration and through Congress.'" But while harried by the unaccustomed perplexities of his position, Chase yielded to Spaulding and gave an official sanction to the bill, it did not commend itself to his calmer judgment. His later views are stated at length in a dissent- ing opinion which he rendered, as Chief Justice, upon the " Legal Tender Cases," in December, 1870. Of his own course as secretary of the treasury, he said: He thought it indispensably necessary that the authority to issue these notes should be granted by Congress. The passage of the bill was delayed, if not jeoparded, by the difference of opinion which prevailed on the question of making them a legal tender. It was under these circumstances that he expressed the opinion, when called upon by the Committee on Ways and Means, that it was necessary Examination and reflection under more propitious circumstances have satisfied him that this opinion was erroneous, and he does not hesitate to declare it Was the making of the notes a legal tender necessary to the carrying on the war? In other words, was it necessary to the execution of the power to borrow money ? .... If the notes would circulate as well without as with this quality it is idle to urge the plea of such necessity. But the circulation of the notes was amply provided for by making them receivable for all national taxes, all dues to the government, and all loans. This was the provision relied upon for the purpose by the secretary when the bill was first prepared, and his reflec- tions since have convinced him that it was suflicient In their legitimate use the notes are hmrt, not helped, by being made a legal tender. The legal-tender quality is only valuable for pinposes of dishonesty. Every honest purpose is answered as well and better without it. We have no hesitation, therefore, in declaring our conviction that the making of these notes a legal tender, was not a necessary or proper means to the carrying on war or to the exercise of any express power of the government.^ 1 Mr. 'PomeTOy.— Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 884. 2 12 Wallace, 576-9. History of the Geeenbaoks Competent critics have usually been inclined to accept Chase's later in preference to his earlier opinion. They have held that the treasury crisis which rendered the argu- ment of necessity plausible need not have occurred had Congress adopted a more vigorous policy of taxation at its extra session in July and August, 1861. Tax laws then enacted might not have added greatly to the revenue before the close of the year, but they would have strengthened the credit of the government and so enabled it to borrow more freely and on better terms. But though this failure to tax adequately was unfortu- nate, it was not unnatural. The secretary of the treasury, with whom the initiative rested, was inexperienced and was devoting a large part of his attention to military matters.' Moreover, the Union leaders feared that the temper of the North was not firm enough to submit cheerfully to the onerous burden of a heavy federal income tax or high internal duties. Such taxation had been unknown for more than a generation; the Republican party was young, composed of heterogenous elements not yet completely fused, and led by men not sustained by consciousness of unhesitating popular support. Realizing their dependence upon public opinion for success, it is not strange that Mr. Lincoln's administra- tion hesitated to take steps likely from all precedent to prove unpopular.^ Perhaps even more important in explaining the failure to tax heavily at the outset of the war was the confident expectation of its early end. Even in February, 1862, Justin Morrill, one of the firmest opponents of the legal- tender clause, could say in rhetorical strain: The ice that now chokes up the Mississippi is not more sure to melt and disappear with the approaching vernal season, than are 1 Cf. Habt, S. p. Chase, pp. 211-14. 2 C/. M. B. Field, Memories of Many Men and of Some Women, 1874, pp. 253, 278 ; Hakt, op. cit., p. 237. The First Legal-Tender Act 73 the rebellious armies upon its banks when our western army shall break from its moorings, and, rushing with the current to the Gulf, baptize as it goes in blood the people to a fresher allegiance We can close this war by the 30th day of July next as well as in thirty years.' Had such optimistic expectations been realized, Chase's plan of raising by taxation means sufficient only for ordinary expenditures, interest, and a sinking fund need have caused no serious disorder in the finances.^ But, granting that a mistake was made in not levying heavier taxes at the extra session of Congress, the question still remains: Was the issue of legal-tender treasury notes necessary to relieve the treasury from the embarrassments existing in January and February, 1862? Certainly there was no such pressing necessity as Spaulding, for example, asserted in the first panic. His letter of January 8, quoted above, declares that the government "will be out of means to pay the daily expenses in about thirty days." ' But it was forty-eight days before the legal-tender act was passed, and over thirty -four days more before the first notes were issued. None of the legal-tender notes were paid out until April,* three months after the treasury had suspended specie payments. Whatever were the immediate needs of the treasury, then, they were supplied from other sources.^ Had these three months been utilized energetically in passing a 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 630. Cf. the similar remarks o( Pessenden, ibid., p. 765, Chandler, p. 774, and Simmons, p. 794. The most impressive evidence of confidence in an early peace, however, is the issue of General Order No. 33 by the adjutant general, April 3, 1882, stopping the enlistment of fresh troops.— See Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. Ill, p. 636. 2 Cf. Chase's discussion of the question in his report of December, 1863, pp. 10-12. 3 Spauldino, p. 17; cf. his opening speech in the House, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 524. *The New York Times ol April 7, 1862, reports that "the first instalment of United States notes .... was received at the subtreasury in this city Saturday morning (April 5)." Cf. R. A. Bayley, National Loans of the United States (Wash- ington, 1881), p. 157. 6 See chap, iii, sec. i, p. 88, below. 74 HiSTOBT OP THE GREENBACKS few simple sections of an internal revenue tax act, imposing duties on whiskey, beer, and tobacco, and in organizing machinery for the sale of bonds, there seems to be slight reason for believing that the government would have failed to obtain sufficient funds, particularly when account is taken of the improvement of credit caused by the military suc- cesses of the winter and spring.' After all, discussion of the "necessity" of the legal- tender act is rather beside the point. For no one, not even Stevens and Spaulding, denied the possibility of borrow- ing, provided the government was ready to sell its bonds at their market price. The real question is, was the making of United States notes a legal tender preferable to selling bonds at a discount? Upon this question the following chapters will throw some light by showing what were the consequences of the course pursued, both for the people and for the government.^ IV. PASSAGE OF THE ACT The debate upon the legal-tender act, a logical analysis of which has been presented in a preceding section, began in the House of Representatives January 28, 1862. Mr. Stevens and Mr. Spaulding pushed the measure vigor- ' Cf. Part II, chap, iii, sec. iii, below. 2 On the question of necessity see Simon Newcomb, Critical Examination of Our Financial Policy (New York, 1865), chap, vii; J. K. Upton, Money in Politics^ 2d ed. (Boston, 1895), p. 103; W. G-, Sumner, History of American Currency (New York, 1875), pp. 197-209 ; S. T. Speak, The Legal-Tender Acts (New York, 1875), chap, xii ; F. W. Taussig, p. 537 of The United States of America, ed. N. S. Shaler, Vol. 11 (New York, 1894) ; C. F. Dob£, Die Papier-wahrungswirthschaft der Union, Berlin, 1877 ; C. VON Hock, Die Finanzen und die Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten (Stutt- gart, 1867), pp. 471, 472; Chables A. Mann, Paper Money the Boot of Evil (New York, 1872), pp. 147, 148; Nicolay and Ha^, A. Lincoln: A History (New York, 1890), Vol. VI, chap, xi; Geobge B. Butlee, The Currency Question, New York, 1864; J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. Ill, pp. 556, 557 ; Hugh McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century (New York, 1888), p. 175; Habt, S. P. Chase, 1899, pp. 248-51; Henrii C. Adams, Public Debts (New York, 1887), pp. 126-33; Henry Adams, " The Legal Tender Act," Historical Essays, New York, 1891 ; and especially Don C. Babebtt, " The Supposed Necessity of the Legal Tender Paper," QTjmrterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XVI, pp. 323-54. The First Legal-Tendek Act 75 ously. Three bills were proposed as substitutes by the opposition. One, introduced by Mr. Vallandingham, pro- vided (1) for the issue of $150,000,000 of treasury notes, receivable for government dues, bearing no interest, exchangeable for bonds, but not a legal tender; (2) for the sale of $200,000,000 of 6 per cent., twenty-year bonds — at rates not less than par.' A second, offered by Roscoe Conkling, proposed (1) to sell $500,000,000 of 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds at rates not less than the equivalent of par for 7 per cent, stocks; (2) to allow the secretary of the treasury at his discretion to issue $200,000,000 of one-year treasury notes, either bearing no interest or interest at 2^ per cent., and not legal tender, in place of an equivalent amount of bonds.^ Finally, Mr. Horton's and Mr. Morrill's substitute, favored by one-half of the Committee of Ways and Means, authorized (1) the issue of $100,000,000 treasury notes, bearing interest at 3.65 per cent., receivable for gov- ernment dues except duties on imports, exchangeable at par for all bonds issued, and not a legal tender; (2) the sale of $200,000,000 of 7.3 per cent., ten-year bonds, and of $300,000,000 of 6 per cent., twenty-four-year bonds at prices not less than par ; (3) the payment of interest on the bonds in coin." Nine days after the debate began a vote was taken on the substitution of the third of these measures for the legal- tender bill. It resulted 55 yeas to 95 nays.* Then th€ vote was taken on the legal-tender bill itself, and it was passed by 93 to 59 — a majority of 84.^ An analysis of the vote upon the legal-tender clause shows that it was not a strict party division. Of the 95 votes for the legal-tender 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 614. 'ilbid., p. 615. 3 J6id., p. 693; Spaulding, pp. 92-4. * Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 695; SPAULDING, p. 94. 5 Congressional Globe, loc. cit. ; Spadlding, pp. 95, 96. 76 History of the Gteeenbacks clause 8 were cast by Democrats and 3 by " old line Whigs." With the 25 Democrats who voted against the clause were 7 " old line Whigs " and 23 Kepublicans. Nor is a marked sectional division of the vote apparent. Of the members from New England States 16 voted for and 11 against the legal-tender clause; of the delegations from the Middle States the corresponding votes were 36 and 18; of the Southern States 7 and 10 ; of the Central States 27 and 13 ; and of the Western States 9 and 3. The most noticeable feature of the vote was the number and standing of the regular supporters of the administration who on this occasion sided with the opposition. Among them were Roscoe Conkling, Justin S. Morrill, Valentine B. Horton, Edward H. Rollins, Benjamin P. Thomas, and Owen Lovejoy. As the bill went to the Senate, it provided for the issue of $150,000,000 of United States legal-tender notes; but of this sum $50,000,000 were intended to take the place of the like sum of "old demand notes" authorized at the extra session of Congress in July, 1861.' A very import- ant amendment was made by the Senate finance committee. In order to "raise and support the credit of the government obligations," they proposed to pay the interest on the public debt in coin. The committee had considered the advisa- bility of making customs duties payable in specie to obtain the coin necessary for interest; but they finally pre- ferred to set aside the proceeds of sales of public lands, confiscations of rebel property and import duties as a fund to be used for the purpose. To provide for the possible case when this fund would be insufficient, the secretary of the treasury was authorized to sell bonds at their market price to get coin.^ 1 For the text of the bill as it passed the House see Spaulding, pp. 96-8. 2 See Senator Fessenden's speech explaining the House bill and the committee's amendments, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 763. The First Legal-Tender Act 77 In this modified form the bill passed the Senate by a vote as devoid of partisan or of sectional character as had been the vote in the House. A motion to strike out the legal- tender clause failed by a majority of 5 — 17 yeas to 22 nays.' Of the yeas nine were Republicans — Senators Anthony of Rhode Island, CoUamer and Foot of Vermont, Fessenden of Maine, King of New York, Cowan of Pennsyl- vania, Foster of Connecticut, and Willey of Virginia. On the other hand, three Democrats — Senators McDougall of California, Rice of Minnesota, and Wilson of Missouri — voted for the clause. But when it was seen that the bill would pass, legal-tender clause and all, the final vote was 30 for and 7 against it.^ Of the seven, three were Republi- cans, three Democrats, and one an "old line Whig." The House refused to concur in the Senate amendment for the payment of interest on the public debt in coin. Mr. Spaulding declared that such an arrangement would create intolerable discrimination between different classes of govern- ment creditors. To pay the army in depreciated paper money and the money lender in coin was unjust to the sol- dier risking his life on the field of battle.' "It makes," said Mr. Stevens, " two classes of money — one for the banks and brokers, and another for the people." * Further, argued Mr. Hooper, the refusal to use United States notes for interest would be an admission in advance of a difference in value between paper and coin, the effect of which would be to discredit the government's issues.^ Mr. Pomeroy replied first, that so far from exaggerating the depreciation of paper currency, the amendment would diminish it ; for coin inter- est would tend to increase the value of bonds and so indi- rectly of the notes which were to be exchangeable for bonds 1 Ibid., p. 800. 2 Ibid., p. 804. 3 Ibid., pp. 881-3. * Ibid., p. 900. 5J6id., p. 899. 78 History of the Greenbacks at par ; and second, that only by paying interest in coin could the government borrow on favorable terms.' To terminate the disagreement conference committees were appointed — for the Senate, Fessenden, Sherman, and Carlisle ;' for the House, Stevens, Horton, and Sedgwick ' — and a compromise was agreed upon. Interest was to be paid in coin, but the method of obtaining the coin was changed. Instead of pledging receipts from customs, sales of public lands and confiscations, with an ultimate resort to selling bonds at the market price, it was decided to make import duties payable in specie.* Both Senate and House con- curred in this change,' and the bill received the approval of President Lincoln, February 25, 1862.° In its final form the act authorized the issue of $150,000,- 000 of United States notes in denominations not less than five dollars. Fifty millions of this sum was in place of the "old demand notes," which were to be withdrawn as rapidly as practicable. The notes were declared to be "lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and pri- 1 CoTigressional Globe, 37tli Cong., 2d Sess., p. 884; cf. similar argruments of Messrs. Morrill, p. 886, and C. B. Calvert, p. 886. 2 Ibid., p. 899. 3 Ibid., p. 909. * Text of report, ibid., p. 938. 6 Ibid., pp. 929 and 939 respectively. 6 12 Statutes at Large, p. 345. In the version of the financial history of the war later current with the greenback party, this limitation of the legal-tender quality of United States notes, by using coin for interest on the public debt and for customs dues, was represented as a serious blunder, marring the otherwise perfectly symmetri- cal paper-money system. E.g., see G. F. Wilson, A Practical Consideration of the Currency of the United States, 1874, p. 5; Flint Feeeman, Correspondence on National Finance, 1875; H. C. Baibd, Money and Its Substitutes, 1876, p. 14; Peter Cooper, Political and Financial Opinions, 1877, p. 9. Indeed, the charge was often more serious. It was said that the " conspiracy " of bank delegates who visited Washington in January, 1862, " corruptly or not " used their influence to induce the secretary of the treasury and the Senate to " mutilate " the House bill by inserting the " exception clause " limiting the full legal -tender power of the United States notes. See, e. g., J. G. Drew, Our Money Muss, 1874; W. A. Berkey, The Money Q«e8fton, 1876, pp. 176-9; Nevah, The ^" Legal-Tender" Acts, [date?], pp. 3-7; Jesse Harper, Thirty Years^ Conflict, 1881, p. 13; Henry S. Fitch, Speech in the State Convention of the National Currency Party of California, 1877, pp. 9-21 ; Mrs. S. E. V. Emery, Seven Financial ConspircLcies, 1887, chap. ii. Thaddeus Stevens in a measure countenanced such views. See his speech of June 23, 1864, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3212 £B. The First Legal-Tendee Act 79 vate, within the United States, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt," which were expressly made payable in coin. Further, the notes were exchangeable at any time in sums of fifty dollars or multiples of fifty for 6 per cent, five-twenty bonds, $500,000,000 of which were authorized by the second section. Sec. 4 provided that holders of the notes might deposit them with any designated depository of the United States, and receive 5 per cent, interest. But such deposits could not be made for less than thirty days and ten days' notice was required for withdrawal. The sum of these temporary deposits was limited to $25,000,- 000. By sec. 5 the coin received from duties on imports was set apart as a special fund to be applied, first, to the payment in specie of interest on the public debt ; second, to the pur- chase of 1 per cent, of the entire debt yearly to be set aside as a sinking fund ; third, to the general expenses of the government, if any residue remained. The attitude of the general public toward the legal-tender act was divided between doubt and hesitation on the part of a few who appreciated clearly the evils of an irredeemable paper currency, and cheerful acceptance on the part of those who felt that scruples, justifiable under ordinary circum- stances should not be allowed to interfere with decisive action in the face of such a crisis. Organized opposition to the bill by the business community ceased with the failure of the bankers' convention. The opinions expressed by practical financiers showed marked diversity — a fact that was not without influence upon the fate of the bill in Con- gress. Senator Sumner said of the advice given by business men : "Some tell us that the legal tender will be most bene- ficent ; others insist that it will be dishonorable and perni- cious. Which shall we follow?'" On the other hand, i Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 798; cf. remarks of Senator Fessenden, ibid., p. 766. 80 History of the Greenbacks Senator Henry Wilson received a letter signed by several Massachusetts firms of high, standing, saying they did "not know a merchant in the city of Boston engaged in active business" who was not in favor of the legal-tender clause.' Of greater weight was the resolution adopted by the New York Chamber of Commerce that "the present financial condition of the government and of the country requires the immediate passage of the [legal-tender] bill."^ Mr. Stevens and Mr. Spaulding said that similar encouragement was received by the promoters of the bill from the boards of trade in Boston, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Louis- ville, St. Louis, Chicago, and Milwaukee.^ " I have never known any measure," said Mr. Spaulding, " receive a more hearty approval from the people."* Newspapers showed similar differences of opinion. When the proposal was made to issue legal-tender treasury notes, the New York Tribune said, " We ponder and hesitate." * Mr. Greeley believed that "heavy taxing, light stealing, and hard fighting," would remove the alleged necessity for the bill," and advocated " a stirring appeal to the people for a Patriotic Loan of Two or Three Hundred Millions." ' But by the middle of February he concluded that, " there has been so much delay and hesitation and vacillation, that it is possible that no other means of giving immediate relief to the Treasury now remains." " He finally acquiesced with an ill grace in the enactment of the bill, and supported very vigorously the amendments of the Senate making interest payable in coin.' More decided opposition to the legal- ^Ibid., p. 7S9; cf. Senator Simmons, p. 79i. 2 Proceedings of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York for the Year Ending December 31, 1362, p. 12. 3 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 900 and 882. * Ibid., p. 882. s New York Tribune, January 13, 1862. 6 Ibid., January 22, 1862. TIbid., February 1, 1862. ^Ibid., February 10, 1862. ^Ibid., February 18, 1862; cf. the issues of February 19 and 26. The Fibst Legal-Tender Act 81 tender clause was made by the New York World^ and Journal of Commerce,^ the Springfield (Mass.) Republican," and the Boston Daily Advertiser.* On the other hand the New York Herald espoused the cause of the bill. With heavy taxation and the provision for exchanging notes for bonds, it thought the greatest depreciation could "not exceed 10 per cent, and that not before a lapse of two years" — especially not after the interest had been made payable in coin.^ Somewhat similar was the attitude of the New York Times, which thought the legal-tender clause was necessary to protect the notes from bank competition and hostility ;° of the Philadelphia Press, which regarded the issue of irredeemable paper as an unavoidable evil which it was "not manly to bemoan;"' of the New York Commercial Advertiser, which acquiesced " in the measure, as the best on the whole that could be done under the existing circum- stances;"* of the National Intelligencer of Washington, which thought the measure would be of great assistance to the government provided the notes were fundable in bonds bearing interest [in coin ;' of the Boston Post, which advo- cated "a national issue of paper, legal-tender, as the best thing to be done under the circumstances;"'" and of the Boston Journal, which declared that people who feared the bill would be a step toward an irredeemable currency were "too timid for the times."" 1 E. g., see the issues of January 6 and 10. 2 Extract from the New York Journal of Commerce^ reprinted in the Baltimore Sun, January 16, 1882. 3 See the issues of January 7, 8, 15, 18, 21, 29, and of February 5, 8, and 18, 1862. * See the issues of January 24, 28, and 31, and of February 5, 6, 11, 13, 17, and 22, 1862. 6 See the issues of January 11, 20, 21, 23, 30, 31, and of February 5, 10, 13, and 15, 1862. 6 See the issues of January 13, 16, 18, 22, 23, 27, 29, and of February 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, and 11, 1862. 'See the issues of January 18, February 8, U, and 21, 1862. 8 See the issues of February 7 and January 29, 1862. 9 See the issues of January 11, 25, and of February 1 and 10, 1862. 10 See the issues of January 14, 21, 28, and of February 1, 1862. 11 See the issues of January 8 and of February 3 and 7, 1862. CHAPTEK III THE SECOND LEGAL-TENDER ACT I. Oovemment Finances January to June, 1862: Deficit in the Revenues — Existing Authority to Borrow — Second Issue of Old Demand Notes — Temporary Loan — Certificates of Indebtedness — Receipts, January to March — Relief Afforded by Issues of Greenbacks — Small Amount of "Conversions" — Receipts April to June — Position of Treasury, June 30, 1862. II. The Second Legal-Tender Act: Chase's Request for Second Issue of Greenbacks — Chandler's Attempt to Forestall its Consideration — Debate in House and Senate — Provisions of the Act. III. The Postage-Currency Act: Embarrassment of Treasury from Disappearance of Small Change — Remedies Proposed by Chase — Passage of Postage Currency Act. I. GOVERNMENT FINANCES JANUARY TO JUNE, 1862 " Within sixty days," Justin Morrill had prophesied in discussing the first legal-tender act, " we must have at least twice the amount of notes which is proposed now." ' His prophecy was fulfilled, but not until double the time set had elapsed. During this interval between the first and second legal- tender acts, Secretary Chase perforce depended maialy upon loans. At the time of suspension "expenditures had already reached an average of nearly a million and a quar- ter of dollars each secular day; while the revenue from all sources hardly exceeded one- tenth of that sum." ^ In the ' Congreasicmal Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 886. Cf. the similar predictions cited in note 1, p. 58, above. 2 Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury, Becember, 1862, p. 7. The advocates of the legal-tender bill in their anxiety to prove the necessity of the measure seem to have exaggerated the expenses of government. January 28 Spaulding set the amount at "more than $1,600,000" per day (Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 524) , and by February 6 Stevens declared daily expenditures had reached "about $2,000,000" (ibid., p. 687). But on June 7 Chase still put the sum at $1,000,000, with the admis- 82 The Second Legal-Tender Act 83 quarter January to March the ordinary income of the govern- ment from customs, sales of public lands, and miscellaneous sources was hardly $15,000,000. Though in the next quarter the income from these sources increased $4,000,000 and was supplemented by the first receipts from the direct tax imposed the summer preceding, the total came to but $21,000,000." This made total receipts for the six months of $36,000,000 from ordinary sources, while expenditures were probably between $325,000,000 and $350,000,000.' Of course the difference between these sums had to be borrowed. When the banks and the treasury ceased paying in specie Chase found that his authority to borrow was confined practically to the loan acts passed at the summer session of Congress. These acts, it will be remembered, permitted the secretary to borrow $250,000,000 and to issue a variety of bonds and treasury notes as security.' Under this authority Mr. Chase had already arranged with the asso- ciated banks for three loans amounting to $150,000,000. $30,000,000 of the bank subscriptions, however, had not yet been paid into the treasury.* This balance formed his first immediate resource. His second was found in the fact that of the $50,000,000 of demand notes authorized, but $33,- 500,000 had been issued. =■ This left a sum of $16,500,000 which he could pay out at once. Finally, after the funds sion, however, that this amount would probably be exceeded in the near future (i?. R. Miscellaiieous Document No. 81^ p. 2, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.). In fact, the daily expenses did not reach quite two millions a day even for the fiscal year of 1863-3. (C/. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury^ December, 1863, p. 29.) 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 37. 2 Expenditures — unlike receipts — are not given by quarters in the reports of the secretary of the treasury, except for the three months, July to September. The above fibres are the result of a rough estimate made after considering the expendi- tures from July to September, 1861, the total for the fiscal year 1862, and the ratio of increase from 1862 to 1863. 3 See chap, i, p. 17, above. * Ibid., p. 40, note. 5 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 9. 84 History of the Geeenbacks obtained from the $150,000,000 bank loan and the $50,000,- 000 of demand notes had been exhausted, there still remained $50,000,000 of the $250,000,000 which the secre- tary had been authorized to borrow. But this $50,000,000 was not for the moment available. For, though it could be borrowed on either 7.30 three-year notes at par, or on 6 per cent, bonds at 89. 3 -|-, the equivalent of par for 7 per cent, stocks, the sixes already issued were selling in the market at 89 and the seven-thirties at 98.' Under these circumstances Mr. Chase continued to draw upon the banks from week to week until their last instalment upon the $150,000,000 loan was paid on February 4.^ At the same time he issued demand notes freely, and also persuaded a few government creditors much in need of funds to accept 7.30 notes at par in satisfaction of their claims.' But these resources were not adequate for the needs of the treasury, and on February 7, the day after the legal-tender bill had passed the House of Representa- tives, Chase was obliged to request authority to issue another $10,000,000 of the demand notes to tide over the time until the Senate could act upon the pending measure.* The short bill which he sent with his letter was passed at once by the Senate without debate or even reference to committee, and on the following Monday it was acted upon by the House with similar dispatch.^ Ten millions, however, was a small sum compared with the needs of the treasury, and Chase found it necessary to resort to various new devices to obtain additional means. 1 See the table of prices of government stocks in the ATnerican Annual CyclO' pcBdia, 1862, p. 474. 2 Chap, i, p. 40, note, above. 3 Thaddens Stevens said in the House on February 6 that such issues of seven- thirties had then reached about $10,000,000.— Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 687. *See his letter to Fessenden, ibid., p. 705. ^Ibid., p. 726; 12 Statutes at Large, p. 338. The Second Legal-Tbndek Act , 85 One plan that ultimately had marked success was suggested by Mr. John J. Cisco, the chief of the New York sub- treasury.' February 8 he published a notice stating that he had been "authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury to receive on deposit United States notes as a temporary loan " at. 5 per cent, interest, with the condition that sums deposited could be withdrawn at any time after ten days' notice.^ About $2,000,000 were deposited in this fashion within a fortnight; but Secretary Chase seems to have entertained some doubts of his authority to make such an arrangement, and accordingly he requested the Senate finance committee to insert an amendment in the legal- tender bill then in their hands granting him power to accept such deposits to an amount not exceeding $25,000,- 000.' Senator Sherman and others demurred on the ground that if men could draw 5 per cent, interest on notes deposited but temporarily with the subtreasuries they would be slow to lock up their capital by funding notes in 6 per cent, bonds.* But after Fessenden and Chandler had explained that the secretary believed that the plan would induce banks to accept the notes more freely and that whatever sums were deposited would constitute a loan to the government at 5 per cent., the measure was finally passed by a vote of 21 to 18.^ No objection was raised to the plan in the House, and with some minor changes the amendment was incorporated into the legal-tender act as sec. V 1 ScHUCKBEB, Life of Chaee, p. 269. 2 See financial columns of the New York papers and the Amn/aal American Cyclopcedia, 1862, p. 454, for text of the notice. The object of this plan was at first rather to secure a readier acceptance of the old demand notes by the banks than to raise a loan at 5 per cent. Cf. Part II, chap, ii, sec. iii, below. 3 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 772. 4 See the discussion of the amendment, ibid., pp. 772, 773, 802, 803. i Ibid., -p. SOS. 6 12 Statutes at Large, p. 346. 86 . HiSTOEr OP the Geeenbaoks The opportunity afforded by this measure of obtaining 5 per cent, interest on current funds proved very attractive to the banks. March 7 a meeting of the New York Clearing House Association voted to employ such certificates of deposit in payment of balances at the clearing house, and their agents arranged with Mr. Cisco to issue for the pur- pose certificates payable to the order of any bank in the association.' As the New York banks wished to take out $20,000,000 of these certificates, Mr. Chase saw that the 125,000,000 limit imposed by the act of Fejbruary 25 would not allow him sufficient margin for similar issues in other cities. Consequently he asked the finance committee of the Senate to add an amendment raising the limit to $50,000,000 to the bill that had just been sent up by the House providing for the purchase of coin for interest on the public debt. This request was acceded to, though not without further objec- tions from Senator Sherman, and the new limit was provided for by sec, 3 of the act which was approved March 17.^ By the end of the month the treasury had received over $20,000,000 on account of the "temporary loan," as it was called, and had redeemed less than $1,500,000.' Another shift for obtaining means was the issue of "certificates of indebtedness." During the winter a floating debt had been gradually accumulating, variously estimated 1 Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVI, pp. 809-11. 212 Statutes at Large, p. 370; Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1156, 1162-4, 1235. 3 Batlet, NatioTial Loans of the United States, p. 158. The table compiled by Pro- fessor D. C. Barrett from Senator Chandler's speech of June 17, 1862, and published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XVI, p. 327, does not agree with Bayley's figures. According to Bayley's table the amount of the temporary loan outstanding March 31 was $18,876,404.43; according to Barrett the amount on April 1 was $12,227,- 185. Chandler's figures, on which Barrett relies, are inconsistent — the totals do not agree with the several items. Perhaps the reason is that he includes in the totals the deposits received under Cisco's notice of February 8, before congressional authorization had been given to the temporary loan. Moreover, if his figures are for the end of the day they would include the notes deposited April 1, but these deposits could not have been a large sum, for the net increase that week was, accord- ing to Barrett, only $746,691. The Second Legal-Tendeb Act 87 at from $80,000,000 to $180,000,000.' Mr. Chase did not have sufficient ready money to pay even those creditors whose claims had been audited. As a measure of relief he requested authority to issue to creditors who might desire to receive them, certificates of indebtedness bearing 6 per cent, interest and payable in one year or earlier at the option of the government.^ This request was granted by the prompt passage of the act of March 1.^ March 17 authority was granted to issue such certificates in payment of disbursing officers' checks as well as in payment of audited accounts.* Army contractors and similar creditors found great relief in these provisions, for the delay in obtaining payment for supplies had interfered with their operations seriously, the more so because banks showed a disinclination to lend on their claims even after the claims had been approved by the treasury. Under the new system contractors could at any time obtain 6 per cent, obligations of government which could be sold in the market at a slight discount, or used as first-class collateral in securing loans from a bank.^ By these various shifts Mr. Chase obtained means suffi- cient to tide the treasury over the trying quarter between suspension of specie payments and the time when the resources provided by the legal-tender act became available. The following brief recapitulation may give a clearer idea of the situation. Against expenses of perhaps $112,500,000 to $137,500,000 the ordinary receipts were: 1 January 16 the financial column of the New York Herald gave $80,000,000 as the current estimate. January 28, Spaulding put the floating debt at $100,000,000 iCon- gressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 523) ; February 6 Stevens declared it to be $180,000,000 (ibid., p. 687). 2 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 945, 954, 955. 3 12 Statutes at Large, p. 352. ilbid., p. 370. 5 cy. Annual American Cyclopaedia, 1862, p. 456. 88 History op the Greenbacks From customs 114,618,558.44 Prom sales of public lands 27,019.74 From miscellaneous sources (estimated) - 232,946.91 $14,878,525.09 Meanwhile the issues of government securities were: Oregon war debt $ 297,000.00 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds 20,374,753.43 7.30 three-year notes - 11,170,598.24 Old demand notes - 25,900,000.00 Temporary loan (less withdrawals) - 18,876,404.43 Certificates of indebtedness - - - 5,629.000.00 ' $81,247,756.10 The operations of the next three months, April to June, require less notice because no new measures were adopted. There was an increase of about one-half in ordinary receipts, but it was still necessary to borrow about nine- tenths of the funds required. In borrowing Secretary Chase made use of all the resources employed the quarter before except the issue of 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds. On the other hand he was able to employ also the means provided by the legal-tender act. He did this chiefly by paying out the new legal-tender notes which differed from the "old demand notes " in not being receivable for duties. Of these new notes — which were almost immediately christened the "greenbacks" — $99,500,000 were issued by the end of June. The other grand resource provided by the legal-tender act proved for the time being a vain reliance. An issue of 1 For the reventies of the quarter see Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 37. The receipts from miscellaneous sources are taken as a quarter of the amount for the whole year. The issues of securities are compiled from Baylet, National Loans of the United States. The Oregon war issues were authorized by the act of March 2, 1861 (12 Statutes at Large, p. 198), for the payment of expenses incurred by Oregon and Washington during the Indian troubles of 1855 and 1856. All of the 6 per cent, bonds and about $2,500,000 of the seven-thirties were issued to the associated banks for the loans negotiated before suspension. The Second Lbgal-Tendee Act 89 $500,000,000 of 6 per cent, bonds had been authorized — called " five-twenties" from the fact that they were redeem- able after five and payable after twenty years — and it had been provided that the legal-tender notes might be exchanged for these bonds at the desire of the holders.' Much had been hoped from this "funding provision" by the supporters of the bill. Thaddeus Stevens expressed their theory most concisely: My distinguished colleague from Vermont [referring to Justin Morrill] fears that enormous issues [of legal-tender notes] would follow to supply the expenses of the war. I do not think any more would be needed than the $150,000,000. The notes bear no interest. No one would seek them for investment This money would soon lodge in large quantities with the capitalists and banks Where could they invest it? In United States loans at 6 per cent., redeemable in gold in twenty years, the best and most valuable permanent investment that could be desired. The Government would thus again possess such notes in exchange for bonds, and again re-issue them. I have no doubt that the $500,000,000 of bonds authorized would be absorbed in less time than would be needed by Government; and thus $150,000,000 would do the work of $500,000,000 of bonds. When further loans are wanted you need only authorize the sale of more bonds; the same $150,000,000 of notes will be ready to take them.^ Experience proved that such expectations as Mr. Stevens indulged were far too sanguine. While the government was in. the midst of an enormously expensive war of which the end could not be foreseen, its credit was not high enough to make men desire its 6 per cent, coin interest bonds on the conditions permitted by the first legal-tender act. Conse- quently conversions of greenbacks into bonds were slow — less than $14,000,000 of the five-twenties were disposed of in the first three months after they were ready for issue.' 1 Sec. 2, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 345. 2 Oongressimial Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 688. Cf. the remarks of SpauldiBg, ibid., p. 526; Sherman, p. 791; and Pomeroy, p. 884. 3 Batlet, National Loans of the United States, p. 156. 90 History of the Greenbacks Instead of its being necessary, as Mr. Stevens forecast in February, to issue more bonds to take up the legal-tender notes constantly offered for conversion, it became necessary to issue more greenbacks to compensate for the small demand for bonds.' The treasury operations for the quarter April to June may best be presented in a summary like the one given above for January to March. EECEIPTS FROM OSDINAEY SOOECES From customs From sales of public lands From miscellaneous sources (estimated) From direct tax ISSUES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES Oregon war debt 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds 7.30 three-year notes Old demand notes Temporary loan (less withdrawals) Certificates of indebtedness Legal-tender notes (greenbacks) Five-twenties of 1862 118,930,170.16 49,558.54 232,946.91 1,795,331.73 §21,008,007 .34 $ 198,850.00 13,997,936.64 30,000.00 39,049,712.14 44,252,979.73 $97,529,478.51 98,620,000.00 13,845,500.00 ' $209,994,978.51 The free issue of greenbacks put the treasury by the end of the quarter in a very much better position than it had been in at the beginning. The floating debt that had accu- mulated during the preceding three months was all cleared away and current expenses were paid promptly. On July 1, said Mr. Chase in his December report: 'For the subsequent history of the "conversion" scheme, see chap, iv, pp. 104, 107, 108, 115, 116, below. 2 For authorities see above, p. 88, note. The Second Legal-Tendek Act 91 Not a single requisition from any department upon the treasury remained unanswered. Every audited and settled claim on the government, and every quartermaster's check for supplies fur- nished, which had reached the treasury, had been met. And there remained in the treasury a balance of 113,043,546.81.' II. the second LEGAL-TENDEK ACT While it is true, as has just been shovra, that the treas- ury worked into comfortable condition during the quarter April to June, 1862, and possessed abundant funds to meet all current demands, Mr. Chase foresaw that this pleasant situation could not continue long without further grants from Congress. The credit was due in large measure to the rapid issues of greenbacks, and when the whole amount of these notes authorized by the act of February, 1865, had been put into circulation stringency would recur. This matter he called to the attention of Congress by a letter written June 7 to Thaddeus Stevens, chairman of the Com- mittee of Ways and Means.^ According to the terms of the first legal-tender act, he reminded Congress, |150,000,000 of United States notes might be issued, but $60,000,000 of this sum must be used to replace the old demand notes authorized by the acts of July 17, 1861, and February 12, 1862. The new issues, therefore, were confined to $90,000,000. This limit, he said, had already been reached, and accordingly further issues could be made only as equal sums of the old notes were retired. Moreover, no more temporary deposits could be received, because the amount on hand had reached $50,000,- 000 — the full sum authorized by Congress — despite a reduction in the rate of interest from 5 to 4 per cent. Thus the only available resources were receipts from customs, and I Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 10. 2H. B, Miscellaneous Document No. 81, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. The date of the letter as giren by this document is April 7, but this is an error of the press. See the remarks of Mr. Stevens, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2768. 92 HlSTOEY OP THE GREENBACKS sales of five-twenty bonds for greenbacks, or "conversions." But these resources were far from adequate to meet the expenditures. No safe reliance [said Mr. Chase] can be placed on conversions so far as experience has afPorded any grounds of estimate, for more than 1150,000 daily; and the daily average revenue from customs, during the past month, has been about $230,000. The aggregate daily receipts from both these sources, therefore, cannot be estimated at more than $380,000, and may very possibly fall short of that simi; while the average daily expenditure cannot be estimated at less than $1,000,000, and will, probably, unless very considerable retrenchments are made, exceed that sum. To meet the deficit the secretary proposed two measures: first, the "removal of the restriction upon temporary deposits ; " second, the issue of another $150,000,000 of legal- tender notes. The first measure would enable him to take full advantage of the disposition of business men to lend their means to the government temporarily at a low rate of interest. Mr. Chase thought that not less than $30,000,000 would be added at 4 per cent, to the $50,000,000 of deposits already received. To provide for the prompt redemption of such of these deposits as were withdrawn, he proposed that a reserve of 33^ per cent, be provided out of the new issues of greenbacks. Another suggestion, indicative of the state into which the circulating medium of the country had already fallen, was that $25,000,000 of the new United States notes should be of denominations less than five dollars. Payments to public creditors, and especially to soldiers [Mr. Chase said in explanation], now reqtiire large amoimts of coin to satisfy fractional demands less than five dollars. Great inconveni- ences in payment of the troops are thus occasioned. With every effort on the part of the treasm-y to provide the necessary amoiuit of coin, it is foimd impracticable always to satisfy the demand. When the amoimt required is furnished, the temptation to disburs- ing oflBcers to exchange it for any small bank notes that the soldiers The Second Legal-Tendek Act 93 or the public creditors will take, is too great to be always resisted. And even when the coin reaches the creditors it is seldom held, but passes, in general, immediately into the hands of sutlers and others, and disappears at once from circulation.* With this letter Mr. Chase sent a bill embodying his recommendations. "The condition of the treasury," he said, in conclusion, " renders prompt action highly desirable." This communication was laid before the House June 11. The request for a second issue of legal-tender notes imme- diately alarmed the opponents of paper money. With the hope of preventing its consideration, Senator Chandler, of Michigan, introduced a resolution: "That the amount of legal tender treasury notes already authorized by law, shall never be increased." ^ Speaking in support of this resolu- tion he said that the effect which the passage of a second legal-tender bill would have was shown by the fact that the mere publication of Secretary Chase's request, " without any action of Congress on the subject, has created such a panic, and has so convinced the money center of the world that we are to be flooded with this paper, that gold has risen in price from 2f to 7 per cent, premium." If full use were made of other resources, he continued, the disastrous consequences of fresh paper money emissions could be avoided. By pay- ing 5 per cent, interest an indefinitely large sum could be obtained on temporary deposit and the lagging conversions of greenbacks into bonds could be stimulated by an appeal to the patriotism of the people.* Senator Fessenden, chairman of the finance committee, replied in a moderate vein. Eeliance upon temporary deposits, he pointed out, would be very hazardous, because if any severe shocks occurred to the credit of the govern- ment, large sums might be withdrawn within a few days, 1 Cf. Part 11, chap, ii, sec. iv, below. 2 Cmgressimal Globe, 37tli Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2746. 3 Ibid., pp. 2774, 2775. 94 HlSTOKY OP THE GeEBNBAOKS and Mr. Chase be left without funds. He regretted that the secretary had found it necessary to request the issue of moi'e notes, and he was not convinced that such a course would be wise. But until the secretary's reasons were fully known he thought it would be wrong to resolve not to grant his request. Therefore, he moved that the resolution be referred to his committee for consideration. This was done, and nothing more was heard of the matter by the Senate." Meanwhile Mr. Chase's bill was introduced into the House.^ As before, Mr. Spaulding fathered the measure. The tone of the debate was quite different from that upon the first legal-tender act. The advocates of paper money spoke in a less apologetic tone, boldly assuming the offensive. The first experiment, they held, had demon- strated the wisdom of their policy. Mr. Spaulding declared that the act of February 25 had " worked well," and had "exceeded the most sanguine expectations of its warmest advocates."' Some members who had voted against the first bill were won over by such claims to vote for the second. Senator Simmons, for instance, said the first issue " has given great practical relief to the country, and inas- much as it has done so, I ... . give my consent to author- ize a further issue."* Other members agreed to the bill because of the hopelessness of opposition. Owen Lovejoy, who had spoken vigorously against the bill in February, explained that he still thought the policy pernicious but that he would not "persist in any factious opposition to what is a foregone conclusion."^ On the other hand, there were members who had voted for the first bill as a measure of 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2774, 2775. 2/b2d., p. 2665. The bill as reported from the Committee of Ways and Means difiEered from the bill submitted by Chase in not authorizing the issue of notes less than five dollars. See the tezt, p. 2766. 3 Ibid., p. 2766. Qf. on the other side Mr. Sheffield, p. 2888. 4 Jftid., p. 3077. 6I6ic8„p, 2885. The Second Legal-Tender Act 95 temporary necessity, but who opposed the second on the ground that it inaugurated a regular policy of depending on inconvertible paper.' Thus the character both of the support and of the opposition shifted somewhat. In the debate one point especially received relatively more attention than in February. Mr. Hooper based his argument for the bill on the country's need of a currency of uniform value. It was a question, said he, between bank notes and government notes, and he preferred the latter.^ "If anybody," said Mr. Lovejoy, "is to have the advantage of a depreciated currency — the advantage, in other words, of not paying interest on what they [sic^ owe — I say let the government have that advantage ; and let the bankers share with the rest of ns."^ In order to secure this advantage to the government, Senator Sherman proposed an amendment to the bill imposing a tax upon bank notes.* But it was again the argument of necessity that did duty as the chief reason for the bill. In opening the debate Mr. Spaulding reiterated it explicitly. "The ground upon which the secretary of the treasury, and upon which the Committee of Ways and Means, rest this issue of notes," he said, "is the necessity of the case." ^ By the opposition the alleged necessity was once again emphatically denied. Mr. Pomeroy made an elaborate attempt to show that Secretary Chase had underestimated the probable receipts of the gov- ernment, and that the daily deficit instead of being $620,- 000 was only $166,166.' Mr. Pike, who had voted for the 1 Cf. the remarks of Mr. Pike, ibid., p. 2798, and Senator Davis, p. 3078. 2 J6id., p. 2882. 3ibid., p. 2885. *Ibid., pp. 3071, 3072. This proposition was opposed by Senators CoUamer, p. 3073; Simmons, pp. 3076, 3077; and Davis, p. 3078. ^Ibid,, p. 2768. Cf. remarks of Messrs. Baily, ibid.. Appendix, p. 298; and Edwards, ibid., p. 2888. 6 Mr. Pomeroy estimated " conversions " at $275,000 instead of $150,000 daily, and further added $333,000 per day as the expected receipts from the internal revenue act then just enacted.— /6id., p. 2797. As a matter of fact this act yielded about $103,000 instead of $333,000 daily in the fiscal year, li63.— Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1863, p. 28. 96 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS first bill on the ground of necessity, refused to vote for the pending measure, which could be advocated only upon "the mere ground of convenience."' And Mr. Morrill declared that after the recent victories of the federal armies and the passage of the tax bill there was not only no neces- sity, but no excuse, for the issue of more paper.^ Nor were these gentlemen who denied the necessity at a loss for an alternative. "The true policy," said Mr. Morrill, "is to put upon the market the small amount which will be required .... in the bonds of the Government, at what- ever they would bring."' Mr. Sheffield concluded his speech by saying : "I am persuaded that it would be far better for the people of the country to sell bonds at a large discount than to further disturb the relation between price and value by a further issue of these notes." * Mr. Horton put these suggestions into formal shape by presenting, as a substitute for the bill, a measure authorizing the secretary of the treasury to borrow $100,000,000 on 6 per cent., twenty-five year bonds." As in the first debate, the supporters of the bill implicitly gave away the argument of necessity in the answer made to the proposal of borrowing. Instead of showing that it was impracticable to sell bonds, they responded that, as a method of securing revenue, it was better to issue inconvertible paper money than to borrow below par. "When money can be obtained at par on six per cent, bonds," said Mr. Spaulding, "I would prefer to have that done to the issuing a very large amount of legal tender notes." " Mr. Edwards fol- lowed suit, " I would gladly give my consent," said he, " to .... the sale of bonds .... if I were assured those bonds could be sold at par." ' 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2798. 'Ibid., p. 2885. See also Mr. Baker, ibid., p. 2881. 3 Ibid., p. 2885. i Ibid., p. 2888. 5 Ibid., p. 2794. 6 Ibid., p. 2767. TIbid., p. 2888. Cf. on the other side Mr. Pomeroy, ibid., p. 2796. The Second Legal-Tendee Act 97 The legal-tender debate in June and July was by no means so exhaustive as had been the debate in January and February. Apparently members felt it would be a fruitless waste of time to discuss again the questions debated at such length five months before. An attempt was made, however, to learn whether this was the last issue that would be asked for. Mr. Stevens, the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom the question was put, replied frankly that he did not know where the issues would stop.' To offset this damaging admission the supporters of the bill praised the paper currency,^ and asserted that there was no reason why a new issue should increase depreciation.' The measure came to a vote in the House June 24. It passed by 76 yeas to 47 nays. Of those who voted in the affirmative five had opposed the legal-tender clause in the first act. On the contrary, of the nays, seven had sup- ported the legal-tender clause in February. The large majority of members, however, voted upon the second act as they had upon the first. The yeas included four Democrats and the nays fifteen Republicans, so that the division was not a party vote.* In the Senate the vote was 22 to 13. Pour senators voted for the bill who had opposed the legal-tender clause of the first act, and three senators — John Sherman among them — who had supported the first act opposed the second. Twenty-one Republicans voted in the affirmative and nine in the negative. Of the four democratic votes one was in favor of the bill. As in the case of the first act the vote was devoid of sectional and of party character.' 1 Ibid., p. 2886. 2 Mr. Spaulding, e. g., said the act of February 25, 1862, " had given the country a sound national currency, in which the people have had entire confidence." — Ibid,, p. 2767. 3 Mr. Hooper said he had " no apprehension of any depreciation of the currency being produced by the passage of the bill." — Ibid., p. 2883. *76id., p. 2903. ^ Ibid., p. 3019. 98 HiSTOET OF THE GREENBACKS ^ »r President Lincoln approved the second legal-tender act July 11, 1862. The law authorized the issue of |150,- 000,000 United States notes. In addition the limit upon the amount of temporary deposits that might be received was raised from $50,000,000 to $100,000,000. In order to provide for the prompt payment of these deposits the secretary was directed to retain as a reserve fund not less than $50,000,000 of the newly authorized notes.' III. THE POSTAGE CUEEENCY ACT It has been seen that Secretary Chase's letter requesting authority for a second issue of greenbacks referred to the difficulty experienced by disbursing officers in making change for sums of less than $5. To relieve this difficulty it was provided in the act of July 11 that $35,000,000 of the new issues should be of lower denominations than $5, but it was also provided that no note should "be issued for the fractional part of a dollar.'" Hardly had this act been approved by President Lincoln when Mr. Chase found it necessary to request authority to use paper money, not only in payments of one and two dol- lars, but also in payments of 50, 25, and even 10 cents, July 14 he wrote a letter to Thaddeus Stevens, saying: The depreciation of the currency, resulting, in great measure, from the unrestricted issues of non-specie-paying banks and unauthorized associations and persons, causes the rapid disappear- ance from circulation of small coins. To supply the want of these coins, tokens and checks for sums less than one dollar are being issued by hotels, business houses, and dealers generally; and the most serious inconveniences and evils are apprehended vmless these issues can be checked and the small coins of the Government kept in circulation, or a substitute provided.' 1 12 statutes at Large, p. 532. 2 Zbid., loc. cit. 3 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3405. On the disappearance of subsidiary silver from circulation see Part II, chap, ii, sec. iv, below. JlJjtK, Second Legal-Tendee Act 99 'Xmh^' liase-^rr5posed. two methods of meeting this situation. One was to diminish the weight of the subsidiary coins to such a point that as bullion they would be worth less than their face value as money; the other was to authorize the use of postage and other stamps in payments of fractional parts of a dollar. For the convenience of the Committee of Ways and Means the secretary submitted two bills embody- ing these suggestions. The second expedient seemed preferable to the committee, and accordingly the bill providing for the use of stamps as currency was introduced by Mr. Hooper July 17 and passed at once by a vote of 62 to 40, with no debate aside from an objection raised on constitutional grounds against the clause forbidding the issue of small notes by state banks.' The Senate passed the bill the same day without debate or division,^ and President Lincoln signed it before night. The act directed the secretary of the treasury "to furnish to the Assistant Treasurers, and such designated depositaries of the United States as may be by him selected, in such sums as he may deem expedient, the postage and other stamps of the United States, to be exchanged by them, on application, for United States notes." Such stamps were not made a legal tender between indi- viduals, but their currency was assured by providing that they should be receivable in payment of all dues to the United States less than $5, and that they should be redeemed in greenbacks on demand by the treasury officials. The second section forbade any "private corporation, bank- ing association, firm, or individual" to put in circulation notes or tokens of any character for sums less than a dollar.' 1 Congressional Olobe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3405, 3406. 2I6id., p. 3402. 3 12 Statutes at Large, p. 592. On the authorization of fractional currency to take the place of postage currency, see Part I, chap, iv, p. 118, below. On the circula- tion of both these forms of small change see Part II, chap, ii, sec. iv. CHAPTER IV THE THIRD LEGAL-TENDER ACT I. The Finances from July to December, 1862: Receipts and Expenses July to September — Increase of Deficit in October and November — Proposals of the Finance Report; No Further Issues of Greenbacks, But Reliance Upon Loans. II. The Joint Resolution of January 17, 1863: Arrears in Pay of Army — Congressional Inquiries and Chase's Rejoinders — Resolution for Additional Issues of Greenbacks. III. The Third Legal-Tender Act: Provisions of Ways and Means Bill — Character of Debate — Repeal of Funding Provisions — Substitutes Proposed — Senate Amendments — Provisions of the Act. I. THE FINANCES FROM JUNE TO DECEMBEE, 1862 On July 1, 1862, the beginning of the new fiscal year, the treasury was in easy circumstances, as has been shown. All audited claims had been met, and there was a balance of $13,000,000 on hand.' But in the next quarter the treasury began to run behind again. The futile ending of McClellan's campaign in the Peninsula, from which so much had been hoped, showed that the end of the war was not at hand, and on July 1 President Lincoln issued a call for 300,000 additional troops.^ Enlarging the army of course promised an increase of demands on the treasury. During the quarter July to September, however, the war- rants drawn against the treasurer for other purposes than payment of the public debt were slightly less than the quarterly average for the fiscal year 1862 had been — viz., $111,000,000 as compared with $119,000,000.' But at the iPp. 90, 91, above. 2 Complete Works, ed. NICOLAY and Hay, Vol. II, pp. 194, 195. 3 See the statements of expenditures in the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, pp. 41, 43. 100 The Third Legal-Tender Act 101 same time some $45,500,000 more had to be used in redeem- ing old demand notes, greenbacks, certificates of indebted- ness and certificates of deposits/ To help in meeting these total expenditures of $156,- 500,000 there was a slight increase in the receipts from taxa- tion and miscellaneous sources. This revenue rose from about $21,000,000 in the preceding quarter, to $24,000,- 000.^ For the rest Mr. Chase had to borrow. As conver- sions of greenbacks into five-twenty bonds amounted to but $2,500,000, he relied mainly on issues of greenbacks and various short-time obligations.' Altogether he succeeded in obtaining $114,500,000 from loans, but the necessity of pay- ing $45,500,000 of the principal of the debt reduced the net increase of means from loans to $69,000,000. This sum, with the receipts from ordinary sources, gave the secretary $93,000,000 to meet warrants of $111,000,000.* The dif- ference between these sums swallowed up the balance of $13,000,000 on hand July 1 and left an accumulation of unpaid warrants amounting to $5,000,000. Unpromising as the situation of the treasury was at the end of September, it became worse during October and November. The increase of the army began to be felt by the treasury. The expenditures during these two months other than those for payment of debt were almost as great as the total for the three months preceding — viz., $109,000,000 as compared with $111,000,000.^ Mr. Chase was not able to raise money fast enough to meet these expenses, and though he borrowed $85,500,000,° the accumulation of unpaid requisitions at the end of November reached $48,000,000.' 1 Ibid., p. 43. 2/6id.,pp. 37, 43. 3 $3,500,000 of seven-thirty notes, $72,500,000 of greenbacks, $12,000,000 of certificates of indebtedness and $23,000,000 of certificates of deposit were issued.— 76id., p. 43. * Exclusive of payments of the principal of the debt. 5 Ibid., p. 10. ^Ibid., p. 3. TIbid., p. 10. 102 History op the Gebenbacks When the secretary prepared his annual report to Con- gress early in December, he estimated that the expenditures for the remainder of the fiscal year would be $485,000,000. The addition of the $48,000,000 of accumulated floating debt made the total to be provided $533,000,000. Against this sum Mr. Chase expected to receive $125,000,000 from taxes of all kinds and miscellaneous sources. This left $408,000,000 to be raised from loans. Under existing laws the secretary expected to secure $27,000,000 from issues of greenbacks, $86,000,000 from postage currency, $13,000,000 from certificates of indebtedness, and $20,000,000 from temporary deposits. These sums, with an estimated sale of five-twenty bonds amounting to $35,000,000, made a total of $131,000,000; which, subtracted from the $408,000,000 to be borrowed, left loans of $277,000,000 to be provided for by new legislation." In discussing how this sum should be procured Secretary Chase took emphatic ground against any considerable increase in the emission of greenbacks: 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, pp. 3-5, 11, 12. The figures in the report give estimated receipts and expenditures for the whole fiscal year, while the figures above are confined to the months December, 1862, to July, 1863. In obtaining the latter figures from the former it is necessary to cast out the expenses actually paid from July to November. This can be done with certainty for the months July to September because a full statement is given of the receipts and expenditures of that quarter. But for October and November the statements show only receipts from loans ($86,000,000), and expendi- tures for objects other than payment of the principal of the debt ($109,000,- 000). It is, therefore, necessary to estimate the receipts from ordinary sources and the amount paid on the principal of the debt. Such an estimate is not difiicult to make, because the figures actually given show that the latter sum exceeded the former by $20,000,000. The difEerenoe between the stated expenditures and receipts is $23,000,000. But it is also stated that the accumulation of unpaid requisitions rose from $5,000,000 at the end of September to $48,000,000 at the end of November. Since the treasury thus fell behind $43,000,000 on all expenditures and only $23,000,000 on stated expenditures it must have been because expenditures not stated exceeded receipts not stated by $20,000,000. With this guide and that afforded by the figures for the quarter July to September, I have estimated the receipts from customs, etc., during October and November at $18,000,000 and the payments on the principal of the debt at $38,000,000. The figures for the amounts to be borrowed given in the text, however, agree with those in the secretary's report and are not affected by any inaccuracy of these guesses, for, if the estimated receipts from taxation are too small they are compensated for by correspondingly deficient estimates of expendi- ture on the principal of the debt. The Third Legal-Tendek Act 103 The easiest mode [of obtaining the 1277,000,000] doubtless would be an issue of the required amount in United States notes; but such an issue, especially in the absence of proper restrictions on corporate circulation, would, in the judgment of the Secretary, be as injurious as it would be easy. The addition of so vast a volume to the existing circulation would convert a currency, of which the benefits have thus far greatly outweighed the incon- veniences, into a positive calamity. Its consequences would be inflation of prices, increase of expenditures, augmentation of debt, and ultimately, disastrous defeat of the very purposes sought to be attained by it.' While the secretary thus opposed further issues of greenbacks, he had no suggestions to make of increased taxation. Instead, he proposed to secure the additional $277,000,000 solely by borrowing. In order to facilitate the negotiation of loans as well as to provide a better currency, he urged again upon Congress the plan proposed in his report of the year before for reorganizing the banking system. Banks that desired to issue circulating notes were to be required to purchase United States bonds to be held as security. This plan, he thought, would make a market for not less than $250,000,000 of bonds "within a very few years." ^ Moreover, the steady sale of bonds to banks would strengthen the credit of the government and enable it to borrow from others on better terms.' If reliance were to be placed upon loans, the question as to what form of security had best be offered became important. Mr. Chase opposed any increase beyond five years in the length of time that bonds should run before they became redeem- able, and any increase in the rate of interest beyond 6 per cent. As an alternative he preferred the issue of 7.30 three- year notes, "convertible into five-twenty sixes at or before maturity, and of smaller notes bearing an interest of 3.65 per cent." * iJMd., p. 12. 2jjid., p.l8. 3I6Jd., pp. 18, 24, 26. ilbid., p. 25. 104 HiSTOEY OP THE GeEENBAOKS No prudent legislator [said he] at a time when the gold in the world is increasing by a hundred millions a year, and interest must necessarily and soon decline, will consent to impose on the labor and business of the people a fixed interest of 6 per cent, on a great debt, for twenty years, unless the necessity is far more urgent than is now believed to exist.' Accordingly, he recommended no change in the law providing for the issue of bonds beyond the necessary increase in amount and the repeal of two clauses which in his view limited the sale of the five-twenties already author- ized.^ These clauses, however, or rather Mr. Chase's inter- pretation of them, require some attention. The first legal-tender act of February 25, 1862, as will be remembered, had authorized the issue of $500,000,000 6 per cent, five-twenty bonds, which the secretary was permitted to sell "at the market value thereof." The law also provided that holders of greenbacks might exchange them in sums of $50 or multiples of $50 for these bonds at par.^ Under this authorization the secretary had been able to dispose of but relatively few of the five-twenty bonds. Up to the first of December "conversions" amounted to less than $24,000,000.* Mr. Chase now declared that these small sales were due to the clauses restricting sales to the "market value" of the bonds and permitting "conversions" of greenbacks into five-twenties at par. Considerable amounts [he explained] are seldom taken, except with a view to resales at a profit, and resales at any profit are impossible under the law. Negotiations below market value are not allowed, and if not allowed the taker of the bonds can expect no advance, tmless a market value considerably below par shall become established. The act makes advance above par impossible, by authorizing conversion of United States notes into bonds at that rate.^ 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p, 25. 2 Ibid., p. 26. 3 12 Statutes at Large, pp. 345, 346. i Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 12. 5 Ibid,, p. 52. The Third Legal-Tendbe Act 105 What this peculiar explanation meant Congress did not understand, and, as will soon appear, the secretary was asked to interpret it. II. THE JOINT RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 17, 1863 This report was laid before the House of Represen- tatives December 5 and referred to the Committee of Ways and Means, which at once set about drafting finance bills along the general lines indicated by the secretary.' But this was a task that necessarily required some time. It was not until the 8th of January that Mr. Stevens was able to report the loan bill and the bill for reorganizing the banks of issue." Meanwhile the treasury continued to run behind as it had done in October and November, and the accumulation of requisitions which could not be paid for lack of funds became larger. This state of affairs attracted much atten- tion in Congress because the pay of the army fell into arrears. Members began to receive letters from constituents who were serving in the field, complaining that their families at home were suffering from lack of the money which the government owed but did not pay them." Such complaints found a ready response. December 11 the House adopted a resolution asking the secretary of war to report " what regiments remain unpaid and how long have the soldiers of such regiments remained without pay." * As Mr. Stanton did not reply promptly, ^ the House adopted another resolution December 15, directed to the secretary of the treasury: 1 Congressional Globe, 37tli Cong., 3d Sess., p. 15. 2 Ibid,, pp. 235-7. It was the Senate banking bill introduced by Sherman January 26, " a little different from the bill introduced in the House of Representa- tives " (p. 505), that was finally passed. Cf. Spaulding, op. cit, p. 186. 3 See, e. g., the remarks of Mr. Gurley, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 344. *Ibid., pp. 75, 76. 5 No answer had been received up to January 12.— Ibid., p. 283. 106 HiSTOEY OP THE GbEENBACKS Whereas grievous delays happen in the payment of money due soldiers: Therefore, in order to ascertain if any and what legisla- tion may be necessary to remedy such delays, Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasvuy be requested to furnish to this House the reasons why requisitions of paymasters in the Army are not promptly filled.' Mr. Chase answered that the unpaid army requisitions then in the treasury amounted to $28,700,000. Payments of requisitions designated by the war and navy departments as most urgent were being made at the rate of about $1,000,000 daily from the proceeds of customs, internal revenue taxes, conversions, temporary deposit loans, and new issues of greenbacks. These resources, he concluded were insufficient, but he could not obtain more funds until Congress should adopt the measures recommended in his report.^ The House replied to this commimication the day before adjourning for the holidays by passing a joint resolution declaring that in the opinion of Congress " immediate steps ought to be taken by the Treasury Department to pay the sums due the soldiers .... and that to this end a prefer- ence be given to this class of Government creditors over every other." ^ After the recess Henry Wilson, of the Committee on Military Affairs, reported this resolution to the Senate with an amendment which authorized the issue of an additional $50,000,000 of greenbacks to enable the secretary to carry out its directions. Senator Fessenden, however, pointed out that before such a measure was adopted Mr. Chase ought to be consulted, and for this purpose he requested and the Senate consented that the matter be referred to the Committee on Finance.* 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 93. 2H. B. Executive Document No 18, 37th Cong., 3d S6SS.,Dated December 18, 1862. 3 Adopted December 22, lieZ.— Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 167. For the text see p. 199. ilbid., pp. 199, 200. The Third Lbgal-Tendee Act 107 When the resolution was sent to Chase he declared that the means provided by it would be insufficient. The exist- ing resources of $1,000,000 a day did not cover current expenditures, and the addition of $50,000,000 of greenbacks would not suffice for the arrears in the pay of the army and navy, which probably approached $60,000,000. Therefore, as a substitute for the joint resolution, he sent in a bill providing for the sale at the best rates obtainable of $100,- 000,000 of 6 per cent, ten-year bonds, the issue of $50,000,- 000 of United States notes, and of a like sum of two-year 4 per cent, treasury notes.' On recommendation of the Committee on Finance the Senate postponed indefinitely the resolution adopted by the House and passed in its place the bill prepared by Chase.^ While the joint resolution was pending in the Senate, the House followed up its inquiry into the non-payment of the soldiers by requiring Secretary Chase to explain why he had not availed himself of the authority conferred upon him by the act of February 25, 1862, to sell $500,000,000 of 6 per cent, five-twenty bonds.' In replying. Chase laid the blame for the failure to use this authority, as he had done in his annual report, upon the clause specifying that the bonds should be sold at "the market value thereof." "The market value," he said, "can only be ascertained by the daily quo- tations of sales in New York." But he could not sell large amounts of securities at these market quotations, for heavy purchasers as a rule bought to sell again, and resales at a profit were impossible unless bonds could be bought from the government at prices less than those ruling in the market.* The question whether Chase or Congress was respon- 1 The text of his letter is published ibid., p. 270. 2I62(J., p. 270; January 12. 3 Resolution adopted January 8.— Jfcid., p. 237. *H. B. Executive Document No. 29, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 108 History of the Geeenbacks sible for the emptiness of the treasury thus turned upon the meaning of the phrase "market value" of bonds. Chase, who construed it to mean the quotations of the New York stock market, was no doubt right in saying that sales of large amounts at these quotations were impossible. His critics in Congress, however, regarded his interpretation as a legal qidbble which ought not to stand in the way of supplying the pressing needs of soldiers. "Everybody knows," said Mr. Gurley, impatiently, that the market value of bonds "is the price they will bring when placed upon the market; .... no far fetched construction of this sort should prevent their sale." ' Though the majority of congressmen probably shared Mr. Gurley's feeling that in his fear of exceeding the powers conferred upon him the secretary had been over-nice, the needs of the hour were too urgent to permit of further fen- cing. The great Ways and Means bill which had been reported from the committee while this dispute about the pay of soldiers was going on, contained a section which authorized the issue of $300,000,000 additional greenbacks " if required by the exigencies of the public service, for the payment of the army and navy and other creditors of the Government."^ Debate upon it began January 12 with an elaborate speech by Mr. Spaulding.' The same day the joint resolution giving soldiers preference over all other government creditors which the House had passed December 22 was rejected by the Senate in favor of Chase's substitute.* Just before adjournment, still on this same day, the latter bill was referred to the Committee of Ways and Means in the House.^ Though this committee felt that steps should be taken at once for the relief of the soldiers, they did not approve of Secretary Chase's proposals. The Ways and 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. p. 343. Cf. pp. 389, 390, 927. 2 Ibid., p. 284. 3 Ibid., p. 284-9. i Pp. 106, 107, above. 5 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 291. The Thied, Legal-Tendek Act 109 Means bill which they had framed would grant abundant power to borrow money, but they knew that it could not be passed much before the end of the session. Consequently they determined to put the simplest of the proposals of the Ways and Means bill into a separate measure and ask for immediate action. With this view, on the 14th of January, Thaddeus Stevens introduced a " Joint Resolution to provide for the immediate payment of the Army and Navy of the United States." It was very brief, merely authorizing the issue of $50,000,000 additional greenbacks to be included in the issue provided for by the pending bill. On Lovejoy's motion the amount was doubled. Then without any discus- sion the resolution was passed.' The next day the Senate acted upon it with similar expedition,'' and President Lincoln signed it on the 17th.' In notifying the House of his approval of the measure the president expressed his "sincere regret that it has been found necessary to authorize so large an ad- ditional issue of United States notes," and urged prompt enactment of Chase's plan for a national banking system.* A third issue of greenbacks was thus determined upon with much less discussion than had been bestowed upon the first and second issues. The opening for it was made by Secretary Chase's peculiar interpretation of the loan sections of the first legal-tender act. Had he taken the "market value" of bonds to mean what Congress seems to have intended — the price which they would bring when sold on the market — it is probable that he could have negotiated a much larger amount of the five-twenties in the summer and autumn of 1862. Then the pay of the army would not have fallen into arrears and the occasion for the joint resolution of January 17 would not have presented itself. 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 314. 2 Ibid., p. 323. 3 12 Statutes atLarge, p. 822. » Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 392, 393. 110 History op the Gkeenbaoks iii. the thikd legal-tender act The greenbacks authorized by the joint resolution, how- ever, formed but a third of the issues proposed by the Ways and Means bill reported by the committee. This bill author- ized the secretary of the treasury to borrow $900,000,000, intended partly to supply the wants of the current fiscal year and partly of the year that would begin July 1, 1863. To secure this sum the secretary might sell "upon the best terms he can obtain, not less than par," twenty-year bonds, bearing interest at 6 per cent, in coin. He might also issue $300,000,000 of three-year treasury notes bearing coin interest at 5.47^ per cent.; i. e., a cent and a half per day on $100. Further, " if required by the exigencies of the public service," he might issue $300,000,000 of green- backs. To prevent the avenues of circulation from being closed against government paper money by enlarged issues of bank notes, a tax of 2 per cent, per annum was pro- posed on the circulation of banks beyond certain limits, which varied from 25 per cent, of the capital in the case of institutions with a capital of over $2,000,000 to 90 per cent, of the capital of banks with capitals of $100,000 or less.' Rather curiously, the discussion of this sweeping measure centered not in the question how best to borrow the $900,000,000 needed, nor in the policy of issuing more legal- tender notes, but in the proposed tax on bank notes. Con- gressmen acquiesced with little dispute in the recommenda- tions concerning the loans f but they discussed at much length and with much warmth the alleged attack upon the banks. Of strenuous opposition to the increase of the irredeemable currency there was none. It was clearly enough seen that 1 The text of the bill is given Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 283, 284. 2 See, e. g., the speeches of Messrs. Spaulding, ibid,, p. 287; Morrill, p. 296; Shef- field, p. 367; Hooper, p. 384; Riddle, p. 383; Lovejoy, p. 345; Gurley, p. 342; Walker, p. 339. The Third Legal-Tbndek Aot 111 the bill would cause further depreciation,' injure the govern- ment's credit,^ increase the cost of the war, work injury to recipients of fixed wages — particularly soldiers — to savings bank depositors and all creditors, and that it would still further excite the "spirit of speculation.'" But this recital of the ill effects which would follow the bill apparently had little influence. Even Amasa Walker — then serving his short term in the House — who saw these evils most clearly, could lightly waive them aside. "One thing is certain," said he, " we are in such an emergency at the present time that it is not worth while for us to be very particular."* He frankly admitted that he could see no alternative. ° Simi- larly Justin S. Morrill, who had opposed the first and second legal-tender acts, felt constrained to vote for the bill because he knew of no better way of securing funds. "The patient has got accustomed to opiates," said he, "and the dose can- not now be withheld without peril." ° Mr. Horton took the same stand. He had opposed the whole paper-money sys- tem, but now that the country was "launched .... on this current of paper money," there seemed to him to be no turning back.' While even these staunch opponents of irredeemable currency admitted the necessity of the bill, Mr. Spaulding and his associates proclaimed it as they had done in the case of the first and second issues. "I have an aversion," said Mr. Spaulding, "to any considerable further issue of legal tender notes, and can only consent to it as an imperative necessity. I think too large an issue will tend to inflate prices ; but I do not see how it can be avoided." ' In the recognition of the ill effects of an irredeemable paper currency and the assertion of necessity the discussion 1 Senator Sherman, ibid., p. 841. 2Amasa Walker, ibid., p. 339. 3 See remarks of Messrs. Walker, loc. cit. ; Ward, ibid., p. 337 ; and Pike, p. 347. M .,. r-l jOg iH ■**ieoc- ir-(M oatcos '^•i s ill II SSS ^ o oooow eq-* wc-oo 8 inoaia ^^ ^^^ n ^H M jojs N rtiHCD ^»ft -44cqc^ Sg^ ^SS la-l-t iHNcS ;§0 ,_, ft® s O t-rH «W Wt-M< 8 ss ss 3gg s ■M ,„ j°2 1st dH 1 OSrH 432.5 59.6 214.4 158.5 [98.6 ►-■a P4g o 00 -4< t-M la ^ S SS ^^ r « •M ,- 1~< . 02 UT IfSCD OCO 00 ill S ^S S3S3 r aP :^ : S :* : o . o .3 : u : a ;.9;:» c 1 lea est rin ote c . N • eo d 1 ^' 1 .SE ■Hi J i 1 et receipts Bonds Short-time gatioDS . . Non-intere [United St c K 55 1 e 1 130 HiSTOET OF THE GrEEBNBACKS to a quarter in 1864, and it would have been considerably instead of slightly larger ia 1865 had not customs duties fallen off so largely in consequence of the tariff act of June 30, 1864, which discouraged legal importations and stimu- lated smuggling.' By " net receipts from loans " is meant the receipts minus sums employed in paying principal of the public debt. These receipts are divided into three classes, according to the kind of security upon which money was borrowed. Each class is charged with all redemptions of securities falling within it and credited with all new issues, including premiums realized on sales.^ When the redemptions exceed the issues the fact is indicated by placing a minus sign before the figures. Two matters of interest are brought out by the exhibit. The first is the correlative of the point already noticed; as the revenue system became more efficient, a smaller pro- portion of the means necessary to carry on the war had to be borrowed. From nine-tenths in 1862 the proportion fell to three-quarters in 1864 and 1865. The second matter concerns the method of borrowing. At first reliance was placed rather on issues of circulating currency than on sales of bonds ; but with increasing experience the secretaries used bonds and interest-bearing treasury notes more and green- backs less. To make this clearer a supplementary table is added giving the proportions of the net receipts from loans obtained from the three classes of securities. From this table it appears that the greenbacks were not an important financial resource after June, 1863. In the fiscal year, 1862, more than a fifth, and in 1863 nearly half of the 1 Cf, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury^ December, 1864, pp. 13, 26. 2 Issues and redemptions of tlie principal of the debt are compiled from Batley, op. cit. Premiums are as given by De Knight, History of the Currency of the Country and of the Loans of the United States, Treasury Department Document No. 1943, pp. 121, 122. How FuETHEK Issues were Avoided 131 TABLE III PEOPOETION OF THE NET EEOEIPTS FEOM LOANS DBEIVED FEOM BONDS, BHOET- TIME INTEEE3T-BBAEING OBLIGATIONS, AND FEOM NON-INTEEEST BEAE- ING OBLIGATIONS FOE THE FISCAL YEABS 1861-66 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Net receipts from loans 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%. Bonds 101.3 -1.3 [■'■'■'■) 13.8 49.6 36.6 [22.8] 23. 9 28.6 42.5 [48.5] 67.1 26.7 6.2 [6.3] 39.3 60.4 .3 [-.2] 119.9 Short-time interest-bear- 7.2 Non-interest-bearing obli- -27.1 [United States notes] [-28.6] loans were represented by issues of United States notes, but in 1864 the proportion fell to a sixteentb, and thereafter the redemptions were greater than the issues. This statement, however, does not by any means show the real financial effect of the greenback policy. More important than the nominal amount of the issues was the influence of the paper money upon the price of supplies bought by the government. But this is a large subject that must be reserved for a future chapter.' 1 See Part II, chap, x, below. PART II Economic Consequences of the Legal-Tendeb Acts CHAPTEK I PRELIMINARY SKETCH The preceding chapters have shown that the policy of issuing irredeemable paper money was adopted because of the financial embarrassments of the federal government. But the policy thus adopted for purely fiscal reasons had serious consequences of quite other than a fiscal nature. It caused a grave disturbance of established economic relations and affected for good or ill the economic circumstances of almost every person in the country. The purpose of the present part is to trace out these consequences in as clear a fashion as the available materials permit. Of necessity the analysis must be intricate and tedious, because to be faith- ful it must deal with a bewildering complexity of conditions and must attempt to distinguish between the effects of a mul- tiplicity of economic causes. Perhaps the best way to give a degree of coherence to the details will be to preface the analysis with a sketch of the general nature of the economic disturbances that characterized the period. In the first place, then, suspension of specie payments threw the monetary circulation of the loyal states into dis- order by causing the withdrawal of gold and silver coin from common use as money. The inconveniences that attended this withdrawal and the various substitutes that were employed to take the place of specie as media of exchange form the subject of the next chapter. But, though the inconveniences caused by these changes in the medium of exchange were not slight, they were less serious than were the results produced by the change in the standard of value. For about nine years before suspension 135 136 History of the Greenbacks the money unit of the United States in which all prices were reckoned and debts discharged, had been, in fact, if not in legal theory, the gold dollar.' The legal-tender acts substituted the greenback for the gold dollar as this unit. Now the gold dollar had contained 23.2 grains of pure metal, but the greenback dollar that took its place was at no time during the war worth so much as this. A year after the passage of the first legal-tender act a greenback dollar would purchase but 14.5 grains of gold. Though from this point its value advanced until in August, 1863, it was worth 18.4 grains, the rally was followed by a serious relapse that culminated in July, 1864, when the paper dollar was worth but 9.0 grains. Another advance carried the value to 17.1 grains in May, 1865, and another relapse reduced it to 15.9 grains at the end of the year. The course and causes of these fluctuations in the gold value of the standard money are dealt with in chap. iii. It was this depreciation of the money unit that gave rise to the most complicated and interesting economic develop- ments of the war period. Of course, in exchanging com- modities for money men were unwilling to give as much for a dollar worth 9 grains of gold as they had given for the dol- lar worth 23.2 grains. What is tantamount to giving less goods for the dollar, they demanded more dollars for the goods. The decline in the specie value of the greenbacks, therefore, produced an extraordinary rise of prices, which is investigated in chap. iv. From the very organization of a modern industrial society, such a rise of prices must produce far-reaching dis- turbances. The complex process of producing and distribut- ing wealth is carried on by a succession of money payments. Business-men buy materials for money prices, lease land for money rents, borrow capital expressed in money for the pay- 1 Cf. Laughlin, History of Bimetallism in the United States (4th ed., 1897), p. 86. Preliminaey Sketch 137 ment of money interest, hire labor for money wages, sell their products for money, and in money reckon their profits. At bottom, of course, this highly developed system of money payments is only a mechanism for distributing among the members of society the economic satisfactions which are the real goal of effort. But under the present regime the eco- nomic satisfactions which any individual can obtain — what may be called his "real income" — depend proximately on the purchasing power of his money income. The rise of prices that resulted from depreciation decreased, of course, the purchasing power of a given money income. As a result the economic satisfactions received by all those whose money incomes did not rise as quickly and in as great degree as prices, were diminished. But the matter could not rest there. Men did not long remain content with the same money return, when the economic satisfactions it enabled them to command had declined so considerably. As prices rose, then, all classes in the community which contributed of their property or their services to the process of production insistently demanded a larger sum of money for their co-operation. The economic situation apparently favored their success. For depreciation of the currency of itself did not decrease the amount of commodities produced and services offered — the source from which the real income of all classes in the community is drawn — nor did it affect directly the relative supply of and demand for the various factors of production ; it altered only the division of these commodities and services among the various classes that shared in them. Those persons whose money incomes had not advanced pari passu with prices received a less proportion than before, and those whose money incomes had increased more rapidly than prices commanded a larger proportion. But it was the former distribution of wealth that was the outcome of the 138 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS existing economic conditions. The change in the distribu- tion, caused by depreciation of the standard of values, was from the standpoint of the situation before suspension an artificial disturbance. Under the operation of free competi- tion, a readjustment of the nominal amounts of money pay- ments — the mechanism by which real income is distributed — was therefore to be expected, in the direction of restoring the relative distribution of wealth between different classes prevailing before the disturbance had occurred. A further consequence of depreciation, therefore, was to start a readjustment of money incomes, whether derived from rents, interest, or wages. But this process of readjusting the whole system of money payments so as to restore real incomes was certain to encounter serious obstacles. 1. At any given time business men are bound to a con- siderable extent by legal contracts calling for the payment or receipt of specified sums for specified goods or services. They are under engagement to pay set amounts for rent and interest ; they owe others and others owe them accounts payable in legal money; they have agreed to buy materials at fixed prices, or to supply others with their own products; they have borrowed and lent money; when due the loans are to be paid in the standard currency ; they have contracted with others to give or receive their services at certain salaries, etc. Whether the purchasing power of dollars rises or falls, such contracts are fulfilled by the payment of the specified number of dollars. Until the termiaation of the contracts there is no alteration in the nominal amount of the money to be paid. In this way the scale of money payments existing before depreciation is legally petrified and enforced for a while in the new situation where the same sum of money means less economic satisfactions. 2. Rapid readjustment is further hindered by the fact that the nominal amount of many money payments is a con- ventional sum, not subject as a rule to bargaining between Pkeliminaet Sketch 139 the parties. The fee of the bootblack, the barber, the notary, the physician; the price of a newspaper, a cigar, a ride in the street-car, in some places the monthly wage of a farm hand — these and many other payments are not easily changed in amount. 3. Even where legal contracts are not in the way, and the prices paid are mostly the subject of bargaining, the change in the amount of payments produces friction. The complex system of money payments, by which the distribution of wealth is effected, is an organic whole, and a change in one part encounters serious opposition unless all the other parts are similarly altered. A change in the scale of money pay- ments that affects all simultaneously and ih the same propor- tion would proceed smoothly and work hardship to no one. But changes do not occur in this manner. They always start somewhere, and extend spasmodically over the rest of the field. Persons whose products or services do not at once rise in price, oppose, so far as they can, changes which increase their money expenditures. Laborers may demand an increase of wages because the price of food has risen. But the employer cannot accede to the request, without injuring himself, until the price of his products has advanced. If he sell to other dealers, they object strenuously to paying higher prices unless sure the increase can be shifted onto others. And consumers exceedingly dislike paying more for their goods especially if their own money incomes have not risen. So at every step the advance in the scale of money payments is impeded. 