I'RLiNCH 
 
 AN AUIHEN TIC BKXiMPMY 
 
 l\Y CECIL CHfSHC)LM,M.A. 
 
 
CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
Cornell University Library 
 DA 68.32.F87C54 
 
 :>ir John French: 
 
 3 1924 028 000 564 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis bool< is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028000564 
 

 
 
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 FIELD-MARSHAL SIR JOHN D. V. FRENCH, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G. 
 From a portrait by J . R. L. French 
 
SIR JOHN 
 FRENCH 
 
 AN AUTHENTIC BIOGRAPHY 
 
 BY 
 
 CECIL CHISHOLM, M.A. 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 
 
 SIR EVELYN WOOD, V.C. 
 
 AND A PORTRAIT BY J. R. L. FRENCH 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 FREDERICK A. STOKES COMPANY 
 
 PUBLISHERS 
 
" This is the happy warrior — this is he 
 That every man in anns should wish to be." 
 
 Wordsworth. 
 
 :by-zff?^ 
 
 WVUAN AND SONS LTD., PRINTIRS, lONDON AND READINO, ENGIAHD. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 BY FIELD-MARSHAL SIR EVELYN WOOD, V.C. 
 
 I REGARD John Denton French as the man 
 who for the last twelve years has been the 
 driving force of tactical instruction in 
 the British Army. He made use of all the best 
 ideas of the Generals who preceded him in 
 the Aldershot Command, and he was, I think, 
 instrumental in causing the appointment of 
 Horace Smith-Dorrien and Douglas Haig to 
 succeed in turn to that nursery of soldiers. 
 
 How sound his judgment has proved to be 
 may be discovered from the dispatches — • 
 carefully worded — in which he describes how 
 Smith-Dorrien conducted the most successful 
 retreat since that of Sir John Moore to Corunna, 
 1808-9, 3.nd how Douglas Haig carried his 
 Army across the Aisne river in the face of the 
 enemy's fire opposition. 
 
 From 1884-5, when as a Squadron Officer 
 he showed marked determination in the 
 abortive expedition for the relief of Gordon, 
 until 1899-1902 in South Africa, he has been 
 the foremost man to inculcate the " Cavalry 
 Spirit," and unUke many advocates of that 
 
iv INTRODUCTION 
 
 spirit, he has never become a slave to the 
 idea. He has been at pains to teach the 
 Cavalry soldier that when he can no longer 
 fight to the best advantage in the saddle, he 
 is to get off his horse and fight on foot. This 
 is a marked feature of his military genius. 
 
 He is intensely practical ; and he is pos- 
 sessed of great moral and physical courage 
 which never fail to assert themselves in the 
 face of the most difficult situations. They 
 were conspicuously shown during the Boer 
 War when, with an extraordinary determina- 
 tion, he formed up his men on their tired and 
 exhausted horses and advanced in extended 
 order, galloping through the Boers in position, 
 and reaching Kimberley as the result of his 
 heroic determination. 
 
 When, in the earlier part of this War, 
 things were not going well, I was asked to 
 give my opinion of our chances of success. 
 I said that I did not think that our prospects 
 were then bright, but although many men had 
 gone " Hands up " before John French, he 
 would never put up his own, whatever 
 happened. 
 
 Evelyn Wood, F.-M. 
 
 November lo, 
 1914. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 IN writing this biography of Field-Marshal 
 Sir John French I have been deeply in- 
 debted to many of his personal friends for 
 helping me with first-hand impressions of 
 our General in the Field. A number of 
 military writers have been almost equally 
 helpful. Among those to whom I owe sincere 
 thanks for personal assistance are Lady 
 French, Mr. J. R. L. French, Mrs. Despard, 
 Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, Field-Marshal 
 Sir Evelyn Wood, General Bewicke Copley, 
 Colonel E. K. Aylener, Colonel Kendal Cog- 
 hill, Colonel Charles E. Warde, M.P., the 
 Editor of the Army and Navy Gazette, Mr. 
 Percy J. King, the Editor of the Regiment, 
 Mr. Frederick W. Carter, Mr. Leonard Cro- 
 combe and Mr. S. R. Littlewood, who put 
 valuable material at my disposal. 
 
 I shall be very grateful for any further 
 biographical particulars, stories, or correc- 
 tions for incorporation in subsequent editions : 
 all communications should be addressed to 
 me, care of my publishers, 
 
 C. C. 
 
The outside wrapper is reproduced from a drawing by 
 E. Oakdale, by courtesy of Mr. Holbrook Jackson, Editor 
 of " T.P's Weekly." 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 r\os 
 INTRODUCTION jii 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 EARLY DAYS 
 
 A Kentish Celt — ^A Rebellious Boy — Four Years in the 
 Navy — ^With the 19th Hussars — " Captain X Trees " 
 — ^A Studious Subaltern — Chafing at Home — ^The 
 First Opportunity ...... i 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 WITH THE NILE EXPEDITION 
 
 A Forlorn Hope — Scouting in the Desert — ^The Battle 
 of Abu Klea — ^Metammeh — ^The Death of Gordon — 
 A Dangerous Retreat — " Major French and His 
 Thirteen Troc^ers " 10 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 YEARS OF WAITING 
 
 Second in Command — ^Maintaining the Barrow tradition 
 — The Persistent Student — Service in India — Retires 
 on Half-pay — Renewed Activities — Rehearsing . for 
 South Africa ........23 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 ELANDSLAAGTE AND RIETFONTEIN 
 
 The Unknown Commander of Cavalry — ^Who is General 
 French ? — ^Advancing without Reinforcements — 
 " This is your Show, French "—The White Flag — 
 The Chess-Player — The Victor in Anecdote - - 32 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE TIDE TURNS 
 
 White's Dash from Ladysmith — ^Nicholson's Nek — The 
 Reverse at Lombard's Kop — A Cavalry Exploit — 
 French's Dramatic Escape from Ladysmith . . 45 
 
viii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN ROUND COLESBERG 
 
 The Fog of Wax — A Perilous Situation — Damming " The 
 Flowing Tide " — Shows His Genius as a Commander 
 • — A Campaign in Miniature — ^Hoisting Guns on Hill- 
 tops — The Fifty-mile Front — Saving the Situation - 52 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE DASH TO KIMBERLEY 
 
 French's Pledge — ^The Task — ^The First Shell — " Hemmed 
 in " — " We must break through " — ^The Lancers' 
 Charge — In and Out of Kimberley — The Surrender of 
 Cronje 67 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 ROUNDING UP THE BOERS 
 
 French in the Modder — ^At Bloemfontein — ^French and 
 the Artist — An Ambush — Doing the Impossible Again 
 —Short Shrift with Barberton Snipers — Some French 
 Stories ..-.-...-82 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 WORK AT HOME AND RESIGNATION 
 
 At Aldershot — Driving Training at High Pressure — 
 General French is " fairly well pleased " — Strenuous 
 Manoeuvres- — Chief of the Imperial General Staff — 
 Ulster and Resignation _....- 97 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 HIS BELIEF IN CAVALRY 
 
 The Lessons of the Boer War — Cavalry v. Mounted In- 
 fantry — A Plea for the Lance — ^The Cavalry Spirit — 
 Shock Tactics still Useful 106 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE MODERN MARLBOROUGH 
 
 Europe's Need — The Plight of France — A Delicate Situa- 
 tion — ^The Man of " Grip " — A Magnificent Retreat - ii6 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 FRENCH, THE MAN 
 
 A Typical Englishman- — ^Fighting at School — Napoleon 
 Worship — ■" A Great Reporter " — Halting Speeches 
 and Polished Prose. A South African Coincidence — 
 Mrs. Despard and the Newsboy — ^The Happy Warrior 121 
 
 Index ---.- 149 
 
SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 Early Days 
 
 A Kentish Celt — A Rebellious Boy — Four Years in the 
 Navy— With the 19th Hussars—" Captain X Trees " 
 — ^A Studious Subaltern — Chafing at Home — ^The 
 First Opportunity. 
 
 " "TF I don't end my days as a Field-Mar- 
 f shal it will not be for want of trying, 
 and — well, I'm joUy well going to do 
 it." In these words, uttered many years ago 
 to a group of brother officers in the mess room 
 of the 19th Hussars, Sir John French quite 
 unconsciously epitomised his own character 
 in a way no biographer can hope to equal. 
 The conversation had turned upon luck, a 
 word that curiously enough was later to be 
 so intimately associated with French's name. 
 One man had stoutly proclaimed that all 
 promotion was a matter of luck, and French 
 had claimed that only work and ability really 
 counted in the end. Yet " French's luck " 
 has become almost a service proverb — for 
 
2 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 those who have not closely studied his career. 
 Luck is frequently a word used to explain our 
 own failure and another man's success. 
 
 Not that success and John French could 
 ever have been strangers. There are some 
 happy natures whose destiny is never in 
 doubt. Providence having apparently planned 
 it half a century ahead. Sir John French 
 is a striking instance of this. Destiny 
 never had any doubt about the man. He 
 was born to be a fighter. On his father's side 
 he comes of the famous old Galway family 
 of which Lord de Freyne, of French Park, 
 Co. Roscommon, is now the head. By tradi- 
 tion the Frenches are a naval family, although 
 there have been famous soldiers as well as 
 famous sailors amongst its members. There 
 was, for instance, the John French who 
 fought in the army of King William, leading 
 a troop of the Enniskillen Dragoons at 
 Aughrim in 1689. 
 
 Sir John French is himself the son of a sailor, 
 Commander J. T. W. French, who on retiring 
 from the Navy settled down on the beautiful 
 little Kentish estate of Ripplevale,nearWalmer. 
 Here John Denton Pinkstone French was bom 
 on September 28, 1852, in the same year 
 as his future colleague, General Joffre. His 
 mother, a Miss Eccles, was the daughter of 
 a Scotch family resident near Glasgow. 
 
PLAYING WITH SOLDIERS 3 
 
 Of the boy's home life at Ripplevale very 
 little is known. He was the sixth child and 
 the only son of the family. Both his parents 
 dying while he was quite young, he was 
 brought up under the care of his sisters. But 
 there is no reason to suppose that he was 
 therefore spoilt ; for one of these ladies 
 shared in a remarkable degree the qualities 
 of energy and determination which were to 
 distinguish her brother. Young French's 
 earliest education was largely guided by this 
 gifted sister, who is now so well known in 
 another field of warfare as Mrs. Despard. 
 
 It is extremely difficult to say what manner 
 of boy the future Field-Marshal was. Only 
 one fact emerges clearly. He was high- 
 spirited and full of mischief. Everything 
 that he did was done with the greatest 
 enthusiasm, and already there were signs that 
 he possessed an unusually strong will. 
 
 Inevitably games quickly took possession 
 of his imagination. Very soon the war game 
 had first place in his affections. He was per- 
 petually playing with soldiers — a fascinating 
 hobby which intrigued the curious mind of 
 the rather silent child. French, in fact, was 
 a very normal and healthy boy, with just 
 a touch of thoughtfulness to mark him off 
 from his fellows. 
 
 He was not, however, to enjoy the freedom 
 
4 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 of home life for very long. At an early age 
 he was sent to a preparatory school at Harrow, 
 which he left for Eastman's Naval College at 
 Portsmouth. After the necessary " cram- 
 ming " he passed the entrance examination 
 to the Navy at the age of thirteen. In the 
 following year (1866) he joined the Britannia 
 as a cadet. Four years of strenuous naval 
 work followed. But like another Field- 
 Marshal-to-be, Sir Evelyn Wood, the boy 
 was not apparently enamoured of the sea. 
 As a result he decided to leave that branch of 
 the service. 
 
 That action is typical of the man. He is 
 ruthless with himself as well as with others. 
 If the Navy were not to give scope for his 
 ambition, then he must quit the Navy. 
 Already, no doubt, his life-long hero. Napoleon, 
 was kindling the young man's imagination. 
 But the English Navy of those days gave 
 little encouragement to the Napoleonic point 
 of view. It was bound up with the sternest 
 discipline and much red tape. If rumour 
 speaks true young French was irritated by 
 the almost despotic powers then possessed by 
 certain naval officers. So he boldly decided 
 at the age of eighteen to end one career and 
 commence another. 
 
 To enter the sister service he had to stoop 
 to what is dubbed the " back-door," in other 
 
THE "DUMPIES" 5 
 
 words a commission in the militia. It seems 
 rather remarkable that one of our most 
 brilliant officers should have had this diffi- 
 culty to face. Incidentally it is a curious 
 sidelight on the system of competitive ex- 
 aminations. But there are several facts to 
 remember. Sir John French's genius de- 
 veloped slowly. One does not figure him as 
 ready, like Kitchener, at twenty-one, with a 
 complete map of his career. In these days 
 he was probably more interested in hunting 
 than in soldiering. The man who is now 
 proverbial for his devotion to the study of 
 tactics was then very little of a book-worm. 
 Indeed he seems to have shown no special 
 intellectual or practical abilities until much 
 later in life. 
 
 In 1874 he was gazetted to the 8th Hussars, 
 being transferred three weeks later to the 
 19th. At that time the 19th Hussars was 
 scarcely a crack regiment. With two other 
 regiments raised after the Indian mutiny it 
 was nicknamed the " Dumpies," owing to the 
 standard of height being lowered, and it had 
 yet to earn the reputation which Barrow and 
 French secured it. About John French the 
 subaltern, as about John French the mid- 
 shipman, history is silent. No fabulous 
 legends have accumulated about him. Pre- 
 sumably the short, firmly-built young officer 
 
6 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 was regarded as normal and entirely de 
 rigeur in his sporting propensities. 
 
 The subaltern of the 'eighties took himself 
 much less seriously than his successor of to- 
 day. The eternal drill and the occasional 
 manoeuvres were conducted on well-worn 
 and almost automatic principles. As a 
 result, the younger officers found hunting and 
 polo decidedly better sport. Few or none of 
 them were military enthusiasts ; and study 
 did not enter largely into their programme. 
 It entered into French's — but only in stray 
 hours, often snatched by early rising, before 
 the day's work — or sport — began. 
 
 Despite constant rumours to the contrary, 
 there can be no question that French was a 
 most spirited young officer and a thorough 
 sportsman. He at once earned for himself the 
 sobriquet of " Capt. X Trees," as a result of 
 his being a " retired naval man." To this day 
 among the very few remaining brother officers 
 of his youth, he is still greeted as " Trees." 
 
 As might be expected, French showed no 
 desire to pose as " the glass of fashion or the 
 mould of form." He never attempted to 
 cultivate the graces of the beau sabreur. His 
 short square figure did not look well on horse- 
 back and probably never will. But he was 
 admitted to be a capable horseman and to 
 have " good hands." Although not keen on 
 
A DIFFICULT TEAM 7 
 
 polo he was very fond of steeplechasing. Of 
 his love for that sport there is ample proof in 
 the fact that he trained and rode his own 
 steeplechasers. 
 
 One of his best horses was a mare called 
 " Mrs. Gamp," which he lent on one occasion 
 to a brother subaltern — ^now Colonel Charles 
 E. Warde, M.P. for Mid-Kent. Riding with 
 his own spurs on French's mare. Colonel 
 Warde was one of three out of a field of four 
 hundred to live through a Warde Union run 
 which was responsible for the death of six 
 hunters before the day was over. 
 
 Young French also became a very good 
 whip. Along with Colonel H. M. A. Warde — 
 now the Chief Constable 'of Kent — ^he had a 
 thrilling adventure in coach driving. When 
 the regiment first started a coach it was 
 necessary to bring it from Dublin to the 
 Curragh. The two subalterns, neither of 
 whom had ever driven fom: horses before, 
 commandeered four chargers belonging to 
 brother of&cers. One of the animals was a 
 notorious kicker. But they took them up to 
 Dublin and drove the coach twenty-eight 
 miles down to the Curragh next day, arriving 
 there aUve and with no broken harness ! 
 
 At that time French differed from his fellow 
 officers probably rather in degree than in tem- 
 perament. Although a very keen sportsman 
 
8 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 he did not put sport first. Colonel C. E. 
 Warde, one of his closest friends, gives the 
 following description of the man. " Although 
 he never attempted to go to the Staff College 
 he was continually studying military works, 
 and often, when his brother subalterns were 
 at polo or other afternoon amusements, he 
 would remain in his room reading Von 
 Schmidt, Jomini, or other books on strategy. 
 I recollect once travelling by rail with him in 
 our subaltern days, when after observing the 
 country for some time, he broke out : ' There 
 is where I should put my artillery.' ' There 
 is where I should put my cavalry ' and so on 
 to the journey's end." 
 
 In spite of these evidences of a soldier's eye 
 for country, there is nothing to show that 
 French had developed any abnormal devotion 
 for his work. He was interested but not 
 absorbed. In 1880 a captaincy and his 
 marriage probably did something to make 
 him take his career more seriously. His wife. 
 Lady French, was a daughter of Mr. R. W. 
 Selby-Lowndes, of Bletchley, Bucks. They 
 have two sons and a daughter. 
 
 A few months after his marriage he accepted 
 an adjutancy in the Northumberland Yeo- 
 manry. For four uneventful years he was 
 stationed at Newcastle, where the work was 
 monotonous and the opportunities almost nil. 
 
THE WAITING GAME 9 
 
 Naturally the young man fretted very 
 much at being left behind with the Yeomanry 
 when his regiment was ordered to embark for 
 Egypt in 1882. And he never rested until he 
 was allowed to follow it out in 1884. It was 
 in many ways a new 19th which the young 
 officer re-joined in Egypt. The regiment 
 hurried out in 1882 had at last come under a 
 commander of real genius in Colonel Percy 
 Barrow, C.B., and in that commander French 
 was to find his first real military inspiration- 
 It is difficult to judge what his future might 
 have been but for this one man and the Nile 
 Expedition, which proved the turning point in 
 French's career as it did in that of his regiment. 
 
 Then, as ever, French was a man who had 
 to wait for his opportunities. He was thirty- 
 two years of age before he saw this, his first 
 piece of active service. Where Kitchener 
 foimd, or made, opportunities for military 
 experience, French was content to wait the 
 turn of events. So it has been all through his 
 life. He has never forestalled Destiny; he 
 has simply accepted its caU. But when an 
 opportunity presented itself he always seized 
 it, and the Nile Expedition was no exception 
 to the rule. Major French, without Stafi 
 CoUege training, without the usual diplomas, 
 was to prove himself once and for all a master 
 tactician. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 With the Nile Expedition 
 
 A Forlorn Hope — Scouting in the Desert — ^The Battle 
 of Abu Klea — Metammeh — ^The Death of Gordon — 
 A Dangerous Retreat — " Major French and His 
 Thirteen Troopers." 
 
 SIR JOHN FRENCH'S first experience 
 of actual warfare was a bitter one. 
 If ever the British Government bungled 
 one of their military enterprises more 
 thoroughly than another, it was the Nile 
 Expedition of 1884-5. What began as a 
 forlorn hope ended in complete failure, and 
 in three short months French experienced 
 the miseries of retreat, of failure, and of 
 work under an invertebrate War Office. 
 
 To this day no one has ever justified the 
 hidden processes of logic by which the 
 Government responsible came to the con- 
 clusion that the Soudan must be evacuated. 
 It is true that the Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, 
 had won considerable successes against our 
 forces since his appearance in 1881. But 
 no army of any dimensions had ever been 
 
THE SLEEPER WAKES ii 
 
 opposed to his " Divine powers." Why Gor- 
 don should have been entrusted with the 
 evacuation is not so doubtful. W. T, Stead 
 and other journalistic pundits conceived him 
 to be the man for the task, however much 
 Egypt's ruler, Lord Cromer, might differ 
 from their verdict. So to Khartoum Gordon 
 was sent with an all too small band of follow- 
 ers. Presumably the authorities imagined 
 that the man who had worked miracles in 
 China with neither men nor money would 
 settle the Soudan on equally economical 
 terms. But the Mahdi's black braves were 
 other mettle than the yellow men, as Gordon 
 himself well knew from his past experience 
 in the Soudcin. 
 
 Reaching Khartoum on February i8, 
 1884, he quickly discovered how perilous the 
 defeat of Baker Pasha at El-Teb had made 
 his position. He at once warned his superiors, 
 but nothing was done. In April he found 
 Khartoum besieged, but even that did not 
 startle the Home authorities from their 
 lethargy. At length, however, the Govern- 
 ment reahsed that to allow their General 
 to perish at the hands of the Dervishes 
 might be to forfeit their prestige in Egypt. 
 Lord Wolseley was accordingly instructed to 
 relieve Khartoum at all costs. 
 
 Those instructions were more easy to give 
 
12 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 than to obey. Wolseley decided to send 
 a flying column across the desert from Korti 
 to Metammeh and thence to Khartoum ; 
 and a second up the Nile, With the luckless 
 flying column went part of the 19th Hussars, 
 under Lieutenant-Colonel Barrow. Major 
 French was second in command. 
 
 On December 30, General Herbert Stewart's 
 little force, with its thousand odd men and 
 two thousand camels, was on parade for 
 inspection near Korti. At first there was 
 some doubt as to how the camels would 
 stand the attack of the Mahdi's wild warriors. 
 
 " In order to test the steadiness of our 
 camels as regarded noise and firing, the 19th 
 Hussars one day at brigade drill charged on 
 the unprotected mass of camels, cheering and 
 yelling. Everybody expected to see them 
 break their ropes and career wildly over the 
 desert. The only result was that one solitary 
 camel struggled to his feet, looked round and 
 knelt down again ; the others never moved 
 an eyelid. 
 
 " That was satisfactory : and as firing into 
 them with blank cartridges and over them 
 with ball had already been tried . . . with 
 no visible result, the general opinion was 
 that they would stand charging niggers or 
 anything else in creation with equanimity. 
 Sad to say we came to the conclusion that 
 
THE KITCHENER WAY 13 
 
 it was want of brains pur et simple that 
 caused our steeds to behave thus docilely : 
 any other animal with a vestige of brain 
 would have been scared to death, but, as 
 it was, no one regretted their deficiency."* 
 
 Before the corps set out from Korti, Sir 
 Herbert Stewart sent for the chief men at 
 Ambukol who knew the desert route. Show- 
 ing them money he asked whether they would 
 act as guides. This they refused to do. 
 Said Stewart, " You will come anyway. If 
 you like to ride to Metammeh tied on your 
 camels well and good ; if you prefer not being 
 lashed on, you will get these nice presents." 
 They agreed to go ! So they were sent to 
 ride ahead of the column, guarded by some 
 of the 19th, who had orders to shoot if they 
 attempted to fly. But no such effort was made. 
 
 The rest of the 19th had more arduous work 
 to do. During the whole weary march they 
 were far ahead of the column scouting. 
 
 " On coming to a plain with hills in the 
 distance, you'd see various specks on the 
 tops of the furthest hills, and with the 
 help of your glasses discover them to be the 
 19th. Sir Herbert (Stewart) was immensely 
 pleased with them and pointed them out to me 
 as being the very acme of Light Cavalry."* 
 
 * With the Camel Corps up the Nile, by Count Gleichen, 
 by pennissioii of Messrs. Chapman and Hall. 
 
14 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 The column itself was almost half-a-mile 
 in length, even when by night it marched 
 in close order. It was a strange sight to 
 see the camels, with long necks outstretched, 
 swaying across the desert towards the horizon, 
 both the men and their ostrich-like steeds 
 enveloped in a huge cloud of dust. A wind 
 storm arose more than once, flinging blinding 
 clouds of sand in the men's faces. On New 
 Year's Eve, however, the soldiers shouted 
 themselves hoarse with " Auld Lang Syne " as 
 they plodded wearily along the moonUt desert. 
 
 Very soon the cavalry had an opportunity 
 to distinguish themselves. On the following 
 day a halt was called " to allow the inde- 
 fatigable igth to find out the reason of a 
 faint light burning far off on the plain. . . . 
 They returned with several natives, a string 
 of camels and several loads of dates. They 
 had found . . . the natives bivouacked for 
 the night, surprised them, captured as much 
 loot as possible and bolted the rest."* 
 
 After a fortnight's marchuig the column 
 came in touch with the enemy at Abu Klea. 
 At this time French's work was peculiarly 
 dangerous. He spent night after night in the 
 desert in solitary watching and waiting for 
 the Dervishes. 
 
 On January i6 the 19th Hussars were 
 
 * With the Camel Corps up the Nile, by Count Gleichen, 
 by permission of Messrs, Chapman and Hall. 
 
