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CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
Cornell University Library 
 BL210 .B88 
 
 Things divine and supernatural conceved 
 
 i 
 
 a 1924 029 058 539 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029058539 
 
T H„ I N _G S 
 
 DIVINE dnd SUPERNATURAL 
 
 Conceived by 
 
 ANALO G Y 
 
 With Things 
 
 NATURAL and HUMAN. 
 
 i Cor. xiii. 12. 
 
 j^prf «</ Myjieriorum ExpUtatienem attinet, vldemus non 
 dedlgnari Deum ad Infirmtatem C apt us nojlri fe demit- 
 tere ; Myjieria fua ha explicando, ut a nobis optime ea 
 pojjirit per dpi: Atque Revelationes fuas in Rationis noftrte 
 Syllepfes et Notitmes veluti INOCULANDO, atque 
 Infpirqtiones ad Intelle&um noflrum aperiendum fie accom- 
 modando, quemadmadum Figura Clavis aptatur Figurtt 
 Sera. Baca. 
 
 By the Author of 
 The Procedure, Extent and Limits of Human Underftandin?. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for William Innys and Richard Manbtt 
 
 at the Weft-End. of St. Paul's. 
 
 MDCCXXXIIL 
 
t«H E 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 THE Difference between Metaphor and A* 
 nalogy in general ; and of divine Analogy in 
 particular. Pag. i 
 
 CHAP. IE. 
 
 The various Methods of Men's accounting for the 
 manner of our Knowlege of Things Divine and 
 Immaterial. p. i j 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 That there is a true and fure Foundation for this 
 Divine Analogy in the Nature of Things 
 
 p. 41 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Authorities for Divine Analogy. And the mif- 
 taken Notions of it. p. 60 
 
 CHAP, V. 
 
 Another great Miftake concerning Divine Analogy 
 confidered: And the True Notion of a Chri- 
 Jtian Mjfteryflated. p. 1^4 
 
 CHAP. 
 
The Contents. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 A fofitive Proof 'of Divine Analogy? p. 241 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 A pofitvve "Proof of Divine Analogy, with re- 
 
 ' fpeffi to the moral Attributes of God. Arid the 
 
 Divine Attributes rightly Aiftinguifhed. p. 258 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 A Collection ofloofe and general Reflections upon 
 the e DoBrim of 'Divine Analogy, confidered. 
 
 P- 374 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Pig.. 267. line 24. for it read this Internal Difpofition. Pag. 277. 
 line 1 8. after or tnfert eshzu$.ed by. 
 
 OF 
 
.(.'*■) 
 
 O V 
 
 Divine Analogy. 
 
 CHAP. L. 
 
 The Difference between Metaphor and 
 Analogy in general; and of divine 
 Analogy in particular. 
 
 HAVING in the firft Book of the for- 
 mer Trad treated of the Ideas of Senfa- 
 tion, as the only Original Materials for 
 the Mind of Man to work upon, and the Firji 
 Foundation on which the whole Superftru&ure 
 of all our Knowlege both human and divine 
 is railed ; having alio in the Second treated of 
 the Pure Intellect , and its various Operations 
 upon thole Ideas and the Conceptions and Com- 
 plex Notions formed partly out of them : I am 
 now to difcourfe more fully and particularly of 
 that Divine Analogy to which we owe the great- 
 eft Enlargement of human Underftanding ; and 
 without which the Nature and Properties of 
 God and lupernatural Beings, and the Objects 
 of another World, would be as utterly incon- 
 ceivable to us as if they had no Exiftence. 
 
 Nothing, as I have formerly obferved, is 
 B ef 
 
2 DIVINE 
 
 of greater Confequence in order to fet dut 
 rightly the Bounds and Limits of human Un- 
 derftanding ; to the ftating the true Ufe of Rea- 
 fon in Religion ; and to give us a right Notion 
 of our Chriftian Myfteries, than the apprehend- 
 ing with fome ekactneft the Nature of Metaphor 
 and Analogy : Which have been commonly mi- 
 staken one for the other, and treated of indi- 
 itincHy and confufedly under one and the fame 
 Confideration ; whereas there is a great and ma- 
 terial Difference between them, which tho' I 
 have already touched on, I fhall now defcribe 
 more at large. 
 
 Metaphor in general, is a Subfiitution of 
 the Idea or Conception of one Thing, with the 
 Term belonging to it, to Stand for another 
 Thing, on Account of an Appearing Similitude 
 only, Without any real Refemblancej and true cor- 
 refpondency between the Things compared; as when 
 the Pfalmift defcribes the Verdure and Fruitful' 
 nefs of Vallies by Laughing and Singing. Ana- 
 logy in general, is the StibfUtuting the Idea 
 or Conception of one Thing to Stand for and Re- 
 prefent another, on Account of a Trm Refem- 
 blance, and Correfpondent Reality in the very Na- 
 ture of the Things compared. It is defined by 
 Ari/lotle, 'icrcTtis tov Xoysv, an Equality or Parity 
 of Reafon; tho' in Striftnefs and Truth the Pa- 
 rity of Reafoning is rather Built on the Simili- 
 tude and Analogy and confequent to them, 
 than the fame Thing with them. 
 
 i. They 
 
ANALOGY. 3 
 
 t. TkE y both agree in this, That they are 
 equaly a Subfiitution of the Idea or Conception 
 of one Thing to Hand for another \ and that 
 by them a Word is Transfered from its Firfi and 
 Proper Signification, to exprefs fbme other Thing 
 in a more remote and Secundary Meaning. 
 
 2. They agree alfd in this, That the, Sub' 
 ftituted Ideas or Conceptions cannot, either in 
 Analogy or Metaphor, Represent to our Mind 
 any thing of the Real true Nature of the Ob- 
 jects they ftand for, As they are in themfelves. 
 They only fornifh us at beft with Similitudes; 
 or Reprefentative and Mediate Conceptions of 
 thofe Obje&s. 
 
 But they differ in this* Firft, That the 
 Ground and Foundation of Metaphor confifts only 
 in an Appearing or Imaginary Refemblance and 
 Correfpondency ; as when God is laid to have 
 Hands, and Eyes t and Ears. But the Founda- 
 tion of Analogy is an ABual Similitude and a 
 Real Correfpondencj in the very Nature of 
 Things ; which lays a Foundation for a Parity 
 ofReafon even between Things different in Na- 
 ture and Kind: As when God is faid to have 
 Knowlege, Power ', and Goodnefs. 
 
 a. They differ in this. Metaphor is alto- 
 gether Arbitrary, and the Refult merely of the 
 Imagination ; it is rather a Figure of Speech, 
 than a Real Similitude and Cofflparlfon of Things;' 
 
 B 2 and 
 
4 DIVINE 
 
 and therefore is properly of Confideration in 
 Rhetoric and Poetry. -But Analogy being built 
 on the very Nature of Things themlelves, is. 
 aNeceJfary andUfeful.Method of Conception and 
 Reafoning; and therefore of Confideration in. 
 Phyfics and Metaphyfics. It is the Refult of 
 Reafon viewing the True Nature of Beings. 
 The Comparifon here contains fomething not 
 only A&ual and Real, but Correspondent and *5V- 
 milar ;* and the Parity of Reafoning upon it is 
 juft and true. For Inftance, when God is called 
 a Father in reiped of Chrift, being derived from 
 his very Nature and Eflence; both the Word 
 and Conception are transfered to him by Ana- 
 logy, founded on the very Nature of God and 
 of Man, thus : What a Father is to his Son be- 
 gotten in the way of Nature, That God the 
 Father is to Chrift who was derived from him 
 by a fupernatural Generation. The Applica- 
 tion of the fame Conception and Word Son to 
 both is not Arbitrary ; but founded on a real 
 Correfpondency Antecedent to any Operation of 
 our Mind upon it. 
 
 As all Language abounds with Metaphor 
 and that Analogy which is between worldly 
 Things, inf§much that by Reafon of the con- 
 ftant Ufe of fuch Phrafes we do not often di- 
 ftinguifh the Propriety from the Secondary Mean- 
 ing : So the Scriptures are full of this Divine 
 Analogy ; as I have intitled it in the* flrft of 
 thefe Tra&s, to diftinguifh it from that which 
 is Human , and founded on the Refemblance 
 
 and 
 
ANALOGY. 5 
 
 and Correfpondency we obferve between the 
 *Things of this World , which are eoualy the 
 Immediate Obje&s of our Senfes and our Reafon : 
 But more particularly when they fpeak of the 
 Myfteries of Chriftianity , as in the Words Fa- 
 ther ; Son, Holy Spirit, Mediator, Redemption, In- 
 tercejjion, and fuch like. So that we run into 
 them inlenfibly, and they become fo familiar to 
 us that we do not diftinguifti the Analogy in 
 thole Terms, from trie ftridr. Propriety of them 
 as they were originaly applyed to the common 
 and immediate Objects of our Faculties. 
 
 This Divine Analogy differs from that 
 which is Human y Firftj In that the Particular 
 Similitude and Correfpondency which is the 
 Foundation of human Analogy, either is or may 
 be in forne Degree Known. It is between Things 
 'which are, or may be, equaly the DireEf and 
 Immediate Objects of our Faculties In fome Mea~ 
 Jure; as the Operations of Reafon in Man, and 
 of Natural Inftinlf in Brutes. But the Parti* 
 cular Similitude, and Precife Correfpondency 
 which is the Ground of that divine Analogy by 
 which we transfer our Conceptions and Words 
 from Earth to Heaven, and from Man to God; 
 is not only aclualy Unknown, but as Inconceiv- 
 able to us as thole divine Things themfelves 
 "Which.it ferves to reprefent. The Companion 
 and Parity of Realon here is drawn between 
 Things well known and familiar ; and what is 
 immaterial, lupernatural, and inconceivable to 
 *js As it is in its felf, and far removed out of the 
 B 3 Pire$ 
 
6 DIVINE 
 
 DireB Reach of all our Capacities. And accord- 
 ingly in this divine Analogy there is always 
 One Term at leaft, expreffive of fbmething no£ 
 to be known or comprehended As it is in its 
 own Nature. For Inftance, What Wifdom is in 
 an human Creature, That fome Similar and Cor- 
 refpondent , but Incomprehenfible Perfection is in 
 God. We have but One Conception for both, 
 thefe Things { we exprefs them by the Same 
 Word JVijdon\--, and we Analogicaly transfer 
 both the Word and the Conception from that 
 Wifdom and Thought we are immediately Con- 
 fcious of, to that imperceptible and ineffable 
 Perfe&ion in the Divinity, to the True and Real 
 Nature of which we are intirely blind : Which 
 Perfection is in the utmoft Propriety of Speech 
 we are capable of, called Wifdom ; and not 
 by a mere Figure only which is purely Vo- 
 luntary^ and which has no Foundation in the 
 Nature of Things. 
 
 Just thus are all the Myfteries of the Go? 
 fpel conceived and expreffed. The Term Me* 
 diator for Inftance is thus transfered to Chrift. 
 In its Strictly proper Acceptation it fignifies 
 what is common and familiar ; namely a Per* 
 fon who interpofes between Men at Variance, 
 and by his good Offices on both Sides works 
 an intire Reconciliation and Friendfhjp, This 
 plain vulgar Word and Conception are in the 
 Gofpel Substituted to exprefs and Reprefent to us 
 Chrift's Mediation between God and Man • the 
 True Kind and Manner of which as it is in it 
 
 felf, 
 
ANALOGY. 7 
 
 felf, is to+us inconceivable and ineffable. How- 
 ever, tho' the Real Nature of it is thus above 
 all our Capacities, yet thus much we learn from 
 the Term Clearly and Fully and Certainly: That 
 as an human Perfbn by his Mediation perfectly 
 t econciles others at Enmity among themfelves J 
 lb are we brought into favour with God, by 
 that incomprehensible Performance of Chrift, 
 which we can no otherwile conceive than un- 
 der the Analogy of a worldly Mediation. So 
 that it is a Real and Similar and Correjpondeni 
 Performance of Chrift ; tho' not a Literal Me- 
 diation, or any Operation the fame in Kind with 
 what is merely natural and human. 
 
 Now tho' this divine Analogy is certainly 
 founded on an Affual Similitude and Real Cor' 
 refpondency between worldly and human, and 
 Supernatural and divine Objects : Yet ic is very 
 fure the things of this Life can bear no fuch 
 Refemblance or Correfporidency to heavenly 
 Things, as they do to each other. And this is 
 more efpecialy true of thofe Conceptions and 
 Words by which we exprefs the Attributes of 
 God: For it is utterly impoflible to conceive, 
 what Particular Degree or Proportion of Simi- 
 litude and Correfpondency the Properties of a 
 Finite Creature bear to the Perfections of an In- 
 finite Creator. And therefore we muft and ought 
 to depend on the Veracity and Goodrieis of God, 
 who has made this Analogy Necejfary to us in 
 onr Conceptions of hirhfelf ; for fuch a True 
 and Realj tho' Incomprehenfibk Similitude and 
 B 4 CorreC* 
 
§ DIVINE 
 
 Correlpondency between them^ as may be a fafe 
 and fufficient Foundation for all our Moral Rea- 
 sonings and Religious Sentiments. So that tho' 
 we have the greateft Reafon, and are under an 
 ablblute Neceffity to pie divine Analogy in all 
 our Conceptions and Difcourfes of God, and 
 Things heavenly and immaterial ; yet That 
 Part of the Ground of it which exifts in the Di- 
 vine Things themielves, is utterly impercepti- 
 ble to us. Thq' we are fure there muft be a Real 
 Ground for it there, yet we cannot tell Parr 
 ticularly what it is, or comprehend Wherein ex? 
 a£?ly it confifts. 
 
 Fro m what has been laid we may dilcern 
 how the Words Door, Vine, Way, and Light 
 when apply ed to Chrift, and many other fuch 
 like Terms with which the Scripture abounds, 
 are pure Figure and Metaphor : Becaule they con- 
 tain no other than an Imaginary Relemblance ; 
 and the Companion is between Things equaly 
 the DireB Objects of our Underftanding At pre- 
 sent. Sq thrift figuratively calls himfelf a Door, 
 as by him we are Admitted into his Church 
 on Earth , and by that Means into Heaven 
 hereafter. He fays of himfelf 1 am the true Vine, 
 becaufe all good Chriftians are Branches Graft- 
 ed upon him by being admitted Members of his 
 Church, and fo become Partakers Here of all 
 the happy Means of Salvation i^hich nourifh thq 
 Soul. He fays again I am the Way, as his Doc- 
 trine Directs us here in our Way to Heaven. 
 And thus he is ftylecl the Light of the Worldj 
 
 as 
 
ANALOGY. 9 
 
 as his Inftruftions and Example difperfe the 
 Clouds of Error, Inform our Underftandings, and 
 DireB our moral A&ions. The Comparhon in 
 thefe Inftances is between a Door, and Admif- 
 fion into the Vtftble Church of Chrift ; between 
 a Vine, and the Members of his Church Here-, 
 between a Way, and his Doffrine ; between 
 Light % and his InjlruBions and Example. So, 
 that there is nothing of that Dwine Analogy m 
 them by which a Word is transfered from the 
 proper and immediate Ohjedls of our Senfes 
 and Realbn, to import fomething Divine and 
 Supernatural j nor are they made Ufe of to 
 Hand for and Reprefent any Similar and Corres- 
 pondent Reality in the Nature or Operations of 
 Heavenly Beings ; as it is in the words Father, 
 Son, Holy Spirit, Redemption, Inter cejfion, and iucri 
 like , under which Terms the Myfteries of Chri- 
 stianity are revealed to us. Befides that the 
 firft Sort of Words are ufed without znAbfolute 
 JSfecejffitiy, and may all of them be expreffed with- 
 out a Figure and in proper Terms : But the 
 latter are abfblutely NeceJJary in our prefent 
 State ; becaule we can have no Proper Words 
 or Ideas, nor any DireB Conceptions of Things 
 divine and purely immaterial. To which I fliall 
 add, that we can make Good Seme of all that 
 former Sort of Words and Expreffions relat- 
 ing to God, and to Chrift, and to Heaven 
 (which are pure Figure) Without transfering 
 them to any Thing Realy Like and Correfpon- 
 dent'va immaterial Beings. But we can find no 
 Sence or Meaning irj the Latter Sort ? unlefs we 
 
 luppofe 
 
io DIVINE 
 
 fuppofe them to fignify fbmething a&ualy True 
 and Similar and Anfwerable in the Very Nature 
 of God and of Chrift. 
 
 i. From thefe Inftances it appears they 
 differ in this likewife. That Human Analogy 
 is in great Meafure Voluntary^ becaufe whatever 
 is thereby intended, is capable of being known 
 by DireB Ideas or Conceptions, and exprefled 
 by a proper Word, tbo' perhaps not with the 
 fame Emphafis and Elegance ; thus the liibtle 
 Knowlege of a Fox may be expreffed by Natural 
 JnflinBj which is more proper. But the Ufe 
 of divine Analogy is from abfblute Nee ejjity^ be- 
 caufe we have neither "Proper Ideas or Words, 
 nor Vireff Conceptions of Things divine and 
 immaterial; and muft therefore not think nor 
 fpeak of them at all, unleis we perform it by 
 a Similitude and Correfpqndency with Things 
 human and immediately known. God's Know-> 
 lege for Inftance could never have been Juftly 
 and Ufefully conceived by us at all ; if we did not 
 form a Conception of it by Analogy with that 
 Knowlege and Thinking which we experience 
 in an human Mind. And Chrift's prevailing 
 in Heaven with God the Father for our Pardon 
 and Reconciliation, could no way lb juftly be 
 revealed to us, as by Analogy with a Man's be- 
 ing an Advocate and Interceding fuccefsfully with 
 a temporal Prince for the Life of another who is 
 a Criminal ; and thus it is in all the other My- 
 ileries of Chriftianity , and Attributes of God. 
 
 1 3, A 
 
ANALOGY. ii 
 
 3. A Third Difference is this. That Hu- 
 man Analogy as well 9.5 all Metaphor, may 
 confift in a Subftitution of mere Ideas of Sen- 
 fati&n only. But the true Divine Analogy, con- 
 fift? in a Subftitution of our Conceptions and 
 Complex Notions, to reprefent fupernatural and 
 heavenly Things. The Realbn of this is ap- 
 parent 5 bceaufe Qbje&sof mere Senfe can bear 
 no Real Refimblance to purely fpiritual Beings ; 
 they cannot Reprefent any Similar and Corref- 
 pond&tt Reality in divine Things, But the Fa- 
 culties and Properties and Operations of our own 
 Minds, and the Confiious Conceptions we have of 
 them 3 together with fome of the Complex No' 
 tions we form out of Them confidered in Con- 
 junction with Ideas of Senfe; furnjlh us with 
 fuch a Real Refemblance and True Corn/pendency 
 between the Properties and Actions of human 
 Creatures, and the Attributes and Operations of 
 divine and fupernatural Beings, as ferve all the 
 noble Ends of Morality and Religion in this 
 Xife. And we form an unanfwerable Argument 
 to prove that fuch Analogical Conceptions are 
 Jufi and True ■, not only from our being created 
 after the Imme of God ; But alfo from the ah* 
 folute Ntceflrty of this Analogy to our Thinking 
 and Speaking at all of the divine Being and the 
 Qbje&s of another Life s as well as from the 
 Example of God himfelf in his Revelation to 
 Mankind. 
 
 I t may be objected againft this laft Piftin- 
 
 ftion, 
 
12 DIVINE 
 
 aion, That in all our moft abftrafted Concep- 
 tions and moft fublime Complex Notions, there 
 is a mixture of Ideas of Senfation ; which render 
 them very Improper and Unworthy Reprefenta- 
 tions of Purely Spiritual Perfedions ; and that 
 for this Reafon there can be no True and Jujl 
 Analogy between them. 
 
 I Answer, that without doubt there is a 
 mixture of Ideas of Senfe in our moft elevated 
 Notions and Conceptions. We cannot be con- 
 fcious of any Faculty of our own Minds without 
 confidering it, either as operating on fome Ideas 
 of Senfe, or without taking them in SomeMeafure 
 into the Account : While our Spirit continues 
 to a£t in a neceffary Conjunction with Matter, 
 this muft be the Cafe,. But all that can be truly 
 infered from hence is, That therefore fuch fub- 
 ftituted Objects and Analogous Conceptions do 
 not furnifh us with any Knowlege of divine and 
 fupernatural Things as they are In themfelves, 
 but with Similitudes only of them; That they 
 are not ExaB Images of them in Every RefpeB\ 
 That they do not convey to us any Idea of the 
 Real Nature of thofe Beings 5 That there is not 
 fuch a Perfeti, Complete and Adequate Refem- 
 blance betweem Them and their fupernatural 
 Correfpondent Realities, as if we were all Spirit, 
 and could form Conceptions of thefe without 
 any mixture of fuch Ideas: All which I readily 
 grant. But ftill there is fuch a Real tho' Di- 
 Jtant Refemblance and Analogy between them, 
 unci the Objects they are fubftituted .to repre- 
 
 fenti 
 
ANALOGY. 13 
 
 lent ; as lays a folid Foundation whereon to 
 build a Juji Parity of Reafoning between 
 them. Tho' the Knowlege we have after this 
 Manner of divine and heavenly Obje&s be Ana- 
 logous only , yet it is not Delujwe ; it is Jufl, 
 and Real, and True, and Clear, as far as it goes j 
 and therefore no Improper Reprefentation as the 
 Objection fuppofes ; unleft by Improper be 
 meant Analogical, as oppofed to Proper Ideas or 
 DiretJ Conceptions. The Faculties and Proper- 
 ties and Operations of our own Spirit, tho' in 
 Conjunction with Matter, and notwithstanding 
 the inevitable Mixture of fenfitive Ideas in pur 
 Conceptions ; will always afford us a True tho' 
 Remote Analogy whereby to conceive the Attri- 
 butes and Operations of God himfelf, after 
 whole Image it was created. Befides that what- 
 lbever is bound down upon us by an abfblute 
 Neceffity of our Nature, and is the very Beji 
 Method of proceeding we have ; cannot be 
 juftly called Improper or Unworthy. We might 
 as well argue that we can form no Notions at 
 all Worthy of God, becaufe our Soul actsnecef- 
 iarily in Conjunction with Matter. Whereas 
 were the brighter! Angel in Heaven to form an 
 Analogous Conception of God from its own Per- 
 fections, even this would be but a diftant «5V- 
 militude only or Reprefentation of them in a Finite 
 Creature ; tho* perhaps it might thus be made 
 up Without any Ideas of Senfe intermixed ; and 
 yet we cannot fay it would- be Improper or Un- 
 iportihy. Now all the Difference between fitch 
 4n Angel's Conception of God , and our's, 
 
 would 
 
i4 DIVINE 
 
 would be this ; That as he is created in a nearer 
 Refemblance of the Divinity, fo his Analogy 
 would be vaitly more Perfeff, and ExaSf, and 
 Lively than our's ; tho' at the fame time our's 
 may be equaly Juft, and True, and Clear, and 
 Worthy, as far as it goes. And therefore, 
 
 4. AFourth Difference is this. That in 
 this divine Analogy we cannot juftly fay the 
 lame Word or Conception is attributed to one 
 Thing Properly, and to another Improperly ; as 
 it is in Metaphor, and in many Inftances of hu- 
 man Analogy : Becaufe we can have no Words 
 Stftffly proper for thole heavenly Things ; and 
 therefore they cannot be laid to be Improperly 
 expreffed or reprefented by the only Terms 
 and Conceptions we can Poffibly ufe for them, 
 and which accordingly are the moft proper 
 Terms and Notions we are capable of. But we 
 can truly fay, that in divine Analogy the lame 
 Word and Conception is affixed to one Thing 
 Properly or Liter aly, and to another Analogicalyi 
 that is, after the moft proper Manner we are 
 Capable of conceiving and expreifing it. The 
 Word and Conception is Strittly proper to one, 
 and Necejfarily transfered to the other. Thus 
 the Word Intercejfion with the Notion annexed 
 to it, is properly and literaly ufed for one 
 Man's Application to another for the Pardon of 
 a third Perfbn ; and yet it does not exprefs and 
 reprefent the divine and incomprehenfible In- 
 terceffion of Chrifi with the Father for the Par- 
 don of Sinners Improperly, but Analogicaly '.- Be- 
 caule 
 
ANALOG Y. 15 
 
 caufe theie are the only Word and Conception 
 we have for it ; and thefe are Necejjarily ufed to 
 convey to us the Knowlege of a Thing, for 
 the Real Nature and True Manner of which we 
 can have neither a Proper Term nor any Direff 
 Idea or Notion. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 The various Methods of Men's accounting 
 for the manner of our Knowlege of 
 Things Divine and Immaterial. 
 
 THIS "Divine Analogy of which I have 
 been difcourfing, is that by which the 
 Mind of Man is render'd capable of railing it- 
 felf above all things Material and Human ; by 
 which only it can acquire any acquaintance 
 with the World of Spirits, or the great Creator; 
 with thole heavenly Obje&s which are yet be- 
 hind the Veil, and will not open to a more Di- 
 rect and Immediate View, till we enter into the 
 Holy of Holies , where we are to behold Face to. 
 Face. 
 
 Concerning this Analogy I fhall make 
 the following Obfervatiqns. 
 
 1. We are to lay it down as a lure and un- 
 deniable Truth which holds univerfaly, That 
 we have not the leaft Perception or Idea of things 
 Immaterial, of purely fpiritual Beings, or of 
 
 God 
 
16 DIVINE 
 
 God in particular, as they are in their Own Na- 
 ture •> nor doth the leaft fpark or glympfe of 
 the Light of Heaven, or Glory of God dart 
 itfelf Direttly into an human Mind. We have 
 no Faculties of Body or Soul for any iiich £)j- 
 TeB Idea or Perception of them in this Life. 
 
 Men have feveral ways endeavoured to ac- 
 count for the Manner of our Knowlege or Con- 
 ceptions of things Immaterial. Some lay the 
 Ideas which they fuppofe we have of them, are 
 derived from their original Ideas in the divine 
 Mind, Tanquam ab aterno exemplari ; as from 
 the Archetypes according to which all things were 
 formed: For they fuppofe that God hath in 
 himfelf the Ideas of all things created by him, 
 and that we derive them Immediately from 
 thence ; thus a Modern Philolbpher explains it 
 farther , By the Power of which Ideas they were 
 created ■, i^yEterna Veritas exterius nos admonet per 
 imagines a rebus defumptas; fed forte interim per 
 illam Similitudinem qua rem ipfam producit. 
 
 Another way of accounting for our 
 Knowlege and Conceptions of God and heaven- 
 ly things is, by imagining r our Ideas of them 
 to be as fome fparfcs of divine Light, ftrucfc 
 out of the Mind by a ftrong impreffion from 
 above. The Ideas of this fort are defcribed to 
 be §uadam Intelleftionis fcintillatio, et efi momen- 
 tanea-, they are called Repentina Lumina, fuch 
 as happen but feldom, and do not remain upon 
 the Mind j and we have, fay they, no Idea of 
 
 God 
 
A N A L O G ¥. t? 
 
 God in this Life but Per fubitas et intercifds Co- 
 ruftdtionesi -Other Philofophers on the contrary- 
 lay that material Objects are perceived by Ideas i 
 but that immaterial Objects are Self Intelligible ; 
 they could find no Ideas of them in the Mind, 
 and from thence concluded that things Immate- 
 rial muft be perceived without any Mediation of 
 Ideas; 
 
 Others again teil us this is performed by 
 Purely Spiritual Symbols or Reprefentations of 
 thofe immaterial Beings Infenjibly conveyed into 
 the Mind; accordingly they fay Genus. videndi 
 Deum eftSymbolicum-, funt enim Jpiritalia fymbolA 
 quibus Deus eminns confpkitur ; by help of which 
 we have very imperfect and diltant Views of 
 him.- 
 
 Others, becaufe they could not rightly di* 
 ftinguiih the different manner of our Knowlege 
 of things putely Spiritual, and Material ; put 
 them all upon a Level and held, That we fee alt 
 things in God: For he having the Ideas of all 
 things, in him, and being ever prefent to out 
 Minds, we can lee thole Ideas no otherwile than 
 they are in that divine Mind which is prefent to 
 ours ; and puriuant to, this Notion they ftyle 
 God the Iriteltigible World or Place of Spirits, as 
 this World is the Place of things Material 
 
 Others again have found themlelves fo in- 
 tirely at a lofs, that they have refolved the man- 
 ner of our Conceiving the divine Nature and 
 G Perfection* 
 
i8 DIVINE 
 
 Perfections into fome fecret and altogether url-/ 
 
 accountable Immediate C&nfcioufnefs of the Mind, 
 which they imagine for that very purpofe to be 
 nearly allied , and as it were adapted to the Di- 
 vinity. Cm \T)eo~\ as a Modern Philofopher ex- 
 preffes it, Ut ret cognata mens coaptatur, quern 
 rnagis prgfagit quam intelligit ; eique arcano quo- 
 dam contaffu copulatur. Eft enim in ipfo mentis 
 Apice quidam fenfus, el velut tatfus, quo tangimus 
 potius, quam intelligamus §uid Deus fit. 
 
 N 
 
 The way of accounting for this fort of 
 Knowlege Metaphyficaly is, that it is performed 
 by a kind of Ideas Purely Intellectual, by ab- 
 itra&ion from all things Senfible and Material j 
 Intelleffus, fays a Metaphyfician, e fpeckbus cor- 
 porek alias omnino fpirituales ei intetligibiles, velut 
 per diftillationem quandam, extrahit. 
 
 Lastly, the ufual way of accounting for 
 this Knowlege of things purely fpiritual with 
 fome Divines, is by attributing it to an Irradi- 
 ation from the Fountain of Light, or a Ray from 
 God let into our Souls ; which gives us clearer 
 or lefs diftincl perceptions of the Divine Nature 
 and things of another World, according to the 
 increafe ,of Grace and permanent Operations, of 
 the Holy' Spirit within us. This the Myjlical 
 Divines carry on to fuch an intimate Union and 
 Gonverfation with God and all things Spiritual, 
 as is not to be performed but by a 'iufpenfion 
 of all the Operations of Senle and Reafon. This 
 a very elevated Genius of that ftrain defcribes 
 
 by 
 
ANALOGY. 19 
 
 "by fuch a Simple Intuition of the Abyfs of the 
 Deity, as is performed Abfque Imaginatione, out 
 
 immixtione Rationis -cum Oculns Rationis et In- 
 
 ftlleftionis retmditur et obfcuratur -, /implex vero 
 dnim<eX)culus apertus manet 5 et hac efi pur a, nni- 
 formis, et ultra captum elevata meditatw. This 
 -again your Enthufiafts of a lower Rank, with 
 more Ignorance and Confidence, and much lefs 
 mixture of fincerity and true Religion, do carry 
 On yet farther ; And arrogate to themielves a 
 Direfit and familiar intercourfe with the very 
 Nature of God and fpiritual Things 5 and fuch, 
 an Immediate View of them by an Inward Light 
 from Heaven in the Mind, as fenders the Ufe 
 of all Senfation and Reafoning vain and unne- 
 ceffary. But the Gnqfticks of old carryed this yet 
 one ftep higher ; to fuch an intimate Kndwlege 
 of the Real Nature and EJJence of all things Spi- 
 ritual, and even to fuch an internal Senie and 
 Feeling of them by Supernatural Illumination, 
 as was fufficient to iah&ify the vileft and moft 
 exorbitant Sallies of their Lufts and Pallions. 
 
 By thefe and Other fuch Methods, whereof 
 we can form no clear and diftincl: Conception, 
 and exprefled in dark Phrafes to which* we can 
 affix no determinate Sence or Meaning, have 
 Men gone about to account for the manner of 
 our conceiving the Things of another World : 
 And they all proceed upon this grofs Miftake, 
 That our manner of conceiving things Immate- 
 rial is by ibme fort of Ideas ,of them, as we do 
 fenfible and material Objefts. But. as I ob* 
 C a feryedj 
 
so DIVINE 
 
 N ferved, we rhuft lay this down for a certain 
 Troth, that we have no Capacities for any Idea 
 of the Real Nature of them in the leaft degree ; 
 no more than a Man born blind hath for any 
 Idea of the Sun or of Light. Such a Man, 
 of no more than four Senfes, could not be laid 
 to have only an Imperfeff, Glimmering, uncer- 
 tain View of Things - r but No View at all : Light 
 would be^ to him in this refpeft as thick Darfc- 
 nefs ; the Sun and Moon and Stars, the Firma- 
 ment and all the Heavenly Bodies would be to 
 him as imperceptible by any Idea of them as 
 if they had no Being; The Word Light would 
 be to this Man a Term to which he could affix 
 no direct Idea or Conception. 
 
 L e t us luppole then that all Men were in 
 the fame Condition without the Senfe of Seeing, 
 and that God were to reveal to us there was luch 
 a thing as Light. We having neither a Name nor 
 an Idea for it^ nor any Capacity of conceiving 
 the True Nature of it as it is in it felf; it is plain 
 this could not be revealed to us by the Name 
 Light, a Word wholy unknown to us, and for 
 which we had no Idea or Conception. Nor 
 would it be. revealed by any Direff and Immtr 
 diaU Irnpreffion of the Object Itfelf ftrifcing up- 
 on us; there being no Organ, of "Senfation for 
 the Perception of it. ., Nor would this be per- 
 formed by any Supernatural Operation caufing 
 Jbme little, obfcure, zad Confiifed Glimmerings 
 of Light to break in upon, the Pure Intellect-, 
 for tho' we lhould fuppofe the pure Intellect 
 
 capable 
 
ANALOGY. 21 
 
 capable of this, yet ftill it would be impoffible 
 for one Man to Communicate this Revelation to 
 another as blind as himielf ; and it would re- 
 quire the lame Almighty Power after the fame 
 Manner to enlighten the Mind of every indivi- 
 dual Man, or he could have no fort of Idea 
 of it. 
 
 I f therefore it were to. be revealed to fuch 
 blind Mortals that there was fuch a thing as 
 Light, this would be performed by the Subjli- 
 tution or Mediation of ibme Words and Ideas or 
 Conceptions already well known and familiar 
 to us. And accordingly when we were told, 
 that it was lomething which derived its being 
 from the very Subftance of a Glorious Body cal- 
 led the Sun , whereof we could now have no 
 other DireB Knowlege but that of its Name and 
 its Exigence •, that it was Coeval with that Siin, 
 tho' it is as truly Derived from it as a Child 
 from his Father who begat him ; that they were 
 truly and realy DifltnB from each other, and 
 yet. lb much one and the fame as to-be. ftill In- 
 separable. When we were informed, that this 
 was what Warms and Cherifheth and Invigo- 
 rates us after an infenfible Manner ; and that it 
 is from thence we continue to have Life, and 
 Motion and Subfiftence ; That it can diffufe it 
 felf in an Inftant thro' a Vaft and Immenfe Ex- 
 panfion ; That when our Eyes were opened it 
 would help to enlarge our Underftanding, and 
 marvelloufly recreate and delight us, by enabling 
 us to diftinguilh things much more accurately, 
 C 3 and 
 
52 DIVINE 
 
 and after quite another Manner, than ever we 
 did before ; by difcovering to us Myriads of new 
 and furprizing Objects, with their differemvAr- 
 xangements and Proportions j and at luch di- 
 ftances from us and each other, as could not now 
 enter into our Hearts to imagine. , After all 
 this, we fhould remain as utterly void of any 
 Direff Idea of Light and its Red Nature as we 
 did before ; and rhe very beft Conception we 
 could form of it from all this Revelation, would 
 amount to no more than an IndireU-, and Subfti- 
 futed, and Complex Knowlege, collected from 
 thofe Ideas we were already flocked with by 
 our four Senfes, and the Mind's various Ope- 
 rations upon them \ inftead of that Simple Idea 
 we mould have of it, had we a proper Senfe for 
 its perception. 
 
 This ferves in fome meafure to illuftrate the 
 Cafe of us Mortals in this Condition of Imper- 
 fection and Infirmity we are now in. We are 
 Born Blind in refpect of the True Nature of things 
 Immaterial and their Real Properties'-, of God 
 in particular, and of all the Things of another 
 World, as they are in Them/elves. So that we 
 may tire our felves out with the moft exquifite 
 Labour of Abftraction ; and range all our Ideas 
 either among themfelves alone, or combined 
 and complicated with the confeious Knowlege 
 of the Mind's Operations, into Millions of diffe- 
 rent Figures and Notions, without arriving 
 to one direct Idea or Conception of Heavenly 
 Qbje&s. The very utmqft qur g/eajeft Efforts 
 
 can 
 
A~N-K LOGY. 23 
 
 can ever arrive to, will prove no other than 
 Analogical Conceptions and Subftituted Reprefen- 
 tations of Things, whole real Nature and At- 
 tributes are at prefent intirely out of the DireEf 
 reach of our moft fublime Capacities. And 
 therefore I am to obferve, 
 
 adlyi That we have no Ideas, properly 
 ipeaking, even of the Mind of Man, or any of 
 its faculties and Operations. We cannot with 
 our utmoft Intention of Thought and greateft 
 Energy of Abftra&ion form to our felves any 
 priginal and Purely Intellectual Ideas of the Na- 
 ture and workings of our own Mind. And the 
 Reafon of this is, becaufe the moft abftracted 
 and exalted Operations of the Human Mind 
 are Aftions of both Matter and Spirit in EJJen- 
 tidl\ J nion, and not peculiar to either Alone: We 
 have indeed an immediate Confcioufnefs : of the 
 Operations Themfelves, without the Interven- 
 tion of any Idea of them; but no Perception 
 of them by fuch Abjfraffi or feparate /<fez of any 
 ibrt. 
 
 Thinking, Willing, Intellect, Memory, , 
 "Hope, Joy, Fear, Love, Grief, . and other Terms 
 which are commonly miftakeh to be expreffive 
 of fuch Simple Ideas ; are not realy Words affixed 
 to any immediate and Purely Spiritual Ideas 
 which we have of thofe Operations and Pafc 
 lions, exclufive of Matter and Senfation, as 
 lbme imagine : But they are expreffive of fo 
 jmany Complex Conceptions which we form to our 
 C 4 felves 
 
24 DIVINE 
 
 felves from that immediate internal Confbipu£ 
 nels vye have of the Mind's different manner 
 of Atfing or Operating, firft on Ideas of Senfe, 
 and then ppop Notions made up partly of 
 fuch Ideas ; as alfo from the manner; pf bpfh 
 Body and Mind being JjfecJed Paj^vely by fuch 
 Objects and Pperations ; as any Man who con- 
 fults his own Nature attentively and impar- 
 tiaJy will readily allow. 
 
 Nothing can be more abfurd than for a 
 Being compofed qf Spirit and Body in ftricl: and 
 intimate Union, to imagine it can frame either 
 Merely Sensitive or Merely Spiritual Ideas of its 
 thinking Faculty or its Ads : And if it has not 
 Ideas of either fort Separately, coqfequently it 
 can have no Direct and immediate Knowlege of 
 its own Mind but by Complex Conceptions, form- 
 fd from a Confiioufnefs of the Operations them- 
 jtelveSj and Ideas of Senfe taken together; and 
 as neceffarily intermixed and blended in order 
 to this Knowlege of its felf, as its own EfFence 
 is in fa£t compounded of Matter and Spirit. 
 Nay the State and Condition of an human Mind 
 Would, in this refpeft, be apparently the fame 
 I ijow'defcribp it; tho' we mould, fuppofe our 
 -Spirit to ad not in effential Union With $he 
 Body ; but only In it a^s a mere Inftrument ne- 
 ceflary to the exerting its Operations. For in 
 fuch a Cafe, pur forming Merely Spiritual or 
 purely intellectual Ideas of the Mind,, whjch 
 fhouid be totaly independent of Senfe ; would 
 prove contrary to the very Supposition of Mat 7 
 
ANALOGY. 25 
 
 ter being an Inftrument Necejfary to its Opera- 
 tions : And fuppofes our Spirit to ad in a Ne- 
 cejfary Dependence on material Organs, and yet 
 Independently of them at the fame Time 9 or 
 which amounts to the fame thing, Thgt th? 
 jnaterial Inftrument is Necejfary to the Opera- 
 tions of the pure Intellect, and JSfyt necejfary a£ 
 the lame Time. 
 
 For theie Reafpns it is, that whenever we 
 Attempt to frame any Ideas, properly lpeaking» 
 of the find's Operations or the Manner of them, 
 they prove no more than Indirect Metaphorical 
 Images borrowed from Senie and Imagination 5 
 and no Diredf Reprefentations or Original Ideas of 
 any thing tranfa&ed in the Mind it felf. What 
 a large Stock of Ideas and Words for that pur- 
 pofe doth the Eye with its Objects furniih to 
 (Speech ? This being the qpbleft sjnd moftexten- 
 five Organ pf Sjeniation, ancj its Objects moil 
 plain and delightful, we chpofe the Words be- 
 longing to it, to express raoft of the Operations 
 pf the Eye of the JVfind ; and when thefe fail, 
 we have recourle to the reft of pur Senfes. Per- 
 ception is a Word and Idea transferee] from the 
 View and Sight we take pf Material Objects, 
 to a quality of the pure Intellect. Difcerning 
 is fuppoled to be fomething in the Mind like 
 a Power the Eye hath of diftinguiihing its dif- 
 ferent. Objects. So Comparing Ideas takes its 
 rife from a nice and. particular View of two 
 or more Vtjible Objects at the fame Time ; and 
 the very word Simple Idea^ is r,aken from thole 
 
 Objec> 
 
26 D I V I N~E 
 
 Objects of Senfe in which we perceive the great* 
 eft Uniformity, and which have the leaft vi- 
 fible diftin&ion of Parts. Ahftraffion is an Idea 
 formed from the feparating one part of Matter 
 from another, in order to a more diftinct and 
 particular View. Capacity of Mind is a Word 
 transfered from a large or bulky Space or Mea- 
 fure which can contain many things together ; 
 or more immediately from a fpacious Profpec~fc 
 of the Eye at once. Thus again Comprehenfion 
 is the Mind's Grafping an Idea on all its Sides 
 at once. Invention is the finding out fuch things, 
 by looking for them, as do not lye directly be- 
 fore us in our way. Intention is the* bending or 
 ftraining of the Mind ; lb we fay it is Unbent, 
 or Relaxed. Nay the only Idea we have of 
 Thinking in general, which feems to be fartheft 
 removed from Senfe, is that of a certain Motion 
 of the Mind employed about its Obje&s: And 
 we conceive it as the Working of lome bufy 
 a&ive Principle we feel within us, taking a View 
 of thofe Ideas it finds tranfmitted from the Sen- 
 fes to the Imagination \ Diminijhyig or Enlarge 
 ing, Separating or Compounding them atpleafure ; 
 Comparing them among themfelves, Meafuring 
 them by one another, and joyning them into 
 Notions with its own confcious Operations ; fi> 
 as to be able to pronounce upon all their Diffe- 
 rences and Agreements, Purfuant to this figu- 
 rative Language we fay, that a Notion is Hard 
 or Obvious, Clear or Confufed; That the Intel- 
 left hath a Ta/le or Reltjfh of a thing ; that it 
 bath a great Reach ; that it is Quick or Slow, or 
 
 Deep 
 
ANALOGY. 27 
 
 Deep or Shallow j that it Concludes or Shuts up 
 its Reafcnings; that it Infufes its Sentiments 
 into others, or receives a Tincture from them. 
 It is faid to be Dull or to have an Edge, to 
 take the Strefs of a thing ; to Urge znAPrefs its 
 Arguments j and to have a peculiar Vein of 
 thinking. 
 
 This fame Method which we have obferv- 
 ed as to the Intellect, runs thro' all the Opera- 
 tions of our Will, and thro* all the Pajfions and 
 AffeBions of the Soul. PaJJion itfelf is Tmagin'd 
 as no more than fomething like the Suffering 
 of one Body from another ; and we Imagine all 
 the different Paffions of Love and Hatred, and 
 Anger and Hope, and Fear, but as fb many 
 different ways of Suffering both of Body and 
 Mind from various Qbje&s or Ideas; and the 
 Rifing, and Falling and Commotion of thofe Paf- 
 fions are Words of mere Senfation. We have 
 no Idea of Willing but that of a Motion or Pro- 
 penjion of the Soul towards certain Objects ; and 
 we exprefs it Vy Inclination or the Bending of the 
 Mind that way. So we fuppofe Hatred to be 
 an Averfion or Turning the Mind away from 
 any thing; Temper of Mind is a Word derived 
 from the mixture or Grafis of Bodies ; accord-* 
 ingly we fay a Temper is Sxveet, Even-, Harjb 
 or Bitter, Smooth or Rugged-, Firm, Unjhaken, 
 Wavering, Unmanagable ; Pojitive or not eafily 
 removed from its prefent Pofture and Scituati- 
 on ; Obftinate or withftanding all Force and Op- 
 pofition. Apd according as tfie Tempers of 
 
 Men 
 
2 8 DIVINE 
 
 Men are Strung and Tuned to one another, we? 
 iay there is an Harmony or Dtfcord of Souls. 
 
 Ju^t thus it is with the Memory likewile. 
 We have no other Idea of it, but that of the 
 Laying. up of Notions and Ideas in the Imagina- 
 tion, as in a Store-houfe; or elfe that of Stamp- 
 ing or Painting out the Images of things there as 
 in a Picture, for the View or Oblervation of the 
 Intellect, and the exercife of all our Paffions and 
 Affections upon them. Recollection is the Ga- 
 thering together any neglected or difperfed No- 
 tions or Ideas ; we fpeak of retaining them Frejb 
 in our Memory j of Stirring up liich as lay 
 Dormant ; Reviving fuch as are Obliterated j 
 and we defcribe the Memory to be Strong or 
 JVeakj Frail or Tenacious. 
 
 From what I have faid under this Head, 
 we may again obfervehow great and fundamen- 
 tal an Error it is in our Modern Logicians, and 
 how pernicious ,to human Underftanding, to 
 lay down Indifferently Ideas of Senlation and 
 Reflection for the Primary Materials of all our 
 Knowlege j and that too, as if they were Equaly 
 Original and Simple and Direct. The only Caufe 
 I can think of for Men's running into this Er- 
 ror is, becaule the Mind does lb very Infenfibly 
 rnix and combine the Original Ideas of Senfe 
 with its own com plicated Operations upon them • 
 and by that means raifes up to its felf many com- 
 plex Conceptions and Notions with fuch Quicfa- 
 vefs and. 4&mty, that it overlooks this Gradual 
 
 Procels \ 
 
ANALOGY. 29 
 
 Procefsj and is apt to confider fbme of thefe 
 complex Conceptions , efpecialy thole^relating 
 to its own Workings, as Simple and Original: 
 So as from thence too haftily and proudly to 
 conclude, that it has a native Faculty for a D/V 
 retf View and Immediate Idea of its own imma- 
 terial Principle and its Operations, independent 
 of Matter and all Senfation. Whereas upon a 
 more wary- and attentive Try al in any one par- 
 ticular inftance which ieems moft abftra&ed ; 
 it will find that in all its Reafbnings, Ideas of 
 Senfation muft not only be Prefuppofed as the 
 iole Groundwork ; But that all its Knowlege 
 has an immediate intimate Mixture of them, and 
 a neceflary Connexion with them; as I have 
 often obferved in Jthe firft of thofe Tracts. And 
 therefore.it is that, whenever we fubftitute the 
 Faculties and Perfections of our Mind, or the 
 commendable ,^e$«w of the Soul, to reprefent 
 Analogicaly Correfpondent Qualities of Immate- 
 rial Beings;; it is properly fpeaking no fubfti- 
 tution of Ideas, but of the Confiious Conceptions 
 we have of the Faculties and Operations of our 
 Mind ; tho' it be impolEble in our prefent State 
 totaly to exclude All Mixture of fenfitiye Ideas 
 from fitch Conceptions. 
 
 3.. Since then the Cafe is thus with trie 
 Mind of Man, whereof we have a nearer, and 
 more immediate Knowlege ; infpmuch that we 
 are not capable of one Simple or DireB Idea ei- 
 ther of its Nature and Effence or Operations, 
 which is in$irely independent of Senfation : We 
 4 may 
 
go DIVINE 
 
 may the lefs wonder that we have no filch di- 
 rect or immediate Ideas of things Purely Spirt- 
 'tual, which are fb much farther removed out 
 of the reach of all our Capacities ; and that we 
 are under a neceffity of thinking and fpeaking 
 of them by Subftitution and Analogy. The 
 moft direct Knowlege we have of fueh Spiritual 
 Objects is that of their Exigence ; and yet even 
 this we Conceive and Infer from the Exiftence 
 of things worldly and human. The inyifibk 
 things of God, faith St. Paul, Are clearly ]ien\ 
 being underftoodby the things that are made. And 
 ib fayeth the Angelic Do&or, EJl aatem natu- 
 rale homini, ut per fenjibilia ad inteltigibilia ve- 
 niat ; quia omnis noflra cognitio a fenfu initium 
 habet. And again, Convenit—^—utfpiritMdliitfub 
 Jimiliiudinibus corporalium propmantw. And ac- 
 cordingly the Spirit of God hath made uie both 
 of Metaphor and of Analogy, in all his Reve- 
 lations of the things of another World to Man- 
 kind } in merciful Condefcention to the narrow- 
 nefs and frailty of human Underftanding, 
 
 There are but two ways imaginable of 
 God's making any difcoveries of himfelf, and 
 the things of another World to us. One is by 
 Paifing our Minds Up to them ; the other by 
 bringing them Down tJ the level of our Under- 
 ftandings. 
 
 I. A s to the firft, that of Rai/ing the Mind 
 
 up to theni, and enabling it to take lbme Direct 
 
 andlmtnediate View of them, this could not be 
 
 4 done 
 
ANALOGY. 31 
 
 done without altering and enlarging our Natural 
 Capacities of Apprehenfion and Knowlege to 
 a Supernatural Degree : And perhaps not with- 
 out giving us Faculties intirely New, and turn- 
 ing us into quite other Creatures from what we 
 now are ; and in Ihort not without fuch an in- 
 tire Alteration in the whole frame and contex- 
 ture of human Nature, as would anticipate our 
 great Change at the laft Day. How far God 
 by his Almighty Power Can difpofe the pure 
 Intellect, even in its natural ftate of Infirmity^ 
 to receive an Immediate impreffion of heavenly 
 Objects, or fupply it with Ideas of them equaly 
 TiireB with thofe we have from Senfe ; and by 
 that Means enable us to difcern fbmething of 
 them as they are in their Own Nature, this I 
 lay is not for us to determine. But thefe two 
 things we may be pofitive in. 
 
 1 . First, that if the Mind were any way 
 fupplyed with fuch Purely fpiri'tual Ideas, we 
 ftiould be as Confcipus to ourfelves of the Per- 
 ception of them ; as we are now of the Per- 
 ception of material Objects ; wje fhould dilcera 
 that Light which gave us fiich a Direct and im- 
 mediate profpedt of Heavenly Objects, as Clearly 
 as we do that of the Sun. 
 
 2. Secondly, That if a Man did himielf 
 receive any liich immediate Tmpreffions,it would 
 be fuch a Light within him as could never be 
 feen by others; he could have no way of Com- 
 municating them to any one elfe, And this ap- 
 pears 
 
32 DIVINE 
 
 peafs from the Cafe of St. Paul, who when 
 he" was Caught up into the third Heavens, his 
 Vifions and Revelations were fuch that he could 
 give other People no Notion of them ; the 
 Words he heard were Unfpeakdbky and which 
 'o-jjc i£ov it was Not pojjibk fof a Man to utter 1 
 The Reafon of which he himfelf affigns ; be- 
 caufe he was in a Trance ; or the Revelations 
 were to his Spirit only in a&ual feparatidri from 
 the Body ; and whether it was the one or the 
 other, they could not be communicated to any 
 but fuch as were in the fame fupernatural State 
 and Condition he then was. 
 
 II. The other way of God's making dip 
 coveries of himfelf and the things of another" 
 World to us is, by bringing them Down to the 
 level of our Underftanding and Imagination § 
 by adapting things fupernatural to our natural 
 capacities of Senfe and Reafon ; and by making 
 feme Reprefentation of them to thofe faculties 
 of Perception, and Knowlege with which wc 
 are already endowed, 
 
 Now this method of proceeding being what 
 Men were neceffarily led into by the mere light 
 of Reafon, in order to conceive and exprefs any 
 Thing of God and the Obje&s of another 
 World ; and thus becoming altogether the Lan- 
 guage of Natural Religion ; it is carryed on 
 and wonderfully improved by Revelation. Thus 
 it is that God in Scripture fpeaks to us of him- 
 felf in the fame Style and language we do of 
 
 one 
 
ANALOGS 33 
 
 8ne another, fbmetimes Figuratively under the 
 mere Symbols of an human Body, and Ideas of 
 Seniej arid fbmetimes by way of Analogy with! 
 the Perfe&ions and Operations of an httmari 
 Mind, that is Faculties of Matter aTid Spirit 
 afting in effential Union. By this means he 
 delivers himfelf to us with great plainels and 
 familiarity ; by this we have an intercqurfe with 
 Heaven ; and we think and fpeak 6f God witH 
 as much eafe, and clearnefij and certainty as we! 
 do of our fellow Creatures, and of the othef 
 Vifible Parts of the Creation. 
 
 I'his might have pa'ffcd withdut a ; pafticifc 
 lar Notice ; and we fliould have no occafion td 
 diftinguiffi the Nature of this divine Metaphor* 
 and Analogy with fo much exaftnefs and riicety^ 
 if the pervef fhefs and iubtilty of Heretics and 
 Infidels, and all the Enemies of Myflery and 
 f evealed Religion had not made it riecefiary s 
 In order to an effectual confutation of their Ob* 
 je&ions and Arguments, which are moft of therii 
 founded either upon, a grofs fuppdfitioh of Our? 
 cottceivirig things Human and Divine after the 
 Same manner ; or upon a miftake of this AriaJ 
 logy for a Purely figurative arid Metaphorical 
 mariner of Conceptions 
 
 By this Analogical method efpe'cialy it isy 
 that we come to a competent and fufficient: 
 Kriowlege of the moil exalted Myfteries of Chrf- 
 ftianity: Which are not drfcovered to us irt a! 
 Isariguage adapted to the ReaU diymey and he'-f 
 
34 D. I V I N BT 
 
 venly Nature of them ; nor are there any J\Tw0 
 Terms invented, to exprefs any new Ideas or 
 direct Conceptions of things before impercepti- 
 ble and ineffable. No, the Language of the 
 Gofpel was all our own before ; and we have 
 not any one Direct Conception or Simple Idea 
 more now than the Mind of Man was furnifhed 
 with before it was written. It makes no Al- 
 teration in thefe, but takes them as it finds 
 them already in our Mind : And the Revelation 
 confifts in fhewing us how to exalt and as it 
 were Spiritualize our natural Sentiments and 
 Words ; by transfering them Analogicaly from 
 things of this World to things Divine ; and by 
 rendering things obvious and familiar, a kind of 
 Reprefentations of thofe Obje&s for which we 
 have not as yet either Proper Words and Ideas, 
 or Direct Conceptions. Thus is the Word Fa- 
 ther ufed in the Gofpel, in refpect of Chrift ; 
 fo it is with the Words Son, Spirit, Begotten, 
 Proceeding, Purchafe, Ranfom, Mediator, Inter- 
 cejjion, Propitiation, Redemption, and all fuch 
 like Words and Expreffions which are Analo- 
 gicaly applyed to another World. In the very 
 fame manner we ufe the Word Trinity, Satis- 
 faction, Incarnation, Perfon. 
 
 Let the Reader fingle out any one of thofe 
 Words, and look into his own Mind, and exa- 
 mine what Immediate Notion it fuggefts to him, 
 and he will find it to be of fbmething in Na- 
 ture; fbmething intirely within our ordinary 
 Sphere of Knowlege, and nothing more than 
 
 a common 
 
ANALOGY. 35 
 
 a common Objeft of our faculties of Reaibn 
 and Perception. For Inftance, the word Fa- 
 ther immediately fuggefts to us a relation 
 founded in natural human Generation ; the 
 word Son fuggefts a Man $0 begotten of an- 
 other; and. the word Spirit is dire&ly expreifive 
 of an Human Spirit acting in effential conjun- 
 dion with Matter. And if his Mind refts and 
 terminates here in the firft and ftricT: propriety 
 of thole Words, this will be a degree of Know- 
 lege which will anfwer all the purpofes of this 
 •Life : But they muft be carryed on and trans- 
 fered from thence by Analogy, to exprefs 
 things ineffable and imperceptible as they are 
 in their own Nature, in order to anfwer the 
 Ends of Religion and the purpofes of another 
 World. 
 
 Let him therefore think of thefe Words 
 Over again, and attend to what they fignify in 
 a Gofpel and myfterious Sence ; and he will 
 find, that they do not exhibit to the Mind any 
 New Idea or DireB Conception of the Real Na- 
 ture of <jfod, or any of his Operations : But of 
 ibmething in the Divine Nature, the Corre- 
 fpmdent Reality and Truth of which the Scrip- 
 ture leaves us under a neceffity of infering by 
 an Analogy and parity of Reafon, after this 
 manner. What a Father in the way of Nature 
 is to his Son begotten of him, That God is to 
 Chrift Supernaturaly ; What a Son by natural 
 Generation is to the Perfon who begat him, 
 that Chrift is to God the Father by a fuper- 
 D 2 natural 
 
36 DIVINE 
 
 natural Generation ; The Holy Spirit is to trie! 
 Father and the Son, what we can moft exa&ly 
 reprelent to ourlelves by the Spirit of a Man 
 which is in him. And fo in all the reft ; What 
 a Purchafe or Ranfom is among Men j That the 
 Blood of Chrift is in refpeft of God. Thus he 
 will find his way of apprehending the import 
 of thefe and all other Words by which we fpeafc 
 of the things of another World, is not by any 
 Immediate Ideas and "Direct Intuition or Concep- 
 tion of them : But by the Snbjlituttoti and Me- 
 diation of fnch Words and Notions as are ob- 
 vious and familiar to us ; Injlead of fiich 2)/-» 
 reB Imprefilons as thofe divine things would 
 make upon our Minds if we had Capacities 
 for it. 
 
 To all this, which is plain and evident, t 
 ihall add what is matter of Conjecture only, but 
 as highly probable as any thing of which we 
 have no certainty. That even in our moft per- 
 fect ftate of Glory in another Life ; our Con- 
 ceptions of God and his Attributes or Perfec- 
 tions, will not be fb Hired and Immediate as to 
 exclude ail degrees of this Analogy. It is true 
 even to a Maxim, that no Finite tfnderftanding 
 can dire&ly and adequately Comprehend Infi-* 
 nity ; And therefore whether we fuppole all our 
 faculties in another World intirely New ; or 
 thofe we have, Improved to the utmoft pitch they 
 are capable of; yet we lhall even then be as in- 
 capable of Comprehending an infinite Nature, as 
 we are now* 
 
ANALOGY. 
 
 ZT 
 
 If it is faid that we may then Apprehend 
 God DiteBly, tho' not Comprehend him ; that 
 we may have a Direfit and immediate Know- 
 Jege Partly, and in Ibme Degree ; and tho' not 
 of his Ejjence, yet of the Perfections flowing 
 from it. I anfwer, That all the Attributes 
 and Perfe&ions of God are in their real Nature 
 as infinite, as his very Ejfence ; lb that there 
 can be no fuch thing as having a direcl View 
 of him in Part; for whatever is in God is Equal/ 
 Infinite : If God is to be apprehended at all by 
 any DjrecJ and immediate Idea, he mutt be ap- 
 prehended As Infinite, and in that very aft of 
 the Mind he would be Comprehended; and there 
 js no medium between Apprehending an infinite 
 JJeing Dire&ly and Analogical), 
 
 From hence it may be conje&ured, that 
 the meaning of the Apoftle's oppofing our fee- 
 ing Face to Face, to our feeing now Thro' a Glafs 
 darkly, is to point out to us the great difparity 
 in the Degrees of our Analogical Knowlege here, 
 and hereafter; which will be As great as that 
 between the fight of an Image in the Glafs 
 here, and the original Face. Here the Analogy 
 by which we form Conceptions of the divine 
 Nature and Perfections, is comparatively fpeak- 
 ing very Remote and faint ; in proportion only 
 to the prefent frail and imperfed ftate of our 
 Humanity, who can form Conceptions of God 
 no otfeerwife than from thofe Perfe&ions 
 we fijvj in our felyes: But when all our Capa- 
 D 3 citwi 
 
3 8 DIVINE 
 
 cities are improved and enlarged, then the Con- 
 templation of our own Nature will raife up to 
 us more Lively and Emphatical Semblances and 
 Representations of him, who is the fource and 
 ftandard of all Perfection; and confequently 
 the more tranfporting will that Happinefs be, 
 which muft arife from fuch an inwiefife jnereaie. 
 of Knowlege. 
 
 That which may give lbme Countenance 
 to this Opinion is, the Anfwer of God to Mofes 
 when he defired to fee his Glory, Thou can'fi 
 not fee my Face, for there Jhall no Map fee me 
 and live ; which one would be inclined to be-r 
 lieve in lbme degree applicabla even to another 
 World: Efpecialy fince the Apoftle doth, in 
 general and without any exception or limitation 
 of the faying to this Life, defcribe God as a 
 Being Whom no Man hath Jeen at any Time i and 
 as Dwelling in the Light which no Man can 
 approach unto ; whom no Man hath feen or can 
 fee. So that thole expreffions of feeing Face to. 
 Face y feeing him As he is, Beholding his Glory \ and 
 filch like, are not improbably to be refered to 
 that prefent and immediate Vifion we mall have, 
 of Chrift's Human Nature in his ftate of Glori- 
 fication ; which will render the Divine Nature 
 as it were vifiple to us, In and Thro' him. Ac- 
 cordingly it muft be a comfortable and pleafing 
 thought to a pious Mind, that it might have 
 been one Inftance of infinite wildom and good- 
 nefs in Chrift's taking our Nature upon him*} 
 to render us capable of a more J)inB and in*r 
 
 mediate 
 
ANALOGY. 39 
 
 mediate Intuition of the Divine Nature in him : 
 And to exalt our Humanity to a nearer and 
 more direct Contemplation of the Eflence and 
 Perfections of the Godhead which lhine forth 
 In him ; and that by this means we might be 
 admitted even to an intimate and familiar In- 
 terview and Communication with him, fo as to 
 fee him As he is ; to converfe Face to Face ; and 
 to behold his Glory, The Glory as of the only be- 
 gotten of the Father. In fliort to converfe with 
 him, as we do with one of our own Nature, 
 or with our fellow Saints ; a Privilege perhapsr 
 fo peculiar to Mankind, that it might have raif- 
 ed the Malice and Envy of the fallen Angels. 
 
 The fhort of what I mean by the forego- 
 ing Paragraphs is this ; that what juft and fuf- 
 ficient Knowlege we have of God now in this 
 Life, is obtained by Analogy r , or Similitude with 
 thofe Perfe&ions we find in oftr felves. That 
 when we become more perfecT: by our great 
 change at the laft Day , our Knowlege of the 
 divine Nature and infinite Perfections will be 
 proportionably increaled ; and our Contempla-r 
 tibn of them be to an inconceivable degree more 
 clear and perfpieuous : And that the greater 
 Perfections any created Nature is endowed with, 
 the more unfpeakably Clear and Extenfive muft 
 his Knowlege of God be, to whom he thereby 
 makes Nearer Approaches ; and the Contempla-r 
 tion of His Periedions ftill more exalted and 
 Ravifhing. But that no Finite and created Being 
 can have Direft and Immediate Views of that 
 P 4 Eflence 
 
4 DIVINE 
 
 Effence or thofe Perfections which are Infinity 
 bepaufe it could not Thus conceive or apprehend 
 them otherwiiefhan^ Infinite, and that would 
 be fiippofing a finite Creature to Comprehend 
 Infinity, , And therefore that even the liighefij 
 Order of Angels, Cherubim or Seraphim, mu$ 
 probably have a method of forming Concep- 
 tions of God and his Perfections, which do not; 
 come up to direct and immediate Perceptions ; 
 fuch as they have of one another and of all 
 Heavenly Objects, and fuch as We now have 
 pf things Human and Material. Their man- 
 ner of conceiving the divine Perfections, and ' 
 pf communing abqut them with one another } 
 muft probably be thro' the lively Tranfcript 
 pf them in their own Nature from then- grpat 
 Archetype and Creator. So that they think and 
 Communicate or Difcourfe about them, if I may 
 ip fpeafc, as we dp; but from inconceivably 
 more Elevated and ExaB Reprefentatipns of 
 them which they find in themfelves ; Which 
 is but a kind oi Analogy ftill, tho' fuch as hath, 
 a. much nearer foundation pr Proportion of Si- 
 militude than purs. And tho' it is a ftrain of 
 divine Knowlege in them vaftly tranfcending 
 the fartheft reach of all our prefent Capacities^ -, 
 and may for ever fucceffively receive a gradual. 
 Increafe and Improvement ; yet probably will 
 never come up to a Dirtft and Immediate Intu-g 
 ppn of thg divide Nature As it is in itfelf. 
 
 |j HAB. 
 
ANALOGY. 4* 
 
 CHAP, HI. 
 
 ffaat there is a true and fure Foundation 
 for this Divine Ajialpgy in the Nature 
 of Things.. 
 
 IS H A L L now Ihew that our Knowlege 
 of God and the things of another World is 
 True, and Solid, and Real, and Juft; and found- 
 ed in the very Nature of Things, tho' obtained 
 by Analogy only : And that the Terms and Lan-, 
 guage we ufe in fpeaking them, are then as 
 Juft and Expreffive, as when they are taken in, 
 their ftri£t and Literal Propriety, 
 
 In order to this I muft premife, that we 
 have three ways of thinking and fpeaking con^ 
 cerning God and his Attributes, as well as all 
 other Beings purely Spiritual and Immaterial. 
 By the Parts and Members of an human Body, 
 or other things Merely Material', by the Paf- 
 Jims and Affe&ions of an human Soul ; and by 
 the Operations and Pejfe&ians of the Mind ot 
 Intelleffi. 
 
 I. As to the fir ft of thele, it is certain there 
 can neither be any hodily Parts, or Members, 
 or Appetites in Beings Immaterial; much lels 
 in the divine Being, who is of a Nature infi-^ 
 pitely above that of any created Spirit : Nor 
 can there be any fuch. Real Similitude and Re-*, 
 
4 2 DIVINE 
 
 femblance between mere Matter and pure Spi- 
 rit ; as that the Nature and Properties of one 
 Ihould, of themfelves, furnifti our' Underftand- 
 ing with any Jufi and Ufeful Conceptions of 
 thofe belonging to the other. So that neither 
 the Words or Ideas of that fort can with any 
 fuch aptnefs and Correfpondency be transfered to 
 the Divine Being, as the Operations and Per- 
 fections of our Minds are. Therefore when we 
 attribute to him any bodily Members, fuch as 
 Eyes, and Ears, and Hands, and Feet ; or bo- 
 dily Actions, fuch as Searching, or Seeing, or 
 Walking ; the Words are purely Figurative and 
 Metaphorical. Thefe and fuch like Terms are 
 ufed to exprefs the Wifdom, or Knowlege, or 
 Mercy, or Power of God ; or Ibme other Attri- 
 butes and Perfections for which we are not with- 
 out Words more Proper, Juft, Significant, and 
 Expreffive. 
 
 Besides, the transfering our bodily Mem- 
 bers or other things merely material to God or 
 the divine Nature of-Chrift, is purely Volun- 
 tary: And not of abiblute NeceJJity, as it is in 
 thofe other Words Power, and Knowlege, and 
 JVifdom, and Holinefs ; which are by a true 
 Analogy transfered to the divine Being; ajid 
 without which we could neither think nor 
 ipeak either of him or his Attributes. To 
 which I may add, that if the Reader will look 
 inward and think with lbme Intenlenefs, He 
 will find that in attributing to God our Bodily 
 Members or Movements, or any other things 
 
 merely 
 
ANALOGY. 43 
 
 merely Material, he transfers the bare Words 
 only, and abhors the transfering of the Idea ; 
 which fhews that all fuch Expreflions are pure- 
 ly Figurative and Metaphorical : But in attri- 
 buting the Operations and Perfections of the 
 Mind or Intellect, he jointly transfers both the 
 Word and the Conception without Scruple, 
 which is a Confirmation of their being truly 
 Analogical. 
 
 Now, tho* this firft kind of Words and Ex-* 
 preffions are purely Figurative and Metapho- 
 rical j yet they are not mere Empty Sounds, or 
 fo many Letters put together without any Re&H 
 Import or Signification. Even in Common Me- 
 taphor, where a borrowed Word is ufed to ex- 
 press Ibmething left properly but to more Ad>» 
 vantage, the Thing thereby exprefTed is never- 
 thelefs Real becaufe the Word is Figurative. 
 As when it is faid an Orator Thunders and high' 
 tens in his Difcourfe ; it means foroe Real Ac* 
 tion or Performance in him, and ibme real effect, 
 ibme warmth or Commotion or Paflion raifed 
 in the Minds of his Auditors. So when we 
 lpeafc of God as having bodily Members, and 
 performing bodily Actions, we always intend 
 to expreis Ibmething (tho' Not Correjpondent 
 and Similar, yet) True and Real; of which we 
 had Before obtained the moft exact Knowlege 
 we are capable of by the help of Analogy. 
 
 a. T h e Second way we have of expreffing 
 prod's Attributes is ? by the Affections and Paf- 
 
 fiont 
 
44 DIVINE 
 
 fans of an haman Soul. Men have ran fntO 
 two Extremes concerning this way of fpeaking 
 of God. Some, contend earneftly for Real Pap* 
 fans in God, and of the Same Kind they are if* 
 us but more excellent in Degree', as the Soci- 
 nians : Others, in the contrary extreme, allow 
 neither Any Pajjions in God, nor any divine 
 Perfections Similar and Anfwerable to them ; to 
 be a Foundation for Truth and Reality in all 
 our Difcourfes concerning God where we uif 
 the Language of human Paffions. 
 
 That there are Liter 'aly /peaking no Paf-» 
 fions in God, nor indeed any Perfections of the 
 Same Kind with what thefe are in Man ever* 
 when duly regulated, is moft true ; for all our 
 Paffions and Affections, as well as our Think-* 
 i»g, and Knowlege, and Will, are the Joint 
 Operations or Properties of Matter and pure Spi- 
 rit in Ejjeniial Union : And therefore when they 
 are under even the ftricteft Government and 
 moft exact Regulation, cannot be of the Same 
 Kind with the Excellencies or Perfections of 
 pure Spirits ; who have not only a quite diffe- 
 rent way of Knowing from us, intirely S,epar 
 rate from all Matter and independent of it j 
 but alio of Loving and Hating , of Inclination 
 and Averfion. And certainly this muft be more 
 eminently true with refpect to the infinite Per-* 
 fections of the Divine Nature, which differ vaft« 
 ly more In Kind from thole of all finite Created 
 Spirits; than theirs do from the njoil exalte^. 
 Jfiuman Perfe§ipns, '"' * ! 
 
 As 
 
Analogy. 43 
 
 As the Paffions and Affections therefore are 
 attended with Natural Commotion and Dtjiur* 
 bance in us, and are more apt to be feduced by- 
 material Impreffions than the pure Intellect and 
 Will ; confequently they cannot be attributed 
 to God fo Fully and Exactly as the Operations 
 of thefe laft : But are however transfered with 
 a Lower and he.fi perfect degree of Analogy, af- 
 ter we have removed all the Natural and Mo* 
 ral Irregularities of them as carefully as w<S 
 can. And accordingly we may obferve that 
 tvhenever we attribute even our Commendabk 
 Paffions and Affections to God, we do it with 
 ibme degree of Scruple and Reluctance at the 
 beft ; whereas when we transfer Knowlege i Wif- 
 dom, Power and Will to Him y we do it fami* 
 liarly and, without Scruple. 
 
 From hence we may obferVe that tho' our 
 Paffions are not transfered to the Divine Na-* 
 ture as Fully as the Operations of the Intellect 
 and Will ; yet God is not fo groily reprefented 
 by them, as by our bodily Parts ; nor is the 
 Language of our Paffions then purely Figura- 
 tive and Metaphorical, but carries in it a good 
 degree of Analogy. For tho' there are literaly 
 fpeaking no fuch Paffions in God as Love or 
 Hatred, Joy or Anger, or Pity ; yet there may 
 be Inconceivable Perfections in him ibme way 
 Anfiwerable to what thofe Paffions are in us, 
 under a due Regulation and Subje&ion to Rea- 
 fon. 
 
 ft 
 
46 DIVINE 
 
 I t is fure that in God thofe Perfections are 
 not attended with any degree .of Natural Di- 
 fturbance or Moral Irregularity, as the Pafiions 
 are in us. Nay Fear and Hope, which imply 
 fomething Future for their Objects, may have 
 nothing Anfwerable to them in the divine Na- 
 ture to which every thing is Prefent. But fince 
 our reafonable Affections are Real Difpofltions of 
 the Soul which is compofed of Spirit as well as 
 Matter ; we rnuft conclude fomething in -God 
 Analagous to Them, as well as to our Knowlegt 
 or Power. For it cannot be a Thought Un- 
 worthy of being transfered to him, that he realy 
 Loves a virtuous and Hates a vitious Agent; 
 that he is Angry at Sinners ; Pities their moral 
 Infirmities; is plealed with their Innocence or 
 Repentance, and Difpleafed with their Tranf- 
 greflions: Tho' all thefe Perfections are in him 
 accompanied with the utmoft Serenity and never- 
 failing Tranquility. 
 
 Thus much is certain ; that they all exhi- 
 bit and reprefent to us Something as Real on 
 the Part ofthe Divine Nature, as in common 
 Ule they exprefs in the Human. Something lb 
 Solid and Anfwerable, as renders all our Rea- 
 ibnings and Dilcourfes concerning God in the 
 Language of our Commendable Paffions, as Juft 
 and True as when we fpeak them of one an- 
 other: Some Ineffable Perfections which move 
 and Incline him to act in all his Difpenfations 
 towards Mankind and other intelligent Beings, 
 i as 
 
ANALOGY. 47 
 
 as our Paffions properly regulated difpofe us to 
 demean ourfelves to other Men ; and which are 
 neverthelefs Real becaufe they are Infinite, and 
 confequently of Another Kind than they are in us. 
 
 3. The laft way we have of conceiving and 
 expreffing the divine Nature and Attributes is 
 by the Operations and Perfections of our Intel*. 
 leB and Will; which being more refined and 
 far theft removed from Matter, and but acci- 
 dentally liable to Moral Corruption (that is by 
 voluntarily yielding to the vitious Appetites of 
 the Body, and the irregular Paffions of the in- 
 ferior Soul) are the beft and moft Lively Re- 
 presentations we have of the Divinity : Such 
 as Wtfdom, and Knowlege, and Thinking, and 
 Rtafbn, and Will, with all the various Modifi- 
 cations of them ; and accordingly in thefe we 
 familiarly transfer both the Word and thp Con- 
 ception annexed to it, to expreis the divine Per- 
 fections. But becaufe even thefe in Us, as well 
 as our Paflions, are the Joint Operations of fi- 
 nite Matter and Spirit in eflential Union, and 
 are filecejfarily tranfa&ed by the concurrence 
 of Body ; therefore they are likewife but Ana- 
 logy when applied to the Divinity. Now tho' 
 they are Co ; and as I have obferved, tho' we 
 are utterly Ignorant of Part of the Real Ground 
 of that Analogy which runs thro* Thefe, as well 
 as thro' all thofe moral Virtues and Evangeli- 
 cal Graces proceeding from the due Direction 
 and Regulation of our Paffions : Yet that there 
 is a fure and folid Foundation for this Analogy 
 
 in 
 
4& DIVINE 
 
 in the Nature both of God arid Man is evident; 
 if we cbnfider 
 
 i . T h a t we were originaly arid in bur Kind 
 formed to Ibme Refemblance and Similitude of 
 the divine Nature. The words of God himfelf 
 are thus, Let us make Man in our Image, aftet 
 our Likenefs ; and the Relation of Moles by 
 Infpiration is thus^ So God created Man in his 
 own Image ; in the Image of God created he him. 
 How far the Expreffion may have a refpe£fc 
 even to that Bodily likenefs of Chrift, who iri 
 the eternal purpofe of God was at the fulnefi 
 of Time to take our human Nature into the 
 Divinity ; and to that Refemblance of hint 
 in the Body of a Saint* when at his appearing 
 it fhall be Fajhioned like unto his glorious Body$ 
 We know not : Tho* the Expreffion being in 
 the Plural Number, and fpoken to his Council 
 as fbme learned Jews expound it (which Coun- 
 cil could be no other than that "Divine Perfori 
 who was to take that Nature upon him, and 
 the Holy Spirit of God) would incline one to* 
 think that a Likenefs even in This Inftance 
 was not totaly excluded. Nor can we fay 
 how far any Refemblance or Correfpondency 
 may be intended between that Living Soul iri 
 Man, which refulted from the Union of th<J 
 pure Spirit with the Body, when God Breathed 
 into his Nofirils the Breath of Life-, and the 
 ineffable Procejfion of the Holy Spirit from the 
 Father and the Son. But without all doubt 
 the lokmn manner of expreffing this JLikeraefs* 
 
AN A L O G Y. 49 
 
 fey fiich an immediate Repetition of the fame 
 thing over again ; and the Reduplication of 
 the words Image and Likenefs, do plainly Ihew 
 ^at fomething is intended very remarkable 5 
 fb*mething fo Real and Solid in the very Na* 
 ture of things, that it is not to be evaded by 
 any Suppofition of its being only a Figurative 
 and Imaginary Likenefs : Nay fomething of no 
 lefs confequence muft be intended at the Bot- 
 tom, than by thofe fayings to lay a firm and 
 immovable Foundation for Truth, in all thofe 
 Sentiments, and Words, and ExprefSons which 
 thro' all Generations were Necejjarily to be 
 Transfefed from the human Nature to the Di- 
 vine. 
 
 However this may, or may not ftrike us 
 with Conviction, yet all agree in this; that 
 thole Texts do chiefly import a Likenefs to 
 the Divine Nature in that Part of our Frame 
 efpecialy which in Scripture is diftinguifhed by 
 the word nnupa, or Spirit. In our firft Crea- 
 tion this had a Nearer Refemblance of the 
 Divinity in a Superior Knowlege and Wifdom; 
 in a much more perfect Rectitude of Wttl\ and 
 in untainted Innocency and Holinefs : And as 
 all the Paflions and Affections were more com- 
 pletely biaffed and inclined to Goodnefs in our 
 firft Parents, before they had the actual expe- 
 rience of any Vice ; fb this original Perfection 
 of their Nature and Morals rendered them 
 more lively Reprefentations of the Divinity, 
 to whom the correfpondent fupernatural Per- 
 
 E fections 
 
5© DIVINE 
 
 fections were all Ejjential and neceflary. In 
 their ftate of Innocency, they were hereby en- 
 abled to think more Clearly and Fully of" the 
 Divine Being; and it rendered all their PiG- 
 courfe and Language concerning him more Apt, 
 and Proper, and Significant : But by the Fall 
 both our Conceptions of ail things Divine* and 
 the Language in which we exprefs them are 
 grievoufly impaired. And becaufe in our pre- 
 sent ftate we are not perfect even in our Kind, 
 we are now at the additional trouble of remov- 
 ing (as far as we are able I mean) net only all 
 Natural Imperfe&ion, but alio all Moral Cor- 
 ruption efpecialy, which have invaded our Un- 
 derstanding and Will, as well as our Affections 
 and Paffions fince the Fall ; before we can with 
 Ju/lnefs and Safety Subftitute them, even Ana- 
 logically to reprefent the abfolute and inconceiv- 
 able Perfections of the Divine Nature. 
 
 Now, tho' this Rectitude of our Will, Af- 
 fections, and Paffions ; and this original Per- 
 fection and Clearnels of our Underftanding are 
 loft : Tet the Spirit of a Man that is in him ftill 
 retains Much of that natural Image and Like- 
 riefs of the great Antitype, according to which 
 it was originaly and in its Kind moulded 
 and fafhioned; in that it is Immaterial, Im- 
 mortal^ and endued with Reafon and Freedom 
 of choice. And in what degrees fbever our 
 bodily Appetites are reafonably fubdued and 
 reftrained ; our Paffions mattered and re&ifyed ; 
 and our Underftanding cleared of all Prejudice 
 
 and 
 
ANALOGY. 51 
 
 ttnd Pirepofieffions ; fo far we Repair a darkefl- 
 ed, decayed, and corrupted Nature, and re- 
 cover More of that primitive Image and Like- 
 riefs of God which was unhappily defaced and 
 almoft obliterated : And the Confequence of 
 this is, that both our Analogical Sentiments and 
 Speech concerning that Standard of all Per-< 
 fe&ion do by this means ever receive proper* 
 tionable Improvement. Since therefore all Per- 
 fections in Us f which are diftinguifhed into Mo- 
 ral zn&Natural, are neceflary and efTential At- 
 tributes in God, of an intirely different Kind; 
 We may well conclude that tho' we fee not 
 Wherein it confifts, yet there is a lure Founda- 
 tion in the Nature of both for fuch a Similitude 
 and Parity of Reafbn, in our whole manner of 
 Thinking and Difcourfkg of the Divine Being 
 frorh thbfe Moral and Intelleftual Perfections 
 we find in out felves, as 1 renders it all Juft and 
 True-, and the Terms we ufe in all fuch Rea- 
 ibnings and Difcourfes are as expreffive a'nd 
 Significant, as when they ate fpoken in their, 
 moft Literal and ftrict Propriety. 
 
 a. T3u* this will appear more fully if we 
 cbnfider Secondly, that all the Perfections of 
 Intelligent Beings muft be greater or left, as 
 they make Nearer or more Diftant Approaches 
 in their Kind to a Refemblance of him who is 
 the only Source and Fountain of all Perfection* 
 There can beiVo Perfection in the Creature but 
 what is Derived from thence, and what is ori* 
 ginaly of a more Tranfcendent Kind in him j and 
 E a hi* 
 
52 DIVINE 
 
 his very Creation of fuch Beings efpecialy* wass 
 no other than a formation of them after the 
 Original Archetypal Idea of them in the Di- 
 vine Mind : So that if they are good and per- 
 fed in Their Kind, this .muft confift in having 
 all the Refemblwce of the Creator their refpec- 
 tive Natures are Capable of. As Angels are an 
 Order of Beings much fuperior to Man, this 
 muft be becaule they are in their j(md framed 
 to a Greater Likenefs and Reiemblance of God : 
 And consequently their Knawlege of him, and 
 their Conceptions of all his Attributes and Per- 
 fections muft vaftly exceed any thing of which 
 we are capable,. Nor is it an improbable Con- 
 jecture that their whole Know lege of him, and 
 intire manner of communicating that Knowlege 
 to one another, takes its rife from thofe Per- 
 fections they obferve in themfelves, and which 
 they transfer after the method of our Analogy 
 from their own to the Divine Nature. 
 
 But however this may be in . reipe£fc of 
 Angels ; yet all the Perfections of our Reafon- 
 able Human Nature muft have ibmething Cor- 
 refpondent and Similar to them in the Divine, 
 tho' infinitely more excellent and tranfcendent, 
 in Kind. Hence it is that our whole manner 
 of thinking and fpeafcing- of God, is from what 
 we find in omrfelves, and more efpecialy from 
 the Operations of the Mind ; And this we na- 
 turaly fall into, as if they were exactly of the 
 Same Kind .in him that they are in us ; tho' 
 upon Recollection we know it is impoffible 
 
 they 
 
ANALOGY. 53 
 
 they fliould be fo. All our Thoughts and 
 Words concerning fpiritual Beings and God in 
 particular do proceed, tho* inferifibly, upon this 
 Prefumption; that there is fomething in the 
 Real Nature of luch Beings Correspondent and 
 Similar to thofe Attributes we fubftitute for 
 them, and which we conceive to be moft ex- 
 cellent and perfeft in human Nature. And 
 this is a Prefumption lb well Grounded upon 
 that Image and Likenefs of God after which 
 we were created ; that there is a Natural Apti- 
 tude in all the Operations of the Mind, and 
 even in our commendable Paffions and Affecti- 
 ons, to Reprefent to us the Perfe&ions of the 
 Divine Nature : Infbmuch that our Concepti- 
 ons and Exprefiions of thofe Perfections, tho' 
 in their firft and StriBly profef Acceptation they 
 be merely Human , are all yet Apt and Necefi 
 fary- when fpoken of God ; and there is nothing 
 the lefs of Truth and Reality in this Analogy, 
 became we are not able to difcern any ExaCi 
 Degree and Proportion, or that Particular fort 
 of Similitude which is the Ground arid Hun* 
 dation of it. Tho* we do not apprehend \t 
 flow, yet there is a Reafon in the Very Nature 
 of things Divine, why they mould be conceiv- 
 ed and expreffed aftef That Manner they now 
 are, father than after any other ; infomuch that 
 we then think Juflty, andexprefs out Thoughts 
 of them in the greater* Aptnefs and Propriety 
 of Speech our prefent Condition of Infirmity 
 will admit, 
 
 E 3 3, Lastly 
 
54 DIVINE 
 
 3. Lastly we are to confider, that if 
 there were not a fure Foundation for this Di-i 
 vine Analogy in the very Nature of things ; 
 we ihould be under a grand Delufion in all our 
 Sentiments of Natural as well as Revealed Re- 
 ligion. For fince the Attributes of God differ 
 from ours in Kind-, all the Knowlege we have 
 of them and the things of another World, even 
 by the mere Light of Reafon y muft be founded 
 upon Analogy. For the proof of which, be* 
 fides what I have urged already, I fliall only 
 defire any Perfon under the ftrongeft prejudice 
 againft this Doctrine, to fingle out any one of 
 the Divine Attributes which he thinks moft 
 eafy and obvious, and try whether he can form 
 any Diretf Idea of it; or any Conception or Idea 
 vhich fliall be Purely Spiritual ', and intirely ex^ 
 clufive and Independent of Ideas of Sen fatten and 
 the confeious Operations of his own Mind, as, 
 Parts of the Ingredients of it. So that either 
 our Creator has rendered human Ages utterly 
 void cfcAny tifeful Knowlege of him and his At- 
 tributes ; or eife there muft be a Real Ground 
 for this Analogical Conception of them in his 
 Nature and our own. We are intirely incapa- 
 ble of any Direct Knowlege or Idea of them; 
 and therefore muft NeceJJarily conclude there 
 is a Sure Foundation for this Method of pro- 
 ceeding; Qr that we labour under an Invincible 
 miftake in all our Thoughts pf Divine Objects, 
 and can never arrive to more than a merely 
 Metaphorical ?md Precarious Ncjtion of them. 
 4 Since 
 
ANALOGY. 
 
 55 
 
 Since then It is thus in our natural Noti- 
 ons of God from unenlightened Rft«/0#; we may 
 the left wonder that all Revelation concerning 
 God and the Myfterious things of another 
 World, is made to us by the Subftitution and 
 Mediation of fuch Conceptions and Expreflions 
 as are moft common and familiar among Men. 
 And if there were not a. fare Foundation of Simi- 
 litude for a Parity of Reafon in the very na- 
 ture of things both Human and Divine, which 
 are thus conceived and expreffed by the very 
 fame Notions and Words in fhe Scriptures ; it 
 would be impoffible to reconcile any Divine 
 Revelation to our natural Notions of the Vera- 
 city of God j or to any exa£t Teft or Standard 
 of Truth. 
 
 And therefore as to the Scripture Analogy, 
 the Goodnefs as well as the Veracity of God is 
 more Immediately concerned in the Jiiftnefs of 
 it. For if filch Scripture Words and Concep- 
 tions contained in them No Analogy at all, i. e. 
 refered to nothing Like and Correspondent in di- 
 vine Things : It would follow that our Creator 
 has expofed us to the Danger of Unavoidable 
 Error and Darkneft, even in the plain Ufe of 
 our Realbn when we interpret fiich Parts of 
 Scripture ; by revealing to us his Myfterjes in 
 iiach Terms as unavoiably head us into this 
 Notion. For Inftance, it is revealed to us that 
 Chrijl is the only begotten Son of God. No Man 
 Jiving can be ft) abfurd as te imagine this Ex- 
 
 E 4 preiTion 
 
56 DIVINE 
 
 preffion means Literal]/ fuch a Kind of Son or 
 Manner of Generation as we every Day obferve. 
 And yet» if there be any thing of fblid Truth 
 at all in this Propofition, it muft mean that 
 Chrift is a Real and True fupernatural Son of a 
 fupernatural Father, by a Generation effentialy 
 different from any Kind of External Efficiency 
 or Creation ; and confequently his Son after 
 fuch an Inconceivable Manner as we have no way 
 of apprehending but by Analogy with an human 
 Son. The Mind of Man can find out no other 
 ^ufi and Rational method of proceeding in ; all 
 fuch Scripture Inffcances as this ; without either 
 dire&ly impeaching theGoodnefs and Veracity 
 of God in his Revelations, which finely were 
 not defigned to puzzle but to inform Mankind : 
 Or which amounts to the fame, without turn- 
 ing the main Parts of them into Mere Figure 
 only and Allufion. 
 
 I H a v e before obferved that no difeover y 
 of things Divine can be made to us but by one 
 of thefe two Ways. 
 
 i. First, by giving us fbme DireSt and 
 Immediate and Proper Ideas of them ; and then 
 indeed all our Conceptions and ExprefEons 
 would exa&ly Quadrate with the True and Real 
 Nature of thofe things, as much and in the 
 fame Strict Propriety as we now think and fpeafc 
 of the moft familiar Obje&s of Life. But we 
 have not the leaft capacity for any fuch Reve- 
 lation in this WqrkJ. |f we had intelleftuat 
 
 Faculties? 
 
ANALOGY. 57 
 
 Faculties for the DirecJ Perception of things Im- 
 material, this would be obtained from an adual 
 Shewing of them, and exhibiting them to the 
 Immediate View of the Mind ; and the Effect 
 of it would be indeed fome degree of Direct 
 Kmwlege of them ; but it would leave no room 
 for Belief or Faith which is The Evidence of things 
 not feen : We fhould then alfentto nothing but 
 what was feen Directly and Immediately by the 
 Eye of the Mind. 
 
 S o that tho' all the Revelations of God are 
 True y as coming from him who is Truth it 
 felf ; yet the Truth and Subftan'ce of them doth 
 not confift in this, That they give us any New 
 Set of Ideas, and exprefi them in a Language 
 altogether unknown before : Or that both the 
 Conceptions and Terms are fo immediately 
 and properly adapted to the True and Real Na- 
 ture of the things revealed, that they could not 
 without great Impropriety and even Profanefs 
 be ever applyed to the things of this World. 
 But the Truth of them confifts in this ; That 
 whereas the Terms and Conceptions made ufe of 
 in thofe Revelations are Strictly proper to things 
 worldly and obvious : They are from thence 
 Transfered Analogical? to the Correipondent Ob- 
 jects of another World with as much Truth and 
 Reality, as when they are made ufe of in their 
 firft and moft Literal Propriety 5 and this is a 
 folid Foundation both for a -Clear and Certain 
 Knowlege^ and frr a firm and well grounded 
 
 2. Anq 
 
5 8 DIVINE 
 
 t. A n d therefore Secondly, The other way 
 of Revealing and Difcovering things Divine to- 
 ns, muft be by the Intervention and Mediation 
 ©f foch Ideas or Conceptions as the Mind was 
 fupplyed with Antecedently to any fuch Reve- 
 lation ; and by foch Words and Expreffions as 
 were before grown into familiar and common 
 U£e among Men, And then we are to depend 
 upon our natural Notions of the Wifdom- and 
 Veracity of God (obtained already thro' Ana- 
 logy,, by mere Reafbn) that thefe earthly Re- 
 presentations, under which thofe invifible things 
 are revealed in* Scripture, do bear the Greatejt 
 Similitude and Correspondency to them that any- 
 thing Can do within our prefcnt fcanty Sphere 
 ©f Knowlege. Nor is there any thing left of 
 Truth and Certainty in this way of Revelation, 
 than there could be foppoied in the former. 
 For tho' divine Revelation doth not exhibit 
 to us any Direct View or Knowlege of the real 
 True nature of things; Divine : Yet it lays be- 
 fore us foch Lively Semblances of them, that 
 from thence we Necejfarily infer the Exiftenc© 
 of their Subftance and Correspondent Realities ; 
 and that thefe become the Subject of our Faith 
 and our Hope, This is Seeing them, as the 
 Apoftle fpeaks, Thro' a Glafs darkly* As by the 
 help of a Looking-Glals. we fee the Refem- 
 bjance only or Similitude of a Man, but nothing 
 of the Subfiance or Reality of human Nature - 
 ip God in his Revelations gives us a. view of 
 lumfelf, and of all other divine things which. 
 
 have 
 
ANALOGY. 59 
 
 have, any Relation to us, in the Mirrour of This 
 Woria : Which tho' it can afford us no Direct 
 or Immediate Idea of the Real true Nature and 
 Subftance of thole divine Objects as they are 
 In themfehes 5 yet exhibits to us fuch a Sem- 
 blance and Reprefentation of them as lerves all 
 the Ends of Morality and Religion in This Life. 
 Thefe Images are what we now can Directly 
 difcern and give our Ajfent to ; they are the Im- 
 mediate Objects of our Knowlege, and of that 
 Faith which is built upon it. 
 
 The Subftance and True Nature of what we 
 thus Conceive and Believe is now the Object 
 of our Hope and Expectation in Another World j 
 which is neverthelels Real becaule we lee the' 
 Similitudes only, and Ibme Refemblances of it 
 in a Glals. If they were Types and Symbols 
 Alone, or nothing more than bare appearances 
 without any Correfpondent Realities, then .would 
 all divine Revelation be one grand. Delufibn ;' 
 our whole Faith of the Golpel would be n*> 
 other than blind Credulity; and our Hope, a 
 Fain Expectation of things without nay Being. 
 That we lee the Semblances only and Images of 
 them, is not from any failure in the Objetfs; 
 but from the weakneft of our Sight: Which 
 can neither dire&ly difcern the Subftance or 
 Prdperties of things Immaterial ; nor what Par- 
 ticular Proportion of Similitude they bear to 
 thole things by which they are reprelented. 
 But Whatever the Proportion of Similitude re- 
 aly is j the Nature and Kind of it is certainly 
 
 fuch^ 
 
6o DIVINE 
 
 fuch, that they could not have been fo Truly 
 and Aptly revealed to us by any Other Words 
 or Conceptions as thefe already given us : Nor 
 would any Other Semblances than thofe which 
 are made ufe of in Scripture have been fo con- 
 fiftent with the Wifdotn, and Goodmfs^ and Fe» 
 msity of God j or with our prefent Capacities 
 and Means of Knowlege. ; 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Authorities for Divine Analogy. And 
 the mifiaken Notions of it. 
 
 THE Neceffity of Analogy in order to 
 our Thinking and Speaking of things 
 Supernatural and Divine hath, one would 
 think, appeared fufficiently evident from the 
 whole Courfe of thole Obfervations which have 
 been already made : And it might reafbnably 
 be fuppofed that I had nothing farther to do 
 here than to leave every Man to make the 
 Application of it to his own Mind, and to 
 confider well thefe two things. 
 
 First, When he endeavours to apprehend 
 the Subjlance of God by a Simple Idea in his 
 Mind, whether he doth not fix upon fomething 
 Natural j fuch as the moft refined particles of 
 Matter, the Parts and Members of an human 
 Body, or Light, or the very Globe of the Sun, 
 or a Fountain, or forne other rifible and worldly 
 
 Objecl : 
 
ANALOGY. 61 
 
 Object: And then transfer that fenfitive Idea 
 with the Term which denotes it, by pure Fi- 
 gure and Metaphor to reprefent the impercep- 
 tible Subjlance of God ? 
 
 And Secondly, When he would think or 
 fpeak of the Intellectual and Moral Perfections 
 of the Divinity j whether he doth not pifoeeed 
 after this manner, by firft obftrving what are 
 the Faculties and Operations and Excellencies 
 of his own Mind : And then transfering them 
 likewife to the divine Being, by fubftituting 
 them as &> many Images or Reprefentations 
 of thofe infinite Perfections in him j whereof 
 we are as incapable of any Din£l r Immedute^zndi 
 Simple Apprehenfiort in the Mind, or of any 
 Idea pnnly Spiritual^ as we are of any fenfi- 
 tivs Perception of his real true Smbjtance or 
 M$e&& ? And whether thole Faculties and Ope- 
 rations of our own Mind lb transfered to the 
 Mind of God, are not fly led Attributes for this 
 very Reafon chiefly ; becaufe we only Attri- 
 to^.them to Gad, to Supply the want of any 
 T^keB and Immediate Apprehension or Concep- 
 tion of his own Real intrinsic Operations and 
 Perfe&ions? 
 
 I Say I need to have proceeiitedno iarther 
 for the Eltabliftiment of this Truth, than an 
 Appeai to every Man's own Gonfcioufnefs of 
 what he finds within himlelf, upon a. delibe- 
 rate and impartial Tryal. But the ftrong Pre- 
 judices and PrepofTefiions of the generality of 
 
 Men 
 
6i D I V I N -fi 
 
 Men from wrong Principles of KnowlegCj 
 greedily imbibed in their younger Years and at 
 the Beginning of their Studies ; the great Pro- 
 grels of a new Religion framed out of Aria* 
 nifm and Socinianiftn blended together, and 
 founded upon either the merely Metdphofkal or 
 ftri&ly Literal Acceptation of Scripture Terras', 
 as it belt lerves the Turn of an Hypothefis; 
 together with the Pious tho' miftafcen Zeal of 
 modern Defenders of Truth and Orthodoxy r 
 made it neceflary to come to a more clofe En- 
 gagement upon this Point (I am lorry I have 
 it to lay) not only with the well known Cor- 
 rupters and Subverters of our Chriftian Faith: 
 But with thofe very learned and worthy Pejr- 
 fbns who have defended it with the greateft 
 Courage and Skill they could poffibly fliew up* 
 on the received Metaphyseal, AbftraBed, and in 
 fbme Inftances even Unfcriptural Principles of 
 the Schools. 
 
 In order therefore to a more exprefs and 
 pofitive Proof of this Divine Analogy, I mall 
 firft fliew it hath been the conftant received 
 Opinion of all Men, that we can have no Di- 
 rett and Immediate Knowlege of God or his 
 Attributes in any Degree As they are in them- 
 /elves: And that our only way of conceiving 
 them is, by the Intervention of thofe Ideas arid 
 Conceptions we have of things Natural and 
 Human. And Secondly, That there are very 
 good Reafons for their being of that Opinion. 
 
 As 
 
A N A X O G Y. 63 
 
 As to the firft then, I fhall produce my 
 Authorities in this Method. 
 
 1. All Men have ever afltrted that God is 
 not only altogether Imperceptible by any of our 
 Sen/es, lb as to be 'AmQyjs IntaBilis, 'a^cmus In- 
 i)ifibilis\ but that even in refpecr. of the Mind 
 of Man he is hcomprehenfible ; and in the ftyle 
 of the Fathers 'A7r£/»voV°ff> ' hiri^hfiirr^ cckccto.- 
 KiiirTes. The meaning of which Terms is not^ 
 that we have no Adequate or Complete and RiS 
 Knowlege of God and his Attributes ; for no 
 finite and limited Uriderftanding can have fuch 
 a Knowlege of him, not the moft exalted of 
 all created Beings : In this Sence therefore none 
 can be faid to Know the Father but the Son; 
 and the Holy Ghoft, who is faid to know the 
 Mind of God. Nor do Men mean by thofe 
 Terms that we have no Clear and DiftinB 
 Knowlege of God and his Attributes : For as 
 far as the Knowlege we have of God in our 
 Mind reaches, it is as clear and diftind as any- 
 other Knowlege we have, which is founded 
 upon Moral Evidence and Certainty. As for a 
 Smfitive Knowlege of him we have none; 
 and with refpeel: to a Perception of any thing 
 in the divine Nature by Spiritual Ideas, or z, 
 DireB Intuition, or by any Supernatural Notions 
 and Conceptions infuled direcHy from above, 
 the Eye, of the Mind is altogether as blind as 
 that of the Body : And Thus we cannot be 
 iaid to haye Indijimci, Confufid, and ImperfeB 
 
 Appre- 
 
64 DIVINE 
 
 Apprehenfions of the true Nature of God and 
 of his Real Attributes ; but None at all in any 
 Degree. However as we conceive them by A- 
 nalogy, our Conceptions of them are all as clear 
 and diftin£r, as thole we have of the Faculties 
 and Operations of our own Mind: So that we 
 can conceive God to be Powerful, and Wife, 
 and Good, and Juft, and Holy, with the fame 
 Diftinctnefs and Peripfcuity we know and con- 
 ceive a Man to be fb. The true meaning 
 therefore of the Word Incomprehenfible is, that 
 we have no Idea at all of the Real true Na- 
 ture of God ', nor any DireB or Immediate Per- 
 ceptions in the Mind, of his Attributes and Per- 
 fections in any Meafure : And that we are ut- 
 terly incapable of any Dirett and Immediate 
 Knowlege of him, by the utmoft Efforts of 
 Senfe, orReafon, or Imagination. 
 
 This is the meaning of the Word Incom- 
 prehenfible among all the Antients ; that we have 
 no direct Knowlege at all of God in any De- 
 gree. Chryfoftom, defcribes God 'r*-cg€amrr« 
 httveiae &vtiTyjs xardfyil'tv, Tranfcendmg all Appre- 
 henfion of human Knowlege: Nay, 'A$ictrov rote 
 a-epa(fot, Invifibk to the Seraphim, Undifiernible to 
 the higheft Order of Angels who are all Spi- 
 rit and Mind. 'AKaTav^tev tdig xeoovfiif*, Not 
 to be htown or perceived even by the Cherubim-, 
 by which he could mean no other than a Di- 
 refl and Immediate Perception of the divine 
 Effence and Attributes. For 'tis plain that 
 both they and we have a Solid and R««/Ktiow* 
 1 lege 
 
ANALOGY. 65 
 
 lege of God, in proportion to the Excellency 
 of bur Nature, and of thofe Attribute's and 
 Properties which fupply us <*ith diftant Repre- 
 fintations 6f the infinite incomprehenfible Per- 
 fections of that Fountain of all Perfe&ion : 
 And as the higheft Order of Angels are 
 without doubt in all their Faculties formed to 
 a greater Similitude and Relemblance of God ; 
 their Knowlege of him muft be ftill more 
 bright and clear; more dired and immediate 
 and comprehenfive. Gregory Nyffen fays that 
 God is ndirqs dvnAqipias rijs 'tx, ruv Koyitr^uv vipq- 
 hirtpos, Vajily above all <rfpprehen(ion or Percep- 
 tion even of the Mind ; and he affigns this Rea- 1 
 fbn for it, becaule he tranfcends all Knowlege ; 
 that is furely all Dire£t and Immediate Know- 
 lege and Perception only. Nazianzen fays of 
 God that he is Hows ayvse^og Alone ^or only 
 unknown; that is by any Direct Knowlege or 
 Perception of him, as he is in hiriilelf. Pleu- 
 do-Dionyfius afferts him 'abfblutely to be 'xtt^ 
 yvanv Above Knowlege. 
 
 This is the Style of all the Fathers who 
 mean by thele and fuch like Exprelfions which 
 are frequent in them; not that we cannot Fully 
 comprehend the true Nature of God and his 
 Aftributes ; butthat we are not capable of any, 
 Direct or Immediate Apprehenfion or Percepti- 
 on of them : And accordingly they affert him 
 to be fb tranfcendently above all things Natu- 
 ral and Human ; that no Ideas or Conceptions 
 in the Mind of Man (all which take their Rile 
 
 F from 
 
66 DIVINE 
 
 from the things of this World) can exhibit to 
 us any thing of the Truth and Reality of his 
 Nature and Attributes. Agreeably to this 
 their common Epithets for God are that he is 
 'TTripUyvwros More than unknown, or tranfcen- 
 dently above all Apprehenfion or Knowkge. 
 'A-ywraqxTeg Without Exiflence, 'avwo-us Without 
 Sttbjlance ; and Dionyfius afferts that the Term 
 "ova-ia or Subfiance cannot Property be applyed 
 to God, who is 'tv^oVw? Above all Siibftance. 
 "Avovg Without Mind or Soul. * 'a£uos Without 
 Life. 'r-7rtp<ro(p©» above allWifdom. "T^-ip^oe above 
 all Life. Nay to this Purpofe he ufesfuch 
 hyperbolical ExpreffiQns as thefe concerning the 
 Divinity j that God is 'rjrgfltp^xfl? yrtyos Dark- 
 nefs above all Light and Splendor ; 'h uVg^oVice 
 UTrcigis A Juper/ubjlantial Exi/kuce, 'Hv7rep$&>s 
 B-iGTqg Afuperdivine Divinity ', 'h uTtp^UyetSo^dya.- 
 B-orfjg A Goodnefs above all Goodnefs. And what 
 is more remarkable, fome of the Antients re- 
 jected even the word Perfection as very im- 
 properly attributed to God ; for this Reafbn, 
 becaufe they apprehended that he was 'tjt^ts- 
 Xyg beyond all Bounds of Perfection^', even to 
 iuch a Degree that, as Dionyfius lpeaks, n<*<r*y 
 a,Tret^a,v fyfyt, He even terminates all Infinity. 
 
 Their. meaning in, aU this is plain and 
 obvious i that there is not in the Mind of' Man 
 the leaffe Sen/itive Idea, or the moft Minute im- 
 perfect Intellectual Perception of the Red Ma- 
 ture and Attributes of the divine Being as 
 they are in themfelKn insomuch, that aJlour 
 
 beft 
 
ANALOGY. 67 
 
 befil Conceptions 1 of him in the utmoft Ele* 
 vation and Abftri&ion of the Mind^ and hjgheft 
 Rights of the Imagination, can never attain to 
 any degree of a Direlf and Immediate Know- 
 lege 6f him/. The moft apt and accurate Ideas 
 or Conceptions we dan frame even of Divi- 
 nity or Perfection, it felf, fall vaftl'y fhort of 
 giving us any inch direct Knowlege. This 
 being rightly underftood from thofe Epithets, 
 and Expreffions already quoted ' y it will be eafy 
 to reconcile thefe Authors to themfelves, in 
 refpe® of thofe contrary Epithets and Expreffi- 
 dns which lb frequently occur in them* As 
 that God is 'avtot^x^ Perfect in himfelf 'a«t£t 
 ^gEiernafy Perfeffi n^ Absolutely PerfeB\ 
 'a^os Without Bounds, 'Avt^drmag Incbmmen- 
 furab.lt-, T.e tubrtthnvyov That which can be rnojl 
 of all apprehended. And again their ftyliiig him 
 'OvTicTfK Sbtbftance it felf, (Smirr^ Divjnity it felf t 
 * AhqQeta, Truth it felf, ~zv.[*,p,njiU Harmon) \ Sym- 
 metry or Proportion it (elf, , Tdyot^y The one and 
 only Good: And in fhort their afferting him to 
 be Life, and ffifdom, and Power, and Nolinefs^ 
 and Infinity and Perfection it felf. As at other. 
 times they deny all or any of thefe to fee in 
 God* fb here they run quite into the other 
 extreme, afferting them all to be in him even 
 in the Abjlr act : And they affirm Both for the 
 fame Reafbn, becaufe we can have no' Direct 
 or ^mediate Perception or 'Notion of the real 
 NaMre and Perfe&ioris of' God; thefe being 
 altogether fottmprehen/ibki 'Arid therefore they 
 either rejected all our beft 1 Nations and Con- 
 
 F a ceptions, 
 
68 DIVINE 
 
 ceptions, as exhibiting to the Mind nothing at 
 all of the Truth and Reality of any thing in 
 him : Or on the other Hand they attributed 
 to him the moft exalted Perfections the Mind 
 is capable of apprehending, in the AbftraSi 
 only ; to exprefs fuch Perfections of the divine 
 Nature as are in themfelves utterly Inconceiv- 
 able. They perceived that thofe Titles and 
 Characters could not with any Aptitude and 
 Significancy be Direffily and Literaly applyed 
 to God in the Concrete j and that this would 
 be altogether unworthy of him : Unlefs we ob- 
 ferved the true Medium, and attributed the 
 beft Notions and moft exalted Perfections the 
 Mind of Man can conceive, to the divine Be- 
 ing by ^eprefentation only and Analogy, 
 
 a. Secondly, As the true meaning of the 
 vroxAIncomprehenfiblem the Opinion of all Men 
 is, that we have no Direft Perception, Appre- 
 henfion, Intuition or Idea in the Mind, of 
 the real Nature and Attributes of God, in any 
 Degree; fo all Men have concurred in aflerting 
 them to be accordingly Ineffable, in a Senfe 
 agreeable to their being thus incomprehenfible: 
 That is, we have not Terms in human Lan- 
 guage to : exprefs any thing in the real Nature 
 of God, as he is In him/elf;, or with the fame 
 Literal Propriety theyexprels things natural and 
 human. It is in this Sence that God is fo fre- 
 quently ftyled by the Antients 'Avwvposy 'a*M- 
 <<ro?, "a^pVos- Without a Name, ox Appellation, 
 Imxpfeffib'h.i nay 't^^,™? More than Inex- 
 
 tireffible. 
 