4. The readjustment in the scale of money payments, then, that is necessitated by an alteration in the standard money works itself out in a period of economic stress and strain. During the Civil War the tenseness of the situation was increased by the constantly varying degrees of deprecia- tion. There was not a single shift from a higher to a lower level; the standard of value was fluctuating all the time. 14:0 History of the Greenbacks Before a readjustment of money payments to a scale that, at the existing value of a dollar, would restore real incomes approximately to what they had been could be worked out, the value of the dollar had changed again and a new adjust- ment on a new basis began.' The price level was constantly changing, and each new change unsettled real incomes afresh and precipitated a new struggle for a readjustment of money payments. While the war continued no adjustment could be even tolerably stable, for the next week's war news might raise or lower the value of the government's notes which served as the community's money several per cent., and so produce new confusion. A study of the economic consequences of the issue of legal- tender paper currency as a measure of "war necessity" becomes, then, primarily an examination of the intricate effects of the changes in the purchasing power of the standard money upon the distribution of what Marshall calls the "national dividend." The most important problem is to dis- cover how the real incomes of laborers, landlords, capitalists, and active business managers were affected. Beyond this problem lies the question what effect these changes in real income had upon the consumption and production of wealth. Such in brief are the subjects discussed in chaps, v-ix. 1 The rapidity and violence of these fluctuations may best be seen from the following tabular statement of the percentage of alternating depreciation and appreciation in the specie value of the greenback dollar : Month. Average Gold Value of $1 in Paper Money Rise (+), or Fall {-) Per Cent, of Appreciation or Depre- ciation in Gold Value of the Cur- rency $1.00 .966 .985 .623 .795 .387 .737 .684 -0.034 + .019 - .362 + .172 - .408 + .350 - .053 April, 1862 Rise of 1.97 per cent, in 2 months February, 1863 Fall of 36.75 per cent, in 10 months August, 1863 July, 1864 Fall of 51 .32 per cent, in 11 months Mav. 1865 Rise of 90.44 per cent, in 10 months CHAPTEE II THE CIRCULATING MEDIUM I. Gold and Silver Coin : Money in Use Before Suspension — Disappearance of Gold After Suspension in East — Continued Use in California. II. Bank Notes: Exceptions to Rule of Suspension— Obstacles to Free Circulation of Bank Notes — Redemption in Greenbacks — Increase of Note Issues. III. Old Demand Notes : Attitude of Banks — Demand Notes at a Discount — Temporary Loan Scheme — Eflfect of Legal-Tender Act. IV. "Shinplasters" and Fractional Currency : Disappearance of Silver Coin — Issues of "Shinplasters" — Postage Currency — Fractional Currency. V. Minor Coins: The Premium on Nickel Cents — Its Cause — New Bronze Cents — Other Minor Coins. VI. Treasury Notes : Greenbacks — One and Two Year Notes of 1863 — Compound Interest Notes — Use of Certificates of Indebtedness and Seven- thirties as Currency. VII. Recapitulation: Chaotic Condition of Circulating Medium — Uncertainty Regard- ing Volume. I. GOLD AND SILYEK COIN Before the banks and the treasury suspended specie pay- ments, December 30, 1861,' the monetary circulation of the United States consisted of (1) gold coin, (2) subsidiary sil- ver coins for fractional parts of a dollar, (3) one-cent pieces of a copper and nickel alloy, (4) treasury notes of the gov- ernment payable on demand, and (5) circulating notes issued 1 See Part I, chap, i, pp. 40, 41. 141 142 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS by banks chartered under state laws.' The specie in circu- lation was estimated by the director of the mint in October, 1861, at from $275,000,000 to $300,000,000, of which he thought not more than $20,000,000 was at the South;' the demand notes outstanding were $33,500,000,' and the bank notes reported as issued by the 1,289 institutions in the loyal states amounted to about $129,000,000/ Suspension threw this whole system into disorder. Gold coin, the only full legal-tender money in use, was withdrawn from general circulation as soon as the banks and the treasury ceased paying it out, and the country was left dependent upon a currency of paper money which the issuers were not pre- pared to redeem in specie. It is not quite accurate to say that gold coin ceased to circulate. The banks continued to hold large amounts of specie in their reserves,* while the government paid interest on a large portion of its debt in gold and required the use of gold by importers in payment at the customs houses. More than this, there was a section of the country where the greenbacks did not succeed in displacing coin even in com- mon business transactions. In 1862 there were but very few banks in states west of Kansas and Nebraska." Indeed, in California, the wealthiest and most populous of the far western states, the existence of banks of issue was expressly prohibited by the state 1 Silver dollars had not been in common use for many years, because they were worth more as bullion than as money. See the table showing the average value of an American silver dollar each year from 1834 to 1862 in H. E. Lindebman's Money and Legal Tender in the United States (New York, 1879), p. 161, and compare LaughIiIN, History of Bimetallism in the United States^ chaps, iv, v. •i Finance Report, 1861, p. 62. 3 Ibid., 1862, p. 9. * Compiled from the "Synopsis of the Returns of the Banks in the Different States," published in the Finance Beport for 1862, pp. 189 fl. 5 According to the "Annual Reports on the Condition of the Banks," the amount of specie held by institutions in the loyal states increased from $76,400,000 at the beginningof 1862 to $81,500,000 at the beginning of 1863.— ff. B. Executive Document ifo.iS, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 209; and. No.20, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 211. 6 See the bank reports cited in preceding notes. The Cieculating Medium 143 constitution.' "Suspension" was, therefore, a much less momentous occurrence for these communities than for those of the East, where business centered around highly developed banking systems. West of the Rocky Mountains men con- tinued to buy and sell for coin, giving little thought to the fact that bank notes in circulation elsewhere were no longer redeemed in specie. But when Congress, by the act of February 25, 1862, provided for the issue of $150,000,000 of United States notes and made them a legal tender between individuals, the currency troubles of the rest of the country were brought home even to Califomians. Under this law it was techni- cally possible for a person who had bought goods from a San Francisco jobbing merchant to compel his creditor to accept in payment greenbacks worth considerably less than the expected gold. Elsewhere this situation had been prepared for by the use of notes of suspended banks for three months before the first United States notes were issued, and men adjusted their business transactions to suit the currency. But on the Pacific coast people had been accustomed to a circulation of specie only and were very loath to surrender it. Business men consequently cast around for some means by which they could maintain the circulation of gold and prevent debtors from forcing them to accept greenbacks. One means to this end was the formation among the mer- chants of San Francisco in November of an agreement "not to receive or pay out legal-tender notes at any but the mar- ket value, gold being adhered to as the standard." Firms that refused to enter into this agreement, or to abide by it, were to be listed in a black book and required in future deal- ings to pay cash gold for goods which they purchased. Loyal observance of such a voluntary agreement, how- ever, was difficult to maintain, and vigorous efEorts were I Article IV, sees. 34, 35. There were, howeyer, a few deposit banks. See J. J. Knox, A History of Banking in the United States (New York, 1900), pp. 843-5. 144 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS accordingly made to secure such action from the state legis- lature as would secure the same end by legal means. After several other proposals had been rejected, a "specific con- tract act" was finally passed and approved April 27, 1863. It provided in substance that contracts for the payment of specific kinds of money should be enforceable by legal process. After the constitutionality of this law had been affirmed by the state courts, business-men were able to protect themselves against tenders of greenbacks effectively by inserting in all their contracts clauses specifying that payment should be made in gold coin. This became the general practice, and consequently the people of California maintained a large circulation of specie during all the seven- teen years that the rest of the United States were using paper money. Greenbacks were not prevented from circu- lating, but when they were passed it was usually at their gold, not at their nominal, value.' II. BANK NOTES As has been said, the withdrawal of gold from circulation in other parts of the United States left the notes of the state banks and the federal treasury the only monetary circulation, aside from "deposit currency," available for use in large transactions. But neither the bank nor the treasury notes were at that time a legal tender, and consequently the circu- lation of both was for a time beset with difficulties that require discussion in some detail. Though all the banks, with the exception of the banks of the states of Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana, and a few scatter- ing institutions elsewhere like the Chemical Bank of New York, had followed the example of the New York banks very 1 Beenakd Moses, "Legal tender Notes in California," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. VII, pp. 1-25 ; J. A. Feeeis, The Financial Economy of the United States Illustrated (San Francisco, 1867), Nos. V, XV. The Circulating Medium 145 promptly in suspending specie payments/ the suspension was perhaps nowhere complete. Banks very generally con- tinued for some time to supply coin to their customers who required it for the payment of duties or any other necessary purpose.^ Indeed, in those states where the banking laws imposed penalties for refusal to pay notes in coin the banks were obliged to redeem their notes whenever the holder insisted upon their so doing. Such was the case in New York. The state superintendent of banking was required by law to close any institution that failed to redeem its notes in coin within fifteen days after the notes had been pro- tested.' As the superintendent had no discretion in the matter, the banks were at the mercy of any note holder who chose to insist upon redemption in gold. Certain speculators in currency took advantage of the situation to collect bank notes systematically and send them, in to the issuing institu- tions for payment in coin, which they then sold at a premium.* Fear of such operations made the banks unwilling to pay out their notes freely. Instead of notes they issued many certi- fied checks, which for a time formed a prominent part of the circulating medium.* For such reasons there was a marked contraction in the bank-note circulation in the first months of 1862. January 4, the New York city banks had outstanding $8,600,000 of notes; by March 1 this circulation had fallen to $5,400,000. The hesitation of the banks ceased, however, when the treasury notes in circulation were made legal tender, for this measure provided funds other than coin which note holders I Bankers^ Magaziine (New York), Vol. XVI, p. 650. 2Z6id., Vol. XVI, p. 648 (Rhode Island) ; p. 649 (Philadelphia) ; Vol. XVII, p. 760 (Boston) ; H.B. Executive Document No, 25, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 80 (Con- necticut) ; p. 28 (New Hampshire) ; New York Herald, January 5, 1862. This and the subsequent references to newspapers give the date of the "financial column." 3 See text of the law, Bankers^ Magazine, Vol. XVI, p. 811. 4 New York Herald, January 20, 1862. 5 Hunfs Merchante' Magazine, Vol. XL VI, p. 309. 146 HiSTOEY OP THE GeEENBAOKS pressing for redemption could be compelled to accept. Accordingly, the banks began to pay out their notes again, and by May 3 their circulation was practically as large as it had been January 4.' The situation in Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana where the state banks did not suspend specie payments immediately, did not long maintain its peculiarity. These banks were deterred from following the example of eastern institutions by clauses in their charters which forbade the redemption of their notes in anything but coin. In Ohio, however, the legislature enacted a law January 16, which granted immunity from the penalties for suspension to such banks as should advance coin to be used in paying the interest on the state's foreign debt.^ Similarly in Kentucky, "the banks of issue having consented to loan to the citizens of the state $1,000,000 .... the legislature passed an act on March 8, 1862, relieving the banks from the penalties for suspension of specie payments and authorizing them to pay out United States legal-tender notes.'" The Bank of the State of Indiana and its branches, under the presidency of Hugh McCuUoch, held out somewhat longer. December 31 McCuUoch issued a statement that under no circumstances would the bank fail to redeem the pledge it had given to pay its notes in coin.* In pursuance of this policy the managers of the branches were instructed " to redeem promptly in coin all notes that might be pre- sented; to anticipate and prevent their return, as far as might be practicable, by taking them up at commercial points with other cash means ; [and] to make arrangements with deposi- tors by which deposits of gold should be paid in gold, 1 See the New York city bank statements, ibid., p, 559; compare Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 15. 2 Bankers'' Magazine, Vol. XVII, pp. 163, and 793, 794. 3 Knox, History of Bankingin the United States (New York, 1900), p. 642. * Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVI, p. 650. The Cieoulating Medium 147 deposits of bank notes .... in bank notes.'" By this course "in a few weeks the larger part of the circulating notes of the branches were at rest in their vaults, and the business of the branches was reduced to what could be safely done upon their capitals and deposits." When, however, the legal-tender act had been passed the question arose whether the bank might not legally use United States notes in discharge of its notes. After ascertaining that the courts would give prompt trial to a case involving this important question, Mr. McCuUoch, in order to make a test case, directed that greenbacks be tendered in payment of a note. The supreme court of Indiana decided that the legal-tender act was constitutional, and that the bank might redeem its notes in notes of the government. When this decision was rendered, the bank at once commenced paying out its notes again. ^ The same question regarding the availability of green- backs for redemption of bank notes that under state laws were payable only in coin, had to be faced in other states. In New York the question was peculiarly pressing because the legislature was powerless under the constitution to pass such measures of relief as were enacted in Ohio and Ken- tucky.'' To determine whether banks could avail themselves of the act of Congress making treasury notes a legal tender, test cases were arranged by the superintendent of the bank- ing department and a decision obtained in June, 1863, from the court of appeals maintaining the constitutionality of the law.* This and similar decisions rendered in other states 1 H. McCuLLOCH, Men and Measures of Half a Century, p. 136. Hbid., pp. 136-8. 3 Article VIII, sec. 5 of the constitution provided that "the legislature shall have no power to pass any law sanctioning in any manner .... the suspension of specie payments by any person, association, or corporation issuing bank notes of any description." — Bankers^ Magazine, Vol. XVIII, p. 811. *See Annual Beport of the Superintendent of the Banking Department of the State of New York, January 7, 1864; Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVIII, pp. 811-13. The full text of the court's opinion is published ibid,, pp. 345 ff. 148 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS removed the last doubt about the right of banks to use the greenbacks instead of gold coin as reserves and put them in a position to issue their own notes freely. The increase in the circulation of the state banks after the passage of the legal-tender act was very general. Secretary Chase estimated that the notes issued by banks in the loyal states amounted to $167,000,000, November 1, 1862, as com- pared with $130,000,000 a year before.' The Annual Report on the Banks in the United States for 1863, though not with- out omissions, made the circulation in the same states about the first of the year nearly $181,000,000.' Bank deposits increased with like rapidity. According to the bank reports, the deposits in the loyal states were $257,000,000 in Jan- uary, 1862, and $367,000,000 in January, 1863.' After April 1, 1863, however, the increase of circulation seems to have been checked by the tax imposed of 1 per cent, a year on certain proportions of the notes outstanding and 2 per cent, on amounts in excess of the specified proportions.* Shortly thereafter the organization of new national banks and the conversion of state into national banks introduced a new element into the circulating medium. As the issue of •national bank notes proceeded for several years more rapidly than the withdrawal of the state-bank issues, there was again an increase in the total bank circulation.^ But aside from this increase the change was merely the substitution of a more uniform and better-secured kind of notes for the diverse issues of the state banks. 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury y December, 1862, p. 14. 2 H. B. Executive Document No. 20, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 210. 3 Ibid., loc. cit., for 1863, and H. B. Executive Document No, 25, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 208, for 1862. ♦Act of March 3, 1863, sec. 7; 12 Statutes at Large, p. 712. 5 See the statement of bank notes outstanding in the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1878, p. 14. The Cieoulating Medium 149 iii. old demand notes The circulation of the demand treasury notes was for a time beset by more difficulties even than was the circulation of bank notes. The first issues of these notes by Secretary Chase in the late summer and autumn of 1861 was opposed by the banks which subscribed to the 1150,000,000 loan. When the secretary insisted on making the issues, however, they yielded, and with few exceptions made no difficulty about receiving such of the notes as were brought to them by depositors.' The situation changed, however, when the treasury, by suspending specie payments, gave notice that these notes would not be redeemed in coin.'' At this time there were $33,460,000 in circulation.' Early in January the New York banks held a meeting to discuss what policy should be pursued with regard to them. Opinion was divided, and the meeting ended with the adoption of a vague resolution: That before we consent to receive such notes, we must require that such legal provision be made by Congress as shall insure their speedy redemption, and that a committee of this association be appointed to consider that subject and report to an adjourned meeting.* 1 Cf. Part I, chap, i, pp. 26, 27, above. 2 It has been stated in an ofiicial document that " the demand notes were paid in gold when presented for redemption," and that such payment with their receivability for all public dues, " prevented their depreciation." — Information Respecting United States Bonds^ Paper Currency^ Coin^ etc., revised ed.. United States Treasury Depart- ment Circular No. X25, July 1, 1896, p. 7. This has been the common view and is found, e. fir., even in the work of so recent a writer as Professor A. B. Hart (Life of Chase, p. 242). But none the less it is certainly an error. Mr. Chase himself said ; "The banks of New York suspended on the 30th of December, 1861 and the government yielded to the same necessity in respect to the United States notes then in circulation." — Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1862, p. 7 : cf. American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 300, -and Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XL VII, p. 509. More than this, the "old demand notes," as the issue came to be called, did depreciate in value, which could hardly have happened had they been " paid in gold when presented for redemption ;" cf. Part II, chap, iii, sec. ii, below. 3 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 9. * Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVI, p. 647. 150 History op the Greenbacks Of course, this resolution procured no action by Congress, and the committee was unable to frame a policy acceptable to all the banks. Some institutions took the notes without question as current funds, while others did not.' The Ameri- can Exchange Bank, for example, issued a circular dated January 1, 1862, informing its dealers and correspondents that it would not accept treasury notes from them, unless they would sign a contract to accept payment in the same notes at par.^ But so long as a portion of the subscriptions to the $150,000,000 loan remained unpaid, almost all of the banks were ready to receive demand notes at least in small quanti- ties, because they could be used in making payments into the subtreasury.' After the last instalment of the loan had been paid on the morning of February 4, the disinclination to receive the notes as current funds became much stronger. Banks could no longer find an outlet for them at the subtreasury, and they could not be certain that depositors would accept such notes in payment of checks, since the notes were not yet legal-tender. The metropolitan banks seem to have been rather more liberal than those of Boston, Philadelphia, and other cities.* But even in New York there was apparently a considerable number of large institutions that discriminated against the treasury notes and accepted them only as I New York Herald, January 2, 5, and 6, 1862. ^Bankers' Magazine,Yol. XVI, p. 647. Compare tte similar circulars received by Chicago banks from their New York correspondents, Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XL VI, p. 293. 3 New York Herald, February i, 1862, and Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XL VI, p. 309. The banks of Boston acted in similar fashion. Though these banks were forbidden by their charters to pay out any notes except their own, a resolution was adopted, January 10, that banks concerned in the government loan should accept treasury notes " receivable for government dues to the extent of 25 per cent, of their subscriptions to said loan, including such notes as they may have on hand."— Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVI, p. 648. * New York Herald, January 24 and 29, 1862. The Oikculating Medium 151 "special deposits," repayable in kind.' Refusal to take the notes on the part of even a few banks in the clearing-house association made serious trouble for the other institutions that desired to receive them without question. For, if one of the more liberal banks accepted demand notes on deposit as current funds, it had to make provision for meeting checks drawn against this deposit and presented at the clearing- house by other institutions. At the clearing-house, however, the demand notes would not be accepted in payment of a balance, and the bank that had taken such notes from its customers had therefore to provide other funds for meeting the checks, or, if it did not have sufficient currency of other kinds, to take out loan certificates on which 7 per cent, interest was charged." This situation seems to have given much concern to the treasury authorities. Though the treasury notes were com- monly accepted in business transactions between individuals without question,' men could not use them freely at the banks, and consequently persons who received large quanti- ties were compelled to sell them at a slight discount.* It was the desire to prevent such discrimination against the treasury notes that Mr. Chase gave as his reason for urging the retention of the legal-tender clause in the bill introduced by Mr. Spaulding.^ While the bill was still pending, another scheme for the same purpose was devised. Mr. Cisco, the head of the New 1 Ibid., February 4 and 5, 1862. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine states that this course was pursued by a majority of the banks. — Vol, SXjVI, p. 309. 2 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XL VI, p. 309. Cf. the remarks of Senator Simmons in the Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d sess., p. 794. 3 New York Herald, February 9 ; Shipping and Commercial List, February 19, 1862. 4 According to the New York Tribune, February 13, 1862, the selling price was one-fifth of one per cent, below par, while notes could be bought of the street brokers at half this discount. 5 Letter of January 29, 1862, to Thaddeus Stevens.— Congressicmal Globe, SJth Cong., 3d Sess., p. 618; cf. remarks of Mr. Bingham, ibid., p. 639. 152 History op the Greenbacks York subtreasury, suggested, and Chase authorized, the acceptance of the treasury notes on deposit at the sub- treasuries at 5 per cent, interest.' It was apparently their expectation that the banks would now accept the notes with the intention of depositing them at the subtreasury and so drawing interest upon a part of their current funds.'' But the plan was received less kindly than had been hoped. On February 8 about half a million was deposited with Mr. Cisco, and by the 11th another million had been added.^ But these deposits seem to have come mainly from savings banks and out-of-town institutions.* Most of the city banks looked upon the plan as a bid to induce the public to deposit with the subtreasury instead of with themselves.' For the time, therefore, this plan accomplished little, and the demand notes continued to rule at a slight discount until the passage of the legal-tender act." The first reports of the law that reached New York indicated that the treasury notes already in circulation, as well as the new issues, had been made a legal tender.' An amendment to this effect had, indeed, been made by the Senate on motion of John Sherman ; * but it had not been agreed to by the House of Representatives,' and at the recommendation of the com- mittee of conference the Senate receded from it.'" Though the report was false, it changed the attitude of the hesitating banks toward the notes. The new law provided that customs should be paid, not in paper money, but in coin. From this 1 C/. ScHUCKBBS, Life of Chase, p. 269. 2 Cf. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XLVI, p. 310 ; New York Herald, Febru- ary 9, 1862. 3 New York Herald, February 8 and 11, 1862. ilbid,, February 14. ^Hunt's Merchants' Magazine. Vol. XLVI, p. 310. 6 New York Tribune, February 13, and Shipping and Commercial List, February 19, 1862. 'New York Times, February 26; Herald, March 3.- 8 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 771. 9 Ibid., p. 888. 10 Ibid., p. 929. The Circulating Medium 153 rule, however, an exception was made in favor of the old demand notes, because the act, under which they were issued declared them " receivable in payment of public dues.'" If made legal tender, then, the old notes would differ from the new only in possessing a virtue lacked by the latter — availa- bility for use at the customs house in place of coin. As but $60,000,000 of the demand notes had been authorized, and as they were to be replaced as rapidly as feasible by the new issues, it seemed likely that there would be a strong demand for them from importers who had duties to pay. Conse- quently even the banks that had hitherto refused to receive the notes as current funds now refused to pay them out, and instead of being at a discount of ^^^^ to ^ they rose to a pre- mium of -| to ^J' This advance to a premium, however, proved premature. When after three or four days it was found that the retirement of the old notes could not com- mence until the new notes were printed, that printing would require at least a month, and that in the meantime the treas- ury must continue to pay out the old notes, they fell again to par.* And when on the 4th of March the full text of the legal-tender act was received, and it was found that the legal-tender clause included only the new issues, some of the banks reverted to their former policy and began again to discriminate against the government notes. Accordingly the notes fell once more to a discount.* The discovery that the old demand notes had not been made legal tender seems to have been as much of a surprise to many members of Congress as it was to business men in New York. Steps were taken at once to remedy the omis- 1 Act of August 5, 1861, Sec. 5, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 313. 2New York Times, February 26 and 27, 1862; fferoM, February 27 and 28; Com- mercial Advertiser, February 26, 27, 28, and March 1 ; Shipping and Commercial List, March 1. 3 New York Herald, March 1 and 3 ; Times, March 3. * New York HeraJd, March!; Commercial Advertiser and Shipping and Com- mercial List, March 5. 154 History of the Greenbacks sion. A clause making the treasury notes already in circu- lation a legal tender was inserted in the bill to authorize the purchase of coin for the payment of interest on the public debt, which Thaddeus Stevens introduced into the House March 6.' When this bill received President Lincoln's signature, March 17,^ there was no longer any reason for discriminating against the demand notes, and they returned for a short time to par." Meanwhile the New York banks had taken action that put an end to all opposition on their part to the use of the treasury notes. At a meeting held March 7, 1862, they determined to make their clearings in certificates issued by the assistant treasurer for deposit of the demand notes with him at 5 per cent, interest.* This arrangement, which went into effect March 10, made treasury notes the standard for all banking operations in current funds. ^ Foreseeing that when the new notes were ready for issue the old notes receiv- able for customs would be more valuable, Mr. Cisco pub- lished a notice March 14, that all certificates of deposit issued in the future would be paid in any notes that were legal tender.* The new respect in which the old demand notes were coming to be held was shown by the fact that this notice caused a falling off in the daily deposits. The check was only temporary, however, for the new notes became themselves available for deposit early in April. From the 7th of March, then, the old demand notes were current funds in New York and passed without question at par. But soon after the appearance of the greenbacks their 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1103 and 1116. 212 Statutes at Large, p. 370. 3 In fact, the notes returned to par as soon as it was known that the clause had been introduced, because it was a foregone conclusion that the measure would become a law. — New York Commercial Advertiser, March 8. * Bankers^ Magazine, Vol. XVI, pp. 809-11. 5 Cf. New York Tim£s, March 10. 6 See the test in Annual American Cyclopcedia, 1862, p. 456. The Circulating Medium 155 position changed again. The first greenbacks in New York came in a remittance of $4,000,000 received by the assistant treasurer April 5.' A large sum was paid out the same day, and from this time on issues were so rapid that $90,000,000 was outstanding before the 7th of June.^ All through April the old demand notes circulated side by side with the new notes at par.' But, as the supplies of the latter currency became sufficient for the wants of business, a difference became apparent between the treatment of the two issues. Owing to their receivability for customs, the old demand notes were preferred, and as early as the second week in May they began to be quoted regularly at a premium which, slight at first, gradually rose as the volume in circulation became smaller and the premium on gold for which they served as a substitute at the customs-house became higher. The possibility of obtaining this premium caused holders of old demand notes to hoard them just as they had hoarded gold in January. When Mr. Chase wrote his letter of June 7 requesting authority for a second issue of greenbacks, he said that the $56,500,000 of the old demand notes then outstanding were "held by banks and capitalists, and not used as circulation."* They were sold from time to time to importers and used in the payment of duties. As they came into the treasury through the customs-houses, the old demand notes were canceled and replaced by greenbacks. By this process the amount outstanding had been reduced to 13,300,000 by June 30, 1863.' This withdrawal from circulation in May, 1862, closed the brief but eventful history of the old demand notes as a part of the circulating medium. 1 See the financial columns of the New York papers under this date. 2 B.B. Miscellaneous Document No. 81, 37th Cong., 2d Sess,, p. 1. 3 Bunfs Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XL VII, p. 33. •» H.B. Miscellaneous Document No. 81, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1. 6 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1863, p. 45. 156 History op the Gkeenbaoks From what has been said it is clear that the business public must have suffered considerable inconvenience from the uncertainty regarding the currency between the time of suspension and of abundant issues of the greenbacks. Gold had ceased to be used in ordinary transactions; notes of state banks, always inconvenient, were in many cases not issued freely for prudential reasons and had to be replaced in considerable measure by certified checks, and the treasury notes were most of the time discriminated against by many banks. The appearance of the greenbacks in large amounts afforded relief from such difficulties, though the wide and rapid fluctuations in their value gave rise to other embarrass- ments of a more serious character. IV. "SHINPLASTEES" AND FRACTIONAL CURRENCY One difficulty with the currency, however, the greenbacks could not meet. While they served as a convenient medium of exchange in large transactions, they did not supply the want of small change, for the first legal-tender act had for- bidden the issue of notes of less than five dollars.' Hardly had the perplexities of business men who handled currency in large amounts been relieved by the free issues of the greenbacks, when yet greater inconveniences began to be felt by everyone from the lack of fractional coins. When specie payments were suspended the subsidiary silver coins did not disappear from circulation at once, as did gold, for reasons found in existing coinage laws. While a dollar contained 371.25 grains of pure silver, only 345.6 grains were put into two half-dollars, four quarters, or ten dimes." In January, 1862, one grain of gold was selling for 15.35 grains of silver.^ At this ratio a silver dollar was worth 1 Sec. 1, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 345. 2 Act of February 21, 1853, 10 Statutes at Large, p. 160; c/. Laughlin, History of Bimetallism in the United States, chap, v, sec. 4. 3 See the table in Laughlin, op. cit., Appendix II, F. The Oiboulating Medium 157 $1.04 in gold, while two halves, four quarters, or ten dimes were worth but 97.05 cents. While, therefore, there was a profit in treating gold coin as bullion instead of as money, the moment a fractional premium appeared upon it in paper, there was no profit in exporting or in melting subsidiary silver coins until the premium on gold had risen sufficiently above 3.1 per cent, to give brokers compensation for collect- ing the coins and shipping them to Canada. For, when gold stood at lOS-jlj-, a paper dollar was worth 97 cents in gold — just as much as ten dimes. It was therefore a matter of indifference to the possessor of subsidiary silver coins whether he paid it over as current funds in purchasing commodities or sold it for paper money. But when gold rose above lOS^Jj^, a paper dollar became worth less than ten dimes, and a person who had the latter could make them go farther in the payment of debts by selling them for paper money and giving it to his creditor than by handing him the silver itself. Since, however, some trouble and expense were involved in melting or exporting coins of small denomina- tions, it was a nice question how high the premium on gold must rise above 3^^ before the silver would disappear from circulation. For the first week after payments in specie had been stopped the premium on gold varied from 1 to 3 per cent.' But on the 8th of January it rose to 3^ and on the 9th to 4J. At the latter premium a paper dollar was worth 95.92 cents in gold, or 1.13 cents less than ten dimes. According to the money column of the New York Herald, this slight difference sufficed to induce brokers to begin the purchase of silver coins. "An inquiry has sprung up for silver," reports the financial writer on the 9th, "which has been held at 1 per cent, premium." It is not improbable, how- 1 For this and subsequent references to premium on gold see tables in Appendix A, below. 158 History of the Greenbacks ever, that purchases of silver on so slight a margin were prompted rather by anticipations of the profit that could be made if the premium on gold continued to advance, than by the opportunity for immediate profit. If so, the buyers of silver were disappointed, for after rising to 5 on the 10th of January, the premium fell again below 4. During February the average premium was 3.5, during March 1.8, during April 1.5, and during May 3.3. At such low prices for gold, or, more accurately, at such high prices for paper money, there was no profit in buying subsidiary silver coins for export or melting, and consequently they continued to circulate as money. But in June, when the hopes of a speedy end of the war were being dispelled, the paper money fell in value, that is, the premium took an upward turn. From 3j^ on the first Monday of the month, the premium rose to 4^^^ on the second Monday, 6f on the third, 7f on the fourth, and 9^^^ on the fifth.' With gold at the last-named premium, a paper dollar was worth 91.69 cents in gold — a price which afforded an ample margin of profit for the purchase for export of silver coins worth 97.05 cents. Accordingly, the newspapers late in June and early in July began to remark a rapid disappearance of small change from circulation. For example, the Springfield Bepublican of July 2, 1862, said: "The ruling premium of 5 to 6 per cent, on silver coin, as compared with the paper currency in use, is fast driving it out of circulation. Laboring people and those of small means are constantly to be seen at brokers' oflices selling $10 to $50 of silver change at 2^ per cent, premium, which the brokers ship to Europe where they can realize 6 or 7 per cent, in comparison with our irredeem- able paper currency." Similarly, the New York Times 1 These figures are averages of the highest and lowest prices of gold recorded each day. The Oikoulating Medium 159 of July 18 declared that "the annoyances suffered in this city and throughout the country during the last two or three weeks, on account of the scarcity of specie, have been unsp6akable, and in many lines of business the loss of custom and profit has been heavy."' Though over $45,- 000,000 of subsidiary coins had been struck under the act of 1853,^ of which perhaps three-fifths circulated in the loyal states,' nearly the whole amount seems to have been with- drawn from use as currency between the middle of June and the middle of July. Apparently, the brokers who purchased the coin exported a large portion of it. Over $3,750,000 were carried to Canada in 1862 by a single express com- pany.* American coin became a drug in the Canadian mar- ket and was accepted only at a discount.' Considerable amounts were shipped also to South America and a sum large in the aggregate was no doubt kept for a long time in small hoards." Of course, the disappearance of the silver coins from circulation caused serious inconvenience in retail trade. Various shifts were tried to supply their place. In Philadelphia, and perhaps elsewhere, old Spanish quarter- dollars were brought again into use. These coins had formed a considerable portion of the small change before an abun- dant supply of American silver was furnished under the act of 1853. From long wear they had become light in weight. The act of February 21, 1857, provided that they should be accepted by the government offices for 20 instead of 25 cents.' 1 Compare New York Tribune, July 9 and 16 ; Commercial Advertiser, July 10 and 16 ; Chicago Post, July 15 ; and other references in the following notes. 2 Report of the Director of the Mint, October, 1862, p. 49. 3 Cf. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XL VII, p. 155. * Annual American Cyclopcedia, 1862, p. 468. 5 Cf. Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVIII, pp. 83, 482 ; Vol. XIX, p. 699. 6 Knox, United States Notes, p. 100. ' 11 Statutes at Large, p. 163, and Lindeeman, Money and Legal Tender, p. 32. 160 HiSTOBY OP THE GbEBNBACKS When the American silver was withdrawn a few of these old coins, because of the less amount of silver left in them, came out of retirement and passed current again as quarters of a dollar.' Another method of meeting the situation was to decline to make change for paper bills at all, or else to charge a premium for the silver returned. This plan is said to have been adopted for a time by transportation companies and many retail shops in New York city.^ A third device was to cut dollar bank bills into halves or quarters and pass these pieces for 50 and 25 cents. In Hartford, Conn., it was said that some $20,000 of the bills of the ^tna Bank were floating about cut in two.^ A more ingenious scheme was hit upon by the Farmers' Bank of Mount Holly, N. J., which paid out notes for $1.25, $1.50, and $1.75 to enable people to make change within 25 cents by returning a dollar bill.* Much commoner, however, was the issue of notes for fractional parts of a dollar, colloquially called "shinplasters." Though the laws of many states forbade any bank to put into circulation notes less than one dollar, a few institutions adopted this plan, relying on the obvious need of fractional currency to secure immunity from prosecution.* But most of the "shinplasters" seem to have been issued by individuals or firms not engaged in banking. In Chicago, for instance, the city railway company supplied 25-cent tickets which the conductors gave in exchange for paper bills and accepted for fares." In Boston, Young's Hotel started a system of checks for 15, 25, and 50 cents 1 Springfield Bepubtican, July 15, 1862. 2 New York Tribune, July 9 and 16. 3 Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 404. On similar practices elsewhere see ibid., p. 821. tibid., p. 316. 5 For example of such illegal issues by a banker of Beading, Pa., see ibid., p. 475. 6 Chicago Post, July 15, 1882. 1 The Circulating Medium 161 witli the proprietor's signature attached — an example that saloons, restaurants, and retail shops were quick to follow.' Many of these issues were made by irresponsible persons and consequently resulted in loss to those who accepted them.^ Partly to protect the public from such losses and partly to obtain a "loan without interest," several towns and cities provided for municipal issues of small notes. The city council of Newark, N. J., for instance, voted July 11, "to issue promissory notes to the amount of $50,000 in denominations ranging from ten cents to fifty cents" and redeemable by the city in sums of $10 or more.' This example was followed by Jersey City, Wilmington, and Albany, and a proposition of similar character was dropped in Philadelphia only because it was found to be contrary to state law.* These various substitutes for the silver coins furnished a fractional currency that, although unsatisfactory, had to be tolerated for a time as a makeshift. Secretary Chase, however, took steps promptly to relieve the general embarrassment. He called the attention of Congress to the matter in a letter written July 14, and Congress responded by authorizing the use of " the postage and other stamps of the United States" as currency.'^ Though this act was approved by the president only three days after Chase's letter was written, some time elapsed before it afforded substantial relief. The chief immediate effect was to cause the use of ordinary letter postage stamps for small change. In New York where as a rule about $3,000 of stamps were sold daily, the sales ran up 1 Springfield Beptiblican, July 15, 1862. 2 Cf. quotations from the Philadelphia Ledger in the Bankers^ Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 823. 3 New York Times, July 13, 1862. 4 See Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, pp. 823, 566, 316, and 161 respectively. 6 Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 592. See Part I, chap, iii, sec. iii. 162 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS to $10,000 on the day after the bill was approved, and next day to $16,000.' Such stamps, however, were exceedingly inconvenient for use as currency because of their small size and their propensity for sticking together and getting crumpled. To take their place Secretary Chase caused a series of special stamps in denominations of 5, 10, 25, and 50 cents to be prepared.^ They were about 2| by 3f inches in size, printed on both sides and not gummed.' The first issues were made late in August.* In order to force the withdrawal of the "shinplasters," attorneys of the national and local governments in some districts published notices warning the public that the penalties imposed by federal and state laws upon the issue of small notes by unauthorized persons would be vigorously enforced by prosecutions.^ Municipal "shinplasters," how- ever, were not affected by the Postage Currency Act, which forbade such issues only to "private corporations," firms, and individuals." Town and city notes continued therefore to circulate unhindered for a considerable time. The difficulties with the fractional currency do not seem to have come to an end even by the close of 1862. The vari- ous substitutes for coin could not be dispensed with until the "postage currency" became abundant enough to supply the demand for small change, and at first the issues were rather slow. By the end of September but $787,700 had been placed in circulation, and in the next two months the total 1 Bankers^ Magazine^ Vol. XVII, p. 159. 2 Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury, December 1862, p. 28. 3 Eepresentations of this " postage currency " are given by Knox, United States Notes, pp 105-8. * Knox, ibid., p. 104; Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 239. 5 For example, see the notice given in New York city. Bankers^ Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 256, and compare the action taken by the bank commissioners of Illinois, ibid., p. 567. 6 Sec. 2, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 592. See also the correspondence between the chairman of the finance committee of Wilmington and the commissioner of internal revenue.— Bawfcers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 566. The Oieoulating Medium 163 reached less than $4,000,000.' In December Mr. Chase reported that it had been " found impossible to keep pace with the public demand for this currency," and that, although the daily issue had "been rapidly increased to $100,000," and was then being " extended as fast as practicable to twice that amount," the supply was still " largely deficient." ^ In the West the St. Louis Republican of December 10 stated that " there is still much complaint of the scarcity of small change," ' and in the East the Springfield Republican of the same date reported that " shinplasters " were still in circulation. In the same month the city council of New York passed an ordinance providing for the issue of 5, 10, 25, and 50-cent notes, which the Bankers' Magazine declared to be " a necessity growing out of the scarcity of change in this city." * Ordinary postage stamps also continued in use side by side with the deficient " postage currency " despite the efforts of the post-office department to prevent it. The post- master-general in his report dated December 1, 1862, said : Postmasters were specially instructed to discontinue sales of stamps to persons evidently designing them for use as currency; but, notwithstanding the precaution taken and the checks adopted, .... the demand has until quite recently been largely in advance of the daily manufactiu-e .... the majority of applications .... from postmasters were only partially filled, generally but one-half the number asked for having been sent The aggregate value of the postage stamps and stamped envelopes sold at 29 of the larger post-ofiBces during the third quarter of 1862 was 11,400,937.48, and during the corresponding quarter of 1861 was $606,597.40, showing an excess in favor of 1862 of $794,340.08 Nearly the entire excess .... has been or is now in use as currency.^ 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, pp. 43 and 12. 2Ibid., pp. 28. 29. 3 Quoted in Banlcere' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 568. * Vol. XVII, p. 562. Mayor Opdyke, however, did not agree with this view, and vetoed the measure.— New York Tribune, December 22, 1862. SH. B. Executive Document No. 1, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., Vol. IV, pp. 131, 132. 164 History of the Greenbacks In the winter months, however, the supply of " postage currency" became more adequate to the needs of retail trade. Nearly $7,000,000 had been issued by the end of December, 1862, and $12,000,000 more were added in the next three months/ When people could obtain this federal currency, they manifested a strong disposition to reject postage stamps and " shinplasters " — even those issued by the towns. The Springfield Republican of January 29 said : There is a general agreement throughout the country to banish all private and corporate shinplasters and use only the government postage currency for change after the first of February. In Boston, abeady, none but those of the Parker House remain in circulation, and these are refused at many stores, and are being fast retired. .... A few choice shinplasters may be temporarily retained in special localities, till sufficient of the postal currency works in to accommodate public wants There are large amounts of the postal currency in circulation, and much is hoarded that will come out as soon as the other sort is banished.^ As late as March the Philadelphia Ledger said : Now Philadelphia is tolerably well supphed with small cur- rency authorized by the government, while at New York and other eastern points they are suffering great inconvenience and much loss by an immense circulation of all sorts of trash So intolerable has the nuisance become, everybody is denying them, causing quite a panic among the poorer classes — those least able to bear the loss. .... Nobody but the brokers will deal in them now The corporation issues of Newark and Jersey City .... more popular than others .... are included in the general decree of banish- ment The people will take nothing but government postage currency for small change. There appears to be no lack of it now.' To protect holders of postage stamps that had been used as currency from losses similar to those suffered by holders 1 Baylet, National Loans of the United States, p. 159. 2 Compare the notice published by the same newspaper at the head of its editorial section January 23, that "no shinplasters or postage stamps except in the sheet " would be received in remittances after that date. See also notice of January 27. 3 Quoted in Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 823. The Cieoulating Medium 165 of shinplasters the postmaster-general was obliged to order the redemption of such stamps as were evidently uncanceled.' May 27, 1863, issues of the postage currency ceased, after $20,000,000 had been placed in circulation. Its place was taken by the " fractional currency " authorized by the act of March 3, 1863.^ The new notes were made of thinner but stronger paper, could not be counterfeited easily, and were not injured by wetting.' But aside from the technical superiority of the new issues as currency, the change was one only in name. The title "postage currency" had been a misnomer, for the notes were not like ordinary postage stamps. Issues of the new notes commenced October 10, 1863. By the 30th of June, 1864, about $7,750,000 of the fractional currency had been put in circulation, while $5,000,- 000 of the postage currency had been withdrawn, so that the whole amount outstanding was not quite $23,000,000.* The same process of withdrawal of the old and substitution of the new notes was continued during the next year. The amount of postage currency decreased from $15,0Q0,000 to $10,000,000, while the amount of the fractional currency increased from $7,750,000 to $15,000,000. Thus at the end of the war the aggregate fractional currency of both kinds in use was $25,000,000.' V. MINOE COINS The difficulties with the circulating medium did not stop with the subsidiary coins of silver, but extended even to the minor coins of base metals. The act of February 21, 1857, had provided for replacing the old copper cents of 168 grains by coins weighing 72 grains and composed of 88 1 Beport of the Poetmaster-General, cited above, p. 133, and Annual American Cyclopmdia, 1862, p. 463. 2 12 Statutes at Large, p. 711. 3 Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVIII, p. 364. * Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1864, p. 45. 5 Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1865, p. 53. 166 History of the Geeenbaoks parts copper and 12 parts nickel.' Of these new cents there had been issued 116,066,000 by June 30, 1862.' The work of exchanging the new for the old coins was still going on, but the director of the mint reported in October, 1862, that the number of old cents was rapidly diminishing and that they would soon disappear altogether from circulation.' The new cents, together with such of the old as still remained in use, were the only minor coins, for the making of half -cents had been stopped by the act of 1857, and two, three, and five-cent pieces were not authorized until 1864, 1865, and 1866, respectively.* The withdrawal of the silver coins from circulation in June and July caused a marked extension in the use of the nickel cents as substitutes. To make them serve more conveniently in the place of silver, cents were sometimes done up in rolls of twenty-five and passed from hand to hand, frequently without opening.^ The demand for these coins at the mint suddenly became very great. As many as 3,600,000 pieces were struck at Philadelphia in July, and there was a great rush to procure them." " Large amounts," said the director of the mint in October, "have been sent to every part of the country, and orders beyond our ability to fill are constantly forwarded to the mint." ' The number of cents coined increased from 10,000,000 in the fiscal year 1861 and 12,000,000 in 1862, to 48,000,000 in 1868.' It is a curious but well-attested fact that the nickel cents went to a premium almost as soon as the subsidiary silver coins. The New York Commercial Advertiser of July 10 1 Sec. 4, 11 Statutes at Large, p. 163. 2iJej)orte of the Director of the Mint, October, 1857 and 1862, pp. 49 and 75 respectively. Here and in other citations of the Be/portt of the Director of the Mint the pages refer to the finance reports. 3 J6id., p. 46. * Coinage Laws of the United States, 1792 to 1894, 4th ed., p. 89. 6 Springfield Bepublican, July 15, 1862. iBcmkers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 390. ' Bymrt, p. 46. * Beport of the Director of the Mint, October, 1865, p. 237. The Cikoulating Medium 167 reported that while gold was at 17 per cent, premium in paper, silver was at 10 and nickel at 4 per cent. A similar condition was noted by the Springfield Bepublican July 15, and the director of the mint in his annual report for 1863 said that "for the past two years" cents had "commanded a premium" and were then "scarcely to be had." ' The cause for this premium on cents in 1862 must have been different from the cause for the premium on gold and silver coins. The latter were at a premium because the bullion in them was of more value than the corresponding sums of paper money. According to the director of the mint, however, the cent in 1862 cost "the government scarcely half a cent," ' and again in 1863 he reported that nickel cents contained a "half cent's worth of metal, more or less, according to market fluctuations."* These state- ments of cost to the government, however, do not necessarily show the market value of cents as bullion, because a large part of the metal used in their manufacture was imported,* and the duties which private men would have to pay were remitted to the mint. But these duties were not heavy enough to make a very great difference. Under the tariff act of July 14, 1862, imported nickel paid a tax of but 10 per cent, ad valorem, and under the act of June 30, 1864, this rate was increased to but 15 per cent.' Meanwhile copper in pigs, bars, or ingots paid two cents a pound according to the act of March 2, 1861, and 2^ cents accord- ing to the act of June 30, 1864." Consequently, even if the director's estimates of cost be taken to mean cost on a specie basis and 10 per cent, be added for the duties, 100 of the 1-cent coins would have had 1 p. 189. 2 BepoH, p. 49. 2 Beport, p. 188. *Ibid., p. 189, and letter of the director of the mint to Chase, March 16, 1864, in CongresBkmal Globe, 38th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1228. ' 12 Statutes at Large., p. 550, and 13 Statutes, p. 211, 9 12 Statutes at Large, p. 182, and 13 Statutes, p. 206. 168 History of the Gebenbaoks a market value as bullion of not more than 55 cents in gold. On this estimate cents would not have gone to a premium in paper currency for the same reason that gold and silver did, until the specie value of a paper dollar was less than 55 cents — that is, until gold was at a premium of almost 82 per cent. But so high a premium was not reached until April, 1864. In July, 1862, when a premium is said to have been paid for cents, the average value of paper dollars was 86.6 cents in gold, and the metal in 100 nickel cents was worth at most about 63^ cents in paper. If men were ready to pay a pre- mium for cents, then, it must have been because of their anxiety to procure a part of the insufficient supply for use as small change — not because they could make a profit by melting or exporting the coins. This need for 1-cent pieces continued to be felt even after the issue of the postage and fractional currency, for the lowest denominations of the latter were 5 and 3 cents respectively.' That the supply of cents was not sufficient to meet the demand is clear. Before suspension they were "considered redundant in quantity," according to the director of the mint, and it "was part of the hourly finesse of buyers and sellers to get rid of them." " Although 116,- 000,000 of the nickel coins had been issued by June 30, 1862, and 48,000,000 more were added during the next year, the supply was still so short in comparison with the demand that not less than three hundred varieties of illegal cent tokens of the same size, but less weight than the mint cent, and containing no nickel, were issued by private parties in direct violation of the law and " until suppressed were freely used as coin by the public." ' Since the supply was thus deficient, it is perhaps not surprising that business houses were willing to pay a slight premium for their small change. 1 Knox, United States Notes, pp. 103 and 104. 2 Beport of 1863, p. 189. 3 Ibid. The Circulating Medium 169 As the amount of cents called for continued to be so great, and as nickel was a costly ingredient, the director of the mint proposed in October, 1863, to substitute bronze for the alloy of nickel and copper/ No action was taken upon this recommendation at the time, and on March 2, 1864, the director wrote a letter to Secretary Chase, calling attention again to the subject: This change in the material of the cent .... has become a necessity from the adTance[d] price of nickel (for a supply of which we are at present entirely dependent upon the foreign market, paying for it in gold or its equivalent), and the great tmcertainty of procuring an adequate supply for the future from any som-ce at a price within the legal limit, .... if nickel is retained it will be impossible to meet the enormous demand for cents, and the increasing cost of production may compel a cessa- tion of that coinage. The demand for cents is now far beyond our ability to supply it.'' Chase sent this letter with one of his own, supporting the diuector's recommendations, to Pessenden.^ When the pro- posal to drop nickel as an ingredient in the coinage became known, it encountered serious opposition from the friends of Mr. Joseph Wharton, from whose works in Pennsylvania and New Jersey came the entire domestic supply.* To remove their objections Mr. Pollock, the director, wrote a second letter March 16, recommending as a compromise that the old alloy of 88 per cent, copper and 12 per cent, nickel be retained, but that the weight of the cent be reduced from 72 to 48 grains.' Mr. Clark, from the Senate finance committee, 1 Ibid. 2 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1228. a Ibid., p. 1227. * Mr. Wharton himself prepared a little pamphlet. Project for Beorganizing the Small Coinage of the United States of America, in which he offered to provide all the nickel that would be necessary for making not only one- and two-cent pieces, but also other coins less than twenty-five cents at $2.50 per pound. At this price he estimated that one- and two-cent pieces could be made at a profit of 33M per cent, to the gov- ernment. The pamphlet bears the date April 15, 1864, 5 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1228. 170 HiSTOET OF THE GkEENBAOKS however, brought in a bill for a bronze cent of 48 grains and a 2-cent piece of the same composition, but twice the weight.' This measure was at once passed by the Senate" and a month later by the House after very brief discussion.' In October the director of the mint reported that the new coinage law had been "highly successful." "The demand for the one and two-cent pieces," he added, "has been unpre- cedented, and every effort has been made to meet it." In explaining why the demand continued greater than the supply, despite daily issues largely in excess of any former period, he said: Large quantities are hoarded and thus kept from circulation. They have also been bought and sold by small brokers at a premium. This has induced individuals to collect them for the purpose of sale, thus producing a scarcity and inconvenience to the public that ought not to exist.* The letters of Mr. Pollock to Secretary Chase and these remarks in the October report indicate that the time had at last come when the bullion value of nickel cents was approxi- mating their nominal value as currency. Indeed, as early as March, 1864, Lyman Trumbull, of Illinois, remarked in the Senate : The cent as a general thing does not circulate in the country now, I think. We see some few of them here, but in my travels I very seldom see a cent. I do not know how it maybe in other por- tions of the country.* At this time, March 21, gold was at 162 and paper was accordingly worth 61.7 in specie. If cents were being hoarded, it must have been because the advance in the price of nickel, of which Mr. Pollock complained, had carried the bullion value of 100 coins above 62 cents in gold. But 1 CongresHimal Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1227. 2 Jfcid., p. 1228. 3iJi(J., p. 1763; actof April 22, 1864; 13 Statutes at iarse, p. 54. *Bepcyrt, October, 1864, p. 213. 5 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1227. The Cieculating Medium 171 whether there was a profit in melting or exporting the minor coins in March, 1864, there apparently was one in June and the following months. The monthly average price of gold was above 200 from June until February of the next year, inclusive. During this period the average specie value of paper dollars varied from 38.7 cents in July to 48.7 cents in February. Even had there been no advance in the gold price of nickel, there would have been a margin of profit in collecting coias which would pass current as money at a gold equivalence of considerably less than 50 cents, but could be sold as bullion for perhaps 55 or more. Consequently, it is not improbable that some of the brokers who bought nickel cents at a premium in the summer of 1864 purchased them to melt or export, not to sell again for change. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the expense of collecting and handling one-cent pieces would be much greater in proportion to their bullion value than in the case of silver coins. The situation was, of course, somewhat different with the cents struck imder the new coinage law. These coins con- tained no nickel and weighed but two-thirds as much as the previous issues. During the fiscal year 1865 the government made a profit of about $400,000 from their manufacture.' If any premium was paid for them, it must consequently have been from the desire to obtain change. As the nickel cents appear, from what Senator Trumbull and the director say, to have gone out of circulation in large measure, the scarcity of change less than three cents — the smallest fractional note — must have been severe. Of the bronze cents 5,874,000 were struck before July 1 and of the two-cent pieces 1,822,500.^ 1 Report of the Director of the Mint, September, 1865, p. 232. 2 No separate statement is made by the director of the mint of the coinage of nickel and bronze cents in the fiscal year of 1864, but the above figures are obtained by subtracting from the total coinage of cents up to June 30, 1864, the total number of copper and nickel cents struck as given in Coinage Laws of the United States, 1792 -1894, 4th ed., p. 89. 172 History of the Gkeenbacks Thought the coinage during the fiscal year 1865 was very rapid — an average of 2,250,000 two-cent pieces and 4,500,- 000 cents each month' — the supply could not have been sufficient to meet the demand. One more change was made in the circulation of minor coins before the end of the war. From a price of 226 the last day of 1864 gold fell to 200 by the Ist of March, and the rapid progress of the northern armies then promised a still further fall, which was realized in April and May, when the average price was 148.5 and 135.6 respectively. This fall in gold or rise of paper money seemed to show that the day was close at hand when minor coins would remain in circulation without difficulty.^ Accordingly a bill was passed without discussion by Congress,' authorizing the issue of a three-cent piece, made of copper and nickel, in the propor- tion of 75 parts of the first and 25 parts of the second. This coin was to be legal tender in payments of sixty cents, and the one and two-cent pieces in payments of four cents. At the same time it was provided that thereafter no frac- tional notes should be issued of denominations less than five cents, and that any such notes outstanding should be destroyed when paid into the treasury.* When the director of the mint prepared his report at the end of September, 1865, he made no further complaints about the premium on minor coins. Paper dollars had then a value of more than sixty-nine cents in gold, and even the three-cent pieces, containing 25 per cent, of nickel, seemed to have been worth more as currency than as bullion. " The coinage of the cent and the two-cent piece from the bronze alloy," the director said, "has been very large, but not in 1 Report of the Director of the Mint, 1865, p. 235. 2Hunfs Merchants* Magazine for May, 1865, includes ^'coppers" in its statement of " the active circulation of the country," Vol. LII, p. 381. 3 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1391 and 1403. 4 Act of March 3, 1865; 13 Statutes at Large, p. 517. The Cieodlating Medium 173 excess of the demand. They have been distributed to almost every part of the United States, and many into states, west and south, that heretofore refused to use such coin as cur- rency.'" He closed by suggesting that the policy pursued in issuing a three-cent piece be followed further by making five-cent coins also of 25 per cent, nickel, and that, to make room for their circulation, all fractional notes below ten cents be withdrawn. VI. TREASUKY NOTES As was said above, the first greenbacks were issued early in April, 1862. From this time on until specie payments were resumed, January 1, 1879, they served as the standard of value in all business transactions and also as an impor- tant part of the circulating medium. United States notes to the amount of $98,600,000 were issued before July 1, 1862. From this time on for two years the treasury was paying out large sums in these notes, but was also redeeming those paid in to it and then reissuing them. During the next fiscal year the issues were $291,300,000 as compared with the redemp- tions of $2,100,000; during 1864, $86,400,000, as compared with $42,600,000, and during 1865, $4,200,000, as compared with $4,300,000. Thus $431,000,000 were left outstanding at the close of the war.^ The greenbacks served as a medium of exchange, not only in large, but also in small transactions, for while the first act provided that $5 should be the lowest denomination, the second and third acts per- mitted any denomination not less than a dollar. The amount of the several denominations in use is indicated by the fol- lowing table: IP. 232. 2 Batley, National Loans of the United States, p. 157. These statements differ slightly from those given year by year in the contemporaneous reports of the secre - tary of the treasury. 174 History op the Gebenbacks TABLE IT UNITED STATES NOTES OF THE SETEBAL DENOMINATIONS OUTSTANDING AT THE CLOSE OF EACH FISCAL YEAE FEOM 1862 TO 1866 1 (In millions of dollars) 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 One dollar iiii 15.4 15.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 10.0 16.0 17.0 79.9 90.0 74.9 23.0 30.8 26.5 29.5 16.8 17.7 95.5 108.7 86.6 29.9 34.2 25.4 37.1 17.8 19.6 96.0 109.5 86.1 29.7 33.8 24.8 35.8 17.2 Two dollars 18.8 Five dollars 95.4 Ten dollars 109.0 Twenty dollars Fifty dollars 85.1 29.3 One hundred dollars. Five hundred dollars . One thousand dollars. 33.3 35.4 57.1 Total 96.6 387.6 451.9 4.6 453.1 22.0 480.7 Denomination un- known, in reserve. . . 79.9 Net 96.6 387.6 447.3 431.1 400.8 But the greenbacks were by no means the only form of government obligations employed as currency. Three other sorts of treasury notes were made a legal tender to the same extent as United States notes, but differed from the latter in that they bore interest. The third legal-tender act, approved March 3, 1863, authorized the issue of $400,000,- 000 treasury notes, bearing not more than 6 per cent, inter- est, redeemable in not more than three years, and a legal tender for their face value, excluding interest.^ Under this act Mr. Chase issued $166,500,000 of two-year 5 per cent, notes between July 1, 1863, and June 30, 1864, and $44,500,000 of one-year 5 per cent, notes between January 1 and June 30, 1864.' How far these notes were employed as currency is alto- gether uncertain. It was apparently the expectation of the 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1896, p. 62. 2 12 Statutes at Large, sec. 2, p. 710. 3 Baylet, op, cit, p 161. The Circulating Medium 175 treasury that banks and capitalists into whose hands they came would retain the notes to secure the interest. This would probably have happened very generally had the inter- est been paid only at maturity. But when, in the autumn of 1863, Mr. Chase borrowed money for paying the troops from the banks, to be repaid in 5 per cent, notes, the banks stipulated that the notes given them should bear half-yearly interest coupons.' One hundred and fifty millions of the $166,500,000 of two-year notes issued were of this form.^ They were found in practice to be a most unsatisfactory form of currency. After Secretary Chase had ruled that the interest coupons must be detached in the presence of an officer of the treasury or of a national bank," the notes were usually paid out with no regard to the interest until the date on which the next coupon was payable approached, then hoarded for a time, and as soon as the interest had been collected, once more thrown into circulation.* This tended, of course, to cause periodical expansions and contractions of the cur- rency embarrassing alike to the business public and to the treasury. The circulation was also rendered irregular by fluctuations in the current rates of interest on short-time loans in the New York market. When money was at 5 per cent, or less, men found it advantageous to retain the gov- ernment notes in their own hands ; but when the rates rose to 7 or 8, few would choose to keep their funds in a short- time 5 per cent, security.^ Appreciating these evils, Mr. Chase and Mr. Fessenden, who succeeded him as secretary of the treasury on July 5, 1864, determined to withdraw the coupon notes as rapidly 1 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. L, p. 455. 2 Report of the Treasurer, November, 1864, p. 75. s Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. L, p. 455. 4 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1864, p. 18 ; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. L, pp. 215, 216, and Vol. LI, p. 447. 5 Hunfs Merchants' Magazine, Vol. L, pp. 215 and 455. 176 HiSTOEY OF THE GkEENBAOKS as possible. Before December, Secretary Fessenden re- ported, about 190,000,000 of the $150,000,000 issued had been retired.' Their place was occupied by another form of interest-bearing, legal-tender treasury notes issued under the authority of the acts of March 3, 1863, and June 30, 1864.^ The new notes ran three years and bore interest at 6 per cent., compounded half-yearly but payable only at maturity. Some $17,000,000 were issued before the close of the fiscal year 1864, and $180,000,000 during the next year.' These issues were called compound-interest notes. They were commonly regarded as the least injurious form of treasury notes devised during the war because of the inducement which the compound interest gave for keeping them as an invest- ment.* Of course, this inducement became stronger the longer the note had been issued. Thus a $10 note — the smallest de- nomination — was worth $10.60 at the end of the first year, $11.25 at the end of the second, and $11.94 at the end of the third. Anyone who paid the note away at the end of the first year would therefore lose 60 cents, at the end of the second $1.25, and at the end of the third $1.94. Nevertheless the compound-interest notes served to in- crease the currency inflation to an uncertain extent, both directly and indirectly. The comptroller of the currency thought that in October, 1865, perhaps $10,000,000 of these notes were in actual circulation as money,* and in December the secretary of the treasury thought it was "safe to esti- mate" that $30,000,000 of the one- and two-year notes of 1863 and the compound-interest notes together were so used.' Perhaps the indirect use was really more important. 1 Report, p. 18. Cf. Chase's letter of April 17, 1865, to Colonel J. D. Van Buren in ScHncKEES's Life, p. 413. 2 12 Statutes at Large, p. 710, and 1.3 Statutes, p. 218 ; cf. Baylei, p. 84. 3 Bayley, p. 163. The form of these notes is given by Knox, p. 111. 4 Report of the Secretary of the Treasm-y, 1864, p. 18. ' H, B. Executive Document No. 4, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess., p. 5. 6 Report, p. 9. The Cieoulating Medium 177 This was found in practice of banks of holding compound- interest notes as reserves in place of greenbacks that bore no interest. The comptroller of the currency stated that the amount held by national banks October 2, 1865, was $74,- 250,000.' Similar use was made of the one- and two-year 5 per cent, notes left outstanding.^ In so far as interest- bearing, legal-tender notes were kept in this fashion, they set free greenbacks for circulation among individuals. The list of government obligations employed as cur- rency is not yet complete. Two other forms, although not a legal tender, were used as a circulating medium. The issue of certificates of indebtedness, bearing interest at 6 per cent, and payable in one year, had been authorized without lim- itation of amount by the act of March 1, 1862.' This method of postponing claims which they had not the funds to meet at once was availed of on a large scale by the secre- taries of the treasury during the entire war. Fifty millions of such certificates were issued in the fiscal year of 1862, $157,000,000 in 1863, 1169,000,000 in 1864, and $131,- 000,000 in 1865.* Most of these notes were paid out to con- tractors and by them used either as collateral for procuring bank loans or directly as currency. Much of the time certifi- cates of indebtedness were at a small discount, but despite this they passed freely from hand to hand as current funds. ° Similar use was made of the "seven- thirties." This was the name given to the three-year treasury notes bearing 7.3 per cent, interest issued under the acts of July 17, 1861, June 30, 1864, and March 3, 1865.' Interest on notes 1 See reference in note 5 on preceding page. They were not, however, a legal tender in payment of bank notes.— 13 Statutes at Large, p. 219. i Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVIII, p. 827; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XLIX, p. 384. 3 12 Statutes at Large, p. 352. * Batley, p. 159. 6 Cf. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. LII, p. 382. 6 12 Statutes at Large, p. 259 ; 13 Statutes, pp. 218 and 468. 178 History op the Gbeenbacks issued under the first of these laws was paid in gold, but the second and third issues were payable, principal and interest, in lawful money. In the summer and autumn of 1864 Sec- retary Fessenden ofPered 7.30 notes of the second issue in small denominations to army officers and soldiers in pay- ment of their wages. Over $20,000,000 were thus paid out in place of greenbacks.' In December, 1865, Secretary McCuUoch reported that many seven-thirties of these small denominations were in circulation as money .^ VII. EEOAPITULATION Perhaps the clearest view of the confused state of the monetary circulation of the United States during the Civil War can be obtained from a summary statement of the various coins, government obligations used as currency, and bank notes outstanding at the close of the several fiscal years, so far as the amounts can be ascertained. Such a statement is presented on the following page, with a few explanatory notes. This table is intended rather as an indication of the vari- ous kinds of currency in use than as a quantitative statement of the circulating medium. Few of the items can be regarded as showing with any degree of definiteness amounts in use as money. The specie circulation, for example, is computed on the basis of the statistics of coinage and the director of the mint's estimate that in 1861 there were from $275,000,- 000 to $300,000,000 of specie in the country and that in 1862 there were $45,000,000 of silver coinage.' A different 1 Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1864, p. 21. 2 Beporrt, 1865, p. 9. Under the act of June 30, 1864, it was provided that such of the notes as should be made payable principal and interest at maturity should be a legal tender (13 Statutes at Large, p. 218). As, however, the secretary preferred to attach interest coupons of which only the last was payable with [the not© at matur- ity, they did not possess this property. Cf. W. F. De Knight, History of the Cur- rency of the Country and of the Loans of the United States (Treasury Department Doc. No. 1943), 1897, p. 96, and form of the 7-30's as given on the following pages. 3 Report of 1861, p. 62 ; Beport, 1862, p. 49. The Cieoulating Medium 179 TABLE V CCEEENCT OF THE LOTAI. STATES AT THE CLOSE OF EACH FISCAL TEAB FEOM 1860 TO 1866 (In millions of dollars) 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 I. Specie:^ 1. Gold coins 2. Silver dollars. . . 3. Subsidiary silver 4. Minor coins II. Postage and frac- tional currency :" 1. Postage currency 2. Fractional curr. III. Non-interest bear- ing, legal-tender, treasury notes : l.Old demand notes^ 184.6 '39.6 .9 245.3 ■42! 2 1.0 22.0 "3!6 1.2 53.0 96.6 183.8 49.9 23.8 22.0 "3.6 1.6 20.2 3.4 387.6 238.7 156.8 79.5 22.0 ' '3.6 2.1 15.2 7.7 .8 447.3 179.2 31.2 44.5 109.0 15.0 160.7 35.9 22.0 ' 's.'o 3.3 9.9 15.1 .5 431.1 142.9 146.1 ■42.3 193.8 115.8 234.4 437.2 55.4 22.0 "slo 3.9 7.0 20.0 3 2. Greenbacks^ IV. Bank notes : * 1. Notes, state b'ks 2. Notes, nat'l b'ks V. Interest-bearing, legal-tender, treasury notes:' 1. One-year, 5 per cent., treasury notes of 1863.... 2. Two-year, 5 per cent., treasury notes of 1863.... 3. Compound inter- est notes VI. Government obli- gations not a legal tender:' 1. Certificates of in- debtedness 2.7-30 treasury notes of 1864.... 3.7-30 treasury notes of 1865.... VII. Coin, bullion, and paper money in the Treasury ^. . . 207.1 6.7 202.0 3.6 400.8 20.0 281.5 3.5 159.0 26.4 1806.3 80.8 1 See explanations in text below. 2 Compiled from the annual Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury, 3 See Table IV above. 4 statistical Abstract of the United States, 1878, p. 14. 6 " Information Bespecting U. S. Bonds, Paper Currency, Coin," etc. (revised ed.. Treasury Department Circular No. 123, July 1, 1896) , p. 52. 180 History of the Geeenbacks result would have been reached had Mr. Chase's guess at the amount of coin been taken in place of the director's.' Of course, the coins put down as circulating after 1862 were used only' on the Pacific coast. The common guess is that about $25,000,000 were employed there, and this sum has been divided between gold and subsidiary silver again by guesswork.^ The figures for the minor coins show the amounts struck under the acts of 1857 and the laws of 1864, 1865, and 1866, as given in the current reports of the director of the mint. But, as has been shown, it is probable that a considerable part of these coins were withdrawn from circulation at least during the summer, autumn, and winter of 1864. On the other hand, some of the old copper cents made before 1857 remained still in circulation in 1862 and large amounts of cent tokens were privately issued in 1863. The figures for the postage and fractional currency are drawn from the public debt statements of the annual reports of the secretary of the treasury. They are subject to a con- siderable but indefinite error, particularly in the later years, on account of the large number of these little notes lost and destroyed. It must also be remembered that the place in the currency which they were intended to fill was largely occupied from July, 1862, to perhaps February or March, 1863, by shinplasters and postage stamps. The next four items in the table are less uncertain. It is well ascertained that the old demand notes were not com- monly used as currency after May, 1862. From that time on they were seldom paid out except as a substitute for gold at the customs-houses. The circulation of greenbacks during the war is subject to small doubt, although different official 1 Chase made the coin of the loyal states November 1, 1861, not less than $210,000,- 000 (Report, 1862, p. 13). The director of the mint made this same sum somewhere between $255,000,000 and $280,000,000. See note 3, p. 178, above. 2 Of. " Information Respecting United States Bonds, Paper Currency, Coins, etc." (revised ed., Treasury Department Circular No. 123, July 1, 1896), p. 52, note 1. The Cieculating Medium 181 documents do not give precisely identical figures, and the same is true regarding the notes of state and national banks. In the next two divisions — interest-bearing government obligations which were and which were not a legal tender — the amount outstanding is stated with accuracy by the regis- ter of the treasury, but no reliable estimate can be made of the amount that was in actual use as currency at the different dates. Statements of the volume of the monetary circulation of the United States during the Civil War have been published from time to time in official documents' and frequently accepted uncritically as the basis of argument in currency discussions. The preceding review of the situation, indefi- nite and tedious as it is, has at least the negative merit of showing that such statements are subject to a much. wider margin of error than is commonly the case — and few would be found to claim a high degree of accuracy for statements of this sort under the most favorable circumstances. To cast up the totals of the above table would be not only useless, but positively misleading, because several of the items are mere guesses, and in the case of others where the amounts are reasonably certain, not all of the sums set down were in use at any time as currency. Nor could any estimate be made on the basis of the totals that would command confi- dence. But, while the amount of currency in circulation is not and cannot be known, it is evident from the discussion that not least among the unhappy consequences of the legal- tender acts was the disorder into which the circulating medium was thrown — a disorder that caused much incon- venience to the business public. The more serious effects produced by the disturbance of the standard of value remain to be discussed in other chapters. 1 See for example the Statistical Abstract for 1878, p. 14, and the circular of the Treasury Department referred to above. CHAPTER III THE SPECIE VALUE OF THE PAPER CURRENCY I. The Markets for Gold: First Dealings in Gold — The Stock Exchange — The Gold Ex- change — The "Open Board" — The Evening Exchange — Nature of the Business in Gold — Tables of the Premium. II. Factors which Affected the Gold Price of the Currency: Various Theories of the Premium — The Supply of and Demand for Gold — Effect of Receivability for Taxes, Convertibility into Bonds and of the Legal-Tender Clause on the Value of Greenbacks — Effect of Additional Issues — Of Finance Reports — Of "War News" — Of Political Events — Of Foreign Affairs — The Premium and the Quantity Theory — Speculation. III. The Course of Depreciation, January, 1862, to December, 1865: 1. January to April, 1862—2. The Fall from May, 1862, to Febru- ary, 1863—3. The Rise from March to August, 1863—4. The Fall from September, 1863, to July, 1864 — Chase's Campaign against the Gold Speculators— 5. The Rise from August, 1864, to May, 1865 — 6. The Decline from June to December, 1865. A PKEMiUM appeared upon gold as soon as it became kii,own that tHeTreasury and the New York banks had determined to suspend specie payments. This premium represented the difference between: the commimity's valuation of gold coin, on the one hand, and of the paper currency, on the other. In January, 1862, the latter consisted of bank and treasury notes that had been put into circulation as tacit or explicit promises to pay gold coin. Of course, men did not esteem such promises as equivalent to gold itself after the promisors had given public notice that they were unable to redeem 1 See K. COENWAiiLis, The Gold Room and the New York Stock Exchange and Clearing House ("Atlas Series," No. 8), New York, 1879; Jaues K. Medbebby, Men and Mysteries of Wall Street (Boston, 1870) , chapters xii, xili ; HoBACE White, Money and Banking (Boston, 1896), pp. 174-90; and fiirther references in footnotes below. 182 Spboib Value of the Paper Cueeenoy 183 their promises for the present, and when no one knew how long such redemption would be postponed. Hence, when men who required gold coin for any purpose sought to procure it in exchange for paper money, they had to pay more than $100 of paper for $100 of gold. Whatever excess they paid was, of course, a premium on gold. For about a fortnight after suspension there was no organized market for gold in New York. People desiring to buy gold naturally went to the dealers in foreign coin who displayed the precious metals in their shop windows, and people who had specie to sell took it to the same places. But very soon the business became too large to be con- ducted in this fashion. The small offices of the money brokers were overcrowded, and traders blocked the sidewalks of narrow Wall street to such an extent that the police were given special orders to keep,the crowds moving. This state of affairs led to an organization of the traffic and the forma- tion of gold exchanges. O - — ir*^ O From the published tables of the premium it appears that regular dealing in gold began on the New York stock exchange January 13, 1862. Here it was regarded as the gentlemanly and patriotic thing to sell gold, and the majority of members of the exchange who engaged in the traffic at all were on the "bear" side of the market. A second and less decorous market was formed in a dingy cellar in William street, dubbed the "coal hole." A number of men who were devoting themselves exclusively to dealing in gold took refuge in this place when their business grew too large to be conducted in their private offices or in the street. As the number of brokers increased, the "coal hole" was found too small and the company moved to more commodious quarters, first in Gilpin's News Room at the corner of William street and Exchange place; later in the rooms of the old stock board at No. 24 Beaver street; and finally in New street. 184 HiSTOEY OF THE GbBENBAOKS next door to the stock exchange. For some time the mem- bers of this exchange, that came to be known as the " Gold Room," contented themselyes with a very loose organization. It was not xmtil October, 1864, that a constitution and by- laws were adopted and regular officers elected. Besides the stock exchange and the " Gold Room," there were two other markets for gold in New York — the "open board" and Gallagher's evening exchange. The "open board" of stock brokers was a more popular organization, running as a rival of the "regular board" — i. e., the stock exchange — with which it was amalgamated in 1869. The "evening exchange" was a characteristic excrescence of the times. Speculation was carried to an unprecedented extent in New York during the winter and spring of 1864. Though the regular exchange was kept open long hours, crowds of men thronged the corridors of the Fifth Avenue hotel speculating at night. A certain Mr. Gallaghpr seized upon the opportunity in March, 1864, to open a luxuriously appointed room opposite the hotel, where gold and railway and petroleum stocks could be bought and sold till mid- night. So injurious was this continual round of feverish business deemed that after the disclosure of the Ketchum gold-certificate forgeries' in August, 1865, the city banks, the stock exchange, the "open board," and the gold exchange united in an effort to suppress the evening exchange by forbidding their members to frequent it. As a result Gal- lagher was forced to close his rooms.^ The volume of transactions in these markets became very great. Importers came to buy gold, not only for payment of customs dues and for making payments to foreigners, but also for protection against fluctuations in the value of the currency between the time goods were bought and sold. 1 See, e. g., Bunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. Lin, p. 226. 2C/. New York Herald of Augnst 20, and the money article of August 24, 1865; Tribune, news columns of March 22, 1864. Specie Value of the Paper Cueeenot 185 Bankers doing business in foreign exchange had to purchase gold for remittances. Exporters and apparently many men engaged in domestic trade or manufactures bought or sold like importers to guard against changes in the value of the currency. But the volume of speculative dealings probably far exceeded these transactions growing out of the needs of business. Indeed, gold became as favorite an article to speculate in as petroleum stocks or railway shares. Many persons whose occupations presented no need for such opera- tions bought and sold gold — clergymen, physicians, law- yers, small merchants, anyone who had sufficient funds to provide the necessary 10 per cent, margins. Members of Congress, clerks in the government departments, and news- paper reporters frequently tried to obtain pecuniary advan- tage from their positions by operating through gold brokers on the information that came to them before it was given to the public. Most large operators in gold had correspondents in Washington, Baltimore, or Louisville — the centers of war news — charged with sending them early dispatches con- cerning any event that could affect the credit of the govern- ment. In the' "gold room" itself the struggle between oppo- site parties of speculators partook largely of the sectional feeling of the time ; and when the air was full of exciting war news, the "bulls" would of ten sing "Dixie," and the "bears" try to drown their voices by chanting "John Brown" in chorus.' The price of gold in currency, as determined by transac- tions in these New York markets, was regularly reported by telegraph in all considerable towns of the United States, and everywhere accepted as authoritative. There is no necessity for taking account of the premium on gold in other places, because local markets were dominated by the New York quotations. The money columns of the daily newspapers 1 See COENWALLIS, op. cit, pp. ir-1. 186 History op the Gkeenbacks and the weekly or montlily issues of the financial journals gave full reports of current fluctuations, and more permanent records were made by the compilation of a number of tables showing the highest and lowest prices each day for a series of years. Such tables may be found in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the Bankers'' Magazine, and the annual Reports of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York} All of these tables appear to be constructed in the same general manner from the recorded transactions of the most important of the New York markets. From January 13, 1862, to June 20, 1864, they are based upon sales at the stock exchange. On June 21 the "gold bill" went into effect and stopped all dealing in gold outside the private offices of brokers.^ From this time until the repeal of the "gold bill" by the act of July 2, there was no organized market, and the quotations are those ruling on the street. After the repeal, transactions in gold on the stock exchange were infrequent, and most of the business was done in the "gold room." From July, 1864, on, therefore, the tables are based upon the latter market.^ In studying the fluctuations in the gold value of the paper currency it is necessary to go back to these records of the daily premium. As the differences between the tables mentioned are slight, it matters little which set is accepted as a basis for the investigation. I have decided to use the tables published in the chamber of commerce reports, not only because of the official character of the source from which they are taken, but also because they contain fewer obvious errors of the press than some of the others. To adapt them better to the 1 SoHUCKEES, op. cit, pp. 631-4, publishes similar tables for the years 1862-65 pre- pared by Messrs. B. K. Jamison & Co., bankers, of Philadelphia. 2 See p. 231, below. 3 Compare the explanations made regarding the Commercial and Financial Chronicle tables; e. gr., Vol. I, p. 168. Specie Value op the Papek Ourkenoy 187 purposes of the present chapter I have altered their form. As published, the tables show the highest and lowest price paid each day in currency for $100 in gold. This form of statement gives the impression that the fluctuations were due to extraordinary changes in the valuation at which gold was held by the community, whereas in fact they were due mainly to changes in the community's valuation of the notes of the government. When the market quotation was 200 the ex- planation, of course, was not that men esteemed gold twice as highly as they had done in 1861, but rather that they esteemed the paper currency but half as highly as they had when it was redeemable in specie. A much juster impression of the significance of the change in the relative values of gold and paper money is therefore given by quoting currency at a discount in gold than by quoting gold at a premium in paper ; by saying, to use a numerical example, that $100 in green- backs was worth $50 in gold, than by saying that $100 in gold was worth $200 in greenbacks. For this reason the chamber of commerce tables for the years 1862 to 1865 have been converted into tables showing the highest and lowest daily prices of currency in gold. These tables, given in full inthe Appendix,' furnish a basis for studying the remarkable changes in the gold value of the currency during the Civil War. II. FAOTOES WHICH AFFECTED THE GOLD PRICE OF THE CURRENCY So rapid and so violent were the fluctuations in the gold markets that, despite the absorbing interest of military events, they attracted much attention from the treasury offi- cials and the general public. Various attempts were made to account for the changes. Perhaps the simplest theory was that a nominal advance of gold had been produced by Pp. 425-8, below. 188 History of the Gkeenbaoks the nefarious acts of disloyal speculators, who took advan- tage of the fact that "gold had become a mere commodity" to monopolize the supply and raise the price. This theory logically involved the conclusion that the currency had not depreciated, but that gold had risen in value — a conclusion that was commonly accepted and defended by instancing the case of various commodities that had not advanced in price.' One buoyant adherent of this view went so far as to con- gratulate the country upon the increase in its wealth pro- duced by the advance of gold.'' The plausibility of such views diminished in proportion as the rise in the price of commodities progressed, and after the winter of 1862-63 few were found to deny that the paper money had depreciated. It then became common to ascribe depreciation to inflation of the currency, which some charged on the banks, some on the treasury, and some on both. In view of the dominance of the quantity theory of the value of money among economists of the time, inflation was the most natural explanation of the rise of prices! But the fluctuations in the premium on gold were so much more rapid and violent than the changes in the volume of the cir- culating medium that not even academic economists could regard the quantity theory as an adequate explanation of all the phenomena.' Sometimes they charged the fluctuations that did not accompany changes in the quantity of money to mere speculation, sometimes to a variety of other causes. Indeed, in discussing the question, it was common to begin by demonstrating that the premium and the volume of the 1 Compare the congressional speeches cited above, pp. 113, 114 ; and Report of the Secretary of the Treasury^ December, 1862, pp. 12-15. 2 S. P. TowNSEND, The Great Speech of the Late Political Campaign, etc, (New York : J. A. Houston, 1862), p. 10. 