THE BROKEN SQUARE 15 
 
 sent to reconnoitre. They reported that 
 the Mahdi had mustered considerable force 
 between the British camp and the wells. 
 Stewart determined to fight his way through 
 to the wells at any cost. Leaving a very small 
 force to hold his camp, he formed his main 
 body into a square, in which form it advanced. 
 No sooner had the advance begun than 
 the enemy opened a terrific fire. Yet the 
 square pushed on, despite constant halts 
 necessary to assure its formation remaining 
 intact, as the guns were hauled over the 
 rutty and uneven surface of the desert. 
 
 Soon, however, the Dervishes rushed to 
 the attack, and Stewart found himself out- 
 numbered by four to one. The attack was 
 dehvered with appalling force. The Arabs' 
 shouts as they rushed forward have been 
 described by an eye-witness as like the 
 thunder of the sea. 
 
 Their onslaught was so sudden that the 
 square was broken, the heavy camel corps 
 suffering specially severely. So did the naval 
 brigade whose solitary Gardner gun jammed 
 at the critical moment. When Lord Charles 
 Beresford was attempting to clear it his 
 assistants were all speared and he himself 
 was knocked senseless under the gun. Some- 
 how or other, with much difficulty, he managed 
 to get back to the square. 
 
i6 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 During the afternoon, however, the Arabs' 
 attack began to diminish in violence. Here 
 was the cavaky's opportunity. They charged 
 the enemy with great impetuosity. Gradually 
 the Dervishes were driven off by the aid of 
 the artillery. But there were the wells still 
 to capture, and the detachment of the igth 
 Hussars was given that important mission. 
 They were able to accomplish it without 
 resistance. That night the thirsty force was 
 able to drink water again — albeit yellow in 
 colour and weird of taste. 
 
 After a brief rest the advance on Metammeh 
 was continued, with the Hussars still in the 
 van. On the following night there was a 
 scene of wild disorder. It was very dark 
 and camels began to stumble and lose their 
 places in the long grass 
 
 The men were so weary that many went to 
 sleep and even fell from their camels, which 
 wandered along unguided and strayed far 
 from the column . The night was extraordinarily 
 dark, and there was no moon to light the way 
 for the exhausted column through the wild 
 and pathless country, which would have been 
 difficult to traverse even in broad daylight. 
 At times it was discovered that the troops 
 were going in a circle and the rear guard found 
 itself in front of the force. 
 
 When at last open ground was reached 
 the enemy were found to be in strength. 
 
THE GUARDS AT ABU KLEA 17 
 
 Once again a fight was inevitable for the 
 tired force. So Stewart had a zeriba of camel 
 saddles, boxes, etc., hastily flung up to protect 
 his men. By this time the horses of the 19th 
 Hussars were so done up as to render them 
 useless. French's regiment, therefore, was 
 left with some artillery, under Colonel Barrow, 
 in the zeriba, along with the war correspond- 
 ents, who had tried in vain to make a dash 
 back to Abu Klea. 
 
 The rest of the force once more formed 
 into a square to meet the enemy's attack. It 
 was Hke a tornado when it came. 
 
 With a headlong rush eight hundred spear- 
 men, led by emirs on magnificent horses, 
 hurled themselves upon the British square. 
 Without a tremor the troops awaited their 
 onslaught, cheering loudly as they saw the 
 fluttering banners of the enemy approach. 
 The brunt of the attack was on the left angle 
 of the front face, where the Guards and 
 Mounted Infantry received the charge, at a 
 distance of three hundred yards, with a fire 
 so deadly that the front ranks of the yeUing 
 Dervishes were mown down. The battle was 
 over within a few moments. The enemy never 
 got within thirty yards of the square, but with 
 broken ranks and wild confusion the spearmen 
 fled, leaving two hundred and fifty of their 
 dead upon the field. 
 
i8 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 This rapid victory was largely due to the 
 garrison in the zeriba, who made very effective 
 use of their guns. The enemy left two 
 hundred and fifty dead on the field. Yet 
 not a single British soldier was either killed 
 or wounded in actually repelling the charge. 
 Among those seriously wounded later in the 
 day was General Stewart, who died of his 
 wounds a few days later. Almost his last 
 words to Colonel Barrow were, " Take care of 
 the 19th Hussars ; they have done well." 
 
 But all this gallantry was vain. While the 
 force was stUl near Metammeh, news came 
 of the fall of Khartoum. An of&cer who was 
 with him when the blow fell has recorded that 
 he never saw French so profoundly moved 
 as he was on the receipt of these black tidings. 
 With Khartoum fallen the mission of the 
 fl5dng column was ended. Its position indeed 
 had become extremely precarious. The 
 problem before the authorities was now not 
 how to relieve Khartoum, but how to reUeve 
 the Reheving Expedition. 
 
 It caimot be said that they solved it very 
 successfully. Buller was sent up to Gubat 
 to take command. With him he brought 
 only the Royal Irish and West Kent Regi- 
 ments to reinforce the column. And his 
 instructions were to seize Metammeh and 
 march on Berber! 
 
HIS FIRST RETREAT 19 
 
 Once on the scene, however, BuUer soon 
 saw the hopelessness of the situation. Con- 
 sidering that the fall of Khartoum had 
 released a host of the Mahdi's followers, the 
 storming of Metammeh was now a doubly 
 difficult enterprise ; an attack on Berber 
 would have been simply suicidal. BuUer 
 accordingly determined on a retreat. 
 
 On February 13 he evacuated Gubat. On 
 March i his advance guard had reached 
 Korti. In this retreat the 19th Hussars 
 again did splendid work. For days on end 
 the column was submitted to that unceasing 
 pelting of bullets which BuUer characterised 
 in one of his laconic dispatches as " annoying." 
 But Barrow, the Hussars' chief, was a master 
 of the art of reconnoitring. Time and again 
 he and his men were able to deceive the enemy 
 as to the direction of the column's march. 
 It was then that French had his first experi- 
 ence in " masterly retreat." 
 
 How sorely the column was pressed may 
 be shown from one incident. While he was 
 preparing to evacuate Abu Klea, Buller 
 received information to the effect that the 
 enemy was advancing upon him with a force 
 of eight thousand men. He determined upon 
 a desperate measure. He left standing the 
 forts which he had intended to demoKsh and 
 filled up the larger wells. 
 
20 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 A desert well, to the Oriental, is almost 
 sacred, and never even in savage warfare 
 would such a course have been adopted. But 
 BuUer knew that the absence of water was 
 the only thing that could check the rush of 
 the oncoming hordes, and this deed, terrible 
 as it may have seemed to the Eastern mind, 
 was his sole means of covering his retreat. 
 Orders were therefore given to fill up all the 
 principal wells with stones and rubbish. It 
 was certainly an effectual measure, for the 
 enemy would be delayed for many hours, 
 perhaps days, before he could restore the wells 
 and obtain sufficient water to enable him to 
 continue in pursuit of the British force which 
 was so hopelessly outnumbered . In the circum- 
 stances BuUer could not be blamed for saving 
 British lives at the price of Oriental tradition. 
 
 Sir Evelyn Wood was also sent with rein- 
 forcements from Korti to strengthen the 
 force at Gakdul Wells. There he met French 
 for the first time. " I saw him," Sir Evelyn 
 relates, " when our people were coming back 
 across the desert after our failure, the whole 
 force depressed by the death of Gordon. I 
 came on him about a hundred miles from the 
 river — the last man of the last section of the 
 rear guard I We were followed by bands of 
 Arabs. They came into our bivouac on the 
 night of which I am speaking, and the night 
 
MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES 21 
 
 following they carried off some of our slaughter 
 cattle."* 
 
 Major French was quickly able to distin- 
 guish himself in the retreat. For BuUer was 
 a behever in cavalry and used it wherever 
 possible. In his dispatch on the retreat 
 he paid French the following handsome 
 tribute : 
 
 " I wish expressly to remark on the ex- 
 cellent work that has been done by a small 
 detachment of the 19th Hussars, both during 
 our occupation of Abu Klea and during our 
 retirement. Each man has done the work 
 of ten ; and it is not too much to say that the 
 force owes much to Major French and his 
 thirteen troopers." 
 
 The flying column occupied just two months 
 in its fruitless expedition. But no more 
 trying experience was ever packed into so 
 short a time. On that march across the 
 Bayuda desert history has only one verdict. 
 It is that pronounced by Count von Moltke 
 on the men who accomplished it : — " They 
 were not soldiers but heroes." None of 
 the men earned the title more thoroughly 
 than Major French and his troopers. " Dur- 
 ing the whole march from Korti," says 
 Colonel Biddulph, " the entire scouting duty 
 
 * For this and much other valuable information the 
 writer is indebted to Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood. 
 
22 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 had been taken by the 19th Hussars, so 
 that each day they covered far more ground 
 than the rest of the force."* The enemy 
 themselves came to respect the little force 
 of cavalrymen. " Even the fierce Baggara 
 horsemen appeared unwilling to cross swords 
 with our Hussars," wrote one who accom- 
 panied the column. Major French and his 
 regiment had firmly established their reputa- 
 tion. 
 
 * The Nineteenth and their Times, by Col. J. Biddulph, 
 by permission of Mr. John Murray. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 Years of Waiting 
 
 Second in Command— Maintaining the Barrow tradition 
 —The Persistent Student— Service in India— Re- 
 tires on Half-pay— Renewed Activities— Rehearsing 
 for South Africa. 
 
 AFTER the success in the Soudan Major 
 French had not long to wait for pro- 
 motion. A few days after General 
 BuUer's tribute he was appointed Lieutenant- 
 Colonel of his regiment. So that he came 
 back to England as second in command of 
 the igth Hussars. 
 
 From this time onward he became entirely 
 absorbed in his profession. It is true that he 
 had always been interested in it ; but there 
 is no question that Barrow was the man who 
 had shown him the fascination of scientific 
 generalship. While making the reputation 
 of the 19th, Barrow had unhappily lost his 
 own hfe. He died as the result of re-opening 
 an internal wound while tent-pegging in the 
 following year. French determined to carry 
 on his work, and at Norwich the training of 
 
24 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 the 19th Hussars rapidly became famous 
 throughout the Army. 
 
 One young officer, now General Bewicke 
 Copley,* was attached to the 19th from another 
 regiment in order to study their methods. 
 He tells how he was greatly struck by the 
 brilliant work which French was doing. His 
 strict discipline and his terrific ideas of what 
 training meant, may have struck some of his 
 young subalterns as scarcely yielding them 
 the ideal existence of the beau sabreur. 
 Probably they were right ; but they were 
 being licked into a state of amazing efficiency. 
 
 In 1887 it fell to Sir Evelyn Wood's lot to 
 inspect the regiment. Pointing to French, 
 he asked his Colonel, " Of what value is that 
 man ? " The reply was, " He is for ever 
 reading military books." And he has been 
 reading them ever since I 
 
 A couple of years later he attained the rank 
 of Colonel, with command of his regiment. 
 Very soon Sir Evelyn was to discover the 
 answer to his question. For he was anxious 
 at that time to introduce the squadron 
 system. French was the one commanding 
 officer who carried it out. In spite of the 
 very large amount of extra work it entailed, 
 he was willing to take any number of recruits 
 
 * To General Bewicke Copley the writer is indebted 
 for much kind assistance in writing this chapter. 
 
THE AUTHORITIES ASTONISHED 25 
 
 and train them in the new method. That 
 method was finally allowed to lapse, although 
 it has been adopted in another form for 
 infantry regiments. It is typical of French 
 that he was willing to slave over the unpopu- 
 lar way of doing things, while other men 
 adhered to the traditional and official methods. 
 
 While French was still busy elaborating 
 new theories and testing them at manoeuvres, 
 his regiment was ordered to India. There he 
 met one of his future colleagues in South 
 Africa, Sir George White. He was also 
 fortunate in working with one of the most 
 brilliant of all British cavalry trainers, Sir 
 George Luck. 
 
 The latter considered that the cavalry 
 regiments in India required drastic reorgani- 
 sation. French was ready to carry it out. 
 To increase the efficiency of the cavalry 
 extensive manoeuvres were organised. French 
 acted as Chief of the Staff to General Luck, 
 and astonished the authorities by the way in 
 which " he conducted troops dispersed over a 
 wide area of ground, allotting to each section 
 its appointed work and bringing the complete 
 movement to a brilhant conclusion." 
 
 But the Government's recognition of his 
 brilhant work was by no means encouraging. 
 In 1893 Colonel French was actually retired 
 on half -pay ! It is an admirable system which 
 
26 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 allows the middle-aged officer to make way 
 for youth in the British army ; but the 
 spectacle of a French despatched into civil 
 obscurity at the ripe age of forty-one, has its 
 tragic as well as its comic side. That it 
 acutely depressed him we know. For a time 
 he was almost in despair as to his career. 
 
 Actually, however, these two years " out 
 of action " were probably invaluable to him — 
 and to the army. For the first time he had 
 the opportunity for unrestrained study ; and 
 much of that time was spent, no doubt, in 
 thinking out the theories of cavalry action 
 which were yet to bring him fame and our 
 arms success. 
 
 Much of his most valuable work dates from 
 this period of enforced retirement. He was 
 present, for instance, during the cavalry 
 manoeuvres of 1894 in Berkshire. He took 
 part in the manoeuvres as a brigadier. His 
 chief Staff Officer, by the way, was Major 
 R. S. S. (now Lieut. -General Sir Robert) Baden- 
 Powell, while the aide-de-camp to the Director- 
 General of manoeuvres was Captain (now 
 Lieut.-General Sir) Douglas Haig. Here 
 French formulated what was to be one of the 
 axioms of his future cavalry tactics. One of 
 those present at headquarters has recorded 
 his remarks. 
 
 " There is," said French, " no subject upon 
 
THE FUNCTION OF CAVALRY 27 
 
 which more misconception exists, even among 
 service men, than as regards the real role of 
 cavalry in warfare. My conception of the 
 duties and functions of the mounted arm is 
 not to cut and to hack and to thrust at your 
 enemy wherever and however he may be 
 found. The real business of cavalry is so to 
 manoeuvre your enemy as to bring him 
 within effective range of the corps artillery 
 of your own side for which a position suitable 
 for battle would previously have been 
 selected."* 
 
 It is difficult to conceive a more clear and 
 concise statement of the function of cavalry. 
 It differs widely from the rather grim utter- 
 ance of the late Sir Baker Russell, who stated 
 that the duty of cavalry was to look pretty 
 during time of peace, and get killed in war. 
 
 Happily Colonel French's theorising was 
 not without its effect. The Berkshire man- 
 oeuvres showed a number of flagrant short- 
 comings in our cavalry. Several military 
 men, ably seconded by The Morning Post, 
 insisted on the reorganisation of that arm. 
 After the customary protest, of&cialdom bowed 
 to the storm. 
 
 French's old chief. Sir George Luck, was 
 brought back from India to institute reforms. 
 The first thing that the new Inspector-General 
 * Quoted in M.A.P., March 3, 1900. 
 
28 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 of Cavalry insisted upon was a revised Cavalry 
 Drill Book. Who was to write it ? The 
 answer was not easy. But eventually Colonel 
 French was called in from his retirement and 
 installed in the Horse Guards for that pur- 
 pose. 
 
 The result was a masterpiece of lucid ex- 
 planation and terse precision. The book 
 evolved into something much more than a 
 mere manual of drill. For it is also a treatise 
 on cavalry tactics, a guide to modern strategy, 
 and a complete code of regulations for the 
 organisation of mounted troops. 
 
 No sooner was the book issued than another 
 problem arose. Who was to carry out all 
 these drastic alterations ? Once again, re- 
 course was had to the half-pay Colonel in 
 Kent ! Who so fit to materialise reforms as 
 the man who had conceived them ? So in 
 1895 Colonel French was ensconced in the 
 War Office as Assistant Adjutant-General of 
 Cavalry. There were great reforms instituted. 
 
 British cavalry was placed on a brigade 
 establishment at home stations. Which means 
 that, for the first time, three regiments were 
 grouped into a brigade and placed under the 
 command of a staff colonel, who was entirely 
 responsible for their training. In the summer 
 months the regiments were massed for com- 
 bined training. 
 
FROM STOOL TO SADDLE 29 
 In spite of the revolution he was accom- 
 plishing, it is doubtful whether French was at 
 all happy at the War Office. He is essentially 
 a man of action. Unlike Kitchener, he pre- 
 fers execution to organisation, and he prob- 
 ably chafed horribly over the interminable 
 disentanghng of knots which is efficient organi- 
 sation. His one consolation was the solution 
 every night before he left his desk of a refresh- 
 ing problem in tactics. 
 
 There are endless stories of his pacing up 
 and down that back room in Pall Mall like a 
 caged hon. Like Mr. Galsworthy's Ferrand 
 he hates to do " round business on an office 
 stool." His temperament is entirely dynamic. 
 Everything static and stay-at-home is utter 
 boredom to him. Probably no soldier ever 
 showed the qualities and the limitations of 
 the man of action in more vivid contrast. 
 
 His trials, however, were not of long dura- 
 tion. So soon as the brigade system had been 
 fully organised he was given command of one 
 of the units which he had created — the 
 Second Cavalry Brigade at Canterbury. Here 
 he was able to achieve one of his most notable 
 successes. It happened during the 1898 man- 
 oeuvres. As commander of a brigade, French 
 was chosen to lead Buller's force in the mimic 
 campaign. His opponent was General Talbot, 
 an older officer who worked on the stereo- 
 
30 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 typed methods. The antiquity of his antago- 
 nist's ideas gave French his opportunity. 
 He made such a feature of reconnaissance 
 that the experts declared his tactics to be 
 hopelessly rash. But by the mobility of his 
 force he continually checked and out-man- 
 ceuvred his opponent — appearing in the most 
 unexpected places in the most unaccountable 
 ways. 
 
 At the end of the manoeuvres the fighting 
 centred round Yarmbury Castle. All day 
 French had been harassing General Talbot's 
 forces. At last, by a rapid movement, his 
 cavalry surprised several batteries of the 
 enemy's horse artillery. He commanded them 
 to dismount and made the whole force his 
 prisoners. When the umpires upheld his 
 claim, the experts aforesaid were given con- 
 siderable food for thought. 
 
 The general conclusion was that luck had 
 contributed to his success, and that in actual 
 warfare such recklessness might lead to disas- 
 ter. Consequently, French's opponents were 
 justified to some extent in their insistence that 
 the old methods were best. Indeed, his 
 success only strengthened prejudice in certain 
 quarters. 
 
 Happily, however, the original mind won 
 the day. And in iSgg, French was given 
 command of the first cavalry brigade at 
 
THE CRITICS ROUTED 31 
 
 Aldershot, with the rank of Major-General. 
 This is the highest post open to a cavahy 
 officer in his own sphere during the time of 
 peace. Thus French's critics were finally 
 routed, and he was free at last to train British 
 cavalry according to his own brilliant and 
 original ideas. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 Elandslaagte and Rietfontein 
 
 The Unknown Commander of Cavalry — Who is General 
 French ? — ^Advancing without Reinforcements — 
 " This is your Show, French "—The White Flag— 
 The Chess-Player— The Victor in Anecdote. 
 
 FROM the end of the South African War 
 until the outbreak of the European 
 War the British nation had never 
 taken its army seriously. At best it had 
 shown very tepid interest in its work. Some 
 brief Indian skirmishing might momentarily 
 flash the names of a few regiments or a stray 
 general upon the public mind. But for the 
 most part we were content to take the army 
 very much for granted, forgetful of Mr. 
 Dooley's sage pronouncement that " Standing 
 armies are useful in time of war." Prior 
 to the Boer War the public ignorance on the 
 subject was even more appalling. 
 
 At the opening of the South African cam- 
 paign there was a good deal of vague discussion 
 as to who should have the cavalry command 
 in Natal. But General French was not one 
 
 32 
 
A NEW STAR 33 
 
 of the officers prominently mentioned. Yet, 
 he had already risen to a position analo- 
 gous to that which General von Bernhardi 
 then occupied in the German army. In any 
 other European country his name would 
 have been practically a household word. 
 Even to the EngUsh newspaper writer it was 
 a paradox and a problem. 
 
 " Who is this General French ? " people asked 
 one another, when news of his first victories 
 came to hand. Scarcely anyone was able 
 to answer the question. One finds curious 
 corroboration of the prevaihng ignorance of 
 French's career in a society journal of that 
 date. In January of 1900, a then most 
 popular social medium was almost pathetically 
 confessing its perturbation on the point. 
 After giving a description of General French, 
 the writer goes on rather in wrath than in 
 apology — " Since I wrote the above para- 
 graph, I have foimd a letter in an Irish paper, 
 which declares that the French of whom I 
 have just spoken is not the hero of Colesberg. 
 The French of whom I have spoken is George 
 Arthur {sic), while the Colesberg French is 
 John Denton Pinkstone French. Of John 
 Denton Pinkstone French I have found no 
 details in any of the ordinary books of refer- 
 ence. Probably some correspondent will 
 supply me with the details." There was a 
 
34 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 lapse or six weeks before any further informa- 
 tion was forthcoming. 
 
 But there was one man who knew his 
 French. General Sir Red vers BuUer had 
 found his worth on the Nile Expedition, in 
 repeated autumn manoeuvres at home, and 
 in many a long discussion on military topics. 
 His casting vote, therefore, made French 
 Commander of Cavalry in Natal. 
 
 Major Arthur Griffiths has supplied an 
 admirable little sketch of French's appear- 
 ance at this time. " He is short and thick, 
 and of rather ungainly figure. Although he 
 can stick on a horse as well as anyone, rides 
 with a strong seat, and is indefatigable in the 
 saddle, he is not at all a pretty horseman. 
 His mind is more set on essentials, on effective 
 leadership with all it means, rather than 
 what soldiers call ' Spit and pohsh ' : he 
 is sound in judgment, clear-headed, patient, 
 taking everything quietly, the rough with the 
 smooth ; but he is always on the spot, willing 
 to wait, and still more ready to act, when the 
 opportunity comes, with tremendous effect." 
 
 That description is true in general, if not 
 in detail. For patience is certainly not one 
 of French's personal, if it be one of his military 
 virtues. A close friend of his agreed to the 
 word "tempestuous," as most nicely describ- 
 ing his temperament. Like every good 
 
RECALLED TO LADYSMITH 35 
 
 soldier, in fact, French has a temper, for 
 which he is none the worse. If apt to flame 
 out suddenly, it quickly burns itself out, 
 leaving no touch of resentment in the scorched. 
 
 Ten days after the Boer ultimatum had 
 been delivered to the British agent at Pre- 
 toria, French was in Ladysmith. He arrived 
 there, to be pedantically accurate, on October 
 20, 1899, at 5 a.m. At 11 a.m. he was 
 in the saddle, leading a column out to re- 
 capture the railway station at Elandslaagte, 
 which, with a newly-arrived train of troops, 
 the Boers had seized overnight. No sooner 
 had his men begun to locate the enemy, 
 than French was recalled to Ladysmith. 
 Reluctantly the men turned back to re- 
 inforce Sir George White's small garrison, 
 for what he feared might prove a night 
 attack. Soon afterwards, however, news of 
 General Symons' victory at Talana came in 
 to cheer the men after their fruitless sortie. 
 
 At once Sir George White saw his oppor- 
 tunity. It was the Boers, and not the 
 British, who now stood in peril of a sudden 
 attack. There was little sleep for French's 
 men that night. At 4 a.m. neKt morning 
 they were again on the march for Elands- 
 laagte. 
 
 About eight o'clock on one of those perfect 
 mist-steeped -summer B^^^^^^igs that presage 
 
36 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 a day of burning heat, French's force came 
 in sight of the Boer laagers. As the mist 
 cleared the enemy could be spied in large 
 numbers about the station and the colliery 
 buildings and over the yellow veldt. French 
 ordered the Natal Battery to turn its little 
 seven-pounder on the station. One of the 
 first shots told ; and the Boers came tumbling 
 out of their shelter, leaving the trainload of 
 British soldiers, captured the previous night, 
 free to join their comrades. Soon afterwards 
 the station was in the hands of the British, 
 as the result of a dashing cavalry charge. 
 
