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HE SPARKS 
 
 LIBRARY. 
 
 [AMERICA.] 
 Collected by 
 
 JARED SPARKS, LL. D., 
 
 President of Harvard College. 
 
 Purchased by the Cornell University, 
 
 1872. 
 
Cornell Unlvaralty Library 
 BT741 .D77 1819 
 
 Original essay on the Immaterial ty & Im 
 
 olln 
 
 3 1924 029 317 389 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029317389 
 
AN. _ 
 
 ©rigtual €ssap 
 
 ON THE 
 
 IMMATERIALITY AND IMMORTALITY 
 
 OP THE 
 
 HUMAN SOUL 
 
 FOUNDED SOLELY ON 
 
 PHYSICAL AND RATIONAL PRINCIPLES, 
 
 BY SAMUEL DREW. 
 
 « ,, ,, Wh; shrinks the soul 
 
 Back on herself, and startles at destruction? 
 
 'Tis the divinity that stirs within us : 
 
 lis Heav'n itself that points out an hereafter, 
 
 And intimates eternity to man ; 
 
 Eternity ! thou pleasing, dreadfiil thought ! 
 
 Through what variety of untry'd being, 
 
 Through what new scenes and changes must we pass } 
 
 The wide, the unbounded prospect lies before me ; 
 
 But shadows, clouds, and darkness rest upon it. 
 
 Herevnlllhold ADcjsnN. 
 
 f outtf) €bitiom 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED FOR R. EDWARDS, CRANE-COURT, FLEET STREET J 
 
 AND SOLD BY T. HAMILTON, T. BLANSHAED, AND 
 
 OGLES, DUNCAN, AND COCHRAN, PATERNOSTER 
 
 ROW ; R. BAY*ES, IVY LANE ; AND ALL 
 
 OTHER BOOKSELLERS. 
 
TO THE 
 
 REV. JOHN WHITAKEH^ 
 
 RECTOR OF RUAN-LANYHORNB^ 
 
 REV- SIB, 
 
 ff HEN this Dedication meets yoM 
 eycy it will be' amsecessary for me to say,^ — 
 that the modes of address, and the arts* of 
 pleasing, are a species of learning which I 
 laate never yet acquired ; bttt sileniCe is not 
 Jnstifiahk wlmn graliitiiide urgies an ackiiow^ 
 ledgmeo^. It k a full' eonvietion of your 
 £a(fovgf wlaknh hdus^ juremp^eed me to a Dedi- 
 cation; aiad I intend; Bothiiig more in this 
 Addsesst,. than to tell the WwFld how mtieh I 
 am< indnebtediy and te^ ejipr?^ the warm effu- 
 sions of a gtaHeM heart. 
 
IV DEDICATION. 
 
 When, without patron or friend, I abandon- 
 ed my first pubhcation to its fate, you saw 
 it floating on the stream of time toward the 
 caves of obHvion, and, kindly extending the 
 
 hand of unsoHcited friendship, you rescued 
 it from the sha,de. 
 
 Under the forms of common civiUty, you 
 have treated me with a degree of poUteness 
 to which my deserts can bear no proportion ; 
 while the condescension of your manners, 
 has taught me to surmount that distance, 
 which station and circumstance had made 
 between us. 
 
 Superior to those local prejudices which 
 might have influenced a mind devoid of 
 magnanimity, you have more than called 
 yourself my friend; while, stimulated by 
 your encouragement, I have prosecuted with 
 vigour the present work, which, abstracted 
 from this circumstance, would, in all ipro-' 
 bability, never have. seen completion. 
 
DEDICATION-. 
 
 Destitute of literary reputation in my- 
 self, and treated with indifference by several 
 of those whom custom had taught me to 
 call ray friends, — the link which united 
 completion to publication originated also 
 with you. 
 
 Distinguished as an Historian and Philo- 
 logist, in the literary world, the name of 
 Mr. Whitaker has been my passport to 
 many of my subscribers, to whom, without 
 it, even presumption itself would have led 
 me to despair of all access. 
 
 It is undelr the sanction of your appro- 
 bation of my Work, that I have addressed 
 myself to the Ladies and Gentlemen of 
 Cornwall ; and, beyond my most sanguine ex- 
 pectation, their generosity has crowned n|y 
 application with success. 
 
 Under these circumstances gratitude be- 
 comes a duty ; and I should reproach my- 
 self with that ingratitude, to which I hope 
 
vi DEDICATION^ 
 
 my bosoHi will long remain a str&rager, were 
 I to omit the acknowledgment of favors, 
 where I canaaot cancel obligations. 
 
 The uniform attachment of Mr. Whi- 
 TAKER to the cause of Christianity, and 
 his abilities to defend her out-posts against 
 all opposers, have been sufficiently appreci- 
 ated both by friends and foes ; — the present 
 Workj therefore, approaches you by a kind 
 of natural right. But to proceed further in 
 detailing those facts, which are necessary to 
 make good its claim, would look like adula- 
 tion; — In proceediag, I niust hurt your 
 feelings ; and in desisting^ I mtiat sdiiflie; my 
 own; and though, I wish to be grateftil, I 
 must be silent. 
 
 To the Nobility, the Getsbry, and Other 
 respectable inhabitants of Cornwall, I ac- 
 knowledge myself to be particularly indebted 
 for their patronage and support. There are 
 many among them, who have iritereated 
 
DEDICATION. Vil 
 
 themselves in the issue of my present pub- 
 lication, whose names it would gratify my 
 feelings to publish ; but it is a liberty which 
 I dare not take. — ^To notice aU the marks of 
 attention which I have received, would be 
 to violate the bounds of prudence ; and to 
 make selections, would be invidious and 
 unjust. 
 
 To them, and to you, the Work is now 
 presented, and the fate which awaits it 
 cannot be remote. Under the sanction of 
 your approbation, I shall feel tranquillity 
 amidst the shafts of critical malevolence ; 
 and this reflection will afford me consola- 
 tion in obscurity, though forgetfulness should 
 stamp her seal upon my Work. But should 
 a different fate await it — should it rise into 
 some degree of reputation, this paper will 
 bear testimony to whom I am indebted. 
 
 That they, and you, in the regions of im- 
 mortality, may inherit that Glory which 
 
Vlll DEDICATION. 
 
 <jod has reserved in a future state of Being 
 for them that love and fear him, is among 
 the genuine wishes of my heart. The in- 
 fluence of discordant motives, no doubt, 
 produces changes in the human mind, 
 which baffle all ^ calculation ; but, judging 
 from those feelings which have been . long 
 the inhabitants of my breast, gratitude and 
 life must forsake together the bosom of, 
 
 Rev. Sir, 
 
 Their and Your 
 Muck obliged. 
 And very humble Servant, 
 SAMUEL DREW. 
 
 St, Austell, 
 November 5th, 1802. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Among that infinite variety of abstract truths 
 which the God of Heaven has placed within the 
 reach of human investigation, there are but few 
 more pleasing to a contemplative mind than the 
 natural Immortality of the Human Soul, ^o the 
 gratification which resiilts from such a cohtem-' 
 plation, the Author of our being has been 
 pleased to unite our most important interests ; 
 and has placed the immortality of [the human 
 soul among those truths which it is at once oui* 
 duty and privilege to explore in our pi-esent 
 state of being ; aiid our felicity to enjoy through 
 all eternity. 
 
 A subject which thus becomes interesting 
 from its own importance, must be applicable to 
 mankind in all ages of the world, and can only 
 lose its energy when we lose- our being. If, 
 however, from the chequered state of human 
 life, any one period can advance a claim in pre- 
 ference to another, it must be in an ^^ge, when in- 
 
 b 
 
•X PREFACE. 
 
 fidelity, under the apparent sanction of philosor- 
 phy, attempts to impose itself upon the credu- 
 lous and the unthinking. It is in this age that 
 we live. 
 
 When principles appeal to our passions, under 
 the auspices of Reason, and yet leave the under- 
 standing uninfluenced by their efficacy, they 
 carry with them a presumptive evidence, that 
 error lies concealed behind the mask. The 
 principles of French philosophy answer this 
 description, and therefore justify this conclu- 
 sion. They fascinate with a specious appear- 
 ance; and, by gratifying the corrupted passions 
 to which they appeal, conceal their delusive 
 tendencies under the visor which they wear. 
 Error chiefly becomes formidable from its con- 
 cealment, and a detection of falsehood generally 
 dispels its charm. And were infidelity to dis- 
 close its horrors, it would cease to operate 
 upon the mind of men. Defeated in its native 
 form, it approaches us in habiliments which are 
 less questionable ; and enters, unperceived, the 
 unguarded avenues of the heart. In this 
 strange delirium of the mind, we become capti- 
 vated with the novelty of new ideas^ and mis- 
 take a paroxysm of soul for an intellectual ac- 
 quisition. 
 
 The ptogress of French philosophy, has. 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 perhaps, been more destructive than the arms 
 of Fraacei By appealing to the more vulnera^ 
 ble parts of human nature, we sufffer our prin^ 
 ciples to be undermined by imperceptible de-' 
 grees, till we barter tinith for error ; and, by 
 adopting sentiments which originate a few 
 shades benieath the surfaces of things, a super- 
 ficial mind is tempted to place the reasoning by 
 which it has been seduCed among the recondite 
 depths of sciehpe. 
 
 The principles df Rosseau on education, if 
 indiscriminately adopted, will prepare the 
 youthful mind for that ridicule which marks 
 the pages of Voltaire ;* and the mind which can 
 cherish the ridicule of the latter without re- 
 morsBj is sufficiently prepared for the false phi- 
 losophy of Marat and Volney, and bids fair for 
 the adoption of the, bare-faced impu4«nce of* 
 Thoinas Paine. 
 
 It is thus the principles of posterity beCome 
 poisQdsed at the fountain-head- And while un-' 
 der the sanction of a Bcvlingbroke Or a Shaftes- 
 bury, the insidious volumes of similar writers 
 
 * The name of this great bad man but seldom passes 
 through my mind^ withotit bringing with it that laconic, but 
 pointed choCacter given of him by Mr. Cowper. Uis cliaraot^ 
 of M. de Voltaire is, that he-*» 
 
 " Liixd longj wrote nmeh, laughed h/eartily, and died !" 
 b 2 
 
Xll PREFACE. 
 
 have been calling into question those truths^ 
 which we have been taught to revere as sadred 
 and incontrovertible ; it is to be lamented that 
 men of erudition and splendid talents,' who 
 profess themselves Christians, have coldly len 
 their pens--^" to point a moral, or adorn a tale! ' 
 This stricture may seem severe. I should grati- 
 fy rny feelings in softening its rigour, but the 
 fact is self-evident, and I draw the comparison 
 with the deepest regret. 
 
 In all ages of the world a general belief has 
 prevailed, that man must survive the grave. 
 This sentiment is inculcated so early as the days 
 of Homer, in — 
 
 " That wrath which hurl '«f to Pluto's gloomy reigUj 
 " The solids of mighty chiefs, untimely slain ; 
 " Whose limbs, unburied on the naked shore, 
 " Deyouring dogs and hungry vultures tore." 
 
 On the presumption of this general truth, the 
 idea of future consciousness is foutided, and 
 consequently of rewards and punishments in 
 another life. From this source those systems 
 of morality have been drawn by those venerable 
 sages of antiquity, whose writings have illumi- 
 nated the Pagan world. And while arguments 
 and authority have both conspired to establish 
 this general truth, and define the boundaries 6T 
 human action ; a full conviction of its being true, 
 
PREFACE. Xiii 
 
 has afforded us that immoveable basis oi^ which 
 we rest our hopes and fears. 
 
 It is indeed to be lamented, thatwhile these 
 truths have obtained the general suffrage, the 
 world has hot been without exceptions to 
 universal belief. Whether the insufficiency of 
 evidence, or some unaccountable deformity in 
 the human intellect; whether the novelty of 
 being singular, a determined resolution to resist 
 those restraints which a conviction of those 
 truths would impose ; or a lazy apathy vrhich 
 freezes the ipental powers, may claim thfe prir 
 mary station in the black catalogue of causes ; 
 are points of speculation which it might be 
 useful to explore. Whatever the cause or 
 causes are, certain it is, that an apparent far 
 tality extends its influence to a certain descrip- 
 tion of men, who seem to place their defence in 
 the blandishments of wit, and derive their secuT 
 rity from the sorceries of applaus^- 
 
 In proportion as science has enlightened the 
 human mind, an attack on these truths has na- 
 turally been succeeded by an examination of 
 first principles; opposition has produced de- 
 fence ; and life and immortality' have .been 
 brought to light by the gospel. The day of 
 general controversy has long been past, apd 
 
XIV PKEFACE. 
 
 peace has been the happy result ofdemonstra^ 
 tion. 
 
 Iij this state of tranquillity, when the ground 
 of infidelity was no longer tenable, and opposi- 
 tion became too feeble to keep alive debate, the 
 rational methods of defence were lost, with 
 many, in the blaze of demonstration ; and the 
 arguments which proved the soul to be immor^ 
 <;al, were forgotten in. the full conviction of its 
 being true. An Atheist, like a solitary meteor, 
 might have wandered through a century, and 
 elicited the mixed emotions of astonishment and 
 -pontempt, 
 
 The concluding years of the eighteenth cen^. 
 tury, have, however, presented us with a dif^ 
 ferent aspect. The revolution in France has. 
 extended itself to the departments of literature, 
 aijd moral philosophy has undergone a cousit 
 derable change. The contagion has been com-, 
 municated across the water, In England we 
 have been told that the human soul " is nothing 
 ■* but matter;'' and in France we are informed, 
 that " death is an eternal sleep." A Godwin has 
 told us, that " duty is th^ bugbear of the igno-; 
 rq^nt;" and a Marat has assured us, that -^pity 
 " IS not a native of the human bre(iist." The 
 doubts which have been started by Hume and 
 Hobbes, have been improved by Priestley and 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 Barlow, and diffused through every order of 
 society, by emissaries of the present day. Infi- 
 delity is a pernicious evil. The different 
 branches into which it shoots, are but distinct 
 parts of one great whole. And whether infide- 
 lity approaches us in the stern philosophy and 
 materialism of a Priestley,* or in the scepticism 
 of a Rosseau ; in the polite ignorance of a 
 Volney, or the naked blasphemy of Tho6aas 
 Paine, the identity of its nature is not thereby 
 changed. The s*treams may be different, but 
 they all originate in one common fountain, and 
 all terminate, in one general event. 
 
 To sit a.s idle spectators on the issue of these 
 commotions, is no longer a matter - of indif- 
 ference ; but to be active in the cause of truth, 
 is a duty which every man owes to his God, and 
 to his country, to himself, and to posterity.; and 
 he must be deficient in the discharge of his duty, 
 who, to the utmost of his power, will not exert 
 himself to check the progress of so destructive 
 an evil. 
 
 Under the influence of this persuasion, I haye 
 
 * In this classification the author has no design uniformly 
 to inclufie Dr. Priestley. Neither is it his intention to ajpply 
 to him the strictures which are made on those with whom his 
 name is associated, any further than as he has denied the Ini- 
 materiality, and consequently the natural Immortality of t'he 
 Human Soul. 
 
XVI PREFACE. 
 
 been led from traditionary belief, to an investi- 
 gation of first principles, and the result of ray 
 inquiries is, — ^a full conviction that rational 
 principles will support the fact. The argu^ 
 nients which have produced that conviction, I 
 have committed to writing, and am now about" 
 to commit them to the world. The modes of 
 reasoning, therefore, which I have adopted, are 
 founded upon no preconceived hypothesis ; and 
 the arguments, as w^U as manner, are equally 
 new to me. 
 
 On a subject so awful, I am well assured 
 that the ground on which I tread, is, if possible, 
 more than sacred ; but whatever be the event, 
 I shall have this consolation, — that I have ijot 
 been actuated by impure motives. To pretend 
 to be without all emotion On the issue of this 
 Essay, I should betray my vanity in professing. 
 I have sensations on the occasion which I feel 
 it difficult to describe ; and I place the internal 
 conflict of my bosom among those indescriba' 
 bles, which may naturally be conceived op 
 such an occasion, to occupy the mind of 
 man. 
 
 My feelings revolt at the idea of publishing 
 an Essay on such a subject while I am writing 
 this Preface ; yet the importance of the subject 
 suggests these ideas;— if 1 succeed in my 
 
PREFACE. XVn 
 
 main propositions, I shall feel myself amply 
 recompensed for my present perturbations ; if 
 not, the occasion itself will soften the mortifica- 
 tion of disgrace. 
 
 It is not, however, to my own feelings, but 
 to the public judgment that I appeal. 
 
 A subject so abstruse in its nafure, and 
 whose consequences extend to a future state 
 of being, must necessarily impress some ob- 
 scurities on the manner of its investigation ; I 
 have avoided all in my power, and yet many, 
 perhaps remain. It must, however, be remem- 
 bered, — that our inability to comprehend a fact, 
 is no argument against the feet itself. The 
 ploughshare of reason may be driven through 
 the rocks of error, although every reader may 
 not be able .to discern the furrow which it 
 makes. 
 
 Far be it from me to insinuate, that I have 
 said all that might be said, or aijticipated every 
 objection which may be started ; but truths 
 can never oppose each other ; and if the argu- 
 ments - which I havie adduced to establish my 
 main propositions be conclusive, every objec- 
 tion, however plausible, must lose its force. 
 On such a subject, new arguments are con- 
 tinually appearing to a contemplative mind ; and 
 
XVllT PREFACE., 
 
 whether the importance or extension of this sub- 
 ject be the greatest, it is, perhaps, hard to say; 
 but in favouF of an interesting subject, he that 
 advances any thing new, 9,dds to the general 
 stock of argument ; and he that adds to the ge- 
 neral stock of argument, adds to the general be- 
 nefit of mankind. ■ 
 
 Let it not be thought because I have declin- 
 ed all appeal to the Sacred Volume, that I have 
 therefore drawn over the book of God the mo^t 
 distant shade of disrespect. The mind that 
 can harbour such an idea, must form but a very 
 partial conception of my undertaking. The 
 Bible I consider as the great repository of sacred 
 knowledge ; and moral philosophy can be no 
 longer right, than while it acts in concert with 
 revelation. I consider moral truth, as an ele- 
 vated mountain, the summit of which. Revela- 
 tion unveils to the eye of faith, without in- 
 volving us in the tedious drudgery of painful 
 speculations; To :SOme of these views philo- 
 sophy^will direct ixs, through a labyrinth of in- 
 tricacies ; and after the humaxi understanding 
 has put forth all her efforts, it is "by toil and 
 " art the steep ascent -yv^egain." If,!however, 
 in any given momentous instance, the tardy 
 movements of philosophy will lead us to the 
 same. conclusions which the Bible has already 
 formed; it affords us no contemptible evidence , 
 
PREFAOfi. XIX 
 
 of its authenticity; and hence Revelation chal'^ 
 lenges our belief in those instances where ype 
 can trace no relation. 
 
 The ground on which I have assumed the 
 present question, is simply this — Have we, or 
 have we not, any rational evidence of the soul's 
 immortality, admitting that no revelation had 
 ever been given us from God ? if we have, infi- 
 delity loses one of its strongest fortresses ; if 
 not, all rational proof of the. immortality of the 
 soul is at once done away. 
 
 Whether the present Work, like those bub- 
 bles on the passing stream, which float along 
 and then expire, will engiposs the attention of 
 mankind only for a moment, and then disap- 
 pear ; or pass onward to ages which its author 
 can never reach, are points which events can 
 alone decide. I have not vanity enough to 
 presume, that infallibility has impressed her 
 footsteps upon every sentence which I have 
 written ; the arguments, however, are such as 
 have produced conviction in my own mind, 
 from a persuasion that they arise from the fixed 
 relation of things, I have attempted to erect 
 this fabric on such facts and propositions as 
 are incontrovertible, and have traced the in- 
 termediate ideas which appeared to stapd in 
 
XX PREFACE. 
 
 contact with one another, to that conclusion, 
 which I had in view. 
 
 To those who are skilled in the critical ac- 
 curacies of grammar, my language may sound 
 harsh and unharmonious, and some solecisms 
 may appear; but the real critic, and the candid 
 of every description, I am persuaded will 
 readily make allowances for these imperfec- 
 tions, when they consider my situation in life, 
 and the disadvantages under which I have 
 written. 
 
 I have no apology to offer ; I publish with 
 diffidence, but I publish with deliberation ; I 
 solicit no favour wjj|ich justice and candour 
 will not entitle me to claim, and which I have 
 been more than once convinced the public are 
 ready to bestow. 
 
 Should what I have written be made instru- 
 mental in reclaiming but one from the fangs of 
 infidelity, or in preventing another from becom- 
 ing its victim ; it will afford me a consolation 
 which will accompany me through life, and, I 
 hope, be remembered with gratitude through 
 all eternity. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 TO THE 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 As a second edition of this work is about to 
 enter the world so close upon the firsts I think 
 it a duty which I owe to the public and my- 
 self, to state a few particulars relative to both. 
 
 When proposals for printing the first edition 
 of this Work, were presented to the inhabitants 
 of Cornwall, I had no conception that a patro- 
 nage so liberal awaited it ; I had, therefore, no 
 further design in soliciting subscriptions, than 
 to obtain a partial reimbursement of those ex- 
 penses which attended the publication, the 
 risk of which my circumstances would not per- 
 mit me to bear. And although almost un- 
 known in the departments of literature, and 
 destitute of those acqiiirements which might 
 justify^ the public expect^itipns, the Work has 
 come forward under the sariction of the most 
 respectable list of subscribers, that Cornwall 
 on any similar occasion, has, perhaps, ever af- 
 forded. 
 
 Anxious to know its fate, and solicitous for 
 the issue, I waited the event with a mind fluc- 
 tuating in suspense, and labouring under sen- 
 sations, which it would be useless to publish, 
 and difficult to describe. The ordeal of local 
 criticism, however, is now past ; and the nu- 
 merous testimonies of approbation, which I 
 
XXIl ' KREFACE. 
 
 have received from the candid and judiciou!*, 
 are such as have exceeded my most sanguine 
 expectations. And I hope^ I may state M^ith- 
 out the imputatiori of vanity, that it has been 
 highly gratifying to me to learri, that I have 
 given no occasion to 'the enlightened and li- 
 beral-minded, to reflect on their patronage 
 AVith regret. 
 
 The claims of an infant family, obliging me 
 to attend on the common avocations of life^ 
 have rendered the present Work, during the 
 whole progress of its composition, the produce 
 of my leisure hours ; it has, therefore, been 
 written under different impressions. On a se- 
 cond review, I have found some paragraphs 
 which required elucidation, and in this new edi^ 
 tion, the whole is ahalized, and arranged in a 
 more methodical order, which will render the 
 afguments more distinct; and place their ener- 
 gy in a more decisivfe point of view^ 
 
 In the present edition, the Work has under- 
 gone a considei*able alteration. It is now di- 
 vided into Parts and Chapters ; and these 
 chapters Subdivided into Sections. The ya 
 rious arguttients are now arranged under pro- 
 per heads, and placed in a more conspicuous 
 light. Several of the foritier arguments are 
 constrttcted anew, and rescued from that bre- 
 vity, which, to readers who are unacquainted 
 vvith the nature of metaphysical reasoning, , 
 must sometimes have rendered the conclusions 
 apparently confused and indistinct. To such 
 as are acquainted with the windings of meta- 
 
PREFACE. XXIU 
 
 physical disquisition, these changes must ten,d 
 very much to relieve the mind from the severity 
 of close argument; and to such as are unac- 
 quainted with it, these Chapters and Sections 
 will give a general view of that theory, which 
 is here submitted to the public consideration. 
 
 The favourable light in which this work has 
 been received by the enlightened inhabitants of 
 CorntvaU, has also led me to venture on some 
 arguments which are entirely new, and which 
 are now occasionally interspersed through the 
 different sections, and so interwoven with the 
 whole, as to become additional, or explanatory, 
 as circumstances seemed to require. 
 
 Two sources of argument are now ventured 
 on, which were untouched in the former edi- 
 tion ; and two entire sections are added, which 
 are founded wholly on arguments drawn, from 
 the Omnipotence and Oinriipresence of God, 
 These new sections, together with those addi- 
 tional proofs which are Qccasionally interspers- 
 ed: thr©ugh the workt, will form an additibft of 
 nearly forty pages, and 1 flatter Myself, will 
 add more to the argumentative part of the 
 book^ than to the number of its leaves. 
 
 These new Sections, these new Arguments, 
 these Elffdfdationsi, - together with a Table of 
 Contents, whwh will direct the reader to the 
 different depai-tiMents of the Work, where he 
 may consult distkietly the various reasonings 
 by which the theory of the whole is supported, 
 will, I hope be considierable acquisitions, and 
 
XXlV PKEFACE. 
 
 render the Volume still more worthy of public 
 notice. 
 
 The confidence which I feel in the enlighten- 
 ed generosity of the respectable inhabitants of 
 Cornwall, precludes the necessity of all apolo- 
 gy for these alterations and corrections. Those 
 among them who comprehend the subject^ must 
 have more liberality than to conceive them- 
 selves slighted by the improvement of a Work 
 which owes to them its primary existence; 
 their minds must therefore be superior to such 
 prejudices : and those who are incompetent to 
 judge of its merit, or demerit, will feel no in- 
 terest in the change. It is to those subscribers 
 whose names fill the original list, that, I feel 
 myself primarily indebted^ Lhope I shall ever 
 retain a just sense of their kindnesses toward 
 me, and shall take pleasure in acknowledging 
 the obligations which I owe them, while grati- 
 tude is capable of warming my heart. 
 
 My primary motive in writing this Essay, 
 and in all the improvements which I. have since 
 made, has been to attempt the establishment of 
 the Immortality of the Human Soul; a truth 
 which scepticism and infidelity would teach us 
 to disbelieve. If that end be accomplished, my 
 design will be fully answered ; if not, my mo- 
 tive in writing will afford me a source of conso- 
 lation ; and I shall reflect with satisfaction, 
 that I have done my best, and meant it well. 
 
 St. Austell, Feb. % 1803. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 TO THE 
 
 THIRD EDITION. 
 
 Nine years have now elapsed since this i^lssay 
 on the Soul, first made its appearance in the 
 world, during which period it has undergone 
 two impressions in England, and one in Ame- 
 rica^ The first of these editions in England, 
 was confined almost exclusively to Cornwall ; 
 but the second, having taken a more general 
 spread, has been circulated through various 
 parts of the united kingdom. With the suc- 
 cess of that published in America, the author 
 is not particularly- acquainted- 
 
 As the public request for this Essay remains 
 undiminished, notwithstanding the supplies 
 which the former impressions have afforded, it 
 is obvious that the demand for it has kept pace 
 with the progress of tiriie. And since in many 
 instances the sale has increased in proportion 
 to the circulation which it has obtained ; ano- 
 ther edition has become indispensably neces- 
 sary to meet the increasing demand. This new 
 edition is now offered to the public. 
 
 The interest which this work has excited 
 since its first publication, has been fully proved 
 by the numerous testimonies, of respectful ap^ 
 probation, which the author has received from 
 men of distinguished character in various de- 
 
XXVI PREFACE. 
 
 partments of Ikca-a^ure. These testhnonies, 
 have been accompanied with hints at improve- 
 ments of which they thought the work suscep- 
 tible in a scientific light. To these hints they 
 have kindly added observations on occasional 
 expressions, which, in their estimation, might 
 with some trifling variations, be rendered mor^ 
 perspicuous, and be thus made to convey ideas 
 wilii a more specific and permanent significa- 
 tion. To these literary, gentlemen the author 
 acknowledges his obligatioiis : and he thinks 
 that he should ill requite their disinterested fk- 
 YOurs, were he to nqglect their friendly recom- 
 mendations. 
 
 With these remarks and suggestions before 
 him, combined with his own mature reflections, 
 the author has endeavoured to improve the pre- 
 sent edition. Hence, such paragraphs as he 
 had reason to believe admitted a diibious in- 
 terpretation, he has new modelled; — to such 
 language as was vague and indefinite, he has 
 endeavoured to give a specific meaning ; while 
 such expressions as appeared redundant or in- 
 applicable, he has excluded from his pages. 
 On the contrary, several additions which ap- 
 peared to him, to be of importance, have been 
 made. These have been introduced to giye 
 perspicuity to obscure arguments, and to bring 
 them to bear fully on the subject to which they « 
 applied; — to obviate objections which hspve 
 been anticipated ; — to elucidate what appeared 
 confused ;—aijd to prevent inferences which 
 the author never made or meant. In short,i 
 
PREFACE. XXVll 
 
 he has taken advantage of all the hints which 
 have been given him ; and, combining all that 
 hd thought appropriate in them, with his own 
 observations, during the nine years that have 
 elapsed, has to the utmost of his power con- 
 centrated the whole in the present edition. 
 
 These additions, elucidations, corrections, 
 and improvements, the author hopes will be 
 evident to all who enter into the nature of his 
 arguments, and exaoline their tendencies and 
 force. He however, has not vanity enough to 
 presume that the work is free from obscurities, 
 Or that it has obtained the utmost perfection of 
 which it is susceptible. He has nevertheless 
 endeavoured to remove every impediment 
 which he perceived , and flatters himself that 
 the work is now rendered less unworthy than 
 heretofore, of a continuance of that patronage 
 and support which it has already so amply re- 
 ceived. 
 
 But every human exertion in the cause of 
 moral truth, must prove.ineffectUal without the 
 blessing of Heaven. This, and this only can 
 render it beneficial to those who read ; and it 
 is to this that the writer looks for the ultimate 
 success of his works- That God may crown 
 the present effort with tokens of his Divine ap- 
 probation, by rendering it a blessing to those 
 into whose hands it may fall, is the sincere^ de- 
 sire and earnest prayer of the Author. 
 
 St. Austell, Cornwall, 
 iHarcb 18, 1811, 
 
 c 2 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 ARGUMENTS WHICH ILLVSTRATE AND PROVE THE 
 IMMATERIALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MATTER FROM ITS KNOWN PROPERTIES, INCAPABLE OF 
 THOUGHT AND VOLITION IN ANY FORM. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Ererythiug in Mature known to us, included within tiie 
 confines of Matter and Spirit. Design of the present 
 work respecting these two substances. Man com- 
 pounded of Matter and Spirit. The union of these 
 two substances mysterious, and the manner of it un- 
 known. — Substance in general defined. Reasons 
 and facts which induce us to believe that immaterial 
 substances exist, and that the Human Soul is such a 
 substance, ....,.,-.... Page 1 
 
 SECTION II. 
 Nature and essential properties of Matter. All essen- 
 tial ^properties must co-exist with their substances, 
 and with one another. Matter must fill empty space, 10 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Spiritual or immaterial substances may ^xist. The es- 
 sence of Matter and Spirit unknown. Properties of 
 a spiritual substance exist in our minds. Properties 
 of Matter and Spirit united together in Man, . 12 
 
XXX CONTENTS, > 
 
 SECTION IV, 
 
 Consciousness, Volition, Judgment, and Perception, 
 having no positive existence in themselves, demon- 
 strate the positive existence of some substance in 
 which they inhere. Substance distinguished from 
 its essential properties, and further defined. Page 17 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Mental qualities cannot arise from Matter. Thinking 
 not an essential property of Matter. Absurd conclu- 
 sions to which the supposition would lead. Proved 
 to be impossible by a variety of arguments, . 22 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Material bodies act by contact, hence neither conscious? 
 ness, nor thinking can result from mere matter. The 
 mind can operate where matter is not. Matter not 
 infinite in its extension. The divisibility of matter 
 prevents consciousness and thinking from resulting 
 from it, ,,.,..,. 29 
 
 SECTION VII, 
 
 Consciousness cannot result from any modification of 
 matter. Modification can confer no new properties 
 on matter. Effects which modification is capable of 
 producing. Pernicious consequences which will re- 
 sult from the supposition that consciousness results 
 from the modification of matter. Arguments, which 
 prove its impossibility 34 
 
CONTENTS. iCXXX 
 
 SECTION vm. 
 
 Consciousness is not a quality superadded to Matter. 
 A quality could not be added unless it previously ex- 
 isted. If it previously existed, there could be no oc- 
 «^iOB for the union. Consciousness can never arise 
 from the mere union of any quality with an uncon- 
 scious substance, , 42 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 T«er VISIBLE QTJAUTIES Of THE HOHAM 8001, CAM 
 ONLY INHERE IN AN IMLMATERIAt SUBSTANCE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 An agreement in nature must subsist between a sub- 
 stance and its essential properties. Consciousness, 
 volition, &c. essential properties of the soul. These 
 properties being immaterial, their substance must be 
 immaterial also. The nature of these properties, and 
 their fixed relation to an immaterial substance prov- 
 ed. The nature of substances is only known by 
 their properties. Consciousness can inhere in no- 
 thing but an indivisible^ and consequently an imma- 
 terial substance. Properties of the soul can acquire 
 no new quality or nature by their inherence. Con- 
 seiousness not an adventitious acquisition. Matter 
 cannot abstract, 46 
 
XXXU CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 The actions of an iatellioent being cannot arise from 
 extprnal impulse. Matter can only move by impulse. 
 Man possesses intelligence, and acts from it. The 
 soul is not an assemblage of distinct independent 
 properties. Substances are unchangeable in their 
 natures. The human mind limited in its powers 
 and researches, yet furnished with indubitable propfs 
 of its immateriality. An objection, that God can 
 cause matter to think, stated and answered. Argu- 
 ments to prove, that the powers of the soul are im- 
 material, and that they must inhere in a substance^ 
 whose nature is similar to their own, .... 60 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Objection against the soul's immateriality, taken from its 
 app^ently insensible state during the hours of sleep, 
 stated and answered ; first, from the analogies which 
 life supplies ; secondly, from facts which our waking 
 hours afford ; thirdly, from forgetful ness and acciden- 
 tal recollection ; fourthly, from dreams ; fifthly, from 
 the inattention of the mind to its own operation ; 
 sixthly, from the certainty that these operations must 
 precede our apprehensions of them ; finally, that 
 consciousness may exist, though we should be inat- 
 tejjtive to it, . . . ' 75 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 The affections which exist in the soul, prove it to be im- 
 material. These affections cannot inhere in matter 
 nor flow from it. Atoms must be incogitative, and 
 therefore inconsistent with the affections. — ^The sup- 
 position absurd, and leads to palpable contradictions. 
 Objections founded on external excitement, stated, 
 examined, and answered, gg 
 
CONTENTS. XXXm 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 The intellectual endowments of individuals apparently 
 different. The cause of this is not physical, but oc- 
 casioned by the defective organization of the bsdy, 
 through the operation of moral evil. The physical 
 nature of the intellect the same, though depraved in 
 its moral tendencies .98 
 
 ' SECTION VI. 
 Animation possessed by all living creatures. Brutes 
 possess instinct. Instinct distinguished from reason. 
 Instinct defined. Bounds of operation specified. 
 Marks of reason as contrasted with it. Creatures 
 gov^ned by instinct, act under the dominion of im- 
 pulses wh;cb they cannot resist. No instinctive ac- 
 tion can exist without impulse. The causes various. 
 Instinctive capacity destitute of activity. End of in- 
 stinct. Station which animal^ g.overned by instinct, 
 fill in the chain of being. Instinct can have no self- 
 determiniug power. Animals cannot be impelled by 
 contrary impulses at the same time, though the im- 
 pulses may be different. The strongest impulse. go- 
 verns, .............. 108 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 Reason belongs to man. Reason defined. — Founded 
 on reflection. — Distinguished from instinct. — Uses of 
 reason. Primary source of reason. Compared and 
 contrasted with instinct. Reason possesses an elec- 
 tive and self-determining power. Answer to an ob- 
 jection. Submission to, and connexion with, motives 
 considered. Prescience of God perfectly compatible 
 with the contingency of human actions. Province 
 of reason further considered. Distinct from instinct 
 in its nature and operations. Connected with a mo- 
 ral nature. No symptoms or vestiges of this moral 
 nature discoverable in brutes. Moral nature connect- 
 ed with reason, and issuing in consequences unknown 
 to animsds, . . 120 
 
XXXIV CONTENTS, 
 
 SECTION VIII, 
 
 Memory distinct from rec6IIectioi]. The former visible 
 in the animal powers, and dependent npon foreign 
 causes which operate involuntarily; illustrated^by 
 , instances. The latter produced by a rational assa- 
 ciation of ideas which can only flow from an imma- 
 terial principle. The human soul concluded to be 
 immaterial, .,.,...,.... 144 
 
 PART II, 
 
 ARGUMENTS WHICH fLLVSTRATE AND PRO^E THE 
 IMMORTALITY OF THE HVMAN SQVL, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE NATURE, MOOEfe, AND POSSIBILITY OF THE 
 DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL PONSIPERED, 
 
 SECTION I, 
 
 Death, definition of it. Proved to be a mere privation, 
 Incapable of destroying the soul. Dissolution, pri- 
 vation, and annihilation defined, and asserted to be 
 the only modes through which the destruction of the 
 soul can be conceived to be possible, . . ^ 1,51 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 The soul cannot perish by dissolution^ because devoid 
 of parts. Nor by privation, because its mode of ex- 
 istence can undergo no internal change. Nor by an- 
 nihilation, because it can have no tendency to it, and 
 is inaccessible to all external force, .... 155 
 
CONTENTS. XXlt9 
 
 SECTION III. 
 We can have no simple idea of any thing which has no 
 existence. We hare an idea, though inadequate, of 
 the existence and immortality of God, Man cannot 
 rationally desire any thing which is unnaturaL We 
 desire immortality, and these desires gather strength 
 from an advancement in holiness and virtue. Im- 
 iftortaiity of the soul inferred from our desires of ob- 
 taining the greatest happiness^ , 172 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 The annihilation of the soul cannot be occasioned by 
 any finite being. Note on the miracles recorded in 
 the Bible. The possibility of the annihilation of the 
 soul doubtful. Annihilation inconceivable. Anni- 
 hilation, if not ascertained, cannot be known ; and 
 when ascertained, it will involve a contradiction. 
 We have no data for assuming the possible annihila- 
 tion of ihe soul. All abstract possibilities totally un- 
 known to us. The abstract possibility of creation 
 must have been inconceivable, prior to creation, ad- 
 mitting the previous intelligence of man. It could 
 not have been known either by reason or intuition. 
 Brief review of the primitive principles of creation, 
 in connexion with infinite power. The creation of 
 matter inconceivable, but not contradictory. Crea- 
 tion could not have taken place by the laws of na- 
 ture, ., 177 
 
 SECTION V. 
 The power which produced creation, cannot be con- 
 ceived to retrace its actions by the laws of nature. 
 The existence of a Zamiff cannot be known to be pos- 
 sible. Creation must have been the work of an'uncreat- 
 ed being. Creation and annihilation impracticable by 
 the laVcs of nature. Beingand No-Being cannotboth ex- 
 ist positively. No-Being is a negation of Being. Two 
 negations the reverse of each other cannot be possible. 
 The soul can never meet the absence or reverse-of it- 
 $ftl{. It must therefore be immortal, . . . 194 
 
9xxvi CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 The mere absence of the Soul cannot approach it, be-r 
 cause being' a negation, it cannot act. Being and 
 No-Being, entity and nonentity, are antipodes which 
 can neYer approximate or meet. Annihilation which 
 is a nonentity can neither be communicated, nor pro- 
 duced by power, or without it. Power cannot pi;r* 
 sue the Soul to a point which describes a nonentity* 
 That which has no perishable tendency, and can neii- 
 ther suffer from the presence, nor the absence of 
 power, must necessarily be immortal, . . . 207 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 The total absence of the Divine powe^ impossible. li 
 is inconsistent with the nature of Omnipotence, to 
 suspend Omnipotence. Duration previous to crea- 
 tion affords no proof that Omnipotence was partially 
 suspended. Omnipotence may vary in its modes of 
 operation, proved by creation and providence. If a 
 suspension of any particular mode of power can des- 
 troy the soul while permanent Omnipotence remains, 
 the soul must retire out of Being and drop into God, 
 which involves a contradiction, .;.... 216 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 Things not necessarily existent, notwithstanding the to- 
 tal absence of omnipotent power is impossible. No- 
 thing but power can withdraw power. Absence of 
 power can neither constitute nor cause annihilation. 
 Mere absence of power, insufficient to produce anni- 
 hilation, because destitute of all energy and being. 
 That which is removed by no power must continue 
 forerer. Collective force of the argument, . ^7 
 
CONTENTS. XXXvft 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 All Effects must hare some natural agreement with 
 their causes. Mediums through which causes act, 
 serve as subordinate causes, or connective links. 
 Being, can have no agreement with No-Being ; no 
 mediums can connect them. Annihilation cannot be 
 effected by any Being. All mediums, whether ma- 
 terial or immaterial, must exist ; and, therefore, must 
 be as far distant from non-existence, as the causes 
 which operate through them. This distance has no 
 relation to space. The soul may exist in space, with- 
 out having any relation to it, 241 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THAT NOTHING BUT ANNIHILATION CAN DESTROY 
 
 THE SOUL, AND THAT ANNIHILATION CANNOT 
 
 APPLY TO ANY SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 A substance which thinks, must be indivisible. The 
 soul incapable of becoming corruptible in itself. In- 
 accessible to corruption from ai)y thing contaminating 
 either internal or external.^ No stamen of corrup- 
 tion can be included in its nature, or can incorporate 
 with its identity, . . . < 252 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Admitting a principle of Corhiption, it cannot ultimate- 
 ly destroy the Soul. The Soul cannot perish, either 
 from choice or necessity; — nor from any material 
 cause; — nor from an immaterial cause;— nor from 
 the presence, or absence, of any natural power. It 
 is invariably independent, inaccessible to all violence, 
 aud necessarily immortal « ■ 262 
 
XXXVIU CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 We have no conception that an iiiimaterial substance 
 can exist, abstractedly from all life and conscigus- 
 ness. Consciousness distinguishes an immaterial 
 substance both from matter and nonentity. Such a 
 substance cannot be compreheqdied- within the defi- 
 nition either of matter or spirit, God may create 
 substances equally remote from matter and, spirit. 
 The removal of consciousness from an immaterial 
 substance destroys its identity. Identity and exists 
 ence inseparabllg. ~ Consciousness, &c. essential to 
 all known immaterial substances, 272 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 The soul is a simple essence. Its simplicity secures its 
 immortality. The soul cannot lose its essential pro- 
 perties, nor perish Vhile it retains them. This not 
 arguing in a circle. The essence and essential pro- 
 perties of the soul co-exist together. These mutual- 
 ly support ea«h other in and by their co-existeflce. 
 The essence of matter iniperishaMe ; that of the soul 
 imperishable also, . . . 2§2 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 The Soul existing independently of created power, can- 
 not he approached' by* it Ind'ependeirce and uility 
 guard its immortality. Inherence of its essential' pro- 
 perties can nevCT be made the medium of the souPs 
 annihiktion. Tliese essential properties can never 
 be lost prior to annihilation, ip the act, nor subise- 
 qnent upon it. The Soul cannot perish^farough aa- 
 mbilation as its ceuise, . ....... S^ 
 
CONTENTS. kXiilX 
 
 SECTION VI: 
 
 Na act of annihilation can destroy the Soul. An d£* 
 tion must exist before any effect can be producecl by 
 it. , The supposition that the Soul can perish by an 
 annihilating act, includes several contradictions. The 
 utter privation of Being, cannot be the annihilating 
 act, because the destruction of the Soul is necessary 
 to give this action birth. The Soul incapable of 
 being annihilated. All actions, with which we have 
 any acquaintance, must include progression. Illus- 
 trated by two familiar instances. Progression 
 wholly inapplicable to that action which can destroy 
 the Soul, because of its unity. No action which in- 
 cludes progression can annihilate the Soul, and none 
 can exist without progression, 296 
 
 SECTION VII, 
 
 The actual extinction of Being, necessary to our idea of 
 that extinction. The extinguishing action cannot 
 exist until the soul is extinguished by it. Such an 
 action cannot possibly extinguish it. That whicb an- 
 nihilates the soul, must exist previously to its annihi- 
 lation. Nothing can act before it has a Being. No 
 destroying action can be sai^ to exist, until the non- 
 entity of the soul gives it birth. Annihilation can 
 never be known to be possible though it were a 
 fact, . . ^ .308 
 
AN 
 
 PART I. 
 
 ARGUMENTS WHICH ILLUSTRATE AND PROVE THE 
 IMMATERIALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 MATTEn FROM ITS KNOWN PROPERTIES, INCAPABLE OF 
 THOUGHT AND yOLITION IN ANY FORM. 
 
 'section I. 
 
 f 
 
 Every thing in Nature known to us, included within thie 
 <:onfines of Matter and Spirit. Design of the present 
 
 :, leofk respecting these two substances. Mancompoundr 
 ed of Matter and Spirit. The union of these two sub- 
 stances mysterious, and the manner cf it unknown. — 
 Substance' in general defined. Reasons and facts 
 which induce us to believe that immaterial substances 
 eaist, and that the Human soul is such a suifstance. 
 
 In the vast empire of created nature, there are 
 but two primary substances with which we are 
 acqua,inted, which have in themselves a positive, 
 existence, and these are, matter and spirit. 
 Within the confines of these two substancfes, all 
 bpecieS" of Being, whether animate or inanimate, 
 as well as the individuals of each species, claim 
 their f^atence, and ultimately resolve them- 
 
selves. And although the diversified scenery of 
 nature, may furnish the senses with an infinite 
 variety, yet these two substances, are respective- 
 ly and invariably in -^ their physical natures the 
 same; and the phenomena of nature are nothing: 
 more than the distinct modifications under which 
 these substances are presented, through the 
 senses, to the intellectual powers. 
 
 These two substances have their beings inde- 
 pendently of each other, having properties which 
 are totally distinct, and which jthey cannot par- 
 take in common with one another.* 
 
 * It has frequently been asserted — ^that man is a threefold 
 compound, consisting oi .ho^, soul) and spirit ! — that the body 
 is formed of gross corporeal particles ; — that the spirit is pure 
 intelligence ; — and, that the soul is a kind of ethereal vehicle, in 
 ■which the spirit is enclosed, in order to its union -with the g^'dsser 
 compages of the body.-. Such is the;notion of bo<iy, souly and 
 spirit ! ' • . , ; . ; ■ 
 
 Perhaps an inability to comprehend^ how, pwre.^rii could be 
 inunediately connected with partidles so gross as. those of which 
 the human body isi composed, may be ?tm,ong. the primary causes 
 of this theory of man. And hence,the conception of tl^is ethereal 
 vehicle, which is presumed to act as a medium between these two 
 distant nature's. ' , , .; 
 
 That we cannot conceive how two ^natures, so physically dis- 
 'tant from each other, as matter and spirit are, can be immediate- 
 ly united, is a truth which I readily adinit ; but I fear that the 
 admission of an ethereal vehicle> willgive the diffictdty no solo- 
 tion. The sublimation of matter can. never iiesbeof any of its 
 permanent properties, nor in any wisf change the identity of its 
 nature . Let any given portion of matter pass eitWr thf ough an 
 alieiribic oiF alchymy, or ah alembic of tW mind, Ihe satfie epn^ 
 dtisibamnst ine^€tably follow.— rAsre caw Se riotTwrig htt.t'iiiatttr 
 
Th^ desigtt c»f the following pages, is to make a 
 ipatiotial iiixjuiry intd the existence df these sub- 
 staiices, to point out a few of the most distinguish^ 
 ing qualities of their distinct natures, and appro- 
 priate' fd each of thetii, a few of those discriminat- 
 ing pr'operties'from whence lioth are respectively 
 
 tolsoi^ice/ifiement can Uav^ behind, aiid there is nothing put matter 
 ivhifih, xefinement cqn take away. Theibnly ch^inges wljichrefijie- 
 Inent cin produce in matter, are, an alteration of its specific, 
 quantity, or a new arrangement of its component parts ; but 
 iiOT^'this new arrangement of' partis, or alteration in quantity, 
 earn lidnder it more dabble of an imnlediate alliE^nce withpufe 
 spirit^ I corifi^s myself wholly unable to discern. 'She rarest- 
 atmpSpheie with which we are acquainted, can be no nearer lii, 
 v|)oint,(?f nature to true spiritj than a rock of adamant ; /and we 
 can ho more coriceive how an alliance can be effected with lihe 
 one than with tjie other. The union of two distinct, natures, 
 wfccti in themselves have no relation to one another, can never 
 be produced by any thing in the natures themselves, and can be 
 ascribed only to the power of that God, to whom all things are 
 possible. , . , . 
 
 ifewever muiJh refined tile soul or etliereal velucle miy he, 
 certain it is, that it must be either matter .or.spirit ; if the former^ 
 we are exactly at the same loss to account for its union with 
 pure spirit, as we afe for that of the body, if we suppose no such 
 tiling as ,an ethereal vehicle to exist. , If, on the' contrary, we 
 suppose the soul to be spirit,^ the same difficulty meets uS; in 
 ano^er stage ; for although we ihight be altle to .assign some 
 reasons how a spiritual substance could be enclosed within a spi^- 
 ritual vehicle, yet how a spiritual vehicle can-unite with the gross 
 matter of our bodies, I fear we shall feel ourselves rather at a 
 loss to say. ' The admission, therefore, o{ a third principle in 
 the ccimpoiund of man, appears in my \!iew, tp add to the em- 
 Ijarrassmeiits whicli are necessarily, included in the.\inion,_ with- 
 out affor^ng us a single ray of light^ or removing a single ob- 
 
 B 2 
 
denominated and known ;— properties which are 
 at once inseparable from the substances in which 
 they inhere, and exclusively applicable to their 
 respective substances only. 
 
 It is foreign to my present design to investigate 
 all those properties, which may either positively 
 oi" relatively claim their inherence in these sub- 
 stances ; my aim being only to ascertain certain 
 prominent features, by which these separate na- 
 tures niay be distinguished from one another. 
 
 It is certain, that whatsoever is an essential pro- 
 perty of any substance, must be always applica- 
 ble to that substance— applicable to each species 
 which it includes, to each individual of that spe- 
 cies, and inseparable from it ; to suppose other- 
 
 stacle. I shall therefore use the Words soul and spirit indiscii> 
 minately through this Essay, . and consider its union with the. 
 body among those mysteries which human ingenuity can never 
 penetrate, and which must for ever rest in the eternal God. 
 
 It has, indeed, heen said, that unless pure spirit be enclosed 
 in a vehicle which is material, we cannot conceive how pure 
 spirit can be rendered visible to our bodily organs. But surely 
 this is not the language either of reason or philosophy. If the 
 soiils of the departed be evdr rendered visible to our bodily ors' 
 gans, it must be through the agency of supernatural power ; 
 and to attempt to account upon natural principles, for a phe- 
 nomenon which is admitted to be supernatural, is to destroy 
 thie very foundation upon which an apparition is supposed to 
 stand. The very moment we can account for the visibility of 
 spirit upon principles of reason, from, that very moment it, 
 ceases to be supernatural ; and by attempting to make that to 
 ha. natural J which, we adjpit to be supernatural, we attempt to. 
 account for that which we admit to be unaccountable. 
 
wise is a contradiction. For if any property 
 can be separated from that nature to the exist- 
 ence of which it is essential, the property so se- 
 parated, is no longer essential to the existence 
 of that nature; and -we are led to this conclu- 
 sion, — that it is an essential property, and not 
 an essential property at the same time. 
 
 I cannot doubt, that both matter and spirit, 
 have a variety of latent powers, which may for 
 ever elude the researches of finite penetration, 
 and, as to their physical origin, rest for ever in 
 the. knowledge of the Great Supreme alone. 
 Nevertheless, we behold in each of them ti va- 
 riety of emanations, from whence we obtain the 
 knowledge of the certainty of their existence, 
 while the primary qualities, together with the 
 substances in which all known properties in- 
 here, must remain permanent in theniselves, in 
 order to the display of those sensible qualities,^ 
 which are invariably the same, and from whence 
 we denommate lioth matter and spirit. 
 
 But while the Almighty God has made these 
 substances distinct from one ajiother, and incor- 
 porated with them certain primary qualities 
 which are necessarily co-essential with them- 
 selves, and incommunicable to each other, the 
 substratum or substances in which these qualities 
 inhere, are concealed from the researches of phi-- 
 losophy, if not placed beyond the reach of ?ill 
 finite coi]iip]reheiision. 
 
6 
 
 ilJt^is fram- ol^erwng the differences in these 
 qualities, thatweJknow to what substance they 
 belong, and from th§n(^e we dgjcide whether the 
 su)?stance be spiritual or material. ,■ 
 
 , I ha4 long thought, when revolving these ab- 
 s,trjise subjects in my mjnd, that th©; tejrm ^r 
 stance was inapplicable to any thing of anim- 
 jtnaterialBature; but if I mistake not, IVIr. J^ocjce, 
 in one of his letters to. the. Bishop of Worcester, 
 observes, " that the term substance, when thus 
 ^' applied, is only used to express tijiat jjanaeless 
 ^' sopaething, in -vyrhiioh ftos§ quaJaties exist 
 * ' which we perceive, and is used thus, fe? want 
 " of a niore expressive tenu," J)x, W^tts also 
 says, " a substance, is a Peing which cau sub- 
 *' sistljy i|;§elf, without dependence upon awy 
 'f ptJier created being. The pption of s^bsistt<« 
 f ing by itself, gives occasion J;<) logicians tQ call 
 *' it substance."* 
 
 * The general definition w(ljiehha^;been given to siibstancCj, 
 ig, that it w that which supports accidents. J see nothing 
 errMeousAn this definition;, biit I conceive that it is defective. 
 Itor if theiidea of its' supporting accidents;, be'adlnitted ks a 
 full definition of substance, I conceive that it Traill bei attended 
 T|ri|;h,some difpcj:^ltie^ to distipgaishs.ub^tfir^e&pia-\})fipriinary 
 modification of.it. For aJtJiQugh in ^ primary senses ^acd, 
 dents are supported \>j substance, yet in a secondary , sense the 
 modification of substance is essentially necessary to the exist-» 
 ence of some accidents which we {iei-yive' res tilting from tl^at 
 {ieculiar modification ; and the shad^ -vyhich di^detiifepe two 
 species of accidents, ^re so minute^oj^ -W^f^sg^liSJe, tthdtfthe 
 
From these defiaitioos giwenr by >Mr., Lojcke, 
 and Dr. Watts, if I understand their words 
 aright, it evidently appears that the t&yia s^ 
 stance, is not aeceSsarUy confined within the 
 limits of corporiety, ^a^t may he with equal pro- 
 yribety applied to any thing which includes with 
 in jt§ nature the idea of self-subsistence, though 
 t© corporeal Being, that nature bears no physi- 
 <5al relatijoi). If then we discover wi;(iiin; our 
 pjinds, not only thetvi^o powers of Understand- 
 ing and Will, but th^t of consciousness ^j^icl^ 
 accompanies the former, an4 that of volitipp 
 which results frpig tihe latter, our v;ews are j}^ 
 cessarily conducted to some common substance, 
 in iwbich these primary and secondary powers 
 claim their inherence, and yi^out which it 
 would befinapo^sible for them to h^ve either an 
 independent or a relative ^ifiist^ijjqe., i^or should 
 we admit either /Consciousness or volitjon to 
 exist, while we deny th^ existence of a substance 
 which is conscious and which fWs, we <;annpt 
 buit involve ourselves in ab^urnjitip^ ^^^^iVs^b^J 
 la^e the follQWiing : — . , , ,;:.-,; > , j ,v 
 
 mind is .oppressed with difficulties in drawine- thai line of de- 
 markation which divides them from one another. But inad- 
 lidtting the definition' here given by Mr. Locke aHd Dr. Wattsi 
 the hoi'iSajn is widened, a(nd' a greater latitude is. assumed, 
 whiQh, while it includes aU tliat is comprehended in,4h^ifpjr- 
 mer ^^^itiqn, ,*7°i^i? . those di^qultie;^ whichrare iij^eparahle 
 ^roiuit, , , 
 
8 
 
 If consciousness and volition be admitted to 
 exist abstractedly from all inherence in some 
 substance, they must include within themselves 
 the nature of self-subsistence, and produce 
 Tvithin the mind the same idea. Now if they 
 possess the nature of self-subsistence, it is evi- 
 dent that they must be capable of existing ab- 
 stractedly from their own operations, for it 
 would be absurd to imagine that a self-subsist- 
 ing principle, depended for its existence upon 
 its own activity. But in admitting conscious- 
 ness and volition to exist without their ovrn 
 operations, we shall be compelled to admit an 
 unconscious consciousness, and a volition that 
 is destitute of activity and will ; both of which 
 conclusions involve contradictions. 
 
 In pursuing these absurdities we must also 
 be obliged to deny that necessary connection, 
 which we cannot but acknowledge to subsist 
 between those mental powers which all possess. 
 Hence, if consciousness can include within it 
 the nature of self-subsistence, it may be sepa- 
 rated from the understanding in which it has 
 been supposed to inhere, and also from' all 
 those subordinate powers with which it is con- 
 nected, and even from its own operations, by 
 which alone it is known to exist. In like 
 manner, volition, by being thus endued with 
 the power of self-subsistence, may e^ist without 
 any dependence upon a prior principle, and 
 
9 
 
 "without any of those active exertions which 
 constitute its nature, and enable us to know 
 that it 'exists. Thus the final result will be, 
 that all the powers of soul will be raised, into 
 distinct independent substances, by which the 
 mrity of the soul will be destroyed, and its 
 identity annihilated ; and these imaginary sub- 
 stances will usurp that station which our own 
 folly had rendered vacant. 
 