3 Peesident J. T. Champlin of Colby University, for example, who enunciated a stiff form of the quantity theory in his little text-book. Lessons on Political Economy , 1868, admitted that the value of a paper dollar depends " partly upon the prospect of its being ultimately redeemed in real values " (p. 125) . Specie Value of the Paper Cueeency 189 currency did not vary concomitantly, as they legitimately should have done, and then to launch into a tirade against the unpatriotic gold gamblers.' Men who observed the transactions of the gold markets with care and did not allow their conclusions to be controlled by preconceived theories, as a rule gave less simple explana- tions of the changes. The momentary credit of the govern- ment, the course of military events, the policy of the banks, the export of specie, the demand for gold from importers, the probability of fresh issues of legal-tender paper, treasury sales of gold, speculative manipulation of the markets, the chance of resumption of specie payments — these and similar matters were declared to affect the premium. Some writers jumbled such matters together indiscriminately and implied that the price of gold depended in the same manner on all ; others attempted to show the logical connection between one set of factors and another; but perhaps no one who studied the situation with care failed to see that the oscilla- tions of the indicator in the gold room generally followed the news dispatches from Washington and the front.^ Anyone who undertakes nowadays to investigate the grounds for these divergent opinions regarding the premium on gold must make a patient study of the transactions in the gold market from day to day in order to discover what considerations influenced those who bought and sold. For 1 C/., e. ff., FBS9ENDEN and McCulloch in the Finance Report of 1864, pp. 22, 23 and 52, 53, respectively. Perhaps as near an approach as any to a strict quantity theory of the premium is found in Hunfs Merchants^ Magazine^ Vol. L, p. 299. 2 See as examples A. B. Johnson, The Advanced Value of Gold, Suspended Specie Payments, etc, (Utica, N. Y., 1862) ; Alexander Delmar, Gold Money and Paper Money (New York, 1863) ; Henry C. Caret, The Way to Outdo England without Fighting Her, 1865, Letters XII-XVI, and other of Carey's pamphlets on the currency ; Cael, von Hock, Die Finanzen und die Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten Staaten (Stuttgart, 1867), pp. 585-90; H. M. Fitzhugh, Cash and Credit (Baltimore, 1868) ; Charles A. Mann, Paper Money the Boot of Evil (New York, 1872), pp. 166-79; Charles Moean, Money, Currencies and Banking (New York, 1875), p. 21; E. E. Thompson, Social Science and National Economy (Philadelphia, 1875), p. 205; Carl Schuez, Honest Money and Labor: An Address (New York, 1879), p. 35; George M. Weston, Money (New York, 1882), pp. 77-80. 190 History of the Greenbacks this purpose it is necessary to have recourse to the financial columns of the newspapers, in which the fluctuations of the premium were reported and attempts made to account for them. Such reading, however, merely supplies a mass of material of uneven value and contradictory meaning that requires careful analysis before much can be made of it. And at best the investigator is forced to admit that his con- clusions regarding many of the fluctuations are open to doubt, either because some of the factors affecting the situa- tion are unknown to him, or because it is difficult to assign their relative importance to the different factors that were active at the same time. The difficulties arise mainly in explaining the quantitative effects of given causes ; one often feels that for aught one knows a certain event might have produced equally well half or double the actual effect. But, as in the case of most economic questions, the qualitative analysis is less uncertain ; one can see why the known factors should have produced a certain sort of consequences, though one would be puzzled to say why these consequences were of the given magnitude. In analyzing the influences that made themselves felt on the stock exchange and in the gold room, after this fashion, one naturally begins by distinguishing two broad classes. Since the price quoted showed the ratio between gold and paper currency, and changed whenever anything occurred to alter the supply of, or the demand for, either, the factors to be taken account of may be ranged under these heads: (1) factors affecting the valuation of gold, (2) factors affecting the valuation of greenbacks. But brief attention need be given to the first category. The common assertion that the high premium was due, not to depreciation of the currency, but to an advance in the valuation of gold produced by speculation, commands scant respect in face of the evidence borne by exports of precious Specie Value of the Papeb Cueeency 191 metals and by the price tables. Gold has a world-market per- haps more truly than any other commodity, and the fact is well ascertained that in the early sixties its value in Euro- pean markets was declining. If, then, the value of gold had been notably augmented in the United States by "speculation" or any other cause, the export of the precious metals would inevitably have declined and imports might have begun. But such was by no means the case. In the fiscal year 1861 imports of gold exceeded exports by $14,900,-^ 000, but after specie payments had been suspended in 1862 exports exceeded imports by $21,500,000, in 1863 by $56,600,000, in 1864 by $89,500,000, in 1865 by $51,900,- 000, and in 1866 by $63,000,000.' As was remarked at the time, gold really became redundant in the United States when it had been withdrawn from current circulation as money, and when bankers were asked for exchange they could "find no commodity so cheap as gold to ship and draw against."^ Equally decisive is the testimony of the price tables. If the "gold- room gambling" actually caused a rise of gold, prices of commodities reckoned in gold must have fallen. But, as will be shown at length in the next chapter, this did not happen. On the contrary, the price of gold in currency, momentary fluctuations apart, rose less than the currency prices of most commodities. This evidence of the price- tables accords perfectly with the evidence of the gold-export tables and effectually disproves the theory which explains the premium as a consequence of an advance of gold engin- eered by mercenary speculators. The demonstration, however, that gold did not appreciate in value in the United States during the war, does not exclude the possibility of temporary fluctuations in the premium 1 statistical Abstract of the United States, 1901, p. 73. 'HunCs Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XLVIII, p. 224. 192 HiSTOEY OF THE GkEENBAOKS caused by changes in the supply and demand for gold in the local market. Indeed, it is certain that such changes exercised a perceptible influence upon the gold quotations, especially in quiet times. New York's supply of gold came mainly from \ inland towns and from California. Keceipts reported from th^ latter source, it is true, fell from $32,600,000 in 1861 to $10,400,000 in 1863, because of danger of capture by Con- federate cruisers that haunted the track of the Aspinwall steamers. But this simply meant that gold destined for export was shipped directly from California under a foreign flag, instead of being brought through New York as heretofore. While the shipments from California to New York declined $22,200,000 between 1861 and 1863, the shipments to Eng- land increased $24,400,000.' Demand for gold in New York was mainly either for pay- ment of customs duties or for export. According to the official tables, the monthly customs receipts varied during the war from $2,500,000 in December, 1862, to nearly $14,000,000 in April, 1864, while the exports of specie and bullion varied from less than $500,000 in March, 1865, to nearly $10,000,000 in June, 1862.' If the fluctuations in the amount of gold used for these two purposes each month from January, 1862, to December, 1865, be compared with the corresponding changes in the average value of the premium each month, only twenty-two of the forty-seven cases are found to present concomitant variations. But while this comparison shows that the demand for gold for such purposes was not the dominant factor in the market, it does not show that this demand had no effect. On the contrary, there can be little doubt that when the market was free 1 See tables of exports of specie from San Francisco in C(mimercial and Finan- cial Chronicle^ Vol. II, p. 135 ; and compare Hunfs Merchants^ Magazine, Vol. LIV, p. 96. 2 See the tables published in the CoTnmercial and Finaticidl Chronicle, Vol. II, pp. 230, 231. Specie Value of the Papee Cubkency 193 from more powerful influences, purchases of gold for the payment of duties sometimes caused relatively slight increases of the premium; and that the export demand had similar effects is sufficiently shown by the fact that news that the Bank of England had raised its discount rate could send up the premium because it made probable larger exports to London.^ It was a fact noted at the time that what influence this market demand and supply had upon the premium was often in the direction of moderating instead of increasing the fluctuations. When the premium rose sharply, gold that had been hoarded would be sent to be sold on the stock exchange in order to benefit by the high price. At this high price, however, importers would find it unprofitable to buy the gold they required to pay customs duties or remit abroad. Thus, demand would decrease while the supply increased. Precisely the opposite results were noticed when the price fell rapidly. To an extent, therefore, the supply and demand for gold, instead of controlling, were themselves controlled by the fluctuations of the premium.^ Aside from fluctuations caused by changes in the actual supply of and demand for gold, it was possible for a strong clique of dealers to produce fluctuations by "cornering" the local supply at a time when many men had entered into contracts that required the purchase of gold in large amounts within a limited time. Such attempts at "manipulating" the market appear to have been frequent, but their effect was necessarily temporary. Unless the clique could persuade the public that there was some real reason for a low valuation of the government's notes in comparison with gold, they could not long maintain an 1 See, e. g., money articles of New York Times, February 3, 1864 ; May 17, 1864. 2 See HunVs Merchants^ Magazine, Vol. LIV, pp. 96, 97 ; money articles of New- York Times for June 16, 17, and July 24, 1862. 194 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS artificial rise. Black Friday itself — tlie culmination of the greatest of these raids upon the market — was followed by a fall more rapid than the rise had been. While, then, specu- lative manipulation of the gold supply was at times the domi- nant influence in the market, the abiding forces that governed the premium are to be looked for elsewhere. They are found in the second-mentioned category of influences, viz., the con- siderations which entered into the community's valuation of the paper currency. What, then, were these considerations? Obviously, the utility of the material of which the currency was made was not one of them; for the bits of engraved paper were them- selves nearly worthless. Congress, however, attempted by inserting certain provisions in the legal-tender acts to give these bits of paper a high value in exchange. United States notes were made receivable for all taxes except duties on imports; they were exchangeable at par for bonds bearing an interest of 6 per cent, in gold; and they were declared a legal tender in the payment of debts.' Had the issues of greenbacks not exceeded the sums required for the payment of internal revenue taxes, etc., the first of these provisions might have been efficacious, at least in some measure. But the volume of paper money available for such uses was many times too great to be absorbed by them.^ After the war, writers of the greenback party fell into the habit of declaring that the failure of the clause making green- backs receivable for taxes to prevent their depreciation, was due to the exception of customs dues, which continued to be payable in gold.' This contention was supported by referring to the case of the old demand notes that 1 Act of February 25, 1862, sec. 1 ; 12 Statutes at Large, p. 345. 2 It has already been shown that several other forms of paper issues were made legal tender to the same extent as the greenbacks. See Part II, chap. 11, sec, vi, above. 3 This exception was made, it will be remembered, in order to obtain coin for the payment of interest on the debt. See Part I, chap, ii, sec. iv, p. 76, above. Specie Value op the Paper Cukeenoy 195 commanded a premium in greenbacks from early in May, 1862, because they were receivable for all dues to the government without exception.' Had the greenbacks been unlimited legal tender like the old demand notes, ran the argument, they would have maintained as high a value.^ It is not true, however, as was so frequently asserted, that the old demand notes did not depreciate after suspension. Their availability for customs, in conjunction with their relatively small amount, caused them to be preferred above greenbacks, but the premium which they bore was not equal to the premium upon gold, until practically all had been withdrawn from circulation. The degree of their deprecia- tion as compared with that of greenbacks is shown by the following table, based upon the weekly quotations given in Hunt's Merchants^ Magazine. While this table shows that receivability for customs limited the maximum depreciation of the old demand notes to less than 10 per cent, in gold, it does not at all follow that the greenbacks would have remained as near par had they been endowed with the same property. Indeed, this property had so powerful an effect in buoying up the demand notes precisely because it was not shared with other forms of paper money. Only $60,000,000 of the demand notes were issued, and the first legal-tender act provided that they should be canceled and replaced by United States notes as rapidly as feasible. In contrast, more than seven times this amount of greenbacks were issued and they were paid out again about as rapidly as they were paid in. The second congressional provision for sustaining the value of the greenbacks — the privilege of exchanging them at par for bonds bearing 6 per cent, interest in coin, redeem- 1 See Part II, chap, ii, sec, iii, above. 2 See citations from greenback literature given by R. M. Bseokeneibge, " The Demand Notes of 1861," Sound Currency, Vol. V, p. 331. 196 HiSTOET OP THE GREENBACKS TABLE TI EBLATIVB DEFBECIATIOK OF UNITED STATES NOTES AND OF OLD DEMAND NOTES AT VAEIOnS DATES IN 1862 AND 1863 1 CtJEEENCI Gold CUEBBNCTt Gold Valde of Value of Date Value of Value op Date Old De- Cur- Old De- Old De- Cur- Old De- Gold mand mand Gold mand mand Notes rency Notes • Notes rency Notes 1862 1862 Apr. 12 lOlf 100 98.1 98.1 Oct. 4 122| 119* 81.5 97.3 19 101^^ 100 98.4 98.4 11 128J 123i 78.1 96.6 26 101^ 100 98.4 98.4 18 130* 129 76.8 99.1 May 3 102i 100 97.4 97.4 25 130i 127 76.6 97.2 10 lQ3i% looi 96.8 97.0 Nov. 1 130^ 126* 76.7 97.0 17 103tV lOOf 97.0 97.6 8 132i 126 75.6 95.3 24 103i 1001 96.6 97.2 15 131| 126i 75.8 95.9 31 103A lOOf 96.6 97.2 22 130J 124i 76.6 95.1 June 7 104iV 101 96.1 97.1 29 129* 124* 77.5 96.4 14 105U 103 94.6 97.5 Dec. 6 131i 125 76.2 95.2 23 1071 103 93.1 95.9 13 131ft 126* 76.0 96.2 26 109J 104^ 91.7 95.8 20 132ft 1271 75.5 96.3 July 5 109R 105i 91.2 96.0 27 132r 129 75.6 97.5 12 114ft 107i 87.6 93.9 1863 19 118 108 84.5 91.2 Jan. 3 134* 129' ■ii'.h 96!2 26 117i 106i 85.3 90.8 10 13711 135 72.6 98.0 Aug. 2 115* 105i 86.9 91.4 17 1474 143 67.9 97.1 9 112H 105i 88.7 93.6 24 149ft 144| 67.0 97.0 16 llift 107^ 87.3 93.8 31 159* 153 62.5 95.7 23 115^ 108 86.6 93.5 Feb. 7 157i 155 63.6 98.6 30 115H 108i 86.4 93.6 14 155| 151 64.3 97.0 Sept. 6 119 108 84.0 90.8 21 1621 162 61.5 99.5 13 llSJr 108| 84.7 92.1 28 172 171 58.1 99.4 20 116^:1 112^ 85.5 96.2 Mar. 7 155* 153 64.5 98.6 26 1201 116J 83.1 96.8 14 158i 153 63.2 96.7 able in five and payable in twenty years — was never very efPective and was repealed after a year and a half's trial. There has already been occasion to remark that the right of conversion was little ezercised in 1862, and that, in the hope 1 Quotations of gold are from the New York Chamber of Cormnerce Repoiis referred to above; quotations of old demand notes from Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. 5LVII, pp. 33, 338 ; Vol. XL VIII, pp. 69, 305. The statements of the premium on gold in the latter source differ slightly from those used ; they are not taken because of inconsistencies and obvious misprints. — See, e.^;., last reference. Quotations of old demand notes cease in HunVs Merchants^ Magazine after March 14, when all but about $5,375,000 had been retired. The daily papers, however, con- tinued to quote them for a few weeks longer. Specie Value of the Papee Cubeenot 197 of getting better terms for bonds, discretionary power was granted Secretary Chase to abrogate the right after July 1, 1863.' During the continuance of the war, however, this repeal of the funding provision made little difference in the value of the currency, because holders of greenbacks who desired to invest them in government securities could still get five-twenty bonds at rates not far from par. Up to the close of subscriptions for the five-twenties of 1862 under the agency of Jay Cooke these bonds could be bought at par from the government. After this date, January 21, 1864, they could be bought in the New York stock market at the fol- lowing rates: TABLE VII MONTHLY HIGHEST AND LOWEaT PBICES OF FIVE-TWENTT COUPON BONDS IN THE NEW YOBE STOCK MAKEET IN 1861 AND 1865 2 Month 1864 Lowest Highest Lowest Highest January. . . February. . March April May June July August September. October . . . November . December . 101^ 103M 107 105 101 lOlM 1061^ 105 106>^ 100^ 1061^ 104% 107 110^ 114 107M 106^ 109 113 111% 1081^ 107M 110 106% 108% 104?^ 105M 102 J^ 102 103% 1051^ 105% lOlM 99M 100 110 112 lllM 109 J^ 107 104M 106 106% 108 Ji 105M 103 105^ This table shows that, after allowance is made for accumu- lated interest, the five-twenties at no time in 1864 or 1865 rose more than a few per cent, above par in the paper cur- rency. This few per cent, marks the maximum difference which continuation of the right of exchanging United States 1 See Part I, chap, iv, pp. 104, 107, 115, above. 2 From the Financial Seview, 1873, p. 17 (supplement of the Commerical and Financial Chronicle). 198 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS notes at par for five-twenties could possibly have added to the value of the former. Of course, the reason why the conversion scheme was not more effective, while it lasted, in preventing depreciation of the currency is found in the fact, that while the government was waging a war of enormous cost and uncertain issue, investors did not put a high value upon its bonds. To attempt to maintain the credit of one set of promises to pay by means of a second set could avail little when the ability of the promisor to keep either set was regarded as doubtful.' As for the legal-tender clause — the third provision against depreciation — it could compel a creditor to receive paper money as the equivalent of gold only for debts already con- tracted. It could not control contracts to be made in the future. Sellers were free to charge higher prices for their goods when they knew the payment would be in greenbacks ; and they did so. Not only did the legal-tender clause fail to prevent depreciation, but, had it been the only support of the value of the greenbacks, the depreciation might have been as great as was the depreciation, for example, of the Russian legal-tender paper money in the first quarter of last century. But, though these artificial provisions proved futile, one important consideration remained. Greenbacks were notes of the government of the United States, and as such their value — like the value of the notes of a private person — depended upon the credit of the issuer. If confidence in the government's ability ultimately to redeem its notes had been entirely destroyed, the paper money would have depreciated to the level finally reached by the Confederate currency. On the other hand, if the credit of the government had suffered no diminution, its notes would have depreciated 1 Whether the abrogation of the right of funding greenbacks in bonds delayed resumption of specie payments after the war is a further question, discussion of which is not in place here. Specie Value of the Paper Cuebenoy 199 little, if at all. Fluctuations between these two limits — par and zero — followed tlie varying estimates which the com- munity was all the time making of the government's present and prospective ability to meet its obligations. It is there- fore necessary to analyze the elements that entered into these varying estimates. First, it is plain that an increase in the amount of the demand debt made speedy repayment more doubtful. Hence the effect of every suggestion of an increase in the amount of the paper currency was to decrease the value of the greenbacks already in circulation. This is clearly shown by the influence of the second and third legal-tender acts. June 11, 1862, the gold value of $100 in paper currency was $96.22.' The next day it was oflicially announced that the secretary of the treasury had requested Congress to authorize a second issue of United States notes.^ Immedi- ately the value of the currency declined to $94.96. As the probability increased that the request would be complied with, the fall continued, until, on the day when the final vote was taken on the second legal-tender act, July 8, the cur- rency price was $89.79.' Even more striking was the fall caused by the third legal- tender act. December 1, 1862, just before Congress con- vened, currency was worth $76.94. Three days later a fall to $74.63 was caused by a rumor that the annual finance report would recommend another issue of United States notes.* A denial produced a reaction to $76.63. But on the 8th Thaddeus Stevens introduced a bill providing for 1 See the tables of daily prices in the Appendix, pp. 425-8. The figures in the text for certain days are sometimes the highest or lowest prices, sometimes (as here) the average of the two. 2 See the New York Times, June 12, 1882. 3 Cotwressicmal Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3182. * Banlcers' Magazine, New York, Vol. XVII, p. 560. 200 HiSTOBY OF THE GrEBENBACKS an issue of $200,000,000,' which brought about a relapse the next day to $75.19. When he admitted, a few days later, that there was no chance of his measure passing, a slight rise followed.^ But January 8 the Committee of Ways and Means submitted a measure authorizing the issue of $300,000,000 of United States notes.' The currency fell to $72.99. Six days later the House of Representatives passed a joint resolution for the issue of $100,000,000 to secure the immediate payment of the army and navy.* The fall reached $67.57. The acquiescence of the Senate caused a slight further decline. Meanwhile the Ways and Means bill was under discussion in the House. When it was passed and sent to the Senate, the notes were depressed to $65.90.^ Three weeks later the measure came back with the Senate amendments, one of which reduced the new issue of legal-tender notes from $300,000,000 to $150,000,000. A drop of $1.46 followed the House's refusal to agree to the change. During the next two days it was thought in New York that the Senate would yield, and the decline of the currency continued to $60.98. When this idea was dissipated there was another reaction. But February 26 the House yielded and passed the bill.* This action made the increase of notes certain, and their value fell to $57.97. After this extreme depression came a slight reaction to $58.48 on the day the bill became a law.' 1 Congressumal Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 23, 145; New York Times, Decem- ber 9, 1862. The references to the daily papers are, unless otherwise specified, to the date of the money articles. 2 Congressional Globe, loc. cit., p. 146. ^rbid., p. 235. See sec. 3 of the bill, p. 284. * Ibid., p. 314. 5 January 26.— IftitJ., p. 522. 6 For Senate amendments see ibid,, pp. 926, 927 ; for action of the House, pp. 1039, 1312. ' March 3, 1863. The probability of further issues of greenbacks was, however, by no means the only depressing influence affecting the value of the currency while either the second or third legal-tender bills was pending in Congress. See pp. 213, 216, below. Specie Value of the Papee Oueeenoy 201 Not only the amount of notes which the government issued, but also the condition of the resources at its dis- posal for meeting obligations, affected the probability of a speedy redemption of the paper currency. This explains why almost every important public event was, reflected in the fluctuations of the gold market. Few things could happen to the government that would not directly or indirectly influence its credit, and therefore the value of its notes. Consequently notice must be taken of the effect of financial, military, political, and diplomatic events upon the course of the depreciation. Since the first condition of redeeming the paper currency was financial strength, the condition of the treasury was narrowly watched by the gold market. For example, the annual reports of the secretary of the treasury were anxiously awaited each December and their appearance caused a rise or fall of the currency according as the condition of the finances presented seemed hopeful or gloomy. In Decem- ber, 1862, the day before the report was published, a rumor was circulated in New York, that another issue of greenbacks would be proposed. The currency fell from $76.34 to $74.63, but rose again to $76.63, when the report appeared recommending a national bank currency as preferable to government notes. Next year the report was responsible for a slight decline; for, though Secretary Chase declared specifically against an increase of the greenbacks, the esti- mated expenditures so far exceeded receipts that he was obliged to ask for a loan of $900,000,000. Again in 1864 the report caused a fall, for even the New York Tribune admitted that it was disappointing.* By December, 1865, the gold market had become much steadier, but Secretary McCuUoch's report recommending a speedy resumption of 1 See the editorial article in the issue of December 8, 1864, and the money article for December 7. 202 History of the Greenbacks specie payments was warmly received and caused a rise of the currency from $67.34 on the 5th to |68.14 on the 6th.' Ability of the government to borrow also influenced the value of the currency; for the fate of a loan indicated pub- lic confidence or distrust, and success provided means for continuing the war without the issue of more legal-tender notes. Thus, in the spring of 1863, Mr. Jay Cooke's suc- cess as agent of the government in obtaining subscriptions for five-twenty bonds at the rate of |2,000,000 a day caused the currency to rise from a level of about $65, prior to March 23, to $71.68 on the 25th, when the favorable result of his operations seemed assured.^ In October, 1863, the report that a foreign loan had been obtained caused a rise from $68.49 on the 21st to $70.05 on the 22d. Next day the report was discredited, and the currency fell back to $68.26.' Again, in September, 1864, a loan of some $32,- 500,000 was subscribed twice over and the sum advertised awarded at a premium of 4 per cent, and upwards. This news caused a rise from $42.37 on the 9th to $45.87 on the lOth.* Changes in the officials of the Treasury Department con- stituted another important factor. The resignation of the assistant treasurer in New York caused a fall June 2, 1864, from $53.05 to $52.63. July 1, of the same year, Secretary Chase's resignation depressed the currency to $40.] A few hours later, upon the receipt of a dispatch announcing Sen- ator Pessenden's appointment to the vacant post, there was a reaction to $45.05. Mr. McCuUoch's nomination the fol- lowing March occasioned an advance from $50.25 on the 7th to $51.05 on the 8th. 1 See comments of New York papers of December 6 ; and Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. LTV, p. 77. 3 New York Times, money article for March 24, 1863. 3 New York Times, money articles for October 22 and 23,1863. * Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. LI, p. 292; Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1864, p. 21. Specie Value of the Papee Cdeeenct 203 Even more striking than the influence of financial events upon the currency was the effect of the "war news." While the war continued there could be no thought of redeem- ing the government's notes. Hence every victory that made the end of hostilities seem nearer raised the value of the currency, and every defeat depressed it. The failures and successes of the Union armies were recorded by the indicator in the gold room more rapidly than by the daily press. A few instances may be cited. Chancellorsville, fought May 3, 1863, was one of the most disastrous battles of the war. But the first reports that reached New York were favorable, and caused a rise of the currency to $67.45. Next day, however, adverse rumors began to arrive, and the quotations were lower. On the 6th a partial confirmation of the bad news continued the fall. When all uncertainty about the disaster was removed on the 7th, the currency dropped to $64.62.' Following up the advantage gained at Chancellorsville, General Lee crossed the Potomac and invaded the North. With the progress of his movement the currency fell from $71.17 on the 10th of June, 1863, to $67.40 on the 16th. Similarly the battle of Chickamauga caused a decline from $74.77 on the 19th of September, 1863, to $71.81 on the 21st; in April, 1864, the currency fell from $57.43 on the 23d to $54.79 on the 25th, because of the report that the Confederates had captured Plymouth, N. C. ; General Butler's failure to take Fort Fisher was the occasion of a drop from $46.24 to $44.64, December 28, 1864: the knowl- edge of the ill success of the Yazoo river expedition brought a fall of over $4, from $67.34 March 31. to $63.34 April 1, 1863.' The power of victories to raise the value of the currency 1 See conflicting reports from the battles in the New York papers of May 4 to 8, 1863. 2 See the news columns of the papers of April 2, 1863. 204 History of the Geeenbaoks was most strikingly illustrated by the series of triumphs in July, 1863. On the first three days of that month the battle of Gettysburg was being fought. The 4th was the national holi- day ; the 5th Sunday. When the gold market opened on the 6th, currency, which on the 1st had been at $68.97, rose to $72.46. Next day news came of the capture of Vicksburg ; currency reached $75.47. Despite the draft riots in New York city, the reaction was small, and when the capture of Port Hudson was announced, July 15, there was a further advance to $77.59. With the increase of confidence the currency continued to appreciate, Tintil upon the 20th it was worth $81.14. Thus the gain was $12.17 in twenty days, due to favorable war news. Grant's series of victories at Chattanooga caused a rise of $4.99 in four days. The victory of Sheridan over Early at Opequan Creek and two days later at Fisher's Hill led to an advance from $44. 10 to $46.30. Sherman's capture of Atlanta, announced in New York September 3, 1864, occasioned a rise from $39.29 on the preceding day to $42.37. Later, after Sherman had started north from Georgia, no news came from his army for some time, and fears were entertained for his safety until March 14, 1865, when a dispatch was received stating that he had reached Laurel Hill, N. C, and that all was well. This news caused the currency to appreciate from $52.22 to $56.26. More examples might readily be given. Many of the fluctuations of the currency were due to mis- taken reports of military events. Thus, September 3, 1862, an absurd story that Stonewall Jackson was marching on Baltimore with 40,000 men caused a fall from $85.84 — the price of the previous day — to $84.75.' A rumor that Atlanta had been evacuated by the Confederates produced a rise from $38.80 to $39.92 on July 22, 1864.' Another false report of 1 New York Times^ money article, September, 3, 1862, 2 Ibid.y money article for July 22, 1864. Specie Value op the Papek Cubbenot 205 the fall of Petersburg led to an advance from $48.78 to $51.28.' A similar story of the evacuation of Richmond was the occasion of the change from $56.54 to $58.74 on the 16th of March, 1865.^ Peace rumors were especially frequent. The "peace mission" of the two Blairs was followed with much anxiety. A report that the elder Blair was in Richmond caused a rise from $46.54 to $48.08 January 19, 1865.' On the last day of the month news came that three Confederate commissioners were within the Union lines.* Currency rose from $47.39 to $49.50; but fell back again to $46.62 on the announcement, a few days later, that the conference would accomplish nothing. Being of less frequent occurrence, political changes played a less prominent r6le in the gold market than finan- cial and military affairs. The best example of their influence is shown by the events attending the presidential election of 1864. Mr. Lincoln was the Republican nominee. The Democratic party, which did not hold its convention until August 31, finally nominated General McClellan. News of this choice caused the currency to fall from $42.73 to $41.15. The canvass that followed was spirited, and for a time the result seemed doubtful to many. The Pennsylvania state election in October was looked to for an indication of the probable outcome. For a day or two after the votes had been cast it was uncertain which party had won. October 11 the New York World claimed that the Democrats had made large gains and would carry the state. Because of this report the currency fell from $50.41 to $49.17. Curiously, the Republican triumph in November had the same effect upon the currency as this promise of Democratic success had exercised. It seems to have been argued that 1 September 28, 1864; see New York Herald, money article. 2 New York Herald, money article, March 16, 1865. 3 Ibid., January 19, 1865. * Ibid., January 31, 1865. 206 History of the Gbebnbaoks President Lincoln's re-election meant an indefinite prolonga- tion of the war, and hence destroyed any chance of a speedy redemption of the paper money.* On the strength of this view there was a fall on the 9th from $40.65 to $38.46. However, a reaction quickly followed. President Lincoln's assassination occurred after the regu- lar gold market had closed on the evening of April 14, 1865. Currency had ranged between $67.97 and $68.49. The news was received, however, at the "evening exchange." At the first shock there was a fall to $60.61. This fall was followed by a quick reaction, so that the market closed about $63.90.'' Next day the gold exchanges remained closed, and the following day was Sunday. The intermission gave an opportunity for the panic to subside. On Monday the opening price was $65.36, but it soon rose to $67.51, and the next day the currency nearly regained the level which it had held before the assassination. Though the country's foreign relations were overshadowed during the war by domestic affairs, they exercised some influ- ence upon the value of the paper money. There were two important matters of diplomatic concern: the chance of for- eign intervention between the federal and confederate governments and the French occupation of Mexico. Fears on the former score were in a measure put to rest on July 30, 1862, by the arrival of a steamer from England bringing reports of a speech of the prime minister, Lord Palmerston, which was interpreted to mean that the British govern- ment had no intention of interfering in the American war.' Currency rose from $85.84 — the lowest price on the 29th— to $87.43. On the 10th of the following February a report that the French emperor was attempting to bring 1 See editorial article in New York Express, November 9, 1864. 2 New York Herald, money article dated April 16, 1865. 8 See the dispatches to the New York papers of July 31, 1862, and editorial com- ments. Specie Value of the Paper Cukkenoy 207 about a conference between the North and South caused the paper money to appreciate from $63.90 to $65.57.' The news of the withdrawal by England of the recognition which it had accorded the Confederacy as a belligerent occasioned a rise from $68.91 to $71.43 on the 19th of June, 1865.' May 3, 1864, the publication in Le Moniteur of the con- vention assuring the stay of French troops in Mexico caused the currency to depreciate from $56.50 to $55.63.' At the close of the war the administration attacked the Mexican question with vigor. June 5, 1865, word came that Napoleon had been urged to withdraw his troops. This news showed the possibility of trouble with Prance, and caused a slight decHne — from $73.94 to $73.13.* During the summer many con- flicting reports were circulated concerning complications on the Rio Grande, causing considerable fluctuations in the gold market.^ But the beginning of the end came November 7, with the report that the cabinet had decided to notify the French government that the sending of further troops to Mexico would meet with the disapprobation of the United States. That little fear of a serious complication was enter- tained is shown by the slight extent of the fall caused by this news— $68.03 on the 6th to $67.91 on the 7th.'' Perhaps some explanation should be given why two mat- ters of which much was made by contemporary commenta- tors on the premium have been passed over so lightly in the preceding analysis, viz., the quantity of money in circula- tion and speculation. Statistical attempts to demonstrate or disprove the validity of the quantity theory of the value of money must always be inconclusive so long as there are no 1 New York Times, money article, February 10, 1863. 2 New York Herald, money article, June 19, 1865. 3 New York Times, money article. May 3, 1864. * New York Berald, money article, June 5, 1865. 5 HunVs Merchants^ Magazine, Vol. LIU, p. 133. i> New York Herald, money article, November 7, 1865. 208 HiSTOKY OF THE GeEBNBAOKS accurate data regarding the volume of exchanges to be per- formed by the use of money and the rapidity of circula- tion.' Of course, no such data are to be had for the years of the Civil War, and besides there is the added embarrass- ment that the quantity of money in use is involved in even more obscurity than common.^ A rigorous comparison between the quantity and the gold value of the currency or between quantity and prices is therefore out of the ques- tion. But at least this much may be said with confidence : the fluctuations of the gold premium cannot be accounted for by actual issues and redemptions of government notes. As the above remarks upon the second and third legal-tender acts show, additional issues of United States notes affected the value of the notes already in circulation as soon as their probability was known and long before they were actually made or even authorized. Indeed, in the six months follow- ing the passage of the third legal-tender act, when notes were being issued in accordance with its provisions, the value of the currency appreciated in a marked degree.' That is, the quantity of the greenbacks influenced their specie value rather by affecting the credit of the government than by altering the volume of the circulating medium. Nor is the case of the quantity theorist improved by tak- ing account of all forms of money in circulation instead of the greenbacks alone. Most discussions of the value of an inconvertible paper currency proceed on the assumption that its quantity is arbitrarily determined by government, and that the business community must adapt itself to the situation. But such an assumption is hardly more true of the North during the war than of the whole country before suspension. In both periods free use was made of bank 1 1 feel none the less convinced of the soundness of this proposition because I once made such an attempt.— Journal of Political Economy, Vol. IV, pp. 159-65. 2 See Part II, chap, ii, sec. vii, above. 3 See pp. 217-20, below. Specie Value of the Papee Cukeenoy 209 notes and bank deposits as currency, and of course the vol- ume of these elements in the circulating medium followed the needs of the public. More than "this, the amount of gov- ernment currency in use as money was in neither case deter- mined solely by treasury policy. Before suspension, free coinage and free export provided for an automatic regulation of the supply of specie ; after suspension a somewhat similar element of elasticity was found in the presence of legal- tender, interest-bearing treasury notes which could be treated as an investment or used as money at the convenience of the holder.* It would be difficult, indeed, to show that the vol- ume of a currency comprising elements so elastic as these interest-bearing legal tenders and the notes and deposits of banks was the ultimate fact that regulated the value of the whole circulating medium. As for speculation, there seems to be more danger of exaggerating than of minimizing its importance as an inde- pendent factor in the gold market. No doubt, as has been suggested, the formation of highly organized markets, where engagements were entered into to receive or deliver large amounts of gold within stipulated times, gave opportunity for artificial manipulation. No doubt, also, many of the false rumors so industriously circulated were concocted by operators with special intent to affect the premium.^ But it must be remembered that there were two parties in the mar- ket, and the arts of "bulls" were set off against the arts of 1 See Part II, chap, ii, sec. vi, above. 2 The most notable instance of this character was the fraudulent proclamation of President Lincoln, taken by unknown persons to the offices of all the New York papers except the Tribwne about 3 : 30 o'clock on the morning of May 18, 1864. It stated that Grant's campaign was virtually at an end ; that the Eed Elver expedition was a failure, that 400,000 additional men would be raised by draft if the state quotas were not filled by June 15, and that May 26 would be observed as a day of fasting and prayer. Though the World and Journal of Commerce alone were duped into pub- lishing the document, it caused a rapid rise in the premiiun before the opening of the exchanges. As the World at once denounced the forgery on its bulletin board, the fright subsided quickly and the transactions on the stock exchange were at a very slight advance over the preceding day. See the newspapers of May 18 and 19. 210 HiSTOEY OF THE GrEEENBAOKS "bears." Which party carried the day depended in the long run on matters over which neither had control — prima- rily the condition of the iinances and the war news. Viewed in a broad way, it is therefore a serious mistake to look on the gold market as a place where a few gamblers were toss- ing the premium about to suit their selfish schemes ; a much saner view is that it was the place where the community's estimate of the government's credit was visibly recorded. Here, as in other markets, those operators succeeded who forecast the future correctly, and men who tried to advance the price of gold when public confidence was increasing, or to depress it when confidence was on the wane, learned to their cost that they were not masters of the situation. III. THE COUBSE OF DEPEECIATION, JANDAET, 1862, TO DECEMBEB, 1865 In order to facilitate study of the progress of depreciation during the war, the highest, average and lowest gold value of the currency for each month from 1862 to 1865 is shown upon the accompanying chart. From this graphic repre- sentation it is readily seen that there were six strongly marked periods in the general course of the fluctuations : (1) January to April, 1862, the depreciation was slight and almost constant. (2) After April there occurred an almost unbroken fall until February, 1863, when the average value of the currency for the month was but $62.30. (3) This fall was succeeded by an appreciation, which culminated in the following August, when the average price reached to $79.50. (4) A second and more serious decline followed, until, in July, 1864, the lowest value of the war was reached — $38.70 for the month. (5) August, 1864, to May, 1865, an upward movement, interrupted by a reaction in November, carried the currency to $73.70. (6) After May there was a slow decline till the end of the year. Specie Value op the Paper Cueeenoy 211 CHAET II FLUCTUATIONS IN THB GOLD VALUE OF $100 IN AMEEICAN PAPBB MONET FBOU JANUABT, 1862, ;CO DECEUBEB, 1865 s s •& s s e £ s s S S S 8 Dsc. Nov. Oct. Sop. Aug. Joly Juno Mo, Apr. Mar. Fob. Jan. Dec. Nov. Oct. Sop. A.,g. July June May Apr. Mar. Feb. ,Jan. ■Dec Nov. Oct. Sop. Aug July Juno May Apr. Mar. Fob. .Jan. Dec. Nov. Oct. Sop Aug. July Juno May Apr. Mar. Fob. .Jap. ft / / / ,-• ^ ,/ ) <:. i.. ^ ~- s:->- N V — — '"- .^ -^^ "^ ■-■, V J ,\ > f^ <' < L '' \ — ii •si ill III B Hi " — ■ ■y '" 's - ■i > ;.. ■l___^ ,--■ r"^,- — " > f'- / / /■^ ' / I \ ^^ -i ,,,^-— ^ ---j;.^ -'^ f' <-< ^ U __J2"-, _. ^ N ' ~~-^ -v \-' \ > •-. ^ — < ^ ^j;s» ^ ■ — ",. <:' f^-"" " >' \ ^ ^T'^:;^ -^ / '" <^ ..J^ ^:;^ " /^ / \\ >'\ ? S '3 212 History of the Greenbacks 1. January to April, 1862. — From a gold value of $99.50 on the 1st of January the currency fell as low as $95.24 on the 10th, but from this point there was a rally, so that the average value for the month was $97.60. The perplexities of the financial situation, particularly the slow- ness of Congress in framing tax bills, exercised a depressing infiuence in the first half of February, that was counteracted in the latter half by Grant's capture of Fort Donelson and the provision made for the treasury by the first legal-tender act. Despite this rally, the average for the month was $1 less than in January. March, however, more than restored this loss. Curtis defeated the Confederates decisively at Pea Ridge, the "Monitor" proved itself more than a match for the "Merrimac," McClellan advanced into Western Virginia, and Shields defeated Stonewall Jackson at Win- chester on the 23rd.' Confidence in the speedy end of the war was high, and consequently the value of the currency was but 1.8 per cent, below par in gold. During April the depreciation was even less. So confi- dent was the administration that peace was at hand that the adjutant-general issued an order stopping recruiting. While Grant suffered a severe check at Pittsburgh Landing on the 6th, he more than recovered the lost ground on the 7th. Island No. 10 surrendered, Halleck telegraphed that Pope had captured 6,000 prisoners in Missouri ; on the 15th news came to New York that Fort Pulaski, guarding the entrance to Savannah, had been taken ; and to crown the month, New Orleans fell into Union hands, in its closing week. Moreover, the greenbacks, which now, for the first 1 As most of the events referred to in the following review of the course of depre- ciation are very well known, I have not considered it necessary to insert references to war histories. The newspapers have been my main reliance, because the premium was affected rather by what was reported concerning battles, etc., than by what really happened ; but I have also used the diaries in Harper^s Monthly Magazine-, and Moose's Record of the Rebellion^ besides Bbapeib's Civil War in America^ and J. F. Ehodbs's History of the United States. Specie Value of the Papee Cueeenoy 213 time, began to come into general circulation, were most favorably received, for it was considered highly patriotic to accept the government's notes as nearly the equivalent of gold. Thus, under the stimulus of victories and universal confidence, the paper money reached the highest value of the war — $98.50, a depreciation of but $1.50. 2. Tlie fall from May, 1862, to February, 1863.— In May military operations turned against the North. The Confederates quietly slipped out of Yorktown after Mc- Clellan had made elaborate preparations for a siege, and McClellan followed so slowly as to lose his advantage. Far- ragut took Natchez on the 13th, but all the successes of the month were overshadowed by Jackson's brilliant operations iu the Shenandoah valley, where he defeated the Union forces at Front Royal, drove Banks across the Potomac, eluded the attempts of McDowell and Fremont to cut off his retreat, repulsed their attacks at Cross Keys and Port Republic, and finally effected a junction with Lee. So great was the consternation at Washington that the gover- nors were called upon by Stanton to forward all their militia and volunteers for the defense of the capital. From $97.92 on the 1st of the month the currency declined to $96.04 on the 27th, when the fright in Washington was at its height and the average for the month was $1.70 less than it had been in April. A further fall of $2.90 came in June. Hanover Court- House, Seven Pines, and Fair Oaks caused a slight rise in the last days of May and the first days of June ; Port Pillow was taken on the 4th and Memphis two days later. But on the 12th Chase's request for a second issue of greenbacks was an- nounced. Meanwhile McClellan lay inactive while Stuart's cavalry rode around his army, capturing prisoners and burn- ing supplies. July brought yet greater disasters. McClellan' s peninsu- 214 History op the Geeenbaoks lar campaign, which was to have ended with the capture of Richmond, ended instead with the desperate retreat to Harri- son's Landing, where he remained quiescent for the rest of the month. The dream of a prompt close of hostilities was rudely dispelled, and the president issued a call for 300,000 volunteers. Meanwhile Morgan was raiding in Kentucky, and Congress passed the second legal-tender act. Under such depressing influences the currency fell rapidly, and the average for the month was $7.30 less than in June. After the 22d of July there was a rally from the extreme depression that lasted during the first part of August. Hal- leck's appointment as general-in-chief had a good effect. Reports were received of a debate in the House of Commons that was interpreted to mean that the English government had no intention of intervening in favor of the South. Such news more than offset the draft of 300,000 nine- months' militia ordered on the 4th. But after the 11th of August the current set in the opposite direction. Lee forced Pope into the defenses before Washington, and opened the way into Maryland, while Bragg was executing a similar northward movement in Kentucky. About the same time the Sioux Indians suddenly commenced their outrages in Minnesota. During September the depreciation continued. Lee's advance caused grave fears for the safety of Baltimore, Har- risburg, and Philadelphia. The public archives of Pennsyl- vania were sent to New York for safekeeping, and Grovernor Curtin called for 50,000 men to repel the invasion. Similar fears were entertained for Louisville and Cincinnati, which Bragg and Kirby Smith were threatening. The fall was stopped for a week in the middle of the month by the battles of South Mountain on the 14th and Antietam on the 17th, but the latter was too dearly bought a victory to compensate for Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry with its immense Specie Value op the Papee Cueeenoy 215 stores and garrison of over 11,000 men. When it was found that McClellan had failed to follow up his advantage and that Lee had recrossed the Potomac in safety, the disap- pointment was keen, and despite Rosecrans's victory at luka the fall of the currency recommenced, and the lowest price was that of the last day of the month. In October McClellan remained inactive, despite the urg- ing of the president and the impatience of the public. Lee had time to recover in a measure from the losses of his sortie into the free states, and he caused great exasperation by sending Stuart on another raid entirely around McClellan's idle army. In the West military operations favored the North. The desperate attempt to recapture Corinth was foiled by Kosecrans ; and Bragg, after his failure to capture" Louisville, retreated from Kentucky, suffering rather greater loss than he inflicted at the battle of Perryville on the way. While these successes tended to offset Stuart's raid and McClellan's inactivity, the autumn elections had a very depressing influence. Almost everywhere the administration lost ground. In Maine and Michigan the Republican majori- ties were greatly reduced ; Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New York went Democratic. A majority for the opposition was predicted in the House of Represen- tatives.' The net effect of these various influences was an average price of the currency $6.60 below that of September. November was a quieter month, with a much narrower range of fluctuations, although the average value of the currency was somewhat less. Military events were not of great consequence, and the market was dull awaiting the convening of Congress in December. The lowest quotation of the month occurred on the 10th, when the order relieving Greneral McClellan was published.^ 1 Cf. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. I, pp. 441-3, 2 Cf. money article in New York Times, November 10, 1862. 216 HiSTOEY OF THE GrEEENBAOKS When Congress assembled Chase's report showed that unpaid requisitions were accumulating at a rapid rate, and that the secretary had no suggestions for increased taxation, but laid great stress upon his widely distrusted banking scheme. Presently, inquiry in Congress called public atten- tion to the fact that the pay of the army was in arrears, and a third issue of United States notes was foreshadowed. The administration was also sharply attacked for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and for the monitory proclama- tion of emancipation. Meanwhile there was a quarrel in the Republican ranks. The caucus of the Senate advised the president to reconstruct his cabinet, and in consequence the secretaries of state and of the treasury both resigned, but were prevailed upon by Mr. Lincoln to remain in office. The greatmilitary event of the month was Burnside's bloodyrepulse at Fredericksburg with a loss of nearly 14,000 men. Under this combination of depressing influences the first year of the paper standard closed with a depreciation of 25 per cent. In January and February the fall of the currency was accelerated in the manner shown above by the framing of the third legal-tender act. On the Potomac Hooker, who succeeded Burnside, was quietly engaged in reorganizing the army and preparing for a spring campaign. Meanwhile it became known that Grant's first campaign against Vicks- burg had been frustrated by the destruction of his depot at Holly Springs, and by Sherman's repulse at Chickasaw Bayou on the 29th of December. The next day the "Monitor" foundered off Cape Hatteras, Forrest's Confederate cavalry were beaten at Parker's Cross Roads, and the great battle of Murfreesboro began. On the first of the new year Magruder recaptured Galveston, but ten days later Sherman, on his return from the Yazoo river, captured Arkansas Post with 5,000 prisoners. Early in February a Federal attack on Fort McAllister in Georgia and a Confederate attack on Fort Specie Value op the Papee Cueeenoy 217 Donelson in Tennessee were repulsed. The rest of the month was rather quiet and the dominating influence in the gold market was the progress of the third legal-tender act. This period, May, 1862, to February, 1863, commenced with a depreciation of but 2 per cent., and ended with one of 42 per cent. From May to November the dominating causes of the decline were military disasters and the second issue of greenbacks. McClellan's peninsular campaign was a mel- ancholy failure. Richmond was not taken; instead, Lee invaded the North. Though his sortie was checked at Antietam, full advantage was not taken of the situation. When the offensive was at last resumed with vigor, the defeat of Fredericksburg resulted. What slight advantages had been gained in the West could not counterbalance such dis- asters. To this ill fortune in war was added the political defeat of the administration in the autumn elections, the dis- sensions among Republican leaders in Congress and the cabi- net, and the gloomy financial prospect. In January and February the depreciation was accelerated, but now because of the legislation pending in Congress rather than because of military events. 3. The rise from March to August, 1863. — February closed with the currency at about $58. In March a reaction began. There were no decisive military operations ; for Grant was vainly trying to get at Vicksburg from the North, Far- ragut bombarded Port Hudson without result, and in Ten- nessee and Virginia the fighting was mainly confined to the cavalry. But Congress had passed the supplementary inter- nal revenue act, the national banking act, and the $900,- 000,000 loan act; and the enactment of these laws was fol- lowed, as Secretary Chase said, "by an immediate revival of public credit.'" The same favorable causes continued to operate in April. 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December 1863, p. 2. 218 HiSTOBY OP THE GkEENBAOKS Jay Cooke now had his system of agencies for the five- twenty loan well organized, and subscriptions began to come in. An unsuccessful bombardment of the forts in Charles- ton harbor checked the rise for a time ; but Banks was suc- cessful in his operations along the Bayou Teche in Louisiana, and Grant shifted his forces to the west of the Mississippi, marched them south of Vicksburg, ran his gunboats and transports past the batteries with slight loss, and prepared to cross again and attack the city from the south. Mean- while Hooker executed a well-planned movement across the Rappahannock and seemed to have Lee at a disadvantage. For these reasons the average value of the currency was a little higher in April than in March. During the first week in May there was a fall caused by the disastrous battle of Chancellorsville. But Grant's cav- alry reached Baton Rouge after cutting the communications of Vicksburg with the East, and his main army effected its landing on the eastern bank of the Mississippi and won the series of victories that forced Pemberton back into the city and completed its investment. A trifle later in the month Banks closed in on Port Hudson farther down the river. These events with increasing subscriptions to the lo.an' caused another advance in the value of the currency, so that the average for the month was slightly higher than for April. June presents a striking example of an appreciation of the currency — small, to be sure — despite military reverses. After Chancellorsville, the Army of Virginia was reinforced by conscriptions and fitted out better than ever before. On the 3d of June Lee set forward on a second grand invasion of the North. At Winchester he captured nearly 4,000 prisoners, with many guns and large supplies, and proceeded through the Shenandoah valley to Ohambersburg in Pennsylvania. 1 Cf. Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 817. Specie Value of the Paper Oubkenoy 219 On the 15th President Lincoln issued a call for 100,000 militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Vir- ginia, to aid in repelling the invasion. In the West nothing decisive was accomplished. Grant was pressing Vicksbnrg closely and Banks Port Hudson, but their attacks upon the works were repulsed without substantial gains. Meanwhile the political opponents of the administration seized the moment to push their agitation against the conduct of the war. Mr. C. L. Vallandingham, who had been arrested for treasonable utterances, was nominated for governor of Ohio. At New York a great "peace meeting" was held. All this made the latter half of June a very dark period for the Union cause. But the machinery of the national loan was now thoroughly organized, and, while Lee was advancing, the treasury was receiving $1,500,000 to $2,500,000 daily for government bonds.' The fact that the government was able to borrow on so large a scale, even at this crisis, had a great effect in maintaining its credit, and hence the value of its notes. So, while Lee's invasion caused a heavy fall in the middle of the month, there was a reaction after the first scare subsided, and for the month the average value of the cur- rency was $2 higher than in May. If June had shown the possibility of a rise in the face of military reverses, July showed how powerful a stimulant was military success. It was a month of victories — Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson. These great successes, with Sherman's expulsion of Johnson from Jackson, the repulse of the Confederates at Helena, and the capture of Morgan and his raiders in Ohio, completely overshadowed the draft riot in New York and a few Union reverses. On the 15th President Lincoln appointed a day of thanksgiving, and on the 25th President Davis a day of fasting and prayer. The advance of the currency over June was $7.40. 1 Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVIII, p. 607. 220 History of the Gbeenbacks August continued the good times. In a military way the month lacked dramatic features, for Grant, Meade, and Lee were allowing their troops a rest, essential after the furious campaigning of July. Rosecrans, however, began his advance against Bragg at Chattanooga, and Burnside moved on Knoxville. Much encouragement was received from the vigorous pushing of the siege of Charleston.' The draft in New York, which had been interrupted by riots, was resumed and completed. Elections in Kentucky, Vermont, and Cali- fornia resulted most favorably for the administration candi- dates. Under these circumstances the currency reached $79.50 — a higher level than was again attained during the war. 4. The fall from September, 1863, to July, 1864. — Many had expected after the great victories of July that the end of the rebellion was at hand. But much to the chagrin of the president and the public, Lee, instead of being annihi- lated was suffered to withdraw unmolested across the Poto- mac, and was soon confronting Meade in the old positions along the Rappahannock. Early in September news of positive disaster was added to this disappointment. At Chickamauga Rosecrans lost 16,000 men and narrowly escaped the destruction of his whole army. The news caused a fall of nearly $3 in a single day. So the currency declined from $78.82 on the opening day of September to $69.87 on the 29th. From the last of September to the close of the year there was a slow but tolerably steady depreciation. The lowest point of the period was $63.80, October 15, caused by rumors of another forward movement by Lee. After Longstreet had been sent west to reinforce Bragg, Hooker was also dispatched with two corps to help Rosecrans. Lee then threatened to turn Meade's flank and compelled him to fall back on Bull 1 New York Times, money articles, July 15, 17, and August 25, 1863. Specie Value op the Papeb Cueeenoy 221 Run. The operations in Virginia, however, were less important than those in Tennessee, where Grant relieved Eosecrans, who had allowed himself to be cooped up in Chattanooga by Bragg. In November the lowest prices, those of the 21st and 23d, were due to the investment by Longstreet of Knox- ville, where Burnside's forces lay ; the highest, on the 27th, to Grant's spectacular victories at Chattanooga. December was a very quiet month with a slight range of variation. Sherman averted disaster to Burnside by hurrying from Chattanooga to Knoxville and forcing Longstreet to raise the siege. In the East Meade recrossed the Rapidan and went into winter quarters. Congress assembled and received a treasury report of rather cheerful tenor, despite the fact that Chase found it necessary to ask authority for borrowing $900,000,000. During the first three months of 1864 the slow decline continued. In January the armies lay nearly still both east and west. On the 1st of February a draft was ordered for half a million men to serve three years or for the war. Butler's sally from Fortress Monroe, made in the hope of taking Richmond by surprise and freeing the prisoners of war, was frustrated by a deserter who alarmed the Confed- erates, and Kilpatrick's cavalry on a similar mission suc- ceeded in penetrating the first and second line of defenses about the city, but were repulsed from the third. Late in the month the Florida expedition received a serious check at Olustree. In Mississippi Sherman succeeded in destroying Meridian and effectually cutting the line of railway that supplied Mobile from the North, but the hoped-for destruc- tion of Pope's army was not accomplished because the co-op- erating cavalry failed to do its expected part in the cam- paign. In March the ill-fated Red River expedition set out, and the Confederate general Forrest defeated W. S. Smith at Okalona, re-captured Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, 222 HiSTOKY OP THE GREENBACKS but late in the month was repulsed at Paducah with a loss of 1,500 men. More important in its effect upon the gold market was the slowness of Congress in passing the finance bills. Even the New York Tribune became impatient. "A Congress fit to exist," it said, " would have matured and per- fected some sort of finance system before the close of its fourth month.'" In April Congress still passed no revenue laws, and the war news was unfavorable. The massacre of Fort Pillow, the failure of the Red River expedition, Steel's forced evacuation of his position in Arkansas, the Confederate capture of Fort Williams, and later of Plymouth, in North Carolina, all combined to make a gloomy commencement of the spring campaign.^ Slight successes in Texas, Grant's preparations for a vigorous advance, and Union gains in the elections in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Missouri, and New Jersey could not counterbalance these disasters and the inactivity of Congress. Consequently the currency fell $3.50 below the average of March. In the first half of May there was a rise. Sherman set- ting out from Chattanooga succeeded by skilful maneuvers in forcing Johnson back from Dalton, then from Resaca and then from AUatoona Pass. At the same time Grant crossed the Rapidan and fought the desperate battles of the Wilder- ness and Spottsylvania Court House. Every rumor from the field caused a rise or fall of the currency,^ but despite Grant's enormous losses, he was believed to have the advan- tage, so that the general trend of the fluctuations was upward until near the middle of the month. But on the 10th Ave- > Editorial article, March 29, 1864. 2 The feeling of depression is shown by the New York Tribune's remark : "With perhaps a single exception, the important military events which we have been called upon to record since the early opening of the campaign have been disasters to the national cause " (April 29, 1864). ^ E. g., see New York TimeSy money article, May 12, 1864. Specie Value of the Paper Currency 223 rill's cavalry was defeated by Stuart, on the 15th Siegel was routed at Newmarket, and on the 16th Beauregard forced Butler back upon Bermuda Hundred and intrenched along his front so strongly as to prevent his co-operating with Grant. Meantime Lee forestalled Grant in his move- ment to the North Anna, and Congress still failed to pass the tax bills. Consequently after the 10th currency fell again ; by the 17th it was back to the opening value of the month, and as the depreciation continued the average value was $1.20 less than in April. During these first five months of 1864 there had been a depreciation of less than $2 a month, due to lack of prog- ress in subduing the rebellion and the dilatoriness of Con- gress in voting taxes. In the next two months this rate of depreciation was greatly accelerated, in part at least because of the appearance of a new factor in the market — the "gold bill." This measure, however, was only the last of a series of governmental attempts to control the price of gold. As' was shown in the preceding section, the treasury officials believed that the premium was in very large measure due to a rise in the value of gold effected by the nefarious arts of speculators. Could this speculation be broken up, they thought that the premium would fall back to a moderate figure and the credit of the government be greatly enhanced. Acting on this principle. Congress, on March 3, 1863, laid a stamp tax upon time sales of gold, amounting to one-half of 1 per cent, of the amount plus interest at 6 per cent, per annum, and at the same time forbade loans on the pledge of coin in excess of its par value.' News of the passing of this law was followed by an advance of the currency from $58.22 1 12 statutes at Large, sees, i, 5, p. 719. At the same time a bUl was pending in the New York legislature to prohibit banks from selling specie above par and from loan- ing upon specie so long as specie payments were suspended. It had some effect upon the market, although it finally failed of becoming law. See money articles of New York Tribune, February 6, 7, and March 5, 1863; Times, March i, and April 17, 1863. 224 HiSTOEY OP THE GREENBACKS on the 3d of March to |66.67 on the 6th ; but the gold market quickly rallied, and by the 10th the currency had fallen again to $61.35.' Though this measure produced but little effect, for other reasons, the average gold value of the currency advanced slowly from March to June, 1868, and much more rapidly in July and August. During this period, therefore, the public concerned itself little with the iniquity of gold specu- lation. But when the current turned and the premium began to advance again, denunciation of the speculators recommenced. As a specimen of the way in which they and their works were regarded by a large section of the most earnest northern people, one of the numerous edi- torial articles on the subject may be quoted from the New York Tribune: For years past, the partisans of the Rebellion quartered in our city have systematically and by concert striven and employed their means to increase the premium on gold. Their intercepted letters prove that they did this in behalf of their master, Jeff. Davis, and in the conviction that they were aiding the Rebellion as truly and palpably as though they were wielding muskets in the front ranks of Lee's army.^ When Congress assembled in December the prevalence of the feeling that the premium was largely due to specula- tion, and speculation to treason, manifested itself in proposals to enact restrictive legislation. But it was some time before these proposals were given serious attention. In the Senate Mr. Lane, of Kansas, introduced a bill December 15, 1863, to prohibit speculative transactions in gold, and another January 13, prohibiting the sale of gold at a price higher than that of 6 per cent, federal bonds. Both these measures 1 See money articles of this period. 2 June 15, 1864. More or less similar outbursts can be found in most of the New York papers at any time that the premium was advancing rapidly. Cf., e. gr., New York Times, money article, February 3, 1864. Specie Value of the Paper Cukeency 225 were referred to the Committee on Finance and were no more heard of.' A third bill of the same character met a similar fate, though introduced by so influential a senator as John Sherman.^ In the House Mr. Clay's "bill to regulate con- tracts for gold" was killed by the Committee on Judi- ciary, to which it had been referred.' But while Congress was not yet ready to attack the business of dealing in gold directly, it assented to a measure of which the object was the reduction of the premium. Just at this time the government was receiving more gold from customs duties than was required for meeting the inter- est on the public debt. The excess was accumulating in the New York subtreasury. It was thought that, if this large supply could be suddenly thrown on the market, it would break the "corner" in gold and cause the premium to fall. With this intent, the secretary of the treasury was author- ized to dispose of any surplus gold not required for interest.* The passage of this measure, like that of the tax provision of March, 1863, was followed by a temporary appreciation of the currency from $59.61 on the 9th of March, when its defeat was expected, to $62.06 on the 17th, when it was approved by the president.* Mr. Chase, however, was loath to use the power thus 1 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 24, 173. When the committee was asked what it had done with the bills, Fessenden replied that it still had the matter nnder consideration. — Ibid., p. 360. 2J6td., p. 539. 3J6t(J., pp. 730,2773. ♦ Joint resolution of March 17, 1864, 13 Statutes at Large, p. 404. For the grounds on which the bill was urged see Sherman, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1023; Hooper, ibid., p. 731; Kasson, pp. 707, 737, 738; Garfield, p. 734. On the other side see Pendleton, pp. 731,732; Brooks, p. 733; Hendricks, pp. 1045, 1046; Reverdy Johnson, pp. 1050, 1051. As the bill passed the House, it merely authorized the secre- tary to anticipate the payment of interest in gold, but the Senate Committee on Finance reported an amendment permitting the secretary to sell any gold in the treasury not needed for the payment of interest (p. 1023) . This resolution as amended was adopted by the Senate after a yea and nay vote of 30 to 8 on March 11 (p. 1052), and after much discussion was accepted by the House March 16, by 84 votes to 57 (p. 1147). 5 New York Times, money articles, March 9, 11, 12, 15, 1864. 226 History op the Gbeenbaoks given him to sell gold, except as a last resort. He had another plan. Importers with customs duties to pay had to buy the necessary coin in the gold room or on the stock exchange. Chase thought the premium might fall if this demand were taken out of the market. Consequently he announced that importers would be allowed to deposit paper currency with the subtreasury, receive in return certificates of deposit of gold at a rate a trifle below the current pre- mium, and use these certificates in payment of customs.' The announcement of this plan caused a fall of gold from 169| on the 26th to 165f on the 29th of March. This day certificates were sold at 165^, and for the 30th the price was set at 164. The market quotation followed, and for the next day the price of certificates was 163^. But this time the market did not yield, and in consequence the rate for certificates had to be raised to 165 on April 1, and to 166 on the 2d. This advance meant the defeat of the plan. Instead of the treasury being able to dictate to the market what the price of gold should be each day, it was obliged itself to accept the dictation of the market. However, the plan was kept in operation two weeks longer. The rate for certifi- cates was set permanently at 165 ; but the market quotation regardless of this rose to 175 on the 12th. The next day Mr. Chase issued an order stopping the sale of certificates after the 16th.' Balked in his first scheme, Mr. Chase went to New York on the night of April 13 and ordered the surplus gold in the subtreasury to be sold.' On the 14th the gold quotation reached 177J. By selling about $11,000,000 of gold in, five days Chase forced the premium down to 66|- on the 21st. In comparison with the effort made, the result was trifling. 1 See official announcement in the New York papers of March 29, 1864. 2 Published in New York Tribune, money article, April 16, 1864. These operations can all be followed best in the current money articles. SSOHDOESBS, op. ctt., p. 358. Specie Value of the Paper Cdeeenoy 227 The policy could not be continued indefinitely, because suf- ficient gold had to be kept in the treasury to meet interest. When the pressure was removed, the advance recommenced, and by the 25th of April the premium was higher than ever.' At the outset of this campaign in the gold market Mr. Chase seems to have been influenced by outside pressure rather than by any conviction of his own that the expedients adopted would produce a permanently beneficial result. Many business men as well as many politicians, who had become alarmed by the rapid leaps upward of the premium in the spring of 1864, were urging him to suppress the gam- bling in gold by any means in his power." But even when he was beginning the sales of gold Chase wrote to President Lincoln: "The sales which have been made — yesterday and todays seem to have reduced the price, but the reduction is only temporary, unless most decisive measures for reducing the amount of circulation and arresting the rapid increase of debt, be adopted." ' And after the sales were over he wrote to Mr. S. D. Bloodgood, of New York: "I see that gold is again going up. This is not unexpected. Military success is indispensable to its permanent decline, or, in the absence of military success, taxation sufficient upon state bank issues and state bank credits to secure .... an exclusive national currency ; and sufficient, also, to defray so large a proportion of current expenditures as to reduce the necessity for bor- rowing to the minimum." * But neither this clear insight into the situation, nor his 1 Though these operations had but a fleeting effect upon the price of gold, they produced a severe panic in the stock market. Money became exceedingly " close," and speculators holding stocks for an advance were obliged to sell at heavy sacri- fices. Cf. COENWALLIS, The Gold Boom, p. 8 ; Medbbeet, Men and Mysteries of Wall Street, pp. 248, 249. 2 Cy. ScHncKEES, op. csi., pp. 357,358. Schuckers says that the plan of selling customs-house certificates was adopted at the recommendation of the New York chamber of commerce (p. 361). 3 Letter of April 15, ibid., pp. 358, 359. 4 Letter of April 26, 1864, Waeden, Life of Chase, p. 582. 228 HiSTOKY OP THE Geebnbacks former failures, deterred Chase from trying a third plan — that of satisfying the export demand for gold by selling exchange upon London at a rate below that prevailing in the market.' This plan had still less efiPect than its pre- decessors. It caused a fall of gold from 18 1|- on May 19 to 181 on the 20th. But the next day gold began to rise again, and on the 24th the treasury was forced to raise its price for exchange,^ thus acknowledging another defeat. Why all the attempts to reduce the premium on gold had failed is not difficult to see. They were based on the assumption that speculators had increased the value of gold — while the fact was rather that the government's notes had fallen in common esteem. Neither increasing the market supply of gold by selling the coin in the treasury, nor dimin- ishing the market demand for gold by selliag customs-house certificates or foreign exchange, could better the govern- ment's credit, and therefore such measures could have noth- ing more than a temporary effect upon the premium. What was needed was, as Mr. Chase himself wrote, victories and heavier taxes. By this time, however, the secretary's temper had become ruffled by defeat, and he was ready to try extreme meas- ures. "The price of gold must and shall come down," he wrote to Horace Greeley, June 16, "or I'll quit and let somebody else try."' One resort was left: the government had failed to control the gold market; it remained to try abolishing the market altogether. A bill with this purpose had been sent by Chase to the Senate Committee on Finance and reported by Sherman April 14.* This measure prohibited under heavy penalties all contracts for the sale of gold for future delivery and also 1 New York Times, money article, May 20, 1864. 2 Ibid., May 24. 3 Warden, op. cit., p. 603. * Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1618. Compare Fessenden's eipla- nations of the source of the bill, p. 1669. Specie Value of the Paper Cuekenoy 229 forbade the sale of gold by a broker outside his own office.' Of course the bill, if it became law, would make dealing in "futures" illegal, break up the gold room, and prevent sales at the stock exchange. It was with much misgiving that the Committee on Finance brought the bill before the Senate and few advo- cates were found who would say more than that they hoped it might accomplish some good. Fessenden spoke for the majority of his colleagues when he said: Although we may not believe .... that a bill of this kind will necessarily produce the effect .... it is nevertheless a duty in the present condition of things in this country to leave nothing imtried which offers even a reasonable ground of hope ; and it is upon that supposition .... that the committee recommend the measure .... a bill of this kind may produce an effect in two ways; first by operating upon public opinion, and second by high penalties .... it may .... have an effect to check in some, perhaps not any inconsiderable, degree, the rampant and heartless and wicked spirit which is actuating men with reference to this subject.^ If those who voted for the bill spoke doubtfully of it, those who voted against it were more certain of their ground. With one accord they declared that such legisla- tion could not accomplish what the secretary expected. Mr. Henderson, for example, reminded the Senate that the act authorizing sales of gold had been " a total failure " and added: "It is utterly futile for us, unless we can keep up the character of the currency of the United States, to under- take to interfere with the price of gold." ' Senator Collamer took similar ground : " Gold does not fluctuate in price," he said, " . . . . because they gamble 1 See text, ibid., p. 1640. 2J6tcJ., p. 1640; compare similar remarks of Chandler, p. 1644; Hale, p. 1671; Sherman, pp. 1640, 1646. 3 Ibid., p. 1670. Cf. remarks of Clark, p. 1643; Powell, p. 1671; Reverdy Johnson, p. 1645. 230 HiSTOET OP THE Geeenbaoks in it ; but they gamble in it because it fluctuates But the fluctuation is not in the gold; the fluctuation is in the currency, and it is a fluctuation utterly beyond the control of individuals." ' The true way to restore national credit, said Cowan, was not to pass futile enactments against gold speculation, but to prosecute the war vigorously and to raise large sums by taxation. "If we do that," he concluded, "if in the first place we satisfy the money lender that we are going to put down the rebellion, and in the second place that we are going to pay the expenses .... then the public credit at once will appreciate and public securities will rise, or, if you choose the other phrase, gold will apparently go down." " Perhaps the only senator who heartily approved of the bill was Lane, of Kansas: "It is my opinion," he said, "and the opinion of loyal and sagacious business men of the city of New York, that the Confederate government is to day, and has been since last December, through its foreign agents, engaged in the effort to depreciate our currency by gam- bling." His only objection was that Secretary Chase was being credited with the authorship of the bill, when he himself had introduced a very similar measure several months before.' Though the bill was passed by the Senate April 16,* its consideration in the House was delayed while Mr. Chase was trying his other experiments in the gold market. When they had all failed he wrote a note to Samuel Hooper urg- ing that the bill be acted on. "Its passage," he said, "will probably check the advance and give a little time for further measures."^ Accordingly the bill was taken up June 7, but so closely was opinion divided that the speaker's casting 1 /6id., pp. 1666, 1667. ^ Ibid., i>. 16a. 3J6td.,p. 1689. -r iH(MiH(NrHiH iH ^lQQQ03rHOeDCD■*I-lli3<^^r^O tH 00 CO tH 00 (N t- ■* r-l ■* iH IN ■ (M rH '*rH10T-lrH SS' •o ■CO ■^ ■tH ;0 •O ;0 ;0 •CO 8 be ^ ^ 05 "^ Oi -^ C35 -* OT CTi 05 05 05 OS <35 . >. grHrHi-lrH(MINS Li M n.3 fl 03^ 142 162 156 154 176 194 233 234 247 207 184 199 than either of the others. But, granting that this series rests upon the best arrangement of the available data, the question may well be asked whether the arithmetic mean is the best method of averaging to employ. It has been pointed out frequently since the days of Jevons that in an arithmetic mean a few cases of extraordinary advance in price will offset many cases of decline. As such cases of unusual advance are not wanting in the series even as finally amended, it seems wise to try some method of striking an average not open to this criticism. For this purpose the median may be used — that is, the point which divides the whole number of relative prices each quarter into two equal groups, one showing advances in price greater than the median, and the other less. In ascertaining the median, the final grouping of price series used in making Table XIII has 256 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS been used as the basis, and the results are presented side by side with the final set of arithmetic means from the same table. TABLE XIV MEDIAN AND ABITHMETIC MEAN OF THE 135 SEEIES OF EELATTVB PEI0B3 AFTEE AVEE- AOINQ ALIi CLOSEIil RELATED SEBIE3 Arithmetic Mean Date Median Arithmetic Mean 1860, January. April. . .. July October . 1861, January. April. ... July October . 1862, January. April July October . 100 100 100 100 100 97 95 100 100 100 103 117 102 102 100 104 97 98 93 100 111 110 113 124 Date Median 1863, January . 130 April. . . . 142 July .... 139 October . 140 1864, January. 161 April. ... 175 July .... 200 October . 208 1865, January. 228 April .... 184 July .... 160 October . 180 142 162 156 154 176 194 233 234 247 207 184 199 On the whole, I incline to believe that the column show- ing the median is the most trustworthy indication of the general character and degree of price fluctuations that can be obtained from the data for wholesale prices given in the Aldrich Report. It is interesting, however, to see whether the results thus obtained agree with corresponding figures from other sources. Such material as is available for the purpose of comparison is analyzed in the next two sections. III. EBLATIVE PRICES PAID BY THE PEDEKAL GOVERNMENT FOR SUPPLIES In Part IV of the Aldrich Report there is a series of tables showing the prices paid by various bureaus of the federal government for a large variety of articles. From these tables it is possible to obtain fifty series representing the sums paid contractors for various kinds of food, clothing, and drugs for the years 1860 to 1865, and twenty-nine addi- Pbices 257 tional series of similar character for 1861 to 1865. In the majority of cases it is stated that the prices are averages for the year, or else the prices are given by months so that an average can be struck ; but in the case of twenty-three of the series the time of the year to which they refer is not explicitly indicated. For this reason, because there were probably changes in the quality of the supplies furnished by army contractors from time to time, and because nearly half of the series are for a single class of articles — drugs — these data have not so high a character as the data dealt with in sec. ii. However, any credible price data deserve a brief analysis, if only for the purpose of comparison with the preceding tables. With this end in view the arithmetic means of the series have been computed, first before, and second after, grouping the intimately related articles, and then the medians of the series as they stand after grouping have been ascertained. These three sets of results are pre- sented in the next table side by side with the annual averages of the quarterly index-numbers obtained by similar methods from the data for wholesale prices: TABLE XV BEL ATIVB PEIOES PAID BY THE FEDEEAL GOVBENMBNT FOB SUPPLIES OOMPABED WITH EELATIVE PEICES IN WHOLESALE MAEKBT8 Aeithmbtio Mean of Abithmetic Mean — All Sebies Befobe Aftee Geotjping OF GBonpiNG OF Relat- Belated Commodi- ed Commodities ties Govern- Wholesale Govern- Wholesale Govern- Wholesale ment Sup- Market ment Sup- Market ment Sup- Market plies Prices plies Prices plies Prices 1860 100 101 100 102 100 100 1861 101 98 101 97 100 98 1862 110 117 109 115 100 105 1863 126 158 123 154 113 138 1864 179 224 176 209 173 186 1865 206 220 202 209 187 188 258 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS It will be noticed that the grouping of the related series reduces the average relative prices of government supplies somewhat less than it reduces the average relative wholesale prices, and the same is true of the substitution of the median for the arithmetic mean as an average. Whatever method of grouping and averaging is employed, however, the table indicates that the advance in the price of the commodities purchased by the government for which data are available was less than the advance in the price of a somewhat larger list of commodities dealt in upon the wholesale markets. Whether this result is due to the imperfections of the materials on which the table is based, or whether it is fairly representative of the relative advance in the prices paid by the government and by private persons, it is diflBcult to say. The common opinion has been that the demand for war sup- plies was a very important factor in causing the advance of prices and that those articles purchased by the government on a large scale advanced much more in price than the majority of other things. No doubt this opinion is well founded when expressed with reference to the first year of the war, when there was a sudden as well as a large increase in the quantities of goods ordered by the war and navy departments. To fill such large orders at once was diflBcult, and accordingly competing contractors found it possible and necessary to advance prices. This condition of affairs is reflected by the table, which indicates that, while there was a general decline in the prices paid in wholesale markets in 1861, the prices of government supplies did not fall but rose slightly. But one need not be surprised to find that after sufficient time had been given to readjust the machinery of production to meet the government demand and to organ- ize the intricate business of furnishing supplies, the very increase in the quantities ordered enabled contractors to supply the majority of articles at an advance in price some. Prices 259 what less than purchasers in the open market were asked to pay. While, however, there is no inherent improbability in the results of the comparison between the advance in prices paid by government and by private persons, the statistical material on which that comparison is based is not of sufficient scope or of sufficiently uniform character to make one comfortably sure of its reliability. IV. EELATIVE PRICES OF VARIOUS NECESSITIES AT RETAIL Another interesting body of price data is found in the twentieth volume of the Tenth Census, which contains a "Report on the Average Retail Prices of Necessaries of Life in the United States," by Joseph D. Weeks. The material for this report was collected by sending a large number of schedules to retail merchants in various sections of the country, with the request that they report the prices of specified staple articles in which they dealt. Some 409 returns were received giving the retail prices of about sixty different commodities for longer or shorter periods of time. As Mr. Weeks says,it is not probable that the articles quoted by different dealers under the same caption — as, e.g., rice, cheese, starch, beans, etc. — are all of precisely the same quality. But this fact did not seriously diminish the value of the material for the calculation of relative prices in Mr. Weeks's opinion, because he thought it "fair to presume that in a given tabulation the price of the same quality or grade of each article, as near as is possible, is quoted for the different years, as the report is made by the same person and of the prices at the same shop."' While the material thus collected was tabulated with care and published at length in Mr. Weeks's report, no attempt was made to analyze or combine the different series for the same or different articles in such a manner as to show the IP. 2 of the "Report." 260 History of the Gebenbacks general trend of price movements. Consequently, little, if any, use has ever been made of this source by students of prices. In the hope of getting some light upon the very interesting question of the relation between the fluctuations of prices at wholesale and at retail, however, it seems well worth while to see what can be made of Weeks's data for the years of the Civil War by applying to them the methods used in dealing with the material of the Aldrich Report. A collation of the list of articles for which this Census report gives retail prices with the wholesale price lists of the Aldrich Beport shows that there are twenty-three commodi- ties included in both sources that seem to be identical, or very similar. This fact makes possible a comparison between the relative prices of these articles at wholesale and at retail. There is, however, one obstacle. The census series used purport to show average prices for the year, while the Aldrich series give returns as a rule for four months only — in most cases January, April, July, and October. It is accordingly necessary to take the average prices of these four months as representing the average for the year— a pro- cedure that seems from comparison of other tables to be legitimate. The full detail of the comparison is given in the Appendix and a summary of the results is presented in Table XVI. This table indicates that prices at retail continued to cor- respond roughly with the fluctuations in wholesale prices, despite the disturbances caused by the paper currency, but that their movements were more sluggish. From the figures it seems that the fall in wholesale prices in the spring and summer of 1861 caused by the cessation of remittances from the South that embarrassed so many large jobbing houses^ was not reflected in retail prices — probably because it was followed by the sharp upward turn in the last quarter of the 1 Compare Part I, chap, i, p. 21, above. Peioes 261 TABLE XVI BEIiATIVE PKICE8 OF TWBNTY-THEEE COMMODI- TIES AT WHOLESALE AND AT EETAIL 1 Date Aveeage Phices Peb Yeae Whole- sale Retail I860 100 88 105 138 221 222 206 100 1861 107 1862 129 1863 165 1864 211 1865 214 1866 202 year.'' On the other hand, the advance of wholesale prices from 1863 to 1864 under the stimulus of the paper issues was more prompt and more considerable than the advance of prices at retail. Finally wholesale prices fell rather more rapidly when the war ended and the paper money began to appreciate in value. The uses of the census data, however, are not exhausted by this comparison of the relative prices of the articles which appear both in the Weeks and the Aldrich Report. Similar materials are given for the retail prices of thirty-seven other commodities, and it will be well to employ all the data available in the computation of a new set of index-numbers. While the whole number of commodities included by Mr. Weeks's investigation (sixty) is less than half as great as the number in the preceding quarterly tables and is only one- quarter as great as that in Falkner's table, it is still con- siderable enough to afford a fair average. In transcribing the actual prices as given in the census volume, all series 1 While the number of articles included in this table is not large, the changes in the relative retail prices are almost identical with those of the fifty-eight articles for which prices are given below from the same source. On the average there are more than ten series from different towns for each of the twenty-three articles. 2 See Table XJV above. 