 But the Boers were only temporarily dis- 
 lodged. Their long range guns very soon 
 shelled the station from the neighbouring 
 kopjes with deadly effect. French was com- 
 pelled to withdraw. The stupidity of the 
 enemy, in leaving the telegraph wires uncut, 
 enabled him immediately to acquaint Sir 
 George White with the peril of his situation. 
 White's orders were emphatic : " The enemy 
 must be beaten and driven off. Time of 
 great importance." The necessary reinforce- 
 ments were ^ irried to the spot. 
 
 French a not wait for their arrival before 
 striking ' •^'^e enemy. The Light Horse, 
 under C' ""tt Chishohne, quickly took 
 
 possessic ' "^' "i^jge near the r^il.vay 
 
 station, "Se r.:aln ime of the 
 
 > 
 
IN HIS ELEMENT 37 
 
 enemy's kopjes. While he held this ridge 
 French had the satisfaction of seeing infantry, 
 cavalry and artillery coming up the railway 
 Une to his assistance. In the late afternoon 
 his force numbered something like three 
 thousand five hundred men, outnumbering 
 the enemy by more than two to one. 
 
 Those who ask why so many men were 
 required, do not understand the position in 
 which the British force found itself. The 
 enemy were entrenched on a series of high, 
 boulder-strewn tablelands, which offered 
 almost perfect cover. Between these table- 
 lands and French's force lay a wide and 
 partly scrubless stretch of veldt. Over that 
 terrible exposed slope his men must go, 
 before they could come within useful range of 
 the enemy. French was faced with a most 
 perilous and difficult enterprise. However, 
 that is precisely what French Ukes. He rose 
 to the situation with ready resource. It 
 was not easy to locate the exact position 
 of the enemy ensconced amid these cover- 
 ing hills. So in the afternoon he ordered 
 a simultaneous frontal and flank attack. 
 Just which was front and which was flank 
 it was for his lieutenants to discover. Sir 
 Ian Hamilton's instructions to the infantry 
 were brief but decisive. " The enemy are 
 there," he said, " and I hope you will shift 
 
38 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 them out before sunset — in fact, I know you 
 will." 
 
 When the action had fairly commenced, 
 Sir George White and his staff galloped 
 over from Lady smith. French approached, 
 saluted, and asked for instructions. The 
 chivalrous White's only reply was, " Go on, 
 French ; this is your show." All the after- 
 noon he stayed on the field, watching the 
 progress of events, and approving French's 
 dispositions. 
 
 The battle proved to be, in many ways, 
 one of the most spectacular in history. For 
 as the infantry advanced, under a steady 
 hail of shell and bullets, the sky began to 
 darken. The Boer positions stood silhouetted 
 by stray puffs of white smoke against a 
 lowering cumulus of clouds. While the 
 artillery on both sides shook the ground with 
 an inferno of sound, the storm burst. The 
 thunder of the heavens became a spasmodic 
 chorus to the roar of the guns. One corres- 
 pondent has described how he found himself 
 mechanically humming the " Ride of the 
 Valkyries " that was being played on such a 
 dread orchestra. Slipping and stumbling, 
 cursing and cheering, the Devons crept for- 
 ward across the sodden grass. Many of the 
 bravest, among them Chisholme, went down 
 on that plain of death. Far beyond the level 
 
THE WHITE FLAG TRICK 39 
 veldt there were something like 800 feet to 
 climb in the face of Mauser and shrapnel. 
 At length, however, the top of the ridge was 
 reached. There stood the three guns that 
 had wrought such havoc, now silent among 
 the corpses of the frock-coated burghers who 
 had served them. 
 
 The Boers still kept up the fight, however, 
 on the further side of the plateau. The 
 cheering Gordons, the Manchesters and the 
 Devons now flung themselves at the remnant 
 of the foe. Suddenly a white flag was seen 
 to flutter defeat from a kopje beyond the 
 laager. On the instant the soldiers paused 
 at the surprising notes of the " Cease fire," 
 followed by the " Retire." For a moment 
 they wavered between disciphne and dismay. 
 At that instant from a small kopje east of 
 the nek came a violent burst of firing as some 
 fifty of the enemy made a last effort to regain 
 their position. 
 
 There was a momentary panic in the 
 British fines. But a httle bugler shouted 
 " Retire be damned," and sounded the 
 "Advance." Gradually the infantry recov- 
 ered, and the Gordons and Devons, rushing 
 on the enemy, took a fearful revenge for the 
 dastardly trick. 
 
 French had scored his first victory within 
 a day of his arrival. What wonder if men 
 
40 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 called him " French the lucky ? " From 
 now onwards that tradition was to cling to his 
 name. But a great deal more than luck went 
 to the winning of Elandslaagte. Had French 
 not advanced his men throughout in open 
 formation, the day might never have been his. 
 It has been said that he was our only general 
 to master the Boer methods. He was certainly 
 the first and the most able ifnitator of those 
 methods. But he was prepared to meet them 
 before he ever stepped on South African soil. 
 For his whole theory of cavalry tactics is 
 based on the realisation that massive forma- 
 tions are now hopelessly out of date. 
 
 One of the newspaper correspondents * 
 happened to run across French twice during 
 the battle. He tells how at the end of the 
 engagement he met the General, who had 
 come along the ridge in the fighting hne of 
 the Manchesters and Gordons, and offered 
 him his congratulations on the day. He 
 adds : " Last time I had met him was when 
 the artillery on both sides were hard at it ; 
 he appeared then more like a man playing a 
 game of chess than a game of war, and was 
 not too busy to sympathise with me on the 
 badness of the light when he= saw me trying 
 to take snap-shots of the Boer shells bursting 
 amid the Imperial Light Hoj-se near us." 
 
 * The correspondent leferred to is Mr. George Lynch. 
 
LUCK OR BRAINS 41 
 
 French's luck lay in his ability to see 
 his opportunities and grasp them. But the 
 soldier will never be convinced on that point, 
 even if French himself attempt his conver- 
 sion. For him the British leader has remained 
 " The luckiest man in the army " ever since 
 Elandslaagte. Yet in a letter to Lady French 
 after the engagement he had written, " I 
 never thought I would come out alive." 
 
 As frequently happened in the South African 
 campaign, success could not be followed up. 
 Having cleared the railway line, French was 
 unable to garrison his position, and returned 
 next morning to Ladysmith. A couple of 
 days later he was again in action, and again 
 he was successful. It had become necessary 
 to keep the way open for General Yule and 
 his jaded forces now in retreat from Dundee. 
 White determined to sally out and distract 
 the enemy. Once again the heavy share of 
 the work fell on French and his cavalry. 
 
 Marching out from the town towards Mod- 
 der Spruit they found the enemy holding 
 a range of hills about seven miles from 
 Ladysmith. 
 
 Flanked by the artillery, and supported 
 from the rear by rifle fire, the infantry ad- 
 vanced to a convenient ridg§ from which the 
 Boer position might be shelled. There they 
 were joined by the field and mountain bat- 
 
42 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 teries, whose well-directed fire played great 
 havoc among the enemy. 
 
 During the engagement one costly mistake 
 was made. The Gloucesters on reaching the 
 summit of the slope, attempted to descend 
 on the other side. Their advancing lines 
 were ploughed down by a deadly fire. " In 
 the first three minutes," said an eye-witness, 
 " Colonel Wilford, who was commanding the 
 regiment, had fallen shot through the head, 
 and a number of the men lay dead and dying 
 about him. So fierce was the attack that no 
 living thing could have remained upon the 
 exposed slope, which boasted not even a 
 shred of cover of any kind." Slowly and 
 silently the Gloucesters retired. 
 
 By two o'clock the infantry fire had ceased, 
 and White had received news that Yule was 
 nearing Ladysmith in safety. He therefore 
 decided to withdraw his troops. This was no 
 easy matter, for the Boers, instead of relin- 
 quishing their position, had merely retired 
 for a short distance. The retreat, however, 
 was safely carried out, thanks largely to 
 the masterly fashion in which French's cavalry 
 covered the retirement. 
 
 From a mihtary point of view the engage- 
 ment would scarcely be caUed important. 
 But from a strategic point of view it was 
 invaluable. It certainly saved General Yule's 
 
THE ONLY GENERAL 43 
 
 force, which the Boers would otherwise have 
 cut off on its way to Ladysmith. This would 
 scarcely have been difficult, for the column 
 was in no condition to fight. That it covered 
 twenty-three miles without food, water, or 
 rest before nightfall in its exhausted condition 
 was in itself remarkable. 
 
 This was the last successful engagement 
 that the British forces were to fight for many 
 a day. But that was not French's fault. 
 In the first week after his arrival he had scored 
 two distinct successes and won for himself a 
 reputation among the Boers. He was indeed 
 the only British general for whom they at 
 that time expressed the very slightest respect. 
 In a week his name became a by-word 
 among them. A soldier* has recorded how, 
 when towns or railway stations were captured, 
 our men would find allusions to French chalked 
 on the wall. Thus : " We are not fighting 
 the English — ^they don't count — we are only 
 fighting the ' French.' " Quite early in the 
 campaign this inscription was found on the 
 wall of a Boer farm house : " Why are we 
 bound to win ? Because although we have 
 only 90,000 burghers, that means 90,000 
 generals — but the English, though they 
 have 200,000 soldiers, have only one General 
 — and he is French." That was in the days 
 * " A.D.C." The Regiment. 
 
44 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 before Roberts and Kitchener were on the 
 
 scene. 
 
 But the Boers were not alone in their 
 appreciation of French. One of the authori- 
 ties of the German General Staff wrote of him 
 " His (French's) name was one of those most 
 dreaded by the enemy," and " he impressed 
 his personality on the troops." Perhaps the 
 best description of the man ever penned, 
 however, came from the brilliant^^^merican 
 journalist, Julian Ralph. " As to his per- 
 sonality, the phrase ' The square .yittle 
 General ' would serve to describe him in 
 army circles without a mention of his name. 
 
 " He is quiet, undemonstrative, easy, and 
 gentle. When you are under his command 
 you don't notice him, you don't think about 
 him — unless you are a soldier, and then you 
 are glad you are there."* 
 
 In the Daily Mail. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 The Tide Turns 
 
 White's Dash from Ladysmith — Nicholson's Nek— The 
 Reverse at Lombard's Kop — A Cavalry Exploit — 
 French's Dramatic Escape from Ladysmith. 
 
 SO far the tide of battle had flowed fairly 
 equally between the two armies. 
 Thanks to French, White had won the 
 two engagements which he had to undertake 
 in order to save Yule's column. In Lady- 
 smith he had now an admirably proportioned 
 force of 10,000 men, quite adequate for 
 the town's defence. Across the Atlantic an 
 Army Corps was hastening to his succour. 
 He had only to sit still and wait in Lady- 
 smith, fortifying it with all the ingenuity 
 that time would permit. 
 
 Unfortunately he was not content to sit 
 still and wait behind his entrenchments. 
 He determined not to be hemmed in without 
 a struggle. Be it remembered that at that 
 time the British commanders had not fully 
 realised the numbers, the equipment and 
 
 45 
 
46 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 the intrepidity of their opponents. The tra- 
 ditional chastening of experience was still 
 wanting. As Napier has it, " In the be- 
 ginning of each war England has to seek 
 in blood the knowledge necessary to ensure 
 success ; and, like the fiend's progress to- 
 wards Eden, her conquering course is through 
 chaos followed by death." 
 
 It was a very beautiful if a rather op- 
 timistic plan of attack that White arranged 
 for the morning of October 30. He divided 
 his forces into three columns. During the 
 night of the 29th Colonel Carleton, with the 
 Irish Fusiliers and the Gloucesters, was to 
 advance upon and seize a long ridge called 
 Nicholson's Nek, some six miles north of 
 Ladysmith. This would protect his left wing. 
 On the right flank the infantry were to 
 advance under cover of French's cavalry 
 and mounted infantry, while the artillery 
 was to advance in the centre. 
 
 Provided that all went well the plan was 
 of course superb. No sooner had the main 
 army won their action at Lombard's Cop 
 than it would swing round to the right and 
 wedge the Boers in between its artillery and 
 the force on Nicholson's Nek. But suppose 
 anything happened to Carleton ? Or suppose 
 that the main action was lost ? In either 
 case disaster would be inevitable. In the 
 
THE MULES BOLT 47 
 
 event, French was alone able to stick to his 
 time table. Misfortune befell both Carleton 
 on the left.'^and Grirawood on the right. 
 
 At lo.o p.m. Carleton was on the march ; 
 and two and a half hours later Grimwood's 
 brigade had set out eastward. By some 
 mistake two of his battalions followed the 
 artillery to the left instead of taking the 
 infantry route. Of that error Grimwood 
 remained in ignorance until he reached his 
 destination near the south eastern flank of 
 Long Hill towards dawn. Soon afterwards 
 the Gordon Highlanders were amazed to 
 find an officer in their ranks from Carleton's 
 column, jaded and spent. He reported that 
 all the mules of his battery had bolted and 
 had not been recovered. 
 
 The day had begun with a double disaster. 
 Grimwood's force was not all at White's 
 disposal ; Carleton's was not to appear at 
 all. Never had a general's plans gone more 
 thoroughly agley. 
 
 Of the unequal engagement which ensued 
 little need be said here. A ludicrously in- 
 sufficient force was attempting to encircle a 
 larger and better equipped one. The result 
 was not long in doubt. Although White's 
 forty-two guns pounded away bravely, they 
 were no match for the heavy artillery of the 
 enemy. One huge Creusot gun had been 
 
48 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 dragged to the top of Pepworth Hill whence 
 it threw a 961b. shell a distance of four miles. 
 There were also several 40 lb. howitzers which 
 hopelessly outranged the British guns. 
 
 From a front over eight miles in extent 
 there poured in a converging artillery fire 
 against which our guns could do nothing. 
 Gradually the right flank was pushed back 
 along with the centre ; and the left flank 
 was now non-existent. During the after- 
 noon the inevitable retirement took place, 
 under the Creusot's shells. Had not Captain 
 Hedworth Lambton rapidly silenced the gun 
 on Pepworth Hill with his naval battery, 
 opportunely arrived at the critical moment, 
 the retreat might well have been a rout. 
 As it was the tired force which wandered 
 back to Ladysmith had left 300 men on 
 the field. 
 
 Irretrievable disaster had overtaken Carle- 
 ton's column. While breasting Nicholson's 
 Nek in the darkness the men were surprised 
 at the sudden clattering by of a Boer picquet. 
 The transport mules, panic-stricken, fled en 
 masse, wrecking the column as they stam- 
 peded down the hillside, felhng men as they 
 went. It was a gunless, ammunitionless and 
 weary column which the Boers surprised 
 in the early morning. The end was the 
 surrender of the force to the enemy. 
 
A BRILLIANT SUCCESS 49 
 
 The British position was now serious. 
 Nothing could prevent Sir George White and 
 his forces from being cooped in either Colenso 
 or Ladysmith. But it is typical of French that 
 he found a last opportunity of out-manoeuvring 
 the Boers before leaving Ladysmith. In the 
 battle of Lombard's Cop his cavalry had taken 
 but a small part. Had some of them, how- 
 ever, been sent with Carlton's column to keep 
 it in touch with the base, the issue of its 
 enterprise might possibly have been different. 
 
 A couple of days afterwards, on November 
 2, French found an opportunity to score. 
 The Boers had moved round our lines and 
 posted their guns in a very advantageous 
 position. White therefore ordered a bom- 
 bardment by the naval guns to which the 
 Boers replied. Whilst they were so engaged 
 French crept round behind Bester's Hill, 
 where the Boer commander had a large 
 camp. Before Joubert realised what the 
 movement meant French was upon him. 
 Field artillery, along with the naval guns, 
 supported his advance. While this double 
 fire was distracting the Boers, French stormed 
 their laager. The enemy fled, leaving their 
 camp and all its equipments to French. 
 This brilliant httle success was practically a 
 cavalry exploit, and it was typical of much 
 that was to follow. 
 
50 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 It now became obvious that Ladysmith 
 was becoming completely invested. The Boer 
 lines which had been three miles from the 
 town were creeping nearer. Assuredly the 
 belligerent town was no place for a cavalry 
 officer. 
 
 French determined to leave Ladysmith. 
 It would not be easy to break through the 
 lines of the net that was closing round the 
 city. Whether or no the railway was still 
 open was uncertain. When French's aide- 
 de-camp. Lieutenant Milbanke, now Sir John 
 Milbanke, V.C, asked the station-master 
 whether a special train could get through to 
 Pietermaritzburg, that worthy indignantly 
 scorned the idea. With the Boers at 
 Colenso it would certainly be madness — a 
 fool's errand. Milbanke, however, used per- 
 suasions which resulted in an effort being 
 made to run the gauntlet. That evening 
 an engine and a few carriages duly drew up 
 at the station. Very soon French's staff 
 was aboard. As the train was about to 
 start a short and agile elderly officer might 
 have been seen to dash across the platform 
 into the last carriage, where he ensconced 
 himself beneath a seat lest the train be 
 stopped and searched. Very soon bullets 
 were rattling through the carriage windows, 
 and it was an excessively uncomfortable 
 
THE ESCAPE 51 
 
 journey that the British General and his 
 staff endured. But they were at last free 
 to carry out fresh services for their country. 
 Five months were to pass before another 
 train crossed these metals. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 The Campaign Round Colesberg 
 
 The Fog of War — A Perilous Situation — Damming 
 " The Flowing Tide " — Shows His Genius as a 
 Commander — A Campaign in Miniature — Hoisting 
 Guns on Hilltops — The Fifty-mile Front — Saving 
 the Situation. 
 
 SO far French had justified the tradition 
 which called him lucky. Any compe- 
 tent and experienced general might, 
 with luck, have won the battle of Elands- 
 laagte. That victory did not mark French 
 out as a commander of genius. But what 
 followed in the campaign round Colesberg 
 did. 
 
 It is very much to be regretted that the 
 circumstances of the case forced this campaign 
 to be fought amid an unusually dense variety 
 of " the fog of war." Owing to the difficulty 
 and danger of the operations and the extended 
 front on which they were carried out, any 
 newspaper correspondent present could hope 
 to chronicle only a sub-section of the action. 
 The public, therefore, was without any com- 
 
 S3 
 
THE " INEFFICIENT " GENERAL 53 
 plete record of what happened.* To the 
 man in the street the British general and 
 his forces seemed to spend three months 
 in perpetual dodging in and about some thirty 
 square miles of kopjed veldt. 
 
 Yet French's column was the pivot on 
 which the whole British plan turned. This 
 campaign in miniature gave French his 
 chance finally to disprove the fallacies 
 of the critics at home. Before his appoint- 
 ment in October, he had actually been des- 
 cribed by some of his opponents as " inefficient 
 to command in the field." This is the tragedy 
 of many a brilliant cavalry leader — it is 
 impossible for him to demonstrate his ability 
 save in actual warfare. 
 
 When French went down to Cape Town 
 to consult with General BuUer, he found his 
 Chief oppressed by serious misgivings. Sir 
 George White and his force were surrounded 
 in Ladysmith ; Mafeking and Kimberley 
 were both invested by the enemy ; and a 
 great invasion was threatened along the whole 
 northern boundary of Cape Colony. To 
 deal with all these difficulties Buller had only 
 one army corps. One column, under Lord 
 Methuen, was advancing to the relief of 
 
 * To those interested enough to pursue the subject 
 further, I commend With French and his Cavalry in 
 South Africa, by C. S. Goldman. (Macmillan & Co.) 
 
54 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Kimberley ; another, under General Gatacre, 
 was attempting to stem the Boer invasion of 
 Cape Colony ; while a third, to be led by 
 BuUer himself, was massing at Chieveley, 
 prior to advancing to the relief of Ladysmith. 
 French was given command of a fourth 
 column with which he was to harass the 
 Boers around Colesberg. A Boer commando 
 under Schoeman had seized a passage on 
 the Orange River at Norval's Pont on 
 November i. On the 14th the Boers entered 
 Colesberg ; and a proclamation was issued 
 declaring the district to be a Free State 
 territory. 
 
 From the first no striking victories were 
 anticipated for French's little force. It was 
 to act as a dam, rather than as a weapon of 
 destruction. It was a rather flimsy dam at 
 that. BuUer's instructions, which at first 
 spoke of a " flying column," soon declined to 
 suggestions of "a policy of worry without 
 risking men." In particular it was to stop 
 raids on the railway line which might impede 
 Methuen's advance on Kimberley. 
 
 Collecting a part of his force at Cape Town, 
 French left on November 18. On the follow- 
 ing night he reached De Aar, where Major- 
 General Wauchope gave him another couple 
 of companies of Mounted Infantry. Acting 
 on Wauchope's advice, he determined to 
 
WORRYING TACTICS 55 
 
 make Naauwpoort his base. BuUer had sug- 
 gested Hanover Road. But French on arrival 
 found that Wauchope was right. The country- 
 round Naauwpoort proved to be much more 
 level, was less closely laced with wire fences, 
 and afforded better means of communication 
 both by road and rail. 
 
 No sooner had he arrived (on November 
 21) than he ordered a reconnaissance to be 
 made on the following morning. His cavalry 
 came within eight miles of Colesberg, without 
 seeing the enemy. Accordingly French de- 
 termined to attack the town, and asked for 
 reinforcements of cavalry for that purpose. 
 On November 23, however, further recon- 
 naissance supported by a trainload of infantry 
 showed that the situation had developed. 
 It was found impossible to approach Arundel, 
 as the kopjes north of Arundel station were 
 occupied by the Boers. 
 
 Reporting the state of affairs to head- 
 quarters, French said that, in his opinion, the 
 Boers should be pushed out of Colesberg 
 immediately, as they were being reinforced 
 daily, and were spreading disaffection through- 
 out the Colony. But he was not in a position 
 to do more than worry the enemy for 
 several days. However, his persistent night- 
 and-day fretting of Schoeman's forces achieved 
 the desired result. His ubiquitous patrols 
 
56 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 seriously alarmed the Boer general as to the 
 safety of his outposts at Arundel. A squadron 
 of Lancers discovered one day that the 
 kopjes round Arundel had been evacuated. 
 
 After that a dash on the town followed. 
 Here again the policy of nag and bluster had 
 frightened the Boers out of their position. 
 There were only a hundred men in it when the 
 British force arrived ; and they fled precipi- 
 tately at the mere sight of it. Next day. 
 Colonel Porter struck even farther north with 
 his cavalry and mounted infantry, occupying 
 a kopje three miles north of the town. 
 
 There followed a brief lapse in active 
 hostiUties. The Boers heavily entrenched 
 themselves on the neighbouring hills ; and a 
 prisoner taken by our men said that Schoe- 
 man had at least 3,000 men, with some useful 
 guns, and was waiting for further reinforce- 
 ments. 
 
 French's position now became critical in 
 more than one sense of the word. For in 
 mid-December news of the triple British 
 disaster came through to hearten Schoeman 
 and his men. Cronje had inflicted a crushing 
 defeat on Methuen at Magersfontein ; Botha 
 had crippled BuUer at Colenso ; and Gatacre's 
 force had met with a reverse at Stormberg. 
 Elated by his colleagues' successes, Schoeman 
 was spoiling for the fray. Could he once 
 
A TIGHT CORNER 57 
 
 gain a victory over French, the whole of Cape 
 Colony would probably join the rebellion. 
 Both east and west the Dutch population 
 were simply waiting a sign to rise. 
 
 With the whole of South Africa in revolt, 
 our position of " splendid isolation " in 
 Europe might well have induced Continental 
 complications. The foreign Press, indeed, 
 was almost unanimous in its jubilations over 
 this series of disasters. The German papers 
 in particular, filled their pages with the most 
 atrocious insults and jibes. Such was the 
 situation in " Black Week." There was much 
 ominous talk on the Continent about " the 
 flowing tide." Only one obstacle prevented 
 these dire prophecies from coming true. French 
 and his little force possibly stayed the tide of 
 a world conflict, through checking the rebel 
 torrent between Naauwpoort and Colesberg. 
 
 It is typical of his perfect sang froid, that 
 in this excessively tight corner, French found 
 time to send a cheering Christmas greeting to 
 friends at home. " We shall drink your health 
 on Christmas Day," he wired on behalf of 
 himself and his staff, " and we hope you are 
 well, and having as good a time as we are." 
 