 Such are the absurdities which must result 
 from the Supposition that the soul is not a sub- 
 stance, or a something distinct* at least in idea, 
 from that consciottsness and volition, which are 
 and must be qualities of it. And whether the 
 , soul be matter or spirit, , certain it is, that as 
 these faculties cannot include within them- 
 selves the nature of self-subsistence, some sub- 
 stance must be admitted to exist, in which 
 alone these properties can inhere. • ^ 
 
 If then, the term substance may be applied 
 both to corporeal and incorporeal Seing; I 
 shall, in the following pages, use the term in- 
 discriminately, as expressing that something in 
 which those qualities inhere, that are essential 
 to those natures of which I may have occasion 
 to speak. 
 
10 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Natum and essential ptteperties of Matler. ■ All esseiu- 
 tial properties must co-^seist with their suhstanoefit 
 loith one another- Matter must Jill empty space. 
 
 W^HAT^VEli is material, mu^^ 1^9,-Ye all tliQ^? 
 properties which are essential ,t;o matter,, be- 
 cause, it is from thes,e,es^!^njtial properties that 
 its nature is both denominate^ and Jcnq^ssTi. 
 Among those properties which are necessary 
 tp the existence of ipg.tter, may be inG|luded,,itS 
 s,QUdity, its fnagnity^e, and figwe. Withqut 
 these dis,tingujshii;ig propprti^, we can fQ^rm 
 no conception of any thing that is material, an4 
 in what subject soever we find these propertiies, 
 from that discovery we denominate this sub- 
 stance to be material. Nor are these iproper- 
 ties mere accidents of matter. The impossibi- 
 lity of conceiving a,ny thing which is material, 
 to exist where these properties are i mot, will 
 satisfactorily prove that they are essential to 
 its nature, and therefore necessary to its ex- 
 istence. For if any given portion of matter, 
 though ever so minute, can be conceived to ex- 
 ist, though it have undergone every modifica- 
 tion of which it is capable in the endless series 
 of divisibility, still these properties must inva- 
 riably adhere to its minutest parts, and be as 
 
11 
 
 lappU cable to an atom as to a globe. Neither 
 is it possible for us to conceive a sepajratipn 
 between them. Where there is solidity, tbere 
 must hemo,gmtv4e, spd where there is magni- 
 tude, there must b^ Jigwfe , and if we could 
 qqfjioeive either pf these qualities to be destroy- 
 ed, the others must necessarily perish with it. 
 Tbe infinite divisibility which matter is capable 
 of undergoing, cannot affect its permanent qua- 
 lities ; each particle is an equal partaker; and 
 where thcise qualities 9fe supposed to be done 
 away, there the idea of twattej? can be no miose- 
 In a4ditian. to this, ^all imtter must be «»- 
 t^tided in prQpodrtian to its vwgm4'i*de. For, if 
 we subtract the idea of extension fropa any ma- 
 terial substance, the ideas of mUdity, magm- 
 tf^ip, and .j/%'»tr^, roust perish with it, and ihe 
 mind is left in possession of a perfect nonentity. 
 Tbe idea of imatter is also necessarily connect- 
 ed with that of space ; not, that space is an es- 
 sential property of matter, or to be reckoned 
 amongst its modeS; or accijdents, but it is that 
 pure expansion in which all substances must 
 exist. The identity of pure space can be no 
 otherwise affected by matter, than, that it is 
 engrossed or empty in proportion to its pre- 
 sence or absence ; and in proportion as space 
 if devoid of matter, matter is devoid of ^xisit- 
 ^^ce.,, ^ Jf, ,th§n» matt^i: cannot e^ist abstracted- 
 ly .from Jjjpse given spaces \\fhich it occupies, 
 
J2 
 
 space itself must be necessary to the existence 
 of matter, although it is not an essential pro- 
 perty of its nature. And as the ideas of soli- 
 dity, magnitude, figure, and extension, are all 
 necessary to our idea of matter, and are inse- 
 parable from it, and from ea,ch, other; it fol- 
 lows, that matter, under every -mode of divisi- 
 bility which it is capable of undergoing, must 
 be a solid, extended, divisible substance^ always 
 partaking of magnitude and figure. Indeed, 
 magnitude and figure are but mere properties, 
 and therefore can have but relative existences ; 
 and whenever we form conceptions of them, 
 we mention, them in relation to some substance 
 ^ in which they inhere ; and if we destroy that 
 relation, we can no more form an idea of either, 
 that we can of black, blue, or red, without hav- 
 ing a reference to some portion of matter in 
 which these colours exist by inherence, which 
 every one knows is totally impossible. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Spiritual or immaterial substances may exist.' The es- 
 sence of Mattel- and Spirit unknown. Properties of 
 a spiritual substance exist in our minds. Proper- 
 ties of Matter and Spirit united together in man. 
 
 The existence of matter being so evident as 
 to admit of sensible proof, leaves no room for 
 argument to prove its certainty. But actual 
 
13 
 
 esci^tence does not terminate here. There are 
 spiritual substances, which also must have a 
 positive existence ; though, by being incalpable 
 of communicating themselves through the me- 
 dium of sensation like.matter, they are more 
 remote from common apprehension. Distance, 
 in nature, is, however, no more a proof of the 
 non-existence of spirit, than distance in space 
 is a proof of the non-existence of matter. Po- 
 sitive existence can have no J-elation, either to 
 distance or perception : it is true, that clear- 
 ness of apprehension conmoiunicates to the 
 mind, the idea of assurance, and this assurance 
 the certainty of its Being ; but Being itself, 
 .exists independently, either of our clearness of 
 apprehension, or our assurance o.f:^he certainty 
 of its existence; Not only so, but whatsoever 
 has a positive existraice, must have existed an- 
 tecedently to our apprehension of it ; because 
 apprehension in its very nature, supposes the 
 pre-existence of that which is apprehended ; 
 for to suppose it possible, for us to have an ap- 
 prehension of what had not a previous exist- 
 ence, is to suppose we can apprehend what 
 has , no existence, which includes this con- 
 tradiction, that we can apprehend, __ that of 
 which it is impossible for us to have the most 
 distant apprehension. 
 
 Hence, then, it follows, that there may be 
 other substances, whose constitutions are 
 
14 
 
 wholly disti^t ffdtti that of matter. And^ 
 ail though their essences may .be totally tm- 
 kno'vm t6 us, their existence may, ncTertheless,. 
 be certain and positive ; and this existence 
 ma:y be ascertained by certain qualities, which 
 af e ai once discoverable by us, and absolutely 
 ins*p^Efcrable from th6m. This is a fact which 
 will admit of no dispute, though there may be 
 sOiite properties in these substances, with tvhich 
 we are unacquainted, by their being placed at 
 a distance too remote, for the human intellect 
 to grasp. For, as our pel'ception of existence' 
 dep*ends upon existence itself for its own being-, 
 and not existence upon our perception of it, 
 nothing more is iiecessary to our certainty of 
 the existence ,Sf an immaterial substance, thaW 
 some line which will lead u's with precision to 
 that spiritual source from whence it emanated. 
 And, if in exploring these intellectual regions^ 
 but one ray bah be found, which will infellibly 
 lead us to thie genuine source from whence it 
 sptuhg, i't is suflSicient to all the purposes of de-' 
 monstration ; and that demonstration will a^ 
 iafkl'libly prOve both the real existence and na- 
 ture of that source, as if it had been an object 
 of animal sensation. 
 
 That matter does exist, has been already ad- 
 mitted and defined ; and, that spiritual substan- 
 ces exist also, is a truth no less certain : it is; 
 true, we can by no meAns ccrtnprehignd the 
 
15 
 
 physical natttre of spirit ; neither can we com* 
 prehend thsA of mattef ; but this waMt of coffl-' 
 prehension, no more preclad^s the possibility 
 of thci existence of the former, than of the lat- 
 ter: That secret extended somethings in which 
 ms^nitude and flgiire inhere, has hitherto elu- 
 ded the researches of philosophy, iSnd rendered 
 itself, known by those properties only, which 
 are at once essential to, and inseparable fifOtit 
 its nattrre ; and, in like manner, the real "eSsen^ 
 ces of all Spiritual substances, are in themselYes 
 inknown to the human mind ; ' an'd the sub- 
 stance itself is demonstrated to exist, only by 
 those »<Jualiti6fe which we discover in the facul- 
 ties Of Oilr own minds : —qualities which iKatter 
 is incapable of producing, and which therefore 
 can flow from no other than st spirittial snd- 
 siUHce. 
 
 , ■ It is certain, "from what has been already 
 si^/ that, wherever cotisciousness, and voIMdri, 
 are found to exist, they plsrinly demonstrate 
 the etxistence of some cominon principle in 
 which theytoh^re, to which they belong, and 
 froWl which they are inseparable. For could 
 #e sftjifpose that there might X)6"i;onscimsness 
 and- vofeW^, while we deny the existence dfk 
 conscious and willing ptincipte' in which they 
 inhere, we should be under the necessity of 
 jcdffiitting that there may 'be consciousness; 
 Miile nothing is supposed to be coASdiOti^, and 
 
1@ 
 
 that there may be volition, although there b^ 
 nothing which wills. If, then, it can be proved, 
 that consciousness and volition do exist, it ne- 
 cessarily follows, that there must be some ipn- 
 mory principle: {rom whence they flow, some 
 substance in which they inhere, and without 
 which- they could "have no relative existence : 
 and to trace this consciousness to its substance, 
 to examine whether this substance be rAaterial 
 or immaterial, is one principal design which I 
 propose to myself in the following sheets. 
 
 When the infinitely wise God, for physical 
 reasons which he has thought proper to con- 
 ceal from us, called intoexistence a race of 
 beings, which he has denominated human ; he 
 united in this link in the vast chain of Being, 
 those different qualities, from the existe;nce of 
 which we denominate both matter and spirit. 
 How this strange connexion is formed, or by 
 what secret ties these distant natures are unit- 
 ed together, is not placed within the reach of 
 human comprehension to discover ; nor is the 
 discovery thereof any ways concerned in the 
 subject which lies before us. That Man, with 
 respect to his body, is material, no one can 
 doubt ; we partake, in common with all other 
 given portions of matter all its essential proper- ' 
 ties. Our bodies partake of magnitude and 
 figure; they are necessarily extended; iand 
 they Qccupy space, l?i|s is so evident, that 
 
if 
 
 pl-oof itself would be an insult on so clear a 
 point. 
 
 In addition to those corporeal parts of which 
 our bodies are composed, every man discovers 
 within himself, an evident consciousness of his 
 own existence. We perceive the existence of 
 material objects' by sensation ; and by recol- 
 lecting the past, and anticipating the future, we 
 take into one view, the relations which subsist 
 between things, and discover the necessary 
 connection which there is between certain 
 causes and their effects. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Coascmiisness, Volition, Judgment, and Perception, 
 having no positive existence in themselves^, demon- 
 strate the positive ea^iitence of some substance in 
 yshich they inhere. Substance distinguished from 
 its essential properties, and further defined. 
 
 W^HILE the ideas of consciousness, volition, 
 and perception, are admitted to exist, the un- 
 derstanding is necessarily carried, in a re- 
 trospective manner, to some substance in which 
 these properties unite together;, and, at the 
 same time, is carried forward to some object 
 which is perceived ; and hence the mind be- 
 comes cqnscious of its own operations, '^o 
 suppose, otherwise, would lead us to conclude, 
 that we were conscious, without being con- 
 
18 
 
 oious of any thing,-^that the will was in ex€i^ 
 cise, while it was destitute of choice, — and 
 that the mind perceived, though it pete^Ted 
 nothing. If then, consciousness, volition, and 
 perception, imply both a source and an object, 
 .it follows from hence, that this mental vacuity 
 is the great field of action, -in which the under- 
 standing operates., „ It is here that by forming 
 intenmediate ideas; it proceeds j step by step, 
 until it has connected together apparently- dis- 
 tant objects, without the aids of which we 
 could not perceive the connexion which sub- 
 sists between them. As, then, the activity of 
 the mind implies both a source and an object 
 in all its operations, it is a sufficient demon- 
 stration that consciqUsness, volition, and per- 
 ception, do exist, and from this existence an 
 active principle must follow also ; for without 
 this, nothing but absolute inertness could re- 
 main. 
 
 But while these primary actions of the soul 
 are necessarily admitted to exist, we find in 
 our minds, a judgment forming itself, upon per- 
 ception, and electing or rejecting objects which 
 are presented to our view, in proportion as the 
 real or fancied excellencies of these objects 
 are supported by evidence^ 
 
 I said, forming itself upon our perception; 
 for in the nature of things, it is evident that 
 perception^ must have existed previously to our 
 
19 
 
 judgments ; for unless wig admit this previous 
 existence of perception, we must suppose the 
 judgment to decide upon 'what (to us) can 
 havet no existerwse. In addition to this, we 
 discorer certain preponderations of mind, by 
 which we either adopt or reject such things as 
 present themselves to our view. These aidop- 
 tions or rejections, may be termed volitions, or 
 the actions of the will.' That "ev^j volition is 
 but pn action, will appear when we consider, 
 that volition can halve no permanent existence : 
 for whatever^ has a real andpermanent exist- 
 ence must be independent, arid what is inde- 
 pendent must be invariably the same. Without 
 this uniformity, its existence cannot be ascfer-' 
 taJB^; andto s^e2k: oi permanent existence, 
 wMehM times may iiE, and at othei* times may 
 ceaiseto B«, is a conti-adiction. JPor could, we 
 concave ariy thing which has a permanent ex- 
 isffewee, to dispense with that mode of Being for 
 any given time, and yet to retain its name ; by 
 the same mod« o| reaspjiing it might dispense 
 with its Being entirely, and we must give in 
 this case, a positive existence to a nonentity. 
 
 That volition does not invariably exist, is 
 evident, pot only frorp, the irregularity of its 
 manner, l)ut from its p^s^jng from one object 
 to another* Now if it be admitted, that it is' 
 capable of exerting itself in different directions ; 
 
 I would 'ksk;— What is become of its existence 
 
 c 2 
 
w 
 
 in that moment of duration in which it passesf 
 from one object to another? — Between its for- 
 saking one exertion, and putting forth another, 
 in the next link of successive action ? Here it 
 is certain it can have no existence. Or if it 
 have,, it must be a volition without any volition, 
 which is a contradiction in terms. 
 
 As volition must in this interim necessarily 
 cease to exist ; it follows from hence, that its 
 existence cannot be permanent ; and if not per- 
 ipianent, it can only exist in relation to some 
 principle from which it results. Nothing can 
 produce no action. Mere nothing can have no 
 accidents. And as nothing must ever result 
 from nothing, volition itself demonstrates the 
 positive existence of some primary substance. 
 As, therefore, volition is what every man pos- 
 sesses, — as it can have no positive existence of 
 itself, — and can never result from nothing, the 
 positive existence of some primary substance,*, 
 necessarily _follows, 
 
 * Whatever the real, internal nature o£ substance may loe 
 in itself, it is very certain, that our abstract idea of it is very 
 confused and incomplete. But it is equally certain, that the 
 confusedness and incompleteness of our ideas, can in no case 
 affect the certainty of its existence. The existence of aU ma"- 
 terial substances^ becomes cei^ain, from the knov^ledge which 
 we have of those primary qualities which cannot exist of 
 themselves, whether they be separately or collectively consi- 
 , dered. When we perceive magnitude, ponderosity, and figure^ 
 in any given portion of matter, we well know, that magni- 
 
^1 
 
 But although I have hitherto spoken of con- 
 sciousness, volition, perception, And judgment, I 
 would not wish to insinuate, that these proper- 
 ties can have any existence independently of 
 one another. They are only the modifications 
 
 lv,de, ponderosity t aadfigure^ cannot exist o£ themselves ; and 
 we are naturally led to conceive the existence of something in 
 which these qualities do inhere, and from whence we "derive 
 our ideas of them. Thus for instance,— the ideas of' magni- 
 tude, ponderosity, figinre, and solidity, are aH necessary to 
 our idea of iron; but neither magraitwde, ponderosity, _/igMre, 
 nor solidity, whether taken separately or collectively, can give 
 to us the idea of iron ; and yet so closely interwoven in the 
 very nature of iron, are these qualities, that if we subtract 
 ail, or either of them from the nature or idea of iron, both the 
 idea and nature of iron must necessarily perish also. It is 
 from hence we learn, — ^that the substance of iron, must be a 
 something distinct &om all these qualities, though totally in- 
 separable from them. This secret something, in which these 
 qualities exist, is, therefore, that to which the term substance 
 is justly applied in all material bodies. 
 
 When from a substance which is material, we turn to one 
 that is immaterial ; the same modes of reasoning wiU carry 
 us up to the certainty of its existence ; although we can form 
 no idea whatever of the internal constitution of its nature 
 For neither consciousness, volition, perception, nor judgment, 
 includes, withia itself the idea of self-subsistence ; nor can 
 these qualities,, whether taken individually or collectively, in- 
 dude within themselves the nature or idea of an immaterial 
 substance. The substance in which these qualities inhere, 
 must be a somethirtg distinct from the qualities themselves, ' 
 but totally inseparable from them ;— -a something which has hi- 
 therto eluded all human penetration, and baffled the researches 
 ^f philosophy, both la material and immateriEvl natures, 
 
22 
 
 of thg aQtioHS of that common principlie in 
 which they inhere ; and as none, of theses . qua- 
 lities can have but a relative existence, 'they 
 plainly carry the mind up to that source from 
 whence thqy flow :— a source, which mugt he 
 immaterial, or else we must suppose matter to 
 have communicated to these qualities; a nature 
 which it does not possess, and consequently ^ 
 nature that it .could not bestow. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Mental qualities cannot arise from Matter. Think- 
 ing not an essential property of matter. Absurd 
 conclusions to which the supposition would lead. 
 JPrpvedto be impossible by a vanetyof arguments^ 
 
 1 HE positive existence of some source, being 
 thus far explored, the great question now pre- 
 sents itself to our view. Is this common prin- 
 ciple or substance from whence these mental 
 qualities flow— mafma/T or immaterial ? Can 
 consciousness, volition, perception. Sec. .^e essen- 
 tial to, or result from matter? Are these quali- 
 ties material in themselves? If they be^ does 
 not the supposition include within it -several 
 contradictions; If not material, can matter 
 produce qualities which have no .relation to it- 
 self? These are questions which I purpose 
 briefly to examine. 
 
 li this substance', from whence these qualities 
 
23 
 
 flow, be ma/erta/, it then follows that matter 
 itself iBust think. Now, if mere matter, con- 
 sidered as such, be originally capable of think-- 
 ing, thinking mvist be an essential property of 
 its nature J and if thinking be an; essential 
 pisoperty, no portion of matter can exist ab- 
 s^fcractedly from it ; without admitting this, its 
 essentiaUty- is done away. Now if we admit 
 every portion of matter, whether animate or 
 inanimate^ to think, this thinking must be an- 
 nexed to it, under all its mutations of infinite 
 divisibility ; and then, either this thinking must 
 adhere to some .pai*ticular part of this divisible 
 portion ; or be divided with it. If the. former, 
 then those portions of matter, whifch are de- 
 tached from that part to which this thinking 
 adheres, must exist where no thinking can 
 possiblybe ; ahd this demonstrates — that think- 
 ing is not essential to its nature. But, if we 
 suppose .thinking to be divided with the divi- 
 sions of matter^ it can then exist in.no part of 
 tiiis divided portion. For to suppose think- 
 ing- 'to. be divided, and to exist by inherence, in 
 several -portions of divide4 matter, is to sup- 
 pose it to exist,- and not to exist, at the same 
 time. As, therefore, the idea of a , divided 
 thinking includes a.cont|radiction, it necessarily 
 fellows-r-that ^in either case, thinking cannot 
 be essential to any material substance. 
 Ithas been already proved, — that maWer is 
 
24 
 
 an extended substance ; and if it be capable 
 of thinking, thinking must be either as exten- 
 sive as its dimensions, or confined to some 
 particular part. If the former, let us suppose ' 
 any given portion of this extended substance 
 to exist, throughout which we .will admit think- 
 ing to be diffused. In this case, if the actions 
 of this diffused principle, were to be at once 
 directed to the central point of this, extended 
 substance, thinking must operate in opposite 
 directions, which opposition in its directions 
 will at once prove the diversity of its nature, 
 and consequently destroy the identity of its 
 existence. For if a simple action of the mind, 
 can arise from a principle which is necessarily 
 extended and diffused ; this action must derive 
 its being, from an energy which cannot equally 
 contribute to its existence. But if it be the 
 latter, then it follows, that matter is different 
 from itself, because one part is supposed to be 
 capable of thinking, and the other parts not ; 
 which ends in this contradiction — that matter 
 thinks, and does not think at the same time. 
 
 Th.^ former, supposes an action of the mind 
 to arise from a cause which can give it no ex^ 
 istence.; and ih^Jatter, — that matter is capable 
 of thinking, and incapablfe at the same time: 
 the rational result therefore is,— that matter 
 cannot think. ; 
 
 Nor can we suppose^ that the. refinement, ox 
 
25 
 
 suhtil^ of any substance, can give to it a quali- 
 ty which it does not naturally possess. Matter, 
 under every modification, is but matter still. 
 No matter, therefore, can be refined beyond 
 thp boundaries of its nature ; it is a contradic- 
 tion to suppose it. If, therefore, the soul be 
 material, it must be formed of parts ; — must be 
 an extended substance, and capable of diyisi- 
 bility : and from hence it follows, that there 
 can be no distinction between soul and body, 
 except in modification ; and what is divided 
 by nothing but modification, must leave the 
 natures physically alike. And if those essen- 
 tial properties-vrhich. are applicable to the body, 
 be alike applicable to. the soul, all distinctions 
 vanishfin an instant, and the distinct identity 
 of the soul is at once done away. 
 
 If thinking be essential to the nature of 
 matter, thinking can assume no variety of 
 modes. 'The essential properties of a material 
 substance, must be as permanent in their na- 
 tures as the substance itself, with which its 
 essential properties must Jbe co^essential ; for 
 certain it is, that nothing which includes muta- 
 bility and diversity in its nature, can be an es- 
 sential property of a substance which is of it- 
 self restive and inert. The physical nature of 
 all substances must be permanent and fixed, 
 in order to the establishment of their Being, 
 and the preservation of their identity. And 
 
^6 
 
 m making that which includes mutability and 
 VUHdhleness, to be an essential property of a 
 substance, to the verj^ identity and existence 
 of which, piernianency must be admitted to i3e 
 absolutely necessary, we make that which is 
 jWMtoftfe and' variable to be an essential property 
 of that which is uniform and immutable. If, 
 therefore, thinking be an essential property 
 of Hiatter, either activity and variableness, 
 must be excluded from its nature, or,' wilth its 
 activity and variableness, thinking must be 
 an essential property of a substance, from tbe 
 perman^cy and stability of whose nature; 
 activity, and variableniess mustbe excluded :--- 
 in the former case we must destroy every idea 
 which we have of thinking, in order that we 
 may establish its source, which is proving the 
 existence iof a substance, by the destruction of 
 what is supposed. to be an essentiar property 
 of its nature ; and in the latter, iri order to 
 preserve thinking, we must compel it to des- 
 troy the> pferraanency of that substance from 
 whence we attempt to derive its existence. I 
 thjBrefore conclude, that thinking cannot be an 
 essereifm^ property of any material substance. 
 
 iTo affirm the soul to be material, and yet 
 to deny to it any of those properties by which 
 alone matter can be known, is to affirm it to 
 be matter and not matter at the same time. 
 Now if the soul have those properties which 
 
29 
 
 are insepavable from material substances, 
 which must be admitted if it be material, we 
 must then allow, either that thinking is ex- 
 tended through the whole soul, or that it is- 
 not. If it be extended or diffused throughout 
 the whole^ then no part of the soul can be said 
 to possess thinking entire ; and what is not 
 vJrtualljT included in every part, can never be 
 essentially a whole which is formed of these 
 parts. > Beside^, the thinking is but one, but 
 the divisible parts are numerous, and to Make 
 thinking, while we aeknowledgfe that it is but 
 dB(B» to be essential to parts which we cannot 
 number; is to make thinking to be but one, 'and 
 yet innumerable at thesaine timd/ If on the 
 conti-ary, thinking be not thus diffused Uirough 
 every divisible part, it then follows, from it? 
 being located, that the whole soul is not neces- 
 sary to its own existence. Thus in either case 
 the mind is cbhducted to a contradiction, and, 
 receding from each conclusidtt',' retires with "a 
 full conviction, that mere matter cannot Ihink? 
 In what light soever we survey matter and 
 thinking, we cannot but know that it is ex- 
 tremely easy for us to conceive the iformer as 
 existing perfect and entire, though we were to 
 detach fr6m it every idea of the latter. But 
 this would have been impossible if thinking 
 had been essential to matter. We can no more 
 conceive of matter as actually existing when 
 
28 
 
 we have taken from it the idea of extension, or 
 figure, than we can create a new substance 
 or annihilate one that now exists. This af- 
 fords us a satisfactory evidence that thinking 
 cannot be reckoned among its essential pro- 
 perties, seeing it' would have been impossible 
 for us to exclude it from the substance, and 
 permit this substance to survive a privation of 
 what was essential to its nature. 
 
 If thinking be an essential property of matter, 
 thinking and matter must be co-existent, for 
 the latter could never exist without the former, 
 seeing it is presumed to be an essential proper-, 
 ty of it. But since thinking is only an action, 
 it is absurd to imagine, that a mere action can- 
 co-exist with, or be an essential property of 
 that which can perfectly exist without it. 
 
 If thinking were an essential property of 
 matter, thinking could never exist where: mat- 
 ter is not. But fact demonstratively proves 
 that thinking can extend to objects which are 
 evidently not material, and operate in regions 
 which matter can never enter. From these 
 and similar considerations the conclusion is 
 certe,in, that thinking can never be an essen- 
 tial property of a material substance. 
 
^9 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Material bodies act by contact, hence neither con- 
 sciousness, nor thinking can result Jrom mere matter. 
 The mind can operate where matter is not. Matter 
 not infinite in its extension. The divisibility of mat- 
 ter prevents consciousness and thinking from result- 
 ing from it. 
 
 As neither thinking nor consciousness for rea- 
 sons already assigned, can be essential to mat- 
 ter, so neither from the considerations, follow- 
 ing, can either the former or the latter result 
 from it. The only possible ways in which 
 consciousness can result from matter, must be 
 from matter, as a substance, or from some pe- 
 culiar modification which it assumes. The 
 influ|H^ of matter can extend no further than 
 the contact of its surfaces; and under every 
 forai which it is capable of assuming, matter 
 can be but matter still. If the mutual contact 
 of material bodies be entirely prevented, in 
 that instant it is certain, that all influence 
 must cease to exist. For could we suppose 
 the influence of matter, to extend beyond the 
 physical contact of material bodies, we must 
 suppose it then to be where it is not ; and to 
 operiate and produce effects beyond those cop-! 
 fines of nature which limit its existence. '' 
 If a ball, shot from 'the mouth of a canno«; 
 
30 
 
 were to move onward with all its velocity to 
 some destined object, it could produce no 
 effect, but in proportion as its surfaces were 
 brought into contact with the surfaces of other 
 bodies: and though in the -progress of its mo- 
 tion it might rousfe from a state of mere pas- 
 siveness, other portions of matter, and com- 
 municate to them a motion 'from its' own im- 
 pulse ; yet it must be evident, that these por- 
 tions of matter thus put. in motion, could pro-^ 
 duce no effect, but by bringing their surfaces 
 into contact also with those of Other bodies on 
 which the effect was to be produced. Such, 
 therefore, is the uniform manner in which all 
 material bodies influence one another, and 
 without which no effect whatever can be pro- 
 duced.. And to suppose matter to produce 
 effects where it is not, is to suppose iii to ejc- 
 tend itself beyond its own existence ;— to act, 
 where from its absence it can have ho poweii 
 of acting, — and that it is present, and yet absent 
 at, the same time. As matter, therefore, can- 
 not possibly extend itself beyond its own ex!- 
 istence, nor ever act where it is not, it neces- 
 sarily follows, that consciousness cannot result 
 from any-material substance. v 
 
 If consciousness result, from matter, it must 
 depend upon matter for its existence ; and if 
 it thus be dejpendent, congdousness cannot 
 possibly exist where matter is not; And if 
 
31 
 
 matter ]be not infinite in its extension, there 
 must be in the immensity of space, pure expan-^ 
 sio^i; where no matter is. In this case I would 
 ask, — Is the mind of man capable of extending 
 its actioiBS through this pure distance, which is 
 thus supposed to be devoid of matter, or not? 
 If it be, we have then a clear idea of the mipd 
 acting where no matter is ; and if it can exist 
 and act vrhere matter is not, it undeniably fol- 
 lows, that consciousness neither results from 
 ma,tter, nor can be dependent on it for its ex- 
 istence. But, if the mind cann()t extend its 
 actions; in thi^ pure expansion, it mu^t be be- 
 catise something hinders ; but this is contrary 
 to. the supposition in the case given. For, as 
 every thing capable of obstructing its opera- 
 tions, is. supposed to be removed, it must fol 
 Iqw, that the mind must be at full liberty to 
 perform its operations, or we must be driven to 
 tb?.s conclusion, that something inust obstruct, 
 wl^n every thing capable of obstructing is sup- 
 posed to be removed. 
 
 If consciousness result ivovfi matter^ it must 
 exist virluaMy in the cause, as it dioesformally 
 in the effect ; for if this be not admitted, we 
 must suppose matter to be capable of producing 
 effects which it has no power to bring to pass,- 
 or that it does what it, is incapable of, doing, 
 whiqh is a contradiction. But if consciousUi^ss 
 exist virtually in the cause, as it does formally 
 
32 
 
 in the effect, the divisibility of matter must be 
 done away. For if we annex the idea of divi-' 
 sibility, to any portion of matter in which a 
 principle of consciousness is supposed virtually 
 to inhere, it will be impossible to detach the 
 idea of divisibility from this inherent conscious 
 power. And to ^dmit the possibility of an 
 effect to arise from a power which is necessarily 
 divided with that substance on which this 
 power depended fOr existence, is to admit the 
 certainty of an effect to arise from a cause 
 which must be necessarily destroyed. Hence 
 if the producing power be done away by divi- 
 sibility, which must be admitted, it necessarily 
 follows that no effect can possibly be produced 
 by a power which is'not; and consequently, 
 that consciousness cannot result from matter as 
 its pause. 
 
 As, then, a potential or virtual energy must 
 necessarily inhere in matter, in order to the 
 production of mental action, as its result, 
 which must be granted, if consciousness result 
 from matter ; and as all matter is capable of 
 infinite divisibility, it necessarily follows, that 
 no such energy can reside within it ; and con- 
 sequently that no such action can result from 
 it ; and therefore, matter considered merely as 
 such, can have no such energy resident within' 
 it to produce consciousness, and can have no 
 «uch action as its result. 
 
33 
 
 That matter is not infinite in its extension, is 
 evident from its motionv and its capability of 
 division. If matter were infinite in its extension, 
 there could be no portion of space where 
 matter is not. And if infinite space be full of 
 matter, there can be no vacuum in which it can 
 possibly move : all matter must necessarily be 
 in a quiescent state, nor could it be possible 
 that any portion of matter could take posses- 
 sion of that space, which must be pre-occupied 
 by another. No foreign impulse could remove 
 it, because there can be no room for such im- 
 pulse to act ; nor if there' were such a power, 
 could it remove a single atom. Every atom 
 must be . supported in its station by the con- 
 tiguity of surrounding atoms ; and if we were 
 to conceive it possible, that any atom could 
 pQssibly be moved, it must enter into that 
 portion of space which another atom occupied 
 at the same time. If the space which any 
 single atom occupies, could admit another 
 atom without removing the former, it would 
 follow, that this portion of space could not be 
 filled with this pre-occupying atom ; which at 
 once desti^oys the infinitude of matter ^ and to 
 suppose that the. spac^ which any atom occu- 
 pied were entirely full with this pre-occupying 
 atom, and yet that it could admit another with- 
 in the bounds of its superficies, is to include 
 this contradiction,— that space is full, and yet 
 
34 
 
 not full of matter at the same time. Matter, 
 therefore, is not infinite. 
 
 Ifj then, space can, and necessarily must, ex- 
 ist where matter is not, and if the mind can 
 extend itself through this pure distance, it 
 follows, with all the decisiveness that reason 
 can require — that consciousness can no more 
 result from matter, than it can be an essential 
 property of its nature. 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 Consciousness cannot result from any modification of 
 matter. Modification can confer no new ■properties 
 on matter. Effects which modification is capable of 
 producing. Pernicious consequences which will re- 
 sult from the supposition that consciousness results 
 from the modification of matter. Arguments which 
 prove its impossibility. 
 
 As" consciousness cannot be an essential proper- 
 ty of matter, nor res;ult from it, merely con- 
 sidered as such, for reasons which have been 
 already offered, the next question which offers 
 itself to the mind, is — Whether consciousness 
 can result from any peculiar modification of its 
 parts, or combination of those particles of 
 which any material being is composed. 
 
 To consider the human soul as distinct from 
 the body, while both are supposed to be ma- 
 terial, is a mei:e fallacy; — matter, under every 
 
35 
 
 , form, can be but matter ^till ; and whether it 
 be denominated body, or soul, its real essence 
 can be by no means altered by this distinction. 
 If it be: matter, it miist, in all its states, have 
 all its properties ; and by all the modifications 
 which it is capable of undergoing, it can ac- 
 quire nothing new. A being' which is phy- 
 sically incapable of thinking in awy state,, 
 mu^t, if it be the same, be necessarily incapa- 
 ble in every siaiie. For if no new powers be 
 added to any being, its modification can only, 
 affect the arrangement of its component parts, 
 while the physical state of its nature must re- 
 main entirely the same. 
 
 To suppose that the mere modification of any 
 body, will enable that body purely from this 
 modification, to be capable of producing effects, 
 with which all the parts of the body modi- 
 fied have no relation, is to suppose that it re- 
 ceives an additional power, which nothing but 
 modification can communicate ; while modifi- 
 cation itself can have no existence but what 
 it derives from the parts which are modified, 
 and which of themselves' can possess no Such, 
 power, which is a palpable contradiction. 
 :■•- All bodies, under every modification, must 
 be formed of. parts, which, though united to- 
 gether, are still the same ; and if a po\?er to 
 produce consciousness, under any modification, 
 do exist in any body, it must result from 
 
 D 2 
 
36 
 
 the particular arrangement of its component 
 parts. 
 
 Every whole must be formed of those parts 
 which are necessary to its existence : and to 
 conceive, that consciousness can result from 
 any modification of these parts, is to conceive, 
 that the whole possesses a power of which all 
 and every part of which it is composed are 
 totally destitute. — That the whole, which is 
 formed only of certain parts, is capable of 
 communicating what it neither possesses, nor 
 has received ; or in other language, that it is 
 capable of producing consciousness, and yet 
 incapable at the same time. 
 
 An assemblage of atoms may produce an 
 increase of magnitude. A modification of 
 parts may produce a change of figure. A i^ew 
 disposition of surfaces may produce different 
 sensations, and variously affect the organs ' of 
 vision ; but all changes which matter is capa- 
 ble of undergoing, are only capable of enlarg- 
 ing or lessening the extent of those essential 
 properties of its nature, which always exist in 
 proportion to the specific quantity of matter 
 which is thus modified. If all consciousness' 
 result from any modification of matter, it is 
 certain, that consciousness could not have ex- 
 isted previously to the existence of that modifi- 
 cation from which it IFfesults ; and if so, no 
 consciousness could have existed prior to the 
 
37 
 
 existence of matter. The arrangement of ma- 
 terials must necessarily be posterior, in point 
 of time, to the existence of those materials 
 which are thus arranged ; and if we admit the 
 pre-existence of those parts which are thus 
 modified, and allow consciousness itself to be 
 the "result of a modification which depends 
 upon those parts for its own existence ; we be- 
 hold, not only the pre-existence of matter, but 
 the pre-existence even of that modification from 
 which consciousness itself must be supposed 
 to result. And yet, to make consciousness 
 to result from any modification of matter, we 
 must deny the existence of all consciousness, 
 previously to that which results from a modifi- 
 cation, which must be the effect of conscious- 
 ness itself.* 
 
 * I have frequently been inclined to thinks that the doc- 
 trine which makes consciousness to result from matter, or 
 any modification of it, approaches nearer to atheism than its 
 advocates are aware. If matter, under any modification^ be 
 capaUe of thinking, we shall, perhaps, never be able to know 
 by any modes pf reasoning which are placed within our 
 reach, — ^whether God himself be not a material Being } And 
 whatsoever opens the door to the materiality of God, com- 
 mences an attack on his immensity and infinity. For certain 
 it is, that whatsoever results from any modification of matter, 
 supposes the previous existence of the thing modified. If, 
 therefore, the Divine consciousness result- from any modifi- 
 cation of matter, there must have been a period when the 
 Divine consciousness was not} and consequently God can be 
 
38 
 
 If then, consciousness be the result of the? 
 modification of matter, this modification must 
 have been made without any consciousnessi 
 But to suppose consciousness to result from any 
 thing which is of itself unconscious, is to sup- 
 pose that what is, could be begotten by that 
 which is not, — that nothing itself is capable of 
 acting, although we admit that it has no exist- 
 ence. 
 
 If consciousness result from any given modi* 
 flcation of matter, the stability of that peculiar 
 modification is necessary to the existence of 
 that consciousness, which can only result there- 
 from. To suppose the contrary, is to destroy 
 
 neither eternal nor infinite. Such is the inevitable result of 
 the supposition— ^that the Divine consciousness can result 
 from any modification of matter. 
 
 But if we admit the supposition — ^that God is a material 
 Being, abstracted from all ideas of the manner or modification 
 of his Being ; we then make coi^sciousness to be an essential 
 property of matter j and banish at one stroke all spiritual sub- 
 stances from existence. Without entering into any detail of 
 argument in this note^ 1 assume it as a self-evident proposi- 
 tion — that matter cannot he infinite in its extension, but that 
 some boundaries must limit its existence. If, therefore^ God 
 be a material Being, his immensit'if must be given up, because 
 that which is limited by any boundaries, can never include the 
 idea of immensity within its dimensions. But as eternity, 
 infinity, and immensity, are inseparable from Gbd, it clearly 
 foUpws^ that God cannot be a material Being j and I consider 
 this as no contemptible argument, to prove that matte;' can- 
 not think, 
 
39 
 
 consciousness, and to admit its stability, is as 
 repugnant to every principle of philosophy, as 
 it is false in fact. 
 
 The human body is continually in a state of 
 instability and mutation. Effluvia are perpe- 
 tually exhaling by degrees which are impercep- 
 tible, those particles which were previously in 
 union with one another. Nutrition is constant- 
 ly invigorating with new supplies, those suc- 
 cessive wants which unavoidably arise from, 
 this impermanent state of things. 
 
 The rage of disorder's, — the accidents to 
 which we are exposed, — the very atmosphere 
 which we respire, all conspire to tell us that — 
 stability is not for man. Nor is it probable that 
 any considerable portion of those particles of 
 which the body of an infant is formed, when 
 . he enters this world, are carried with him in 
 hoary age to the silent grave. The continual 
 diminution of old particles, and the constant 
 accession of new, in the human system, are so 
 evident to our senses, that the subject pre- 
 cludes the necessity of further proof. 
 
 That modification is nothing but an arrange- 
 ment ofpfirts, is a positron, which I believe, no 
 one will dispute. And to suppose conscious- 
 ness to result frona a miere arrangement, is to 
 suppose that those parts which are thus ar- 
 ranged, have communicated to the arranger 
 ment of themselves, a potential quality which 
 
' 40 
 
 they did not possess — and that they have com- 
 municated what they cotild not communicate^^ 
 
 As the modification of all material substances 
 can have no positive, biit only a relative exist- 
 ence, and can exist no longer than it is depend- 
 ent upon matter, so it can of itself have no 
 effects. Nothing can result from a mere rela- 
 tion. For if a merp relation can, produce con- 
 sciousness, this relation must be its cause ; and 
 to suppose any thing to be a cause, which of it- 
 self has no positive existence, is to suppose it 
 to act without a being— ^and that it begets what 
 it has no power of begetting."" 
 
 Whether consciousness result from matter, 
 or from any modification of it, it must still de- 
 pend upon matter for its existence ; and in ad- 
 mitting consciousness to result from any giv^n 
 modification of it, we must admit that matter, 
 under that given modification, is capable of 
 producing effects, with which, in its abstracted 
 State, it could have no connexion. The modi- 
 fication, in this case, must be supposed to pos- 
 sess what is not physically included in tKe 
 thing modified ; which is as contradictory as it 
 is absurd. 
 
 Consciousness, resulting from the modifica- 
 tion of matter,, must still look up to matter as 
 its remoter cause ; and whether we suppose 
 consciousness to be the remote, or the imme- 
 diate result of matter, it must either be a neces- 
 
41 
 
 sary effect, or an accident of it. To suppose it 
 to be a necessary effectj is to make a quality to 
 result from matter with which it (matter) can 
 have no relation ; and to suppose conscious- 
 ness to be an accident of it, is to destroy the 
 iiecessitif of any peculiar modification of matter, 
 in order to its existence. 
 
 Thus, then, consider consciousness in what 
 relation soever we may to matter, it ends either 
 in an absurdity or a contradiction ; and in no 
 case which can be given, can any such relation 
 be made out, as is necessary to establish that 
 connexion between consciousness and matter, 
 which must ever subsist between an effect and 
 its cause. And if this relation, without which 
 no such connexion can be established, be dpne 
 away, the undeniable consequence is, that con- 
 sciousness cannot result from matter, nor from 
 any modification which it may assume. 
 
 The order of nature can receive no outrage, 
 without revolting at the violence of the attempt. 
 Nature will not warp to serve the private sys- 
 tems of men, nor accommodate herself to those 
 modes of thinking, which are adopted without 
 consulting her dictates. The grand chain of- 
 things lies straight before us ; and though the 
 human mind may be influenced by prejudice, 
 or rendered tenacious through ambition, no in- 
 roads can be made. A deviation from the 
 voice of nature may be rendered plausible for 
 
42 
 
 a season 5 till, divested of those mists in which 
 error conceals herself, she unveils the contra- 
 dictions which await those, who, borne on the 
 wings of presumption, dart into those regions 
 where nature never travels, and on which ac- 
 count she refuses to become their guide. 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 .Consciousness is not a quality superadded to Matter^ 
 A quality could not be added, unless it previously, 
 existed. If it previously existed, there could be no 
 occasion for the union. Consciousness can never 
 arise from the mere union of any quality with an un^ 
 conscious substance. 
 
 But while I assert — that neither thinkii^, nor 
 consciousness can be an essential property of 
 liiatter, nor result from any modification of it, 
 it may be said thast — " Consciousness may be 
 " a superadded quality." That a mere quaUty;,, 
 considered as such, cannot possibly have an ab- 
 stract existence, I feel no hesitation in assert- 
 ing. Whatever is a quality, must be a quality 
 of some substance; the mind is necessarily 
 obliged to associate together the two ideas. 
 
 To suppose any thing to be a quality, with- 
 out admitting the existence of some substance 
 of which it is the quality, is a contradiction. — 
 It supposes it to be a quality, and not a quality 
 at the same time. If consciousness be a qua- 
 
43 
 
 lity superadded to matter, which is the case 
 now supposed, I would ask— What is con- 
 sciousness a quality of? It must be of matter, 
 or it must not. If it "be a quality of matter, it 
 ceases to be superadded; if not, its existence is 
 thus ascertained distinct from matter, and the 
 mind, in order to find its substance, is led to 
 ^explore another source. If consciousness be 
 a quality superadded to matter, both conscious- 
 ness and matter must have existed antecedent- 
 ly to their union with each other. Matter must 
 have existed previously to this accession of 
 quality, for a quality' could not be added to 
 that which did not exist. Consciousness must 
 have existed also, or it could not have been 
 communicated to matter. Existence must al- 
 ways be previous to any modification of it. 
 And if both matter and consciousness existed 
 prior to their union with each other, it then fol- 
 lows, that 'this new quality in matter, the pre- 
 vious existence of which must be admitted, 
 does not depend for its existence upon its union 
 with matter. And if this dependence be taken 
 away, it must also follow, that consciousness 
 may as well exist after its separation from mat- 
 ter, as it did previously to its union with it. 
 Either this quality must have existed prior to 
 its union with mattei*, .or it must not. If it did, 
 it cannot be a quality of matter 5 if not, it can- 
 not be superadded. 
 
44 
 
 Should it. be said, that—" though the pre- 
 " existence of a conscious quality be admitted, 
 " it may, nevertheless, bfe incapable of action, 
 " until this union takes place ; and that all its 
 " actions are the result of this union ;" to this 
 also I answer, — that the supposition includes 
 several contradictions. 
 
 To suppose a conscious quality to exist with- 
 out a conscious capacity, is to suppose it to be 
 and not to be at the same time. It also sup- 
 poses the quality to be conscipus, and yet 
 it makes all its consciousness to depend upon 
 its union with matter. So that a conscious 
 quality is supposed not to be conscious ; and 
 its consciousness is supposed to result from a 
 union of this quality with an unconscious sub- 
 stance. If this consciousness must result from 
 such an union, it must follow that this con- 
 scious quality must be an unconscious one pre- 
 vious to this union, and that the idea of a super- 
 added conscious quality is an absolute nonenti- 
 ty* If the superadded quality be conscious in 
 
 * When Mr. Locke saySj (vol. ii. p. 140) " We h^ve the 
 " ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be , 
 " able to know, whether any mere material being thinks or 
 " no," I am rather at a loss to discover his meaning. 
 
 If Mr. Locke means — that finite comprehension cannot fa- 
 thom the modes in which infinite wisdom can operate, and that 
 we know not what latent properties God may unfold to pro- , 
 duce this phenomenon ; I most heartily assent to his propo- 
 
45 
 
 itseHj there can be no necessity for its union 
 with a subst3,nce which is unconscious ; if not, 
 conscibusness can never result from such an 
 union. 
 
 sition. But this is bidding adieu to our cirde of comprehen- 
 sion, and means of knowledge j and is in effect saying no more 
 than this—" that what is to us unknown, is unknown to us." 
 But if Mr. Locke intend by that proposition tp intimate,— 
 that in the present state of things, and under the present 
 modes of human knowledge, operating upon the known quali- 
 ties of matter, no certainty of reasoning can be obtained to 
 prove that matter cannot think, I feel some hesitation from 
 reasons which I have already advanced in the preceding sec-; 
 tions in giving it my assent. It is with the profoundest dif- 
 fidence that I presume to depart from such a genius as' Mr. 
 Locke ; but if an implicit confidence be placed in any man, 
 an embargo is laid on free investigation, and unbiassed iii- 
 quiry can be no more. 
 
46 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 THE VISIBLE QUALITIES OF THE HUMAN SOUL, CAN 
 ONLY INHERE IN AN IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 An agreement in nature must subsist between a sub- 
 stance and its essential properties. Consciousness, 
 volition, ^c. essential properties of the soul. These 
 properties being immaterial, their substance must 
 be immaterial also. The nature of these properties, 
 and their fixed relation to an immaterial substance 
 pjoved. The nature of substances is only known by 
 their properties Consciousness can inhere in no- 
 thing but an indivisible, and consequently an imma- 
 terial substance. Properties of the soul can acquire 
 no new quality or nature by their inherence. Con-' 
 sciousness not an adventitious acquisition. Matter 
 cannot abstract. 
 
 Having in the foregoing pages advanced rea- 
 sons to prove that matter cannot think, that 
 thinking cannot be either an essential property 
 of it, or belong to its modes and accidents, and 
 that it cannot result from any combination of 
 particles, or modification of matter ; I now^ pro- 
 ceed to investigate those mental qualities which 
 we find within ourselves, and without which, 
 the station that we fill in the vast chain of ex- 
 istence, is done away. 
 
 Whatever real qualities we possess, whether 
 
47 
 
 they be corporeal or mental, they are equally 
 necessary to our present state of being. And 
 if any power or quality necessary to our pre- 
 sent state of being be taken away, the present 
 mechanism of man is entirely destroyed, and a 
 new sera is formed in the present state of things. 
 
 How any created being can fully compre- 
 hend itself, is to me a problem which I cannot 
 solve. "A full comprehension, implies an ex- 
 pansion of mind which takes a circuit round 
 itself, and travels on those margins Of existence, 
 where entity both begins and ends. A mind, 
 therefore, which can fully comprehend itself, 
 must be expanded beyotid itself, and exercise^ 
 its actions where it has no being.' It must act 
 where it is not, and exist in its comprehension, 
 where, in its real Sein^, it has no existence. 
 Whether such a Being can possibly exist, 
 which w and is not at the same time, every man 
 is at liberty to decide. 
 
 If the human intellect cannot expand itself 
 beyond its own being, that reason, which God 
 has planted within the human soul, brands 
 with presumption arid folly, the arrogance of 
 those, who dare to reject certain truths, of the 
 existence of which, we may be fully assured, 
 merely because they are beyond the reach of 
 human comprehension; 
 
 We know not the physical nature" of any 
 substance; but the assurance of existence, and 
 
48 
 
 I 
 
 a knowledge of the physical nature of that ex- 
 istence, are distinct ideas, which bear to one 
 another, but little or no relation. It is not the 
 physical essence of things that we inquire after, 
 but a certainty of their existence, and of that 
 connexion which subsists between substances 
 and qualities, and the relation which they bear 
 to one another. 
 
 I. have already endeavoured to prove that 
 matter cannot think. I now proceed to prov^ 
 that the human soul cannot be material. In^ 
 deed the inevitable result of what I have already 
 advanced, . fully tends to establish this point., 
 For if the soul be admitted to have any exist- 
 ence — if there be but two substances in which 
 all things inhere — matter and spirit ; and if the 
 soul' be not material, — there must be an irimia- 
 terial principle in man. 
 
 Whatever has any existence, must be mate- 
 rial, or it must riot. And that which has any 
 existence, and is not material, must be immate- 
 rial ; there can be no medium between these 
 two extremes. If then, there be in the human 
 mind, consciousness, volition, and perception, 
 there must be some primary principle which 
 is conscious, which wills, and which perceives. 
 And whatever the physical natures of those 
 -qualities is, such must be the physical nature 
 of that primary principle also, to the existence 
 of which these qualities are essential. 
 
49 
 
 If any substance ^^.n be of a natuire distinct 
 from the nature of those qualities which are es- 
 sential to its existence, this substance must be 
 different from itself. And if the qualities 
 which are supposed essential to the nature of 
 this substance, be different in nature from that 
 substance, to the being of which they are sup^ 
 posed to be essential ; their essentiality is .done 
 away, and the relation between them can be no 
 more. 
 
 The same reasonings will hold good through 
 the modes and accidents of substances ; — Na- 
 ture is invariably inseparable from herself. If 
 man be supposed to possess any knowledge, 
 he must have a capacity suited thereto ; and 
 between this knowledge and capacity thete 
 must be a physical oongruity. To suppose 
 otherwise, is to suppose, that man has know- 
 ledge without any capacity for it ; which is a 
 contradiction. If, then, we have knowledge, 
 and this knowledge, and the capacity thereof, be 
 of the same physical nature, it necessarily fol- 
 lows, that either knowledge itgelf must be mate- 
 riitl, or that both knowledge and capacity must 
 be destitute of corporeity. That nothing is able 
 to extend itself beyond its own being, will, I be- 
 lieve be readfey admitted; and, that knowledge 
 is able to operate beyond the limits of coi'por- 
 real being, will not, I believe, be denied. Now 
 it seems certain that solidity can never go be- 
 
50 
 
 yond a solid substance, nor magnitude beyond 
 matter. If, then, knowledge can go beyond the 
 compages of body, and if nothing can extend 
 beyond itself, it uitdeniably follows, that know- 
 lege is not from matter — and that there must be 
 an immaterial principle in man. Knowledge 
 implies a capacity, and this capacity, implies a 
 substance in which it must inhere ; and which, 
 for reasons already assigned, must be of the 
 same physical nature with itself. And from 
 hence also the conclusion follows, that there 
 «iust be an immaterial substance in man. 
 
 To form an idea of any substance which is 
 not material, abstractedly from consciousness 
 and volition, seems absolutely impossible. For 
 if we detach from any material substance, the 
 properties of magnitude, solidity, and figure ; 
 and from any substance which js not material, 
 the qualities of consciousness, and volition, we 
 can form no conception of either ; for when the 
 only properties are destroyed,; from whence 
 these distinct natures are denominated, there 
 remains nothing to which we can attach any 
 idea, and. the mind is left in possession of a 
 mere nonentity. 
 
 But while all men discover within them- 
 selves, that volition and that cuisciousness of, 
 which it is impossible to divest the, mind, — 
 while we cap by no means whatever annex the 
 idea of corporeity, either -to volition or con- 
 
51 
 
 Bciousness ; and while it is certain that a same- 
 ness of nature must subsist between this voli- 
 tion and consciousness, and that substance 
 from w^iph they flow, the mind is carried to 
 the same conclusion — that there must be an 
 iinmaterial principle in man. ' 
 
 But it is not to volition and consciousness 
 alone, that these observations will apply* Every 
 man finds within himself distinct ideas «f other 
 powers, w;hich, though subordinate in point of 
 dominion, are similar in their natures. These 
 are known to exist from their operations ; and 
 known to be distinct from the diversities which 
 they display. We can compound, compare, 
 abstract, discern, and judge, and reason. Yet 
 none of the powers by which we perform these 
 mental actions, can claim independence, or 
 st^l^. alone. The existence which they have 
 is only, reia.tive, aiid as such it appears when 
 we view them in a detached light; while they 
 unitedly declare the necessity of some cotnmon 
 substance in. which they must inhere. No man 
 can abstract while he is destitute, of discern- 
 ment, or compound, or compare, without the 
 exercise of judginent; and few things will per- 
 haps involve a greater complication of absur- 
 dities, than for us to suppose the judgjpent to 
 perform its office, when every other power of 
 ^e mind is so far inactive as to pfesent «« 
 
 with no ide^, 
 
 E 2 
 
d2 
 
 If then the judgment cannot exist abstract- 
 edly from the other subordinate powers of the 
 mind, and if neither of them can claim any in- 
 dependent state of existence, or be even sup- 
 posed to stand alone, it follows that all these 
 relative powers must inhere in some common 
 substance, to the nature of which they give a 
 fixed denomination. As therefore, this sub- 
 stance must on this account, partake of their 
 common nature ; and as these powers can bear 
 no affinity to matter, it follows as a necessary 
 consequence that the human soul must be im- 
 material. 
 
 Now if consciousness and volition, percep- 
 tion and judgment, necessarily suppose the 
 existence of some substance, they cannot by 
 inhering in that substance, either communicate 
 to, or acquire from it, a nature totally opposite 
 to their own, and therefore distinct from it. 
 Neither can a whole by any means possess a 
 nature, of which those powers and properties 
 that are necessary .to its existence, are entirely 
 destitute. As therefore, a sameness of nature 
 must be possessed by the substance and its es- 
 sential properties, it follows, either that con- 
 sciousness and volition, perception and judg-^ 
 ment, must in themselves be materially extend- 
 ed, Of that the soul must be immaterial. 
 
 That consciousness and volition, or any of 
 the subordinate powers of the soul are jnateri- 
 
53 
 
 ally extended, I believe no one will affirm, the 
 reverse may be gathered not only from intuitive 
 knowledge, but from actual proof. No two 
 things which are material can occupy in one 
 instant the same given portion of space. The 
 admission of one atom is the exclusion of all 
 besides ; for a portion of space that is abso- 
 lutely filled, can admit nothing more. Now if 
 the powers of the mind be material, they can 
 neither co-exist in the same soul, nor operate 
 so diversely and conjointly as we perceive" them 
 to do, without occasioning such an interference 
 with one another, as the nature of matter ex- 
 pressly forbids. But that these mental powers 
 do and must, co-exist together, is evident from 
 the impossibility and absurdity of admitting 
 their separation : and that they cannot be ex- 
 tended, is the necessary result of their co-eX' 
 istence. 
 
 As therefore consciousness^ volition, &c. are 
 properties of the soul ; — as they must co-exist, 
 -^be dependent, — and cannot be extended, they 
 must claim their inher^ice in some common 
 substance. And as this substance^ to the ex- 
 istence of which they are essential, must par- 
 take of their common nature, it must be both 
 unextended and immaterial. 
 . If the nature of substances cannot be deno- 
 minated from their own essential properties, it 
 will follow, that these essential properties are 
 
54 
 
 tiot essential, which is a contradiction. But if 
 the substance can be denominated from its es- 
 sential properties, and these essential projper- 
 ties may be known ; we then have, from our 
 knowledge of these essential properties, all 
 that knowledge of their substance which is< 
 within the reach of possibility, supported by 
 the unequivocal evidence of demonstration^ 
 If then, to suppose consciousness to exist, 
 while we deiiy the existence of a conscious 
 principle, be a contradiction; — if to suppose 
 consciousness to have a.n abstracted, positive ex" 
 istence, be: equally absurd ; — and tf to suppose 
 consciousness to be essential to matter, or to 
 result from any peculiar modification of it, be 
 hetnsillj impossible; it necessarily follows, from 
 the very existence of cdnsdioUsness, that there 
 must be an immaterial substance in man. 
 