262 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEBNBAOKS were rejected except those which were explicitly said to give average prices for the several years. This course was neces- sary to secure uniform material, and while it reduces con- siderably the number of series for some articles, 556 are left — an average of more than nine series for each of the sixty articles. In constructing the table all of the series of rela- tive prices for each article were averaged to form a single series, and then these average series were treated as the representatives of the articles to which they referred. The whole material may be found in the Appendix and a notion of its general character and scope formed from the next table : TABLE xvn EELATIVB BETAlIi PKICES OF SIXTY COMMODITIES Groups of Articles 1 l.a a .S o| a s I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Drv eroods 9 1 11 4 3 4 3 3 7 2 4 5 2 2 60 108 27 84 33 26 35 20 .17 50 14 34 41 38 29 556 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 126 102 104 107 107 108 108 109 111 98 99 104 99 109 109 199 119 128 114 137 112 109 111 117 112 107 118 107 119 130 290 138 162 150 158 129 126 122 131 127 130 154 116 136 165 402 196 205 185 182 158 157 135 165 150 162 173 131 154 208 364 165 212 198 182 167 160 158 187 155 183 176 136 160 211 ',^96 Boots 154 9,11 ?m Rice, beans, and potatoes Beef 193 167 Veal 161 158 Pork and hog products. Fish, dried or pickled. . . Eggs and dairy products Fuel 186 159 182 171 139 Board 156 Total Average relative price of all articles (except 901 Prices 263 In this table the average relative price is not the aver- age of the index numbers of the groups, but the average of the relative prices of the fifty-eight commodities. Board is excluded from the average because of the proba- bility that the character of the food furnished at most boarding-houses changed very much as the result of the advance in prices. As in the case of the wholesale-price tables, a considerable variety is to be observed in the price movements of the different groups. For example, in 1865 dry goods, which here consist entirely of cotton fabrics, show an advance of 264 per cent, over the prices prevailing before the war, while fish show an increase of 55 and house rent of but 36 per cent. A study of the 556 series given in the Appendix from which the averages for the several groups have been made will discover still greater divergencies. Even in the case of the same articles the relative change in the retail price in different towns is by no means uniform, for the equalizing effect of competition is much less felt in the case of prices at retail than at wholesale. But the number of quotations used is considerable enough to give some ground for accept- ing the general average as fairly representative of the fluctu- ations in the retail prices of some of the most important articles of daily consumption. In order to make possible comparisons with what have been regarded as the better forms of the preceding tables, a new series of arithmetic means and one of medians have been computed from the above data after grouping the closely related commodities. The results of these computations with the corresponding figures for wholesale prices and for government supplies are shown in Table XVIII. In order to make the character of the material more uniform, ordinary commodities alone are included — that is, the series for board and house rent are not used. 264 History of the Greenbacks TABLE XVIII ABITHMBTIC MEAN AND MEDIAN OF EELATIVE KETAIIi, WHOLBSALB AND GOVBEN- MBNT PBICES, AFTEB AVEEAGING SEBIE9 FOE KELATED ABTICLES Abithmetic Mean of Median of Date Relative Retail Prices Relative Wholesale Prices Relative Prices of Governm't Supplies Relative Retail Prices Relative Wholesale Prices Relative Prices of Governm't Supplies 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 100 105 121 150 184 191 102 97 115 154 209 209 100 101 109 123 176 202 100 103 115 144 172 181 100 98 105 138 186 188 100 100 100 113 173 187 When the differences between the sources from which the data for these three sets of averages are drawn, the lists of articles which enter into them, and the character of the material, are taken account of, the correspondence between them must be regarded as fairly close. Confidence in the representative character of each series is materially increased by the confirmation borne by the other two. The greatest advance is shown by the largest and most fully authenticated set of series — that for wholesale prices. Re- tail prices, on the contrary, show the steadiest movement — a fact that may be due in part to the less complete organi- zation of retail markets and in part perhaps to the fact that the series used for each commodity in making up the table is itself an average of several series from different towns. V. GENERAL CAUSES OF THE PRICE FLUCTUATIONS OTHER THAN THE CURRENCY The tables in the three preceding sections present the facts concerning the price changes of the Civil War as fully as they can be ascertained from the available data by the common methods of analysis. But, while a price table may Prices 265 show with approximate fairness the general trend of price movements, it does not show to what causes these move- ments are due. The only help a table gives in solving this problem is by eliminating the effect of fluctuations in the particular supply of and demand for single commodi- ties or small groups of commodities. But if changes of a tolerably uniform character have taken place in the supply of and demand for a large number of the commodities in- cluded in the table, their efiPect will not be eliminated by the process of averaging. Before concluding that the results shown by the price tables were produced by the issue of the greenbacks, it is therefore necessary to consider what other general causes of price perturbations were active during the Civil War. Such a study is the more imperative because contemporary observers were in many cases inclined to ascribe the price disturbances mainly to other factors than the currency. Two of these other factors on which much stress has been laid have already been noticed briefly — government pur- chases and the interruption in the supply of southern products. On the whole, there seems to be much more danger of over- than of underestimating the importance of both these causes. The government demand for many articles was not at all an increase in the whole amount required by the community, but amounted merely to a change in the channel through which the commodities reached their con- sumers. For example, the War Department purchased each year thousands of uniforms and vast quantities of rations ; but had the volunteers remained at home, they would doubtless have bought nearly as much clothing and eaten an equal amount of food. While the demand for certain kinds of food and clothing was increased, the demand for other kinds fell off in nearly the same degree. Indeed it is not unlikely that the increase of price from the former cause was less 266 History of the Geeenbacks considerable than the decrease from the latter, because a given quantity can be furnished at lower prices when there is but little variety in quantity and style, as in the case of army uniforms and rations, than when there is a great diver- sity in these respects as is the case with food and clothing used by the general public. Finally, if the war increased the total demand for certain articles, like lead, it indirectly decreased the total demand for others, like brick.' Such opposite changes in the demand for different articles may be expected to neutralize each other in the averages of a large price table. But speculative analysis is not the only resort in dealing with this question. It has already been shown that there is available a considerable body of statistical data regarding the prices paid by government bureaus for war supplies, and that these data indicate an average increase rather less than that indicated by other data for ordinary wholesale markets. If one accepts the evidence, therefore, one must conclude that this factor is responsible in very slight degree, if at all, for the great advance in prices shown by the tables. Much the same must be said of the interruption in the supply of the staple products of the Confederate states. The diminished supply of cotton, tar, turpentine, etc., caused a spectacular advance in their prices ; but it is also true that the cessation of southern demand for northern products tended to lower the prices of the latter articles. The latter effect was much less noticeable than the former, because less extreme, but it was probably felt by a larger number of com- modities. In the preceding price tables, as they stand after the grouping of cotton and cotton fabrics under a single series, there seems little reason to fear that the peculiar con- ditions affecting the few southern products included in the list exercise undue influence upon the general averages — ' Relatively few new buildings seem to have been constructed during the war. Prices 267 especially when the median is substituted for the arithmetic mean.' A third much-emphasized factor in causing the advance of prices was the war taxation. In its need of revenue the federal government subjected almost all imported articles to heavy customs duties, and levied internal taxes upon almost all articles produced within the country. These taxes, it has been held, were equivalent to a general increase in cost of production and as such were added to the selling prices of products.^ This contention raises a most complex question which it is obviously impossible to discuss fully in this place — namely, the incidence of the war taxes. But a little consideration serves to show that the danger again lies in unduly exaggerating rather than in unduly minimizing the importance of the factor. For, in the first place, not all of the internal taxes at least were of a nature to be shifted — e, g., the tax upon incomes was not. And, second, the shifting of the taxes upon manufactures, sales, etc., was seriously impeded by the very universality of the levies. A tax upon a few competitive products is usually trans- ferred to the consumers, because, unless they will submit to the addition of the tax to the price, the producers out of whose pockets the money is taken in the first instance have the alternative of gradually turning their attention at least in part to untaxed branches of industry. But when nearly all branches of industry are taxed at a tolerably uniform rate, as was the case during the Civil War, there is no such alternative open to the producer. He must pay the tax out of his profits and sell at the old rates, or add all or a part 1 For, as stated above, an advance in relative price very much in excess of the average, has no more eflEect upon the median than an advance very little in excess of the average. 2 See, e. g., J. S. Gibbous, The Public Debt of the United States (New York, 1867), pp. 219-32. 268 HiSTOBY OF THE GREENBACKS of the tax to his price and submit to a diminished volume of sales in consequence. Which policy will be pursued will depend upon a number of circumstances, such as the elasticity of the demand for the products taxed, the closeness of com- petition among producers, etc. If this statement be true, it is clearly inadmissible to assume that in the case of all articles the full amount of tax was added to the price, though some addition must have been made in many cases on this account. It is accordingly impossible to determine, by reasoning upon the incidence of the internal taxes, how much importance should be attached to taxation in ad- vancing prices. Unfortunately no satisfactory statistical test can be applied to supplement this indeterminate analysis. The most promising test case turns out on examination to have little significance. The 5 per cent, tax on sales, of which most has been said as a factor in raising prices, imposed by the act of June 30, 1864, and increased to 6 per cent, in March, 1865, applied to most domestic products except lumber, breadstuff s and a few .less important articles.' Accordingly one might hope to gauge the effect of this levy roughly by seeing whether by 1865 these excepted articles had risen in price less than the average.^ Examination shows that the average relative price of the eight grains and the five 1 H. B. Executive Document No. 34, p. 13, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 The average relative prices of the thirteen commodities referred to compare as follows with the general index numbers for 1862 and 1865 : 1862 1865 Month Thirteen Commodi- ties All Com- modities Thirteen Commodi- ties All Com- modities January April July October 101 107 106 113 111 110 113 124 212 179 157 168 247 207 184 199 Prices 269 kinds of lumber included in the quarterly table of sec. ii was indeed less than the average for all articles in 1865, but also that it was less before this tax was thought of. Accordingly, quite aside from the objection that might hold against this comparison on the score of the scanty number of commodities included, it throws no new light on the problem. There are two facts, however, of some significance, to which attention may be called: first, prices had reached almost their highest point before the 5 per cent, tax on sales was imposed; second, the repeal of the internal reve- nue duties after the war did not cause any considerable decline of prices. David A. Wells, special commissioner of the revenue, who had maintained in his report of December, 1866, that "the burden of national taxation" was "perhaps the most influential" of the causes to which the "inflation of prices may be attributed," admitted in his report of January, 1869, that he was "constrained to confess, that thus far the abatement of prices consequent upon the large annual reduction of taxes has not been what was antici- pated.'" A somewhat more definite conclusion can be reached regarding the effect of duties on imports. Successive tariff acts advanced these duties to a much higher point than had ever been reached before in the United States, and as the legal tender acts forbade the acceptance of greenbacks at the cus- toms house, the real increase of taxation was greater than in the case of excises which were paid in paper money. Importers had consequently to buy goods abroad for specie, pay duties upon them in gold, and finally sell them for paper money. New duties would therefore increase directly the prices charged to American consumers of imported i Senate Executive Document No. 2, p. 26, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., and H, B. Execu- tive Document No. le, p. 23, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 270 History of the Gkeenbaoks goods without compelling the foreign producer to accept a lower price — except perhaps indirectly if there were a con- siderable falling off in sales which the producer hoped to remedy by making concessions. One expects to find, there- fore, that imported commodities on the average advanced somewhat more rapidly in price than domestic products, and an examination of the price series in the Appendix will show that this expectation is justified, so far as materials for making the comparison exist. It seems altogether probable, therefore, that the war tariffs and perhaps the internal taxes also are responsible for some portion of the advance in prices as shown in the preceding tables. Three other matters that have played rSles in the dis- cussions of war prices may be dismissed more briefly. Withdrawal of men from their ordinary occupations to fill the armies, it has been frequently argued, made labor scarce ; consequently wages rose, expenses of production increased in proportion, and this increase made it necessary to advance prices.' But, as will be shown in the next chapter, the rise of wages was subsequent, not prior, to the rise of prices. Wages did not advance first and increase prices by augment- ing cost ; but quite the contrary, prices rose so sharply as to decrease real wages in a marked degree, and this decrease led, though not immediately, to an increase in money wages. That the rise of money wages when once secured was an obstacle in the way of reducing prices is true, but it can hardly be that the advance of wages caused the preceding rise of prices. In fact, depreciation actually decreased the cost of labor to the employer and so worked in the direction of a fall, not a rise, of prices. Contemporary observers were apt to hold speculation responsible for the advance of prices as for the advance of IE. p., see C. A. Mann, Paper Money (New York, 1872), p. 239; John Eadib, Panics in the Money Market (New York, 1873), p. 24. Pkioes 271 the premium on gold.' But it would probably be more true to say that the marked speculation of the war time was the effect than that it was the cause of the price movements — although neither statement is true without qualification. So universal and long-continued a rise of prices cannot have been due to artificial cornering of the supply of nearly all articles. The really important part, with reference to prices, that speculators played then as at other times, was in fore- seeing the advances that were coming from the general conditions of the market — monetary and other — and pur- chasing commodities at a lower range of prices in the hope of selling at a higher. Such operations had the effect of accelerating the advance, but also of tempering its excesses, for the stocks of speculators, sold after prices had risen in order to realize profits, tended to depress the market. Finally a word may be said about the relation between prices and the quantity of money in circulation — a subject that was much debated by the pamphleteers of the greenback agitation.'' It is altogether impossible to determine whether there was a close correspondence between the course of prices and the volume of the currency, as was affirmed by some writers and denied by others, because, as has been shown at length,^ the quantity of money in use cannot be ascertained. And more than this, the circumspect quantity- theorist would hardly expect to find a close correspondence at a time when "other things" were so far from "being equal." To add one important, but unobstrusive, point to the list of these inconstant "other things" that readily come to mind — there was a very decided contraction of 1 E. g.f see Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. II, p. 2. 2 See, e. g., H. C. Cabby, Contraction or Expansion? (Philadelphia, 1866), Letters III and IV; J. S. QlBBOHa, Public Debt of the United States (New York, 1867), pp. 219-32. 3 Part II, chap, ii, sec. vii. 272 HiSTOKY OF THE GeEENBACKS credit during the war, arising from the unstable volume of the paper currency, and consequently, a considerably larger proportion of exchanges than usual was performed by the use of cash.* While the importance of all the foregoing considerations in the study of the war prices has been frequently observed and exaggerated, there remains another factor that has attracted little, if any, attention. The notion that prices in any country which has important commercial relations with other nations are necessarily influenced by the course of prices elsewhere has long been familiar, but it was probably not until the compilation of elaborate tables of relative prices for different countries that the degree of correspondence between the direction of price movements was duly appre- ciated. After examining such tables, a careful student would hardly think of discussing the fluctuations in the price level of the United States, without taking account of the trend of prices in England and Europe. But the aban- donment of the specie for the greenback standard in 1862 seemed to sever the connection between prices in America and elsewhere. The fluctuations of prices in the United States were so exceedingly violent that they appeared to have no relation to the gentle undulations of the foreign price level. How great the differences were is best seen by comparing Sauerbeck's index-numbers for England and Soetbeer's for Grermany, as recomputed by Falkner upon the basis of prices in 1860, with averages of the quarterly arithmetic means for each year from the preceding tables. But this emancipation of American prices from the influence of the international markets for goods and gold was more apparent than real. Even the barriers of a war tariff did not greatly diminish the extent of exports and imports, and so long as such commercial relations continued, 1 See Part II, chap, vii, sec iii. Prices 273 TABLE XIX COMPARISON OF EBLATIVE PEICE9 IN THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND GEEMANI I Date United States England Germany 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 102 97 115 154 209 209 100 99.6 105.5 109.3 112.3 105.8 100 97.6 101.4 103.7 106.9 101.4 tlie conditions of supply and demand in one market neces- sarily exercised a very considerable influence over the cor- responding conditions in all related markets. During the paper-money period the influence of these commercial rela- tions was towards making the advance of prices in the United States conform to the decline in the specie value of Ameri- can currency, in the same manner that before suspension it had been toward making the movements of gold prices in the United States correspond in a general way with similar movements abroad. For, had the prices of exportable com- modities in the United States not risen above their specie prices elsewhere in proportion as the price of gold in paper money advanced, there would have been a large profit in sending gold from London to New York, selling it for greenbacks, investing the latter in American products, and shipping them abroad to sell again for gold with which to repeat the operation. Of course, the influence of such oper- ations would be to depress the price of gold and raise the prices of commodities until the divergence between their relative advances in price had been reduced to compara- 1 For the English and German prices see Aldrich Report, Part I, pp. 255, 295. Sauerbeck's figures for England are distinctly superior to those of the London Economist at this period, because the inclusion in the latter of so many articles affected by the price of cotton gives altogether too much weight to the diminished supply of that article as a price factor. As recomputed on the basis of 1860, the Ecmumist figures are, 1801,102; 1862,109; 1863,1.3.5.9; 1864,144.8; 1865, 135.5.— I6sd., p. 226. 274 History of the Geeenbacks tively narrow limits. On the other hand, had the prices of commodities in the United States risen above their prices elsewhere much in excess of the advance in the premium on gold, a large profit would have been realized by shipping European products to the United States, selling them at the high currency prices, converting the paper money received into specie by buying gold in the gold room, and taking the coin back to Europe to invest anew in articles for export. Here again the effect would be in the direction of bringing the currency price of gold and commodities in the United' States into tolerable harmony with the trend of the European equation between money and wares — but this time the means would be reduction of prices from the increased sup- ply of imported articles, and a rise in the premium from the increased demand for gold. Such a line of reasoning, however, must not be pushed too far. (1) While the purchase of American products for shipment abroad in case the premium was much above prices would not have been hindered by law, the converse operation when prices had outstripped the premium would have encountered an obstacle in the high duties upon impor- tation of foreign commodities. Of course, the American prices for such articles might remain above the European level by the amount of the duties and the cost of transporta- tion ; but once given this difference in the general level, a divergence from it would be checked by the process indi- cated. (2) It is also true that such complicated operations would have been more than commonly hazardous during the war because of the rapid fluctuations both of the premium and of prices. A state of affairs that promised a large mar- gin of profit one week might so far change before the series of transactions could be completed as to substitute loss for gain. The existence, then, of brief divergencies between the courses of the premium and of prices is quite compati- ble with the logic of the argument ; but if the argument Pkioes 275 is valid, one would not expect to find a wide divergence long-continued. (3) The trend of the commercial forces was not in the direction of making the movement of com- modity prices and of the gold premium in the United States parallel, but in the direction of making the movements harmonize with the relative value of commodities and gold abroad. At the time of the Civil War the purchasing power of gold was everywhere slowly declining in conse- quence of the immense production from the Californian and Australian mines. Consequently one would expect to find in the United. States a corresponding advance of relative prices of commodities slightly greater than the advance of the premium on gold. One must not be betrayed, then, by the very great differ- ence between the course of specie prices in England and Germany and of greenback prices in the United States, into treating the latter as entirely independent of the former. In fact, barring the influence of increased taxation in this country, the connection between the markets of the great commercial nations was quite as real during the paper- money period as at other times, and the common influences upon prices were as truly felt, despite the fact that their effect in the United States was effectually concealed from superficial observation. Had there been no war and no paper standard, doubtless prices would have advanced here| in somewhat the same degree as they advanced in Englandr and Germany, and we seem bound to believe that some part— though, of course, a small part — of the violent rise actually experienced was due to the decline in the exchangei value of gold. VI. THE CUEEENOY AS A CAUSE OP THE PEIGB FLUCTUATIONS The argument has at last reached a stage where the prob- lem of chief interest may be attacked : How far were the fluctuations of prices due to the disorders of the greenback 276 HiSTOBY OF THE GREENBACKS currency ? By process of exclusion the conclusion has been reached that these fluctuations cannot be accounted for, except in small measure, on any other ground than has been suggested ; but it remains to be seen whether any positive evidence can be adduced for the opinion that the monetary conditions preponderated over all other factors as a price determinant. The most effective method of dealing with this problem is to apply the test of concomitant variations by comparing the specie value of the currency with its rela- tive purchasing power over commodities. To put the data in convenient form for making this test, the average monthly value of gold in currency, and the average relative prices of commodities at wholesale by quarters are platted on the accompanying diagram. Most value seems to attach to the median of the relative prices, but a line representing the arithmetic mean is added for purposes of comparison. Examination of this chart shows that there is a general correspondence between the relative prices of specie and of commodities in greenbacks. Agreement in detail is pre- cluded by the nature of the data; for prices are given but once a quarter, and the intermediate monthly fluctuations answering to those of gold can only be surmised. But in general direction and to a less extent in degree of movement the gold and commodity lines harmonize well. There are, however, two noticeable differences. First, the fluctuations of prices are more sluggish than those of gold, partly, no doubt, because the lines for commodity prices . represent averages, and partly because the market for gold was more highly organized, and therefore more immediately sensitive to all changes in conditions of supply and demand, than even wholesale markets for commodities. Second, the advance of commodities does not halt at any time until it has consider- ably outstripped the advance of gold. In this excess of prices above the premium we see the effect of various Prices 277 CHART III BEIiATIYE PEICES AT WHOLESALE AND THE VALtlE OF QOLD COIN IN CUBBENCY, 1860-65 s S 3 ! ! i s S 3 i ! s S .1 5 ■ 5 1 5 8 I ! I^ab. M«. Apr. May Jure July Aug. Btp. OcL No». D«3. Jon. ■ F>-b. M«t Apr MB^ June 3u\r AUB. Sep, OcL Nov, Dec , Jan ' t'tli. Apr Mny Juno Jul, ; -\ > - J - y if f' f f » 1 I H ill ■,i \ \ *, s. > \ A • \ ^ V *;7 ■v <-. % ^ Srp. Oct d™. Jnn. Fob Apr ■ May Jung July AuB Sfp. Oi:l. !Jov. Dee., J.n. 1 F«b. Mar. Apr, May July AUR, O.I. Hoi- Dlc , Jai. • FrI. Mnr Mny Juno July Aug, fop. Oct. Nov, Dw. N s ■ \ % W ■s "■.. \ vi- ^ H^ •^ -^ ' — 1 /■ ■ ^-~. 1 -■"^ t^ ■A •«r^ * N"' "-. '>^. ^ ''^^ — — 'v., — •::^ - S \ . — ; "^ ' — y '■ "i-f-^ -^ --- .i-r^ = — -.J*- ..i..— ** ^_— - A-"**^ ^.- < ^' ^ \ e <■ ■^ k '^. '-, \ 8 a 5 i 1 E i s 3 s § g « g g s ? 278 History of the Gbeenbacks general causes other than the currency — particularly war taxation and the world-wide decline in the exchange value of gold. But to appreciate fully the facts as shown by the chart it is necessary to follow the course of prices and of gold quarter by quarter. In so doing attention will be directed to the median, rather than the arithmetic mean. Throughout 1860, then, prices remained practically con- stant, but in the summer of 1861 the general business depres- sion caused a rather general but moderate decline. Jn the autumn, however, business improved somewhat and immense government purchases caused a sharp stiffening in the price of supplies. The class of articles affected, however, was not large, and consequently the median shows merely a return to the price level of 1860. Suspension of specie payments and the appearance of a small premium upon gold had no appre- ciable effect upon prices for the first six months; but when the premium began to rise rapidly after the failure of McClellan's campaign against Richmond, prices followed. The rise of gold, however, was considerably faster, so that by January, 1863, its average value was 145 against a median relative price of 130. But after the advance of gold had culminated in February and the current turned sharply in the other direction, prices still continued to rise for three months and then reacted very little, so that by July prices were higher than the premium. Very similar maneuvers were executed from the middle of 1863 to the end of 1865. There was a 'rapid rush upward of gold in which prices were left behind; then gold fell, while prices continued to climb until they had outstripped the premium once more. The chief difference between the two periods, aside from the greater scale of the fluctuations, is that in the beginning the advance of the premium was not so fast, but that prices could keep fairly even pace with it. But in June and July of 1864 the premium advanced at a Peioes 279 pace that made the progress of prices seem slow, and it was not until October, when the premium had been falling rapidly for three months, while prices continued to rise at a scarcely diminished rate, that the two were on even terms again. Another sudden advance of gold in November gave it a momentary advantage, but after its great fall began prices passed it once more, and, declining with less precipitance after January, remained for the rest of the year considerably higher. In all these movements from 1862 to 1865 the lines repre- senting the premium and the median of relative prices cor- respond so well that one cannot resist the conclusion that these changes are mainly due to a common cause, which can hardly be other than the varying esteem in which the notes of the government that constituted the standard money of the country were held. If this conclusion be accepted, it follows that the suspension of specie payments and the legal- tender acts must be held almost entirely responsible for all the far-reaching economic disturbances following from the price upheaval which it is the task of the following chapters to trace in detail. CHAPTER V WAGES I. Falkner's Table of Relative Wages : Defects of Falkner's Table — A New Table Necessary. II. Scope of the Data Concerning Wages in the Aldrich Report: Kinds of Work — Industries — Geographical Range. III. New Tables of Relative Wages Based upon the Aldrich Report: Method — Weighting — Range of Fluctuations — Actual Wages — Wages in Nine Industries — Constant and Variable Weights — Various Occupations — Men and Women — Relative Wages and Earnings before Suspension — Actual and Relative Wages — Relative Wages of All Employees — New Tables and Falkner's Results. IV. Relative Wages in Coal, Iron, Glass, and Pottery Industries : Weeks's Data — Coal Miners — Iron-Ore Miners — Iron Workers — Potters — Glass Blowers. V. Relative Salaries of School Teachers: Character of the Data — Earnings of Professional Men. VI. Relative Wages of Farm Laborers: Character of the Data — Results of Computations. VII. Tables of Relative Money Wages Based on Tenth Census: Character and Scope of Data — Average Relative Wages — Range of Fluctuations — East and West — Relative Wages and Earnings before Suspension. VIII. Pay of Government Employees: Clerical Employees in Washington — Private Soldiers. IX. Increase of Living Expenses: Difficulty of Weighting the Price Tables — Wholesale and Retail Tables — Median and Arithmetic Mean. X. Relative Real Wages: Character of Series — Real Wages of Various Groups — ^East and West. XI. Conclusion. I. falknee's table of relative wages Fob the study of money wages, as for the study of prices, the most important source of material is the Aldrich Report. Part I contains a table — No. 37 — prepared under the direc- 280 Wages 281 tion of Professor Falkner, showing the relative wages of working people in twenty-one industries from 1860 to 1891. But this table, like the corresponding table of prices, is found on close examination to be constructed in such a man- ner as to be unfit for the purposes of the present investiga- tion. From the point of view of statistical method, its chief defects are as follows: 1. Only one index-number is given for each year. This index-number is usually computed from the wages paid in January; but in some cases — what cases is not specifically stated — from the wages paid in July or October. For the present purpose more than one index-number per year is highly desirable, and the indiscriminate use of returns for different months is to be deprecated. An average into which enter figures for several different months cannot be taken to represent the condition of affairs at any specific time, and therefore is of little value for comparisons with the data regarding prices. 2. No attempt is made to distinguish between the wages of men and women, or between the wages of groups of workers possessing different degrees of skill and receiving unlike remuneration. As will be shown later, the paper standard did not produce the same effect upon the wages of the different sexes or the different groups, and a table must be had which will permit an investigation of these diver- gences. 3. The 543 wage series included in this table are classi- fied by industries, but not by occupations. It is as impor- tant, e. g., to know the variations in the wages of carpenters, machinists, etc., wherever employed, as it is to know the variations in wages paid in the building and metallic indus- tries as a whole. 4. In computing the average variations of wages in each industry Professor Falkner treated all wage series as if they 282 HiSTOKY OF THE Gkeenbacks possessed precisely the same importance, quite irrespective of whether they represented the pay of a single man or that of several hundreds. But if the table is to be employed as an index of the probable average variation in the wages of the great mass of workers, a return which shows the pay of many men is of much greater importance than one which shows the pay of but few. Every series, that is, should be given a weight in the computations, proportioned to the niun- ber of persons whose pay it represents. Recognition of these defects has the unhappy conse- quence that Professor Falkner's table of relative wages must be discarded altogether and a fresh table of relative wages, like the fresh table of relative prices, laboriously compiled from the data published in the "exhibits" of the Aldrich Report} 1 More extended criticisms of the wage-tables of the Aldrich Report may be found in several places. In 1894 F. C. Waitb published in Washington a pamphlet entitled Prices and Wages ; A Dissection of the Senate Finance Committee's Great Report, This was a rather acrid criticism of the methods employed by Falkner in analyzing the wage-data and of the conclusions drawn from his results. In 1895 an article by A. L. Bowley appeared in the Economic Journal (Vol. V, pp. 369-83) under the title " Comparison of the Hates of Increase of Wages in the United States and in Great Britain, 1860-91." Bowley took exception to Falkner's methods. His chief objections were (1) that there was no guarantee that the establishments from which returns were obtained were typical of the industries to which they belonged; (2) that no account was taken of the number of men represented by the different series ; (3) that the relative importance of the series was unwarrantedly assumed to have remained constant throughout the whole period ; and (4) that the tables showed, not the change in average wages, but the average change in wages. Bowley, however, like Waite, put a high value upon the material published in the "exhibits" of the Report. Again, C. B. Spahe, in his Essay on the Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States (New York, 1896), declared that it is " necessary to throw away the work done by the committee's experts." He did not hesitate to charge that the Aldrich Report was "prepared by men who wished to show the highest possible level of wages," and that the statisticians " employed to summarize the returns were to a hurtful extent in sympathy with the political aim of the investigation " (pp. 103, 106). Finally PEOFEgsOE C. J. Bollock in his " Contributions to the Study of Wage Statistics " (Publications of the American Economic Association^ Vol. VI, pp. 187-218) subjected Falkner's tables once more to a searching criticism, which, how- ever, added little to the points developed by his predecessors. It seems to have been this systematic critique of Bullock's that led Falknee to publish his article upon " Wage Statistics, in Theory and Practice " {Publications of the American Statistical Association^ Vol. VI, pp. 275-89). To the detailed criticisms of the methods which he had followed, however, he found no effective answer. Wages 283 ii. scope of the data concebning wages in table xii of the aldeich kepoet These data, which are all brought together in Table XII, were collected by the Department of Labor from actual pay- rolls and show the daily wages paid in January and Jxdy — or, in a few cases, October — of each year to the different classes of employees in twenty-one industries, together with the num- ber and sex of the employees and the length of the working- day. Some 1,268 pages are covered by this exhibit. Though the material thus supplied is much more compre- hensive than that from which most wage tables have been constructed, it suffers from serious limitations. 1. The data are confined almost entirely to manual laborers engaged in manufactures or transportation. Pro- fessional earnings are represented only by a scant supple- mentary report upon the salaries of school-teachers. Clerical work is omitted entirely, while three wage series from two New Hampshire stores give the only data for the large body of sales-people. No account is taken of domestic servants, nor of fishermen, while miners again are treated in a supple- mentary report for which the data were collected in a differ- ent fashion.' Last and most important, agricultural laborers — the most numerous group of workingmen in the United States of the Civil War — are entirely unrepresented. 2. The exhibit is incomplete even for manufactures and transportation. Nominally there are returns for eighteen manufacturing industries; but of these industries three are of slight importance, viz., sidewalks, spice, and white lead. On the other hand, certain very important branches are rep- resented only in the supplementary reports — as is the case with the iron, glass, and pottery industries ; or else are not represented at all — as is the case with the boot and shoe, the milling and baking, dressmaking and millinery, tailoring, iAldrich Report, Part I, p. 180, and Part IV, Table XIII. 284 HiSTOKY OF THE GrEEENBAOKS ship-building, tobacco, and brick industries. Furthermore, the data for some of the important industries included are very meager. This may best be seen from the following table, which shows for each of the twenty-one industries the number of establishments from which returns were obtained covering the war period, the number of wage series, and the number of employees whose pay is reported. TABLE XX CONSPECTUS OF WAGE DATA FOK THE TEAES 1860 TO 1866 GIVEN IN TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH KEPOET Industries Number of Establish- ments Number of Wage Series Number of Employees Jan., 1860 Agricultural implements . Ale, beer, and porter Books and newspapers. . . Building trades Carriages and wagons City public works Cotton goods Dry goods Ginghams Groceries Illuminating gas Leather Lumber Metals and metallic goods Paper Railways Sidewalks Spice Stone White lead Woolen goods Total 1 1 3 21 1 4 3 1 1 1 4 2 2 19 1 1 1 1 6 1 3 5 5 17 42 4 22 105 3 30 2 22 16 5 138 7 11 4 4 19 4 62 9 40 76 216 14 1,955 639 10 568 3 460 46 35 803 41 263 31 8 227 20 177 78 527 5,641 If it be thought that returns for 100 employees is as nar- row a basis as can well be accepted in computing the probable wage fluctuations in any industry, ten of the eighteen branches of manufacture would have to be excluded. 3. Of the seventy-eight establishments included in the above table, all but five were situated in the North Atlantic Wages 285 states, and of these five four were in Maryland and one — a gas plant — was in Ohio.' Thus the material shows the course of wages in but one section of the country. 4. While the material of Table XII seems to have been collected and published with scrupulous care, it nevertheless suffers from a defect characteristic of wage statistics in general. It frequently occurs that when several men are employed in an establishment to do substantially similar work they are paid different rates of wages, which vary as their efficiency, the length of time they have been connected with the firm, etc. In this case, when the several men are not distinguished in the reports, it is necessary to take the average wage as the basis of calculation. But at any time some of these hands may be discharged. If the ones sent away are the recipients of the lower wages, the average pay rises; on the other hand, if the better-paid men are dis- missed, the average falls. A similar change is effected by taking on new men at wages differing from the pay of the old employees. Thus the table may show a fluctuation in wages, though no change whatever has taken place in the pay of the men who have had steady employment.^ Of course, a fall in average wages caused by the employment of more men is not an injury to wage-earners, and a rise caused by the discharge of the lower-paid portion of a force is a purely fictitious gain. But while the effect of such adventi- tious changes cannot be wholly eliminated by any manipula- tion of the material, it may be expected that in a large number of cases the depressing influence of some such changes upon the general average will be counterbalanced more or less completely by the opposite influence of others. It may seem that the imperfections of the material to 1 The distribution of the establishments by states was as follows : New Hamp- shire, 4 ; Massachusetts, 21 ; Rhode Island, 1 ; Connecticut, 9 ; New York, 25 ; New Jersey, 2 ; Pennsylvania, 11 ; Maryland, 4 ; Ohio, 1. 2 For examples see the " Exhibits," pp. 947, 973, 982, 1318, and 1510. 286 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS which attention has been called are so serious as to invali- date any conclusions regarding the general trend of wages that may be based upon it. But, after all has been said, the fact remains that Table XII of the Aldrich Beport shows the actual wages paid to more than 5,000 men and women throughout the war period. Of course, the whole number of wage-earners, even in the North Atlantic States alone, was many times 5,000 ; but if there be any considerable degree of truth in the common assumption regarding the effect of competition upon the price paid for similar services there seems to be sufficient reason for believing that a range of observation so considerable as the table affords may be accepted as fairly typical. The assumption involved in the use of such material as the basis for generalizations is that a common cause — the rise of prices — which is shown to have had a certain average effect upon the remuneration of 5,000 persons had a substantially similar effect upon the remunera- tion of the thousands doing similar work whose pay is not recorded. III. NEW TABLES OF EELATIVE MONEY WAGES BASED UPON THE DATA IN TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH EEPOET In order to get the material of these elaborate "exhibits" into usable shape the series of actual wages were reduced to series of relative wages on the "index-number plan." Every series in Table XII that gave tolerably complete returns twice a year from 1860 to 1866 was transcribed upon a card. The industry, number, and location of the establishment, and the number and sex of the workers were recorded as well as the rates of pay. Then the relative wages in January and July of each year were computed as percentages of the wage in Janu- ary, 1860. Next, in order to secure to the most important occupations a weight proportionate to their numbers, the series of relative wages were multiplied by the number of Wages 287 persons whose pay they represented. Finally, these products were added together, and the resulting sums divided by the whole number of persons employed. Thus the results show in all cases the arithmetical average change in the pay of all the persons included in any group. By arranging the cards in different ways it was possible to classify the wage-earners by industries, occupations, sex, establishments, per diem wages, etc., and to compute the average changes in pay for the vary- ing groups thus formed. In carrying out this general plan the most serious prob- lem that presented itself was in what manner the weighting of the several series according to number of employees should be performed. The choice lay between multiplying the relative wage shown by each series for each succes- sive January and July by the average number of persons employed during the whole period under investigation, and multiplying by the number actually employed at different dates. In the many cases of series which show no change in number of employees the results of the two methods — which for convenience may be called the methods of " constant " and of " variable weights" — are identical. But there are many and important series that show considerable variations in number of employees, and it is accordingly necessary to canvass the relative merits of the rival methods. The distinctive advantage of the method of variable weights is that it shows the average change in the money wages of a division of the industrial army as it was actually constituted. Changes in number of employees are a con- stant and important feature of the industrial situation and one of peculiar significance for the wage-earning classes, whose interests are at present the subject of investigation. To adopt a scheme of weighting which takes no account of such changes would be to eliminate this important element in the situation. If an increase in the numbers employed in 288 History op the Greenbacks certain kinds of work as compared with the numbers employed in other kinds causes a change in the average relative wage for the whole body of working men that change is as real in its effect upon the well-being of laborers as if it had been due to some other cause. Accordingly, it may be argued, no scheme of analysis can be trusted that will exclude the effect of changes in number of employees. On the other hand, one who examines the wage-series and notes how frequent and how considerable are the fluctu- ations in numbers employed, is not unlikely to distrust an average made up of such shifting elements. The total num- ber of employees represented by the series included in the following tables as working in January, 1860, is 5,641. In July the number rose to 6,444. Then followed a gradual decline to 4,009 in January, 1863, and afterward a rise to 5,576 in July, 1866. If these changes in aggregate num- bers were produced by uniform changes of corresponding degree in all the series, variable weights would make no difference in the results, because, while the number of men represented by any series would vary absolutely, it would bear a constant proportion to the numbers in all other series. But, of course, the variations of numbers in the different series are not thus uniform, and the weights therefore fluc- tuate relatively as well as absolutely. To take the most extreme example — common laborers employed by some city in the state of New York — -the number of employees varies from 1,500 in July, 1860, to 420 in January, 1866, and the proportion of these numbers to the aggregate number of all employees varies from 23 per cent, at the first date to 8 per cent, at the second. Now, it may be argued, if the object is to ascertain the effect of the paper currency upon money wages, it would be improper to compute the average of changes in a fashion that would expose the results to the influence of such fluctuations in the constitution of the wage-earning class as those represented by the Aldrich data. Wages 289 In deciding, on the basis of the preceding arguments, what course to pursue in regard to weighting, the question seems to turn upon the character of the changes in numbers. If these changes are largely due to particular causes — -such for example, as the completion of an elaborate plan for paving streets that would reduce the number of men employed by a city, or the sale of a factory followed by a new policy of rapid expansion that would increase the work- ing force — they cannot properly be allowed consideration. In this -case the method of constant weights is to be pre- ferred. But if the changes in numbers are not mainly due to causes that may from the present point of view be regarded as accidental; if, on the contrary, they should prove to be largely an indirect consequence of the monetary situation itself, then careful account should be taken of them and variable weights used for this purpose. Inasmuch as it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in advance whether the changes are of the one kind or the other, the best course to pursue is to employ both methods of weighting, see what differences exist between the two sets of results, and try to form some conclusion regarding the significance of these differences. All of the series used in the following computations are published in the Appendix, where they are arranged accord- ing to industries, establishments, sex, and occupation. To save space, the initial wage, number of employees, and rela- tive wages alone are given, but to show more clearly how the computations have been made, a specimen of the card actu- ally used in making the tables is placed here. It will be noticed that on this specimen card the series is extended through 1866. This last year is included in all the following wage-tables in order to supply data for deter- mining whether or not the withdrawal of wage-earners from the labor market into the army was a chief cause of the 290 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS SPECIMEN CAED Metals Blacksmiths Establishment 57 Males Maryland Date Wages Num- ber Relative Wages Products Variable Weights Constant Weights 1860, January July $1,565 1.605 1.555 1.50 1.48 1.48 1.705 1.83 2.105 2.655 2.75 2.71 2.875 2.78 8 8 3 2 4 4 6 6 7 8 7 6 6 8 5.9 100 103 99 96 95 95 109 117 135 170 176 173 184 178 800 824 297 192 380 380 654 702 945 1,360 1,232 1,038 1,104 1,424 590.0 607.7 584.1 566.4 560.5 560.5 643.1 690.3 796.5 1,003.0 1,038.4 1,020.7 1,085.6 1,050.2 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January July advance in money wages. If it appears that when the volunteers were disbanded and returned to their usual occu- pations wages did not fall, there will be a strong presumption that some other cause than enlistments was a more powerful factor in determining wages. A study of the individual series of relative wages, as given in the Appendix, shows that during the war the range of fluctuations was considerably narrower in the price of labor than in the price of commodities. For a comparison it is best to take the changes between January, 1860, and Jan- uary, 1865 — the culminating point of prices. The greatest relative advance in price shown by the quarterly table between these dates was 991 per cent, (cotton), and the greatest fall 11 points (raw Italian silk). On the other hand, the greatest advance in wages was 220 per cent, (slate and metal roofers), and the greatest fall 37 per cent, (steam- Wages 291 and gas-fitters' helpers). Thus while the prices of the com- modities included in the table covered a range of 1,002 points, the prices of labor covered but 257. Of the 135 articles for which relative prices are given in 1865 some 67 per cent, had doubled or more than doubled in price ; but this was true of only 3 per cent, of the wage-series and of an even smaller proportion of the wage-earners. Within this comparatively restricted range, however, no great degree of uniformity is observable in the fluctuations of wages. This may best be seen from the subjoined table, in which the wage-earners for whom reports are given in January, 1865, are classified according to the degree in which their wages had changed since 1860 : TABLE XXI WAGE-BAENEB8 IN JAITOABY, 1865, CLAaSITIED ACCOEDING TO EELATIVE CHANGE TO WAGE8 SINCE 1860 Eatio of Wages in Jantiabt, 1865, TO Wages in 1860 NuMBEE or Employees in THE HBSPECTIVE GeODPS Peecentage of Whole Num- BEE of Employees in the Eespeotive Geodps Males Females Males Females 60- m% 4 3 16 30 72 183 444 414 459 787 370 385 379 539 30 2 4 2 "k 12 52 144 54 206 130 10 1 2 5 5 1 0.10^ 0.07 0.39 0.73 1.74 4.44 10.77 10.04 11.13 19.09 8.97 9.34 9.19 13.07 0.73 0.05 0.10 0.05 70-79 80-89 0.96^ 90-99 1.91 100-109 8.28 110-119 22.94 120-129 8.60 130-139 32.80 140-149 20.70 150-159 1.59 160-169 0.16 170-179 0.32 180-189 0.79 190-199 0.79 200-224 0.16 225-249 250-299 300 and over Totals 4,123 628 100.00^ 100.00^ 292 HlSTOET OF THE GrEEENBAOKS This table shows that over nine-tenths of the men had received an increase of between 20 and 100 per cent., and nearly nine-tenths of the women an increase of between 10 and 50 per cent. But there is no very striking concentra- tion on any one point in the scale of increase, except that nearly one-third of the women had gained about one-third, and nearly one-fifth of the men had gained between 50 and 59 per cent, in pay. The absence of cases of extreme variation in the wage- series makes it unnecessary to work out averages in two ways, as was done in the chapter on prices. The reason given for using the median there was that the few commodi- ties which showed an extraordinary advance in price affected the arithmetic mean much more powerfully than the few commodities which were just as extraordinary in not rising at all. Accordingly, the median which is not affected by the degree of divergence from the average shown by any series gave results considerably lower than the arithmetic mean. With the wage data, however, the two methods of averaging give almost the same results. In the above table the median point is found in the group 50-54 per cent, for males and 30-34 per cent, for females. The corresponding arithmetic means are 55 and 28 per cent. Such differences are hardly sufficient to justify the laborious computation of two sets of results.' More concrete ideas regarding the change in wages are given by study of the actual amounts of money received per day in 1860 and 1865. An average wage computed for such diverse kinds of labor as those included in the material would mean little, and consequently a "classified" table has been arranged for the purpose of the comparison. The significant fact brought out by this exhibit is the 1 It may be added that arithmetic means of both wages and prices were com- puted before the superiority of the median in averaging the price series was fuUy appreciated. Wages 293 TABLE XXII EMPLOYEES IN JANUAET OF 1860 AND OF 1865 CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO AMODNT OF DAILY WAGES I Males Females Wage Classes Number of Employees Percentage of Whole Number Number of Employees Percentage of Whole Number 1860 1865 1860 1865 1860 1865 1860 1865 $0.25-0.49 0.50-0.74 0.75-0.99 1.00-1.24 1.25-1.49 1.50 1.74 1.75-1.99 2.00-2.24 2.25-2.49 2.50-2.74 2.75-2.99 3.00-3.24 3.25-3.49 3.50-1- 118 123 599 2,186 542 609 184 628 66 23 1 28 1 3 51 86 57 276 567 381 897 614 332 319 181 259 31 54 2.31^ 2.41 11.72 42.77 10.61 11.92 3.60 12.29 1.29 .45 .01 .55 .01 .06 1.24^ 2.09 1.39 6.72 13.81 9.28 21.85 14.96 80.9 7.77 4.41 6.31 .76 1.32 139 469 14 IC 632 16 250 313 1 11 591 21. 74. 2. 1. 99^ 2] 22 58 2. 42. 52. i. \\ 71^ 30 96 17 86 5,111 4,105 lOO.m 100. 00;? 100.00^ 100.00^ decrease in the number of persons of both sexes in the lower wage classes and the increase in the higher. Among males the largest group of wage earners in 1860 was the $1-$1.24 class, and in 1865 the $1.75-$1.99 class ; among females, the $0.50-$0.74 class in 1860, and the $0.75-$0.99 class in 1865. The median wage for males was $1.05-| in 1860 and $1.90 in 1865. For females it was $0.56 in 1860 and $0.80 in 1865. Greater significance attaches to the results obtained when the numerous wage-series are classified according to ' The totals of Tables XXI and XXII do not agree, because in a few cases the Aldrich Report gives piece-rate wages' instead of time wages, and in a few other cases gives wages with board furnished. As these series show changes in relative pay, they are included in Table XXI, but as they do not show net earnings, they are excluded from Table XXII and all subsequent computations in which-actual, instead of relative, wages is regarded. 294 History op T'He Geeenbacks the various economic groups to which the wage-earners belonged. One such classification — that according to industries — is made in the next table. No industry is included in which returns are not given for an average of at least 200 employees. The results are presented according to both the systems of weighting described above. Comparison of these industries shows that the slightest advance of relative wages occurred in the textile trades which employ numerous women and children. At the other extreme, with the greatest advance are city public works and the manufacture of gas in which the employees represented by the data are all men and mostly men who rank as unskilled laborers. It will be noticed that the two systems of weighting pro- duce results that vary but little. What difiPerence exists, however, is, on the whole, on the side of higher figures for the constant weights. If one compares the two sets of index-numbers for each of the nine industries from January, 1864, when the full effects of the paper currency began to be felt, to July, 1866, one finds that in ten cases the con- stant weights give the same figure as the variable weights, in twelve cases a lower figure, and in thirty-two cases a higher figure. Observation of these differences raises again the problem that was mentioned in discussing the two sys- tems of weighting: What is the cause of the differences — are they accidental results due to the imperfections of the data, or are they indicative of some general feature of the wage situation which has so far been overlooked ? In answer to these questions a hypothetical explanation may be suggested. In organizing the labor force of a fac- tory, a railway, or a commercial house, it is often possible to secure substantially similar results at about the same cost from several different combinations of laborers belonging to different trades or possessing different degrees of skill. For Wages 295 w m (rl n 5q iissiSSS^SS^ss OC0<:Dt-C0iHO"^(M0Dm(Mi-HOiO;.9 i3 -1 ^ l-J M •9 & Jd fS a 1* o a o *3 2 5 •S5 & !Pt1 RJ II a S a S -a en I? ."tn S 13 .'7'a (D i-j fJ Fl K .a i-i ffl TS © c " m o a S o (1) - a Cli) >.^ ^ n & II 1 b ■S .3 Tt K ® § g,^ I* S a n ^^ rH I— I rH rH 03 ' «l4 X o X m en i-J o ^ s H > S90i:;ii8iddY 8S $S 38 SB S3 Sa !l?S SJ33SJ8A(;) ^ O m" il ii §3 is s^ §2 Sa .2 sj,™.J §s 11 33 as ss ^g as S9IBM "$i SS? SS SS SS SS 3S S5 (9IBra9j^) N CO ^ ooo osco coco giiH i«co oo at oa^n ooi Oicn 2'^ oio T-ic i^ i§ 3s SS sS SS 33 sj,3t,H-i8UOa is 13 SS 2§ |B SS II SI9CII9H (SI{:^TraB3[0B|a 1 ss| SS S^ SB 3§ gg |3 SS sq^TraS3[0B]a -ss 88 ^B II 3| gS 11 3g SI9CII9JJ ,SI9piOH -S3| ii SS |g a§ S5 §1 gi SI9P10IH OS 00 =o 8| 3| SS SS gS Ig gg SJ9 flfr ii is is is SS §3 ss SJ9!(n9> 3 d >> 'a oto t^ e 1-3 l-J It. ■t. 1-1 1-s l-J i-j 1^ >-j i-j 1-5 1-5 ^: > a >. d >, fl" 9 a >i a >1 •a d .?? ^ 0} a 3 a aj m n] z ii w i-= 1-J i-j i-j 1-5 >-J i-= 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 h5 $0.25-0.992.... 94 615 100 102 100 102 102 106 115 118 127 137 148 150 162 166 1.00-1.49 m a,5Hii 1(K) KK) 102 9n 101 1(11 119 121 140 151 161 162 l(iX 166 1.50-1.99 121 873 1(H) 1(10 102 102 105 108 11H 119 127 13X 150 152 157 160 2.00-2.49 52 377 KHI KHI 1(10 HK 99 KHI 103 108 117 i;« 142 149 1.5(1 158 2.50-1- 29 57 100 100 99 100 100 98 98 101 106 113 123 122 126 128 473 4,451 — about the close of 1862 — to the end of the period cov- ered by the figures, the increase in relative wages varied in a rough way inversely as per diem wages in 1860, with the important exception that men earning less than $1 per day received a less proportional increase in pay than men in the second class. It also shows that when the rapid fall of prices began early in 1865 these differences between the relative rates of increase in money wages became less. If we take men paid less than $2.50 per day in 1860 — over 98 per cent, of the whole number — we find that the difference between the increase in the relative wages of the various groups declined from 23 points in January, 1864, to 19 points in January, 1865, and to 8 points in July, 1866. As already suggested, the general fact of a connection between the relative increase of wages and the amount 1 July, 1860, to July, 1866, inclusive. 2 Were female employees included with male, the first two series in the above table would be as follows : Per diem Wages 03 tft 00.2 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 in 1860 d 1-5 100 100 101 100 d (6 1-5 101 102 104 96 d 1-5 103 101 >> 107 101 a 1-5 113 119 1-5 114 121 d 1? 120 139 >> ■3 1-5 128 150 d cd 1^ 138 161 146 161 a 1-5 160 167 >> 3 $0.25-0.99 1.00-1.49 1,199 2,538 167 166 306 History of the Greenbacks earned before the sudden advance in cost of living is readily explainable on the hypothesis that the rise of prices rather than the withdrawal of men into the army or any other cause was the chief reason for the higher pay. Though it may not seem so clear at first, both the exception to this general rule in the case of men earning less than $1 per day before the war, and the decreasing divergence between the series after prices had begun to fall, can be accoim.ted for on similar grounds. It is probable that most of the mien repre- sented in the table who received less than |1 a day before the war were unmarried, or at least that a considerably larger proportion of them than of men earning from $1 to $1.49 were without family responsibilities. On the average, a single man is better off, from the material point of view, on a wage of, say, 75 cents a day than a man with a family on a wage of, say, $1.25 a day. If this be so, there is the same reason why men in the first of our groups should receive a less average increase in money wages because of the increased cost of living that there is why men in the third group should receive a less average advance than men in the second, men in the fourth less than men in the third, and men in the fifth group less than men in the fourth. As for the decreasing divergencies between the series of relative wages, a study of the table shows its cause to be that after prices began to fall in January, 1865, the rate of increase in wages became distinctly smaller in the case of the group that had been most affected by the increased cost of living, but not in the case of the other groups. As the changes in the pay of men earning from $1-|1.49 per day conformed more closely to the changes in cost of living when the cost was advancing than did the changes in the pay of other men earning either more or less, so also, when the cost of living declined, this group was the first to show the effect of the change. Wages 307 Similar considerations explain why on the whole the wages of women increased less than the wages of men. One of the reasons commonly given for the fact that female employees are paid less than men for similar work is that they have smaller family responsibilities. ' If such is the case, an increase in the cost of living would press on the average less severely upon working women than upon working men, just as it would press less severely on men receiving high, than upon men receiving low, wages. It would be an error, however, not to note that this connection between earnings and change in relative wages holds true only in a broad and general way. The contrast between the first and second forms of Table XXVIII shows that the rule does not hold uniformly in the smaller wage- groups. Similarly, reference to Table XXV will show that, while the better-paid occupations on the whole exhibit a less considerable increase in relative wages than the poorer- paid occupations, this is not true in every individual case. For example, the average increase in the pay of 440 machin- ists who received an average wage of $1.62 per day in 1860 was 52 per cent, by January, 1865, as compared with 22 per cent, in the case of 69 of their helpers, who got but $1.16 a day in 1860. This qualification means nothing more, however, than that the general law of statistics applies to these figures — uniformities are discovered only when large groups are taken. Another misapprehension may be guarded against by call- 1 A rough illustration of this fact is furnished by the following classiQcation of male and female breadwinners in the United States in 1890 according to conjugal condition — computed from Eleventh Census^ " Population," Part II, p. cxzvi. Total Single Married Widowed Divorced 100^ 100^ 39.2^ 69.8% 57.1^ 13.2^ ZA% 16.1^ 0.3^ Ffimales 0.9^ 308 History of the Gteeenbacks ing attention to the fact that the above discussion refers only to the relative — not to the absolute — increase in money wages. The fact that men earning from f 1 to $1.49 per day in 1860 received a relatively greater advance in pay than any other class does not mean that the extra sums given them were as large as the sums added to the pay of employees of higher grade. As a matter of fact, the actual increase was greater in the pay of men receiving higher wages at the outset. To bring out this fact, Table XXIX has been pre- pared by computing the average actual increase of pay represented by the average relative increase for each of the groups of Table XXVIII B. A wage midway between the greatest and the least included in each group has been taken as the basis for the computations. TABLE XXIX AVEEAGE ACTUAL INCEEASB IN DAILY WAGES OF MALE EMPLOYEES, COMPUTED EKOM TABLE XXVIU B i^ 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 ^"g g g ^ a rt ri a nj S5> ^ ^ ii( >-» i-s 1-5 1^ 1-5 i-s 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 i-s $0.62 $.00 $.01 $.00 $.01 $.01 $.04 $.09 $.11 $.17 $.23 $.30 $.31 $.38 $.41 1.25 .(H) .(Kl .03 .06 .01 .01 .24 .26 ..5(1 .«+ .76 .78 ,85 .Ki 1.75 .(K) .(Rl .04 .04 .09 .14 .28 .33 .47 .67 .88 .91 1.00 1.05 2.25 .(Ht .(HI .00 .05 .02 .00 .07 .IX .38 .81 .95 1.10 1 13 1.31 3.00 .00 .00 .03 .00 .00 .06 .06 .03 .18 .39 .69 .66 .78 .84 According to this table the most considerable average increase in actual wages was that of men earning from $2 to $2.49 per day in 1860; but the relative increase was greater in the case of men earning less, because the smaller actual additions bore a higher proportion to the lower initial wages. Of the two forms of presentation — relative and actual increase — the former seems to possess more significance when one is concerned with the economic well being of Wages 309 wage-earners, for the reason that the importance of a given sum added to an income depends upon the amount of that income before the addition is made. An increase of 75 cents to the daily wage of an unskilled laborer who formerly received $1.25 means more to him than an increase of $1 to the daily wage of a carpenter who had been paid $2.25. Consequently a better idea of the alteration in the circum- stances of the two men is afforded by saying that the day- laborer's pay had been increased 60 per cent, and the car- penter's 44 per cent., than by saying that the former's pay had been increased 75 cents and the latter's $1. As has been said, an average wage computed from the returns of employees of such diverse character as the persons for whom the Aldrich Report gives returns means compara- tively little ; but there is no valid objection to a computation of the average variation in the pay of men in unlike occupa- tions. While a series of such averages does not present the facts concerning the changes in the wages of any specific individuals or groups, it is nevertheless the only means by which a general notion regarding the circumstances of the whole class of workingmen can be arrived at. Consequently it seems worth while to present a summary of the average relative wages of all employees for whom we have data and to compare it with the results obtained by Professor Falkner from practically the same material. This is the purpose of Table XXX. Between the two forms of the semiannual table it is found again that the differences are slight, but that the constant weights give slightly higher figures. In order to test once again the explanation given above for this difference, all of the wage-series have been divided into two nearly equal groups, one containing the 255 series that show an advance by January, 1865, of 42 per cent, or less, and the other the 257 series that show an advance of 43 per cent, or more. The 310 History of the Geeenbaoks TABLE XXX AVEEA6E BBLATIVE WAGES OF ALL : EMPLOYEES FOE WHOM DATA AEE GIVEN IN TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH KEPOET Semiannual Table Falknei :'s Table 1 Variable Weights Constant Weights Simple Average Weighted Average 1860, January July 100 100 100 / 99 J 100.0 100.0 1861, January July 102 99 102 99 100.8 100.7 1862, January July 102 104 102 103 102.9 103.7 1863, January July 116 119 114 I 119 110.5 118.8 1864, January July 131 142 132 / 144 S 125.6 134.0 1865, January July 152 155 156 / 159 ) 143.1 148.6 1866, January July 161 164 165 / 166 ) 152.4 155.6 former group includes 27 per cent, of the whole number of employees in 1860 and 38 per cent, in 1865; conversely, the latter group includes 73 per cent, of the whole number in 1860 and 62 per cent, in 1865. Lest it be thought that this difference is due to the prominence of the one very large series — laborers employed by establishment 35 — the figures have been recomputed after excluding it. Then the result is that the group of series showing an increase less than the median include 35 per cent, of the employees in 1860 and 42 per cent, of the employees in 1865, while the corresponding figures for the other group are 65 and 58 per cent. The data thus show unmistakably the tendency to substitute employees whose pay had increased relatively less for employees whose pay had increased relatively more, wher- ever such a change was feasible. 1 AldrichBeport, Part I, pp. 174, 176. Wages . 311 The discrepancies between bath the columns of the semi- annual table and the two sets of results obtained by Falkner are much greater than the differences produced by variable and constant weights. These discrepancies deserve care- ful attention, because they show clearly the effects produced by dissimilar methods of analyzing substantially the same data. The first of the Falkner summaries was obtained by striking a simple arithmetic average of the 500 or more wage-series, all of which were treated as having precisely the same importance. In the semiannual table, on the con- trary, each series was weighted by the number of persons whose pay it represented. That this difference in the method of striking the averages must produce somewhat divergent results may be seen from Table XXVIII A or B. Not only are the wage-groups in this table that show the greatest increase in pay represented by a larger number of series than the groups that show a smaller increase, but, more than this, their series include on the average a larger number of employees. Falkner's method of preparing a general aver- age of variations would allow to each of these groups an influence upon the result in proportion to the number of series included in it; but the method adopted in construct- ing the semiannual table would give each group an impor- tance in proportion to the number of employees. For example, in computing the index number for January, 1865, the group $1-$1.49, which shows the greatest advance in money wages, would have a weight of 35 per cent., accord- ing to Professor Falkner's method, because 179 of the 505 series fall within it, and a weight of 50 per cent, according to the second method, because 2,325 of the 4,696 employees fall within it. It is further true that the average index num- ber for this group is higher when calculated according to the second method, because the large series as a rule show a 312 Hia,TOEr OF THE Greenbacks somewhat greater increase than the small series. This last fact may perhaps mean that establishments requiring the services of many hands found it necessary in order to secure full quotas to offer wages rather higher than a small employer was compelled to pay to secure two or three men. The second of the Falkner series in Table XXX, like the semiannual series, is a " weighted " average. But the meth- ods of weighting adopted in the two cases are very different. Instead of multiplying each relative wage by the number of employees whose pay it represented. Professor Falkner struck a simple average of the relative wages in each indus- try and then multiplied the series for each industry by the number of persons engaged in it according to the fed- eral census reports. As several of his critics have pointed out, there are grave objections to this procedure. First, the census does not purport to show the number of persons engaged in industries — like the manufacture of agricultural implements, for example ; but the number of persons engaged in various occupations — -like painting, bricklaying, tailoring, carpentering, and the like. Nor is it possible to ascertain from these returns for occupations the numbers employed in industries. To take one example, the first of Falkner' s industries — " Agricultural Implements " — is weighted for the years 1880-91 by the number of persons reported in the occupation tables of the Tenth Census under the caption "Agricultural Implement Makers " — viz., 4,891.' But that this number does not include by any means all the persons engaged in this industry is indicated by the follow- ing footnote appended to the caption in the census table: " Generally reported as ' iron founders,' ' carpenters,' ' machin- ists,' 'painters and varnishers,' etc." Second, if the weights used are erratic, some of the series for the industries to which they are applied are not less so. 1 Tenth Census, Vol. I, " Population," p. 746 ; cf. Aldrich Report, Part I, p. 175. Wages 313 It has been pointed out above that the nixmber of wage- series in several of the "industries" of the Aldrich Report is altogether insufficient to give a reliable indication of the general trend of wages.' To take the most extreme cases, there are but two series for "Groceries" and three for "Dry Goods." ^ Of course this is an altogether inadequate basis for conclusions about the wages of salesmen, yet " Dry Goods " receives, in Professor Falkner's table, a weight sec- ond only to that of " Building Trades." In considering which of the four series of relative wages in Table XXX has the best claim to acceptance, therefore, Falkner's weighted series must be discarded. Curiously enough it approaches the results of the semiannual tables more closely than its companion series of simple averages. But in view of the faulty method by which the weights were obtained and the recklessness with which they were applied, this closer approach must be regarded as an acci- dental virtue. Of the three remaining series, Professor Falkner's simple average will be preferred only by those, if any such there be, who believe that in computing average variations in wages no attention should be paid to the number of persons employed at different rates of pay. On the other hand, the semiannual table will be preferred by those in whose eyes the numbers are important. Perhaps the difference between the two tables can best be expressed by saying that Falkner's simple average shows the average change in the price paid for various kinds of work, allowing to each kind an importance in proportion to the number of reporting establishments in which it is performed, while the semi- annual table shows the average change in the pay of all the wage-earners for whom returns are given. 1 See sec. ii, above. 2 See Table XX, above. 314 HiSTOKT OF THE GREENBACKS IV. EELATIVB MONEY WAGES IN THE COAL, IKON, GLASS, AND POTTERY INDUSTRIES The preceding discussion has been confined to the material afforded by Table XII of the Aldrich Report. Before combining the figures for money wages with the tables of prices it is in order to seek what additional wage- data may be found in other sources. The task of collecting material for the Aldrich committee regarding wages in the coal, iron, glass, and pottery industries was intrusted to Mr. Joseph D. Weeks. His report presented the data in such a different form that they cannot readily be compared with the uniform returns for other industries secured by the Department of Labor. Not only do Mr. Weeks's tables fail to report number and sex of the workers, but they also do not give wages for the same TABLE XXXI EELATIVB WAGES OF COAL MINERS 1 AUTHBACITB COAL Bituminous Coal Anthracite Coal Bituminous Coal Date T3te « M 13te Date Date '^ bo 1^ eg a •3te or Date 1859, Nov 1860, March .. Dec 1861, May Aug 1862, May July.. .. Nov 1863, July.. .. Sep 1864, May July. . . . 93 107 93 107 93 100 107 123 154 185 208 239 100 100 '50 75 88 88 100 150 200 250 1859 1860 isei 1861 1861 1862 1862 1863 1863 1864 1865, May July Sep Oct 1866, Jan Feb April June Aug Dec 208 162 185 208 169 181 166 185 208 166 250 200 1865 i866 1 In computing the relative ■wages in the first of these series the average of the wage paid in November, 1859 {$6 per week), and March^ 1860 ($6.96), was taken as the basis. In the case of the second series the months of the year in which the specified wages were paid are not stated. Wages 315 months in the year. As a glance at any of the previous tables will show, this second lack of uniformity is particu- larly serious when one is studying the effects of the green- back issues, because wages changed so rapidly during the war. It is, therefore, necessary to take up Mr. Weeks's reports for the several industries separately. For the coal industry he gives two series, one presenting the weekly wages of a miner of anthracite coal doing " company work " in Luzerne county, Pa., and the other showing the price paid per bushel for mining bituminous coal near Pittsburg. These series are shown in the preced- ing table. Both these series show a somewhat greater relative TABLE XXXII BBIiATITB WAQES OF IBON-OBG MINEBB New Jeeset OxroBD , N. J. COENWAIL, Pa. Blasters and Drillers Miners Un- skilled Laborers Skilled Laborers Miners Per diem wage, 1860 1860 Oct. $1.00 100 113 100 100 144 144 163 200 250 250 iiOO 150 165 Per diem wage, 1860 1860 $1.00 100 '90 100 125 i75 i88 1.38 150 Per diem wage, 1860 1860 $0.75 100 ioi 120 133 207 isi i93 $0.95 100 ios 116 126 ira 179 isi $1.25 100 1861 1862 1863 1864, Jan. Feb. 1861, Oct. 1862,July 1863,July 1861 1862 1863 100 108 112 Apr. July 1865, Jan. Apr. July 1866, Jan. 1864 200 1864,July 1865 120 1865,July 1866, Jan. 1866,July 1866 132 316 History of the Geeenbacks increase of pay than any of the occupations included in Table XXV, but not greater than some of the individual series, as may be seen by referring to Table XXI. The anthracite miners belong in the f 1.00-$ 1.24 wage group, for their pay per day before the war averaged $1.08. In which group the bituminous miners belong it is difficult to say. During the nine years, 1852 to 1860, they had been paid two cents a bushel, and according to Mr. Weeks men in good mines working full time could mine about 100 bushels a day. What average earnings per day had been, however, we do not know. Among men engaged in mining iron ore Mr. Weeks' s figures also show not only a large increase in money wages, but also violent fluctuations from time to time. An attempt to compare the five series relating to this industry is made in Table XXXII. Men employed in making pig iron, on the contrary, received an advance in pay below the average, if the two series given by Mr. Weeks and represented in Table XXXIII give a correct impression. TABLE XXXIII EEIiATiVii WAGES IN THE PIG IRON IND0STET Catasauqua, Pa. Year Fillers at Blast Furnace Keepers at Blast Furnace Per diem, wage, 1860. I860 11.37 100 105 91 101 153 141 142 SI. 85 100 1861 103 1862 91 1863 103 1864 146 1865 135 1866 130 Wages 317 TABLE XXXIV EELATIVE EAENINGS IN THE BAR IRON INDUSTRY PnDDLiNQ Iron Etna, Pa. Date PM 03 3 tJ ID Puddling Iron Dunoannon, Pa. 3M 3 Ph' W EoLLiNG Iron Ddncannon, Pa. oPS EH t4 <0 WO Per diem wage,'60 1860 September 8 1861 1862, April 12.... July 12 August 23.. September 1 September22 October. . . . October 18. November 35 1863, April April 25 May 2 June July December . . 1864, January 30.. April 9 May May 17 June June 4 July August 27 . . October 1 . . . December . . 1865,February 4. . March April May 13 July September . . September 9 September23 October 21. 1866 January 6. . January 27. March 31. . December 22 100 ioo iis i25 i38 iso i63 m iss 200 225 200 150 i44 200 200 225 $2.67 100 ioo ii2 i25 i37 iso i62 iis isi 200 225 200 150 iis 200 201 226 11.33 100 ioo iis i26 i38 iso ies iis iss 26i 226 26i 150 iii 201 202 227 100 ioo iii 129 136 143 isi 171 186 214 229 200 iii 157 171 200 200 2.01 100 ioo iii 129 136 143 iss 189 206 223 257 2i5 240 206 189 205 240 240 11.01 100 ioo iii 129 136 143 ise 188 205 222 256 2i3 2i6 205 188 205 240 240 100 100 113 125 iss 150 im iis ies iso 138 150 165 i58 16S $3.20 100 100 113 125 i38 150 ies iis ies iso 138 ISO 165 i58 165 318 History of the Geeenbaoks For the bar iron industry Mr. Weeks' s reports are not quite so restricted. They indicate a large increase in the pay of puddlers and their helpers, checked by a brief reac- tion in 1865, and for the better paid bar-rollers an increase not greatly in advance of that of pig-iron workers. The two series given by Mr. Weeks as representative of the pottery industry are both for men making very high wages. The net earnings of the hollow-ware pressors from 1859 to 1863 are reported as $10 a day, and of the handlers as $9. The dollar a day added to their earnings in 1864 accordingly represented a relatively slight increase. TABLE XXXV KELATIVE EAENINGS OP POTTEES Year Hollow-Ware Pressers Handlers Average net earnings in 1860 $10.00 100 100 100 100 110 110 110 $9 00 1860 100 1861 100 1862 100 1863 1864 100 111 1865 1866 111 111 Finally, Mr. Weeks gives six series representing the aver- age daily earnings of glass-blowers engaged in making win- dow glass and green-glass bottles of various sizes. These figures are for years beginning in September and ending in May or June, for glass-blowing is generally suspended during the summer months. Table XXXVI shows that until May, 1866, the average earnings of blowers had increased slightly less than wages in the industries represented in Table XXX. Wages 319 TABLE XXXVI EELATIVE EARNINGS OP GLASS BL0WEB9 Blowers of Window - Glass Blowers of Green Glass Bottles Year 2 oz. 4 oz. 8 oz. Pint Quart Av. earnings a day in 1859-60 $3.32 100 lOO 100 100 100 136 151 213 $2.25 100 93 100 100 100 149 149 233 $2.25 100 98 107 107 107 156 156 231 $2.40 100 96 110 110 110 156 156 225 JS2.97 100 91 121 121 121 148 148 167 $3.08 1859-60 100 1860-61 94 1861-62 125 1862-63 125 1863-64 125 1864-65 155 1865-66 155 1866-67 159 V. RELATIVE SALARIES OF SCHOOL TEACHERS The Aldrich committee found it impractical to collect data regarding the earnings of professional men, such as lawyers, physicians, or even clergymen ; but as in a measure representative of this whole class their statistician used a few carefully selected returns of the salaries of teachers in the public schools of four cities — Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and St. Louis — and of two rural counties in Massachusetts — Franklin and Barnstable. These returns are presented in Table XXXVII. On the whole, these results accord well with those of the preceding sections. The average increase in the salaries of male teachers is less than that shown by any of the twenty- seven occupations represented in Table XXV with two excep- tions. The discussion based on Table XXVIII suggests that the reason for this slight increase is found in the high initial earnings. On the other hand, a seeming contradiction of the rule is found in the fact that the advance in the sal- aries of women teachers is greater than in the case of men. But this exception is one in seeming only. In gathering 320 History of the Greenbacks TABLE XXXVII RELATIVE SALARIES OF SCHOOL TEACHERS, 1860-66 Boston Baltimore Cinoin'ati St. Louis COUNTRI Schools IN Mass. Average op ALL Series M. Fern. M. Fern. M. Fern. M. Fern. M. Fem. M. Fem Both No. o f serie s 3 2 3 6 3 3 2 2 2 2 13 15 28 Av'r'g e $2,267 $400 $1,167 $292 $1,423 $390 $1,225 $400 $34.09 $17.52 saint s pr yr. pryr. pryr. pryr. pryr. pryr. pryr. pryr. prmo prmo iear I860.. . 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1861.. . 100 100 100 100 87 91 fifi 78 102 95 92 95 93 1862.. . 100 100 100 100 87 91 82 91 100 99 94 97 96 1863.. . 100 100 100 100 100 100 101 97 100 100 100 1864.. . 109 127 i;« 178 120 100 123 131 106 101 118 1,39 129 1865.. . 125 145 130 na 120 100 12S 131 128 115 1?.5 143 135 1866.. . 125 145 159 249 138 117 139 143 137 126 140 183 164 their data the agents of the Aldrich committee found it pos- sible to include only the highest and the lowest grades of teachers ; because the intermediate grades are so many and show such variations in pay that no satisfactory data could be obtained regarding them.' Since the highest grades of teachers in American schools are men and the lowest women, the figures of the report for women relate to teachers with very low salaries and the figures for men to well-paid teach- ers. The salaries of the women range from $100 to $500 a year and those of the men from $900 to $2,800. Now, while it has been shown that in most industries in which both sexes participate the average increase in the pay of men was greater, it does not follow that the increase in the wages of the best-paid men was greater than that in the wages of the worst-paid women. Indeed, a comparison of the two parts of Table XXVIII A will show that the men belonging in the wage-groups $2.25-$2.49 and above received on the whole a smaller average advance than the 628 females for whom we have returns. Of course, in Table XXXVII we are com- 1 Aldrich Report, Part I, p. 184. Wages 321 paring with women men receiving on the average con- siderably more than $2.25 a day. A less definite, but nevertheless an important contribu- tion to knowledge of the economic situation of professional men during the war, is supplied by an inquiry made in 1869 by David A. Wells, then special commissioner of the revenue. "The answers," he says in his fourth report, "to a large number of circulars sent out by the commissioner during the past year to clergymen, teachers and other professional men, lead to the conclusion that, while their salaries or incomes have, as a general rule, been advanced since 1861, the advance has not been equal, by any means, in extent, to the advance in the price of commodities."' Since prices fell after January, 1865, while money earn- ings of such persons apparently continued to increase, it follows that the case of these correspondents was probably worse during the war than when their troubles were laid before Mr. Wells in 1869. VI. EELATIVE WAGES OP FAEM LABOEEES It is especially regretable that wages of farm laborers are not included in the exhibits of the Aldrich Report, because they formed in the United States of the Civil War the largest single class of wage-earners.^ Nor can this gap be satisfactorily closed with material drawn from other sources. The Department of Agriculture has made several investigations into the wages of farm laborers, but the earliest of these was not undertaken until 1866, and no systematic 1 H. B. Executive Document No. 27, p. xlii, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 In the occupations table ot the Census of 1860 the number of " farm laborers " in the nine states represented in the material of the Aldrich Report (see sec, 2) is reported as 335,246, while the number of "laborers" given is 512,481. But the pre- ponderance of the latter class is probably due to the fact that in rural districts a farm hand is often reported simply as a " laborer " on the schedules filled in by the enumerator and tabulated as such in the Census Office, when he should have been reported as an " agricultural laborer." 322 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS attempt was made then to ascertain what wages had been paid in former years. Mr. Dodge, the statistician of the department, however, gave it as his opinion that there had been an increase of about 50 per cent, between 1861 and 1866.' But when the ninth of these investigations was made, in 1892, the department requested its correspondents to send it copies of any accessible wage-records relating to years before 1866. A considerable number of replies was received from different sections of the country and published by Mr. Dodge in his report.^ Fragmentary as is this mate- rial, one can glean from it a few series that may give some notion of the changes in the pay of farm hands during the war. The results of such an attempt are presented in Table XXXVIII. TABLE XXXVIII RELATIVE WAGES OF FAKM LABOBEBS Terms 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 Males 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 loo 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 89 99 90 108 109 108 100 100 88 100 104 100 100 100 100 120 84 127 137 108 109 108 89 100 106 117 104 100 100 100 100 126 129 167 138 136 117 104 138 118 133 125 120 117 93 136 133 137 135 167 354 145 133 125 1S4 129 167 167 160 150 133 136 147 Per month, with board, Mass., Southampton.... Per month, with board. Mass 132 154 173 Per month, with board, N.J., for summer only.. Per month, with board, N.J., for whole year 154 145 Per month, with board [ ?], Ohio, Butler Co 154 Per month, with board. 111., Champaign Co Per day, with board, common labor, N.J 147 167 Per day, with board, harvest. Pa 160 Per day, with board [ ?1, Ohio, Butler Co Per day, without bd. [1], harvest, O., Butler Co. Females Per week, with board [ ?] Ohio, Butler Co 183 167 155 Average relative wages of the sixteen series — 100 99 107 126 145 158 Scanty as is this material, it seems to be the most authentic upon the subject, and some interest attaches, 1 Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, 1866, p. 81. 2 Wages of Farm Labor in the United States (Department of Agriculture, Divi- sion of Statistics, Misc. Series, Eeport No. 4, 1892), pp. 54^-69. Wages 323 therefore, to a comparison with the fuller returns for other occupations. To facilitate such comparison the series for " farm laborers," " all employees," " laborers," and "unskilled laborers" are placed side by side in Table XXXIX. TABLE XXXIX COMPARISON OF EELATITE WAGES OF FABM LABOBEBS AND OTHER WAGE-EARNEEB Date Farm Laborers Tab. XXXYIII All Employees Table XXX Laborers Table XXV Unskilled Laborers Table XXVI 1860, January July ioo 99 iOT i26 U5 i58 100 100 102 99 102 104 116 119 131 142 152 155 100 100 100 93 100 101 123 125 143 167 173 176 100 100 1861, January July 103 93 1862, January July 100 99 1863, January July 121 121 1864, January July 143 157 1865, January July 169 167 From this comparison it appears that farm laborers received an advance in money wages slightly greater than the average for the 5,000 employees for whom the Aldrich Report gives returns, but considerably less than the advance in the pay of the groups with which they have most in common. This result is what the previous analysis would lead one to anticipate. As the rise of wages seems to have been due primarily to an increase in living expenses, one would expect to find that when part of this increased expense was assumed by the employer in furnishing board, the advance in money wages would be less than when the person had to find himself. Table XXXVIII shows that in the case of but one of the sixteen series is it positively stated that the pay was "without board." Second, there seems reason to believe that, as a rule, farm hands have smaller family responsibilities than unskilled laborers in towns. 324 HisTOEY OP THE Gbeenbaoks The occupation returns of the census of 1860 are not classi- fied by conjugal condition, but it is improbable that there was a change in this respect in the next generation sufficient to invalidate the application of the ratios shown by the census of 1890. According to the latter census, in the nine states covered by the Aldrich returns, slightly more than one-half of the "unspecified laborers" were married as com- pared with but three-tenths of the " agricultural laborers." As many who belong in the latter class are probably classi- fied erroneously in the former, the real difference would appear greater, could it be ascertained accurately.' As has been suggested, a single man is less affected by a sudden increase in the cost of living than one with a family, and the previous discussions seem to show that wage-earners received an increase in money wages roughly proportioned to the dis- tress caused them by the rise of prices. VII. TABLES OF RELATIVE MONEY WAGES BASED UPON THE MATERIAL IN VOL. XX OP THE TENTH CENSUS The second of the great collections of data regarding wages in the United States covering the period of the Civil War is found in Vol. XX of the Tenth Census (1880). Beginning in 1820, the Census Office had made attempts to ascertain the rates of wages paid in the census year; but in 1880 this investigation was extended to cover a long series of years. Blank schedules were sent to the proprietors of a large number of carefully selected manufacturing establish- ments representing over fifty measurably distinct industries and located in different sections of the country, with the 1 The figures compiled from Table CXVI of the second volume on Population aro as follows : Agricultural Laborers Laborers, Unspecified Whole number 470,105 782,844 Single, number 312,603 353,124 Single, per cent. . 67 45 Married, number 141,341 398,359 Married, per cent. 30 51 Wages 325 request that they report the wages paid to certain important classes of their employees for as many years as their records allowed. When these schedules were received by the Census Office they were examined, and when necessary sent back to the manufacturers for correction, completion, or explanation. "Not infrequently," it is stated in the report, "schedules were passed backward and forward several times before a final adjustment was reached.'" Owing to the care exercised in their compilation, the figures as finally published have borne a good reputation;^ but very little use has been made of them because of the inconvenient form of publication. Mr. Joseph D. Weeks, the special agent in charge of the investigation, made no attempt to analyze or combine the data obtained, or to discuss their significance. He confined his efforts to collecting and verifying materials from many sources, and published the reports made to him by some 600 factories substantially as received. Consequently anyone who desired to make use of the material was under the hard necessity of working it into intelligible form for himself. An examination of the figures as published, however, shows sufficient promise in them to warrant an attempt to discover how far they bear out the inferences drawn from the materials already dealt with. In particular, the Census figures have the great merit of being more comprehensive than the data of the Aldrich Report. Nearly three times as many wage-series available for the present investigation can be collected from the former source as from the latter, and these series represent a larger number of branches of manufacture and a larger geographical area. A conspectus 1 Tenth Cemus, Vol. XX, p. xv. 2 See, for example, the opinion expressed by C. J. Bullock in his paper upon *'Wage Statistics and the Federal Census," in T/ie i^'ederaZ Ce?i5«s ("Publications American Economic Association," New Series, No. 2), pp. 351, 352, and the prefatory note by General F. A. Walkee in the report itself, p. x. 326 HiSTOKY OP THE GeEENBACKS of the material derived from the census is afforded by Table XL. In this exhibit twelve industries are marked by a star (*) to indicate that they are not represented in the wage- TABLE XL CLASSIFIOATION OF WAGE-8EKIE3 FEOM THE TENTH CENSUS 1. According to Industkies Agricultural implements Boots and shoes* Breweries Brick* Carriages Carpets* Clothing* Cotton Flint glassf Flour mills* Furniture* Gas and coke Hardware Ice* Iron blast f urnacesf Iron mining^ Machinery Marble Paper Pianos* Pins* Pottery! Rolling mills! Saw mills Ship carpentry* Stove foundries! Tanneries Tin* Tobacco* Woolen Total go 1 3 1 3 9 1 3 14 i 5 13 2 7 1 8 2 11 2 7 3 1 4 1 7 2 4 ■8 1 4 10 142 5 17 4 32 73 18 17 258 62 28 117 4 47 9 76 3 98 11 103 26 3 38 6 61 8 46 63 7 16 173 1429 II. ACCOEDING TO LOCATION East: Maine New Hampshire. Massachusetts. . Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania . . . Delaware Maryland District of Col- umbia West Virginia West: Ohio Indiana . . . Illinois. : . Kentucky. Michigan . Wisconsin Iowa Missouri. Total East and West 3 8 16 8 26 7 12 2 2 1 1 86 13 13 7 6 3 6 2 6 56 142 CD tn a '' ;« 51 114 208 116 265 52 134 4 13 1 11 969 128 100 63 51 23 45 9 41 460 1429 Wages 327 tables of the Aldrich Report, and six more by a dagger (•}•) to indicate that they are included only in the supple- mentary returns discussed in sec. iv above.' Quite as important as the larger number of industries is the greater geographical range of the material. As was pointed out in sec. ii, all the establishments for which returns are inserted in the main wage-table of the Aldrich Beport were situated in states east of Ohio, with the exception of a single gas plant. But of the series obtained from the Tenth Census nearly one-third are from the middle West. This makes it pos- sible to compare the fluctuations of money wages in different sections of the country. On the other hand, the character of the Census series is in several respects distinctly inferior to that of the Aldrich series. (1) But one wage is reported for the different kinds of labor in each year, and it is not stated whether this quotation rep- resents the average wages for the whole year, or the wages paid in some one month. This must be regarded as a decided blemish, particularly unfortunate for the study of money wages during the war; for the preceding summaries show distinctly that from 1863 to 1865 wages were fluctuating so violently that there was on the average a considerable difference between the rates paid at the beginning, middle, and end of the year, and that the average for twelve months might differ from the wage at any specified date within the year. (2) The sex of the employees is not uniformly reported, so that it is impossible to separate the female from the male series. (3) The number of persons whose pay is represented by the series is not stated. Thus it becomes necessary in making up summaries from these series to treat them in the way that Professor Falkner treated the Aldrich material — that is, to disregard the number of wage-earners 1 This division cannot be made with entire confidence in every case, because no precise statement is made of the nature of the establishments included in the twenty-one " industries " of the Aldrich Beport. 