 French's use of Arundel was masterly. 
 For him to attack was impossible ; about this 
 time he was outnumbered by something like 
 five to one. His one aim, therefore, w^s to 
 
58 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 keep the Boers from the railway line. The 
 moment that his scouts discovered the Boers 
 throwing out detachments to defend a kopje, 
 French would have an elaborate attack, or a 
 reconnaissance in force to drive the enemy in. 
 At this time scarcely a day passed without 
 its " affair " of one sort or another. If it 
 was not a night attack, then it was a miniature 
 siege, or a flanking movement — or a piece of 
 bluff ! His men were in the saddle night and 
 day. One of those present has related how 
 he practically lived on his horse for two 
 months. 
 
 Did Schoeman attempt to force a pitched 
 battle, then French, by a series of simultaneous 
 flank and rear movements, would harass him 
 out of the possibility of a general action. 
 It is doubtful, indeed, whether during this 
 lively period of his life the Boer commander 
 ever really had time to meet either his 
 fellow commanders or his lieutenants and dis- 
 cuss a concerted plan of action. No sooner 
 was a general movement visible in the Boer 
 camps, than French and his men swept out, 
 or threatened to sweep out, on some dangerous 
 design. Every morning the General himself 
 made a personal reconnaissance in the neigh- 
 bourhood. 
 
 During his reconnaissance on December 
 31, French came to the conclusion that an 
 
A BRILLIANT EXPLOIT 59 
 
 offensive movement was at last possible. 
 Colesberg lies in a little plateau, ringed round 
 by a quadrangle of kopjes, all of which were 
 strongly held by the enemy. Just beyond 
 this quadrangle, however, one or two kopjes 
 projected from its western face. French de- 
 termined to seize one of these, from which he 
 could push forward along the enemy's flank, 
 jeopardising his line of retreat. 
 
 As usual, the venture was briUiantly con- 
 ceived and ably carried out. During the day 
 a squadron of Hussars was sent forward to 
 Maeder's Farm, some five miles on the line of 
 march. There the men bivouacked under 
 arms, and at midnight set out on a silent 
 march to the west. Under the screen of 
 darkness and perfect silence the advance 
 was speedy. Even the regimental carts were 
 dispensed with, lest the creaking of their 
 wheels might betray the advance. Not until 
 the column was near its objective, McCracken's 
 Hill, did the Boers suspect its approach. An 
 amazed shouting and some wild rifle-fire from 
 the outposts — and McCracken's Hill was in 
 French's hands. 
 
 The cavalry now wound round the hill 
 towards the road. But their commander. 
 Colonel Fisher, found it impossible to take 
 the hills commanding the road. As generally 
 happened, a complicated engagement ensued. 
 
6o SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 The Boers attempted to retake McCracken's 
 Hill next morning, adding a counter-attack 
 to the north-east and an enveloping move- 
 ment on the right to the already complex 
 situation. But French checkmated every 
 move, although he finally thought it wise that 
 Colonel Fisher should evacuate the hill he 
 had so cleverly won. That night both French 
 and Schoeman were wiring for reinforcements 
 in the hope of clearing up the situation. 
 
 Some days afterwards came the only reverse 
 which French ever received at the hands of 
 the Boers. There has been endless argument 
 as to who was directly responsible for the 
 disaster to the Suffolks. It seems best simply 
 to record the fact that the order was given by 
 French as the result of pressure brought to 
 bear on him by the enthusiastic colonel of 
 the Suffolks. The key to the Boer strong- 
 hold lay in the kopje of Grassy Hill. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Watson had fre- 
 quently reconnoitred the Boer position in 
 company with General French. As a result, 
 he was confident that his battalion could 
 rush the position. On January 5 he begged 
 for permission to attempt the feat. On the 
 following day French authorised him to make 
 the attack should he see a favourable oppor- 
 tunity, on condition that he first informed the 
 General of his plans and probable time of 
 
THE FATE OF THE SUFFOLKS 6i 
 attack. This he failed to do, and that night, 
 without further warning, Watson and his men 
 crept noiselessly out of camp, walking either 
 in canvas shoes or in stocking-soles in order 
 to deaden the noise of their footsteps. 
 
 The foremost ranks were scrambling breath- 
 lessly towards the summit, when a withering 
 Boer fire fell upon their panting hues. It was 
 clear that they were not only discovered but 
 expected. Watson ordered a withdrawal. 
 But withdrawal from that stark boulder- 
 strewn hill-side was almost an impossibility. 
 The column fell into disorder, some advancing 
 and some retreating, under a fierce fire from 
 the enemy. Watson himself gathered together 
 the rear company and attempted, with reck- 
 less gallantry, to lead it to the summit. He 
 was among the first to fall, riddled with 
 bullets, and although his officers perished 
 with him almost to a man, the men beat a 
 hasty retreat, in face of the enemy's destruc- 
 tive fire. The affair accounted in all for 
 eleven officers and 150 men. No doubt the 
 gallant Watson was largely to blame. But 
 the facts seemed to show that the enemy were 
 in some way apprised of his intentions. 
 Against such a chance as this, strategy and 
 generalship are helpless. Certainly French 
 would be the last man in the world to 
 deny any responsibility, had he been to 
 
62 SIR JOPIN FRENCH 
 
 blame for that one mishap in a memorable 
 campaign. 
 
 One fact was now clear beyond dispute. 
 The enemy's right had been strongly reinforced 
 and was too alert to allow of much hope of 
 successful action against it. Nothing daunted, 
 French therefore directed his energies to the 
 left. A few days later (January ii) he 
 accomplished the tour de force of the campaign. 
 In the plain to the west of Colesberg there 
 arose an isolated kopje, some six hundred 
 feet in height, called Coles Kop. This hill, 
 which rises almost sheer from the plain, taxes 
 the wind of the unencumbered climber to the 
 utmost. Being higher than the surrounding 
 kopjes, it commands both Colesberg and the 
 enemy's laager. The Boers had left it un- 
 garrisoned, thinking it useless either to them- 
 selves or to the enemy. They made a very 
 great mistake. For the mere hint that a 
 thing is impossible fires French to attempt it. 
 
 One day Schoeman woke up to find shrapnel 
 assailing him apparently from nowhere. It 
 was coming from a 15-pounder which Major 
 E. E. A. Butcher, R.F.A., had coaxed up 
 to the top of Coles Kop in three and a half 
 hours by dint of much scientific haulage and 
 more sinew. The Boers themselves never 
 equalled this extraordinary feat. 
 
 To hoist the guns on to the hilltop was the 
 
PREPARING A SURPRISE 63 
 least part of the undertaking. Guns without 
 ammunition are useless. To get shells on to 
 the kopje without disaster was an infinitely 
 more difficult undertaking. He solved it by 
 installing a hill lift. The veldt is not a very 
 promising engineering shop ; but Butcher 
 was not easily beaten. Using steel rails for 
 standards and anything worthy the name for 
 cable, he soon had the framework erected. 
 To the uprights were fixed snatchblocks over 
 which he passed his carrjdng wires. On this 
 mountain lift he was able to send weights up 
 to 30 lbs., thanks to an ingenious system of 
 pulleys. Nor was the Uft altogether rustic, 
 for a drum and ratchet made it double- 
 acting, so that as one load went up another 
 was automatically let down. It is only fair 
 to say that the Boers themselves were masters 
 of the art of haulage. How they managed 
 to get their guns to the top of kopjes remained 
 for long a mystery to our men. Butcher, 
 however, quickly taught his men to beat the 
 enemy at their own game, although nothing 
 else quite so dramatic as the Coles Kop 
 incident is on record. 
 
 During this proceeding French had been 
 distracting the enemy by a demonstration to 
 the south-east of Colesburg. Consequently 
 the shells from nowhere began to pour 
 into their laager during breakfast (January 
 
64 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 12) with devastating results. The la!ager 
 was instantly abandoned, and a second, 
 two thousand yards farther off, suffered the 
 same fate. When Butcher had finally been 
 able to get a second 15-pounder up the 
 hill, the Boers were compelled to shift every 
 camp they possessed into sheltered positions. 
 Most of these exploits show the resource 
 and the daring which mark French's tactics. 
 But his caution is no less remarkable. One 
 instance of it will suffice. Shortly after the 
 Coles Kop incident, it was discovered that 
 the Boers had left open a portion of the road 
 from Colesberg, where it goes through a narrow 
 pass known as Plessis Poort. Immediately 
 French planned its capture. One detachment 
 was sent to occupy Bastard's Nek, another 
 defile to the west of Plessis Poort. Covered 
 by a cross-fire from the artillery, the infantry 
 were to move forward and seize the road. In 
 order to divert the Boers' attention from these 
 matters, a demonstration was ordered along 
 the whole British line. Advancing carefully 
 the infantry met with little opposition, a fact 
 which made French suspicious. As the silence 
 continued he abruptly ordered the " Retire." 
 The moment that his men obeyed, a fierce 
 fire broke out from the enemy, who were 
 present in force. French's cantion was 
 justified. 
 
MASTERS OF TACTICS 65 
 
 During all this time the rival fronts had 
 been gradually stretching out, in the constant 
 effort to parry outflanking movements, until 
 they reached the extraordinary length of 
 fifty miles. Yet at the utmost neither general 
 could throw more than ten thousand men into 
 the field ! During the last days of French's 
 command, the fighting had become more a 
 matter of outpost skirmishes than anything 
 else. The Boer generals, who now included 
 De Wet and Delarey, were entirely taken up 
 with the effort to out-manceuvre the irre- 
 pressible French. 
 
 It was here that French first mastered the 
 new problem of modern warfare — ^the extended 
 front. The ability of the rival generals 
 gradually gave the campaign the resemblance 
 of a Mukden or a Mons in miniature. That 
 the British force was not entirely out- 
 manoeuvred by such masters of tactics as 
 Delarey and De Wet says something for 
 French's extraordinary mastery of a new 
 method of warfare in something like six weeks' 
 time. 
 
 Herein lies French's peculiar genius. Al- 
 though he knows all the methods of all 
 the schoolmen, he is capable as one soldier 
 expressed it, " of making his own tactics brand 
 new on the spot." To that fact one may 
 attribute his consistent superiority to the 
 
66 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Boer. Where even Kitchener and Roberts 
 doubted, French invariably did the right 
 thing. During the following fortnight he 
 had more brilliant opportunities of J demon- 
 strating his unique abilities. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 The Dash to Kimberley 
 
 French's Pledge— The Task— The First Shell— "Hemmed 
 in"— "We must break through "—The Lancers' 
 Charge— In and Out of Kimberley— The Surrender 
 of Cronje. 
 
 BY the end of the year French had saved 
 the situation in Cape Colony. Realiz- 
 ing this, Roberts summoned him to 
 Cape Town on more important business. 
 Into French's hands he placed the task which 
 Methuen had failed to accomplish through 
 adverse circumstances — the Rehef of Kim- 
 berley. When Lord Roberts, with custom- 
 ary precision, had stated exactly what he 
 wanted, he was surprised to receive a dramatic 
 pledge from his General. " I promise faith- 
 fully," said French, " to relieve Kimberley 
 at 6 o'clock on the evening of the 15th, 
 if I am ahve." 
 
 It may be asked why the case of Kimberley 
 was considered so urgent by Lord Roberts. 
 There are those who have suggested that the 
 presence of the millionaire, Cecil Rhodes, in 
 
 67 
 
68 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 the beleaguered city was responsible for the 
 authorities' energy in the matter. The mere 
 suggestion, however, refutes itself. For 
 Rhodes was the one man who did more than 
 any other to have the defences of the city 
 brought into a state of some sort of efficiency. 
 The fact is that there was discontent among 
 the civil population and a constant peril of 
 surrender. For this the great hundred pound 
 shells which hurtled destruction across the 
 town's streets from the neighbouring heights 
 were chiefly responsible. 
 
 On the face of it, French's promise might 
 then have been taken for a piece of reckless 
 bravado. The camp on the Modder River 
 in which he gathered his forces together was 
 over a hundred miles from Kimberley. The 
 commander-in-chief had promised him a full 
 cavalry division of eight thousand five hundred 
 men. But on February ii, French had 
 barely four thousand eight hundred men, 
 with seven batteries of Horse Artillery at his 
 disposal. Between his camp and the mining 
 city lay Cronje with a mobile force as large 
 as French's own. Add to this that the 
 ground to be covered consisted largely of 
 arid and well-less veldt, affording neither 
 food nor drink for man or beast. The time 
 too was the African summer, with all the 
 difficulties of handling partly raw English 
 
DECEIVING CRONJE 69 
 
 troops to be faced. The task before French 
 and his men was certainly such as might have 
 appalled a less courageous leader. 
 
 Guile as well as daring had much to do 
 with the success of the enterprise. The vast 
 concentration camp, with its flapping seas of 
 canvas, was in itself a huge blind. Through 
 its bustle and pubUcity French meant Cronje 
 to conclude that he was about to force the 
 Pass of Magersfontein, and thence to reUeve 
 Ladysmith. For this Cronje prepared him- 
 self with customary care. Meantime, French 
 proceeded, as ever, to belie the very justifi- 
 able expectations he had aroused. 
 
 The most obvious route for French would 
 be over Koodoesberg's Drift towards the west. 
 Accordingly Macdonald's Highland Brigade 
 spent a strenuous day in threatening the 
 Drift and returned to camp. 
 
 After a day's rest Macdonald's horses were 
 again ready for the field. On Sunday morning 
 therefore, February 11, the long column 
 filed silently out of camp. At 10 o'clock the 
 main body had covered 22 miles, reaching 
 the farmhouse of Ramdam. By that time 
 Cronje's outposts had probably realised that 
 the camp which French had carefully left 
 standing at the Modder River was simply 
 a city of canvas from which the inhabitants 
 had departed. 
 
70 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Next day the force was again on the march 
 at 3.0 a.m. It now took an easterly course 
 in order to force a crossing on the Riet 
 River. Its goal was Waterval Drift. But 
 so intense was the darkness that after an 
 hour of difficult movement the General 
 ordered a halt, until dawn, when he or- 
 dered the division to make the feint on 
 Waterval. He was not certain whether the 
 Drift was held in force by the enemy or not. 
 But very soon conviction came in a shell 
 nicely aimed at the General in person. It 
 burst between French and his staff. " There 
 are too many of us riding together," was 
 his only comment, as he moved forward to 
 reconnoitre the ground from the top of the 
 nearest kopje. 
 
 Very soon the Horse Artillery had the gun 
 silenced, and the whole division swerved 
 to the right just as the Boers drew off down 
 stream to wait for the English crossing. 
 Immediately the whole division was making 
 for De Kiel's Drift further up stream. The 
 banks proved to be steep and difficult, but 
 a ford was discovered. As the cavalry neared 
 the bank a party of Boers saw the ruse, 
 and a neck-to-neck race for the Drift began. 
 By a piece of daring horsemanship our 
 cavalry got home first, and the Boers arrived 
 too late to dispute their passage. By mid- 
 
DELAYED TRANSPORT 71 
 
 day the division was able to cross and bivouac 
 on the right bank, pending the arrival of 
 the baggage train, left far behind. 
 
 The Riet River is by no means a refreshing 
 torrent ; it winds its slow way in muddy 
 melancholy to the cleanly water of the 
 Vaal. But at least it contained water in 
 which both men and horses could forget the 
 heat of the veldt. All day the weary cavalry- 
 men waited for the supplies, which did not 
 come until they were attempting to snatch a 
 few hours of sleep. The transport horses 
 stumbled and strained their way up the banks 
 in the early hours of the morning. 
 
 There was pleasant excitement in camp, 
 however, when both Roberts and Kitchener 
 rode over to congratulate French on his 
 progress, and wished him " good luck " for 
 the rest of the journey. But the delay in 
 transport was annojdng to French. Neither 
 the men nor their horses received any supphes 
 untU the morning was well advanced. And 
 the sun was already scorching the veldt before 
 the division was ready to advance. That 
 delay was to be paid for in sweat and suffering. 
 On that day alone over one hundred horses 
 died or fell out from exhaustion. Their 
 tired riders were forced to trudge across the 
 veldt at what pace they could, or to find 
 ignominious rehef in the ammunition carts. 
 
72 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Shortly after mid-day, however, a welcome 
 well of water was reached. Here, thought 
 the parched and foot-sore men, was relief at 
 last. But once again they were doomed 
 to disappointment. It is one of French's 
 characteristics that he practises an exquisitely 
 perfect loyalty both to the army and to his 
 superiors. That well of sparkling water was 
 destined for the infantry tramping on behind. 
 Reluctantly the troopers turned aside on 
 their tedious way. Not a drop of the water 
 was touched. 
 
 By this time the men's sufferings from 
 thirst and dust were intense. At two o'clock 
 they neared Klip Drift, where they were 
 fiercely attacked by a large body of Boers. 
 The guns of the first brigade, however, 
 quickly put the enemy to flight, but the 
 General thought it well to make certain 
 alterations in the order of his advance. These 
 changes were only accomplished with the 
 greatest difficulty. So tired were the horses 
 that even the General's gallopers, who were 
 continually traversing the column's half-mile 
 front, were often unable to spur their horses 
 to anything better than a walk. Very quickly 
 the enemy returned to the attack, pestering 
 French on the right. Reahsing his peril, 
 he changed his course suddenly and headed 
 away from the Khp Kraal Drift. Naturally, 
 
THE BOERS FLEE 73 
 
 the enemy rushed off to block his way. For 
 an hour and a half the Drift appeared to be 
 the division's urgent objective. Then, without 
 warning, he as suddenly turned about and 
 swung back to KUp Drift. 
 
 These manoeuvres had reduced the horses 
 almost to the last stage of exhaustion. Many 
 of them fell dead by the way. But at last 
 the river was reached. Still the actual 
 crossing was not yet. Once again French 
 showed his extraordinary mastery of finesse. 
 He ordered preparation to be made for the 
 actual crossing at Klip Drift and Rondeval 
 Drift. Having thrown Gordon to the left to 
 effect one crossing and Broadwood to the right 
 to effect another, French advanced so rapidly 
 that Cronje was utterly nonplussed. Gordon 
 opened a heavy shell fire which completely 
 disconcerted him, although only a very few of 
 the guns could come into action. Soon after- 
 wards Gordon was crossing the river in pursuit. 
 The Boers fled, in spite of the natural strength 
 of their positions and the utterly exhausted 
 state of our men. But neither Gordon on 
 the left, nor Broadwood on the right, was 
 satisfied with merely effecting a crossing. 
 Both went in pursut of the enemy towards 
 Kimberley. The result was a complete rout. 
 The Boers' camp, their ammunition, their 
 wagons, fell entirely into our hands. 
 
72 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Shortly after mid-day, however, a welcome 
 well of water was reached. Here, thought 
 the parched and foot-sore men, was relief at 
 last. But once again they were doomed 
 to disappointment. It is one of French's 
 characteristics that he practises an exquisitely 
 perfect loyalty both to the army and to his 
 superiors. That well of sparkling water was 
 destined for the infantry tramping on behind. 
 Reluctantly the troopers turned aside on 
 their tedious way. Not a drop of the water 
 was touched. 
 
 By this time the men's sufferings from 
 thirst and dust were intense. At two o'clock 
 they neared Klip Drift, where they were 
 fiercely attacked by a large body of Boers. 
 The guns of the first brigade, however, 
 quickly put the enemy to flight, but the 
 General thought it well to make certain 
 alterations in the order of his advance. These 
 changes were only accomplished with the 
 greatest difficulty. So tired were the horses 
 that even the General's gallopers, who were 
 continually traversing the column's half-mile 
 front, were often unable to spur their horses 
 to anything better than a walk. Very quickly 
 the enemy returned to the attack, pestering 
 French on the right. Realising his peril, 
 he changed his course suddenly and headed 
 away from the Klip Kraal Drift. Naturally, 
 
THE BOERS FLEE 73 
 
 the enemy rushed off to block his way. For 
 an hour and a half the Drift appeared to be 
 the division's urgent objective. Then, without 
 warning, he as suddenly turned about and 
 swung back to Klip Drift. 
 
 These manoeuvres had reduced the horses 
 almost to the last stage of exhaustion. Many 
 of them fell dead by the way. But at last 
 the river was reached. Still the actual 
 crossing was not yet. Once again French 
 showed his extraordinary mastery of finesse. 
 He ordered preparation to be made for the 
 actual crossing at Klip Drift and Rondeval 
 Drift. Having thrown Gordon to the left to 
 effect one crossing and Broadwood to the right 
 to effect another, French advanced so rapidly 
 that Cronje was utterly nonplussed. Gordon 
 opened a heavy shell fire which completely 
 disconcerted him, although only a very few of 
 the guns could come into action. Soon after- 
 wards Gordon was crossing the river in pursuit. 
 The Boers fled, in spite of the natural strength 
 of their positions and the utterly exhausted 
 state of our men. But neither Gordon on 
 the left, nor Broadwood on the right, was 
 satisfied with merely effecting a crossing. 
 Both went in pursut of the enemy towards 
 Kimberley. The result was a complete rout. 
 The Boers' camp, their ammunition, their 
 wagons, fell entirely into our hands. 
 
74 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 The rout was not without spasmodic touches 
 of humour, even for these jaded men. " One 
 of the Staff plunged into the river and caught 
 some geese, but someone else ate them ; 
 a pig ran the gauntlet through the camp — 
 amidst roars of laughter, even from the 
 serious General — of lances, bayonets, knives, 
 sticks, boots, water-bottles, anything to hand, 
 and at length was caught by a lucky trooper, 
 who shared his feast that night with his 
 friends. A wagon of fresh fruit was taken, 
 sufficient to make thirsty men's mouths 
 water, but some thought the grapes were 
 sour."* 
 
 The next day was perforce spent in camp, 
 resting the tired troops and awaiting the 
 arrival of supplies. The baggage was not 
 on the scene until late in the afternoon, much 
 to the discomfort of French's men. It was 
 midnight before Lord Kitchener and his 
 Staff were near the camp. One of French's 
 aides-de-camp. Captain J. Lay cock, rode out 
 in solitary peril, and although continually 
 sniped at by the Boers, was able to lead Lord 
 Kitchener and his Staff safely into camp. All 
 day the Boers had been making the men's 
 lives a burden through unexpected sniping 
 and feints. French is said to have admitted 
 
 * The Cavalry Rush to Kimberley. By Captain Cecil 
 Boyle, Nineteenth Century, June, 1900. 
 
THE ROAD BLOCKED 75 
 
 that had any of their attacks been driven 
 home, his plans might have been seriously 
 disconcerted. " Could the Boers learn to 
 attack they would be a most formidable 
 foe," was his verdict on the situation. 
 
 At 9.30 on February 15 the column set 
 out on the last stage of their journey. French, 
 with the idea of putting the enemy off the 
 track, led his men towards Bloemfontein. 
 His idea was eventually to dash straight for 
 Kimberley with his whole division, hemming 
 the enemy's rear and flank in at Magers- 
 fontein, where Methuen's force could hold him 
 in front. Scarcely had the advance begun, 
 however, when a murderous fire broke out 
 from the river on the south-west, followed 
 almost instantaneously by a cross fire from 
 a Une of kopjes on the north-west. The 
 road to Bloemfontein was blocked ; and the 
 road to Kimberley was exposed to a cross 
 fire from the enemy's two positions. This 
 was checkmate with a vengeance. It was 
 thought that some two thousand Boers held 
 the kopjes ahead of French. At once he 
 ordered the guns into position and boldly 
 replied to the enemy's fire. The column was 
 now nearing a plain several miles in width, 
 guarded on one side by a ridge running 
 from north to south, and on the other by a 
 hill. The Boers held both hill and ridge in 
 
76 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 force. So that whatever the guns might do, 
 the position was difficult — ^if not impossible. 
 By all miUtary rules French was " hemmed 
 in." To a lesser man retreat would have 
 seemed inevitable, though disastrous. Once 
 again it was French v. The Impossible. A 
 member of his staff relates how, sweeping 
 the horizon with his glass, while riderless 
 horses from the guns galloped past, he 
 muttered, squaring the pugnacious jaw, 
 " They are over here to stop us from Bloem- 
 fontein and they are there to stop us from 
 Kimberley — we have got to break through." 
 In an instant his decision was taken. He 
 would attempt the impossible — a direct cavalry 
 charge in the teeth of the enemy's fire. 
 