 If consciousness, volition, &c. considered as 
 tjualities of the mind, be not material^ which 
 must be admitted, I would ask^^How can they, 
 by inhering in any common substance, acquire 
 from that substance, a nature, whose proper^ 
 ties are totally distinct from their own ? If they 
 can, then these qualities are not necessairy'lo 
 the existence of that substance, because their 
 naturae is distinct ; if they cannot, the princi- 
 ple itself must;be immaterial. If these quali- 
 ties be not essential to the Being of that sub- 
 stance in which they are supposed to inhere, 
 
55 
 
 liiey may be separated; and if separated, I 
 would again ask — What idea can we form of 
 their abstract existence ; And what idea can we 
 form, of that substance from which they are 
 abstracted? To suppose this substance to be 
 matter, is to make consciousness not to be ne- 
 cessary to the existence of the human soul; 
 and to suppose it to be spirit, is to suppose it 
 to be spirit while every pro^perty is abstracted, 
 from which spirit is denominated ; — that it is 
 spirit without spiritual powers — and that it is 
 spirit, and not spirit at the same time. 
 
 If thiB conscious principle which exists in 
 man, be material, it must have all the proper- 
 ties which are essential to matter ; to suppose 
 otherwise is a contradiction ; and whatsoever 
 has the properties of matter, must fill empty 
 space : — ^for to suppose any substance, to the 
 existence of which, extension is necessary, to 
 have a Being, and yet to extend in no space, 
 is a contradiction also. And whatever .^^/fe 
 empty space, must have dimensions. But to 
 attribute dimensions to a substance, wh(^se 
 ejcistence: can only be ascertained by those 
 qimlities which must necessarily be immaterial, 
 and which qualities must be essentially neces- 
 sairy to the existence of this substance ; is to 
 suppose the substance to be material, while we 
 have no conception of such a nature, and; while 
 the only qualities which denominate and de- 
 
56 
 
 monstrate its existence^ exdtide the idea, 6f 
 materiality from our conceptions. And to sup- 
 pose, under these circumstances, the substance 
 to be material, is to admit the idea of materiali* 
 ty, while we must confess we have no such 
 idea. If these conclusions be fair, the neces- 
 sary result is, that this substance must be im- 
 material. 
 
 If the soul be capable of division, which 
 must be admitted if it be material, and yet 
 every part be necessary to the existence of 
 consciousness ; how can those parts either ac- 
 iquire or lose a property by division, which 
 they did not individually possess when in union 
 with one another ? Mere modification, caii nei- 
 ther communicate nor destroy any property 
 which is peculiar to the nature modified. If 
 a being, under any modificaition, be capable of 
 thinking, I tvould ask,^-Is this being, capable 
 of divisibility, or not? If not, it cannot be 
 material ; if it be, I would again ask, — If it be 
 divided into as many distinct particles as the 
 mind cai^ conceive, is each of these particles, 
 in this divided state, capable of thinking, or 
 not ? If it be, then, an union of them is not 
 necessary to cogitation ; but if all be incapable 
 of thinking in this divided state, I would fur- 
 ther ask, — If two of these particles were united 
 together, can they be capable of that exertion 
 of power, which neither of them possessed in 
 
57 
 
 its separate state ? If they can, then all besides 
 are useless ; if they cannot, can the acquisition 
 of three, or three thousand, by being united to- 
 gether, acquire a quality which is. possessed 
 by neither ? If a number of particles, whether 
 they be three, or three thousand, possess no 
 quality of thinking in themselves ; it is certain 
 that their mere union with one another, can 
 give the whole no quality, of which all the 
 parts are destitute. Can a whole possess a 
 quality, which is possessed by no part of which 
 that whole is composed ? If the parts which 
 compose a whole, cannot, and do not, possess 
 that quality which is supposed-to reside in th^ 
 whole, (neither can the whole, which is formed 
 of those^ parts. To suppose that a whole can 
 possess a power which none of those parts 
 possessed,, of which it is composed, merely by 
 the acquisition of those parts^. will end in this 
 glaring contradiction — that it is capable, and 
 yet incapable of thinking at the same time. 
 
 An union or disunion of parts^ can only 
 affect thjeir modificatio^i ; but the essential 
 properties of all substances, are too peribanent 
 to be^hanged by any modification. 
 
 Nor will the case be altered, by supposing 
 that thinking is a mere adventitious acquisition. 
 A quality which is adventitious, is precludf d 
 by the same mode of reasoning^ ; and can no 
 more exist in such a divisible sulastauce, than 
 
58 
 
 if it were an essential property. If one atom, 
 of which any being is composed, have not the 
 power of thinking, neither can another > of the 
 same nature. If two atoms be incogitative, 
 four must be equally so; and if we proceed 
 onward in addition, till the mind is lost in the 
 immensity of numbers, the same conclusions 
 will invariably hold good. 
 
 The modification of mere matter, whether 
 the particles, of which any given portion is 
 coiliposed, be the same in nature, or diverse 
 from one another, can never communicate to 
 that portion, a power, which neither particle 
 possessed. It may create a new -disposition 
 of surfaces, and alter the configuration of its 
 internal parts ; and from this change, new sen- 
 sations may be excited by its sensible quali- 
 ties, in the human mind. But all these are 
 but the same numerical particles, differently 
 perceived ; and all the modifications which any 
 quantity of matter is capable of undergoing, 
 from an atom to a world, can never give to any 
 material substance, a single quality, which is 
 not to be found, either inhering in, or resulting 
 from, the minutest particle in that supposed 
 portion. And the result of all is — that matter, 
 under every form with which we have yet been 
 permitted to view it, is not only incapable, in 
 its own nature, of thinking, but can never ad- 
 
59 
 
 tait a conscious quality to incorporate with its 
 identity. 
 
 Whether it be possible, or not, for any 
 created bdng fully to comprehend itself, is to 
 me a matter of considerable doubt ; and these 
 dailbts I have already hinted. If it can, and 
 the soul be nothing but mere matter, it must 
 extend its comprehension not only to the bound- 
 aries of its own nature, but to the remoter re- 
 gions of intellectual life. There are certain ab- 
 stractions, which the mind of man is continual- 
 ly forming, to which mere matter can never 
 reach;, for if matter can never act on any >thing 
 but by contact, < those abstractions must for 
 ever elude its approach. But from that inter- 
 nal thinking capacity which we possess, and 
 from the distinct perceptions which we have 
 of those abstractions, that are inaccessible to 
 sensation ; we have all the evidence that the 
 nature of the subject is capable of admitting, 
 that there must be an immaterial principle in 
 man. 
 
60 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 The actions of an intelligent being cannot arise Jrom 
 external impulse. Matter can only move hy impulse. 
 Man possesses intelligence, and acts Jrom it. The 
 soul is not an assemblage of distinct independent 
 jproperties. Substances are unchangeabe in their 
 natures. The human mind limited in its powers and 
 researches, yet furnished with indubitable proof's of 
 its immateriality. An objection, that God can 
 cause matter to think, stated and answered. Ar- 
 guments to prove, that the powers of the soul are 
 immaterial, and that they must inhere in a substance, 
 whose nature is similar to their own. 
 
 That all matter is of itself indifferent to mo- 
 tion or rest, is undeniable, from the instance 
 given by Mr. Locke. " If God," says he, 
 " were to place any given portion of matter 
 " beyond the influence of all corporeal being, 
 •" where nothing could either attract or repel 
 " it ; and were to put this body in motion, it 
 " is certain, that under these circumstances, it 
 " must move for ever : And if God were in 
 " this case to deprive it of motion, it must be 
 " for ever in a state of rest." In this case, all 
 motion must be impressed on all material bo- 
 dies by some foreign impulse. Now if we sup- 
 pose nothing but material substances to exist, 
 it will be impossible for any thing to move, be^ 
 
61 
 
 cause there can be nothing then with which 
 this motion can originate. The existence, 
 therefore, of motion, proves the existence of 
 something that is radically distinct from matter. 
 That man is capable of exerting Volitions, 
 which from deliberate choice shall terminate 
 in the motion of matter, has never yet, I be- 
 lieve, been denied. But if man be wholly' ma- 
 teiial, and nothing that is so, can move, or be 
 moved, but by external impulses ; it will be 
 impossible for us to reconcile with principle, 
 those displays of intelligence, which appear .to 
 originate in choice, and are fully confirmed by 
 fact. In this case, the sources of action which 
 are perceptible, cannot originate with man, 
 but must reside in some external cause by 
 which he is impelled to every deed that he per- 
 fbnns. Now if the human mind act continual- 
 ly uader the impulsions of foreign caus€«j 
 which must be admitted, if it be material, the 
 phenomena which appear, and from which we 
 have been induced to denominate man, an in- 
 telligent beings will be proved to be delusive ; 
 and every idea which we have, or have had, of 
 human intelligence, will not merely be render- 
 ed useless, but totally done away. For unless 
 intelligence manifest itself, we can have no idea 
 whatever of its existence ; and that of Wfiich 
 we know nothing, we cannot pronounce to 
 have a being. To attribute, therefore, to" ex- 
 
62 
 
 ternal impulse, every modification of mental ac- 
 tion, and yet jf;o suppose man to be an intelli- 
 gent being, while those very actions of his mind 
 by which alone intelligence can be known to 
 exist, are attributed to another cause; is to 
 suppose rnan to be an intelligent, and yet an 
 univttelligent being at the same time. 
 
 'If man be not an intelligent creature, he can 
 have no anticipation of a future state. Nor 
 can any being, which is not intelligent, associ- 
 ate together the "ideas of past and future in his 
 mind, and discover the relation which subsists 
 between them. Now this power of associat- 
 ing our ideas, we possess, and therefore man 
 must be an intelligent creature ; and as man 
 must be an intelligent creature^ his mental ac- 
 tions cannot be produced by external impulse. 
 But as all matter must move from this external 
 cause ; — as external impulse is 'incompatible 
 with the idea' of intelligence in the same sub- 
 ject; and as it is contradictory to suppose a 
 subject to be intelligent and yet vv^holly im- 
 pelled; it must follow, from the power which 
 we have of associating our ideas, that the hu- 
 man mind must date its origin from another 
 Source, and man must have ah immaterial prin- 
 ciple within. 
 
 Noi^ can the soul be considered as an assem- 
 blage of distinct independent properties. Such 
 an assemblage supposes the abstract existence 
 
63 
 
 of each property, and this supposition necessa- 
 rily destroys the uncompounded. nature of the 
 soul's essence. Whatever is formed of inde- 
 pendent and aJbstract properties, must be ca- 
 pable of separation, and must therefore be a 
 compounded being. That J;he properties of 
 the soul cannot exist abstractedly from each 
 other, bias been already proved ; but that they 
 do exist, every man's feelings suflBciently evince. 
 The powers of the soul, therefore, vv^hich we 
 possess, may be considered as its attributes, 
 which, unable to exist independently of each 
 ■other, emanate purely from the soul, as the 
 fountain of intellectual life, and thus diverge, 
 as its streams, into these difFereht directions 
 which we behold. These attributes must be 
 the same in nature with the soul itself; the 
 same in manner of existence, and the same in 
 their relations to one another, under every 
 circumstance in which they may be viewed. 
 If, therefore, consciousness itself be immaterial 
 and unextended, the soul itself must be im- 
 material and unextended also. 
 
 Whatever is thus founded in one common 
 nature and -not extended, cannot be capable 
 of divisibility ; and what is incapable of divisi- 
 bility, must necessarily be. immaterial in its 
 nature, 
 
 Every power and quality which, we can dis- 
 cpver in the human mind, uniformly evinces 
 
64 
 
 this truth— that tiiese qualities are not material 
 in themselves ; and, that any association which 
 they may, or can pOssibly form, will, only 
 change the manner of their operations, while 
 the identity of their nature must remain entire, 
 is too evident to admit dispute. And as the 
 various modifications yhich material substan- 
 ces are capable of undergoing, cannot separate 
 them from those properties which are neces- 
 sary to the existence of matter under every 
 modification; in like manner, that substance 
 from whence consciousness and volition flow, 
 can be, by no modification in their operations, 
 changed in the identity of its nature, or ac- 
 quire or lose by such modifications, any pro- 
 perty which is, or is not, essential to its being. 
 The internal real essence of substances is to 
 us totally unknown. The infinitely wise God 
 has rendered such knowledge incommunicable 
 to mail; either by placing ,this real essence 
 too remote for human r^seai-ches, or by laying 
 A restraint on the faculties which explore. To 
 communicate to us the real knowledge Of es- 
 sences, would, in all probability, be to strike 
 us from that rank which we now hold in the 
 vast chain of being : and even if the knowledgie 
 at which we now aim were communicated to us, 
 we should in that advanced state of being 
 which we now attempt in vain to explore, be- 
 hold the prospect still opening to our view ; 
 
65 
 
 and, beyond the boundaries of that superior 
 cirele of knowledge, other real essences might 
 give sufficient evidence ' of their existence, of 
 which we might attempt the comprehension, 
 with as little success as we now have, in at^ 
 tempting to find the real essences oi material 
 or «joi8nfe<a? substances, 
 
 The Almighty God has given to us, faculties 
 suited to our stations in existence, but has 
 fixed certain boundaries, beyond which we 
 cannot pass. We: discover the illimitable re- 
 gion at a distance from us, but the moment we 
 attempt to seize it, it eludes our grasp. What 
 faculties may unfold tliemselves in another 
 state of existence, is at present to us unknown, 
 We see not the extent of substances, because 
 we know not their real, essences ; and for the 
 same reason we cannot say, where the intel- 
 lectual powers shall cease to operate. The 
 distance between finite and infiiiite, must be 
 infinite, But to what an extent the human 
 intell^pt may be e^fpaijded in this intellectual 
 infinity, we must chjinge our state of being tp 
 understand. 
 
 That we know not the internal e^spnee of 
 substances, I have already admitted ; and that 
 we know not by what mysterious cement this 
 immaterial principlie for Avhich I contend, is 
 confined within the compages of the body, L 
 am also willing to allow; but can in neither 
 
60 
 
 case admit this want of comprehension to fee 
 ah argument against fact. *The phenomena 
 of both the visible and intellectual world stand 
 on the evidence of their own existence ; and 
 the only reason why things are as they are, is 
 because the Almighty Creator has been so 
 pleased to appoint them. The different parts 
 of the visible creation adhere together by secret, 
 yet indissoluble ties. — They are destined to 
 fill up those distinct stations which are allotted 
 them by the appointment of Heaven, till the 
 periods of their allotment are accomplished, 
 
 * It is a question which has been frequently asked by a de- 
 scription of men, wMo display more curiosity than wisdoiBj, 
 In what part of the human iody does the soul reside ? It ap- 
 pears to me to be one of those questions which admits no affir- 
 mative answer. The question itself seems founded upon the 
 idea of materiality, which I conceive is foreign to the nature 
 of the soul. It is enough for us to know, that the residence 
 of the soul can be traced within a sphere so contracted as man. 
 Whatever can be so far localized as to enable us to identify the 
 exact limits of its existence, must include within it the idea of 
 extension, and So far occupy a given quantity of space, as to 
 preclude every thing besides from inheriting the limits which 
 it engrosses. Whatever, .therefore, can have its residence so 
 far identified, cannot, in the nature of things, be immaterial. 
 I therefore conclude, that no such particular point of space a^ 
 the question supposes, can exist in the manner which is re- 
 quired ; and consequently, that no such distinct apartment 
 can possibly be assigned. An answer to all such inquiries 
 must, tho5efore> be precluded by the very nature of thesouiTS 
 existence. 
 
67 
 
 when they shall occupy new stations, in ways 
 and manners, which are at present to us un- 
 known. 
 
 The obscurities which are to be met with in 
 the modifications of existence, are, however, 
 no arguments against existence itself. The 
 mind, in investigating a subject which is so 
 abstruse, may be oppressed with difficulties, 
 which to us may be incapable of solution ; but 
 in cases like these, it is undoubtedly our high- 
 est Msdom to close with that side where fewest 
 difficultiies are. This must be in the admission 
 of an immaterial substance, with which thought 
 is not incompatible, though many questions 
 may be started, to which no specific replies 
 can be given. Questions like these, can, how- 
 ever, be of no weight when placed in opposi- 
 tion to fact. For if an inability to compre- 
 hend, were admitted as an argument against 
 fact,' almost every truth must be rejected. 
 And those who affect to doubt the existence 
 of an inunaterial principle in man, merely be- 
 cause they cannot comprehend the manner of 
 its existence ; and plead the want of compre^ 
 hension as a justification of their unbelief,— * 
 would do well to account for theii; own exis- 
 tence, in order to be consistent with themT 
 selves. 
 
 Against the certainty of an ^immaterial prin'- 
 
 ciple in man, it has, indeed, been urged as 
 
 V 2 
 
68 
 
 follo/ws, and that with much energy of, lan- 
 guage, — " That if God can eommunic^te to 
 " matter, under any modification of being, a 
 f quality of thinking, all rational proof of an 
 "immaterial substance must be done away; 
 " but if he cannot, it argues in him a want of 
 " power, and in this case he ceases to be pm- 
 " nipotent." 
 
 To an objection similar to this, it has b^n 
 already observed, that in supposing a quality 
 of thinking to be added to matter, the pre-ex- 
 istmce of matter must be admitted. And if 
 this quality be added, not only the substance 
 to which it is added, but the quality itself must 
 have had an existence also, previously to this 
 union which is now supposed. And if both 
 substance . zxiA. quality must have existed pre- 
 viously to their union, the quality itself must 
 ever be extraneous to that matter to which it 
 is united ; and what must thus be extraneous 
 to matter, can never derive from inhesion, either 
 a real or nominal existence. ,. ^ 
 
 If thinking be supposed to be a quality 
 which is thus added to matter, it is seltevir 
 dent, that this quality must have .existed: pre- 
 viously to its being added to matter ; — for that 
 quality can never be added which has no kind 
 of existence. But if this thinking quality .ex- 
 isted prior to its being added to matter, and 
 matter itself also existed previously to its re- 
 
69 
 
 ceiving this quality ; from whence arose the 
 necessity of this union ? If this thinking quality, 
 and that substance to which it is added, have 
 a suflSciency of "being to furnish us with two 
 abstract independent ideas ; the existence of 
 an immaterial quality is admitted by that Very 
 objection which is raised against it. 
 
 It may, indeed, be said, that " what is added 
 '* is but a mere quality.''^ I would then ask, if 
 it be but a mere quality, how could it exist 
 previously to its union with msttter ? A mere 
 ^ualityj considered as such, can have no inde- 
 ptendent existence; there must be something 
 oif which it is the quality, This^ being ad^ 
 mitted, I again ask — Was this quality; prior to 
 its being added, a quality of matter or of spirit? 
 if it were of matter, it is absurd to su;^pose it 
 tb have existed previously to its being- added 
 to matter ; and even if it could have thus ex- 
 isted, there could be no necessity whatever for 
 the union. If, on thie contrary, it were a quali- 
 ty 'of spirit, the immaterial substance for which 
 I 'contend is allowed, and in either case this 
 part of the objection is done away. 
 •C; What is further said in :the objection,— That 
 if God caa£iotmake this addition to matter, it 
 argues ia him a want of power, arid • inilitates 
 against his Omnipotence ; I humbly conceive 
 to be a gross mistake. God's power and wis- 
 dom always go hand in hand: To add, there- 
 
70 
 
 fore, to a mateml substance, a quality, which 
 has been already proved to exist, previously 
 to its union with this substance, and to make 
 this quality depend for its existence on its 
 union with mg,tter, argues not power, but mi- 
 litates against wisdom. To suppose that God 
 should a-dd a thinking' qaality^ to an unconscious 
 unthinking, material sttfistance, when both'g'Ma- 
 lity and *«i*^a;jce, are admitted to be in exis- 
 tence previously to their union ; and to make 
 this thitiking quality to depend for its exist- 
 ence upon this substance, with which it can 
 have no physical connexion ; and while it is 
 admitted to exist prior to its union with this 
 substance on which it is made to depend for 
 its existence ;^nstead of displaying , God's 
 omnipotence, is an arraignment of infinite wis* 
 dom. If the quality of thinking. existed pre- 
 viously to its union with matter, how can it de- 
 pend upon matter> or any modification of it, 
 for its existence? If not, how can this qu^ality 
 be added to a material substance? In sup^ 
 posing it not to depend upon matter for its 
 existence, we destroy the only reason for which 
 it is supposed to be added ; and in supposing 
 it to depend^ We ma,ke the quality to be dep4n^ 
 dent for its being, even while we admit its pre- 
 vious existence. ,-■'.. 
 
 Thus is this quality made to be dependent, 
 and yet not dependent— to derive its existence 
 
71 
 
 fcom matter, although it is admitted to have 
 existed previous,ly to that dependence ; which 
 is as gross a contradiction as can enter the 
 mind of man : — And yet it is supposed to mili- 
 tate against Omnipotence, because God cannot 
 do Tvhat is not within the re^ch pf possibility 
 to be done ! 
 
 No power, whether finite or infinite, can do 
 what is absolutely impossible to be done. The 
 instant any thing is placed within the reach of 
 accomplishment, that instant it ceases to be 
 an impossibility. But to suppose a quality of 
 thinking to be added to a material substance, 
 and yet to suppose this quality to have had no 
 existence, even while it was thus acted upon 
 and added, is a contradiction ; it supposes an 
 action upon a subject which is supposed to 
 have no existence. And to suppose this qua- 
 lity to date its origin from matter, and yet to 
 suppose that it existed previously to its con- 
 tiguity with matter, is a contradiction also, and 
 therefore an absolute impossibility. And to 
 suppose that omnipotence consists in the ac- 
 complishment of what cannot be accomplished, 
 is to make Omnipotence to consist in doing 
 what it cannot do. 
 
 However conclusive these arguments may 
 appear, to an Unjirejudiced inquirer after truth, 
 there have not been wanting men of splendid 
 talents, and profound erudition, who have, un- 
 
der ihe auspices of philosophyj presumed td 
 call the immateriality of the soul into question. 
 Perhaps the impossibility of conceiving how 
 any thing can exist which is not extended, and 
 which has no relation to space, may have been 
 thd" principal inducement with these gentlemen, 
 to suppose that refined organized matter might 
 produce those powers, which every man is 
 conscious that he possesses. I am ready to 
 idmit, that could matter be so far refined, that 
 its extension and divisibility Could be purged 
 away, it would be refined to some purpose. 
 But then it must be remembered, that when 
 these properties are purged awayj it will be no 
 longer, matter ; but, divested of those proper^ 
 ties which are necessary to the existence of all 
 material substances, and still retainingsthe cer- 
 tainty of existence ; it must be raised into that 
 immaterial . substance, from i which alone con- 
 sciousness and volition can ilow. 
 J But this cannot possibly be. All matter, 
 however refined or organized, is butmatter still. 
 And all matter must be extended, in an exact 
 ratio to its solid contents. Nor can any refine- 
 ment divest it of any one property which isjeg- 
 sential to its nature. The . naoment in which 
 it is supposed to be thus divested, that mo- 
 mgpt, it .ceases to exist; and what ceases to 
 exist j must not only necess9,rily cease to act, 
 
73 
 
 but must be incapable either of consciousness 
 or sensation. <" , : 
 
 The soul of man must either be material, of 
 it mugit not. If it be, it must be capable of di- 
 visibility ; and if with this capacity it be di- 
 vided, I would askj'^Does consciousness sur- 
 vive this division^ or expire? If it survive, then 
 the adhesion of the different - parts of the soul 
 is not. necessary to its existence; which in- 
 cludes this contradiction, — that consciousness 
 is dependent for its being, on a concrete sub- 
 stance which is not' necessary to its existence* 
 If it expire, then it must have 'depended for its 
 existence, not upon the component parts of the 
 SOul,( but upon the adhesion of these component 
 parts, because nothing but adhesion is now des- 
 troyed; but in admitting a mere adhesion oi 
 parts, to. be -capable of producing what the' 
 parts themselves had no power of communi- 
 cating, is a contradiction. It therefore must 
 follow, that consciousness, volition, &c. cannot 
 inhere in any material substance ; and if so, a 
 substance which , is immaterial must necessa- 
 rily be admitted. 
 
 If the human soul be material, it must be 
 extended 5 and if : the faculties which we pos- 
 ses depend \ upon this extended: substance, 
 they must all be diffused throughout the whole 
 soul, or they must not. If they be thus dif- 
 fused they may be divided, for whatever is dif- 
 
74 
 
 fhsively extended must be capable of divisioa. 
 But to admit the*division of any simple power 
 of the mind, which every faculty of the soul 
 must be, is to diestroy the existence of that fa* 
 culty; and we shall be obliged in this case to 
 admit the division of what can then have no 
 real or nominal existence ; and to allow the 
 partial existence of the soul, when all its facuL 
 ties are divided and done away. But if we 
 suppose those faculties not to be diffused, an 
 extended substance is not necessary to their 
 existence ; and then it follows, that the soul, 
 which if it be material must of itself be extend- 
 ed, can exist abstractedly from those faculties 
 which we attribute to it; and that the soul and 
 its faculties, can have no physical relation,' but 
 must exist independently of each other. And 
 if those properties, and this substance, which 
 we have been accustomed to associate together 
 in our minds, have no necessary connexion 
 with one another, we must still advance further 
 to discover a primary principle, the nature of 
 which is congenial to those properties ; while 
 the extended substance, with which these pro- 
 perties can have no physical connexion, can 
 afford us no conception of its nature, distinct 
 from animated n^atter in any of its modes^ or 
 relations. 
 
f5 
 
 SECTION in. 
 
 Objection against the soul's immateriality, taken fiom 
 its apparently insensible state during the hours of 
 sleep, stated and lansttoered ; first, from the analogies 
 which life supplies; secondly, from facts which our 
 waking hours afford ; thirdly, from forgetfulness 
 and accidental recollection : fourthly, from dreams; 
 
 fifthly, from the inattention of the mind to its own^ 
 operation ; sixthly, from the certainty that these 
 operations must precede our apprehensions of them ; 
 
 finally, that consciousness may eidst, though we 
 should be inatttfitive to it. 
 
 There is another argument urged against the 
 immateriality of the soul, which is as specious 
 as it is. unsound, and is generally stated thus : 
 — " If the soul be a thinking immaterial sub- 
 " stance, and thinking be essential to its na- 
 " ture, it must follow, that the soul must al- 
 " ways think: but this is contrary to what 
 *' every man experiences. We have no recoUec- 
 **-tion of what passes in sleep ; and having ntf 
 " recollection, we are left destitute of all proof 
 " that thinking at that time existed. And to 
 " suppose an immaterial substance to exist, 
 " and to suppose thinking to be essential to its 
 " nature, and yet to admit an interval in which 
 " this thinking can afford no evidence of its 
 " existence, is to admit as certain what we 
 
76 
 
 " have no certainty of ; it is to suppose a man 
 " to think and not to think at the same time." 
 
 To combat theory with fact and incident, 
 must always be forcible, and sometimes cOh^ 
 elusive. • And when theory can be fairly con- 
 fronted with such incidents, as its design Was 
 to invalidate and overcome, fact and incident 
 must always bei diecisive on the point in debate. 
 But when theory is established on the firm and 
 immoveable basis of solid and conclusive rea- 
 soning, fact itself must be presented, fairly to 
 the mind, to counterbalance the efficacy of 
 such reasonings as it has fo oppose. The phe- 
 nomena of appearance are no proof of reality. 
 Speciousness may dazzle the eye, but it cannot 
 produce conviction. The philosophic ' mind 
 investigates with accuracy, and moves with 
 slow but steady steps, from link to link, in the 
 great chain of causes and effects. 
 
 To give the objection that stability which it 
 claims, it is necessary that it should be made 
 to appear, that every man, or some individual 
 man, does not always think. And when this 
 is established, the conclusive part of the ob- 
 jection must be admitted ; and it will then 
 appear — that it is contradictory to suppose 
 thinking to be essential to the nature of an 
 immaterial principle, while an interval can be 
 proved in which this thinking has no existence. 
 Of every fact which we attempt to establish. 
 
77 
 
 we must have some concepibion ; without this 
 we cannot be certain that it is fact. And every 
 idea which we have of any fact, supposes the 
 existence of this fact. But for any man to 
 prove, or rather attempt to prove, tha,t the mind 
 d^es not always think,, is to prove the positive 
 existence of a nonentity. Should it be assert- 
 ed, that man does not always think, I would 
 ask, — How can that fact be known ? It must 
 be deduced from reasoning, must be self-evi- 
 dent, or must exist in common experience. 
 And if I mistake not, it is not difficult to prove 
 that it can be in neither. To prove by^ reason- 
 ing, the existence •qf what is supposed to have 
 no existence, is. proving exactly the reverse of 
 what is wanted to establish the-supposition^-^it 
 is proving the existence, of a nonentity ; which 
 is a contradiction : it cannot, therefore, be 
 known by reasoning. 
 
 To suppose it to be self-evident, is to sup- 
 pose the existence of what is supposed to have 
 no existence : and which, could it be once ad- 
 mitted, would necess9.rily destroy the very sup- 
 position it was designed to establish ; it would 
 prove jCxajctly, the reverse of what it ought. — 
 What, therefore, is supposed to, have no exist- 
 ence, cannot possibly be self-evident. Neither 
 can it be by common experience. Whatever 
 we admit on . the ground of experience, we 
 must be .conscious of; without this the very 
 
78 
 
 term is done away. It is a contradiction to 
 suppose, that we experience the absence of 
 thinking, while the very supposition itselfi 
 wherever it exists, establishes the fact which 
 we attempt to deny. And for any man to 
 suppose himself destitute of thinking, is ,in ef- 
 fect for him to suppose, that he is conscious of 
 the absence of all consciousness, — that he now 
 feels what he does not feel— and that he now 
 knows what he does not know. It is proting 
 the non-existence of a thing by the existence 
 of the thing itself. A nonentity, therefore, 
 cannot be proved ; and the f?ict which was ne- 
 cessary to support the conclusive part' of the 
 objection, has vanished into air. 
 
 To assert that a continuation of thought 
 may be inferred from a continuation of life, 
 may, probably, be deemed more presumptuous 
 than conclusive, because, it seems to assume 
 the point for which proof is demanded. But 
 though this inference should be declined, the 
 regularity with which animal life proceeds, 
 during the recess of nature, cannot but furnish 
 us with some striking analogies. The man 
 who is asleep is as insensible that he is alive, 
 ?is he is that he is conscious ; and should we 
 appeal to him for proof, he would find it equal- 
 ly as diflScult to furnish the evidence in the for- 
 mer case as in the latter. But however insen- 
 sible he may be of his conditon, we well know 
 
79 
 
 that his lungs heave, his breathing continues, 
 his heart beats, his blood circulates, and his 
 pulsation goes on. And yet when he wakes 
 he has no knowledge whatever of these facts, 
 and nothing can induce him to admit :them as 
 such, but information and analogy. If then 
 the functions of animal oeconomy may be, and 
 actually are carried 'on in the hours of sleep, 
 without our knowledge or sensibility, why may 
 not the mind continue its operations, even 
 though we never could know -the manner in 
 which it is employed ? 
 
 It may indeed be said, that '* all our animal 
 " functions which are performed in sleep are 
 " mechanical and involuntary, and therefore 
 " require little or no attention." This fact 
 cannot be denied ; but this will not destroy the 
 analogy. We know during our waking hours, 
 that it is easy for us to make these things the 
 objects of our thoughts, whenever the attention 
 is turned to them ; but through life we notice 
 these mechanical operations but little, even in 
 those moments when we have the clearest evi- 
 dence that our minds are conscious. Indeed 
 the more intense our application is to other ob- 
 jects to which we apply ourselves, the less are 
 we sensible of these involuntary actions. 
 
 In turning our attention to ojir own thoughts 
 during our waking hours, we want no evidence 
 to prove that many things which we perfectly 
 
80 ', 
 
 well knew while they passed through our 
 mmds, jnade little or no impression, and have 
 been recollected only in a. transient manner 
 since. Many things which had entirely escaped 
 our notice, some accidental circumstance in life 
 renews in all their vigour, many years after the 
 events occurred. Several eveints no doubt have 
 occurred to every man in the course of his life, 
 which have never more been remembered, and 
 which will for ever remain unknown. Hence 
 then it may be fairly inferred, that if even 
 during our waking hours, we make our perpe- 
 tual consciousness to depend upon our atten- 
 tion to the objects which present themselves to 
 our observations, or to the thoughts which pass 
 through our Uiinds, we shall have no more 
 reason to conclude th'at we are perpetually 
 conscious when we wake than when we sleep. 
 We well know that frequently while we are 
 asleep the mind is occupied with dreams, many 
 of which so far engage the attention as to leave 
 an impression which continues when we are 
 awake. Nay some of these are recollected 
 with pain or pleasure after a series of years, 
 and even continue through life. Among these 
 dreams a great number are totally forgotten 
 when we first start from sleep ; and sometimes 
 it is the case, that some occurrence which hap- 
 pens in the day, recals the impression, and 
 brings it to our memories in all its force. 
 
81 
 
 Sometimes, days, and even weeks elapse before 
 these sleeping" impressions are recalled; and 
 yet when they return, no person can convince 
 us that our minds were unconscious through 
 the whole of that night on which they ' were 
 first made. But should any person during 
 the interval which passed bet'v^een the dream 
 and our recollection of it, assert, that our con^ 
 sciousness was suspended, that the mind did 
 not operate, and that all our mental powers 
 were destitute of activity, we should have no 
 means of' contradicting the assertion, until a 
 recollection of the impression returned. But 
 whenever this took place, we should want no 
 argumen,ts to convince us that his opinion was 
 unfounded. 
 
 In like manner it may with safety be ad- 
 mitted, that we have no reason to conclude, 
 that the mind is unconscious either when we 
 sleep or when we wake, merely because we do 
 not recollect what passed through our minds 
 during these questionable hours. No doubt 
 a multitude of dreams occur to the mind, to 
 which even then we pay little or no atten- 
 tion, and' which we never recollect afterwards. 
 Though, could these be collected in the regu- 
 lar train of succession in which thfey occurred, 
 it is highly probable that they would leave 
 but few intervals in which the perpetual con- 
 sciousness of the mind could be questioned, 
 
 G 
 
82 
 
 These considerations are sufficient to silence 
 objections against the perpetual consciousness 
 of the mind during the hours of sleep, even 
 though they may be deemed insufficient to 
 prove that consciousness does actually and un- 
 i-emittingly exist. 
 
 But it would hot affect the immateriality of 
 the soul, even if it could be proved that there 
 vv'ere intervals in whifih the mind paid no at- 
 tention to its own operations, even at the timfe 
 that it was'engaged. , This fact the occurrences 
 of our waking hours will sufficiently prove. 
 And every instance in which the attention is 
 suspended, whether sleeping or waking, will 
 demonstrate the fact. For that men do not 
 always attend to their own consciousness I 
 readily admit ; but it does not follow from 
 hence, that consciousness during these inter- 
 vals has no existence. It proves that we have 
 no apprehension of the thing, but it does not 
 prove the non-existence of the thing itself. 
 The existence of a faculty of the mind and of 
 its actions, and our apprehension of their exist- 
 ence, are two distinct ideas. The former may 
 exist independently of the latter, but the latter 
 cannot exist if the former cease to be. The 
 existence o{ a faculty must necessarily precede 
 in the order of nature, our apprehension of its 
 existence; and the action of this faculty niust 
 for the same reason precede our knowledge of 
 
83 
 
 it. If then the existence of consciousness 
 and thinking, must necessarily priecede our 
 apprehension of them, our apprehension of 
 them can in no way whatever be essential to 
 their real being. ■ It is therefore not only pos- 
 sible tha;i the soul may think during the hours 
 of sleep, though we may bie totally ignorant 
 when we awake, of those objects which thm 
 approached the mind, as well as insensible of 
 the manner of our intellectual operations'; but 
 it appears absurd to suppose that tli6 ope- 
 rations of the mind and our apprehensioh of 
 them, should be co-existent with one another. 
 And Consequently '^ Where recollection fails, 
 thbse subjects which occupied our thoughts 
 must be totally unknown. ^' 
 
 "Alfhcfugh the facility of the Soul be always 
 the Same, it msty, nevertheless, vary in the 
 manner of its operations. Thinking may di- 
 verge itsielf into a thousand directions, iand 
 consciousness may be employed about as ma;ny 
 diffeiJent ideas; but it does not follow from 
 thence that we must always understand the 
 manner in which the former operates, or that 
 in which theJ latter is employed. Hence it is 
 no more necessary to our idea of thinking, that 
 we always understand the manner in which 
 the faculty operates, than it is necessary to the 
 operations themselveSj' that we should ailways 
 
 comprehend the secret springs by which thfey 
 
 G 2 
 
84 
 
 move. In like manner it is no more necessary 
 to the existence of consciousness, that we al- 
 ways recollect the manner in which it was 
 employed, or the ideas about which it was 
 occupied, than that we should be acquainted 
 with those mysterious laws by which consci- 
 ousness is governed, or that both should, be 
 supposed to depend for their existence upon 
 our knowledge of them. 
 
 We may be sensible that we fear, or love, 
 but no man will pretend to say that he knows 
 by what secret physical powers these impres- 
 sions are made upon the mind. Yet while all 
 men are satisfied that these internal impressions 
 are made, we must be assured, if we permit 
 our reason to act, that our sensibility of these 
 impressions, and those secret powers by which 
 it is excited in consequence of them, can bear 
 no physical relation to one another. 
 
 The principal force of the foregoing objec-r 
 tion, seems to consist in the blending together 
 the two ideas of consciousness and our recol- 
 lection of it; though it is evident that they are 
 distinct, and that our consciousness of any 
 given idea must exist in the order of nstture 
 before we can know that we are conscious of 
 : it. And if we admit the necessary existence 
 of the former, prior to the latter, it must follow 
 — that an appreihension of our own conscious- 
 
85 
 
 ness, is nbt necessary to the existence of con- 
 sciousness itself. 
 
 If consciousness do not exist previously to 
 our apprehension of it, it must also foUow^- 
 that our knowledge of a fact, does not depend 
 for its existence on the iact itself; and if this 
 be admitted, it then follows — that we may 
 know a fact which is not a fact ; which is a 
 contradiction. But as it is impossible to ad- 
 mit a contradiction, it follows with certiainty, 
 that every thing which we apprehend, must 
 exist prior to our apprehension of it. And 
 when we admit, though but for a moment, the 
 existence of consciousness, previously to our 
 apprehension of it, we at once admit; on the 
 permanent basis of demonstration, what the 
 objection pronounces to be an impossibility. 
 
 I am well aware, that to this mode of reason- 
 ing, another objection will be made. It will 
 be said — " that if the mind may be conscious 
 " without having any knowledge of it, it in- 
 " eludes this contradiction — that a man may 
 " be conscious and not conscious at the same 
 " time." To make this objection as valid as 
 it is specious, and to render the contradiction 
 at which it aims complete, it should be made 
 to appear — " that the reasoning in question 
 " induces a belief, that a man may be conscious 
 " of a given idea, and not conscious of that 
 *' very idea at the same time." This, however, is 
 
86 
 
 Hot itifcluded in the reasoning above; it only 
 supposes that a man may be conscious of one 
 fact, and yet unconscious of another at the 
 same time. 
 
 Every man must allow that we may perceive 
 the motion of any given piece of matter, while 
 we may be ignorant of the' power whicTi pro- 
 duced it, and inattentive to the operations «f 
 our own mind concerning both. And it no 
 more implies a contradiction to suppose that 
 the mind; may operate while we are inattentive 
 to its operatioiis, than it does to suppose that 
 we may perceive motion,, arid yet remain in- 
 attentive to our manner of perceiving it. To 
 suppose that we are conscious of any given 
 idea, while we suppose that we are not consci- 
 ous of that ^iveu idea,' is a plain contradiction. 
 But to suppose that we may be conscious of 
 ah id^a, While we are inattentive to our consci- 
 ousness of it, is a totally different ca^e; because 
 the former relates to our consciousness of a 
 given idea, but the latter to the recognitiQil of 
 our consciousness of it, A contradiction is 
 instantly perceived by a simple action .of the 
 mind, and refutied by itself; but the csise be- 
 fore us implies two distinct actions, which 
 may exist together or may not, ; without ha>;ing 
 any reciprocal dependence, Our being conscious 
 of any given idea,- is a simple action, of the 
 mindvoperatijig upon that idea, while our at- 
 
87 
 
 tention to what is passing, is a reflex act of 
 the mind operating upon its own operations. 
 The former must precede the latter in the order 
 of nature, and therefore must exist indepen- 
 dently of it ; while the latter, founded on the 
 former, is dependent on it for its existence. 
 But whether the latter exist or not, it implies 
 neither contradiction nor absurdity.* 
 
 * Whether the mind of man be necessarily active, without 
 any intermission, is a question otfact which is foreign to my 
 present argument. If the distinct possibility can be made out, 
 that consciousness may exist without our apprehension of it, all 
 objections j^inst the soiil's immortality, drawn from its appa- 
 rent inactivity during the hours of sleep, are at once done 
 away. An attempt to decide between fact and possibility, is, 
 perhaps, equally difficult and injudicious. That consciousness 
 and our apprehension of it, are two distinct Ideas, I hope I 
 have sufficiently made out ; and although the latter depends 
 upon the former for its existence, yet the former may exist 
 independently of the latter; and, therefore, all reciprocal 
 necessary connexion between them, is rather the produce of 
 prejudice than philosophy. 
 
 Whether the intellectual powers be active or dormant, du- 
 ring the recess of nature, is a point of speculation, perhaps, 
 more curious than useful j but however it may be decided, it 
 can prove nothing against the soul's immortality. That we 
 cannot conceive how an immaterial substaince, with -^fhose 
 real essence we are totally unacquainted, can exist, while all 
 those powers and properties are apparently suspended, through 
 the activity of which we can alone be certified of its existence, 
 I am ready to admit ^ but it never ought to be forgotten, that 
 our inability to comprehend, is no argument either against 
 iHEOEY or FACT. If the human soul be an immaterial sub- 
 
88 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 The affections which exist in the soul, pi-ove it to hi 
 immaterial. These affections cannot inhere in mat- 
 . ter, nor flow from it^ Atoms must he ineogitative, 
 and therefore inconsistent with the affections, — The 
 supposition absurd, and leads to palpable contra- 
 dictions. Objections founded on external excite- 
 ment, stated, examined and answered. 
 
 That there are certain affections in the human 
 mind, is one of those truths which will admit 
 neither of controversy nor denial. And that 
 these affections cannot exist of themselves, 
 independently of some common principle, must 
 be equally certain. For if eithei- kindness or 
 gratitude, love or compassion can be supposed 
 to have a distinct independent existence, they- 
 are no longer affections of any substance, but 
 must be principles theniselves. And then it 
 will follow, that there are in man, as many dis- 
 tinct independent principles as there are affec- 
 tions of the mind. And if these affections be 
 
 stance^ it is among the grossest of absurdities to suppose, that 
 God has made its existence to depend upon the continual activity 
 of its own powers, or our uninterrupted perception of it 5 
 and unless it can be proved, that the real essence of spirit 
 excludes from its nature, a possibility of suspending its own 
 actions, it never can be proved, that a suspension of action, 
 and a destruction of that substance, from /whence the action 
 flows, are terms synonymous with one another. 
 
89 
 
 mdependent, they can have no physical relation 
 to one another. To suppose a physical re- 
 lation between principles, which are of them- 
 selves independent, is a contradiction ; and to 
 suppose that which is independent, to be desti- 
 tute of self-subsistence, is a contradiction also ; 
 —-it is to suppose it to be a principle, and not 
 a principle at the same time. . 
 
 Hence then it follows, that those affections 
 which we discover in the human mind, can 
 have but a relative existence ; and if so, they 
 must inhere in some common ^inciple, which 
 is capable of them ; and this principle must 
 be either material or inimaterial^t must be 
 either matter or spirit. / 
 
 If the soul, in which the affections inhere, 
 be matter, it must be either an union of divisible 
 particles, or one single unextended atom, thei'e 
 being no other light in which matter can be 
 viewed, or manner through which it can pos- 
 sibly enter into our conceptions. If we admit 
 the first case, and suppose the soul to be an 
 union of divisible particles, then, either the 
 affections which are supposed to inhere in the 
 soul, must inhere in each particle of this union, 
 or they must not. If they inhere in each par- 
 ticle of this union, then each particle in this 
 union must have the affections ; and if so, an 
 union of these particles cannot be necessary to 
 the existence of these affections, because the 
 
so 
 
 aifections are now supposed to inhere in each 
 of those particles of which the soul; is com- 
 posed ; and in this case, the existence of the 
 whole soul is nOt necessary to the existence Of 
 those affections, which are supposed to inhere 
 in each of its constituent parts. But in ad- 
 mitting the affections to inhere in, and to result 
 from, a cause which is not necessary to their 
 existence, we not only make the soul necessary 
 and unnecessary to the'existence of those affec- 
 tions at the same time, but we make the affec- 
 tions to, exist, after we admit it possible that' 
 the soul, upon which they depend for their 
 existence, haay be divided and thereby des- 
 troyed. But if we admit ianother view, and 
 suppose that no single minute particle in this 
 union has the affections inhering in it, it must 
 then follow that an union of particles, all of 
 which are destitute of these affections, can never 
 be necessary to the existience of them. For 
 as ho cause or substance, can communicate 
 what it does not possess,^and as each particle 
 in this supposed union is presumed to be desti^- 
 tute of these affections, the affections can never 
 result from a cause, which is admitted by the 
 supposition, to be devoid lof all energy to call 
 them into being; And whether we suppose 
 the affections to depend upon an union of these 
 particles, or upon any single :particle in this 
 supposed union; as the former destroys the 
 
91 
 
 eauseupott ^yhich the aiFectious are presumed 
 to depend, and as the latter attriljutes to that 
 cause, an energy of which, by the supposition 
 itself, it is admitted: to bC; destitute, it demon- 
 stratively follows— that matter can in neither 
 case,, give being! to. those ^affections which we 
 discover in ;the huttian mind. 
 
 fShouMjan uftion of particles be still insisted 
 on as th0.:"Becessajry constituent parts of the 
 hnnian soul, I would ask— [f God were to re- 
 moye any particle frOm this .supposed union of 
 divisible atoms, would the so.nl retain the affec- 
 tions or not? If it wowld retain them^ then this 
 subtracted atom roust have been Superfluous 
 and unnecessary,, which will'at once destroy 
 th^ necessity of i^ch ah union of particles, 
 but if the son! would h<5t, retain them after this 
 ziom is subtracted, I would further ask — is 
 the atom thus subtracted cogitatiye or not? 
 I{ fsogitative the affections, must adhere to this 
 single atom, and then all be4ide are rendered 
 useless and unnecessary; if uncogitative the 
 affections can never be destroyed by the re- 
 moval of an uncogitative atom. In either case, 
 the necessity of \an. union of particles is des- 
 troyed, and the plain consequence is — that the 
 affections_can neither exist in, nor result from, 
 any union o.r combination of particles what- 
 soever. 
 
 As an Union of particles, from the arguments 
 
92 
 
 I have already adduced, is not only absolutely 
 unnecessary, but altogether incompatible with 
 the existence of the affections, the absurdity 
 will perhaps not be lessened by admitting the 
 second case, and supposing them to exist in 
 arty single unextended atom. However minute 
 or magnified this atom may be supposed, it 
 must be incapable of division, for. if this be no^ 
 granted, the supposition cannot exist. For 
 unless it be admitted to be incapable of divisi- 
 bility, it will still be an union of divisible parti- 
 cles, and, therefore attended with the absurdi- 
 ties and contradictions stated above. But to 
 suppose a divisible substance, which all matter 
 is, that cannot be divided, is to conceive what 
 is utterly inconceivable : it is to conceive an 
 extended substance which has no extension ; 
 or a divisible atom which is incapable of 
 divisibility. 
 
 That a capability of division is necessarily 
 included in our idea of matter, all must readir 
 ly grant, it being impossible to form any idea 
 of matter which shall exclude this capacity, 
 because it is essential to its nature, or abso- 
 lutely inseparable from it. And therefore, to 
 imagine matter to exist, (as matter) after we 
 have excluded from it any property or capacity 
 whichas inseparable from its -nature, conducts 
 the mind to a palpable contradiction. 
 
 But admitting it possible that this contra- 
 
93 
 
 diction could be dispensed with, and that an 
 s^tom could exist without extension, or possi- 
 bility of division, the diflSculty would not there- 
 by be removed. For while the soul is sup- 
 posed to be a material atom, though totally 
 removed from all extension, and wholly inca- 
 pable of divisibility, under which consideration 
 we now view it, it is certain that it can be but 
 matter still ; and as such can hav^ acquired 
 no new quality by the loss it has sustaiiied. 
 It has indeed been "deprived of extension, and 
 rendered incapable of division through mere 
 minuteness ; but these are only simple priva; 
 tionp ; and mere privation can never confer or 
 destroy any quality of a material substance, or 
 bestow upon it a capacity through which it 
 can become the seat of the affections, or a sub- 
 ject in which they inhere. Now if the affec- 
 tions, which must be admitted to exist, reside 
 within or result from this atom, they must be 
 uniform, and invariable in their manifestations, 
 or we must admit their changes without ad- 
 mitting the existence of any adequate cause. 
 To suppose any affections of the^ mind to be 
 uniform and invariable, is to. place theory in 
 direct opposition to fact; — it is to annex the 
 idea of mutability, to affections which in their 
 own nature must be fleeting, transitory, and 
 ^instable. And to admit the existence of the 
 affections, and to pretend to derive them from 
 
94 
 
 a cause which we mtist admit to be incapable 
 of producing thetti, is to make that datise to be 
 adequate and inadequate to the same purpose 
 at the same time. 
 
 That the afFectiohs are mutable and transi- 
 tory is as evident as theiir existence, it being a 
 fact which seems self-evident. But if the soul 
 in which these affections inhere, be a simple 
 wnextendeclatim, it miist continue uniformly and 
 invariably the same ; for that atom can admit 
 of no variety, which is devoid of all extension, 
 and totally destitute of partL If then, variable- 
 ness and mutability be excluded from this 
 atom through the simplicity of its nature ; and 
 mutability and variableness be the distinguish 
 ing characteristic of the affections, the power 
 through which they diverge themselves into 
 such a variety of directions, can never be de- 
 rived from an atom which is destitute of all 
 variety, and therefore incapable of communi- 
 cating that transition and instability which 
 they' possess. Can the affections w^hich'mani- 
 fest variety," result from an atoirij-from the in- 
 ertness and simplicity'of whose nature all 
 variety is excluded? A cause which cannot 
 change, must be the same-td-day that it was 
 yesterday, and can therefore produce now, no 
 other effects than' ii did th^n . If therefore the 
 affections' result from such a caiiise, either thc?;^ 
 must be always felt with ah equal impi'ession, 
 
95 
 
 or the mind can have but one single tendency 
 and direction. In supposing the affections to 
 be always felt with an equal impression, we 
 not only (Contradict our knowledge, but we 
 render it impossible for any affection to be 
 suspended, or to be removed from one object 
 to another. Hence in admitting this theory 
 which gives immutability . to the affections, 
 while the assurance which we gather from ex- 
 perience, proves thecertainty of their occasion- 
 al suspension; and while the transitions which 
 they manifest, doclare that such stability forms 
 no part of their nature, we place hypothesis in 
 direct opposition to fact ; and by so doing 
 defeat our own intentions. For as fact will 
 pot, cannot, be rejected, we shall be com- 
 pelled, if we retain the hypothesis, to conclude 
 from both, that an affection may be present, to 
 the mind, and yet absent from it at the same 
 time. Should we reject this conclusion, and 
 admit the mind to have but one single tenden- 
 cy of direction, we shall be under the necessity 
 of destroying the nature o{ the affections, in 
 order to establish their existence. Thus then, 
 as each of these questions leads to the most 
 palpable absurdity, and as every light in which 
 it is viewed, involves the grossest contradic- 
 tions v it follows, that that which is the seat 
 of the affections, cannotbe an unextended atom. 
 And cons^equently that the affections which 
 
96 
 
 we possess, can in no case result from matter, 
 either considered as such, or in any of its 
 modes or relations. 
 
 As therefore,'there are affections in the soul, 
 and these affections cannot arise either from 
 an assemblage of atoms, or from a single par- 
 ticle, it necessarily followsr— that the soul can- 
 not be material. , And as matter and spirit, are 
 the only two subjects with which we are ac- 
 quainted in the vast empire of nature ; it fol^ 
 lows also, with all the certainty that is neces- 
 sary to produce convictioji, that there must be 
 an immaterial principle in man. 
 
 It may, indeed, be said — " that the affections 
 " of the mind are excited by foreign impulses; 
 " and that they depend not upon the nature of 
 " the soul, but on the external application of 
 " the exciting power." This however, can in 
 no case affect the question. For though the 
 - aflFections may be excited by the impulses of 
 external causes ; yet these causes must apply 
 to, and operate upon, an internal : subject. 
 Even the supposition of an external impulse, 
 implies an internal recipient power ; for where 
 there is nothing to be acted upon, nothing can 
 b^vproduced by any action. It would be ab- 
 surd, if not contradictory, to suppose that an 
 external impulse could excite the affections, 
 while it operated upon nothing ; and it would 
 not be less preposteroiis to imagine, according 
 
97 
 
 to tlie supposition, tliat the affections existed 
 prior to their being excited. But if something 
 be admitted to exist, previously to its being, 
 excited, this carries us back again to the ori- 
 giiial question; and the previous existence of 
 the subject being admitted, it follows, that it 
 must either be material or immaterial. It has 
 been already proved, that it neither is, rior can 
 be material ; and therefore, from' the admission 
 of its previous existence, it undeniably follows, 
 that ihere muat be an immaterial substance in 
 man. 'w^' 
 
 It is certain that no foreign mipulses can 
 coimnunicate to matter, any new quality which 
 is not included within those confines which cir- 
 oumscribe its existence, nor excite within it 
 any affection -which these boundaries exclude. 
 Hence all those affections which are presumed 
 to be excited by a perception of Worth, Excel- 
 lence, Rectitude, Virtiie, or Justice, are at once 
 rendered visionary and chimerical ; because 
 these principles can never operate on a sub- 
 stance which is purely material, so as to ex- 
 cite within it, affections which are foreign to 
 its nature. That these principles do exist, and 
 exist in a manner evidently distinct from all 
 material bodies, is too obvious to require proof. 
 And it is equally certain, that those affections 
 Whidh they excite within us, while they )bear a 
 strong i^semblance ito the exciting power, re- 
 
 H 
 
98 
 
 tain liot a single property, besides simple 
 existence, of that material substance in which 
 they are presumed to inhere. 
 - Can it then be supposed, that a material 
 substance which is acted upon by an immate- 
 rial principle, such as Justice, SfC. can be made 
 to produce, or to put forth affections which 
 shall be congenial with the exciting power, 
 but shall bear no physical resemblance to the 
 substance in which they are excited? The 
 existence of the affections, demonstrates the 
 existence of some substance ; and the physical 
 nature which they display, as plainly tells us, 
 that this substance must be one, to which mat' 
 ter and motion can bear no affinity or relation. 
 Hence then the conclusion is obvious,— that 
 though foreign impulses may occasionally ex- 
 cite, there must be an immaterial principle in 
 man. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 The intellectual endowments of individuals apparent- 
 ly different. The cause of this is not physical, hut 
 occasioned by th^ defective organization of the body, 
 through the operation of moral enil. The physical 
 nature of the intellect the same, though depraved^ in 
 its moral tendencies. 
 
 That there is a vast difference between the 
 ^apparent intellectual endowments of indivi- 
 duals, is too evident to admit of any dispute ; 
 
99 
 
 but whether this difference he physieai or mo- 
 ral, is q.uite another question. If it be phy- 
 sical, we must look for this variation wiiich is 
 visible, in the primary formation of things. — If 
 it be moral, we must look to some cause, inde- 
 pendent of the original state of man. 
 
 Could we conceive, that the variations which 
 we discover in men, depended upon the pri-^ 
 mary formation of the human intellect, we 
 must suppose, that the Almighty God had 
 created beings of the same species, very differ- 
 ent from one another. Beings, however, which 
 are the same in species, must be the same in na- 
 ture; and if so, they must be the same in those 
 physical endowments, from whence alone 
 CMi be denominated their real identity. But 
 if those endowments from whence their identity 
 is denominated, be found totally different in 
 the same species of beings ; then those beings 
 must be the same in nature, while they are 
 totally different in those endowments from 
 whence that identity of nature is denominated. 
 It therefore must follow, that the real or nomi- 
 nal difference which we discover, cannot arise 
 from the physical origin of things. 
 
 If the sensible difference which we perceive 
 between men, depend upon the primary for- 
 mation of the human intellect, this difference 
 
 must be for ever inseparable from human na- 
 
 H 2 
 
100 
 
 tare. For whatever is physically included in 
 any nature, is necessary to the identity of that 
 nature under all its changes ; and the instant 
 in which we can conceive it to be extracted/ 
 that instant the original identity of that nature 
 can be no more. 
 
 Does not, then, the supposing this difference 
 to arise from the physical causes of things, cast 
 a reflection on the Great Creator ? And in ad- 
 mitting this, must^we not suppose, that to a 
 superior intellect, God has communicated a su- 
 perfluity of excellence ; and, from one that i^ 
 inferior, that he has withheld what is necessary 
 to the perfection of its nature ? And in either- 
 case, are we not led to accuse the Deity of im- 
 perfyetions or imprudence ? But as neither can 
 attach to God, we cannot conceive that the dif- 
 ference between men, can arise from the phy- 
 sical nature of things. 
 