328 History of the Gkeenbaoks belonging to the different groups altogether. (4) The material is even more strictly confined to manufacturing industries than that of the Aldrich Report. Because of these limitations of the Census wage material — particularly the absence of information regarding the numbers employed at different wages — it seems advisable to confine the comparison between it and the series from the Aldrich Report to a few of the most general forms of presentation. We may begin by comparing the average variation in relative wages as computed from all the series derived from both sources. TABLE XLI COMFABISOX OF RELATIVE WAGES COMPUTED FROM THE TENTH CENSUS AND THE ALDRICH REPORT Census of 1880 Palkner's Table Semi- Total East West Table Number of series 1860 1,429 100 102 106 117 133 145 152 969 100 101 104 112 127 141 150 460 100 103 112 127 144 153 155 543 100 101 103 111 126 143 152 520 100 1861 102 99 1862 102 104 1863 116 119 1864 131 142 1865 152 155 1866 161 164 It will be observed that there is a remarkably close correspondence between the average variation in wages computed from the Census material for the eastern states and Professor Falkner's average for all industries. This correspondence enhances confidence in the approximate Wages 329 accuracy of both sets of data. These are the two columns that ought logically to agree, because they refer to prac- tically the same district and the averages are obtained in the same way. On the other hand, the lack of correspondence between the results of the Census series and the semiannual table does not disturb faith in the latter, because of the unavoidable difference in the methods employed. As has just been explained, in the latter case each relative wage was weighted by the number of persons whose pay it repre- sented, while in the case of the Census series this could not be done for lack of data. Substantial agreement is here shown by differences nearly identical with those between the two series obtained from the Aldrich material by the two methods of computation. But while the general average variation in wages appears practically the same in the Census and the Falkner tables, the fluctuations of the individual series from the two sources are somewhat different. This is best shown by Table XLII : TABLE XLII WAGE-SERIES TEOM THE TENTH CENSUS AND THE ALDEICH EEPOET CLASSIFIED ACCOEDING TO EELATIYE CHANGE IN WAGES BETWEEN 1860 AND 1865 No. of • Sbeies in Each Geoup Peecentage of Series in Each Group Ratio of Wages in 1865 TO Wages IN 1860 Census of 1880 Aldr'ch Report Series Census d 1880 Aldr'ch Report Series Total East West Total East West 60-99 % 21 182 164 349 268 208 75 112 41 7 2 19 111 128 273 185 144 35 50 19 5 2 71 36 76 83 64 40 62 22 2 2 19 13 71 132 148 80 33 10 3 1 1 1.5^ 12.7 11.5 24.4 18.8 14. b 5.2 7.8 2.9 0.5 0.1 1.9^ 11.5 13.2 28.2 19.1 14.9 3.6 5.2 1.9 0.5 • % • • 0.4^ 15.4 7.8 16.6 18.1 13.9 8.7 13.5 4.8 0.4 0.4 2.5 13.9 25 8 No change 101-119^ 120-139 140-159 29.0 160-179 15.7 180-199 6 5 200-219 1.9 220-259 0.6 260-299 0.2 300 and over 0.2 1429 969 460 511 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 330 History of the G-eeenbaoks As shown here, the grouping of the series from the Cen- sus is somewhat less symmetrical. A relatively larger num- ber show no variation or a very considerable increase. Of the series used in the semiannual table 71 per cent, show an increase of from 20 to 79 per cent, in wages, as compared with 62 per cent, of the eastern and 49 per cent, of the western Census series. A second fact brought out by Table XLI is that the in- crease in relative wages seems to have been greater in the Mississippi valley than on the Atlantic slope. This differ- ence is due, in part at least, to the fact that the textile indus- tries that furnish over 30 per cent, of the Census series (Table XL) had their chief seats in the East, and in them the relative increase of wages has been shown to have been least among the industries represented in Table XII of the Aldrich Reports But this fact cannot account for the whole difference, because among persons belonging to the same economic groups the average increase in pay was generally greater in the West. The following table has been arranged to bring out this relation. It shows the relative wages paid in the eastern and western states to men following the eight trades most fully represented in the Tenth Census returns. It will be noticed that in six of these eight cases western workingmen received a larger average increase in pay than their fellows in the East. Why this should have been so is a question that can best be discussed after the course of prices in the two sections of the country has been investi- gated.^ There is one feature of this table that seems to contra- dict certain of the conclusions drawn from the Aldrich Report data. In Table XXV it appears that the poorest- paid occupations as a rule show the greatest relative gain in wages, but the same is not true of Table XLIII. This > See Table XXIII, above. a See pp. 346, 347, below. Wages ^ 93 :^ g ^ iH rH rH tH rH rH i-H 1 S 8 tH tH iH iH iH tH iH i 1 S sssssss 1 §3 S ii tH iHiHtHiHiH H 1 CO 5 d 8g3§SgS -U s S g rH rHrHrHrH m O CO ?2 8rH(NmCoScO rH rH rH rH rH 1-) rH 1 1^ §3 8§8SSSg iH iH iH rH iH r-t S to R} M H n 1 t* s ^ O O rH (M CO -^ -^ rH rH rH rH rH rH rH la tH o 8g8SSigS rH rH rH rH rH rH rH w 8|SSg|g 1 s rH rH rH rH rH rH rH CQ 1 t- s ^ ■8S!3SS£^ r-\ 1-^ 1^ -r-i r-i r-i i-i 1 g? s rH rH rH rH rH rH rH 1 m ID S sssasgg 1 S s d rH rH rH rH rH rH rH o to 03^ ::::::: ^S J 00 00 CO CO CO CO OD 332 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS observation suggests that the connection between ratio of increase and earnings per day, of which so much has been made, may not be shown by the Census material. When, however, these series are all classified according to daily wages received in 1860 and the average rates of increase computed for the several groups, this inference is found to be mistaken. The figures for the comparison are given in Table XLIV, A and B, which corresponds to Table XXVIII, A and B. TABLE XLIV WAGE-SEBIES TEOM THE TENTH CENSUS CLASSIFIED ACCOKDINO TO DAILY WAGES EECEIVED IN 1860 Per- Diem Wages Eeceived in 1860 No. of Series I860 1861 1862 1863 1861 1865 1866 $0.15-0.49 63 100 101 103 116 126 146 162 0.50-0.74 126 100 103 108 114 128 144 158 0.75-0.99 169 100 101 107 119 140 158 167 1.00-1.24 262 100 101 106 118 138 149 156 1.25-1.49 191 100 103 109 123 138 149 156 1.50-1.74 254 100 101 106 116 134 143 149 1.75-1.99 108 100 102 107 118 132 143 145 2.00-2.24 120 100 101 106 114 126 136 140 2.25-2.49 28 100 99 101 105 117 120 124 2.50-3.99 89 100 101 106 113 120 127 131 4.00-6.99 19 100 102 102 105 112 126 127 Per Diem Wages Received in 1860 No. of Series 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Under $1.00 $1.00-1.49 1.50-1.99 2.00-2.49 2.50+ 358 453 362 148 108 100 100 100 100 100 102 102 101 101 101 107 107 106 105 106 117 120 117 112 112 133 138 133 124 119 151 149 143 133 126 163 156 148 137 131 While the general rule that there is a regular connection between the advance in pay under the stimulus of the price disturbances and the amount of wages earned before the war Wages 333 is fully confirmed by this exhibit, it is noticeable that the most considerable gain is found, not among persons earning $1— $1.24 a day, but in the next lower group. When, how- ever, the fifty-cent groups are taken instead of the twenty- five, the second group — $1-$1.24: — shows the greatest gain in both tables in the years 1863 and 1864, while by the end of the period the first group takes the lead. It is also true of both sets of data that, while employees in the lower groups received a greater relative increase in pay, the actual sums added to their wages were less than in the higher groups. The application of the method of Table XXIX to the figures for 1865 in Table XLIV B shows the average actual increase in the daily wages of the five groups to be 32, 61, 75, 74, and 78 cents, respectively. VIII. PAY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES An interesting side light is thrown upon the advance of wages during the war by the position of government employees as represented in the reports of officials. Of course, the war caused a vast increase in the amount of busi- ness to be transacted by most of the departments, and the clerical force employed in Washington was increased accord- ingly. The salaries paid for clerks were generally regarded as fairly liberal before the war, but as the cost of living rose after the issue of the greenbacks many employees, especially men with families, began to find themselves pinched for funds. Congressional action was required to increase the rates of pay allowed, and in the face of the enormous expenditures for the military and naval service Congress was unwilling to pass any general act that would involve an increased outlay for clerks. Consequently many men resigned their positions in Washington to accept places with private employers. So general did this movement become that the heads of several bureaus found themselves seriously embar- 334 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS rassed by the difficulty of securing and retaining sufficient skilled assistants. The reports of 1864 and 1865 are full of such complaints. General F. E. Spinner, for example, the treasurer of the United States, declared in his report for 1864 that " But for the employment of females, whose com- pensation is low, and in most cases too low, it would have been impossible to have carried on the" business of the office with the compensation allowed. During the year many clerks who were employed in this office have been obliged, in justice to themselves, to resign their positions, in order to enter into business for themselves, or to take places with moneyed and other corporations, or in business houses, where their talents and services were better appreciated and rewarded.'" Similar remarks can readily be found in the reports of General Spinner's colleagues. ^ The rank and file of the army fared somewhat better than the clerks in Washington. At the outbreak of the war the pay of privates was |11 per month. ^ One of the first of the war measures passed in August, 1861, increased this pay to $13.* As the rise of prices proceeded, much was heard in Congress of the distress caused to the soldiers by the decline in the purchasing power of their pay. True, the soldier himself was supplied with food and clothing, so that his position was less serious than that of a clerk who had to pay board and tailor bills; but the soldier's family, if dependent on his earnings, was no better off than the clerk's. At last in June, 1864, when the specie value of $13 in greenbacks had fallen to $6.18, Congress undertook to 1 Finance Report, 1864, p. 76. 2 For examples see reports of the secretary of the navy, 1864, p. xlii, and 1866, p. 37 ; secretary of the treasury, 1865, p. 42 ; comptroller of the currency, 1864, p. 55 of Finance Report; treasurer, ibid., 1865, p. 98; second auditor of the treasury, ibid., 1864, p. 99, and 1865, p. 127; fourth auditor, ibid., 1864, p. 110 j commissioner of internal revenue, ibid., 1865, p. 92. 3 Act of August 4, 1854, 10 Statutes at Large, p. 575. * Act of August 6, 1861, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 326. Wages 335 relieve the army. Rejecting a proposition to pay the $13 a month in gold, or an amount of paper equivalent at the market rate to $13 in gold/ Congress added $3 to the monthly pay.^ This act raised the stipend to $16 per month, at which figure it remained for the rest of the war. The advance was but 23 per cent, on the old rate^ — an increase in relative wages less, according to all our tables, than that received by the majority of worki:pgmen. It must be remembered, however, that both the local and federal gov- ernments were paying lavish bounties for volunteers. Of course these extra sums mitigated somewhat the hardships suffered by soldiers' families. IX. INCREASE IN LIVING EXPENSES Statistics of relative money wages, no matter how elabo- rate, throw no light upon the relative well-being of the working classes until they have been compared with figures that show the changes in cost of living. In the present case satisfactory figures of the latter sort are extremely difficult to obtain. Of course, the tables of relative prices in the preceding chapter may be made to serve as a general guide of increased expenditure, but it will be remembered that in making up these tables, all commodities were treated as having the same importance. From the point of view of statistical theory this procedure was correct in the last chap- ter, for there the object was simply to ascertain how far the changes in the specie value of the paper currency were reflected in the prices of commodities. But here, when an index of variation in the living expenses of workingmen's families is the desideratum, another form of computation would be preferable. Theoretically, each commodity should 1 This proposition was made by Senator Powell, of Kentucky.— Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2306. 2 Act approved June 20, 1864 (13 Statutes at Large, p. 144). This act took effect from May 1, 1864. Privates in the cavalry, artillery and infantry were all included. 336 History of the G-eeenbacks now be weighted according to its importance as an item of expenditure to wage earners. Professor Falkner has per- formed this process upon his table of wholesale prices by using weights for groups of expenditure obtained from an elaborate collection of American workingmen's budgets. The results of the weighting are lower index numbers for all the years of the war except 1865.' Reasons have been given in the preceding chapter, however, for distrusting Falkner's table of prices, and it therefore seems unwise to accept the weighted series, which is but a modification of the unweighted, and open to all criticisms urged against the latter. If Falkner's figures are not to be used, the question becomes serious whether it is not possible to weight the tables that have been preferred to his in such fashion as to take account of the relative importance of various items of expenditure. The obstacle in the way is that the tables do not contain price series for many of the commodities that figure most prominently in family outlay. In the quarterly table of wholesale prices, there are no series for men's cloth- ing, tea, or house rent, and in many other cases it would be necessary to infer changes in the price of consumption goods from changes in the price of materials — e. g., shoes from harness leather. The same obstacle is even more serious in the case of the table of retail prices, for it contains even fewer series than the quarterly table. Of course, an elabo- rate scheme of weights is of no advantage unless one has corresponding price series to which to apply the weights. Without such data the attempt at improving the character of the table by weighting is futile. The fact that a satisfactory plan of allowing for the importance of the various price series is not attainable with the budgetary and price data at our disposal ought not, how- 1 Aldrich Report, Part I, pp. 93, 94. Wages 337 ever, to prejudice us in advance against the results that can be obtained from our unweighted tables. Statistical experi- ence has shown abundantly that where there is no biased error in the figures, the application of weights to a large number of series makes little change in the final averages. Even in a time of such remarkable fluctuations as that of the Civil War, Falkner's simple and weighted series are very similar, and there is no reason for assuming that an applica- tion of weights to the tables of the last chapter, were such an application possible, would seriously modify the character of the results.' As has been said frequently before, the margin of error in all such computations as the present is wide, and the differences introduced by weighting would not be great in comparison with differences that might be made by the possession of a wider range of data for prices or money wages. If we are to content ourselves with the tables of the last chapter from a conviction that with the data at hand we cannot weight them satisfactorily, it remains only to decide what series shall be used as the index of increase in living expenses. Both the wholesale and retail series have char- acteristic advantages. The former contains a larger number of articles and, moreover, gives index numbers for January and July that can readily be applied to the figures for rela- tive wages obtained from the Aldrich Report. On the other hand, the latter table is better because based on retail- price returns. But a glance back at Table XVIII, where the two series are presented side by side, shows that it does 1 It may be pointed out that the problem of weighting as affecting the wage tables is quite different from the problem as affecting the price tables. The reason for this difference is that there is a biased error in the wage statistics — that is, the wage-series representing the lower and most numerous grades of laborers show rather uniformly a more considerable advance in pay than the series representing the higher and less numerous grades. Therefore, weighting the series according to number of employees represented gives higher figures. But there is no reason for assuming that the articles of much importance as items of expenditure would show a uniformly higher or lower range of prices than the articles of slight importance. 338 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS not matter greatly which series is used. The chief differ- ence is that prices at retail show a somewhat more slug- gish movement than prices at wholesale — not exhibitiag a fall in 1861, rising less rapidly from 1862 to 1864, and fall- ing less promptly in 1865. Consequently it seems fair to use in any case the series that applies most conveniently to the wage statistics in hand, but with the constant remem- brance that the wholesale figures probably show somewhat too large a purchasing power of wages in 1861 and again in 1865, and too small a purchasing power in the earlier years of the war. One other question remains: Shall the arithmetic mean or the median of the price tables be employed ? In the last chapter it was argued that the latter is a more significant form of average for the years of the war, but in the present chapter the arithmetic mean alone has been used in making the wage tables. The median was not used in the latter case, however, simply because the absence from among the wage- series in Tables XXI and XLII of such cases of extreme advance as are found among the price-series, shows that the fluctuations of relative wages were much more uniform than the fluctuations of relative prices as exhibited in Table IX. Therefore, there can be no such divergence between the two forms of average for relative wages as for relative prices. A trial of the semiannual wage-table for the single date, January, 1865, has shown that the median is a trifle lower than the arithmetic mean for males and a trifle higher for females.' Since the results of the two methods of averag- ing are so nearly identical, there is no valid objection against using the arithmetic mean of relative wages in the same way that the median would be used had two sets of averages been computed. In the tables of the following section, therefore, the median of the price-series will be employed, for the rea- 1 Sec. iii, p. 292, above. Wages 339 son that it was preferred in chap. iv. Computations based on the arithmetic mean would show a lower range of real X. RELATIVE EEAL WAGES It is now possible to combine the results of the investi- gations into money wages and into prices with the pur- pose of obtaining an idea of the manner in which the issue of greenbacks affected the material well-being of families dependent on wages. Despite all that has been said, it may not be superfluous to enter once again a caution that the results obtained can be nothing more than rough approximations. The limitations of the wage data have been dwelt upon at length, and the tables have shown that the money incomes of some workingmen's families increased much more than those of others. No columns of "average variations" can give an adequate notion of these differences. If one set of figures shows fairly the changes in the pay of any one man or class of men, it must from that very fact be inaccurate as applied to others. Limitations not less serious exist in the price- series that are to be used as indicative of changes in the cost of living. Families living side by side in the same town have different scales of expenditure, and therefore will be affected in different degrees by price fluctuations. And an examination of the retail-price series, as given in the Appendix, will show that the living expenses of men receiv- ing similar incomes did not vary in the same degree in dif- ferent towns. To bring this fact out more clearly a table has been compiled showing the average variations in the retail prices of thirty-six articles in the four towns for which the fullest reports are found in the Census volume. If it is well to enter this caution, it is equally well to guard against an undervaluation of the results. Though the data both of wages and of prices leave much to be 340 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE XLV EELATIVB KETAIL PEICES OP THIKTT-9IX COMMODITIES IK FOCE TOWNS {AVEEAGE PBI0E8 FOB EACH YBAE) Year New Cumber- land, W. Va. Canton, O. Zanesville, O. Lawrence- burg, Ind. 1860 100 100 100 100 1861 155 93 115 99 1862 203 141 135 128 1863 236 210 176 165 1864 264 283 248 218 1865 265 246 221 183 1866 222 207 209 170 desired in fulness, they have been carefully collected from reliable sources and show the actual wages paid to thou- sands of employees for work of a diverse character per- formed in many different places, and the actual prices paid at wholesale and at retail for many articles of great impor- tance. So far as the material extends, there is little reason to doubt its substantial accuracy. Confidence in its repre- sentative character is strongly supported by the uniformity in the results obtained regarding both wages and prices from the figures drawn from different sources. Finally, though there are many deviations from the general averages, the trend of fluctuations is the same in almost all cases. It seems, then, that we may proceed to combine the two sets of tables with a considerable degree of confidence in the sig- nificance of their results. This combination may begin with Tables XXI and XIV. In Table XXI the wage-earners included in the series drawn from the main exhibits of the Aldrich Report are classified according to the relative change in wages between 1860 and January, 1865. The more conservative price- series of Table XIV indicates that prices had more than doubled within this period. But of the 4,751 employees accounted for in Table XXI the pay of but thirty-nine Wages 341 had increased as much as 100 per cent. — less than one in a hundred. The remaining ninety-nine wage-earners in every hundred must have suffered in no inconsider- able degree from the paper standard of value, because their money incomes had risen less rapidly than the cost of commodities. Of the men, half had received an increase of less than 54 per cent, in pay, and of the women half less than 34 per cent. If money income increases but one-half, while living expenses double, real income is reduced a quarter; this, or worse than this, appears to have been the case with half the men and much more than half the women. It seems clear, then, that practically all wage- earners found themselves in more straightened circumstances in 1865 than in 1860, and that in the majority of cases the inconvenience suffered was not slight. This combination refers to a single year. Some notion of the rapidity of the changes that took place in the circum- stances of working-people may be gained by turning to the tables that represent the fluctuations of money wages year by year. Table XXX gives the average relative wages of over 5,000 persons from 1860 to 1866. A series showing average changes in real wages to July, 1865, may be readily computed from these figures and the price index numbers of Table XIV. In making the computation both columns for relative wages and the lower column for relative prices — the median — have been employed. According to these figures, the average relative purchas- ing power of money wages over the commodities included in our largest price table was at its lowest ebb from the middle of 1864 to the beginning of 1865 — although money wages at this time were nearly half again as great as they had been before the war. From this low point there was an extraordinary recovery owing to the very rapid fall of prices between January and July, 1865. It must not be forgotten, 342 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS TABLE XL VI AVERAGE CHANGE IN EBAL WAGES OF OVBE 5,000 WAGE-EABNEES, COMPUTED FBOU TABLES XIV AND XXX Date Variable Weights Constant Weights Date Variable Weights Constant Weights 1860, January . . July 1861, January . . July 1862, January.. July 100 100 102 lOi 102 101 100 99 102 104 102 100 1863, January.. July 1864, January. . July 1865, January. . July 89 86 81 71 67 97 88 86 82 72 68 99 however, that this fall was much more sudden in wholesale than in retail markets, and therefore the figures give an altogether too favorable picture of the situation of the workingman's family in the middle of 1865. Even accord- ing to the wholesale price table there was a sharp reaction of prices in the latter part of the year that would make the real wage-index number for October considerably less than that for July, had we data for computing it. It would be interesting to apply the retail-price table to these same figures for relative wages and see how difiPerent the results would be. But such an application is scarcely legitimate, because the retail prices are averages for the year and the wages are the rates prevailing in but two months. On the whole, therefore, it seems best to rest con- tent with the rather vague modification of the preceding series suggested by the relation between wholesale and retail prices brought out in the last chapter. With these results may be compared similar figures computed from the tables of the Aldrich Report. The re-working of the price data in the last chapter and of the wage data in the present chapter has led to the conclusion that Falkner's methods of analysis show too slight an advance in both cases. The question remains whether the failure to gauge the full extent of the rise in prices is offset Wages 343 by the failure to gauge the full extent of the rise of money wages. To answer this question two series of relative real wages have been computed from Falkner's tables by using his weighted and his simple averages for both wages and prices. TABLE XL VII COHPABISON OP EELATIVB SEAL WAGES AS SHOWN IN TABLE XL VI, WITH EELATITE BEAIi WAGES COMFtTTED FBOU FALKNEB'S TABLES Falkner's Tables Simple Weighted Averages Averages 100 100 100 107 87 100 74 90 66 78 66 64 On the whole, there is less difference between these results for real wages than between the results of the tables of prices or of money wages. The extreme depression of real wages in all three series is about the same, and except in 1865 the impression left by Falkner's weighted average agrees very closely with that left by the series from Table XLVI. The chief difference is that the semiannual figures show the recovery of real wages in the middle of the last year — a recovery that certainly took place, although its completeness is exaggerated by the enforced reliance upon wholesale instead of retail price data. This examination of the decline in the real wages of all employees represented in Table XII of the Aldrich Report might be elaborated by making similar computations of real Table XLVI 1860, January 100 July 100 1861, January 102 July 104 1862, January 102 July 101 1863, January 89 July 86 1864, January 81 July 71 1865, January 67 July 97 344 History of the Geeenbaoks wages in the several industries, occupations, and wage-groups of the preceding tables. The reader who will compare the figures for money wages in these tables with the figures for prices will find that in no case did the wage-earners escape a considerable loss in real income. By way of illustration, three tables based upon the most significant groupings of the wage-series are presented below. In examining them, one must remember that, like the preceding tables, they overstate real wages in July, 1865. TABLE XLVni AVEBAGE CHANGE IN EEAL WAGES [N NINE IND03TEIES, COMPUTEr EEOM TABLES XIV AND xxin 1 Date City Public Works Illumi- nating Gas stone Build- Trades Metals and Me- tallic Goods Rail- ways Cotton Goods Ging- hams Wo'len Goods 1860, Jan.. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 July. 100 99 100 102 101 103 101 100 103 1861, Jan.. 100 100 128 101 102 105 97 103 106 July. 96 104 96 107 108 111 102 115 113 1862, Jan.. 99 100 96 103 105 105 98 105 108 July. 96 100 87 104 105 100 95 107 108 1863, Jan.. 94 96 77 91 88 82 82 84 92 July. 88 102 81 85 86 78 78 77 82 1864, Jan.. 89 98 89 80 78 71 76 66 76 July. 85 81 68 72 70 56 65 59 64 1865, Jan.. 77 77 68 64 65 63 61 57 62 July. 111 109 94 99 94 91 88 93 89 Extended comment upon these tables is superfluous. While the fluctuations of real wages are seen to have been by no means uniform in all cases, there is no industry or occupation in which the advance in money wages kept pace with the advance in prices. The differences represent merely greater or less degrees of inconvenience, not to say suffering. Perhaps the most interesting of the tables is the third, for it brings out once more the rule that the incomes of those families nearest the minimum of subsistence before 1 The variable-weight wage-series are used here. Wages 345 TABLE XLIX AVEEAGE CHANGE IN EEAL WAGES, IN NINE OCCUPATIONS, COMPUTED PEOM TABLES XIV AND XXV Date Labor- ers Quar- rymen Masons Stone- cutters Car- penters Hold- ers Machi- nists Fire- men Weav- ers, Female 1860, Jan.. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 July. 100 100 99 101 100 102 100 102 99 1861, Jan.. 100 114 101 100 99 104 103 103 103 July. 98 96 100 108 106 108 109 107 • 115 1862, Jan.. 100 100 99 91 103 105 107 102 104 July. 98 87 100 92 100 103 107 106 109 1863, Jan. . 95 78 85 79 80 85 92 92 85 July. 90 81 80 80 79 83 89 101 79 1864, Jan.. 89 92 76 75 78 76 80 101 68 July. 84 69 66 73 70 68 71 79 58 1865, Jan.. 76 71 63 68 67 65 67 75 59 July. 110 96 92 99 98 94 95 106 92 the war were reduced relatively less than the incomes of families in easier circumstances. It does not seem worth while to multiply examples of decline in the purchasing power of the money incomes of wage-earners by computations based on the wage-series TABLE L AVEEAGE CHANGE IN EBAL WAGES IN FIVE WAGE-GEOUPS COMPUTED PEOM TABLES XIV AITD XXVIII B Date Males Earnings in 1860, Daily Wages of $0.25— $0.99 $1.00— $1.49 $1.50— $1.99 $2.00-$2.49 $2.50+ 1860, January July 100 102 100 107 102 103 88 85 79 69 65 94 100 100 102 100 101 98 92 87 87 76 71 101 100 100 102 107 105 105 89 86 79 69 66 95 100 100 100 103 99 97 79 78 73 68 62 93 100 100 1861, January July 99 105 1862, January July 100 95 1863, January July 75 73 1864, January July 66 57 1865, January July 54 76 346 History of the Gkeenbaoks drawn, from the Tenth Census. Were this done, a some- what harsher state of afPairs would be shown, for the absence of data regarding numbers employed produces a general average advance in wages less than that computed from the completer data of the Aldrich Report} But there is one point brought out by Table XLI that deserves further notice — viz., the difference between the rise of wages in the East and "West. It was found that even if the comparison be confined to members of the same trade, the average increase in wages seems to have been somewhat greater in the north central than in the north Atlantic states. It is interesting to see whether this difference can be accounted for on our general hypothesis, that the rise of wages was due chiefly to the increased cost of living. If so, prices must have advanced more rapidly in the West than in the East. The Census statistics of retail prices make it possible to discover whether or not this was the case, for there are 239 series from the East and 287 from the West. An exhibit of the relative prices of the fifty- TABLE LI BELATrVE BETAIli PRICES OF FIFTY-EIGHT ARTICLES IN THE EAST AND WEST BY GROUPS Dry Goods Men's Heavy Boots Gro- ceries Flour and Meal Rice, Beans, Potat's Meat and Fish Eggs, Dairy Prdcts. Fuel House Bent E w B W E W E W E W E W E W E 5 W 5 E 2 W No. of Articles 9 9 1 1 11 11 4 4 3 3 19 19 4 4 2 No. of Pr. Ser. 42 66 8 19 33 51 17 16 12 14 79 57 14 20 22 18 12 26 1880.. . 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1861.... i«a 122 105 101 116 9X 103 HI 111 103 113 103 HZ 91^, 118 105 100 99 1862.... 210 186 116 121 143 119 111 117 145 1«) 117 110 116 109 1-« 126 106 109 1863.... 2Hi) 2X5 129 142 166 159 124 179 156 160 125 135 128 131 16« 161 105 120 1864.... ««« 414 151 216 207 201 160 212 178 185 14r. 168 149 174 1X5 168 123 136 1865.... «H5 XK5 15'( 168 209 211 166 2;fe 183 1X3 164 175 172 196 188 164 132 139 1866.... 287 301 156 153 205 215 167 243 184 203 172 174 168 195 183 162 138 141 1 See sec. vii, p. 328, above. Wages 347 eight articles arranged in nine groups is presented in Table LI. This table indicates that boots, flour and meal, meat and fish, and eggs and dairy products increased more in price in the West, while the opposite is true of fuel, and the remain- ing groups — dry goods, groceries, rice, beans, and potatoes, and house rent — varied in about the same degree in both sections. If the arithmetic mean be struck of the relative prices of all the fifty-eight articles in the Census list, the advance is found to be greater in the West, as the next table shows ; TABLE LII AVEEAGB RELATIVE PBICE3 AT RETAIL OF FIFTY-BIGHT COMMODITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST Date 1860. 1861. 1862. 1863. 1864. 1865. 1866. East West 100 100 116 105 139 126 164 169 200 216 206 215 196 207 These figures lend strong support to the view that the difference between the advance of relative wages in the two sections of the North was in large measure due to the unlike changes in relative cost of living. XI. CONCLUSION All of the statistical evidence that has been presented in the preceding pages supports unequivocally the common theory that persons whose incomes are derived from wages suffer seriously from a depreciation of the currency. The confirmation seems particularly striking when the conditions other than monetary affecting the labor market are taken into consideration. American workingmen are intelligent 348 HiSTOKY OF THE GeEENBAOKS and keenly alive to their interests. There are probably few districts where custom plays a smaller and competition a larger r6le in determining wages than in the northern states. While labor organizations had not yet attained their present power, manual laborers did not fail to avail themselves of the help of concerted action in the attempt to secure more pay. Strikes were frequent.' All these facts favored a speedy readjustment of money wages to correspond with changed prices. But more than all else, a very considerable part of the labor supply was withdrawn from the market into the army and navy. In 1864 and 1865 about one million of men seem to have been enrolled.^ What proportion this number forms of the wage-earners can be very roughly esti- mated from the Census statistics of occupations. Accord- ing to the Eighth Census, there were 6,791,844 persons engaged in gainful occupations in the loyal states in 1860.^ If we assume that as large a proportion of wage-earners went to the war as of those who were working on their own account, it follows that about one-seventh of the labor supply withdrew from the market. But despite all these favoring circumstances, the men who stayed at home did not succeed in obtaining an advance in pay at all commensurate with the increase in living expenses. It is sometimes argued that the withdrawal of laborers iThe Springfield Bepublican of March 26, 1863, said: ". . . . the workmen of almost every branch of trade have had their strike within the last few months. No less than six strikes are reported by the New York papers this week, of laborers on the Erie, Hudson Eiver, and Camden and Amboy railroads, the journeymen tailors of the city, and the employees of two large manufacturing companies .... in almost every instance .... the demands of the employed have been acceded to. These strikes, which have all been conducted very quietly, .... have led to the formation of numerous trade leagues or unions." 2 The Report of the Secretary of War for 1865 states the number of men enrolled as 970,710, May 1, 1864; 965,591, March 1, 1865 ; and 1,000,516, May 1, 1865.— Pp. 1, 5, and 13. The Beport of the Secretary of the Navy for the same year states that the number of men in service in the navy increased from 7,600 at the commencement of the war to 51,500 at its close. The number of men employed in the navy yards increased in the same period from 3,844 to 16,880.— P. xiii. 3 Compiled from the table on p. 680 of the volume on Population, Wages 349 from industrial life was the chief cause of the price dis- turbances of the war period. This withdrawal, it is said, caused the advance of wages, and greater cost of labor led to the rise of prices. The baselessness of this view is shown by two facts, established by the preceding tables — first, that the advance of wages was later than the advance of prices, and second, that wages continued to rise in 1866 after the volunteer armies had been disbanded and the men gone back to work. Though the figures developed in the foregoing analysis show a slightly smaller decline in real wages than those heretofore accepted on the authority of the Aldrich Report, it is probable that even the new figures overstate rather than understate the actual injury suffered by wage-earners. The tables used as an index of the change in cost of living really show what would have been the relative cost of the articles included in the price lists had people continued to purchase them in the same proportions as before the war. But, of course, the character of the consumption of most families did not remain unchanged. In many cases it was possible to substitute some other article for one which had risen more than common in price. Thus woolen, linen, and other fabrics were largely made to take the place of cotton goods, and cheaper beverages took the place of tea and coffee. In so far as the substitutes were less agreeable as articles of consumption, the change represents a loss of eco- nomic satisfaction. But the degree of this loss of satisfac- tion is exaggerated somewhat by a table that shows the increase in cost of the less-used article ; for the motive for buying other things is found precisely in the possibility of thus avoiding a portion of the inconvenience caused by the high prices. As the price tables probably exaggerate the increase in relative living expenses, so the wage tables probably under- 350 HiSTOET OP THE GREENBACKS estimate the increase in the income of working-people. The reason for thinking thus is that wage-earners seem to have been more fully employed during the war than in common times of prosperity. Of course, the enlistment of so many thousands of the most efficient workers made places for many who might otherwise have found it difficult to secure work. Moreover, the paper currency itself tended to obtain full employment for the laborer, for the very reason that it diminished his real income. In the distribution of what Marshall has termed the "national dividend" a diminu- tion of the proportion received by the laborer must have been accompanied by an increase in the share of someone else. Nor is it difficult to determine who this person was. The beneficiary was the active employer, who found that the money wages, interest, and rent he had to pay increased less rapidly than the money prices of his products. The differ- ence between the increase of receipts and the increase of expenses swelled his profits. Of course, the possibility of making high profits provided an incentive for employing as many hands as possible. But here we are trenching upon the subject of a later chapter. The importance of these factors — the changes in the character of consumption and the fuller employment — as affecting the material well-being of wage-earners is inca- pable of statistical measurement with the materials at hand. But while they must be recognized as modifying in consider- able measure the inferences to be drawn from the series of "changes in real wages" given above, it can hardly be that they sufficed to compensate many families for the increased money cost of living. Most families were doubtless forced to practice economies of a very uncomfortable character to make both ends meet. After such an examination of the change in the condition of the great mass of wage-earners, it may seem surprising that Wages 351 few complaints were heard from them of unusual privations.' This silence may be due in part to the fact that a consider- able increase of money income produces in the minds of many a fatuous feeling of prosperity, even though it be more than offset by an increase of prices. But doubtless the chief reason is to be found in the absorption of public interest in the events of the war. The people both of the South and North were so vitally concerned with the struggle that they bore without murmuring the hardships it entailed of what- ever kind. Government taxation that under other circum- stances might have been felt to be intolerable was submitted to with cheerfulness. The paper currency imposed upon wage-earners a heavier tax — amounting to confiscation of perhaps a fifth or a sixth of real incomes. But the working- men of the North were receiving considerably more than a bare subsistence minimum before the war, and reduction of consumption was possible without producing serious want. Accordingly the currency tax, like the tariff and the internal revenue duties, was accepted as a necessary sacrifice to the common cause and paid without protest by severe retrench- ment. 1 Compare D. A. Wells, Recent Finaticial, Industrial^ aTid Commercial Experi- ences of the United States (New York, 1872), p. 22. CHAPTEK VI RENT I. Urban Rents : Use ot Term "Rent" — Long and Short Leases^ — Wells's Investiga- tions into House Rents — Statistical Data from the Tenth Census — Rents in Eastern and Western States — In Cities and Towns — Nar- row Range of the Data. II. Farm Rents: Farms Let for Money Rents — Farms Let "on Shares." I. DEBAN EBNTS In studying the influence of depreciation upon rent, it is necessary to use that term in its popular rather than in its scientific sense. The distinction, so dear to the economist, between payment for situation and return on capital invested in improvements, cannot be maintained in a discussion based on figures which show simply the sums paid for the use of real property. This fact is less to be lamented, because the theorist himself admits that the distinction becomes sadly blurred when he attempts to deal with short intervals of time. Capital once invested in improvements can seldom be withdrawn rapidly. In "the short run," therefore, it is practically a part of the land, and the return to it follows the analogy of rent rather than of interest.' Like the lending capitalist, the renting landlord found that the degree in which he was affected by the fluctuations in the value of the paper money depended largely upon the terms of the contract into which he had entered. It is clear from the preceding chapters that the landlord who before suspension had leased his property for a considerable period without opportunity for revaluation must have suffered I Compare Marshall, Principles of Economics, Book V, chaps, viii, ix. 352 Kent 353 severely if paid in greenbacks. The number of "dollars" received as rental might be the same in 1865 as in 1860, but their purchasing power was less than one-half as great. Somewhat less hard was the situation of the landlord who had let his property for but one or two years. At the expiration of the leases he had opportunities to make new contracts with the tenants. To ascertain accurately how far he succeeded in recouping himself for the rise of prices by increasing rentals, elaborate statistics of the sums paid for the use of different classes of real estate would be necessary. Unfortunately, such figures are scanty, and such as are avail- able refer entirely to urban property. In his capacity as special commissioner of the revenue, Mr. David A. Wells devoted some attention to the rise of rent. His report for December, 1866, says: The average advance in the rents of houses occupied by mechan- ics and laborers in the great manufacturing centers of the country is estimated to have been about 90 per cent.; in some sections, however, a much greater advance has been experienced, as, for example, at Pittsburg, where 200 per cent, and upward is reported. In many of the rural districts, on the other hand, the advance has been much less.' In his third annual report, dated January, 186,9, Mr. Wells modified this estimate somewhat. Edward Young had prepared for him " tables showing the comparative cost of provisions, groceries, domestic dry goods, house rent, etc., in the manufacturing towns of the United States in the respective years 1860-61 and 1867-68." These tables made out an average increase of about 65 per cent, in rents. Mr. Wells remarked, however, that this .... average is ... . largely affected by the circumstance that in New England, where manufactiunng companies .... very generally own the tenements occupied by the operatives, rents have i Senate Executive Document No. 2, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 14. 354 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS not been advanced to any considerable extent. Excluding New England from the calculation, the average advance in rents for 1867, as compared with 1860-61, must be estimated at a much higher figure. Thus in the smaller manufacturing towns of Penn- sylvania the average increase in the rents of houses occupied by operatives is believed to have been about 81 per cent., and in New Jersey 111 per cent. In the cities of New York, Philadelphia, Newark, and Pittsburg the increase has been from 90 to 100 per cent.* Young's figures, on which these conclusions were based, are as follows: TABLE LIU HOUSE KENT IN MANDFACTUEINO TOWNS 1860-61 AND 1867-68 ' FoDK-EooM Tenements Six-EooM Tenements State 1860-61 1867-68 Per cent, of In- crease 1860-61 1867-68 Per cent, of In- crease Maine $3.25 2.42 5.86 5.93 4.04 4.20 5.60 4.67 4.00 $5.67 3.68 10.28 9.63 5.77 6.85 9.60 10.00 5.00 74 52 75 62 43 51 71 114 25 $4.67 3.17 6.54 9.11 4.56 5.78 8.00 7.17 5.17 $8.17 5.75 10.14 11.69 6.81 9.37 15.20 15.00 6.33 75 N. Hamp., Vermont Massachusetts Ehode Island Connecticut New York Pennsylvania New Jersey Delaware 81 55 28 49 62 90 109 22 General average . . $4.44 • $7.39 66 $6.02 $9.83 63 These figures become more significant for the present purpose when interpreted in the light of the similar data already presented in part in the chapter on prices.' The latter figures are taken from Mr. Weeks's report in the Tenth Census and show the relative rents paid for four- and six- 1 H. B. Executive Document No. le, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 14. 2 Ibid., Appendix D, pp. 118-21. 3 See Part II, chap, iv, sec. iv, Table XVII. Kent 355 or seven-room houses in twenty towns scattered over eleven states from Massachusetts to Missouri. Comparison with Young's figures, however, should be confined to eastern towns, and of these returns are given but for five.' In these five towns the average increase in rents between 1860 and 1868 was somewhat less than Young makes out for four- room tenements — viz., 56 instead of 66 per cent. — -and slightly greater in the case of six-room tenements — viz., 68 as compared with 63 per cent. But though it be inferred, as both these sets of data indi- cate, that rents of workingmen's houses in eastern towns were on the average some 60 or 65 per cent, higher in 1868 than they had been before the war, it does not at all follow that rents had advanced so much as this in 1864 and 1865. In fact, the Census figures that cover the intervening years indicate that in most towns rents rose during the war more slowly than prices, but that, like wages, they continued to rise for some time after prices had fallen. Table LIV com- TABLE LIV EELATITE BENTS IN rIVB EASTEEN TOWNS AND EELATIVE PEICES ' (Arithmetic means) Eents Prices Eetail Wholesale I860 100 100 101 101 120 132 138 141 163 100 116 139 164 200 206 196 100 1861 101 1862 118 1863 149 1864 191 1865 217 1866 191 1867 172 1868 161 1 Boston; Jewetfc City, Conn.; Camden, N. J.; PMladelphia and Hokendauqua, Pa. New Cumberland, W. Va., which is included in the East in the table of the pre- ceding chapter, is excluded here because Young gives no figures for West Virginia. 2The figures for rent are simple averages of the ten series for the five towns ; the retail prices are from Table LII of chap, v, and the wholesale prices are from the Aldrich Report^ Part I, p. 91. 356 HiSTOEY OP THE Geeenbacks pares the fluctuations of rent in the five eastern towns with the index numbers for retail prices in the East, as far as they extend, and with Falkner's unweighted average of the relative prices of all articles. According to this table, though owners of small houses in these towns may have found themselves approximately as well off in 1868 as before the war, they had not escaped severe injury from the depreciation of the currency during the interim. Elsewhere landlords seem to have been in a rather worse plight. In the fifteen western towns for which the Tenth Census gave returns the increase in rents of similar property seems to have been somewhat less, as Table LV shows : TABLE LV RELATIVE EENTS IN FIFTEEN WESTEKN TOWNS ' 1860 100 1865 138 1861 99 1866 139 1862 108 1867 137 1863 121 1868 135 1864 135 This contrast between rents in the East and West is vitiated to a certain extent by the fact that a much larger propor- tion of the western towns were small places. More signifi- cant is the comparison between rents in the five cities for which figures are given — Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Louisville, and St. Louis — and the fifteen lesser towns.^ Table LVI presents the data in succinct form. The conclusion, supported by these figures, that the ad- vance in rents was greater in cities than in minor towns, is not diflBcult to accept. In two of the cities — Cincinnati and Louisville — owners of workingmen's tenements appear 1 The figures are simple arithmetic means of the twenty-eight series. New Cum- berland, W. Va., is included. 2 Louisville, with 68,033 inhabitants in 1860, is the smallest of the cities, and Indianapolis, with 18,611 inhabitants, the largest of the towns. Kent 357 TABLE LVI EELATIVB EENTS IK CITIES AND TOWNS Year Boston Phila- del- phia Cincin- ziati Louis- ville St. Louis Average for Preceding Cities Averagefor Fifteen Lesser Towns 1860 100 100 100 100 138 138 138 138 196 100 100 100 100 133 167 200 200 200 100 84 84 117 207 207 207 167 167 100 129 129 167 221 221 221 167 167 100 90 90 131 131 131 157 157 157 100 101 101 123 166 173 185 166 177 100 1861 99 1862 110 1863 115 1864 120 1865 124 1866 122 1867 128 1868 128 to have been able to increase their money incomes rather more rapidly than prices advanced, but in Boston, Phila- delphia, St. Louis, and in all the smaller towns on the list, with the possible exception of Terre Haute, their money incomes appear to have increased more slowly than living expenses.' It must be remembered that these conclusions rest on a narrow statistical basis. No figures for house rent can be altogether satisfactory because of the change in the charac- ter of accommodation from time to time. What figures are available refer to one class of property alone — such tene- ments as are occupied by working people in manufacturing towns. For houses of other classes and for business prop- erty of all kinds no reliable data are known to me. And even for the workingmen's tenements the Tenth Census gives but two or three series for each town. But though all this be true, the fact remains that the figures seem to be worthy of credence for one class of urban property at least, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, establish a pre- sumption that relatively few owners of urban real estate of other descriptions escaped injury from the greenback issues. 1 The figures for all the towns are given in detail in the Appendix, 358 HiSTOET OF THE Gbeenbacks Even in those cases where rents advanced more rapidly than commodity prices it is probable that the greenbacks deprived the landlords of a portion of the gains that they would otherwise have made. II. FAEM BENTS All the foregoing refers to the rent of urban property. For agricultural rents Wells and Weeks give no data. Inas- much, however, as custom seems to play a larger r5le in deter- mining the price paid per acre for farms than the price paid per month for city houses, it is probable that much the same difference existed between the advance of rents in the coun- try and in the small towns that Table LVI indicates as having existed between the advance in towns and in cities. If this conjecture be just, it follows that the rural landowner suffered serious injury from the paper currency when he let his land for a money rent. But renting farms for a fixed sum of money has always been less common in the United States than renting for a definite share of the products. Prior to 1880 the Census Oflice made no attempt to ascertain the tenure on which farms were held. In that year, however, 30 per cent, of the farms not occupied by their owners are reported as " rented for a fixed money value" in the northern and western states, and 70 per cent, as " rented for a share of the products." Since the enumeration of 1890 showed that the practice of accept- ing money rent was increasing, so that the above percentages had become 35 and 65 respectively,' it is probable that at the time of the Civil War more than three-quarters of the rented farms were let "on shares." Inasmuch as no money payments entered into such arrangements, the pecuniary relations of landlord and tenant were not directly affected 1 Percentages computed from Table 3 of the Beport on the Statistics of AgricuU ture at the Eleventh Census, pp. 116, 117, Eent 359 by the change in the monetary standard. Farm owners who had let their places on these conditions escaped the direct losses that weighed so heavily on the recipients of money rents. But even they did not avoid all loss. For, as will be shown at length in chap, viii, the price of agricultural prod- ucts for the greater part of the war period lagged consid- erably behind the price of other goods. This difference, of course, meant loss to men whose incomes were paid in bush- els of grain. CHAPTER VII INTEREST AND LOAN CAPITAL I. The Problem of Lenders and Borrowers of Capital: Two Elements in the Problem : Rate of Interest and Purchasing Power of Principal — Differences in Relative Importance of These Elements to Different Lenders and Borrowers. II. Purchasing Power of the Principal of Loans : Table Illustrating Variations in Purchasing Power of Loans and Consequent Loss or Gain of Lenders. III. The Rate of Interest: Interest on Long-Term Loans — On Short-Term Loans — Defective Character of Statistics Regarding Interest — Slight Increase in Rates on Short Loans — Failure of Lenders and Borrowers to Foresee the Future Course of Prices — Inability of Lenders to Recoup Them- selves for Losses Due to Such Failures — Effect of Government Loans and Profitableness of Business on the Rate of Interest^ Contraction of Credit Operations During the War — Gains of Lend- ers after January, 1865 — Position of Capitalists Who Invested in Federal Bonds. I. THE PROBLEM OF LENDERS AND BOEBOWEES OF CAPITAL The task of ascertaining the effect of the greenback issues upon the situation of lenders and borrowers of capital is in one respect more simple and in another respect more complex than the task of dealing with wage-earners. It is simpler in that there are not different grades of capital to be considered like the different grades of labor. But it is more complex in that the capitalist must be considered not only as the recipient of a money income, as is the laborer, but also as the possessor of certain property that may be affected by changes in the standard money. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the relative importance of these two items — rate of interest and 360 Interest and Loan Capital 361 value of principal — is not the same in all cases. Whether a lender is affected more by the one item or the other depends upon what he intends to do with his property at the expiration of existing contracts. A widow left in 1860 with an estate of say $10,000, who expected to keep this sum constantly at interest and to find new borrowers as soon as the old loans were paid, could neglect everything but the net rate of interest received. On the other hand, if this estate had been left to a youth of twenty who intended to invest his property in some business after a few years, the rate of interest would be of relatively less importance to him than the purchasing power of the principal when the time came to set up for himself. Of course, the same difference exists, mutatis mutandis, in the case of different borrowers. Those borrowers who expected to renew old loans on maturity would have to con- sider little beyond the interest demanded by lenders, while borrowers who expected to pay off the loans out of the pro- ceeds of their ventures would be interested primarily in the amount of goods that would sell for sufficient money to make up the principal. Although these two classes of cases are by no means independent of each other, the following discussion will be rendered clearer by observing the broad difference between them. Accordingly, attention will first be directed to the effect of the price fluctuations upon the purchasing power of the principal of loans, and afterward to changes in the rate of interest. II. PURCHASING POWER OF THE PRINCIPAL OP LOANS It follows directly from the chapter upon prices that most persons who made loans in the earlier part of the Civil War and were repaid in greenbacks must have suffered heavy losses from the smaller purchasing power of the 362 History op the Greenbacks principal wlien it was returned to them. But while this general fact is clear, it is difficult to make a quantitative statement of the degree of the loss that will be even tolerably satisfactory. Indeed, no single series of percentages can represent the loss of all lenders, any more than any single series can represent the decline ia the real wages of all laborers, for the reason that the loss depends both upon the time of lending and repayment, and upon the particular commodities which the capitalist wishes to purchase. Prob- ably the best course to pursue is to take the median of relative prices at wholesale as the most reliable index of general price movements, and work out a table based upon it which shall show the relative rise or fall in the purchasing power of money from quarter to quarter. Such a table is given on the next page. The first line of figures across the top of this table, showing the relative purchasing power of money, is obtained by computing the reciprocals of the corresponding index numbers for prices as given in Table XIV. To see how the variations shown by this series of figures affected the interests of lenders, a number of loans is supposed to be made each quarter, one of which matures and is repaid each subsequent quarter. The second to the twenty-fourth lines of figures across the table show what was the percent- age of loss or gain in the purchasing power of the prin- cipal in the months of repayment as compared with the months when the loans were made. To obtain these series, the figure representing the relative purchasing power of money each quarter is taken as the starting-point, and the corresponding figures for each subsequent quarter are treated as percentages of the first. For example, the loss on a loan made in January, 1863, and repaid in January, 1865, is stated as 43 per cent., because 44, which represents the relative power of money at the later date, is only 57 Interest and Loan Capital 363 table lvii PBECENTAGB Olf LOSB ( — ) OE GAIN (+) TO CEEDITOE IN POECHASINO POWEE PEINCIPAL OF LOANS MADE AND EEPAID AT DATB3 INDICATED 1 s i s 3 3 3 1 s 1 -1 ^ ^ !' s 1 1 1 5 1 s 3 ] s 7 " + + + + t 1 5 ■S 1 s S s 1 s 1 1 1 s 1 f 1 7 7 OS 7 3 + ? + + s + % i 1 2 ^ 1 S T 1 5 I T s s 1 3 1 s 1 1 s 1 a s 1 + + + i t 4 t s 1 s 1 s s 1 1 s is 1 T f I n 1, 1 s f 1 7 1 t 1 < i S g 1 s 1 s 1 I f I s s 1 ? 3 g 1 1 g ^ CD 1 s 4. >, g s 'o s S s s s s 5 3 s s g s a i 1 ^ 1 15 s 5 s 1 5 1 s s s g T to t 1 § ca 1 s 1 ll -4 s s s s " 1 s J s g g 1 1 7 3 3 m i 1 8 p s 3 s 1 a 1 7 g s 1 1 s CO I 1 + -^ 1 4 ■3' f; s s s s *? 7 7 s s 1 1 s •0 03 + I 1 s 1 < g g 1 g 1 g 1 1 g g S s 1 1 » il 1 p Si 1 1 f s ^ 7 s 1 s SI s 1 1 s ^ s 1 2 2 tc iS c 1 s s s 7 i 1 i. s i 1 >= ^ =, = = " T i 4 1 ■5 s + + lO + + + s « i s 1 •s 1 3 + + + + % 1 1 4 1 = => =■ = i 1 1 .0 1 o ° = s 9' •? S i 1 1 1 8 = 11 1 S i 1 1 1 i 1 \h 4 rri ^flS A e-ss S £ S.B < 364 History of the Greenbacks per cent, of 77, which represents its purchasing power at the earlier date.' The conclusion to be drawn from the table is so clear as hardly to require formal statement. In the case of almost all loans made before the middle of 1864 and repaid at any- subsequent time embraced by the table, the creditor found that the sum returned to him had a purchasing power much less than the purchasing power that had been transferred to the borrower when the loan was made. According to the figures, this decline varied from 1 to more than 50 per cent. On loans made in the middle of 1864 or later, on the contrary, the creditor gained as a rule. In the case of loans made in January, 1865, and repaid six months later, the increase in purchasing power was over 40 per cent. It may not be unwise, however, to enter once again a caution against taking such figures too literally." III. THE RATE OF INTEREST In turning to study the fortunes of men who have no thought of employing their capital for themselves, but expect to seek new borrowers as rapidly as old loans are repaid, one finds it necessary to distinguish between 1 A more strictly accurate method of estimating the relative loss or gain would be to compute the average relative prices of all the series anew on the basis of the actual prices at each successive period. But this would be a heavy task, and it is thought that the inaccuracy of the simple method employed is not greater than the inaccuracy of the material upon which the whole computation rests. To pretend to great refinement in the method of analysis for the purposes of so rough a statement as the present would be pedantic. 2 Loans made before the passage of the first legal-tender act, February 25, 1862, are treated in the table as if they were all repaid in greenbacks. Some debtors, how- ever, are said to have repaid such obligations in gold. (See letter of Judge Hoar to E. J. James in Fublications of the American Economic Association^ Vol. Ill, p. 51.) But so nice a sense of business honor was not universal, and the courts were called upon to adjudicate the question involved. In Hepburn vs. Giiswold (8 Wallace, p. 603; 1869) the federal Supreme Court held that United States notes were not a legal tender for debts contracted before February 25, 1862; but within a year the court reversed this decision ("The Legal Tender Cases," 12 Wallace, p. 457). But the table indicates that losses on loans made in AprU, 1862, were not less heavy than on loans made in 1860. Interest and Loan Capital 365 cases where loans have been made for short and for long terms ; between the cases, that is, where there is and where there is not an opportunity to make a new contract regarding the rate of interest. The latter cases may be dismissed with a word. The capitalist who lent |10,000 for five years in April, 1862, at 6 per cent, interest would be in relatively the same position as the workingman who received no advance in money wages; while his money income remained the same, the rise of prices would decrease his real income in 1864 and 1865 by about one-half. Of course, this loss to the creditor is a gain to the debtor; for to the business man using borrowed capital the advance of prices means that he can raise his interest money by selling a smaller proportion of his output. More interesting is the case of loans maturing and made afresh during the period under examination. The impor- tant question is : How far did the lender secure compensa- tion for the diminished purchasing power of the money in which he was paid by contracting for a higher rate of interest? To answer this question adequately abundant statistics of the rate of interest received on loans of differ- ent kinds during the war are necessary. Unfortunately, however, it is extremely difficult to find such figures. To my knowledge there are no systematic records of rates of interest on long-time business loans, and the data for short-time loans are unusually meager and doubtful. In 1860 Hunfs Merchants^ Magazine and the Bankers^ Maga- zine — the most prominent business periodicals of the day — were publishing each month tables showing the rates of interest paid in New York for loans of several different kinds. But during the war they ceased these systematic reports and one can glean from them but occasional scatter- ing statements. Professor Irving Fisher, however, in his Appreciation and Interest gives a table which purports to 366 History op the Greenbacks show the rate on "call" loans, "60 day" loans and "prime, two name, 60 day" loans for a period of years including 1860 to 1865. The third of these series was obtained, he states, from a diagram prepared by one of his students showing "the highest and lowest monthly rates" — though from what source the data were taken he does not say. The other two series were obtained from a table compiled by Mr. E. B. Elliott. Elliott made this table for a paper upon "The Periodicity of Rates of Interest," read before the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1874. The paper was not published in the pro- ceedings of the association, and the only record which I have been able to find of it is a brief abstract published in the Bankers^ Magazine.^ It is here said regarding the source of information upon which Elliott drew: "Being asked whence the data were obtained, Professor Elliott replied that they were collated from The Bankers'' Maga- zine, The Financial Chronicle and Hunt's Merchants' Magazine." I have no doubt that this statement is correct for most of the years included in the table (1849 to 1874), but since the Commercial and Financial Chronicle was not established until July, 1865, and the other journals men- tioned did not maintain these tables of interest regularly, it follows that Mr. Elliott must have had irregular data for the years of the war, or else that he went to some unknown source for his figures. Under these circumstances it seems justifiable to attempt constructing a new table from the reports of the daily news- papers. On examination, however, one finds that this course also is open to objection. In the first place, regular state- ments can be found only for one kind of transactions — loans on call. In the second place, whenever the rates for call loans rise above 7 per cent, the reporter is apt to say 1 Vol. XXIX, p. 220. Intekest and Loan Capital 367 merely that the ruling rate is "the legal maxinnim plus a small commission." In the third place, one is justified in feeling some suspicions of the accuracy of newspaper reports. However, I have compiled a table from the financial columns of the newspapers of the rate for call loans every Saturday from 1862 to 1865. In doing so I have been compelled to supplement one paper by another, for no one gives the reports with perfect regularity for the whole period.' Since none of these series have an unquestioned title to acceptance, they are all presented in the next table. The TABLE Lvm INTEKEST BATES IN THE NEW YORK MONEY MABKET 1860 TO 1865 I. AVEHAGE BATES PEB YBAB Teab Call Sixty Days Peimb two Name 60 Days Elliott Newspapers Elliott Fisher 1860 6.1^ 5.4 5.6 5.0 7.2 6.1 5^2^ 6.2 6.6 6.2 8.4^ 9.0 6.8 6.7 9.3 10.2 T.1% 1861 6.6 1862 1863 5.4 5.8 1864 1865 8.0 8 2 II. AVEKAGB RATES PEE MONTH FOE CALL LOANS 1862 1804 January . . . February . , March April May June July August September October .. . . November . December. 6.5^ 6.0 5.5 5.5 4.6 4.1 5.4 4.0 4.3 4.6 6.3 6.0 6.1^ 6.3 6.1 6.2 5.3 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.6 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.0^ 6.1 5.9 6.8 5.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.9 7.0^ 6.1 7.0 5.6 5.4 4.9 5.5 5.9 6.0 7.0 1 The Herald, Tribune, Evening Express, and World have all been drawn upon. 368 History ov the Greenbacks exhibit of average annual rates is followed by a statement of the average rate each month based upon the newspaper reports. While the different series showing annual average rates of interest do not agree with each other perfectly, they all indicate that the advance in the rate of interest was com- paratively small — much too small to compensate persons whose income was derived from such sources for the increased cost of living. To bring this fact out clearly the next table shows the relative increase in the rates of interest side by side with the relative increase in prices and in money wages: TABLE LIX RELATIVE IKCEEASE IN INTEREST, PRICES, AND WAGEg Bates of Interest Prices Wages Year Call BODais Prime TWO Name 60 Days ID o 1 1 3 a > 'S Elliott News- papers EUiott Fisher 1 d o O 1860 100 89 92 82 118 100 ioo 119 127 100 100 107 81 80 111 121 100 86 70 75 104 106 100 98 105 138 186 188 100 103 115 144 172 181 100 101 103 118 137 154 100 1861 101 1862 103 1863 117 1864 138 1865 158 The conclusion from these figures is not only that per- sons who derived their income from capital lent at interest for short terms were injured by the issues of the greenbacks, but also that their injuries were more serious than those suffered by wage-earners. To explain this state of affairs is not easy. The first reason that suggests itself to the mind considering the problem is that both lenders and borrowers failed to foresee Inteeest and Loan Capital 369 the changes that would take place in the purchasing power of money between the dates when loans were made and repaid. No doubt there is much force in this explanation. If, for instance, men arranging for loans in April, 1862, to be repaid a year later, had known that in the meantime the purchasing power of money would decline 30 per cent., they would have agreed upon a very high rate of interest. On the assumption that, monetary conditions aside, the rate would have been 6 per cent., the lender gifted with second sight would have demanded 50.52 per cent. ; i. e., 6 per cent, plus 42 per cent, of both capital and interest to offset the decline of 30 per cent, in the purchasing power of the dollars received in repayment as compared with that of the dollars lent. According to the table of relative prices, any interest rate less than this would have deprived capitalists of a portion of their ordinary returns; and, on the other hand, since the prices of products increased on the average 42 per cent, between April, 1862, and April, 1863, borrowers could afford to pay on the average 50.52 per cent, for loans quite as well as they could afford to pay 6 per cent, in years of stable prices. Men able to discern the future course of prices would not have lent money at the ordinary rates, and if, as the table indicates, the rates prevailing in the New York market throughout all 1862 and 1863 were less than 7 per cent., it must have been because the extraordinary rise of prices was not foreseen by borrowers and lenders. Nor, if the arguments of the preceding chapters are valid, is it surprising that business men failed to see what was coming ; for the course of prices depended chiefly upon the valuation set upon the greenbacks, and this valuation in turn depended chiefly upon the state of the finances and the fortunes of war — matters that no one could foresee with cer- tainty. Indeed, there was much of the time a very general disposition to take an unwarrantedly optimistic view of the 370 History of the Geeenbaoks military situation and the chances of an early peace. Many members of the business community seem to have felt that the premium on gold was artificial and must soon drop, that prices were inflated and must collapse. To the extent that such views prevailed borrowers would be cautious about making engagements to repay money in a future that might well present a lower range of prices, and lenders would expect a gain instead of a loss from the changes in the pur- chasing power of money. But the full explanation of the slight advance in interest cannot be found in this inability to foresee the future — at least not without further analysis of what consequences such inability entailed. Workingmen are commonly credited with less foresight than capitalists, and nevertheless they seem, according to the figures, to have succeeded better in making bargains with employers of labor than did lenders with employers of capital. The explanation of this less success seems to be found in the difference between the way in which depreciation affected what the capitalist and the laborer had to offer in return for interest and wages. There is no reason for assuming that an artisan who changed employers during the war would render less efficient service in his new than in his old position, or that a landlord who changed tenants had less advantages to put at the disposal of the incoming lessee. In both these cases the good offered to the active business man remained substantially the same, and it may safely be assumed that, other things being equal, this business man could afford to give quite as much for the labor and the land after as before siispension. From the business man's point of view, therefore, there seems to have been room for a doubling of money wages and rent when the purchasing power of money had fallen one-half. But in the case of the borrower of capital the like was not true. The thousand dollars which Mr. A. offered him in 1865 was not. Inteeest and Loan Capital 371 like the labor of John Smith or the farm of Mr. B., as effi- cient for his purposes as it would have been five years before. For, with the thousand dollars he could not purchase anything like the same amount of machinery, material, or labor. And since the same nominal amount of capital was of less efficiency in the hands of the borrower, he could not without loss to him- self increase the interest which he paid for new loans in pro- portion to the decline in the purchasing power of money, as he could increase the wages of laborers or the rent for land. From the point of view of the lender this remark means &imply that the expiration of old contracts and the making of fresh ones gave him no opportunity to remedy the mis- takes of judgment once committed. If a farm hand in April, 1862, contracting to work a year, failed to foresee the advance of prices that would occur, and agreed to accept his usual wage of $15 a month and board, he would suffer during the year from having to pay more for clothing, etc. ; but when he came to renew his bargain in April, 1863, he would be in a strong position to demand an increase of wages sufficient to offset the depreciation in the purchasing power of money. But if a capitalist with no more power of divination than the farm hand lent $1,000 in April, 1862, for a year at 6 per cent, interest, he would not only suffer during this time from the rise of prices, but he would also have no ground for ask- ing from a new borrower compensation, in the form of higher interest, for the advance that had already taken place in prices. If both lender and borrower in April, 1863, antici- pated that the rise of prices would continue during the next year, they might attempt to adjust the rate of interest so as to counterbalance the expected changes, but the bor- rower could givS no compensation for the changes that had already taken place, inasmuch as these changes diminished the efficiency of the thousand dollars which the lender trans- ferred to his control. 372 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS Thus ground once lost by a lender through monetary depreciation could not be recovered so long as prices con- tinued to advance ; the utmost that the lender could hope to accomplish was to keep from falling farther behind by obtaia- ing a rate of interest sufficiently high to offset the further advances of the future. As has been shown, the capitalist who lent $1,000 in April, 1862, for a year should have charged 50.52 per cent, for interest. After deducting his income of 6 per cent, plus 42 per cent, of itself, he would have had left at the end of the year a nominal principal of $1,420, which in April, 1863, had the same purchasing power as $1,000 in April, 1862. With this number of paper dollars to put at the disposal of borrowers, the capitalist could prevent a decline in his real income if he were able to foresee that the purchasing power of money would depreciate 19 per cent, more during the next year and to persuade bor- rowers of the same fact. The rate charged should be 30.9 per cent. — i. e., 6 per cent, plus 23.4 per cent, of capital and interest to offset the diminution of 19 per cent, in purchasing power. This rate would give the usual real income to the capitalist and leave him in April, 1864, a nominal capital of $1,752, or the equivalent in purchasing power of $1,000 in April, 1862. For the next year the rate should be 11.61 per cent., which on $1,750 would give the usual real income and a principal of $1,841 in April, 1865, which again is equal to $1,000 in April, 1862. Failure to obtain these exceedingly high rates of interest in making the loan for any year would subject the lender to a heavy loss of real income not only for that year, but also for the years to come, beause it would not provide for an increase in the nominal amount of the prin- cipal sufficient to sustain its purchasing power undiminished. The failure of the rate of interest to attain anything like the extraordinary rates which alone could have saved lenders from loss seems at first sight more remarkable when the Interest and Loan Capital 373 government demand for loans and the high profits made by business men are taken into account. But neither of these factors had quite so much influence as one at first imagines. Just as the government's demand for food and clothing was not a new demand superadded to that formerly exist- ing, but rather a part of the old demand making itself felt through a new channel, so in a measure the government demand for capital was a substitute for private demands rather than an increase in the whole sum required by the community. The government had become the employer of a considerable fraction of the working population, and it needed large sums of money to provide for these employees, in the same way that a corporation that increased the number of its hands would need a larger working capital to pay wages and purchase supplies. But after all there is a radical difference between the eflfect of war loans and industrial loans upon the rate of interest. The corporation would hope to direct the labor in such fashion that it would more than replace the capital consumed in providing for it; while the majority of the men employed by the federal government during the Civil War were not engaged in productive operations. Since the soldiers enlisted in 1862 did not produce an equivalent in commodities for the food they ate and the clothes they wore, the government had to borrow new sums of capital to maintain them in 1863, and new sums again in 1864 and 1865. Through the war loans the community was voluntarily devoting a not inconsiderable proportion of its labor and capital each year to employments that from the strictly economic point of view must be called unproductive, and so far as this was the case the process of accumulation was retarded. It seems therefore safe to say that though the government demand for loans was in considerable degree a substitute for private demands, the difference in the use made of the 374 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS borrowed funds tended to raise the rate of interest for future years. The modification required by the proposition that the high profits of trade were a factor of great importance in the loan market is more serious. That profits were uncommonly large during the war is not doubted; indeed, the next chapter will be devoted primarily to showing that such was the fact. Nor is it doubted that under ordinary circumstances high profits will tend powerfully to produce high rates of interest ; both by making business men anxious to borrow capital with which to extend the scope of their existing operations or to undertake new ventures, and by making capitalists who have the choice between employing their means themselves and lending them to others prefer the former course. But during the Civil War this usual consequence of high profits conflicted with another conse- quence of the monetary situation — namely, the uncertainty about the future course of prices. Men were at any given time " making money," but they recognized that their unu- sual profits were in a large measure the product of monetary depreciation. If the premium on gold should drop suddenly, as it might at almost any time in consequence of a favorable change in the military situation, prices would probably fol- low, and the trend of affairs might set as strongly against the realization of high profits as it had set formerly in its favor. Under such circumstances prudence forbade men to enter into contracts that would call for the repayment of large sums of money in a future that might bring a low level of prices and make it necessary for the debtor to sell an unexpectedly large part of his product to obtain suflicient money to meet his obligations. A man would be in a safer position if he kept free of debt and confined his operations as closely as possible to business that he could manage with his own capital. In other words, men realized their inability Inteeest and Loan Capital 375 to foresee the future and, knowing that it might bring great price fluctuations in either direction, sought protection against these changes by limiting their future pecuniary obligations as narrowly as possible. That considerations of this character were carefully weighed by business men is clearly shown by the remarkable contraction of credit operations that took place during the war. When no one could foresee with confidence what would be the relative purchasing power of a dollar three months in advance, it was obviously risky for a merchant to accept a note due in ninety days for goods sold, or to give such a note for goods bought. Consequently, cash busiuess increased in importance and credit operations diminished — a condition of affairs that was remarked in mercantile circles as early as August, 1862.' In proportion as the fluctuations of prices became more marked, credits were more strictly curtailed. "Even the West," said the New York Times of November 28, 1863, " which has long been wont to strain credit to its utmost, is now buying and selling for cash to an unprece- dented degree." The circular published in 1864 by Dun's Mercantile Agency ascribed the small number of bankrupt- cies in large part " to that rigid caution which has obtained in our business community in dispensing credits."^ Mr. McCuUoch in his report as secretary of the treasury, Decem- ber, 1865, said that "it is undoubtedly true that trade is carried on much more largely for cash than was ever the case previous to 1861." ' In the autumn of the same year the Commercial and Financial Chronicle made a careful inquiry into the credits being granted to the South and West, and reached the following conclusions: "The great bulk of jobbing sales now being made are on short time, say from sixty days to four months Half of the buyers 1 Compare Sunfs Merchants^ Magazine^V 61. XL VII, p. 333, and the " Commercial Chronicle and Review " of later issues. 2I6id., Vol. LII, p. 146. 3P. 11. 376 History op the Greenbacks pay in cash, and a large portion of the remainder average less than three months in their credits, while but a very few obtain six or eight months." ' Of course, the increase in cash business meant that the demand for commercial loans was less, and this diminution in the quajitity of commercial paper on the market may not improbably have offset the great increase in public securities offered to investors. It must be noticed, however, that in explaining the cause of the contraction of credit one finds himself brought back again to men's conscious inability to foresee the future course of prices as the controlling factor in the loan market. Ordinarily men treat the value of money as a constant and arrange their transactions with little conscious reference to its fluctuations. A paper stand- ard, however, the value of which depends upon the varying credit of a government passing through a serious crisis, forces upon everyone a realization of the fact that the pur- chasing power of money is subject to great variations. But the realization of this fact is of little practical use in arran- ging business affairs unless men can foresee the character of the impending changes. During the Civil War the uncer- tainty was so great that such foresight was hardly possible. As a consequence it seems probable from what information is available that men made their bargains for borrowing and lending money upon terms not very unlike the terms pre- vailing in less unquiet times. The chief difference appears to have been that, so far as possible, everyone refrained from assuming obligations to receive or to pay money at future dates, because everyone realized that the sum which he would be called upon to give or take might well possess much less purchasing power than the sum which he had received or given — particularly when the time that would elapse between the making and repayment of the loan would be considerable. iVol. I, p. 325. Interest and Loan Capital 377 Lest too strong an impression be given of the losses of creditors during the war, it is well to call attention to the fact that against the losses during the period of rising prices, extending broadly from 1862 to January, 1865, were set similar gains during the period of falling prices, extending broadly from January, 1865, to the resumption of specie payments in 1879. If Falkner's index number of 100 for the latter year can be accepted, it follows that a man who had kept a sum of money at interest for the whole period from suspension to resumption would find its pur- chasing power at the end of the paper-money regime substantially the same as it had been at the beginning. In the meantime, however, he would have suffered a heavy loss of real income from 1862 to 1865, and on the other hand would have enjoyed an increase of real income from the latter date to 1879. It should also be pointed out that on one important class of loans capitalists suffered comparatively little even during the war. Interest on many forms of government bonds was paid in gold. Capitalists who invested their means in these securities consequently received an income of unvarying specie value. But even these investors did not escape all the evil consequences of the paper-money system ; because, as has been shown, prices rose in the end to a greater height than the premium upon gold. To illustrate the situation of such investors, suppose the case of a man who in 1860 had $10,000 of the fifteen-year 5 per cent, federal bonds of the loan of 1858. The following table shows what would be his income in gold and paper money, and how its purchasing power would fluctuate in consequence of the advance in prices. While persons who had purchased bonds as an investment before the war suffered no great loss of income, persons who had sufficient faith in the stability of the federal government 378 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE LX MONEY AND EEAIi INCOME YIELDED BY $10,000 OF BONDS OF LOAN OF 1858 Year Income in Gold Coin Average Value of $100 of Gold Coin in Currency Equiva- lent of Gold In- come in Currency Eelative Prices at Eetail Purchas- ing Power of Money Income Eelative Eeal Income 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 $500 500 500 500 500 500 $100.0 100.0 113.3 145.2 203.3 157.3 $500.0 500.0 566.5 726.0 1,016.5 786.5 100 103 115 144 172 181 500 485 493 504 591 435 100 97 99 101 118 87 to purchase its securities at the low prices that prevailed during the war realized a very high rate of interest. By way of rough illustration, consider the case of a foreigner who sent $1,000 in gold to New York every January and directed his broker to purchase 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds of the loan of 1861. The following table shows the amount of bonds which this sum would buy and the interest which the investment would yield: TABLE LXI INTEREST YIELDED BY AN INVESTMENT OF $1,000 IN GOLD IN UNITED STATES SIXES OF 1881, MADE IN JANUARY OF EACH YEAE FEOM 1862 TO 1865 Date Average Value in Currency of $1,000 in Gold ; Average Price of U.S.6'sof 1881 Amount of Bonds Which $1,000 in Gold Would Buy Gold Interest at 6 per cent. on Bonds Bought Eate of Interest Bealized 1862, January 1863, January 1864, January 1865, January $1,025 1,451 1,555 2,162 89.6 95.4 105.5 110.9 $1,143 1,521 1,474 1,950 168.58 91.26 88.44 117.00 6.9^ 9.1 8.8 11.7 If the person who made these investments were an American, he would be able to sell his gold-interest money at a high premium, but he would also have to pay corre- Inteebst and Loan Capital 379 spondingly high prices for commodities, so that upon the whole his position would not be greatly different from that of the foreign investor. That such opportunities for invest- ment as these securities offered should exist when men were most of the time loaning money for short terms at 7 per cent, or less, is perhaps the most emphatic proof that could be offered of the inability of the public to foresee what the future had in store. Had men been able to make clearer forecasts, the rate of interest would have risen much more than it did, and had they not feared for the solvency of the federal government, its bonds would not have fallen so low. But, for that matter, this same distrust of the government's solvency, arising from the darkness of the future, may be said to have been fundamentally responsible for all the economic disturbances of the war times, because to it was due the varying depreciation of the greenbacks. CHAPTEK VIII PROFITS I. Profits as a Share in the Distribution of the Product: Use of the Terms " Profits " and " Besidual Claimants " — Gains of Residual Claimants at the Expense of Laborers, Landlords, and Lending Capitalists — Other Things being equal, Profits Varied Inversely as Average Wages Paid to Employees and Directly as the Complexity of Business Organization. II. Profits in Different Industries: Dependence of Profits on Relative Advance in Prices of Different Products — Profits of Farmers as an Illustration. III. Statistical Evidence Regarding Profits: Meagerness of the Evidence — Statistics of Failures. I. PEOFITS AS A SHARE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRODUCT In the three preceding chapters an attempt has been made to show in what manner the depreciation of the paper standard affected the real incomes of laborers, landlords, and lending capitalists. These classes are all alike in that the amount of the remuneration received by them for the aid which they render to production is commonly fixed in advance by agreement, and is not immediately affected by the profitableness or unprofitableness of the undertaking. It remains to examine the economic fortunes of those men whose money incomes are made up by the sums left over in any business after all the stipulated expenses have been met. For the purposes of the discussion it is convenient to call these men "residual claimants," and to use the term "profits" to denote the sums which they receive. It will be observed that neither of these terms is used in the sense frequently assigned it in economic treatises. When one is 380 Pbofits 381 investigating the consequences of monetary depreciation or appreciation, particularly within a limited period of time, one finds that the economic functions that men perform in the process of production are facts of less significance than the legal positions in which they stand with reference to the payment of their incomes. The residual claimant of the present chapter is likely to be that man in any business organization whom Marshall would call the undertaker; but the factor of importance in determining whether the rise of prices injures or benefits him is not the work that he per- forms in initiating and superintending operations, but the fact that, instead of having entered into a contract to accept a certain sum for his services, he has as his share whatever funds are left after paying all fixed charges and operating expenses. The residual claimant in this sense may be either manager, capitalist, landlord, or laborer, or any two or three, or all of these persons in one. Which man in any establish- ment of those who contribute services or property to aid the process of production is in the legal position of residual claimant depends upon the organization of the business. Many cases can be differentiated, varying in complexity from that of the farmer who works his own land without assistance of hired labor or borrowed capital, to that of the great corporation which leases its land, borrows most of its capital, hires its laborers, and pays fixed salaries to its officials. In the last case the residual claimants are the shareholders among whom the profits are divided in the form of dividends, and these shareholders may include among their number persons who are officials, or laborers, or bondholders, or landlords of the corporation, or who have no other connection with it than that of owning stock. But widely different as these residual claimants inay be from other points of view, they are all alike in that the amount of their incomes depends upon the difference between 382 History op the Geeenbacks the total receipts of the business and the sums paid to all the other co-operators in production who have commuted their claims to share in the product for a stipulated pay- ment. The problem of the present chapter is: How did the depreciation of the greenbacks aifect these differences between total receipts and the total of payments to other co-operators ? When the problem of profits is conceived of in this fashion, it becomes clear that a very important part of the solution has already been contributed by the preceding studies of wages, rent, and interest. The evidence has been found to support the conclusion that in almost all cases the sums of money wages, rent, and interest received by labor- ers, landlords and capitalists increased much less rapidly than did the general price level. If the wording of this conclusion be reversed — the prices of products rose more rapidly than wages, rent, or interest — we come at once to the proposition that as a rule profits must have increased more rapidly than prices. For, if the sums paid to all the other co-operating parties were increased in just the same ratio as the prices of the articles sold, it would follow that other things remaining the same, money profits also would increase in the same ratio. But if, while prices doubled, the payments to laborers, landlords, and capitalists increased in any ratio less than 100 per cent., the sums of money left for the residual claimants must have more than doubled. In other words, the effect of the depreciation of the paper currency upon the distribution of wealth may be summed up in the proposition: The shares of wage-earners, landowners, and lenders in the national dividend were diminished and the share of residual claimants was increased. Keal profits were unusually large during the Civil War, therefore, but large because real wages, rent, and interest were low. It must not be assumed, however, that the residual Peofits 383 claimant necessarily gained as much as the other parties in distribution lost. In the chapter upon wages, for example, it was suggested that the efficiency of labor probably decreased somewhat during the Civil War, because a large number of the most efficient laborers had enlisted in the armies and their places had to be filled with less skilful hands. So far as this was the case, the volume of output must have diminished, and, of course, such diminution would decrease the difference between total income and total outgo that figures with us as profits. But if this was an important consideration, it was one due, not to the paper standard, but to the fact that the country was involved in a great war. With regard to the relations between residual claimant and lending capitalist it must be said that the capital bor- rowed during the war decreased very much more in efficiency than the labor hired. When prices had doubled, $1,000 of capital was the equivalent of only $500 on the old level of prices, and if the borrower had to pay 8 instead of 6 per cent, interest, he seems to have been worse instead of better off in consequence of the depreciation of money. And, of course, the residual claimant is, in fact, worse off because of even a slight increase in the rate of interest which he has to pay — unless further depreciation takes place between the time that he invests the funds lent him and repays them to the lender. But if such depreciation does take place, he is likely to make a larger gain at the expense of the lender than he makes at the expense of the laborer, because the contract which he makes with the former is likely to run for a longer time than the contract with the latter, and conse- quently the person who finds himself injured by the course of events cannot seek reliei so promptly by insisting upon making new terms. Moreover, the borrower gains not only by continuing to pay the same money income to the lender for a considerable period, as he may perhaps do with the 384 History op the Geeenbacks laborer, but also by returning the principal sum lent in dol- lars of much less purchasing power than the dollars received. On the other hand, the borrower of capital feels the effect of a downward turn of prices much more quickly than the employer of labor. The wage-tables indicate that, though money wages continued to rise for some time after prices had begun to fall, they had nevertheless not caught up with prices by the end of the war. Therefore, while employers were making less extra gain at the expense of their hands at the close of 1865 than they had been making in 1863 and 1864, they were nevertheless receiving an extra profit as compared with the situation before the suspension of specie payments. The extra gain of the borrower, however, was turned into a positive loss as soon as the purchasing power of the dollars in which his obligations were repaid became greater than the purchasing power of dollars which had been lent to him. As for the relations between the tenant and landlord, they were like those between employer and employee in that the efficiency of the good transferred was not affected by monetary conditions, and like those between borrower and lender in that the contract was likely to run for a con- siderable term. From the tables of chap, vi which indicate that money rents increased less rapidly than money wages, it follows that the gain of the residual claimant at the expense of his landlord was probably greater in degree than the gain at the expense of laborers. Two other general propositions respecting profits are sug- gested by the results of preceding investigations. First, other things being equal, profits varied inversely as the average wage per day paid to employees. This conclusion follows directly from the demonstration in chap, v that the money wages of men earning $1-$1.49 per day before the perturbation of prices increased in higher ratio than those Pbofits 385 of men earning |1.50-$1.99; that the wages of the latter class increased more than the wages of men in the next higher wage class, etc. Second, other things being equal, profits varied directly as the complexity of the business organization. By this proposition is meant, for example, that a farmer who paid money rent, used borrowed capital, and employed hired laborers, made a higher percentage of profits than a farmer of whom any one of these suppositions did not hold true. If, as has been argued, the increase of profits was made at the expense of laborers, landlords, and capitalists, it follows that that residual claimant fared best whose contracts enabled him to exploit the largest number of these other persons. II. PEOFITS IN DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES The effect of monetary depreciation upon profits resulting from the increase in the share of the residual claimant in the product at the expense of the shares of laborers, landlords, and capitalists, was felt more or less alike in all industries. Of course, the average advance of money wages was not uni- form in all branches of production: there were probably similar differences in the increase of the sums paid as rent for locations of various sorts, and there may have been dif- ferences in the fluctuation of rates of interest charged to borrowers in dissimilar lines of business. But, despite these differences in degree of diminution in the shares of these three classes of participants in distribution, as compared with the share of residual claimants, the general character of this effect of depreciation was substantially the same in all industries. There was another and hardly less important effect of depreciation upon profits, however, that was by no means uniform. In chap, iv emphasis was put upon the dissimi- larity in the price fluctuations of different commodities. 