 He immediately ordered Gordon to charge 
 the right front. The members of his Staff 
 expected that the General would now take 
 up a position of security in the rear of the 
 column, before the grim work began. But he 
 kept his place in the van with his Staff. His 
 officers were practically certain that not only 
 the first, but several of the leading squadrons 
 would be utterly wiped out. There appeared 
 to be nothing in heaven or earth which could 
 prevent huge losses. Gordon led his men — 
 the Ninth and Sixteenth Lancers — ^in superb 
 style. Despite the pitiable condition of the 
 horses, it was a charge worthy of the British 
 
A TERRIFIC CHARGE 'J^ 
 
 Army. A strong fire poured in from the 
 Boer trenches and from the kopjes above. 
 But as the huge masses of armed men gained 
 the inevitable momentum and pounded down 
 upon the enemy in a cloud of sword-ht dust, 
 the Boers fled before these clattering hoofs. 
 Throwing up their guns they begged for 
 mercy. But nothing could stop the terrific 
 impetus of the charge. Nearly one hundred 
 and fifty Boers feU as the Lancers ploughed 
 through their trenches. Behind the Lancers 
 the whole division now swept on in perfect 
 order, led by the Greys. " So the whole 
 division swung up the plain at the gallop. 
 It was a thrilling time never to be for- 
 gotten," wrote Boyle. So wild was the 
 Boer fire that our casualties only amounted 
 to four men wounded and two horses 
 wounded. 5 
 
 The plain once cleared, a halt was made for 
 the guns to come up, to hold the enemy 
 on the left. When the Artillery had joined 
 the main force, the advance was again 
 begun. The plain once crossed, the smoke 
 stacks of Kimberley came into view. At 
 sight of these dingy symbols of the commerce 
 they had risked all to save, the men raised 
 a tired cheer. Kimberley was relieved — 
 although the nervous operators to whom 
 French attempted to heliograph the fact, 
 
78 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 persisted in pessimistically believing that he 
 
 was the enemy. 
 
 By far the worst of the work was now over. 
 Before French reached Kimberley, however, 
 the Boers made a last effort to stay his 
 victorious advance. But they were driven 
 back with heavy loss. Only the frightful con- 
 dition of his horses prevented French from 
 turning rout into annihilation. But his worn- 
 out animals were quite beyond pursuing even 
 a beaten enemy. 
 
 At length, Kimberley, seeing the huge sand 
 cloud on the horizon, came to the conclusion 
 that it enveloped the horsemen, not of 
 Cronj e but of French. About six o'clock in the 
 evening an officer rode out of the besieged 
 city to meet the soldier who had saved it. 
 At 7 — just one hour after the moment of 
 French's historic promise, the General entered 
 Kimberley with his Staff. He dined that 
 night at De Beer's Sanatorium. 
 
 But there was no rest for the conquerors. 
 At 3.30 on the following morning the cavalry 
 was harrying the Boers to the north-east. 
 At 5 o'clock they came upon a body of Boers 
 on a well-fortified ridge, who were covering 
 the army's retreat. Unable to operate vigor- 
 ously against them owing to the condition of 
 his forces, French forced them to draw in 
 their outposts. But it was impossible to do 
 
A MAGNIFICENT RESPONSE 79 
 
 more. His horses were half dead. And in 
 the terrific heat " the tongues of men and 
 horses become black from thirst." Realising 
 the hopelessness of the situation, French 
 returned to the town. 
 
 Rest was not yet, however. Scarcely had 
 he retired than news came that Cronje had 
 decided to evacuate Magersfontein. No con- 
 firmation followed, however. The General, 
 therefore, advised his Staff that at last . a 
 night's rest was possible. A couple of hours 
 later a telegram arrived from Lord Kitchener, 
 announcing that Cronje, with ten thousand 
 men, was in full retreat from Magersfontein, 
 with " all his wagons and equipment and four 
 guns, along the north bank of the Modder 
 River towards Bloemfontein, that he had 
 already fought a rearguard action with him, 
 and if French with all available horses and 
 guns could head him and prevent his crossing 
 the river, the infantry from Klip Drift would 
 press on and annihilate or take the whole 
 force prisoners." 
 
 General French responded magnificently 
 to the call of this opportunity. Another 
 man might have pleaded that his troops 
 and horses were utterly unfit for work, but 
 with French the greater the obstacles, the 
 stronger is his determination to win through ! 
 Of all his five thousand men, only two 
 
8o SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 thousand could be found whose horses were fit 
 to carry them in that wild dash to head off 
 the Boer Commando. 
 
 At 3 a.m. on February 17, French left 
 Kimberley, and by a marvellous piece of 
 far-sighted calculation made straight for Koo- 
 doos Rand Drift, the very crossing which 
 Cronje himself had chosen. His horses died 
 on the way, but French reached the river 
 first and seized the Drift, aln.ost under the 
 enemy's eyes. 
 
 Cronje was completely surprised. The 
 previous evening, French had been in pursuit 
 of the Boers north of Kimberley; now he 
 had suddenly appeared 35 miles to the 
 south, and was facing the enemy, determined 
 to cut off his retreat. Swiftly Cronje moved 
 down the river and took possession of a 
 long stretch between Gaardeberg Drift and 
 Wolveskraal Drift. 
 
 It must have been an anxious night for 
 General French, for had Cronje realised 
 how small was the force that thus held him 
 at bay, and made a desperate effort to 
 break through, there would have been little 
 chance of thwarting him. But Cronje lay 
 stUl in the river bed, while the British forces 
 closed swiftly in and the net was drawn 
 closer round him. 
 
 For ten long days the Boer General held 
 
CRONJE SURRENDERS 8i 
 
 out, while the British artillery poured shells 
 into his laager. Meanwhile the Boers flocked 
 in from every side to endeavour to rescue 
 Cronje from his hopeless position. French 
 undertook to check them and hold them 
 back, leaving the main army to deal with the 
 surroimded enemy. 
 
 General French and his men were in 
 continual action for the next few days. But 
 the soldiers gloried in their work, for they 
 were cheered by the message from Queen 
 Victoria in appreciation of their excellent 
 work, particularly in the relief of Kimberley, 
 which had earned for them " the gratitude 
 of the whole nation." 
 
 At length, on February 27, Cronje sur- 
 rendered, and four thousand men laid down 
 their arms. Thus closed the most briUiant 
 exploit of the British Arms in South Africa — 
 an exploit whose success can be largely traced 
 to the extraordinary mixture of dauntless 
 courage, practical acumen and remorseless 
 persistence which mark the genius of Sir 
 John French. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Rounding up the Boers 
 
 French in the Modder — At Bloemfontein — French and 
 the Artist — An Ambush — Doing the Impossible 
 Again— Short Shrift with Barberton Snipers — 
 Some French Stories. 
 
 TO have relieved Kimberley and partially 
 effected the capture of the redoubtable 
 Cronje in the course of a fortnight, was 
 no mean accomplishment. The average com- 
 mander would have been content to rest his 
 forces after such exertions. But French is 
 never tired. The very day that Cronje sur- 
 rendered news came through that a rescue 
 party was coming to Cronje's assistance, 
 and already held a hill on the south-east of 
 the Modder. Although the river was in 
 flood, as the result of torrential rains, French 
 forthwith led out two brigades with their 
 batteries to make a reconnaissance. In forc- 
 ing the stream both French and his A.A.G. 
 very nearly lost their lives. Losing its foot- 
 hold the General's horse took fright and fell, 
 flinging him into the raging torrent. As the 
 
 82 
 
AT POPLAR GROVE 83 
 
 animal strove to recover, it upset Colonel 
 (now Sir Douglas) Haig, who was coming to 
 the rescue, dashing rider and horse into an 
 over-hanging wiUow tree. Both French and 
 Haig luckily managed to get themselves 
 free from their plunging animals and struck 
 out for the shore. Dripping but determined, 
 they jumped on to fresh mounts, and advanced 
 in two steamy haloes across the dusty veldt. 
 Of course, not a solitary Boer was in sight 
 for ten miles at least ! 
 
 It very quickly transpired, however, that 
 the Boers were strongly entrenched at Poplar 
 Grove. At their head were French's most 
 redoubtable opponents in the Colesberg cam- 
 paign — De Wet and Delarey. For once his 
 old antagonists were able to get back at least 
 a httle of their own. Their position extended 
 across the river and was protected by a chain 
 of hills, with kopjes between, not to mention 
 the wired fences, ditches and other wiles in 
 which they excelled. 
 
 Lord Roberts determined that an attack 
 must be delivered before the enemy had 
 time to recover from the shock of Cronje's 
 surrender. French was, therefore, ordered 
 to circle round the Boer left flank, thus 
 cutting off his retreat, while the infantry 
 delivered a frontal attack. 
 
 The result was a compUment to the terrible 
 
84 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 French and his cavalry. No sooner did the 
 Boers reahse that the horsemen were upon 
 them, than they beat a hasty retreat. Before 
 the cavalry were in position, the Boers and 
 their wagons could be seen scurrying off for 
 the river. Arm-chair critics at home have 
 strongly criticised French for what followed. 
 They claim that what should have been a 
 rout, ended in an orderly escape. But they 
 forget several factors in the situation. 
 
 While French's men were urging their 
 spent horses forward to overtake the enemy, 
 it became obvious that De Wet had very 
 cleverly covered his retreat. First from a 
 farmhouse in the rear, and, when it was 
 taken, from a low kopje, a small body of 
 men poured forth a hail of bullets. In 
 manoeuvring to take the kopje, the tired 
 cavalry allowed the astute De Wet and 
 Delarey to escape with their guns intact. 
 Kruger and Steyn also, who had come up to 
 hearten their followers, got away. 
 
 Maddening as it was to French to see his 
 old enemy escape through his fingers like 
 this, the condition of his men and of his horses 
 had to be taken into account ; they were 
 dead beat. For once the manoeuvring of 
 De Wet proved as successful as when it was 
 practised by French at Colesberg. Finally 
 the event of the day is attributable to two 
 
A PAINFUL SITTING 85 
 
 of French's best qualities — ^his caution and 
 his extreme parsimony in the matter of 
 human life. A more ruthless leader might 
 possibly have captured the Boer guns. But 
 it is extremely doubtful whether he would 
 have taken De Wet, Delarey or any other of 
 the well-mounted Boer leaders. 
 
 From Poplar Grove the enemy fell back 
 on Driefontein. On March 10, French again 
 drove them, although not without real diffi- 
 culty, from their stronghold. This accom- 
 pUshed, the army pushed on towards Bloem- 
 fontein, which surrendered on March 13. 
 For six weeks the main body halted there to 
 rest, but chiefly to obtain remounts for the 
 cavalry. During that time, however, French's 
 men were not idle. They continually pat- 
 rolled the surrounding country, keeping in 
 constant touch with the enemy and driving 
 him back for many miles from the town. 
 
 One unhappy afternoon the General spent 
 in sitting for a painter in Bloemfontein. It 
 was probably the severest ordeal of the 
 campaign for that retiring soldier. " General 
 French," wrote the painter's youngest 
 daughter, " is quite the shyest man in the 
 British army, and looks less Kke a cavalry 
 officer than you could possibly imagine. 
 He is a heavy man, always looks half-asleep — 
 although who is there more wide awake ? — 
 
86 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 has a very red complexion, grey moustache, 
 thick-set figure, and the last personality 
 in the world to help an artist as a sitter. He 
 promised to sit for the painter, although most 
 characteristically he could not for the life 
 of him think what he had done to be of suffi- 
 cient interest for anyone to want to sketch 
 him. At last, after a great deal of trouble, 
 the painter got him to sit one morning just 
 outside the club at Bloemfontein. That 
 sitting was the shortest and most disjointed 
 the painter has ever had. The General 
 sat bolt upright in a chair, reading his paper 
 upside down through sheer nervousness, and, 
 if he left that chair once, on one excuse or 
 another, he left it a hundred times, coming 
 back looking more thoroughly upset and 
 nervous each time, until at last he never 
 came back at all. And the painter's only 
 chance of sketching him was at the club 
 during dinner ! "* 
 
 At last the main army was ready for work 
 again, and on May i the troops moved out 
 of the fever-stricken town. French and his 
 ca\-alry were the last to leave, but they over- 
 took Lord Roberts and the main body, and 
 led the way to Kroonstad, once again the seat 
 of the Free State Government. Here by 
 one of his famous turning movements, French 
 * M.A.P., August 25, 1900. 
 
THE GUNS 87 
 
 cleverly forced the enemy to surrender and 
 give up the keys of the town. Keeping ahead 
 of Lord Roberts and his forces, he crossed 
 the Vaal River and was first at the gates of 
 Johannesburg, which the British entered on 
 May 31. 
 
 After two days in the mining city. Lord 
 Roberts' triumphant forces moved on their 
 way to Pretoria. French's next task 
 was to cut the railway communications to 
 the north of Pretoria. In carrying this out 
 he made a wide detour to the west, where 
 his cavalry found themselves in a treacherous 
 country of kopjes, scrub and menacing gorges, 
 a type of country most dangerous to mounted 
 men. Anxiously he pushed forward to reach 
 open country before nightfall (of June 2). 
 But the Boers were before him. A sudden 
 hail of Mauser bullets and shells announced 
 an ambush. But French was undismayed. 
 " Quietly, in complete mastery of the situation, 
 General French gave his orders. ' Make room 
 for the guns,' passed down the line ; and 
 like a fire engine to the rescue, up dashed 
 a section of horse artillery and a pom-pom."* 
 Very quickly the enemy was beaten off, in 
 spite of the fatigue of a thirty-two mile 
 
 * With General French and his Cavalry in South 
 Africa. By C. S. Goldman. By permission of Messrs. 
 Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 
 
88 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 march. No further resistance was met with 
 as the men passed through the rich, orange- 
 growing country round Pretoria. On June 
 4, French had completed his enveloping 
 movement, and taken up his position to the 
 north of the town. In the afternoon the 
 cavalrymen learnt, with no little chagrin, 
 that Lord Roberts had already entered 
 Pretoria. 
 
 When the efforts to negotiate peace with 
 Botha had failed, French was instructed by 
 Lord Roberts to push the Boers east by a 
 turning movement on their flank, which he 
 would follow by the usual frontal attack on 
 foot. So energetic were the Boers in harassing 
 Lord Roberts' force, that drastic action had 
 become necessary. It proved to be one of 
 the most difficult enterprises that the cavalry 
 had undertaken. 
 
 As usually happened the Boers were securely 
 ensconced on ridges, the chief of which was 
 known as Diamond Hill, while our men were 
 condemned to work round from a level plain 
 open to the enemy's fire. In order not to 
 become a series of conspicuous targets, the 
 cavalrymen were forced to dismount and 
 fight their way up to the ridges on foot. For 
 two days they fought gallantly against a 
 steady fire, until the infantry's attack on the 
 enemy's other flank gave French his chance 
 
A DARING VENTURE 89 
 
 to drive them out. For a third time the 
 pUght of his horses finally forbade his taking 
 full advantage of his success. The Boers 
 were driven back, but without being severely 
 punished. The ubiquitous De Wet, need 
 one add, showed a clean pair of heels. 
 
 In July, French was in command of the 
 forces operating in Eastern Transvaal. There 
 followed a long and arduous march towards 
 the east which, after the capture of Middle- 
 burg, ended in the surrender of Barberton. 
 It was in the beginning of September that 
 French turned his attention to the enemy's 
 forces collected round the latter town. He 
 commenced his operations by circulating 
 reports of an intended action in the opposite 
 direction. While the Boers prepared to meet 
 this he was able to reach Carohna with com- 
 parative ease. Here he remained for three 
 days in order to prepare for a flanking move- 
 ment against Barberton. As he must cut 
 himself off entirely from sources of supply, 
 such preparation was very necessary. French 
 was about to attempt one of the most daring 
 achievements of his career. He was going 
 to take mounted men over a miniature Alps. 
 The Boers were prepared for his attacking 
 Barberton from every direction save one. 
 They never supposed for a moment that the 
 British troops would attempt to force the 
 
90 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Nelshoogte Pass. For what did it mean ? 
 The scaling of precipitous heights, and the 
 passage along narrow ledges of men, horses 
 and guns. It would have been a difficult 
 task for mountaineers, far less for heavily 
 burdened cavalrymen. 
 
 French, however, was determined to do 
 the impossible " once more." He would 
 repeat the miracle of Coles Kop on a titanic 
 scale. Accordingly, after a day's hard fighting, 
 he rested his men for a night near the entrance 
 to the pass. On the following morning, the 
 enemy having disappeared, the advance was 
 sounded. Up a narrow path, whose gradient 
 was frequently one in four, the men crawled, 
 often on hands and knees, while their horses 
 stumbled on behind. Frequently they were 
 scaling towering crags several hundred feet 
 in height, from which there was sometimes a 
 sheer fall of over a thousand feet. In teams 
 of sixteen the oxen panted, struggled and 
 frequently perished in the attempt to drag 
 the heavy guns up the fearful incline. Only 
 a man of indomitable courage would have 
 attempted such a feat. But French lost not 
 a single man in the process. Perhaps the 
 division's perfect belief in his luck did 
 something towards nerving the men for the 
 ordeal. 
 
 The top of the pass once reached, French 
 
A WAY WITH SNIPERS 91 
 
 determined to make a sudden descent on 
 Barberton. Taking a leaf out of the Boers' 
 book, he left the whole of his baggage behind 
 to lighten the horses, and rushed his men 
 towards the town. On descending the other 
 side of the pass the soldiers had still to 
 lead their horses, who were as often on 
 their haunches as their feet. Barberton and 
 the Boers saw the oncoming of the British 
 force with blank amazement. It was the 
 last thing in the world they expected. The 
 Boer Commando in possession, six hundred 
 strong, had just time to escape from one 
 end of the town as French entered it at the 
 other. 
 
 Enraged at the surprise that had been 
 sprung on them, the Boers commenced sniping 
 the town from various vantage points in the 
 vicinity. But French knew how to treat 
 the sniper. The following notice was immedi- 
 ately dashed off by the local printing press 
 and posted all over the town. 
 
 TO THE INHABITANTS OF 
 BARBERTON. 
 
 This is to give notice that if any 
 Shooting into the Town or Sniping in 
 its vicinity takes place, the Lieutenant- 
 General Commanding will withdraw the 
 
92 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Troops, and shell the Town without 
 further notice. 
 
 By order, 
 
 D. Haig, Lt.-Col. 
 Chief Staff Officer to Lt. -General French. 
 
 September 15, 1900. 
 
 The sniping stopped forthwith. 
 
 One of the first things that French did was 
 to go and personally rescue his old enemy, 
 Schoeman, from the local jail. That worthy, 
 having surrendered, had come into bad odour 
 with his fellow countrymen. In consequence 
 he had been incarcerated at Barberton. For 
 once the unfortunate Schoeman was glad to 
 see the face of his old enemy again ! 
 
 French rested his forces in Barberton for 
 three weeks, leaving the town on October 3. 
 The march back to Pretoria was, if anything, 
 more trying than the adventurous dash to 
 Barberton had been. Apart from the trying 
 climb over the heights of the Kaapsche Hoop, 
 and the eternal sniping of the Boers, the 
 weather now brought new sufferings. The 
 men were exhausted by days of heat, and 
 soaked by nights of torrential rain. It was 
 a thoroughly tired and jaded force which 
 finally reached Pretoria on November 3. 
 
 One incident of that trying march shows 
 how ably French dealt with Boer bluff. The 
 
LORD ROBERTS' RETURN 93 
 
 enemy had made prisoner a captain of the 
 R.A.M.C, and sent a message that they 
 woiild shoot him unless General French 
 pledged his word that he would burn no Boer 
 farms. French replied that unless the cap- 
 tured medical officer were brought into the 
 British camp next morning, he would burn 
 the town of Bethel to the ground ; and, if he 
 were shot, ten Boer prisoners would be 
 similarly put to death. The doctor was 
 brought into camp next morning. 
 
 In inspecting the cavalry on their return, 
 Lord Roberts expressed his high appreciation 
 of French's work and informed him that, 
 while retaining his cavalry command, he had 
 been appointed to the command of Johannes- 
 burg and district. 
 
 At the end of the month Lord Roberts 
 returned to England to take command of the 
 Home Forces ; and several months elapsed 
 before French was able actively to take up 
 that long rounding-up of the Boers which 
 Kitchener was now planning in such elaborate 
 detail. During the early part of 1901 he was 
 able to clear the Boers out of the central 
 district of Cape Colony. On June 8 he took 
 supreme command of the operations in that 
 Colony, and by November he had confined 
 the enemy to its north-eastern and south- 
 western extremities. 
 
94 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Not until Midsummer, 1902, was French able 
 to return home. Before that he had spent 
 some time recruiting his health in Cape Town. 
 Very eager were the loyal citizens to f§te the 
 most successful of all the British Generals. 
 But French would have no banqueting on his 
 account. The war, he characteristically ex- 
 plained, was not yet ended, and so long as it 
 was in progress he was not inclined to accept 
 any public hospitality. 
 
 Anything like show or ostentation is foreign 
 to French's whole nature. If there are few 
 stories of his exploits in South Africa, there 
 lies the reason. He is far too modest a man 
 to prepare bons mots or pretty jeux d'esprit 
 for public consumption. Also he is by nature 
 a silent man. His silence is not the detached, 
 Olympian and rather ominous silence of Kit- 
 chener. It proceeds simply from a natural 
 modesty and reticence, which reinforce his 
 habitual tendency to " thmk things over." 
 He is the type of man whom hostesses have to 
 " draw out " ; he never talks either on him- 
 self, the army or any other subject. To "do 
 his job " better than anybody else in the 
 world could do it is enough for French ; 
 chatter about it he leaves to less busy people. 
 
 His habitual taciturnity, curiously enough, 
 is one of the traits which endears him to the 
 armv. For French's silence has no trait of 
 
A SHIRT-SLEEVED GENERAL 95 
 
 churlishness. It is the silence of a man 
 utterly absorbed in the task before him, the 
 man whom Tommy Atkins admires. " If the 
 British soldier hkes one thing in a General 
 more than another," wrote a soldier who 
 served with French in South Africa, "it is 
 the golden gift of silence, especially when 
 joined to straight action, just to distinguish 
 him from the old women of both sexes. 
 Whenever French penned a dispatch, or an 
 order, or a proclamation, he wasted no ink 
 and strained no pen nibs ; but he never penned 
 anything if there was a way of doing the 
 thing himself."* 
 
 In South Africa he earned the title of " the 
 shirt-sleeved General," — a soubriquet that 
 conveys a subtle compliment from Tommy's 
 point of view. Actually French was often 
 to be seen walking about in camp during his 
 heavy marches in shirt-sleeves. One after- 
 noon a correspondent rode up to the lines, and 
 seeing a soldier sitting on a bundle of hay, 
 smoking a dilapidated looking old briar pipe, 
 asked where the General was. " The old man 
 is somewhere about," coolly repUed the soldier. 
 " Well, just hold my horse while I go and 
 search for him." " Certainly, sir," and the 
 smoker rose obediently and took the bridle. 
 "Can you tell me where the General is?" 
 * The Regiment, September 5, 1914. 
 
96 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 inquired the correspondent of a staff officer 
 further down the hne. " General French ? 
 oh, he's somewhere about. Why, there he is, 
 holding that horse's head ! " And the 
 officer pointed directly to the smoker, still 
 tranquilly pulling at his pipe, and holding the 
 horse ! Needless to say " Uncle French " 
 and his men hugely enjoyed the correspond- 
 ent's awakening. 
 
 Such a man is bound to be the idol of the 
 ranks. " What a good leader General French 
 is," wrote Driver Payne, of the Royal Horse 
 Artillery, to a friend. "He seems so cool at 
 excitable moments ; he does not lose his 
 head and rush his men into danger. In fact, 
 he always looks before he leaps, and when he 
 does leap, he makes us move — and the Boers 
 too." Perhaps French was best summed-up 
 one day by a trooper whom, in a curt word, he 
 had just sentenced to barracks for some 
 offence. " The General don't bark much," 
 he remarked, "but, crikey, don't he know 
 how to bite ! " 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 Work at Home and Resignation 
 
 At Aldershot — Driving Training at High Pressure — 
 General French is ' ' fairly " well pleased — Strenuous 
 Manoeuvres — Chief of the Imperial General Staff — 
 Ulster and Resignation. 
 
 WITH Lord Kitchener, General French 
 had a wonderful welcome on his 
 return from South Africa. The 
 former had certainly added a few leaves to 
 his laurel wreath, but French brought back 
 a complete new crown of his own. His 
 return home in July was a triumphal progress. 
 At Southampton, in repljdng to congratula- 
 tions, he paid a fine tribute to his men. 
 