 To continue through all eternity, the human 
 race, as a distinct link in the vast chain of 
 Being, it is necessary that their identity be pre- 
 served ; and so far as human discernment can 
 penetrate, this can only be effected, by pre- 
 serving the physical origin of, their natures. 
 But if the apparent incongruity that we disco- 
 ver in lUen, exist in the physical essence of the 
 human soul, it must remain unalterably the 
 same for evfer, and reproach, through all eter- 
 nity, the Deity himself with the imperfectiafts 
 
101 
 
 of his works. But is it eoQsisteit with those 
 notions which we form of that God—" in whose 
 " sight the stars are not pure," and whom 
 Plato calls — t1i£ ineffable JBeauty, to suppose 
 that this can be the case ? Can we conceive, 
 that, either intellectual superfluity, or intellec-^ 
 tual imperfection, can enter heaven ? Or if both 
 were admitted thither, can we conceive, that 
 the harmony of heaven can arise from those 
 chords of dissonance? Isit possible, that such 
 a thing can ever exist, as physical imperfecticm 2 
 Certainly not. Does not each thing, whether 
 animate or inanimate, possess every physical 
 perfection necessary to its nature ? And whe- 
 ther its endowments be exalted or debased, 
 does it not possess every physical perfection 
 necessary to its station? And if every phy- 
 sical perfection be possessed by any individual 
 ef any given species, must not each individual 
 of the same species be an equal possessor ? 
 And without this, can those individuals be of 
 the same species ? But if each be an equal pos- 
 sessor, must there not be a physical equality 
 tdirough all individuals of the same species, 
 both in material and immaterial nature ? Cer- 
 tainly there must. And if so, the nominal dif- 
 ference which we discover, cannot arise from 
 the physical essence of things. To admit any 
 thing to be physically included in any nature, 
 which is not essential to that nature, is a con- 
 
102 
 
 tradiction. And to suppose any thing to fee 
 essential to any nature, which is not applicable to 
 every individual of that nature, is a contradiction 
 also. Norwill the absurdity be lessened, by sup- 
 posing an adventitious difference to result from 
 the fixed essence of things ; because whatever 
 results from the essence must be derived from 
 it ; and whatever it produces in one, must be 
 produced by it in others also. It therefore 
 follows, that a physical difference in the nature 
 of the human soul, cannot be that which dis- 
 tinguishes man from man. 
 
 That these differences are purely adventitious^ 
 I readily admit. But while they are admitted 
 to be adventitious, the physical nature of the 
 soul must be totally discharged ; and we must 
 apply to another source, for that inequality 
 which we discover, when the intellectual 
 powers of mankind are compared and most vi- 
 gorously displayed. 
 
 To a mind capable of penetrating deeper 
 than the mere surface of things, it must in- 
 stantly occur, that since the introductio'n of 
 moral evil, the stat& of man must have been 
 considerably- changed. The human body, 
 lying open to the innovations of natural evil, 
 is exposed to calamities in various forms. 
 Diseases and misfortunes, inhumanities and 
 accidents, are among those evils, that "life is 
 " heir to," and these are but the harbingers of 
 
103 
 
 death. An exposure to those calamities, un- 
 der which the " whole creation groans," must 
 have had a peculiar influence on the mechanism 
 of the human body, — must have materially im- 
 peded the operation of physical causes, and 
 considerably affected the organization of our 
 material parts. 
 
 It is through the organs of sense alone, that 
 we have any communication with external ob- 
 jects ; and all impressions which we thus re- 
 ceive from them, must be clear or indistinct, in 
 proportion to the evidence with which the im- 
 pulse is communicated. Every defect in the 
 organ mustobstruct that evidence, and impede 
 the impression, in proportion to its magnitude. 
 Defects must be almost as various as the indi- 
 viduals who possess them ; and this being ad- 
 mitted, leaves the apparent inequality of man, 
 no longer an undecided point ; — the physical 
 essence of the soul, is no longer included in 
 the question, the obstructions are purely ad- 
 ventitious, and the phenomena present us with 
 totally another cause. 
 
 By what secret power the intellect lays hold 
 on external objects, is to us totally unknown ; 
 it is a subject concealed , too deep for philoso- 
 phic researches, and the fact only serves to 
 tell us, that we are strangers to ourselves. Be 
 these things, however, as they may, observa- 
 tion will convince us, that while the body is 
 
104 
 
 exposed to those diseases and misfortunes that 
 are incident to life, and which in this deprayed 
 state of being are inseparable from us, the 
 mind is subjected to error, enslaved to appe- 
 tite, and under the direction of ungovernable 
 passions. The empire of reason is invaded 
 with hostile inclinations, and the observer is 
 presented with an awful picture of intellectual 
 ruin&. , 
 
 In this mutilated state of things, — is it pos- 
 sible that physical causes can perform their 
 operatioiis without obstruetioris ? If they can 
 act without obstructions; these impediments 
 can be impediments no longer ; if'they caimot* 
 we discover a cause of the deviation we per- 
 ceive, abstracted from iall physical operations. 
 Every defect, whether Corporeal or mehtal^ is 
 a deviation from physical rectitude. And 
 to imagine, that any physical cause can pro- 
 duce an effect, which is contrary to the nature 
 of that power which produced it, is too absurd 
 to be admitted. 
 
 If a physical cause can produce those ine- 
 qualities that are so visible in the human intel- 
 lect, it «must pi-bdufce them invariably ; Unless 
 this be admitted, it cannot be a physical causfe. 
 But to suppose an inequality to be produced 
 invariably, is an absurdity too gross^to be pur- 
 sued, — an invariable variation is a contradiction 
 in terms. It \b, thfeSrefore, to the ioifoads of 
 
105 
 
 moral evil, operating through the jarganization 
 of the body, upon the intellectual powers, that 
 we must look for that variation which we daily 
 discover in men. 
 
 A physical difference in nature, implies a 
 real difference in species ; and a real difference 
 in species, destroys the only criterion from 
 whence can be denominated the common iden- 
 tity of man. But as both *jome* and identity 
 are preserved, it must undeniably follow, that 
 the real and nominal essence on which both 
 species and iildentity depend, must be preserv- 
 ed also ; and the evident result is — that there 
 neither is, nor can be^ any pbysicalrdifference 
 between the individuals of the human race. 
 
 If this reasoning be admitted, and admitted 
 as conclusive, it fully answers that question — 
 '* Wherein consists .the difference between a 
 " wise man and a fool ?" Not in the physical 
 essence of their natures, but in the organization 
 of the body, and the inroads of moral evil on 
 the intellectual powers. 
 
 As the intellect is accessible or inaccessible 
 to the evidence of external objects, we form 
 accurate or inaecurate conceptions of them. 
 And in an exact proportion as the internal 
 perception is clear and shining, or confused 
 and indistinct, we reason on this ground-worJk 
 of human knowledge, and form complex ideas 
 — crude and inconsisitenl, br incontrovertible 
 
106 
 
 and decisive. Obstructions in the organs, must 
 always mutilate the images which pass through 
 them; and from this cause, they must approach 
 the intellect with distorted features, and make 
 impressions suitable to their natures. 
 
 From this confused and indistinct mass of 
 materials, it is — that the mind must begin its 
 operations. And while these organical ob- 
 structions, and broken images of externals, 
 impede its progress, it can never obtain an 
 adequate knowledge of the import and relation 
 of subjects, which may be physically within it& 
 reach. 
 
 Unable to form a proper estimate of things, 
 or to discover the mutual dependencies, and 
 influences, which subsist between them ; it is 
 impossible, in ten thousand instances, that 
 any rational conceptions can be formed, or 
 proper conclusions drawn. And while desti- 
 tute of a clear perception of those materials, 
 which are the foundations of human knowledge, 
 it is impossible that any complex idea can be 
 formed with accuracy or precision. External 
 objects are, therefore, distorted, by being view- 
 ed through imperfect and discoloured mediums. 
 It is under the influence of these distortions, 
 that the mental powei-s perform their opera- 
 tions, and discover to the understanding, the 
 phenomena which are so visible in the intel- 
 lectual and natural world. 
 
107 
 
 'But while the organical passages, through 
 ^hich external objects present their images to 
 the m^d, appear so evidently in a disordered 
 state, it is but rational to conclude, that even 
 the immaterial substance itself, has undergone 
 a considerable change. This change, however, 
 must be confined to its moral 'tendency, with- 
 out being able to reach its physical nature. 
 Analogy will lead us to this conclusion, and 
 daily experience confirms the awful fact. The 
 internal essence of the soul is too refined for 
 human discernment, and of a nature too remote 
 from our knowledge to be explored. It is from 
 a discovery of its effects alone, that we may 
 hazard conjectures on its state; and those 
 effects sufficiently warrant the supposition I 
 have made. Hence then, the causes of devi- 
 ation from rectitude, may be sufficiently ascer- 
 tained from the influence of moral evil, withoxxt 
 obliging us to have recourse to any other cause. 
 The physical nature of the soul may be in- 
 variably the same, although appearances may 
 ^eem to indicate the very reverse. Mere ap- 
 pearance however, is no criterion of fact ; and 
 though the human powers may deviate from 
 one another in their tendencies, it no more fol- 
 lows, that there is not a sameness of immuierial 
 substance in man, than that there are no such 
 jspecies as those we denominate huuian^ be- 
 cause we differ in/eatures from one another. 
 
Ip8 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Animation possessed by all living creatures. Brutes 
 possess instinct. Instinct distinguished Jrom reason. 
 Instinct defined. Bounds of operation specified. 
 Marks of reason as contrasted with it. Creatures 
 governed by instinct, act under the dominion of im- 
 pulses which they cannot resist. No instinctive 
 
 ~ action can exist without impulse. The causes vari- 
 ous. Instinctive capacity destitute of activity. 
 En-d of instinct. Station which animals govertied 
 by instinct, fill in the chain of being. Instinct can 
 have no self-determining powen Animals cannot 
 be impelled by contrary impulses at the same time, 
 though the impulses may be diff'er^t. The strong^ 
 est impulse governs. 
 
 That th^re is diffused through all animated 
 nature, a certain principle of vitality, is one 
 of those truths which supersedes the necessity 
 of all proof. It is a principle which every 
 human being fi^ds diffused through every part, 
 and which forms that insuperable line which 
 divides all animate from inanimate nature. Nor 
 is this principle confined to man alone. Every 
 knimal, every reptile, and every insect is made 
 ian equal possessor of it, though with different 
 degrees of acuteness, from the unwieldy el^ 
 phant, down to " the green myriads of the 
 "peopled grass." To separate this vital prin- 
 ciple from any animated being, without des- 
 
109 
 
 troying its present state of existence, is utterly 
 impossible. It is therefore a principle which 
 is widely diffused, and in its most general ac- 
 ceptation, is applicable both to material and 
 knmaterial natures. For as the term existence 
 will equally apply both to God and all his 
 creatures, whether possessed of life or desti- 
 tute of it, so far as to distinguish Being frOm 
 No Being, so in like manner this principle of 
 vitality is disseminated through the universe, 
 to distinguish living beings, from dead and in- 
 animate matter. 
 
 But while we behold this principle of ani- 
 mation diffused thronghout the vast empire of 
 nature, distinguishing such portions of creation 
 as are animated, - from such as lie in a state of 
 mere passiveness, we have no more reason to 
 conclude from hence, that all the creatures 
 uniformly partake of one common nature, than 
 that an angel and a stone are the same, because 
 the term existence will apply to both. In 
 man, and in all the inferior orders of tlie ani- 
 mal creation, we behold this common prin- 
 ciple ; but the former, by displays of intellect 
 which brutes never manifest, rises superior to 
 the latter, though both present us with pheno- 
 mena which F'ere animation can never furnish'. 
 
 But while 1 assert, that man rises above the 
 brute creation, in the intellectual powers whic^h 
 he displays', it cannot be denied, that in many 
 
110 
 
 instances the latter so far approach towards 
 him, in their . sagacity and knowledge, as to 
 shew a striking gradation in the chain of sensi- 
 tive and intelligent being, if not an alliance by 
 a still nearer conformity. This intimate con- 
 nexion or remarkable resemblance is visible to 
 every superficial observer, who notices the ap- 
 pearances which he discerns; without once ad- 
 verting to the causes from which they spring, 
 or looking to the consequences to which they 
 lead. 
 
 But when we penetrate beneath the surfaces^ 
 of things, where appearances too frequently de- 
 lude us, and compel the mind to float in a 
 shoreless ocean of uncertainties, we enter a 
 region which popular observation cannot ex-' 
 plore. In this intellectual region, where ap- 
 parent reason operates in all its gradations^ 
 there however, must be some line of demark- 
 ation which distinguishes the animal from the 
 man. But where this line can be drawn, or 
 where the boundaries can be fixed with pre- 
 cision, is with me a point of almost inexplicable 
 difficulty. And yet some discriminating cri- 
 terion must first be ascertained, before any 
 conclusions can be drawn from those premises 
 which are attempted to be established. 
 
 Among those appearances which present 
 themselves to the mind, there are none which 
 I can discover, more appropriate than the in- 
 
Ill 
 
 stmct of animals and the reason of man. Yet 
 even here, the shades "which divide them from 
 each other are, so minute, and so nearly are 
 they in many instances allied, that they seem 
 to lose themselves in each other by tints which 
 are almost imperceptible.- Hence, while we 
 attempt to examine with accuracy the full ex- 
 tent of either, we imperceptibly pass its bound- 
 ary, without discovering our situation,, until 
 we find ourselves within the confines of that 
 subject which we wished to avoid. 
 
 It is foreign to my present design, to inquire 
 into all the various and active operations either 
 of instinct or reason. I only wish to discrimi- 
 nate between them ; — :to fix on something in 
 which they are specifically different ;— to mark 
 their distinct relations to their respective caus« 
 es ; — and to point out some of those connexions 
 which they form with these causes, and there- 
 by enable us to trace them to their respective 
 sources. In this viewy instinctive action ap- 
 pears to be founded upon impulse, and that 
 which is reasonable upon reflection. 
 
 Whatever Being is capable of being irresist- 
 ibly driven to action by impulse, is so far under 
 the dominion of instinct; and whatever Being 
 is capable of counteracting these impulses, 
 and acting contrary to them, is under the do- 
 minion of reason. Impulses which originate 
 in external causes act through the medium of 
 
112 
 
 tb« senses ; and these causes must be confined 
 within the bounds of corporeal existence, 
 though other causes may produce similar ef. 
 fects, without operating through this medium : 
 but reason originates in .another source. 
 ' 'By instinct, I understand that natural pro- 
 petisity or aptitude called into action, which 
 all creatures have, included within their natures, 
 by which they move in conformity to some im- 
 pelling cause. The dictates of this cause it 
 invariably obeys, whether it be specifically 
 known or not, whenever its impulses reach, the 
 serisorium, either through the senses or by any 
 other medium. The causes however which 
 impel, the sensations which excite, and the 
 propensity- or aptitude which yields submis- 
 sion, are so guarded by the wisdom and good- 
 ness of God, that in all their connexions, they 
 mutually tend to the preservation of the crea- 
 ture, and the propagation of its species. 
 
 By reason, I understand that power or facul- 
 ty of the human mind, by which those impul- 
 ses that instinct obeys, are controlled and 
 counteracted ; and by which their legitimate 
 effects are, or may be defeated. It is by rea- 
 son that we weigh the relations, and compare 
 the natures and properties of things ; and by 
 it that we perceive the opposition or contra- 
 riety, which invariably subsists between good 
 atirf evil. 
 
113 
 
 That instinct acts under the dominion of 
 impulse, may be gathered from facts which are 
 open to popular observation. It is on this 
 geiBeral principle that the bull is urged to use 
 his hoirnSi the horse his heels, and the dog his 
 tfeeth, whenever danger or provoca:tion rouses 
 them by impulse from inaction. It is inmlich 
 the same manner that uneasiness, or the pros- 
 pect of gratification, begets desire, — that settsa- 
 tieiis priomoite appetite, and that the creature 
 i*' impelled to seek iildulgence, when other 
 causes commence arid continue their operkti- 
 tms. Consistently with this principle, the bea- 
 ver Constructs his hut, the bird her nest, and 
 the bee her cell; while, impelled by hunger", 
 every animal pursues its prey, or seeks its 
 food, by such ways as have been appointed for 
 the a<ieomplishment of the intended end. Re- 
 treat fr-dia danger may be accounted' for on- 
 the same principle, operating in a different' di*- 
 refetiori-, to ensure the Creature's safety; for 
 safety is a? branch of self-preservation. While 
 this appears to be attainabfe by' defence, the 
 ^toal 'uses every weapon with which it is 
 ftmaished', and exerts every effort Within its 
 power ; but when its strength becomes ex- 
 hausted, andi the prospect of victory lessens in 
 pfroportion- as apprehensions for its' safety in»- 
 crease, self-preser\^ation is immediately trans- 
 fenied from defence to flight, and the animal 
 
114 
 
 fendeaiTburs to shun the enemy which it had in 
 vain attempted to vanquish. In a variety of 
 instances, all human beings act under the in- 
 fluence of this common principle ; and had 
 there not been numerous exceptions in all, 
 we should want a criterion by which to distin- 
 guish the man from the brute. 
 
 When we view instinct as an active principle, 
 (and without activity it sinks into a mere apti- 
 tude or capacity,) it is impossible that we can 
 detach it from its dependence upon these im- 
 pulses by which it is rendered visible. That 
 instinctive activity is not invariable in any of 
 its modes, is demonstrated by fact ; and hence 
 the conclusion ' is evident, that activity is not 
 essential, to the aptitude or capacity of such 
 creatures as act solely under the dominion of 
 impulse. It therefore follows, that the activity 
 of instinct must be derived, and derived from 
 those impulses which the creature invariably 
 obeys, when they operate upon its natural ca- 
 pacity, either through the medium of the senses, 
 or without their instrumentality. 
 
 It is certain, that no instinct can directly 
 countei^act instinct, in the same creature, and 
 under the same circumstanceSj, though it may 
 vary in the manner of its operation, because no 
 principle can act in hostility to itself. Brutes, 
 therefore, being destitute of reason, must sub- 
 mit to those impulses which operate upon 
 
115 
 
 tiiem, and follow the dictates of their influence 
 as their chief and only good. They have no- 
 thing within them to beget a hostile inclination, 
 and no power to support that inclination even 
 admitting it to exist. 
 
 An instinctive action can have no existence 
 unless foreign causes impel, it is evident, 
 ^ough the aptitude or capacity may he essen- 
 tial to the creature, that the activity is not ; 
 and it is to the propensity in action, and not 
 to the, mere capacity that the name belongs. 
 Now as instinct acts under the dominion of 
 impulsive causes, it is absurd to imtlgine that 
 it has any independent existence. For if -this 
 had been the case, it would as fully exist when 
 these causes ceased to impel,-^ as when they 
 operated in all their vigour. But this we know 
 is contradicted, both by experience and obser- , 
 yation. Instinct, therefore, as an active prin- 
 ciple cannot have an independent existence, 
 because its activity is evidently dependent upon 
 those impelling causes which operate upon the 
 internal recipient sensory. And the only branch 
 l>f instinct, if such it may be termed, which 
 can remain, when viewed as detached from 
 that activity by which alone we can ascertain 
 its existence is, that of an aptitude in the crea- 
 ture to act in conformity to the influence of 
 iippelling causes. In this light, the dormant 
 
 ca pacity may be conceived to exist abstracted- 
 
 i2 
 
116 
 
 ly from all action : but this is not instinct, but 
 only a permanent instinctive capacity. And 
 to view instinct as an active principle, when 
 the absence of all impulse deprives it of* all 
 action, involves a plain contradiction. 
 
 If the preceding reasonings be admitted, it 
 will follow that the province of instinct as tvell 
 as its nature is marked out. It presents itself 
 to our view by certain characteristics, with 
 which it cannot dispense, and appears within 
 specific boundaries beyond which it cannot 
 pass. We behold it acting under the dominion 
 of impulsive causes, and perceive its depend- 
 ence on them so clearly, as to exclude from its 
 nature, every property of a constant and inde- 
 pendent existence. 
 
 If the nature of instinct and its connexion 
 with its causes be thus ascertained, it must 
 follow also, that it can only h^ve a relative ex- 
 istence ; and consequently, as an active prin- 
 ciple, it can no longer exist than while it is 
 kept alive by foreign impulse. In the naean 
 while, though an instinctive capacity, be in all 
 animals, so far as they are governed by influ- 
 ences which they cannot counteract, the central 
 point where the various lines of organization 
 meet, through which varied and combined caus- 
 ^ communicate their impulses, it must in itself 
 be destitute of all activity. At the same time 
 it appears obvious, that the propensity called 
 
117 
 
 into action, through the impulse of a single 
 cause, or a combination of causes, can be no- 
 thing more than the appointed medium through 
 which the creature is directed to its intended 
 end. 
 
 But though in all its actions the creature is 
 directed by impulses, which invariably direct it 
 to self-preservation and the propagation of its 
 species, yet in all its movements it acts sensi- 
 tively, and intentionally pursues its object, 
 notwithstanding it is impelled. Hence its acti- 
 ons are not mechanical like those of the heart, 
 like those by which we breathe, or like those by 
 which we open or shut our eyes ; for these 
 being involuntary, and performed even when 
 we are insensible of them, come under the des- 
 cription of being purely mechanical. Where- 
 as, the actions of the creature being performed 
 with an eye to the chief good which lies be- 
 fore it, and which impulse urges it to seek, be- 
 come instinctive from the knowledge and con- 
 currence with which they are accompanied. 
 But as these creatures possess no self-determin- 
 ing power, they describe a middle station, be- 
 low rational beings, and above such things as 
 move mechanically without sensibility or know- 
 ledge, and thus connect the rational and me- 
 chanical world together. 
 
 That instinct, in what light soever it m^-y be 
 viewed, can have no self-determining powCT, is 
 
118 
 
 evident, from its dependence upon impulse for 
 all its energies. The exercise of a self-deter- 
 mining power, can never be reconciled with 
 the influence of impulsions which cannot be 
 resisted, because both being independent, no- 
 thing can command their mutual co-operation. 
 If, therefore, we attribute to instinct a self-de- 
 termining power, and yet retain in our minds, 
 that idea of its dependence Avhich I have been 
 endeavouring to establish, we shall be com- 
 pelled to allow that it is dependent upon im- 
 pulse, and yet independent at the same time. 
 
 If then, activity, either internally or exter- 
 nally, be necessary to our idea of instinct, and 
 this activity cannot exist without impulse, it 
 follows that instinct can have no self-determin- 
 ing power. It follows also, that whether the 
 cause which impels be known or unknown ; 
 whether it act through the medium of the sen- 
 ses or without it, that its influence must reach 
 the internal sensory, in order to give being to 
 instinctive actions. While, therefore, the im- 
 pulsive cause and the recipient power form an 
 union, the natural effect will follow. But 
 whenever this recipient power becomes inac- 
 cessible to impulsion, there the propensity dies, 
 there instinct ceases, and there our idea of it 
 can find no place. 
 
 It may perhaps be said, that " when opposite 
 " causes impel to contradictory actions, in- 
 
119 
 
 " stinct, or rather such creatures as are goverij- 
 " ed by it, must have an elective power, or be 
 " incapable of action, if the influences of th? 
 " opposite causes are equal." But this ob- 
 jection is unworthy of much attention, because 
 it is founded on an impossible supposition. 
 No instinctive propensity can be accessible to 
 contradictory influences at the same time ; 
 for it would be grossly absurd to imagine that 
 any creature was impelled to any given action, 
 and yet equally impelled to abstain from that 
 action at the same time. No cause can act in 
 direct hostility to itself; and consequently can 
 never produce contradictory effects. And even 
 should the ground work of the objection be 
 granted, contradictory 'impulses would defeat 
 each other, and reduce the creature to the same 
 condition as though it had been beyond the 
 reach of all influence. No impelling cause 
 can urge the creature to an action that shall 
 be contrary to the preservation of itself, or the 
 pir^pagation of its species. Within these con- 
 fines however, the operative causes may assume 
 a variety of modes, without directly opposing 
 each other ; and whenever this is the case, all 
 creatures seem to be so constituted by the Al- 
 mighty, that they must necessarily follow the 
 strongest impulse. 
 
120 
 
 SECTION VH. 
 
 Reason belongs to man. Reason defined. — Fqut^d,ed 
 on reflection.— Disting'Uished from instinct.- — Uses 
 of reason. Primary source of reason. Compared 
 and contracted with instinct. Reason possesses an 
 elective and self-determining power. Answer to 
 an objection. Submission to and connexion with 
 motives considered. Prescience of God perfectly 
 compatible with the contingency of htiv^an actipjiSi 
 Province of reason farther considered- Distinct 
 fronf, instinct in its nature and operatiori$. Con- 
 nected with a moral nature. No symptoms or vesti- 
 ges of this moral nature discoverable in brutes. 
 Moral nature connected with reason, and issuing in 
 consequences unknown to animals. 
 
 But while we behold this general instinctive 
 principle implanted in the nature of all animals^ 
 through which they are directed to their in- 
 tended ends, according to the stations which 
 the wisdom of Providence has appointed them 
 to fill, we cannot but perceive a superior print 
 ciple in man ; — a principle which raises him far 
 above the whole of the mere animal creation. 
 This superior principle, to which we have 
 given the name of reason, the Almighty stamp- 
 ed upon us at our primary formation; and 
 under its guidance and direction he has placed 
 the whole economy of human actions. Whe- 
 ther we have acted conformably to the influ- 
 
121 
 
 ences apd directions of this polar star, is ra- 
 ther foreign to my inquiry. It is to the sacred 
 writings that we are indebted for information 
 on these points, because they describe our 
 melancholy deviations from that perfect stand- 
 ard which they erect, to distinguish right fj-om 
 wrong. 
 
 This superior principle of reason, I have al- 
 ready defined to be that faculty or power of 
 the human mind, which controuls those im- 
 pulses which instinct implicitly obeys;— which 
 weighs the relations, and compares thejiatures 
 aiid properties of things, and perceives the 
 contrariety which invariably subsists between 
 good and evil. The actions of this faculty of 
 the soul, appear in its various exercises, to be 
 connected with judgment and choice, and to 
 be founded upon reflection. 
 
 By the term reflection, I understand that 
 general operation of the mind, by which, when 
 a multitude of ideas are presented to it for in- 
 spection, it turns its attention to them. It is 
 on this mass of materials that reason begins 
 and performs its work, by selecting, combining, 
 comparing, contpounding, simplifying, or mark- 
 ing the agreement, or disagreement betweien 
 the objects which appear. And when this 
 task is accomplished, the judgment decides 
 upon the relations which are pointed out, pro- 
 nouncing certain ideJ^s to be contradictory to, 
 
122 
 
 or congenial with one another, as existing 
 circumstances msiy direct. 
 
 Now reason in all its operations, is either 
 inattentive to those impulses by which instiric- 
 tive propensities are governed, or else it exerts 
 its power in suppressing those emotions which 
 would sometimes ' defeat its labours, by that 
 bias, which when indulged they never fail to 
 occasion. In either case reason is clearly dis- 
 tinguished from instinct, not merely as one 
 faculty differs from another, but as containing 
 a power by which it can withstand impulse. 
 This is a power with which mere instinct neter 
 can be reconciled. And hence it is not more 
 a dictate of philosophy than of Common sense, 
 that, as brutes are unable to withstand the in- 
 fluehce of those causes from which they act, 
 they, must be destitute of reason ; and conse- 
 quently by being thus destitute of its power, 
 they must submit to impulsive force. While 
 man, on the contrary, whenever he exerts his 
 reason, and it is free to act, is capable of con- 
 trolling the energies of impulse, to which in 
 common with brutes he is exposed, and of sup- 
 pressing those instinctive propensities which 
 are always ready to act in unison with the im- 
 pelling cause. Reason therefore is not more 
 distinct from instinct, than reflection is from 
 those impulses which reason resists, and by 
 which instinct is governed. 
 
123 
 
 V 
 
 Indeed if reason were not radically different 
 from instinct, man could not have possessed a 
 moral nature ; and when we take from him his 
 rational and moral powers, we reduce him to 
 a level with animals, which, by possessing 
 neither, are disqualified for yielding obedience 
 to any moral laws, and are therefore incapable 
 of punishments or rewards. We might indeed 
 have differed from them just as one animal 
 differs from another; but if there were no- 
 thing in man, which the brute creation did 
 not and could not possess, without losing their 
 present distinguishing characteristics, all must 
 have partaken of one common nature. It is 
 not diflScult however to ascertain, that reason 
 is different fi'om instinct, in its source, in its 
 nature, in its operations, and in its end. And 
 if the distinction can be thus ascertained, our 
 perception of this distinction, will direct us to 
 a conclusion which will in some respects oppose 
 the indications of appearances. 
 
 " In reason," says Mr, Locke, " we may 
 " consider these four degrees. The first and 
 " highest is the discovering and finding out of 
 " proofs ; the second is, the regular and me- 
 " thodical disposition of them, and laying them 
 " in a clear and Jit order, to make their con- 
 " nexion and force be plainly and easily per- 
 " ceived ; the third is the perceiving' their 
 ** connexions ; and the fourth is the making a 
 
124 
 
 " right conclusion." (Essay, vol. ii. p. 299.) 
 Now if instinct act under the direction of im- 
 pulse, and unless this be granted it must have 
 a self-determining power, it is impossible that 
 any one of these four degrees or modes of 
 reason can be identified with it. Reason^ to 
 perform its office must be free from impulse, 
 and consequently must derive its power from 
 another source. No effect can possess an 
 excellency which it did not derive from ita 
 cause. But in reason we discover many, which 
 neither an impulsive power, nor an instinctive 
 propensity can impart, and which cannot be 
 derived from any thing short of an intelligent 
 principle. The varied excellencies of reason 
 can therefore never be inferred either from - 
 matter and motion, or from any modification 
 which matter and motion may assume. If 
 therefore, " Reason stands for a faculty in man, 
 " that faculty whereby he is supposed to be, 
 " and actually is distinguished from beasts, 
 " and wherein it is evident he surpasses them," 
 as Mr. Locke asserts, our views are carried to 
 an immaterial substance, as that which alone 
 can be its primary source. 
 .- But it is not merely in its source, nor in 
 those specified differences which have been 
 already pointed out, that reason varies in its 
 nature from instinct. There are other instances, 
 in which the distinction wiU appear with equal. 
 
125 
 
 if not superior advantages. While reasori re- 
 fuses to be guided by impulse, it is accompan- 
 ied with judgment, and cheerfully enters from, 
 choice into those ample fields which are spread 
 before it, where a knowledge of the most im- 
 portant relations of tihings, and the most inter- 
 esting facts may be gathered. It is on the 
 comparisons which reason deliberately and 
 freely makes,, that the decisions of judgment 
 are founded. For where there is nothing to be 
 compared, no agreement- or disagreement of 
 ideas can be perceived ; and where■^ no sAch 
 petceptians exist, judgment can have no place. 
 if then judgment be the result of the operations 
 of reason, we cannot but behold such a con- 
 nexion between reason and judgment, as mtist 
 be totally unknown to instinct. The former, 
 from ike operations which it displays, — the 
 associations which it forms, — and the source to 
 which it may be traced, evidently striking its 
 roots in an immaterial nature ; while the latter 
 hang»in a state of dependence upon impulse, 
 or else dwindles into a mere capacity. 
 
 Nor does this difference terminate here. It 
 is necessary to the nature of reason, not merer 
 ly to follow the real or apparent good which is 
 immediately presented to it, but to trace thfC 
 ideas which are thus presented, through all 
 their labyrinths, previously to the adoption of 
 any of them. To retrospect the past, to iA- 
 
126 
 
 vestigate the present, and to calculate upon 
 the future, are all branches which belong to 
 the provmce of reason. For could we sup- 
 pose that reason could adopt without retros- 
 pecting, investigating, or calculating, we should 
 make reason to act unreasonably, which is a 
 plain contradiction. But as neither of these 
 can possibly be included in our idea of instiuct, 
 we are' here presented with a specific differ- 
 ence in the nature of these intellectual and ani- 
 mal powers. 
 
 If from this specific difference in their na- 
 tures, we turn to the operations of each, we slv^ll , 
 find sinlilar variations. It is the province 0f 
 instinct to gratify appetite, but the province of 
 reason to lay it under restraint. If instinct be 
 capable of restraining appetite, it must thus 
 act either from necessity or choice. If from 
 necessity, it must act in opposition to its go- 
 verning principle, and this will lead us to », 
 contradiction ; if from choice, it can no longer 
 act under the dominion of impulse. A con- 
 tradiction is inadmissible, and an abstraction 
 of instinctive action from impulse, is refuted 
 by fact. Instinct therefore, cannot restrain 
 that appetite which it is invariably induced to 
 gratify. 
 
 But while instinct, from its nature and man- 
 ner of e;sistence must be prevented from res- 
 training that appetite which it always aims to 
 
127 
 
 gratify, we behold in reason an elective power. 
 It is this elective power, which is inseparable 
 from the faculty, that enables it to resist those 
 impulses by which , instint;t is governed. It is 
 through the exercises of this power, that the 
 influence of motives ceases to be irresistible, 
 and that reason is able to prefer one to another, 
 when to all appearance their claims are 
 equal. On the , same principle it is equally 
 certain, that when but one motive is presented 
 to the mind, and where the only alternative is 
 either to adopt or reject its dictates, that ho- 
 thing but a self-determining power can enable 
 it to refuse to submit to its immediate in- 
 fluence, when it incites to action. Neverthe- 
 less even in this case every man knows that 
 he is capable of deliberating, and of forming 
 an arbitrary decision. Now should the mind 
 while in this state, resist the influence of this 
 solitary motive, and act in direct opposition 
 to its influence, when this motive contained no- 
 thing hostile to the ititerest&^f the individual, 
 we cannot but discover a self-determining 
 power, and be assured that reason exists and 
 operates there. 
 
 It may indeed be asked— " If reason dictates 
 " a rejection of the only object or motive which 
 " is presented to the mind, and there be no- 
 " thing in that motive which is prejudicial to 
 " its nature, — On what principle is it rejectr 
 
128 
 
 " ed ?" 1 answer, because reasdn founded 
 upon reflection, possesses a' self-determining 
 power. By this, it directs its elective power 
 for the moment, while it proceeds to examinit 
 deeper than the surfaces of things. Iii all its 
 active operations the present good is but a part 
 of its consideration : it reviews the past, sur^ 
 veys the present, and anticipates the future ; 
 and by comparing them together, forms its 
 final election or rejection from the estimate; of 
 all. 
 
 It may perhaps be urged, " that the pros- 
 " pect of distant good, outweighing the power 
 " of the present influence, becomes a motive 
 " which determines the action." To this I re- 
 ply, that distant good can never operate as a mo- 
 tive till it is recognized as such. It therefore 
 could never operate when only one motive pre- 
 sented itself to the mind, and when thatm®- 
 tive was in opposition to this distant gbodr 
 Hence then it is certain, that when the mind 
 sought after motives, thi-ougb which it was 
 enabled to act in opposition to the influence of 
 that which first solicited, it must have acted 
 from its own innate' vigour, and self-deter- 
 mining power ; for nothing besides can be sup- 
 |iosed present to direct it to action. 
 
 It must however, be admitted, under the 
 case supposed, that the final rejection of the 
 first motive could only be eiSfected by* aibstrac- 
 
129 
 
 tion ; and by looking forward beyond the iti- 
 fluence of present motives to a certainty or pro- 
 bability of conclusion, in which nothing but 
 a,bstraction could become its guide. If, then, 
 reason in its operations can calculate upon 
 consequences, remote from that motive which 
 first excited its attention, and with which that 
 motive has no apparent connexion, it is certain 
 that reason must, in this case, operate in a re- 
 gion within the confines of which, instinct can 
 never enter : and, this leaves us in the posses- 
 sion of a, decisive difference between their res- 
 pective operations and powers. 
 
 It may indeed be asked—" Whether reason 
 "must not necessarily follow the direction of 
 " sojne motive or. ^ther ?" ■ A reply to this 
 question will much depend upon the defini- 
 tion given to motive, and upon those views 
 which we have of its nature and extent. If the 
 arbitrary determinations of the mind be in- 
 cluded in the catalogue of motives, I most rea- 
 dily answer, that reason must necessarily fol- 
 low the direction of motive. But if these ar- 
 bitfaTy determinations be excluded, I rather 
 doubt the, fact, and in the preceding para- 
 graphs have assigned some reasons for these 
 dottb|;s. 
 
 It appears that when a new motive is pre- 
 sented to the understanding, the attieiition of 
 the mind is involuntarily attracted by it from 
 
130 
 
 other objects of its pursuit. This motive aris- 
 ing from external causes, cannot however be 
 excited by previous choice, but it presents it- 
 self unsolicited to the view ; but it does not 
 follow from hence, that reason must necessa- 
 rily adopt its dictates* Motives of this class 
 
 * It is not improbable tbat by advancing the observations 
 suggested above, I may be thought, by many, to inculcate 
 sentiments which include in them ihe ideas oi'/atality and des- 
 tiny. Those among my acquaintances, whoSe setitiments are 
 Congenial with my own, may think I havegiv^ft thetri an oc- 
 casion of offence ; and those who thiak differently, will per- 
 haps he offended if I attempt to explain. I should, however, 
 be very sorry to be the occasion of uneasiness to either : — a 
 subject on which the world has been so long divided, will 
 have its votaries on each side : but as equivocation is with 
 me a despicable trait of character, I feel no hesitation in avow- 
 ing those sentiments which I have adopted. 
 
 It is a question which has long agitated the controversial 
 World, " Whether man be a. free or a necessary agent.'' On 
 both sides of this question many able pens have been employ- 
 ed, and many volumes have been jproduced ; written, I am 
 sorry to observe, with as much acrimony and invective, as with 
 , an apparent aim at universal mental empire. With all defer- 
 ence to those great men, whose writings have kept alive the 
 flame of controversial war> by endeavouring to extinguish it i 
 I fear that they have shewn, not merely a wish to judgfe for 
 themselves, but to think for, and dictate to, others. 
 
 If I have a right tcr think for myself, every other man has 
 the same right ; but an attempt to impose my creed upon the 
 belief of another, merely because I think it right, is a piece of 
 arrogance which top plainly characterizes the mind that 
 adopts it. The mind of another may be silenced: by the sor- 
 ceries of argument, without being proselyted to that senfi- 
 
131 
 
 only, awaken the mind from an inattentive 
 state, and by presenting reasons for action, so- 
 licit reason to examine their propriety, but in 
 
 raent by which it is refuted. It is in this case rather dragoon- 
 ed into a compliance, than proselyted to belief. The weight 
 of evidence is alone able to produce rational cbnviction ; and 
 this weight of evidence, will operate in proportion as it can 
 -have access unto the mind. It is on these principles, that I 
 attempt to offer to the public my thoughts on this point, in 
 the follo^ving note. Those whose minds enter into a train of 
 tMnking similar to my own, may feel weight in the following 
 observations ; and those who do not, will do me no injury, 
 and give me no offence. 
 
 It has been frequently asked by the advocates of destiny, 
 " If God foresees all future events, and those events cannot 
 " happen otherwise than he foresees them, how can human 
 " actions be contingent ; If they be contingent, can God fore- 
 " see them ; if not, must not man be a necessary agent ?" 
 Arguments like these are the most plausible of any I have 
 hitherto met with j and I am inclined to think, that all their 
 energy is derived from associating togesther two distinct ideas, 
 which in themselves have no necessary relation^-j>re(ie«^i»a- 
 tvm and prescience. The difference in these two ideas wiU 
 appear, the instant we trace them to their saurces. 
 
 Predestination is evidently founded upon the idea of infinite 
 j)ower, which necessarily calls those actions into being, that 
 are supposed to depend on previous destiny for their exist- 
 ence ; and to abstract the idea of power from those attions, 
 which necessarily depend upon that power for their existence, 
 is at once to annihilate their active original cause, and conse- 
 quently to destroy their own existence. But were it possible 
 to annihilate that connexion, which subsists between that in- 
 finite power, which influences into being all human actions ; 
 and were it possible that those actions could remain, after they 
 
 K 2 
 
this stage of the mind's progressj volitidfl cari 
 have no existence. If the mind wills to exa- 
 mine these motives, or wills to refuse, its. de- 
 were separated from infinite power ; all hi;inia,n actions would 
 be contingent, and consequently predestination . could tierjia 
 more. I therefore conceive predestipaj^ion to. include aneces^ 
 "sary connexion, bet)veen human- actions and- infinite power. 
 And hence we learn,that human actions nepessarily flow from 
 infinilje. poWjSr,. ^re inseparable from, p,fld necessarily depend j' 
 ent ;,on it; „that,if predisstinatipn be adraitfedj.,;the; present • 
 State of man ja a state? of mere pa^siv.eness, an^ that the, idea 
 of. cpretm^ewcy ca,n have no existence. . . < 
 
 But while predestination is founded on thp.ideg, of infinite 
 power, the knowledge of future events .is, founded upon the 
 idea of infinite discernment, with which the. idea, of power has 
 no necessary connexion. It would be absurd, to- suppose that 
 God were infinite in bi.s power, feecawe, he. possessed infinite 
 discernment, or that he Were infinite ih his ^scernment, fie- 
 cduse he possessed infinite power. Infinite power, and infinite 
 .discernment, must therefore be attributes which are co-ordi-' 
 ynate in the 'Deity. . If the knowledge of any ?ic'tioii;be:founded 
 upon the, discernment of , that action, the very discernment of 
 it pre-suppos^ )th^ previous existence of tha,t. action, of, which 
 this is the discernment. Existenjie,- in, the : very natjir.e of 
 things, must necessarily precede, inorder of beipgjj^attidis- 
 cemment of its mod?s and accidents ; for.nPtljing ean besup- 
 posed to be Jsnpwn prftvjo;us to .the sjipposition of its ovraiTeJaSlt-' 
 ^nce. iVnd,tho,ugh we admit that infinite disce)[;ninen.t i^ pre- 
 vious tq the posiiipe ari^ferace of the ractipn, itself; yet the.ac-» 
 tion itself exists in j(if a, antfis a,"future action actually ejdst* 
 ing.in idea, as njuch as the discernment of this action is. future 
 knowledge, existing previously to. that action, on which the 
 existence of this, discernment is founded.. Here,., then^j the 
 action itself must be supposed to be in being, while the -dis' 
 
13S 
 
 terminations are from itself, for moral motives 
 can never operate like physical eflScient causes.- 
 To this primary volition the. presented motive 
 
 cernment of this action is founded upon that existence : but 
 neither the necessity, nor contingency of this action, can be 
 infared from, that discernment, which only .pre-supp.oses the' 
 previous exj^teuije pf the simple a,ctipn, with, which; its neces- 
 sity; or contingency can have no relation. 
 , It will novv^.b^ asked, '" Could this action have.been diffleiv; 
 " entjfrom ;e(rhat:it is ? if it could, how could infinite dlscern- 
 " ment have decided upon its. certainty ; if not^rwhat.-is be- 
 " comeof flie contingency of rhuman actions ?"; However spe- 
 cies, tl^is question may appear in its,ejf,i it seems to iaoe to bpij 
 upon the .whole, a mere fallacy. It has been already proved, ■ 
 that the aqtiou Itself must be supposed to be in existence, ajid 
 the (ijscernment of , .this aqtion is ;founded upon that supposi- 
 tion ; ,fi3f it ;would;be a contradiqtipfl ij} terms, to suppose any " 
 thing Goul^^be discerned, which; had, not even aft ideal existr 
 enee ; so ti^t_ the queistionji§,,iipthing more than if jt, were 
 asked. Can an action, after, it is past, be different from itself? 
 Tp- ^s question I would answer. No : and yet I cannot con- 
 ceive that t]i.ecan,tingenqf.o(ihaib action c^n ibe^^aifected there- 
 by, because its contingency depended not on the discernment 
 of its final ifisue, but on the adoption of tljpse- mutable mo- 
 tives, .which, when sdopted,- led to this end, and. of which this 
 action was the resujt^ without in; the least affecting the action 
 itself. The action wliicb;is thus -jdiseerned, is the effect of 
 elfidave, adoption, and the necessary termination of such mo- 
 tives as, were adopted. To suppose that the action itself, .un- 
 der the direotioa of these elected motives, could' be different 
 from what it is, js to suppose tliatjhesfii motives could have 
 produced, an action contrary ,to their own conclusions, which 
 is a contra.diction.. That these mutable , mqtivp might have 
 been differently elected, I, admits but.tKen infinite di.scenir 
 
134 
 
 could not necessarily contribute, for even 
 though its dictates should afterward be adopt- 
 ed, this adoption must be the result of exami- 
 nation. 
 
 ment could have penetrated thfe result of that election, — liave 
 looked through the! contingency, and have seen a different con^ 
 chisioti, with as much precision as it does the present ; and 
 vchatever mutations these motives might have assumed, in- 
 finite discernment is still equal to the penetration, and' capa- 
 ble of looking to the same certainty of conclusion. And al- 
 though yre suppose these motives to be subject to ten thousand 
 mutations, to be subject to as many different elections, and 
 capaUe of ending in as many conclusions, — yet, these con- 
 clusions cannot elude the penetration of infinite knowledge, 
 which arises from the plenitude o'f infinite discernment ; and 
 the same result must ever be, while Jinite is placed within 
 the reach of infinite- — and while the Creator is capable of com- 
 prehending afl created capacities. The power and discernment 
 of God, must always be superior in their extensiveness, to the 
 mutations which human contingencies are capable of under- 
 going ; and we can thus conceive all human actions to be 
 known to him, without having recourse to that destiny, which 
 is supposed to influence them into being. 
 
 To ask, therefore — whether an action whichis foreseen, can 
 be Afferent from the foreknowledge of it, is no other than to ask^ 
 — ^Whether an action can be different from itself? To this ques- 
 tion I would answer, no ; because the question itself is founds 
 ed upon the idea of the action's being known. And if the action 
 be known, it must be supposed,-' at least^ as much past, as 
 that knowledge of it which is founded thereon. To conceive, 
 therefore, that absolute foreknowledge and eternal decree, are 
 similar in their effects, is, I conceive, an imposition upon the 
 mind. If a superior Being could be supposed capable of pos- 
 sessing infinite discernment and knowledge* abstracted from 
 
135 
 
 If reason necessarily follow the impulse 
 of motive, motive must be the active cause of 
 allits exploits, and if so, instinct and reason 
 
 all power, this Being woiild be as capable of looking through 
 the contingency of human actions, as though he were possess- 
 ed of infinite power. But we cannot conceive the idea of a 
 decree, abstracted from the idea. otinfiniU power ; andthere- 
 fpre it follows, that prescience and destiny are totally different 
 in their natures, as well as founded upon two distinct attri- 
 butes of Deity — discernment and power ; which, in the pre» 
 sent consideration can have no necessary connexion. The 
 necessary effect of a decree, is the positive accomplishment 
 of it ; but the necessary effect of absolute foreknowledge, is 
 what I have never yet been able to discover. 
 
 Every action must bear some relation to the knowledge 
 which is obtained of. it, because the knowledge of an action- 
 is the communication of itself' j without this relation, there 
 can be no knowledge. And to say, that an action njay be, 
 or is known, while that action which is thus known, is in 
 futurity, even in idea, while the knowledge of it is now 
 actually existing, is to make the effect to eixist prior to its own 
 cause } and is to suppose a relation between that which is, 
 and that which is not ; which is a glaring contradiction. 
 
 Whenever we form an idea of prescience, and speak of It as 
 applying to the infinitely wise God, according to our weak per- 
 ceptions of His attributes ; we either behgld him stepping in- 
 to futurity, and there beholding actions in thei;- dark reqesses^ 
 or calling futurity to his bar, to develope its hidden mysteries ; 
 but in either case, the action itself, and the knowledge of that 
 action, m\ist be brought into contact with one another. 
 
 That the relative ideas ot pa^t ani future, must be inappli^ 
 eable to the eternEil God, is too evident to require proof, or 
 admit denial, there being but few abstract propositions more 
 certain ; and therefore, the jdea of successive existence, must 
 
136 
 
 will be plae.ed nearly on an equal ground. 
 And hence, as all causes must exist previously 
 to their own effects, we must attribute to mere 
 
 be precluded by the Omnipresence of his nature : and in the 
 physical rela,tion in which things stand to God, nothing can 
 be said to be remote from him. Ifi then, we admit a future 
 action to be known to, and present with God, we in futurity, 
 admit its actual existence ; . and while we admitxthis event 
 which f§ future to us, to be present with, and therefore known 
 to God, we admit, that nothing which is in futurity to us, 
 can be remote from Him ; but we- behold this future action, 
 actually existing now before God. Here, then, we behold 
 the certainty of the action perfectly existing before God, and 
 perfectly remote from the relative idea of futurity; and 
 hence that action which is future with us, is in actual exist- 
 ence with ffim. 
 
 Whatever event or action is said to be foreknown, cati 
 ofily be so in relation to us, but not to God. With him the 
 event or action is only simply known. And as the simple 
 discernment of an action, necessarily pre-supposes the pre-ex- 
 istence of that action ; the action itself is not subsequent 
 upon, but antecedent to that discernment which is founded 
 upon it. If an action which is future with us, be totally 
 destitute of all existence, in the most absolute sense of the 
 word, it never can be an object even of infinite discernment, 
 because the supposition includes a contradiction ; for he who 
 discerns that which is destitute of all existence, discerns jvhat 
 is admitted even by the supposition itself to be undiscernible.^ 
 The existence of an action, is therefore necessary to the dis- 
 cernment of it. If, then, an event ,which is future to us, be 
 actually present with God; and if the actual existence ^of 
 an event be necessary to his discernment of it, its mutable 
 state is already past, and its result is as inevitable, as those 
 events which are ^enrolled in the antediluviafl annals. And 
 
137 
 
 motive, a species of abstract independent ax-t 
 istence, even vfhile the mind is left to* form an 
 idea of it, independeritiy of those effects which 
 
 as the knowledge of an events must necessarily pre-suppose 
 the previous existence of that event, the knowledge of it, can 
 never influence that event, or any of its preceding mutations, 
 upon Which this knowledge itself must depend for its, own 
 existence. 
 
 Discernment itself, whether divijie or human, necesiSai^y 
 implies an object ; for it is a contradiction in terms, to suppose 
 any being to discern an object which we conceive has no kind 
 of existence. To suppose that the discernment of an object 
 may exist, while we suppose the objefct itself to be a pure non- 
 entity, is to suppose the object to be at once discernible and 
 not discernible ; 1p be an entity and a nonentity^ at thfe same 
 time. 
 
 However distant the modes of God's discernipent are froin 
 those of our own, yet when we ask the question — How can, 
 any thing be different from uihat God f6resee»it 9 we have re- 
 course to our own modes of apprehension, and incorporate 
 in that question, the idea of successive duration, with this 
 mode of apprehension ; although in our- abstract reasoning 
 upon, it, we exclude aU kinds of succession from that idea. 
 
 In all our abstract reasoning upon the prescience of God, 
 we exclude the idea of successive existence, and speak the lan- 
 guage of philosophy and reason ^ but when we appljr the pre- 
 science of Gad, to the contingency of human action, we lose 
 sight of the only excltisive foundation on which the question 
 can stand, arid incorporate with it the relative ideas of past 
 and future; and thus re-adopt that successive existence, 
 which we had previously excluded from our aljstract idea of 
 the question. It is from the want of this distinction, that we 
 have such confusion in our ideas on the subject. Only let 
 the idea of successive existence, be excluded from incorporating 
 
138 
 
 can alone denominate it to be an active cause. 
 Motive, therefore, can never act like impiilse, 
 nor produce effects which shall assimilate the 
 reason of man with the instinct of brutes. 
 
 That man is an animal as well as a rational 
 being, is a position which almost claims a right 
 to be admitted as self-evident ; but where the 
 animal powers end, and where the rational 
 begin, is a point which cannot be so easily 
 ascertained. There are however many instan- 
 ces in which those powers differ from one 
 another, both in their nature and operations, 
 besides those already pointed out. 
 
 It is the proyince of reason to examine ab- 
 stract propositions ; — to ascertain the simple 
 ideas which are necessary to their existence ; — - 
 to travel through their various modes and re- 
 lations, and to identify them by definition. 
 'But can any man imagine that mere instinct 
 can distinguish between goodness and mercy ? 
 Or can it be thought that instinct can identify 
 
 with that of prescience^ and the diflSculty will disappear^ the 
 i|uestion will assume an inoffensive form, and the prescience 
 ef God will be perfectly reconcileab],e with the contingency of 
 human actions. 
 
 Finally, an action which is future with us, must be in itself 
 either an entity or a nonentity, in the most perfect sense of 
 the words ; if an entity, it has all that existence which I con-, 
 tend for; i£ a. nonentity, it cannot be an object either of infi- 
 nite discernment or knowledge, for he that beholds or knows 
 a perfect nonentity, must behold and know notlnng. 
 
139 
 
 those simple ideas which are necessary to 
 either of these divine principles ? Can instinct 
 distinguish between a simple and a complex 
 idea? Or can it separate those ideas which 
 have been uniformly associated together, thougli, 
 with each other they have no kind of physical 
 relation ? Whoever views these questions, must 
 be satisfied that they belong exclusively to the 
 province of reason, and therefore must be 
 above the reach of every inferior principle. If 
 then, instinct, from its being always dependent 
 upon impulse for its actions, be ^so circum- 
 scribed in its nature, as to be wholly incom- 
 petent to that task which reason can with ease 
 accomplish, in unfolding those latent truths 
 which it is the glory of the human intellect to 
 know and understand, it affords another deci- 
 sive proof that reason and instinct are as differ- 
 ent in their operations, as they are distinct in 
 their natures from each other, 
 
 Nor are there wanting a variety of instances 
 in which reason and instinct are at variance 
 with each other ; in which there is an iri^econ- 
 cileable hostility subsisting between them. 
 These variations could have had no existence 
 if reason and instinct were the same, or had 
 originated in the same source.* There is not 
 
 * On the future life of bniteSj many things have been said, 
 and much t;as been written ; and both for and against the 
 subject^ many forcible arguments have been employed. An 
 
140 
 
 perhaps an instancy; either, of moral ; or retri- 
 butive justice where this is not the case. Rea- 
 son .and (instinct are frequently at war with 
 respect to distinctions in property ; b,ence those 
 
 attempt to decide on such an impprtantpoint in a few " strag- 
 " gling propositions," or a solitary note, would be both im- 
 modest and indiscreet. The' thoughts which • I have offered 
 on this' subject are perfectly new lb me ;. hut whether they be 
 admitted' as conclusive or not, the decision can in no way 
 affect the main puf port of t^iis €ssay. ■ For although itcpul^. 
 be proved, that brutes have an immaterial principle, and 
 though the immortality of their natures could be deduced 
 therefrom, it wiU neither destroy nor lessen the proof of an 
 immaterial and immortal spirit in man. 
 
 The acute reasonings drawn from the vis inertia of matter, 
 by Mr. Baxter, together with the arguments advanced by 
 Mr. Smith, arq to me neither convincing nor conclusive. 
 The heavy objections which may be advanced against the 
 hypothesis of each, are to me more forcible than their argu-- 
 ments, however plausible they may appear. 
 
 How creatures, that are not subjected to any moral law 
 here, can be made the subjects- of rewards or punishment?: 
 hereafter, I confess I do not perceive ; neither can I discern 
 how beings, that are incapable of intellectual enjoyments, can 
 derive happiness from sources which they have no appetites 
 to relish: but I would not urge either case as an argument 
 against possibility. Yet I fear, that the admission of the 
 belief of the immortality of brutes, will so far violate those 
 distinctions which "God has placed between the different 
 orders of intelligent and animated beings, that when the door 
 ts once opened we shall not know where to shut it, nor be 
 sufficiently guarded against the adoption of equivocal gene- 
 ration^-a doctrine which has been justly exploded by Mr. Ray, 
 a his book, entitled, " The Wisdom^of Godwin the GtbcMoii."' 
 
141 
 
 boundaries which are fixed by reason, may be, 
 and are considered by.instinct as an infringe- 
 ment upon natural right. The calls of instinct 
 aim inmost instances at ■Eothdng but the grati- 
 fication of- desire and appietite, without any 
 regard to subserviency ;." "while the voice of 
 reason imposes a salutary restraint, and com- 
 pels the passions and appetites tO' be subser- 
 vient to moderatiotij'^arid. the principles of im- 
 BQigtabJe justice. ,i. 
 
 i But it is aiot by possiessing reason only, that 
 roan rises superiorrteDthe^bpirfedreation, though 
 this principle is i fully sufficient to exalt Mm 
 above the whole ianiaanteil tribe. To our rational 
 powers, the ttuth^r of our being has been plteas- 
 ed to add la moral nature, which none of the 
 inferior oiid&s of nua-efeltion have ever imitated 
 or possessed. It is by>this, that we possess 
 an innate i power of fidiistingtoshing gOOd from 
 evil, truth from falsehood, ahd^justice from 
 injustice 5' and of measuring the actions of our 
 lives by aft fenmutable standard, which is the 
 only, criterion of innocence a:ftd guilt. 
 ? With this moral nature the Almighty origi- 
 naliy connected 'certain moral powers, by which 
 man wasfienabled to act consistently with the 
 discoveries which he made. ' With these the 
 bias.<of his iftdinations was turned to good; 
 and thefWhole, in conjunction with that moral 
 reGtitude in't^hich he'- was formed, displayed 
 
142 
 
 the divine image stamped upon the humitn 
 heart. An abuse of his exalted privileges, it is 
 true, has degraded man from his primitive 
 condition, and rendered these moral powers 
 comparatively useless. Still however many oaf 
 their features remain, to inform him from what 
 height he has fallen, and to show him his loss 
 by preserving the picture of his magnificence 
 in ruins. At the head of these moral powers, 
 ,and this moral nature, conscience still asserts 
 her right. And though in many instances her 
 power is too feeble to command Obedience, 
 yet she exerts a voice which the most abandon- 
 ed sometimes hear with terror. 
 