386 History of the Greenbacks These dissimilarities produced corresponding variations in the profits realized by producers. The residual claimant whose profits came from the production of commodities that advanced in price more rapidly than the majority of other commodities derived a second gain in addition to the gain made at the expense of his laborers, landlord, and creditors. Not only did such a residual claimant have a relatively larger share in the product, but the money value of that product was relatively larger as compared with the money value of other things that he might wish to buy. When the advance of the product in price was nearly the same as the advance of the articles which the residual claimant purchased, he enjoyed no such second gain — the only way in which he was benefited by the depreciation was through his abiUty to satisfy contracts with the proceeds of a smaller portion of the output. Finally, in the case of products that advanced in value less than the average the residual claimant not only made no second gain, but he even suffered a loss through the diminshed relative purchasing power of his product — a loss that might or might not be offset by the gains made at the expense of the other participants in distribution. The statistical material is not complete enough to make possible an elaborate investigation of these differences in the profitableness of industries due to the dissimilar price fluctuations. But there is one case that merits attention, not only because of the relative fulness of the statistical record, but also because of the great importance of the industry. It will be remembered that thirteen agricultural products are in- cluded in the tables of relative prices at wholesale. Since this list comprises all the most important farm products of the northern states, it affords a fair basis for estimating how the farmer's money income was affected by price changes in comparison with that of other producers. Table LXII pre- sents the data regarding the prices of farm products in two Profits 387 TABLE LXII BEIiATIVB WHOLESAIiB PEI0E3 OF FAEM PRODUCTS AND OP OTHEE COMMODITIBa Aeitfivtrtic Mean Median Thirteen Seven All Thirteen Seven All Date Farm Farm Articles Farm Farm Articles Products- Products- Included Products — Products — Included Simple Weighted in Simple Weighted in Average Average Table XIV Average Average Table XIV 1860, Jan . . . 103 108 102 101 102 100 April. . 105- 103 102 105- 105 100 July . . 98 94 100 96 92 100 Oct . . . 95 95 104 94 97 100 1861, Jan . . . 9^ 91 97 941 90 100 April. . 94- 87 98 90 92 97 July . . 74 66 93 66 66 95 Oct . . . 76 71 100 71 72 100 1862, Jan... 83 78 111 84-i 79 100 April. . 92 81 110 87- 85 100 July . . 87 77 113 86 74 103 Oct . . . 97 85 124 96 82 117 1863, Jan... 119 100 142 100 94 130 April. . 144 129 162 130 120 142 July . . 129 110 156 115 103 139 Oct . . . 133 125 154 127 122 140 1864, Jan... 159 157 176 152 153 161 April. . 171 171 194 161 160 175 July . . 189 192 233 185 206 200 Oct . . . 194 194 234 194 174 208 1865, Jan . . . 223 216 247 224 212 228 April.. 186 177 207 179 169 184 July . . 143 129 184 139 117 160 Oct . . . 166 154 199 149 149 180 ways. The first column gives tlie simple arithmetic means of the relative prices of the thirteen agricultural products included in the general price tables ; the second column gives a similar average of the relative prices of barley, corn, meats, oats, rye, tobacco, and wheat weighted according to the esti- mated money value of these products in the northern and western states in I860;' the third column gives the arith- 1 These weights are as follows in percentages : Com, 39.4 ; meats, 32.2 ; wheat, 17.4 ; oats, 6.9 ; rye, 1.7 ; barley, 1.6 ; tobacco, 0.8. They are derived from the table of quan- tities and values prepared by the statistician of the Department of Agriculture for Senator Aldrich's committee and published in its report. Part I, p. 108. In order to exclude the south Atlantic and south central states, recourse was had to the census reports of farm yields in 1860, as given in the Eleventh Census, " Beport upon Agri- culture," Table 2. 388 HiSTOET OF THE Geebnbaoks metic mean of the relative prices of all articles included in the wholesale price-tables of chap. iv. A second set of aver- ages is added in which the median is substituted for the arithmetic mean. It seems safe to conclude from these figures that the farmers of the loyal states were among the unfortunate pro- ducers whose products rose in price less than the majority of other articles, and that from this standpoint they were losers rather than gainers by the paper currency. Of course, it is possible that the farmer's loss from this inequality of price fluctuations might be more than offset by his gains at the expense of laborers, landlord, and lending capitalist. But there is good reason for believing that the increase of the residual claimant's profits in the latter fashion was less in farming than in any other important industry. This conclu- sion seems to follow from the proposition that, other things being equal, profits varied directly as the complexity of business organization. The American farmers of the Civil War were in a large proportion of cases their own landlords, capitalists, and laborers. So far as this was true, they had few important pecuniary contracts with other persons of which they could take advantage by paying in depreciated dollars. Of those farmers who hired labor very many paid wages partly in board and lodging — an arrangement which threw a considerable part of the increased cost of living upon them instead of upon their employees. Finally, the renting farmer probably gained less on the average from the contract with his landlord than tenants of any other class, because in a majority of cases the rent was not a sum of money, but a share of the produce. While, then, the general effect of the paper standard was in the direction of increasing profits, it seems very doubtful whether farmers as a whole did not lose more than they gained because of the price disturbances. Profits 389 III. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE EEGAEDING PEOFITS So far the conclusion that profits were on the whole much increased during the Civil War has been based mainly on the results of preceding chapters. It would be highly desirable to test these conclusions by means of direct information regarding profits made in various branches of trade, but the data available for such a purpose are more meager even than the data concerning rent or interest. What scraps of informa- tion are available, however, support the view that profits were uncommonly large. Mr. David A. Wells, for example, in his reports as special commissioner of the revenue, has stories of "most anomalous and extraordinary" profits that were realized in the paper, woolen, pig-iron, and salt indus- tries.' A more general indication of the profitableness of business is afforded by the remark in the annual circular of Dun's Mercantile Agency for 1864, that "it is generally conceded that the average profits on trade range from 12 to 15 per cent.'"' But the most important piece of evidence is found in the statistics of failures compiled by the same agency. The fol- lowing table shows Dun's report of the number of bank- ruptcies and the amount of liabilities in the loyal states from the panic year 1857 to the end of the war: TABLE LXIII STATISTICS OF FAILUBES IN THE LOYAL STATES FEOM 1857 TO 1865 ACCOEDING TO dun's MEKCANTILE AGENCY' Year Number LiabUities Year Number Liabilities 1857 1858 1859 1860 4,257 3,113 2,959 2,733 $265,500,000 73,600,000 51,300,000 61,700,000 1861.... 1862.... 1863.... 1864.... 1865.... 5,935 1,652 495 510 500 $178,600,000 23,000,000 7,900,000 8,600,000 17,600,000 ^Executive Document No. 27^ Ust Cong. ^ 2d Sess,, pp. Ixxxi, xciii, cvi ; Executive Document No. le, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 42, 46 ; House of Representatives Report No. 72, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 73, 74. Cf. also Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. II, p. 227; 0. B. CONANT in Hunt's Merchants'' Magazine, Vol. LII, p. 359. ^Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. LII, p. 146. 3 C(ymmercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. II, p. 34. 390 History of the Geeenbacks The very great decrease both in the number and the liabili- ties of firms that failed is the best proof that almost all business enterprises were "making money." From one point of view the small number of failures is surprising. An unstable currency is generally held to make business unsafe, and seldom has the standard money of a mercantile community proven so unstable, undergone such violent fluctuations in so short a time, as in the United States of the Civil War. Yet, instead of being extremely hazard- ous, business seems from the statistics of failures to have been more than usually safe. The explanation of the anomaly seems to be that the very extremity of the danger proved a safeguard. Business men realized that the inflation of prices was due to the deprecia- tion of the currency, and that when the war was over gold would fall and prices follow. They realized very clearly the necessity of taking precautions against being caught in a position where a sudden decline of prices would ruin them. How they did this by curtailing credits has been shown in the preceding chapter. So long as prices continued to rise such precautions were really not needed by the man in active business except, in so far as he was a creditor of other men ; but when prices commenced to fall prudence had its reward. Such a sudden and violent drop of prices as occurred between January and July, 1865, would have brought a financial revulsion of a most serious character upon a business com- munity under ordinary circumstances. But so well had the change been prepared for, that the number of failures was actually less than it had been in the preceding year of rap- idly rising prices. The whole situation can hardly be explained better than it was by a New York business man writing in Harper^s Monthly Magazine: "When the war ended," he said, "we all knew we should have a panic. Some of us, like Mr. Hoar, Profits 391 expected that greenbacks and volunteers would be disbanded together. Others expected gold to fall to 101 or 102 in a few days. Others saw a collapse of manufacturing industry, owing to the cessation of government purchases. But we all knew a 'crisis' was coming, and having set our houses in order accordingly, the 'crisis' of course never came."' iVol. XL,p. 7i7. CHAPTEK IX THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OP WEALTH I. Production: Attempt of Publicists to Demonstrate Prosperity of the North During the War — Contemporary Criticisms — Effect of the Paper Currency on Production — Influence of High Profits on Industrial Enterprises Counterbalanced by Uncertainty of the Future — And by Attractiyeness of Speculative Lines of Trade. II. Consumption: Contemporary Complaints of Extravagance — Increased Consump- tion of Articles of Luxury — Decreased Consumption of Necessities and Comforts. I. PEODUOTION During the Civil War the question whether or not the loyal states were really "prosperous" was debated with much zeal. Supporters of the Greenback policy, like Spaulding and Hooper, were in the habit of claiming that the paper currency " operated very beneficially upon the business of the country " and promoted the general well-being of the people.' "It is an indisputable fact," said Hooper in Jan- uary, 1863, "that the material interests of the North were never more prosperous than at present."^ From Congress such assertions passed on to newspapers and pamphleteers. Publicists of the prominence of Dr. Wil- liam Elder, D. A. Wells, and Lorin Blodget employed their pens in drawing most cheerful pictures of the condition and prospects of the country. A brief citation from the first writer will suffice to indicate the general character of the conclusions at which these optimistic patriots arrived: "The knowledge of an immensely enhanced activity in all branches 1 Spaulding, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 288. 276id., p.386. 392 Peoduotion and Consumption op Wealth 393 of industry," said Dr. Elder, "is brought home to everybody in the free states by the almost perfect distribution of its benefits. One class, and one class only, of the people, and that a class which the general prosperity always injures, sufEers something — the class of annuitants, salaried officers, and people living upon accumulated capital.'" The general tone of all these pamphlets suggests that the primary object of the writers who prepared them was to encourage the public to accept heavy taxation without grumbling, and to invest their savings in government bonds without hesitation. Laudable as such a design may have been, it was not conducive to impartial selection of data or to successful analysis, and sober-minded critics had no diffi- culty in showing to such as would listen that the boasted prosperity was not so real as it seemed. The little pamphlet, "Are We Prosperous?" by "A Boston Merchant" is a good example of the protests against accepting the specious appearances of activity in business as sufficient evidence of actual increase in well-being. The booklet begins by admit- ting that "labor is fully employed, .... trade is active, .... money plenty," and that everywhere "are heard rejoicings over our prosperity." But, runs the argument, if true prosperity consists "in the productive employment of labor," there is no great ground for congratulation. For nearly a million of men are engaged in the service of the government and nearly a million more are making materials of war. So far as the work of supplying the wants of the community is concerned, all these persons are "not only non-producers, but are destroyers and consumers of the cap- ital of the country." The "enhanced activity" of trade and 1 Debt and Eesources of the United States (Philadelphia, June, 1863) , pp. 21, 23, 24; cf. Wells, Our Burden and Our Strength, Troy,I}. Y., 1864; Blodgbt, Tlie Commer- cial and Financial Strength of the United States, Philadelphia, 1864. Also see the series of letters published in London by Robebt J. Walkee, under the title Ameri- can Finances and Sesources, 1863 and 1864. 394 History op the Greenbacks the full employment of labor mean only that the people left at home are working more than usually hard in the effort to supply these non-producers as well as themselves with the requisites of life. The producers who sell to the government are receiving in exchange not products that are wealth, but evidences of debt. This unproductive employ- ment of labor, consumption of capital without replacement, and rapid accumulation of debt, may quicken the pace of business, but it does not make true prosperity.* From the present point of view it would be improper to enter at length upon the question in what degree the pro- duction and accumulation of wealth were retarded in the years from 1861 to 1865. Such a discussion would involve an attempt to gauge the relative importance of several inde- terminate elements, such as the degree in which the labor force of the North was weakened by enlistments, how far the withdrawal of laborers into the army was compensated by the increased exertions of those who stayed at home, how far the introduction of labor-saving machinery in agriculture and other industries was promoted by the lack of hands, whether industry suffered from lack of capital because of the huge sums lent the government, etc. All these problems lie beyond the scope of the present inquiry. But it is pertinent to ask here: what influence did the greenback currency have as one of the many factors that affected the production of wealth? On this problem the preceding investigations throw some light. In the first place, the paper standard was responsible in large measure for the feeling of "prosperity" that seems from all the evidence to have characterized the public's frame of mind. Almost every owner of property found that the price of his possessions had increased, and almost every 1 78 Our Prosperity a Delusion? Our National Debt and Currency, by a Boston Merchant (A. W. Stetson ?), Boston, 1864. The title on the cover is The Age of Green- backs. Pkoddotion and Consumption op Wealth 395 wage-earner found that Ms pay was advanced. Strive as people may to emancipate themselves from the feeling that a dollar represents a fixed quantity of desirable things, it is very difficult for them to resist a pleasurable sensation when the money value of their property rises or their incomes increase. They are almost certain to feel cheerful over the larger sums that they can spend, even though the amount of commodities the larger sums will buy is decreased. Habit is too strong for arithmetic. But, more than this, "business" in the common meaning of the word was unusually profitable during the war. The "residual claimant" of the last chapter is in most enterprises the active business man, and, as has been shown, his money income did as a rule rise more rapidly than the cost of living. Only in those cases where the advance of the product with which the given individual was concerned lagged so far behind the advance of those things that he wished to buy as to neutralize the gain which he made at the expense of his employees and creditors, was the business man actually worse off. In other words, "business" was, in reality as well as in appearance, rendered more profitable by the greenbacks. There is therefore no error in saying that the business of the coimtry enjoyed unwonted prosperity during the war. And it may be added that the active business man is probably a more potent factor in determining the community's feeling about "good times" and "bad times" than is the working- man, the landlord, or the lending capitalist. The effect of high profits, however, is not limited to pro- ducing a cheerful frame of mind among business men. Under ordinary circumstances one would say that when the great majority of men already in business are "making money" with more than usual rapidity they will be inclined to enlarge their operations, that others will be inclined to enter the field, and that thus the production of wealth will 396 History of the Greenbacks be stimulated. But the circumstances of the war period were not ordinary and this conclusion cannot be accepted without serious modifications. 1. It has been shown that business men realized the pre- cariousness of all operations that depended for their success upon the future course of prices — and nearly all operations that involved any considerable time for their consummation were thus dependent. So far did this disposition prevail that it produced a marked curtailment in the use of credit. The prudent man might be willing to push his business as far as possible with the means at his own disposal, but he showed a disinclination to borrow for the purpose. Thus the uncertainty which all men felt about the future in a large measure counteracted the influence of high profits in increasing production. 2. The foregoing consideration of course weighed most heavily in the minds of cautious men. But not all business men are cautious. Among many the chance of winning large profits in case of success is suflBcient to induce them to undertake heavy risks of loss. On the whole, Americans seem to display a decided propensity toward speculative ventures and are not easily deterred by having to take chances. To men of this type it seems that the business opportunities offered by the fluctuating currency would make a strong appeal. But, while the force of this observation may be admitted, it does not necessitate a reconsideration of the conclusion that the instability of prices tended to diminish the production of wealth. For in a time of great price fluctuations the possibilities of making fortunes rapidly are much greater in trade than in agriculture, mining, or manufactures. Every rise and fall in quotations holds out an alluring promise of quick gain to the man who believes in his shrewdness and good fortune, and who does not hesitate to take chances. The probable profits of productive industry Peoduotion and Consumption op Wealth 397 in the narrower sense might be larger than common, but this would not attract investors in large numbers if the probable profits of trading were larger yet; and such seems clearly to have been the case during the war when the paper currency offered such brilliant possibilities to fortunate speculators in gold, in stocks, or in commodities. Instead, then, of the greenbacks being credited with stimulating the production of wealth, they must be charged with offering inducements to abandon agriculture and manufactures for the more speculative forms of trade. This tendency of the times did not escape observation. On the contrary, it was often remarked and lamented in terms that seem exaggerated. Hugh McCuUoch, for instance, in his report as secretary of the treasury for 1865, said: There are no indications of real and permanent prosperity .... in the splendid fortunes reported to be made by skilful manipu- lations at the gold room or the stock board; no evidences of increas- ing wealth in the facts that railroads and steamboats are crowded with passengers, and hotels with guests; that cities are full to overflowing, and rents and the necessities of life, as well as luxuries, are daily advancing. All these things prove rather .... that the number of non-producers is increasing, and that productive indus- try is being diminished. There is no fact more manifest than that the plethora of paper money is not only undermining the morals of the people by encouraging waste and extravagance, but is strik- ing at the root of our material prosperity by diminishing labor.' More explicit was Mr. Wells's statement of the movement away from industry and toward speculative trading. In one of his reports as special commissioner of the revenue he said: During the last few years large numbers of our population, under the influence and example of high profits realized in trading during the period of monetary expansion, have abandoned employ- ments directly productive of national wealth, and sought employ- ments connected with commerce, trading, or speculation. As a ip. 9. 398 History of the Greenbacks consequence we everywhere find large additions to the poptdation of our commercial cities, an increase in the number and cost of the buildings devoted to banking, brokerage, insurance, commission business, and agencies of all kinds, the spirit of trading and specu- lating pervading the whole community, as distinguished from the spirit of production.^ Within the period under review, then, it seems very doubtful whether the high profits had their usual effect of leading to a larger production of raw materials or to an increase in manufactures. The prudent man hesitated to expand his undertakings because of the instability of the inflated level of prices ; the man with a turn for speculative ventures found more alluring opportunities in trade. II. CONSUMPTION No one can read contemporary comments on American social life of the later years of the war without being impressed by the charges of extravagance made against the people of the North. Newspapers and pulpits were at one in denouncing the sinful waste that, they declared, was increasing at a most alarming rate. The "shoddy aris- tocracy" with its ostentatious display of wealth became a stock subject for cartoonists at home, and earned a well- merited reputation for vulgarity abroad. So common are the comments on this subject that no specific references need be given; one has only to examine the files of news- papers and magazines, or to read published sermons or let- ters, to find how universally observers were impressed by the prevalence of extravagant expenditure. 1 Executive Document No, 27, 41st CoHg., 2d Sess., p. xxxi. Cf. Chables A. Mann, Paper Money, pp. 187-94. The opponents of the greenback party were fond of point- ing to the less rapid increase of national wealth between 1860 and 1870 than between 1350 and 1860, shown by the figures of the federal census, as an indication of the influ- ence of the paper currency in discouraging production. Cf. Amasa Walkek, Tfte National Currency (New York, 1876), p. 44; Tlie Nation (New York), Vol. XII, p. 286; Wells's fourth report, cited at the beginning of this note, p. xxxi. The imperfec- tions of the Census of 1870, however, to say nothing of the unreliability of statistics of national wealth in all American censuses, make these data of slight value. '^irM PsODUiSTiQ/ AND CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH 399 account for this unpleasant phase of social development, men usually laid the blame upon the paper standard. High prices were said to make everyone feel suddenly richer and so to tempt everyone to adopt a more lavish style of living than his former wont. Thus the view gained general credence that the greenbacks were ultimately responsible for a great increase in the consumption of wealth. If the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters regarding the changes in the distribution of wealth caused by the paper money are sound, however, such a view regarding the consumption of wealth can be but partially true. The enormous profits of "residual claimants" made possible the rapid accumulation of an unusual number of fortunes, and the families thus lifted into sudden affluence enjoyed spend- ing their" money in the ostentatious fashion characteristic of the newly rich. It is therefore true that the monetary situ- ation was largely responsible for the appearance of a con- siderable class of persons — of whom the fortunate speculator and the army contractor are typical — who plunged into the recklessly extravagant habits that called down upon their heads the condemnation of the popular moralist. But if the greenbacks were in the last resort a chief cause of the increased consumption of articles of luxury by families whom they had aided in enriching, they were not less truly a cause of restricted consumption by a much larger class of humbler folk. The laboring man whose money wages increased but one-half, while the cost of living doubled, could not continue to provide for his family's wants so fully as before. He was forced to practice economies — to wear his old clothing longer, to use less coffee and less sugar, to substitute cheaper for better qualities in every line of expenditure where possible. Similar retrenchment of liv- ing expenses must have been practiced by the families of many owners of land and lenders of capital. In other words. 400 History of the Geeenbacks the war-time fortunes resulted in a very large measure from the mere transfer of wealth from a wide circle of persons to the relatively small number of residual claimants to the proceeds of business enterprises. The enlarged consumption of wealth which the paper currency made possible for the fortunate few was therefore contrasted with a diminished consumption on the part of the unfortunate many on whose slender means the greenbacks levied contributions for the benefit of their employers. That the diminished consumption of wealth by large num- bers of poor people escaped general notice, while the extrava- gance of the newly rich attracted so much attention, need not shake one's confidence in the validity of these conclusions. The purchase of a fast trotting-horse by a government con- tractor, and the elaborateness of his wife's gowns and jewelry, are much more conspicuous facts than the petty economies practiced by his employees. The same trait that leads for- tunate people to fiaunt their material prosperity in the eyes of the world leads the unfortunate to conceal their small privations. Even an attentive observer may. fail to notice that the wives of workingmen are still wearing their last year's dresses and that the children are running barefoot longer than usual. But though the newspapers were not full of comments on the enforced economies of the mass of the population, whole- sale dealers in staple articles of food and clothing noticed a decrease in sales. In reviewing the trade situation in Sep- tember, 1864, when real wages were near their lowest ebb, Hunfs Merchants^ Magazine remarked that "the rise in the prices of commodities has .... outrun the power of con- sumption and the fall trade has been almost at a stand. Those articles such as coffee, sugar, low grade goods, which [form] the staple products of the great mass of the people in moderate circumstances, has [sic] reached such high rates Production and Consumption of Wealth 401 that the decline in consumption is very marked, amounting almost to a stagnation of the fall trade." ' It would be of exceeding interest to trace the temporary change in the character of the consumption of the people that resulted from the artificial alteration of the distribution of wealth by the greenback currency — to see, for example, how the consumption of tobacco and liquors was afPected as compared ^ith the consumption of sugar, coffee, flour, and woolen fabrics. But unfortunately there are no reliable data to serve as the basis of such an investigation. The Revenue Commission of 1865-66 made an attempt to esti- mate the decline in the consumption of cotton, tea, coffee, sugar, and molasses, but its figures are too largely the results of guesswork to possess much significance. ^ All that can be said with assurance is that the consumption of many articles of luxury increased very greatly, while the con- sumption of many staple articles declined. It is probable that in the first year or two of the war a spirit of economy pervaded nearly all classes of the people.' As the charac- teristic effects of the greenback standard began to make themselves felt, still more careful supervision of expendi- tures was forced upon wage-earners and small owners of land and lenders of capital, while residual claimants began to find their profits uncommonly great. The great fall of prices in the first half of 1865, combined with the continued advance of money wages, alleviated the situation of the first class of persons, though it did not quite restore them to the situation that existed before the war. To residual claimants it brought a reduction in profits that was in part merely nominal — the expression of their fortunes in fewer figures, 1 Vol. LI, p. 243 J c/. also pp. 370, 447. sfl". B. Executive Document No. 34, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Special Beports Nos.1-4. 8 Cf., e. g., remarks of T. M. Parker, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong,, 2d Sess., p. 885; "Eeport of the Bank Commissioners of the State of Maine," December, 1862, in Executive Document No. go, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3. 402 HlSTOEY OF THE G-REENBAOKS but with a denominator of enhanced value — and in part real — -the relative increase in the shares of the product that went to other co-operators in production and the increased value of the dollars in which whatever pecuniary obligations they had contracted must be paid. But, on the other hand, the fact that they had survived the sharp fall of prices that they had foreseen would come with the end of the war relieved their minds of a great source of anxiety, and put them in a position to enjoy the gains that they had saved. Consequently in 1865, consumption of goods of all kinds prob- ably increased over that of 1864; of staple articles, because money wages had risen, while prices had fallen ; of luxuries, because, though profits were less enormous, fortunes were felt to be less precarious. , CHAPTER X THE GREENBACKS AND THE COST OP THE CIVIL WAR I. The Problem, and the Method of Solution: Financial vs. Economic Consequences of the Legal-Tender Acts — Varipus Estimates of Increase in Debt Caused by Greenbacks — Method by which Estimate Should Proceed. II. The Greenbacks and Expenditures : Difiference Between Increase of Expenditures for Commodities and for Services — Difficulty of Distinguishing Between the two Classes in Government Accounts — Estimate of Increase in Ordinary Expenditures. III. The Greenbaeks and Receipts: Effect of Depreciation on Various Items of Revenue — Indirect Financial Consequences of the Legal-tender Acts. IV. The Greenbacks and the Public Debt: Danger of Double Computation of Loss by Greenbacks — Terms on Which Bonds were Sold — Saving and Loss of Interest. V. Conclusion: Net Effect of Greenbacks on Amount of Debt Incurred During War — Financial Consequences after Return of Peace. I. THE PEOBLEM AND THE METHOD OP SOLUTION Discussion of the consequences of the legal-tender acts has so far been confined to the economic relations between individuals. There is, however, another phase of the sub- ject to be considered. The reader who turns back to the account of the debates upon the legal-tender bills will find that most of the unfortunate consequences that followed their enactment were foretold in Congress — the decline of real wages, the injury done creditors, the uncertainty of prices that hampered legitimate business and fostered specu- lation. But a majority of this Congress were ready to sub- ject the community to such ills because they believed that 403 404 HiSTOBT OP THE Geeenbaoks the relief of the treasury from its embarrassments was of more importance than the maintenance of a relatively stable monetary standard. There was little of that confusion between economic and fiscal considerations that has fre- quently been held responsible for the attempts of govern- ment to use its power over the currency as a financial resource. Rather, there was a conscious subordination of the interest of the community in a stable monetary standard to the interest of the government in obtaining funds to carry on the war. It is therefore incumbent upon one who would judge the policy from the standpoint of its sponsors to inquire into the financial eflFects which to them seemed most important as well as into the effects on the distribu- tion of wealth. This topic has two aspects — one of which has already been discussed. Power to issue greenbacks formed a quickly available financial resource from which the treasury was able to meet large amounts of indebtedness already accumulated when the legal-tender acts were passed. But while such issues relieved immediate needs, their ultimate effect was to increase the future demands on the treasury. The first of these consequences has been dealt with in the historical chapters of Part I, where an attempt was made to show how much immediate help the greenbacks afforded Mr. Chase. It remains for the present chapter to treat the larger question: What effect had the greenbacks upon the amount of expenditures incurred? Few questions raised by the legal-tender acts have attracted more attention than this last. Even while the first legal-tender bill was being considered its critics declared that if made a law it would increase the cost of waging the war by causing an advance in the prices of articles that the government had to buy.' As the war went 1 See Fart I, chap, ii, p. 57. Geeenbacks and Cost of the Civil Wab 405 on the soundness of this view became apparent. Simon Newcomb, writing early in 1865, estimated that by the end of 1864 the greenbacks had increased the amount of indebted- ness incurred by the federal government $180,000,000 beyond the amount that would have been incurred had the specie standard been maintained. Even if the war should end in 1865, he prophesied, $300,000,000 more would be added to this needless augmentation of the debt.' When the war was over and the divers reasons that had deterred many men from criticising the financial policy of the government were removed, competent writers began to express similar views with freedom. For example, Mr. H. R. Hulburd, comptroller of the currency, said in his report for 1867: "Probably not less than 33 per cent, of the present indebtedness of the United States is owing to the high prices paid by the government while its disbursements were heaviest."^ Mr. C. P. Williams put the increase of debt at one-third to two-fifths ; C. A. Mann, at one-fourth ; S. T. Spear, at a billion dollars ; L. H. Courtney, an English critic, at nearly $900,000,000." Of later discussions that of Professor H. C. Adams has attracted the most attention. He estimated that of the gross receipts from debts created between January 1, 1862, and September 30, 1865, amount- ing to $2,565,000,000 the gold value was but $1,695,000,- 000— a difference of $870,000,000 between value received and obligations incurred.* All of these estimates seem to rest either upon guesses or upon reduction of sums borrowed in currency to specie value. The former method of arriving at the result inspires little 1 Critical Examination of our Financial Policy (New York, 1865) , pp. 171, 172. 2 Finance Report, 1867, p. 15. 3 See A Review of the Financial Situation of Our Country (Albany, 1868), p. 7; Paper Money (New York, 1873), p. 184; The Legal-Tender Acts (New York, 1875), p. 78; Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. XXXI, p. 204. i Public Debts, p. 131. 406 HiSTOEY OP THE GREENBACKS confidence even when the guesses are made by men inti- mately familiar with the federal finances, and the latter method assumes that all government expenditures rose in proportion to the decline in the specie value of the green- back dollar, and that all revenues remained what they would have been on a special basis — assumptions subject to impor- tant exceptions.' The problem of ascertaining the financial consequences of the greenback issues is much too complex to be solved by methods so crude. Some branches of ex- penditure were much affected by the depreciation of the currency, other branches but little. The effect of the paper currency on the receipts of the government is quite as important a part of the problem as the effect on expendi- tures, and examination shows that here as there different items were affected in very different degrees. Finally, the greenbacks were themselves a "loan without interest" though, on the other hand, they increased the volume of the interest-bearing debt by augmenting expenditures. These three topics, then — the influence of the paper-money standard on ordinary expenditures and receipts, and on interest — must all be examined by anyone who hopes to frame an adequate estimate of the net effect of the greenbacks on the cost of the war. As will appear, however, examination of these topics is beset by serious difficulties. II. GKEENBACKS AND EXPENDITUEES It is a familiar remark of writers on public finance that all things required by government fall into one of two categories — commodities and services. If the conclusions of the preceding chapters on prices and wages are well founded, it follows that this elementary distinction regard- 1 Professor Adams is free from this reproach, for he is careful not to say that his figures represent the difference made by the greenback policy in the cost of the war. This latter interpretation, however, has been commonly put upon the passage. E, g., see H. White, Money and Banking, 1st ed., p. 162. Geeenbacks and Cost of the Civil Wae 407 ing the objects of government expenditure is of very great importance for the present problem. For, since prices advanced in much greater ratio than wages, it is clear that the greenback issues must have increased the sums paid for commodities more than the sums paid for labor. Indeed, this difference between increase in cost of commodities and of labor seems to have been much wider in the case of the govern- ment than in the case of private persons; for, as was shown in sec. viii of chap, v, the wages of federal employees -were advanced on the average considerably less than the wages of other persons. Clearly, then, the first step in any estimate of the effect of the legal-tender act upon the expenditures incurred by government during the war should be a careful separation of expenditures for commodities from expenditures for services. Accordingly, it is a very serious obstacle that one encounters in finding that such a separation cannot readily be made. A statement of the expenditures of the preceding fiscal year is published in each annual report of the sec- retary of the treasury. But in these statements the items are arranged rather according to the department of govern- ment through or for which the specified sums were spent, than according to the object of expenditure. For example, the first general division of expenditures is placed under the caption " Civil," and under this caption the first three items are "For Congress, including books," "For executive," "For judiciary." It is obvious that each of these items must include payments for both commodities and services; but there is no way of separating the two classes of payments. A more detailed statement is given in the annual Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States rendered by the register of the treasury. But even these bulky documents do not make possible such a division of expenditures as is desired. A careful examination of the 408 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS register's accounts for the fiscal years 1863-65 shows that about one-third of the total expenditures each year con- sists of items which appear to include payments for both labor and commodities in unknown proportions. Such, for example, are expenditures upon fortifications, armories, and hospitals, repairs of ships, construction of buildings, inci- dental expenses of various bureaus, and the like. The best that can be done with these accounts is to divide the items into -three classes: (1) expenditures for salaries and the like, most of which appear to have been little affected by the paper currency; (2) expenditures for commodities; (3) ex- penditures that include payments for both commodities and labor. Even with such a scheme of classification it is some- times difficult to decide where certain items should be placed. If this division of expenditures be accepted, the next step is to determine in what ratio the expenditures falling within each of the three classes shall be assumed to have been increased. In the first class the largest items are the pay of the regular and volunteer armies. As was shown in sec. viii of chap, v the wages of private soldiers was increased from $13 to $16 per month after May 1, 1864. Since this increase was made with the avowed object of compensating soldiers in some measure for the decline in the purchasing power of the paper money, one must con- sider three-sixteenths of the pay of the army after that time as an addition to the money cost of the war. It is not im- probable also that, had the specie standard been maintained, it would have been unnecessary to grant such lavish bounties to stimulate enlistments. If so, a part at least of the large sums reported as paid in bounties should be added to the increase in the cost of the war. To be on the safe side, however, this item will be neglected. As for other employees of the government besides the soldiers, it appears that in Geeenbaoks and Cost of the Civil Wae 409 few cases were the money salaries increased beyond the scale prevailing before suspension. No doubt it was largely from motives of patriotism that so many men in humble as well as in conspicuous positions remained in the service of the government at wages they would have accepted from no private employer. Their self-sacrifice lessened the effect of the greenbacks upon the cost of the war in dollars and cents. But from any other than the narrowest fiscal point of view it was one of the most unfortunate consequences of the paper-money regime that the men who were serving the country faithfully were compelled to submit to a great decrease in their real incomes. With respect to the second of the above described classes of expenditures, the question of interest is whether the depreciation of the currency affected the prices paid by the government for commodities as much as it did prices paid by private purchasers at wholesale. Reference to the tables in sec. iii of chap, iv will show that the statistical material gleaned from the Aldrich Report indicates that public con- tractors did not advance their prices quite as rapidly as other dealers. But it must be remembered that the two series there brought into comparison are not constructed in the same fashion — one series gives the averages of four relative prices each year; the other gives the relative average prices of twelve months in some cases and of prices for unstated dates in others. Moreover, many of the government series are based on prices for 1861 instead of for 1860, and in the former year the government seems to have been paying rather higher prices than in the latter. Still further the whole number of articles included in the government list is not great, and about half belong to a single and financially unimportant group — drugs and chemicals. Finally, it is not improbable that there were changes in the qualities of some articles accepted from contractors that account for a relatively slight 410 HiSTOEY OF THE GeBENBAOKS increase in price. For these various reasons the divergence between the two series possesses little significance. Much greater weight should be attached to the general conclusion drawn in chap, iv — that the dominant factor in determining prices during the war was the fluctuating valua- tion of the currency. There is no reason why knowledge that he would be paid in greenbacks should affect in differ- ent degrees the prices that a dealer would ask from the gov- ernment and from private men. Since, then, the fairly satisfactory wholesale-price data show a rather close paral- lelism between prices of commodities and of gold, it seems fair to infer that the sums asked of the government for identical goods also rose and fell in rough agreement with the premium. True, prices seem not to have advanced so quickly as did the gold quotation, but neither did they fall so quickly. Everything considered, then, the most trust- worthy index of the increase in the sums expended by the government upon commodities is probably foimd in the aver- age premium upon gold in the several fiscal years. An even larger element of conjecture enters into the esti- mate of the increase in the expenditures of the third class, which includes payments for both commodities and labor. So far as commodities are concerned it is as fair here as in Class II to apply the average premium upon gold as an index of the increase. But with reference to labor a new problem arises. The salaries of most persons in the regular service of the government, aside from soldiers, were not in- creased at all. But the titles of the items grouped in Class III as they appear in the register's accounts seem to indicate that the great mass of the labor was not that of officials, but that of workmen employed on a strictly commercial basis. In constructing fortifications, erecting and repairing public buildings, etc., it is probable that the government or its contractors paid as much for the labor hired as a private Geeenbaoks and Cost of the Civil Wab 411 employer woald have done. If bo, it follows that the best index of the increased expenditure on the labor included in this class is found in the tables of chap, v, particularly Table XXX, which shows the averave relative wages for all em- TABLE LXIV ESTIMATED INOEEASE IN THE OEDINAEY EXPENDITUEB3 OF THE FEDEEAL GOVEBN- MENT CAnSED BY THE GBEENBACES (In millions of dollars) Fiscal Yeaes 1862 Six Months 1864 1865 1866 Two Months Expenditures:' Class I, salaries, etc Class II, commodities Class III, both labor and commodities Assumed ratio of increase: Class 112 Classing Estimated actual increase: Class I, increase in pay of soldiers* Class II Class III Total estimated increase each year 92 82 89 242 214 m% 58 51 109 259 258 294 44^ 6 93 90 189 408 402 405 11% 62 203 176 441 45 43 44 20 13 14 47 1 The fljrares for the fiscal years 1863-65 are obtained from the annual reports on **Iteceipts and Expenditures." For the second half of the fiscal year 1862 the ordinary expenditures were estimated on the basis of the "Treasurer's Accounts" {H. B. Ex, Doc. No. 4, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.), and these expenditures were divided among the three classes according to the proportions given by the computations for 1863. Similarly, the expenditures for the months July and August, 1865, are assumed to be two-thirds of the total for the quarter July to September and are divided among the three classes in the same ratio as the expenditures for the fiscal year 1865. 2 Average premium upon gold as given in Appendix A below. 3 Average of premium on gold and increase in money wages according to system of variable weights, as shown by Table XXX above. For wages in each fiscal year 1 have taken the index number for January of the corresponding calendar year. * Three-sixteenths of pay of army (except bounties) after May 1, 1864, as the pay is reported in "Keoeipts and Expenditures." For the months July and August, 1865, the increase is computed on oue-half the sum stated by the paymaster-general as paid to the army between June 30 and October 31. (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part II, p. 898, 39tb Cong., 1st Sess.) 412 History of the Greenbacks ployees for whom data are given in Table XII of the Aldrich Report. Assuming so much, we have two ratios of increase in expenditure for this class — one applicable to the prices of commodities, the other to the wages of labor. Since there is no way of distinguishing between expenditure for goods and labor it is necessary to make some purely arbitrary assumption regarding their relative amounts. The simplest assumption is that the increase in the total expenditures of Class III was midway between the average premium upon gold and the average increase in money wages. Perhaps this assumption may be accepted as well as any other, for, if no definite reason can be assigned for it, neither can any reason be assigned in favor of any rival assumption. In accordance with the preceding plan. Table LXIV has been constructed to show the probable increase in the ex- penditure of the government caused by the issues of paper money between the date of suspension and August 31, 1865, when the public debt reached its maximum amount.' The total increase for the whole period is $791,000,000. After all that has been said of the elements that enter into the problem it is hardly necessary to insist strenuously that this total is but a very rough estimate. III. THE GREENBACKS AND RECEIPTS Almost all the writers who have discussed the financial consequences of the legal -tender acts have confined their attention to the increase of expenditures. This procedure is perhaps natural for ardent critics of the paper-money policy, but a little consideration shows that it is unfair. The reports of the secretary of the treasury give the govern- ment revenue under five heads — customs, sales of public lands, direct tax, miscellaneous sources, and internal revenue. Of these receipts some were and some were not affected by ^Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1866, p. 6. Geeenbacks and Cost or the Civil War 413 the greenback issues. In accordance with the provisions of the first legal-tender act customs duties were paid in gold, and the ad valorem duties were assessed on the foreign specie valuation of goods. The receipts from this source therefore remained on substantially the same footing as if specie payments had been maintained. During the war receipts from the sales of public lands were an item of little importance — less than $1,000,000 per year — despite the decline in the value of the currency that might be paid by the purchaser of lands. The receipts from direct taxes were all collected under one law passed six months before suspension. This law fixed the total amount of the tax at $20,000,000 and determined the precise amount to be raised by each state.' Accordingly the legal-tender acts had no effect upon this item — -except that the states were enabled to pay their quotas in greenbacks instead of in gold. The revenue derived from miscellaneous sources includes a con- siderable number of small items. Of these, some were doubt- less increased by depreciation, e. g., proceeds of sales of captured and abandoned property. Other items were unaffected, e. g^., receipts of fees by American consuls abroad. Premiums on sales of gold coin among these miscellaneous receipts may be set down from the present point of view as clear gain. The last of the enumerated government receipts remains, the internal-revenue duties. This system of taxation was inaugurated by an elaborate law passed July 1, 1862, which imposed certain duties, partly ad valorem, partly specific, upon a great variety of manufactured articles ; imposed a tax upon the gross receipts of canals, railroads, theaters, etc.; taxed auction and brokers' sales; required licenses for prac- ticing professions; levied an income and a legacy tax, and placed certain taxes upon articles of luxury, such as carriages, 1 Act of August 6, 1861 ; 12 Statutes at Large, p. 294. 414 History op the Greenbacks pianos and plate.' This law was superseded two years later by another internal-revenue act which raised the rates of taxation, and increased the number of articles made to pay duties.^ At the time the first law was passed the depreciation of the currency was not great, and probably the rates of taxa- tion imposed do not differ much from what they would have been upon a specie basis. But without any modification of the terms of the law, the progressive rise of prices must have caused an increase of the revenue from ad valorem duties, and from taxes on gross receipts and upon incomes. Receipts from specific duties, licenses, etc., however, prob- ably did not increase except as changes were made in the law or in its administration. While, then, the yield of this most important of the sources of federal revenue was materi- ally affected by the legal-tender acts, it would be too much to argue, as was done with reference to expenditures ior commodities, that it was increased in the ratio indicated by the premium on gold. Some arbitrary assumption, however, must be made regarding the ratio of increase if any estimate is to be had. Again, it is perhaps best to adopt the simplest expedient, and count the increase of receipts from internal taxes at the. full amount indicated by the premium, but, on the other hand, take no account of the increase of receipts from miscellaneous sources. Since the latter sums are relatively small, it is probable that an estimate thus made will err rather on the side of over, than of understating the increase of revenue. The total increase of receipts shown by this method as applied in Table LXV is 1174,000,000. Again the caution 1 12 Statutes at Large, pp. 432-89. The amendments to this act were not such as to increase the total revenue derived from it. See acts of July 17, 1862 (12 Statutes, p. 627) ; March 3, 1863 (ibid., pp. 713-31), and March 7, 1861 (13 Statutes, p. 14). 2Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Statutes at Large, pp. 223-306 ; amended by act of March 3, 1865, (ibid., pp. 469-87). Geeenbaoks and Cost of the Civil Wae 415 TABLE LXV ESTIMATED INCEEASE IN THE OKDINAET EECEIPT3 OP THE FEDEEAL GOVEENMENT CAUSED BT THE GEEENBACK3 (In millions of dollars) Fiscal Year 1862 (Six Mouths) Fiscal Year 1863 Fiscal Year 1864 Fiscal Year 1865 Fiscal Year 1866 (Two Months) Current receipts: ^ 33.5 .1 1.8 .5 69.1 .2 1.5 3.0 37.6 102.3 .6 .5 47.5 109.7 84.9 1.0 1.2 33.0 209.5 31.3 Prom sales of public lands. .1 .0 From miscellaneous sources From internal revenue 12.3 64.4 Assumed ratio of increase . . . Estimated actual increase . . . 35.9 111.4 10 260.6 56^ 39 329.6 102^ 106 108.1 43^ 19 is hardly necessary that the result is to be accepted subject to a wide margin of error. So far the discussion of the increase both of expenditures and of revenues has proceeded as if the paper currency had exerted none but simple and direct effects. There were other financial consequences of the shift from the specie to the paper standard, however, that were not unimportant, though they were indirect and difficult to gauge. Three of the most prominent must be indicated. 1. It is probable that not a little of the lavishness with which public funds were appropriated by Congress during the war can be traced to the paper-money policy. At least such was the opinion of a man so well placed to observe the operations of the treasury as Hugh McCulloch. In his report of 1867 he said: "As long as notes could be issued and bonds could be sold at a premium or at par, for what the 1 As given by the annual statements of the register of the treasury (see Finwfice Reports, 1862, p. 37 ; 1863, pp. 34, 35 ; 1864, p. 33 ; 1865, pp. 44, 45, 48) . For 1862 the receipts of the last two quarters of the year are given ; for 1866 two-thirds of the receipts for the first quarter. 416 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS statute made money, there was a constant temptation to liberal, if not unnecessary, expenditures. Had the specie standard been maintained and bonds been sold at a discount for real money, there would have been an economy in all branches of the public service which unfortunately was not witnessed." ' 2. If the paper currency tempted the government to reck- less expenditures, it also predisposed the people to submit more willingly to heavy taxation. It has been remarked several times that the advance of money wages and of money prices made most people feel wealthier, and, feeling wealthier, they were less inclined to grumble over the taxes. 3. But while the feeling of prosperity may have been instrumental in procuring a cheerful acceptance of war taxes, it is very doubtful whether the net effect of the paper-money system was favorable to revenue. It was pointed out in the last chapter that the lagging of money wages behind money prices necessarily diminished the consumption of wealth among wage-earners. In so far as this diminution affected the consumption of articles that paid either an import or an excise duty — and there were but few articles exempt from taxation by one of these methods — the fall of real wages must have lessened the tax receipts. Much the same must have been true, although in less degree, of the indirect taxes collected from the consumption of the great agricultural class, if the conclusion of chap, viii is true, that farmers were injured rather than benefited by the price fluctuations. On the other hand, the extravagance of the fortunate families enriched by the receipt of high profits tended to increase the revenue for the time being ; but it is improbable that the increase of receipts from the enlarged consumption of this limited class offset the decrease of receipts from the enforced economies of wage-earners and farmers. ' Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, November 30, 1867, p. xi. Geeenbacks and Cost of the Civil Wak 417 While, then, these indirect effects of the paper currency on expenditures and receipts could not by any system of bookkeeping be brought to definite quantitative statement, it is probable that their net result was unfavorable to the treasury. IV. THE GEEENBACKS AND THE PUBLIC DEBT It may seem that in a discussion of the financial conse- quences of the legal-tender acts account should be taken of the effect of the desertion of the specie standard upon the terms on which the government could borrow. The resort to a legal-tender paper currency, one may argue, is a con- fession of acute financial distress and as such must depress the market for bonds. Therefore, to the financial loss caused by the increase of expenditures should be added a second loss from the unfavorable terms to which the government had to submit in selling its securities. Of course, it is true that the secretaries of the treasury in their efforts to borrow money were obliged to agree to some very hard bargains. There was little ground for exultation over the sale at par of bonds bearing interest at 5 or 6 per cent, in gold when the currency received from purchasers was worth in specie but 50 per cent, of its face value. But this loss arising from the difference in value between the paper dollars received by the treasury for bonds and the specie dollars which the treasury contracted to pay bond- holders after a term of years is not a further loss in addition to the losses discussed in the preceding sections, but rather these same losses looked at from another point of view. For, the estimate of the increase of expenditures above receipts, and therefore of debt contracted, rests precisely upon the decline in the value of the paper dollar from the specie standard. One may arrive at an estimate of the loss either by computing the increase in the number of dollars that had 418 History of the Geeenbacks to be borrowed in paper money to be repaid in gold, or by estimating the decline in the specie value of the paper money raised by the sale of bonds; but to make estimates by both of these methods would be to include two guesses at the same item. It is, of course, true that, had gold bonds been sold largely at less than par for paper money, a second loss would have been incurred from the discount in addition to the loss from the smaller purchasing power of the currency received. But, as a matter of fact, the deviations from par in the subscrip- tion prices for bonds were not of great importance. The prices of government securities did not fluctuate very widely during the war, for the very good reason that these prices showed merely the value of one set of government promises to pay, viz. , bonds — in terms of another set — viz., green- backs. Most factors that affected the credit of the govern- ment would affect the specie value of all its promises in much the same manner, and therefore would not alter materially the ratio of one to another. It remains only to say a word about the effect of the legal-tender acts upon the interest charge borne by the gov- ernment. The great financial argument in favor of the greenbacks has always been that they constitute a "loan without interest." However many millions the depreciation of this currency added to the principal of the public debt, the greenbacks should be credited with whatever sum was really saved in this fashion. But against the saving of interest effected by issuing greenbacks instead of selling bonds should be put down the loss of interest on the increase of debt arising from the augmentation of expendi- tures. If the rate of interest be taken at 6 per cent., a simple calculation shows that the interest saved by the greenbacks up to August 31, 1865, was but $28,000,000 greater than the interest lost through the excess of increase Greenbacks and Cost op the Civil War 419 of expenditures over the increase of receipts as shown by Tables LXIV and LXV. By the end of this period the augmentation of debt caused by the greenbacks had appar- ently become greater than the volume of greenbacks in cir- culation, so that from this time forward the annual loss of interest probably exceeded the gain. V. CONCLUSION The public debt reached its maximum amount August 31, 1865, when it stood at $2,846,000,000.' Of this immense debt the preceding estimates indicate that some $589,000,000, or rather more than a fifth of the whole amount, was due to the substitution of United States notes for metallic money. Little as these estimates can pretend to accuracy, it seems safe at least to accept the conclusion that the greenbacks increased the debt incurred during the war by a sum run- ning into the hundreds of millions. If so, it follows that, even from the narrowly financial point of view of their spon- sors, the legal-tender acts had singularly unfortunate con- sequences. The present chapter, to agree with its predecessors, must end with the Civil War. But it may be pointed out that the financial effects of the legal-tender acts, like the eco- nomic effects, did not cease with the return of peace. No additional discussion is required to show that the varying depreciation of the currency continued to affect the volume of both receipts and expenditures until resumption of specie payments in January, 1879, restored the greenbacks to equality with gold. It is equally clear that the United States notes continued to be a "loan without interest," and that, on the other hand, the government continued to pay interest on the unnecessary debt created during the war. But there is another phase of the subject that deserves spe- 1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1866, p. 6. 420 HiSTOKY OF THE GeEENBAOKS cial remark, because it is frequently overlooked. A consid- erable portion of the immense public debt in existence August 31, 1865, consisted of obligations expressly payable in " lawful money." In so far as the government was able to pay these debts out of revenue before the greenbacks had appreciated to par, it effected a saving.' But all such top- ics — the continued effect of depreciation on government expenditures and revenue, the annual loss or gain of inter- est, the cost at which the "lawful money" debt was paid, the expense at which specie payments were resumed, and the difficulties encountered in maintaining the convertibility of the paper money into specie — belong to a later period in the history of the greenbacks. It is probable, however, that were a careful study made of these topics the indictment brought against the greenbacks on financial groimds would be rendered yet more serious. I Of course, when the lawful money debt was paid by refunding operations — that is, out of the proceeds of new loans themselves payable in gold — no such savings resulted, unless the new bonds were sold at a premium. An estimate of the saving actually effected may be found in the Journal of Political Economy^ Vol. V, pp. 146-9. The total arrived at is $72,000,000. It this sum be deducted from the above estimate of the increase in debt, the net loss to the government caused by the greenbacks during the war will still appear to have been over half a billion in gold. STATISTICAL APPENDICES APPENDIX A Gold Value of the Paper Currency, 1862-65 EXPLANATOET NoTE. — There are two well-authenticated tables that show the average monthly and yearly value of currency in gold during the Civil War: (1) a table published by the ^mericon ^imanac (see, e.g.^ issue of 1889, p. 341 ) ; (2) a table prepared by the Bureau of Statistics (Finance^ Commerce and Immigration of the United States^ Series of 1895-96, No. 4, p. 518). For the years 1862-65 these tables are identical; the figures given below are taken from the second. This table was pre- pared by Mr. E. B. Elliott, actuary of the treasury, in the following manner : four daily quotations of the rates of gold at New York, viz., the opening, highest, lowest, and closing prices, were recorded ; from them a daily average was made, and from these average daily prices was prepared the average rate for each month. The table of daily highest and lowest prices is based, for the reasons assigned in the text (Part II, chap, iii, sec, i), upon the table given in the Report of the Cham- ber of Commerce of the State of New York for 1865-66, Part II, pp. 130-33. The figures for the first eleven days of January, 1862, however, are supplied from the daily reports of the premium on gold in the New York Commercial Advertiser. TABLE 1 MONTHLY HIGHEST, AVERAGE, AND LOWEST GOLD PRICE OF $100 OF PAPER MONEY IN THE NEW YORK MARKET Month Date of Highest Price Highest I Average Lowest 1 Date of Lowest Pr. January February . . . March April May June July August September . . October November. . . December.. . 1 27,28 25 8,18,19,24,25,26 11 1 9,11 1, 2, 16, 17, 18 1 29 1 $99.50 97.92 98.77 98.52 97.92 96.74 91.95 88.89 85.84 81.97 77.52 77.82 197.60 96.60 98.20 98.50 96.80 93.90 86.60 87.30 84.40 77.80 76.30 75.60 $95.24 95.47 97.56 97.68 96.04 91.32 83.25 86.02 80.65 74.91 75.05 74.63 10 15 1 2 27 27 22 29 30 22 . 10 4 1 The highest and lowest prices are taken from the following tables of daily prices. 423 424 History op the Greenbacks TABLE 1 — Continued MONTHLY HIGHEST, AVEBAQE, AND LOWEST GOLD PRICE OF $100 OF PAPER MONET IN THE NEW YOBK MARKET 1863 Montli Date of Highest Price Highest I Average Lowest 1 Date of Lowest Pr. January 2 $74.84 $68.90 $62.21 31 February . . . 10,11 65.57 62.30 57.97 26,28 March 26 71.94 64.70 58.22 1,2 April 8 68.73 66.00 63.34 1 May 26,28 69.69 67.20 64.62 7 June 10 71.17 69.20 67.40 16 July 20 81.14 76.60 68.97 1 August 25 81.88 79.50 77.07 1 September. . 1 78.82 74.50 69.87 29 October 1 71.24 67.70 63.80 15 November. . . 27 69.93 67.60 64.94 21,23 December.. . 1 67.51 66.20 65.47 4,29 1864 January February . . . March April May June July August September. . October November. . . December.. . 6 27 1 4 10 2 1 30 30 3 18 19 $66.01 $64.30 $62.75 63.64 63.10 62.11 62.89 61.40 58.91 60.15 57.90 54.13 59.52 56.70 52.63 53.05 47.50 40.00 45.05 38.70 35.09 43.20 39.40 38.20 52.36 44.90 39.29 52.91 48.30 43.91 47.62 42.80 38.46 47.00 44.00 41.15 19 16 26 26 31 29,30 11 6 2 31 9 7 1865 January. . . February . March April May June July August . . . September October . . November December 21 21 24 10 11 5 3 11,15 15 2,3 1 9 $50.70 $46.30 $42.67 50.92 48.70 46.14 67.51 57.50 49.75 69,69 67.30 64.73 77.82 73.70 68.91 73.94 71.40 67.74 72.14 70.40 68.43 71.30 69.70 68.73 70.11 69.50 68.97 69.38 68.70 67.11 68.73 68.00 67.23 69.20 68.40 67.34 4 7 1 5 1 15 28 2 1 6 29 1.4,5 I The highest and lowest prices are taken from the following tables of daily prices. Appendix A 425 TABLE 2 DAILY HIGHEST AND LOWEST VALUE IN GOLD OF $100 IN CUEKENCY 1862 January February March April May June 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 $99.50-98.52 99.01-98.77 99.01-98.77 98.28-98.04 S. 97.80-97.56 97.32-97.09 96.62 95.92 95.69-95.24 96.62-96.15 S. 97.09-97.09 97.32-96.85 97.56-97.33 97.80-97,56 98,16-98,04 98,28-98,04 S. 97.80-97,56 97,80-97,56 97,44^-97,21 96,74-96,39 96,74-96.62 97.09-96,85 S. 97,09-96.85 96.74-96,74 96.85-96.74 96.85-96.62 96.62-96.50 $96.62-96.62 S. 96.74-96.62 96.62-96.50 96.74r-96.62 96.74-96.62 96,74-96,50 96.62-96,50 S. 96.50^96.27 96.27-96.15 96.15-96.04 95.92-95.81 95.81-95.58 95.58-95.47 S. 96.39-96.27 96.74-96.39 97.09-96.85 96.85-96.74 96.97-96.97 97.09-97.09 S. 97.09-96.85 97.09-96.97 97.21-96.97 97.92-97.80 97.92-97.80 $97.68-97.56 S. 98.04r-97.68 98.16-98.04 98.04-98.04 98.04r^7.92 98.04-97.92 98.28-98.16 S. 98.04-98.04 98.40-98.28 98.40-98.40 98.52-98.52 98.52-98.40 98.52-98.52 S. 98.52-98.40 98.64r-98.52 98.52-98.40 98.77-98.64 98.77-98.52 98.77-98.64 S. 98.77-98.64 98.89-98.77 98.77-98.64 98.77-98.28 98.77-98.64 98.52-98.52 S. 98.64-98.28 $98.16-98.04 98.04r-97.68 98.28-98.16 98.28-98.16 98.16-98.04 S. 97.92-97.80 98.52-97.92 98.28-98.16 98.28-98.16 98.16-98.04 98.28-98.04 S. 98.28-98.16 98.28-98.16 98.40-98.40 98.52-98.40 98.52-98.52 98.52-98.40 S. 98.40-98.40 98.40-98.40 98.40-98.28 98.52-98.40 98.52-98.52 98.52-98.40 S. 98.40-98.28 98.28-98.28 98.04-98.04 $97.92-97.80 97.80-97.1)6 97.56-97.32 S. 96.97-96.39 97.44-96.73 97.68-97.32 97.32-97.09 96.97-96.85 96.85-%.74 S. 96.74-96.50 96.85-96.74 96.83-96.85 96.85-96.50 97.09-96.62 97.09-96.97 S. 96.85-96.85 96.85-96.74 96.85-96.62 96.62-96.50 96.74-96.62 96.74-96.50 S. 96.15-96.15 96.15-96.04 96., 27-96, 15 96,39-96,27 96,50-96,50 96,62-96,50 S. $96.62-96.50 96.62-96.62 96.62-96.50 96.50-96.15 96.15-95.92 96.15-95.04 S. 95.92-95.81 95.92-95.81 96.74-95.69 95.47-93.01 95.01-94.90 94,67-94,56 S. 93,90-93,68 94,34-93.90 94.90-94.45 94.34-93.79 94.01-93.79 94.01-93.90 S. 93.68-92.59 92.38-91.95 92.38-91.95 91.85-91.53 91.43-91.32 91.74-91.64 sn ■^1 July August September October November December 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 .31 $91.95-91.53 91.85-91.43 91.32-91.32 Holiday 91.32-91.01 S. 90.91-90.70 89.89-89.69 88.11-&5.84 86.49-85.11 87.15-86.21 87.82-87.34 S. 86.58-«5.93 85.65-85.47 85.65-75.29 84.93-84.12 84.03-83.88 84.57-84.39 S. 83.. 51-83. 33 83.59-83.25 84.03-83.88 85.47-84.39 87.53-85.84 85.47-85.11 S. 85.74-85.02 86,39-85,84 87,43-86,67 87,34-86.67 $86.86-86.39 86.96-86.77 S. 87.24^6.96 87.34r^87.15 87.24-87.15 87.72-87.05 88.79-87.72 88.89-88.59 S. 88.89-88.20 88.11-87.53 87.43-87.34 86.77-86.30 87.15-86.58 87.34-87.24 S. 86.86-86.77 87.15-86.86 86.96-86.77 86.77-86.30 86.58-86.02 86.86-86.30 S. 86.77-86.39 86.77-86.67 86.77-86.58 86.58-86.49 86.21-86.02 86.49-86.39 S. $85.84^85.47 85.84r-85.65 84.93-84.75 84.93-84.84 84.57-83.95 84.21-83.88 S. 84.21-83.68 84.30-84,12 84.30-84.21 84.21-84.12 84.39-84.21 84.75-84.57 S. 85.11-84.93 85.84-84.93 85.84-85.11 85.84r-85.56 85.56-85.47 85.65-85,38 S, 85.38-85.11 84,93-84.21 84.30-84.03 83.33-82.81 83.16-82.99 82.39-82.39 S. 82.14-80.97 82.30-80.65 $81.97-80.81 81.47-81.30 81.72-81.55 81.63-81.30 S. 81.38-80.56 81.30-80.72 80.48-80.08 79. 84-79. (K 78.59-77.52 78.12-77.97 S. 77.52-77.37 76.34-75.19 75.76-75.33 75.76-75.47 75 76-75.47 76.92-76.78 S. 77.75-77.22 77.97-77.07 75.19-74.91 75.47-75.19 76.34-75.76 76.92-76.19 S. 76.92-76.19 75.97-73.61 76.19-75.90 76.78-76.48 77.22-76.92 $77,15-76,19 S. 76,63-76.05 77.22-76.63 76.05-75.61 76.05-75.76 76,05-75.76 73.76-75.47 S. 75 61-75.05 76.34-75.33 76.0.3-75.76 76.05-75.76 76.34-73.76 73.90-75.76 S. 73.76-75,61 76.12-73.76 76 92-76.34 76 78-76.63 76.78-76.56 76.63-76.48 S. 76.85-76.48 77 00-76.92 77.37-77.22 Thanks. Day 77.37-77.22 77.52-77.37 S. $77,82-76,03 76,34-76,05 76,34-75,76 75,19-74,63 76,05-75.47 76,63-75,76 S, 76,12-67,05 75,40-75,19 75,69-75.47 73.69-75.61 76.05-75.90 76.26-75.76 S. 75.83-75.61 75.76-75.26 75.61-75.19 75.69-75.33 75.61-75.33 75.76-75.26 S. 75.61-75.40 75.69-75.61 73.76-75.69 Xmas Day 75.83-75.76 75.83-75.40 S. 75.83-75.33 73.40-75.19 75 05-74 84 426 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 2 — Continued DAILY HIGHEST AND LOWEST VALUE IN GOLD OF $100 IN CUEKENCY 1863 January February March April May June 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 N. Year's Day $74.84-74.70 74.77-74.35 S. 74.28-73.94 74.63-74.28 74.63-74.07 73.60-72.99 72.46-72.20 73.06-72.07 S. 71.11-70.30 70.42-69.44 68.14-67.57 67.51-67.23 68.73-68.61 68.08-67.74 S. 67.68-67.23 67.68-67.23 67.68-67.34 67.91-67.34 68.03-67.51 67.40-66.67 S. 67.17-65.90 65.25-64.62 65.57-64.94 65.36-64.41 65.36-63.19 62.89-62.21 S. $63.80-62.89 64.73-64.46 63.69-63.09 63.85-63.29 83.59-63.09 63.85-63.34 S. 64 73-63.90 65.57-64.99 65.57-65.04 64.88-64.73 64.46-64.10 64.41-64.10 S. 64.15-63.49 63.19-62.79 62.31-61.73 61.92-60.98 61.54-61.07 61.13-61.16 S. 61.16-60.65 59.61-58.31 58.31-58.01 59.00-57.97 58.87-58.48 58.31-57.97 S. $58.31-58.22 58.48-58.22 60. 61-59. .52 63.69-63.29 66.67-64.94 64.62-64.31 S. 64.21-63.59 62.50-61.35 63.34-63.09 63.09-62.45 62.89-62.02 63.39-62.99 S. 64.73-64.31 64.67-64.41 65.20-64.52 6.4.57-64.15 64.73-64.52 64.99-64.57 S. 66.23-65.15 68.73-62.89 71.68-70.55 71.94^71.30 71.43-70.98 70.30-69.87 S. 69.32-67 91 $64.10-63.34 66.25-63.69 65.36-65.15 64.62-64.41 S. 66.23-65.41 66.61-65.41 68.73-68.03 68.38-67.51 68.26-67.11 66.45-65.51 S. 63.69-63.49 64.52-64.26 65.19-64.94 65.79-65.04 65.25-64.21 66.12-65.52 S. 67.23-66.34 68.49-68.03 68.61-68.03 67.40-66.67 66.01-65.79 65.79-64.94 S. 66.67-64.99 66.83-66.39 66.67-66.39 National Fast $66.34-66.01 66.12-66.45 S. , 67.45-66.67 61.34^66.01 65.68-64.94 64.83-64.62 64.83-64.13 61.11-66.56 S. 61.34-61.11 61.34-61.00 66.18-66.12 66.18-66.61 66.18-66.61 66.78-66.56 S. 66.78-66.61 61.51-67.06 61.28-61.11 61.23-66.61 61.34-66.18 61.34-66.89 S. 68.61-68.26 69.69-68.91 69.63-69.08 69.69-69.50 69.20-68.91 69.03-68.85 S. $68.49-67.80 68.14-67.91 68.14.-68.08 68.49-68.26 68.49-68.38 68.91-68.79 S. 69.93-69.93 70.36-70.24 71.17-70.98 70. .54-70.42 10.80-10.73 10.30-70.18 S. 69.20-68.49 67.68-61.40 68.13-68.61 69.81-69.14 69.93-69.57 69.69-69.69 S. 69.75-69.50 69.15-69.69 69.81-69.44 69.08-68.61 69.08-68.91 68.91-68.85 S. 68.26-67.97 fiS 4^1-flS 14 30 .'^l 67.34r-66.67 July Au^st September October November December 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 $69.08-68.97 69.50-69.32 69.4^^69.32 Holiday S. 72.46-71.81 75.47-72.20 76.12-75.90 76.19-76.05 75.61-75.47 75.69-75.41 S. 76.19-75.97 76.19-76 05 77.59-77.37 79 37-79.29 79.52-79.37 79.84-79 84 S. 81.14-79.76 79.37-78.51 80.32-79.52 79.52-79.29 79.29-79.21 79.52-79.44 S. 78.43-78.12 78.43-78.28 78.43-78.28 78.35-78.28 78.05-77.52 $77.29-77.07 S. 78.43-78.28 77.97-77.67 78.28-78.20 Nat'l Thanks. 78.74-78.28 79.21-79.13 S. 79.29-78.90 19.21-79.05 .19.29-79.13 78.97-78.14 79.84^79.05 79 76-19.68 S. 79.60-19.52 79.60-79 60 80.32-79.92 80.08-80.08 79.84-79.76 80.16-80.08 S. 80.65-80.65 81.88-80.97 81.63-81.14 80 32-80.08 80.65-80.40 80.16-80.08 S. 78.74^77.97 $78.82-78.51 78.43-78.12 77.31-74.49 14.91-14.35 76.05-75.90 S. 75.19-75.05 15.16-75.69 75.54-75.40 76.26-76.12 71.29-11.07 n.59-77.52 S. 16.41-15.91 16.34-15.69 16.12-75.61 75.61-75.41 15.19-15 05 14.17-74.63 S. 71.94-71.81 72.86-72.20 72.73-72.33 73.13-72.99 72.46-72.40 11.94-11.81 S. 11.81-11.75 10.18-69.81 70.80-70.42 $71.24^71.24 70.18-69.81 70.11-69.87 S. 69.44-69.08 68.49-67.91 68.38-68.26 68.55-68.49 68.14^^8.03 67.40-67.34 S. 66.89-66.56 65.04-64.52 65.57-65.04 64.10-63.80 64.88-64.83 67.00-66.67 S. 66.28-64.31 66.83-66.78 69.57-68.49 70.05-69.32 68.61-68.26 68.14^8.03 S. 66.89-66.78 68.49-67.91 68.61-68.26 68.03-67.57 68.49-68.32 68.79-68.73 S. $68.55-68.26 68.43-68.38 68.49-68.43 68.38-67.91 67.57-67.23 68.38-67.85 S. 68.38-68.20 68.97-68.73 68.79-68.61 68.20-68.03 68.0:i-67.85 68.20-68.03 S. 68.03-67.97 67.62-61.34 66.89-66.67 66.23-65.47 65.57-65.25 65.15-64.94 S. 65. .36-64-94 66.45-65.79 67.23-67,11 Thanks. Day 69.93-68.73 69.20-69.14 S. 67.57-67.23 $67.51-67.40 67.34-67.28 66.01-65.57 65.57-65.47 65.90-65.79 S. 66.23-65.14 61.23-66.89 67.34-67.28 67.23-66.83 66.23-66.01 66.56-66.50 S. 66.78-66.50 66.34-66.34 67.00-66.78 66.56-66.45' 65.95-65.74 66.01-65.79 S. 65.74-65.57 65.74-65.68 65.79-65.57 65.95-65.90 Xmas DV 66.01-66.01 S. 65.90-65.52 65.52-65.47 65.90-65.57 65.84-65.84 Appendix A 427 TABLE 2— Continued DAILY HIGHEST AND LOWEST VALUE IN GOLD OP $100 IN CUEEENCY 1864 January February March April May June 1 2 3 4 N. Year's Day $65.95-65.79 S. $63.49-63.39 63.59-63.54 63.39-63.29 63.29-63.29 63.39-63.19 63.39-63.19 S. 62.99-62.79 62.65-62.60 62.79-62.79 62.75-62.70 62.89-62.79 62.70-62.65 S. 62.55-62.35 62.40-62.11 62.55-62.50 62.55-62.55 63.29-63.04 62.84-62.79 S. 62.89-62.89 63.59-63.39 63.59-63.49 63.19-63.14 63.49-63 14 63.64-63.49 S. 62.89-62.79 $62.89-62.50 62.65-62.65 62.31-62.11 62.45-61.92 61.87-61.78 S. 61.82-61.82 61.49-61.26 59.88-59.61 60.70-60.70 60.74-60.70 62.31-61.73 S. 62.31-62.21 61.63-61.44 61.87-61.73 62.06-61.92 61.35-61.35 61.73-61.73 S. 61.73-61.73 $60.06-59.44 60.06-59.97 S. 60.15-60.02 59.66-59.61 59.26-58.61 58.61-58.48 59.00-59.00 59.00-59.00 S. 59.00-59.00 57.55-57.14 56.94-56.90 56.82-56.42 57.64-37.55 58.48-58.39 S. ,58.65-58.65 59.88-59.52 .59.88-59.70 59.93-59.70 57.64-57.22 57.43-36.34 S. 55.87-54.79 55.17-54.13 55.25-53.17 56.22-55.48 36.30-.55.48 55.71-55.56 S. $56.82-36.38 56.. 50-55. 63 53.71-55.71 .56.42-56.30 57.47-56.58 57.89-57.85 S. 58.91-58.48 59.52-59.35 57.39-56.74 57.80-,37.39 58.82-57.51 58.14-58.06 S. 57.64-57.55 56.50-56.18 .55.25-55.17 55.10-55.06 55.25-55.25 55.10-.55.10 S. 54.91-54.91 54.83-54.83 54.13-54.09 54.64-54.50 53.76-53.69 53.76-53.76 S. 53.76-53.76 32.63-.52.63 $52.63-52.63 53.05-52.63 52.67-,52.32 52.56-52.19 5 6 7 8 q 65.95-65.95 66.01-66.01 65.84-65.68 65.90-65.68 S. 51.55-51.53 51.81-51.35 51.81-51.75 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 S. 65.63-65.57 65.04-64.83 65.04-64,99 64.73-64.57 64.41-64.31 64.21-63.90 S. 62.79-62.79 62.79-62.75 63.19-62.94 64.00-63.69 63.80-63.44 64.10-63.85 S. 63.41-63.34 63.29-63.24 63.69-63.69 63.64-63.59 63.80-63.44 63.80-63.84 S. 50.3S-50.31 30.44-30.38 S. 51.09-51.09 51.15-50.63 50.57-50.57 50.70-50.70 50.86-50.79 51.22 51.13 S. 50.31-30.44 50.25-48.08 47.62-43.48 23 24 23 26 27 60.88-60.42 60.06-60.06 Good Friday 59.00-58.91 s. 48.78-44.84 46.95-46.08 46.73-45.45 S. 45.25-41.67 42 73-41 67 29 30 60.33-60.29 61.12-60.88 60.88-60.88 42.3.5-40.00 40 82-40.00 ■11 July August September October November December 1 2 3 $45.05-40.00 43.48-40.00 S. Holiday 42.55-40.16 40.32-38.24 38.17-36.63 37.49-36.17 38.46-36.36 J. 36.23-35.09 36.90-35.46 37.21-36.63 38.76-37.31 40.98-39.06 40.24^38.28 S. 39.33-38.24 38.68-37.21 38.31-37.91 38.99-38.46 39.92-38.80 39.41-39.06 S 39.16-38.65 ,38.80-38.54 39.. 37-38. 87 40.98-39.68 40.00-39.45 39.53-38.76 S. $39.84-38.61 39.08-38.68 39.06-38.68 $41.15-40.24 40.24-39.29 42.37-41.07 S. 42.55-41.07 41.58-41.32 41.52-41.19 42.42-41.49 42.71-42.37 45.87-43.76 ' S. 46.84^44.44 45.98-43.86 44.74-43.86 43.81-43.57 44.62-43.86 45.27-44.72 S. 44.67-44.10 44.84-44.10 45.45-43.05 46.30-45.20 47.39-46.08 50.00-47.17 S. 51.27-50.47 52.02-51.27 51.28-48.78 51.48-49.50 52.36-51.51 $52.63-51.61 S. 52.91-52.15 52.63-52.02 52.84-52.29 32.02-30.76 50.51-49.02 50.83^9.20 S. 51.02-,50,25 50.41-49.17 49.94-48.84 49.05-47.68 48.08-46.03 46.89-45.45 S. 45.82-44.94 48.48-46.51 48.19-47.28 48.48-47.34 48.22-47.85 47.73-46.84 S. 47.11-46.11 46.57-45.71 47.09-46.08 46.54-46.16 46.48-45.92 45.92-45.20 S. 45.1.5-43.91 $43.48-41.41 43.57-40.65 44.00-42.24 43.17-41.91 42.46-40.86 S. 41.93-40.67 40.73-40.08 40.65-38.46 41.1.5-39.53 42.22-40 90 41.24-40.82 S. 41.15-40.53 41.91-40.98 43.76-41.67 45.82-44.10 47.62-45.66 46.30-44.35 S. 45.98-45.15 44.64-43.67 45.35-44.74 Thanks. D'y 46.14-45.20 45.56-44.51 S. 44.20-42.78 43.10-42.35 4-1.00-42.92 $44.10-43.67 43.43-42.78 43.81-43.29 S. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 38.83-38.28 38.57-38.20 S. 38.95-38.54 39.60-39.14 39.29-39.14 39.39-38.95 39.20-38.83 39.35-39.02 S. 39.10-38.93 39.12-38.95 39.10-38.91 38.91-38.76 38.91-38.78 38.99-38.89 S. 38.93-38.87 38.89-38.72 39.35-38.91 39.29-39.10 39.47-39.06 40.82-39.53 S. 42.53-40.82 43.20-42.37 42.73-41.15 44.03-43.53 43.48-42.60 41.93-41.15 41.84-41.19 41.75-41.26 42. 64-41. 80 S. 43.01-42.11 42.87-42.46 42.85-42.46 42.64^42.06 42.78-42.60 44.42-43 22 S. 47.00-46.03 45.35-44.05 44.99-44 25 45.25-44.54 45.35-44.89 45.38-45.05 S. Holiday 46.30-45.87 46.24-44.64 43.05-44.42 44.25-43.57 44.59-43.88 428 History op the Greenbacks TABLE 2 — Continued DAILY HIGHEST AND LOWEST VALUE IN GOLD OF $100 IN CUKBENCI 1865 January February March April May June 1 S. $49.38-48.63 $50.12-49.75 $66.23-65.79 $70.11-68.91 Fast day 2 Holiday 49.08-48.54 50.99-50.51 S. 71.05-70.18 $72.73-72.27 3 $44.25^3.57 48.72-47.68 50.47-50.25 68.73-67.57 70.86-70.48 73.26-72.99 1 43.29-42.67 47.93-46.62 50.25-50.00 68.32-67.23 70.42-69.75 S. 5 44.17-43.57 S. S. 67.57-64.73 70.18-69.50 73.94^73.13 6 44.05-43.81 47.17-46.62 60.51-50.22 66.56-65.57 70.05-69.63 73.39-72.93 7 44.17-43.96 47.06-46.14 50.73-50.25 67.91-66.45 S. 72.99-72.66 8 S. 47.51-46.92 51.05-50.57 67.34-66.34 72.33-69.93 72.60-72.46 9 44.22-44.05 47.34-46.73 51.71-50.92 S. 73.66-72.86 72.93-72.46 10 44.94-43.69 47.51-47.20 53.58-52.32 69.69-68.67 76.26-73.66 72.93-72.60 11 45.45-44.69 48.87-47.85 53.12-52.22 68.49-68.03 77.82-75.90 S. 12 46.19-45.51 S. S. 68.91-68.49 76.56-75.05 72.33-70.92 13 45.77-45.05 48.75-48.31 53.98-52.22 68.49-67.97 77.37-76.78 71.11-69.93 14 45.92-45.25 48.28-47.90 56.26-54.05 Pres. assass. S. 70.61-69.93 15 S. 48.84-48.43 57.39-55.90 Exch. closed 77.07-76.63 69.69-67.74 16 45.85-45.22 49.26-48.78 58.74-56.54 S. 76.70-76.48 69.69-68.85 n 46.62-46.08 49.14-48.87 62.50-59.17 67.51-65.36 77.15-75.97 69.57-68.91 18 46.51-46.08 49.02-48.66 61.26-60.15 68.38-67.68 77.15-76.34 S. 19 48.08-46.54 S. S. Holiday 76.56-76.05 71.43-69.75 20 49.57-48.13 SO.44-49.94 62.40-59.57 Holiday 76.78-76.34 72.60-71.62 21 50.70-48.54 50.92-50.06 64.73-62.79 67.91-66.83 S. 71.68-70.48 22 S. Holiday 64.10-62.89 67.06-66.45 76.56-76.19 71.17-70.55 23 50.54-49.32 50.28-49.94 66.34-63.69 S. 76.26-75.54 70.61-70.30 24 50.54-49.08 50.28-49.94 67.51-65.57 Holiday 74.07-73.80 70.61-70.18 25 48.96-48.19 50.51-50.03 65.15-63.49 Holiday 73.53-72.14 S. 26 49.50-48.31 S. S. 66.39-65.79 73.66-72.46 71.43-70.61 27 47.90-46.51 50.12-49.57 65.36-64.31 67.80-67.00 73.60-73.06 70.80-70.42 28 46.95-45.45 49.81-49.14 65.04-64.67 68. 14-67., 57 S. 71.81-70.80 29 S. 47.39-46.57 49.50-47.39 66.23-65.63 66.83-65.84 66.12-65.84 68.49-68.26 S. 73.53-72.99 72.86-72.07 73.26-72.73 72.40-71 81 30 71.94-70.80 31 July August September October November December 1 $71.75-70.92 $69.50-68.91 $69.26-68.97 S. $68.73-68.55 $67.57-67.34 2 S. 69.03-68.73 69.32-69.14 $69.38-69.32 68.49-68.20 67.80-67.45 3 72.14r-71.17 69.38-69.14 S. 69.38-69.08 68.20-68.03 S. 4 Holiday 69.75-69.32 69.50-69.26 69.08-68.14 68.14.^7.97 67.62-67.34 5 71.68-71.24 69.87-69.57 69.38-69.14 68.26-67.91 S. 67.51-67.34 6 71.94^71.49 S. 69.20-68.97 68.43-67.11 68.03-67.85 68.14-67.57 7 71.68-71.56 69.69-69.44 69.14-69.03 68.49-68.08 68.08-67.91 Thanks. Day 8 71.56-71.36 69.32-69.08 69.20-69.08 S. 68.26-67.74 68.61-68.26 9 S. 69.57-69.20 69.14-69.08 68.61-68.14 68.43-68.14 69.20-68.91 10 71.88-71.30 70.30-69.63 s. ■ 69.03-68.79 68.26-68.20 S. 11 71.75-71.43 71.30-70.48 69.20-69.14 69.08-68.91 68-26-68.08 69.08-68.85 12 71.05-70.42 70.98-70.42 69.57-69.20 68.97-68.79 S. 69.14-68.91 13 70.48-70.42 S. 69.81-69.57 69.14-69.03 68.14-67.97 68.97-68.73 14 70.18-69.63 70.30-69.99 69.87-69.57 69.14-69.03 68.03-67.91 68.85-68.43 15 70.42-70.18 71.30-70.73 70.11-69.81 S. 67.91-67.85 68.38-68.14' 16 S. 70.86-70.39 70.05-69.81 69.97-68.73 67.97-67.91 68.49-68.26 17 70.42-69.93 70.55-70.11 S. 69.67-68.32 68.14.^.03 S. 18 69.93-69.75 70.18-69.57 69.75-69.57 68.49-68.38 68.08-68.03 68.43-68.20 19 70.30-69.57 69.63-69.32 69.63-69.44 68.26-68.03 S. 68.26-68.20 20 70.24-70.05 S. 69.63-69.44 68.49-68.38 68.20-68.03 68.49-68.14 21 70.36-70.05 69.38-69.08 69.50-69.32 68.61-68.32 68.20-68.08 68.55-68.38 22 70 18-70.05 69 81-69.44 69.81-69.50 S. 68.08-68.03 68.55-68.43 23 S. 69 69-69.50 69.81-69.57 68.49-68.32 68.08-68.03 68.79-68.61 24 70.11-69.81 69 63-69.50 S. 68.49-68.38 68.14-68.08 S. 25 69.93-69 69 69.69-69.44 69.93-69.50 68.73-68.38 68.08-67.97 Xmas D'y 26 69.99-69.69 69.44r^9.26 69.57-69.50 69.03-68.67 s. - 68.85-68.73 27 69.81-68.85 S 69.50-69.32 68.73-68.55 67.97-67.74 68.85-68.79 28 69.14-68.43 69.50-69.38 69.50-69.38 68.85-68.67 67.85-67.40 68.79-68.67 29 70 05-68.73 69.38-69.26 69.50-69.38 S. 67.57-67 23 68.91-68.67 30 S. 69.44-69.03 69.44-69.32 68.67-68.62 67 91-67.40 69.03-68.97 31 69.87-69 38 69.20-68.97 68.55-68 38 S. APPENDIX B Relative Peioes of Commodities TABLE 1 EELATIVE PEICES OF FAEM PBODDOTS A. iNDiviDnAL Seeies Date 1860, January . April July October . 1861, January . April July October . 1862, January . April July October . 1863, January . April July October . 1864, January . April . . . . July October . 1865, January . April . . . . July October . 1866, January . April July October . Baelet New York 103 100 '96 90 88 94 81 94 113 '75 166 191 ies 178 165 232 257 202 163 160 135 153 135 175 Chi- cago 101 117 93 89 64 71 34 59 59 80 101 131 161 186 195 181 205 233 233 248 220 165 101 129 110 89 76 140 Cin- cinnati 84 109 98 109 92 78 57 52 57 80 80 115 155 184 i72 190 155 224 184 149 161 132 172 184 Clovbe Seed New YoA 103 94 ios 103 91 91 '84 98 89 89 126 117 i49 161 183 25i 326 294 343 274 160 123 iss Chi- cago 99 88 99 114 102 89 89 92 85 105 83 102 124 107 120 120 143 139 161 193 309 298 161 163 158 114 137 137 COEN New York 122 97 87 94 97 88 65 75 89 79 75 82 109 126 103 119 178 178 217 217 257 196 102 125 127 106 120 130 Cin- cinnati 107 95 97 101 71 67 57 57 57 69 73 81 91 133 115 182 208 212 218 242 212 141 131 127 107 97 125 166 429 430 History of the Gkeenbacks TABLE 1 — Continued EELATIVE PEICES OF FAKM PBODDCTS Flax Seed Ftpes Meat: Beeves Date New York Cin- cinnati Cin- cinnati Chi- cago New York Cin- cinnati New York Chi- cago 1860, January . . . April July October 1861, January . . . April July October 1862, January . . . April July October 1863, January . . . April July October 1864, January... April July October 1865, January . . . April July October 1866, January . . . April July October 98 102 101 99 101 91 '98 116 140 129 125 193 182 165 165 207 223 231 200 233 176 142 190 187 160 203 209 100 100 100 100 100 100 91 91 114 136 iii 182 295 i82 227 236 255 255 259 182 136 245 227 205 264 255 100 107 107 85 93 93 63 85 78 100 100 100 126 130 137 137 148 141 174 159 156 156 96 119 133 141 133 133 91 100 106 103 69 82 58 69 72 86 79 103 106 120 113 141 132 156 161 120 139 100 91 122 93 76 93 120 100 103 103 94 68 75 61 86 83 75 83 94 99 94 94 103 125 139 161 133 153 104 83 128 139 133 125 139 103 117 90 90 97 110 76 90 83 90 97 76 90 131 124 97 131 179 166 193 221 262 193 166 172 193 207 193 103 108 92 97 103 90 90 90 103 97 87 87 97 118 110 103 118 144 162 178 164 215 159 190 174 159 172 169 97 113 105 85 105 105 110 77 73 97 90 85 92 145 110 101 105 141 177 153 169 242 145 ?,?.'>. 179 155 210 185 Meat: Sheep Meat: Poke Oats Rttb Date New Cin- Chi- Cin- New New Cin- Cin- New York cinnati cago cinnati York York cinnati cinnati York 1860, Jan. . 101 110 91 121 90 111 119 113 107 Apr. . 110 138 100 101 97 103 106 119 100 July. 92 83 101 62 107 95 101 87 99 Oct. . 97 69 108 116 106 92 74 81 94 1861, Jan. . 101 138 87 115 86 90 64 70 Apr. . 99 124 87 98 82 80 64 63 77 July. 78 55 53 63 68 72 57 52 Oct. . 87 55 51 61 63 83 59 41 82 Appendix B 431 TABLE 1— Continued RELATIVE PRICES OF FARM PRODUCTS Meat: Sheep Meat: Pork Oats Eye Date New Cincin- Chi- Cincin- New New Cincin- Cincin- New York nati cago nati York York nati nati York 1862, Jan.. 106 90 48 65 60 99 69 49 101 April 110 110 52 65 74 93 72 63 94 July. 97 72 45 47 57 103 84 56 87 Oct.. 101 103 57 63 67 138 99 66 75 1863, Jan.. 110 83 69 94 75 166 128 69 107 April 138 179 84 76 88 200 173 113 126 July. 87 114 76 74 88 178 156 85 121 Oct.. 97 121 79 57 79 168 173 113 130 1864, Jan.. 136 145 92 141 113 224 205 153 152 April 179 200 144 151 139 214 195 149 151 July. 117 110 184 151 176 238 200 175 236 Oct.. 147 166 142 237 179 208 185 158 173 1865, Jan.. 175 207 227 314 219 261 212 164 203 April 211 276 197 227 191 212 148 113 145 July. 101 117 147 174 169 177 153 70 101 Oct.. 124 152 235 257 229 144 111 88 119 1866, Jan.. 161 166 176 244 165 122 96 85 121 April 140 179 175 189 171 115 101 73 101 July. 113 138 176 188 165 147 111 107 143 Oct.. 108 131 183 196 173 137 111 127 149 Timothy Seed Tobacco Leaf Leaf Wrap's Wrap's Wrap's Leaf Date Aver'ge Fine Ohio Penn. Conn. K-y. Cincin- Chi- New Cincin- Cincin- New New New New nati cago York nati nati York York York York 1860, Jan.. 87 83 94 100 100 100 100 126 112 April 121 113 110 100 100 100 100 91 98 July. 116 100 100 91 89 Oct.. 92 87 96 100 100 91 101 1861, J an.. 89 98 100 100 91 104 April 107 85 120 100 100 91 98 July. 101 88 88 74 110 Oct.. 58 57 72 84 iis 88 88 74 125 1862, Jan.. 58 64 77 145 123 88 88 74 146 April 66 65 82 116 105 104 104 94 152 July. 67 148 127 104 104 94 153 Oct. 64 60 74 222 182 131 131 118 223 432 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 1— Continued BELATIYB PBICE8 OF FAKM PBODUOTS Timothy Seed Tobacco Leaf Leaf Wrap's Wrap's Wrap's Leaf Date Aver'ge Fine Ohio Penn. Conn. Ky. CiBClQ- Chi- New Cincin- Cincin- New New New New nati cago York nati nati York York York York 1863, Jan.. 68 72 110 241 218 131 131 118 259 April. 78 59 82 284 236 173 173 191 312 July. 94 284 236 173 173 191 238 Oct.. 99 91 94 220 205 173 173 191 213 1864, Jan.. 120 110 104 255 218 173 173 191 262 April. 110 101 106 253 218 231 231 235 262 July . 120 220 218 269 269 265 253 Oct.. 229 162 192 216 205 269 269 265 318 1865, Jan . . 227 218 226 261 295 269 269 265 333 April. 174 152 211 247 318 135 135 176 387 July. 181 134 273 341 96 96 135 226 Oct.. 155 144 182 240 341 115 115 162 297 1866, Jan.. 140 129 163 237 250 115 115 169 297 April. 136 147 163 216 205 115 115 169 297 July. 178 259 216 205 115 115 169 297 Oct.. 128 114 127 212 205 115 115 169 232 Date 1860, January April . . . July. ... October. 1861, January. April . . . July.... October. 1862, January, April. . . . July . . . . October, 1863, January, April July October , Wheat Winter New York 102 105 102 91 98 99 78 95 103 97 86 93 107 125 108 Spring New York 105 98 103 94 97 102 65 94 103 102 85 92 103 99 102 103 Prime Cincin- nati 103 110 93 95 84 83 63 66 72 78 69 72 83 108 89 93 No. 2 Winter Chi- cago 99 105 105 91 96 '■76 71 73 76 85 93 112 100 95 No. 2 Spring Chi- cago 99 105 108 88 82 81 57 74 70 74 75 83 86 110 97 104 Appendix B 433 TABLE 1— Continued BELATIYB PEICBS OF FABH PRODUCTS Datk Wheat Winter New York Spring New York Prime Cincin- nati No. 2 Winter Chi- cago No. 2 Spring Chi- cago 1864, January, April . . . July October , 1865, January April .. . July.... October. 1866, January. April . . . July.... October , 116 126 190 143 185 134 107 166 148 141 177 199 118 131 193 149 184 137 103 141 139 112 155 177 110 110 169 143 173 127 105 181 165 198 228 2,36 108 123 176 129 144 iii 132 191 115 114 199 149 160 101 92 126 98 93 119 195 B. AVEBAGES FOE THE SBVEEAI, PRODUCTS Date Barley Clover Seed Corn Flax Seed Hides 96 101 115 99 97 109 91 96 101 103 96 99 92 101 105 98 109 98 100 94 82 103 84 101 77 79 90 78 96 83 62 90 61 91 61 64 92 66 95 80 70 85 73 115 78 91 102 74 138 87 91 86 74 129 87 107 96 82 120 99 161 125 100 188 110 187 112 130 239 115 195 120 109 165 115 172 135 151 174 127 191 152 193 217 135 184 161 195 230 145 2.33 161 218 243 165 235 222 230 228 137 Meat: Beeves 1860, January April . . . July October 1861, January April . . . July October 1862, January April . . . July . . . October 1863, January April . . . July October 1864, January April . . . July . . . October 101 113 96 91 102 102 92 86 86 95 91 83 93 131 115 100 118 155 168 175 434 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 1—Ccmtinued EEIiATITB PEICES OF FAKM PEODUCTS Date Barley Clover Seed Com Flax Seed Hides 220 318 235 246 149 172 296 169 179 120 117 252 117 139 90 lis 219 126 218 123 135 159 117 207 122 125 119 102 183 117 128 137 123 234 117 166 160 ■148 232 121 Meat: Beeves 1865, January April . . . July , October 1866, January April ... July .... October 185 240 166 193 175 169 196 182 Date 1860, January, April July.... October , 1861, January, April July . . . . October , 1862, January, April. . . . July.... October , 1863, January. April. . . . July.... October . 1864, January. April. . . . July October . 1865, January. April. . . . July . . . . October . 1866, January. April. . . . July.... October . Meat: 106 124 88 83 120 112 67 71 98 110 85 102 97 159 101 109 141 190 114 157 191 194 109 138 164 160 126 120 Meat; Pork 101 99 90 113 96 89 61 58 58 64 50 62 76 83 79 72 115 145 170 186 253 205 163 240 195 178 176 184 Oats 115 105 98 83 77 72 65 71 84 83 94 119 147 187 167 171 215 205 219 197 237 180 165 128 109 108 129 124 Eye 110 110 93 88 70 70 52 62 75 79 72 71 88 120 103 122 153 150 206 166 184 129 86 104 103 87 125 138 Tim. Seed 115 116 92 94 156 101 62 66 71 67 66 83 73 94 95 111 106 120 194 224 179 158 160 144 149 146 123 Tobao- 106 98 95 98 99 97 90 96 111 113 122 168 183 228 216 196 212 238 249 257 282 233 195 212 197 186 186 175 Wheat 102 105 102 92 90 92 66 81 84 85 78 85 94 111 99 99 113 121 185 143 169 125 104 149 138 136 170 200 Appendix B 435 TABLE 2 EELATIVB PEICE3 OF VAEIOUS COMMODITIES AT WHOLESALE Beans Beead BUTTBE Date BostoQ Boston Boston Cheese Crackers : Crackers : Crackers: 1 2 Ex. Grade 1860, Jan.... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 April . . 93.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 81.0 110.0 July . . 93.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 81.0 75.0 Oct . . . 120.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.2 100.0 1861, Jan.... 100.0 107.1 117.6 116.7 81.0 100.0 April. . 103.2 107 1 123.5 116.7 85.7 90.0 July . . 120.0 100.0 129.4 116.7 61.9 60,0 Oct . . . 120.0 100 129.5 116.7 64.3 60.0 1862, Jan.... 136.5 107.1 135.3 116.7 90.5 70.0 April . . 116.6 107.1 141.2 120.8 97.6 75.0 July . . 173.3 100.0 147.1 120.8 73.8 65,0 Oct . . . 153.3 100.0 147.1 120.8 90.5 80,0 1863, Jan . . . 145.9 107.1 164.7 141.7 116,7 110.0 April . . 153.3 107.1 152.9 133.3 119.1 145.0 July . . 180.0 107.1 147.1 133.3 92.9 105.0 Oct.. . 129,9 107.1 147.1 129.2 114.3 120.0 1864, Jan... 160.5 185.7 152.9 133.3 145.2 140.0 April . . 146.7 185.7 158.8 137.5 230.9 170.0 July . . 146.7 185.7 158.8 137.5 157.1 150.0 Oct . . . 146.7 185.7 158.8 137.5 202.4 205.0 1865, Jan . . . 173.3 185.7 117.6 116. ■( 250.0 225.0 April . . 142.7 185.7 129.4 116.7 150.0 210,0 July . . 106.7 157.1 129.4 116.7 142.9 125,0 Oct . . . 120.0 157.1 117.6 116,7 204.8 150.0 Coffee : Rio, Fair Eggs Flous: Eye Feuit Fish* Date Apples : Dried Currants : Zante Cod 1860, Jan . . . April. . July . . Oct.... 1861, Jan . . . April. . July . . Oct.... 1862, Jan . . . April . . July . . Oct.... 100.0 115.2 117.4 121.7 100.0 104.3 104.3 134.8 156.5 178.2 182.6 195.7 149.1 88.9 78.8 83.2 103.2 88.9 64.5 74.5 134.8 74,5 68,8 83,2 100,0 100,0 95,0 100,0 92,5 95,0 75,0 87,5 100,0 100,0 87.5 106,3 100.0 90.3 87.1 77.4 77.4 51.6 103.2 77.4 96.8 90.3 71.0 71.0 100.0 104.2 91.7 79.2 75.0 75.0 66.7 158.3 150.0 158.3 166.7 179.2 Feb. 100.0 May 100.0 Aug. 112. 