 French's hatred of ostentation in any form 
 prevented him from allowing Society to f6te 
 him to its heart's content. He was the 
 most retiring of lions ; and, like Kitchener, 
 he allowed London to idolise him only at a 
 distance. A knighthood was one reward of 
 his services ; and after a brief rest he was 
 back at Aldershot as Lieutenant-General in 
 command. 
 
 97 
 
98 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 For the first time French found himself in 
 command of all arms of the service in time 
 of peace. After his arrival, instruction was 
 driven at high pressure. No sooner had he 
 arrived than he turned out the whole of his 
 command — " just to see how they looked ! " 
 Such a thing had scarcely ever happened 
 before ; and the order sent desolation to the 
 hearts of some of the officers. For it meant 
 that the whole force, every man, horse and 
 gun had to turn out forthwith, in full march- 
 ing order, and ready for action. After 
 the first feverish digging out of accoutrements 
 and tents, however, the men became hardened 
 to these sudden alarums and excursions. They 
 became a part of the programme. 
 
 The cavalry especially was trained to an 
 extraordinary degree of perfection. The most 
 rigorous methods in use abroad were used and 
 bettered. The result was the production of 
 a body of men who, like Wellington's heroes 
 of Torres Vedras, " were ready to go anywhere 
 and do anything." 
 
 In December, 1907, French was appointed 
 Inspector-General of the Forces. In this 
 extremely exacting office, his qualities of 
 thoroughness and grip had splendid scope. 
 A glance at his comments discloses the high 
 standard of excellence which he exacted from 
 every branch of the service. Only the other 
 
"FAIRLY" WELL PLEASED 99 
 day timid folk were bewailing his methods at 
 manoeuvres. Four horses had succumbed to 
 a gruelling day of fierce exertion. But French 
 expressed himself as " well pleased." One 
 does not remember his ever going farther 
 up the giddy incline of the superlatives. 
 Probably his exacting eye never yet met the 
 corps of his dream. He had a terrible word 
 with which he was wont to emphasise the 
 fact of disenchantment. How often did one 
 read " General French expressed himself as 
 ' fairly ' well pleased with what he saw " ? 
 A withering qualitative. French was deter- 
 mined to infuse the whole army with his 
 own professional love of efficiency. To that 
 end he phrased his judgments with extra- 
 ordinary care. His remarks were as nicely 
 aimed and as carefully timed as his cavalry 
 charges. Nor did they lack shattering force 
 on occasion. 
 
 After five years of " tuning up " the army, 
 French took command of its administration. 
 In 1912 he was appointed Chief of the Imperial 
 General Staff, a body formed on the lines of 
 the efficient German General Staff. Of the 
 nature and value of the reforms instituted 
 under his direction it is too early yet to speak. 
 Suffice it to say that in the European War 
 they have met the almost intolerable strain 
 with signal success. For once we presented 
 
100 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 to the Continent the unparalleled spectacle 
 of a War Office " ready for action." 
 
 In particular Sir John French encouraged 
 originality of thought among his officers by 
 frankly seeking critical contributions for a new 
 service journal, and by putting various oppor- 
 tunities for individual enterprise in their 
 way. 
 
 In the midst of these invaluable if slightly 
 uncongenial administrative activities. Sir John 
 French was brought to a tragic standstill. 
 A political intrigue cut across his soldier's life, 
 and ended its usefulness for the time being. 
 At this early date it is extremely difficult to 
 disentangle the rights and wrongs of the 
 Gough incident. But there is no need to 
 enter into the political aspect of the case 
 here. Suffice it to deplore the sticky mess 
 of party politics which threatened to gulf a 
 great career. 
 
 In the month of March the Government 
 believed that they had serious reason to 
 expect disturbance in Ireland. Accordingly, 
 General Sir Arthur Paget was summoned 
 to the War Office to consult his military 
 chiefs. Apparently, General Paget was in- 
 structed — so far as can be gathered in the 
 absence of documentary evidence — to lay 
 before his officers a certain choice of action. 
 He accordingly called a meeting of his officers. 
 
THE ULSTER CRISIS loi 
 
 whom he informed that " Active operations 
 were to be begun against Ulster ; that he 
 expected the country to be in a blaze by 
 Saturday (March 21) ; and that he was 
 instructed by the War Office to allow officers 
 domiciled in Ulster to disappear, but as 
 regards others that any who resigned would 
 be dismissed." The officers were given two 
 hours to make their decision. Out of a total 
 of 72 officers in the Brigade, 59 " would, 
 respectfully, and under protest," prefer to 
 be dismissed, while five claimed exemption 
 on the ground of being domiciled in Ulster. 
 
 A few days later it was explained on behalf 
 of the Government that no operations were 
 intended against Ulster, and that through 
 " an honest misunderstanding " General Paget 
 had misinterpreted his instructions. Briga- 
 dier-General Gough was therefore asked to 
 return to his command, finally obtaining 
 a written undertaking, signed by the Secretary 
 of State for War, that the troops would not be 
 used in Ulster. In addition to Colonel Seely's 
 signature, that of the Chief of the Imperial 
 General Staff (Sir John French) and of the 
 Adjutant-General (Sir J. S. Ewart) appeared 
 on the memorandum. 
 
 Now it transpired that two important 
 paragraphs of the memorandum were written 
 by Colonel Seely, but presumably they were 
 
102 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 not sanctioned by the Cabinet. The para- 
 graphs in question ran : "His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment must retain their right to use all the 
 forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere, 
 to maintain law and order, and to support 
 the Civil Power in the ordinary execution of 
 its duty. 
 
 " But they had no intention whatever 
 of taking advantage of this right to crush 
 political opposition to the policy or principles 
 of the Home Rule Bill." 
 
 As they stand these two paragraphs are 
 a trifle ambiguous. The fact apparently 
 occurred to General Gough. For he asked 
 Sir John French explicitly whether they could 
 be taken to mean that he could not be called 
 upon to order his brigade to take part in 
 the coercion of Ulster to the Home Rule 
 Bill. Sir John French wrote across the 
 note that this was his belief. On the strength 
 of this General Gough returned to his com- 
 mand. 
 
 When the facts of the case were known, 
 the Government were severely criticised by 
 the Labour and the Nationalist parties. In 
 replying to these criticisms, on Wednesday, 
 this pledge was declared to be " not operative." 
 As the result. Colonel Seely, who 'had signed 
 the assurance, threatened resignation. On 
 Friday, March 26, it was known that both 
 
A QUESTION OF HONOUR 103 
 
 Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart had 
 resigned their positions. Every effort was 
 made to induce these distinguished officers 
 to reconsider their decision, but without 
 avail. To remain in of&ce would mean 
 repudiating their pledged word. To this 
 course no possible pressure could induce 
 Sir John French to agree. He persisted in 
 his resignation : and the Prime Minister 
 solved a very dangerous situation by himself 
 taking up the office of Minister of War, which 
 Colonel Seely had now resigned. 
 
 So Sir John French went for a second time 
 into retirement. Nothing less could be ex- 
 pected of one whose views on discipline are 
 so extremely strict and whose ideals of 
 loyalty are notoriously so high. To have 
 remained in office would have been to impair 
 the authority of the Imperial General Staff, 
 quite apart from faihng in loyalty to a 
 pledged word. For all these reasons Sir 
 John French chose eclipse rather than dis- 
 honour. 
 
 Unquestionably he viewed the impasse 
 purely from the military point of view. His 
 dishke of anything like politics in the army 
 is well known. Mr. Asquith's famous dictum 
 on taking up the office of Secretary for War 
 is an echo of General French's invariable 
 advice to his officers — " You will hear no 
 
104 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 politics from me, and I expect to hear none 
 from you." 
 
 What his attitude towards the officers at 
 the Curragh was in the first instance, is a 
 matter of mere surmise. It has been said that 
 he would personally have dealt very sharply 
 with those concerned. But such statements 
 obviously lack authority. Sir John French is 
 much too discreet an officer to babble his 
 views abroad on such a point. All we know 
 is that at the time he strongly deprecated 
 politics in the army in several speeches of 
 considerable force. A psychological problem 
 in army feeling was closely bound up with 
 the issue. It is enough to emphasise the 
 fact that Sir John French is himself no 
 pohtician and did what he did because his 
 honour demanded nothing less. 
 
 For four months the most energetic man 
 in the Army was able to rusticate. Actually 
 nothing ever fell out more happily than this 
 enforced holiday. His duties during the 
 past few years had necessarily been extremely 
 exhausting. He had rarely had time for 
 the rest and relaxation that make for physical 
 and mental freshness. Now he gave him- 
 self to the walking, the riding and the yacht- 
 ing he so keenly enjoys, and so rarely in- 
 dulges in. For the General has, at least, 
 taken the love of the water from his other- 
 
A HOLIDAY 105 
 
 wise tedious days in the Navy. He is an 
 expert yachtsman and has explored a large 
 part of the British coast at one time or 
 another. Riding and hunting are, however, 
 the only sports he now takes very seriously. 
 He rides a great deal during his busiest days 
 at home, running down from London to the 
 Manor at Waltham Cross for the purpose 
 when occasion permits. 
 
 Until the beginning of August, Sir John 
 French was able to revel in his new found 
 freedom. When the call came, it found him 
 feehng better and fitter than he had done 
 for years. Perhaps even political intrigue 
 serves a purpose in the game of the War 
 Gods. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 His Belief in Cavalry 
 
 The Lessons of the Boer War— Cavalry v. Mounted 
 Infantry — A Plea for the Lance — -The Cavalry 
 Spirit— Shock Tactics stiU Useful. 
 
 IT does not necessarily follow that be- 
 cause a man is a great cavalry leader, 
 he therefore has ideas on the subject 
 of cavalry. To the popular mind cavalry 
 suggests clouds of dust and a clatter of hoofs, 
 the flashing of swords, followed by the crash 
 and sound of an engagement. The man 
 who would conduct this imagined spectacle 
 satisfactorily would therefore be dependent 
 rather on the timely uprush of the spirit than 
 on the mechanical certainty of the mind. 
 He would need to act by inspiration and 
 impulse, rather than by cold thought. Quite 
 obviously some other and less resplendent 
 being would have to time the rise of his 
 curtain in the theatre of war. He would 
 be the last man whom one would figure, like 
 Kipling's successful General, " worrying him- 
 self bald " over a map and compasses. 
 
 1 06 
 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 107 
 But the popular version does less than 
 justice to the modern cavalry leader in general 
 and to French in particular. We have seen 
 him as a subaltern poring over his books 
 before his colleagues were out of bed. We 
 have seen him varying the monotony of War 
 Office administration by solving problems in 
 tactics. Indubitably he is a student : in- 
 cidentally he is an innovator. This fact 
 of mental duality raises him in a moment out 
 of the ruck of mere cavalry experts — of both 
 sorts. On the one hand he is not a competent 
 machine working out other people's ideas in 
 the field of battle : on the other he is no 
 blundering theorist whose ideas crumple into 
 ineffectual dust under the stress of actual 
 warfare. He can carry out with the ardour 
 of the soldier the schemes which he has formu- 
 lated with the cold cunning of the strategist. 
 It is difficult indeed to say in which field of 
 cavalry work he more greatly excels — that 
 of theory or practice. We shall see later 
 that he possesses qualities altogether apart 
 from those of the theoriser or the man of 
 action. Suffice it now to glance at the aston- 
 ishingly complete theory of cavalry on which 
 his marvellous execution is founded. 
 
 One reaches the bedrock of French's 
 curiously sane conception of war when one 
 asks him to define war. In dealing with those 
 
io8 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 gentlemen who tell us that the Boer War 
 was fought under such abnormal conditions 
 that it is useless as a ground-work for con- 
 clusions as to future wars, he uttered a memor- 
 able retort. " All wars are abnormal," he 
 observed, " because there is no such thing 
 as normal war."* There we have one of 
 the axioms both of his theory and of his 
 practice. There can be no fixed conditions, 
 and so there can be no final theories as to the 
 conduct of warfare. Theory is simply a 
 means to an end. And the successful general 
 is he who most ably adapts the general 
 body of theory suitable for all cases to the 
 particular campaign on which he is engaged. 
 Broadly, however, French has very clearly 
 defined what he considers to be the use 
 and the abuse of cavalry. After the Boer 
 War, as is well known, opinion on the subject 
 of the future of the mounted arm was bitterly 
 divided. There were those who saw in 
 French's success a justification for the cavalry- 
 men of the old school, armed cap d, pie. There 
 were others who, like Sir Arthur Conan 
 Doyle, saw the end of their day approaching. 
 The author of The Great Boer War says of 
 the charge before Kimberley : "It appears 
 
 * Sir John French's Preface to Cavalry by General 
 von Bernhardi. By permission of Messrs. Hugh Rees, 
 Ltd., and Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton. 
 
A VEXED QUESTION 109 
 
 to have been one of the very few occasions 
 during the campaign when that obsolete and 
 absurd weapon the sword was anything but 
 a dead weight to its bearer." And again : 
 " The war has been a cruel one for the cavalry. 
 ... It is difficult to say that cavalry, as 
 cavalry, have justified their existence. In 
 the opinion of many the tendency of the 
 future will be to convert the whole forces 
 into mounted infantry. ... A little training 
 in taking; cover, leggings instead of boots, 
 and a rifle instead of a carbine, would give 
 us a formidable force of 20,000 men who 
 could do all that our cavalry does, and a great 
 deal more besides. . . . The lesson both of the 
 South African and of the American Civil War 
 is that the Ught horseman who is trained to 
 fight on foot is the type of the future."* 
 This is the opinion of a very competent 
 civihan who deeply studied the South African 
 campaign. But it is the opinion of a civihan. 
 On the other hand many experts, most of 
 them mihtary men, insist that the day of 
 shock tactics is far from done. They instance 
 the charge before Kimberley as a case in 
 point. Obviously all the elements of disaster 
 were there. Only a brilhant use of the 
 traditional cavalry attack saved the situation 
 
 * The Great Boer War, by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. 
 By permission of Messrs. Smith, Elder & Co. 
 
no SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 — and Kimberley. Situations of that sort 
 are bound to arise again. How is the mounted 
 infantryman, lacking the elan and spirit of 
 the cavalryman, to meet the situation ? 
 
 French takes an attitude somewhat mid- 
 way between these two extremes. He, of 
 all men, has developed cavalry most success- 
 fully on what might be called mounted 
 infantry lines. That is to say, he has taught 
 his men to fight on foot, to take cover at 
 every opportunity, and to master the whole 
 art of reconnaissance. But at the same time, 
 he objects to extremist* views as to the 
 abolition of the cavalry spirit. " One or two 
 distinguished foreign soldiers who have pub- 
 licly commented upon that campaign have 
 said that what is termed the ' Cavalry 
 Spirit ' is opposed to the idea of dismounted 
 action. They hold that the cavalry disdain 
 to dismount, and they see in riding the end 
 instead of the means. They consider that 
 events in the Far East teach us that we must 
 render our cavalry less devoted to 'man- 
 oeuvres ' and to ' tournaments,' in order to 
 enable them to fit themselves to take part in 
 modern fighting; that the times have come when 
 the methods of warfare should be changed ; and 
 
 * Sir John French's Preface to Cavalry in Future Wars, 
 by General von Bernhardi. By permission of Mr. John 
 Murray. 
 
TOO MUCH CAUTION iii 
 
 that the cavalry must determine to defeat the 
 enemy by dismounted action entirely. 
 
 " I cannot speak with any certainty as 
 to what has happened in European Armies, 
 but as regards the British Cavalry, I am 
 absolutely convinced that the Cavalry Spirit 
 is, and may be encouraged to the utmost, 
 without in the least degree prejudicing either 
 training in dismounted duties or the acquire- 
 ment of such tactical knowledge on the part 
 of leaders as will enable them to discern when 
 and where to resort to dismounted methods. 
 
 " How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its 
 role in war until the enemy's Cavalry is 
 defeated and paralysed ? I challenge any 
 Cavalry officer, British or foreign, to deny the 
 principle that Cavalry, acting as such against 
 its own Arm, can never attain complete 
 success unless it is proficient in shock tactics. 
 
 " Cavalry soldiers must, of course, learn to 
 be expert rifle shots, but the attainment of 
 this desirable object will be brought no nearer 
 by ignoring the horse, the sword or the lance. 
 On the contrary, the elan and dash which 
 perfection in Cavalry manoeuvres imparts to 
 large bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable 
 value in their employment as mounted rifle- 
 men when the field is laid open to their enter- 
 prise in this role by the defeat of the hostile 
 Cavalry. That the Cavalry on both sides in 
 
112 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 the recent war did not distinguish themselves 
 or their Arm, is an undoubted fact, but the 
 reason is quite apparent. On the Japanese 
 side they were indifferently mounted, the 
 riding was not good, and they were very 
 inferior in numbers, and hence were only 
 enabled to fulfil generally the role of Divisional 
 Cavalry, which they appear to have done very 
 well. The cause of failure on the Russian 
 side is to be found in the fact that for years 
 they have been trained on exactly the same 
 principles which these writers now advocate. 
 They were devoid of real Cavalry training, 
 they thought of nothing but getting off their 
 horses and shooting ; hence they lamentably 
 failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, 
 a display of the highest form of Cavalry spirit." 
 On the other hand Sir John French pro- 
 tests against the tendency to tiltra-caution in 
 handling cavalry at manoeuvres. The cavalry 
 charge is always a risk. The risk taken by 
 the Field-Marshal, for instance, when he 
 ordered the famous charge which won him 
 the way to Kimberley, would certainly have 
 been regarded as fatal at official manoeuvres. 
 It is absurd, he insists, that the umpires 
 should call on cavalry to surrender the 
 moment that they come face to face with an 
 infantry fire. Such a moment may be the 
 cavalry's great opportunity. 
 
VIEWS ON CAVALRY 113 
 
 Many of the modern armies, he holds, are 
 suffering from cavalry without confidence. 
 And there is abundant evidence to justify the 
 charge. Bernhardi has pointed out that the 
 phenomenal successes of the German cavalry 
 in the war of 1870-1 were due not to its own 
 extraordinary valour, but to the absence of 
 opposition on the part of the French. Von 
 Moltke made a similar criticism (which Sir 
 John French approves) on the Prussian 
 cavalry after the war of 1866. " Our cavalry 
 failed," he wrote, " perhaps not so much in 
 actual capacity as in self-confidence. All its 
 initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres, 
 where criticism and blame had been almost 
 synonymous, and it therefore shirked inde- 
 pendent bold action, and kept far in the rear, 
 and as much as possible out of sight." 
 
 French, in fact, is convinced that the 
 " cavalry battle " is by no means a thing of 
 the past. Until the enemy's cavalry is over- 
 thrown, the work of the mounted infantryman 
 cannot begin. So long as opposing countries 
 train efficient cavalry, the clash of the rival 
 horsemen is the inevitable preliminary of any 
 campaign. 
 
 At the same tim^e his views on the specialisa- 
 tion of training are far from extreme. The 
 cavalry spirit must be encouraged : but it 
 must not be permitted to overshadow that 
 
114 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 wider camaraderie which is the Army spirit. 
 "It is not only possible but necessary," he 
 says, " to preach the Army spirit, or, in other 
 words, the close comradeship of all arms in 
 battle, and at the same time to develop the 
 highest qualities and the special attributes 
 of each branch. The particular spirit which 
 we seek to encourage is different for each 
 arm. Were we to seek to endow cavalry 
 with the tenacity and stiffness of infantry, 
 or to take from the mounted arm the mobility 
 and the cult of the offensive which are the 
 breath of its life, we should ruin not only the 
 cavalry, but the Army besides. Those who 
 scoff at the spirit, whether of cavalry, of 
 artillery, or of infantry, are people who have had 
 no practical experience of the actual training 
 of troops in peace, or of the personal leadership 
 in war. Such men are blind guides indeed." * 
 For cavalry, then. Sir John French sees 
 a brilliant future. " The opinion which I 
 hold and have often expressed is that the 
 true role of cavalry on the battlefield is to recon- 
 noitre, to deceive and to support. If the 
 enemy's cavalry has been overthrown, the 
 role of reconnaissance will have been rendered 
 easier. In the rSles of deception and support, 
 
 * From Sir John French's Introduction to Cavalry, 
 by General F. von Bernhardi, by permission of Mr. 
 Hugh Rees and Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton. 
 
A HISTORIC PHRASE 115 
 
 such an immense and fruitful field of useful- 
 ness and enterprise is laid open to a cavalry 
 division which has thought out and practised 
 these roles in its peace training, and is accus- 
 tomed to act in large bodies dismounted, 
 that I cannot bring myself to believe that 
 any equivalent for such manifest advantages 
 can be found even in the most successful raid 
 against the enemy's communications by 
 mounted troops." * 
 
 How brilliantly Sir John French trained 
 his men to accomplish these multiple activities, 
 recent history has shown. We may note in 
 passing, however, that mechanics have now 
 divested the cavalry of one of their chief 
 functions. The aeroplane is now the eye of 
 the army and the strategical role of the 
 cavalry is no more. The mounted arm will 
 almost certainly now be confined to screen- 
 ing operations and to shock tactics, after the 
 opposing armies have come into touch with 
 one another. History, therefore, has obviously 
 justified Sir John French in his championship 
 of the cavalry spirit. Without it his horse- 
 men would have been no match for the German 
 cavalry. Thanks to their training, they ' ' went 
 through the Uhlans Uke brown paper " in 
 General Sir PhiUp Chetwode's historic phrase. 
 
 * From Sir John French's Introduction to Cavalry, 
 by General F. von Bernhardi, by permission of Mr. 
 Hugh Rees and Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 The Modern Marlborough 
 
 Europe's Need — The Plight of France— A Delicate 
 Situation — The Man of "Grip" — A Magnificent 
 Retreat. 
 
 ON August 4, Great Britain woke up to 
 find herself engaged in one of the most 
 terrific contests in history. Out of an 
 assassination at Sera j e vo had sprung a European 
 war. In demanding apologies for the death of 
 its Archduke, Austria-Hungary, with the con- 
 nivance of Germany, refused to be conciliated 
 with the most adequate apologies offered 
 by Servia. The result was a protest from 
 Russia, which would doubtless have allayed 
 the situation, but for the aggressive attitude 
 dictated to Vienna from Berlin. In the 
 sequel Great Britain found herself arrayed 
 with Russia and France against the Austro- 
 Germanic forces. 
 
 The question arose as to who should lead 
 the English expeditionary force so sorely 
 needed to stem the tide of the German 
 legions as it rolled over an outraged Belgium 
 
 Il6 
 
A CAPABLE STAFF 117 
 
 and an unprepared France. There was never 
 any doubt as to whom the great task should 
 be entrusted. Sir John French was obviously 
 the man for the task. 
 
 Fate pointed to him not only as the greatest 
 active mihtary leader in this country, but 
 as the one man possessing the peculiar 
 qualities called for in this campaign. There 
 may be more briUiant intellects in the army, 
 but there is no other such leader of men. 
 This campaign was bound to be a long, 
 a hazardous and a delicate enterprise. It called 
 for a man of extraordinary grip and pertinacity 
 of purpose. These qualities French pos- 
 sesses to a marked degree. He has also 
 the power of sensing abihty in other men. 
 In South Africa he was able to surrotmd him- 
 self with one of the ablest General Staffs in 
 Europe. French's extraordinary rapidity of 
 thought, his lightning decisions, and his 
 masterly grip of the most complex situation, 
 allied with lieutenants competent to undertake 
 the most difficult operations which he may 
 suggest, provides a combination probably 
 unequalled in history. 
 
 In another respect French is peculiarly 
 suited to the onerous task imposed upon him. 
 His innate sense of loyaltj'' makes him a col- 
 league of rare qualities. On the face of it 
 the British commander's position called for 
 
ii8 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 very great tact. It was delicate almost to a 
 distressing degree. Allied commanders have 
 always to struggle with the teasing element 
 of friction. Sir John French eliminated that 
 at the outset. Even more difficult was the 
 problem of seniority. General Joffre, who 
 is French's superior, is his inferior in rank, 
 not being a Field-Marshal. Here was a 
 situation teeming with difficulties. The 
 slightest clumsiness on the British Com- 
 mander's part would have caused a crisis. 
 There were no crises, because French is 
 a diplomatist as well as a soldier. 
 