 To this moral nature, these moral powers, 
 and this moral sense^ the brute creation appear 
 to be total strangers. In some of them indeed 
 we perceive a degree, of sagacity which at times 
 half induces us to associate the instinctive with 
 the rational powers. But in none, not even of 
 the most intelligent, have any vestiges or sympr- 
 toms of a moral^nature, of moral powers, or of 
 a moral sense ever yet been discovered. 
 
 Nor is it over our moral nature and powers 
 alone that conscience extends her empire. The 
 rational and intellectual faculties must submit , 
 to her dominion ; and in all cases ^here moral 
 good and evil are concerned, they dare not en- 
 croach upon her province. It is on this prin- 
 cipjp that one great end of reason is to regu- 
 
143 
 
 late the solicitations of desire and to render 
 appetite subservient to propriety and the prin- 
 ciples of immutable justice ; while the great 
 end of instinct is to obtain gratification, inde- 
 pendently of moral right or wrong. 
 
 Right and wrong on their broadest basis, 
 are realities of which instinct can form no idea, 
 but without some attention to right and wrong, 
 reason can have no existence. Whether what 
 instinct follows and adopts, may issue in truth 
 or falsehood, in good or evil, is what can ex- 
 cite within it no solicitude, but the final issue 
 of thingSj is the great point to which reason 
 directs its steps. Reason and instinct must 
 therefore be essentially different from each 
 other, in their origin, — in their nature, — in their 
 operations, and in their end. Instinct deno- 
 minates the animal, and reason and a moral 
 nature designate thte man. 
 
144 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 Ment,oTy distinct from recollection. The former msi' 
 ble in the animalpowers, and dependent upon foreign 
 causes which operate involuntarily ; illustrated by 
 instances. The latter produced by a rational associ- 
 ation of ideas, which can only /low from an imma- 
 terial principle. The human soul concluded to be 
 immaterial. 
 
 The abstract ideas which we have of memory 
 and recollection, however they may seem! to 
 bo! allied, or may be so in reality, must in 
 themselves be considerably different from each 
 other ; the former we discover among the ani- 
 mal powers, but the lattej we discern only in 
 an immaterial principle. Memory it. is certain, 
 can have no relation to any ithingbut what is 
 past ; but it is always involuntary, and de- 
 pends upon the operation of causes over which 
 the mind can exert no absolute, no command- 
 ing dominion. In this view memory bears a 
 strong resemblance to instinct. It does not 
 appear that we have any voluntary power 
 either to bring things to our memory or to put 
 them from it,' just when we please. Some 
 causes therefore must exist, and operate inde- 
 pendently of our wills, through which we are 
 enabled to retrace those transactions and events 
 which are now no more. Brutes without all 
 
t45 
 
 doubt possess memory ; but with them foreign 
 causes w^ust operate, to call this and all their 
 instinctive actions into exercise, for I can have 
 no conception that memo!ry can exist with 
 them, any longer thaiU the causes on which it 
 depends continue to operate. In this light it 
 appears to be distinct from recollection. 
 
 In recollection an association of ideas may 
 lead the things that are past, and rcrimprint 
 the ideas of them on the mind in legible charac- 
 ters, without the interference of foreign causes. 
 But I have no proof or conception that brutes 
 have any such power by the exercise of which 
 they can recal what is past. The effects re- 
 sulting from the impressions made by foreign 
 causes, dnd those which flow from the exercise 
 of our powers of association, appear indeed to 
 be nearly the same, but their causes are mani- 
 festly distinct. In those branches of recol- 
 lection which are connected with the associ- 
 ation .of ideas, or result from it without the 
 introduction of any other cause, reason is clear- 
 ly discernible ; but in mere memory, as it is 
 excited, by -the operation of external causes, 
 which, we can -neither command nor controuly 
 no reason whatever appears. Hence then we 
 may safely conclude, that though brutes hav^ 
 memory, it affords no proof that they possess 
 an iiomaterial principle; while the power of 
 
146 
 
 recoilectiori which we possess through the 
 association of our ideas alone, pre-supposes an 
 immaterial principle, from which reason' de- 
 rives all the power which it exercises, in this 
 association which leads to the final result. 
 
 If these definitions, reasonings, and obser- 
 vations are right ; it will follow, that while 
 inemory may be excited by foreign causes, the 
 inflnence of which in many instances operate 
 vdth brutes through the medium of the senses, 
 recollection may move entirely in the intellec- 
 tual region. In the human mind, recollection 
 through the association of ideas, may begin its 
 operations, where memory that is excited by 
 foreign causes, ends ; and produce results in 
 ways which brutes can never know. Mere me- 
 mory, in this case, like instinct, can never exist 
 but while it is in connexion with its exciting caus- 
 es, which chiefly operate through the external 
 senses ; but riecollection being independent of 
 all outward causes, may in a great degree be 
 produced -by the mind alone, through a pro- 
 cess in the association of our ideas, wbick at 
 once discovers its intellectual source, and 
 stands as remote from sensitive memory, as its 
 cause is from tliose involuntary influences by 
 which sensitive memory is ex^cited. 
 
 The artist who constructs his machine, and 
 the builder who erects his house, are governed 
 in their first essays by the observations they 
 
147 
 
 have made on the labours of others, or by some 
 kriown ttfles^'of art which are distinctly under- 
 stobd. But" I bave no conception that the bird 
 which builds her 'nest;" or the spider which 
 weaves it4 -iveb, acts under the dirfectitin of any 
 similar principle. The b'uilder oii erecting a 
 sfecond house will recollect how he" proceeded 
 with the first, and Will imptbve'by his former 
 ei'rors ; but the bird and the insect pi'oceed in 
 the same manner that they proceeded before, 
 without deviation, without additional defect; 
 or improvement. Neither does it appear that 
 any of thd brute creation pui-^ue any of th^ir 
 objectig, from remembering how they aCtfed on 
 a similar occasion. The origiftal causes are 
 always at hand, and by operating in their form- 
 er manner, lead to the saifae Effect without di- 
 recl3«|f' the creature to derive any assistance 
 fri>m ^ast experience, memory, or observation ; 
 and if in any state Of its progress 'mere memory 
 be excited, it can only 'be By the return of 
 caus^ Which first ihade the impression. 
 
 On the same principle it will appear, that 
 thoug;h an animal might have a clear percfeption 
 of any external Object through the mediiiih of 
 only orie of the senses, if this sense were Kftei"- 
 wards totally destifoyed; t^e impression could 
 never again be re-made on the sensory. For 
 as nothing but a retiurn of the datise can pro- 
 
148 
 
 duce a recurrence of the effect, and this cause 
 is shut out through the destruction of the only 
 medium by which it operated, it is plain that 
 the animal must remain in future totally igno-' 
 rant of those impressions which it had once 
 received. This is not the case with mae. Let 
 a man grow^i to ^maturity hare a clear idea of 
 a cube, of a circle, and of a triangle, only 
 through the medium of his sight. Now though < 
 he should afterwards be deprived of sight, the 
 power which he has of associating his ideas 
 together, will enable him to recollect the dis- 
 tinction, without the aid of any other sense, 
 notwithstanding the original medium of com- 
 munication maybe for ever closed. 
 
 Consonant with the preceding remarks, it is 
 reasonable to conclude, that should an animal 
 lose one of its limbs, it can have no knowledge, 
 when the causes of amputation, are removed, 
 and the sensations of pain which were excited, 
 have subsided, that ever it possessed an ad- 
 ditional limb ; unless the causes which depri-i 
 red it of it be again presented to its view, or 
 the pain which the loss occasioned be again 
 re-impressed on the senses. In this case sensi- 
 tive memory is again excited, and may be con- 
 tinually excited so long as either the causes or 
 the effects appear. 
 
 From these cf>nsiderations it is obvious, that, 
 if the cause be removed^ and the painful effects 
 
i4d 
 
 >3f that cause destroyed, sensitive meinbry 
 which is dependent upon both must instantly 
 expire, and can never more be restored until 
 the causes are again brought into action. On 
 the contrary, it plainly appears, that a recoUec- 
 tioui of past events, may be obtained by man, 
 through the innate power which the mind has 
 of associating its ideas together, and by that 
 means of reaching the final result, even though 
 the primary causes which first made the im- 
 pression should exist no more. 
 
 Hence then it finally appears, that mere sen- 
 sitive memory can only be excited by foreign 
 causes ; and that when these are totally done 
 away, no power of associating its ideas, to 
 recal what' s past, can lie within the reach of 
 the creature. While on the contrary, recollec- 
 tion may in numerous instances be recovered 
 by man through the exercise of a power to 
 which all mere animals are total strangers, even 
 when a knowledge of what is past must other- 
 wise be wholly unattainable. And from these 
 phenomena, we may conclude^ that the renew- 
 ed knowledge which we have of past trans- 
 actions, through the association of our ideas, 
 is recollection, and results from the exercise 
 of our intellectual powers. But that thie res- 
 toratibnof former impressions, by causes which 
 operate without our command or controut,, is 
 sensitive memory, — that it is all which brutes 
 
150 
 
 possess^— «,nd tljiat it is lodged in the sensory 
 which; belongs to the animal and not to the 
 rational or intellectual ppwei;s. , . , ,. 
 
 But these speculations haye only a Temfite 
 connexion with the subject of our .general in- 
 qi^iry. For in what manner. soever these qu^s- 
 ,ti<?ns may_ be decided, nj) inferences can be 
 drawn from the decision* which will invalidate 
 the evidences of the soul's immateriality. . . -' 
 
 Confining our thoughts to material substan- 
 ces, few perhaps wijl be disposed to question 
 this propositipn,n— that every action necessarily 
 implies thq pre-exisftence of the actor, l^ow 
 if the human soul be material, the matter of 
 which it is formed must haye existed prior to 
 that consciousness whic^ is depeiident upon 
 it, and prior to. any modification which the 
 soul assumes. Hence then the conclusion is 
 certei^, that consciousness cannot be an essen- 
 tial property, either of matter or any modifi- 
 catj^xiof it, Andasno adventitious acquisition, 
 of quality, ca.n communicate a power of jvhijqli 
 both, acquisition and quality are naturally des- 
 titute, consciousness can never incorporate with 
 the identity of a, substance which is o.^, itself 
 inert, and thejeifore incongruous to, its nature: 
 nor derive its being from that which must 
 necessarily exist withqut jt. Jhe .final con- 
 clusiou therefore immediately foJAOiWs — Tbebb 
 
 MUST BEAU IMMATERIAL PRINCIPLE IN MAN. 
 
151 
 
 PART II. 
 
 JRGITMENTS WHICH ILLUSTRATE AND PROVE THE 
 IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE NATURE, MODES, AND POSSIBILITY OF THE 
 DESTRUCTION OF THE SOTIL CONSIDERED. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Death, definition qf4t. Proved to be a mere priva- 
 tion. Incapable of destroying the soul. Dissolu- 
 tion, privation, and annihilation defined, and assert- 
 ed to be the only modes through which the destruc- 
 tion of the soul can he conceived to be possible. 
 
 In the unbounded empire of human langu£|,ge^ 
 there is, perhaps, no term to which such strange 
 and preposte];:ous ideas h^ve been annexed, as 
 to that of Death. 
 
 The Orientals have spiritualized it into an 
 angel, the Moralists have degraded it into a 
 monster, the Rhetorician^ s art has subjoined to 
 it the idea of personification ; while the poet$ 
 imagination has lent him " his meager aspect, 
 and his naked bones." All these ideas are, 
 however, but the creatures of a prolific fancy. 
 
152 
 
 utterly devoid bf any real existence in nature, 
 and totally unfounded in fact. 
 
 To strike the passions, and animate the 
 feelings, representations like these are undoubt- 
 edly judicious and appropriate; but it is the 
 province of philosophical disquisition, to dis- 
 robe realities of thetrappings of fancy ; and to 
 present them to the world, in the genuine 
 features of their native forms. For while the 
 embellishments of fancy are thus added to a 
 mere abstraction of the mind, the inquirer is 
 too 9.pt to be misled in his investigations. 
 Hence — 
 
 " Death, and Ws image rising in the brain, 
 " Bear faint resemblance, never are alike : 
 " Fear shakes the pencil. Fancy loves excess, 
 " Dark Ignorance is lavish of her shades, 
 . " And these the formidable picture draw." 
 
 But setting aside these things, as the creatures 
 of a warm imagination,: let us inquire what is 
 Death? 
 
 It is certain, that if Death can be said to 
 have any kind of existence, this existence must 
 be either real or privative, for in no other manner 
 can the term with any propriety be applied, 
 because negative existence can be nothing 
 more than the mere absence or reverse of being; 
 JVow if death can be said to exist positively, it 
 must exist even though nothing were to dife'. 
 But this we know is impossible, because it 
 
153 
 
 I 
 
 compels us to suppose death and no death at 
 the same time. If no Being were capable of 
 suffering the loss of animation, it would be 
 pTeposteroiis to admit any.such thing as death. 
 It is from this loss of animation, and the con- 
 sequent dissolution of the inanimate parts, that 
 we derive our idea of it ; and on this account 
 we are assured that death can have no positive, 
 no independent CTcistence. As then the loss 
 of animation is that from which we primarily 
 derive our idea of death, its existence can only 
 be privative, and consequently it is absurd to 
 suppose that death, as an existent being, can be 
 ' the cause of those changes upon which all our 
 ideas of its existence depends. 
 
 The most simple, and perhaps correct notion 
 which we can have of death is, that in itself it 
 is a mere privation, and in our ideas of it, that 
 it is the reverse of life, with which it may with 
 propriety be contrasted, just as silence is the 
 reverse of sound, and rest the reverse of motion, 
 though these qualities have nothing more than 
 a relative existence. As a mere privation, it 
 can therefore produce no positive effects-; nei- 
 ther can it be the cause of those accidents and 
 changes to which animated mortal bodies are 
 liable, though we vaguely attribute them to 
 this imaginary power. Hence then the con- 
 clusion is certain, that the human soul can 
 never perish by death, even admitting that it 
 
154 
 
 were perishable in its own nature, because no 
 mere privation can destroy that which has in 
 itself a positive and independent being. 
 
 But still it may, be contended, that the 
 human soul, though placed beyond the reach 
 of death, according to this definition of it, may 
 nevertheless be capable of ceasing to be what 
 it now actually is. Now there are b»t three 
 ways through which we can admit such a sup- 
 position to be possible ; the first is by disso- 
 lution, the second is by privation, and the third 
 is by annihilation. A Being which can survive 
 these three modes of destruction, must continue 
 fo'r ever. 
 
 When, destruction is x>ccasioned by disso- 
 lution, I- understand it to imply a separatioaof 
 those parts and properties of any Being which 
 are necessarily united in order to the preser- 
 vation, existence, and identity of that Being. 
 By privation, I understand -the subtracting 
 something from any Being, which, without 
 destroying its entity, shall prevent it from con- 
 tinuing to be what it now is. And hy anniAi- 
 lation, I understand not only the destruction of 
 any and every modification which it might hav6 
 assumed, but the utter nihility of all Being, and 
 the reduction of any substance to an absolute 
 nonentity. If therefore the soul,, wlych is an 
 immaterial substance, perish,, it must be in one 
 of- these three ways. 
 
156 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 The soul cannot perish hy dissolution, because devoid 
 oj' parts. Nor by. privation, because its mode of 
 eq^^ence can undergo no internal change, . Nor by 
 annihilation, because it can have no tendency to it, 
 and is inaccessible to all external Jorce. 
 
 If the soul perish through dissolution, it must 
 be by having those parts disunited, of which it 
 is composed. But this cannot possibly be ; 
 beicause the soul is not an assemblage of dis- 
 tinct particles, but, a simple, uncompounded 
 substance ; and therefore has no parts to be 
 dissolved.— To imagine any substance to be 
 ciapable of being dissolved, which has no parts, 
 is a contradiction — it supposes a separation of" 
 parts, in a Being which has^ no parts to be 
 separated. 
 
 A Being which has no parts included in the 
 abstract idea of its existence, can never under- 
 go a separa;tion ; and that Being which has no 
 parts to be separated must necessarily be in- 
 capable oidissolution. An exclusion of all parts, 
 is necessary to the existence of an immateria.1 
 substance ; and to suppose a Being to be dis- 
 solved, from the very nature of whose existence 
 a capacity of dissolution is necessarily exclud- 
 ed, is a flat contradiction ; — it is suppoising a 
 
156 
 
 Being to be capable, and yet incapable of disso- 
 lution, at the same time. , 
 
 Whatever has parts, cannot be immaterial ;: 
 and what has no parts, can never lose them. 
 To suppose any substance to have parts, des- 
 troys its immateriality ; for it is a contradiction 
 to suppose that to be immaterial, which by its 
 parts is demonstrated to be otherwise ; if there- 
 fore the soul be immaterial, which has been 
 already proved, it necessarily follows, that it 
 cannot perish by dissolution. 
 
 Neither can it be conceived that the soul 
 can perish by privation, according to that idea 
 which I annex to the term. For if privation 
 implies the subtracting something from a sub- 
 stance which is essential to its being what it is, 
 without wholly annihilating the substance it- 
 self, it is certain that whatever undergoes a pri- 
 vation, "must be "a subject capable of it. Now 
 whatever is capable of thus suffering from pri- 
 vation, must also be capable of surviving it ; 
 and must, in some manner or other, retain its 
 entity, whatever property priv-ation may have 
 taken away. If therefore the soul perish by 
 privation, and privation be only partially des- 
 tructive, the soul itself must have something 
 included within its nature which it can lose, 
 without suffering the total annihilation of its 
 being. For where the substance itself is re- 
 duced to a perfect nonentity, it cannot be said 
 
157 
 
 to bB thus reduced by privation, but by aunihi^ 
 lation, which is not the subject under immedi- 
 ate consideration. 
 
 To suppose a privation possible, which takes 
 nothing away from that subject to which it 
 applies, will certainly involve a contradiction "; 
 and to suppose a privation which leaves nothing 
 behind, will conduct the mind to the same con- 
 clusion. For if a privation, can exist, which 
 leaves nothing behind, and which takes nothing 
 away, the substance itself which is supposed 
 to undergo this privation, must remain unin- 
 jured and entire ; and from the permanent state 
 of the substance,' we shall be obliged to reduce 
 that very privation to a nonentity, which we 
 had previously admitted to exist and act. And 
 a privation which cannot change the substance 
 which is supposed to suffer by it, must be a 
 privation, and not a privation, at the same time. 
 
 That a privation when applied to compound- 
 ed bodies, may reduce to a nonentity that union 
 of parts, which it takes atvay, I readily admit ; 
 yet the substance itself from which the parts 
 are taken, and between which all union is des- 
 troyed, must remain in existence and survive 
 its loss. It is true, the modification of being 
 in this substance, may, and must be consider- 
 ably changed ; but this alteration in the modes 
 of being, cannot eflFect the entity of Being it- 
 self. A substance, and the modification of that 
 
158 
 
 substance, are two distinct things, i The pecu- 
 liar modification of Being may be destroyed, 
 while the substance remains ; but where liiB 
 substance is destroyed, the modification which 
 depended upon the substatice for its existence, 
 must necessarily perish with' it. 
 
 As privation must, therefore, imply a sepa- 
 ration iietwdfen the component pirts' of that 
 Bang which undergoes it, so it must also itti- 
 ply a'changb in the state of that Being which 
 sufiers by its influence; which chaUgein'the 
 state of that Being must arise from the sepa^ 
 ration of its compioneni parts. , Fot to admit 
 a privatiori to take place, -while we exclude 
 all change from that Being which suffers; as 
 it leaves the' Bteihg- unchanged and entire, it is 
 certain that naothing can possibly perish by it; 
 and we must in this case iallow privation to 
 exist, whik we are under the necessity of dei- 
 nying its existence. I thi^efori^ coinclude, that 
 wherever privation take^ plrfce; itmust neces- 
 sarily imply a change. • ' ■ .» V 
 
 If, then, privation implies subduction, with- 
 out destroying the entity of that substance in 
 which this subduction "takes place; and at 
 the s£tme times implies a change in the internal 
 state of that Being which suffers ; it must Cer- 
 tainly follow,^— that privation can only apjll^ 
 to BeingU which are ckp^U lof sepafatioA and 
 change ; arid therefore, from the pure simpli- 
 
159 
 
 city of its nature, the soul can never perish by 
 its influence. , 
 
 If the soul perish by privation, and privation 
 imply a partial subduction of Being, the soul 
 must suffer loss without losing its entity, but 
 this, on a more minute survey will be found 
 impossible. 
 
 That the soul is a simple immaterial sub- 
 stance, has been already proved ; and from the 
 simplicity of its nature, it can have nothing 
 but its entity to lose : and to imagine it to pe^ 
 fish by privation, while privation implies a pm- 
 tial subduction ; •and while the soul has noticing 
 biit its entity of which it can possibly be de- 
 prived, we must suppose the soul either to re- 
 main in existence, after its entity is destroyed, 
 or to perish by privation while its entity re- 
 mains entire. But as both sides present us 
 with palpable contradictions, it clearly fol- 
 lows, that privatidn can never destroy the 
 soul. 
 
 The thinking and volition which are mani- 
 festly displayed by man, are but actions of the 
 soul ; and to ]su|)pose that privation can des- 
 troy an iiction, is a quibbling absurdity. An 
 action, cannot be destroyed previous to its ex- 
 istence ; and the very instant it exists, its end 
 teing answered, it expires. And as actions' 
 (are only relative, perishing energies of a sim- 
 ple subst^iiCe, no privation can possibly pass 
 
160 
 
 upon either. The substance of the soul forms 
 but one simple idea ; and to make a partial 
 subduction from a simple idea, and yet to sup- 
 pose that the part which remains may survive 
 such subduction, is a Contradiction— it is sup- 
 posing the existence of that, which by the sup- 
 - position itself, can have none : — It supposes 
 an idea of that which is not an idea ; which is 
 an idea, and nat an idea, at the same time. 
 
 As privation implies a change, there are 
 other reasons which preclude its application iG 
 the soul. Whatever sustains a change must 
 be capable of being changed ; and what is ca- 
 pable of being changed, cannot be a simple un- 
 compounded substance. To change the same 
 numerical particles, for the same numerical 
 particles, in material bodies, is not a real 
 change, but a nonentity. And to admit, that 
 a change has passed upon an immaterial subr 
 stance, when it remains the same after this 
 supposed change, that it was before, is an evi- 
 dent contradiction. If the soul Jbe changed, it 
 must be changed from itself to itself, which in- 
 cludes this contradiction, — that it has been 
 changed, and not been changed, at the same 
 time. But if no change take place in the soul 
 by privation, it must remain the same after this 
 supposed privation, that it was previously; to 
 it ; and this will lead us to this conclusipurt- 
 that the soul has suffered a privation, and yet 
 
161 
 
 has not suffered it; at the same timet. A Being 
 which has nothing but its entity to lose, can- 
 not 9urtiv« that privation bp which it suffers ; 
 and that which cannot survive privation, can- 
 not be a subject of it. 
 
 It is a privation. of auimatign, which all- ani- 
 mal -bodiissund'ergOj in natural death. What 
 remains i& a lifeless mass; and the change^ 
 which- it undergoes, is from action to inaction.^ 
 Btat^this-priesents to the mind the idea of a Be- 
 ing capablpof such a changes— Yet after this, 
 change- has ^ssed'^ipqn -the hxtmpi body, it is 
 no !onig6r'a subject capable of death. It would 
 be - prep'osteitous to speak of : a, dead man's 
 dyfeg, ^r to suppose that a dead man were ca- 
 pi^l^ of 4Hider^ing; death, when he was known 
 to fe^^ead -before-, It would^not be more con- 
 ti^^iotqr^^. to imagine a dead man to be ^Jiye ; 
 iGmnse^ea^ case we must suppose the man to 
 be>dea4r and not .dead at the sanj^ time. He 
 who^is.^dead. is no^ longer capable of death; 
 tite onl^ privation in .which death consists, has 
 aliieadyipassiidj upon hini, ^nd he has nothing 
 more tiQ lose. . 
 
 The only entity which can now remain, is 
 limt: of ;the component parjs of the body, A 
 s^paralion of these may S'ncceed to this, priva- 
 tion; but this, can only annihilate their mutual 
 ■nth M . 
 
162 
 
 contact; but in no case affect the entity of 
 those component parts themselves. When the 
 greatest possible "separation has taken plape 
 through corruption, it is still the same in point 
 of entity that it was before', only it now en-- 
 grosses different portions in the abyss of space. 
 Every particle possesses all the essential pro- 
 perties which the whole did, prior to this total; se- 
 paration, only they are now differently modified* 
 Matter can never be separated from itself: it is 
 a contradiction to suppose it ; it supposes the 
 existenceof it, afteritsupposesitto be destroyed., 
 If then a material substance, after having bpen, 
 separated from an immaterial nature, with 
 which it had no physical connexion, be inca-, 
 pable of undergoing any further loss : by the 
 same mode of reasoning, the immaterial princi- 
 ple, now separated from its gross companion, 
 has nothing more to lose. As it implies a con- 
 tradiction, to suppose matter to be separated^ 
 from itself; so it implies the same contradic- 
 tion, to suppose an immaterial substance to be 
 capable of being separated, when it has no- 
 thing but itself to be separated from. To ima- 
 gine mere matter to suffer by privation, and yet 
 to survive the loss it has sustained, is to rer 
 cognize as existing, that which is presumed to 
 be destroyed; and to suppose an immaterial 
 substance to be deprived of itself, and to sur- 
 
163 
 
 viVe that privation, is to suppose the existence 
 of that which has no being. 
 
 A change can only take place in compound- 
 ed bodies. Whatever is formed of one simple 
 indivisible nature only, can be separated from 
 nothing but those properties which are essen- 
 tial to that, nature. And to suppose a separa- 
 tion in those properties, is to suppose that they 
 are essential to the existence of the soul, and 
 not essential, at the same time. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be objected to this mode of 
 reasonings" that if the bod,y be ciipable of un- 
 " dergoing a separation of all its parts, and 
 " thereby cease to be a body; the immaterial 
 " substance may undergo a similar change, and 
 "^ thereby cease to be a soul." On this I virould 
 observe, that I conceive the objection is found- 
 ed upon a gross mistake. It is not founded 
 mpon the nature of substances, but upon the 
 cemhination of parts. The comparison is not 
 fairly stated. The body is a combination of 
 atoms ; the soul is but a simple essence. 
 
 To state this case fairly, let us suppose, 
 (what however, must be adnaitted to be impos- 
 sible, because matter is capable of eadless di- 
 visibility) a portion of matter to be divided, till 
 it is impossible that it can be divided any 
 more : I then ask',-^Can either of these divided 
 particles of matter undergo any further division 
 
 M 2 
 
164 
 
 or not ? If it can, it is not yet divided, as in the 
 case supjjosed; if it cannot, we have here a 
 case in point. The soul is this immaUrial 
 atom, if i may so speak, which is incapable 
 either of division or change ; because it is di- 
 vested of all diversity, and fixed m unity : — And 
 if so, it can neither lose, by privation, nor un- 
 dergo a change. ' Or if we must still retain the 
 idea of corporeity : let us suppose, that there 
 are as many distinct independent substances 
 in the soul, as there are atoms in the body^ ca- 
 pable of divisibility ; in this case the compari- 
 son will hold goOd, and the conclusions will be 
 fair ; each may be separated to infinity, and 
 yet each will preserve its entity uninterrupted, 
 independent, ^nd entire. For as matter, as to 
 its entity and essential propertiesj can suffer 
 nothing from division ; so in like manner, the 
 soul can never perish through privation. Di- 
 visibility can take nothing froiii matter,- and 
 privation can take nothing froin the soul. 
 
 It now remains to be considered, vi^hether 
 the soul can perish by annihilation'i' If it can, 
 all rational proof of its imrnortality must be 
 given up; if not, its immortality will be as- 
 certained. 
 
 It has been already provedV that the soul 
 cannot perish by dissolution, becaiise it has no- 
 thing to be dissolveds It has also been prov- 
 ed, that it cannot perish by /?r«pj^'o«, because 
 
165 
 
 it has nothing to lose, and because :.an un- 
 dergo no Gha,nge. If therefore the soul perish, 
 it must be by annihilation ; and if this be the 
 case it must be either through the tendency of 
 its own nature^ or the q>ppUcation of external 
 farce. 
 
 If an immatmal substance has no parts — 
 has nothing to lose^ and cannot change, it 
 must follow, that such a substance cannot pe- 
 rish ikrough the tendency of its own nature. - To 
 suppose in the soul a natural tendency, to that 
 which is hostile to its own existence, is a con- 
 tra,dictibn. A Being which cannot change, 
 can have no tendencies, but such as are in- 
 separable from its nature ; and that its natural 
 tendency is to life, is demonstrated by its aot 
 tual existence. M, then, a natural change in 
 tea^denqy, imply a change in that nature whieh- 
 prodviced it, ; and .nO: such change' in nature 
 can possibly take place in the soul, because of 
 the simplicity of its existence ; it must follow 
 that the^soul cannot perish through the tenden- 
 cy of its Own juatures 
 
 A being jwhich hais no parts cannot change i 
 ^nd- that which cannot change, jnust be the 
 same to-day, that it was yesterdajt ; and that 
 which is the same now, that it, was then, can 
 be no farther removed frbBrannihilation to-day, 
 than it will be to-morrow. ; And to suppose a 
 being, with a natural tendency to annihilation^ 
 
166 
 
 which can make no approaches towards it, i^ 
 to suppose it to have a tendency to annihila- 
 tion, and yet to have no such tendency at the 
 same time. A Being which is no nearer to an- 
 nihilation to-day, than it was yesterday, and 
 which, for the same reason, must be as far re* 
 moved from it to-day, as it will be to-morrow, 
 must always be at an equal distance from it; 
 and that which is always at an equal distance 
 from any given point, can never arrive at it. 
 
 If the soul tend to annihilation, it must tend 
 to its own contrariety ; and that which tends to 
 its own contrariety, must act in opposition to 
 itself, which is a contradiction. An action per- 
 formed by any Being, supposes in that Being, 
 a capacity for such an action. But if an ac- 
 tion be performed by any Being, which its na- 
 ture is incapable of performing, vv^e must behold 
 in such a Being, a capacity, and an incapacity, 
 for such an action, at the same time. 
 
 It may, indeed, be said—-'" that this tenden- 
 ^' cy of its nature, was impressed upon' it at its 
 " primary creation ; — that it invariably accom- 
 *' panics the soul in all its progress through 
 " existence j, and that its final annihilation is 
 " nothing but the necessary result of things." 
 This, however, leaves the question in much 
 the same state that it was before— clogged 
 with absurdities, and embarrassed with con- 
 tradictions. 
 
167 
 
 ' If the Almighty God, in the primary forma- 
 tion of things, created a simple, uncompound- 
 ed substance, it can have but one physical ten- 
 dency. The moment we admit a Being tend- 
 ing to it^ own annihilation, that very moment 
 we admit the rfi??ers% of its coinponent juarfo. 
 If we admit the unity of any Being, it is a contra- 
 diction to suppose it to have a tendency in op- 
 position to itself. That the soul has a tenden-r 
 -cy to life, is evident from its own existence^ 
 •And if it have a tendency to its own annihila- 
 tion, it must tend to life, aild not tend to life, 
 ^t the same instant ; or, it must have a tenden- 
 cy to annihilation, and yet have no such ten- 
 dency, in the same moment. In either case, 
 the contradiction is equal, and therefore no 
 such tendency can possibly exist in the soul. 
 
 If a principle of life, have a tendency to its 
 own extinction, it must, in the instant of its 
 annihilation, exist, and yet not exist, in the 
 same moment. That which is annihilated, can- 
 not be in existence ; and that which is in ex- 
 istence, cannot be annihilated. Either the 
 soul must exist in the moment of its annihila- 
 tion, or it must not. If it exist, it cannot be 
 annihilated while that existence continues ; if 
 it do not exist, it can never perish through the 
 tendency of its own nature. And if the sub- 
 jstance on which this tendency depends;, be not 
 ia existence at the time of its annihilation, in 
 
168 
 
 stead of annihilation being produced through 
 the natural tendency of the soul, we^re obr 
 liged to suppose the soul to belannihilated pre- 
 vious to its annihilation, (i WhatelJfer annihi- 
 lates the soxil; must certainly be in existence 
 at the time of its annihilation ; but it is impos- 
 sible that' that tendency which results from 
 the^oul, can thus exist at the moment that the 
 soul, from which it results, is. annihilated ; for 
 this would make the cause to bie 'destroyed 
 through an action of its own physicially indepen- 
 dent effect. In this case we mxtst suppose the 
 effect to exist, and to opei'ate in'the destruc- 
 tion of that cause, upon Avhich, af the same mo- 
 ment it is dependent for its own being, .ij' ; , Ay 
 If A destroys B, it is certain that A' must be 
 in existence at the moment of the action, in or- 
 der to perform the' deed: ^^ But then it is evi- 
 dent that A cannot be deptenderat aapon B for 
 the power which it th"us ei^iterdses. It might 
 destroy another Being, but it can never destroy 
 that cause from w'hieh it- monientaridy derives 
 its own existenccftln this case it must exer- 
 cise a power which the -xsaiuse cannot supply ; 
 arid while no other is assignable jthan that 
 which perishes through its instrumentality/ we 
 shall be compelled to suppose this tendency 
 to be dependent, and not d^erident at the 
 same' time. '^ And as each side ineludjes a 
 naked cdritradiietibn; the ufidteriiable Tesmlt- is, 
 
169 
 
 that an imniaterial uncompounded aubstancej 
 cannot perish through the tendency of its own 
 nature. 
 
 As the soul cannot perish throu^ the ten- 
 dency of its own nature, the next consideration 
 is-^Whether it can -perish or not,. from the ap- 
 pltdaMmt of eternal force ? All external force 
 must be either natural, or supernatural ; and 
 the means thF{nigii'''w4iich; this: external force 
 must be applied^ must < be either nmterial or 
 iwnnaterial. xu- oi 
 
 It has been already provedi that material bo- 
 dies can neter act^ biit when they brin^- their 
 Surfaces into contact with one anothert As 
 an immaterial substance has no surface, it is 
 a contradiction to suppose, that matter can 
 ever be brought inta contact with it: to sup- 
 pose .such a- contact-possible, -is to suppose a 
 surfeee in animmateriai Being, which,'^ at the 
 'Same time, is supposed to exist wjthout.it. 
 
 Whatever has an exterior, -must have an in- 
 terior ; and what has both, must necessarily be 
 extended ; and what is thus extended, cannot 
 be immateriai. liAn immateriar substance, 
 therefore, can have no surface ; and what has 
 no surface, can never i be' brought into contact 
 with that which has. The ver j supposition 
 includes this contradiction— ^that 'there is a 
 contact, and no contact, at the samestime. It 
 therefore follttWSy that the soul must be inac- 
 
170 
 
 cessible to all violence from matter, and that 
 it can never perish through its instrument 
 tality. 
 
 ■- If matter can only act through the medium 
 of matter, and an immaterial substance can be 
 supposed to perish by it ; matter must either 
 act where it is not, or extend itself beyond its 
 own being ; but in admitting either, the mind 
 is conducted to a contradiction. Before any 
 portion of matter can extend itself- to an im- 
 material nature, so as to accomplish its des- 
 truction, it must lose its own, and consequent- 
 ly will be no longer matter. For that which 
 retains solidity, surface, and dimensions,, can 
 never form a contact with thjat which has nei- 
 ther. And as matter can only act by contact, 
 it follows, that without being extended beyond 
 its nature, itijever can destroy the soul. . And 
 -to suppose matter to be thus extended, is to 
 suppose it to be matter, and not matter, at the 
 ^ame time. Nor can any accession ofpower 
 overcome the contradiction. No acquisition 
 of power can alter the identity of its nature, 
 without destroying its identity; or communi- 
 cate to it a force^ of which its nature is incapa- 
 ble ; the suppositiori includes not only a moral, 
 but an absolute impossibility. 
 
 To make driver Jly, a rock to walk, or a tree 
 to speak, are all impossibilities to us ; but they 
 are on:ly moral. It is not impossible to con- 
 
ceive, that Omnipotence can add wings to the 
 first, motion to the next, and speech to the last ; 
 but to conceive, that even Omnipotence itself, 
 can make a river to fly, and not to fly, at the 
 same time ;. that a rock should move, and not 
 move ; pr that a tree should speak, and yet not 
 speak, in the same instant, is utterly impossible. 
 In like manner yfe can conceive, that an 
 accession of povsrer, can make matter to accom- 
 plish every thing which is placed within the 
 reach of its nature ; but to suppose matter to 
 extend its influence beyond, the limits of its 
 own existence^ or to act where' it is not, is to 
 suppose its presence and absence at the same 
 time. And to suppose it to annihilate a nature 
 with w^hich it has no physical connexion, is to 
 suppose it to act where it can have no influ- 
 ence ; or that it can act, and not act, at the 
 same time; which every one must see, Js not 
 only; a moral, but an absolute impossibility. 
 It therefore follows, that the soul cantjiot perish 
 by the instrumentality of matter, whatever in- 
 fluence be attributed to the propelliiig power. 
 
172 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 We can have no simple id^a of any thing which kasnd 
 existence. We have an^ idea, though inadequaiet of 
 the existence and immortality of God. Man cannot 
 rationally desire any thing which is unnaturaL W^ 
 desire immortality, and these desires gather jstretigt a 
 from an advancement in holiness and virtue. Im- 
 mortality of the soul inferred from our desir'es of 
 obtaining the greatest happiness. 
 
 If all our ideas arise from sensation and re- 
 flection,- which is now generally admitted ; it 
 is certain, thati4he»ia#enafe upon which these 
 ideas are founded, must have existed antece- 
 dently to the ideas themselves, which are evi- 
 dently founded upon those materia:! s. It there- 
 fore follows, that we can have no siinple ideA 
 of what has no existence ; because he^ that has 
 a simple idea of that which has no existence, 
 Biust have an idea oi'notJung, which is absurd. 
 If, therefore, .we have^ an idea of the 'Being of 
 a God, it plainly follows,' that a God must be 
 in existence. Nor can the imperfection of" our 
 simple idea of God, be admitted as an objec- 
 tion against the truth of the proposition. For 
 the imperfection of our idea of God, does not 
 arise from the uncertainty or nonentity of his 
 Being ; but from the inadequacy of our facul- 
 ties to comprehend, what, from its own nature, 
 
173 
 
 must necessarily be incomprehensible. And 
 whatever notions we have of any thing which 
 includes infinity, they mustthas be necessarily 
 imperfect, in an exact proportion to the relation 
 which ^raiie bears to infinite. 
 
 That our notion of God, and of all his- attri- 
 butes, are but simple conceptions of the mind, 
 may thus be certified with precision. What- 
 ever' is but a simple conception of the mind, 
 ■we can subtract nothing from, without annihi- 
 lating the idea from whence we thus subtract. 
 Such is the case with ; respecfr to God, and all 
 his attributes. Whereas, in compounded bo- 
 dies, by subtracting certain portions," we only 
 alter- their numerical parts, and change their 
 specific" quantities, while the identity of their 
 JBeiitg remains entire. , 
 
 Among the essential attributes of God, we 
 mnstinclnde his' immo^talilff-; it being as im- 
 possible to conceive God to exist, abstracted 
 from immortality, as it is to conceive him to 
 exist, abstracted from 0mmpotmce^ ox Holiness^ 
 For that, which is not necessarily immortal, can- 
 nob be God. jHere, then; we have a clearand 
 distinct idea of immortality, although wfe are 
 totally unable to comprehend, or grasp it in 
 its fullest extent. 
 
 , Having thus, distinct notions of the certainty 
 of imoKtrtallty, and of the existence of the 
 human soul ; the next atage in tiie .^isesent 
 
174: 
 
 argtiment, is, tb trace out those intermediate 
 id^as, which are necessary to connect these 
 two simple conceptions together; — theunqitenck- 
 ahle desire which every man feels after happiness, 
 appears to me most likely to~ form this con- 
 nexion. 
 
 Wherever moral evil has not transmuted Aojue 
 into despair* from a consciousness of future 
 punishment, there is in every human mind^ an 
 insatiable desire after the greatest degree of 
 possible happiness, which certainly includes the 
 idea of immortality; And it may justify our 
 inquiries, on principles superior to those of 
 curiosity and idle speculation, to know on 
 what this desire, is founded ? And whether it 
 be natural, or unnatural, to the mind of man ?' , 
 
 It is very certain, that no man can desire 
 any thing which he is conscious will produce 
 him no felicity,-^the supposition is refuted by 
 the vety term itself, because the prospect of 
 felicity, either false pr real, lies at the foun- 
 dation of desire, and is that which begets it. 
 And therefore, as our desires of immortality, 
 arise in proportion to the expansion of our 
 faculties, and our love of holiness and virtue.;: 
 it is evident, that these desires must be found- 
 
 * The safae modes of reasoning which can deduce imjgor- 
 tality from hope, can gather it from despair. The sajnepliysi- 
 oal principle is alike active at the bottom 3 — it is '^myfal evilj 
 bpannihUaHng hope, that unlocks the aveaues' of despair. , 
 
175 
 
 ed upon an apprehension of some real or fancied 
 excellency, which we conceive to be included 
 in immortality; and a belief that if it were 
 added to our natures, our felicity would be 
 increased by the acquisition. This desire, 
 therefore, must either Jbe rational, or irratioi\aJ,, ' 
 — must be natural, or unnatural, to the human 
 mind. 
 
 A desire, which is unnatural, is a mon&ter, 
 and cannot uniformly conceal its deformity ; and 
 never can be consistent with holiness and virtue. 
 .But a desire of immortality, instead of being 
 inconsistent with holiness and virtue, derives 
 its chief energy from the influence which these 
 principles have upon the mind which they in- 
 habit. It therefore follows; that this desire 
 cannot jbe unnatural, to the human mind. A. 
 desire which is unnatural, must be irrational ; 
 and that desire which is at once unnatural and 
 irrational, can never associate with holinessj. 
 and virtue. For if we can suppose, that a 
 desire, which is unnatyral arid irrational, can 
 associate with holiness and virtue, holiness and 
 virtue must 'be unnatural and irrational also ; 
 and consequently all distinctions between vice 
 and virtue^ are at once done away. But as a 
 distinction between vice and virtue must eter- 
 nally exist ; — as holiness and virtue can neither 
 be unnatural nor irrational ; and as the desire 
 of immortality, derives its chief energy from 
 
176 
 
 the influence which holiness ;and;. virtue have 
 upon us; it follows, that- the. desire of immor- 
 . tality can neither be irrational, nor unnatural^ 
 to the mind of man. 
 
 Have both reason and nature, then, conspired: 
 to cheat us with a lie ? Is it possible that na- 
 ture can Suggest a desire which is unnatural? 
 Or is it possible, that reason can beget within 
 us, a desire, which she declares to be irration- 
 al ? To suppose either, is to admit a palpable 
 contradiction. As nature suggests to us the 
 idea of our own imniortality, she must suggest 
 what is unnatural, if man be not immortal, and. 
 thu&act in contradiction to herself; and we 
 shall then be reduced to this conclusion, to; 
 admit the desire of immortality to be natural, 
 and unnatural, at thesame time; the impossi- 
 bility of which, requires noargument to disprove, 
 and but little philosophy ^ to discover. And if 
 reason beget within us, a desire whichi is un- 
 reasonable, we must derive from reason, "what 
 from its own nature it is incapable of producing^ 
 — An unreasonable desire, resulting from rea- 
 son is a contradiction in terms ; and therfifore 
 I conclude, that the certainty of immoptaiity> 
 arises from those desires which w© feelforits 
 J)ossession. 
 
m 
 
 SECttoNIV.' 
 
 The annihilation of the soul cannot he eceasionsd Ity 
 any fimte, being. ,Nqt6- on the mirAcles„recorded,An 
 the Bible.' , The yfq^^ibjlity of the annihilqition of 
 the: soul doubtful. , Annihilation inconceival^le. 
 Annihilation, if not ascertained, cannot be known; 
 and when ascertained, it will involve a cofitr a diction. 
 We have no data for' assuming the possible annihi- 
 lation of the soul. All abstract possibilities totally 
 unknown to us. The abstract possibility of creation 
 mitst have been inconceivable, prior to creation, ad- 
 mitting the previous intelligence of man. It -could 
 ^not JiQ3J^, been^ known either by reason or intuition. 
 Brief review of the primitive principles of creation, 
 in {Connection with infinite power. " The creation of 
 matter inconcewable, but not contradictory. Cre- 
 ation could not have taken place by the laics of 
 nature,. 
 
 It is eertaiii,; tjiat no created Peing can be 
 infinite; the .supposition refutes itself. And 
 if no created Being can be infinite, no created 
 Being can pierform an action, which nothing 
 less, than an infinite power can aqcomplish. 
 The distance between Being, B.nd not iBeing, is, 
 and must,be_ infinite; and that distance which 
 is infinite,' no finite power can possibly grasp ; 
 and what'no finite power can grasp,' must (if it 
 be grasped) be grasped by that which is ihfi- 
 
 N 
 
178 
 
 nite, for nothing less than an infinite power, 
 can make an infinite exertion. And as nothing 
 but an infinite exertion can change that which 
 is, to that which is not ; so that whiich cannot 
 be changed from something to nothing, canno,t 
 be annihilated by any created Being ; and that 
 which cannot be annihilated, must thiis far be 
 immortal. 
 
 Nor can we conceive that an infinite power 
 can be communicated to any finite Being ; for 
 afinite Being who can perform an infinite action, 
 must be finite, and infinite, at the same time. 
 And even to suppose a finite Being, to be dele^ 
 gated with power to perform an action, which 
 no finite Being can accomplish ; is. to suppose 
 it to be empowered to do what it cannot do — 
 it is to raise a finite Being into infinity, and yet- 
 to suppose it to be finite still.* 
 
 * While revising the copy of this work, for the third edi- 
 tioHj it was kindly hinted to me by a judicious and iutdligent 
 Mend, that " the sentiments contained in the above passage, 
 " itaight.be thogght by som6 to militate against the mjra^ 
 " which are recorded in the Old and New Testaments." I 
 am not, however, aware that this can be inferred by any fair 
 deductions, but I think it necessary to make the following re^ 
 marks to prevent unfair ones. 
 
 The miracles recorded in the sacred writings were evidently 
 perforaned by a divine power, through the aigency of men ) but 
 these men were no more than mere instruments in the hands 
 of God, or vehicles through which he acted. The Prophets 
 and Apostles exhibited no human energies, which tiU their 
 days had Iain dormant, and had been concealed for the want 
 
170 
 
 A Beiijg thus empowered, must be either 
 finite or infinite. If finite, it can do hothihg 
 bey©u(J.'fi finite nature ; if infinite,- it is no longer 
 a finite Being; and from either case it follows, 
 that the soul cannot be annihilated by any . 
 created Being, whether it be possessed ■0f,9'» 
 intelligent, or of an- unintelligent nature* 
 
 Whether annihilaiion be jposs't^/e in the nature 
 ofthikgs, is with me a matter of considerable 
 doubt. That it is to me utterly inconceivable, 
 I feel no hesitation in asserting ; and while I 
 can ha^e no conception of the possibility oi 
 
 of exercise. They were only instruments that the Almighty 
 selected, through which he might display his power, in order 
 to make known to the world, that they were the objects of 
 
 ■ his peculiar approbation, and engaged in a work w:hich he 
 
 ' tras thus determined miraculously to support. 
 
 As these men were finite, it is evideht that the actions 
 attributed to them, and which were really effected through 
 their instrumentality, if they were strictly their own, though 
 only by delegation, could not b^ such as no finite Beings 
 could accomplish i because in this case the fact proves that 
 they were performed by finite Beings. On the contrary, if 
 these actions were such as no finite Beings could perform, we 
 Can only view these men as instruments or mediums of divine 
 communication, while we trace the power displayed through 
 them to a higher source, and connect infinite with God. No 
 Being can perform an ajction that does not lie within the 
 power of its nature to accomplish. And even if we adnait an 
 additionzil energy to be communicated by delegation, this 
 ene^-gy must always be extraneous to- the nature of such a 
 Being, because this must always continue the same. No 
 finite Being therefore can be delegated with an infinite power, 
 
 N 2 
 
180 
 
 annihilation, I can have no reason to suppose 
 it possible.* ' 
 
 If annihilation be a total extinction of all 
 
 * I think it unnecessary in this place, to inforai the rea,d- 
 'er, that -vvhile I assert annihilation to be. impossible, I, 
 would by no means insinuate, that annihilation is not within 
 the reach of Omnipotent i)ower. Thfe infinitely powerful and 
 ever blessed God, must have an infinite variety of ways in 
 which- he can exert his power, that are to us totally unknown, 
 and will probably remain so through all eternity. It is true, 
 we cannot conceive how annihilation, can be accomplished} 
 but this is no argument against fact. 
 
 The same power which treated the laws of nature, can un- 
 doubtedly destroy them ; but when we admit the destruction 
 of those laws, a scene presents itself to our astonished, views, 
 which human penetration cannot enter ; — a scene in which 
 we discover but little more, than "■ the war of elements, the 
 " wreck of hiatter, and the crush of worlds." 
 
 By what antecedent laws, the Almighty chose to act, when 
 the laws of nature were created, we may venture to conjec- 
 ture ; but, with certainty, we perhaps, shall never know, ■ It 
 appears -probable, that they arose from the unchangea,ble per- 
 fections of the Divine mind, and are but a transcript of the 
 essential perfections of the nature of God, so far manifesteci as 
 suited the purposes and designs displayed in creation. If this 
 conjecture be right, the final destruction of things, as iticannot 
 affect the immutability of God, cannot bring the soul nearer 
 to annihilation> than if we suppose the laws of nature to con- 
 tinue for ever. But as this is only conjecture, it would be inn- 
 prudent to pursue it within the limits pf a solitary note.^ . 
 
 All that I contend for^, is — that according to the present 
 laws of nature, and our means of knowing them, annihUatipn 
 must be impossible. But when thpse laws are done aw^y,we 
 enter a region in which an impenetrable cloud extends its siio- 
 dow over us, and aU beyond it is perfectly unknown. 
 
181 
 
 Being, something must be reduced to nothings 
 But if the reduction of something to nothing, 
 be necessary to the very admission of annihi- 
 lation, we ascertain the existence of a point 
 that denominates o, nonenlity. And to ascer- 
 tain the certainty of what is admitted to have 
 no. kind of existence, supposes nothing itself to 
 be identified, which is a contradiction^ 
 
 . If, on the contrary, we suppose, that the 
 certainty of annihilation cannot be ascertained, 
 it is impossible to say that the soul can ever 
 be reduced to it ; and if the soul be not known 
 to be thus reduced, it cannot be said to be in 
 a state of annihilation. Annihilation is, there- 
 fore, inconceivable. 
 
 If the soul cannot be reduced or resolved 
 into perfect nothing, annihilation is not only 
 indonceivable, but utterly impossible; because 
 annihilation is an exchange of entity for nonen- 
 tity. And if this point of nonentity, cannot be 
 ascertained with as much precision as entity 
 itself, it is impossible to say where the former 
 begins, or where the latter ends. But in sup- 
 posing this strange point to be ascertained, 
 where entity ends, and where nonentity begins ; 
 which must be admitted, if annihilation be 
 supposed possible, we give a beginning to what 
 we cannot admit to have any kind of possible 
 existence. 
 
 To suppose a.' nonentity to h.3ive no beginning,' 
 
182 
 
 is to suppose ati entity to have Bio etid \ and 
 W^hat has no end, instead of being annihilated, 
 niiist be immortal.- ' 
 
 To give a beginning to a nonentity, is a con- 
 ti-adicftion : atid to deprive it otit, is to make 
 the soul immortal. Annihilation is, therefore, 
 impossible in the nature of things. 
 
 To reduce entity to nonentity, is to reduce 
 that which is, to that which is not ; it is to 
 make entity and Monew^j/j' meet together, and 
 entity and nonentity can thett be extremes no 
 longer. But if the p>hysical distanee which is 
 between all natural extremes, be dene away, 
 entity and nonentity hiust be tlie same thing ; 
 for that which is separated by nothing, must 
 necessarily be the same. And if that which 
 is, can be the same with that which is not, we 
 are brought to this .naked contradiction -rrthfit 
 the soul may be annihilated, i and not annihi- 
 latedi at the same time. . i ;• . 
 
 Whatever is perfectly annihilated, can have 
 no kind of existence; and what has no kind 
 of existence, we. can form no kind of concepr, 
 tiou of; and what we can form no kind of. com 
 ceptiori Of, cannot possibly be known." To 
 ascertain the soul's annihilation, is therefore 
 utterly impossible. 
 
 To this it may, perhaps, be objected, " that 
 " although the soul's annihilation cannot be 
 " ascertained, it may, nevertheless, be possible, 
 
183 
 
 ^* as the possibility of a fact hj.no means de- 
 " pends on our knowledge of that fact for its 
 " existence." To admit any supposed fact to 
 be poi^sible, while we can form no p&ssibU, 
 conception of such a possihiUty^, is to lay the 
 foundation of our reasoning in the sand ; and 
 to build on such a foundation, is to raise a far 
 brio on what has no existence. 
 
 In every mental exertion, the mitftd must 
 take its flight from some admitted point— there 
 must be some data &om whence we start. And 
 if the Dtitad can trace an association of ideas, 
 between this given point, and the object it 
 designs to compass, the demonsta-ation will be 
 complete. But if we have no data, from whence 
 we commence our mental 4»pepations, it is im^ 
 possible that ever the progressive movemients 
 of the soul can arrive at their fancied object ; 
 — we can have no foundation on which to build, 
 in order to approach it. Such' is the ease be- 
 fore us. The annihilationa. of the soul is to be 
 made out ; to do this, prOof must be adduced \ 
 this proof cannot be obtained. The objection, 
 then, has recourse to probability; probability 
 deeerts it also : — The last refuge, then, is, " that 
 " the case is possible." And on this I pre- 
 sume to say, that if the annihilation of the soul 
 be supposed to be possible, either this possi-- 
 bility must be self-evident, or supported by 
 unquestionable authority ; without this, we can 
 
184 
 
 have no data from whence AVe hiay pi-efeume to 
 make. the supposition. 
 
 As. to authority, it cannot furnish the least 
 pretence. .And to admit the ' possibility of 
 what we cannot conceive to Ise possible, is a 
 gross absurdity; — it is supposing a thing to; be 
 possible, and yet not supposing it possible, at 
 the same time : . it: is taking for granted, the 
 very point which requires to be proved ;-^and 
 the; mind, being thus deprived of its resting 
 place, can never move onward in: progressive 
 reasonings, to identify that possibility which 
 the objection assumes as an admitted point. 
 And to urgeas a possibility, what we can hare 
 no conception of the possible existence of; is 
 to admit that as a possibility, which we cannot 
 even conceive to be possible. ^ • 
 
 An idea of the possibility of annihilation, 
 may be retained while that ppssibilUy, is, con^ 
 ceivable: but to suppose it possible that the 
 soul can be, annihilated, while we can have no 
 possible conception of such a possibility, is to 
 admit, and yet to. deny the existence of such a 
 possibility, at the same instant* 
 
 In admitting any fact to be possible, there 
 must.be some evidence to support the mind in 
 that belief. But to admit a fact to be possible, 
 while we have no kind of evidence to sustain 
 0ur minds in what we adrhit ; is not only- to 
 give ourselves up to the caprice of blind ere- 
 
185 
 
 dulity, but it is to argue from no evidence, arid 
 to decide withovit any proof. And, to found 
 the soul's annihilation on a rnere abstract possi- 
 bility, of which the mind can avowedly form 
 no conception ; is to admit as fact, what we 
 cannot know to be possible : because the 
 probabilities are equally strong in favour of 
 the absolute impossibility of the fact. 
 
 But even admitting the naked, abstract, possi-' 
 Mlity of the fact, that the soul can be annihi- 
 lated, yet the abstract possibility of what only 
 may be, must necessarily be to us inconceivable ; 
 for the instant we can have a conception of 
 any possibility., it is a possibility of what may 
 be, in the abstract no longer. Such a possibilii- 
 ty must be conceivable to us, or it must not. 
 If it be conceivable, we must traoe it by some 
 relation, and then it cannot be in the abstract ; 
 but if it be not conceivable, the mere abstract 
 possibility, is a possibility to us no more. For 
 to conceive the existence of a possibility, which 
 to us is inconceivable, is to conceive a pos- 
 sibility which we cannot conceive; and is a 
 contradiction in terms^ 
 
 To admit the future existence of what may 
 be, is to admit the present existence of its possi- 
 bility ; and if the existence of this possibility 
 be in the abstract, it must be detached from 
 all evid^ce of its actual existence; without 
 this, it cannot be in. the abstract. But to ad- 
 
186 
 
 mit the presentexistence of a possibility, which 
 has no evidence to support the mind in the 
 conception of that joomife existence, is to rea- 
 son without all reason, which is an absurdity 
 too gross either to be adopted or refuted. 
 
 Of a subject which is totally unknown to us 
 we can have no idea ; and that of which we 
 have neither knowledge nor idea, can never be 
 an object either of our conception or belief 
 To admit, therefore, the existence of an abstract 
 possibility, while we hate neither knowledge 
 nor idea of the possibility Of its existencfe, is to 
 acknowledge that to be possible, which we can 
 neither believe nor know tO: be so. From 
 hence it follows, that there can be to us no 
 such thing as an abstract possibility of what 
 may. be. AH abstract possibilities must be 
 to us unknown ; and what to us is absolutely 
 unknown, can never be an object either of our 
 knowledge, reason, or belief. 
 