ANALOGY. 69 
 
 frejfible, or Infinitely above all Expreffion. And 
 that they fb often pronounce it with great po- 
 lltivenels Aovvatov <Ppda-a,i, XiyetVy 'atQoveiv, cvoju-ct- 
 Qtv, A thing utterly impofiible to find out any 
 Name or Denomination which can exprefs the 
 divine Nature ; that is with any Literal Signi- 
 fication or Propriety. Accordingly Dionyfius 
 aflerts God to be 'Tjrep ttm 'ovo/jlo. >i ttcLvto, Aoyov, 
 Above any Name or Speech. Says Nazianzen, 
 he is Mfloi/sff d'tyasos Alone Unfpeakable. Says 
 Plotinus orf're i'vifia, cujtS Nor is there a Name for 
 Him, v ot< [ie$kv tear ewrS Becaufe we can think 
 and [peak nothing concerning Him. Juftin Mar- 
 tyr oblerves That there is no Name for God} 
 and that ©so?, UaT^p, KtjVjjj, Kug/o?, Asitwoti;? 
 Are not properly Names, but nqoc-foet? Appella- 
 tions only for the fupreme Being, taken from his 
 Operations \ and the Benefits we receive from Him % 
 it is only npoo-a.yopvpa, A Denomination for what 
 is in it felf ineffable. But Philo, in a ftrain be- 
 yond them all, exprefly aflerts that God can* 
 not have "ovb[m Kvpot A proper Name ; and that 
 it was for this Realbn that God ftyled himfelf 
 / am to Moles, Becaufe his Nature was to exift 
 only, not to be named or fpoken. And in another 
 Place he fays, // is impoffible to fpeak of God 
 in proper Words, fb as to exprefs any degree of 
 true and immediate Knowlege of Him: Nay fb 
 
 impoffible- 'Ou^e ydp crv(X7ra,g xpetvog impQaag (pec 5 
 
 ympms That if the univerfal Heaven became an 
 articulate Voice, it could not exprefs him with any 
 Aptnefs and Propriety. The Ground upon which 
 they all proceed for the fupport of this Opinion, 
 
 F,3 that 
 
#7 P DIVINE 
 
 that theTe can be no Proper Name for God is 
 becaufe he is utterly Inconceivable as he is in 
 bimielf; and that what is fb, can never be ex- 
 prefled in proper Words. And from them 
 Aquinas determines, That as we have no di- 
 jfedt or immediate Knowlege of God ; lb we 
 can have no Name expreffive of his Nature 
 or Subftance, in the fame Propriety that the 
 Term Man is applyed to one of ourfelves; 
 Deus ejl fupraNommaiionem, quia Ejfentia ejus 
 eft fupra id, quod de eo intelligmms & voce Jig~ 
 nificamus. And for the lame Reafon many of 
 the Antients have very juftly argued, that we 
 have no Words to express the Nature and At? 
 tributes even of Angels- with- any fuch. Propri- 
 ety of Speech, as that they fhall not be at 
 the lame time applicable to other things in a 
 more Literal and Immediate meaning. 
 
 Now the Inference to be made here up- 
 on the Principles of our modern clandeftine 
 Arians is this ; Why then, if we have no pro- 
 per-Name for God, how can we worihip him ? 
 Can we worihip we know not what? How 
 can we pray, Hallowed he thy Name; or fay 
 with the Pfalmift, Holy and" Reverend is his 
 Nam}? The Anfwer is obvious; that tho' we 
 have neither a proper Name nor Word for any 
 thing iivthe True Namre of God as he is in 
 himfelfi yet there are many Names and 
 Words which We apply to him, to exprefi 
 both his Nature and Attributes : Which tho* 
 t^hey have no Literal and StricJ Propriety in 
 4 them 
 
ANALOGY. 71 
 
 them when fpofcen o£ the divine Beings do 
 however exprefs both him and his Attributes 
 in the utmoft Propriety whereof our human 
 Language is capable. Accordingly thole very 
 Perfbris who have lb pofltively determined that 
 God is 'hvuwfjuog Without a Name ; have at the 
 fame time aflerted that he is noXvuvvpo?, that 
 we have Many Names, and Appellations, and 
 Words for God and his Attributes. So that 
 tho* the Name God attributed to the divine 
 Being, hath none of the Literal Propriety in 
 it, which the word Man hath when applyed 
 to our Humanity; and tho' every Notion in- 
 cluded in that Term is borrowed from things 
 worldly and human, and more Striftly appli- 
 caple to them : Yet in refpecT: of Us, who have 
 voluntarily appropriated that Name to exprefs 
 the inconceivable Subftance and ErTenee and 
 Perfections of the Divinity, it hath the greateft 
 Propriety that human Language is Capable of. 
 Thus therefore we can pray with Underftanding 
 and Faith, Hallowed be thy Name ; and we can 
 lay with the utmoft Reverence and Devotion 
 of Soul, Holy and Reverend is his Name: And 
 we can after the lame Manner adore and mag- 
 nify him in all thole Terms, which denote his 
 Attributes Natural and Moral, and which in 
 relpect of the Real Perfections of the Divine 
 Being have no more Literal Propriety in them 
 than the Name God ; and yet in refpefl: of Us and 
 our Manner of Thinking and Speaking, have the 
 utmoft Propriety which any Words can have 
 when applyed to things Divine and Supernatural, 
 
 F 4 3. A s 
 
72 
 
 DIVINE 
 
 3. As the Antients held ike Nature zn&Efi 
 fence of God to be thus Jncomprehenfible, and 
 Ineffable by us j fo they were of the lame Opinion 
 with refpeft to all his Attributes in General. 
 They not only held God to be altogether ano- 
 ther Kind of Being from Man j but to differ 
 more in Kind from every Rank of all created 
 Beings, than any one ( of £hem do from ano- 
 ther. In this Sence it is that they fp often ufe 
 that Expreflibri of his being Above, all things; 
 not in Degrees of Perfection, but as being in 
 his whole Nature of another Kind. 'qv$\v yap 
 $<rt t£v ovtuv fays Damafcene, For God is nothing 
 of thofe things which exift. So like wife Ploti- 
 nus, "ovTi rt rSv nanm Nor, is he any thing of 
 all things. Nazianzen defcribing God poetica- 
 ly fays, that he is k*j -n-oivTa, Xj ivM$, All things^ 
 and yet no one. 'ovx h iay } » "jrdna x Being 
 neither one, nor all. And it is a well known 
 faying of the Platonifts, that the Divinity i& 
 To ov, ^,73 fAvj ov, That -which only exijls, and 
 that which alone hath no Exiftence, in that lite- 
 ral Propriety of the Term wherein it is lpoken 
 of any other Being. It is hardly poffible for 
 Men to expreis that God is of a different Kind 
 from any Being or Rank of Beings in the Uni- 
 verfe with a higher Signification, and greater 
 Emphails. 
 
 A s the Antients I fay thus held God to be 
 of a Kind infinitely different from all other Be- 
 ings, with regard to his real EJfence or Subjtance: 
 4 So 
 
ANALOGY. 73 
 
 So they were very exprefs in declaring them- 
 felves of the fame Opinion, in refped of all 
 the Attributes and Properties which Flow from 
 that Effence, or are included in it. And in- 
 deed if they had thought otherwife, they would 
 have been irreconcilably inconfiftent withthem- 
 feives; as well as with the common Sence and 
 Reafon of Men, into whofe Heads it could 
 never enter (otherwife than to ferve a vileHy- 
 pothefis) that the Effence or Subftance of any 
 thing Jhould differ in Kind from that of ano- 
 ther j and yet that the Attributes and Proper- 
 ties, infeparable from that Effence, fhould be 
 of the Same Kind in both. This is more re- 
 markably falfe with refpeft to the Divine At- 
 tributes or Properties, which all Men allow to 
 be diftinguifhable from the divine Effence as 
 well as from one another, not as they realy 
 are in t,hemfelves: But as they arc in the Mind 
 pf Man, and in refped of Our Under/landing 
 only; in order to our thinking and fpeaking 
 of God in a way proportioned to the weak- 
 nefs of human Nature. That is, as we infer 
 the Exiftence of an inconceivable divine Na- 
 ture or Effence, from the Works of the vifible 
 Creation : So we conceive the otherwife incon- 
 ceivable Attributes and Properties of that Effence, 
 by the Faculties and Operations of our own 
 Mind ; and diftinguifh them both from that divine 
 Effence, and from one another, after the very 
 fame manner we do our own. It was for this 
 Reafon that in the ftyle of the Fathers all the 
 Perfections we attribute to God arc u Emuu, 
 
74 DIVINE 
 
 Nojjira?, 'ETrmieu, 'E7r&v^v^irei?j 'STitoyiirf&ot, all 
 of them Terms exprelfive of Natural Notions 
 only, and Apprehenfions, and Conceptions, and 
 Reckonings in the Mind of Man : Which from 
 thence are Anologicaly transfered to the Di- 
 vinity, to reprefent and exprefs thofe Attri- 
 butes which are in themfelves altogether Su- 
 pernatural, arid Inconceivable to us as they 
 are in themfelves , thofe true and real Perfec- 
 tions which Fulgentius afferts, Cannot be ex- 
 prefed with the Tongues either of Men or An* 
 gels. 
 
 Because the Real Attributes of God are 
 all of them equaly inconceivable and ineffable ; 
 it was the univerfal Opinion of all the Anti- 
 cnts that there could be no Communication 
 or Intercourse between God and Man, but by 
 the Intervention and Mediation of fuch Noti- 
 ons and Conceptions as are natural and fami- 
 liar to us. Accordingly Tertullian afferts, 
 Dernn non potuiffe humanos Congreffus inire, nifi 
 hwmanos & Senfus & AjfeEtus fufcepijfet. Thai 
 God could have no Intercourse with Mankinds 
 other wife than by taking on himfelfthe T>ialeB of 
 our Stnfts and AjfeEiioris. And " that the Cafe 
 is the fame on our Side is thus expreffed in 
 fhort by a learned and more modern Author; 
 Ex Us qua ufu quotidiano, & fmfibus atque In- 
 tel'hgentia capimusi qualem pojfumus, adumbra- 
 mus Dei Notitiam. From thofe things which are 
 obvious and familiar to us, the common Objects 
 of our Senfation and Intellect; we frame to our 
 
 felves 
 
ANALOGY. 75 
 
 /elves fitch a Knowlegt of God as we are capa- 
 ble of by Shadow and Reprefentation. So fays 
 Maimonides, The Law fpeaketh in the Language 
 bf the Sons of Men ; and I add alfoin thofe natu- 
 ral Conceptions and Sentiments which are ex- 
 preffed by that human Language in its firft 
 and literal Propriety; and then transfered by 
 Analogy to the incomprehenfible Nature and 
 Subftance, and Properties of the divine Being. 
 This is a thought lb natural that lbme of our 
 modern Englifh Writers of the belt Note have 
 of, late run into it in the Grols 5 We cannot, 
 iays one, think or fpeak of the firfi Being, but 
 by making ufe of fuch natiral Notions and Words 
 as we have: This is felf evident, fence none can 
 think or fpeak with thoughts or Words which 
 he hath not. 
 
 I t is demonjlrable fays the lame Metaphy- 
 fical Author, That no Notion, nor confequentlf 
 Word we have, can be univocaly fpoken of God, 
 as he is in himfelf-, and of the Creatures. No, 
 not lb as to exprefs any thing of the fame Kind 
 in God ? and in the higheft Angel of the Crea- 
 tion ; much lels jn refpedr. of. God and Man : 
 And for the Realbji he gives, Becaufe no Noti- 
 on can be common to God and Creatures -, no, it 
 is even Frenzy to jrnagine it. All the Notions, 
 lays he, we have for Gvd y and the Words we 
 ufe when we fpeak of him are Metaphorical; for 
 no Word fpoken of God and Creatures are uni- 
 vocal, or fpoken in the fameSence; they muflthen 
 fy fpoken of him and tfaem W different Sencesi 
 
 Where- 
 
76 DIVINE 
 
 Wherefore Jince, when fpoken of Creatures, they 
 exprefs thofi natural Notions which we had from 
 the Creatures themselves i and are therefore proper ; 
 it follows that the Seme they are taken in, when 
 they are transfered thence to God, is in fome 
 fort Improper and Metaphorical. This Author 
 did plainly difcern, that no Words of ours, 
 not even thole which exprefs the Moral At- 
 tributes of God, could be fpoken of him with 
 any Literal Propriety; and therefore he runs 
 into the other as dangerous Extreme and crude- 
 ly afferts, that All our Language of God is 
 Metaphorical: And accordingly fays, that The 
 Names of our beji Virtues are Metaphorical}* 
 faid of God ; his Reafbn is, Becaufe we had the. 
 Notion of thofe Virtues firji from ourfehes, and 
 therefore the Names of them are apply ed. to 
 Man in their firft Propriety, and afterwards, 
 transfered to God ; not in pure Metaphor as he 
 afferts, but by a True Analogy. 
 
 Says another, who is reckoned among the 
 polite Authors of the Age, If we confider the 
 Idea which wife Men, by the Light of Reafon, 
 have framed of the divine Being, it amounts to 
 this-, That he hath in him all the Perfection of 
 afpiritual Nature: and Jince we have no Notion 
 of any Kind of fpiritual Perfection but what, 
 we. difcover in our own Souls — What is a Fa- 
 culty in an human Soul, becomes an Attribute in 
 God. Each of thefe human Faculties indeed 
 (mifled by the great modern Ignis Fatuus of 
 Human Understanding) he fuppofes enlarged 
 
 by 
 
ANA L O O Y. 77 
 
 by the Notion of Infinity. Enlarged by a Ne- 
 gation ! So then it is plain that, according to 
 him, we can have no Notion- or Conception 
 or Knowlege of God but what is purely Ne* 
 gative. If it is anfwered, that our Knowlege 
 of God is Pqfitive before we begin to enlarge; 
 and even till we Stop\\n theCourfe of our En- 
 larging by a general Negation of any Limits. 
 So lay I ; it is both pofitive and ufeful, if we 
 keep within our bounds of Enlargement which 
 are very finite and limited ; and which cannot 
 with any Reality or Sence or Meaning be ex- 
 tended beyond that of Reprefentation and Ana- 
 logy : And furely if we could fuppofe that 
 Knowlege Pqfitive which is by Negation only ; 
 yet an Infinite human \Affec~tim or Faculty is a 
 monftrous Notion, and one of the laft things 
 I would attribute to God. The adding Infini- 
 ty to any Idea or Conception neceflarily Finite, 
 makes 'up no other than a curious Contradic- 
 tion for 1 a divine Attribute. Add Infinity to 
 the moft remote and imperceptible Fibres of 
 the Brain, and to the animal Spirits operating 
 in effential Unity with pure Spirit in the A& 
 of Thinking ; and then you make up. an At* 
 tribute of Knowlege or Wifdom Infinitely Fi- 
 nite: Which is as Chimerical and Gigantick 
 an Idea, as an infinite human Body ; and 
 which you may apply after any other manner 
 you pleale, rather than as a Reprefentation 
 of the Divinity. 
 
 Another hath this faying to the lame 
 
 Purpofe. 
 
7 s Divide 
 
 Purpoie. By ftudying attentively the Book of 
 Creatures, and reflecting heedfully on thofe natural 
 Notions which are mofi fublime and mofi defeca* 
 ted from Matter; we tranfcend Nature it Jelfj 
 and all the lower Orbs of finite Beings , and f oar 
 up to their great Creator, and divine Original. 
 Thus far right, but Alas ! it follows ; Nay wi 
 gain fome dtftant Glimmerings of his Ejjmve it 
 felf, and of all his glorious Attributes. No* if 
 is hy gazing with the utmoft ftretch and In* 
 tenfneis of the Mind at thofe Imaginary Jpark- 
 Imgs, and D awnings , and Glimmerings, and 
 Twinklings of celeftial Light, that Men contract 
 fuch a degree of Blindnefs ; that they cannot 
 rightly difcern the only Reprefentations of God; 
 and his Attributes which are within our Reach, 
 and as perceivable as the Light of the Sun at 
 Noon Day : Which otherwile they might have 
 done, with the fame Diftin&neis and Perfpicu- 
 ity they do the Natural Obje&s of human/ 
 Underftanding ; or the Qualities, and Facul- 
 ties, and Operations of their own Mind. In 
 this confifts the Emptinefs and Vanity of all 
 MyfiicalTheohgy (that dazling Appear ana s only 
 of Perfection in Religion) that it is all a fruit- 
 Ids and impracticable Attempt in Men, to 
 think and fpeafc of God in fome Degree 
 As he is in himfelf: In order to which they 
 iet themlelves to abftracl: intirely in their own 
 Minds from all Ideas, and Notions, and Con- 
 ceptions of things Worldly or Human, Thejr 
 firft defcribe God in the moft emphatical and 
 lofty Terms they are able to invent, as in- 
 finitely 
 
ANALOGY. 79 
 
 finitely tranfeending all Perception or Ap- 
 prehenfion of the Mind of Man 5 and as al- 
 together ineffable by the Tongues of Men or 
 Angels : And then, by a ftrange Inconfiftency 
 With themfelves, their whale Aim and Ambi- 
 tion is, to attain fome Immediate intellectual 
 ViewS) and diftant Glimmerings of that real 
 Nature and Eflcnce which they hold to be ut- 
 terly Incomprehenfible to usj and to find out 
 Words to exprefs with fome Propriety of Speech 
 what is thus inexpreflible. This unavoidably 
 runs their towering Piety and Devotion into 
 Eft$hu(iafm', for all that unnatural Working, 
 an,*! Struggle, and Labour of the Mind, by 
 eager and impotent Efforts to fbar above the 
 Reach of human Underftanding ; do end at 
 laft in a fupine Sloth and Wearinefs : It is all 
 a Dream ; with no other Effect and Tendency, 
 but to impair and weaken the native Strength 
 and Vigor of the Soul for the Functions of a 
 truly Religious Life ; and for the more active 
 and commendable Difcbarge of all the In- 
 ftances of a genuine Virtue and fubftantial 
 Holinels. 
 
 4. A s the real intrinfic Attributes of God 
 in General were thus univerfaly held to be 
 above all our direct Apprehenfion, and Pro- 
 priety of Expreffion ; fo were thofe we call 
 his Moral Attributes in particular. The Di- 
 ftinction of the divine Attributes into Natural 
 andMorialy hath no more Foundation in the Real 
 Mature of God j than that of his Attributes in 
 
 General, 
 
So DIVINE 
 
 General, from his Effence: Tho'both theft £>i-» 
 ftinctions are neceffary in refpecl of our human 
 Underftanding, who have no other way of 
 thinking and fpeaking of him but by what we 
 obferve in our felves, Wherefore tho' they are 
 not to be diftinguifhed by the Mind of Man 
 As they are in God; whofe Nature and Effence 
 and Attributes we conceive in the General as 
 one Being in whom is all infinite Perfection 
 in a Manner as inconceivable as his Effence i 
 Yet it would be impious (as the Anomoeans 
 did of old) to argue that they Ought not t<> 
 be diftinguifhed at all in our Manner of con- 
 ceiving them ; fince this would be to deprive 
 Mankind of all that Knowlege of God where- 
 of alone we are capable, and by direct Im- 
 plication to fubvert and deftroy all Religion 
 Natural and Revealed. Accordingly when 
 the Antients were fo expreis and emphatical 
 in defcribing the divine Being as Incomprehen- 
 fible and Ineffable, they meant it of his whole 
 intire Nature ; including both his real Effence 
 and all his Attributes or real Perfections with- 
 out Exception ; and this made them the lels 
 exprefs and particular in refpedt of his Moral 
 Attributes. Yet even in relpedt of thefe their 
 Epithet for him is that he is 'iTripcLyaJjog Above 
 all Goodnefs ; and Dionyfius ftyles him 'tste^- 
 (par) Kf 'TTTspeovvfABv dyad infra, Goodnefs above all 
 Splendor and above all Name : And fays again 
 that he is 'h rfg v7nt>ct,yet,$erfiros vva^g /in Ex- 
 
 iflence of Goodnefs above all Goodnefs -, that is a 
 Goodnefs infinitely out of the Reach of all 
 
 Dirett 
 
ANALOGY. 81 
 
 f)ireSf Conception, or Apprehenfiori, or proper 
 Exprefiioft of ours, in any degree. For which 
 Realbn God is with great Significancy laid to be 
 ndvrav S-icrtV) Him of whom all things may be 
 affirmed; that is all rrioral as well as all na* 
 tural Perfection imaginable ; km irdnw d(pa,l- 
 pnv, And of whom all things may be denyed-, 
 even the greateft moral and natural Perfection 
 directly conceivable by the Mind of Man. To 
 the very lame Purpofe Dionyfius delcribes him 
 'rjr«£ 7raa-av si dtpa.ipeo'iv % S-ia-iv Above all Nega- 
 tion or Affirmation,. Thb' the Parts in theft 
 two Sayings are ieemingly oppofite, yet they 
 both mean the lame thing? that none of either 
 the affirmative or negative Attributes we have 
 for God, do exprels any thing in his Real Na- 
 ture, with any Literal Propriety : That we 
 have neither a direct Idea or Conception, nor 
 proper Word or Expreffion for the real Per*- 
 lections of the Divinity; lb that all we can 
 do is by Negative Attributes to remove from 
 him all Imperfection, and by thole which are 
 Affirmative to attribute to him Analogicaly all 
 the Perfections which fall within our Sphere of 
 Knowlege. 'ov% t%et lays St. Cyril yd% )J aV 
 Q'auTTOv <p6ng peifyv t« tm naff iavrtiv Myeiv ew» 
 
 S-ix. For human Nature hath not any thing to 
 fay of God greater than thofe things that are 
 within it felf : And it follows, We think and 
 /peak of God, as they before us have done, in a 
 Manner that is proper to our felves, Tdxatfiew- 
 
 Wsy [m£ww v7ro$etyfJMTei> <7rci&f*ivai Making the 
 
 things within our felves Symbols or Represent a- 
 
 G tions 
 
82 DIVINE 
 
 tions of thofe things that arefuperior to us-, that 
 is, fubftituting the Affections, and Properties,* 
 and Operations of our own Mind to leprefent 
 the infinite Perfections of God. And agree-* 
 ably to this Dionyfius, fpeaking of the divine 
 Attributes, hath this Saying; In God done there 
 is no Mind, and yet there is 'i7rtpixx<r(* <rotpla t 
 A trdnfcendent Wifdom* k«m otra, h rdytdZ rfc 
 ran dvetfrtuv Wiv v7Tt(>o%M3}g titidwQi'ictt- And foit 
 
 is with all other In/lances of Exprejfion for a fit- 
 ter-excellent Form of thing* 'without Form or 
 Idea, in that abfolute Good; that is, the Mind of 
 Man by fuch Forms and Ideas as it hath within; 
 it felf, muft conceive thofe divine Perfections 
 of him who is Goodnefs it felf, and for which 
 it can have neither Proper Form nor Idea. 
 
 The meaning of thele, and of fiich like 
 iayings which frequently occur in the Fathers,- 
 is very obvious ; that we cannot have the leaft 
 Conception or Idea of what Goodnefs is in the 
 Real Nature of God ; nor of any of thofe mo- 
 f al Attributes into which we branch it, accord- 
 ing to our Obfervation of the greateft moral 
 Perfections whereof we find our human Na- 
 ture to be capable: And that, as a learned 
 Man remarks, whoever thinks or lpeaks of God, 
 Humana de eo vel Cogitatione Jit, vel Oratione 
 contentus, He mufl be contented with fuch Noti- 
 ons and Words as are properly Human. It was 
 for this Realbn that, as another obferves St, 
 Peter calls the divine moral Perfections t<*$ 
 ««jT*f The Virtues of God ; becaufe of that Si- 
 militude 
 
ANALOG Y. 3 3 
 
 militude our Virtues «hd Graces bear to the 
 divine Perfections : A»d hecaufe we have no 
 other way of exprefiing them but by the Vir- 
 tues and Graces of our own $qu1s; .and he 
 hath this faying to that Purpofe, Analogiam 
 turn ea [Sanctitate] habet aUquam Hqnejlas ac 
 Virtus humana. And again fpeaking of the 
 moral Attributes of God, Ex natura Aftetfuupt 
 humanorum, a qitibus ipfe Dei Spiritus ob Analor 
 gidm ac Similitudinem faces ad Deum transfert } 
 ahqua Ratione teftimanda nobis erit Natura Uhr 
 rum divine Voluntatis AcJuum. From the Na- 
 ture of human Affections, the Names of 'which 
 are by the Spirit of God him felf transfer ed to Go4 
 by Analogy and Similitude ■, we can in fome forf 
 judge of the Nature of thofe Operations of thp 
 Divine Will To. which I fhjadl ^dd, that we 
 have no other way of Reafbnipg upon thoip 
 divine Virtues as St. Peter calls them, or Affec- 
 tions, or moral Attributes, or Perfections in 
 God j but by Analogy with the Notions we 
 have of the Virtues and Graces of 'our own Souls, 
 and thole Wor,ds by which we exprefs them: 1 
 And that thofe human Perfections which Men 
 affert to be thus transfered by Similitude only 
 and Analogy, can never he fuppofed of the 
 fame Kind with thole divine Perfections of which 
 they have a Similitude only and Refemblance. 
 When we attribute our own Perfections to God, 
 lays one of out own Writers, We abjlraff from 
 the x Manner how thofe Virtues are in him ; -in 
 regard this being utterly unknown to us, it could 
 not enter into our Intention or Notion when we 
 
 G % thus 
 
84 DIVINE 
 
 thus tramfered them. And again, Thefe Attri- 
 butes are however truly fpoken of God, tho' they 
 have this Impropriety in them ,• for tho' all Crea- 
 tures are as nothing in Comparifon- of him- — -• 
 when we ufe thofe Words^ we only mean to apply 
 them to God, as far as they fuit fome Notion of 
 ours, which by Analogy hath fome Perfection re- 
 femblmg what is in him. To thefe Authorities 
 I fliali add that of Aquinas, who is very ex- 
 prefs and diftind in this Matter, and in relpe£k 
 thofe moral Attributes which are fpoken of 
 God even affirmatively, fays, that they have no 
 ftrift Propriety in them, for this Reafon ; In- 
 telleclus nojler eo modo apprehendit eas [Perfe&i- 
 ones] fecundum quod funt in Creaturis •, & (e- 
 tundum quod apprehendit, ita fignificat per No- 
 mina. He diftinguifheth thefe two things in 
 the Names of thole moral Attributes ; one is 
 the Real true Perfections in the very Nature 
 of God expreffed by thofe Terms ; which he 
 lays are altogether tranfcendent and inconceiv- 
 able, but are however fignifyed by thole Terms 
 in the greateft Propriety we are able to exprefi 
 them: The other is; our Manner of fignifying 
 or denominating .thofe Attributes, in relpeft of 
 which they cannot Properly be lpoken of God ; 
 Habent emm Modum fignificandi, qui Creaturis 
 competit. 
 
 5. A s the Real Nature of God, of all his 
 Attributes in general, and of his moral Attri- 
 butes in particular were in the Opinion both 
 of the Antients and Moderns held to be alto- 
 gether 
 
ANALOGY. 8$ 
 
 gether Incomprehensible and Ineffable 5 that is 
 above all our direct Apprehenfion, and literal 
 Propriety of Expreffion : So fuch of them as 
 have thought more clofely of the true Nature 
 and Manner of that Knowlege we have of things 
 Supernatural and Divine ; have found them- 
 ielves under a Neceffity of acknowleging that 
 we conceive and exprefs them all by Analogy. 
 Tho' it muft be confeffed that they have not 
 yet proceeded farther than ibme general Ex- 
 preffions, and confuted and very indiftinct Af- 
 iertions concerning this divine Analogy ; nor 
 to any particular Application of it to the Con- 
 futation of thofe many Arguments and Ob- 
 jections of Heretics and Infidels, which proceed 
 Upon a grofly literal Acceptation of the Terms 
 of the Gofpel. And that many for want of a 
 due and full Confideration of the true Nature 
 of this divine Analogy, together with a clear 
 and diftinct Explication of its difference not on- 
 ly from that which, is merely human, but from 
 human and divine Metaphor, have unhappily 
 confounded them; and have thereby run into 
 dangerous Miftakes, and into fuch Errors as are 
 fundamentaly deftrudive both of Natural and 
 Revealed Religion, 
 
 The firft I.fhall mention is Hilary, in Op- 
 pofition to the Arians; who then argued, as 
 they do at this Day, from our grofs Ideas and 
 Conceptions of worldly things,, and the Literal 
 Acceptation of the Terms in which we exprefs 
 them, to things Spiritual and Divine. He hath 
 
 Q 3 this 
 
86 DIVINE 
 
 this Saying among many others to the lame 
 Purpole. Comparatio enim terrenorttm ad Deum, 
 nulla eft; fed Infirmitas nojlra Intelligentia cogit 
 Jpecies quafdam ex inferiofibtis, tanquam fuperio- 
 rum Indices quartre: Ut rerum familtarium Con- 
 fuetudine admonente, ex Senfus noftri Confcientia, 
 ad infoliti Senfus Opinionem educeremur. Per- 
 gimus itaque de Deo locuturi , Dei Verbis; 
 fenfatn tamen noftrum rerum noftrarum fpecie 
 imbuentes. In which Words tho' he doth not 
 name it, yet he gives us a very clear and di- 
 ftincl: Defif iption of Analogy ; and the Inference 
 he makes from this Doctrine of his which he 
 ib frequently urges is, Ut cum aliquid ex huma* 
 nis Comparationibus proferimus, non fecimdum na- 
 ttiras corporales de Deo /entire credamur s nee 
 PaJJlonibus noflris Spiritualia comparare: Sed po- 
 ints rerum vifibilium fpeciem ad Intelligehtiam in- 
 vifibilium protulijfe. That when we make any 
 Comparifbn from things human, we may be itn-> 
 derftood not to think of God according to the A 7 ^- 
 iwe of things Corporeal; nor to compare Spiri- 
 tual things to our PaJJions: But to have applyed 
 the Species or Appearances of things Fiftble, to the 
 Ufiderftanding or Apprehending things that are In- 
 vifible. And Glemens Alexandrinus long before 
 theArian Herefy appeared in the World observed 
 A Oi 5 aTTi^iSi e| • jfi^wS Xj rS do^ra, waLvra, 'iX&xa-iy 
 
 «V yr,v. But Infidels draw all things from Heaven, 
 and fhom what is there Invijible, down to the 
 Earth. That is, as he explains himfelf/ They 
 conceive the in vifible incomprehenfible things, 
 of another World, relating to God and the My- 
 
 fteries 
 
ANALOGY. 
 
 fleries of the Gofpel, exa&ly by their grqfs Idea£ 
 and Conceptions of the vifible things of this 
 World, as if both were the Same in Kind: In- 
 fomuch that they think and fpeak of them 
 as if T&fg xeptrw axi%v8)<; vrirpcts, % fyug vec/Mft- 
 (ZdnvTis They were realy or aiiualy handling Stocks 
 find Stones which they difiingutjh by the Touch. 
 What is here placed in fb fhort and clear a 
 Light, is the very ground of all the prevail- 
 ing Herefy and Infidelity at this Day ; and moffc 
 of the Herefies in every Age of the Churcrj 
 hare fprang from the fame Caufe. But the 
 Arguments in defence of them, and the Ob- 
 jections againft the Orthodox Faith drawn from 
 this earthly Topic, have been of late not only 
 revived; but lb far improved, and difguifed, 
 and refined beyond the Artifice and Subtilty 
 of jthe Antient Heretics: That {here is now no 
 other effectual way left for a clear and full Con-r 
 futation of their Defcendents, but by proceeding 
 upon that excellent Obiervation of Clemens j 
 till we come to a particular Application of the 
 Do&rfne of Analogy to every Article of our 
 modern Herefies put into the ftrongeft Terms, 
 and carry ed on to the utmpft Point of Pecifion. 
 
 T o the lame purpofe Athanafius , with 
 refpecl to our manner of thinking and fpeak- 
 ing of things Divine and the Myfteries of the 
 Gofpel, with great Trufh and Elegance ex- 
 prefjeth himfelf thus, T«£t# <*Y#tfwojr*0<2ff ph 
 hiywTcit) 3-to7rpi7rus 'A yexvrcv, Theje things are ex- 
 frejftd indeed after the fanner of Mm, or in 
 
 G 4 human 
 
DIVINE 
 
 human Language ; but they are conceived in d 
 godlike or heavenly Manner. This was levelled 
 at the Arians, who founded their heretical Opi- 
 nions, and the whole ftrefs of their Reafoning in 
 Defence of them, upon the ftridlly literal Accep- 
 tation and Meaning of the Terms wherein the 
 Myfteries of the Gofpel are revealed : Whereas 
 we exprefs thole Myfteries in Words of human 
 Language, which lofe their ftrid Propriety 
 when applyed to things Supernatural and Divine, 
 and are then to be underftood Analogical^, 
 
 Among the learned of later Times we 
 meet with many Hints and fhort Defcriptions 
 of this divine' Analogy; and in fome of them 
 a few feeble Efforts towards a fuller Difcovery 
 of fomething, which they found was plainly 
 wanting to all divine Knowlege : But they were 
 always driven back from any commendable 
 Progrefs by a frightful Apparition, in the ghaftly 
 ftiape of airy Figure and Metaphor, ready with 
 open Mouth to devour all Religion as well 
 Natural as Revealed. Obferve the Determi- 
 nation of a Philolbpher of Name upon this 
 Queftion of higheft Importance to us, Quomodo 
 J)eit$ a nobis cognofcatur ? There are two diffe- 
 rent:' ways, fays he, which lead us to the Know- 
 lege of God ; One by Negation, or removing 
 from him all Imperfection in the Creature; 
 which we do by negative Attributes, fuch as 
 Infinite, Immenfe, Invifible; by this means, Ob- 
 Jew am et invoUttam y fed magis noftra Infirmitati 
 0tteMj>eratam, divitue Jimflicitatis Imaginem Co* 
 
 gitationf 
 
ANALOGY. 89 
 
 gitatiorie depingimus. He ftiould have remarked 
 here, that in this Negative way of proceeding 
 we are to remove from him not only all natu- 
 ral and moral Imperfections incidental to the 
 Creatures ; but the whole intire Nature and EJ- 
 fence and Kind of all and every one of them, 
 together with all their EJJential Attributes and 
 Properties, as one grand Imperfection utterly 
 /unworthy the Real Nature and Intrinfic Perfecti- 
 ons of the great Creator ; and then, as far as it 
 reaches, this negative Knowlege is not obfcure 
 and involved^ but moft clear, and diftin£t, and 
 ufeful. But when Men attempt to add all or 
 any of thofe negative Attributes, and Infinity 
 in particular, to any created Beings or to any 
 EJJential Property ox Faculty or Operation of 
 that Being, taken in its Literal Sence, in order 
 to make up an Attribute expreffive of any Per- 
 fection fuperior in Degree, but of the fame Kind 
 in the Divinity; they do but confound our 
 Thoughts, ' and pervert a plain and obvious 
 Knowlege, moft ufeful to Religion, into Ab- 
 furdity and Contradi&ion. 
 
 The other way to the Knowlege of God, 
 he obferves, is by Analogy. Cum ex Analogia 
 & Similitudine quadam Creaturarum Votes Deo 
 tribuimus ; turn magis difttnBam divina Majejia- 
 tis Imaginem formare nobis videmur. Sic ueum 
 ut Unum, perAnalogiam vero-, ut Bonum ipfum 
 eoncipimus. We Seem to form ; and to our Selves ; 
 and a Sort of Similitude ; and a More diftincl 
 Refemblance. What Qccaiion was there for 
 
 4 al l 
 
go DIVINE 
 
 all this Caution in a plain Cafe ? How tender* 
 ly he touches a fafe and evident Truth, as if be 
 were feeling for it in the Dark i Where it was to 
 remain no longer concealed, than till new and 
 unheard of Forms and Difguifes df Herefy and 
 Infidelity made it necefTary for it to break into 
 Light, and appear in Public. He might have 
 ipoke out and boldly affirmed, that we have 
 no other way of forming to our felves any 
 Pojitive Conceptions of things Supernatural and 
 Divine, but by Semblance only and Reprefen* 
 tation of things Natural and Human : Info? 
 much that, as he remarks, we could not con- 
 ceive even the Unity of God, but by our grofi 
 Idea or Conception of human Unity; nor his 
 Goodnefs, but by the Virtues and Graces of 
 our own Souls, 
 
 Another, more truly a Divine than 3 
 Philofopher, accounts much after the lame Man- 
 ner for our Knowlege of God. Naturam Dei 
 fro captu Viatorum declarat nobis facra Scrip- 
 tura, per certa Attributa ejffentialia partim nega- 
 tiva, partim affrmativa: Partim etiam, quoad 
 rationem quandam formalem, analogice (fi fasita 
 bqui) feu in Imagine quadam, .& Similitudim* 
 Pro captu Viatorum, of Travellers, who are in« 
 tire ftrangers to the Real Nature of the Place, 
 as well as Company to which they are going $ 
 and whereof they can have no other Knowlege, 
 than by Refemblance only or Similitude with 
 what they, have already feen and known. At* 
 tributd effentwlia Negativa, was only a great 
 
 Slip 
 
ANALOGY. 9 t 
 
 Slip of the Pen. But what is moft material 
 to oblerve is, that the Scripture declares to us 
 Travellers, thole effential Attributes; Quoad 
 Rationem formalem, which is the Language of 
 the Schools to exprels, As they are in their own 
 Nature analogicaly ; they being otherwife incon- 
 ceivable and ineffable. Could that great and 
 good Man hear me now from among the 
 BlefTed, I might venture to tell him, that 
 the Do&rine of divine Analogy in its full La- 
 titude is now become not only Lawful, but 
 NeceJJary ; both for the farther Defence of 
 the orthodox Faith from its open and clan- 
 deftine Enemies : And for a lealbnable Rein- 
 forcement and Relief to our learned and wor- 
 thy Defenders of it ; who wanted nothing to- 
 wards an intire Conqueft, but the giving up the 
 literal and ftri&ly proper Acceptation of the fe- 
 veral Terms in Difpute ; which as it was a Point 
 utterly indefenfible by them, fb the Conceffiori 
 jnuft have proved fatal to their Adverfaries. 
 
 Another very learned Man expreffeth 
 himfeif to the lame Purpofe after this Man- 
 ner. < Igiiur 'qua a rebus creatis& corporeis trans* 
 feruntur Nomina, & ad divinas explicandas ac~ 
 Commodantur ; a nativa ilia originis fua face pur- 
 ganda funt: Ut 'qnicquid in his unde petitajunt 
 rebus impurtim & imperfeEtum cernitur ; id a di- 
 'vinis ijlis & calefiibus, cogitatione feparetur. The 
 Meaning of which is, that The Words transjered 
 from things created and corporeal to things Di- 
 vine, are to be purged from the Dregs of their 
 
 original 
 
92 DIVINE 
 
 original Acceptation-, that nothing imperfect or 
 impure imported in them y might be applyed^ to 
 things Divine and Heavenly. Why, every thing 
 in the whole Nature of whatsoever is created 
 or corporeal is imperfect, and even impure in 
 refpecl: of the Divinity ; fo that no word can 
 be transfered from things natural and human 
 to God, but by Semblance only and Reprefenta- 
 turn : But lcared with the Name, at his time 
 of Day, when there was no more than a Dawn 
 of Analogy ; he however expreffed the Thing. 
 And again, inOppofition to thofe Heretics who 
 founded their Arguments againft the orthodox 
 Faitl% upon the literal Acceptation of Terms, 
 he moft rightly obierves ; That the Fallacy of 
 their Realbning confiited in this, Quod qua Di- 
 vimtati tribuuntur a nobis, humanis explicataSi- 
 miUtudinibus ac Vbcabulis j iifdem quibus infunt no- 
 bis irretita Conditionibus ac Modis, transferri in 
 Deumexifiimant. That is, they fondly imagine 
 that the Conceptions and Terms which we 
 transfer to God, are to be then underftood after 
 the fame Manner -as when they were applyed 
 to things Natural and Human. No fays he, 
 J)e Deo aliter hac intelligenda, qua a creatis re- 
 bus affumuntur ; quam de creatis ipjis unde funt 
 ptita. The Sabellians and Arians to whom 
 thefe Sayings are applyed, he obferves, under- 
 hand the Terms of the Gofpel in a groft and 
 Jjuman, that is a literal Sence, and from thence 
 make their Inferences quite contrary to each 
 other: But we muft take them as he feys 
 4Uter y when transfered to the Divinity ; and 
 
 from 
 
ANALOGY. 93 
 
 from a full Explication as Well as a right Ap- 
 plication of that Alitor i Or that very different 
 Manner, will arile a final Determination of the 
 great Points in Controveffy. 
 
 But of all whom I have yet met with, the 
 Angelic Doctor hath let this whole Matter in 
 the trueft Light, and with greater! Judgment 
 and Exadrnels. Speaking of our Conception 
 or Knowlege of God by Refemblance only 
 and Similitude, he diftinguiiheth thus. In re- 
 fpeft of the divine Being himfelf, there can be 
 nothing in the Creature whereby to difcem 
 any thing of his real true Nature and Bflence; 
 no created Species or Form can exhibit to the 
 Mind of Man any thing as it is in the Real 
 Nature and Effence of God: But in refpe£fc 
 of our Under Handing, lome Similitude or Re- 
 prefentation of God and his Perfections he afferts 
 to be however ablblutely neceffary, in order to 
 render us capable of fbme Conception or Ap- 
 prehenfion of Him. All the Perfections of 
 the Creature, . and of an human Mind in par- 
 ticular, he afferts to be in God not Eminenter 
 in a higher Degree, as the vulgar Notion is; 
 but Supereminenter, quite of another Kind, and 
 infinitely above all Form or Species of created 
 Beings; and therefore no created Perfection can 
 be any more than a Similitude and Relemblance 
 of the divine Perfections. And he concludes 
 by (hewing, that altho' nothing can give us a 
 real and true Perception or Apprehenfion of 
 any thing in the Nature of God, as he is in 
 
 himfelf; 
 
§4 fc> I V 1 N E 
 
 himfelf ; yet we have a fblid and lubftantiai 
 Knowlege of him by Similitude and Repre- 
 fentation : And all this he clears up fully un- 
 der that Conclufiori of his with this Title, No- 
 mina de Deo & Creaturis diffa non Univoce, net 
 pure z^Equivoce ; fed Analogue dicuntur, fecun* 
 dam Anatogiam ad ipfunti 
 
 Again upon thefe three different Accep- 
 tations of Words he farther explains himfelf 
 thus. Nothing can be affirmed of God and 
 of the Creature Univoce, in the fame Sence or 
 as if they were of the fame Kind. Fprlnftancey 
 lays he, when we fay a Man is Wife^ this Term 
 is taken in the Concrete, fb as to include a di* 
 redly known Being j and withal we know 
 what it is for him to be Wife or Foolifh : But 
 when this is made an Attribute of God, Re- 
 linquit rem fignificatam ut incomprebenfam, & 
 excedentem Nominis Significationem. Therefore 
 when we fay God is Wife, we can mean - it only in 
 theAbftfad as he calls it; as an incomprehen- 
 fible Perfection of an incomprehenfible Sub* 
 ftance or Effence, Anf-werable and Similar to" 
 Wifdom in human Nature. To which he adds, 
 that Wifdom in Man is a Property only, diftin- 
 guifhed from his Effence; but that in God it 
 is not realy diftinguifhed from his very Sub- 
 ftance and Effence ; and from thence he makes 
 this Inference, therefore Wife or Wifdom cannot 
 be fpoken of God and Man in the fame Sence* 
 
 N p r are the Attributes ©f God fays he* 
 
 -and 
 
ANALOGY. 95 
 
 and the Moral Attributes in particular, affirmed 
 of him and of Man Pure s^Equivoce\ that is 
 in the other Extreme, in a -Sence or Meaning 
 without any Real Correfpondency, or Similitude: 
 For then We could have no ufefial Knowlege 
 of God at all, Sed femper incident Fallacia 
 tjMquvvocationis > but one continued ^Equivo- 
 cation and Fallacy would run thro* all our Con- 
 ceptions and Reasonings upon God and his 
 Attributes. 
 
 Wherefore his Conclufion is, that the 
 divine Attributes are ipoken of God and of 
 Man, in a middle Way between the two for- 
 mer \ that is Analogue : Et ifte modus Commu- 
 nitatis, medius eft inter pur am ^yEquFVocationem^ 
 & fimplicem Univocatioimn ; which Manner ia 
 his own Words is Secundum Anologiam^ id eft, 
 Propwtionem. This Analogy with great Accu- 
 racy he founds in the Relation of Man in par- 
 ticular to God the firft Caufe and Principle of 
 all things : In whom all the Perfections of his 
 Creatures (and I fhall take leave to add by way 
 of farther explication j and of Man in parti- 
 cular, who was made in the Likenefs of God 
 and after his Image) are Supereminenter ; in % 
 manner lb tranfcendent, that our greateft Per- 
 fections bear only a faint and very diftant Si- 
 militude and Correfpondency to thofe which 
 are Divine ; which Similitude or Analogy he 
 aflerts to be lb imperfect, that no Words or 
 Attributes can be afcribed to God and Man, 
 Secundum idem genus, So as to mean any thmg 
 4 *F 
 
96 DIVINE 
 
 bfthe fame Kind. I ftiall only obferve here 
 for the fake of thole who are unacquainted 
 with the Terms of the Schools, that a Word 
 applyed Univocaly to God and Man meanSj its 
 being attributed to both in the fame literal 
 Sence and ftrift Propriety, By Purely Equi* 
 vocal is meant, that the fame Word is attri- 
 buted to God and Man in a Sence fo intirely 
 different, that it implies no Real Similitude, or 
 Correfpondency of the one to the other. And 
 a Word is attributed Analogicaly, when it is 
 fpokeri of Man in its firft and literal Propriety} 
 and transfered to, God on account of an in- 
 conceivable, but Real and Correfpondent Simili- 
 tude in the Nature of both Beings. 
 
 After fo clear and diftincl: an Account of 
 Divine Analogy by a Perlbn to whom, as Eraf- 
 mus obferves, no Divine even of his own more 
 refined and learned Age was equal in a found 
 Judgment and folid Learning, it may well be 
 thought ftrange that in the fpace of above four 
 hundred and fifty Years no farther Improve- 
 ment fhould be made of it : And that fo im- 
 portant a Point fhould have been thus intirely 
 overlooked among the many ufelels , and 
 trifling, and fome of them even mifchievous 
 Niceties of the Schools. 
 
 The firft of our Englifh Writers in whom 
 I have met with any mention of the Thing 
 without the Name, is that great and good Man 
 who will liye and flourifh in the Latin; when 
 
 Alas! 
 
ANALOGY. 97 
 
 Alas ! all that he wrote in Englifh muft die! 
 In one of his Sermons he hath this Saying. 
 Repentance is not dfcribed to God properly ; bui 
 as other human PaJJions and Affections are, as 
 Griefs Sorrow, &c> 'AvS^aTrova^us, To import 
 fome Anions of God eventual), and according to 
 the Manner of our Under/landing, like unto the 
 Operations which thofe PaJJions produce in as; 
 but have nothing at all of the Nature of thofe 
 Pajfions in them. Upon this I fhall only ob- 
 ferve, that the Diftindtion between taking 
 Words 'Avfyu-jwredluf after the manner of Men, 
 or in a literal Sence ; and ©low^-n-ug in a man- 
 ner worthy of God, or in a divine Analogical 
 Acceptation -, hath prevailed more univerfaly 
 among learned Men from the Time of Atha- 
 nafius, who made ufe of it againft the Arian 
 way of arguing from the literal Application 
 of Terms in the Gofpel both to God and 
 Man indifferently. And again, that if all our 
 Intellectual and Moral Attributes (which are 
 ipoken of the Divine Being A^^TTcs-ci^ and 
 Analogicaly, as well as our commendable Af- 
 fections and Paflions) import no more than the 
 ■Anions of God Eventnaly ; then there can be 
 no Real Correfpondmcy and Similitude between 
 them and the divine Perfections which they re- 
 prefent and exhibit to the Mind of Man ; And 
 thus all Parity of Realbn is quite taken away; 
 we can have no lblid and real Meaning at 
 the Bottom when we fpeafc of God in the 
 Language Of human Faculties ; and any other 
 Terms whatfoever would ferve as well to ex- 
 
 H prefs 
 
98 DIVINE 
 
 prefs the A&ions of God, as what we call his 
 Attributes taken from the Perfections of our 
 own Minds. But this was only an incautious 
 way, of wording a Doctrine which, had there 
 been in his Time the fame Occafion for Ex- 
 acinefs there is now, that curious Logical Head 
 could have placed in iuch a Light as perhaps 
 no Man will be able to do after him. 
 
 I am now come down to our own Times, 
 wherein Arianifm hath been not only revived; 
 but wrought up together with all the Prin- 
 ciples of Socinianifm not inconfiftent with it, 
 into a new and formidable Herefy : Which from 
 hiding its Head in clandeftine Darknefs and 
 Receis, and fculking from the Laws, without 
 ever appearing in Public but under Cover of 
 Diffimulation and a Color of Orthodoxy; be- 
 gins now to ftare the received, eftablifbed, Or- 
 thodox Truth in the. Face; not without an in- 
 fulting difdain, and triumphant Pity of what- 
 ever has been laid or written againft it. The 
 Prime Authors and Defenders of it have, with- 
 out any Provocation, and merely thro' a Fore- 
 fight of the impending Danger which threate- 
 ned their Hypothefis from the Do&rine of di- 
 vine Analogy, attacked it vigoroufly at every 
 Turn ; and with fo much keennefs and viru- 
 lence, that they feem to have wafted all their 
 Strength againft it already, before this un- 
 tryed Ground can be fairly laid out for the 
 Engagement. _ On the Side of Orthodoxy we 
 find no mention of Analogy, but where Men 
 
 are 
 
ANALOGY. 99 
 
 are hard prefled with abfurdity in the Appli- 
 cation of Terms in their literal Propriety to 
 things Divine and Supernatural : Nor have they 
 yet proceeded any farther than to lome ge- 
 neral Expreflions concerning it, and that often 
 without even the Name ; and fometimes per- 
 haps to a few Remarks on it, dubioufly if not 
 erroneoufly worded ; for the moft Part with as 
 much Caution as they would ufe in walk- 
 ing upon the Brink of a Precipice, from whence 
 they obferved others, by making a wrong ftep, 
 to have fallen down headlong. 
 
 The firft I mail cite here is a Right Re- 
 verend Peribn, whom I have ibmewhere leen 
 ftyled in print, and very defervedly, the Fmefi 
 Thinker of the Age. What Conceptions I have 
 of the Nature and Perfections of God are accord- 
 ing to my Apprehenfim fo far clear-, as to enable 
 me truly and Juftly to determine which of thofe 
 diftincl Ideas fhave in my Mind are applicable to 
 him, and which are not : And fuch a Knowlege 
 of the "Divine Nature as this, is a fufficient Di- 
 reElion of my Faith in any Proportion concerning 
 God; where I clearly under ft and all the Ideas at- 
 tributed to him. A fine Sentence, and fraught 
 with Judgment j only it muft be obferved that 
 he mingles Ideas, which it has been ftiewn we 
 attribute to God by Metaphor only; with 
 thofe Notions or Conceptions which we .attri- 
 bute to him by Analogy. Here no left than 
 thefe leveral things are comprifed. That the 
 Knowlege I have of the Nature and Perfections 
 
 H 2 of 
 
too DIVINE 
 
 of God, is taken from the clear and diftincl 
 Ideas or Conceptions I have in my own Mind, 
 which are from thence applyed and attributed 
 to him. That thefe Ideas or Conceptions at- 
 tributed to God are clearly underftood ; fo that 
 what we know of God, and all that we attri- 
 bute to him is as clear and diftindr. when thus 
 attributed to him, as when they are applyed to 
 our'felves. That the Mind of Man is capable 
 of judging and diftinguifhing which of our 
 Conceptions are fit to be attributed to God, and 
 which are unworthy of him : That is, we at- 
 tribute all the Perfections of human Kind to 
 him ; after having feparated the Intermixture 
 of Imperfection as far as we are able. Laftly^ 
 That this lort of Kpowlege by the Interven- 
 tion of fuch Ideas or Conceptions as are natu- 
 ral and human, is fufficient for the Direction of 
 our Faith ; I add, and of our Pra&ice, and for 
 all the Ends of Religion. 
 
 Again lays the fame Author, It feems U 
 have been the Defign of the Scriptures to repre-* 
 Jent God in a fenfible Manner ■, tho' at the fame 
 time they take Care to ajjure us, that God is in 
 his own Nature a Being of different Perfections 
 not conceivable by human Underftanding ; and is 
 thus reprefented only in condefcenfion to our Weak- 
 nefs, for the Help and Ajfiftance of our Devotion] 
 So that all Expreffwns of this Kind, where God 
 is the Subjeff, are to be underftood in an higher 
 and more fpiritual Sence ; butfidl with fome Anai 
 logy to what they properly and ufualy figniff. 
 
 The 
 
ANALOGY. 101 
 
 The whole Matter is here folly expreffed, tho' 
 with much Caution. In a Senfible Manner ; he 
 means in a natural, eafy, and intelligible 
 Manner, reprefenting God by fiich Conceptions 
 or Ideas as he before obferved we had already 
 in our Minds, from Senfe and Reafon: And 
 accordingly the Language of Scripture concern- 
 ing God and things fupernatural runs altoge- 
 ther either upon divine Metaphor or Analogy. 
 Of different Perfections not conceivable by human 
 Under/landing, that is as they are in themfelves ; 
 which they would be in ibme Degree, if any 
 of our natural or moral Excellencies were of 
 the fame Kind in God that they are in us. 
 In a higher and more fpiritual Sence ; that is in 
 a divine Sence analogous to what they exprefi 
 in their literal and proper Acceptation. 
 
 The next I mail cite is a later Author, 
 who unwarily runs into that Error of the Ano- 
 moeans of old and partly of the Socinians, of 
 refolving all the moral Attributes of God into 
 the Rectitude of his Nature ; and who finds 
 great fault with Men's Dijiinguijhing and mul- 
 tiplying the moral Perfections of God beyond Mea- 
 fure, and without Grounds. But if they did not 
 diftinguiih and multiply the moral Attributes 
 of God, they could have no way of thinking 
 or fpeaking of them any farther, than that 
 His Nature is Right ; which is a confuted, ge- 
 neral, and undetermined Manner: And Men 
 would thus proceed in direct Contradiction to 
 the Scripture, which all along diftinguifhes and 
 . H 3 multiplies. 
 
102 DIVINE 
 
 multiplies the moral Perfections of God. This 
 he himfelf immediately obferves in direft Oppo-i- 
 fition to his own Principle, but folves it thus. 
 This is done in the Scripture fays he By way 
 of Accommodation to human Language and hu- 
 man Conception. It afcribes to him our Affecti- 
 ons, our Paffions, our Senfes, and even Parts of 
 our Bodies-, but yet we do not fuppofe that any 
 of thefe things are ftri&ly applicable to the Deity; 
 or any otherwije than in a figurative and foreign 
 Sence. In like Manner human Virtues — feem 
 applyed to the Deity, if not in a Figurative, yet 
 in a lefs proper Sence. I will not prefume to 
 affirm that it is even an Impropriety to afcribe 
 the fever al forementioned Characters to the Deity ; 
 much lefs that they are to be confidered in him 
 merely as Analogical. I muft obferve here that 
 there are but three ways wherein our moral 
 Perfections can be afcribed to God ; either firft 
 in a Literal and Proper Sence, as they are fpoken 
 of Man ; lb as to be of the fame Kind in both. 
 Or Secondly, in a Sence purely Figurative or 
 <iyEquivocal ■, fo as to import nothing in the 
 Deity which hath any Correfpondent Reality with 
 what they fignify in us. Or laftly, fo as to 
 import real incomprehensible Perfections in the 
 Divinity, which have a real Correfpondency and 
 Similitude to the moral Perfections of our own 
 Souls ; and this is conceiving them Analogicaly. 
 Now read thofe few perplexed, obfeure, in- 
 confiftent Periods over again ; and obierve how 
 thefe three ways are jumbled together, fo that 
 you cannot -tell which of them he means; or 
 
 whether 
 
ANALOGY. 103 
 
 whether all of them together ; or none of them, 
 but lbme Foreign Way which he hath not ex- 
 plained; or whether he makes more or fewer 
 ways than thefe, of afcribing our moral Per- 
 fections to God. Human Virtues feem applyed 
 to the Deity in a lefs proper Sence : And in the 
 lame Breath, he will Not prefume to affirm that 
 it is even an Impropriety to afcribe them to God-, 
 fo that thus they are attributed to God neither 
 with Propriety, nor Impropriety. Again the Scrip- 
 ture alcribes our bodily Parts to God, in a Fi- 
 gurative and Foreign Sence: And human Vir- 
 tues In like Manner ; but not with Impropriety. 
 But above all obferve the flat Contradiction 
 between the Beginning and Ending of the whole. 
 The Scripture diftingiujheth Jujlice, Righteoujhefs, 
 Truth, Faithfulness, Holinefs, Gocdnefs, Mercy, 
 Long-fufering, and all other moral Char after s^ 
 by way of Accommodation to human Language 
 and human Conception. Now if we transfer 
 this human Language and^ thefe human Con- 
 ceptions to God, then they become divine At- 
 tributes; and thofe divine Attributes muft 
 mean fbmething Real in God, or they may as 
 well be inarticulate Sounds j and they muft 
 mean befides, fomething Similar and Correfpon- 
 dent to what thofe moral Perfections are in 
 us (other wife they help us to no true and ufe- 
 ful Knowlege of God) and this is Analogy. 
 And yet in the clofe he intimates That it is 
 Prefumption to affirm that they are to be conji- 
 dered as merely Analogical. I did not produce 
 this Citation, with # defign to leffen the Cha- 
 
 H 4 rafter 
 
104 DIVINE 
 
 rafter of the ingenious and worthy Author; 
 but to fhew how neceffary a clear and well 
 digefted Knowlege of divine Metaphor and Ana- 
 logy is, even to thofe of greateft Parts and 
 Learning, in order to prevent all Gonfufion 
 and Obfcurity in their Dilcourfes and Realbn- 
 ings : Not only upon the moral as well as na- 
 tural Attributes of God ; but upon all thole 
 Terms of Revelation which in Scripture are 
 fpoken, as he truly obferves, By way of Accom- 
 modation to human Language and Conception. 
 
 M y next Citation is from another learned 
 and ingenious- Author who hath obliged the 
 World with fome very valuable Reflections 
 on Reafon. He juftly lays down Clear and 
 diftinct Ideas of Senfation as the original mate- 
 rials and ground-work of all our Knowlege, 
 and then it follows ; Thefe and the reflex affs 
 of the Mind whtreby Jhe adjufis, compounds, and 
 compares thefe Ideas : and from their, different 
 Combinations draws Inferences, makes Deductions, 
 and forms Conclufions ; or from thence forms 
 Analogical Conceptions of abftratled and fpiritual 
 Truths ; make up the whole and file Province of 
 Reafon. From thefe reflex a£fs of the Mind up- 
 on its own Powers and Operations in receiving, 
 retaining, comparing, and compounding thefe Ideas, 
 proceed a clafs of Notions and Conceptions of a 
 more fpiritual and refined Nature. By removing 
 every fhadow of Imperfection, and heightening to 
 the utmofi Extent of Thought every Perfection we 
 perceive in our felves or created Nature, we ar* 
 
 rive- 
 
ANALOGY. 105 
 
 rive at a certain Ideal KnowJege of God and di- 
 vine things, which we apprehend and conceive 
 only by Analogy, and exprefs only by Metaphor. 
 The tJIe I would make of this Paflage is, to 
 fhew how the ingenious ^and learned Part of 
 the World are coming into thele great and 
 important Truths therein contained. That Idea's 
 of Senfation are the Only original Materials and 
 Groundwork of all even our Rational Knowlege^ 
 That all Compojltions of thofe Ideas, and much 
 more all our complex Notions and Conceptions, 
 are Falfely and improperly called Ideas. That 
 the Mind forms Analogical Conceptions of ' fpiritual 
 Truths. That by the Knowlege Of every Per- 
 feffim we perceive in our felves, we arrive at a 
 certain Knowlege of God and divine Things. And 
 that We apprehend and conceive God and divine 
 Things by Analogy. 
 
 Thus far all is exa&ly right, but for the 
 fake of Truth I muft hot pals over thofe grie- 
 vous Miftakes which are here mingled with it. 
 
 1 . B y Ideas the Author fays he means both 
 thofe of Senfation, and the Reflex ABs of the 
 Mind. Here he confounds even fimple Ideas 
 of Senfation, with our complex Notions and 
 Conceptions: Nay and lays them down indif- 
 ferently together as the Materials and Ground-, 
 work of all our Knowlege, exprefly contrary 
 to what he afterwards affirms; that Simple Ideas 
 are the Materials and Groundwork of all our 
 Knowlege. 
 
 2. He 
 
106 DIVINE 
 
 i. He calls the Confcioufnefs which the 
 Mind hath of its own Operations upon thofe 
 fimple Ideas of Senfation, Reflex ABs. Where- 
 as the internal View, the Mind hath of thofe 
 Ideas, as well as the Confcioufnefs of its own 
 Operations, are as direct and immediate, as 
 the Sight the Eye hath of a vifible Object di- 
 rectly before it : If it were otherwife, all our 
 Knowlege might well be compared to the con- 
 futed, uncertain, imperfect Perception of that 
 Organ of Senfation by a forced fide Look ; or 
 rather by a Diftortion and wrefting of it in- 
 wardly upon it felf. Reflex or Reflection ap- 
 plyed to the Operations of the Mind, is a 
 Term fo utterly fencelefs, and without any Ap- 
 titude or Ground of Propriety in Nature ; and 
 which neceffarily occafions fo much Obfcurity 
 and Confufion thro' the whole Procedure of the 
 Intellect, that its prevailing lb much is unac- 
 countable. 
 
 3. Analogical, Conceptions of abflraBei 
 Truths. Abftraction is the feparating in 
 Thought one thing from another which is not 
 feparated from it in Nature, for a more di- 
 Itinct Confideration of the Mind. This hath 
 been, by a profound Miftake, applyed in Re- 
 ligion to exprefs the manner of our Percep- 
 tion or Apprehenfion of things Divine and Spi- 
 ritual ; by the Mind's abftracting intirely from 
 all Perception and Conception of things Natu- 
 ral and Human: For lay afide that obfcure 
 2 affected 
 
ANACDGY. 107 
 
 affected Term Abftrattiwi, and the Meaning is 
 no more than this; let the Mind drop all 
 Thought or Conception of worldly Things 
 when it contemplates divine Objects, and then 
 it will be capable of feme Apprehenfion or 
 Conception of thefe laft. Whereas both are 
 equaly impracticable ; for if a Man thinks at 
 all, he cannot by the utmoft intenfneis of his 
 Mind take it intirely off from things Mate- 
 rial or Human, which are its proper and im- 
 mediate Objects. He hath no way of ab- 
 ftracting intirely from thefe, but by fliutting 
 his Eyes both of Body and Mind, and becom- 
 ing ftone Blind. And if he could thus ab- 
 ftract from all worldly things, how would it 
 enable him to obtain the leaft Perception of 
 things Divine and Spiritual, which are the im- 
 mediate and proper Obje&s only of another 
 World ; there being no diftinct Faculty in hu- 
 man Nature now for the direct Perception of 
 them? So that Analogy, which is a Subftitu- 
 tion of the Conceptions we have of our own 
 Perfections to reprefent thofe of God and 
 things Spiritual, is quite contrary to all fuch 
 Abftraction, and utterly inconfiflent with it ; 
 and yet thefe two things hath this Author 
 huddled together into one. If you abftract in- 
 tirely from all our natural Ideas and Concep- 
 tions, by his own Conceflion you abftradt from 
 all the materHis and ground- work of Knowlege, 
 and then the Intellect hath nothing to operate 
 upon. But if you preferve the Foundation, 
 and only transfer the. natural and worldly Know- 
 lege 
 
io8 DIVINE 
 
 lege y©u have already built upon it, to things 
 divine and ipiritual by Analogy, It is a Kind 
 ef Knowlege, as the Author obferves, Which 
 thai 1 Low, and Inadequate, (as he words it) will 
 however be found a firm and fubftantial Bafis 
 for all our Enquiries after Truth and Happi- 
 nefs. 
 
 4. 1 d e a l Knowlege of God and divine things. 
 Here again this Author hath grievoufly mi- 
 ftaken his own Doctrine of Analogy. For we 
 can have no Ideas of things Divine and Spiritual ; 
 that is in other Words no Ideal Knowlege of 
 them. No, all our Knowlege of them as he 
 hi mfelf truly obferves, is by Analogical Concep- 
 tions formed from Inferences, DpduBions and Con- 
 clufions : That is in other Words, from the Ope- 
 rations of the Mind confidered together with 
 thpfe fimple Ideas which he juftly calls the firft 
 Materials and Ground- work of all our Know- 
 lege. Ideal Knowlege of God, are two things 
 put together with the g'reateft Inconfrftency 
 imaginable. 
 
 j. God and divine things we conceive only 
 by Analogy, and exprefs them only by Metaphor. 
 This is not a Trip, but a Stumble occafioned 
 by too much Hafte or Inadvertency; and he 
 might as well have faid that we conceive them 
 only by Hyperbole, and expreis tlera by Irony. 
 To think of them necefTarily after one manner 
 only, and yet to be able to exprefs that fame 
 Thought after another, requires a new and un- 
 heard 
 
ANALOGY. 109 
 
 heard of Figure of Rhetoric : And is no lefs 
 abfurd than affirming a Man cannot avoid con- 
 ceiving a thing by a Figure, and yet can be ca- 
 pable of exprefling that very Conception Proper- 
 ly 5 or of conceiving it in a Proper Manner only, 
 and exprefling that fame Conception Figura- 
 tively. Surely never was there a more palpable 
 Miftake ever contracted into fo few Words. 
 
 This Do&rine of Analogy is elfewhere by 
 the lame Author exprefled thus. The highefl 
 that this feeble Faculty [Reafon] can pretend to 
 in thefe Matters [Spiritual Truths and Myfte- 
 ries of Religion] is from the known, certain, 
 and experienced Nature and Properties of mate- 
 rial things to apprehend a proper Analogy ; 
 
 and from the vifible things of this lower World, 
 which are low Images of the fpiritual and invi- 
 fible things of God ; to frame imperfeB Likeneffes 
 and Reprefentations of thofe fuperior Objects ; and 
 that in fhort^is all that Reafon can do in thefe 
 fublime Matters. Very juft and clearly exprefled 
 (except the words Material and Vifible, which 
 turns all into Metaphor) and it cannot be 
 thought an unreaibnable requeft that the Au- 
 thor would never recede from it ; but employ 
 all that Learning and Ingenuity he hath^fhewn 
 himfelf Matter of in its Defence againft thole 
 who hold a quite contrary Do&rine. But, 
 That fpiritual Truths and the Myfleries of Reli- 
 gion, are not to be apprehended by all the Powers 
 of Reafon. , That For this there mvft be fome 
 fttpreme central Faculty, Power, or Capacity of 
 % the 
 
no DIVINE 
 
 the Souli fuperior to all its rational Powers. Some 
 fecret Principle of Truth independent of all corpo- 
 real Objeffs and Ideas whatsoever ; tho', as he 
 truly lays, thefe are the only Materials or 
 Ground-work of all our Knowlege. That We 
 have vital fpiritual Perceptions, and Taftes, and 
 Views of God and invifible Things., by the help of 
 inward fpiritual Senfes, capable of infinite Percep- 
 tion. That Articles of Faith cannot be appre- 
 hended by Reafon, but by a divine effential Light 
 manifefled to the Spirit ■, or by a myflerious Com- 
 munication of myflerious Light to the Soul: To 
 ule the Author's own Words but otherwife ap- 
 plyed, this is all Cant and Enthufiafm, Jargon 
 and Nonfence. I lhall leave thefe exftatic No- 
 tions to himfelf for a fecond Review and more 
 mature Deliberation. 
 
 Another Authority I lhall produce from 
 among our late Writers is in thefe Words of a 
 very ingenious and ufeful Author. If our Paf 
 (ions be, as certainly they are, real Motions and 
 AffeBions of the rational Soul, there can be no 
 doubt but that there is fomething in the Nature 
 of God, conjidered as a perfectly rational Being* 
 Analogous to thefe AffeBions in us i tho' infinitely 
 removed from thofe ImperfeBions, with which they 
 are attended in us: and we may as well refuft to 
 afcribe the Faculty of Knowlege to God, becaufe we 
 know by Ratiocination-, as deny all rational AffeBi- 
 ons to him, becaufe they are excited in us by P^affion, 
 
 Here it is very rightly afferted that there 
 
 muft 
 
ANALOGY. in 
 
 muft be Something in the Nature of God Ana- 
 logous to human PaJJions and Affections ; that is 
 in other Words, there muft be Ibmething in 
 the divine Nature that bears a Similitude only 
 and Correfpondency with the commendable Paf- 
 fions and Affections of an human Soul : For other- 
 wife there could be no Analogy between them ; 
 and then thofe Perfections in the Nature of God 
 which are fignifyed by them, would be as truly 
 the very fame in Kind with your Paffions and 
 mine, as the Paffions and AfFe&ions of any other 
 Man. The Reafon affigned here for this great 
 Truth is likewife very Good ; for if we afcribe 
 Knowkge to God which in us is performed by Ratioci- 
 nations that is by Thinking, which requires the 
 help of imperceptible Fibres in the Brain, and 
 the Concurrence of the animal Spirits : We may 
 as fafely afcribe to him thofe PaJJions and Affec- 
 tions which are alfo the Operations of the rational 
 Soul, compofed of Matter and Spirit a&ing in 
 eflential Union. Thefe indeed, as he truly ob- 
 serves, Shew themfehes more in thefenfitive Part 
 of the Body, than Ratiocination or the Motions 
 of the Will ; that is, than the % feveral Modes 
 of Thinking and Willing ; and Are attended 
 with a more extraordinary Commotion of Spirits: 
 But there is ftill a motion or Commotion of Bo^ 
 dily Parts and Spirits in both, which are often 
 even wafted and impaired by Intenfnefs and 
 Vehemence of Thinking and Willing. And 
 therefore all to be infered from thence is, that 
 in this ftate of corrupt Nature, our Paffions 
 are afcribed to God in a lower degree of Ana- 
 logy. 
 
H2 DIVINE 
 
 logy, than our intellectual Operations and mo- 
 ral Virtues ; tho' in a ftate of Innocence they 
 muft have been all equaly complete Reprefen- 
 tations of the divine Perfections. 
 
 Infinitely removed from thofe Imperfec- 
 tions with which they are attended in us. Here 
 I muft obviate a Miftafce common to this Au- 
 thor, with feveral others who in the Main al- 
 low this Doctrine of divine Analogy. He means 
 as they do, That if you remove all the Motions 
 and Commotions with which our Paffions and 
 Affections are attended, you may then attri- 
 bute them to God in a Literal and proper 
 Sencej'-as being then of the Same Kind in 
 him that they are in us, tho' infinitely more 
 tranfcep'dent in Degree. v But if you remove 
 all Motion and Commotion of bodily Parts 
 from them, you in effect remove the Paffions 
 themfelves ; even as considered in a State of 
 perfect Innocence, or as they may be in a State 
 of Glory. For as they never were, ib they 
 never will be the fole Operations of pure Spi- 
 rit ; but of Spirit and Matter in effential Union: 
 And now in this Life they include in their 
 very Notion, Nature, and Effence, the Motion 
 and Commotion of the imperceptible Fibres 
 or Animal Spirits. So that if you remove all 
 the Imperfections neceffarily adhering to them 
 in us, you remove all Conception of the real 
 Nature and Kind of them ; and leave nothing 
 to fubftitute even as a Similitude and Refem- 
 blance of God's correfpondent Perfections? 
 
 or 
 
ANALOGY. 113 
 
 or for a fure and lolid Foundation of Analogy, 
 and a found Parity of Reafon in all that is 
 fpofcen of him in the Language of our human 
 Pafllons and Affections. 
 
 r 
 
 My next Citations are from a learned and 
 worthy Author, who hath faid more upon this 
 Subject of Analogy than any I have yet feen 
 among our Englifh Writers; A Perfon of a 
 foaring and elevated Genius ; who could he 
 have been contented with walking upon the 
 Ground in the fearch of Truth, might have 
 outgone all his CotemporarieSj and not have 
 come behind even the Antients of his Profefe 
 fion : But his too lofty and frequent Flights of 
 Imagination Petmis non homini Datis ; and his 
 being lb often upon the Wing in abftracted-tfa* 
 permechanical Reafohings, as to Matters de- 
 pending on Obfervation of Fact only^ and 
 Experiment} together with a Deduction of 
 Confluences relating to the things of the 
 invifible World, independent of all Ideas and 
 Conceptions of things Worldly and Human; 
 have retarded his Courfe, and given others 
 thofe Advantages which Nature defigned for 
 him- Alas ! This fond prevailing Ambition of 
 thinking above Man ; and this ftraining of the 
 Mind till it feemingly exerts its Faculties and 
 Operations beyond its ielf, is no other than 
 throwing it into Convulfwns y which tho' they 
 carry an Appearance of Strength and Vigor: 
 beyond what is natural, yet never fail to end 
 in extreme Fainting and Weaknek 
 
 l I GAS- 
 
*i4 t) I V I Kf E 
 
 I canst o-'r omit here his unhappily tunning 
 !tl£o the falhibnable Afie&ation' of the Age, by 
 treating moral and divine Matters in a Mathe* 
 matical Method; with Axioms, Definitions, 
 Proportions*, Demon/lrations, ^Corollaries, Scho- 
 liumSy Lemmas., and mutual. References of 
 fchefe to each other, in order to draw out a con- 
 tinued Chain of Confequences ; in which if 
 there is a Failure of one Link, the whole is difc 
 folved. Whereas every Moral Truth ftands 
 fecure on its own Bottom, without this tedious 
 Apparatus ; and requires no fuch additional 
 Sbpport or Corroboration „ There is indeed a 
 perfed: Agreement and Harmony between all 
 the Truths both in Morality and Revelation ; 
 but no fuch Necejfary. Connexion as there is be- 
 tween things Material, which' are to be eftt- 
 mated by their Quantity; nor will they be 
 treated, like them, in Number and Figure t 
 You may as well go about to meafure the Di- 
 menfions of a Virtue by a Square or a Triangle^ 
 or to compute its Degrees of Perfe&ion by the 
 Golden Rule ; which this Author aflerts Ana- 
 logy to be, not only in Philofbphy, but alfb in 
 natural and revealed Religion. This Manner 
 of proceeding is taken up of late, with a mif- 
 taken Intention to add Weight arid Prevalency 
 to Men's Difcourles upon the Truths of Morali- 
 ty and Revelation ; but the Event is quite con- 
 trary : For thofe Truths are by that method 
 only wrefted into an unnatural Pofture and Si- 
 tuation; in which their natural Eafineis and 
 
 Force 
 
ANALOGS ii| 
 
 Fdrce and Beauty are ffcarcely vifible ; the foB- 
 ftance of therri is quite loft in Form j and they 
 become fo difguifed with a ft#ched ungainly/ 
 Meinj that all due Regard and Veneration fat 
 them is dropped in the Reading. Had hefoeeri 
 iatisfyed with any thing fhort of fcernanftrati* 
 on, no Man was better able to have placed the 
 utmbft Degrees of Moral Evidence (of ^vhMfc 
 alone the Truths of natural Religion arid Re- 
 velation are capable) in a more fhiriing Light : 
 But the injudicious blending of thefe together > 
 and cloathing this Evidence in a Mathematical 
 Qtef&y is covering it with the difguife of a 
 &lave ; and throwing the Truths of Religion 
 into Chains and Fetters ; whereby all the Free- 
 dom; and Majefty; and commanding Air of 
 Reafon and Authority peculiar to them is wbnl 
 off; tdgetherwith that uriiverfal arid Free Em* 
 pire they have an innate Right to exercife^ 
 hot over the Underjtandings orily, but over the 
 Witts arid Cmfcknces of Men; 
 
 There! are three material Points aUtried 
 by this Author. 
 
 FYnisf, That the Vifibti, Intellectual, Md 
 treated Species of things are Pictures^ tniageSi 
 and Reprefent.afioris of the iWvifibU Archetypal 
 and uncreated species of things- in- 4he Mtod of 
 the fuprime iBeing-^-^That thejt are PiBurii, h 
 mages and ReprefeHtations of the dk)ine AttrStitifj 
 Morijr [ifs Perfeff according Unfteir Ofder ' iH 
 '"' of Beings-^ — 'That ihings k$tify aW 
 I § Analogical 
 
n6 DIVINE 
 
 Analogical Types and Miniatures of the Ihvijtbk 
 *<-*-lt is abfolutely impoffible that infinite Power 
 and Perfection Jhould bring any thing £any free 
 and intelligent Agent] into Being; which had 
 not its own Signature, Stamp, or Image on it; 
 for then could be nothing befides himfelfj whofe 
 Images they fhould be ; and it is abfurd to ima- 
 gine they Jhould reprefent nothing at all-^^AU 
 thefe ^Faculties [of human Nature] feem to he 
 originaly defigned for nothing but this material 
 World, and the Syfiem of things about us; 
 they help us to no Notion or Conception of anj 
 fort of Beings difiinc^ from' Matter, but in Jo far 
 as Analogy will bear us out. And in another 
 Place he obferves, That. from this Method, of 
 Analogy (the only Medium of 'human Knowlege) 
 we are necejfarily led to conclude the Attributes 
 or Qualities of the fupr erne and abfohte Infinite, 
 are indeed Analogous to- the 'Properties and Qua- 
 lities of finite Beings. "All this would have 
 been very juft and intelligible (tho* fbmewhat 
 darkly worded) had he not included the Vi~ 
 jfible Species of Things among his Analogical 
 Representations of God j whereas they are 
 merely fenfitive and metaphorical Images when 
 transfered to the Divine Being ; and contain 
 60 real Analogy, 
 
 Secundly, That things Vifible {Human 
 he fhould have faid] are no more than Pic- 
 tures, and Types, and Reprefentations ; and 
 Thave nothing in them of the fame real Nature 
 and Kind with^hofe invifible and divine things, 
 
 whereof 
 
AN A L O G Y. 117 
 
 whereof ithey are Pictures and Representations* 
 Thoje Affections and Properties'* in Creatures, 
 which in them are but Modes j when Analogic 
 ealy carried up to the like, or fimilar Affeffions or- 
 Attributes in the divine Nature, are the utmofi 
 Realities, as being complicated with abfolute Infi^ 
 nitude u and thereby transformed and exalted 
 into real Qualities and atJual Subfiftences. A- 
 gain, Power, Subfifience, Duration* Knowlege, 
 Wifdom, Gowlnefs, Beauty, &c. which in in- 
 telligent Bpngs are Images of Omnipotence, Necef 
 jary Exigence, Eternity, Qmnifcience, the divine 
 Sophia, Benignity, Infinite Perfection, &c. in the 
 divine* Nature; and are but Modes of Being, 
 and not effential Perfections in thofe% are in him 
 infinite Realities, and living aclive Principles. 
 Here I muft confefs he is almoft out of Sight ; 
 but what is difcernible of him is much to 
 the Purpofe ; That all the Perfections of in* 
 telligent Creatures, and of Man in particular^ 
 are no more than bare Images and Represen- 
 tations of the correspondent Perfections in the 
 Divinity. In Man they are only Similar Af-? 
 feci ions and -Attributes as he words it; and fb 
 iar from being of the fame Kind with the di- 
 vine Attributes or Perfections which they re- 
 prefent, that they, are but very low and dik 
 tant Similitudes. So very low, that fome 
 learned Men have ran into a very dangerous 
 Extreme, and have peremptorily denyed not 
 only that there can be any Similitude*, but even 
 any Proportion or Correfpondency between 
 the intellectual or moral Perfections of an hur 
 
 I 3 man 
 
nS D I V I NE 
 
 jnan Mind, and tWe which are divine. iS»- 
 ter infinitum & finkum, .fays one, fimplicijfimum 
 & cmttpofitum, dependens & independent, nulla 
 Similitude, And again, Licet igitm Veum pr& 
 , die emus Sapient em, Santtum, Bonuw, Potentpn; 
 eademque Encomia Angelis & hominibus trilwh 
 ptus ; Ken credendum propter ea edfdeWi.aut Jh 
 miles verbis tilts fignificari Perfetfiones—^Veum 
 
 f' itur Optimum, Maximum, Regem,, zyBfernum^ 
 ufium, Fortem pradicamus ; propterea quod ifih . 
 stfmodi Titulis, eos qui magni a nobis afiimantur 
 falemus cohonefiare i Non vero quod in animo ha- 
 beamus ipfum Veum vocibus Hits defcribere f 
 aut aliquam in ipfo nofiris jimilem PerjeBimem 
 deflgnare — —Immenfo igitm diflingumur Inter, 
 yallo, quo Proportio omnis excluditur, 
 
 I t might haye been: faid with great Truth, 
 that all Conceivable and Known Similitude and 
 Correspondency is excluded ; for the true Ground 
 and Degrees of that Similitude which all in- 
 telligent Beings bear to their great Archetype, 
 are as incomprehenfible as the divine Nar 
 turet But to deny there can be any Simi-r 
 litude conceivable or inconceivable, is in efs 
 fedr. to deny that Man is made In the Like* 
 mfs of God or after his own Image; upon that 
 Principle we can affix no intelligible Meaning 
 to that Text j but we deftroy it utterly by lay-? 
 ing in fhort. Inter finitum & infinitum nulla 
 Smiliiudo.' That nothing Finite can be of' 
 the lame Kind with that which is Infinite^ 
 is as plain as a firft Principle^ but to afTert 
 
 that 
 
AN AX" O G Y. 119 
 
 that there can be no Similitude, or Propor* 
 tion, or Correspondency in one to the other, 
 is to overturn the whole Foundation of all 
 our divine Knowlege, which is only by Ana- 
 logy: Infbmuch that if there can be no Si* 
 fnilitude between Finite and Infinite, there 
 can be no folid Ground for a Parity of Reafbn 
 in our whole Manner of thinking and lpeafc- 
 ing of things Supernatural and Divine. But as 
 we have not only Reafon, but the Word of 
 God to fupport the Truth of that Similitude ; 
 fo we are to depend upon his Goodnefs and 
 Veracity in not iuffering us to be liable to fuch 
 an inevitable and univerfal Delufion, as we 
 ftiould labour under if it were Groundlels. t 
 
 But to return to our own Englilh Author. 
 His way of demonftirating the Vifible and In- 
 tellectual Species of things to be Pictures only, 
 and Images of the invifible Archetypal Species 
 of things is, becaufe the AjfeBions and Proper* 
 ties in Creatures are hut Modes, and no effential 
 'Perfections ; but in God they are Realities and 
 living Principles ; which I am obliged to take 
 Notice of here, becauie it overturns all that 
 <Do6rrine of Analogy which he hath been de- 
 monftrating. For there can be no Real Si"* 
 militude, or Proportion, or Analogy between, 
 Nothing and Something. If the Affections 
 and Properties in Man are not Realities, as he 
 feems to intimate; then in afcribing them to 
 God we afcribe nothing real to hkn: So that 
 thus all the divine Attributes by which we ad- 
 
 I 4 mire 
 
120 DIVINE 
 
 mire ahd praife and worftiip the divine Being, 
 can have no more meaning than if they were 
 inarticulate Sounds. They cannot mean any 
 thing in God Similar and Anfwerable to what 
 they are in us, becaufe in us they arc but Modes ; 
 that is according to him, fb many Nothings., 
 as oppofed to infinite Realities; and how can 
 mere Nothings import any Similitude or Pro- 
 jjortidn or Correfpondency with Realities,? It 
 is no proper Anfwer to this to fay* that tho' 
 Knowlege, and Power, and Wifdwn, and Good" 
 nefs are no Realities in us ; yet that they become 
 fuch when Analogkaly carried up to the divine 
 Nature, as being then complicated with abfolute 
 Infinitude. Now what It is for Modes to be 
 transformed into Quantities, and exalted into ac- 
 tual Subfijiences ; . For Nothing to be realized 
 into Something, without an A#, of Creation j 
 For A finite Mode to be complicated with abfo- 
 lute Infinitude, without a Contradiction ; I take 
 to be Propofitions that ought to be underftood^ 
 before they ar,e demonftrated. If Power, and 
 Knowlege, and Goodnefs, and Juftice y and Mer- 
 cy y and the reft of thofe Perfections which we 
 afcribe to God for divine Attributes, are to 
 be deemed no Realities or real Perfections in us, 
 before we afcribe them to him : Whatever 
 Realities they may be in refpect of the divine 
 Nature, they can have no real fixed Meaning 
 in refpeft of our Underftandings which trans- 
 fer them ; becaufe we have no "Direct Idea, No- 
 tion, or Conception of any divine Perfection j 
 fo that after his manner of arguing, all we fay 
 a of 
 
A N A.L, O Q Y. 121 
 
 of God. in the Language of our own Perfecti- 
 ons is ftill but ib much inarticulate Breath. 
 * Whereas the very Reafon why we attribute 
 them to God is, becaufe we firft find they are 
 Real Perfections a&ualy in our Nature; and 
 therefore we transfer them to God, to exprefs 
 feme incomprehenfible Realities in him : And 
 if they were not real Affe&ions and effential Pro- 
 perties in us, they could not denote or exhibit 
 to our Mind any correfpondent Realities iq, 
 the divine Nature, 
 
 Another thing very material taken No-» 
 tice of by this Author is, that there is no ar-» 
 guing juftly from the real Nature of the Crea-f 
 tures, and of Man in particular j to the real in- 
 trinfic Nature of the Divinity: Or in other 
 words,' that there is no proceeding upon the 
 ftriftly proper and literal Acceptation of Terms, 
 as if any one effential Affection or Attribute 
 were of the fame Kind in God and Man. He 
 who would reafon Analogkaly from the Nature 
 ofthofe [Knowlege, Wiidorai, Goodnefs, Pow- 
 er, Beadty&c.^ in created intelligent Beings, to 
 the Nature of thofe [Perfections] in the- divine 
 Effence; without having the utmqfl Regard to ab-> 
 folate Infinitude- — -would be wiferably mifiaken. 
 Again, He that from the FiBure of a Man would 
 reafon Analogic aly about human Nature : and from 
 the Blending and "Pofitww of fome Colors on Canvas, 
 would nafon to ijfe and I Knowlege :- Or from the 
 refleBe&Image of the Sun in the Water, would 
 draw any Conclufions concerning the real intrinfie 
 
 Nature: 
 
122 DIVINE 
 
 -Mature of Light and Heat, could not err moregrofsi 
 Jy. Once more, He who would judge, determine, 
 and purfue practical Conclufions about the Nature 
 and Properties of fpiritual and divine things by 
 his Reafon; would aft as incongruoufly and contrary 
 to the Analogy of Nature j as he who would tafie 
 Colors, and look into Sounds. Thehighefl that this 
 faculty can juftly pretend to in thtfe Matters is, from 
 the known, certain, and experienced Nature and 
 Properties of material things ( to which the rati- 
 onal Faculty is in fome Meajure adequate) by a pro* 
 fer Analogy {and from the Vtfible's being low Ima- 
 ges of the Invifible and fpiritual) to frame fimilar 
 but imperfeB Likmejfes and Reprefentations of thefe 
 fuperior ObjecJs. 
 
 Without having the utmoft Regard to abfohte 
 Infinitude. Here this Author falls in with that 
 monftrous Notion of adding Infinity to the 
 Powers, and Properties, and Affections of our 
 own Minds, in order to work them up into di- 
 vine Attributes ; the Abfurdity and Falfenefs of 
 which I hope hath already been made fufficient- 
 ly evident. I fhall only take Notice how this 
 Notion utterly dcftroys all that Analogy which 
 this Author had been demonftrating. For it 
 proceeds upon a Supposition that our Affections 
 and Properties are attributed to God in Kind. 
 How then can his Opinion, That their being com- 
 plicated with Infinity quite changes their Nature, 
 and exalts them into a different Cate gory or Kind, 
 be confiftent with this ? And how can this agree 
 with our haying no Apprehenfions, or Ideas, or 
 4 Conceptions 
 
A N ATO GY. 123 
 
 Conceptions of thing? Invifible and Spiritual, 
 other-wife than by Similar and itnperfeft Like* 
 nefes and Reprefentatiens of thojefuperior Objects ; 
 fince according to this Opinion we have tfaf 
 Things themfelves in Kind ?, 
 
 B y his Reafon. We have no way of judg- 
 ing j|nd determining ^concerning divine tilings, 
 but by the lame Faculty by which we judge 
 and determine concerning things Natural and 
 Human V and that is our Reafon. But the 
 Author's Meaning is however juft ; That we 
 have no way of apprehending or perceiving 
 any thing of the Real intrinpc Nature of things 
 divine and fpiritual by our Reafon, or by any 
 other Power or Faculty in human Nature; we 
 have no way of conceiving or apprehending 
 them, or of judging and reafoning upon them, 
 otherwife than by Analogy with things World- 
 ly and Human, 
 
 The Author hath purfued this Do&rine of 
 Analogy with great Learning and Ingenuity 
 (but in the Demonftrative Way) thro' all the 
 Works of Nature, and vifibk Syftem of the 
 Creation : And from thence carries it by a no- 
 tional Gradation up to the very Nature of the 
 invifible World ; taking the whole Univerfe, 
 and even the Pivinity it felf into an Infinite 
 Qone, whereof he fuppofeth God to be the Ba- 
 ps. The Body of it is The whole Syftem of 
 Creatures from the highefi fpiritual Intelligence ; 
 defcending in a perpetual Subordination 'and con- 
 tinual 
 
124 DIVINE 
 
 tinual Scale down to brute Matter. As you thus 
 Conjider the Creator and the Creatures altogether 
 in one View, but in an inverted Order from 
 the Bale downward; you are to imagine, 
 that as All the Sections of a Cone parallel to the 
 Baft are fimilar to it, and to one another : So 
 every Species and Rank of Creatures have a 
 fivonger ImpreJJion and more lively Similitude 
 of the Ortgin of all Perfection, as they come 
 nearer to their Bale; from whence that Re- 
 femblance diminifhes in Proportion to their 
 Diftance from it, till you come to the Vertex; 
 where that Similitude is moft fVeak y and Faint, 
 and; Contracted. 
 
 This comprehensive Scheme, and- the 
 whole Series of Demonftrations which follow 
 upon it, may be entertaining enough to the 
 Curious j But I meddle not with Analogy 'as 
 the Ground of it may be either Imagined, or 
 Demonftrated in the very Natures of All things 
 ^Vifible, or Invifible, Human, or Divine ; or as 
 they bear a mutual and Known Similitude or 
 Proportion in the Order of Beings. I confine 
 my felf to that Divine Analogy only, whereby 
 things worldly and human do neceffarily be- 
 come Images and Reprefentations of Superna- 
 tural and Divine Things, to the Mind of Man,: 
 Between which the Similitude oe Correfpon- 
 dency, tho' true and real, is fb far from admit- 
 ting of any Demonftration, or even Illuftration 
 of its particular Nature and Degrees ; that thefe 
 are- altogether as inconceivable and unknown 
 
 as 
 
ANAL G Y. 125 
 
 as the true intrinfic Nature of things Spiritual 
 and .Divine. Nor is this kind of Analogy Mat- 
 ter of mere Guriofity only and Speculation ; 
 but fuch as is of real Ufe and Neceffity to be 
 plainly underftood, and well confidered : As it 
 leads: us into* the true Method and Manner of 
 that Knowlege we have of the things of another 
 World ; and as it enables us in Religion to fteer 
 fafely between the two dangerous Extremes of 
 Enthufiafm and Infidelity. 
 
 : Icannot however but obferve here what 
 a favourable AfpecT: that Hypothefis, tho' far 
 from the Defign of the worthy Author, bears 
 towards Atheiftri. Had he left the divine Na- 
 ture out of his Cone, it might better have fit- 
 ted the reft of the Univerfe, and the whole 
 Syftem of created Beings : Among which it is 
 not improbable that there mould be many di- 
 ftincc Ranks and Species one above another ; 
 tho* not differing by fuch infenfible Degrees 
 only, as we imagine between the contiguous 
 Sections of a Cone. For this carries in it an ugly 
 Implication that they are all one common 
 Mais, and hardly diftinguifhable Heap of the 
 iame univerfal, fimilar, uniform SubftaUce j 
 one mere Huddle of Beings thrown all clofe 
 together by a Kind of Fate and Neceffity, or 
 by lbme Chance and accidental Dilpofition of 
 the Parts of an eternal and infinite Syftem of 
 Matter in endlels Motion : Rather than, by the 
 voluntary Contrivance of an infinitely Wife 
 and powerful Agentj who created all purely 
 
 Jbiritual 
 
fpiritual Intelligences totaly and effentialy dif- 
 ferent from each other ; and at great diftances 
 from thofe compofed of Spirit and Matter. 
 This Notion*hath a direct Tendency to rendef 
 doubtful the truly eflential and wide difference 
 between Matter and Spirit; which all unbe- 
 lievers are very fond of doing ; being heartily 
 difpofed to wifflt that there were no fuch thing 
 as pure Spirit in the UniverfC. 
 
 This might however have parted as a flight 
 Inadvertency : But to take the divine Nature 
 into one and the lame unhrerial Syftem with 5 
 the Creatures, is no left than running unwari- 
 ly into the veify Atheiftical Hypothecs Of Sfi- 
 nofa j who, as this Author himfelf obferves,' 
 Conftdered the uniroerfal Syftem of things as a, 
 kind of a Huge-Brute* Animal. But at the 
 famd time he held God to be Part of that Sy- 
 ftem, as a vital Spirit at leaft or natural Virtue 
 difiuied thro' the Whole : Or in the Language 
 of other Meri of the like Principle's, as tite 
 Soul of the itniverfe j ibme of them aflerting 
 this to foe an intelligent, and others an unin- 
 telligent Principle. Now whether it be one of 
 the other, it makes little Difference in refpecl 
 of the evil Tendency of every Hypothefis 
 which includes God and the Creatures into one 
 Common universal Syftem ; and it would have 
 ferved Spinofa's Turtt as well, if he had cOnfi- 
 dered the whole Syftem of things as zn> Ifti0< 
 Animated-Cone, of as ah Huge-Monftrous*Any 
 thing elfe< All fuch Hypothecs' therefor e are 
 
ANALOGY. ti? 
 
 to be utterly exploded, as altogether unworthy 
 of God} and as leading Men directly into a 
 Disbelief of his diftind Exiftence, real Crea- 
 tion, and Providence ; as well as of that infi- 
 nite Diftance there is between him and his 
 Creatures. The Author law this Confequence, 
 and therefore took care afterwards to, place 
 the Supreme Infinite^ or Balis, at an Ahjoluu* 
 ly infinite Diftance from the Body of the Cone* 
 But this is fo far from removing the Objection, 
 and preventing the evil Aliped of the Hypo- 
 thefis ; that it is loading it with Abfurdity 
 and Contradiction ; For how the Cone fhould 
 be it felf Infinite, and yet its Balis be at an 
 Absolutely infinite Diftance from it, requires a 
 very exuberant Imagination to conceive, or a 
 Faculty of Demonftrating even beyond Ma- 
 thematical Certainty. 
 
 This wrong inconfiftent Notion^ together 
 With that of Conplicating Infinity with out 
 human Perfections, in order to work them 
 up into Realities for divine Attributes ; it may- 
 be eafily conjectured this Author lucked in 
 with his Mother's Milk at the University ; who 
 was herfclf, with the reft of her Sifters, about 
 that Time unhappily poyibned by an Effay 
 toncefning Human' Under/landing : Which ap- 
 peared indeed in the Beauties of Style, and 
 Wit, and Language $ but all this was the Glit- 
 tering of the Serpent, to palliate and difguife a 
 long Series of falls Principles of Knowlege, 
 directly deft ru&iye of revealed; Religion ef- 
 
 pecialyj 
 
128 DIVINE 
 
 pecialy ; and calculated with no fmall Labour 
 and Artifice for leading youthful and half 
 learned Minds into all that prevailing Igno- 
 rance and Infidelity, which lad Experience 
 hath fhewn to be the Confluences of them. 
 The Author of that Eflay hath laid the Foun- 
 dation of this very Hypothefis. Things, fays 
 he, as far as we can obferve, UJJen and aug- 
 ment as the Quantity ^doth in a regular Cone; 
 where tho' there be a manifefl odds betwixt the 
 Bignefs of the Diameter at remote Diftances, 
 x yet where they touch one another the Difference 
 is hardly difcernible. — *-^-Qbferving fuch gra- 
 dual and gentle Defcents downwards, in thofe 
 Parts of the Creation that are beneath Man; 
 the rule of Analogy may make it probable, that 
 it is fo alfo in things above us ana our Obferva- 
 tion ; and that there are fever al Ranks of In* 
 telligent Beings, excelling us in feveral Degrees 
 of Perfection, afcending upwards towards the 
 infinite Perfection of the Creator, by gentle 
 Steps and Differences that are every one at no 
 great Diftance from the next to it. — This fort 
 of Probability, which is the beft Conduct of 
 rational Experiments, and the Rife of Hypothe- 
 fis, hath alfo its~~Ufe and Influence. Yes, this 
 Hypothefis, as laid down and applyed by him, 
 hath two very evil UTes, and a moll: malignat 
 Influence. 
 
 First, The plain Defign and Implication 
 of it is, tofliewthat there is no effential Diffe- 
 rence between Men and Brutes j thefe are fup- 
 
 pofed 
 
ANALOGY. ii£ 
 
 golfed to touch one another in the Gradation! 
 of his univerfal Cone, and their Diameters to 
 be fo nearly of the lame Length, that they 
 differ but. in a Point; This is the exprefs Ufe 
 and Application made of this Conical Do&rinc 
 by tb.6 Author; For, fays he, it is a hard 
 Matter to fay whin fenfible and rational begin, 
 and where ihfenfible and irrational end. Again* 
 If we compare the Abilities of fome Men and 
 fome Brute's, we fhall -find fo little Difference ; 
 that it will be hard to fay that thofe of the 
 Man dre clearer or larger. Thus a Fool of 
 2 Man and a cunning- Fox (the very Inftance 
 by which he elfewhere illuftrates this vile No- 
 tion whereof he is very fond) come as near 
 together as any two Syftems of Matter carf 
 do: So that Rdtiorial and Irrational, Senfiblt 
 and Infenfible^ Man.; and Beajl, /and Vegeta- 
 bles; are all onef common uniform Syftemy 
 Whofe Parts' are as clofely linked together as 
 the Sections of a Cone ; and each of us differ 
 from thofe fpecies of Beings contiguous' to us, . 
 no otherwife than as the infenfible length of 
 the adjoining Diameters in fuch a Figure. 
 This is exactly of a Piece with many other in- 
 finuatibns of this Author; particularly that 
 Men by decrepid old Age, and lofs of Senfes' 
 and Memory, may be in a Condition not above 
 Cockles and O'yfter's ; and that Matter may 
 poffibly have a property of Thinking luper- 
 added to it. 
 
 SeCon'dl y, As this Hypothecs includes 
 
 K God 
 
130 DIVINE 
 
 God and the Creature in one and the fame Sy- 
 ilem, it is liable to all the dangerous Confe- 
 quences before mentioned ; but without any 
 Softening or Alleviation, or the pious Ufe made 
 of it by the other Author. God was there the 
 Bafis, but he is here Supfofed to be the Vertex 
 of the Cone, and the Notion is left barefaced 
 to do all the mifchief it can ; by a pernicious 
 Insinuation that the Difference between the 
 higheft created Intelligence and the Creator 
 himfelf, is as infenfible as that between Man 
 and Brute, and that there is the fame clofe 
 Connexion between them : Which Hypothefis 
 at beft gives no fmall Countenance to thofe 
 Atheiftical Opinions, which run upon fuppp£» 
 fing the whole Univerfe one uniform Syftem of 
 Matter; and in which God is luppofed to be 
 the vital Spirit, or a Natural Virtue and Erier^ 
 gy difFufed thro the whole; or to be the Soul 
 of the Univerfe ; and which attribute he Dif- 
 ferences between all Ranks of Beings to Moti- 
 on, or Chance, or Ibme continual Series of a fa- 
 tal Neceffity. This and all fuch notional Hy- 
 pothefes which carry in them thefe Dangerous 
 Implications, and from whence fuch evil Cott- 
 fequences are (b eafily deduceable ; fhould be 
 carefully avoided by all who have a frncere Re- 
 gard to natural, as well as to revealed Religion : 
 Of which this Author was fo far aware, as not 
 to fay exprefly that God was the Vertex of his 
 univerfal Cone; this he knew would have been 
 read with Abhorrence. But he leads you up- 
 ward thro' the feveral, even contiguous Ranks 
 
 of 
 
ANALOGY. 131 
 
 of intelligences, till he brings you\Towards the 
 Vertex ; and then if you keep to his Hypo- 
 thec's, he leaves you to flop fhort of including' 
 it if you can ; from whence there is but one 
 eafy Step into Infidelity ; and another as eafy 
 from thence into Atheifm. 
 
 This is his way of proceeding quite thro' 
 that Eflay. He will not lay in pofitive Terms 
 that there is no fpiritual or immaterial Sub- 
 ftance in Man. But, fince the granting fucK 
 a Siibftahce in us, totaly diftindT: from Matter, 
 would Utterly confound and deftroy that be- 
 loved Hypothefis of his ; he leads you fb far 
 Towards this Opinion, as to maintain that God 
 may fuperadd to Matter a Power of Thinking : 
 From whence there is but a fhort Step into a 
 Perfuafion of the Materiality of the Soul ; and 
 from thence into a disbelief of all future Re- 
 wards and Punifhments 5 and from thence again 
 into all the Immoralities which may be prac- 
 tifed with prefent Impunity, and with Safety 
 to the Honour and Reputation of thofe who 
 are to die like Beafts. And few People are able 
 at fifft fight to difcern that the Queftion can 
 mean no more than, Whether God can make 
 the fame thing to be Matter and no Matter, 
 Rational and Irrational at the fame time? And 
 therefore that Superadding here, is a Term as 
 Sencelefs and Contradictory, as it is in asking 
 this Queftion, Whether God can Super add to 
 pure Spirit Impenetrability and Bxtenjkn, with- 
 out making it Matter? 
 
 K. a Again, 
 
132 DIVINE 
 
 Again, his afferting with great pofitive*-* 
 nefs, that JVe can hare no Knowlege ^ where we 
 have no Ideas ; is not flatly denying that we 
 can have any Knowlege at all of things Super- 
 natural and Divine : but it decoys Men fo fa* 
 Towards it, that by excluding all other means 
 of Knowlege, he leaves them no rational Foun- 
 dation for the Knowlege of the things of ano- 
 ther World. And Men neither finding Ideas 
 of thole things in their Minds-, nor being able 
 on his Principles to account for a lure and lb- 
 lid Knowlege of them without liich direct and 
 immediate Ideas ; they conclude it in vain to 
 attempt any Knowlege at all of them : For 
 few Heads are attentive enough to diftinguifh 
 between Ideas of things Divine and Superna- 
 tural (which it is impoffible for us to have) 
 and thofe Complex Conceptions of them, which 
 the Mind forms to its lelf from its own Opera- 
 tions taken in Conjunction with thole Ideas, 
 and then fubftituted to Reprefent fueh divine 
 6bje£b. 
 
 Again, He would not fay in plain Words* 
 that Natural Religion is preferable to reveal- 
 ed j but he advances fo far Towards it as to 
 argue that Morality is capable of Demonftra- 
 tion, which all the World knows Revelation 
 cannot pretend to: And this hath a direcT: Ten- 
 dency to lead Men Towards Infidelity and a 
 Contempt not only of the Scriptures, but 
 indeed of natural Religion it felf, for after all,, 
 
 even 
 
ANALOGY. 133 
 
 even this can never admit of Mathematical 
 Certainty ; as doth fufficiently appear from 
 the vain Attempts of feveral, who from this 
 Author's groundlels Suggeftions have been 
 drawn in to treat moral Subjects in a demon- 
 strative Method, and with Mathematical Terms. 
 And it is well worth remarking that moft of 
 the Treadles written in that manner, have 
 been evidently contrived with a former Pur- 
 pole and Defign to render all revealed Religi- 
 on uielefs and contemptible. 
 
 Once more, He doth not fay in exprels 
 Words that there' are no fueh things as Intel- 
 ligent Beings which are purely Spiritual ; but 
 he draws you on inlenfibly Towards it, by af- 
 ierting contrary to common Senle and Reafbn, 
 that Tou have as clear and difiinB an Idea of the 
 Subjiance of Spirit \ as you have of bodily Sub- 
 fiance: The immediate Confequence from 
 which is, that if you have not, upon Tryal, 
 as clear and diftincl: an Idea of Spirit as you 
 have of Matter (which is impoffible) you have, 
 upon his Ideal Principles, nothing to do with 
 it, as what cannot be -the dired Object either 
 of your Underltanding or F^aith. And few Peo- 
 ple will lee that he means quite otherwife than 
 what he fays, namely that We have no Idea at 
 all of either of them 5 Tou have, fays he, an 
 Idea of their Properties and Qualities, but none 
 at all of the Subjiances themfelves. Why then, 
 lay I, if we have no Idea of the Properties and 
 Qualities of Pure Spirit y we can have no 
 
 % 3 Knowlege 
 
i 3 4 DIVINE 
 
 (Knowjcge at all of it. What , Saving then bath 
 he left for any Ivnowlege at all of God, or for 
 all Religion Natqral and Revealed? Why, you 
 Jiave an Idea of Thinking, which is the pro- 
 perty of Spirit; and fb all is fafe again. But 
 how is this a Saving ; if, according to him, 
 \God cqn jitperadd Winking tp Matter? Or if 
 Thinking, as it realy is, fhould prove a Pro- 
 perty not of pure Spirit, but of Spirit and 
 JVIatter in effential Union; fo as to be the 
 joint Faculty or Operation of both? For if fb, 
 then it cannot be the Property of God or of 
 pure Spirit ; lb that all is loft again, and here 
 he leaves it ; till in another Place, in flat and 
 open Contradiction to himielf, he lays it down 
 as a certain Portion, that the very Exiftence 
 of finite Spirit is not know&ble ; nay thp', he fays, 
 you have clear and diftindt Ideas of its Qualities 
 or Properties; which is the only way he before 
 allowed you of .knowing the Exiftence of it, 
 pr of bodily Sujaftance ; And he tells you plain- 
 ly in the fame Paragraph, that you cannot cer- 
 tainly conclude its Exiftence from fu^h Ideas, 
 any more fhan the Reality of Fairies from the 
 •Jdeas you form of them. The immediate Con- 
 iequence from all which is, that you cannot 
 poflibly know there is any Immaterial Sub- 
 ftance at all, no not even in the human Com- 
 pofition ; and thus all Religion inevitably falls 
 to the Ground. 
 
 These Inftances which are to our prefent 
 purpofe, are but a few of thofe covertly perni- 
 cious 
 
ANALOGY, 135 
 
 clous Principles. I could point out to the Rea- 
 der, thro' that unweildy Bulk of Ideal Ignorance 
 and Error; which is difpofed in every Part of 
 it (when once you pals Ideas of Senfation) for 
 overturning all Foundations of our Knowlege 
 relating to things Divine and Supernatural. 
 The laying down falfc Principles of Know- 
 lege in the General; Giving the Reader the 
 -Premifes only, and leaving him to make the 
 -Inferences; ftating and afferting Propositions 
 feemingly true, but full of falfe and evil Im- 
 plications ; the forming Whole firings of Propo- 
 'fitions in the Style and Language of Ortho- 
 doxy, 'but fraught with direct and immediate 
 Coniequences againft the Fundamentals of Ghri- 
 ftianity; and framing Hypotheies to give a li- 
 teral and worldly Turn to all the moft impor- 
 tant Terms of the Gofpel; in order to fet Re- 
 velation at Variance with Reafbn; and to in- 
 finuate as 'if it was altogether ufelefs and u,n» 
 necefiary. Thefe are the modern clandeftine 
 Methods of proceeding agairift the truly antient 
 and orthodox Faith ; 'whereby Men are carried 
 on ib far Towards Infidelity and even Atheifm, 
 that it is not eafyfor weak Minds overcome with 
 Vanity and Lioentioufhefs, to flop fhoft of 
 the utmoft Extremes; and to return back 
 again to a full Perluafidn of the Excellency of 
 a fincere Faith in Chrift, and of that frricl: 
 Virtue and Holinefs which is truly Evangeli- 
 cal. As it is too evident that moff of thefe 
 Methods of proceeding took their firft Rife 
 from that Effay : So the Applaufe and Appro- 
 
 K 4 bation 
 
136 DIVINE 
 
 bation Jt even ftill meets with, from ,tpo many 
 in whom it ought fp have raifed the great- 
 eft Indignation : fhews the Power and Preva- 
 lency of Education in blinding the Uncley- 
 Handings as well as the Confidences of Men, 
 beyond any Jnftance whatfoever of Bigotry oj: 
 Enthufiafm. 
 
 . Another Authority for the Do&rine of Ana- 
 logy lhall be out of a late Writer, who in his De- 
 lineation of the Religion of Mature holds there 
 is no Sin but what confifts In Speaking or Atting 
 a hie ; and therefore that he may be fore to avoid 
 this, he hath linked together a long Chain of 
 Truifms : By which, under color of deep Sci- 
 ence and profound demonftrative, Knowleg?, 
 he hath involved and perplexed the moft com.* 
 mon and obvious Prinpiples of practical Religi- 
 on; and wafted a great (Jeal of ^Learning and Parts 
 jin an aufcward Application of them to the pro- 
 ving what every one knows better without it, 
 and what no body denies. However in hope* 
 that what he fays upon this Subject may have 
 ibme Weight with thole who admire him up- 
 pn other Accounts much left tp be regarded^ 
 take the Citations as they follow. 
 
 But as we have no adequate [np nor inade- 
 quate] Idea, of an infinite and perf eft Being; 
 pis Powers, and among ■ them his Power of 
 -Knowing, mujl infinitely pafs all our understand- 
 ing: It muft be fomeihing different from, and 
 Infinitely tranfeending all the- Modes of agpr^ 
 4 kending 
 
ANALOG Y. 13.7 
 
 hending things, which we know any thing of. 
 And for this he cites thefe two remarkable 
 Sayings of Maimonides, His Knowlege is not 
 of the fame Kind with our Knowlege. And 
 again, It differs not only in much or little, but 
 in the very Kind of its Exiflence. Speaking 
 not long after of our Manner of Knowing by 
 Senfes, Memory, Phanfy y Report of others : it 
 follows, God "has no Organs of Senfation, nor 
 fuch mean Faculties as the beft of ours are, and 
 confequenily cannot know things in the Way which 
 we know them ;, if he doth not know them by 
 fome other Way^ he cannot know them at all, 
 
 even thd they are prefent They are and muft 
 
 be known to God by fame other Way. And he 
 quotes another Saying of Maimonides to the 
 ftme purpole, Ho attempt to comprehend the 
 Manner of God's knowing, is the fame as for us 
 to endeavour to be God himfelf. For this Reafbn 
 he argues in another Place, That we muft en- 
 deavour to think and /peak of him— —in the 
 moft proper Mannner we are able ■, keeping with" 
 
 all this general Conchfton that tho' we do 
 
 the beft we can, he is ft ill fomething above all 
 our Conceptions; And defiring that our faint 
 Expreffions may be taken as aiming at an higher 
 and more proportionable Meaning. ■ To do other* 
 wife implies not only, that his Mode of Exiftence 
 and effential Attributes are cdmprehenfible by 
 p -, — -r-but that our Words andPhrafes taken 
 from among our felves, are adequate Expreftions 
 ■of them ; contrary to Truth, This he explains 
 in .the Initoe' of Mercy, When we afcribi 
 
 !.' 
 
i 3 8 D I VI N E 
 
 Mercy to God — it mufl not be underfioodto be 
 like that which is called Companion in us — >but 
 that we mean Something, which tho' in our low 
 way of /peaking, and by way of Analogy, we call 
 it by the fame Name-, is yet in the perfect Na- 
 ture of God very different. And here he cites 
 that common Saying of the Jews, Wefpeak of 
 God according to the Language of the Sons of 
 Men : And that faying of Plotinus, For want 
 
 of proper Exprejfion transfer ing fuch Words 
 
 or Names [to God] as we are fond of among 
 our felves. And he aflerts exprefly, that His 
 Attributes of Mercy, and Jufiice, &c. cannot 
 be as we conceive them. 
 