 No sooner had the British army fairly 
 landed on French soil than it was faced with 
 the worst trial of war — a prolonged and 
 perilous retreat before overwhelming odds. 
 But Sir John French knew all that was to be 
 known of the scientific retreat. Had he not 
 seen it thirty years ago on an Egyptian 
 desert, and practised its every form time 
 and again on the African veldt ? In four 
 days the British force covered 60 miles in 
 orderly and aggressive retreat, without once 
 giving way to confusion or disorder. The 
 men who had been with French in South 
 Africa, General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien 
 and General Sir Douglas Haig, had the 
 situation in hand from the first. The retreat 
 was a triumph for the British army, and 
 
SPLENDID PRAISE 119 
 
 particularly for the cavalry which French 
 had trained. Nor was its route that desired 
 by the German Headquarters Staff. Through 
 the vigour of his cavalry charges, French was 
 able to dictate his own line of retreat. He 
 had held his position long enough to save 
 the French left wing ; and he had retreated 
 in order before a force five times that of his 
 own. 
 
 French's old South African commander. 
 Lord Roberts, was particularly struck by the 
 retreat from Mons. He expressed his admira- 
 tion in the following remarkable letter to Lady 
 French : 
 
 12 Sept., 1914. 
 My dear Lady French, 
 
 I write these few lines to tell you how 
 much I admire your husband's Dispatch, 
 and how proud I am of the splendid work 
 done by the troops under his command. 
 When the whole story of the war comes 
 to be known, the masterly way in which 
 the Retreat from Mons — under vastly 
 superior numbers — was carried out, will 
 be remembered as one of the finest mili- 
 tary exploits ever achieved. ... * 
 
 I trust you will continue to get good 
 
 news of Sir John, and that you are 
 
 keeping well yourself. With kindest 
 
 * Published by courtesy of Lady French and Earl Roberts. 
 
120 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 regards, in which Lady Roberts and my 
 daughters join, 
 
 Believe me. 
 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 [Signed) Roberts, 
 (F.-M.). 
 
 That was only the first chapter in the story 
 of his new achievements. The authentic his- 
 tory of his latest successes remains to be 
 written. The French, however, were not 
 wrong in dubbing the British Field-Marshal 
 " the modem Marlborough." For French 
 belongs to the same dogged, cautious school 
 as Marlborough and Wellington. His genius 
 is one of those which include an infinite 
 capacity for taking pains. Indeed his 
 thoroughness is more than Teutonic. In 
 this war, French has, so far, found no Napo- 
 leon to fight. It is, indeed, questionable 
 whether the Germans have a commander of 
 his excellence on the field. But the prepara- 
 tions of the German Headquarters Staff may 
 be admitted to be Napoleonic in their elaborate 
 and far-seeing perfection. Yet time and 
 again, as in the Napoleonic wars, they have 
 gone down before a British General who 
 unites the dash of von Roon with the caution 
 and the prescience of Moltke. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 French, the Man 
 
 A Tj^ical Englishman — Fighting at School — ^Napoleon 
 Worship — " A Great Reporter "—Halting Speeches 
 and Polished Prose. A South African Coincidence — 
 Mrs. Despard and the Newsboy — ^The Happy 
 Warrior. 
 
 SO far, this book has necessarily been 
 chiefly a record of events. That was 
 inevitable, for the man of action writes 
 his story in deeds. Nor was there ever a 
 great soldier who made less clamour in the 
 world of newspapers than General French. 
 He has never adopted the studied reticence of 
 Kitchener nor yet the chill aloofness of certain 
 of his colleagues. War correspondents are 
 not anathema to him ; neither does he 
 shudder at the sight of the reporter's pencil. 
 Yet, somehow, few anecdotes cluster round 
 his name. 
 
 Perhaps that is because his modesty is 
 not a pose, although it has become almost a 
 tradition. It is simply a natural trait in 
 a modest and rather retiring disposition. 
 French simply will not be talked about — 
 and there is an end of the matter. 
 
122 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 If one were asked to describe the man, 
 one might best answer that he is the English- 
 man to the nth degree. It is usual to find 
 that the man of extraordinary merit is in 
 some degree a contrast with and a criticism 
 of the mere average mortal of his set. The 
 dour urbanity of Kitchener, for instance, is 
 Oriental rather than EngUsh, and contrasts 
 strangely with the choleric tradition of the 
 army officer. So the infinite alertness and 
 constant good humour of Roberts has a 
 quality of Latin esprit very foreign to the 
 English temperament. But there are no 
 such peculiarities about French. He is the 
 very essence of healthy normality. 
 
 Yet, although of Celtic descent, he is essen- 
 tially English. He has not hacked his way 
 to fame in the manner of the Scot, nor has 
 he leapt upon her pedestal with the boisterous 
 humour of the Irishman. He has got there 
 in the dogged but sporting English way, 
 taking Fortune's gifts when they came, but 
 never pushing or scrambling for them when 
 they were out of reach. 
 
 One catches the spirit of the man in the 
 schoolboy. When he first went to school at 
 Harrow, the boys, knowing that sisters had 
 been responsible for his education, were pre- 
 pared to take it out of him. But as French 
 was ready to fight at the slightest provocation. 
 
AN ADMIRER OF NAPOLEON 123 
 and equally ready to swear eternal friendship 
 when the fight was done, he quickly won his 
 way through respect to popularity. 
 
 Despite this quality, the steadfast object 
 of his admiration has been one of the most 
 abnormal and theatrical figures in history — 
 Napoleon. It is, however, Napoleon the 
 soldier and not the personality that has 
 attracted French, who, by the way, possesses 
 a wonderful collection of Napoleonic relics. 
 He sees Napoleon as the greatest strategist 
 the world has known. As such the Cor- 
 sican claims his unstinted admiration : but 
 there his admiration stops. For French is 
 altogether humane. There is nothing of 
 the iron heel about either his methods 
 or his manners. His extreme parsimony of 
 life we have seen as the cause of the only 
 criticism which has ever been levelled against 
 him. 
 
 By a strange coincidence, however, his 
 worship of Napoleon has proved itself invalu- 
 able in an unexpected way. In following 
 Napoleon's campaigns out in detail, French 
 had traversed every inch of Waterloo, and 
 much of the Belgian battle-ground in the 
 European war. There can be little doubt 
 that the success of some of his work has been 
 due to his detailed knowledge of the scene 
 of operations. 
 
124 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Inevitably, perhaps, French suggests Napo- 
 leon in certain subtle traits of character 
 rather than in personality. His rapidity of 
 thought, for instance, has probably rarely 
 been equalled, since Napoleon set Europe by 
 the ears. An officer under his command 
 in South Africa, has recorded how, day after 
 day, for weeks on end, French would answer 
 the most intricate questions on policy and 
 tactics over the telephone with scarcely a 
 moment's delay. Such inhuman speed and 
 accuracy of decision link French with the 
 greatest commanders of history. 
 
 There is just a suggestion of Napoleon too, 
 in his habitual attitudes. He usually stands 
 with legs wide apart and arms folded either 
 across his chest or clasped behind his back. 
 But the perfect cheerfulness of his smile 
 banishes any fear of Corsican churlishness 
 of manner. It is very certain that French 
 is not feared by his staff : he is worshipped by 
 them. The reason for that is not far to 
 seek. Although his temper is irascible, 
 it is not enduring. Often it will flash out 
 in wrathful words, but the storm is quickly 
 over. Men of this choleric temper are always 
 beloved, for good humour inevitably underlies 
 the ebullitions of so hght a rage. They never 
 nurse hatreds nor brood over trifles. Also 
 they are healthily impervious to the wiles of 
 
THE SOLDIERS' IDOL 125 
 
 flattery or the snare of favouritism. There 
 is nothing of the jealous and erratic genius 
 about French. To read his dispatches is 
 to find praise lavishly given to subordinates 
 but no mention of self. For he looks after his 
 assistants and leaves his own record to fate. 
 He has, indeed, mastered the art of being 
 great enough to allow others to be great. 
 Hence the excellence which always marks his 
 General Staff. 
 
 Such quaUties must inevitably endear a 
 General to his officers, to the men who have 
 to bear the brunt of their Chief's personality. 
 But do they appeal to the private ? Both 
 Napoleon and Wellington indubitably took 
 immense pains to surround themselves with 
 a shroud of mystery. Under their dark 
 mantles, the ranks must feel, lay buried the 
 tahsman of success. We know that his 
 officers found " the sight of Wellington's 
 long nose on a frosty morning worth another 
 ten thousand men " to them. Sir John 
 French has cultivated neither a nose, nor a 
 frown, nor even a chin. Hov/ does he manage 
 to be the idol of his men ? it may be asked. 
 Simply and solely by being himself. Without 
 any of the meretricious arts of the personality- 
 monger, he has impressed his personality 
 on the troops in a most memorable way. 
 This is largely due to the impression 
 
126 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 of quiet confidence which he always gives. 
 You feel you are safe with French. Nothing, 
 you know, will ever upset the cool sanity of 
 his reasoning, the balanced decision of his 
 judgments. This impression of certainly is 
 strengthened by the distinctly masterful 
 carriage of the man. His short, stocky figure, 
 like General Grant's, suggests that fatigue is 
 unknown to him. This is indeed the case. 
 The story has often been told of how the 
 General and his staff once decided, after an 
 exhausting day, to spend the night in a lonely 
 farm in South Africa. The house only boasted 
 one bed, which was of course, reserved for 
 the General. But French insisted on a tired 
 member of his staff occupying the solitary 
 mattress, and wrapping himself up in a rug, 
 went contentedly to sleep on the floor. 
 
 His mind is as tireless as his body. The 
 operations round Colesberg could only have 
 been undertaken in their complicated entirety 
 by a General who did not know what mental 
 fatigue meant. This physical and mental 
 fitness French has most carefully studied to 
 preserve. At one time, several years ago, 
 he feared a tendency to avoirdupois, and 
 instantly undertook a stern but successful 
 bulk-reducing regimen. Apropos the regimen 
 there is a story. Just before thj present 
 war, a bulky package was one day delivered 
 
AN INDEPENDENT THINKER 127 
 
 to him at his club. French opened it negli- 
 gently, expecting to discover the inevitable 
 knick-knack of doubtful utility. But this 
 was not the usual gift. It was a package 
 of weight-reducing preparations. 
 
 French's mind, however, is original as well 
 as tireless. Just there lies the unique quality 
 of his gifts. The art of wir is necessarily 
 one of the most highly systematised and 
 therefore the most hide-bound in the world. 
 No man is more perilously in danger of 
 having his mind swathed in red tape and 
 numbed by discipHne than the soldier. In 
 modem times the tendency to employ masses 
 has not lessened the tendency to stereotype 
 habits of thought. The danger of the 
 mechanical soldier is stressed by no one more 
 forcibly than by General von Bernhardi. 
 He holds that a self-rehant personahty is as 
 essential as a profound knowledge of general- 
 ship to the modern commander. French 
 possesses both. Although profoundly versed 
 in all the doctrines of the schoolmen, he is 
 never afraid to jump over the traces where 
 they would lead to a precipice. He has 
 never been hampered, as so many soldiers 
 are, by his studies. Knowledge he has always 
 used as a means to an end, which is its proper 
 vocation. To this independence of mind, as 
 to nothing else, may be attributed his 
 
128 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 phenomenal success amid the abnormal con- 
 ditions of Boer warfare. Where the books 
 end, French's active mind begins to construct 
 its own " way out " of the corner."^ 
 
 The Boers were indeed the first to admit 
 his superiority to the other EngUsh officers, 
 if not to themielves. De Wet was once 
 asked in the eerly stages of the war how 
 long he expected to avoid capture. He 
 replied, with a smile, that it all depended on 
 which General was dispatched to run him 
 down. When a certain name was mentioned, 
 the reply was " Till eternity." General 
 
 B was next mentioned. " About two 
 
 years," was the verdict. " And General 
 French ? " " Two weeks," admitted De 
 Wet. 
 
 French has, of course, never accepted social 
 life in this country on its face value. The 
 young officer who was stud5nng when his 
 friends were at polo or tennis, was under no 
 illusions as to the havoc which an over- 
 accentuation of the sporting and social side 
 of hfe was playing with the officers' work. 
 Nowadays, hke Kitchener, he is bent on pro- 
 ducing the professional and weeding out the 
 " drawing-room " soldier. No wonder that 
 his favourite authors are those acutest critics 
 of English social life and English foibles, 
 Dickens and Thackeray. The former's 
 
A GREAT REPORTER 129 
 
 " Bleak House " and the latter's " Book of 
 Snobs " are the two books he places first in 
 his affections. 
 
 He is himself a writer of parts. We are, 
 ourselves, so close to the event he describes, 
 that we are perhaps unable to appreciate 
 the hterary excellence of the despatches which 
 French has sent us on the operations in 
 France. A Chicago paper hails him, however, 
 as " a great reporter." " No one can read 
 his reports," the writer remarks, " without 
 being struck with his weighty lucidity, his 
 calm mastery of the important facts, the total 
 absence of any attempt at ' effect,' and the 
 remarkably suggestive bits of pertinent 
 description." 
 
 Undoubtedly, the Americans are right — 
 provided that these dispatches were actually 
 penned by the General himself. 
 
 His speeches may be obvious and even 
 trite ; his letters may lack any flavour of 
 personality ; but these dispatches are litera- 
 ture. Like his hero Napoleon, like Caesar and 
 Wellington, Sir John French has forged a 
 hterary style for himself. There is nothing 
 amateurish or journalistic about his com- 
 munications from the front. The dispatch 
 from Mons, for instance, is a masterpiece of 
 lucid and incisive EngUsh. It might well be 
 printed in our school-histories, not merely as 
 
130 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 a vivid historic document, but as a model of 
 English prose. 
 
 Not that Sir John French's style is an acci- 
 dent. Like most of the other successes of 
 his career, it is the result of design. The man 
 \\'ho laboriously " crammed " tactics laboured 
 equally hard over the art of writing. The 
 many prefaces which he has written to famous 
 books on strategy and war bear traces of 
 the most careful preparation. 
 
 Apart from his dispatches, however, French 
 has written some virile, telling English in his 
 prefaces to several books on cavalry and on 
 military history. The most interesting is 
 that which he wrote for Captain Frederick 
 von Herbert's The Defence of Plevna. He 
 prefaces it with a dramatic little coincidence 
 of war capitally told. " During the last year 
 of the South African War, while directing 
 the operations in Cape Colony, I found 
 myself, late one afternoon in February, 1902, 
 at the north end of the railway bridge over 
 the Orange River at Bethuhe, strangely 
 attracted by the appearance of a well-con- 
 structed and cleverly hidden covered field 
 work, which formed an important part of 
 the ' Bridge head.' Being somewhat pressed 
 for time I rode on and directed my aide-de- 
 camp to go down into the fort, look round it, 
 and then catch me up. He shortly overtook 
 
OSMAN PASHA 131 
 
 me with an urgent request to return and 
 inspect it myself. I did so, and was very- 
 much struck, not only with the construction 
 of the work and its excellent siting, but also 
 with all the defence arrangements at that 
 point of the river. Whilst I was in the fort 
 the officer in charge arrived and reported 
 himself. Expressing my strong approval of 
 all I had seen, I remarked that it brought 
 back to my mind a book I had read and 
 re-read, and indeed studied with great care 
 and assiduity — a book called The Defence of 
 Plevna, by a certain Lieutenant von Herbert, 
 whom, to my regret, I had never met. ' I am von 
 Herbert, and I wrote the book you speak of,' 
 was the reply of the officer to whom I spoke."* 
 Osman Pasha was a soldier after French's 
 own heart. Indeed, his tenacity was probably 
 equal to that of his critic. Hence this fine 
 tribute : " The great soldier who defended 
 Plevna refused to acknowledge such a word 
 as defeat. When things were at their worst 
 his outward demeanour was calmest and most 
 confident. There was no hysterical shrieking 
 for supports or reinforcements. These might 
 have reached him, but through treacherous 
 jealousy he was betrayed and left to his own 
 
 * From Sir John French's Preface to The Defence of 
 Plevna, by Capt. Frederick von Herbert, by permission 
 of Messrs. Smith, Elder. 
 
132 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 resources. In spite of this no thought of 
 capitulation or retreat ever entered the mind 
 of Osman Pasha. . . ." * What a wonderful 
 little cameo of courage ! 
 
 One wonders whether the school-boy who 
 sent French the following letter on his return 
 from South Africa knew the quality of his 
 writing. 
 
 " My Dear French, — You are a great 
 British General. I want your autograph, 
 but, whatever you do, don't let your 
 secretary write it." 
 I have said that Sir John French is the 
 average Englishman in an accentuated degree. 
 How then does he regard war ? If the plain 
 truth be told, we are not at heart a martial 
 nation. We have made war when we have 
 been compelled to it by the threat of an 
 Armada or the menace of a Napoleon. But 
 we have not cultivated war, at least since 
 our wode days, as a pastime and a profession. 
 Nor is French that abnormal being, an Eng- 
 lishman governed by the blood lust. Mrs. 
 Despard has said that in reality he regards 
 war as a hideous outrage. He has no delu- 
 sions as to the glory of war. By no chance 
 could he be ranked among the romanticist of 
 
 * From Sir John French's Preface to The Defence of 
 Plevna, by Capt. Frederick von Herbert, by permission 
 of Messrs. Smith, Elder. 
 
FRENCH AND THE SUFFOLKS 133 
 the battlefield. That, perhaps, is why he 
 never is, never has been, ruthless or remorse- 
 less with the men whom he commands. 
 
 If ever French had cause for anger, it was 
 over the unlucky incident of the Suffolks, 
 the one failure unwarrantably attributed to 
 his ever victorious arms. Yet he was the 
 one officer who softened the bitterness of that 
 reverse to the men. He met the regiment 
 in the Transvaal just eight months after the 
 disaster. His speech to the troops, as reported 
 in at least one paper, is well worthy of preserva- 
 tion. After referring to his pleasure in meet- 
 ing them all again, he said : " What you did 
 at Colesberg is still fresh in my recollection 
 . . . but what I wish especially to recall is the 
 sad event of the night of January 5th and 6th, 
 and to express my sympathy with you on the 
 loss of your gallant leader. Colonel Watson, 
 who on that night showed splendid qualities 
 as a noble and able officer. Now, it has come 
 to my knowledge that there has been spread 
 about an idea that that event cast discredit 
 of some sort upon this gallant regiment. I 
 want you all to banish any such thought 
 from your minds as utterly untrue. You 
 took part . . . in a night operation of extreme 
 difficulty on a pitch dark night, and did all 
 in your power to make it a success. So do 
 not let any false idea get into your minds. 
 
134 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 Think rather that what took place brings 
 honour to your regiment, and add this event 
 to the long list of honours it has won in the 
 past. I want you all to bear in mind about 
 such night operations, that they can never be 
 a certain success, and because they sometimes 
 fail it does not, therefore, bring discredit on 
 those who attempted to carry them out. 
 You must remember that, if we always waited 
 for an opportunity of certain success, we 
 should do nothing at all, and that in war, 
 fighting a brave enemy, it is absolutely 
 impossible to be always sure of success : all 
 we can do is to try our very best to secure 
 success — and that you did on the occasion I 
 am speaking of. I thank you for that and 
 all the good work you have done since, and 
 remember above all that no slur whatever 
 attaches to your regiment for the result of 
 that occasion." 
 
 With these finely sympathetic words might 
 be placed French's speech to his troops 
 before the battle of Elandslaagte. " Men," 
 he said, " you are going to oppose two 
 thousand or three thousand Dutch. We 
 want to keep up our honour as we did in the 
 olden time — as soldiers and men, we want to 
 take that position before sunset." 
 
 In that single phrase, " as soldiers and 
 men," one has the key to French's popularity 
 
FRENCH AND HIS MEN 135 
 
 with the ranks. He treats the men as human 
 beings and not as machines. In other words, 
 he understands the British soldier through 
 and through. Mrs. Despard has told a touch- 
 ing little story of the affection which he 
 inspires in his men. She was returning home 
 one evening when she was surprised by a 
 question as she stopped to buy the customary 
 evening paper. " Are you Mrs. Despard, 
 General French's sister ? " asked the ragged 
 wretch. She admitted that claim to dis- 
 tinction. The man then told her, with much 
 enthusiasm, how when working with a battery 
 in a very hot corner during the South African 
 war, he had seen the General ride over to 
 cheer them up. " Now, hi don't care '00 
 that man is, and I don't care '00 I am, I love 
 that man," he said rather huskily. Mrs. 
 Despard has told how she forgot her paper 
 that night in shaking the ex-soldier's hand. 
 
 For this tact in deahng with his men, Sir 
 John French has largely to thank the vein 
 of acute sensibihty which runs through his 
 character. This sensibihty can be traced in 
 his mouth, which is remarkably finely chis- 
 elled. We have seen it in his childhood, 
 when he shrank from some^of the usual 
 noisiness of boyhood. And Mrs. Despard has 
 crystallised it in a phrase. Feehng depressed 
 on one occasion before addressing a meeting 
 
136 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 on some refonns which she considered urgent, 
 she confessed to her brother that she was 
 spiritually afraid. " Why," he repUed, " don't 
 worry, I've never yet done anything worth 
 doing without having to screw myself up to it." 
 French, very obviously, is a man for whom 
 spiritual doubt may have its terrors. One 
 cannot figure him as harbouring the narrow 
 if sincere religion of a Kitchener or a Gordon. 
 One might sum him up as the beau-ideal, 
 not only of the cavalry spirit, but of the 
 scientific soldier. He can lead a cavalry 
 charge with the dash of a Hotspur : and he 
 can plan out a campaign with the masterly 
 logic 6f a Marlborough. Unlike some of 
 his contemporaries, he has attained extra- 
 ordinary mastery over the science of war 
 without himself becoming a scientific machine. 
 In many ways he bears, in character and tem- 
 perament, a striking resemblance to his 
 colleague in arms — General Joffre. Although 
 Joffre is three inches taller than French — ^he 
 is five foot nine — ^he is otherwise very similar 
 in appearance. There is the same short, 
 powerful physique, the narrow neck sur- 
 mounted by a massive head and heavy jaw, 
 and the same broad forehead, with masterful 
 eyes peeping from beneath bushy eyebrows. 
 Neither of these men on whom hangs Europe's 
 destiny is in the least degree strident or 
 
AN OPPORTUNITY 137 
 
 self-assertive. Indeed, both tend to be 
 listeners rather than talkers. Both have 
 the same trick of making instantaneous 
 decisions. Both scorn to be merely " smart " 
 in outward appearance ; both are devoted to 
 efficiency in detail ; and, most suggestive of 
 all^ each finds himself eternally compared to 
 General Grant ! Probably the latter's dogged 
 personality forms the best possible common de- 
 nominator for these two remarkable men. 
 
 It is said that when news of the war in 
 South Africa reached French, momentarily 
 obeying a natural impulse, he waved his hand 
 and cried, " Hurrah for South Africa." If 
 anyone had any right to thank Heaven for 
 that particular campaign, it was certainly 
 French. But he would have " hurrahed " 
 any campaign that gave opportunity for his 
 powers. After all, the soldier's stage is the 
 battlefield. Without wars he is without an 
 active role, and must spend his years drudging 
 in the rehearsal theatre of the Colonies. 
 If he be so original and so thorough a soldier 
 as French, his abilities will be at an even 
 graver discount. For the rehearsal is not 
 the play ; and the best Generals, like the 
 ablest actors, are notoriously weak at rehearsal, 
 which does not pluck fully at their energies. 
 Probably French would have hurrahed for 
 South Africa, however, had he had no special 
 
138 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 abilities at all. For nowhere is he happier 
 than on the battlefield. If the grisly game 
 of war must be played, French plays it with 
 all his heart. It is the game which destiny 
 put him on the stage to play ; the game which 
 he has devoted his Ufe to mastering ; and the 
 only game in which he has ever seriously 
 interested himself. 
 
 Luck invariably follows the man who is 
 utterly absorbed in his profession, for the 
 simple reason that, being always engrossed 
 in his work, he is always ahve to his oppor- 
 tunities. French's luck consists solely in 
 the fact that he happens to be a soldier. 
 Men of Kitchener's organising genius may 
 be many things ; in nothing, not even in the 
 arts, are they likely seriously to fail. But 
 French is a soldier in the sense quite other 
 than Kitchener. He is a man made for the 
 endurance of hardship and for the facing 
 of hard practical difficulties in the field. It is 
 as natural for him to conduct a campaign as 
 it was for Pope to " lisp in numbers, for the 
 numbers came." He is the Happy Warrior 
 in being. 
 