 That the abstract possibility of the Being of 
 all created substances, both material and imma- 
 terial, must have existed previously to their 
 actual existence, is a truth, which, I believe, 
 no one will attempt to controv^ert, or deny. 
 Yet of this abstract possibility of things, no 
 conception could possibly have been formed, 
 prior to the actual existence of them. It is 
 not my design to found the force of this argu- 
 ment, upon the absurdity of supposing a ere- 
 
187 
 
 ated Beiiig to fovm a conception pc^viOiisly to 
 its own^ existence, ^though this assuredly must 
 have been the case ; but what I intend, is — 
 that e\en admitting our own existence, no rea- 
 son could ever have led us to form any con- 
 ception of -the abstract possibility of creation. 
 It is from the actual existence of creation, that 
 we know it must Jiav^beien possible, prior to 
 its. actual existence. ; hut if no such creation 
 had .ever actually existed, the;abstract possi- 
 bility of it would have been .totally unknown. 
 Supposing God had permitted such a Being 
 as man to have existed previously to the actual 
 creation of other things, I would ask — Could 
 man, in this, state, have had any iiotion of the 
 possibility of j creation? If not, the abstract 
 possibility! is at once rendered totally incon- 
 ceivable ; but if he could, it, must have been 
 either by reason of intuition. It cpiild not have 
 been by reason, because. reason would have 
 led to an opposite conclusion, Creation is the 
 cfiUing something into ex;istence, which was 
 not before. But how the Divine efficiency 
 could have operated so as to produce some-? 
 thing material,, is what no human capacity 
 could comprehend. To modify and combine 
 certain properties which previously exist, may 
 be conceived possible, from ihe previous ex- 
 istence of what is to be modified and com- 
 bined; but to conceive that the Divine effici- 
 
188 
 
 ency which is: immaterial, could produce tan- 
 gible matter ;-^that material substances could 
 be produced without any materials ;— or, that 
 real Being could be made to arise out of what 
 had no Being ; instead of being a dictate of 
 reason, is utterly incomprehensible and incon- 
 ceivable. 
 
 To suppose an intuitive knowledge of its 
 possibility to have been communicated to man, 
 is to. call iri the assistance of supernatural 
 power; it is theii no longer a conception, 
 arising from our natural faculties, but is rather 
 a conviction produced by authority, than the 
 result of discernment. The abstract possibili- 
 ty of creation, must therefore, in the case giveh, 
 have been totally inconceivable to man. 
 
 When we lift our thoughts to God's creative 
 power, we feel it difficult to exclude frOm its 
 genuine nature, those local ideas of generation 
 and corruption; with which, on all occasions, 
 we are enveloped ; but which, when applied to 
 creMion, must be lequally injudicious and ab- 
 surd. From the influence of these local preju- 
 dices, and this erroneous association of ideas,- 
 we feel it difficult to disentangle ourselves, to 
 form any separate conceptions of formation and 
 creation; though, in themselves, the tAfo ideas 
 are quite distinct, and have but little or no 
 reflation to one another. The former undoubt- 
 edly implies, the previous existence -of those 
 
189 
 
 Etiaterials, whifch are modified by formation; 
 and it undeiiiably includes a contradiction to 
 suppose— that formation could ever have taken 
 place, out of pure and absolute not/iing: In 
 this case, Ave must suppose pure nothing to 
 have been acted upon^ as a pre-existent and 
 material cause ; which must equally include a 
 contradiction, whether the efficient power be 
 supposed to reside in a finite, or an infinite, 
 Being. Fottnation, therefore, is > not creation. 
 But while formation presents us with an idea, 
 which includes the pre-existence of thiB.se ma- 
 terials, out of which any Being or thing is 
 formed ; creation presents us with an exertion 
 of infinite power, calling into existence; what^ 
 from the term itself, could not have' existed 
 before. And the supporters of that theory, 
 which makes formation and creation to be 
 terms synonymous with one another, would do 
 well to consider, whether it does not include a 
 denial of a creative power in God. 
 
 When we attribute to the Great God; a 
 creative power, it is absurd in the highest de- 
 ^ee, to admit the pre-existence of those mar 
 terials, out of which, matter itself was, created; 
 — it is admitting the existence of matter^ prior 
 to the existence of matter, which is a- contra- 
 diction in terms. If the materials^, out of which 
 matter itself was created, existed, as matter, 
 previously to the existence of matter, the term 
 
r 
 
 creation must be totally inapplicalble. In this 
 case, it is rather re-production than creation , 
 and to find one, to which the term creation 
 can be applied, we must look deeper into the 
 recesses of nature* than' either Of the Cases 
 Under consideration can afford. 
 
 If, under thes# circumstances, we admit the 
 pre-existence Of those materials, out of which 
 matter itself was created, and ask^--of what 
 peculiar nature were those materials ? We sll&ll 
 feel ourselves rathejF at a loss to find an answer. 
 To suppose them to be material, includes the 
 contradiction stated above ; and to suppose thein 
 to be spiritual, will lead us exactly to the samfe 
 conclusion!; We are, therefore, under the ne» 
 eessity of resolving all into the effidemy of the 
 Divine power. 
 
 Let it not, however, be thought, because I 
 thus resolve all things primarily into the divine 
 eflSciency, that I therefore confound the e»^ 
 sence of God with that of his creatures, or in* 
 corporate him in otir most enlarged idea of the 
 universe. Nothing can be -farther from my 
 thoughts than to imagine that matter as such 
 existed in God, or that even the essence of mat- 
 ter is included in his nature. 
 
 When I take a survey of the Varieties of the 
 material World around me,- 1 as'k from whence 
 they came ? I trace them to matter, and view 
 them as so many distinct modifications of it. 
 
isi 
 
 I ask again from whextoe matter came, 'and 
 what it is? and then I trace from its known 
 properties to its essence. I then again inquire 
 for the origin of its essence? and find myself 
 ufflider the necess-ity of seeking it in something 
 or nothing. I search through the strange re- 
 gion oindtimg, and find it a barren waste, to- 
 tally incapable of every thing. I then turn to 
 Something, and carrying back my views an- 
 tecedently to creation, find nothing in exist- 
 ence but the eternal, the self-existent God. I 
 then contemplate his nature aijd perfections, 
 and find all at an- infinite distance from every 
 thing finite, and receive from thence the fullest 
 Gjonviction that the essences of finite substances 
 cannot be included in his nature. I then turn 
 to his power, and finding it infinite, conclude 
 that it is capable of doing every thing which in- 
 cludes not within it a contradiction. I then 
 take a review of matter, and discovering no- 
 thing which can induce me to believe, that the 
 creation of its essence, can include a contifj^- 
 diction, when I view it as the effect of infinite- 
 power, conclude that infinite power -called it 
 into Being. Now as the power of God never 
 acts >but in concurresaee with his Mdll, and un- 
 der its direction, the exercise of this power 
 must have- been voluntary ; so that the crea- 
 tion of the essence of matter was an act of 
 dioice, and not an act of necessity in God. ^f 
 
192 
 
 As the term creation, includes within it nc^. 
 thing more — than the causing of that to be, 
 which was not before, ■ the action through 
 which it was accomplished, can involve nei- 
 ther an absolute impossibility nor contradic- 
 tion. 
 
 That the manner how this could be accom- 
 plished, surpasses all human comprehension, 
 if not the comprehension of all finite intel- 
 ligences, is too evident to admit a. moment's 
 doubt ; but this can never be admitted as an 
 argument against infinite power. 
 
 On the contrary, the supposition which 
 makes matter to originate in absolute nothing, 
 not only supposes the non-existence of all ma- 
 terials, but it annihilates also the idea of an 
 efficient power ; for where an eflicient power 
 is admitted to exist, there ifc is certain, that 
 absolute nothing cannot be. If, then, we admit 
 that (jrod voluntarily created matter, by his 
 own efficiency, though it presents us with an 
 idea which must necessarily b& inexplicable, 
 yet it involves neither contradiction nor absurd- 
 ity. And for aught we know, the Divine effici- 
 ency may afford the only source, out of which 
 the essence of both matter and spirit could 
 possibly be created. 
 
 Certain it is, that we can have no conception 
 how any thing could be performed, unless ft 
 be by the laws of nature; and itvis equally 
 
f93 
 
 certain, that by those laws, creation could not 
 have taken place. For if we admit, that cre- 
 ation was accomplished "by the laws of nature, 
 we must, in order to avoid an opposite contra- 
 diction, 'admit the existence of those laAVs ante- 
 cedently to all Creation ; and in this case, those 
 laws must be uncreated, independent, and eternal. 
 But as all, the laws of nature suppose the pre- 
 vious existence of a lawgiver, antecedently, to 
 their own existence, it .plainly follow?, that 
 those laws can be neither uncreated, indepen- 
 dent, nor eternal. 
 
 I therefore conclude — that as the creation 
 X)f nature, could not have been accomplished 
 by the laws of nattjre ; and that as all human 
 conceptions must be circumscribed by the 
 boundaries which these laws presqribe,— the 
 manner how fcreation was accomplished, xfxvLst 
 be to us necessarily incoijiprehensible ; and 
 will, withoiit involving any contradiction, in 
 all probability, renjain so through eternity. 
 
194 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 The povBer which produced creation, cannot he con- 
 
 -- chived to retrace its actions by the lams of nature. 
 
 , The existence of a Zamiff cannot be^ known to, he 
 possible. Creation must hape been the Work of an 
 uncreated Being. Creation and annihilation im- 
 practicable by the laws of nature. Being and No- 
 Being cannot both exist positively. No-Being is a 
 negation of B^inff. Two negations the reverse of 
 
 " each other cannot be possible.. The soul can never 
 meet the absence or reverse of itself. It, must there- 
 fore be immortal. 
 
 When from a contemplation of yhat we con-t 
 C^ivei to be possible by the laws of nature, We 
 turn our thoughts tp God, and inquire whether^ 
 the same Almighty Being that produced us by 
 his power and his will, cannot retrace his own 
 voluntary actions, and finally reduce all finite 
 beings, both material and immaterial,; into their 
 primitive state of non-creation, the question 
 assumes a new and totally different aspect. 
 It is no longer in this case, a point which lies 
 within the province of reason to determine, but 
 must be resolved into that power and wisdom, 
 which in ways and manners unknown to us, 
 called creation and the laws of nature into 
 being. 
 
 To unhinge creation,, and resolve every thing 
 
195 
 
 iatolts pristine state, is most undoubtedly with- 
 in the reach of that infinite power which gave it 
 birth. But as finite substances were not 
 created by those laws by which their actions 
 and operations are regulated, so neither have 
 we any reasoh to believe that, their destruction 
 can be accomplished by those Jaws, . which, ap- 
 pear to be inseparably connected with their 
 present state of existence. It is by these laws 
 that our reasonings are governed; and in pro- 
 portion as we take them for our guide, we 
 sjhall be led, to conclude, that annihilation can 
 never take place. For though it must be 
 granted, that the annihilation of every created 
 Being and thing is possible to God, yet this 
 fact is admitted to be possible, rather because 
 his power is omnipotent, and becaiuse he has 
 already called them into existence, than from 
 any deductions which our reasoning poyrers 
 enable us to make. 
 
 That reason will lead us to a very different 
 conclusion, is evident from the following con- 
 siderations. For as absolute nonentity which 
 excludes, an efficient power, was not that out 
 of which God caUed forth creation, so neither 
 will absolute nonentity take place, although 
 God were to retrace all his actions, and to re- 
 duce every thing tp that state of nonrCtysaHon in 
 which things :^ere, antecedently to their actual 
 
 ? 
 
196 
 
 being. Those, therefore, who out of venera- 
 tion to the Divine Being, ascribe to him the 
 power of producing annihilation, do in reality 
 ascribe to him, an etfect Which appears con- 
 trary' to his nature ; and which, therefore,' his 
 power must be incapable of producing.-^That 
 power which produces annihiltttibn, must ^vo- 
 Aute Htnonentitp; and that power which produces 
 a nonentity, produces riothing. I therefore con- 
 clude, that annihilation must be impossible, 
 according to every liiode of reasoning of whicl^ 
 we are capable, and according to' every view 
 which we have of the nature of things. 
 
 If I were to be asked, whether it be possible 
 for a Zamr^ to exist or not ? I shCuld natural- 
 ly -reply, that I know not what a Zdmiff\s\ 
 and therefore, caii annex no idea t*d the expres- 
 sion ;-and shaving no conception of the thing, 
 I cannot. be guided iu'nly decision, whether it 
 be within the limits of possible existence or 
 not. To decide 'whether a Zamiffhe within 
 the rieach of possible existence, it is necessary 
 to have some knowledge of its nature-; but a 
 knowledge of its naturie, supposes the exist- 
 ence of that nature, for to know what is not, is 
 a contriadiction;; but if that nature bie in exist- 
 ence, though only in idea, it is no longer a 
 question oi abstract possibility, hnt of choice in 
 the Deity. But Unless its nature be ascertain- 
 ed, it is impossible to 'say, whether a Zamiff , 
 
197 
 
 be within the reach of joossiiZe existence or not, 
 either of corporeal or incorporeal Being.* In 
 like manner, perfect annihilation is the total 
 negation of all Being ; and to form any con- 
 ception of what a total negation is, is utterly 
 ^conceivable, if not totally impossible. 
 • If ever^anaihilation take place, annihilation 
 must be 71010 possible, or it must not. If not, 
 that which is impossible now, must remain im- 
 possible for ever ; for no.power can make that 
 which is an impossibility now, to be a possibi- 
 lity -hereafter^ , But if we no-w admit annihila- 
 tion to be possible, this very fflrfmitoo« of the 
 possibility of . annihilation, supposes ihaipossi- 
 biUtif to be now known; and this knowledge 
 will then identify the certeWy of that, which, 
 when identified must be a nonentily ; and 
 which, from that very circumstance, can have 
 no kind of existence. Whatever can be ideh-r 
 tified, "cannot be a . nonentity ; and that which 
 cannot be identified, cannot be known to be 
 
 * To the term Zamiff, I annex no kind of idea. It is pre- 
 sumed to be a something whicl^ is^ totally distinct in nature, 
 both from cfeated and uncreated existence. 
 
 A term to which no idea can be annexedj and which ex- 
 presses nothing, either of Corporeal or incorporeal Being, can 
 never be determined by any one to be within the reach of 
 possible existence. And yet it must be in such a state, that all 
 future things are supposed, when we conceive they are pos^ 
 sihle in the abstract only. 
 
198 
 
 possible. The admission, therefore, of the 
 certainty of the itiere possibility of annihilation, 
 must inevitably destroy the fadt itself; because 
 the fact itself is a nanentity, 2iad., therefore, can 
 never be identified ; and what cannot be iden- 
 tified, as it can afford no kind of evidence of 
 its certainty, can never be known to be possi- 
 ble. And, therefore, whichsoever side of the 
 alternative be admitted, the human soul, ac- 
 cording to all our modes of reasoning, must 
 necessarily be immortal. 
 
 To suppose that any created Being could 
 be a creator, is a contradiction ; and, there- 
 fore, from the nature of things, creation must 
 have been the work of an uncreated power. 
 And to conceive that any finite intelligence can 
 be able to form, without any evidenccj- an idea 
 of the abstract possibility of what infinite power 
 alone is able to effect ; is to make ajpart to 
 comprehend the whole, and to arrogate to it- 
 self a species of infinity. 
 
 As nothing but infinite power could create 
 matter and spirit out of no materials, so no- 
 thing but infinite power can retrace its own 
 exertions ; but to suppose that either could be 
 effected by the laws x)f nature, is a plain con- 
 tradiction. If all creation took place by the 
 laws of nature, the laws of nature must have 
 existed prior to their own existence : and if an- 
 nihilation take place by those laws, the laws 
 
199 
 
 of nature must survive their own destruction, 
 and exist after they are destroyed. For if an 
 immaterial substance can be destroyed by 
 the laws of nature, every thing in nature 
 (including the laws of nature, which form a 
 part) can be destroyed by the same laws. But 
 if every thing in nature can be extinguished by 
 thd laws of -nature, the laws of nature must 
 survive their own annihilatipn, in order to their 
 own destruction; which is a contradiction. 
 And if we suppose the laws of nature to pe- 
 rish with the annihilation of any natural sub- 
 stance, then this substance must be annihilated 
 by. those laws, which, at the instant of its aur 
 nihilation, can have nO; existence ; which, is 
 also a contradiction. , , . ; • 
 
 There is, therefore, nothing to found the 
 possibility of the soul's annihilation upon, but 
 Omnipotent power, and this exerted in oppo- 
 sition to the laws- of nature. And what can 
 be accomplished only in opposition to the laws 
 of nature, can never be conceived by any Being> 
 which is only subject to its laws. Therefore, 
 to suppose the annihilation of the soul possible, 
 is to suppose in opposition to reason and evi- 
 dence ; it is to pretend to comprehend by the 
 laws of nature, what to the laws of nature is, 
 and must be, incomprehensible. ■ 
 
 That Being and No-Being cannot bpth hav# 
 
200 
 
 a positive existence is almost a self-evident 
 proposition ; the dtie being exactly the reverse 
 of the other. Thus, if we suppose No-Being 
 to be positive, Being, vi^hich is its reverse, can 
 be no' more than the pure negation of it. Or 
 if Being have a positive existence, then No-Be- 
 ing, which is its reVerse, can be nothing more 
 than its absence, or the negation Of it. To 
 suppose both Being and No-Being to have^ 
 positive existence; is to suppdse that they may 
 ^xist at once; and if both may exist at once, 
 both ihay meet in the same slibjiect; But to 
 suppose both Being and No-Being to meet 
 together in the same svibject, or even to have 
 a positive existence, involves in it this contra- 
 diction, that things may be and not be at the 
 same time. Both, thetefoTCj cannot positively 
 exist. ■"■.•-■' 
 
 But whilfe it is impossible that Being and 
 No-Being can ever ineet together, and unite- itt 
 the same subject, it follows, with all the evi- 
 dence of demonstration, that either the former, 
 or the latter, must positively eiist. To suppose 
 neither to exist positively, is to suppose both 
 to be puTe negations. But to suppose two 
 negations to be the reverse of opie the othet, is 
 the grossest of Contradictions. Whatever is a 
 negation, must be the negation of sohiething 
 which positively exists,' without this, it is the 
 negation of nothing. . And if neither the former 
 
201 
 
 nor the latter positively €xist, they must each 
 l>e the negation of a mere nonentity. 
 
 The negation oif a nonentity, will prove the 
 positive existence of that smp^Qsedi negation ; 
 for that whidh is the absence oi nothing, must 
 be something ; and thslt virhich is something, 
 cannot be d |)ure physical negation i But to 
 suppose Being ahd No-Being to be pure ne- 
 gations, or the niere absence of each other, 
 while neither is supposed to have aily positive 
 existence; is hot oilly to make each, less than 
 the- " shadow of a shade," but it is to place in 
 opposition to each other, twoiiegationsj heither 
 of which, from the nature of the cdse supposed, 
 can possibly exist. It therefore follows, that 
 either Being or NO'Being must positively exist ; 
 and the next inquiry must'be. Which of these 
 exists positively; and which negatively. 
 
 If the pure negatioh of all Being had existed 
 from eternity, positive Being could not now 
 exist. That . which was from eternity, must 
 necessarily now exist -^ and that \^hich thus 
 exists, can be subject neither to decay noi: 
 change. Numerous casualties may affect A 
 compounded nature, but Being and No-Being 
 must ever be inaccessible to each other, and 
 be placed beyond the influfence of mutation, or 
 i-elative change. 
 
 If nothing hsid existed from'eterhity, the im- 
 mensity of Space could have furnished nothing 
 
202 
 
 - Ut the mere absence of Being. The mere ab- 
 sence of Being could never have acted.; for 
 this v(rould be to suppose an action without an 
 actor, which is a contradiction ; and that which 
 could never have acted, could never have pro- 
 duced positive Being. But as every substance 
 has a positive Being, it undeniably follows, 
 that mere absence could not have existed fi:om 
 eternity. And if iiaere absence could hot have 
 been from eternity, it follows also, that the re- 
 verse of Being can haye no positive existence ; 
 it is, therefore, a mere negation ; aild a mere 
 negation of that which positively/ is. 
 
 If the mere absence of Being has been from 
 eternity, we can no more attach, any positive 
 idea to the term, than we can imagine that it 
 stands for something actually existing. As a 
 fact indeed it would sufficiently prove the non- 
 entity, or entire negation of all substances ; it 
 -would totally destroy every idea which we 
 have of the plenitude of Being ; but while the 
 idea of plenitude was thus destroyed, or rather 
 prevented from existing, mere absence could 
 never erect any thing positive in its stead. ' 
 
 If life had been to the soul what animation 
 is to the body, we could easily conceive that 
 life might terminate, while the entity of Being 
 should remain. It is from the total removal 
 of animation that we derive our ideas of death. 
 But this absence of animation is not the real 
 
203 
 
 absence of all Being, but the absence of. some- 
 thing that is essentially necessary to the con- 
 tinuance of some particular mode of Being* 
 It is the subtraction of something, the loss of 
 which that particular mode of Being cannot 
 survive. 
 
 All nature will furnish us with instances of 
 those physical contrarieties, which God has 
 placed in extremes, which must for ever remain 
 inaccessible to one another. Thus cold is the 
 absence of heat, darkness the absence of light, 
 inanimation- the absence of animation, and in- 
 sensibility the absence of sensation. And the 
 very instant that we conceive either of these 
 extremes to make any approaches towards its 
 ■-reverse, that very instant, by deserting its 
 station, its relative and nominal existence can 
 be no more. It is in the same sense that in- 
 action is the absence of action, and rest the 
 absence of motion ; that death, in the most 
 common acceptation, is the absence of life, and 
 nothing more. 
 
 Now in all these physical extremes, which 
 I have enumerated^ nothing can prevent these 
 contrarieties from continuing unalterably the 
 same, even while those Beings which are sub- 
 ject to them, undergo transitions from one to 
 another. Thus heat may • give place to cold, 
 light' to darkness, action to inaction, motion to 
 rest, and life to death ; butheat itself can neiver 
 
204 
 
 be accessible to cold, nor light to darkness, 
 nor action to inaction, nor motion to rest, rior 
 lifeto death. It is the subjects to ^vhich these 
 contrarieties apply, that enjoy or suffer, that 
 possess or lose ; but the extremes themselves 
 are immutable, aild riever can suffer any alter- 
 ation in their rfelations to their own reverses. 
 And consequently, the instant that We exclude 
 from our thoughts,' all ideas of subjects capable 
 of sustaining alternately these relations, and 
 of undergoing such changes as the transitions 
 of these extremes import? that very moment 
 we render these contrarieties permanent, aiid 
 immoveable ; and we c^n iio more conceive 
 that they can make any approaches towards 
 each other, than we can imagine it possible for 
 any thing to exist arid hot exist at the same 
 time. Hence then the Conclusion is obvious, 
 that though a Being Capable of life and death, 
 may be alternately subject to both, yet life and 
 death must always preserve their distance from 
 each other, because they are physical extremes 
 which never can meet together. And finally, 
 we cannot but observe, that to what Being 
 soever, life and death may alternately apply, 
 that Being must in its own nature be distinct 
 from both; — that life or death is essentialto 
 some particular mode of existence ; — but that 
 the entity of Being cannot be affected by either. 
 Thus far the case is clear when we confine 
 
205. 
 
 our views to eompounded bodies, and make 
 to them an exclusive application of the terms 
 life anid death. But when fronj these we lift 
 our thoughts to the , nature of the human soul; 
 and consider it as a principle of pure essential 
 life, we discover nothing of which it can pos- 
 sibly be deprived, hutits own existence. And 
 whether we denominate that which is its per- 
 fect extreme— Death, — the perfect- absence of 
 iiieif^or the reverse of Seingi certain it is, 
 that these iire extremes which' are separated 
 from the soul, by those insuperable barriers 
 which they cannot pass ; and iupon the preser- 
 vation of their respective distances, all our 
 notions i of natural extremes depend for their 
 existence^ If, then, the soul be a principle of 
 pure essential life, in which consciousness and 
 volition inhere, and from- whence must be sub- 
 tracted every foreign appendagfe ' and super- 
 fluity ; — ^if consciousness and volition can only 
 exist in an unextended,'' immaterial, arid'un- 
 compounded suhstance; — if nothing can be- 
 long to the human soul, but what is physically 
 necessary to its existence ; — and if the' sub- 
 traction- of any one property of the soul, be to 
 the soul the utteT'loss of Being ; whether "We 
 suppose the soul to approach toward the per- 
 fect nonentity 'of its' own Beiiig, or suppose 
 this nonentity of Being to approach toward -the 
 soul, by annihilating the relative and nomiiial 
 
206 
 
 existence of tliat to which either. is supposed 
 to approach, the soul must ever be inaccessijile 
 to its own extreme, and can never meet in con- 
 tact with the perfect absence of itself. 
 
 Such then is the nature of the human soul, 
 and such is the contrariety in which it stands 
 to the perfect absence, or entire reverse ofit^ 
 self And we cannot but conclude,, unless 
 this contrariety can be destroyed, or overcome^ 
 that the soul must retain its innate vigour and, 
 activity through eternity. 
 
 Can, then, these extremes in nature ever 
 ijieet together ? If they can, they are extremes 
 no longer ; if not, the soul must be inaccessible 
 to destruction, and consequently immortal..' If 
 these extremes can meet together, either the 
 soul must approach to the entii'6 absence of 
 itself, or that which has no positive existence, 
 must act upon the soul. , To; suppose the soul 
 to approach to the pure negation of itself, is a 
 contradiction: it is to suppose the soul to be 
 a principle of pure abstracted life, and yet at 
 the same time, to suppose it to be no such thing, 
 
 Whatever the soul moves towards, is proved 
 by that very movement, to be the perfect ab7 
 sence of itself no more. And whije we sup-, 
 pose, that the soul approaches to the absences 
 of itself, we are obliged to suppose that the 
 soul is abstracted from itself, — that it leaves 
 itself behind, and yet moves with itself, tothq 
 
207 
 
 entire absence of itself; — that it has access to 
 that which must necessarily be inaccessible : 
 while the soul, could it have access unto it, 
 would entirely destroy that very absence which 
 it pursued, and thereby annihilate that very 
 death by which it is supposed to be extinguish- 
 ed. This mass of coBtfadiction istoogrosa 
 to be pursued. And the Undeniable conse- 
 quence is-, that the soul itself cannot- move 
 towards, or ever -approach the mere absence 
 of itself. .-./u! 
 
 SECTION VI, 
 
 The mere absence of the Soul, cannot, approaph it, 
 because being', a negation, it cannot act. JBeing jand 
 No-JBeing, entity and nonentity i are antipodes which 
 can never approximate or meet. Annihilation which 
 is a nonentity can neither be communicated, nor 
 produced by potoer, or without it. Povfer cann6t 
 pufsite ' the Sokl to a point which describes a non- 
 entity. That which has no perishable tendency ^ and 
 can neither suffer from the presence, nor the absence 
 ofP,ower^ must necessarily be immortal. 
 
 As the soul cg^nnot approach to the absence 
 of itself, nor perish through any tendency which 
 it, has to its own negation, for. reasons which 
 have been already assigned; it remains to be 
 considered, whether the mere absence of pure 
 essential life, can ever approach unto it. . 
 
208 
 
 If the mere absence of pure essential life be 
 capable of approaching the soul, we must adt 
 mit mere absence to lexist, because that which 
 has no existence can neyer act, and con^^ 
 fluently can never make any approaches toward 
 the souli And if this mere absence be capable 
 pf acting; and this action implies previous ex- 
 istence in that which acts, this mere absence 
 can tjo longer be the^pure negation of positiviB 
 Being, and is therefore not the subject under 
 present consideration, 
 
 The mere absence of which I speak, can be 
 no more than a pure negation ; and what is 
 but a pure negation of positive Being, must be 
 djevoid of that positive existence which is 
 necessary tp that activity which y\^e attribute 
 to it. If, therefore, the soul be approached 
 by the entire absence of itself, and this absence 
 have no kind of positive ejcistence, mere absence, 
 must act without a Being, and approach the 
 soul without having any power to do it. Either 
 jthis absence niust be capable or incapabh\oi 
 japproaching the soul. If capable, it is nolonger , 
 a pure negation ; and if incapable, it can neither 
 approach the soul, nor act upon it. If it be 
 not a pure negation, it is not the subject of 
 present inquiry ; but if it be, the soujl can 
 never be accessible to, and therefoi-e can never 
 perish by it. '' 
 
 Hence, as it implies a contradiction to sup- 
 
209 
 
 pose that the absence of Being, which is tKe 
 reverse of the soul, can be any thing more than 
 a pure negation ; and, as to suppose a mere 
 negation ^o have a positive existence, is a con- 
 tradiction also ; so likeveise that supposition 
 vrhich would lead . us to_ admit, that what ha§ 
 no positive Being can perform an action, must 
 be equally contradictory and absurd. ,And 
 to suppose that that which positively exist?, 
 can perish by that which neither exists nor 
 acts, is a contradiction too monstrous to bip' 
 either refuted or pursued. As the ^'quI, there- 
 fore, cannot approach to the negation of itself, 
 nor this negation approach the soul, it neces- 
 sarily follows, that the soul, being inaccessible 
 to death, must be immortal. r 
 
 But admitting that a mutual approximation 
 could .take place between the soul, and that 
 death by which it is supposed to be destroyed, 
 yet still they are extremes in nature, which 
 must for ever be rendei::ed inaccessible to one 
 another, Iij these extremes of nature, which 
 fprin the insuperable barrier of things, Being 
 and No-Bdng are placed at antipodes to each 
 other. It is from this natural distance which 
 lies between them, that we form our concep- 
 tions of each ; and no longer than this distance 
 iS; preserved, can we attach any idea to either. 
 
 And although we admjt, that an approx:i- 
 
210 
 
 mation were to take place between these ex- 
 tremes, still their proximity to each other in 
 point of space, can no way overcome that dis- 
 tance which God has placed between life and 
 death, and between that entity of Being which 
 constitntes'the soul, and this nonentity through 
 which it is supposed to be destroyed. To ad^ 
 mit the idea of a proximity, through which a 
 contact may be supposed to take place be- 
 tween the soul and the entire absence of itself, 
 is to lose sight of the idea of absence, which is 
 the subject under present consideration : and 
 is to raise mere absence into an.efficient causej 
 and to attribute to it all that formal existence 
 through which alone positive existence can be 
 distinguished from the negation of Being. But 
 as mere absence can never approach that which 
 it is the absence of, nor destroy that positive 
 Being upon which it depends for its own^e^a- 
 tive nomination ; it is certain that no contact 
 can be formed, and consequently no proximity, 
 in point of space, if it were admitted possible, 
 can bring the soul nearer to annihilation j than 
 if we admit the soul to be divided from the 
 absence of itself by a distance which would 
 exceed the extremes of the orbit -of Saltern. 
 From these considerations, it appears evidtot^ 
 that no negatioia of life can approach the soulj 
 or possibly effect its annihilation, even if its 
 proximity were granted to be possible. But: 
 
211 
 
 whether any power which possesses positive 
 Being in itself, can destroy the soul, must be 
 the subject of our next inquiry. 
 
 It is certain, that nothing can communicate 
 what it does not possess ; nor produce what it 
 has not the potVer oi producing. These propo- 
 sitions are self-evident, and the reverse of either 
 is a contradiction. A Being which can com- 
 municate annihilation^ must be one which is in 
 existence ; for that which is not, can communi- 
 cate nothing; and, for the same reason, can 
 produce no effects. And that Being which is 
 in existence, cannot, from the certainty of its 
 eocistence, include the absence of existence within 
 its nature ; and, consequently, can never com- 
 municate to another, that absence of existence 
 or annihilation, which it does not possess itself. 
 Annihilation, therefore, can never be comuni- 
 cated, either by a Being which is in existence, 
 or by one which is not. 
 
 As no Being can communicate to another, 
 what it does not possess itsdf, so neither can 
 \i produce, what it has not the power of joro- 
 ducihg. If annihilation be the effect of power, 
 which must be admitted by all who contend 
 that power pi*oduces it ; annihilation must be 
 produced by an energy residing in that power, 
 which is supposed capable of producing it. 
 For unless an ability to "produce annihilation, 
 
 p % 
 
212 
 
 be included in tlie natttre of power, power it- 
 sdf,can never perform what it hafe iiot the 
 alility to accomplish. But in admitting an 
 effective energy in power, to produce annihi- 
 lation, we make this effective energy to produce 
 a nonentity, ^6x annihilation is a nonentity ; and 
 that Which produces a nonentity, produces no- 
 thing. The supposition, therefore, of a power, 
 Whdse effective energy produces nothing, is a 
 contradiction in terms; it attributes to the 
 power, an accomplishment of purpose, which, in 
 the only effect that it is supposed to produce, 
 we are obliged to deny the existence of; and 
 a power which is thus constituted, must b6^ 
 effective, and ineffective, at the same time. If, 
 therefore, neither the absence, nox presence of 
 power, can produce annihilation, it necessarily 
 follows— that the human soul must be iift- 
 mortal. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be said — that " annihilation 
 " is not, in the strictest propriety of speech, 
 " an effect of pdioer, but it is rather that" point 
 " to which through the application of power, 
 " positive Being is reduced." Admitting; for 
 argument's sake, the case which is here sup- 
 posed, I would then ask — Can power ever pur- 
 sue an oltjeet to a point which includes the 
 absence Of all Being, and consequently the^atb- 
 sence of all power ? If it caiij we must suppose 
 power to be, where we suppose power not to be. 
 
213 
 
 which every one must perceive is a contradic- 
 tion :--If not, annihilation must be impossible. 
 And whether we suppose power to be present 
 or absent, at this given point, as the former in- 
 cludes a contradiction, and the latter pre- 
 cludes the possibility of annihilation ; the de^ 
 cisive result is— that the human soul must ae- 
 cessarily be immortal. 
 
 Against this mode of reasoning, I can con- 
 ceive no objection more forcible than this — 
 " that though the annihilating power may be 
 "supposed toexjst, yet it does not follow, 
 " that -the substance which is supposed to be 
 "annihilated, must exist also." To this I re- 
 ply— thfit, the point which admits the exist- 
 ence of the annihilating pother,, does not pre- 
 clude the existence of that substance, which 
 is supposed to be annihilated by it. For as 
 neither power, nor an immaterial substance, .can 
 occupy space, t\ie point which admits the exist- 
 ence of the former, cannot exclude th^ latter 
 from Being. If power, which is supposed to 
 annihilate, can exist, in this point of annihila^ 
 tion, why should we suppose — that thie same 
 given point should refuse existence to that 
 substance, which is supposed to be annihilated 
 by it ? Natural causes can never annihilate one 
 substance, and yet permit another, .under the 
 same circumstances, to exist, If the annihi- 
 la,ting power be supposed to reach that point, 
 
214 
 
 and exist in it, at the same instant in which 
 the substance IS annihilated by it; this point 
 must then contaiu an entity arid a nonentity at 
 the same time : but for any given point to coh- 
 tttia something and nothing in the same instant, 
 every one must perceive to 'be impossible ; and 
 consequently, the annihilating power can ne- 
 ver reach that point in which annihilation is 
 supposed to be accomplished. I therefore 
 finally observe, — ^the power which is supposed 
 to reduce the soul to a point of annihilation, 
 must either ea?!!*^ in this given point, or it must 
 not .'—If it exist, we are not yet arrived to that 
 point, which describes a nonentity ; and where 
 rionentif If is not, annihilation can never be ; and 
 if it exist not in this given point, the soul -can 
 never be annihilated by its in^uence ; and in 
 either case, the soul must be immortal. 
 
 If the soul be annihilated, it must be either 
 by something which is in existence, or some- 
 thing which is not. But that which is iu exist- 
 ence, can never produce what is physically con- 
 trary to itself; and that which has no exist- 
 ence, can never act. < . , j= 
 
 A Being, which is in a state of positive ex- 
 istence, can never be annihilated while that 
 existence continues ; and a Being which is de- 
 void' of all existence, can never be a subject of 
 it. That which is in existence, must be at an 
 infinife distance from non-existence ; and that 
 
215 
 
 which is not iji existence, is not the subject of 
 our inquiry. Whatever is at an infinite dis- 
 tance ' from Tany given point, can never be 
 brought nearer to that point, through the in- 
 fluence, either of time, circumstance, or power; 
 and that which is removed from the influence 
 of time, circumstance, and power, must neces- 
 sarily be immortal. 
 
 Annihilation- must either be the effect of 
 power, or it must not. If of power, power 
 must continue to operate upon a subjedt, until 
 the subject itself, through the influence of that 
 power, be reduced to a nonentity. But in ad- 
 mitting power to have an active operation, un- 
 til it produces a nonentity, we admit a palpa- 
 ble contradiction. If it be not the effect of 
 power, we must suppose annihilation to be 
 produced, without admitting the existence of 
 any cause sufficiently powerful to produce it, 
 which is a contradiction also. The admission 
 of a power, which is only known to exist, be- 
 cause it produces a nonentity, furnishes thp 
 mind with a chaos of contradictions — because 
 that which produces a nonentity, is not power,, 
 but nothing. If, therefore, annihilation cannot 
 be produced, either with power, or without it, 
 the soul can never be a subject of it ; and what 
 cannot be a subject of it, must lie immortal. 
 
216 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 The total absence of the Bivine power impossible. li 
 is inconsistent with the nature of Omnipotet^e,i to 
 suspend Omnipotence. Duration previous to crea^ 
 tion affords no proof that Omnipotence was partial^ 
 ly suspended. Omnipotence may vary in its modes 
 of operation, proved by creation and providence. 
 If a suspension of any particular mode of power 
 can destroy the soul while permanent Omnipotence 
 remains, the soul must retire out of Being and drop 
 into God, xvhich involves a .contradiction. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be said, tliat. " the annihjia- 
 " tion of Being is not the .effect of any power ; 
 " but, that as all positive Being is supported in 
 '* existence by infinite power, the mere cessa- 
 " tion of that power, is, pf itself,. suflScient. to 
 " produce annihilation ; so that annihilation 
 " camjot be said to be ;the effect of any active 
 " cause, because the. jibsence ,pf, the cause of 
 " JSeing^ is alpne sufficient to produce the non- 
 " entity of a finite Being." 
 . The objection which is here-sta-rted, appears 
 to involve two (ii^tinct points. The first is, 
 that the absence of the Divine power is possi- 
 ble ; and .the second is, that the absence of 
 this power is of itself sufficient to accomplish 
 annihilation, without admitting the existence 
 of any active cause to produce it. But whe- 
 
217 
 
 ther the formei- be possible, or whether the lat- 
 ►ter b6 sufficient to the annihilation of Being, I 
 must confess I have some considerable doubts ; 
 and as this -objection seems plausible, I will 
 endeavour in these sections to examine its 
 force, and give to each part an attentive con- 
 sideration. 
 
 If God be an omnipotent and an omnipresent 
 Being, which I believe no one will deijy, it is 
 certain that no portion either of space or na- 
 ture, of titne or eternity, can exist where God 
 is not. And it is equally certain, that the ex- 
 -istence of the. Divine Being cannot he partial 
 any where, but must be perfect every where ; 
 — this proposition is necessarily included in 
 our notion of his Omnipresence. And if 
 God be an omnipresent Being, it is also cer- 
 tain tha.t every attribute essential to his exist- 
 ence, must be inseparable from his Beiiig and 
 nature. That God, from the very notion we 
 have of Omnipotence, must be possessed of 
 infinite power, cannot, I believe, be denied by 
 any who will admit of his existence ; and as 
 power is an essential attribute of Deity, it is 
 «ertain, that its diffusiveness can be limited by 
 nothing but the existence of God : it therefore, 
 :Can, neither be arbitrary, nor adventitious, since 
 both 4he nature, and attributes of God, must 
 bp denominated from their .tiecessary exist&ice. 
 The present, therefore, is not an inquiry inta 
 
218 
 
 the nature of the moral attributes of God, but 
 into the nature of that power which is essen- 
 tial to his Being, and without which, all our 
 notions of God are at once banished from' the 
 world. For could we admit it possible, that 
 God could withdraw from any given point, 
 either of space or nature, of time or eternity, that 
 power which is ah essential attribute of hiiS 
 nature, and which from his omnipotence must 
 be admitted to be infinite ; we must behold in 
 that given point, a certain vacuum where the 
 Divine power is- not ; (because an immaterial 
 substance is supposed to drop' into annihila- 
 tion through its total abSiettce ;) and conse- 
 quently, a point of duration, in which an m/?- 
 nite power is tibt infmite ; arid we must admit 
 the Being of a God, even while we subtract 
 from his Being that infinite diffusion of his 
 power, the' presence of which is absolutely ne- 
 cessary to our notions of his existence. Abtl, 
 consequently, we must admit the existence of 
 an omnipotent God, while we admit a poi^t 
 in which his Omnipotence has no existejjce. 
 To admit, therefore, the absence of the Divirie 
 pOwer to be possible, will oblige us either to 
 admit the Being of a God, abstracted from 
 that power which is essential th bis nature ; 
 or to admit an infinite power not to be infinite, 
 both of which suppositions are plain and pat 
 pable contradictions. 
 
219 
 
 If God can withdraw his power from any 
 given portion, either of space or nature, of time 
 or eternity, and yet remain infinite in his 
 power, by the same modes of reasoning we 
 must admit it possible, that he can withdraw 
 his power from other portions of space and 
 nature also. For, what has no necessary exist- 
 ence in one part, can have no necessary exist- 
 ence in any part ; and what has no necessary 
 existence in all and every part, can have no 
 kind of necessary existence whatever; and we 
 may thus proceed until we totally deny the Be- 
 ing of , a God. 
 
 If God withdraw his power from the support 
 of ^ny Being, and that Being fall into a non- 
 entity through its absence, it is.certain, that 
 this power cannot be so diffusive afterward as 
 it was before,^ because that portion of energy 
 which was necessary to support that Being in 
 existence, which has perished through its ab- 
 sence, is now done away ; and consequently we 
 lessen the extent of that power which we ad- 
 mitted to be infinite, and which must, there- 
 fore, be without limits. This conclusion will 
 conduct us to this contradiction — that infinite 
 power is limited and illimitable, at the same time. 
 
 The supposition of the absence of an omni- 
 present Being, is of itself a contradiction in 
 terms: — and an omnipotent power, which is 
 capable of beiixg withdrawn, is an absurdity 
 
220 
 
 equally gross. In both cases we must totally 
 deny the nature of necessary existence; and, 
 by adopting the supposition— that the absence 
 of the Divine power is possible, we. make the 
 most essential attributes of Deity, to be only 
 arbitrary and adventitious. Now what is only 
 arbitrary and adventitious to any Being, may 
 be totally done away, without affecting the na- 
 ture of that Being to which it is thus arbitrary 
 and adventitious ; and we may thus admit the 
 existence of God, after we have supposed his 
 power and presence not to be necessary, either 
 in space or nature, in time or eternity. But 
 as these contradictions cannot possibly be al- 
 lowed in point of argument, nor rationally ad- 
 mitted in point of fact ; it must evidently fol- 
 low — that no portion, either of space or na- 
 ture, of time or eternity, can be destitute of 
 Ciod ; and, therefore, no Being vy^hich exists 
 within the confines 6i either, can possibly pe- 
 rish throiigh that absence of power which is as ' 
 diffusive as his Being, 
 
 It iBiay, perhaps, be further asked—'* Whe- 
 '* ther that God can be infinite in his power, 
 "who has not power to withdraw his power? 
 " If he can withdraw it, must not annihilation 
 '* be admitted to be possible ? If not, can God 
 " be omnipotent?" —Questions like these are 
 specious, but I cpnceivfe they are sophistical 
 and unsound- If God have the power to with^ 
 
221 
 
 draw his power, from supporting substance in 
 existence, which is presumed in the objections 
 now before us, I would ask,' — Is God presetit 
 or absent in those vacuities from whence all 
 finite existence is suppbsed to be removed ? If 
 presents he must be there a God without, his 
 power; because the absence of the Divine 
 power is supposed to constitute that vacuity 
 on which I found the present question; and 
 if he be absent, we at once give up his Omni- 
 presence, and in either case destroy an attri- 
 bute of his nature. In the former case, we 
 make Omnipotence to exist without power; 
 and in the latter, we admit the absence of an 
 omnipresent Being. 
 
 If God can partially withdraw his own 
 power from his' own existence, which must 
 be admitted by all those who admit the objec- 
 tion, and who do not deny his Being, I would 
 further ask — Cannot God, on the same princi- 
 ple on which he can partially withdraw his 
 power, and separate it from his own existence, 
 totally withdraiw, and finally annihilate it? 
 The same reasonings, which suppose a partial 
 absence of power to be produced by the ope- 
 ration of omnipotent power will carry us to the 
 total absence of it. Fdr we may proceed on- 
 ward with the same questions, until Deity it- 
 self is no more, and until we make Omnipo- 
 tence to consist in the withdrawing; of Omni- 
 
222 
 
 potence ; and we must thus suppose omnipo- 
 tent' power to remain after it is removed, all of 
 which are palpable contradictions. 
 
 As then, from the nature and attributes of 
 God, all space and nature, all time and eterni- 
 ty, must be full of God ; and as the certainty 
 of the Divine Being must be denominated from 
 his necessary existence ; and as to suppose 
 the reverse of either is a contradiction ; it must 
 inevitably follow, that if the soul perish through 
 the absence of the divine power, it must perish 
 where the boundaries of space, of nature, of 
 time, and of eternity can never reach, and 
 consequently, where that power which we ad- 
 mit to be infinite, cannot possibly extend. But 
 as space and nature, time and eternity, bound 
 a:ll our conceptions of possible existence ;— ^a^ 
 these limits cannot possibly admit the absence 
 of the divine power; and as all possible exist- 
 ence must be confined within these limits (if 
 such be) ; I conclude, that the entire absence 
 of the divine power must be totally impossible, 
 according to all those modes of reasoning, and 
 means of knowledge, which God has placed 
 within the reach of human comprehension. 
 
 It will, perhaps, be said — " That if we ad- 
 " mit the absence of the divine power to be 
 " impossible, it will not only militate against 
 " the creative power of God, but will tend to 
 ^' prpVe all things to be eternal."— Although 
 
223 
 
 such an objection may seem plausible, I con* 
 ceive it to be entirely founded upon an errone- 
 ous idea of creation. If the non-eternity of 
 matter did imply the non-existence of the di- 
 vine power, I would not only, admit the plausi- 
 bility of such an objection, but would admit it 
 as unanswerable ;. but this, however, I coneeiff 
 is not the case. If the divine power had not 
 existed from eternity, it is certain that creation 
 could not have taken place through its efficacy. 
 That the efficient cause of creation did exist 
 from eternity, I not only admit, but think 1 
 can easily prove. But if the absence of all 
 power be admitted possible, and the nonentity 
 of Being be supposed to result from that ab- 
 sence, the efficient power must be removed. 
 And if the efficient power be supposed to be 
 entirely removed from any substance which is 
 supposed to be reduced to a nonentity through 
 its absence, I w^ould ask — Is the rC'Creation of 
 that substance during the absence of power, 
 possible to the divine power, or not ? If pos- 
 sible, the divine , power must operate where it 
 is not, because' the absence of this power is 
 that which is supposed to have produced annihi- 
 lation ; but in admitting any power to operate 
 where it is not,- we shall :be obliged to admit 
 its presence and absence at the same time. 
 Butif there-eteation of this substance b^not 
 withinthe reach of the divine power, it is cer- 
 
224 
 
 taitt that the nonentity of Being, can bear no 
 relation to the state of things antecedently tQ 
 creation. 
 
 • Our ideas of sooner and later, are all local 
 and relative, but can have no kind of relation 
 to God. Creation could not have taken place 
 sopner than it did. -God who created time, 
 must have created it in eternity; and what 
 took place prior to time, bids adieu to all our 
 local ideas of soon and late, before and after; 
 and leaves us enveloped with what has no be- 
 ginning, no middle, no limits, no end. 
 
 And although creation has not been from 
 all eternity, yet it does not follow, that there 
 ever was in God the absence of an ability to 
 display a creative power. The creative power 
 of God, is certainly only a particular mddifl^ 
 cation of active energy, which, instead of im- 
 plying the previous tthsence oi omnipotent i^ovf- 
 ev, clearly demonstrates the certainty of; its 
 being, and proves it to be inseparable from the 
 divine nature. Creative power was undoubt- 
 edly displayed in creation; but this work 
 being accomplished, that mode of active energy, 
 by which it was performed, must have been 
 withdrawn ; while permanent onanipotence must 
 have remained to support existence, and a new 
 mode of providential power must have been ^ 
 exercised, to support the various relations of 
 what had been called into existence. But even 
 
225 
 
 if this particular modification of active energy 
 were withdrawn, the presence of which is ne- 
 cessary to support the relations of all finite 
 Being, in this present state of existence, yet it 
 would not prove the absence of an omnipresent 
 Bfeing ; nor yet the total annihilation of any 
 finite intelligence. And no chajige whatever 
 that can be supposed, can affect the present 
 argument, that will not prove the annihilation 
 of Being itself. But to admit the total absence 
 of the divine power, we must admit the total 
 absence of the divine Being ; and consequently 
 destroy the necessary existence of God, who 
 can no more exist abstractedly from his power, 
 than he can exist abstractedly from his own 
 existence, of which the divine power is an essen- 
 tial attribute. 
 
 Whether the absence of that particular active 
 energy, the presence of which was necessary, 
 to piroduce creation, be of itself sufficient to 
 produce the nonentity of Being, is quite a dis- 
 tinct question. If the absence of this active 
 energy, or any particular modification of the di- 
 vine power, be sufficient to the production of 
 annihilation, while the omnipotence and omni- 
 presence of God remain entire, we must suppose 
 annihilation to take place where we admit the 
 Deity perfectly to exist, and how annihilation 
 can possibly take place within the very bOsom 
 AS %- . ■ a .'■ 
 
226 
 
 of Deity, without any action of divine powier^ 
 we shall probably never know until we can 
 reconcile contradictions. 
 
 ^r If the absence of the divjne power be suffiei-' 
 ent and necessary to the annihilation of any 
 fini'tfe Being-, it is certain that this annihife- 
 tion fnust take place where God is not; for 
 wherever the divine Being is, it is certain that 
 annihilation cannot be. For to suppose the 
 existence of a point which dfescrlbes the non- 
 entity of Beingi while we admit in, this point 
 the Deity to have a full and positive existence, 
 is to admit this point to contain a nonentity, 
 while- we admit the existence of God within 
 its confines. — This point must then confeiin an 
 entity and a nonentity at the same time. But 
 if.wc imagine that the absence of some particu^ 
 larmodifieation only, of the divine ehergy, i& 
 all that is necessairy to produce anliihilation, 
 even while the perrnanency of omnipotence 
 rjgmain«, we s'hall- then- be under the! -necessity 
 of conehiding . tl\at the souf retires out of ex- 
 istence,' and yet drops into God ; which .suppo* 
 sitiori involves a plain contradiction," since ifrris 
 itapossible that any thing can be annihilated ' 
 which is lodged- in God. ^ ■ '• And yet this contra- 
 dfctiOn ^cannot be avpidted, unless we imagine 
 the total absence of omnipotent power, frdiii 
 the point where this event takes plaee.^^'Bttt 
 this total absence of power I hg,ve already 
 
227 
 
 proved to be impossitjie, because God exists 
 necessarily, and because omnipotence and om- 
 nipresence are essential to his nature. But 
 whether the mere absence of omnipotent power, 
 if it were adiriitted possible, or the absence of 
 any particular modification of it, be suflBcient 
 to effect the annihilation of the soul, must be 
 the subjedt of the en'sning section. 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 Things not necessarily existent, notwithstanding the 
 total absence of omnipotent power is impossible. , 
 Nothing, hvt power can withdraw power. Absence 
 
 . of power can neither constitute tior cause annihi' 
 lation. Mere absence of power, in^iifficient to pro- 
 duce annihilation, because destitute of all energy 
 and being. That which is removed by no power 
 must continue for ever. Collective force of the 
 tegument. ''* 
 ■. ' " {«i 
 
 I NOW proceed to examine the remaining part 
 of that objection, which was started in the 
 precedi^ section, namely, — " that the niere'iib- 
 " sence of power, is alone sufficient to annihilate 
 *' the soul." 
 
 That all"finite Beings originated in, and ai'e 
 
 supported in existence by the will and power 
 
 of Ge^d, I fully admit; and that tfee divine 
 
 power is infinite and universal, I have endea- 
 
 , ','-'/, ,■ q2 ■■ 
 
228 
 
 voured to prove in the preceding section : But 
 that the total absence of the divine, power is 
 possible, I have contended against, and am 
 ftilly persuaded, that if this total absence be 
 admitted to be possible, it will amount to a 
 tacit denial of some of the most essential attri- 
 butes, sLnd consequently of the existence and 
 Being of God. It may perhaps, be said — 
 " that if the theory I have advanced be ad- 
 " mitted, — if the absence of the divine power 
 "be impossible, it will make all things neces- 
 "^ sarily existent." But to this I reply, that 
 the theory I have advanced, makes the annihi- 
 lation oS- the soul, if it be possible, to depetid 
 upon the power, and not the absence of the 
 power of God. The positive, certain, and un- 
 alterable existence, of Omnipotent power, and 
 the peculiar direction and modification of that 
 power, I consider as two distinct ideas ; the 
 former of which, is an essential attribute of the 
 unchangeable nature of God, the absence of 
 which cannot be admiitted, without admitting 
 a palpable contradiction; but the latter de- 
 pending entirely upon the will of an infinite- 
 ly free and powerful Being, may assume a va- ' 
 riety of directions without affecting the im^- 
 mutability of his nature. 
 
 That any particular mode of active energy 
 may be withdrawn, I readily allow, but still 
 contend that if any mode of active energy be 
 
229 ' 
 
 withdrawn, nothing but power can withdraw 
 it ; and if this active energy of the divine power 
 be withdrawn by power, and the soul sink into 
 Tfonentity through its absence, the power which 
 withdraws this active energy, must be the 
 cause of that annihilation which follows from 
 the active operation of it ; and the active ener- 
 gy which is withdrawn by the influence of the 
 withdrawing power, can be nothing more than 
 the mere instrument, through which this with- 
 drawing power acts. Mere abse7ic€, therefore, 
 cannot produce annihilation. 
 
 It is certain, that if the mere absence- of 
 power be admitted as suflBicient to the annihi- 
 lation of the soul, this absence must either con- 
 stitute annihilation in itself, «r be the cause 
 which produces it ; there being no other way 
 through which the mere absence of power can 
 be conceived as possible, For if the mere ab- 
 sence of power, neither constitutes nor causes 
 the annihilation of the soul, it can bear no re- 
 lation to that nonentity of Being, which is at- 
 tributed to the removal of power, and conse- 
 quently the soul can never perish byits absence. 
 
 It is certain, that if the mere absence of pow- 
 er constitutes the annihilation of the soul, the 
 presence of power must constitute its Being. 
 For if the presence of this power,, do not con- 
 stitute the identity of the soul, the absence of 
 wiich constitutes its annihilation, we must adr 
 
230 
 
 mitithe power (preTJously to its removal) to be 
 extraneous tojthe idesntity , of the soul ; a^d, 
 consequently, that power, which is extraneous 
 to the rea,l and personal identity of the soul, 
 can never, through its- absence, constitute the 
 annihilation of a substance, to the identity of 
 w;hich it is admitted to be extraneoi^s. I there- 
 fore think the conclusion certain — that, unless 
 the. presence of power constitutes the ideniitj 
 of the soul, the absence of power can never con- 
 stitute its annihilation. B.ut in admitting mere 
 power to constitute the identity, of ^ny sub- 
 stance, we must totally .deny, the Being of all 
 substances, and reduce all our notions of mat- 
 ter and spirit, to chimerical absurdities,; and 
 even bid adieu to pur own existence.. 
 
 If matter , and spirit do j exist, mere 'power 
 cannot constitute the identity of either ; and if 
 they do not exist, they, can neither be support- 
 e4 ijn existence by the presence, nor annihilated 
 by the absence of power; an^ all our reason- 
 ings about bpthmatter and spirit, can have no 
 kind of foundation in nature, nor existence 
 whatever. , If,, therefore, the absence of power 
 ^constijtutes the annihilation of the soul, the 
 presence of pow«r must constitute its identity. 
 But as to .admit the identity of the soul to con- 
 sist in. mere power, will prove the entire ne- 
 gation of all substances, so I think the final re- 
 sult perfectly conclusive — that the mere absence 
 
231 
 
 of power can never constitute the annihilatioij 
 of the soul. 
 
 As the mere absence of power, for reasons 
 already assigned, cannot constitute the annihi- 
 lation of the soul, the remaining inquiry is — 
 Whether the absence of power can occasion, or 
 be the cause of, the soul's annihilation ? 
 
 That all finite Beings were .created by God> 
 and created by a particular display of active 
 energy, which nothing but Omnipotence could 
 exert, are truths that cannot rationally be opr 
 posed. Yet I consider this display of active 
 energy^ through which creation took place, as 
 distinct from that Omnipotent Power, which 
 called this creative active energy into action. 
 But as creation was the work of God, so when 
 it was completed, there could have been no oc^ 
 ca&ion for the perpetuity of this exertion. Subr 
 stances were formed by a particular display 
 of energy, and are ultimately supported in ex- 
 istence by that Omnipotent Powef on which 
 they rest; a power which pervades, and filh, 
 and envelopes all. Under these circumstances 
 the power of selfrsubsistence .ia\^st have been 
 meorporated in their natures to enable them 
 to continue in existence^ aftier the display of 
 creative energy, had subsided ; andr nothing 
 but a new display of active energy can retrace 
 the paths of creative power. If the same disr 
 play of energy, which called things into thejj? 
 