 Ishall now cite a few Concejjions, out of 
 fome .who are Profefjed Adversaries to the Doc- 
 trine of divine Analogy ; which dropped from 
 them, as being infenfibly influenced by the 
 Power of that Truth, notwithstanding a form- 
 ed and fet Purpoie in them to oppofe it. One 
 of them, in his Sermons at Boyle's Lecture, 
 arguing againft the Deifts and Atheifts, That 
 the fuprme Governor of the World cannot but 
 teftify his Favour and Difpleafure according as 
 rational Creatures act for, or againft the Obli- 
 gations of their rational Nature ; obferves that 
 this rnuft be true, Unlefs we imagjme that moral 
 perfections in the divine or fupreme Being have 
 no manner ^Analogy to moral Perfections 
 in other rational Beings ; which is to deflroy all 
 manner of Argument from the Nature of things. 
 Here he lays down that Analogy which there 
 is between the moral Perfections of -God and 
 
 th? 
 
A N A L O G Y. 139 
 
 the moral Perfedions of Man, as the Foun- 
 dation of all Religion: And his Argument 
 concludes unanfwerably againft all who difal- 
 low that Favour or Difpleafure of the -Supreme 
 Governor ; becaufe there is fuch a Similitude 
 and Correipondency between the Nature of 
 God and Ivfon, as is a lure Foundation for an 
 unerring Parity of Reafop, in this moral re- 
 ipecl;, which can never fail. 
 
 B u t lo ! In his very next Sermon this 
 Foundation is quite overturned ; befides that 
 he maintains with all his Might, that %$gfw 
 muft to thfi fame in all Intelligent Beings ; which 
 is faife. For he means' the Faculty of Realbn ; 
 and that God and Angels -muft have the fame 
 Kind of natural Powers and Faculties of 
 Knowing and Reafbning that we have ; ptherr 
 wile it is plain their Knowlege and R$0$ffl 
 cannot t?e the Same with what they are in us. 
 But if their Faculties of Knowlege are gfien- 
 tialy different from ours, their Atfanyer of 
 Knowing and Reafoning -muft be lb too, that 
 is of quite another Kind : And this muft be 
 their Condition, unlcls they think and realbn 
 by the help of animal Spirits and the labour 
 of the Brain. But if by Rep/an he had meant 
 the Rational "Deductions and Conclusions only 
 of our natural Faculties of Knowlege ; and 
 that all the Jteafonings and Inferences founded 
 on that Refemblance and Correfpondence which 
 there is between our own and the divine Per- 
 fections, are fplid, ancl true $ intirely Agreeable 
 } to 
 
i 4 o DIVINE 
 
 to the infinite Knowiege, and Coincident with the 
 eternal Realbn and Wifdom of God ; he had 
 been in the Right, and his Argument againft 
 Beifts and Atheifts had concluded irrefragably. 
 
 A g a i n he afferts that Juftice, and Good- 
 iiefs and Truth, and all other moral Perfeliu 
 ons in God, are of the fame Nature with the 
 correfpondent Perfections in Men. This is an 
 Inconfiftency ; for to be Correfpondent only, and 
 to be of the Same Nature are two very dif- 
 ferent things. We fay Injlinff in Brutes is cor- 
 refpondent to Reafon in Man ; but vye do not 
 lay the Reaibn of one Man is correfpondent 
 to the Realbn of another, but that it is of the 
 feme Nature or the fame in Kind : Which I 
 take Notice of here to prevent this loofe and 
 indiftincl: way of Men's exprefling themfelves 
 upon this Subject. Where is there a Ground 
 for the Analogy he mentions, if they be of the 
 fame Nature or Kind? He argues that thofe 
 Perfections differ in God and us, only in degree. 
 And fays, inconliftently with what he afferts in 
 the former Sermon, That if they are not of the 
 fame Kind, it is in vain to reafon at all about 
 them, and that We can have no Meaning at all 
 when we fpeak of them. Why ? Becaufe other- 
 wife Tou can have no Idea annexed to thofe 
 Words, when you afcribe them to God ; that is 
 according to that falfe and vile Pofition, Where 
 you have no Ideas, you can have no Knowlege* 
 Have we any Idea of God As he is in himfelf? 
 and yet do we mean Nothing by that Word & 
 
 Pq 
 
ANALOGY. i 4i 
 
 Do we not mean a real or a&ualy exiftent Be- 
 ingj whereof we neither have nor can have 
 any proper Idea? Have we an Idea of any 
 one effential Property or Attribute as it is in 
 him j any more than of his divine Effence ? How 
 then are we to conceive his Exiflence, his Sub- 
 fiance or Effence, his effential Properties and 
 Perfections Natural and Moral ;■ by Ideas ? Di- 
 rect immediate Ideas of themj or as this Author 
 holds* As they are in his very Nature? And 
 can thofe Words have no Meaning at all when 
 afcribed to him, unlefi we have Such Ideas an- 
 nexed to them ? God forbid ; for thus there is 
 an End of all Religion natural and revealed, at 
 one deadly Stroke. Nor is there any way of 
 bringing it to Life again, but by frankly al- 
 lowing that human Nature is not capable of 
 the leaft direft Idea of them in any degree: And 
 that we have no other way of knowing or 
 conceiving his Effence or Perfections but by 
 Analogy with our own Exiftence, and Effence^ 
 and Knowlege, and Juftice, and Goodnefs, and 
 Truth, and the reft of our own Perfections 
 which we transfer and attribute to God, for 
 want of any Direct Ideas or Immediate Con- 
 ceptions of his Perfections both Natural and 
 Moral. When Chrift faid There is none good 
 but God, could this be true if Goodnefs in God 
 were of the fame kind with Goodnefs in us? 
 Or is it poilible for us to have any direct Idea 
 of it as it is in him? Oh ! but fays this Author, 
 Chrift meant that there is none Infinitely, Ab- 
 filutttyt and Efjentialy good but God. He did 
 
i 4 2 DIVINE 
 
 lb* and therefore his Goodnels differs from ours 
 Ejjefitialyi or in other Words it is of quite ano- 
 ther Kind. But he farther urges, How then can 
 we Be prfeB as our Father which is in Hea- 
 ven is perfeB? Not by Attainment of any of 
 his Perfections in Kind, but by becoming as 
 like him as we can : by being perfect in Out . 
 Kind; as he is in his Own Nature: It is the 
 higheft Pfefumprion artd bordering upon Blaf- 
 phemyi to understand this Text of our attain- 
 ing fitch a Kind of Perfections as there are in 
 God. 
 
 A g a in he reafoneth thus ; Our Ideas of 
 his natural Attributes are as imperfect as thole 
 of his moral Attributes ; and therefore if we 
 cannot realbn from one, we cannot reafbn 
 from the other. Very true, our Ideas of them 
 both are'equaly imperfect in this fence ; that we 
 have no DireB Conception or Idea at all of either 
 of them ; and therefore we can realbn frorn nei- 
 ther as being of the fame Kind in him that they 
 are in us ; but we can realbn from' both, as hav- 
 ing a Similitude and Correlpondency with hu- 
 man Perfections. The mdral FerfeBions of God 
 he yields are indeed Infinite, and thdfe of Matt 
 are only Unite-, but, fays he, this doth not argue 
 that they are of a different Kind : Then fay Ij 
 it is becaufe this is lb felf-evident, that Infinite 
 and Finite cannot be of the fame Kind, that 
 no arguing: can make it more evident. 
 
 I shall now eke feme Gonceffions from . 
 
 the 
 
ANALOGY. 143 
 
 the celebrated Author of the fifty five Arian 
 Propositions, the Oracle from whence all the 
 foregoing Do&tine was taken ; and the Labours 
 of whofe Life and the Credit of them among 
 Men depend upon its Truth. In exprejfing 
 fays he the fever al Powers of God [natural and 
 moral without Diftinction] ail Language is Jo 
 deficient ± that we are faced to make ufe of figu- 
 rative wtys offpeaking, and of Similitudes drawn 
 from our own Maimers of acfing to reprefent our 
 Conceptions of thefe divine Powers ; to which the 
 Faculties of Mm bear but a very fmall and im- 
 perfect Analogy. Here he runs into an Ex- 
 treme againft himfelf which we will not al* 
 low ; for -if our ways of fpeaking of the Powers 
 and Perfections of God were Purely and Only 
 Figurative, there could be no farther Ground 
 of Truth in them' than what depends upon 
 our Imagination: And this is directly contrary 
 to that divine Analogy he exprefly afferts ; and 
 which fuppofes a folid Foundation for eternal 
 Truth in a real Similitude and Correfpondency 
 between the Divide and Human Nature ; lb that 
 the former and latter Part of that Sentence 
 are plainly Inconfiftent. 
 
 Again in another Place. God is a Being 
 excelling not only 4he Souls of Men, but all other 
 Intellectual Natures-, That is, Excelling them 
 in his Wh6le NdMre, as he explains himfelf in 
 another Place. Then as his Nature and theirs 
 are not of the fame Kind; fo neither can any 
 of their natural or Effential Properties be of 
 
 the 
 
i 4 4 LT I V I N £ 
 
 the fame Kind. Wholy void of all AffeBions^ 
 futh as Love, Hatred, Anger, Grief, Repen- 
 tance, and the like; which are the Properties of 
 embodied Spirits— — But has thefe Paffions of 
 Mind afcribed to him in" Scripture} only, after 
 the fame figurative Manner of fpeaking} as the 
 fenfitive. Organs of the Body likewife are .-' Be-* 
 caufe thereby to us are befi reprefented fuch Ac~ 
 tions of his, as in their Effect upon other things} 
 not in their Nature within him, bear fome And~ 
 fogy to the like Paffions and Affettions in us. 
 ^ow take this Sentence to Pieces fof a while/ 
 and then make them ding together again with; 
 good Sehce and Meaning if youf can. If God 
 is in his Nature wholy void not Only of all hu-i 
 man Paffions and Affe&ians, but of all Attri- 
 butes likewife any way Correfpoyident or An- 
 fwerable to them; and if thefe Affections, which 
 in us are the Faculties or Operations of Spirit 
 and Body united, are fpoken of God as Figu- 
 ratively as our bodily Parts : Then there is no- 
 thing at all in us that can bear any Real Simi- 
 litude and Correfpondency to the divine Perfec- 
 tions; no not even our Know lege or Will; thefe 
 being equaly the operations of Matter and Spi- 
 rit with the others. What Truth then can there 
 be in all that is fpoken of him thro' the Scrip- 
 ture not only in the Language of our PaffionS 
 and AfFe&ions ; but even of our moral Perfec- 
 tions and Virtues, which are likewife the Ope- 
 rations and Qualities of the Human Spirit and 
 Body united ? Are all thofe Words and Ex- 
 preffions purely figurative, fo as to- mean no^ 
 
 thing. 
 
A N A L 6 G V. i 45 
 
 thing as Real and Correfpondent in refpeft of him 
 and his Nature, as they do in refped of JMan ? 
 
 Again, Oar PaJJions are afcribed to God, in the 
 fame figurative Manner we afcribe tpe Organs of 
 the Body to him. And yet By our PaJJions are re- 
 prefentedfuch Actions of God, as in their Effect upon 
 other things, bear fome Analogy to the like PaJJions 
 in us. That is, the Adtions of God are Represented 
 by our Paffions j. and yet, the Effects only of thole 
 Actions bear an Analogy to Out Paffions ; or, per- 
 haps he means to the Effects of our Paffions. 
 Tho' no Man living can make Sence of this Sen- 
 tence, yet thus much we can pick out of it j 
 that he Jumbles Metaphor and Analogy toge- 
 ther as ii they were the fame thing, tho' they 
 are vaftly different. For we transfer the Names 
 of our bodily parts to God, as we do all things 
 elfe merely material, whereof we have fenfitive 
 Ideas, by a pure Metaphor which fuppoles no 
 correfpondent Reality and Similitude : Where- 
 as we transfer thofe Notions and Conceptions 
 we have of the natural and moral Perfections 
 of our Minds to him by Analogy, which fup- 
 poles fome fimilar and correfpondent Perfections 
 in the Divinity. But above all obferve the 
 Profundity of this Saying, that We afcribe our 
 PaJJions to God, becaufe thefe bejl reprefent his 
 ABions ; which Actions, in their Effects 
 Bear fome Analogy to our P a s s i o n s. In other 
 Places he drops fuch Expreffions as thefe, Spi- 
 rit doth not fignify one Kind of Being as Body 
 doth j but fever al different Kinds of Beings, as 
 
 L different 
 
1 46 DIVINE 
 
 different ffom each other as they are from Body; 
 Then fure God, who as he fays is Abfolutely and 
 perfectly Spirit is in his whole Nature dif- 
 ferent from the moft exalted of created Spirits, 
 and much more different yet from Embodied 
 Spirits ; and confequently there can be no one 
 elfential Attribute of the fame Kind in both. 
 
 Again, To frame to our felves any jufi 
 Idea of the Power by which God ruleth over all, 
 is abfolutely irnpoffible; becaufe our Conceptions 
 are altogether Finite. And again, Love, Ha- 
 tred ', Anger, Grief are afcribed to God Fi- 
 guratively, and not Liter aly. Jv.ft. Idea. 
 It is ablolutely irnpoffible to have any Idea at 
 all of Power, any more than of any thing elfe 
 as it is in God; and for that Reafon, as he 
 himfelf is forced to own, we frame our No- 
 tion and Conception of it from Power in Man. 
 And thus we do alio as to the Attributes of 
 Wifdom and Goodnefs in God, whereof it is 
 abfolutely irnpoffible for us to have any other 
 Idea or Conception than from thofe which are 
 in Man : And for the very Reafon he affigns j 
 Becaufe our Conceptions are altogether Finite, 
 we can have no Conception or Idea of an infi- 
 nite Perfection ; and therefore we afcribe the 
 Conceptions we have of our own finite Perfec- 
 tions to God, to exprefs his infinite Perfections 
 which are Similar and Correfpondent. Love, 
 &c. are afcribed to God Figuratively, and not 
 Liter aly. "Not Liter aly; no nor any other na- 
 tural or moral Attribute. There is nothing 
 4 we 
 
ANALOGY. 147 
 
 We attribute td God literaly, but what is molt 
 unworthy of him 5 nay even the moft exalted 
 'Difpofition in the Soul of Man to Goodnefs, 
 Which is moft properly lb called. The intrin- 
 fic Difpofition in the divine Nature to Good- 
 nefs, is effentialy different frorii it ; that is of 
 quite another Kind : And all the ABs or Ex- 
 ertions of that Divine Difpofition, are like wife 
 effentialy different frorh all Acls or Exertions 
 of any good Difpofition in an human Soul* 
 Let Men take Goodnefs in which of thefe two 
 Sences they pleafe, or in both together, they 
 Will find Goodnefs in God effentialy different 
 from what it is in us ; that is, of quite ano-^ 
 ther Kind. Then fays he they muft be Figu- 
 ratively afiribed. No nor that neither ; for 
 mere Figure of Speech reprefents nothing in 
 God Realy correfpondent to Love, or to any 
 moral Perfections in us : And therefore we a£* 
 cribe all thefe by Analogy, which fuppofes a 
 -r^eal Ground of Similitude in the Nature of 
 God and Man for a Parity of Reafon which holds 
 eternaly. So that, as he himfelf owns in another. 
 Place, The true Notion of the Goodnefs of God, 
 that is, the trueft Notion in the Mind of Man, 
 Mujt be learned by confidering what Goodnefs is in 
 Men* Yes furely, for you can have no Idea of 
 that Perfection as it is in the Nature of God: 
 But not as it fellows^ By adding to the Idea of a 
 good Man, bound lefs Perfection ; that is, by add- 
 ing Infinity to the good Difpofitions and Ads 
 of an human Soul, and thereby iuppofing 
 God an infinite human, Creature, 
 
 L 2 The 
 
148 DIVINE 
 
 The ftrongeft Arguments and Objections! 
 againft divine Analogy common to this and 
 otheisAuthors, will come under a particular 
 Confideration. And therefore I lhall here only 
 take Notice of thefe two things concerning 
 this and the immediately preceding Author. 
 
 First, That in relation to the moral At- 
 tributes of God in particular, they exprefe 
 themfelves very inconfiftently and even after a 
 contradictory Manner ; by afferting fbmetimes 
 that we conceive and exprefs them by Ana- 
 logy : And at other times that they are the very 
 Same in Kind with our own ; and that they 
 are the lame in him as they are in our Ideas. 
 Thele two things are directly oppofite ; for the 
 fame Property, or Difpofition, or Quality in 
 human Nature, cannot be faid to bear an 
 Analogy to the divine Perfections ; and yet be 
 of the fame Kind with them. To bear a Si- 
 militude only, and Correfpondency to the 
 divine Perfections ; is a thing directly contrary 
 to the having a famenefs of Kind or Identity 
 of Nature with him, in any the leaft Degree. 
 They differ as much as a Picture, or Image 
 doth from a Child, with refpect to a grown 
 Man ; the firft is a Reprefentation only or Si- 
 militude of the Man, the latter is of the 
 fame Nature or Kind in Miniature : Or as Na- 
 tural Inflmfi in Brutes differs from the natural 
 Faculty of Reafon in a Child ; the firft bears a 
 Similitude or Refemblance only to the Reafon 
 
 of 
 
ANALOGY. 149 
 
 of a full grown Man ; the latter is of the fame 
 Kind in a very low and imperfect Degree. 
 
 If they lay that our moral Perfections, tho' 
 of the fame Kind, are however in fo low 
 a Degree, and at fuch an immenle Diftance 
 from thole which are Divine; that both our 
 Conceptions of them, and the Words by which 
 we exprefs them muft be Analogous ; and that 
 by Analogy, they mean as they fpealc, an infi- 
 nite Difference in Degree : This contains an 
 Anfwer to its felf in the exprefs Words ; for an 
 Infinite Difference in Degree is not Sence ; this 
 is to lay, our moral Properties are the lame in 
 Kind but in a low, vaftly low Degree of In- 
 finity. But if every Property or Quality in us 
 is Finite, then it is flat Contradiction to lay 
 that any .thing Finite can be of the lame Kind 
 (tho' in ever lb diftant a Degree) with what is 
 Infinite. Again, as by Analogy they mean a 
 very low Degree of the lame Nature or Kind 5 
 it is plain they mean one thing, and Ipeafc an- 
 other quite contrary to it : For iuppofe the De- 
 gree ever fb low and diftant, if it is of the 
 lame Kind this deftroys all Analogy ; that is 
 all Similitude only and bare Refemblance. 
 We do not fay that the Faculty of Reafon in a 
 Child bears a Similitude only, or Refemblance 
 of the Reafon of a full grown Man ; but that 
 it is the lame in Kind ; and that Inftind in 
 Brutes bears an Analogy to both. Conceive the 
 Pifproportion as great as you .pleafe j compare 
 it with the Difproportion between a Graih of 
 L 3 Sand 
 
150 DIVINE 
 
 Sand and the univerfal Syftem of Matter : You 
 will not fay that this bears a Similitude only 
 or Refemblance of the Whole in its natural 
 Properties of Extenfion, Solidity, and Mobi* 
 lity ; but that it hath the very Same fort of ef- 
 fential Properties and Subftauce. 
 
 Thus you fee the frequent mention of 
 thefe two things, which are totaly different, 
 indiftin&ly and promifcuoufly as if they were 
 the very fame; hath occasioned great Confu- 
 fion and Inconfiftency in the Oppofers of this 
 Do&rine of divine Analogy. One or the other 
 of thefe Pofitions let them adhere to for the 
 future ; either let them allow what is exprefly 
 revealed, That we are made in the Similitude 
 only of the divine Nature, and in the Image 
 only of God : Or let them make it out, that 
 in this Revelation ibmething is meant beyond 
 what is expreffed ; namely, that we were creat- 
 ed the very fame in Kind with him, but in a 
 very low Degree ; and that we have a Same- 
 nels or Identity of Nature in any one effen- 
 tial Property, Affection, or Attribute. And 
 it is of no fmall Concernment to Mankind, to 
 fix and determine this Point; becaufe one or 
 the other of thefe two very contrary Pofitions 
 muft be a Foundation of Truth, in our whole 
 manner of thinking and fpeaking of all things 
 Divine and Supernatural ; and if our Founda-: 
 tion mould fail us, and prove to be wrong 
 Xaid ? all Religion Natural and Revealed falls 
 to the Ground. 
 
 The 
 
A JN A Z t> G Y. 151 
 
 The other Obiervation I mall make is, that 
 thele two Authors have, very invidioufly, put 
 this Doctrine of Analogy into the Mouths of 
 Deifts and Atheifts: Who together with the 
 Arians and Socinians, of all Men living have 
 the greateft Reafon to dread the Confequences 
 of its being well known and thro'ly under- 
 ftood in the World ; fince nothing elfe can ib 
 effe&ualy lay open, the Fallacy of their Rea- 
 ibning. That lort of Deifts and Atheifts which 
 they mention do indeed, astheyfpeak, in effect 
 Deny, or at leaft not exprefly own, the moral* At- 
 tributes of God. And fay That they are fo trans- 
 cendent that we cannot make any true Judgment 
 of them, fo as to argue from thence with any 
 Affurance for the Certamty of a future State. 
 But why do they proceed thus? Becaufe their 
 Adverfaries proceed upon a falfe Principle in 
 defence of the Truth, and hold the moral At- 
 tributes of God to be the fame in Kind with 
 ours ; to be the very lame that they are in our 
 Ideas: They run into the quite contrary Ex- 
 treme, and hold them to be lomething fo tranf- 
 cendent that we can have no Juft Idea or No - 
 tion at all of them ; and conlequently that there 
 can be no fure Ground of reafoning from them. 
 The Truth lies between them in the Middle ; 
 for our Virtues or moral Perfections are not of 
 the lame Kind with the divine Perfections ; it 
 is even impious to affirm it : Nor is it true that 
 we can have no fuch juft Notions or ufeful Con- 
 ceptions of them, as to be a folid and unerring 
 
 JL, 4 Ground 
 
152 DIVINE 
 
 Ground of Reafoning. For tho' it muft be 
 granted that the divine Perfections cannot be 
 luch as they are in our Ideas or Conceptions, 
 becaufe it is impoffible for us to have any Di- 
 rect or Immediate Ideas or Conceptions of them ; 
 yet the Conceptions we have of our own moral 
 Perfections or Virtues are very clear and di- 
 ftinct: Nor do thefe become lefs lb, when we 
 fubftitute them by Analogy to represent what 
 we can have no Idea at all of; fuch cor-? 
 refpondent divine Perfections as are the An- 
 titypes or 'Realities as Ibme Men ftyle them; 
 whereof our Virtues have a beautiful Refem- 
 blance only and Similitude ; and may therefore 
 be comparatively called the Images, in refpe£fc 
 of thole divine Perfections which are the Sub- 
 ftance and Originals. So that we can affirm God 
 to be Good, and True, and Juft, and Righteous*, 
 and Merciful with greater Affurance, and with 
 more Truth than we can affirm Man to be fo. 
 And if all our juft Reafbnings and Conclufions 
 from thofe moral Perfections of ours, are of 
 eternal Truth in refpect of our Selves and all 
 human Affairs ; furely they muft lofe none of 
 that Truth when we transfer the Reafoning 
 from the Similitudes and Reprefentations, to 
 the original and correfpondent Reality and Sub- 
 ftance in the divine Nature. If we fay a Man 
 is Juft ; it may with greater Affurance be ask r 
 ed, Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do 
 Right? And if we difcern an unequal Diftri- 
 bution of Rewards and Punifhments in this 
 Life; the lure Confequence from the jntrinfic 
 
 incom- 
 
A JST A T, 6 G Y. 153 
 
 incomprehenfible Perfe&ions in the divine Na- 
 ture, Corre/pondent and Similar to the Virtues 
 of Juftice and Equity in the inward Difpofi- 
 tions of the Soul of Man is, That there muft be 
 a future State, where all Rewards and Punifh- 
 ments lhall be difpenled in exactly juft and 
 equal Proportions, 
 
 Thus we fee the true Ground of that fort 
 of Infidelity and Atheifpi is laid in one of thefe 
 two Points, In denying that there are any Per- 
 fections in the divine Nature correfpondent and 
 like to fome moral Virtues in the Soul of 
 Man : Which we can prove with the higheft 
 moral Evidence from Reafon, and with the 
 ftri&eft Certainty from Revelation ; and which 
 Unbelievers will never be able to difprove. Or 
 that if there are realy fuch Perfections, we 
 have no Ideas or Conceptions of them clear and 
 diftin$ enough for a fure Foundation of Rea- 
 foning : Which they themfelves muft acknow- 
 lege to be abfolutely falfe ; fince all the Notions 
 and Conceptions we have or can have of them, 
 are as clear and diftincT:, as thole we have of 
 the good and virtuous Difpofitions and A&ions 
 of our own Souls, which Reprefent them. Now 
 if we grant them what is plain to common Sence 
 and Reafon, and molt evident from Scripture ; 
 that there can be no Perfections of the fame 
 Kind in God and Man: But that however 
 there are Perfections in him fimilar and cor- 
 refpondent to ours, of which we have clear 
 ^nd ufeful Conceptions by Analogy with our 
 
 Qwn,i 
 
154 DIVINE 
 
 own ; the Argument concludes unanfwerably 
 againft them. But when we relinquifh this, 
 and argue upon a fiippofition that If the Vir- 
 tues of our Souls, and the moral Perfections in 
 the divine Nature are not the fame in Kind ; 
 there will be no Foundation at all left on which 
 we can fix any thing: We put an Argument in- 
 to the Mouths of our Adverfaries, which, had 
 it any Ground of Truth, we fhould never be 
 able to Anfwer ; nor to evade the Abfurdities 
 and Contradictions they might charge upon 
 that Principle. 
 
 They could urge upon us, that fuppofing 
 the purely Spiritual Principle in Man which 
 we contend for ; yet all our intellectual and 
 moral Perfections are Difpofitions and Opera- 
 tions of Matter as well as Spirit in eflential 
 Union ; and therefore can never be of the lame 
 Kind with the Faculties or Difpofitions or Ope- 
 rations of a pure Spirit. 
 
 That fuppofing our inward Faculties of 
 Mind, and the virtuous Difpofitions of our Souls, 
 together with the Exertions and Operations of 
 them, to be properties of our Spirit only 7 but 
 neceffarily afting In us by bodily Organs, as a 
 Man plays upon the Keys of a Mufical In- 
 ftrument : Yet even thus they mull: be Faculties 
 and Operations of a Kind effentialy different 
 from fuch as are exerted independently of all 
 Matter. 
 
 That 
 
ANALOGY. 155- 
 
 T ha T if it werepoffible fof even thefe pro- 
 perties of all Finite Spirits to be of the fame 
 Kind ; yet that the internal natural Difpofiti- 
 ons and Faculties of a finite Spirit, and the O- 
 perations and Acts of them, muft be of quite 
 another Kind from thole of an Infinite Spirit • 
 Efpecialy if that infinite Spirit is allowed to be 
 in his whole Nature of a Kind- as different from 
 the moft exalted created Spirit, as this is from a 
 Spirit embodied. And this holds ftronger yets 
 againft thofe who maintain that God may iu- 
 peradd to Matter a Power of thinking. 
 
 They might objecl: that this Notion of a 
 Samenefs in Kind or Identity of Nature between 
 any one real Attribute in God, and any one hu- 
 man Property jn us; is by plain Implication the 
 higheft Prefurnption : Becaufe it fuppofes Man 
 to poffefs fomething of the very divine Nature or 
 E fence in Kind • fince all the Moral Attributes of 
 God are as truly EJJential to him, as thofe we 
 diftinguifh by the Appellation of Natural At? 
 tributes ; and if we have any one of them in 
 Kind, we muft then have in Kind fome one 
 Effeniial Attribute of God in us. Nor can we 
 have in Kind one Attribute that is truly effen- 
 tial to him, without having them all in Kind. 
 So that in fhort if we have any one, even Mo r . 
 ral Attribute of God in Kind, we muft have 
 his Kind of Will, and confequently his Ejfence, 
 and be no, pther than Gods jn Miniature. 
 
 Ji ASTL Y. 
 
156 DIVINE 
 
 Lastly, That we have no Ground or Foun- 
 dation in all Scripture for this Opinion of having 
 anything in our Frame or Compofition, of the 
 fame Nature or Kind with any moral Perfection 
 of the Divinity, but rather quite the Contrary; 
 for there it is exprefly faid that there is None Good 
 but God, and that He only is Holy. And that 
 if thefe Sayings do not mean that the Goodnels 
 and Holinefs of the Creature is not of the fame 
 Kind with what they are in God ; but on y that 
 there is none So Good as God, none So Holy as 
 he ; i: will be no difficult matter to evade the 
 Sence and Meaning of any Text in Scripture. 
 
 To all which I mall add that in the Account 
 we have of our Creation, we are exprefly faid to 
 have a Similitude only, and Relemblance of the 
 Divinity j and to think more arrogantly of our 
 felves than this, is directly contrary to the Word of 
 God. In this Similitude and Correfpondency be- 
 tween the Divine and Human Nature, is laid the 
 only fure Foundation of all our Knowlege of God, 
 and of all our Conceptions of his inconceivable At- 
 tributes and Perfections. I have therefore ftyled 
 this Manner of thinking and fpeaking, Divine 
 Analogy, not only becaufe it relates to our Know- 
 lege of things divine and fupernatural : But be- 
 caufe it was conveyed to us by a divine Reve- 
 lation from Heaven, and in Words proceeding 
 Immediately out of the Mouth of God. And the 
 Wifdom of the whole Wprld, and.higheft Rea- 
 fpn of Man, cannot find out any other fure and 
 
 fatis- 
 
ANALOGY. 157 
 
 iatisfa&ofy method of accounting for the Truth 
 and Certainty of our Conceptions of things Su- 
 pernatural, and of all our Reafonings upon the 
 Nature and Attributes of the divine Being. 
 
 I shall clofe all above cited Authorities 
 with one from - a very Metaphyseal Author 
 before mentioned, but taken out of the fafhion- 
 able demonftrative Method, 
 
 Tho' the Truth of the Proportions or Points 
 of Faith are made known to us by fupernatural 
 Means, or by Revelation ; yet each Jingle Word 
 in which they were delivered or preached' at firfl 
 mufl be fuch as was in ufe then and there, to 
 Jignify our natural Notions. This is very evi- 
 dent', for unlejs Faith had been delivered or 
 preached to the firjl Faithful, in fuch Lan- 
 guage as every one underftood, or as fuited with 
 their natural Notions ; the Hearers, having as 
 yet no Notions but what were natural, could not 
 have under flood what had been told them-, nor 
 could have known what it was they were to be- 
 lieve. By natural Notions I mean, thofe which 
 we have by direB Imprejjlons on the Senfes ; or 
 by fuch Reflexion as the generality of Mankind 
 have— — Hence thofe Words being proper to ex- 
 prefs Men's natural Notions, which they had 
 from Creatures; to fignify which they were a- 
 greed on, and ufed by Mankind in that Place : 
 It follows, that when we apply them to the di- 
 vine Nature, they mufl be in fame fort Meta- 
 phorical, or transfered thence to God. This is 
 4 . evident, 
 
158 £> I V I Jsr E 
 
 evident, for fince the Sence and Meaning which 
 Men impofed on them at firfl, and in which 
 they ufed them all along, was of fome created 
 Being or Perfection; it is manifeft that that 
 was their fir ft or proper Signification: And 
 consequently if they applyed them to God after* 
 wards {without which we could not fpeak of 
 God at all, nor know any thing of him) they 
 mufi necejjarily be transfered from Creatures to 
 God; which is to be Metaphorical. Tet when 
 Divines apply fuch Words to God, whom they 
 
 hold to be infinitely perfect They cannot 
 
 mean to apply them otherwife than as devefted 
 of their Imperfections Such are the Imper- 
 fections of Corporiety, and all Notions which 
 arife from Matter: As alfo all Limitednefs ; 
 which tho' ejfential to Creatures, is repugnant 
 to the divine Nature. Hence all fuch Wordt 
 thus underflood, notwithjlanding their Meta- 
 
 phoricalnefs , are truly faid of God Thus 
 
 when Metaphyficians apply to God Mercy, Juf- 
 tice, Power, Wifdom, &c. which as found in 
 our Underfianding are diftinEf Formalities, of 
 which one is not the other: They being welt 
 aware that the Divine Nature is one moft fimple 
 Formality, which includes and verifies all thoft 
 Attributes -, do therefore Jirip them of that Li- 
 mitation or Imperfection, when they apply them 
 to God ; and do not intend to fignify they art 
 thus diftin6t in God as they are in our Under- 
 fianding which Rule and Reafon obtains in all 
 
 other Metaphorical Exprefiions, or in allow Words 
 whatever ufed by us when we fpeak of God. 
 
 Tag 
 
ANALOGY. 159 
 
 The Do&rine of divine Analogy is here af- 
 ierted in the General; but fo loofly, in a Style 
 fb involved and perplexed, mingled with iuch 
 Metaphyfical Abftra£tions, and fo much grofi 
 Error and Miftake : That I produce the whole 
 Paffage, rather to fhew how fenfible Men are 
 become that this Analogy is real and juft ; thaa 
 for any Illuftration or Corroboration of it. 
 
 Here he confounds Divine Metaphor^ 
 with "Divine Analogy ; which are as different in 
 their Nature as the transfering mere Ideas of 
 Senfation, and fubftituting the complex Notions 
 and Conceptions of the Mind: Both of thefe he 
 relblves indifferently into mere Figure, and fo 
 leaves us no fure Foundation for any true and 
 fblid Knowlege of God and his Attributes. He 
 runs likewife into that prevailing Error of Ideas 
 of Reflexion, things neither in Nature nor in 
 the Mind of Man ; an Idea of Reflexion, or 
 which is the fame thing an Idea ofReafon, is 
 as manifeft an Abfurdity as a Notion or Concep- 
 tion of Senfation. 
 
 Again, he grofly fuppoles that when we 
 deveft our Ideas of things material of all 
 Corporiety and Limitednefs, we may then trans- 
 fer them to God in a True, that is in a Literal 
 Sence : Which is faying in other Words, that if 
 you deveft Matter of Materiality, it will be a 
 very innocent Idea and no way unbecoming 
 the Divinity. But is it not for this very Rea- 
 son, 
 
160 DIVINE 
 
 ion, becaufe all our Ideas of things merely ma- 
 terial and fenfible are unworthy of Godj and 
 can reprefent no Similar and Correfpondent Perfe- 
 ction in his Nature, that we transfer the Terms 
 in which we exprefs them by Metaphor only ? 
 He hath the fame grofs Sentiment concerning the 
 Notions and Conceptions we have of the Inward 
 Affections, and Difpofitions, and Operations 
 of the Mind ; that if they are likewife deveft- 
 ed of all thofe Imperfections which are natural 
 to them, you may then tfansfer them to God 
 in a literal Sence, to exprefs Perfections in him 
 of the fame Kind. But if you deveft them of 
 AH Imperfection, you remove all Conception 
 we can have of the real Nature of them, and 
 leave nothing at all, no Conception to be trans- 
 fered : And on this very Account it is, that be- 
 caufe the moft exalted Degree of our Perfections 
 are imperfect and unworthy of the Nature of 
 God, we transfer them to him not in a ftrictly 
 literal or proper Sence, but by Analogy. 
 
 Lastly, He affirms with great pofitive- 
 nefs That Mercy, Juftice, Power, Wifdom, &c. 
 are not all di/linguifhed in the divine Nature. 
 But how doth he know this ? Becaufe God is 
 a Simple Being. But how doth he know what 
 Uncompoundednefs or Simplicity is in the divine 
 Nature It felf? All that he or any Man 
 living can know of it, amounts to no more 
 than a Negation only of all Compofition di£- 
 cernible in the Creature : All that can be af- 
 firmed of God's Attributes in this Refped is, 
 
 that 
 
ANALOGY. i£f 
 
 that there is no Diftin&ion betwedn theni 
 which is conceivable, as it is in it felf, to the 
 Mind of Man ; and that if they are a&uaiy" 
 diftincl: iri him $ it cannot be after the Sami 
 Manner they are diftinel: in the Son! of Mart; 
 But however they are$. or are not realy diftin$ 
 in him ; we are under a neceflity of conceiv J 
 ing them diftinguifhed after the fame Manner wd 
 find them in our lelves ; for otherwile we could 
 neither think nor lpeak of God at all. God 
 hath made a Diftin&ion between his own At-* 
 tributes thro' all the Language of Revelation j 
 and I think it becomes Divines to adhere td 
 thole Biftin&ions, and to leave his unintelli«* 
 gible Notion of the divine Simplicity to thd 
 Metaphyflcians. 
 
 I m i g h t have produced many rriofd Authd* 
 rities of this Kind to the lame Purpole, efpeci* 
 aiy but of our late Writers. But in fome of theni 
 the Do&rine of Analogy is rather Aimed at iri 
 general, than e'xprefly arid Particularly mentions 
 ed ; others lpeak of it Indijlintfly and Confufed^ 
 ly, others handle it AbftraStedly and Meta/hyfi* 
 caly j others Enthufiaftitaly ; 'others Deceitfully 
 and Difingenuoujly to ferve the Turn of a vile 
 Hypothefis; and all of them Itnperfetfly and 
 Inconfiftently : So that it would be too tedious 
 to trouble the Reader wtyh any more of then* 
 (except one which I have referved for theSubje£E 
 of the next ChapterJ efpecialy fince they muffi 
 have been accompany ed with neeeffilryRernark| 
 and Qbferyations upon them* Wherefore* J 
 
iU DIVINE 
 
 fliall only make this UTe and Application of 
 them all. They fliew how fenfible the learned 
 and Ingenious are become that this Divine 
 Analogy is neceffary for a more fatisfa&ory 
 Anfwer to the Arguments of Infidels and 
 Heretics againft the truly Chriftian Faith; 
 and for a fhorter and more eafy method of 
 obviating their Objeftions. For laying open 
 their Sophifms and Evafions ; and for ward- 
 ing off all the new invented Turns and' Form* 
 of Subtilty, whereby Men have perplexed and' 
 entangled the Doftrmes of the Gofpel; and 
 involved the Myfteries of Chriftianity in Glouds 
 and Darknefs. In order to clear up the Terms- 
 and Propolitions in which thefe are revealed' 
 to us, and fix them to a determinate Sence 
 and Meaning. To rid the World of an im- 
 menfe Voluminous Mafs of learned Trifling' 
 upon Religious Subjects, and the Holy Scrip- 
 tures : And to ftiorten thefe our unhappy Bays* 
 of Infidelity and Herefy; in which, as far as it 
 was poflible, the very Ek£t have been de-- 
 ceivedw 
 
 These are the IVonders (as fome have Iro± 
 mealy wrote) to be performed by divine Ana-' 
 logy ; whenever it fliall pleafe God to raife up 
 Men of Abilities for the further clearing and* 
 Improvement of it ; and for a judicious Ap- 
 plication of it to the particular Points in (Son-' 
 troverfy between us and the Adverfaries of the 
 antient and orthodox Faith. The thing is ob- 
 vious and naturaLin it- felfj and there is nc* 
 
 Difficulty 
 
A N A L 6 6 Y. i6j 
 
 Difficulty of Nicety in itj but what arifes frorii 
 inveterate Prejudices arid ftfong Prepofieffibnd 
 bceafioned by the laic Wrong Methods of edu- 
 cating Youth : From .whence it is eafy to ac- 
 count for all thofe Miftakes, and Errors con- 
 cerning divine Metaphor and Analogy, which* 
 I have had Occafibn to take Nbtice of in the 
 Ibrecited Pafiages. They proceed from falfe 
 Principles of Knowlege, imbibed cat of that 
 Fountain of Bitter Waters, which wafs unhap- 
 pily opened about the Time of their yaungei 
 Days at the Univerfity ; and which hath ear- 
 ly ed, with it Poyfbn and Infection to human 
 Underftanding thro' the Nation, wherever i£ 
 inn. The lamentable Effect and Confluences! 
 of this,' do how difcover therhfelves* Openly i 
 not only in theft, but in too matiy other Au?- 
 Ihors, who have grown up to Maturity witri 
 crooked Impreffions from thence and a wrong 
 iurn of Mind ; and have: hbw commenced Au- 
 thors of our Time. I appeal to any difcefning 
 ^xeniusf whether thefe Confequences are not yi- 1 
 fible thro' moft of the modern 7 Writers upon 
 Irioral and divirle Subje&s ; who' build', upbrtt 
 Ideas aj 'Reflexion, Reflex Acfs of the Mirfd, Meat 
 Knoimege bf divine Objects, AbjtraStions!, Spi* 
 Htuai , Perceptions, Internal Senfes and ffiri* 
 tual Sen fat ions, , Moral Inftintfs, .Moral Fit? 
 peffes ; jSemonftratians (of things indemCnftfa- 
 felej from the abftraB Reafon of things, the Na- 
 fares of things in general/ the Truth of Things^ 
 We Metaphyseal Matures and Effences and f Sub- t 
 fiances of things. By\th'efe and many iiicfi :llfc£ 
 M 2 empty 
 
164 DIVINE 
 
 empty Sounds and Forms of fpeaking, without 
 any conceivable and determinate meaning in 
 the Mind ; all the truly ufeful and liibftantial 
 Knowlege of the immediately preceding Time, 
 under a plaufible Colour of great Exaltation 
 and Refinement, hath been relblved into Smoak 
 and Vapour \ lb that there is but little left of 
 the true Subftance and Power and Influence of 
 Religion upon the Conlciences of Men. Nor 
 are we likely ever to come about again to lblid 
 Learning, found Do&rine, and good Sence ex- 
 preffed with Diftincmefs and Perfpicuity ; till 
 a new Generation ariles which fhall have quite 
 worn off all thole unhappy Prejudices and 
 Prepoflelfions. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Another great Miftake concerning Divine And' 
 logy confideredt And the true Notion of a 
 Chriftian Myftery ftated. 
 
 TH E laft Authority I fliall cite to the 
 foregoing Purpofe is that of a learned 
 Writer, who in one of his Sermons on the 
 Subject of Myfteries exprefly aflerts, That our 
 prefent Knowlege of thefe Matters is not by Ideas 
 immediately derived from the things themfehes; 
 but by fuch as are Analogous to the things they 
 represent. Thus we fee as by Reflection from a 
 Glafs, not Face to Face. Then it is by Ideas 
 or Conceptions derived immediately from. 
 4 other 
 
ANA LOGY. 165 
 
 • other things, which are natural and human j 
 and which only reprefent things divine and 
 iupernatural by Analogy : This is no immedi- 
 ate Perception or Knowlege of the things as 
 they are in their own Nature, or by any di- 
 rect Ideas from them, but by Reflection; as 
 a Man fees in a Glals, not any thing of the 
 Face it felf, but an Image only and lively Re- 
 prefcntation of it. This is a great and fun- 
 damental Truth ; and a very juft Explication 
 of thofe laft Words of Scripture: Only it 
 muft be obferved here, that he ufes the word 
 Idea in the fame crude and pernicious Sence 
 with fome other modern Authors. But I have 
 already ftiewn it ought never to be applyed 
 thus indifferently and indiftinctly to all the 
 immediate Objects of the Mind ; and that 
 when it is taken confufedly not only for Ideas 
 of Senlation, to which it ought to be limited : 
 But for the Operations of the Mind whereof 
 we have an immediate Confcioufhefs without 
 the Mediation of any Ideas of them ; and for 
 all the Conceptions and complex Notions form- 
 ed out of thefe in Conjunction ; it lerves no 
 other Purpofe than to confound and bewilder 
 the Underftanding in the fearch of Truth. 
 
 This he repeats and confirms by laying, 
 Our Ideas therefore of thefe things muji be 
 taken from other Ideas, with which they have 
 fome fort of Refembfance or Analogy. A very 
 obfeure way of faying, that thofe things, from 
 which (as he himfelf juftly obferyes) we can 
 M 3 have 
 
$66 DI?TNE 
 
 fiaye no immediate Ideas, are conceived and 
 jtnown by Ideas or Conceptions of other things 
 which bear fbme Relemblanee to them ; that 
 js, the things of this World, whereof we 
 have dire® and immediate Ideas or Concept^ 
 pns; otherwise this Saying hath neither Senqj 
 nor Meaning. One Idea taken from another 
 Analogous Idea means nothing intelligible; 
 but it is obvious and eafy to apprehend how 
 pie fame Ideas or Conceptions, and the Terms 
 Whereby we expreft therh, mould fland for 
 things both divine and human : For thefe di- 
 rectly, and in a ftrift and literal Propriety ; for 
 £he other mediately and indirectly, by Similitude 
 pnly and Analogy: Thus the very fame direct 
 and immediate Ideas or Conceptions of humar^ 
 feneration, Begotten, Proceeding, Per/on, Father\ 
 'Son, : Spirit, Making, Redeeming, Mediation, 
 Atonement, Propitiation, Reconciling, intercef 
 fion ; do like wife ftand for every one of thefe 
 in a divine Sence: Each of them is a Word 
 pf human Language, in its firft and ftri& 
 Propriety applyed to things of Nature; and 
 \t is by Reprefentation and Analogy only that 
 the Conception annexed to it is fubftftuted fof 
 ibmething divine and fupernatural, and in any 
 other Manner utterly inconceivable to the 
 Mjpd of Man, and ineffable. 
 
 Ag^i^, Our Knowlege of divine Matters 
 
 p not direst and immediate but as "it were bj 
 
 Reflection -^—Reprefented fo us by famt remote 
 
 Refemblaricfthey have with things qf Sence. Then 
 
 4 it 
 
ANALOG Y, 167 
 
 s£ is -indirect and mediate, by Reprefentatiora 
 only of things which, as he fays, have a re- 
 mote Refemblance of them; that is, things 
 fupernatural and divine are feen by Reflection 
 only in the Mifrour of Nature. Again, In 
 thefe Cafes [of Mytteries] they are revealed 9 
 by representing them by fome other Ideas with 
 which they have a remote Refemblance and Ana- 
 logy. Yes, becaufe we can have no "Direct Per- 
 ception or Ideas of thole things Clear or Ob- 
 fiure, Per feci or Imperfect, in Whole or in Part, 
 Adequate or Inadequate, Determinate or Inde- 
 terminate : And therefore we could have had 
 no Knowlege at all of them in any Degree, if 
 they were not revealed by Ideas or Conceptions 
 which were in us prior to that Revelation, andt 
 which had fome remote Refemblance of them; 
 that is, by Analogy with our fiatural Ideas or 
 jjConceptjons. 
 
 Again, The "Doctrines revealed are made up 
 of fuch Ideas, as we are capable of receiving in 
 the ordinary Methods of Knowlege. That is, The 
 Doctrines of Scripture Myfteries are revealed 
 to us by the Help of our original Ideas of Sen- 
 fation, joyned with the confcious Perceptions of 
 the Mind's own ' Operations, which are The 
 Ordinary Methods of Knowlege : From whence 
 jt is enabled to frame not any Direct or Sim- 
 ple Ideas, but Analogical Conceptions only pf 
 things divine and fupernatural. Thus hi 
 light, had he purfued if. 
 
 ' M 4 But 
 
|6§ DIVINE 
 
 But behold! In direct Oppofition to al| 
 jthis, he in the fame Difcourfe afferts as ex- 
 prefly and pofitively ; that Myjlerious Doctrines 
 fire fuch, concerning which our Ideas are either 
 inadequate or indetermimate. No, they are Doc- 
 trines concerning Objects of which we have no 
 |deas or Conceptions at all as they are In their 
 Qwn Nature ; and therefore relating to Objects 
 which cannot properly be called Myjlerious in 
 %hk refpecl:, but utterly Unknown and Incom- 
 prehenjlble %o us. For this Realbn they are 
 conceived by the Help of Objects natural and 
 human, as eafily apprehended as any thing in 
 common Life; And nothing can be plainer 
 and more intelligible than the Doctrines them- 
 ielvesj and the Propofitions in which they are 
 cleliyered ; being all expreued likewiie in Terms 
 pf dpmnlon Language. Thefe two taken in 
 Conjunction, are properly called ,a Myfiery or a 
 PoSrine of Myftery : But there is' great Ambi- 
 guity and ./Equivocation in the word Myjterir 
 pus when applyed to Both thefe Parts in the 
 grofs. Becaufe the purely lpiritual Part of the 
 Myfteiy, or tha.t T)ivine and Supernatural Ob- 
 ject conceived by Reprefentation and Analogy, 
 js not properly myfterious, but utterly un- 
 known a,nd intirely inconceivable to'us as it is 
 in its own Nature : And that Whereby it itW&- 
 prefented and let down to our Capacity, cannot 
 pe called Myfterious ; becaufe nothing can be 
 jefs fo, or more plain and obvious and intelli- 
 gible. §o th$t when we fay a Doctrine of 
 
 Chr^ifiiatl 
 
ANALOGY. 169 
 
 Chrifiian Myftery, the Expreflion is clear and pro* 
 per; as it includes both what is utterly unknown 
 and inconceivable to us as it is in its felf, 
 and only Represented by another thing : And 
 that well known natural Reprefentation of it 
 in our Mind j both which taken together, and 
 expreffed in a Propofition compofed of Terms 
 worldly and human, we call a Myjiery. Buf 
 when it is called a Myfierious Doctrine, whether 
 we apply thele Terms to one Part or the other 
 of it, or to both together, they have no deter^ 
 minate and clear Sence or Meaning. 
 
 Thus we difcern a manifeft and wide dif- 
 ference between thele two Expreflions, Doc- 
 trines of Myfteries or Doctrines concerning My- 
 Jleries ; which may be as clear and diftincl 
 and intelligible as any Doctrines of common 
 Life : And Myfierious Doctrines ; by which 
 muft be meant Doftrines, either not appre- 
 hended or underftood at all ; or fo imperfect- 
 ly that we can have but a confuled, dblcure, 
 and very uncertain Knowlege of them ; which 
 is not the Cafe of our Chriftian Do&rines or 
 Propofitions concerning Myftery; for they are 
 all as clearly apprehended and as plainly un»- 
 derftood, as any Doctrines or Proportions relate 
 ing to natural prehuman Affairs. 
 
 F k o m the Things themfehes we have no 
 Ideas, as he before truly afferted ; fo that we 
 are totaly and intirely ignorant of them, other- 
 wife than, as they are reprefented by oth<?r 
 
 things, 
 
i 7 o DIVINE 
 
 .tfiings. And yet here it is fuppofecl that we 
 fikve IdedS Of the things themfelves, but they 
 are Inadequate or Indeterminate,. It immediate*. 
 !y follows, This Account fuppofes that of thefi 
 Myfterious Doctrines we have fome Ideas, tho* 
 purtial or' indeterminate. Whereas before, we 
 flad no Ideas derived from the thjngs them- 
 selves, and therefore our Knowlege of them 
 \vas not dired and immediate ; and they were 
 revealed to us by Other Ideas : Here he fuppoles 
 we have fome Ideas of the things themfelves, 
 or of the Myfierious Doctrines relating to thole 
 things (which amounts to the lame) but fuch 
 as are partial and indeterminate. 
 
 In this confifts the fundamental Error of 
 the whole Sermon; that the Author fuppoles 
 our Ideas of thole Myfierious Dodtrines, as he 
 calls them, or of the divine and iupernatural 
 Pbjeds, to be Taken from other Ideas with 
 which they have fome fort of Refemblance and a 
 f emote Analogy ; and to be therefore on that 
 'Account Indeterminate, partial, and inadequate. 
 Whereas in Truth we do not Take y no nor 
 Borrow! or Frame any Ideas or Conceptions of 
 things fupernatural either from thole things 
 themfelves, or From other Ideas; but we 
 make the Same Ideas or Conceptions which 
 we already have of natural and human Ob- 
 je&s, Stand for and Reprefent correfpondent 
 'divine and heavenly Qbje&s. He imagines the 
 Ideas, which he fays we have, of Things dis 
 yine and fupernatural, to be VifiintJ and Dif 
 
 ferenf 
 
ANALOGY. i 7 i 
 
 firent from the Ideas or Conceptions of Things 
 natural and human From whence they arc 
 Taken, as he words it; and at the f^me time 
 to be Analogous po thofe Other Ideas from, 
 whence they' are taken. ' Whereas the Ideas 
 or Conceptions in the Mind for Both are ftil| 
 £he Same-, they differ no otherwife than as 
 one thing may differ from its felf in the Up 
 pr Application made of it : And are properly 
 ^termed direct and immediate as they are ori ? 
 ginaly derived from Things worldly and na- 
 tural ; and Indirect and Analogous, when fub- 
 ftituted to rejprefent what is Divine and Super- 
 natural. '""" 
 
 r 
 
 T o render this very plain by an Inftance. 
 W& do not Take any Other New Idea, frorrj 
 what is already in qur Minds of an Human Son. 
 whereby to obtain ifome Knpwlege of the di* 
 yine Son': But we fubftitv}te this, to reprefent 
 that divine Filiation whereof we have no 
 idirect Idea or Conception at all. One and the 
 fame Conception ftands in the Mind for what; 
 is well and directly known, and for what is 
 Utterly unknown as it is in its fglf. Again, 
 Tho' it be very true that divine and human 
 Objetfs are Themfehes Correfpbndent and Ana- 
 logous; yet there are not two different Ana~ 
 logons and Correfpondent Ideas or Conceptions 
 in our Mind, to represent thole different Ob- 
 jects. Tho' the different human and divine 
 Objects or Things be Analogous to each other; 
 yet there are not Different Setts of Ideas of 
 :*' • ■>-» -' ' : '' i; ■ ' v ;: " them; 
 
172 D I V I N E 
 
 them in our Minds Analogous to each other. 
 If this were the Cafe, one Sett of fuch Ideas 
 could not be Taken from the Other as he infifts; 
 tut Both muft be derived directly and immedi- 
 ately from the very Objects themfelves, or at 
 leaft from fbmething the fame in Kind; which 
 is impoflible with refpecl to fupernatural Ob- 
 jects. Hence it is plain that when thefe 
 worldly and natural Objects, or their Concep- 
 tions, are fubftituted for things Divine and 
 Correfpondent, they cannot be called Partial, 
 Obfiure, or Indeterminate ; as if they gave us 
 feme partial, indiftindt, or indeterminate View 
 of thole Things themfelves : But they are, on 
 the contrary, full as clear and diftin£t in this 
 $ecundary Confideration, as when they are im- 
 mediately taken for Things natural and hu- 
 man. Since the Conceptions are the Same 
 in both Cafes, and only differently applyed ; 
 how can thefe Conceptions, when confider- 
 cd as Analogous and Reprefentative only of hea- 
 venly Things, become more indeterminate, 
 partial and inadequate, than when taken ori- 
 ginaly for their proper and immediate Ob- 
 jects ? He muft either allow thefe Analogous 
 Conceptions of divine Objects, to be at leaft 
 as determinate and adequate as the Concep- 
 tions of human and worldly Matters which 
 reprefent them : Or he muft fuppofe we only 
 Jake the Hint from thefe Jaft, and thence, 
 by fome unaccountable Means or other, form 
 to our felves New but TmperfecJ Ideas of fu- 
 pernaturaj Bejngs j which feems from all that 
 
 follows 
 
A K A L O G V. 173 
 
 3WS to be his real Meaning, but Very inconw 
 fiftent with what he eftablifhed before. 
 
 Again, Where <We can frame no Ideas, wi 
 can- — give no Affent. A moft pernicious and 
 dangerous Aflertion ; which is not to be won- 
 dred at as it proceeds lb frequently from our o-> 
 pen and fccret Enemies, who make a mifchic- 
 Vious Ufe of the wofd Idea when applyed to 
 Scripture Doctrines 5 but very Ihocfcing out of 
 the Mouth of fo valuable a Friend to the truly 
 Chriftian Caufe. Nothing is more evident front 
 what has been laid, than that we can Frame no 5 
 Direct and Immediate Idea of God or his Attri- 
 butes, or of heavenly Objects. So that if this 
 Author means any Such Ideas, when he lays af- 
 terwards We do maintain therefore that we havt 
 fame Ideas of myfierious "Doctrines (that is, in 
 plain Terms, of the divine Things Contained 
 in Doctrines of Myfteries) it is a rnoft miftaken. 
 and fatal Notion \ which by direct and imme- 
 diate Confequence overturns all Religion Natu- 
 ral and Revealed. For thus you cannot give 
 your Affent to anyone Doctrine relating to 
 things divine and fiapernatural ; becaufe you 
 cannot have any direct Ideas of thefe either by 
 Impreffion from the Things themfelves or by ' 
 the framing of the Mind : And becaufe it is 
 Impoffible for us to have any Such Ideas or 
 Conceptions of the Extremes in any Propofitions 
 or Doctrines which relate to the Objects of ano- 
 ther World. And that this is his meaning of 
 the word Ideas in this Sermon on Myfteries teem* 
 
 evident, 
 
174- blVINE 
 
 evident, not only from his frequently calling the 
 Ideas of them partial, indiftinft, indeterminate^' 
 2nd inadequate ; but from his fundamental Nd'* 
 iion of our Taking the Ideas of them from the Ide- 
 as of other things ; Which manifeftly fuppoles fuch' 
 Ideas to be a New Sett, diftintt and different from 
 the Other Ideas From which they are thus Taken : 
 And alio from his laying that by Revela- 
 tion '>we have a more clear and better View of 
 
 fame Things than-^before^ and Others do now ap- 
 pear to us of which before we had no View at alii 
 But the mifchievous Tendency of this Miftakc 
 will appear more fully from the following Oft- 
 iervatiori. 
 
 For where we have no Manner of Ideas of 
 ihe Extremes in a Propofitiofi, we can have no 
 Perception or Verfuajion. No! What would the* 
 Author think of this Propofition ? God is the 
 Creator , of all things, flath he any Manner of 
 Idea (properly ipeaking) of either Extreme here, 
 God or Creator? For want of an Idea of God, 
 ■we frame to otfr felves a complex, Analogical 
 and Reprefentative Conception of him, by the 
 greater! Perfections in our felves : And for wantf 
 of an Idea of the Production of a thing from no- 
 thing by Divine Power, we are obliged to con- 
 ceive it by Analogy with human Operation or 
 Making. And yet t'ho' we have no proper Idea 
 either of God or Creating as they are in thenH 
 felves, we have a clear and diftincl: and ufefuf 
 Underftanding or Conception of both from this 4 
 Analogy 3 a Mi Perception of the Connexion.! 
 
 of 
 
ANAL O G Y. ij$ 
 
 of thofe Extremes ; and a certain Cmvifkioti 
 and Perfuajion of the Truth of that Prppofitiom. 
 The Cafe is the very fame in all Propofkions 
 relating to things .divine and iupernaturaL 
 Tho' we have, properly fpeafcing, no Idea of 
 the extrenre'Terms, or of the heavenly Beings 
 oltimately fignifyed by them t We have Itowt- 
 cver clear and diftinft Analogical Conceptions of 
 both ; as clear as we have of any Matters re- 
 lating to human Actions ; and we may have 
 likewife a firm and unftiaken Perfuafion of the' 
 Truth of fiich Propositions.- 
 
 We do maintain therefore that <We have fom 
 Ideas even ofmyjlerious DoBrines. Then he main- 
 tains a moft falfe and dangerous Pofition ; and? 
 it is well bouh for natural: and revealed Religi- 
 on that he mult fiirely fail in his Support of it. 
 Had he given one Inftance of any Idea we have' 
 of myfterious Doctrines, or of the heavenly Ob- 
 jects themselves mentioned in thofe Vofifrmes, 
 tho' ever fo imperfect, inadequate, or indetermi- 
 nate ; the whole Controverfy might have been 1 
 contracted mto a Decifion of that fingle Point:' 
 But inftead of this he mentions only two Inftani 
 ees, whereof we have no Idea at all. The firft 
 is the Generation of the Son of God. But hath 
 he even any partial, imperfect, indeterminate 
 Idea of the real fupernatural Divine Generation? 
 And is not this Part of the Myftery, which is ut- 
 terly inconceivable by any Idea ever fc partial 
 or inadequate, revealed to us (in his own Words) 
 Not by any Urn from the thmgit felfjbut. by. another 
 
 Idea-' 
 
t 7 S 13 iVINfi 
 
 Idea by which itis reprefenied ; thatjis, by the Corit-» 
 ception of human Generation ; thro' the Me- 
 diation of which we think and fpeafcof what: 
 was otherwife utterly inconceivable and ineffa- 
 ble? The other Initance he mentions is, The 
 Diftirttlion between the Perfons of the ever blefjed 
 Trinity. Hath he any Idea ever fo partial, im- 
 perfect, or indeterminate^ of the Real Nature 
 or Manner of that Diftinttton ? Is it not as 
 utterly inconceivable as the real intrinfic Na-i 
 ture of thole Perfons? And is not this the Rea-i 
 fdn that it is revealed to us by fbme other Ided 
 (as he erroneoufly calls it) that of a Perfonal 
 Diftinttion among our felves ; the only Concep- 
 tion by which what is to us otherwife utterly iri* 
 Conceivable and ineffable^ becomes eafy and 
 familiar and intelligible as any thing in Na- 
 ture ? If he maintains this laft Pofitiofl, That 
 it is revealed by another Idea whereby it is repre- 
 fentedz It muft be in direct Contradiction to 
 his former Pofition, That we have Jome Ideas 
 even of myfierious Doctrines ; and therefore he 
 can never fupport them both. Had we any 
 Ideas of things divine and heavenly tho' ever 
 Jo partial and imperfect, they Would frill be 
 Ideas From the Things them/elves; and our 
 Knowlege tho* partial and imperfect likewife, 
 would however be Direct and Immediate^ and 
 not by any Remote Refemblance or Analogy 
 With things of Senfe, or Reafbn. It is our 
 Knowlege of thofe Matters by Refemblance 
 only and Analogy, which renders it clear and 
 cUftinot and determinate j whereas if we had 
 
 fueh> 
 
ANAL O G Y. 177 
 
 fuch Ideas .of them as he defcribes, our Know-, 
 lege of them muft likewife necefTarily be im- 
 perfect, obfcure, partial, and indeterminate; 
 and our Faith purfuant to that Knowlege 
 would be nothing better. 
 
 That is unintelligible whereof we can frame 
 no Ideas ; and thai ihcomprehenfible, concerning 
 which our Ideas are imperfect. Nay, then God 
 and his Attributes and all things divine and 
 fupernatural would be unintelligible : For as he 
 maintained before, We can have no Ideas from 
 the things them/elves, and therefore ho. Ideas 
 of the things as they are in themfelves. That 
 is indeed Imperceptible whereof we can frame no 
 Direct Idea or .Conception j, but it cannot be 
 called Unintelligible, if it may be conceived and 
 well underftood by Analogy with thole Things 
 which are perceptible by direct immediate 
 Ideas or Conceptions. Nor can that be called 
 Incomprehenjible, in the true Seqce of the Term, 
 whereof we have any direct Idea or Concepti- 
 on, tho 1 ever fo imperfect, inadequate, or in- 
 determinate ; for then it would be Cdmprehen- 
 Jible, tho* in a very minute Degree : And we 
 fhould have fbme direct Knowlege of it, tho' 
 proportionably minute, obfcure,- imperfect and 
 uncertain. But the remote Reprefehtatiori and 
 Refemblance by which we conceive divine 
 Objects is clear and diftinct and determinate i 
 And it is this which fenders all the revealed 
 Doctrines of Gofpel Myfteries as plain and 
 Intelligible as any thing in human Language ; 
 
178 DIVINE 
 
 our Faith of them firm and rational ■, and all 
 Infidelity obftinately wilful and inexcufable. 
 The word IncorHprehenftble mutt be taken in 
 one of thefe two Sences. Either for that 
 whereof we have no Adequate Ideas of Con- 
 ceptions, no intire comprehenfive Know- 
 lege : And with this Sence of the Word we 
 have nothing to do here } for all Things around 
 us and within us are thus incorhpreherifible, 
 as well as heavenly Objects. Or for that where- 
 of we can have no Direff Idea or Conception 
 at all ; and which muft therefore be conceived 
 by other Ideas or Conceptions, that is, by 
 ib'rhe Repfefentation or Analogy \ which is the 
 true Sence of the Term when applyed to My- 
 fteries in Religion. Between thele two Ex- 
 tremes the Word can have no determinate 
 Sence or Meaning in this Coritroveffy. 
 
 Again, The Incomprehenfibitity therefote of 
 certain Doffrines in our Religion doth not arije 
 from our having no Ideas of them ; but pom 
 ' hence, that our Ideas are either inadequate or in- 
 determinate. So grbfly miftakeh is our Author 
 here, that, to ipeak properly, the Incompre- 
 henfibility of the divine Objects of thole Doc- 
 trines (which he inadvertently confounds with 
 what he calls the tncomprehenjibility of The Doc- 
 trines themfehes) ariies Only from our having 
 No Ideas or Conceptions of thole Objects as 
 they, are in themfelves : And for that Reafon 
 alone it is that we are neceffitated to" "conceive 
 them, in his own Words, by Reflection, by 
 
 Refemblance, 
 
ANALOGY. i 79 
 
 Refemblance, and Reprefentation ; that is, hy 
 Analogy with things natural and human. His 
 great Miftake here is, that he thinks the Doe- 
 trims incomprehenfible, becaufe the divine Ob* 
 Jeffs about which thole Do&rines are conver- 
 fant are incomprehenfible ; that is, in his Sence 
 of the Word Incomprehenfible, inadequately and 
 indeterminately conceived. But furely if we had 
 any Ideas or Conceptions at all of the Real Ob- 
 pBs themfehes, tho' even inadequate or inde- 
 terminate ; neither thofe Obje£is r nor the Doc- 
 trines of them could be fly led Incomprehenfible j 
 for nothing is fb that can be thus directly 
 Perceived or Apprehended even imperfectly, 
 in Part, or inadequately. Whereas had he un- 
 derftood the word Imomprehmfible in its true 
 Sence when applyed to divine and fiipernatu- 
 ral Beings, he would have eafily difcerned 
 how the divine Objects to which a Chriftian 
 Do&rine ultimately relates, may be utterly 
 imperceptible and incomprehenfible as they 
 are in themlelves ; and yet the Do&rine or 
 Propofitioh-be as plain and comprehenfible as 
 any practical Doctrine in Ibcial Morality. For 
 Inftance, God is the Father of our Lord Jefus 
 Chrifi. Here we neither know in Whole 
 or in Part, adequately or inadequately, what 
 God is in his Real Nature and Attributes ; nor 
 what it is for him to be a divine Father, or 
 to have a divine Son-, any more than we know 
 what it is to Create : And yet we know clear- 
 ly and determinately and adequately, That 
 what an Human Father is to his Son in the 
 
 N a Way 
 
180 DIVINE 
 
 Way of Nature ; That God as realy and ac- 
 tualy is to Chrift, in a Correfpondent but a Dif- 
 ferent, Supernatural, and Incomprehenjibk Man- 
 ner. This is all we are Capable of conceiving 
 in this revealed Propofition, and confequently 
 all that we are Obliged to Know or Believe 
 of it 5 all that we have Faculties to apprehend ; 
 and all that was Defigned to be Revealed in 
 thofe Words: Nor was it ever intended by 
 this to give us any glimmering, indeterminate, 
 inadequate Ideas or Conceptions of the real 
 Nature of the divine Father and Son; The 
 Doctrine or Propofition revealed is plain and 
 eafy and determinate, in obvious Conceptions 
 and human Language ; but the Divine Reality 
 thus Reprefented in it, is to us intirely unknown 
 and incomprehenfible ; and both taken together 
 are properly ftyled a Chriftian Myftery. 
 
 Again, In fome Inflames the Doctrines re- 
 vealed are made up offuch Ideas, as we are in- 
 capable of receiving in an ordinary ffay In 
 
 thefe Cafes, the Ideas are themselves revealed. 
 Very unhappy ! For the Reverfe of both Parts 
 of this AfTertion is the Truth. Such Doctrines 
 are made up of no other Ideas or Conceptions, 
 than what we are Capable of receiving in the 
 Ordinary Way ; even in the Inftances he pro- 
 duces, the Generation of the Son of God, and 
 The Diflinfiion between the divine Perfons. Th^ 
 Conceptions of human Generation, and of Fef- 
 fonal Diftrn&ion among Men, are fuch as we 
 are Capable of receiving in the ordinary Way ; 
 
 and 
 
ANALOGY. 181 
 
 and it is by the Subftitution of thefe only, that 
 the divine incomprehenfible Generation and 
 Diftinction are revealed to us by way of Re- 
 femblance ; and not by any Extraordinary Ideas 
 of the things Themfelves, whereof the Mind of 
 Man is not capable. The Ideas themfelves of 
 thefe things (as he words it) could not be Re- 
 vealed, without giving us new Faculties for the. 
 Perception of Things at prefent invifible and 
 imperceptible to the Eye of Body or Mind. 
 
 N o w of thefe two directly oppofite and 
 even contradictory Opinions, which are plac-r 
 ed in a clear Light by the foregoing Citations 
 and Remarks upon them, the Author hath 
 Unhappily (for us I mean) declined and reject- 
 ed the former ; by which we have loft a va- 
 luable Difcourfe upon the important Subject 
 of Chriftian Myfteries : And he hath proceeded 
 intirely upon the latter; which hath been the 
 Occafion of all that Obfcurity and Confufion 
 and Inconclufivenefs, which runs thro' the whole 
 Difcourfe till you come towards the End. 
 Where he begins to fpeak Like himfetf, with 
 great Judgment dnd Accuracy; upon the un- 
 warrantable and dangerous Attempts which 
 have been made to explain that Part of the 
 Myfteries of Chriftianity which is inxeplicable ; 
 and for the framing imaginary Hypothefes to 
 fblve Difficulties relating to fupernatural 
 Things, by us infolvable : And he very juftly 
 obferves how this hath miniftered Occafion of 
 much ufelefs Difpute and Animofity, and how 
 N 3 Herefy 
 
182 DIVINE 
 
 Herefy it felf hath fprung from this Root. 
 What Perfpicuity then and irrefragable ftrehgth 
 of Argument would fhine thro' the whole Per- 
 formance ; if a Perfon of his Abilities fhould 
 undertake the lame important SubjeeV over 
 again, with more caution, upon that unfhaken 
 Foundation of Analogy firft laid down by 
 himfelf ? Such as would produce thofe noble 
 Effects, as well as intitle him to that great and 
 juft Applaufe, which otherwife in Providence 
 will be referved for fbme fuch extraordinary 
 Genius of the next Generation : When the 
 prevailing obftinate Prejudices of the prefent 
 Age againft the Doctrine of Analogy fhall be 
 worn out ; and the generality of learned Men 
 are brought to a Conviction of the great ler- 
 vice it will do Religion, when rightly and faUy 
 apprehended and duly managed ; and how 
 hurtful and dangerous it may prove by being 
 mifunderftood or mifapplyed ; of which that 
 Difcourfe is a glaring Inftance. I fhall only 
 remark farther fome other Expreffions in it 
 which are moft material. 
 
 The Knowkge which hath been communi- 
 cated to us is hut in Part. That is, in his 
 Sence, by giving us partial, indiftinct, imper- 
 fect, inadequate, and indeterminate Ideas of 
 things fupernatural and divine; not taken 
 From the things themfehes (this he knew was im- 
 pdffible) but from the Ideas of Things of Sence. 
 Purmant to which Notion, fpeaking of My- 
 flerions Doffrines, t as he very improperly calls 
 
 the 
 
ANALOGY. 183 
 
 the DaBrines concerning Myfiexies, he lays We 
 have inadequate Ideas of their Parts : Whereas 
 we have no Idea at all adequate or inade- 
 quate, determinate or indeterminate, of the 
 Whole or of any Part, either taken from the 
 Things themfelves to which the Doctrines ul- 
 timately relate, or Taken from any Other Ideas 
 of things natural and human. For no Ideas of 
 things natural and human can be Made Ideas 
 of things lupernatural and divine ; nor can any 
 Ideas or Cmceptions of the Things of this World 
 fuit the Real true Nature of the incomprehen- 
 fible things of another in any Degree : And 
 the True Ideas of each, could we obtain them, 
 muft be as different in Kind from one another 
 and as oppofite, as the real intrinfic Nature of 
 the refpecliye Objects. So that the Opinion of 
 our having Purely Spiritual, or Merely Intellec- 
 tual Ideas of things lupernatural and divine, 
 intirely Independent of worldly and human 
 Qbje&s, infufed into the Mind from aboye, 
 tho' falfe ; yet is not fo grofly ablurd as this 
 upon which our Author proceeds. No; the 
 Knowlege of thole things In Part does not con- 
 fift in our having the leafl: minute or partial or 
 obfcure Perception and Idea of the things 
 themfelves, or of any Part of them ; but a 
 Conception of the whole by Refemblance only 
 and Reprelentation. One and the fame Word 
 of human Language, together with the na^ 
 tural Conception annexed to it, ftands in the 
 Mind both fat the Image and the Original : 
 Nor is it poffiblefor Mankind to hayeauy Idea 
 N 4 of 
 
j84 DIVINE 
 
 pf the incomprehenfible Reality, Taken from 
 any Other Idea by which it may be a&ualy 
 and truly difcerncd in any the loweft Degree. 
 
 Our natural Ideas and Conceptions can 
 at the utmoft be nothing more than fo many 
 Refemblances, by which the Originals are 
 Imaged only and reprefented : And the Doc* 
 trines of Myfteries in Chriftianity are revealed 
 to us by the very Same Conceptions that we 
 have of things natural and human, and not 
 by any Other Ideas Analogous to them j which 
 is the very abftra&ed unintelligible Notion 
 that hath unhappily led this ingenious Author 
 into all his variety of Error. That faying of 
 St. Paul's, Now we know in Part, he miftoofc 
 for our having a Knowlegeof Some Part of the 
 Real true Nature of things divine and liiperna- 
 tural : Whereof it is now utterly impoffible for 
 us to have any Conception or Idea, either in 
 the Whole or in Part, fuppofe them ever fo 
 Short, Obfcure, Confufed, Partial or Tndetermir 
 note as he ftyles them. Whereas according to 
 the Apoftle's Explanation of his own Meaning, 
 our prefent Knowlege is not of any Part of 
 the things themfelves Face to Face % but of the 
 whole of them, after the lame Manner that 
 an human Face is feen in a Glals By Reflec- 
 tion: Not by an obfcure confufed direct View 
 pf the Real Face it felf^ or of any the leaft Part 
 pf it; but by a clear and total Refemblance, 
 and a diftinft Similitude only of the intire fii- 
 pernatural Reality. That which I iirppofe 
 
ANALOGY. 185 
 
 might have confirmed the Author in his Mis- 
 take was the Word Darkly \ but this is a 
 wrong Tranflation of Ev dinypctTi in his Text ; 
 which here means Per Invoiucrum, IndireB- 
 Ijy or Covertly and in a Myjiery as it is fbme- 
 times uled, or By a Sign or Semblance, as it is 
 in the Arabic Verfion. And this is exactly 
 agreeable to the Companion made by St. 
 Paul, of our prefent Knowlege of heavenly 
 things ; with the full, diftinct, and direct View 
 we have of a Likenefs only and Refemblance of 
 of a Face in a Mirrour: Which according to 
 our Author muft be a Telefcope, exhibiting to 
 us a partial, indiftinct, confuted, indeterminate 
 View of the Object It felf, lying at a great Di- 
 ftance from us and invifible to the naked Eye. 
 
 Pursuant to his Notion of our Know-? 
 lege In Part, he fays, Light there is let in 
 upon us anfwerable to the Necejfities of our prefent 
 State. That is, upon his Principle, either a 
 Light Taken from Another Light ; or elfe trans- 
 mitted directly and immediately from Hea- 
 ven, to give us an actual but confuted, indi- 
 ftinct, indeterminate View of things .divine 
 and Supernatural by I d e a s ; DireB tho' Par- 
 tial. Ideas of them, which by the whole Tenor 
 of his Sermon he maintains we have, and I as 
 pofitively maintain we have not : That we 
 have no fuch Ideas at all of them ; nor any 
 other Knowlege or Difcernment of them, but 
 by the Mediation and Subftitution of liich Con- 
 ceptions as are originaly natural and human ^ 
 3 and 
 
186 DIVINE 
 
 and which we had obtained by the Light of 
 Nature or Human Reajon: Which receives no 
 other additional Improvement or further Illu- 
 mination from above, than by the fecret Influ- 
 ences of the divine Spirit promoting, and guicl- 
 ing, and affifting all its natural Operations up- 
 on the Ideas and Conceptions of worldly Obr 
 je&s -, and then enabling it to difcern and con- 
 template heavenly and fpiritual Things in the 
 bright and extenfive Glafs of this World. So 
 that in refpe& of the Real Nature of divine 
 and fupernatural Beings, we are to confider 
 our felves as a Scene or Chamber of thick 
 Darknefs, into which there is no Admiffion of 
 the leaft DireEi Glympfe of Celefiial Light. 
 Wherein we are truftmg intirely to natural 
 Reajon for all our Knowlege, as to a Lamp 
 lighted up within us; which enables us not 
 only to difcern the Ideas of all material exter- 
 nal Objects let in by our five Senfes, and to 
 perceive that inward Confiioufnefs we have of 
 all ks own various Operations: But alio to 
 rarfe up to our felves, out of thele, apt and 
 Correjpondent complex Notions and Conceptions 
 offucto things, whereof it is impoffible for us 
 to have any dired Idea or Perception. There- 
 fore by this Expreffion of our Author Letting 
 Light in upon* us, he ought to have meant no 
 more than the Care which is taken of this 
 Lamp both by our felves, and by the infen- 
 fible Operations of the divine Spirit ; in dref- 
 iing, and trimming, and ftirring it up, and 
 rendering it more clear and Alining by con- 
 3 flantly 
 
ANALOGY. 187 
 
 ftantly pouring in new Supplies of Oyl. Thro* 
 this Concurrence of Nature and Grace, the 
 Eyes of our Underftanding are opened wider 
 by Degrees, for a more diftrn£t and comprehen- 
 five Profped of all things natural and hu- 
 man, which fall within the Sphere of our di- 
 rect and immediate Perception and Knowlege; 
 and for reaibning morejiiftly upon them : And 
 after this, above all, lor SantJifying fuch No- 
 tions and -Conceptions as are framed in the 
 Mind out of thofe original Ideas, confidered 
 together with its own Operations upon them ; 
 by obftrving how far they become lively I- 
 mages and Reprefentations of things purely 
 divine and ipiritual. This is a Kind of Know- 
 lege abundantly fufficient to anfwer all the 
 Ends of Revelation, as well as of natural Re- 
 ligion ; without any Purely Spiritual and Mere- 
 ly Intette&ual Ideas, or any Method intirely ab- 
 ftra&ed from that which is originaly Senfitive 
 and Rational. 
 
 This is a Knowlege of Religion and its 
 Myfteries ('whereof God himfelf and all his. 
 Powers and Attributes are the greateft) Clear, 
 and Eafy, and Determinate : But according to 
 this Author's fundamental Notion of a middle 
 Way of knowing them, between pure Ana- 
 hgy only ; and by Ideas of the Things them- 
 felves Taken from Other Ideas, our Cafe is thus. 
 Befides our Organs of Senfation, and the Facul- 
 ties of the Mind operating on worldly Ideas 
 and Conceptions, there are Other imperceptible 
 
 Inlets 
 
i88 DIVINE 
 
 Inlets for darting Tome dired but very minute 
 and indiftind Degrees of Celejiial Light into the 
 Soul of Man; to raife up a Kind of fupernatu- 
 ral Duskifhnefs or Twilight in the midft of this 
 parfcn&fs of Nature : Whereby the Eye of the 
 Mind is enabled to obtain an obfcure, imper- 
 fect, inevident, and indeterminate Perception 
 or adual Difcernment of fome Ideas of things 
 divine and heavenly. In purfuance of this he 
 is full of thefe and fuch like Expreffions. God 
 hath left fome Particulars relating to thefe Points 
 [of My fiery] obfcure. No; all Points and Parti- 
 culars relating to the Real Nature of thofe things 
 are not Obfcure, but utterly Unknown and In- 
 conceivable to us. And all the particular Points 
 relating to them which are realy Revealed, are 
 clear and diftindt ; and as intelligible as that na- 
 tural and obvious and familiar Analogy by which 
 thofe Points are revealed and reprefented- My-> 
 fierier are Doctrines of themfelves inevident. No, 
 blefled be God, nothing is more evident and clear^ 
 to our Underftanding than the Doctrines them- 
 felves concerning Myfteries, And what mould 
 hinder, them from being fo? They are all made 
 up of Conceptions natural and human, and ex- 
 prefTed in Terms of common Language; and 
 muft therefore be as intelligible as any Doctrines 
 or Propositions relating to thofe things of this 
 Life by the Help of which thofe of another are let 
 down to our frail and limited Capacities. How 
 then can that fupernatural Part of the Myftery ul- 
 timately refered to in. the Dodrine or Propositi- 
 on, be Obfcure or Inevident ; which is intirely 
 
 unknwon 
 
ANALOGY. 189 
 
 unknown and altogether inconceivable to us ? 
 Nothing is more imperceptible and intirely out 
 of the Reach of all our Faculties of Knowlege, 
 than the true Subftance or real Nature of things 
 divine and fpiritual: And nothing more plain 
 and diftinct and eafy to be underftood, than that 
 natural and correlpondent Analogy by which 
 they are conceived and expreffed ; and that Pa- 
 rity of Reafon which infenfibly runs thro' our 
 whole Manner of thinking and fpeaking of 
 them. If Men do not always take Care well 
 to diftinguifh thefe two very different conftitu- 
 ent Parts of Myfteries in all their Difcourfes and 
 Realbnings upon them; they cannot avoid 
 endlefs Obfcurity and Confufion. 
 
 Again, Other Things [of Myftery^ do now 
 appear to us, of which we had before no View at all* 
 No ; the divine Reality and true Nature of them 
 appears as little to us now after the jRevela- 
 tion, as they did before. It is the remote Simili- 
 tudes only or Refemblances of them which appear 
 to us ; and which are as truly the Images of 
 the Subftance as the Likeneis of a Face in the 
 Glais. Let us adore thofe Truths which we cannot 
 comprehend. No, let us adore thole Truths which 
 we as Clearly and Dijlinc~ilj> comprehend as any 
 Truth in Life. For if we did not know thole 
 Truths to be fuch, and Clearly and Diftinffly 
 underftand them, how could we rationaly a- 
 dore them ? How could we adore even God him- 
 felf, if we had not a clear and diftincl: Knowlege 
 of him? But net arifing from any indiftincT:, con- 
 futed 
 
i 9 o DIVINE 
 
 fufed, indeterminate Ideas given us of any thing 
 relating to his real Nature and Attributes : 
 For then we ihould be always feeling after him 
 in a purblind, Owl-eyed, and gloomy State 
 and Condition of the Mind ; and if we fliould 
 haply find him, the Worlhip to be paid him 
 would be equaly dubious and uncertain, con- 
 futed and indeterminate. Surely of all Things 
 we ought to have a moft Clear and Determinate 
 Conception of the true Object of divine Worfhip, 
 as well as of the Adoration it felf which ought 
 to be paid to it. So that we Adore fome of our 
 Chriftian Truths (as he words it) or Doctrines of 
 Myfteries, becaufe we adore God and his At- 
 tributes in them, whereof we have no Appre* 
 henfion or Perception at all by Ideas : And not 
 becaufe we cannot Comprehend them in his 
 Senpe of the Word, that is, cannot have Ade~ 
 quate Ideas of them •, for what is there in this 
 World which we can thus Comprehend? No- 
 thing, not the leaft grain of Sand. That Term 
 is equivocal even when applyed feparately to 
 either the known, or unknown Part of a My- 
 flery; but it is doubly fo, when applyed with- 
 out Diftin&ion, as it commonly is, to Both the 
 Parts taken together. Of thefe myfterious Doc- 
 trines we have fome Ideas. A Man may have 
 Complex Notions or Conceptions of Doctrines, 
 or of the Propofitions wherein they are contain- 
 ed and delivered ; and he may have Ideas of 
 the Things concerning which lbme of tho&Doc- 
 trines or Propofitions are framed ; but as for Ide- 
 as of DocJrines it is a very obfeure Expreffion, 
 
 beyond 
 
ANALOGY. 191 
 
 beyond all Propriety of Language : However 
 this is the well known peculiar Dialecl: of a mo- 
 dern Ejjay towards perplexing and confounding 
 Human Underjtanding : Wherein the various 
 Kinds of Knowlege, which before were well e- 
 nough diftinguifhed, and current by their feve- 
 ral relpedtive Stamps and Chara&ers, are mel- 
 ted down into one undiftinguiftied Mais of 
 Ideas ; and all refblved into a vile Medly or 
 Compofition of bafer Metal and Drols. 
 
 Again, That is ftritfly fpeaking unintelligible, 
 concerning which we can frame no Ideas ; and 
 thai dftly mcvrnprehen/lbk, concerning which our 
 Ideas ire imperfect. No, but quite the Re- 
 verie j That is ftri&ly fpeaking Incomprehens- 
 ible (in Religious and Divine Matters) of which 
 We have no Immediate Ideas or Conceptions at 
 all j no Dfreffi Perception or Idea or Ap- 
 prehenfion in any Degree ; and of which we 
 are capable of no Knowlege at all but by Si- 
 militude and Reprefentation, as we lee a Face 
 in the Glafs, or the Sun in Water. And 
 that is ftriftly fpeakihg Unintelligible, of which 
 we can have no Kind of Knowlege either di- 
 rectly or by Analogy ; either by Direct Ap- r 
 pretention and* Perception, or by fome Cor- 
 nfpondint Semblance and Reprefentation among 
 the immediate Objects of our Knowlege: Or 
 ftlbrter, that whereof we can have neither any 
 Idea or Conception from the Thing itfelf, nor 
 are able to frame any juft Analogous Notion 
 or feprefentative Conception of it to our felves; 
 
 and 
 
192 DIVINE 
 
 and which consequently muft be to our Under* 
 {landing as that which is not, that which has no 
 Truth and Reality of Exiftence. We can 
 Frame to our ielves Compound Ideas ) and Com- 
 plex Notions and Conceptions ; but we can ne-» 
 ver Frame to our felves Simple and Original 
 Ideas ; thefe can come no otherwife than froni 
 lome immediate aftual Communication with 
 the Object 
 
 Thus then our Anfwer to an Objection 
 this Author cites out of one Toland, againft 
 our Chriftian Myfteries, is obvious and never 
 to be evaded. The Objection is levelled at 
 our Divines who are laid by him to contend, 
 That there are fome Chriftian Doctrines Jo my- 
 Jlerious as to be in themfelves inconceivable. The 
 true Anfwer to this and all fuch like Objections 
 is ; That the Real Nature and Intrinfic Proper- 
 ties of the Divine things as they are in Them- 
 (elves, which are ultimately refered to in our 
 Chriftian Do&rines of Myfteries, are utterly 
 imperceptible and inconceivable to us ; and con- 
 iequently are no Immediate Obje&s of our pre- 
 ient Knowlege or Faith : But the HoBrines arid 
 Proportions in which thole things are revealed 
 by acorrefpondent ReprelentalSon and mediate 
 Similitude ; are as plain, arid obvious, and as eafiU 
 ly underftood as any thing in Nature or in hu- 
 man Language. Now our Author Anfwers this 
 Obje&ion By allowing that there are fome Doctrines 
 [of Myftery] incomprehenflble by US; but not" ab- 
 iblutely and in Themfelves inconceivable* But how 
 
ANALOGY. i 93 
 
 is this an Anfwer to his Objection, who is noto- 
 rious for having reje&ed Doctrines of Myfteriesf 
 for that very Realbn, becaiifc they are tneom- 
 prehenjible by US, arid allowed to be fo by fpme 
 Divines ? If the Ghoft of that Reviler of Chri- 
 ftian Myfteries were conjured up by the Ad* 
 verle Party for a Reply y I have forrie Realbn 
 to know it would be this; That iffome Doc- 
 trines of Chriftian Myfitry are incomprehenfible, 
 by us, they niufl all of them be equaly foj and 
 cdnfequently, as J have proved in my Ghriftianity 
 not .Myfteripusj none ,of them can be Qbjecls 
 either of our Knowlege or Faith; To this our 
 Author could, upon his Principles, make no 
 other than this fhort inconfiftent Anfwer j 
 That thole Doctrines are not fo Incomprehenji- 
 ble to us neither but that we Comprehend them 
 "by Partial, Confufed, Indeterminate Ideas. Upon 
 which he might fexpecl: to hear a Sound, as it 
 were of human Voice^ uttering thefe Words j 
 This is the very Reafon why I was' one of the 
 Chriftian Unbelievers in the Flejh ; becaufe Di- 
 vines held they could have but a very confufed j 
 Partial, indeterminate Knowlege of the very Fun* 
 Aamental Doctrines of Chriftianity; and becaufe 
 I could therefore have no other than a very uncer* 
 tain, dubious,, tottering Faith built iff on thai 
 Knowlege, Here the Conference mult neceflW 
 rily break off ftiort; our Author being thu# 
 pufhed to the End of his Reafbning. 
 
 For the effectual filencing 7 fiich a reftlefsf 
 $nd' diltuxbedi Spirit,' the Anfwer before given; 
 
 €? Iftighf 
 
i 9 4 DIVINE 
 
 might be further explained and urged by o& 
 ierving ; that the Cafe of Myftery is not (as- 
 lbme would have it) that of the one Part- 
 thereof we have Clear and "DiftinB and De- 
 terminate Ideas or Conceptions, which muft 
 tee allowed' on all Sides : And that of the other 
 Part we have none but fuch as are Partial,, 
 Indiftinffj and Indeterminate ; according to this 
 Author, and to many 'others who are under 
 fhe fame Miftake. For this is plainly a vairv 
 Attempt to blend the Noonday Sunjhine of this 
 World, with an imaginary Duskiftinefs or 
 Twilight of another, in order to the Compofi- 
 fion of a Myftery. It is as if a Man who was? 
 always without the Senfe of feeing, fhouldrea- 
 fon himfelf into a fond Perfuafion that he rs> 
 no more than- Purblind ■,. and that he hath/ 
 feme Partial, Confufed, Indeterminate Ideas* 
 of Light and Colours :' And then mould en- 
 deavour to put Thefe Ideas,, together with the 
 faireft and molt lively Conceptions his Rcafon 
 operating on the Ideas of his four Senfes* 
 could afford, into one and the fame Propofi- 
 tion to make up a Myfierious Voffrine, as this 
 Author would call it if he were the Man ; and 
 mould affirm pofitively that he had Ideas of 
 fuch Obje&s of Sight, and of the Do&rines or 
 Propofitions formed concerning them, Diflintt 
 from thofe conveyed to his Mind thr©' the 
 only Inlets of Knowlege of which he is already 
 pofleffed! In lhorc this Notion of Myftery is- 
 a mixing plain Truth with palpable Error ; 
 fioce- we can have- no direct. Idea, at all, tho a * 
 
 ©yes*' 
 
ANALOGY. 125 
 
 ever fb partial and imperfect, of things divine 
 and fupernatural either From themfelves, or 
 Fnom any Other Ideas whatfoever. 
 
 But the true Cafd of Chrifiian Myftery is $ 
 That of one Part of, it we have direct, clears 
 diftind^ and determinate Conceptions: And 
 of the other no Idea or Conception At all as it 
 is In itsfelf ; but only a correfpondent, Ana+ 
 hgous x Reprefentatiye Conception. If it fhould 
 be replyed that this is ftill worfe than the 
 former Cafe* becaufe it is blending Light with 
 Midnight Darknefs, : I anfwer that this Obfer-i 
 vation is rather applicable to the former Cafe, 
 where Midnight Darknefs is miftafcen, by a 
 falfe Fire of the Imagination, . for a real Twi- 
 light. In this true Cafe, We are fp far from 
 blending Light with Darknefs^ that we only 
 put together the DireBly perceptible Light of 
 this World, with the Light of fleaven Imper- 
 ceptible indeed DireStly, but perceived Indirectly 
 and by Reflection, for the Compofition of z 
 Myftery. As a blind Man, under no ridicu- 
 lous perfuafior* of a glimmering Sight, lb fai 
 at leaft as to peep at the Sun or Stars ; but 
 acting up to the Truth of genuine Reafon, 
 would choofe the fnoft affecting Ideas and Im- 
 preflioris conveyed to his Mind by his four 
 Senfes, to Stand for the trUe Ideas of Light 
 and Colours, , m order; to frame 1 any intelligi- 
 ble Propofitfbn; or Doctrine relating to fuch 
 Objects; whereof no" Ideas could be Taken from 
 the Ideas of his' tout SenTcs; tho' the latter 
 
 1 may* 
 
196 DIVINE 
 
 may be Subftituted to fupply the want of the 
 former. Thus what we Do know concerning 
 things divine and fpiritual, is a real true Know- 
 lege of them ; tho' by Analogy and Simili- 
 tude only with things natural and human, and 
 not by direct Perception or Ideas : It is fo far 
 from total Darknejs or Ignorance , as the Ob- 
 jection would infinuate ; that it is a competent 
 degree of Clear and Ufeful Knowlege. 
 
 Thus every Doctrine or Propofition of 
 Chriftian Myftery is perfectly confiftent ; and 
 the Parts of it are fb far from being fet in a 
 jarring Contrariety to each other, as in the 
 former Cafe, that they ftand together amica- 
 bly and remain infeparable in one and the fame 
 Propofition ; only by fubftituting the Light of 
 this World to fupply a prefent total want of 
 Celeftial Light. Thus our Knowlege of the 
 things of this Life becomes excellently fubfer- 
 vient to a truly competent and ufeful Know- 
 lege of things divine and fpiritual ; by fuch an 
 apt and lively Reprefentation of them, fo con- 
 trived in the Truth and Wifdom of God, and 
 in the Frame of an human Mind ; that the 
 fame, the very fame Conceptions and Terms, 
 and Proportions are common to them both: 
 All of them in their firft Confideration merely 
 human, but afterwards rendered holy and reli- 
 gious by Analogy ; and by a juft Parity of Pea- 
 fon, which infenfibly carries on the happy Pa- 
 rallel between things- natural and fupefnatural, 
 divine and human, thro' the whole Courfe of 
 3 all 
 
ANALOG Y. 197 
 
 ail our Thinking and Speaking of what would 
 be otherwife utterly incomprehenfible and in- 
 effable. Thus Reafon is a true ferviceable 
 Hand-jmaid to Religion, and excellently admi- 
 nifters to all its noble Purpofes; infomuch that 
 our mott exalted Knowlege of things divine 
 owes its Rife, and Progreis, and greateft Im- 
 provements to the Knowlege we have of Na- 
 ture and of our felves. Whereas in the former 
 Cafe, our whole Knowlege of this World put 
 together, and of all things in it, to the greateft 
 Exactness and Perfection, could not promote 
 or advance our Knowlege of things divine one 
 ftep farther than thofe partial, indiftind, con- 
 futed, indeterminate Ideas floating in the Ima- 
 gination of Men who allow them to be fcarce- 
 ly dilcernable by the fliarpelt Sight and Ob- 
 feryation. 
 
 If it is farther urged, that in Myftery we 
 however blend Intelligible with Unintelligible. 
 I Anfwer that the Objection thus worded pro- 
 ceeds upon a Miftake of the true Meaning of 
 thofe Terms. We do indeed put together 
 what is Perceptible and Directly conceivable, 
 with what is altogether Imperceptible and in- 
 cdnceivable as it is In its felf: But this latter 
 cannot be called Unintelligible, becauie it is 
 not fo in its Own Nature-, and tho' the real 
 Nature of it is Imperceptible to Us> fo that we 
 can have no proper Idea of it, yet it is fuffici- 
 ently Intelligible by Relemblance and Analo- 
 gy with thole" things natural arid human which 
 
 O 3 are 
 
198 DIVINE* 
 
 are the Extremes in every Proportion of My- 
 ftery, So that we do not blend Intelligible 
 with Unintelligible-, but what is Directly and //»- 
 mediately Perceptible and Conceivable, with what 
 js Utterly Imperceptible to Us as to its Real Na- 
 ture ; but very Intelligible and Conceivable by 
 /»fczge and Reflexion, for the Compofition of a 
 Chriftian Myftery. Tho' one Part of it is not 
 to be perceived or apprehended by Ideas ; yet 
 it becomes very intelligible and conceivable by 
 correfpondent Similitude and Reprefentation in 
 our natural Conceptions. 
 
 AMystery is fomething hidden and con- 
 cealed. No furely, it contains Something clear- 
 ly revealed, and moft diftin&ly underftood; 
 or it could be no Chriftian Doctrine, fo as to 
 be an ObjedY of either our Knowlege or Faith. 
 Thole Terms Hidden and Concealed are very 
 ambiguous when applyed, as they are here, to 
 the whole Myftery in grofs ; whereof one Part 
 is divine and inconceivable to us as it is in its 
 felf, the other obvious and eafily conceived as 
 it is in its own Nature. When they are aft 
 firmed of the latter only, they are abiblutely 
 falfe, for it is not hidden and concealed; but 
 clearly and diftinclly underftood and perceived. 
 And they are very unaptly and abiurdly ap-» 
 plyed even to the purely Divine and Spiritual 
 Part of the Myftery, whereof we can have 
 no Perception or Idea, or any other Kind of 
 Knowlege but by Reprefentation and Ana- 
 logy : Becaufe they imply that this Part is not 
 '- •-■■•/:■■ > ■ • tn 
 
ANALOGY. 1^9 
 
 Mn its own Nature, but Accidental)/ inconceiv- 
 able by us ; as if we were Capable of feeing 
 it, had it not been defignedly and on purpofe 
 abfconded from us; as if our prefent Ignorance 
 of it did not proceed from Natural Blindnejs, 
 but from fame Accidental Impediment, which if 
 Cod thought fit to remove, it would lye ex- 
 <pofed to open View. The divine. Reality or 
 ipir-itual Part of a Myftery is not faid to be 
 hidden and concealed from us, as the Light 
 oi the Sun is at Midnight by the Interpofitioa 
 of the Earth ; but as this Light may be ftyled, 
 stho' very> improperly, Concealed -or Hidden 
 from a blind Man j who hath no natural For- 
 tuity for the lean: View or Perception of it. 
 It were well if this loofe improper indetermi- 
 nate Ule of Terms in all Difcourfes of Myftery 
 could be prevented. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, our Concept 
 lions [of Myfteries revealed] are in many Points 
 indiftmff. No, every Point of the Revelation 
 ox Doctrine, and all our Conceptions of it, are 
 -equaly clear and diftind in «a-ch Myftery. 
 For Inftance this Do&rine or Proposition, 
 Chrift is the Only-begotten Son of God, is as 
 <lear and diftin& as that One Man is the Only* 
 begotten Son sf another. What is it -then which 
 makes a Difference between thefe two Pro- 
 positions in refpecl: of human Underftand* 
 jng ? Is it that we have a -Clear and Diftin$ 
 Idea or Conception of an human Son ; and 
 ibut an IndiflinB*. .confufed, indeterminate Idea 
 
 O 4 or 
 
2oo DIVINE 
 
 or Conception of a divine Son? No iurelyj 
 but that we have no dired Conception or Idea 
 at all of the latter ; and that which is direct, 
 clear, and diftind of the former : For which 
 Reaibn that which is to us utterly (not Unin- 
 telligible but) Imperceptible by any dired Perr 
 eeption or Conception at all, is revealed to us 
 by Analogy with that whereof we have lbme 
 jlired Perception or Conception; and accord- 
 ingly thus far and no farther doth the divine 
 (Generation beeome an Objed of our Know- 
 Jege and Faith. Nothing therefore can be 
 more erroneous as well as pernicious to Reli- 
 gion, than thofe Forms of fpeaking; That 
 pur Ideas or Conceptions of Chriftian Dodrines 
 concerning Myfteries, as well as of God him- 
 felf and his Attributes (which are the greateft 
 of Myfteries) are Imperfect, Partial, Dim, Ob' 
 /cure, Confufed, Inadequate, IndiftinB, Short, 
 Glimmering, Hidden, Concealed, Dubious, Inevi- 
 dent, Uncertain; Above Reafon (otherwife than 
 as the divine Objeds themfelves are impercep- 
 tible) Above Comprehenfion ; Framing Ideas ; 
 Revealing Ideas ; Knowing Part of what is in- 
 tirely unknown ; Letting Light in upon us, 
 diftind from the Light of Reafon affifted 
 and improved ; Seeing darkly, otherwife than 
 ^Enigmaticaly by Exemplar, or Sign, or Sem- 
 blance i Taking Ideas from Other Ideas; Myfte- 
 rious Truths, or Doctrines, or Proportions. As to 
 thefe and all fuch like Epithets and Phrafcs, 
 lpoken of our Chriftian Dodrines of Myfteries 
 almoft every where, and indifferently by Friends 
 
 and 
 
ANALOGY. 201 
 
 £nd Foes ; the latter make all their Advan- 
 tages of them againft Truth and Orthodoxy : 
 And they are no other than fo many wrong 
 Conceflions in the Mouths of the former to 
 weaken our common Caufe, and render the 
 Defence of it more difficult and •• perplexing. 
 At belt they ferve only to raife a Cloud andL 
 Darknels about Do&rines of Myftery, in 
 themfelves as bright as the Sun at Noon Day. 
 They are all full of Ambiguity, and generaly 
 falfe in the Application of them ; and intirely 
 without any folid Foundation in Reaibri. For 
 after all, the whole Truth of the Matter m 
 relation to Myftery is in ftiort thus. We 
 have no Ideas or Conceptions at all in any 
 Degree of the heavenly things as they are in 
 themfelves; and therefore the Applicati6n of 
 fuch Terms and Sayings to Objects altogether 
 imperceptible, muft at beft be lifeleis and in- 
 fignificant. And on the other Hand, the very 
 Reverie of them all is true, with refpecYto 
 thole Doctrines and Tropofitions i which exprefs 
 and exhibit to us that natural and eafy Refem-r 
 blance and Similitude, under which what is 
 to us imperceptible and inconceivable ■' as to 
 its real Nature, becomes Thus as conceivable 
 and intelligible as any thing in this World, or 
 particularly in human Nature. 
 
 A Mystery is a "DoBrim which is fo 
 above our Rtafon y that we are incapable of com- 
 prehending it. Then every thing in Nature 
 is a Myftery ; for there is no one thing in it 
 
 whereof 
 
202 DIVINE 
 
 whereof we have a perfect and truly compre- 
 henfive Knowlege. Comprehenfion^ in this Au- 
 thor's loofe, as well as the commonly mis- 
 taken Acceptation of the Term, fignifies the 
 having perfect adequate, and determinate Ideas 
 of an Object. Now Thus divine and human, 
 heavenly ;and worldly things are both above 
 cur Comprehenfion : So that we have nothing 
 to do with this meaning of the Word in a 
 Treatife of Religious Myfteries. The Queftion 
 iiere is, in what Sence we are incapable of 
 comprehending Divine and lupernatural Ob- 
 jects ? Whether it is that we have only inad* 
 cqnate, indeterminate, indiftincl:, and imper*- 
 fed Ideas of them, as he explains the Word 
 Incomprehenjible ; or upon what other Ao 
 £ount ? 
 
 Now in order to underftand this clearly, 
 Comprehenfion ought to be well diftinguifhed 
 from Perception, which proceeds from lbme 
 immediate Communication of an external Ob- 
 ject with our fenfitive Faculties, furnifhing us 
 with a conftant fupply of original Ideas of Sen- 
 fation. And from Self-cenfciouJhefs y which is 
 the immediate internal Feeling of the Facul- 
 ties of our own Minds and their Operations* 
 without the Intervention of any Ideas of them 
 whatlbever. As alfo from what is juftly ftyled 
 the Simple Apprehenfian of the Intellect ; that 
 is, the firft naked view only, and fimple pro- 
 ipefi it takes of the fenfitive Ideas in the Ima- 
 gination, and of all its own Powers and Oper 
 
 rations, 
 
ANALOGY. 203 
 
 rations, without proceeding to any Judgment 
 .or Reafoning upon either. Thefe are the Far 
 culties of human Nature which furnifh us with 
 all the Materials of our rnplt extenfive Know- 
 lege : From which it proceeds to its own Al- 
 terations and Combinations of ienfitive Ideas : 
 to the forming complex Notions and Concep- 
 tions out of them and its own Operations con-? 
 iidered together; to the finding out their A? 
 greements and Diiagreements ; and to all its 
 Reaibnings, Conclufions and Maxims. And 
 how we may difcern diftinftly in what Sence 
 any Part of a Religious Myftery is above ouj 
 Reafbn or Comprehenfion. Whatever in My- 
 flery is above all Senfitiw Perception, Immedi- 
 ate ConfcioufnefSy and the DireEt Apprehenfion 
 of the Intellect, is properly above our Compre- 
 hension', becaufe it lies beyond all our DireSh 
 Ideas and Conceptions, and conlequently be- 
 yond all the direct and immediate Operation, 
 of Reafbn. 
 
 Now then, lay you, here you have led us 
 from the Beginning to the End of all our 
 Knowlege confined to the Limits of this 
 World, and of all Things in it: But what 
 then becomes ©f Religion and the Things of 
 another ; and even of that Part of Myfiery 
 which is purely divine and ipiritual ? And 
 what have we to do but to let it alone, as 
 what doth not concern us ; as what we can 
 have no Knpwlege of, and upon which Rea- 
 son can exert none of its Operations ? I Anfwer 
 
 by 
 
204 DIVINE 
 
 by thus far owning the Charge, that I have here 
 brought the Mind on to the utmoft Bounds 
 of all its Direff and immediate Knowlege r, but 
 not with the fame, treacherous Defign with 
 which fome others have done the fame : Name- 
 ly to perfuade Men that they can have No 
 Knowlege at all of things whereof they can 
 have wIdeas; and by neceflary Confequence 
 that they mutt reject all the Myfteries of Chri- 
 stianity from being either the Immediate, or 
 Mediate Obje&s of our Underftanding or Faith; 
 little confidering that upon the fame Princi- 
 ple they muft explode all Knowlege of God 
 himfelf and his Attributes, of which we have 
 no Ideas. No, but with a quite different In- 
 tent ; to fhew Men that they are not to ac- 
 fmiefce intirely and take up their Reft here 
 among Atheifts and Infidels ; without troubling 
 themfelves to look Backward or Forward, 
 either for a Direct or even Mediate Knowlege 
 * of any thing befides what is purely natural or 
 human. To diffuade others from all vain 
 Attempts and impotent Struggles for look- 
 ing ftrait before them over thole Bounds /for 
 any direct and immediate View and forbidden 
 Prolpect into the other World. For let them 
 ftrain their Optics and gaze with ever lb much 
 Intenfenels, they never will be able to obtain 
 any one minute, diftant, obfeure, glimmer- 
 ing Idea of the real Nature of things divine 
 .and lupernatural, or of any thing the lame in 
 Kind, by the Eye of the Mind, any more than 
 they would by. the Eye of the Body : And if 
 
 it 
 
ANALOGY. 205 
 
 it were poffible to obtain any fuch Idea, it 
 muft be expreffed by the Tongue of an Angel, 
 and not in Sounds of Syllables articulated by 
 a mere Collinon of Air. This is too common- 
 ly the Cafe both of the Orthodox, and Unor- 
 thodox ; and the Confequences of it are a Mul- 
 tiplicity of Errors ; great Ambiguity and Con- 
 fujibn in reafoning on both Sides ; and feveral 
 very different Kinds of Enthujiafm and Herejy. 
 
 A nd lafHy, to convince all Men if poffible, 
 that when they find themfelves at the utmoffc 
 extent of our Underftanding in things temporal 
 and human ; and can proceed no farther by the 
 Help of either Sence or Reafon to any VireSt 
 Perception, or Simple Apprehenfion, or Immediate 
 Confeioufnefs r or Purely Spiritual Ideas of things 
 ' divine and fupernatural : That they would 
 wifely, without any Hefitation or Delay, look 
 behind them, and turn backward for a Review 
 of that Knowlege merely natural and human 
 which they obtained in their Progrefs hitherto ; 
 to traverfe it all over again, and obferve how 
 our little Syftem is an Epitome of the Univerfe, 
 and Man a remote Image and Picture in Mini- 
 ature of the divine Being himfelf. How it is by 
 looking, into this World, and more particular- 
 ly into our felves, that we can have any Con- 
 ception at all of things divine and fupernatu- 
 ral ; which are there alone to be difcerned, and 
 that by Reflection only and Similitude ; but as 
 truly and clearly difcerned, as the Subftanee of 
 an human Face is by a clear and lively Refem- 
 
 blancc 
 
206 DIVINE 
 
 blance of it in a Glafs. How the Knowlege 
 by that Image only, is true and real and uie- 
 fuj ; tho' a Man had no Power to turn about 
 and view the Subftance it felf : And fb likewife,' 
 how our Knowlege of Sun Moon and Stars ap- 
 pearing to us in the Water only, would be thus 
 far juft and fufficiently well grounded ; tho' our 
 Eyes were naturally ib prone and fixed to this 
 little Globe of ours, that we could not look up- 
 ward for the leaft direct and immediate View 
 of them. HoW this is a fure and lblid Founda- 
 tion of all the divine Knowlege we have ; and 
 how therefore it is here the Mind begins to ex- 
 ert the noblefl and moft exalted of all its Ope- 
 rations, in fubftituting its Conceptions of things 
 natural and human, for reprelenting the corret 
 pondent but undifcerned Subftance and Rea- 
 lity of Things divine and lupernatural : And 
 in carrying on an unerring Parit5ysf Realbn be- 
 tween them thro' all its own Conceptions and 
 Notions, together with all its regular Judg- 
 ments and Politions and Deductions concerning 
 them ; without glancing at the Real Nature pt 
 True Properties of what muft be allowed intire-' 
 ly unknown otherwise than by this Semblance 
 and Analogy. Thus all Nature within our Di- 
 reB View, becomes a large and ipacious Field 
 of Divine as well as of human Knowlege,- abun- 
 dantly iufficient for all the Purpofes of Reli- 
 gion in this Life : And they who are riot con- 
 tented with this Kind and Degree of ity muft 
 in effect renounce all- Religion as welt natural* 
 as revealed; 
 
 From' 
 
ANALOGY. 207 
 
 From hence It plainly" appears how the 
 terms Comprehenfion^ Perception, Idea, Confci- 
 oujbefs, Simple Apprehenfion are no way applica- 
 ble in the Affirmative to thepurely Ipiritual and 
 divine Part of Myftery. NonorcanGww/tfwwbe 
 lb applyed to it, otherwiie than as we Conceive 
 k by Similitude and Reprefentation ; and 
 thus indeed we may be truly faid to Conceive 
 things divine and spiritual , not obfeurely and 
 dimly, or by Part and Parcel ; but as fully arid 
 clearly and diftinclly as any thing relating to 
 ©ur own Nature: And all the Do&rines and 
 Propofitions concerning them are as plain, and 
 intelligible, and Comprehenjibk, as any of thole 
 things whereby they are imaged and reprefen- 
 ted ; or as any other Words or Propofitions in 
 liuman Language. From hence likewife it ap- 
 pears how nearly we are concerned even in the 
 purely fpiritual Part of Myftery.. For tho' we 
 can exert no one Operation of the Mind Direff* 
 ly upon any thing relating to the Real Nature 
 and Subftance of it: Yet all its Operations may 
 be exercifed upon the Do&rines and Propofitions, 
 ki which the Myftery is revealed by natural 
 Reprefentation, and in Terms of fhuman Lan- 
 guage. Tho' that imperceptible Part of it can- 
 not be the Direct and Immediate Obje£t of either 
 our Knowlege or Faith ; yet by the Interven- 
 tion and Mediation of Things natural and ob- 
 vious, it neeeffarily becomes a Remote and Dip- 
 tant Objecl: of both: Of our Knowlege, by this 
 Reprefentation an4An.ak>gv. j andof our Faith y 
 
 in 
 
ao8 DIVINE 
 
 in believing the Truth and Reality and Exijtentli 
 of things Correfpondent, but inconceivable any 
 otherwife than as they are thus beheld in a 
 Mirrour only, 'ev dtvlypctn by Sign, or Simili- 
 tude, or Representation. 
 