5 Nov. 125.0 Feb. 125.0 May 125.0 Aug. 125.0 Nov. 125.0 Fob. 125.0 May 125.0 AUT..300.0 Nov. 125.0 436 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 2— Continued EELATIVB PEICES OF VAEIOUS COMMODITIES AT WHOLESAIjE Date Coffee : Rio, Fair Boas Ploue : Rye Feuit Apples: Dried Currants : Zante Fish: Cod 1863, Jan. April July Oct.. 1864, Jan . April July Oct . 1865, Jan. April July Oct . 243.5 269.6 252.2 265.2 293.5 339.1 373.9 317.4 378.3 279.6 243.7 243.1 114.7 134.8 111.8 114.7 166.3 120.9 146.2 166.3 252.3 106.1 152.0 163.4 118.8 112.5 106.3 125.0 137.5 137.5 181.3 187.5 212.5 143.8 127.5 168.8 83.9 87.1 90.3 83.9 122.6 125.8 148.4 167.7 200.0 177.4 132.3 167.7 175.0 233.3 250.0 241.7 239.6 275.0 308.3 283.3 341.7 216.7 208.3 233.3 Feb. 150.0 May 125.0 Aug. 150.0 Nov. 150.0 Feb. 200.0 May 175.0 Aug. 200.0 Nov. Feb. 387.5 May 225.0 Aug. 450.0 Nov. 200.0 Meal: Meat Fetjit: Raisins liAED Corn, Yellow, Kiln-Dried Date Beef: Salt Mess Beef: Loins Beef: Ribs 1860, Jan... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Feb. 100.0 100.0 April. . 103.3 97.6 96.4 91.3 May 100.0 93.3 July . . 106.5 114.3 89.2 87.0 Aug. 100.0 93.3 Oct . . . 123.9 116.7 92.8 82.6 Nov. 94.4 93.3 1861, Jan . . . 89.1 95.2 84.3 91.3 Feb. 88.9 93.3 April. . 68.5 85.7 90.4 91.3 May 88.9 100.0 July . . 50.0 76.2 72.5 82.6 Aug. 83.3 93.3 Oct.... 102.2 76.2 73.5 95.7 Nov. 83.3 86.7 1862, Jan . . . 139.1 76.2 78.3 104.3 Feb. 83.3 86.7 April. . 139.1 73.8 75.9 100.0 May 83.3 86.7 July . . 135.9 73.8 71.1 104.3 Aug. 83.3 86.7 Oct . . . 154.3 73.8 94.0 113.0 Nov. 83.3 86.7 1863, Jan... 152.2 88.1 108.4 108.7 Feb. 94.4 93.3 April. . 173.9 100.0 112.0 113.0 May 100.0 100.0 July . . 184.8 89.3 106.0 100.0 Aug. 100.0 100.0 Oct.... 180.4 102.4 115.7 104.3 Nov. 100.0 100.0 1864, Jan... 173.9 114.3 144.6 106.5 Feb. 105.6 106.7 April . . 178.3 126.2 148.2 95.7 May 138.9 146.7 July . . 184.8 157.1 192.8 217.4 Aug. 155. 6 153.3 Oct . . . 173.9 185.7 189.2 130.4 Nov. 150.0 146.7 1865, Jan . . . 254.3 195.2 212.0 165.2 Feb. 194.4 186.7 April . . 215.2 147.6 156.6 191.3 May 194.4 213.3 July . . 250.0 152.4 124.1 113.0 Aug. 177. 8 186.7 Oct . . . 204.3 233.3 122.9 139.1 Nov. 166. 7 166.7 Appendix B 437 TABLE Z — Continued EELATlVifi PEICE9 OF VAEIOHS COMMODITIES AT WHOLESALE Molasses Salt Meat Date P'rto Rico : Best N.Orleans: Prime Ashton's Ashton's Liv., fine Pork: Salt Mess Mutton 1860, Jan . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Feb. 100.0 April . 107.9 90.6 76.9 77.9 109.1 May 120.0 July . 100.0 90.6 89.7 90.9 109.8 Aug. 100.0 Oct .. 105.3 94.3 82.1 83.1 116.7 Nov. 100.0 1861, Jan.. 92.1 69.8 82.1 83.1 101.5 Feb. 110.0 April. 86.8 70.8 82.1 83.1 109.1 May 110.0 July . 71.2 67,9 82.1 83.1 97.0 Aug. 100.0 Oct.. 118.4 103.8 84.6 85.7 90.9 Nov. 90.0 1862, Jan .. 105.3 103.8 87.2 88.3 75.0 Feb. 100.0 April. 100.0 84.9 92.3 93.5 76.5 May 100.0 July . 97.4 92.3 93.5 65.2 Aug. 90.0 Oct .. 131.6 'goie 105.1 106.5 71.2 Nov. 100.0 1863, Jan . . 126.3 105.7 110.3 111.7 86.4 Feb. 100.0 April . 118.4 105.7 143.6 145.5 98.5 May 125.0 July . 139.5 94.3 138.5 140.2 84.8 Aug. 120.0 Oct .. 164.5 113.2 130.8 132.5 86.4 Nov. 125.0 1864, Jan . . 171.1 132.1 143.6 145.5 118.2 Feb. 120.0 April . 223.7 160.4 174.0 176.6 145.5 May 140.0 July . 289.5 217.0 230.8 233.8 275.8 Aug. 160.0 Oct .. 223.7 311.3 256.4 259.7 254.5 Nov. 150.0 1865, Jan.. 289.5 283.0 243.6 246.8 212.1 Feb. 190.0 April . 184.2 207.5 161.5 163.6 162.1 May 190.0 July . 184.2 217.0 166.7 168.8 163.6 Aug. 170.0' Oct .. 250.0 212.8 223.1 213.6 Nov. 170.0 Spi CES Salt: Turk's Island Ship Biscuit Staech : Corn SuGAE : Date Nutmegs Pepper: Whole, Fair, Refining Sumatra 1860, Jan... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOO.Q April . 90.0 100.0 102.4 98.5 100.0 93.1 July . . 97.5 100.0 101.2 98.5 100.0 91.4 Oct . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 101.5 100.0 86.2 1861, Jan... 85.0 112.5 90.5 95.5 100.0 74.1 April . . 95.0 112.5 95.2 101.5 100.0 65.5 July . . 100.0 100.0 97.6 98.5 100.0 63.8 Oct . . . 120.0 100.0 113.1 134.3 94.1 106.9 1862, Jan... 100.0 100.0 142.9 185.1 94.1 106.9 April . . 120.0 100.0 160.7 191.0 94.1 101.7 July . . 150.0 100.0 154.8 209.0 94.1 101.7 Oct . . . 155.0 100.0 161.7 238.8 100.0 120.7 438 HiSTOEY OP THE GREENBACKS TABLE Z—Contin'md EELATrVE PEICES OF VARIOUS COMMODITIES AT WHOLESALE Salt: Turk's Island Ship BiSCDIT Spices Staech: Com Sugab: Fair, Refining Date Nutmegs Pepper : Wliole, Sumatra 1863, Jan.. April. July . Oct.. 1864, Jan. . April . July . Oct.. 1865, Jan.. April . July . Oct .. 150.0 185.0 210.0 220.0 240.0 250.0 300.0 500.0 330.0 250.0 255.0 275.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 193.8 193.8 193.8 193.8 187.5 187.5 137.5 137.5 190.5 208.3 190.5 184.5 214.3 327.4 428.6 381.0 428.6 297.6 273.8 342.7 274.6 322.4 316.4 304.5 346.3 489.6 549.3 417.9 537.3 358.2 346.3 395.2 111.8 117.6 111.8 111.8 129.4 141.2 152.9 164.7 176.5 176.5 152.9 152.9 131.0 134.5 141.4 158.6 165.5 206.9 269.0 220.7 244.8 141.4 158.6 189.6 SUGAE Vegetables Tallow : Prime,City in hhds. Date Havana : Refined, Crushed, Fresh Potatoes : Fresh Potatoes : Calico Granulat'd White (1) White (2) 1860, Jan ... 100.0 100.0 100.0 Feb. 100.0 Jan. 143.8 100.0 April . . 96.9 97.5 102.4 May 100.0 April 137. 5 105.3 July . . 93.0 100.0 97.6 Aug. 128. 6 July 112.5 100.0 Oct . . . 91.4 93.8 97.6 Nov. 100.0 Oct. 100.0 100.0 1861, Jan . . . 72.7 83.8 82.9 Feb. 100.0 Jan. 112.5 100.0 April . . 67.2 80.0 95.1 May 128.6 April 118. 8 94.7 July . . 64.1 77.5 78.0 Aug. 114. 3 July 143.8 94.7 Oct . . . 100.0 108.8 82.9 Nov. 114. 3 Oct. 106.3 105.3 1862, Jan... 97.7 110.0 92.7 Feb. 128.6 Jan. 112.5 131.6 April. . 96.9 102.5 87.8 May 128.6 April 125.0 126.3 July . . 96.9 105.0 92.7 Aug. 100.0 July 106.3 131.6 Oct . . . 118.8 128.8 109.8 Nov. 128. 6 Oct. 106.3 179.0 1863, Jan... 121.1 132.5 101.2 Feb. 121.4 Jan. 112.5 210.5 April . . 126.6 145.0 112.2 May 107.1 April 131. 3 July . . 134.4 147.5 109.8 Aug. 128. 6 July 131.3 Oct . . . 145.3 146.3 109.8 Nov. 142. 9 Oct. 1V5.0 1864, Jan . . . 160.9 168.8 125.6 Feb. 128.6 Jan. 156.3 252.6 April. . 195.3 178.8 124.4 May 214. 3 April 231. 3 263.2 July . . 271.9 300.0 165.8 Aug. 342. 8 July 287.5 421.1 Oct . . . 231.3 255.0 143.2 Nov. 171. 4 Oct. 200.0 357.9 1865, Jan . . . 239.1 285.0 175.6 Feb. 242. 8 Jan. 237.5 389.5 April. . 150.0 180.0 107.3 May 142.9 April 212. 5 210.5 July . . 154.7 195.0 102.4 Aug. 142. 9 July 112.5 289.5 Oct . . . 176.6 202.5 141.4 Nov. 157.1 Oct. 193.8 315.8 Appendix B 439 TABLE Z — Continued KBIiATIVB PBICES OF VAEIOUa COMMODITIES AT WHOLESALE Date Carpets Cotton : Denims Dkil- LINGS : Upland 30-inch Brussels Ingrain Wilton Middling Pepperell 1860, Jan . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 April. . 96.2 100.3 100.0 101.1 103.5 97.2 July . . 92.3 99.3 97.3 97.7 103.5 100.0 Oct . . . 92.3 98.0 97.3 97.7 103,5 100.0 1861, Jan . . . 92.3 101.4 97.3 109.1 103,5 97.2 April . 96.2 95.0 100.0 117,0 103.5 97.2 July . . 96.2 95,1 100,0 134.1 103.5 97.2 Oct . . . 96.2 92.6 100,0 195.5 105.2 116.8 1862, Jan... 100.0 106.6 105.4 327.3 124.1 146 April. . 100.0 109.1 105.4 250.0 136.2 146,0 July . . 107.7 119.3 108.1 336.4 137.9 157.2 Oct . . . 115.4 123.4 116.2 509.1 210.3 292.0 1863, Jan . . . 134.6 149.5 132.4 613.6 258.6 308.8 April. . 165.4 174.5 151.4 663.6 393.0 July . . 153.8 166.0 151.4 627.3 308.8 Oct . . . 146.2 154.9 143.2 768.2 404.3 1864, Jan . . . 165.4 179.4 162.2 736.4 379.3 449.2 April.. 173.1 196.7 173.0 690.9 396.6 449.2 July . . 269.2 299,3 270.3 1400.0 425.8 701.8 Oct . . . 269.2 250.9 270.3 1090.9 606.9 729.9 1865, Jan . . . 269.2 260.6 270.3 1090.9 463.8 673.8 April. . 192.3 208,2 202.7 318.2 412.1 336.9 July . . 192.3 219.9 202.7 454.6 424.1 336.9 Oct . . . 211,5 241.2 216.2 400.0 455.2 404.3 Leathee ; Harness Peint Cloths Sheet- ings: Brown, 4-4, Atlantic A Shiet- INGS: Bleached, 4^4, N. y. MiUs Silk : Date 28-inch, 7 yds. to lb. Standard 28-inch, 64X64. Metacomet Raw Italian 1860, Jan . . . April . . July . . Oct . . . 1861, Jan . . . April. . July . . Oct 1862, Jan ! ! ! April . . July . . Oct . , , 100.0 100.0 102.9 100.0 94.3 88.6 85.7 100.0 94.3 94.3 91.4 102.9 100.0 97.8 100.0 97.8 84.4 77.8 80.0 106.7 160.0 128.9 153.3 220.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 86.0 79.1 76.7 104.7 107.0 125.6 155.8 251.1 100.0 102,9 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 105.8 135.1 164.5 164.5 188.0 296.9 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 96.8 96.8 96.8 103.2 109.7 116.1 129.0 167.5 100.0 100.0 105,6 100,0 100,0 83.3 77.8 72.2 72,2 72,2 83,3 80.6 440 History of the Geeenbaoks TABLE 2 — Continued EBLATIVE PEI0E3 OF VAEIOnS COMMODITIES AT WHOLESALE Pkint Cloths Sheet- Shiet- Silk: Leather : Date Harness 28 inch, 7 yds. to lb.. Standard. 28 inch, 64 X 64, Meta comet Brown, 4-4, Atlantic A Bleached, 4-4, N. Y. Mills Raw Italian 1863, Jan. . . 108.6 253.3 279.1 356.3 209.7 75.0 April. . 128.6 257.8 297.7 445.4 209.7 72.2 July.. 128.6 257.8 260.2 415.6 232.3 66.7 Oct... 131.4 280.0 295.3 445.4 237.1 66.7 1864, Jan... 142.9 302.2 316.3 504.6 266.6 69.4 April. . 154 3 288.9 300.0 475.0 283.8 75.0 July.. 165.7 524.4 593.0 831.3 467.7 88.9 Oct... 171.4 568.9 480.0 682.8 307.3 94.4 1865, Jan... 171.4 480.0 537.2 712.5 411.3 88.9 April. . 165.7 177.8 188.4 463.1 270.9 100.0 July . . 137.1 337.8 360.5 386.0 290.3 111.1 Oct... 151.4 484.4 453.5 397.8 354.8 100.0 Date Tickings Alcohol Alum Bichrom. of Potash Blue Vitriol Brimstone 1860, Jan . April July. Oct.. 1861, Jan. . April July. Oct.. 1862, Jan. . April July. Oct.. 1863, Jan.. April July. Oct.. 1864, Jan.. April July. Oct.. 1865, Jan. . April July. Oct.. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.6 95.6 98.5 101.5 122.1 150.0 136.8 211.8 266.2 416.2 413.2 617.6 451.5 411.8 469.2 472.1 100.0 85.2 81.5 85.2 74.1 66.7 63.0 74.1 74.1 88.9 107.4 122.2 142.6 174.1 161.1 192.6 342.6 379.6 657.4 638.9 814.8 796.3 759.3 833.3 100.0 105.6 100.0 100.0 94. 94. 94. 94. 94. 100.0 100.0 133.3 155.6 166.7 166.7 133.3 161.1 161.1 200.0 266.7 255.6 222.2 188.9 183.3 100.0 95.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.2 100.0 95.2 97.6 95.2 104.8 114.3 114.3 107.1 114.3 119.0 133.3 133.3 142.9 133.3 104.8 104.8 100.0 97.4 97.4 94.7 94.7 86.8 89.5 94.7 94.7 94.7 94.7 100.0 121.1 157.9 134.2 142. 142. 168. 189. 221. 192.1 178.9 147.4 142.1 100.0 100.0 122.2 128.9 133.3 95.6 88.9 88.9 133.3 95.6 97.8 106.7 111.1 122.2 111.1 116.7 127.8 1.31.1 188.9 166.7 222.2 200.0 138.9 133.3 Appendix B 441 TABLE 2 — Continued EELATIVE PRICES OF VAKIOUS COMMODITIES AT WHOLESALE Date Castor Oil Copperas Flax Seed Linseed Oil Mercury Muriatic Acid 1860, Jan... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 April. . lOi.8 125.0 98.2 105.3 100.0 100.0 July . . 100.0 125.0 103.1 103.5 100.0 100.0 Oct... 104.8 125.0 101.2 101.8 100.0 100.0 1861, Jan... 95.2 125.0 89.0 187.7 100.0 100.0 April.. 85.7 125.0 85.8 105.3 100.0 100.0 July . . 85.7 125.0 92.0 94.7 100.0 100.0 Oct . . . 102.9 112.5 92.0 103.5 81.8 100.0 1862, Jan... 119.1 150.0 110.4 149.1 81.8 116.7 April. . 152.4 125.0 135.0 149.1 81.8 116.7 July . . 150.5 125.0 107.4 150.9 81.8 116.7 Oct... 145.7 150.0 116.6 150.9 109.1 116.7 1863, Jan... 190.5 200.0 171.8 219.3 127.3 100.0 April. . 214.3 200.0 245.4 298.2 127.3 100.0 July . . 190.5 175.0 147.3 210.5 127.3 100.0 Oct. . . 176.2 150.0 147.3 236.8 141.8 100.0 1864, Jan... 190.5 175.0 184.0 250.9 150.9 133.3 April.. 195.2 175.0 214.7 280.7 200.0 133.3 July . . 261.9 187.5 220.9 298.2 281.8 133.3 Oct... 333.3 250.0 199.4 245.6 345.5 133.3 1865, Jan... 319.1 237.5 230.1 271.9 250.9 150.0 April. . 342.9 200.0 168.7 245.6 181.8 150.0 July . . 323.8 150.0 116.6 207.0 96.4 150.0 Oct . . . 314.3 250.0 177.9 271.9 96.4 150.0 Date Opium Oxide of Zinc Quicksilv'r Quinine Soda Ash Sugar of Lead: Brown 1860, Jan... 100.0 111.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 April. . 121.7 111.1 112.3 122.7 100.0 93.3 July . . 95.7 100.0 113.3 136.4 94.7 93.3 Oct . . . 104.3 100.0 113.8 159.1 89.5 100.0 1861, Jan... 82.6 100.0 113.3 154.5 89,5 100.0 April. . 91.3 100.0 108.7 172.7 89.5 93.3 July . . 95.7 100.0 98.5 78.9 93.3 Oct . . . 100.0 100.0 96.4 190.9 105.5 93.3 1862, Jan... 87.0 100.0 96.4 227.3 121.1 126.7 April.. 87.0 100.0 88.2 204.5 111.1 113.3 July . . 108.7 100.0 114.8 236.4 105.5 113.3 Oct . . . 125.2 100.0 129.2 259.1 115.8 126.7 442 HiSTOKY OF THE GREENBACKS TABLE 2 — Con* 1863 1864 1865 per lb. 0.06 100 117 150 167 167 250 .08 100 113 125 162 175 .06 ioo 100 150 167 250 250 .07 100 143 214 214 214 214 .06 100 100 133 208 a33 250 .08 100 100 125 125 125 125 .0625 100 160 192 240 288 320 .10 100 100 150 200 200 120 .05 100 200 240 240 250 Conn. Pa.... Md. .. W.Va Ohio. Ohio . Ohio. Ind. .. la. . . . Jewett City Philadelphia Baltimore New Cumberland Canton Springfield Zanesville Lawrenceburg . . . Cedar Rapids 250 175 233 214 208 125 320 120 250 POTATOES Mass. Conn. Pa.... W.Va Ohio. Ohio. Ind... la. . . . Boston Jewett City Philadelphia New Cumberland Springfield Zanesville Lawrenceburg . . . Cedar Rapids per bu. 1.02% 0.50 .60 .35 .30 .60 .80 .20 100 100 ioo 100 100 100 81 90 100 143 133 83 94 100 94 110 100 214 133 83 125 175 93 153 100 180 125 133 214 214 167 250 100 133 150 94 200 200 117 160 150 214 283 167 94 200 117 120 167 214 333 167 188 350 RELATIVE PRICES OF FUEL AT RETAIL— OIL State Town Initial Price per Gal I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Conn Conn N. Y Pa Pa W.Va . . . Ohio .... Ohio .... Ill Jewett City New Haven Watertown Norristown Philadelphia New Cumberland Canton Zanesville Rock Island 1.00 1.00 1.12 0.70 .25 .30 .50 .60 .35 100 100 ioo ioo 100 100 75 75 100 100 100 100 80 100 100 75 75 45 100 100 133 80 100 171 75 85 54 100 400 133 100 100 286 92 75 73 171 400 167 120 100 286 100 120 107 171 400 167 100 100 229 90 90 67 143 320 133 80 117 171 466 HiSTOKY OF THE GREENBACKS TABLE i— Continued. RELATIVE PKICE9 OP FUEL AT BETAIL — COAL : ANTHEACITE State Town Initial Price per Ton 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Mass Mass Pa Pa Pa Boston(l) Boston (2) Philadelphia (1) . Philadelphia (2) . Reading 6.00 5.75 5.00 3.41 2.50 3.00 100 100 ioo 98 121 100 100 100 100 117 117 100 123 100 133 175 173 120 186 180 167 217 220 130 277 220 167 217 229 140 281 260 167 204 192 160 218 260 Ohio .... Zanesville 167 COAL : BITUMINOUS W.Va.. Ohio . . . , Ohio . . . Ohio . . . Indiana Illinois . Illinois . New Cumberland Canton Springfield Zanesville Lawrenceburg. . . Belleville Rock Island 1.40 100 171 179 214 214 196 2.00 100 88 100 175 175 150 3.50 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 200 200 200 3.50 100 93 114 114 129 114 1.82 100 171 171 3.12 100 80 96 104 104 104 196 150 100 200 107 171 104 WOOD : HABD Mass . . . Mass . . . Conn . . Conn . . . Pa W.Va... Ohio .... Ohio .... Ohio .... Indiana . Illinois,. . Iowa Missouri. Boston (1) . . . . Boston (2) . . . . Danielsonville Jewett City . . Reading New Cumberland Canton Springfield Zanesville Lawrenceburg. . Rock Island .... Cedar Rapids . . . Pilot Knob PerC'd 6.50 100 150 169 200 200 6.50 100 i23 183 164 192 195 4.00 100 100 100 100 119 138 3.50 10(J 100 100 114 114 157 4.00 100 100 125 125 150 1.75 100 100 114 143 143 143 2.50 100 80 100 liO 120 180 3.00 100 92 92 100 133 167 1.50 100 1.33 133 150 183 200 4.00 100 100 138 150 150 138 4.50 100 89 133 144 144 133 2.50 100 100 120 1-20 200 2.50 100 120 no 160 160 160 231 228 125 143 150 143 180 167 200 125 133 200 160 WOOD : PINE Mass . . . Mass . . . Conn . . W. Va. . Ohio . . . Illinois . Boston (1) Boston (2) . . . . Danielsonville New Cumberland Zanesville . . Rock Island. 4.50 100 153 178 233 211 4.50 100 133 154 185 230 207 3.50 100 100 100 100 121 143 1.50 100 117 133 150 150 150 1.00 100 175 175 200 225 250 1.00 100 150 200 200 150 267 267 129 150 275 150 Appendix B 467 TABLE i—Contimied EELATIVE PEICE3 OF MEN'S HEAVY BOOTS, AT BETAII, State Town Initial Price :^afr 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 2.50 100 120 140 150 160 3.0O 100 9S 92 100 117 133 3.25 100 108 108 123 123 3.. 50 100 100 114 143 171 2.50 100 100 115 135 150 160 3.50 100 100 100 129 200 171 3.50 100 120 171 171 171 186 4.0O 100 113 125 138 150 150 3.00 100 100 133 200 267 2(X) 6.00 100 67 83 100 100 117 3.00 100 108 142 158 183 183 3 50 100 100 11 + 114 143 143 5 00 100 100 100 100 120 120 3.00 100 100 117 150 150 3.50 IOO 114 129 157 1.57 4.00 100 100 125 150 3.00 100 100 117 133 167 167 3 125 100 100 124 144 160 160 4.00 100 150 150 169 181 181 3.00 100 150 2(K) 267 233 4.50 100 100 100 HI 111 111 3.50 100 71 171 2.50 100 110 120 140 160 160 2.00 100 8H 113 150 175 200 3.50 100 157 157 J 43 143 4,00 ioo 100 113 125 125 125 2.. 50 101) 120 140 160 160 160 1866 Conn . Conn . Conn . N. Y. . N. J.. Pa.... W. Va W. Va Ohio . . Ohio . . Ohio Ohio . . Ind ... Ind... Ind... Ind ... Ind... Ind... Ind... Ind... Ill .... 111.... Ill .... Ill .... Iowa . Mo ... Mo ... Ansonia Jewett City Waterbury Homer Camden Sharon New Cumberland Wheeling Canton Cincinnati Ravenna Zanesville Aurora Evansville Port Wayne LaFayette New Albany (1).. New Albany (2).. Terre Haute Vincennes Belleville (1) Belleville (2) Bloomin^ton Springfield Cedar Rapids Pilot Knob St. Louis 180 142 123 157 155 143 20O 150 167 117 183 171 100 133 157 150 133 160 181 217 111 157 160 225 143 100 140 BELATrVE KENT OF HOUSES PER MONTH — FOUE BOOMS State Town Initial Rent per Month 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1867 1 Mass . Conn. N. J.. Pa... W. Va Ohio. Ohio. Ohio. Ohio. Ky... Ind... Ind . . . Ind . . . Ind . . . m.... 111... Iowa . Mo... Mo ... Boston Jewett City Camden Philadelphia New Cumberland Canton Cincinnati Springfield Zanesville Louisville Indianapolis LaFayette Lawrenceburg . . . Terre Haute Bloomington Rock Island Cedar Rapids Pilot Knob St. Louis 5.00 2.00 6.50 6.00 4.00 6.25 6.00 5.00 7.00 12.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 140 100 115 200 125 200 100 123 200 100 96 83 120 143 167 143 142 129 175 138 125 130 80 180 468 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS TABLE i — Continued EELATIVE EBNT OP HOnSES PEE MONTH — SIX OK SEVEN BOOMS State Town Num- ber of Eooms Initial Rent per Month 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1886 1867 1868 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 6,1st 6, 2d 6 .6 6 6 6 6 6 6 $9.00 10.00 3.00 8.00 3.42 ■•9.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 8.00 9 00., 15. 00^ 8.00 18.00 10.00 10.00 6.00 r6.oo 15.00 100 luO 100 100 100 ioo ioo 100 100 100 ioo IOO ioo 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 71 IOO 110 100 100 100 80 100 lUO 100 100 HI 100 133 114 86 100 100 133 125 100 125 100 100 100 80 100 100 100 100 117 100 133 129 100 1.50 111 167 125 100 125 120 100 100 111 133 140 100 100 129 133 133 143 114 313 111 233 138 100 125 120 100 117 111 13.3 140 100 125 129 167 133 143 114 313 111 233 138 113 125 120 117 117 111 133 140 100 125 129 200 133 143 114 313 111 233 138 125 125 120 117 117 133 133 140 100 150 129 200 133 143 114 250 122 167 150 ISf 125 130 117 125 133 189 Mass Conn N. J Pa Boston Jewett City Camden Hokendauqua . . . PhiladelpKa New Cumberland 200 100 188 129 Pa ?00 W. Va Ohio. 117 143 Ohio Ohio Ohio Ky Canton Cincinnati Zanesville Lionisville Indianapolis La Fayette Lawrenceburg . . . Bloomington Eock Island Cedar Rapids — 114 250 122 167 Ind.... Ind Ind ni 150 lU 125 130 111.. . 117 la Mo 125 133 KBLATIVE PEICE OF BOAED PEE WEEK — FOE MEN State Town Initial Price Week 1860 1861 1862 1803 1864 1865 1866 Conn Pa Jewett City $2.00 3.00 2.50 1.50 2.50 1.75 2.50 2.75 4.00 2.00 3.50 3.50 5.00 2.. 50 2.50 3.U0 100 ioo 100 100 100 100 100 100 ioo ioo 100 100 100 133 120 114 120 109 100 100 IOO 100 100 100 100 117 100 117 100 167 180 114 120 109 100 100 114 114 100 100 100 133 100 117 160 167 180 171 160 127 125 150 128 128 100 100 100 150 150 1 3 200 167 180 229 200 127 175 150 143 143 100 100 120 150 150 167 200 167 180 229 200 145 175 150 143 143 100 120 120 150 175 167 Pa 200 W. Va Ohio. New Cumberland — 167 160 Ohio. 229 180 145 Ky Ind 175 150 Ind Ind Ill Indianapolis Lawrenceburg 143 128 IOO 111 120 la Mo . Cedar Eapids 120 117 FOE WOMEN Conn, Pa... W.X: Ohio. Ohio. Ohio. Ohio. Ky... Ind.. 111... 111... la... Mo.. Jewett City Philadelphia New Cumberland Canton Cincinnati Springfield Zanesville Louisville Indianapolis Belleville Rock Island Cedar Rapids Pilot Knob $1.50 100 100 100 100 133 133 1.75 100 114 129 143 171 1 25 100 140 160 160 160 160 2.50 100 120 180 180 180 180 1.50 100 100 100 167 •m 233 2.50 100 120 120 160 200 200 2.00 100 13X 138 150 150 175 3.00 100 100 100 133 167 167 3.00 100 133 133 133 133 4.00 100 1(K) 100 100 100 2.00 100 100 100 100 125 2.00 100 100 100 1.50 150 3.00 100 117 133 150 150 150 167 171 160 160 233 180 175 167 133 100 125 150 117 Appendix B 469 TABLE 5 COMPARISON OP THE RELATIVE PRICES OF TWENTY-THREE COMMODITIES AT WHOLESALE ANB AT RETAIL .DM 1860 1861 1862 1864 1865 1866 Sheetings ; brown, 4r-l, Atlantic A. . . Sheetings: brown, 4r-4, Atlantic A.. . Shirtings: bleached, 4-4, N. Y. Mills, Shirtings: bleached, 4-4, N. Y. Mills.. Tickings : Amoskeag, A.C.A Tickings : Amoskeag, A.C.A Flour : Eye Flour: Eye Meal : corn, yellow, kiln-dried Meal : corn, yellow, kiln-dried Beans Beans Eice : Carolina prime Eice : Carolina prime Sugar: Havana brown., Sugar : good brown Molasses : N. O. prime Molasses : N, O. prime Molasses : Porto Eico, best Molasses : Porto Eico, best Starch: ordinary laundry Starch : ordinary laundry Butter Butter Cheese Cheese Eggs Eggs Mackerel : salt, shore. No. 1 Mackerel : pickled. No. 1 Beef Beef Mutton Mutton Pork: hams, sugar-cured Pork : hams, smoked Pork: bacon, clear Pork : bacon, clear Pork : salt mess Pork : corned or salted Lard Lard Coal : anthracite, stove Coal : anthracite, stove Coal : bituminous Coal: bituminous Average of relative prices Average of relative prices Wholesale Eetail Wholesa' Eetail . . Wholesa' Eetail . Wholesa' Eetail . Wholesa' Eetail .. Wholesa! Eetail . . Wholesa' Eetail . Wholesa' Eetail Wholesa] Eetail Wholesal Eetail Wholesa' Eetail Wholesa] Eetail Wholesa] Eetail . . Wholesa] EetaQ Wholesa] Eetail Wholesa] Eetail.. Wholesa] Eetail Wholesa] Eetail . . Wholesa] Eetail . Wholesa] Eetail . Wholesa] Eetail . Wholesa] Eetail . Wholesa] Eetail . Wholesa] Eetail 1 n 1 13 1 12 1 8 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 11 1 6 1 9 1 7 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 7 3 35 1 17 1 9 1 7 1 6 2 9 1 6 1 7 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 109 136 98 133 98 130 70 102 66 111 109 104 114 113 80 102 83 104 89 114 92 103 82 93 81 90 83 92 53 93 95 108 98 109 80 104 6i 104 92 114 81 100 101 103 95 105 88 107 199 233 131 207 151 187 100 108 84 118 143 122 163 169 108 123 99 144 105 132 92 116 99 110 75 97 90 103 52 111 98 112 93 111 107 107 56 116 66 116 69 106 94 116 130 116 105 129 407 352 222 335 237 117 153 91 143 150 142 610 469 331 511 482 .33.5 163 198 178 174 148 156 187 138 151 112 192 133 192 115 140 124 129 125 113 119 122 88 125 107 129 112 122 195 119 60 ]?39 82 i27 89 118 154 i6-7 150 161 138 i65 220 225 213 219 238 220 242 169 165 206 i<9S 173 153 150 i33 188 i53 146 158 136 i35 257 154 119 i79 182 131 146 242 205 191 156 221 2i]? 480 405 332 447 451 324 165 208 163 :?90 133 /56 244 217 189 20i 251 235 220 227 169 ]r84 209 218 184 i75 168 167 138 i49 184 i67 171 158 288 ]?85 170 178 173 ]r9J 179 ]?69 232 216 211 ]r48 222 214 328 302 366 396 271 142 205 122 i83 151 160 273 2i]? 153 212 236 235 185 220 154 180 237 2i5 190 180 163 ]?63 142 i52 191 167 160 /5S 298 182 185 W8 172 ]?97 172 ^67 246 200 178 147 206 202 APPENDIX C Kelativb Wages TABLE 1 WAGE-SERIES PEOM TABLE XH Or THE ALDBIOH EEPOETl- AGKICULTUKAIi IMPLEMENTS 1. Massacliiisetts FOKEMEN WOODWOEK'S Laboeees Machinists Paintees Woodwoek's Sex M. M. M. M. M. Initial wage per day — $1.64 $1.00 $1,665 $1.25 $1,333 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan... July.. 1861, Jan... July.. 1862, Jan... July . . 1863, Jan... July . . 1864, Jan... July.. 1865, Jan... July.. 1866, Jan... July.. 100 100 100 99 99 98 108 112 122 152 152 175 175 183 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 5 2 3 3 7 6 5 100 100 100 100 88 100 90 112 117 142 150 161 163 169 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 6 5 100 100 108 108 100 84 113 101 108 123 125 138 131 134 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 1 100 100 100 100 100 '89 106 113 127 124 120 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 4 3 4 4 5 5 100 103 103 94 113 113 113 119 124 161 169 189 191 179 1 In the following tables the series of relative wages from the "exhibits" of the Aldrich Beport^ used in chap, v of Part II, are reproduced in full. As in the exhibits, the series are classified by establishments, and the establishments by industries. To facilitate references, the same order of arrangement is followed and the number assigned to each establishment in the exhibits and the state in which it is located are given. A change has been made, however, in the arrangement of the series by group- ing the foremen, overseers, etc., in any establishment at the beginning and the females at the end. The initial wage from which variations are computed and the number of employees are given because they were made use of in preparing certain of the tables in the text. 470 Appendix 471 TABLE 1 — Contimied WAGB-SEBIES FBOM TABLE XH OF THE AZiDBlGH BEPOET- 2 New York ALE, BBEB, AND POBTBB FOKEMEN Laboeebs Beewees COOPEES Laboeebs Teamsteks Sex M. M. M. M. M. Initial wage per day.... 11.34 16.39 $1,505 $0.85 $1.44 No. Kel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan . July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 115 124 129 136 130 132 132 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1. 2 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 100 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 250 250 8 8 8 10 7 6 7 8 6 7 5 4 5 5 100 101 101 100 101 101 101 103 125 131 127 148 146 143 26 28 32 30 26 33 26 27 29 28 23 18 30 21 100 99 99 100 99 101 102 114 134 147 151 149 154 152 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 4Md. BOOKS AND NEWSPAPEE3 5 N. Y. 5 N. Y. 5 N. Y. 5N. Y. 5N. Y. Peintebs : Bk. and Job FOEEMEN COMPS. POEEMEN Pbessmen Caepent's COMPOSI- T0E3 COMPS. Leaenebs Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day .. $1,665 $2.00 $2.00 $1,315 $1,665 $0,695 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 8 8 6 6 6 8 6 9 12 12 12 12 ioo 100 100 100 100 100 120 150 180 180 180 180 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 '2 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 i38 150 150 150 150 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 'i 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 iss 133 142 150 150 2 2 1 '2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 95 '95 95 102 102 102 127 127 127 140 ... 17 11 20 17 16 18 21 23 27 25 23 26 100 100 99 99 99 99 99 iso 150 150 150 150 10 7 8 6 5 7 5 '4 4 4 5 3 100 81 76 72 81 88 94 '99 108 105 120 132 472 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEKIES FKOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDEIOH KEPOET — BOOKS AND NBWSPAPEES 5 New York Machin'ts FEES3MEN Peesseoom Hands POETEES FOLDEBS Peesseoom: Hands Sex M. M. M. M. F. F. Init. wage per day . . $1,705 $1,665 $0,612 $0,915 $0.47 $0,465 No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 3 ! 3 1 2 3 2 3 2 100 95 95 95 94 88 92 i37 161 156 153 1 2 2 2 2 2 '2 1 3 3 3 100 ioo 100 100 100 100 150 150 133 130 130 3 1 3 4 5 3 2 ■4 5 4 5 5 100 41 105 104 113 95 126 ii9 139 133 134 115 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 '5 5 4 5 3 100 109 115 103 103 109 119 iss 144 146 144 140 16 7 16 15 11 12 11 26 41 30 30 22 100 99 91 94 100 105 104 ii9 110 117 119 134 6 5 8 10 7 9 9 ii 14 13 12 13 100 104 97 98 84 95 103 isi 133 140 140 145 6 New York Foremen compositoes COMPOSITOES COMPOSITOES Appeentices Feessmen Peess- feedees Sex M. M. M. M. F. Initial wage per day . . . $2.50 $1,835 $0,755 $2,335 $0.33 No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan.. July. 1861, Jan. . July. 1862, Jan.. July. 1863, Jan.. July. 1864, Jan.. July. 1865, Jan.. July. 1866, Jan.. July. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 117 129 129 129 129 2 2 3 4 6 6 6 6 9 8 11 8 10 10 100 104 108 104 106 104 107 111 114 117 138 136 134 134 9 9 8 7 7 8 6 6 2 3 4 3 4 3 100 101 88 83 93 91 89 89 121 99 98 121 97 103 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 i 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 ioo 152 152 152 152 152 164 174 189 202 202 Appendix C 473 TABLE 1— Continued WAGE-SEEIES FROM TABLE XII OF THE AIiDBICH EEPOET— BUILDING TEADES 7 Conn. 8 Conn. 8 Conn. 9 Conn. 9 Conn. 10 Md. Caepent's Caepent's Caepent'9 HELPEE3 Hod Caeeiees Masons Paintees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day .. $1.50 $1,715 $1.00 $0.80 $1,765 $1.75 No. Eel. Wages No. Bel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 4 6 3 4 3 3 2 1 3 4 4 4 100 117 89 100 89 100 100 117 117 iso 183 171 188 9 10 9 6 1 7 20 19 23 10 100 99 91 87 87 89 ii2 111 131 127 1 i 2 'i 2 6 9 6 100 i38 132 iM i25 125 157 146 8 17 12 40 15 9 10 7 i7 '5 is 100 137 125 125 125 125 188 202 i99 208 208 6 11 12 1 9 9 7 4 2i '7 io 100 116 105 113 113 113 158 131 iio 160 lib 2 4 2 1 1 6 1 8 2 9 5 9 5 11 100 100 86 86 86 86 86 100 114 143 143 143 143 143 12 Massachusetts • Foeemen Beiokl'es Foeemen Masons Beicel'ss Beickl'bs Helpebs Masons Masons' Helpers Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day .. $2.50 $2.50 $1,765 $1.12 $1,875 $1,055 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 i 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 120 ieo 160 j 100 100 100 120 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 160 160 160 9 12 12 28 10 11 4 17 15 19 9 20 15 13 100 86 107 101 106 105 110 105 120 131 139 146 147 167 5 6 12 35 13 14 9 14 11 13 9 18 11 11 100 91 100 100 101 110 109 108 122 1.34 134 134 156 156 5 11 11 13 10 13 4 9 7 19 7 8 13 15 100 85 101 96 84 105 93 102 114 102 116 137 143 167 9 15 9 15 20 17 6 16 11 8 9 8 13 21 100 100 85 92 97 110 118 114 130 142 142 142 160 166 474 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 1— Continued WAOE-SEBIES TEOM TABI/B XH OF THE ALDKICH KEPOET— BUILDING TEADES 13 Mass. 13 Mass. 13 Mass. 13 Mass. 13 Mass. UMass. Foremen Caepent's' FOEEMEN Paintees Caepent's Caepent's' Helfees Paintees Stm. & Gas FiTTEES Sex M. M. M. M. M, M. Init. wage per day.. $1.67 $1.50 $1,425 $0.83 81.165 $1,875 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 100 100 100 100 120 105 120 120 135 135 135 150 165 195 1 1 1 1 1 'i 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 100 100 iii 111 117 133 150 167 183 7 17 14 21 18 18 20 23 15 20 17 19 30 24 100 93 93 83 90 95 99 106 110 119 126 147 152 167 1 4 3 3 3 3 5 4 6 3 3 5 6 100 100 100 100 '90 120 120 120 120 151 151 181 211 6 6 6 4 4 4 6 6 7 20 3 5 15 4 100 102 101 99 107 103 119 107 110 130 150 172 152 182 4 5 4 'i 3 2 3 6 4 4 6 5 100 90 105 '93 iii 110 115 106 123 120 113 120 14 Mass. 15 Mass. 16 N. J. 18 N. J. 16 N. J. n N. y. St'm & Gas Fitters' Helpers Painters House Plumbees Laborers Tinsmiths Caepent's Sex M. M. M. M. M. .M. Init. wage per day . . $1,195 $1.10 $2.00 $1.18 $1.52 $1,185 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1859, July 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 i '2 i 1 1 3 3 4 2 3 100 '84 iio ios 42 112 77 63 79 84 73 '5 10 5 17 3 6 5 1 2 7 5' 9 4 10 ioo 101 103 101 114 102 116 102 136 175 164 195 227 198 i 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 ioo 100 100 100 81 84 94 100 113 125 125 150 150 139 '3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 5 2 ioo 100 85 85 92 85 95 97 97 117 123 153 151 155 's 8 6 5 3 3 3 2 4 4 3 3 5 5 ioo 104 108 110 113 113 115 107 132 122 128 148 148 155 '2 5 5 5 3 6 5 10 9 14 12 12 10 10 ioo 110 112 122 127 127 133 152 152 169 183 174 186 196 1 Hours reduced January, 1865, from 13 to 10. Appendix C 475 TABLE 1— Continued WAGB-SBEIBS FBOU TABLB xn OF THB ALDBICH EBPOET— BUILDING TBADBS n N. Y. 17 N. Y. 17 N. Y. 17 N. Y. 18 N. Y. 19 N. Y. Cabpent's Appeen. Caepbnt's' Helpers Laboebes Tbamstbes Paintees Caepbnt's Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Inlt. wage per day.. $.375 $1.00 $0.88 $0.75 $2.00 $2.00 No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1859, Jan. 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 'i 5 4 1 1 1 3 4 4 2 i ioo 123 147 88 112 100 96 133 139 183 267 'i 3 3 4 5 8 5 I 'i 1 'i ioo 79 79 92 100 111 113 125 125 iso 150 150 'i 1 3 3 1 2 '2 1 'i 2 ioo 100 99 109 142 142 ii4 114 i42 156 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 ioo 100 100 133 167 167 233 233 233 233 233 i5 60 8 40 8 45 10 40 7 45 12 45 10 45 ioo 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 113 150 150 175 175 175 30 65 30 70 15 40 12 60 20 65 25 50 40 80 ioo 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 150 150 163 175 175 20N.Y. 21 N. Y. 22 N. Y. 22 N. Y. 22 N. Y. 23 N. Y. Flumbbes EOOPEES Sl.&M't'l Beickl'es Beickl'es' Hblpbbs Plast'e's Paintees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,875 $1.25 $2.00 $1.25 $2.00 $1,915 Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Mo. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages Mo. Wages Mo. Wages 1860, Jan. 4 100 2 100 8 100 12 100 8 100 July 4 100 6 125 8 100 10 100 8 100 3 100 1861, Jan. 4 100 3 120 7 100 10 100 7 100 July 4 100 4 120 7 100 10 100 7 100 5 93 1862, Jan. 5 101 2 160 5 113 8 100 5 100 July 5 107 3 160 5 113 8 100 5 113 2 91 1863, Jan. 10 107 3 240 4 125 6 130 4 125 July 12 133 6 240 5 125 6 130 5 125 3 113 1864, Jan. 4 160 5 280 9 125 10 180 9 125 , July 4 187 8 280 9 150 10 180 9 150 4 150 1865, Jan. 4 187 2 320 5 150 3 180 5 150 . > . July 4 187 5 320 5 150 4 180 5 150 2 185 1866, Jan. 6 195 2 280 5 175 10 180 5 175 July 6 195 6 280 5 200 10 200 5 200 4 iss 476 History of the Geeenbaoks TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SBKIEB FBOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH KEPOKT— BtTILDINa TBADES 24 N. Y. 26 Pa. 26 Pa. 27 Pa. 28 Pa. 29 Pa. EOOFEES Beicttt.ay's Beicklak's Helpees Caepent's Caepent's Plast'e's Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,835 $2.00 $1.12 $1.75 $1.75 $1,665 No. Bel. Wages No. Kel. Wages No. Kel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Hel. Wages No. 9 13 9 16 10 12 8 12 10 14 10 14 8 10 Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 2 3 2 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 100 91 82 82 78 82 84 105 113 131 150 150 163 163 6 20 20 6 20 io 35 10 30 12 40 100 100 ioo 113 113 i25 125 150 150 150 150 3 10 io 3 10 io 18 5 15 12 20 100 100 ii2 112 112 134 134 179 179 179 179 3 8 4 10 4 10 4 10 10 14 20 21 15 19 100 100 100 100 114 114 114 114 129 129 136 133 151 151 6 10 5 12 7 16 5 10 6 8 7 12 8. 20 100 100 100 114 114 143 143 171 171 171 171 143 143 143 100 102 98 99 99 100 116 115 114 116 114 137 139 156 oaeeiages and wagons ■33 New York Sex Initial wage per day 1860, January July 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January July Blacksmit's M. $1.50 No. Eel. 100 100 100 100 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 BliACKSMIT'S' Helpees M. $0,835 No. Eel. 100 100 100 100 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 Paintees $1.25 No. Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 Wheel wei's M. $1.25 No. Bel. Wages 100 100 100 100 160 : 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 Appendix C 477 TABLE 1 — Continued WAOE-SEBIES FBOM TABLE XH OF THE ALDBICH EEPOET— CITY PUBLIC WOEK8 34 Mass. 34 Mass. 35 N. Y. 35 N. Y 35 N. Y. 35 N. Y. FOBEMEN Laboeees Laboeebs FOEBMBN Laboeees Blacksm's Blacksm's' Helfees Blastees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. 11.25 11.02 $2.00 11.82 $1.25 $1.25 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 6 3 5 4 100 140 140 170 100 160 160 170 147 220 193 167 180 180 7 24 18 16 21 27 7 12 29 14 75 19 12 32 100 99 99 99 99 100 107 146 119 131 120 153 147 157 42 30 25 28 20 22 19 20 17 16 12 11 12 8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 125 150 150 150 150 150 16 23 17 25 9 7 4 7 8 7 7 5 2 2 100 99 99 96 97 99 106 110 137 151 176 179 179 192 15 12 19 8 4 5 4 5 5 7 5 5 1 1 100 100 92 84 92 91 100 108 128 .152 160 160 160 160 6 10 15 2 i 1 1 1 100 100 100 i28 i52 160 160 160 35 New York Beicklay's Caepent's Gaeden'bs Labobebs Masons STONECni'S Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Inlt. wage per day.. $2.00 $1.72 $1.40 $1.00 $2.00 $2.00 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 25 45 25 35 7 8 7 12 5 8 5 3 2 1 100 100 100 90 88 88 100 110 125 150 160 150 175 175 36 18 28 38 14 13 19 8 8 10 9 10 8 11 100 100 101 97 100 99 114 116 145 158 174 187 189 203 20 40 14 30 10 15 15 16 16 30 20 22 12 12 100 93 93 82 79 79 93 100 114 136 143 143 143 143 1225 1500 1200 1100 800 900 800 800 700 650 500 450 420 500 100 100 100 90 100 100 125 125 150 180 190 190 190 190 150 165 58 55 8 8 7 12 6 8 5 3 3 2 100 100 100 90 88 88 100 110 125 150 160 150 175 175 240 185 290 20 ie 15 5 5 20 10 1 11 2 100 100 100 113 '88 100 113 125 150 160 150 175 175 478 History of the Geeenbacks TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEBIE9 PEOM TABIiB XU OP THE ALDEICH EEPOET — CITI PUBLIC WOKKS 35 N. Y. 36 Pa. 36 Pa. 36 Pa. 36 Pa. 36 Pa. Qcaeetm'n Caepent's Engineees Engineee Assistant FlEEMEN Labobebs Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.10 $2.00 $2,125 $1.25 $1.25 $1,335 Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. No. Wages >Jo. Wages Wo. Wages No. Wages No. Wages Mo. Wages 1860, Jan. 110 100 4 100 1 100 3 100 23 100 July .340 100 1 100 4 100 1 100 3 100 30 97 1861, Jan. 280 100 1 100 6 99 1 88 6 100 30 97 July 2 100 6 99 1 88 7 103 34 96 1862, Jan. 2 100 6 99 1 88 7 103 34 96 July 2 100 6 99 1 88 7 103 34 96 1863, Jan. 6 94 5 92 6 102 8 96 July 6 94 5 92 5 99 8 96 1864, Jan. 70 145 6 96 5 92 10 99 36 112 July 45 173 6 96 5 92 10 99 36 112 1865, Jan. 70 182 4 119 5 132 8 132 21 131 July 50 182 2 138 4 119 6 132 8 132 26 131 1866, Jan. 30 182 O 138 4 119 7 132 8 132 15 131 July i 138 4 119 6 132 8 132 13 131 iPa. iPa. )Pa. 37 Pa. Sex Initial wage per day 1860, January July 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January July Machinists $1.50 Eel. Wages 100 100 121 121 121 121 100 100 146 133 175 183 183 178 Patteen Makees $1.50 No. Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 150 150 150 150 Watchmen M. $1.50 Eel. Wages 100 100 89 89 89 94 73 73 73 73 100 100 100 100 Laboeebs $1.25 Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 140 140 140 140 140 140 Appendix C 479 TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEBIBS FROM TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICE EEPOET — COTTON GOODS 38 Massachusetts M'ST'K Ma- chinists overseeks Carding Dep't ovebseees Cloth Room ovbeseeks Dbessing Dep't ovebseees Spinning Dep't ovebseebs Weaving Dep't Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day . . S3. 33 $3.00 82.00 83.00 $3.00 $2,065 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 -■ 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 106 120 120 120 120 150 150 ]• 100 100 83 83 83 83 100 100 117 117 117 117 133 133 100 100 84 84 84 84 100 100 125 125 113 113 138 138 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 83 83 83 83 100 100 117 117 117 117 133 133 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 83 83 83 83 100 100 113 113 117 117 133 133 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 100 100 85 85 85 85 103 103 129 129 121 121 157 157 Second Hands TUIKD Hands Backbotis Balees Beam- Caeeiees Beltmbn Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,365 $0.97 $0,265 $1.00 $0,835 $1.50 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 13 13 13 13 13 13 10 10 12 12 11 11 12 12 100 100 77 77 78 78 101 101 113 113 139 139 157 157 17 17 18 18 12 12 9 9 4 4 6 6 13 13 100 100 71 71 80 80 103 103 155 155 159 159 175 175 13 13 12 12 13 13 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 13 100 100 87 87 74 106 136 158 177 177 172 172 187 187 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 83 83 83 83 108 108 133 133 133 133 167 167 2 2 2 2 2 I 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 100 100 83 83 83 83 129 129 150 150 159 162 175 175 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 100 ni 111 111 111 117 117 122 122 150 150 480 History op the Gebenbaoks TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SERIES FROM TABLE XII OP THE AliDRICH REPORT — COTTON GOODS 33 Massachusetts Black- Bobbin BOIJ''P'-'R.MTBW B'l'rm'n's' Carpp-wt's Card smiths eiEN Helpers Grinders Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day . . $1.79 $1,415 $1.75 $1.08 $1.52 $1,025 Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages 1860, Jan. 4 100 100 2 100 5 100 7 100 July 4 100 100 2 100 5 100 7 100 1861, Jan. 4 97 2 100 86 2 100 6 102 7 90 July 4 97 2 100 86 2 100 6 102 7 90 1862, Jan. 3 106 2 106 95 2 100 7 113 3 111 July 3 106 2 106 95 2 100 7 113 3 111 1863, Jan. 3 106 124 2 100 1 116 6 113 3 111 July 3 106 124 2 100 1 116 6 113 3 111 1864, Jan. 3 116 159 2 98 1 116 6 132 3 120 July 3 116 159 2 98 1 116 6 132 3 120 1865, Jan. 3 151 153 2 107 2 130 6 168 3 140 July 3 151 153 2 107 2 130 6 168 3 140 1866, Jan. 3 158 4 144 1 114 1 139 6 164 3 141 July 3 158 4 144 1 114 1 139 6 164 3 141 DOFFEBS Double Tenders Entetmen Pilling Carriers Lap Carriers M'CHINISTS Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $0,315 $0.64 $0.92 $0.83 $0.71 $1,565 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 33 33 33 33 33 33 27 27 26 26 26 26 27 25 100 100 92 92 97 97 124 124 139 139 186 186 183 187 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 100 88 88 110 110 117 117 113 113 198 198 198 198 100 100 82 82 82 82 109 109 136 136 136 136 163 163 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 100 100 81 81 81 81 111 111 141 141 155 155 155 155 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 100 100 92 92 126 126 118 118 146 146 144 144 192 192 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 8 8 100 100 97 97 105 105 109 109 128 128 144 144 166 166 Appendix C 481 TABLE 1 — CcmUnued WAGK-SSBTES FBOK TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH EEPOET — COTTON GOODS 38 Massachusetts. Masons OlLEBS Painters PiCKEES B01.1.EE COYEEEES Waste Hands Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day . . ^1.48 $0.42 $1.36 $0.71 $1.50 11.10 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 5 5 6 6 7 7 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 100 100 99 99 98 98 115 115 151 151 192 192 225 225 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 100 100 107 107 107 107 107 107 11^ 112 131 131 242 242 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 104 104 107 107 107 107 113 113 135 135 156 156 12 12 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 9 9 9 9 100 100 111 111 109 109 146 146 181 181 193 193 200 200 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 100 111 111 111 111 122 122 142 142 151 151 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 100 100 91 91 86 86 121 121 136 136 132 132 114 114 Watchmen Wheelpit Mbn Yaed Hands Yaen Caeeiees Card Steippees SCEUBBEES Sex M. M. M. M. p. F. Init. wage per day . . $1.33 $2.00 $1.10 $0.68 $0.71 $0.45 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 100 100 81 81 81 81 107 107 113 113 132 132 150 150 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 100 100 113 113 113 113 113 113 125 125 133 133 150 150 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 100 91 91 82 82 110 110 127 127 114 114 127 127 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 1 1 4 4 100 100 74 74 74 74 74 74 92 92 178 178 145 145 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 100 100 96 96 113 113 141 141 162 162 190 190 190 190 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 100 100 83 83 83 83 111 111 129' 129 149 149 164 164 482 HiSTOKY OF THE GeEENBACKS TABLE 1— Continued WAGB-BEBIES FEOM TABLE Xn OP THE ALDEICH EEPOET — COTTOIT GOODS 38 Mass. 38 Mas;. 39 Mass. 39 Mass. 39 Mass. Spoolebs SWEEFEBS FOEEMBN Caepbnt's Foremen Machin'ts FOEBMEN Yaed Oyebsbebs Cakd. Dep. Sex F. F. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day... $0.50 10.71 $1.75 $1.75 $2.00 $2.00 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 47 47 45 45 45 45 45 45 44 44 37 37 100 100 84 84 80 80 105 105 95 95 200 200 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 14 14 100 100 70 70 85 85 97 97 102 102 102 102 104 104 100 107 107 107 107 114 114 114 114 129 143 143 171 171 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 100 100 100 100 94 94 114 114 119 129 143 143 171 186 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 125 125 100 100 100 100 100 75 100 100 100 113 113 113 125 125 « 39 Massaelrasetts OTEE3BEE3 OVEESBBES OVEESEEES Oyebsbebs Second Cloth E'm Deess.Dep. Spin. Dep. Weav.Dep. Hands Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day... $2.25 11.75 $2.00 $2.00 $1,175 $1.42 Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. No. Wages Wo. Wages Wo. Wages Wo. Wages No. Wages Wo. Wages 1860, Jan. 100 100 100 100 6 100 11 100 July 100 100 100 100 7 103 11 96 1861, Jan. 100 100 100 100 6 103 9 98 July 100 100 100 100 2 103 11 99 1862, Jan. 100 100 100 100 3 101 10 98 July 78 86 75 75 4 89 12 95 1863, Jan. 78 114 100 100 1 99 24 90 July 78 114 100 100 1 99 26 92 1864, Jan. 78 114 100 100 2 128 14 106 July 92 114 88 113 2 106 8 128 1865, Jan. 100 129 88 113 2 106 8 143 July 100 129 113 113 5 136 14 148 1866, Jan. 111 143 125 138 5 149 12 147 July 111 143 129 138 4 154 12 150 Appendix C 483 TABLE 1— Continued WAGE-SEKIES PEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH BBPOET — COTTON GOODS 39 Massachusetts Caed Gkindees Card Steippees Machin'ts Paintees PiCKEES Section Hands Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day... S0.83 S0.625 $1.38 $1.14 $0,735 $0.76 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 100 110 110 110 114 104 110 110 151 160 160 201 202 192 6 6 3 4 4 2 1 1 5 2 2 4 4 4 100 103 111 112 112 104 96 96 120 179 179 179 179 179 24 24 14 13 14 17 7 10 11 10 10 12 16 15 100 101 104 106 97 99 109 102 112 126 145 136 146 149 7 7 7 5 4 6 4 6 8 6 6 6 6 5 100 104 111 111 111 100 95 97 97 119 130 133 132 136 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 100 102 102 102 102 102 113 113 136 170 204 181 171 165 5 6 6 6 6 4 3 3 2 3 2 5 7 7 100 110 106 107 109 103 113 113 109 123 109 147 185 185 SliASHEE Tendbes Watchmen Yaed Hands Deawees- IN Deawing Hands Speedees Sex M. M. M. F. F. F. Init. wage per day... 11.08 $0.86 $0,855 $0,475 $0.42 $0.52 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 3 4 2 2 1 '2 2 5 3 2 2 6 4 100 92 83 83 84 '97 97 111 131 127 139 148 155 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 15 14 15 14 16 15 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 116 145 145 145 174 174 17 12 12 14 10 18 14 13 8 9 5 10 14 13 100 101 101 102 92 101 104 105 119 150 148 152 154 168 5 3 4 5 4 3 2 2 5 2 2 7 6 5 100 112 84 113 114 117 114 114 123 143 141 133 189 171 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 4 5 100 119 119 119 119 95 95 95 119 119 119 129 160 160 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 1 2 3 2 5 4 5 100 106 104 101 104 96 92 92 106 110 110 121 161 161 484 History of the Geeenbaoks TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEEIE3 FBOM TABLE XH OF THE ALDEICH EEPOET — COTTON. GOODS 39 Mass. 39 Mass. 39 Mass. 40 Mass. 40 Mass. 40 Mass. Spimnees Feamb Waepees Weavees Mastbk Machin'ts FOEEMEN Yaed Gteeseees Caed. Dbp. Sex F. F. F. M. M. M. Init. wage per day... $0,475 $0,595 $0.46 $2.00 $1.50 $2.50 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Bel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Bel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 28 21 26 29 30 25 23 25 24 25 28 34 34 31 100 92 97 95 102 102 97 99 114 121 118 131 191 189 6 6 7 6 7 5 1 1 2 1 1 2 4 1 100 115 108 105 79 84 67 67 94 109 97 141 132 161 19 15 25 16 18 19 21 23 20 22 24 25 24 22 100 103 110 102 112 102 117 118 128 149 140 132 186 198 -*- 100 100 113 113 113 113 113 125 150 150 150 150 163 163 j 100 100 117 117 117 117 117 117 150 167 167 167 157 167 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 110 110 120 120 120 40 Massachusetts Oveeseees Cloth E'm Oveeseees Deess.Dep. Oveeseees Spin. Dep. Oveeseees Weav.Dep. Second Hands Thted Hands Sox M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day... $1.42 $1.83 $2.50 $2.25 $1,485 $1,265 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 123 123 123 123 123 100 100 100 100 137 137 137 137 150 150 164 164 164 164 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 110 110 120 120 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 111 111 111 111 111 111 98 102 102 111 111 111 6 6 7 7 6 5 6 3 13 13 14 14 15 11 100 100 97 97 97 97 97 96 109 112 114 118 119 121 5 5 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 5 2 100 100 100 100 100 96 82 82 112 132 122 125 132 128 Appendix 485 TABLE 1— Continued WAGE-SKBIES FBOM TABLE XH OF THE AliDBICH BEPOKT— COTTON GOODS 40 Massachusetts 1 Basd Boys Cakpent's Caed Geindees Caed Steippees Cloth-R'm Hands Drawing Hands Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init.wage per day .. 10.79 $1.49 $0.83 $0,755 $0.50 $0,662 No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 4 4 1 1 1 i 4 1 100 89 93 105 127 127 63 111 127 8 8 7 7 7 9 9 9 13 9 11 11 14 8 100 100 104 104 105 106 103 107 128 139 128 140 141 159 11 11 8 8 8 2 1 'e 7 5 6 6 6 100 100 105 105 105 96 106 isi 178 179 189 189 189 11 11 11 11 14 4 3 '9 12 10 9 9 9 100 100 99 99 99 99 100 i66 175 180 179 180 181 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 '2 2 100 100 108 108 116 116 116 116 i69 169 5 4 5 5 4 2 '2 3 3 3 5 6 100 100 95 95 79 94 ioe 113 121 129 157 176 Deessees DOPFEES Engineees FlEEMEN Haeness Hands Labobeks Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day .. $0.98 $0,303 $3.00 $1,415 $0.38 $0,995 No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 3 4 5 7 100 100 101 102 88 90 88 92 94 100 73 88 111 117 27 28 25 15 14 5 9 15 15 15 14 10 9 100 100 102 107 105 114 94 i24 124 132 132 165 165 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 92 96 96 96 100 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 100 102 98 99 100 105 105 99 104 106 107 108 112 118 2 2 2 2 2 1 i 1 '2 1 100 97 121 121 126 132 i97 197 2i6 234 16 16 11 11 9 6 5 4 11 14 8 13 13 8 100 100 103 103 100 106 107 124 147 173 164 174 176 177 486 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE 1— Continued WAGE-SEEIES FROM TABLE XII OF THE ALDEIOH EEPOET— COTTON GOODS 40 Massachusetts Maohin'ts Maohin'ts' Appeent's Picking EOOM H'DS EOYING Hands Section Hands Spoolees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,765 SO. 875 $0.85 $0.38 11.25 $0,448 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 14 13 10 10 10 10 9 10 14 13 14 15 16 17 100 102 105 105 105 105 103 102 125 127 126 134 132 142 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 i 1 100 100 114 114 114 114 1^4 137 119 126 129 '77 114 4 4 6 6 7 7 2 2 3 5 2 4 7 8 100 100 98 98 98 98 106 106 123 165 162 162 181 187 4 5 4 4 'i '7 3 2 2 4 4 100 101 101 104 i32 ios 132 145 151 153 168 4 4 4 4 1 1 '7 7 5 3 4 5 100 102 107 108 106 106 ios 108 127 131 122 115 4 5 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 7 6 8 5 100 101 84 96 119 128 62 61 92 98 107 114 144 183 Teamstbes Watchmen Cloth-E'm Hands DOITEES Deawing Hands Debssees Sex M. M. F. F. F. F. Init. wage per day . $1.50 $1.06 $0.61 $0,315 $0,455 $1,059 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 100 100 92 92 92 92 89 83 94 94 91 91 117 117 2 2 4 4 's 8 4 4 4 5 5 3 100 100 94 94 '94 94 134 158 158 158 165 165 6 6 5 5 "i 1 3 3 3 3 8 8 100 100 87 87 82 82 "99 99 130 130 136 136 2 5 5 3 2 1 4 'e 6 8 100 103 103 112 105 105 98 i27 159 159 22 23 9 9 8 5 3 1 13 18 20 20 21 19 100 105 130 134 114 122 101 114 127 125 117 127 139 134 9 10 8 7 6 6 3 3 5 5 10 11 11 7 100 105 107 106 69 71 54 55 105 105 92 98 117 138 Appendix C 487 TABLE 1— Continued WAOE-SEBIES FBOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH EEPOET— COTTON GOODS 40 Massachusetts Haeness Hands EOOM Hands Speedees Spoolees Steetch- EES SWEEPEES Sex F. F. p. p. P. P. Init. wage per day.. $0,464 $0.67 $0,503 $0,404 $0,533 $0.39 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 5 4 1 1 1 1 ; 2 2 1 1 3 1 100 103 125 125 140 140 151 151 162 162 162 162 185 192 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 8 2 100 100 112 112 112 112 112 112 93 106 106 149 152 153 8 8 6 6 6 1 1 io 8 8 8 8 8 100 100 104 105 105 99 99 144 154 152 156 155 159 9 11 15 20 12 12 7 7 10 11 15 17 19 24 100 95 86 90 98 101 88 103 120 127 118 125 173 200 3 3 6 6 8 3 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 100 100 110 114 113 118 119 116 117 120 122 124 134 143 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 5 6 7 100 100 103 103 i28 147 154 156 182 187 Sex. Initial wage per day . . Waepees $0,059 No. Eel. Wages Weavees F. $0,321 No. Eel. Wages Weavees $0,422 No. Rel. Wages 1860, January July . . . . 1861, January July . . . . 1862, January July . . . . 1863, January July . . . . 1864, January July . . . . 1865, January July . . . . 1866, January July ... 7 9 11 12 6 5 1 1 3 3 2 3 6 3 100 100 99 103 100 103 102 102 137 148 127 126 162 202 12 14 14 15 10 10 3 9 8 6 16 10 45 52 100 100 106 106 106 106 109 116 116 116 125 125 125 125 8 7 6 9 5 6 8 9 10 8 10 8 9 6 100 100 100 100 102 102 107 107 107 107 107 119 119 119 1 Per cut for sheetings 46 inches wide, 48 yards per cut. 2 Per cut for sheetings 72 inches wide, 40 yards per cut. 488 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 1~ Continued WAGE-SEKIES FEOM TABLE Xn OF THE ALDRICH EBPOBT- 42 New Hampshire DKT GOODS Sex. Initial wage per day. . POETEES M. $1.00 No. Eel. Wages Salesmen M. $1,125 No. Rel. Wages Saleswomen $0.80 No. Rel. 1860, January. . July 1861, January. . . July 1862, January. . July 1863, January, . July 1864, January. . . July 1865, January. . July 1866, January . . July 100 100 100 100 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 100 100 100 100 156 156 156 156 178 178 178 178 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 104 104 104 104 GINGHAMS 43 Massachusetts Oveeseees Carding Dressing Sp nning Weaving Hands BOTS Dep't Dep't Dep't Dep't Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $3.00 $3.00 $2.50 $3.00 $1.55 $0.30 Rel. Rel. Rel. Kel Rel. Bel. No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages 1860, Jan. 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 100 16 100 July 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 100 16 100 1861, Jan. 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 100 16 100 July 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 100 16 100 1862, Jan. 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 100 16 100 July 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 100 16 100 1863, Jan. 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 100 16 100 July 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 100 16 100 1864, Jan. 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 103 16 100 July 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 116 16 117 1865, Jan. 1 100 100 2 100 100 5 124 16 117 July 1 108 108 2 110 108 5 132 16 123 1866, Jan. 1 108 117 2 110 ia3 5 148 16 133 July 1 108 117 2 120 133 5 152 16 150 Appendix 489 TABLE 1—Contimied WAGE-SERIES FROM TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH BEPOET — GINGHAMS 43 Massachusetts Boiler Tenders Carpen- ters Card Grinders Card Strippers Card Tenders Dressers Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,165 SI. 75 $1.25 $0.83 $0.75 $1.64 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 129 129 140 140 140 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 6 100 100 100 86 86 86 86 100 100 114 114 129 129 134 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 107 120 120 140 140 140 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 114 114 135 135 169 181 181 7 7 7 7 6 6 3 3 6 6 t 5 5 100 100 100 100 100 100 111 111 111 133 149 167 187 187 14 14 14 9 10 10 10 11 11 9 10 11 14 14 100 112 110 112 114 120 117 107 110 112 118 131 137 138 43 Massachusetts Dters Loom Fixers Machin- ists Painters Pickers Smash Menders Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day . $1.00 $1.58 $1.55 $1.75 81.00 $1.30 No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 24 24 24 22 22 22 12 12 16 23 24 33 35 35 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 150 150 175 175 175 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 13 13 14 17 18 17 100 99 97 103 94 84 107 96 97 99 128 136 146 147 6 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 6 7 7 7 7 100 90 90 99 97 92 97 100 100 107 110 128 145 152 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 103 103 114 120 120 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 112 112 125 125 150 165 165 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 100 100 100 100 87 87 87 87 87 90 86 106 115 115 490 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS TABLE 1— Continued, WAGB-SEEIE3 FEOM TABLE XII OP THE ALDBICH BEPOET — QINGHAUS 13 Massachusetts Watchmen Weavees Yaed Hands Deawees- IN Deawing- Feame Tensebs QniLLEES Sex M. M. M. F. F. F. Init. wage per day . . $1,165 $0.93 11.00 $0.80 $0.49 $0.57 No. Eel. Wages No. EeL. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 2 2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 115 115 129 129 129 85 93 108 100 82 65 23 n 35 40 40 34 85 98 100 98 100 104 97 104 97 104 99 105 129 135 167 185 10 10 10 8 6 6 6 6 8 8 10 10 12 12 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 150 163 163 163 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 100 100 100 115 118 111 108 104 103 103 103 100 125 150 10 10 10 9 10 10 8 8 11 14 12 15 10 12 100 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 112 122 133 163 163 173 36 35 37 36 34 29 23 20 25 29 29 39 45 45 100 100 100 96 96 104 104 100 100 128 128 131 153 160 43 Massachusetts EeEIjEES o„„^„^„„ 1 Spinnees Spebdbes I Frame Waepees Weavees WiNDEES Sex F. F. F. F. F. F. Init. wage per day . . $0.66 10.60 $0.56 $0.73 $0.72 $0.56 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 34 38 33 28 26 19 14 14 21 25 26 39 45 43 100 100 120 120 120 145 145 132 132 130 130 129 144 148 12 12 10 13 12 12 6 6 12 11 11 13 17 17 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 108 117 133 158 158 167 19 17 10 10 10 10 6 8 16 18 20 29 26 25 100 105 105 105 105 105 105 107 116 125 143 170 170 170 26 26 27 20 20 19 11 13 18 25 20 28 35 34 100 100 100 134 133 130 123 108 104 101 110 142 144 144 115 103 98 97 120 89 88 90 115 160 140 188 196 172 100 97 99 111 101 114 107 106 101 109 134 151 1654 178 103 101 99 70 61 54 43 37 44 25 49 70 82 85 100 105 107 121 121 121 121 121 121 141 143 168 175 186 Appendix C 491 TABLE 1 — Ccmtinued WAGE-SEEIES FBOM TABLB XII OP THE ALDEIOH EEPOBT— GROCEKIBa 44 New Hampshire Salesmen Teamstbes Sex . . M. M. Initial wage per day. . . $0,875 $1.50 iNo. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, January July 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January July 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 129 157 157 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 100 100 100 100 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 45 Mass. illuminating gas 46 Mass. 46 Mass. 46 Mass. 47 N. Y. 47 N. Y. Eetoetm'n Cool Handlees FlEEMEN Laboebes : Steeet Black- smiths Blacksm's Helpees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day . . $0,955 $1.00 $1.00 11.00 S1.965 $1,125 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Bel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 100 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 116 136 138 146 138 160 3 '4 1 2 1 2 '5 1 1 2 100 ioo 100 100 100 100 iis 150 150 iso 7 6 7 6 12 10 14 9 14 10 15 8 11 9 100 100 100 100 100 113 113 137 137 175 175 175 175 200 3 12 '8 2 6 ■5 6 2 4 '4 100 100 ioo 109 100 iio i25 125 125 iso 7 8 10 10 10 9 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 100 98 97 97 97 97 104 140 124 140 151 151 151 153 4 3 3 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 100 111 111 100 100 100 111 156 133 156 178 178 178 178 492 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEBNBACKS TABLE 1 — Continued WAGB-SEEIES TEOM TABLE XII Off THE ALDKIOH EBPOET — ILLUMINATING GAS 47 New York Beicklat- EHS Beickl'ks' Helpees Caepen- TEES Engineees Fieemen Laboeees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. . $2,105 $1,335 $1.75 $2,165 $1.34 $1,055 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 7 26 11 15 11 4 2 2 4 1 3 7 3 9 100 97 97 97 97 101 107 131 119 119 127 143 143 160 3 4 4 5 5 4 3 4 2 2 2 6 3 5 100 103 103 101 101 103 119 131 131 131 150 150 150 150 6 6 10 9 9 6 4 4 3 4 5 5 6 8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 143 133 143 171 171 171 182 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 3 3 3 2 2 100 100 100 100 100 100 112 123 112 123 135 139 139 162 80 80 90 90 90 60 60 60 80 80 70 80 80 60 100 100 100 100 100 100 131 168 149 168 187 187 187 187 219 208 240 210 220 190 100 80 90 60 75 43 65 55 100 98 99 98 99 97 142 142 142 142 186 188 188 173 « N. Y. 47 N. Y. 47 N. Y. 48 Ohio 4« Ohio 48 Ohio Stablb- Black- Blacksm's' Beicklat- MBN smiths Helpees BE8 Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day . . $1.50 $1.25 $1.25 $1.50 $1.00 $2.25 Eel. Eel. Rel. Eel. Eel. Eel. No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages 1860, Jan. 100 3 100 3 100 100 100 2 100 July 100 6 100 3 100 100 100 2 100 1861, Jan. 100 6 100 3 100 100 100 2 100 July 117 4 100 3 100 100 100 2 111 1862, Jan. 117 3 100 3 100 100 100 2 111 July 117 4 100 3 100 3 111 115 2 111 1863, Jan. 117 4 100 3 104 3 128 115 2 122 July 167 4 140 2 160 3 139 125 2 122 1864, Jan. 150 1 120 3 140 3 172 175 2 133 July 167 3 140 1 160 3 178 200 2 178 1865, Jan. 183 4 160 2 160 3 189 200 2 178 July 2 200 3 160 2 160 3 189 200 2 178 1866, Jan. 2 200 2 160 2 160 3 217 200 2 178 July 1 217 2 160 2 160 3 217 200 2 200 Appendix 493 TABLE 1 — Contimied WAGE-SEBIGS FBOM TABI/E XH OF THE ALDBICH EEPOET — ILLUMINATING GAS 48 Ohio Sex Initial wage per day 1860, January .... July 1861, January July 1862, January.... July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January July CAKPENTEB8 M. $1,525 No, Eel. Wages FlEEMEN $1,225 No, Eel. Labobees M. $1.00 No. Eel. Wages Watchmen M. $1.10 No, Eel. Wages 100 103 103 103 103 107 115 131 148 164 164 197 197 180 58 58 58 75 75 75 75 75 90 123 123 123 123 133 100 100 100 100 100 113 116 141 204 169 169 169 184 184 40 40 40 40 40 65 65 65 111 46 10 10 10 10 100 100 100 100 100 113 115 125 150 175 175 175 190 190 100 100 100 102 102 114 114 136 159 159 159 159 159 159 leatheb 50 Massachusetts Blackees Cellae Hands FiNISHEES Flatten- EK3 Glossees Settbes- ODT Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. -wage per day . . $1.00 $1.00 $1,195 $1,165 $1,165 $1,165 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 100 117 117 117 134 134 134 134 134 159 159 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 117 117 125 125 142 150 175 184 200 200 200 192 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 9 10 10 7 7 100 100 109 118 128 137 144 146 141 143 157 160 144 146 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 100 100 115 129 129 143 158 158 172 172 186 186 162 158 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 115 115 129 129 143 143 143 143 143 150 150 158 1 100 100 115 115 129 143 158 172 186 186 136 186 172 172 494 History op the Geeenbaoks TABLE 1— Continued ■WAGE-SEEtES FBOM TABLE Xn OF THE ALDBICH BEPOET — LEATHEB SO Mass. 50 Mass. 50 Mass. 50 Mass. 51 Mass. 51 Mass. Splitteks Stuffbes Table Hands Whiten'es Baek Geistdees Beamstees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.50 $1,085 $1,055 $1,035 $1.50 $1.50 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 122 122 133 133 144 144 156 156 156 156 156 156 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 100 100 107 107 123 123 143 148 150 153 179 179 174 174 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 100 100 105 105 127 132 142 147 147 147 158 160 158 158 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 100 100 113 116 133 141 150 161 185 201 188 188 177 169 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 111 111 111 111 133 133 144 144 144 144 144 144 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 100 100 111 111 129 129 140 140 144 144 144 144 144 144 51 Massachusetts Sex Initial wage per day 1860, January July 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January July .-. Leach Tbndees M. $1.50 No Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 122 122 133 133 144 144 144 144 139 133 LiUEES M. $1.50 No Eel. Wages 100 100 111 111 111 111 133 133 144 144 144 144 144 144 Shavbes M. $2.50 No, Eel. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 120 Yaed Hands M. $1,165 No, Eel. Wages 100 100 120 129 130 130 133 133 173 173 182 182 186 186 Appendix C TABLE 1— Continued WAGE-SEEIES FBOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH EEPOBT— iUMBEB 52 New Hampshire Laboeees Ldmbeemen Sex M. M. Initial wage per day $0,385' 10.505' No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, January October 1861, January October 1862, January October 1863, January October 1864, January October 1865, January October 1866, January October 4 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 100 100 100 100 119 119 160 160 179 179 179 179 179 179 19 16 23 24 17 16 12 11 14 16 15 23 21 19 100 104 99 100 130 126 182 186 189 194 202 201 202 208 53 New York Salesmen Teamstebs Yaed Hands Sex M. M. M. Init. wage per day. . 11.50 ' $1,125 $1.04 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, January . . . July 1861, January . . . July 1862, January . . . July 1863, January . . . July 1864, January . . . July 1865, January . . . July 1866, January . . . July 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 100 100 92 92 100 114 101 115 120 139 139 139 139 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 115 99 94 94 98 98 117 111 111 111 122 122 9 11 14 14 12 11 11 10 11 11 15 14 13 12 100 104 104 106 101 106 105 119 123 131 135 135 129 130 1 Board supplied. 496 HiSTOKY OP THE GREENBACKS TABLE l—Continiied WAGE-SEEIES FEOM TABLE XH OF THE ALDRICH KBPOET — METALS AND METALLIC GOODS 54 Counecticnt FOBBMAN BOILEE-M'S FOEEMAN Machinist FOEBMAN MOLDBES Black- smiths Blacksm's' Helfbes Boilbe-M'b Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. . $3.00 13.835 $2,875 $2.25 $1,375 $1.77 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Hel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 133 183 200 200 133 133 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 167 167 167 98 98 100 104 104 104 104 104 104 122 122 157 157 157 139 139 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 100 100 100 100 94 100 100 94 111 133 156 130 156 148 3 3 1 7 6 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 1 100 100 100 101 96 100 100 103 100 121 133 121 121 4 5 3 4 1 1 2 3 3 5 3 10 3 9 100 99 101 101 99 99 120 141 127 144 141 138 136 149 54 Connecticut Boilbe-M's Helpers Enoinbbbs Machin'ts Machin'ts' Hblpbes MOLDBES MOLDEBS' Hblpbes Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.15 $1.50 $1,765 $1.16 $1,625 $1,215 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 5 5 3 7 3 3 6 8 9 12 8 6 5 6 100 102 109 101 109 109 100 106 121 143 145 145 152 150 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Hi 150 167 167 167 167 12 15 9 6 18 14 6 12 14 21 16 14 20 23 100 100 102 106 97 98 96 103 111 129 149 144 145 154 6 4 7 16 26 13 4 1 7 4 5 2 7 7 100 104 126 110 109 110 125 97 129 130 134 122 123 137 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 5 3 4 4 4 10 15 100 112 123 112 123 123 119 126 126 152 152 152 147 168 7 10 9 8 7 7 6 5 11 7 9 7 10 8 100 100 100 102 109 112 108 103 109 134 142 123 120 130 Appendix 497 TABLE 1 — Corainued WAGE-SEKIES FBOU TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH EEPOET — METALS AND METALLIC GOODS 54 Conn. 54 Conn. 54 Conn. 55 Conn. 55 Conn. 55 Conn. Patteen- Makees Black- smiths Blacksm's' Helpehs Boilee- Maeees boilee-m's Helpees Machin'ts Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. . $1.75 11.895 11.00 §1.555 $1,005 $1,645 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1859 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 1 2 3 2 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 4 ioo 100 86 105 100 100 89 102 111 136 138 159 171 152 6 '8 6 10 8 7 7 6 6 6 7 100 93 96 96 108 118 132 136 136 132 145 10 9 6 11 20 15 13 11 13 10 14 100 iog 111 113 125 132 147 148 146 147 151 11 2i 19 15 26 42 47 45 45 26 33 100 108 106 121 129 138 163 172 170 173 178 12 6 5 10 39 46 60 59 48 24 32 100 iii 115 117 126 121 141 144 147 150 147 46 65 62 58 86 69 65 52 51 49 79 100 ios 109 122 126 141 158 171 168 173 176 55 Conn. 55 Conn. 56 Conn. 56 Conn. 56 Conn. 56 Conn. Machin'ts' Helpers Patteen- Makbes Pat'n-M'es Helpees FOEBMAN Machin'ts FOEEMAN MOLDEES Black- smiths Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,135 $1,675 $1.00 $4.79 $2.49 $1.75 No. Eel. Wages No Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1859 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 21 20 22 25 37 31 41 31 32 21 29 100 '99 101 110 111 115 121 127 126 130 136 10 ii 14 16 18 17 11 8 10 9 100 iio 110 117 129 140 147 150 161 173 2 '2 2 2 2 1 2 2 100 '75 75 100 150 150 150 165 "i 1 1 1 1 1 i i 2 2 ioo 100 100 100 100 100 '68 '67 101 100 ioo 100 100 120 120 120 120 128 128 192 192 192 192 257 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 io 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 4 4 4 4 9 498 HiSTOET OP THE GkEENBACKS TABLE 1— Continued WAGE-3BEIE3 FKOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH BEPOKT — METALS AND METALLIC GOODS 56 Conn. Engineebs Machin'ts Machin'ts' Appbent's Machin'ts' Helpbes MOLDEBS MOLDEBS' Appbent's Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,165 $1,715 W.615 $1.04 $1.53 $0.55 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. .Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 100 100 100 107 107 i29 129 143 158 172 172 172 186 12 12 8 10 19 14 9 5 7 12 12 12 27 23 100 102 98 99 99 105 106 110 119 119 127 137 143 149 5 5 7 8 9 9 6 4 4 3 11 12 13 12 100 102 101 109 107 109 96 102 103 106 129 140 145 154 4 4 4 6 11 9 9 5 5 6 6 10 8 12 100 106 105 104 106 109 109 117 127 135 141 150 142 149 12 9 11 15 12 12 9 12 18 25 14 18 17 23 100 101 102 101 104 104 105 112 113 126 145 149 141 146 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 100 109 115 119 119 125 121 182 205 145 155 i82 182 56 Conn. 56 Conn. 57 Md. 57 Md. 57 Md. 57 Md. MOLDEKS' Patteen- Black- Blacksm's' BOILEE- Helpers Makees smiths Helpees Makebs Laboeebs Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. . 11.075 11.875 $1,565 $1.00 12.085 $0.92 Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages 1860, Jan. 14 100 2 100 8 100 8 100 2 100 4 100 July 13 100 2 100 8 103 10 100 4 86 4 100 1861, Jan. 11 97 2 100 3 99 3 100 1 120 4 100 July 13 95 2 100 2 96 6 96 1 72 5 82 1862, Jan. 16 95 2 100 4 95 5 97 2 88 4 82 July 13 95 2 100 4 95 8 92 2 94 4 90 1863, Jan. 11 98 2 100 6 109 6 100 6 87 8 109 July 13 110 2 100 6 117 6 125 8 92 8 125 1864, Jan. 18 110 2 109 7 135 10 135 13 107 10 134 July 21 125 2 120 8 170 13 147 8 106 8 156 1865, Jan. 17 132 2 140 7 176 13 159 15 136 14 162 July 13 130 2 140 6 173 8 165 U 138 16 172 1866, Jan. 14 132 3 142 6 184 8 173 12 139 14 176 July 12 138 3 142 8 178 7 172 7 120 12 174 Appendix C 499 TABLE 1 — Continued ■WAGE-SERIES PEOM TABLE XU. OF THE ALDBICH EBPOET — METALS AND METALLIC GOODS 57 Md. 57 Md. 57 Md. 57 Md. 57 Md. 58 Mass. Machin'ts MOLDEBS Paintees Pattebn- Maeebs Teamstees FOEEMAN F'en'cem'n Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. . $1,645 11.87 11.56 $1.62 $0.97 $3.00 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 16 20 12 8 9 12 22 27 24 20 28 22 47 28 100 100 103 94 98 102 112 116 125 157 164 167 169 169 5 5 4 2 1 5 4 6 6 18 9 5 15 10 100 100 103 94 107 98 103 103 114 120 135 136 141 141 8 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 i 1 1 3 100 99 107 75 75 75 107 109 96 i44 160 160 170 17 11 7 4 3 6 11 11 17 15 12 12 10 9 100 102 106 89 «9 98 104 116 119 139 153 161 177 181 4 3 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 100 102 100 87 84 94 116 122 131 155 159 169 169 169 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 117 100 100 100 58 Mass. FOBBMAN Machin'ts FOEN ace- men Laboeebs Machin'ts Machin'ts' Helfees MOLDEBS Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. . $2.68 $1,445 $0.89 $1.72 $1.28 $1.56 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 7 8 6 7 9 11 10 14 6 7 12 12 10 5 100 101 104 105 106 102 97 101 117 117 127 128 127 147 2 1 1 3 4 3 1 6 4 18 6 2 2 2 100 100 100 91 90 94 100 110 97 94 92 99 102 121 30 38 40 88 60 36 42 27 30 9 14 22 28 40 100 102 101 98 99 103 104 105 110 122 143 153 153 152 42 74 81 114 110 81 78 70 112 106 78 77 86 98 100 98 100 97 100 102 103 103 120 125 136 137 141 146 9 14 21 33 18 14 10 32 53 42 30 20 26 24 100 97 100 98 100 98 100 93 99 109 112 117 121 121 19 25 23 58 38 27 15 24 21 20 24 22 25 26 100 102 102 100 101 102 105 110 120 120 141 147 153 155 500 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE 1— Continued WAGE-SEEIES FROM TABLE XH OP THE ALDEICH KEPOBT — METALS AND METALLIC GOODS 39 Mass. 59 Mass. 59 Mass, 60 Mass. 58 Mass. 58 Mass. Teamstees Teamstees WITH Team Laboeees M'CHINISTS Patteen- Makees Laboeees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. 10.94 12.50 W.90 $1.50 $1.75 $1.25 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Bel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 5 8 5 10 8 10 9 12 7 8 8 10 5 9 100 109 106 104 108 109 112 121 124 139 146 158 160 156 100 100 100 ioo 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 144 144 144 167 167 17 17 17 17 17 17 22 22 25 25 25 25 26 26 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 120 153 150 150 157 167 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 114 137 137 137 143 143 9 13 12 10 16 16 18 14 14 12 12 10 14 15 100 100 120 120 120 120 140 140 140 140 128 140 160 160 60 Mass. 60 Mass. 60 Mass. 61 Mass. 61 Mass. 61 Mass. M'CHINISTS Patteen- Maeees Watchmen Black- smiths Laboeees M'CHLNISTS Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,665 $2.00 $1.50 $2.00 $1,125 $1,635 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 75 73 72 72 65 75 65 60 54 52 62 59 91 82 100 100 108 120 132 132 180 180 165 165 180 180 180 180 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 100 100 105 105 113 113 125 150 150 150 175 175 175 175 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 140 140 160 160 160 100 88 88 88 88 88 100 100 100 119 119 119 119 119 4 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 100 100 111 111 HI 118 118 133 133 133 133 133 122 122 11 11 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 16 16 17 17 100 100 104 107 108 109 108 112 117 133 130 137 143 145 Appendix 501 TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEHIES FBOM TABLE Xn OF THE ALDEICH BEPOET — METALS AND METALLIC GOODS 61 Mass. 62N. H. 62N. H. 62 N. H. 62 N. H. 62 N. H. WOOD- WOEKEES Black- smiths Engineebs Labobebs M'CHINISTS M'chVsts' Appeent's Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day . . $1,665 $1.50 $1.17 $1.14 $1.48 $0,485 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 100 110 110 113 116 115 115 125 130 135 150 155 155 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 100 100 95 95 105 100 106 111 114 150 167 150 167 159 1 1 1 "i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 ioo 100 100 107 107 128 128 128 150 150 3 5 1 1 1 3 3 4 2 1 1 1 5 4 100 104 88 88 88 97 100 102 117 110 81 81 121 130 19 23 10 6 13 16 12 12 12 11 11 12 10 12 100 103 102 104 105 104 110 116 117 125 134 122 144 136 5 5 8 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 4 10 9 100 106 99 124 134 92 113 108 114 138 166 170 156 160 ! N. H. 62 N. H. 65 N. J. 65 N. J. N. y. 66 N. Y. Patteen- WOOD- FOEEMEN COBB- Cupola Makebs WOBKBBS M'CHINISTS Maebbs Men Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.67 $1,375 $3.00 $2.00 $1.25 $1,055 Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. No. Wages Mo. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages 1859, July . 1 100 3 100 1860, Jan. ioo 2 ioo ioo 3 ioo July 100 1 109 100 3 100 1861, Jan. 95 100 3 100 July 95 100 2 103- 1862, Jan. 91 100 2 103 July 90 91 100 2 103 1863, Jan. 121 100 9 86 100 2 110 July 90 133 100 7 91 100 2 110 1864, Jan. 120 109 100 12 94 100 2 114 July 120 133 111 17 110 120 3 127 1865, Jan. . 164 139 15 110 120 2 136 July 120 139 17 113 120 2 136 1866, Jan. 150 1 158 139 17 120 120 3 134 July 180 139 19 121 120 3 134 502 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 1—Contimied WAGE-SGBIES FBOU TABLE XH OF THE ALDEICH EEPOET — METALS AND IIETALLIC GOODS iN. Y. IN. Y. 3N. Y. )N. Y. iN. Y. 67 N. Y. Bnginbees Labobebs M'CHINISTS Teamstebs Watchmen Black- smiths Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.00 $0,835 $1,125 $1.00 $0,855 $1.75 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 150 150 150 150 150 6 6 5 '7 13 11 11 12 13 10 8 6 7 100 100 100 '97 98 101 122 125 160 166 166 167 167 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 137 119 133 163 163 163 163 163 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 142 142 142 142 142 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 100 117 117 117 117 117 i 100 100 100 100 100 100 105 105 114 157 157 150 i57 67 New York Bl'ks'ths' Helpees liABOBEBS Machin'ts Machin'ts' Helpees MOLDEBS MOLDEES' Appeen. Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day... 10.875 $0.89 $1.59 $1,095 $1.66 $0,675 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 1 100 107 107 100 100 100 86 143 143 186 186 186 179 186 8 10 9 7 7 8 7 10 9 12 12 11 12 15 100 99 99 97 97 97 103 133 134 177 174 169 170 166 7 8 8 6 6 9 8 12 13 13 12 12 14 13 100 101 102 100 96 100 101 106 115 151 153 153 153 152 7 7 7 5 4 4 2 2 2 5 5 4 5 5 100 100 100 91 95 95 94 105 126 146 146 148 139 144 7 7 6 6 4 7 6 6 7 8 9 8 9 10 100 100 102 100 100 97 103 111 119 138 141 145 142 143 4 3 3 1 1 1 i 2 1 1 2 100 105 103 93 111 111 iii 98 86 111 106 Appendix C 503 TABLE 1— Continued ■WAGE-aEErE3 FKOM TABIyll XH OF TEE ALDEIOH EEPOET — METALS AND METALLIC GOODS 67 N. Y 67 N. Y. 67 N. Y. 67 N. Y. ! N. Y. 68 N. Y. MOLDEKS' Helpees Pattben- MAKEKS Pattekn- MAKEES' Appebn. Watchmen Foremen Bl'ksm's POEEMEN Boilbem's Sex M. M. M. M, M. M. Inlt. wage per day... 11.125 11.50 ®0.33 10.81 $2.00 $2.00 No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 97 97 101 98 96 95 108 108 126 126 130 144 144 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 100 100 100 94 94 94 94 103 106 136 136 136 135 135 'i 1 1 1 'i 1 1 1 1 ioo 100 152 152 i52 189 189 227 227 1 1 1 'i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 103 162 115 115 115 132 123 123 132 132 'i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 'i 166 100 100 100 l-.'5 175 175 225 225 '1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 166 100 100 125 125 125 163 163 163 167 167 i New York Black- smiths BOILEE- MAKBES boileem's' Appeen. Boilbem's' Helpees Machin'ts Machin'ts' Appeen. Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day... 11.25 $1.21 $0,375 $0.84 $1,375 $0,545 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 100 110 166 I63 114 120 140 164 164 155 158 3 2 '5 7 6 5 14 17 30 27 21 18 5 100 98 I32 127 131 116 137 152 162 173 174 174 149 1 2 '2 3 3 1 2 1 4 4 3 100 116 I33 133 111 100 105 112 123 151 156 12 8 '4 9 5 3 5 10 9 5 3 4 1 100 90 116 109 110 114 89 98 98 107 124 108 119 8 4 '3 9 12 13 12 14 11 12 9 11 13 100 100 119 107 115 117 128 131 162 158 144 156 169 4 2 '5 6 7 8 4 7 10 11 11 10 7 100 115 '89 89 108 102 69 90 100 116 118 122 122 504 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 1—Ccmtinued WAGE-SEEIES PEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDRICH EBPOitT — filETALS AND METALLIC GOODS 68N. Y. 68N. Y. 68 N. Y. 68 N. Y. 69 N. Y. 69 N. Y. MOLDEES MOLDEBS' Appeent's MOLDEES' Helpeeb Patteen- Makees M'CHINISTS M'ch'n'sts' Appeent's Sex M. M. M. M. M. H. Iiiit. wage per day.. 11.315 $0.50 iO.72 $1.29 $1.49 $0,855 No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 8 11 ii 11 16 13 23 23 39 41 29 35 26 100 116 ii? 117 115 117 122 123 137 149 147 149 152 2 1 2 2 2 1 4 6 6 4 2 1 3 100 125 '84 84 117 117 113 106 129 148 157 84 97 12 8 1 8 10 14 16 10 12 i 2 2 2 100 128 122 130 120 131 135 162 162 i39 191 153 174 3 2 1 1 2 3 7 8 8 9 5 4 5 5 100 107 126 136 116 116 116 133 143 158 169 179 180 186 25 17 18 20 35 22 15 2 1 63 65 61 43 54 100 96 99 102 103 115 115 109 235 154 157 159 168 172 7 9 13 6 7 4 5 i2 12 9 3 8 100 74 86 91 99 95 89 '83 85 77 94 81 )N. Y. 70 N. Y. "1 N. Y. 71 N. Y. 71 N. Y. 71 N. Y. M'ch'n'sts' Foeemen Black- Bl' ks'ths' Helpers Bl KS'THS smiths Helpees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.25 $1.90 $3.00 $2,075 $1.15 $1,915 No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. 3 100 7 100 100 12 100 11 100 9 100 July 4 92 8 98 100 12 100 11 100 9 100 1861, Jan. 5 98 4 99 100 10 100 13 100 8 101 July 8 95 2 103 100 9 101 11 100 8 101 1862, Jan. 7 102 6 97 1 100 9 103 5 100 8 103 July 5 92 5 102 100 9 104 13 104 8 103 1863, Jan. 2 80 4 104 1 111 9 113 5 120 8 108 July 5 107 111 10 117 12 124 9 121 1864, Jan. 4 125 133 11 132 15 141 8 130 July 7 98 4 144 167 11 160 17 174 6 135 1865, Jan. 7 98 5 155 167 17 155 18 172 6 136 July 8 104 5 159 167 13 164 13 177 6 136 1866, Jan. 1 110 5 162 167 14 164 15 176 6 140 July 3 110 5 169 167 13 167 15 176 6 145 Appendix C 505 TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEEIES FEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH KEPOET — MBTAIiS AND METALLIC GOODS 71 N. Y. n N. Y. 71 N. Y. 71 N. Y. 72 N. Y. 72 N. Y. Deaughts- MEN Laboeees MOLDEES Pattben- Maeebs Black- smiths Bl'ks'ths' Helpees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. luit. wage per day.. $2,165 11.00 $1,885 $1.96 $1,515 $0,875 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 5 7 7 7 8 6 9 100 100 98 98 100 100 106 115 127 137 155 154 171 183 12 12 10 10 10 10 11 11 13 19 10 15 19 18 100 100 100 100 102 103 111 121 130 152 150 152 152 152 14 14 13 13 11 12 11 12 15 16 10 15 17 15 100 100 102 102 104 102 107 115 132 158 164 160 170 171 3 3 4 .4 5 5 5 5 7 8 6 7 5 5 100 100 97 97 94 94 99 111 125 146 145 144 147 148 9 8 5 4 5 4 5 4 3 5 3 5 4 3 100 97 92 93 96 109 102 122 121 144 149 152 165 165 7 10 6 5 9 5 6 7 10 7 8 12 11 9 100 105 100 103 103 111 114 118 129 165 171 170 177 176 72 New York Caep'nt'es Cabpbnt's Helpers Coal Wheelees M'CHINISTS Masons Masons' Helpees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,625 $0,815 $0,895 $1,375 $2.50 $0,965 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 2 1 1 'i 1 5 5 4 7 7 ioo 92 92 i23 135 126 135 134 134 130 'i 3 6 9 6 2 3 4 4 3 ioo i48 161 171 202 107 210 215 211 204 11 6 9 5 10 9 6 10 16 13 15 i5 14 100 102 103 109 104 131 126 148 164 170 198 i97 197 3 6 9 7 6 4 '5 8 4 6 8 100 101 102 108 103 104 ieo 181 166 174 176 1 1 1 1 2 6 8 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 100 100 100 100 87 83 82 87 92 104 104 96 109 109 5 4 5 5 4 7 7 5 7 6 10 5 4 7 100 104 100 100 89 107 109 114 121 138 148 149 149 149 506 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEEIE8 FROM TABLE XII OF THE ALDitlCH BEPOET — METALS AND METALLIC GOODS 73 Pennsylvania Black- smiths Bl'ks'ths' Eelfebs COEE- Makebs Labobeks M'CHINISTS MOLDEES Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.89 $1.00 $1,335 $1.00 $1,705 11.635 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 5 3 3 4 5 100 103 100 103 108 106 112 126 139 139 159 153 152 148 2 4 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 4 100 100 100 100 100 113 113 121 125 150 167 167 167 167 1 2 2 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 5 5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 112 125 137 150 150 150 150 13 16 16 17 20 22 18 21 20 22 20 24 18 23 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 114 123 148 159 159 159 159 12 9 9 8 11 13 13 13 13 13 14 8 8 16 100 102 102 103 103 103 103 112 116 144 162 159 173 165 5 8 8 9 9 8 8 7 5 4 3 4 4 8 100 94 97 98 96 94 97 101 112 122 132 132 153 153 73 Pa. 74 Pa. 74 Pa. 74 Pa. 74 Pa. 74 Pa. Patteen- Black- Bl ks'ths' COEB- Deaughts- Enginbees Makees smiths Helpees Makees BrTEN" Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1,585 $2.20 $1.40 $1.20 $2.50 $2.40 Eel. Eel. Eel. Eel. Rel. Eel. Wages Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages No. Wages 1860, Jan. 4 100 2 100 2 100 8 100 100 July 2 110 2 100 3 107 8 100 2 100 100 1861, Jan. 3 112 2 100 3 107 10 100 2 100 100 July 3 112 2 91 3 107 10 100 2 100 100 1862, Jan. 3 112 2 91 3 107 9 117 2 100 100 July 3 112 2 100 3 107 8 117 2 100 100 1863, Jan. 3 119 2 100 3 114 10 117 2 100 100 July 3 126 2 114 3 114 12 117 2 100 110 1864, Jan. 3 152 2 114 3 114 7 117 2 108 110 July 2 174 2 114 3 121 7 125 2 108 125 1865, Jan. 3 175 2 114 3 121 7 142 2 108 125 July 3 175 2 114 3 121 7 142 2 108 125 1866, Jan. 5 173 3 114 4 121 10 167 2 108 125 July 5 173 3 114 4 121 8 167 2 108 125 Appendix C 507 TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEEXES FEOM TABLE XH. OF THE ALDBICH EEPOET — UETALS AND METALLIC GOODS 74 Pennsylvania Labobees M'CHINISTS Mill- weights MOLDBES Patteen- Makees P't'n-M'k's Hblpees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.00 11.65 $2.00 $1.70 11.535 $1.30 No. Kel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. ,Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan, July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 15 15 15 12 14 13 14 12 13 15 17 18 18 18 100 110 110 110 110 120 140 140 140 140 150 150 150 150 16 17 15 14 14 16 16 15 16 16 16 16 15 14 100 101 101 100 112 112 112 112 124 124 138 138 158 157 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 115 125 150 150 185 185 12 12 10 8 10 10 10 6 6 10 8 8 10 10 100 100 118 118 118 129 129 147 147 176 176 176 176 176 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 100 101 101 101 107 114 121 127 130 143 159 159 176 176 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 100 100 100 100 100 100 115 115 115 115 154 154 123 123 papee 75 Massachusetts Engineees Sex Initial wage per day 1860, January July 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January July M. $1,165 No. Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 100 100 115 115 115 129 143 143 143 143 FiNISHEES M. $1.25 No. Eel. Wages No. 100 100 100 100 87 87 107 107 107 140 160 160 200 200 Laboeees $1.00 Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 80 80 100 100 100 134 150 167 150 150 Machine Hands M. $1,335 No. Eel, Wages 100 100 100 100 100 112 112 112 125 150 169 169 187 187 508 History of the G-eeenbacks TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SERIES FEOM TABLE Xn OF THE ALDEICH EEPOET — PAPER 75 Massachusetts Sex Initial wage per day 1860, January July 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January July M'h'ne H's Helpers M. 11.00 No. Bel. Wages No. Paper Cutters F. 10.50 Eel. Wages Eag Sorters $0.50 No. Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 100 117 117 117 117 150 150 150 150 150 100 100 100 100 80 80 100 100 100 117 117 130 130 150 100 100 100 100 80 80 100 100 100 117 117 117 117 130 railways 76 Massachusetts Baggage- men Braeeuen Pass'g'r Brakbmen Freight Conduct's Pass'g'r Conduct's Freight Engineers locomo've Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day... $1,915 $1.25 $1,165 $3,195 $1.61 $2.30 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 6 6 6 6 8 10 4 10 6 10 10 10 10 3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 110 110 110 10 12 18 18 18 18 12 9 17 6 12 18 32 18 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 153 140 153 22 6 14 10 12 12 13 13 16 1? 10 10 16 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 146 146 16 12 12 12 10 12 12 22 22 16 10 13 12 12 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 20 19 23 22 23 16 17 17 30 22 26 17 21 23 100 102 109 108 111 110 111 113 110 110 163 165 172 159 56 41 33 46 46 40 43 47 43 46 50 56 46 48 100 100 100 100 100 100 105 105 106 106 125 130 130 131 Appendix C 509 TABLE 1— Continued WAGE-SEBIES FEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH EEPOET — RAILWAYS 76 Massachusetts Firemen Locomotive Foremen Masons Carpenters Masons Painters Sex M. M. M M. M. Initial wage per day... $1,145 $2.50 $1.30 $2.00 $1,425 No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 42 24 38 22 22 50 38 56 36 36 36 42 40 42 100 114 114 114 114 114 117 117 117 117 153 153 153 153 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 140 140 160 100 79 49 65 24 29 68 49 27 58 61 50 54 100 iii 107 87 98 108 131 118 170 165 135 156 '4 '7 's 3 6 3 5 16 19 ioo '91 iis 125 125 125 140 105 147 11 1 1 "4 's '9 8 6 6 11 100 117 140 '96 165 146 145 142 160 177 SIDEWALKS 77 New York Sex Initial wage per day 1860, January July 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January July 1864, January July 1865, January July 1866, January — July Sidewalk Layers M. $2.00 No. Rel. Wages Sidewalk Layers' Helpers M. $1.00 No, Eel. Wages Stone cutters M. $2.00 No. Rel. Wages Teamsters M. $2.00 No. Rel. Wages 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 113 138 138 175 175 175 188 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 125 175 175 250 250 275 275 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 113 138 138 175 175 175 188 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 510 History of the Gtkeenbaoks TABLE 1 — Continued WAGB-SERIEa FEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH BEPORT — SPICE 78 Pennsylvania Sex . Initial wage per day . 1860, January . July .... 1861, January . July . . . . 1862, January. July .... 1863, January. July 1864, January . July .... 1865, January . July .... 1866, January . July Gkindees M. $1.00 No. Hel. Wages 100 100 92 84 84 84 111 142 134 134 Labokebs M. $1.05 ,, Eel. No. Wages 100 100 101 103 103 106 112 116 115 149 152 167 167 167 TEAMSTEE3 M. 11.50 No. Eel. Wages 100 100 100 122 122 122 117 117 Packees $0.12" No. Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 79 Conn. 79 Conn. STONE 80 Conn. 80 Conn. 81 Md. 81 Md. Foremen Qcakkym'n Qdae'ym'nS Foremen 3 QOAEElfM'N Quar'ym'n* Caepent'3 Caevers Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. $1,435 $0.80 $1,465 $0.82 $1,375 $2.50 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, J an. July 4 2 2 6 3 3 6 2 5 5 8 5 9 100 98 113 126 120 137 137 98 140 142 169 167 178 89 267 50 138 37 140 26 268 162 213 143 208 247 300 100 100 113 97 100 91 100 114 136 135 159 155 177 158 3 4 4 1 2 3 3 7 6 5 6 6 100 100 126 84 '79 105 126 114 133 132 145 138 86 117 109 83 'so 5 126 130 162 81 162 148 195 100 100 149 80 '87 110 111 165 130 152 144 174 156 1 1 1 i 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 i2i 121 121 115 121 121 121 121 2 2 1 'i 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 ioo 95 125 130 130 145 140 1 Per gross. 2 Because of difference between the summer and winter wages of quarrymen, the relative wages for January of each year are computed as percentages of the wage in January, 1860 ($0.80), and those for July as percentages of the wage in July, 1860 ($1.18). 3 See note concerning quarrymen, Stone 79 ; wages Jan., 1860, $1.465 ; July, 1860, $1.90. * See note concerning quarrymen, Stone 79 ; wages Jan., 1860, $0.82 ; July , 1860, $1.22. Appendix 511 TABLE 1 — Continued WAGB-SEEIES FBOUC TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH EEPOET — STONE 81 Maryland Engineers Labokees Maeblb CnTTEES Maeble polishees Maeble Rdbbees TEAMSTBE8 Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. $1.50 11.125 12.00 $1.15 $1,085 $1,125 No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 '89 111 111 145 145 145 145 145 2 2 2 '2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 100 100 100 '89 111 111 141 148 148 158 158 7 7 6 4 '7 6 8 9 9 8 8 100 113 104 100 iis 113 145 163 163 163 163 5 5 4 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 100 100 98 87 '87 109 120 140 149 149 155 155 6 4 4 3 2 1 5 5 5 10 9 11 9 9 100 101 101 100 104 92 92 115 118 151 154 153 149 150 2 2 2 2 100 100 ioo 89 89 100 111 133 148 148 163 163 81 Md. 82 N. Y. 82 N. Y. ;n. Y. 83 N. Y. 81 Pa. Watchm'n Maeble CUTTEES Maeble polishbbs Maeble Rubbers Geanite Gutters Laborbes Ses M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day. $1.00 $2.00 $1,315 $1,155 $2.25 $1.25 No. Eel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages No. Rel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1 1 1 1 'i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100 100 100 72 ioo 100 100 125 125 125 125 125 5 8 6 8 5 6 4 9 9 9 9 11 13 21 100 102 87 78 74 86 88 98 108 131 136 149 146 148 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 5 4 5 7 15 12 9 100 100 92 79 81 83 89 106 112 156 156 166 157 153 8 14 12 12 6 9 10 10 7 11 7 6 5 7 100 99 95 88 88 88 98 133 119 160 166 181 195 200 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 6 6 8 7 7 100 100 83 89 89 83 89 94 97 133 133 133 133 157 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 512 HiSTOEY OF THE GbEENBAOKS TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-HBEIES FROM TABLE XII OP THE ALDEICH KEPOET — STONE 84 Pennsylvania. Stone Cut- tees Stone Cdt- TBBS Sex M. Sex M. Initial wage per day $1.50 Initial wage per day $1.50 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, January 1 3 2 4 2 6 2 100 117 100 117 100 117 133 1863, July 5 4 8 3 5 4 7 133 July .. . 1864. January 158 1861, January July 179 July 1865, January 206 1862, January July 203 July 1866, January 217 1863, January July 217 ■WHITE LEAD (5 Pennsylvania Sex Initial wage per day 1860, January July 1861, January July 1862, January July 1863, January .... July 1864, January July 1865, January .... July 1866, January July Engineees M. $1.50 Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 111 111 111 111 133 133 117 117 117 117 Laboeees M. $1.12 Eel. Wages 100 100 101 102 104 104 112 112 110 143 150 156 156 156 Laboeees, Boys M. $0,635 Eel. 100 105 105 92 105 105 92 101 118 105 98 105 105 Watchmen M. $1,145 No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 i 1 1 1 1 Eel. Wages 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 125 iso 150 150 150 150 Appendix 513 TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEKIES FEOM TABLE XII OF THE AI^DBICH EEPOBT — WOOLEN GOODS 86 Connecticut OVEESEBEa Caed. Dep. oveesbees Dye House ovbesbbes Finish. Dep oveesebes Fulling & GiGG. Dep. oveesbees Wbav.Dbp. Cakd Cleanees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. 12.00 11.80 $1,375 11.375 11.50 $0.69 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 100 100 125 125 88 125 150 150 150 150 180 190 190 190 100 100 100 100 83 83 83 83 125 128 167 167 167 167 100 100 100 100 100 109 218 218 218 218 262 262 262 262 100 109 109 109 109 109 109 95 84 98 145 120 120 120 100 100 100 117 117 117 117 117 133 173 177 175 200 200 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 5 4 5 2 3 3 6 100 . 100 112 112 138 100 103 104 109 112 154 115 138 121 > Connecticut Caed Tendbes Caepent's FULLBES & GlGGBES Loom Fixers Second- hands Sheaebes Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day . . 10.60 11.50 $0.84 11.25 $0.90 $0.75 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July I 5 5 8 8 4 7 6 6 7 7 9 6 100 104 107 105 106 101 108 105 113 99 143 137 123 130 1 1 i 'i 2 1 1 1 100 100 ios ios 108 108 150 150 4 8 3 6 10 8 3 12 9 3 6 6 9 10 100 88 107 93 94 95 107 86 87 149 168 151 152 154 i 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 ioo 100 93 110 113 125 176 192 160 160 150 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 98 98 106 100 119 98 107 111 144 158 150 189 i i 4 4 2 2 3 2 3 4 5 ioo ioo 117 107 103 133 149 187 193 183 160 514 History op the Geeenbaoks TABLE 1 — Continued WAGB-SBEIES FROM TABLE XII OF THE ALDKICH BEPOET — WOOLEN GOODS 86 Connecticut Spinnees Jack and Mule SOETEES Watchmen Weavees Yaen Caeeibes Deawees- IN Sex M. M. M. M. M. F. Init. wage per day.. $1.05 $1.50 $1.00 $0,925 $0.69 10.62 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. 12 100 1 100 100 13 100 1 100 1 100 July 10 101 1 100 100 16 104 2 89 1861, Jan. 9 100 1 100 100 15 125 , July 7 110 1 100 100 16 119 1 ioo 1862, Jan. 10 95 1 100 100 16 121 1 119 July 13 106 3 122 100 22 119 1 119 1863, Jan. 11 124 1 120 100 23 146 1 119 July 12 117 1 142 100 26 120 2 119 1864, Jan. 15 129 2 150 125 25 133 July 14 129 2 150 140 24 145 1 120 1 134 1865, Jan. 11 160 1 157 150 27 173 2 133 1 202 July 15 170 1 160 175 22 151 2 133 1 202 1866, Jan. 13 171 1 167 175 27 159 1 181 1 222 July 12 184 1 160 175 37 175 2 172 86 Conn. 86 Conn. 86 Conn. 86 Conn. 87 Mass. 87 Mass. Handees- Speckees Oveeseees Oveeseees IN Caed. Dep. Dye House Sex P. F. F. F. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $0.50 ■ $0.50 $0.65 $0.81 $2.00 $2.50 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. 1 100 1 100 2 100 4 100 1 100 1 100 July 2 100 3 92 5 119 1 100 1 75 1861, Jan. 2 114 4 136 1 115 1 75 July i 60 4 ioo 2 114 4 131 1 115 1 75 1862, Jan. 1 60 2 100 4 102 4 132 1 113 July 1 60 2 114 5 130 1 115 1 113 1863, Jan. 1 60 2 ios 3 128 4 160 1 115 2 119 July 2 60 6 108 4 103 6 117 1 115 1 125 1864, Jan. , 7 102 7 141 2 138 July 1 90 4 i32 8 106 5 148 2 138 1 150 1865, Jan. 1 96 2 140 6 82 5 180 2 138 1 150 July 1 120 5 128 7 152 1 125 1 150 1866, Jan. 1 90 i 126 6 117 4 151 1 150 1 175 July 2 166 3 123 4 184 1 150 1 175 Appendix C 515 TABLE 1 — ContinvM WAaE-SBEIBa PEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH EEPOET — WOOLEN GOODS 87 Massachusetts ovebseeks Weav.Dep. Cakdees Cabd Tendebs Dye-Hodse Hands LOOM- FlXEES Cabd Tenders Sex M. M. M. M. M. F. Init. wage per day.. $1.75 $0,795 $0,378 $0.65 $1.25 $0,418 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 100 100 100 107 114 114 114 171 iii 171 229 229 229 8 6 9 4 3 7 8 5 5 12 8 6 7 8 100 120 108 95 103 109 109 123 122 113 116 135 148 147 6 14 7 14 19 22 30 12 13 5 7 4 6 5 100 137 135 143 136 148 146 152 155 144 160 173 179 179 22 16 16 23 29 29 i9 22 24 18 12 15 16 15 100 94 101 99 98 102 119 119 119 132 155 156 195 195 1 1 1 i 1 3 6 5 13 9 7 7 100 100 100 iio 140 122 i27 148 164 184 192 192 4 2 '5 13 8 20 14 15 16 15 18 17 100 115 i28 120 123 130 128 136 146 147 165 165 88 Ehode Island OVEESEEES OVEESEEES OvEESEEES OVEESEEES OVEESEEES Second- Cabd. Dep. Dye Hocsb Finish.Dep Spinn. Dep. Weav.Dep. hands Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.75 $1.67 $1.50 $1.33 $1.33 $1,145 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. 100 1 100 100 1 100 100 3 100 July 100 1 100 100 1 110 107 3 102 1861, Jan. 100 1 105 100 1 110 107 3 102 July 100 1 105 100 1 113 107 3 103 1862, Jan. 100 1 105 100 1 113 107 3 104 July 100 1 120 100 1 113 107 3 104 1863, Jan. 143 1 120 100 1 126 113 3 119 July 143 1 120 100 1 126 113 3 119 1864, Jan. 157 1 120 111 1 150 126 3 132 July 157 1 120 111 1 150 126 3 132 1865, Jan. 200 1 120 111 1 150 138 3 132 July 200 1 120 111 1 150 138 3 1,32 1866, Jan. 200 1 120 111 1 150 150 3 132 July 229 1 120 136 1 201 150 3 128 516 HiSTOEr OF THE Gebenbacks TABLE 1 — Continued WAGE-SEKIES FEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDEICH EEPOKT — WOOLEN GOODS 88 Khode Island Alley Boys Caed Feedbes Cleanebs DBESSEK9 Dtees Filling Caebiees Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. 