232 
 
 iff ^ 
 
 primeval forms, were necessary to their cod.« 
 tinuance in existence, creation must have been 
 imperfect; and the same display of active- 
 energy would have continued creating, without 
 intermission, and without .augmenting creation, 
 for ever. But as this is not the case, we have 
 all the evidence which moral certainty can give 
 us, that those substances which God at first 
 created, and endued with tlie power of self-sub— 
 sistence, require nothing more to support them 
 in existence, than that power on which they 
 rest. This power must be both immutable 
 and- eternal. Its absence must be impossible. 
 On this all finite beings rely ; and in this stat^ 
 they must continue until a new display of ac- 
 tive, energy shall strike them from existence. 
 And as finite existence could not have taken 
 place by the laws of nature, so the annihilation 
 of Being, (if it be possible) must be equally 
 removed, from every mode of operation whict^ 
 these, laws discover, and can never be account- 
 ed for by creatures that are only subject to 
 their influence. 
 
 If the uniform continuance of that particular 
 energy, which at first called creation into ex- 
 istence, be necessary to support created nature 
 in existence, we shall never be able to distin- 
 guish between creation and preservation, — be- 
 tween the calling things originally into a state' 
 of positive existence, and the continuing of the 
 
233 
 
 thiilg formed in its present state of Being ; nor 
 know with precision whether any Created sub- 
 stance be complete or not. And to admit the 
 self-same display of active energy to continue 
 alike through the creation of substances, and 
 the preservation of them, will lead us to attri- 
 bute to this energy an unifprmlty of effect, 
 which is at once contradicted by the suppo- 
 sition under consideration, as well as fact. The 
 continuance, therefore, of this particular exer- 
 tion of energy to ^preserve created substances 
 in existence, cannot be necessary to' the per- 
 petuity of what God has created, unless we 
 admit creation to be imperfect ; and to admit 
 the imperfection of creation, is to admit creation, 
 and to deny it, at the, same time. — The con- 
 tinuance of a creative energy that creates no- 
 thing, is a contradiction in terms. As, then, a 
 creative energy can no longer exist than while 
 -it is creating, and as the power which supports 
 creation is Omnipotent, and therefore an essen- 
 tial attribute of God ; as the former, with cre- 
 ated substances can have no present existence, 
 and as the absence of the latter is impossible, 
 — the mere absence of power can ne\er pro- 
 duce, nor be the cause of the annihilation of the 
 soul. , 
 
 If the mere absence of power be the cause, 
 of the soul's annihilation, the soul's annihilation 
 must be the effect of a nonentity ; for the ab- 
 
234 
 
 sence of power must be a nonentity } and to 
 make an effect to result from what must be a 
 nonentity, and which, therefore, can have no 
 power to produce it, is to attribute to the ab' 
 sence of power, an energy that nothing but 
 power can possess ; which is supposing power 
 to be present, while nothing but the absence 
 of power is admitted to exist. And by admit- 
 ting the mere absence of power to be the cause 
 of annihilation,, we must attribute an active 
 energy to that nonentity of power, which we 
 admit to be destitute of it, which is a contra- 
 diction. 
 
 That the absence of power must be destitute 
 of all energy,' will admit of no denial ; and, 
 therefore, the innate powfers of consciousness 
 and will, which are essential properties of the 
 soul, can never perish through an- energy of 
 which the absence of power must be totally 
 destitute. And as nothing but energy can 
 quench the natural powers of the soul, which 
 energy the absence of power cannot possess, 
 the powers of the soul can never through this 
 cause be deprived of existence. I therefore 
 conclude, that, whether we suppose the mere 
 absence of power to be devoid of energy, or pos- 
 sessed of it; as the former will'pi-event it from 
 quenching the innate powers of the soul, and as 
 the latter implies a contradiction, the mere ab- 
 
235 
 
 sence of power can, in neither case, be the causfi 
 of the annihilation of the saul. 
 
 If power support the soul in existence, and 
 the absence of this power produce its nonenti- 
 ty, this absence of power must be produced 
 by power, or it miist not. If this absence of 
 power be produced by power, power must be the 
 active cause of the nonentity of the soul; which 
 ^activity will at once demonstrate the insuffici- 
 ency of the absence of power to annihilate the 
 soul ; but if this absence of power be not oc- 
 xasioned by power, we must suppose the pow- 
 er that supports the soul in existence, tO' l^e 
 removed by no power; and that which is re- 
 moved by no power, must continue for ever. 
 In supposing the absence of power to remove 
 power, we must make it to contribute towards 
 its own existence, and to act before it had a 
 Being. And we must attribute to it an activity 
 and energy, of which, from its very name and 
 nature, it must necessarily be destitute, which 
 is a palpable .contradiction. In admitting the 
 power that supports the . soul in existence, to 
 be removed by power, we call into existence 
 an active cause, and discard the absence of 
 power from being the cause of annihilation ; 
 and in admitting the power that supports the 
 soul in existence, to be removed by «o power, 
 the soul, which is supported thereby, must 
 continue for ever ; for that which is removed 
 
236 
 
 by no power, must thus continue; and that 
 which continues for ever, instead of being re- 
 duced to a nonentity, must be immortal. I 
 therefore think this conclusion certain also— 
 that the mere absence of power can neithiei;' 
 constitnlej nor be the Cawse of the soul's annihi- 
 lation. 
 
 That all finite substances were created by 
 power, will not, I believe, be denied by any ; 
 and if the mere absence of power, can counter- 
 act and annihilate what nothing but power 
 could create; the absence of power must be 
 equal in its efficacy to po~wer itself. For if 
 the mere absence of power can counteract the 
 efficacy 6f power, we must attribute to the 
 absence of power, an -energy which nothing 
 but power can possess ; but in supposing the 
 absence of power to be possessed of power, we 
 must suppose power to be, where, from the 
 nature of the supposition, and from the import 
 of the term itself, power -cannot be, which is a 
 contradiction, and therefore cannot be ad- 
 mitted. 
 
 However the soul m^-y be supported in exr 
 istence by any, power, it is certain, from its 
 actual existence, that it must have a distinct 
 identity in itself, independently of that power 
 which supports it in existence ; and if so, all 
 power must be extraneous to its real identi- 
 ty ; and, therefore, that power which supports 
 
237 
 
 the soul in existende, and is extraneous to the 
 identity of the soul, can never, either through 
 its mere presence or a,bsence, change the na- 
 ture of that substance, to the identity of which 
 it is extraneous. For if we admit the distinct 
 identity of the soul, and suppose it to be sup-, 
 ported in existence, by a power which is dis- 
 tinct frorii that-ideptity ; it is among the grosi 
 sest of absurdities, to suppose that ^Ae absence- 
 of this power can affect the Being of the soul, 
 to whose identity the presence of power was 
 extraneous.- If ihe presence of power was ex- 
 traneous, the absence of power must be equal- 
 ly so ; and, therefore, the soul can never perish 
 through the absence of power, which must not 
 only be remote from the identity of the soul, 
 1jut totally destitute of alt energy and action, 
 and consequently devoid of all influence. If 
 the mere absence of power be supposed to oc- 
 casion the annihilation of the soul, I would 
 ask — 'Does this absence of power possess power, 
 or not ? If it possess power, we must ad- 
 mit a contradiction ; and if it do not possess 
 power, that substance which positively exists^ 
 irideperidently of it, can never perish by it; 
 and, therefore, the mere absence of power must 
 be insufficient to produce annihilation. ^"' 
 
 That the power, occasiohirig the absence of 
 that sustaining energy which supports the soiul 
 in existence, must be different frow that sus- 
 
238 
 
 1 
 
 taming energy itself, is, I think, demonstiCable 
 from this consideration, — that the sustaining 
 energy, which supports the soul in existence, 
 must be necessary to its Being ; whik the 
 power which reoals this sustaining energy, is 
 that which deprives it of existence. Gan the 
 »aitoe display of sustaining energy, which sup- 
 ports the soul in existence, be the same which 
 occasions that absence of power that deprives 
 it of Being ? If so, it must procure the absenee 
 of itself ; — it must be a power that supports 
 the soul in existence, and a power that deprives 
 it of Being, at the same timer. If the same 
 jfower that supports the soul- in existencej eail 
 withdraw itself, and if through the absence of 
 this power, the soul sinks into a nonentity, the 
 nature of this power must first be changed, in 
 pfder to produce' these opposite :«ifects ; and 
 if the nature of a supporting power be changed, 
 before it cfein- absent itself from the soul; it is 
 not the same modification of povter, b«t ano- 
 ther ; which is not the subject under present 
 consideration. In admitting ^supporting pow- 
 er to withdraw dtself from that substance 
 whick is supposed to be supported by it, we 
 must admit ':it to 'be a supporting power, and' 
 not ia supporting power, at the same time ; — 
 and a supporting power that does-not support, 
 is a plain ^ contradiction . . In admitting a sup- 
 porting power to withdraw itself we must ad- 
 
239 
 
 mit its previous nature to be done away ; and 
 the power which was previously supporting, 
 must now become destmcthe. But this affords 
 us a distinct modification of power, and by ad- 
 mitting a distinct modification of power, ^ we 
 admit the necessity 'of an active cause to pro- 
 duce annihilation ; and, therefore, thesoul can 
 never perish, either by the presence, or ab- 
 iSence, of that immutable power which supports 
 the soul in existence. That immutable power 
 which supports the soul in existence, must be 
 a stipportmg one, and, therefore, cannot deprive 
 the soul of Being, nor absent itself from the 
 soul while it retains its nature. The presence 
 of this power which supports the soul cannot 
 be dispensed with,^ because it is essential to 
 the existence of Him who is every where pre- 
 sent, and who fills all in all. And even ad- 
 mitting that it could, its absence could do no- 
 thing ; for the mere absence of power is a non- 
 entity ; and a nonentity can never act nor pro- 
 duce any effects, or consequences. Whatever, 
 therefore/ deprives the soul of being, csiimot 
 be a negation, but must be an active power, 
 and, in its nature, it cannot be supporting, but 
 destructive. 
 
 Thus, then, from these arguments, I think 
 the final result decisive,-^ that the total absence 
 of the Divine Power is absolutely impossible, 
 — and that this Omnipotent Power alone, can 
 
240 
 
 support the soul in existence :— That if th* ab- 
 sence of the Divine Power were possible, while 
 that power retained its name and nature, still 
 the mere absence of power, must be alike in- 
 sufficient, either to constitute annihilation, or 
 io produce it. And if the mere absence of 
 power, can neither co«y/^/M^e annihilation, nor 
 be the occasion of it, an active cause must be 
 admitted. And if the admission of an active 
 cause, must imply progression in the activity 
 of its operations ; and progression cannot ap- 
 ply to those actions through which an imma- 
 terial substance can alone be capable of perish- 
 ing, because such substances must be desti- 
 tute of all dimensions, and without interior, or 
 surface; it must follow, that neither the ab- 
 sence nor presence of power, can possibly 
 annihilate the soul, through any way, or mode^ 
 or manner, which God has placed within the 
 circle of human comprehension. And that 
 which cannot be annihilated, either by the 
 presence or absence of power, must, according 
 to our views, necessarily be immortal. 
 
241 
 
 SEtDTION IX. 
 
 Ail Effects must have some natural agreement with 
 ■their Cflnses. Mediums through wh,iph caifses act, 
 serve as subordinate causes, or connective links. 
 Being, 6dn hixve no agreement tbtth' N^o-Being ; no 
 mkidiums cah connect them. Amiihiltititin cctniick 
 be ^ffkcfed by fany yBeing^ All midiuwis, whether 
 .matt'fittl or immaf^ali' must fxist ; and, ther^prei 
 jgmstbe cfs" Jar distant Jrpm non-existence, as thc~ 
 causes which operate through them. This ^istc^nce 
 has no relation to space. The soul may exist in 
 space, without having any relation to it. 
 
 \\i ■'*^* '' ■''' ' ' '"' ''■ • '' " 
 
 Vy jiEN we, take a survey, of t^t influence, 
 
 wbich all causes .^spljay, iriihe, production of 
 
 theii" own eflfects, we panpot avoid concluding, 
 
 that, some agreement in nature m,ust inevitably 
 
 SjiibsiiSjt jbei;w,ejen them. ,,^henever ^n action 
 
 t3,lc^s place, it is certaip; that there must bje 
 
 something which performed it : — For to sup- 
 
 pqs|^.^an|i^C^'on without an actw, is a plain con- 
 
 tr^dip^i^. And jit is equally certain, that all 
 
 capses, in qrder tp, produce effects, must either 
 
 apt through tl;e instrumentality pf mediums, or 
 
 produce effects purely from themselves. . An4 
 
 whateipei: ^thesq mediums are, through which 
 
 any eiv,en cause is ^ppps^d to. operate, tp th^ 
 
 productiop of itS; own effect ; still these me^ 
 
242 
 
 diums through which it operates, must act a» 
 links in the chain of causes and effects, to 
 bring the distant cause and remote effect into 
 contact with one another. 
 
 As the exchange of 'Being, iox No^ Being, is 
 of itself a positive aetiott, some cause to pro- 
 duce this change, must necessarily be admit-^ 
 ted. And whether the cause which produces 
 it, act throttgh a medium, of without it, th0 
 datise and the eflfect, must be brought into con- 
 tact with one another^ 
 
 Whatever these mediums are, through which 
 the cause is supposed to operate, in order to 
 produce annihilation, it is certain^ that they 
 must have a Beift^ ; fomo cause can make that 
 to be £1 medium of action, which has no kind 
 6f existence. But if these mediums have a 
 Being, it is then certain, that they must, in 
 point of real existence, be equally removed 
 from annihilation with that cause which is sup*- 
 posed to operate upon them, or to act through 
 their instrumentality. For as both caus^ 
 and medium, frona the actidAs whidi we 
 attribtite to^hem, must be admittied to ex- 
 ist ; and as annihilation is a perfect nonen- 
 tity, an infinite distance must for ever subsist 
 between them. And^hatt is at an infinite dis- 
 tance from annihilation, can never be brought 
 into contact, or union, with it. 
 
 However much, distinct parcels of mattw 
 
243 
 
 maybe separated frona one another, by th^ pe- 
 CT^im quantities, or qualities, of wfeich they 
 are cooaposjed, stiU absolute nonentitif must he 
 ikH an equal distance, both from an fitoni and a 
 W&rldi i An iatoni; fcaii be no nearer to a nomtt- 
 Ufy, itt p&iUjt of real Being, than the whale 
 ma^s of universal nature; and, therefore, neir 
 th^t" an atom nOr a world, can ever be made inp 
 strUnjental;tOithe,productioin of that which is 
 at an iflfinite distance from both. ;. 
 
 Ifj from mediums which; are material, we 
 twn to. those that are ppiritu^ and incorpor 
 real>: the: same. modes of reasoning will hold 
 equally good. A spiritual nature, , whal^ir^ 
 ifg-.^s^enceinay be, jlf it be actqd;:upon, must 
 n0o^^sarily haye a Being ; fpr one which -hs^f 
 no Being, can ijever.bo, madp the vfshfcLe of acr 
 tioi|::it, therofpTCy must be at an equ£|.l dis- 
 ^ai^pe from a iionentity, with t^gt Being, which 
 is supposed to aqt upon, or through jit, I grant, 
 that la .spiritual substance, which is the nadiym 
 anderi consiii^rajt^oii^ , may bp. supposed to be 
 perfectly passive ; ]l?ut passiven^ss implies ex- 
 istence, as. muqh as activity^ For thp differ- 
 ence biPtween material an4 spiritijal Beings, — 
 betwveen, an active cause, and tb^ mediums 
 tJbrQfigh wjkich i% ajcts, lies in the naiwre and 
 mmfjer of existence, but not in thf certainty pf 
 exist^o? itself. , 
 
 R 3 
 
244 
 
 tj Whatever hks any existence, must be 'at an 
 inMitfe distance frdin that v^hich has none; 
 and, therefoi-e can neter form any eonnJexion 
 with it\ ' And" where- ho conn^ion . can - be 
 formed betweien cause and effefct^ eitJi^r tbirdi^h 
 the instrumentality of any medium, or ab- 
 «traetedly from it, there no effect can -be pro- 
 duced. If, then, annihilation be produced, at 
 must be produced by something;' and that 
 which producey it, mttst form '^sOme kind- of 
 cdntfexioh with it: iiiit as the dist^rice ' he- 
 tti^eeri Being, tind No-Seirig,' is, aiid' must be 
 infinite; and as nothihgbnt that' Which ha^ a 
 Being, dan dther act, or be atcted ■ tipon, it ne* 
 be^sarily follows,— that nO s'ttch cfOWhe'Siion cart 
 be formed, and, conseiquently, ho such effect 
 can be producfed.'" Annihilation, therefore, 
 cg,ttndt'* be feffected by any Being ; and that 
 which cjihnot be effected by any Being, tnust 
 remain unaccomplished for ' ever. ' And-the 
 evident result of all, fherefOr^j is-^that the 
 human soul must necessiirily be immortal. '-*''' 
 
 \Vhatevfer annihilates the sOWl,^tfiiislfdJ)ei'ate 
 upOrl it; and what opierateS tl^to; mttst be 
 brought into contact vvith it;' jiud what is 
 brought into contact with the %b^l> eart'no'lon^ 
 gfef preserve its physical distkhde' fi"Ottl*^it: 
 These f>roppsitionS d,rfe self-etlddit, ' jtnd' it is a 
 contradiction to suppose the reverse of either; 
 If, theti, that which lanhihilates the soul, must 
 
245 ; 
 
 be brojaghHiKt©* contact with it; if the«oitl be 
 pmk, absliracted life: and if life and; no life, 
 belong to those extremes by which God >has 
 divided things ; the soul cannot be laooessible 
 to its own reverse, alid consequently must be 
 immortal. ■«" ^? Hi'..- <•- .i^'t lo-y' Jj-pjrtfii 
 
 I 'i Either the distance which divides life from 
 ho life/' mtist continue for ever,; or ilimus^be 
 Wemdived :— If. it be rembved; the very idea of 
 no life is annihilated by that removal ; if it con- 
 tinue, the soul can never perish ; and in either 
 case it must be immortal.""' > d 'iov/*'.'' Z*^ 
 ' Let it not be imagined, that* the distaiijee of 
 which I here speak, has any relation :to space; 
 the idea .of space is forei^ to the question. 
 IiifTekiititm'to space,: this (iistance ' is 9 -mere 
 B<in{entity : it can neither have a positive nor 
 relative existence here;' airid can only.iielate to 
 those physical contrarieties which can never ap- 
 ^proxiikiate tbwards reach other; q If this ^^ 
 tance.ilay in any relation' it boi« to space,' it 
 would, be; hard to say, how faf it'might be dis- 
 pensed' with.' The p/xjg'ress of time may be 
 productive of events that may baffle -Icalcula'' 
 trorij and overcome distancesjwhich.to us are 
 inconceivable; but where the distance is;:plar 
 <ded in the physical nature of extremes, as in the 
 case before us; and ifhei^e the'k-emovailofit 
 imj>lies thefgrossestof coniradictipns*, the hu? 
 ^an uiide|Tstiandin^' re^joils at the>idea of aijnj^ 
 
246 
 
 hildtion, atd the immoritality of the st)i4 prgissje!^ 
 itsfelf.rujiQn uS" with anevM^nde that is. iri?e- 
 sistible/ The Mind, while floating in an ocesua 
 of uncertainties, may languish under the 
 doilbits of scepticism aad epror ; and we tnay 
 hazard conjectures, which will terminate; in a 
 doubtM issue ; but to abstract ourselTeiS fEom 
 ffidr^jireallBeiQgj to examine subjects which it 
 is oub; highest interest to knoW,jis a' rational 
 method' to ensure certainty, as the rficompience 
 of exertion. ■' ; ■',»i'r,)i.| ■ '"vki, n''fi*„iM(,y. '■■'ii ,9t7'{f)-» 
 Whatever has any,' v^laimji to space,, must 
 occupy it; and what occupies it, must be ex- 
 tended ; and what is extended, must be form- 
 ed of pa^ts ; and what is formed of parts, imnst 
 be capable of dissolution ; and what is' capa- 
 ble of dissolution, cannot (in that state) be phy- 
 sically immortal. There is, theueforepno other 
 alternative left, -^either the soul must liave a 
 relation to spac©,. and be material j; or it must 
 be imnjat^rial, And have iio such relation, ^mid'i 
 -•- ' It has Ibeen already proved,! that faiattlerj un- 
 d^r every form it is capable' of. asisuniin^, is 
 uiiable to think ; and that the supposition im- 
 plies ; a palpable contradiction. . And if we 
 fiuppfi^e; tkdi ia. thinking quality can be added 
 t« any material substance, this substance,! to 
 liyfeich this thinking quality is added,' mitst 
 haVehad a previous exiisteiMse; and, froeijthat 
 puevidus existence, this thinking quality can 
 
247 
 
 have no physieal relation to it, uotwitiistanding 
 it^ being added. < 
 
 It wiJl, perhaps, be asJted/How can any 
 thing e;scist in space, without having some rela» 
 tion to it? Or, how ^an any thing, having no 
 siich relation, exist in it ? I might also ask. If 
 anmiion be performed within the Ijimits of pure 
 distance, — can that actioh thus exist, without 
 paving some relation to that distance, within the 
 limits of which it is performed ? If it can, the 
 sohition will apply to the former case y if not, 
 we must admit a relation, without being able 
 to trace it, and without having any knowledge 
 of such relation, or we must totally deny the 
 existence of all action. The former i« a plain 
 contradiction, because it supposes the knowr 
 hdge of a relation, without any such Ifriow- 
 itdge ; and the latter contradicts common 
 sens6. 
 
 As all actions must be performed within the 
 limits of pure distance, without having any re- 
 lation to it; so volition, And that substance 
 which is similar thereto in nature, and from 
 whence it proceeds, must exist in space also ; 
 while the ideas themselves pan have no kind 
 of relation to one another. To ask. Whether 
 virtue or vice be square ox oblavg ? Whether 
 the abstract idea of f«?, be more ponderous 
 than that of blue ? Or, whether the primttry or 
 sensible qualities of substances, be more obtuse 
 
248 
 
 thatitthose conceptiofts which we have of thfem ? 
 — are questions which demon str Ate their"6wh 
 absurdity. And it is certainj to all who exa- 
 mine with minuteness and attention, that* the 
 soul ifaelfj although existing in space, can have 
 no more relation to it, ;than'' those questions 
 caUj have -with the decisions' expected from 
 them. To decide whether, a conception' 0^ the 
 mind, includes within' it more ' substantiality 
 than is included in an inference fxoai that con- 
 ception, is at once frivbJous andiabsurd. 'I^lhe 
 mind can easily have a perception of difference 
 between these two ideas, without being able 
 tp, associate the idea of tangibility with eithter 
 ,of them. ; t.> -ym i- 
 
 , How any thing can exist an space, without 
 haying, any relation to it, is a question which, 
 pesrhaps, we shp^ll never know, h To i^olye/ tfeis 
 question, it is necessary that we have someide'- 
 termiriaite idea of space : but this jis absolutely 
 impossible. For if space he an infinite i^nd 
 immoveable expansion, which must be admit- 
 ted, a I perfect, idea of it mtist necessarily be 
 ;plabed beyond the limits of j&nite comprehen- 
 sion. An expansion, which'ean be grasped 'by 
 •any), finite intelligence, cannot' be infinit(i ; 
 while em expansion which is infinite, can be 
 grasped only by an infinite comprehension. 
 Andy therefore, from the finitude; of'our n^- 
 
249 - 
 
 fui*^; 'We tkti form but vei-y jyartial kM inade- 
 quate liotioTis of its nature. 
 
 If space be infinite* in expansion, whatev^t 
 has any existence, either possible or real — either 
 positive or relative, must exist within it ; but it 
 does not from thence follow, that every real olr 
 relatire existence mtist have a relation to space, 
 The mind can form ten thousand abstractions, 
 which can have no more relation to space than 
 they can to duration : yet it is certain', that 
 every abstraction of the mind must be made 
 #ithin the confines of both ; while it is equally 
 certain, that they can have 60 relation to either. 
 If man were able to comprehend infinite ex- 
 pansion, ''he would be no longer man;— ^and;^ 
 thei"ef6re, while the identity of man is pi*eserv- 
 ed in* the 'vast chain of Being, whatever is' in- 
 finite,' must necessarily elnde our comprehen- 
 sion, by the finitude of our nalriires. An ejt- 
 paiision which is, and must be, infinite, must 
 necessarily include- »witb in its confines, all reM 
 •and possible Being; were not this the case, 
 'we must sUppoSei'an existence without Spade, 
 or a portion of space where space is not ; either 
 of which suppositions is a contradiction. 
 
 It is not because space 'is neces^fy to our 
 fofmatiori of the' idea of \B'e/«^l but ironi its 
 infinite diffusion, that we .are certain, that all 
 existence must be included in it; for all Being 
 must exist, either in real c^ tnentalracMMm. 
 
250 
 
 The ijdea of Being, do0s not include within it 
 the idea of space, as necessary to the formation 
 of that idea ; but when the idea of any possible 
 Being is formed, the necessity of space arises, 
 from the utter impossibility of any^ thing ex- 
 isting in a state of perfect abstraction from^ it. 
 
 (Every conception of the mind^, as well as the 
 mind itself, must exist in space ; not that sp^Ce 
 is necessary to the conception or Being of 
 eitiher, but because infinite expansion encircles 
 and envelopes all : and therefore, to conceive 
 -^that to exist in, and to occupy space, are 
 terms of the same import, seems to be a gross 
 Inistake. Use may have rendered an associ' 
 iation of the two ideas so familiar, that we may 
 have blended and incorporated lliem together; 
 but if their natures are found to be distinct, no 
 locality of thought can in the least affect the 
 identity of either. 
 
 Whatever occupies space, must undoubted- 
 ly exist in it ; but it does not follow, that what- 
 ever exists in space, must therefore occupy it. 
 To the former class belong all material Beings ; 
 and to the latter, all immaterial substances, 
 and those mental abstractions- which fesi^lt 
 frpra the peculiar directions of their natures. 
 
 No two portions of matter, can occupy the 
 same portion of space in the same instant ; it 
 is a contradiction to suppose it ; but volition 
 can never, hy pre-occupying, preclude the en- 
 
251 
 
 trance of matter from any given portion of 
 space whatever. The mind can wander, with 
 equal facility, through a perfect vacuum, or a 
 rock of adamant, and feel no obstruction from 
 either. It tnust, therefore, be evident, that 
 there is a peculiar difference, between the ex- 
 isting in, and occupyiing of space. 
 
 If the soul of man be a substance distinct 
 froln, and independent of, all material Being, 
 it must necessarily he immaterial; and may, 
 on that account, exist in space, without occu- 
 pying it. The component parts of bo(?y must 
 still remain under every form which matter 
 may assume ; but simple modification can never 
 aifect identity; If matter, as matter, be capa- 
 ble of blinking, it must be capable in all its 
 forms ; if not, form can never communicate to 
 it, a quality which is foreign to its nature. 
 Form, is but a configuration of parts; and it 
 is a contradiction to suppose, that mere ar- 
 rangement can communicate to that of which 
 it is an arrangement, a qua;lity which is pos- 
 sessed by neither. ■ 
 
2S-2 
 
 CH^i^PTER It.' 
 
 , ;i'WAa; nothing, bdT" anniiIilation can. destroy; 
 
 T^B SODL, AND THAT ANiN^piI-ATIpN CjiNNQt, ; j { [ . 
 ,^i. .APPiY TO ANtY. SIMPLE. SUBSTANCE.. ,,; .,■..,;(: 
 
 ■ ''SECTION I; • /^v--: •■••'■ 
 
 A substance which , thinks, must be indivisibles The 
 soul incapable of becoming corruptible in itself, 
 inaccessible to corruption from any thing confami- 
 ngLting, either interiiai orexierndl.'No stamen of 
 cdrmption can be included in' its nature, or cdk in- 
 -eatporate with its identity, ; : ii ;'i i 
 
 Whether the* Oipeat : God can communicate 
 to m.?ttter, a quality off thinkings ; is a qttestion 
 wh,ich;h^s,,b!een already ;examiped,i;itt the. for- 
 mer part pf this work..; But the very ddea of 
 such a Qommunication, necessarily iimplies 
 the previous , exi^tj^nce of matter ; and demon- 
 strates that thinking can never he connaiewiih. 
 that substance, which must: have existed :pre- 
 viousty to, and which stands in need of, such 
 a communicable quality. The very supposi- 
 tion that God can, in the infinitude of his pow- 
 er and tvisdom, communicate to matter a quali- 
 ty of thinking, is a decisive proof that matter, 
 as such, does not, and in its own nature, can- 
 not think. If, then, matter be incapable of 
 thinking, under every modification, and man 
 
253 
 
 b© capable of abstraction and reflection, in all,, 
 their fotms; it must follow,'— that there isi in 
 tj^Hn,' a certain subfetance fdistifiiot from,«« and 
 ii$iie|fMideni of, all, Material nature; and that 
 which is distinct from, and independent Of mat- ' 
 teri^musit necessarily be imjmateriaL - i)uh..') 
 '" If th^ there be in man snch an immateHal 
 substance, it iaust be indivisible in its nature, 
 aild destitUtie of parts ; jfof if it be not indivisi- 
 ble^, it is not an individual substahce, but an 
 assiemblage of distiiict individuals of thetsaiAe 
 species. An immaterial' substance ican be but 
 ^ne-snbktande ionly : the admission i of others 
 annihilates the very idea which was .suippiosed, 
 -and I obligies < the mind 1 to -have recourse to a 
 series of sxibtmctionsi, till itanriviesaitja siiaple 
 
 Uait.>'» '■»■■«'. '■■: .••■((!';)/■■*>'■-(>} I'lU'l !-'Mli it-- 
 
 -Mjj^an union of these substances be necessary 
 to fcffm a' cogitative Bieiiig, fthen it is ievident, 
 that neither of Miese individuals; in. this union, 
 is of itself capable of cogitation ; and if neither 
 be capable, then, either may be taken away. 
 But if' either be ' taken away,' them cogitation, 
 ■which' depended '.upon an union of the s^holej 
 aa^»t be* 'destroyed. And 'to make cogitation 
 to ■ 'd^p^^d for its existence, upbn ahs union of 
 individxial substancies of the same specaesj nei- 
 ther of which^ in itself,; pdssOssie&.oogitation-; 
 •irhen the removal of one' -which is'uneogitaMee, 
 anhihila};e8ih6 ndtuiPeof oo^zto^i£m,'-^is tojnake 
 
254 
 
 an union of these substances necessary to cogi' 
 tation, and not necessary at the same time. It 
 liierefore must follow, that cogitation can only 
 result from one identical, individualy uncom- 
 {^ounjdedj, immaterial substance; which minst 
 exclude the ideds of divisibility and separatioji. 
 If a Being, thus constiluted,. be capable of 
 corruptibility, F this corruptibility must pro- 
 ceed, either front 'itself, or something exterior. 
 From itself it canm^t possibly be, because it iB 
 absurd to suJ>po'sie that any simple substance, 
 which actually exists, ,; can possess the power 
 of altering the permanency of its nature.* i If 
 that innate power, which denominates the soul's 
 certainty of existerice, be capable of corrupting 
 it, that power roust act jn opposition to itself. 
 — It must tend to corruption, and yet remain 
 incorruptible at ! the same time ; a simple es- 
 sence therefor*^ which thus exist*,, musrtjiieces- 
 sarily, from the 'nature of its existence, include 
 within it the idea of incorruptibility., rA simple 
 essence, which tends td its own cor-ruptiori, 
 implies within that essence an hostility of pow- 
 er, which is utterly inconsistent with thfe simqi- 
 plicity of its nature; for it has beien already 
 proved, that the soul is a simple essence; a§d, 
 therefore, this hostility of power nlust neces- 
 sarily be excluded ; and fiom this exclusion it 
 follows, that corruption cannot be froin itself, 
 A' Being which is simjxle and imdompdiiiided 
 
255 
 
 in its nature, must necessarily retain that nature 
 which denominates its identity while its exis- 
 tence continues ; unless this be admitted, it is 
 not the same Being, but another; and What 
 retaius through its simplicity, the denomination 
 of its own idSentity, must necesga,rily exclude, 
 through that simplicity of nature, every inter- 
 nal propensity and tehdency, to corruptioi^ or 
 decay. ^ ' 
 
 To imagine a Being to exist, which is simple 
 and uncompounded in its own nature, with an 
 internal propensity to decay, includes the gros- 
 sest of contraidictions. Its very existence de- 
 monstrates that it is in Bdng; and the sim- 
 plicity of that existence, excludes from it, the 
 possibility of a contrary tendency, in oppo- 
 sition to the supposition in the case given. 
 
 A simple Being, therefore, which is in. exist- 
 ence, which is supposed to have an internal 
 tendency to decay, includes in it this contra- 
 diction ; — it supposes the Being to be simple 
 and unoompouiided in its naiure, while' that 
 very tendency which it is supposed to possess, 
 places itself in direct opposition to that sim- 
 plicity: — a Being thus constituted must be 
 S&k^h, anA yet not siiiiiple, at the same time. 
 
 ' A tendency to corruption in any sflbstatice, 
 sUjiposes in that sitbstanee somethitag capable 
 of corruption ; but this gives to us an idea of 
 parts, which destroys the idiea of unity, and is 
 
'256 
 
 jncdmpatible with the uncoDapoundeid j^ure^of 
 the soul. But if i the ideia of parts,, Ixe i^ec0s- 
 sary to the capaibility of (jorruption, fg.nd, the, 
 soulf be a siuiple essence, and therefore with- 
 outpar^s,; it necessarily follows — that itjoaust, 
 be destitute of all tendeppy, tq ,tli^t corruption 
 which is hostile . to, itp identity, and which must 
 theuefore be incompatible ^ith its nature, ^nd, 
 that which excludes throilgh the simplicity 91^ 
 its nature, all tendency to corruption, must 
 necessarily be hnniortal. . .; ;,;.)., 
 
 As corruption cannot proceed either irgifx^ 
 the internal nature, or from the.tendeucy of 
 the SQul, so neither can it be occasioned, by 
 any thing exterior to it. It has been alre:ady, 
 proved, in a foi^mer sectio;n, that the' human, 
 soul is one of those extremes, which is fix;ed 
 by the Almighty, in that remote situation, 
 which must for ever secure it froni what is 
 opposite to its nature. But waiving the energy 
 of this argument, I will now suppose it poss^ 
 ble, that the soul can be approached by what.ia 
 the reverse ©f its nature, ^nd that it may wait 
 the arrival of its own antipodes. , ; In ,.this ca^0, 
 whatever can corrupt the soul,, must commence 
 the attacjs. ; and this must either be by vio- 
 lence, or by . compaunicating a contaminating 
 quality. Wha;t the abstract nature of, corrup- 
 tion is, it is, perhaps, . not easy to ascert^^,^ 
 but be it what it may,, it is certain, that jt mus^ 
 
257 
 
 include one of these two ideas— either the dis- 
 junction of cohesive particles, by violence, or 
 the subdual of the soul by mere cotitaminatiQn. 
 
 A substance, like the soul, can have no 
 parts ^ and what has no parts, must ever be 
 impervious, in its own nature, to all violence, 
 and invulnerable against all assaults. What- 
 ever has no parts, can never lose them ; and 
 ■what has nothing which it can possibly lose, 
 must remain unchangeably the same; and 
 what remains the same, must necessarily be 
 immortal. And if the soul have nothing which 
 it can possibly lose of itself, because it has no 
 piarts, and therefore, is physically iheapable of 
 separation, it must follow also, that not one of 
 those radical powers which it possesses can 
 expire, because they derive their existence from 
 the stability of their primary principle. And 
 as there is no part to which violence can pos- 
 sibly have access, there is no property which 
 is capable of subduction ; and therefore, the 
 soul, with all th^ appendages of its affections, 
 must be forever inaccessible to violence ov 
 decay. 
 
 Neither can the soul perish through contatti^ 
 nation. Contamination, when applied to sub^ 
 stance, is but a relative term ; and a mere re- 
 lation can never affect the identity of positive 
 existence ; the soul, therefore, cannot be cor- 
 
 s 
 
258 
 
 f njrted by any thmgtrhich is but a mere relation. 
 Btit if c^jntamihation be considered as the ef^ 
 fect'ofextfernal application, tbe fbrniet argu- 
 ments will still apply ; and, notwithstanding 
 its tppTbaches to the soul, ihe sonl^ must ever 
 be inkcc^sible to its influence; because no- 
 thing which is fof feigA to its nature can ever 
 |)ollute its essence; and that which cannot 
 pollute its essence, caii never corrupt it by gob^ 
 tamination ; arid in either case, the immortality 
 of the soul necessarily results from the incor- 
 tUptibility Of its natUre. 
 
 In adinitting corruption, to take place in a 
 Bsi&irig which is simjile in its owii nature, we 
 suppose both the ^reseriCe and absence of that 
 v«9^ Being which is corflipted. Corruptioio 
 is the reverse of inCorpuption ; and the identity 
 6f a simple Being which is not in a state 6f 
 corruption, must be changed before it can be 
 What it is not; for it is a contradiction to 
 suppose, that att incorruptible substance can 
 be c6rruptedj with&ul first losing its nature a,nd 
 essence. But thfe very essence of its ]&ature« 
 places it beyond the possibility of bec^RMn^ 
 ^hat it is not; and the immutable lines which 
 divide iientitif from dimrsity, must be for etw 
 secured by the uncontrblable l^ws of nature. 
 And therefoi-e, to suppose any simple Beilog 
 to be, what it is not suppo^d toi«, is a contrar 
 diction in terms ; and is one of those self-evi- 
 
259 
 
 dent errors which carries with it its own refu- 
 latioa. 
 
 If any given substance be supposed capable 
 of corruption, the actual existence of that sub- 
 stance, is Btecessary to the idea of its corrup- 
 tion ; for it is an absurdity to suppose any 
 Being to be corrupted, which has no existence. 
 But if the actual existence of that substance, 
 bie necessary to the idea of its corruption ; ^.n^ 
 this substance be Uncompbunded, and desti- 
 tute of parts ; the very existence •f this sufer 
 stance, without which corruption is impossible, 
 |>necludes the very possibility of that Corrup- 
 tion, by which it is supposed to perish. A 
 simple essence must .have an existence, or it 
 must^ not ; if it have, corruption must be ex- 
 cluded by the simplicity of that existence ; if 
 not, corruption is totally impossible. What- 
 ever 'has a simple Being must retain that Being 
 while it exists, and therefore cannot be cor- 
 rupted during that period ; and when it ceases 
 to exifiit, ifcis no longer a subject of corruption. 
 
 Corruption cAn never operate upon a Being 
 which has "no existence; atid the very nature 
 of corruption must be excluded by admitting 
 a Being to exist vrtiich is simple and uncom- 
 pounded. 
 
 Oooniption is, and ever must be^ the reverse 
 of inocKrriiption ; and whether stability, or in* 
 -s2 . 
 
260 
 
 stability, be the distinguishing characteristic 
 of an immaterial substance, that which is not, 
 must necessarily be excluded by that which 
 is. If stability be its characteristic, insta- 
 bility and mutation must be excluded, or we 
 must suppose the same Being to be possessed 
 of stability, and not possessed of it at the same 
 time. The same conclusion will hold equally 
 good if the case be exactly reversed ; and in 
 either case, it will equally end in a contra- 
 diction. < , 
 . To suppose any simple substance to be 
 what it is notj and what, from its nature and 
 essence it is even supposed not to be, is a po- 
 sition which will admit of no defence; and yet 
 this contradiction must be maintained, by ad- 
 mi'tting even the possibility, of the corruption^ 
 bf an immaterial substance. 
 
 Nor will it be of any avail to suppose, *' that 
 " the seeds of corruption were sown in the 
 *' soul at its primary formation ; that they 
 " have ' grown with its growth, and^ strength^ 
 *" ened with its strength ;;' and, that its final 
 *° extinction is nothing but the necessary result 
 "of things." ^ 
 
 If there be within the soul, such; a stamen 
 of corruption as the objection supposes, it is 
 certain, that this stamen must have been Icoe- 
 val with the soul's existence ; for withoutad^ 
 mitting this, the soul must have exis^ted pre- 
 
261 
 
 viotisly to this corrupting stamen; land if we 
 admit its previous existence, the, reasonings 
 advanced above, must for ever preclude it from 
 being acquired. But if We admit this stamen 
 of corruption to have been coeval with the soul^ 
 we immediately contradict the simplicity of its 
 nature, aiid take into our conception the idea 
 of a compounded Being. It has been already 
 proved, that a conscious substance must be 
 simple in its nature, and that it can only-exist 
 in unity ^ and if so, it is cOntradicJ;ory to its 
 simplicity, to admit a stamen of corruption to 
 be implanted within it ; and to ripen to ma- 
 turity through the gradations of nature. The 
 very supposition takes into the conception two 
 distinct ideas ; — first, that of a simple, uncom- 
 pounded essence ; and secondly, that of a sta- 
 men of corruption moving onward in a progres- 
 sive state. 
 
 If this stamen of corruption, as well as the 
 essential properties of the soul, be included in 
 the nature of the soul, How can the soul be 
 simple and uncompounded ? If this stamen of ' 
 corruption be included within the soul, I Would 
 again ask, — Is this stamen necessary to the 
 soul's existence or not ? If it be, it mUst be 
 inseparable from the soul, and therefore, can 
 never destroy it ; if not, it must still be foreign 
 to its Jiatwe, and therefore, can have no access 
 unto it. To suppose any thing which is ne- 
 
262 
 
 cessai*y ta any given substance, and whfeh is 
 inclxtded in the idea of that substance, to be 
 capable of destrbyiiog it, is in effect to say, that 
 it is necessary to the existence of that sub- 
 stance, and not necessary at the same time. 
 And to suppose any thing to be included with- 
 in the nature of any simple substance, which is 
 Mot necessary to the existence of that substance, 
 h a contradiction in terms. And view the 
 idea, in what form soever we may, a stamen of 
 corruption must be inadmissible in a simple 
 Substance ; and, therefore, lio sudi stamen can 
 possibly exist in the human soul. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Admitting a principle of Cnxrwgtimi it cannot ulti' 
 Viatefy destroy the Soul, The Soul cannot pexish-f 
 either from choice or necessity ; — nor from any 
 material cause i — nor from an immaterial cause ; 
 -rnorfrom the presence, or ahsence, of any natural 
 povier. It ii invariably independent, inaccessible, 
 to all violence,' arid necessarily immortal. 
 
 If, from this priority of Being, in which T have 
 been considering the objection, we turn our 
 thoilghts to its consequences and issue, and 
 from the admission of the principle, trace it to 
 'its m()st remote conclusion, the same or simi- 
 lar JtbfeUrdities will arise. In tracing this ob- 
 'jection to its^ final issue, let us suppose the 
 
soul to be wholly annihilated ; and when this 
 is the case, either this stamen of corruption 
 must survive the soul, or perish with it. If it 
 survive, we must admit corruption, while we 
 deny the existence pf that which is corrupted ; 
 if it perish with the $oul, then it is impossible 
 that it should be the occasion of the soul's exs^ 
 tinction. The effect and its cause can never 
 be coeval with one another. Neither dissolution 
 nor annihilation can ever be coeval with tha$ 
 which occasioned it. And yet tp s.uppose that 
 jt£aj^ which occasions the soul's destri^ctioii, 
 and the soul itself, to expire together, ia to 
 bl^[id tpgether both cause and effect, and to 
 destroy that priority and independency of exr 
 islence. in the cause, which alone can distin-; 
 guish it from its pwn effects ; and thus blende^ 
 te^^her^ a stamen of corruption must be sup» 
 posed to be the cause of the soUl's final ruin, 
 and yet not the cause, at the same time* On 
 the whole, it is evident from the nature and 
 essence of the soul, that it can haye no such 
 stamen of cprruption ; and if it had, we inust ' 
 iȣlude a contradiction in our ideas, if we 
 ^suppose the soul to perish by it. 
 
 To adn^it the corruption of a simple sub^ 
 stance which has no existence, is a CMitradic? 
 tion ; and to suppose corruption in one which 
 perfectly exists, and in the idea of which, cor? 
 ruption is not included), is to suppose that sub;- 
 
264 
 
 stance to be, and not to be, at the sartie titne. 
 And the final result of all, is,— that the soul 
 must be mcorruptible, and that which is incor- 
 ruptible, must necessarily be immortal. 
 
 If the soul perish, it must be from some 
 cause and this cause must be eitheir from it- 
 self, or something else; — if from itself, it must 
 arise either from choifte or nedessity. 
 
 It cannot be from choice, because this choice, 
 being nothing more than an act of the will of 
 a finite Being, can liever become a cause suffi- 
 ciently powerful to annihilate a substance which 
 nothing less than the power of God could cre- 
 ate. In addition to this, there is a physical 
 contrariety between this imaginary cause and 
 the efifect which we thus attribute to it. The 
 power of choice evidently implies a certainty, 
 of Being; and as all volition is closely con- 
 nected with its cause, it must bear an evident 
 relation to it. But annihilation being the re- 
 verse of Being, must be at an equal distance froiii 
 actual existence, and from that choice which 
 this Being displays. 
 
 Now between Being and No-Being there 
 certainly can be no relation- and, therefore, 
 though we suppose it possessed of power, the 
 former can never become the cause of the lat- 
 ter : and consequently, as choice is a relation 
 of Being, or evidently results from it, it can 
 have no more connexion with the reverse o£ 
 
266 
 
 Bdjigj than it has with the reverse of itself; 
 Hencei whefe there is a physical contrariety, 
 there can be no relation ; and where two things 
 have no relation, they can neither be the cause, 
 nor the effect, of each other. The idea, there- 
 fore, that choice is the cause of the annihilation 
 of that substance on which choice is invariably 
 dependent, involves in it this contradiction, 
 that the^ is a relation between the cause a5.d 
 the effect, and no relation at the same time. 
 
 Neither can /it be from necessity, because 
 physical necessity must be ever incompatible 
 with physical freedom. And to suppose a 
 conscious Being to act upon itself, from the 
 impulse of physical necessity, supposes an 
 anniMlation of those powers, which are essen- 
 tial to the existence of that very consciousness, 
 which is thus influenced by this physical im- 
 pulse. For neither consciousness, understand- 
 ing, nor will, is necessary to the existence of 
 physical impulse ; and if not necessary, each 
 may be c^i^P^^^^d with ; and we are left to 
 form an idea of an immaterial substance, after 
 we admit its essential properties to be des- 
 troyed. 
 
 If the soul perish through a necessity which 
 is implanted within itself, either those proper- 
 ties of the soul which are essential to its Being; 
 must be in existence when it is thus impelled, 
 or they must not. If they be in existence, we 
 
266 
 
 must admit their existence after their uses are 
 supplanted" by necessity. For as neither jutlg-, 
 ment, consciousness, nor will, can be necessary 
 to the existence of the soul, while it is impelled 
 by physical impulse; if they exist, we m^st 
 admit i\iQ judgment to exist while its decisions 
 are rendered nugatory; conscioiisness to. exist 
 while its compreliensioEft can afford no ground 
 for action ; and we must admit the existenjQe 
 of the ieill, which, while it is overruled by the 
 impulses of necessity, must be blind to the re- 
 lations of those things which it is presumed to 
 chu^e* And to admit st, judgment, the decisions 
 of which are rendered nugatory ; a conscious-. 
 wes*, "Whose comprehension can afford, no ground 
 for action ; and a will, which is blind td, those 
 objects it is presumed to chuse ; is to admit 
 a judgment which cannot decide, a conscious- 
 ness which cannot comprehend, and a- will 
 which is destitute of choice; And' to admit a 
 judgment without decision, a consciousness 
 without couiprehensiou,- and a will without 
 choice, will conduct us -to a region which in- 
 volves the mind in shadows ; but whether of 
 contradictions or absurdities,, it is hard to say. 
 But if these properties that are essential to the 
 existence of the soul, be not in existence when 
 the soul is thus impelled to destruction by 
 necessity, we shall be obliged to suppose a 
 previous annihilation of these properties^ in 
 
267 
 
 order that an action may follow whieh is alone 
 capable of producing annihilation, the absurdly 
 ty of which every intelligent reader must dis- 
 cover. In admitting the existence of these 
 properties of the soul when it is thus impelled, 
 we must suppose thfir natwres to be annihila- 
 ted while the properties themselves remain; 
 and in supposing these properties not j;o exist, 
 we myst suppose the soul to exist after those 
 properties are destroyed, which are essentially 
 necessary to its existence. The soul, there- 
 fore, candpt perish from itself, either through 
 choice or necessity. 
 
 Can the soul, then, perish through any exter- 
 nal cause ? AM e^terqal causes must be either 
 material, or immaterial, in their own natures ; 
 and if the soul perish through a material cause, 
 it must perish through a cause which has no 
 relation to it. Howsoever annihilation be pro- 
 duced, the cause from whence it proceeds must 
 communicate its influence, and that influence 
 must be brought into contact with the object 
 to»be destroSyed;^ — for where a cause can ex- 
 tend no influence, it can produce no effect. 
 But to suppose a material cause, extending it- 
 self to an immaterial nature, is to suppose an 
 extension, of which it is necessarily incapable; 
 which is a palpable contradiction. For to 
 imagine any given substance to retain its own 
 nature, and yet to extend beyond the physical 
 
268 
 
 fcouhdaries of tha. nature ; is to suppose it to 
 retain its own nature, and not retain it, at the 
 same time. The soul, therefore, cannot perish 
 through a material cause. 
 
 It now remains to be considered, whether its 
 annihilation can proceed from ah immaterial 
 cause. Whatever this immaterial cause maiy 
 be, it is certain, that it must possess intelli- 
 gence, because an immaterial power, which is 
 abstracted from all intelligence; is a notientitj/y 
 of which we can form no conception. If, then, 
 the soul perish through an immaterial, intelli- 
 gent power, or agent, this agent must operate 
 in its effects, quite contrary to its own nature ; 
 and this necessarily ends in the same contra- 
 diction, that the supposition does, of the soul 
 annihilating itself through choice. For to sup- 
 pose any intelligent agent to possess a power, 
 which, produces an effect which is contrary to 
 itself^ and while it retains a nature which is 
 contrary to the effect produced by it, is to sup- 
 pose it capable of producing such an effect, 
 and incapable of producing it at the same time. 
 
 If, therefore, the soul cannot perish frftm it- 
 self, either through choice or necessity, nor 
 from any external cause ; not material, because 
 it is contrary to its nature; not immaterial^ 
 because it is similar to its nature ; and because 
 such considerations end in palpable contra- 
 
26Sf 
 
 dictions, it necessarily follows, that the soul 
 must be immortal. 
 
 If nature, " which lives . through all life," 
 can produce annihilation,.she must act in oppo- 
 sition to herself; for the annihilation of any 
 substance, whether it be materialor immaterial, 
 cannot be produced by a mere cessation of 
 support, but it must be a positive action. A 
 mere cessation of assistance will terminate swp- 
 port ; but the negcdionoi support, does not im- 
 ply the annihilation of that substance which 
 was supported. The suspension of sup jMjrt, is 
 the negation of an action ; and to suppose a 
 mere negation, to be able to perform a positive 
 action, is a contradiction in terms. . It there- 
 fore follows^ that the' soul cannot perish by 
 nature's withdrawing her support. 
 - Natural power is not \\ie came, hut Hhe ef- 
 fect oi nature. The powers of nature could 
 not have existed antecedently to nature, it is 
 a contradiction to suppose it :— because nature 
 must then have existed antecedently to its own 
 existence. If natural power can Ojnly result 
 ivova matter . s.nd. spirit, and' without this it 
 cannot be natural power, matter and spirit 
 must both have existed antecedently to. those 
 powers which they display ; and, therefore, 
 natural poiver cannot be even coeval in its. ac- 
 Uim, with those substances on which it de^ 
 pends for its existence. And if natural power 
 
Ijould not have existed previously to, nor be 
 COJ-iexistent with, those substances on Trhiteh, it 
 depends, and of which it is the pOwer, it necies^ 
 earily follows, thiat no natural power can des-» 
 troy the soul; andj therefore?, the soul must 
 be inaccessible to annihilation^ A power which 
 is capable of acting, mnsit certainly exist, other* 
 wise it cannot act ; but to suppose a power to 
 exist,'which is capable of destroying that cause 
 on which it depends for its own existencCj, 
 leads to a contradiction. ♦ 
 
 It may, perhaps, be sqtid, that " though no 
 " power can destroy its own cause, yet, as these 
 ".powers msult from distinct substances, one 
 " may annihilate that of another." This, how- 
 ever, will he found fallacious; for how, thM»> 
 can the last substance be destroyed. ThiSj 
 on the principle of the ;©bjection itself, is abso- 
 lutely impossible. Besides, the powers which 
 are thus presumed to produce annihUsi'tioD^ 
 must ^operate in some of those manners, or 
 through some of those mediums, which have 
 been already examined, and found to be ina- 
 dequate to the purpose. And what is inade>> 
 quaie in one 'ca<s6, must be inadequate in all ; 
 audi consequently, must thus secure in im- 
 mortality, each individual of the same species. 
 
 Whatever has a perfefctly physical existence, 
 miist necessarily retain it ; and what rfetaiins it. 
 
cannot be annihilated ^ and what is not annihir 
 lated, must necessarily be immortal. 
 
 As independence is : necessary to the exist- 
 ence of a Being thus constituted, this inde- 
 pendence must be insepat^bl<e .frbm^ &nd uni- 
 formly attached to it. For to suppose a Being 
 to have a positive existehcC, which is only oc- 
 6asionally independent, is hot only to make 
 that independent which in reality is not so, 
 but is to destroy the denomination of its Being. 
 It must, therefore,, follow, that a Being, which 
 thm exists, must not only be. independent, but 
 must be invariably so. If, then, the soul be 
 invariahly independent, no suspension of sup- 
 port can expose it to violfence. And, conse- 
 quently, if while supported in existence, it 
 must be placed beyond the reach of annihila- 
 tion, through that support; and be equally 
 exenfj)t from being exposed to it through its in- 
 dependence, when that stlpport is withdrawm ; 
 it must in both cases retain its iramoTtality. 
 If, therefore, a Being, or substance, which is 
 mvariably indie^endent, can be subjected to 
 ^nsHhilatiom, the idea of its ^independence must 
 be annihilated, previoufely t6 the aninihilation 
 of its^^dh!^. Bttt to suppose a ph^jrsically 
 independent !6eing, which can lose its inde- 
 pendence without being deprived of its exist- 
 ence, is, a plain contradiction ; and, therefore, 
 the humain soul must necessarily be immortal. 
 
272 
 
 SECTION HI. 
 
 We have no conception that an immaterial substance 
 can exist, abstractedly Jrom all Life and ConciottS' 
 ness. Consciousness distinguishes an immaterial 
 substance both Jrom matter and nonentity. Such a 
 substances cannot be comprehended within the defi- 
 nition either of matter or spirit. God may create 
 substances equally remote Jrom matter and spirit. 
 The removal of Consciousness Jrom an immaterial 
 substance destroys its identity. Jdentity and exist- 
 ence inseparable. Consciousness, SfC. essential to 
 all known immaterial substances.* 
 
 M'hether it be possible, or not, for the Great 
 God to create an immaterial substance, ab^ 
 stracted from all life and cbnsciou^nessj or to 
 deprive an immaterial substance pf life and 
 consciousness, without annihilating the sub- 
 stance itself, is a point of speculation which I 
 tremble even to approach. 
 
 * I thiiik it necessary to inform the reader, that wherever 
 the term " Consciousness" occurs, from this place to the end 
 of the fourth section, I have used it to express that faculty 
 which we possess, and which I have been endeavouring to 
 prove fo be an essential property of the soul : under this parti- 
 cular consideration, the activity of that faculty is quite remote 
 from the point in hand. Whether this faculty be continually 
 active, or whether its activity be occasionally suspended> is. 
 quite a distinct question, which I have considered in a former 
 part of this Essay. All that There contend for, is,— that an 
 
273 
 
 ,It,, h3..s been, hinted ,by_ a celebrated writer, 
 to whose name, since I have been acquainted 
 withilb, I -have ever ^nneyed, th(3 profoun«iest 
 veneration, f.' t^atitris not much moi;e, remote 
 ".from, our comprehension ..to conceive; thai; 
 "God caw, I if he please,, sijpteradd to our ide:^ 
 *' of matter, a fapuUy of thinkings than, tjiat 
 " i^e ^honld . superadd 'to it mother suhslay^e 
 " with the faculty of thiaking."*, And to this 
 8^i,timen,t it has been yeplied, " that if this be 
 " jadmitted, all natural proof of the soul's, im-r 
 "..niortality must be, done away."t 
 
 I would not have presunied to tread that 
 hallOiWecf ground, which is rendered almost 
 sacred by the venerable fopt^teps of these great 
 men, were, not the subject of such i a nature, as 
 unavoidably to fall within my way. It is a 
 question which suspends the mind between 
 the demonstration of what is, — and the possjt 
 bility of what may he ; — and the qjiestiQnjpufely 
 is — " Whether God can create an immateri^il 
 '' substance, and cause, that substance to exist; 
 " iabstracted from, all, life and ponsciousnesg, 
 
 : : .--US'- 
 
 iiumat^rial silbstanc^^ with » fjacu^tj; of thinkings or consciousr 
 n^s^ canot kjs^ thip faculty, and yet retain hs icteitity and 
 n3,ttire ; but, that the instant we suppose this faculty to be 
 annihilated, that very instant it must cease to be an imma- 
 terial substance. 
 
 * Locke. t Bighap of Worcester. 
 