 We affirntj lays he,' then are fever 'd DoffrineS 
 £of Myftery] above our Reason j notivithftanding 
 they are revealed. Here again, as he hath done 
 all along, the Author confounds the Doffrines, 
 ■with the Divine things themselves to which thole 
 Doctrines ultimately relate ; tho* thefe ought 
 ever to be moft carefully diftinguilhed. The di-; 
 vine Objects as they aire in their own Nature^ 
 lie intirely above all Perception of Sence or Ap- 
 prehenfionof Reafon, as well after as before the 
 Revelation; but the Doctrines or Propofitions 
 in which the Revelation is made are not above 
 our Reafont If they were lb, it is plain we 
 could neither underftand nor believe them ; all 
 Do&rines of Myftery in the Gofpel^would be 
 ufelefs and unintelligible ; and there would be 
 no luch thing as a Revelation made to us 
 from Heaven, till we were endued with fbme 
 Faculty of Knowlege different from Sence 
 and Realbn for apprehending and underftand* 
 ing it. The Real true Nature of things divine 
 and fiipernatural, ultimately deligned and re- 
 fered to in thefe Doctrines, is indeed far above 
 all Perception of Sence, or Confeioufnefi; and 
 confequently above Reafon, which cannot from 
 them, or from any Thing the fame in Kind, be 
 fupplyed with Materials for the Exercife of any* 
 
 of 
 
ANALOG^. 26$ 
 
 faf its Operations : This is* as utterly impercep* 
 tible and inconceivable after the Revclatiori as 
 before it; but how can the Doctrine it feljb6 
 jibove our Reafotii after it is Revealed to Out 
 Reafon ? Is not this faying in the fame Breath 
 that it is, and is not revealed ? And will any 
 Man lay that the Doftrines concerning Gofpel 
 Myfteries are not clear and diftindfy plain and 
 intelligible? Yes furely/as plain and diftinft and 
 intelligible as any;Doftrines or Proportions rela- 
 ting to human Life. Thefe exprefs nothing 
 indeed of the real true Nature of things divine $ 
 becaule of this we can have no Perception of* 
 Senfe, or Idea, or Confcioujhefs^ or Simple Appre-* 
 henfion: But they fbppofe and affert every thing 
 Ipoken of thus by Repreietttation and Analogy j 
 to be As fubftantialy True and Real on the Part: 
 0f the Divinity, as the things by which they are 
 thus Represented are with refped to This World 
 and bur Humanity. And it is our full Per- 
 iuafion of that Corrifpondent Truth and Reality 
 of things no otherwife revealed than by fuch 
 Representation and Similitude, which improves 
 and exalts the Knowlege and AJfent of the purd 
 Intellect into a truly Chriftian Faith ; Which 
 then becomes, according to the Apoftle's Defi-* 
 nitioh of it, The Evidence of things not few : Of* 
 things ineomprehenfible and aboVe Reafon as 
 they are in thenifelves ; but let down to the 
 Level of human Underftanding in Doctrines of 
 Propjojitions plain and intelligible and obvious! 
 to the common Reafon of all Mankind* 
 
 V fox. 
 
2ro DIVINE 
 
 For want' of obierving the above mention- 
 ed Diftindtion, the Author runs into many, 
 fuch loofe and ambiguous Expreflions as thefe.- 
 Wi allow and contend for it, that there are fitrii- 
 J^vBtms [of Myftery] in (fur Religion above our 
 Reafon.' Hut why Some Doctrines? Surely all 
 Doctrines concerning Myftery are equaly above 
 dur Reafon, in refpe£t of the fpiritual Part of 
 them or the divine things as they are in therh- 
 fetves : And in refped of the Doctrines, or of 
 the Terms or Propofitions in which they are 
 delivered, they are all equaly plain, arid diftin&j 
 and intelligible. Again, A Votfrine may be very 
 true notwithftanding its being above our Reafon* 
 But fiirely if the Dotfrineor Proportion is above 
 Reafon, we can never be the wiier or the bet-* 
 ter for it. Suppofe it ever lb true in It s felfa 
 how (half it appear to be fo to Us-, if ourRea^ 
 fon cannot understand it clearly, and judge of 
 it, and form certain and determinate Gonsiufi± 
 orts concerning it? And how can it judge o* 
 determine any thing concerning what is lb above 
 it, as to be out of the Reach of all its Operati- 
 ons? From whencejt is plain that Jbftteihing in 
 Chriftian Myftery muft not be above our Rea«* 
 fort ; but rriuft be as truly the Immediate^ Di*- 
 reef, and Prdper dbje£fe of our underftandinjg 
 Faculties, as any thing in Nature, And Whethei 
 this be the Doctrines and Propofitions in whifcli 
 they are delivered, compofed of analogous Cori* 
 ceptions and Terms wbrldly and human j of 
 fche Divine Things as they are In themf elves y ul-*- 
 
 timately 
 
ANALOGY. 2it 
 
 timateiy refered to in thole Doctrines, is eafy 
 to deter tmn£ : Which if the Author had well 
 eonfidetfed, neither that Sermon, nor .this long 
 Chapter of Remarks upon it had ever feen the 
 Light. 
 
 ■rt 
 
 As he affirms that there are Some jDofflrinei 
 in our Religion above Redlbn $ fo he ohferves^ 
 that the Sociniam on. the contrary Affirm thai 
 there is Nothing in'ihe Chriflian Religion above 
 ReafMiShd both erroneously. Whereas had 
 the Sfocfeferis affirmed only, That there are no 
 DffStritfei in the Chriftian Religion Above our 
 Urn/oft j i and oar Author, That not only Some i 
 bcit thatyf// t!be divine and heavenly Objects them* 
 fehes, ultimately refered to in thole Doctrines* 
 were Above our Reafon ; they had been both fo 
 far- in the Right: But the real Miftake of one, 
 is perfectly the Reverfe of the other. For He 
 alferts not only the Real Nature ofjthe divind 
 things themfelVes, but even the IhStrines in 
 wftitsfe they are revealed by Analogy, to b6 a- 
 bove Reafon : And the great and fundamen- 
 tal Error of the Socinians, which runs thro' thei* 
 whole Syftem of Religion is ; that neither the 
 %y00riws, nor the Things themfelves reprelent* 
 ed and defigned in thole 1 Doctrines are above 
 Reafon* They intirely reject all the divine and 
 fuper natural Objects and Tranfactions, ultimate- 
 ly refered to and intended in thole Chfiftian 
 Doctrines of Myftery ; they turn all the Terms 
 of them into pure Figure and Metaphor j and 
 W#H have them allude to any thing, rather than 
 
 Pa a fub- 
 
212 DIVINE 
 
 a fubftantial Comfpondent Truth and Similar 
 Reality on the Part of the Divine Nature. The 
 Miftake of this Author is, That he applies this 
 laft Affirmation of his to the Representation or 
 Analogy, as well as to the Things themfefaes fb 
 represented ; and the Herefy of*the Socinians 
 is, That they utterly reject the Divine Analo- 
 gy ', and explode all Comparifon or Similitude 
 between things divine and human, founded in 
 the Real Nature of both : And from thence by 
 an inlenfible and fatal Tranfition they glide in-* 
 to Human Metaphor, and make all the Terms 
 of the Golpel concerning Myftery, no more 
 than a bare Allufion to the Things and Tranf- 
 actions of this Life ; and particularly to the 
 Rites and Ceremonies tinder the Jewilh Difpen- 
 fation. Both thele Extremes are dangerous to 
 Religion; where lbme, out of a miftaken Zeal 
 for Orthodoxy, aflert that we have Direct Ideas 
 or Conceptions of things divine and fupernatu- 
 ral,. DiftmEl and different from, thole of worldly 
 and human Objects j tho' fuch as are partial, 
 indinin6t, and indeterminate : And where others, 
 for the Support and Maintenance of their He- 
 terodox Principle?, will not allow that in Doc- 
 trines or Propofitions of Chriftian Myftery, any 
 torrefpondent tho' incomprehenfible Subftance 
 arid-Reality pn the Part of the Divine Nature is 
 Imaged out and reprefented. From whence it 
 may be obferved, that moft of all the Miftakes 
 and Errors of Men concerning our Chriftian 
 Myfteries proceed j either from their attributing 
 to the whole Myftery in GVo/y what is truly ap- 
 4 plicable 
 
ANALOGY. 213 
 
 plicable only to one, or the other Part of it: 
 Or from their unfairly Separating the two ef- 
 fential constituent Parts of it, which ought ever 
 to remain infeparable ; and that with an invidi- 
 ous clandeftine Defign to dafh them againft each 
 other for the DifTolution of the Whole. 
 
 This lays open the Miftake in his other De- 
 finition of My ftery, A Doff rim concerning which 
 our Ideas are either inadequate or indeterminate. 
 No, a DoEtrine concerning which both the Con- 
 ceptions, and the Terms in which they are ex- 
 preffed, are very clear and diftinft and determi- 
 nate ; tho ? the Real Nature and true Properties 
 of the Things them/elves ultimately refered to in 
 thofe Doctrines, are utterly inconceivable: In- 
 ibmuch that We can have no Idea or Concep- 
 tion at all of thefe, or of any thing the lame in 
 Kind, either by an internal Perception or Con- 
 jcioujhefs, or Simple Apprehenfion of the Mind ; 
 or by any External Senfation. Nothing is tru- 
 ly Above Reafbn, but what muft firft be fuppof- 
 ed Above the Reach of all thefe, which are the 
 only Faculties whereby Reafbn is fupplyed with 
 Original Materials to work upon ; call thefe Ideas 
 or what elfe you pleafe, they muft be fuppofed 
 antecedent to all its Operations ; without them 
 it is an una&ive Principle, and cannot operate 
 upon Nothing. So that the divine and Super- 
 natural Things themfelves are above Reafon, only 
 becaufe they are above all external or internal 
 Perception or Senfation; they are Inconceivable, 
 becaufe they are altogether Imperceptible. They 
 
 P 3 «* 
 
2i4 DIVINE 
 
 are with relpccl to thejr Real NaUfre above Rea- 
 ion, as the Light of the $un is above theRe^fon 
 of a Man born blind ; who hath no Faculty in his 
 Nature for any internal or external Perception or 
 -Idea of if^as lbmp Material for the Work and In> 
 ployment of his Re^fpn. From the firft Inftant he 
 obtained any the leaft Glimple of Light, Rea- 
 fon would begin with its Operations upon it; 
 But it cannot work without Materials ; and 
 muft therefore be confined to operate upon fucfa 
 Ideas as are adminiftred by his Four remaining 
 Senfes, together with the Confrioufnefs he hath of 
 his own Mind's internal Senjatipns, gnd its Ope- 
 rations urjon thefe Materials. The Operations 
 pf Realbn are likewile ever exerted to greater 
 or lefs Advantage, in Proportion to the Soundr 
 nefs and Aptitude of thofe Materials : If the 
 Perceptions and Senfations are ftrong and clear 
 and diftinft, the Operations of the Intellect or 
 Realbn upon them will be proportionally di- 
 ftinft and clear; and it is fo much the lels 
 liable to Error and Miftake. But if the original 
 Perceptions and Ideas are obfcuie, confuted, 
 and indeterminate ; then all the Operations of 
 our Reafon upon Them muft be likewile full 
 of Obfcurjty and Confufion; the firft Ample 
 View the Intelled takes of thefe, as well as 
 all its fuhfequent Qbfervations and Judgments 
 upon them muft at beft be very dubious and 
 uncertain ; and no Conclufions can be drawn 
 concerning them with any lure and determi- 
 nate Marks of Truth or Falfhood : Which 
 according to this Author's Principles muft 
 
 neceflarily 
 
ANA L O G Y. 215 
 
 neceflarily be the Cafe of every Chriftian My- 
 ftery, as he takes it in grofs ; and without any 
 Djiftindion of its Parts into comprehenfible and 
 incomprehenfible, perceptible and impercep- 
 tible. 
 
 Since therefore Reafon cannot operate 
 till Ibme actual Ideas, Perceptions, or Senfa- 
 tions offer themfelves as Materials for it to 
 work upon; and fince it hath no inherent 
 Ppwer of Creating fimple Ideas and Percep- 
 tions, or of producing them fpontanepufly for 
 the Exercife of its own Operations : The re- 
 maining Queftion is, what fhall Realbn do 
 where it hath no Supply of any fuch original 
 Materials, no immediate Perception, Idea, or 
 Conlcioufnelg ; which is its true Cafe with 
 refpect to the purely fpiritual and divine Part 
 of all our Chriftian Myfteries ? I anfwer that 
 the Intellect or Reafon hath nothing to do 
 here, but to fufpend all its Operations; not 
 to pretend to Work without pre-exiftent Ma- 
 terials, nor to affume to it felf a Power of 
 creating them where they are not otherwife 
 to be found : They are both equaly prefump- 
 tuous, and by a juft Retribution they confign 
 Men over to Error, Infidelity, or Enthufiafm. 
 Here then, Realbn is to exert all its Operations 
 on that Part of .Myftery whereof the Ideas 
 -and Conceptions are natural, and the Terms 
 worldly and human : As thefe are all clear and 
 •diftindt and determinate, all its Operations 
 upon them will be fo likewife. And then it 
 
 P 4 hath 
 
2i6 DIVINE 
 
 hath nothingTnore left to do, but to conclude 
 that a divine Supernatural incomprehenfiblc 
 Subftance and Reality, Correspondent and An? 
 fwerable to thofe Natural and Obvious Images 
 an4 Reprefentations, is ultimately defigned 
 and intended in every "DoBrine and Proportion 
 of Myftery exprefled by the plaineft and moll 
 intelligible Words of human Language. 
 
 Our Cafe then in refpeft to Myftery may 
 be illuftrated by the State of a Man under 
 patural Blindnels from his Birth. The Light 
 of the Siyi and Colours are above his Reafon, 
 for want of a Faculty to fupply fome fimple 
 Jdea or Perception of them; and becaufe his 
 Intelled or Reafon is void of all Power to 
 frame or raife up to it felf any fuch Idea or 
 Perception ever fo imperfed, confufed, or in? 
 determinate, If the Truth and real Exiftence 
 of Light and Colours were to be difcovered 
 to this Man, as yet in total Ignorance of 
 them, by human Information or divine Re- 
 velation; it would not be done by opening his 
 Eyes juft wide enough for an obfcure glance at 
 Light and Colours, for this would be contrary 
 to the Supposition : But by Subftitution of thofe 
 ilmple Ideas he received from lbme of his four 
 remaining Senfcs ; or by fome of thofe Concep- 
 tions already formed in his Mind, and natural 
 to him before the Revelation wa,s made. Sup? 
 ppfe then that Scarlet Colour were revealed to 
 flirh by the Idea or Conception of a Detighh 
 pi fmooth Surface y and Light under the Cqn- 
 
ANALOGY. 117 
 
 eeption of a Very Extenfive Reach or Feelings 
 which would enable him to Diftmguifh many 
 ObjecTfcs at once and at a vaft Dtftanee with ex- 
 quifite Pleafure. Grant thefe at prefent to be 
 the apteft Symbols and moft correfpondent 
 Conceptions of thofe things imperceptible and 
 incomprehenfible to him as they are in them- 
 felves, which all Nature could lupply for thaE 
 Purpofe. What then hath he to do here? 
 Surely not to work himfelf up to a Perfuafion 
 that he can lee without Eyes; lb far at leaft 
 as to have fbme Partial, Confufed, Inadequate, 
 Obfcure, IndtftintJ, Glimmering Views of Go- 
 lour or of Light ; nor vainly to think that he 
 can lupply his total want of Sight, by an auk- 
 ward unnatural Effort of Reafon or Stretch of 
 the Imagination : So as to taifc up or frame to 
 himfelf Ideas of Things whereof he can have 
 no aclual Perception or Confcioufnefs ; or to 
 find out fome AbftraBed and Purely fyfikUal 
 Ideas infufed into his Mind from above; oc 
 according to this Author's grand Notion, to 
 Take Ideas of Scarlet and of a Sun Beam, From 
 the Other Ideas of a finooth Surface and Feeling 
 at a great diftance; Ideas which (hall not be 
 the Same, but intirely ViftinEi and different 
 from thofe From whence they are Taken, and 
 which only bear fbme Refemblance and Ana- 
 logy with them. No, he hath nothing elfe to 
 do, but to fubmit to his Informers in a full 
 Conviction of his total want of Sight ; to ac- 
 quiefce in his Blindnefs ; and to reft contented 
 ^yithouj: any the leaft minute Glimpfe of Light, 
 
 9$* 
 
218 DIVINE 
 
 or mod feintand imperfecl: Difcernment or Di- 
 ftinclion of Colours : And in the midfl: of thick 
 Darknefs, to adhere intirely to the rnoft apt 
 and proper Symbols and Types offered him 
 of things utterly imperceptible to him ; which 
 are to be found among the natural Ideas, or 
 Cmc$pwns> or Comjfie^ Notions of his fcanty 
 Mind. - He is to leaye one and the feme Con- 
 ception to #ind both for a Delightful^ fmooth 
 Syrf act, which he can eafily touchy and ibr 
 Scarlef which he cannot fee: The fame Idea 
 or Conception for his Feeling with exquifit§ 
 iPIesfurf at a great Viftonce all around him; and 
 for Light whereof He can have no Perception, 
 Idea, or Cpn&ioufnefs. 
 
 There is no other way whereby thofe 
 things, imperceptible and utterly inconceiv- 
 able to him as they are in themfelves, can be- 
 come the Objects of his Underftanding ; if he 
 will think of them at all it muft be after, this 
 Manner : And if he will fpeak of riiem at all, 
 lb as to affirm or deny any thing concerning 
 them, he is under a Neceffity of putting to- 
 gether the Direct and well known Objeds or 
 Conceptions which are Subftituted, and the In- 
 comprehenjlbh and Imperceptible Objects thus fi- 
 gured out and ultimately refered to, into 
 one plain, fimple Propofition ; which in re- 
 fpecVof; him is an Information or Dotfrine 
 concerning Myfiery. Of this Myftery there 
 are two Parts, which to avoid endlefs Con- 
 fufiori in all his Pifcourfes and Reafonings, 
 
 ought 
 
A N A L O G Y. 319 
 
 oiight eyer to be Wtffl diftinguifljed from cacti 
 ofaet. One, utterly imperceptible and incom- 
 prefeenfible to hip? ; upon which therefore his 
 Reafon cannot operate at all : The other, a. 
 Symbol or Type of the firft ; apprehended by 
 the direct Ideas and Conceptions of a blin# Man, 
 and exprefTed in Words of his own Language; 
 mi therefore as perfectly plain, and diftinft, 
 and intelligible to hinj as my. thing ejfe within 
 the Compais of natural JBlindncfs. As to this 
 then he may give his Reafon full Scope, and 
 be as curious and inquifitive as poffibly h# can ; 
 whether any Injbrmation concerning things im- 
 perceptible and inconceivable could be given 
 him by God or Man, any otherwife than by 
 3. little opening his Eyes ? And whether j&e Re- 
 velation of the Exigence and Reality of Light 
 and Colours coulgl foe made to him with any 
 jjfeful Purpole and Defign, by the Mediation 
 of fome of the, Ideas of his four remaining 
 Senfes ; o* of thofe complex Notions and Conl- 
 ceptions which arife in his Mind from the 
 Operations of his Reafon upon them? ®u£ 
 how ridiculous would this Man appear in his 
 own Eyes, whenever they came to be fuHy 
 .opened ; if inftead of this Manner of Proce- 
 dure, thro* a vain ASe&atioa of being wifer 
 and a greater Matter of Reaibn than athfer 
 blind Mortals ; he fhouLd intirely lay afide 
 and explode the main and iingle Point of Com- 
 panion defigned between Light and Scarlet, 
 and thofe other Ideas under which they were 
 revealed and defcribed ; And ihould exert all 
 
 the 
 
220 DIVINE 
 
 the Talents of his Mind, in arguing away the 
 Truth and Reality and Exiflence of them ; by 
 underftanding the Terms either in a ftri£Uy 
 Literal only, or a Purely Figurative and Me- 
 taphorical Sence, as they beft ferve the Pur- 
 pofe of his Fancy and Humour : Or by a fri- 
 volous and groundlefs Comparifon between 
 The Originals and Images in any Other In- 
 ftances, which were never defigned or intend- 
 ed in the Revelation. 
 
 N o w do but transfer this natural Blindnefi 
 from the Body to the Mind, whereby we 
 difcern as little of the fpiritual (Part of My- 
 flery as we do with our Eyes, and you will 
 find the Cafe parallel, only with thefe material 
 Differences. That whereas a Perlbn blind 
 from the Womb could never have had the 
 Terms Light and Scarlet, other wile than from 
 ibme others who had feen them ; becaufe hav- 
 ing no Ideas of the things themfelves, he could 
 not himfelf affix any proper Names or Deno- 
 minations to them: We can have no Words 
 ftridtty proper and literal for things divine and 
 fupernatural, either from our felves or others ; 
 for St. Paul who had a vifionary ProfpecT: of 
 thofe things, and heard the Language of ano- 
 ther World, tells us that the Words are Un- 
 fpeakable, nor is it Pqfftble for a Man to Utter 
 them. And that whereas there is little or no 
 Correfpondent Similitude or Real Analogy be- 
 tween Scarlet and a fmooth, Surface, or between 
 gtight and m extenfiye plcafont Feeling : Yet 
 
 there 
 
ANATOGY. 221 
 
 there is a correfpondent Refemblancc or true 
 Analogy in the very Nature of the things, be- 
 tween the divine fupernatural Originals, and 
 thofe natural and human Objects and Concep- 
 tions by which they arc reprefented to the Mind^ 
 of Man; which we found upon the Goodneis 
 and Veracity of God, as well as upon our be- 
 ing- originaly formed in his Likenefs and after 
 his Image. What we have to do therefore is, 
 at prefent to acquiefce in this natural Blindnefs 
 of our Intelled, and lay afide all groundlefs 
 and even prefumptuous Opinions of Direfl and 
 Immediate Views of heavenly things, in any 
 degree ever fo obfeure minute and imperfect ; 
 as well as all imaginary Analogous Ideas or 
 Conceptions of them DiftinB from thofe Other 
 Ideas from whence they are fuppofed to be 
 Taken. The Ideas or Conceptions we have 
 from things natural and human, can never be- 
 get Other Analogous Ideas, Difiintt from Them- 
 felves, of things divine and fupernatural : But 
 they can themfelves Supply the Want of all 
 other Ideas and Conceptions whatfbever of 
 thofe things; only by a new Ufe and Appli- 
 cation of them, as analogical Reprefentatives 
 of Objects correfpondent and otherwife incon- 
 ceivable. 
 
 Thus are we alfo under a Neceflity of 
 putting thefe two Parts together in every 
 Chriftian Myftery, One, the well known Ana- 
 logous Objeft of This Life, under the plain and 
 obvious and direct Conception of which God 
 
 reyeala 
 
2*2 tr I V I N E 
 
 reveals tttf thing of another ; arid confeqpiieijrJy* 
 tipon which ReaJbn is to exert all its Operations 
 ifi thefi utmoft Latitude : The other, a divine 
 and Sufietnatufhl Objed ; Gotnftdnderti indeed 
 to the fiVft, but intirely Imperceptible and incon- 
 ceivable to us as h is In its jelf$ arid therefore 
 in this refpe& altogether above our Reafbn* 
 
 Now, no Man can pretend* to fee mylncm* 
 Jiftenty in this Part of a Myfteryy or in the 
 Redl Nature's of the divine and heavenly things 
 themfelves: Becaufe it niuft be allowed on all 
 Hands, that there are fo- intirely irnperceptrbte 
 and inconceivable, as to berio Qbje£b? of Rea-» 
 fen, but altogether above it ; as affording nc* 
 Materials, either from therrrfelvesj or from any 
 thing the fame in Kind, for the Exercife of any" 
 of its Operations. Nor can any Man affert the' 
 Doctrines or Propofitions in which thofe incom- 
 preherififele things are revealed by Analogy, fo be 
 either above Reafon ; or any way more obfcure f 
 confuted, and indeterminate, than any other Doc- 
 trines or Propofitions relating to things merely 
 natural and human : Becaufe they are compofed 
 of Ideas or Conceptions and Terms equaly clear 
 and diftind and intelligible with any Proposi- 
 tions relating only to common Life. Nor laftlyy 
 can it be laid that there is any Inconfiftency 
 of Contradiction between thefe two DijlihEl 
 Parts when put together at once into the Sdtm 
 Doctrine or Proposition ; becaufe we are fuppor- 
 ted in doing this by the Example of God him* 
 felf, as well as by Arguments from his Veracij 
 
 ty 
 
ANA L O G Y. 223 
 
 ty and Goodnefs ; nay this is unavoidable, fince 
 we have no other way of thinking or fpeaking 
 concerning, things divine and fupernatural. So 
 that tho'' theie two Parts are very different and 
 diftant in their real Nature and Properties, yet 
 they delightfully combine to the Conftitution- 
 of a Chriftian Myftery ; and do never clalh one 
 againft another, but when they are fet at Va- 
 riance by Men who have an ill will to both: 
 And that by unwarrantable and odious Compari i 
 fons between them in fueh Inftances as fhppofe 
 their Real intrinfic Natures to be the feme in 
 Rind, and are quite befide the only main Point 
 of Analogy defigned and intended by the Wif- 
 domofGod. Nor can they be Separated from 
 each other, and the Myftery diflolved ; other- 
 wife than by turning the well known Part of it 
 into mere Figure and Metaphor for the Other, 
 or only for fomething elfe well known and al- 
 luded to in l'his Life, and fo refolving the Myf- 
 tery into Nothing. And accordingly theft are 
 the two Ways the Enefnies of Revelation and 
 Myftery in general, and of the Orthodox Faith 
 in particular, go to work in all the Opposition 
 they give us : Tho' it is manifeft that at the 
 lame time and by the fame Methods they 
 are effecmaly cutting off all our Real and Ufe- 
 fttl Knowlege of another World, even of God 
 himfelf and his Attributes. 
 
 T 6 explain all this by ah Inftance. In this 
 Doctrine or Propofition, The Logos is the Only- 
 begotten Sm of God ; Th,e two Parts of this My- 
 4 ftery 
 
$24 DIVINE 
 
 tery are, firft the Divine Supernatural Derivati* 
 on or Generation of the Word from his divine 
 Father as it is in it felf Of this we have not 
 the leaft partial, obfcure^ imperfe&, indetermi- 
 nate or glimmering Perception or Idea* either 
 ojdiredlly from the thing it felf; or from any Other 
 Idea from which it is Taken and to which it is 
 Analogous: If we had, in either Cale the Terms 
 by which we expreffed thole Ideas mult have 
 been intirely New ; and quite different from the 
 Terms proper to the Other Ideas or Conceptions 
 natural and human by which they are Repre- 
 fented, or From whence they were Taken ; 
 which was not well confidered by this Author. 
 This Part of the Myftery cannot therefore be 
 ftyled Iridiftinff, Confufed, Indeterminate or My~ 
 fierious •» but altogether Imperceptible, Unknown^ 
 and utterly Incomprehenfible $ as well as Inef- 
 fable, there being no Word in human Lan- 
 guage to exprefs it with any literal Proprie- 
 ty. Secondly, The other Part of this My- 
 ftery is that Analogous Reprefentation of this 
 Divine Derivation under that of an Only- 
 begotten Son ; whereof the Conception is mere- 
 ly natural, and expreffed in Terms of common 
 Speech ; and accordingly nothing in human Life 
 can be more obvious and plain and more diftindt* 
 ly intelligible. Thefe two Parts conftitute this 
 Myftery, and are neceffarily apprehended by 
 the fame Ideas or Conceptions ; expreffed in the 
 fame Termsi ; and put together at the fame time 
 into one and the fame Propofition. No Mart 
 can fay there is any Ineonfiftericy, Abfurdity, 
 
 or 
 
A N A L O G Y. $25 
 
 or Contradiction in the imperceptible Real Na* 
 ture of that Divine Derivation it felf ; for that 
 Very Reafbn, becaufe it is altogether impercep* 
 tible and incomprehenfiblc* Nor can it be laid 
 that the Doctrine or Proportion in which the Re- 
 velation of that Supernatural Derivation is 
 made, is Above Reafbn; or more indiftinft of 
 confuted or indeterminate, than any other Doc- 
 trines or Propofitions relating to things merely 
 natural and human : And confequently that there 
 is not full Scope for Reafon to exert all its O* 
 perations upon it; to examine whether the Pro? 
 polition is good Sence and Grammar ; and not 
 to many Words joyned together abfurdly and 
 improperly fo as to have no intelligible Significa- 
 tion ? Whether it contains any Abfurdity or 
 Contradiction in it, that there mould be fuch a 
 divine Generation poffible as we cannot perceive 
 at all, or have any the leaft Idea or Conception 
 of; and therefore can never difcern it to be im- 
 poffible. 
 
 LastIy, Nor can any Man argue natural Ge* 
 iteration to be an unapt or improper Reprefen- 
 tation of that divine Derivation, unlefs he had 
 ibme direct Idea or Conception of the real true 
 Nature and Manner of this laft. God himfelf 
 is the only Judge of that ; and we are good 
 Judges of the Main Point of Analogy defigned 
 and intended in the Revelation. Namely^ Thdt 
 we fhould believe and conceive Chri/l to be as 
 realy and truly the S01* of God in a correfpon* 
 dent and divine Sence of the Word, as One Man 
 
 Q. is 
 
226 DIVINE 
 
 is liter 'aly the Son of another ; and In a Sencf dS> 
 diftinff from divine Efficiency (according to the 
 common Acceptation of the Terms) as Hu- 
 man Generation is from any Work of human Ef" 
 fcitncy* Whilft Men adhere to this Analogy, 
 the two Parts of this Myftery, as diftant from 
 each other in their Nature as Heaven and 
 Earth* do however perfectly agree; and com- 
 bine together to make up one and the lame 
 Object or Point of clear and certain Knowlege, 
 and of a fure and well grounded Faith. The 
 Mutual Relation they have to each other, by a 
 Correfpondent Refemblance or Analogy in their 
 very natures, is the firm Cement which joyns 
 together thefe two things into one eternal 
 Truth; revealed indeed from Heaven, but at 
 the fame time as truly Thus the Object of 
 our Reafon by Analogy, as any thing merely 
 human. 
 
 StiT fome Men will perverfty Confound 
 thefe two different Parts of Myftery, fo as to 
 understand the whole Doctrine or Propofition 
 cither as refering intirely to human Generation 
 alone 5 or totaly in the other Extreme, as re* 
 fering purely to the divine iupernatural Deri- 
 vation of the Son from the Father: And then 
 they can never think or fpeak of it intelligibly; 
 but muft ever run into endlefs Ambiguity and 
 Confufion. Others on the Contrary labour to 
 JDifJol've the clofe infeparable Union between 
 thefe two effential Parts of this Myftery ; to 
 tear them afunder with Violence, and fet them 
 
 at 
 
ANALOGY. 227 
 
 at Variance in dired Oppqfition to each other : 
 By groundlefs Companions, between the Real 
 Manner in a Derivation of . an human Son 
 jfrom his Father ; and the Manner in the De- 
 rivation of the divine Son from God. This 
 is either done exprefly or by Suppofition, in 
 fuch Inftances of the Nature of human Ge- 
 neration as were never intended in Scripture^ 
 and which all muft allow to be unworthy of 
 God ; from whence they frame their Conclu- 
 fions againft the Reality and Truth of Any 
 actual divine Generation: And by this Arti- 
 fice they infinuate the Neceffity of turning the 
 Terms Son and Only-begotten in that Propo- 
 fition, into a mere Figure or Metaphor for di- 
 vine Efficiency or Making \ to which it is plain- 
 ly oppoied, and from which it ought of all 
 Other things in the World to be diftinguifhed 
 as well in Exa&nefs of Thinking as in Pro- 
 priety of Language. Whereas after all, the 
 only Conclufion to be drawn^ which can truly 
 ierve the Caufe and Purpofe of Arians as well 
 as profefTed Infidels would ht ; That even the 
 very Reprefentdtion or Analogous Refemblance 
 it fel£ under Which we conceive and hold d 
 real, and true, and a&ual Derivation of the 
 divine Son from the Father, is altogether Un- 
 worthy of God ; and therefore cannot be any 
 more than purely Figurative and Metaphorical 
 when applyed to him: But this would evi- 
 dently ftrike not only at the Truth and Reali- 
 ty of the Myftery ; but at the Goodnefs and 
 Wifdom of God himfelf, who hath revealed t6 
 
228 DIVINE 
 
 us the fupernatural Derivation of the Son ffptfi 
 himfelf by Repreientation and Analogy with 
 that of human Generation. 
 
 I shall here once more obierve to this 
 Author how We have no proper Idea of the 
 Extremes in this Proposition, The Lagos or 
 Word is the Only-begotten Son of God; No 
 Ideas I lay, either From the divine things 
 themfelves; or Of thole things themfelves^ 
 Taken from any Other Ideas whatfbever, as he 
 aflerrs : So that according to his Principles it 
 will follow, that we can have no Apprehen- 
 fion or Knowlege of that Propofition ; we can 
 give no Affent to it, nor can we have any 
 Perfuafionof the Truth of it; and confequent- 
 ly no Faith purfaant to that Knowlege or Per- 
 fuafion. But I hope it is now fully evident 
 that without any Ideas of the Extremes, or 
 even Conceptions of the divine Obje&s as they 
 are in themfelves, or indeed of any thing the 
 fame in Kind ; we may have a clear Notion 
 and a diftinct Knowlege of that Propofition } 
 a full Perfuafion of the Truth of it as com- 
 ing from God; and a ftedfaft firm Belief of 
 the correfpondent fupernatural Realities, re- 
 vealed in it by Reiemblance only and Ana- 
 logy with the Conceptions of things natural 
 and human; and not by any Other or Di~ 
 JlmcJ Ideas Taken from them (as he fays) and 
 then appropriated to things divine and fu- 
 pernatural. 
 
 To 
 
ANALOGY. 329 
 
 To render the true Notion of Chriftian 
 Myfteries plainer yet, by a more obvious In- 
 ftance if poffible. It is a Doctrine of Scrip- 
 ture that Chrifi ever liveth to make Intercept- 
 on for us. The Correfpondent Conception under 
 which this heavenly Interceffion is revealed ; 
 is that of an human Perfbn's interceding with 
 an earthly Monarch juftly offended,, fo as to 
 reconcile him to a Subject, guilty of a capital 
 Crime. This Part of the Myftery, or the 
 Analogous Reprefeniation, falls under the fe- 
 vereft Tryal and Difquifition of our Realbn : 
 In refpecl: of this, it is not only allowable, but 
 our Duty and commendable to give Reafbn 
 its full Scope. We ought to know the true 
 Meaning of the Words ; that the Doctrine or 
 Proportion is contained in Scripture : That it 
 implies no Contradiction in its felf, nor any 
 manifeft Inconfiftency with other Truths na- 
 tural or revealed. We fhould have clear and 
 convincing Proofs by Prophecies and Mira- 
 cles that this Do&rine came from God ; and 
 the higheft Moral Evidence that the Book 
 in which it is found was written by Perfons 
 divinely inlpired. We fhould underftand 
 alfb the important Relation this Doctrine of 
 Chrift's Interceffion bears to Us, and our near 
 Concernment in it; together with the power- 
 ful Influence the Truth of it ought to have 
 upon our Love, and Gratitude, and Obedience : 
 And we fhould confider whether it be PoJJible 
 for God, to communicate to us any Solid and 
 Ufeful Knowlege of things imperceptible and 
 
 Q^3 incon- 
 
2 3 o DIVINE 
 
 inconceivable as they are in themfelves, hj. 
 Analogy and Refembhnce with thofe things 
 whereof we have direct Ideas and Conceptions. 
 Thus far we are ready to joyn Iffue with all 
 the Adverfaries of Revelation' and Myftery, in 
 this and every other Doctrine of the fame Sorry 
 purely upon the Foot of Realbn. But as toi 
 t;he other Part of this Myftery, namely the 
 Real Nature zn^True Manner b£ thrift's In- 
 Urcejfion in Heaven •■> it is at- prefent above 
 Reafbn and wholy exempted from all our En- 
 quiries : And to demand any Account of it, 
 is to ask for an Explanation of what is now' 
 imperceptible and inconceivable to us. Here- 
 in then properly confifts my Chriftian Faith 
 with reined to this Proportion : That I give 
 my full Affent to it upon the Teftimony of 
 God, tho* I have no Idea or Conception at all 
 of this heavenly Interceflion as it is in its ielf $ 
 and tho' I know nothing more of this nowy 
 only that it is Incomprehenflble, but yet Real, 
 and' Analogous to the worldly Conception fub- 
 ftituted to reprelentit. From thefe Inftances 
 it plainly appears,' that if we ought not to 
 give our Affent to any thing, but where we 
 have Ideas or Conceptions of its" Real Nature 
 and Properties as it is in its felf, or at leaft Of 
 fomething the fame in Kind- [us fbme hardily and 
 pofitively affert) then we muft hot acknow- 
 lege a God, or believe any Thing relating to 
 another "World. 
 
 If the Reader will be at the Trouble of 
 
 viewing 
 
ANALOGY. 231 
 
 viewing every other Chriftian Myftery in the 
 Light I have placed thefe two, he will find 
 the Cafe exactly parallel in every refpecl: : And 
 will plainly difcern how the injudicious Ap- 
 plication of a certain Sett of Words and 
 J'hrafes indifferently to the whole Myftery in 
 grofs, and without any juft Diftin&ion of its 
 Parts So widely diftant from each other in 
 tbeir real Nature j occafions all that Intricacy 
 and Confufion too vifible in Men's Differtati- 
 (Ons upon this Subject. How it is this which 
 draws out the Controverfy concerning Myfte- 
 fies into luch tedious Lengths j hinders it 
 from being brought to any certain and deter- 
 minate Conclufion ; and opens a much larger 
 Field of Oppofition for the Enemies of the 
 truly Orthodox and Chriflian Faith. I mean 
 fuch as the calling them Myjlerious Doctrines -, 
 faying that we have Ideas of thole Myjlerious 
 Doffrines j not diftinguifhing between the Con-' 
 ception or Kwwlege of a Dottrine or Propor- 
 tion, and Ideas of the Things themfelves ul- 
 timately refered to in that Doctrine or Propo- 
 rtion j afferting our Ideas or Conceptions of 
 thole DoEtrines to be Partial, Indiftin£f y and 
 Indeterminate -, that our Ideas of luch Doctrines 
 or Propofitions are Taken from Other Ideas; 
 that where we can frame no Ideas, we can 
 give no jiffent; that where we have no Ideas 
 of the Extremes we can have no Perfuajion^ 
 affirming that to be Incomprehenjlble, whereof 
 bur Ideas or Conceptions are only Imperfe&% 
 fever conf©undihg the Term Ineompuknfiit 
 
 0*4 w *^ 
 
232 DIVINE 
 
 with Imperceptible, or with Inconceivable as a 
 Thing is in it felf-, the Simple rfpprehenjion of 
 the Intellect, with the Simple Perception of 
 Senfe: And never making any Difference 
 between the Natural and Analogical Reprefen* 
 tations, which are the well known Extremes in 
 every Propofition or Do&rine of Myfrery^ 
 and the Supernatural but correfpondent Ori- 
 ginals of whole real Nature and Properties we 
 have no Conception or Idea. But above all 
 the perpetual tile of the Term Idea in a loofe, 
 confuted, indeterminate Sence; and the Ap* 
 plication of it equaly and univerfaly to all 
 Manner of Things natural or fupernatural, 
 divine or human, (enfitive or rational : Ancf 
 that without any Diftindion of it from the 
 Conceptions, or Complex Notions, or Confciduf- 
 nefs of the Mind. An Error lb generaly pre-? 
 vailing and of fiich pernicious Confequence, 
 that I may be bold to affirm, the thick Cloud 
 of Duft which hath been thereby railed to 
 darken the Subject not only of Chriftian My- 
 iteries, but of all Things fupernatural and 
 fpiritual, and even of God and his Attributes; 
 will never be thro'ly difpelled, till that ridicu- 
 lous Affectation is quite worn out of the learn- 
 ed World : And till the Term Idea is duly 
 and conftantly reftrain'd to thole Images in 
 the Mind obtain'd thro' the Perception of 
 Senfe, according to its original Ufe and Pro- 
 priety. I have inftanced in the foregoing Par- 
 ticulars becaule they are fuch as occur in this 
 Author, and not as it is an Error peculiar to 
 
 him; 
 
ANALOGY. 233 
 
 him: For there are many fuch like Terms 
 and Expreflions, applyed after the fame indi- 
 ftin& ambiguous Manner to both the Parts of 
 Myftdry in grofi, in moft Other modern Au- 
 thors, too numerous to be recited here j efpe- 
 cialy fince from what hath been already re- 
 marked they will eafityfall under the Reader's 
 own Obfervation. 
 
 On the other Hand the Reader may ob- 
 ftrve, how all the Oppofition given to the reft 
 of our Chriftjan Myfteries from clandeftine 
 At tans as well as other Ghriltian Infidels is ; 
 by their Dividing the two Parts in each of 
 them, and placing them in a direct. Oppofition 
 and open Enmity, in Order to the Deftruction 
 of the whole. Their Procedure is thus ; fchey 
 either leave it always to be prefumed, or ex- 
 prefly argue the Terms of the Propofitions in 
 which the Doctrines of Myftery are delivered, 
 as well as the Conceptions annexed to them, 
 to be altogether unworthy, the divine Nature 
 in their original Application and literal Sence ; 
 In which we freely and fully concur with 
 them; but do abhor and explode their perpe- 
 tual Confequence from thence ; That there-! 
 fore they are to be turned into Pure Figure 
 and Metaphor only ; fo that thole Terms and 
 Conceptions fhall not exprefs and reprefent as 
 True and ' Correjpondent Realities on the Part 
 of the Divinity, as they do on the Part of 
 {his World and of our Humanity. No Con- 
 feqq^cejs'-qin, be, djawn, from all their Pre- 
 
 mifes 
 
234- P I.V.I N E 
 
 mifes to their Main Purpofe, and which will 
 lightly conclude againft Chriftian Myftery 
 but this onej which they have never yet 
 attempted, nor will ever be able to perform. 
 That in thefe and all our other Doctrines of 
 Myfteries relating, for Inftance to the Divine 
 Unity , the Diflintfion of the divine Perfons, the 
 Proceffion of the Holy Ghofi \ or to the Propi- 
 tiation, Atonement y Mediation, Inter ceffiort of 
 the Son* or the SanBification of our Nature 
 in taking away the Guilt of Sin by his Blood ; 
 That in thefe I fay and fuch like ]?o£trines 
 concerning Myftery, the Obvious Inftances of 
 Companion or chief Points of Analogy plainly 
 defign'd, and accordingly contended for in each 
 of them j are altogether io unworthy the di- 
 vine Perfons, that they can never reprefent 
 any Correfpondent Realities pn the Part of the 
 Divine. Nature. In the literal Acceptation 
 only, wherein they underftand the Terms of 
 every Doctrine or Propofrtion concerning My- 
 ftery, we willingly clofe With them in that 
 Confequence; that they are unworthy of God; 
 Xetthem in Return clofe with us in allowing 
 a Similar and Correfpondent Reality, fignifyed 
 by thpfe Conceptions and Terms when trans*! 
 fered to things divine and fpiritual ; and we 
 are all agreed to leave the Myftery whole and 
 intire, with the two very different but effen-; 
 tial Parts of it infeparable and in perfect Ilar/- 
 mony. But if they perfift in renouncing all 
 Analogy, adhering ktirely and only to the 
 ftriftly proper and 1 literal Acceptation of the 
 
ANALOGY. 235 
 
 Terms, in every Doftrine and Propofition re- 
 lating to things fpiritual and divine ; in order 
 to wreft them at laft into mere Figure 
 and Metaphor ; Nothing can be more evident, 
 than that they do thereby render thefe Terms 
 utterly infignificant to any Religious Purpofe, 
 and void of all real and Ufeful Meaning ; and 
 refblve the whole Tenor and Subftance of the 
 Gdfpel into an unintelligible Cant and empty 
 Sound of Words. 
 
 Upon this Author's Principle of partial, 
 indiftind, indeterminate Ideas of Myfterious 
 T>oBrines\ as he ftyles them, Analogous to 
 Qther Ideas from which they are taken ; He 
 anfwers this grand Objection of our Adveria- 
 ries, How can a Thing be revealed, and yet 
 Myfterious ? The Truth, fays he, of the Pro- 
 pofition is revealed ; tho' the Manner how it 
 is true, may notwithstanding remain a Secret. 
 But furely even the Truth or Exijkme or Rea- 
 lity of the divine and heavenly Thing* which 
 are ultimately and neceffarily refered to in- 
 fuch Propositions ; as well as the true and 
 Real Manner of them, are equaly inconceiv- 
 able and altogether impoffible to be now re- 
 vealed to us As they are in their own Nature > 
 And fince in refpeft of us they are thus Both 
 alike inconceivable As they are- in Themfelves* 
 they muft be both alike revealed in the Same 
 Degree and in the Same Way by Reprefenta- 
 tion only and Analogy. So that the Objecti- 
 on can never be furmounted upon his Princi- 
 
 P lc °, 
 
236 DIVINE 
 
 pie. For the Proportion in which the Doc- 
 trine or Myftery is revealed, whether it re- 
 lates to the Truth and Exiftence only ; or to 
 the Real Manner of things divine and heaven- 
 ly, muft according to him be made up of Ideas 
 or Conceptions and Terms confufed, partial, 
 imperfect, and indeterminate. Confeouently 
 the Dotfrine it Jelf muft be fo likewife - r and 
 Whatever Thing is Thus difcovered or revealed 
 to us, muft at the fame time be indiftincr. 
 confufed and indeterminate, that is Myfterious 
 in his Sence of the Word. Surely if the 
 Ideas and Conceptions we have, not only of 
 the fupernatural Things themfelvesj but even 
 of the Do&rines or Propofitions in which they 
 are revealed and delivered, be luch as he de- 
 icribes them j we can now have no other than 
 partial indiftin& and indeterminate Revelations 
 of thofe Matters in the Golpel ; that is they 
 will Both ftill jcontinue Myfierious y as the Ob- 
 jection urges. And indeed what mould make 
 either of them otherwife than partial and in- 
 diftinft, and Myfterious in his Sence j unleft 
 the very Same Ideas and Conceptions and 
 Terms which make up thole Propofitions, are 
 firft moft Diftinfily apprehended and Clearly 
 and De(erminately underftood in their literal 
 Sence ; and then fubftituted by Analogy to ex- 
 prefs and reprefent Things for which we have 
 no Idea or Conception, or ftridrly proper 
 Word or Expreffion as they are in their own 
 Nature, 
 
 As 
 
K TT R f, © G T. 237 
 
 As the Objection is here ftated, no other 
 Return ought to be made to it but this ; That 
 the lame thing cannot be clearly and adualy 
 Revealed, as all our Chriftian Voffirines con- 
 cerning Myfteries are ; and yet remain Myfte- 
 rious at the fame time: It is flat Contradic- 
 tion by plain Implication, and ends in this ; 
 That the fame thing is Clearly and Fully and 
 Vi/lintJly revealed, and yet at the fame time 
 it is but Partialy Conjufedly and IndiJlinBly 
 revealed. Do but word the Queftion right by 
 dropping that ambiguous and fallacious word 
 Myjlerious (which in the Sence of the Ob- 
 jection, as well as 'of this Author, means Par- 
 tialy Cmfufed, Indiftinff and Indeterminate} 
 together with Partial and Indiftinft Ideas of 
 Doctrines taken from other Ideas, and that cap- 
 tious Queftion receives a clear and Satisfactory 
 Anfwer. How can a thing be revealed, and yet 
 remajn a Mjftery ? Very confidently ; if we 
 confider what hath been obferved before, That 
 a Chriftian Myftery confifts of two very dif- 
 ferent Parts at once. Firft, the Real Nature 
 and True Manner of the "Divine and Superna- 
 tural Objects ; whereof we can have No Ideas 
 or Conceptions at all either in whole or in Part, 
 diftind or confufed, clear or obfcure, determi- 
 nate or indeterminate ; and for which we can 
 have no ftri&ly proper Terms or Expreflions;: 
 And accordingly we can form no Judgments, 
 Conclufions, or any Propositions whatsoever 
 concerning thofc Objects As they are in them- 
 
 felves; 
 
DIVINE 
 
 Jelves ; and therefore thefe are not to be called 
 IndtftinB> Confufed, or Myfterious, but things 
 Utterly XJnknmum and Imperceptible to us. Se- 
 condly, The real Nature and true Manner of 
 fbmething in This World whereof we have 
 Clear, Diftinff and Determinate Conceptions^ 
 expreffed in Terms of common and familiar 
 Speech j Subftituted for, and Reprefenting the 
 other Analogicaly. In refpeift of the former^ 
 it is truly and properly called a Myftery ; be- 
 caufe the divine Truth which is contained in 
 the Propofition could not have entered At all 
 into the Head or Heart of Man, otherwife 
 than by immediate Revelation from Heaven : 
 And becaufe even after this, the divine and 
 heavenly Objects to which it ultimately relates, 
 are ftill as imperceptible and inconceivable as 
 they were before, in relpeft of the Real Na- 
 ture and True Manner of them ; and will con- 
 tinue ib till we come to fee directly, or Face 
 to Face in another Life. In refpeel: of the 
 latter, the important Truth is clearly and di*- 
 ftin&ly revealed by lively Reprefentation and 
 Correfpondent Similitude in the Mirrour of Na- 
 ture ; and eafily conceived and understood by 
 a well grounded Analogy and unerring Parity 
 of Reafom 
 
 I f it is here asked, How can thefe two things' 
 as diftant from each other in their Nature as 
 Heaven and Earth, God and Man, be lb put to- 
 gether as to make up one and the fame Myft£- 
 *y ? I anfwer as Body and Spirit are combined 
 
 and 
 
ANAl O'G'Y. 239 
 
 tHd blended together, fo as to conftitute one 
 aneLthe fame Man. The Terms of each Propo- 
 fition in which a Doctrine of Myftery is revealed, 
 have originaly a ftri&ly proper arid literal and 
 wordly Signification ; and the fkft Ideas or Con- 
 ceptions affixed to thole Terms are of Objects, 
 purely natural and human; and both are clear 
 and diftinS and determinate. When thole li- 
 teral Terms with the worldly Conceptions an- 
 nexed, are iubftituted to expreft and repreient 
 Things divine and fupernatural, then is the grofs 
 and earthly Propofition SanBif)ed; not into a 
 Signification Purely divine and fupernatural, or 
 intixely Abftraffed from all Ideas and Concepts 
 ons of Things Natural and Human, for then ic 
 could have no intelligible Meaning; and the 
 PFhokMyfteiy, as our Adverfaries obje£r, would 
 be altogether unintelligible and inconceivable 
 to us: But into a Compound, Secondary \ Re<* 
 frefentative> and Analogical Signification: So 
 that Together with the eafy and obvious and 
 Worldly Propriety ', it Connotes a Correfpondent Re- 
 ality in the very Nature of Divine and Superna- 
 tural Objedts ; and thus the Letter of the Propo- 
 rtion is fandtifyed and exalted into a Religious 
 and Gofpel Meaning. Now if you divide thefe 
 two diftincl Significations, thus joyned and u- 
 nited together into one Doctrine or Propofition 
 by the Wifdom of the Holy Ghoft ; lb as to con- 
 fider them quite afunder, and to underftand the 
 Propofition either in a Sence intirely abftra&ed 
 from all things worldly and human ; or in a Sence 
 itri&ly proper and literal Qnly> in order after- 
 4 wards 
 
2 4 o DIVINE 
 
 wards infidioufly to convert the Teriiis of it in* 
 to hollow empty Figure when applyed to Hea- 
 ven and the Divinity : Then it ceafes to be Myf- 
 tery; which is thereby as fiirely deftroyed, as a 
 Man dies upon the Separation of Soul and Bo- 
 dy : the Religious and Heavenly Sence intirely 
 difappears, Returning to God who gave it in his 
 Revelation ; and the merely human and worldly 
 Sence or ftrid Propriety of the Propofition finks 
 into a dead Letter, and returns to the Earth 
 from whence it was taken. 
 
 I h a ve been thus particular in my Remarks 
 upon this Sermon, which proceeds upon that Er- 
 ror of our conceiving things divine and fuperna- 
 tural By Ideas taken from other Ideas to which 
 they are Analogous, becaufe it is grofs and fun- 
 damental. For which I hope there is no want 
 of an Apology, either to the Reader j if there- 
 by ibme things have occurred to him for clear- 
 ing up the true Notion of a Chriftian Myftery, 
 which hath been of late fo involved in Cloud 
 and Darknels : Or to the worthy Author, who 
 I prefume will not be difpleafed at his being 
 occafionaly reminded (t^io* by a Fellow-Sol- 
 dier of inferior Abilities for the Combate with 
 Unbelievers) that he hath unhappily engaged 
 the Enemy upon wrong Ground ; where there 
 is no Safety for him but in a timely Retreat. 
 The only Means now left to prevent fullying 
 the Brightnefs of his own Chara&er ; as well as 
 all that apparent Injury which muft other- 
 wife accrue to the Common Chriftian Caufe, 
 4 from 
 
ANALOGY. 241 
 
 from any Defeat given by our Enemies to one, 
 who hath in his other Writings diftinguifhed 
 himfelf with fo much Conduct and Honour in 
 its Defence. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 A pjitive Proof of Divine Analogy. 
 
 THO' from what hath been already faid, 
 all reaibnable and unprejudiced Perlbns 
 muft be fufficiently convinced, that the only 
 true Manner we have of apprehending and 
 conceiving things Divine and Spiritual is by 
 Analogy. Yet becaufe I have to deal more 
 particularly with a Sett of Men, whofe Credit 
 and Reputation in the World for good Sence 
 and Learning; whole whole Hypothefis and 
 Scheme of Religion; and whole Faith and 
 Worfhip depend upon the quite contrary Opi- 
 nion ; and who difregard every thing which 
 doth not appear in the Drefi of Arid Evidence 
 and Demonftration : I lhall therefore now 
 proceed to a more direct and pofitive Proof 
 of this Doctrine of divine Analogy: Firft with 
 relation to purely lpiritual Beings and the di- 
 vine Attributes in general ; and Secondly, in 
 relation to the moral Attributes of God in 
 particular. 
 
 1. As to the Firft then, I lhall begin with 
 an Argument drawn from the only two ways 
 
 R we 
 
242 DIVINE 
 
 we have of obtaining a Virefl Perception or 
 Apprehenfion of any thing ; that is either by 
 Ideas or by Confcioufiieis. From thence I ar- 
 gue thus. 
 
 I f we have neither fuch Diretf Ideas, nor 
 Immediate Confiioufnefs of things Divine and 
 Supernatural, as we have of things Natural 
 and Human ; then we muft necefTarily conceive 
 them by Analogy. 
 
 B u t we have neither fiich Diretf Ideas, nor 
 Immediate Confiioufnefs of things Divine and 
 Supernatural, as we have of things Natural 
 and Human. Therefore. 
 
 The Confequence of the Major can never 
 be deny'ed, till it is proved that the Mind of 
 Man hath fome third way of Direffly appre- 
 hending and conceiving Things befides thofe 
 mentioned. 
 
 The Minor will hold for ever ; and needs 
 no other Proof than an appeal to every Man's 
 Senfes and Confcioufnefs. That we have no 
 Senfitive Ideas of Purely spiritual Obje&s, is 
 paft Controverfy. And if we had "Purely fpi- 
 ritual Ideas, or an Immediate Confiioufnefs of 
 them in our Minds, there could be no Doubt, 
 no Dilpute or Controverfy about it ; any more 
 than, whether we have the Idea of a Tree, 
 when we fee it ? Or whether we have a Con- 
 fcioufnefs of Thinking, in the Very Actor Opc- 
 3 ration 
 
ANALOGY. 243 
 
 ration thereof? If we had any direct Idea or 
 Conception of God, we fhould never have 
 conceived him by the ienfitive Idea of Light: 
 And if we had an immediate Confciouiheis of 
 any one real Property or Attribute As it is 
 in his Nature, we fhould think it a thing as ri- 
 diculous to go about to Prove his Exiftence, 
 as to prove our own. But that this may ap- 
 pear felf-evident, as it realy is, to our modern 
 Reafoners, let them take it in their own Juxtd- 
 
 Pojition Form. Things Divine Direct Idea 
 
 or Confiioufnefs- —Should have no Doubt — Per- 
 ceived by Analogy. And now I hope they lee 
 clearly, that if they had any direct Idea or im-> 
 mediate Confcioujhefs of things Divine and Su- 
 pernatural ; they would have as little Doubt 
 whether they had fuch a Perception of it, as 
 whether they have an Idea of an Houfe before 
 their Eyes ; or whether they have a Confciouf- 
 nels of Thinking, when they confider this their 
 new fangled Form of Argumentation. We 
 can have no Notion of pure Spirit but what 
 is a fubftituted Compofition, framed out of 
 thele two Ways of Direff Perception or Ap- , 
 prehenfion, together with the Operations of 
 Realbn upon them. If we had any Direct 
 Idea or Conception of God within us, we fhould 
 never have been beholden to our Eyes for a 
 Metaphor, and have conceived him by the 
 Senfitive Idea of Light; which hath no more 
 in it of the True Nature of Him or his Glory 
 than thick Darknels. And we can no more 
 have a Confiioufnefs, than an Idea of Pure Spi- 
 
 R 2 rit: 
 
244 DIVINE 
 
 rit ; becaufe there is rio fuch thing, properly 
 fpeaking, Within the Body as in a Cafe ; but 
 in the Man, as an EJfential Part only of his 
 Frame : Infomuch that Confcioufnefs it felf is a 
 mixed Act or Operation of Body as well as 
 Spirit; and fince we cannot exert any Act 
 abstractedly and independent of Matter, this 
 Confcioufnefs can never qualify us for any di- 
 rect Perception or Conception of a pure Spi- 
 rit, intirely feparate from any neceffary and e£- 
 iential Union with Body. If this were practi- 
 cable, we fhould be as immediately and clear- 
 ly confcious to our felves of fuch direct and 
 purely fpiritual Perceptions of immaterial Be- 
 ings, or at leaft of their real Properties, as we 
 now are of the Operations and Properties of 
 our own Minds ; nay or even of the Ideas of 
 fenfitive Objects ; and fhould as little difpute 
 the Ability or Capacity of the Mind for one, 
 as for the other. Since therefore neither any 
 direct Ideas or Conceptions, nor inward Con- 
 fcioufnefs of pure Spirit or its real Properties 
 can be obtained; the abfblute neceffity of di- 
 vine Analogy follows by a plain Confequence j 
 there being no conceivable Medium between 
 perceiving or apprehending the true Nature 
 and real Qualities of fuch Beings Direffly and 
 Immediately, and conceiving them by Subftitu* 
 tion and Analogy : Excepting that of a pure 
 Figure of Speech only or bare Allufion : which 
 can never amount to fuch a juft and ufeful 
 Knowlege, as is neceflaryi to all the Ends of 
 Religion natural and revealed. Nay tho' we 
 3 fhould 
 
ANALOGY. 245 
 
 mould allow fuch a direct Perception by Ideas 
 or Confcioufhefs poffible to us in our prefent 
 State, with refpedt to other Created Spirits 
 and their Properties ; yet it would not follow 
 that even with this Capacity, we could ever 
 attain any fuch direct Perceptions or Apprehen- 
 fions of an Infinite and Uncreated Spirit. 
 
 a. M y fecond Argument is taken from the 
 EJfential Difference between an Intelligent Be- 
 ing which is altogether Pure Spirit ; and that 
 which is a Compofition of Matter and Spirit, 
 thus. 
 
 If the EfTence and Faculties and Opera- 
 tions of a Pure Spirit, cannot be of the fame 
 Kind with thofe of Spirit and Body in effen- 
 tial Union ; then we can apprehend and con- 
 ceive them no otherwife than by Analogy with 
 our own. 
 
 "But the EfTence and Faculties and Opera- 
 tions of a pure Spirit, cannot be of the fame 
 Kind with thofe of Spirit and Body in effen* 
 tial Union. Therefore. 
 
 The Confequence of the Major is very 
 fafe, till it is fhewn that we have fome other 
 way of conceiving or apprehending Things 
 purely Spiritual and of a different Kind from 
 ourfelves, than by a Confcioufnefs of what 
 paffes within us. Now the Conception and 
 Apprehenfion of them no otherwife than by 
 -R 3 cor- 
 
246 DIVINE 
 
 correfpondent Semblance and Reprelentation 
 of what paffes in our felveS is properly Ana- 
 logy. 
 
 The Minor is as plain as a firft Principle. 
 Tor certainly a Purely fmple Being or Sub- 
 fiance cannot be of the fame Kind, either as to 
 Effence or Attributes, with a Being compound- 
 ed of Two forts of Sub/lances. Nay we have 
 no other way of conceiving Intelligences which 
 are all pure Spirit, but fijeft, by a Negation of 
 their having the fame Kind of Subftance and 
 Attributes with human Spirit and Body blend- 
 ed together into one Intelligent Being : And 
 then Subjlituting the known Properties and 
 Faculties of the latter, to Reprefent that dif- 
 ferent Kind of correipondent Perfections in the 
 former. Infomuch that even Thinking mull 
 sst ::-;:>>?v " i* reft be taken into that Negation ; 
 zr.:.~ . Ground of all our Knowlege are 
 firft Ideas of Senfation ; then a Confcioujhefs of 
 the Operations of our own Mind ; and laftly 
 the Working or Obfervations of Reafon upon 
 thefe j which is it felf no Operation of pure 
 Spirit, but of Body and Spirit united into one 
 individual Agent. The Actions and Operati- 
 ons of which are not thofe of Matter and Spi- 
 rit conildered either feparately, or in Diftinc- 
 tion from each other ; nor are they Operations 
 which are Muhialy or Alternately performed ; 
 nor is one the Inftrument only of the other : 
 But they are all indifcriminately the Ope- 
 rations of both together, proceeding from na- 
 tural 
 
A N A L O G Y. 247 
 
 tural Powers and Faculties compounded of 
 Both ; fo that all our Faculties and Operati- 
 ons are as truely of a different Kind from 
 thofe of pure and fimple Spirit, as the Fa- 
 culties and Operations of Brutes are from thofe 
 t>f Mankind. So far are pure Spirit and our 
 compounded Nature from differing in Degrees 
 only of Perfection ; that no two things can 
 be put together in the Mind with greater In- 
 confiftency and Contradiction, than that a Be-j 
 ing compounded with Matter, fhould be .of 
 the fame Kind either as to its Nature or At- 
 tributes, with an Effence Intirely Simple, and 
 Attributes Purely Immaterial. 
 
 Now when any thing --differs thus total y 
 in Kind from all things whereof we have any 
 direct Idea or immediate Confcioufhefs ; we 
 muft either remain utterly Ignorant of its Na- 
 ture and Properties, without being able either 
 to think or fpeak of it at all : Or We muft 
 form Conceptions of it by fubftituted Repre- 
 fentations, and Analogy with thofe Beings and 
 Properties whereof we have feme direct and im- 
 mediate Perception or Confcioufhefs. And tho' 
 it fhould be allowed that, notwithftanding this 
 Incapacity, we may in general infer the Ex- 
 igence of Other intelligent Beings not com- 
 pounded with Matter: Yet of the Kind and 
 Manner even of that Exi/lence we can form 
 no other Notion than from that we already 
 have of our own ; and we fhould be ftill in- 
 tirely in the Dark as to any Farther Know- 
 It 4 leg* 
 
248 DIVINE 
 
 lege of their Nature or Attributes, without 
 the Affiftance of this Analogy. 
 
 3. Once more, which I hope would foe 
 an Argument liifficient of it felf if there were 
 no other. 
 
 I f the Natural inherent Attributes of God 
 are totaly different in Kind from ours ; then 
 wc have no way of conceiving them but by 
 Analogy with our own. 
 
 But the natural Inherent Attributes of 
 God are totaly different in Kind from ours. 
 Therefore. 
 
 The Confequence of the Major is appa- 
 rently good, and has been fufficiently corro- 
 borated already. 
 
 The Minor is proved paft Contradi&ion 
 thus. 
 
 If the Ejfince or Subflance of God is of a dif- 
 ferent Kind from ours ; then All his Natural In- 
 herent Attributes are different in Kind from ours. 
 
 But the EfTence or Subftance of God, is of 
 a different Kind from ours. Therefore. 
 
 This Minor is next to felf-evident, and 
 needs no other Proof than a Recital of the 
 monftrous Confequences which follow upon 
 the Denial of it, which are lb obvious that I 
 leave them to the Reader. The Confequence 
 of the laft Major is founded upon this un- 
 doubted Univerfal Maxim ; That all natural 
 
 inherent 
 
ANALOGY. 249 
 
 inherent Attributes or Properties flow immediate- 
 ly and neceffarily from the Subftance or Effence 
 to which they belong : And that The refpethve 
 Subftances or Effences, and their Natural in- 
 herent Properties or Attributes mutualy infer, 
 and Neceffarily fuppofe each other. 
 
 If therefore the Natural pofitive Attributes 
 or Perfe&ions of God and Man, are the lame 
 in Kind (contrary to the Minor in the firft Syl- 
 logifm) the relpe&ive Subftances are fo likewife ; 
 and then the internal 'Effence or Subjiance of 
 God will be inevitably the fame in Kind with 
 that of an human Creature. But this no Man 
 <:an affert without affirming, that he poffeffeth 
 the fame in Kind All the natural Attributes 
 or Perfections neceffarily belonging to that Kind 
 of Subftance ; and among the reft Self-Exiftence, 
 Eternity and Infinity; which are equaly Pofi- 
 tive effmtial Perfections In God as 'Knowlegeox 
 Wifdom or Power ; and which in their very Na- 
 ture and Conception admit of no Degrees. 
 This way of arguing for a Difference in Kind 
 between things will for ever hold true 5 tho' 
 the different Subftances or Effences, and their 
 reipe&ive inherent Attributes , with regard to 
 to any Othen and Farther Knowlege of them 
 and their real Nature, were hid in impenetra- 
 ble Obfcurity. And if this fort of Proof will 
 not ftand the Teft of impartial Reafon, we 
 have no way in the World of knowing any 
 two Subftances and Effences to be different in 
 Kind; or that there are any different Kinds of 
 Bemgs^in the Uniyerfe. It 
 
250 DIVINE 
 
 I t is in vain to endeavour the evading this 
 by the vulgar Diftin&ion of Incommunicable 
 and Communicable Attributes in God ; and by 
 laying the Firft only are Effential or Proper to 
 him As God. For All the Natural Attributes 
 of God are Real po/itive Perfections in him, 
 flowing with an Equal NeceJJity from their 
 Principle or his Eflence ; and therefore all 
 E'qualy Effential, Proper, and Incommunicable. 
 If it were otherwife, and there were fbme 
 real Attributes in God Incommunicable, and 
 others Common in kind to created Beings j 
 then, fince all natural inherent Attributes or 
 Perfections neceffarily imply their refpeftive 
 Effences, we muft imagine two different Kinds 
 of Subjlances or Ejfences in God; one with its 
 Attributes Peculiar to him ; and another Com- 
 mon to him with other Beings : TJnlefs we will 
 abfurdly iuppofe it poffible for God to give 
 another Being a pofitive real Attribute or Per- 
 fection, without giving at the fame time the 
 Subfiance or EJfence which it Neceffarily im- 
 plies, and to which it Realy belongs. So that 
 this erroneous Diftinftion^is a mere begging of 
 the Queftion in Difpute ; which is, Whether 
 any of God's Attributes Are common in kind 
 to God and Man? Or elfe can mean no more 
 than that fome of them are called by the fame 
 Names with Properties in us; which is no- 
 thing to the Purpofe ; and proceeds not from 
 their being of the Same Kind, but only frorri 
 our Inability to form DiretJ Ideas or Concep- 
 tions 
 
ANALOGY. 251 
 
 tions of them as they are in themfelves, and , 
 to know or exprefs them any otherwife than 
 by Analogy wfth our own. 
 
 What hath hitherto been laid relates on- 
 ly to thofe Natural Attributes which are falfe- 
 ly imagined to be Primary Properties (as they 
 are termed) Common to all Intelligent Beings ; 
 without adding Infinity to them, which is fup- 
 pofed to exalt them in Degrees of Perfection 
 only. But it fhould be confidered befides, that 
 iuch Properties, namely Knowlege, Power, 
 Wifdom and Will in God are as Truly, Effen-> 
 tialy, and NeceJJarily Infinite, Self exiftent, and 
 Eternal, as the Principle it felf or his Ejfence, 
 from whence they Necejfarily flow ; and there- 
 fore muft be as different In Kind from ours, 
 even upon account of this Infinity neceffarily 
 annexed to them, as his Subjlance or Ejfence is. 
 
 Those who affert the Divine Attributes to 
 differ only in Degree of Perfection from ours, 
 muft yet allow them to be as Infinite as his 
 Efience. Now Infinite in the very Notion of it 
 admits of No Degrees. Any thing Finite indeed 
 may be capable of different Degrees, becaufe 
 it is Finite : But whatever is Infinite is In it 
 felf incapable of More or Lefs, Higher or Lower, 
 Greater or Smaller in any refpect. So that 
 jf God's natural Attributes differ only in De- 
 gree from ours, they are Indefinite and not In- 
 finite Perfections. If they were the fame in 
 Kind with ours, they could not be Infinite ; 
 
 becaufe 
 
252 DIVINE 
 
 becaufe the Addition of any thing Finite, ever 
 lb often Repeated j would only make up an In- 
 definite, but never an Infinite. And therefore 
 one would think it fufficient here to ask any 
 Perfon, Whether Infinite and Finite, Uncreated 
 and Created, Purely Spiritual and Compounded, 
 Immutable and Mutable, Necejfarily Exifient 
 and Precarious, Independent and Dependent, In- 
 comprehenfible and Comprehenfible Attributes are 
 not of ah intirely different Kind ? As different 
 as we conceive any two things in the Univerfe 
 can poffibly be ? At leaft as different as Pro- 
 perties or Attributes which may be formed in- 
 to Contradictory Propofitions; one Dependent 
 (as much and" as Necejfarily as the Ejfence or 
 Subftance) the other Not Dependent ; one Ne- 
 ceftarily-exifient, the other Not; one Finite the 
 other Not Finite, and lb on ; and are therefore 
 Attributes intirely Incompatible in the fame 
 Kind of Subject or Effence. 
 
 The grand Objection againft what I have 
 faid, and which I conceive to be the true 
 Ground of all thofe Warm and Zealous Ex- 
 preffions, in different Authors, againft this laft 
 Reafon for the Truth of divine Analogy ; I 
 have here extracted in its full ftrength out of 
 one of the moft fafhionable Authors of the 
 Age, who is vainly boafted by a Writer of 
 his own Strain to have been The greatefi Mafter 
 of Reafon that ever lived. 
 
 O b j. No ejfeB can have any Perfection which 
 
 was 
 
ANALOGY. 253 
 
 yaas not either acraaly, or at lead of the fame 
 Kind tho' in an higher degree, in the Caufe. 
 For if it could, then that Perfection would be 
 caufed abfolutely by nothing 5 which is aflat Con- 
 tradiction: And confequently God could not 
 give any Perfections to Man, which he had 
 not in himfelf* either AcJualy, or of the Same 
 Kind tho' in an Higher Degree. 
 
 1. I Answer, That this Objection no 
 way affects the foregoing Argument; nor re- 
 moves the grofi Absurdities which follow from 
 fuppofing God's inherent Attributes the lame 
 in Kind with thofe in Man. Namely, either 
 that our human Subftance or EJfence is the fame 
 in Kind with his, or that God confifts of Two 
 Kinds of EJfences. But 
 
 adly. I Answer more directly, That the 
 Affertion contained in the Objection is true 
 only of Finite and Created Caufes. No Finite 
 Caufe can give any Perfection, or indeed any Ef- 
 face, or real Pofitive Attribute or Property what- 
 ever, which it has not either ACtualy or In Kind 
 in its felf. But a Creating Caufe Can do it, or 
 elfe Matter and its Properties were not Created. 
 The Reply to this is, that Matter and its Pro- 
 perties are not Perfections. But it is enough that 
 the Subftance or EJfence of Matter is a Real Thing, 
 and not a mere Negation ; and that Solidity or 
 Impenetrability is a Pofitive inherent Property of it, 
 which God had not in Faft or in Kind. A Caufe 
 that can give Exiftence to any one Real EJfence 
 
 and 
 
2 5 4 DIVINE 
 
 and its Pofitive Propertied without having them 
 in Fact or in Kind himfelf, may as eafily give 
 a Perfection different in Kind which he had not. 
 For fince Both are equaly Productions from To- 
 tal Non-Exiftence ; no imaginably higher degree 
 of Ability in the Caufe is required for one, than 
 for the other. Both Inftances equaly demand 
 fuch a Kind of Power as can never be made up 
 by adding only repeated Degrees to any Finite 
 Powers in human Nature. And therefore, con- 
 trary to the Objection, we can as Eafily conceive 
 it PoJJtble for an infinite Creator Thus to produce 
 From Nothing a Perfection of the Human Eflence, 
 as Material Subjlance\ fince we know no more 
 of the real Nature or inconceivable Manner of 
 either Performance, than we know how to Cre- 
 ate: And fince neither of thefe Productions are 
 Impoffible, or imply any Contradiction; and there- 
 fore may be equaly Objects of Almighty Pow- 
 er. So that the true Confequence from hence 
 is, not that Something is caufed abfolutely by No- 
 thing ; but that fome EfTence, real Attribute, 
 or Perfection is Produced by Nothing of the fame 
 Kind: True; but by a Caufe of a quite Diffe- 
 rent and Tranfcendent Kind y who had a Power to 
 produce it; and who never Could have Thus pro- 
 duced it, had not his Power been of a Superior 
 Kind from any in the Effect. In this Cafe Some- 
 thing is caufed or produced abfolutely from No- 
 thing indeed, or from Non-Exiftence j but it is 
 jiot caufed abfolutely By Nothing. 
 
 Besides, Why fhoud not Solidity or Impe- 
 netrability, 
 
ANALOGY. 255 
 
 mil 'ability \ which is a Real Pofttive inherent pro- 
 perty of Matter, be allowed as much a Perfecti- 
 on with regard to the Subftance or Effence in 
 which it inheres ; as 'Thinking and fVilling with 
 regard to the Human Subftance or Effence ? Un- 
 lell we affirm God created Matter Imperfect in 
 its Kind. 
 
 The foregoing Anfwer to this Objection 
 muft hold good, till it be proved that material 
 Subftance is a Mere Negation and not a Real 
 pofitive thing a&uary Created-, and that it is im- 
 poffible and Contradictory for Almighty Power, 
 to produce from nothing Effences with Proper- 
 ties or Perfections which he had not Any way in 
 himfelf. 
 
 This Objection againft Analogy is varied 
 by the fame Author in his Pofthumous Works 
 after this Manner. That God muft be himfelf a 
 Being indued with perfect Knowlege (for Inftance) 
 Appears from his having communicated toother Be- 
 ings certain degrees of that Perfection; for what- 
 ever Perfection is in any Effect '; muft of neceffity be 
 much more (that is more in degree) in the Caufe 
 that produced it. Now this is plainly taking for 
 granted what ought to be proved. For the 
 GJueftion is, Whether God Has realy communi- 
 cated to other Beings any Degree of his Perfecti- 
 ons ? Whether our Knowlege for Inftance be not 
 an Attribute different In Kind f and not in De- 
 gree only from God's ? As to the Reafon given 
 here, That whatever Perfection is in any Ef- 
 fect, 
 
2,56 DIVINE 
 
 fe&, tnuft of neceffity be much more (that is 
 in degree) in the Caufe producing it ; it is ftill 
 begging the Queftion as to a Creating Caufe, 
 which is the only one can be meant Here. 
 
 As to Imperfections or mere Negations (lays the 
 fame Author) fitch as Fmitenefs and all its Confe- 
 quences, Figure, Divifibility, Motion, Compoflti- 
 on, Divifion, &c. the Argument lies otherwife; 
 Thefe may be in the EjfeEt tho' they were not in the 
 Caufe. And what is the wife Reafbn given for 
 the Difparity ? Beoaufe tho' nothing can give or 
 communicate More than it has it felf, yet it can 
 communicate as much Left as it will. Obferve 
 the Fallacy ; That God can neither give or com- 
 municate More than he hath in himfelf, is moft 
 true. And that he can communicate Left 
 than he hath in himfelf; is as true. All 
 created beings are lefs than any thing God hath 
 in himfelf; lefs in Kind, and not in Degree. 
 The Quibble lay in the word Lefs, by which 
 he meant lefs in Degree, lb that according 
 to him, no Intelligent Being could have been 
 created, or produced even from nothing, but 
 what muft be a God in little. In the Cafe of fiich 
 Mere Negations, none of them are More or Lefs, 
 in Kind, or Degree, or Any way at all in the 
 Creator. Nay what is more, Matter it felf, 
 which is a Pojitive thing and not a mere Ne- 
 gation) is no way in the Creator. But what 
 does all this fignify to the true Queftion in 
 difpute ; Whether God has Created any Being 
 with a real Perfection, different not in Degree, 
 
 but 
 
A N A t G Y. 257 
 
 but In Kind froiti his own ? And whether it be 
 not as poffible for him, without a Contradic- 
 tion, to do this as to Intelligent Creatures, as in 
 the Cafe of Matter? 
 
 In fhort what deceives Men here, is the 
 Expreffion of Communivating or Giving Per- 
 fections j as if this were a Kind of Production 
 Different from Creation-, or as if God gave 
 and communicated His own ; that is, his Own 
 Kind of Perfections ; which is the very Point 
 Controverted. And did Men, inftead of Giv- 
 ing and Communicating, uie the proper word 
 Creating, they would immediately perceive the 
 Fallacy ; and difcern that to fay, Nothing can 
 Create what it had not in it felf ; and that 
 God cannot Create an Attribute or PerfeBioii 
 which he has not in himfelf in Kind \ isjuft as 
 falfe as to fay God cannot create Matter which 
 he has not in himfelf. But if they muft and 
 will ufe thofe Words for Creating, they ought 
 to reflect that in truth both Matter and Think- 
 ing are equaly Given and Communicated by 
 Creation 1 ; that is, produced not From God Him* 
 felfy but from Nothing, by an External Aft of 
 his infinite Power and./iP*//: And that no thought 
 can be more abfurd and Contradictory, than 
 that God, fhould realy Create any Effence or 
 Perfection of the fame Kind with his own. 
 
 Indeed if any Thing was either produced 
 out of the very Subfiance of God himfelf, or 
 had his Effence communicated, it would be 
 
 S con- 
 
258 DIVINE 
 
 contradi&ory that Such a Being fliould have 
 any Perfection, or any E (fence or Real Property, 
 but what God had either Actualy or In Kind ; 
 but this is not neceflary in Creation, or diftind 
 external Produ&ions from Abfolute Non-Ex- 
 ifience. No, but the Contrary appears to be Ne- 
 ceffary -, namely that the Created effect Cannot 
 poffefs any Perfection (or Effence, or Any thing 
 pertaining to it) the fame In Kind with thole 
 of the Creator \ no not even an Exigence of the 
 Same Kind. Were it Otherwife, we muft fup- 
 pofe it Formed or Derived out of the Divine 
 Sukftance-, and not produced Originaly from 
 Nothing as to All that Belongs to it, and All 
 that it is. In fhort God could have none of 
 our Properties Qi-Perfefiions in him, any other- 
 wife than he had Matter and its inherent Pro- 
 perties : That is, He had the Patterns of both 
 in his Divine Mind, but neither of them Ac- 
 tualy, or In Kind, or in an higher Degree. A 
 Self-exiftent necejfary Being muft differ in Every 
 jR.efpe# from all things Created -, or otherwife it 
 will be impoflible to conceive how any one 
 thing can differ in Kind from another. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 A pojltive Prmf of Divine Analogy, with re* 
 Jpefi to the moral Attributes of God. And 
 the Divine Attributes rightly diftmguijhed. 
 
 SOME Men who are very ready to allow 
 a Differencein Kind between God's Natu- 
 ral 
 
ANALOGY. §59 
 
 Vat Attributes afad ours, yet perfift iri denying 
 the fame Difference in the Moral Attributes j 
 tho' this is an unavoidable Confequence of the; 
 former : For all the Perfections or Attributes 
 of God are equaly natural, as confidered in 
 relpeft of his real internal Effence; Natural 
 and Moral is a Diftin&ion arifing from the 
 Obfervation of our felves, becaufe our moral 
 Virtues aire moftly acquired by Reflexion and 
 Habit ; and leem therefore to be things Super- 
 induced^ and Additional Qualities onlyj over! 
 and above all that is truly Natural and Ejfen* 
 tial to our Humanity. But we are now to be 
 confidered as in a preternatural State and Con- 
 dition, with all the Powers and Faculties of 
 Body and Mind greatly out of Courfe ; With 
 Our whole Frame miferably broken and diftort- 
 ed; and as upon the Recovery only of out ori- 
 ginal Make and Conftitution : In which the: 
 whole Man was an Unfullyed Similitude and 
 lively Refemblance of God ; and an Image of 
 the Divinity as yet intire and unimpaired* 
 Then all our moral Perfections were truly Na* 
 tural and Effential to us ; and all the Powers 
 and Faculties of Soul and Body we're combined 
 together into an harmonious Difpofition for 
 Virtue and Holinefs. Natural and Moral! 
 This is the Language only of corrupt degene- 
 rate Mortality ; it had no Place even in our' 
 felves in a State of Innocence ; and the Diftinc-r 
 tiort will ceafej together with the Terms* 
 whereby we exprefs it, when we come to be 
 nil SupeftiatufaL Much lefs then can this Di j 
 
 S 4 ftin&iofS 
 
260 DIVINE 
 
 ftin&ion have any Place in the Fountain of all 
 Perfection Natural and Moral ; in whom all 
 his natural Perfections are Moral, and all his 
 moral Perfections are Natural. Tho' this Di- 
 Itinftion is neceffary in reipect of our Under- 
 ftanding, who are obliged to think and fpeak 
 of God after the belt Manner we can ; that is 
 by Analogy with the Powers and Faculties and 
 Operations of our own Minds : Yet nothing 
 can be more groundlefs than intirely to lay 
 afide this Analogy ; and found an Argument 
 upon the Reality of a Diftin&ioft in the Divi- 
 nity (which agrees only to a State of Corrup- 
 tion in us) for a Samenefs in Kind with God, 
 in refped of any Properties in Man, either 
 Natural or acquired. 
 
 ButI almoft forgot that I was here to deal 
 chiefly with a Mungril particoloured Generation 
 of Infidels ; who at the fame time that they 
 make an open Profeffion of revealed Religion 
 in the Eye of the World, and feemingly ad- 
 mire the Superftructure, are labouring to under- 
 mine and fubvert the Foundation j under a 
 fpecious Colour of Abftradr. Reafoning, ftricl 
 Evidence, and Demonftration of Principles of 
 Reafbn, and Natural Religion : And by alluring 
 Wiles and Subtilty, corrupting and fuborning. 
 thofe her two Servants and Handmaids; to 
 infinuate the innocent Matron guilty of their 
 own deteftable Crimes of Falfity and Diffimu- 
 lation towards Man, and of Enthufiafm and 
 Hypocf ify towards God. Wherefore before I 
 
 propofc 
 
ANALOGY. 261 
 
 propofe my Argument in Form, I muft prepare 
 them for it by this material Diftinction. 
 
 T he r e are two things very different from 
 each other to be confidered in all moral Vir- 
 tue in Man j as well as in all the moral Per- 
 fections or Attributes of God, before either 
 they or we can fpeafc or argue to the Purpofe 
 upon this Head. Firft, the inward Frame, or 
 Temper, or Difpofition of the Soul of Man to 
 Virtue and Holinefs, in every particular In- 
 ftance. This is ftyled Virtue or moral Good- 
 nefs in the true Propriety of the Word ; and 
 in Scripture it is called The Heart, the Hidden 
 0an of the Heart, and The inward Man ; out 
 of which; proceeds all moral Goodnefs, as well 
 as moral Evil ; And one of the bright Reve- 
 lations of the Gofpel is, that all Degrees of 
 Virtue and Goodnefs are to be computed in 
 Proportion only to the inward Difpofition of 
 our Souls. This is the Fountain of all Mo- 
 rality ; and as it is more or lefs Clear or Mud- 
 dy, all the external Actions and Performances 
 which flow from it have a greater or lefs De- 
 gree of unmingled Purity, and of genuine Vir- 
 tue and Holinefs. Secondly, The External Ex- 
 ertions and Operations proceeding from that Vir- 
 tuous Difpofition of the Soul; which are not 
 abfolutely neceflary to the very Nature and 
 Effence of Goodnefs, but fb accidental to it, 
 that if no proper Occafions or Opportunities 
 ftiould offer of exerting the inward virtuous 
 Difpofitions externaly, our Goodnefs and Vir- 
 
 S 3 tuc 
 
262 DIVINE 
 
 tue may thereby receive neither Increafe nor 
 Diminution in the Account of God the Searcher 
 of Hearts. The habitual external Exercife in- 
 deed of our virtuous Difpofitions of Mind when 
 proper Occafions and Objects offer, are then 
 the indifpenfablc Refult of thofe Difpofitions, 
 and ferve to ftrengthen and confirm them ; and 
 we may by that Means become more Virtuous 
 and Holy every Day : But ftill the Virtue re- 
 mains where it was at firft ; and all the exter- 
 nal Exertions and Performances proceeding 
 from it, are fo many proper Inftances and ne- 
 ccflary Indications of the inward virtuous Dif- 
 pofitions of the Soul ; from whence they de-? 
 rive all their Morality and Worth, and even 
 borrow the Name of Virtue and Goodnefs. 
 
 These two things muft likewile be well 
 diftinguifhed on the Part of the divine Nature, 
 Firft, The real intrinfic Difpofitions or Deter* 
 jninations in the very divine Nature it felf, or 
 thofe effential Perfections which are altogether 
 Incomprehenfible and Ineffable ; that is, for 
 which we have neither any DireB Idea or 
 Conception, nor proper Word or Expreffion; 
 For want of which, we think and fpeak of 
 them by Analogy with the inward moral 
 Difpofitions of our own Souls; which, when 
 we afcribe them to God to reprefent corref- 
 pondent Perfections in him, take the Deno- 
 mination of divine Attributes. Secondly, The 
 external Exertions or Manifeftations of thofe 
 divine fupernatural Perfections, in Actions or 
 
 Ope : 
 
ANALOGY. 263 
 
 Operations equaly Divine and Supernatural ; 
 obfervable in all his Dilpenfations toward the 
 Creature, and toward Mankind in particular. 
 Thefe are all lb many different Exertions of 
 the intrmfic effential Perfections of the divine 
 Nature ; the true and Real Manner of which is 
 as Incomprehenfible as the real Nature of thofe 
 internal Perfections and Difpofitions from whence 
 they proceed : And therefore even thefe exter- 
 nal Actions, or Operations, or Manifeftations, 
 we can neither think; nor ipeak of, otherwife 
 than by Analogy with the external Operations 
 of the inward virtuous Inclinations and Dif- 
 pofitions of our own Souls. Both thele latter to- 
 gether we transfer in one complex Notion to 
 the Divinity, under the Denomination of At- 
 tributes j and call them Moral by a Word ex- 
 preflive of the Regulation of our Manners, 
 and of our external virtuous Behaviour. This 
 being premiled I argue thus. 
 
 If the real Intrmfic Difpofitions and Deter- 
 minations of the divine Nature and Will to all 
 Ads of Goodnefs ; are EJJentialy different from 
 the correfpondent Difpofitions and Determina- 
 tions in the Soul of Man to A&s of Goodnefs : 
 Then the Moral Attributes of God are different 
 in Kind from the correfpondent moral Attri- 
 butes in the Soul of Man. 
 
 B u T the real intrinfic Difpofitions and De- 
 terminations of the divine Nature and Will to 
 all A&s of Goodnefs, are EJJentialy different 
 S 4 from 
 
264 DIVINE 
 
 from the correfpondent Difpofitions and De- 
 terminations in the Soul of Man, to Ads of 
 Goodnefs, 
 
 Therefore the moral Attributes of God 
 are different in Kind from the correfpondent 
 moral Attributes in the Soul of Man. 
 
 The Confequence of the Major is €o plain 
 and juft, that I leave it to ftand upon its own 
 
 Evidence. 
 
 The Minor is as evident, as that the di- 
 vine and human Nature differ effentialy ; for 
 if the Intrinfic EJJence or the real Nature of 
 God As he is in himfelf, differs intirely from the 
 real intrinfic Nature or Effence of Man (as I 
 have plainly proved before) or if he is above 
 all Nature and created Effence : Then the fra- 
 ternal Powers, and Faculties, and "Difpofitions % 
 and Determinations of that Nature or Effence, 
 muft in all Refpeds differ from the inward 
 Powers and Faculties and Difpofitions in the 
 $oul of Man to moral Goodnefs and Virtue. 
 And now as to the other Member of the afore- 
 mentioned I)iftindipn I argue thus. 
 
 I v the External Exertions and Operations of 
 the intrinfic Faculties and Difpofitions for Ads 
 of Goodnefs in the divine Nature, differ in 
 Kind frorri the extemalgxertions and Operations 
 pf the inward Faculties and Difpofitions for 
 Afts of Gopdnefs, in the Soul pf Man? then 
 
 the 
 
A JT K L TT G Y. 265 
 
 the moral Attributes of God differ in Kind 
 from the coirefpondent Virtues and Graces 
 in us,- 
 
 But the external Exertions and Operations, 
 of the intrinfic Faculties and Dilpofitions for 
 Aits of Goodnefs in the divine Nature ; differ 
 in Kind from the external Exertions and Ope- 
 rations of the inward Faculties and Difpofi- 
 f:ion for Ads of Goodnefs in the Soul of Man. 
 
 Therefore the Moral Attributes of 
 God differ in Kind from the correfjpondent 
 yirtues and Grapes in us. 
 
 I Leave the Confequence of the Major 
 to ftand upon its own Evidence. The Minor 
 is to be proved by an Induction of Particulars? 
 and to fhorten the Difpute, I leave it upon the 
 Oppofers of the Do&rine of Analogy to pro- 
 duce any one Inftance againft the Truth of 
 this Propofition. As to the external Exertions 
 and Operations of the intrinfic Faculties and 
 Dilpofitions in the Nature of God, with re- 
 aped to all his Difpenfations of Jujlice, or 
 Mercy 1 or Truth relating to Another World; 
 it muft be granted that no external Exertions 
 or Operations of our internal Faculties or Dif- 
 pofitions for moral Goodnefs can be of the fame 
 Kind with them, No external Actions or Ope* 
 rations of ours can be of the fame Kind, or 
 performed after the fame Manner , with the di» 
 vine Pilpenfations gf eternal Rewards and Pu- 
 
 nifhments, 
 
266 DIVINE 
 
 mifhments, or any other Glorious Manifeftarion 
 of God's Attributes in Another Life. Thefe 
 are fitch Manifeftations of the inward Recti- 
 tude and Goodnefs of his Nature, of his in- 
 trinfic Juftice, and Mercy, and Truth; as it 
 muft be allowed we have not the leaft Diretf 
 Conception or Idea of. 
 
 These therefore being out of the Queftion, 
 the Minor muft be underftood of the outward 
 Exertions and Manifeftations of God's inherent 
 Attributes or Difpofitions in This Life : And 
 the Queftion is, whether any of thefe are of 
 the fame Kind, with the outward Acts and 
 Operations of the virtuous Difpofitions of our 
 Souls ? Here then again, I leave it upon one 
 fingie Inftance to be produced to the contrary, 
 of any Exertion or Manifeftation of Juftice, or 
 Mercy, or Truth ; or of any other moral At- 
 tribute of the Divinity, which fhall appear to 
 be of the fame Kind with the outward Exer- 
 tions or Performances flowing from our own 
 Tirtuous Difpofitions. Take any Inftance of 
 the Exertions or Operations of that infinite 
 Perfection in the divine Nature whish is called 
 his Jufii.ce ; let it be in the Diftribution of any 
 Temporal Reward or Punifhment; and you 
 will find it of a quite different Kind, and per- 
 formed in quite a Different manner from any- 
 external Act of Juftice performed by us. Nay 
 tho' God inflicts immediate Death* as in the 
 Cafe of Ananias and Saphira ; it is not after 
 the fame manner as in human Executions: 
 4 Nor 
 
ANAL CTG Y. 267 
 
 Nor can any external A& of Juftice among 
 Men be of the fame Kind, with that of God's 
 raining down Fire from Heaven upon Sodom 
 and Gomorrha. So likewife confider the Di- 
 vine Truth, either in the Veracity of his In- 
 formations by Revelation ; or in his fulfilling 
 any of his Promifes even in this Life; they 
 are in every Inftance of quite another Kind, 
 and brought about in quite a different way, 
 from any Inftance of our exerting the Truth 
 and Veracity of our Souls. Laftly, Take 
 God's Mercy in what Sence you pleafe, either 
 for Pardon and Remiflion of Sin ; or for re- 
 lieving the Miferable ; no one external Exer- 
 tion or Manifeftation of that infinite Perfect 
 tion in the divine Nature, is of the fame Kin4 
 with the correfpondent Exertions of that Vir- 
 tue in our Souls. Carry on the Companion, 
 between all our virtuous Performances, and the 
 Manifeftations of the intrinfic moral Attri- 
 butes of God, either in his ordinary or extra- 
 ordinary Providence; and you will not finc| 
 them to be of the fame Kind in any one In- 
 ftance. It may as juftly be faid that God go-? 
 verns the World after the very Same manner an 
 Earthly Monarch rules his People; as that any 
 moral Difpofition in him is exerted in the fame 
 way with ours. If the Faculty which operates, 
 be not the fame in Kind with the human Fa-; 
 eulties, the Method and Manner pf their Ope- 
 ration cannot be the fame. 
 
 If it is faid, that thq' the Manner of exert- 
 ing 
 
268 DIVINE 
 
 ing externaly thofe internal moral Perfections in 
 the divine and human Nature, is different ; yet 
 the external Effects and Confequences of them both 
 are of the fame Kind, as in the Inftance of A- 
 nanias and Saphira, compared with an human 
 Execution, where Death is the Effect and Con- 
 fequence in both Cafes. To this I Anfwer that 
 the Manner is indeed different ; the Exertions 
 and Operations of the divine Attributes are per- 
 formed after a divine incomprehenfible Manner; 
 thole of our virtuous Difpofitions after an human 
 Manner, whereof we have ibme direct. Concep- 
 tion or Idea : And for that very Realbn it is that 
 they differ in Kind ; and that we think and lpeak 
 of all the Exertions and Manifeftations of the di- 
 vine Perfections, by Analogy only with fiich vir- 
 tuous Actions and Performances as flow from the 
 good and regular Difpofitions of our own Souls. 
 Let the Real Manner of exerting the divine Pow- 
 ers and Faculties be ever io much above our 
 Knowlege, ever fb unknown to us ; it will ftill 
 be as totaly "Different a Manner of Action and 
 Exertion from ours, as the intrinfic Powers and 
 Faculties of God which thus exert themfelves, 
 are different from ours ; tho* the Senfible Effects 
 or Confequences fhould be allowed to be exactly 
 the fame. 
 
 But you may urge, that whether thofe Ex- 
 ertions and outward Manifeftations are from God 
 or Man,, they are ftill Juft, and Merciful, and 
 True. Yes they are ; and our thus ufing the 
 fame Words for them both ia commop, is the 
 At Ground 
 
ANALOGY. 269 
 
 Ground of the Miftake, that they are of the lame 
 Kind. But alas ! We are as little able to con- 
 ceive the divine manner of externaly exerting 
 the intrinfic moral Perfections of the Divinity, 
 as to conceive the real internal Perfections them- 
 ielves from whence they proceed : And accor- 
 dingly, as we conceive the latter by Analogy 
 with the virtuous Dilpofitions of our own Mind- 
 lb we conceive and exprefs the former by our 
 own external moral Actions and Performances. 
 In fhort, as all the difcernible Works of the Cre- 
 ation are the outward Exertions and Manifefta- 
 tions of Power, and Will, and Wifdom, and 
 Reafbn in the intrinfic Nature of God: So his 
 Holinefs, Goodnefs, Jufiice, Mercy, and Truth, and 
 all the reft of his moral Attributes, are to be con* 
 ceived by us as lb many different inward Di£ 
 pofitions of the divine Mind and Will, which are 
 outwardly exerted in a great variety of Opera- 
 tions towards all Intelligent Agents more e£- 
 pecialy; and towards Mankind in particular. 
 Accordingly the Operations or Manifeftations of 
 thofe moral Attributes, muft differ as much from 
 thole Operations or Performances of ours, call- 
 ed by the fame Names: As his Will, whereof 
 they are the Dilpofitions and Determinations ; 
 as his Power whereof they are the external Ex- 
 ertions ; as his lupematural Reajon and Wifdom 
 Whereof they are the Dictates, differ from the 
 correfpondent Attributes and Faculties in hu- 
 man Nature. 
 
 This Argument fufficiemtly proves, that the 
 
 moral 
 
$70 t> 1 V I N E 
 
 moral Attributes of God cannot in any Sened 
 be of the lame Kind with our moral Virtues and 
 Graces ; and it is fiich as will never admit of any 
 jeaibnable Anlwer or colourable Evafion. How- 
 ever, becaufe the want of rightly diftinguifhing 
 the divine Attributes, and the very different 
 Manner of our conceiving and eXprefSng them ; 
 hath been the true CaUle of Men's denying 
 the moral Attributes to be conceived by Analo- 
 gy: As well as of much ConfufiOn, and of many 
 grofs Errors in their Difcourfes and Realbnings 
 upon the Nature of God, and his Attributes; 
 I fliall therefore diftinguifh and range them into 
 the following Order. 
 
 I. The firft Head then of the divine Attri- 
 butes are luch, as can be conceived no otherwile 
 thunNegativefy; and we accordingly exprefs them 
 in negative Terms,luch as Infinite, Immenje^ Un- 
 divided) Independent, Umriginated, Underived, In* 
 vifible, Immaterial, Immortal, Uncompounded t In- 
 comprehenfible, and Uncreated. Thefe and fuch 
 Other negative Attributes have occafioned fome 
 Men very erroneously to affert All our Know- 
 lege of God to be purely Negative } and it is 
 too current a Saying among the Fathers, That 
 the Subftance of all our Knowlege concerning 
 God, is the knowing what he is not, rather than 
 what he is. 
 
 B y the term Infinite when applyed to Gfod, h 
 
 eommonly meant that He is infinite in Expan- 
 
 fionjVurationtm&Pe^rfeJifton, Now to conoeiver 
 
 God 
 
ANALOGY. 271 
 
 God actualy infinite in Extenfion or Expanfion, 
 is moft abfurdly attributing to him our Idea of 
 Matter or Space ftretched out as far or farther 
 than our Imagination can reach; fo that in this 
 refpect that Term when applyed to God can 
 mean nothing but a Negation of his being boun- 
 ded by Matter or Space. To think him infi- 
 nite in Duration ; is no other than adding to his 
 Exiftence as many Hours, and Days, and Tears 
 backward and forward as exceed our Power of 
 reckoning : So that here it is a Negation only 
 of his Exiftence being bounded by Time or du- 
 ration. To fay that he is Infinite in Perfecti- 
 on, means nothing Real and Pofitive in him, 
 unlefi we fay in a Kind of Perfection altogether 
 inconceivable to us as it is in it felf : For the 
 multiplying or magnifying the greateft Per- 
 fections whereof we have any direct Concep- 
 tion or Idea, and adding our grofs Notion 
 only of Indefinite to them ; is no other than 
 heaping up together a number of Imperfections 
 to form a Chimera of our Imagination j which 
 is fo far fuppofed to become the more worthy 
 Object of divine Worfhip, the more it is fwell- 
 ed up beyond the ftated Dimenfions of Na- 
 ture, and exceeds all human Size and Pro- 
 portion. Whereas what we call Perfections even 
 in our ielves, elpecialy fince the Fall, are only 
 iiich Comparatively with other Beings below us 
 in the Scale of Exiftence ; that is, it is better to 
 have them than to be without them, as being 
 perfective of our Kind' But they are in reali- 
 ty monftrous Imperfections with relpect to 
 
 God, 
 
272 £> I V i N E 
 
 God, when refined and exalted in Degree only $ 
 and thus attributed literaly and in Kind to the 
 inexhauftible Fountain of all Abfolute Perfec- 
 tion. So that in this refpect the term Infinite, 
 when ipoken of God, can mean nothing conceiv- 
 able but either a Negation of all Perfection to 
 be found in the Creature, as to Kind and De- 
 gree ; or elie a Negation of any Bounds to his 
 own Real and incomprehenfible Perfections. In 
 fhort, whatever real pofitive Perfection in the 
 very Nature of God this Word Infinite is expref- 
 five of, we can have no other than a negative 
 Conception of it; namely that God is not Finite 
 or limited in any reipect, as the Creatures are. 
 
 From hence then we fee, how the Argu- 
 ment drawn from this Attribute of God by our 
 modern Arians, againft the orthodox Do&rine 
 of the Trinity, namely that There can be but one 
 infinite Perfon, concludes fallacioufly. If you 
 take Perfon in a ftriftly proper and literal Ac- 
 ceptation, and the Term Infinite in a pofitive 
 Sence, then they have you faft in a Noofe; but 
 take the firft Analogically, and the latter Nega- 
 tively, according to the only conception we can 
 annex to it, and you are loole again : And will 
 find that by that AfTertion of theirs no more can 
 be meant than this ; There can be no fuper- 
 natural Incomprehenfible DiftinBion in the Na- 
 ture of a divine Being (of whole Infinity we can 
 form no pofitive Conception or Idea) of which 
 the perfonal diftin&ion among Men affords us 
 the moft juft Repreftntation we are capable of. 
 
 Which 
 
A N AX U G Y. 
 
 WMch is fclarfrom an Argument, that it is on- 
 ly a ■bold prefemptuous Affirmation, in rela- 
 tion to the intrinfic real Nature of a Being aU 
 together Incomprehenfible and Ineffable as he 
 is in himfelf : And infered from a Conception 
 and Term purely Negative, -which can exhibit 
 to the Mind of Man no Pofkive Perfection, 
 either DireSfly and immediately ; or by Com- 
 panion und Analogy with any thing conceiv- 
 able by human : Uhderftanding. And therefore 
 to argue from that Term, that there can be 
 but One infinite Perdon, isto-ar-gue from a mere 
 Negation only; and not from iany thing in the 
 'Nature of <xod conceived by us Pqfitwely^ 
 -and which renders it an Inconliftenoy or Con- 
 tradiction that there fhould -be fueh a TUfiinc- 
 tion in the Divinity, as is no otherwise fb apt- 
 4y conceivable as by that of a perfbnal Diftinc- 
 tion among Men. So that inftead of three, 
 -if it were as clearly revealed that there were 
 "fix divine Perfons; this <:ould -never Jfaaye -been 
 proved impofiible and only contradictory, -from 
 \ Pure Negation of all conceivable 'Bounds and 
 'Limitation in the Creature ; and -from a Word 
 to -which no pofitive Notion or Conception can 
 •be affixed in the 'Mind of Man, no net even 
 *by Analogy, for the Ground of an Argument. 
 And it muft not be omitted here, how evi- 
 dent' it is from hence what a crude and {uper-ft- 
 -cial way of thinking thofe Men ^avei; Who 
 make up AttributesfbrGod by adding Infinity 
 to our intelle&ual and moral Perfe&ions taken, 
 eyeji in a literal Sence : That is, how they 
 
 T fo$ 
 
274 D I V I JN n, 
 
 firft make up a chimerical Compofition of a 
 Notion or Conception, in each of them half 
 Negative and half Pqfttiye ; and then transfer 
 it to the Divinity to exprels a real Perfection 
 in the very Nature of God, and of the very 
 fame Kind with the intellectual and moral Fa- 
 culties and Operations of our Humanity. 
 
 Undivided, when afcribed to God, can 
 mean no more than a Negation of all Divifion 
 or Diftin&ion conceivable in the Creature j and 
 particularly of that human Divifion or Diftinc- 
 tion into Spirit, and Soul, and Body; into 
 which tho' Man is diftinguiflied, as into ib 
 many effential Parts, yet he is ftill but one Man : 
 Thus the intrinfic Nature of God as it is in it 
 ftlf being utterly Incomprehenfible, all the in- 
 -telligible meaning which can be affixed to that 
 Term is, that he cannot be divided into more 
 Gods than One: So that the full Import of it 
 is, only a Negation of any other Gods what- 
 ibever, co-ordinate or Subordinate. But whe- 
 ther he is diftinguifhed In himfelf^ or after what 
 manner ; and particularly whether there is in 
 his Nature any thing correfpondent and ans- 
 werable to the Diftin&ion of the effential Parts 
 of human Nature ; or a divine Diftin&ion no 
 otherwife conceivable than by our Conception 
 of three human Perlbns ? Can no way be in- 
 «fered either one way or other, from a mere 
 Negation of all Divifion and Diftin&ion in 
 this World. 
 
 All 
 
ANALOGY. 275 
 
 All the Idea or Conception we* have of 
 Dependency, is that of one Material Subftance 
 upon another, as a Caufe and Effect ; or the 
 Dependency of any fort which one Man hath 
 upon another, or other things upon the Power 
 of Man. This latter Conception we transfer 
 to God analogicaly, to exprefs the Dependency 
 of all Creatures, and of Mankind in particu- 
 lar upon him ,for their Being and Well-being. 
 In direct Oppofition to this, and by way of 
 Negation only, we term God Independent ; and 
 thus there is no greater harm in it, than that 
 it is an unfcriptural, affected, Metaphyfical 
 Term for a very plain thing, that God hath 
 no Dependence upon his Creatures. But as 
 our modern Arians make this an effential At- 
 tribute of the Father Incommunicable to the 
 Son and Holy Ghoft ; it can thus have no other 
 intelligible Sence or Meaning to us, than a 
 mere Negation of his being Begotten or Pro- 
 ceeding from either of them : And what real 
 Dependency or Subordination thefe laft Terms 
 imply, in two Perfons truly Divine, to the 
 third, is altogether inconceivable ; otherwife 
 than by Analogy with that of an human Per- 
 fon's being derived from the very Subftance or 
 Nature of another ; or coming forth from the 
 Prefence of another. Whatever the True in- 
 comprehenfible Nature of that Dependency is 
 in it lelf, we cannot conceive it to be the fame 
 with that of Creatures produced by an Effici- 
 ency from Non-exiftence. Thus therefore it 
 T a appears, 
 
2 7 6 DIVINE 
 
 appears, that all their Arguments drawn from 
 a dubious u'ndifttogoi&d Acceptation of this 
 jSlegatPvt Term, to prove the dependency and 
 Subordination of the Son and Holy Ghoft to 
 be, in cotaffibn, of the Same Kind with the 
 frependtnty and Subordination of created In" 
 telligetlt Beings, are Sophiftical and Fallacious. 
 
 What ten 'Origin is among Mankind, and 
 in the Courfe of Nature, we clearly appre*- 
 trend ; and the Conception we hare of it we 
 transfer to God, as he is the Origin or Caule 
 fcf all created feeings : And thus the Notion or 
 ■Conception We hare of it is juft and ufefuh 
 and as cleat and diftihtT: when afcribed to God 
 as When it is applyed to a CauKe in Natute 
 which is the Origin of its Effects. But U»dH- 
 ginated when applyed to the irttrinfic Nature 
 of God by way of an efTential Attribute or Per* 
 fe£tioft, tan have no intelligible Sence or Mean- 
 ing to Us but what is Negative. Pot tho' we 
 can diftinguim well between a Caufe and ite 
 Effeft in Nature, and by Analogy with this 
 can conceive God the Maker or Origin of all 
 his Creatures : Yet a manner of Exiftentte 
 Withoitt any <2aufi tir Origin^ is as 1far out ; 6f 
 the reach of all bur Capacities ; as a Subftance 
 which neithtfr exifts frdrh itfelf, ifor fo derived 
 Trorh any other. So that Unoriginated, what- 
 ever P^/We'and Iritererit Attribute In 'God it 
 may iignffy, yet can 'have ho 'Conception an- 
 nexed to it by us, but aijitt'e Negation drify, 
 Either of i befrfg"Crazm7 ty another? -Ot ofbe^ 
 3 ing 
 
ANALOGY. 277 
 
 ing B^atfett'y or of Profw4?ng from the Nature 
 of another : All erf them equaly representing (p 
 many lupernatural Operations of the Djvi- 
 mty ineomprehenfible to us as they are in 
 themielves ; and all alike cpneeiveel only fey 
 Analogy. From whence it appears, that the 
 Inferences of our modern Arians, from this Term 
 Unoriginatsd (which they ftyle an incommuni- 
 cable Attribute) for an Inferiority of Nature 
 in the Son and Holy Qhoft, and for a Priority 
 of Exiftence jn the Father j are all founded 
 upon a mere NegQtiw of fomethiog. Ineompre- 
 henfible to us as it is jri the Nature of God, or 
 in his Operations. 
 