10.63 $0.58 $0.83 $1.00 $1.10 11.12 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 100 100 100 100 100 79 79 79 92 92 100 100 100 113 5 5 5 5 5 5 100 100 100 100 100 86 86 86 122 122 143 143 152 159 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 4 4 2 2 2 3 100 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 100 100" 86 86 88 80 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 100 117 125 150 100 100 109 114 114 114 109 114 114 114 114 114 114 118 100 100 100 100 112 112 112 112 112 119 119 127 127 127 88 Ehode Island Pilling Sorters PiNISHEES FULLEES GiGGEES liABOREES, Dye House PlCKEES Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. 11.21 $0.79 $1.17 $0.79 $0.96 $1.21 No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages No. Eel. Wages 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 100 100 100 100 103 103 110 110 110 110 110 110 114 117 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 100 100 100 100 100 95 95 95 116 116 127 127 127 137 100 100 100 100 100 103 103 107 107 107 107 114 114 114 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 95 95 105 105 105 127 127 127 127 142 148 2 2 2 3 3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 96 96 100 104 104 104 104 2 2 2 2 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 110 117 117 124 124 124 131 Appendix C 517 TABLE 1 — Continued WAaE-SEBIES FEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH BEFOBT — WOOLEN GOODS 88 Rhode Island Pbess- SCOTIE- Section Sheab- Spinnebs Waste MBN EBS Hands EBS Jack SOETEBS Sex M. M. M. M. M. M. M. Init. wage per day.. $1.00 $0.83 $1.00 $1.00 $0.95 $0.92 $0.92 S ^ 100 125 142 186 196 299 289 St. Liouis, Mo., 44 $ 2.66 1.85 1.00 1.30 2.66 0.70 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 150 127 130 142 150 143 162 162 166 181 162 186 188 178 185 192 188 186 188 178 185 192 188 186 216 Cutter 178 Laborers 185 192 Sorter 216 Stripper 186 New Jersey, 45 Cas6r $ 1.00 2.00 0.70 1.37 2.00 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 129 100 125 100 100 100 129 100 125 100 100 Cutter 100 Laborer Packer 160 100 150 stripper 100 Appendix O 521 TABLE Z— Continued WAGE-SERIES FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS CIGABS AND TOBACCO Wisconsin, 50 Occnpation Initial Wage p'rDay 1860 1861 1862 1863 1861 1865 1866 Maker $ 1.33^ 1.75 0.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 114 120 150 126 133 175 143 133 175 171 133 162 Packer 152 Stripper. 133 CLOTHING Kentucky, 51 Cutter Salesman . Tailor .... Tailoresses $ 3.84 100 100 125 125 125 125 2.56 100 150 150 150 150 150 1.75 100 129 129 171 171 171 1.161 100 129 129 172 172 172 125 150 157 158 Newark, N. J., 51 Cutter Man Tailor Tailoresses Woman . . . $ 2.00 100 125 117 138 142 1.25 100 100 100 100 120 1.25 100 100 100 100 120 0.375 100 100 100 100 133 0.375 100 100 100 100 133 167 130 130 167 167 Syracnse, N. Y., 52 Foreman Apprentice .... Cutter Machine woman Presser Tailor Tailoress Trimmer 80.001 100 100 125 125 150 150 0.335 100 122 122 122 149 149 1.83 100 123 146 146 160 160 0.661 100 113 126 126 126 126 1.00 100 116 133 150 150 150 1.50 100 100 111 122 122 122 0.66J 100 100 126 126 126 126 0.661 100 126 126 126 150 150 150 149 160 126 133 122 126 150 FliOUE MILLS Stanton,' Del., 58 Assistant miller . Miller $ 1.73 2.50 1.73 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Packer 100 1 Per month. 522 History op the Greenbacks TABLE Z— Continued WAQE-SEBIES FBOU VOL. XX OF TEE TENTH CENSUS FLOUB MILLS BeUeviUe, 111., 59 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1861 1865 1866 Assistant miller- Engineer Firemen Laborers Miller 1.73 1.54 1.00 1.00 1.92 1.00 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 89 75 75 75 90 100 75 100 100 100 100 100 125 100 133 125 125 125 160 125 125 166 162 175 150 200 200 150 178 186 175 150 250 200 150 200 249 200 150 300 200 Teamster 175 Port Wayne, Ind., 60, 61 Assistant miller Laborer Miller Millwright Packer Stone dresser. . . Teamster l.*75 100 100 114 114 114 114 1.00 100 125 125 150 150 150 2.50 100 120 120 140 140 140 3.00 100 100 100 117 117 117 1.25 100 100 104 108 116 120 1.75 100 114 114 129 129 129 1.25 100 120 120 140 140 140 114 125 120 100 88 129 140 Lafayette, Ind., 62 Assistant miller. Laborers Miller Millwrights Stone dressers. . . Teamster 1.^15 100 117 117 152 217 217 0.875 100 100 100 129 153 153 1.44 100 116 116 139 174 174 3.00 100 117 117 117 117 2.00 100 100 113 113 125 1.15 100 100 100 130 174 174 181 181 174 117 125 174 De Soto, la., 64 Assistant miller. Laborer Miller Millwright Teamster $ 0.60 100 167 167 208 200 0.55 100 150 178 201 218 1.15 100 150 250 250 235 1.50 100 117 133 167 167 0.60 100 167 167 208 200 250 160 200 150 167 Appendix C 523 TABLE Z— Continued WAGE-SERIES FBOU VOL, XX OP THE TENTH CENSUS GAS AND GAS COKE Indianapolis, Ind., 76 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Laborer Stoker $ 1.00 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 150 150 150 150 175 200 175 200 East Boston, Mass., 77 Foreman . Laborer . . 16.00' M.OO' 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 FlilNT GLASS Cambridge, Mass., 81 Manager Blower Carrying-in boy . Clay-tramper . . . Clearing-off boy. Cutter Driver Engineer Engraver Finisher Gatherer Laborers Machinist Mixer Mold-holder Mold-maker Packer Pot-flller Pot-maker Presser Sticker-up Teaser 125.002 100 100 100 100 120 120 3.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 0.62 100 100 100 100 161 161 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 0.62 100 100 100 100 161 161 2.00 100 100 100 100 138 138 1.50 100 100 100 100 117 117 2.00 100 100 100 100 125 125 2.00 100 100 100 100 138 138 2.52 100 99 99 99 119 119 1.00 100 100 100 100 200 200 1.50 100 100 100 300 117 117 2.00 100 100 100 100 138 138 1.50 100 100 100 100 133 133 0.62 100 100 100 100 161 161 2.00 100 100 100 100 138 138 1.50 100 100 100 100 117 117 1.50 100 100 100 100 133 133 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 133 133 0.75 100 100 100 100 167 167 1.50 100 100 100 100 133 133 120 100 161 100 161 138 117 125 138 119 200 117 138 133 161 138 117 133 100 133 167 133 1 Per week. 2 Per month. 524 HiSTOKY OF THE GeEENBACKS TABLE Z— Continued WAGB-SEBIBS I'BOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS FLINT QLASS Pittsburg, Pa., 84, 85 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman cutter . Carrying-in boy . Clay-tramper . . . Cutter, j'yman . . 21.0)1 0.60 6.501 7.371 7.001 2.58 1.12 5.001 6.501 11.701 6.251 13.001 2.62 0.90 6.501 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 108 105 100 131 136 120 123 114 120 131 126 100 115 100 100 108 105 100 131 136 120 123 114 120 131 126 100 115 100 100 108 105 100 131 136 120 123 114 120 131 126 100 115 143 las 169 170 186 Finisher Gatherer Laborer Mixer 196 176 200 215 Mold-m'k'r, ass't Packer 194 232 Pot-maker Presser 146 193 Stieker-up 178 262 Pennsylvania, 86, 87 Blower 2.00 100 109 113 175 245 245 Pen nsylvan a, 87, 88 Manager 76.*002 100 100 100 100 100 100 158 Cutter 2.50 1.00 1.50 100 ioo 80 100 100 80 133 111 80 167 133 80 200 133 100 200 167 100 Driver 200 Engineer 178 Furnaceman 1.50 100 100 117 117 117 133 150 Laborer 1.33J^ 100 100 100 100 100 125 125 Mixer 1.661 100 70 70 70 70 80 80 Mold-cleaner 0.75 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 Mold-maker 3.00 100 100 100 100 100 111 111 Packer 1.161 100 94 94 100 100 129 129 Top-iiller 1.661 100 70 70 70 70 80 80 Leerman 1.10 100 136 155 155 159 182 182 1.42f 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 1 Per week. 2 Pen Qonth. Appendix 525 TABLE 2— Continued WAGE-SEBIES FBOM VOL. XX OF THl! TENTH CENSUS FLINT GLASS Wheeling, W. Va., 89 Occupation Initial Wage per Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Manager Clay-tramijer . Driver Eng'r and blksm. Laborer Mixer Moldm'krJ'yman Packer Pot-flller Pot-maker Teaser 120.001 0.83^ 1.16 1.75 0.83 J^ 0.911 2.08 1.125 0.83J^ 1.50 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 127 90 100 100 100 100 100 89 86 76 90 109 96 89 90 83 100 100 119 115 133 120 127 108 119 120 83 100 100 159 158 152 160 145 163 148 160 122 200 100 159 158 171 160 145 132 160 160 133 200 100 159 158 171 160 154 130 148 169 144 200 ICE Peoria, 111., 108 Carpenter Hook-carrier Laborer $ 1.50 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 133 125 100 125 125 125 125 117 125 133 125 100 125 125 125 125 133 125 133 125 100 125 125 125 167 200 150 167 150 120 150 150 125 167 167 150 133 150 120 150 125 125 167 183 175 167 150 Peddler 140 175 Sawyer 150 Spudder Teamster 150 208 lEON BLAST FUENACES — ANTHEACITE New York, 115 Manager Blacksmith . Brksmith'shelp'r Bottom-filler Carpenter Cinderman Engineer Founder Keeper Keeper's helper . Laborer 125.001 100 100 100 100 100 140 1.375 100 91 100 119 145 164 1.25 100 85 90 100 130 120 1.00 100 88 94 125 175 164 1.25 100 100 100 140 160 170 1.125 100 89 95 122 167 156 15.002 100 96 100 117 167 167 1.50 100 89 94 118 142 142 1.25 100 90 95 120 160 150 1.125 100 89 95 122 167 156 1.00 100 88 94 125 163 150 140 182 140 164 200 156 125 144 150 156 150 iPer month. 2 Per week. 526 HiSTOET OP THE GREENBACKS TABLE 2— Continued WAGE-SEEIES FEOM VOIi. XX OP THE TENTH CENBBS lEON BLAST FUBN ACES — ANTHE AOITB Catasanquaf Pa., 116 Initial Occupation Wage p'rDay I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman, $ maihine shops 2.50 100 100 100 114 130 130 127 Blacksmith, boss 1.55 100 100 97 113 145 145 145 Carpenter, boss . 1.75 100 100 106 114 129 135 143 Boss laborer 2.00 100 100 100 113 125 125 138 Boss mason 1.60 100 97 97 125 172 156 172 Bl'ksmith helper 0.80 100 100 125 144 200 200 200 Bl'ksmith j'yman 1.35 100 100 93 111 130 130 137 Bottom- and top-filler 1.43 100 100 104 108 154 149 148 Brakeman 1.00 100 90 100 120 360 175 185 Carpenterj'yman 1.25 100 100 108 120 160 160 168 Engineer 7.911 100 93 106 124 164 159 177 Engineers, 1 o c o- motive 1.65 100 97 106 106 121 141 145 Fireman 1.12 100 94 98 121 156 161 170 Founder 2.25 100 100 100 100 133 133 133 Keeper 2.01 100 95 102 107 135 130 129 Keeper's helper. . 1.69 100 101 103 100 137 136 135 Laborer 0.80 100 100 113 141 181 178 191 Machinist 1.40 100 100 104 118 150 161 143 1.40 100 96 96 125 161 161 161 Pennsylvania, 119 Blacksmith . . . Bl'ksmith helper Engineer, j'yman. Bottom-filler Cinderman Founder Keeper Keeper's helper . Laborer Metal-weighman, Top-filler 1.25 1.00 8.04 0.90 1.50 1.30 1.15 1.00 0.875 0.90 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 86 88 100 111 117 103 100 100 100 100 113 100 100 110 125 75 103 116 113 114 111 113 146 114 139 151 86 175 150 143 130 127 143 186 200 160 222 133 219 198 200 229 190 214 203 200 187 222 133 296 192 207 171 199 207 200 200 149 222 133 296 192 207 171 199 200 1 Per week. Appendix 521 TABLE 2—Contimied WAQE-SEBIES FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS lEON BLAST FUBN ACES — BITUMIN0D3 Youngstown, O., 122 Occupation Initial Wage p'rDay I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Manager Blacksmith Bottom-filler and top-filler Carpenter Cinderman Engineer Pounder Keeper 100*00' 1.50 1.125 1.50 1.00 1.12 4.81 1.50 1.125 0.875 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 122 118 138 120 100 127 133 143 140 100 167 222 175 238 210 100 192 222 229 250 100 292 200 150 225 210 100 175 200 200 225 100 292 188 167 212 220 100 167 Keeper's helper. Laborer Metal-carrier 188 200 225 IBON BLAST FUKNACES — CHABCOAL Baltimore, Md., 128 Manager Coal-raker Collier Engineer Filler Keeper Keeper's helper $ 32.001 100 113 139 175 0.85 100 134 155 218 0.95 100 116 133 165 6.00 100 121 150 192 0.96 100 111 131 164 0.85 100 . 126 146 193 0.78 100 128 146 182 Boiling Springs, Pa., 132 Blacksmith Carpenter Cartman Coal-raker Collier i.ls 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.10 1.50 1.10 1.30 1.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Filler 100 Founder Gutterman Keeper 100 100 100 Keeper's helper.. 100 100 Ore miner Teamster 100 100 iPer month. 528 HiSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS TABLE Z—Cemtinued WAGE-SEBIES FROM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CEXSUS IBON BLAST FTTBNACES — CHAECOAIi Pilot Knob, Mo., 129 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Filler Keeper Laborer . . $ 1.00 1.35 1.00 100 100 100 ... ... 110 85 100 120 93 115 150 111 140 140 148 140 Amenia, N.Y., 130 Filler $ 0.875 100 86 129 137 171 raON AND STEEL FODNDETES- Quincy, lU., 141 Foreman Blacksmith Carpenter Cleaner Cupola man Engineers Filer Finisher Grinder Laborer Melter Melter's helper. . Holder Holder's ap'rent. Mounter Pattern-dresser . . Pattern-maker . . Teamster 80.00' 100 113 113 125 125 125 1.50 100 117 117 133 133 133 1.50 100 117 133 133 150 167 1.25 100 120 120 120 140 140 2.25 100 100 111 111 111 111 1.75 100 114 114 114 129 129 1.25 100 120 140 160 180 180 1.25 100 100 120 120 140 140 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.25 100 100 100 120 120 120 2.00 100 113 125 125 125 125 1.75 100 100 114 114 114 114 3.00 100 117 150 158 167 167 0.50 100 200 200 200 200 200 1.50 100 117 117 133 133 150 1.50 100 117 117 117 117 100 2.00 100 113 125 138 150 150 1.25 100 100 120 120 120 140 125 133 167 140 111 129 180 140 100 120 125 114 167 200 150 100 150 140 Philadelphia, Pa., 148 Engineer Finisher Laborers Holder Holder's helper.. l.*50 100 133 133 133 133 1.39 1.15^ 100 80 101 94 207 170 1.08 100 84 81 100 121 132 1.545 100 93 128 71 128 218 1.241 100 81 81 52 90 78 156 188 136 184 85 1 Per month. Appendix C 52£ TABLE 2— Continued WAGE-SEBIES FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSnS IRON AND STEEL FOUNDEIES — STOVE Taunton, Mass., 142, 143 Occnpation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman Carpenter Cleaner $ 66.66|i 1.75 1.50 1.75 1.50 1.75 1.50 1.25 3.00 1.50 2.50 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 86 83 86 83 86 83 80 67 83 80 75 100 100 93 86 93 91 93 96 75 93 90 95 113 114 100 129 100 114 100 120 92 100 110 113 113 143 117 157 117 143 117 140 83 117 140 Engineer Filer Finishers Grinder Laborer ... .... Melter Melter's helpers. Molder Mounter 138 St. liOuis, Mo., 143, 144 Foreman Carpenter .. Cleaner Cupola man. Engineer Filer Laborer Melter Molder Mounter Teamster . . . 150.001 100 133 133 133 133 133 2.301 100 100 160 160 160 147 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.54 100 110 180 180 180 180 2.885 100 100 120 120 120 120 2.00 100 100 150 150 200 200 1.50 100 133 133 150 150 147 1.54 100 110 180 180 180 180 2.00 100 100 100 250 250 250 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 111 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 167 147 100 165 107 200 i65 200 113 77 HABDWABE Coaneotiout, 159 Foreman . . . Blacksmith Galvanizer . Grinder . . . Packer 65.00' 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 107 107 107 107 110 1.25 100 112 112 112 112 112 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 110 2.00 100 113 113 113 113 125 108 110 120 110 125 1 Per month. 530 History of the Grbenbaoks TABLE 2 — Continued WAGE-SEEIES FEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS EABDWABE Connecticut, 157 Initial Occupation Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman 6O.*0Oi 100 100 125 125 125 125 125 Blacksmith 2.00 100 100 113 125 138 138 150 Engineer 2.00 100 100 113 113 113 125 125 2.125 1.75 100 100 100 100 118 114 129 129 141 143 141 143 153 Grinder 157 Helper 1.50 1.50 100 100 100 100 117 117 117 117 133 133 133 133 150 Packer 133 Laborer 1.00 100 100 125 125 125 125 150 Machinist 2.00 100 100 113 113 113 125 125 Polisher 1.75 100 100 114 114 129 129 129 Temperer 1.50 100 100 117 117 133 133 150 Chicopee, Mass., 159 Foreman .. Blacksmith Forger Grinder . . . Helper . . . . Laborer . . . Machinist . Polisher . . . Temperer . 71.501 100 109 109 109 127 145 2.00 100 100 100 113 125 138 1.60 100 100 100 109 125 141 1.90 100 100 100 105 145 158 0.90 100 100 100 111 139 167 0.90 100 100 100 111 139 167 1.75 100 100 100 114 129 143 1.25 100 100 100 120 140 160 2.15 100 100 100 116 140 163 145 138 141 158 167 167 143 160 163 Massachnsetts, 161 Foreman . . Blacksmith Forger Grinder . . . Laborer . . . Machinist . Packer Polisher . . . Temperer . . 52.001 100 100 100 113 125 125 2.00 100 100 100 125 150 150 1.25 100 120 140 140 180 180 1.75 100 100 114 114 114 114 1.00 100 100 100 125 125 125 2.17 100 104 104 104 115 127 1.50 100 100 117 117 133 167 1.50 100 100 117 117 117 117 1.00 100 100 125 125 150 167 138 175 180 114 140 138 200 117 167 1 Per Month. Appendix 531 TABLE 2 — Continued WAQE-gEErBS FBOSI VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS HAEDWAEB Massachusetts, 160, 161 Forger . . . Laborer . . Machinist Packer . . . Polisher . . Temperer . $ 3.00 100 100 100 117 117 117 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.75 100 100 100 114 114 114 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 117 117 117 2.50 100 100 100 110 110 110 125 125 129 100 117 110 FishervUle, N . H., 162 Occupation Initial Wage p'rDay 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman $ 52.00 > 3.841 1.125 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 75 111 125 75 111 150 75 Laborer 133 New York, 164 Forger Grinder Helper, first . . . Helper, second. $ 3.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 MACHINEBY Lafayette, Ind., 171 Blacksmith Bl'ksmith helper Laborer Machinist Molder Pattern-maker . . $ 2.00 100 100 100 125 138 150 1.25 100 100 100 120 120 160 1.00 100 100 100 125 125 150 1.75 100 100 100 129 157 171 1.75 100 100 100 143 157 171 1.75 100 100 100 129 143 143 150 160 150 171 171 143 Paterson, N . J., 173 Blacksmith Laborer Machinist $ 1.075 0.75 1.3125 1.3125 100 100 100 100 108 100 100 100 108 100 84 95 140 131 132 114 131 131 124 124 180 179 171 222 186 186 193 209 iPer Month. 532 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE 2—C WAGE-SEEIE3 FEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS PIANOS AND OEGANS Concord, N. H., 291 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day I860 1861 1862 1853 1864 1865 1866 Action-maker . . . Case-maker Finisher Mill hand l.*75 1.75 1.75 1.65 2.00 1.75 100 100 100 100 100 100 114 100 100 106 113 100 114 100 100 106 113 100 114 100 100 106 113 100 143 114 114 121 138 114 143 114 114 121 138 114 143 114 114 121 138 Varnisher 114 PINS Waterbury, Conn., 293 Girl Laborer . Mechanic 0.58 J 100 100 100 143 143 156 1.00 100 100 100 125 125 150 1.50 100 100 100 133 133 150 156 150 150 POTTEEI East Liverpool, O., 300 Boy Clay-maker . . Dipper Dish-maker . . Fireman Girl Jiggerman . . . Kilnman Laborer Mold-maker . . Packer Presser Sagger-maker Woman $ 0.30 100 100 167 167 167 1.50 100 100 133 133 133 1.50 100 100 133 133 133 1.50 100 100 150 150 150 1.50 100 100 167 167 167 0.30 100 100 167 167 167 2.00 100 100 125 125 125 1.25 100 100 160 160 160 0.75 100 100 250 250 250 2.00 100 100 150 150 150 1.50 100 100 167 167 167 1.50 100 100 133 133 133 1.50 100 100 167 167 167 0.40 100 100 163 163 163 167 133 133 150 167 167 125 160 250 150 167 133 167 163 Liverpool Tovfnship, O., 303 Foreman Brick-molder Carpenter . . . Engineer . . . . Laborer Miner 52.00> 100 100 100 100 113 1.50 100 100 100 113 117 1.25 100 120 120 120 140 1.10 100 100 100 114 114 1.00 100 100 120 125 140 1.00 100 100 110 125 135 113 117 140 114 150 135 1 Per month. Appendix C 541 TABLE 2 — Contimied WAGE-SESZES FEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS POTTEBY East Liverpool, O., 301, 302 Occupation Initial r- Wage I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 p'r Day $ 0.33 100 100 152 152 182 1.50 100 100 133 133 167 1.50 100 100 150 150 167 2.00 100 100 113 113 125 1.50 100 100 167 167 200 0.33 100 100 121 121 152 2.00 100 100 113 113 125 1.25 100 100 160 160 180 1.00 100 100 150 150 175 2.00 100 100 125 125 175 1.50 100 100 150 150 167 1.50 100 100 133 133 150 1.50 100 100 167 167 183 3.00 100 100 117 117 133 2.00 100 100 113 113 125 1.25 100 100 160 160 160 0.50 100 100 150 150 160 1866 Boy Clay-maker Dipper Dish-maker Fireman Girl Handler Kilnman Laborer Mold-maker Packer Presser Sagger-maker. . . Thrower Turner Warehouseman. . Woman 182 167 167 125 200 152 125 180 175 175 167 150 183 133 125 160 160 Newark, N. J., J Laborer . 1.00 100 100 150 150 150 150 TANNEEIES Binghamton, N. Y., 312 Beam hand. . Currier Finisher Handlerman. Shaver Striker Teamster. . . . Yard hand . . $ 1.00 100 100 100 125 150 165 1.70 100 118 129 141 153 153 1.25 100 120 128 140 160 140 1.00 100 100 112 150 160 160 1.70 100 118 129 141 153 153 1.25 100 120 128 140 160 140 0.88 100 100 114 127 148 142 1.00 100 100 112 150 160 160 175 153 140 160 153 140 142 160 New York, N. Y., 313 Foreman Laborer $ 125.00' 1.375 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1 Per month. 542 History of the Gkbenbacks TABLE 2— Continued "WAGE-SEEIES FEOM VOL. XX OP THE TENTH CENSUS TANNEKIES Lancaster, N Y., 314 Initial Occupation Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Bark-grinder $ 0.75 100 100 167 183 183 200 200 Beam hand 0.875 100 100 171 186 186 200 200 Engineer 0.875 100 100 171 186 186 200 200 Handlerman 0.81 100 100 169 185 185 201 201 Laborer 0.75 100 100 167 183 183 200 200 Eoller 0.81 0.875 100 100 100 100 185 171 201 186 201 186 216 200 216 Teamster 200 Watchman 0.875 100 100 171 186 186 200 200 Yard hand 0.81 100 100 154 170 170 185 185 Sanford, N. Y., 316 Foreman Bark-grinder . . . Beam hand . . . . Currier Engineer Handlerman Laborer Roller Teamster Watchman Yard hand $ 2.24 100 100 100 107 107 107 0.75 100 100 107 133 133 133 0.77 100 104 104 149 164 175 0.72 100 100 104 132 139 139 1.00 100 100 108 135 142 154 0.76 100 100 100 132 132 164 0.73 100 100 105 158 169 173 0.88 100 102 108 125 142 159 0.70 100 100 107 107 121 136 0.90 100 100 111 139 139 167 0.76 100 100 100 132 132 164 121 133 i53 157 164 185 159 136 194 164 Pike Pond, N. Y., 316 Foreman 25.001 100 100 100 160 180 180 Beam hand 0.77 100 < • . 100 130 149 Handlerman .... 0.73 100 105 137 158 Laborer 0.69 ioo 100 ioo 145 167 167 Boiler 0.85 0.73 100 100 113 105 ... 118 137 135 158 Teamster Watchman 0.65 100 154 177 Yard hand 0.69 100 ii2 145 167 1 Per month. Appendix 543 TABLE 2r-Continued WAGE-SEEIES FEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS TANNEBIES Wellsville, N. Y., 318 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman Bark -grinder Beam hand Engineer Handlerman Laborer Roller $ 50.00' 0.75 1.00 1.25 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 150 133 100 100 100 133 100 100 100 100 150 133 100 100 133 167 100 125 100 100 150 167 125 100 167 167 125 125 100 125 200 167 125 120 167 200 125 150 120 125 200 200 150 120 200 200 150 Teamster Watchman Yard hand 150 120 150 Oneida, N. Y., 315 Foreman Bark-grinder Beam hands Engineer Laborer Yard hand $ 40.00' 100 100 100 113 113 105 0.92}- 100 100 100 124 124 124 1.15 100 100 100 117 117 107 1.15 100 100 100 117 117 107 0.92^ 100 100 100 124 124 124 0.92^ 100 100 100 124 124 124 113 145 117 117 124 124 Cincinnati, O., 318, 319 Bark-grinders . Beam hand . . . Currier Finisher Handlerman . . Engineer Laborer Shaver Watchman Yard hand $ 1.00 100 100 83 116 133 183 1.25 100 100 93 120 160 166 1.50 100 111 100 117 133 144 1.33 100 113 106 113 162 150 1.08 100 100 100 116 185 185 1.58 100 105 116 137 147 158 1.00 100 100 83 100 166 166 1.66 100 110 100 110 140 151 1.16 100 100 72 115 158 172 1.08 100 100 100 116 185 185 183 173 155 162 216 168 166 160 172 185 1 Per month. 544 History of the Geebnbaoks TABLE Z—Continiied WAGE-SEKIES FEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS CAKPET3 Massachusetts, 324 Occupation Initial Wage 1860 1861 1862 1863 1861 1865 p'r Day $ 0.39 100 103 105 133 177 1.50 100 89 100 100 117 133 1.38 100 100 87 109 115 127 0.57 100 100 102 123 191 0.83 100 100 90 111 171 181 1.38 100 100 91 100 127 139 1.50 100 89 100 109 133 150 0.83 100 100 90 100 161 171 0.45 100 98 109 156 202 0.49 100 100 98 127 198 0.73 100 100 110 144 160 0.43 100 88 102 140 237 1.25 ioo 100 100 106 120 134 0.46 100 109 107 135 196 0.51 100 127 122 163 241 0.52 100 115 125 165 229 0.37 ... 100 100 103 132 224 1.10 100 105 114 127 168 182 1866 Carder Carpenter Dyer Finisher (earn- ings for Dec). . Laborer Loom-fixer Machinist Pickerman Reeler Spinner Spinner jack Spooler Teamster Twister Warper Weaver Winder Wool sorter (wages for Dec.) 187 133 127 181 181 163 150 181 216 204 159 226 134 207 249 229 230 182 COTTON MANITFACTUEE Willimantic, Conn., 333 Carding overseer Spinn'g overseer. Back boy Card-stripper . . . Carpenter Drawer Grinder Laborer Machinist Mule-spinner .... Painter Picker Second hand Speeder Yard hand 50.001 100 100 120 120 1.30 266 50.001 100 100 100 110 130 156 0.33^ 100 100 100 100 175 175 0.83J- 100 100 100 100 150 150 1.50 100 100 100 100 133 167 0.58J 100 100 100 100 123 143 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 113 1.00 100 100 100 125 150 150 1.50 100 100 100 133 150 167 0.83^ 100 100 100 100 150 150 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 117 0.83^ 100 100 100 100 140 140 1.25 100 107 120 140 140 147 0.50 100 100 100 100 133 144 1.00 100 100 100 125 150 150 266 182 175 150 167 143 120 150 183 160 133 150 147 178 150 1 Per month. Appendix C 545 TABLE 2— Continued WAGB-SKBIES FBOfll VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS COTTON MANHFACTUKE Connecticut, 336 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1863 1866 Overseers, card'g, spinn'g, weav'g Back boy Baler Card-stripper . . . Carpenter Cloth trimmer . . Dofifer Drawer Dresser Polder Frame-spinner . . Grinder Laborer Machinist Mule-spinner . . . Painters Picker Second hand Speeder Spin'g section h'd Spooler Warper Weaver W'v'g section h'd Web-drawer . . Yard hand 001 25 83i 75' .50 411 475 41i .29 875 .33^ .161 00 50 05 33i 75 00 50 08! 45 54 77 331 80 m 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 94 94 100 100 100 100 100 83 100 112 108 100 100 104 100 100 100 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 87 88 100 106 108 120 100 83 108 123 120 87 133 133 100 83 94 89 100 89 100 100 115 100 108 91 87 83 100 106 108 120 100 100 120 123 120 116 133 133 100 100 117 110 100 89 100 120 138 100 108 119 112 94 120 111 108 120 100 117 133 123 120 136 153 133 100 125 150 127 106 89 125 150 161 100 108 130 131 115 150 128 133 140 155 150 151 149 160 174 171 179 136 133 167 167 125 155 150 200 184 122 139 162 150 130 160 Evansville, Ind., 341 In cloth r'm, f em. In el. room, male Repairer Weaver, female . 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100. 1.75 100 100 100 100 100 1.05 .... 100 100 100 100 143 100 100 100 143 I Per month. 546 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 2 — Continued WAGE-aEEIES TEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS COTTON MANHFACTUBE Connecticut, 338 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 100 100 104 99 102 124 100 100 100 100 100 112 100 100 100 107 107 115 100 100 100 100 130 130 100 100 115 115 121 172 100 100 109 109 109 127 100 100 101 101 107 124 100 100 120 120 141 160 100 100 100 100 100 115 100 100 100 100 108 125 100 100 95 95 95 125 100 100 107 107 107 121 100 100 100 100 120 130 100 100 100 100 113 113 100 100 106 111 123 148 100 100 113 126 150 188 100 100 100 100 111 148 100 100 100 100 122 133 100 100 100 100 100 109 100 100 143 107 107 115 100 100 100 100 100 120 1866 Overseers, card'g, spinn'g, weav'g Back boy Baler Card-stripper . . . Carpenter Clotli-trimmer . . Doffer Drawer Folder Laborer Machinist Painters Picker Speeder Spinner Spin'g section h'd Spooler Warper Weaver Wv'g section h'd Web-drawer 001 25 16i 46 37 411 081 00 661 16i 83J 66S 70| 66 45 75 911 161 83J 134 116 123 140 186 182 146 181 115 125 125 136 140 138 153 226 148 167 119 143 140 Christiana Hundred, Del., 340 Carpenter 1.50 100 100 100 100 123 167 167 Chicopee Falls, Mass., 347 Overseers, card'g. spinn'g, weav'g Card-stripper . . . Drawer Grinder Picker Slasher Spinner, female . Spin'g section h'd Warper, girl . . Weaver, girl . . 42.81' 0.64 0.41 0.97 0.72 1.08 0.51J 0.82 0.52 0.565 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 98 99 90 96 100 121 103 86 103 117 121 114 104 127 115 141 114 104 117 176 121 136 144 144 126 178 126 136 126 179 129 148 175 156 135 188 135 155 145 195 178 169 175 181 195 212 178 219 1 Per month. Appendix C 547 TABLE 2— Continued WAOB-SEBIES TBOM VOL. XX OP THE TENTH CENSUS COTTON MANnFACTCEE Maine, 313 Initial Occupation Wage p'r Day I860 1861 1862 ,1853 1864 1865 1866 Overseers, card'g, $ spinn'g, weav'g 65.00' 100 100 102 102 110 120 120 Back boy 0.30 100 83 83 83 110 110 110 Card -stripper . . . 0.75 100 100 100 100 133 167 167 Carpenter 1.33 100 125 102 102 119 159 159 Dresser 1.00 100 100 83 83 88 115 115 Prame-spinner . . 0.54 100 107 96 96 107 135 135 Grinder 1.08 100 100 93 93 108 146 146 Machinist , 1.50 100 100 90 90 110 155 155 Mule-spinner . . . 1.22 100 99 82 82 119 116 116 Painter 1.50 0.75 1.50 100 100 100 ioo 100 58 100 77 58 100 77 i33 112 139 167 133 139 Picker 167 Second hand . . . 133 Spooler 0.54 100 96 100 100 109 143 143 0.75 0.63 100 80 100 84 102 84 102 107 121 120 108 120 Web-drawer 108 0.65 1.00 100 100 108 100 92 80 92 80 98 106 108 140 108 Yard hand 140 Concord, N. H., 355, 356 Carding overseer Spinning overse'r Weaving overse'r Back boy Card-stripper . . . Cloth-trimmer . . Day watchman. . Doflfer Drawer Dresser Frame-spinner . . Grinder Laborer Loom-fixer Machinist Machinist (wood) 32.00' 100 100 94 94 113 150 34.00' 100 94 88 88 124 147 38.00' 100 95 84 84 116 126 0.25 100 100 100 100 100 120 0.70 100 100 95 95 119 179 0.46 100 100 100 100 109 136 1.00 100 100 92 92 116 133 0.25 100 100 100 100 100 120 0.45 100 100 100 100 111 148 i.m 100 100 100 100 106 125 0.46 100 100 100 100 109 117 0.95 100 100 96 96 123 158 1.00 100 100 92 92 100 100 0.96 100 100 86 86 130 156 1.58} 100 105 105 105 116 142 1.33} 100 112 112 112 119 131 225 176 158 120 179 163 150 120 148 150 182 175 125 182 158 187 I Per month. 548 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBACKS TABLE 2— Continued WAGE-SEEIES FBOM VOL. XX OP THE TENTH CENSUS COTTON MANUFACTUEE Massachusetts. 350-52 Occupation Carding overseer Spin'ing overseer Weav'ng overseer Back boy Card-stripper . . . Carpenter Cloth-trimmer . . Doffer Drawer Drawer-in Dresser Dyer Prame-spinner . . Grinder Laborer Lap-head tender Machinist Mule-spinner . . . Painters Picker Quiller Ruler R.W. head tender Second hand Scrubber Speeder Sweeper Warper Watchman Weaver W'v'g sect'nhand Winder Yard hand Yardman Inital Wage p'r Day $ 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.29 0.83 1.75 0.47 0.475 0.53 0.80 1.74 1.00 0.53 1.25 1.00 0.75 1.40 0.40 1.75 1.085 0.57 0.66 0.75 1.625 0.55 0.60 0.55 0.73 1.16j 0.94 1.52 0.59 1.00 1.00 1860 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1861 100 100 100 109 100 86 100 100 96 115 106 100 108 100 100 100 110 125 100 88 96 120 100 100 100 98 100 134 100 106 109 115 100 100 1862 100 100 100 109 100 86 100 84 96 111 113 100 104 100 100 100 102 130 100 88 104 145 100 100 105 98 105 130 100 9S 95 136 100 100 1863 100 100 100 109 100 100 100 87 96 104 101 100 109 100 100 100 111 118 100 98 100 132 100 92 105 98 105 108 100 72 96 115 100 100 1864 100 100 100 112 135 114 100 105 113 103 105 132 111 112 125 133 119 145 103 122 128 130 120 115 115 113 115 101 107 97 111 134 125 125 1865 1866 104 104 104 136 163 129 100 132 127 225 124 160 130 128 150 167 142 153 114 134 131 129 167 138 109 129 109 142 115 118 116 159 150 150 117 108 133 147 187 134 100 158 156 150 130 175 168 140 163 200 168 203 120 152 160 149 187 162 152 154 152 144 134 153 126 176 163 163 Appendix C 549 TABLE Z—Contimied WAGE-SEBIES PEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS COTTON MANUFAOTUKE Concord, N. H., 355, 336 Initial Occupation Wage p'rDay I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Mule-spinner . . . $ 1.08^ 100 100 100 100 115 153 184 Night watchman 1.161 100 100 93 115 115 129 143 Picker o.sa^ 100 100 100 100 140 160 160 Second hand 1.00 100 100 92 92 100 125 125 Speeder 0.50 100 100 100 100 117 142 167 Spin, section h'd 0.92 100 100 100 100 109 136 136 Spooler 0.411 100 111 111 111 120 141 160 0.50 0.625 100 100 117 106 133 106 133 106 150 120 167 134 200 Weaver 174 W'v'g section h'd 0.92 100 100 100 100 109 136 136 Web-drawer 0.62i 100 100 94 94 120 146 154 Yard hand 1.00 100 100 92 92 100 100 125 Dover, N. H., 356, 357 Carding overseer Spin'ing overseer Weavi'g overseer Back boy Card-stripper . . . Carpenter Doflfer Drawer Dresser Frame-spinner . . Grinder Machinist Mule-spinner . . . Painters Picker Second hand Speeder Spooler Warper Weaver Web-drawer Yard hand 66.001 100 89 73 91 109 66.001 100 73 73 91 109 48. 00' 100 88 100 125 150 0.26 100 104 104 115 146 0.83 100 81 90 151 151 1.50 100 89 93 117 133 133 0.32 100 84 78 103 94 0.24 100 88 88 104 96 0.56 100 89 80 95 104 0.35 100 89 71 94 94 1.08 100 82 93 139 139 1.50 100 89 93 117 133 133 0.85 100 100 87 101 124 1.42 100 94 94 94 141 141 0.75 100 89 100 167 167 1.25 100 90 100 120 120 0.39 100 95 85 103 100 0.19 100 121 84 137 253 0.42 100 95 69 81 107 0.36 100 86 75 94 100 0.39 100 92 87 87 113 0.83 100 100 100 120 151 151 127 127 1&3 192 160 158 172 125 179 160 155 158 176 141 177 160 131 247 138 258 164 181 1 Per month. 550 HiSTOEY OP THE GeBENBAOKS TABLE 2— Continued WAGE-SEBIES FROM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS COTTON MANUFACTCEE Massachusetts, 352, 853 Occnpation Overseer, spinn'g Dresser Machinist Spinner Spooler Warper Yard hand Initial Wage p'r Day 4500 1.5575 1.73i 0.615 0.5575 05575 1.155 1860 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1861 100 104 IdO 100 110 110 100 1862 100 104 100 100 110 110 100 1863 100 104 100 100 110 110 100 1864 100 104 100 106 110 110 100 1865 122 123 122 106 117 117 100 1866 122 123 122 106 117 117 100 New Hampshire, 358 Overseers, card'g, spinn'g weav'g Back boy . ^ Baler Card-stripper . . . Carpenter Cloth-trimmer . . Doflfer Drawer Dresser Folder Frame-spinner . . Grinder Laborer Machinist Mule-spinner . . . Painters Picker Second hand .... Speeder Spin, section ha'd Spooler Warper Weaver W'v'g section h'd Web-drawer $ 65.001 100 100 100 100 100 120 0.35 100 100 100 100 100 117 1.00 100 100 100 100 117 133 0.83 100 96 96 96 100 160 1.58 100 100 100 100 100 111 0.56 100 100 100 100 120 134 0.50 100 100 100 100 120 170 0.50 100 100 100 100 108 150 0.83 100 100 100 100 121 121 1.00 100 100 100 100 117 125 0.54 100 100 100 100 100 185 1.161 100 100 100 100 107 129 1.08 100 100 100 100 100 116 2.25 100 100 100 100 100 89 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 142 1.33 100 100 100 113 126 126 0.87 100 103 109 109 129 153 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 0.83 100 66 72 72 96 120 1.125 100 100 100 100 111 126 0.54 100 130 130 130 130 170 0.54 100 100 111 111 111 207 0.92 100 100 89 89 114 138 1.33 100 100 100 100 100 119 0.83 100 84 84 84 90 120 120 117 137 160 111 141 200 184 193 133 185 136 116 89 142 126 153 133 133 126 170 207 138 132 139 1 Per month. Appendix C 55] TABLE 2— Continued WAGB-SEEIES FROM VOIj. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS COTTON MANUPACTUEB Cohoes, N. Y., 361, 362 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Overseer, carding Overseer, cloth- room 58.50' 1.125 55.25' 65.00' 0.30 0.80 0.70 1.62 0.50 0.625 0.50 2.00 0.50 0.56 0.875 0.75 0.33 0.70 2.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 .7875 1.00 1.3125 .65 .50 .65 1.50 .62 .8375 .70 1.375 .75 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 104 100 100 104 112 100 100 111 100 133 115 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 115 125 115 100 110 112 89 100 133 122 100 112 110 150 110 108 108 108 106 112 113 108 111 111 150 127 107 113 117 113 155 111 155 138 115 140 115 117 110 123 107 118 150 133 133 112 120 167 118 125 123 116 106 112 125 116 111 135 167 136 143 125 133 125 170 142 170 133 115 150 115 133 110 145 114 127 167 178 156 Overseer, spin'g.. Overseer, weav'g. Back boy Baler 129 140 183 125 Card-stripper Carpenter Cloth-trimmer.. . Drawer 125 139 125 133 Doffer 124 Dresser 125 Folder 125 Frame-spinner. . . Grinder Laborer 125 157 167 152 Lapper 196 Machinist Painters Pressman Piecer-mule Picker 138 150 138 180 174 Mule-spinner . . . Second hand Slubber Spreader Speeder Spinning section- 180 157 154 200 173 133 Spooler 121 Watchman Warper 164 131 Weaving section- 145 Yard hand 167 I Per month. 552 HiSTOBY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE Z— Continued WAGG-SEBIES FEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS COTTON MANUFACTDEE Philadelphia, Pa., 364, 365 Occupation Initial Wage 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 p'r Day 80.00' 100 100 100 100 100 100 60.001 100 100 100 100 100 100 60.00' 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.661 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1866 Overseer, carding Overseer, spinn'g. Overseer, vpeavi'g Polder , Grinder Laborer Machinist , Mule-spinner.. . Picker Second hand .... Spinning section hand Weaver Web-drawer 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 WOOLEN INDU8TBY Indianapolis, Ind., 385, ! Overseers, differ- ent departm'ts Carder Carder, boy Dyer Dyer's helper Engineer Finisher Fuller Gigger Laborer Loom-flxer Picker, boy Scourer Shearer Spinner Warper Weaver, girl Wool-sorter $ 39.00' 100 111 133 133 167 200 1.75 100 114 114 129 143 143 .75 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 133 133 200 200 1.00 100 100 125 125 150 150 1.50 100 100 100 100 133 133 1.50 100 108 108 108 167 200 1.50 100 111 133 133 150 150 1.25 100 100 120 120 120 120 1.00 100 100 100 100 150 200 1.66 100 100 120 120 120 151 .75 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.25 100 100 120 120 120 120 1.50 100 111 133 133 150 150 1.25 100 120 160 160 160 200 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 .661 100 100 100 150 150 150 1.25 100 120 120 120 133 133 200 143 100 200 150 167 200 150 120 200 151 100 120 150 200 100 150 133 iPer month. Appendix C 553 TABLE %-Continued WAGE-SEEIES FKOM VOI . XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS — WOOLEN tNDUSTEir Massachusetts , 392, 393 Initial Occupation Wage p'r Day 1860 1881 1862 1863 1861 1865 1866 Overseer, carding $ ,No. 1 1.75 100 100 100 71 143 200 180 Overseer, carding No. 2 1.75 100 100 100 143 114 157 142 Overseer, carding No. 3 3.00 100 100 100 133 133 133 133 Overseer, dress- ing No. 1 1.75 100 100 100 114 157 214 ■214 Overseer, dress- ing No. 2 1.75 100 100 100 114 157 214 214 Overseer, dyeing. 1200.001 100 100 100 150 150 150 150 Overseer, flnish'g 3.00 100 100 100 108 117 133 133 Overseer, fulling. 2.00 100 100 100 125 150 150 150 Overseer, gigging 3.00 100 100 100 108 117 133 150 Overseer, repairs No. 1 ....... . 2.00 100 100 100 138 175 175 200 Overseer, repairs No. 2 ........ . 2.00 100 100 100 125 150 150 175 Overseer, spin- ning No. 1 1.75 100 100 100 114 157 157 157 Overseer, spin- ning No. 2 1.75 100 100 100 114 129 171 171 Overseer, spin- ning No. 3 1.75 100 100 100 129 171 171 200 Overseer, waste sorting No. 1. . 1.00 100 100 100 120 150 150 150 Overseer weaving No. 1 2.25 100 100 100 111 133 167 167 Overseer weaving No. 2 2.25 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 120 111 65 133 80 167 90 167 Overseer, yard. . . 100 Carder 1.75 0.68 100 100 100 79 100 81 71 96 114 113 143 132 157 Carder, boy 138 Dyer 0.91 0.48i 100 100 100 106 100 115 108 113 145 123 164 124 165 Finisher, female. 180 Finisher, male... 0.88 100 103 102 105 135 153 161 Fuller 0.81 0.84 1.75 100 100 100 98 100 100 99 102 114 107 110 77 152 151 95 154 164 109 157 Oiffffer 168 *-*^B&^^ .......... Laborer 115 Picker 0.81 1.38 100 100 91 98 100 101 105 116 142 138 164 159 168 Repairer 159 Spinner 0.78 100 109 121 122 154 199 221 Teamster 1.75 100 100 114 77 95 108 115 WarDer .8025 0.34 100 100 119 100 114 103 117 126 118 156 143 144 214 Waste-sorter 159 Watchman 1.00 100 100 100 106 132 154 154 Weaver, female.. 0.691 100 109 103 100 102 133 179 Wool-sorter 1.17 100 99 101 113 138 157 171 iPer year. 554 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS TABLE Z — Continued WAGE-SBEIES FBOH VOL. XX OP THE TENTH CENSUS WOOLEN INDUSTET Dover, Me., 389 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1861 1865 1866 Foreman Overseers, differ- ent departm'ts, Carder, boy Carpenter Dyer Dyer's helper . . . Fuller Laborer Loom-fixer Machinist Picker Scourer Spinner Spooler Teamster Warper, female.. Weaver, female.. Wool-sorter 39 .W 39.00' 0.50 i.as 1.33 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.33 0.86 1.00 1.30 0.46 1.00 0.67 0.70 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 105 100 110 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 107 100 100 100 110 113 113 no no 100 133 113 105 no 100 100 100 100 107 100 115 100 120 113 113 115 125 no 133 113 116 115 115 109 no 100 lU 125 141 141 150 150 132 125 150 133 133 150 116 125 135 163 133 137 136 140 154 150 180 169 141 150 175 150 150 169 116 150 140 174 150 149 143 155 154 150 180 169 141 150 175 150 150 169 116 150 138 163 150 149 143 160 Fitchbnrg, Mass., 390 Superintendent . . Overseers of dif- ferent dep'tm'ts. Carder Carder, boy Dyer's helper Fuller Gigger Loom-flxers Picker, boy Spinner Spooler, girl Warper Weaver, female . . Wool-sorter $ 83.33' 100 100 100 100 100 100 42.25' 100 100 108 115 128 136 1.25 100 106 106 112 120 120 0.60 100 100 108 117 133 133 0.75 100 100 127 133 177 177 0.92 100 100 100 100 145 145 0.75 100 100 127 133 177 177 1.25 100 100 100 100 120 120 0.60 100 100 108 117 133 133 0.85 100 100 104 129 176 206 0.58 100 103 103 103 108 122 1.25 100 112 112 110 140 140 0.75 100 100 100 107 107 120 1.80 100 100 100 125 138 138 100 138 120 133 177 145 177 120 133 206 122 140 127 138 1 Per month. Appendix C 555 TABLE 2 — Continued WAGE-SEBIGS FBOM VOI*. XX OP THE TBNTH CENSUS WOOLEN INDDSTET Illinois, 384 Occupation Initial Wage p r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Superintendent . Foreman Carder Engineer Spinner Spooler Weaver Wool-sorter $ 65.001 58.50' 0.50 2.25 0.50 0.50 1.00 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 100 111 100 100 100 100 100 125 100 111 100 100 100 100 100 125 120 111 100 100 100 100 100 125 120 111 120 100 120 100 125 125 160 111 120 100 120 100 125 125 New York, 398, Superintendent . Foreman Overseers, differ ent departm'nts Carder , Carder, girl . . Carpenter Dyer Dyer's helper. Engineer , Finisher , Fuller Gigger Laborer Loom-fixer Machinist Picker Scourer , Shearer Spinner Spinner, boy or girl Spooler, girl Teamster Watchman Warper Weaver Weaver, boy or girl Wool-sorter 160.00' 100 100 100 100 100 188 100.00' 100 100 100 100 100 200 53.56' 100 100 100 100 100 149 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 120 0.42 100 100 100 100 100 137 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 140 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 133 0.70 100 100 100 100 100 179 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 200 .5375 100 100 100 100 100 182 0.75 100 100 100 100 100 200 0.70 100 100 100 100 100 179 0.75 100 100 100 100 100 167 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 117 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 140 0.625 100 100 100 100 100 200 0.75 100 100 100 100 100 200 0.75 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.13 100 100 100 100 100 142 0.56 100 100 100 100 100 82 0.30 100 100 100 100 100 140 0.75 100 100 100 100 100 167 0.85 100 100 100 100 100 147 0.75 100 100 100 100 100 230 0.94 100 100 100 100 100 133 0.40 100 100 100 100 100 135 1.10 100 100 100 100 100 145 188 200 149 120 137 140 133 179 200 182 200 179 167 117 140 200 200 100 142 82 140 167 147 230 133 135 145 1 Per month. 556 History of the Greenbacks TABLE 2 — Continued WAOE-SEBIES FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS WOOLEN INDUSTRY Manchester, N. H., 396 Oooupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Overseers, diflfer- ent departm'nts Carder 66.*56i 0.92 1.47 1.00 1.25 1.36 0.92 1.00 0.52 0.60 1.17 0.60 0.78 1.48 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 100 97 100 100 105 100 100 123 100 100 100 90 95 96 103 101 100 100 104 103 125 112 102 100 102 79 95 100 100 110 117 106 122 109 125 112 128 107 128 90 116 118 136 144 125 120 118 136 112 121 127 128 127 109 116 129 136 las 125 134 143 136 117 127 127 128 127 112 124 142 145 Carpenter 139 133 Loom-fixer Machinist Picker 140 137 145 Shearer 128 175 Spooler 183 Teamster 128 183 Weaver 171 Wool-sorter 139 Dresden, C, 400; Overseers, difiFer- ent departm'nts Carder Carder, boy Dyer Dyer's helper Fuller Gigger Loom-fixer Picker, boy Shearer Scourer Spinner Teamster Warper Weaver 58.50> 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 0.60 100 100 125 125 125 125 1.25 100 100 160 160 160 160 1.25 100 100 120 120 120 120 1.25 100 100 100 120 120 120 1.25 100 100 120 120 120 120 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 0.60 100 100 1-25 125 125 125 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.25 100 100 160 160 160 160 1.25 100 100 120 120 120 120 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.00 100 100 125. 125 125 125 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 160 120 120 120 100 125 100 160 120 100 125 100 1 Per month. Appendix C 557 TABLE 2— Continued WAGE-SEKIE3 FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS WOOLEN INDUSTBT Springfield, 111., 382, 383 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Overseers of dif- ferent dep'ts . . Carder 36.25' 1.50 0.75 2.00 1.25 1.50 1.00 0.75 1.40 1.25 1.25 100 100 100 ioo 100 100 100 100 100 1W, 87 80 100 128 100 100 133 93 120 100 122 87 80 100 128 100 100 133 93 100 100 126 100 100 100 140 117 100 133 100 120 120 152 167 107 125 160 150 125 167 143 140 160 197 183 107 150 200 133 125 200 179 200 220 206 183 Carder, boy Dyer 107 150 Engineer Finisher 200 150 150 Picker 200 179 Weaver 160 Wool-sorter 220 New Hampshire, 396, 397 Overseers in dif- ferent dep'ts . Carder Carpenter Dyer Engineer Fuller Laborer Machinist Spinner Spooler Teamster Weaver $ 42.251 100 100 100 100 100 138 0.50 100 100 100 125 125 150 1.75 100 100 100 100 100 143 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 130 1.375 100 100 100 109 109 145 0.875 100 100 100 114 114 149 0.875 100 100 100 114 114 157 1.25 100 100 100 108 108 160 1.10 100 100 100 114 114 148 0.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 0.875 100 100 100 114 114 149 1.10 100 100 100 107 107 125 138 150 143 130 145 149 157 160 148 100 149 125 CAEEIAGB AND WAGON WOKKB Belleville, 111., 413 Apprentice o.m 100 100 149 149 149 149 149 Blacksmith 2.00 100 100 125 125 150 150 150 B'lksmith, helper 1.00 100 100 125 125 150 150 150 Bodymaker 2.00 100 100 125 125 150 150 150 Painters 2.00 100 100 125 125 150 150 150 1 75 2.00 100 100 114 100 143 125 143 125 171 150 171 150 171 Trimmer 150 Varnisher 2.00 100 100 125 125 150 150 150 Wood-worker . . . 2.00 100 100 125 125 150 150 150 I Per month. 558 HiSTOEY OP THE GhEENBAOKS TABLE 2 — Continued WAGE-SEBIES FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS CABBIAGE AND WAGON WORKS Indianapolis, Ind., 414 Initial Occupation Wage p'r Day I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Apprentice $ 0.50 100 100 100 100 100 150 150 Blacksmith 2.25 100 100 89 89 89 111 111 Bl'ksmith, helper 1.00 100 100 75 75 100 125 125 Body-maker 2.25 100 100 78 78 111 111 111 Laborer 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.50 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 100 100 100 100 75 100 100 88 100 88 100 117 88 125 88 125 117 100 125 Painters 88 Stitcher 125 Striper 117 Trimmer 100 Varnisher 2.00 100 100 100 88 88 100 100 Watchman 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 125 125 Wheelright 1.75 100 100 100 86 86 100 100 Wood-worker 2.00 100 100 75 75 75 88 88 Dubuque, la,, 416 Blacksmith . . . Painter Trimmer Wood- worker . l.*25 100 120 160 200 220 220 1.25 100 120 160 200 220 220 1.25 100 120 160 200 220 220 1.25 100 120 160 200 220 220 220 220 220 220 Portland, Me., 417 Foreman Apprentice Blacksmith Bl'ksmith, helper Body-maker Finisher Laborer Painter Stitcher Striper Teamster Trimmer Varnisher Watchman Wheelwright Wood-worker 1.75 0.60 1.75 1.25 1.75 1.25 1.25 1.75 1.25 1.75 1.25 1.75 1.75 1.00 1.50 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 140 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 114 100 114 100 114 120 100 114 120 114 100 114 114 100 117 117 143 171 171 171 108 108 108 108 143 171 171 171 100 120 120 120 143 171 171 171 120 140 140 140 120 120 120 120 143 171 171 171 160 160 160 160 143 171 171 171 100 120 120 120 143 171 171 171 143 171 171 171 125 150 150 150 150 183 200 200 167 200 200 200 Appendix C 559 TABLE 2— Continued WAGB-SEBIBS FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS CAEEIAGB AND WAGON WOKKS Massachusetts, 120, 421 Occupation Foreman Apprentices Body-maker Finisher Painter Stitcher Striper Teamster Trimmer Varnisher Watchman Wheelwright Wood- worker Initial Wage I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 p'r Day $ 2.875 100 109 109 109 109 109 0.75 100 117 117 117 117 117 1.33 100 100 100 132 132 132 2.50 100 120 120 120 120 120 1.58 100 100 116 116 116 1.50 100 108 108 108 108 108 1.875 100 117 117 117 117 117 1.50 100 83 83 83 83 83 1.58 100 100 100 142 142 142 2.00 100 113 113 113 113 113 1.00 100 113 113 113 113 113 1.33 100 100 100 132 132 132 1.25 100 160 160 160 160 160 Blacksmith . . Bl'ksmith, helper Body-maker Painter Trimmer Wheelwright . . . $ 1.50 100 100 117 167 183 200 1.00 100 100 125 150 150 150 1.50 100 100 126 167 183 183 1.375 100 100 127 164 164 164 1.375 100 100 127 164 182 182 1.50 100 100 133 133 167 167 109 117 188 120 158 108 117 83 206 113 113 188 160 New York, 423 Helpers 0.875 1.365 100 100 115 111 121 111 116 111 116 115 129 140 146 Mechanics 149 Eavenna, O., 424 200 150 183 164 182 167 Whitewater, Wis., 426 Blacksmith . . Bl'ksmith, helper Engineer Laborer Machinist . . . Teamster $ 1.25 100 110 120 120 140 150 0.80 100 125 125 125 156 188 1.00 100 113 113 125 138 150 0.75 100 107 133 133 167 183 1.25 100 100 120 120 120 160 0.76 100 132 132 132 164 197 180 188 175 200 180 197 560 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE 2—Contimied WAGE-SEBIES FROM VOL. XX OP THE TENTH CENSUS CABKIAGB AND WAGON WOEKS Louisville, Ky., 416 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day I860 1861 1862 1863 1861 1865 1866 Blacksmith Painter $ 2.33 2.00 2.00 1.66 100 100 100 64 96 83 100 71 92 92 110 129 108 108 120 172 125 121 140 186 150 150 151 215 158 Trimmer Wood- worker 158 181 rUENITUEB New Haven, Conn., 435 Foreman Cabinet-maker Carver Chair-maker . . Engineer Finisher Laborer Machine hand Packer Turner Upholsterer . . . Varnisher 65.001 100 108 115 123 123 123 2.00 100 100 100 113 113 125 2.00 100 100 113 113 113 113 1.80 100 100 100 100 111 111 2.00 100 100 100 113 125 125 1.80 100 100 111 111 111 125 1.25 100 100 120 120 120 120 2.00 100 113 125 125 125 125 1.75 100 100 114 114 114 129 2.00 100 100 113 125 125 125 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 125 2 00 100 100 100 113 113 125 131 125 125 111 138 125 120 125 129 125 125 125 Chicago, ni,, 438 Cabinet-maker . $ 1.10 100 100 114 148 205 227 250 Kentucky, 446 Foreman Cabinet-maker Carver Engineer Laborer Machine hand Packer Turner Upholsterer . . . Varnisher $ 75.00' 100 100 113 113 113 113 1.40 100 107 125 179 179 196 1.50 100 100 133 133 133 200 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.00 100 100 125 125 125 150 1.25 100 120 140 160 160 200 1.25 100 100 100 120 120 120 1.50 100 100 100 167 167 183 1.25 100 120 140 200 200 200 1.25 100 100 120 140 140 160 133 196 200 100 150 200 160 183 220 160 1 Per month. Appendix 56] TABLE Z — Continued WAGB-aEEIES FBOU VOL. XX OP THE TENTH CENSnS — FCENITCKE Indiana, 441, 442 Occupation Foreman Boy Carver Chair-maker . . Engineer Finisher Laborer Machine hand Packer Painter Turner Varnisher Foreman Cabinet-maker Carver Engineer Finisher Laborer Machine hand . Packer Turner Varnisher Foreman Cabinet-maker Carver Chair-maker . . Engineer Finisher Laborer Machine hand Packer Turner , Varnisher , Foreman Cabinet-maker . Carver Finisher Packer Upholsterer Varnisher 1 Per month. Initial Wage p'r Day 40.001 0.33J 2.00 1.661 1.50 1.50 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.161 1.25 1.25 1860 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1861 125 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1862 125 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 150 100 120 100 1863 138 100 113 100 117 117 100 100 150 100 120 120 1864 150 100 113 100 117 117 100 100 150 100 140 120 1865 163 100 113 120 117 117 101 100 150 100 140 120 1866 175 175 125 120 117 117 111 100 150 100 160 120 Louisville, Ky., 444 150.001 100 100 100 100 100 1.80 100 100 100 100 100 1.90 100 100 100 100 100 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 1.75 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 1.80 100 100 100 100 100 1.80 100 100 100 100 100 1.75 100 100 100 100 100 1.55 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Louisville, Ky., 445 $ 80.001 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.75 100 100 100 100 100 114 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.00 100 100 100 100 113 113 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 114 100 113 100 New York, N. Y., 450 48.001 100 100 104 125 167 229 1.161 100 100 143 172 229 286 1.33^ 100 75 112 137 162 187 1.16f 100 86 115 129 186 200 1.00 100 100 133 167 200 217 1.50 100 78 111 133 167 189 1.00 100 100 133 167 200 233 229 315 200 200 217 211 217 562 History of the Gbebnbaoks TABLE 2 — Continued WAGE-3BEIE3 FKOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS FnKNITUEE Rochester, N. Y., 450 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Cabinet-maker . . Carver $ 1.50 2.50 1.50 1.25 1.50 1.00 2.00 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 100 125 100 120 117 100 117 120 100 125 113 120 117 100 117 120 100 150 113 120 133 100 Chair-maker Finisher Machine hand . . Packer 133 160 100 150 Upholsterer Varnisher 113 160 New York, 452 Foreman Cabinet-maker Carver Chair-maker . . Engineer . .'. . . Finisher Laborer Machine hand Packer Turner Upholsterer. . . Varnisher 60.00" 100 100 100 100 120 120 1.50 100 100 100 100 167 167 1.75 100 100 100 100 143 143 1.50 100 100 100 100 150 150 2.00 100 100 100 100 150 150 1.50 100 100 100 100 150 150 1.25 100 100 100 100 120 120 1.50 100 100 100 100 150 150 1.00 100 100 100 100 175 175 1.50 100 100 100 100 150 150 1.75 100 100 100 100 143 143 1.50 100 100 100 100 150 150 120 167 143 150 150 150 120 150 175 150 143 150 Columbus, O., 454 Foreman Carver Cabinet-maker Chair-maker . . Engineer Finisher Turner Laborer Machine hand Packer Upholsterer . . . Varnisher 100.00> 100 100 100 100 100 100 3.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 3.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 3.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.25 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.40 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1 Per month. Appendix C mi TABLE 2 — Contin'ued WAGE-SEBIES FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS FUENITUEB New Hampshire, 448 Occupation Initial Wage p'r Day I860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman Cabinet-maker . . Machine hand . . Turner 36.40' 1.15 1.00 1.25 100 100 100 100 100 109 110 100 100 117 125 100 125 in 125 120 125 130 140 120 125 139 150 140 125 139 150 140 Philadelphia, Pa., 456, 457 Foreman Cabinet-maker Carver Chair-maker . . Packer Upholsterer . . . Varnisher 48.00' 100 100 100 125 125 125 1.67 100 100 100 120 120 120 2.00 100 100 100 113 113 113 1.50 100 100 100 117 117 117 1.50 100 100 100 117 117 117 2.00 100 100 100 125 125 125 1.32 100 100 100 126 126 126 125 120 113 117 117 125 126 Wisconsin, 459 Foreman Cabinet-maker Carver Chair-maker . . Engineer Finisher Laborer Machine hand Packer Turner Varnisher 33.33*1 100 150 250 250 250 1.50 100 117 117 117 1.50 100 117 117 117 1.50 100 117 117 117 1.50 100 117 117 117 1.50 100 117 117 117 1.25 100 120 120 120 2.00 100 125 125 125 1.50 100 117 117 117 2.00 100 125 125 125 1.50 100 117 117 117 250 117 117 117 117 117 120 125 117 125 117 SAW- AND PLANING-M1LI.S barroUton, Mich., 473, 474 Engineer Filer .... Laborer . Sawyer . . Teamster $ 2.37 100 100 74 84 148 148 2.00 100 100 100 119 103 175 1.00 100 100 100 150 200 175 1.345 100 102 114 139 180 182 1.00 100 94 100 150 225 200 148 175 188 202 200 iPer month. 564 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEENBAOKS TABLE 2 — Continued WAGE-SEBIES FEOM VOL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS SAW- AND FIiANINQ-UIIiIiS Kentucky, 468,469 Initial Occupation Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman, dress'g $ department . . . 80.001 100 63 81 100 156 208 125 Foreman, sash department . . . 70.00' 100 71 86 143 179 143 143 Bench hand, sash department . . . 1.50 100 83 83 167 183 200 200 Laborer 1.00 100 125 150 175 175 175 160 Machine hand, sash departm't 1.75 100 80 86 157 171 186 186 Matcher, dress'g department . . . 1.375 100 91 91 127 164 218 218 Molder, dressing department . . . 1.80 100 83 89 111 153 181 181 Planer, dressing department . . . 1.375 100 91 91 127 164 218 218 Sawyer, dressing department. . . 1.375 100 91 91 127 164 218 218 Surfacer, dress'g department . . . 1.375 100 91 91 127 164 218 218 Steamboat joiner 1.60 100 94 109 125 172 203 188 Teamster 1.00 100 100 100 138 167 150 200 Traverse City, Mich., 477 Foreman Engineer . Filer Laborer . , Sawyer . . . Setter Teamster , 153.831 100 100 100 100 100 100 5.811 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.00 100 100 100 150 173 261 0.385 100 119 140 200 260 300 0.77 100 100 100 130 175 200 0.77 100 100 100 130 175 200 0.385 100 119 140 200 260 300 Wisconsin, 496 Foreman, sawing department Engineer Filer Laborer Sawyer, sawing department . . Setter Teamster 52.001 100 100 100 125 150 200 1.50 1.50 1.00 1.50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 133 113 133 150 150 150 150 167 200 150 183 1.25 1.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 113 120 150 160 150 200 167 200 175 200 160 175 iPer month. Appendix C 565 TABLE 2— Continued WAGB-SEEIBS FBOSI VOL. XX OP THE TENTH CENSDS SAW- AND PLANING-MILIiS Dtica, N. Y., 481, 482 Initial Occupation Wage p r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Foreman, dress'g $ department . . . 83.33i' 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Foreman, sash. department . . . 83.3311 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Bench hand 1.875 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Engineer 2.00 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Laborer 1.25 100 100 100 100 90 90 90 Machine hand . . 1.75 100 100 100 100 86 86 86 Matcher 1.75 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Molder 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 86 86 100 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 Planer 86 86 Surfacer 86 Teamster 1.625 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Ohio, 485, 486 Foreman, dress'g department . . Foreman, sawing department . Foreman, sash department . . Bench hand . . . Engineer Laborer Machine hand . Matcher Molder Planer Sawyer, dressing department Sawyer, sawing department Teamster 65.001 100 120 140 160 200 200 65.001 100 120 140 160 200 200 65.00' 100 100 100 140 160 200 1.50 100 100 117 133 183 233 1.75 100 100 100 114 143 171 1.00 100 100 100 150 200 200 1.75 100 100 114 143 200 229 1.50 100 100 133 167 200 233 1.75 100 114 114 143 171 200 1.50 100 100 133 167 200 200 1.50 100 117 133 167 200 200 1.75 100 100 114 143 200 229 1.25 100 100 100 140 200 200 200 200 200 233 171 200 229 250 229 200 200 229 200 MeDomonee, Wis., 495 Filer $ 3.00 1.08 2.00 1.50 1.30 ioo ioo 100 106 100 100 104 100 114 100 100 110 100 128 100 107 123 117 150 125 133 148 117 150 125 133 146 117 Laborer Sawver 128 125 Setter 113 Teamster 131 iPer month. 566 HiSTOKY OF THE GkEENBACKS TABLE 2— Continued ■WAGE-SEKIES FROM TOL. XX Or THE TENTH CENSUS SHIP-CARPENTEY St. Louis, Mo., 499 Initial Occupation Wage p'r Day 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 Calker $ 2.50 100 120 120 120 170 200 180 Carpenter 2.50 100 120 120 120 170 200 180 Engineer 2.885 100 100 133 133 167 200 200 Laborer 1.00 100 125 125 125 200 250 . 2-25 Ohio, 500 Carpenter Laborer . . Dock hand Sawyer . . . $ 1.75 100 143 143 143 200 200 1.125 100 111 118 111 140 140 2.00 100 125 125 125 188 188 2.25 100 111 111 111 156 156 200 140 188 156 TABLE 3 'beiiAtive salaries of school-teachers 1 Baltimore, Md. Grade Init. Sal. Srx 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 pr.Xr. $ 1,500 M. 100 100 100 100 120 120 1,100 M. 100 100 100 100 127 127 900 M. ](K) UK) 1(X) 1(K» 144 144 500 K. 1(X) KHI 100 KM) 14<) 14<) .'i.SO h'. 100 1(X) ino ino 171 171 300 J!'. 100 100 100 100 167 167 300 p. 100 100 100 100 167 167 200 F. 100 100 100 100 175 175 100 F. 100 100 100 100 250 250 1866 Principals, high schools, boys Assistants, high schools, boys Principals, grammar schools, boys Principals, grammar schools, girls First assistants, grammar schools, boys First assistants, grammar schools, girls Principals, primary schools, boys and girls Highest grade, primary schools, boys and girls Assistants, beginners, primary schools, boys and girls 147 164 167 180 200 250 400 Boston, Mass. Head masters, high schools 2 Masters, high schools ^ Masters, grammar schools 2 First assistants, grammar schools Assistants, lowest, primary schools 3 .. 2,800 M. 100 100 100 100 107 125 2,000 M. ](K) 1(K) 1(K) 1(X) 110 125 2,000 M. 100 IIX) 1(K) 1(X) 110 125 ,5(K) K. 1(K) 1IH) 1(K) KHI 120 140 300 F. 100 100 100 100 133 150 125 125 125 140 150 1 From the Aldrich Report, Part IV, Table XIV. 2 After four years' service. 3 First year of service. Appendix C 567 TABLE 3— Continued BELATIVE SALAEIES OF SCHOOL-TBACHEKS Cincinnati, O. Principals, high schools Principals, intermediate schools Principals, district schools Assistants, highest, intermediate schls Assistants, highest, district schools . Assistants, lowest, district schools . . 1,750 M. 100 86 86 100 114 114 1,320 M. 1(K) XV 87 1(K) 121 121 1,200 M. 1(K) 89 89 1(X) 125 125 450 H'. KKt 9(1 90 1110 1IK) 1(K) 420 V. 100 HI 91 100 100 100 300 Jb'. 100 92 92 100 100 100 138 1591 1581 100 1672 133 St. Louis, Mo. Assistants, high schools Principals, district schools Head assistants, district schools Third assistantSj district schools, mini- mum salaries 1,200 1,250 425 375 M. 100 67 S3 125 125 M. 10(1 64 HO 12(1 120 i'. 100 82 94 141 141 F. 100 73 87 120 120 142 136 153 133 Barnstable County, Mass. 40.73» 19.123 M. F. 100 100 101 94 100 99 102 94 105 98 122 109 132 118 Franklin County, Mass. 27.443 15.913 M. F. 100 100 102 96 99 99 100 100 106 103 134 120 141 Teachers of country schools 133 1 After three years' service. 2 After six years' ser,vice. 3 Per month. INDEX Adams, Henet, 52 n., 74 n. Adams, H, C. : oq financial consequences of legal-tender acts, 4(3 ; see also 74 n. Advertiser (Boston), 18, 19 n., 81. AGEicnLTDEAii PEODncTS : prices of, 386-8 ; 429-34. AiiDEICH Repoet : criticism of table of relative prices, 239-43; of table of rela- tive wages, 281, 282, 311-13 ; new analysis of price-data, 243-59, 386-8, 409, 410: of wage-data, 283-321, 411, 412; c/. tables of prices, 429-51 : of wages, 470-517 and 566,567. Alley, John B. : remarks on first le^al- tender bill, 61; resolution approving speedy resumption of specie payments, 128 ; see also 55 n., 59 n. Alley RESOLnTiON, 123, 238. Ameeican Annual Cyclopedia: U n., 12 n., 13 n., 14 n., 20 n., 21 n., 26 n., 29 n., SO, 37 n., 39 n., 43 n., 84 n., 85 n., 87 n., 149 n., 154 n., 159 n., 165 n. Anthony, H. B., 77. Appendices: gold value of the paper currency, 423-8 ; relative prices or com- modities, 429-69; relative wages, 470- 567. Aemy, pay of : in arrears, winter of 1862- 63, 105; congressional inquiries, 105-9, 216 ; arrears summer of 1864^ 125 ; how made in 1865, 127; increase m rate of, 334, 335. Atlanta, captcee of: eSect on value of currency, 204. Atlantic Monthly^ 19 u. Baily, J., 95 n. Baikd, H. C, 78 n. Baeee, Stephen, 96 n. Bank notes: circulation of, during Civil War, 145-8, 181. "Bankbes' contention": o Spaulding's legal-tender financial program proposed, 50, Bankers' Magazine (New York), 20 n., 21 n., 22 n., 23 n., 27 n., 28 n., 29 n., 34 n., 35 n., 36 n., 38 n., 39 n., 40 n., 43 n., 86 n., 145 n., 146 n., 147 n., 149 n., 150 n., 154 n., 159 n., 160 n., 161 n., 162 n., 163, 164 n., 165 n., 166 n., 177 n., 186, 199 n., 218 n., 219 n., 365, 366. Banes: condition of banks in summer of 1861, 20-23; agreement regarding $150,000,000 loan, 23; effect of loan on banks, 28-42; suspension of specie payments, 38-41, 144-8. Baeeett, Don C, 74 n., 86 n. Bates, Edwaed: opinion on constitu- tionality of legal-tender clause, 52. Bayaed, J. A., 52 n., 63 n., 64 n. Baylby, E. a., 9 n., 17 n., 73 n., 86 n., 88 n., 89 n., 123 n., 124 n., 126 n., 164 n., 173 n., 174 n., 176 n., 177 n. Beekby, W. a., 43 n., 78 n. Bingham, J. A. : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 53; see also 151 n. Blacksmiths: relative wages of, 299, 331. Blake, H. G., 52 n., 65 n., 67 n. Blaine, J. G., 10 n., 20 n., 37 n., 51 n., 215 n. Blodget, Loein : on prosperity during war, 392. BoiLEE-MAKEES : relative wages of, 299. BoLLES, A. S., 10 n., 23 n., 27 n., 43 n., 51 n. BoEEOVTBES OF CAPITAL (see also Re- sidual claimants) : eSect of green- backs on interests of, 360-79. Boston : relative rents in, 357. "Boston Meeohant": discussion of prosperity during war, 393, 394. BOWLEY, A. L., 282 n. Bbeceineidge, R. M., 27 n., 195 n. Bbooes, James, 225 n. Building teades: relative wages in, 295, 344. Bullock, C. J., 282 n., 325 n. Business (see Profits). Butlee, Geo. B., 74 n. Calhoun, J. C, 113 and note. Califoenia: monetary circulation of, during Civil War, 142-4. Call loans: rates of interest on, 367, 368. Calteet, C. B., 78 n. Campbell, J. H., 55 n., 61 n., 65 n. Capitalists (see Lenders of capital, Residual claimants, Interest, Profits). Cabby, H. C, 189 n., 271 n. Caelile, J. S., 78. Caepentbes: relative wages of, 299, 331,345. Census (tenth fedeeal) : data regard- ing retail prices, 259-64; data regarding wages, 324-33; data regarding rent, 354-7. Ceetificatbs of indebtedness: first issue authorized, 86, 87; issues Jan- uary to March, 1862, 88; issues April to June, 1862, 90; use as currency, 177. 570 History of the G-eeenbaoks Champlin, J. T., 188 n. CHANCELliOBSVILLE, BATTLE OF: effect on value of currency, 203, 218. ChandIjEB, Z. : on temporary loan, 85 ; attempt to forestall second legal-tender act, 93; see also 73 n., 86 n., 229 n. Chase, S. P. : appointment as secretary - of treasury, 3 ; administration of treas- ury, March to June, 1861, 10-15; issue of treasury notes, 15; financial pro- gram, July, 1861,15,16; attitude toward taxation, 18, 19; arrangement for $150,- 000.000 loan, 23; refusal to draw on banks, 25, 26; issne of demand notes, 26, 27; report of December, 1861, 37, U; responsibility for suspension of specie payments, 41-3; letter regarding fijst legal-tender bill read in Congress, 62; attitude toward bill, 68-71; administra- tion of treasury, January^ to June, 1862, 82-91 ; request for second issue of green- backs, 91-3 ; suggests postage-currency act, 98, 99; administration of treasury, July to December, 1862,100-104; report of December, 1862, 102-4; answers to inquiries into arrears in pay of army, l(fi--8; explanation of premium upon ^old in December, 1862, 112; regards issues of greenbacks necessary to facili- tate borrowing, 114 ; opposes additional issues in December, 1S63, 121; admin- istration of treasury in 1864, 123, 124; resignation, 124, 202, 234 ; issue of one- and two-year treasury notes of 1863, 174-6; campaign against gold markets, 225-32; see also 4 n., 12 n., 26 n., 27 n., 34 n., 62 n., 70 n., 73 n., 82 n., 94 n.. 123 n., 149 n. Chattanooga, battle aeousd : effect on value of currency, 204, 221. Chickamauga, battle of: effect on value of currency, 203, 220. Cincinnati : relative rents in, 357. ClECULATiNG MEDIUM: effect of legal- tender acts on, 135, 141-81. Cisco, J. J.: secures bids for treasury notes of 1860, 7; suggests temporary loan, 85, 151, 152; sends in resignation, 124,202. Claek, Daniel: reports bill regarding bronze cents, 169 ; see also 229 n. Clay, B. J. : bill to regulate contracts for gold, 225. Clearing-house loan cektificates, 20, 21, 21 n., 28, 32, 33 n. Cobb, H. : administration of treasury, 5,6. Coe, G. S., 8 n., 23 n., 26 n., 27 n., 29 n., 43n., 48n. Coin: withdrawal of gold from circula- tion after suspension, 135, 142 ; con- tinued u^e of gold in California, 142-4, 180 ; disappearance of subsidiary silver, 156-9; circulation of minor coins, 165- 73, 180; amount of specie in circulation in 1861, 178, 180; premium upon gold coin, 182-238; tables of value of paper money in coin, by months, 423, 424; daily, 425-8. CoLLAMEB, Jacob: remarks on first legal-tender bill, 53, 59; remarks on the " gold bin," 229, 230 ; see also 52 n., 53 n., 54 n., 55 n., 56 n., 57 n., 58 n., 60 n., 63 n., 77, 95 n. Commercial Advertiser ( New York) , 19 n., 81, 153 n., 154 n., 159 n., 166. Commercial and Financial Chronicle^ 186, 192 n., 197 n., 232 n., 271 n., 366, 375, 389 n. Commodity fbices (see Prices). Conant, C. B., 389 n. CONGKBSS (see Debates in Confess, Legal-tender acts. Alley resolution) : financial legislation of extra session, July and August, 1861, 16-18 ; subordina- tion of ecoDomic to fi.nancial considera- tions by, 403, 404 ; lavish appropriations by, 415, 416. Conjugal condition: and advance in relative wages, 306, 307, 323, 324. Conkling, F. a., 4 n., 26 n. Conkling, RoscOB : substitute proposed for first legal-tender act, 75; opposition to legal-tender clause, 76; see also 19 n., 52 n., t)0 n., 63 n., 65 n. Consumption of wealth: change in character of consumption of working- men's families, 349; effect of green- backs on consumption, 398-402. "Convbesion"clause: purpose,89; slow- ness of conversions, 88-90, 92, 101, 104; repeal of the clause, 115, 116; effect upon value of greenbacks, 195-7. Ck)OKE, Jay : successful conduct of five- twenty loan of 1862, 121, 123, 202, 218, 2 19 ; of seven-thirty loan in 1865, 127, 238; see also 34 n. CooPEE, Petee, 78 n. Corning, Erastus : member Committee of Ways and Means, 45 ; attitude toward legal-tender bill, 46. COENWAiLis, K., 182 n., 185 n., 227 n., 235 n. Cost of living ; method of estimating chang'es in, 335-9; as a factor in ad- vancing money wages, 303, 306, 347. Cost of the wae : effect of greenbacks on, 403-20. Couetney, L. H. : estimate of effect of greenbacks on cost of war, 405. Cowan, E. : remarks on first legal-tender bill, 60, 66; remarks on the "gold bill," 230; see also 52 n., 55 n., 56 n., 58 n., 64 n., 65 n., 69 n., 77. Ceedit : contraction of, caused by green- backs, 375, 376, 390, 396. Ceisfteld, J. W. : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 53, 59; see also 52 n., 53 n., 59n., 60n.,66n. Cuetis, G. T., 8 n. Customs-house ceetificates : sales of, by treasury, 226. Customs revenue : act of March, 1857, 5 ; act of March, 1861, 9, 11 ; act of August 5,1861. 17, 18; receipts, January to June, 1862, 83 ; effect of greenbacks on, 413, 416. Index 571 Davis, G., 95 n. Debates in Congeess : upon first legal- tender act, 51-68; upon second legal- tender act, 94-7; upon third legal- tender act, 110-15 ; upon the "gold bill," 229-32; absence of confusion between economic and fiscal considerations, 403, 404. Debt, fedebai^ : increase of, caused by greenbacks, 403-20. De Knight, W. F., 130 n., 178 n. Delmae, a., 189.n. Demand notes of 1861: authorization, 17; issue of, during progress of $150,- 000,000 loan, 26, 27, 27 n. ; redemption in specie suspended, 41 ; additional issue authorized, 84; issues January to March, 1862, 88; issues April to June, 1862, 90; replaced by greenbacks, 91; difiiculties attending circulation, Jan- uary to March, 1862, 149-54 ; withdrawal from circulation, 155, 180 ; value in gold and currency, 194-6. Depaetment of laboe: collection of wage-data, 283. Depeeciation op the cueeenov: with relation to gold, 182-238; with relation to commodities, 239-79 ; tables of value of paper money in coin by months, 423, 424 ; daily, 425-8 ; tables of prices, 429-69. Direct tax : act of August 5, 1861, 18 ; proceeds, April to June, 1862, 83 ; efEeot of greenbacks on, 413. Dix, John A. : administration of treas- ury, 8, 9. Dodge, J. R. : on wages of farm laborers, 322. Domett, H. W., 40 n. Dooi/iTTiiE, J. E. : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 61 ; see also 59 n. DOEfi, C. F., 74 n. Deapt eiotb: effect on value of cur- rency, 204, 220. Deapee, J. W., 212 n. Deew, J. G., 78 n. DtJNBAE, C. F., 21 n. Dun's Meecantile Agency: estimate of southern indebtedness to North in 1861, 21 n. ; diminished use of credit, 375 ; statistics of failures, 389. Eadie, John, 270 n. Economic consequences op geeen- BACKS (see Circulating medium. Stand- ard of value. Prices, Wages, Rent, Interest, Profits, Production, Consump- tion, Credit, Cost of war) : Economic vs. financial effects, 403, 404. Economist (London), 20 n., 273 n. EcoNOMT : vs. extravagance, 398-402. Edwaeds, T. M. : remarks on second legal-tender bill, 96 ; remarks on third legal-tender bill, 113; see also 61 n., 64 n., 65 n., 95 n. EiiDEE, William : on prosperity during war, 392, 393. Elections r effect of, on value of cur- rency, 205, 215, 220, 222, 236, Elliott, E. B. : statistics of interest, 366. Emeet, Mes. S. E. v., 78 n. Engineeeb : relative wages of, 299, 331. Enlistments in aemy: effect of, on wages, 289, 290, 306, 348, 349. Evaets, W. M., 4 n. Evening Exchange, 184, 206. Eveeett, E., 19 n. ExPENDiTUEES (see also Finances, state of the) : January to June, 1862, 82, 83 ; July to December, 1862, 100, 101; in- crease of, 1862 to 1865, 119 : expenditures in summer of 1864, 123-5; effect of greenbacks on, 406-12, ExpOETS and imposts, 11, 22, 22 n. Express (New York), 206 n., 367 n. Exteavagance : effect of greenbacks upon, 398-^2. Failuees, business: caused by cessa- tion of southern remittances in 1861, 21, 22; small number during war, 389-91. Falknee, E. P.: criticism of table of relative prices 239-43 ; of relative wages, 281, 282, 311-13, 328, 329; Falkner's method of weighting price-tables, 336. Faem laboeebs: relative wages of, 321-4. Faem peoducts : prices of, 386-8, 429-34. Faem eents, 358, 359. Faemees : profits of, 386-8. Feeeis, J. A., 144 n. Fessenden, W. p.: remarks on first legal-tender bill, 59-61, 63, 64, 66-8; on temporary loan, 85; on resolution to issue no more greenbacks, 93, 94; on Wilson's resolution to issue greenbacks to pay army, 106 ; reduction in amount of third issue of greenbacks, 117 ; ap- pointed secretary of the treasury, 124, 202, 234; administration of the treas- ury, 124-6 ; withdrawal of coupon treas- ury notes, 175, 176; remarks on the "gold bill," 229; see also 25 n., 55 n., 69 n., 66 n., 73 n., 76 n„ 77, 78, 79 n., 189 n., 225 n., 228 n. Field, M, B., 10 n., 72 n. Finances, state of the: during Bu- chanan's administration, 5-10; March to June, 1861, 10-15; January to June, 1862, 82-91 ; July to December, 1862, 100- 104 ; improvement due to success of five- twenty loan, 121; difficulties of 1864, 122^ McCulloch's administration, 126- 8; effect of greenbacks on, 403-20. Fieemen : relative wages of, 299, 345. FiSHEE, Ieving: statistics of interest, 365, .we. Fishee's Hill, battle op: effect on value of currency, 204. Fitch, H. S., 78 n. FiTZHUGH, H. M., 189 n. Foot, S., 77. 572 History op the Geeenbaoks FOEEIGN EXCHANGE: low price of ster- ling, spring and summer of 1861, 22 ; sales of, by treasury, 228. Foreign relations : effect of, on value of currency, 206, 207, 214, 238. Foremen and overseers: relative wages of, 299. Foster, L. S., 77. Fractional currency : issues of, 165. Freeman, Flint, 78 n. Funding Provision (see "Conversion" clause) . Gallagher's Evening Exchange, 184, 206. Gallatin, James : opposition to issue of demand treasury notes, 15 n. ; oppo- sition to Spaulding's legal-tender bill, 48; see also 21 n., 26 n., 40 n. Garfield, J. A., 225 n. Gas industry: relative wages in, 295, 344. Gettysburg, battle of : effect on value of currency, 204. Gibbons, J. S., 26 n., 267 n., 271 n.' Glass blowers : relative wages of, 318, 319. Gold (see Coin, Premium upon gold. Depreciation, Greenbacks): value of gold and prices, 272-5 ; monthly highest, lowest, and average value of paper money in gold, 423, 424; daily highest and lowest value of paper money in gold, 425-8. " Gold bill," 228-32. Gold room, 183, 184. Government employees : pay of, 333-5, 408, 409. Government purchases: effect on prices, 256-9, 265, 266; c/. tables 449-51. Greenbacks (see also Legal-tender acts, "Conversion" clause) : first issues, 88, 155; relief of treasury by, 90; Chase opposes further issues, December, 1862, 102, 103; as a financial resource, 128-31; gold value of, 135, 136. 140 n., 182-238; circulation of, 173, 174, 180; effect of, on prices, 239-79; on wages, 280-351; on rent, 352-9; on interest, 360-79; on prof- its, 380-91; on production of wealth, 392-8; on consumption of wealth, 398- 402; on cost of war to government, 403-20 ; tables showing value of green- backs in gold, by months, 423, 424; daily, 425-8 ; tables of prices in green- backs, 429-69 ; of wages in greenbacks, 470-567. GURLEY, J. A. : on Chase's failure to sell five-twenty bonds, 108; see also 105 n., 110 n. Hale, J. P., 229 n. Hardy, S. McLean, 248 n. Harper, Jesse, 78 n. Harper'' s Monthly Magazine, 212 n., 390. Hart, A. B., 4 n., 70 n., 72 n., 74 n., 124 u., 149 n. Henderson, J. B. : remarks on the ''gold bill," 229. Hendricks, T. A., 225 n. Herald (New York) 19 n.,39n.,48n., 81, 87 n., 145 n., 150 n., 151 n., 152 n., 153 n., 157, 184 n., 205 n., 206 n., 207 n., 231 n., 367 n. Hickman, John : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 62. Hoar, Geo. F., 364 n. Hock, C. von, 10 n., 43 n., 74 n., 189 n. Hooper, Samuel : work on Committee of Ways and Means, 45 ; attitude toward legal-tender bill, 46; remarks on Senate amendments, 77; remarks on second legal-tender bill, 95; introduces post- age currency bill, 99 ; remarks on third legal-tender bill, 114; substitute pro- posed by third legal-tender bill, 116,117 ; remarks on the "gold bill," 230; opin- ion of effects of greenbacks on busi- ness, 392 ; see also 58 n., 59 n., 67 n.,97 n., 110 n., 114 n., 116 n., 225 n. Horton, "V. B. : opposition to first legal- tender bill in committee, 46; remarks upon it in House, 59, 63; substitute pro- posed for first legal-tender act, 75 ; op- position to legal-tender clause, 76; amendment offered to second legal- tender bill, 96 ; remarks on third legal- tender bill. 111, 114; proposes repeal of " conversion " clanse, 115 ; see also 55 n., 58 n., 59 n., 60 n., 78. Howard, J. M. : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 53. Howe, T. O. : remarks on first legal-ten- der bill, 56, 64 ; see also 52 n., 56 n., 57 n., 61 n. HuLBURD, H. R. : estimate of effect of greenbacks on cost of war, 405. HunVs Merchants' Magazine : comments on decline in consumption of staple commodities, 400, 401 ; see also 11 n., 13 n., 14 n., 18 n., 21 n., 22 n., 24 n., 30, 37 n., 39 n., 43 n., 125 n., 145 n., 149 n., 150 n., 151 n., 152 n., 155 n., 159 n., 172 n., 175 n., 177 n., 184 n,, 186, 189 n., 191 n., 192 n., 193 n., 196 n., 202 n., 207 n., 365, 366, 375 n., 389 n. Independent subtreasury: relation to $150,000,000 loan, 25; prevents bank loan, July, 1884, 125. Index-numbers: for prices, 239-79; for wages, 280-351. Interest on public debt: effect of greenbacks on, 418, 419. Interest, bate of: statistics of rate, 365-8; slight increase in, 368; causes, 369-72; effect of government demand for loans, 373; of high profits, 374; of contraction of credit, 375, 376; interest realized on investments in government bonds, 377-9. Internal revenue duties (see Taxa- tion) : increase in receipts from, during war, 120, 129 ; effect of greenbacks on receipts from, 413-16. Ibon industry : relative wages in, 315-18. Index 573 James, E. J., 364 n. Johnson, A. B., 189 n. Johnson, Eevebdtt : repeal of the " gold bill," 232; see also 225 n., 229 n. Journal (Boston), 19 n., 81. Journal of Commerce (New York), 81, 209 n. Kasson, J. a., 225 n. EeI/LOGG, William: remarks on first legal-tender bill, 56, 57 ; see also 53 n., 55 n., 56 n., 57 n., 59 n., 65 n. King, H., 8 n. King, Pbeston, 77. Knox, J. J., 8 n., 10 n., 51 n., 146 n., 159 n., 162 n., 168 n., 176 n. Laboeees: relative wages of, 299, 331, 345. Lane, J. H. : remarks on the "gold bill," 230. Laughlin, j. Laubence, 52 n., 136 u„ 142 n., 156 n. L aitbel Hill dispatch : effect on valne of currency, 204. Legal-tendee acts : 1. Act of February 25, 1862; Spaulding's bills, 44-51 ; debate in Congress, 51-68; attitude of Chase, 68-74; fathered by Spaulding, 69-71; substitutes pro- posed, 75; votes in House, 75, 76; Sen- ate amendments, 76 ; votes in Senate, 77 ; action of House on Senate amend- ments. 77; conference committee, 78; g revisions of the act, 78, 79 ; reception y business public, 79; attitude of newspapers, 79, 80. 2. Act of July 11,1862: suggested by Chase, 91-3; Chandler's opposition, 93; bill introduced by Spaulding. 94; debate, 94r-7; votes, 97; provisions of act, 98 ; effect on the value of the cur- rency;, 199, 213, 214. 3. Joint resolution of January 17, 1863 : arrears in payment of army, 105 ; Wilson's resolution, 106; Chase's bill, 107 ; ways and means bill, 108 ; Stevens's resolution, 109; effect on the value of the currency, 200. 4. Act of March 3, 1863: introduction of bill, 108; provisions of bill, 110; debate, 110-15; amendments, 115-17; votes, 116, 117 ; provisions of act, 117, 118; effect on the value of the cur- rency, 199, 200, 216. 5. Limitation of greenbacks to $450,- 000,000, 122. Legal-tendeb clause (see Legal- tender acts, Greenbacks) : impotence in sustaining value of greenbacks, 198. Ledger (Philadelphia), 161 n., 164. Lendbbs of capital: effect of green- backs on interests of, 360-79. Lincoln, A. : appointment of Chase as secretary of treasury, 3; call for additional troops, July 1, 1862, 100; expresses regret at third issue of greenbacks, 109; accepts Chase's resig- nation, 124; effect of second election on value of currency, 205; effect of assassination on value of currency, 206; see also 21 n., 68 n., 78, 209 n. LiNDEEMAN, H. R., 142 n., 159 n. LippincoWs Monthly Magazine^ 23 n. Loan committee: of New York banks, report of, 1862, 28 n., 29 n., 32 n., 33 n., 34 n., 35 n., 36 n., 40 n., 41 n., 43 n. Loans, fedeeal : of 1858, 5 ; of 1860, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14 ; of February 8, 1861, 8, 9, 11. 12 ; of March 2, 1861, 11 ; $150,000,000 loan of 1861, 16, 17, 1943, 83, 84, 88, 90; five- twenty loan of 1862, 79, 88-90, 104, 107, 108, 121, 123; temporary loan, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 151, 152, 154; ten-forty loan of 1864, 123, 126; five-twenty loan of 1864, 126; effect of loans on value of currency, 202. See also Treasury notes. Certificates of indebtedness. Demand notes. Greenbacks. Loans, peivate : loss and gain ia pur- chasing power of principal caused by greenbacks, 361-4. Loans, state, 20 n. Louisville : relative rents in, 357. LovEJOT, Owen : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 56; opposition to legal- tender clause, 76; attitude toward second legal-tender bill, 94, 95; amends joint resolution of January 17, 1863, 109; see also 66 n., 58 n., 64 n., 110 n. McCuLLOCH, Hugh : appointed secretary of the treasury, 126, 202; payment of the army, 127; recommends speedy resumption of specie payments, 127, 128; as president of Bank of State of Indiana, 146, 147 ; on increase of specu- lation, 397; on effect of paper money in encouraging lavish appropriations, 415, 416; Men and Measures, 4 n,, 62 n., 74 n., 147 n. ; see also 189 n., 375. McDouGALL, J. E., 18 n., 54 n., 59 n., 61 n., 62 n., 77. Machinists : relative wages of, 299, 331, 345. McPheeson, E., 6 n. Mann, C. A. : estimate of effect of green- backs on cost of war, 405 ; see also 74 n., 189 n., 270 n., 398 n. Maeshall, a. : 352 n., 381. Maesland, G., 27 n. Masons : relative wages of, 299, 345. Medbeebt, j. K., 182 n., 227 n., 234 n., 235 n. Median : of relative prices, 255, 256, 257, 263, 264, 276; of relative wages, 292, 310, 338. Medium of exchange: confusion in, during war, 135, 141-81. Metallic tbades: relative wages in, 295, 344. Minees : of coal, relative money wages, 314; of iron-ore, relative money wages, 315. MOLDEES : relative wages of, 299, 345. Moniteur (Paris), 207. 574 HiSTOEY OF THE GREENBACKS MOOEE, 212 n. MoEAN, Chaeles, 189 n. MOEGAN, E. D. : disagreement with Chase over Cisco's successor, 124. MoEEiLL, Jdstin S. : work in Commit- tee of Ways and Means, 45; attitude toward legal -tender bill, 46; remarks on first legal-tender bill, 58 ; anticipa- tion of early end of war, 72 j substitute proposed for first legal-tender act, 75 ; opposition to legal-tender clause, 76; prophecy of second issue, 82 ; remarks on second legal-tender bill, 96; remarks on third legal-tender bill. 111 ; opposi- tion to further issues of greenbacks, 122; see also 55 n., 56 n., 57 n., 58 n., 59 n.,60n., 68n.,78n., UOn. Moses, Beenaed, 144 n. Nation, 398 n. National banking system: proposed by Chase, December, 1861, 37, 44; Spaulding's banking bill, 45, 46 ; urged by Chase, December, 1862, 103; bill reported by Stevens, January 8, 1863, 105; urged by Lincoln, 109; issue of national bank notes, 148. National Intelligencer (Washington) , 19 n., 81. Necessity eoe legal-tendee acts: affirmed by Spaulding, 47; incon- sistency of argument, 49; argument of necessity in Congress, 61-7; Chase's opinion in 1862 and 1870, 70, 71 ; opinion of financial critics, 72-4. Nevah, 78 n. Newcomb, Simon: estimate of increase in cost of war caused by greenbacks, 405 ; see also 74 n. Newspaeees : demand for heavier taxa- tion, 18, 19 n. ; attitude toward first legal-tender bill, 80, 81 ; reports of gold markets, 185, 186, 190; reports of inter- est rates, 366, 367. New Yoek Chambee of Commeecb : ad- vises adoption of legal-tender bill, 80; see also 19 n., 186, 196 n., 227 n. NicoLAY and Hay, 3 n., 15 n., 21 n., 68 n., 74 n., 100 n. Opdyke, Geoege C, 163 n. Opeqdan Ceeek, battle of : effect on value of currency, 204. Paintbes : relative wages of, 299, 331. Paekbe, T. M., 401 n. Patteen-makees : relative wages of, 299. Peaece, J. A., 52 n., 59 n. Pendleton, G. H. : remarks on first legal-tender bill, 53; see also 52n., 58 n., 59 n., 225 n. Philadelphia : relative rents in, 357. Pike, F. A. : remarks on second legal- tender bill, 95 ; see also 55 n., 56 u., 58 n., 64 n., 65 n., 95 n.. Ill n. Pollock, James: recommendations regarding minor coins, 169, 170. POMEEOY, T. M. : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 57, 77; on second legal- tender bill, 95 ; see also 56 n., 68 n., 71 n., 89n.,95n., 96n. POOE, H. v., 26 n., 27 n. Poet HnDSON, capture of: effect on value of currency, 204. Post (Chicago) , 159 n., 160 n. Post (Boston), 19 n., 81. Postage cdeeency: history of the act of July 17, 1862, 98, 99; circulation, 161- 5, 180. Postmaster geneeal : report of, De- cember, 1862, 163, 165 n. Pottees : relative wages of, 318. Powell, L. W., 54 n., 229 n., 335 n. Peemiijm upon gold, 182-238; cf. tables showing value of paper currency in gold, 423-8. Press (Philadelphia), 81. Prices: of commodities at wholesale, 243-56 : of government supplies, 256-9, 406-12 ; of commodities at retail, 259-64 ; in England, Germany, and the United States, 272, 273; effect on prices of government purchases, 265; of inter- ruption in supply of southern products, 266; of taxation, 267-70; of enlistments In the army, 270 ; of speculation, 270, 271 ; of the quantity of money, 271 ; or the decline in gold, 272-5 ; of the paper standard, 275-9; general character and consequences of fluctuations, 13fr-40; relative retail prices in four towns, 340 ; in eastern and western states, 346, 347; cf. tables in Appendix; relative prices of farm products, 429-34 ; of va- rious commodities at wholesale, 435- 48 ; relative prices paid by federal gov- ernment for supplies, 449-51; relative prices of various commodities at re- tail, 451-68; comparison of relative prices of 23 commodities at wholesale and at retail, 469. Printers : relative wages of, 299. Production of wealth : effect of green- backs on, 392-8. Peofessional men : relative earnings of, Peofits : use of the term, 380, 381 ; in- crease of profits caused by decline of wages, rent, and interest, 382-5 ; effect of differences in relative prices upon profits, 385-8; profits of farmers, 386-8 statistics bearing upon profits, 389-91 effect of high profits on interest, 374 on production of wealth, 395-8. Prosperity : discussion of, by war-time pamphleteers, 392-4. Public debt: increase of March 7 to July 1, 1861, 14 ; effect of greenbacks on amount of, 403-20. Public works (municipal): relative wages of employees, 295, 344 ; see also 297 n. Quantity theory: and the value of the greenbacks, 207-9 ; and prices, 271, 272. Index 575 Qdakh'SMEN : relative wages of, 299, 345. Railway employees : relative wages ot, 295, 344. Eeceipts and EXPENDITDEE3 : annual reports upon, 407, 408. Receipts of the teeasuet (see also Finances, state of the) : January to March, 1862, 88 : April to June, 1862, 90 ; July to September, 1862, 101 ; increase of receipts from taxation, 120; reca- pitulation, 128-30 ; effect of greenbacks on, 412-n. Rent: in towns, data collected by Young, 353, 354: data collected by Weeks, 355-7 ; difference between rents in eastern and western states, 355, 356; in cities and towns, 356, 357; rent or farms, 358, 359; c/. tables, 467, 468. Reports of seceetaey of teeasuet: July, 1861, 15, 16 ; December, 1861, 37 ; December, 1862, 102-4 ; December, 1863, 121 ; December, 1864, 125, 126 ; Decem- ber, 1865, 127, 128 ; effect of reports on value of the currency, 201. Eepublican (St. Louis) , 163. Republican (Springfield, Mass.), 19 n., 81, 158, 160 n., 161 n., 163, 164, 168 n., 167, 348 n. Retail peices (see Prices). Revenue commission, 1865-66: inquiry into consumption of wealth, 401. Rhodes, J. P., 38 n., 51 n., 73 n., 74 n., 212 n. Rice, H. M., 77. Riddle, A. G. : remarks on third legal- tender biU, 114 ; see also 110 n., 114 n. Rollins, E. H. : opposition to legal- tender clause, 76. St. Louis : relative rents in, 357. Sales op gold by the teeasuey, 225-7. Saueebeck, a. : English index-numbers, 272, 273. Saulsbuey, W., 54 n. School-teachees : relative salaries of, 319, 320. SCHUCKEES, J. W., 4 n., 29 n., 43 n., 85 n., 123 n„ 124 n., 125 n., 152 n., 176 n,, 186 n., 226 n., 227 n. SoHDEZ, Gael, 189 n. Schwab, J. C, 21 n. Second hands : relative wages of, 299. Sedgwick, C.B., 78. Sewaed, W. H., 68 n. Sheffield, W. P.: remarks on second legal-tender bill, 96 ; see also 52 n., 55 n., 59n.,60n.,94n., llOn. Shell ABAEGEE, S. : opposes repeal of "conversion" clause, 116 ; see also 65 n., 113 n. Sheeman, John : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 53, 65 ; opposition to tem- porary loan, 85, 86 ; remarks on second legal-tender bill, 95 ; vote upon it, 97 ; proposed amendment making demand notes legal tender, 152; introduces "gold bills," 225, 228; Becollections, 10 n. ; see also 53 n., 55 n., 59 n., 61 n., 67 n., 78, 89 n., 105 n., HI n., 225 n., 229 n. "Shinplastees" : circulation of, 159-64, 180. Shipping and, Commercial List (New York), 151 n., 152 n., 153 n. "Shoddy aeistoceaoy" : extravagance of, 398. Simmons, J. F. : remarks on second legal-tender bill, 94; see also 55 n., 66 n., 73 n., 80 n., 95 n., 151 n. SoETBBEE, A.: index-numbers for Ger- many, 272, 273. SOLDIEES : pay of, 334, 335, 408. Sound Currency^ 27 n., 52 n., 195 n. Southeen DEBTS : treatment of, in 1861, 21 and 21 n. Southern peoduots : relative prices of, 252-4, 266. Spahe, C. B., 282 n. Spaulding, E.g.: work on Committee of Ways and Means, 45 ; first draft of legal- tender bill, 46; reasons assigned for it, 47 ; reply to Gallatin, 48-50 ; second draft of legal-tender bill, 51; remarks on bill, 52, 61, 64, 65, 67, 77, 80; " Father of the Greenbacks," 69-71, 94; remarks on second legal-tender bill, 94, 95, 96 ; remarks on third legal-tender bill, 108, 111, 114 ; opinion of effect of greenbacks on business, 392; History of Legal- Tender Paper Money, 4 n., 19 n., 23 n., 25 n., 26 n., 27 n., 29 n., 33 n., 43 n., 45 n., 46 n., 47 n., 48 n., 49 n., 51 n., 52 n., 62 n., 67 n., 68 n., 70 n., 73 n., 75 n., 76 n., 105 n. ; see also 55 n., 56 n., 57 n., 68 n., 61 n., 65 n., 82 n., 87 n., 89 n., 97 n., 110 n. Speae, S. T., 74 n. Specie payments, suspension of: by banks, 38-41, 144^8; by treasury, 41 ; re- sponsibility for, 41-3. Speculation: and the premium upon gold, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193, 194, 209, 210, 224 ; attempts to crush gold specu- lation, 223-32 ; speculation and prices, 270, 271 ; effect of greenbacks on specu- lation, 396-8. Spinnee, F. E. : on wages of government clerks, 334. Stamp tax : on sales of gold, 223, 224. Standard of value: fluctuations in specie value of greenbacks, 135, 136, 140 n., 182-238 ; in prices, 239-79 ; effect of changes in the standard, see Wages, Rent, Interest, Profits, Production, Consumption, Cost of war. Credit; community's interest in standard vs. financial interest of government, 403, 404. Stanton, E. M., 68 n., 105. Stevens, Thaddeus: chairman Com- mittee of Ways and Means, 45; atti- tude toward legal-tender bill, 46 ; re- marks on first legal-tender bill, 52, 57, 64, 65, 67, 77, 80; explanation of " fund- ing provisions," 89 ; remarks on second 576 HiSTOEY OF THE GeEBNBAOKS legal-tender bill, 97; reports loan and banking bills January, 1863, 105, 199, 200; opposes repeal of "conversion" clause, 116; substitute for third legal- tender bill, 116 ; attempt to secure pay- ment of interest in paper money, 122; introduces bill to make demand notes legal tender, 154; bill to prevent pay- ment of premium for coin, 237 ; see also 52 n., 55 n., 58 u., 61 n., 78, 78 n., 82 n., 84 n., 87 n., 91 n. Stone-cutteks : relative wages of, 299, 345. Stone ibade: relative wages in, 295, 344. Stbiees, 348 n. Sumner, Charles: remarks on first legal-tender bill, 54,79; see also 55 n., 59 n., 60 n., 62 n. Sumnee, W. G., 21 n., 43 n., 74 n. Sun (Baltimore), 81 n. Tadssig, F. W., 9 n., 74 n. Taxation: inadequacy of taxes levied in August, 1861,18, 19, 63,72; increase of taxes, 120; effect of, on prices, 267- 70; effect of greenbacks on receipts from taxes, 412-17. Teamstees : relative wages of, 299, 331. Textile trades: relative wages in, 291, 295, 302, 330, 344. Thomas, B. F. : remarks on first legal- tender bill, 57, 63 : opposition to legal- tender clause, 76 ; see also 52 n,, 54 n., 56 n., 57 n., 59 n., 60 n. Thomas, P. F. : administration of treas- ury, 6-8. Thompson, R. E., 189 u. Times (New York), 19 n., 39 n., 73 n., 81, 152 n., 153 n., 154 n., 158, 161 n., 193 n., 199 n., 200 n., 202 n., 204 n., 207 n., 215 n., 220 n., 222 n., 223 n., 224 n., 225 n., 228 n., 375. Tod, David: offered secretaryship of the treasury, 124. TOWNSEND, S. p., 188 n. Teeasukt notes: one-year notes of 1857,5; one-year notes of 1860,6, 7, 8, 11 ; two-year notes of 1861, 12, 13, 14, 20; sixty-day notes of 1861,20; 7:30 notes of 1861, 17, 28 ; one- and two- year notes of 1863, 123, 124, 126, 174-6; compound- interest notes, 123, 124, 125, 126, 176; 7 : 30 notes of 1864, 125 J26, 127, 177, 178 : see also Greenbacks, Demand notes or 1861, Certificates of indebtedness. Trent affair: financial effect of, 37, 38,42. Tribune (New York), 19 n., 21 n., 36 n., 39 n., 41, 80, 151 n., 152 n., 159 n., 160 n., 163 n., 184 n., 201, 209 n., 222, 223 n., 224, 226 n., 234, 235 n., 237 n., 367 n. Trumbull, Lyman : remarks on circula- tion of cents, 170. United States notes : see Greenbacks, Treasury notes, Demand notes of 1861. Upton, J. K., 27 n., 52 n., 74 n. Vallandigham, C. L. : attacks on policy of the administration, July, 1861, 16 ; substitute proposed for first legal- tender act, 75; nomination for gover- nor of Ohio, 219 ; see also 60 n. ViCKSBUEG, CAPTURE OP: effect on value of currency, 204. Wages: connection between advance in prices and in wages, 270, 306; value of wage-data, of Aldrich Report, 283- 6 : of Weeks's supplementary report, 314, 315 ; of Department of Agriculture for farm-laborers, 321, 322; of the Tenth Ceneiis, 324^8; relative money wages, by industries, 294^8, 314-19 ; by occupa- tions, 298-300, 319-21, 321-4, 330, 331 ; by sexes, 291, 293, 300-303, 307 ; by grades of skill and responsibility, 300, 301,323; by wage-groups, 303-7, 322, 323; range of fiuotuations, 290-92, 329, 330; connec- tion with actual earnings before sus- pension, 303-7, 332,333; actual money wages, increase in, 308, 309, 333 ; relative wages in eastern and western states, 328-31, 346, 347; relative real wages, approximate character of figures, 339, 340; of all persons represented by Aldrich Beport, 340-42; comparison with Falkner's figures, 342, 343; by industries, 344; by occupations, 345; by wage-groups, 345; in eastern and western states, 346, 347; conclusions regarding, 347-51 ; ef. tables of relative wages computed from Table XII of the Aldrich Beport, 470-517; from Table XIV, ibid., 566, 567 ; from Vol. SX of the Tenth Census, 518-66. Waite.F. C.,282n. Walkbe, Amasa: remarks on third legal-tender bill, HI, 113 ; see also 110 n., llln.,113n., 114n., 398n. Walker, F. A., 52u.,325n. • Walker, K. J., lOn., 393 n. Walton, C. W., 61 n., 63 n. War news : effect on value of currency, 203-5. Ward, E., HI n. Warden, E. B., 4n., 24n., 26 n., 27 n., 34n., 41 n., 43 n., 70 n., 124 n., 227 n., 228 n.. 230 n., 231 n., 232 n., 235 n. Watchmen : relative wages of, 299. Watts, J. S. : remarks on third legal- tender bill, 115; see also 113 n. Wealth: effect of greenbacks on pro- duction of, 392-8 ; on consumption of, S98-402. Weavers : relative wages of, 299, 345. Weeks, J^ D. : report on retail prices, 259-64; report on wages in Aldrich Beport, 314-19; report on wages in Tenth Census, 324-33; data for rent, 354-7. Weighting: of tables of prices, 244, 250 n. ; of tables of wages, 287-9, 294-8, 301, 309-13, 327 ; of tables of cost of liv- ing, 336, 337; of tables of prices of agricultural products, 387. Index 577 Wells, David A. : inquiry into earnings of professional men, 321 ; into rent of workingmen's houses, 353, 354; into profits, 389; on cause of price fluctua- tions, 269; on prosperity during war, 392; on increase of speculation, 397, 398; see also 351 n., 398n. Weston, G. M., 189 n. Whaeton, Joseph : opposition to cessa- tion of coinage of nickel cents, 169. White, Hoeaoe, 26n., 182 n., 406 n. Wholesale Peices (see Prices). Wilderness, battles of: effect on value of currency, 222. Wilkinson, M. S., 18 n. Willey, W. T., 60n., 77. Williams, J. E., 26 n., 27 n., 4Sn. Williams, C. P. : estimate of effect of greenbacks on cost of war, 405. Wilson, G.F., 78 n. Wilson, Henet : offers resolution for a third issue of greenbacks, 106 ; see also 55n., 65u., 80. Wilson, E., 77. Women : relative wages of, as compared with men, 291, 293, 300-303, 307. World (New York), 81, 205, 209 n., 234, 367 n. Weight, H. B., 52 n., 63 n. Yazoo eiver expedition: effect on value of currency, 203. Young, Edwaed : investigation into rent of workingmen's houses, 353-5.