 T 
 
274 
 
 " or liot?" For in this the dispute finally 're- 
 solres ifself; 
 
 It is agreed by thes^grejitltien, that matter, 
 eoasidered as such, does not include within it 
 theideas of life arid confecidusriess ; bttt whe- 
 ther an immaterial substance can exist, ab- 
 stractedly from life arid consciorisnesS,' is quit^ 
 another qiiestibn, which seems ttf adiriit of sotrie 
 considerable doubt. * 
 
 It is very evident, that consciousness must 
 be either an'6s^entisil property of an immaterial 
 substance, or it must be an adventitious acqui- 
 sition. If it be an essential property, it is a 
 self-^ideiit contradictidn, to suppose, an imma- 
 Iterial siibstahcie to exist after consciousness is 
 abstracted from it ; — ^in this case' no such sub- 
 Stance can exist where consciousness is not. 
 But if consciousness be fillrely adventitious, it 
 may be separated from this iniriaaterial sub- 
 stance, without annihilating the substance it- 
 self: but in admittiiig this,' we shall necessarily 
 break down the only barrier, which divides a 
 material from an imtkateii'dl nature ; and matter 
 and spirit must then have the same denomi- 
 nating »iieg-(#jiowsi" If, in ail imriiaterial sub- 
 stances; consciousness be the bnly criterion by 
 Vlrhich that which is,, caii be distinguished from 
 that which is not ; and this consciousness be 
 taken away, entity and non-entity can afford 
 no marks by which they can b^ distinguished 
 from one another ; arid what can yield no dis- 
 
275 
 
 tinctions, we have no right to pronounce to be 
 different. But if an immaterial substaneef be 
 supposed to exist, when that which distin- 
 guishes it from a nonentity is done away, we 
 must retain what we previously discarded ; — ^. 
 and hence it seems certain, that consciousness 
 must be essential to the very natiire of ail 
 immaterial substance. And if we take off this 
 only idea, which can certify to us the actual 
 existence of such a substance, and yet admit 
 the 'possiMe existence of this suljstance after' 
 this idea of consciousness is annihilated, we 
 must admit the possible existence of that sub- 
 stance, while we admit that we have no grounds 
 ivkateHer for that possibility. - Ahd this leads' 
 us immediately to this absurd conclusion — that 
 we know it to be impossible, and'yet do not know 
 it at the same time. 
 
 Ji SLTi'immateHal substance be' created, desti- 
 tiite of all life atod c(kikcid%isness, or, deprived 
 of these properties, its real substance remain- 
 itig ; I ^ould ask — Is this substance thus de- 
 prived of life and consciousness, matter 'ot 
 spirit 1 It is certain, that it cannot be taatter, 
 bfeeause it is irmiMtrial; and' equally certain, 
 that it cannot be spiritj because it is destitute 
 of that life and consdfditrshiess froM Whence 
 alone spirit can be denoininated : and, there-' 
 fore, I cdndliide, that life and coHsci&usness 
 cannot be abstracted froiri an immaterial sub- 
 
 t 2 
 
2.76 
 
 stance, that substance still remainingjn eiistj 
 ence. And as matter and spirit pert^ade all 
 created, nature; and as every essence, and 
 species of essence, of which we have apy know- 
 ledge, must necessarily .be included therein.; 
 and as an immaterial substance, which; has 
 neither life nor consciousness, see,ros ' to ,h.e 
 necessarily excluded from both, it follows, 
 '(vith all the evidence that certainty can give it, 
 that no such substance (pan be in existence.; 
 and consequ^Atly, that lifd and consciomness 
 must ,be essential to its nature, ■'J'o suppose 
 an immaterial substance to exist, which has 
 neither life ^or consciousness, is to suppose it 
 to be neither spirit nor matter, and of any 
 other independent substance, I am tota,lly un- 
 able to form any conception. 
 
 That the Great God can create , a. Being, 
 which partakes neither of matter nor spirit, 
 may un-doiibtedly be within the reaqh of Om- 
 nipotence: bu,t such a Being, which must be 
 at an equally physical distance from both, cap 
 have no kind of relation to either.; And to 
 suppose such a Being to exist within the con- 
 fines o£mcitter and spirit, which is at an infinite 
 distance from each, and yet partal^es of both, 
 is a plain contradiction. 
 
 When, therefore, it is asked, " If God^Jsvere 
 "to create, aft. immaterial substance, endued 
 "with: consciousnegs,, cpuld be,: not: deprive 
 " that substance of it.s consciousness, without 
 
277 
 
 « ani^liilating its nature."* I confess I feel 
 some hesitation in assenting to the proposition. 
 With all deference to so great a man, I humbly 
 (ioneeive, that— to resolve all into dod's Omnipo- 
 tfe'nce, is ndt giving th6 question a fair statement 
 The question rather is^^" Can an immaterial 
 " suhstlince, endued with life and conscious- 
 " ness, s,urvive a privation of them, without 
 " undergoing such an alteration' as must affect 
 ** its identity ?" If it cannot; the case is deci- 
 ded;" but if it cad, it must have suffered a 
 privation, and' yet remain entire— ^or, in other 
 words, it must have undergone a change, and 
 yet not have sustained any alteration in the 
 identity of its nature at the saiiietime: arid 
 how such a change can take plade in a sub- 
 stance whitjh is dcA^oid of all parts, I confess 
 I have not acuteness -enough to discover. If 
 any substance, under any modification whatr 
 soev'er, Jbe identified by what it displays, not 
 <Mly the permanent, primary qualities of it 
 must be ascertained, but' its secondary qualities 
 also ; for whatsoever that be, which 'deiiOEai- 
 nates identity va axxy given substance, the same 
 denominations are essentially necessary to its 
 recognition. It is this stability of th^ denomt 
 nating qualities, which can atione divide identif 
 ty from diversity, and ascertain to us that it i^ 
 sthfr same, and not another. If then, the physi- 
 
 * Locke. 
 
ijai identity of substances be denominated fypm 
 their real existence, not only the primary quaJji- 
 ties, but thp secondary also, mu&t remain ; be- 
 cause the secondary, resulting from the primary 
 qualities, miist depend upon their stability for 
 their own existence ; and where the secondary 
 qualities of ajiy substance are not thp saipe, it 
 is an uudepial^l^ proof, that the primary quali- 
 ties of ]that substance ^ve chapgf4 also, and 
 ponseque|>tly that i\,p identity is totally des- 
 troyed. And, therefore, yfhether we cpnsid^r 
 consciousness to belong to , the primary or 
 secondary qualities of an immaterial substance, 
 in either case, a priYation of it must aflfect the 
 identity of the substance JtseH" ; and thiat real 
 or nominal essence which ascertained its iden- 
 tity, eluding all recognition, will demonstrate 
 that, the priimary identity of the substaw<?ei ^ 
 annihilated by the change. ,, 
 
 Most Qf these observations will, I cqnceive, 
 apply to isubjitai^ces in general; but wheuiwe 
 particularly restrict them to.iome.that is imma- 
 terial, they acquire a more vigorous energy^i 
 
 Animipatfirial substance can have no part^,, 
 r— it is a contradictiou to suppose it : and what 
 has no parts, can, in its miwe, undergo no 
 modification ; and what caii undergo no mpdiT 
 ficatiori^ can nevier lose its identity while it re- 
 tains jits i3eing. If . then,^ cons,Gipus;ness bean 
 ,essential property of this substance, it can 
 
27» 
 
 Dever b^ lost; Jif it be only adventitious, it can 
 i^ever be connate with, nor i^ist in it, by iflhe- 
 sipij. If consciousness be a primary quality 
 of an immaterial substance, it is impossible 
 that it can be sepai^ated. from it, unless th^ 
 identity qf that substance be annihilated.. If 
 it be a secondary, quality, it .iinu<$t depend upon 
 the stability of the primary ones for its ^exist- 
 ence; and while these primary qualities re- 
 main, consciousness must continue, > And if, 
 to'tlestroy a primary quality of any substancfe, 
 be to annihilate the identity of that substance, 
 it certainly must follow, that consciousness 
 cannot be separated from an immaterial Being; 
 — r-hence if the substance remain, oonsciousness 
 must continue for ever. ^ ; i ! > 
 
 If all consciousness be purely adventitious, 
 an immaterial substance may exist without it, 
 and there can, then, be no such thing as a real 
 conscious Beingin nature; conscibusuess, then, 
 cannot be necessary to the existence of spirit; 
 and, spirit which is an animated, conscious 
 Being, may exist without animatian or cour 
 scwusness. . , 
 
 If consciousness be only adventitious, and 
 not an essential property of ah ii^material sub- 
 stance, I wowld ask — If Gpd were to take 
 away this consciousness, by what can the 
 actual existence of the sujbstanpe be ascertain- 
 ed ? Will »ot all distinction between entity and 
 nonentity be done away ? And if so, must not 
 
^60 
 
 entity sind nonentity be the' same thing? Atid 
 is not tiie supposition of entity and nonentity 
 being the same!, a positive contradiction ? And 
 must hot this contradiction be the necessary 
 result of sfdmittihg conSciousiiess t6 bfe annihi- 
 lated, while the substiance remains ? ^And if so, 
 must not Mr. Locke's conclusions be Wrong. 
 
 If God were to create an immaterial sub- 
 stance, abstracted from all life' arid coriscibus- 
 ne^s, must not th^t substance' be imperfect? 
 And is not an imperfect substance the negation 
 of a substance ? If it be imperfect^ can it, as 
 a mbstance, possibly exist ? Or if snch a sub- 
 stance be not imperfect^ must riot life and con- 
 sciousness be superfluous to its ' physical na- 
 ture ? And if superfluous, must not the inhesibn 
 of a conscious quality destroy the perfec^on 
 of its physical identity } And if its perfection 
 be destroyed, can its physical nature remain ? 
 But if its physical identity he ^not destroyed 
 nor altered, either by Hhe inhesion ox abstmctian 
 of life and Consciousness, must not i life and 
 cOTOscionsne^s %& a nonentity ? .-■ • 
 
 Can any quality incorpoVg-te with a simple 
 
 stibstknce, which is iot essential tci the nature 
 oftliat substance, arid which of itself can ha'^e 
 lio' abstract existence,' without altering the na- 
 ture or identity 'of that substance? ' If it caii, 
 this (fontr^diction- mUst'then follow, — that' {He 
 substance is differeht from'what it was before, 
 fend ntit different' at* thfe feame titoe ; iif it tanribt. 
 
281 
 
 this eonseious quality must have a positive 
 existence, independently of i;hat substance in 
 which it is supposed to inhere ; and the idea 
 of any other 'imitiEi,terial siibstarice is a mere 
 creatiire of the iihagination: On the whole,' if 
 a simple substance, whichundergqes no change, 
 can be conscious at one time, and unconscious 
 at another, consciousness cannot affect its ideir- 
 tity, and we must suppose it to be altered and 
 not altered at the same time,. But as this 
 cannot be admitted, I conclude- that COnscibtis 
 iiess must be essential to its natUi«e. 
 
 If God were to^ crfeate an immaterial sub- 
 stance, devoid of all (Consciousness, it is certain, 
 that cottsciauiness' can be no way essential to 
 its natui'e. But if this consciousness itself, 
 cannot exist, abstractedly from this immaterial 
 substance; and this substance be naturally 
 destitute of it, — How can an union between 
 this substance" and quality, call into existence, 
 an energy of which both are totally destitute ? 
 If it can, then both quality and substance must 
 confer an energy which is possessed by nei-» 
 ther whi^his a contradiction ;— if not, cohcionsT 
 ness must be essential to the existence of such 
 a Being. An immaterial substance, which has 
 neither life nor consciousness, can have lio 
 known property, either q^ matter or spirit ; and 
 to jylaee it Under thei denomination of either, 
 is not to be ireeoriciled, with the supposition of 
 its being removed ffotn both. 
 
SECTION IV. 
 
 Tfie soul is' a simple essence. Its simplicity securei 
 ■ its immortality. The soul cannot lose its essential 
 properties^ nor perish while it retains, them. This 
 not arguing in a circle. The essence and essential 
 properties of the soul co'cxist together. These mu-r 
 tually support each other in and by their co-exis- 
 tence. The essence of matter imperishable ; that of 
 the soul imperishable also. ' 
 
 That the human souA is a pimple essence, has 
 been already proved ; and if so, it must follow, 
 that it cannot perish. A simple essence can 
 be but one, and nothing but this can be a 
 conscious Being. If an essence, which 4s in 
 existence, be perishable in its own nature, it 
 must be because it is defective ; and an essence 
 which is simple, and is supposed to be defec- 
 tive in its own nature, seems to inclitde this 
 contradiction, that it is an essence; and not an 
 essence at the sartie time. An essence, which 
 is simple in its own xiatUre, can include within 
 it nothing, but what is necessary tO: its own 
 existence ; for to admit any thing ;to, be in- 
 cluded in a simple essence, which is not neces- 
 sary^' TtO' the existence of that essence, is to 
 annihilate its simpUciti/, in order to establish 
 its- nature ;, and is, in fact, to destroy that very 
 essence which is supposed to exist, abstract- 
 edly from all extraineous properties. And if 
 
283 
 
 nothing can he included withii^ this essence, 
 but :s^hsit is necessary tp its^xistence, to sup- 
 pose any property of it, tp be perishable in it^ 
 nature, is to suppose that what i^ thus perish- 
 able, is necessary, and yet not necessari/ tOi i^T& 
 existence of the soul at the same time, whjcli 
 i^ a plajp contradiction. 
 
 . .4? an exclusion of all foreign acquirements 
 is necessary to o«r idea of the soul's sir^licif^f 
 nothing that is either hostile or foreign tp its 
 nature, can ever .have access unto it ; and what 
 pqssesses in itself ^p perishable quality, and 
 through th^ pure simpUciii/ of its n,a|]ijre.exclu^es 
 all diversity,, uiu^t necessarily be immprta}. 
 
 As no physical essence can be def<^ctivp ;• as 
 oue that; is simple, m|ist necessarily exclude 
 all diversity ;.. and as nothing but ^ simple sjiib- 
 s^nce like this can be capable ,«f th jnk,ing, it 
 is r certain, that as man is a conscious Being, 
 l^q must possess this physicqUt/ pure and simple 
 substance, which, in its pwn nature, must b^ 
 distinct from, and indespendent of, all cprporeal 
 Being; and to which, ^xtensipn apd figure c^n 
 have no affinity or relatioiij: ;; 
 
 We have now befoje us, an essence or sub: 
 stance which is physically simple, and which 
 can include within it, nothing but what is 
 necessary to its own existence vaud the great 
 question is— Can such an essence be perish- 
 aible in its nature ? 
 ; jIfeis)a)B^fi-ieYide»t prppositiop, that wh,atis 
 
284 
 
 «imj9?ie in its own nature, can have ho parts • 
 and \^hai lias no parts, can- never lose them ; 
 and what has' nothing which it can lose, can 
 admit nothing' t'd'inicorporate with its essericie, 
 while its' simple itiiture remains ; and what hia's 
 nothing which it eian eithet acquire or lose, 
 can never be affected by modification. To 
 suppose any thing to perish while it sustains 
 no loss, is absurd. And if we'imaginfe that 
 an esgetice which has nothing to lose, cian be, 
 capable of perishing through privMidri,'^ or loss, 
 we must' first suppose arf arinihilS-tion of its 
 «j'mp/ic%,' previously to the ariiiihilatiori of its 
 JBeing, which includes this contt^ictidni that it 
 is in existence, and z* not in existence at the same 
 time. Arid as a contradiction canridlf bef admit- 
 ted, the soul must be imperishable'ift*its nature^ 
 
 A Being, which continues'siulplg, must be 
 the samfes to-day that it was yelsterday ; and 
 must be exkctly the sanie! to-hl6rrow, for the 
 same reason ; and whilfe this physical simplicity 
 remains; it must continue the same for ever. 
 And to imagine the annihilation of its '«mj9/m<[y, 
 as preparatory to thfe annihilation of its Being, 
 is to imagine the annihilation of its identity, 
 and not the annihilation of it, at the same time. 
 
 As the continuance of every property of a 
 simple substance, is necessary to the .duration 
 of its Being, it is certain that none of these 
 properties can be lost. The properties which 
 *uch a simple nature possesses, are, and must 
 
285 
 
 ibei necessary to its existence ; and the ^epsixaf 
 tion of them ^rora one another, is the annihila- 
 tion of its Being,;i.hutif the separation, of these 
 properties ibe in^possible,;it is .certain, that ithif? 
 substance must remain perpetually thie same^ 
 - The common principle in which these pro- 
 ,perties iiihere, must be a something distinct in 
 idea, and in reality, from either of these pro- 
 perties, considered in itself; which, taken in 
 the aggregate, are essential to the existence of 
 this substance. And .though the ideas >which 
 we form of this substance, be distinct Irom 
 those which we form of the properties of it, 
 yet.the latter being necessarily included inth? 
 former, demonstratively preclude the possibili- 
 ty of their separation, and prove that union, 
 without which, the idea of substance itself can 
 have no kind of existence. If, then, the soul 
 «an p^ish^ every property which is essential 
 to its existence* must expire ; and if each indi- 
 vidual property expire, each individual proper- 
 ty must be capable of perishing. But as it is 
 a contradiction to suppose, that any essential 
 property of any substance can perish, while 
 .that substance remains, so it is impossible that 
 this substance can perils, unless its essential 
 properties expire, to the existence of which 
 thesp properties ajre necessary. 
 
 If the individual properties of the soul be 
 -imperishable; in their own natures, because in 
 separable from one another; how can they ac- 
 
286 
 
 quire a perishing nature by inhering in one 
 common principle ? Can the whole of thdt sub- 
 stance perish, of which no property can expire? 
 Or if the inhesion of these properties be neeeis- 
 safy to their own existence, can mere inhesion 
 destroy, whdt witkotit ifihesiqti can have no ex- 
 istence ? If inhesion be neciessary to the exist- 
 ence of these properties, can it be made the 
 vehicle of their annihiliatibn ? If it can, inhesion 
 must be necessary, and yet not necessary to 
 th* existence of these properties ; if not, the 
 whole must necessarily be immortal. 
 
 It is a self-evident proposition, that no pro- 
 perty which is essential to the existence of 
 any substance, can perish while that substance 
 remains: iand it is equally self-evident, that 
 this substance, to the existence; of which these 
 properties are essential; cannot 'perish unless 
 these properties expire.' If; then, this| sub- 
 stance, and the properties of this substance, be 
 alike necessary to the existence of each other ; 
 if these properties canndt expire while the sub- 
 stance remains ; and if the substance must re-, 
 main until, its essential properties perish, — it 
 follows, that the human soul must be immortal. 
 
 I am well aware, that to the energy of this 
 argument it will be objected, " that this is 
 " arguing ih a circle,— ^that it is making two 
 "ideas mutually to depend forsiippoutloij bne 
 " another, while neither of them c^TicbamjOkV' 
 " cate that assistance to each Othejr, which 
 
287 
 
 " they nlutually want." I have no <ioubt, that 
 in all comp6'6lided bodies, this objection would 
 be of forcie ; but it itiust be rettiembered, that 
 this is not a question about the identitt/ and di- 
 versity of body, but about the enlitt^ andnon- 
 entity of SHng. It has been abundantly pro- 
 ted, that the soul is a physically pure and un- 
 compounded substance; and what is physically 
 siinple, can be (eis to its essente) neither the 
 subject oi accidents nor of modes : — And what 
 is not the subject of either, precludes, through 
 the Tery nature of its JBeing, that adventitious 
 support, from which, if we separate compound- 
 ed bodies, they call' have no existence. 
 
 The two faculties of will and consciousness, 
 are necessary to duf conception of that sub- 
 stance in which they inhere ; though the ab- 
 stract idea of that substance is distinct in point 
 of existence, but not of nature, from either. 
 The support whifch thfese properties derive from 
 their substance; and the supjjort which the 
 substance itself derives from those properties 
 that are lidciegsary to its existence, are neither 
 adifehtitious nor arhUrary^ but physical, and 
 t^s&luiely necessary to each other's Being.. And 
 where the simple properties, which are neces- 
 sary to the fdi'ttiation of our ideas of immaterial 
 Substancies, are founded in those substances; 
 they afford to each other a certainty of sup- 
 port, not by any mutual dependence, but 
 through an inseparable and necessary cO-ex- 
 
?88 
 
 isteflce. And, therefore, as thqi soul, is .a physi- 
 cally pure jand, simple iE!s,s,^ce, and as no sim- 
 ple essence can .perish^., its in^prtality arjs^^ 
 Hot only from the cOr/essentiality ,of its propei;- 
 -ties and substance, but ;from the apparejal; im- 
 possibility of its beijpg; otherwise tha^ whatit i^s. 
 And even, matter itself, notwithstanding the 
 various for-ms which it is capable of assuming, 
 must. be permanent in its, primary nature. A.nd 
 although new forms are for ever attendant on 
 the internal conjbinations of particle^, and^the 
 external disposition of surfaces ;. and thqugh 
 these forms rise and, perish in,, fleetiijg suc- 
 cession to one another; while the mere super- 
 ficial observer is, presented with nqthing jbut 
 portion^, of matter, which present their fjprms, 
 and theii disappear; the discerning eye, pen% 
 trates deeper into ^be recesses of nature,. , and 
 explores, in those recesses, an pssence whic]^ 
 can neither expire nor change. , For althoijg^ 
 all p'ar tides of matter, by arrangemeut, con- 
 figuration, and variable combinations, are sjib- 
 ject to every modification of which their nature 
 is capable, yet it is pertaiftj, that those particlei? 
 which are thus arranged, figured, and comr 
 bined, must be, in themselves, of a moreperna£t- 
 nent nature.-^The existence of all matter must 
 be confined within the limits of its nature, be- 
 yond the boundaries of which it cannot pass. 
 If, then, we suppose any given particle to be 
 so reduced by divisibility on the one han^;, 
 
289 
 
 that it is no longer capable of separation ; and 
 so bounded on the other, by the limits of its 
 nature, that it cannot pass from what it is, to 
 what it is not ; we at once behold it in a state 
 of permanency, which is imposed ijipon it 
 through the ntecessity of things ;— incapable of 
 mutation or decay. 
 
 In this state, of physical permanency, it is 
 very certain, that no single atom which is once 
 in Being, can be lost. It may be diversified 
 in a thousand forms ; it may assume a variety 
 of attitudes, and form new combinations with 
 other particles, with which it had no previous 
 association ; but this can only affect its modi- 
 fication. It is still the same under every form ; 
 and modes and accidents , will leave it perfect 
 matter still. If, therefore, modes and acci- 
 dents can only affect the Configuration of its 
 parts ; and if the certainty of its nature exists, 
 independently of all these mutations, even 
 matter itself must be imperishable in its nature. 
 If, then, the physical nature of matter re- 
 mains entire and incorruptible, upon what prin- 
 ciple can we supposie an immaterial substance 
 to expire? The same incorruptibility which 
 belongs to the former, must necessarily be at" 
 tached to the latter. And d.lthough a mys- 
 terious union may subsist between that which 
 is material, and that which is immaterial in the 
 present life, yet this union can no more affect 
 the identity of the one, than it cah affect the 
 identity of the other ; because, with each other, 
 they can have no physical connexion* 
 
 u 
 
290 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 The soul existing independently of created power, tan^ 
 not he approached by it» Jnd^p^dence and nhity 
 guard its imindrtality. Inherence of its essential 
 properties can never be made the medium of the 
 Soul's annihilation. ' These essential properties am 
 never be lost prior to annihilation, in the act, nor 
 subsequent t^on its The Soul cannot perish through 
 annihilation as its cause. 
 
 Whatever is a simple essence, can be de' 
 pendent for its existence on no created power, 
 and wtat is dependent on no created power, 
 must be naturally independent. We know of 
 nothi4g which can claim this privilege but 
 matter and spirit : and whatsoever is thus natn- 
 rally independent, must be incapable of receit^ 
 ing obstructions, or violations, from any intrin- 
 sic cause ; and to admit the interference of any 
 external influence, is utterly inconsistent with 
 the ideas of unity and independence. And if 
 the unity and independence of a simple sub- 
 stance be admitted, all external influence must 
 be prevented from approaching it, by, a neces- 
 sary exclusion. 
 
 If, therefore, the soul be incapable of being 
 approached, because of its independence ; and 
 incapable of undergoing a separation, if ap- 
 proached, because of its unitt/, it must neces- 
 sarily be immortal. 
 
 If the properties of the soul can have no 
 existence, abstractedly from their inherence in 
 an imiuaterie^I substance ; and that they cannot. 
 
m 
 
 has }^m already proved, iu^prem^ paust be 
 necessary to their existence ; and if iiiki^renQe 
 be necessary tjo their existence^ it is dontra- 
 dictQry to suppose that inherency pan ever be 
 jom^th^ mediuni pf their ^.nnihilatiQn ; for if 
 inhermea tw. be naade the me4ium pf their 
 annihilatiaiit inherence must be petiessary to 
 their existence, ffl^A ji^pt itecpssary at the saime 
 time. — To suppose thpsp properties to pierish 
 abstractedly from ih^\x mh^vmce in a §Hb§>f^(^> 
 is utterly iioppsipibld ; aud tq sijppose theqa to 
 pevish titrpugh itg instrwn^riipklity,, pr by it^ 
 being laadp a medium of it, is, a plain cpntra- 
 dictioQ ; aad, therefore, th0 huiiu^u soul iqust 
 necessarily partake of imiportality.- . 
 
 If the soul ipse not its essential properties, 
 it is utttriy jijapossible that it should expire ; 
 aud \i ii lo^e them, it i^ necessary, in order to 
 tmr J^UQR^lf^d^ of th^ fact, that fiv§. ascertain 
 U^ lorn ; but to ascertain it§ los», is npt only 
 tp a§eertain a point which we adn^t to have 
 UP e^igt@&ce, but i^ to identify an absiplute 
 jDiPpeniiJty. Jf ^he spul lose its essential proper^^ 
 iimi it must be in o^e pf tiiese three ways ; — 
 either l^efore its (tmihUotiOfii ia the (fpf ofanwM- 
 laMmt- or, suA^isquenf iipon thap annihilation ; 
 tiiere is bp c^hier way within thi© reach of possi- 
 bility- 
 
 To a4^it the £^s^ case, is to suppose that 
 the soul can- a«d does^ survive thj? annihila^ 
 tiou of. thpseprppertiep which ate essentially 
 necessai^ to its M7a§^m^'^ a&d theii we must 
 
292 
 
 adnlit these properties to be necfessary, and 
 not necessary at the same time. 
 
 To admit the second case, is to suppose that 
 those properties may be separated from the 
 soul, which are inseparable from it ; for while 
 these properties remain, the soul cannot ex- 
 pire :— and that every prbperty which is essen- 
 tial to the. existence of the soul, must be pos- 
 sessed by it ia that moment of duration in 
 which they are separated from it, and in%which 
 they expire. For if the soul be not possessed 
 of these properties in the moment of its annihi- 
 lation, it can never lose them by it, nor be the 
 subject of annihilation ; and if it be possessed 
 of them, it cannot perish. If the mere extinc- 
 tion of all these properties, be the identical act 
 of the soul's annihilation, the soul must perish 
 without being separated from any thing which 
 is essential to its nature ; and without sustain' 
 ing the loss of any thing which is necessary to 
 its existence; Whfch of itself is a contradiction. 
 A simple Being, which is in the possession of all 
 its essential properties, is not extinct ; and one 
 that is not in possession of them, has no exist- 
 ence. If consciousness be an essential proper- 
 ty of any Being, that Being cannot become ex- 
 tinct while this consciousness remains. If, 
 therefore, that Being becomes extinct, of which 
 this consciousness is an essential property, 
 consciousness itself must separately expire, in 
 order to the annihilation ofjthat Being. Un- 
 less this be admitted, the Being itself must be 
 imperishable in its nature; it being a contra- 
 
293 
 
 Action to suppose any Being to expire, with- 
 out being detached from those properties which 
 denominate and certify its existence. But if 
 Consciousness be an essential property, the 
 idea of its being detached from that substance 
 to the existence of which it is necessary, in- 
 cludes this contradiction, that it is essential, 
 and not essential at the same time. 
 
 To admit the third case, is to suppose that 
 an essential property can survive the annihila- 
 tion of that substance, to the existence of which 
 it is necessary, and with which it must be co- 
 essential. To conceive, therefore, that the soul, 
 which is a simple essence, can be separated 
 ^om itself, is utterly impossible ; and to sup- 
 pose it to perish without such separation, is a 
 contradiction : and, therefore, no simple es- 
 sence can perish. 
 
 If, then, for the soul to lose its essential 
 properties, be absolutely impossible ; and if to 
 expire without losipg them be a contradiction; 
 there remains nothing to be considered, but 
 whether the soul, together with all its essential 
 properties, can expire together, in one act of 
 annihilation. 
 
 It is very certain, that nothing can act be- 
 fore it has a Being ; and if so, tibe soul cannot 
 possibly perish through annihilation as its 
 cause. Annihilation can certainly have no 
 Being while the soul is in existence ; and, 
 ther^Ore, the non-existence of the soul, is ncr 
 ceseary to the existence of our idea or notioa 
 ^f itisf ajajaihilation. And if aiinihilatiop qan 
 
^94 
 
 hiavfe no Beihg uiitil th^e WtA be f fedufcted to an 
 feillii^ nonentity, it is abfeoiutely cbrtAin, th&t 
 the ^oul cari never be' thu* redueed by that 
 annihilation, Which ctinnot eJEifetj eVeh itt idl^, 
 until tlje sOtil bfe perfectly destroyed. 
 
 If , ^nnihilAtibii cotiid destroy tH€ g&kl, it 
 ihnst act before it had any kind of eiistencife, 
 whiph is a fl^t icontradtetiOn. The nOtt-fe:kiSt- 
 eUce of the soul, is iifectes^ai-y to Our idfek of 
 its annihilatipn ; aijd, thereforte, the soul must 
 be destroyefd hpf6)c'6 it can be siai^d to be annihi- 
 lated. Aud if the 'soul be ttilis destroyed be? 
 fore ysfe can haVe any cottdeptiOh oi it4 annihi- 
 lation, auttiiiilation can never be the caU^fe Of 
 itk destruction, 
 
 If the soul perish through annihilatio^i, attd 
 the total nonentity of the soul be necessaJry to 
 the idea of annihilation^ the effect must hatifi 
 an existence prior to that cause Which c£tBed 
 it into Being ; and the effect of this cause must 
 be completed, before the cause w'M'ch is prer 
 ^titaed to have produced it, cah have any l^ind 
 of existence ; the absurdity of which is too 
 manifest to be refuted. 
 
 If the destruction of the soul be that whicfh 
 (gives annihita,tion birth, annihilation must c6me 
 too late tp effect that purpose for which it i's 
 'suppbsed to Be ; for if the tota;l absence of 
 ^dng in the soul, be necessary to pur con- 
 ception of its dnhfMlati&n, the sOul can never 
 perish through that annihilation, pf whiph we 
 ti&ft form no idea until the soul be destroyed. 
 But if the pre-destruction df the fepal be ne-^ 
 
295 
 
 eessalry jtp the notion of its annihilation,-^and 
 if, without this previous destruction, it be im- 
 possible to form any idea of its annihilation :, 
 we behold, on both sides of the question, the 
 inost palpable contradictions. 
 
 For if, on the one hand, the soul be destroy- 
 ed previously to the completion of its annihi- 
 lation, — aijLd if tiiis utter loss of Bei^g be nfe- 
 cessary to our idea of annihilation, — the soul 
 must bd annihilated previous to its annihilation, 
 a^id must be reduced to a nonentity, in order 
 to the birth of that axtnihijation which is sup- 
 posed to produce it^ — the absurdity oi which 
 every reader niust discover. If, on the other 
 hand, we view the opposite member of the 
 alternative, and conceivp that no such pre-degr 
 truqtion of the soul is necessary to the idea of 
 its annihilatioi^ ; and that annihilation may take 
 plape upon it, without our fir^t conceiving its 
 destruetioo, and srnisumg to it the utter loss 
 of Being ; we must behold annihilation, while 
 nothing is annihilated ; and we mu^t conceive 
 the utter loss of that very Being, which we her 
 hold in existence; the jabsui'dity of which 
 needs no further pursuit. And as the contra- 
 diction is equal on each side, it must follow, 
 as an immoveable consequence — that the ^oul 
 cannot perish through ajpnihHation. 
 
296 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Ho act of dnnihilationcan destroy the Soul. Aii 
 action must exist before any effect can be produced 
 by It. The supposition that the Soul can perish by 
 an annihilating act, includes several contradictions. 
 The utter privation oj" Being, cannot be the annihi- 
 lating act, because the destruction of the Soul is 
 necessary to give this action birth. The Soul in- 
 capable of being annihilated. All actions, with 
 .. which we have any acquaintance, must include pro- 
 gression. Illustrated by two familiar instances. 
 Progression wholly inapplicable to that action which 
 can destroy the Soul, because of its unity. No 
 action which includes progression can annihilate'thei 
 Soul, and ngne can exist without progression. 
 
 1 HE certain and actual existence* of an action, 
 mu«t necessarily precede all eflfects which can 
 
 * I here use the word " existence" in preference to the 
 word " completion" as being more expressive 'of that idea, 
 which I wish to convey. In an action , (if such there b^) 
 which does not include progression, the word completion might 
 convey an erroneous idea. And yet so much are we accus- 
 tomMto those actions which apply to compounded bodies, that 
 we feel it difficult to find terms that are exactly adequate to 
 those ideas which we wish to express. In compliance, how- 
 ever, with pur customary modes of speaking, I have, in the 
 following pages, occasionally introduced the word completion, 
 not from any conviction of its strict propriety, but from a 
 difficulty in making the term existence to be understood to in- 
 clude completion, wheji it applies to ap action through which 
 an immaterial substance is supposed to perish. That the word 
 completion, implies progression and previous incompletion, I 
 readily admit 3 and for that reason I consider it rather inappli-r 
 cable to the" case in hand. Forsince an immaterial substance 
 ean have no parts, the action which destroys it, caix have no 
 
297 
 
 result from that action ; and if so, the soul can 
 never be destroyed by that action through 
 which it is supposed to be annihilated. For 
 if the actual annihilation of "the soul, be neces- 
 sary to the existence of the annihilatiug act, 
 the annihilating act can never be the occasion of 
 the soul's annihilation. The annihilation of 
 the soul being necessary to the perfect exist- 
 ence of this supposed action, the action^ itself 
 can never produce that annihilation, upon 
 vrhich itself depends for its own existence; 
 and therefore, no act of annihilation can ever 
 destroy the soul. 
 
 Whether the idea of an action be real, or 
 relative, it is only the actual existence of that 
 action, which can give to the mind any idea Of 
 its Being, — it is a contradiction to suppose 
 Otherwise. But if the actual existence of an 
 action, be necessary to the existence of any 
 thing which can result from that action, the 
 soul can never perish by an annihilating act 
 For if we suppose the soul to perish by an 
 annihilating act; and admit that nothing can. 
 
 progression. Th^e can be no room for a progressive actiqiij, 
 in that substance which has neither interior nor surface j — ^pro- 
 gression can never appli/ to that^ to which it is inapplicable', 
 I have said, in page 233, that "that which destroys the Soul, 
 " must be a positive action ;" but how an action can possbly 
 exist, which excludes progression, I believe it ip impossible to 
 coiiceive. That the idea of an action which excludes progres- 
 sion, includes a contradiction, it is not diflScult to prove j 
 which wiU afford us another evidence that no such action can 
 possibly eust ;t— and consequently, that the human 8ox4 mus). 
 b« immort^. 
 
298 
 
 result from an action, until ibat action certainT 
 ly exists ; we must suppose the soul to be 
 annihilated, previously to the existence of that 
 annihilating q,ct, by which it is supposed to be 
 destroyed. 
 
 As no cause whatever can produce any 
 effect, until that cause is in actual existence, 
 the act of annihilation, through which the soul 
 is supposed to perish, must have a certainty 
 of existence, previously to that ahnihilationf 
 which it is supposed to produce, — ^a contrary 
 supposition will involve absurdities. But if 
 the certainty of the existence of that action* be 
 necessary to the annihilation of the soul, we 
 must suppose the existence of this action ante- 
 cedently to the soul's annihilation, which is a 
 contradiction also ; and, therefore, since no such 
 thin^ as an annihilating act can possibly exist, 
 the human soul must necessarily be immortal. 
 
 To admit the soul to be a&nihilated previous- 
 ly to its annihilation, is a self-evident contra- 
 diction. To suppose it to be annihilated by 
 am action, which of itself cannot exist until the 
 soul be actually deprived of Being, is to make 
 an action to produce effects previously to its 
 own existence, And to suppose the soul to 
 perish subsequently upou its own annihilation, 
 is an absurdity too gross to be refuted. If then 
 fhe soul can neither perish previously to the 
 act of annihilation, nor by the act of annihilatiorr, 
 nor subsequent ujpon it, the self-evideni;^ result 
 is— that it must uecegsarily be immorled. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be said, " that the utter 
 
29§ 
 
 " ^vatiidn of Being, is the atinihilating h,&t^ 
 But that such an act of ptiration can possibl;^ 
 eKist, I must confi^ss I have {bondtdefablj^ 
 doufote. For if nothing can bfe said to bei 
 annihiliited, but what has ^ufferfed the utte* 
 logs of Bdng, instead of admitting the d<7<d|^ 
 prveaimH to be that which destroys the sdul, 
 tile totai pnvation of JBeing^ must fee neeess&!i*Jr 
 to tour idea ©f that act af primtiion throikg^h 
 which the sottl is supposed ^o be destroyed) 
 And, therfeftjre, the perfttt itJompltMrni of the 
 aiction, is not only ttecessary to' o\\x idea of the 
 action but to that effect also, whi<Gh thfe ob-s 
 jection iatteibutes to the aptio^ while in a pro^ 
 gf^ssJve state, and which the ia<:tion i« sup. 
 posed to produce, befoJe it caia h^ said per-- 
 fectly to exist itself. Total pfvpe^Ou cantaot 
 be said to *xist, until the soul is peilfectly d«g-r 
 troyed; and that act can never destroy, the 
 sotil, which cannot be said to be in Being, un- 
 til the soul is no more ; for it is the t,QttA e-X*- 
 tinction of the soul, which can alon'e givecto^li- 
 jftfete existence to that act, by Which the Ofe"? 
 jection supposes it to bp destroyed, For if 
 the privation of Being, bp that very act WhicAi 
 teraninates in ^complete MfiiiiMltition, the soul 
 CMintever perish through that act of pritialioiH 
 which can h$,ye no complete existence, iierltf*^ 
 in idea, nor ip reality, unatil the soul is p^ 
 fectly d,estroyed, 
 
 ! If the existence of an action bte i«eeessary to 
 ^&msl)mna$'0i\UiMi wMc^h no man can deny, 
 the id!£tioi| *^ljich is stif^oserd \o^^ovt^Wb. 
 
300 
 
 Jtoy event, must necessarily exist in the order 
 of nature, before that event can be accomplish- 
 ed by it. But in admitting this conclusion, 
 we shall be obliged to admit the existence of 
 au^annihilatiog act, while we admit nothing to 
 be annihilated by it ; and the soul will then 
 be admitted by us, to be annihilated, and not 
 annihilated at the same time. If, on the other 
 hand, we reject this conclusion, and adopt 
 the opposite member of the alternative, wie 
 shall then be driven to this conclusion — that 
 an action may exist before it has any existence 
 — and, that the soul itself may be annihilated 
 by an action, which cannot have any kind of 
 existence itself, until the goul is perfectly re- 
 duced to nothing by it. 
 
 To suppose the privation of Being, to be 
 that act through which the soul is reduced to 
 nothing, while the iperfect nonentiti/ of the soul 
 is necessary to the existence of the act of pri- 
 vation, and is that, from whence both privation 
 and' annihilation are denominated ; is to make 
 the idea of, the, act of annihilation, to exist 
 antecedently to that perfect nonentity of Being, 
 from whience alone annihilation can be denomi- 
 nated ; which is an evident contradiction. And 
 to suppose the soul to be annihilated by an 
 action which is not an annihilating one, is to 
 attribute to that action, an eflfect which is pre- 
 cluded by its very name and nature ; — the soul 
 to be annihilated by an action, which is not an 
 annihilating one, is a , plain contradiction in 
 terms. Can any effect result from an action. 
 
301 
 
 before that action has a Being? If there can, 
 an effect must be produced by that which has 
 no existence ; if there cannot, no act of annihir 
 lation can destroy the soul ; and that which 
 cannot be destroyed by an act of annihilation, 
 must necessarily be immortal. 
 
 If, then, the soul cannot be annihilated, ei- 
 ther by what is supposed to be an annihilating 
 act, or by an act which is not an annihilating 
 one, nor abstractedly from either, the plain 
 conseq-uence is — that no such thing as annihi- 
 lation, according to those modes of reasoning 
 which God has placed within the reach of 
 human intelligence, can possibly take place ; 
 and, therefore, the soul can never perish by it. 
 And that which is not placed within the reach 
 of annihilation, must necessarily be immortals 
 
 I am well aware, that to these arguments it 
 will be objected-—" that if the mode of reason- 
 " ing which I have adopted in the preceding 
 " pages be admitted, it will amount to a total 
 " denial of all possible action." This, how- 
 ever I conceive, upon a more minute^ survey, 
 will be found to be an erroneous conclusion. 
 Confined as we are within the circle of com- 
 pounded things, a strange association of ideas, 
 has led us to apply the modes of dividing com- 
 pounded bodies, to the annihilation of simple 
 substances, though the actions which are pecu- 
 liar to each, can have but little or no relation 
 to one another. 
 
 That all human actions include progression 
 in their very nature, is a truth, which I believe, 
 
302 
 
 iio one will attempt to deny ; and the admis- 
 sion of this principle, will present to us a deci- 
 sive difference between those actions whioh 
 apply ib the division of compounded bodies, 
 and those which will apply to the annihilation 
 of an imiriaterial siibstaiice. ; 
 
 Let us suppose, for instance, the ^ctioti of 
 my han^i with which I am now Writing, — ^it is 
 Jan action which includes pr0gres9i(m-; but 
 the action through which I am now Writing, 
 though it may be said to eXiiSt, yet it cannot 
 be said to be a tbmpkte bopk-'Writiftg action^ 
 until tlie book is completed ; for it is the com^ 
 pletion of the book, which can istlone denomi-^ 
 note it to be a eompMb hook-writing acfim* 
 iBut if, in the midst 6t my writing, the action 
 of my hand be suspended, the action is only 
 eomphte. in an exact proportion to the quantity 
 '^Hiich I have written ; and it is from this partial 
 Completion of the book alone, that the action 
 can then be denominated. But, where the mi^ 
 j6et under consideration i« so simple in itg na^ 
 ture, that the idea &i progression must neces* 
 sai-ily be excluded from the action,^— there these 
 actions will not apply, — there no medium can 
 possibly exist, between js)^r/ec<f annihilation aja^ 
 yerfect existence. 
 
 If We again suppose the existence of an ac- 
 tion, throu^ whi<;h an apple is divided 'm%Q, 
 two equal parts, the action can only be cow^ 
 plete in proportion to the quantity divided ; 
 but it is the totaisepaaration of its parts, which 
 can ^QVLi^ denominate the action, to be a c&mr 
 plete apple-dividing^ action^ But whether we 
 
305 
 
 aduait the progress which this action has made, 
 to he paitial or complete, it is the progress of 
 the division alone;- which can determine the 
 specific quantity of the action which exists. 
 In an action which applies to the division of 
 compounded bodies, the action may be said to 
 exist before it is complete; but in B.n action 
 which is supposed to annihilate an iiUmaterial 
 substance, there cah be no medium whatever 
 between existence and completion. And as, in 
 the order of nature, the actio^ must exist be- 
 fore the soul can be annihilated by it ; and aa 
 the annihilation of the soul can alone denomi- 
 nate it to ,be an annihilating act, certain it ia^ . 
 that if the soul perish, it must perish by an ac-- 
 tion which is not an annihilating one. But in 
 admitting the soul to be aunihilated by an ac- 
 tion, which is not an annihilating one, we ad* 
 Init a palpable contradiction ; and attribute to 
 the action, an effect, which must be excluded 
 from it, both by its name and nature. 
 
 An Apple may .be paartially divided; this 
 Book may be partially written ; and jft either 
 case the action may be suspended in this par- 
 tial state ; but when we apply any action to 
 the annihilation of the soul, no such medium 
 of suspension can possibly be admitted. Be-- 
 tAVeen eompktioa and nort'Cmstence, there can 
 be no «xedium, because there is nothing which 
 can be divided ; and where there is nothing 
 which can be divided, there the action which 
 SEpplies, can know no distinction between &(^ 
 ^nnmg, progression, and end. Simple exifit^ 
 ence must comprehend and encircle alL • 
 
304 
 
 If the action, through which an iounaterial 
 substance is supposed to be annihilated, be of 
 the same nature with those actions through 
 which compounded bodies are divided, it is 
 certain^ that such an action ttiust include prtt- 
 gression ; unless this be admitted, the actions 
 cannot be alike. But if an annihilating act be 
 admitted to include progression, I would ask, 
 — If in- the progressive state of this annihilating 
 act, God were to suspend this action, would 
 the soul be, annihilated or not? It is very cei*- 
 tain, in this case, that it could be neither. It 
 is Certain, that the soul Cannot be in existence, 
 because an, action has so far passed upon it, as 
 to be denominated an annihilating one ; and it 
 i^ equally certain, that the soul cannot be re- 
 duced to a nonentity, because that action has 
 been suspended, thrx)ijgh which its perfect 
 annihilation could be alone accomplished ; and 
 how a simple Being, which has no parts, can 
 bo partially annihilated, and partially in exist- 
 ence, I must leave for those to decide who cait 
 reconcile contradictions. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be said — " that in coiti- 
 " pounded bodies, there can be no medium be- 
 " tween division, and no division, — that an ap- 
 " pie must he either sound or injured." The 
 truth of these positions I readily admit ; but I 
 ^till contend, that the action whicih produces 
 an injury, must include progression. Unable 
 as we are, through the want of acuter organs, 
 to penetrate the minuter parts of compounded 
 bodies, we must content ourselves with that 
 evidence which analogy supplies. 
 
305 
 
 The specific quantity of time which any given 
 action requires, in order to its completion, 
 can by no means affect the present argument. 
 The "effect which results from the application 
 of an instrument, as well as the movement of 
 the instrument, may be too rapid for us to fol- 
 low in its various stages : but our inability to 
 trace these progressive movements, can never 
 militate against the principle upon which this 
 reasoning is founded. The fibre of a cobweb 
 demands progression in the action of a razor 
 which cuts it, as much so as a cable would 
 that of an axe by which its parts should be 
 severed. A piece of glass may be said to be 
 broken instantaneously if struck with a bullet, 
 but this can only be a comparative fact. A 
 shot, if it did nothing more than form a simple 
 contact with the glass, instead of shivering it 
 in pieces, would not make the least impression. 
 It is not its mere contact, but its progressive 
 violence that accomplishes the execution. The 
 same observations may be made on the rapid 
 movement of the electric fluid. Let this fluid 
 pass through this globe ; it must begin before 
 it can end ; it must enter some given part before 
 it can reach the antipodes of that place. Now 
 if progression be necessary, for this fluid to 
 pass through the whole globe it mu«t be equal- 
 ly necessary in order to its passing through one 
 half, one quarter, one mile, one inch ; the differ- 
 ence is in the quantity of time, not in nature ; 
 progression is alike necessary in every stage. 
 
 Contact, simple contact is instantaneous ; but 
 simple contact is insufficient to break the most 
 
 X 
 
306 
 
 brittle thing in natiire. Indeed^, if simple contact 
 were sufficient, every shottha,t touched a piece 
 of glass would prove destructive to it. Instead 
 of this, violence must be added to contact ; the 
 impression must be deeply made, to effect the 
 purpose ; and from simple contact to contusion, 
 there must necessarily be progressiou, however 
 instantaneous or minute it may seem to be. 
 The same or similar observations will apply to 
 all actions. What we vaguely term an instant, 
 may be too minute to be defined : but it cannot 
 be too minute to be progressive if it can admit 
 an, action. If one such instant has no pro- 
 gression, neither can two, nor two thousand, 
 though they immediately succeed each other. 
 
 Let us now imagine two thousand of the 
 KBOst minute periods which we can conceive, 
 to follow each other in such rapid succession 
 that no interval shall elapse between them. 
 Are these, I would ask, when taken in the ag- 
 gregate, longer than one of them when taken 
 singly ? — If they are, then all must partake of 
 progression, otherwise duration could never 
 arise from a combination of them. But if they 
 are not, we shall then be compelled to acknow- 
 ledge succession in time, while we deny the 
 progress of duration. That any action can ta,ke 
 place in such an instant as does not include du- 
 ration, is I believe utterly impossible. For 
 should we admit this to be possible^ sjuccessiye 
 duration cannot be applicable to all the actions 
 that are performed in time. But to suppose 
 an actio® to be perfoyao^d in time^ whicb^ by 
 excluding progressiori, e^^cludes dujcation, is 
 
307 
 
 to suppose it to be perfot-ined in time, and yet, 
 not so performed at the same time. 
 
 If the division of ttixo particles, in any given 
 portion of matter, can be accomplished by an 
 action which has no progression, /ottr may be 
 divided in the same manner, and for the same 
 reason ; and we may extend the same principle 
 even to the division of the Globe. In the di- 
 vision of larger bodies, progression becomes 
 visible, because it is more suited to our per- 
 ception; but ihe progression of all actions which 
 divide compounded bodies, must be in an ex- 
 act proportion to the quantity of matter which 
 is divided . As an action which divides a world, 
 includes progression, progression must be in- 
 cluded in that action also which divides an ap- 
 ple ; and progression must continue, so long as 
 parts are included in the thing divided. But 
 where there are no parts, there can be no pro- 
 gression^ and where there is no progression, 
 there can be no action ; and where there is no ac- 
 tion, nothing can suffer by it. An action, there- 
 fore, which includes progression, cannot apply 
 to an immaterial substattce ; arid an action whict 
 does not include progression, is a contradiction 
 in terms. I therefore conclude, — that since 
 all those actions with which we are surrounded, 
 must include progression, because they apply 
 to compounded bodies ; and since an action, 
 which includes progression, cannot apply to 
 an immaterial substance, because it is uncom- 
 pounded ; the soul can neVer perish by any 
 such action as those are with which we are ac- 
 quainted ; and must, therefore, be immortal. 
 
308 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 The actual extinction of Being, necessary to our idea 
 of that extinction. The extinguishing action cannot 
 exist until the soul is extinguished by it. Such an 
 action cannot possibly extinguish it. That tohich 
 annihilates the soul, must exist previously to its 
 annihilation. Nothing can act before it has a Being. 
 No destroying action can be said to exist, until the 
 nonentity of the soul gives it birth. Annihilation 
 can neverbeknowntobepossiblethoughit were afact. 
 
 Nor will it be of any avail, to exclude the 
 term " annihilation," and introduce another. 
 The same reasonings which preclude the term 
 will apply with equal force to any other, which 
 includes within it the utter loss of Being. No- 
 thing that is in existence, can be said to be de- 
 prived of existence, while this existence con- 
 tinues — it is a contradiction to suppose it. And / 
 if nothing can be deprived of Being while it is 
 in existence, the actual loss of existence must 
 be necessary, in order to our having that idea 
 of the utter extinction of Being, which arises 
 from the fact itself. If then ovir idea of the 
 utter extinction of Being, can have no existence 
 until the actual, utter extinction of being gives 
 birth to this negative fact, the actual extinction 
 of Being which is supposed to be affected by 
 this act, to which it gives both. existence and a 
 name, must necessarily precede the act itself. 
 And if our idea of the extinction of Being as 
 well as the extinguishing act itself be neces- 
 sarily preceded by the real extinction of Being, 
 from which the act is denominated, and our 
 idea of it derived, the act itself must necessari- 
 
309 
 
 ly be excluded from entering into the produc- 
 tion of that nonentity, from the completion of 
 which alone this extinguishing act receives its 
 nomination. 
 
 If the complete and real nonentity of Being 
 be not necessary to the actual existence of this 
 act of extinction, no reason can be assigned, 
 why this act of extinction might not exist, 
 though the Being remained entire. For if an 
 act which extinguishes Being, can be said. to 
 exist, while the Being thus annihilated or ex- 
 tinguished, remains in actual existence, this 
 act may exist though nothing should be ex- 
 tinguished by it, and in this case it must be an 
 extinguishing act, and not an extinguishing act 
 at the same time. But if on the contrary, the 
 complete nonentity of Being, be necessary to 
 the existence and the name of this extinguish- 
 ing act, this extinguishing act cannot occasion 
 that real nonentity of Being which was neces- 
 sary to give it birth. 
 
 Nor will the absurdity be lessened by- pur 
 supposing that the total extinction of Being is 
 the identical act of the soul's annihilation, even 
 though we allow the terms to be nearly synony- 
 mous : because this is nothing more than the 
 identifying of a fact without having any su£B- 
 jcient reason for allowing it. It is certain that 
 the completion of annihilation is necessary to 
 give reality to our idea of the extinction of 
 Being. If therefore the terms be synonymous, 
 we must conclude that the extinction of Being 
 existed antecedently to its own existence. But 
 since the real completion of the act is npces- 
 
310 
 
 sary, in order to any effects which may be pre- 
 sumed to result from it, we never can identify 
 the two ideas together, and suppose the soul 
 to perish through this cause ; for nothing can 
 contribute towards its own existence. 
 
 An action necessarily supposes the pre-ex- 
 istence of an actor. The supposition, there- 
 fore that the soul can perish, either through 
 " annihilation" — " the extinction of Being," — 
 " the utter loss of existence," or any other cause 
 that may be deemed of synonymous import, 
 leads us to conceive that these causes contri- 
 bute towards the ruin or annihilation of the 
 soul, when they are allowed to depend upoii 
 its annihilation fofthe origin of their existence. 
 And to imagine either of these causes thus to 
 act is to make it contribute towards the cause 
 of its Being, and consequently to act before it 
 could possibly have had any kind of existence. 
 
 The force of these arguments depends upoil 
 the reasonings advanced in the preceding sec- 
 tion ; namely, that all actions imply progres- 
 sion, and that on this very account they can 
 never affect the soul, seeing it has no exterior, 
 no interior^ no surface, no dimensions. Hence 
 then it follows, that if the soul be annihilated 
 by an action, it must be by one which has no 
 progression ; and consequently if such an ac- 
 tion can exist, there can be no medium between 
 its beginning and end. If then there can be 
 no medium between its beginning and end, exist- 
 ence and completion are the same. And as 
 the completion of this action is necessary to 
 its existence, it cannot possibly be said to ex- 
 
311 
 
 ist until completion takes place. Now as com- 
 pletion cannot take place until the soul be 
 utterly" annihilated, annihilation can never b^ 
 occasioned by it,, because it must necessarily 
 have already taken place. This conclusion 
 "will give to the arguBaeats of the present section 
 all their energy, and demonstrate the absuifdity 
 of the supposition, that the soul can perish, by 
 any such action. 
 
 And even in case the soul, through any cause 
 which we cannot comprehend, should be actu- 
 al ly annihilated, it is impossible that we can 
 kipiow the fact, unless its annihilation can be 
 a.seertaiined. Now if this fact be ascertained 
 by any thing, except an express uevelation from 
 God, something must survive the annihilated 
 substance, which bears some relation to it, to 
 give evidence of the fact. And if any thing^ 
 can be supposed to survive, which is so nearly 
 related to the annihilated substance as to, en- 
 able us to ascertain the ftict, the existence of 
 this thing will demonstrably psove that no such 
 annibitatiou has taken place; Hence if nothing 
 can ascertain the fact, it can never be known to be 
 pesaibk although it were an accomplished event. 
 
 The mere absence of Seing, can never afford 
 any proof of the annihilation of Being, while 
 the infinitude of space is too vast for all finite 
 eomprehensions : and mere absence of Seing 
 is, all that can possibly survive the annihilation 
 of any substance, to give evidence of the fact. 
 If then the annihilation of the soul can never 
 be admitted unless we have some evidence of 
 the fact ; — if the only possible evidence that can 
 
512 
 
 exist be the mere absence of Being; — if the total 
 absence of Being can never be ascertained un- 
 til a finite mind can grasp what is infinite ; — 
 and if to grasp infinity be a contradiction, it 
 necessarily follows, thatthe possibility ofannihi- 
 lation must for ever remain unknown, even 
 though in itself it were an actual reality. 
 
 Annihilation can never be admitted, where 
 there is no evidence to induce belief, and the 
 admission of evidence suflicient to induce it, 
 must necessarily contradict that fact which it 
 was designed to prove and establish. 
 
 Such then are the prospects which reasoning 
 and argument afford us, of this interesting and 
 amazing subject. The preceding mass of evi- 
 dence in favour of the soul's immortality has 
 been drawn purely from the fountain head of 
 nature, without deriving any bias from literary 
 prejudices or education. The reasonings may 
 not be alike conclusive, but the fact itself ap- 
 pears to be indisputable. 
 
 ■ In this pleasing but awful reality the wholfe 
 of the human race are deeply interested ; and 
 we are taught by all the evidences which sup- 
 port the fact, the necessity of connecting hap- 
 piness with immortality. This happiness, is 
 placed within our reach, and laid up in store 
 for all therighteous beyond the grave. It was 
 purchased by the blood of Christ, the Saviour 
 of mankind, who is the way, the truth, and the 
 life, and who by his gospel has brought both 
 life and immortalittf to light. ' 
 
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