 Underived, whatever ineomprehenfible 
 Pojitive Perfe&ion it may mean in the intrinsic 
 Nature of God, yet exhibits no #npre to the 
 Mind of Man than a pure Negation. And even 
 litis. Negation is General and TXukiofiis j and can 
 be no way particular and deterroinaf? till it is 
 <JMtinguifhed, Firft into a Negation of being 
 derived by any Creation or Ejfaiem} from ano- 
 ther \ which is a very true meaning of the wor4 
 {Jtufafiwh when thus appjyed to the Creator 
 fpfljadered in refpe# of the Creatures derived 
 \%$ an Efficiency : Only that there is an Im- 
 propriety in the Term thus appjyed ; i§>f t)i- 
 rived in propriety ©f gpeeefe |s ev.fr, ufed mPi* 
 ftjn#ion , from. Efficiency y aqd rafiber for any 
 ©Ithef manner of Perivftion of one thing frpm. 
 a^othef, than as from an efficient Cauic j and 
 wou wiHl KMWm&t witfe it jflihis ggufebfff 
 T 3 thro* 
 
278 DIVINE 
 
 thro' Ignorance, or with defign to infinuate the 
 Generation of the Son, and Proceflion of the 
 Holy Ghoft, to be Figures only for Efficiency ; 
 and that the Son and Holy Ghoft are derived 
 from the Father in the fame manner with all 
 other Intelligent Beings. Secondly into a Ne- 
 gation of being derived by Generation or Pro- 
 cefiion ; both which Terms when fpoken li- 
 teraly of Mankind, are properly enough ex- 
 prefTed by the general word Derivation, in 
 oppofition to a Man's Making an Image, or 
 any other Work of Art, as an Efficient Caule. 
 And therefore if the Arians will apply the 
 Word Derived not only to the Creatures, but 
 to the Son and Holy Ghoft, with refpecT; to 
 the Father whom they term Underivedj it 
 ought to be done with the very fame effential 
 Diftin&ion here which it conftantly imports 
 in human Language. So that Chrift is truly 
 derived from the Father, not by Efficiency, but 
 as truly as a Son is derived from his Father in 
 the way of Nature ; and the Holy Ghoft truly 
 and fupernaturaly Proceeds from the Father: 
 And therefore they may be ftyled Derived in 
 refpe£t of the Father; but in a Sence effentialy 
 different from that of all created Beings, who 
 can be called Derived from him no otherwife 
 than in a very improper and equivocal Sence 
 of that Term. As that of the Son and Holy 
 Ghoft is truly a Derivation, and no Creation ; 
 ib the incomprehenfible Subordination of thefe 
 to the Father, muft be effentialy different from 
 tbie Subordination of the Creatures, which is 
 
 conceived 
 
ANALOGY. 279 
 
 conceived ;by that of Subjects and Vaflals to 
 an Abfolute Monarch : And all the Arian 
 Confequences from this Term Underived mull 
 for ever fail, till they fhew that we have a 
 more direct and immediate Conception or. Idea. . 
 of the manner of L the divine Making a thing 
 from Non-exiftence ; than of the Manner of, 
 divine Begetting and fupernatural Proceeding; 
 and that they are not Terms equaly Analogi- 
 cal, but that Begetting and Proceeding are, 
 mere Figures only and Metaphors for a divine 
 Production by Efficiency. 
 
 The Term Uncompounded, likewife, when, 
 fpoken of God, conveys no other Conception 
 to us than a Negation of any Mixture or Com- 
 pofition in the Divinity, which we direcHy 
 know, or which can poffibly enter into the 
 Mind of Man to conceive or imagine. Nay 
 we may venture to proceed Co far as to include 
 in this Term a Negation likewife of all Mix- 
 ture or Compofition which is in any Intelli- 
 gent Being of the whole Creation. But this 
 helps us to no Pofltive, Idea or Conception of 
 any thing Inherent in the Nature of God ; in 
 refpecl: of whom the term Uncompounded (what- 
 ever real Perfection In God it implies) can 
 have no other conceivable Meaning at all to 
 us than what I have juft mentioned ; So ill 
 grounded and even ridiculous are all the Con- 
 clufions made by Deifts and Socinians and our 
 modern Arians, from any Conception we can 
 form of the Simplicity or Uncompoundednefs of 
 
 T 4 the 
 
280 D I V I ft E 
 
 the divine Nature, agairift the* DbdMrie 1 of the 
 Trinity. 
 
 Ttii Term ificofnpfehWjMe is p^diy* ttepv 
 tive, riot only Of ar Fall arid' PtrpB and >&fe- 
 gwte Knowlege of the divine Nature; but 
 of any Viretf arid Immediate Conception or 
 Idea of him; no not ever fbpaftial, or confuted, 
 or obfcure : It frieans that he is utterly imper- 
 ceptible, inconceivable, and unknown to us 
 As he is in hMfelf; or any way at all but by 
 Reprefentation, and byyinmogy with lUch thi©g£ 
 natural and human as fall within the Compafi 
 of Our DereB Ideas and Conceptions, 2nd Im- 
 mediate Gorifcioufhefs. 
 
 II. Secondly, Another Head of Attri^ 
 feutes are liteh as we do indeed exprefe in Tfffi- 
 tvve Terms \ but they are general and com- 
 pounded, arid without any particular Signifi- 
 cation, or any Certain, diftinft and Intirely po* 
 fitive Idea or Conception annexed to them ifi 
 the Mind. Such as Omnipotent) Mntightj^ Onfi> 
 tiiprefetit, OmnifcUnt^ Mf-exiftent; Nmjfitfity 
 txi/lent, Stlf-originatidi Self-fujficiefit, and Eter* 
 Hal. Which tho' thdy are riot altogether Ne- 
 gative, yet there are no fueh determinate, and 
 intirely pofitiye Conceptions annexed to them, 
 as we have of the Sitnple words Poivef, Kflow- 
 tige, Frfyerice, Exifieitce y Origin, Sufficiency^ and 
 THurSmri. Nor have we any Netion of .that 
 Kind of Attributes, but what we form either 
 by Enumeration of the fenfible Ejf/Ufs only of 
 
 each 
 
ANALOG Y. 281 
 
 eateli of them, as far as the Mind can Ibjetek* 
 when it proceeds by a gradual Increaie, or 
 Makiplication, or Enlargement; or by a Ner- 
 gation of fbme Deficiency and Imperfection in 
 our own Nature. To explain this more fully 
 fceeauife ft is of no lhiall Confequeftce. 
 
 Our. Conception of Power k pofitive and 
 determinate, formed from Natural human 
 Poweis, or from the Civil Authority of a tem- 
 poral Prince : And from thenee both the Con- 
 ception and Term is transfered to the Divinity 
 to denote a Perfection fimilar and correlpon- 
 dent to it. But we can form no purely posi- 
 tive Notion or Conception of Omnipotence \ 0$ 
 jUnrightimfs, from our Limited human Power ; 
 nor can we have any direct Idea or Conception 
 of what Omnipotertcy is In God. So that the 
 term Omnipotent or Almighty can have no fixed 
 «and Intirely pofitive Conception, either direct, or 
 by Analogy with any thing elfe wh ich we know : 
 It is no other than a Word we have for a very 
 extended Conception of Power, framedfrom our 
 Obfervation of the EjfeBs only of the divine 
 Power in the vifible Creation ;, and when we 
 can proceed no farther in our Enumeration 
 and Enlargement of thole Effects, we iiim up 
 all at once in this Negation, There, is nothing 
 impojjible for that Power to perform. For we 
 can never form an Intirely pofitive Conception 
 of a Power able to do all things, from our Power 
 of doing fime Things , any more thatt we can 
 form a purely Pofitive Conception of Infinite 
 
 Power, 
 
282 DIVINE 
 
 Power, from a- Power which is Finite. Which > 
 laft Obfervation I defire the Reader to apply- 
 to other Attributes of the lame Kind under 
 this Head. 
 
 Thus again our Notion or Conception of 
 the Prefence of a Perfbn is pofitive and deter- 
 minate; and accordingly the Term whereby 
 we exprefs it includes no Negation. This Con- 
 ception we take from an human Peribn's be- 
 ing in a certain particular Place: And it is by 
 the help of this Conception that we can think 
 and Ipeak of the prefence of God. But of Om- 
 niprefence we can have no Notion or Concep- 
 tion intirely pofitive, from any known Being 
 of the Creation, which we might transfer by 
 Analogy to the Divinity j and we are likewile 
 utterly void of any dirett Conception or Idea 
 of what it is in the very Nature of God. So 
 that to this word Omniprefence we can affix no 
 other than a general and compound and inde- 
 terminate Imagination of his Being here, and 
 there, and every where we know not how ; 
 and at laft it is refolved into this Negation, 
 There is no Place or Space in which he is not, or 
 from which he is abfent. 
 
 Knowlege is a pofitive Term for a de- 
 terminate Conception formed from our own 
 manner of Knowlege by Ideas, and Confciouf- 
 nefs, and Realbning, and Deduction. This 
 we transfer to God, to Reprefent a correfpon- 
 dent and otherwife inconceivable Perfection in 
 
 his 
 
ANALOGY. 283 
 
 his Nature; and it ftill continues as determi- 
 nate and Pofitive, as clear and diftindr, when 
 thus afcribed to the Divinity, as when it is ap- 
 ply ed to Man. But of Omnifcience we can 
 form no Notion or Conception Intirely pofitive, 
 from any Kind of Knowlege in Man, and can 
 therefore have no pofitive Analogical Concep- 
 tion whereby we may even reprefent it : And 
 being utterly void of any direct Notion or Idea 
 of what it is in the real Nature of God, the 
 Signification of this Word muft be likewife 
 very uncertain and indeterminate; and can 
 amount to no more at laft than this, There is 
 nothing which he doth not know. 
 
 Of Exiftence lifcewile we have a determi- 
 nate and moft diftinft Notion, from the Con-' 
 icioufneis of our own Exiftence, or the Con- 
 ception of the Exiftence of other things about 
 us ; the Term is pofitive and its Signification 
 not to be relblved into a Negation : And it is 
 by this as a Reprefentation, that we are en-*- 
 abled to think and lpeak as clearly and diftin&ly 
 of the Exiftence of God, as we do of our own, 
 or of the Exiftence of any Being of the vifible 
 Creation. But of Self-Exiftence, we can form 
 no confiftent Notion or Conception Intirely 
 pofitive, even by Similitude with our own man- 
 ner of Exiftence; the Mind of Man hath no- 
 thing intelligible to annex to that compound 
 Term when taken thus, which can be tranf- 
 fered even analogicaly to the Divinity: In 
 fliort the Word Self-exijlmt can have no pure- 
 ly 
 
2&4 DIVINE 
 
 ly pofitive determinate Meaning when fpoken 
 of him j bat a Signification ib Joofe and un- 
 certain, and even Negative, that it is at laft 
 jefqlved into this, He hath not his Being as wet 
 have, from another : Unlefs we abfordly take 
 it in fueh a Pofitive Senee as to fignify, that 
 God gave Exifience to kimfelf. And thus it 
 is as to Necejfary-Exiftence alfo: When we 
 attempt to annex any plain intelligible Con* 
 ception to it in our Mind, it ends at laft m 
 this, God cannot but always Exift, or Cannot 
 not Exiji. 
 
 What it is to have an Origin or Begin- 
 ning we well know ; of this we have a clear 
 and diftinct and pofitive Notion or Idea. But 
 ©f Self-Origmatim we are ib far from having 
 any Pofitive Conception or Idea from any thing 
 cither in God or Man j that we muft know it 
 to be a Senceleis Term when taken thus ; ar*4 
 without any confiftent Meaning either ftricUy 
 Proper or Analogical. For when it js under- 
 ftood pofitively of God, it include? in it two 
 monltrous Abfiirdities, one, as it implies God 
 to have an Origin or Beginning ; and the other, 
 that he had this Beginning from himfejf : ^Ln<§ 
 to make the beft of it, it can fignify no more 
 than a Negation directly contradi&ory to what 
 it expreffeth; that his Exiftence is Not from 
 bimjelf, for that he had Jfr Origin at afl. 
 
 Sufficiency $ likewife a deterniinate 
 Conception, which we form fto® a Mm's hav* 
 
 ing 
 
ANA LT) G Y. 285 
 
 iffg in hfe own prefcnt Power or Pofieffion 
 what is wecefflary to Ms Being and Well-being 5 
 this we transfer to God to reprefent that divine 
 Sufficiency whereof we can have no direft Con- 
 ception car Idea. But the compound term Self- 
 jujficient exprefleth nothing conceivable to Us 
 in refpe& of the real internal Nature of God 
 bat this Negation, There is nothing in him hid 
 what he hath Independently^ mor doth he ft and in 
 
 my\ 
 
 imMvf the Concurrence wfmyvtfar Being, 
 
 X ast l r, Of Duration or the Continuance 
 ©f Exiiftence, we have a ipofitwe sboSl deter* 
 minate Conception, formed from the confci- 
 ous SuoeeflSon of Ideas or Notions in our own 
 Mind j and mea/lured out by tftated portions of 
 iTime, focfe as Houass, and Days, <aind Months, 
 a»d Years. IMs ierves to neprefent Analogi- 
 mbf an aBcomprehenfible Divine Duration, 
 eor*efp«)ndent and anfwerable totem's, tho' of 
 quite another Kind, But of Eternity we hav« 
 no purely pofitive Conception or Reprelefita- 
 tion in the Mind of Man ; and we can affix 
 *j© Notion to it but -either a ttegaitive ;one of 
 jtifffifte Duration, that is Without Beginning (er 
 Ettdingj or a Negation of all ^hueand Suo- 
 ceflion, and any other banner of Duration di- 
 te&Iy eoaceJvabte by us. 
 
 And tbws it is In all tfaerefft t©f this Kind 
 of Attributes ; fo that when any of them atfe 
 attributed «o t!he fiatbw only , by cour modem 
 -iAfiah^ as %%&% fDc^Sut^lndcafb^ W the Son 
 
 or 
 
286 DIVINE 
 
 7 
 
 or Holy Ghoft, they can conclude nothing real 
 and Pofitive With refpect to the divine Nature. 
 For whatever intrinfic pofitive Perfections they 
 may fignify in the ivery Nature of God, no 
 Inference can be made how far they are Com- 
 municable or Incommunicable to the two other 
 divine Perfbns; from our indiftinct and very 
 indeterminate manner of conceiving them, by 
 the utmoft Enumeration or Enlargement of 
 their Effects only in the vifible Creation, where- 
 of we are capable ; or by a Negation only of 
 what we obferve to be a Defect or Imperfection 
 in the Creature. Accordingly obferve the only 
 Inference which the Arians can make from 
 thole compound Terms, the weaknefs of which 
 will appear at firft Sight} Thefe do fignify 
 lbme real Perfections in the Nature of God, 
 whereof we can frame to our felves only inde- 
 terminate and Negative Conceptions ; therefore 
 they muft fignify fuch pofitive and effential 
 Attributes in the Father, as are Incommunicable 
 to the Son and Holy Ghoft. *•*, ■ 
 
 IMust not here pals over a grand Objection 
 made againft what hath been laid concerning 
 the Purely negative Attributes ; as well as con- 
 cerning thofe which have no DiJlincJ and Intirely 
 pofitive Idea or Conception annexed to them in 
 the Mind, tho' the Terms are pofitive ; becaufe 
 I find it propofed with an uncommon Air of Afc 
 furance and Difdain. It is a great Mi/lake, fays 
 the Objector, To think all thefe or any of them ne- 
 gative Charaftersifor tho' according to the Gram- 
 i 
 
ANALOGY. 287 
 
 matted Compofition thofe Words ^Negative, 
 yet the Ideas exprejfed by them are Positive: 
 Thus Infinite, or Immense according to 
 the Grammatical Compofition is merely Negative; 
 but the Idea annexed to it is not a mere Negationof 
 Bounds, but that of a pofitive Greatnefs. So Un- 
 originate, or Underived, which means the very 
 fame as Self-Exiftent, do not exprefs a mere Ne- 
 gation of being derived; but a pofitive Ground or 
 Foundation of Exiftence in the divine Subftance itfelf 
 And thus^ He infers, the whole Orthodox Scheme^ 
 of the Trinity, jails to the Ground. 
 
 T o which I anfwer, that whatever pofitive 
 Perfe&ions in the divine Nature either thf? .ne- 
 gative or Pofitive Attributes may exprefs > W w 
 can have no Direct Idea or Conception at all of 
 them : And for that Reafon we are neceffitated 
 to conceive even the Pofitive Attributes by Ana- 
 logy with Properties natural and human, But 
 of the purely Negative Attributes we have no 
 pofitive Idea or Conception even by Compan- 
 ion and Analogy with any thing natural or hu- 
 man ; and therefore it is that we both conceive 
 and exprefs thefe only by Negation. To take 
 his own Inftances, Infinite fignifies a Pofitive 
 Greatnefs; true, but it is a divine Greatnefs 
 whereof we can have no Pofitive Idea or Concep- 
 tion even by Analogy, as we have of other At- 
 tributes of God, fuch as his Power, Wifdom, 
 Goodnefs: And therefore we are under a Ne- 
 ceffity of conceiving and expreffing this Infini- 
 ty by a Negation only of all Bounds or Limits. 
 
 Thus 
 
288 D I V 1 N E 
 
 Thus Kfcewife Endkfs and Urilitmte4y as he ■©!>- 
 lerves, without doubt exprefleth ibme real effen- 
 tial Perfe&ion in the I>ivinity, a real pofitive 
 Duration which we expreis by the word Eter- 
 nal. But this is fuch a Duration or Manner of 
 Exrftence. as is incomprehenfible to us as it is in 
 it lelf'by any pofitive Conception, either DireSt 
 or Amhgitdl: And therefore we conceive and 
 expreis this Eternal Duration no otherwhe than 
 by a 'Negation of Beginning or Ending $ and of 
 every Manner of Duration which can enter in* 
 to the Head or Heart of Man to conceive or 
 imagine. 
 
 S o again KJwftigmate% and Underived y which 
 we expreis by J Self-ex^ent y do fignify a Ptifitrtie 
 "and 'Red Manner of Mxiftence in the Subftance 
 -of God; 'but ofthis ^Seif\exiftence it is irhpoffi- 
 bre*for the Mind to have any purely pofitive 
 Conception or Tdea, not only T^treffly, or of ^he 
 "thmgas it/is in kieff; i>ut even'by jimlogy: Be- 
 caufe thd' we have a pdfitiveldea of 'God's E$- 
 ijtence' from oyxxxmn Exiftence; yetthere is -no- 
 thing In Man, or in the whole Compafs of -the 
 viubleOeation which can be any;pofitive3>ym- 
 ibol or Repreientation of Self-Exifience in an hu- 
 man Mind j .and therefore the Conception of ft, 
 'however exprefted, can be no other than pure- 
 ly or moftly Negative. So that tho' SeipEx$- 
 ence ovt/nUerivtd i be a pofitive Property ^niflte 
 Subftance df God, yet.it is fuch an effentialiPer- 
 fe&ion of it as is more itreomprehenfible 'than 
 the'5ubftance it felf. For we can form a po- 
 fitive 
 
ANALOGY. 289 
 fitive Conception of the divine Subftance by A- 
 nalogy with what we know of that Which is hu- 
 man : But nothing in Nature can be a pofitive 
 Reprelentation of Self-exiftence: and accor- 
 dingly we muft think and fpeak of that Per- 
 fection by way of Negation, or not think and 
 fpeak of it at all. From whence it is plain that 
 the Term Self-exifient is altogether Sencelefs 
 and without any intelligible gleaning in Reli- 
 gion, otherwife than as the Word, together with 
 the Conception annexed to it, is a Negation of 
 being derived from another ; either Firfi by be- 
 ing Made, that is, produced by an Efficiency, as 
 all created intelligent Agents in particular are: 
 And thus it is a very uleful and fignificant Term ; 
 as it very well expreffeth our Dependence upon 
 a Being who could not have been himfelf made 
 or created by any other, and muft therefore have 
 exifted from without Beginning. Or fecondly 
 a negation of being Begotten or derived by a fii- 
 pernatural Generation, as we are taught the on- 
 ly begotten Son of God was : And thus far like- 
 wile Self-exiftent may be a very harmlefs and in- 
 nocent, tho' a very ufeleis and unicriptural 
 Word ; and can have no farther intelligibleMean- 
 ing, but that the Father is not derived from the 
 Son, or from any other Perlbn by any fuper- 
 natural Generation. And the moft that can be 
 infered from the Self-exiftence of the Father in 
 this refped, is a real Subordination of the Son 
 to the Father; but a Kind of Subordination al- 
 together as inconceivable and ineffable as it is 
 in it felf, as the real intrinfic Nature of the Fa- 
 tT their 
 
290 DIVINE 
 
 ther and the Son, or the real Manner of the di- 
 vine Generation; and therefore to be no other- 
 wife conceived than in general, by Analogy- with 
 the filial Dependence and Subordination of a 
 Son to his human Father. And confequently 
 when Men proceed to explain, and limit, and 
 define the very Peculiar Nature and Manner and 
 Degrees of this incomprehenfible Subordination 
 Literal) ', by the Subordination even of an human 
 Son in all reipedts to his Father, and as if both 
 were the fame in Kind', their Inferences are all 
 falfe and groundlefs: But when they explain it 
 by the Subjection and Dependency of a Subjeff 
 or Vaffal to an abfolute Monarch, as our mo- 
 dern clandeftine Arians do thro' their whole 
 Scheme of Religion, it is not only prophane and 
 impious, but open Blafphemy againft the Father 
 and the Son. 
 
 According to this way of arguing, lays 
 the Objector, All the Attributes of God maybe 
 turned into mere Negatives ; as his Unity, into not 
 being more than one. This is a very true Afler- 
 tion with regard to Some of the Attributes, and 
 particularly with refpect to the divine Unity : that 
 tho' it be a pofitive Perfection both in the real 
 Nature ol God, and Alfo in our Conception of 
 it ; yet at the fame time it may be Turned into a 
 Negative, or conceived and expreiTed after a ne- 
 gative Manner alio, namely That there are no 
 more Gods than One: But this Affertion is egre- 
 gioufly falfe with refpect to thofe other Inftan- 
 ees which he confufedly produces to confirm his 
 2 Ob- 
 
ANALOGY. 291 
 
 Objection. $ and which tho' they ftiould be allow- 
 ed to Exprefi pofitive Perfections in the real Na- . 
 ture of God, yet are conceivable by Us after a 
 negative Manner \ For thus he goes on. His 
 Omnifcience into not being ignorant of any thing. 
 Now we have a purely pofitive Conception of 
 Knowlege or Wifdom in God by Analogy with 
 Knowlege or Wifdom in our felves ; but let 
 that Author affign lomething in Nature which 
 can be a purely pofitive Refemblance or Repre- 
 fentation of Omnifcience or Infinite Knowlege ; 
 till that is done we can annex to that Term the 
 very negative Conception he mentions. His 
 Omnipotence, into not being limited in Power.. 
 Very true; for want of any direct, or even A - 
 nalogical Pofitive Idea or Conception of Omni- 
 potence, we are under a Neceffity of affixing that 
 Negative. Conception to it; and muft ever do> 
 ib, till we have a purely pofitive Idea or Con-, 
 ception of Infinite Power. His Omniprefence y - 
 into not being abfent from any Place. Very true 
 again ; excepting only his Word Turning it into a 
 Negative ; whereas the Term Omniprejence muft, 
 necefiarily have a negative Conception annexed 
 to it in the Mind of Man, and cannot poffibly 
 be turned into a purely pofitive Conception : Of 
 the Prefence of God indeed we can form a pofi- 
 tive Conception by Analogy with the Prefence 
 of a Prince ; but of Omniprejence we can have no 
 fuch pofitive Conception or Idea either Direct, 
 or Analogical. 
 
 ThaTwc have no direct and immediate Con-, 
 U a ceptioa 
 
292 DIVINE 
 
 ception or Idea of any of the divine Attributes 
 as they are in themfelves, or of any Properties 
 the fame in Kind; has been proved clearly and 
 evidently. The next Queftion then is, which 
 of thofe Attributes are conceived by any Pofi- 
 tive correfpondent Representation in human Na- 
 ture ? For luch only are properly pofitive At- 
 tributes ; as Power, Wifdom, Goodnefi, Will : 
 And which of them can have no a&ual cor- 
 refpondent Reprefentation in things Natural 
 and Human ? For thefe are properly the nega- 
 tive Attributes ; both as to the Grammatical 
 Compofition of the Word, and the Conception 
 annexed to it : Such as Unoriginated and Un- 
 derived, Infinite and Immenfe; as well as thole 
 which, tho' Grammatical? Pofitive, yet are 
 Negative in the Signification or Conception an- 
 nexed to them ; luch as Eternal and Self-ex- 
 iftent, Neceffarily-exijlent, Omniprefent, and 0/»- 
 nifcient. And thus that contradictory ungram- 
 matical Notion, of pofitive Ideas or Concep- 
 tions being annexed to negative Terms when 
 applyed to God, falls to the Ground ; I hope 
 never to rife again ; not even at the laft Day, 
 to upbraid the Objeftor with the Application 
 of it for the Support of a deteftable Herefy. 
 
 III. Another Head of divine Attributes 
 are fuch as Men exprefs by Hyperbole; not 
 that any Term in human Language expreffive 
 of Perfe&ion can be truly hyperbolical in re- 
 fped of the Divinity, whofe real Perfections 
 are equaly above all Apprehenfion or Expief- 
 
 fion: 
 
ANALOGY. 293 
 
 fion : But in refpeft of our limited and imper- 
 fect way of thinking and fpeaking of him, of 
 whom we have no direct Conception or Idea. 
 Of this Kind are fome of thole .Attributes .be- 
 fore mentioned '?7re(>a.ycLQos, 'iwipdyvu^o?, 'T7Ttp- 
 *>%X">s> 'Tws^ouo-ioff, 'TTreqwvpos and luch like,' 
 for which we hav eno fingle Synonymous Terms 
 in the Englifh Tongue; and whereof the 
 Greek Fathers are full, as alfo the Myftic 
 Areopagite. ' Thefe are all no other in reality, 
 than a Negation of God and his Attributes to 
 be in any Sence of the Same Kind -with created 
 Intelligent Beings, and tHeir Attributes or 
 Properties 5 but fbmething in his whole Na- 
 ture infinitely beyond them all. The only 
 things to be obferved here are, Firit, That 
 fince thefe compound hyperbolical Terms have 
 no real meaning beyond what may be and of- 
 ten is expreffed in fimple and common Terms j 
 they carry in them an empty Appearance only 
 of a fuperior and real Knowlege of the divine 
 Nature : They are in Truth no more than fo 
 many different ways of defcribing our own Ig- 
 norance, and intire want of all Degrees of any 
 direct Apprehenfion or immediate Perception 
 of what relates to the real Nature of God 
 and his Attributes. And Secondly, That moft 
 Infidels and Heretics run into a quite contrary 
 Extreme ; and found their realbning upon a 
 Suppofition, that the Attributes of God are of 
 the very lame Kind in him that they are in us; 
 and all the Terms of the Gofoel which they 
 qannot ftrain to pure Metaphor, they under- 
 XJ 3 ftand 
 
294 DIVINE 
 
 ftand in a Literal and proper Acceptation j fb 
 that one way or the other, they bring all the 
 Myfteries of Christianity to nothing. 
 
 Now tho' thefe three Heads of Attributes 
 give us no Pqfltive Knowlege of God, and are 
 no more than either Mere Negations ; or very 
 loofe, indeterminate and Mojuy negative Con- 
 ceptions, formed out of our Reaibning upon 
 the vifible Effetfs of the Creation ; or Hyper* 
 holical Terms and Expreffions, invented with 
 defign to fpeak of God in a Style above Nature, 
 above our felves, and above all things whereof 
 we have any Conception- or Idea. Tho' moft 
 of them exhibit to the Mind of Man nothing 
 in the Nature of. God it can apprehend by any 
 diftind Pq/itive Conception, or by any truly 
 Analogical Semblance or Reprelentation : Yet 
 it is a very ufeful Degree of divine Knowlege, 
 well proportioned to the Shortnefs of our Un> 
 derftanding in this Life ; very neceffary to all 
 the Purpofes of Religion ; and hath no fmall 
 Tendency to the promoting of all Virtue and 
 Holinefs. For they ferve to exprefs that the 
 Divinity vaftly tranfcends in Kind all the Bounds 
 of Nature and Creation ; they enable us to con- 
 temn not only this World, but all created Be- 
 ings of another in companion of that Still in- 
 comprehenfible Being; of" whom by the help of 
 thefe Attributes we can fpeak in a Style no 
 way applicable to any other Intelligent Agent 
 in the Univerfe. The due Confideration of 
 them hath an immediate Tendency to produce 
 
 in 
 
ANALOGY. 295 
 
 in us a great Love and Admiration of that di- 
 vine Being, which is fb far out of the Reach of 
 all our direct Apprehenfion or Conception, 
 that we are often forced to have recourfe to 
 negative and hyperbolical Terms to exprefi 
 his Perfections. They ftrike the Soul with the 
 moft profound Awe and Veneration of him ; 
 this inclines it to the humbleft Adoration and 
 Worfhip ; and there is not any one Inftance of 
 Virtue and Goodnefs to the Promoting and En- 
 couragement of which they do not greatly con- 
 tribute. But when Men draw Confluences 
 from any fuch Conceptions as we are able to 
 form of thefe, to the Real intrinfic Nature of 
 the Divinity ; whereof they give us no DifiinSt 
 and Pqfitive Conception or. Idea: Then they 
 pervert the true Uie and whole Intention of 
 them ; lb that from being great and prevail- 
 ing Motives to all Virtue and Holinefs, as well 
 as conftant Ingredients and Helps in all our 
 Piety and Devotion ; they render them Intern- 
 ments of clandeftine Herefy and Infidelity. 
 
 And now I am to proceed to thofe divine 
 Attributes which, in our manner of thinking 
 and fpeaking, are Determinate and Pofitive and 
 truly Analogical. Accordingly 
 
 I. The firft divine Attribute under this 
 Head, is that which we conceive by Analogy 
 with the Spirit of a Man. To apprehend this 
 rightly, we are to confidcr that thefe two fol- 
 lowing very different Notions are affixed to 
 U 4 this 
 
296 DIVINE 
 
 this Word, when 'tis underftood either of our 
 own and other created Spirits, or of God. 
 
 First, It is taken for an Immaterial Be- 
 ing or Subftance. In this Sence it has no other 
 Notion affixed to it than a Negation only of 
 Matter and all its Properties ; and can include 
 nothing pofitive, but a Notion of Being in ge- 
 neral, or of a Subftance in particular, where- 
 of we can have no DireB Perception or Idea. 
 When it is underftood thus of God, it proper- 
 ly falls under the former Head of the negative 
 Attributes. Accordingly it is laid in Scripture 
 that God is a Spirit, that is an Immaterial 
 Being: Which is no oblcure Indication that 
 our human Spirit alfb is Immaterial; efpecialy 
 iince there' is luch exprefs and particular men- 
 tion made in Scripture of the Spirit of a Man 
 that is in him, and the lame word nn uled for 
 both : Nay it is a ground of fufficient Convic- 
 tion to any one who hath Realbn to rejoyce 
 that it is fuch, and that he is not to perifh like 
 a Beaft. And fince we obferve no liich kind of 
 Operations as thole of our own Minds, in other 
 animate Bodies in all appearance fufficiently 
 organized, and in all other relpe&s fcemingly. 
 qualifyed for them; we naturaly infer that 
 there muft be a Concurrence of ibme fubftan- 
 tial Principle within us which is Not Matter, 
 
 Secondly, This word Spirit is taken in 
 a Pofitive Sence, to exprefs that complex Con- 
 ception or Notion we are able to form of Q,ur 
 
 own 
 
ANALOGY. 297 
 
 own Spirit. Now it muft be obferved, that of 
 the Subftance or EJfence even of our own Spirit, 
 we have no direct Perception or Idea fenfitive 
 or Intellectual ; or even any immediate Con- 
 fciouiheis : But a complex Notion only or Con- 
 ception of Spirit, from a Conicioufneis of the 
 various Operations, Faculties, and Properties of 
 our own Minds ; that is, from the Faculties and 
 Operations of Spirit and Matter in eflential U- 
 nion. This complex Notion we attribute to 
 God, to expreft and reprelent the Divine Spi- 
 rit, as a Being endued with incomprehenfible 
 Perfections Correfpondenl and Simitar to thole 
 we are confcious of in our felves, but of a Kind 
 totaly different : So that the common Ufe and 
 whole Import of the Word, when taken pofi- 
 tively, and afcribed thus to purely Ipiritual Be- 
 ings, is Analogical. And the Realbn why we 
 ufc the word Spirit thus in common for God 
 and all other fpiritual Beings; is the want of 
 any direct Idea and Conception, or proper 
 Term, to diftinguifh him as he is in his own 
 Nature, from Angels : Whereas his intire real 
 Nature is as much or rather vaftly more of 
 another Kind from that of all created pure 
 Spirits, than theirs is from Hich as are embo- 
 died; and confequently cannot be apprehend- 
 ed by us under any pofitive Conception but 
 what is merely Analogical. 
 
 A s the word Spirit is thus transfered to God 
 
 by Analogy ; ib likewile we attribute to him 
 
 the Terms Subftance, EJfence, Ewftence, and 
 
 5 Nature. 
 
298 DIVINE 
 
 Nature. That is, we fubftitute the Concep- 
 tions we form of the human Subftance or Ef- 
 ience, and Exiftence ; to reprefent Analogi- 
 caly an inconceivable but correipondent Sub- 
 ftance or Effence, and Exiftence, of which we 
 have not the leaft glimmering T>ireB Idea 
 or Conception. And from the Necefllty we 
 are under of proceeding thus, we call God and 
 Angels Subftances in common ; for want of any 
 direct Idea and Conception, or proper Term to 
 diftinguifh an Immaterial Subftance from that 
 which is material ; or the Subftances of dif- 
 ferent immaterial Beings from each other : Not 
 but that it is as grols to call -an Angel, and 
 much more the divine Being a Subftance, in the 
 literal propriety of the Word, as to call it a 
 Body. As we juftly attribute thefe Terms and 
 Conceptions to every Thing, of which, or its 
 Properties, we have a Direct Perception and 
 Idea, or any Immediate Confcioufhefs ; and which 
 by this means we obferve to have a real and 
 actual Being ; and fince what hath not a real 
 Subftance or Effence of lome Kind or other, 
 mutt be as nothing to Us, that is with regard 
 to our manner of conceiving things ; So alio we 
 juftly attribute them to God, as to a real and 
 actual Being altogether Supernatural ; that we 
 may have a way of thinking and fpeaking, pro- 
 portioned to our Underftanding, of him who 
 is otherwife inconceivable and ineffable, 
 
 For any one therefore, with the clandefline 
 Arians, to fpeak of God as a Per/on, abftracT:- 
 
 ed 
 
ANA VO G Y. 299 
 
 ed from all Subftance or E (fence, is not to con- 
 ceive him at all ; Nay it is by a direct Implica- 
 tion to deny even his Exiflence. And yet this. 
 is the, very Blind with which a Reader muft 
 be contented to cover his Eyes, at his firft En- 
 trance into the modern fifty five Arian Propo- 
 fitions: So that tho* he may chance to diicern 
 the venomous Tendency of them in the Gene- 
 ral, yet he fhall not be able to point out di- 
 ftincHy where the Fallacy lies. In the firft of 
 them the Author ftyles God, not an Intelli- 
 gent Ejfence or Subflance, but an Intelligent 
 [Agent or Perfon, abftra&ed from all Subflance 
 or Ejjmce : And the Reader muft not fee how 
 impoffible it is, for the Mind of Man to con- 
 ceive a Per/tin abftracted from fome Subftance 
 or other, natural or Jupernatural, conceivable 
 or inconceivable; or to imagine an Agent with- 
 out any actual Subftance, For Agency. Now, 
 do you but inlert into that Propofition Intelli- 
 gent Subflance, inftead of Intelligent Agent or Per- 
 fon ; and carry this Diftinction with you as far 
 as the fifty firft Propofition, in which he begins 
 to reduce all his Doctrine to Practice j and 
 there again apply that Diftindion to the Pay- 
 ing Honour or Wbrjhip to an Intelligent incompre- 
 henfible Essence or Substance, as all 
 People do who call themfelves Chriftians (the 
 clandeftine Arians only excepted, who call this 
 a Worfhiping We know not what) and to the 
 Paying Honour or PForJhip to a Person only, 
 abflrac~iedly from all Nature, Subftance, and 
 jLJfence (which we call worshiping an Idol on- 
 
 l Y 
 
3 oo DIVINE 
 
 ly of our own Imagination ; that is worfhip- 
 ing Nothing, or no Real Being either in this 
 World or the other) If you do this I lay, you 
 will difcover a fundamental Fallacy which 
 reaches from the Beginning to the End of that 
 long Chain of Propofitions ; and without which 
 no two Links of it could hold together. I 
 muft own this requires more intenfe Thought 
 and Application, than is neceffary to difcover 
 the Fallacies of the Socinians and other Here- 
 tics. For in thole Proportions all the Poylbn 
 of the Arian and Socinian Herefies is extra&ed 
 and heightened by the Author ; and artfully 
 blended together, to fit the Tafte of liich Per- 
 fbns as are already of a broken Conftitution ; 
 and in a fickly Dilpofition of Mind and Con- 
 science, which inclines them to nauleate all 
 plain and wholelbm Food ; and to choofe ra- 
 ther to gratify their vitiated Palates with no- 
 tional abftraft Novelty, and Metaphyfical Ra- 
 rities. 
 
 II. ASecond head of Attributes to be 
 mentioned in Order here, are thole which we 
 conceive and exprels by Analogy with the intire 
 Man, compofed of Spirit and Body in eflential 
 Unity. Thus we lay the Living God ; tho' of 
 that Life we have not the leaft direcl Idea or 
 Conception ; and therefore we conceive it by A- 
 nalogy with the Life of Man, Whofi Breath is 
 m his Nojlrils ; which confifts in the Conjuncti- 
 on of Spirit and Body ; in the Circulation of the 
 Blood and animal Spirits ; and ends with the Se- 
 paration 
 
ANALOGY. 301 
 
 paration of the Spirit from the Body : And yet 
 this Attribute, which can exhibit no more to the 
 Mind of Man than an incomprehenfible Perfecti- 
 on, and a manner of Life and Exiftence Corref- 
 pondent only and anfwerable to our Life ; ferves 
 very well to denote the Living God, in Opposi- 
 tion to lifelefs Idols of Stock and Stone; and 
 that eternal Omnipotent Being who is the Caufe 
 and Fountain of Life to all Creatures. Nay the 
 very word Man is thus afcribed to him in Scrip- 
 ture, in which he is ftyled A man of War. We 
 call him One, an Agent ; we fay he is a Maker, 
 Author, Caufe, and Principle. In the fame A- 
 nalogical Sence we lay he is High or Powerful, 
 and moft High, Great, Mighty, and Happy. Af- 
 ter the lame manner we attribute to him our 
 Perlbnal Operations, fuch as Making, Commu- 
 nicating, Giving, Difpo/ing, Diftributing, Par- 
 doning, Blejfing, Rewarding, and Punijhing ; to- 
 gether with Providence, Oeconomy, Supremacy, 
 and many fuch Terms of human Language, 
 which run thro' all our Diicourfes and Realbn- 
 ings of God. Thus again we attribute to him 
 our own Perfonal Characters and Offices, fuch as 
 Father, King, Ruler, Governor, Lord, and Lord 
 ofHofls or of Armies, Redeemer, Saviour, Judge, 
 Searcher of Hearts, Lawgiver, Monarch, and all 
 other human Titles of an abfolute and extend ve 
 Power, that is Poteftas or Dominion among Men. 
 
 HEREit ought to be remarked, that when 
 we attribute the word Greatnefs to God, which 
 includes moft of the reft ; the Idea of that Great- 
 
 nels 
 
3 02 DIVINE 
 
 nefs we borrow either from the Size or Bulk 
 of a material vifible Subftance, which is very 
 improperly applyed to any Spirit, of which We 
 can have no Notion or Idea whether it is great 
 or fmall : And very unworthy of God, any 
 otherwife than Metaphorical). Or that Term 
 mult have a Conception annexed to it borrow- 
 ed from the Grandeur of a Prince, and the 
 Power and Magnificence of an earthly Mo- 
 narch ; which is lifcewile unworthy of God in 
 a literal Acceptation, whofe Power or Gran- 
 deur is not external only, ieparable, and acci- 
 dental, or feated in the Number and Magnifi- 
 cence of his Creatures and Subjects ; but all 
 within himfelf, eflential and inherent; and 
 can receive no Increafe or Diminution from 
 any thing without him. In this latter Sence 
 we alcribe the word Greatnefs to him by Ana- 
 logy; which is therefore worthy of him, be- 
 caule it is an apt and correfpondent Repreftn- 
 tation of that iupreme Dominion of his Over 
 all) which is otherwife utterly Incompreheu- 
 fible and Ineffable ; according to that Saying 
 of David, There is no End, 120 no Scrutiny, or 
 Knowlege or Conception of his Greatnefs, as it is 
 in it felf 
 
 I n relation to this laft head of Attributes, 
 it will be neceffary to obferve thefe three 
 things particularly. 
 
 i. That we attribute the very Term U- 
 nity, together with the Conception annexed to 
 
 it, 
 
ANALOGY. 303 
 
 it, to the divine Nature, by Analogy with One 
 Man. This being the only dired Idea or Con- 
 ception we have for the Unity of One Intelli- 
 gent Nature ; this therefore is the Conception 
 which neceflarily Hands in the Mind to repre- 
 fent the divine Unity, and recurs as often as 
 we fay God is One. The Neceffity of which 
 arifes from hence ; That tho' it may be evident- 
 ly proved, there can be no more Gods but One, 
 yet How or after what Real Manner he is one 
 In him/elf, we have not the leaft Conception 
 or Idea: We cannot fingle him out as one in 
 our Imagination j nor could we diftinguifh them 
 by the Intellect, and reckon them, if it were 
 poffible there could be More Gods than one. 
 For which Reafbn God is ftyled by the Fathers 
 'T7r*ecl7rii%os Above all Infinity, in relpecl: of Num- 
 ber or Extenfion. 'T^a^p?™? Above all Num- 
 ber. They affert him not to be One in Number ; 
 to be 'AxaTavcpwrev tv An Unity without any 
 Word to exprefs it. Uanog hog v7re(>tx,7rAovf*.ivov A 
 tranfcendent Simplicity above all Unity: And fay 
 that he is 'rxsj 7roL<rav d7rAcTqTa Above all Sim- 
 plicity ; purfuant to which he is in. Bernard's 
 Style called Uniffimus. Now fince the Real 
 Unity of God is thus incomprehensible as it is in 
 it felf, and apprehended by Analogy only 
 with our Conception of one human Intelligent 
 Agent ; it is plain the Terms Individual and 
 Numericaly one, can have no Sence or Mean- 
 ing when applyed to the Divinity. Becaufe 
 tho' they denote an Unity, yet they at the fame 
 time Imply and Connote a Multiplicity, either 
 
 Attualy 
 
304 DIVINE 
 
 ABualy or Potential]/: And are therefore pro- 
 perly enough ufed to exprefs the Unity of fuch 
 Intelligent Agents of whom there may be More 
 in Number of the fame Kind; or of fuch things 
 as we can diftinguifh in the Imagination by 
 Number, and even point out with the Finger. 
 They ferve very well to exprels an Intelligible 
 and Directly conceivable Unity with a good 
 Emphafis ; but to lay God is Individual)/ or 
 Numericaly one, or that he is one Individual 
 Subflance, or Numericaly one Subftance, is lb far 
 from being emphatical; that it is altogether 
 fencelefs and impertinent: From whence it 
 appears not only how ufelefs, but how mifr 
 chievous thefe Terms are in all our Con tro ver- 
 ifies with Heretics and Infidels." 
 
 z. That all the Arguments drawn by A- 
 rians, Socinians, and Deifts, from the Unity of 
 God, againft the orthodox Doctrine of the Tri- 
 nity, are altogether inconclufive and without 
 any Foundation. For there are but thefe two 
 ways for them to proceed. Either they muft 
 conceive the divine Unity pofitively and by A- 
 nalogy with that which is human ; and then 
 no juft Inference can be drawn from any thing 
 in the human Nature, to the reality of fbme- 
 thing of the Same Kind in the Divine Nature; 
 fince nothing, is more fure, than that the true 
 Nature, and Kind, and Manner of Unity in one, 
 and in the other is infinitely different : And if 
 they adhere to this Analogy, the whole Ar- 
 gument will turn againft them; for tho' in 
 
 th» 
 
ANA T7D G Y. 305 
 
 this way, the Diftin&forf of Spirit, and Soul, 
 and Body in Man, is no direct PrOofof a Tri- 
 nity ; yet it is a good Prefumption againffc 
 them ; this being at leaft a diftant Illuftration 
 of an incomprehenfible Diftin&ion in that di- 
 vine Nature, after whofe Likenefs and in whole 
 own Image we are fo exprefly faid to be formed. 
 Or, if they reject, this Analogy, then it is evi- 
 dent they can have no other than a merely 
 Negative Notion of the divine Unity ; that is 
 a Conception that there can be No more Gods 
 than one: And they themfelves muft. allow 
 that none of their Reaibnings from a Purely 
 negative Notion in our Mhtd, can juftly infer 
 any thing againft the Pofllbiltiy of a Real and 
 Pofitive tho- Jncomprehinjible difrin&ion in the 
 Intrinflc Nature oi God. • ' 
 
 3. That as we neceiTarily conceive the 
 Unity of God, by that of one Man, or one 
 human Intelligent Agent ; lb we have no other 
 way of fpeaking of him but as we do of one of 
 our felves, in the third Perfon of Verbs'; arid 
 as it is particularly in the Latin and the Greek, 
 by the mafeufine Article, and Adjectives of the 
 fnafciiline Gender. And yet it is a very evil as" 
 well as iehcelefi way of fpeaking, which our 
 modern Arians ate fallen into, to Fay the Pet* 
 fort of God-, and it h yet toorfe to argue him, as 
 they do, to be bat Owe Ferfon. For if they trie 
 tfte term Perfon in a Mfapfoorical' Sente when 
 applied to God, it is a Metaphor without any 
 real Meaning; that is, for fopiething uttedy* 
 
 X and 
 
3o6 DIVINE 
 
 and intirely incomprehensible} for what is nei- 
 ther DireBly conceivable, nor to be apprehend- 
 ed by any Analogy; fo that Thus it is a Meta- 
 phor for Nothing, or for. No Perfon at all. If 
 they attribute this Term to God, on the quite 
 Contrary in its ftridtly literal Propriety, it is 
 highly impious ; and the very fame thing as to 
 afiert and argue him to be literaly one Manj 
 for Perfon and Man in their literal Propriety 
 and Meaning, and with regard to any direct 
 Conception we can affix to the word Perfon, 
 aje equivalent Terms : And yet this the Arians 
 are neceflitated to do ; becaufe their whole 
 Scheme of Religion is built upon the ftrittly 
 proper and literal Acceptation of that Term ; 
 for which Realbn they proceed fo far as to ar- 
 gue him to be one Individual numerical Perfon. 
 Nay if we even take the middle way, and apply 
 the word Perfon to God in its Analogical Ac- 
 ceptation, it is highly abfurd and unjuftifiable, 
 Becaufe as God is no Perfonal Term among 
 Men themfelves, but a Name appropriated by 
 us to the Divine Being ; fo it can admit of no 
 Analogical Word to exprefs it. Whereas Father, 
 and Sop, and Spirit, are in themfelves Terms 
 of Analogy ; fir ft appropriated to Man/ and 
 thence transfered to the divine Nature ; they 
 are Perfonal Denominations and Diftinclions ; 
 And accordingly the Term Perfon can be trans- 
 fered together with them by Analogy likewife; 
 to exprefs that incomprehenfible Diftindtion in 
 the divine Nature with- great Aptitude and 
 Significancy. 
 
 III. A 
 
A k A L d G 'x> 367 
 
 III. A Third Kind of Attributes uhdef 
 this Head are luch as we apprehend by Ana-> 
 logy with the Mind of Man. The Spirit of 
 a Man is that immaterial Part of our Frame, 
 which is in luch intimate Unjon with the Bo- 
 dy j that the moft abftra&ed of its Operations 
 are not performed only In the Body, or By thd 
 Body as ah Inftrument: But by both of therri 
 together, ib efferitialy blended into one Na- 
 ture ; that neither of them can act in our 
 Frame either in ftparation from each other, or 
 feciprocaly on each other as diftinft or difuhit- 
 ed Agents. This is to be carefully diftinguifh- 
 ed from the Mind, which is' a Principle in Us 
 relulting from that effential Union of Spirit 
 and Matters the Anions and Operations of" 
 which are the Operations not of the Spirit 
 bniy, but of the intire Individual Mari'com- 
 pofed of both. The Mind is a Word of a 
 more general Signification than that of the i#- 
 Hlk&i which is reftrained to the Operations! 
 of Thinking and Knowlege alone,, and the la- 
 teral Modifications of them. It is called the* 
 Soul, as it takes in all the Paffions arid Affec- 
 tions in human Nature which are the more 
 immediate Subjects of Virtue and Gdodnels in 
 us. And it is called Confcience, in refpecl of that 
 inward Knowlege we havef of our felves, relat-* 
 ing particularly to Religion and Morality ; to 
 the reftrainirigour Appetites, the Regulation of 
 our £ affions arid Affe&ions ; and to the Degrees 
 
 X 2 ©f 
 
3 o8 DIVINE 
 
 , of our Attainments in the Pra&ice of all In- 
 stances of Virtue and Holinefs. 
 
 . As we transfer this Mind of ours to God| 
 by Analogy, and {peak as familiarly of the 
 Mind of God as we do of the Mind of Man; 
 $6 we likewife transfer all the Faculties and 
 Operations of it to reprefent correfpohdent At- 
 tributes and fimilar Perfe&ions in his Nature.' 
 
 The firft of its Faculties, or rather Opera- 
 tions, is that of Under/landing, with all the va- 
 rious Ixodes thereof, as Thinkings Knowings 
 Reafoning, Perceiving, apprehending, Difcern- 
 ing, and Judging ; together with Wifdom the 
 greate,ft Perfection of our tJnderftandmg. Nay 
 we thus attribute to God the very Operation 
 of Memory, which in Man is a Power of re- 
 viving our Ideas when they are grown obfcure 
 and confuted ; and of bringing intQ View all 
 bur various Notions and Conceptions'. Thus 
 we fay God Calls to Mind, that he Remembers-, 
 and we apply to him, in an Analogical Sence> 
 the fevqral Expreffions which relate. tQ a Re- 
 colJe£fi(m ti of former Tranfa&ions. 
 
 N 6 vv it is very natural for Men here to run 
 into tfiis, miftake : That there is no other dif- 
 ference between the Knowlege of God and! 
 Man than this ; that whereas we know but very 
 few ^things,, fuch as are paft and prefer, an4" 
 that in an imperfed Degree too; God knpws 
 3 all 
 
ANALOGY. 309 
 
 all things Paft, Prefcnt, and to come, and in 
 the raoft perfect Degree. This it imuft be con- 
 fefTed is the common and ordinary Method of 
 conceiving this and the other Attributes of 
 God j and it were well if our avowed and clan : 
 deftine Enemies had left the World in quiet 
 and peaceable Poffeffion of that innocent way 
 of thinking. But fince they toferve a vile Hy- 
 pothesis, have with uncommon 2eal and Ear- 
 neftnefs maintained the Attributes of God iri 
 general, to be of the very fame Kind with thofe 
 which are in us : It is now become neceflary to 
 put this whole Matter in the Light the Reader 
 will find it here j and to obferve in refpecT: of 
 the divine Knowlege in particular, that it is fb 
 far from being of the fame Kind wtfh ours ; 
 that all the Knowlege we have doth not only 
 take its firft. Rife from our Senfations, but is 
 built upon them 5 and hath no other original 
 Foundation but thole Seals or Impreffions they 
 leave upon our Imagination, which we call 
 Ideas. The Mind, of Man works upon theft 
 mean Materials, this we call thinking ; thefe it 
 compounds, or divides, and alters at Pleafure, 
 and raifes up to it felf from thence a great 
 many Notions and Conceptions, formed out of 
 thele confidered jointly with the Operations of 
 the Intellect : It makes many Inferences and De- 
 ductions from thefe ; then it forms to it felf le- 
 veral Conclufibris, Maxims, and Principles ; this 
 we call Knowlege \ and when upon Obfervatiori 
 and Experience we find our Notions, and Con- 
 clufions, and Maxims to be juft, and regulate 
 
 X 3 • our 
 
310 DJVINE 
 
 pur Conduct by them, particularly in choofing; 
 proper means to obtain a commendable End, 
 we call that Wifdom. Laftly, when we transfer 
 merely fenfitive Ideas to things fpiritual and 
 immaterial which are not dire&ly perceptible, 
 we call it divine Metaphor : When we lubfti-: 
 tute the Notions and Conceptions of our own, 
 human Perfections to Hand for Similar and Cor- 
 refpondent Perfe&ions in thole Beings, that we 
 may think and Ipeak of things otherwile incon- 
 ceivable and ineffable ; we call that divine Ana- 
 logy. , When by help of this divine Analogy, 
 things fupernatural and otherwile incomprehen- 
 sible, and the divine Nature and Properties in 
 particular, are rendered the Objects of our Rea- 
 ibning v and Meditation, as far as Man can lee 
 by the Light of Nature ; and When we from, 
 thence deduce rules of Behaviour in the dif* 
 ferent relations of Life; this* we call Natural 
 Religion or Morality. When there is a farther 
 J)ifcovery of things fupernatural and incom-> 
 prehenfible, and of the divine Being in parti- 
 cular, youchfefed to us by an additional Light 
 from Heaven; not by any immediate Rays 
 which ftrike bireffly upon the Eye of the Mind : 
 But by Reflexion only from the Earth ; that 
 the Myfteries of another World might be fuit- 
 ed to our Capacities by Semblance and Repre- 
 sentation of things natural and human which 
 ?reeafy, familiar, and directly perceivable;, this 
 is Revelation. 
 
 \ \ ■ f 
 
 And now who will fay that the Knowlegc 
 
 "of 
 
ANALOGY. 311 
 
 of a pure Spirit, independent of all Matter, 
 without any Labour of the Brain, or ufe of 
 Animal Spirits; infinitely removed from all 
 Senfation ; in no fence Progreflive ; intirely 
 without the help of Semblance or Reprelenta- 
 tion; no way intermediate; and without the 
 need of Reflection, or Metaphor, or Analogy ; 
 and for which human Language cannot fupply 
 a ftrictly proper Term or Expreffion : In fhort 
 a Knowlege without a Mind, without Ideas, 
 without Thinking, without all Reafoning or 
 Deduction ; fueh as that the Knowlege even of 
 the moft exalted Being of the Creation can 
 no more be of the lame Kind with it, than he 
 himfelf can be of the lame Effence or Subftance 
 with .God. Who then I fay, will prelbme to 
 affirm that: liich a divine Knowlege is of the 
 lame Kind with ours ; and that if it were 
 not, a Man could not fpeak with Truth when 
 he lays, God knows ? All I contend for is, that 
 he Knows more truly than we do; that our 
 Knowlege is but a diftant Image only or Sem- 
 blance of what is in him an infinite incom- 
 prebenfible Perfection : And that for want 
 of any direct Idea or Conception, and proper 
 Term for the Latter, we are under a NeceC- 
 fity of ufing the lame Word and Conception 
 in common for them both. It is the great 
 weaknefs of human Underftanding, that we 
 have not a very different Conception of that 
 divine Perfection which we denote by the 
 word Knowlege j and the Ihortnels of human 
 Language, r that we have not a proper Term 
 laexprefs if, *& 4 The 
 
312 DIVINE 
 
 The other great Property or Operation of 
 the Mind is that of Willing. According to the 
 vulgar Notion, the Will, more particularly as 
 it refpe&s Religion and Morality, is confidered 
 as a diftincl: Principle or Faculty in the Mind of 
 Man ; which qualifies him for choofing indif- 
 ferently, what the Underftanding fhall judge to 
 be moraly Good or EviL Whereas this is but 
 a crude and ill digefted Notion, that God fbould 
 from the firft create Intelligent Agents with 
 any Principle or Faculty in their Frame equaly 
 free and Indifferent to what was moraly Good 
 or Evil. No, they were all, and Man in par- 
 ticular, originaly formed with a Voluntary In« 
 clination and Tendency of all their Powers 
 and Faculties to Good only ; and moral Free- 
 dom in Man muft be ultimately relblved, not 
 into any one peculiar Faculty of the Mind 
 diftincl: from the reft, which we call the Will: 
 But into the Original inherent Prevalency of 
 the purely fpiritual Part of our Frame ; which 
 in a ftate of Innocency was the predominant 
 Ingredient in our Corrftitution, by means of 
 which we were intirely free and inclinable to 
 Goodnefs in All our Powers and Faculties ; lb 
 as to have neither a Knowhge of moral Evil, 
 nor the leaft Will or Inclination towards it* 
 but only a Power of incurring Evil. By the 
 Fall that moral Freedom was miferably im- 
 paired, and almoft loft together with that Pre- 
 valency of the Spirit;, and the whole Purpofe 
 and Defign of all Religion Natural and Reveal- 
 ed 
 
A N A L O G Y. 313 
 
 ed is to recover in us this original prevailing 
 Tendency of the Spirit ; that we may regain 
 a more commendable degree of that Freedom, 
 from the Load and PrefTure of bodily Appe- 
 tite,, together with the exorbitant Paffions and 
 Inclinations of the Soul ; which bear down the 
 Spirit along with them to the Earth, where it 
 wallows in Dirt and Filthineis; and cannot, 
 without the divine Affiftance, commendably 
 raife it felf above the Objects of Senfe and Ap- 
 petite, the groveling worldly Aims and Views 
 of a corrupt and vitiated Mind. 
 
 This Liberty, or Freedom of ours, both 
 Natural and Moral, we expreft by the Term 
 Will, and this is transfered to God by Analo- 
 gy ; together with all the Forms we have of 
 fpeaking concerning our own human Will, 
 Such as Eleflion, Reprobation, Choq/ing, Refuf- 
 irtg, Good Will and Pleafare, Doing the Will 
 of God, Fulfilling his Will; and every other- 
 Fhrafe we ufe for a freedom of Adion, or ib? 
 our voluntary Operations of Body or Mind. 
 
 Tho' this is not the proper Place to enlarge 
 upon human Liberty. and Freedom; yet I can- 
 not forbear remarking the many erroneous 
 Opinions, and groundlefs Difputes and Con- 
 troversies, very tedious and full of Obfcurity 
 and Confufion, which have been occafioned 
 both in Metaphyfics and Divinity, by that mi- 
 ftaken Notion of the Will as a I>iftinEi Facul-r 
 ty and Principle of Liberty in the Mind of 
 
 Man, 
 
3i* DIVINE 
 
 Man. It would require a Volume to recite 
 them all, from the Monothelites (who aflert- 
 ed Chrift to have but one Will) down to the 
 feventeenth of the fifty five Arian Propofitions, 
 wherein it is aflerted, that Chrift is derived 
 from the Father by an Aft- of his Will, and 
 not by a mere Neceffity of his Nature: The 
 Author of which had a celebrated Conteft with 
 a certain Foreign Antagonift of Name, con** 
 cerning human Liberty and Freedom upon 
 that vulgar Notion. And I leave any indif- 
 ferent Perfbn to judge from the Event, whe- 
 ther, if they had knocked thofe two learned 
 Metaphyfical Heads together, to try which was 
 hardeft; they had not ftruck out as much 
 Light for the Information and Benefit of 
 Mankind, as they have done by that Con- 
 troverfy ? Had they entered upon an eager 
 and zealous Debate thro' whole Volumes, 
 whether a Man Thinks, or not ; would it not 
 all be refolved into this at laft, that we are 
 conlcious to our felves that we do certainly 
 think ? And if all the Learning and Meta* 
 pbyfics in the World were laid out in prov- 
 ing that we have not the Power of Thinking ; 
 one fingle Inftance of Thought or Self-con- 
 Icioufnefs would overturn it all. The very 
 fame theatrical Folly it is in Men, to run into 
 tedious abftra&ed and intricate Debates, con- 
 cerning the Liberty and Freedom of human 
 Actions from any internal Neceility or exter- 
 nal Compulfion j fince the Point can never be 
 ptherwife determined than' by a like Self-con* 
 "4 fcioufnefs, 
 
ANALOGY. 315 
 
 fcioufhefs, whereby we come to the certain 
 Kno\ylege of our Power of Thinking, 
 
 IV. A% other Head of divine Attributes 
 are fuch as are conceived by the Paffions and 
 AffzBionSy and Inclinations or "Difpafitions of an 
 human Soul, This, as. I obfprved before, is but 
 another Word for the Mind, only limited to 
 Matters of Religion and Morals in particular j 
 and efpecialy as it is the Seat of all our Paffions 
 and Affections and Inclinations, which are the 
 more immediate Subjects of moral Good or Evi^ 
 according as they are dire#ed to their proper 
 Objects, that is chiefly to things above ; and are 
 under a due Conduct and Regulation; Or as 
 they are on the contrary fuffered to grow head- 
 ftrong and rampant, fo as to become paft all 
 Check and Guidance of the Spirit or Inner Man, 
 in St. Paul's Phrafe ; which having once let gq 
 the Reins, is unexpectedly run away with ; npt 
 without much helplefs ^Terror and Reluctance, 
 into utter Ruin and Deftruction in clear full 
 Profpeft before his Eyes, but certain and inevi- 
 table. Even this human Soul of ours is frequent- 
 ly attributed to God in Scripture by Analogy ; 
 and fb are our Pafiions and Affections, fuch as 
 Love, AverJion % Angei;^ and Difpleafure t Pity 
 and Compajfiony Hatred^ Pleajure, and fuch like y 
 by the help of which we conceive incomprehen- 
 sible Perfections in his Nature, correfpondenfc 
 to our Paffions and Affections duly regulated. 
 Concerning thefe I fhall only make thefe feyf 
 |frOrt, Oj&fervation^. 
 
 I. First, 
 
3 i6 DIVINE 
 
 i. First, That thefe PafBons, and Affec- 
 tions or Inclinations, are fb far from being of 
 the fame Kind in God with what they are in 
 us ; that, as our Church afferts, there are none 
 6f them in him, who is without Body, Parts, 
 or Pajfions. He can no more have any of this 
 Kind of Paffions and Affe&ions or Inclinations, 
 than he can have an human Soul, or human 
 Mind : And this he cannot have without a fpi- 
 ritual and bodily Subftance blended together 
 in his Nature; framed and conftituted for a 
 Principle of mixed and compounded Acls, of 
 a quite different Kind from thole of pure Spi- 
 rit ; or of Matter intirely disjoined and feparate 
 from Spirit. The very Import and Etymolo- 
 gy of thole Words taken in a literal Sence fhew, 
 how unworthy they are of the divine Nature ; 
 the Term Paffions expreffes that Suffering or 
 Paffivenefs of the Mind, and that ienfible Com- 
 motion of the Blood and Spirits which is con- 
 sequent to each of them, in Proportion to the 
 Strength and Violence to which they arrive. 
 Affections is a Term one Degree farther remov- 
 ed from Sence, and bodily Commotion ; and 
 yet they have their Name from affecting us even 
 in our bodily Parts, fometimes very ftrbngly 
 and fenfibly ; and they frequently become vi- 
 able to others in our very Countenance. The 
 Inclinations are to the Mind , what Appetites 
 are to the Body ; more remote and concealed 
 from the Oblervation of others ; They are 
 deeper rooted in the Mind and never difcover 
 
 them- 
 
AN A L O G Y. 3 i 7 
 
 themfelves otherwife than by putting the Pat 
 Sons into motion 5 and letting them to worfc 
 towards the Objects to which we fccretly incline* 
 And yet even thefe Inclinations are not exerted 
 without an inward. Feeling or Confcioufheis, of 
 fbme Workings and Commotion within us i 
 and are not any Operations of the pure Spirit 
 alone, but proceed ftom it in Concurrence with 
 the imperceptible Fibres of the- Body and our 
 Animal Spirits. Now if the Inclinations of the 
 Mind, which are moft remote from all fenfible- 
 Commotjon, are fo unworthy of God, and of a. 
 quite different Kind from any of the divine Per- 
 fections : Surety our Bajpons and AffeStiom, 
 which are attended with inch fenfible bodilyv 
 Commotions as even to become often vifible. 
 in the Countenance, muft be much more un- 
 worthy of him. Nay tho' we fliould remove 
 from all thefe every Imperfe&ion and'irregula.- 
 rity to which they are fubje&j all Corruption, 
 Un.eaftneis,, and Difturbance j. we could not. 
 however attribute them to God in a literal Ac?v 
 captation and Meaning : For at bell they are 
 the. Refult and Operations of Matter and Spirit, 
 in an eflential; Union, and confidered as the 
 cohftituent Ingredients of the Mind or Soul of 
 Man ; infomuch that to fay the Body is the In- 
 ftrument of the Spirit, is fuch another Impro- 
 priety of Speech, as to fay the Spirit is the Ir-t 
 ffrument of the Body. 
 
 i. That tho' there can be literaly none of 
 thftfe PafBons, and Affs&ions. or Inclinations in, 
 
 God, 
 
$iS 15 I V I N £ 
 
 God, of the fame Kind with ours 5 yet they being 
 albribed to him all thro'the Scriptures, Men have 
 not been fufficiently aware of their Rafhnels in 
 peremptorily aflerting that there are no Paffions 
 iri him j without removing the Objection which 
 h £0 natural and obvious againft that too gene- 
 tal Aflertion : Namely, that then what is lpoken 
 Of God thro' the Scripture in the Style of human 
 Paffions, can have no determinate and intelligi- 
 ble Meaning. If he is altogether without any 
 Paffions at all, then the Terms expreffive of 
 them mult be altogether without a lolid and ufe- 
 full Meaning when they are lpoken of him. This 
 Objection, I lay, ftiould at the lame time have 
 been removed, by fhewing that the'' there are 
 ilo Paffions or Affections in God of the fame Kind 
 •with ours i yet there mult be luch a eorrelpond- 
 ent Similitude or Proportion between lbme in- 
 comprehenfible Perfections of the divine Nature, 
 and our human Paffions and Inclinations, as is 
 a lure Foundation for a Parity of Realbn be- 
 tween them : Such as fhall render the Language 
 of Our Affections expreffive of lbmething as real, 
 and true, and anfwerable, when they are alcrib . 
 ed to God; as when they are lpoken of Man in 
 their moft ftrid and literal Propriety. Since no 
 Man fcruples to attribute the Affection of Love 
 to God, in order to exprels a correfpondent Per- 
 fection in his Nature ; whv fhould we not at- 
 tribute to him after the lame manner, thole o- 
 ther Affections I have mentioned? For they 
 being not only Perfections in our human Na- 
 ture, when duly directed j but alio fb many O- 
 
 perationft 
 
ANA LOGY. 319 
 
 derations f the Mind, cannot be afcribed to 
 God by mere Metaphor : But are transferee! 
 to him by the fame Kind of Analogy with 
 the other Perfections and Operations of it; and 
 particularly with the virtuous Difpofitions of 
 the Soul; with which they have lb clofe a 
 Connexion, that moft of our inward Virtues 
 and Graces confift in the due Conduct and Re- 
 gulation of our Paffions and Affections. And 
 therefore if you take away all that true and real 
 Similitude and correfpondency, which makes 
 them analogous Reprefentations of Ibme di- 
 vine Perfections ; you render them as void of 
 all Sence and Meaning when fpoken of God, 
 as if they were fo many inarticulate Sounds. 
 
 T q take off any furprize this may give the 
 Reader, it muft be confidered ; that tho' our 
 moft commendable Paffions are now become 
 very faint and diftant Repreientations of the 
 divine Perfections; becaufe of that milerable 
 moral Crookednefs and Diftortion of them 
 even at the beft, from their native Uprightness 
 and Regularity : Yet in a State of Innocence, 
 they were fo far from being attended wjth any 
 moral Corruption, or uneafinefs and ruffling, 
 either of Body or Mind ; that they then tended 
 to their proper Objects with a moft delightful 
 Serenity, and were the more immediate In- 
 ftruments both of our Virtue and Happinels. 
 Their whole Bent and Tendency was to moral 
 Goodneis, without any Reluctance or Mur- 
 muring of the Soul j from whence aiofe an 
 
 uniform 
 
320 DIVINE 
 
 uniform Pleaiure and unmingled Complacence 
 of Mind in our firft Parents j heightned by a 
 Profped and Confcioufhefs within them, of 
 that lively Refemblance and Similitude they 
 bore to the Fountain of all Perfe&ion, after 
 whofe Image they were created. In that bleffed 
 State of Harmony and Agreement among all 
 the Powers and Faculties of human Nature, 
 we may well prefume our Paffions had a vaft- 
 ly greater and more complete Conformity to 
 the divine Perfections : And were luch lively 
 Tranferipts of them, that our whole manner 
 of thinking and fpeaking of God now, by A- 
 nalogy with them, muft ftill exhibit to us 
 ibmethihg" real and correfpondent in refpe& of 
 him ; even in this State of Imperfe&ion and 
 Degeneracy. And when thefe Paffions of ours, 
 which are ft* generaly vitious and contempti- 
 ble,, are in fome good Degree fet right again 
 in this Life, under the Regulation and Con- 
 duct of ReafBn and Religion ; and come to 
 lecerve- a proportionable Improvement with 
 the reft of our Nature at the great Change: 
 Then will it appear how bright and ftiining 
 Reprefentations they are of the incomprehen- 
 fible PbrfeflKons of the Divinity ; and the glo- 
 rious Refemblance will become more Corripi* 
 cuous and Admirable. 
 
 3. That tho' m a State of Innoeence all 
 the FacuMcs and Operations of the Mind, our 
 Intellect, and Reafon, and WiH; our Paffions 
 and Afifedfons and Inclinations; and thofe Vir- 
 tues 
 
A N A L O d Iti 321 
 
 tues arid Graces of our Souls which confift in 
 the due Condud and Regulation of them, were; 
 all of them equaly intire and lively Images and 
 Reprefentations of the divine Perfections : Yet 
 in the State of Corruption and Degeneracy wef 
 now are, our Paffions and Affections carry in 
 them but a Degree of Analogy inferior to the 
 reft ; as having more of bodfly Difturbancd 
 and Commotion in their Compofition^ and a 
 greater Concurrence of the material Part of 
 our Frame, than the Intellect and Will; or 
 thole virtuous Dilpofitions of the Soul, which 
 become no otherwile confprcuous than in the 
 external Performances which proceed front 
 them. Thefe are more remote from Senfe, and 
 from any Impreffions made on the grofler and; 
 vifible Parts of the Body, than our Paffions $ 
 And feem therefore to us to approach nearer; 
 to the Operations of Beifigs altogether irnma-* 
 terial ; and for that Reafbn to be more apt 
 and complete Similitudes and Reprelentationsr 
 of the correfpondent Perfections in the divine 
 Nature. But the Paffions and Affections be- 
 ing attended with fo many different irregular: 
 Commotions of bur fenlible bodily Parts, cauf- 
 ed by an Inclination towards what is grateful 
 and agreeable j or an Averlation from what is 
 unpleafant and difagreeable, are therefore to 
 be confidered in a lower Degree of Analogy : 
 As it were in the middle betwixt the purely 
 Intellectual Powers of the Mind, on one Side* 
 and our bodily Senles and' Members, in the 
 other extreme i which laft, together with the 
 
 Y Ideas 
 
322 D I V I N-E 
 
 Ideas of other things merely lenlible and ma- 
 terial, can be afcribed to God in Metaphor 
 only, as having no Foundation of a Similar 
 and Correfpondent Reality in the Divine Na- 
 ture. 
 
 4. £, a s t l y, From hence we may obferve 
 wherein confifts the true Kind and Manner of 
 our Imitation of God, with refpect to our hu- 
 man Paflions, and Affections, or Inclinations. 
 Nothing is more evident than that there can 
 be no Imitation of what we do not at all know j 
 and if all the divine Perfections are altogether 
 inconceivable to us as they are in them lei ves, 
 they muft all likewife be in the lame Sence 
 altogether inimitable. What then muft we 
 mean when we fpeak of our Imitation of God, 
 and of his Perfections; Surely we mean that 
 we are to imitate them, after the fame manner 
 we come to know them ; our Imitation muft 
 be agreeable and proportionable to our Know- 
 lege and Conceptions ; So that if we know and 
 conceive them no otherwile than by Analogy 
 with our own human Properties, particularly 
 our Affections and Inclinations ; we can have 
 no other method for our Imitation. This muft 
 be as mediate and indirect and Analogical as 
 our Knowlege ; and muft confift in the Exercife 
 of a vaftly lower and inferior Kind of Powers 
 and Faculties, regulated according to that 
 Knowlege we are able to procure of the Pat- 
 tern and Original of all Perfection. As the di- 
 vine Being is absolutely perfect in himfelf, fo 
 
 ought 
 
ANAL OOY. 323 
 
 ought it to be the whole endeavour of our 
 Lives to improve our Nature -in the utmoft 
 degree of Perfection poffible to Creatures of 
 our Kind. As the internal Difpofitions of the 
 Divinity, as well as the external Exertions of 
 them, are always directed according to his infi- 
 nite tV^ifdom and Knowlege, which are Ana- 
 logous to thole Properties in us called by the 
 fame Names : So ought our Inclinations and 
 Affections and Paffions, which are likewife cor- 
 refpondeqt to the Divine Difpofitions and Af- 
 fections, to be conftantly regulated agreeably 
 to the Dictates of Realbn, improved and culti- 
 vated to the utmoft of our Power, and guided 
 by the beft Light we can procure. Confequent- 
 ly all this muff be performed, by taking off our 
 Paffions and Affections from the things of this 
 World, and placing them upon their moft no- 
 ble and proper Objects, the things of another f 
 That is, from things whereof we have direct 
 and immediate Conceptions and Ideas, to 
 things altogether imperceptible and incompre* 
 henfible to us as they are in themielves, and of 
 which we have only mediate and reprefenta- 
 tive Conceptions. Or in the Apoftle's Expref- 
 fion, Setting our Affections on things above, and 
 not on things on the Earth ; and again, Look* 
 ing at the things that are not feen. The invifi- s 
 ble things of God which are clearly feeh~^-being 
 underjlood by the things that are made. 
 
 Our Imitation of God therefore in this re- 
 •fpect, confifts in the due Regulation of our 
 
 Y a Paffiona 
 
3^4 DIV I N E 
 
 Paffions according to the governing Part of out 
 compound Nature •, and in reftoring them as 
 near as we can to that original ftate of Recti- 
 tude and Perfection, wherein they gave us a 
 much greater Refemblanee and Similitude of 
 the incomprehenfible Perfections of the Divini- 
 ty : By railing them up to Heaven ancLthings 
 divine ; not viewed directly, but in tnofe re- 
 prefentative Images only which we have of 
 fuch Beings ; by placing them on God, as the 
 primary and ultimate Object of them all, but 
 ftill conceivable only by Analogy • and by 
 leaving the things of this World no farther 
 ftiare in our Affections, than in proportion to 
 the Relation they bear to him, and as far, on- 
 ly as they are confiftent with his more imme- 
 diate Service. They who difallow this Analog 
 gical manner of Imitating., as well as conceiving 
 God and his Perfections, do moft effectualy 
 cut off any real and Practicable Imitation of 
 him: They who preiume upon an Imitation 
 of his Perfections from any "Direct and Immedi- 
 ate Knowlege of them, or as if they were of 
 the fame Kind with any correfpondent Proper- 
 ties in us, and as if this rendered us capable of 
 an Imitation of God in an inferior Degree of 
 his moral Perfections ; may as well pretend to 
 imitate his inconceivable Effence or Subftance. 
 Nor on the other hand can Men account for 
 all that is fpoken of God thro' the whole Scrip- 
 ture, in the Language of>bur commendable 
 human Paffions, Affections,. and Inclinations; 
 otherwife than upon a Supposition that they 
 
 muft 
 
ANALOGY. 325 
 
 muft all refer to fbme incomprehenfible Perfec- 
 tions of his : For to what Ufe or Purpofe are 
 all thole Terms if they are mere Figures only 
 and Metaphors for Nothing in God ; and how 
 could they excite our Love, and Gratitude,- 
 ajffl Admiration of him; or be any Pattern 
 or Example for our Imitation, unlefs they 
 exhibited to our Underftanding lbmething as 
 real and a&ual, tho* not of the lame Kind, on 
 the Part of- the divine Nature, as of the Hu«- 
 man ? 
 
 Alas for thole fiery Zealots againft Ana- 
 logy! It is in this that the great Dignity and 
 Excellency of our Imitation of God confiftsj 
 in bringing all our Paffions and Affections 
 and Inclinations, lb intirely under the Domi- 
 nion and Influence of the Iprritual and govern- 
 ing Part of our Frame ; that things unfeen and 
 incomprehenfible fhall become the chief Objects 
 to which they tend ; Ho that the main of our 
 Affections and Inclinations fhall be to Things we 
 know not what, in the ihort and captious Phrale 
 of our modern Arians. Yes, to things we know 
 not what, by any direct, or immediate Con- 
 ception or Idea; Yes, to things we have now 
 no other Knowlege of, but by Semblance only 
 and Analogy : And it is the farther more direct 
 and immediate Knowlege and Enjoyment of 
 them in Reverfion, which become the great 
 and prevailing Motives with us to rectify and 
 overcome that almoft inflexible Turn our Paf- 
 |ions took, fince the Fall, to things which give 
 
 Y 3 them 
 
 V 
 
326 DIVINE 
 
 them only an immediate, fenfitive, and prq- 
 lent Gratification. ••»- 
 
 Thus then, lay the Oppofers of Analogy, 
 we imitate our felves, and not God. No, the 
 giving a Loofe to the natural Corruption, a*fed 
 Irregularity, and exorbitant Tallies of our Pat- 
 fions, is more truly to be called an Imitation 
 of our felves, in our prefent State ; the regular 
 Conduct and rational Management of them is 
 no Imitation, but a real Improvement of our 
 felves, and a Reftitution of our Nature, as far 
 as we are able, to our primitive Likeneis and 
 Refemblance of the Divinity: And our gradual 
 habitual Progrefs in regaining that original 
 Likeneft, is the true and only Imitation of the 
 divine Perfections whereof we are capable. 
 Then, they will urge, in the State of Innocen- 
 cy there could be no Imitation of God. Yes, 
 a more exact and perfect Imitation of God, 
 than is poffible for us now. Our firft Parents 
 Imitation of him confifted in an Exa£i and In- 
 tire Conformity of all their Faculties and Ope- 
 rations to the great Pattern and Standard of all 
 Perfection, as far as their Nature and Kind was 
 capable. It was fuch an exact Imitation, in 
 a lower Kind, as there is now in Angels and 
 glorified Saints j which may perhaps for ever 
 receive additional Degrees of Improvement : 
 But they can never be employed as we are, in 
 warning off Stains ; and cleanfing fuch Defile- 
 ments as have miferably defaced and ruined 
 that wonderful Performance, which came out 
 
 of 
 
ANALOGY. 327 
 
 of the Hands of the divine Artift with a lively 
 and amiable Rcfemblance of himfelf. 
 
 V. The laft Head of pofitive divine Attri- 
 butes, are fiich as we conceive by Analogy with 
 our own moral Virtues and evangelical Graces. 
 Theie are what Men commonly call the Moral 
 Attributes of God; but when they hold them 
 to be of the lame Kind they are in us, they at 
 bell think very loofly, and fpeak too much in 
 the General. Whereas if we come to confider 
 them diftin&ly and in particular; we muft 
 firfl except all thole Virtues and Graces of our 
 Souls which relate to the Duty we owe our 
 felves; fiich as Ttemfertince, Cbaftity, Regenera- 
 tion, Poverty of Spirit, Meeknefi, Fortitude, Di~ 
 ligence, Humility, and fiich like : None of this 
 lbrt of Virtues are eyer attributed by any bo- 
 dy to God. Secondly, We muft remove like- 
 wife from the Divinity all thofe Virtues and 
 Graces, which come under the Head of our 
 Duty to God ; as Faith, Fearj, Hope, Tnfi, 
 Gratitude, Tkmkfulnefs, Demotion, Reverence, 
 Worjhip, and luch like : For none of thole Qua- 
 lifications or Difpofitions of our Mind, or the 
 Offices and Performances eonfequent to them, 
 which refpe£l God as our Creator and the Ob- 
 je£fc of all our Obedience and Worfhip, can be 
 any way attributed to him confiftently with 
 common Sence. So that no other of our Virtues 
 or Graces can be even imagined of the fame 
 Kind in God and us, or be rationaly afcribed to 
 him after any manner, and confequently come 
 
 Y 4 under 
 
328 DIVINE 
 
 under Confideration here ; but thofe of a third 
 Rank, which relate, altogether to the Duty we 
 owe to one another : Such as Jujlice, Mercy and 
 Compajfion, Bounty, Benignity, Liberality Truth 
 and Sincerity, Long-rfufering, Fdrgivenefs, Be-* 
 nevolence, Mildnefs, -Clemency, and fuch like; 
 by Analogy with which we conceive and repre- 
 fent to our ielves fupernatural, but fimilar and 
 correfpondent moral Perfections in the divine 
 Being, which are otherwife utterly inconceiv- 
 able and imperceptible to any Faculty in the 
 Mind of Man. ■ 
 
 Now the Queftion here is, whether any of 
 thofe moral Attributes in this laft Rank, are 
 of the fame Kind in God that they are in us ? 
 And whether the divine Perfections which we 
 term Moral, differ only in Degree, from thofe 
 in us called by the fame Names? 
 
 T o anfwer this more diftin&ly I mall here 
 again remark, that the word Virtue or Goodnefs 
 in any Inftance means ; either firft that Inward 
 Temper or Difpofition of Soul, which inclines 
 us to the outward Performance of all good 
 .Offices towards the reft of Mankind. Or Se- 
 condly, the External Exercife and Exertionoi 
 the inward good and virtuous Difpofitions of 
 the Soul, in fuch Acts and Performances as are 
 •the natural refult and Confluences of thofe 
 good Inclinations and Propenfions. Or laftly 
 the word Virtue is taken for both thefe con- 
 fldered together. If it is asked here which of 
 i , thefe 
 
ANALOGY. 329 
 
 thefe it is that we afcribe to God for a divine 
 Attribute ? I anfwer, both of them together 
 in one complex Notion or Conception ; the 
 very lame we frame to our felves of our own 
 human Virtues or moral Perfections: This be- 
 ing the beft thing we can afcribe to him, as 
 the moft apt and lively Similitude and Repre- 
 fentatian within thecompafsof our Knowlege, 
 of an incomprehenfible moral Perfection in the 
 Divinity. Now if neither the real intrinfic Dif- 
 pofition of the divine Nature to any moral Ac^ 
 tion, can be the fame in Kind with the .virtu-* 
 ous Difpofition of an human Soul or Mind, 
 which is compofed of finite Spirit and Body : 
 Nor the outward Exertions and Manifeftati-? 
 ons of moral Gbodnefs, flowing from the in- 
 trinfic divine Perfections ; are the lame in Kind 
 or Manner, with any good Actions or virtuous 
 Performances proceeding from the inward Dif-* 
 pofition of the Soul of Man ; Then the moral 
 Attributes of God cannot be of the lame Kind 
 with any of our Virtues and Graces, either in 
 Whole or in Part ; nor can we otherwife af- 
 cribe any of thele to him, than by the fame 
 Analogy thro* which we attribute to him the 
 Soul or Mind of Man, and any of its natural 
 Powers or Phyfical Properties. 
 
 This leads us directly to the true Caufe of 
 Mens great Error in imagining the moral Attri- 
 butes of God to be of the fame Kind with what 
 they are in Man. They miftafce the external 
 Exertions and Manifeftatiorjs of %b,t divine Per? 
 11 fe&ion^ 
 
33© DIVINE 
 
 fections, vifible in the Works of the Creation 
 and in the Courfe of Providence ; for the in- 
 conceivable Perfections themfelves which are in- 
 trinfic to the divine Nature, and from, whence 
 thofe Manifeftations and Effe&s Sow : And then 
 imagine the outward Perfomances of Virtue and 
 Goodnefs proceeding from the inward Inclina- 
 tion and Difpofition of our human Soul ; to be 
 of the lame Kind with the outward Exertions 
 and Manifeftations of the Perfections inherent in 
 the divine Nature. Whereas even thele have 
 a Similitude only, and Refemblance of the cor- 
 refpondent Exertions and outward Manifeftati- 
 ons of the divine Perfections 5 which are perform- 
 ed after quite a different and fupernatural Man- 
 ner ; as vaftly different, as the Power and Know- 
 lege of God and his other natural Attributes, are 
 different from thole of frail and impotent Mor- 
 tals. For want of confidejing this duly, Men 
 grofly miftake thole complex Notions we form 
 to our felves of our own Virtues and Graces, be- 
 fore we attribute them to God ; for dired Per- 
 ceptions or Ideas of moral Perfections as they are 
 inherent and even effential to the divine Nature. 
 
 I H a v e made this Point fufficiently evident 
 before ; and it cannot but already open in full 
 profpedr. to the Mind of every Reader; that no 
 Perfections inherent in the Divinity, and even 
 elfential to it (as it hath already appeared all the 
 real true Attributes of God are) can be of the 
 feme Kind with any inward Tendency or moral 
 Ptfppfition of an human Soul : And that all the 
 
 external 
 
ANALOGY. 33t 
 
 external Exertions and Actions of one Intellir 
 gent Nature, muft differ as effentialy from thole 
 pf another ; as the inherent effential Powers and 
 Faculties from whence they proceed ; and that 
 theft again muft be as different as the Eflences 
 to which they refpeftively belong, But becaufe 
 this is a point of great Importance, and cannot 
 be too plainly inculcated ; I fhall again clear it 
 up farther, by inftancing in thofe moral Attri-* 
 butes of God which have been moft contefted, 
 and always mentioned in oppofition to this 
 Doctrine of Analogy. 
 
 Goodness is a, general Word including 
 All moral Virtue in Man, and all moral Per- 
 fection in the Divinity : If Men fay that this 
 is intirely of the fame Kind in both, and diffe- 
 rent only in degree; thefe two Confequences, 
 muft neceffarily follow, neither of which they 
 themfelves will allow. Firft, That all Inftances 
 of human Goodnefs under the two firft Heads 
 of moral Virtues, which relate to God and to 
 our felves, muft be afcribed to him equal y and 
 upon the fame Foot with all the Virtues of the 
 third Rank. So that he muft have true Faith) 
 and Refignation, and Trufi^ and Devotion, and 
 Thankfulnefs ; and in refpect of himfelf he muft 
 be very Temperate, and' Chafte, and Humbl*, 
 and Patient under Affliction, and full of true 
 Contrition and Repentance ; all which tho' they 
 are great Inftances of Goodnefs in Man, yet are 
 never even imagined to be of the fame Kind 
 with any Goodnefs in God. Secondly, That 
 4 tb? 
 
332 DIVINE 
 
 the whole inward Nature and Frame, as well 
 as the internal Difpq/ition of the human Soul to 
 Goodnefs^ muft be the very lame in Kind, with 
 the intrinfic Effence as well as the Moral Per~ 
 fetfions of the Divinity. 
 
 But let us reftrain the word Goodnefs to 
 the laft mentioned Rank of Virtues only, which 
 lbme call the Social Virtues, and which make 
 up but a third Part of our moral Goodneis ; and 
 yet are by fome made the whole Sum and Sub- 
 ftance of all Virtues : By fome Men ridiculoufly 
 ranged under the general Head of Benevolence, 
 and impioufly under the Head of Honour , by 
 your Men of Honour without Conference ; and 
 both of them generaly confidered and treated 
 exclufive of our Duty to God and our felves, 
 and of the glorious Improvements of Morality 
 into evangelical Graces by Revelation. Even in 
 this Acceptation of Goodnefi, you can do no more 
 than put together the feveral different Notions 
 you form of all the Social Virtues, from the in- 
 ward virtuous Difpofitions and Inclinations of 
 an human Soul ; and from all the fiiitable Ex- 
 ertions or Exercifes of thole inward good Qua- 
 lities and Dilpofitions in external Performances, 
 into one very complex Notion compounded of 
 them all under the name of Goodnefs : And then 
 prepofteroufly attribute that very general No- 
 tion or Conception to God in the Grofs, as one 
 real Perfection of the fame Kind with a corref* 
 pondent moral Vjrtue in the Soul of Man. 
 
 But 
 
ANALOGY. 333 
 
 But they will urge, that if the outward Ex-t 
 ertions andAdts of God's Goodnels, are of the 
 lame Kind with the outward Operations and Per- 
 formances proceeding from virtuous Difpofitions 
 in us ; then the Goodnefs it lelf as it is in him, 
 is likewile of the lame Kind with what it is in 
 our Souls. IAnfwer, that the Suppofition is 
 ablblutely falle ; and I leave it again upon the 
 Objectors, if they can, to inftance in any one 
 Exertion, or Operation, or Manifestation of the 
 Divine Goodnefs, which is of the fame Kind with 
 any external Exertion or Operation of that Good- 
 nefs and Virtue which is in the Soul of Man; 
 and to (horten the Difpute I am willing to let it 
 pals for a Decifion of this Controverfy. The 
 true Nature and Manner of all the divine Ope- 
 rations of Goodnefs is utterly incomprehenfible. 
 And tho' we fee and feel and enjoy the blefled 
 Effects- and happy Confequences of infinite 
 Goodnels : Yet the Manner of Performing them 
 is as elfentialy different from the manner of a- 
 ny Exertions or Operations of our virtuous Qua- 
 lities and Difpofitions, a? his Effence, his Pow- 
 er, or his Knowlege ; and Co intirely of another 
 Kind, that they are utterly impracticable by 
 Man. It is no matter where I begin or end in 
 giving Inftances to this Purpofe. It was of his 
 Goodnefs that he Created us out of Nothing: 
 This furely is not an Operation of the lame Kind 
 with our performing, making, or building any 
 thing for the Benefit and Advantage of others. 
 It is of his Gooduefs that he Preferves us j but 
 
 this 
 
334 DIVINE 
 
 this is a Kind of Prefervation as much above 
 our Capacities, as the incomprehenfible Energy 
 of his Almighty Power: And the real manner 
 of it is as totaly different from our way of pre- 
 ierving any thing, as our living and moving 
 and having our Being In him, differs from the 
 manner of material Subftance poffeffing Place. 
 He Redeemed us by his infinite Goodnefs from 
 the Power of Death and Hell; but not as Man 
 redeems with Silver and Gold. He Sanfiijy- 
 eth us; not with Prayer and Bleffing or perib- 
 nal Exhortation, after the manner of Men; 
 but by the fecret, imperceptible, and incompre- 
 henfible Influence of his Spirit upon ours. He 
 Forgives us our Sins ; but not by word of 
 Mouth, by any Sort of temporal Pardon, or on- 
 ly by forbearing Retaliation or Punifhment; 
 but by taking away the very Guilt and Polluti- 
 on of Sin out of the Soul. He Defends us from 
 the Attempts of evil Spirits and evil Men j not 
 as Man defends by ftrength of Arm, or the ci- 
 vil Power. He Gives Food and Raiment', not 
 by directly beftowing Morfels of Meat, and 
 Changes of Garments ; but by fending us Rain 
 and Sunfhine and fruitful Sealbns, and by 
 various other imperceptible methods of his 
 Providence. By his Bounty he Provides all 
 things neceffary for our Souls and Bodies ; But 
 not as a Man may reckon to us a great Sum 
 of Money, or make a Conveyance of a Parcel 
 of Land ; or fix a Settlement for the teaching 
 Arts and Sciences, and the Inftrudion of Per- 
 fbns in the Principles of Religion. He pre- 
 
 fcribes 
 
ANALOGY. 335 
 
 fcribes and publilhes good Laws to Mankind, 
 not after the manner of human Proclamations 
 and Ads of Legiflature : But by giving us Rea- 
 fon, and Senfes, and other Faculties to difcern 
 and execute them ; and by fupernaturaly in- 
 ipiring and empowering lome Men to teach 
 and promulgate them, and to confirm their 
 Authority. And tho' the Ten Commandments 
 were written by the Finger of God, yet it will 
 be grofly abfurd to imagine evfcn that Operation 
 of the divine Goodnels; to be of the fame Kind 
 and manner with a Man's writing Laws with 
 a Pen. In Abort he Rewards Virtue even in 
 this Life; but in no one Inftance after the 
 lame manner as Man doth. He Punijbeth 
 Wickednefs even in this Life with Calamities 
 of various Kinds, and lometimes with fudden 
 Death ; but not as Man doth by Whipping or 
 Beheading or Crucifying. In thefe and all the 
 other Exertions and Operations of the divine 
 Goodnefs the Manner is effentialy different 
 from that of any good and virtuous Operati- 
 ons or Performances of ours ; and utterly im- 
 practicable and inimitable to us in any De- 
 gree. But you will lay the external Operati- 
 ons and Exertions of good Difpofitions in the 
 Soul of Man, are however like the Operations 
 and Exertions of Goodnels in God . Yes they are, 
 and lb very like that this hath been the Occa- 
 fion of Men's imagining both to be of the lame 
 Kind j Yes they have a Likeneft, and that on- 
 ly ; and this is what we affert and contend for. 
 And from thence it is that we infer an Analo- 
 gy 
 
336 Divine 
 
 gy and Refemblance of the inward virtuous 
 Difpofitions of our Souls alio, to the moral ma- 
 ternal Attributes and Perfections 1 of the Divi- 
 nity at the fame time that we think it the 
 higheft Prefumption to aflert, there is any 
 thing in us of the fame Kind with what there 
 is in the real intrinfic Nature of God. But to 
 be yet more particular* 
 
 Justice is*defined, A perpetual Will or 
 Difpo/ition of Mind to give every one his due; 
 that is in refpe£t of Property ', Reward^ and 
 Punijhment. As to the firft of them ; tho' we 
 have Property in refpeft of one another, yet no 
 Man can have any Property in refpecYofGod 
 and exclufive of him ; and therefore Juftice in 
 this Sence of the Word cannot be of the lame 
 Kind in God that it is in us. The Juftice due 
 from one Perlbn to another in the fame State 
 and Condition of Being, muft differ infinitely 
 from the Juftice of God towards; his Creatures : 
 And as for the juft Service and; Worihip which 
 is due from us to God, no Man will fay it can 
 be in any one Iriftance of the fame Kind with 
 the Juftice of God towards us. As to Rewards 
 and Punifhments, thole of God are moftly difc 
 penfed in another World, and relpecl: both Soul 
 and Body ; and therefore they cannot be of the 
 fame Kind with any Rewards and Punifhments 
 among Men. But you will fay he often re- 
 wards good Men, and inflicls temporal Pu- 
 nifhment in this Life. But how do we know 
 when it is he does this, or in what particular 
 
 Inftances? 
 
A N A L O G Y. 337 
 
 Inftances? We have no other way even of 
 gueffing at it, by our own Realbn, and till he 
 pleafes to reveal it ; than by obferving the Pros- 
 perity and Succels of lome good Men, and the 
 Misfortunes of fome wicked Men. After all 
 this, how do you frame to your felf a Notion 
 or Conception of the divine Jufticd? No other- 
 wile than by putting together thole vifible Ef- 
 fects and Confequences of it (the True Caufs 
 and Real Manner of which is altogether in- 
 conceivable and unaccountable to us, but) which 
 have a great Likeneis of our human Rewards 
 and Puniftiments; and the Confcioujhefs you 
 have of a Dilpofition and Inclination in your 
 own Mind to adminifter human Rewards and 
 Punilhments with Juftice and Equity; This 
 complex Notion or Conception you afcribe to 
 God for an Attribute ; that is, to reprefentlbme 
 real and correlpondent, but incomprehenfible 
 Perfe&ion in his Nature, which gives every Per- 
 lbn his due Reward and Punilhmentj after a 
 Manner as inconceivable by us as that intrinfic 
 Dilpofition of Mind which prompts him to thole 
 external Performances. 
 
 But you will fay, it is however an inward 
 Difpofition, or Will, or Inclination both in 
 God and Man to give every one their due 5 
 and that is Juftice ftill. Yes it is ; and what de- 
 ceives Men here is, that Juftice is neceffarily 
 a Term with us common to that virtuous Dif- 
 pofition in the Soul of Man, whereof we have 
 % Self-confeioufaefs ; And that intrinfic and 
 
 % cor- 
 
33^ DIVINE 
 
 correfpondent Perfection in the Very Nature 
 of God, which is altogether incomprehenfible. 
 And that which makes this neceflary, is our 
 having no Cohception or Idea of that Perfec- 
 tion as it is in its felf ; and therefore we are 
 obliged to conceive and name it from one of 
 our own Virtues, that, is by Similitude only 
 and Analogy with a correfpondent Perfection 
 of our Humanity. Not but that upon Re- 
 collection we cannot avoid concluding that 
 thefe two intrinfic Diipofitions, one of which 
 k literary the Virtue of Juftice in us, and the 
 Other an infinite Perfection in the divine Na- 
 ture ; muft as necefTarily be different in Kind, 
 as the Soul of Man> and the intrinfic Effence 
 or Subftance of God. 
 
 Besides (which I think ought not to be 
 omitted here) if we carry our Thoughts up to 
 the firlt Production of all Intelligent Beings, 
 the very Diftinction of Remanerateve and Vin- 
 dictive Juftice is intirely loft in relpe&ofGod; 
 and the very Notion and Conception of it muft 
 be dropped. For originaly they were all mo- 
 raly good ; and if they had continued fo, there 
 was no room left for Punitive Juftice: Not in- 
 deed upon this Supposition, could there, have 
 been arty Remunerative Juftice ; fince ther6 
 would have been then no loft Degrees of 
 moral Gobdnefs to be regained by them ; and 
 all the Bounty of God muft in fucha Gale 
 have been the Refult not of Juftice, but al- 
 together of his free Grace and Goodnefij Nay 
 3 even 
 
ANALOGY. $39 
 
 even after the fail of Men and Angels, Mi- 
 ftry became the NdWr-dl ittevitableCtonfeq'aehdS 
 of their voluntary Corruption of themfelves; 
 And they who refblve all the Punifhments 
 and Miferies 6f another Life into a purely 
 pofitive InflifiUon of God, do think with the: 
 Vulgar. Which ferves to Ihew how far We are 
 from having any direct and immediate Con- 
 ception or Mea of that irmnite Perfection in 
 God ; and how widely it differs in Kind frohi 
 the moral Virtue in us which we diftinguifh 
 by the Name of Juftice. So little do we know 
 What the real Perfection of Juftice is in the very 
 Mind of God it felf, by help of that complex 
 Notion we form of our own Virtue of Juftfce, 
 from the inward Temper and Difpofition of 
 our Souls ; together with thofe human Re- 
 wards and Punifhments, which have a Sem- 
 blance only or Similitude of thofe Acts or. 
 Operations confeqtfent to the Juftice of God, 
 in the Corrrfe of his Providence and the Manf- 
 feftations of it towards Mankind even in this 
 Life : All which we conceive and exprefs no 
 other wife, than by Analogy with the external 
 Exertions, and Operations, and Effects flow- 
 ing from an inward virtuous Difpofition and 
 Inclination of an human Soul. 
 
 Again, MetCy, in the general Sence of the 
 Word, includes all the Particulars of God's 
 Goodnefs to Mankind; in this Sence therefore 
 as it doth not differ from the divine Attribute 
 of Goodnefs, I hope no Man will now fay it 
 
 % 2. is 
 
340 DIVINE 
 
 is of the lame Kind with the Virtue of Mercy 
 in Man. As it is confidered in a duly limited 
 Acceptaion, it confifts either in forgiving In- 
 juries, and fo it is oppofed to Revenge and 
 Punifhment ; or in pitying the Miferable, 
 and lb it is oppofed to Cruelty or Hardnefs of 
 Heart. 
 
 As to the firft of thofetwo Acceptations of 
 the word Mercy ; furely our forgiving a frail 
 Fellow mortal in the, fame Rank of Being with 
 our felves, and the forgiving a Creature infi- 
 nitely different in Effence and Properties ; the 
 remitting fuch temporal bodily Puniftiments 
 as we are able to inflid, and God's Remiffion 
 of eternal fupernatural Puniftiments for Soul 
 and Body ; our forgiving outward Offences 
 only committed againft Man, and his forgiv- 
 ing the inward Guilt and Pollution of the Mind 
 contra&ed by Offences committed againft the 
 moft high and incomprehenfible God; our 
 Change from Refentment and Purpofes of Re- 
 venge to a contrary Difpofition and Temper of 
 Mind, and God's fbrgivenefs proceeding from 
 the fixed and immutable Rectitude of bis Na- 
 ture ; muft undoubtedly be as totaly different 
 moral Qualities, as the Nature and Condition 
 of God are different from ours. Nay the more 
 violent the Commotion of Mind is in us, and 
 the greater the Inclination to Revenge and 
 Punifhment is, the more exalted is that Vir- 
 tue of Mercy 'in us which overcomes it all • 
 but there is no change in God, nor are there 
 3 any 
 
ANALOGY. 341 
 
 any irregular Paflions in him to be overcome 
 and re&ifyed. Surely, I fay, none of thofe op- 
 pofite Exertions and Operations, flowing from 
 the internal Difpofitions of the divine and hu- 
 man Nature, can be any more of the lame 
 Kind ; than the divine and human Effence, or 
 the Faculties which exert themfelves in thofe 
 Operations. But you will lay it is all Mercy 
 Ml, whether in God or Man. Yes furely, but 
 not the lame Kind of Mercy. What that real 
 Perfe&ion is in the Nature of God which inclines 
 and diipofes him to fuch external, incompre- 
 henfible, inimitable A&s and Operations of 
 Mercy and forgivenels, we know not ; and for 
 this Reafon we apply that fame Term to him, 
 by which we exprels the inward Virtue and 
 Grace of Mercy whereof we have a Conlciouf- 
 nels in our felves. And becauie the external 
 Operations and Exertions of that virtuous Dif- 
 polition of Soul in us, have in them fome 
 Likenels, and Refemblance, or Analogy with 
 thole Inftances of Forgivenels confequent to 
 the intrinfic Goodnefs of God, we call them 
 both by the lame Name. When this forgiving 
 Inclination or Temper of the Soul in Man, is 
 ftrengthned and confirmed by Habit arid Per- 
 leverance ; and taken in the General, fo as to 
 include all the external Performances of it, we 
 call it Mercy : And this very complex Notion, 
 together with the Word which expreffeth it, 
 we afcribe to God,' to reprefent a correfpondenf: 
 
 divine' Attribute. <» [ 
 
 : \1 r', 
 
 Zj If 
 
342 DIVINE 
 
 If it is asked j fiace the very external Ex* 
 ertions and Operations of the divine QoadRafa 
 and Jwftke, a.nd Mercy are fo incomprekenfi-s 
 ble ; how do we know that there is any Smu* 
 litude , apd Correfpondency between them , 
 and the virtuous Performances proceeding from 
 our own Difpofitions ? I gnfwer, the very fame 
 way we came to know we were made in the 
 Jjikenefs, and after the hmgs of God. As ou» 
 Mature was oniginaly framed to his Likenefs, 
 in the Powers and Faculties of the Mind j 
 fc all the commendable Exertions, and Acls 
 and Operations of thole Powers and Facial* 
 ties, muft likewile carry in them a diftant Su 
 militude of the divine Operations : And thus it 
 is that we are enabled to think and fpeak of all 
 thofe Exertions and Operations of the divine 
 Goodnefi in every Ijnftance, which would have 
 otherwife remained utterly and intirely incon^ 
 qeivable. This ^imibfcude, even in the external 
 Operations of both, is a farther Illuftration and 
 Corroboration: of that glorious Revelation,, that 
 we are made after the Image of God and m 
 his Likenefs, And if any Man is- ftill inclined 
 to think it more than a Xikenefs; let him but 
 lay afide all Idea and Conception of Goodness; 
 or Juftjce, or Mercy, or Truth as they* are in 
 Man ; and then try whether he hath any Idea 
 or Conception left for them as they are in God. 
 If there were not a fure Foundation of Ana- 
 logy, and a lblid unerring Parity of Reafo^ 
 in" the Likeriefs both of gur inward Powers 
 •? I and 
 
A N A L O G Y. 343 
 
 and Faculties to the divine Perfections j and of 
 all the external Exertions and Operations of 
 them, to the outward Exertions and MaiiifeP- 
 tations of God's Perfections : We fhould not 
 have been able to conceive them at all; much 
 lei's to account for the Truth and Certainty of 
 any of our Conceptions of God and his Attri- 
 butes ; or for the Truth of any of our Reason- 
 ings upon the Operations, or Manifestations, 
 or Difpenfations of his Providence. 
 
 As Mercy is taken for pitying the Miser- 
 able, and for the outward Ads and Methods of 
 relieving them, which are the external Exer- 
 tions of that Virtue in the Soul of Man; it 
 cannot be of the fame Kind with the infinite 
 Perfection in the Nature of God, which in- 
 clines him to pity or relieve us ; as will plain- 
 ly appear from the Order and Procedure of this . 
 Virtue in the Mind or Soul of Man. There 
 is firft, a Confcioufiiefs of an uneafy Senfation 
 or Commotion ftirred up within us at the Men- 
 tion or Prefence of a miferable Object, and that 
 is Pity ; a Paffioa in the Soul naturaly excited 
 by a view of Pain or Affliction in any of our 
 fellow Creatures : And this is often heightened 
 and inereafed by natural Affection, or Friend- 
 fhip, or Intimacy ; and then it gets the Name 
 of Companion. When by this inward Pertur- 
 bation or Uneafinefs, together with a "rational 
 Sence of Duty to God and Man, we are 
 prompted to adminifter Help and Relief by 
 viftting the afflicted in Perfbn, actuaty fupply- 
 
 Z 4 ing 
 
344 DIVINE' 
 
 ?ng them with fbme of our own Meat and 
 Prink, or Cloaths, or Money, or Medicines j 
 then it goes by the Name of" Charity. When 
 this grows into Practice and a fettled Habit, 
 and the inward Difpbfition of the Soul is, 
 ftrengthned and confirmed by Perfeverance in 
 luch Ads and Operations, as Opportunity of- 
 fers; and exerts it felf on all fuch proper Qc-r 
 cafiops to the utmoft ; then we put all theft 
 things together into one complex Notion, and 
 call it Mercy. When all this is done, that very 
 lame complex Notion or Conception we trans- 
 fer to the Divinjty to exprels a correfpondent 
 incomprehenfible Perfection, and djftinguim it 
 by the Name of a moral Attribute : Tho' at 
 the fame Time it is evident, that not one Step 
 of that Gradation can be afcribed to him in 
 a literal and proper Sence. 
 
 The only Queftion here then is whether 
 Pity, with the utmoft Regulation and Improve- 
 ment it is capable of in the Soul of Man ; can 
 be of the fame Kind with the intrinfic Perfe&i-. 
 on in the very Nature of God, which incline? 
 him to all divine Means and, Methods, for re- 
 lieving the Mifery of his Creatures ? But no-« 
 thing is more evident at firft Thought, than 
 that they cannot be of the fame Kindj Gncq 
 Pity of a fellow Creature, and a feeling of his 
 Mifery is ftill an human Paffion, tho' in its ut- 
 moft Improvement and Exaltation ; and fines 
 there are, literaly fpeaking, no Paffions in God. 
 *This Paflion qr Affection, in the Sou( of Man, 
 
ANALOGY. 345 
 
 may very aptly reprefent a correfpondent Per- 
 fection of another Kind in the Divinity ; which, 
 for want of any direft Conception or Idea, we 
 conceive and exprefs after the fame manner 
 we (Jo that virtuous Diipofition we are con- 
 lcious of within our lelves : Nay that incon* 
 ceivable Perfection is alfo in Scripture Metapho- 
 ricaly cxprefTed by the Hebrew word Dirn and 
 in the Greek by sw-A«y^w^E<r^««, both which 
 are of the feme Import with The yearning of 
 the Bowels in English ; and ib it is laid Luke 
 i. 78. Aj* cnrA*y^v« eAe« &(£ Thro' tlqe Bowels 
 of the Mercy of Goo 1 , 
 
 I Have been thus particular in the three 
 chief moral Attributes, becaule I would leave 
 it to the Reader to go.over all the reft in his 
 own Mind j and to diftinguifh in each of them 
 the outward Exertions and Operations of every 
 Inftance of Virtue, from that inward Inclina- 
 nation or Difpofition in the Soul, whence thole 
 outward Performances proceed. When the 
 Qijellion is thus rightly ftated, let him firft 
 cqnfider whether thole Virtues are of the 
 lame Kind \n God that they are in the Soul 
 of Man j and he will foon convince himlelf 
 how unworthy that Thought is of the divine 
 Nature : Then let him compare even the out- 
 ward Operations and Performances of Virtue 
 in us, with the outward Exertions and Ope- 
 rations of the correfpondent Perfections in the 
 divine Nature; and he will find that no one 
 of them j§ f t f^ f ame Kjn4 with, thole of the/ 
 
 Other," 
 
346- DIVINE 
 
 other. If any intrinfic Perfe&ion of God were 
 of the fame Kind with any virtuous Difpofi- 
 tion in our Soul, it would be an human, and 
 not a divine Perfe&ion} and if any of the out- 
 ward Exertions and Operations were of the 
 fame Kind, they rauft proceed from intrinfic 
 Powers and Faculties and Dilpofitions of the 
 fame Kind : Which is impoffible, fince the ve- 
 ry Conftitution and Frame of an human Soul 
 includes both Matter and Spirit ; but God is 
 all Spirit, and not only fuch, bat a Kind of 
 Spirit more effentialy different from all other 
 created Spirts, than they are from embodied 
 Spirits. So that there can be no Powers or Fa- 
 culties, no moral Attributes or Perfe&ions in 
 the higheft Order of Angels, of the fame Kind 
 with the correfpondent Powers or Faculties, 
 Attributes or Perfections in the Divinity; where- 
 of it is their greateft Glory and the Higheft 
 Exaltation of their Nature, to have a more 
 lively Similitude only and Refemblance. 
 