 FINIS 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 THE MONS DESPATCH 
 
 To the Secretary of State for War 
 
 September 7, 1914. 
 My Lord, 
 
 I have the honour to report the proceedings of the 
 Field Force under my command up to the time of 
 rendering this despatch. 
 
 I. The transport of the troops from England both by 
 sea and by rail was effected in the best order and without 
 a check. Each unit arrived at its destination in this 
 country weU within the scheduled time. 
 
 The concentration was practically complete on the 
 evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to 
 make dispositions to move the Force during Saturday, 
 the 22nd, to positions I considered most favourable from 
 which to commence operations which the French Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, General Joffre, requested me to under- 
 take in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the 
 campaign. 
 
 The line taken up extended along the Une of the 
 canal from Conde on the west, through Mons and Binche 
 on the east. This line was taken up as follows : — 
 
 From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the 
 2nd Corps, and to the right of the 2nd Corps from Mons 
 the 1st Corps was posted. The 5th Cavalry Brigade 
 was placed at Binche. 
 
 In the absence of my 3rd Army Corps I desired to 
 keep the Cavalry Division as much as possible as a 
 reserve to act on my outer flank, or move in support of 
 any threatened part of the Une. The forward recon- 
 naissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Phihp 
 Chetwode with the 5th Cavahy Brigade, but I directed 
 General Allenby to send forward a few squadron^ to 
 assist in this work. 
 
 During August 22 and 23 these advanced squadrons 
 did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as 
 
 ii39 
 
140 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 far as Soignies, and several encounters took place in 
 which our troops showed to great advantage. 
 
 2. At 6 a.m. on August 23 1 assembled the Commanders 
 of the 1st and 2nd Corps and Cavalry Division at a point 
 close to the position, and explained the general situation 
 of the Allies, and what I understood to be General 
 Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the 
 immediate situation in front of us. 
 
 From information I received from French Headquarters 
 I understood that little more than one, or at most two, 
 of the enemy's Army Corps, with perhaps one Cavalry 
 Division, were in front of my position ; and I was aware 
 of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. 
 I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my 
 patrols encountered no undue opposition in their recon- 
 noitring operations. The observation of my aeroplanes 
 seemed also to bear out this estimate. 
 
 About 3 p.m. on Sunday, the 23rd, reports began 
 coming in to the effect that the enemy was commencing 
 an attack on the Mons line, apparently in some strength, 
 but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray 
 was being particularly threatened. 
 
 The Commander of the ist Corps had pushed his 
 flank back to some high ground south of Bray, and the 
 5th Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche, moving sUghtly 
 south ; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche. 
 
 The right of the 3rd Division, under General Hamilton, 
 was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous 
 salient ; and I directed the Commander of the 2nd Corps 
 to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too 
 long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the 
 centre behind Mons. This was done before dark. In 
 the meantime, about 5 p.m., I received a most unexpected 
 message from General Joffre by telegraph, teUing me 
 that at least three German Corps, viz., a reserve corps, 
 the 4th Corps and the 9th Corps, were moving on my 
 position in front, and that the 2nd Corps was engaged in 
 a turning movement from the direction of Tournay. He 
 also informed me that the two reserve French divisions 
 and the 5th French Army on my right were retiring, the 
 
APPENDIX 141 
 
 Germans having on the previous day gained possession 
 of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and 
 Namur. 
 
 3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the 
 Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in 
 rear to be reconnoitred. This position rested on the 
 fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended west to 
 Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the left. The 
 position was reported difficult to hold, because standing 
 crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very 
 difficult and Umited the field of fire in many important 
 localities. It nevertheless sifforded a few good artillery 
 positions. 
 
 When the news of the retirement of the French and 
 the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I 
 endeavoured to confirm it by aeroplane reconnaissance ; 
 and as a result of this I determined to effect a retirement 
 to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th. 
 
 A certain amount of fighting continued along the 
 whole line throughout the night, and at daybreak on 
 the 24th the 2nd Division from the neighbourhood of 
 Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to 
 retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of 
 both the 1st and 2nd Divisions, whilst the ist Division 
 took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of 
 Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the 2nd 
 Corps retired on the Hne Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. 
 The 3rd Division on the right of the Corps suffered con- 
 siderable loss in this operation from the enemy, who had 
 retaken Mons. 
 
 The 2nd Corps halted on this hne, where they par- 
 tially entrenched themselves, enabhng Sir Douglas Haig 
 with the ist Corps gradually to withdraw to the new 
 position ; and he efiected this without much further 
 loss, reaching the hne Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 p.m. 
 Towards midday the enemy appeared to be directing 
 his principal effort against our left. 
 
 I had previously ordered General Allenby with the 
 Cavalry to act vigorously in advance of my left front 
 and endeavour to take the pressure off. 
 
142 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 About 7.30 a.m. General AUenby received a message 
 from Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding 5th Division, 
 saying that he was very hard pressed and in urgent need 
 of support. On receipt of this message General AUenby 
 drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured to bring direct 
 support to the 5th Division. 1 
 
 During the course of this operation General De Lisle, 
 of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good 
 opportunity to paralyse the further advance of the 
 enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his 
 flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, 
 but was held up by wire about 500 yards from his objec- 
 tive, and the 9th Lancers and i8th Hussars suffered 
 severely in the retirement of the Brigade. 
 
 The 19th Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding 
 the Line of Communications, was brought up by rail to 
 Valenciennes on the 22nd and 23rd. On the morning 
 of the 24th they were moved out to a position south of 
 Quarouble to support the left flank of the 2nd Corps. 
 
 With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith- 
 Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new posi- 
 tion ; although, having two corps of the enemy on his 
 front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great 
 losses in doing so. 
 
 At nightfall the position was occupied by the 2nd 
 Corps to the west of Bavai, the ist Corps to the right. 
 The right was protected by the Fortress of Maubeuge, 
 the left by the 19th Brigade in position between Jenlain 
 and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer flank. 
 
 4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support 
 except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge ; 
 and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round 
 my left flank assured me that it was his intention to 
 hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that 
 not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position. 
 
 I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces 
 were somewhat exhausted, and I knew that they had 
 suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pur- 
 suit would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting 
 my object. 
 
APPENDIX 143 
 
 The operation, however, was full of danger and 
 difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force 
 in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops. 
 
 The retirement was recommenced in the early morning 
 of the 25th to a position in the neighbourhood of Le 
 Cateau, and rearguards were ordered to be clear of the 
 Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5.30 a.m. 
 
 Two Cavalry Brigades, with the Divisional Cavalry 
 of the 2nd Corps, covered the movement of the 2nd Corps. 
 The remainder of the Cavalry Division, with the 19th 
 Brigade, the whole under the command of General 
 Allenby, covered the west flank. 
 
 The 4th Division commenced its detrainment at Le 
 Cateau on Simday, thef 23rd, and by the morning of the 
 25th eleven battalions and a Brigade of Artillery with 
 Divisional Staff were available for service. 
 
 I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a 
 position with his right south of Solesmes, his left resting 
 on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south of La Chaprie. 
 In this position the Division rendered great help to the 
 effective retirement of the 2nd and ist Corps to the new 
 position. 
 
 Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the 
 Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground 
 had, during the 25th, been partially prepared and en- 
 trenched, I had grave doubts — owing to the information 
 I received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy 
 against me — as to the wisdom of standing there to fight. 
 
 Having regard to the continued retirement of the 
 French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency 
 of the enemy's western corps (11) to envelop me, and, 
 more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I 
 determined to make a great effort to continue the 
 retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle, such 
 as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the 
 enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest 
 and reorganisation. Orders were, therefore, sent to 
 the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon 
 as they possibly could towards the general hne Vermand- 
 St. Quentin-Ribemont. 
 
144 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered 
 to cover the retirement. 
 
 Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the 
 ist Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following 
 the road along the eastern border of the Foret De Mormal, 
 and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had 
 intended that the Corps should come further west so 
 as to fiU up the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, 
 but the men were exhausted and could not get further 
 in without rest. 
 
 The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, 
 and about 9.30 p.m. a report was received that the 
 4th Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked 
 by troops of the 9th German Army Corps who were 
 coming through the forest on the north of the town. 
 This brigade fought most gallantly and caused the 
 enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the 
 forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss 
 has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 
 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me 
 from Sir Douglas Haig that his ist Division was also 
 heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent 
 urgent messages to the Commander of the two French 
 Reserve Divisions on my right to come up to the assist- 
 ance of the 1st Corps, which they eventually did. Partly 
 owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner 
 in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an 
 exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the 
 night, they were able at dawn to resume their march 
 south towards Wassigny on Guise. 
 
 By about 6 p.m. the 2nd Corps had got into position 
 with their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbour- 
 hood of Caudry, and the Une of defence was continued 
 thence by the 4th Division towards SeranviUers, the left 
 being thrown back. 
 
 During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the 
 Cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the 
 early morning of the 26th General Allenby had suc- 
 ceeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of 
 Cambrai. 
 
APPENDIX 145 
 
 The 4th Division was placed under the orders 
 of the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Army 
 Corps. 
 
 On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting 
 of three divisions, under General Sordet, had been in 
 billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, 
 which was my " Pos'^ de Comman dement " during the 
 fighting of the 23rd a.u \ 24th, I visited General Sordet, 
 and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. 
 He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Com- 
 mander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses 
 were too tired to move before the next day. Although 
 he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course 
 of the retirement, he was imable for the reasons given to 
 afford me any support on the most critical day of all, 
 viz., the 26th. 
 
 At daybreak on August 26 it became apparent that 
 the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against 
 the left of the position occupied by the 2nd Corps and 
 the 4th Division. 
 
 At this time the guns of four German Army Corps 
 were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith- 
 Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to 
 continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face 
 of such an attack. 
 
 I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to 
 break off the action and retire at the earUest possible 
 moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any 
 support, the ist Corps being at the moment incapable of 
 movement. 
 
 The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordet, 
 was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and 
 I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to 
 come up and support the retirement of my left flank ; but 
 owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself 
 unable to intervene in any way. 
 
 There had been no time to entrench the position 
 properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to 
 the terrible fire which confronted them. 
 
 The Artillery, although outmatched by at least four 
 
146 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses 
 on their opponents. 
 
 At length it became apparent that, if complete an- 
 nihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be 
 attempted ; and the order was given to commence it 
 about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with the 
 most devoted intrepidity and determination by the 
 Artillery, which had itself suffere i heavily, and the 
 fine work done by the Cavalry in the further retreat from 
 the position assisted materially in the final completion 
 of this most difficult and dangerous operation. 
 
 Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too 
 heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit. 
 
 I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand 
 of the British troops without putting on record my 
 deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by 
 General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. 
 
 I say without hesitation that the saving of the left 
 wing of the Army under my command on the morning 
 of the 26th August could never have been accomplished 
 unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, 
 intrepidity, and detennination had been present to 
 personally conduct the operation. 
 
 The retreat was continued far into the night of the 
 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date 
 the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fere, 
 having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit. 
 
 On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General 
 Sordet and the French Cavalry Division which he com- 
 mands for materially assisting my retirement and 
 successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai. 
 
 General D'Amade also, with the 6ist and 62nd French 
 Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood 
 of Arras on the enemy's right flank and took much 
 pressure off the rear of the British Forces. 
 
 This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which 
 commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, August 23, 
 and which really constituted a four days' battle. 
 
 At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present 
 despatch. 
 
APPENDIX 147 
 
 I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the 
 British Forces have suffered in this great battle ; but 
 they were inevitable in view of the fact that the British 
 Army — only two days after a concentration by rail- 
 was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five 
 German Army Corps. 
 
 It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill 
 evinced by the two General Ofificers commanding Army 
 Corps ; the self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of 
 their Staffs ; the direction of the troops by Divisional 
 Brigade and Regimental Leaders ; the command of the 
 smaller units by their officers ; and the magnificent 
 fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers 
 and men. 
 
 I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice 
 the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps 
 under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and 
 perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have 
 furnished me with the most complete and accurate 
 information, which has been of incalculable value in the 
 conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by 
 friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of 
 weather, they have remained undaunted throughout. 
 
 Fiirther, by actually fighting in the air, they have 
 succeeded in destroying five of the enemy's machines. 
 
 I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the in- 
 calculable assistance I received from the General and 
 Personal Staffs at Headquarters during this trying 
 period. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of 
 the General Staff ; Major-General Wilson, Sub-Chief 
 of the General Staff ; and all under them have worked 
 day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill, self- 
 sacrifice and devotion ; and the same acknowledgment 
 is due by me to Brigadier-General Hon. W. Lambton, 
 my Mihtary Secretary, and the Personal Staff. 
 
 In such operations as I have described the work of 
 the Quartermaster-General is of an extremely onerous 
 nature. Major-General Sir William Robertson has 
 met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties 
 
148 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 with his characteristic energy, skill and determination ; 
 and it is largely owing to his exertions that the hard- 
 ships and sufferings of the troops — inseparable from 
 such operations — ^were not much greater. 
 
 Major-General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant- 
 General, has also been confronted with most onerous 
 and difficult tasks in connection with disciplinary 
 arrangements and the preparation of casualty Usts. 
 He has been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the 
 difficult situations which arose. 
 
 I have not yet been able to complete the hst of officers 
 whose names I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice 
 for services rendered during the period under review ; 
 and, as I understand it is of importance that this des- 
 patch should no longer be delayed, I propose to forward 
 this hst, separately, as soon as I can. 
 
 I have the honour to be. 
 Your Lordship's most obedient Servant, 
 
 (Signed) J. D. P. French, Field-Marshal, 
 Commander-in-Chief, 
 British Forces in the Field. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abd Klea, battle of, 17. 
 
 Asquith, H. H., 103. 
 
 Baden - Powell, Lieut. - 
 
 General Sir Robert, 26. 
 Barrow, Col. Percy, 12, 18, 
 
 19, 23. 
 Beresford, Lord Charles : 
 
 Knocked senseless, 15. 
 Bemhardi, General von, 33, 
 
 127. 
 Bewicke Copley, General — Ad- 
 miration of French, 24. 
 Bloemfontein, 75, 85, 86. 
 Botha, General, 56. 
 BuUer, Sir Redvers : 
 
 ReUef for the Expedition, 1 8 . 
 Desperate measure. A, 19. 
 Checking the enemy's ad- 
 vance, 20. 
 Tribute to French, 21. 
 His knowledge of French's 
 
 value, 34. 
 Oppressed by misgivings, 53. 
 Preparing to reheve Lady- 
 smith, 54. 
 Disaster at Colenso, 56. 
 Butcher Major E.E.A.: Ingeni- 
 ous solution of a difficulty, 
 62, 63. 
 Cakleton, Colonel, 46, 47, 48, 
 
 49. 
 Cavalry : 
 Test against camels, 12. 
 Distinguishing themselves, 
 
 14. 
 Buller's belief in, 21. 
 Enemy's respect for, 22. 
 Cavalry regiments in India, 
 25- 
 
 Cavalry (continued) ; 
 French's, Sir, J., idea ot 
 
 the function of, 26. 
 Opinion of the late Sir 
 
 Robert Russell, 27. 
 British cavalry reform, 28. 
 Worrying the enemy at 
 
 Colesberg, 55. 
 Race for De Kiel's Drift, 
 
 The, 70. 
 Popular idea of cavalry, 106. 
 Use and abuse of, io8. 
 Lesson of the Boer War, 109 
 French's, Sir J., confidence 
 
 in, 114. 
 Mounted arm in modern 
 warfare. The, 115. 
 Chisholme, Colonel Scott,36,38. 
 Colenso, 50, 56. 
 Colesberg, 33, 55, 59, 62, 64, 
 
 84, 127, 134. 
 Cromer, Lord, 11. 
 Cronje, General, 56, 68, 69, 
 
 73- 78. 79. 80, 81, 82. 
 Curragh, The, 7, 104. 
 Delarey, General, 65, 83, 84. 
 Despard, Mrs., 2, 136. 
 DeWet, General, 65, 83, 84, 129. 
 Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, 99. 
 " Dumpies," The, 5. 
 EccLES, Miss, 2. 
 Elandslaagte, 40, 41, 52, 135. 
 Ewart, Sir J. S., loi, 103. 
 Fisher, Colonel, 59. 
 French, General Sir John ; 
 Boyhood, 3. 
 War game. The, 3. 
 8th Hussars, Gazetted to 
 the, 5. 
 
 149 
 
150 
 
 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 French, Gen. Sir John (cont): 
 Naval career, Early, 4. 
 Sportsman, As a, 6, 7. 
 Nickname, His, 6. 
 Strategy, Interest in, 8. 
 Marriage, 8. 
 Egypt, Ordered to, 9. 
 Scouting in the desert, 14, 15. 
 Wood, Sir E., First meeting 
 
 ■with, 20. 
 Mentioned in Dispatches, 2 1 . 
 Promotion, 23. 
 Reorganisation of cavalry 
 
 regiments in India, 25. 
 An enforced retirement, 25. 
 Function of cavalry. His idea 
 
 of the, 26. 
 Effect of his cavalry theory, 
 
 27. 
 Appointment at the Wax 
 
 Office, 28. 
 Temperament, His, 29. 
 Notable success. A, 30. 
 Promotion to Major-Generall, 
 
 31- 
 Public ignorance of his work, 
 
 33 
 Sketch by Major Arthur 
 
 Griffiths, 34. 
 Arrival at Ladysmith, 35. 
 Result of a cavalry charge, 
 
 36. 
 Difficult enterprise. A, 37. 
 His opportunity, 38. 
 His first victory, 39. 
 Impression of him on the 
 
 battlefield. An, 40. 
 Secret of his ability, 41. 
 Won a reputation among the 
 
 Boers, 43. 
 An American journalist's 
 
 description, 44. 
 Out-manoeuvring the Boers, 
 
 49. 
 Leaving Ladysmith, 50. 
 Confounding the critics, 53. 
 Object at Colesberg, 54. 
 Cavalry attack. A, 55. 
 Cheering Christmas greeting, 
 
 A, 57- 
 Cavalry tactics. His, 58. 
 
 French, Gen. Sir John (cont): 
 
 Brilliant venture. A, 59. 
 
 Disaster to the Suffolks, The, 
 60. 
 
 His remarkable caution, 64. 
 
 Problem — modern warfare, 
 mastered. A, 65. 
 
 Ability for doing the right 
 thing, 66. 
 
 Promise to relieve Kimber- 
 ley, 6j. 
 
 Greatness of the under- 
 taking, 68, 69. 
 
 Congratulated by Lords 
 Roberts and Kitchener, 7 1 . 
 
 Boers routed, 73. 
 
 French v. The Impossible, 
 
 Kimberley relieved, 78. 
 Cutting off Cronje's retreat, 
 
 80. 
 Escape of De Wet, 84. 
 Narrow escape from death, 
 
 82. 
 Sitting for his portrait, 86. 
 Command of the forces in 
 
 Eastern Transvaal, 89. 
 Imitating the Boers, 91. 
 Releasing Schoeman from 
 
 jail, 92. 
 Command of the operations 
 
 in Cape Colony, 93. 
 His modesty, 94. 
 " Shirt - sleeved General, 
 
 The," 95. 
 Artilleryman's tribute. An, 
 
 96. 
 Return from South Africa, 
 
 97- 
 Appointed Inspector-General 
 
 of the forces, 98. 
 His love of efficiency, 99. 
 Appointed Chief of the 
 
 Imperial General Staff, 99. 
 Gough incident. The, 100, 
 
 lOI. 
 
 His resignation, 103. 
 Student and an innovator, 
 
 107. 
 Objection to extremist views, 
 
 no. 
 
INDEX 
 
 French Gen. Sir John (cont) : 
 His value in the present 
 
 crisis, 1 1 8. 
 Man as he is. The, 123. 
 Worship of Napoleon, His, 
 
 124, 125. 
 Secret of his popularity, 126. 
 Literary abiUty, 130. 
 How he regards war, 133. 
 French, Lady, 8. 
 Fr^ch, Commander J. T. W.,2. 
 Fr^me, Lord de, 2. 
 Gatacre, General : 
 
 Boer invasion of Cape 
 
 Colony, 54. 
 Reverse at Stormberg, 56. 
 Gordon, General, 11. 
 Griffiths, Major Arthur, 34. 
 Grimwood, Colonel, 47. 
 Gough, Brigadier-General, 10 1, 
 
 102. 
 Haig, Lieut.-Gener al Sir 
 
 Douglas, 26, 83, 119. 
 Hamilton, Sir Ian, 37. 
 Hussars, 19th, i, 5, 12, 16, 17, 
 
 18, 19, 21, 22. 
 JoFFRE, General, 2, 119, 137. 
 Joubert, General, 49. 
 IChartoum : 
 Besieged, 11. 
 Effort to reheve, 12. 
 FaU of, 18. 
 
 Release of the Madhi's, 
 
 followers, 19. 
 
 Kitchener, Lord, 5, 9, 29, 66, 
 
 71. 74. 79, 93. 97. 122, 
 
 139- 
 
 Kimberley, 53, 54, 68, 75, 77, 
 
 78, 100, lOI. 
 Kruger, President, 84. 
 Ladysmith, 35, 38, 41, 42, 45, 
 46, 48, 49, so, 53. 54, 69. 
 Lambton, Captain Hedworth, 
 
 48. 
 Laycock, Capt. J., 74. 
 Lombard's Cop, 49. 
 Luck, Sir George : 
 
 Opinion of cavalry regi- 
 ments in India, 25. 
 Instituting cavalry reforms 
 at home, 27. 
 
 151 
 
 Mahdi, The, 10, n, 12, 15. 
 Maf eking, 53. 
 Magersfontein, 56, 75, 79. 
 Methuen, Lord, 53, 67, 75. 
 Milbanke, Sir John, 50. 
 Modder River, 69. 
 " Modern Marlborough, The," 
 
 120. 
 Moltke, Count von, 21. 
 Morning Post, The, 27. 
 Nile Expedition, 9. 
 Paget. General, loi. 
 Porter, Colonel, 
 Pretoria, 88, 92. 
 Relieving Expedition, 18. 
 Rhodes, Cecil, 67, 68. 
 Roberts, Earl, 66, 67, 71, 83, 
 
 86, 87, 88, 93. 
 Seely, Colonel, loi, 102. 
 S e 1 b y-Lowndes, Richard 
 
 William, 8. 
 Schoeman, General, 56, 58, 92. 
 Smith-Dorrien, General Sir 
 
 Horace, 119. 
 Stead, W. T., 11. 
 Stewart, General Sir Herbert : 
 
 Testing the camels, 12. 
 
 Compelling the guides, 13. 
 
 Outnumbered by Dervishes, 
 
 15- 
 Hasty protection, 17. 
 Last words. His, 18. 
 Steyn, President, 84. 
 Stormberg, 56. 
 Talbot, General, 29, 30. 
 Warde, Colonel Charles E., 
 
 7- 
 Watson, Lieut.-Colonel A. J., 
 
 60, 61, 134. 
 Wauchope, Major-General, 54. 
 White, Sir George : 
 
 French's, Sir. J. colleague 
 
 in South Africa, 25. 
 Peril at Ladysmith, His, 35. 
 Orders to French, His, 36. 
 Chivalrous reply. A, 38. 
 Attempt to distract the 
 
 enemy, 41. 
 Difficult retreat. A, 42. 
 Two successful engagements, 
 45- 
 
152 
 
 SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 
 White, Sir George (cont) : 
 An optimistic pla n, 46. 
 Seriousness of British posi- 
 tion, 49. 
 Surrounded in Ladysmith, 
 
 53- ^ 
 WUford, Colonel, 42. 
 
 Wolseley, Lord : 
 
 Khartoum, Orders to relieve, 
 
 II. 
 
 Wolseley, Lord (cont) : 
 
 Flying column, Dispatch of, 
 12. 
 Wood, Sir Evelyn, 4 : 
 
 First meeting with French, 
 
 20. 
 Discovery of French's value, 
 24. 
 Yule, General : 
 
 Retreat from Dundee, 41. 
 His force saved, 42, 45.