 I Shall only make two Obfervations here. 
 One concerning our Knowlege of thofe moral 
 Attributes : The other concerning our Imita- 
 tion of them. 
 
 i, F i R s T then, it is evident from what hath 
 been faid, that they who renounce and explode 
 this true divine Analogy, take away All Know- 
 lege whatsoever of the moral Attribute* of 
 God. For as we have no Direfif Idea or Im- 
 mediate intellectual Perception, either of thofe 
 
 intrinfic 
 
ANALOGY. 347 
 
 intrude Perfe&ions in the very Nature and Ef. 
 fence of God; or of the external Exertions or 
 Operations proceeding from them ; or of any 
 thing the very fame in Ktnd with either; we 
 can have no folid Knowlege at all of them, 
 otherwife than by Analogy. The utmoft ex- 
 tent of the Procedure of human Underftand- 
 ing here is thus. As we infer the necefiary Ex- 
 istence of an eternal, infinite, intelligent Be- 
 ing or Snbftance, from the vifihle Works of 
 the Creation; fo from the fenfible Effe&s of 
 the Gourfe of his Providence, and of his gra- 
 cious Difpenfations to Mankind (the true pro- 
 eels and real manner of which we conceive by 
 Similitude only, and Refemblanee with the 
 manner of the outward Anions and Opera- 
 tions proceeding from virtuous Dilpesfitions in 
 the Soul of Man) we infer there muft. be in-* 
 finite Perfections in that Being, correfpondent 
 and fimilar to fbme of our own Virtues and 
 Graces,. As we think and ipeak of his incom- 
 prehenfible Subftance as realy and a&ualy Ex- 
 iftwgi by Analogy with the Exiftence of our 
 own Subftance ; fo we think and fpeak of his 
 incomprehenfible Moral PerfeBi&ns, by Analogy 
 with the inward virtuous Diipofitions in the 
 Soul of Man: Which being the greateft Per- 
 fections of human Nature, are the moft apt and 
 lively Reprefen'tations of thole which are di- 
 vine ; and we accordingly afcribethem to God 
 for Attributes ; that is, for real internal Per- 
 fgyjftoms. otherwife utterly incomprehenfible and 
 ineffable, They, who labeaw to take away 
 
 frotn 
 
348 DIVINE 
 
 from us this Knowlege of God and his Attri- 
 butes and Operations, by Analogy ; either ig- 
 norantly or defignedly ftrike at the Founda- 
 tion of all Religion; and are unwarily, or 
 treacheroufly doing the Work of Irifidels and 
 Heretics. 
 
 Thus we not only obtain a certain deter- 
 minate Knowlege of thole moral Attributes of 
 the Divinity, but all our Notions and Con- 
 ceptions of them become clear and diftinct ; as 
 clear and diftinct as thole we have of the in- 
 ward virtuous Dilpofitions of our own Souls: 
 And all the bleffed Exertions and Operations 
 of thofe divine Perfections, which would be 
 otherwife utterly inconceivable and inutterable,^ 
 become intelligible, and even familiar to us ; 
 thro' the like Operations and Performances to 
 which we are prompted, by the inward vir- 
 tuous Dilpofitions whereof we have a direct and 
 immediate Confcioufnefs in our own Mind. 
 Thus our Knowlege of God increafes, in the 
 feme Proportion with the Knowlege of our 
 ielves. So that let us but attain to a true and per- 
 fect Notion of what Goodnefs, Juftice, Mercy and 
 Truth are in the Soul of Man ; and how thefe 
 differ from our other inward Virtues and Graces : 
 And then we have the moft clear and diftinct 
 Notions or Conceptions of the correfpondent 
 Perfections in the Nature of God, that are at- 
 tainable in this Life. In proportion as. our 
 own moral Virtues and Graces are habitualy 
 improved, and at length happily confirmed in 
 
 the. 
 
ANALOGY. 349 
 
 the Soul of Man : So they become ftill more 
 lively Emblems of the immutable moral At- 
 tributes or Perfections of the Divinity : And 
 as far as we carefully obferve and confider the 
 outward Operations and Exertions of our own 
 internal virtuous Difpofitions; we by this 
 Means are enabled to comprehend all the Ope- 
 rations and Manifeftations of the divine Good- 
 nefs, reprefented by them, with more diftinct- 
 nels and PerJpicuity. 
 
 Now lay afide all Analogy r and all Concep- 
 tion of the intrinfic moral Perfections of the 
 Divinity ; as well as of the external glorious 
 Exertions and Manifejiations of them to the 
 unfpeafcable Benefit and Advantage of Man- 
 kind ; by this Semblance and Reprefentation : 
 And then our intire Knowlege of the moral 
 Attributes of God (which above all things it 
 concerns us to know with greateft Diftinft- 
 neft and Certainty) is unhappily refolved into 
 impoffible AbftraB Ideas, Intellectual Vtfion^ 
 Purely fpiritual Perceptions-, or Metaphyseal 
 Properties and Perfections, Imperfect Notions and 
 Conceptions^ Conjufed Apprehenjions, Uncertain 
 Glimmerings of divine Objects. Thefe and 
 many other luch like Terms and Forms of 
 ipeaking of God and his Attributes, you will 
 frequently meet with ; all of them denoting 
 Uncertainty, Oblcurity, and Confufion in our 
 Conceptions of things Divine and Heavenly; 
 and all occafioned merely thro' Miftake of the 
 true and real manner of conceiving them. What 
 
 Edi- 
 
35& DIVINE 
 
 Edification is there in all thofe dafk and doubt- 
 ful Phrafes; or what Improvement of Divine 
 Knowlege in the Mind of Man ? And is it not 
 a very prepblrerous way of managing our De- 
 fence of any Truths in Religioft natural or re-' 
 vealed, to make a dangerous Gonceffidh at 
 every Turh to its Adverfaries; That indeed it 
 fnuft be cOnfefled, the Knowlege we hate of 
 the Points in Goritroverfy^ and out Concep- 
 tions of the moral Attributes of God in parti* 
 cular, are at the bell but very imperfed, con- 
 futed, and obfcure. 
 
 S u v v o s e feme of the flirewd Adverfaries to 
 the orthodo* Truth, fliould (as it is well known 
 they do) deny that there are, Trudy fpeifldng, any 
 fuch Attributes in the Nature of God as Juftlcl 
 or Mercy : And from thence make all their Infe* 
 renceS againil the Truth and Reality of out Re* 
 demptioh thfo' the Merits and Mediation of 
 Chrift ; and turn all the Language-of the Gofpel 
 concerning him, into Metaphorical Allufion on- 
 ly to the feveral particulars of the ceremonial 
 Law ; how would you go aboutto confute them? 
 If you appeal to any ConfcioUlhefs they muft 
 haire in their own Minds of Immediate thV ob- 
 fcure Perceptions, and fbme Direct tho'impeffecl: 
 Glimmerings of any fuch Attributes in God, it is 
 eafy for them to reply with great Truth, that by 
 the Utmoft Abftra&ion of their Minds they do 
 not find the leaft fuch Glimpfe of any divine At- 
 tributes. And if you tell them that Juftice and 
 Mercy are afcribed to God for Attributes thro* 
 
 the 
 
ANALOGY. 351 
 
 the Scripture, they readily grant you that ; but 
 reply that Juftice and Mercy in Scripture are 
 Metaphors only for the internal R-efctitude of the 
 divine Nature, and for two different Operati- 
 ons only of the divine Will. Is there any way 
 pf confuting them effe&ualy, but by freely 
 aekisowleging that we have no direct Concepti- 
 on or Idea, or any immediate Perception wbat- 
 lbever of Juftice and Mercy as they are in thd 
 real intrinfic Nature of God j any more than 
 we have of his Eflence, or of the reft of his na- 
 tural and moral Attributes ? But that thefe be- 
 ing the greateft moral Perfections in the Soul 
 of Man* who is made after the Image of God ; 
 the greateft whereof we have or can have any 
 Confeioufhefs or Perception in this Life ; we 
 do bytheSuggeftiOn of natural Reafbn, and af- 
 ter the Example of the Holy Ghoft thro' the 
 whole ftyle of Scripture, transfer them to the 
 Divinity, to reprdent and exprefs Perfections 
 of another Kind otherwife 'utterly incompre* 
 henfible to the Mind of Man, and which we 
 diftinguifti by the. Name of Moral. And we 
 call them divine Attributes upon a well ground- 
 ed Prefumption of fuch a real and true Cor- 
 refpondency, and Refemblance between thole 
 divine Perfections and the moral Virtues and 
 Graces of our Souls ; as renders all our Concep- 
 tions of God after that Manner, and all Judg- 
 ments and Reaibnings and Conclufions concern- 
 ing thofe Perfections, as folid and true as if 
 our Conceptions of them were more direct and 
 immediate, and as if we were able to expreis 
 them in the Language of Angels. I f 
 
$$i t> I V i N £ 
 
 If it fhould be obje&ed here, that the T)U 
 fiinBim of the divine Attributes is founded 
 only in the Mind of Man; and that we afcribe 
 our own Virtues or moral Perfections to God 
 according to that ttfftin&iou' of them we find 
 within our felves; but that there are no fuch 
 Realy Diftinft Attributes in the Nature of God. 
 I anfwer, that it is ifnpoffible for us to conceive 
 either what the divirie Perfections realy are In 
 Them/elves , or How they are Dijlinguijhed in the 
 very Nature Of God. But that fince we find our 
 own moral Virtues truly diftinguifhable in our 
 ielves, we are under a neceifity of continuing 
 the fame Diftin&ion when we transfer them to 
 God for Attributes; becaufe all the Knowlegd 
 we have of his moral Perfections, is* by Analo- 
 gy with our own, and that this is the only way 
 we have of thinking and fpeaking of them : And 
 becaule it concerns us not to know How and af- 
 ter what Particular Manner they are realy and 
 adualy diftinguifhed in the intrinfic Nature of 
 God ; but only to know and believe that, how* 
 ever they may be there diftinguifhed, they are 
 certainly fb far correfpondent and anlwerable to 
 ibme of our Virtues and Graces, that we are not 
 under any invincible Miftake or Delufion, in the 
 only Means and Methods given us for the Know- 
 lege of God and his Attributes in this Life. 
 
 In this way of proceeding we may urge utf* 
 anfwerably againft the Sociniansj that all the 
 reft of the divine Attributes which we call 
 
 Mvrd 
 
ANALOG Y. 35 j 
 
 Moral are upon the fame foot ; with Juftice ztiA 
 Mercy ; fo that, according to^them, we mutt re- 
 folve them all equaly into ihe ReCtitude of the 
 divine Nature, and into the* Effeftsofhis Wilh 
 Nay even the divine A4ger$ or ^I)ifpleafure y 
 Hatred, Pity, together /with Benigitityj and 
 hove^ which they evafively fubftitute in the 
 room of Juftice and Mercy : Thefe and every 
 other divine Attribute lifcewife, muft thus bd 
 only ib many different Words for the Refit* 
 tude of God's Nature ; and all the outward 
 Operations and Manifeftations of them, muft be 
 no other than lb many different Effects of hi? 
 Rectitude^ or his Will Thus all Diftinaion 
 between the divine moral Attributes is ut- 
 terly deftroyed, and fummed up together in the 
 Reffitude, and Will of. God; both of them e* 
 <]ualy incomprehenfible, as thdy are in them- 
 felves, with the divine Juftice and Mercy, of 
 with any other Attribute whatfoever. So that 
 thus we may deny all the Attributes of God 
 one after another ; thus not only that Diftin&i- 
 on of Attributes iuggefted to us by the Light 
 of Reafbnj but all that is fpofcen of God thro' 
 the Scripture in the Language of his Different 
 moral Attributes, is brought to nothing : The 
 beft Notions and moft diftin£t Conceptions we" 
 form of them from the internal virtuous Diipo- 
 fitions of our own Souls, together with the out- 
 ward Operations and Performances they prompt; 
 us to, are thus rendered merely Figurative ; 
 and as altogether expreffive of nothing Truly 
 Correjpondent and Similar in the real Nature of 
 
 A a God # 
 
354 DIVINE 
 
 God, as if they were To many inarticulate 
 
 Sounds. 
 
 What is all this but by plain Implication 
 and immediate necefTary Confequence, to deriy 
 that God is Good, or J-uJi, or Merciful^, whidh 
 inexprefs Words would be downright 'Blafphe- 
 tny? What is this but making all the diftinft 
 Attributes of God mentioned in Scripture fo ma- 
 ny ufelefs Figures for his Reffiitude ; an unferip- 
 tural Word, and altogether without any dear 
 determinate Notion or' Conception affixed to It 
 in the Mind, which all the Terms expreffive 
 of his moral Attributes have ? What is this 
 but rendering them an ufelefs Amufement of 
 Mankind ; and at once to deftroy all the power- 
 ful Motives both in natural and revealed Reli- 
 gion, to our Love of God, our Gratitude to 
 him, our Admiration of his Goodnefs, and 
 our Worfllip and Thankfulnefs : And in fhort 
 to take off all the Influence and Efficacy of 
 thofe Attributes, Which have a direct Tenden- 
 cy to regulate and exalt our PafEons and Af- 
 'fedtions j and to give them a Turn to every 
 Tnftahce of Virtue and Holinefs? This is the 
 very Ufe made of that Socinian Doctrine by 
 Free-thinkers, Unbelievers and Deifts. For if 
 there are in reality No fitch Attributes in the 
 Nature of God as Jtifiice arid Mercy, there can 
 be none of the reft of the moral Attributes' reaJy 
 in him : And if they are all notional and imagi- 
 nary Diftin&ions of our own ; or only different 
 Metaphors for his RttJimde-, then our Concep- 
 4 tions 
 
A -N A IPO G Y, 2M 
 tipns of t^Tfa, together with >pur ^eafonjnglj 
 the Judgrnents w;e form upon tiiejni,' " a,nd th£ 
 1C9n.9lHliops.Wje ^raw-from thein,!Ju;e jUI ground- 
 .Jfi^ftpfi fallacious. Our modern el^ndeftine A- 
 r $ians <$neh.$hjs Argument quite $p tf}e oppofite' 
 Side ; fyylfreriuadly maintain ingthjsjnierericjs 
 .to fpjtajw, inevitably, junlels we allow'. all the 
 .moi$i^ttributes ,<pf, God to. be of the jSdjpe Kind 
 rW|ifh : #s^iat ; they.^re in human -Nature,* 
 
 T^HUs : the.two.F i xtrejnes concur againft.dje 
 •ort-hodjox /Truths which is feated betjveen, therri 
 in T t$ic jjOiiddJe^ u and obliged equaly^to ward 
 .againil[both. jltijs falfe that there are ISfo fuch 
 Attributes jn the -Nature of God as Juftice or 
 -iMercj; and. it js ; as;falfe that they are of the 
 . fame ?f£(ftd , with - thofe Virtues in the Spul of 
 :Man. ' For r thpjfe ^Woijds, .when - transie-red .to 1 
 God, f xpreJs, jeal.|>erfe&iQns in. the divine JSfa^ 
 A ur -?'j ~MS»ly j cpTjefpon^,t jftp/1 ^nfwerable .to 
 thofe t virtues /.^ppptj^gWpich, they t %nlfy 
 in us : jfcpd pyn^'^^ps:^^ Graces can nave.no, 
 -more than , a jLj^fpefs and ( Rj^gmbjanjce" of 
 thofe incomp/e^fible Perfections ; they pah 
 only repjefent ^hem ; and the'y 4nu.fi: be" as 
 much of a ; din%rent r ^W, ,.as finite and.jdiortal 
 .Man j is. of \ a dir!erent r Kind , from . the infinite 
 andimmprtal Grod. T^he. divine Perfe^ipns.^pe 
 the original Patterns and Standard of all created 
 moral ; .and. . natural Perfection, . whiqfi at 40C 
 : $trnQf\,is, but as aPi&ure or Image tq^th^SJufr- 
 ^agce-.^Andthe gieatefi: Glory of all, tnteUi-' 
 -^£fr£eingsjs-tq smyM 3SW hM&W %P" 
 A* * ly 
 
3$6 DIVINE 
 
 ly and Refemblance of the Divinity, in Prd- 
 portion to the Rank and Dignity of their Na- 
 ture. So that it is not only truly affirmed of 
 God that he is Juft and Merciful, and fo of the 
 reft of his moral Attributes ; but that he is 
 more Truly and Realy fo than Man or Angel. 
 For all thefe Perfections are in the Creator af- 
 ter a Manner infinitely more Tranfcendent, 
 than they can be in any of his Creatures ; "and 
 particularly in Man, who is exprefly faid to be 
 formed in the Likenefs only, and only in the 
 Image of God: And furely that which is a 
 Likenefs only, and no more than an Image, 
 Cannot with any Juftnefs and Truth be ima- 
 gined of the fame Kind, with that Original 
 whereof it is a Reprefentation only. And yet 
 thus, all our juft Reafbnings upon the moral Pro- 
 perties or Attributes or Perfections of the real 
 Antitype, muft proceed at leaft upon as fure a 
 Foundation in the very Nature of things, as 
 when they are applyed to the correfpondent 
 Properties and Perfections of Men j tho* thefe 
 are at beft but fb many living Rcfemblances of 
 the Divinity. For when we fay God is Juft and 
 Merciful and Holy ; we mean that there is no 
 Juftice, or Mercy, or Holinefs, or any other mo- 
 ral Perfection in the Creature ; but what is in 
 the divine Nature, not in a more eminent De- 
 gree, but in a manner fo tranfcendently dif- 
 ferent, that they are as truly of another Kind, 
 as God himfelf is of another Kind from all his 
 Creatures. And fo effentialy of another Kind, 
 that it would be an impious afpiring Preemp- 
 tion 
 
ANALOGY. 357 
 
 tion in the higheft Seraph (perhaps the very- 
 Crime of Lucifer) to imagine aby thing in him- 
 felf of the fame Kind with the Attributes and 
 Perfections of the Creator, 
 
 a. The fecond Obfprvation I mail make 
 is, that they who will have the moral Attri- 
 butes of God of the fame Kind with what 
 they are in us 5 and upon -this grols Miftake 
 reject and explode our Analogous Conceptions 
 of them, do utterly fubvert and deftroy all 
 true Imitation of the divine Perfections: Which 
 can never be too often repeated j and therefore 
 I ftiall here again once more urge my Reafons 
 for this Affertion ; that they may if poffible, 
 ftrifce the Mind of every Reader, and remove 
 all doubt concerning this Point, which has 
 been thought to bear fo hard againft the Doc-» 
 trine of divine Analogy. 
 
 For firft, nothing is more evident tha& 
 that we cannot imitate the Real effential moral 
 Perfections of the divine Nature ; thofe ftrper- 
 natural Intrinfic Perfections in the divine Mind, 
 from which all the external Operations and 
 Manifeftations of Goodnefi and Juftice and 
 Mercy do flow thro* the Univerfe, and par- 
 ticularly thro' this vifible Creation: For thefe 
 are as inimitable with Relpect to their real Na- 
 ture and Manner, as they are in themielves in- 
 comprehensible by us. Surely nothing ought to 
 be more plain, more diftinctiy perceived, and 
 better known and underftood, than a Pattern 
 
 A a 3 or 
 
358 D I V I N t 
 
 pf Example for 1 rhitattorr. #ut afccoVdirig tq 
 thofe Men, a Pattern is propbfed to' our Irni- 
 tatiori whereof, 11V reality, We halve riot the* 
 leaft Perception or Idea* as* it ii to' it felf ; 
 whereof at the utmoft, as they themfelves do 
 ackhowlege, we have ho other' than obfcare 
 inipeffeft Motions, and c^nfufScf uncertain 
 Glimmerings: Which y?er£ ft true, would on- 
 ly confound smd 4 diftract all Imftatioh ; atfd we 
 fhould thus be left to winder in A Labyririrfr, 
 thro' a dark and gloomy\ Shade, without one* 
 certain Glance, or at heft with only faint un- 
 certain Glimpfes of Light, to difcoVef either 
 our Track of our "Leader. Arid fupp6& it 
 poffible for us to iee lb far into the ihtrinjic 
 Nature of Gdd, as to hsHfe a cieilr, and dirfind, 
 and Dire3 Perceptiori of the drtiHe moral Per- 
 fections is they realy are in him : The Cohfe- 
 tjuence of this would be, that the more we 
 could thus fee of them, the more inimitable 
 itiii they would appear. And Perhaps one l3if- 
 covery we flibuld thereby make is, that there 
 is no real Foundation in the diving Nature fot 
 that Diftinctibn 'of ours between his Natural 
 and Moral Attributes ; and that we might un^ 
 doubtedly as well alpire to an Imitation of his. 
 Almighty Power in the Creation of all things, 
 or his infinite Wifdom in the Myfterious Work 
 of bur Redemption, as art Imitation 6f his real 
 moral Perfections. 
 
 But on the contrary, we have an inward 
 and immediate Confciouihefs of the bifponti- 
 
 ons 
 
ANALOGY. 359, 
 
 ons of our own Souls, and Inclinations of our 
 Wills to all Inftances of Virtue and Goodneis : 
 And from thefe^ together with the fuitable ex- 
 ternal Acts and Operations of them, we form 
 to our felves complex Notions and Concepti- 
 ons of all our Virtues, as Clear and T>iftmB 
 and DireEt as any that are in the Mind of Man ; 
 before we transfer them to .God as Reprefen- 
 tations of his incomprehenfible Perfections. 
 From whence it appears what the true Nature 
 and Manner is of Imitating thole incompre- 
 henfible Perfections; We can imitate them no 
 farther than as they are thus clearly and di- 
 ftinctly difcernible in the greateft moral Perfec- 
 tions or Virtues of the human Soul. Our Imi- 
 tation confifts in rectifying and improving thole 
 Correjfiondent Reprefentatwns of the divine Per- 
 fections, by Care and Obfervation of what panes 
 within our felves ; refining and exaking them 
 to the utmoft of our Power by Prayer, and a 
 conftant habitual Exertion of the good Difpo-' 
 .fitions within us in their feveral peculiar out- 
 ward Operations; and eftabliftiing and con- 
 firming them by Conftancy and Perfeverance : 
 Till we do in fome commendable Degrees re- 
 ftore the inward Powers and Difpofitions of 
 our Souls, to that bleffed and more compleat 
 Refernblance they originaly bore to the moral 
 Perfections of the divine Nature. This is the 
 true and happy Imitation of the moral At- 
 tributes of God ; a manner of Imitation very 
 clear, and diftinfit, and intelligible to all Capa- 
 cities* as well as very practicable by every fin- 
 cere Chriftian. A a 4 S e- 
 
360 DIVINE 
 
 S e c tfN d l y, They who affert our Virtues 
 and Graces to be pf the fame Kind with the 
 moral Attributes of the Divinity, do intirely 
 cut off all poffibility of our imitating even the 
 External Operations and Manifpftations of 
 thofe Attributes in the divine Nature ; for this 
 plain Realbn. Becaufe it is impoffible for the 
 inward Powers and virtuous Pilpofitions of 
 our Souls, to exert thernfelyes in any one extern 
 nal Operation or Performance of the fame Kind 
 with the external Operations proceeding from 
 the correfpondent divine Perfections in the vifi- 
 ble Creation, or in the Courfe of God's provi- 
 dential Government and Dilpenfations towards 
 Mankind. The whole Exertion of the Attri- 
 bute of Jufiice in God, is quite of another 
 Manner and Kind from any external Opera-= 
 tion or Performance of purs, and in every 
 Particular inimitable, Th,is mult be acknow* 
 leged, unlets fome Inftances of Rewards and 
 Pimifhments are pf the f^me Kind in both ; 
 but, as I obferved before, the divine Rewards, 
 moftly refpect another Life, they are eternal, 
 and adapted to Soul and Body ; afid fb far from 
 being practicable by us in the fame Kind, that 
 we are not capable of any direct Coriceptipn 
 or Idea of them. No nor pf his Rewards and 
 Punifhments even in th;s Life ; either of the 
 Soul by inward Cprace and Affiftance, pr leav-; 
 ing it in a State pf Hardneis and Impenitence ; 
 or of the Body, How he conveys Health or 
 Fqod, or Raiment; Riches or Plenty : or fcow 
 
 * he 
 
ANALOGY. 361 
 
 he lends Sickneis, Poverty, or Death : The 
 whole Nature and intire Manner of all theft 
 divine Operations and Performances are equaly 
 incomprehenfible and impracticable. Even in 
 this Life, I fay, no one Aft or Operation of 
 his Juftice is conceivable, and much leis prac- 
 ticable by us, in Kind. 
 
 The divine Attribute of Mercy likewiie 
 exerted in the Forgivenefi of Sin, fo as to take 
 the very Evil and Pollution of it out of the 
 Soul j together with all the true Ways and Me- 
 thods of God in (hewing Pity and Compaffion 
 to the Miierable, are altogether inconceivable 
 and inimitable by us as they are in themlelves. 
 And thus it is in all the external Exertions of 
 his Goodnels ; no one Inftance of it can be af- 
 figned, whereof the real Manner or Kind of 
 Execution in it, is conceivable or practicable 
 by us in any Degree ; I leave it to our Adver- 
 faries to name any one if they can, without con- 
 futing themfelves. Thus then we fee wherein 
 confifts the real true Manner of our imitating 
 the external Operations of the divine Perfect 
 tions ; not by any vain impracticable Endea- 
 vours of doing as God aclualy and realy doth 
 in any one Inftance s But by exerting the in- 
 ward virtuous Diipofitions of our Souls, in 
 fuch external Acts and Performances as have a 
 Similitude only and Refemblance of the Ope- 
 rations, and a correipondency to the Actions 
 proceeding from the intrinfic Nature of God. 
 |r* distributing hurnan Rewards and'PuniftiT 
 4- raent$ 
 
362 DIVINE 
 
 meats in our Own Way, and within our own 
 Sphere of Action. And as God forgives, and 
 redeems, and faves us, and in fhort as he di- 
 stributes all his Graces and Favours and Blef- 
 fings, in fuch a Supernatural Manner as we can 
 neither know nor practife in any Degree : So 
 do we imitate thole Acts and Operations after 
 the Kind and Manner of Mem in fuch In- 
 ffcances, and after fuch a "Different but Anfwer- 
 able manner, as are well known and common 
 and familiar. 
 
 But it muft be well remarked here, that 
 all that is practicable by us is ftill no more 
 than a bare Imitation. It is not what lome 
 Men vainly imagine, a Repetition of the fame 
 Acts and Operations in Kind; as when one 
 Man imitates the virtuous Actions and Per- 
 formances of another; both which proceed 
 from the fame human Difpofition and Facul- 
 ties of Mind. When one Man imitates ano- 
 ther, the Operations are not only the lame in 
 Kind, as proceeding from the fame Kind of 
 Powers and Faculties and Difpofitions ; but 
 may be, and often are, the fame in Degree 
 likewife ; and the Imitation often exceeds' the 
 Pattern : But our Imitation of thofe Actions and 
 Operations and Effects proceeding from the in- 
 trinfic Perfections of the Divinity, which we 
 call Moral (by a Term as indirectly applyed 
 to God as Natural} can never come up to any 
 thing more than a lively Similitude or Refem 7 
 blance. Herein then we may behold the won- 
 derful; 
 
ANALOGY. 263 
 
 derfui Wifdom atfd 1 Goodhefs of God, in fend- 
 ing us a mining Pattern and glorious Example 
 of all : Virtue and'Htflinefs, in our own human 
 Nature : That fince even the vifible Manife- 
 ftations of the divine Goodnefs, are in their 
 own Nature and Kind of Performance incon- 
 ceivable and inimitable ; they might thereby 
 be let down to the Diretf level of human Un- 
 derltandirtg atfd'Fracliee. That our Imitation of 
 a Perfon who Was himfelf a PerfeB Tranfcript 
 of the divine Perfections, might be the lame- 
 as when one Man imitates another; eaftlyapr 
 prehended, ana) practicable, and the very lame 
 in Kind : And that thus all the Virtues and! 
 Graces of otff Souls, together with their out- 
 ward Exertions and Actions 5 might be exalted 1 
 into the moft lively Similitude, and brighteffi 
 Kefemblatice of thole incomprehensible Per-? 
 fe&iorts, attainable by human Nature. 
 
 I H a v £ now gone thro' the different Heads 
 of thofe Attributes which are afcribed to God, 
 iri a manlier as plain and explicit as Ipoffibly 
 £duld. Afld becaufe of the great moment and 
 i mportance of the Subject, and the many griev- 
 ous Miftakes generafy committed in treating oft- 
 it j I have ventured to incur the cenfure of 
 Verbofenels and Repetition in lome Places, 
 ^fpecialy in treating of the moral Attributes, 
 j-ather than leave the leaft room for a Com- 
 plaint of; Obieurfty, or want of Explanation 
 by Variety of Inftances. But before I clofethis 
 Chapter I fhall add fome Remarks upon Di- 
 vine. 
 
364 DIVINE 
 
 vine Metaphor, particularly that which is ufed 
 in Scripture to defcribe and exprefs figurative- 
 ly fome of the Attributes and Operations of 
 God. 
 
 M-ANY of thefe divine Metaphors are 
 taken from things merely Material) and par- 
 ticularly from the Parts and Members of an 
 Human Body. Thus the Scripture fpeaks of 
 the Hands, and Arms., and Feet, and Eyes, 
 and EarSy and Noflrils and Mouthy and Bow- 
 ehy and Heart of God. It afcribes to him our 
 own Senfations, fuch as Seeingy and Hearing, 
 and Smelling ; Our bodily Pojiures and Actions, 
 fuch as Walking, Standing, Sitting, Dwelling, 
 Teaming, Breathing, Fighting, and Hunting, 
 Again we find afcrihed to him the Names and 
 Actions of things Irrational, as that of a Lion, 
 and Roaring, and Hying : Nay even the Deno- 
 minations of things Inanimate, fuch as Fire, 
 a Rock, a Buckler, a Fortrefs, a Horn of Sal- 
 vation; and Light, which tho' it is the bright- 
 eft and moft lively Emblem we have from 
 things material, yet exhibits to the Mind no 
 more of the real true Nature or Glory of God, 
 than the thickeft Darknefs. Here it ought to 
 t>e observed, 
 
 i. That thefe and many fueh like Terms 
 and Forms of ipeaking, are not in any Pro- 
 priety of Speech to be called Attributes ; be- 
 caufe they are fpoken of God by pure Meta- 
 phpr only, without any Correfiondent Reality 
 
ANALOGY. 365 
 
 and True Similitude in the>ery Nature of the 
 things compared: And therefore they are very- 
 well to be diftinguifhed from all iuch as are 
 properly Attributes j and which are applyed to 
 the divine Being in a greater or left degree of 
 Analogy. 
 
 h.. T fa a t divine Metaphor being no more 
 than a mere Figure of Speech, and founded on 
 a fuppofed and Imaginary Similitude only be- 
 tween the things compared } owes all the Ufe- 
 fulnefs, Truth> and Significancy of it, when ap- 
 plyed to God, to ibmething already known of 
 him by Analogy. All divine Metaphor necef- 
 farily Pre-fuppofes ibme Analogical Knowlege 
 of him, from the Powers and Faculties or O- 
 perations and Virtues of Mankind ; otherwife 
 there could be no luch thing as divine Meta- 
 phor. For there could be no intelligible Con- 
 ception conveyed Thus Only, of any thing al- 
 together imperceptible, and inconceivable ei- 
 ther Direffly by any immediate Gonicioufhefs or 
 fenfitive Perception ; or Mediately and Indireft- 
 ly by a True Analogy ; and thus every divine Me- 
 taphor would be a Figure for Nothing, nothing 
 any way known. But when there is a Prior 
 Real Knowlege, and well grounded ufeful Con- 
 ceptions, obtained from that aclual Similitude 
 and Correipondency there is in the divine At- 
 tributes and Operations, to the Powers and Fa- 
 culties and Operations of the human Mind: 
 Then all divine Metaphor exprefles Ibmething 
 otherwife clearly and diftinttly known (tho' not 
 
 by 
 
3 66 DIVINE 
 
 by any dired Ideas or Immediate Perception^ 
 tyct) by that true Similitude and Correfppnden- 
 cy which is founded in the .veiy Mature of {Jod 
 *and Man. What lays, a Foundation of (Reality 
 ■and Ufefulnefi even in ifktm&n Metaphor is, 
 that whatever we exprefs thus* may, not only 
 be expreffed in ftri&ly proper Terms ; but is 
 always 'fometfeing which' falls? within rfhe Com- 
 rpafs of anummediate^Confeioufnefs, <jf direft 
 ••fenfitive Perception; and is i thus known and 
 conceived, Previous, to: any Application of Me- 
 taphor to it ; for other wife the Metaphor w#u.^i 
 *:be ufeleis. But in , idiviine eMetaphor, That 
 which is :defigned : to be Jfeus expreffed i isiever 
 da 'refpe£t of us altogether imperceptible jajEjd 
 -inconceivable as it is in it £eif ; and inexprejfli&le 
 in any literal and ftriclly proper Terms : And 
 mufi:: therefore be firft ufefully and juftly con- 
 ceived and expreffed by, a true Analogy, be- 
 fore a: Metaphor can be applyed toit.Writh any 
 -fblid and iubflantial-' Meaning ; or indeed with 
 anpSence or Meaning at .all. 
 
 To . explain , this .by. an Inftance pi -two. 
 ^WhenwefaytheiS^ ofjaod beholdall things, 
 itis^pure ; Metaphor ; /intended to exprefs.an ;n- 
 comprehenfible Perfection i in the divine Na- 
 ture ; that is, fbmething fuppofed to be as yet 
 altogether unknown otherwife than ; ; by this 
 Metaphor ; and thus it would; be j a Figure 
 •without any >■ intelligible ^Sence or Meaning. 
 But as that, incomprehenfible Perfection, js the 
 -Knowlege of .God, which we ; fte«ei£«i!y con- 
 ceit 
 
ANALOGY. 367 
 
 -ceive and exprefs by the help of that Know- 
 lege which is merely human ; and -fince the 
 Metaphor is applyed to What is Thus clearly 
 and diftinclly and ufefully -known before by A- 
 nalogy, Ibmething real and liibftantial is couch- 
 ed in the Figure: And that Metaphorical man- 
 ner of exprefling it helps to render that prior 
 Knowlege of it yet more ufeful and beneficial » 
 lb as that it'ftrikes the Mind, elpecialy theJPat- 
 lions and Affections, with greater Life and 
 Emphafis. 'But what Ufeful Notion could we 
 ever bave attained of the Knowlege of God, 
 Merely by Allufion only to a bodily Eye ; and 
 exclwfive of any Conception of it before by A- 
 nalogy with our own Intellectual Knowlege ? 
 No other than we could have of -the Protec- 
 tion of his Providence Over good Men, merely 
 from a Buckler, a Fortrefs, or a Rock*. 
 
 Ag'AW, when it is ifeid^God hath a. Mighty 
 Arm, it is. plain that he hath no Arm, nor 
 bodily Strengths nor can there be any thing 
 in bjm^tbat has a real, Iiifcenefs to an Arm of 
 -Flefh, or that is truly correipondent and fimi- 
 larto bodily'Strength. And therefore tho' we 
 'transfer the Words to him, yet we carefully 
 avoid 'afcribing to him the Ideas which belong 
 to theto j and to transfer a Wordonly, without 
 the^Conception Or Idea annexed to it, is to 
 %ea>kwithout meaning any thing at all; unlels 
 -we had a previous Knowledge, -after -another 
 manner, of the thmglnfmded to be thus expref- 
 ied, >Bxx& as the' Alufiot* is to the Power of God, 
 
 Which 
 
3 68 6IVINE 
 
 which we had conceived and exprefled before 
 by Analogy with that which is human; that 
 is, to a Perfection in the divine Nature correfc- 
 pond en t and anfwerable to human Power or 
 Authority and Dominion : Then there is not 
 only a real and folid meaning in that Metaphor 
 of a Mighty Arm when fpoken of God j but 
 it defcfibes with great Beauty and Energy 
 that divine Power, which was otherwife ufe- 
 fully known before, and exprefled in Terms 
 neither ftri&ly Proper nor purely Metaphori- 
 cal, but truly Analogical. I leave the Reader 
 to revolve in his Mind any other Inftances of 
 divine Metaphor; and to conlider whether 
 what is intended to be expreiTed by it in God 
 and his Attributes, is not fomething firft 
 knOwn by Analogy with the human Powers 
 or Faculties and Operations : And whether it 
 is not this which adds not only any Uie, and 
 Solidity, and iubftantial meaning at all, but 
 even Beauty and Energy to the Metaphor. 
 
 From hence we lee the great Milchief 
 which is done by confounding things in thenm 
 felves fo very different as divine Metaphor, and 
 divine Analogy; and by turning^// the Terms 
 relating as well to the Myfteries of theGofpel, 
 as to the Attributes and Operations of God, 
 equaly into mere Figure only and pure Meta- 
 phor. I don't mean thole which are realy Fi- 
 gurative and Metaphorical f and which are 
 ufed in Scripture more effe&Ualy to Move our 
 Paffions and Affections, which is the ptdpet 
 
 TO 
 
A N A L O G Y. 369 
 
 Uie of all Figure : But thole which are truly 
 and plainly Analogical, and in our prefent 
 State abfolutely neceflary to Inform our Un- 
 derftandingS) and to furnifti us with any Ufe- 
 ful and True Knowkge of divine and heavenly 
 Objects. The Confequence of this is nothing 
 Jtels, than taking away from fuch Terms all 
 lblid and fubftantial Meaning ; refolving them 
 into empty Sound; and leaving no ground of 
 Truth and Reality in either Natural or Re- 
 vealed Religion. For if all that is fpoken of 
 God in -the Language of the Faculties and 
 Powers, Operations and Virtues of Men, does 
 as little refer to any Truly Similar and Cor- 
 re/pendent Perfections in the divine Nature, as 
 what is ipoken of him in the Language of 
 our bodily Parts and Senfes ; and if all that is 
 revealed of our Salvation and Redemption un- 
 der the Reprelentaion and Likenefs of human 
 Operations and Tranfa&ions, as little relates to 
 any thing Truly Anfimrable in the divine Per- 
 formances thus let down to our Capacities, as 
 what is laid of him in the Language of all 
 other things merely material and irrational: 
 Then there is no Foundation left for any ufeful 
 divine Knowlege whatsoever in the Mind of 
 Man ; or for any fure and rational Deductions, 
 whereon to build our Religious Duty or moral 
 Practice. For according to this Opinion all 
 Correfpondent Reality and True Similitude is ut- 
 terly taken away ; and as for any DireEl and 
 Immediate Perception or Knowlege of things 
 Diyine and Immaterial as they are in them- 
 B.b felves, 
 
37© DIVINE 
 
 felves, or of any thing the lame in Kind with 
 them in this World, we have it net in any the 
 leaft Degree. So that thus there would be no- 
 thing remaining but empty Sounds and ufelefs 
 Words under a falfe colour of Figure and Me- 
 taphor, drawn from things altogether unwor- 
 thy of God, and intended to fignify Nothing : 
 That is, nothing in the divine Nature and 
 Operations any way conceived or Known, ei- 
 ther by Direct Ideas or Perceptions ; or by the 
 Subjlitution and Mediation of any Like and Cor- 
 refponderit Powers or Faculties, Operations or 
 Virtues among Men. 
 
 3. That tho' mere Metaphor cannot of 
 its felf convey a Notion of any thing in the 
 Nature of God or divine Objects, truly Cor- 
 refpondent and Similar to the fenfitive Obje&s 
 and Ideas made ule of in the Allufion : Yet we 
 may difcern from what has been faid, that 
 every juft Metaphor thus applyed, is intended 
 to fignify and exprels fbmething Real and Ac- 
 tual m reipeft of God and divine Things. Tho' 
 God for Inftance has nothing like a Mighty 
 Arm y or Bowels \ yet thefe are defigned to 
 fignify and exprels figuratively the real Power, 
 and Mercy or Compajfion of the Divinity. Even 
 in Human Metaphor, what is defigned to be 
 exprefied by that figurative manner, is as Real 
 and Aftual, tho'- not Correjpondent and Like, as 
 if the Terms in which it is delivered were lite- 
 ral and proper 5 it is the fame Reality &t off 
 with greater Emphafis only and Elegance. So 
 
 it 
 
ANALOGY. 371 
 
 it is in divine Metaphor ; which hath always 
 as real a Meaning of Something a&ua-J and true 
 in divine Objc&s ; as if the fame thing defign- 
 ed, were exprefled in Terms more proper, or 
 Analogous. Which I leavp to the Reader's 
 own Qbfervation in running over all the par- 
 ticular Terms mentioned above ; in every one 
 $f which he may obferve a pofitive and Affiud* 
 thq' not a Correfpondent reality fignifyed in 
 refpect of God. 
 
 4. These Obfervations lay open the fun* 
 damental Fallacy of the whole Socinian Hy- 
 pothefis, which is thro'out calculated to in- 
 vert the natural Order of all the divine Rever 
 lations to Mankind. The whole Patriarchal 
 and Jewifh Dilpenlations were contrived by the 
 Wifdom of God, to be Prophetical only and 
 typical of thofe things which were to be ful- 
 filled in the Perfon of Ghrift. But they, in- 
 ftesad of allowing the things typifyed, fuch as 
 Ponchafe, Redemption, Prieft and Priefthood, 
 Sacrifice, Atonement, Oblation, SanEtification*, 
 and l0ercejjion, to mean any thing real and 
 foljd and true in refpect of God or of Chrift: 
 They> I lay, turn them all into pure Mejtaphor 
 { as they lifcewi-le do the Terms Father, Son, 
 Spirit, Born, and Begotten) upon this falfe Pre- 
 emption ; that if they are mere Metaphor they 
 can fignify nothing at all of lolid Truth and 
 Reality in reipeet of God, as they do in ref- 
 peel: of Man. But tho' we Ihould grant them 
 all thefe Terms %p he purely Metaphorical (as 
 
 B b 2 none 
 
3?4 DIVINE 
 
 none of them are, but truly Analogical) even 
 thus their Confequencc would not follow, 
 Therefore they can mean nothing real and ac- 
 tual in refpecJ of God and of Chriji: For all 
 Metaphor, both Human and Divine, is intend- 
 ed to mean fomething real and actual in thole 
 things to which it is indirectly applyecj ; other- 
 wile it would be an elegant way of laying 
 Nothing ; and every Metaphorical Term would 
 carry no more in it than the mighty Empha- 
 fis only and Eloquence of an inarticulate 
 Sound. 
 
 The Socinians were aware of this Rock, 
 on which theyfaw they muft inevitably Split; 
 and therefore chofe to run upon the Sand, and 
 take Refuge in another no lefs dangerous and 
 fatal Evafion. In their Meaning therefore, all 
 thole Scripture Terms are Metaphorical Allu- 
 lions to the Rites and Ceremonies of the Jew- 
 ifh Oeconomy ; they allow each of them a 
 Meaning of fomething real, only as it refers 
 upward to fome particular Rite and ConftitU" 
 tion or Tranfa&ion under the Patriarchal and 
 Jewilh Difpenfations : And this is the fallacious 
 and iniquitous Turn they give to all the Lan- 
 guage of the Gofpel; which they are not 
 alhamed expreflyto fay, is One grand Meta- 
 phor. Thus, whereas the very Completions of 
 thole Types and Prophetical Reprefentations, 
 under the Gofpel, were in the Wifdom and 
 Goodnefs of God defigned to have a ftill far- 
 ther Reference forward and to another World ; 
 2 fo 
 
ANALOGY. 
 
 lb as to fignify ibmething not only real and true, 
 but Similar and Correjpondent alfo, with refpedt 
 to divine Obje&s and Operations :' They with 
 human Subtilty, have made all thofe Comple- 
 tions in the Perfbn and Office of Chrift, to"ge\ 
 ther with the Words in which they are e<pref- 
 fed, to recoil back again upon the Jewifh Dif- 
 penfation, from whence they were taken'; giv- 
 ing to each of thole Gofpel Terms no other Im- 
 port or Signification than that of A Figure Jfff 
 a Type,- and that of One Figure for Another. , So. 
 that all the antient 'Types, and the Completions 
 of them likewile, were equaly Figures only ; 
 nay Figures mutualy for each other ; and all 
 the Jewifti Difpenfation is but one grand Type,, 
 or one grand Metaphor for it felf. Thus be- 
 tween Type and Metaphor both the Old and New 
 Teftament fall to the Ground; and end in no- 
 thing more than one long unneceffary Series 
 of Amufement to Mankind ; the whole Gourfe 
 of God's Providence is turned upon himlelf, 
 and runs Backward; all the real Virtue and 
 Efficacy both of the Law and Gofpel, are in- 
 tirely taken away - 7 and all the divine Methods 
 of proceeding in our Favour, are ultimately 
 refolved into a Metaphorical Redemption and 
 Salvation. This came fo dire&ly in my way, 
 that I was not willing to ftep over it ; becaufe 
 it doth not only fet before a Reader the whole 
 Socinian Scheme at one View : But will ena- 
 ble him, by a judicious Application of what 
 is here laid, to confute that Herefy almoft in 
 every particular. 
 
 B b 3 CHAP. 
 
374 DIVINE 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 A Colletfion of foofe and general Refletfiehs upon 
 the DoBrim of Divine Analogy y conjidmd. 
 
 JXJ S T as this Treatife was finiftied and fent 
 )away to the Prefs, I was very accidentaly 
 furprifed with a threatning Appearance of 
 a powerful Attack upon the Doctrine of Di- 
 vine AnaUgy, from an anonymous Author 
 under the Difguife of a Minute Phikjbpber. 
 That Title filled me with great expecta- 
 tion of nothing lefs than the ftrongeft Ar- 
 guments and Objections, and the cloleft Rea- 
 foning which could be offered agaittft what has 
 been already published in defence of that Doc- 
 trine. But I found my felf loon undeceived, 
 in meeting with nothing but fuch a Strain of 
 pure common place, as amounts to no more 
 than a ipecious declaiming againft the received 
 and genuine Notion of Analogy ; and the cry- 
 ing up another of his own in Opposition to 
 it, which will appear raoft abfurd and imagi- 
 nary. The Author doth not ofier at any folid 
 Reafoning or Argument, as others have done 
 who even glanced upon the Subject. But to 
 make up the want of it, he hath heaped to- 
 gether a number of plaufible and popular 
 Phrafes ; invidious Turns of Expreflion ; many 
 Terms in a loofe and indeterminate Significa- 
 tion, without any particular Application to 
 
 the 
 
ANALOGY. 373 
 
 the Point in Controversy; odious Infinuations 
 of pernicious Conlequences from that Doctrine; 
 not without fbrrowful and boading Lamenta- 
 tions for the utter Ruin and Downfall of all 
 Religion natural and revealed, if that dread- 
 ful Doctrine fhould ever Prevail in the World, 
 For it is no lels than Denying of God, and his 
 Being, and Attributes, and Leaving him no- 
 thing but an empty Name. By it the very Noti- 
 on of God is taken away, and you have nothing 
 left inftead of it but Fate, or Chaos, or Pla- 
 fiic Nature. By it the Attributes of God are 
 taken in No known Sence or Notion, but in a 
 Sence unintelligible and which No one under- 
 fiands; and they are Denyed in every intelli- 
 gible particular Sence. It allows no Knowlege or 
 Wifdom or Goodnejs in God. At this Rate his 
 Attributes do not belong to him, 'They may be re- 
 conciled with any thing or nothing. And the Me- 
 thod of proceeding as we do upon the Foot 
 of our Analogy, he afferts to be np other than 
 Clearing up Doubts by Nonfence, and Avoiding 
 Difficulties by running into affected ContradiUiion^ 
 that upon our Principle we cannot Frame a 
 Syttogifm to prove the Being or Attributes of 
 God, without four Terms in it. And in fliort, 
 That it never was a received Notion, and never 
 will, Jo long as Men believe a God, 
 
 I n a fingle Combat a Man would be lit-* 
 
 tie applauded, who fliould with an Air of 
 
 Bravery and Defiance dextroufly flourifh. a 
 
 skittering Sword at a diftance, without ven- 
 
 B b 4 turing 
 
376 DIVINE 
 
 turing- within reach of being hurt himfelf, or 
 wounding another. And yet I cannot forbear 
 obferving that this is the very Image of my 
 ingenious Antagonift, which muft ftrike the 
 Mind of every difcerning Perfon, upon read- 
 ing over all that relates to this Subject in the 
 two Volumes of the aforementioned Minute 
 Phi'ofopher. Now therefore to prevent, all far- 
 ther Improvement of this Parallel, by any 
 Triumph, as if, in an Attempt fo extraor- 
 dinary, he had obtained an eafy and complete 
 Victory ; and left he, or any others prepofleffed 
 in Favour of his Opinion, mould continue that 
 Boafting which I find is already begun, as if 
 it were a clear and full Confutation of all that 
 has been yet publilhed to eftabliih the Doctrine 
 of Divine Analogy : I thought it fealbnable to 
 do both th^t, and my felf Juftice ; by a fair 
 and impartial Confederation of every thing to 
 this Purpole in thofe Books. But fince there 
 is nothing of real Weight relating to it, to be 
 found in them ; all clofe and regular Anfwers 
 muft be defered till I come to the Confedera- 
 tion of fuch material Objections againft divine 
 Analogy as deferve a more diftinct and parti- 
 cular Notice. Here, where I am only to re- 
 move fome groundleft Prejudices and Prepof- 
 feffions ; there is no more to be done, but to 
 prevent Mens being amufed by a dazling Ap- 
 pearance of Learning : And to take off fuch 
 Impreffions as are too commonly made on 
 weak Minds by pofitive Affertions uttered with 
 great Solemnity of Style, and with no fmall 
 
 Degree 
 
ANALOGY. 211 
 
 Degree of Affurance that he is on the right 
 Side of the Queftion. Tho',. contrary to the 
 natural and common Sentiments of all Man- 
 kind, he exprefly maintains this dangerous 
 Pofition directly deftructive of all Religion; 
 That Words may be vital, active, ruling Prin- 
 ciples ; tho' they have no clear and di/lintf, or de- 
 terminate Idea or Conception annexed to them\ 
 Nay, Tho' in fbme Inftances It is as impojfihle 
 to affix any fuch Idea to them, as if they, were 
 altogether inarticulate. 
 
 Tho' 1 choofe to perform this here, yet the 
 judicious Reader will oblerve how this intire 
 Chapter is calculated, not for an Anfwer to 
 that Author in p'articular ; but to all fuch loofe 
 and general Reflections as too frequently occur 
 in other Writers, who have not fufficiently 
 weighed and confidered this Subject j account- 
 ing it not worth all that Application of Mind, 
 which it feems to require in order to a right and 
 full Apprehenfion of it. For which realbn they 
 cannot yet difcern the univerfal Uie and even 
 Neceffity of it, in an Age wherein Infidelity 
 and Herefy are wrought up to a Crifis, by 
 Mens confounding divine Analogy with Figure 
 and Metaphor ; by arguing from the ftrictly 
 proper and literal Acceptation of All Terms in 
 Religion; and by requiring fuch direct and 
 immediate Ideas, or Conceptions of things fu- 
 pernatural and divine, as we have of Things 
 natural and human. Take then this Author's 
 Sayings in his own Words, and in the Order 
 
 I met 
 
378 DIVINE 
 
 I met with them; all of them fuch as proceed 
 intirely from a grofs Miftake of Analogy, and 
 no other than fo many plain Mifreprefenta- 
 tions of the Truth of that Do&rine we main- 
 tain. According to us, he fays, 
 
 The Attributes of God mufi be under flood in 
 a different Sence from what they fignify in the 
 vulgar Acceptation. Here Vulgar Acceptation is 
 a very dubious and equivocating Expreffion. 
 If thereby he means, as he realy doth, the 
 ftri&ly Proper and Literal and Formal Accep- 
 tation of the Terms in which the divine At- 
 tributes are exprefled ; it is moft true that we 
 affirm they are not to be underftood in that 
 Sence : So as to exprefs any Faculties or Qua- 
 lities or Properties in the Divinity, the very 
 fame in Nature or Kind with fuch as are hu- 
 man; this is a moft abfurd Sence of thole 
 Terms, which we utterly rejed as unworthy 
 of God. But if thereby he had meant what he 
 ought to mean, that Acceptation of thofe 
 Terms whereby we attribute or apply to God 
 the well known conceivable Perfections of our 
 own Mind, to ftand for and Rtprefent fimilar 
 and correfpondent Perfections in the divine 
 Nature ; which as they are in themfelves all 
 Mankind allow to be in refpedt of our Under- 
 ftanding altogether as incomprehenfible and in- 
 effable as his real intrinfic Nature it felf: Then 
 we acknowlege them to be taken in the Vulgar 
 or commonly received Acceptation ; the only 
 true Acceptation of thofe Terms, when they 
 3 are 
 
ANALOGY. 379 
 
 are transfered from us to a Being whole Real 
 itotrinfic Properties and Attributes are as un- 
 known and incomprehenfible to us, as the true 
 Subftance or Effence to which they belong. 
 Accordingly when any Man in vulgar Speech 
 names the Life of God, he doth not mean a 
 Life of the fame Kind with our's which confifts 
 in the Circulation of the Blood and the Breath 
 of our Noftrils, and in a Conjunction of Spirit 
 and Body ; or when he names the Kmwlege or 
 Wifclom Of God, he doth not mean that which 
 cohfifts in Thinkingby the Help of animal Spi- 
 rits and the Labour of the Brain ; or when he 
 names the Goodnefs of God, he doth not mean 
 that which confifts in the virtuous Regulation 
 of Manners, in the rectifying and governing of 
 Paflions, and reftraining of Appetites. But he 
 ever means incomprehenfible and ineffable Per- 
 fections Cwnfpndmt and Similar to thofe hu- 
 man Perfections, Which for that very Reafon 
 We only attribute or transfer to him 5 becaufe" 
 it is impoiiible for us to have any "Direct Con- 
 ceptions or Ideas of thofe divine Perfections as 
 they are In them/elves ; or any Terms in hu- 
 man Language to exprefs them with the fame 
 Ariel: and literal Propriety in which they are 
 applyed to the things of Nature. 
 
 Bu t it may be objected that the Generali- 
 ty of Men never attend to this Analogy; and 
 look no farther than the ftrictly literal Pro- 
 priety of thofe Terms, and in that Acceptati- 
 on fpeafc them indifferejtitly of God and Man. 
 
 Very 
 
380 DIVINE 
 
 Very true; and the Realbn of it is obvious 
 It is neceffary'that one and the fame Word 
 fhould in common Speech be applyed indif- 
 ferently to exprefs a divine and an human Per- 
 fection : And becaufe the fame general Term, 
 fuch as Wifdom or Knowlege, applyed to two 
 different Men ever fignifies fbmething the ve- 
 ry fame in Kind ; we are apt infenfibly to run 
 into the fame Notion when that Term is ap- 
 plyed to God and Man. And what promotes 
 this Miftake is, that it is as neceffary, alio 
 that one and the fame Conception, affixed to 
 that Term, fhould ftand in our Minds to re- 
 prefent both human and divine Knowlege: 
 Since we cannot poffibly form two different 
 Conceptions of thefe two-things, one of which 
 is utterly imperceptible as it is in it felf ; but 
 muft unavoidably make one Notion as well as 
 Term ferve for both indifferently, or not think 
 or fpeak at all of the latter. From whence 
 we eafily flide into an Opinion, that the 
 Things themfelves thus expreffed and conceiv- 
 ed are the fame in Kind : Tho' this procedure 
 of our's is occafioned not by any famenefs of 
 Kind in thofe Qbje&s, but by the Scantinefs 
 ©J" our Underftanding ; which is often forced 
 thus to fupply the want of a direct Know- 
 lege, by indirect and fubftituted and correfpon- 
 dent Conceptions. That this therefore fhould 
 be the vulgar and ordinary way of Exprejffim 
 and Thinking is obvious : For Men muft under- 
 ftand thofe Terms Firji in that literal Proprie- 
 ty, wherein they are applyed in* their original 
 
 Ac- 
 
ANALOGY. 381 
 
 Acceptation to things natural and human ; and. 
 not in that fecundary Signification wherein 
 they are afterwards applyed to things divine 
 and fupernatural. Nor was it poffible for the 
 Mind of Man to proceed in a contrary Method 
 the Very Reverie of the other : That is, firft to 
 underftand thole Terms as they are applyed to 
 things altogether inconceivable and inexpreifn 
 ble as they are in themlelves ; and then After- 
 wards apply them to things diredly appre- 
 hended, for the expreffing of which they were 
 originaly invented. And liarely it is natural 
 for the Generality of Mankind to take Words 
 Ordinarily in that Acceptation which firft oc- 
 curs to the Mind; in that Meaning wherein 
 they are ordinarily underftood, and applyed to 
 Objects immediately perceptible; and in that 
 Sence wherein they have not only clear and 
 diftinct, but direct Conceptions annexed to 
 them : And not in that Analogical and Secun- 
 dary, Acceptation wherein they are uled to 
 exprefs any divine correlpondent Perfection, 
 for which as it is in it felf we can have no di- 
 rect Idea or Conception ever lb minute or ob- 
 fcure or inadequate. If the Words Life, for 
 Inftance, or Wifdom or Goodnefs, as alio the 
 common Conceptions annexed to them, necef- 
 larily and unavoidably ftand in the Mind both 
 for the well known natural Images, and for 
 the divine incomprehenfible Originals : Is any 
 thing more natural, nay is it not neceflary for 
 Men to underftand the Terms ordinarily as 
 they expreis the former ; and afterwards upon 
 
 Re- 
 
382 DIVINE 
 
 Recolle&ion to transfer them to the latter, 
 whereof the others are Likeneffes and Repre* 
 fentations ? And would it not be a very ground- 
 lefs Inference from thence; that therefore the 
 Image and the Original muft be the fame in 
 Nature and Kind, becaufe they are ever in 
 common Speech expreffed by one and the 
 fame general Word, 
 
 Now tho' the Cafe is ordinarily or vulgarly 
 thus and cannot be otherwife ; yet when Men 
 come to obferve more particularly the diffe- 
 rent Application of thofe Terms to the expreff- 
 ing both divine and human Perfections or Pro- 
 perties, and confider the Sence of them right- 
 ly ; it is as neceffary they fhould diftinguifh 
 between that ftricHy proper and literal Accep- 
 tation of them wherein they are applyed to 
 things merely natural and human > and that 
 fecundary Acceptation wherein they are from 
 thence transfered Analogicaly to things divine 
 and fupernatural. And I muft obferve to this 
 Author, that this way of diftinguifhing is now 
 become more neceffary than ever ; not only 
 becaule of the Arguments and Objections of 
 modern Heretics and Infidels againft Revela- 
 tion and Myftery, which mofUy proceed from 
 confounding thefe two different Significations : 
 But becaufe of that dangerous, not to lay fa- 
 tal Miftake and Overfigfat too generaly pre- 
 vailing even among the Orthodox; which 
 hath led them unawares into a public and zea- 
 lous efpoufing the Principles of our Adverfa- 
 
 ries, 
 
ANALOGY. 383 
 
 ries, and into labouring with all their might 
 to fecure to them the quiet Pofleffion of their 
 laft and ftrongeft Hold. 
 
 The Attributes do not belong to God in any 
 known Notion. Had this Author told us what 
 he meant by a Known or Unknown Notion pf 
 the Attributes pf God, or explained the Mat- 
 ter by any one Inftance ; he would have con- 
 futed himlelf, and knight have laved me the 
 Trouble of diftinguifhing for him. If then 
 by Any known Notion he means, according to 
 any DireEt and Immediate Idea or Concepti- 
 on we have of the real Properties or Perfect*- 
 ons themfelves in the very Nature of God, fig- 
 nifyed by thole Terms which we attribute or 
 transfer to him j or of any Properties the lame 
 in Kinds Then it is moft true that thole At- 
 tributes do not belong to God in a Known, 
 that is a Direffly perceptible Notion of them: 
 And how is it poflible they lhould do fo, 
 when it is impolSble for us to have the leaft 
 direct Idea or immediate Notion or Concept 
 tion of thole divine Perfections they are defign- 
 ed to exprels, as they are in his real intrinfic 
 Nature; or any otherwile than as they be- 
 come known and conceivable to us by Analov 
 gy with thole human Properties which we 
 therefore neceflarily attribute to him for want 
 of any fuch direct Idea or Notion or Concep- 
 tion ? But if by Any known Notion he means, 
 that in our Method of Analogy we can have 
 no real or..ufeful Knowlege at all of thole di- 
 vine, 
 
3&4 ft I V I N £ 
 
 vine Perfections; and can affix no Intelligible 
 Meaning to the Terms in which we expreis 
 them, nothing can be more palpably falfe. 
 For the very Point we contend for, is the Ap- 
 plication of thofe Terms, by which the divine 
 Attributes are exprefled, in a well known No- 
 tion and very conceivable Sence \ That is, as 
 our human Perfections are clear and eafy Re- 
 prefentations of incomprehenfible Properties 
 and Perfections in the divine Nature which are 
 correfpondent and fimilar to them. In this Ac- 
 ceptation the Terms are all very determinate 
 and diftin&ly intelligible ; and lofe nothing of 
 their Clearnefs and Perfpicuity by being trans- 
 fered from their ftri&ly literal and proper Ac- 
 ceptation, to that which is Divine and Analogi- 
 cal: But are as conceivable and well underftood 
 in this Sence, as when they were firft applyed 
 to the Faculties or Properties or Operations of 
 our own Mind. Whereas the very thing we 
 juftly charge upon this Author and others of 
 his Strain is, that according to them the Attri- 
 butes belong to God in a Sence altogether ab- 
 furd and unintelligible : That is as they ex- 
 preis Perfections the very lame in Kind with 
 thofe that are either natural or acquired in us, 
 only infinitely greater in Degree; which is in 
 plain Words, as they expreis the fame with 
 Infinite human Perfections. 
 
 That Expreffion of Belonging to God is 
 likewife very loofe and ambiguous, and fit to 
 be put into the Mouth only of a Minute Phi- 
 
 lofopher. 
 
^ A N A L O G Y. 385 
 
 lofopher. If it muft have a ferious Anfwer 
 then, I tell him that the divine Attributes do 
 truly belong to God in our Sence of the 
 Terms ; as they exprels fo many real but in- 
 eomprehenfible Perfections in him, correfc 
 pendent and fimilar to thole human Facul-i 
 ties or Properties or Operations they were 
 Jjrft invented to fignify : They belong to God, 
 and to him only, as they are thus taken from 
 common Speech and appropriated to him in 
 that Analogical Acceptation* And I muft tell 
 him again, that the Attributes do not belong to 
 God in his Acceptation of them -, or in that 
 fencelels contradictory Notion wherein they 
 are fiippoied to exprefs an infinite Degree o£ 
 io many human Perfections. What we lay is, 
 that Human Life for Inftance, or Human 
 ffyowlege and Wifdom) or human Goodnefs are 
 in no Degree truly or properly or formaly the 
 fame with the divine ; and that they do not 
 belong to God, according to this Author's 
 grand Notion, as being of the lame Kind when 
 fpoken of God and Man; But at the fame 
 time we affirm that they more truly belong to 
 God than Man, as our Attributes or Proper-- 
 ties carry in them a Similitude only and Re^ 
 femblance of the. truly original archetypal 
 Perfections. So that the Cafe in ihort is this; 
 The Terms by which we exprefs the divine 
 Attributes, firft belong to us only in their prn 
 mary and ftrictly literal and proper Accepta- 
 tion; and they belong to God. and to him on- 
 ly as they are transfered from us to him in an 
 Analogical Sence. G c Again 
 
^86 D I VI N E 
 
 Again fays he, The Attributes are denyed 
 in every intelligible Seme. This is a moft un- 
 fair and groundlefs Charge upon the Do&rine 
 of Analogy. For can any thing be more 
 glaringly evident, than that a thing may become 
 very Conceivable, and confequently very /»- 
 telligible by Simlitude and Reprefentation, 
 which is otherwife to us utterly imperceptible 
 and inconceivable ? And thus it is that all the 
 divine Attributes are very clearly and diftin£t- 
 ly Underjiood; tho' they are, as to their own 
 Real Nature and Manner intkely unknown and 
 inconceivable to human Underftanding. • Now 
 had we denyed the divine Attributes in either 
 of thefe Sences, there would have been fbme 
 Colour of Truth in that Affertion of his : But 
 it happens that we affirm and allow them in 
 both thole Sences, as they are very conceiv- 
 able by Similitude and Reprefentation-, and as 
 they are in their own True and Real Nature 
 utterly inconceivable to us. We do not deny 
 that the Terms by which we exprefs the di- 
 vine Attributes are with the greateft Truth 
 and Certainty applyed to God, as that Saying 
 infinuates : But what we deny is that, accord- 
 ing to this Author's Notion, they can with 
 any Truth be applyed to him in the fame li- 
 teral and proper and formal Acceptation of 
 the Words in which they are applyed to Man. 
 And pray who is it then that denies the di- 
 vine Attributes in every intelligible Sence ; 
 we who affirm thatour human Faculties or 
 
 Pro' 
 
ANALOGY. 3S7 
 
 Properties or Operations cannot be truly and 
 formaly in any Degree the fame with divine 
 Perfections: Or our .Author, who proceeds al- 
 together upon this Principle; that the divine 
 Attributes are literaly and formaly in lbme 
 Degree the fame with human Properties. 
 
 Knowle,ge in God hath no Sort of Re* 
 femblance or Agreement , with any Notion that 
 Man can frame of Knowlege. This is a charge 
 upon us as perfectly the Reverfe of what wd 
 hold, as it waspoffible for Words to exprefsj 
 Fot what we affirm and contend for is ; That 
 there is a true and real Refemblance or Agree- 
 ment between Knowlege in God and Know- 
 lege in Man : And that there is fuch a Foun^ 
 dation of Similitude and Analogy between 
 them, both in the divine and human Nature ; 
 that the Conception we have of our Know- 3 
 lege, ftands in the Mind to reprefent juftly and 
 ufefully a correipondent and fimilar, but infi-* 
 nite and otherwife incomprehenfible Perfect 
 tion in the divine Nature. This Foundation 
 we affirm to be difcovered to us not by mere 
 Reafbn only, but more particularly by that 
 exprefs Revelation wherein we are faid to be 
 formed in the Likenefs and after the Image 
 of God. From whence Mankind was very 
 early taught from Heaven, that there is fuch 
 a real Similitude and Cotrefpondency between 
 the Powers and Properties and Operations of 
 the human Mind efpecialy ; and the infinite 
 Perfe&ions of the divine Nature > that it is 
 G e % the 
 
3 88 DIVINE 
 
 the only fure and folid Ground we have fof 
 the Truth and Certainty of all our Knowlege 
 of things divine and fupernaturaL This is 
 the only infallible and determinate Criterion 
 of Truth in the Mind of Man, with refpeft 
 to our whole Manner both of Thinking and 
 Speaking of things purely fpiritual and divine. 
 Were it not for this, we could have had no 
 Conceptions at all in any Degree of things to 
 us ib imperceptible and utterly incbmprehen- 
 fible as they are in themfelves. And if even 
 this were poffible for us; yet no human Un- 
 derstanding could have found out any other 
 Way of judging and determining how far all 
 our Inferences and Deductions from thole Con- 
 ceptions were true or falfe : Otherwile than 
 by a Parity of Reafoning, which infenfibly 
 carries on the happy Companion and Parallel 
 between things human and divine, thro' the 
 whole Series of all the Powers and Operations 
 of the Intellect and Will ; as well as thro' all 
 thole Words and Forms of human Language 
 wherein they are expreffed. This is our Opi- 
 nion ; whereas this Author is not fatisfyed 
 with any Sort of Refemblance only, or Ana- 
 logy between Knowlege in God and in Man : 
 But on the quite contrary and in direct Op- 
 position to us, will have thofe Terms which 
 -fexprefs the divine Attributes to fignify lbme* 
 thing Formal) the very fame in Nature or 
 Kind with our own. May I not here then ap- 
 peal to the Reader whether any thing could 
 be more hardy, than for an Author in the 
 s -\ Face 
 
ANALOGY. §8g 
 
 Face of the World fb exprefly to charge upon 
 us the very pernicious Error we are labouring 
 to confute j and which at the fame time is his 
 own darling fundamental Notion ? » 
 
 W e both do hold that there is real Knowr 
 lege in God, but with this material Difference ; 
 that He rejects all Refemblance only or Simi- 
 litude and Correfpondency between this Attri- 
 bute, and that Knowlege whereof we have a 
 Confcioufhefs in our felves; and will have 
 them formaly the very fame in Kind, and dif- 
 ferent only in Degree. But we contend, that 
 the Term Knowlege, when applyed to God, 
 expreffeth anincomprehenfible Perfection pure- 
 ly and intirely divine, whereof it is impoffible 
 ,for us to have any direct Conception or Con- 
 fcioufhefs: And therefore we do neceffari* 
 ly conceive it only by Refemblance and Ana~ 
 logy with that Property or Operation of our 
 own Minds to which we affix the Term Know- 
 lege. From whence we may occafionaly ob- 
 serve, how Framing a Notion oj Knowlege is a 
 very unphilofophical Way of fpeaking. For 
 we do not voluntarily frame to our lelves a 
 Notion or Conception or Idea of human Know- 
 lege ; but we come by the Notion of it from 
 an immediate Confcioufnefs of fuch a Power 
 or Operation within our felves : And this is 
 the very Notion or Conception we transfer to 
 God on purpofe to reprefent and exprefs a real, 
 •and correfpondent, but otherwife inconceivable 
 Perfection of his intrinfic Nature, 
 
 Cc 5 The 
 
39° DIVINE 
 
 The Author ftarts an Objection here a- 
 gainft the Forekhowlege of God, with defign 
 to fliew how aukwardly it was to be anfwer- 
 ed upon our Notion of Analogy; and how 
 All the divine Attributes may, in our Way of 
 proceeding, Be reconciled with every thing, or 
 pothing. The Obje&ion is this ; Future Con- 
 tingencies are inconfiftent with the Fareknowlege 
 of God> becaufe it is repugnant that certain Know' 
 lege Jhould be of an uncertain thing. It were to 
 be wiftied that he who calls our Way of pro-? 
 ceeding Cutting of the Knot, and' not, untying 
 it, had himfelf performed either ; and not left 
 it in its full Strength without any Anfwer 
 pf his own, when he made a falfe Reprefenta-s 
 tion of our's. But the Reafbn of this is plain ; 
 the Objection is unanfwerable upon his Prin- 
 ciple : For the Realbn affigned why God can- 
 not forefee Contingencies is \ becaufe they are 
 as truly Uncertainties in refpecr. of him as 
 they are of Man, without which Suppofitfon 
 the Objection falls to the Ground. Now if 
 the Property of Knowlege in God and in Man 
 are the very fame in Nature or Kind, and 
 differ only in Degree ; then all Contingencies 
 rnuft neceffarily be in fome Degree fo many 
 Uncertainties in refped of the divine Know^ 
 lege, as welfasof the human; and can be no 
 more forefeen with Abfolute Certainty by God, 
 than they can be certainly forefeen by Man. 
 Nay if you take the Attribute of Knowlege 
 iq. the ftri&ly proper and literal Sence of the 
 
 Word, 
 
ANALOGY. 391 
 
 Word, as he will have it, fo as to fignify a. 
 divine Perfection of the fame Kind with that 
 Property in Man: Then, whatever Notion- 
 you form of the divine Forehnowlege, Man 
 mull have that very divine Attribute in forne- 
 Degree, and confequently can,with Some Mea* 
 Jure of Certainty forefee Contingencies likewife ; . 
 tho' not with luch quickneis, clearnels, and 
 fulnefs as they, are foreleen by him who is en- 
 dued with that Property in an higher Degree. 
 In fhort, if Knowlege in God be of the lame 
 Kind with our's, it can be only an Indefinitely 
 greater Perfection, and not an Infinite Perfect 
 tion : And if this be the Gale, then God can 
 forefee Contingencies, not with Abfolute Infal-, 
 lible Certainty, but only with a much higher 
 Degree of probability than Men can ; that is, 
 He can only make a vaftly more probable 
 Conjecture of them. He doth not only thus 
 leave the Objection in its full Force and Infu- 
 perable, but puts this mock and lencelels An* 
 fwer into our Mouths; that according to any 
 Known Seme of that Attribute of Knowlege, 
 or any Notion that we can jorm of it, it may 
 be True that God cannot forefee Contingencies : 
 But as that Attribute cannot be taken by us 
 in An) known Seme, but in a Sence which we 
 know nothing of, and as we deny it in eVery 
 Sence that is intelligible ; there- may be No 
 Incmjlftency between the contingent Nature of 
 things, and divine Foreknowlege. 
 
 I n giving our own Anfwer to that Objec* 
 Cc 4/ tion, 
 
392 DIVINE 
 
 tiori, we muft anfwer him firft ; that we do not 
 lay the divine Attribute of Knowlege is to be 
 taken in a Sence that we know nothing of, or in 
 any Unknown unintelligible Sence, that is in no 
 Sence at all : For thus it amounts to no more 
 than this, that Men fpeafc Nonfence, and lay 
 nothing when they name that Attribute ; and 
 that accordingly it may indeed thus be recon- 
 ciled with every thing, or nothing. No, we 
 affert the quite Contrary ; that Knowlege is to 
 be taken, after the lame Manner with all the 
 reft of the divine Attributes, in a well known 
 determinate Sence which every one of us un- 
 derftands; and in the only Sence wherein it 
 can become conceivable and intelligible to 
 the Mind of Man : That is, by Similitude or 
 Analogy with what' is natural and human ; 
 the only Knowlege whereof we have any 
 direct Perception or immediate Gonfcioulhels. 
 That this very human Knowlege, whereof we 
 have a clear and diftincl: and immediate Per- 
 ception or Confciouihels, is transfered to God 
 to reprefent and exprefi an incomprehenlible 
 Perfection intrinfic to his Nature, but Corref* 
 pondent and fimilar to that natural Property 
 in us. And that this Conception, as well as 
 Term of human Language to which it is an- 
 nexed, retains 1 its firft Perlpicuity, and remains 
 ftill equaly Clear and Viftintt when it thus 
 becomes the Reprefentative of a divine Perfec- 
 tion ; which is no way obfcurely or partialy 
 dilcerned, but totaly imperceptible and alto- 
 gether unknown as it is in it felf; Juft as a 
 3 lively 
 
ANALO G Y. 393 
 
 lively Image or a compleat Picture becomes 
 never the more confuted or obfcure, for its be- 
 ing confidered as a Reprefentation of an Un- 
 known Original. That this divine incompre- 
 heniible Perfection, fo clearly conceived and 
 diftinctly underftood by Analogy, is of a Kind 
 infinitely different from that Property in us to 
 which the Term was firft appropriated, before 
 vulgar UTe rendered it general, and a Word 
 common to God, and Angels, and Men, and 
 even to Brutes : And they rrmft have a very 
 low and vulgar Way of thinking indeed, who 
 upon fome Recollection do not difcern that 
 when the Term Knowlege comes to be proper- 
 ly limited and particularly applyed to any of 
 thefe, it muft fignify fome Faculty or Pro- 
 perty of a very different Nature in each of 
 them ; and efpecialy in God fome incompre- 
 henfible Perfection infinitely different from 
 them all, which muft be of another Kind for 
 that very Reafon, becaufo it is infinite and in- 
 comprehenfible ; which it could not be if we 
 had a direct Perception or Idea of it in any 
 Degree. That the divine Property or Perfec- 
 tion correfpondent and fimilar to Knowlege in 
 us, that is to Thinking by the Labour of the 
 Brain and Help of animal Spirits, being ut- 
 terly inconceivable and unknown as it is in it 
 folf ; it is impoffible for us to difcern or con- 
 clude DireBly what is, or is not confiftent with 
 it or contradictory to it as it is in the Intrinfic 
 ■Nature of God : Thus confidered it is out of 
 the Immediate Reach of all our Underftanding 
 " Faculties; 
 
394 DIVINE 
 
 Faculties ; and nothing can be more ground- 
 left and prefumptuous than all Reafonings and 
 Inferences concerning this Attribute in parti- 
 cular taken Only in this much miftaken Sence 
 of our Author ; and thus, to return him his 
 own Expreffion , that Attribute may be recon- 
 ciled with every thing or nothing. That there- 
 fore what we have to do is, to confider what is 
 or is not confident with this divine Attribute, 
 as it becomes conceivable and is rendered the 
 Objed of human underftanding by Similitude 
 or Analogy with that human Knowlege where- 
 of we have an immediate Confcioulhefs ; which 
 is the only clear and diftindt and intelligible 
 Way we have of thinking and lpeaking of 
 that fupernatural and infinite Perfection. What?- 
 ever in the whole Courfe of all Differtation and 
 Argument can be proved inconfiftent with this 
 only conceivable and intelligible Acceptation 
 of the divine Attributes, or contradictory to 
 them, is to be utterly reje&ed j and by a Parity 
 of Reafon may be Mediately and Ultimately con- 
 cluded inconfiftent likewife with the real intrin- 
 fic Nature of God and contradictory to it. And 
 laftly that the Refemblance between that Know- 
 lege which is merely Natural and Human, and 
 that which is purely Divine and Supernatural is 
 not to be extended beyond the main and fingle 
 Point of Analogy defigned, and which is alone 
 worthy of God : Namely to exprels a real in- 
 finite Perfe&ion in his Nature, correspondent 
 and fimilar to that Property in us ; and there- 
 fore that all other particular Inftances of Com* 
 
 parifbn 
 
ANALOG Y. 395 
 
 parifbn between them muft be precarious and 
 groundlefs, and intirely unworthy the divine 
 Nature. 
 
 Now this Author is removed out of the 
 Way, who covered the Socinian Objection 
 with all the Force he was Mailer of, it is eafy 
 to demolifh it : By anfwering that it proceeds 
 upon a falle and groundlefs Prefumption that 
 the Property of Knowlege is exactly of the 
 fame Kind in God and in Man ; which being 
 granted, the Confequence would furely follow 
 that he could not certainly forefee Contingen-i 
 ties. For the Realbn affigned why things 
 depending on the free Will of Man cannot be 
 infallibly foreleen is, becaufe they are Contin- 
 gent and Uncertain ■, which they liirely are to 
 human Underftanding : And if all Knowlege 
 in God were of the fame Kind with our's, 
 they would all be in ibme Degree contingent 
 and uncertain in relpedt of him lifcewife. But 
 fince Knowlege in God is a Perfection (not alto- 
 gether unknown and unintelligible, but clears 
 ly and diftinclly conceived and known by Ana- 
 logy with that which is human, and yet) fo 
 utterly inconceivable to our Underftanding As 
 it is in its felf, that we cannot conclude or deter* 
 mine what is, or is not confiftent with it or con- 
 tradi&ory to it when confidered in this Sence 
 Alone : And fince it is infinitely different from 
 human Knowlege not in Degree only, but in 
 Nature and Kind ; no Argument can be formed 
 with any Juftnefs and Truth, from the Topic 
 
 in. 
 
396 DIVINE 
 
 in the Obje&ion Only, to prove that future 
 Contingencies are inconfiftent with a divine 
 Perfe&ion, of which neither we nor the Ob- 
 jectors have any other Conception or Notion 
 than by Representation only or Analogy. Tho* 
 things to come and depending upon our Free- 
 dom of Will are Contingent and Uncertain, in 
 lefpecl: of that Knowlege which is the joint 
 Operation of limited Spirit and Matter in ef- 
 fential Union : Yet no Inference can be made, 
 from thence only, againft the Foreknowlege 
 of a Pure Spirit. Nor can we, from Thence 
 alone, conclude it impoffible even for an Angel, 
 whofe Knowlege is altogether different from 
 our's, to forefee Contingencies with fbme De- 
 gree of certainty : And much left can any fuch 
 Conclufion be made from thence with refpecT: 
 to a Divine Spirit, whofe Knowlege mull: be 
 infinitely different in Kind from that of all 
 created Spirits. But tho' it were granted that 
 all things depending on the free Will of other- 
 intelligent Agents, were in every Degree in- 
 confiftent with the certain Knowlege of all 
 Created Spirits, as being contingent and un- 
 certain to the moft exalted of them : Yet 
 thofe things cannot be contingent and uncer- 
 tain in refpect of that divine Perfe&ion; 
 which, Whatever the real Nature or Kind of 
 it is in Other refpetfs, muft neceffarily be In- 
 finite ; and Infinite Knowlege cannot be con- 
 ceived otherwife than exclufive of all Con- 
 tingency or Uncertainty. So that there can be 
 no fuch thing as Contingency or Uncertainty 
 t* in 
 
ANALOGY. 297. 
 in refpect of God, who muft CertMnly forefee, 
 whatever will or can Realy happen; infomuch 
 that Infinite Knowlege, and Contingency or Uncer- 
 tainty is exprefs Contradiction in Terms. Nay 
 tho* the Knowlege of God with refpect to all 
 Other things, were allowed to be the lame Pro- 
 perty in Kind with our own ; ftill his Certain 
 ForeknowJege of Free Actions muft be granted to 
 be of a peculiar and different Kind. And there- 
 fore where is the Abfurdity in averting, that 
 God is endued with a Perfection totaly different 
 from any in our Nature, which enables him to 
 difcern infallibly the future Actions of others: 
 Any more than in the Belief of a Perfbn born 
 blind, that other Men have a Faculty, which 
 he wants, of clearly perceiving and diftinguifh- 
 ing Objects at a great Diftance ? God therefore 
 certainly foreknows what we call future Con-; 
 tingencies and Uncertainties, as being truly 
 fuch in refpect of our Underftanding j beeaufe 
 there can be. no fuch thing as Contingency or 
 Uncertainty in refpect of that infinite Perfec- 
 tion : And this being in Nature or Kind intire- 
 ly different from our natural way of Thinking, 
 is no otherwife conceivable by us than thro' 
 Analogy with human Knowlege ; which is of 
 a Kind formed for the certain Difcernment 
 only oiTafi and Prefent Actions, and not for 
 looking infallibly Forward one Moment into 
 the Actions of our fellow Creatures. 
 
 This Author calls our Faith, The Belief 
 that there is an unknown. Subjett, of Attributes 
 
 abfolutely 
 
398 DIVINE 
 
 abfolulely unknown* No, but our Belief- fa' 
 That there is an incomprehenfible SubjeEl, of 
 Attributes abfolutely incomprehenfible as they 
 are in them/elves; and I hope this Author's 
 Belief is the very fame, notwithftanding all 
 the Pains he hath taken to difguife and mif- 
 reprefent it to the World. The Term Un- 
 known in that Saying is very dubious and equi- 
 vocal. As it fignifyeth the lame with Imper- 
 ceptible, or Inconceivable and Utterly Incom- 
 prehenfible as a thing is in its own Nature, he 
 muft believe God to be in this Sence an un- 
 known Subjed of Attributes equaly unknown, 
 as well as we: For it is utterly impoffible for . 
 us to have the leaft Perception or Idea of therri 
 as they are in themfelves; and nothing can be 
 more vain than for Men to fuppole, that they 
 dilcern fomething of their real Nature, or of 
 the very lame Kind, in things of a quite dif- 
 ferent Nature and Kind. But as the Term 
 Unknown fignifyeth in his Intention here a 
 Total Ignorance of God and his Attributes, 
 and an ablblute want of any Degree of Know- 
 lege; either by direct and immediate Percep- 
 tion, or by Similitude and Refemblance with 
 the greateft Perfections in an human Mind ; I 
 hope that Saying cannot with any Truth be 
 applyed to either of us. Tho' there is ftill this 
 material Difference between us; that his Be- 
 lief in divine Attributes Formal?, as he Ipeaks, 
 the very fame in Kind with our human Pro- 
 perties, or Faculties, or Operations, is abfo- 
 lutely precarious and falfe, and altogether 
 3 unworthy 
 
ANALOGY. 399 
 
 unworthy of God : And that our Belief in At- 
 tributes truly and in every Degree incompre- 
 heniible as they are in themfelves, and of a 
 Nature and Kind infinitely different from any 
 that are not only merely Human but Angelic, 
 is founded upon Realbn and Scripture ; as I 
 hope abundantly appears from feveral Parts of 
 the foregoing Treatife, j, 
 
 ; ■ Absolutely Unknown / How little this 
 Author underftands the Doctrine of divine A- 
 nalogy, which he is all along not confuting 
 but reviling. No ; our Belief is in Attributes, 
 not obfcurely or confufedly, but clearly and 
 diftinctly known ; by the Intervention of that 
 clear and diftincl: and determinate Perception 
 and Knowlege we have of our own Properties 
 and Perfections: which lofes nothing of its 
 Diftinctnefs and Perfpicuity when it is tranfc 
 fered to God and his divine Attributes or Per- 
 fections by Analogy. For the Defign of it is 
 not to give us any obfcure or imperfect Know- 
 lege of the divine Attributes, as it neceflarily 
 muft be upon this Author's Principle; but 
 fuch a clear and diftincl: Knowlege of them as 
 we fhould have of a Face which we beheld 
 in a Glaft or Mirrour : Which tho' it is by Si- 
 militude only and Reprefentation, is yet a 
 Kind of Knowlege juft and clear and ufeful ; 
 as being founded in the original Frame and 
 Conftitution of Man, and in that Relem- 
 blance he bears to the Divinity. So that we 
 ( have juft as clear and diftincl: (tho' not direct 
 
 and 
 
4 oo DIVINE 
 
 and immediate) Conceptions of the divine 
 Perfections, as we have of our own Faculties 
 or Properties, which are attributed to God by 
 Analogy only and Similitude : And beyond 
 thele we know nothing more of them, than 
 that the Real Manner and intrinfic Nature of 
 them is utterly inconceivable, and intirely 
 out of the Reach of all our Faculties. 
 
 To do Juftice to both Sides, each of us 
 holds that neither God nor his Attributes are 
 Absolutely unknown * that Charge upon us is 
 not only falfe but ridiculous. The proper 
 Queftion between us is concerning the true 
 Kind and Manner of this Knowlege : Whe- 
 ther we have any direct and immediate Con- 
 ception or Idea of the real Perfections or Attri- 
 butes of God j by having a direct and imme- 
 diate Perception or Confciouihefs of our own 
 Faculties or Perfections, as being the very lame 
 in Nature or Kind with thole that are truly 
 divine? Which being all along affirmed and 
 maintained by this Author, ftiews that tho' he 
 doth not believe the divine Attributes to be 
 ablblutely unknown ; yet he is fundamental/ 
 miftaken with refpect to the real true Man^ 
 ner and Degrees of that Knowlege. Or,- whe- 
 ther all things divine and iupernatural are \of 
 a Nature or Kind lb totaly different from a*' 
 things natural and human j that they are j 
 otherwife conceivable to the Mind of Ma% 
 than by Similitude only or Analogy ? Which 
 is what we affert in direct Oppofition to u 
 
 precedi 
 
ANALOG Y. 401 
 
 preceding Queftiori. Tho' this Author hath 
 taken more Pains on this Subject, than on any- 
 Other thro' his two Volumes of the Minute 
 Philofopher •, and hath been here more pomp- 
 ous in his Citations, apparently in Order to a 
 grand, Performance; yet he hath not dropped 
 one Word or Sentence which is rationaly ap- 
 plicable to this true Point in ControVerfy. 
 
 He aflerts with great Pdfitivenefs, that if 
 our Doftrine of Analogy Once obtain in the 
 Worldy there. 'Would be an End of all Natural 
 or Rational Religion. Now fhduldxl fay the 
 Quite contrary, That if the VocJfine of divjni 
 jinalogy Jhould not obtain in the World (which 
 God forbid) it, is more likely that there will 
 foon be an End of all Revealed Religion among 
 its, without afligning any Realbn for it: This 
 would be but fuch another 'dogmatical Afler- 
 tion, as all thofe I cite from this Author; fot 
 any of which, he hath not condeicended to of- 
 fer one Realbn. But as neither of thele Sayings 
 are to be regarded upon our bare Authority, I 
 affign this plain Realbn for my Aifertion ; be- 
 caufe all the modern Refinements upon Ari- 
 anifm and Socinianifffi; and upon that Infi- 
 delity which (tho' it. formerly appeared only in 
 lome loofe and Icattered Notions, is 'now form- 
 ed into whole Syftems, and wrought up into 
 jntire delufiye. Schemes of Religion; for a 
 Dilguife and falfe Imitation both of that 
 ■which is natural and Revealed) is the obvious 
 Refult of them : Together with all the main 
 
 D d Arguments 
 
403 DIVINE 
 
 Arguments by which they are fupported, and 
 the ftrongeft Objections againft the Ortho- 
 dox Faith in the Myfteries of the Goipel; 
 proceed upon Men's running either into the 
 literal and ftri&ly proper Acceptation of all 
 the Terms in which they are exprefled; or 
 into the other Extreme of that which is 
 purely Figurative and Metaphorical. By 
 which means the whole Subftance and Reali- 
 ty of things divine and lupernatural, fignifyed 
 and intended by' thole Terms, is explained a- 
 way and brought to nothing. So that it is now 
 become more neceflary than ever to Ihew that 
 the Terms expreffing the Attributes of God 
 and the Myfteries of the Goipel, are to be un- 
 fiterftood neither in one Extreme nor the other j 
 but in the Way which lies between them, 
 that is by Analogy. And unlefi this comes to 
 be allowed, there is an End of all natural Re- 
 ligion likewife. For if the Terms-expreffing 
 thole Attributes of God which are known 
 by the Light of Nature, are not to be undef- 
 ftood Analogicaly ; but muft be turned either 
 into empty Figure and Metaphor : Or taken 
 in fuch a literal Sence as to exprefs fomething 
 the fame in Kind both in God and Man ; not/ 
 one of them can fignify any thing truly, and 
 realy, and Worthily applicable to the divine 
 Natnre. 
 
 If fuch, a Notion of God and his Attributes 
 as this Author hath taken fo much needlefs 
 £a»*s to describe, ihouM; obtain in the World; 
 . d V„. 3' a Notion* 
 
A NAIL O G Y. 403 
 
 a Notion which doth not Belong tq him, 1 
 which denies his Being and Attributes,, which is 
 Unintelligible, abf&lutely unknown, arid in fhort 
 which is Nonfence and Contradifiiian : Then 
 indeed there would be an End not only of all 
 natural but of all revealed Religion \ as well as 
 bf all the common Sence and Reaibn of Maa- 
 kind. But whence is all this Zeal for Natw* 
 ral and Rationd Religion, and Revealed Re* 
 ligion. left out ; as if this were not likewiie a 
 rational Religion, arid as if it were not in! 
 more apparent Danger from the prefent Ten- 
 dency of the Times to Herefy and Infidelity? 
 Wherein- the Name' of Natural Religion is 
 become the high " Mode ; an<$ wherein the 
 .common Cry is for Menffw, prepofteroufly let 
 up in Opposition to Revelation and the Myfie- 
 ries pf the Golpol:' And of Courfe agaihfi: 
 Divine Analogy j as it lays openuall the falfe' 
 Pretences of that prevailing hypocritical Con- 
 cern for Religion in general j which hath 'no' 
 other Defign at the Bottom, but the refuting 
 and exploding - all Revelation in Particular. 
 This the Dodtrine of divine Analogy .performs,* 
 by fhewirig how natural and. revealed Reli- 
 gion are both alike e'ftabliftied upon the fame 
 Foundation of KnotoAege by Similitude and 
 Reprefentation n only : Arid that,, they mufl: 
 therefore ftand and fall together ; -. lince with- 
 out this Analogy we could have ho Concept!' 
 on tit Notion at all of God; of of any of 
 thofe divine Attributes which are the Ground? 
 k& ail O&tiiral Religion. Here it nauft be con- 
 Dd z i feSbdj, 
 
;404 D I V I N E 
 
 fefied, that this Author hath not only fallen 
 in with the clamorous Crowd of Oppofers of 
 this Analogy ; but hath diftinguifhed himfelf 
 with a loud Roar and open Throat : As too 
 many others have done, in the contrary ex- 
 treme, by an affected, profoundly deep, and 
 criminal Silence ; at a Juncture and in a Caufe 
 which requires them to be Injlant on the other 
 Side, in a zealous Defence and unreferved Pro- 
 feffion of the Truth, whether they are inclined 
 to think it In Seafon or out of Seafon. 
 
 If this Author's Notion fhould obtain, 
 That we could not believe a God, or any of 
 his Attributes, or the Reality of any thing fu- 
 pernatural and divine, unlejs we believed them 
 to be Truly and Properly arid Formaly the fame 
 in Kind with things natural and human, and 
 to differ from them only in Degree; then 
 there would be indeed a Ipeedy End of natu- 
 ral, as well as revealed Religion. For all 
 ;Ranks of Infidels, who are bigotted to Rea- 
 fon no farther than it is fpirited up to Rebel 
 .againft Revelation to which it is truly fub- 
 fervient,. would not only foon difcover the 
 Abfurdity and Contradiction of that Notion ; 
 but charge us home with the grofs Impiety 
 and Prefumption of it. And when it appear- 
 ed that the grand Principle upon which we 
 founded all our Religious Knowlege of things 
 divine and fuperhatural, was impoffible to be 
 maintained with any Colour of Reafon ; the 
 Cohfequence would be a farther Confirmation 
 
 •-' 5 ~ of 
 
ANA LOGY. 405 
 pf their disbelief in all Religion. But when; 
 the Truth is granted them ; That no Proper-, 
 ties or Faculties or Operations can be in any 
 Degree the fame as to Nature and Kind both, 
 in, God and Man. That of the real Intrinfic 
 Properties and Perfe&ions of God we cannot 
 have the leaft Direff and Immediate Concep-. 
 tion or Idea: And can therefore have no 
 Other way of conceiving them but by Refem- 
 blance or Similitude with thofe that are hu- 
 man. That thole divine Perfections are never 
 the left real, tho' infinitely more tranfeendent^ 
 for being thus altogether incomprehenfible As 
 they are in them/elves. That our Knowlege of 
 them, tho' by Analogy alone, is however riot 
 only jufl and folid, but as Clear and DiftinB 
 as that Knowlege we have of their natural 
 Reprefentatives. And that accordingly the 
 divine .Pojver, and Wijdom^ and Goodnefs, and 
 Jujlice, and Mercy are infinite archetypal Per- 
 fections correfpondent and fimilar to the like 
 natural > Perfections in Man whereby they are 
 juftly reprefented. And laftly that the Ground 
 of this Analogy is laid in the Nature both of 
 God and Man ; and in that real Similitude and 
 Refemblance of the Divinity, to which we were 
 originaly formed ; From whence there is an 
 eternal unerring Parity of Realbn, running thro! 
 all our Conceptions, and Sentirnents and Dif* 
 courfes concerning thole Properties or Per- 
 fections, which from our Humanity are thus 
 transferee! or attributed to the Divinity. So 
 $hat every Inference made from thofe AttrW 
 Dd 3 butes 
 
4 o6 DIVINE 
 
 butes apply ed to God, and thus taken in a 
 idivineSence ; is lb much the ftronger for their 
 being altogether incomprehenfible as they are 
 in themfelves, and of a Kind infinitely different 
 from any thing immediately perceptible by an 
 human Mind; And every Argument drawn 
 from them for the Performance and diicharge 
 of all moral and practical Duties; as well as 
 againft all loofe and infidel Principles ; con- 
 cludes more irrefragably, than if the divine 
 Properties or Attributes were the Same in 
 Kind with our own ; and that our Conceptions 
 or Ideas of them were in fome Degree direct 
 and immediate, tho* partial and inadequate. 
 If all thefe apparent Truths, I lay, were grant- 
 ed them without Referve ; there would be no 
 Retreat lefp for Infidels, out of which they 
 could not be eafily diflodged } nor any objecti- 
 ons which would not admit of a clear and 
 ready and fatisfa£tory Anlwer. 
 
 What may be objected here is, that he 
 doth not aflert any of our human Attributes 
 to be Truly and Properly and Mrmaly of the) 
 fame Kind in God that they are in Man, Till 
 fli Jttiperfeflion is firfi removed front them; 
 and that then they are divine Attributes when 
 jmderftopd thus in a higher Degree, as truly as 
 they are human Properties when taken in a 
 much lower Degree. This is the common 
 Evafion ; to which I anfwer, that this is a Mi- 
 stake of the true Queftion in Debate ; For we: 
 are agreed on both Sides, that all Imperfection 
 
 -- • is 
 
ANALOGY. 407 
 
 is to be removed, to the utmoft of our Power^ 
 from our human Faculties or Properties be- 
 fore they ought to be fboken of God £w« 
 /fnalogicaly; and that they muft be applyed 
 to him in the utmoft Degree of Perfection 
 conceivable by us. But the true Queftion be- 
 tween us ftill remains ; Whether even then, 
 in the moft perfect and exalted degree con- 
 ceivable by an human Mind, they Proper!/ 
 and Literaly and Formal) exprefs Faculties 
 or Perfections or Operations of the Same Kind 
 in the real Nature of God, that they do in 
 the Nature of Man ? This is what our Author, 
 with the other Enemies of Analogy holds in 
 the Affirmative ; and what we utterly reject, 
 for this plain Reafon. Becauie when we have 
 to the utmoft of our Ability removed all Im- 
 perfection from any Faculty or Property or 
 Operation of our's ; and when it is confidered 
 in the moft perfect. Degree conceivable by us, 
 it is ftill no more than a Perfection Natural 
 and Human, improved and carryed on to the, 
 greateft height of Refinement within the 
 Reach of an human Mind: And muft there- 
 fore be totaly different in Kind from what is 
 Infinite and altogether Incomprekenfibfcas it is in 
 it felf, and intirely beyond the direct Reach of 
 all our Perception or Imagination ; and for 
 that Reafon no otherwife conceivable, than by 
 fuch a Refemblance only and Similitude as is 
 founded in the real Nature of things different 
 not irr Degree only, but in Kind. And ac-f 
 pordingly we affirm that even then in its great - 
 " Pd-j. eft 
 
4 o8 DIVIN E 
 
 eft Exaltation, it is to be attributed to God 
 not literaly, or properly, or formaly, but by 
 Divine Analogy only. The Do&rine whereof 
 I now begin to truft is of God, and will fure- 
 ly obtain in his good Time; notwithftandirtg 
 the open as well as clandeftine Oppofition it 
 now meets with, not only from Heretics and 
 Infidels of all Ranks and Sizes : But even from 
 the Orthodox, who are filled with groundlefs 
 Fears and Surmifes of its Confequences ; which 
 proceed from Prejudice of Education, and falie 
 Principles of Knowlege with which their Minds 
 were ftrongly and unhappily impregnated in, 
 their earlier Age. But it is to be hoped that 
 all this Prepofleffion and panic Terror will gra« 
 dualy wear away with the prefent Generation ; 
 when our Youth grow up with fome true Tafte 
 and early Seafbning of a Doftrine, fb little at- 
 tended to and altogether uncultivated before : 
 Which will then plainly appear of great and 
 univerfal Ufe, when it is throMy underftood^ 
 and rightly applyed ; but may indeed become 
 dangerous and deftruftiye to the Truths of 
 Religion by being any way grofly miftaken 
 and mifapplyed. 
 
 The DpBrine, fays this Author, of Ana-, 
 logical Perfections in God, or of knowing God 
 By Analogy h Jeems very much mifitnderftood and 
 mifapplyed by tbofe who would infer from thence, 
 that we cannot frame any dirett or proper. 
 Notion, tho' never fo inadequate, of Knowlege 
 mWifdom as they are in the Deity; or under- 
 
 fiand 
 
ANALOGY. 409 
 
 Jfand any more of them y than one born blind can , 
 of Light and Colours, But he muft Underftand 
 very little of the Do&rine of Analogy, and 
 Mifapply it egregioufly, who thus, blends toge-, 
 ther into One and confounds ^two things 
 which are as different as Light and Darkneis. 
 Namely Brft, that we cannot frame any 
 t>ireB Notion or Idea (tho' ever fo inadequate 
 or opfcure) of the real intrinfic Attributes 
 or Perfections of God, and of his Knowlege 
 and Wifdom in particular; any more than 
 a Man born blind can of Light and Colours; 
 Which is a great Truth; and accordingly we 
 pofitively aflert and maintain that there is no 
 Facility or Capacity in the Mind of Man 
 for the leaft t>ired View or Notion, or im-, 
 mediate I)ifcernment of the real intrinfic Per- 
 fections or Attributes of God as they are in 
 their own Nature and Kind ; any more than 
 there is for any direct View, qv Notion and im- 
 mediate Difcernment of his real intrinfic Sub- 
 ftance or Eflence, It is impoflible for us in 
 our prefent State to come by fuch a Know-, 
 lege of God any other way than either by 
 fbme Ideas let in upon the Imagination thro' 
 the Senfes: Which it is allowed we cannot 
 nave; fince ttiefe proceed only from things 
 material, and therefore are never attributed 
 to God o.therwife than by Metaphor -, as being 
 in no Degree real and apt Reprefentations of 
 any incorriprehenfible Perfections in a Nature, 
 purely fpiritual and divine. Or elfe, by fome 
 Sterna! inir^edjate Conjcioufnefs, which we 
 
4 io DIVINE 
 
 can have of nothing befides the Faculties or 
 Properties or Operations of our own Mind: 
 And therefore it is that thefe are transfered to 
 God by Analogy; as being apt and juft Re- 
 presentations of correspondent Perfections in 
 the Divinity, otherwife altogether inconceiv- 
 able. Or laftly, by: Conceptions, or Complex 
 Notions ', formed out of both the former con- 
 sidered in Conjunction : Which can reach no 
 farther, with reSpedt to any Direff Know- 
 lege, than the Sensitive Ideas and the Conjfci- 
 oufnefs of the Mind's Operations, out of which 
 they were formed. Not but that even thefe 
 truly Analogical Representations of the divine 
 Perfections, are likewiSe altogether unworthy 
 pf God, and unfit to be attributed to him in 
 Kind; as being infinitely different from any 
 thing in his real intrinfic Nature. For which 
 Reafbn nothing can be more abfurd and pre- 
 fumptuous, than Men's Imagining that by an 
 Immediate Difcemment of the Faculties, or 
 Properties, or Operations of our own Mind; 
 or by any Conceptions formed out of theSe 
 and Ideas considered together ; we have at the 
 lame time a Direft and Immediate Perception 
 or Notion of So much of the real Nature or 
 Perfections of God: Which could not then 
 be Infinite, or indeed Incomprehenfible in the true 
 Sence of that Term. If any Man hath yet 
 a Doubt of what is here afferted ; for a fuller 
 Conviction let him lay afide all Ideas of Senfa- 
 tion, together with all that Immediate C&nfciouf- 
 tiefs or Perception he hath of the Faculties 
 
 and 
 
ANALOGY. 411 
 
 and Properties and Operations of his own 
 Mtod: And then fhut his Eyes and look in ? 
 ward ; and try if he can find any Idea, or tm-r 
 mediate Confcioufnefsy or Direff Notion of any 
 thing divine ahd fupernatural in Che leaft De- 
 gree. And if upon opening them again he 
 rnuft confefs that he could find no Such Per- 
 ception or Idea, Confcioufnefs, or Notion of 
 any thing beyond what is natural and merely- 
 human : Then he will be of our Opinion, that 
 a Man born bSid can as well form a T)ire& 
 and Immediate Idea or Conception of Light and 
 Colours, as we can in our prefent State of Blind* 
 riefs of the real Attributes or Perfections of 
 God. And consequently that we can neither 
 think nor fpeak of them otherwise than by 
 Similitude and Reprefentation ; that is by A- 
 nalogy with fuch Obje&s and Conceptions as are 
 merely natural and human. 
 
 A s to the latter Part of that Affertion of 
 his, which he makes the fame with the for- 
 mer; that we profefs Not to tmderfiand any 
 more of the divine Knowlege or Wifdom, than 
 me born blind doth of Light and Cohan; it is, 
 pn the other Hand, a downright Falfity. For 
 the Parallel between bodily Blindneis, and 
 that of the Mind in refpecT: of things divine 
 and fupernatural; cannot be juftly carry ed 
 on beyond their being equaly void of any 
 Immediate Perception, or any DireU Idea and 
 Notion of thofe Objects. Tho' we have no 
 immediate Perception ox direct Notion of 
 
4 i2 DIVINE 
 
 Knowlege or Wtfdom as they are in God, or of 
 any other of the divine Attributes ; yet we are 
 fb far from being as totalyjgnorant of them as 
 a blind Man is of Light and Colours, that we 
 have a very ufeful and clear and fubftantial 
 Knowlege of them by Analogy with thofe 
 correfpondent Faculties, or fimilar Powers and 
 Operations of our own Mind whereof we have, 
 an immediate Perception or Confciovifnefs.; 
 And the great Difparity between our Cafe,* 
 and that of a Man born blin^vill evidently; 
 appear in thefe three following Inftances; 
 which fhew that it is nothing lefs than aDif-, 
 ference between a total Ignorance on the one 
 Hand, and of a clear and diftind Knowlege 
 on the other. 
 
 : Fir st then; as one born blind can frames 
 no Direff Idea or Conception of Light and^ 
 Colours; fo neither can he frame any Idea or 
 Conception' of them which is Truly Analogical : 
 Beqaufe there are no Objects of his Senfes or; 
 his Reafbn fb truly Correfpondent. and Similar, 
 to them, as to be either merely Accidental and ; 
 Voluntary, or ahfolutely Unavoidable and Ne-, 
 cejjary Images, or Real Reprefentations of thofe> 
 things utterly imperceptible to any of his four- 
 remaining Senfes. For this Reafbn as he can 
 have no Knowlege of Light and Colours by, 
 any Senfation, or by fimple Apprehenfion of 
 the Intellect; lb neither can he form any com- 
 plex Notions or Conceptions of them with ; any 
 Antitqde an4 real.Sigaifcancy, or true Applfc 
 
 cation. 
 
A N A L O G Y. 413 
 
 cation to thofe Obje&s ; and fuch as are found* 
 ed upon an ABual Similitude and True Correfi- 
 pondency between any thing which he already 
 knows, and thofe things utterly inconceivable 
 to him ; much left upon any Identity of Na- 
 ture between thefe and any Objects of his 
 Mind, according to the Opinion of this Author. 
 If upon hearing there was fuch a thing as 
 Light, he mould conceive it by a Long Reach 
 in, Feeling; - or if upon being informed that 
 there was fuch a Colour as Scarlet, he ftiould 
 conceive it by the Sound of a Trumpet or lbme- 
 thing Wonderfully fmooth ; or either of them 
 by any other Image of his Imagination : This 
 would proceed from mere Accident only, or 
 from his own Arbitrary Appointment; and 
 not from any Real Similitude and Correspondency 
 in the .very Nature of the Things, which might 
 be a fure Foundation of a folid and univerfal 
 Parity of Reafon thro' all his Conceptions, and 
 Sentiments, Expreffions and Difcourfes con- 
 cerning thofe things which are to him utterly 
 imperceptible and inconceivable. He could 
 have no fure Foundation of.Knowlege laid by 
 any 'direct Perception and immediate Gonfci- 
 oufnefs ; or in any real Similitude and Corres- 
 pondency with what he already knows ; or with 
 any Idea or complex Notion whatever which 
 he was capable of forming. Nay and if he had 
 a Conception of any thing truly correfpondent 
 and fimilar to Light and Colour, this would itill 
 be no Divine but Human Analogy: Becaulc 
 it woujd be founded upon a Similitude and 
 "■ : Correspondency 
 
414 DIVINE 
 
 Correspondency between things of Nature; 
 whereas the former is ever founded upon a Re- 
 semblance and Gorrefpondeney between things 
 natural and human, and fiich as are divine and 
 fupernatural. Thus then the blind Man can 
 have no Real and True Knowlege at all of any 
 thing relating to the Nature of Light and Co?- 
 lours, and muft ever remain in total Ignorance of 
 them in every Degree, no otherwife to be re- 
 medy ed than by a Miracle; or by opening his 
 Eyes, for a dired and immediate View or Idea 
 Of what it was utterly impofiible for him before 
 to have had any Conception, either Dire0 or 
 I'mly Analogical. 
 
 But our Cafe With refped to all things di- 
 vine and fupernatural, and the Attributes of 
 God in particular, is quite the Reverfe. For 
 tho' we can have no immediate Perception, or 
 ' direct Idea and Notion of them in the leafif 
 Degree either as they are in God himielf, or 
 by a Difcernment of lomething of the lame 
 Kind in any of his Creatures : Yet by the im- 
 mediate Perception or Confcioufhefs we have 
 of the Properties and Perfections of our own 
 Mind; we at the fame time are able to con- 
 ceive the divine Properties and Perfections, by* 
 a real and true Analogy founded in the very 
 Nature of God and Man, we being made in 
 his Likenefs and formed to his Image. So that 
 our Conceptions of the divine Attributes in 
 this Manner are not merely Arbitrary,' or any 
 way jjusety Contingent and Uncertain ; but ori-f 
 
 gifraiy 
 
ANALOG Y. 415 
 
 ftnaly built upon that Natural and Necejfary 
 Lefemblance we bear to the Divinity in the 
 Faculties and Properties and Operations of our 
 Mind. That Knowlege and Wifdom and Good- 
 nefsy whicb. we are confcious of within our 
 felves, are not mere Notions or Conceptions 
 of our own, Voluntarily and Fradw#/?y appoint- 
 ed to ftand in the Mind for things whereof 
 we have no Knowlege either by direct Percep- 
 tion, or even indireftly by a true Reprelenta- 
 tion and real Analogy ; as it is in the Cafe of 
 the blind Man when he attempts to form a 
 Notion of Light and Colours : But they are 
 Natural Likeneffes and necefTary Real Repre- 
 fentatives of fo many Correfpndent infinite in- 
 comprehenfible Perfe&ions of the Divinity. 
 Thus the Knowlege we have of the divine At- 
 tributes is more Jufl and Real and Solid ; than 
 if it could be in a low Degree even by im- 
 mediate Perception ; and it is fully as Clear and 
 Dijlinff, as that we have of our own Proper- 
 ties and Attributes : Since all we conceive and 
 know of thofe which are truly and intrinficaly 
 divine, can be extended no farther than our 
 Conception and Knowlege of their natural 
 Representations ; and that all beyond this, is 
 no more than a Knowlege or Belief that they 
 are infinite, and utterly incomprehenfible as 
 they are in themfelves,, Thus are we from our 
 natural Prame and Constitution enabled to 
 think and fpeak of God and his Attributes, 
 mfenfibly ftom the firft Beginnings of Reafon 
 to its utnaoft Height and Improvement j and 
 
 to 
 
4i6 DIVINE 
 
 to carry oft a Parity of Reafbn, by a juft and 
 uttiverfal and unerring Parallel, .thro'. all the 
 Operations of the Intellect upon things divine 
 and fupernatural. And thus from a right Uri- 
 derftanding of our felves and of Our Own intel- 
 lectual Perfections and moral Endowments, we 
 arrive at fuch a clear and fufficient Knowlege 
 of God and his Attributes, as is fully fuitable 
 to our prefent State and Condition in this Life, 
 and to all the noble Ends of Religion and 
 Morality : And all Knowlege of them by any 
 immediate Perception, or arty direct Ideas and 
 •Notions, we ate to leave intirely to another 
 World. 
 
 2. Again, As one bofrt blind is far front 
 "being able to frame to Himfelf any Idea, or 
 Conception, or complex Notion of any thing 
 which carries in it a real Similitude and Cor-* 
 refpondency to Light or Colours : So neither 
 would it be in the Power of any Other Per/on 
 who had feen them, to give him any Idea or 
 Conception of them Truly Analogical, by the 
 molt exact and perfect Defcription imaginable. 
 Infbmuch that tho' he might be informed of the 
 various and wonderful Effects of Light in par- 
 ticular, yet all this would not help him to form 
 any juft Idea or Conception in his Mind, of 
 any thing fimilar and correfpondent to the real 
 Nature of Light : And the whole Subftance 
 of his Knowlege of the thing It Jelf, would 
 amount -to no more than that of its bare Exf- 
 ftence only j and even this he could not infer 
 c " from 
 
ANALOGY. 417*, 
 
 from any natural Ground or Foundation of 
 Knowlege within himfelf; nor could he come 
 by it any other way than thro* the Informa- 
 tion of another who had the Advantage of 
 his Eye Sight. Whereas on the quite con- 
 trary, without any actual Information from? 
 Heaven we can not only infer the bare Exi-' 
 fimce of things divine and iupernatural, and 
 of God in particular, from the vifible Effects 
 of the Creation ; but there naturaly arife up 
 within us fuitable Conceptions of the divine At- 
 tributes, from fimilar Faculties and corres- 
 pondent Properties and Operations of our own 
 Mind : Such Conceptions as we. are neceffarily 
 led into from our very Frame and Conftituti- 
 onj infomuch that we cannot rightly attend 
 to what paffeth within our felves, without' 
 being enabled for ufeful and juft Conceptions 
 of thole Archetypal Perfections, whereof our's 
 are a remote but lively Tranfcript. From 
 hence we naturaly proceed to accumulate all 
 the greateft Perfections conceivable in our own 
 rational Nature, and joyn them together into 
 one complex Notion, to ftand in the Mind for 
 an analogous Repreientation of that incompre- 
 hehfible Being ; of whom, or of any one of 
 whole real Attributes or Properties we cannot 
 have the leaft direct Knowlege : And this com- 
 plex Notion of the Divinity is more or lefs 
 juft, and perfect, and worthy of God in every 
 one; according to the different Diipofition or 
 Capacity of Men's Minds, and their various 
 ways ©f thinking. Thus as we can infer the 
 
 E e Mxiftence 
 
4i8 DIVINE 
 
 Exijience only of a firft Caule from eyery 
 thing that is vifible; fo we difcern his Per- 
 fections in the Mirrour only of human Nature y 
 by the help of which we attain a lure and lb- 
 lid and competent Knowlege of him who is 
 other wife inconceivable and imperceptible, and 
 of bis Properties and Attributes which are all o- 
 therwile as incomprehenfible as his intrinfic Ef- 
 lence. And all this from the Oblervation of 
 what paffeth within our felves 5 and by a Pari- 
 ty of Reafon drawn from our own Nature, and 
 Properties, and Operations, to thole which are 
 ijealy and truly divine : So that from the origi- 
 nal innate Tendency of our Mind, with the 
 firft dawnings of Realbn we fall inlenfibly in- 
 fo the only Means and Method we have of 
 conceiving God and his Attributes by Relem- 
 blance and Analogy ; and into the only Man- 
 ner we have of expreffing them in Terms of 
 human Language. Accordingly all the divine 
 Revelations made to Mankind preluppole this 
 Light of Nature, which qualifies us for the 
 Knowlege of things divine and liipernatural ; 
 and for the Dilcernment of that Celeftial Light 
 which could come to us no other way than by Re- 
 fieBion, and whereof we could not otherwile have 
 the kaft Glimpfe, without being fupplyed with 
 lome fiipernatural Faculty for the direct Per- 
 ception of it. By this Refemblance and Ana- 
 logy founded in the very Natures of God and 
 Man, all divine Truths are revealed to thole 
 Faculties of TJnderftanding we already have : 
 ILnforauch that the whole Tenor of Scripture 
 
ANALOGY. 413 
 
 relating to God and his Attributes, and to all 
 the Myftefies of the Gofpelj runs intirely iri 
 the Style of dikine Analogy, enforced upon 
 our Affections by variety of Metaphor. 
 
 3. L a s t l t, A Man born blind could have 
 had no Terms for Light ahd Colours, with- 
 out hearing them from another; and even 
 after he heard thOife Words pronounced, they 
 Could be to hiiri no Terms ftri&ly Proper and 1 
 Literal, beeaufe he could not affix to thdfrt 
 any direet and immediate Ideas or Concepti- 
 ons of the things they exprefled : Nor could 
 they be to him Terms truly Analogical \ be- 
 eaufe he Would not be capable of forming the; 
 leaft Idea, or Conception, Or complex Notion 
 of any things fb correfpondent and artfwerable 
 to them as to be natural Images and real Re- 
 prelentatives of Light and Goloufs, which are 
 to him imperceptible and inconceivable* It ia 
 plain that upon hearing thole Terms they 
 Would neceflarily, in refpecl of hiffl, firft ex* 
 ftfefs fomething altogether impefceptible drid 
 Inconceivable, as- well as inexpreflible by any 
 Wor-d of his own; and be afterwards apply ect 
 to the beft Ideas or Conceptions he could 
 frame of them in his Mind ; bat which bore 
 no real Similitude and Correfpondency to the 
 things they Were intended to reprefent. So that 
 thole Terms could have no real Meaning affix- 
 ed to them by him, beyond the bare Exiftenrt 
 only of Something abfolutely unknown and in* 
 conceivable 5 .and they would othgrwife be as 
 
 E c % feneeleft 
 
4 2o DIVINE 
 
 fencelefs and unintelligible to him as if they : 
 were mere inarticulate Sounds. But on the : 
 quite contrary, all our Terms for things divine 
 and fupernatual are ever firft applyed to, 
 things of Nature very conceivable and clearly 
 underftood ; and afterwards in a fecundary Ac- 
 ceptation exprefe fbmething divine and fuper-; 
 natural, which is to us utterly inconceivable, 
 and inexpreflible as it is in its felf. So that 
 tho' we cannot then underftand them in a 
 ftri&ly Literal and Proper Acceptation, yet 
 we can affix to them a Signification Truly A- 
 nalogical, as to Knowlege and Wifdom in par^ 
 ticular : They being Terms firft applyed to 
 the well known Properties and Perfections of 
 an human Mind, whereof we have an imme- 
 diate Perception and Confcioufheis j and af- 
 terwards transfered to exprefi fimilar and cor- 
 refpondent Perfections in the divine Nature, 
 of which or any thing elfe the fame in Kind 
 we can have no fuch Perception or Confciouf- 
 nefs, direct Idea or Conception ; and which 
 are therefore no otherwife conceivable than 
 by Similitude only and Reprefentation. Which 
 is however a Solid and Ufeful Knowlege, be- 
 caufe it is in Truth a Light of Nature ; as 
 being founded in the very Make and Confti- 
 tution of an human Mind : and it is a Know- 
 lege Clear and Di/linfi, becaufe it reaches no 
 farther than thofe natural Images and Like- 
 neffes; whereof we have clear and diftincl Con-? 
 ceptions. 
 
 Another. 
 
ANALOG Y. 421 
 
 Another of this Author's Sayings is, 
 That He who comes to God, muft firft believe 
 that there is a God in fome intelligible Seme. 
 This is a Charge upon us that we believe a 
 God in No intelligible Sence. To which I an- 
 fwer, That he 'who comes to God muft be- 
 lieve he is Incomprehenftble ; that is, in the true 
 Sence of the Word, a Being lb inconceivable 
 that we cannot have the leaft Idea or Concep- 
 tion of any thing as it is in his real intrinfic 
 Nature or Effence : Nay whofe very Exiftencc 
 would be utterly inconceivable, had we not 
 firft an Idea of what it was to exift from our 
 Own Exiftence. And will he infer, that be- 
 caufe we muft on both Sides hold God to be 
 thus Incomprehenfible, we muft therefore believe 
 him not to be Intelligible ? This Word Intel- 
 ligible, which thro' this Author's Style chimes 
 in for a Clofe at every Turn, is very captious 
 and enfharing to a Reader not thro'ly acquaint- 
 ed with this Subject. It may have either of 
 thefe two very different and even contrary 
 Significations. It may mean a Thing's be- 
 ing actualy perceivable and difcernible, either 
 by DireB Ideas obtained from a Communica- 
 tion with external Objects, fuch as we have of 
 things material -, or by an Immediate Confcionf- 
 toefs of what paffeth within our felves, fuch as 
 we have of the Faculties and Properties and 
 Operations of our own Minds ; from which 
 two Repositories we are fupplyed with the on- 
 ly Materials of all our, Diret? and immediate 
 i- Ee 3 Knowlege. 
 
422 DIVINE 
 
 Knowlege. Upon thele alone it is that Reafbn 
 exerts all its Operations, which are employed 
 in working them up with Art and Labour $ 
 $nd in Proportion to its natural Extent in the 
 Minds of Men, or its providential Refinement, 
 Tailing out of them a great variety of Super- 
 itru£ture ; from that of the meaneft Cottage, 
 to the loftieft and moft ftately Palace ; nay 
 even to that of an intire City, which fhall be; 
 a lively Reprefentation of the heavenly Jeru-* 
 falem. Now God and his Attributes are not 
 Intelligible either of thole two Ways; and yet 
 it would be a very improper as well as fall? 
 Way of fpeaking to lay, that they are Un-> 
 known or Unintelligible. For tho' we can have 
 no T>ireB Idea or Immediate Confcioufnefs of 
 them, or of any thing elfe the lame in Kind-, 
 and tho' in this Sence they are utterly un- 
 known and in no Degree intelligible \ yet in 
 another Signification of that Term they are 
 truly Intelligible ; that is, as they are well un- 
 derstood and clearly and diftin6tly known by 
 their Natural Representatives : Which are in oui 
 original Make formed by the wile Creator to 
 fuch a Similitude and Correipondeney with, 
 things divine and fupernatural, that thefe be-f 
 come very intelligible ; nay juft as clearly and 
 diftin&ly intelligible, as the Faculties and O^ 
 perations of our own Mind. He every where 
 confounds the general word Intelligible, with 
 perceptible which is of a more particular Sig-? 
 nification, and limited to what is intelligible 
 by fome djre$; Idea, or immediate/ Conception 
 
 of 
 
ANALOGY. 423 
 
 of the Object it felf, or of fornething the very 
 feme in Kind ; as if nothing could be in any 
 Sence intelligible, but that whereof we have 
 fome Such Conception or Idea ; whereas thofe 
 two things are widely different. We believe 
 a God in a very intelligible Sence, nay in the 
 only Sence wherein he is Truly intelligible to 
 us; that is, as he is a Being whole Real in- 
 trinfic Nature and Suhfiance and Attributes are 
 equaly imperceptible and inconceivable in 
 every Degree as they are in themfelves ; and 
 no otherwile intelligible or in any other Man- 
 ner conceivable than by Analogy and Refem- 
 blance with the Properties and Perfections of 
 our Humanity : And what we positively deny 
 is, that God or any of his real Attributes 
 are conceivable and intelligible, by any direcl: 
 Idea and immediate Perception ; either as they 
 are in themfelves, or as there is any thing of 
 the fame Kind in the Creatures. 
 
 Must we therefore believe God and his 
 Attributes to be in No Sence Intelligible, be T 
 caule we deny him to be Jo in the fame Sence 
 that the Exiftence, and Faculties, and Qua- 
 lities, and Operations of our own Mind are 
 intelligible? That is in other Words, beeaufe 
 we will not clofe with his contradictory and 
 even ridiculous Imagination ; that we have in 
 fome Degree the very lame immediate Percep- 
 tion of the real Properties and Perfections of 
 the divine Nature, that we have of thole 
 which are human. Which at beft is no othef 
 Ee 4 in 
 
424 DIVINE 
 
 in Effe&, than to believe him to be the lame 
 with an human Mind tranfcendently exalted 
 in all its Faculties and Operations to an infi- 
 nite "Degree: The Favourite Notion of this 
 Author- who every where fuppofing that we 
 can have no intelligible Notion at all of God 
 or his Attributes, unlefs we have a direct Idea 
 or immediate Conception of ibmething the 
 very fame in Kind ; doth by plain Implication 
 tiold that he is abfolutely Unintelligible, and 
 that we can have no Kndwlege at all of him. < 
 
 But he explains himfelf by laying, we 
 ought to believe God to be a thinking intelligent 
 Being ; and that the true Queftion is, Whether 
 he is a Nou? a Mind, or Intelligence in the proper 
 Seme of the Word? To which I anfwer, that 
 move or Mind is a Word Properly applyed to 
 the Mind of Man, a Principle compofed both 
 of Spirit and Matter operating jointly and ne- 
 ceffarily in effential Union : which Term tho* 
 afterwards transfered to God, could never 
 therefore be applyed to him in the fame li- 
 teral Propriety of Speech wherein it was firft 
 applyed to Man. Accordingly when we fay 
 God is a Thinking Being, the Word cannot 
 mean that Knowlege in him is the Refult or 
 joint Operation of material Subftance and Spi- 
 rit ; nay or of a pure Spirit the fame in Kind 
 With that which is in the human Compofition ; 
 or even with that of any other Spirit of the 
 Whole Creation. The Cafe is the feme when 
 we ftyle God an Intelligence -, we can have no 
 
 othej 
 
ANALOGY, 425 
 
 other true and real Meaning in this, but that 
 he is a, Being endued with a divine Perfection 
 correfpondent and fimilar to that natural Pro- 
 perty of Knowlege in us confifting in Think- 
 ing, which is no other than a remote Refem- 
 blance only of that original archetypal Per- 
 fection: Fpr which becaule we can have no 
 diredfc Conception or Idea, nor ftrictly proper 
 Term ; we think and ipeak of it with the 
 greateft Aptitude whereof the Mind of Man 
 is capable, and exprefs it in the utmoft Pro- 
 priety in which any Terms of human Lan- 
 guage can be applyed to things utterly incom- 
 prehenfible and jnexpreffible as 'they are in 
 themfelves. 
 
 The Text of Scripture to which the Au- 
 thor refers in! this Saying is this, He who comet h 
 to God mufi believe that he island that he is a 
 Rewarder of all them that diligently feek him. 
 Now every material Word of this Text is to 
 be underftood not in the ftriftly Proper and 
 Literal^ but Analogical Acceptation 5 and the 
 whole Meaning of it becomes intelligible to 
 us no otherwife than by a Parity of Realbn- 
 ing, founded on a Similitude between things 
 natural and human and things divine and 
 fupernatural. For Inftance; every Concep- 
 tion which makes up the complex Notion 
 affixed to the Term God y is truly Analogical ; 
 as has already appeared in all the particulars 
 of the divine Attributes. Again ; Mufi believe 
 that he is, that is, that he Extfis ; Now of 
 i the 
 
426 DIVINE 
 
 the Real Manner of the Vivim Exiftence or of 
 any other Exiftence the lame in Kind, we are 
 $6 far from a Capacity of forming any DireSl 
 Idea or Conception; that whenever we at- 
 tempt to frame any Pofitive Conception of it, 
 we are forced to have Recourfe to what we 
 know of our own Exiftence as an Analogical 
 Reprefentation only of the other, which is in- 
 conceivable and inexpreffible as it is in it felf. 
 Muft Believe that he is ; fo that the very Exi- 
 ftence of God is a Point of Faith founded on 
 the Deduction of Realbn only, and Revelati- 
 on: Whereas had we any direft and imme- 
 diate Idea "or Conception of the divine Ex- 
 iftence or of any one of his Attributes, this 
 would fuperfede all Realbning and Revelation 
 and Faith upon this Point ; and render them 
 as needlefs and unneceffary as. it would be to 
 prove or dilcover to us the Exiftence of a Man 
 we fee ftanding before our Eyes. Laftly, the 
 Term Rewarder and the Conception annexed 
 to it, is taken from ajuft temporal Go vernour 
 or Judge ; who diftributes due Encouragements 
 and Recompences to thofe who ftiew themlelves 
 a&ive and zealous in the Oblervance of his 
 Laws, and in promoting the public Good. 
 This Conception is Analogicaly attributed to the 
 divine and Incomprehenfible Rmwrder ; of whole 
 ipiritual Graces and eternal Heavenly Rewards 
 for Virtue and Goodnels, as they are in them- 
 felves, or of any thing the fame in Kind, we 
 cannot now obtain the leaft Direft Glimpfe or 
 Conception : Any more than we can attain to 
 
 an 
 
ANALOGY. 427 
 
 am Immediate Knowlege of his fupernatural Me- 
 thod of bellowing, and Manner of diftributing 
 them. I have made thefe few Remarks upon, 
 the Text refered to by this Author, to fhew 
 how groundlefs and falfe his grand Notion is, 
 that the Terms expreffing the Attributes of 
 God muft be underftood in the Literal and 
 Proper and Formal Sence wherein they are 
 fuppoled'to fignify Something of the fame 
 Kind in Man: Since it is evident from the 
 very Text he cites, that divine Analogy, to- 
 gether with the Parity of Reafoning which is 
 built upon it, neceflarily runs thro 1 our whole 
 Manner of thinking and fpeaklng of all things 
 divine and purely ipiritual. And that it can- 
 not be otherwife, till we come to have a direct 
 and immediate Intuition of thole Qbje&s ; and 
 to exprels our Conceptions and Sentiments of 
 them after the Manner of Heaven, and in the 
 fupernatural and inconceivable Method of glo- 
 lifyed Saints and Angels. 
 
 Again he puts it into our Mouth to lay, 
 That properly /peaking there is in God no Know- 
 tyre or Wifdom ; none at all y as he elfewherc 
 Jpeaks, kut only fimething elfe which fupplies 
 the Plate of Wifdm end Knowlege ; which 
 'produces The vi/fak- Effieffs in Nature, and 
 which M&n fi? want of knowing better call 
 ky the Names Knowlege and JVifdom. But 
 properly fpeaking is a very ambiguous Expref- 
 fion, and. calculated to deceive. For if there- 
 by is mea&t te Ike Termj Knowlege and 
 
 ' ffifdom 
 
428 DIVINE 
 
 Wifdom cannot be applyed to God in the 
 fame literal and ftrid Propriety in which 
 they exprefs the like Faculties or Properties 
 in Man, and fo as to fignify lbmething of the 
 very fame Kind in both: Then he doth us 
 no Injuftice, for he makes us fpeak what we 
 think j and what he may decry in * general 
 equivocating Words and Expreffions,. but will 
 never be able to difprove whenever he at- 
 tempts to come dole to the Point. For it is 
 no more than laying in other Words, that 
 there is no Property or Operation in God which 
 is the Refult only of Thinking in a Mind 
 compofed of Matter and Spirit necefTarily 
 operating together in eflential Union : It is 
 no more than denying that there is human 
 Knowlege or Wiidom in the divine Nature 
 in an infinite Degree ; or that there is divine 
 Knowlege and Wiidom in Man in any Degree ; 
 or that Finite, Created, and Comprehenfible ; and 
 Infinite, Uncreated and Incomprehenflkle Know- 
 lege and Wifdom, can be equaly exprefled 
 in the fame literal and proper and formal 
 Acceptation of thofe Terms. But if by Pro- 
 perly Speaking he means, that we deny there is 
 in God Knowlege or Wifdom according to 
 the utmoft Propriety in which the Terms of 
 human Language can poffibly be applyed to 
 any thing in his incomprehenfible Nature, it is 
 a moft injurious Charge. For we do affert that 
 there is real Knowlege and Wifaom in God ^ 
 that is, infinite fupernatural Perfections lolely 
 and intirely divine, correlpondent and dm ila* 
 
 to 
 
ANALOGY. 429 
 
 to thofe natural and purely human Proper- 
 ties in us : Nay we affert that Knowlege and 
 Wifdom are more Truly in him, than in Man ; 
 the Faculties and Properties of whofe Mind 
 have no more than a Di/lant Refemblance of 
 thofe Original and incomprehenfible Perfec- 
 tions totaly divine, and as intirely different in 
 Kind from any thing natural and human, as 
 the real intrinfic Nature or Effence of the 
 Divinity. This is the true Reafon why no. 
 Words of human Language can expreis the 
 divine Attributes with the lame literal Pro- 
 priety, wherein they are firft apply ed to our; 
 Properties or Faculties : And yet we cannot 
 juftly fay there is any Impropriety in them 
 when thus transfered to thole incomprehenfi- 
 ble divine Perfections j becaufe they have then 
 the utmoft Significancy and Propriety where- 
 by things purely divine and Spiritual can be 
 cxpreffed by us. Men muft always fpeak af-> 
 ter the fame Manner they are neceflitated to 
 think: If they can Think no otherwife of di- 
 vine Knowlege and Wifdom, than by Simili- 
 tude and Refemblance only with the natural 
 Properties whereof they have an Immediate 
 Perception or Gonfcioufnefs j then they can 
 Speak of them no otherwife than by the fame 
 Terms of human Language wherein they ex- 
 prels thofe natural Properties. Where Men 
 rieceffarily think by the Help of Analogy only, 
 they muftneceffarily fpeak Analogicaly; tho* 
 what is thus conceived and expreffed, may 
 afterwards be greatly enlarged upon in an end- 
 
 lcfi 
 
430 DIVINE 
 
 Ids Variety of divine Metaphor and Allufion 
 to our SenfeSy and Bodily Members, and to ma- 
 ny other things of Nature : Which purely Fi- 
 gurative way of ipeaking doth more eipecialy 
 ferve to all the Purpofes of moving our PaJ- 
 fions, and influencing our AffeBumf\ as divine 
 Analogy ferves to fiipply the tMderftandmg 
 with a Fund of juft and folid and ufeful Know- 
 lege, and to a ftricT: and neceffary Information 
 of the Judgment. 
 
 Lastly, The Author hath this Saying 
 by way of Objection againft our Doctrine of 
 Analogy, Men cannot argue from unknown 
 Attributes, or from Attributes in an unknown 
 Seme. What he means by arguing from At- 
 tributes Abfdutely unknown, as he elfewhere ex- 
 plains it, which is arguing from nothing, and' 
 where every Inference made mrrft be down- 
 right Nonfence ; or by arguing from Attributes- 
 in an Unknown Sence ,* or how he diftinguifk. 
 eth thofe two things with any Eye to the Sub- 
 ject; we muffi leave himfelf to explain in his 
 next warm Attempt againft the Doctrine of" 
 divine Analogy. Let his Meaning be what it 
 will, this Saying hath an Air and r Face of 
 Truth, for no Man can arguff either From of 
 To any thing Abfolutefy unknown; but it is at 
 the fame time a downright Falfitty at the Bot^ 
 torn, and fallacious^ in the defigned Applicati- 
 on of it to that Doctrine : By which only we 
 are enabled to explain the true and real and 
 genuine Knowlege of the divine Attributes/ 
 3 in 
 
ANALOGY. 431 
 in the only Manner by which they become 
 conceivable and intelligible to the Mind of 
 Man; by Refemblance and Analogy with 
 thofe natural Properties and Faculties where- 
 of we have immediate Conceptions. To bring 
 the whole Matter, out of that affected Dark* 
 nels wherein it is here involved, into a clear 
 Light j the proper Queftion between us is, 
 Which is moft true as well as of greateft 
 Force and Influence upon the Minds of Men ; 
 The arguing from divine Attributes fuppofed' 
 to become O&fcwely and Partial} and Ina- 
 dequately knowa and intelligible, by being the 
 Same in Kind with our own human Properties 
 and Qualities, but different from them Infi- 
 nitely in Degree? Or arguing from infinite di- 
 vine Perfections totaly Different, in Kind from 
 our human Properties and Qualities ; but lb tru- 
 ly Correfpmdent and Similar to fome of them, 
 that they become dearly and QijlinBly known 
 and very intelligible, from the clear Concep- 
 tions and immediate Conicioulhels we have 
 of their natural Similitudes and Representa- 
 tives? Had this Author fliewn in any one 
 Inftance, how we hold the Attributes of God 
 to be Abfolutely unknown or Unintelligible ; 
 or how there could be no arguing from them 
 with any Truth or Certainty in our Manner 
 of conceiving them by Refemblance only and 
 Analogy; and how no Inferences could be 
 made from them for influencing Men's Minds 
 in the neceffary Points either of Faith or 
 Practice, otherwise than upon a Suppofitkaa 
 ' that 
 
432 DIVINE 
 
 that they are the fame [in Kind with thoftf 
 called by the fame Names in Man : He had 
 acted Fairly in putting the whole Matter 
 to a fhort and clear IfTue j and Worthily alio, 
 in offering at fome feafbnable Check to the 
 fpreading' Contagion of a falfe and delufive 
 Do£trine, in his Opinion of fiich deadly Con- 
 fequence to Religion, and fatal to the Souls 
 of all who are willing to believe a God. But 
 fince he hath all along moft induftrioufly a- 
 voided descending thus to Particulars, I ihall 
 here inftance in that of the divine Knowlege 
 or Wifdom the very Attribute to which he 
 every where recurs. 
 
 From this divine Attribute then of Know- 
 lege, among other things, Men argue the Per- 
 fection and Excellency of the divine Nature 5 
 our indifpenfable Obligation to an awful Vene- 
 ration of God ; to Obedience and Worfhip, to 
 Sincerity of Heart, to internal Virtue and Ho- 
 Knefs, to a conftant Care and Watchfulnefs 
 over all our Thoughts and inward Inclina- 
 tions and Difpofitions as well as outward Acti- 
 ons ; fince they are all naked and open to him, 
 and that it is impoflible any moral Irregulari- 
 ty or Corruption of the Soul mould be con- 
 cealed from him by the deepeft Diffimulation 
 and Hypocrify. And laftly Men from thence 
 argue the intire Dependence we ought to have 
 upon his Providence, who knows how to regu- 
 late the whole Oeconomy oftheUniverfe; anct 
 can make all things woik together for good 
 5 to 
 
ANALOGY, 433 
 
 to them that love him. Now what we fay 
 is, that none of thefe" or any other Cbnfe- 
 quences drawn from that Attribute, do con- 
 clude with any Truth or Certainty upon a 
 Suppolition that Knowlege is of the fame 
 Kind in God and !Man ; becaufe that very Af- 
 fumption or Grcund of the Argument is ablb- 
 iutely falfe and abfurd : And therefore the Con- 
 sequences drawn from it can have no ejFeftu- 
 ^Ll Power or lafting Influence upon the Faith 
 or Practice of Men, fince it is lb eafily and] 
 fo commonly refuted by Atheifts and Deif$ 
 and Libertines. Thefe Men may tell you with 
 gi;eat Truth, that human Knowlege is all ori- 
 jginaly founded upon Ideas of Senfation lodg- 
 ed in the Imagination ; and upon that inter- 
 nal Perception or Confcioufnefs we have of the 
 Faculties and Operations of our own Minds ; 
 whence follows the Simple Apprehenjion or In- 
 tuition of all thele by the Intellect; this again 
 is fycceeded by th^ various Combinations o;f 
 Senfltivte Ideas among themfelves } as well as 
 with the OperMons of our Minds, in order to 
 form Conceptions and Complex Notions j then 
 follows the different Obfervations or Judg^ 
 xnents of the Mind upon all thefe ; and from§ 
 thence we proceed to Deduction and Infe- 
 rence of one thing from' another. They may 
 juftly urge that all thefe are the Operations of 
 ■Matter and Spirit in effential Union; And 
 confequently that Knowlege cannot be of the 
 fame Kind in God and Man ; fince every one 
 of thefe feyeral Steps and Degrees of human 
 
 F f Know. 
 
434 DIVINE 
 
 Knowlege, and much more all of them toge- 
 ther, mull be intirely unworthy of God. And 
 above all that it is even Contradiction that any 
 thing Natural and Human, > Finite and Creat- 
 ed, fhould be in Reality of the lame Kind with 
 What is Divine and Supernatural, Infinity Un- 
 created, and Eternal: And from hence again 
 they proceed to this falle Conclufion, that the 
 divine Attributes are fo Abfolutely unknown 
 and Unintelligible, that none of the Conle- 
 truences drawn from them in relation to Mat- 
 ters of Faith or Practice conclude with any 
 Truth or Gertainty. Here they are in the 
 higheft Elevation of their Knowlege, at the 
 utmoft Bounds of Nature ; and for want of 
 rightly apprehending the Doctrine of divine 
 Analogy, never make any the leaft Attempt 
 to get over them, by the laft and moft excel- 
 lent Operation of the Intellect ; that of its 
 Subftituting worldly and human Objects and 
 our Conceptions of them,, together with thole 
 Words we ufe for them, to exprefs and Re- 
 present correlpondent divine arid lupernatural 
 Objects. And accordingly here they come to 
 "this one general Refolution; That what they 
 are able to obtain no luch "DireB and Imme- 
 diate Conception or Idea of as they have of the 
 things of this Life, can be no Object either 
 of their Knowlege or Faith: And this noted 
 Maxim of their's they apply to the Attributes 
 of God in particular ; and of courfe defpife 
 and explode all the Arguments and Inferences 
 deduced from them in relation to Matters of 
 Faith or Practice. But 
 
A N A L O G Y. 
 
 '435 
 
 Butoii the quite contrary, when we argue 
 from that Attribute as an Infinite Perfection 
 in the Divinity Gprrejpondent , and Similar to 
 our natural Property of Knowlege; butequaly 
 unknown and incomprehenfible , as it is in 
 it felf, with the real intrinfic Nature or EC- 
 ience of the Divinity ; and as being fb totaly 
 different in Kind from any thing human, that 
 it is.no otherwife conceivable than by Simi- 
 litude and Analogy with that Knowlege where- 
 of we have an immediate Confcioufhefs in, 
 our Mind : Then all our juft Inferences from 
 thence conclude with the utmoft moral Cer-' 
 tainty and Evidence} with irrefiftible Force 
 and Influence upon the Confciences of Men 5 
 nay much more irrefiftible for that the Know^ 
 lege of God is a Perfection of a vaftly tranf- 
 cendent and fupefior Kind. And thus the 
 ftrongeft and even fundamental Objection of 
 Infidels is clearly and fully obviated.; and a 
 wide Door laid open to let them into the 
 Knowlege and Faith of our Chrift'ian My- 
 fteries. Fpr upon this footing, our Knowlege 
 and Conceptions of things divine and purely 
 fpiritual are fatisfa&orily accounted for from 
 Reafon-, which fhews us the Abfurdity and 
 Contradiction of our having any Faculty or 
 Property in us of the fame Kind with any 
 Perfection truly and effentialy divine: And 
 from Scripture, which reveals to us our .be- 
 ing made in the Likenefs and after the Image 
 of God j andconfequently that it is a Likenefs 
 F f 2 ©nly, 
 
436 DIVINE 
 
 only, and no Identity of Nature or Kind in 
 any Degree. Which Similitude or Image is 
 lb truly the Ground of all our diyine Know- 
 lege, that we could not argue that God is 
 to be loved for his Goodneis, or feared for 
 his Power, or relpected and adored for his 
 Knowlege ; if we did not firft infer from the 
 well known particular Qualities of Goodnefs 
 and Power and Knowlege in our felves, that 
 there rauft be in the Divinity real Perfections 
 correipondent and fimilar to them; but as 
 infinitely different in Kind, as. the divine Ef- 
 fence is from the human: And afterwards 
 frame to our felves a complex Notion of him, 
 by Accumulation of thefe and all the other 
 greateft Perfections in human Nature. Thus 
 again in this way of thinking, the divine At- 
 tributes are ib far from being ablblutely Un- 
 known and Unintelligible', that our Concep- 
 tions of them are as clear and diftinct and de- 
 terminate, as thole we have of the Faculties 
 and Properties of our own Minds by which 
 they are reprefented. Thus likewife it is ob- 
 vious that a divine Perfection fo tranfcendently 
 exceeding all the Properties and Qualities of 
 created Beings not in Degree only, but in its 
 intire Nature and Kind, as to be utterly incon- 
 ceivable and ineffable otherwife than by Ana- 
 logy; muftffrike the Minds and Coniciences 
 of Men with greater Awe and Veneration, 
 than if it were imagined a Property or Qua- 
 lity in God of the very fame Kind with that 
 01 Knowlege in our felves: Than if we grofly 
 
 conceived 
 
ANALOGY. 437 
 
 conceived God to have a very extenfive Ima- 
 gination, ftored with infinite Idea? of external 
 Objects ; to have an extend ve and unlimited 
 Simple Jpprehenjion and Profpect of all t'nefe j 
 and from thence to proceed to Infinite XJ$ler- 
 Vqtion upon them, as our Author Ipeafcs ; 
 and from thence again to infinite DeaiiBiQns 
 and Confequences ; and in ijiort than if wc 
 took Knowlege in God to be ho other than 
 Infinite Thinking in fiich a Mind as our own, 
 compofed of infinite Matter as well as Spirit 
 neceflarily operating together in eflentkl Uni- 
 on. And yet the true divine Perfe&ion is 
 never , the lefi Real for being thus utterly in- 
 comprehenfible and ineffable as it is in it Mf t 
 or otherwife than by Analogy ; it is never the 
 lefs Knowlege, but the more truly fuch, be- 
 caufe the moft exalted of all created Intefti- 
 gences can have no other Knowlege than what 
 hath a lively Similitude and Refemblance only 
 of it ; and all the Operations and Effects of ifi 
 are lb much, the more universal and certain 
 and infallible, and it is lb much the more to 
 be admired and feared and adored, the more 
 we conceive it to tranfcend all Kinds of creat- 
 ed Perfection. Laftly, this clearly obviates 
 that grand Objection of Libertines and Infidels, 
 from the divine Attributes being Unknown 
 and Unintelligible j and from their not being 
 able to find within themfelves any Idea or 
 Conception of divine Knowlege in particular, 
 Different from that which is human:. For it 
 is plainly an ignorant and fencelefs Expe&a- 
 Ff3 tion 
 
438 D I V I N E 
 
 tion \n Men to imagine they can obtain any 
 direct Conception or Idea of what is utterly 
 imperceptible and incomprehenfible in every' 
 Degree either as it is in it lelf, or by the Help 
 of any thing elfe the lame in Kind. No, one 
 and the lame Conception necefTarily ftands in/ 
 the Mind for that Faculty or Property where- 
 of we have an immediate Perception or Con- 
 lcioufnels ; and for that correfpondent divine 
 Perfection of which it is impofiible for us to 
 have either: And accordingly we are under 
 the lame Neceflity of expreffing. the incom-r 
 prehenfible. lupernatural Perfection , and the 
 well known hunian Property by one and the 
 lame Term Knowlege ■, which is the true Cafe 
 of all the other Attributes of God known by 
 the Light of Nature, as well as of all our Chri- 
 stian Myfteries f 
 
 A s this Author is fubjed to an exuberant 
 Flow of Words, io there are many other ge-r 
 fleral ExprefGons in him to the fame Purpofe ; 
 which are no other than a, continual giddy 
 Round and tedious Repetition of the fame 
 Things over again, with no fmall Variety and 
 Alteration of the Phrafe: But finceall of them 
 may be eafily obviated by the Remarks al- 
 ready made upon the few I have cited, I mall 
 now pafs on to His Notion, or Defection of 
 Analogy, in defigned Qppofition to that which 
 is Truly fuch and fet forth and maintained by 
 Us- 3 and to the Confidera tion of thole Authori- 
 ses he produceth for the Support ojf ft 
 
A N A L a G Y. 439 
 
 H e fays of us that we miftake the Scholaftic 
 Ule of the Terms Analogy and Analogicaly, 
 when we mean by them That we cannot frame, 
 in any Degree, a true and proper Notion of the, 
 divine Attributes. "Propriety is in Words and 
 Expreffions, and Proper Notions is therefore an 
 Impropiety of Speech; which I had not taken 
 notice of, but that it occafions no fmall Gon- 
 fufion in this Subject. What We aflert is plain 
 and may be clearly underftood ; namely, that 
 we have moft True and Ufeful and T>iftin£t No- 
 tions of the divine Attributes; and what we deny 
 is, that we can have any Direct and Immediate 
 Notions or Ideas of them as they are in their 
 own Nature or Kind, in any Degree ; or that 
 we can exprefs any of them in Terms ftri&ly; 
 literal and proper, as we do thofe human Pro- 
 perties or Attributes which are their Images 
 only and Reprefentations, 
 
 He makes The Schoolmen to diftinguifh a 
 two-fold Analogy -, a Metaphorical Analogy, and 
 a Proper Analogy.. Whoever may be the Au*- 
 thor of this, Diftin&ion, it is as grofs an Ah- 
 furdjty as if he had diftinguiftied between Ana- 
 logical Metaphor and Proper Metaphor: And 
 every one may difcern at firft Sight how it 
 changes the commonly received and allowed 
 Biftin&ion between Metaphor and Analogs -, 
 into a Metaphorical and Proper Analogy; which 
 is not only full of Obfcurity and Confusion., 
 .but a flat "Contradiction in Terms. A thipg 
 
 Ff4' may 
 
44Q DIVINE 
 
 may be. Properly Metaphor, or Properly Ana- 
 logy, and it' is good Sence; but to fay any 
 thing is a Metaphorical Analogy, or a Proper 
 Analogy is neither common Sence nor Lan- 
 guage, but the very fame Abfurdity as Ana- 
 logical Metaphor and Analogical' Propriety : And 
 I* fliall entertain this, Opinion in favour of all 
 Rhetoricians and IVfetaphyficians, as well as of 
 all the Schoolmen in general ; that it is a Di- 
 ftinftion never heard of in the World, before 
 it dropped, from the^ teeming Invention of this 
 Author ; till he produces lbme Inftances to the 
 Contrary. Now obferve the Ufe and Appli- 
 cation he makes of his new Diilinction. 
 
 ' F.i .r st, Metaphorical Analogy is ', when we 
 attribute human Parts to Gody jttchas a Finger, 
 an Eye, or an Ear ; then fays he, every one fees 
 that the Analogy is Metaphorical. But every 
 one who lees with the Eye of common Sence 
 muft immediately difcern the quite contrary, 
 that it is mere Metaphor and No Analogy ; be- 
 c,aufe there can be nothing in the divine Na- 
 ture which bears any real Similitude and Cor- 
 refpondency to our bodily Senifes or "Members : 
 And therefore it is, that when we ipeak of 
 God or his. Attributes by Allufion to any thing 
 •Jnerely Senfitiye and Material, it is ib purely 
 a Figure of Speech that we transfer the Term 
 only to him, without ,the Idea annexed to it: 
 Whereas when we ipeak of God in the Lan- 
 guage of our Intellectual faculties and the Pro- 
 perties of theiWSsW, we transfer both the Terms 
 
 and 
 
ANALOGY. 441 
 
 and the Conceptions annexed to them, which 
 is truly and properly Analogy j becaufe there 
 Is a real Similitude and Correfpondency be- 
 tween thefe, and the divine Perfections where- 
 of they are true Reprefentatives. The Rea-r 
 lbn affigned by him why our Senfes and bodi- 
 ly Members are attributed to God by Metaphor 
 only, is as falie as his calling it a Metaphorical 
 Analogy ; Becdufe in every Degree they necejfarily 
 andjimply include Defect and Imperfeffion. But 
 if material Organs of Senfation and bodily Sub- 
 flarice, as fuch, in Every Degree Necejfarily and 
 $imply include Defeat and Imperfection, they 
 never would have been effential Ingredients 
 of our Compofition ; nor could it be then laid 
 of us that we were created truly perfect even 
 in our Kind j or that God law Every thing that 
 he hid made and behold it was Very Good. 
 Nay thus the very Body of Chrift as he is now 
 irt a State of Glory, would Simply and Necef- 
 fdrily include^ Defect and Imperfection In every 
 Degree. No, the true Reafon is becaufe God 
 is a' Spirit, a pure Spirit ; and therefore there 
 can be nothing in material Subftance or bodily 
 Senfes Realy Similar and Correfpondent to any 
 ^property in his purely fpiritual Nature : 
 /Whereas it is quite otherwife with regard to 
 the intelle&ual Endowments and Qualifications 
 of our Mind, which is compofed ■ of Spirit as 
 W'ell as Matter i and in refpeft of which we 
 are laid* to be made in the Likenefs and after 
 the Image of God. Not but' that even the hu- 
 inan Spirit it felf,' which considered in refpect: 
 
 of 
 
442 DIVINE 
 
 of Man is the higheft Perfection and Ingredient 
 of his Nature ; in refped of that Divine Spirit 
 includes Defed and Imperfedion \ as no doubt 
 the Subftance and Properties of every Rank of 
 created Spirits muft do. 
 
 H e adds here as another Inftance of his Me- 
 taphorical Analogy, As we attribute human Paffi- 
 ons to God, as if this were as truly Metaphor 
 as the former. But in this he is grievoufly mi- 
 ftaken likewife; for the commendable Paffions 
 or Affedions of the Mind are attributed to 
 God, as well as its intellectual Operations, not 
 by Metaphor but by a good Degree of true Ana- 
 logy. He affigns the fame Reafon why human 
 Paffions are attributed to God by his Meta- 
 phorical Analogy; Becaufe they necejjarily and 
 (imply include Imperfection in every Degree : And 
 I return much the fame Anfwer; that then 
 we were, not at firft made perfect in our Kind, 
 but Necejjarily and Simply imperfed; and 
 this noble Work of God came neceflarily de- 
 fective out of his Hands. Nor are we upon his 
 Principle capable of ever being rendered tfuly 
 perfect in our Kind even by Almighty Power; 
 but all our Paffions and Affedions muft, As 
 fitch, continue for ever, even in a State of 
 Glory, limply defedive and neceffarily imper- 
 fed in every Degree. Why Friend I No Grear 
 ture of God, or natural Faculty or Property 
 of it, is Neceffarily and Simply defedive and im- 
 perfed in Every Degree : So that This cannot 
 be a Reafon why even the Properties and Qua- 
 5 lities 
 
ANALOGY. 443 
 
 {ities of material Subftance, or the very Name 
 of a Pebble may not be attributed to God ; 
 for none of thefe Necejfarily and Simply include 
 Defect and Imperfection in Every Degree, as 
 fiich. Lay afide therefore your Simply, and Ne- 
 cejfarily, arid In every Degree which have nei- 
 ther Sence nor Application Here; and if you 
 confider the PaJJions or Affections of the Soul 
 inrefpect of our human Compofition, when 
 they are in a juft Degree, truly and properly 
 regulated under the Conduct of right Reafon 
 and Religion : They are lb far from being Sim- 
 ply arid Necejfarily Imperfections As fitch, that 
 they are great Perfections of Our Nature; and 
 ibme of the very Qualities which in our firft 
 Creation gave us a near and lively Refemblance 
 of the Divinity. But if you confider them in 
 refpect of the real Nature of God, the very 
 Kind of them is then indeed neceffarily Defe- 
 ctive and Imperfect in every Degree ; as every 
 Kind of thing in this World and in our human 
 Compofition muft unavoidably be. So that 
 there can be nothing in him of the lame Sort 
 with human Paffions or Affections; anymore 
 than with bodily Senfes or Members ; or with 
 human Power, or human Knowlege and Wif- 
 dqm, or human Goodnefs. Even thefe laft 
 are 'Necejfarily and Unavoidably Defects and 
 Irriperfe&ions in refpect of the Divine Nature, 
 in Every'' Degree of them, and as to their ve- 
 ary Kind ■, and therefore: none of them can be 
 attributed to God in the fame formal or Jite- 
 $al Propriety wherein, they are firft fboken 
 
 of 
 
444 DIVINE 
 
 of our felves, before they are applyed to himl 
 Qur,Paffions or Affections, as well as our in- 
 tellectual Properties, are all alike attributed 
 or tpasfered from us to God by Analogy only, 
 tbo' , not Equal] or in the fame Degree of it 
 with o.ur other Perfections : They not having 
 the fame Foundation, ; that is, the lame Degree 
 and Proportion of Similitude in the divine and 
 human Natures ; ,#nd consequently not being 
 row Equal? perfect and lively Reprefentations 
 of the divine Perfections. Accordingly fince 
 there is nothing in the divine Nature fimilar 
 and correfpondent to our bodily Senfes and 
 Members, we apply them to it by Metaphor 
 only. ThefPaflions or Affections being more 
 immediately liable to moral Difbrder and Cor- 
 ruption, we attribute them to God in a Lower 
 ■Degree of Analogy : And the intellectual Pro- 
 perties, and Operations of our Mind w e attri- 
 bute) to him. by a More Jutland Complete. and 
 Lively Analogy ,\ they being fubjedt to Blind- 
 nefs and Error and all moral Corruption, moft- 
 ly from. the Strepgth and Influence of the 
 -Paffions. 
 
 Now that our Paiuons and Affections can- 
 not be attributed to God in the Same Sence 
 -and after the Same, Manner with our bodily 
 , Senfes and- Members, , is. plain j becaufe they 
 are ■; Properties . and Operations of the Mind 
 •whish is, the Image of , God within us, as well 
 as tbofe. which— are ftylec| intelleCtpal: And 
 Sacs; .the Jatter. are. attributed by a true and 
 
 Real 
 
ANALOGY. 44.5 
 
 Real Analogy founded in the Nature of things, 
 it is realbnable to think fo likewile of the for- 
 mer. Is any thing more realbnable than to 
 believe that there are Perfections in the divine 
 Nature correlpondent arid anfwerable to Lovfy 
 and Compajfioriy and to all the other commend- 
 able Affections in Man ? Such real Perfections 
 as lay no left a firm and Iblid Foundation of 
 Truth, in all that is fpoken of God thro' the 
 Scriptures in the Language Of the commend- 
 able Paffions and Affections of the Mind ; than 
 in that of our intellectual Properties? That it 
 may as 'truly be faid that there is L&ve and 
 Corhpaffion in God, as Ktoowlege, and WMom, 
 and Goodnefs? And furely with more Truth 
 (tho' our Author afferts the Contrary) than 
 when we^ fay he hath Fingers arid Eyes and 
 Ears, which can have nothing correlpondent 
 and fimilar to them on the Part of the divine 
 Nature. So that our Paffions or Affections are 
 truly attributed to God, not by mere Meta- 
 phor but by a Real Analogy ; tho' in a lower 
 Degree of it, and with more Caution in lepa- 
 rating all the Imperfection we are able from 
 them (as I obferved before) than when we at- 
 tribute the intellectual Properties and Opera- 
 tions of the Mind. 
 
 Secondly, Proper Analogy, lays he, is 
 when we attribute fuch as Wijdom and Know- 
 iege to God. Had he faid this was Truly and 
 Properly Analogy, he had Ipoke properly and 
 a great deal of Truth ; but as he calls it a Pro- 
 
4+6 DIVINE 
 
 per Analogy in Diftinction from MetaphfariC&i 
 Analogy, it is neither good Serice nor proper 
 .Language. That thefe and fuch like Attri- 
 butes are attributed to God by a Real Analo- 
 gy is moft lure, but the Reafon he affigns for 
 it is moftfalfe; becaufe In Knowlege and Wif- 
 dom /imply taken, or as fuch, there is no Defect 
 or Imperfection. Thefe Words Simply taken and 
 As fuch are lb dubious and equivocating, that 
 .they would deceive any Reader, who doth not 
 difcern, that they can have no other intelligi- 
 ble and rational Meaning here; but Know- 
 lege and Wifdom in the General Sence of the 
 Words, and as they exprefs and include that 
 which is Divine, Angelic, and Human. Know* 
 lege is moft furely a Perfection in them all, 
 but vaftly different not in. Degree alone but in 
 Kind. In God it denotes an infinite incompre- 
 hensible Perfection Abfblutely confummate. In 
 all Created Spirits it is a "Perfection, not ablb- 
 lutely luch ; but only as it renders them per- 
 fect in their leveral Kinds and Ranks. It is 
 the fame likewife as to us ; tho' our Knowlege 
 contributes to render us complete and perfect 
 in our Kind, and is one of the higheft Per- 
 fections in our Frame : Yet it is lb far from 
 being void of all Defect and Imperfection, con- 
 fidered in refpect of God; that the only real 
 •and Pofitive Perfection of Human Knowlege, 
 .confifts merely in the diftant Similitude and 
 Analogy it adtualy bears to that infinite and 
 abfblutely confummate Perfection, whereof it 
 is only a Reprefentation. So that we attribute 
 
ANALOGY. 447 
 
 to God that Knowlege whereof we have a di- 
 rect Conception, for a quite different Reafon 
 to that affigned by this Author ; not becaufe 
 Simply taken and As fuch it has No Defect and 
 Imperfection in it; for even our bodily Parts 
 and Senfes, Thus confidered, include no De- 
 fed; and might, notwithftanding any thing 
 in this Principle, be attributed to God. But 
 becaufe, tho' our Kind of Knowlege is mani- 
 feftly an Imperfection, in its utmoft Degree, 
 in refpect of the Divinity ', and therefore we 
 cannot apply or transfer it to him as an Ef- 
 fential and Intrinfic Perfection of his Real Na- 
 ture whereof we have any direct Idea or Con- 
 ception, or for which we have a proper Term 
 and literal Denomination: Yet it is a Per- 
 fection of the human Mind, which manifestly 
 contains a lively Image and true Analogical 
 Reprefentatim of a Correfpondent, infinite, and 
 absolutely complete Perfection in the Divi- 
 nity | which cannot be truly afferted of our 
 bodily Parts in any Degree. In fhort nothing 
 in the Nature or Properties of created Beings, 
 no not even in Mere Matter, Simply and Ne- 
 cejfarily includes Defect and Imperfection in 
 Every Degree, as fuch; for other wife every 
 created Being would be neceffarily defective in 
 its Kind: Nor on the other Hand can there 
 be any thing in the Created Univerfe fo per- 
 fect, as to exclude all Defect and Imperfection 
 in Every Degree and in. Every Refpett, confider- 
 ed At fuch; fb that all the Confequences de- 
 duced from the contrary Topics are alike 
 groundlefs and falfe. A s 
 
DIVINE 
 
 As it is thus with Knowlege, fb it is like- 
 wife with 41 the pther Faculties and Proper- 
 ties and Operations of our Mind. Tho' they 
 &re truly Perfections, confidered as they are in 
 Us the juft Complement and finifhing Our 
 Nature, and fiich as raife us up to the utmoft 
 Pirnenfion and Size o£ Humanity, and which 
 render us truly perfect in our Rank of Being: 
 Yet when they are confidered in refpeft of the 
 real intrinfic Nature of God ; they are all lb 
 many Defects and Imperfections, altogether 
 unworthy of him (as to their very Kind) who 
 is in himfelf fimply and ablblutejy perfect, 
 not by pofleffing the moft Exalted Purees 
 of any Created Sort of Perfection, much left 
 ©f that which is Human ; but by fuch real 
 Ferfe&ions as are infinitely different in Kind, 
 not only fom ill Human ;but even Angelic 
 Properties. And therefore it is that no Fa- 
 culty or Operation of an human Mind, can 
 he applyed or attributed to his abiblutely per- 
 fect Nature literaly, or Properly, and Formdy 
 as our Author terms it ; and fb as, according 
 •to him, to .preferve any Proportion of Degree 
 tmly between the infinite Nature of God, and 
 ■the finite and limited and imperfect Nature of 
 Man, which is grofs Ablurdity : But by Analogy 
 only with the molt perfect and correfpondent 
 Faculties and Properties and Operations of an. 
 human Mind, in relpect of which we are 
 formed after the Likenefs or Image of God. 
 Which lays a fure and lolid Foundation for 
 
 uniyerfal 
 
ANAL O G - Y* 449 
 
 iJtiiverfal Truth and Certainty in all our Con- 
 ceptions of things purely fpiritual and divine^ 
 and in all our exaft Reafbnings upon them ; 
 jtho' at the fame time nothing is mote mani- 
 feft, than that they rhuft be altogether diffe- 
 rent in Kind from every thing natural and hu* 
 man. 
 
 From hence then the true Difference be- 
 tween Metaphor and Analogy is apparent. 
 Metaphor is merely Imaginary and Arbitrary^ 
 without any Real Similitude and Correfpon- 
 dency in the very Nature of the things be- 
 tween which the Companion is made: And 
 it is therefore in Truth no more than a pure 
 AUufion, or Figure of Speech, without any 
 transfering of the Ideas or Conceptions j as 
 when in human Metaphor we exprefs the 
 Verdure of a Field by Smiling,, or the Con- 
 federation of the Mind by its Runing over a 
 Subject. And thus when we attribute Fin- 
 gers and Eyes and Ears to God, the Terms 
 are purely Metaphorical; fince it is mani- 
 feft from Reafon and Scripture, that there 
 can be nothing in the Nature of a pure Spirit 
 fimilar and anfwerable to our Sehfes and bo- 
 dily Members. But the Refemblance an4 Cop 
 feipondency which is the Ground of Analogy* 
 is not Imaginary and Arbitrary ; but founded 
 in the very Nature of the things compared ; as 
 when in human Analogy we fey, what Reafon, 
 is to Man, that natural InftwB is to Brutes, 
 And accordingly, when we attribute J£now- 
 
 Gg lege 
 
45° DIVINE 
 
 lege and Wifdom and Goodnefs to God, we do, 
 it by Divine Analogy ; becaule it can be undoubt- 
 edly proved that there are Perfections in him 
 Correspondent and Similar to thole Properties or 
 Qualities of an human Mind : Which we are 
 under a Necejjity of applying or transfering to 
 , God Analogicaly, for want of any DireEi of 
 Immediate or (in this Author's Language) For- 
 mal Ideas or Conceptions of thole divine Per- 
 fections ; which are totaly imperceptible and 
 incomprehenfible to us, as to their Real Nature 
 and Kind. This is what Cajetan very aptly 
 fays is Analogia proprie fa£ta, Analogy properly 
 formed, or Jufily inflituted\ that is, what we 
 truly and properly call Analogy in Diftin&ion 
 from Metaphor: And not, according to this 
 Author's grofs Miftake in rendering the Words, 
 a Proper Analogy ; as if it had been Analogia 
 Propria in Oppofition to Analogia Metaphorica f 
 which I am perfuaded neither Cajetan not any 
 other of the Schoolmen ever dreamed of. For 
 furely a Metaphorical Analogy^ and a Proper 
 Analogy, which is as palpable an Abfurdity as 
 Analogical Metaphor and Analogical Propriety j 
 are two fuch unnatural ungainly Monfters of hu- 
 man Imagination, as were never before drawn 
 out at full Length, and let off with lb much 
 Daub and Colouring, for a public Shew to the 
 World with no fin'all Pomp and Solemnity. 
 He attempts to father thefe chimerical Births 
 upon the Schoolmen j who as far as I can yet 
 fee, are intirely innocent of the Charge. But 
 what if ibme among them had been guilty ; 
 
 fhould 
 
ANALOGY. 451 
 
 ihould he not have left their ipurious Iflue ex*> 
 poled in that folitary forfaken Defert where he 
 fbund them, to perifh in their Infancy; fince 
 no human Creature befides himfelf would evef 
 have owned them: And not have taken^up 
 fuch grois Abfurdities in order to be cherifhed, 
 and maintained, and openly abetted under a 
 DHguileof the genuine Offspring ofgoodSence 1 
 and fblid Learning. 
 
 I n Defence of this unheard of DiftincKori' 
 of his, and of his fundamental Principle of Ana* 
 logy irirefpetf of Degree only\ or Attributing 
 Knowkge and JVifidom to God proportionably t 
 or prejerving a Proportion to the infinite Nature 
 of Godr That is, in his Meaning, a Propor- 
 tion purely in Degree between things the very 
 fame in Kind ; and not a Proportion of Simili- 
 tude only and Correfpondency between natural ot 
 human Knowlege, and that which is divine 
 and fupernatural; as if Proportion of Degrees 
 between any thing Finite and Infinite were not 
 downright Contradiction* In Defence of thefe 
 Notions, I lay, One Writer whom he happens 
 to cite is Thomas Aquinas ■, whole Opinion with 
 refped to Analogical Perfections in God, or our 
 knowing God by Analogy is, fully and dearly 
 fiiewn already in the preceding Part of this 
 Volume, nothing of which need be here re- 
 peated. But the two particular Places or Sen- 
 tences in him refered to here, by this Author, 
 muft not be omitted. The firft is this ; Opor- 
 tet quod; quandocnnque nomen fumpium a quacun* 
 G g a que 
 
45* DIVINE 
 
 que Perfetfione Creatura, Deo Mrikuitur ; feck* 
 datur ab ejus Sigmficatwm omne illud, quod perti-* 
 net ad imperfeBum Modum qu\4ompetit Creature, 
 Here Aquinas moft etfprefly aflerts two things j 
 one is, That Words exprejfing the Perfeftions of 
 the Creature are from thence attributed or apply- 
 ed to God for expr effing the divine Perfections; 
 which all Men muft allow to be, with reipeft 
 to their own Real Nature, utterly incorapre- 
 henfible and inexpreffible by us. This our Au- 
 thor very well expreffeth by faying, We bor- 
 row tie Name of the Perfection from the Crea* 
 ture t and attribute it to God. Yes, and webor- 
 row the natural and worldly Conception like- 
 wife annexed to that Word of human Lan- 
 guage, to help us to conceive fbmething alto* 
 gether divine and fupernatural; which could 
 never be conceived and expreffed otherwifc 
 than by fuch borrowed Terms and fubftituted 
 Conceptions. Again fays he, The Intellect gets iti 
 Notions' of all Sorts of perfections from the Crea- 
 tures. But fay I, it gets no Notion of any cter* 
 nil, uncreated, and eflentialy divine Perfec- 
 tion from the Creature, either in Kind or Z>*- 
 gree$ the very thing which lyes upon him tp 
 prove. This and the preceding Queftioa cited 
 hy this Author are full of fuch Sayings as theft 
 jo the fame Purpofc. Nm pqftttms nommari 
 Dfum nifiex Cr eat wis. Nomina de Qeo et Crea- 
 turn XHcta are not, fays he, to be taken Uni- 
 ioce, as if they fignifyed lomething the iame 
 in Kind with any thing human ; nor Mqmeace 
 as if it expreffed nothing Realjf Similar and Art* 
 
 fwefable 
 
ANALOG Y. 4 5 £ 
 
 to any thing in human Nature ; but 
 Analogue, as it expreffeth a Being endued with 
 Perfections realy Oorrefpondmt and Similar to 
 the greateft Perfections of an human Mind ; 
 therefore he adds, that the Words are fpoken 
 of God and the Creatures Secundum Analogiam 
 Creaturarum ad ipfum. 
 
 The other thing exprefly afferted by Aqui* 
 nas in that Saying is, That when the Name of 
 any Perfection borrowed from the Creature is 
 attributed to God ; We mt/Jl exclude from its 
 Signification all that belongs to the . imperfeH 
 Manner in which it agreees to the Creature. 
 What our Author builds upon here is the 
 word Modus or Manner-, as if Aquinas meant 
 that Words expreffive of Perfections in God 
 and Man fignifyed fomething the fame in Kind, 
 and differing in the Manner only: As if the 
 word Knowlege in particular, borrowed from 
 Man and attributed to God, fignifyed no more 
 than a Different Manner of knowing in each 
 of them; and confequently that Knowlege in 
 both muft be the fame in Kind. That the 
 Manner of Knowlege in God and Man is dif- 
 ferent, infinitely different is moft true ; but 
 nothing can be more falfe than his Confe- 
 quence, which fhould have been the very Re- 
 verie : For the Different Manner of Knowing 
 in each of them is the very thing that alters 
 the Nature of their Knowlege, and which 
 makes it realy different in Kind. Now our 
 human Frame being compofed of Spirit and 
 Gg 5 Matter; 
 
454 DIVINE 
 
 Matter ; the Manner of our Knowlege is by- 
 original Ideas of Senfation, and the Confciouf- 
 tiefs we have of the feveral Operations of our 
 own Mind; the only Materials of all our 
 Knowlege human and divine: The Manner of 
 the Intellect's operating upon thefe is, firft by 
 a fimple Apprehenfion and View, or a bare 
 Profpect of thofe Ideas and Operations ; then 
 by its various Combinations of them, among 
 themfelves and with each other ; to which 
 Succeed the Oblervations upon them, or the 
 Judgments it makes of them; fubfequent to 
 which is its whole Manner of Deduction and 
 Confequence. The chief and moft concern- 
 ing of all its Conlequences, as being the Foun- 
 dation of all Religion, is the Exifience of an 
 eternal, infinite, and purely fpiritual Being: 
 Whofe intire Nature or Effence, and Attributes 
 are utterly imperceptible and inconceivable in 
 any Degree as they are In themfelves ; and 
 consequently not to be conceived or exprefled, 
 otherwife than by Analogy with the higheft 
 correfpondent Properties and Qualities of an 
 human Mind. This whole Procedure and/** 
 tire Manner of human Knowlege is, in every 
 ftep of it, altogether unworthy of God j and 
 renders it of a quite different Kind from that 
 correfpondent Perfection in him, which we 
 exprefs hy the Term Knowlege borrowed from 
 Man. 
 
 7 Accordingly Aquinas in t;he very Ar- 
 ticle cited argues, that Secundum Modum Im* 
 
 water ialit atis y 
 
ANALOGY. 455 
 
 materialitatis, eft Modus Cognitionis. So that 
 the Manner of Knowlege in Brutes muft be of 
 a quite different Nature and Kind from that 
 of our'sj the whole Manner of Knowlege in 
 a Mind compofed of Matter and Spirit operat- 
 ing jointly in efTential Union, mull: be of quite 
 another Kind from that of Angels or created 
 Beings who are all Spirit; and the Manner of 
 Knowlege in a divine and infinite Spirit muft 
 differ vaftly more from the Manner of know- 
 ing in Angels, than tjieir Manner of knowing 
 doth from that which is merely human. Now 
 if the Manner of Knowlege in God is Infi- 
 nitely different from our Manner; the divine 
 Knowlege it felf muft be of a Kind infinitely 
 different from that which is human: Nay fb 
 different in Mindy that he obferves the Divine 
 Knowlege is neither a Quality nor an Habit , 
 as it is in Man, But it is his very Subftance ; 
 and confequently muft differ as truly in Kind 
 from human Knowlege, as his Effence or Sub- 
 ftance differs in Kind from that which is hu- 
 man. And therefore he fays it is a Pure Aff-, 
 to exclude not only all Habit and Improve-? 
 ment, but the whole intire Nature and Man- 
 ner and Kind of human Knowlege. For other- 
 wile where is that Simplex InteUigentia, which 
 is very aptly oppofed by himi:o the Compound- 
 ed Knowlege which is the Refult of Matter and 
 Spirit , of Senfatim as well as Reafon, and of 
 fucb a gradual Procefs and lb many diftinct 
 Operations of the Intellect ? 
 
 Gg 4- This 
 
456 DIVINE 
 
 This is Aquinas's Meaning in thole Ex> 
 preffions of his where he fays, The PerftB*' 
 ons of the Creature are in God Mtiori Modo r 
 that is, in a Manner very different from what 
 they are in the Creature ; not Altiwi Gradu, 
 as this Author would have it, but in a Higher 
 Sence ; and in a Manner fo infinitely different 
 from what is in the Creature, that the whole 
 intire Nature or Kind of thofe Perfections is 
 thereby altered. In this Sence it is that he fays* 
 Whatever Perfection is in the Creature y Pre* 
 exijlit et continetur in Deo ficundum Modum ex* 
 ceflentem, not Secundum Gradum excellentem. 
 This he explains by faying, that it is con- 
 tained in God as its Caufe or Principle ; §Luic+ 
 quid dicitur de Deo et Creaturis, dicitur fecun* 
 dim quod eft aliquis Ordo Creatura ad Deum 
 ut ad Principium et Caufam ; in qua praexiftunt 
 excellent er omnium Rerum PerfecJtoms. There 
 Is nothing he is more full and expreis in, than 
 that no Perfections attributed to God and the 
 Creature can be of the lame Kind ; Nullum 
 Nomen convenit Deo fecundum illam Rationem, 
 ficundum qttam dicitur de Creatura: And to 
 convince you that by Rationem he means Ac- 
 cording to the fame Manner ■, or Nature and 
 Kind., take the Words immediately following, 
 Genus autem variatum mutat Rationem ; Change 
 the Kiqd, and you change the whole Meaning 
 and Signification of the Word when you apply 
 it tp God and the Creature. Nay he aflerts 
 the fame with relbe^ to Knowjege in par* 
 
 ticuJar i 
 
A N A L O G Y. 457 
 
 ticuiar ; Non fecundum eandem Rationem hoe 
 Nemen Sapiens de Deo et de Homme dicitur } 
 et eadem Ratio eft de aliis r XJnde nullum Nomen 
 mivoce de Deo et Crealuris pradkatttr. Words 
 taken Secundum eandem Rationem and Umvoee, 
 in the conftant Style of all the Schoolmen, 
 fignify Terms ufed to expreft things The fame 
 in Nature or Kind and Manner, Efe js fo clear 
 and expreis in this Point, that his Conchjion 
 in anfwer to that Qiieftion, Utrum aliqua Crea- 
 turapoffit efje Jmufa Deo, is this; Since God is 
 the universal Principle, and not contained in any 
 Species or Genus, Creaturai ei Jimiles funt non ft* 
 cundum eandem fpecificam aut genericam Ra- 
 tionem; fedjecundum aliqudlem Analogiam. And 
 accordingly he afferts that God is Extra omne 
 Genus, fo that nothing elfe can be of trie 
 lame Kind with any thing in him.!; his intire 
 Nature being different from any thing in the 
 Creature. And again, It is not fmd that there, 
 is any Lifenefs of the Creature to God, Secun- 
 dum eandem Rationem Generis et Speciei; fed 
 fecundum Analogiam tantum. Upon which he 
 makes this excellent Remark, of which I 
 would have a particular Notice taken once for 
 all : That tho the Creature may be faid to be 
 Me God, as we fay a Picture or Image is like 
 the Perfm it represents ; yet it cannot be laid 
 with the Same ftrid Propriety of Speech, That 
 God is like the Creature. For as it is not with 
 exa& Fitnefi and Propriety faid that A Man 
 hath a Likenefs of his Image or Picture ; that 
 js, a Likenefs of his Own lakenefi or of his 
 
 own 
 
458 DIVINE 
 
 own Image : So neither can it be faid with the 
 Same exact Propriety and diftinct Significancy 
 of Language, that the Original archetypal Per- 
 fections of God have a Likenefs of any Creat- 
 ed Perfections ; as when it is affirmed that the 
 Creatures poffefs Perfections fimilar to His ; 
 and which carry in them a more or lefs lively 
 Relemblance of his, in Proportion to the 
 Rank and Dignity of their Nature. Nay and 
 he proceeds farther to aflert on another Oc- 
 cafion, that this very Likenefs of our's to 
 the Divinity is ImperfeB for this Reafon ; Quia 
 etiam nee idem* Secundum Genus, re- 
 prafentat. 
 
 The other Place cited by our Author from 
 Aquinas is this, IntelleBus autem nofter eo modo 
 apprehendit eas [Perfectiones quae in Deo funt] 
 fecundum quod Junt in Creaturis; et fecundum 
 quod apprehendit, ita fignificat per Nomina. In 
 Nominibus igitur qua "Deo attribuimus i eft duo 
 confiderare j Scilicet PerfeBiones ipfas fignificatas, 
 ■nt Bonitatem, Vitam, et hujufmodi; et Modum 
 fignificandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod Signifi- 
 cant, hujufmodi Nomina proprie competent Deo; 
 et magis proprie quam ipfis Creaturis-, et per prius 
 dicuntur de eo : Quantum vero ad Modum figni- 
 ficandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo; habent enim 
 Modum fignificandi qui Creaturis competit. Here 
 he aflerts That our IntelleB apprehends the 
 divine PerfeBions no otherwife than according to 
 what they are in the Creatures ; then this Au- 
 thor takes him up fliort, as if he meant that 
 % the 
 
ANALOGY. 459 
 
 the very fame Perfections with thofe of God 
 are in the Creature; and that in apprehending 
 the Perfections of the Creature, we apprehend 
 the fame Kind of Perfections which are in 
 God, tho' in a lower Degree. But if Aquinas 
 had any fuch Meaning it was fhort and eafy 
 for him to have laid, what he no where fays, 
 that the Perfections in God and the Creature, 
 and in Man in particular, do not differ in 
 Kind; or that they differ Only in Degree: 
 Whereas a thing lb contrary to common Sence, 
 could never drop from the Pen of that great 
 Author ; and lb fraught with Contradiction 
 as that God fhould Create any Subftance, or 
 any Faculty or Property or Quality of that 
 Subftance, the fame in Kind with his own 
 which are uncreated, infinite and eternal ; that 
 is, that he fhould Create an Human Subftance 
 with Faculties or Properties in lbme degree 
 Divine. Aquinas's Notion is quite the contrary 
 thro' the whole thirteenth and fourteenth 
 Queftions cited by this Author ; That we do 
 not apprehend or conceive the divine Perfections 
 in any Degree as they are in themfelves, or as 
 they are in their own Nature or Kind ; that 
 we conceive or apprehend them no otherwife 
 than by apprehending the Perfections of the 
 Creature, derived from him as from their firft 
 Caufe and Principle; in whom therefore all their 
 Perfections muft be Eminenter. And left this 
 fhould be underftood of a more eminent Degree 
 only ; he ufes the word Super eminenter, which 
 jignifieth their being of a, different and trans- 
 cendent, Kjnd, Another 
 
466 DIVINE 
 
 Another thing contained in that Cita- 
 tion out of Aquinas is. That as we apprehend 
 the divine Perfections only in the Perfections 
 of the Creature j So we exprejs them in the fame 
 terms of human Language ; in fuch Terms 
 as are made common both to our well known 
 natural Faculties, Properties, and Qualities ; 
 and to the divine Perfections, which are in- 
 comprehenfible to us in every Degree as they 
 are in themfelves. When thefe Terms taken 
 or borrowed from the Creature are attributed 
 to God ; there are, fays he, two things to be 
 confidered in them. Firft the Divine Perfecti- 
 ons themfelves ultimately fignifyed and intends 
 pd by thole Terms j and Secondly How or af- 
 ter what Manner the Terms Jignify or exprels 
 thofe Perfections. In refped of the divine Per- 
 fections Themfelves, or the Real Things in God 
 fignifyed by them (things inconceivable other- 
 wife than by the Ideas or Conceptions we 
 have of fuch Faculties and Properties as are 
 purely natural and human ; and ineffable other- 
 wife than by Terms borrowed from them) 
 thefe Properly agree or belong to God ; ana 
 Per prius, as he expreffeth it, Chiefly and Pri- 
 marily. Nay thefe agree to God more truly 
 and properly than to the Creature or to Man 
 in particular, from whom the Terms with 
 the Conceptions annexed to them were firft 
 borrowed. Nay farther yet, thefe are fb*pe-f 
 culiar and proper to God, and to him only; 
 that they are not in the fe#ft Degree attributa- 
 ble 
 
A N A L OQ Y. 46* 
 
 ble to Man. For the Terras Thus fignify infi- 
 nite, incomprehenfible Properties of the di- 
 vine Nature ; and lb incommunicable, that 
 the fame in Kind cannot be created, or com- 
 municated to the Creature in any Degree, 
 But in relpe& of the Manner of the Terms fig* 
 mjying or cxpreffing thofe divine Perfe&ions, 
 he pofitively afferts they cannot be fpoken of 
 God with any literal Propriety of Speech, for 
 the following Reafon in this very Article; 
 Quia Nomina Pea attributa Modum fignifican- 
 di Creaturarum retinent, Deo prpprie ex Modo 
 ipfo J^gnificandi minime competunt. And he 
 elfe where affigns this Reafon, Quantum ad 
 Impojltionem Nomims y per pritts a nobis impo- 
 nuntur Creaturis, quas pritts cognofcirnus. The 
 Terms ftiU Retain the Manner of their Signi- 
 fication; and therefore cannot be applyed to 
 God with the ftrid Propriety of human Lan- 
 guage ; but (which is his conftant Do&rine) 
 can be Ipofcen of Him no otherwife than by 
 «^M%A His Inftances here are Goodnefs and 
 Life, Terms taken or borrowed from Man, 
 whole Gaodmfs confifts in governing and regu- 
 lating his Paffions and Appetites according to 
 Reafon, and retraining them from any evil 
 Influence upon his Underftanding and Will ; 
 and whofe Life is partly in his Blood and 
 Breath, and lafts no longer than the Union of 
 Spirit and Body. When Life and Goodnefs are 
 applyed to* God, they fignify incomprehenfi- 
 ble Perfections- Peculiar and Proper to Him 
 alone as an infinite Caufe or eternal Principle ; 
 4 and 
 
462 DIVINE 
 
 and which are not attributable to Man in any- 
 Degree. But with refpect to the Manner of 
 Signifying thole divine Perfections; the Terms 
 are applyed to the divine Nature by Analogy 
 only. An excellent Diftinction; and which 
 ought to be univerialy obleryed in all thole 
 Attributes and Terms that are borrowed from 
 Man, and transfered to God for the conceiving 
 and exprefling his incomprehenfible Perfecti- 
 ons. In relpect of the Truth and Reality of th6 
 Divine Perfections Themfefoes, the Terms in 
 which thele are expreffed are Chiefly and Pri- 
 marily fpoken of God; for thus they denote 
 Perfections Proper to the nrft Caufe alone, and 
 which do not belong to Man in any Degree: 
 They then exprels the Original, Archetypal, 
 Incomprehenfible Realities ; whereof all created 
 Perfections, particularly thole of an human 
 Mind, are no more than bare Tranfcripts or 
 Representations. But in relpect of the Man- 
 ner of their fignifying thole incomprehenfible 
 Perfections, which muft unavoidably be the 
 lame with Our Manner of Conceiving them, by 
 the Help and Substitution of Properties peculi- 
 ar to Man -, the Terms are firft applyed to us in 
 an immediate and ftrictly literal Propriety of 
 Speech ; and afterwards borrowed from thence, 
 and transfered to God for exprefling his divine 
 Attributes, in an Analogical Sence only. 
 
 The Conclufion quoted by this Author 
 from Picus of Mirdndula y and by him mif- 
 tranflated, is this, Magis improprie dkitur de 
 
 Deo, 
 
ANALOGY, 463 
 
 Deo, quod fit Intelligens vel Intellefius ; quam 
 de Angela, quod fit Anima rationalis. It is 
 more improperly /aid of God, that he is IntellL 
 gent or an Intellect ; than it is faid of an Angel, 
 that he is a rational Soul. This Do&rine he lays 
 Picus defended, by explaining it away into a 
 mere verbal Difference from what is meant by 
 other Men. No j he explained the Doctrine by 
 a juft Diftinftion, and defended it to the very 
 laft. As Knowlege fays Picus, Is taken Com* 
 muniter et generaliter pro omni Cognitione, in 
 General for all Kinds of Knowlege belonging 
 to God and Angels and Men j I do not only 
 allow but contend that there is Knowlege in 
 God; nay the moft perfect Knowlege of all 
 things : But if you take the term Knowlege 
 as it is particularly applyed to a Property in 
 Man, which he calls Notitia difcurfiva homi- 
 nibus propria ;■ he utterly denyeth that there 
 is any Such Knowlege in God, who doth not 
 Know after the Manner of Men. Accordingly 
 he aflerts over and over, that the word Reafon 
 is not in its proper Acceptation applicable to 
 God, as being expreffive of a Faculty peculiar 
 to Man. This very Diftin&ion he again put? 
 into a fhorter and clearer Light thus. Se-> 
 cundum propriam Acceptationem hujus Dittio- 
 nis Intelligere, God cannot be called Intelli-, 
 gent or an Intellect: ; but he may be fb ftyled, 
 Secundum communem viam minus propriam. 
 From thence he concludes that Cognitio omni- 
 um eft in Deo ; fed ijla magis difiat ab Intel- 
 lectione proprie captd, quam homo ab Angelo> 
 
 And 
 
464 D I VINE 
 
 And again moft exjfrdty, Notitia aigtkia md* 
 gis diftat ah infinite Notitia Dei ; quam diftdt 
 a Notitia) rationatrva, Anima rational* vel 
 homini appropriate. Is this any thing like ex* 
 gaining his Doctrine away? Or muft he be 
 iaid to recant, becaufe he allows and contends 
 for a real infinite Perfection or Knowlege in 
 God $ but vaftly different in Kind from Rea* 
 Ion and Khowlege in Man ? And which we 
 are obliged to call by the lame General name 
 Knowlege ; becaufe we have no dired Concept 
 tion or Idea or ftri&ly proper Word for it$ 
 and becaufe it is to us utterly inconceivable 
 and ineffable as it is in it felf. 
 
 However, that Conclusion might have 1 
 been relifhed when propofed and defended by 
 Picus, it was a great Truth. For feho' to fay 
 of an Angel that he is a Rational Soul} by way 
 of Analogy with that which is human, may 
 be no unapt or infignificant way of lpeaking 
 concerning an imperceptible Being of whofe 
 Faculties, or Manner and Kind of Knowlege, 
 we have not the leaft dired Conception or 
 Idea; becaufe we juftly infer there muft be in 
 him a real Faculty or Perfection correfpoa- 
 dent and anfwerabie to Reafbn in Man : Yet 
 nothing is more evident, than that Rational 
 Soul cannot be lpofcen of an Angel with any 
 itiiSt Propriety of Speech, as it is fpoken of 
 Man ; whofe Mind or Soul is compofed of 
 Body and Spirit; who thinks by a joint O- 
 peration of both together j ajnd whole whole 
 
 Manner; 
 
A N A L b G ¥. 46J 
 
 planner arid Kind bf Kndwlege muft therefore 
 be efientialy dijfferent from that bf a Creaturfc 
 who we iuppofe is all Spirit. Tho' at the feme 
 time, whenever we think or fpeak of lbch 
 Beings, we are under an inevitable Neceffity 
 pf exprefling that imperceptible correfpondent 
 Perfc&ion, by the feme Word which in a li- 
 teral Propriety of Speech is applicable drily id 
 that Kind of Faculty or Manner of Knbwlege 
 whereof we have an internal and immediate 
 Confcioufijeft. Now therefore to iky even of 
 an Angel that he is Intelligent or that he is an 
 Intelkffi is the very fame thing, and carries 
 in it as little ftrict and literal Propriety, ad 
 laying that he is a Rational Soul: Becaule the 
 only direct Conception we can form of a Crea- 
 ture's being Intelligent or an IntdleB, is from 
 that Faculty called the Intellect in our own 
 Soul or Mind. And consequently thofe Terms 
 cannot be #pplyed to an Angel With any lite- 
 ral Truth dr ftrict Propriety. Surely then it 
 is much more certain and manifeft with re- 
 ipect to God, that tho' Intelligent and IntdleB, 
 may and muft be applyed to him as ibme of 
 the apteft Words in human Language, to ex- 
 prefs a Perfe&ion effentialy divine and infi- 
 nite, and therefore not to be directly appre- 
 hended in any Degree,; but correfpondent 
 however and anfwerable to our natural Fa- 
 culty of Reafbn and Thinking : Yet there can 
 be no ftrict and literal Propriety at all in thole 
 Terms when thus borrowed from Man,- and 
 applyed to an infinite Perfection of the divine 
 H h Subftance ; 
 
466 DIVINE 
 
 Subftance ; which cannot be of the farrie Kind 
 with that of any created Spirit. 
 
 t This Author falls foul upon the Tfeudo* 
 Dionyjius, on account of Picus's defending 
 the foregoing Conclufion by his Authority/ 
 as being a Spurious Apocryphal Writer, of 
 a much later Date than the Age of Dion^fius; 
 as .writing in a fihgular Style; with great 
 harShneSs of Language and ExpreffiOns ; and 
 as perfbnating a Saint and Martyr of the A- 
 poftolical Age. But what is all this profufe- 
 neSs and wafte of Learning for ? It is to no 
 Manner of PurpoSe here; for the Doctrine of 
 divine. Analogy doth not ftand in need of our 
 justifying 'him in any of thofe Particulars,' 
 nor . is it , of any Confequence to the Matter 
 in Hand whether he lived in the firft, or thd 
 fourth, or the fixth, or even in the Sixteenth 
 Century. The Doctrine of divine Analogy 
 depends only upon common Reafon, and ex- 
 prels Scripture; which hath laid a firm Foun- 
 dation for it in the firft Creation of Man, and 
 in the conftant Style and Language of Re- 
 velation which is full of it, and unintelligible 
 without it. Let him therefore be as Severe as 
 he pleafes upon the Suppofed Dionyjius; we 
 Adopt none of his Harjh Language, nor Swell-' 
 ing hyperbolical Terms, nor his Enthufiafti- 
 eal Manner of ReaSbning in Defence of them; 
 but adhere to the Received Notions taken- from 
 Holy Scripture and the Light of Nature : Nay 
 more, we religioufly retain the very Words 
 4 and 
 
Analogy. 
 
 and Expreffions of Revelation ■> as well as all 
 thofe Terms which are borrowed from Com-* 
 man Speech or human Literature, and applyed 
 to things divine and fupernatural. None of 
 the Terms or Expreffions cited by me in this 
 Treatile from the Pfeudo-Dionyiius, or from 
 any of the genuine Fathers, are brought for* 
 any farther Parpoie than to fhew that they 
 had a general Notion of divine Analogy, tho* 
 very confuted and imperfect ; that they naturaly 
 fell into the Thing, tho* they did not ufe the 
 Name: And that none of them fet themfelves 
 to purfue and cultivate that Doctrine ;* to ex** 
 plain it fully, and confirm it from Reafbn and 
 Scripture ; to anfwer all the Objections of Meo. 
 againft it, and remove their Prejudices; ana 
 to make a particular Application of it to the 
 feveral erroneous Principles and falfe Hypothec 
 fcs of Infidels ahd Heretics. 
 
 Had the fuppofed Dionyfius or the genu- 
 ine Fathers rightly underftood the Doctrine of 
 divine Analogy ; it would have prevented all 
 that affected Angularity of Style, and all their 
 lofty fwelling Terms, and Enthufiaftieal Rea- 
 lbnings upon them. Had the Fathers clearly 
 apprehended how all thofe Terms when ap- 
 plyed to things fupernatural and divine, toger 
 ther with the Ideas or Conceptions annexed 
 to them, are then truly Analogical j had they 
 diftinguifhed with fome Exactnefs between 
 divine Analogy, and divine Metaphor : Had 
 they' obferved that our being made in the 
 H h a Likenefi 
 
468 DIVINE 
 
 Likenefs and after the Image of God, is the 
 Foundation of all the Knowlege we have of 
 things divine and purely fpiritual; how this 
 is the only Criterion of Truth and Certain- 
 ty with refpe£t to all our Conceptions and 
 Sentiments and Difcourfes concerning them ; 
 and had they been liifficiently apprifed how 
 the whole Sum and Subftance of all our 
 Knowlege of them in this Life is to be re- 
 folved into this Analogy. Had all this I lay 
 been known and thro'ly digefted by the primi- 
 tive Fathers, it would (as this Author ipeaks 
 fey way of Contempt and Irony) Have fur* 
 nifhed them with admirable Weapons againfi the 
 Heretics of their Times, and would have faved 
 a World of Pains : As I now truft it will for- 
 nifti the Orthodox with admirable Weapons 
 againft the Infidels and Heretics of our Days^ 
 who have not only revived the Antient Hetero- 
 dox and Infidel Principles ; but have refined up- 
 on them with much Learning and Artifice, and 
 publiftied them to the World under a more 
 modern and exquifite Difguife. And tho' 
 this Author's fupercilious contemptuous Man- 
 ner of expofing this Dodrine, to return him 
 his own Expreflion, May proceed from a well'' 
 meant Zeal, yet I hope it now abundantly 
 Appears not to be according to Knowlege : And 
 that infiead of reconciling Atheifts to the Truthf 
 it hath a direct Tendency to confirm them in their 
 own Perfuafion. 
 
 Let the Failings of the fuppofed Diony- 
 
 flU3 
 
A N A L O G Y. 469 
 
 fius be what they will, he ought to have Ju- 
 ftice done him ; and it fhould have been own- 
 ed that in the Treatifes quoted by this Author, 
 he was ever accounted Orthodox from their 
 firft Appearance in the World. Which he 
 never would have been, if thofe uncommon 
 Terms and Expreffions of his were underftood 
 by others, in that very Angular and harfh Man- 
 ner wherein he hath tranflated them; or if 
 there had been any Herefy or Profanefs in the 
 main Scope and Defign of them. Which was 
 to fhew, in direct Oppofition to this Author, 
 that all the real Attributes or Perfections of 
 the Divinity are utterly inconceivable in every 
 Degree as they are in themfelves : And of a 
 Kind Co infinitely different from any Attri- 
 butes natural and human, that they are alto- 
 gether inexpreffible with any ftrift and literal 
 Propriety of human Language. His Negative 
 and Hyperbolical Manner of expreffing this 
 well grounded Notion, he illuftrates by Givi 
 ing the Name of Darknejs to Light inaccejfible, 
 Becaufe if the Light is inacceffible and imper-r 
 ceptible As it is in it filf\ if it be that Which 
 no Man hath Jeen or can fie ; and a Light where- 
 of we cannot have the leaft dired Glimple ; 
 then it is in this Refpeft as Darknefs to us, 
 and we can obtain no Conception of it other- 
 wife than by Analogy with the Light we do 
 fee. Thus when he fays God is 'xt\^ TreLa-av 
 evtrlav k»i £w*jv his Meaning is not as this Author 
 reprefents it, that he hath No Effince or Life 
 a$ all i or that he has not as Real an Efftnc-ezh 
 H h 3 that 
 
47© D IVINE 
 
 that which is human ; and as True and ASfudl 
 a Life as that which refults from the Union 
 of Spirit and Body, and depends on the Cirr 
 culation of Blood: But that he is above all 
 Kind of EfTence and Life Diretfly conceivable 
 by us. So again; when he affirms God to be 
 . c T5s-gjj yrairav <ro<pia,v xeu <rvv&riv, he doth not mean 
 as this Author would interpret him, that there 
 is no fuch thing as Underftandjrig and Know- 
 legq in God: But that he doth not know or 
 Hnderftand after ; the Manney of .Men , " by 
 thinking Which is performed thro' the necefTa* 
 ry Concurrence > of the fineft of our bodily 
 Parts and animal Spirits; and that therefore 
 the Terms Kwvolege and Underfianding cannot 
 have any literal and formal Propriety in them 
 when; they are applyed to thole correfpondenf 
 div.ine Perfedions^. . ;' ... ' 
 
 Again, tifeWifdom of God he defcribes 
 
 to be "S^v kKoyov, %cu ctvav, xeti fiupetv trotyictv, all 
 which' this Author hath falfly rendered into 
 •J^onfenicerf and flat Contradiction thus ; An 
 unreafbnabky -^unintelligent,, and foojifb Wifdoni. 
 N.o, the rendring is trijly thus; A Wifdom 
 without ;Reafin, that is, without the rational 
 difcurlive Facility proper only to human Nar 
 ture ; Without, a,. .Mind, which is effentialy 
 compounded of Spirit and Matter: And in 
 the words h&i^ <ro$U hp certainly alludes t{> 
 that Expreffipn of the 4;poftle, JfpeFooliJhnefs of 
 Clod, -which Is wijer than Men, He is again 
 cited and condemned by this Author ^s faying 
 .l'x', '" ~ - :: U ' tba,t 
 
ANALOGY. 47 1 
 
 that God is 'xTregs-opas and 'r^e^s; and the 
 unfair Remark made upon it is, As if Wif- 
 dom and Life were Words not worthy to ex- 
 prejs* the divine Perfections. Noj this was far 
 from the Intention of that towring Genius^ 
 who knew them to be the beft Words we 
 have in human Language to expreft thofe di-* 
 vine and incomprehenfible Perfections which 
 are otherwife inexpreffible ; and therefore 
 Words moft Worthy of God. What Diony-* 
 fius means that the terms Wifdom and Life., 
 together with the Conceptions annexed to them, 
 are altogether unworthy of him in the Sence 
 of this Author; who imagines they muft Li- 
 ter dy and Formaly and Properly fignify Perfec- 
 tions or Attributes the very fame in Kind 
 both in God and Man : This is what he ab' 
 hored; and what will be the Abhorrence of 
 all good Men, when the Doctrine lb grievouf- 
 Jy mifreprefented by this Author comes to be 
 rightly underftood and thro'ly digefted, 
 
 , To ward againft all fuch grofs Miftakes 
 and Mifreprefentations of his Principles ; and 
 in Juftification of thofe lofty Expreffions of 
 his, and of his many negative and hyperboli- 
 cal Terms ; he lays down this juft and clear 
 Diftinction. That they are not to be afcribed 
 to the Divinity kclt sAAet^w By wayofDefeH-, 
 as if there were in God a Want of any of thofe 
 Perfe&ions denoted by the Words commonly 
 apply ed to Him for Attributes. Not by way 
 of denying the Reality of , thofe Effential M- 
 ■ Eth ^ tributes 
 
472 DIVINE 
 
 tributes of the Divinity which we conceive by 
 Analogy with the Faculties and Properties and 
 Qualities of our own Mind, and exprefe in 
 Terms ljteraly and properly applyed only to, 
 thefe lafi. But Ku9' umpwiv By way of Ex* 
 cellency y and of removing from the intrinfic 
 Nature qf God all Kinds as well as 'Degrees of 
 Created Perfe&ion; and to fhew that the 
 Terms, by which the divine Attributes are 
 commonly expreffed^ do fignify real Perfections 
 Correspondent and Similar only to thofe that 
 are natural 5 but utterlyjnconceivable in every 
 Pegree as they are in themfelve$, and inexT 
 preflible lifcewile wjth any literal Propriety of 
 human Language. And he accordingly ap- 
 plyeth the common Attributes to God in that 
 Acceptation, with the lame Freedom that 
 other Men do; And affirms over and over, 
 as this Author acknpwlegeth, that God knows 
 all things. Whereas the fliort Turn given to 
 this Eliftin&ion and the Application of it by 
 him is, that it was in order to fliew how The 
 Attributes Unintelligent ^Umper- 
 peiying are afcribed to God j when there, 
 are no fuch Attributes of God mentioned in 
 jDionyfius, without a wrefted and perverlq 
 Tranflafion of his Words; and when no fuch 
 Attributes were ever heard of in the World 
 before this Author. From hence he takes Oc- 
 cafion to fay that The Schoolmen rejeded or 
 foftened his harfh ExfjreJfiotos\ and explained away 
 his "Dottrine. But the Reader is now an Eye- 
 witnefs that the very Scbsolinen quoted by him- 
 
 felf 
 
ANALOGY. 473 
 
 felf have explained the Do&rine of Dionyfius 
 fully; and defended it ftrenuoufly, in diredt 
 Oppofition to this Author's erroneous Notion 
 of Analogy; That we conceive God and his 
 Attributes by having in our felves Properties 
 pr Qualities the iame in Kind with the divine 
 Perfe&ions, but in a low Degree. Whereas 
 had they miftaken him as grofly as this Au- 
 thor hath done; and had they apprehended 
 his Meaning to be according to this Author's 
 harm Tranflations of him ; they had efteemed 
 him not merely Heterodox and Heretical-, buf 
 an open Infidel, Atheift, and Blafphemer. 
 
 A n o t h e r of the Schoolmen cited by this 
 Author is Snares, whofe own Words are thefe 
 Hac tria, Scientia, Voluntas, et Potentia, pe- 
 culiar i wodo concipiuntur a nobis; tanquam 
 Facilitates vel Operationes ipfius Dei -, per A- 
 nalogiam ad res creatas. We conceive the di- 
 vine Knowlege, and Will, and Power after a 
 peculiar Manner \ as if they were fo many Fa- 
 culties in God, or fo many Operations of thofe 
 Faculties-, by Analogy only with the Faculties 
 and Operations of the Creature. For, fays he, 
 by Knowlege in particular when attributed to 
 God, We do not under (land a Quality, or Ha- 
 bit , or even an AH fubfequent to a Power of 
 aping, or any difiurfive Knowlege -, no nor any 
 thing like thefe which include Imperfection : 
 As indeed the moft exalted human Perfecti- 
 on doth in refpecl: of God ; it being as he terms 
 it Material, or the natural Refult of Matter 
 
 4 " . m 
 
474- DIVINE 
 
 as well as Spirit. That is, he doth not un» 
 dcrftand any fuch Knowlege as is in Man, in 
 any Degree ; but a Perfe&ion infinitely diffe* 
 rent in Kind. In this Sence, fays he, they un- 
 derftand the Attribute Knowlege who affirm it 
 Nen ejje proprie in Deo, and it is for thefe 
 Reafons Men Formaliter et proprie Scientiam 
 in Deo ejfe negarunt. And from hence he pro* 
 ceeds to obferve with juft Indignation the un? 
 reafonablenefs of thole who, in the Strain of 
 this Author, charge fuch Men with imagining 
 (Jofl to be Prorfus ftolidum et Infcium, that is 
 Unintelligent and Unperceiving j the very blaf; 
 phemous Attributes this Author would have 
 fixed upon Dionyfius. ' In Senfu expojito, fays 
 Suares, According to the foregoing explanati* 
 on, it is evident even to , the Light of Nature 
 'That there is Knowlege in God ; not iuch as 
 is in Man, but an incomprehensible Per- 
 fection Analogous to it : Which he iuppoleth 
 to be infinitely different in Kind from that 
 which is human ; and imagines it to be the 
 very divine Sub/lance it ielf, or Intellectual 
 Life of God. This is Suares his true and real 
 Opinion, and why did not this Author fet 
 himfelf to refute it; who calls it A denying of 
 God, and his Being, and Attributes ; which 
 leaves him. nothing but an empty Name ; and 
 which undermines all Religion natural and re-, 
 vealed ? 
 
 Suares indeed runs into this miftaken No- 
 tion with many others ; that thofe Imperfeftir 
 
 pns 
 
ANALOGY. 475 
 
 oris of the Creature and of the Mind of Man 
 in particular, which are to be removed from 
 the divine Knowlege, do not belong AdRatio- 
 nem jormalem Scientia 5 and therefore that in 
 afcribing that Term to God he takes it. Ah* 
 JlraSiiffiwe, et prafcindendo a creata et increa- 
 ta fcientia. But Knowlege is an unintellir 
 •gible Thing, or rather Nothing at all, when 
 it is abftracied from every particular Kind of 
 Knowlege belonging to each diftincr. Rank 
 and Sort of Beings j from the Knowlege of 
 Cod, and Angels, and Men. The Ratio forma- 
 lis of Knowlege Abflra&ed from All thefe, can 
 have no,other real or intelligible Meaning ex- 
 cept (in plain Language) the taking the word 
 Knowlege In the General: That is, the fuiting 
 our felves to the Weaknefs of our Underftand- 
 ingj in conceiving and expreffing different but 
 correfpbndeht Obje&s. and Attributes by the 
 Help of the fame Conceptions and Terms. But 
 when you have firft taken Knowlege thus jn 
 the General, and afterwards come to make a 
 particular Application of it to each Sort of 
 Beings; it Will then import a, different Ratio 
 formalis as you apply it to God, or to Angels, 
 Or Men ; that is, it will neceffarily fignify a 
 peculiar Perfe&ion or Property in God efpe- 
 cialy, of a Kind infinitely different from any 
 .created Faculty or human Perfection. 
 
 This Author takes occafion from : hence 
 to fay, That it was indeed a current Opinion 
 in the Schools, that even fieing or E,xiflence it 
 
476 D I V I N E 
 
 felfj Jhould be attributed Amlogicaly to God 
 and the Creatures. But liirely not according 
 to His Angular Notion of Analogy between 
 things the very fame in Kind, and differing 
 only in Degree; To that a lower Degree of 
 Exiflence fhould be Analogous to a higher. 
 Degree. No 5 but as he himfelf is obliged to 
 own, That they fuppofed not God to exifi in the 
 SameSence with created Beings ■, not that he 
 exifis lefs realy and truly than they ; and he adds 
 Jefs properly and formaly than they. But to Ex- 
 ifi properly and formaly is a Phrafe of his own 
 here, and not of the Schoolmen ; who bold that 
 tho' God doth exift Realy and Truly, yet the 
 term Exifience is not to be applyed to him in 
 the fame Proper and Formal Sencc in which 
 it is applyed to Man. The Ratio formalis of 
 any thing in the Sence of the Schools is, what 
 is lb peculiarly effential to it. as fuch, that 
 thereby only it becomes What it is, and diffe- 
 rent from all other Kinds of things whatfo-? 
 ever : And accordingly when a Word is applyT 
 ed to any thing fo as to include and fignify 
 that intrinfic, peculiar, diftinguifhing Effence 
 or Property of it j it is faid to be applyed in a 
 Formal Sence , and in its ftri£t and Literal 
 Propriety. Thus it is they iky Exifience' is ap- 
 plyed to God in a Sence aftualy True and 
 Real, but not Formaly and Properly and Li- 
 teraly as it is applyed to Man ; of whofe Ex- 
 ifience and the Manner of it we have a direct 
 and immediate Conception. This is what our 
 Author fhould have confuted } and not have 
 
 blended, 
 
ANALOGY. 477 
 
 blended his abfurd Notion together with it iri 
 one Sentence, by flipping into it two Words 
 of his own utterly deftru&ive of the School- 
 men's real Meaning, Till he does confute it, 
 it muft be a current Opinion among all Men. 
 For furely we are as far from any dired Idea 
 or Conception of the True divine Exiflence, as 
 we are of the divine Sub/lance ; or at leaft as 
 we are of thole Real mtrtnjic divine Attributes 
 which exift: And conlequently we can have 
 no other way of conceiving the Manner of 
 God's Exiftence, than by Analogy with our 
 own and that of other Men whereof we have 
 an immediate Perception and Confcioufnefs ; 
 nor any other way of expreffing it than by a 
 Word borrowed from thence. And tho' no- 
 thing is more true than that God doth not 
 Exift in the Same Sence with created Beings; 
 Or that he hath not the lame Kind or Manner of 
 Exiftence, but a Kind and Manner infinitely 
 different from them all 5 yet we can affirm that " 
 God is or Exifis, with as much Truth and 
 Reality as that we our felves exift. 
 
 The laft of his Schoolmen is Cajetan, from 
 Whom the «nly material thing obferved is this. 
 Knowiege, fays our Author, may be attributed 
 to God in the proper and formal Meaning of the 
 Wordt For as we fay that God is infinitely 
 above Man, fo is the Knoivlege of God infinitely 
 above the Knowlege of Man 5 this, lays he, is 
 what Cajetan calls Analogia proprie faff a, A 
 fropef Analogy as he wrongly tranflates it. 
 
 But 
 
478 D I V I N £ 
 
 But word the Sentence right, and you will 
 do Juftice both to Truth; and to Cajetan,; 
 We fay, that as the Nature of God is infinite- 
 ly above the Nature of Man ; ib is the Nature 
 or Kind of his Knowlege infinitely above the 
 jNature or Kind of Knowlege in Man} and 
 confequently no Proportion of Degrees only> 
 can be fignifyed by that Term when, attribut- 
 ed to God: So that it cannot be attributed 
 to him in the "Proper, ox Formal, or Literal 
 Sence of the Word ; but by that Analogy only 
 which is founded on fuch a real Correipondency 
 and Similitude as may be between two things 
 different in Nature or Kind. This is Andogia 
 proprie faffa^ Analogy properly formed, ox What 
 is properly Analogy; and not Analogia propria j 
 the fhort and miftaken Turn given to the 
 Words of Cajetan in this Author's Tranflation 
 of them. 
 
 I Here appeal to the Reader whether, as 
 Our Author confeffeth this to have been His 
 firjl Fault in xnedling with the Schoolmen ; he 
 is not bound in Confcience to keep His Pro- 
 mife y that it Jhall be the lafl of the Kindt To 
 induce him to be as good as his Word, I fhall 
 obferve to him ; that Men of Sence in the 
 prefent Age are already furfeited of Treatifes 
 full of Curtailed f Perverted, Mijlranflatedi Mif> 
 applyed y and Impertinent Quotations: And be- 
 gin to naufeate them, as temperate ibber Men 
 do the Difhes that are ferved up with a very 
 little fubftantial Food j but fluffed with Force- 
 
 meatS; 
 
ANALOGY. 4.79 
 
 meats, and brimful of unwholefbm- and per-* 
 hicious Sauces. Nothing is more void of real 
 Improvement and Inftruction to the Mind, 
 and more fulfbm, than Heaps of Quotations, 
 and tedious Difquifitions what Opinions fuch 
 and liich Men were of, in relation to Mat- 
 ters properly determinable only by right Rea- 
 son and Scripture ; and Inquiries how far they 
 at firft maintained thole Opinions, or how far 
 they receded from them afterwards. Where- 
 as the ftatirig any ofthbfe Opinions of Impor- 
 tance diftin&ly and fairly; explaining them 
 clearly and fully ; and producing the beft Rea- 
 ibns and Arguments for or againft them either 
 from our fel ves or others, with that Brevity 
 And Perlpicuity which may lave Men the 
 irkfbm Trouble of frequently raking over a 
 large Dunghill before they find one Jemj 
 would be of real Service to Mankind in general, 
 as well as to the more Polite Part of them in 
 particular. 
 
 T h o* all his Authorities from the School- 
 men have proved lb exprefly againft him, I lay 
 no ftrefs upon them beyond the clearnefs of 
 their Diftinctions and their Explanations of 
 the Ground of them ; and the Strength of the 
 Realbns they offer for them ; of all which o- 
 ther Men have a Right to Judge as well as 
 they. But, fays he, however pofitive they are 
 in their Affertions and Conclufions, They ex- 
 plain them away till there is but a mere ■ver- 
 bal Difference, between Them, and His direcTy 
 v ...; ly 
 
D L V I N £ 
 
 ly oppofite Notion of Analogy. Suppofe this 
 were true ; it requires no other Anfwer than 
 that it ill became thofe great Names to aflert 
 one thing firftj and then be at much Trouble 
 to fliew that they mean the quite contrary : 
 To be fo Contradictory to themfelves as to 
 affirm, That the Terms when applyed to ex- 
 prels things divine and fupernatural and the' 
 Attributes of God in particular, arc to be un« 
 derftood Analogic dy ; and yet that they are 
 however to be then underftood in their Pro* 
 per and Formal and Literal Acceptation. Aft 
 ter their firft plain and open Declaration of lb 
 great and fundamental a Truth ; what if they 
 had been feared out of it again, by fuch a con- 
 fufed Clamour as is now railed againft it in 
 the World j by a Rote of hard Words and in- 
 vidious Expreffions, officioufly bellowed our, 
 againft it from among the Crowd of its Op- 
 pofers ? Muft we adhere to that Opinion of 
 their's which was owing to the innate Ener- 
 gy and irrefiftable Force of Truth: Or to 
 fuch of their Explanations as are but £o many 
 Diiguifes, and Palliations, and Concealments 
 Of it; and which amount to nothing more 
 than the refolving it into the quite oppofite 
 Falfity ? But after all, they were fo far from' 
 being inconfiftent with themfelves, by explain- 
 ing it away, that all their Explanations and 
 Diftin&ions are €o many Illuftrations and 
 Confirmations of it, in direct Oppofition to the 
 Opinion of this Author. And to thofe who 
 objected in his dogmatical Style, That this 
 
 was 
 
ANALOGY. 4 8r 
 
 was Denying the Exiftence of God and his At* 
 tributes-, leaving him Nothing but a Nanie\ 
 that no Man of their Opinion -could Believe 
 a God, or have anj^Jtetigion natural or reveal' 
 ed; .the Subftance of all their Anfwers is, 
 That the Being of God and his Attributes 
 are never the left Real and True In them- 
 felves, or Ufeful to us, for their being no other- 
 wife conceivable than by Analogy : And there- 
 fore that they did not thereby deprive God' of 
 his Exiftence or Kndwlege or any of his other 
 Attributes, by holding them to be Real Per- 
 fections inconceivable by us as they Are in 
 themfelves. And that thofe Men .by plain Im- 
 plication deny the Attributes of God, who pCN- 
 fitively aflert that they cannot be either true 
 and real, or ulefully conceived, Unlets they are 
 of the lame Kind, with the like Faculties and 
 Properties and Qualities in us ; and unlels the 
 Words which are common to both of them 
 are underftood equaly in the very lame Proper 
 ahdFormal and Literal Acceptation. 
 
 I Shall here leave the Header to his A* 
 ftoniihment at what this Author could mean 
 by his Quotations from the Schoolmen who 
 are fb clearly and diftin&ly, lb fully and pofi- 
 tively againft him: And (hall pals on to his 
 Mi and grand Obje&ion, That according to 
 our Notion of divine Analogy, Every Syllo- 
 gifm brought to prove the Being or Attributes 
 of God, . mil: be found to confifi of four Ternts t 
 and confequently can conclude Nothing. Now 
 
 I i this 
 
482 DIVINE 
 
 this is no more than a bold and groundlefs Af- 
 fertion ; and to have rendered it an Argument 
 he mould have framed fbme Syllogifm relating 
 to the Being or Attributes of God, and have 
 fliewn how upon our Notion of Analogy it 
 muft neceflarily have four Terms in it. This 
 he was cautious enough to avoid ; and there 
 was' more Reafbn for this Omiffion than a cur- 
 fory Reader can be aware of : For any one In- 
 ftance whatever upon that Foot would have 
 overturned his whole Scheme, and all that he 
 hath wrote upon this Subject would have gone 
 for nothing. But I will lupply this grievous 
 and in Appearance wilful Omiffion, and per- 
 form it for him. Take then this Argument 
 for the Exiftence of God or an eternal Being, 
 in the Syllogiftic Form. 
 
 I f no Being could make it felf ; then there 
 muft have been an eternal Being. 
 
 B ut no Being could make it felf There- 
 fore 
 
 The Objeftion here is, that upon my Scheme 
 of Analogy there muft be four Terms in this 
 Syllogifm. But how can this ever appear ? 
 For the term Being is taken in the fame pre- 
 cipe General Acceptation both in the Antece- 
 dent of the Major, and the Minor j as includ- 
 ing all Kinds of Beings whatever, and how- 
 ever different among themfelves. The Term 
 Make it felf thro'out the Syllogifm is taken 
 
 Generaly, 
 
ANALOGY. 483 
 
 Generaly, for making it felf after Any Manner. 
 But here perhaps he will ftill urge* that ac- 
 cording to my Doctrine the term Being in the 
 Antecedent means Beings different irt Kind, 
 from that mentioned in the Gonfequence. Nd.j 
 Being in the Antecedent is taken as Inclufive. 
 of All Beings, and confequently of that "Par- 
 ticular Being mentioned in the Confequence ; . 
 and not in ContradiflinStion from it : So that if 
 no Kind of Being whatever could Make it felf 
 after Any Manner ' r then Some Being muft have 
 been Eternal. Whether that eternal Being is 
 the fame or different in Kind from all others,, 
 is another Queftion depending on other Pre- 
 miffes ; and the Point here is only, Whether 
 there muft have been an Eternal Being? How*, 
 ever different This Being is from others, whe- , 
 therin Degree only or in Kind, it does not in 7. 
 the leaft affect the Argument as to Matter or 
 Form.' For tho' it be certain that He differs in- 
 tirely in Kind, and that we have no Notion 
 qf his Being and Exigence, or Nature, or At- 
 tributes , , or particularly of his Eternity and 
 Power of Caufirig,' but what is Analogical: 
 Yet Whatever Conceptions we form of any of 
 thefe, and after Whatever Manner we obtain 
 thofe Conceptions ; this is quite foreign to the 
 Argument, which has no Dependence on it. 
 So that turn it which way you pleafe, there 
 is no ground for afferting there are four Terms 
 in the Syllogifm; tho'. it be allowed that an 
 Eternal Being or Caufe differs totaly in Kind 
 from all Created Beings and Caufes. 
 
 Ii 2 But 
 
484 DIVINE 
 
 B u t to come clofer to the ftreft of his Ob- 
 jedtion, let us take a Syllogifm proving A Po- 
 Jleriori that there is Knowlege in God. Now 
 this cannot be done at all without firft allow- 
 ing Knowlege to be a (DireElly conceivable Per- 
 fection in an human Mind ; for otherwife we 
 fhould have No Manner of Conception or Idea 
 of it at all, or even have known that there 
 was fuch a Perfection. Which by the Way is 
 the Cafe of all the other natural and moral 
 Perfections which we attribute to God, for the 
 fame Realbn we do our Knowlege ; becaufe all 
 his Attributes are equaly inconceivable, as they 
 are in themfelves, with his intrinfic EfTence 
 or Subftance ; and the Order and Manner of 
 our proceeding to a Proof of them is like wife 
 the fame: From a directly conceivable Per- 
 fection in our own Mind, we infer (not that 
 there is a Perfection of the Same Kind in God j 
 but only) that there muft be fome Perfection 
 in him Correfpottdent and Similar to that which 
 we have in our felves. Now fince Knowlege 
 is our Author's Inftance, take the Proof of 
 its being an Attribute in God, thus. 
 
 I f Knowlege is a Perfection in an Human 
 Mind; theathwe muft be Knowlege in God. 
 
 But Knowlege is a Perfection in an hu- 
 man Mind. Therefore 
 
 Upon our Notion^of Analogy, this Author 
 
 objects 
 
A 1ST A L O G Y. 485 
 
 obje&s that there are four Terms in this Syl- 
 logifin; becaufe the term Knowlege in the 
 Confequence of the Major, muft thus exprefs 
 fomething of a quite different Kind from what 
 it fignifies in the Antecedent and Minor : Or, 
 which is the lame thing, it fignifies one Kind 
 •of Knowlege in the Minor, and another Kind 
 of Knowlege in the Conclufion; whereas it 
 ought to mean ftri&ly and properly and for- 
 maly fomething of the very fame Kind in both : 
 otherwife there are four Terms and nothing is 
 concluded. To which I anfwer, by granting 
 that the term Knowlege in the > Confequence of 
 the Major and in the Conclufion doth fignify 
 fomething of a different, nay infinitely dif- 
 ferent Kind from what it fignifies in the An- 
 tecedent and in the Minor j and that however 
 there are not four Terms: I?ecaufe there are 
 not two Different Ideas or Conceptions annexed 
 to that Term in thofe different Places; but 
 one and the Same Idea or Conception necefia- 
 rily ftands in the Mind for both , the Divine 
 and Human Knowlege-, ib that the Idea or 
 "Conception affixed to that Term is exaftly and 
 Precifely the very Same thro' the whole Syllo- 
 gifm. There is this Difference in the Ufe of it 
 only (which is unavoidable in all Syllogifrris 
 relating to things divine and fupernatural) that 
 the Idea or Conception annexed to that Terrft 
 in the Antecedent and Minor, ftands Immedi~ 
 ately for a well known and DireBly percepti- 
 ble Property in Man : But in the Confequence 
 of the Major and in the Conekfioh, that very 
 Ii 3 fame 
 
486 DIVINE 
 
 fame Conception is fubftituted as a Mediate and 
 Analogical Reprefentative of a Comfpondent Per- 
 fection in the Divinity, otherwife utterly in- 
 conceivable to us. 
 
 Were it poffible for the Mind of Man to 
 obtain two Different Ideas or Conceptions di- 
 rectly from the two Different Kinds of Know- 
 lege in God and Man j or, in other Words, 
 to affix two different Conceptions to the term 
 Knowlege in the different Parts of that Syllo- 
 gifm, there would be four Terms in it, and it 
 would conclude Equivocaly: But fince we 
 can obtain no other Conception for that Sort 
 of Knowlege which is in God than what we 
 have for our own, both the Term and the 
 Conception remain unalterably the famej and 
 they differ from* themlelves no otherwife than 
 as in one Part of the Syllogifm they are Li- 
 teraly and Directly applyed to a Property in 
 Man, and in another Part Analogical? to an 
 Attribute in God. And this is done not out 
 of Choice, but Neceffity; in order to exprefs 
 and conceive a divine and otherwife incompre- 
 hensible Perfection anfwerable to our Know- 
 lege, but infinitely tranfeending it ; not in De- 
 gree only according to this Author's Notion, 
 which would leave no room for what is truly 
 and properly Analogy: But in Kind, which 
 is the real Foundation of that Analogy, and 
 what 'renders it absolutely neceflary to Any 
 Manner of Conception or Apprehenfion of 
 things infinite and divine. Thus then as the 
 
 word 
 
ANALOGY. 487 
 
 word Knowlege, and the Conception annexed 
 to it, are the very fame in all Parts of the 
 Syllogifm ; and ftand for real Perfections both 
 in Man and God, One of which is necejfarily 
 m Analogous Reprefentative of the .' other, there 
 are ftill but' three Terms: All Equivocation 
 and Fallacy is removed, and the Argument is 
 clear and determinate} If there is Human 
 Knowlege in us, there muft be Divine Know- 
 lege in God ; or, If there be fuch a Perfection 
 as Knowlege in the Creature, there muft be 
 Some Kind of Perfection Correspondent and Si- 
 milar to that" Knowlege in the Creator; which 
 is all that is poffible to be proved juftly, and 
 confidently with other plain Truths, by this 
 pr any other Argument to the fame Purpofe.* 
 Becaule, whether this Perfection in God be of 
 the lame Kind with our's called by the fame 
 Name, is an independent Queftion ; and be- 
 cauie by other Arguments we can prove irre- 
 fragably, that every Intrinfic Faculty and At- 
 tribute muft be of a different Kind in God and 
 Man. And thus it is in all Arguments A 
 Vojtmori, infering any Attribute in God from 
 an Attribute in human Nature. The Term ex- 
 prelfive of fuch an Attribute muft, in different 
 Parts of the Syllogifm, unavoidably fignify 
 two things different in Kind, and yet this does 
 not. make four Terms in it, becaufe we can- 
 not polBbly form two different Conceptions 
 of thole two things. Which does not proceed 
 from their being of the Same Kinds but on the 
 quite Contrary from hence , That One of them 
 
 Ii 4 is 
 
488 DIVINE 
 
 is totaly Different in Kind from the other; 
 and consequently inconceivable to us as it is in 
 it felf, or after any Manner but by fubftituting 
 the Other (or rather our DireiJ Conception of 
 the other, obtained immediately from its pro- 
 per Object) as an Analogical Reprefentatiye 
 of it. 
 
 B u t in this Author's abfurd Meaning, and 
 agreeably to his jnconfiftent Notion of an Ana- 
 logy founded only on different Degrees of 
 Attributes altogether the lame in Kind, which 
 is no Analogy at all, the Syllogifjn muft mean 
 thus ; If Knowlege is a Perfection in an human 
 Mind, then there muft be the Same Kind of 
 Knowlege in God in a higher Degree : Which 
 is more than can poffibly be infered by any 
 Argument whatever ; becaufe it has been prov- 
 ed that the Conclufion is an ablblute Falfity, 
 and the whole Syllogifm would thus amount 
 to no more than this Abfurdity, If there is hu- 
 man Knowlege in us ; there muft be the fame 
 Kind of human Knowlege in Gpd 7 in. an infi- 
 nitely greater Degree. Whereas in our true No- 
 tion of Analogy this Conlequence is good, 
 and intirely confident with all Other Truths ; 
 If there is human Knowlege in Man, there 
 muft be divine ' Knowlege in God ; that is, 
 there muft be a' different Kind of Perfection 
 in his Nature, correfpondent and fimilar to 
 human Knowlege in us. 
 
 To explain, this fully arid glaringly, take a 
 "i" parallel 
 
ANALO G Y. 489 
 
 parallel Inftance. We have an immediate and 
 dired -Idea or Conception of that Life which 
 is in our felves; and if one were to prove that 
 there is Life in God, he would do it thus : If 
 Life is a Perfection in human Nature; then 
 there muft be Life in the divine Nature, and. 
 lb on. Now in his abfurd way of proceeding 
 the Confequence muft mean, Then there muft 
 be the Same . Kind of Life in the divine Nature 
 in an infinite Degree. But becaufe we can 
 evidently prove that there is no fuch Kind of 
 Life in God as confifts in an Union of Spirit and 
 Bodj!, or in Breathing and the Circulation of 
 the Blood and Animal Spirits-, and that infi- 
 nite and finite Degrees of the fame Kind of 
 Perfection, is Nonfence : Our Meaning in the 
 Confequence, and which renders it agreeable 
 to other plain Truths, is That then there muft 
 be a Perfection in the divine Nature Analo- 
 gous to human Life, but of a Different Kind. 
 And yet no Man can fay there are four Terms 
 in the Syllogifm thus underftood; becaule we 
 cannot affix one Idea or Conception to, the 
 Life of Man, and another different Conception 
 to the Life of God ; but we muft unavoid- 
 ably and neceffarily make the very fame Idea 
 or Conception ftand for both : Immediately for 
 that Kind of Life which is in Man, whereof 
 it is a Direct Conception ; and Mediately or 
 by, way of Analogical Reprefentation for that 
 Kind of JL,ife which is in God, whereof we 
 can have No direct Conception at all in any 
 Degree, nor any Notion as it is In its felf or 
 In its own Kind. If 
 
496 DIVINE 
 
 I f Men proceed upon what is truly and 
 properly Analogy ', namely that which is found- 
 ed on a real Similitude and Correfpondency 
 between two things differing not in Degree 
 only, but in Kind: The foregoing Syllogifm 
 concludes regularly in due Form; and with 
 the utmoft Certainty, for a real Perfection 
 in the divine Nature correfpondent to that 
 Knowlege in us which confifts in Thinking; 
 tho' of a Kind as different from it, as an 
 eternal infinite Creator and pure Spirit, can 
 poffibly differ from a created finite Nature 
 compounded of Body and Spirit. But accord- 
 ing to this Author, and to all thofe who pro- 
 ceed upon a miftaken Analogy founded on a 
 Likenefi between things of the fame Kind and 
 differing only in Degree; fuch as may be con- 
 ceived between the Light of the Sun and 
 that of a Star ; or between Knowlege in one 
 Man and Knowlege in another j or to fpeak 
 the Abfurdity plainer, on a Similitude only 
 between two things which are Not alike only, 
 but the very Same in Kind: According to thefe 
 I fay, no Syllogifm can be formed for the 
 Proof of God's Knowlege or any of his other 
 Attributes, but what will infer more in the 
 Conclufion than was either exprefled or could 
 be Truly implyed and intended in the Pre- 
 mises; namely, that in every Inftance they 
 muft be of the fame Kind in the divine and 
 human Natures. Whereas this is a diftind and 
 Very different Point, requiring a diftind and 
 2 different 
 
ANALOGY. 491 
 
 different Proof, which we muft expect from 
 this Author : And when he hath anfwered 
 weat I have elfewhere offered againft that 
 wild prefumptuous Notion, it will be time 
 enough to believe as he doth ; That the di- 
 vine Knowlege is truly and properly and for- 
 maly the fame with the Human j and that our 
 human Knowlege is truly and properly and 
 formaly the lame with the Divine. 
 
 But lay they, we found our Analogy on 
 that Similitude and Correfpondency there is, 
 not between different Finite Degrees of two 
 Perfections the lame in Kind ; but between Fir- 
 nite and Infinite Degrees of the fame Kind of 
 Perfections in God and Man. Then lay I, to 
 avoid one falfe Notion of Analogy, they run 
 into another which is grols Abfurdity and ma- 
 nifeft Contradiction : For tho' there may be a 
 Difference of Indefinite Degrees between two Fi- 
 nite things of the fame Kind ; yet there is ex- 
 prefs Contradiction in the words Infinite Degrees, 
 or Infinite in Degree. According to the only 
 Conception we have of Infinity, it is in its ve- 
 ry Notion and Nature utterly exclufive of all 
 Degrees, of More ox Lefs ; fo that if any At- 
 tribute of God be realy Infinite^ it can never 
 be a tranfcendent Degree of any Kind of thing 
 whatever that is Finite, becaufe nothing Fi- 
 nite ever fo often added or repeated would ever 
 make up an Infinite. Infinity added to the Con- 
 ceptions of our own Perfections, when tranfc 
 fered or attributed to God, neeeflarily alters 
 
 the 
 
492 DIVINE 
 
 the very Nature of them even in our way of 
 Thinking; and renders them totaly different 
 in Kind from any thing finite and created: 
 Much more then from what is purely human ; 
 and confequently doth as neceffarily exclude 
 all Analogy between them, founded on De- 
 grees only of the lame Kind. Tho' there may 
 be a Similitude and Correfpondency between 
 things Finite and Infinite, for which we have 
 the Word of God himfelf in the Hiftory of 
 our Creation ; yet that Knowlege for Inftance 
 in God fhould be the higheft Degree only of 
 that Kind which is finite and purely human ; 
 and that there fhould be an Analogy between 
 them not built on a Similitude only, but on an 
 Identity of Nature or Kind; is an Opinion 
 without the leaft Foundation either in Revela- 
 tion or in common Sence and Reafbn. 
 
 IShall give a third Inftance of a Syllo- 
 gifm relating to the Myfteries of Chriftianity ; 
 and to the divine pre exiftent Nature of Chrift 
 in particular. 
 
 If Chrift is truly the only-begotten Son of 
 God ; then he muft be of the fame intire Ef- 
 ience or Subftance with his Father. 
 
 But Chrift is truly the only-begotten Son 
 of God. Therefore 
 
 Here as the term Only-begotten cannot be 
 underftood in the literal a ! nd proper, but in the 
 
 Analogical 
 
ANALOGY. 493 
 
 Analogical Sence only ; and the Signification 
 of it is thus limited to lbmething fupernatu- 
 ral, and altogether incomprehenfible otherwils 
 than by Analogy with an only-begotten hu- 
 man Son j it is ftill but one Term with the 
 Same Analogical Conception and determinate 
 Signification affixed to it thro'out the whole 
 Syllogifm : And can admit of no Equivocation 
 any farther than the divine Generation is pur- 
 pofely confounded, and fuppofed the lame in 
 Kind with that which is natural ; which can- 
 not convey to us a Conception of any thing 
 real and true on the Part of the Divinity, o- 
 therwife than by Analogy only. Thus it is 
 like wile with the term E (fence or Subftance. 
 As the Word is particularly transfered from 
 Earth to Heaven, from Man to God, and 
 from our own Effence or Subftance to that 
 Which is divine; and as it Includes that which 
 is Natural and Human, no otherwife than as 
 an Analogical Reprefentation only of what is 
 iijpernat-ural and incomprehenfible ; it is ftill 
 but one Term, with the fame precife Analo- 
 gical Idea or Conception in every Part of the 
 Syllbgiim. So that the Logical Form of Syl- 
 logifm is here duly preferved; and there are 
 not more than three Terms in it, even by any 
 forced or obfcure Implication. 
 
 A s the foregoing Syllogifm is, upon the true 
 
 Principle of Analogy, ftri&ly regular in Form; 
 
 ib it concludes jrrefragably as to the Matter 
 
 of it, againft our modern clandeftine Arians. 
 
 ; Fcr 
 
494 DIVINE 
 
 For if a Son in the way of Nature is intirely 
 of the fame Effence or Subftance with his Fa- 
 ther j when the terms Only-begotten and Ef- 
 fence or Subftance are transferee! from things 
 natural and human to things divine and fu- 
 pernatural: Then from the Veracity of God in 
 his Revelations we may conclude by an infalli- 
 ble unerring Parity c£ Reafbn, that the Confe- 
 quence muft have as much Truth in it ; and 
 that Chrift muft be the Son of God of the fame 
 Subftance with his Father, in as much a&ual 
 Reality as if thofe Terms were to be here un- 
 derftood in the ftri&ly proper and formal and 
 literal Acceptation. Then nothing is more evi- 
 dent than that fbmething Correfpondent is fig- 
 nifyed and expreffed by thofe Terms, as fblidly 
 True and Real on the Part of the divine Nature, 
 as on the Part of the human ; and as diftinft 
 from Creation, as natural Generation is from 
 human Efficiency: For otherwife the Words 
 could have no intelligible ufeful Meaning ; and 
 would ferve not to inform and enlighten^ but 
 to baffle and confound the Reafon of Man- 
 kind. Thus according to this only Manner 
 we have of Thinking and Speaking of that fii- 
 pernatural Derivation, the main Point of A- 
 nalogy defigned in this. Inftance of Reyela- 
 on is; That Chrift is as Fully and Truly 
 the Son of God, as if we were to conceive 
 him fuch by a natural Generation: Which 
 would be a falfe and erroneous way of Think- 
 ing and Speaking, unlefs the Terms Son and 
 Only-begotten fignifyed a Real tho' incompre- 
 
 henfible 
 
A N A L U Q Y. 495 
 
 heniible Derivation Correfpondent and anfwer- 
 able to human Generation; and unlefs Chrift 
 is as realy and intirely of the lame divine Ef- 
 fence or Subftance with God the Father 
 {Whatever that Subftance or EfTence may be 
 in it felf) as Abel was of the lame intire hu- 
 man Effence or Subftance with Adam. 
 
 The profefled and open Arians have no 
 way of anfwering this Syllogifm but by aflert- 
 ing, that the term Begotten in the Minor is a 
 mere Figure ; and no more than a purely Me- 
 taphorical Word for Created, or Derived by 
 an Efficiency. But our modern clandeftine 
 Arians being well aware of the grofs Abfurdi- 
 ty of making Begotten a mere Figure of Speech 
 and a Metaphor for Created, which is quite 
 oppofite to it ; nay lb directly oppofite that it 
 is the laft thing in all human JLanguage for 
 which it could be a Metaphor : And foreseeing 
 this palpable Abfurdity, that if Begotten is 
 only a Metaphor for Created, then Only-be- 
 gotten muft be a Figure or Metaphor for 
 The only one Created} and confequently that 
 Chrift alone of all intelligent Beings muft have 
 been made or Created, and all the Reft of 
 them muft have been Begotten or produced 
 by lome other divine Operation than that of 
 an Efficiency. They I fay being aware of this, 
 tho' they are exprels and pofitive that Only- 
 begotten is but mere Figure and Metaphor, yet 
 they deny it to be a Metaphor for Creation: 
 And at the fame time have ever craftily declin- 
 ed 
 
496= DIVINE 
 
 ed affigning any particular determinate thing 
 which is ib Metaphor icaly expreffed by that 
 Term, and which might be an ObjecY of our 
 Knbwlege or Faith. But by way of a delufive 
 Evafion they fay it is a- Figure for Some.Jingu-. 
 lar inconceivable Manner of' Derivation^ fb at 
 thereby to be diflinguifbed froth all other Be- 
 ings. But if the Manner of that divine Deri* 
 vation can be no way conceived or apprehend* 
 ed either by any Conception obtained directly 
 and immediately from the thing it felf; or by 
 a true Analogy with fbmething whereof we 
 have a dired arid immediate 5 Conception ; 
 then Only-begotten muft exprefs nothing 
 Any way uiefully conceivable or intelligible 
 to the Mind of Man ; nothing that we can ei- 
 ther Conceive or Believe. Whereas Chrift is 
 laid to be an Only-begotten Son, on purpofe to 
 enable us to diftinguifh him from all other 
 Beings ; and unlefs this fighifies lomething as 
 real, and yet as different from Creation, as hu- 
 man Generation is from human Efficiency j all 
 Diftinetion between them, conceivable or any 
 way: intelligible to the Mind of Man, is loft j 
 and the Revelation relblved into nothing more 
 than an empty Word without a Meaning : And ' 
 ihftead of that Diftin&jbn thefe Arians argue; 
 Chrift to be in this Refped produced after' 
 the very fame Manner with all other intelli- 
 gent Agents of the Creation. 
 
 Thus unanfwerable is the Matter of that 
 Syllogifrn upon the true and genuine Notion 
 
 of 
 
ANALOGY. 497 
 
 .of Analogy ; but upon our Author's potion 
 of it between things the fame in Kind and 
 differing only in Degree, all the Force of if 
 is loft and amounts to.no more than this: 
 The divine Gewration and divine Ejjence oar 
 Subfiance are the very.j&me in Kind with 
 human Generation and human Subftance, 
 and they' difier only in an infinite Degree j 
 therefore the term Only- begotten is to be at- 
 tributed to -Chrift in the fame proper and for- 
 mal and literal Sence in which it is applyed 
 £® Man ; and therefore the Confequence is 
 .good, that he is of the fame intire Effence and 
 &Abftamce with the Father. Butnothing is more 
 obvious to all Unbelievers than the glaring 
 Falfity of the Affunaption the Syllogifm thus 
 ^proceeds upon; it betrays it felf at ftrft Sight* 
 .For it. is evident that neither the Diviwe Ge- 
 neration, or Effenct and Sa&jignce can be of 
 the fame Kind with what is maturai and hu- 
 Juan: Nor hath fcbis Author , with all that 
 sconcur with him in his Notion of Analogy, 
 any other way of evading this abfurd way of 
 arguing here ; but by runningan with the Ari- 
 ans, and affertting the Terms of the Syllogifm 
 •to be purely Figurative and Metaphorical. 
 
 I. S h a l l give this Author one Syllogjfrri 
 Inore proving A Priori; becaufe it is dire&ly 
 in Anfwer to that (Part of the Objection he 
 puts into the Mouth of his Minute Philofi* 
 phen, .designedly againft our Doctrine of di- 
 vine Analogy; but .which, in Truth, lies e- 
 K k qualy 
 
498 DIVINE 
 
 qualy againft all Doctrines of Myfteries in Re- 
 ligion whether natural or revealed : That we 
 
 cannot argue from unknown Attributes that 
 
 God is to be loved for his Goodnefs , or feared 
 for his Juftice, or refpeSied for his Knowlege; 
 that is from Attributes in an Unknown Sence, 
 in no Particular Sence, or in a Sence which 
 None of us under ft and \ as he moft ignorantly 
 or wilfully explains our Notion of Analogy. 
 He himfelf is notorioufly guilty of the very 
 Abfurdity and Folly which he fo confidently 
 chargeth upon us ; for tho' be makes his Un- 
 believer falfly object that we argue from At- 
 tributes in an unknown Sence, yet He pretends 
 to argue from the divine Attributes As they are 
 in themjehes; whereas they are utterly un- 
 known and altogether inconceivable by us af- 
 ter that Manner ; He argues as if they were as 
 directly conceivable by us as our own ; and as 
 if we had an immediate Conception of their 
 Real Nature, by having the- fame Kind of Pro- 
 perties in our own Mind. Which the Enemies 
 of revealed Religion and Myftery urging home 
 upon us at every Turn as abfurd and falle and 
 unworthy of God, have made all their Advan- 
 tages of it \ by firft pinning us down to the 
 ftrictly Proper and Literal Acceptation of luch 
 Terms in Religion, for which fome of us 
 thus imprudently and zealoufly contend : And 
 then treating us with Difdain and Infolence, 
 whilft we are not without great Toil and 
 Struggle labouring to difengage our ielves,; by 
 reconciling them in that Acceptation to the 
 3 purely 
 
ANALOGY. 499 
 
 purely fpiritual, infinite, and incomprehenfibte 
 Nature of the Divinity. But We on x the quite 
 contrary are for arguing from the divine Attri- 
 butes as we conceive and exprefs them by A- 
 nalogy with thofe Properties in human Na- 
 ture which are correfpondent and fimilar, tho* 
 different in Kind; that is in a Well known 
 Sence, in a very Particular, Determinate and 
 Intelligible Sence, and in a Sence which Every 
 one of us underftands ; nay in the Only Sence 
 wherein thofe Attributes are at all in any De- 
 gree Conceivable, or Intelligible, or Exprefftble* 
 Now fince the Grace of God is one extraordi- 
 nary Inftance of his Goodnefs towards us, let 
 the Syllogifm be this. 
 
 If the Grace of God is neceflary to the At- 
 tainment of Evangelical Holinefs ; then we 
 ought to Pray to him for it. 
 
 But the Grace of God is necefldry to the 
 Attainment of Evangelical Holinefs. There- 
 fore. 
 
 t Take Grace here in that particular 
 Sence, wherein it is limited to the impercepti- 
 ble affifting Influence or Operation of the Ho- 
 ly Spirit of God upon the Mind of Man. Now 
 this Authors Objection againft the Syllogifm 
 Upon Our Principle of divine Analogy would be j 
 'That there are four Terms in it, becaufe the 
 term Grace here muft exprefs two things diffe- 
 rent eyen in Kind : The two different things 
 Kka arc 
 
5 go DIVINE 
 
 are a Supernatural Influence or Operation of the 
 divine Spirit, and ibme Natural Influents or 
 Operation whereby we affirm it to be conceiv- 
 ed and reprefented Analogical-} -, and therefore 
 that the Syllogifm. is Equivocal and Falla- 
 cious, and concludes nothing. But furely the 
 Term- Grace as well as the Conception annexed 
 to it in the Mind, is preeifely one and the 
 fame thro' that Syllogifm : We can have no 
 Conception or Idea at all of the True Nature 
 or Real Kind and Manner of that divine In- 
 fluence, or in other Words, of that fuperna- 
 tur al Operation As it is in it [elf ; and therefore 
 we have no other way of conceiving it, but by 
 Analogy with a dire&ly conceivable Influence 
 or Operation in natural Caufes and in human 
 Nature particularly. And tho' the Idea or 
 Conception of it is thus borrowed from things 
 common and human, and the Term from 
 vulgar Speech; yet the Application of both 
 together, thro'out that Syllogifrn, is altogether 
 to a fupernatural and divine Operation, necek 
 farily fo conceived and exprefled by Analogy 
 only. Confequently then either there are not 
 four Terms in this SyllOgifm ; or it will be 
 impofEble to ffame any SyllOgifm relating to 
 things divine and fupernatural^ which fhall not 
 have four Terms in it at leaft. The Difference 
 here between us and fuch as hold this Author's 
 Doctrine of Analogy, is this; We affert the 
 divine Influence and Operation in the Work Of 
 Grace to be, as to the Real Nature and True 
 Manner of it, utterly impercejptifele and incon- 
 ceivable j 
 
ANALOG Y. 501 
 
 eeivable ; and that we have no other way of 
 Thinking and Speaking of it, but by the In- 
 tervention of feme limilar and correfpondent 
 Influence or Operation of one thing in Nature 
 upon another. They rauft hold that we have as 
 Ijirefl; and Immediate^ tho' not lb complete 
 and adequate a Conception of it, as we have 
 of any Influence or Operation merely natural : 
 Nay that this divine Grace or Operation, is 
 the very fame in Kind with that which is na- 
 tural and human; that the Power and Good- 
 nefs of God and Man in this, as well as in all 
 other Inftances differ in Degree of Perfection 
 only ; and that this Difference in Degree is the 
 only Foundation of what they call a true A- 
 nalogy. Now, as I obferved above, every Syi* 
 logifm they form upon this Foot relating to 
 any one of God's Attributes, will conclude 
 falfely ; by ever" Implying and Suppqfing what 
 is absolutely falfe, or at ieaft what ought to 
 be firft proved in the General, That the di- 
 vine and human Perfe&ions are the very fame 
 in Kind : Whereas it cannot be even charged 
 upon us, that we barely Suppofe the contrary, 
 namely that they are different in Kind; fince 
 it is already abundantly proved that they are 
 lb. And if this had* not been already perform^ 
 ed fb as to admit of no reafbnable Reply; yet 
 we fhould hav.e had nothing more to do here, 
 but to appeal to common Sence and Reafbn, 
 Whether if the Subftance or Effence of two 
 diftin£t things ;differ in Kind, their refpe&ive 
 inherent Attributes or Properties muft not do 
 Kk 3 fo 
 
502 DIVINE 
 
 jb likewife ? And whether things created arid 
 uncreated, infinite and finite, eternal and ori- 
 ginated can be the very iame in Kind ? 
 
 Thus then you lee how the foregoing Syl-f 
 logifm evidently concludes againft all Sorts 
 of this Author's unbelieving Minute Philofo-? 
 phers ; and how it is a full Anfwer to that 
 Obje&ion he puts into their Mouths againft 
 our Notion of Analogy ; That we cannot ar- 
 gue from Attributes (and confequently from 
 divine Operations) in an unknown Seme ; from 
 inconceivable unintelligible Attributes (and Ope- 
 rations) and which none of us under jiand. For 
 tho' we have no DireSf or Immediate Concep- 
 tion of Divine Grace, or of any thing the 
 iame in Kind j yet ^.s we conceive the Grace 
 of God by Analogy, we can moft truly and 
 ufefully argue from it thus : That if ihch a 
 fuperna^ural Operation of the divine Spirit 
 upon our Minds, no otherwife comprehensible 
 by us but thro' Analogy with a dire&ly con? 
 ceivable and corre,fpondent Operation of one 
 thing" in Nature upon another, is revealed to 
 us by God ; we are bound to believe the 
 Truth and Reality of it ; and we ought to Pray 
 <3aily for that Grace, and offer up our cpnftant 
 Tribute of Praife and Thanfcigiying fpr it to 
 the Throne of Grace, 
 
 '* 9 
 
 But as this is in Truth an Obje&ion of 
 Infidels not only againft our Notion of Ana- 
 logy, according to th^s Author's apparent De;? 
 
 fign; 
 
ANALOGY. 503 
 
 fign ; but againfi: all our Do&rines concerning 
 Myfteries : How would he go about to anfwer 
 it, and to confute Men who are fixed to this 
 Principle, That they can have neither Knowlege 
 nor Faith of any thing whereof they have no 
 Ideas ? He hath no other way, upon His No- 
 tion of Analogy, but to tell them, that by 
 having a direcY and immediate Conception of 
 human Grace and Favour, or of the Opera- 
 tion and Influence of one thing in Nature up- 
 on another j they have at the Same Time a 
 Direct and Immediate Idea of the Grace of 
 God, and of the Operation of his Spirit, tho* 
 they are not aware of it ; for they are both 
 the very Same in Kind and differ in Degree 
 only. But if they mould reply, as they realy 
 do, that by looking into their own Mind 
 they find Ideas or Conceptions of Human 
 Grace or Favour indeed, and of the Influence 
 or Operation of Natural Caufes j but that 
 with the moft intenfe Obfervation and Search 
 they can find no Idea or Conception within 
 them of Divine Grace, or of any Divine In- 
 fluence or Operation, DiftinB from the Con- 
 ceptions of thofe that are natural and human ; 
 which is what they require and demand from 
 us. That they will never be perfuaded, con- 
 trary to the common Sence and Reafon of all 
 Mankind, that things Divine and Human, 
 Natural and Supernatural, Finite and Infinite, 
 Created and Uncreated fhould be the very fame 
 in Nature and Kind : So ' that one and the 
 fame Idea fhall equajy give the Mind a dircft 
 K k 4 and 
 
504. DIVINE 
 
 and immediate Knowlege of both ; and one 
 and the fame Term exprefs them both with 
 the fame ftii£t and formal and literal Pro? 
 priety. And yet that this very Term with 
 the very fame Idea annexed to it mould be 
 in refped of a thing natural and human, moft 
 clear and diftin&j but in refpecT: of what is 
 divine and fupernatural, oblcure and partial 
 and confufed: And therefore that they can 
 never recede from their Demand of As clean 
 and DifiinB Ideas of things divine and fuper- 
 jiatural, as they, have of things natural and 
 human. I fay if Men mould make this Re r 
 ply, our Author rauft be at a full ftand, hav- 
 ing gone' the utmoft Length of his Chain of 
 Reasoning; with his Metaphorical Analogy and 
 Proper Analogy between things the very fame 
 in Kind, that "is no Analogy at all at the End 
 of it. 
 
 Here then we muft leave him behind, to 
 the Contemplation of his Analogy of $>egrm ; 
 and proceed to tell thofe Objectors they are 
 fo far in the right, That things divine and fu-^ 
 pernatmal cannot be the fame in Nature or 
 Kind with things natural and human; that 
 one and the lame Idea or Conception cannot 
 exhibit to the Mind a Knowlege of each of 
 them Equaly DireSt and Immediate ; that they 
 pannot be expreffed by one and the fame Terra 
 in the fame literal and ftricl: Propriety ; that 
 we can have no Ideas or: Conceptions of things 
 divine and fupernatural, totaly diftinci and 
 
 different 
 
ANALOGY. 505 
 
 different from thofe we have of things natural 
 and human: And laftly . that Analogy of De- 
 grees, fuch as is fuppofed between More 
 White and Lefs White, More Wife and Left 
 Wile, More Good and Lefs Good, is a modern 
 Invention; and the fpurious Iffue of lbme 
 wanton Imagination, defigned to fupplamt the 
 genuine Analogy founded on a Teal Retem* 
 blance and Correfpondeney between things 
 different in Kind. But that the Truth of 
 the Matter in fhort is this: They muft not 
 expect to find within themfelves any Ideas 
 Clear or ObfcWe y Biftinff or Confttfed, \dd* 
 equate or Inadequate of things divine and lu- 
 pernatural, and of divine Grace in particular* 
 As they are in ihemjehes 5 becaufe they are ut» 
 terly imperceptible after that Manner, and fa 
 infinitely out of the Reach of: all our under* 
 ftanding Faculties that it is impoffible for us 
 to have a Dire£t Idea or Conception of them 
 in any Degree. That therefore thofe things 
 can be conceived no otherwife than Mediate- 
 ly, that is by Analogy with things natural 
 and human ; nor expreffed otherwife than by 
 Terms of common Speech, which in their 
 original Meaning and literal Propriety were 
 applyed to things of Nature, the only direct 
 and immediate Objects of human Underftand- 
 ing. That accordingly in every Inftance of 
 that Knowlege which refpects things divine, 
 One and the Same Idea or Conception necefTa- 
 rily ftands in the Mind both for what is natu- 
 ral and human, and fox what is divine and fu- 
 
 peynaturali 
 
5 o6 DIVINE 
 
 pernatural; and that both of them arc ever 
 expreffed by one and the lame Term to which 
 that Conception is annexed : Only with this 
 Difference, that the Term with the Concep- 
 tion annexed to it is at one time applyed di- 
 rectly and immediately and in a literal Accep- 
 tation to what is natural and human j at ano- 
 ther time to what is divine and fupernatural ,' 
 in an Analogical Sence only. That thoie 
 Terms and Conceptions are never the lefs 
 Clear and Diftinff when applyed to things 
 divine and fpiritual, than when applyed to 
 their proper Objects ; becaufe they are apply- 
 ed to the former, not as they are apprehended 
 directly, or in their own Real intrinfic Nature ; 
 for in this refpeft we are involved in a total 
 Ignorance of them, exclufive of all Obfcurity 
 and Confufion: But as they are conceived 
 thro' the Help of Correfpondent Refemblances ; 
 by which Means the Conceptions receive no 
 other Alteration than in being ufed as Analo- 
 gical Reprefentations of things otherwife ut- 
 terly unknown and inconceivable to us ; and 
 mutt therefore in that new Application retain 
 the very fame diftinct Perfpicuity which they 
 had before. Accordingly that in this very In- 
 ftance of the Grace of God, we have no other 
 way of apprehending it but by Analogy with 
 the clear and direct Idea or Conception of fame 
 natural Operation; nor of expreffing it but 
 by a Word of common Speech, well under- 
 ftood by being nVft "applyed in general to 
 Grace or Fajo.w and Affiftance. youchiafed 
 
ANALOGY. soy 
 
 by one Man to another, as by a Prince to his 
 Subje&s ; and afterwards more particularly 
 to a worldly Caule and Effe£t; fo that the 
 Term Grace or Favour is equaly clear and 
 diftinft and intelligible whether you apply it 
 to God or Man. Laftly, we are to tell them 
 that the Foundation of this Analogy is laid, 
 not in any Samenefs of Nature or Kind be- 
 tween things divine and human (a Notion 
 without which the Unbelieving and Heretical 
 Genius of our Age could not fubfift) but in our 
 being formed in the Likenefs only*, and after 
 the Image of God. As this Analogy is the on- 
 ly Ground of all our Knowlege of things 
 purely fpiritual and fupernatural ; lb it is to 
 this we owe the greateft Fulnefs and Enlarge- 
 ment of it : It is the higheft Degree of fpiri- 
 tual and divine Knowlege we are capable of 
 in this Life ; and they who are not contented 
 with it, muft reject not only all Revelation 
 and Gofpel Myftery, but all Natural Religion 
 Jikewife ; fince we have no other way but this 
 pf conceiving even God and his Attributes. 
 
 N o w as upon this Writer's Notion of di- 
 vine Analogy in refpecl of Degrees only, the 
 foregoing Syllogifm, as well as every other 
 Syllogifm relating to things purely fpiritual 
 and divine, muft conclude falfly ; and as that 
 great fundamental Principle of Infidelity could 
 never receive any fatisfa&Ory Anfwer, in his 
 way of proceeding: So upon another quite 
 
 differed Notion 0/ this Author jn the latter 
 
 « _ ,-,.- . p art 
 
5 o8 DIVINE 
 
 Part of his fecond Treadle, where he ftates 
 the fame Objection at full length, there can 
 be no more than two Terms in the preced- 
 ing Syllogiftn ; and inffcead of any diftindt and 
 folid Anfwer to it, he intirely falls in with that 
 Infidel Principle in the General ,• and in the 
 particular Inftance of divine Grace, he in ef- 
 fect gives up the whole Cauie of Revelation 
 and Myftery. The Objection put into the 
 Mouth of his Minute Philofopher, and enlarg- 
 ed upon thro' many Pages is in fliort this. 
 Knowhge is the Perception of the Connexion or 
 Difagrtement between Ideas; fb that where 
 there are no Ideas, there can be no Knowkge : 
 jill Degrees of Afjent terminate in Ideas, as 
 their proper Object; and without them there 
 can be no fuch thing as Knowle ge, Fai th, 
 wOpinion. Confequently then, Words which 
 faggeft no Ideas are infignificant ; and where 
 clear Ideas are wanting to them, the Speaker 
 utters Nonfence. So that the only way to know 
 whether a Man's Speech be fencelefs and infig- 
 nificant, is to lay afide the Words-, and confiaer 
 the Ideas fuggefted by them : Strip any "Doctrine 
 or Tenet of the Words, and examine what Ideas 
 are underneath, or whether any Ideas at all; 
 and you will find this the fhortefl way to expofe 
 fuch of thofe De0iines or Tenets as are falfe, 
 and to end all Difputes about them. This is 
 the Foundation of the grand Objection as it is 
 ftated by him in general; and the Inference 
 made from thence by Unbelievers is, That be- 
 caufe they are fo far from having clear and 
 
ANALOGY. 509 
 
 -$mffl Ideas of Things partly fpiritudl and 
 divine ; that they can ftw no Ideas at all af- 
 fixed to the Terms which ixprefs the Attri- 
 butes of God or the Myfteries of Chriftianity* 
 different 'from fitch as are affixed to them when 
 applyed^ to Things natural and human in com" 
 man Speech': They therefore reject them all, as 
 things abfolutely unknown; together with all 
 the Deductions and Cmfeqttences drawn from 
 them, as utterly precarious and groundless; 
 And by the fame Method of Reafoning, the Ob- 
 jector oblerves, Men may confute all other tht 
 msfi ejfential Articles of the Gkrijlian Faith, 
 
 The true way of anfwering this Objection 
 of Unbelievers is thus. By granting them* 
 flrft that we have no iiich Ideas, either in the 
 Abftradt or in the Concrete, of fhings purely 
 ipiritual and Supernatural, as we have of thing* 
 natural and worldly j and consequently that 
 no fuch Ideas can be annexed to the Words 
 by which we exprels divine Objects. Accord- 
 ing to the duly limited and proper Accepta- 
 tion' of the term Idea, it fignifyeth the Know- 
 lege we obtain from a Direct Perception of art 
 external Object it lelf, or of Something the 
 lame in Kind with it. But we can have no 
 direct Perception of any Objects purely Ipi- 
 ritual and divine, nor of any thing the fame 
 in Kind with them ; and the Objection pro* 
 eeeds upon this falle Prefumption, that with- 
 out Such a direct Perception or Idea we can 
 haye no Ksdwlege at all of them. It is a 
 4 grols 
 
516 DlViNfi 
 
 grofi fundamental Error in Logic, that Words 
 can have no Signification unlefs Ideas, even 
 Direff Ideas can be annexed to them ; whereas 
 none but thole Words which exprels things 
 material and fenfitive can have fuch Ideas an- 
 nexed to them by Us. But Words may be very 
 fignificant which have the Operations, Concep- 
 tions^ and Complex Notions of the Mind annex- 
 ed to them ; and thele make up the greateft 
 Part of fignificant Words in human Language. 
 Nothing therefore can occafion lb much Equi- 
 vocation and Fallacy thro' the whole Courfe 
 of Men's reafoning upon any Subject, efpecialy 
 in Religion, as the loofe indifcriminate Ufe of 
 the Term Ideas ; and the confounding them 
 not only with the Immediate Confcioufhefs we 
 have of the Operations of our own Mind, with- 
 out the Intervention of any Ideas of them : 
 But with all our Conceptions, and thole Com- 
 plex Notions which arife from combining the 
 various Operations of the Intellect with Ideas 
 of Senlation. 
 
 Secondly, By granting them what is a 
 plain undeniable Truth, that where we can 
 have no Ideas, nor Conceptions i nor Complex 
 Notions, we can have no Knowlege, Iaitb y or 
 Opinion: And that where Words have none of 
 thefe annexed to them, they are altogether in- 
 fignificant ; as much without a Meaning as if 
 they were inarticulate ; and the Speaker utters 
 Nonfence. So that if you add the terms Con- 
 ceptions and Complex Notions to the term Ideas 
 
 thro* 
 
ANALOGY. 511 
 
 thro' the former Part of that Objection ; then 
 from being one grand fundamental Falfity, 
 you turn it into a great Truth. For without 
 lbme of thefe affixed to the Words we make 
 ufe of, we can never form a Mental Proposition 
 anfwering to the Verbal: Nor can a Word 
 without feme of thefe annexed to it, be one of 
 the Terms in a Syllogifm ; it is not any Number 
 of Syllables that renders it luch, but either the 
 Idea or Conception or Notion it Hands for. 
 Words are Signs, and where a Word is not a 
 Sign of fbmething any way conceivable and in- 
 telligible, it is to us a Sign of nothing; and 
 accordingly nothing can be concluded from it. 
 When the Idea or Conception or complex 
 Notion is diftindl: and clear, Co likewife is the 
 Signification of the Word to which it is an- 
 nexed : And where thefe are not to be had 
 in the Abftraft, the Word muft exprefs lbme 
 of them in the Concrete. Where the Word 
 is not General, it may be made luch by Hand- 
 ing for an indefinite Number of Particulars 
 of the fame Kind. And laftly, where no D/- 
 reff and Immediate Ideas or Conceptions or 
 complex Notions can poffibly be affixed to 
 the Terms we ufe (which is the Cafe of all 
 the Terms whereby we exprefs things divine 
 and purely Spiritual) we transfer lbme of 
 thofe Terms to which our Ideas are annexedj 
 to exprefs- things divine and fpiritual by mere 
 Figure and Metaphor ; and fbme of them 
 which are applyed to the Operations, Con- 
 ceptions, and complex Notions of our Mind, 
 
 we 
 
$12 DIVINE 
 
 we transfer for expreffing things diyine and fp|- 
 titual by Analogy i 
 
 Thirdly, And that which is the moft 
 material Conceffion of all is this. We grant 
 them that, as we have no direct Ideas, or im- 
 Jnediate Cmfcioufnefs of things purely fpiritual 
 and divine, or of any thing the fame in Kind ; 
 ib ooniiequently neither can we have any di- 
 rect and immediate Conceptions or Complex Mo- 
 tions of them: And therefore no Such Con- 
 ception or complex Notion can be affixed to 
 any Word whereby we exprefe the Attributes 
 of God or the Myfteries of Chriftianity. For 
 all the moft Abftratted and moft SpiritualCaa- 
 ceptjons and complex Notions of the Mind, 
 take their original Rife from Ideas of Situati- 
 on ; and are no other than fo many Compofi- 
 ttons formed out of Thefe and the Confcious 
 Operations of the Intellect. It muft therefore 
 be a Vain Expectation in Men, and a Senctlefs 
 Demand, to call upon us at every Turn even 
 for direct and immediate Conceptions or Noti^ 
 ons of things Supernatural-, that is, of things 
 above the direct Reach of all our natural Pow- 
 ers and Faculties. But it is downright Frenzy 
 ito infift upon Ideas of them, nay DireSt and 
 Immediate Ideas in the Se'nce of this Objecti- 
 on ; when they may as well require us to Shew 
 them the Deity ; or to place an Angel before 
 their Eyes ; or at leaft to give them fuch a com- 
 plete and perfect Defeription of the Subftance 
 of a pure Spirit, that they fiaall haye juft fucfar 
 
 another 
 
ANALOGY. 513 
 
 smother refpedtive Idea of it as they have of 
 the Members of an human Body : Or to ex- 
 plain to them the Intrinjic ejjential Properties 
 of the divine Nature in fuch lively Words* 
 that they fliall conceive them after the very 
 feme Immediate Manner they do our mental 
 Powers and Faculties and Operations. 
 
 After all thefe Conceffions freely made 
 to Unbelievers, which open to* us the true 
 Matter in Controverfy, and by which we are 
 brought on gradualy to the utmoft Point of 
 its Decifion ; there is but one Gonceffion that 
 we infill upon and require from them : Which, 
 if not freely made ; from the Conviction of 
 their own Judgment, will be extorted from 
 them by the irrefiftible Force of Truth. That 
 tho' we have no diredt and immediate Concep- 
 tion or Complex Notion, and much lefs any 
 iuch Ideas of things divine and fupernatural, 
 ©f God and his Attributes, or of any of the 
 Myfteries of Ghriftianity j yet we have clear 
 and ufeful Conceptions of them by Analogy 
 with the Properties and Qualities and Opera- 
 tions of human Nature : As we conceive them 
 Analogicaly, lb do we likewife Exprefs them ; 
 and from thence we are carryed on infenfibly 
 to Enlarge upon them, by a purely Figura- 
 tive and Metaphorical Allufion even to our 
 Senles and bodily Members, and to many o- 
 thcr fenfible Objeds of this World. All the 
 Terms which we ufe for them have accord- 
 ingly fbrhe of thele determinate and clear 
 L 1 Conception* 
 
5 i4 DIVINE 
 
 Conceptions or Notions annexed to them; and 
 without them they would be infignificant emp- 
 ty Sounds : But thus they have all a Meaning 
 as diftinft and intelligible, as when they are 
 in their formal and literal Propriety applyed 
 to things natural and human. 
 
 I Hope it now appears undeniable and 
 paft any realbnable Oppofition, that as this 
 Analogy is our only Method of conceiving 
 God and his Attributes and the Myfteries of 
 Chriftianity ; lb it is lure and lolid, and will 
 remain unfhaken to the End of the World : 
 Since all thofe things are not the left Real and 
 fubftantialy True in themfelves ; nor the left 
 Ufefully conceivable to all the Intents of Mo- 
 rality and revealed Religion in this Life ; nor 
 of left Influence and Concernment to Mankind, 
 becaufe we cannot apprehend them by Ideas, 
 or after the fame direct and immediate Man- 
 ner we do things natural and human. It is this 
 which will render all Kinds and Degrees of 
 Infidelity unreafonable here, and inexcufable 
 hereafter } and not any falfe Imagination that 
 Men are as little able to frame AbftraB Ideas 
 of Things natural and human , as they are 
 of Things divine and fupernatural : Or a fan- 
 taftic Opinion that our Words may be figni- 
 ficant and ufeful without diftindt Ideas j nay 
 without any Ideas or Conceptions or complex 
 Notions affixed to them. And yet thefe are 
 the two Ways our Author takes to obviate 
 that main Objection of Infidels, which he hath 
 
 been 
 
ANALOGY. $1$ 
 
 been at much Trouble and Pains to render too 
 ftrong for him to encounter; 
 
 The particular Inftance put into the 
 Mouths of Unbelievers by this Author to il- 
 luftrate and fortify the general Objection, is. 
 that of divine Grace ; concerning which fay 
 they Many things are (poken in Scripture, and 
 which hath occafioned Many Difputes and Contro- 
 verfies in the Church. And yet after all they asfcj 
 What is the clear and dtftinff Idea marked by 
 the word Grace ? For without fuch an Idea it can 
 be neither the SubjeB of a rational Difpute, nor 
 the Object of Knowlege, Faith, or Opinion. That 
 for their Party when they Jay afide the word 
 Grace y and look into their own Mind j or a clear 
 and diftinB Idea to affix to it, they find a per* 
 feci Vacuity or Privation of all Ideas ; and from 
 thence they infer it to be no more than an empty 
 Name without any real ufeful Meaning or in- 
 telligible Signification. The fliorteft and clear- 
 eft Way of giving an Anfwer to their Quefti-* 
 on> is by asking them another. What is the 
 clear and diftincT: Idea marked out by the 
 word Favour? To which they make this 
 ready Anfwer, That they have a clear and di- 
 ftinft Idea annexed to that Word when apply- 
 ed to any Favour confered by one Man upon 
 another, as by a Prince upon his Subjedta 
 Then fay I, that and no other is the very Con- 
 ception or Idea which is annexed to it, when 
 it is applyed to God in order to exprefi and 
 reprefent any divine Favour j and there is 
 Ha not 
 
S i6 DIVINE 
 
 not then any other New Idea or Conception 
 to be annexed to it. But fay they, what we ex- 
 ped is a New and DiftmB Idea Purely Spiritu- 
 al, and of a Divine Object, and intirely Dif- 
 ferent, from that Idea or Conception of Human 
 favour which we clearly perceive and appre- 
 hend ; becaufe thofe two Things themfelves are 
 totaly different from each other : And there- 
 fore fince this cannot be had, we will not al- 
 low that Term Favour to have any real Signi- 
 fication or intelligible Meaning beyond what is 
 merely human : Tho' nothing is more obvious 
 than that upon this Principle they muft not 
 believe or acknowlege Any Favour received 
 from God, and confequently there is an End 
 of all Religion natural and revealed. That 
 thofe Men cannot find within themfelves any 
 fuch Spiritual Ideas, intirely Different from all 
 Ideas or Conceptions of correipondent Natu- 
 ral and Human Objects ; and that when they 
 look into their own Mind for any fuch Idea 
 to annex to the word favour in particular 
 when applyed to the Divinity, they find a 
 perfect Vacuity or Privation of all Such Ideas, 
 is mod true: But their Confequence is moft 
 falfe ; that Therefore that Term can have then no 
 real ufeful Meaning or intelligible Signification. 
 For the Word together with that Conception 
 of human Favour, is transfered to God Analo- 
 gicaly ; to expreft and conceive fuch correfpon- 
 dent divine Favour, as is in every Inftance and 
 Degree otherwife inconceivable and ineffable. 
 One and the lame Idea or Conception and the 
 
 Term 
 
ANALOGY. 5-i7 
 
 Term to which it is annexed, necefTarily ftand 
 both for human and divine Favour; accord- 
 ing to the different Application of it either to 
 God, or to Man : When it is applyed to Man 
 it literaly expreffeth fomething dire&ly con- 
 ceivable; when applyed to the Divinity, it 
 expreffeth fomething to us utterly inconceiv- 
 able directly, or in Kind, or as it is in it felf j 
 but clearly and diftin&ly conceived by a cor- 
 refpondent Refemblance, We have no direct 
 and immediate Idea or Conception of what 
 Grace or Favour is In God, or of that internal 
 Difpofition in the divine Nature to fhew us Fa- 
 vour ; and tno' all the Senfibk and Vifible BlefC 
 ings of this World are from him j yet we are 
 $6 far from any Conception of the true and 
 real Manner of his Operation in Beftowing 
 them, that we know not even that they Come 
 from him : Otherwife than as we have the ut- 
 rnoft moral Evidence and Certainty, by De- 
 duction and Confequence, that they could 
 come originaly from none but one neceffary 
 and eternal Being ; who alone can be endued 
 with infinite Power and Wifdom and Good- 
 nefs ; which is farther confirmed to us by Re- 
 velation. And then as for all the Favours of 
 God which are Infenfible and Purely fpiritudl 
 Operations, they are intirely inconceivable; 
 otherwife than by Analogy with feme worldly 
 and natural Operation. Let us therefore here 
 drop the word Favour, and ufe the Synony- 
 mous word Grace inftead of it. 
 
 LI 3 The 
 
5 i8 DIVINE 
 
 The term Grace then thus applyed to God 
 fry Analogy only, is taken |n a General Sence 
 by making fbme one Inftance of his Favour 
 and Goodnefi to us, to ftand for an indefinite 
 Number of many Inftances of his gracious 
 Bounty and Favours : For no univerfal Idea 
 of it can be formed by any imaginary and 
 groundleis Abftra£|:ion from all the Particulars. 
 In a more limited Sence the word Grace is ap- 
 plyed to the Light of the Gofpel, the greater!: 
 of the divine Graces or Favours vouchfafed to 
 Mankind ; and in a Sence yet more particular, 
 it is ufed to expreft the greater! Inftance of God^s 
 Grace and Favour under the Golpel Difpenia-? 
 tionj That of the acraal Influence or immedi- 
 ate Operation of the divine Spirit upon the 
 Mind of Man : Which being equaly impercep- 
 tible and .inconceivable, as it is in it fell", with 
 the intrinfic Nature and Powers of that Spirit 
 which operates ; we conceive it only by Ana- 
 logy with the Influence or Operation of a 
 well known natural Caufe. Thus as the Ob- 
 jector exprefleth it, tho- by way of upbraiding 
 us with Folly, We /peak of this Holy Principle 
 as of fomething that redly Afts, Moves, and 
 Determines 5 and we take our Idea or Concep- 
 tion of it from things natural:- —Which be- 
 ing very obvious, and immediately perceptible, 
 we fubfiitute in the "Place of a thing fpiritual 
 and incomprehenjible. This iswhat he lays Im- 
 pofeth upon Mankind, and he calls it A manifefi 
 Delufion. But they are under % manifeft De- 
 
ANALOGY, 519 
 
 lufion who either reject and explode that holy 
 Principle as fomething feigned and imaginary, 
 becaule it is not natural and fenfible ; or who 
 conclude it can be nothing true and real, or 
 ufeful to us, becaufe they cannot affix a direct 
 Idea or Conception to the Term by which it 
 is exprefled : Whereas the very iuppofition of 
 our being able to conceive it Thus, deftroys the 
 Nature of it ; nor could there be any fuch thing 
 as a divine fupernatural Operation, if it could 
 be thus naturaly fenfible or directly conceiv- 
 able by us. If Men will allow what they will 
 never be able to difprove, That the divine Spi- 
 rit can actualy aflift the Mind by any immedi- 
 ate Influence or Operation at all j they mull at 
 the lame time allow this to be inconceivable 
 and inexpreflible, otherwiie than by Analogy 
 with a directly conceivable Caufe and Effect. 
 Surely this blelfed Operation or divine Infra* 
 ence is never the lefs real and true becaule it 
 is iupernatural, and cannot therefore be natu- 
 raly and directly difcerned ; never the lefs the 
 proper Subject of our Prayers, becaufe it could 
 not be fb aptly and ufefully revealed to us any 
 other Way as by Analogy } and never the lefs 
 an Object of our Affent, becaule we have not 
 fuch a direct and immediate Idea or Concep- 
 tion of it as would leave no room for a Reli- 
 gious Faith. This then is the only Idea or Con- 
 ception which can be affixed to the word 
 Grace, when it is uled to exprefi that par- 
 ticular Inftance of the divine Favour; And 
 thole Unbelievers who reject the Truth and 
 X> \ 4 Reality 
 
520 DIVINE 
 
 Reality and Ufefulnels of fuch an infenfible 
 and incomprehenfible Operation of the divine 
 Spirit ; and affert the Word by which we ex- 
 prels it to be utterly infignificant and without 
 any intelligible Sence or Meaning, becaufe 
 they cannot find within themlelves any clear 
 Idea or Conception of fbmething divine to af- 
 fix to it, Different from that of fomething 
 anfwerable in natural and worldly Objects y 
 muft for ,the fame Reafibn reject the very 
 Being-^ef God, and all his Attributes ; and 
 may in particular as well deny that Almighty 
 Energy and incomprehenfible Influence where- 
 by he preferves the created Univerfe. Thole 
 pretended Patrons of Liberty and Freedom in 
 Thinking will fail in the End for want of ufing 
 A little common Sence where it is mojl concern- 
 ed, in a Matter of the laft and higheft Impor- 
 tance; they are like finaly to perifh by not 
 following the Dictates of the plaineft Reafon, 
 and by a wrong Byafs upon their Judgment 
 from 4 manifeft Blunder in common Logic. 
 
 This is an Anfwer to that fundamental 
 Objection, which will admit of no Reply but 
 one; namely the proving that we have fome 
 other way of Conceiving things divine and fpi- 
 ritual (when the Exifience of fuch things is 
 granted) than by Analogy with things natural 
 and human i and That the Properties or At- 
 tributes and Operations of an eternal, infinite 
 and purely Spiritual Subftance, are of the lame 
 Nature or Kind with the Properties ox Quali- 
 ties 
 
ANALOGY. 521 
 
 ties and Operations of fuch as are human and 
 compounded. I have already juft mentioned 
 the two Ways our Author hath taken to An- 
 iwer that Obje&ion, which are thefe. 
 
 i. The Subftancc of his firft Anfwer is, 
 That whereas the Objection fuppofeth every 
 General Term in an intelligible Difcourie, to 
 ftand for a diftind Abftratf general Idea 5 He 
 proceeds to ftiew, very juftly indeed, how 
 groundlefs and falfe that Notion is, of Men's 
 forming any Univerfal Ideas by AftraSting ma- 
 turely from all the Particulars of any Kind 
 of things whatfoever. The Application he 
 makes of it is this. That Men are as little 
 capable of forming Abfira£i Ideas or Con- 
 ceptions even of things Natural and Senfibk, 
 as they are of things Divine and S&pernatMr 
 ral , that they can form no fuch general ab^ 
 ftraffc Idea of Number and Force, anymore than 
 -they can of Grace: And his Confequence is, 
 that both being upon the fame level with re- 
 ipect to our forming any abftract Conception 
 or Idea of them 3 it is unreafonable that Men 
 mould infill upon having fuch an Idea of 
 Grace, when they cannot have the like Idea 
 of Number or Force, But to what Purpofe 
 is all this ? For the Objection, as it is ftated by 
 Infidels firppoieth no fuch thing ; nor doth he 
 himfelf mention Any Sort of AbflraB Ideas in 
 any Part of it, to give even a Colour to his 
 being fo prolix in difcanting upon them in his 
 Anfwer. No ? the whole Strength of their 
 
 Objectioo 
 
522 DIVINE 
 
 Objection is refblved into this; that they can 
 obtain no Ideas, either General or Particular,^ 
 cither in the Abftracl: or in the Concrete, ei- 
 ther Clear or Obfcure, Diftind or Indetermi- 
 nate, of Things divine and fpiritual contain- 
 ed in the Gofpel Myfteries; Different from the 
 Ideas of common worldly Obje&s: Nor of 
 Grace in particular, different from that of hu- 
 man Grace or Favour ; and therefore they re- 
 ject it as an infignificant Term, without any 
 real and ufeful Meaning when taken in a Di- 
 vine and Religious Sence. They do not infill 
 upon Ideas of Things divine and fpiritual, ren- 
 dred general by Abftraflion from all the Par- 
 ticulars ; nor upon fiich as become general by 
 One of the Particulars being made to Stand 
 jor an Indefinite Number of Things of the lame 
 Kind, which is the true Abftra&ion : No nor 
 upon an Idea of divine Grace abftra&ed from 
 the Caufe operating, from the Subjeft operat- 
 ed upon, and from the EffeBs produced; as 
 he groundlefsly fuppofes in his Anfwer. But 
 what they demand is, Any Ideas of them as 
 different from all the Ideas and Conceptions 
 of things fenfible and human, as thefe are from 
 things imperceptible and divine ; And accord- 
 ingly they tell you that when they look in* 
 ward for liich Ideas to annex to the Terms, 
 their Mind is an empty Void; and therefore 
 they look no farther than the ftri&ly proper 
 and formal and literal Acceptation of thole 
 Words, 
 
 But 
 
ANALOGY. 523 
 
 But fliould we grant that the Objection 
 did realy proceed upon a Suppofition that 
 Men cannot have as clear and diftinct an Ab- 
 ftraft Idea of Grace, as they imagine they have 
 of Number and Force : Yet the tacit Suppofi- 
 tion upon which his whole Anfwer manifeftly 
 proceeds, and which is an unavoidable Confe- 
 quence of his fuppofing the divine and human 
 Attributes to be the fame in Kind, is abfolutely 
 falfe. Namely, that we have as DireB and 
 Immediate Ideas or Conceptions of Things 
 divine and fpiritual, as we have of Things fen- 
 fible and human, tho* we have no abftract Ideas 
 of either; and that we have as Dirett an Idea 
 of Grace in particular, as we have of Number 
 or Force : For tho', lays he, we cannot form 
 any Idea of Number in the Abftratt, or ex- 
 clufive of all Things numbred; nor of Force 
 prefcinded, as he fpeaks, from Body, Motion, 
 Time and Place ; yet we can form a clear and 
 diftin£t Diretf Idea of each of them in the Con- 
 crete. But fiirely we can form no Virefi Im- 
 mediate Idea or Conception of: divine Grace, ei- 
 ther AbjiraSted from God the Author, from Man 
 the Subject, and from Virtue and Piety its Ef- 
 fects; 01 'Even in the Concrete and In Conjunction 
 with them: Becaufe as the Operation it felj is 
 inconceivabe directly, ib neither can we have 
 any direct and immediate Conception or Idea of 
 the divine Spirit which operates, or of any Thing 
 the fame in Kind with it. What are we to do 
 then here ? The yery fame that we are obliged 
 '-"' - - ----- '•- to 
 
524 DIVINE 
 
 to do in reipecT: of all other things divine and 
 fpiritual, even the very Attributes of God ', that 
 is to fubftitute the clear and diftind and Direff 
 Conception of a natural and human Opera- 
 tion in the Concrete, as an Analogical Repre- 
 sentation of (what is otherwife inconceivable) 
 the divine Grace or Influence in the Concrete 
 allb; or inclulive of the holy Spirit, the hu- 
 man Mind, and the happy Effe&s. So that 
 the true Ground of Men's Dejufion in reject- 
 ing the Conceptions and Faith of Things di- 
 vine and spiritual contained in the Gofpel 
 Myfteries ; and all real and ufeful Signification 
 of the Terms by which we exprefs them, and 
 of Grace in particular; is not the intire want 
 of fuch an AbfiraU Idea of it as they falfely 
 imagine they have of Number and Force, 
 which is this Author's wrong Solution of the 
 Matter : But their not difcerning that tho' the 
 Thing it felf were granted to be ever ib true and 
 real ; yet it is abfurd to exped that the Mind of 
 Man can obtain Direct and Immediate Ideas or 
 Conceptions of fuch Kinds of Obje&s as are 
 out of the direft Reach of all their Faculties ; 
 or that if can have Natural Ideas of Things 
 Supernatural. And therefore that if there Is 
 any fach thing as Grace, or an immediate affift- 
 jng Influence of the divine Spirit upon the 
 Mind of Man (which is plainly revealed, and 
 impoffible for them to difprove) there can he 
 no other way of conceiving it but by the Influ- 
 ence of an human and natural Cauie: Be- 
 caufe fuch divine Operation myfl; unavoidably 
 
 be 
 
ANALOGY. 525 
 
 be as inconceivable with refpedl: to its Real 
 Nature, as the Spirit it felf which operates. 
 And their fatal Error is, that upon their Prin- 
 ciple they muft neceffarily rejed the Truth 
 and Reality of every Thing that is thus Incm* 
 ceivable to us as it is in itfelf\ and of whatever 
 is no otherwife conceivable than by Analogy 
 with Things natural and human j even the At- 
 tributes of God included. 
 
 a. T h e Subftance of this Author's Second 
 Anfwer to the foregoing grand Objection of 
 Unbelievers, you have in thele following Par- 
 ticulars. 
 
 T h e r e may be, lays he, another Ufe of 
 Words befides that of marking and fuggefting 
 diftinft Ideas; which is, the raijing certain Taf- 
 fions Difpofitions and Emotions in our Minds, tho* 
 the Words jhould not bring each ^Distinct 
 Idea to the Mind. In the Term Idea, according 
 to the modern loofe and illogical Acceptation 
 of it, this Writer without Diftin&ion includes 
 all our Conceptions and complex Notions. 
 Before in the former Anfwer it was, That 
 there may be another Ufe of Words befides 
 marking or fuggefting AbftraB Ideas. Here it 
 is, without THftinB Ideas : And anon you will 
 find, that there may be another Ufe of Words 
 befides that of marking or fuggefting Any Ideas 
 at all. Nay at laft he ends in this, That 
 Words may be very ufeful Tho' there Jhould be 
 "no P o s $ 1 b 1 l 1 t sr of their offering or exhibiting 
 
 any 
 
526 DIVINE 
 
 any Ideas to the Mind. But finely Things 
 whereof we have no DiftinB Ideas or Concep- 
 tions or Notions, muft be very indiftinctly 
 known ; and the Words to which we cannot 
 affix fuch diftind Ideas or Conceptions, muft 
 be very confuted and obfcure in their Signifi- 
 cation : And if we cannot affix clear and di- 
 ftinct Ideas or Conceptions to the Terms 
 whereby we exprels the Attributes of God, 
 and all the Myfteries of Chriftianity ; our 
 Faith which is confequent upon theft, muft 
 be proportionably blind, confuted, implicit and 
 indeterminate. Men difpofed to Infidelity 
 are here furnifhed with an invincible Argu- 
 ment for rejecting not only revealed, but natu- 
 ral Religion likewife ; both which muft upon 
 his Principle be full of Confufion and Obfcurity 
 in the moft material and fundamental Points: 
 Nor can either of them thus admit of a firm 
 and undoubting AfTent of the Underftanding ; 
 or of a well grounded religious Faith, which 
 muft ever be as wavering and inftable as the 
 Foundation it is built upon. Without fbme 
 clear and diftinct Idea or Conception annexed 
 to the word Knowlege, how could we alcribe 
 it with any Certainty to God for an Attribute? 
 We have no Idea or Conception directly from 
 that divine Faculty or Perfection, as it is in 
 it felf; and fome clear and diftinct Idea or 
 Conception we muft have of it, or we could 
 never reafbn clearly and diftinctly upon it : 
 Nor could we ever infer with any Truth that 
 there muft be fuch a Perfection in God, other- 
 wife' 
 
ANALOGY. 527 
 
 wife than by this Confequence; That fince 
 human Knowlege, whereof we have a clear 
 and diftinct Conception, is a Perfection of 
 a created Mind compofed of Matter and Spi- 
 rit ; there rauft be a Perfection in the Crea- 
 tor, to which this is correfpondent and fi- 
 milar. If it is objected, that we have a clear 
 and diftind Idea of human Knowlege to an- 
 nex to that Term, when we apply it to God; 
 which being of the Same Kind with the di- 
 vine Knowlege, is a good Foundation of all 
 our Reafbning upon that Attribute : I anfwer, 
 That its being of the fame Kind with the di- 
 vine Knowlege, is a falfe and groundlefs Pre- 
 fumption ; and what will never admit of any 
 Proof, till it is firft proved that an infinite 
 and eternal Nature is of the fame Kind with 
 that of Man ; then indeed, but not till then, 
 it will follow that the inherent Faculties and 
 Attributes are of the lame Kind in both. With - 
 out a Clear and Diftinff Idea or Conception 
 marked out and fuggefted to the Mind by the 
 word Exifiencej even antecedently to any 
 Knowlege of a firft and eternal Caufe $ how 
 could we come to any clear and certain and 
 determinate Knowlege of the Exiftence of fuch 
 a Caufe ? How could we otherwise attempt to 
 offer anyfblid and convincing Proof of the ve- 
 ry Being of God, either from Reafbn or Re- 
 velation ; when all our Arguments and Dedu- 
 ctions muft be as confuted and obfcure, as the 
 Idea or Conception we have of that Exiftence 
 which is the Subject of «ur Realbning? 
 v 3 Again, 
 
528 DIVINE 
 
 Again, Without Clear and Diftintt Ideas 
 or Conceptions annexed to the Terms Son 
 and Begotten before ariy Revelation was made ; 
 how could it have been clearly revealed to 
 Mankind that Chrift is the Only-begotten Son 
 of God ? And now that it is fo exprefly re- 
 vealedj how are we able to affix any other new 
 Ideas or Conceptions to thole Words, diffe- 
 rent from thole clear and diftind Ideas or 
 Conceptions before affixed to them ? Have we 
 then any other lure Ground for a real and ufo** 
 ful Knowlege of that fundamental Myftery 
 of the Goipel, but by transfering the Words 
 together with thole clear and diftincT: Ideas or 
 Conceptions anhexed to them, to the divine 
 Nature by Analogy. Whereas had we only ob- 
 lcure and indiftirift Ideas or Conceptions an- 
 nexed to thole Terms when we ?pply them to 
 the Divinity ; or werc we abfurdly to under- 
 ftand them as fignifying fbmething of the 
 lame Kind with human Filiation or Genera- 
 tion, but infinitely above them in Degree of 
 Perfedion; all our Knowlege and Faith of that 
 Do&rine would be proportionably confufed 
 oblcure and abfurd. Without a Clear and Di- 
 ftinU Idea or Conception previoufly annexed to 
 the Term Interceffion^ namely the Idea or Con- 
 ception we have of human Interceffion; how 
 mould we be capable of receiving fuch a clear, 
 diftinft and determinate Revelation of Chrift's 
 incomprehenfible Interceffion for us in Hea*. 
 ven j as may be a fure foundation for Faith and 
 5 Dependence 
 
ANALOGY. $IQ 
 
 Dependence upon a Tranfa&ion whereof we 
 can have no dire&ldea or Conception, for out 
 everlafting Peace and Reconciliation with God ? 
 Nay how fliould we otherwife have arty Notion 
 at all of a Thing to us fb utterly incomprehen- 
 fible and ineffable as it is in it felf, that we 
 cannot obtain the leaft Idea or Conception of 
 the Real Nature of it to anrtex to that Term I 
 And are therefore under a neceflity of annex* 
 ing to it the Idea or Conception of human In- 
 terceffion asli Reprefehtatidn of the other, and 
 of applying them jointly to the Divinity by 
 Analogy, with the fame Clearnefs and Di-» 
 ftinftneis we apply them to Man? And can 
 any Thing be more wild and extravagant, 
 than the Notion we muft have of Chaffs 
 heavenly Interceflion upon this Author's Prin- 
 ciple ; that it is the very lame in Nature or! 
 Kind with that which is human, but in a fu* 
 perexcellent Degree : And that the Term In- 
 tercejfion muft be applyed to what is divine 
 and what is human, in the iame proper and 
 formal and literal Acceptation ? Laftly, with- 
 out a Clear and ViftinEi Idea or Conception 
 in the Mind to annex to the Term Grace-, firft 
 in the General, that of human Favour ftiewn 
 from one Man to another ; and then in parti- 
 cular, that of the Influence of a natural Caule : 
 How could we ever arrive at any diftin£t and 
 ufeful Notion of a fupernatural imperceptible 
 Influence of the Spirit of God upon the Mind 
 of Man? Dire&ly from this divine Operation 
 it felf, we can obtain no Idea Or Conception th 
 :a ~* Mm annex 
 
53Q DIVINE 
 
 annex to thaf Term ; wifhppt: fome Idea or 
 Conception annexed, it would fignify nothing ^ 
 and unlefs this Conception be clear and al- 
 ilin£t, our Information concerning the Thing, 
 and our Faith of it would hq. but uncertain 
 obfcure and indetermipate. What have we 
 then to do ? Nothing more but to fubflitute a 
 plain Word, with a mofi clear and diftin& 
 Conception of what is natural and human an- 
 nexed, to express and reprefent Analogjcaly 
 what is otherwife inconceivable and ineffable : 
 And then a divine Favour and a fiipernatura^ 
 Influence of the Spirit upon our Mind, be- 
 comes as Clearly and Qtftwffly and Ufifafy 
 conceivable, as any human Favour or the In- 
 fluence of a natural Caufe. 
 
 , Once more, that I may not omit tfris Au- 
 thor's main Ipftance. Without Clear and Di- 
 ftinffi Ideas or Conceptions preWoufly annex- 
 ed to the words Father, Son, and Spirit, wc 
 could have received no clear and diftinft Inforr 
 mation of the three divine Pprfons : Nor could 
 we plainly tell what we meant by the word 
 Trinity, without a clear and diftincl Idea or 
 Conception as well of human Perfimal DifttW- 
 tion, as of an , Equality or Identity of JV^tyre 
 among Men, to be annexed to if. We can 
 have no Conception or Idea (tho' ever fa mi- 
 nute or obfcure) to annex to tholp Terms, di- 
 rectly from the djyine Nature it felf, or frofR 
 any thing the fame jn Kind with it: And if 
 we could obtain any jfoch dark and confuted 
 
 Conception 
 
ANALOGY. S3 t 
 
 Conception of the real Nature ©f that divine 
 Difjtinltion and Unity 5 this would not be fufi. 
 ficient for a Do&rine which is the Foundation 
 of Chriftianity, and ought therefore Some way 
 or other to be Clearly and DiftinBly under* 
 flood, in order to a firm unftialcen Faith both 
 of that and all other Chriftian DocMnes 
 which are built upon it. The clear and di* 
 ftinft Ideas or Conceptions annexe d to thofe 
 Terms when applyed to the divine Perfbns, 
 are the very lame which were annexed to them 
 before that Do&rine was revealed; and it 
 could not have been revealed to us either Oral- 
 ly, or by Writing without them : And they arc 
 ftiU applyed to the Divinity with the very lame 
 clear and diftinct Ideas or Conceptions annex- 
 ed to them, but Analogical/ ufed } and thus 
 they ufefully exprefs and exhibit to the Mind 
 correfpondent Things as true and real on the 
 Part of the divine Nature, as they do when li- 
 feraly and djrecTiy applyed to our Humanity,' 
 So likewife without a clear and diftinft Con- 
 ception before annexed to the Term Three, 
 we could never have received any clear and 
 plain Revelation of a real Diftin&ion between 
 the divine Peribns : Whom we cannot diftin- 
 guiih as they are in themielves, and to whom 
 we cannot apply the Term Three any other 
 way than by Analogy with that clear and 
 diftindt Conception, which was previously ob- 
 tained from human Perfbnages whom we can 
 readily and dire&ly diftinguifh. Thefe world- 
 ly Ideas or Conceptions which are clear and 
 M m a diftind 
 
532 D I V IN E 
 
 diftinct, are made ufe of in Revelation to in- 
 form us of that Doctrine in the only way it 
 could be conveyed to our prefent Capacities : 
 And confequently the Doctrine it felf is clear 
 and diftinct and eafily intelligible ; and ought 
 never to be rejected on Account of any.Con- 
 fufion or Obfcurity in the Manner of appre- 
 hending it; becaufe we are neither obliged nor 
 concerned to apprehend or believe any more of 
 it, than what is thus clearly and diftinctly 
 conceivable by Analogy. So that what will 
 render Men's disbelief of this and other fuch 
 Chriftian Doctrines inexcufable is, their not 
 affenting to it upon fufficient Teftimony As 
 jar as it is Clearly and Dtftinffly to be con- 
 ceived and apprehended : And their unreafbn- 
 ably demanding or expecting Ideas and Con- 
 ceptions of the Real Nature and Manner of 
 that fupernatural Unity and Diftinction as it 
 is in it ielf, to annex to thofe Terms by which 
 it is exprefled. In fliort their rejecting what 
 is clear and obvious and ufefully intelligible in 
 it ; and infilling upon Dirett and Immediate 
 Ideas or Conceptions, of what is infinitely 
 out of the direct Reach of all our intellectual 
 Powers and Faculties; tho* upon the lame 
 footing they muft neceflarily reject even all 
 natural Religion. 
 
 It is by Means of thofe clear and diftinct 
 Ideas or Conceptions annexed to the Terms 
 in the feveral foregoing Inftances, as well as 
 to all other Words which are uied to expreis 
 
 things 
 
ANALOGY. 53$ 
 
 things divine and fupernatural, that they are 
 rendered in any Degree ulefully conceivable and 
 intelligible to an human Mind j that they are 
 made the Objcds of our Knowlege, Faith, or 
 Opinion j that we can difcourfe and realbn 
 upon them, lb as to come to Relblutions and 
 form Conclufions concerning them with un- 
 doubted and determinate Certainty ; and that 
 Words thus applyed to things fupernatural 
 with thole clear .Ideas and Conceptions, be- 
 come ABive vital and ruling Principles for re- 
 gulating and influencing the Faith and Practice 
 of Mankind. So that let Men but fuppofe 
 the actual Exifience of a Deity, as well as the 
 Reality of thole divine Attributes and Opera- 
 tions which are deduceable by the Light of 
 Nature : And they muft grant that the Mind 
 of Man is capable of conceiving them no other 
 way, than by Analogy with thofe clear and 
 diftincl: Ideas or Conceptions we have of our 
 own Exiftence, and of the Faculties and Pro- 
 perties and Operations of our own Mind. All 
 thole therefore who let up for Natural Religion 
 in Oppofition to Revelation, under pretence 
 of our Doctrines of Chriftian Myfteries being 
 utterly inconceivable and unintelligible, are 
 intirely without Excule for this plain Rea- 
 ibn : Becaufe every one of them is conceived 
 and exprefled after the very fame Manner, 
 by which Alone we are enabled to think and 
 fpeak of thofe Attributes of God which they 
 allow to be the true Ground of all natural 
 Religion. 
 
 Mm 3 The 
 
534 DIVINE 
 
 The next Step taken by our Author to 
 obviate the grand Obje&ion of Infidels is* by 
 laying it down for a fur e Maxim Thai Words 
 may he figmficant alt ho' they do mt Jland ffr 
 £any} Ideas \ arid he is lb pofttive in this, that 
 be fays Men's Vrtfvmwg th& Cmtravy x Jems 
 to have produced the Doflrine ej Abftratt Ideas, 
 Now is it not very hard for- any Man to keep 
 bis Countenance and argue ferioufly, in mak- 
 ing a Reply to one who fo frankly acknow- 
 legeth before band, that the main Terms of 
 bis Difcourle may have neither Sence nor 
 Meaning in them ? A Word, fuch as Grace fo* 
 Inftance, fignificant tho' it hath Na Idea, nor 
 ^in his Senceof the Term) Conception, nor Com* 
 flex Notion annexed to it; and confequently 
 not to be underftood either, in a Prober, or 
 purely FigutatPve t or Analogical Acceptation ! 
 This is another chimerical unnatural Offspring 
 (as our Age is fertil of Monfters) lately brought 
 forth, and as yet without a proper Nam© 
 given to it: And therefore you may call it 
 a Literal or Metaphorical Nojfe, or Analogical 
 Sound ; or a Wigme whereby a Man may Whip- 
 tie his Thoughts with as much Advantage 
 and Eloquence as be can fpeak them. This 
 he hath laid at the Poor of fome modern 
 Writer whom he is afhamed to name: But 
 let who will be the Parent* it is of this Au- 
 thor's nurturing; with Defign to manifeft to 
 the World that Words may be Significant , 
 tho' they fignify Nothing. He grants however 
 i that 
 
ANALOGY. £3$ 
 
 that Words ire Signs i and if fo, then they 
 fliuft be Sigri^ bf-fomfething beiides therfift'lves : 
 They are external, fenfible, inftituted Signs of 
 Ideas Conceptions or complex Notions in Our 
 Mfnd ; which not beifig Immediately communi- 
 cable, cannot be made fcnoWn to Others wfr.fi- 
 out forne fueh Indications. One of the moft uft- 
 ftil anrf ready Sorts of Signs for exciting the 
 fettle- Ideas Conceptions and Notion's iii the 
 Minds of others, ir6 tFtfrds\ and becaufe of the 
 vafl: variety of fuch Ideas and Conceptions 1 , 
 they could riot be Cledrly and "DlftittBlj corrr- 
 fnunieated if thofe Words were 1 riot Various arid 
 Aftkuhte. Accordingly Unlefs forrfe Idea or 
 Conception or Notion in the Mind is annexed 
 to each of theie Signs, it hath loft its Ufeattd 
 cirihave no SigiiificatiM. Take away th'efe 1 from 
 the Words arid they are no Itinger Signs \ tfre* 
 Whole Intent and Purpofe et human Latn- 
 gtiage is intifely fobverted and deffrbyed ; we 
 flibiiM converfe afte* the Mariner of Brutes 1 : 
 Arid Upon thh Author's Principle, if vtt Bray- 
 ed to 6h& another, or Bellowed, or Chattered', 
 it friight as well have anflvefed all the Ends' 
 and Exigences of humeri Life and keligiori. 
 
 One Heafohhe gives why Woffls rHay be- 
 Significant without' Ideds or Conceptions of 
 Notions annexed to them is, Be'caafe the Idea 
 isin&ftM: What then? Therefore the Word 
 withorif any Idea or Conception annexed, may 1 
 be* arl Jtfive, -vltdl, ruling Princifti. How* 
 pf epoftef oris arid the very Reyerfe of Truth is 
 M m 4 this ? 
 
536 DIVINE 
 
 this? Surely if there be any common Sence 
 remaining it will inform us, that it is Ibme 
 Idea or Conception or Notion in the Mind, af- 
 fixed to the Word or excited by it, which gives 
 it all its Signijicancy Life and Affinity:, and 
 which renders it a Ruling Principle, as he calls 
 it, for the Conduct of Men's Faith and Prac- 
 tice ; Withoutthis the bare Word it felf would 
 be alogether Inactive ; that is, utterly without 
 JLffecT: and Influence upon us as a Sign, , and 
 nothing more than a dead Letter and a mere 
 Sound. Accordingly it is impoflible to raife 
 any Pafllons Difpofitions or Emotions in Ratio- 
 nal Minds, by Words only without Any Ideas 
 or Conceptions annexed to them or excited by 
 them, in him who Hears or Reads them. Men 
 may be affected indeed by affixing to the Words 
 or Signs very &pneral and Indeterminate and 
 Obfcurei or very Mijlaken and Falfe Ideas and 
 Conceptions ; or fuch as are very Different 
 from thofe affixed to them by him who utter- 
 ed or wrote them: But where they have None 
 annexed to them or excited by them, they are 
 downright Nonfence ; and of no real Influ- 
 ence, Ufe, or Signification. But if it were 
 true, as this Author aflerts, that Words with- 
 out any Ideas or Conceptions belonging- to 
 them could realy^affeft and move usj fuch E- 
 motians would be merely Mechanical ; At beft 
 Men muft be affected as mere Animals only ; 
 they would be moved when there was no- 
 thing but Wind or Sound to move them; 
 they muft be. wrought upon and difpoled with- 
 out 
 
ANALOGY. 537 
 
 out any Concurrence of Thinking or Reafon j 
 and they : would be intirely under the Guidance 
 and Dire&ion of Tones and Accents of the 
 Voice, without any Rational, Moral, or Reli- 
 gious Influence and Meaning. 
 
 The laft and moft extraordinary Step tak- 
 en by our Author for folving the preceding 
 grand Objection of Infidels is, by telling them 
 That the- true End of Speech, Reafon, Science, 
 Faith, Affent ; is not always the imparting or 
 acquiring of Ideas : But fomething of an opera- 
 tive Nature, tending to a conceived Good; which 
 may be obtained-— Alt ho', there Jhould be no 
 PoJJibility. of offering or exhibiting any fuch 
 Idea to the Mind. Surely more Confufion and 
 Abfurdity could not poflibly have been crowd- 
 ed into the Compafi of one fliort Period. 
 The End of Speech is not always the impart- 
 ing or acquiring Ideas, Conceptions, or No- 
 tions ; tho' without fome of thefe affixed to 
 the Words or excited by them as Signs, it is 
 no Speech* but infignificant empty Noife. Tho* 
 it be evidently plain that Speech could ferve 
 no rational End; if it did not iuggeft and im- 
 part fome of theft: Tho' this is the very 
 Point, wherein human Language differs from 
 the irrational inftin&ive Sounds of Birds and 
 Beafts, and even of Infects. And tho' if you ex- 
 clude this Ufe, no Man living can affign any 
 other for Words or Speech : In which it would, 
 be impoflible. there ihould be either Propriety 
 qr Figure; or anything tending to excite us 
 
 to 
 
538 DIVINE 
 
 to a ratidrial Opttdtim, Infomuch thai bur 
 converting like Mates, and denoting the Ideas 
 and Conceptions of the Mind by Sighs upon 
 the Fingers; would, according to his Ndtfdrt, 
 be of more real Advantage to Mankind, ancf 
 upon all Accounts vaftly preferable to any 
 Sounds vafioufly articulated by the different 
 Organs of Voice, thi true End of Rtefort. 
 But furely one true End and Ufe of Ttekfbttj 
 is to acquire and ifnpart a Perception of the 
 Agreements and rj^gfeefrients of our Ideas 
 Conceptions and Notions ; which it could ne- 
 ver perform, unleis the Ideas Conceptions and 
 Notions themfelves are acquired, or exhibited 
 to the Mind: Without this it could never 
 Influence us to A& or Operate like Men ; nOf 
 to obtain our ultimate End, which is true ra- 
 tional Happmefs. The true End af Science, 
 But fttrely each rational Science muft be con- 
 verfant about ibme Ideas Conceptions or No- 
 tions of things; and thefe muft be acquired or 
 exhibited to the Mirk?, and imparted by the 
 Terms and Signs ufed in it : Or it would be 
 irnpofflble to underftand or teach any of the 
 Sciences^ or to render them ufefiil to any ra- 
 tional End or Operation. Otherwise the true 
 End of all Science would be to talk much, 
 but to learn and know and practhe nothing: 
 Thefe would be in Reality but one Science hi 
 the World; that is a very learned Method of 
 multiplying itich Marks and Words only, as 
 were rnoft agreeable to the Eye and harffioiil- 
 ous to the Ea*. 0poa this Author's ftfneiple, 
 
 there 
 
A N A LOG Y. 539 
 
 there might be feme Ufe of &w\giftg indeed ; 
 but: it would be to no purpofe for any Man to 
 fpeak who ..could not. perform it rfielodioufly. 
 The true End <$ Faith. Religion then is placed 
 upon the fame abfurd Foot wifh Science 5 Faith 
 (according to him) may anfwer a true and ex- 
 cellent and operative End, without our always 
 acquiring any Idea or Conception or Notion of 
 What we belie ve ? or having it any way exhi- 
 bited to the Mind ; and We may believe (as this 
 Author himfelf words it) Where ive do not un- 
 derftand. The base Words in which we ex- 
 prefs our Faith, may be vital ruling Principles 
 to rational Creatures ; tho' they are not always 
 animated by any Ideas or Conceptions affixed 
 to them, and exhibited to the Mind .- And tho' 
 Faith in Words only for its Object* is no other 
 than believing in certain Soufijdl and Syllables. 
 You may profefs indeed to believe in Father § 
 StMf and spirit ; in the Gract of God j and 
 in the Mediation and Inter cejfion of Chrift j but 
 yet it is not always Mmffiffl} or Faffihk for 
 you to acquire, or exhibit to your Mind, any 
 Ideas Conceptions or Notions of the things 
 marked out by tbofe Wojds : Tho' by this 
 Rule you may as well be faid to have Faith 
 in the Noife of fo<ii3di>ng Brafe or a tinkling 
 Cy mbaL Nay your believing; a God would bfe 
 very uleful * tho* upon his Scheme it may be no 
 more tftan Fakh in a Moaofy liable. You may 
 comaenijably believe in what you Hear, tho* 
 you do not Under ft and amy thing: of it. Thus 
 all Faith would terminate in the Ear ; and no 
 
 Poke 
 
540 DjVINE 
 
 Point of it could ever reach the Head or the 
 Heart, or Influence us to any rational Action. 
 The true End of Affent. , The End of Affent 
 indeed is not the imparting or acquiring Ideas 
 Conceptions or Notions' But furely fome of 
 thefe mail rieceffarily be acquired or exhibited 
 to the Mind for the ObjetJ of our Affent; o- 
 therwife it would be juft fuch another uieful 
 Affent as one Parrot may yield to another. 
 
 Well then ; Words do not always impart 
 or exhibit Ideas or Conceptions to the Mind : 
 But they may be very uieful, fays he, to ano- 
 ther End; in producing or imparting fbme- 
 thing elfe without a particular Name, Some- 
 thing of an Operative Nature. Then lurely the 
 Words tnuft impart fomething more than the 
 bare Sounds of Syllables: And it cannot be 
 they themfelves which thus Operate alone up- 
 on us, but that Sornething which they impart 
 to the Mind. Now fince he will not have any 
 Ideas Conceptions or Notions always impart- 
 ed by them; it muft be Something, lays he, 
 that tends to a conceived Good y which may be 
 obtained tho' the Ideas or Conceptions Marked 
 by the Terms, in order to our obtaining it, 
 Cannot be offered or exhibited to the Mind: 
 Something tending; to a Conceived Good, ~*tho' 
 there Jhouid be no PojfiHHli of exhibiting fuch 
 an Idea or Conception To the Mind. Change 
 the Syntax of this unaccountable Sentence in- 
 to all the Forms and Varieties it can bear; 
 and yet it will not produce any intelligible 
 Truth. Nor 
 
A N A L O G Y. 5 41 
 
 No t always the imparting Ideas. But fure- 
 ly if Words, in Religious Doctrines eipecialy, 
 do fometimes impart Ideas, and lometimes 
 none; it was highly proper for him to have 
 diftinguifhed thofe Words, and to have in- 
 formed the World" which of them can havel- 
 deas and Conceptions affixed to them and im- 
 parted by them, and which not : For now he 
 hath left his Readers in an endlels Uncertainty 
 in relation to the Grace of God in particular j 
 and upon the lame Foot of Realbning, in re- 
 lation to all the Attributes of God andMyfte- 
 ries of Chriftianity in general. No Pqffibility 
 of offering or exhibiting any Idea to the Mind. 
 Had he taken the word Idea in the true logical 
 Sence, as limited to the Direct and Immediate 
 Perception of external and fenfible Objects on- 
 ly ; and affirmed that there was no Poffibility 
 of our having any Such Perception or Ideas of 
 things divine and purely lpiritual : And that 
 it was as ridiculous for Men to infill upon fuch 
 Ideas of them, as to demand a full View, and 
 Profped of them with their Eyes. Had he 
 affirmed moreover, not only that fuch Ideas 
 are impoffible to us ; but that it is equaly im- 
 poflible for the Mind of Man to obtain an 
 Immediate Confcioufnefs of them, or of any 
 thing the lame in Kind with them ; and con- 
 fequently to frame even any Direct Conceptions 
 or Complex Notions of them : And that we are 
 therefore under a Neceffity of conceiving them, 
 by Analogy with things natural and human* 
 or elfe of denying the Truth and Reality even 
 
 of 
 
542 DIVINE 
 
 of the divine Attributes as well as the Myfte- 
 ries of Chti&knky , or at leaft of disclaiming 
 any Capacity in Mankind of obtaining an 
 Ufiful Knowlege of either. Had he done this, 
 I iay, he had aflierted an evident and ifnpof- 
 tant Truth 5 and thereby have inevitably re*. 
 duced the Advecfaries of Revelation to the 
 palpable Abfurdity of disbelieving the Rtati- 
 ty, or denying the Ufeful KmwUge of every 
 thing in the Univerfe, whereof they have not 
 a direct Senfation or immediate Confciouf- 
 neis, either from the thing it (elf or from 
 fomething the fame in Kind : Nay of reje&- 
 ing all things divine and Supernatural for no 
 other Realbn 5 but becaufe they have no fuch 
 Conceptions of them, as would be directly in- 
 confiftent with their very Nature and Exi* 
 ftence. He Ihould have granted them that 
 Some Idea Conception or Notion muft neeef- 
 farily be affixed to every Word expreffive of 
 each Doctrine in Christianity, and of every 
 one of God's Attributes : Or elfe that it could 
 have no UCe and Signification ; nor could o- 
 therwife impart or luggeft any thing to the 
 Mind for an Objed either of our Knowlege or 
 Faith ; and consequently for a Principle of ra- 
 tional AEiion or Operation. But what involved 
 him in all this complicated Abfurdity, was 
 his having a ftrong Sufpicion that we can ob- 
 tain no Direft and/ Immediate Ideas or Con- 
 ceptions, to annex to Words expreffive of 
 things divine and purely fpiritual; together 
 with his Reluctance at the fame time to ac- 
 
 knowlegc 
 
ANALOGY. 543 
 
 knawlege that we may and muft have Anah- 
 gic4l Conceptions to annex to them, or elfe 
 that they would be utterly ufelefs: To avoid 
 which he ran blindfold and headlong intp the 
 other Extreme, of maintaining a rooft perni- 
 cious Tenet j That Wbrd$ and Do&rines may 
 be fignificaflt and ufeful, gfid prod^ive of Ac- 
 tion, Tk$ there JhmUke m Ide##$wid to them 
 or imfarted by them \ mf no PdpbiHty tf offer- 
 ing or exhibiting my fuck 0ea [Conception or 
 ISotion3 to the Mtw4- 
 
 The main Scope and Pe%fl of that ob- 
 fcure Piffertation, was to fhew how impofll- 
 bie it is to affix any DiftinB Idea or Concep- 
 tion to the word Grace : But that however the 
 Term k felf, without any fueh Idea or Con- 
 ception annexed to it or imparted by it, may 
 have a ufeful Tendency and excite us to A&i- 
 pn. Whereas without the Conception of hu- 
 man Favour annexed tp k or imparted by k, 
 when taken in the General; and without the 
 Idea Qr Conception of the Influence of a natu- 
 ral and human Caufe, when it is taken in par- 
 ticular; and lb applyed wkh thofc Clear and 
 Diftinff Conceptions to God and the divine 
 Spirit, by Analogy : It would have been a Word 
 altogether lencelefi infignifteant and ulelefs in 
 Religion j it would have imparted nothing to 
 the Mind for an (Object either of Knowlege or 
 Faith ; nor could it have been any rational 
 Principle, or have afforded any Motive or 
 Jpring of A&ipn. Now to prove that the word 
 
 Grace 
 
5 44 DIVINE 
 
 G/race is hot Injigniftcant tho' no Determinate 
 . Idea or Conception is annexed to it or impart- 
 ed by it j he inftances in the word Number, as 
 being in this Point exa&ly parallel. Tou can 
 form no Idea of Number, lays he, AbftraBed 
 from all things numbred. No furely, but it is 
 for this Reafon : Becaule there is no fuch Thing 
 as Number abftradted from all things numbred: 
 Exclude thefe from Number, and it can have 
 no Exiftence or Reality. It is equaly true that 
 we can form no Idea or Conception of Grace; 
 exclufive of the Mind of Man, the divine Spi- 
 rit, and the Effects. But why is this impoffi- 
 ble ? For no other Reafon, but becaufe Grace 
 is then reiblved into Nothing; infomuch that 
 the very mention of fuch a Conception or Idea 
 of it, is trifling and ridiculous. And much 
 more fuch a tedious DhTertation about what 
 is then but a mere Sound, and no Sign of any 
 thing True and Real in refpe£r, either of God 
 or Man. The Truth of the Matter is this; As 
 we can form a clear and diftincT: Idea or Con- 
 ception of Number in the Concrete, which is as 
 Direfif and Immediate as the Ideas or Concep- 
 tions we have of the Objects numbred by us: 
 So we can form a clear and diftinft Idea or 
 Conception of Grace, in the Concrete lifcewife j 
 but which is as neceffarily and as truly Analo- 
 gical, as that Conception we form of the di- 
 vine Spirit, and its fupernatural Power. And 
 here I fhall once more obferve to this Author, 
 what he feems to be wholy ignorant of j That 
 we cannot form any DiretJ and Immediate Con- 
 2. ception 
 
ANALOGY. 545 
 
 ccption or Idea of Number, either in the AbftraH 
 or in the Concrete, in refpect of things divine and 
 fupernatural : Becaufe we can obtain no direct 
 Conception or Idea of fuch Objects in any Degreej 
 and confequently the Mind of Man cannot Di-* 
 ftingmfh them from one another as they are In 
 themfelves, or In their own Kind. And therefore it 
 is, that the DiftinPiion between the divine Perlbns 
 is revealed to us by Analogy with that which 
 is Perfonal among Men ; who are eafily num j 
 bred, and directly diftinguifhable from one an- 
 other. 
 
 The other parallel Inftance from which he ar- 
 gues, is that of Force ; exclude, fays he, Body the! 
 Subject of it, and Motion, and the fenfible Ef- 
 fects of it, and then it is impoffible to frame any 
 Idea or Conception of it. Yes furely; it is the fame" 
 fencelefs Ridicule as if you bid a Man try to form 
 a Conception of Thinking or Willing, exclufive of 
 any Object of Thought or Defire, and of a Mind 
 operating. So fay I of Grace ; exclude the divine 
 Spirit, the Mind of Man, and the Effects of it; 
 And then there is nothing left whereof to form 
 even any Analogical Idea or Conception. About 
 that fame chimerical abftract Idea of Force or Im~ 
 petus, he obferves learned Men have had mighty 
 Contefts; and great variety of Opinions there are 
 about what is in Truth but an airy empty No- 
 thing : And therefore it is no Wonder that they 
 are fo much at a lofs for fuch an Idea j and that 
 the Searches of the Ingenious among them fhould 
 amount to this at laft, That it was but a Subtil 
 N a Abfirabt, 
 
546 DIVINE 
 
 Abftratt, or Spiritual §tuinteffenci\ and that they 
 knew not what to make of it. 
 
 W el i, but notwithftanding all this wafte of 
 Learning is nothing to the Strefs of the Objecti- 
 on j yet as our Author hath been very profufe in 
 reciting the particular Difputes and curious Dif- 
 fertations concemingFtfce or Impetus : So hath he 
 blazoned out a large Field of Mechanics, to dif- 
 play the many Ufes which have been made of it, 
 to the great Benefit and Conveniency of Man- 
 kind ; altho' Men could never fix upon any pre- 
 cife Di/lintJ Idea to be annexed to that Term. 
 Even fo then, his Inference is, Infidels need not 
 wonder that the word Grace hath occafioned fo 
 many different Opinions and Controverfies; and 
 that it is of lb great Ufe in Religion ; tho* it be 
 impoffible to frame any preciiediftin£fe Idea of it. 
 But certainly Men could have had no Difputes or 
 Differtations about Force; or have deduced any 
 convincing Confequences in relation to it for the 
 Benefit and Advantage of Mankind, and their 
 Improvement in the Knowlege of Mechanics j if 
 they had not firft formed Some clear and DiflinB 
 Idea of it in the Concrete. This clear and diftincTr 
 Idea annexed to that Word, was the true Ground 
 and Foundation of all thofe Differtations ; and, 
 without it they could not have made one Step to- 
 wards any fblid and ufeful Knowlege concerning 
 it. And thus it is with Grace ; without a Diftinffi 
 Idea or Conception in the Concrete of fome obvious 
 natural Operation or Influence, affixed to that 
 Term 5. and transfered together with it to Repre- 
 sent 
 
ANALOG' V. 547 
 
 fint the iupernatUral Influence of the divine Spi- 
 rit: It would be no diftinft Object of our Kno'w- 
 legfe Faith of Opinion j there would be no intelli- 
 gible Differtatlons or Contefts about it; there 
 could be no uleful Conclusions drawn from it, or 
 iatisfa&ory Proportions formed with relation, to 
 it. And without Any Idea or Conception affixed, 
 it could have rto more real Signification than if 
 yoii ipelled the Word backward. 
 
 Br this Author's thus placing Phyfical Force 
 and Divine Grace upon the fame Level, as tq an 
 Impoulbility of forming any ^Determinate or Di- 
 flintl Idea or Conception of either of them j he 
 puts it intirely out of his Power and the Power 
 of any Man living, to make a clear and effectual 
 "Reply to the ftrongeft Part of the Infidels Objec- 
 tion, as he himfelf hath flated it ; and that by 
 which they clinch their main Argument againft 
 all Revelation. For fays his Minute Philofopher, 
 Tou take your Idea of Grate from things Corporeal, 
 from Motion and the Force of Bodies which are ob- 
 vious and fenfible ; and this you fubfiitute in the 
 Place of the other, which isjbiritual and incompre- 
 henfible-, but this is manifeftDelu/idn. Fortho'ihe 
 Idea of Corporeal Force be everfo dear and inteUi- 
 gibU; it will not therefore follow that the Idea of 
 Grace, a thing perfectly incorporeal, muft befi too: 
 And tho' we may red/on diflintfly, perceive, afent, 
 mdform Opinions about Force ; it wilt by no Means 
 follow that we can dofo about Grace. Tho' he hath 
 prudently declined making any Reply to this 
 Pinch of the Argument ; it will not however be 
 N n 2 amifs 
 
548 DIVINE 
 
 amifs to fhew the only way of performing it up- 
 on his Principle. We muft firft politively deny 
 that we take our Idea or Conception of Grace 
 from the Force or Influence of any thing material, 
 or human : Which is a. manifeft Falfity ; for if we 
 did not take it from ibme of thele (by Analogy) 
 we could have no Idea or Conception at all of 
 Grace, which is altogether fpiritual and incom- 
 prehenfible as it is in it felf ; and thus the Word 
 would be completely infighificant and ufelefs. 
 Then we muft go about to perluade Unbelievers 
 out of their Senfes, and convince them that they 
 can form no Determinate and Diftinffi Idea or Con- 
 ception of natural Force or human Influence ; 
 than which nothing is more obvious and lenfible, 
 and which they fee and feel and clearly perceive 
 every Day of their Lives : And out of their Rea- 
 fon likewife ; lb as to make them believe they can 
 as.eafily form a DireEt Idea of Grace, or the In- 
 fluence of the divine Spirit on the Mind of Man, 
 in the Concrete ; as they can of any natural Force 
 or human Influence : Whereas it is impoflible to 
 form any fuch "Direct Idea of it ; either general 
 or particular, determinate or indeterminate, di- 
 ftind or indiftincl, in the Abftracl: or in the Con- 
 crete. And from thefe Premifes we muft at laft 
 draw this wild Conclufiori, That tho' it may be 
 as impoflible to affix a Dijim^i^ or even Any Idea 
 or Conception to Grace, as to Force : Yet that 
 Term may be Significant and Ufeful, and excite 
 us to Operation ; and we can afient to it, and 
 reafon and form Opinions about it, as we can 
 about Phyfical Force or Influence. 
 
 Now 
 
ANALOGY. 549 
 
 Now therefore may Inot appeal to theReader, 
 in this Author's own Words, Whether this is tak- 
 ing his Notions of Faith Opinion and AJJent from 
 common Serice and, common life-, and from maturely 
 weighing the Nature of Signs andhanguage ? And 
 whether he had any wrong. done him when I af- 
 ferted, that upon his Principle there could be but 
 two Terms in the preceding Syllogifm of Grace ; 
 or in any other Syllogifm relating to the Attri- 
 butes of God or the Myfteries of Chriftianity ? 
 Since nothing is more evident than that no Word 
 can be a Syllogijlic Term without Some Idea Con- 
 ception or Complex Notion annexed to it ; either 
 direct and immediate, or Analogical : And that 
 unlels this is Clear and Diftinffi, nothing can be con- 
 cluded with any Determinate Truth and Satisfac- 
 tory Certainty. Was he any way injured or mifre- 
 prefented, when I faid he intirely gave up the 
 whole Caufeof Chriftian Myfteries? . And may I 
 not now juftly add, that his notional Method of 
 proceeding thro' that tedious oblcure and per- 
 plexed Diflertation upon Number and Force and 
 Grace, unwarily tends to fap the very Foundation 
 of Religion natural and revealed ? And to refolve 
 it all at laft into nothing more than a blind impli- 
 cit Faith, and an empty Sencelefi Sound ofSylla- 
 bles without any real Meaning Ufe or Significa- 
 tion : By granting to Unbelievers the very Prin- 
 ciple upon which their grand Objection proceeds, 
 and by making them the only Concelfion they 
 wanted ; namely that it is not always Necefjary or 
 foffible to annexDiftinff, nay Any Idea.s Concep- 
 tions 
 
550 DIV:IN£ 
 
 tions or Notions, to the main Terms by which 
 we expreis our Faith in the Do&rines ^f the^GoC- 
 pel ; and to the words Grace and TWsi^.iirparti« 
 eular. For then all the vile Confequences which 
 he hath put into the Month of his Minute Philofor- 
 pher inevitably follow. That thofe Terms are alto^ 
 ther injignificant ; that there can be no Affent and 
 emfequently Faith, where there are no Ideas Con- 
 ceptions or Notions ; that then we pronounce hard 
 Words without a Meaning ; thai thus there can be no 
 Argument or Belief* nor any thing in Faith farther 
 than a mere verbal Trifling. That thofe Terms are 
 merely Forms of Speech, and exprefs empty Sounds 
 which mean nothing and are of no Ufe to Mankind ; 
 that they are Names only in/lead of Ideas and Things t 
 and thought intelligible only becaufe they are familiar. 
 In fhort, That Daffrines and Proportions compofed 
 of them cannot regulate our WMs Paffions and Con* 
 dufi j or be lively Principles influencing the Mind 
 and operating upon it : And that their Method of 
 Reafoning concerning Grace maybeapplyed, by any 
 Man afSence, tothe confuting all other the mofl effen- 
 tial Articles of the Chriftian Faith. 
 
 ■ The true. Anfwer to the Strefs of that Objecti - 
 on of Unbelievers in this latter Form is ; by grant- 
 ing them That we do realy take our Idea or Con- 
 ception of divine Grace from thiqgs natural and hu- 
 man and obvious (tho* not from things Merely ma- 
 teria], as they unaccurately word it) and thefi we 
 fubflitute in the Place of the. other : And that for the 
 V§ry Reafbn mentioned in the Objection ; becaule 
 Grace i§ Spiritual wdlncdmprehMftbk as it is in it 
 
 \ felf, 
 
ANALOGY. 551 
 
 felf, and therefore it is impoffible for us to do 
 otherwife. And this is fb far from being A mani- 
 fefi Velujion, that it is a highly rational Method 
 of proceeding ; and effectualy anfwers all the 
 prefent Ends of Morality and Religion. For our 
 Cafe in fhort is this ; As natural and human Force 
 or Influence is a thing obvioufly and directly 
 perceptible, we can frame a Diretf and Immedi- 
 ate Idea or Conception of it : And as Grace is a 
 thing of quite a different Kind, purely fpiritual 
 and imperceptible -, we can form no direct and 
 immediate Idea or Conception of it in any De- 
 gree. And therefore we fubftitute the clear, and 
 diftinct, and direct Idea or Conception of natural 
 and human Force or Influence in the Concrete; 
 as a clear Analogical Conception and diftinct Repre- 
 fentation of a Correfpmdent Operation of the di- 
 vine Spirit upon the Mind of Man. So that the 
 Idea or Conception is one and the fame, as well 
 as the Word : Nor are either of them to be other- 
 wife diltinguiflied, than by the different Ufe and 
 Application of them to human, or divine Grace and 
 Favour ; and to natural, or fiipernatural Influ- 
 ence. Thus the perfpicuity, DtftinSfnefs, and Ufe- 
 fulne(s both of the Term and of the Idea or Con- 
 ception annexed to it, are ftill the fame ; whe- 
 ther you apply thofe Terms to one or the other 
 of thofe Things. If the Idea or Conception of na- 
 tural and human Influence or Operation annexed 
 to the Term is Clear and Diftinff, as the Objecti- 
 on fuppofeth ; it is not the leis clear or Ufeful 
 when the Word is ufed Analogicaly, to exprefs 
 that which is Correfpondent and Similar in fuper- 
 3 natural 
 
552 D I V INE 
 
 natural and fpiritual Objects ; for thefe two plain 
 Reafbns. Becaufe no new and different Idea or 
 Conception, obtained dire&ly from the Thing it 
 filf(or from any thing Ofthefame Kind) can then 
 be affixed to it ; this being utterly imperceptible 
 and incomprehenfible after that Manner, and 
 no otherwife conceivable than by lome Analogi- 
 cal Reprefentation '. And becaufe we are Obliged 
 to Under/land and Believe nothing more beyond 
 what we thus conceive by that diftinft and in- 
 telligible Correfpondent Refemblance ■, except that 
 the fupernatural Original is Real and True, 
 but in no Degree conceivable or intelligible by 
 us As it is in its own Nature. 
 
 Now then ; If fupernatural and divine Objects 
 be totaly Different in Kind from any thing diredt- 
 ly and immediately conceivable by us : And con- 
 fequently there can be no other Pojfible way of 
 Thinking or Speaking of thern, but by the fame 
 Conceptions and Terms we ufe for Correfpondent 
 and Similar worldly Objects. Accordingly if we 
 are not Concerned and Obliged to Apprehend or Be- 
 lieve the former, as they are in their own Real Na- 
 ture ; but only as they are Reprefented by fuch 
 clear and diftincl: and intelligible Analogical Re- 
 femblances. If the Wold and the Idea or Conception 
 annexed to it are the very Same, forlnftance, in 
 refpe&of a natural and human ; and a fupernatu- 
 ral and divine Operation or Influence : And that 
 it is impoffible to affix any new and different Idea 
 or Conception, when the Tefmistransfered to the 
 latter. If the Idea or Conception is Equal) Clear 
 
 and 
 
ANALOGY. 553 
 
 and THftinB 5 and the Word equaly plain and In- 
 telligible when they are applyed to either. If the 
 Things for which that one and the fame Idea or 
 Conception ftands in the Mind; and which are 
 exprefled by one and the lame Word, are or may 
 be equaly True and Real. If we conceive and ex- 
 prefs the divine Grace, and all Giffiflkxdxinesof 
 Myftery , after no other Manner than ■wtNecef- 
 farily do the Attributes ofGodknown even by the 
 Xight of Nature. And laftly, If this only Method 
 we have of conceiving them be perfectly Ufeftth, 
 effe&ualyanfweringall the Ends of Religion, and 
 moft ftrongly Influencing our Moral Pramce. 
 
 If thefe thing*, I lay, are firm fubftantfa! 
 Truths; eftablifliedupon albfid Fotmdatio©, ne- 
 ver to be fhaken by the utmoft Efforts of miftafc- 
 en Believers, or obftmate Unbelievers: Then, 
 fince I am in a Station which obligeth me tofence 
 on both Sides, and ward agamft Friend's as well as* 
 Enemies ; here I fix my Foot, with open and re- 
 fbfete Defiance to any Man living to aiftgn a 
 good or even plaufrble Reafbn ; why we may not 
 Underjiand the divine Grace as clearly and di- 
 ftin&ly ; and believe the Trufh and Reality of it as 
 furely, firmly, and uiefully, as we can conceive 
 and believe any thing in this World, for which we 
 have the utmoft moral Evidence and Certainty ? 
 And why we may not Reafon asdi/linffly, afent, 
 and form Opinions about the fupernatural Influ- 
 ence of the divine-Spirit upon the Mind of Man ; 
 as we do about the Force or Influence of natural 
 Caufes ? To which I lhall add in the Style of this 
 
 Author's 
 
554 DIVINE 
 
 Author's Minute Philoibpher, That the fame Me- 
 thod of Reafoning maybe applyedby any Man ofSence 
 to eftablifh all the Attributes of God known by 
 the Light of Nature or Revelation, as well as all 
 the Myfieries of the Gofpel ; againft the ftrangeft 
 Objections of Infidels and Heretics : And he may 
 thereby make it plainly appear to be Manifefi 
 Delujion, and a lhameful Want not only of com- 
 mon Logic, but of common Sence and Reafbn in 
 Men ; either to explode the Truth and Reality, or 
 to deny the Ufeful Knowlege of things divine and 
 fupernatural ; only for want of fuch DiretJ Ideas 
 or Conceptions of them, as they have of things na- 
 tural and human. Which is no other than by plain 
 Implication deftroying the very Nature of the 
 things themlelyes, and then requiring fome Ideas 
 or Conceptions of them. The Abfurdity is no left 
 than demanding a Direffi Apprehenjion in fome 
 Degree, of things in every Degree Incomprehenfi- 
 ble to us As they are in themfelves ; an Immediate 
 Perception of things, totaly Different in Kind from 
 all Objects Immediately perceptible by us; and 
 Purely spiritual Ideas, in a Mind compofed of 
 Matter and Spirit : Which is a Knowlege of them 
 utterly impofEble to human Understanding; as 
 well as intirely inconfiftent with their very Na- 
 ture, Properties, and Existence. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
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